Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/636/606/26351/
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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 68', '§ 299', '§ 1983', '§ 1985', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1', '§ 3', '§ 1985', '§ 8', '§ 1985', '§ 5', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1985', '§ 1985', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1985', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1985', '§ 1982']

James W. Mccord, Jr., Appellant, v. F. Lee Bailey et al, 636 F.2d 606 (D.C. Cir. 1980) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › D.C. Circuit › 1980 › James W. Mccord, Jr., Appellant, v. F. Lee Bailey et al
James W. Mccord, Jr., Appellant, v. F. Lee Bailey et al, 636 F.2d 606 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit - 636 F.2d 606 (D.C. Cir. 1980) Argued Oct. 17, 1979. Decided Sept. 9, 1980. Rehearing Denied Oct. 15, 1980
* In June of 1972, Washington's Metropolitan Police arrested McCord with four others at the Democratic National Committee headquarters. McCord was tried in federal district court, and eventually convicted of burglary, possession of intercepting devices, interception of oral and wire communications, and conspiracy to commit these offenses. McCord then petitioned the trial court for relief in the nature of a writ of error coram nobis, raising in part allegations of ineffective counsel at the criminal proceedings. McCord claimed that his attorneys had been disloyal because they discussed his case with attorneys for the other defendants and with some of McCord's co-conspirators, because they failed to cross-examine key government witnesses with sufficient vigor, and because they did not raise a defense of official authorization for McCord's acts. The district court denied McCord's petition in late 1973. McCord appealed this decision and his conviction the following year, repeating his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as one ground for reversal. This circuit, sitting en banc, discussed these contentions in detail, found them meritless, and affirmed the conviction. See United States v. McCord, 509 F.2d 334, 343-45, 351-53 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 930, 95 S. Ct. 1656, 44 L. Ed. 2d 87 (1975).
Collateral estoppel "prohibits parties who have litigated one cause of action from relitigating in a second and different cause of action matters of fact which were, or necessarily must have been, determined in the first litigation." Tutt v. Doby, 459 F.2d 1195, 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See Nasem v. Brown, 595 F.2d 801, 805 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 68 (Tent. Draft No. 4, April 15, 1977). Like res judicata, collateral estoppel promotes judicial efficiency. As the Supreme Court has noted,a party who has had one fair and full opportunity to prove a claim and has failed in that effort should not be permitted to go to trial on the merits of that claim a second time. Both orderliness and reasonable time saving in judicial administration require that this be so unless some overriding consideration of fairness to a litigant dictates a different result in the circumstances of a particular case.
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 324-25, 91 S. Ct. 1434, 1440, 28 L. Ed. 2d 788 (1971) (quoting Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419, 421 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 865, 71 S. Ct. 87, 95 L. Ed. 632 (1950)). For this doctrine to apply, the same issue must be at stake in both cases, and the issue must have been litigated and decided in the first suit.1
Furthermore, the legal standards for ineffective assistance of counsel in McCord's criminal proceedings and for legal malpractice in this action are equivalent. At the time of McCord's criminal appeal, this court defined ineffective assistance of counsel as the denial of a defendant's entitlement "to the reasonably competent assistance of an attorney acting as his diligent conscientious advocate." United States v. DeCoster (DeCoster I), 487 F.2d 1197, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The concept of reasonable competence is also the standard "traditionally and universally employed as the measure of the lawyer's civil liability ...." United States v. DeCoster (DeCoster III), 624 F.2d 196 at 249 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Robinson, J., concurring), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 944, 100 S. Ct. 302, 62 L. Ed. 2d 311 (1979). See Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540, 544 & n.9 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1011, 98 S. Ct. 1885, 56 L. Ed. 2d 394 (1978); Gard, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel-Standards and Remedies, 41 Mo.L.Rev. 483, 495-96 (1976). See also McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771, 90 S. Ct. 1441, 1449, 25 L. Ed. 2d 763 (1970); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 299A (1965); Bines, Remedying Ineffective Representation in Criminal Cases: Departures from Habeas Corpus, 59 Va. L. Rev. 927, 937 (1973).
A hearing need not be held for collateral estoppel to apply. When the facts are undisputed or accepted as true, a hearing would serve no purpose. Disposition by summary judgment will suffice, for example, because "there is no issue of material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law," Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). See Exhibitors Poster Exchange, Inc. v. National Screen Service Corp., 517 F.2d 110, 115-16 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1054, 96 S. Ct. 784, 46 L. Ed. 2d 643 (1976). In McCord's criminal appeal we accepted all of McCord's factual assertions as true, but still rejected his contentions. See United States v. McCord, 509 F.2d 334, 352 nn. 65-66 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 930, 95 S. Ct. 1656, 44 L. Ed. 2d 87 (1975). Having accepted McCord's factual assertions, a hearing now would amount to little more than a "useless ritual." Exhibitors Poster Exchange, Inc. v. National Screen Service Corp., 517 F.2d at 115.
Estoppel is not inappropriate because a contested issue is first raised after trial. McCord first asserted his ineffective assistance of counsel claim in his motion for a writ of error coram nobis. See Supplemental Memorandum on Points and Authorities in Support of Motion in the Nature of a Writ of Error Coram Nobis at 2, United States v. McCord, Crim. No. 1827-72 (D.D.C. Aug. 9, 1973).4 Judge Sirica denied the motion after considering the parties' memoranda and arguments. United States v. McCord, Crim. No. 1827-72 (D.D.C. Nov. 7, 1973) (order denying writ of error coram nobis). On appeal, the parties fully briefed the issue, and it received a full discussion from this court. See United States v. McCord, 509 F.2d at 351-53. Thus McCord has already litigated the issue twice and lost, see Rosenberg v. Martin, 478 F.2d 520, 565 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 872, 94 S. Ct. 102, 38 L. Ed. 2d 90 (1973), making defensive invocation of collateral estoppel appropriate, see Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 329-31, 99 S. Ct. 645, 650, 58 L. Ed. 2d 552 (1979); Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 328-29, 91 S. Ct. 1434, 1442-43, 28 L. Ed. 2d 788 (1971).5
Moreover, the circumstances of this case particularly favor invocation of collateral estoppel. McCord had every incentive in his criminal proceedings to argue aggressively for his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. As noted above, he had a full and fair opportunity to prove his case. Precluding reconsideration of a litigated claim saves valuable judicial time and resources, while reaffirming the certainty and stability of judicial decisions. See Johnson v. United States, 576 F.2d 606, 609-19 (5th Cir. 1978). Furthermore, estoppel saves Bailey, Alch, and their former law firm from the burden of defending a lawsuit on an issue that has already been fully adjudicated. See Parklane Hosiery v. Shore, 439 U.S. at 326-27, 99 S. Ct. at 649; Tutt v. Doby, 459 F.2d 1195, 1199 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
As a plaintiff in a malpractice suit,6 McCord must demonstrate that the defendants' actions caused a legally cognizable injury. Becker v. Colonial Parking, Inc., 409 F.2d 1130, 1136-37 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Richardson v. Gregory, 281 F.2d 626, 629 (D.C. Cir. 1960). The plaintiff must show, among other things, that his attorney's "negligence resulted in and was the proximate cause of loss to the client." Niosi v. Aiello, 69 A.2d 57, 60 (D.C. 1949). Thus an attorney is not liable for malpractice if his client has suffered no damages.
A division of this court has suggested by way of a per curiam reversal that a limited defense to a criminal charge exists for reasonable, good faith reliance on the apparent authority of a government official to authorize otherwise unlawful activity. United States v. Barker, 546 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (per curiam). Writing in a separate opinion, Judge Wilkey stated that a defendant asserting this defense must "show that his reliance was objectively reasonable under the particular circumstances of his case." Id. at 949 (Wilkey, J.) (separate opinion) (original emphasis). Judge Merhige agreed that the defense was available "if, and only if, an individual (1) reasonably, on the basis of an objective standard, (2) relies on a (3) conclusion or statement of law (4) issued by an official charged with interpretation, administration and/or enforcement responsibilities in the relevant legal field." Id. at 955 (Merhige, J.) (separate opinion) (emphasis added).7
Even if we assume that after Barker a criminal act will be excused if the defendant was misled by a government official into believing that the act was lawful, McCord cannot make a colorable argument under either Judge Wilkey's or Judge Merhige's formulation. Clearly McCord must show that he had some objective basis to believe the Watergate operation enjoyed official sanction. Such a showing is unimaginable. McCord's employer was not a government agency, but a political committee. McCord did not believe his supervisor, Gordon Liddy, was other than a private individual. McCord had no direct contact with any government official, nor did he have reason to believe Liddy functioned as an intermediary for anyone acting in an official capacity. McCord conceded before the Senate Watergate Committee that his bugging and surveillance all concerned political activities and that McCord himself harbored suspicions that the operations were unrelated to national security or other legitimate government interest.8 Thus to the extent there is an official authorization defense, it could not apply to McCord. See Democratic National Committee v. McCord, 416 F. Supp. 505, 508-09 (D.D.C. 1976). Accordingly, had Alch or Bailey raised the defense at McCord's trial, Judge Sirica would have stricken it on its face; there could have been no difference in the trial's outcome.
In the fourth and final count of his amended complaint, plaintiff McCord asserts claims against the defendants under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(2), (3) (Supp. II 1978).9 The district court did not discuss these allegations. Findings of fact and conclusions of law must be "sufficiently comprehensive and pertinent to the issues to provide a basis for decision." Schilling v. Schwitzer-Cummins Co., 142 F.2d 82, 84 (D.C. Cir. 1944). See Kelley v. Everglades Drainage District, 319 U.S. 415, 420-22, 63 S. Ct. 1141, 1144-45, 87 L. Ed. 2d 1485 (1943) (per curiam). Although inadequate findings and conclusions may be remanded to the district court for supplementation, "we will not remand a case for more specific findings if doing so will consume precious time and judicial resources without serving any purpose." LaSalle Extension University v. FTC, 627 F.2d 481, 485 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (per curiam). We therefore must examine each of McCord's civil rights contentions to determine whether further consideration by the district court is required.
To maintain a cause of action under section 1983, McCord must show that the defendants deprived him of his civil rights "under color of state law." Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 99, 91 S. Ct. 1790, 29 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1971). On this record McCord could not make the required showing. The defendants appeared on McCord's behalf at his criminal trial. Lawyers may be officers of the court, but " 'they are not officers of the state within the meaning of (section 1983).' " French v. Corrigan, 432 F.2d 1211, 1215 (7th Cir. 1970) (quoting Jones v. Jones, 410 F.2d 365, 366 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1013, 90 S. Ct. 547, 24 L. Ed. 2d 505 (1970)), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 915, 91 S. Ct. 890, 27 L. Ed. 2d 814 (1971). Accord, Brown v. Chaffee, 612 F.2d 497, 501 (10th Cir. 1979). In their capacities as representatives of a client in court, private counsel do not act under color of state law. Slavin v. Curry, 574 F.2d 1256, 1265 (5th Cir. 1978); Fine v. City of New York, 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1975).
McCord argues, however, that the defendants are subject to section 1983 by virtue of their alleged conspiracy with various federal officials. Even if McCord's factual allegations are correct, such a conspiracy fails to satisfy section 1983's requirements. As the Supreme Court stated in District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 93 S. Ct. 602, 34 L. Ed. 2d 613 (1973), section 1983 "deals only with those deprivations of rights that are accomplished under the color of the law of 'any State or Territory.' " Id. at 424, 93 S. Ct. at 606. Actions of federal officers are outside its proscriptions. See id. at 424-25, 93 S. Ct. at 606.
McCord's claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) is equally without merit. In Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 91 S. Ct. 1790, 29 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1970), the Court held that although section 1985 reaches private conspiracies as well as those involving state action, the language, legislative history, and constitutional basis of the statute indicate that a plaintiff under section 1985(3) must allege and prove "some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action." Id. at 102, 91 S. Ct. at 1798. Accord, e. g., Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 at 229 (9th Cir. 1980). Plaintiff McCord cannot pretend that he was the object of civil rights deprivation because of his race or membership in some other class.
We begin with the language of the statute itself. See, e. g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197, 96 S. Ct. 1375, 1382, 47 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1976); Zerilli v. The Evening News Association, 628 F.2d 217, 220 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The first clause of section 1985(2) creates a cause of action
According to the Supreme Court, the Reconstruction civil rights acts are to be "accord(ed) a sweep as broad as (their) language." Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409, 437, 88 S. Ct. 2186, 2202, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1189 (1968) (quoting United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 801, 86 S. Ct. 1152, 1160, 16 L. Ed. 2d 267 (1966)). Accord, Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97, 91 S. Ct. 1790, 1795, 29 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1971). Given the manifest meaning and the absence of reason for restrictive reading, we do not believe a class-based, invidiously discriminatory intent is an element of a cause of action under the first clause of section 1985(2). See, e. g., Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d at 840. Our instructions are clear: "Where the language is plain and admits of no more than one meaning the duty of interpretation does not arise and the rules which are to aid doubtful meanings need no discussion." Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485, 37 S. Ct. 192, 194, 61 L. Ed. 442 (1917).
Protection of civil rights was not the only reason for the enactment of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871. Restoration of civil authority, including restoration of the federal courts' ability to proceed without improper interference, was a major concern. The statute has its roots in the racial violence that erupted in the southern states at the end of the Civil War. The Ku Klux Klan had been organized in 1866. The subsequent five years had been marked by increasing numbers of attacks, often fatal, against blacks and Union sympathizers, including many federal officials. By 1871, the turbulence in the South had caused considerable consternation in Congress. On March 23, 1871, President Grant asked for legislation giving him additional authority to control the apparent chaos. Five days later, Representative Samuel Shellabarger of Ohio introduced a bill to meet the President's request. See generally District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 425-26, 93 S. Ct. 602, 606-607, 34 L. Ed. 2d 613 (1973).
The doctrine of collateral estoppel, reduced to its essence, provides that our judicial system will provide a party with only one "full and fair opportunity" to litigate an issue. "Collateral estoppel, like the related doctrine of res judicata, has the dual purpose of protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical issue with the same party or his privy and of promoting judicial economy by preventing needless litigation." Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326, 99 S. Ct. 645, 649, 58 L. Ed. 2d 552 (1979).
Nevertheless, I have difficulty with holding McCord totally estopped from asserting all claims of disloyalty and conflict of interest under the circumstances of this case. And I note other courts have had similar difficulties when faced with occasional unfair results which might be wrought by too broad an application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Some have gone so far as to describe the doctrine as dangerous, in that it could result in "utter disaster" as a result of a "trivial controversy," subjecting litigants to "extravagant hazards." The Evergreens v. Nunan, 141 F.2d 927, 929 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 720, 65 S. Ct. 49, 89 L. Ed. 579 (1944) (Learned Hand, J.). Traditionally, courts relied on a variety of approaches to avoid the necessity of holding a litigant bound when to do so would be unfair or unwise under the circumstances.4
These analyses led to a conclusion that collateral estoppel could not apply because its prerequisites had not been met. I do not believe that such a restrictive ruling is necessary here, however. A more straightforward and flexible analysis has recently been commended to us by the Supreme Court. Parklane Hosiery, supra, 439 U.S. 322, 99 S. Ct. 645, 58 L. Ed. 2d 552, struck down the last vestiges of mutuality of estoppel, which had provided that neither party could use a prior judgment against the other party unless both parties were bound by the same judgment. The Court recognized, however, that as traditional restrictions on the use of collateral estoppel were eased, the possibility of unfairness increased. I would add that the possibility of the frustration of the important public benefit of having issues fully aired and finally decided also increases. The solution, declared the Court, was not to impose strict limitations on when collateral estoppel may apply, but to grant broad discretion to determine that it should not apply in a particular case. Id. at 331, 99 S. Ct. at 651.
Furthermore, one of the principal purposes of collateral estoppel, "to protect litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical issue with the same party," Parklane Hosiery, supra, at 326, 99 S. Ct. at 649, is not a factor in this case. Alch and Bailey have never previously been party to any suit brought by McCord; calling them to answer in a judicial forum for the first time works no more of an injustice against them than a lawsuit may against any litigant.5 Mutuality may not be a requirement of collateral estoppel any more, but lack of mutuality certainly eliminates much of the potential unfairness of deciding not to apply the doctrine.
When preventing unfairness to litigants is not a factor in deciding whether collateral estoppel should apply, we are left with the goal of conserving judicial resources. In such a case, the court's discretion to decide that the benefits of an evidentiary hearing to finally resolve this issue are greater than the detriment to its resources is appropriately broader. This case should not involve the "staggering expense and typical length" of a patent case, for example, where collateral estoppel is particularly valuable. Id. at 328-329 n. 10, 99 S. Ct. at 650.
Finally, and particularly noted by the Supreme Court in Parklane Hosiery as a factor to be considered in exercising discretion to decide whether collateral estoppel should apply, there were practical and procedural disadvantages suffered by McCord in presenting his claims to this court before. He was "unable to engage in full-scale discovery or call witnesses," id. at 331, 99 S. Ct. at 651, and indeed he alleges that some witnesses were unwilling to talk with him because they were still subject to criminal prosecution. He was also in the process of attempting to pursue his appeal with new counsel, allegedly with a notable lack of cooperation from Alch. All of these are factors which I believe should be considered before the district court decides to foreclose McCord's tort claims, though I would leave initial determination of the balance of equitable considerations to it.6
All of this is not to say, of course, that McCord has proved his case of disloyalty and breach of fiduciary duty, even under this limited rationale. Rather, he has presented a plausible sequence of events, supported at key points by uncontested facts and affidavits from third parties, which I believe would give rise to a cause of action for tortious breach of fiduciary duty. Since motive, state of mind and how much of what Alch did was done at McCord's bidding or with his knowledge are critical factors, summary judgment is inappropriate, so long as collateral estoppel does not raise an absolute bar, just as it would be, for instance, in an antitrust or race discrimination case in which the sequence of events alleged by the plaintiff could be either innocent behavior or carefully disguised misconduct. Summary judgment should be used sparingly when motive and intent play a leading role, when proof is likely to be largely in the hands of alleged conspirators, and when a plaintiff is faced with hostile witnesses. Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 82 S. Ct. 486, 7 L. Ed. 2d 458 (1962). The fact that McCord may have a difficult time proving his case, however, is not relevant; it is the litigant's choice whether pursuit of an issue difficult to prove and promising only meager relief is justified.
Because it is the defendants who raise collateral estoppel to bar the plaintiff's relitigation of the malpractice issues, we need not be concerned that the defendants were neither parties nor privies to the criminal trial or appeal. In Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 328-29, 91 S. Ct. 1434, 1442-43, 28 L. Ed. 2d 788 (1971), the Court held that "defensive use" of a prior judgment-that is, a defendant's assertion of collateral estoppel to prevent a plaintiff's litigation of issues the plaintiff previously litigated and lost-was permissible even though the defendant was not himself bound by the prior judgment. Last year the Court reaffirmed this rule. See Parklane Hosiery v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 99 S. Ct. 645, 58 L. Ed. 2d 552 (1979). Distinguishing defensive use from offensive use (a plaintiff's assertion of collateral estoppel to prevent a defendant's litigation of issues the defendant previously litigated and lost), the Parklane Court observed that even if the defendant was not himself subject to an estoppel arising from the prior judgment he asserts against the plaintiff, defensive use promotes judicial economy without being unfair. See id. at 329-31, 99 S. Ct. at 650-51
When asked during oral argument to identify any issues of fact concerning his defense attorney's performance that had not been raised during the criminal proceedings, McCord's counsel responded only: "The overlooking, and we maintain and there's evidence, the intentional suppressing of that (official authorization) defense as a defense for McCord in the trial of the case." This issue was in fact argued in the coram nobis proceeding, see, e. g., Supplemental Memorandum of the United States in Opposition to Motion by Defendant McCord in the Nature of a Writ of Coram Nobis at 4 & n.5, United States v. McCord, Crim. No. 1827-72 (D.D.C. Sept. 18, 1973), and in the criminal appeal, see United States v. McCord, 509 F.2d 334, 353 n. 69 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 930, 95 S. Ct. 1656, 44 L. Ed. 2d 87 (1975)
McCord does not contest that litigation of an issue in a criminal proceeding can estop a party from raising the same claim in a subsequent civil action. See Emich Motor Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558, 568-69, 71 S. Ct. 408, 413-14, 95 L. Ed. 534 (1951); McNally v. Pulitzer Pub. Co., 532 F.2d 69, 76 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 855, 97 S. Ct. 150, 50 L. Ed. 2d 131 (1976). This "rule is not changed by the fact that the (civil) action is brought by the person convicted in the prior criminal action ...." Willard v. United States, 422 F.2d 810, 812 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 913, 90 S. Ct. 1714, 26 L. Ed. 2d 76 (1970). See Cardillo v. Zyla, 486 F.2d 473 (1st Cir. 1973); United States v. Lima, No. 79-502, slip op. at 4 (D.C.App. Mar. 12, 1980); Ross v. Lawson, 395 A.2d 54 (D.C. App.1978)
Count 3 of plaintiff's amended complaint alleges that the defendants took part in a conspiracy to deprive McCord of proper representation. However, civil conspiracy is not in and of itself a civil wrong, giving an independent cause of action. Lamont v. Haig, 590 F.2d 1124, 1136 n. 73 (D.C. Cir. 1978). See Edwards v. James Stewart & Co., 160 F.2d 935, 936-37 (D.C. Cir. 1947); Blankenship v. Boyle, 329 F. Supp. 1089, 1099 (D.D.C. 1971). But see also Note, Civil Conspiracy: A Substantive Tort?, 59 Bost.U.L.Rev. 921, 926 (1979) (separate cause of action for civil conspiracy permitted in a few jurisdictions under limited circumstances)
We have studied plaintiff's complaint closely, but we are unable to discern that he pleads or intimates any cause of action other than legal malpractice and deprival of civil rights. Cf. Fielding v. Brebbia, 399 F.2d 1003, 1004 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (complaint alleged attorney had committed a breach of fiduciary duty). We are not free to fabricate pleadings for either party. As McCord himself reminds us,
Brief for Appellant at 34 (quoting Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701, 709 (D.C. Cir.) (Tamm, J., concurring), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 947, 89 S. Ct. 2021, 23 L. Ed. 2d 465 (1969)).
Judge Leventhal dissented in Barker because he did not believe any mistake of law defense actually applied to the Watergate circumstances. See United States v. Barker, 546 F.2d 940, 957-73 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Leventhal, J., dissenting)
United States v. McCord, 509 F.2d 334, 343 n. 18 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 940, 95 S. Ct. 1656, 44 L. Ed. 2d 87 (1975).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). In 1979, Congress expanded the coverage of § 1983 to include acts under color of District of Columbia law. Pub. L. No. 96-170, § 1, 93 Stat. 1284 (1979). This amendment has no bearing upon McCord's case, however, because McCord does not contend that any deprivation of his rights occurred after the effective date of the amendment, December 29, 1979. See id. § 3.
Decisions in other circuits have reached differing conclusions. Compare, e. g., Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d 830, 840 (3d Cir. 1976) (showing of discriminatory animus not required) and Kelly v. Foreman, 384 F. Supp. 1352, 1355 (S.D. Tex. 1974) (same) with Jones v. United States, 401 F. Supp. 168, 172-74 (E.D. Ark. 1975) (plaintiff must show class-based, invidiously discriminatory intent), aff'd, 536 F.2d 269, 271 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039, 97 S. Ct. 735, 50 L. Ed. 2d 750 (1977)
The constitutional basis for the first clause of § 1985(2) is Congress's plenary power over the federal courts. The Constitution grants Congress power "(t)o constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court," U.S.Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 9, and Congress enjoys wide latitude in effectuating its constitutional powers, see McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 4 L. Ed. 579 (1819). Preserving the integrity of the federal judicial process clearly includes discouraging all conspiracies, whatever their motivation or target, that use threats, force, or intimidation to deter free, full, and truthful testimony. See Stern v. United States Gypsum, Inc., 547 F.2d 1329, 1341 n.19 (7th Cir.) (dictum), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 975, 98 S. Ct. 533, 54 L. Ed. 2d 467 (1977); Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d at 840; Kelly v. Foreman, 384 F. Supp. at 1355. Congress lacked an equivalent authority over state courts, so the equal protection language in the second half of § 1985(2) was inserted to ground that portion of the statute on Congress's power under § 5 of the fourteenth amendment. See pages 615-617 infra
if two or more persons shall, within the limits of any State, band, conspire, or combine together to do any act in violation of the rights, privileges, or immunities of any person, to which he is entitled under the Constitution and laws of the United States, which, committed within a place under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, would, under any law of the United States then in force, constitute the crime of either murder, manslaughter, mayhem, robbery, assault and battery, perjury, subornation of perjury, criminal obstruction of legal () process or resistance of officers in discharge of official duty, arson, or larceny, and if one or more of the parties to said conspiracy or combination shall do any act to effect the object thereof, all the parties to or engaged in said conspiracy or combination, whether principals or accessories, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and upon conviction thereof shall be liable to a penalty of not exceeding $10,000, or to imprisonment not exceeding ten years, or both, at the discretion of the court; provided, that if any party or parties to such conspiracy or combination shall, in furtherance of such common design, commit the crime of murder, such party or parties so guilty shall, upon conviction thereof, suffer death....
By the same token, the clause's requirement that the conspiracy consist of two or more persons "in any State or Territory" does not exclude conspiracies conducted in the District of Columbia. In District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 93 S. Ct. 602, 34 L. Ed. 2d 613 (1971), the Court held that the words "State or Territory" as used in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 do not include the District. Nevertheless, the term "State or Territory" may have one meaning in § 1983 and another in § 1985(2). The Carter Court recognized that " '(w) here the subject matter to which the words refer is not the same in the several places where they are used, or the conditions are different, or the scope of the legislative power exercised in one case is broader than that exercised in another, the meaning may well vary to meet the purposes of the law....' " 409 U.S. at 421, 93 S. Ct. at 604 (quoting Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433, 52 S. Ct. 607, 608, 76 L. Ed. 1204 (1932))
The first clause of § 1985(2) is readily distinguishable from § 1983. In § 1983, "State or Territory" defines whose officials will have liability. In Carter, the Court reasoned that Congress did not intend the provision to extend to District of Columbia officials because Congress already had plenary power over officers of the District, and Congress had ample opportunity to supervise those officials directly. In § 1985(2), however, "State or Territory" defines what conspiracies will be subject to the statute. We cannot presume Congress intended to attack conspiracies throughout the nation except for the District of Columbia. A rationale that would justify establishing the District as a conspiracy enclave is difficult to conceive. Furthermore, Congress enacted § 1983 pursuant to its powers under the fourteenth amendment. The Carter Court concluded that the District's officers were not liable under § 1983 because the fourteenth amendment reaches only state action. This limitation does not apply where article I powers are employed, such as the enactment of the first clause of § 1985(2) to protect the federal judiciary. See also Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 68 S. Ct. 847, 92 L. Ed. 1187 (1948) ("State or Territory" includes the District of Columbia for purposes of § 1982 because the statute is based upon the thirteenth amendment and thus is not limited to state action).
In Fielding v. Brebbia, 399 F.2d 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1968), the plaintiff sued his attorney for breach of the fiduciary relationship, alleging that the attorney had counseled him to resign his position as president of a corporation, in order to help another client replace him and take over the business. In spite of the fact that in its factual allegations supporting the claim the complaint was conclusory and vague in the extreme, this court held that its dismissal for failure to state a claim was improper, noting that "this jurisdiction has been outstandingly alert to the delicacy of the status of attorneys who undertake to counsel a client." Id. at 1005. The court further justified its hesitancy to bar the plaintiff from his opportunity to prove his claim by noting that the confidential relationship "presents so many opportunities for the reaping of special benefits at the expense of the client by an attorney so disposed." Id
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266, 98 S. Ct. 1042, 1053, 55 L. Ed. 2d 252 (1978).
For example, some decisions define the "issue" determined in the prior proceeding very narrowly, and then conclude that the new issue is different, albeit only slightly. See Brubaker v. King, 505 F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1974); Williams v. Liberty, 461 F.2d 325 (7th Cir. 1972). Other courts have held that if the prior determination decided more than was "necessary," the bar should not apply. Haize v. Hanover Ins. Co., 536 F.2d 576 (3d Cir. 1976). Still other courts have strictly applied the requirement that a question be "distinctly put in issue and directly determined," especially in cases involving prior criminal proceedings. Kauffman v. Moss, 420 F.2d 1270 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 846, 91 S. Ct. 93, 27 L. Ed. 2d 84 (1970)