Source: http://nj.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.19850514_0040700.C03.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2017-03-30 02:48:04
Document Index: 350674541

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 304', '§ 7604', '§ 7604', '§ 304', '§ 7604', '§ 304', '§ 1988', '§ 1988', '§ 304', '§ 304']

DELAWARE VALLEY CITIZENS' COUNCIL FOR CLEAN AIR, ET AL., AMERICAN LUNG ASSOCIATION OF PHILADELPHIA, AND MONTGOMERY COUNTY, DELCHESTER LUNG ASSOCIATION, SIERRA CLUB, PENNSYLVANIA CHAPTER FRIENDS OF THE EARTH OF THE DELAWARE VALLEY, CITIZENS' COMMITTEE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL, QUINN, KEVIN, FARRELL, KAYSI, WEISS, RUTH G., KLINKNER, JOHN, BIEZ, ELIZABETH S., SHULMAN, MONAv.COMMONWEALTH OF PA., & TRAIN, RUSSELL E., IND. & AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL., SHERLOCK, WILLIAM T., INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SECRETARY OF THE PA. DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION, GODDARD, MAURICE K., INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SECRETARY OF THE PA. DEPT. OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES, SNYDER, DANIEL J., III, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, REGION III (D.C. CIVIL 76-2068). UNITED STATES OF AMERICA V. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA; THE PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND WILLIAM T. SHERLOCK, SECRETARY OF THE PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION; THE PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES AND MAURICE K. GODDARD, SECRETARY OF THE PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCE (D.C. CIVIL 77-619). COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, SECRETARY OF PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND SECRETARY OF PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES, APPELLANTS IN NO. 84-1179. DELAWARE VALLEY CITIZENS' COUNCIL FOR CLEAN AIR, APPELLANT IN NO. 84-1208.
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civ. Nos. 76-2068 & 77-619).
This opinion addresses an appeal by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania*fn1 from a large judgment for attorneys fees and costs in favor of the Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air (DVCCCA), pursuant to the attorneys fee provision contained in § 304(d) of the Clean Air Act (the Act), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d), in an action brought under the citizen lawsuit provision of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a). We also consider a cross-appeal by DVCCCA.
The relevant facts surrounding the complex litigation underlying this attorneys fee request have very recently been summarized by this Court and need not be repeated here. See DVCCCA v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 755 F.2d 38, 40-41 (3d Cir. 1985)*fn2 We will therefore turn directly to a brief description of the fee petition litigation itself.
In its petition to the district court for attorneys fees and costs, plaintiff divided its request for compensation into nine phases.*fn3 The Commonwealth acceded to this approach, as did the district court, which made its fee award in terms of the nine phases.*fn4 The district court considered an extensive record and decided the fee petition application in a comprehensive opinion of some 40 pages. While we need not summarize the district court's opinion (the challenged portions are discussed infra), it is important to note that the court took much care in examining the fee petition and disallowed a significant number of claimed hours because it found them inadequately documented, duplicative, unnecessary, or excessive. The court awarded attorneys fees of $209,813.00 for work in the underlying litigation representing a lodestar of $82,233.50 augmented by multipliers of two for phases IV and VII and four Phase V.*fn5 The court then stayed its order pending appeal.
This fee petition is brought pursuant to the Clean Air Act's counsel fee provision, § 304(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d), which states:
In Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 103 S. Ct. 3274, 77 L. Ed. 2d 938 (1983), the Supreme Court held that "absent some degree of success on the merits by the claimant, it is not 'appropriate' for a federal court to award attorney's fees." Id. at 3281.*fn6 Plaintiff is eligible for attorneys fees, therefore, only if it has achieved "some success on the merits."
If plaintiff meets this threshold eligibility requirement, it is entitled under § 304(d) to an award of "reasonable" fees. This part of the Clean Air Act's attorneys fee provision is consonant with the requirements of most other statutory attorneys fee provisions, including 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and we see no reason why the calculation of a reasonable fee for Clean Air Act purposes should differ from the same calculation that courts undertake pursuant to other provisions with the identical standard. Accordingly, we hold that the jurisprudence regarding the calculation of reasonable attorneys fees developed in connection with other attorneys fee statutes -- particularly § 1988 -- is applicable to cases brought pursuant to § 304(d). This includes the jurisprudence concerning the calculation of a lodestar, the determination of reasonable hourly rates, and the enhancement of a fee award based on the quality of work. See generally, Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 104 S. Ct. 1541, 79 L. Ed. 2d 891 (1984); Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of Public Welfare, 758 F.2d 897 (3d Cir. 1985).
The district court included in the lodestar five categories of work (phases I,II,III,VI, and IX) for which the Commonwealth contends that fees cannot be awarded. Before we examine these contentions, we state two general propositions. First, we have no doubt that, by gaining implementation of the consent decree, plaintiff has achieved "some success" in its efforts and a fee award is therefore "appropriate" under § 304(d) of the Act. We hold, therefore, that the work done in each ...