Source: http://openjurist.org/143/f3d/373/united-states-v-e-nelson
Timestamp: 2013-06-20 05:19:14
Document Index: 20420393

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 4', '§ 922', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 3742', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4']

143 F3d 373 United States v. E Nelson | OpenJurist
143 F. 3d 373 - United States v. E Nelson	Home143 f3d 373 united states v. e nelson
143 F3d 373 United States v. E Nelson 143 F.3d 373
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,v.Robert E. NELSON, Defendant-Appellant.
Argued Feb. 26, 1998.Decided May 6, 1998.
Robert Nelson broke into a LaPorte, Indiana sporting goods store on two separate occasions and stole a total of over sixty firearms. Nelson was apprehended after the second burglary and sentenced to 140 months in prison after pleading guilty to two counts of a five-count indictment. At the sentencing hearing, the court considered Nelson's two prior burglary convictions and found that one of the convictions was a crime of violence under the United States Sentencing Guidelines ("U.S.S.G."). On appeal, Nelson argues that the district court erred in enhancing his sentence under § 4B1.2(1)(ii) (1995) because the burglary of a commercial building does not constitute a crime of violence under the guidelines. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the district court's sentence.
Nelson pled guilty to two counts of stealing firearms from a licensed firearms dealer, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(u). U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 provides the base offense level for theft of firearms. According to the guideline, the defendant starts with a base offense level of 14 if he is a "prohibited person" (which Nelson is by virtue of his prior felony record). U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(6). If the defendant has a prior conviction for a crime of violence, his base offense level is increased to 20. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A). Two prior convictions for crimes of violence raises the base offense level to 24. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2). (Commentary Note 5 of § 2K2.1 refers to § 4B1.2 for the definition of a crime of violence.) Under § 4B1.2, the term "crime of violence" means "any offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that--(ii) is burglary of a dwelling, ... or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another."
We have jurisdiction over Nelson's appeal of his sentence only if it: (1) was imposed in violation of the law; (2) resulted from an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines; (3) is outside the applicable guideline range; or (4) was unreasonable (in the case where there is no applicable Guideline). 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a); United States v. Prevatte, 66 F.3d 840, 843 (7th Cir.1995). Nelson claims that the district court erred in applying the U.S.S.G. insofar as it held that his 1991 burglary in LaPorte, Indiana, of Sportsman's Corner was a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(1)(ii). Whether Nelson's 1991 conviction for burglary of a commercial building is a crime of violence under § 4B1.2 is a question of law that we review de novo. United States v. Unthank, 109 F.3d 1205, 1208 (7th Cir.1997).
In determining whether this burglary presented a serious risk of physical injury to others, the district court correctly held that it may only look to the conduct set forth in the indictment and/or information. See United States v. Shannon, 110 F.3d 382, 384 (7th Cir.1997) (en banc), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 223, 139 L.Ed.2d 156 (1997). The district court took a middle course and declined to adopt a per se rule that commercial burglaries are crimes of violence and always present a risk of physical injury. See also United States v. Hicks, 122 F.3d 12, 13 (7th Cir.1997) (declining to decide whether the burglary of a building that is not a dwelling might still be classified as a crime of violence per se under the catchall provision of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(1)(ii)). We, too, avoid a per se rule. We hold only that the facts of this case warrant the conclusion that Nelson's burglary in 1991 of Sportsman's Corner did create a substantial risk of physical confrontation and "resultant physical injury," thereby constituting a crime of violence within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(1)(ii).
The Information Affidavit of Nelson's 1991 burglary at Sportsman's Corner indicates that a potential risk of physical injury was posed: an alarm went off during the burglary and Nelson was in possession of thirteen guns, a fact which very obviously makes for a dangerous situation. The police were summoned by the alarm, and the possibility of an armed confrontation was easily foreseeable. "The fact that an offender enters a building to commit a crime often creates the possibility of a violent confrontation between the offender and an occupant, caretaker, or some other person who comes to investigate." Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 588, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 2153, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990). That no physical injury occurred is simply fortuitous.
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