Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-2nd-circuit/1038796.html
Timestamp: 2020-08-10 00:08:33
Document Index: 355358957

Matched Legal Cases: ['§\u2002541', '§\u2002541', '§\u2002541', '§\u2002437', '§\u200210', '§\u20027']

Before MAHONEY, WALKER, and SPROUSE,* Circuit Judges. William P. Fanciullo, Albany, NY, for defendant-appellant. George A. Yanthis, Asst. U.S. Atty. N.D.N.Y., Albany, NY (Gary L. Sharpe, U.S. Atty., N.D.N.Y., Albany, NY, of counsel), for appellee.
“The Double Jeopardy Clause provides that no one shall ‘be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.’ U.S. Const. amend V. The Clause protects against both a subsequent prosecution for the same offense after acquittal or conviction as well as multiple punishments for the same offense.” United States v. McCormick, 992 F.2d 437, 439 (2d Cir.1993) (collecting cases). It is by now well settled that “punishment” imposed by prison authorities for infractions of prison regulations does not generally bar a subsequent criminal prosecution for the same conduct. See United States v. Rising, 867 F.2d 1255, 1259 (10th Cir.1989) ( “administrative punishment imposed by prison officials does not render a subsequent judicial proceeding, criminal in nature, violative of the double jeopardy clause”) (collecting cases); Kerns v. Parratt, 672 F.2d 690, 691-92 (8th Cir.1982) (per curiam) (“[A]dministrative proceedings based upon violation of prison disciplinary rules․ do not place an offender in jeopardy for purposes of the double jeopardy clause. It is well-settled that there is no bar to separate criminal prosecution․”) (collecting cases); United States v. Stuckey, 441 F.2d 1104, 1105-06 (3d Cir.) (per curiam) (“Administrative sanctions imposed by prison officials upon a prisoner following his apprehension in connection with the commission of a crime is not a bar to subsequent prosecution for the crime in a court of competent jurisdiction.”) (collecting cases), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 841, 92 S.Ct. 136, 30 L.Ed.2d 76 (1971).
We are unpersuaded. Halper addressed the issue “whether and under what circumstances a civil penalty may constitute punishment for the purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause,” 490 U.S. at 446, 109 S.Ct. at 1901, and is therefore not precisely on point. However, Halper does provide some guidance for analyzing the instant case. Halper opined that the civil fine at issue in that case constituted punishment for double jeopardy purposes because of the “tremendous disparity” between the civil penalty and the government's actual damages, id. at 452, 109 S.Ct. at 1903, and concluded that a sanction that “may not fairly be classified as remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution” constitutes a punishment for double jeopardy purposes. Id. at 449, 109 S.Ct. at 1902. Punitive interests and remedial interests, however, are nowhere so tightly intertwined as in the prison setting, where the government's remedial interest is to maintain order and to prevent violent altercations among a population of criminals. Accordingly, the mere fact that a sanction imposed by prison officials has a punitive component does not mean that the sanction constitutes “punishment” for double jeopardy purposes. In this context, we perceive no distinction of constitutional significance between “disciplinary segregation” pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 541.21 and “[a]dministrative detention” pursuant to id. § 541.22.
Subsequent to Halper, the question whether disciplinary segregation bars a subsequent prosecution was recently addressed by the Third Circuit, which concluded that: “Disciplinary sanctions imposed by prison authorities for infractions of prison regulations do not bar a subsequent criminal prosecution.” United States v. Newby, 11 F.3d 1143, 1144 (3d Cir.1993) (citing Rising, 867 F.2d at 1259; Kerns, 672 F.2d at 691-92; Stuckey, 441 F.2d at 1105-06), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, ---U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 1841, 115 S.Ct. 111, 128 L.Ed.2d 468, 130 L.Ed.2d 58 (1994). The disciplinary sanctions imposed upon the defendant in Newby consisted of disciplinary transfer, disciplinary segregation, and the loss of one thousand days of “good time credits”. Newby, 11 F.3d at 1145. Although Newby does not explicitly address the distinction between administrative detention and disciplinary segregation, the punishment at issue in Newby falls within the latter category, and was punitive in nature. Cf. Russell v. Scully, 15 F.3d 219, 222 (2d Cir.1993) (distinguishing administrative and punitive segregation). Newby reasoned that “prison disciplinary proceeding[s] ․ determine whether prison rules are broken and ․ maintain institutional order,” and accordingly do not bar subsequent criminal prosecutions for the same conduct. Newby, 11 F.3d at 1145. We find this reasoning persuasive.
Further, McCormick teaches that if Congress intended multiple punishments to flow from a single act, “ ‘then for the purposes of Double Jeopardy analysis the combined punishment would simply be viewed as the appropriate punishment,’ ” and not limited by the Double Jeopardy Clause. McCormick, 992 F.2d at 440 (quoting United States v. Koonce, 945 F.2d 1145, 1150 (10th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 994, 112 S.Ct. 1695, 1705, 118 L.Ed.2d 406, 413 (1992)). 18 U.S.C. 4042(3) directs the Bureau of Prisons to “provide for the protection, instruction, and discipline of all persons charged with or convicted of offenses against the United States.” 28 C.F.R. § 541.21 sets forth one such means of disciplining prisoners, disciplinary segregation, defined as “the status of confinement ․ in a special housing unit ․ separated from the general population.”
Congress could hardly have intended that only those violations of prison regulations that do not rise to the level of criminal behavior come within prison officials' duty to maintain prison discipline, while more heinous behavior is beyond their reach except at the cost of precluding subsequent criminal prosecution. Cf. Pagliaro v. Cox, 143 F.2d 900, 901 (8th Cir.1944). (“It would be a strange anomaly if a mere infraction of prison rules would be a basis for forfeiture [of good time] while commission of a serious crime while in custody and in respect to such custody could not be.”).
We have addressed similar testimony, and similar objections, in a number of cases. In United States v. Sliker, 751 F.2d 477 (2d Cir.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1058, 471 U.S. 1137, 105 S.Ct. 1772, 2679, 84 L.Ed.2d 832, 86 L.Ed.2d 697 (1985), the defendants were charged, inter alia, with bank embezzlement, bank larceny, and falsification of bank records. It was an essential element of these crimes that the victim bank be insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (the “FDIC”). Id. at 483.
The hearsay objection to the admissibility of Zarone's testimony on this issue also does not withstand analysis. Zarone was not essentially testifying as to the substance of the out-of-court “statement,” see Fed.R.Evid. 801(c), represented by the deed that established concurrent federal jurisdiction over Raybrook. Rather, he was testifying to an overall conclusion that Raybrook was “under concurrent jurisdiction.” Cf. Sliker, 751 F.2d at 483 (testimony establishing overall conclusion of FDIC insurance). This testimony was presumably based, inter alia, upon the commonplace knowledge that a federal prison is likely to be a location where federal jurisdiction is at least concurrently exercised. Cf. Sliker, 751 F.2d at 485 (invoking “ ‘common knowledge of the nearly universal prevalence of the banks of the United States having their deposits insured by the [FDIC]’ ” (quoting Cook v. United States, 320 F.2d 258, 259-60 (5th Cir.1963))).
We turn to the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence of concurrent federal jurisdiction. Having concluded that Zarone was a competent witness on this issue, and in view of his uncontradicted testimony that concurrent federal jurisdiction existed, the only remaining sufficiency issue is the claim that his testimony established only the existence of concurrent federal jurisdiction at the time of trial, rather than at the time of Hernandez-Fundora's assault upon Parris. Sliker addressed the parallel claim in that case that no evidence had been provided to establish FDIC insurance at the time of the criminal activity at issue, as distinguished from the time of trial. We responded that “the Government can rely on [the bank officer's] testimony viewed in light of the principle that the subsequent existence of a condition is some evidence of its prior existence, at least when the time span is not too great and there is no suggestion of an intervening circumstance that might call its previous existence into question.” Id. at 484 (citing 2 Wigmore, Evidence, § 437(1) at 513-19 (Chadbourne rev.1979)). We followed Sliker on this issue in United States v. Schermerhorn, 906 F.2d 66, 69-70 (2d Cir.1990), where the crime charged was making a false statement to a federally insured bank and the evidence of FDIC insurance again consisted of trial testimony by a bank officer that the bank was insured at the time of trial. In light of Sliker and Schermerhorn, we deem the evidence in this case to be sufficient to support the existence of concurrent federal jurisdiction over Raybrook at the time of the assault by Hernandez-Fundora upon Parris.
Subdivision (a). This is the only evidence rule on the subject of judicial notice. It deals only with judicial notice of “adjudicative” facts. No rule deals with judicial notice of “legislative” facts․
The omission of any treatment of legislative facts results from fundamental differences between adjudicative facts and legislative facts. Adjudicative facts are simply the facts of the particular case. Legislative facts, on the other hand, are those which have relevant to legal reasoning and the lawmaking process, whether in the formulation of a legal principle or ruling by a judge or court or in the enactment of a legislative body. The terminology was coined by Professor Kenneth Davis in his article An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 Harv.L.Rev. 364, 404-407 (1942)․ In addition, see the same author's Judicial Notice, 55 Colum.L.Rev. 945 (1955); Administrative Law Treatise, ch. 15 (1958); A System of Judicial Notice Based on Fairness and Convenience, in Perspectives of Law 69 (1964).
These authorities clarify that while courts may take judicial notice of either legislative or adjudicative facts, only notice of the latter is subject to the strictures of Rule 201. Although Rule 201 is frequently (albeit erroneously) cited in cases that involve judicial notice of legislative facts, see II Davis & Pierce's § 10.6, at 155, we recognize the importance of this distinction and its clear basis in Rule 201(a) and the advisory note thereon, as explicated in Gould and Bowers. We therefore conclude that the jurisdictional issue in this case is premised upon a determination of legislative, rather than adjudicative, facts to which Rule 201, including Rule 201(g), is inapplicable.
2. The federal enclave laws are a group of statutes that permits the federal courts to serve as a forum for the prosecution of certain crimes when the occur within the ‘[s]pecial maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States', 18 U.S.C. § 7; this jurisdiction includes federal land, and property such as federal courthouses and military bases.United States v. Markiewicz, 978 F.2d 786, 797 (2d Cir.1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1086, 113 S.Ct. 1065, 122 L.Ed.2d 369 (1993).