Source: https://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/arizona/azdce/2:2010cv00892/517241/78
Timestamp: 2017-03-26 05:51:46
Document Index: 788034969

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 2000', '§ 1997', '§ 3084', '§ 14', '§ 3084', '§ 3084', '§ 3084', '§ 3084', '§ 14', '§ 3084', '§ 3084', '§ 3054', '§ 2000', '§ 2000', '§ 2000', '§ 2000']

ORDER The reference is withdrawn as to Brunk and Miller's 36 Motion for Summary Judgment, Hallahan's 46 Motion for Summary Judgment, and Plaintiff's 44 Motion to Disregard Defendants' Motions as Untimely for Davitashvili v. Schomig et al :: Justia Dockets & Filings Log In
Davitashvili v. Schomig et al
ORDER The reference is withdrawn as to Brunk and Miller's 36 Motion for Summary Judgment, Hallahan's 46 Motion for Summary Judgment, and Plaintiff's 44 Motion to Disregard Defendants' Motions as Untimely. Plaintiff's [4 4] Motion to Disregard Defendants' Motions as Untimely is denied. Brunk and Miller's 36 Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. Hallahan's 46 Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. The Clerk of Court must terminate this action and enter judgment accordingly. Signed by Judge David G Campbell on 01/04/12. (ESL)
Mikhail Davitashvili,
J. Schomig, et al.,
No. CV 10-892-PHX-DGC (MEA)
Plaintiff Mikhail Davitashvili brought this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against three Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) employees: Assistant Warden Chad
Miller; Chaplain James Brunk; and Food Service Director Michael Hallahan (Doc. 1).1
Before the Court are two separate Motions for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants
(Docs. 36, 46) and Plaintiff’s Motion to Disregard Defendants’ Motions as Untimely
(Doc.44). The Court will deny Plaintiff’s motion, grant Defendants’ motions, and terminate
Plaintiff’s claims arose during his confinement in the La Palma Correctional Center
(LPCC) in Eloy, Arizona (Doc. 1 at 1). LPCC is a facility owned and operated by CCA (id.
at 2). In Count I of his Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that he informed Brunk that he required
Upon screening, the Court dismissed CCA, Schomig, Young, Alldredge, Powers,
Roberts, Canteen Correctional Services, Croch, Meyers, and Hayman as Defendants (Doc.
a kosher diet but Brunk disregarded Plaintiff’s religious needs and Plaintiff was continually
given non-kosher food (id. at 3). Plaintiff further alleged that he discussed his need for a
kosher diet with Miller, who also failed to ensure that he received a kosher diet. Plaintiff
claims that Hallahan repeatedly provided food that was not kosher.
In Count III, Plaintiff alleged that Hallahan denied Plaintiff proper food for Passover
and refused to follow kosher laws when preparing the Passover meal (id. at 5).2 For relief,
Plaintiff requested injunctive relief and money damages (id. at 7).
The Court found that Plaintiff’s allegations sufficiently stated a claim under the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc, as
well as a free-exercise claim under the First Amendment (Doc. 8).
Brunk and Miller move for summary judgment on the grounds that (1) Plaintiff failed
to exhaust administrative remedies; (2) Plaintiff cannot prove a RLUIPA violation against
the two Defendants; (3) Plaintiff cannot show a First Amendment violation; (4) Plaintiff did
not sustain a physical injury and therefore cannot recover damages; and (5) Plaintiff is not
entitled to punitive damages (Doc. 36).
Hallahan moves separately for summary judgment, arguing that (1) Plaintiff’s request
for declaratory and injunctive relief against Hallahan is misdirected and moot; (2) Plaintiff
cannot obtain compensatory damages because he did not suffer physical injury; (3) RLUIPA
does not authorize a money-damages claim against Hallahan; (4) Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim
fails on the merits; (5) Plaintiff cannot show a First Amendment violation; and (6) punitive
damages are not warranted (Doc. 46).
Plaintiff filed a Motion to Disregard Defendants’ Motions as Untimely (Doc. 44). He
also filed a memorandum in opposition to Defendants’ motions (Doc. 63).
Plaintiff’s Motion to Disregard Defendants’ Motions as Untimely
The Court originally set a dispositive-motions deadline of March 25, 2011 (Doc. 23).
On Defendants’ Motion for Extension of Time, the Court extended the dispositive-motions
The Court dismissed part of Count I and Counts II and IV (Doc. 8).
deadline to April 24, 2011 (Doc. 35). Miller and Brunk filed their summary judgment motion
on April 25, 2011 (Doc. 36), and Hallahan lodged his summary judgment motion that same
day in conjunction with his Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages (Docs. 38-39). On
May 16, 2011, the Court granted Hallahan’s motion for leave and docketed his motion
(Docs. 45-46).
Plaintiff moves the Court to disregard both summary-judgment motions on the ground
that they are untimely (Doc. 44). Defendants oppose Plaintiff’s motion and note that
April 24, 2011, fell on a Sunday; thus, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(a)(1)(C), the
deadline extended to April 25, 2011, and their motions were timely (Doc. 48).
Rule 6(a)(1) applies only to time periods stated in days or a longer unit, e.g., 10 days
or 30 days. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1) (“[w]hen the period is stated in days or a longer unit
of time; (A) exclude the day of the event that triggers the period; (B) count every day[.]”).
The Rule does not apply when, like here, the Court sets a specific date as a deadline. Thus,
Defendants’ motions were filed one-day late.
But a review of the motion for an extension and the Court’s Order granting the motion
shows that the April 24, 2011 deadline was calculated by simply adding 30 days to the
original deadline of March 25, 2011 (Docs. 34-35). Indeed, had the Court ruled that the
deadline was extended 30 days without setting a hard date, then Rule 6 would apply, and
April 25, 2011 would be the proper filing deadline. The Court instead mirrored the request
in the motion that April 24, 2011, was 30 days later, and set that date as the deadline (id.).
Obviously, neither Defendants nor the Court looked at a calendar, which would have
reflected that April 24, 2011, was Easter Sunday.
The purpose underlying Rule 6 is that filing deadlines should not fall on weekend
days or holidays; thus, the Court should not have set the deadline for a Sunday. More
importantly, there is no prejudice to Plaintiff in accepting Defendants’ one-day-late motions.
The Court agrees with Defendants that by granting the motion to exceed page limits, it
implicitly allowed for the motions to be filed one-day late. For these reasons, and in the
interests of deciding motions on the merits, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s Motion to
Disregard Defendants’ Motions as Untimely.
1. Brunk and Miller’s Motion
The Court will first address Brunk and Miller’s argument that Plaintiff failed to
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (Doc. 36). In support, Defendants submit the affidavit of Ruth
Williams, Grievance Coordinator at LPCC (Doc. 37, Ex. 3, Williams Aff. ¶ 1). Williams
explains that the grievance procedures are set out in LPCC’s Policy 14-101, which is
modeled on the requirements contained in Title 15 Cal. Code of Regulations § 3084 (id. ¶ 4,
Attach. A). She attests that upon arrival at LPCC, inmates are issued an Inmate Orientation
Handbook that summarizes the grievance procedures and they are given a verbal explanation
of the procedures during an Orientation Program (id. ¶ 5). Williams states that a copy of
Policy 14-101 is also available to inmates in the law library (id. ¶ 6).
Williams describes the steps in LPCC’s grievance policy: (1) an inmate must submit
a complaint on an Informal Resolution Form and place it in the grievance box within 15 days
of the alleged incident (id. ¶ 8(a)); (2) if the response to the complaint is unsatisfactory, the
inmate may file a Level One formal grievance within 15 days of receipt of the response (id.
¶ 8(b)); if not satisfied with the response, within 15 days the inmate may submit a Level Two
appeal to the California Out-of-State Correctional Facility Appeals Coordinator (id. ¶ 8(c));
and if not satisfied with that response, within 15 days the inmate may file a Level Three
formal grievance to the Director (id. ¶ 8(d)).
Williams avers that she reviewed the facility Grievance Log and identified 11
informal grievances filed by Plaintiff (id. ¶ 15). But she states that there is no record that he
filed any Level One formal grievances on any issue, nor is there any record that he filed any
Level Two or Level Three appeals (id.).
In addition to Williams’ affidavit, Brunk and Miller rely on Plaintiff’s deposition
testimony to support their claim that there was no exhaustion (Doc. 36 at 8-9). They cite to
Plaintiff’s testimony that he filed numerous formal grievances about his kosher diet but
received no responses and did not subsequently file any appeals; instead, he filed his
Complaint in federal court (id., Doc. 37, Ex. 4, Pl. Dep. 105:22-25, 106:1-11, Nov. 9, 2010).
Based on this evidence, Brunk and Miller argue that Plaintiff did not exhaust and it
is too late for him to remedy the exhaustion deficiencies; therefore, they move for dismissal
with prejudice (Doc. 36 at 9-10).
2. Plaintiff’s Response3
Plaintiff states that he is familiar with the rules and policies governing the grievance
procedures at LPCC and that he followed the steps that were available to him (Doc. 63 at 28).
He avers that he filed numerous grievances related to his problems with a kosher diet (id. at
Plaintiff states that on February 2, 2010, he submitted an Informal Resolution Form
concerning diet issues he had raised in January 2010, but received no answer from the
Grievance Coordinator (id. at 29).4
Plaintiff asserts that he filed an Informal Resolution Form on February 20, 2010, in
which he complained about problems with his kosher diet and the lack of weekly Shabat
services (id. at 6; Doc. 65, Ex. 9). He avers that he received to response (id.).
Next, Plaintiff states that he submitted an Informal Resolution Form on March 7,
The Court issued the Notice required under Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962 (9th
Cir. 1998), which informed Plaintiff of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and the rules
governing summary judgment (Doc. 47). The Notice included language that advised Plaintiff
of the evidence required to respond to Defendants’ exhaustion argument (id. at 3-4).
In support of this and following averments, Plaintiff cites to his separate Statement
of Facts (PSOF) ¶¶ 60-61; however, those paragraphs relate to the Kosher Meal Program
Guidelines at LPCC and reference pages from those Guidelines that concern preparation and
special holiday meals (Doc. 64, PSOF ¶¶ 60-61, citing Doc. 41-1 at 39, 42). The Court notes
that Plaintiff’s Exhibit 9 includes a January 12, 2010 Request for Service seeking a meeting
with the chaplain to discuss religious diet problems and a request for Jewish services (Doc.
65, Ex. 9 (Doc. 65 at 23)). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).
2010, to which there was no answer, and then filed an Informal Resolution Form on
March 26, 2010 (Doc. 63 at 6; Doc. 65, Ex. 11 (Doc. 65 at 42-44). Plaintiff explains that he
received an answer on May 27, 2010, and then filed a Formal Grievance immediately, which
was finally answered after 60 days (Doc. 63 at 6).
According to Plaintiff, he filed another Informal Resolution Form on April 9, 2010
(id.). Plaintiff states that he received an answer from the Manager and then filed an Inmate
Formal Grievance on April 19, 2010 (id.; Doc. 64, PSOF ¶ 63, Ex. 50). Plaintiff avers that
he received no response to his Formal Grievance (Doc. 63 at 29-30).
Finally, Plaintiff states that on June 23, 2010, he filed an Informal Resolution Form
to complain about kosher meals (id. at 12). He explains that it took more than 120 days for
officials to respond, and then it took another 68 days for them to respond to his subsequent
Formal Grievance (id. at 12-13). Plaintiff claims that he then timely appealed to the
Warden’s level but received no response (id. at 12-13).
Plaintiff contends that he made good faith attempts to follow the steps in the LPCC
grievance procedures, but LPCC officials failed to respond or answer his complaints (id. at
30). He submits that their failure to respond prevented him from filing appeals and that
without responses from officials, no further administrative remedies were available to him
(id., citing cases).
3. Brunk and Miller Reply
Brunk and Miller respond to Plaintiff’s claim that he filed an Informal Resolution on
June 23, 2010 and appealed it up to the Warden’s level (Doc. 69 at 4). They note that the
evidence Plaintiff cites to support this claim is actually paperwork from an October 2010
complaint, which was months after he filed this lawsuit on April 21, 2010 (id., ref. Doc. 64,
PSOF ¶¶ 34-35). Brunk and Miller assert that the records shows that Plaintiff did not appeal
to the Warden’s level or file any other appeals; rather, he simply filed another informal
grievance (Doc. 69 at 4-5, n. 6). Brunk and Miller conclude that Plaintiff failed to exhaust
and, consequently, deprived the parties of an opportunity to address Plaintiff’s concerns (id.
disputed issues of fact. Id. at 1119-20. Further, a court has broad discretion as to the method
to be used in resolving the factual dispute.
Warehousemen’s Union, 837 F.2d 365, 369 (9th Cir. 1988) (quotation omitted). If a court
finds that the plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies, the proper remedy is
dismissal without prejudice. Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120.
Ritza v. Int’l Longshoremen’s &
Brunk and Miller are correct that Plaintiff’s June 23, 2010 attempt to grieve his claim
about kosher diets does not satisfy the exhaustion requirement. The record does not support
that Plaintiff filed an appeal to the Warden, and even assuming that he did, because he
initiated the grievance after filing this lawsuit, it does not serve to exhaust his claim (see Doc.
1 at 7 (Compl. signed and filed by Pl. on April 15, 2010)). See Vaden v. Summerhill, 449
F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 2006) (a prisoner must exhaust before submitting a complaint in
The grievances that Plaintiff initiated on April 9 and March 26, 2010, also fail to
support proper exhaustion under Vaden because they were still proceeding through the
grievance process when this lawsuit was filed. Id.
Brunk and Miller do not respond to or refute Plaintiff’s claims that he submitted
Informal Resolution Forms on February 2 and 20, 2010, and received no responses (see Doc.
69). Plaintiff proffers a copy of his February 20, 2010 Informal Resolution Form (Doc. 65,
Ex. 9), but the Court does not find a copy of the February 2, 2010 Informal Resolution Form
in the record. As stated, Grievance Coordinator Williams confirmed that Plaintiff filed 11
informal grievances at LPCC (Doc. 37, Ex. 3, Williams Aff. ¶ 15). Copies of those 11
grievances are not submitted with Williams’ affidavit (see id.). Thus, the record does not
foreclose the possibility that Plaintiff filed a February 2, 2010 grievance, and Brunk and
Miller fail to show that he did not. See Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119 (defendant bears the burden
to demonstrate nonexhaustion). The Court must therefore address whether Plaintiff’s
February 2 and 20, 2010 Informal Resolutions, to which there was no response, constituted
exhaustion of available remedies.
The Ninth Circuit has held that the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement is not absolute,
and certain facts may justify exceptions where remedies were effectively unavailable. Nunez
v. Duncan, 591 F.3d 1217, 1223-24 (9th Cir. 2010). Numerous courts have found that
administrative remedies are not available to a prisoner if officials fail to timely respond to
a grievance. Boyd v. Corr. Corp. of America, 380 F.3d 989, 996 (6th Cir. 2004); Jernigan
v. Stuchell, 304 F.3d 1030, 1032 (10th Cir. 2002); Lewis v. Washington, 300 F.3d 829, 833
(7th Cir. 2002); Foulk v. Charrier, 262 F.3d 687, 698 (8th Cir. 2001); Powe v. Ennis, 177
F.3d 393, 394 (5th Cir. 1998). Whether remedies remain available depends on the procedural
rules governing the grievance process and if those rules provide guidance to a prisoner when
there is no response to a grievance. See Jones, 549 U.S. at 200 (the procedural rules are
defined by the prison grievance process, not by the PLRA); Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926,
937 (9th Cir. 2005) (“information provided the prisoner is pertinent because it informs our
determination of whether relief was, as a practical matter, ‘available’”).
The Court has reviewed Policy 14-101 and finds no provision that informs an inmate
what steps to take if he receives no response to his Informal Resolution (Doc. 37, Ex. 3,
Attach. A). See Brown, 422 F.3d at 937. The policy only directs inmates how to proceed
after receiving an unsatisfactory Informal Resolution response (id., § 14-101.4 ¶¶ N(3), P(1)).
The face of the grievance forms does not include any additional instructions that would
advise inmates what to do in the event there is no response to the Informal Resolution (see
Doc. 65, Ex. 50). In addition, there is nothing within Title 15 of the California Code of
Regulations § 3084—the model for Policy 14-101—that informs an inmate how to proceed
absent a response to the initial filing. 15 Cal. ADC § 3084 et seq.5 Both § 3084 and Policy
14-101 require officials to respond to grievances within a specified time period. 15 CA ADC
§ 3084.8(c); Doc. 37, Ex. 3, Attach. A, § 14-101.4 ¶ N(2)(d) & (e), (3)(b).
By failing to respond to Plaintiff’s allegations about the February 2 or 20, 2010
Informal Resolutions or to Plaintiff’s legal argument that remedies are unavailable when
there is no grievance response, Brunk and Miller fail to demonstrate that Plaintiff had an
available remedy after he received no response to either his February 2 or 20, 2010 Informal
Resolution. Accordingly, Brunk and Miller’s request for dismissal for nonexhaustion will
be denied. The Court therefore turns to Defendants’ arguments for summary judgment.
Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations § 3084 provides that the response to
the first level review must be completed within 30 days after receipt, and if there is a delay
that prevents a timely response, the inmate must be provided an explanation of the reasons
for the delay. 15 CA ADC § 3084.8(c) & (e).
inferences in the nonmovant’s favor. Id. at 255.
The parties’ respective statements of facts set forth the following relevant undisputed
and disputed facts:6
Plaintiff arrived at LPCC around December 23, 2009 (BMSOF ¶ 4: PSOF ¶ 4). He
was transferred from another CCA facility, where he had been approved through the
Chaplaincy Department for a kosher diet (PSOF ¶ 8; Doc. 65, Ex. 3). On December 23,
2009, Plaintiff submitted an Inmate Request Form indicating that he just arrived at the
facility and he required a kosher diet; the response informed Plaintiff to submit forms to the
Chaplain’s office to obtain a diet card (PSOF ¶ 9; Doc. 65, Ex. 4).
Because he was not receiving kosher meals, Plaintiff went on a hunger strike in
December 2009, at which time Brunk visited with Plaintiff and advocated for him to receive
See Brunk and Miller’s Separate Statement of Facts (BMSOF) (Doc. 37); Hallahan’s
Separate Statement of Facts (HSOF) (Doc. 40); and Plaintiff’s Separate Statement of Facts
(PSOF) (Doc. 64). The Court considers only those factual assertions that are relevant to
Plaintiff’s kosher diet claims and that are properly supported. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Orr
v. Bank of America, 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002) (a district court may consider only
admissible evidence in ruling on a motion for summary judgment).
a kosher diet (BMSOF ¶ 9; PSOF ¶ 10).
On December 28, 2009, Miller visited Plaintiff in LPCC medical unit and listened to
Plaintiff’s concerns about the food provided to him at LPCC (BMSOF ¶¶ 20-21). While
Plaintiff was in the medical unit for treatment related to his hunger strike, he received kosher
meals that were acceptable to him (Doc. 37, Ex. 2, Attach.). Miller spoke with the Assistant
Warden in charge of Food Services and informed him of Plaintiff’s need for a kosher diet
(id., Ex. 2, Miller Aff. ¶ 16).
Plaintiff submitted a form requesting a Jewish Religious diet on January 20, 2010, and
a restricted diet Order was issued for Plaintiff on January 22, 2010 (HSOF ¶ 21 (in part);
Doc. 41, Ex. B; Doc. 37, Ex. 1, Exs. A-B).
On February 2, 2010, Plaintiff submitted an Inmate Request for an interview with
Miller; Plaintiff referenced their December 29, 2009 meeting and stated that not much had
changed since then and he still had problems with his religious diet (PSOF ¶ 27; Doc. 65, Ex.
22). Plaintiff states that there was no response to this request (PSOF ¶ 27).
Pursuant to Miller’s suggestion, Plaintiff was assigned a job in food services to
instruct kitchen personnel in the preparation of kosher food (BMSOF ¶¶ 28-29). Plaintiff
began working in the LPCC kitchen on February 15, 2010 (PSOF ¶ 36; Doc. 65, Ex. 27). He
worked in the kitchen from February 15 to the end of March 2010, and his job entailed
preparing all kosher diet meals served at LPCC, including his own (HSOF ¶ 38). While
working in the kitchen, Plaintiff states that he discovered that the canned tuna did not contain
any symbols indicating that it was certified as kosher, so he notified Hallahan (PSOF ¶¶ 47,
49). Hallahan states that the tuna was Stella brand tuna packed by Pataya Food Industries,
Ltd., which is a kosher certified tuna packer; thus, the Stella canned tuna was kosher (HSOF
¶ 37). Hallahan states that, nonetheless, to appease Plaintiff, the tuna brand was switched
and in February or March 2010, the kitchen began serving Chicken of the Sea brand tuna,
which is certified as kosher by the Orthodox Union and bears a kosher certification on its
label (id.; Doc. 41, Ex. I).
Hallahan states that all cold cereals served to Plaintiff are kosher and bear the kosher
certification symbol (Doc. 41, Hallahan Aff. ¶ 26). Plaintiff states that he has been served
Frosted Mini Wheats cereal, which is not kosher (PSOF ¶ 50; Doc. 65, Exs. 33-34).
On March 7, 2010, Plaintiff submitted a Request for Service that asked about
ceremonial foods for Passover (PSOF ¶¶ 14, 29; Doc. 65, Ex. 10). There was no response
to this Request for Service, so on March 26 and 30, 2010, Plaintiff filed Emergency Informal
Resolution Forms about Passover food preparation (PSOF ¶¶ 15-16; Doc. 65, Exs. 11-12).
Hallahan states that about a week before Passover 2010, Plaintiff repeatedly requested
a copy of the Passover menu, but Hallahan told Plaintiff that he did not have authority to
provide a copy of the menu; rather, Plaintiff had to request it from the chaplain (HSOF ¶ 40).
Hallahan states that after Plaintiff obtained a copy, he claimed that it did not satisfy Passover
standards—even though it had been approved by a rabbi (id.). Hallahan states that Plaintiff
requested changes to the menu, and when Hallahan told him he had no authority to modify
it, Plaintiff quit his kitchen job (id.).
Plaintiff states that Defendants failed to provide the essential food items for the
March 31, 2010 Passover meal (PSOF ¶ 52). Hallahan states that the entrees served during
Passover were certified by the Orthodox Union (HSOF ¶ 43; Doc. 41, Exs. J-K).
On April 23, 2010, Plaintiff declared a hunger strike, and he states that in the
following days, while he was in the LPCC Medical Unit, he was served meals that did not
match the scheduled kosher menu (PSOF ¶¶ 54-55).
Plaintiff states that while confined at LPCC, he has lost more than 30 pounds (PSOF
¶ 68).
The First Amendment provides that the government shall not prohibit the free exercise
of religion. U.S. Const. Amend. I. Prisoners must therefore be afforded reasonable
opportunities to exercise their religious freedom. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 n. 2
Nevertheless, free-exercise rights are “necessarily limited by the fact of
incarceration, and may be curtailed in order to achieve legitimate correctional goals or to
maintain prison security.” O’Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987). With respect to
the claim at issue here, the Ninth Circuit has held that inmates “have the right to be provided
with food sufficient to sustain them in good health that satisfies the dietary laws of their
religion.” Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 877 (9th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted).
To establish a First Amendment free-exercise violation, a plaintiff must first show that
the religious practice at issue concerns a sincerely held belief and that the claim is rooted in
religious belief. Malik v. Brown, 16 F.3d 330, 333 (9th Cir. 1994) (internal citations
omitted); see Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 884-885 (9th Cir. 2008).
The plaintiff must then demonstrate a burden to his sincerely held belief. Shakur, 514
F.3d at 884. To substantially burden the practice of an individual’s religion, the interference
must be more than an isolated incident or short-term occurrence. See Canell v. Lightner, 143
F.3d 1210, 1215 (9th Cir. 1998) (interference that is relatively short-term and sporadic was
not substantial).
Finally, if the regulation or conduct at issue impinges on the plaintiff’s constitutional
rights, it is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Turner v.
Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). Turner sets out four factors to be balanced to determine
whether a regulation is reasonable. Id. at 89-90.7
1. Brunk and Miller
Brunk and Miller argue that Plaintiff cannot prove that his religious practice was
burdened (Doc. 36 at 13). They cite to numerous instances that they contend demonstrate
accommodations to Plaintiff and the provision of kosher meals (id., citing Doc. 1 at 3,
Attach.). These two Defendants submit that Plaintiff’s complaints either relate to isolated,
short term incidents or are assumptions based on the fact that he does not know how the food
is prepared (Doc. 36 at 13-14). They point to Plaintiff’s deposition testimony in which he
Defendants submit that because Plaintiff cannot demonstrate a substantial burden,
there is no need to analyze the Turner factors (Doc. 69 at 6-7 n. 8). As set forth herein, the
Court agrees and, therefore, does not reach a Turner analysis.
admits that he has no knowledge of how the food is prepared and he further admits that when
he worked in the kitchen, all utensils were brand new (id., citing Doc. 37, Ex. 4, Pl. Dep.
83:22-25). Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s claims that, at times, there were different items
or a smaller quantity than that listed on a day’s menu are insufficient to constitute a
substantial burden (Doc. 36 at 14).
Finally, Brunk and Miller contend that even if Plaintiff could make a prima facie free-
exercise claim, his claim fails because he had alternative means to maintain a kosher diet
through commissary purchases and food packages that he is permitted to receive from family
members (id.; Doc. 37, Ex. 4, Pl. Dep. 43:1-20).
2. Hallahan
Hallahan also argues that Plaintiff’s free-exercise rights were not substantially
burdened (Doc. 46 at 18). Hallahan maintains that Plaintiff used the available procedures to
request a kosher diet and that he, in fact, received a kosher diet and special Passover meals
(id. at 12-13). Hallahan submits evidence that the Kosher diet menu at LPCC was reviewed
by a Rabbi and certified as compliant with nutritional and kosher dietary standards (Doc. 41,
Hallahan Aff. ¶ 11, Ex. C). He also submits copies of the “Kosher Meal Program
Guidelines,” which detail the preparation requirements and the restriction to serving only
foods certified by a recognized Orthodox Kosher standard and that bear the appropriate
kosher certification symbol (other than inherently kosher foods like fresh fruits and
vegetables) (id. ¶¶ 13-15, Ex. D). Hallahan attests that Passover meals are prepared in the
same manner as other kosher diet meals but the menu is modified to include special Passover
items, like matzo and other food with a “Kosher for Passover” certification, and he proffers
copies of the Passover menus for the last two years (id. ¶ 19, Ex. E).
Other evidence submitted by Hallahan includes copies of the kosher certifications
issued by the Rabbinical Council of New England for the cereals Plaintiff receives (Doc. 41,
Ex. G), and copies of the kosher certification issued by the Orthodox Union for the Pataya
tuna that was previously served and the Chicken of the Sea tuna that is now served (id., Exs.
H-I).
Hallahan concedes that mistakes may occur in the institutional food service operation
at LPCC, but he argues that any periodic failures are the exception, not the rule (Doc. 46 at
17). Hallahan concludes that Plaintiff’s complaints about items based solely on his belief
that they may not be properly prepared or his dissatisfaction with some meals is insufficient
to show a substantial burden (id. at 16-17).
3. Plaintiff’s Response8
Plaintiff notes that Defendants do not dispute his sincerity of beliefs or that he had an
established right to receive kosher diet (Doc. 63 at 34). He maintains that since his arrival
at LPCC, it was documented that he was Jewish and required a kosher diet (id. at 32-33).
Plaintiff contends that Defendants nonetheless failed to provide him with a copy of the
kosher menu plan and they deliberately served him food that was not kosher certified (id. at
33, 36).
Plaintiff states that problems with his kosher food tray began upon his arrival and
continued into January 2010 and through Passover and that Brunk and Miller were aware of
the problems (id. at 4, 6, 9; Doc. 64, PSOF ¶ 32). According to Plaintiff, Defendants cannot
show that they accommodated his request for a kosher diet (Doc. 63 at 8).
Plaintiff recounts that during his hunger strike in December 2009, he was in the
medical unit and was served an unacceptable meal in Miller’s presence (id. at 9). Plaintiff
states that Miller ordered a new tray for him, which was acceptable (id. at 10). But Plaintiff
claims that Miller did nothing to ensure that future meals were properly kosher (id.).
In response to Defendants’ evidence that kosher meals that were approved by a Rabbi
Plaintiff was granted leave to exceed the allowable page limit with his response
(Doc. 62). Much of his 40-page response, however, relates to the alleged denial of religious
services or religious items, nutritionally inadequate food, and LPCC officials’ failure to
respond to grievances (see Doc. 63). Those claims were dismissed on screening (Doc. 8).
Plaintiff also cites various provisions from the Interstate Corrections Compact and Title 15
of the Federal Code of Regulations § 3054 that he alleges Defendants violated (id. at 34-38).
The Court will consider only those opposition arguments and evidence pertaining to the
alleged First Amendment and RLUIPA violations related to the denial of kosher meals and
proper Passover meals (see Doc. 8).
and served to Plaintiff, Plaintiff submits copies of grievance documents that complain he is
not receiving the kosher meals listed on the kosher menus (Doc. 65, Exs. 23-25). Plaintiff
asserts that he was often served food trays with both dairy and meat products, which is
unacceptable (id. at 18). He also alleges that the tuna and Frosted Mini Wheats cereal did
not bear the appropriate kosher certification symbols (id. at 19-20).
Plaintiff alleges that his requests to Brunk and Hallahan for a copy of the Passover
menu were denied for no reason and in violation of the their duty to supply the menu (id. at
21). Plaintiff states that the food plates he received on March 30 and 31, 2010, were not
kosher for Passover, and Hallahan refused to replace the dinner plates (id. at 22-23). During
his subsequent hunger strike in April, Plaintiff claims that he was served non-kosher and
spoiled foods while in the medical unit (id. at 23).
4. Defendants’ Replies
Brunk and Miller acknowledge that the record shows, at most (1) a five-day delay in
receipt of kosher meals after Plaintiff arrival at LPCC, (2) isolated instances of mistakes in
the portions of kosher meals served to Plaintiff, (3) unknown discrepancies between the
kosher menu and the food actually served, (4) Plaintiff’s inability to personally verify the
certified packaging of the meal served to him on March 31, 2010, and (5) Plaintiff’s distrust
of kitchen staff’s kosher meal preparation and concern over the lack of kosher certification
symbols on tuna or cereal packaging (Doc. 69 at 8). Brunk and Miller submit that none of
this, nor any other evidence or allegations presented by Plaintiff, demonstrate that his
religious exercise was substantially burdened (id.).9
Hallahan joins Brunk and Miller’s reply and also argues that Plaintiff’s response
memorandum is deficient because it consists primarily of conclusory allegations, is
Brunk and Miller also argue that Plaintiff cannot show that either of them personally
participated in the alleged constitutional violation (Doc. 69 at 9; see Doc. 36 at 16-17). The
Court already determined on screening that the allegations in Plaintiff’s verified Complaint
sufficiently linked Brunk and Miller to the alleged violations (Doc. 8 at 2, 3, 5, citing
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1948-49 (2009), and Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 37172, 377 (1976)).
confusing, and fails to authenticate or establish admissibility of many exhibits (Doc. 73 at
1 n. 1, 2-3). Hallahan further argues that Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief is moot
because Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated at LPCC; thus, Hallahan is no longer involved in
the provision of food service to Plaintiff (id. at 4).10
Hallahan contends that Plaintiff fails to present any evidence that he imposed a
substantial burden on Plaintiff’s religious exercise (id. at 7, 13). Hallahan asserts that the
record shows that Plaintiff received individually prepared kosher and Passover meals and that
efforts were made to ensure that he received the proper meals (id. at 13).
There is no dispute that the religious practice at issue here—the provision of a kosher
diet—concerns a sincerely held belief and that Plaintiff’s claim is rooted in religious belief.
See Malik, 16 F.3d at 333. Thus, the next step in the analysis is whether Plaintiff can
demonstrate a burden on his religious belief. See Shakur, 514 F.3d at 884.
Taking as true Plaintiff’s claim that he did not receive kosher meals immediately upon
his December 2009 arrival at LPCC, that demonstrates nothing more than a short-term
interference with his religious exercise. He concedes that just after his arrival, after initially
being served an improper meal, he was given an acceptable kosher dinner (Doc. 63 at 10).
And there is no dispute that he was officially approved for the kosher diet in January 2010
(Doc. 41, Ex. B).
Plaintiff’s speculation that meals provided to him are not kosher or properly prepared,
absent any evidence, is insufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact. This is
particularly true here, where the evidence includes the “Kosher Meal Program Guidelines,”
which describe the procedures governing kosher meal service, including preparation of
kosher meals; kosher meal packaging and certification requirements; and the delivery of
On November 3, 2011, Plaintiff submitted a Notice of Change of Address indicating
his transfer to Calipatria State Prison in California (Doc. 76). Brunk and Miller filed a
Supplement to the Motion for Summary Judgment arguing that Plaintiff’s transfer renders
his request for injunctive relief moot (Doc. 75).
kosher meals to inmates (Doc. 41, Ex. D). Defendants also proffer copies of the Kosher Diet
menu, and Hallahan attests that all items on the menu are reviewed by a dietician and Rabbi
to confirm that they meet nutritional guidelines and Kosher dietary standard (id., Hallahan
Aff. ¶ 11, Ex. C). He also attests that only prepackaged items bearing the appropriate kosher
certification symbol are served and all kosher items are stored separately from non-kosher
food and in areas designated exclusively for the storage of kosher items (id. ¶¶ 13-14).
Hallahan explains that utensils and other equipment used to prepare Kosher Diet
meals—including a separate table used solely for kosher meals—are stored and handled
separately from those used for non-kosher meals (id. ¶ 14). He states that in response to
Plaintiff’s concerns, the kitchen altered its normal procedure of covering the table with
cellophane and two layers of butcher paper and began to wrap an additional layer of
cellophane over the butcher paper, and they purchased new utensils and equipment at
Plaintiff’s request (id. ¶ 16). Hallahan avers that the Passover meals are prepared in the same
manner as regular Kosher meals, but with special Passover utensils and equipment (id. ¶ 18).
In addition, he states that the Passover meals bear symbols specifically indicating that they
are “Kosher for Passover” certified, and he proffers copies of the Passover menus (id. ¶ 19).
In his deposition, Plaintiff indicated that the “Kosher Meal Program Guidelines” were
appropriate but that not everything set out in the Guidelines was followed (Doc. 37, Ex. 4,
Pl. Dep. 107:9-19). He proffers his hand-written notes documenting the meals served to him
during late December 2009 and January 2010 (Doc. 65, Exs. 5, 29). These notes demonstrate
that Plaintiff was served meals with some items that were not kosher, that cheese was
occasionally served with meat on the same plate, and that other meals did not contain items
that should been included with that day’s menu (id.). With Plaintiff’s evidence is an attached
note from the chaplain, signed January 6, 2010, which states that Plaintiff’s records reflect
that the religious diet rotation list does not appear to be followed (id., Ex. 5).
Plaintiff’s evidence supports that there were occasional mistakes made in the delivery
of his kosher meals and that there was little variety in the meals served. But Defendants’
failure to adhere to the scheduled menus does not rise to a constitutional violation. Nor does
their failure to provide Plaintiff copies of the menus. Further, as stated, the burden or
interference must be more than a sporadic or short-term occurrence. See Canell, 143 F.3d
at 1215. The periodic problems evidenced from Plaintiff’s December 2009 and January 2010
records amount to a short-term occurrence.
With respect to Plaintiff’s claims regarding the Passover meals served in March 2010,
Defendants present documents showing that the meals served bore the “Kosher for Passover”
certifications (Doc. 41, Exs. J-K). Plaintiff presents no evidence to refute the certification
evidence; he simply challenges whether the food was, in fact, actually kosher and whether
it was properly prepared. In his deposition, however, he admitted that when he worked in
the kitchen in February-March 2010, all the items used to prepare kosher foods were brand
new and he has no knowledge of what items or utensils were used prior to that time (Doc.
37, Ex. 4, Pl. Dep. 78:9-19).
As to Plaintiff’s claims about non-kosher tuna and cereals, Defendants present
evidence that the tuna previously served and that currently served to Plaintiff both carry the
proper kosher certification. The record also shows that the majority of cereals provided to
Plaintiff are kosher. That one variety of cereal provided by LPCC is not kosher does not
constitute a burden on Plaintiff’s religious practice (see Doc. 65, Ex. 34 (Doc. 65-1 at 16)
(letter from Rabbinical Council of New England confirming that Mini Wheats are not
certified as kosher because it contains gelatin)).
In short, the record shows that Plaintiff received meals that did not comply with
kosher requirements on some occasions, primarily in December 2009 and January 2010.
However, there is no evidence to show that these instances were anything more than periodic
service-delivery related problems. There is no evidence that Defendants were using nonkosher foods or that the kitchen was not adhering to the Guidelines’ requirements governing
preparation of kosher and Passover meals. As a result, Plaintiff cannot show that his
religious practice was substantially burdened, and Defendants are entitled to summary
judgment on the First Amendment claim.
RLUIPA Analysis
RLUIPA provides more stringent protections than those accorded by the First
Amendment. Under RLUIPA, a government may not impose a substantial burden on the
religious exercise of a confined person unless the government establishes that the burden
furthers a “compelling governmental interest” and does so by “the least restrictive means.”
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2). RLUIPA must be “construed broadly in favor of protecting
an inmate’s right to exercise his religious beliefs.” Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989,
995 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g)).
The first step under RLUIPA requires the plaintiff to show that the exercise of his
religion is at issue; this includes “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or
central to, a system of religious belief.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A). Next, the plaintiff
bears the burden of establishing prima facie that the defendant’s conduct substantially
burdened his religious exercise. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1. A “substantial burden” is one
that imposes a “significantly great restriction or onus” upon a prisoner’s exercise of religion.
Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 995 (citation omitted). If the plaintiff meets the prima facie burden,
then the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that the substantial burden on the inmate’s
religious practice both furthers a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive
means of doing so. Id.
Here, there is no dispute that Plaintiff satisfies the first step in the RLUIPA analysis
and that the exercise of his religion is at issue. Defendants argue that he has failed to make
the second required showing—that his religious conduct was substantially burdened (Doc.
36 at 13-14; Doc. 46 at 11-17).11
Brunk and Miller also argue that Plaintiff cannot show that either of them are liable
for a RLUIPA violation (Doc. 36 at 10-12), and Hallahan argues that RLUIPA does not
authorize a claim for monetary damages against Hallahan (Doc. 46 at 9-11).
The RLUIPA substantial-burden test is the same as that used under the First
Amendment. See Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 995-96 (citing to First Amendment cases to
determine what constitutes a substantial burden under RLUIPA); see also Nelson v. Miller,
570 F.3d 868, 877 (7th Cir. 2009) (the First Amendment and RLUIPA both use the
substantial-burden test); Gladson v. Iowa Dep’t of Corr., 551 F.3d 825, 833 (8th Cir. 2009)
(once it is determined that a substantial burden exists, the analysis under the Free Exercise
Clause differs from RLUIPA). Here, Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim is based on the same factual
allegations as his First Amendment claim, and the parties’ arguments over whether there
exists a substantial burden are the same for both claims. Thus, this element of the RLUIPA
analysis—whether there is substantial burden to Plaintiff’s religious exercise—has already
been addressed, and the Court concluded that Plaintiff failed to show a substantial burden to
his religious exercise.
Because Plaintiff has not established a substantial burden, the RLUIPA inquiry ends,
and Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this claim. The Court need not address
Defendants’ remaining arguments.
(1) The reference is withdrawn as to Brunk and Miller’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. 36), Hallahan’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 46), and Plaintiff’s
Motion to Disregard Defendants’ Motions as Untimely (Doc. 44).
(2) Plaintiff’s Motion to Disregard Defendants’ Motions as Untimely (Doc. 44) is
(3) Brunk and Miller’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 36) is granted.
(4) Hallahan’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 46) is granted.
(5) The Clerk of Court must terminate this action and enter judgment accordingly.