Source: http://dc.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.19900703_0004.DC.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2016-12-02 20:02:35
Document Index: 788606838

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 28', '§ 339', '§ 28', '§ 28', '§ 28', '§ 28', '§ 28']

ROWAN HEATING-AIR CONDITIONING-SHEET METAL, INC., APPELLANTv.JAMES E. WILLIAMS, ELIZABETH T. JESTER, APPELLEES
Withdrawn October 16, 1990; Substituted Opinion Rehearing Granted October 16, 1990,
This appeal originated in an action for breach of contract brought by appellant, Rowan Heating-Air Conditioning-Sheet Metal, Inc., against appellees, James E. Williams and Elizabeth Jester, and in appellees' counterclaim for negligence, breach of contract, and violation of the District of Columbia Consumer Protection Procedures Act, D.C. Code § 28-3901 et seq. (1981 & 1989 Supp.) ("Consumer Protection Act"). Appellant challenges the trial court's dismissal of its claim and its judgment for appellees in the amount of $15,700.
In the fall of 1985, appellant and appellees entered into a contract pursuant to which appellant was to design and install a heating and air conditioning system in appellees' home. *fn1 The system installed by appellant did not provide adequate heat, and appellees asked appellant to make the necessary adjustments. Appellant made some minor changes, but refused to take further action until appellees had paid the balance they owed under the contract. When payment was not forthcoming, appellant brought the instant lawsuit, and appellees counterclaimed. After a non-jury trial, the court denied appellant relief, and awarded appellees $10,700 on their breach of contract claim as well as $5,000 in punitive damages arising from appellant's violation of the Consumer Protection Act. *fn2 This appeal followed.
In this regard appellant argues that the trial court improperly disregarded the testimony of William Rowan, the owner of appellant company, who maintained that it would cost only $500 to correct the flaws in the system. Appellant contends that because Jones was never questioned about Rowan's testimony, there was no evidence from which the court could conclude that Rowan's repair proposal would be ineffective. It was not necessary, however, for appellees to take affirmative steps to discredit Rowan's damage estimate. It was sufficient for them to introduce independent evidence, in the form of Jones' testimony, that the actual cost of rectifying the faulty heating system was $10,700. See E. Cleary, McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 339 (3d ed. 1984). The trial court credited this testimony, and specifically rejected Mr. Rowan's estimate. We will not disturb the findings of the trial court in this respect. See Cahn v. Antioch University, 482 A.2d 120, 128-29 (D.C. 1984).
Finally, appellant contends that the court erred by awarding appellees punitive damages pursuant to the Consumer Protection Act. See D.C. Code § 28-3905(k) (1) (C) (1981). Section 28-3905 (k) (1) provides in pertinent part:
(k) (1) Any consumer who suffers any damages as a result of the use or employment by any person of a trade practice in violation of a law of the District of Columbia . . . may bring an action in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia to recover or obtain . . .
The trial court found that appellant had misrepresented material facts about the contract in violation of D.C. Code § 28-3904 (e) (1981). With regard to the issue of damages, the court concluded as follows:
The court went on to conclude that these factors warranted an imposition of punitive damages pursuant to D.C. Code § 28-3905 (k) (1) (C) (1981). *fn5
There is no case law interpreting § 28-3905 (k), but when the section was enacted by the District of Columbia Council, the Committee Report offered the following guidelines for its application:
the standards the courts would use in determining [punitive damages pursuant to § 28-3905 (k) (1) (C)] are the amount of actual damages awarded, the frequency, persistency, and degree of intention of the merchant's unlawful trade practice, and the number of consumers adversely affected.
Accordingly, the trial court's judgment for appellees is affirmed but the case is remanded for recalculation of damages consistent with this opinion. *fn6