Source: http://openjurist.org/423/f2d/993
Timestamp: 2014-11-01 12:46:32
Document Index: 104383815

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 111', '§ 1865', '§ 18637', '§ 1863', '§ 1863', '§ 18658', '§ 1865', '§ 111', '§ 2']

423 F. 2d 993 - United States v. Marcello	Home423 f2d 993 united states v. marcello
423 F2d 993 United States v. Marcello 423 F.2d 993
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,v.Carlos MARCELLO, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 26773.
Rehearing Denied and Rehearing En Banc Denied April 1, 1970.
See 90 S.Ct. 2172.
Jack Wasserman, Washington, D. C., G. Wray Gill, George M. Leppert, New Orleans, La., Michel A. Maroun, Shreveport, La., Anthony C. Friloux, Jr., Houston, Tex., for defendant-appellant.
Morton L. Susman, U. S. Atty., James R. Gough, Ronald J. Blask, Asst. U. S. Attys., Houston, Tex., Louis C. LaCour, U. S. Atty., New Orleans, La., Owen A. Neff, Atty., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., Anthony J. P. Farris, U. S. Atty., Malcolm R. Dimmitt, Asst. U. S. Atty., Houston, Tex., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before JOHN R. BROWN, Chief Judge, DYER, Circuit Judge and HUNTER, District Judge.
This is an appeal from Appellant's conviction of forcibly assaulting and intimidating an officer of the FBI in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 111.1 Fifteen points of error are raised, each of which we find wanting and affirm.
On September 30, 1966 Carlos Marcello arrived at the New Orleans airport where, because of his reputation as a Mafia boss, he was immediately surrounded by newspapermen and photographers. Among this group was FBI agent Patrick Collins, posing as a deplaning passenger, and his co-agent photographer whose job it was to keep an eye on Marcello. This crowd followed Marcello through the airport and onto the upper ramp outside where Marcello, angrily and with some profanity, inquired whether the photographers had taken enough pictures. Collins, with arms folded, answered in the negative, and Marcello retorted: "Are you looking for trouble?" which elicited the not unexpected reply from Collins that "I can handle trouble." This exchange had an unsettling effect on Marcello who took a couple of short jabs at Collins and attempted to mow him down with a hay-maker, which never really got off the ground because of his brother Joseph's restraint. For this fray Marcello was first indicted on October 7, 1966 for assault, but this indictment was dismissed on a motion asserting a failure to comply with the requirements of Rabinowitz v. United States, 5 Cir., 1966, 366 F.2d 34 (en banc). On June 1, 1967, he was reindicted by a grand jury in the New Orleans division of the Eastern District of Louisiana for the same offense.
On July 3, 1967 Appellant filed, among others, a "motion for continuance and for a change of venue." These motions were heard on September 13, 1967, and the motion for a change of venue was immediately granted because of extensive prejudicial publicity in the New Orleans area. Not more than 10 minutes after the conclusion of the hearing and the granting of the motion, defense counsel made an oral ex parte request for the Court to withdraw its order. The Court kept this motion under advisement for 5 months and on March 1, 1968, it ordered the case transferred to the Southern District of Texas. The case came on for trial before Judge Connally in Laredo, Texas in May of 1968 and resulted in a hung jury and mistrial on May 29. The case was reset before Judge Singleton in Houston and on August 8, 1968 a verdict of guilty was returned. On September 12, 1968 Appellant was fined $5000 and sentenced to two years imprisonment.
Appellant's argument on appeal is pentadecal. He raises issues concerning (1) the constitution of the grand jury, (2) failure of the indictment to allege an offense, (3) procurement of the indictment by misconduct, (4) immunity from prosecution, (5) change of venue, (6) change of place of trial, (7) deprivation of records, (8) Cosa Nostra and Mafia references at the trial, (9) improper reference to a document not in evidence, (10) knowledge as an element of the offense, (11) willful intent to injure as an element of the offense, (12) entrapment, (13) refusal of the Trial Court to require an election between the issues of intimidation and assault, (14) refusal to grant motion of acquittal, motion in arrest of judgment and a new trial, (15) improper basis for sentencing.
1. Illegal Grand Jury
Appellant's first point is that he was denied his right to be indicted by a grand jury compiled from a fair cross section of the community. Hill v. Texas, 1942, 316 U.S. 400, 62 S.Ct. 1159, 86 L.Ed. 1559; Rabinowitz v. United States, 5 Cir., 1966, 366 F.2d 34 (en banc). The jury list from which the indicting grand jurors were chosen was composed of residents of only 7 of the 13 parishes comprising the New Orleans Division of the Eastern District of Louisiana2 pursuant to a direction by the Court under the power granted it by 28 U.S.C.A. § 1865(a),3 as it existed prior to the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968.4
The indictment in a criminal case must be returned by a grand jury "drawn from a pool of persons broadly representative of the community." Rabinowitz v. United States, supra, at 45.5 This, of course, does not mean that every conceivable group has to be represented on the jury list.6 What it does mean is that the list must generally approximate the community and its different interests. Smith v. Texas, note 5, supra.
Appellant attacks on two grounds the exclusion of names from the 6 parishes. First, he says that it was taken pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 18637 (before the 1968 amendments) and that since no findings were made by the Trial Judge as required by § 1863, the exclusion was invalid. The fact of the matter is that the parishes were not excluded by a single Trial Judge under § 1863. Rather, they were excluded by order of the District Court en banc dated October 8, 1948 as amended on January 20, 1967 by adding the parishes of St. John the Baptist and St. Charles pursuant to the authority granted by 28 U.S.C.A. § 18658 (before its amendment).
Appellant has not shown that the exclusion of the parishes is anything but conducive to the goal of achieving an impartial trial without incurring unnecessary expense or unduly burdening the citizens of any part of the district with jury service. The action of the Judges of the Eastern District of Louisiana was reasonable and in accord with § 1865 and the Constitution.
A related complaint is that, disregarding the technical validity of the excluding order, it resulted in a jury list that was not representative of the community in that blue collar workers were systematically excluded, if not completely, at least partially, from the list by reason of the parish exclusion. See Labat v. Bennett, note 5, supra. He offered no facts to establish the truth of this assertion, and since the burden is on him to do so, Jackson v. Morrow, 5 Cir., 1968, 404 F.2d 903; Ware v. United States, 1965, 123 U.S.App.D.C. 34, 356 F.2d 787, cert. denied, 383 U.S. 919, 86 S.Ct. 914, 15 L.Ed.2d 673; Frazier v. United States, 1948, 335 U.S. 497, 503, 69 S.Ct. 201, 205, 93 L.Ed. 187, 194; Glasser v. United States, 1942, 315 U.S. 60, 87, 62 S.Ct 457, 86 L.Ed. 680, this contention fails.
2. Insufficient Indictment
Appellant's second contention is that the indictment failed to allege an offense. The indictment alleged that Carlos Marcello "did forcibly assault and intimidate Patrick J. Collins, Jr., an officer of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, while * * * Collins was engaged in the performance of his official duties in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 111." In almost the same words (see note 1, supra) § 111 makes it a crime to do just this.
Appellant offers no argument on appeal to support his contention, but at the pre-trial stage he argued that the indictment did not allege that Marcello knew Collins to be an FBI agent and that knowledge is an element of the offense. This same contention is more forcefully raised later (contention number 10) and we will discuss it then. It suffices to say that Appellant's second contention is wholly without merit.
3. Prosecution Misconduct
Appellant's third contention, that the indictment was procured by the misconduct of the prosecuting officials and therefore should have been dismissed, is apparently based on a statement reportedly made by a government attorney to the New Orleans press that the arrest of Marcello in New York City at an organized crime meeting "makes it obvious that there is organized crime in this area [New Orleans] and that Marcello was there in the interests of this area." Marcello asserts that this announcement was highly improper and was calculated to and did influence the grand jury in its deliberations in bringing the indictment. That the claim borders on the frivolous is shown by the fact that the statement was made before the occurrence of the incident leading to his indictment. It appeared in the newspaper on Friday morning, September 30, 1966. The assault did not occur until that evening.
Appellant's next contention meets the same fate as his preceding ones. After the alleged assault but before the Federal trial, Appellant was called before a Queens County, New York grand jury investigating organized crime. Under the New York State immunity statute he was granted immunity from prosecution (as well as from the use of testimony elicited) for any crime he might mention in his testimony. While testifying he was asked whether he was under indictment anywhere and replied that he was, in Louisiana for assault on a federal officer. Now he contends that his answer while under the Queens grand jury's grant of immunity insulates him from prosecution for this crime in Federal Court in Louisiana and Texas.
He argues that Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 1964, 378 U.S. 52, 84 S.Ct. 1594, 12 L.Ed.2d 678, holds that when the state grants immunity to a witness, this grant is binding on the federal government. Hence, the argument goes, the Queens grant immunized him from prosecution for any crime mentioned and since he mentioned that he had been indicted for assault, Queens could not try him for this assault, and since Queens could not try him neither could the United States.
This contention fails for several reasons. The most obvious of which is that if his contention were accepted then any arm of the state with state-bequeathed power to grant immunity could thwart any federal prosecution. The power to grant immunity from prosecution may not be the power to destroy, M'Culloch v. Maryland, 1819, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 4 L.Ed. 579, but it would then be the power to frustrate federal crime control. In opposition to this approach it is urged that protection of a defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination outweighs the possibility of harm that a state could cause. But Murphy, supra provides adequate protection for these rights by denying to the federal government the use of Defendant's testimony.
A second reason why Defendant's argument must be rejected is because as to the question posed and its answer, he did not have the privilege against self-incrimination. Consequently the grant of immunity did not cover his response.
There was no basis for the privilege here because the information gleened from an answer to this question, no matter what the answer might have been, could not possibly result in, or present evidence leading to, any criminal or civil liability relating to a penalty or forfeiture since the information contained in the statement was already a matter of public record. The question and answer revealed nothing new or unknown.
Appellant's fifth contention is that the District Court erred in changing venue from the Eastern District of Louisiana to the Southern District of Texas and that he was thereby denied his Article 3, § 2, cl. 3 and Sixth Amendment and Rule 18 rights to a trial by an impartial jury of the State and district where the crime was committed.9
The facts here are of the utmost importance. On July 3, 1967, defendant moved for a continuance and for a change of venue10 because of "widespread front-page newspaper coverage" of the alleged assault and other publicity which "was such as to prejudice the readers of the same against defendant." With this motion defendant filed as exhibits several New Orleans newspaper articles which, to say the least, were highly inflammatory.11 On August 1, 1967 this and other motions were continued to September 13, 1967 when they came up for hearing before Judge Heebe. At the Judge's suggestion, in which all acquiesced, the motion styled "Motion for Continuance and for a Change of Venue" was heard first, his reasoning being that disposition of the venue motion favorable to defendant would make determination of the other motions inappropriate since they would be transferred with the case.
Appellant's counsel opened the hearing by pointing out three groups of instances that persuasively proved that Marcello could not get a constitutionally guaranteed fair trial in Louisiana. One was several newspaper articles in the New Orleans area (see note 11, supra), another was an article in the September 1, 1967 issue of Life Magazine12 and the third consisted of two published statements by Louisiana Governor McKeithen.13 Counsel then stated:
"Now, it is in this atmosphere, nationwide, adverse publicity that we are asked to try this particular case. At the time I originally prepared the motion I thought maybe something could be done to assist Mr. Marcello with regard to a change of venue. But I know of no place where I think at this particular time, with the adverse publicity at its height, that Mr. Marcello would receive a fair trial, in view of this adverse publicity. * * *
"My motion * * * this afternoon is for a five-month continuance. I feel we should not be obliged to try this case in this atmosphere at this time. I am, naturally, withdrawing a request for a change of venue — I beg your pardon — I am not pressing my request for a change of venue at this time.
"I am only pressing at this time the request for a postponement until, unfortunately, I think until after election, and until after this publicity, which I feel may continue for some time." But what transpired reflects clearly that the motion as filed and as then presented covered both continuance and change of venue because of inflammatory publicity. In reply to a specific question as to whether his motion was an alternative motion for continuance or a change of venue, counsel for Appellant replied, "The motion incorporated both, but I would be at a loss to suggest to the Court, if the Court were to ask me, where venue should be changed to."
The Government submitted the matter without argument.
The Judge then made it clear that with the motion for both change of venue and continuance immediately before him he would take the wisest tack and rule on the venue portion first since he had to rule on it at some time and "any continuance that might be granted * * * would depend upon the local atmosphere of that particular [transferee] district." His reasoning was that if he did rule that venue should be changed, he should not rule on the other half (the continuance portion) of the motion but rather should leave its disposition (along with the other 10 motions) to the Trial Judge in the transferee district.
There was no objection by Marcello or his counsel to this course of procedure. It was plain as could be that the Judge was going to rule on change of venue first. Again there was acquiescence with no — the word is no — objection.
This became doubly clear from the ensuing colloquy which made it positively evident to all present that on the basis of overwhelming evidence of adverse publicity (see notes 11, 12, 13, supra) the Trial Judge felt that Marcello could not get a fair trial in the Eastern District of Louisiana.14 Before his final determination his purpose was simply but forcibly expressed. "Let me make it clear here that I will grant the motion for change of venue and leave all other motions * * *." Leaving no doubt what his conclusion was and that a change of venue would be ordered, the Court and counsel then discussed whether counsel should submit alternative districts, how many, and within what time they should be submitted. After more discussion concerning potential transferee districts with nary a sound of objection either from Marcello or his counsel, the Court granted defendant's motion for change of venue and determined that all other motions, including the motion for continuance should be transferred.
Although this exposition of fact would seem to be lengthy enough to determine one of the fifteen issues, it is not. A new wrinkle in the form of Mr. Marcello's attorney enters the chambers. Not more than ten minutes after counsel's motion so vigorously pressed had been granted, he appeared in the Judge's chambers and to Judge Heebe's "complete surprise" United States v. Marcello, E.D.La., 1968, 280 F.Supp. 510, 512), requested withdrawal of the just-entered order. The Court asked for a written motion and memorandum, which counsel filed in the form of a "Motion to Reconsider Order Directing Change of Venue" and which was taken under submission after oral argument on September 22, 1967. At the hearing, it was argued that "in view of the fact that we are dealing with a Constitutional right, and in view of the fact that the Defendant desires to assert his Constitutional right to have a trial here, even though there is prejudicial publicity, and in view of the fact that the provisions of change of venue are for the benefit of the Defendant, and since he does not desire to take advantage of it, I submit that this motion for reconsideration should be granted."
We see, as did Judge Heebe in his well written opinion (United States v. Marcello, supra) denying the motion, Marcello's contention as dual. He argues (i) that he withdrew his motion for change of venue at the original hearing and (ii) that even if he did not, he did not waive his Constitutional right to be tried in New Orleans.
Appellant's idea that he withdrew his motion is just factually incorrect as is clear from the events as set out above. Counsel's statement italicized supra, "I am, naturally, withdrawing a request for a change of venue — I beg your pardon — I am not pressing my request for a change of venue at this time" is obviously, shrewdly, and carefully not a withdrawal. Nothing said or done by Court or counsel could have left anyone, including specifically Marcello, in any doubt as to what was being argued and sought. Indeed, the fact that this exceptionally able, articulate advocate caught himself and restated his position is a positive refutation of any purpose to withdraw.
From the Judge's bench we can most clearly see that a determination not to press is not the same as a withdrawal. More than that, as a matter of fact it was not even a case of "not pressing". The running colloquy showed that it was being urged and considered, and at that point it was up to Marcello to advise the Judge that what had been sought and what obviously was being granted was no longer desired. The Judge had a serious duty both under the rules (see note 10, supra) and the Constitution. The evidence overwhelmingly proved that Marcello could not get an unprejudiced trial in New Orleans. No Judge worthy of the name could permit that to occur. The Judge could also see that if he did not grant a change of venue the case would begin with built-in grounds for reversal. In the face of this motion and showing by Marcello, Judge Heebe stated and this Court agrees that it would have been utterly absurd to believe that if the motion had been denied and if Defendant had been convicted, a higher Court would then preclude the Defendant from arguing on appeal that the lower court had erred in