Source: http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/439/32/case.html
Timestamp: 2013-12-19 16:15:26
Document Index: 197269570

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 5', '§ 4', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 51', '§ 51', '§ 5', '§ 5']

Dougherty County Bd. of Educ. v. White - 439 U.S. 32 (1978) :: Justia US Supreme Court Center
Sign In	Justia > US Law > US Case Law > US Supreme Court > Volume 439 > Dougherty County Bd. of Educ. v. White - 439 U.S. 32 > Case	NEW - Receive Justia's FREE Daily Newsletters of Opinion Summaries for the US Supreme Court, all US Federal Appellate Courts & the 50 US State Supreme Courts and Weekly Practice Area Opinion Summaries Newsletters. Subscribe Now
Dougherty County Bd. of Educ. v. White - 439 U.S. 32 (1978)
Case	U.S. Supreme CourtDougherty County Bd. of Educ. v. White, 439 U.S. 32 (1978)Dougherty County Board of Education v. WhiteNo. 77-120Argued October 2-3, 1978Decided November 28, 1978439 U.S. 32APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, WHITE, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a concurring statement, post, p. 439 U. S. 47. STEWART, J., filed a dissenting statement, Page 439 U. S. 33 post, p. 439 U. S. 47. POWELL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C.J., and REHNQUIST J., joined, post, p. 439 U. S. 47.
Under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, [Footnote 1] all States and Page 439 U. S. 34 political subdivisions covered by § 4 of the Act [Footnote 2] must submit any proposed change affecting voting, for preclearance by the Attorney General or the District Court for the District of Columbia. At issue in this appeal is whether a county board of education in a covered State must seek approval of a rule requiring its employees to take unpaid leaves of absence while they campaign for elective office. Resolution of this question necessitates two related inquiries: first, whether a rule governing leave for employee candidates is a "standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting" within the meaning of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act; and second, whether a county school board is a "political subdivision" within the purview of the Act.
Appellee qualified as a candidate for the Democratic primary in June, 1972, and was compelled by Rule 58 to take a leave of absence without pay. After his defeat in the Page 439 U. S. 35 August primary, appellee was reinstated. Again in June, 1974, he qualified as a candidate for the Georgia House and was forced to take leave. He was successful in both the August primary and the November general election. Accordingly, his leave continued through mid-November, 1974. Appellee took a third leave of absence in June, 1976, when he qualified to run for re-election. When it became clear in September that he would be unopposed in the November, 1976, election, appellee was reinstated. [Footnote 3] As a consequence of those mandatory leaves, appellee lost pay in the amount of $2,810 in 1972, $4,780 in 1974, and $3,750 in 1976.
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the three-judge District Court held that Rule 58 should have been submitted for federal approval before implementation. 431 F.Supp. 919 Page 439 U. S. 36 (1977). In so ruling, the court correctly declined to decide the ultimate question that the Attorney General or the District of Columbia court would face on submission of the Rule for preclearance under § 5 -- whether the change, in fact, had a discriminatory purpose or effect. See Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379, 400 U. S. 383-385 (1971). Rather, the District Court confined its review to the preliminary issue whether Rule 58 had the "potential" for discrimination, and hence was subject to § 5. Georgia v. United States, 411 U. S. 526, 411 U. S. 534 (1973). In concluding that the Rule did have such potential, the District Court interpreted Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544 (1969), and Georgia v. United States, supra, to mandate preclearance of any modification by a covered State or political subdivision "which restricts the ability of citizens to run for office." 431 F.Supp. at 922. The court reasoned that Rule 58 was such a modification because:
"shall enact or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force Page 439 U. S. 37 or effect on November 1, 1964,"
This Court first considered the scope of the critical language of § 5 in Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544 (1969), involving consolidated appeals in three cases from Mississippi and one from Virginia. After canvassing the legislative history of the Act, we concluded that Congress meant "to reach any state enactment which altered the election law of a covered State in even a minor way." 393 U.S. at 393 U. S. 566. [Footnote 5] Conceived after "nearly a century of systematic resistance to the Fifteenth Amendment," South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 383 U. S. 328 (1966), [Footnote 6] the Voting Rights Page 439 U. S. 38 Act was, as Allen emphasized, "aimed at the subtle, as well as the obvious, state regulations which have the effect of denying citizens their right to vote because of their race." 393 U.S. at 393 U. S. 565 (footnote omitted). To effectuate the "articulated purposes of the legislation," id. at 393 U. S. 570, the Allen Court held that the phrase "standard, practice, or procedure" must be given the "broadest possible scope," id. at 393 U. S. 567, and construed it to encompass candidate qualification requirements. Id. at 393 U. S. 570 (Whitley v. Williams, companion case decided with Allen, supra). The Court concluded that any enactment which burdens an independent candidate by "increasing the difficulty for [him] to gain a position on the general election ballot" is subject to § 5, since such a measure could "undermine the effectiveness" of voters who wish to elect nonaffiliated representatives. 393 U.S. at 393 U. S. 565.
"[a]fter extensive deliberations Page 439 U. S. 39 in 1970 on bills to extend the Voting Rights Act, during which the Allen case was repeatedly discussed, the Act was extended for five years, without any substantive modification of § 5."
The Attorney General's regulations, in force since 1971, reflect an equally inclusive understanding of the reach of § 5. They provide that " [a]ll changes affecting voting, even though the change appears to be minor or indirect," must be submitted for prior approval. 28 CFR § 51.4(a) (1977). More particularly, the regulations require preclearance of "[a]ny alteration affecting the eligibility of persons to become or remain candidates or obtain a position on the ballot in primary or general elections or to become or remain officeholders." § 51.4(c)(4). Pursuant to these regulations, the Attorney General, after being apprised of Rule 58, requested its submission for § 5 clearance. [Footnote 7] Given the central role of the Attorney General in formulating and implementing § 5, this interpretation of its scope is entitled to particular deference. United States v. Board of Comm'rs of Sheffield, Page 439 U. S. 40 435 U.S. at 435 U. S. 131; Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. at 400 U. S. 391. See Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. at 411 U. S. 536-539.