Source: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/413/508
Timestamp: 2013-12-12 10:50:32
Document Index: 322837971

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 151', '§ 151', '§ 2014', '§ 2023']

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE et al., Appellants, v. Lula Mae MURRY et al. | Supreme Court | LII / Legal Information Institute
Supreme Court aboutsearch liibulletin subscribe previews UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE et al., Appellants, v. Lula Mae MURRY et al.
413 U.S. 508 (93 S.Ct. 2832., 37 L.Ed.2d 767)
Argued: April 23, 1973.
Appellees challenge the constitutionality of § 5(b) of the Food Stamp Act of 1964, as amended in 1971, providing that '(a)ny household which includes a member who has reached his eighteenth birthday and who is claimed as a dependent child for Federal income tax purposes by a taxpayer who is not a member of an eligible household, shall be ineligible to participate in any food stamp program . . . during the tax period such dependency is claimed and for a period of one year after the expiration of such tax period.' This provision was generated by congressional concern over nonneedy households participating in the food stamp program, and abuses of the program by 'college students' and 'children of wealthy parents.' The District Court held the provision unconstitutional, finding that it went far beyond the congressional goal, and operated inflexibly to deny stamps to households, containing no college students, that had established clear eligibility for stamps and remained in dire need, only because a member of the household 18 years or older is claimed by someone as a tax dependent. Held: The tax deduction taken for the benefit of the parent in a prior year is not a rational measure of the need of a different household with which the child of the tax-deducting parent lives, and the administration of the Act allows no hearing to show that the tax deduction is irrelevant to the need of the household. Section 5(b) therefore violates due process. Pp. 511514.
The Food Stamp Act of 1964, 7 U.S.C. 2011 et seq., as amended in 1971, 84 Stat. 2048, has been applied to these appellees so as to lead the three-judge District Court to hold one provision of it unconstitutional. 348 F.Supp. 242. We noted probable jurisdiction. 410 U.S. 924, 93 S.Ct. 1366, 35 L.Ed.2d 590.
Appellee Murry has two sons and ten grandchildren in her household. Her monthly income is $57.50, which comes from her ex-husband as support for her sons. Her expenses far exceed her monthly income. By payment, however, of $11 she received $128 in food stamps. But she has now been denied food stamps because her ex-husband (who has remarried) had claimed her two sons and one grandchild as tax dependents in his 1971 income tax return. That claim, plus the fact that her eldest son is 19 years old, disqualified her household for food stamps under § 5(b) of the Act.
Appellee Alderete is in comparable straits because her ex-husband claimed the five children, who live with their mother, as tax dependents, the oldest being 18 years old. Appellee Beavert's case is similar. Appellee Lee is the mother of five children, her entire income per month being $23 derived from public assistance. Her five children live with her. Her monthly bills are $249, of which $148 goes for food. Her husband is not a member of her household; he in fact deserted her and has supplied his family with no support. But he claimed the two oldest sons, ages 20 and 18, as tax dependents in his 1971 tax return, with the result that the wife's household was denied food stamps. Appellee Nevarez is in comparable straits.
The legislative history reflects a concern about abuses of the program by 'college students, children of wealthy parents.'
But, as the District Court said, the Act goes far beyond that goal and its operation is inflexible. 'Households containing no college student, that had established clear eligibility for Food Stamps and which still remain in dire need and otherwise eligible are now denied stamps if it appears that a household member 18 years or older is claimed by someone as a tax dependent.' 348 F.Supp., at 243.
Tax dependency in a prior year seems to have no relation to the 'need' of the dependent in the following year. It doubtless is much easier from the administrative point of view to have a simple tax 'dependency' test that will automaticallywithout hearing, without witnesses, without findings of factterminate a household's claim for eligibility for food stamps. Yet, as we recently stated in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 1215, 31 L.Ed.2d 551:
The food stamp program was established in 1964 for the twin purposes of promoting the agricultural economy and alleviating hunger and malnutrition among the needy members of 'the other America.' 7 U.S.C. 2011. Under this program, currently needy households whose members comply with a work requirement, 7 U.S.C. 2014(b), (c), are entitled to purchase enough food stamps to provide those households with nutritionally adequate diets. In 1971, Congress became concerned with the possibility that nonneedy households were receiving food stamps, and its response was the enactment of Pub.L. 91671. While the curbing of abuses in the administration of a government program is assuredly a legitimate purpose, that statute has given rise to constitutional questions in the present case and its companion, United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 93 S.Ct. 2821, 37 L.Ed.2d 782.
The challenged provision in the present case is § 5(b) of the Food Stamp Act, 7 U.S.C. 2014(b), as amended, 84 Stat. 2049. That section renders ineligible for food stamps any household that includes a member over 18 years of age who has been claimed as a tax dependent by a taxpayer who is not himself eligible for the stamps. What little legislative history there is suggests that the sole reason for enactment of this section was to prevent the receipt of food stamps by the sons and daughters of more affluent families. 116 Cong.Rec. 41979, 41981, 41993, 42021; cf. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 483484, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 1160, 25 L.Ed.2d 491.
Rather than requiring an individualized determination that a particular household linked to a relatively more affluent household by a claimed tax dependency was not in fact needy, Congress chose instead to utilize a conclusive presumption. The simple fact that a household member has been claimed as a tax dependent by a non-indigent taxpayer results in the complete termination of benefits for that entire household in the relevant tax period and in the subsequent 12 months as well. 7 U.S.C. 2014(b). It matters not whether that dependency claim was fraudulent, what the amount of support from the non-indigent taxpayer actually was,
whether that support was still available at the time the welfare officials learned of it, or even whether the claimed dependent was still living in the household.
Similarly, I think, the conclusive presumption that led to the termination of the appellees' benefits without any opportunity for them to prove present need denied them due process of law.
Accordingly, I concur in the opinion and judgment of the Court.
Is this, then, such a case? Appellants argue that Congress could rationally have thought that persons claimed as tax dependents by a taxpayer himself not a member of an eligible household in one year could, during that year and the succeeding one, probably receive sufficient funds from the taxpayer to offset their need for food stamps. If those persons received food stamps, they would be denying to the truly needy some of the limited benefits Congress has chosen to make available. The statute, on this view, is aimed at preventing abuse of the program by persons who do not need the benefits Congress has provided. Even if, as appellants urge, the statute is interpreted to make ineligible for food stamps only those persons validly claimed as tax dependents, see Reply Brief for Appellants 23. I do not think that Congress adopted a method for preventing abuse that is reasonably calculated to eliminate only those who abuse the program. In particular, it could not be fairly concluded that, because one member of the household had received half his support from a parent, the entire household's need for assistance in purchasing food could be offset by outside contributions.
It is, of course, quite simple for Congress to provide an administrative mechanism to guarantee that abusers of the program were eliminated from it. All that is needed is some way for a person whose household would otherwise be ineligible for food stamps because of this statute to show that the support presently available from the person claiming a member of the household as a tax dependent does not in fact offset the loss of benefits.
Reasonable rules stating what a claimant must show before receiving a hearing on the question could easily be devised. We deal here with a general rule that may seriously affect the ability of persons genuinely in need to provide an adequate diet for their households. In the face of readily available alternatives that might prevent abuse of the program, Congress did not choose a method of reducing abuses that was 'fairly related to the object of the regulation,' by enacting the statute challenged in this case.
My second concern centers in the meaning of the words, 'who is claimed as a dependent child for Federal income tax purposes,' in § 5(b) of the Act. I cannot believe that the mere fact of claiming is sufficient or that that is what Congress intended. It seems obvious to me that 'claimed' in this context has only one meaning, that is, properly claimed for income tax purposes, and not the mere assertion of dependency in the return. This would be the sensible construction of the statute. It is obvious and clear, from the Court's description of the Valdez, Broderson, and Schultz situations, ante, at 510511, that the parent or parents who claimed those appellees as income tax dependents were not at all entitled to make those claims. They clearly did not satisfy the requirements of § 151(e)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U.S.C. 151(e)(1). Valdez' problem is with his father, not with the food stamp program, if the facts the Court states are accurate. The same is true of Broderson. The same is true of Schultz.
Appellees challenge on constitutional grounds a section of the most recent congressional revision of the Food Stamp Act, 7 U.S.C. 2011 et seq., whereby households containing persons 18 years or older who have been claimed as 'dependents' for income tax purposes are made ineligible to receive food stamps. The Court's opinion sustains this challenge. Referring to what it conceives to be the legislative aim in enacting such a limitation, 'a concern about abuses of the program by 'college students, children of wealthy parents," the opinion states that 'the Act goes far beyond that goal and its operation is inflexible' ante, at 513.
'while apparently recognizing the validity of at least some of these state concerns, nonetheless held that the regulation 'is invalid on its face for overreaching,' 297 F.Supp., at 468that it violates the Equal Protection Clause '(b)ecause it cuts too broad a swath on an indiscriminate basis as applied to the entire group of AFDC eligibles to which it purports to apply . . .." Id., at 484, 90 S.Ct., at 1161.
'In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect. If the classification has some 'reasonable basis,' it does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification 'is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.' Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (31 S.Ct. 337, 340) 55 L.Ed. 369.' Id., at 484485, 90 S.Ct., at 1161.
Thus, we deal not with the law of evidence, but with the extent to which the Fifth Amendment permits this Court to invalidate such a determination by Congress. In Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 487488, 75 S.Ct. 461, 464, 99 L.Ed. 563 (1955), the Court said:
'But the law need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.' Accord, Dandridge v. Williams, supra; Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 83 S.Ct. 1028, 10 L.Ed.2d 93 (1963); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611612, 80 S.Ct. 1367, 1372, 4 L.Ed.2d 1435 (1960).
The majority concludes that a 'deduction taken for the benefit of the parent in the prior year is not a rational measure of the need of a different household with which the child of the tax-deducting parent lives.' Ante, p. 514. But judged by the standards of the foregoing cases, the challenged provision of the Food Stamp Act has a legitimate purpose and cannot be said to lack any rational basis. Section 5(b) declares ineligible for food stamps '(a) ny household which includes a member who has reached his eighteenth birthday and who is claimed as a dependent child for Federal income tax purposes by a taxpayer who is not a member of an eligible household.' Thus, in order to disqualify a household for food stamps, the taxpayer claiming one of its members as a dependent must both provide over half of the dependent's support and must himself be a member of a household with an income large enough to disqualify that household for food stamps. These characteristics indicate that the taxpayer is both willing and able to provide his dependent with a significant amount of support. To be sure, there may be no perfect correlation between the fact that the taxpayer is part of a household which has income exceeding food stamp eligibility standards and his provision of enough support to raise his dependent's household above such standards. But there is some correlation, and the provision is, therefore, not irrational. Dandridge v. Williams, supra.
Section 5(b) of the Act provides in part: 'Any household which includes a member who has reached his eighteenth birthday and who is claimed as a dependent child for Federal income tax purposes by a taxpayer who is not a member of an eligible household, shall be ineligible to participate in any food stamp program established pursuant to this chapter during the tax period such dependency is claimed and for a period of one year after expiration of such tax period. . . .' 7 U.S.C. 2014(b). (Emphasis added.)
The relevant exemption provision in § 151(e)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code, as amended, 26 U.S.C. 151(e)(1) (1970 ed. and Supp. I), reads:
'An exemption of $750 (shall be allowed) for each dependent (as defined in section 152)
'(1) A son or daughter of the taxpayer . . ..' 26 U.S.C. 152(a)(1).
The Congress has alternative means available to it by which its purpose can be achieved. The Food Stamp Act, as amended, already provides that households must demonstrate present neediness to qualify, 7 U.S.C. 2014(b), and that its members must under certain circumstances accept available employment, id., § 2014(c). There is no reason that enforcement of these provisions cannot be strengthened if the Congress believes that fraud is taking place. There are already criminal penalties in effect for fraudulent acquisition, use, or transfer of food stamps. Id., § 2023(b), (c).
The Court's opinion makes much of the facts that there may be no relationship between the tax dependent's parent and the remaining members of the household, that they may be completely destitute, and that they may be one or 10 or 20. Ante, at 2836. Section 3(e) of the Food Stamp Act, 7 U.S.C. 2012(e), provides in relevant part:
In its instructions to the state agencies administering the food stamp program, the Department of Agriculture's Food and Nutrition Service defines 'economic unit' as meaning that 'the common living expenses are shared from the income and resources of all members and that the basic needs of all members are provided for without regard to their ability or willingness to contribute.' (Reply brief for Appellants in No. 72534, O.T.1972, 9 n. 19, U.S. Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 93 S.Ct. 2821, 37 L.Ed.2d 782.)