Source: http://al.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20150312_0000253.MAL.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2017-07-22 00:36:04
Document Index: 185273218

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1381', '§ 401', '§ 405', '§ 423', '§ 405', 'art, 357']

JONATHON NOLON OWENS, Plaintiff,v.CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, [1]Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER CHARLES S. COODY JUDGE
I. Introduction The plaintiff applied for supplemental security income benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq., and disability insurance benefits pursuant to Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq., alleging that he was unable to work because of a disability. His application was denied at the initial administrative level. The plaintiff then requested and received a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). Following the hearing, the ALJ also denied the claim. The Appeals Council rejected a subsequent request for review. The ALJ’s decision consequently became the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (Commissioner).[2] See Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). The case is now before the court for review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405 (g) and 1383(c)(3). Based on the court’s review of the record in this case and the briefs of the parties, the court concludes that the decision of the Commissioner should be reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
II. Standard of Review Under 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A), a person is entitled to disability benefits when the person is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.
The standard of review of the Commissioner’s decision is a limited one. This court must find the Commissioner’s decision conclusive if it is supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Ingram v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1260 (11th Cir. 2007). “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. It is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158-59 (11th Cir. 2004). A reviewing court may not look only to those parts of the record which supports the decision of the ALJ but instead must view the record in its entirety and take account of evidence which detracts from the evidence relied on by the ALJ. Hillsman v. Bowen, 804 F.2d 1179, 1180 (11th Cir. 1986). The court “may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute . . . [its] judgment for that of the [Commissioner].” Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 n.8 (11th Cir. 2004) (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted).
III. The Issues A. Introduction. Owens was 29 years old at the time of the hearing before the ALJ. (R. 35). He has completed the seventh grade in special education classes.[5] (Id.).
Owens’ prior work experience includes work as a “driver helper.” (R. 23). Following the administrative hearing, the ALJ concluded that Owens has a severe impairment of “mild mental retardation.” (R. 15). The ALJ concluded that Owens was able to perform his past relevant work as a driver’s helper, and thus, he was not disabled. (R. 23). In addition, the ALJ concluded that Owens was not disabled because he has the residual functional capacity to perform other work that is available in the national economy. (R. 24)
B. The Plaintiff’s Claims. Owens presents two issues for the Court’s review.
1. The Commissioner’s decision should be reversed because the ALJ failed to follow the “slight abnormality” standard by failing to find Mr. Owens’ psoriasis and obesity as severe impairments, as required by SSR 96-3p.
2. The ALJ committed reversible error in failing to find Mr. Owens’ mild mental retardation meets or equals the ...