Source: http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/417/379/580607/
Timestamp: 2013-05-21 05:11:12
Document Index: 176778808

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1252', '§ 101', '§ 1158', '§ 101', '§ 101', '§ 1252', '§ 101']

417 F.3d 379: Qun Zheng, Petitioner v. Alberto Gonzales, Attorney General of the United States of America :: US Court of Appeals Cases :: Justia
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417 F.3d 379: Qun Zheng, Petitioner v. Alberto Gonzales, Attorney General of the United States of America
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit. - 417 F.3d 379
Meer M.M. Rahman, Christophe & Associates, P.C., New York, NY, for Qun Zheng.
Douglas E. Ginsburg, Lyle D. Jentzer, United States Department of Justice Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, for Alberto Gonzales.
Qun Zheng, also known as Zhao Xin Zhu, was born in China in 1989. He claims that his mother was forcibly sterilized shortly after giving birth to him, because he was her third child and she had thus violated China's family planning policy. His father left China in 1992, and his mother in 1997, leaving Zheng with his grandparents. Both of Zheng's parents came to the United States and petitioned for asylum. Their petitions were denied, although it appears that they both remain in the United States. See Xiu Jin Wang v. BIA, 87 Fed.Appx. 209 (2d Cir.2004) (unpublished summary order).
Because the BIA affirmed without opinion, we review the IJ's opinion. Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 245 (3d Cir.2003) (en banc). The standard of review is the familiar "substantial evidence" standard: "[T]he administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary." 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). Adverse credibility determinations are factual findings subject to substantial evidence review. Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 597 (3d Cir.2003). But credibility findings must be grounded in the record, id., and must be based on inconsistencies and improbabilities that go to the heart of the asylum claim, Gao v. Ashcroft, 299 F.3d 266, 272 (3d Cir.2002).1
Zheng argues that this finding amounts to "no more than a game of `gotcha' with a juvenile Respondent." Zheng is a teenager who speaks little or no English; his mother read over the I-589 form before he signed it, but he apparently did not. Furthermore, as the form asks aliens to list their "residences during the last five years," it would not be unreasonable for Zheng to omit places where he stayed in hiding for no more than a few weeks. The omission strikes us as only a minor error, and such "minor inconsistencies and minor admissions that reveal nothing about an asylum applicant's fear for his safety are not an adequate basis for an adverse credibility finding." Gao, 299 F.3d at 272 (internal quotation marks omitted).
In short, we are troubled by some of the reasons underlying the IJ's adverse credibility finding. Nonetheless, we are bound to uphold the IJ's decision if it is supported by substantial evidence, and may do so even if we reject some of its bases. See He Chun Chen v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 215, 224-25 (3d Cir.2004) (finding substantial evidence for an adverse credibility determination despite our "extreme discomfiture" with some of the IJ's specific findings).
In Jishiashvili v. Attorney General, 402 F.3d 386, 393 (3d Cir.2005), we explained the requirement that a credibility determination based on "implausibility" must be "grounded in the record"&#x2014;as, for example, by reference to country conditions&#x2014;in order to avoid "speculative or conjectural reasoning." We think that the IJ's implausibility determination here had some basis in the record, in that there was evidence to support his belief that Zheng came to America because he missed his parents, not because he was persecuted.
At all events, the IJ did not rely on implausibility alone. Instead, he determined that, due to the inherent implausibility of Zheng's story, and the (relatively minor) contradictions in his testimony, it would not be unreasonable to expect some evidence to corroborate Zheng's account. In Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 551-54 (3d Cir.2001), we upheld the BIA's rule on corroboration set out in In re S-M-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 722 (BIA 1997). Under this rule, "(1) an applicant need not provide evidence corroborating the specifics of his or her testimony unless it would be `reasonable' to expect the applicant to do so; but (2) if it would be `reasonable' to expect corroboration, then an applicant who neither introduces such evidence nor offers a satisfactory explanation as to why he or she cannot do so may be found to have failed to meet his or her burden of proof." Abdulai, 239 F.3d at 551.
We find no fault with the IJ's conclusion here that it would be reasonable to expect corroboration of Zheng's story. As the IJ noted, Zheng's grandparents and uncle are still in China, and lines of communication remained open. Zheng did not submit any corroboration from them. Nor did he submit any school records indicating that he was suspended for writing his essay.2
1 Congress has recently revised this judicially-created standard to allow a trier of fact to find a lack of credibility based on any inconsistency or falsehood, "without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant's claim." Real ID Act of 2005, § 101(a)(3), Pub.L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231, 303,to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). This provision, however, applies only to applications for asylum made after the effective date of the Real ID Act, see id. § 101(h)(2), and so does not apply to Zheng's case.
2 We are sympathetic to Zheng's argument that the IJ was merely speculating that such records exist, but we note that the Real ID Act largely forecloses it. The Act provides that "[n]o court shall reverse a determination made by a trier of fact with respect to the availability of corroborating evidence . . . unless the court finds ... that a reasonable trier of fact is compelled to conclude that such corroborating evidence is unavailable." Real ID Act of 2005, § 101(e), Pub.L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231, 305, to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4). This provision is effective immediately, and applies to Zheng's petitionSee id. § 101(h)(3), 119 Stat. at 305-06. We see no compelling reason to believe that such documents would be unavailable, and therefore cannot reverse the IJ on this point.