Source: http://pa.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.19811228_0040023.C03.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2017-01-18 01:54:55
Document Index: 78424434

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1382', '§ 416', '§ 602', '§ 1302', '§ 601', '§ 1383', '§ 1383', '§ 416']

| Zambardino v. Schweiker
Zambardino v. Schweiker
ZORAIDA ZAMBARDINO, APPELLEEv.RICHARD SCHWEIKER, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, AND FRANCIS J. MCDONOUGH, SOCIAL SECURITY DISTRICT MANAGER, JERSEY CITY, NEW JERSEY, APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY (No. 80-2192)
Before Seitz, Chief Judge, Garth, Circuit Judge, and Pollak, District Judge.*fn*
Zambardino alleged that 20 C.F.R. 416.1151(a)(2) directly conflicts with 42 U.S.C. § 1382a(b)(6), and sought a declaratory judgment that the regulation was invalid.*fn1 On behalf of herself and a class of similarly situated New Jersey SSI recipients, she sought an order directing the Secretary to pay the amount withheld from lump sum SSI payments by reason of 20 C.F.R. § 416.1151(a) (2). Both parties moved for summary judgment.
After an AFDC recipient begins receiving SSI benefits, states must terminate AFDC payments to maintain a qualified program eligible for federal funds. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(24) (1976). In addition, states may recoup from the SSI recipients the state-funded portion of any interim AFDC benefits, but are not required to do so. If a state chooses to seek reimbursement, the SSA treats the state contribution to interim AFDC payments as a loan and thus excludes such payments from the lump sum benefit calculation. See Moore v. Colautti, 483 F. Supp. 357, 363 (E.D.Pa.1979), aff'd 633 F.2d 210 (3d Cir. 1980). The dispute in this case arises because New Jersey has elected not to recoup its portion of AFDC payments. N. J. Administrative Code 10:82-3.7(a)(4)(ii) (1980).
Although neither the pre-amended version of section 1382a(b)(6) nor the regulation promulgated thereunder, 416 C.F.R. 1151 (1976), explicitly sanctioned the deduction of AFDC benefits from lump sum SSI checks, it is undisputed that the Secretary engaged in this practice under prior law. See Jones v. Califano, 576 F.2d 12, 14-16 (2d Cir. 1978) (indicating that the Secretary deducted AFDC payments from lump sum SSI checks prior to 1976 statutory amendments.). Zambardino does not argue, and we are not prepared to assume, that the Secretary's practice before 1976 conflicted with the pre-amended version of section 1382a(b)(6).*fn2
As the agency charged with administering the SSI program, the Department's interpretation of the statute is entitled to deference. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16, 85 S. Ct. 792, 801, 13 L. Ed. 2d 616 (1965). Only if, after an examination of the statutory language, the legislative history, and the overall statutory scheme, it appears that a regulation is "inconsistent with the statutory mandate ... or frustrate(s) the policy that Congress sought to implement" will we reject administrative constructions of a statute. Federal Election Commission v. Democratic Senatorial Committee, 454 U.S. 27, 102 S. Ct. 38, 42, 70 L. Ed. 2d 23 (1981). See Rochester v. Baganz, 479 F.2d 603, 606 (3d Cir. 1973) ("Regulations issued pursuant to the broad rulemaking authority granted to the Secretary (of the Department of Health and Human Services) by 42 U.S.C. § 1302 must be sustained if reasonably related to the purposes of the Act.").
Section 1382a(b)(6) itself does not contain a requirement that excludable assistance must be wholly state funded. The absence of such a requirement lends some credence to the district court's view that Congress intended to exclude any assistance that is funded by a state. Even if we accept the district court's conclusion that the statute plainly requires exclusion, however, we are not foreclosed from examining its legislative history to divine congressional intent. E.g., Train v. Colorado Public Interest Group, 426 U.S. 1, 10, 96 S. Ct. 1938, 1942, 48 L. Ed. 2d 434 (1976).
We acknowledge that some language in the Senate Report would support a more expansive view of Congress's purpose in amending section 1382a(b)(6), e.g., S.Rep.No.1265, 29, reprinted in (1976) U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News at 6023 ("(The bill) would also allow States and localities to provide emergency and special need assistance to SSI recipients without causing a reduction in their Federal SSI payments."). Nonetheless, in light of the purpose of the amendment, we do not believe that this language compels the conclusion that Congress intended to alter the existing policy regarding income exclusion. Indeed, it seems unlikely that this passage would encompass the AFDC program, because AFDC cannot fairly be characterized as a program of "emergency and special needs assistance." See 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1976) (Authorizing AFDC appropriations to "encourage the care of dependent children in their own houses ... to help maintain and strengthen family life and to help ... parents and relatives to attain or retain capability for the maximum self-support and personal independence consistent with the maintenance of continuing child care and protection.").
Although it is true that, as a general proposition, we must presume that Congress intended the plain language of the statute, where the legislative history casts doubt on Congress's intent, "we must allow ourselves some recognition of the existence of sheer inadvertence in the legislative process." Cass v. United States, 417 U.S. 72, 83, 94 S. Ct. 2167, 2173, 40 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1974), quoting Schmid v. United States, 193 Ct. Cl. 780, 436 F.2d 987, 992 (Ct.Cl.1971). Such recognition seems appropriate in this case. Congress clearly intended to change existing law regarding certain types of state assistance to individuals in small public institutions. It is equally clear that Congress amended section 1382a(b)(6) to accommodate this objective. Significantly, there is little evidence in the legislative history that Congress sought to alter the wholly state funded requirement. In light of the limited purpose of the amendment, we believe that the Secretary reasonably construed the statute.
As the district court correctly observed, section 602(a)(24) is not directly applicable here. It requires only that states terminate AFDC benefits to individuals who are simultaneously receiving SSI payments and contemplates that any duplication be remedied by terminating AFDC payments. We believe, however, that the Secretary could have reasonably inferred from section 602(a)(24) a general congressional intent to preclude simultaneous recovery under both the AFDC and SSI programs. The interpretation of section 1382a(b)(6) urged by Zambardino would indirectly conflict with such a reading of section 602(a)(24), and the Secretary permissibly construed the section so as to avoid conflict. See Citizens to Save Spencer County v. Environmental Protection Agency, 195 U.S. App. D.C. 30, 600 F.2d 844, 871 (D.C.Cir.1979).
We believe it is also significant that prior to the 1976 amendment of section 1382a(b)(6), the Secretary had promulgated a regulation giving an identical interpretation to state assistance in another context. In an effort to encourage states to provide interim assistance to SSI beneficiaries, Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1383(g) (1976). The section permits the Secretary to withhold from SSI recipients the amount of interim assistance provided by states and to reimburse the states for such assistance. "Assistance" is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 1383(g) as "assistance financed from State and local funds." In May, 1976, the Secretary promulgated a regulation interpreting the interim assistance statute, which explicitly excludes "assistance payments financed in whole or part from Federal funds (e.g. to families with dependent children)" from the coverage of the statute. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1911(b)(3) (1977).