Source: http://vertumnus.courts.state.ny.us/claims/html/2009-041-031.html
Timestamp: 2018-06-22 03:37:19
Document Index: 322462001

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 70', '§ 70', '§ 380', '§ 70', '§ 380', '§ 70', '§ 380', '§ 70', '§ 380']

BURCH v. THE STATE OF NEW YORK, 115299
BURCH v. THE STATE OF NEW YORK, #2009-041-031, Claim No. 115299, Motion Nos. M-76413, CM-76608
2009-041-031
M-76413
CM-76608
Claimant moves for summary judgment as to defendant’s liability for this wrongful confinement claim, as alleged in claimant’s first cause of action. The claim alleges that defendant unlawfully added a period of mandatory post-release supervision (PRS) onto claimant’s sentence of incarceration even though the PRS term was never imposed by the sentencing judge. Claimant further alleges that the administratively imposed PRS term ultimately resulted in claimant’s unlawful confinement for nearly three years, until claimant’s release on February 25, 2008, pursuant to a Memorandum Order of the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, issued upon a writ of habeas corpus (People ex rel Burch v Goord, 48 AD3d 1306 [4th Dept 2008]). Claimant has also alleged a cause of action for violation of his federal constitutional rights. The federal constitutional cause of action is not the subject of either the claimant’s motion for partial summary judgment or defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment. The Court notes, however, that it is well-settled that no cause of action for damages against the State of New York exists for an alleged violation of an individual’s rights under the United States Constitution since the State is not a “person” amenable to suit pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 (see Matter of Gable Transport, Inc. v State of New York, 29 AD3d 1125 [3d Dept 2006]; Welch v State of New York, 286 AD2d 496, 498 [2d Dept 2001]; Zagarella v State of New York, 149 AD2d 503 [2d Dept 1989]; Davis v State of New York, 124 AD2d 420, 423 [3d Dept 1986)]).
Defendant opposes the motion and cross-moves for summary judgment dismissing the claim. Defendant’s cross-motion to dismiss will be considered first.
Defendant concedes that the facts essential to resolution of these motions “are not in dispute.” On September 7, 2004, claimant pled guilty to violating conditions of his probation, previously imposed for a conviction of Attempted Robbery in the Second Degree. Bronx County Supreme Court, pursuant to a plea bargain, revoked his probation and sentenced claimant to a determinate term of two years incarceration on the original conviction of Attempted Robbery in the Second Degree. Neither the sentence imposed nor the sentencing commitment order included a period of post-release supervision.
Despite the clear and unambiguous terms of the sentence and sentencing commitment order, defendant administratively imposed a three year period of PRS to the claimant’s sentence, to commence upon his release from incarceration on May 20, 2005. This, even though the sentencing judge had discretion to set claimant’s (a first time violent felony offender) term of PRS, had the judge imposed it, at between 1½ and 3 years under Penal Law 70.45 (2). While subject to the administratively imposed period of PRS, claimant was declared delinquent for violating the PRS terms, arrested and incarcerated from August 30, 2005 until released on February 25, 2008, in accordance with the Memorandum Order of the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, described above.
Defendant asserted as defenses that the claim failed to state a cause of action and that the defendant’s actions “were privileged as being judicial, quasi-judicial or discretionary determinations . . . and therefore defendant is immune from liability for such actions.” In opposing claimant’s motion and in its cross-motion for summary judgment, defendant argues that “both the plain language of the statute and the then prevailing decisional law required Claimant to serve a three year period of PRS as a mandatory component of his determinate sentence.”
This Court considered and rejected a similar assertion of defendant that it was either permitted or mandated by statute to administratively impose a term of PRS on claimant, and that the confinement was therefore privileged, in Donald v State of New York (24 Misc 3d 329 [Ct Cl 2009]). In Donald, defendant relied upon Penal Law §§ 70.00 (6) and 70.45 (1), rather than Penal Law § 70.45 (2) which it now cites, in making its statute-based argument, but defendant’s assertion of privilege remains unpersuasive in view of the absence of express statutory authority to administratively impose PRS, the explicit statutory instruction (CPL §§ 380.20 and 380.40) that only a court may impose sentence and the fact that Penal Law § 70.00 (6) expressly stated at all relevant times that the court, and not DOCS or any other administrative agency, is required to impose any applicable term of PRS:
In support of this proposition, defendant cites, among other cases, two federal district court actions which involved allegations of violation of the federal due process rights of the plaintiffs based upon unlawful imposition of PRS, Sinclair v Goord and Doe (CV-1317-LEK-RFT [ND NY, filed March 10, 2009]), and Scott v Fischer, et al. (2009 WL 928195, 07-CV-11303-NRB [SD NY, filed March 30, 2009]). The federal decisions, in finding the defendants’ conduct in imposing PRS objectively reasonable in that it did not violate clearly established law, did not address the following: The explicit statutory instruction (Criminal Procedure Law §§ 380.20 and 380.40) that only a court may impose sentence; that Penal Law § 70.00 (6) expressly stated at all relevant times that the sentencing court, and not DOCS or any other administrative agency, is required to impose any applicable term of PRS; that “prior decisional law” relying only on decisions holding that PRS was “automatically” included in the sentence ignores an even greater number of decisions from the same time period in which a sentencing court’s failure to impose PRS was held to be unlawful; that a state agency acting in the clear absence of jurisdiction is not entitled to immunity; that long-ago decided decisions, federal and state, clearly established that sentencing is exclusively a judicial prerogative; and that the New York State Department of Correctional Services had, prior to the emergence of the PRS issue, acted beyond its jurisdiction by similarly inserting itself administratively in the sentencing process and, as a consequence, was repeatedly found liable for wrongful confinement (Donald, 24 Misc 3d at 339-341).
Specific to this claim, defendant’s claim of reliance on “prior decisional law” to support a defense of immunity is unsupported by the facts. Defendant imposed the PRS term on claimant on his release from incarceration on May 20, 2005. By that time, the Court of Appeals had already issued its opinion in People v Catu (4 NY3d 242, 245 [March 24, 2005]) in which the court held that “a defendant pleading guilty to a determinate sentence must be aware of the postrelease supervision component of that sentence in order to knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently choose among alternative courses of action.” Surely defendant, in carefully tracking PRS decisional law, as suggested in its cross-motion papers, would have learned that “[p]ostrelease supervision is a direct consequence of a criminal conviction” and that “the court must advise a defendant of the direct consequences of the plea” (Catu, 4 NY3d at 244). If, as mandated by Catu, a guilty plea must be vacated upon a sentencing court’s failure to advise the pleading defendant of the PRS requirement prior to defendant pleading guilty, then clearly defendant was aware approximately two months prior to May 20, 2005, that it had no authority to administratively impose a PRS term upon claimant more than six months after his plea (under the same circumstances as Catu) in the sentencing court.
As set forth at length in Donald, any claim of defendant to have been acting in good faith under a mistaken belief that it was required or permitted to add a PRS term on claimant is unpersuasive in view of the complete absence of statutory authority to do so, the explicit statutory instruction (CPL §§ 380.20 and 380.40) that only a court may impose sentence, together with “long-ago decided decisions, federal and state, making it clear that sentencing is exclusively a judicial prerogative.”
Defendant further asserts that claimant would be provided a “windfall” were he to obtain monetary damages for wrongful confinement because he would have been required to serve the administratively imposed PRS term of three years except for “the sentencing court’s error.”
Initially, it is again particularly troublesome in the instant matter, as in Donald, that defendant usurped the discretion vested in the sentencing court under Penal Law § 70.45 (2) to impose a PRS term upon claimant of between 1½ and 3 years, by unlawfully imposing any term of PRS upon claimant, let alone presumptively adding the maximum term of three years.
More importantly, defendant’s contention ignores the possibility that if defendant had acted lawfully upon learning of the “sentencing court’s error” and sought judicial re-sentencing as statutorily provided (CPL §§ 380.20 and 380.40), claimant may have chosen to withdraw his plea (Catu, 4 NY3d at 244), be tried on the violation of probation charges and be acquitted.
The invalidity of defendant’s suggestion that claimant cannot recover because he would have been confined anyway had he been properly sentenced is further illustrated by the holding in Montanaro v State of New York (42 Misc 2d 851 [Ct Cl 1964]). In Montanaro, the claimant was confined at a state hospital on August 23, 1960 based upon an order of commitment issued by a local court judge which was later found to have been issued improperly because the police officer who had arrested claimant had not signed the underlying criminal information and because claimant had not yet been arraigned on the charge. On September 12, 1960, a proper order of commitment was issued by a county court. The Montanaro court held, at 855, “that the claimant was unlawfully confined from August 23, 1960 to September 12, 1960 and for this confinement is entitled to damages in the amount of $2,000.” In total, the claimant was confined in the state hospital from August 23, 1960 to March 3, 1961, at which time she was released on convalescent status. Under defendant’s reasoning, there could be no recovery because the claimant could have been lawfully confined between August 23, 1960 to September 12, 1960, if she had been arraigned and if the officer had signed the information.
Claimant seeks partial summary judgment, on his first cause of action, as to defendant’s liability for wrongful confinement.
Claimant’s Notice of Motion, filed March 19, 2009;
Affirmation of Joel Berger, dated March 17, 2009, and annexed exhibits;
Defendant’s Notice of Cross-Motion, filed April 29, 2009;
Affirmation of Michael T. Krenrich, dated April 29, 2009, and annexed exhibits;
Reply Affirmation of Joel Berger, dated May 4, 2009.