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Elements of Negligence | James Education Center
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To state a negligence cause of action, the defendant must owe a duty of due care to the person injured, or to a class of persons of which the plaintiff is a member. Valdez v. J. D. Diffenbaugh Co., 51 Cal.App. 3d 494, 124 Cal.Rptr. 467 (1975). The extent and type of duty varies according to the relationship of the parties and other circumstances. See discussion of specific types of negligence in §§1-2:00 – 11:00.
Ordinary negligence consists of acts or omissions which are not compatible with the standard of care exercised by an abstract man of ordinary prudence. People v. Young, 20 Cal.2d 832, 129 P.2d 353 (1942).
It is a relatively broad standard requiring only that the contribution of the individual cause be more than negligible or theoretical. Bockrath v. Aldrich Chemical Co., 21 Cal 4th 71, 79 (1999); Bunch v. Hoffinger, 123 Cal.App 4th 1278 (2004).
Damage must be pled and proved as an essential element of negligence. Rosales v. Stewart, 113 Cal. App. 3d 130, 169 Cal.Rptr. 660 (1980). The phrase “injury occasioned to another” as used in Civil Code §1714 is the injury to the person who is the victim of the actor’s negligence. Buckley v. Chadwick, 45 Cal. 2d 183, 288 P.2d 12 (1955); CACI 261.
The duty of care requires the use of ordinary care to prevent injury to others and is determined on a case-by-case basis.Weirum v. RKO Gen., Inc., 15 Cal. 3d 40, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1975).
To establish negligence per se, a plaintiff must prove: (1) defendant violated a statute, ordinance or regulation of a public entity, (2) the violation proximately caused his injury, (3) the injury resulted from an occurrence the nature of which the statute was designed to prevent, and (4) he was one of the class of persons for whose protection the statute was adopted. Capolungo v. Bondi, 179 Cal. App. 3d 346, 349-350, 224 Cal. Rptr. 326 (1986); see also Cal. Evid. Code §669.
The element of breach of duty is a question of fact for the fact-finder to decide. Slaughter v. Legal Process and Courier Serv., 162 Cal.App. 3d 1236, 1250, 209 Cal.Rptr. 189 (1984).
Conformity with the general practice or custom in the business or trade will not excuse conduct which is not consistent with due care. Holt v. Department of Food and Agric., 171 Cal.App. 3d 427, 435-36, 218 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1985) (crop duster breached its duty of care by spraying dangerous chemical without sufficient surveillance of rice field to determine whether persons were in area).
The owners and operators of a dance hall breached their duty to a dancer when they increased the risk of falling by adding a slippery substance to the dance floor. Bush v. Parents Without Partners, 17 Cal. App. 4th 322, 329, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 178 (1993).
A carrier who breached a shipping contract by contaminating the shipped product was liable in tort for negligently performing the contract. North American Chemical Co. v. Superior Court, 59 Cal.App. 4th 764, 776, 69 Cal.Rptr. 2d 59 (1997).
Therefore, “a force which plays only an ‘infinitesimal or theoretical’ part in bringing about injury, damage, or a loss is not a substantial factor.” Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 16 Cal. 4th 953, 969 (1997). But a very minor force that does cause harm is a substantial factor. Bockrath, 21 Cal.4th at 79.
Ordinarily, plaintiffs bear the burden of proving causation. However, in the proper case, where plaintiff’s inability to prove causation is inherent in the condition created by defendants themselves, a presumption of causation may arise with the burden shifting to defendants “who will absolve themselves if they can.” Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel, 3 Cal.3d 756, 772 (1970).
A street vendor who attracted children by a sound device was liable to a child who was struck by another’s automobile while crossing the street. The vendor’s “intervening cause” defense failed because the vendor could foresee that an intervening act of negligence by a passing motorist might harm potential customers. Ellis v. Trowen Frozen Prods., Inc., 264 Cal.App. 2d 499, 70 Cal.Rptr. 487 (1968).
An ice company engineer’s failure to take steps to prevent the bursting of sulfuric acid drums after seeing their bulged condition, which he knew was caused by internal pressure, was a proximate cause of injuries to a bystander when the drums burst. The chemical company’s delivery of the drums to the ice company was also a proximate cause since the chemical company knew the drums were likely to burst if not kept cool and vented and failed to warn the ice company of such fact. Each company was liable. Gall v. Union Ice Co., 108 Cal.App. 2d 303, 239 P.2d 48 (1951).
The defense of “inevitable accident” is nothing more than a denial of negligence by defendant, or a contention that his negligence, if any, was not a proximate cause of the injury. Smith v. San Francisco, 117 Cal. App. 2d 749, 256 P.2d 999 (1953) (“inevitable accident” jury instruction was not in error where plaintiff pedestrian stepped into path of bus which allegedly failed to yield and struck plaintiff).
Generally, a fire is the proximate cause of all injuries and damage it may produce, whether it spreads to one abutting property or for several miles. Osborn v. Whittier, 103 Cal.App. 2d 609, 230 P.2d 132 (1951).
The plaintiff’s damages cannot be contingent or speculative. Negligence in drafting a will did not result in damages until the testator’s death. Horne v. Peckham, 97 Cal. App. 3d 404, 158 Cal.Rptr. 714 (1979).
Negligence causing only monetary harm does not give rise to emotional distress damages. Quezada v. Hart, 67 Cal.App. 3d 754, 136 Cal.Rptr. 815 (1977). See also Rest.2d Torts, §313; Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th ed. 1984) §54, p. 361.
In negligence actions for physical injury, recovery for emotional distress caused by that injury is available as an item of parasitic damages. Crisci v. Security Insurance Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 433, 58 Cal.Rptr. 13, 426 P.2d 173 (1967).
“[U]nless the defendant has assumed a duty to plaintiff in which the emotional condition of the plaintiff is an object, recovery is available only if the emotional distress arises out of the defendant’s breach of some other legal duty and the emotional distress is proximately caused by that breach of duty. Even then, with rare exceptions, a breach of the duty must threaten physical injury, not simply damage to property or financial interests.” Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 6 Cal. 4th 965, 985, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 550 (1993) (emotional distress caused by fear of a cancer that is not probable should generally not be compensable in a negligence action).
Emotional Distress (Erlich v. Menezes, 21 Cal. 4th 543, 87 Cal. Rptr. 2d 886, 981 P.2d 978 (1999) (unless defendant has assumed a duty to plaintiff in which plaintiff’s emotional condition is an object, recovery is available only if emotional distress arises out of defendant’s breach of some other legal duty and is proximately caused by breach of that independent duty; even then, with rare exceptions, that breach of duty must threaten physical injury, not simply damage to property or financial interests)).
Limit of Liability (Cal. Civ. Code §1431.2;Greathouse v. Amcord, Inc., 35 Cal. App. 4th 831, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 561 (1995) (liability of an individual defendant for non-economic damages cannot exceed that defendant’s percentage of fault)).
Prior to 2003, the statute of limitations for personal injury actions was one year from the date of injury. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §340. Effective January 1, 2003, the new Code of Civil Procedure §335.1 extends the statute of limitations to two years. Avila v. Citrus Community College Dist., 38 Cal.4th 148, 41 Cal.Rptr. 3d 299, 131 P.3d 383, (2006).
Note: The doctrine of “last clear chance” and the defense of “assumption of risk” are abolished to the extent that they are merely variants of the former doctrine of contributory negligence. Both are now subsumed under comparative fault. Li v. Yellow Cab Co. ofCalifornia, 13Cal. 3d 804, 119Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
Secondary Assumption of Risk. In cases involving “secondary assumption of the risk,” i.e., where defendant does owe a duty of care to plaintiff, but plaintiff proceeds to encounter a known risk imposed by defendant’s breach of duty, the comparative fault scheme applies, and the court may consider the relative responsibility of the parties in apportioning loss resulting from the injury. Knight v. Jewett, 3Cal. 4th 296, 314-15, 11Cal. Rptr. 2d 2 (1992).
However, the role of the defendant is an important component in the legal analysis relating to duty. A business, participant or manufacturer may have different duties and therefore may not avail themselves of the Assumption of the Risk Doctrine. For instance, a swimming pool operator cannot violate a safety statute relating to pool maintenance and claim assumption of the risk for a slip and fall. Capri v.L.A. Fitness International, LLC, 136Cal. App. 4th 1078 (2006). Similarly, a co-participant negligently operating an All Terrain Vehicle in violation of the California Vehicle Code is unable to invoke the doctrine. Huff v. Wilkins, 138Cal. App. 4th 732 (2006). Finally, a manufacturer may not insulate itself from supplying defective equipment by use of the doctrine. Ford v. Polaris Industries, Inc., 139Cal. App. 4th 755 (2006).
Several Liability for Non-Economic Damages (Cal. Civ. Code §§1431.1 – 1431.5 [Prop.51]).
Professional Negligence (§1-2:00 – 5:00)