Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/661/514/298837/
Timestamp: 2019-11-20 04:59:05
Document Index: 197431082

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 24', '§ 2000', '§ 1983', '§ 78', '§ 78']

International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 2188,plaintiff-appellant, v. Western Electric Company, Incorporated, Defendant-appellee, 661 F.2d 514 (5th Cir. 1979) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Fifth Circuit › 1979 › International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 2188,plaintiff-appellant, v. Western Electric...
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 2188,plaintiff-appellant, v. Western Electric Company, Incorporated, Defendant-appellee, 661 F.2d 514 (5th Cir. 1979)
US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit - 661 F.2d 514 (5th Cir. 1979)
The two agreements in question are the "General Agreement" between the union and the company, covering the terms and conditions of employment for all union members, and the "Journeyman Trades Plan Agreement" ("JTPA"), covering certain terms and conditions, including wages and job classifications, for certain skilled employees. Arbitrability of disputes over job classifications under the JTPA is governed by Article 5(2) (a) of that agreement, which provides in pertinent part:
The company argues, and the court below agreed, that the use of the term "an employee" in Article 5(2) (a) of the JTPA makes it clear that the question whether a group of employees has been properly classified is not arbitrable.2 We disagree.
Id. at 582-83, 80 S. Ct. at 1353.3 Thus, the question presented is whether we can say "with positive assurance" that a clause covering a dispute concerning "an employee" does not cover an identical dispute concerning "employees."
If we were interpreting a statute giving a right of action to a "person," rather than a contractual clause granting a right of arbitration, we surely would not hold that the use of the word "person" excluded, as a substantive matter, the possibility that the action could be brought by several "persons." If we did, then no joint action or class action could be brought under such a statute, since our court-made rules of civil procedure do not and cannot amend the substantive rights granted by Congress. Yet, our statute books are teeming with provisions which grant a right of action to the singular "person," and which are often the basis of multi-plaintiff litigation.5 The statutory analogy is a fitting one, for "(t)he collective bargaining agreement ... is more than a contract; it is a generalized code to govern a myriad of cases which the draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate.... It calls into being a new common law the common law of a particular industry or of a particular plant." Warrior, 363 U.S. at 578-79, 80 S. Ct. at 1351.
The company argues that separate arbitrations are required because the forty employees "perform various and varying functions." This contention addresses the merits of the union's claim that all forty employees are misclassified; the merits are for the arbitrator, not the court, to decide. Warrior, 363 U.S. at 585, 80 S. Ct. at 1354. Similarly, any argument that the provisions of the two bargaining agreements impose a procedural requirement that each employee's classification be considered separately is for the arbitrator. See John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 557-58, 84 S. Ct. 909, 918-19, 11 L. Ed. 2d 898 (1964); Tobacco Workers International Union v. Lorillard Corp., 448 F.2d 949, 954 (4th Cir. 1971); Avon Products, Inc. v. International Union, UAW, 386 F.2d 651, 658-59 (8th Cir. 1967). We of course express no opinion on these questions; we hold only that the substance of the union's claim is arbitrable under the terms of the JTPA and the General Agreement.
It is well settled by decisions of the Supreme Court and by this court, as well as by circuit courts of appeals in other circuits, that whether the parties have agreed to submit a particular dispute to arbitration depends on the provisions of the contract, and whether the contract requires arbitration is a question for judicial determination. The Supreme Court held in United Steelworkers v. Warrior & G. Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 80 S. Ct. 1347, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1409 (1960):The Congress, however, has by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, assigned the courts the duty of determining whether the reluctant party has breached his promise to arbitrate. For arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit. Yet, to be consistent with congressional policy in favor of settlement of disputes by the parties through the machinery of arbitration, the judicial inquiry under § 301 must be strictly confined to the question whether the reluctant party did agree to arbitrate the grievance or did agree to give the arbitrator power to make the award he made. 363 U.S. at 582, 80 S. Ct. at 1352, 4 L. Ed. 2d at 1417.
The duty to arbitrate being of contractual origin, a compulsory submission to arbitration cannot precede judicial determination that the collective bargaining agreement does in fact create such a duty. Thus, just as an employer has no obligation to arbitrate issues which it has not agreed to arbitrate, so a fortiori, it cannot be compelled to arbitrate if an arbitration clause does not bind it at all. 376 U.S. at 546-547, 84 S. Ct. at 912, 11 L. Ed. 2d at 902-903.
The Union contends that by agreeing to arbitration and participating in the selection of an arbitrator and setting a date for arbitration, the Company waived its right to object to the arbitrability of class or group grievances. I do not agree. The record shows that group arbitration was never mentioned in the correspondence between the Union and the Company and it was never discussed at all in the oral conversations between Burnett and Wilkening. Under these circumstances, where the Company never agreed either by the contracts or by verbal statements to group arbitration, there was no waiver of its right to object to such procedure. See Communications Workers of America v. Western Electric Co., 397 F. Supp. 1318 (N.D. Ga. 1975), aff'd 558 F.2d 816 (5 Cir. 1977) where a controversy was submitted to an arbitrator but the parties could not agree, as here, on the specific dispute to be considered by the arbitrator. The Union argued in that case, as in this case, that the company waived its right to object to the arbitrability of the matter by participating in the arbitration process to the point of disagreement as to the subject matter. The court rejected this argument and held there was no waiver. I would make the same ruling here.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has ruled that questions of procedure are for the arbitrators to decide and not for the courts. The district court is limited to a decision whether the parties have agreed to submit the subject matter of the dispute to arbitration, leaving procedural questions to the arbitrator. See Operating Engineers v. Flair Builders, Inc., 406 U.S. 487, 491, 92 S. Ct. 1710, 1712, 32 L. Ed. 2d 248-252 (1972); John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, supra, 376 U.S. at 557-558, 84 S. Ct. at 918-919, 11 L. Ed. 2d at 909. See 6 T. Kheel, Labor Law § 24.03 at 24-41 (1978). See, also, United Steelworkers of America v. American International Aluminum Corp., 334 F.2d 147, 150 (5 Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 991, 85 S. Ct. 702, 13 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1965). In John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, supra, the Supreme Court said:
While the courts have the task of determining "substantive arbitrability," there will be cases in which arbitrability of the subject matter is unquestioned but a dispute arises over the procedures to be followed. (Emphasis supplied). 376 U.S. at 557, 558, 84 S. Ct. at 918, 919, 11 L. Ed. 2d at 909.
Judicial deference to arbitration, however, does not grant carte blanche approval to any decision an arbitrator might make. Machinists, Local 2003 v. Hayes Corp., 5 Cir. 1961, 296 F.2d 238, 243, aff'd on rehearing, 5 Cir. 1963, 316 F.2d 90. The arbitrator's authority is circumscribed by the arbitration agreement, and he can bind the parties only on issues that they have agreed to submit to him. Whether an arbitrator has exceeded these bounds is an issue for judicial resolution. Torrington Co. v. Metal Products Workers, Local 1645, 2 Cir. 1966, 362 F.2d 677, 680. For that reason, an arbitrator who derives his power solely from the contract cannot hold that charter to be legally ineffective. International Ladies Garment Workers' Union v. Ashland Industries, Inc., 5 Cir. 1974, 488 F.2d 641, cert. denied, 1975, 419 U.S. 840, 95 S. Ct. 71, 42 L. Ed. 2d 68; an arbitrator's award must draw "its essence from the collective bargaining agreement." United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., supra, 363 U.S. at 597, 80 S. Ct. at 1361, 4 L. Ed. 2d at 1428; Safeway Stores v. American Bakery & Confectionery Workers, 5 Cir. 1968, 390 F.2d 79, 81; Local Union No. 787, International Union of Electrical Radio and Machine Workers v. Collins Radio Co., 5 Cir. 1963, 317 F.2d 214, 216. 611 F.2d at 583.
However, once the parties have gone beyond their promise to arbitrate and have actually submitted an issue to an arbiter, we must look both to their contract and to the submission of the issue to the arbitrator to determine his authority. Washington-Baltimore Newspaper Guild v. The Washington Post Co., D.C. Cir. 1971, 143 U.S.App.D.C. 210, 212, 442 F.2d 1234, 1236; Lee v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., D.W.D. Va. 1967, 271 F. Supp. 635, 639. See also Textile Workers' Union of America, AFL-CIO, Local Union No. 1386 v. American Thread Co., 4 Cir. 1961, 291 F.2d 894; Truck Drivers, etc., Union, Local 784 v. Ulry-Talbert Co., 8 Cir. 1964, 330 F.2d 562; cf. Continental Materials Corp. v. Gaddis Mining Co., 10 Cir. 1962, 306 F.2d 952, 954 (commercial arbitration). 611 F.2d at 583, 584.
The company argues, without citation of supporting authority, that the Warrior "presumption of arbitrability" is inapplicable because the arbitration clause at issue in Warrior was a "standard" or "broad" arbitration clause providing for arbitration " 'as to the meaning and application of the provisions of th(e) Agreement,' " 363 U.S. at 576, 80 S. Ct. at 1349 while the clause in the JTPA is a "narrow" one. We reject this argument. While Warrior and its Supreme Court progeny have all involved "standard" arbitration clauses, the Court has never indicated, in its statement of the rule, that the presumption is limited to such broad clauses. See, e. g., Nolde Bros. v. Local No. 358, Bakery & Confectionery Workers Union, 430 U.S. 243, 254-55, 97 S. Ct. 1067, 1073-74, 51 L. Ed. 2d 300 (1977); Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368, 376-80, 94 S. Ct. 629, 636-38, 38 L. Ed. 2d 583 (1974). Such a limitation would render the presumption of little value as a rule of construction: we would first have to determine that the arbitration clause is "broad" enough to cover all contractual disputes, and only then apply the presumption (when it is no longer needed). Moreover, this court has consistently applied the presumption to arbitration clauses of varying breadth. See, e. g., Waverly Mineral Prods. Co. v. United Steelworkers, 633 F.2d 682 (5th Cir. 1980) (clause providing only for arbitration of grievances concerning discharge). The narrowness of an arbitration clause will of course limit the court to determining whether the asserted claim is within its narrow confines: we will not read a "clause of limited scope" to override a specific exclusion when extrinsic evidence makes clear that the asserted claim is within the exclusion, International Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Sid Richardson Carbon Co., 471 F.2d 1175, 1178 (5th Cir. 1973), nor will we adopt an unreasonable interpretation of the words in order to find a dispute arbitrable, see Gangemi v. General Elec. Co., 532 F.2d 861, 865-66 (2d Cir. 1976). But in determining whether a dispute is within the confines of the arbitration clause, the presumption of arbitrability applies, regardless of whether one party characterizes the clause as "narrow."
See, e. g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1) (granting the right to bring a civil action to "the person claiming to be aggrieved") (emphasis added); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (granting right of action to "any citizen ... or other person " subjected to deprivation of federal rights under color of state law) (emphasis added); 15 U.S.C. § 78i (granting right of action to "the person ... injured" by manipulation of security prices) (emphasis added); 15 U.S.C. § 78r (granting right of action to "A person seeking" damages for misleading statements under Securities Act of 1934) (emphasis added)
ORAL OR INFORMAL PROCEDURE Step Representing the UNION ------------------------------- ------------------------------ (1) Discussion at Section Chief Level UNION Representative (2) Discussion at Department Chief Level UNION Representative and Officer of the UNION (or Chief Steward)
WRITTEN OR FORMAL PROCEDURE If a satisfactory settlement cannot be reached informally at Step (2) and the UNION wishes to process the grievance further, the grievance shall be reduced to writing specifying the nature of the dispute and identifying the specific provision(s), if any, of this agreement in dispute and presented at each Step to the level of supervision indicated below until settled: (3) Discussion as Same as Step (2) except Assistant Manager Level for a Joint Committee not (or in a Wage Incentive more than two (2) UNION or Job Grade Grievance Representatives Committee) (4) Grievances not satisfactorily settled in accordance with the foregoing procedure may be presented in writing to the COMPANY's Bargaining Agent by the UNION's Bargaining Agent. In such event, not more than four (4) representatives of either party shall ordinarily participate in a discussion of a grievance. An international Representative may participate as one of the UNION's representatives.