Source: https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/youngman-v-nevada-irrigation-dist-32905
Timestamp: 2019-11-20 04:44:22
Document Index: 147462462

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 452', '§ 1620', '§ 1011', '§ 21185', '§ 22225', '§ 485', '§ 623', '§ 94']

Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist. - 70 Cal.2d 240 - Wed, 01/29/1969 | California Supreme Court Resources
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Citation 70 Cal.2d 240
Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist. , 70 Cal.2d 240
The first amended complaint sets forth five causes of action. The first cause of action asserts that there is an implied contract between plaintiffs and the district under which defendants were required to grant the salary increases; the second alleges that because of certain representations made by the district during wage negotiations with the IBEW and relied upon by plaintiffs the district is estopped from refusing to grant the increases. In the third cause of action Youngman avers that he is bringing the action on behalf of other employees of the district who are similarly situated. The fourth alleges an express oral contract based upon a representation [70 Cal.2d 244] to Youngman by an authorized employee of the district that annual increases would be granted, and the fifth is based on an estoppel because of this representation.
[1] In considering the sufficiency of a pleading, we are bound by the rule that on appeal from a judgment entered on demurrer, the allegations of the complaint must be liberally [70 Cal.2d 245] construed with a view to attaining substantial justice among the parties. (Code Civ. Proc. § 452.) Even as against a special demurrer a plaintiff is required only to set forth the essential facts of his case with reasonable precision and with particularity sufficient to acquaint a defendant with the nature, source and extent of his cause of action. (Smith v. Kern County Land Co. (1958) 51 Cal.2d 205, 206, 209 [331 P.2d 645].) [2] If there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action, it is error to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend. (MacLeod v. Tribune Publishing Co. (1959) 52 Cal.2d 536, 542 [343 P.2d 36]; Lemoge Electric v. County of San Mateo (1956) 46 Cal.2d 659, 664 [297 P.2d 638].)
Finally it is alleged that "by reason of the foregoing practice, conduct, salary schedules and Personnel Policies, there has existed and continues to exist between the District and [70 Cal.2d 246] each employee an implied agreement by the District to review and advance employees one step within their respective classifications on or about their employment anniversary date in that year ... and to pay those employees who were advanced the salary specified for such step. ..."
[3] Defendants insist that the trial court properly sustained the demurrer to the first cause of action because the district has only such powers as are expressly granted by statute or necessarily included in the exercise of the powers granted (Moody v. Provident Irr. Dist. (1938) 12 Cal.2d 389, 394 [85 P.2d 128]; Bottoms v. Madera Irr. Dist. (1925) 74 Cal.App. 681, 702 [242 P. 100]), and no specific authority is granted by statute permitting the district to enter into an implied contract.
It has been said that the essential difference between an implied and an express contract is the mode of proof. (Silva v. Providence Hospital of Oakland (1939) 14 Cal.2d 762, 773 [97 P.2d 798].) That is, the terms of an express contract are stated in words, while those of an implied agreement are manifested by conduct. (Civ. Code, §§ 1620, 1621.)
There seems little doubt that the general provisions giving the district the power to enter into contracts of employment without specifying any formal requirements for such contracts were intended to apply to both implied and express contracts since the only significant difference between the two is the evidentiary method by which proof of their existence and terms is established. [4] Governmental subdivisions may be bound by an implied contract if there is no statutory prohibition against such arrangements. (County of Sonoma v. Santa Rosa (1894) 102 Cal. 426, 431 [36 P. 810]; see City of Pasadena v. County of Los Angeles (1953) 118 Cal.App.2d 497, 500 [258 P.2d 28]; Nash v. City of Los Angeles (1926) 78 Cal.App. 516, 520-522 [248 P. 689].)
[5] In pleading a cause of action on an agreement implied [70 Cal.2d 247] from conduct, only the facts from which the promise is implied must be alleged. (See 2 Chadbourn, Grossman & Van Alstyne, Cal. Pleading, § 1011, p. 159.) [6, 7] Here the first cause of action alleges that the district had an "announced practice" to grant annual wage increases, that this "practice" was adopted "after negotiation" with the IBEW, that the employees were aware of the "practice," and that the district had complied with its "practice" in the prior year. While not a model of precise pleading, these allegations appear to set forth circumstances from which could be found an implied agreement, reached after negotiation with the IBEW, that the district would grant yearly increases. Therefore, the allegations of the first cause of action are sufficient to withstand a general demurrer. fn. 5
[9] Most of the allegations of the first cause of action are incorporated in the fourth, which asserts an express contract between the district and Youngman. It is alleged that Harold Gleason, who was a superintendent of the district "with full authority to act" in its behalf "with respect to hiring of employees, and to enter into contracts with respect thereto" and who was acting within the scope of his authority, had represented to Youngman in April 1963 that it was the "established practice" of the district to grant merit step increases on or about the anniversary date of employment and that he would be granted such advancement in April of each year. "[B]y reason of the foregoing practice, conduct, salary schedules and Personnel Policies, there has existed and continues to exist between the District and plaintiff Youngman [70 Cal.2d 248] an express oral agreement" by which the district is obligated to review plaintiff's situation and advance him one step in April of each year and to pay the increased salary appropriate to the higher step.
There is no merit to defendants' position that the board itself could not promise future wage increases because such authority was not expressly granted by statute. The power to enter into contracts of employment, to fix salaries (§ 21185), and to perform all acts necessary to carry out these functions (§ 22225) clearly authorizes the board to consummate agreements regarding future wages, in the absence of specific restrictions to the contrary. No provisions of the Water Code prescribe any formal procedural requirements of the board [70 Cal.2d 249] before it may enter into an employment contract. It follows, therefore, that the trial court improperly sustained the demurrer to the fourth cause of action.
Healy v. Brewster (1963) 59 Cal.2d 455, 463 [30 Cal.Rptr. 129, 380 P.2d 817], explained: "Under such circumstances, the only reliance which can make the promisor's failure to perform actionable is the promisee's doing what was requested. If that reliance was detrimental, it would constitute consideration. If it was not detrimental, it would not constitute consideration; and since detrimental reliance is an essential [70 Cal.2d 250] feature of promissory estoppel, that doctrine could not be invoked to make the promisor liable. (See Snyder, More on Promissory Estoppel (1959) 26 Brooklyn L.Rev. 41; Snyder, Promissory Estoppel in New York (1948) 15 Brooklyn L.Rev. 27.) In other words, where the promisee's reliance was bargained for, the law of consideration applies; and it is only where the reliance was unbargained for that there is room for application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel."
Plaintiffs rely upon a number of cases in which promissory estoppel was held to apply to require employers to pay pensions or bonuses to their employees, but in none of them was the compensation specifically promised as a part of the bargain under which the plaintiff accepted employment. (Frebank Co. v. White (1957) 152 Cal.App.2d 522 [313 P.2d 633]; West v. Hunt Foods, Inc. (1951) 101 Cal.App.2d 597 [225 P.2d 978]; Hunter v. Sparling (1948) 87 Cal.App.2d 711 [197 P.2d 807].)
[13] The second cause of action also alleges a promissory estoppel, but on the basis of a different promise. After incorporating the allegations of the first cause of action, plaintiffs allege as follows: "Plaintiff IBEW, in negotiating with the District with respect to 1965 wage rates and conditions of employment, and plaintiff Youngman, in accepting and continuing in employment with the District on and after January 1, 1965, acted in reliance upon representations by defendants, express and implied, that general wage increases effective January 1, 1965, would not preclude or in any way affect merit step increases in accordance with said established District policy.plaintiffs ... contend ... that the District is [70 Cal.2d 251] estopped, on the basis of said prior practice, conduct, Salary Schedules and Personnel Policies, from refusing to consider and grant such merit step increases."
[14] Abundant authority holds that a court may not interfere with the board's discretion in determining salaries (see, e.g., Emerson v. Board of Trustees (1937) 23 Cal.App.2d 432, 434 [73 P.2d 935]), but the cases are inapposite to the issues involved here since plaintiffs are not seeking to compel the board to grant salary increases on the basis of its discretionary power but are attempting to enforce alleged contracts already made by the board in the exercise of its discretion.
[15] As shown above, defendants interposed grounds of special as well as general demurrer. It is the rule that if a trial court sustains a demurrer based upon both general and special grounds and its order mentions only the general ground, impliedly the ruling was made either without consideration of the special grounds or upon a determination that they were not well taken. Since the general demurrer was sustained erroneously as to the first four causes of action, the trial judge is directed to consider the special grounds. (Stowe [70 Cal.2d 252] v. Fritzie Hotels, Inc. (1955) 44 Cal.2d 416, 425-426 [282 P.2d 890].)
­FN 1. There is no issue involving future years, for the merit step schedule of increases in salary was restored by the board as to wages for 1966 and subsequently.
­FN 2. Although the demurrer states that the complaint is "uncertain" with respect to these grounds and uncertainty is a ground for a special rather than a general demurrer, the objections that the complaint fails to indicate the district can be bound by implication and that the allegations do not show the existence of an agreement are grounds for a general rather than a special demurrer. (See 2 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (1954) § 485, et seq.) We therefore treat the matter as though defendants had stated these grounds as the basis for a general demurrer.
­FN 3. This ground for sustaining the demurrer was not specifically set forth by the trial court in its order sustaining the demurrer to the first amended complaint. However, the court sustained the demurrer to plaintiffs' original complaint upon this ground and in its ruling on the second pleading it stated that there "appears to be no essential difference between the Original Complaint and the First Amended Complaint."
­FN 4. All references are to the Water Code unless otherwise noted.
­FN 5. Defendants claim that the district's employees are hired on a month-to-month basis, and therefore no agreement to grant annual wage increases may be implied. However, under such circumstances a contract based on a conditional promise could be implied under which the promisor would be required to honor his offer if the employee continued in the district's employ until the time the annual increase was to go into effect.
­FN 6. Chadbourn states at page 175, "The general rule is well established in California that where the action is based upon a contract made by the defendant's agent, it is sufficient to allege directly that the contract was made by the defendant, irrespective whether the agency in question is express or ostensible, or whether it is based upon the theory of ratification."
­FN 7. The doctrine of equitable estoppel, by contrast, rests on the theory that the party to be estopped may not prove certain facts if he has by his conduct or declarations misled another to his prejudice. (See, e.g., Scott v. Federal Life Ins. Co. (1962) 200 Cal.App.2d 384, 391 [19 Cal.Rptr. 258]; General Motors Accept. Corp. v. Gilbert (1961) 196 Cal.App.2d 732, 742 [17 Cal.Rptr. 35]; Evid. Code, § 623; see 4 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (1960) § 94, p. 2870.) Here plaintiffs are not seeking to prevent defendants from showing a state of facts or raising a defense but are attempting to compel them to perform an alleged promise. Thus, cases such as Ruinello v. Murray (1951) 36 Cal.2d 687 [227 P.2d 251], are inapposite.
Wed, 01/29/1969 70 Cal.2d 240 Review - Civil Appeal Opinion issued
1 WILLIAM YOUNGMAN et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. NEVADA IRRIGATION DISTRICT et al. (Defendants and Respondents)
2 NEVADA IRRIGATION DISTRICT et al. (Defendants and Respondents)
Jan 29 1969 Opinion: Reversed
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