Source: http://circuit5.blogspot.com/2006_10_01_archive.html
Timestamp: 2017-08-21 00:53:14
Document Index: 12569554

Matched Legal Cases: ['§2', '§2', '§ 750', '§ 22', '§2', '§ 22', '§2', '§ 22']

Fifth Circuit Blog: October 2006
Anders Brief not Required When Defendant Seeks Appeal of Non-Appealable Order Over Which Court Lacks Jurisdiction
United States v. Powell, No. 05-50918 (5th Cir. Oct. 25, 2006) (Jones, Smith, Stewart)
Isaac Powell was under supervised release arising out of a previous counterfeit security conviction when the government requested a blood sample pursuant to theDNA Act. Powell initially refused, but after discussions with the district court judge who warned Powell that if he did not submit the blood sample he could face revocation of his supervised release, he relented and provided the sample to the government. Powell challenges the constitutionality of the DNA Act in this appeal.
Slip op. at 1-2. The court holds that it lacks jurisdiction to consider Powell's appeal because he appealed from a non-appealable order. The court further holds that "[t]here is no Anders duty in situations such as this where defendant seeks an appeal of a nonappealable order over which this court has no jurisdiction." Slip op. at 2.
posted by Brad Bogan at 10:39 AM 0 comments
Anything Interesting in the Recent Unpublished Opinions?
The Fifth Circuit has issued dozens of unpublished opinions in the past several days. Many of them appear to involve Apprendi appeals in 1326 cases, as well as preservation of the felony-simple-possession-not-an-aggravated-felony issue currently before the Supreme Court. But there could be an interesting needle in this giant unpublished haystack. If you know of any such needles, please point them out in the comments.
posted by Brad Bogan at 10:58 AM 0 comments
Failure to Raise Particular Argument for Inapplicability of Good Faith Exception Constitutes Waiver of that Specific Argument
United States v. Pope, No. 04-51008 (5th Cir. Oct. 17, 2006) (Jolly, Wiener, Dennis)
This is the second opinion in this case, which involves an appeal from the district court's denial of Pope's motion to suppress evidence obtained during the execution of two separate search warrants at her home. The pivotal issue is the applicability of the Leon good faith exception to the first warrant. (The second warrant was based on information obtained during the execution of the first one.)
The first time around, the court of appeals agreed with Pope that the good faith exception did not apply because the supporting affidavit was recklessly false. See 452 F.3d 338. That holding drew a sharp dissent, which accused the panel majority of taking liberties with, misrepresenting, and exaggerating the record to make a factual finding on an issue that the district court never even considered. (The majority disputed that, of course.)
The panel reconsidered the case sua sponte, and now holds that Pope waived the argument regarding reckless falsehood by not raising it in the district court. The court observed that Leon identified four situations in which the good faith exception would not apply (exceptions to the exception, if you will). The court concludes that Pope only argued for one of them in the district court, and it was not the one on which the first opinion granted relief (she argued that there was no objectively reasonable reliance on the warrant, rather than reckless falsehood in the supporting affidavit). The court holds that even though Pope moved to supress evidence and disputed the applicability of the good faith exception, she waived the specific argument on which she relied on appeal (reckless falsehood) by not raising that specific argument in the district court. It further held that the good faith exception did apply because the officer's reliance on the warrant was objectively reasonable.
To state the court's waiver holding another way, there are four exceptions to the Leon good faith exception: A, B, C, D. Pope only argued A in the district court, but she argued both A and B on appeal. Because Pope did not argue B in the district court, she waived that argument and the court of appeals could not consider it. (The court also held that even if the failure to raise the argument was treated as a forfeiture rather than a waiver, it wouldn't constitute plain error.) And A didn't apply.
posted by Brad Bogan at 9:49 AM 0 comments
LEO's Expert Testimony on Methods of Illegal Alien Transportation Violated FRE 704(b); Conviction Reversed
United States v. Hernandez-Acuna, No. 05-30555 (5th Cir. Oct. 17, 2006) (per curiam) (unpublished) (King, Garwood, Jolly)
Sometimes you find the most interesting things in unpublished opinions. For example, when was the last time you saw a conviction reversed on the ground that a law enforcement agent's "expert" testimony crossed the line into an impermissible opinion on the defendant's mental state? The opinion's a little murkier than it could be on that point, but you nevertheless might be able to use it to persuade a district court to circumscribe the scope of, if not prohibit, this highly questionable type of testimony.
Hernandez was a driver for a small (apparently unlicensed) transportation company in Dallas. "On May 16, 2004, Hernandez was the relief driver riding in the front passenger seat of a van when Officer Earlton Parker of the Greenwood City[, Louisiana] Police Department stopped the driver, Jose de Jesus Contreras, for speeding." For whatever reason, Officer Parker summoned ICE agents to check the immigration status of the van's passengers. All of the passengers, including Hernandez, turned out to be aliens illegally present in the United States.
Hernandez was charged with ten counts of illegal alien transportation and one count of conspiring to transport illegal aliens for gain. His defense seems to have centered on the mens rea element of the offenses, i.e., whether he knew or recklessly disregarded the aliens' immigration status. The jury convicted him on all counts. Hernandez challenged his conviction on several grounds, resulting in an odd mix of holdings from the court of appeals.
The most significant holding (seeing as how it results in the reversal of Hernandez's conviction) involves the expert testimony of Agent Jon Stansel concerning camioneta vans. See slip op. at 4-12. Here's the court's summary of his testimony:
In this case, Agent Stansel testified that “camioneta” is a Spanish word meaning small bus or van and that law-enforcement officials generally refer to a camioneta operation as a van company that does not comply with regulations and that transports illegal aliens across the United States. He also noted that smugglers bring illegal aliens directly to the van companies, which then transport the aliens from larger cities, such as Houston and Dallas, to other locations in the United States. According to Agent Stansel, camioneta operations are considered a “front” for alien smuggling operations and do not put signs on their vans to avoid detection. The camioneta passengers do not volunteer that they are illegal aliens, and the company does not ask questions regarding the passengers’ immigration status so that its personnel can say they were unaware of it. [. . .] In Agent Stansel’s opinion, border patrol agents watch for camioneta vans because they are “100% illegal” and the facts of this case were consistent with camioneta operations that he had investigated in the past.
Got any problem with that? The court sure did. It had no trouble concluding that Agent Stansel's testimony was the functional equivalent of an opinion as to whether Hernandez had the mental state required for the charged offenses, an opinion which is of course prohibited by Fed. R. Evid. 704(b). The court even went so far as to conclude that the district court's abuse of discretion in allowing the forbidden testimony was not harmless in light of the thin circumstantial evidence of Hernandez's guilty knowledge.
Unfortunately, the opinion is a little vague on exactly which portions of the testimony were problematic. It makes sure to note that "only that which amounted to a comment on Hernandez's mental state was improper[,]" but it isn't clear whether all of the testimony mentioned in the opinion crossed the line, or just some of it. (Personally, I don't see what value any of Stansel's testimony could have possibly had apart from the looks-acts-and-quacks-like-a-duck inference that the Government clearly expected the jury to draw from it.) Nevertheless, the case should serve as a reminder to district courts to be very careful about allowing this type of flimsy "expert" testimony from law enforcement agents that isn't at all helpful to the jurors' understanding of the evidence in the case.
Where this opinion gets strange is in its resolution of two other issues: the district court's refusal to allow Hernandez to introduce expert testimony of his own regarding camioneta vans (see slip op. at 12-13), and Hernandez's sufficiency challenge to his conviction (see id. at 13-16).
First, the proffered defense expert. Hernandez wanted to call Robert Van Kemper, a professor of cultural anthropology at Southern Methodist University in Dallas, to testify about Hispanics' use of camioneta vans in Mexico and Dallas. The district court refused to allow it for two reasons. First, the district court found the testimony unreliable because it "relied largely upon one study on camionetas done by a professor in Los Angeles," and that study had not been peer-reviewed. Second, the district court concluded that 704(b) precluded the testimony because even though Van Kemper was qualified as an anthropologist, he "was in no better position than a juror to conclude whether Hernandez's actions demonstrated knowledge or reckless disregard of the passengers' immigration status." The court of appeals found no abuse of discretion as to the reliability determination, and concluded that "[b]ecause the purpose of Professor Van Kemper’s testimony was to negate Agent Stansel’s testimony and to provide other evidence concerning Hernandez’s state of mind, the testimony was rightfully excluded under Rule 704(b)."
What? Recall that the court held just a few pages earlier that only some of Agent Stansel's testimony crossed the 704(b) line. By holding the way it does the court sanctions a one-sided presentation to the jury wherin the government gets to elicit expert testimony from a law enforcement officer who sees alien smuggling in every camioneta operation, but the defense can't offer its own expert (a professor of cultural anthropology, no less) to give another expert perspective on who uses camionetas and why. And as far as the reliability issue is concerned, the court makes the common error of relying largely on Daubert to resolve that issue. Daubert isn't really on point for non-scientific expert testimony, and even under Daubert peer-review is not a sine qua non of admissibility. (Bonus tip: see Daubert on the Web for all things Daubert.)
The final point I'll mention is the court's rejection of Hernandez's sufficiency challenge to his conviction. (Why the court even addresses this issue given its reversal of the conviction on other grounds is a mystery.) Here's what the court had to say:
Even if, for the sake of argument we exclude Agent Stansel’s testimony bearing directly on Hernandez’s state of mind, the record is not devoid of evidence pointing to Hernandez’s guilt, nor is the evidence so tenuous that a conviction would be shocking. The remainder of Agent Stansel’s testimony, in addition to Officer Parker’s and Agent Patton’s testimony describing the condition of the van’s passengers, suggests that Hernandez may have recklessly disregarded the passengers’ illegal status. For instance, the evidence showed: (1) that the passengers had utilized a small transport company operated by and for Spanish-speaking individuals; (2) that the van company allowed payment at the destination rather than requiring payment up front; (3) that all the passengers appeared to be Hispanic; (4) that there was a “strong odor” indicating that some of the passengers had not bathed recently; (5) that the van was crowded; (6) that the passengers’ clothing was “dingy”; (7) that they had little luggage in the van, a mere four or five backpacks among twelve passengers each taking a long distance trip; (8) that safety equipment was not in the van; and (9) that the exterior of the van was unmarked.
Since the court reverses the conviction on other grounds, anyway, I guess we'll have to agree to disagree about whether that evidence is sufficient to show reckless disregard.
posted by Brad Bogan at 4:15 PM 0 comments
Michigan Felonious Assault Equivalent to Generic Aggravated Assault; Triggers 16-Level COV Whack Under U.S.S.G. §2L1.2
United States v. Saucedo-Roman, No. 05-41013 (5th Cir. Oct. 16, 2006) (per curiam) (unpublished) (Smith, Wiener, Owen)
Our old nemesis COV makes yet another appearance. In this case, the prior conviction triggering the 16-level crime of violence enhancement under U.S.S.G. §2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) is a Michigan conviction for felonious assault. Michigan defines that offense as "assault[ing] another person with a gun, revolver, pistol, knife, iron bar, club, brass knuckles, or other dangerous weapon without intending to commit murder or to inflict great bodily harm less than murder . . . ." Slip op. at 2 (quoting Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.82 (2002)). The court concludes, on the authority of United States v. Sanchez-Ruedas, 452 F.3d 409, 312 (5th Cir. 2006), that the Michigan offense is equivalent to generic aggravated assault as embodied in the Model Penal Code, and therefore a crime of violence.
This result may be consistent with Sanchez-Ruedas, but that case may have been wrongly decided so Saucedo-Roman should be considered questionable, as well.
posted by Brad Bogan at 1:05 PM 0 comments
Supreme Court Hears Argument on Whether Omission of Element from Indictment Can Be Harmless
Today the Supreme Court heard oral argument in United States v. Resendiz-Ponce (No. 05-998). The issue in the case is whether an indictment's failure to allege all of the elements of an offense can be harmless error. Depending on how the Court decides the case, it may also have something to say about the elements of attempted illegal reentry.
You can read SCOTUSblog's preview of the oral argument here, and the post-game here.
A transcript of today's argument is available here.
UPDATE: It now looks more likely that the Court will address the elements of attempted illegal reentry in one way or another. SCOTUSblog reports that the Court has requested supplemental briefing from the parties on this question: "Did the indictment omit an allegation that was required by the Fifth Amendment?" At issue here is whether an indictment for attempted illegal reentry must allege an overt act/substantial step towards the actual entry.
posted by Brad Bogan at 8:23 AM 0 comments
Another Supreme Court Case to Watch, This One Involving Sentencing
Yesterday the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Cunningham v. California (No. 05-6551), a case which involves the constitutionality of California's sentencing scheme. Some commentators believe that the decision may have big implications for federal sentencing, particularly the contours of reasaonableness review.
Lyle Denniston has a recap of yesterday's argument at SCOTUSblog, and Professor Berman (who's been following the case closely) has a couple of posts about the argument here and here.
A transcript of the argument is available here.
UPDATE: Professor Berman has additional thoughts here, and invites readers to chime in with predictions on how Cunningham will ultimately turn out.
posted by Brad Bogan at 9:38 AM 0 comments
Deadly Conduct Under Tex. Penal Code § 22.05(b)(1) is a 16-Level Crime of Violence Under U.S.S.G. §2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii)
United States v. Hernandez-Rodriguez, No. 05-51429 (5th Cir. Oct. 10, 2006) (per curiam) (Jolly, Davis, Wiener)
Hernandez, who pled guilty to illegal reentry, had a prior Texas conviction for deadly conduct. He was convicted under subsection (b)(1) of the deadly conduct statute, Tex. Penal Code § 22.05, which provides that "[a] person commits an offense if he knowingly discharges a firearm at or in the direction of . . . one or more individuals[.]" The court held that the offense necessarily involves the threat of force against a person, even if the gun is fired in the general direction of another person rather than directly at him. Because the offense involves the threatend use of physical force it qualifies as a crime of violence for purposes of U.S.S.G. §2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii).
Note that there are other ways of committing deadly conduct under § 22.05 that may not necessarily require the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against another person. (The court discusses one of them at pages 5 through 7 of the slip.) Note also that the issue may turn on which version of the deadly conduct statute is at issue. See slip op. at 5 n.1. So don't assume that all convictions for "deadly conduct" constitute crimes of violence.
posted by Brad Bogan at 1:35 PM 0 comments
posted by Brad Bogan at 5:09 PM 1 comments
This one might have escaped attention because it is BIA instead of 5th Circuit.
BIA holds that misprision of a felony is per se a crime of moral turpitude (i.e., misprision is always a deportable offense, no matter what the underlying facts are).
Very bad if the defendant is trying to avoid a deportation by pleading to a misprision. Case is Matter of ROBLES, 24 I&N Dec. 22 (BIA 2006).
Here is the link: http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/vll/intdec/vol24/3542.pdf
posted by Chris Carlin at 10:09 AM 0 comments
Yesterday's Supreme Court Arguments Regarding Simple Possession as an Aggravated Felony
Yesterday the Supreme Court heard oral argument in the consolidated cases of Lopez v. Gonzalez and Toledo-Flores v. United States. The issue, which affects a number of cases in this circuit, is whether a state felony conviction for simple possession of drugs is an aggravated felony, notwithstanding the fact that the same conduct would only be a misdemeanor under federal law.
How Appealing has collected links to articles about yesterday's argument here.
You can read a transcript of the argument here.
posted by Brad Bogan at 9:11 AM 0 comments
posted by Brad Bogan at 4:35 PM 0 comments
Via Steve Sady at the Ninth Circuit Blog:
posted by Brad Bogan at 9:32 AM 0 comments