Source: http://nycrubberroomreporter.blogspot.com/2014/03/clarification-of-freedom-of-information.html
Timestamp: 2017-03-31 00:35:35
Document Index: 511829382

Matched Legal Cases: ['§89', '§87', '§160', '§87', '§87', '§87', '§89', '§89', '§89', '§89']

NYC Rubber Room Reporter and ATR CONNECT: Clarification of Freedom of Information Law by NYS Committee on Open Government Director Robert Freeman
State of New YorkDepartment of StateCommittee on Open Government
One Commerce Plaza99 Washington Ave.Albany, New York 12231(518) 474-2518Fax (518) 474-1927http://www.dos.ny.gov/coog/
July 6, 1998Mr. Gregory P. Klibansky52 Jamaica Ave.Holtsville, NY 11742
The staff of the Committee on Open Government is authorized to issue advisory opinions. The ensuing staff advisory opinion is based solely upon the information presented in yourcorrespondence.
Your letter of June 17 addressed to Governor Pataki has been forwarded to theCommittee on Open Government. The Committee, a unit of the Department of State, isauthorized to provide advice concerning the Freedom of Information Law.
In brief, you described a series of difficulties and delays in your attempts to gainaccess to records from the Office of the Suffolk County District Attorney. As I understandthe matter, you requested any files maintained by that agency pertaining to you, and youexpressed particular interest in a claim made by an individual in a judicial proceeding that you"surreptitiously faxed him some type of material." That individual also contended that theincident was investigated by a detective, and you requested the name of the detective andrecords relating to the contention and its investigation. Despite repeated attempts made byphone and in writing to the Office of the District Attorney, it appears that you had receivedno substantive response as of the date of your letter to the Governor.
From my perspective, several issues are pertinent to an analysis of the matter. In thisregard, I offer the following comments.
First, in an initial response to your request, it was stated that you did not "reasonablydescribe" the records sought as required by the Freedom of Information Law [see §89(3)]. To meet that standard, an applicant is required to supply sufficient detail (i.e., names, dates,indictment, index or docket numbers) to enable agency staff to locate and identify the records. I point out that it has been held by the Court of Appeals, the State's highest court, that todeny a request on the ground that it fails to reasonably describe the records, an agency mustestablish that "the descriptions were insufficient for purposes of locating and identifying thedocuments sought" [Konigsberg v. Coughlin, 68 NY 2d 245, 249 (1986)].
The Court in Konigsberg found that the agency could not reject the request due to itsbreadth and also stated that:"respondents have failed to supply any proof whatsoever as tothe nature - or even the existence - of their indexing system: whether the Department's files were indexed in a manner thatwould enable the identification and location of documents intheir possession (cf. National Cable Tel. Assn. v FederalCommunications Commn., 479 F2d 183, 192 [Bazelon, J.][plausible claim of nonidentifiability under Federal Freedom ofInformation Act, 5 USC section 552 (a) (3), may be presentedwhere agency's indexing system was such that 'the requesteddocuments could not be identified by retracing a path alreadytrodden. It would have required a wholly new enterprise,potentially requiring a search of every file in the possession ofthe agency'])" (id. at 250).
In my view, whether a request reasonably describes the records sought, as suggested by theCourt of Appeals, may be dependent upon the terms of a request, as well as the nature of anagency's filing or record-keeping system. In Konigsberg, it appears that the agency was ableto locate the records on the basis of an inmate's name and identification number.
While I am unfamiliar with the record keeping systems of the Office of the DistrictAttorney, to extent that the records sought can be located with reasonable effort, I believethat the request would have met the requirement of reasonably describing the records. Onthe other hand, if the records are not maintained in a manner that permits their retrieval exceptby reviewing perhaps hundreds or even thousands of records individually in an effort to locatethose falling within the scope of the request, to that extent, the request would not in myopinion meet the standard of reasonably describing the records. If you were not a party to theproceeding in which the issue of the fax arose, it is questionable in my view whether a requestfor records pertaining to you, without additional detail, would meet the requirement ofreasonably describing the records.
Second, assuming that the records of your interest can be located, the Freedom ofInformation Law is based upon a presumption of access. Stated differently, all records of an agency are available, except to the extent that records or portions thereof fall within one or more grounds for denial appearing in §87(2)(a) through (i) of the Law. Several of the grounds for denial might be relevant in determining rights of access.
You did not indicate the outcome of the case. If the charges against the accused weredismissed in his favor, the records would be sealed pursuant to §160.50 of the CriminalProcedure and, therefore, would be exempted from disclosure by statute in accordance with§87(2)(a) of the Freedom of Information Law.
If there was a conviction, much of the information sought would likely be accessible. Insofar as the records were introduced or disclosed in a public judicial proceeding, they wouldbe available, even if one or more of the grounds would otherwise apply [see Moore v.Santucci, 151 AD2d 677 (1989)]. If they were not introduced during the proceeding and arenot part of the public court record, the extent to which the records could be withheld wouldbe dependent on their contents. For example, if the records identify persons other thanyourself, such as witnesses or those interviewed as part of an investigation, of potentialrelevance is §87(2)(b), which permits an agency to withhold records insofar as disclosurewould constitute "an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." Also of possible relevanceis §87(2)(e), which authorizes an agency to withhold records that:
"are compiled for law enforcement purposes and whichdisclosed, would:
i. interfere with law enforcement investigations or judicialproceedings.
ii. deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or impartialadjudication;
iii. identify a confidential source or disclose confidentialinformation relating to a criminal investigation; oriiii. reveal criminal investigative techniques or procedures,except routine techniques and procedures."
The extent to which the records of your interest could justifiably be withheld under theprovisions cited above would be largely dependent on the effects of disclosure.
Since you sought the name of a detective, I point out that public officers andemployees enjoy a lesser degree of privacy than others, for it has been found in variouscontexts that those individuals are required to be more accountable than others. The courtshave found that, as a general rule, records that are relevant to the performance of the official duties of a public officer or employee are available, for disclosure in such instances would result in a permissible rather than an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [see e.g.,Farrell v. Village Board of Trustees, 372 NYS 2d 905 (1975); Gannett Co. v. County of Monroe, 59 AD 2d 309 (1977), aff'd 45 NY 2d 954 (1978); Sinicropi v. County of Nassau,76 AD 2d 838 (1980); Geneva Printing Co. and Donald C. Hadley v. Village of Lyons, Sup.Ct., Wayne Cty., March 25, 1981; Montes v. State, 406 NYS 2d 664 (Court of Claims,1978); Powhida v. City of Albany, 147 AD 2d 236 (1989); Scaccia v. NYS Division of StatePolice, 530 NYS 2d 309, 138 AD 2d 50 (1988); Steinmetz v. Board of Education, EastMoriches, Sup. Ct., Suffolk Cty., NYLJ, Oct. 30, 1980); Capital Newspapers v. Burns, 67NY 2d 562 (1986)]. Conversely, to the extent that items relating to public officers oremployees are irrelevant to the performance of their official duties, it has been found thatdisclosure would indeed constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [see e.g.,Matter of Wool, Sup. Ct., Nassau Cty., NYLJ, Nov. 22, 1977, dealing with membership ina union; Minerva v. Village of Valley Stream, Sup. Ct., Nassau Cty., May 20, 1981, involvingthe back of a check payable to a municipal attorney that could indicate how that personspends his/her money; Selig v. Sielaff, 200 AD 2d 298 (1994), concerning disclosure of socialsecurity numbers].
It is also noted that in a recent decision, it was held that the names of investigativeemployees of the New York City Department of Investigation must be disclosed. It was heldin Lewis v. Giuliani (Supreme Court, New York County, NYLJ, May 1, 1997) that:
"any effort by DOI to keep the names of its investigativeemployees undisclosed under POL §89(2)(b)(iv) or (v) maynot succeed because information concerning the identities ofpersons doing the agency's work is ‘relevant to the work ofthe agency requesting or maintaining it' and is ‘relevant to theordinary work of such agency.' In addition, because thepurpose of the exemption is to prevent the ‘unwarrantedinvasion of personal privacy' (emphasis added), DOI may notengage in mantra-like invocation of the personal privacyexemption in an effort to ‘have carte blanche to withhold anyinformation it pleases' (Kheel v. Ravitch, 93 AD2d 422, 426;affd 62 NY2d 1), especially with respect to information aboutits employees."
Next, in view of the delays that you have encountered, I point out that the Freedomof Information Law provides direction concerning the time and manner in which agenciesmust respond to requests. Specifically, §89(3) of the Freedom of Information Law states inpart that:
"Each entity subject to the provisions of this article, withinfive business days of the receipt of a written request for arecord reasonably described, shall make such record availableto the person requesting it, deny such request in writing orfurnish a written acknowledgement of the receipt of suchrequest and a statement of the approximate date when suchrequest will be granted or denied..."
If neither a response to a request nor an acknowledgement of the receipt of a request is givenwithin five business days, or if an agency delays responding for an unreasonable time after itacknowledges that a request has been received, a request may, in my opinion, be consideredto have been constructively denied. In such a circumstance, I believe that the denial may beappealed in accordance with §89(4)(a) of the Freedom of Information Law. That provisionstates in relevant part that:
"...any person denied access to a record may within thirty daysappeal in writing such denial to the head, chief executive, orgoverning body, who shall within ten business days of thereceipt of such appeal fully explain in writing to the personrequesting the record the reasons for further denial, or provideaccess to the record sought."
In addition, it has been held that when an appeal is made but a determination is notrendered within ten business days of the receipt of the appeal as required under §89(4)(a) ofthe Freedom of Information Law, the appellant has exhausted his or her administrativeremedies and may initiate a challenge to a constructive denial of access under Article 78 ofthe Civil Practice Rules [Floyd v. McGuire, 87 AD 2d 388, appeal dismissed 57 NY 2d 774(1982)].
Lastly, when an agency indicates that it does not maintain or cannot locate a record,an applicant for the record may seek a certification to that effect. Section 89(3) of theFreedom of Information Law provides in part that, in such a situation, on request, an agency"shall certify that it does not have possession of such record or that such record cannot befound after diligent search." If you consider it worthwhile to do so, you could seek such acertification.
I point out that in Key v. Hynes [613 NYS 2d 926, 205 AD 2d 779 (1994)], it wasfound that a court could not validly accept conclusory allegations as a substitute for proof thatan agency could not locate a record after having made a "diligent search". However, inanother decision, such an allegation was found to be sufficient when "the employee whoconducted the actual search for the documents in question submitted an affidavit whichprovided an adequate basis upon which to conclude that a 'diligent search' for the documentshad been made" [Thomas v. Records Access Officer, 613 NYS 2d 929, 205 AD 2d 786(1994)].
I hope that I have been of assistance. Should any further questions arise, please feelfree to contact me.
Robert J. FreemanExecutive Director
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