Source: http://openjurist.org/199/f3d/168
Timestamp: 2013-05-26 06:01:08
Document Index: 147777513

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1988', '§ 1988', '§ 1997', '§ 1997', '§ 1997', '§ 803', '§ 1997', '§ 803', 'art, 461']

199 F3d 168 Montcalm Publishing Corporation Donald Arlis Hodges | OpenJurist
199 F. 3d 168 - Montcalm Publishing Corporation Donald Arlis Hodges	Home199 f3d 168 montcalm publishing corporation donald arlis hodges
199 F3d 168 Montcalm Publishing Corporation Donald Arlis Hodges 199 F.3d 168 (4th Cir. 1999)
MONTCALM PUBLISHING CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellant,andDONALD ARLIS HODGES; MICHAEL GLYNN FLORA, Plaintiffs,v.COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA; RONALD ANGELONE, in his official capacity as Director of the Department of Corrections of the Commonwealth of Virginia; R. J. BECK; J. HORTON; R. A. YOUNG; E. C. MORRIS; MS. SUMMERS; JOHN DOE, 1 7, in their official capacities such fictitious names being designed to identify those VDOC employees whose true dentities are now unknown to plaintiff-intervenor, but who serve as (a) members of the VDOC Publication Review Committee, (2) Warden or Superintendent of Keen Mountain Correctional Center (KMCC), and (3) functional KMCC mail-room censor; J. Phippin; MR. BECK, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 99-6308 (CA-92-696-R, CA-92-907-R).
Argued: October 27, 1999.Decided: December 3, 1999.
Montcalm then moved for an award of attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (Supp. II 1996). That statute empowers a court to award reasonable attorney's fees to prevailing parties in federal civil rights actions. The district court found that Montcalm constituted a prevailing party entitled to reasonable attorney's fees under § 1988, but that all such fees were limited by the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d) (Supp. II 1996). The PLRA provides that in certain cases "[n]o award of attorney's fees . . . shall be based on an hourly rate greater than 150 percent of the hourly rate established . . . for payment of court-appointed counsel." § 1997e(d)(3). The district court applied the PLRA's rate limits to all of Montcalm's requested fees for legal services provided over the entire course of the litigation. After determining that the number of hours for which Montcalm sought recovery was excessive, the district court granted Montcalm a reduced award.
Montcalm notes the myriad provisions in the PLRA narrowing judicial relief available to prisoners, establishing new requirements for prisoners seeking such relief, and imposing penalties on prisoners bringing frivolous lawsuits. See Alexander S. v. Boyd, 113 F.3d 1373, 1379-80 n.6 (4th Cir. 1997) (summarizing various provisions of PLRA), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 880 (1998). Montcalm also relies on portions of the legislative history of the PLRA in which various legislators stated the view that the Act "contains several measures to reduce frivolous inmate litigation." See, e.g., 141 Cong. Rec. S14,317 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1995) (statement of Sen. Abraham). The structure of the statute and its legislative history, Montcalm contends, "demonstrate[ ] that Congress intended the restrictions on the recovery of attorney's fees to be applicable solely to prisoners and their lawyers bringing lawsuits challenging the conditions of the prisoners' imprisonment." Brief of Appellant at 20.
The PLRA expressly imposes limitations on the amount of attorney's fees awarded "[i]n any action brought by a prisoner who is confined to any jail, prison, or other correctional facility." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1). Thus, Congress has mandated that statutory fee limits apply not "solely to prisoners" but to "any action brought by a prisoner." Unquestionably, the case at hand is one"brought by a prisoner." Indeed, two prisoners, Hodges and Flora, initiated this case; Montcalm merely intervened. Thus, application of the PLRA is inescapable.
Much of the legal work in this case--that done at the trial level on the merits and on direct appeal--was performed prior to the effective date of the PLRA, April 26, 1996. In accordance with thencontrolling circuit precedent, see Alexander S. , 113 F.3d at 1388, the district court applied the PLRA caps to all of the fees requested by Montcalm.
We conclude that § 803(d)(3)[42 U.S.C.§ 1997e(d)(3)] limits attorney's fees with respect to postjudgment monitoring services performed after the PLRA's effective date but it does not so limit fees for postjudgment monitoring performed before the effective date.
In view of this general language, we believe that Hadix must be read to hold that the PLRA's limit on attorney's fees does not apply to legal services performed prior to the Act's effective date. This conclusion accords with our recent interpretation of Hadix, see Altizer v. Deeds, 191 F.3d 540, 544 (4th Cir. 1999) (summarizing Hadix as holding that "the PLRA's limitation on attorneys' fees may not be applied to services performed prior to the PLRA's enactment"), and that of other courts. See, e.g., Chatin v. Coombe, 186 F.3d 82, 90 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that "[i]n Hadix, the Supreme Court ruled that, in a case filed prior to the effective date of the PLRA, § 803(d)(3) applied to legal work performed after the effective date, but not to legal work performed before it"); Ilick v. Miller, 68 F.Supp.2d 1169, (D. Nev. Sept. 28, 1999) (ruling that"prior section 1988 law applies to all fees billed up to the effective date of the PLRA (i.e., April 26, 1996), and that the PLRA fee cap applies to all fees billed after that date").
"[T]he community in which the court sits is the first place to look to in evaluating the prevailing market rate." Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v. Caperton, 31 F.3d 169, 179 (4th Cir. 1994); see also National Wildlife Fed'n v. Hanson, 859 F.2d 313, 317 (4th Cir. 1988). If a matter is so complex or specialized that "no attorney, with the required skills, is available locally," a court may, of course, award fees for counsel located elsewhere. Id. In the case at hand, however, the district judge, who was intimately familiar with this litigation, concluded that this case was "straightforward and uncomplicated" and could have been competently performed by available local counsel. Our careful review of the record reveals no abuse of discretion in this assessment.
The district court awarded only 25% of the remaining 304.6 hours requested for the trial phase. "[B]ecause Montcalm failed to properly document its billing records," the court had to estimate how much time the attorneys spent on the successful procedural due process claim as opposed to the three other constitutional claims Montcalm asserted. The court explained that on the basis of its experience with "this litigation and the documents filed in the case," it believed that "Montcalm's attorneys devoted the bulk of their efforts to the First Amendment issues." But in order to "give Montcalm the benefit of the doubt" it "assume[d] that its attorneys devoted their efforts equally between [sic] the four alleged violations."
We recognize that "a mathematical approach comparing the total number of issues in the case with those actually prevailed upon" is inappropriate. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435 n.11 (1983). Attorneys may devote significantly different amounts of time to issues of varying complexity. Moreover, "[w]here a plaintiff has obtained excellent results, . . . the fee award should not be reduced simply because the plaintiff failed to prevail on every contention raised in the lawsuit." Id. at 435. However, a careful review of the record in this case reveals no abuse of the district court's discretion in reducing the award for fees incurred at the trial level.
Finally, Montcalm asked for an award of 344.5 hours for the appellate phase of the litigation. This phase included the appeal to this court, the response to the petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court, the litigation on remand, and the attorney's fees petition. Montcalm litigated only the procedural due process issue throughout this phase of the litigation. The district court nonetheless held that the request for fees in the appellate phase was also "excessive." The court explained that Montcalm appealed a novel but uncomplicated issue, noting that Montcalm itself described the procedural due process claim as a "very simple issue" in its opposition to the petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court. The district court also noted that Montcalm had briefed and researched this issue during the lower court phase. Explaining that it "ha[d] difficulty believing" the publisher needed "the equivalent of one attorney working over eight forty-hour weeks" for the appellate phase, the court reduced by 25% the hours for the appellate phase.
We recognize that a court, in its discretion, may regard intervention as a separate action when the intervenor has an independent basis for jurisdiction. See Atkins v. State Bd. of Educ. , 418 F.2d 874, 876 (4th Cir. 1969); accord Harris v. Illinois-California Express, Inc., 687 F.2d 1361, 1367 (10th Cir. 1982); Fuller v. Volk, 351 F.2d 323, 328 (3d Cir. 1965). Montcalm, however, has not asserted that a federal court would have an independent basis for jurisdiction over its claim in the absence of a prisoner complaint; nor has Montcalm asked either the district court or this court to exercise any discretion to treat its intervention as a separate action. Accordingly, we have no occasion to consider such arguments.
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