Source: https://trellis.law/ca/issue-type/restraint-of-trade-141
Timestamp: 2020-07-12 01:06:23
Document Index: 280888032

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 16720', '§ 1', '§ 16725', '§ 16720', '§ 1', '§ 16700']

“The Cartwright Act, like the Sherman Antitrust Act, was enacted to promote free market competition and to prevent conspiracies or agreements in restraint or monopolization of trade.” (Exxon Corp. v. Super. Ct. (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1672, 1680-1681.) Antitrust laws were enacted for the protection of competition, not competitors. (Marsh v. Anesthesia Services Medical Group, Inc. (2011) 200 Cal. App. 4th 480, 495.) They do not require the Court to protect small businesses from the loss of profits due to continued competition, but only against the loss of profits from practices forbidden by the antitrust laws. (Id.) Injury to a competitor is not equivalent to injury to competition; only the latter is the proper focus of antitrust laws. (Id.)
The Complaint must allege facts from which injury to market-wide competition can be inferred. (Id.) An antitrust injury must be proved; that is, the type of injury the antitrust laws were intended to prevent, and which flows from the invidious conduct which renders Defendant's acts unlawful. (Id.)
Federal antitrust cases interpreting the Sherman Act are helpful in interpreting the Cartwright Act (Corwin v. Los Angeles Newspaper Service Bureau, Inc. (1971) 4 Cal.3d 842, 852), but, because of the history of the Cartwright Act, California law may be different from federal antitrust law (Cal. ex rel. Van De Kamp v. Texaco (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1147, 1168).
The focus of the Cartwright Act is on protecting the process of competition not the result of competition; the same conduct that is legal when accomplished by those acting independently may be illegal when accomplished by the same parties acting in concert. (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 49.)
The Cartwright Act provides that “a combination of capital, skill or acts by two or more persons” for the purpose of creating or carrying out “restrictions in trade or commerce” is “unlawful, against public policy and void.” (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 16720, subd. (a), 16726.) Like its federal counterpart, section 1 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 1), the Cartwright Act is expressed in absolute terms, but has been interpreted to make unlawful only unreasonable restrictions in trade or commerce. (Macmanus v. A. E. Realty Partners (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 275, 285; see also Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16725.)
To state a Cartwright Act claim, plaintiff must allege “[t]he formation and operation of the conspiracy; the illegal acts done pursuant thereto; a purpose to restrain trade; and the damage caused by such acts.” (G.H.I.I. v. MTS, Inc. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 256, 265.) Although the prohibitions of the Cartwright Act are framed in superficially absolute language, deciding antitrust illegality is not as simple as identifying whether a challenged agreement involves a restraint of trade. (In re Cipro Cases I & II (2015) 61 Cal. 4th 116, 145, 146.) Instead, the Act retains the common law understanding that only unreasonable restraints of trade are prohibited. (Id. at 136.) Under the traditional rule of reason, inquiry is limited to whether the challenged conduct promotes or suppresses competition. (Id. at 146.) To determine whether an agreement harms competition more than it helps, the Court may consider the facts peculiar to the business in which the restraint is applied, the nature of the restraint and its effects, and the history of the restraint and the reasons for its adoption. (Id.) In a typical case, this may entail expert testimony on such matters as the definition of the relevant market and the extent of Defendant's market power. (Id.)
Pleading a Cartwright Act claim requires a high degree of particularity. (G.H.I.I. v. MTS, Inc. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 256, 265; Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Great Western Financial Corp. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 305, 326-328.) “‘[C]ontracts, combinations, or conspiracies in restraint of... trade or commerce cannot be alleged generally in the words of the statute but... facts must be set forth which indicate the existence of such contracts, combinations or conspiracies.’ Thus, general allegations of a conspiracy unaccompanied by a statement of facts constituting the conspiracy and explaining its objectives and impact in restraint of trade will not suffice.” (G.H.I.I, supra, 147 Cal.App.3d at 265-266.)
The similar language of the two acts reflects their common objective to protect and promote competition. (State of California ex rel. Van de Kamp v. Texaco, Inc. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1147, 1153; Business Electronics v. Sharp Electronics (1988) 485 U.S. 717, 726 [108 S.Ct. 1515, 1520-1521].) Since the Cartwright Act and the federal Sherman Act share similar language and objectives, California courts often look to federal precedents under the Sherman Act for guidance. (Morrison v. Viacom, Inc. (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 534, 541, fn. 2.)
Although the Sherman Act, by its terms, prohibits every agreement “in restraint of trade,” this Court has long recognized that Congress intended to outlaw only unreasonable restraints. (Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc., 457 U.S. 332, 342-343, (1982).) Restraints of trade violate the Sherman Act if they are unreasonable per se or unreasonable under the “rule of reason.” (Fisher v. City of Berkeley, (1984) 37 Cal.3d 665.) Per se liability is reserved for only those agreements that are “so plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the industry is needed to establish their illegality.” (Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, (“Texaco”) (2006) 547 U.S. 1, 5.) Under the rule of reason, the factfinder weighs all of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition. (Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., (2007) 551 U.S. 877, 885-86.) Appropriate factors to take into account include specific information about the relevant business; the restraint’s history, nature, and effect; and whether the businesses involved have market power. (Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., (2007) 551 U.S. 877, 885-86.) In its design and function, the rule of reason distinguishes between restraints and anticompetitive effect that are harmful to the consumer and restraints stimulating competition that are in the consumer’s best interest. (Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., (2007) 551 U.S. 877, 885-86.)
“Contracts, combinations and conspiracies in restraint of trade covered by Section 1 of the Sherman Act are of two types, horizontal or vertical. Horizontal combinations are cartels or agreements among competitors which restrain competition among enterprises at the same level of distribution. They are ordinarily illegal per se. Vertical restraints are imposed by persons or firms further up the chain of distribution of a specific product (or in rare cases, further down the chain) than the enterprise restrained. Vertical non-price restraints are tested under the rule of reason; that is, the plaintiff must prove that the restraint had an anticompetitive effect in the relevant market in order to prevail.” (Exxon Corp. v. Super. Ct. (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1672, 1680-1681; Marin County Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. Palsson (1976) 16 Cal.3d 920, 930-931; Chavez v Whirlpool Corp (2001) 93 CA 4th 363, 369.)
Useful Rulings on Restraint of Trade
CMC Dirt Works Inc vs San Diego Gas & Electric Company
The general Demurrer (# 127) of Defendants SAN DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY ("SDG&E") and CLARENCE J. RASURE II ("RASURE") (collectively "Defendants") to the Second Cause of Action in the Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") of Plaintiff CMC Dirt Works, Inc. ("Plaintiff"), is OVERRULED. Defendants are ordered to file Answers within twenty (20) days of this hearing. The Cartwright Act is contained in B...
..ry [such] trust is unlawful, against public policy and void." Id. at 264, 265. Section 16750, subdivision (a) confers a private right of action for treble damages and attorneys' fees upon "Any person who is injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden or declared unlawful by this chapter, ..." Id. at 265. Recovery is provided under the Cartwright Act where the activities of...
Coastal Growers Supply vs. Anacapa Agro Tech Supply
..ght Act prohibits every trust, defined as "a combination of capital, skill or acts by two or more persons" for specified anticompetitive purposes. (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 16720, 16726.) The federal Sherman Act prohibits every "contract, combination ... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade." (15 U.S.C. § 1.) The similar language of the two acts reflects their common objective to protect and promote...
Jeff Hendrickson et al vs SB Certified Farmers etc et al
Nature of Proceedings: Demurrer First Amend.Complt Demurrer of Defendants to First Amended Complaint Ruling: For the reasons set forth herein, the demurrer of defendants Santa Barbara Certified Farmers Market, Inc., Molly Gean, and Samuel E. Edelman is sustained with leave to amend to plaintiffs’ first amended complaint and to each cause of action therein. Plaintiffs shall file and...
..California. (First Amended Complaint [“FAC”], ¶ 6.) Santa Rita grows numerous agricultural products including flowers, fruits and vegetables. (Ibid.) Plaintiff Catherine Moss dba Wellington Farm (“Wellington Farm”) owns and operates a small family farm located in Goleta, California. (FAC, ¶ 7.) Wellington also grows numerous agricultural products including flowers, fruits and vegetables. (Ibid.) ...
RICHMOND COMPASSIONATE VS RICH
HEARING ON DEMURRER TO 2nd Amended COMPLAINT of RICHMOND COMPASSIONATE CARE COLLECTIVE FILED BY ZEADD M HANDOUSH, 7 STARS * TENTATIVE RULING: * Defendants have demurred to Plaintiff Richmond Compassion Care Collective’s (“RCCC”) second amended complaint (“SAC”), which includes claims for violation of the Cartwright Act and the Unfair Practices Act. This ruling addresses the three demurrers file...
..[Citation.]” (G.H.I.I. v. MTS, Inc. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 256, 265.) Pleading a Cartwright Act claim requires a high degree of particularity. (G.H.I.I. v. MTS, Inc. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 256, 265; see also Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Great Western Financial Corp. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 305, 326-328.) “… generalized allegations of civil antitrust violations are usually insufficient [Citation] and the unla...
HOMAN DIBAGOHAR DC VS THE BOARD OF CHIROPRACTIC EXAMINERS
Homan Dibagohar v. The Board of Chiropractic Examiners, BS 171229 Tentative decision on petition for writ of mandate: denied Petitioner Homan Dibagohar (“Dibagohar”) seeks a writ of mandate directing Respondent the Board of Chiropractic Examiners (“Board”) to set aside its decision revoking his chiropractic license. The court has read and considered the moving papers,[1] opposition,[2] and repl...
..mplaint Dibagohar provided chiropractic treatment, including massages, to PS. In January 2014, Patient PS complained to Premiere’s Office Manager, Be’Etta Mixon (“Mixon”) that he had received unusual charges in his Health Savings Account (“HSA”). On August 4, 2014, PS initiated legal action against Dibagohar seeking what he believed to be $4,701 in overpayments. He later dismissed this action...
Alan Moelleken MD etc vs Cottage Health System et al
Nature of Proceedings: Motion Leave to Amend Answer; Motion Summary Judg/Adjudication; Motion Order Sealing Records; Motion Evidentiary & Sanctions/Motion in Limine (1) Motion of Defendants Thomas H. Jones, M.D., E. Scott Conner, M.D., Richard Chung, M.D., and Alois Zauner, M.D., for Summary Adjudication (2) Motion of Defendants Thomas H. Jones, M.D., E. Scott Conner, M.D., Richard Ch...
..nts Thomas H. Jones, M.D., E. Scott Conner, M.D., Richard Chung, M.D., and Alois Zauner, M.D., for summary adjudication is denied as to each requested adjudication on the grounds that the moving parties have not met their burden of establishing a right to summary adjudication. (2) The motion of defendants Thomas H. Jones, M.D., E. Scott Conner, M.D., Richard Chung, M.D., and Alois Zauner, M.D., f...
Recent Rulings on Restraint of Trade
Demurrer / Motion To Strike (9)
David R Chaffee (8)
Thomas Anderle (12)
A cause of action for a conspiracy in restraint of trade ‘”must allege (1) the formation and operation of the conspiracy, (2) the wrongful act or acts done pursuant thereto, and (3) the damage resulting from such act or acts.”’” (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 47.)
None of plaintiffs’ allegations come close to establishing “[a] conspiracy, a combination in restraint of trade, or an illegal monopoly.” Section 54040 is merely an organizational provision that states that California’s general corporation laws apply to co-ops. Plaintiffs offer no explanation as to how Sun-Maid purportedly acted “unlawfully as a cooperative. . . .”
KC EXCLUSIVE, INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION VS SEUNG YONG PAEK, ET AL.
Demurrer Analysis: Fourth COA: Civil Conspiracy “A cause of action for a conspiracy in restraint of trade ‘must allege (1) the formation and operation of the conspiracy, (2) the wrongful act or acts done pursuant thereto, and (3) the damage resulting from such act or acts. [Citations.]’ General allegations of agreement have been held sufficient [citation], and the conspiracy averment has even been held unnecessary, providing the unlawful acts or civil wrongs are otherwise sufficiently alleged.'
The courts do not strain to find a restraint of trade in contracts not intended to have that effect. (Keating v. Preston (1940) 42 Cal.App.2d 110, 122.)
AHN VS CHICAGO TITLE A DIVISION OF FIDELITY NATIONAL FINANCIAL
Apparently abandoning an argument as to a violation of public policy violation related to renewable energy, Plaintiff asserts that his claim for violations of the Cartwright Act serves as the basis for the wrongful termination claim. Thus, if Plaintiff has not properly alleged a Cartwright Act violation, his wrongful termination claim fails. "The California Supreme Court demands a high degree of particularity in the pleading of Cartwright Act violations." (Motors, Inc. v.
Based on these allegations, plaintiff asserts claims under PAGA for (1) fraud in violation of Labor Code section 970, (2) retaliation in violation of Labor Code section 1102.5(b), (3) unlawful confidentiality agreement in restraint of trade in violation of Labor Code section 432.5, (4) unlawful confidentiality agreement with no Federal Defend Trade Secrets Act notice in violation of Labor Code section 432.5, (5) illegal harassment release in violation of Labor Code section 432.5, (6) prohibition on engaging
REINER VS. COX COMMUNICATIONS CALIFORNIA LLC
Defendant has arguably met this standard as to the first cause of action for violation of the Cartwright Act and the sixth cause of action for Elder Abuse, but not with respect to the second, fourth and fifth causes of action. (The third and seventh causes of action have since been dismissed.) Although the FAC is not a model of clarity, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged facts that he contracted with Defendant for an “advertised rate,” but was then charged an “additional $19 per month.” (FAC at ¶ 8.)
Violation of Cartwright Act, Business & Professions Code Section 16700, et seq. Breach of Written Contract Aiding and Abetting On January 4, 2019, Plaintiff dismissed CVMC without prejudice. A Final Status Conference is set for December 2, 2019. Trial is set for December 10, 2019.
RICHMOND COMPASSIONATE VS. RICHMOND PATIENT’S GROUP
As a general matter, federal cases analyzing the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act apply to analysis of the Cartwright Act. Corwin v. Los Angeles Newspaper Service Bureau, Inc. (1971) 4 Cal.3d 842, 852. Reviewed more carefully, however, Corwin states that federal court decisions interpreting particular language found both in the Sherman Act or Clayton Act, and in the Cartwright Act, apply to the Cartwright Act. See Id.
FONSECA VS HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY [E-FILE]
Pursuant to the California Business & Professions Code section 16750(a), any person who is injured by a violation of the Cartwright Act (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16700 et seq.) may sue. The relevant case law goes on to make clear that plaintiffs suing under the Cartwright Act must have suffered direct injury as a result of the anticompetitive conduct in order to have standing to sue. See Cellular Plus, Inc. v.
JANE DOE V. MARGARET CAFARELLI, ET AL.
., supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 47-48 [conspiracy in restraint of trade].) Here, there is an express allegation of agreement and intent that the fraud be committed. As the Court determined in ruling on the demurrer of Cafarelli, the allegations as against her are sufficiently pleaded. Consequently, the allegation of conspiracy to commit fraud is sufficient. Demurring defendants also argue that this cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations.
In their Second Amended Complaint ("SAC"), (ROA # 78) Plaintiffs allege claims for 1) Violation of Unfair Practices Act (Business and Professions Code 17043, 17045, 17046, 17047 and 17048), 2) Violation of Cartwright Act (Business and Professions Code 16720), 3) BREACH OF THE COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING, 4) NEGLIGENCE, 5) CONSPIRACY TO INTENTIONALLY INTERFERE WITH CMC'S CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS, 6) CONSPIRACY TO INTENTIONALLY INTERFERE WITH CMC'S PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC RELATIONS and 7) NEGLIGENCE against
“Restraint on Trade” Grading of Students is not a restraint of trade. In any event, there are no facts that any of these Defendants took any action, individually, which would otherwise constitute a restraint of trade. There are no facts under which any of these Defendants are vicariously liable for the acts of others. 11. Breach of Contract There is no contract between any of these Defendants and Plaintiff. 12.
SEYED JAMALI VS LEED ELECTRIC, INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, ET AL.
(discussing cases holding that claims under the Cartwright Act are arbitrable, even though the Cartwright Act provides that the claims will be decided in civil actions “in any court having jurisdiction.”) In sum, these authorities make clear that just because a statute says that the “superior court” must decide an issue does not mean that the claim is not arbitrable.
., supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 47-48 [conspiracy in restraint of trade].) Here, there is an express allegation of agreement and intent that the fraud be committed. The allegation of conspiracy to commit fraud is sufficient. The demurrer to the thirteenth cause of action will be overruled. (D) Defamation Doe’s twenty-first cause of action is for defamation. The action is based upon allegations that Hedgpeth stated to Doe, “You are crazy” and “This is crazy.
“Restraint on Trade” Grading of Students is not a restraint of trade. 11. Breach of Contract There is no contract between Olson and Plaintiff. 13. 42 USC 1983 The allegations do not establish Olson violated Plaintiff’s civil rights under color of law. 14. Due Process Violation Under the authorities quoted above, the facts do not amount to a due process violation by Olson. 15. Unfair Business Practices Only the law school would be subject to this claim. 16.
Recovery is provided under the Cartwright Act where the activities of a combination result in a restraint of trade. Id. The Complaint must allege the following: (a) the formation and operation of the conspiracy; (b) illegal acts done pursuant thereto; (c) a purpose to restrain trade; and (d) damage caused by such acts. Id. A high degree of particularity in the pleading of Cartwright Act violations is required. Id.