Source: http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/546/1009/204926/
Timestamp: 2013-05-22 19:04:07
Document Index: 176778147

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 552', '§ 403', 'art,\n4', '§ 552', '§ 403', '§ 403', '§ 403', '§ 403', '§ 403', '§ 552', '§ 552', '§ 403', '§ 552']

546 F.2d 1009: Harriet Ann Phillippi, Appellant, v. Central Intelligence Agency and George H. Bush, Director,central Intelligence Agency :: US Court of Appeals Cases :: Justia
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546 F.2d 1009: Harriet Ann Phillippi, Appellant, v. Central Intelligence Agency and George H. Bush, Director,central Intelligence Agency
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit. - 546 F.2d 1009
Argued April 19, 1976.Decided Nov. 16, 1976.As Amended Nov. 24, 1976
1 Plaintiff requested
2 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) exempts from disclosure matters that are
3 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3) provides, in relevant part,
4 It is important to note that Congress has been peculiarly sensitive to expansive judicial interpretations of the exemptions to the FOIA. Through various amendments it has sought to insure that these exemptions not provide means by which government agencies could eviscerate the policy of the Act
5 The Agency based its claim to an exemption under § 552(b)(3) entirely on 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3), supra note 3
6 50 U.S.C. § 403g provides, in relevant part, that
7 Since the "document" the Agency is currently asserting the right to withhold is confirmation or denial of the existence of the requested records, we stress that we are not requiring, at this stage, the Vaughn index requested by appellant. If the District Court should decide on remand that the Agency's refusal to confirm or deny the existence of the requested records is unjustified, the standard Vaughn procedures, including preparation of a detailed index to the requested records, if any, would then apply
8 Affidavit of Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, in appellees' supplemental memorandum at 4a
9 The Government was forced to retreat from its original refusal to confirm or deny any involvement with the Glomar Explorer by its disclosures in a tax case in Los Angeles. See United States v. County of Los Angeles, Civil Action No. CV 75-2752-R, C.D.Cal
10 Affidavit of Brent Scowcroft, supra note 8, appellees' supplemental memorandum at 3a. Mr. Scowcroft maintains that only the fact that the Government owns the Glomar Explorer can be or has been disclosed. He asserts that
11 The Government states this proposition to be: "there is a difference in international affairs between rumor and speculation and official confirmation of governmental involvement in a particular activity." Appellees' supplemental memorandum at 4. As so stated, this proposition resembles the original stand taken by the Agency. It is clear, however, that avoiding "official confirmation of governmental involvement" with the Glomar Explorer is no longer possible. See note 10 supra
12 As we have indicated, on remand appellees will be asked to submit a public justification, which is as detailed as is possible, for refusing to confirm or deny the existence of the requested records. Appellant will then have the opportunity to test that justification through appropriate discovery. Assuming that the Government provides no more information than is contained in the public affidavits submitted in Military Audit Project, appellant's discovery would presumably focus on the less than self-evident relationship between confirmation or denial of the existence of records relating to contacts between the Agency and the media and the disclosure, beyond that already officially made, of "the nature and purpose of the Program." For example, appellant might seek to learn the process by which it was determined that confirming or denying the existence of records relating to media contacts by the Agency would indicate more about the nature of the project than do the documents filed in United States v. County of Los Angeles. See note 10 supra. Alternatively, appellant might inquire as to the process by which it was determined that confirming or denying the existence of the requested records would constitute greater "(o)fficial acknowledgement of the involvement of specific United States Government agencies," see pp. ---- - ---- of 178 U.S.App.D.C., p. 1013 of 546 F.2d supra, than has already taken place. For example, Mr. Scowcroft has indicated that a "senior official" of the Central Intelligence Agency was on the National Security Council committee which determined to declassify some information related to the Glomar Explorer. Brent Scowcroft's Answers to Plaintiffs' Interrogatories, supra note 10, Answer to Interrogatory No. 17. Moreover, the Director of Central Intelligence has a statutory responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. 50 U.S.C. § 403(d); see note 14 infra. That responsibility is apparently not limited to keeping Agency-sponsored activities secret. Appellant might inquire how it was determined that confirmation or denial of contacts with domestic news media, undertaken pursuant to the Director's statutory responsibility, would disclose "the involvement of specific United States Government agencies" in the project which the Director sought to keep from being publicized
13 Indeed, the Agency itself might change its position if required to defend that position in public to the extent consistent with the national security. It has already revised its rationale for withholding information once during the pendency of this litigation, and its actions appear to conflict with its currently stated position. See note 10 supra
14 The District Court's order relied on the third exemption to the FOIA and on 50 U.S.C. §§ 403(d)(3) and 403g. Appellant contends that § 403(d)(3) is not a statutory authorization to withhold information within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3). We reject this argument. See S.Rep. No. 93-854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1974); H.R.Rep. No. 93-1380, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1974). If the Agency can demonstrate, see 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (Supp. V 1975), that release of the requested information can reasonably be expected to lead to unauthorized disclosure of intelligence sources and methods, it is entitled to invoke the statutory protection accorded by 50 U.S.C. § 403(d) and 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3)