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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 922', '§ 922', '§ 8', '§ 1890', '§ 922', '§922', '§ 922', '§ 922', '§ 922', '§ 922', '§ 922', '§ 922']

1999 Emerson Case 2nd Amendment
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§ Criminal Action No. 6:98-CR-103-C
AMENDED MEMORANDUM OPINION [see footnote 1]
Defendant Timothy Joe Emerson ("Emerson") moves to dismiss the Indictment against him, claiming that the statute he is prosecuted under, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), is an unconstitutional exercise of congressional power under the Commerce Clause and the Second, Fifth, and Tenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS Emersons Motion to Dismiss.
On August 28, 1998, Emersons wife, Sacha, filed a petition for divorce and application for a temporary restraining order in the 119th District Court of Tom Green County, Texas. The petition stated no factual basis for relief other than the necessary recitals required under the Texas Family Code regarding domicile, service of process, dates of marriage and separation, and the "insupportability" of the marriage. The application for a temporary restraining orderessentially a form order frequently used in Texas divorce proceduresought to enjoin Emerson from engaging in various financial transactions to maintain the financial status quo and from making threatening communications or actual attacks upon his wife during the pendency of the divorce proceedings.
On September 4, 1998, the Honorable John E. Sutton held a hearing on Mrs. Emersons application for a temporary restraining order. Mrs. Emerson was represented by an attorney at that hearing, and Mr. Emerson appeared pro se. Mrs. Emerson testified about her economic situation, her needs in the way of temporary spousal support and child support, and her desires regarding temporary conservatorship of their minor child.
Emerson first argues that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) is an unconstitutional exercise of congressional power under the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Pursuant to the Supreme Courts holding in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), Emerson argues that the Act is unconstitutional because it does not regulate commercial activity.
Two main schools of thought have developed on the issue of whether the Second Amendment recognizes individual or collective rights. These schools of thought are referred to as the "states rights," or "collective rights," school and the "individual rights" school. The former group cites the opening phrase of the amendment, along with subsequent case law, as authority for the idea that the right only allows states to establish and maintain militias, and in no way creates or protects an individual right to own arms. David E. Johnson, Note, Taking a Second Look at the Second Amendment and Modern Gun Control Laws, 86 KY. L.J. 197, 198 (1997-98) (citing Andrew D. Herz, Gun Crazy: Constitutional False Consciousness and Dereliction of Dialogic Responsibility, 75 B.U. L. REV. 57 (1995)). Due to changes in the political climate over the last two centuries and the rise of National Guard organizations among the states, states rights theorists argue that the Second Amendment is an anachronism, and that there is no longer a need to protect any right to private gun ownership.
The individual rights theorists, supporting what has become known in the academic literature as the "Standard Model," argue that the amendment protects an individual right inherent in the concept of ordered liberty, and resist any attempt to circumscribe such a right. Id. (citing Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 461, 464-88 (1995); Robert Dowlut, The Right to Keep and Bear Arms: A Right to Self-Defense Against Criminals and Despots, 8 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 25 (1997)).
A textual analysis of the Second Amendment supports an individual right to bear arms. A distinguishing characteristic of the Second Amendment is the inclusion of an opening clause or preamble, which sets out its purpose. No similar clause is found in any other amendment. Stanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 644 (1989). While states rights theorists seize upon this first clause to the exclusion of the second, both clauses should be read in pari materia, to give effect and harmonize both clauses, rather than construe them as being mutually exclusive.
Collective rights theorists argue that addition of the subordinate clause qualifies the rest of the amendment by placing a limitation on the peoples right to bear arms. Id. However, if the amendment truly meant what collective rights advocates propose, then the text would read "[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the States to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." However, that is not what the framers of the amendment drafted. The plain language of the amendment, without attenuate inferences therefrom, shows that the function of the subordinate clause was not to qualify the right, but instead to show why it must be protected. Id. The right exists independent of the existence of the militia. If this right were not protected, the existence of the militia, and consequently the security of the state, would be jeopardized. Id. at 201.
The Court has also held that given their contemporaneous proposal and passage, the amendments of the Bill of Rights should be read in pari materia, and amendments which contain similar language should be construed similarly. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 298 (1930), cited by David Harmer, Securing a Free State: Why the Second Amendment Matters, 1998 BYU L. REV. 55, 61 (1998). The Courts construction of "the people" as used in the Second Amendment supports a holding that the right to keep and bear arms is a personal right retained by the people, as opposed to a collective right held by the States. Thus, a textual analysis of the Second Amendment clearly declares a substantive right to bear arms recognized in the people of the United States.
A review of English history explains the founders intent in drafting the Second Amendment. As long ago as 690 A.D., Englishmen were required to possess arms and to serve in the military. David T. Hardy, Armed Citizens, Citizen Armies: Toward a Jurisprudence of the Second Amendment, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 559, 562 (1986) (citing 1 JOHN J. BAGLEY & PETER B. ROWLEY, A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND 1066-1540, at 152 (1965)). This obligation continued for centuries, requiring nobility, and later commoners, to keep arms and participate in the militia. Id. at 563-65. The obligation to keep arms was not simply to provide military service in the kings army; English citizens were also required to provide local police services, such as pursuing criminals and guarding their villages. CLAYTON E. CRAMER, FOR THE DEFENSE OF THEMSELVES AND THE STATE: THE ORIGINAL INTENT AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS 24-25 (1994); JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT 2 (1994).
The American colonists exercised their right to bear arms under the English Bill of Rights. Indeed, the English governments success in luring Englishmen to America was due in part to pledges that the immigrants and their children would continue to possess "all the rights of natural subjects, as if born and abiding in England." MALCOLM, supra, at 138. As in England, the colonial militia played primarily a defensive role, with armies of volunteers organized whenever a campaign was necessary. Id. at 139. Statutes in effect bore evidence of an individual right to bear arms during colonial times. For example, a 1640 Virginia statute required "all masters of families" to furnish themselves and "all those of their families which shall be capable of arms . . . with arms both offensive and defensive." Id. (citing THE OLD DOMINION IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF VIRGINIA, 1606-1689, at 172 (Warren M. Billings ed., 1975). A 1631 Virginia law required "all men that are fittinge to beare armes, shall bring their pieces to church . . . for drill and target practice." Hardy, supra, at 588 (quoting 1 WILLIAM W. HENING, THE STATUTES AT LARGE: BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE IN THE YEAR 1619, at 173-74 (reprint. 1969) (1823). These laws served the twofold purpose of providing individual self-defense while giving England a reserve force available in time of war. Murley, supra, at 20.
Hardy, supra, at 589-90 (quoting OLIVER M. DICKERSON, BOSTON UNDER MILITARY RULE 61 (1936)). Shortly after the "Boston Tea Party," British soldiers, led by General Gage, attempted to disarm the colonists. MALCOLM, supra, at 144. The British Parliament banned all exports of muskets and ammunition to the colonies and began seizing the colonists weapons and ammunition. Id. The British efforts to disarm the colonists hardened American resistance. At that point, the colonists began to form the "minutemen," a nationwide select militia organization. Hardy, supra at 890. In February 1775, a colonial militia prevented the British from seizing weapons at an armory in Salem, Massachusetts. Two months later, the colonists defeated British troops at Concord. Id. at 591. Distinguished colonial leaders, such as George Washington and Samuel Adams, strongly influenced the organization of these local militias. STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 60-61 (1984).
The individual right to bear arms, a right recognized in both England and the colonies, was a crucial factor in the colonists victory over the British army in the Revolutionary War. Without that individual right, the colonists never could have won the Revolutionary War. After declaring independence from England and establishing a new government through the Constitution, the American founders sought to codify the individual right to bear arms, as did their forebears one hundred years earlier in the English Bill of Rights.
Id. (citing NOAH WEBSTER, AN EXAMINATION INTO THE LEADING PRINCIPLES OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (1787), reprinted in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, PUBLISHED DURING ITS DISCUSSION BY THE PEOPLE, 1787-1788, at 56 (Paul L. Ford, ed. 1971) (1888)). Richard Lee Henrys view that a well regulated militia was the entire armed populace rather than a select body of men was reiterated by proponents to a bill of rights. As "M.T. Cicero" wrote to "The Citizens of America":
George Mason argued the importance of the militia and right to bear arms by reminding his compatriots of Englands efforts "to disarm the people; that it was the best and most effectual way to enslave them . . . by totally disusing and neglecting the militia." Id. at 74 (citing 3 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 380 (2d ed. 1863)). He also clarified that under prevailing practice the militia included all people, rich and poor. "Who are the militia? They consist now of the whole people, except a few public officers." Id. (citing 3 ELLIOT at 425-26). Because all were members of the militia, all enjoyed the right to individually bear arms to serve therein.
Although on the other side of the ratification debate, Anti-Federalist Patrick Henry was unequivocal on the individual right to bear arms. During the Virginia ratification convention, he objected to the Constitutions inclusion of clauses specifically authorizing a standing army and giving the federal government control of the militia. He also objected to the omission of a clause forbidding disarmament of the individual citizen: "The great object is that every man be armed . . . . [e]veryone who is able may have a gun." Id. at 229 (citing 3 J. ELLIOTT, supra, at 45).
Other states which had not yet ratified the Constitution followed the Maryland conventions practice of ratifying the Constitution while submitting proposed amendments. The New Hampshire convention, for example, adopted the nine Massachusetts amendments and added three others: one to limit standing armies, a second to ensure an individual right to bear arms, and a third to protect freedom of conscience. Id. The proposed amendment on freedom to bear arms read: "Congress shall never disarm any Citizen unless such as are or have been in Actual Rebellion." Id. at 158-59 (citing 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 1787-1870, at 143 (1894)).
That Madison envisioned a personal right to bear arms, rather than merely a right for the states to organize militias, is evident from his desired placement of the right in the Constitution. Madisons original plan was to designate the amendments as inserts between specific sections of the existing Constitution, rather than as separate amendments added to the end of the document. Hardy, supra at 609 (citing 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 707-08 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789)). Madison did not designate the right to keep and bear arms as a limitation of the militia clause of Section 8 of Article I. Rather, he placed it as part of a group of provisions (with freedom of speech and the press) to be inserted in "Article 1st, Section 9, between Clauses 3 and 4." Id. (quoting 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 186-87 (1905)). Such a designation would have placed this right immediately following the few individual rights protected in the original Constitution, dealing with the suspension of bills of attainder, habeas corpus, and ex post facto laws. Thus Madison aligned the right to bear arms along with the other individual rights of freedom of religion and the press, rather than with congressional power to regulate the militia. Id. This suggested placement of the Second Amendment reflected recognition of an individual right, rather than a right dependent upon the existence of the militia.
At that point, the Senate took up the Bill of Rights. Unfortunately, Senate debate on the issue was held in secret, and therefore no record exists of that bodys deliberations. CRAMER, supra at 58 (citing HELEN VEIT ET AL., CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS xix (1991)). The Senate form of the second amendment now described the militia not as "the best security" of a free state, but as "necessary to the security" of a free state, an even stronger endorsement than Madisons original description. MALCOLM, supra at 161. The Senators also omitted the phrase describing the militia as "composed of the body of the people." Elbridge Gerrys fear that future Congresses might expand on the religious exemption clause evidently convinced the Senate to eliminate that clause as well. Id. Even more important, however, was the Senates refusal of a motion to add "for the common defense" after the phrase "to keep and bear arms." Id. (citing HALBROOK, supra at 81, n. 167). Thus the American Bill of Rights, like the English Bill of Rights, recognized the individuals right to have weapons for his own defense, rather than for collective defense. Id. In this form, Congress approved the Second Amendment and sent the Bill of Rights to the state legislatures for ratification. Id.
In retrospect, the framers designed the Second Amendment to guarantee an individuals right to arms for self-defense. Such an individual right was the legacy of the English Bill of Rights. American colonial practice, the constitutional ratification debates, and state proposals over the amendment all bear this out. Id. at 162. The American Second Amendment also expanded upon the English Bill of Rights protection; while English law allowed weapons "suitable to a persons condition" "as allowed by law," the American right forbade any "infringement" upon the right of the people to keep and bear arms. Id.
In his influential Commentaries on the Constitution, Joseph Story emphasized the importance of the Second Amendment. He described the militia as the "natural defence of a free country" not only "against sudden foreign invasions" and "domestic insurrections," but also against "domestic usurpations of power by rulers." He went on to state that "[t]he right of the citizens to keep and bear arms has justly been considered as the palladium of the liberties of a republic; since it offers a strong moral check against the usurpation and arbitrary power of rulers; and will generally, even if these are successful in the first instance, enable the people to resist and triumph over them." 3 J. Story, Commentaries § 1890, p. 746 (1833).
The structure of the Second Amendment within the Bill of Rights proves that the right to bear arms is an individual right, rather than a collective one. The collective rights idea that the Second Amendment can only be viewed in terms of state or federal power "ignores the implication that might be drawn from the Second, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments: the citizenry itself can be viewed as an important third component of republican governance as far as it stands ready to defend republican liberty against the depredations of the other two structures, however futile that might appear as a practical matter." Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 651 (1989).
Furthermore, the very inclusion of the right to keep and bear arms in the Bill of Rights shows that the framers of the Constitution considered it an individual right. "After all, the Bill of Rights is not a bill of states rights, but the bill of rights retained by the people." David Harmer, Securing a Free State: Why The Second Amendment Matters, 1998 BYU L. REV. 55, 60 (1998). Of the first ten amendments to the Constitution, only the Tenth concerns itself with the rights of the states, and refers to such rights in addition to, not instead of, individual rights. Id. Thus the structure of the Second Amendment, viewed in the context of the entire Bill of Rights, evinces an intent to recognize an individual right retained by the people.
However, the only modern Second Amendment case from the Supreme Court is United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939). Jack Miller was charged with moving a sawed-off shotgun in interstate commerce in violation of the National Firearms Act of 1934. Among other things, Miller had not registered the firearm, as required by the Act. The court below dismissed the charge, accepting Millers argument that the Act violated the Second Amendment.
The Supreme Court reversed unanimously, with Justice McReynolds writing the opinion. Interestingly enough, he emphasized that there was no evidence showing that a sawed-off shotgun "at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia." Id. at 178. And "[c]ertainly it is not within judicial notice that this weapon is any part of the ordinary military equipment or that its use could contribute to the common defense." Id. at 178 (citation omitted). Thus, Miller might have had a tenable argument had he been able to show that he was keeping or bearing a weapon that clearly had a potential military use. Justice McReynolds went on to describe the purpose of the Second Amendment as "assur[ing] the continuation and render[ing] possible the effectiveness of [the Militia]." Id. at 178. He contrasted the Militia with troops of a standing army, which the Constitution indeed forbade the states to keep without the explicit consent of Congress. "The sentiment of the time strongly disfavored standing armies; the common view was that adequate defense of country and laws could be secured through the Militiacivilians primarily, soldiers on occasion." Id. at 179. McReynolds noted further that "the debates in the Convention, the history and legislation of Colonies and States, and the writings of approved commentators [all] [s]how plainly enough that the Militia comprised all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense." Id.
This Court has not had recent occasion to consider the nature of the substantive right safeguarded by the Second Amendment. [see footnote 2] If, however, the Second Amendment is read to confer a personal right to "keep and bear arms," a colorable argument exists that the Federal Governments regulatory scheme, at least as it pertains to the purely intrastate sale or possession of firearms, runs afoul of that Amendments protections. [see footnote 3]
As Professor Ronald Dworkin has argued, what it means to take rights seriously is that one will honor them even when there is significant social cost in doing so. Protecting freedom of speech, the rights of criminal defendants, or any other part of the Bill of Rights has significant costscriminals going free, oppressed groups having to hear viciously racist speech and so onconsequences which we take for granted in defending the Bill of Rights. This mind-set changes, however, when the Second Amendment is concerned. "Cost-benefit" analysis, rightly or wrongly, has become viewed as a "conservative" weapon to attack liberal rights. Yet the tables are strikingly turned when the Second Amendment comes into play. Here "conservatives" argue in effect that social costs are irrelevant and "liberals" argue for a notion of the "living Constitution" and "changed circumstances" that would have the practical consequence of erasing the Second Amendment from the Constitution. Levinson, supra at 657-58.
In response to arguments propounded by Professor Laurence Tribe and others describing the Second Amendment as being simply "seemingly state-militia-based" rather than "supporting broad principles" of private ownership of guns, Justice Scalia pointed out that it is incorrect to assume that the word "militia" refers only to "a select group of citizen-soldiers . . . rather than, as the Virginia Bill of Rights of June 1776 defined it, the body of the people, trained to arms." Antonin Scalia, Response, in A Matter of Interpretation, supra at 129, 136 n.13 (quoting JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS 136, 148 (1994)).
Justice Scalia also notes that "[t]his was also the conception of militia entertained by James Madison," citing The Federalist No. 46 for support. Id. "It would also be strange," he goes on to say, "to find in the midst of a catalog of the rights of individuals a provision securing to the states the right to maintain a designated Militia. Dispassionate scholarship suggests quite strongly that the right of the people to keep and bear arms meant just that." Id. at 137 n.13 (citing JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS (1994); William Van Alstyne, The Second Amendment and the Personal Right to Arms, 43 DUKE L.J. 1236 (1994)).
Justice Scalia concludes by stating that "[i]t is very likely that modern Americans no longer look contemptuously, as Madison did, upon the governments of Europe that are afraid to trust the people with arms, The Federalist No. 46; and the . . . Constitution that Professor Tribe espouses will probably give effect to that new sentiment by effectively eliminating the Second Amendment. But there is no need to deceive ourselves as to what the original Second Amendment said and meant. Of course, properly understood, it is no limitation upon arms control by the states." Id.
However, prosecution based on such an order would be tautological, for § 922(g)(8)(C)(i) merely repeats in different wording the requirement in subsection (B) that the order "restrains such person from harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate partner of such person or child of such intimate partner or person, or engaging in other conduct that would place an intimate partner in reasonable fear of bodily injury to the partner or child." §922 (g)(8)(B). All that is required for prosecution under the Act is a boilerplate order with no particularized findings. Thus, the statute has no real safeguards against an arbitrary abridgement of Second Amendment rights. Therefore, by criminalizing protected Second Amendment activity based upon a civil state court order with no particularized findings, the statute is over-broad and in direct violation of an individuals Second Amendment rights.
It is absurd that a boilerplate state court divorce order can collaterally and automatically extinguish a law-abiding citizens Second Amendment rights, particularly when neither the judge issuing the order, nor the parties nor their attorneys are aware of the federal criminal penalties arising from firearm possession after entry of the restraining order. That such a routine civil order has such extensive consequences totally attenuated from divorce proceedings makes the statute unconstitutional. There must be a limit to government regulation on lawful firearm possession. This statute exceeds that limit, and therefore it is unconstitutional.
The conduct this statute criminalizes is malum prohibitum, not malum in se. In other words, there was nothing inherently evil about Emerson possessing a firearm while being under a domestic restraining order. His conduct was unlawful merely because the statute mandated that it be. Wilson, 159 F.3d at 294 (Posner, C.J., dissenting). Section 922(g)(8) is one of the most obscure of criminal provisions. Here, Emerson owned a firearm, and knew or should have known that if, for example, he was convicted of a felony, he would have to relinquish ownership of his firearm. If by chance he did not know this, the sentencing judge or the probation officer would have informed him of the law. Nevertheless, when Emerson was made subject to the restraining order telling him to not harass his wife, Emerson could not have known of the requirement to relinquish his gun unless the presiding judge issuing the order told him. In this case, the state district judge did not tell Emerson about the requirement. Emersons attorney did not tell him either, because Emerson did not have a lawyer. The fact that the restraining order contained no reference to guns may have led Emerson to believe that since he complied with the order, he could carry on as before. Id. at 294-95.
We want people to familiarize themselves with the laws bearing on their activities. But a reasonable opportunity doesnt mean being able to go to a local law library and read Title 18. It would be preposterous to suppose that someone from [the defendants] milieu is able to take advantage of such an opportunity. If none of the conditions that make it reasonable to dispense with proof of knowledge of the law is present, then to intone "ignorance of the law is no defense" is to condone a violation of fundamental principles for the sake of a modest economy in the administration of criminal justice.
Section 922(g)(8) is also one of those "highly technical statutes that present . . . the danger of ensnaring individuals engaged in apparently innocent conduct," of which the Supreme Court spoke in Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 118 S. Ct. 1939, 1946-47, 141 L.Ed.2d 197 (1998). Emersons case differs from Bryan because the statute in this case is easy to understand, but it is hard to discover, which in the end compels the same result as demonstrated by Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
Because § 922(g)(8) is an obscure, highly technical statute with no mens rea requirement, it violates Emersons Fifth Amendment due process rights to be subject to prosecution without proof of knowledge that he was violating the statute. Accordingly, Emersons Motion to Dismiss the indictment as violative of the Fifth Amendment is granted.
Emersons last argument claims that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) violates the Tenth Amendment. The Tenth Amendment provides that:
Because the Fifth Circuit has held that Congress acted pursuant to its enumerated Commerce Clause power under Article I, Congress therefore enacted 18 U.S.C. § 922 (g)(8) pursuant to a valid grant of power in conformity with the Tenth Amendment. United States v. Pierson, 139 F.3d 501 (5th Cir. 1998). As mentioned previously, the court in Pierson held that by creating a nexus between illegal firearm possession and interstate commerce, Congress exercised its delegated power under the Commerce Clause to reach a "discrete set of firearm possessions that additionally have an explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce." Id. at 503. Therefore, under the first line of inquiry set forth in New York, the statute is constitutional under the Tenth Amendment.
In 1997, the Court refined this analysis by holding in Printz v. United States that Congress may act pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers and still violate principles of state sovereignty under the Tenth Amendment. 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997). In Printz, the Brady Act commandeered state law enforcement officers to perform background checks on prospective handgun owners. The Court held unconstitutional this asserted power of the Federal Government "to impress into its service  and at no cost to itself  the police officers of the 50 states." Id. at 922.
By passing 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), however, Congress did not violate the Tenth Amendment the way it did in New York and Printz, because here the federal government is not requiring state legislatures to pass specific laws, nor is it "commandeering" state governments into federal government service. Emerson argues, however, that § 922(g)(8) interferes with the ability of state judges to carry out their state's domestic relations laws, thus impermissibly regulating an area reserved for the states. It is true the Supreme Court has noted that family law is traditionally an area of state concern. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572,581(1979). And while it is arguable that § 922(g)(8) may offend general Tenth Amendment principles of federalism, because Congress was acting through an enumerated power in drafting the law, and the law does not command state activity in support of it, this statute does not clearly violate the Tenth Amendment under the Supreme Court's holdings in New York and Printz. Accordingly, Emerson's Tenth Amendment challenge to the statute fails.
Footnote 1. On February 26, 1999, the Court granted Defendants Motion to Dismiss. The following is the Courts memorandum opinion of the Order. Return to text of the Emerson Case.
Footnote 2. "Our most recent treatment of the Second Amendment occurred in United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939), in which we reversed the District Courts invalidation of the National Firearms Act, enacted in 1934. In Miller, we determined that the Second Amendment did not guarantee a citizens right to possess a sawed-off shotgun because that weapon had not been shown to be ordinary military equipment that could contribute to the common defense. Id., at 178. The Court did not, however, attempt to define, or otherwise construe, the substantive right protected by the Second Amendment." Return to text of the Emerson Case.
Footnote 3. "Marshaling an impressive array of historical evidence, a growing body of scholarly commentary indicates that the right to keep and bear arms is, as the Amendments text suggests, a personal right. See, e.g., J. Malcolm, To Keep and Bear Arms: The Origins of an Anglo-American Right 162 (1994); S. Halbrook, That Every Man Be Armed, The Evolution of a Constitutional Right (1984); Van Alstyne, The Second Amendment and the Personal Right to Arms, 43 Duke L.J. 1236 (1994); Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 Yale L.J. 1193 (1992); Control & Diamond, The Second Amendment: Toward an Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 Geo. L.J. 309 (1991); Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 Yale L.J. 637 (1989); Kates, Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 204 (1983). Other scholars, however, argue that the Second Amendment does not secure a personal right to keep or bear arms. See, e.g., Bogus, Race, Riots, and Guns, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1365 (1993); Williams, Civic Republicanism and the Citizen Militia: The Terrifying Second Amendment, 101 Yale L.J. 551 (1991); Brown, Guns, Cowboys, Philadelphia Mayors, and Civic Republicanism: On Sanford Levinsons The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 Yale L.J. 661 (1989); Cress, An Armed Community: The Origins and Meaning of the Right to Bear Arms, 71 J. of Am. Hist. 22 (1984). Although somewhat overlooked in our jurisprudence, the Amendment has certainly engendered considerable academic, as well as public, debate." Return to text of the Emerson Case.
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