Source: http://narf.org/nill/bulletins/state/documents/david_v_state.html
Timestamp: 2014-11-22 02:54:00
Document Index: 328240284

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1915', '§ 1912', '§ 1912', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1912', '§ 1912', '§ 1912', '§ 1', '§ 18', '§ 1912', '§ 1915', '§ 1912', '§ 1912', '§ 1914', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1912', '§ 1912', '§ 1903', '§ 1912', '§ 1911', '§ 1903', '§ 1903', '§ 61']

Nos. S–13874, S–14208.
*1David appeals the termination of his parental rights to his daughter Hannah, an Indian child.FN1 Hannah was taken into the custody of the Office of Children's Services (OCS) while David was incarcerated. David remained in jail for the first 20 months of Hannah's life. David was released from prison and was on parole for five months, during which time he had regular visits with Hannah. David then became a fugitive for nine months, before being recaptured and reincarcerated. While David was a fugitive, OCS petitioned for termination of his parental rights, and two months after David was returned to prison, the superior court held a termination trial. The superior court found that Hannah was a child in need of aid due to David's abandonment, incarceration, and substance abuse. The superior court also concluded that OCS had engaged in active efforts to help David's rehabilitation, as required by the Indian Child Welfare Act, and that it was in Hannah's best interests for David's parental rights to be terminated. David appeals, and we affirm the superior court's ruling because OCS established all requirements necessary for termination.
A. 2006–2008 Imprisonment And Initial OCS Contact
*2David was imprisoned from November 30, 2006 until August 7, 2008. Although he participated in RSAT, a substance abuse treatment program, while incarcerated, he was written up twice for “incidents of using drugs.”
*3David was present at the September 18 case review, held six months after OCS custody began. After the meeting ended, Karpstein spoke with David about his parenting issues. OCS personnel told David that three months later they would be holding a planning conference to discuss whether the goal should remain reunification or whether it should be changed to termination.
*4Upon returning to the Ford Explorer, the officer saw the passenger walking away from the vehicle carrying a black bag. The officer pulled up behind the passenger, and the passenger threw the bag into a pile of snow where the officer retrieved it.
*5In April 2009 OCS filed a petition for termination. Since David's location was unknown at that time, OCS received permission for service by publication. OCS also mailed David's mother, Claire, a letter asking her to pass this information along to David if she had contact with him. In July 2009 Diane agreed to relinquish her parental rights to Hannah. The trial was held on November 9 and 13, 2009. At the trial, several parties testified: Juneau and Petersburg police, Department of Corrections personnel, social workers, OCS employees, Violet, and David. The superior court ordered termination of David's parental rights on April 9, 2010.
*6 We review the factual findings supporting the termination of a parent's right to raise his children for clear error.FN4 We will find clear error only when a review of the entire record leaves us “with a definite and firm conviction that the superior court has made a mistake.” FN5 Whether the trial court's findings satisfy the requirements of the child in need of aid statutes and rules is a question of law which we review de novo.FN6 We will not consider issues on appeal that were not raised below absent plain error, which exists “where an obvious mistake has been made which creates a high likelihood that injustice has resulted.” FN7 We review ICWA's “active efforts” requirement as a mixed question of law and fact.FN8 [5] “Motions for relief from judgment under Civil Rule 60(b) are committed to the sound discretion of the trial court; we will reverse the trial court's decision only for an abuse of discretion.” FN9 IV. DISCUSSION
In order to terminate parental rights under AS 47.10.088 a trial court must find by clear and convincing evidence that (1) a child is in need of aid under one of the bases set forth in AS 47.10.011 ; (2) the parent has failed to remedy the conduct or conditions underlying the original harm or that returning the child to the parent would place the child at substantial risk of physical or mental injury; and, because the Indian Child Welfare Act applies, (3) OCS made active efforts to help the parent remedy the problematic behavior or conditions and those efforts were unsuccessful.FN10 The court must also find that termination is in the child's best interests.FN11 A. The Superior Court Did Not Err In Finding That Hannah Was A Child In Need Of Aid.
*7David argues that he did not abandon his daughter within the meaning of AS 47.10.011 (1). He argues that he participated in visits in the form available to him. He points to his regular telephone visits when he was incarcerated from November 2006 until August 2008. He also notes that, upon his release, he was able to attend 28 of the 33 in-person visits offered him. David was a fugitive from January to September 2009. After his recapture, David argues that he “took advantage of all telephone visits that were offered by OCS.”
We have “articulated a two-part test for reviewing cases of abandonment: ‘(1) there must be parental conduct evidencing a willful disregard for parental obligations, leading to (2) the destruction of the parent-child relationship.’ “ FN12 We apply “an objective test ‘to see if actions demonstrate a willful disregard of parental responsibility.’ “ FN13 To counter the first prong, the parent must “show ‘continuing interest in the child and [make] a genuine effort to maintain communication and association.’ “ FN14 The record details several distinct periods of David's relationship with Hannah. Hannah was born in November 2006, and David was incarcerated from November 2006 until August 2008. Hannah was taken into OCS custody four months before David's release. After David was released, he was on parole for five months, but when he violated terms of his parole, David was remanded to state custody for two weeks and was then a fugitive for eight months until September 2009, when he was recaptured.
The cases in which we have affirmed superior court findings of abandonment have usually involved extended periods of no contact between the parent and child.FN15 In this case, while David may have had a relationship with his daughter before he absconded, Hannah was just over two years old when David disappeared for eight months. His absence was nearly a third of her life up to that point. Although David claims he had contact with his daughter during this period, there is no evidence in the record that supports his claim. Such an extended absence so early in Hannah's life supports the superior court's finding that David had destroyed whatever parent-child relationship existed before his departure. We therefore affirm the superior court's finding that Hannah was a child in need of aid under AS 47.10.011(1).
*8 In two decisions, Nada A. v. StateFN16 and A.M. v. State, FN17 we concluded “that courts could not rely on the fact of a party's incarceration alone to prove abandonment because it was not the type of willful act upon which abandonment may be based.” FN18 In response to these decisions, the legislature enacted legislation intended to overrule that holding.FN19 This legislation included AS 47.10.011 (2), which provides that a parent's incarceration can be a basis for finding a child to be in need of aid if “the other parent is absent or has committed conduct or created conditions that cause the child to be a child in need of aid under this chapter, and the incarcerated parent has not made adequate arrangements for the child.”
David argues that he “did make arrangements for Hannah's care while he was incarcerated by giving his mother a power of attorney over his legal affairs and his children's needs.” However, David did not produce this power of attorney at trial and it does not appear anywhere in the record. Further, during David's incarceration Claire never actually had custody of the children. They instead remained with Diane until she arranged for OCS to take custody, at which point they went into foster placements. David points to a letter that his mother sent to OCS on September 6, 2009, in which she stated that she wished to have custody of Hannah. The superior court did not discuss the possibility of David's mother caring for Hannah in its termination ruling. Although while he was incarcerated David contacted OCS several times about Hannah before OCS took custody of the child, there does not appear to be any evidence that he attempted to place her with Claire. We therefore affirm the superior court's finding that Hannah was a child in need of aid under AS 47.10.011 (2).
The State points to testimony by a social worker describing how drug use, and methamphetamine use in particular, can be harmful to children. The social worker explained that using methamphetamine can compromise an individual's ability to care for a child. In Stanley B. v. State, we explained that the “substantial harm” requirement was satisfied if a parent's addictions are “at least partially responsible for his current and past incarcerations, and ... his frequent and prolonged absences while incarcerated substantially impair his ability to parent.” FN20 Because David's incarceration was “at least partially” related to drugs, this provision is satisfied. We therefore affirm the superior court's finding that Hannah was a child in need of aid under AS 47.10.011(10).
*9 Alaska Statute 47.10.088 (a)(2) provides that before parental rights can be terminated, the superior court must find that the parent
The Indian Child Welfare Act provides that “[a]ny party seeking to effect a foster care placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child under State law shall satisfy the court that active efforts have been made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that these efforts have proved unsuccessful.” FN21 In describing what constitutes “active efforts,” we have said:
Passive efforts are where a plan is drawn up and the client must develop his or her own resources towards bringing it to fruition. Active efforts, the intent of the drafters of the Act, [occur] where the state caseworker takes the client through the steps of the plan rather than requiring that the plan be performed on its own.[FN22 ]
The superior court found that the active efforts requirements had been met, listing these efforts as including “substance abuse treatment and case management services provided by both the Department of Corrections and OCS, as well as OCS's efforts to assist with housing, to coordinate its efforts with DOC, and to provide [David] with opportunities to visit [Hannah].”
David argues that OCS failed to satisfy the active efforts requirement in two ways. First, he argues that after he was recaptured in 2009 OCS “offered only three telephone visits” and “made no attempt to facilitate in-person visitation.” David was recaptured in September 2009 after being a fugitive for nine months and his termination trial began in November 2009. Responding to David, OCS points to the services it offered during that period. David was arrested on September 28, and Karpstein contacted him on October 1. David told Karpstein that he did not wish to speak with her. Karpstein later arranged three phone visits with Hannah, on October 30, November 6, and November 9, before the termination trial began. Karpstein met with David in person on October 26 and spoke with him by phone on November 5. David does not specify what other services he thinks OCS should have provided. We have previously found that telephonic visits with an incarcerated parent satisfied the active efforts requirement.FN23 And we have explained that a parent's “demonstrated lack of willingness to participate in treatment may be considered in determining whether the state has taken active efforts.” FN24 David's refusal to speak with Karpstein on October 1 undermines his argument that OCS should have arranged more than three visits between October 1 and the beginning of the termination trial in November.
*10Second, David argues that “OCS failed to meet its active efforts burden because it did not comply with ICWA's placement preferences.” FN25 Because David did not advance this argument at trial, we review it only for plain error.FN26 Plain error exists “where an obvious mistake has been made which creates a high likelihood that injustice has resulted.” FN27 We have never directly decided the question whether OCS's failure to follow ICWA's placement preferences can provide a basis for deciding that OCS has failed to undertake active efforts. Section 1915 of ICWA provides:
(iv) an institution for children approved by an Indian tribe or operated by an Indian organization which has a program suitable to meet the Indian child's needs.[FN28 ]
CINA Rule 10.1(b) requires that at
(A) whether the Department has complied with the placement requirements of 25 U.S.C. § 1915(b) and
(B) whether active efforts have been made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs as required by 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) .
We recognize the possibility that cases may exist in which OCS's early placement decisions may directly impact the ability of parents to fulfill the requirements of their case plans and thus may be part of OCS's active efforts “designed to prevent the break up of the Indian family.” Resolving the question whether OCS has met its burden of making active efforts to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs in a particular case requires a fact-intensive inquiry. For example, we have concluded that items as basic as helping a mother acquire a bus pass and day care are relevant to the active efforts analysis,FN29 for in a particular case, the lack of a bus pass or day care assistance could impede a parent's ability to access remedial services. Similarly, a child's placement might affect a parent's ability to participate in remedial efforts. But ordinarily the question whether a placement decision complies with ICWA's placement preferences will not be germane to the elements of termination because nothing in ICWA requires a consideration of the ICWA placement preferences in the decision whether to terminate parental rights.FN30
*11 The statutory scheme of ICWA supports this interpretation. Section 1914 of ICWA provides that any Indian child, parent, Indian custodian, or Indian child's tribe may challenge a termination of parental rights or foster care placement “upon a showing that such action violated any provision of sections 1911 , 1912 , and 1913 ” of ICWA.FN31 The active efforts requirement falls under § 1912 . Placement preferences, however, are under § 1915 , and therefore do not fall within the scope of ICWA's remedial provision. Under ICWA, then, a termination of parental rights may not be invalidated by showing a violation of the ICWA placement preferences. Other courts that have addressed the question whether a failure to follow placement preferences invalidates termination have generally reached the same conclusion. FN32 We reached a similar conclusion in Jacob W. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services, Office of Children's Services, an unpublished decision, where a parent argued that ICWA placement preferences ought to be considered in whether termination of parental rights was in a child's best interest. FN33 We rejected that argument, observing that “nothing in ICWA requires consideration of placement options in determining whether to terminate parental rights. The relevant issue was whether [the parents'] parental rights should be terminated in the best interests of the children, not what would happen to the children after termination of those parental rights.” FN34 We subsequently faced the same argument in Lucy J. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services and summarily rejected it, quoting Jacob W. with approval.FN35 We recognize that active efforts may involve employing available family resources to shape a case plan and assist parents in carrying out that plan. Indeed, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) has promulgated guidelines that provide that state agencies “shall take into account the prevailing social and cultural conditions and way of life of the Indian child's tribe,” and that “[t]hey shall also involve and use the available resources of the extended family, the tribe, Indian social service agencies and individual Indian care givers.” FN36 But placement decisions present a separate analytical question from termination decisions. There is no support in ICWA for an attempt to graft § 1915 's placement preferences onto § 1912 .
We recognize the importance of early placement decisions that are compliant with ICWA. To that end, CINA Rule 10.1(b) requires courts to determine “[a]t each hearing at which the court is authorizing an Indian child's removal” from the home whether OCS complied with ICWA placement preferences. But that rule further provides that a failure to follow those preferences “is not in itself a ground for restoring the child to the parent or Indian custodian or dismissing a petition and does not affect the court's ability to proceed to adjudication.” FN37 And although Rule 10.1(b) specifically provides that “the court cannot enter a disposition order if the court finds that the requirements of 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (active efforts) have not been met,” it does not preclude a termination disposition when there is a failure to follow placement preferences.FN38 Accordingly, it was not plain error for the superior court to find that OCS made active efforts.
OCS also made considerable efforts to place Hannah with Claire, David's mother and preferred placement. OCS spoke to Claire soon after the children were taken into custody. Claire was then living with her daughter and son-in-law and explained that she also needed to talk to her husband about taking the children. Claire said that she needed to “get back” to OCS, but she never did. Two months later, in June 2008, at a case review, Claire again expressed interest in taking Hannah. She was given “a licensing packet” but did not complete it until “mid–2009.” The OCS case worker, Heather Karpstein, had several concerns about Claire as a placement option. Claire had “shown inconsistency” by setting up “scheduled visitations ... and then cancel[ing] at the last minute.” Her housing was also uncertain, as she was “thinking about moving to Point Baker and living on a houseboat.” Claire also told Hannah's foster mother that Claire “was planning to let [David] take care of [Hannah] once he was released from incarceration.” In an April 2009 meeting with Karpstein, Claire again expressed interest in taking Hannah, but she explained that she was not interested in a “long-term adoptive placement.” When Karpstein explained that she was looking for permanent placement, Claire responded that she was “ready to take [Hannah] until mom and dad can get their act together.”
In the Matter of Adoption of F.H., we discussed ICWA's placement requirements and the meaning of ICWA's statement that the preferences are controlling “in the absence of good cause.” FN39 We noted that ICWA does not define “good cause” but that the BIA has issued guidelines on the meaning of the term. FN40 The BIA guidelines expressly state that “they are not published as regulations because they are not intended to have binding legislative effect,” FN41 but as we explained in F.H., we “ha[ve] looked to them for guidance.” FN42 The BIA guidelines include a provision explaining the meaning of good cause:
*13F.3. Good Cause To Modify Preferences
(b) The burden of establishing the existence of good cause not to follow the order of preferences ... shall be on the party urging that the preferences not be followed.[FN43 ]
Section (a)(iii) includes the “unavailability of suitable families” as one example of good cause. Because OCS did explore the availability of “suitable families,” this case fits within this “good cause” exception.
Under ICWA, the trial court must find, based on “evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, including testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that the continued custody of the child by the parent ... is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child.” FN44 We have held that proof may be shown “through expert testimony alone or through aggregating expert testimony with other evidence,” including lay witness testimony.FN45 At trial, OCS relied on the expert testimony of two witnesses: Shelly Gomez, an OCS supervisor who was qualified as an expert in social work, and Samantha Abernathy, a licensed clinical social worker and addiction counselor who was qualified as an expert in chemical dependency treatment. The superior court found that David's substance abuse, including his recent history of relapse, demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that placing Hannah with her father “would put her at high risk of serious emotional or physical damage.” On appeal, David challenges Gomez's qualifications as an expert, but he does not challenge Abernathy's. David argues that Gomez possesses only “normal social worker qualifications,” which are insufficient under ICWA to render her an expert.FN46 But even were David right that Gomez is not an expert under ICWA,FN47 Abernathy's unchallenged expert testimony, combined with evidence of David's continuing substance abuse, support the superior court's finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Hannah was likely to suffer harm if returned to her father's care. We therefore conclude that the superior court did not err in concluding that Hannah would likely suffer serious harm if returned to David.
*14At the time of termination, Hannah had been placed with her maternal grandfather and his wife, but about six months later OCS ended this placement. OCS argues that such “subsequent events ... cannot be used to undermine a court's substantive decisions.” Appellate Rule 210(a) provides that “the record does not include documents or exhibits filed after ... the filing date of the notice of appeal.” In other words, the disruption in Hannah's placement following trial is no basis for upsetting the trial court's finding. In any event, David's main argument is that Hannah should have been placed with his mother, Claire, but OCS thoroughly explored the option of placing Hannah with Claire before deciding it was not appropriate in this case. The evidence in this case amply supports OCS's determination.
David argues that the superior court should have determined at the beginning of the case whether to designate Claire as Hannah's Indian custodian. “Indian custodian” is a term of art under ICWA, defined as “any Indian person who has legal custody of an Indian child under tribal law or custom or under State law or to whom temporary physical care, custody, and control has been transferred by the parent of such child.” FN48 ICWA grants “Indian custodians” several rights, including the right to notice of termination proceedings FN49 and the opportunity to participate in them. FN50 David acknowledges that “[t]his issue was not raised below as it should have been by the State and David's attorney” but argues that we should reverse the superior court for plain error. David argues that, had Claire been properly treated as an Indian custodian, the State would have had the burden of showing that placement with Claire would be harmful to Hannah. David also contends that the State would have had to make “active efforts” on behalf of Claire. FN51 David argues that “if Hannah was placed with her [paternal] grandmother while her father was incarcerated, the course of events in this case may have been different.”
ICWA requires that an “Indian custodian” be an “Indian person.” FN52 ICWA defines “Indian” as “any person who is a member of an Indian tribe, or who is an Alaska Native and a member of a Regional Corporation as defined in section 1606 of Title 43.” FN53 Claire is not an Indian as defined by ICWA. At the 2010 placement hearing, Claire acknowledged that she was not an enrolled member of any tribe but argued that she had Chippewa and Sioux heritage. Claire claimed that she was in the process of investigating her eligibility.
*15 Being a member of an Indian tribe is a formal status. Tribes determine their own membership, and membership rolls are compiled by the BIA.FN54 In Bruce L. v. W.E., we discussed what it means to be a “member” of an Indian tribe.FN55 We quoted BIA guidelines which state that “determination by a tribe that a child is or is not a member of ... or ... eligible for membership in that tribe, or that the biological parent is or is not a member of that tribe is conclusive.” FN56 In this case, it is undisputed that Claire was not a member of any Indian tribe at the time of the trial court proceedings. Therefore, ICWA's requirement that an Indian custodian be a “member” of an Indian tribe precludes a determination that she was an Indian custodian.
In the Matter of K.L.J., we held that indigent parents in a termination proceeding have a constitutional right to appointed counsel.FN57 In V.F. v. State, we held that “the effective assistance of counsel is also constitutionally required.” FN58 In V.F. we applied the standard for ineffective assistance set out in the criminal context in Risher v. State. FN59 In Risher we “promulgat[ed] a two-pronged test”:
Before reversal will result, there must first be a finding that counsel's conduct either generally throughout the trial or in one or more specific instances did not conform to the standard of competence which we have enunciated. Secondly, there must be a showing that the lack of competency contributed to the conviction. If the first burden has been met, all that is required additionally is to create a reasonable doubt that the incompetence contributed to the outcome.[FN60 ]
In State v. Jones, the Alaska Court of Appeals elaborated as follows:
In evaluating trial counsel's conduct, the court must apply a strong presumption of competence. An integral component of the presumption of competence is the further presumption that trial counsel's actions were motivated by sound tactical considerations. The duty of rebutting this presumption is part and parcel of the accused's burden of proof: “[T]he defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.” [FN61]
*16We have applied the Risher standard in two parental termination cases decided after V.F.: in S.B. v. StateFN62 and in P.M. v. State.FN63 David invites us to abandon or alter the Risher standard for parental termination cases. David “suggests that this court establish a new standard for the effective assistance of counsel which is specific to Child in Need of Aid Proceedings.” David urges us to look to other jurisdictions, such as Oregon, which have done just that. We decline to do so. In V.F., we adopted the Risher standard as the appropriate standard for CINA cases.FN64 We have stated that “we will overrule a prior decision only when clearly convinced that the rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of changed conditions, and that more good than harm would result from a departure from precedent.” FN65 David fails to make any argument that we should overrule our controlling precedent under this standard, and we perceive no reason to do so.
*17I have just a few brief comments. We believe that [David], if given the opportunity, would be a suitable parent for his child. And he's been struggling, rightly, with his addictions and he'd usually do—he often does fairly well, and we think with more effort, that he could be a suitable parent.
The first prong of the Risher test calls for evaluating the standard of the attorney's performance at the termination trial. It asks whether the attorney's performance was at a level that “no reasonably competent attorney would provide.” FN66 We have reviewed the question whether counsel's performance fell below minimally acceptable standards in several previous decisions.FN67 V.F. v. State is the only case we have decided that bears any factual resemblance to this one. In that case, V.F. made three arguments to support her claim that her attorney did not provide effective assistance.FN68 First, she argued that she misunderstood the attorney's role and did not realize until shortly before the hearing that he represented her.FN69 But we found that she “was informed of the appointment.” FN70 Second, V.F. argued that her attorney “failed to argue that the proceeding should have been governed by the Indian Child Welfare Act.” FN71 We concluded that this would “not have contributed to the outcome of the hearing” as the proceedings did substantially comply with ICWA.FN72 Third, V.F. argued that her attorney failed to call her boyfriend as a witness, who arguably could have established that V.F. could provide a “good, stable environment for her children.” FN73 We concluded that the failure to subpoena this witness was a “strategic decision” that did not fall “outside of the range of reasonable actions which might have been taken by an attorney.” FN74 In this case, trial counsel demonstrated a willingness to work with David and respond to his concerns. He offered strategic reasons for his trial decisions, and David did not prove otherwise. Although the superior court found that counsel's performance was substandard insofar as he did not conduct a run-through of David's testimony prior to his taking the stand, it is unclear that this mistake “fell outside of the range of reasonable actions which might have been taken by an attorney skilled in the ... law.” FN75 Perhaps more importantly, David did not show how an improved or more aggressive performance would have made a difference in the outcome of his case. At the conclusion of closing arguments, the superior court noted: “This is in my view not a close case.” Nonetheless, David argues that his “trial counsel could have raised the issue that David [ ] had an adequate plan in place for Hannah's care during his incarceration.” But incarceration was only one of the three grounds on which the superior court found Hannah to be a child in need of aid. And David did not dispute the factual bases for the superior court's rulings on the other two grounds: abandonment based on his nine-month flight from the authorities and substance abuse based on his methamphetamine and marijuana use. In In re M.B., the Vermont Supreme Court declined to find ineffective assistance in a termination case because the parent “fail[ed] to specify what additional, relevant evidence would have been provided” had counsel been more effective.FN76 Similarly, David does not specify how he thinks the trial would have been different if his counsel had taken a different approach. As such, he has not met the prejudice prong of the Risher test. FN77
*18David makes a series of arguments related to his desire to have Hannah placed with his mother, Claire. David argues that an attorney in a CINA case acts as “both an advocate for and a counselor to a client” and that his attorney failed in this latter role. David contends that his attorney should not have advised him to stipulate that Hannah was a child in need of aid in April 2008 when she was taken into custody by the State. David also argues that his counsel “failed to advocate for the placement of Hannah with her paternal grandmother, Claire.” David relies on his expert witness's statement that “[the] attorney's failure to advocate for placement adequately with Claire [ ] fell below the standards of representation.”
FN2. The record does not detail the exact number or nature of these encounters. Marylee Cassell–Quinto, an employee of the Department of Corrections, testified that David had “about” ten charges in his juvenile history. But Cassell–Quinto acknowledged that she did “not know the juvenile system well enough” to comment exactly.
FN4. S.H. v. State, Dep't of Health & Social Servs., Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 42 P.3d 1119, 1122 (Alaska 2002) (citing M.W. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 20 P.3d 1141, 1143 (Alaska 2001)).
FN5. Id. (citing M.W., 20 P.3d at 1143).
FN6. Id. at 1122–23 (citing M.W., 20 P.3d at 1143).
FN7. D.J. v. P.C., 36 P.3d 663, 667–68 (Alaska 2001) (quoting Sosa v. State, 4 P.3d 951, 953 (Alaska 2000)).
FN8. Ben M. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 204 P.3d 1013, 1018 (Alaska 2009), as amended on reh'g (Apr. 21, 2009).
FN9. Ghete v. Anchorage, 948 P.2d 973, 975 (Alaska 1997).
FN10. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (2006).
FN11. AS 47.10.088(c); CINA Rule 18(c)(3).
FN12. Sean B. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 251 P.3d 330, 335 (Alaska 2011) (quoting Rick P. v. State, Office of Children's Servs., 109 P.3d 950, 957 (Alaska 2005)).
FN13. Id. at 335–36 (quoting Jeff A.C., Jr. v. State, 117 P.3d 697, 704 (Alaska 2005)).
FN14. Id. (quoting Jeff A.C., 117 P.3d at 704).
FN15. See P.M. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 42 P.3d 1127, 1134 (Alaska 2002) (six years); C.W. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 23 P.3d 52, 56 (Alaska 2001) (three years); In the Matter of H.C., 956 P.2d 477, 482 (Alaska 1998) (over one year).
FN16. 660 P.2d 436 (Alaska 1983).
FN17. 891 P.2d 815 (Alaska 1995).
FN18. Zander P. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., Mem. Op. & J. No. 1290, 2007 WL 2745157, *3 (Alaska, Sept. 19, 2007).
FN19. Ch. 99, § 1(b)(2)(B) (stating the purpose of the act is to “override the court decisions in” A.M., Nada A., and others), § 18 (amending AS 47.10.011), SLA 1998.
FN20. 93 P.3d 403, 407 (Alaska 2004).
FN21. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (2006). The ICWA requirements apply even when OCS is seeking to terminate the parental rights of a non-Indian parent. K.N. v. State, 856 P.2d 468, 474 n. 8 (Alaska 1993).
FN22. A.A. v. State, Dep't of Family & Youth Servs., 982 P.2d 256, 261 (Alaska 1999) (quoting Craig J. Dorsay, The Indian Child Welfare Act and Laws Affecting Indian Juveniles Manual 157–58 (1984)).
FN23. Dashiell R. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 222 P.3d 841, 844, 850 (Alaska 2009).
FN24. Maisy W. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 175 P.3d 1263, 1268 (Alaska 2008) (quoting N.A. v. State, Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 19 P.3d 597, 603 (Alaska 2001)).
FN25. David also incorporates his argument about placement into his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, arguing that his attorney's failure to raise this argument was part of his ineffective assistance.
FN26. D.J. v. P.C., 36 P.3d 663 (Alaska 2001).
FN27. Id. at 667–68 (quoting Sosa v. State, 4 P.3d 951, 953 (Alaska 2000)).
FN28. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(b) (2006).
FN29. See Lucy J. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 244 P.3d 1099, 1115 (Alaska 2010).
FN30. Before a parent of an Indian child may have his or her parental rights terminated, the State must prove: (1) by clear and convincing evidence that the child is in need of aid (CINA Rule 18(c)(1)(A)); (2) by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has not remedied the conditions that placed the child in need of aid (CINA Rule 18(c)(1)(A)(i)-(ii)); (3) “that active efforts have been made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that these efforts have proved unsuccessful” (25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (2006)); (4) “beyond a reasonable doubt, including testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that the continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child” ( Id. § 1912(f)); and (5) “by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child[.]” (CINA Rule 18(c)(3)).
FN31. 25 U.S.C. § 1914 (2006).
FN32. See Doe v. Mann, 285 F.Supp.2d 1229, 1240 (N.D.Cal.2003) (finding that § 1915 did not provide a cause of action for challenging termination decisions); Navajo Nation v. Superior Court of The State of Wash. for Yakima Cnty., 47 F.Supp.2d 1233, 1242–43 (E.D.Wash.1999), aff'd on other grounds, 331 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir.2003) (same); In the Matter of Appeal in Maricopa Cnty. Juvenile Action No. JS–7359, 159 Ariz. 232, 766 P.2d 105, 108 (Ariz.App.1988) (“Even if the Indian Child Welfare Act applied and the preferred placements were ignored, this is immaterial to the question whether termination based on a failure to remedy the condition which made the out-of-home placement necessary is appropriate.”); In re Vincent M., 2010 WL 2557188, *8 (Cal.App.2010) (“[A]ctive efforts and placement [a]re two separate, distinguishable issues.”); In re A.A., 167 Cal.App.4th 1292, 84 Cal.Rptr.3d 841, 863 (Cal.App.2008) (“ICWA and ... California's statutory law address the issue of an Indian child's placement separately from the issue of active efforts. Following their lead, we distinguish the issue of placement from that of active efforts.”) (internal citations omitted); In the Interest of J.W., 528 N.W.2d 657, 662 (Iowa App.1995) (“The remedial provisions of section 1914 do not apply to violations of section 1915”); B.R.T. v. Exec. Dir. of Soc. Serv. Bd., 391 N.W.2d 594, 601 (N.D.1986) (“[I]nvalidation of a parental rights termination may not be accomplished by showing a violation of the placement preferences in a proceeding brought pursuant to [section] 1914.”); State ex rel. Juvenile Dep't of Multnomah Cnty. v. Woodruff, 108 Or.App. 352, 816 P.2d 623, 625 (Or.App.1991) (“Failure to comply with the foster care placement preferences in § 1915(b) is not a basis for invalidating a court order terminating parental rights.”). But see In re K.B., 173 Cal.App.4th 1275, 93 Cal.Rptr.3d 751, 764–65 (Cal.App.2009) (assuming without deciding that placement could be a part of active efforts, but finding that the state had made active efforts to satisfy ICWA's placement preferences); In re L.N.W., 457 N.W.2d 17, 20 (Iowa App.1990) (same); In the Matter of Welfare of M.S.S., 465 N.W.2d 412, 419 (Minn.App.1991) (finding that the state had not proved active efforts beyond a reasonable doubt because it had not considered placing the child with the father's brother and sister-in-law following an explicit request from the child's father that had been endorsed by the tribe); but see also In re Welfare of Child of Wilson, 2003 WL 21266612, at *2 (Minn.App. June 3, 2003) (limiting M.S.S. to cases in which the parents make a specific placement request that is endorsed by the child's tribe).
FN33. Mem. Op. & J. No. 1319, 2008 WL 5101809, at *8 (Alaska, Dec. 3, 2008).
FN34. Id. at *9.
FN35. Lucy J. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 244 P.3d 1099, 1120 (Alaska 2010) (quoting Jacob W. at *9) (“In an unpublished memorandum opinion, we held that while ‘ICWA requires that preference be given-in absence of good cause to the contrary-to members of the child's extended family or to someone otherwise affiliated with the child's Indian tribe.... [T]his specifically applies to placement of an Indian child; nothing in ICWA requires consideration of placement options in determining whether to terminate parental rights.’ ”).
FN36. Guidelines for State Courts; Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed.Reg. 67,584, 67,592 (Nov. 26, 1979).
FN37. CINA Rule 10.1(b)(2).
FN38. Id. As far as remedial provisions for a failure to follow placement preferences, the rule provides that “[o]n motion of a party or on its own motion, the court may order the Department to comply with 25 U.S.C. § ... 1915(b) within a reasonable time. If the Department fails to comply with this order, the court may impose appropriate sanctions.” Id. But that the rule gives courts discretion to issue orders and impose sanctions does not in any way suggest that a failure to follow placement preferences invalidates a termination disposition.
FN39. 851 P.2d 1361, 1364 (Alaska 1993).
FN40. Id.; Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed.Reg. at 67,594.
FN41. Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed.Reg. at 67,584.
FN42. 851 P.2d at 1364 (citing In re L.A.M., 727 P.2d 1057, 1060 n. 6 (Alaska 1986)).
FN43. Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed.Reg. at 67,594.
FN44. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) (2006).
FN45. Ben M. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 204 P.3d 1013, 1020 (Alaska 2009).
FN46. See Marcia V. v. State, 201 P.3d 496, 504 (Alaska 2009) (“ICWA § 1912(f) heightens the requirements for an expert's qualifications beyond those normally required to qualify an expert.”).
FN47. And given Gomez's high degree of experience and previous qualification as an expert, it seems most unlikely that she would not qualify.
FN48. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(6) (2006).
FN49. Id. § 1912(a).
FN50. Id. § 1911(c).
FN51. In a separate hearing, Claire argued that she was an “Indian custodian.” After Hannah was removed from the grandparents' residence in May 2010, a placement hearing was held in October and November 2010. At this hearing, Claire argued that she was an “Indian custodian” and thereby entitled to appointed counsel. We note that ICWA does not explicitly state that active efforts must be made on behalf of Indian custodians, and we do not express an opinion on the matter.
FN52. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(6).
FN53. Id. § 1903(3).
FN54. 25 C.F.R. § 61.2 (2011).
FN55. 247 P.3d 966, 975 n. 22 (Alaska 2011).
FN56. Id. (quoting Guidelines for State Courts; Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed.Reg. 67,584, 67,586 (Nov. 26, 1979)).
FN57. 813 P.2d 276, 283 n. 6 (Alaska 1991).
FN58. 666 P.2d 42, 45 (Alaska 1983).
FN59. Id. at 46; see also S.B. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 61 P.3d 6, 15–16 (Alaska 2002) (applying Risher standard); P.M. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 42 P.3d 1127, 1131 (Alaska 2002) (applying Risher standard).
FN60. 523 P.2d 421, 425 (Alaska 1974).
FN61. 759 P.2d 558, 569 (Alaska App.1988) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)) (internal citations omitted).
FN62. 61 P.3d at 15–16.
FN63. 42 P.3d at 1131.
FN64. 666 P.2d at 46.
FN65. State, Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm'n v. Carlson, 65 P.3d 851, 859 (Alaska 2003) (citing Pratt & Whitney Canada, Inc. v. Sheehan, 852 P.2d 1173, 1176 (Alaska 1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
FN66. Jones, 759 P.2d at 568 (citing Brown v. State, 601 P.2d 221, 234 (Alaska 1979)).
FN67. V.F., 666 P.2d at 45; S.B., 61 P.3d at 15; P.M., 42 P.3d at 1131–32.
FN68. 666 P.2d at 46.
FN72. Id. at 46–47.
FN73. Id. at 47.
FN74. Id. (quoting Risher v. State, 523 P.2d 421, 424 (Alaska 1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
FN76. In re M.B., 162 Vt. 229, 647 A.2d 1001, 1005 (Vt.1994).
FN77. 523 P.2d at 424 (for a finding of ineffective assistance, “[t]he conduct of counsel must have contributed to the eventual conviction”).
--- P.3d ----, 2011 WL 6347722 (Alaska)