Source: http://www.leagle.com/decision/19891718872F2d846_11550.xml
Timestamp: 2014-11-01 04:40:42
Document Index: 62106636

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2113', '§ 1344', '§ 1014', '§ 1344', '§ 1559', '§ 3663', '§ 3663']

Citing Case U.S. v. CLOUD
1. On June 21, 1985, Jon Perroton was sentenced to twenty years in prison after he pleaded guilty to three counts of bank larceny, interstate transportation of moneys taken by fraud, and bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(b), 2314, and 1344 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), respectively. Perroton was prosecuted in the district court for the Northern District of California in case CR-85-0130-SC. Only the bank fraud count arose out of his purchase of the Cal-Neva Lodge. Perroton was also ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $10 million, or a sum to be determined by the probation office.
5. In an argument that he seems to have abandoned in his reply brief, Cloud mistakenly relies on (4th Cir.1987), for the proposition that the government must prove he knowingly made false representations directly to a bank. The bank fraud statute itself contains no such requirement. 18 U.S.C. § 1344. A careful reading of its opinion, moreover, indicates that the court imposed no such requirement. 813 F.2d at 1293 n. 2 (conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1014 requires proof that defendant made a false statement to a bank; conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1344 requires proof that the defendant knowingly executed or attempted to execute a scheme or artifice to obtain money or property owned by or under the custody or control of a federally chartered or insured bank, by means of false pretenses, representations or promises).
7. Cloud also argues, somewhat incredibly, that he was an intended third-party beneficiary of the agreement by which Continental waived its subrogation and direct rights to sue "any party" in connection with the Cal-Neva transaction. A third party qualifies as a beneficiary under a contract if the parties intended to benefit the third party, and the terms of the contract make that intent evident. , 821-22 (9th Cir.1985). Under California law, a third-party may enforce a contract made expressly for her benefit at any time before the parties rescind it. Cal.Civ.Code § 1559 (West 1982). If Cloud could establish that he was an intended third-party beneficiary, perhaps he could assert the waiver provision as a defense to a civil action commenced by Continental. It does not follow, however, that he can assert any contractual rights he might have to defeat the jurisdiction of a federal court to order restitution pursuant to the VWPA. In any event, we need not resolve the parties' dispute about Cloud's third-party beneficiary claim because he failed to raise it in the district court in the first instance. , 223 (9th Cir.1987) (citing , 1012 (9th Cir.1983), 465 U.S. 1100, 104 S.Ct. 1593, 80 L.Ed.2d 125 (1984)).
8. The facts in briefly stated, were that the district court had compelled the defendant to sign a long-term promissory note payable to the victim as a form of restitution. Because the court failed to make specific findings of fact, and because the term of the restitution order exceeded time limits established by the VWPA, 18 U.S.C. § 3663(i)(2), the Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded. 810 F.2d at 458-60. The existence of a promissory note or other settlement agreement was, therefore, not material to the court's judgment.
9. The Court went on to endorse the view of the judge who had decided the case before it in the bankruptcy proceedings below:
10. We do not by our holding mean to imply that Continental, or any other recipient of VWPA restitution, may obtain a double recovery for injuries resulting from the relevant criminal offense. The VWPA itself expressly forecloses this possibility. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663(e)(1) and (2). District courts can factor into their sentencing decisions the existence of settlement agreements between the defendant and any victims of the offense. In fact, when ordering restitution under the VWPA, the district court arguably is required by sections 3663(e)(1) and (2) to consider such agreements. The district court in this case was fully apprised of, and clearly considered, the existence and terms of the settlement agreements among the parties.
11. In a footnote in his opening brief, Cloud argues that the district court was required to make clear findings of fact before entering an order of restitution, and that the failure to do so was an abuse of discretion. This court has recently held that a district court is required to make "factual determinations" under the VWPA and enter a specific order of restitution based on such facts. , 546 (9th Cir.1988). After citing to a Tenth Circuit case, , 618 (10th Cir.1984), the court sketched only a bare outline of the factfinding process that is required before imposition of a VWPA restitution order. The object, of course, is to make an order of restitution that is complete and accurate, and one that has a sound basis in fact. 861 F.2d at 546.
14. We also note our recent holding that joint and several liability for the entire loss may be imposed by the sentencing court, pursuant to an order of restitution, on each of the participants in a fraudulent scheme. , 435 (9th Cir.1987) (amended opinion). Subject to the statutory limitation on double recovery, both Cloud and Perroton could have been ordered to restore Continental's entire loss, plus the amount of unrecovered loss suffered by Hibernia. As in then, it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to order the lower amount.