Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/867/916/356839/
Timestamp: 2019-07-16 19:15:55
Document Index: 84571264

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1346', '§ 2401', '§ 2675', '§ 2675', '§ 2675', '§ 2672', '§ 2675', '§ 2675', '§ 2401', '§ 2675', '§ 2401', '§ 2672', '§ 2401']

Thurman Conn, Plaintiff-appellant, v. United States of America, Defendant-appellee, 867 F.2d 916 (6th Cir. 1989) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Sixth Circuit › 1989 › Thurman Conn, Plaintiff-appellant, v. United States of America, Defendant-appellee
Thurman Conn, Plaintiff-appellant, v. United States of America, Defendant-appellee, 867 F.2d 916 (6th Cir. 1989)
US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit - 867 F.2d 916 (6th Cir. 1989)
Argued Oct. 17, 1988. Decided Feb. 9, 1989
Thurman Conn appeals the district court's grant of the government's motion to dismiss his action under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-80. Conn argues that the court improperly concluded that he had failed to exhaust his administrative remedy as is required by that statute. The United States contends that Conn did not properly present his claim to the administrative agency, a prerequisite to the filing of suit against the United States, and that Conn's claim is further barred by the statute of limitations. Because we hold that Conn's claim had been properly presented to the Bureau of Prisons and that his suit in United States District Court was not barred by the statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b), we reverse the decision of the district court.1
On April 1, 1987, Conn filed suit, with different counsel, in district court under the Federal Tort Claims Act for the injuries he sustained on April 15, 1981, alleging that he had exhausted all administrative remedies. The United States filed a motion to dismiss alleging failure to exhaust administrative remedies and lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to the bar of the statute of limitations. On August 7, 1987, a magistrate's report recommended that the United States' motion to dismiss be granted because Conn had failed to exhaust his administrative remedy in that he had failed to present his claim to the Bureau as is required by 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) and the regulations promulgated thereunder. On December 1, 1987, the district court adopted the magistrate's recommendation and dismissed Conn's action.
I. Conn's claim satisfied the presentment requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a).
The statutory presentment requirement which Conn must satisfy before his suit against the United States will be heard in court is contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) which provides, in pertinent part:
The Form 95 in which Conn's claim was presented to the Bureau was signed by Salyer as Conn's attorney but was not accompanied by any evidence substantiating Salyer's authority to file the claim on behalf of Conn. The information filed with the Bureau therefore did not satisfy the requirements of 28 C.F.R. Sec. 14.2(a). However, this court in Douglas v. United States, 658 F.2d 445, 447-48 (6th Cir. 1981), determined that the regulations in 28 C.F.R. Secs. 14.1-14.11 "govern administrative settlement proceedings; they do not set federal jurisdictional prerequisites." By failing to comply with the regulations promulgated under 28 U.S.C. § 2672,2 a claimant loses only "the opportunity to settle his or her claim outside the courts." Douglas, 658 F.2d at 448 (quoting Adams v. United States, 615 F.2d 284, 290 (5th Cir. 1980)). See also Knapp v. United States, 844 F.2d 376, 379 (6th Cir. 1988) (quoting this same language from Adams) ; Warren v. United States Dep't of Interior Bureau of Land Management, 724 F.2d 776, 778 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc) ("We find the relevant statutes and their legislative histories reveal that Congress did not intend to treat regulations promulgated pursuant to section 2672 as jurisdictional prerequisites under section 2675(a).") (footnote omitted).
The Douglas court determined that presentment pursuant to section 2675 is satisfied where the claimant "(1) gives the agency written notice of his or her claim sufficient to enable the agency to investigate and (2) places a value on his or her claim." Douglas, 658 F.2d at 447 (quoting Adams, 615 F.2d at 289). In a well-reasoned opinion, the District of Columbia Circuit examined the presentment requirement of section 2675(a). GAF Corp. v. United States, 818 F.2d 901 (D.C. Cir. 1987). In GAF, the court determined that "Congress did not impose on claimants the burden of substantiating their claims as part of the presentment process, it made a statutory precondition to filing suit." Id. at 919. The court concluded:
This court in Knapp held that a claim similar to Conn's was sufficient in detail to enable a federal agency to make an independent investigation. Knapp, 844 F.2d at 380. See also Martinez v. United States, 728 F.2d 694, 696 (5th Cir. 1984) ("notice of the skeletal facts of the claim [is] sufficient to enable the agency to investigate"); Williams v. United States, 693 F.2d 555, 557 (5th Cir. 1982) ("no particular form or manner of giving such notice is required as long as the agency is somehow informed of the fact of and amount of the claim"); Surratt v. United States, 582 F. Supp. 692, 699 (N.D. Ill. 1984) ("The form apprised the agency of the place, date, and time of the incident, identified the claim as relating to medical malpractice and identified the VA personnel alleged to have knowledge of the incident.").
Although the Form 95 filed on behalf of Conn did not satisfy the regulation requiring documentation of the authority of the person filing on behalf of the claimant, this failure does not render the form an ineffective presentment for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). Accord Avila v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 731 F.2d 616 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that a claim filed by the claimant's father satisfied the section 2675(a) presentment requirement despite a lack of documentation of the father's authority to file on behalf of his son); Warren, 724 F.2d 776 (holding that presentment was sufficient despite the fact that the attorney who filed on behalf of the claimant failed to document his authority as required by the regulations); Graves v. United States Coast Guard, 692 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that a claim filed by the claimant's attorney constituted sufficient presentment despite the lack of documentation of the attorney's authority).
In the present case, Conn clearly satisfied the second prong of the Douglas test. He placed a definite value on his claim. We also conclude that Conn satisfied the first prong of Douglas because he provided the Bureau of Prisons with written notice of his claim sufficient to enable it to investigate the claim. The Form 95 submitted by Salyer identified the nature of the claim, the underlying incident and the approximate date thereof, the parties involved, and the extent of the injury. The fact that documentation of Salyer's authority to file the claim on Conn's behalf was not also provided does not defeat the sufficiency of the notice provided by the filed claim. We therefore hold that the claim filed with the Bureau of Prisons on behalf of Conn satisfied the requirements of presentment for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) as outlined by this court in Douglas.
The statutory period for filing claims against the United States is prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 2401. That statute provides:
Once a claim is presented pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a), a final denial by the agency must occur4 or a denial must be deemed by the claimant to have occurred before suit can be filed in district court.
Conn argues that there is such a limitation, the six-year limitation period contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a). Since the incident occurred on April 15, 1981 and the action was filed on April 1, 1987, Conn argues, his claim is not barred by this statute of limitations. The difficulty with this argument is that section 2401(a) has been held not to apply to actions under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Menkarell v. Bureau of Narcotics, 463 F.2d 88 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v. Glenn, 231 F.2d 884 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 926, 77 S. Ct. 223, 1 L. Ed. 2d 161 (1956); Wesreco v. United States Dep't of Interior, 618 F. Supp. 562 (D. Utah 1985). Accordingly, we conclude that section 2401(a) cannot be applied in this case.
The Bureau contends that, under a proper interpretation of sections 2401(b) and 2675(a), construed together, the statutes provide that if the claim is not denied within six months of filing or thereafter, the claimant must exercise his option to deem the claim to have been finally denied and file his action in court within a "reasonable" time after the six months has expired. Since nearly four years had elapsed after the six-month period had expired in the present case, the Bureau argues that Conn did not file within a reasonable time and the action is barred. The Bureau relies on Miller v. United States, 741 F.2d 148 (7th Cir. 1984), in which the court held that the claimant has only a "reasonable time" after the six-month period has expired in which to treat the failure to deny the claim as a constructive denial. In Miller, the six-month period had expired on February 19, 1982, the claimant filed her action in court on March 8, 1982, and the court held that the claimant had filed her action within a reasonable time.
On the other hand, in Boyd v. United States, 482 F. Supp. 1126 (W.D. Pa. 1980), and Mack v. United States, 414 F. Supp. 504 (E.D. Mich. 1976), the courts held that the six-month period within which the action must be filed is simply tolled so long as the claim is not finally denied. We adopt this holding of Boyd and Mack for several reasons.
The regulations in 28 C.F.R. Secs. 14.1-14.11 were promulgated pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2672 which provides, in part:
We do not understand the government to contend that the June 16, 1983 letter from the Bureau to Salyer constituted a "final denial" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). In any event, it clearly was not a final denial since it did not comply with 28 C.F.R. Sec. 14.9(a)