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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 340', '§ 1451', '§ 1101', '§ 1451', '§ 1451', '§ 1427', '§ 1101', '§ 1101', '§ 1451', '§ 1101', '§ 1451', '§ 1451', '§ 8', '§ 1001', '§ 1001', '§ 1621', '§ 1623', '§ 1451', '§ 1101', '§ 1451', '§ 1101', '§ 1429', '§ 1423', '§ 1451', '§ 1451', '§ 1451', '§ 1451', '§ 1451', '§ 1451', '§ 1101', '§ 1101', '§ 1451', '§ 1101', '§ 1101', '§ 10', '§ 1451', '§ 10', '§ 1101', '§ 1451', '§ 1101', '§ 164', '§ 525', '§ 167', '§ 1451', '§ 1451', '§ 1451', '§ 1427', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1101', '§ 1451', '§ 1101', '§ 1101', '§ 10', '§ 1101', '§ 1451', '§ 1451', '§ 1101', '§ 1', '§ 1015', '§ 1015', '§ 1101', '§ 1101', '§ 18', '§ 1101', '§ 1101', '§ 1451', '§ 1101', '§ 1101', '§ 1451', '§ 1451', '§ 1429', '§ 1429', '§ 1423', '§ 61', '§ 1451']

Kungys v. United States (full text) :: 485 U.S. 759 (1988) :: Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center Log In
› Kungys v. United States
Kungys v. United States 485 U.S. 759 (1988)
U.S. Supreme CourtKungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759 (1988)Kungys v. United StatesNo. 86-228Argued April 27, 1987Reargued October 13, 1987Decided May 2, 1988485 U.S. 759CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
Juozas Kungys seeks our review of a judgment and opinion of the Third Circuit remanding his case for the completion of denaturalization proceedings. The issues presented are: first, whether certain misrepresentations or concealments made by Kungys in connection with his naturalization proceeding were material within the meaning of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 340(a), 66 Stat. 260, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a), and Chaunt v. United States, 364 U. S. 350 (1960); and second, whether those misrepresentations, made under oath and in the form of forged documents, rendered Kungys' citizenship "illegally procured" under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(f)(6), 1427(a)(3), and 1451(a), because they Page 485 U. S. 764 established that he lacked the requisite good moral character when he was naturalized 34 years ago.
Second, the United States attempted to show that, in applying for his visa and in his naturalization petition, Kungys had made false statements with respect to his date and place of birth, wartime occupations, and wartime residence. The Page 485 U. S. 765 District Court found that these misrepresentations had been made, but held them not to be material within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a), as illuminated by language in Chaunt v. United States, supra.
Third, the United States argued that Kungys' citizenship had been "illegally procured" under § 1451(a) because, when he was naturalized, he lacked the good moral character required of applicants for citizenship by 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a). [Footnote 2] In support of this theory, the United States asserted that Kungys' false representations, whether or not material, were sufficient to show that he had given false testimony to obtain immigration or naturalization benefits, which 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(6) makes determinative of lack of good moral character. [Footnote 3] The District Court ruled that the false statements at issue were not covered by 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(6), because they were not material. Page 485 U. S. 766
We granted certiorari, 479 U.S. 947 (1986), and heard argument last Term, on the question of what materiality standard applies to the "concealment or misrepresentation" clause of § 1451(a) and the false testimony provision of § 1101(f)(6) as incorporated by the "illegally procured" clause of § 1451(a). On June 26, 1987, we restored the case to the calendar and directed parties to file supplemental briefs addressing certain questions. [Footnote 4] 483 U.S. 1017. The case was reargued October 13, 1987. Page 485 U. S. 767
As noted above, 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) provides for the denaturalization of citizens whose citizenship orders and certificates of naturalization "were procured by concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation. . . ." This Court has previously suggested, and the parties do not dispute, that this requires misrepresentations or concealments that are both willful and material. See Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U. S. 490, 449 U. S. 507-508, n. 28 (1981). So understood, the provision plainly contains four independent requirements: the naturalized citizen must have misrepresented or concealed some fact, the misrepresentation or concealment must have been willful, the fact must have been material, and the naturalized citizen must have procured citizenship as a result of the misrepresentation or concealment. It is no longer in dispute that the first two of these requirements were met here, since petitioner now concedes that he willfully misrepresented the date and place of his birth in his naturalization proceeding in 1954, as well as in applying for his visa in 1947. [Footnote 5] Page 485 U. S. 768
"the Government has failed to show by 'clear, unequivocal, and convincing' evidence either (1) that facts were suppressed which, if known, would have warranted denial of citizenship or (2) that their disclosure might have been useful in an investigation possibly leading to the Page 485 U. S. 769 discovery of other facts warranting denial of citizenship."
Blackstone used the same term, writing that, in order to constitute "the crime of willful and corrupt perjury" the false statement "must be in some point material to the question in dispute; for if it only be in some trifling collateral circumstance, to which no regard is paid," it is not punishable. 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *137. See also 1 W. Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown, ch. 27, § 8, p. 433 (Curwood ed. 1824). Given these common law antecedents, it is unsurprising that a number of federal statutes criminalizing false statements to public officials use the term "material." The most Page 485 U. S. 770 prominent of these is perhaps 18 U.S.C. § 1001, which makes unlawful willful concealment of material facts in any matter within the jurisdiction of a department or agency of the United States. The federal courts have long displayed a quite uniform understanding of the "materiality" concept as embodied in such statutes. See, e.g., Gonzales v. United States, 286 F.2d 118, 122 (CA10) (construing 18 U.S.C. § 1001), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 878 (1961); Weinstock v. United States, 97 U.S.App.D.C. 365, 367-368, and n. 6, 231 F.2d 699, 701-702, and n. 6 (1956) (same); Blackmon v. United States, 108 F.2d 572, 573 (CA5 1940) (construing language now codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1621); Carroll v. United States, 16 F.2d 951, 953 (CA2) (same), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 763 (1927); United States v. Lardieri, 497 F.2d 317, 319 (CA3 1974) (construing 18 U.S.C. § 1623); United States v. Koonce, 485 F.2d 374, 380 (CA8 1973) (same). The most common formulation of that understanding is that a concealment or misrepresentation is material if it "has a natural tendency to influence, or was capable of influencing, the decision of" the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed. See, e.g., Weinstock v. United States, supra, at 367-368, 231 F.2d at 701-702; United States v. Corsino, 812 F.2d 26, 30-31 (CA1 1987) (citing cases). While we have before us here a statute revoking citizenship, rather than imposing criminal fine or imprisonment, neither the evident objective sought to be achieved by the materiality requirement, nor the gravity of the consequences that follow from its being met, is so different as to justify adoption of a different standard.
NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U. S. 322, 453 U. S. 329 (1981). See also Perrin v. United States, 444 U. S. 37, 444 U. S. 42-43 (1979). Page 485 U. S. 771
One might perhaps view the Chaunt test as not a repudiation of the established meaning of "material," but as an attempt to craft a more precise test for what constitutes "a natural tendency to influence" a naturalization decision. Surely, however, there is no less need for precision in the criminal context than in the denaturalization context. The more general formulation is preferable there, as we think it is here, because the judgment in question does not lend itself to mechanical resolution. The disagreement between the District Court and the Court of Appeals in Fedorenko turned on whether the Chaunt test required that, had the truth been told, an investigation would have resulted which would have disclosed disqualifying facts, or rather that an investigation would have resulted which might have disclosed disqualifying facts. Fedorenko, supra, at 449 U. S. 528 (WHITE, J., dissenting). But if the ultimate question is "natural tendency to influence," it would seem to make little difference whether the probabilities of investigation and resulting disclosure, respectively, are 100%, 20%, 20%-100%, 51%-51%, or even 30%-30%. It has never been the test of materiality that the misrepresentation or concealment would more likely than not have produced an erroneous decision, or even that it would more likely than not have triggered an investigation. Thus, while the Chaunt formulation may be an adequate explanation of why the misrepresentation in that case was judged not to have had a natural tendency to influence the decision, it does not necessarily facilitate judgment in the infinite variety of other factual patterns that may emerge -- which is perhaps why we did not employ it in Costello a year later. We think it safer in the naturalization context, as elsewhere, to fix as our guide the central object of the inquiry: whether the misrepresentation Page 485 U. S. 772 or concealment was predictably capable of affecting, i.e., had a natural tendency to affect, the official decision. The official decision in question, of course, is whether the applicant meets the requirements for citizenship, so that the test more specifically is whether the misrepresentation or concealment had a natural tendency to produce the conclusion that the applicant was qualified. This test must be met, of course, by evidence that is clear, unequivocal, and convincing. See, e.g., Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U. S. 118, 320 U. S. 158 (1943). Though this formulation may seem less verbally precise than Chaunt, in application it may well produce greater uniformity, since judges are accustomed to using it, and can consult a large body of case precedent.
We turn, then, to whether the one misrepresentation on which the trial court's finding was considered and upheld by the Third Circuit -- misrepresentation of the date and place of Page 485 U. S. 773 Kungys' birth -- was material under the foregoing test. [Footnote 6] As discussed earlier, Kungys made that misrepresentation in both the 1947 visa proceeding and the 1954 naturalization proceeding. But insofar as application of the "concealment or misrepresentation" clause of § 1451(a) is concerned, we find it improper to address the 1947 episode. Unlike § 1101(f)(6), which covers false testimony "for the purpose of obtaining any benefits" under the immigration and naturalization laws, the "concealment or misrepresentation" clause of § 1451(a) applies only where the "order and certificate of naturalization . . . were procured by concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation." Procurement of other benefits, including visas, is not covered. Especially in light of this contrast with § 1101(f)(6), we are unpersuaded by the Government's argument that a misrepresentation in the visa proceeding "procures" the naturalization because it obtains United States residence, which in turn is a prerequisite to naturalization, see 8 U.S.C. § 1429. The same argument could be made with respect to a misrepresentation that effects free enrollment in a reading course, which produces the prerequisite of English literacy, see 8 U.S.C. § 1423. [Footnote 7] Such analysis stretches the "concealment or misrepresentation" clause of § 1451(a) beyond its intent, which we think is Page 485 U. S. 774 limited to falsehoods or deceptions in the naturalization proceeding. [Footnote 8]
"[H]ad [Kungys] told the truth at the time he applied for his citizenship, the discrepancies between the truth and his visa materials would have resulted in either a field investigation or an outright denial of the petition. Had an investigation transpired, . . . such investigation probably would have resulted in a denial of the petition, since it would have tended to prove his ineligibility for a visa in the first instance. In this case, as previously noted, Page 485 U. S. 775 the defendant's claim of persecution by the Nazis -- which is directly related to eligibility -- would be called into question."
793 F.2d at 533.
It seems to us not so clear that, had Kungys explained his earlier misstatement of date and place of birth as he has here, see n 5, supra, the discrepancy would likely have produced either "outright denial" or an investigation, or that an investigation would have produced the described outcome. [Footnote 10] But even a high probability that one or another of those consequences would have resulted from the discrepancy does not establish that Kungys' misrepresentation was material. Section 1451(a) imposes denaturalization for "concealment of a material fact" (emphasis added); and the materiality requirement implicit in the misrepresentation provision likewise relates to misrepresentation of a material fact. Thus, for purposes of determining the natural tendency of a misrepresentation to affect a decision under § 1451(a), what is relevant is what would have ensued from official knowledge of the misrepresented fact (in this case, Kungys' true date and place of birth), not what would have ensued from official knowledge of inconsistency between a posited assertion of the truth and an earlier assertion of falsehood. On the basis of the Third Circuit's reasoning, a misrepresentation that, in and of itself, is utterly immaterial both in the visa proceeding and in the naturalization proceeding becomes material simply because it is repeated in both. That is not what the statute Page 485 U. S. 776 intends. What must have a natural tendency to influence the official decision is the misrepresentation itself, not the failure to create an inconsistency with an earlier misrepresentation; the failure to state the truth, not the failure to state what had been stated earlier. The Government has failed to establish clearly, unequivocally, and convincingly that Kungys' misrepresentation of the date and place of his birth had this natural tendency.
We leave it to the Third Circuit on remand to determine whether the other misrepresentations or concealments that the District Court found to have been made in 1954 were supported by the evidence and material to the naturalization decision under the standard we have described -- bearing in mind the unusually high burden of proof in denaturalization cases. Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U. S. 665, 322 U. S. 670 (1944); Schneiderman, 320 U.S. at 320 U. S. 158. If so, it will have to reach the fourth § 1451(a) issue described in our earlier analysis: whether Kungys "procured" his citizenship by means of those misrepresentations or concealments. That requirement demands, first of all, that citizenship be obtained as a result of the application process in which the misrepresentations or concealments were made. The difficult question, and that on which we part company with JUSTICE STEVENS' opinion concurring in the judgment, is what it demands beyond that. We do not agree with petitioner's contention that it requires the Government to establish that naturalization would not have been granted if the misrepresentations or concealments had not occurred. If such a "but for" causation requirement existed in § 1451(a), it is most unlikely that a materiality requirement would have been added as well -- requiring, in addition to distortion of the decision, a natural tendency to distort the decision. Moreover, the difficulty of establishing "but for" causality, by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence many years after the fact, is so Page 485 U. S. 777 great that we cannot conceive that Congress intended such a burden to be met before a material misrepresentation could be sanctioned. We do think, however, that the "procured by" language can and should be given some effect beyond the mere requirement that the misrepresentation have been made in the application proceeding. Proof of materiality can sometimes be regarded as establishing a rebuttable presumption. See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U. S. 224, 485 U. S. 245-249 (1988). Though the "procured by" language of the present statute cannot be read to require proof of disqualification, we think it can be read to express the notion that one who obtained his citizenship in a proceeding where he made material misrepresentations was presumably disqualified. The importance of the rights at issue leads us to conclude that the naturalized citizen should be able to refute that presumption, and avoid the consequence of denaturalization, by showing, through a preponderance of the evidence, that the statutory requirement as to which the misrepresentation had a natural tendency to produce a favorable decision was in fact met. [Footnote 11] Such a construction gives ample meaning to both the "materiality" and "procured by" requirements.
JUSTICE STEVENS' concurrence would adopt a requirement of "but for" causality, emphasizing the necessity that the Page 485 U. S. 778 Government establish, at least, that the misrepresenting applicant was in fact not qualified to be naturalized. This emphasis highlights another difficulty with "but for" causality: that requirement is simply not a conceivable construction of the "procured by misrepresentation" provision of § 1451(a) if one adheres, as JUSTICE STEVENS' concurrence purports to do, see post at 485 U. S. 795-796, to our holding in Fedorenko that, even without any misrepresentation, the applicant's failure to meet a statutory requirement for naturalization subjects him to denaturalization under the "illegally procured" provision of § 1451(a). Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 449 U. S. 506-507, 449 U. S. 514-515. [Footnote 12] Thus, JUSTICE STEVENS' concurrence's construction violates the cardinal rule of statutory interpretation that no provision should be construed to be entirely redundant. See, e.g., Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U. S. 379, 439 U. S. 392 (1979); Jarecki v. G. D. Searle & Co., 367 U. S. 303, 367 U. S. 307-308 (1961); United States v. Menasche, 348 U. S. 528, 348 U. S. 538-539 (1955). It makes nonsense of the statute to say that its misrepresentation provision can only be the basis of denaturalization if the Government Page 485 U. S. 779 establishes in addition a factor that is itself, without misrepresentation, a basis for denaturalization anyway. On JUSTICE STEVENS' concurrence's reading, the law says, in effect: Citizenship you obtain by lying may be revoked, but only for a reason other than lying. This is likely to have the congressionally desired deterrent effect upon only the most dim-witted of prevaricators. But worse than making an enigma of the statute, JUSTICE STEVENS' concurrence's position makes a scandal of the results the statute achieves: proof that an applicant lied when he said he was not an SS officer at Dachau would not suffice for denaturalization without clear, unequivocal, and convincing proof -- after 40 years of disappearing evidence -- that he was guilty of war crimes.
Under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(6), a person shall be deemed not to be of good moral character if he "has given false testimony for the purpose of obtaining" immigration or naturalization benefits. On its face, § 1101(f)(6) does not distinguish between material and immaterial misrepresentations. Literally Page 485 U. S. 780 read, it denominates a person to be of bad moral character on account of having given false testimony if he has told even the most immaterial of lies with the subjective intent of obtaining immigration or naturalization benefits. We think it means precisely what it says.
Obviously, it will be relatively rare that the Government will be able to prove that a misrepresentation that does not have the natural tendency to influence the decision regarding Page 485 U. S. 781 immigration or naturalization benefits was nonetheless made with the subjective intent of obtaining those benefits. This is especially so since the invalidating intent, like all other factual matters necessary to support denaturalization, must be proved by "clear, unequivocal, and convincing' evidence which does not leave `the issue in doubt.'" Schneiderman, 320 U.S. at 320 U. S. 158. Third, unlike the misrepresentation clause of § 1451(a), the false testimony provisions of § 1101(f)(6) do not apply to "concealments." With all these built-in limitations, and given the evident purpose of the provision, we see no reason for straining to avoid its natural meaning.
JUSTICE STEVENS would read a materiality requirement into § 1101(f) because in his view "[t]here is no material' distinction," post at 797, between the language of that provision and the language of § 10 of the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 (DPA), which we found to contain a materiality requirement in Fedorenko. We think there is a world of difference between the two. First, the texts of the statutes are significantly different. Section 10 of the DPA uses the phrase "willfully make a misrepresentation." Our conclusion in Fedorenko that this contains a materiality requirement was grounded in the word "misrepresentation," which has been held to have that implication in many contexts -- as the name of the common law tort of misrepresentation (which requires a material falsehood) adequately demonstrates. Section 1101(f), by contrast, uses the phrase "giv[e] false testimony." While we do not say that statutory use of the term "false" or "falsity" can never imply a requirement of materiality, such a requirement is at least not so commonly associated with that term as it is with misrepresentation. In fact, we recently described falsity and materiality as separate requirements of misrepresentation, see Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. at 485 U. S. 238, 485 U. S. 239-240, n. 17. Second, the statutory provisions differ in their purpose and their relationship to other provisions in their respective statutory schemes. Section 10 of the DPA, Page 485 U. S. 782 like the willful misrepresentation provision of § 1451(a), is a freestanding provision having no apparent purpose but to punish and thereby deter misrepresentation in the immigration process. Section 1 101(f)(6), on the other hand, is part of a definition of what constitutes a lack of "good moral character" for purposes of qualifying for immigration. More importantly, § 10 is the only provision treating misrepresentation in the DPA, whereas § 1101(f)(6) must be reconciled with the willful misrepresentation provision of § 1451(a). That seems to us ill-achieved by reading the two differently worded provisions (or, as the concurrence would have it, three differently worded provisions, see supra at 485 U. S. 777-779) to be redundant.
Accordingly, it is clear that the Third Circuit erred in importing a materiality requirement into § 1101(f)(6). Nevertheless, we cannot affirm denaturalization under that section, because the question whether any misrepresentation made by Kungys constituted "false testimony for the purpose of obtaining" immigration or naturalization benefits cannot be answered without resolving an additional question of law and an additional question of fact. The former, which we choose not to resolve ourselves, since the case must be remanded in any event, is whether Kungys' misrepresentations constituted "testimony." The latter, which must be resolved by the trier of fact, is whether, in making the misrepresentations, Kungys possessed the subjective intent of thereby obtaining immigration or naturalization benefits. See generally Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U. S. 273, 2 456 U. S. 88 (1982) (issues of intent are factual matters for the trier of fact); Berenyi v. District Director, INS, 385 U. S. 630, 385 U. S. 634-635 (1967). We are unpersuaded by the United States' argument that Kungys' so-called pattern of lies establishes the illegal subjective intent of his alleged false testimony as a matter of law. Page 485 U. S. 783
"* * * *" "(6) one who has given false testimony for the purpose of obtaining any benefits under this chapter."
I agree with this construction of the statute. I wish to emphasize, however, that in my view a presumption of ineligibility does not arise unless the Government produces evidence sufficient to raise a fair inference that a statutory disqualifying fact actually existed. It is this fair inference of ineligibility, coupled with the fact that the citizen's misrepresentation necessarily frustrated the Government's investigative efforts, that in my mind justifies the burden-shifting presumption the Court employs. Evidence that simply raises the possibility that a disqualifying fact might have existed does not entitle the Government to the benefit of a presumption that the citizen was ineligible, for, as we have repeatedly emphasized, citizenship is a most precious right, see, e.g., Klapprott v. United States, 335 U. S. 601, 335 U. S. 611-612 (1949), Page 485 U. S. 784 and as such should never be forfeited on the basis of mere speculation or suspicion. I therefore would not permit invocation of the presumption of disqualification in circumstances where it would not otherwise be fair to infer that the citizen was actually ineligible.
In this case, the Government maintains that petitioner is subject to denaturalization because it has proved that he made certain misrepresentations in his 1947 Application for Immigration Visa (Quota), which he repeated in his October 23, 1953, Petition for Naturalization. He stated that his date of birth was October 4, 1913, when it in fact was September 21, 1915; he stated that his place of birth was Kaunas, Lithuania, when it was in fact Reistru. He asserted that he Page 485 U. S. 785 resided in Kedainiai, Lithuania, only through July, 1941, when in fact he did not leave Kedainiai until October, 1941. He failed to disclose that he had been a bookkeeper-clerk in a Kaunas brush and broom establishment during the war. The Government failed in its efforts to prove that petitioner would have been denied a visa if he had disclosed the true facts in his application. It also failed to prove that truthful responses would have led to a more complete investigation of petitioner's background before granting him a visa, or that an investigation would have revealed any fact that would have disqualified petitioner from obtaining a visa. Indeed, the Government failed to prove the existence of any fact that, if known, would have led to the denial of petitioner's visa application or disqualified him from later becoming an American citizen.
Over a quarter of a century ago, in Chaunt v. United States, 364 U. S. 350 (1960), the Court considered a case in which the District Court found that petitioner had concealed his membership in the Communist Party as well as three arrests that, had they been disclosed, would have led to further investigation by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Although the dissenting Justices thought that Chaunt's failure to tell the truth about his arrest record was sufficient reason to revoke his citizenship, see id. at 364 U. S. 360, the majority Page 485 U. S. 786 came to the contrary conclusion. It held that the Government had failed to prove
"Material" means "having real importance" or "great consequences." Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 733 (1983). The adjective "material" is widely used to distinguish false statements that are actionable at law from those that are not. In the context of criminal false statements, the term "material" has been said to require that the false statement be one that had "a natural tendency to influence, or was capable of Page 485 U. S. 787 influencing, the decision of" the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed. See ante at 485 U. S. 770. In tort law, a misrepresentation is material if
Our holding in Chaunt is also supported by the statutory requirement that there must be a causal connection between the misrepresentation and the award of citizenship. Section 1451(a) provides that the Government must demonstrate that the misrepresentation "procured" citizenship. That is, the statute requires that the Government demonstrate that it relied on the misrepresentation in deciding whether to allow the applicant to become a citizen. In imposing this causation requirement, the statute again merely tracks the law of actionable misrepresentation in other contexts. A material misrepresentation, that is, a statement not in accordance with the truth that a reasonable person would attach importance to in deciding whether to enter a contract, may form the basis for voiding or reforming the contract, but only if the contracting party in fact relied on the statement in entering the contract. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 164. The material misrepresentation must have induced the recipient Page 485 U. S. 788 of the statement to enter the contract. [Footnote 2/2] Likewise, in tort law, a person may recover for a loss resulting from another's material misrepresentation, but only if he or she in fact relied upon the misrepresentation to his or her detriment. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 525. Although in both contract and tort law it is recognized that, if a misrepresentation was material, the recipient probably relied on it, that probability does not alleviate the requirement that inducement be proved distinctly. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 167.
If anything, the causation requirement of § 1451(a) is stricter than that in tort and contract law. The statute specifically requires that the material misrepresentation "procure" citizenship, not merely that it have been an inducement to granting citizenship. Thus it requires that the material misrepresentation must have had the effect of allowing the person to obtain citizenship when a truthful statement would have led directly or after investigation to the denial of citizenship. In other words, the Government must have relied on the statement in offering the defendant the opportunity to become a citizen. Although, as is recognized in tort and contract law, it is likely that any material misrepresentation was relied on by the Government, this likelihood does not change the burden imposed by the statute. [Footnote 2/3] Page 485 U. S. 789
Thus, the Government cannot prevail in a denaturalization action based on a false statement in an application for a naturalization certificate unless it can prove by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence the existence of a disqualifying fact. To prove that a misrepresentation was material, the Government must prove that the statement concealed a disqualifying fact or hindered the discovery of a disqualifying fact. Further, the existence of a disqualifying fact is a necessary element of the Government's proof of reliance. Unless a disqualifying fact existed, it cannot be said that a misrepresentation "procured" citizenship. Section 1451(a) does not allow an individual who was in all ways qualified to be an American citizen to be deprived of that citizenship because of a false statement that did not prevent the discovery of a fact that would have affected his or her eligibility to become a United States citizen. Together and separately, the materiality and procurement requirements reflect congressional intent that citizenship status not be taken away unless the Government proves that the person was not qualified to hold that status at the time it was obtained. [Footnote 2/4] Page 485 U. S. 790
In his separate opinion in Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U. S. 490, 449 U. S. 518 (1981), JUSTICE BLACKMUN correctly pointed out that, as construed by our decision in Chaunt, the misrepresentation ground of § 1451(a) requires that the Government "prove the existence of disqualifying facts." Id. at 449 U. S. 523-524. [Footnote 2/5] Until today, JUSTICE WHITE was the only Member Page 485 U. S. 791 of the Court to have disagreed with this reading of the Chaunt opinion. Even today, it is not clear whether the Court disagrees with this interpretation of Chaunt, or simply rejects it based on its current notion of "the wisdom of experience." See ante at 485 U. S. 769.
The wisdom of experience is further reflected in our prior cases imposing a special burden on the Government when it Page 485 U. S. 792 seeks to denaturalize an American citizen. Thus, in explaining why the Government's burden of proof in this kind of civil proceeding is equivalent to that enforced in criminal cases, and why default judgments in denaturalization proceedings are intolerable, the Court has written:
Virtually ignoring the foregoing settled law, today the Court announces a new burden-shifting presumption that lowers the standard of proof required for the Government to prevail in a denaturalization proceeding. Under the Court's test, a misrepresentation or concealment is material if it concerned Page 485 U. S. 793 a fact that was relevant to the naturalization decision or if the true facts "would predictably have disclosed other facts relevant to [the citizen's] qualifications." Ante at 485 U. S. 774. A fact may be relevant if it would have led to an investigation. Ante at 485 U. S. 775. Thus the Government becomes entitled to the presumption that the citizen was not qualified to become a citizen, that is, to the presumption that citizenship was "procured by" the misrepresentation, if it shows by clear and convincing evidence that the true facts would have led to further investigation. The citizen then bears the burden of
Though joining the Court's opinion, JUSTICE BRENNAN would require more. He would not allow the Government the benefit of the presumption unless it first produced "evidence sufficient to raise a fair inference that a statutory disqualifying fact actually existed." Ante at 485 U. S. 783. Although JUSTICE BRENNAN imposes a burden of production on the Government, he agrees with the majority that the burden of ultimate persuasion rests with the defendant. Under JUSTICE BRENNAN's approach, however, the defendant at least has the benefit of knowing specifically what disqualifying fact must be rebutted. Both approaches require the defendant to rebut the existence of the presumed disqualifying fact -- even demonstrating that there is a completely innocent explanation for the misrepresentation would not be sufficient to rebut the presumption. Page 485 U. S. 794
Neither the majority's nor JUSTICE BRENNAN's formulation of shifting burdens is faithful to our previous recognition of the special burden the Government must bear when it seeks to denaturalize an American citizen or to our previous rejection of default judgments in denaturalization proceedings. See Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. at 335 U. S. 611-612; supra at 485 U. S. 790-792. [Footnote 2/7] "[B]ecause of the grave consequences incident to denaturalization proceedings," Klapprott, Page 485 U. S. 795 335 U.S. at 335 U. S. 612, this Court has always held that the Government must prove its charges in denaturalization cases by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence which does not leave the issue in doubt. We have recognized that this burden is substantially identical to the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt burden of proof borne by the Government in criminal cases. Ibid. Indeed, the factors that support the imposition of so heavy a burden are largely the same in both contexts -- particularly critical are the immense importance of the interests at stake, ibid.; In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358, 397 U. S. 363 (1970), the possibility of loss of liberty, Klapprott, 335 U.S. at 335 U. S. 612; In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 397 U. S. 363, the resultant stigmatization, Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U. S. 118, 320 U. S. 122-23 (1943); In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 397 U. S. 363, and the societal interest in the reliability of the outcome, id. at 397 U. S. 363-364. The use of burden-shifting presumptions to reduce the Government's burden of proof in criminal cases has been consistently rejected by this Court without regard to whether the presumptions were rebuttable. See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U. S. 307, 471 U. S. 313 (1985), and cases cited therein. Such presumptions are equally objectionable in the denaturalization context.
As amended in 1961, § 1451(a) allows the Government to revoke the citizenship of anyone whose citizenship was "illegally procured." In Fedorenko, we held that citizenship had been illegally procured because the petitioner, a former armed concentration camp guard, was ineligible for the visa he had been issued under the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 (DPA), 62 Stat. 1009. Because the naturalization statutes required applicants to be lawfully admitted to the United Page 485 U. S. 796 States for permanent residence, petitioner had failed to "satisfy a statutory requirement which Congress has imposed as a prerequisite to the acquisition of citizenship by naturalization." Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 449 U. S. 515. One prerequisite to naturalization is that the applicant be of "good moral character." 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a). Certain minimum standards for being deemed in possession of good moral character are set out in 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(f). Subsection 6 of § 1 101(f) provides that no person shall be deemed to be of good moral character if he or she "has given false testimony for the purpose of obtaining any benefits under this chapter." The Government contends that it is not necessary for it to establish that petitioner's false statements were material to denaturalize him under this provision. Under the Government's theory, the mere fact that the statements were false is sufficient to compel petitioner's denaturalization if they were made under oath and with the subjective intention of obtaining a benefit -- any benefit, no matter how trivial [Footnote 2/8] -- under the naturalization Page 485 U. S. 797 laws. Because I am convinced that a materiality requirement is implicit in § 1101(f)(6), I reject this contention.
62 Stat. 1013. We held, agreeing with the Government, that this provision applied "only [to] willful misrepresentations about material' facts." 449 U.S. at 449 U. S. 507. We found the implication of a materiality requirement in the DPA's willful misrepresentation section to follow logically from our construction of § 1451(a) as having such a requirement even though its plain language requires only that the misrepresentation have been willful. That same logic applies here. There is no "material" distinction between the language of the DPA at issue in Fedorenko and the language of § 1101(f)(6). See United States v. Sheshtawy, 714 F.2d 1038, 1041 (CA10 1983). It is implausible Page 485 U. S. 798 to suggest that Congress intended by the language of the DPA to engraft a materiality requirement, but had no such intention in drafting § 1101(f)(6). [Footnote 2/9]
In addition to requiring materiality, both § 10 of the DPA and § 1101(f)(6) require that the false statement have been made for the purpose of obtaining a benefit under the immigration and naturalization laws. The Government would have us adopt a subjective test of the individual's motive in any particular case, thus forcing the factfinder to inquire of the defendant in each case why the particular falsehood was asserted and insuring that many citizenship determinations would boil down to credibility battles. An objective test is far more reasonable. Under an objective approach, a false testimonial statement would be considered made "for the purpose of obtaining any benefits under [the immigration laws]" if it in fact had the effect of giving the defendant a benefit under the immigration laws. An objective test would eliminate the necessity of inquiring in each case whether a person lied about his or her date of birth for personal reasons, Page 485 U. S. 799 such as mere vanity, or to conceal information that would lead to the denial of a visa or certificate of naturalization. [Footnote 2/10] If the false statement as to age actually had the effect of obtaining for the individual a benefit he or she would not otherwise have enjoyed, then, and only then, would American citizenship have been "illegally procured." An objective test is more consistent with the heavy burden of proof borne by the Government in denaturalization cases and with the severity of the sanction. Because states of mind are notoriously difficult to prove, an objective test also has the critical virtue of diminishing the risk of erroneous determinations.
It is obvious that there is some overlap between the scope of the misrepresentation and illegally procured clauses of § 1451(a). [Footnote 2/11] That the Government may in some cases be able to choose one of two available paths for denaturalizing a citizen Page 485 U. S. 800 for essentially the same conduct, however, does not suggest that either of the paths should be made more lenient than Congress intended. Page 485 U. S. 801
"* * * *" ". . . [A] certificate of citizenship is"
It is somewhat ironic that both the Government and the Court accept the fact that a materiality requirement is implicit in the disjunctive reference to "willful misrepresentation" in § 1451(a), see ante at 485 U. S. 767, but reach a contrary conclusion with respect to § 1101(f)(6). Moreover, the implication of a materiality requirement in § 1 101(f)(6) is consistent with the interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 1015(a), which punishes the making of "any false statement under oath, in any case, proceeding, or matter relating to . . . naturalization, citizenship, or registry of aliens." Courts have construed the statute to contain a requirement that the false statement be material. United States v. Bressi, 208 F. 369, 370-371 (WD Wash.1913) (to constitute the crime of false swearing in a naturalization case the testimony given had to be material even though the statute does not expressly so state); United States v. Laut, 17 F.R.D. 31, 34 (SDNY 1955) (courts have consistently construed § 1015(a) and its forebears to have a materiality requirement even though the statute does not expressly contain this limitation).
In 1982, the Government filed a complaint to denaturalize petitioner. It set out three reasons why this action was justified. First, it tried to show that petitioner assisted in the arrest and execution of more than 2,000 civilians in Kedainiai, Lithuania, during a 2-month period in 1941. The Government offered three videotaped depositions taken in the Soviet Union as proof of this claim. Although the District Court observed that these depositions would strongly tend to prove the Government's case if they were admitted as evidence Page 485 U. S. 802 without qualification, it admitted them only for the purpose of showing that the atrocities took place. Without the excluded evidence, the District Court held that the Government failed to prove this claim.
The District Court accordingly entered judgment for petitioner. The Government appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed. Initially, the Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that misrepresentations must be material in order to constitute sufficient grounds for finding lack of "good moral character" under § 1101(f)(6). It disagreed with Page 485 U. S. 803 the District Court, however, with respect to the materiality of the false statements in the visa application and the naturalization petition, holding that the misrepresentations about birth and age would have triggered an investigation that probably would have led to the discovery of facts disqualifying petitioner for a visa and for naturalization. It did not rule on the Government's further submission that the District Court erred by not admitting the videotaped depositions into evidence without qualification.
Ante at 485 U. S. 779-780. In addition to the language of § 1101(f)(6), which in itself compels this conclusion, the legislative history of the 1961 amendments to the statute, Pub.L. 87-301, § 18, 75 Stat. 656, shows that Congress sought to broaden, not restrict, the grounds upon which naturalization could be revoked. [Footnote 3/1] Page 485 U. S. 804
In this connection, we must bear in mind the necessity of striking an appropriate balance between the serious consequences that attend loss of citizenship and the need for "strict compliance with all the congressionally imposed prerequisites to the acquisition of citizenship." Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U. S. 490, 449 U. S. 506 (1981). We need not decide in this case whether § 1101(f)(6) would bar naturalization of an individual who offered a single piece of false testimony in only one instance or who later offered a reasonable explanation for why misstatements were made; we also need not decide whether such a construction of the statute would be inconsistent with a proper balancing of the two important but opposing considerations set out above. There may well be cases in which a single willful but immaterial misrepresentation would be insufficient to establish lack of good character, but would constitute grounds for denaturalization if it were material. Similarly, there are cases like this one in which repeated and numerous willful misrepresentations justify a Page 485 U. S. 805 finding of lack of good moral character notwithstanding that the misrepresentations may not involve material facts.
571 F.Supp. 1104, 1139 (NJ 1983). [Footnote 3/2] Page 485 U. S. 806 The congressional mandate expressed in § 1101(f)(6) speaks clearly to such a pattern of falsehoods, and that statute would have precluded a determination in 1954 that petitioner possessed "good moral character." Accordingly, petitioner lacked an essential prerequisite to becoming a naturalized citizen, and he is now subject to denaturalization for having "illegally procured" his citizenship. § 1451(a).
The point of fact is whether petitioner made these misrepresentations "for the purpose of obtaining any benefits" under the immigration and naturalization laws. There is no difficulty about this point either. The willful misrepresentations at issue here were made in the context of petitioner's naturalization petition, and were made earlier at the visa Page 485 U. S. 807 stage. The fact that the misrepresentations were willful, coupled with the fact that they were made during proceedings and on documents required for immigration and naturalization purposes -- indeed, the very proceedings and documents that petitioner was required to complete in order to "obtai[n]" the "benefits" he sought of gaining naturalization -- satisfies the elements of § 1101(f)(6). The District Court itself found that petitioner's naturalization petition was false in particular because it "stated that defendant had not previously given false testimony to obtain benefits under the immigration and naturalization laws." 571 F.Supp. at 1138. [Footnote 3/3] In light of this specific finding by the District Court, there is no justification for remanding this issue to be resolved again by the trier of fact.
Because the Court declines to affirm the decision below on the basis of § 1101(f)(6), it finds it necessary to revisit the definition of the term "material" as it is used in § 1451(a). The Court today holds that the proper test of materiality is whether the misrepresentations "had a natural tendency to influence the decisions of the Immigration and Naturalization Service." Page 485 U. S. 808 Ante at 485 U. S. 772. I do not disagree with this definition, but the Court's application of the definition in this case is flawed.
To begin with, the Court finds it proper under § 1451(a) to consider only the misrepresentations petitioner made in his naturalization proceedings, but not those made in his earlier visa proceedings. The view of the United States is much more persuasive: the misrepresentations made by petitioner at the visa stage were instrumental to his procuring naturalization, for, by obtaining the visa, petitioner obtained lawful admission to residence in this country, which is one requirement for naturalization under § 1429. See also Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 449 U. S. 518-520 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in judgment). The Court responds that, by that logic, any misrepresentation that helps an individual to obtain any prerequisite to naturalization, such as English literacy, would be considered material. These two things, however, are not the same, and the Court's supposed extension of its logic is merely foolish. The visa proceedings and the naturalization proceedings are intimately related not only because they both are proceedings governed by the same provisions of the immigration and naturalization laws, but also because the visa and the certificate of naturalization are obtained as part of the same process for obtaining citizenship, and both must be lawfully procured. For example, it is not mere residence in this country that is a prerequisite to naturalization, but residence after being "lawfully admitted." § 1429. It makes no sense, on the other hand, to speak of proceedings to attain "lawful" literacy skills or a "lawful" understanding of American Page 485 U. S. 809 history and government, as required under § 1423, and the statute does not speak in these terms, but instead manifests complete and understandable indifference as to how the individual came by those proficiencies. Thus the visa proceedings can accurately be regarded as one crucial stage in the naturalization proceedings themselves, yet the time spent acquiring literacy skills or an understanding of American history and government obviously cannot be regarded as a stage in those proceedings.
Even if I were to accept the proposition that we should consider only the materiality of the misrepresentations that petitioner made in the naturalization proceedings, those misrepresentations surely had a natural tendency to influence the decisions of the INS. As an initial matter, there is no requirement that the Court focus only on petitioner's misrepresentations about his date and place of his birth and leave aside his other potentially more significant misrepresentations that were also identified by the District Court. [Footnote 3/4] But even limiting the focus as the Court does, I would find these statements to be material. In reaching this conclusion, I would ask not only whether these misrepresentations of fact would have a natural tendency to influence the decisions of the INS, but also whether the fact of these misrepresentations itself would have had such a tendency. In other words, the proper inquiry is not only whether the true date and place of birth, in isolation, would have aroused suspicion, but also whether an investigation would have ensued had petitioner revealed the true facts, and thereby disclosed the discrepancy between them and the false statements in his supporting documents. Former Ambassador Seymour Maxwell Finger, Vice Consul in Stuttgart in January, 1947, testified that if there were discrepancies between the visa application and the supporting documents, an investigation certainly would have occurred, a view that is consistent with the regulations then in effect. See 22 CFR § 61.329 (Supp.1946). Page 485 U. S. 810
As a final point, it should be emphasized that the Court of Appeals never passed on the correctness of the District Court's determination that the videotaped depositions could Page 485 U. S. 811 not be admitted into evidence unqualifiedly because they were inherently unreliable. [Footnote 3/5] On remand, this issue should be resolved definitively. If the depositions are found to be admissible without qualification, rather than merely for the limited purpose allowed by the District Court, then the petition for denaturalization would be granted regardless of how the other issues are resolved, for it is undisputed that, if petitioner were shown to have participated in the mass arrests and executions at Kedainiai, he never would have qualified for naturalization, and thus now would be properly subject to denaturalization.
For purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a)'s "concealment or misrepresentation" provision, the test of wheth...	Read the full annotations for this case.