Source: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/97-6146/
Timestamp: 2014-04-17 20:11:44
Document Index: 120574901

Matched Legal Cases: ['§11361', '§11360', '§11359', '§245', '§667', '§1192']

MONGE v. CALIFORNIA | LII / Legal Information Institute
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ANGEL JAIME MONGE, PETITIONER v.
This case presents the question whether the Double Jeopardy Clause, which we have found applicable in the capital sentencing context, see Bullington
451 U. S. 430 (1981)
, extends to noncapital sentencing proceedings. We hold that it does not, and accordingly affirm the judgment of the California Supreme Court.
Petitioner was charged under California law with one count of using a minor to sell marijuana, Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. §11361(a) (West 1991), one count of sale or transportation of marijuana, §11360(a), and one count of possession of marijuana for sale, §11359. In the information, the State also notified petitioner that it would seek to prove two sentence enhancement allegations: that petitioner had previously been convicted of assault and that he had served a prison term for that offense, see Cal. Penal Code Ann. §§245(a)(1), 667(e)(1), and 667.5 (West Supp. 1998).
Under Californias three-strikes law, a defendant convicted of a felony who has two qualifying prior convictions for serious felonies receives a minimum sentence of 25 years to life; when the instant conviction was preceded by one serious felony offense, the court doubles a defendants term of imprisonment. §§667(d)(1) and (e)(1)(2). An assault conviction qualifies as a serious felony if the defendant either inflicted great bodily injury on another person or personally used a dangerous or deadly weapon during the assault. §§1192.7(c)(8) and (23). According to California law, a number of procedural safeguards surround the assessment of prior conviction allegations: Defendants may invoke the right to a jury trial, the right to confront witnesses, and the privilege against self-incrimination; the prosecution must prove the allegations beyond a reasonable doubt; and the rules of evidence apply. See, e.g.
, 16 Cal. 4th 826, 833834, 941 P. 2d 1121, 1126 (1997). Here, petitioner waived his right to a jury trial on the sentencing issues, and the court granted his motion to bifurcate the proceedings. After a jury entered a guilty verdict on the substantive offenses, the truth of the prior conviction allegations was argued before the court. The prosecutor asserted that petitioner had personally used a stick in committing the assault, see Tr. 189190 (June 12, 1995), App. 12, but introduced into evidence only a prison record demonstrating that petitioner had been convicted of assault with a deadly weapon and had served a prison term for the offense, see Peoples Exh. 1 (filed June 12, 1995), App. 36. The trial court found both sentencing allegations true and imposed an 11-year term of imprisonment: 5 years on count one, doubled to 10 under the three-strikes law, and a 1-year enhancement for the prior prison term. The court also stayed a 3-year sentence on count two and ordered the 2-year sentence on count three to be served concurrently. Petitioner appealed, and the California Court of Appeal, on its own motion, requested briefing as to whether sufficient evidence supported the finding that petitioner had a qualifying prior conviction. The State conceded that the record of the sentencing proceedings did not contain proof beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner had personally inflicted great bodily injury or used a deadly weapon, but requested another opportunity to prove the allegations on remand. See Respondents Supplemental Brief (Cal. App.), pp. 23, App. 3335. The court, however, determined both that the evidence was insufficient to trigger the sentence enhancement and that a remand for retrial on the allegation would violate double jeopardy principles. The California Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals ruling that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial of prior conviction allegations. The three-justice plurality noted this Courts traditional reluctance to apply double jeopardy principles to sentencing proceedings and concluded that the exception recognized in Bullington
, did not apply. In Bullington
, we held that a capital defendant who had received a life sentence during a penalty phase that bore the hallmarks of [a] trial on guilt or innocence could not be resentenced to death upon retrial following appeal. Here, the plurality acknowledged that Californias proceedings to assess the truth of prior conviction allegations have the hallmarks of a trial, but it found Bullington
distinguishable on several grounds. First, the plurality cited statements by this Court indicating that Bullington
s rationale is confined to the unique circumstances of capital cases. See 16 Cal. 4th, at 836837, 941 P. 2d, at 1128 (citing Caspari
v. Bohlen,
510 U. S. 383, 392 (1994)
; Pennsylvania
v. Goldhammer,
474 U. S. 28, 30 (1985)
)). The plurality also reasoned that capital sentencing procedures are mandated by the Supreme Courts interpretation of the Federal Constitution, whereas the procedural protections accorded in Californias sentence enhancement proceedings rest on statutory grounds. 16 Cal. 4th, at 837, 941 P. 2d, at 1128. The plurality then cited the breadth and subjectivity of the factual determinations at issue in the capital sentencing context, as well as the financial and emotional burden that the penalty phase of a capital case places on a defendant. Id.
, at 838839, 941 P. 2d, at 1129. Finally, the plurality explained that a qualifying strike involves a finding of a particular status that may be made from the record of the prior conviction, while the jurys sentencing determination in a capital case depends on the specific facts of the defendants present crime, as well as an overall assessment of the defendants character. Id.
, at 839, 941 P. 2d, at 1130.