Source: https://thettablog.blogspot.com/2019/05/precedential-no-10-ttab-dismisses-rare.html
Timestamp: 2020-08-12 12:28:03
Document Index: 267674559

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1001', '§ 1001', '§ 1746', '§ 1746', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2']

The TTABlog®: Precedential No. 10: TTAB Dismisses Rare Section 2(c) Opposition Due to Death of Named Individual
In a rare inter partes proceeding involving Section 2(c), the Board dismissed an opposition to registration of the mark MANIKCHAND for "snuff." Opposer claimed that the mark identified its founder, Rasiklal Manikchand Dhariwal, and that the application was filed without his consent, but because Mr. Dhariwal died during the pendency of this proceeding the Board ruled that Opposer no longer could claim any right under Section 2(c). M/S R.M. Dhariwal (HUF) 100% EOU v. Zarda King Ltd. and Global Technology & Trade Marks Limited, 2019 USPQ2d 149090 (TTAB 2019) [precedential] (Opinion by Judge Cheryl S. Goodman).
Rule 2.123(a)(1) provides that testimony may be submitted in the form of a sworn affidavit or an unsworn declaration under Rule 2.20. The latter Rule states that, in lieu of a sworn statement, the language of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, or a specified paragraph referring to 18 U.S.C. § 1001, may be used. In addition, 35 U.S.C. Section 25 authorizes the USPTO to accept a declaration under Section 2.20 or the language of 28 U.S.C. § 1746. In either case, a declarant is subject to United States perjury laws if willful or knowing false statements are made.
When a person executes a document outside the United States, a recitation that it is made under penalty of perjury without reference to which country’s perjury laws will be applied provides no assurance of truthfulness because the penalty of perjury may be non-existent or trivial in the place where the person signed the document.
The challenged declaration did not substantially comply with 28 U.S.C. § 1746 due to the absence of the wording “under the laws of the United States” or its substantial equivalent. Therefore the Board granted the motion to strike.
Because a § 2(c) claim is based on public association with the name of a particular living individual, the question of present-day recognition by the public must be considered at the time registration is sought, since an individual’s notoriety with the public could fade over time.
The Board concluded that any right that opposer may have had under § 2(c) expired upon Mr. Dhariwal's death because he was the “particular living individual” protected by § 2(c).
TTABlog comment: In its main brief, opposer argued the ground of false association under Section 2(a), a claim that presumably would have survived the death of Mr. Dhariwal. However, this ground was not pleaded and applicant objected to its consideration. The Board concluded that the Section 2(a) issue was not tried by consent and it therefore refused to consider it.
posted by John L. Welch @ 5/01/2019 0 comments