Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/131/151/514412/
Timestamp: 2019-08-21 17:52:04
Document Index: 102464830

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', 'art, 27', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 2000', '§ 1981', '§ 44', '§ 1983']

Karen S. Brasko, Plaintiff-appellee, v. City of Caney, Kansas; Bill Jamison; Rick Pell; Montelilburn, Defendants,andjeff Atzenhofer; O.j. Bridenstine; Don Fuqua; Bobbyhawthorne; Ray Stelfox; Laurie Jamison; Stevebuster; David Estes; Gene Vaughan;chad Bradford; Mike Hines,defendants-appellants.darla Lea Cleland, Plaintiff-appellee, v. City of Caney, Kansas; Bill Jamison; Rick Pell; Montelilburn, Defendants,andjeff Atzenhofer; O.j. Bridenstine; Don Fuqua; Bobbyhawthorne; Ray Stelfox; Laurie Jamison; Stevebuster; David Estes; Gene Vaughan;chad Bradford; Mike Hines,defendants-appellants.karen S. Brasko, Plaintiff-appellee, v. City of Caney, Kansas; Rick Pell; Monte Lilburn; Jeffatzenhofer; O.j. Bridenstine; Don Fuqua; Bobby Hawthorne;ray Stelfox; Laurie Jamison; Steve Buster; David Estes;gene Vaughan; Chad Bradford; Mike Hines, Defendants,andbill Jamison, Defendant-appellant.darla Lea Cleland, Plaintiff-appellee, v. City of Caney, Kansas; Rick Pell; Monte Lilburn; Jeffatzenhofer; O.j. Bridenstine; Don Fuqua; Bobby Hawthorne;ray Stelfox; Laurie Jamison; Steve Buster; David Estes;gene Vaughan; Chad Bradford; Mike Hines, Defendants,andbill Jamison, Defendant-appellant, 131 F.3d 151 (10th Cir. 1997) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Tenth Circuit › 1997 › Karen S. Brasko, Plaintiff-appellee, v. City of Caney, Kansas; Bill Jamison; Rick Pell; Montelilburn...
Karen S. Brasko, Plaintiff-appellee, v. City of Caney, Kansas; Bill Jamison; Rick Pell; Montelilburn, Defendants,andjeff Atzenhofer; O.j. Bridenstine; Don Fuqua; Bobbyhawthorne; Ray Stelfox; Laurie Jamison; Stevebuster; David Estes; Gene Vaughan;chad Bradford; Mike Hines,defendants-appellants.darla Lea Cleland, Plaintiff-appellee, v. City of Caney, Kansas; Bill Jamison; Rick Pell; Montelilburn, Defendants,andjeff Atzenhofer; O.j. Bridenstine; Don Fuqua; Bobbyhawthorne; Ray Stelfox; Laurie Jamison; Stevebuster; David Estes; Gene Vaughan;chad Bradford; Mike Hines,defendants-appellants.karen S. Brasko, Plaintiff-appellee, v. City of Caney, Kansas; Rick Pell; Monte Lilburn; Jeffatzenhofer; O.j. Bridenstine; Don Fuqua; Bobby Hawthorne;ray Stelfox; Laurie Jamison; Steve Buster; David Estes;gene Vaughan; Chad Bradford; Mike Hines, Defendants,andbill Jamison, Defendant-appellant.darla Lea Cleland, Plaintiff-appellee, v. City of Caney, Kansas; Rick Pell; Monte Lilburn; Jeffatzenhofer; O.j. Bridenstine; Don Fuqua; Bobby Hawthorne;ray Stelfox; Laurie Jamison; Steve Buster; David Estes;gene Vaughan; Chad Bradford; Mike Hines, Defendants,andbill Jamison, Defendant-appellant, 131 F.3d 151 (10th Cir. 1997)
The district court's denials of qualified immunity are immediately appealable as final judgments. See Walter v. Morton, 33 F.3d 1240, 1242 (10th Cir. 1994). We review the denials de novo. See id.
Government officials are entitled to qualified immunity when their "conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). To analyze a claim of qualified immunity, we use a two-part framework: "first we determine whether the plaintiff has asserted a violation of a constitutional or statutory right, and then we decide whether that right was clearly established such that a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have known that [his or] her conduct violated the right." Garramone v. Romo, 94 F.3d 1446, 1449 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231 (1991)).
Lawmaster v. Ward, 125 F.3d 1341, 1350 (10th Cir. 1997) (quoting Garramone, 94 F.3d at 1451). To show the law is clearly established, the plaintiff must do more than make general allegations that the defendant's conduct was unreasonable; rather, the plaintiff's rights must be sufficiently defined so that a " 'reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.' " Id. at 1350-51 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)); see also Walter, 33 F.3d at 1242 (placing burden on plaintiff to show with "particularity" that facts and law establish inference that defendants violated constitutional right); Woodward v. City of Worland, 977 F.2d 1392, 1396 (10th Cir. 1992) (requiring plaintiff to "come forward with facts or allegations sufficient to show that the [defendant] violated the clearly established law"). This court allows some degree of generality, however, recognizing it is impracticable to require the plaintiff to cite to a factually identical case before this court will determine the law was clearly established. See Lawmaster, 125 F.3d at 1351 (requiring some, but not precise, factual similarity in demanding officials to apply general well-developed legal principles). The action in question need not have previously been held unlawful, but its unlawfulness must be apparent in light of pre-existing law. See Mick v. Brewer, 76 F.3d 1127, 1134 (10th Cir. 1996).
It is clearly established in this circuit that " [a]n allegation of sexual harassment is actionable under § 1983 as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause." Noland v. McAdoo, 39 F.3d 269, 271 (10th Cir. 1994); see also Lankford v. City of Hobart, 27 F.3d 477, 480-81 (10th Cir. 1994) (citing Starrett v. Wadley, 876 F.2d 808, 814 (10th Cir. 1989)).
As the city council members point out, however, there is no factually identical authority establishing the liability of an individual city council member for failure to act on a city employee's claim of sexual discrimination. Thus, the question we must decide is whether it was clearly established "within a sufficiently analogous factual setting" that the individual city council members would have understood that their failure to act would violate plaintiffs' rights. Medina v. City & County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1497 (10th Cir. 1992); see also Yvonne L., ex rel. Lewis v. New Mexico Dep't of Human Servs., 959 F.2d 883, 891 (10th Cir. 1992) (determining whether right was either clearly established or clearly implicit in existing case law).
In denying the individual city council members qualified immunity, the district court relied upon Hirschfeld v. New Mexico Corrections Department, 916 F.2d 572, 577 (10th Cir. 1990), a Title VII action, which held that an employer may be liable for hostile work environment sexual harassment of an employee if the employer knew of or should have known of and failed to prevent the hostile work environment. Employer liability for actionable sexual harassment also has been recognized in § 1983 cases. In those cases, a supervisor's or employer's liability requires " 'allegations of ... actual knowledge and acquiescence.' " Woodward, 977 F.2d at 1400, 1401 (quoting Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1478 (3d Cir. 1990)). Also, in § 1983 actions, liability cannot be predicated upon mere negligence; rather, it must be predicated upon a deliberate deprivation of the employee's constitutional rights. See id. at 1399.
Officer Jamison argues, however, that the law regarding co-worker liability under § 1983 for sexual harassment did not become clearly established until this court's decision in David v. City & County of Denver, 101 F.3d 1344, 1354 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 157 (1997). Although David did not reach, because it was not asserted, the questions of qualified immunity and whether the law was clearly established, see id. at 1354 n. 1, it did cite to Woodward and Noland as authority for its decision that sexual harassment by a nonsupervisory co-worker could violate a plaintiff's equal protection rights if the nonsupervisory co-worker in fact exercised authority over the plaintiff, see id. at 1354.
Officer Jamison argues that plaintiffs failed to sufficiently plead causes of action against him because they failed to plead facts demonstrating that he had actual authority over them. In denying Officer Jamison qualified immunity, the district court noted that plaintiffs alleged in their complaints that all defendants acted under color of state law. However, " 'plaintiff [s] must do more than identify in the abstract a clearly established right and allege that the defendant has violated it.' " Walter, 33 F.3d at 1242 (quoting Pueblo Neighborhood Health Ctrs., Inc. v. Losavio, 847 F.2d 642, 645 (10th Cir. 1988)). Therefore, plaintiffs' allegations that "all defendants acted under color of state law" are insufficient to meet the heightened pleading standards imposed when a defendant raises the qualified immunity defense. However, we agree with plaintiffs that after the defendant raises this defense they should be afforded the opportunity to amend their complaints to satisfy this heightened requirement.
Additionally, plaintiffs sought relief under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e through 2000e-17; 42 U.S.C. § 1981a; the Kansas Acts Against Discrimination, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 44-1009(a) (1), (7); and common law. Also, plaintiffs sought relief against the City of Caney, mayor of Caney, and chief of police of Caney under the above authorities and § 1983