Source: https://m.openjurist.org/401/f3d/979/skokomish-indian-tribe-v-united-states-ge-s-a-p-f-l-w-c-g-e-j-w-m-l-l-b-m-d-g
Timestamp: 2020-01-22 09:21:44
Document Index: 121805228

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1346', '§ 1631', 'art. 3', 'art. 4', '§ 1983', 'art. 4', '§ 4', '§ 803', '§ 803', '§ 825', '§ 1988', '§ 1983', '§ 2415', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 2415']

401 F3d 979 Skokomish Indian Tribe v. United States Ge | OpenJurist
401 F. 3d 979 - Skokomish Indian Tribe v. United States Ge
401 F3d 979 Skokomish Indian Tribe v. United States Ge
401 F.3d 979
SKOKOMISH INDIAN TRIBE, a federally recognized Indian tribe in its own capacity as a class representative and as parens patriae; Denny S. Hurtado; Gordon A. James; Joseph Pavel; Anne Pavel; Maures P. Tinaza; Celeste F. Vigil; Roslynne L. Reed; Gary W. Peterson; Rita C. Andrews; Tom G. Strong; Marie E. Gouley; Victoria J. Pavel; Dennis W. Allen; Joseph Andrews, Sr.; Zetha Cush; Elsie M. Allen; Alex L. Gouley, Jr.; Lawrence L. Kenyon; Doris Miller; Gerald B. Miller; Helen M. Rudy; Ronald D. Twiddy, Sr.; Nick G. Wilbur, Sr., Plaintiffs-Appellants,
UNITED STATES of America; Tacoma Public Utilities, a Washington municipal corporation; City of Tacoma, a Washington municipal corporation; William Barker, Tacoma Public Utilities Board Member in his official capacity; Tom Hilyard, Tacoma Public Utilities Board Member in his official capacity; Robert Lane; Tim Strege; G.E. Vaughn, Defendants-Appellees.
Skokomish Indian Tribe, a federally recognized Indian tribe in its own capacity as a class representative and as parens patriae; Denny S. Hurtado; Gordon A. James; Joseph Pavel; Anne Pavel; Maures P. Tinaza; Celeste F. Vigil; Roslynne L. Reed; Gary W. Peterson; Rita C. Andrews; Tom G. Strong; Marie E. Gouley; Victoria J. Pavel; Dennis W. Allen; Joseph Andrews, Sr.; Zetha Cush; Elsie M. Allen; Alex L. Gouley, Jr.; Lawrence L. Kenyon; Doris Miller; Gerald B. Miller; Helen M. Rudy; Ronald D. Twiddy, Sr.; Nick G. Wilbur, Sr., Skokomish Indian Tribal members for themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
Tacoma Public Utilities, a Washington municipal corporation; City of Tacoma, a Washington municipal corporation; William Barker, Tacoma Public Utilities Board Member in his official capacity; Tom Hilyard, Tacoma Public Utilities Board Member in his official capacity; Robert Lane; Tim Strege; G.E. Vaughn; United States Internal Revenue Service, Defendants-Appellees.
Mason D. Morisset, Morisset, Schloser, Jozwiak & McGaw, Seattle, Washington, for the plaintiffs-appellants.
Philip H. Lynch, Assistant United States Attorney, Tacoma, Washington, for defendant-appellee the United States.
J. Richard Creatura, Gordon, Thomas, Honeywell, Melanca, Peterson & Daheim, LLP, Tacoma, Washington, for defendants-appellees the City of Tacoma and Tacoma Public Utilities.
Philip E. Katzen, Kanji & Katzen, PLLC, Seattle, Washington, for the amici curiae.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Franklin D. Burgess, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-99-05606-FDB.
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (emphasis added).2 Tribe's claims against the United States are properly characterized not as tort claims, but as claims that the United States violated its obligations under the Treaty. The claims are thus quite different from those in cases like Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 108 S.Ct. 1954, 100 L.Ed.2d 531 (1988), and Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 76 S.Ct. 122, 100 L.Ed. 48 (1955), on which the Tribe relies. In Berkovitz, a federal agency allegedly acted tortiously in approving the release of a polio vaccine that did not meet safety standards. In Indian Towing, the Coast Guard acted negligently in its operation of a lighthouse because it did not "use due care to make certain that the light was kept in good working order," causing more than $60,000 in damages to a barge and its cargo. 350 U.S. at 69, 76 S.Ct. 122. The Tribe is not claiming the United States behaved tortiously, but rather that the United States failed to abide by its contractual obligations to the Tribe under the Treaty.
Because we lack subject matter jurisdiction over the Tribe's damages claims against the United States, but believe they might properly have been brought under the Indian Tucker Act, we exercise our discretion to transfer these claims to the Court of Federal Claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1631 ("Whenever ... an appeal, including a petition for review of administrative action, is noticed for or filed with ... a court and that court finds that there is a want of jurisdiction, the court shall, if it is in the interest of justice, transfer such action or appeal to any other such court in which the action or appeal could have been brought at the time it was filed or noticed...."); Beck v. Atl. Richfield Co., 62 F.3d 1240, 1242 n. 4 (9th Cir.1995) (per curiam).
The Tribe has argued that in Fishing Vessel and Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game of Washington (Puyallup I), 391 U.S. 392, 88 S.Ct. 1725, 20 L.Ed.2d 689 (1968), the Supreme Court held that tribes may have a cause of action against non-contracting parties under a treaty, even in the absence of a specific treaty provision. But the Tribe misunderstands the significance of those cases. In Fishing Vessel, the Court interpreted a group of treaties, including the one at issue here, which granted Indian tribes "`[t]he right of taking fish, at all usual and accustomed grounds and stations... in common with all citizens....'" 443 U.S. at 674, 99 S.Ct. 3055 (quoting Treaty of Medicine Creek, Dec. 26, 1854, art. 3, 10 Stat. 1132, substantially similar to Treaty of Point No Point, art. 4). The Court held that this provision secured to the tribes the right to harvest a share of each run of anadromous fish that passed through tribal fishing areas and not merely a right to compete with non-treaty fishermen on an equal basis. Id. at 683-85, 99 S.Ct. 3055. The tribes were thus entitled to an equal measure of the harvestable portion of each run that passed through a "usual and accustomed" tribal fishing ground, adjusted downward if tribal needs could be satisfied by a lesser amount. Id. at 685-89, 99 S.Ct. 3055.
The Court then held that its order was enforceable by injunction. See id. at 692 n. 32, 99 S.Ct. 3055. This is quite different from finding a right to sue a non-contracting party for damages under a treaty — a theory the Supreme Court avoided in Fishing Vessel.
Puyallup I is not to the contrary. In that case, the Court held that the State of Washington — a non-party to a treaty between the Puyallup Tribe and the United States — could regulate the modes of fishing allowed as an appropriate exercise of the State's police power because "the manner in which the fishing may be done and its purpose ... are not mentioned in the Treaty." 391 U.S. at 398, 88 S.Ct. 1725. The Court suggested that, even though the state could regulate in this instance, it could not pass legislation that would directly interfere with rights secured by a treaty. See id. ("We would have quite a different case if the Treaty had preserved the right to fish at the `usual and accustomed places' in the `usual and accustomed' manner."). But the Court did not hold that the Tribe had a private right of action under the Treaty for damages. In fact, the Puyallup Tribe did not bring a claim at all. It was the State of Washington that had sued the Tribe, seeking an injunction and declaratory relief that would allow the State to regulate certain fishing areas named in the Treaty. The Court did not consider whether the Tribe had a right of action even for equitable relief, let alone monetary damages going back nearly seventy-five years.
2. We turn next to the Tribe's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Supreme Court recently held in Inyo County v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians, 538 U.S. 701, 708-12, 123 S.Ct. 1887, 155 L.Ed.2d 933 (2003), that a Tribe is not a "person" capable of bringing a claim under section 1983 for violation of a sovereign prerogative. The Court reasoned that "qualification of a sovereign as a `person' who may maintain a particular claim for relief depends ... on the `legislative environment' in which the word appears." Id. at 711, 123 S.Ct. 1887 (quoting Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159, 161, 62 S.Ct. 972, 86 L.Ed. 1346 (1942)). To illustrate circumstances in which sovereigns may assert claims under section 1983, the Court cited Evans, in which "a State, as purchaser of asphalt shipped in interstate commerce, qualified as a `person' entitled to seek redress under the Sherman Act for restraint of trade." Inyo County, 538 U.S. at 711, 123 S.Ct. 1887 (citing Evans, 316 U.S. at 160-63, 62 S.Ct. 972). It also cited Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308, 98 S.Ct. 584, 54 L.Ed.2d 563 (1978), which "held that a foreign nation, as purchaser of antibiotics, ranked as a `person' qualified to sue pharmaceuticals manufacturers under our antitrust laws." 538 U.S. at 711, 123 S.Ct. 1887 (citing Pfizer, 434 U.S. at 309-20, 98 S.Ct. 584).
The Tribe here is not suing as an aggrieved purchaser, or in any other capacity resembling a "private person[ ]." Id. at 712, 123 S.Ct. 1887. Rather, the Tribe is attempting to assert communal fishing rights reserved to it, as a sovereign, by a treaty it entered into with the United States. See United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676, 688 (9th Cir.1975) ("The treaties must be viewed as agreements between independent and sovereign nations.... Each tribe bargained as an entity for rights which were to be enjoyed communally."). Recognizing that "[s]ection 1983 was designed to secure private rights against government encroachment," id. at 712, 123 S.Ct. 1887, as well as the "long-standing interpretive presumption that `person' does not include the sovereign," Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 780, 120 S.Ct. 1858, 146 L.Ed.2d 836 (2000), we conclude that the Tribe may not assert its treaty-based fishing rights under section 1983.6
As for the individual members of the Tribe, while we have suggested that some treaty-based rights might be cognizable on behalf of a tribe's members under section 1983, see United States v. Washington, 813 F.2d 1020, 1023 (9th Cir.1987), we have noted that the hallmark for determining the scope of section 1983 coverage is whether the right asserted "is one `that protects the individual against government intrusion,'" Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Nevins, 881 F.2d 657, 662 (9th Cir.1989) (quoting White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Williams, 810 F.2d 844, 848 (9th Cir. 1985)). In Hoopa Valley, for instance, we held that section 1983 could not be used to enforce a collective right to tribal self-government.
The Tribe's treaty-based rights do not give rise to individual actions cognizable under section 1983. As we stated in Settler v. Lameer, 507 F.2d 231, 237 (9th Cir.1974), with regard to fishing rights similar to those that the Tribe's members assert here, "the fishing rights reserved in [the relevant treaty] are communal rights of the Tribe, even though the individual members benefit from those rights." See also Whitefoot v. United States, 155 Ct.Cl. 127, 293 F.2d 658, 663 (Ct.Cl.1961) (noting that "interests in ... fisheries are communal, subject to tribal regulation").7 Because the Tribe's members seek to vindicate communal, rather than individual rights, they do not have cognizable section 1983 claims against the City or TPU.8
B. Reserved Water Rights Claim
In Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 28 S.Ct. 207, 52 L.Ed. 340 (1908), the Supreme Court held that federal reservations of public land can sometimes carry implied property rights in appurtenant waters. "While many of the contours of what has come to be called the `implied-reservation-of-water doctrine' remain unspecified, the Court has repeatedly emphasized that [the United States] reserved `only that amount of water necessary to fulfill the purpose of the reservation, no more.'" United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 700, 98 S.Ct. 3012, 57 L.Ed.2d 1052 (1978) (quoting Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 141, 96 S.Ct. 2062, 48 L.Ed.2d 523 (1976)). The Court has found implied water rights stemming from a reservation of public land only where "without the water the purposes of the reservation would be entirely defeated." Id. But "[w]here water is only valuable for a secondary use of the reservation, ... there arises the contrary inference that [the United States] intended, consistent with its other views, that the [reservation] would acquire water in the same manner as any other public or private appropriator." Id. at 702, 98 S.Ct. 3012.
The Tribe directs us to submitted declarations from a historian and a cultural anthropologist, but these declarations only suggest that fishing was important to the Tribe, and that the United States intended to ensure the Tribe was not excluded from its fisheries. Demonstrating that the United States intended for the Tribe to continue fishing on the reservation is not the same as showing that fishing was a primary purpose of the reservation. Cf. id. at 716, 98 S.Ct. 3012 ("While Congress intended the national forests to be put to a variety of uses, including stockwatering, not inconsistent with the two principal purposes of the forests, stockwatering was not itself a direct purpose of reserving the land."); id. at 716-17, 98 S.Ct. 3012 ("Congress, of course, did intend to secure favorable water flows, and one of the uses to which the enhanced water supply was intended to be placed was probably stockwatering. But Congress intended the water supply from the Rio Mimbres to be allocated among private appropriators under state law.").
Nor does the Treaty language help the Tribe. The Treaty merely provides that the Tribe shall have "[t]he right of taking fish ... in common with all citizens of the United States." Treaty, art. 4. This language distinguishes our case from United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir.1983), where we based our finding of implied water rights in part on treaty language "expressly provid[ing] that the[plaintiff Indian Tribe] will have exclusive on-reservation fishing and gathering rights." See id. at 1409 (emphasis added). The Treaty language in this case cannot make up for the inadequacy of the evidence the Tribe has presented.
Under Washington law, the statute of limitations for inverse condemnation is ten years. Highline Sch. Dist. No. 401 v. Port of Seattle, 87 Wash.2d 6, 548 P.2d 1085, 1089 (Wash.1976). The statutes of limitations for trespass, negligence, conversion, tortious interference, nuisance and actions under Washington Revised Code section 4.24.630 are three years. See Wash. Rev.Code § 4.16.080.9
D. 16 U.S.C. § 803(c)
The Tribe also claims the City and TPU violated 16 U.S.C. § 803(c), which requires licensees to maintain project works in a condition so as not to impair navigation. Section 803(c) provides that "[e]ach licensee hereunder shall be liable for all damages occasioned to the property of others by the construction, maintenance, or operation of the project works or of the works appurtenant or accessory thereto, constructed under the license, and in no event shall the United States be liable therefor."
We reject defendants' contention that the FPA preempts the Tribe's treaty-based damages claims against the City and TPU. Defendants' argument is based on the fact that in 1924, the City received a license from the Federal Power Commission (FPC) authorizing the flooding of 8.8 acres of federal land that would result from the ProjectSee City of Tacoma, 67 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,152, at 61,440 (1994). Defendants assert that the Tribe's treaty-based claims are actually collateral attacks on the licensing decision, which are governed by the FPA and which the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider. See 16 U.S.C. § 825 l (b).
The 1924 license was a narrow "minor part" license, applying by its terms only to "the occupancy and use of a tract of land approximately 8.8 acres in area ... said land constituting a minor part of said power project." As the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission — the FPC's successor — has recognized, the license did not"authorize the construction, operation, and maintenance of the Cushman Project." City of Tacoma, 67 F.E.R.C. at ¶ 61,440.
Judge Berzon's dissent misreads our opinion as assuming that "the cases upholding causes of action for violation of Indian treaty rights but providing only equitable relief implicitly held that damages arenot available." Berzon dissent at 2986. We find only that those cases did not recognize an implied right of action for damages, and that there are no grounds for inferring that the parties to the Treaty intended to create such an action. Cf. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 284, 118 S.Ct. 1989, 141 L.Ed.2d 277 (1998) (stating that courts implying rights of action "have a measure of latitude to shape a sensible remedial scheme that best comports" with the relevant enactment).
Similarly mistaken is the dissent's description of our opinion as holding that "Indian tribes and their members cannot, under federal law, sue municipalities for damages for violation of rights secured by Indian treaties." Berzon dissent at 2980. We analyze a specific set of claims brought under a specific treaty, and we thus have no occasion to consider whether different rights of action might be implied from other treaties.
In her dissent, Judge Berzon relies onUnited States v. Washington, 935 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir.1991) (Washington II). Berzon dissent at 2992-93. But in that case we ruled only that lower courts must distinguish "between litigation defining and enforcing" treaty rights in determining whether attorney's fees should be awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Id. at 1061. We did not consider, let alone resolve, whether Indian tribes may properly sue as "persons" under section 1983 for violation of treaty-based rights; the question does not appear to have been raised.
Judge Berzon disagrees with our conclusion in significant part based onKimball v. Callahan, 590 F.2d 768 (9th Cir.1979) (Kimball II), where we reaffirmed our prior holding in Kimball v. Callahan, 493 F.2d 564 (9th Cir.1974) (Kimball I), that an individual Indian "possessing treaty rights to hunt, fish, and trap" on a former reservation "retained those rights even though he relinquished his tribal membership pursuant to" a tribal termination act. Kimball II, 590 F.2d at 772. As the dissent concedes, however, the Kimball cases "did not involve a suit brought under § 1983." Berzon dissent at 2934. Moreover, the cases dealt with the rights of individual Indians after their tribe was terminated. Indeed, we expressly distinguished Washington, 520 F.2d at 688, and Whitefoot, 293 F.2d at 663, on the ground that "[n]either of these cases... was concerned, as was Kimball I, with the tribal rights of individual Indians upon the termination of a tribe." Kimball II, 590 F.2d at 772. Our case likewise does not involve claims made by individual Indians after the tribal entity has been terminated. Kimball II further limited Kimball I by noting that "the court's statement [in Kimball I] that treaty rights to hunt and fish are rights of the individual Indian must be understood within the context of the two cases cited in its support." Id. at 772-73 (footnote omitted). The first of these cases, McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164, 93 S.Ct. 1257, 36 L.Ed.2d 129 (1973), "involve[d] the narrow question whether the State may tax a reservation Indian for income earned exclusively on the reservation," id. at 168, 93 S.Ct. 1257, and was based on the general policy of "leaving Indians free from state jurisdiction and control," id. (quoting Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 789, 65 S.Ct. 989, 89 L.Ed. 1367 (1945)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The second, Mason v. Sams, 5 F.2d 255 (W.D.Wash.1925), dealt with whether "the Commissioner of Indian Affairs could enforce regulations made by him without tribal consent which required [tribe members] to pay a royalty for the fish they caught in reservation streams to be used by the Tribe for the care of the aged and destitute members of the Tribe and for general agency purposes." Kimball II, 590 F.2d at 773. Here, by contrast, the Tribe's members are not attempting to challenge governmental regulation of individual Indians. Our opinions in Kimball I and Kimball II, then, provide little guidance.
Similarly, Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Fish & Game Commission, 42 F.3d 1278 (9th Cir.1994), addressed whether the plaintiff actually intended to sue officers of the Idaho Fish and Game Commission in their individual capacities under section 1983. See id. at 1284-85. Following a close textual analysis of the complaint, we held that it did name one officer in his individual capacity, alleging violations of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, as well as treaty rights. We did not consider when a section 1983 claim could be brought to vindicate treaty rights.
The Tribe argues that the Indian Claims Limitation Act of 1982 ("ICLA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2415, preserves the Tribe's aggradation-related claims. Under the ICLA, claims brought by Indian tribes are subject to a six-year and ninety-day statute of limitations, unless preserved by publication in the Federal Register. Any cause of action not published in the Federal Register is barred sixty days after the date of publicationId. Claims included on the list are not barred until after the Secretary of the Department of the Interior either (1) publishes in the Federal Register a notice of rejection of the claim, and a complaint is not filed by the claimant within one year of the Federal Register notice; or (2) submits a legislative proposal to Congress, in which case any right of action on that claim is barred unless the claimant files a complaint within three years of the submission to Congress. Id."So long as a listed claim is neither acted upon nor formally rejected by the Secretary, it remains live." County of Oneida II, 470 U.S. at 243, 105 S.Ct. 1245.
The ICLA does not apply to state-law claims, as the Tribe conceded at argument. Instead, we apply state statutes of limitations to state-law claims. See Nev. Power Co. v. Monsanto Co., 955 F.2d 1304, 1306 (9th Cir.1992). But even if the ICLA were to apply, the Tribe's state-law claims are distinct from the preserved fishery claims. The Tribe preserved claims relating to "fishery" damage caused by the Cushman Dam. Though there is not much evidence in the record detailing the preserved claims, the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior described them as based on "[d]estruction of fishery by diversion of water for hydroelectric project on North Fork River." Supp. E.R. at 404K. In a letter submitted to Congress urging an extension of the statute of limitations, the Tribe described its preserved claims as follows:
In her dissent, Judge Graber relies on the license that FERC issued to the City in 1998, which directed the City to file a plan for "enhancing the channel conveyance capacity of the mainstem Skokomish River."See E.R. at 177; Graber dissent at 2976-77, 2978-79. But the license states only that the cost of financing the plan may be no more than $5 million, and the Tribe offers no reason to think the actual cost of abatement would be materially less than this maximum. As for Judge Graber's reliance on the possibility that the cost of abatement might "perhaps" be lower than the remediation cost estimates offered by the Tribe, see Graber dissent at 2979, the Tribe cannot overcome defendants' motion for summary judgment on the basis of such conjecture.
I concur in the majority opinion with two exceptions. First, with respect to the right of individual members of the Tribe to bring a § 1983 claim against the City and TPU, I agree with Judge Berzon's dissent at pages 1002-04. Second, I disagree with the majority's conclusion that the statute of limitations has run on the Tribe's Washington-law claims for nuisance and trespass. Under Washington law, even a permanent structure (like a dam or a sewer) can result in a "continuing" nuisance or trespass. If there is a "continuing" nuisance or trespass, then the plaintiff can seek damages for the three years immediately preceding the filing of the complaint, because the act for which damages are sought is a present, ongoing act rather than a past, completed act. Here, a question of fact remains concerning the proper application of the statute of limitations.
Two pieces of evidence support the Tribe's claim that the aggradation is reasonably abatable. First, at least two of the Tribe's technical consultants stated that aggradation can be abated by dredging the river or decreasing the amount of water diverted away from the North Fork.1 Second, Tacoma's 1998 license from FERC directed it to develop "specific cost-effective measures proposed to increase the channel conveyance capacity" of the Skokomish mainstem, including "flow manipulation [and] flushing flows."
The FERC order supports the Tribe's showing, for summary judgment purposes, that these measures to abate aggradation would be feasible. In Fradkin, the court held that summary judgment was improper where the plaintiff had produced a report recommending certain measures to remedy the condition (and where the trespassing utility had itself attempted to fix the problem). Id. The court did not discuss the cost of such measures or the value of the plaintiff's property in relation to these measures. Id. In Jacques v. Pioneer Plastics, Inc., 676 A.2d 504 (Me.1996) (cited in Fradkin, 977 P.2d at 1270 n. 23), a document even more similar to the FERC order sufficed to raise a genuine issue of material fact: a compliance order from a state agency that directed the contaminating parties to submit a remediation feasibility study. Id. at 508. Several courts have noted that abatability is not necessarily a return to the status quo ante or a complete elimination of the problem. See, e.g., Mangini v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp., 12 Cal.4th 1087, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 272, 912 P.2d 1220, 1226 (1996) ("something less than total decontamination may suffice to show abatability") (cited in Fradkin, 977 P.2d at 1270 n. 23); Beck Dev. Co. v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 44 Cal.App.4th 1160, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 518, 558 (1996) (noting that "the ability to remediate to levels demanded by the regulatory agencies was sufficient abatability"); Hanes v. Cont'l Grain Co., 58 S.W.3d 1, 4 (2001) ("We disagree... that in order to show a nuisance can be abated, it must be shown that the entire nuisance can be eliminated, and a reduction or lessening of the nuisance is insufficient.... A nuisance can be abated to the degree where it is no longer a substantial interference.").
Cf. Castaic Lake Water Agency v. Whittaker Corp., 272 F.Supp.2d 1053, 1072 (C.D.Cal.2003) (holding that deposition testimony regarding a $36 million treatment program for drinking water affected by contamination did not support the plaintiff's claim of abatability because the treatment facility would not abate "the actual nuisance-namely, the underground contamination").
More specifically, Supreme Court precedent, as well as cases from the courts of appeals, support the conclusions that (a) both tribes and individual members of tribes may sue municipalities for damages for violations of the tribes' treaty rights; and (b) individual tribe members may sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of their asserted right to take fish at the usual and accustomed times. The majority's contrary assertions largely ignore two centuries of understandings concerning the federal protection of Indian aboriginal and treaty-based rights — in particular, the understanding that Indian treaties in large part simply preserve some pre-existing aboriginal rights in exchange for cession of a portion of Indian land. Whether the majority's conclusions would make sense if we were developing the law of Indian rights to the use of land and water afresh — which I do not think they would — is not the question, as we are not free to reinvent established doctrine. I therefore respectfully dissent.2
* Without examining what pre-existing rights, if any, the Tribe reserved under the Treaty of Point No Point ("Treaty"), 12 Stat. 933 (1855),3 the majority mistakenly dismisses all possibility that the Tribe can seek damages for violations of any such rights. This conclusion-induced by a misplaced focus on cases concerning attempts to imply causes of action from statutes or from international treaties-ignores settled precedent concerning Indian treaty-protected rights. The scope of a cause of action to enforce Indians' aboriginal rights, including such rights reserved in treaties with the United States, cannot sensibly be resolved by invoking lines of authority developed in areas of the law lacking the long tradition of federal common law protection accorded Indian property and related rights. As the majority's reasoning fails to appreciate the uniquely federal nature of the land, water, and fishing claims by Indians, it is largely beside the point. There are hard issues in this case concerning the precise import of several precedents concerning Indians' treaty-protected rights, but the majority's simplistic approach misses them all.
I note at the outset that the majority is quite correct in recognizing — albeit in passing — that rights of action are available for equitable relief against "non-contracting" parties to Indian treaties. Ante at 985. From this starting point, however, the majority rushes to the unsupported conclusion that a Tribe may not recover monetary damages for alleged treaty violations. In doing so, the majority makes three major mis-steps: (1) conflating interpretation of this Indian Treaty with a private cause of action under non-Indian treaties and federal statutes; (2) asserting that the non-signatory status of Tacoma Public Utilities ("TPU") and the City of Tacoma ("City") somehow absolves those entities of responsibility here; and (3) conjuring a distinction between damages and equitable relief inconsistent with binding authority.
(1) The majority rests its constrained interpretation of the rights reserved by — and the relief available to enforce — this Treaty upon a foundation of wholly irrelevant cases. Cases construing Title VI of the Civil Rights Act (Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 121 S.Ct. 1511, 149 L.Ed.2d 517 (2001)) or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 99 S.Ct. 2479, 61 L.Ed.2d 82 (1979)) have little relevance to the interpretation of Indian treaties.4 The Supreme Court has made clear that Indian treaties are unique, governed by different canons of construction than those that apply to statutes and other treaties. See, e.g., County of Oneida II, 470 U.S. at 247-48, 105 S.Ct. 1245.
The right to resort to the fishing places in controversy was a part of larger rights possessed by the Indians ... which were not much less necessary to the existence of the Indians than the atmosphere they breathed.... [T]he treaty was not a grant of rights to the Indians, but a grant of right from them — a reservation of those not granted.... [The treaty] imposed a servitude upon every piece of land as though described therein.... The contingency of the future ownership of the lands, therefore, was foreseen and provided for — in other words, the Indians were given a right in the land — the right of crossing it to the river — the right to occupy it to the extent and for the purpose mentioned. No other conclusion would give effect to the treaty. And the right was intended to be continuing against the United States and its grantees as well as against the State and its grantees....
(3) So, then, if the Treaty is self-enforcing and the Treaty can be enforced against non-contracting parties, what is left of the majority's assertion that the Tribe cannot seek damages for elimination of fishing rights secured by a treaty? To fill this gap, the majority asserts, repeatedly but without citation to any pertinent authority, that in a case involving a nonsignatory to the Treaty, there is a determinative distinction in enforcing these rights between an action for damages and an action for equitable relief. Ante at 985.
The first sentence of Justice Powell's opinion in County of Oneida II explains: "These cases present the question whether three Tribes of the Oneida Indians may bring a suit for damages for the occupation and use of tribal land allegedly conveyed unlawfully in 1795." 470 U.S. at 229, 105 S.Ct. 1245 (emphasis added). To answer this question, the Court explored at some length the historical availability of federal causes of action to enforce Indian aboriginal rights, whether secured by treaties or not, concluding that "Indians have a federal common[ ] law right to sue to enforce their aboriginal land rights." Id. at 235, 105 S.Ct. 1245. Consequently, the Oneidas could maintain their damages action "for violation of their possessory rights based on federal common law." Id. at 236, 105 S.Ct. 1245. Moreover, this circuit, citing County of Oneida II, has similarly affirmed the ability of an Indian tribe to bring a damages action against a public utility based upon a federal common law cause of action. See United States v. Pend Oreille Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 28 F.3d 1544, 1549 n. 8 (9th Cir.1994);6 see also Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Burgett Floral Co., 503 F.2d 336, 338 (10th Cir.1974). This authority makes plain that Indian tribes may bring a damages action under federal common law to enforce their rights to use of land.
A closer examination of the nature of the Tribe's claimed rights further reveals the majority's fundamental misunderstanding of the very claim it summarily dismisses. Like the Oneidas,7 the Tribe here is not simply seeking to enforce rights created by the Treaty. Rather, it is claiming to enforce an aboriginal right — the right "of taking fish at usual and accustomed grounds and stations" (emphasis added) — reserved in the Treaty. See Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 677, 94 S.Ct. 772, 39 L.Ed.2d 73 (1974) (County of Oneida I) (characterizing the right claimed by the Tribe as one in which "federal law now protects, and has continuously protected from the time of the formation of the United States, possessory right to tribal lands, wholly apart from the application of state law principles which normally and separately protect a valid right of possession"); see also Winans, 198 U.S. at 381-82, 25 S.Ct. 662.
Once more, so to state is not to settle the question whether the rights here asserted — to preserve fish runs from destructions — were reserved by the Treaty of Point No Point. See supra note 2. It is only to say that if the right was reserved, it is enforceable in a damages action under the federal common law. In failing to acknowledge that possibility, and, instead, resting on inappropriate analogies to treaties with foreign governments and on federal statutes having nothing to do with Indian rights, the majority reaches a conclusion in direct conflict with binding law.
Inyo County held that a tribe may not sue under § 1983 to vindicate a right held solely because of its status as a sovereign. See Inyo County, 538 U.S. at 712, 123 S.Ct. 1887. As the majority recognizes, ante at 987, this narrow holding leaves open the possibility that a tribe may bring suit to vindicate rights similar to those held by private persons. See id. at 711, 123 S.Ct. 1887 (discussing cases in which the Supreme Court had held states and foreign nations to be "persons").
Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Nevins, 881 F.2d 657 (9th Cir.1989), is not to the contrary. Hoopa Valley held that "[b]ecause the right to tribal government protects the powers conferred upon the tribe, and not individual rights, it falls outside the scope of § 1983." Id. at 662. But, as in Inyo County, the tribe in Hoopa Valley was attempting to assert a tribal government right, held solely because it was a sovereign — namely, its freedom from state taxation.
Hoopa Valley also relies on a distinction between "power conferring provisions" and "rights conferring provisions" of federal law, holding that "power conferring provisions, such as the Supremacy Clause," are not rights that can be vindicated under § 1983. Id. While the Supremacy Clause cannot, by itself, form the basis of a § 1983 claim, see Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 107, 110 S.Ct. 444, 107 L.Ed.2d 420 (1989), that is because the Supremacy Clause "`is not a source of any federal rights.'" Id. (citation omitted). In Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 111 S.Ct. 865, 112 L.Ed.2d 969 (1991), however, the Supreme Court upheld a cause of action under § 1983 based on the Commerce Clause, rejecting the argument that the Commerce Clause could not be the basis of a § 1983 cause of action because it "merely allocates power between the Federal and State Governments and does not confer `rights.'" Id. at 447, 111 S.Ct. 865. The Court instead held that the Commerce Clause both was a "power allocating" provision and constituted a "substantive restriction on permissible state regulation of interstate commerce." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Somewhat similarly, in Golden State Transit Corp., the Court held that rights created by the National Labor Relations Act can support a § 1983 action, because in that circumstance "`pre-emption follows ... as a matter of substantive right.'" 493 U.S. at 110, 110 S.Ct. 444 (quoting Brown v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Int'l Union Local 54, 468 U.S. 491, 503, 104 S.Ct. 3179, 82 L.Ed.2d 373 (1984)).
[T]he case before us differs from these earlier cases in a single critical respect: while previous litigation has attempted to define the treaty rights, [this proceeding] is purely an action to enforce them....
Although the treaty giving exclusive fishing rights to the Quinaielts was with the Tribe, the court held[in Mason v. Sams, 5 F.2d 255 (W.D.Wash.1925)] that the right of taking fish was a right common to the members of the Tribe and that "a right to a common is the right of an individual of the community." [Id.].
(1) I do not believe that the interpretation of the "right of taking fish" language is directly controlling on the reserved water rights issue. Reserved water rights cases usually concern preservation of water flows of rivers and streams appurtenant to a federal reservation. See, e.g., Winters, 207 U.S. at 566-67, 28 S.Ct. 207; Joint Bd. of Control v. United States, 832 F.2d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir.1987); United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1408 (9th Cir.1983). The Treaty fishing language, in contrast, pertains primarily to off-reservation fishing, preserving fishing rights on non-reservation land that is accessible to both Indians and non-Indians. See, e.g., Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 674-85, 99 S.Ct. 3055.
This majority is wrong, however, in stating that the "right of taking fish" language is not pertinent at all in establishing, for purposes of the Winters doctrine, that preserving a fishing culture was a primary purpose of the reservation. Ante at. The "taking fish" language indicates awareness by the parties to the Treaty of the importance of fishing to the Tribe. Surely, if the parties were concerned enough with protecting the Tribe's access to fish to create easements over private land so as to allow off-reservation fishing, see Winans, 198 U.S. at 381, 25 S.Ct. 662, they would also be centrally concerned with preserving the Tribe's ability to fish in water accessible on the reservation itself.
Further, decades of hard-fought litigation concerning Northwest Indian fishing rights have resulted in a Treaty interpretation, ignored by the majority, that supports the Tribe's position. Fishing Vessel concerned the meaning of identical treaty language to that in this case. See 443 U.S. at 674, 99 S.Ct. 3055. In Fishing Vessel, the Washington Game Department and, later, the State of Washington, proposed an "equal opportunity" approach to the language, arguing that "the treaties gave the Indians no fishing rights not enjoyed by non-treaty fishermen except the two rights previously recognized by decisions of this Court — the right of access over private lands to their usual and accustomed fishing grounds." Id. at 671, 99 S.Ct. 3055 (citations omitted).
The Supreme Court, however, unequivocally rejected such an approach. The Court held that the treaty language does not mean that Indians have only the same right as individual non-Indians, but rather, that they retain a right to a portion of the fish runs in an amount "so much as ... is necessary to provide the Indians with a livelihood-that is to say, a moderate living." Id. at 677, 686, 99 S.Ct. 3055. While the percentage distribution can vary depending upon factual conditions,11 the salient point is that the "treaty guarantees the Indians more than simply the `equal opportunity' along with all of the citizens of the State to catch fish, and it in fact assures them some portion of each relevant run." Id. at 681-82, 99 S.Ct. 3055. In so ruling, Fishing Vessel exhaustively reviewed the treaty language itself, additional language in the treaties, and six of the Court's precedents, concluding that the treaty language is "unambiguous" and that all of the Court's precedents reject an "equal opportunity" approach. See id. at 674-84, 99 S.Ct. 3055.
(2) Looking at the record as a whole, including the treaty language, I would hold that the Tribe made a sufficient factual showing on summary judgment that preserving the Tribe's fisheries was a primary purpose of agreeing to the Treaty and creating the reservation.
In interpreting Indian treaties, we pay particular attention to the sense in which the Indians would naturally have understood the treaty. As Fishing Vessel explained: When Indians are involved, this Court has long given special meaning to this rule. It has held that the United States, as the party with the presumptively superior negotiating skills and superior knowledge of the language in which the treaty is recorded, has a responsibility to avoid taking advantage of the other side. "[T]he treaty must therefore be construed, not according to the technical meaning of its words to learned lawyers, but in the sense in which they would naturally be understood by the Indians."
Moreover, the evidence that TPU and the City offer to refute the Tribe's claim is not enough to support summary judgment. They assert that a primary purpose of the reservation is agriculture. Assuming that to be true, such a purpose would not preclude finding that another primary purpose of the reservation was fishing. There does not have to be only one primary purpose to a reservation. See Adair, 723 F.2d at 1410 ("Neither Cappaert [, 426 U.S. 128, 96 S.Ct. 2062, 48 L.Ed.2d 523 (1976),] nor New Mexico [, 438 U.S. 696, 98 S.Ct. 3012, 57 L.Ed.2d 1052 (1978),] requires us to choose between [agriculture or hunting/fishing] or to identify a single essential purpose which the parties to the 1864 Treaty intended the Klamath Reservation to serve."); see also Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 48 (9th Cir.1981) (holding that there was an implied reservation of water for fishing grounds while recognizing that both "[p]roviding for a land-based agrarian society" and that "preservation of the tribe's access to fishing grounds" were purposes for the reservation).
Furthermore, the majority's comparison to Adair to note that decision's reliance on the express recognition of fishing rights is unpersuasive. That the treaty at issue in Adair expressly recognized an exclusive fishing right does little to impair the Tribe's case here. Express treaty recognition of the specific purpose as exclusive is not necessary to recognize an activity as a primary purpose of a reservation. See Adair, 723 F.2d at 1409 (implying the right to hunt from language that only noted "fishing and gathering rights"). Indeed, express recognition of any purpose is not even necessary for that purpose to be a primary one. Colville Confederated Tribes, 647 F.2d at 47 & n. 8 (implying a reservation of water for both irrigation and fishing purposes from a one paragraph Executive Order that articulates no purpose for the reservation).14
In sum, because I find no support for barring the Tribe and its members from bringing suit — either under the federal common law based on Treaty-secured rights or via § 1983 — I respectfully dissent. I also dissent from the grant of summary judgment on the reserved water rights claim. Once more, because the majority does not decide the question, critical though it is, I do not decide whether the Tribe or its members have alleged a right to preservation of fisheries that is protected under federal common law or § 1983.
I dissent only from subsections A ("Treaty-Based Claims") and B ("Reserved Water Rights Claim") of Part II ("Claims Against the City of Tacoma and Tacoma Public Utilities") of the majority opinion
Because the majority does not reach the questions raised in this case that logically follow a determination that these plaintiffs may bring suit for damages against these defendants — including whether the federal causes of action are barred by statutes of limitations or preserved by the Indian Claims Limitation Act (ICLA), 28 U.S.C. § 2415 note, and whether the Treaty of Point No Point ("Treaty"), 12 Stat. 933 (1855), in fact establishes the rights claimed — I do not do so either
I do note that the most challenging question thus left open is whether the Tribe's off-reservation fishing rights give rise to a cause of action for limiting the numbers of fish that formerly inhabited the streams and rivers in which the Tribe traditionally fished, or whether, instead, the Treaty preserves only a right to take a given proportion of such fish as remain extant. This court previously addressed that important question but subsequently vacated the decision and has not since had occasion to resolve it. See United States v. Washington, 694 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir.1982), on en banc reh'g, 759 F.2d 1353, 1355 (9th Cir.1985) (failing to determine whether "the right to take fish necessarily includes the right to have those fish protected from man-made despoliation"); see also Kittitas Reclamation Dist. v. Sunnyside Valley Irrigation Dist., 763 F.2d 1032, 1033, 1035 (9th Cir.1985) (approving district court order releasing water from a water project to preserve nests of salmon eggs so as to preserve the Indian right of taking off-reservation fish "in common with citizens"); Nez Perce Tribe v. Idaho Power Co., 847 F.Supp. 791, 810 (D.Idaho 1994) (holding that a Northwest Indian treaty similar to the one in this case "does not provide a guarantee that there will be no decline in the amount of fish available to take"); CONFERENCE OF W. ATTORNEYS GEN., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK 330-33 & n. 194 (Clay Smith ed., 3d ed.2004) (noting that "[m]any commentators have advocated a treaty-based habitat protection right" and citing to the commentary).
The City and TPU, as governmental entities, are bound by the rights reserved in the Treaty. Cities and local governments are, of course, subject to the Supremacy Clause. As "the constitutionality of local ordinances is analyzed in the same way as that of statewide laws" for purposes of the Supremacy Clause, Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713, 105 S.Ct. 2371, 85 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985) (citation omitted), cities and local governments cannot pass ordinances or laws that "`interfere with, or are contrary to,' federal law." Id. at 712, 105 S.Ct. 2371 (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211, 6 L.Ed. 23 (1824)); see Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 431, 109 S.Ct. 2994, 106 L.Ed.2d 343 (1989) (plurality opinion) ("Since the tribes' protectible interest is one arising under federal law, the Supremacy Clause requires state and local governments, including Yakima County zoning authorities, to recognize and respect that interest in the course of their activities."); see also C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 394-95, 114 S.Ct. 1677, 128 L.Ed.2d 399 (1994); Cmty. Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 57, 102 S.Ct. 835, 70 L.Ed.2d 810 (1982); City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc. 411 U.S. 624, 640, 93 S.Ct. 1854, 36 L.Ed.2d 547 (1973); City of Chicago v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 357 U.S. 77, 84-85, 78 S.Ct. 1063, 2 L.Ed.2d 1174 (1958); Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 343, 44 S.Ct. 515, 68 L.Ed. 1041 (1924); City of Auburn v. Qwest Corp., 260 F.3d 1160, 1175-76 (9th Cir.2001); United States v. City of Pittsburg, 661 F.2d 783, 785-86 (9th Cir.1981); Nat'l Helicopter Corp. of Am. v. City of New York, 137 F.3d 81, 92 (2d Cir.1998); Pirolo v. City of Clearwater, 711 F.2d 1006, 1010 (11th Cir.1983).
Treaties are listed among the types of law that make up "the supreme Law of the Land." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (Supremacy Clause) ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."). Cities and local governments therefore are bound, under the Supremacy Clause, to respect rights created by or reserved in Indian treaties.
That the asserted aboriginal right here is enshrined in a treaty does not separate this case from theCounty of Oneida precedents. The Oneidas' challenge to the 1795 cession by the state of New York was predicated in part upon the "Indians' right to possession under the federal treaties" between the United States and the Oneidas in the 1780s and 1790s. Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 664-65, 94 S.Ct. 772, 39 L.Ed.2d 73 (1974) (County of Oneida I). As is true here, "the right to possession itself is claimed to arise under federal law in the first instance. Allegedly, aboriginal title of an Indian tribe guaranteed by treaty and protected by statute has never been extinguished." Id. at 676, 94 S.Ct. 772. The majority is thus wrong in stating otherwise. Ante at 987.
Settler v. Lameer, 507 F.2d 231 (9th Cir.1974), and Whitefoot v. United States, 155 Ct.Cl. 127, 293 F.2d 658 (1961), upon which the majority rely, were decided before both Kimball and Dion. Also, they concern the question whether the individual fishing rights are subject to tribal regulation, not whether individual rights consistent with tribal regulation may be asserted by individual Indians. Settler, 507 F.2d at 232; Whitefoot, 293 F.2d at 661, 663. As such, they are not informative with respect to the problem before us.
That language comes from article 4 of the Treaty and explains that "[t]he right of taking fish at usual and accustomed grounds and stations is further secured to said Indians, in common with all citizens of the United States...."
"[A]n equitable measure of the common right should initially divide the harvestable portion of each run that passes through a `usual and accustomed' place into approximately equal treaty and nontreaty shares, and should then reduce the treaty share if tribal needs may be satisfied by a lesser amount."Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 685, 99 S.Ct. 3055.
For example, Richard White, Professor of American History at Stanford University and an expert on the Stevens treaties and the Puget Sound tribes, wrote that:
When read with a real attempt to discern Indian concerns, the treaty journals reveal a concern on the part of the Indians for preserving their entire subsistence cycle and particularly the full range of the species in their fisheries. What Indians wanted was access to their customary food resources.
Professor White's declaration reports, relying on documents concerning the negotiation of the Stevens treaties, that Stevens promised the Indians that "as for food, you yourselves now, as in times past, can take care of yourselves ... you will have the means and the opportunity to cultivate the soil to get your potatoesand to go over these waters in your canoes to get your fish." (emphasis added). Professor White goes on to explain:
Stevens's desire for Indians to have permanent access to fish, including shellfish, makes perfect sense given his ambitions for the treaty. Permanent access to food supplies meant that the costs of the treaties could be kept down. Permanent access to resources meant that Indians could feed themselves and still be available for seasonal labor among whites. Permanent access to resources meant that Indians could continue to serve as suppliers of shellfish and other fish to the white market.
I am not prepared to say how many fish the Tribe is entitled to or how many gallons of reserved water that implies. Those questions have no answer until there is a definitive determination, after trial, of what water rights were reserved by the Treaty, the question never reached by the majority