Source: http://openjurist.org/592/f2d/58/public-administrator-of-county-of-new-york-v-angela-compania-naviera-sa
Timestamp: 2017-04-28 01:40:47
Document Index: 94700304

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 761', '§ 688', '§ 688', '§ 51', '§ 6', '§ 763', '§ 762']

In 1886 the Supreme Court held that, in the absence of a statute, the general maritime law itself did not provide a cause of action for wrongful maritime deaths. The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199, 7 S.Ct. 140, 30 L.Ed. 358 (1886). As a result, until 1920 there existed no federal remedy whatsoever for a death caused on the high seas by a breach of one of the duties imposed by federal maritime law. For deaths that were not caused on the "high seas," I. e., deaths caused within state territorial waters, federal courts applied state wrongful death statutes in order to grant recovery. Then, in 1920, Congress passed two statutes designed to provide a federal remedy for wrongful deaths the Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. § 761 Et seq., and the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688. Section 1 of the Death on the High Seas Act provides as follows:
46 U.S.C. § 688. The Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51 Et seq., is "the regime which the Jones Act made applicable to seamen." Igneri v. Cie. de Transports Oceaniques, 323 F.2d 257, 266 (2d Cir. 1963), Cert. denied, 376 U.S. 949, 84 S.Ct. 965, 11 L.Ed.2d 969 (1964). See The Law of Admiralty, Supra, ch. VI, §§ 6-26 & 6-27.
These two statutes, however, did not erase the need for an independent, nonstatutory right of recovery for wrongful death under the general maritime law. In Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 90 S.Ct. 1772, 26 L.Ed.2d 339 (1970), the Court was confronted with one of the peculiarities resulting from the absence of a nonstatutory federal wrongful death remedy under the general maritime law when a wrongful death was caused within state territorial waters, and when that death was caused by a vessel's unseaworthiness rather than negligence, neither federal nor state statutes provided for recovery. The Jones Act and the state statutes afforded a remedy only for negligence; the Death on the High Seas Act allowed recovery only for deaths caused outside territorial waters. In order to fill this gap, the Court overruled The Harrisburg and recognized a remedy for wrongful death under the general maritime law.
Aware that it was announcing an entirely new cause of action, the Moragne Court refrained from addressing itself to what it called the "subsidiary issues" relating to that cause of action the time limitation period, the measure of damages, and the schedule of beneficiaries. "(F)inal resolution" of such issues, the Court said, "should await further sifting through the lower courts in future litigation." 398 U.S. at 408, 90 S.Ct. at 1792. But the Court did characterize the Death on the High Seas Act as "the congressional enactment that deals specifically and exclusively with actions for wrongful death, and that simply provides a remedy for deaths on the high seas for breaches of the duties imposed by the general maritime law," and as "(t)he only (federal statute) that applies not just to a class of workers but to any 'person,' and that bases liability on conduct violative of general maritime law." 398 U.S. at 407-08, 90 S.Ct. at 1791. The Court referred in passing to the argument that the new wrongful death action should "share the doctrine of laches immemorially applied to admiralty claims" and that, in applying that doctrine, "consideration" should be given to the two-year statute of limitations of the Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. § 763. But the Court offered only the following hints as to how the subsidiary issues should ultimately be handled: "the difficulties should be slight in applying accepted maritime law to actions for wrongful death," 398 U.S. at 406, 90 S.Ct. at 1791; "(i)f . . . subsidiary issues should require resolution . . . the courts will not be without persuasive analogy for guidance," 398 U.S. at 408, 90 S.Ct. at 1792.
In Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 94 S.Ct. 806, 39 L.Ed.2d 9 (1974), the Court considered one of these "subsidiary issues" the measure of damages for a wrongful death resulting from injuries suffered inside state territorial waters due to a vessel's unseaworthiness. Despite the fact that neither the Death on the High Seas Act nor the Jones Act would allow damages for loss of society, See 46 U.S.C. § 762; Igneri v. Cie. de Transports Oceaniques, supra, 323 F.2d at 266, the Court decided that such damages should be allowed under the general maritime law. The Court based its decision on the fact that neither federal statute applied, the fact that the majority of state wrongful death statutes allowed for such damages, and on "the humanitarian policy of the maritime law to show 'special solicitude' for those who are injured within its jurisdiction." 414 U.S. at 587-88, 94 S.Ct. at 816. In other words, the Court decided that where no federal statute was applicable, the Court was free to, indeed had the responsibility to, shape the general maritime wrongful death action according to its own policy determinations. At the same time, the Court again referred to the Death on the High Seas Act as the federal statute of special significance in fashioning the new wrongful death remedy. 414 U.S. at 583 n.10, 94 S.Ct. 806.
The Higginbotham Court made it clear that, where Congress has made a judgment regarding the shape of wrongful death recoveries, the courts are not free to substitute their own judgments.(W)e need not pause to evaluate the opposing policy arguments. Congress has struck the balance for us.
In Moragne, the Court recognized a wrongful death remedy that supplements federal statutory remedies. . . . There is a basic difference between filling a gap left by Congress' silence and rewriting rules that Congress has affirmatively and specifically enacted. In the area covered by the statute, it would be no more appropriate to prescribe a different measure of damages than to prescribe a different statute of limitations, or a different class of beneficiaries. . . . (W)e have no authority to substitute our views for those expressed by Congress in a duly enacted statute.
436 U.S. at 623-26, 98 S.Ct. at 2014-2015. (emphasis added; footnote omitted). See also 436 U.S. 624 n.19, 98 S.Ct. at 2014:
The timeliness of an action brought under the general maritime law is to be determined under the doctrine of laches, the doctrine "immemorially applied to admiralty claims," Moragne, supra, 398 U.S. at 406, 90 S.Ct. 1772. "(T)he existence of laches is a question primarily addressed to the discretion of the trial court." Czaplicki v. The Hoegh Silvercloud, 351 U.S. 525, 534, 76 S.Ct. 946, 952, 100 L.Ed. 1387 (1956), Quoting Gardner v. Panama R. Co., 342 U.S. 29, 30, 72 S.Ct. 12, 96 L.Ed. 31 (1951). The questions to be answered in the exercise of that discretion are whether there existed satisfactory excuse for the delay in bringing the cause of action and whether allowing the action to go forward despite the delay would unfairly prejudice the defendant. These questions are to be evaluated in light of the " peculiar equitable circumstances" of the case. Czaplicki, supra, 351 U.S. at 533, 76 S.Ct. 946.
The application of the doctrine of laches also requires reference to or consideration of the analogous statute of limitations.3 It is our judgment that the recent decisions of Moragne, Gaudet, and Higginbotham make inescapable the conclusion that the doctrine of laches is to be applied to wrongful death actions brought under the general maritime law in light of the two-year statute of limitations found in the Death on the High Seas Act.4 Thus, we remand this case to the district court for reconsideration of the defense of laches, this time with reference to the analogous two-year statute of limitations.
(W)hen a plaintiff who asserts a maritime claim after the . . . statute has run, presents evidence tending to excuse his delay, the court must weigh the legitimacy of his excuse, the inference to be drawn from the expiration of the . . . statute, and the length of the delay, along with evidence as to prejudice if the defendant comes forward with any. Moreover, although a plaintiff who has delayed bringing suit beyond the analogous . . . period has the ultimate burden of persuasion both as to the excuse for his own delay and as to lack of prejudice to the defendant, . . . these two factors are not to be viewed independently.
Larios v. Victory Carriers, Inc., 316 F.2d 63, 66-67 (2d Cir. 1963) (citation omitted). See also Hill v. W. Bruns & Co., 498 F.2d 565, 568 (2d Cir. 1974). To this we add the following: given the clarity of the Supreme Court's instructions to apply the two-year statute of limitations of the Death on the High Seas Act to wrongful death actions under the general maritime law, and given the Court's repeated expressions of concern for uniformity in the administration of this judge-made cause of action, the plaintiff in this case has the burden of showing what this Court has called "strong justification for delay." Fitzgerald v. A. L. Burbank & Co., supra, 451 F.2d at 683. See also Raskin v. P. D. Marchessini, Inc., 437 F.2d 563, 565-66 (2d Cir. 1971). In the absence of such a showing, the district court should dismiss Fitzgerald's wrongful death cause of action arising under the general maritime law.
Mr. Bruno Cappellini has since assumed the office of New York County Public Administrator
At trial, the parties agreed to dismiss the action as to two New York corporations originally named as defendants in this action, Commodity Chartering Corporation and Ocean Shipping and Trading Corporation
See Czaplicki v. The Hoegh Silvercloud, 351 U.S. 525, 533-34, 76 S.Ct. 946, 100 L.Ed. 1387 (1956). See also Fitzgerald v. A. L. Burbank & Co., 451 F.2d 670, 683 & n.12 (2d Cir. 1971); Raskin v. P. D. Marchessini, Inc., 437 F.2d 563, 566 (2d Cir. 1971); Larios v. Victory Carriers, Inc., 316 F.2d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 1963); Oroz v. American President Lines, 259 F.2d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 1958), Cert. denied, 359 U.S. 908, 79 S.Ct. 584, 3 L.Ed.2d 572 (1959)
It could be argued that because the general maritime action in this case was joined with the Jones Act that the three-year statute of limitations governing that statute should also govern this case. See McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221, 224, 78 S.Ct. 1201, 2 L.Ed.2d 1272 (1958). But McAllister was decided before the cases of Moragne, Gaudet, and Higginbotham, and these more recent cases supersede whatever prior suggestions might have been made to the contrary. Fitzgerald v. A. L. Burbank & Co., supra, 451 F.2d at 683 & n.12
We are not persuaded by the appellant's attack on Judge Motley's factual findings. Her conclusions that Kontos died of hepatitis and that this ailment could have been remedied but for the negligence of the appellant were not "clearly erroneous." Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a)