Source: http://ca.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20100930_0001620.SCA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2016-10-28 20:05:27
Document Index: 88267689

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1915', '§ 1983', '§ 1914', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 335', '§ 352', '§ 352', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915']

| Woods v. $350.00 Balance from Prisoner Trust Account Romero
Woods v. $350.00 Balance from Prisoner Trust Account Romero
JAMIE L. WOODS, CDCR # C-46083 PLAINTIFF,v.$350.00 BALANCE FROM PRISONER TRUST ACCOUNT ROMERO; LARRY LYLE; A. CANLAS; N. RIDGE; WILLIAM MOSELY; RUSSELL; D. MCCARTHY; PANGRANUYEN; F. SEDIGHI; AND CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION MEDICAL DEPARTMENT, DEFENDANTS.
ORDER: (1) GRANTING MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS, IMPOSING NO INITIAL PARTIAL FILING FEE AND GARNISHING [Doc. No. 2]; (2) DENYING MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL [Doc. No. 3] (3) DISMISSING ACTION FOR FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b)
Plaintiff, a state inmate currently incarcerated at the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has not prepaid the $350 filing fee mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); instead, he has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis ("IFP") pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [Doc. No. 2], along with a Motion for Appointment of Counsel [Doc. No. 3]
The Court finds that Plaintiff has submitted a certified copy of his trust account statement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D. CAL. CIV. L.R. 3.2. Plaintiff's trust account statement shows that he has insufficient funds from which to pay an initial partial filing fee.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed IFP [Doc. No. 2] and assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). However, the Court further orders the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to garnish the entire $350 balance of the filing fees owed in this case, collect and forward them to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
"[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Resnick, 213 F.3d at 447; Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194. Here, however, even presuming Plaintiff's factual allegations true, the Court finds his Complaint both fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and seeks monetary relief from defendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B); 1915A(b); Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; Resnick, 213 F.3d at 446.
Here, Plaintiff claims that many of the Defendants violated his rights when he was first incarcerated in 1996 by failing to provide adequate medical care. Plaintiff then discusses a number of time periods that he was released on parole but subsequently his parole was revoked. Based on the allegations contained in his Complaint, Plaintiff would have reason to believe that his constitutional rights were violated beginning in 1996. Wallace, 549 U.S. at 391.; see also Maldonado, 370 F.3d at 955. However, Plaintiff did not file his Complaint in this case until July 23, 2010, which exceeds California's statute of limitation. See CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 335.1; Jones, 393 F.3d at 927.
Plaintiff does not allege any facts to suggest how or why California's two-year statute of limitations might be tolled for a period of time which would make his claims timely. See, e.g., CAL. CODE CIV. P. § 352.1 (tolling statute of limitations "for a maximum of 2 years" during a prisoner's incarceration); Fink v. Shedler, 192 F.3d 911, 916 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding that CAL. CODE CIV. P. § 352.1 tolls a California prisoner's personal injury claims accruing before January 1, 1995 for two years, or until January 1, 1995, whichever occurs later, unless application of the statute would result in a "manifest injustice."). There appear to be a number of occasions from 1996 to 2009 when Plaintiff was at times incarcerated and at other times, Plaintiff was on parole. Thus, it is not clear whether those claims that arose prior to 2008 would be entitled to statutory tolling.
Generally, federal courts also apply the forum state's law regarding equitable tolling. Fink, 192 F.3d at 914. Under California law, however, a plaintiff must meet three conditions to equitably toll a statute of limitations: (1) he must have diligently pursued his claim; (2) his situation must be the product of forces beyond his control; and (3) the defendants must not be prejudiced by the application of equitable tolling. See Hull v. Central Pathology Serv. Med. Clinic, 28 Cal. App. 4th 1328, 1335 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); Addison v. State of California, 21 Cal.3d 313, 316-17 (Cal. 1978); Fink, 192 F.3d at 916. Here, however, Plaintiff has failed to plead any facts which, if proved, would support the equitable tolling of his claims. See Cervantes v. City of San Diego, 5 F.3d 1273, 1277 (9th Cir. 1993). Thus, Plaintiff's entire action must be dismissed as barred by the statute of limitations.
Plaintiff alleges that he has been denied adequate medical care since he first became incarcerated in November of 1996. "The unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain upon incarcerated individuals under color of law constitutes a violation of the Eighth Amendment." Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056-57 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992)). A violation of the Eighth Amendment occurs when prison officials are deliberately indifferent to a prisoner's medical needs. Id.; see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that he has a number of medical issues including "testicular cysts, neuropathy secondary to hypertension and diabetes, asthma and seizure disorder." (Compl. at 8.) Plaintiff alleges that an unnamed doctor had recommended surgery for his condition while all the subsequent prison doctors who are named as Defendants told Plaintiff that his condition could be treated with antibiotics. (Id. at 8-13.)
A mere "difference of medical opinion" between a prisoner and his physicians concerning the appropriate course of treatment is "insufficient, as a matter of law, to establish deliberate indifference." Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996). Instead, to allege deliberate indifference regarding choices between alternative courses of treatment, a prisoner must allege that the chosen course of treatment "was medically unacceptable under the circumstances," and was chosen "in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to [the prisoner's] health." Id. (citation omitted). Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts from which the Court could find that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff's entire Complaint must be dismissed sua sponte as barred by the applicable statute of limitations and for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b). See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; Resnick, 213 F.3d at 446, n.1.
1. Plaintiff's Motion for Appointment of Counsel [Doc. No. 3] is DENIED without prejudice.
5. Plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED for as barred by the applicable statute of limitations and for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b) & 1915A(b). However, Plaintiff is GRANTED forty five (45) days leave from the date this Order is "Filed" in which to file a First Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading noted above. Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint must be complete in itself without reference to the superseded pleading. See S.D. CAL. CIV. L.R. 15.1. Defendants not named and all claims not re-alleged in the First Amended Complaint will be deemed to have been waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987).
Further, if Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint still fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, it may be dismissed without further leave to amend and may hereafter be counted as a "strike" under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177-79 (9th Cir. 1996).