Source: https://casetext.com/case/holsey-v-state-12
Timestamp: 2019-05-19 22:44:52
Document Index: 116152066

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 17', '§ 15', '§ 16', '§ 16', '§ 17', '§ 17', '§ 17']

Holsey v. State, 271 Ga. 856 | Casetext
271 Ga. 856 (Ga. 1999)
Holseyv.State
Supreme Court of GeorgiaDec 2, 1999
271 Ga. 856•524 S.E.2d 473•
A jury convicted Robert Wayne Holsey of murder in the shooting death of Deputy Sheriff Will Robinson. The jury fixed the sentence for the murder at death. Holsey appeals, contending that he was absent from a jury view at which the trial court and an unsworn store clerk answered questions from jurors. Because Holsey later acquiesced in the improprieties occurring during the jury view, we affirm.
The crimes occurred during the early morning hours of December 17, 1995. Holsey was indicted by the Baldwin County Grand Jury on January 8, 1996, for malice murder, felony murder, and armed robbery. The state filed notice of its intent to seek the death penalty for the murder on January 12, 1996. Upon Holsey's motion for a change of venue, his case was ordered transferred to the Superior Court of Morgan County. The trial began on February 1, 1997, and the jury found Holsey guilty on all counts on February 11, 1997. The felony murder conviction was vacated by operation of law, and on February 13, 1997, the jury fixed the sentence for the malice murder at death based upon a finding of four statutory aggravating circumstances: Holsey had been previously convicted of a capital felony; the murder was committed while Holsey was engaged in the commission of another capital felony; the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing his lawful arrest; and the murder was committed against a peace officer engaged in his official duties. The trial court imposed a sentence of death for the malice murder and a sentence of life imprisonment without parole for the armed robbery in accordance with OCGA § 17-10-7 (b) (2). Holsey filed a motion for a new trial on March 7, 1997, and amended the motion on January 6, 1999. The trial court denied the amended motion for a new trial on January 19, 1999. This appeal was docketed on April 28, 1999, and orally argued on July 13, 1999.
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 ( 99 S.C. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560) (1979).
2. Holsey argues that the trial court impermissibly excused nine prospective jurors who all were full-time college students attending colleges and universities outside of the county. The trial court examined each of the students individually in order to assess the degree to which they would be burdened by jury service in Holsey's one to two week trial. From our review of the record, we conclude that the trial court properly considered each student's individual circumstances in light of the trial's expected length and made a finding that each would suffer an extraordinary hardship if forced to serve. Such an individualized review, as opposed to a blanket, indiscriminate excusal of all college students without regard for the particular hardship each will bear, is consistent with this Court's interpretation of OCGA § 15-12-1.
Thornton v. State, 264 Ga. 563, 575 ( 449 S.E.2d 98) (1994).
DeYoung v. State, 268 Ga. 780, 784 ( 493 S.E.2d 157) (1997); Carr v. State, 267 Ga. 547, 553-54 ( 480 S.E.2d 583) (1997).
4. Holsey contends that the state exercised its peremptory strikes in a race-conscious manner in violation of Batson v. Kentucky. The panel of forty-two qualified jurors was comprised of nine African-American persons (21%). The state used its ten peremptory strikes to remove two African-American persons (20%) and eight Caucasian persons (80%) from the panel, and the jury consisted of seven African-American persons (58%) and five Caucasian persons (42%). The trial court assumed that Holsey made a prima facie case of discriminatory intent and required the state to set forth a "race-neutral, case-related, clear, and reasonable explanation for the exercise of the peremptory strike[s]."
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 ( 106 S.C. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69) (1986).
Turner v. State, 267 Ga. 149, 151 ( 476 S.E.2d 252) (1996).
Turner, 267 Ga. at 151.
Jordan v. State, 247 Ga. 328, 343-46 ( 276 S.E.2d 224) (1981).
The Georgia courts have stringently enforced the right of a criminal defendant under the Georgia Constitution to be present at all aspects of the trial. This Court has consistently considered the defendant's absence from a critical part of the trial as a defect not subject to harmless error analysis. We have no difficulty concluding that the taking of testimony is a critical part of the trial at which the defendant has the right to be present. However, the Court has also stated that a defendant may later acquiesce in proceedings occurring in his absence.
Ga. Const. Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XII; Brooks v. State, 271 Ga. 456 (1999).
Brooks v. State, 271 Ga. at 457 (defendant's absence from in-chambers conferences involving jury selection); Wilson v. State, 212 Ga. 73, 75-78 ( 90 S.E.2d 557) (1955) and Tiller v. State, 96 Ga. 430 ( 23 S.E. 825) (1895) (defendant's absence during portion of prosecutor's argument); Rider v. State, 195 Ga. 656, 659-662 ( 25 S.E.2d 304) (1943) (defendant's absence during recharge of the jury); Hopson v. State, 116 Ga. 90, 91 ( 42 S.E. 412) (1902) (same); Wilson v. State, 87 Ga. 583 ( 13 S.E. 566) (1891) (same); Bonner v. State, 67 Ga. 510 (1881) (same); Chance v. State, 156 Ga. 428, 430-433 ( 119 S.E. 303) (1923) (defendant's absence during jury view of a car that had been admitted into evidence). Compare Pennie v. State, 271 Ga. 419 (1999) (when defendant was absent from a colloquy between a juror and the judge in the presence of both counsel regarding a spectator's greeting of the juror when they passed in the hallway, state did not overcome presumption of prejudice).
See Wade v. State, 12 Ga. 25, 29 (1852).
Harwell v. England, 234 Ga. 640, 641 ( 217 S.E.2d 154) (1975). See also Hudson v. State, 250 Ga. 479, 483 — 484 ( 299 S.E.2d 531) (1983) (defendant acquiesced in counsel's waiver of jury of 12 by not objecting during trial after one juror was excused).
The record demonstrates that when the trial reconvened the Monday after the jury trip to the food store, the defendant began his case. After Holsey had called several witnesses and the jury had taken a break, the trial court raised the issue of the jury's questions at the food store. During this discussion, the trial court stated that the store clerk had pointed to the camera and had spoken to the jurors about it. Holsey's counsel made no objection and Holsey remained silent as well. Therefore, we conclude that Holsey acquiesced in the proceedings that occurred at the food store in his absence.
6. Holsey argues that blood evidence obtained from his shoe as a result of his detention and arrest should have been suppressed at trial because the officer lacked probable cause to seize him. While probable cause is required for a warrantless arrest, a person may be lawfully seized for purposes of a brief investigation when only a reasonable and articulable suspicion exists.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26-27 ( 88 S.C. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889) (1968).
What is intended to be an investigatory detention can be transformed into a de facto arrest by the means of detention employed. However, a law enforcement officer who detains a person for purposes of investigation should "not be denied the opportunity to protect himself from attack by a hostile suspect" and may lawfully detain the person in a manner "reasonably necessary to protect [his] personal safety and to maintain the status quo." Other courts have held that, in sufficiently dangerous circumstances, law enforcement officers may effect and maintain investigatory detentions by drawing weapons and forcing defendants to lie face down with arms and legs spread. Such methods must be reserved for cases where plausible danger exists to the detaining officer's personal safety, but "[t]o require an officer to risk his life in order to make an investigatory stop would run contrary to the intent of Terry v. Ohio. . . ."
See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502-503 ( 103 S.C. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229) (1983).
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 ( 92 S.C. 1921, 32 LE2d 612) (1972).
United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 235 ( 105 S.C. 675, 83 L.Ed.2d 604) (1985).
See e.g., United States v. Aldridge, 719 F.2d 368, 371-72 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. Merritt, 695 F.2d 1263, 1273 (10th Cir. 1982).
United States v. Jacobs, 715 F.2d 1343, 1346 (9th Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
United States v. Malaska, 501 F.2d 208, 213 n. 10 (5th Cir. 1974).
See Jacobs, 715 F.2d at 1345-1346; Aldridge, 719 F.2d at 371 — 372.
See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 ( 101 S.C. 2587, 69 L.Ed.2d 340) (1981).
7. The state presented scientific evidence showing that blood found on one of Holsey's shoes was consistent with the victim's blood. Holsey argues that this evidence should have been excluded because the chain of custody of his shoes was inadequately maintained. We agree that the blood-stained shoe was subject to the chain of custody requirement, but our review of the testimony reveals that chain of custody was adequately demonstrated by the state at trial. Holsey also challenges the chain of custody for his clothing. However, the items of clothing, which had no blood splatters, were distinct and identifiable physical objects. Therefore, a showing of chain of custody regarding the clothing was unnecessary.
See Johnson v. State, 271 Ga. 375, 382 (1999).
Harper v. State, 251 Ga. 183, 185 ( 304 S.E.2d 693) (1983).
8. Holsey argues that a tape-recorded radio transmission by the victim reporting the license plate number of the red Ford Probe was not admissible under the necessity exception to the hearsay rule because the state made no showing at trial that the hearsay statement was more probative than other available evidence. The record reflects, however, that the officer's transmission of the license plate number was the most probative evidence connecting Holsey's car to the shooting.
Chapel v. State, 270 Ga. 151, 155 ( 510 S.E.2d 802) (1998).
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18.
Davis v. State, 263 Ga. 5, 6 ( 426 S.E.2d 844) (1993).
Raines v. State, 247 Ga. 504 (1) ( 277 S.E.2d 47) (1981); OCGA § 16-5-2 (a) ("A person commits the offense of voluntary manslaughter when he causes the death of another human being under circumstances which would otherwise be murder and if he [or she] acts solely as the result of a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation sufficient to excite such passion in a reasonable person. . . .").
State v. Alvarado, 260 Ga. 563, 564 ( 397 S.E.2d 550) (1990).
OCGA § 16-5-2 (a).
Smith v. State, 270 Ga. 240, 250 ( 510 S.E.2d 1) (1998).
Perkins v. State, 269 Ga. 791, 795 ( 505 S.E.2d 16) (1998); DeYoung v. State, 268 Ga. 780, 786 ( 493 S.E.2d 157) (1997); Wellons v. State, 266 Ga. 77, 91 ( 463 S.E.2d 868) (1995).
13. We find that the sentence of death in this case was not imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor. We also find, considering both the crime and the defendant, that the sentence of death was neither excessive nor disproportionate to the penalties imposed in similar cases. The cases listed in the Appendix support the imposition of the death penalty in this case in that they involve the intentional killing of a peace officer engaged in official duties. Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Benham, C.J., who concurs in judgment only as to Division 11 and Sears, J., who concurs in part and dissents in part.
OCGA § 17-10-35 (c) (1).
OCGA § 17-10-35 (c) (3).
I concur in the majority's affirmance of appellant's adjudication of guilt. However, for the reasons explained in my partial concurrence and partial dissent in Wilson v. The State, I would stay ruling on the constitutionality of appellant's sentence of death by electrocution until receiving guidance from the United States Supreme Court on that issue.
S99P0651 (December ___, 1999).
In all capital cases, this Court is obligated to undertake a sua sponte review of the death sentence to determine, among other things, whether the penalty is excessive. OCGA § 17-10-35. "This penalty question is one of cruel and unusual punishment, and is for the court to decide" in all cases. Blake v. State, 239 Ga. 292, 297 ( 236 S.E.2d 637) (1977).
Speed v. State, 270 Ga. 688 ( 512 S.E.2d 896) (1999); Henry v. State, 269 Ga. 851 ( 507 S.E.2d 419) (1998); Davis v. State, 263 Ga. 5 ( 426 S.E.2d 844) (1993); Hill v. State, 250 Ga. 277 ( 295 S.E.2d 518) (1982); Wallace v. State, 248 Ga. 255 ( 282 S.E.2d 325) (1981); Stevens v. State, 247 Ga. 698 ( 278 S.E.2d 398) (1981); McClesky v. State, 245 Ga. 108 ( 263 S.E.2d 146) (1980); Collier v. State, 244 Ga. 553 ( 261 S.E.2d 364) (1979).