Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/479/912/221067/
Timestamp: 2020-06-04 11:51:37
Document Index: 794044987

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1372', '§ 1486', '§ 717', '§ 1301', '§ 1373', '§ 1486', '§ 1502', '§ 1324', '§ 1373']

Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft, Petitioner, v. Civil Aeronautics Board, Respondent, 479 F.2d 912 (D.C. Cir. 1973) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › D.C. Circuit › 1973 › Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft, Petitioner, v. Civil Aeronautics Board, Respondent
Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft, Petitioner, v. Civil Aeronautics Board, Respondent, 479 F.2d 912 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit - 479 F.2d 912 (D.C. Cir. 1973) Argued Nov. 7, 1972. Decided April 18, 1973
Lufthansa, a citizen of West Germany, is a foreign air carrier and holds a foreign air carrier permit issued by the Board under Sec. 402 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1372. All foreign and domestic carriers holding such permits are allowed to limit their liability for loss, delay, or damage to baggage to a specified dollar amount unless the customer declares a higher value and pays an additional charge in advance of the trip. These limitations must be included in the carriers' tariffs.
A most difficult preliminary question that must be answered is whether this court has jurisdiction over the instant case. Section 1006(a) of the Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1486(a),3 confers jurisdiction on this appellate court to hear appeals from any final order issued by the Civil Aeronautics Board. But under an early and often cited decision, this court held that it had no jurisdiction over direct appeals from the promulgation of agency regulations where there had not been an evidentiary record established in a quasi judicial proceeding before the agency, United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 86 U.S. App.D.C. 314, 181 F.2d 796, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 827, 71 S. Ct. 63, 95 L. Ed. 607 (1950) (concerning regulatory authority under Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717r(b)); see also Arrow Airways v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 87 U.S.App.D. C. 71, 182 F.2d 705 (1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 828, 71 S. Ct. 65, 95 L. Ed. 608 (1951). The United Gas decision was followed in many subsequent cases,4 it being held that agency regulations promulgated without a prior evidentiary hearing by the agency are directly reviewable only in a district court. But the continuing vitality of United Gas has recently been called into question by this court,5 and has not been followed in situations where evidence has been assembled before the agency and is not challenged, and where the issues presented are legal and not factual. City of Chicago v. Federal Power Comm'n, 147 U.S.App.D.C. 312, 458 F.2d 731, 740-741 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1074, 92 S. Ct. 1495, 31 L. Ed. 2d 808 (1972); see also Mobil Oil Corp. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 152 U.S.App.D.C. 119, 469 F.2d 130 (1972). In such cases there is no need to have the matter adjudicated at the district court level in order to have an appropriate record compiled. It is the availability of a record for review and not the holding of a quasi judicial hearing which is now the jurisdictional touchstone.
We must determine whether the instant regulation is consistent with Article 3 and with the Convention in general.7 First, we reject the argument that the terms of Article 3, including Sec. 3(1) (e), are exclusive. Rather, the provisions of Article 3 may be supplemented by additional regulations. Indeed, many aspects of the passenger ticket are already governed by regulations not specifically contained in Article 3, but which were added by IATA agreements and approved by the Board.8 The terms of the instant regulation do not therefore, by their mere existence, violate the terms of the Convention since Article 3 may be supplemented.
Next, we reject Lufthansa's argument that the regulation is improperly broad-intended to apply to all passenger tickets issued anywhere in the world. In fact, the regulation is to apply only to flights within the jurisdiction of the Act. This jurisdiction is circumscribed by the words "Air Transportation," which are defined by the Act as common carriage to, from, or within the United States, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301(10), 1301(21).9
The recent trend of appellate court decisions has been to accord substance to the protections that Article 3 of the Convention intended to provide airline passengers. The carriers are not to be permitted to use the article as a protective shelter to shield themselves from their responsibilities to the public.10 Thus in Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 341 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 816, 86 S. Ct. 38, 15 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1965), the airline was not allowed to claim the Convention's limited liability for a passenger's death since the passenger did not receive the ticket, with its complicated notice of liability limitation, until he was already on the plane. Such a sequence of events violated Article 3 since it could not be said that the ticket was "* * * delivered to the passenger in such a manner as to afford him a reasonable opportunity to take measures to protect himself against the limitations of liability * * *" Id. at 856. See also, Warren v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 352 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1965).
In Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, S. P. A., 370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966), aff'd, 390 U.S. 455, 88 S. Ct. 1193, 20 L. Ed. 2d 27 (1968), the Court disallowed the airline's reliance on the limitation of liability provisions contained on a ticket because the notice was
* * * ineffectively positioned, diminutively sized and unemphasized by bold face type, contrasting color or anything else. The simple truth is that they are so artfully camouflaged that their presence is concealed. 370 F.2d at 514 (quoting language of trial court, D.C., 253 F. Supp. 237 at 243).
Under the foregoing rationale, it may be stated that the instant regulation not only does not contradict the provisions of the Warsaw Convention but actually gives Sec. 3(1) (e) substantive effect. Compliance with the regulation will not only provide passengers with adequate notice of the limitations on liability imposed on them but will later enable the carrier to invoke the protection of Sec. 3(1) (e), for unless adequate notice is accorded its passengers, the carrier will later be precluded from using the Convention to limit liability.
49 U.S.C. § 1373(a)
49 U.S.C. § 1486(a) provides:
See, e. g., Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 257 F.2d 229 (1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 881, 79 S. Ct. 120, 3 L. Ed. 2d 111 (1958); C.A.B. v. American Air Transport, Inc., 91 U.S.App.D.C. 318, 201 F.2d 189, certificate dismissed, 344 U.S. 4, 73 S. Ct. 2, 97 L. Ed. 4 (1952); The Flying Tiger Line v. C. S. Murphy, et al., 244 F. Supp. 889 (D.D.C. 1965), aff'd per curiam (D.C. Cir. #19,869, June 2, 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 945, 87 S. Ct. 316, 17 L. Ed. 2d 224 (1966)
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 138 U.S.App.D.C. 391, 428 F.2d 1093, 1099 and n. 27 (1970); City of Chicago v. Federal Power Comm'n, 147 U.S.App.D.C. 312, 458 F.2d 730, 740-741 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 152 U.S.App.D.C. 119, 469 F.2d 130 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
The Convention itself is self-executing, having been ratified by the United States Senate, U. S. Constitution Art. III, see Indemnity Insurance Co. of No. America v. Pan American Airways, 58 F. Supp. 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1944)
Congress may regulate conduct of noncitizens, even if that conduct takes place in a foreign country, if the consequences of the conduct are felt within the United States, United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945); United States v. Pacific Arctic Co., 228 U.S. 87, 105-106, 33 S. Ct. 443, 57 L. Ed. 742 (1913); cf. Timkin Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 71 S. Ct. 971, 95 L. Ed. 1199 (1951) (antitrust cases)
49 U.S.C. § 1502:
49 U.S.C. § 1324(a):
49 U.S.C. § 1373(a):