Source: http://www.lareau-law.ca/mistakeoffact.html
Timestamp: 2017-03-30 08:43:23+00:00
Document Index: 252665311

Matched Legal Cases: ['art,\n1943', 'art, 2', "l'article 25", "l'article 25", "l'article 118", "l'article 118", "l'article 25", "l'article 25", "l'article 41", '§1', '§ 1', '§\n1', '§ 1', '§1', '§ 17', '§ 31', '§ 60', "l'article 28", '§ 302', '§ 303', '§ 304', '§ 609', '§ 1306', "l'article 49", "l'article 49", '§ 42', '§ 1', '§ 2', 'art. 8', 'art. 13']

Bibliography on mistake of fact or ignorance of fact /
Bibliographie sur l'erreur ou l'ignorance de fait
updated on / mise à jour au: 8 November 2011
First posted on the internet on 9
l'erreur ou
l'ignorance de fait
Mistake of fact is also dealt in other bibliographies such as on
attempt, intent,
consent, mistake of law, selft-defence, and Justification, Excuse and
the Tripartite Theory of the Criminal Offence, see http://www.lareau-law.ca/droitpenal_.htm,
L'erreur de fait est déjà illustré dans
d'autres bibliographies, par exemple: l'intention, le consentement,
l'erreur de droit, la
légitime défense, la tentative, et la justification,
l'excuse et la
théorie tripartite de l'infraction pénale, voir les
diverses bibliographies à http://www.lareau-law.ca/droitpenal_.htm
I- Canadian Law /
ACORN, Annalise, "The Defence of Mistake of Fact and the Proposed
Recodification of the General Part of the Criminal Code: A Feminist
Critique and Proposals for Reform", Alberta Women and Seniors'
Secretariat, 1994, 33 p; also available in French under the title
"La défense d'erreur de fait et la recodification
proposée de la Partie générale du Code -- Une
critique féministe et des propositions de réforme";
A.D.G. (Allan D. GOLD), "Notes and Comments: Strict Liability:
of Fact", (1977-78) 20 The Criminal Law Quarterly 300-306;
BACHER, Jean-Luc, "La politique criminelle de la Cour suprême
du Canada en matière de fraude", (avril-juin 2005) 58 Revue
de criminologie et de police technique et scientifique 215-228,
"erreur de fait" aux pp. 221-222;
BOURQUE, Sophie (Mme la juge), "Les moyens de défense",
dans Barreau du Québec, École, Droit
pénal: Infractions, moyens de défense et peine,
Éditions Yvon Blais, 2007, aux pp. 175-207, et voir les "L'erreur de
fait", les pp. 185-187 (Collection; Collection de
droit 2007-2008; vol. 12),
ISBN: 9782896350322;
Canada, KF 385 ZB5 C681 v. 12 1007-08; note: voir aussi la contribution
de LAPOINTE, infra, dans le
même livre;
BRAITHWAITE, W.J., "Developments in Criminal Law and Procedure: The
1978-79 Term", (1980) 1 Supreme Court Law Review 187-248 [see
Mens Rea: Strict Liability, Mistake of Fact and Law, Motive", pp.
188-213];
___________"Developments in Criminal Law and Procedure: The 1979-80
Term", (1981) 2 Supreme Court Law Review 177-234 [see "Mistake
Mens Rea" at pp. 176-188];
BURBIDGE, George Wheelock, 1847-1908, A Digest of the Criminal
(Crimes and Punishments) Founded By Permission on Sir James Fitzjames
Digest of the Criminal Law, Toronto: Carswell, 1890, lxiii, 588 p.;
pdf completed on 4 September 2006; also available at http://www.archive.org/details/cihm_00331
(accessed on 21 September 2008);
- i-lxiii
and 1-41 (Cover page; Table of cases cited; Table of statutes cited
(U.K. and Canada); List of Abbreviations;
Contents; articles 1-34);
- 42-140
(articles 35-184);
- 240-340
(articles 309-434);
- 341-448
(articles 435-561);
- 449-537
(articles 562-629 and Appendix of Notes);
- 539-588
(Index; p. 538 is blank)
BRYANT, A.W., "The Issue of Consent in the Crime of Sexual Assault",
(1989) 68 Canadian Bar Review
94-154;
CAIRNS WAY, Rosemary, 1956-,
"Bill C-49 and the Politics of
Fault", (1993) 42 University of New Brunswick Law Journal
[deals with An Act to amend the Criminal Code (sexual assault) (Bill C-
49) and is part of the Forum "Sexual Assault Legislation"];
CAMPBELL, Kenneth L., "Intoxicated Mistakes", (1989-90) 32 The
Law Quarterly 110-134; CANADA, Department of Justice Canada, Reforming the General Part
of the Criminal Code: A Consultation Paper, [Ottawa];
of Justice Canada], [November 1994], v, 35 p., and see "Defences and "Awareness of the
circumstances", at pp. 11 and 12; see also p. 35; put on
12 January 2007; also published in
French/aussi
publié en français: Ministère de la Justice
de réforme de la Partie générale du Code
criminel: Document de
39 p., et voir "Moyens de
défense" et "La perception des circonstances", aux pp. 13-15;
voir aussi la p. 39,
placé sur l'internet, le 12 janvier 2007;
"Source: Reforming
the General Part of the Criminal Code, Consultation Paper, 1994.
Works and Government
Services Canada, 2007."
- i-v and 1-35;
"Source: Projet
de réforme de la Partie générale du Code criminel,
Document de consultation, 1994.
Reproduit avec la
permission du ministre des Travaux publics
gouvernementaux Canada, 2007."
- i-v et 1-39;
"APPENDIX What this consultation paper does not
deal with This consultation does not cover every possible General Part
issue. For example, it does not deal with the defence of mistake
of fact, because the major problems with that defence were addressed in
a 1992 law, Bill C-49. Mistake of fact had often been raised by
an accused person in sexual assault cases. The accused would
argue that he or she did not have the degree of fault required for a
conviction, having made a mistake about the complainant's consent to
the sexual activity -- "I thought there was consent.' The law now
prohibits the mistake of fact defence where the accused did not take
reasonable steps to make sure that the complainant did indeed
consent. And mistake is not a defence if the mistake came about
because of the accused's person intoxication, recklessness or wilful
blindness to the truth." (p. 35)
Quelles questions le présent
document de consultation n'aborde-t-il pas?
Le présent document n'aborde pas toutes les questions concernant
la Partie générale. Par exemple, il ne traite pas
du moyen de défense fondé sur l'erreur de fait parce que
les principaux problèmes soulevés par ce moyen de
défense ont été réglés par le projet
de loi C-49 en 1992. L'erreur de fait était souvent
invoquée dans des affaires d'agression sexuelle où
l'accusé faisait valoir qu'il ne possédait pas
l'élément moral requis par l'infraction parce qu'il
croyait que la victime avait conmsenti à
l'activité sexuelle. La loi interdit maintenant à
l'accusé d'invoquer en défense l'erreur de fait s'il n'a
pas pris les mesures raisonnables pour s'assurer du consentement
réel de la victime et si cette erreur provient de
l'affaiblissement de ses facultés, de son insouciance ou
d'un aveuglment volontaire." (p. 39)
CANADA, Department of Justice Canada and James W. O'Reilly, Toward
a New General Part of the Criminal Code of Canada -- Details on Reform
Options --, [Ottawa]: [Department of Justice Canada], [December
1994], ii,
p., put on the Internet on 12 January 2007; information on the
French version/informations sur la version française:
Ministère de la Justice Canada et James W. O'Reilly, Pour
nouvelle codification de la Partie générale du Code
du Canada -- Options de réforme --, [Ottawa]:
[Ministère
de la Justice Canada], [décembre 1994], ii, 51 p., placé
sur l'internet, le 12 janvier 2007;
- i-ii and 1-50;
"Source: Pour
une nouvelle codification de la Partie générale du Code
criminel, Options de réforme, 1994.
- i-ii et 1-51;
CANADA, Department of Justice Canada, Brian Jarvis and Darren
123 p., and see "Question 5 -- Awareness of the circumstances [for
defences]", at
pp. 43-48; document obtained by François Lareau with letter from
CANADA, The Minister of Justice of Canada, Proposals to
the Criminal Code (general principles), [Ottawa], [Department of
Canada], 28 June 1993, 17 p.; note:these
proposals do not deal with mistake of fact for the reason given in
CANADA, Department of Justice Canada, Reforming the General Part
of the Criminal Code: A Consultation Paper, supra, at p. 35; put on the
Internet on 12 January 2007 / information
on the French version
/informations sur la version française: CANADA,
la Justice du Canada, Proposition de modification du Code criminel
généraux), [Ottawa], [Ministère de la Justice
Canada], 28 ¸juin 1993, 17 p.; cette
proposition ne traite pas de l'erreur de fait pour la raison
donnée dans CANADA, Department of Justice Canada, Reforming the General Part
of the Criminal Code: A Consultation Paper /
consultation, supra, à la p. 39; mis sur l'internet, le 12 janvier
2007; ENGLISH VERSION (Bilingual text) & VERSION FRANÇAISE (texte
"Source: Proposals
to amend the Criminal Code (general principles), 1993.
- Text / Texte;
CANADA, Officials of the
of Justice Canada, and Members and Consultants of the Law Reform
Commission of Canada, Toward
a New General Part for
the Criminal Code of Canada: A Framework
Document on the Proposed New General Part of the Criminal Code
the Consideration of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice
and the Solicitor General, [Ottawa: Department of Justice
Canada, December 1990], 137 p., see "Failure
of proof defences" and "Mistake of Fact" at pp. 55-57 and "Excuses" and "Mistaken belief
as to defence", at pp. 99-100; pdf completed on 16
December 2006; information
on the French version/informations sur la version française, CANADA,
Fonctionnaires du ministère de la Justice Canada et des membres
de la Commission de réforme du droit du Canada et des
conseillers auprès de celle-ci, Pour une nouvelle codification de la
Partie générale du Code criminel du Canada. Document cadre sur la nouvelle Partie générale
proposée du Code criminel présenté pour examen au
Comité permanent de la Justice et du Solliciteur
général, [Ottawa: Ministère de la Justice
Canada, décembre 1990], 144 p.;
"Source: Toward
a New General Part for the Criminal Code of Canada,
Services Canada, 2006."
___________Parliament, House of Commons, Minutes of
and Evidence of the Sub-Committee on the Recodification of the General
Part of the Criminal Code of the Standing Committee on Justice and the
Solicitor General, [Ottawa]: Queen's Printer for Canada,
1992-1993, 11 Issues; note
that the 11th issue consists of the report: First
Recodifying the General Part of the Criminal Code of Canada: Report of
the Sub-Committee on the Recodification of the General part of the
Code of the Standing Committee on Justice and the Sollicitor General,
and see "Mistake of Fact" at p. 70 and "Mistaken Belief as to Defence"
at p. 74;
le Canada, 1992-1993, 11 fasicules; noter que le 11e fasicule
général et voir "L'erreur de fait" aux pp. 74-75 et
"L'erreur quant à l'existence d'un moyen de défense"
à la p. 79;
"Mistake of Fact
The CBA Task Force proposed that the defence of
mistake of fact should apply where the accused made a mistake as to
circonstances under which he or she was acting. However, where
appropriate, the accused could be convicted of an included
offence. The trial court should consider all of the circumstances
of the case, including any reasonable grounds for the accused belief,
in determining whether the accused really had a mistaken belief.187
The Law Reform Commission also recommended
codification of the defence, but instead of providing for liability
only for included offences, the Commission stated that the accused
could be convicted of an included or an attempt to commit another
offence. Further, instead of a clause directing courts to
consider the presence of reasonable grounds for the accused's belief,
the Commission states that the defence of mistake of fact should not be
available for crimes of recklessness or negligence where the mistake is
due to the accused's recklessness or negligence.
While the Sub-Committee is aware that there may be
situations where a conviction for an attempt to commit an offence other
than the offence may have thought he or she was committing would be
appropriate,188 the Sub-Committee does not agree with the
Law Reform Commission that an accused, in raising the defence of
mistake of fact, should be open to conviction for an attempt to commit any offence. It would
be unfair to convict an accused of an offebce with which he or she was
Sub-Committee agrees with the CBA Task Force that courts should
consider all the circumstances in determining whether the accused was
indeed mistaken. It is unnecessary, in the Sub-Committee's
view, to include an express provision as suggested by the Law Reform
Commission dealing with the defence of mistake of fact to crimes of
negligence or recklessness. In these cases, a reckless or
negligent mistake would be consistent with liability and would not,
therefore, provide an excuse. ...
187 Issue 5A: 56
188 Such as in the situations arising in R. v. Ladue, [1965] 4 C.C.C. 264
(Y.T.C.A.) or R. v. Kundeus, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 272 (see
especially the judgment of Laskin, C.J.C.)." (p. 70)
"Mistaken Belief as to Defense
The Law Reform Commission suggested that no one be
liable if he or she would have had a defence on the facts as he or she
believed them to be.213 This is the
means the Commission chose to use to introduce a subjective element
into various defences. As mentionned in relation to self-defence,
the Sub-Committee would prefer to see
the subjective elements set out in each relevant provision, rather than
in a general provision. This, it belives, would make
clearer the subjective aspect of each defence.
[Report 31], Recommendation
3(17), at 41." (p. 74)
Law Reform Commission of Canada Report 30, Vol. 1, "Recodifying
Law", [Ottawa]: [Department of Justice Canada], December 1987, vii,
80 p., and see "Clause 3(2) Lack of Knowledge" at pp. 8-15 and "Clause 3(16) Mistaken Belief as to Defence" at pp. 24-27; Research Note: this report is cited in
the Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1988-1989 - 18th Annual Report,
Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1989 at p. 37, ISBN: 0662573013 and in
CANADA, Officials of the Department of Justice Canada and Members of
Law Reform Commission of Canada, Toward a New General Part forthe
Criminal Code of Canada: A Framework Document on the Proposed New
Part of the Criminal Code for the Consideration of the House of
Commons Standing Committee on Justice and the Solicitor General, supra. This report of the working group was submitted to the
Coordination Committee of Senior Justice Officials. Members of
Working Group were from: the Department of Justice Canada, and from the
following provincial Attorney General departments or
of Justice: Ontario, Québec, New Brunswick, Saskatchewan,
Manitoba and British Columbia.
the Department of Justice Canada. It was obtained by
Lareau in 1998 under Access to Information Request number
A98-00185; also
available in French / aussi
Canada], décembre 1987, vii, 88 p.; Notes de
: ce rapport est mentionné dans Commission de
du droit du Canada, 1988-1989, Dix-huitième Rapport annuel, Ottawa : Commission de réforme du droit du Canada, 1989, à
la p. 40, ISBN: 0662573013 et dans CANADA, Fonctionnaires du
de la Justice Canada et des membres de la Commission de réforme
du droit du Canada, Pour une nouvelle codification de la Partie
du Code criminel du Canada : document cadre sur la nouvelle
générale proposée du Code criminel
pour examen au comité permanent de la justice et du solliciteur
général, supra. Ce rapport du groupe de
a été soumis au Comité
de la Justice Canada et des ministères des procuereurs
"Clause 3(2) [of the Law Reform
Commission Report 30] Lack of Knowledge
3. Comments on Proposals
a. Position and Points
The members do not agree with clause 3(2) as drafted: it
leaves certain policy issues unresolved, and more fundamentally, it may
be better to deal with the matter of clause 3(2) in the context of the mens rea provisions. Where a mistake of fact relates to an element of an offence, the
offence simply is not made out and a separate provision is not
Generally, therefore, mistake can be regarded as merely a
corollary of mens rea:
it represents an assertion of innocent intention rather than a
defence. If it is possible to draft a satisfactory statement of
the normative concept of criminal blameworthiness, it may be redundant
to make a special provision for mistake.
feel clause 3(2) is more properly a liability-creating provision than a
defence; its only virtue would be to create exceptions, where
appropriate as a matter of policy, to the general principle that
liability requires the specific mens rea inherent in the
offence charged. However, the members feel the LRC has not
accomplished this in its draft of clause 3(2).
There are a number of unresolved issues which are of
sufficient importance to warrant treatment in a separate rule if they
do not follow as a matter of inference from the basic mens rea principle.
In particular, if the LRC draft includes the
provision in s. 5 of Appendix A
5. A person commits a crime only
by engaging in the relevant conduct with the state of mind specified in
the definition of the crime or section 8.
then the draft must also contain a provision to deal with persons
charged with committing one crime where they thought they were
committing a different crime.
The members feel that such a provision would be
better included as a subsection of s. 5 of the draft, rather than in
the part on defences.
In any case the members are not satisfied that the
Commission's solution (essentially, the minority position in Kundeus) is the correct
one. Members considered other possible solutions: the majority
position in Kundeus;
or convicting the person of the offence charged but substituting the
penalty range for the offence the accused thought he was
committing. Most members agree with the sentiment expressed by
Laskin, C.J.C., dissenting in Kundeus,
that it is inconsistent with our legal tradition to convict anyone on
the basis of a mens rea
for an offence different from the offence charged. Moreover,
since Vaillancourt,
it is probably not possible to do so.
The members agreed that this is an important problem
of policy which the LRC has not solved.
Reasonableness of Mistake
Under the present law, a mistake must be honest, but
it is not required to be reasonable. The members are not all
satisfied that this position is correct; some feel strongly that as a
matter of policy, a mistake should be reasonable, and that acting
unreasonably, particularly where bodily harm results, represents a
degree of fault sufficient to found criminal responsibility.
Other members feel that honesty is the more
appropriate test, since it can take into account particular
characteristics of the accused; and this aspect should not be
abandoned, wherever the accused has those characteristics through no
The members are unable to take a definitive position
on this issue but all members agree it is an important policy area
requiring further study. The LRC did not address this issue.
of Fact Resulting from Voluntary Intoxication
Mistake caused by intoxication is another issue not
directly addressed by the LRC. All members agree with the general
principle that, if a mistake of fact is due to voluntary
intoxication, then the mistake of fact defence should not apply. Members feel the law should not protect anyone who, through his own
conduct, prevents himself from being in a position to know facts which,
had he known them, would preclude him from committing an offence. Further work on this issue is required: members did not reach
conclusions concerning the level of intoxication required or the
penalty structure which should be associated with the scheme.
Resolution of this issue also requires discussion of
whether the law should continue to distinguish between offences of
specific intent and general intent. That issue arises in Chapter
2 but has not been addressed. The discussion in Chapter 2
addressed two levels of culpability: intention (which by definition would include recklessness) and negligence.
Blindness, Recklessness, and Negligence
The LRC failed to address the issue of mistake
arising from wilful blindness on the part of the accused. It is
not clear whether this could be covered by the concept of recklessness
outlined in clause 3(2)(b). The members agree that wilful
blindness and recklessness should be addressed as an aspect of a
general statement of definition of mens rea in chapter 2; as
such, the provision would be included in s. 8 of the draft in Appendix
A of the LRC Report. Some members feel that as recklessness
imports knowledge, in the sense of conciousness of risk, it is
inconsistent to treat it as part of a defence of "lack of knowledge"
under clause 3(2).
In any case the members feel there should be more
study of the issues of recklessness and negligence. Clause
3(2)(b) would impose liability only in respect of offences which can be
committed by recklessness or negligence.
Some mebers feel that recklessness or negligence
should simply vitiate the defence, and liability would therefore be
imposed in respect of any type of offence.
The members of the Working Group studying Chapter 2,
which contains the provisions on mens rea, were unable, in
the time available for this study, to devise a statement or
definition of mens rea which they find satisfactory.
The members agreed unanimously that more study is needed,
both on developing a statement or definition of mens rea and on resolving
outstanding issues, including mistake of fact caused by intoxication;
wilful blindness and recklessness; negligence; transferred intent (Kundeus-type cases); and
the question of honest as opposed to reasonable belief.
The members are generally agreed that codification
of the principle in clause 3(2) is unnecessary, but until the mens rea problem is
resolved no definitive conclusion can be reached.
1. If possible, clause 3(2) should not be codified separate from
the treatment of mens rea in
the draft code. Further work should be done on mens rea to arrive at a
statement or definition of mens
rea which will comprise the general principle in clause 3(2)
2. If a mistake of fact is due to voluntary intoxication,
then the mistake of fact defence should not apply (unanimous).
3. Further work should be done on outstanding issues, including:
(i) mistake of fact resulting from intoxication;
(ii) wilful blindness and recklessness;
(iv) transferred intent;
(v) honest vs. reasonable belief.
(unanimous)" (pp. 12-15) --------
"Clause 3(16) [of the Law Reform
Commission Report 30] Mistaken Belief as to Defence
The members agree clause 3(16) is insufficient as
drafted, although they accept the general principle that there should
be a defence of mistake as to facts grounding a defence.
Some members feel the issue of mistaken belief as to
defence should be resolved in the context of a general statement or
definition of mens rea. Other members feel that there are enough significant policy issues
involved to warrant treatment in a separate rule; moreover, mistake as
to the facts grounding a defence is dictinct from mistake as to an
element of the offence because the former, unlike the latter, is not
resolved as a mere consequence of the principles of mens rea. In mistaken
belief as to defence, the definition of the offence is committed by a
person who does the act intentionally, i.e. with the requisite mens rea. If the
facts were as he believed them, then the act would be justified in the
circumstances or its author would be excused. However, where the
facts are not as believed, there is in fact no justification and the
author is not excused as he believed he was; and the mens rea remains
intact. It is at the level of blameworthiness or fault of the
author that the defence, if any, must operate.
Nevertheless, it may be possible to accomodate
mistaken belief as to defence into a statement of mens rea, depending on the
scope of the definition.
has two distinct aspects, descriptive and normative. Descriptive mens rea refers to various
states of mind -- intentionally, recklessly, knowingly, negligently --
which the definition of an offence may require to exist in the author
before he can be convicted of the offence. It is the descriptive mens rea which is negated
by mistake of fact as to an element of an offence (LRC clause 3(2)).
Normative mens
rea consists of blameworthiness, the fault necessary to sustain
a conviction. It is the expression which stands for the principle
that there can be no criminal responsibility without fault. This
is the level of excuses and it is at this level that LRC clause 3(16)
The members of the Working Group for Chapter 2 have
not agreed on any general statement of mens rea. If the
statement ultimately developped deals with both descriptive and
normative mens rea, then
conceivably it could accomodate both 3(2) and 3(16). If the
statement is confined to descriptive mens
rea, 3(16) must be dealt with separately.
It is not known what statement for mens rea the members of the
working group for Chapter 2 will devise; some members of that Working
Group feel it is not possible to devise a general statement. Some
of the members of the Chapter 3 Working Group feel there are enough
independent issues in clause 3(16) to warrant treatment in a separate
rule in any case.
Those independent issues include wilful blindness;
the effect of intoxication on mistake of facts grounding a defence; and
whether the applicable test for mistake should be objective [reasonable
belief] or subjective [actual belief]. In general, the same
issues arise here as in respect of the defence of mistake in clause
3(2), above, and are discussed in that part of this report. Members feel that final resolution of these issues will require more
intensive study of the policy implications and theoretical problems
than was possible in the context of the present exercise.
Three members feel the number of areas in clause
3(16) requiring policy decisions dictates that a provision addressing
the issue should be codified. Two members feel that it should be
possible to devise a statement of mens rea which will
accomodate all these concerns, and there should not be a codified
defence of mistaken belief in a defence.
1. Reject clause 3(16) as drafted (unanimous).
2. More work should be done towards the development of a general
statement of mens rea,
to allow a determination of whether the substance of clause 3(16)
should be codified directly or dealt with as an aspect of mens rea (unanimous).
3. The present law, which requires that in order for mistake to
be a defence, the mistake has to be honestly held (as tested by
reasonableness) is not adequate and a purely objective test of
reasonableness should be substituted, to the effect that no one is
criminally liable for reasonable conduct, including due care for the
safety and security of innocent persons, under a reasonable belief that
the conduct is lawful (the numbers were split on this point: 2 for, 3
against)." (pp. 25-27)
THE CANADIAN ASSOCIATION OF POLICE CHIEFS, An Evaluation of
I of Report 30 Published by the Law Reform Commission Canada and
Titled "Recodifying Criminal Law" for The Hon. Ray HNATYSHYN Minister
Justice and Attorney General of Canada, [Ottawa?]: The Canadian
of Police Chiefs, 1987, 112 p., see "Section 25: Mistaken Belief as to
Defence", at p. 40;
"Would it not be more appropriate if
the mistaken belief referred to in section 25(1) [Law Reform Commission
Report 30,
section 25, at Appendix A, p.103, see
infra] was reasonably based? In
its present draft it is submitted that the belief required to invoke
this defence be subjective only and therefore it is largely beyond the
ability of the Crown to refute. It is further submitted that such
a mischief is inconsistent with the ordinary burdens justifiably and
traditionally recognized by the criminal law." (p. 40)
Canadian Bar Association, [1992], x, 190 p., and see "Mistake of
Fact" at pp. 50-58, ISBN: 0920742335;
Note: This book is also published in CANADA, House of Commons,
and the Solicitor General, supra, Issue 5 of 2 and 18
November 1992 at pp. 5A:1-5A:194; also published in French /
publié en français: ASSOCIATION DU BARREAU
GROUPE DE TRAVAIL SUR LA NOUVELLE CODIFICATION DU DROIT PÉNAL, Principes
de responsabilité pénale: proposition de nouvelles
générales du Code criminel du Canada: Rapport du Groupe
travail sur la nouvelle codification du droit pénal, Ottawa
: Association du Barreau canadien, [1992], xiii, 206 p., ISBN:
0920742351;
de recherche : aussi publié dans CANADA, Chambre des
Communes, Procès-verbaux et témoignages du Sous-comité sur
supra, fasicule 5 du 2 et 18 novembre 1992 aux pp.
5A:224-5A:434;
"Mistaken belief in facts
9. No person is liable for an offence committed through lack of
knowledge which is due to mistake or ignorance as to the relevant
circumstances; but where on the facts as the person believed them he or
she would have committed an included offence, the person shall be
liable for committing that included offence.
Caution respecting belief
10. A court or jury, in determining whether a person had a
particular belief in a set of facts, shall have regard to all the
evidence including, where appropriate, the presence or absence of
reasonable grounds for having that belief." (p. 50)
"Codified defences
The Task Force believes that clause 3(17) of the Law Reform
Commission's recommendation [Report 31] is unnecessary. No other
surveyed jurisdiction has such duplication or detailed codification."
have grafted new provisions onto an old structure results in
significant omissions. The following general principles are not
général visé par la nouvelle codification est
d'obtenir un énoncé exhaustif des principes
dispositions sur une structure dépassée, les
rédacteurs ont été coupables d'omissions
ne sont pas énoncés :
COLVIN, Eric, 1945 and Sanjeev Anand, Principles
of Criminal Law, 3rd ed., Toronto: Thomson/Carswell, 2007, li,
599 p., ISBN: 978 0779813247;
COMMISSION OF INQUIRY CONCERNING CERTAIN ACTIVITIES OF THE ROYAL
MOUNTED POLICE, Freedom and Security under the Law, Second Report
Volume 1, [Ottawa]: The Commission, 1981, xxii, 664 p., and see
"Mistake of fact", at pp. 365-367,
ISBN: 0660109514 and 0660109506 (vol. 1 and 2)
(Chairman: Mr. Justice D.C. McDonald); also published in
publié en français: COMMISSION D'ENQUÊTE SUR
ACTIVITÉS DE LA GENDARMERIE ROYALE DU CANADA, Liberté
et la sécurité devant la loi: deuxième rapport --
volume 1, [Ottawa]: La Commission, 1981, ISBN: 0660907682 (vol.1 et
2) (Président: D.C. McDonald);
CONNELLY, Peter J.,
"Drunkenness and Mistake of Fact: Pappajohn
v. The Queen; Swietlinski v. The Queen", (1981-82) 24 The Criminal Law Quarterly 49-65;
CÔTÉ-HARPER, Gisèle, 1942-, Pierre Rainville,
et Jean Turgeon, 1951-, Traité de droit pénal
canadien, 4e édition refondue et
Cowansville: Éditions Yvon Blais, 1998, lv, 1458 p., voir en
les pp. 1031-1100, ISBN: 2894512589;
COUGHLAN, Stephen G., "Annotation: R. v. Ewanchuk,
22 C.R. (5th) 1 (Ont. C.A.)", (1999) 22 C.R. (5th) 6;
COTLER, Irwin, "War
Crime and the Finta Case", (1995) 6 Supreme Court Law Review
(2d) 577-646, and see in particular "Did the Court Err in its
Characterization of the 'Obedience to Superior Orders' and 'Mistake of
Fact' Defences?", at pp. 632-635;
Criminal Code / Code criminel, available at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/ (accessed on 5 October 2007) et disponible à http://laws.justice.gc.ca/fr/home
(visité le 5 octobre 2007);
Criminal Code -- Annotated used by practioners/ Code
annoté utilisé par les practiciens
GOLD, Allan D., The Practioner's
Criminal Code, Markham, Ont.: LexisNexis Canada, 2008; GREENSPAN, Edward L. and Marc Rosenberg, annotations by, Martin's
Annual Criminal Code 2008, Aurora: Canada Law Book Inc.;
WATT, David and Michelle Fuerst, annotations by, The
Annotated Tremeear's Criminal Code, Toronto: Carswell, A Thomson
in French/en français (publié chaque
année):
COURNOYER, Guy et Gilles Ouimet, Code criminel
2008, Cowansville: Éditions Yvon Blais, une
DUBOIS, Alain et Philip Schneider, Code criminel et
connexes annotés 2008, Brossard: Publications CCH
Ltée;
DELISLE, R.J., “Annotation: R.
v. Park, (1995) 39 C.R.
(4th) 287”, (1995) 39 Criminal Reports
(4th) 287 [deals with mistake of fact as to consent for sexual
offences];
Droste v. The Queen, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 208;
"The literature on transferred intent
distinguishes between two kinds of situations in which the 'wrong
victim' suffers harm at the hands of the accused. The first,
sometimes called error in objecto
involves a mistake by the perpetrator as to the identity of the
victim. A gunman aims at and shoots a pedestrian on the street;
the assailant thought the pedestrian was X, but in fact he is Y. There is little controversy that this sort of mistake as to the
identity in no way affacts the fact that the perpetrator has committed
an intentional crime. It is the second 'wrong victim' situation,
sometimes called aberratio ictus,
or more poetically, 'a mistake of the bullet' that has led to the
controversy surrounding the doctrine of transferred intent. In
this second situation the perpetrator aims at X but by chance or lack
of skill hits Y. The appropriateness of assessing criminal
liability as though the bullet had found its intended mark depends
heavily upon one's evaluation of the importance of the identity of the
victim as an element of the offence in question." (Dickson, J., p. 216)
DUBBER, Markus Dirk, "Commentary" in Don Stuart,
1943-, R.J. Delisle and Allan Manson, eds., Towards a Clear and Just
Law: A Criminal Reports Forum, Scarborough (Ontario): Carswell,
Professional Publishing, 1999, v, 574 p., at pp. 156-182, see "Mistake
of Fact" at pp. 175-176, ISBN: 045927077X; Research Note:
commentary on Stuart, Don's proposals on the General Part in his
"A Case for a General Part",
EWASCHUK, E.G. (Eugene G.), Criminal
pleadings and practice in Canada, 2nd ed.,Aurora (Ont.) : Canada
Law Book, 1987-, 4 v. (loose-leaf), and see vol. 2, Part "21:
6000 Mistake of Fact"; ISBN: 088804013X;
FEDERAL/PROVINCIAL WORKING GROUP ON HOMICIDE, Final Report of
Federal/Provincial Working Group on Homicide, [Ottawa], [Department
of Justice Canada], June 1990, updated April 1991, xii, 170 p., and see
"Recommendation 17 Mistake of Fact" at pp. 81-82 (Co-Chairmen:
Howard F. Morton, Ministry of
Attorney General, Province of Ontario and Jean-François Dionne,
Quebec Department of Justice); copy of this report was obtained by
Lareau under an Access to Information Act request response
November 9, 1998, file A-98-00183 from the Department of Justice
available in French / aussi disponible en français : Groupe
de travail fédéral-provincial sur l'homicide, Rapport
final du groupe de travail fédéral-provincial sur
l'homicide,
[Ottawa], [Ministère de la Justice Canada], juin 1990,
avril 1991, xii, 172 p. et voir "Recommandation 17 Erreur de fait", aux
pp. 84-85 (Co-Présidents: Howard F. Morton,
général de l'Ontario et Jean-François Dionne,
de la Justice du Québec); copie de ce rapport a
obtenu par François Lareau dans la réponse en date du 9
1998 de sa demande à la Loi sur l'accès à
au Ministère de la Justice Canada, dossier A-98-00183;
17 Mistake of Fact
(1) For the purpose of this part, an honest but mistaken belief, in
facts which, if true, would not constitute the offence charged, is a
defence to that charge.
(2) In determining whether or not a mistaken belief referred to
subsection (1), was honest, the trier of fact may take into account the
presence or absence of reasonable grounds for such a belief.
(3) In determining whether or not a mistaken belief referred to in
subsection (1) was honest, the trier of fact may take into account the
failure of the person charged to make prudent inquiries as to relevant
facts where, under the circumstances, the person charged had reason to
suspecty that his belief about such fact was mistaken.
(4) Subsection (1) does not apply as a defence to homicide crimes that
are committed by recklessness or negligence where the mistake is due to
the accused's recklessness as negligence as the case may be.
(5) The common law with respect to mistake of fact is abolished." (p.
81) -----------
"Recommandation 17 Erreur
(1) Aux fins de la présente partie, la perception de bonne foi,
quoique erronée, au moment pertinent, de faits importants qui,
s'ils étaient réels, n'auraient pas constitué
l'infraction reprochée est un moyen de défense contre
cette inculpation.
(2) Afin de déterminer si la perception erronée
visée au paragraphe (1) était ou non de bonne foi, le
juge des faits peut prendre en considération la présence
ou l'absence de motifs raisonnables à l'appui de cette
(3) Afin de déterminer si la perception erronée
juge des faits peut prendre en considération le défaut de
l'accusé de vérifier les faits pertinents à
proposes desquels, eu égard aux circonstances, il aurait
dû soupçonner son erreur.
(4) Le paragraphe (1) ne constitue pas un moyen de défense
contre une inculpation d'homicide commis par insouciance ou par
imprudence si l'erreur est attribuable, selon le cas, à
l'insouciance ou à l'imprudence de l'accusé.
(5) La common law relative à l'erreur de fait est
abrogée." (p. 84)
FERGUSON, Gerry, "Recent Developments in Canadian Criminal Law",
24(4) Criminal Law Journal 248-263, see "Consent, mistaken
belief in consent and sexual assault" at pp. 257-259;
FERGUSON, Gerry A. and John C. Bouck, Canadian Criminal Jury
Instructions (CRIMJI), 3rd edition, vol. 2, Vancouver (British
Columbia) : Continuing Legal Education Society of British Columbia, 1994-, ISBN: 0865047715, see "CRIMJI Mistake of
Fact - Honest
Belief” at 8.44;
R. v. Finta, 1994
CanLII 129 (S.C.C.), Cory, J.; available at http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/1994/1994canlii129/1994canlii129.html (accessed on 29 September 2007);
The common law defence of mistake of
fact is based on the concept that
to have a guilty state of mind, the accused must have knowledge of the
factual elements of the crime he is committing. In other words,
although an accused
may commit a prohibited act, he is generally not guilty of a criminal
where he is ignorant of or mistaken as to a factual element of the
offence. (See for example
R. v. Prue, [1979] 2 S.C.R.
547.) An accused is deemed to have acted
the state of facts he or she honestly believed to exist when he or she
did the act alleged
to be a criminal offence. (See Beaver
v. The Queen, [1957] S.C.R. 531,
and Pappajohn v.The Queen,
[1980] 2 S.C.R. 120.) The trial judge also
jury that this defence was available to the respondent;
FORBES, Brian N., "Mistake of Fact with Regard to Defences in Tort
(1970) 4 Ottawa Law Review 306-311; FORTIN, Isabelle et Valérie Lessard, "Le critère de
en matière d'erreur sur le consentement dans les cas d'agression
sexuelle", (1996) 10 Revue juridique des étudiants et
de l'Université Laval ( R.J.E.U.L) 177 (1 p.
il s'agit du sommaire d'un travail de recherche de 35 pages,
96-15 que l'on peut commander;
FORTIN, Jacques et Louise Viau, "La réforme de la
pénale par la Cour suprême du Canada", (1979) 39 Revue
du Barreau 526-558, voir "Erreur de fait" aux pp. 543-550 et
___________Traité de droit
général, Montréal: Éditions
1982, xi, 457 p.;
FRIEDLAND, M.L. (Martin Lawrence), 1932-, and Kent Roach,
Law and Procedure : Cases and Materials, 8th ed., Toronto: Emond
Publications, 1997, xxvii, 1020 p., ISBN: 0920722962, see on
of fact, pp. 601-634; note: there is also a 9th ed., published by Kent
Roach, Patrick Healy and Gary T. Trotter, Criminal law and procedure :
cases and materials, 9th ed., Toronto : Emond Montgomery Publications,
2004, xxiv, 1068 p., ISBN:1552391183, and see table of contents at http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/g4/0/1552391183_4647in.pdf (accessed on 30 September 2007);
FUERST, Michelle K., Defending Sexual Offences, 2nd ed.,
2000, ix, 162 p., see Chapter 8, "The Defences of Consent and
Belief in Consent", at pp. 71-78 (series; Carswell practice guides),
0459260839; copy at the Supreme Court of Canada, KF9325 F84 2000;
GALLOWAY, Donald, “Annotation: R.
v. Moreau (1986), 51 C.R.
(3d) 209 (Ont.C.A.)”, (1986) 51 C.R. (3d) 210-211;
v. Sansregret (1983), 37 C.R.
(3d) 45 (Man. C.A.)”, (1984) 37 C.R. (3d) 45-46;
GANS, Jeremy, "When Should the Jury be Directed on the Mental
of Rape", (1996) 20 Criminal Law Journal 247-266; important
Canadian law; defence of mistake of fact; important Canadian content; HORWITZ, Stephen, Research paper on cases and materials
on ignorance of law and mistake of fact prepared by Stephen Horowitz
the Law Reform Commission of Canada, [Ottawa] : Law Reform
1977, ii, 29 p.; copy at the National Library, Ottawa; cited in Law
Commision of Canada, Fourteenth Annual Report 1984-1985,
Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1985, 52, [3], p. at p. 36 (under the
title: Cases and Materials on Ignorance of Law and mistake of
Fact , ISBN: 0662539575; INSTITUTE OF LAW RESEARCH AND REFORM, Defences to Provincial
Edmonton: The Institute of Law Research and Reform, March 1984, ii, 123
p., see "Mistake of Fact" at pp. 60-63 (series; Report No.
KAMEL-TOUEG, Nabil, Précis de droit pénal
- Droit pénal I, 2e édition, Mont-Royal (Province of
Québec) : Modulo Édiiteur, 1994, ix, 242 p., ISBN:
2891135024;
LAPOINTE, Pierre, "Les infractions criminelles", dans Barreau du
Québec, École, Droit
Éditions Yvon Blais, 2007, aux pp. 54-121 et voir les "défenses
d'erreur" pour les crimes sexuels aux pp. 90-92 (erreur sur l'âge
consentement) (Collection; Collection de
de BOURQUE, supra, dans le
LAREAU, François, "The Difference Between Negligent Homicide
and Reckless Homicide when Both of them Involve Consciousness of the
Risk",
article presented at the Society for the Reform of Criminal Law
"Reform of the Criminal Law", 26-29 July 1987, London, England, 21 p.
and 1 page errata; paper mentioned in "[Conference Report]: Reform of the
Law - The Inns of Court, London, England, July 26-29, 1987", (1989) 1 Criminal
Law Forum 91-98 at 95; see a revised version : The
Distinction between Conscious Negligence and Recklessness;
"III- Some Thoughts on Recklessness (or Dolus
and Conscious Negligence
We have already alluded to the first
difference between the two concepts. While both recklessness and conscious negligence involve foresight, the
former amounts to voluntary conduct (towards the objective) and
latter to involuntary conduct.
Secondly, for recklessness, the result
is less important in value than
the object of the agent's conduct while for conscious negligence, it is
the contrary. 20 For example, in a situation
of negligent homicide, had the accused realized his mistake by thinking
seriously, reasonably and sufficiently about the matter, he would have
refrained from acting. Professor Fletcher writes that conscious
involves an affirmative aversion to the harmful
"side-effect".21 Professor Fletcher explains: The best way to state the
distinction is to employ a contrafactual
conditional. If the actor knew the side effect was going to
would he act in the same way? If yes, then the actor is
to the side-effect. 22
A possible third difference (which I
have found brilliant) is that
foresight at the precise instant of acting may have disappeared in
of conscious negligence. If the actor no longer takes into
the risk, having concluded that it will not result, is he or she not
unconscious of the risk? This opinion would mean that at the time
of the action (or omission), the conscious negligence has turned itself
into unconscious negligence. 23
The theory of mistake may be helpful
in resolving or confirming the
distinction between recklessness and conscious negligence. Mistake
of fact, if honest and unreasonable, does negate recklessness but not
negligence. With conscious negligence, the actor makes a mistake by concluding that
the unlawful result will not occur. A mistake in cases of
does not eliminate the offence, since the essence of negligence in
cases is having made that unreasonable mistake. As Professor
has stated: "Where the crime requires gross negligence the mistake to
conviction must be grossly unreasonable".24 ......
20. Ibid. [Paul Logoz, Commentaire sur le Code
pénal suisse, Neuchâtel:
Delachaux & Niestlé, 1976, 569 p., at p. 97, ISBN:
2603000578] at pp. 92-94. Professor
Logoz states at pp. 92-93:
[dolus eventualis / translation by me] Given the
between two unpleasant solutions (either give up the desired act, or
out that act but risk bringing about some harmful result), the actor
the second. For him, the harmful consequence of his act is simply
the least of two evils. So in the end one can say that in the
of dolus eventualis, the actor made up his mind out of
to go ahead with the act anyway. ....
[conscious negligence / translation by me]. ...[the]
individual acted not out of selfishness but out of rashness; he did not
give the matter sufficient thought.
See also Hermann Mannheim, "Mens Rea in German and English
Criminal Law [Part I, II and III]", (1935) 17 Journal of
Legislation and International Law (3rd series) 82-101 at
92-93; 236-250; and (1936) vol. 18, pp. 78- 93;
21. Fletcher, supra, note 1 [Rethinking Criminal Law,
Boston: Little, Brown,
1978,], at p. 446. 22. Ibid. 23. See the authorities mentioned in Gillis Erenius,
Negligence and Individuality, Stockholm: P.A. Norstedt &
Söners
Förlag, 1976, 282 p. at p. 78 (series; Institutet för
Forskning (IFRF); vol. 85), ISBN: 9117670713. See also Morkel, supra,
note 9, at pp. 330-331.
24. Glanville Williams, Criminal Law: The General
Part, 2nd ed., London: Stevens & Sons, 1961, liv, 929 p. at p.
202."
____________ Légitime
défense et théorie,
thèse LL.M., Université d'Ottawa, 1992, xii, 335 p., et
voir les pp.
127-198 sur la légitime défense putative (directeur:
André Jodouin);
- Jury,
sommaire (1 p.) et résumé (4 p.);
- pp.222-335;
LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA, The General Part -- Liability and
Defences, Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada,
1982, [ix], 204 p., and see
"Mistake or Ignorance of Fact", at pp. 71-76 (series;
Working Paper; 29), ISBN: 0662514297; available at my Digital Library http://www.lareau-law.ca/DigitalLibrary.html;
on the French version/informations sur la version française, COMMISSION
DE RÉFORME DU DROIT DU CANADA, Partie générale
-- responsabilité et moyens de défense, Ottawa:
Commission de réforme du droit du Canada, 1982, [x], 239 p.,
(Collection; Document de
travail; 29);
ISBN: 0662514297;
___________Recodifying Criminal Law: Volume I,
Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada,
[xiii],117 p., (series;
Report; 30), ISBN: 0662547322; available at my Digital Library http://www.lareau-law.ca/DigitalLibrary.html;
DE RÉFORME DU DROIT DU CANADA, Pour une nouvelle
du droit pénal: Volume I, Ottawa: Commission de
du droit du Canada, 1986, [12], 131 p. (Collection; rapport; 30), ISBN:
0662547322;
_____________ Recodifying Criminal Law
of Report 30), Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada,
[16], 213 p., see "Lack
Knowledge", "Mistake of Fact"and "Exception", at p. 30; "Mistaken Belief as to Defence" at
pp. 41-42; "Different Crime from That Furthered", at p. 47; and
"Alternative Convictions", at pp. 47-48
Report; 31), ISBN: 0662547578; available at my Digital Library http://www.lareau-law.ca/DigitalLibrary.html;
du droit pénal (Édition révisée et
du rapport no 30) , Ottawa: Commission de réforme
du droit du Canada, 1987, [16], 233 p. (Collection; rapport; 31), ISBN:
0662547578;
Provincial Offences: Report to the Minister of Justice, Saskatoon
: Law Reform Commission of Saskatchewan, December 1986, 18 p., see
Law Defences";
LIBMAN, Rick, 1956-, Libman on regulatory offences in
Island, BC : Earlscourt Legal Press, c2002-, 1 v. (loose-leaf), see in
partuclar Chapter 4, "Public Welfare Offences Involving Mens Rea";
Chapter 5, "Absolute Liability Offences"; Chapter 6, "Strict Liability
Offences", Chapter 7, "The Defence of Due Diligence"; and Chapter 8,
Defences" (8.7, Mistake of
Fact; 8.8, Lack of Mens Rea), ISBN:
0968233864;
copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, Ottawa, KF 1292 A6
L53 2002;
LUCAS, David, The Rule of Law and Defences of Justification and
Some Problems Areas, LL.M. thesis, University of Montreal, Faculty
of Law, July 1981, vi, 262 p., see "self-defence, justification or
at pp. 123-141 and "Mistake and its effect on a claim of self-defence",
pp. 141-182;
MacDONALD, Donald, 1952-, Rape and Consent -- The Defense of
Mistake of Fact, prepared for the Standing Committee on Legal
and Constitutional Affairs, Ottawa, Library of Parliament, 1982, 12
copy at the Library of Parliament, J 103 H7 1980/83 L4 226; deals with
the Supreme Court of Canada decision of R. v. Papajohn,
2 Supreme Court Reports 120 and Bill C-53 amending the Criminal
Code for sexual offences;
MARCOTTE, Alain, "Les moyens de défense en
pénale dans le contexte de l'obligation de protection du
victime potentielle", dans
en droit de la santé et
sécurité au travail, 2001, Cowansville
Yvon Blais, 2001, xii, 308 p. aux pp. 171-204
(Collection; Service de la formation permanente Barreau du
vol. 148), ISBN: 2895414700; voir "L'erreur de fait raisonable" aux
194-196; droit pénal provincial;
MARIN, André, "When is an 'Honest but Mistaken Belief in
Consent' NOT an 'Honest but Mistaken Belief in Consent' ", (1995) 37 The
Law Quarterly 451-460 [Table of Contents: "Introduction. The
Impact of Seaboyer. Section 276 and the Claimed 'Honest but
Belief in Consent'. Conclusion"];
McCALLA, W., "Transferred Intent in Murder", (1981) 18 C.R. (3d)
66-74; discusses also aberratio ictus;
McKINNON, G.D. (Gil D.), "Mistake of Fact", May 15, 1991, 26 p.,
Working Paper, Canadian Bar Association, National Criminal Justice
Sextion,
Committee on on Criminal Code Reform; number 3); paper prepared
the The Canadian Bar Association Task Force, mentioned in The Canadian
Bar Association Task Force, The Canadian Bar Association Task Force
Report: Principles of Criminal Liability - Proposals for a New General
Part of the Criminal Code, Ottawa: Canadian Bar Association, [1992], x, 190 p., at p. 189; ISBN: 0920742335; available from
Canadian Bar Association in Ottawa; copy at the University of Montreal,
Library of the Faculty of Law, call number: HAAD W926 v. o3
MEWETT, Alan W., 1930-, "The Reckless Rape", (1975-76) 18 The
418-420;
"Thus, whether the mistake is 'reasonable' or
is not the right way of putting the problem; nor whether rape is an
of general or specific intent. What the jury should be instructed
is to convict the accused if they find that he knew the woman was not
or if they find that he was reckless as to whether she consented or not
and, in the latter question, all the circumstances, such as the
of alcohol, the conduct of the woman, or the time and place of the
must be considered." (p. 420)
MEWETT, Allan W., 1930-, and Morris Manning, Mewett & Manning on Criminal Law
(previously published under title: Criminal
Law), 3rd ed, Toronto: Butterworths, 1994, lxiv, 959 p., ISBN:
0409903752 (bound) and 0433396458 (pbk.); “Table of Contents...Chapter
11: Mistake...363 to 401; I. Mistake and Mens Rea; II. Reasonableness
and Mistake; III. The Innocence of the Mistake: Transferred Intent; IV.
Mistake of Law; V. Statutory Regulations”;
OLIVER, V.L., "Ignorance or Mistake of Fact as a Defence in Military
Law", (January 1957) The JAG Journal 13-16;
OSCAPELLA, Eugene, "Criminal Law: Charge of Trafficking in LSD: Accused
Selling LSD Believing It to be Mescaline: Effect of Mistake on
Conviction: The Queen v. Kundeus 5 N.R. 471", (1976) 8 Ottawa Law Review 91;
Pappajohn v. The Queen, 1980 CanLII 13 (S.C.C.);
available in English /disponible en français à http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/1980/1980canlii13/1980canlii13.html
PARKER, Graham, E., 1933-, "Annotation: Mistake of Fact versus
Intent" (1976) 32 C.R.N.S. 150-162;
PARENT, Hugues, 1970-, "La négligence criminelle en droit
pénal canadien: analyse descriptive et
critique d'un concept en pleine évolution", (May/mai 2006) 10(3)
Canadian Criminal law Review /
pénal 259-298, et voir "L'erreur" aux pp.
271-277;
___________ Traité de droit criminel, Tome
L'acte volontaire et les moyens de défense,
: Éditions Thémis, 2003, xxviii, 587 p., voir "L'erreur
fait" aux pp. 283-327, ISBN: 2894001703;
___________Traité de droit criminel, Tome Premier: L'imputabilité, 2e édition, Montréal :
Thémis, 2005, xxxii, 1023 p., voir "L'erreur de fait", aux pp.
365-438,
ISBN: 2894001703; copie à la Bibliothèque de la Cour
suprême du Canada, KF 9220 ZA2 P39 2005, t. 1, c.
PICKARD, Toni, "Culpable Mistakes and Rape: Harsh Words on
Pappajohn",
30 University of Toronto Law Journal 415-420;
____________"Culpable Mistakes and Rape: Relating Mens Rea to the
Crime", (1980) 30 University of Toronto Law Journal 75-98;
POPPLE, A.E., “Annotation: Mistake as a defence”, (1955) 20 C.R.
297-300;
“Practice Note: Defence of honest belief”, (1964) 43 C.R. 228;
“Practice Note: Honest belief as a defence”, (1963) 40 C.R. 145;
QUIGLEY, Tim, "Annotation: R.
v. Slater, (2005) 31 C.R.
(6th) 112
(Saskatchewan Court of Appeal)", (2005) 31 Criminal Reports
113; charge of obtaining sexual services and mistake as to age
okR. c. Trottier, 2002 CanLII 41589
(QC C.Q.), disponible à http://www.canlii.org/fr/qc/qccq/doc/2002/2002canlii41589/2002canlii41589.html
(vérifié le 19 octobre 2007);
[25] La poursuite a prouvé les éléments
l'infraction: le défendeur a utilisé de façon
intentionnelle la force sur le
bénéficiaire, sans son consentement.
[26] Il s'agit maintenant de décider si le défendeur
était justifié, pour des motifs raisonnables, de recourir
à la force. De plus,
il faut déterminer si le geste présente un
caractère excessif.
[27] Le Tribunal doit en premier lieu examiner si le
défendeur était autorisé par la loi à
utiliser la force en raison de ses
fonctions. Autrement dit, l'article 25 du Code
criminel est-il
[28] Outres les dispositions du Code criminel,
les procureurs ne réfèrent le Tribunal à aucune
source législative,
jurisprudentielle ou doctrinale à l'appui de leur thèse
[29] La défense s'appuie essentiellement sur la
description de tâches du préposé aux
bénéficiaires, prévoyant notamment ce qui
suit: «Intervenir physiquement lorsque nécessaire.
Assurer la sécurité sur
le département».
[30] Le Tribunal n'est pas convaincu que cette
description correspond à une autorisation prévue par la
loi. Après tout, une
description de tâches est un document négocié entre
des parties, assimilable à
un contrat. Comme l'écrit la juge Bergeron dans Procureur
général du Québec
c. D.B., un protocole d'intervention, prévoyant le
recours à la force,
n'est pas une loi et ne peut autoriser ce qui est légalement
proscrit[3].
[31] L'autorisation, au sens de l'article 25, doit
nécessairement trouver une assise dans la loi.
[32] Le Tribunal trouve un premier élément de
dans l'admission des parties: le bénéficiaire est
hospitalisé légalement pour
suivre des traitements psychiatriques.
[33] Or, l'article 118.1 de la Loi sur les
services de santé et les services sociaux[4],
permet le recours à la force comme mesure de contrôle
d'une personne dans un
établissement. Ce recours n'est cependant possible «…que
pour l'empêcher de
s'infliger ou d'infliger à autrui des lésions.
L'utilisation d'une telle force
doit être minimale et exceptionnelle et doit tenir compte de
l'état physique et
mental de la personne.»
[34] De plus, le Tribunal tient compte de la Loi
sur la protection des personnes dont l'état mental
présente un danger pour
elles-mêmes ou pour autrui[5] et
du Code civil du Québec. La doctrine enseigne que le
cadre d'intervention prévu par ces dispositions «…peut
entraîner la
privation de liberté pour un individu et sa détention
contre son gré, pour une
durée indéterminée, dans un hôpital.»[6]
[35] Si un bénéficiaire, en vertu de la loi, peut
être privé de sa liberté, des mesures doivent
nécessairement être prises pour
rencontrer cet objectif.
[36] De telles mesures peuvent entraîner
l'utilisation d'une force raisonnable, lorsque les circonstances le
pour la sécurité du bénéficiaire et des
autres patients. Le Tribunal interprète
dans ce sens le mot «lésions» de l'article 118.1.
[37] Selon cette logique, le Tribunal conclut que le
défendeur est une personne autorisée par la loi à
utiliser la force nécessaire,
en raison de ses fonctions, selon l'article 25 du Code
[38] Cette interprétation de la loi colle d'ailleurs
à la description de tâches et aux témoignages
entendus. Guy Privé, préposé aux
bénéficiaires, Lise Caron, infirmière auxiliaire,
Roger Tremblay, assistant
infirmier chef, et le défendeur, ont déclaré au
Tribunal qu'il arrive au
personnel, en certaines circonstances, pour des raisons de
sécurité, d'intervenir
physiquement à l'endroit des bénéficiaires.
[39] Vu cette conclusion concernant l'application de
l'article 25 du Code
criminel, il ne sera pas nécessaire de décider si
le bénéficiaire est un intrus au sens de l'article 41.
[...]¸"
RANDALL, Melanie, "Sexual Assault in Spousal Relationships, 'Continuous
Consent', and the Law: Honest But Mistaken Judicial Beliefs", (2008)
32(2) Manitoba Law Journal
144-181;
ROACH, Kent, 1961-, Criminal Law,
3rd ed., Toronto : Irwin Law, 2004, xx, 421 p. (series; Essentials of
Canadian Law), ISBN: 155221091X;
ROSENBERG, Marc, "Mistake of Fact and Law" in National Criminal Law
Program Substantive Criminal Law, vol. 3, St. John's Newfoundland,
pp. A1-A39; Research Note: this program of substantive criminal
Law is given every two or three years by the Federation of Law Societies of
Canada so there is a more recent version but not necessarily by the
ROY, Simon, 1959-, L'erreur de fait attribuable à
comme moyen de "défense" en droit criminel canadien,
LL.M., Université Laval, 2001, viii, 166 feuilles; bibliographie
aux pp. 156-166; monsieur Roy est professeur de droit à
RUTHERFORD, Douglas, "But honestly, I didn't know ...", in National
criminal law program (2001 : Charlottetown, P.E.I.), ed., National
law program / The Federation of Law Societies of Canada,
: Federation of Law Societies, 2001, in vol. 2 of 2; copy at Department
of Justice Canada, Prairies Region, Edmonton Office, Law Library, call
number: KF 9655 N36 2001; title noted but not consulted yet; SCHABAS, William A., Les infractions
d'ordre sexuel, Éditions Yvon Blais, 1995, 400 p., ISBN:
2890739791;
SHADLEY, Richard, "Mistake" in National Criminal Law Program:
Criminal Law, Winnipeg, Man.: The Federation of Law Societies of
1996, vol. 2 of 2, section 16.1, 13 p; Notes: "University of
Winnipeg, Manitoba, July 15 to 19, 1996"; copy at the Library of the
Court of Canada; does it deal with mistake of fact also?---------------
SHEELY, E., “The Defence of Mistake...”, on reserve at the desk of
Fauteux Library, University of Ottawa # ZZ Q 0446 (as of Oct. 1997);
note: I did not get full title but the title also mention the proposal
of codification;--------------------------
SHEEHY, Elizabeth, and Christine Boyle, "Justice
and Canadian Sexual Assault Law: Resisting the Privaitization of Rape",
in Elizabeth Sheehy, ed., Adding Feminism to Law: The Contributions
of Justice Claire L'Heureux-Dubé, Toronto: Irwin Law, 2004,
viii, 390 p., at pp. 247-283, ISBN: 1552210855; copy at the Library of
Parliament, Br.B KE 8248 L44 A73;
SIMMONS, Anne Marie, "Mistake", in National Criminal Law Program
: Halifax, N.S.), Dalhousie University, Faculty of Law, and Federation
of Law Societies of Canada, Substantive criminal law : 2004
Criminal Law Program, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, July
12 to 16, 2004 / presented by the Federation of Law Societies of Canada
in conjunction with the Faculty of Law, Dalhousie University, [s.l.
: s.n.], 2004, 3 v., in volume 2, Tab 13.1, 15 p.; copy at the Library
of the Supreme Court of Canada KF9220 ZA2 N38 2004; SMART, W.B., "Mistake" in National Criminal Law Program: Substantive
Criminal Law (1993: Montreal), [ed.], National Criminal Law
Montreal (PQ): Federation
of Law Societies, 1993, 2 volumes; information from http://gate.library.ualberta.ca/
(The GATE: NEOS Libraries' Catalogue) as seen on 11 November
document not consulted;
SNIVELY, Pamela, "Mistake of Fact" brief presented to CANADA, Chambre
des Communes/House of Commons,Minutes
Justice and the Solicitor General/ Procès-verbaux et
témoignages du Sous-comité sur la Recodification de la
Partie générale du Code criminel du Comité
permanent de la justice et du Solliciteur général,
Issue/Fasicule 2: June 15,
1992, at pp. 2A:26 to 2A:33; the
French version/ la version française "L'erreur de fait"
se trouve aux pp. 2A:140 à 2A:151;
STUART, Don, 1943-, Canadian
Criminal Law: A Treatise, 5th
ed., Toronto: Thomson/Carswell, 2007, xix, 815 p., ISBN: 978
0779812950;
__________ "A Case for A General Part" in Don Stuart,
Professional Publishing, 1999, v, 574 p., at pp. 95-145, see "Mistake
Fact" at pp. 118-119, ISBN: 045927077X; "TEXT
OF SUGGESTED GENERAL PART
15. (1) Where the fault requirement is
intent or recklessness, to excuse a mistaken belief need not be
reasonable although resonableness is relevant to determining whether
the belief existed.
(2) Where the fault requirement is
criminal negligence, to excuse a mistaken belief must be reasonable.
(3) Where the accused has a mistaken
belief within the meaning of subsections (1) or (2), he or she may
nevertheless be convicted of an included or attempted offence where the
belief constitutes the requisite fault for that offence." (see
pp. 139 and 142)
___________“Annotation: R. v.
Bulmer (1987) 58 C.R. (3d) 48
(S.C.C.)”, (1987) 58 C.R. (3d) 49-50; ___________"Annotation: R. v. Cornejo, (2004) 18
(6th) 124 (Ont. C.A.)", (2004 18 Criminal Reports (6th)
126-127;
mistaken belief in consent, s. 273.2(b) of the Criminal Code;
___________"Annotation: R. v. Ewanchuk, (1998) 13
(5th) 324 (Alta. C.A.), (1998) 13 C.R. (5th) 330-331; deals with
for a sexual offence;
___________"Annotation: R. v. Livermore, (1994) 31
(4th) 374 (Ont. C.A.)", (1994) 31 Criminal Reports (4th)
375-376;
"mistaken belief defence to sexual assault; air of reality test not
to be supported by source other than the accused"];
__________"Annotation: R. v. Livermore, (1996) 43
(4th) 1 (S.C.C.)", (1996) 43 Criminal Reports (4th) 5-6;
___________"Annotation R. v. O. (M.), (2001) 36 C.R. (5th) 258
(S.C.C.)", (2001) 36 C.R. (5th) 259;
___________“Annotation: R. v. Osolin (1994) 26 C.R. (4th) 1
(S.C.C.)”, (1994) 26 C.R. (4th) 7-9;
Roche, (1984) 40 C.R. (3d) 138
(Ont. County Ct.)”, (1984) 40 C.R. (3d) 138-139;
___________"Annotation: R. v. Roche, (1985) 46 C.R.
160 (Ont. C.A.)", (1985) 46 C.R. (3d) 161; on interpretation of
246.1 of the Criminal Code and the defence of mistake of fact
to consent;
___________"Annotation: R. v. Went, (2005) 25 C.R.
350 (British Columbia Supreme Court) 350", (2005) 25 Criminal
(6th) 352-353; ___________"Ewanchuk: Asserting 'No Means No' at the Expense
Fault and proportionality Principles", (1999) 22 Criminal Reports
(5th series) 39-49;
____________"Sexual Assault: Substantive Issues Before And After Bill
C-49", (1993) 35 The Criminal Law Quarterly 241-263;
____________"Pappajohn: Safeguarding Fundamental Principles",
26 McGill Law Journal 348-361;
___________"White Paper Proposals on Subjective and Objective
of Fault and Defences, Mistake of Fact and Transferred Intent",
: Law Reform Division, Department . of Justice Canada, 1994, 21 p.,
available at my Digital Library;
information on the French version - translation /informations sur la
française - Traduction : "Les normes subjectives et
applicables - la faute, les moyens de défense, l'erreur de fait
le transfert d'intention : la proposition du livre blanc, [Ottawa]
: Division de la réforme du droit, Ministère de la
du Canada, 1994, 25 p.; disponible à http://web.archive.org/web/20020117052514/http://129.128.19.162/docs/whpafdoj.html
numérique (visionnés le 5 juillet 2008);
"1. Mistake of Fact
Recommendation 6. There should
be a provision that a mistake of fact need merely be honest in the case
of awareness of risk crimes but must also be reasonable in the case of
negligence offences." (pp. 18-19)
"2. Transferred Intent
Recommendation 7. There should
be a provision that where an accused has a mistaken belief she can be
convicted on the facts as she believed them to be of an included
offence, which might be an attempt to commit the offence intended."
SUGUNASIRI, Shalin M., Integrating equality into the criminal
context sexual assault, mistake of fact and minimum mens rea, LL.M.
thesis, Dalhousie University 2002, vii, 168 leaves; copy at
University, Law Library, Sir James Dunn Library; title of thesis noted
in my research but thesis not consulted (22 February 2003);
TANOVICH, David M., Annual Review of Criminal Law 1999-2000,
Scarborough (Ontario): Carswell, Thomson Professional Publishing, 2000,
xxv, 247 p., see "Consent" at pp. 98-102, ISBN: 0459276913; comments on
R. v. Ewanchuk,
TANOVICH, David M. and Gerry Ferguson, Annual Review of Criminal
Law 2001, Carswell, a Thomson Company, 2002, xxvii, 200 p., ISBN:
0459271148;
see "Consent and Exercise of Authority" at p. 38 (less than one
and "Mistaken Belief in Consent: Sexual Assault" at pp. 42-46;
Journal of legal Studies 432-441, and see "Papajohn: When is
mistake operative?" at pp. 432-438; copy at Ottawa University, KD 418
VANDERVORT, Lucinda, "The Defence of Belief in Consent:
Guidelines and Jury
for Application of Criminal Code Section 265(4)", (2005) 50 The
Law Quarterly 441-452;
___________"Honest Beliefs, Credible Lies, and Culpable Awareness:
Rhetoric, Inequality, and Mens Rea in Sexual Assault", (Spring 2004)
Hall Law Journal 625-660; available at http://www.ohlj.ca/archive/articles/42_4_vandervort.pdf (accessed on 30 September 2007);
__________"Sexual Assault: Availability of the Defence of Belief
Consent", (2005) 84 The Canadian Bar Review 89-105;
__________"To Codify or Not Codify the Principles of Criminal
A Question of Fundamental Justice and Equality" in Don Stuart,
Professional Publishing, 1999, v, 574 p., pp. 231-242, see p. 239, "(e)
Section 15 - Mistake of Fact", ISBN: 045927077X; note: comments on
Don Stuart's draft General Part found at pp.
95-145;
VERDUN-JONES, Simon N. (Simon Nicholas), 1947-, Criminal
in Canada: Cases, Questions & The Code,
Thomson/Nelson, 2006, xvi, 332 p., see Chapter 9, "Mistake of
Fact, Consent, and Mistake of Law as Defences to a Criminal Charge" at
pp. 212-242,
ISBN: 0176407170;
copy at the Library of Parliament, Br.B KE 8809 V47
2007; WATT, David, 1948-, Ontario Specimen Jury Instructions
(Criminal),
Toronto: Thomson/Carswell, [2003], xiii, 1101 p., see "Final 73,
Mistake", at p. 1045, ISBN: 0459254928; copy at the Library of the
Court of Canada, Ottawa, KF 9682 W38 2003 c. 01; __________ "The Relationship between Mistake of Fact, Wilful
and Recklessness - John Henry Sansregret v. The Queen,
May 9, 1985 (S.C.C.) in Criminal Law Audio Series, Toronto:
Law Audio Series, 1985, tape 6, side 1, # 1, 20 minutes on audio
___________"The Submissions of Defences to the Jury: General
and Mistake of Fact Cases. Daniel Robert Laybourn, Edwin Hanson
and Richard Ray Illingworth v. Her Majesty the Queen, unreported, June
4, 1987 (S.C.C.). Her Majesty the Queen and James Douglas
unreported June 4, 1987 (S.C.C.)" in Criminal Law Audio
Series, Toronto: Legal Audio Services of Canada Ltd, 1987,
cassette, 1987, tape five, side one and two, 60 minutes;
WEILER, Joseph M., “Regina v. Kundeus: The Saga of Two
Ships Passing in the Night”, (1976) 14 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 457-480;
WEILER, Paul,"The Supreme Court of Canada and the Doctrines of
Rea", (1971) 49 The Canadian Bar Review 280-363, see "The Reach
of Fault: Herein of Mistake of Fact and of Law" at pp. 316-323; WILLIAMS, John M., "Mistake of Fact: the Legacy of Pappajohn
v. The Queen, (1985) 63 The Canadian Bar Review 597-628;
WILLIAMS, John M., "Transferred Intent/Transferred Mistake", 7 p.
in Keith R. Hamilton, "Defence of the Person", March 1991, 13,
p., discussion paper mentioned in The Canadian Bar Association Task
Report, Principles of Criminal Liability: Proposals for a New
Part of the Criminal Code, Ottawa: Canadain Bar Association,
x, 190 p. at p. 189, ISBN: 0920742335; available from the Canadian Bar
Association, Ottawa; copy at the Library of the Faculty of Law,
of Montreal; the paper is part of the following series: (series;
Committee on Criminal Code Reform; number 1);
II- Comparative
ALEXANDER, Dolly F., "Twenty Years of Morgan: A Criticism of the
Subjective View of Mens Rea and Rape in Great Britain", (1995) Pace
International Law Review 207-246;
ALEXANDER, Larry, "Mistake", in Joshua Dressler, ed., Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice,
2nd ed., New York: Macmillan Reference USA, Gale Group/Thomson
Learning, 2002, at pp. 1014-1019, ISBN: 002865322X (vol. 3) and
002865319X (set of 4 volumes); article available in a different format
at http://law.jrank.org/pages/1600/Mistake.html (accessed on 6 October 2007);
"The new approach to exculpatory
mistakes has also been extended beyond mistakes regarding elements of
crimes to mistakes that bear on defense." (p. 1016)
(Official Draft and
Revised Comments), Part I - General Provisions §§1.01 to 2.13,
Philadelphia: The American Law Institute, 1985, liii, 420 p., see
"Section 2.04. Ignorance or Mistake", at pp. 267-280;
The American Law Institute, 1962, xxii, 346 p., see "Subsection
1.13(10) and section 2.04;
1.13 General Definitions.
In this Code, unless a
different meaning plainly is required: .
(10) "material element
of an offense" means an element that does not relate exclusively to the
statute of limitations, jurisdiction, venue or to any other matter
similarly unconnected with (i) the harm or evil, incident to conduct,
sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense, or (ii) the
existence of a justification or excuse for such conduct;" (pp. 22-23) "Section
(1) Ignorance or mistake
as to a matter of fact or law is a defense if:
(a) the ignorance or
mistake negatives the purpose, knowledge, belief, recklessness or
negligence required to establish a material element of the offense; or
(b) the law provides
that the state of mind established by such ignorance or mistake
constitutes a defense.
(2) Although ignorance or
mistake would otherwise afford a defense to the
offense charged, the defense is not available if the defendant would be
of another offense had the situation been as he supposed. In such case,
the ignorance or mistake of the defendant shall reduce the grade and
the offense of which he may be convicted to those of the offense of
would be guilty had the situation been as he supposed.
(3) A belief that conduct
does not legally constitute an offense is a defense
to a prosecution for that offense based upon such conduct when:
(a) the statute or
other enactment defining the offense is not known to the actor and has
not been published or otherwise reasonably made available prior to the
conduct alleged; or
(b) he acts in
reasonable reliance upon an official statement of the law, afterward
determined to be invalid or erroneous, contained in (i) a statute or
other enactment; (ii) a judicial decision, opinion or judgment; (iii)
an administrative order or grant of permission; or (iv) an official
interpretation of the public officer or body charged by law with
responsibility for the interpretation, administration or enforcement of
the law defining the offense.
(4) The defendant must
prove a defense arising under Subsection (3) of this
Section by a preponderance of evidence." (pp. 30-31) ___________ Model Penal Code: Tentative Draft No. 4,
The American Law Institute, 1955, xv, 302 p., see "Section 2.04. Ignorance or mistake as a defence" at pp.135-139;
AMIRTHALINGAM, Kumaralingam, "Mistake and Strict Liability", in
379 p., at pp.109 to approx. 128; ISBN: 9781409424420 (hardback); title
article not consulted yet (7 November 2011); ARCHARD, David, "The Mens Rea of Rape: Reasonableness and Culpable
in Keith Burgess-Jackson, ed., A most detestable crime: new
essays on rape, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, xv, 306
at pp. 213 to 229 (approx), ISBN: 0195120752 and 0195120760 (pbk.); no
copy in the libraries of the Ottawa area;
ARISTOTE, Éthique de
Nicomaque, traduction, préface et notes par J. Voilquin,
Paris: Garnier Flammarion, 1965, 310, [3] p.; voir le Livre III,
Chapitre 1; acessible à http://www.darmaisin.com/96%20Textes%20classiques/Aristote_volonte.htm (consulté le 29 septembre 2007);
Puisque la vertu a rapport aux
passions et aux actions, qu'on loue et blâme ce qui émane
volonté, tandis qu'on ne refuse pas son pardon et parfois
même sa pitié
à ce qui est accompli sans volonté de choix,
peut-être est-il
nécessaire de déterminer, puisque notre examen porte sur
la vertu, ce
qui est volontaire et ce qui est involontaire. 2. Du
reste, cette étude ne manquera pas d'être utile aussi aux
législateurs chargés de fixer les récompenses et
les peines. 3.
A ce qu'il semble, sont involontaires les actes accomplis par
contrainte ou s'accompagnant d'ignorance [...]
13. Quant aux actes que nous
commettons par ignorance, tous sont sans doute dépourvus de
volonté;
l'acte exécuté contre notre gré est affligeant et
suivi de regret. Car
quiconque agit par ignorance et ne retire pas de
désagrément de ses
actes, n'agit pas de son plein gré, puisqu'il était
ignorant; et
d'autre part, il n'agit pas contre son gré, puisqu'il
n'éprouve aucune
tristesse. Ainsi donc, pour ce qui a rapport à cette ignorance,
dire de l'un, celui qui regrette son acte, qu'il a agi contre son
gré;
quant à l'autre, qui n'éprouve aucun regret, disons,
puisqu'il diffère
du premier, qu'il n'a pas agi de son plein gré. Puisque la
est différente, mieux vaut lui donner un nom particulier. 14.
Il semble donc qu'il faille distinguer ce qu'on fait par ignorance de
ce qu'on exécute sans savoir ce qu'on fait. En effet, l'homme
s'enivre ou qui se met en colère ne paraît pas agir par
ignorance, mais
pour une des raisons que nous avons indiquées, et non pas sans
mais inconscient de son acte. Ainsi donc tout homme pervers, quel qu'il
soit, ignore ce qu'il faut faire et ce dont il faut s'abstenir. Faute
qui rend injustes et franchement mauvais tous les hommes de cette
sorte. 15. Il faut donc
définir l'acte involontaire, non pas celui qui comporte
l'ignorance de
notre intérêt — car cette ignorance volontaire dans la
est la cause, non pas du caractère involontaire de l'acte, mais
perversité —, ce n'est pas non plus l'ignorance
générale qui est en
cause, puisque celle-là du moins encourt le blâme; mais
l'ignorance des circonstances particulières dans lesquelles et
desquelles l'action a lieu. C'est dans les cas de ce genre que trouvent
à s'exercer la pitié et le pardon, car celui-là
agit involontairement
qui, par ignorance, agit mal sans le savoir. 16.
Peut-être ne sera-t-il pas mauvais d'indiquer quels sont, pour ce
d'actions, la nature, le nombre, l'agent, l'action elle-même, les
circonstances, les conditions, quelquefois même les moyens — par
exemple, tel instrument —, les motifs — par exemple s'il s'agit de son
salut —, enfin la manière— si c'est avec douceur, avec violence.
Toutes ces circonstances, personne ne saurait, à moins
d'être fou, les
ignorer; et il est clair que l'agent ne saurait lui non plus les
méconnaître — qui voudrait, en effet, s'ignorer
lui-même? Mais il peut
arriver que l'agent ignore ce qu'il fait, comme on dit qu'en parlant
des mots vous ont échappé; ou qu'on révèle,
comme Eschyle, les mystères
sans savoir que c'est interdit; ou bien, en voulant montrer l'appareil,
on fait partir la catapulte. Il peut arriver qu'on fasse comme
qui prend son fils pour son plus mortel ennemi; qu'on croie
moucheté un
fer de lance acéré; qu'on prenne un caillou pour une
pierre ponce; ou
qu'en faisant boire quelqu'un pour le sauver on le fasse périr;
encore qu'en voulant montrer comment on s'y prend dans la lutte
plate, on assène à quelqu'un un mauvais coup. 18.
En raison de l'ignorance où l'on est de toutes les conditions de
l'action, l'homme qui en méconnaît quelques-unes semble
agir contre son
gré, surtout dans le cas des plus importantes. Or les plus
sont celles dans lesquelles et en vue desquelles s'exécute
l'action. 19.
Cet acte qu'on appellera involontaire à cause d'une telle
encore faut-il qu'il s'accompagne de chagrin et de regret. 20.
Si donc l'action involontaire est celle qui résulte de la
de l'ignorance, ce qui est volontaire semble être ce dont le
se trouve dans l'agent qui connaît toutes les circonstances
particulières de l'action. 21. On a peut-être tort, en
effet, de classer parmi les actes involontaires ceux qui émanent
de la colère ou d'un vif désir. 22.
Car tout d'abord, dans ce cas, aucun des autres êtres vivants
n'agira
de son plein gré, — non pas même les enfants. Ensuite,
nous ne faisons de notre plein gré aucun des actes que nous
par désir ou par emportement ? Ou bien les belles actions les
faisons-nous de notre plein gré, les actions honteuses contre
notre gré
? Une telle affirmation n'est-elle pas risible, étant
donné que la
cause du moins est la même ? Il serait absurde aussi de
sont accomplies contre notre gré les actions vers lesquelles on
tenu de se porter. C'est qu'il convient même de se mettre en
dans certains cas et de désirer vivement certains biens, comme
et l'instruction. 23. D'autre part, à ce qu'il
semble, les actes involontaires causent de la peine, ceux qui sont
accomplis par désir du plaisir. 24.
Posons encore cette question : quelle différence y a-t-il dans
actes involontaires, dont l'erreur provient d'un faux raisonnement ou
d'un mouvement de la sensibilité ? 25.
Tous deux sont à éviter. Les fautes contre la raison
procèdent tout
autant que les autres de la nature humaine, si bien que les actes de
l'homme proviennent de la colère et du désir. Il est donc
absurde de
les considérer comme ne provenant pas de notre volonté."
(pp. 65 et 67-69)
ARISTOTLE, Nichomachean
Ethics, with an English translation by H. Rackham, Cambridge
(Mass.): Harvard University Press and London: William Heinemann,
1934, Book III, Chapter 1; available http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0054&query=head%3D%233 (accessed on 29 September 2007);
1. Virtue however is concerned
with emotions and actions, and it
is only voluntary feelings and actions for which praise and blame are
given; those that are involuntary are condoned, and sometimes even
pitied. Hence it seems to be necessary for the student of ethics to
define the difference between the Voluntary and the Involuntary; and
this will also be of service to the legislator in assigning rewards and
2. It is then generally held that
actions are involuntary when done (a) under compulsion or (b) through
13. (b) An act done through
ignorance is in every case not voluntary, but it is involuntary only
when it causes the agent pain and regret: since a man who has actedthrough
ignorance and feels no compunction at all for what he has done, cannot
indeed be said to have acted voluntarily, as he was not aware of his
action, yet cannot be said to have acted involuntarily, as he is not
sorry for it. Acts done through ignorance therefore fall into two
classes: if the agent regrets the act, we think that he has acted
involuntarily; if he does not regret it, to mark the distinction we may
call him a ‘non-voluntary’ agent--for as the case is different it is
better to give it a special name.
14. Acting through ignorance
however seems to be different from acting in
ignorance; for when a man is drunk or in a rage, his actions are not
thought to be done through ignorance but owing to one or other of the
conditions mentioned, though he does act without knowing, and in
ignorance. Now it is true that all wicked men are ignorant of what they
ought to do and refrain from doing, and that this error is the cause of
injustice and of vice in general.
15. But the term ‘involuntary’
does not really apply to an action when the
agent is ignorant of his true interests. The ignorance that makes an
act blameworthy is not ignorance displayed in moral choice (that sort
of ignorance constitutes vice)--that is to say, they result
not from general ignorance (because that is held to be blameworthy),
but from particular ignorance, ignorance of the circumstances of the
act and of the things affected by it; for in this case the act is
pitied and forgiven, because he who acts in
ignorance of any of these circumstances is an involuntary agent.
16. Perhaps then it will be as
well to specify the nature and number of
these circumstances. They are (1) the agent, (2) the act, (3) the thing
that is affected by or is the sphere of the act; and sometimes also (4)
the instrument, for instance, a tool
with which the act is done, (5) the effect, for instance, saving a
man's life, and (6) the manner, for instance, gently or violently.
17. Now no one, unless mad, could
be ignorant of all these circumstances
together; nor yet, obviously, of (l) the agent--for a man must know who
he is himself. But a man may be ignorant of (2) what he is doing, as
for instance when people say ‘it slipped out while they were speaking,’
or ‘they were not aware that the matter was a secret,’ as Aeschylus
said of the Mysteries; or that ‘they let it off when they only meant to
show how it worked’ as
the prisoner pleaded in the catapult case. Again (3) a person might
mistake his son for an enemy, as Merope does; or (4) mistake a sharp
spear for one with a button on it, or a heavy
stone for a pumice-stone; or (5) one might kill a man by giving him
medicine with the intention of saving his life; or (6) in loose
wrestling hit him a blow when meaning only to grip his hand.
18. Ignorance therefore being
possible in respect of all these
circumstances of the act, one who has acted in ignorance of any of them
is held to have acted involuntarily, and especially so if ignorant of
the most important of them; and the most important of the circumstances
seem to be the nature of the act itself and the effect it will produce.
19. Such then is the nature of the
ignorance that justifies our speaking of an act as involuntary,given the further condition that the agent feels
sorrow and regret for having committed it.
20. An involuntary action being
one done under compulsion or through
ignorance, a voluntary act would seem to be an act of which the origin
lies in the agent, who knows the particular circumstances in which he
21. For it is probably a mistake
to say that acts caused by anger or by desire are involuntary.
22. In the first place, (1)
if we do so, we can no longer say that any of the lower animals act
voluntarily, or children either.
23. Then (2) are none of our
actions that are caused by desire or anger
voluntary, or are the noble ones voluntary and the base involuntary?
Surely this is an absurd distinction when one person is the author of
24. Yet perhaps it is strange to
speak of acts aiming at things which it is
right to aim at as involuntary; and it is right to feel anger at some
things, and also to feel desire for some things, for instance health,
25. Also (3) we think that
involuntary actions are painful and actions that gratify desire
26. And again (4) what difference
is there in respect of their involuntary
character between wrong acts committed deliberately and wrong acts done
27. Both are to be
avoided; and also we think that the irrational feelings are just
of human nature as the reason, so that the actions done from anger or
desire also belong to the human being who does them. It is therefore
strange to class these actions as involuntary." (pp. 117, 123,
125, 127, and 129)
ARMAGOST, Stephanie, "An Innocent Mistake or Criminal Conduct:
Dying of Hyperthermia in Hot Vehicules", (2001-2002) 23 Hamline
of Public Law and Policy 109-144; copy at Ottawa University;
Law (MPI), Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court --
to the ILC-Draft -- (Siracusa-Draft), prepared by a Committee of
Siracusa/Freiburg, July 1995, 88 p.; available at http://web.archive.org/web/20050904120837/http://www.iuscrim.mpg.de/forsch/straf/referate/sach/hispint/siracusa.pdf
at (accessed on 10 December 2005 and 2 October 2007 for web.archive)
"Art. 33 n Mistake of Fact or Law
1. If the person would not be held guilty of the crime if
were as he reasonably believed, he is not punishable. 2. The person who commits a crime in the mistaken belief
is acting lawfully is not punishable, provided that he has done
under the circumstances which could reasonably be demanded of him to
himself about the applicable law. If he could have avoided his mistake
of law, the punishment may be reduced." (p. 53)
Art. 33 o
1. A person acting pursuant to an
order of a government or a superior is not relieved of punishability,
unless such order results in coercion or duress, mistake of fact or law.
2. A superior order may be
considered in mitigation of punishment if justice so requires."
ATTARDO, Marlene A., "Defense of Mistake of Fact as to Victim's
Consent in Rape Prosecution", (2002) 102 ALR 5th 447-524; ALR=American
AUSTRALIA, Australian Capital Territory, Criminal Code 2002, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/act/consol_act/cc200294/ (accessed on 5 October 2007);
Mistake or ignorance of fact—fault
elements other than negligence (1) A person is not criminally
offence that has a physical
element for which there is a fault element other
than negligence if— (a) when carrying out the conduct
making up the physical
element, the person is under a mistaken belief about,
or is ignorant of, facts; and (b) the existence of the mistaken
belief or ignorance negates a fault element applying to the physical
(2) In deciding whether a
person was under a
mistaken belief about facts, or was ignorant of facts, the trier of
consider whether the mistaken belief or ignorance was reasonable in the
circumstances. Section 36
Mistake of fact—strict liability
(1) A person is not criminally
element for which there is no fault element
(a) when carrying out the conduct
element, the person considered whether or not facts
existed, and was under a mistaken but reasonable belief about the
facts; and (b) had the facts existed, the
would not have been an offence.
(2) A person may be taken
whether or not facts existed when carrying out conduct
(a) the person had considered, on
previous occasion, whether the facts existed in the circumstances
that occasion; and (b) the person honestly and
reasonably believed that the circumstances surrounding the present
were the same, or substantially the same, as the circumstances
previous occasion. Note Section 24 (Absolute liability)
prevents this section
applying to offences of absolute liability. ___________Australian Law Reform Commission, The Recognition of Aboriginal Customary
Laws, Canberra : Australian Govt. Pub. Service, 1986,
vol. 1, ISBN: 0644013451 (series; report; 31; vol. 1);
"[vol.
18. Aborinal Customary Laws and Substantive Criminal Liability
Other Defences...
432. Mistaken Belief. The relevance of mistaken belief
criminal responsibility differs depending on the kind of mistake, and
offence. A mistake of law is, with certain exceptions, irrelevant: this
and the exceptions to it, are discussed
below.[89]
A mistake of fact as to a
particular element of an offence may be relevant in several different
may negative the intent necessary for the offence: for example, if the
mistakenly but honestly believed that the victim was consenting to
intercourse, the defendant cannot be guilty of rape. There is no
such cases that the defendant’s belief be reasonable, provided it is
to be genuine.[90]
there may be no requirement that the defendant believed in the
existence (or was
reckless as to the non-existence) of particular facts. However at
common law it
is a defence to most criminal charges that the defendant actually
reasonable grounds in the existence of facts which, if true, would have
exonerated him from liability.[91]
This defence applies especially to regulatory or statutory offences,
aspects of which are (apart from the defence) subject to a regime of
liability. For present purposes, these offences are however of little
433. Mistake and Aboriginal
Customary Laws. Mistaken or
‘unreasonable’ belief can be produced by adherence to a world-view
based on traditional or customary beliefs or patterns of behaviour.
tradition or to customary laws is not to be equated with superstition,
two may be associated, and when they are legal problems of considerable
difficulty arise. For example an American Indian was convicted of
when he shot what he believed was a Wendigo, an evil spirit in human
form.[92]
Similar problems have
arisen in Papua New Guinea with sorcery, although the courts have
entertain defences based, for example, on mistake of
fact.[93]
Equivalent problems do not
seem to have been raised in Australian cases, at least not in the last
years. There are certainly Aboriginal practices of ‘magic’ or
‘sorcery’,[94]
do not seem to have had much impact in criminal cases. Eggleston
defence based on mistake may have been available to the defendants in
Skinny Jack case, but it was not in fact raised
there.[95]
defence of honest and reasonable mistake of fact would be directly
cases involving customary law issues. What is more likely is that
assumptions or beliefs based on tradition may affect the defendant’s
intent (in cases where mens rea is required), or his belief as
appropriate response in cases of self-defence or provocation. Given the
qualified nature of the ‘objective’ requirement for both defences,
appropriate account could probably be taken of customary laws and
traditional’ practices in such cases, under the existing
law.[96]...
Thomas v R (1937) 59
CLR 279; Proudman v Dayman (1941) 67 CLR 536; R v Reynhoudt
107 CLR 381; Howard 363-377. The position is substantially the same in
States: Qld, s 24; WA, s 24; Tas, s 14; NT, s
R v Machekequonabe (1894)
28 Ont 309. See Glanville Williams, ‘Homicide and the Supernatural’
(1949) 65 Law Q Rev 491; Howard, 41,
See RS O’Regan,
‘Sorcery and Homicide in Papua New Guinea’ (1974) 48 ALJ 76;
Weisbrot (1982) 79-82; and see also the works by RB Seidman, ‘Mens Rea
the Reasonable African: The Pre-Scientific World-View and Mistake of
(1966) 15 ICLQ 1135, and ‘Witch Murder and Mens Rea: A
Problem of Society under Radical Social Change’ (1965) 28 Mod L Rev
cf RM Berndt & CH Berndt,
The World of the First Australians, 4th rev edn, Rigby,
Adelaide, 1985,
319-335. The only instance is which ‘sorcery’ was mentioned in the
cases collected in ACL RP6A was Case No 1, where D was said to feel
‘in danger from spirits who would take [his] kidney fat while
asleep’: id, 4-5. This was taken into account by Justice Forster in
sentencing, but on any view D’s act of manslaughter was wrongful in
case. On this question from a socio-medical viewpoint see J Reid, Sorcerers
and Healing Spirits Continuity and Change in an Aboriginal Medical
ANU Press, Canberra, 1983, esp 92-118; 1H Jones, ‘stereotyped
in a group of Australian Western Desert Aborigines’ (1971) 44 Br J
Psychol 259; 1H Jones & DJ Home, ‘Psychiatric Disorders among
Aborigines of the Australian Western Desert’ (1973) 7 Soc Sci &
Med 219; JE Lemaire, The Application of Some Aspects of
European Law to
Aboriginal Natives of Central Australia, LLM thesis, University of
Sydney, 1971, 118-126; J Cawte, Medicine is the Law, University
Hawaii, Honolulu, 1974, esp ch 6. See also LR Hiatt, Kinship and
Conflict, ANU Press, Canberra, 1965 119-21 ; WL Warner, A Black
Civilisation, Harper & Bros, London, 1937, ch 7, 8; B Spencer
Gillen, The Native Tribes of Central Australia, McMillan,
London, 1899,
ch 16; DB Rose, ‘Dingo Makes us Human: Being and Purpose Australian
Aboriginal Culture’. Phd Thesis, Bryn Mawr College, Bryn Mawr, March
372-3.
But the Papua New Guinea Supreme
Court refused to treat sorcery as giving rise to a defence of
Weisbrot (1982) 79. The Sorcery Act 1971 s 20 expressly allows sorcery
as provocation, provided the ordinary villager in similar circumstances
have reacted in a similar fashion." (source: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/alrc/publications/reports/31/Ch_18.html#fn89,
accessed on 24 September 2007)
Code: A Guide for Practitioners, March 2002, 369 p., on mistake of
fact, see pp. 170-190; see also, pp. 220-221; ISBN: 0642210349;
at http://www.ag.gov.au/www/criminaljusticeHome.nsf/AllDocs/RWP1E51ED9C5B665D5FCA256BDB00227895?OpenDocument
AUSTRALIA, Queensland, Criminal Code
Act 1899, available at http://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/LEGISLTN/CURRENT/C/CriminCode.pdf
(accessed on 5 October 2007);
"24 Mistake of fact
(1) A person who does or omits to do an act under an honest and
reasonable, but mistaken, belief in the existence of any state of
things is not criminally responsible for the act or omission to any
greater extent than if the real state of things had been such as the
person believed to exist.
(2) The operation of this rule may be excluded by the express or
implied provisions of the law relating to the subject."
BACIGALUPO, Enrique, "Responsabilité criminelle", in Peter J.
Cullen, ed., Enlarging the fight
against fraud in the European Union :
sanctions, settlement, whistleblowing and corpus juris in the candidate
countries / [ERA, Europäische Rechtsakademie], Köln :
Verlagsgesellschaft, c2004, c2003, 447 p., aux pp. 75-89, et voir
"Système
de l'erreur", aux pp. 84-86 (series; Schriftenreihe der
Trier ; Bd. 36 = Serie de publications de l'Academie de Droit Europeen
de Treves; Bd.36 = Series of publications by the Academy of European
Trier; Bd. 36),
ISBN: 3898173658; copy at the University of Ottawa, FTX General, KJE
8643 .E55 2004; note: touche aux droits de la Bulgarie, Estonie,
Lituanie, Pologne, Roumanie, Slovaquie, Slovénie et de la
tchèque; texte important aussi pour l'erreur sur les
moyens de défense;
BADAR, Mohamed Elewa, "Mens Rea -- Mistake of Law &
of Fact in German Criminal Law: A Survey for International Criminal
Tribunals",
(2005) 5 International Criminal Law Review
203-246;
available at http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/bitstream/2438/1195/3/1MensReainGermanLawICLR2004%5B1%5DRevised.pdf (accessed on 28 September 2007);
BANTEKAS, Ilias, "Defences in International Criminal Law", in
McGoldrick, Peter Rowe, and Eric Donnelly, eds., The Permanent
Criminal Court: Legal and Policy Issues, Oxford (England)/Portland
(Oregon): Hart Publishing, xviii, 498 p., at pp. 263-284, and see
of Fact or Mistake of Law", at pp. 281-282 (series; Studies in
Law; volume 5), ISBN: 1841132810; copy at the Library of the Supreme
of Canada, KZ 6310 P47 2004;
BIENEN, Leigh, "Mistakes", (1977-78) 7 Philosophy anf Public
224-245; copy at Ottawa University, H 1 .P54 Location: MRT
BURCHELL, E.M., "Unreasonable Mistake of Fact as a Defence in Criminal
Law", (1963) 80 South African Law Journal 46-52;
BURCHELL, Jonathan, "Mistake or Ignorance to the Causal Sequence - A
of Intention" (1990) 107 South African Law Journal 168-175;
BYRD, B. Sharon, "Putative Self-Defense and Rules of Imputation. In
Defense of the Battered Woman" (1994) 2 Annual Review of Law and Ethics
283-306; abstract available at http://www.str2.jura.uni-erlangen.de/hruschka/JRE/vol02/a2-byrd.htm
in Leo Katz, Michael S. Moore and Stephen J. Morse, eds., Foundations
of Criminal Law, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1999, ix, 352 p. at pp. 260-271 followed by "Notes and Questions" at
271-272 (series; Interdisciplinary Readers in Law), ISBN: 0195094956
and 0195094964 (paper);
CAMPBELL, Colin, "Annotation: Mistake or Lack of Information as to
Age as Defense to Statutory Rape", (1997) 46 A.L.R. (5th)
499-522;
= American Law Reports; CANALS, Jose M. and Henry Dahl, translated by, "Standard Penal Code
for Latin America", (1990) 17 American Journal of
Law 263-288; available at http://wings.buffalo.edu/law/bclc/Latspc.htm;
see articles 27-29; note de recherche: pour une traduction
du Code pénal type latino-américain, voir
No act is punishable when a person who commits a criminal act
is convinced that it lacks some element required under the
However, if the person is recklessly or negligently mistaken,
the act is punishable only when the law contemplates the reckless
or negligent commission of the criminal act.
The same rules apply to those who wrongfully assume the existence
of justifying circumstances.
If by mistake the act committed was different from the one the
person intended, the punishment corresponding to the less serious
act will apply." (p. 269)
CASSESE, Antonio, International criminal law, Oxford; New
: Oxford University Press, 2003, lvi, 472 p., see "Mistake of fact" at
pp. 251-255 (includes "Mistake of fact and Superior Order" at pp.
253-255), ISBN: 0199261288 and 0199259119 (pbk); copy at the
of the Supreme Court of Canada, K5000 C37 2003 c. 01; copy at Carleton
University, floor 4, K5000 .C37 2003;
CAVALLARO, Rosanna, "A Big Mistake: Eroding the Defense of Mistake
Fact About Consent in Rape", (1996) 86 Journal of Criminal Law and
815-860;
CHAND, Hukm, Principles of the law of consent: with special
to criminal law, including the doctrines of mistake, duress, and waiver:
Bombay, Bombay education society's press, 1897, xviii, 581 p.; copy at
Laval University, KPN/C454/1897; also available at other places in
Canada; available at http://www.archive.org/details/principlesoflawo00chaniala
CHRISTOPHER, Russell L., "Mistake & Ignorance" in Christopher
Berry Gray, ed.,
The Philosophy of Law: An Encyclopedia, New York
Garland Publishing, 1999, 2 volumes ( xxxviii, 950 p.), in vol.2, pp.
___________"Mistake of Fact in the Objective Theory of Justification:
Make Two Wrongs Make Two Rights...?", (1994) 85 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 295-332;
recherche: voir les canons 1323, nn. 4, 5 et 6, 1324, § 1, n. 8 et 1325 aux
229-230; ces dispositions sont aussi disponibles à http://ledroitcriminel.free.fr/la_science_criminelle/les_sciences_juridiques/la_loi_penale/imputation/droit_canon_imputation.htm (consulté le 27 septembre 2007);
"Can. 1323 -- N'est punissable
d'aucune peine la personne qui, lorsqu'elle a violé une loi ou
un précepte:
4° a agi forcée
par une crainte grave, même si
elle ne l’était que relativement, ou bien poussée par la
nécessité ou pour
éviter un grave inconvénient, à moins cependant
que l’acte ne soit
intrinsèquement mauvais ou qu’il ne porte préjudice aux
5° a agi en
état de légitime défense contre un
agresseur qui l’attaquait injustement, elle-même ou un autre,
la modération requise;
7° a cru, sans faute de sa part, que se
présentait une des circonstances prévues aux
numéros 4 ou 5.
Can. 1324 -- §
1. L’auteur d’une violation n’est pas exempt de
peine, mais la peine prévue par la loi ou le précepte
doit être tempérée, ou
encore une pénitence doit lui être substituée, si
le délit a été
8° par qui, par une erreur dont il est
a cru que se présentait une des circonstances dont il s’agit au
Canon 1323,
numéros. 4 et 5;
Can. 1325 -- L’ignorance crasse ou supine ou affectée ne peut
jamais être prise en considération dans l’application des
canons 1323 et 1324 ; il en est de même pour
l’ébriété ou les autres
troubles mentaux, s’ils ont été recherchés
volontairement pour accomplir le
délit ou l’excuser, ou pour la passion qui aurait
été volontairement excitée ou
nourrie."
and 0005997577 (limp); see canons 1323, nn. 4, 5 and 6, 1324 § 1, n. 8 and 1325
pp. 234-235; these provions are also available at http://www.stjamescatholic.org/ebooks/code_of_canon_law_1983.pdf (accessed on 27 September 2007);
1323 No one is liable to a penalty who, when violating a
law or precept:
4° acted under the compulsion of grave fear, even if only relative,
or by reason of necessity or grave inconvenience, unless, however, the
act is intrinsically evil or tends to be harmful to souls;
5° acted, within the limits of due moderation, in lawful
self-defense or defense of another against an unjust aggressor;
7° thought, through no personal fault, that some one of the
circumstances existed which are mentioned in nn. 4 or 5.
Can. 1324 §1 The perpetrator of a violation is not
exempted from penalty, but the penalty prescribed in the law or precept
must be diminished, or a penance substituted in its place, if the
offence was committed by:
8° one who erroneously, but culpably, thought that some one of the
circumstances existed which are mentioned in Canon 1323, nn. 4 or 5;
1325 -- Ignorance which is crass or supine or affected can
never be taken into account when pplying the provisions of Canon
1323 and 1324. Likewise, drunkenness or other mental disturbances
cannot be taken into account if these have been deliberately sought so
as to commit the offence or to excuse it; nor can passion which has
been deliberately stimulated or nourished."
Corpus juris 2000 (version de Florence);
"Article 10 – Erreur (ancien article 11)
L’erreur sur les éléments constituant
l’infraction exclut
l’intention. L’erreur sur la prohibition exclut la
au cas d’une erreur inévitable par un homme prudent et
Si l’erreur était évitable, la sanction peut être
et le juge pourra donc ne pas prononcer la peine maximale encourue
article 14)." (disponible à http://www2.law.uu.nl/wiarda/corpus/art-frans.pdf,
visionné le 3 mai 2004; voir aussi le site principal à http://www2.law.uu.nl/wiarda/corpus/index1.htm)
Corpus juris 2000 (draft agreed in Florence);
"Article 10 – Error (previously Article
Mistake as to the constituent elements of the offence excludes
Mistake as to the legal prohibition excludes liability if it would have
inevitably been committed by a careful, sensible person. If the mistake
was avoidable, the penalty may be reduced, and the judge may not impose
the maximum penalty (see Article14)." (available at http://www2.law.uu.nl/wiarda/corpus/art-eng.pdf,
accessed on 3 May 2004; see also main site at http://www2.law.uu.nl/wiarda/corpus/index1.htm)
CLIVE, Eric (from CBE, Edinburgh), Pamela Ferguson (from
Dundee),
Gane and Alexander McCall Smith presented A Draft Criminal Code for
Scotland with commentary to the Minister of Justice in August 2003;
ix, 205 p., and see "Error" at pp. 73-74, available at http://www.scotlawcom.gov.uk/downloads/cp_criminal_code.pdf (accessed on 24 September 2007);
COWLEY, D., "The Retreat from Morgan", [1982] Criminal Law Review
CROATIA, Criminal Code in
(1) A perpetrator does not act
intentionally if at the time of the perpetration of a criminal offense
he is not aware of one of its material elements.
(2) If the perpetrator’s mistake regarding the material elements
of the criminal offense is due to his negligence, he shall be culpable
insofar as the statute prescribes punishment for such an offense also
when committed by negligence.
(3) The perpetrator shall not be punished for intent if at the time of
the perpetration of a criminal offense he mistakenly assumed that the
circumstances existed, which, had they actually existed, would have
rendered his conduct lawful.
(4) If the perpetrator is mistaken as to the claim of legal
justification out of negligence, he shall be punished for the
perpetration of a criminal offense, provided that the statute
prescribes punishment for such an offense also when committed by
CROSS, R., "Century Reflections on Prince's Case", (1975) 81 The
Law Quarterly Review 205-222; CURLEY, E.M., "Excusing Rape", (Summer 1976) 5 Philosophy
and Public Affairs 325-360;
DAMASKA, Mirjan, "Comment by Dr. Mirjan Damaska Comparing Study
Draft of Proposed new Federal Criminal Code to European Penal Codes",
in Working Papers of the National
Commission on Reform of Fedderal Criminal Laws, vol. III, Miscellaneous Memoranda and
Guidelines for Conforming Title 18, Parts II-V, and other titles of the
United States Code to the Proposals for a New Federal Criminal Code,
Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971, at pp.
1477-1505, and see pp.
1488-1491; for the sections referred to in those pages, see
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, infra;
DAUBE, D., "Error and Accident in the Bible", (1949) 2 Revue
DELTMAR, Victoria J., "Culpable Mistakes in Rape: Eliminating the
of unreasonable mistake of fact as to victim consent", (1984-85) 89 Dickinson Law Review
473-499; DINGWALL, Gavin,
"Intoxicated Mistakes about the Need for Self-Defence", (January 2007)
70(1) The Modern Law Review 127-138; DINSTEIN, Yoram, "Defences", in Gabrielle Kirk McDonald and Olivia
Swaak-Goldman, eds., Substantive and Procedural Aspects of
Criminal Law. The Experience of International and National
Courts",
vol. I, Commentary, The Hague-London-Boston: Kluwer Law
2000, xvi,705 p., at pp. 367-388; copy at the Library of the Supreme
of Canada, K5000 S83 2000, v. 1;388;
DRESSLER, Joshua, Understanding
Criminal Law, 2nd ed., New York : Matthew
Bender/Irwin, 1995, xli, 556 p., and see "Chapter 12 Mistakes of
Fact", at pp. 133-145 (series; legal text series), ISBN:
0256193193; there is now a 4th ed.:
Newark(NJ): LexisNexis, c2006, xxxiv, 649, [32] p. (series;
understanding series), ISBN: 082057001X;
DUTILE, Fernand N. and Harold F. Moore, "Mistake and
Impossibility:Arranging
a Marriage Between Two Difficult Partners", (1979) 74 Northwestern
University Law Review 166-201;
Olivier, "L'imputabilité de l'acte délictueux : du
droit romain au droit canonique", (1987) 30 L'année canonique115-132;
"L'erreur de fait a
été également admise en droit romain comme cause
d'excuse (96) et
parfois, si elle portait sur un élément secondaire du
délit, comme
cause d'atténuation (97). Le droit canonique l'a reprise
équiparant l'ignorance et l'inadvertence. […]
(96) D. 3, 2, 11, 4.
(97) Cf. Arnaldo BISCARDI,
op. cit. [L'imputabilita dell'atto
delittuoso in diritto romano, in Appolinaris, L. I (1970), pp. 162-163]."
ENGLAND AND WALES, The Law Commission, A Criminal Code for England
1: Report and Draft Criminal Code Bill and vol. 2: Commentary
[1989], v, 278 p. (series; Law Com. No. 177), ISBN: 0102299897;
"Belief in circumstances affording a defence.
41. -- (1)
Unless otherwise provided, a person who acts in the belief that a
circumstance exists has nay defence that he would have if the
Non-application to pre-Code offences.
(2) Subsction (1) does not apply in respect of
a defence specially provided for a pre-Code offence as defined in
section in section 6 (to which section 2(3) applies).
Proof or disproof of belief.
(3) Any requirement as to proof or disproof of a
defence applies to proof or disproof of a belief mentioned in
subsection (1)." (vol. 1, p. 60)
Clause 41: Belief in circumstances
affording a defence
statutory presumption. If knowledge of a particular
circumstance is an element of an offence, a belief that that
circumstance does not exist means that the offence is not committed.9 Subsection (1) provides a presumption in favour of a corresponding rule
for defences, namely, that a person who acts in the belief that a
circumstance exists has any defence that he would have if it existed.10 The Code thus gives general effect to the prima facie principle that a person
is to be judged, for purposes of criminal liability, on the facts as he
believed them to be. This is the tendency, though not the
universal effect,11 of recent judicial
developments in the field of defences. It is desirable that the
Code should provide consistently for offences and defences, leaving it
to Parliament in particular contexts, if it thinks fit, to exclude the
application of this subsection or to limit a defence of belief in the
existence of an 'exempting circumstance'12 to
a case of a belief based on reasonable grounds. Whether a defendant
relies on this subsection, the absence of reasonable grounds for the
belief he claims to have held is, of course, relevant in
determining whether he did hold it.13
9 This truism is discussed in n. 48 to para. 8.32 above.
10 See Appendix B, Example 41. Compare clause 6 of the draft
Criminal Liability (Mental Element) Bill appended to our Report on the
Mental Element in Crime (1978). Law Com. No. 89. That
clause (and the Code team's clause 44) proposed to specify the ways in
which the presumption might be displaced. For our reason for not
now adopting this proposal, see para. 8.27 above, relating to the
presumption of a requirement of fault established by clause 20(1); that
paragraph, appropriately modified, applies here.
11See, e.g., para. 12.15 below.
12 Defined in clause 6 as 'any circumstance amounting to a defence or
any element of a defence'.
13 See clause 14." (vol. 2, p. 228)
ESER, Albin, "Mental Elements -- Mistakes of Fact and Law",
", in Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta and John R.W.D. Jones, eds., The
International Criminal Court: A Commentary, volume I, Oxford/New
York: Oxford University Press, 2002, cxl, 1048 p., Chapter 23, at pp.
889-948,
mistake of fact and law are dealt with at pp. 934-948; copy at Ottawa
FTX General: KZ 6310 .R64 2002 v. 1; copy at External Affairs Library,
Ottawa; available at http://www.freidok.uni-freiburg.de/volltexte/3909/pdf/Eser_Individual_criminal_responsibility.pdf
(accessed on 26 January 2008); ESTONIA, Penal Code, available
§ 17. Ignorance of
circumstances which constitute necessary element of offence
(1) A person who at the time of
commission of an act is unaware that
a circumstance which constitutes a necessary element of an offence is
not deemed to have committed the act intentionally. In such case the
person shall be held liable for an offence committed through negligence
in the cases provided by law.
(2) A person who at the time of
commission of an act erroneously
assumes circumstances which would constitute the necessary elements of
an offence for which a more lenient punishment is prescribed, shall be
liable for an intentional offence the commission of which the person
(3) Ignorance of law shall not preclude
intent or negligence.
§ 31. Error concerning
circumstance which precludes unlawfulness
(1) An intentional act is not unlawful
if at the time of commission
of the act the person erroneously assumes circumstances which would
preclude the unlawfulness of the act. In such case, the person shall be
punished for an offence committed through negligence in the cases
commission of an act is unaware of
the circumstances which objectively preclude the unlawfulness of the
act shall be held liable for an attempt. In such case, the court may
apply the provisions of § 60 of this Code.
ETHIOPIA, The Criminal Code
of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2004,
available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/70993/75092/F1429731028/ETH70993.pdf
80.- Mistake of Fact.
(1) Whoever commits a crime under an erroneous appreciation of the true
facts of the situation shall be tried according to such appreciation.
Where there is no criminal Intention the doer shall not be punishable.
Where he could have avoided the mistake by taking such precautions as
were commanded by his personal position and the circumstances of the
case (Art. 59), he shall be punishable for negligence in cases where
such negligence is penalized by law.
(2) Mistake as to a fact which constitutes a specified crime shall not
exclude the punishment of the doer for another crime constituted by the
act he performed.
(3) The crime is committed where there is a mistake as to the identity
of the victim or the object of the crime."
Herbert, "Alcoholism: Can Honest Mistake About One's
Capacity for Self-Control Be an Excuse?", (1990) 13 International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 77 (Part of the Special Issue: "Intoxication
FINKEL, Norman J. and Jennifer L. Groscup, "When Mistakes Happen -
Commonsense Rules of
Culpability",
(1997), 3(1) Public Policy & Law 65-125; no copy in
libraries; FINKEL, Norman J., Stephen .T. Maloney, Monique Z. Valbuena
and Jennifer .L. Groscup "Lay perspectives on legal conundrums:
Impossible and mistaken
act cases" (1995) 19(6) Law and
Human Behavior 593-608;
FINKEL, Norman J. and
Gerrod Parrott, Emotions and
culpability: how the law is at odds with psychology, jurors, and itself,
Washington: American Psychological Association, c2006, xv, 312 p. and
see chapter 10, "Where Self-Defense's Justification Blurs into Excuse:
A Defensible Theory, with Fitting Verdicts, for Mistaken Self-defense,
(series; The law and public policy), ISBN: 1591474167; title noted in
my research but book not consulted yet (6 December 2006); FLETCHER, George P., Basic
Concepts of Criminal Law, New York and Oxford: Oxford
Press, 1998, xi, 223 p., ISBN: 0195121708 and 0195121716 (pbk.); for
of contents, see: Biddle
Law catalogue, University of Pennsylvania; important
Putative Justification Negates the
Required Intent, 159
Strict Liability: The Mistake Is Deemed
Irrelevant, 160
Putative Justification Is Itself
Justification, 161
Mistakes about the Norms of Justification (Type Four), 163
Summary of Mistakes: Relevant and Irrelevant, 166" (p. ix and x)
"The drafters [of the Model Penal
Code] totally overlooked the significance of the kind of element
to which the mistake relates. As we shall see, it makes an
extraordinary difference whether a mistake pertains to an element of
the defnition, an element of a justification, or an element of an
excusing condition." (p. 155)
___________"Mistake in the Model Penal Code: A False False Problem",
(1988) 19
Rutgers Law Journal 649-670; important
____________Rethinking Criminal Law,
Boston : Little, Brown, c1978, xxviii, 898 p., and see
Chapter 9, "The Theory of Mistake", at pp. 683-758 (also deals with
mistake of law);
FRYLING, Tina, "Mistake of Fact as a Criminal Defense to Criminal
Liability", in Richard A. Wright and J. Mitchell Miller, eds., Encyclopedia
of Criminology, Scarborough : Routledge/Taylor & Francis,
2004, vol. 2, at pp. 1002-1003; copy at the Library of the Supreme
of Canada, HV 61017 E53 2005 REF;
GARRETT, Elisabeth, "Mistaken Mistakes", [October 1989] New
Zealand Law Journal 355-357;
GARVEY, Stephen P., "Two kinds of criminal wrongs", (2003)
5(3) Punishment and Society
"Crimes of negligence are also based
on mistakes of fact. According to the Model Penal Code, negligence is
the failure to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that you
should have perceived. The problem is not (as in the prior example)
that you see a risk where none exists. Just the opposite: you fail to
see a risk where one does exist. If A’s child is in fact suffering from
a life-threatening illness, but A sees no risk to the child’s life,
then A has made a mistake of fact. Moreover, if a reasonable or
virtuous person, who knew what A knew, would have seen the risk, then
A’s mistake is unreasonable; and if the child dies as a proximate
result of A’s mistake, then A is guilty of negligent homicide." (p.
GILES, Marianne, "Self-Defence and Mistake: A Way Forward", (1990)
Modern Law Review 187-200;
GREAT BRITAIN, House of Commons, Bill 178, Criminal Code (Indictable Offences), 1878, xviii, 218 p.; British
Sir James Fitzjames Stephen; first reading in the House of Commons on
by the Attorney General Sir John Holker);
An alledged offender shall in general be in the same
position as he would have been in if he had acted as he did under that
state of facts which he in good faith and on reasonable grounds
believed to exist when he did the act alleged to be an offence,
provided that if an act in itself immoral is punishable by law only
when certain facts exist independent of its immoral character, or if an
act in itself punishable by law is punishable with additional severity
only if certain facts exist indepently of its illegality, every person
liable to punishment or to increased punishment, as the case may be, by
reason of the existence of such facts shall be liable to such
punishment or to such increased punishment, although he was not aware
of the existence of such facts, and although he believed in good faith
and on reasonable grounds that they did not exist, unless a contrary
intention is expressed in the definition of the offence." (available
at http://www.lareau-law.ca/StephenBill178ONE.pdf)
CRIMINAL CODE BILL COMMISSION, Report of the Royal Commission
to Consider the Law Relating to Indictable Offences: With an Appendix
pp. 169- 378; see at pp. 18-19 of the command number paper, the
comments of the Commissioners on section 25, ignorance of fact, in
Stephen's Bill (Bill 178);
"The Bill [Stephen's Bill, Bill 178]
also contained a provision as to the effect of mistakes of fact upon
the criminality of acts done in consequence of such mistakes, which if
some qualifications had been made in it would have included under one
general principle a considerable number of enactments contained in Part
III [Justification and Excuse for Acts which would Be Otherwise
Offences] of the Draft Code. The difficulty presented on the one
by our rules of construction to expressing matters of such intricacy in
general language, and the danger apparent on the other hand of losing
the certainty essential for a Code, have induced us (at some sacrifice
perhaps of brevity) to adopt a mode of dealing with these subjects
which reduces to an intelligible and systematic form a great body of
law on which precise rules are very desirable, and which is at present
in an extremely obscure and fragmentary state." (available at Report: pp.
GROSS, Hyman, "Mistake" in Sanford H. Kadish, ed., Encyclopedia
of Crime and Justice, vol. 3 of 4, New York: Free Press, 1983, pp.
1066-1073, ISBN: 0029181110 (set of 4 volumes);
__________A Theory of Criminal Justice, New York:
University Press, 1979, xviii, 521 p., ISBN: 0195023498 and 0195023501
GRUNSVEN, Paul R. Van, "Medical Malpractice or Criminal Mistake? --
An Analysis of Past and Current Criminal Prosecutions for Clinical
and Fatal Errors", (1997-99) 2 DePaul Journal of Health Care Law
1-54;
GÜNGÖR, Dragana, "Mental Elements and Mistake of Fact and Law in
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court", (18 July 2005) 1(1) Free Law Journal 21-30; available
at http://www.fwpublishing.net/Files/Free_Law_Journal-Volume1Number1-18July2005.pdf
(accessed on 10 December 2006);
HALL, Jerome, General Principles
of Criminal Law, 2nd ed., Indianapolis
: Bobbs-Merrill, c1960, xii, 642 p., and see Chapter 11,
Ignorance and Mistake", at pp. 360-414;
____________"Ignorance and Mistake in Criminal Law", (1956-57)
Indiana Law Journal 1-44;
HARBOE, Nicolai, 1876-1943, Les conditions subjectives de la
3 tomes, Oslo: I. Kommisjon Hos Jacob Dybwad, 1930-34 (series; Skrifter
no.4, 1931: no.1, and 1934: no.1), voir dans l'article de 1934 (tome
3), "Le
par erreur" et "Le crime par ignorance", et respectivement aux
77-83 et 84-93;
livre rare au Canada; copie à l'Université Queens,
HENNAU, Christiane et Jacques Verhaegen, "La faute non
et sa réglementation dans les codes pénaux modernes",
74 Revue de droit pénal et de criminologie 568-580, voir
en particulier la "Section IV: L'erreur fautive de fait et ses effets"
aux pp. 574-576;
HENNING, Terese, Consent and mistaken belief in consent in
Tasmaninan
sexual offences trials, Hobart : University of Tasmania Law Press,
c2000, 152 p. (series; University of Tasmania Law School / Occasional
no. 6); title noted in my research but book not consulted; no copy in
according to the AMICUS catalogue (verification of 6 August 2003)
"Occassional Paper No. 6: Consent and Mistaken
in Consent in the Tasmanian Sexual Offences Trials
This report is the second in a series of reports monitoring
of the 1987 reforms to the Criminal Code 1924 (Tas) and the Evidence
1910 (Tas). The purpose of the present study was to examine, in the
of sexual offences trials, the operation of the reforms to the
of ‘consent’ in the Tasmanian Criminal Code 1924. It also examined the
operation of the defence of mistaken belief in consent in these trials.
The Background to the reform and the defence of mistaken
under s 14 of the Code is discussed in Chapter 1; the research
and basic quantitative findings with respect to the sexual offences
and the lines of defence encountered are dealt with in Chapter 2;
3 discusses the research findings with regard to the Crown construction
of consent and key themes used by the defence to refute the Crown
of non-consent, to construct sexual contact as consensual and to lay a
foundation for the defence of mistaken belief in consent. Chapter 4
findings concerning trial judges’ summations and Chapter 5 presents the
study’s conclusions and recommendations."
HERRING, Jonathan, "Mistaken Sex", [July 2005] The Criminal Law
Review 511-524;
A.J.A., "Self-defence Murder -- self-induced intoxication -- mistaken belief as to threat --
mistake caused by intoxication -- reasonableness of belief -- whether
defendant raising issue of self-defence to charge of murder entitled to
be judged on basis of what he mistakenly believed to be the situation
where mistaken belief brought about by self-induced intoxication … R v Hatton Court of Appeal (Criminal
Division)…", [April 2006] Criminal Law Review
353-356; the case is reported by Vanessa
pp. 353-355 and the commentary by A.J.A. is at pp. 355-356;
HINCHLIFFE, Sara, "Morgan Reviewed: In Defence of Freedom of Will",
(2002/2003) 6(1) Contemporary Issues in Law 37-46; copy at the
of the Supreme Court of Canada, periodicals; important
"[Abstract]
DPP v Morgan provides legal precedent in
for a defence to rape of 'honest but mistaken belief in consent', no
how unreasonable the grounds for arriving at such a belief. This
principle has been the subject of much feminist criticism. Many
claim that the Morgan defence privileges the experience of men
that of women -- in that even if a jury believes that the complainant
not consent to sex they must acquit a defendant so long as he did not
to commit rape. This article argues that Morgan must be
if we are to defend civil liberties, uphold the principle of criminal
and argue that women are not passive victims of male sexuality. Important
protections of civil liberties fought for for hundreds of years are at
risk if the Morgan principle is sacrificed." (source: table of contents
at the beginning of issue 1, volume 6)
MORISHITA, T. (Tadashi), "Règlementation juridique dde
l'erreur en droit pénal japonais, (mars 1979) Hiroshima Law Journal 1; article
cité par Pradel, infra,
p. 300;
HOLLEY, Dannye, "The Influence of the Model
Penal Code's Culpability
Provisions on State Legislatures: A Study of Lost Opportunities,
Including Abolishing the Mistake of Fact Doctrine", (1997-98) 27 Southwestern
Law Review 229-263; HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE. EMPEROR (1765-1790 : Joseph II), The
"5. The want of free-will absolves the offender
f. When the action has been committed through error, in
case no crime can be imputed to the offender, since, had he possessed
information, he migh have conducted himself, as the laws and good
directed him." (pp. 2-4)
HOWARD, Colin, "The Reasonableness of Mistake in the Criminal Law",
4 University Queensland Law Jourmnal
ISRAEL, Penal
"34R. (a) A person who does any act
imagining a state of things
which does not exist shall bear no criminal liability save to
the extent as he would bear it if the state of things were in
fact as he imagined it to be.
(b) Subsection (a) shall apply also to offences of negligence
provided that the mistake is reasonable and, subject to the provisions
of section 22(b), to strict-liability offences.
34S. For the purposes of criminal liability, it is immaterial
whether a person, owing to a mistake as to the existence or meaning
of a penal enactment, imagines that his act is not prohibited,
unless the mistake could not reasonably have been avoided."
The Italian Penal Code Translated by Edward M. Wise in
with Allen Maitlin. Introduction by Edward M. Wise, Lttleton
(Colorado): Fred B. Rothman and London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1978, xli,
249 p., see article 47 (series; American series of foreign
penal codes; vol. 23), ISBN: 08377700434;
"Article 47. Error of Fact.
Error of fact as to the act which constitutes the
offense shall preclude the actor's being punishable. However,
punishability shall not be precluded with respect to an error induced
by negligence when the act is designated by law as a crime of
Error of fact as to
the act which constitutes a particular offense shall not preclude
punishability for a different offense.
Error as to a law
other than the penal law shall preclude punishability when it causes an
error of fact as to the act which constitutes the offense." (p. 16)
47 - Errore di fatto
L'errore sul fatto che costituisce il reato esclude la punibilit&agrave; dell'agente. Nondimeno, se si tratta di errore determinato da colpa, la punibilit&agrave; non &egrave; esclusa, quando il fatto &egrave; preveduto dalla legge come delitto colposo.   L'errore sul fatto che costituisce un determinato reato non esclude la punibilit&agrave; per un reato diverso.   L'errore su una legge diversa dalla legge penale esclude la punibilit&agrave;, quando ha cagionato un errore sul fatto che costituisce reato.(http://www.usl4.toscana.it/dp/isll/lex/cp_l1.htm#L1t3c1, accessed on 3 August 2006)
"ART. 47 -- Erreur de fait. --
L'erreur sur le fait qui constitue l'infraction,
exclut la possibilité de punir l'agent. Néanmoins,
s'il s'agit d'une erreur dérivant d'une faute, la
possibilité de le punir n'est pas exclue, lorsque le fait est
prévu par la loi comme délit non intentionel.
L'erreur sur le fait qui constitue une infraction
déterminée, n'exclut pas la possibilité de punir
l'agent pour une infraction différente.
L'erreur portant sur une loi distincte de la loi
pénale exclut la possibilité de punir l'agent, quand elle
a causé une erreur sur le fait qui constitue l'infraction." (Code
italien de 1930, traduction de P. de
Casabianca avec mise à jour par V. de Toma, avec une
notice spéciale sur ce code par Marc Ancel avec la collaboration
de Yvonne Marx, dans Les Codes pénaux européens,
II, Paris: Centre français de droit comparé, 1956, pp.
871-1014, à la p. 881 (Nouvelle Collection du Comité de
et de droit international));
JESCHECK, Hans-Heinrich, "The General Principles of International
Criminal Law Set Out in Nuremberg, as Mirrored in the ICC Statute",
2(1) Journal of International Criminal Justice 38-55, and see
of Fact, Mistake of Law", at pp. 46-47;
KAHAN, Dan M., "Is Ignorance of Fact an Excuse Only for the
Virtuous?", (June 1998) 96(7) Michigan Law Review 2123-2128;
KEEDY, Edwin R., "Ignorance and Mistake in the Criminal Law",
22 Harvard Law Review 75-96, see "Ignorance and Mistake of
at pp. 81-88;
KELT, Maria and Herman von Hebel, "General Principles of Criminal
Law and Elements of Crime", in Roy S. Lee, ed., ans Hakan Friman,
A. Fernandez de Gurmendi, Herman von Hebel, and Darryl Robinson,
editors, The International Criminal Court: Elements of Crimes and
of Procedure and Evidence, Ardsley (NY): Transnational Publishers,
2001, lxvi, 857 p., at pp. 19-40, and see "MISTAKE OF FACT AND MISTAKE
OF LAW", at pp. 36-37, ISBN: 1571052097; copy at Ottawa University, FTX
General KZ 6310 .I579 2001;
KNOOPS, Geert-Jan, Defenses in contemporary international
law, Ardsley (NY): Transnational Publications, 2001, xxxviii, 297
see "The defense of consent to sexual assault and mistake of fact" at
104-108 (series; International and comparative criminal law
series), ISBN: 1571051511;
KOONTZ, Paul A., "Mistake of Fact as a defense to common law
crimes",
(1937) 41 Dickinson Law Review 115-120;
KOPPE, J. Melvin, "Criminal Law - Attempts - Mistake of Fact",
16 Boston University Law Review 199-204;
de droit et de jurisprudence, 1970, xii, 367 p., voir sur l'erreur de
les pp. 81-82 et 94-100 (Collection; Bibliothèque d'histoire du
droit et droit romain, t. 17); LAPPI-SEPPÄLÄ, Tapio, "The Doctrine of Criminal Liability
and the Draft Criminal Code for Finland" in Raimo Lahti and Kimmo
eds., Criminal Law Theory in Transition: Finnish and
Perspectives/Strafrechtstheorie Im Umbruch Finnische und
vergleichendePerspektiven,
Helsinki: Finish Lawyers' Publishing Company, 1992, xiv, 604 p.,
at pp. 214-246, see "Mistake as to a Circumstance Affording a Defence"
at pp. 234-236, ISBN: 9516405940;
Emmanuel, Étude sur les cas
de non-culpabilité et les excuses en matière
pénale suivant la science rationnelle, la législation
positive et la jurisprudence, Toulouse: Imprimerie de Bonnal et
Gibrac, 1877, 375 p.; pdf et Internet complétés le 2 juin
2007; - Table des
Laws of the New Sudan -- Penal Code, 2003, available
at http://www.unsudanig.org/docs/The%20Penal%20Code%20Act,%202003.pdf
(accessed on 29 September 2007); "Section 44-- Act done by Person Bound
or Justified by Law: No act is an offence which is done by a
person who is legally bound to do it or justified by law in doing it,
or who by reason of a mistake of fact and not by reason of a mistake of
law in good faith believes himself to be bound by law to do it or
justified by law in doing it.
(a) (“A”) an officer of a Court being ordered by that Court to arrest
(“Y”) and after due enquiry believing (“Z”) to be (“Y”) arrests (“Z”).
(“A”) has committed no offence.
(b) (“A”) sees (“Z”) commit what appears to (“A”) to be a murder. (“A”)
in the exercise to the best of his judgment exerted in good faith of
the power which the law gives to all persons of arresting murderers in
the act seizes (“Z”) in order to bring (“Z”) before the proper
authorities. (“A”) has committed no offence, though it may turn out
that (“Z”) was acting in self-defense."
LEVERICK, Fiona, Killing in
Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2006,
xxviii, 217 p., ISBN: 9780199283460, 019928346X (pbk.); title noted in
my research but book not consulted yet (2 July 2007);
"Contents: The classification of
defences -- The justification of self-defence --
Retreat -- Imminence of harm -- Self-generated self-defence -- Killing
to protect property -- Killing to prevent rape -- Mistake -- The impact
of the European Convention on Human Rights" (source: Hollis catalogue,
___________ "Mistake in Self-Defence after Drury", [2002],
1, The Juridical Review 35-48; copy at Ottawa University, KD
.J854 Location: FTX Periodicals;
LOW, Peter W., "The Model Penal Code, the Common Law, and Mistakes
Fact: Recklessness, Negligence or Strict Liability?", (1987-88) Rutgers
Law Journal 539-567; copy at the University of Ottawa, FTX
KFN 1869 .R87;
MacDONALD, Elizabeth, "Intoxication, Mistake and Self-Defence", (2
October 1987) 137
Law Journal 914-915; issue 6325; copy at the Library of the
Supreme Court of Canada; number missing at the University of Ottawa;
MACEDONIA, Criminal Code,
available at http://www.legislationline.org/legislation.php?tid=1&lid=6272
"[Translation]
(1) The offender is not criminally responsible, when at the time the
crime was committed, he had no knowledge of some of its
characteristics, determined by law; or if he wrongly considered that
there are circumstances according to which, if they had existed, this
would have been permissible. (2) If the offender was under mistaken notion out of negligence, he
is criminally responsible for the crime committed out of negligence, if
the law determines a criminal responsibility for such an act."
MENSA-BONSU, Henrietta, J.A.N., "The Defence of Mistake of Fact
Claim of Right Matters Arising from Republic V. Kwando II",
20 University of Ghana Law Journal 125-136;
(C.A.); about mistake due to intoxication in
self-defence; MILTON, J.R.L., "Reasonable Mistake of Fact as a Defence in
Offences" (1971) 88 South African Law Journal 70-83; copy at
University of Ottawa, Law Library, FTX Periodicals, KR 0 .S69; ___________"Recent Cases, "A Stab in the Dark: A Case of Aberratio
Ictus, (1968) 85 South African Law Journal 115-122;
MINKOWICH, Meyer, Mistake of Fact and Ignorance as a Defense in
Law of the Talmud and English Common Law", PH.D. thesis., The
College, 1961, source: ADD X1961; notes: in 1986, the Dropsie
College became the
Research Institute. In 1993, the Annenberg Research
merged into the University of Pennsylvania becoming the institutions
for Advanced Judaic Studies; could be in hebrew, Ta`ut ka-`uvdah
ve-i-yedi`ah
ke-haganah be-mishpat pelili; Franklin Pennylvania Library;
MORGAN, Neil, "Mistake", (1991) 15 Criminal Law Journal
128-138, and see "Mistake of Fact, at pp. 136-138;
"One final feature which is welcome is
the clear recognition that mistake may be either a complete or a
partial excuse, following the Queensland and Western Australian
Model.68...
68 Criminal Codes, s. 24" (p. 138)
MOSTAFA, Mahmoud M., Principes de droit pénal des
de Marc Ancel, Paris: Librairie générale de droit et de
1972, iii, 190 p. et voir "L'erreur dans la justification" aux
pp. 49-50 (collection; Les grands systemes de droit
contemporains; vol. 5); copie à l'Université d'Ottawa,
"Toutefois nous aurions
préféré qu'il soit prévu par un texte
général relatif à l'erreur dans la justification,
à l'instar de l'article 28 du projet de Code pénal de la
République arabe unie (projet de 1966) qui dispose que:
'L'intention est écartée si l'acte constitutif de
l'infraction est accompli sur la base d'une erreur ... dans des
circonstances telles que, si elles se réalisaient, l'acte serait
justifié. Pourtant ceci n'empêche pas la poursuite
de l'auteur pour toute infraction involontaire ou toute autre
infraction découlant de son acte.'." (p. 50)
MOUSOURAKIS, George, Criminal Responsibility and Partial Excuses,
Aldershoot (UK) and Brookfield (Vermont/USA): Ashgate Publishing
1998, vi, 216 p., ISBN: 1855219433; see Table
of Contents; see chapter 6 "Self-defence, Provocation and Mistake
Fact", at pp. 177-195; MYERS, Larry W., "Reasonable Mistake of Age: A Needed Defense to
Statutory Rape", (1965) 64 Michigan
Law Review 105-136;
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, THE, Study Draft of a New Federal Criminal
Code (Title 18. United States Code),
Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., for sale by the Supt. of
Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970, lxiv, 344p.; notes: "Consists
of materials under consideration by the Commission
preparatory to its final report to the President and Congress in
November of 1970." (source: Hollis catalogue, Harvard University);
excerpts are to be read with part of the article of DAMASKA, reproduced
"§ 302 Requirements of Culpability
(3) Factors to Which Requirement of Culpability Applies.
(d) Except as otherwise expressly provided, no culpability is required
with respect to facts which establish that a defense does not exist, if
the defense is defined in part A of this Code or Chapter 10; otherwise
the least kind of culpability required for the offense is required with
respect to such facts." (pp. 24-25)
"§ 303. Mistake of Fact in Affirmative Defenses.
Except as otherwise expressly provided, a mistaken belief that the
facts which constitute an affirmative defense exist is not a defense."
"§ 304. Ignorance or Mistake Negating Culpability
A person does not commit an offense if when he engages in conduct he is
ignorant or mistaken about a matter of fact or law and the ignorance or
mistake negates the kind of culpability required for commission of the
offense." (p. 27)
""§ 609. Excuse
(1) Mistake. A person's conduct is excused if he believes
that the factual situation is such that his conduct is necessary and
appropriate for any of the purposes which would establish a
justification under this Chapter, even though his belief is mistaken,
except that, if his belief is negligently or recklessly held, it is not
an excuse in a prosecution for an offense for which negligence or
recklessness, as the case may be, suffices to establish
culpability. Excuse under this subsection is a defence or
affirmative defense according to which type of defense would be
established had the facts been as the person believed them to be." (p.
"§ 1306 Escape.
(4) Defenses. Irregularity in bringing about or maintaining
dtention, or lack of jurisdiction of the committing or detaining
authority shall not be a defense to a prosecution under this section if
the escape is from prison or other facility used for official detention
or from detention pursuant to commitment by an official
proceeding. In the case of other detention, irregularity or lack
of jurisdiction shall be an affirmative defense if (a) the escape
involved no substantial risk of harm to the person or property of
anyone other than the detainee, or (b) the detaining authority did not
act in good faith under color of law." (p. 101)
1981, 565 p., (Collection des codes pénaux européens du
de législation étrangère et de droit international
du Ministère de la Justice, sous la direction de Marc Ancel avec
la collaboration de Yvonne Marx, tome 5), ISBN:
2110006579;
[Code pénal allemand] "ARTICLE 16 Erreur sur les circonstances de l'acte (1) Si, au moment de la commission de l'acte l'auteur ignorait une
circonstance qui constitue un des éléments constitutifs
du délit, il n'agit pas intentionnellement. Le
caractère punissable de l'acte commis par imprudence n'en est
(2) Celui qui, lors de la commission de l'acte, prévoit,
par erreur, des circonstances qui constitueraient un des
éléments constitutifs du délit par une disposition
légale plus douce, ne peut être puni pour acte
intentionnel qu'en application de cette loi plus douce." (p. 332)
Etat de nécessité en tant que cause d'excuse
(1) Agit sans culpabilité celui qui, en présence d'un
danger pour la vie, la personne ou la liberté, danger qui ne
être évité par aucun autre moyen, commet un acte
en vue de détourner le danger de lui-même, d'un parent ou
d'un autre de ses proches. La présente distinction n'est
applicable s'il pouvait, selon les circonstances, être
de l'auteur qu'il accepte le danger notamment parce qu'il avait
provoqué le danger ou parce qu'il se trouvait dans une situation
juridique particulière; toutefois, la peine peut être
en application de l'article 49, alinéa 1, lorsque l'auteur, eu
à des rapports juridiques particuliers, ne devait pas accepter
danger. (2) Si, lors de la commission de l'acte, l'auteur suppose, par
l'existence de circonstances qui l'auraient excusé, en
de l'alinéa 1, il n'est puni que s'il ne pouvait pas
cette erreur. La peine doit être atténuée
à l'article 49, alinéa 1." (p. 339) ------------ [Code pénal autrichien] "Supposition erronée
de l'existence d'un état de choses justificatif ARTICLE 8 -- Quiconque suppose par erreur un état de
choses, qui exclurait l'illicéité de l'acte, ne peut
être puni pour avoir commis cet acte intentionnellement. Il
doit être puni pour commission (de l'acte) par négligence,
si l'erreur tient à la négligence et si ladite commission
par négligence est passible d'une peine." (p. 15)
"Excuse créée par l'état de
nécessité ARTICLE 10. -- (1) Quiconque commet un acte passible d'une peine pour
écarter de lui-même ou d'un tiers un dommage grave le
directement bénéficie d'une excuse, si la gravité
du dommage dont l'acte en cause fait peser la menace n'est pas hors de
proportion avec celle du dommage que ledit acte vise à
et si l'on ne pouvait s'attendre, dans la situation de l'auteur,
un comportement différent de la part d'un homme attaché
valeurs placées sous la protection du droit. (2) L'auteur ne bénéficie pas d'une
excuse, s'il
s'est exposé au danger délibérément, en
d'un motif reconnu par le droit en vigueur. L'auteur doit
puni pour avoir agi par négligence, si c'est par une erreur
sur sa négligence qu'il a supposé réunies les
qui auraient fait bénéficier son acte d'une excuse, et si
une peine est prévue pour l'acte commis par négligence."
NORWAY, Penal Code,
available at http://www.legislationline.org/upload/legislations/51/ec/c428fe3723f10dcbcf983ed59145.htm
(accessed on 30 September 2007)
"§ 42. If any person has committed
an act in a state of ignorance
concerning circumstances that determine criminal liability or increase
the penalty for the said act, such circumstances shall not be
attributable to him. If the ignorance can be ascribed to
negligence, in cases in which
negligence is punishable the penalty prescribed for such negligence
Error regarding the value of an object
or the amount at which
damages must be assessed shall only be taken into account when criminal
liability is conditional thereon."
O'CONNOR, Vivienne and Colette Rausch, eds., with Hans Joerg Albrecht
and Goran Klemencic, Model codes for
post-conflict criminal justice,
see "Mistake of Fact and Mistake of Law" at pp. 85-86, ISBN:
OKO, Okechukwu, "Unveiling the Cloak of Deception: Determining
Louisiana", (1995-96) 23 Southern
University Law Review 213-255;
O'REGAN, Robin S, Essays on the Australian Criminal Codes,
The Law Book, 1979, xix, 152 p., see Essay III, "Unreasonable Mistake
Fact", at pp. 40-51, ISBN: 0455199558;
"Sorcery and Homicide in Papua New Guinea" (1974) 48 Australian Law
Journal 76-82;
PAIZES, Andrew, "Mistake as to the Causal Sequence and Mistake as to
Causal Act Exploring the Relation between Mens Rea and the Causal
of the Actus Reus", (1993) 110 South
African Law Journal 493-529;
PERKINS, Rollins M., "Ignorance and Mistake in Criminal Law", (1939-40)
88 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 35-70;
___________"Ignorance or Mistake of Law Revisited", (1980) Utah
Law Review 473-491;
POLAND, Penal Code;
at http://www.era.int/domains/corpus-juris/public_pdf/polish_penal_code1.pdf (accessed on 24 September 2007);
"Article 28. § 1. Whoever commits
an act while being in error as to a circumstance constituting a feature
of an prohibited act, shall not intentionally commit an offence.
§ 2. Whoever commits an offence in
the justified but mistaken conviction that a circumstance has occurred,
which constitutes a feature of a prohibited act carrying a less severe
penalty, shall be subject to criminal liability under the provision
regarding the circumstance warranting this lesser liability.
Article 29. Whoever commits a prohibited
act in the justified but mistaken conviction that a circumstance has
occurred which excludes unlawfulness or guilt, shall not commit an
offence; if the mistake of the perpetrator is not justifiable, the
court may apply extraordinary mitigation of the penalty."
POTUGAL, Penal Code -- General Part in English, available
at http://www.verbojuridico.net/download/portuguesepenalcode.pdf (accessed on 30 September 2007);
about circumstances of the act
1- The Mistake about fact or law elements of a type of crime or about
prohibitions the knowledge of which is reasonably indispensable for the
agent to become aware of the act unlawfulness excludes intent.
2- The rule established in the previous number applies to the mistake
about a state of things that, if existing, would have excluded the
unlawfulness of the fact or the agent’s fault.
3- Punishability is safeguarded in negligence general terms."
PRADEL, Jean, "Présentation générale du projet de
(euros-délits), [2003] Revue pénitentiaire et de
277-287; l'article est suivit du texte du Code aux pp. 289-308;
5. Dol et erreur
2. N'agit pas dolosivement celui qui ne connaît pas le fait
au moment de sa commission. Il n'y a pas lieu à dol
lorsque la méconnaissance ou ignorance est évitable et
que cela résulte d'une erreur d'évaluation ou d'une
3. Ne sera pas sanctionné d'une peine prévue pour
fait dolosif, celui qui au moment de la commission considère de
manière erronée que des circonstances
particulières se sont produites et dont l'existence puisse
justifier le comportement (art. 8 et 9). Ce qui est mentionn
antérieurement est également applicable dans les
hypothèses où l'erreur est évitable. Dans ce
cas, si l'erreur est sdue à une négligence ou à
une imprudence grave, l'auteur peut être sanctionné
conformément aux dispositions des articles 4, alinéas 2
et 6"
PRADEL, Jean, Droit pénal
comparé, Paris: Dalloz, 1995, viii, 733 p., ISBN:
2247019315; il y a maintenant une 2e
éditon: Paris: Dalloz, 1995, x, 803 p., ISBN: 2247041108,
" La règle
générale est que l'erreur si elle porte sur un élément essentiel de
l'infraction supprime le dol en sorte que l'infraction ne peut
être retenue que comme infraction d'imprudence -- si l'on
peut reprocher une faute à l'agent. L'acte ne peut donc
être retenu comme infraction intentionnelle, mais tout au plus
comme infraction involontaire. [...]
En revanche, si l'erreur porte sur un
élément secondaire de l'infraction, la
responsabilité pour infraction intentionnelle subsiste. En
cas d'erreur sur la personne (l'agent croit tuer A et tue B qu'il prend
pour A) ou la maladresse dite aberratio
ictus (l'agent vise A et par erreur tue B), la
responsabilité subsiste. Au cas d'erreur, les juges
retiennent en général, le meurtre sur la personne
effectivement atteinte. Et au cas de maladresse, les juges ont
parfois hésité entre retenir une tentative de meurtre sur
la personne visée et homicide par imprudence sur la personne
atteinte ou bien retenir seulement l'homicide volontaire." (pp.
300-301; notes omises)
PRICE, Terry L., "Faultless Mistake of Fact: Justification or
Excuse?",
1993) 12(2) Criminal Justice Ethics 14-28;
____________"Mistakes of Fact and Agent Voluntariness:
Aristotle, Aquinas, and
to Will", (January 2003) 80(2) Modern
Schoolman: A Quarterly Journal of Philosophy 99-113;
RADULESCO, Jean, De l'influence de
l'erreur sur la responsabilité pénale, Paris :
éditions de la ″Vie universitaire″, 1923, 173 p.; thèse, Université de Paris, 1923; titre noté dans
mes recherches mais livre non consulté (22 septembre
1983, 159 p. et voir les pp. 116-122;
"ARTICLE 27. -- N'est pas punissable celui qui aurait agi
dans la conviction qu'il manque au fait quelques-unes des exigences
nécessaires à l'existence du délit selon sa
description légale.
Cependant, si l'erreur provenait d'une faute, le fait ne sera puni que
lorsque la loi aura prévu sa réalisation 'fautive'. Les mêmes règles s'appliuqueront à celui qui
supposerait de façon erronée l'existence de circonstances
justificatives du fait réalisé.
ARTICLE 28. -- N'est pas coupable
celui qui par une erreur invincible agirait avec la conviction que le
fait réalisé n'est pas punissable.
Si l'erreur n'était pas incible, le fait sera
réprimé d'une peine non inférieure à la
moitié du minimum ni supérieure à la moitié
du maximum de celle qui aura été prévue pour le
délit correspondant.
ARTICLE 29. -- Si, par suite d'une erreur de l'agent, le fait
réalisé était différent de celui qu'il
s'était proposé, il lui sera imposé la peine
correspondante au fait le moins grave." (p. 118)
Recent Cases, "Criminal Law -- Acts in Defense of Others -- Mistake
of Fact", (1923-24) 72 University of Pennsylvania Law Review
325-326;
REICH, J.F., " 'No Provincial or Tansient Notion': The Need for a
of Age Defense in Child Rape Prosecutions", (2005) 57(2) Vanderbilt
Law Review 693-740; REVILLE, N.J., "Self-Defence: Courting Sober but Unreasonable
of Fact", (1988) 52 Journal of Criminal Law 84-95;
ROBINSON, Paul H., 1948-, Criminal Law Defences, vol. 1 of 2,
West, 1984, ISBN: 0314815139 (set); ROBINSON, Paul H., 1948-, and John M., Darley, Justice,
directions in social psychology); see Chapter 4, "Doctrines of
When Is One's Violation of a Legal Rule Blameworthy?", pp. 83-125, and,
in particular, "Study 8: Offense Culpability Requirements and
Mistake/Accident
Defenses" at pp. 84-96 and the "Chapter Summary" at p. 123-125; ROMANIA, Penal Code,
"Error de facto
– (1) An act provided in the criminal
law shall not be an offence if the perpetrator, at time of
perpetration, was unaware of the existence of a state, situation or
circumstance on which the criminality of the act depends. (2) A circumstance not known by the perpetrator at the time of
perpetration shall not be an aggravating circumstance.
(3) Para.(1) and (2) shall apply also to acts committed by
negligence that are punished by criminal law, only if the unawareness
of the state, situation or circumstance concerned is not in itself the
result of negligence."
Court / Statut de
Rome de la Cour pénale internationale
Mistake of fact or mistake of
1. A mistake of fact shall be a ground for excluding criminal
responsibility only if it negates the mental element required by the
crime." (available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/english/rome_statute(e).pd
, accessed on 29 September 2007)
1. Une erreur de fait n’est un motif d’exonération de la
responsabilité pénale que si elle fait disparaître
l’élément psychologique du crime." (disponible à http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/french/rome_statute(f).pdf,
consulté le 29 septembre 2007)
___________"Draft Report of the Intersessional Meeting from 19 to 30
copy at the Library of Parliament, KZ6310 S72 (library Br.B.); available at http://web.archive.org/web/20040720010500/http://www.npwj.net/cdrom/zut/zut.pdf
and http://www.npwj.org/1998/05/31/1998_05_31_icc_compilation_un_documents_and_draft_icc_statute_diplomatic_conference (accessed on 24
KZ6310 S72 (library Br.B.); available at http://web.archive.org/web/20040719155140/http://www.npwj.net/cdrom/vol1/vol_1.pdf and http://www.npwj.org/1998/05/31/1998_05_31_icc_compilation_un_documents_and_draft_icc_statute_diplomatic_conference (accessed on 24
Library of Parliament, KZ6310 S72 (library Br.B.); available at http://web.archive.org/web/20030828030555/http://www.npwj.net/cdrom/vol2/vol2_a.pdf (accessed on 15 December
2002) and http://www.npwj.org/1998/05/31/1998_05_31_icc_compilation_un_documents_and_draft_icc_statute_diplomatic_conference (accessed on 24
ROUQUETTE, Théophile, Des
excuses légales et des faits justificatifs en matière
criminelle, Toulouse: Bonnal et Gibrac, 1866; disponible
à http://books.google.com/books?vid=HARVARD32044103179586&printsec=titlepage#PPP5,M1
et à http://books.google.com/books?id=D1kOAAAAYAAJ&source=gbs_summary_s&cad=0
et (vérifiés le 30 mai 2008);
SALAND, Per, "International Criminal Law Principles" in Roy S.
and 904111243X (pbk.); see "XIII. Article 32, Mistake of fact or
mistake of law" at p. 210;
SAMUELS, "Drafting the Criminal Code", (1992) 13 Statute Law Review 229-239; "e. Transferred Fault (or Malice) (Clause 25)
(1) In determining whether a person is guilty of an
offence, his intention to cause, or his awareness of a risk that he
will cause, a result in relation to a person or thing capable of being
the victim or subject-matter of the offence shall be treated as an
intention to cause or, as the case may be, an awareness of a risk that
he will cause, that result in relation to any other person or thing
affected by his conduct.
(2) Any defence on which a person might have relied
on a charge of an offence in relation to a person or thing within his
contemplation is open to him on a charge of the same offence in
relation to a person or thing not within his contemplation.
Transferred fault or malice is not a principle of
law. The definition of intentional or reckless assault already
cover the matter.
D intended to assault A but hit B: guilty. D
intended to assault A but missed and broke a window: if reckless,
guilty. D intended to break window A but broke window B:
guilty. D intended to break a window but missed and hit A: of if
reckless, guilty. There is no problem.
The clause is a sort of philosophical excursus,
suitable for a seminar discussion, but not in in a forensic
context. It is confusing, unhelpful, adds nothing, and need not
and should not be there." (pp. 232-233; note: after the words "within
his contemplation", I have changed the text, by starting a new
paragraph. Clause 25 finishes with the words "within his
contemplation". This clause 25 is from The Law Commission, Criminal
Law: Legislating the
Code : Offences against the Person and General Principles - A
Paper, London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1992, v, 131
p.(series; Consultation Paper No. 122), ISBN:
011730204X);
SATZGER, Helmut, "German Criminal Law and the Rome Statute -- A
Critical Analysis of the New German Code of Crimes against
International Law", (2002) 2 International
Criminal Law Review 261-282, and see discussion on excessive
self-defence and mistake as to justified self-defence, at pp. 270-271;
International Criminal Law Review 1-46, on "mistake of fact
and mistake of law, see pp. 1-16; SEIDMAN, Robert B., "Mens Rea and the Reasonable African: The
World-View and Mistake of Fact", (1966) 15(4) The International and Comparative
Quarterly 1135-1164;
___________"Witch Murder and Mens Rea: A Problem of Society under
Social Change", (1965) 28 Modern Law Review
46-61;
SENDOR, Benjamin B., "Mistakes of Fact: A Study in the Structure of
Criminal Conduct", in Michael Louis Corrado, ed., Justification
and Excuse in the Criminal Law, New York/London: Hamden:
Garland, 1994, xxxviii, 625 p., pp. 163-196 (series; vol. 831, Garland
of Social Science; vol. 1, Garland Studies in Applied
Ehics),
ISBN: 0815308256; originally published in (1990) 25 Wake Forest Law
Review 707-782;
SERBIA and MONTENEGRO, Criminal Code,
(Error Facti)
(1) An act shall not be considered a criminal offence if it was done
out of a compelling mistake of fact.
(2) A compelling mistake of law exists where the perpetrator was not
required or could not avoid a mistake about particular circumstance,
which is a statutory element of the criminal
offence, or about particular circumstance, which, had it existed, would
have rendered such act permissible.
(3) If the perpetrator’s mistake was due to negligence, he shall be
guilty of criminal offence committed by negligence, if such offence is
SIMESTER, A.P., "Mistakes in Defence", (1992) 12 Oxford Journal
Legal Studies 295-310;
SIMONS, Kenneth W., "Mistake and Impossibility, Law and Fact, and
A Speculative Essay", (1990-91) 81 The Journal of Criminal Law and
Criminology 447-517; SLIEDREGT, Elies van, The Criminal Responsibility of
Asser Press, 2003, xxiv, 437 p., see "Article 32 ICC Statute: Mistake",
at pp. 301-316, ISBN: 9067041661; copy at Ottawa University, FTX
K5064 .S53 2003;
___________"Defences in International Criminal Law", 44 p., see
32 OF THE ICC STATUTE: MISTAKE", at pp. 27-32, available at http://www.isrcl.org/Papers/Sliedregt.pdf
SLOVENIA, Republic of, Penal
Code, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/50/18/34287694.pdf (accessed on 14 April 2006); as of 28 September
2004, Unofficial translation, Source: the Commission for the Prevention
of Corruption (OECD);
(1) The perpetrator who, at the time of the committing of a criminal
offence, was either not aware of a statutory element of such an offence
or that he erroneously believed that circumstances were present which,
if they were true, would justify his conduct, shall not be held to be
liable under criminal law.
(2) If the perpetrator was in error due to his negligence, he shall be
held liable for the committing of a criminal offence when such a degree
of criminal liability constitutes a statutory element of the offence in
SMITH, A.T.H., "Rethinking the Defence of Mistake", (1982) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies
429-439;
SUISSE, Code pénal,
art. 13, "Erreur sur les faits"; disponible à http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/rs/c311_0.html
(consulté le 22 septembre 2007); "Erreur sur les faits
1 Quiconque agit sous l’influence d’une appréciation
erronée des faits est jugé d’après cette
appréciation si elle lui est favorable.
2 Quiconque pouvait éviter l’erreur en usant des
précautions voulues est punissable pour négligence si la
loi réprime son acte comme infraction de négligence."
SWOBODA, Innocent Robert, Ignorance in Relation to the
of Delicts: The Imputability of Delicts, Washington (D.C.):
Catholic University of America Press, 1941, xii, 271 p. (series: The
University of America Canon Law Studies; No. 143);
vii, 342 p. (Collection Histoire), notes: Société
du droit et publié avec le concours du CRNS, ISBN: 2717810447;
copie à l'Université Carleton, Ottawa;
TITTLE, Peg. "Sexual Activity, Consent, Mistaken Belief, and
TRIFFTERER, Otto, "Article 32: Mistake of fact or mistake of law"
Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1999, xxviii, 1295 p. at pp. 555-571, ISBN:
378906173; copy at the Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, call
legal KZ 6310 .C734 1999; U.K., Ministry of Defence, The Manual of the Law of Armed
/ UK Ministry of Defence, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004,
611 p., and see "Mistake of Fact", at p. 442, ISBN: 0199244545; copy at
the University of Ottawa, FTX General, FTX, KZ 6385 .M285, reserve;
VERHAEGEN, Jacques, "Aberratio ictus ou le problème
du coup dévié", (1974-75) Revue juridique Zaire,
jubilaire 187-194; titre noté dans ma recherche mais article non
consulté; aucune bibliothèque n'a ce numéro dans
région d'Ottawa;
___________ "L'erreur fautive de fait exclusive du dol" dans
amicorum José Vanderveeren, Bruxelles: Bruylant, 1997,
214 p., à la p.
203, ISBN: 2802710133;
___________"L'erreur non invincible de fait et ses effets en droit
belge", (1989) Revue de droit pénal et de criminologie
VILLEY, Edmond, "De l'intention, de l'ignorance, de l'erreur et de
bonne foi en matière pénale", (1876-1877) La France
- Partie I aux pp. 313-324, voir "L'ignorance du faitt" aux p. 321-324;
Ottawa; WEINREB, Lloyd L., "Comment on Basis of Criminal Laibility;
Causation: Chapter 3; Section 610" in Working Papers of
the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, vol.1,
Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970, xxv, 742 p., at pp.
105-151, see "Section 304. Ignorance or Mistake Negating Culpability"
pp. 136-141;----------------------------
WEISS, Deborah M., "Scope, Mistake, and Impossibility: The
of Language and Problems of Mens Rea", (1983) 83 Columbia Law
1029-1064;
WELLS, Celia, "Swatting the Subjectivist Bug", [1982] Criminal
Law Review 209-220;
WERLE, Gerhard, in cooperation with Florian Jessberger, Wulf
Burchards,
xii, 485 p., and see "Mistake of Fact", pp. 150-151, ISBN:
.W47 2005;
WHITTIER, Clarke Butler, "Mistake in the Law of Torts", (1902) 15 Harvard Law Review 335-352; WILLIAMS, Glanville L., "Homicide and the Supernatural", (1949) 65 Law
Quarterly Review 491-503;
WOODRUFF, Owen E., "Mistake of Fact as a Defence", (1958-59) 63
319-333;