Source: https://casetext.com/case/us-v-pirro
Timestamp: 2020-02-27 05:17:27
Document Index: 101533897

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2241', '§ 2241', '§ 2255', '§ 2241', '§ 2255', '§ 2241', '§2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2555', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2241', '§ 2241', '§ 2241', '§ 2241']

United States v. Pirro, 104 F.3d 297 | Casetext
There is an exception to the general bar against using § 2241 to collaterally attack a federal conviction or…
Parrett v. Iwuagwu
The Ninth Circuit has recognized it as a very "narrow exception." United States v. Pirro, 104 F.3d 297, 299…
Full title:UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALEXANDER THOMAS PIRRO,…
104 F.3d 297 (9th Cir. 1997)
holding that, in general, " federal prisoner authorized to seek relief under section 2255 may not petition for habeas corpus relief pursuant to section 2241"
Summary of this case from Lorentsen v. Hood
Nos. 96-50072, 96-55191
Submitted October 7, 1996 — Pasadena, California
Filed January 9, 1997
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Central District of California. Linda H. McLaughlin, District Judge, Presiding.
D.C. Nos. CR-94-00107-LHM, CV-96-00006-LHM
Before: Melvin Brunetti, Stephen S. Trott, and Sidney R. Thomas, Circuit Judges.
Dismissal of the 28 U.S.C. § 2241 Petition
We review a district court's dismissal of a section 2241 habeas corpus petition de novo. Tripati v. Henman, 843 F.2d 1160, 1162 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 982 (1988).
"The customary procedure for challenging the effectiveness of defense counsel in a federal criminal trial is by collateral attack on the conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255." United States v. Miskinis, 966 F.2d 1263, 1269 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v. Birges, 723 F.2d 666, 670 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 943 (1984) (alteration omitted)). We have rejected the use of a Rule 33 motion for new trial based on "newly discovered evidence" involving the ineffective assistance of counsel. United States v. Hanoum, 33 F.3d 1128, 1130 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 1702 (1995). We also have rejected the use of direct appeal for ineffective assistance of counsel claims, except in limited circumstances where the record is sufficiently developed. Miskinis, 966 F.2d at 1269. In this case, however, Pirro brought his ineffective assistance claim neither in a direct appeal nor in a Rule 33 motion for new trial, but in a section 2241 habeas corpus petition. We therefore must consider whether section 2241 was an appropriate mechanism for relief.
[1] Delay in considering a section 2255 motion results from our direction that, for reasons of judicial economy, "`[a] district court should not entertain a habeas corpus petition while there is an appeal pending in this court or in the Supreme Court.'" United States v. Deeb, 944 F.2d 545, 548 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Feldman v. Henman, 815 F.2d 1318, 1320 (9th Cir. 1987)), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 975 (1992). Pirro would have us declare that a district court complying with our direction robs the section 2255 motion of its effectiveness. Such a result would allow all incarcerated defendants simultaneously to pursue both section 2241 petitions challenging the validity of their convictions and sentences and direct appeals challenging the same. This result would eviscerate our goal of judicial economy by engaging the attention of two courts on the same case at the same time. Accordingly, we hold that a district court's delay in considering a section 2255 motion until direct appeals are resolved does not make the section 2255 motion inadequate or ineffective and therefore does not entitle the defendant prematurely to pursue a section 2241 habeas petition.
[2] In holding that delay in the resolution of a section 2255 motion does not entitle a defendant to bypass section 2255 in favor of section 2241, we join other circuits who have rejected arguments that the delay in the disposition of a section 2255 motion renders it an inadequate remedy. In Winston v. Mustain, 562 F.2d 565, 566-67 (8th Cir. 1977), the defendant argued that the length of time that elapsed after the filing of other motions in the sentencing court without decision evidenced that a section 2255 petition in that court would be inadequate and ineffective. The Eighth Circuit rejected this argument, holding that: (1) "time delays do not operate to confer jurisdiction if jurisdiction does not otherwise exist;" and (2) the defendant could not contend that a section 2255 petition would be inadequate or ineffective when he had not filed one. Id. at 567. Similarly, in Stirone v. Markley, 345 F.2d 473, 475 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 829 (1965), the Seventh Circuit rejected the defendant's argument that the disposition of his section 2255 motion was delayed to such an extent that it became an ineffective remedy. While the court was not prepared to say that an "inordinate delay" would never allow resort to section 2241, it emphasized: "[t]he statute does not prescribe a timetable for the ultimate disposition of a motion filed under section 2255." Id. We agree with the reasoning of these courts and therefore hold that the district court properly dismissed Pirro's section 2241 petition on the ground that a section 2255 motion was adequate and effective. Pirro is free to bring a section 2255 motion asserting ineffective assistance of counsel following the completion of his pending appeal.
II. [18] The Conviction
[3] Pirro contends that three errors committed during his trial require reversal of his conviction: (1) an erroneous instruction on the definition of "assault;" (2) the court's failure to give a specific unanimity instruction; and (3) the prosecutor's closing argument, in which she impermissibly invited the jury to convict Pirro because he displayed the gun but to reject self-defense because he intentionally fired it.
[4] Because Pirro did not object to any of these errors at trial, we review for plain error. United States v. Ponce, 51 F.3d 820, 830 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Manning, 56 F.3d 1188, 1199 (9th Cir. 1995). We find that there was no error in the sufficiency of the jury instructions on the definition of assault. We further find that the court did not plainly err by failing to give sua sponte an additional specific unanimity instruction, because the evidence was not complex and confusing such that there was a risk that different jurors convicted Pirro based on different facts. United States v. Sanchez, 914 F.2d 1355, 1360 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 978 (1991). Finally, we find that the prosecution did not improperly argue inconsistent theories, but maintained that the display of force constituting assault was not reasonably necessary.
[5] Because we find no error, we affirm the conviction.
holding delay in consideration of Section 2255 motion insufficient to make Section 2255 remedy inadequate or ineffective
Summary of this case from Davis v. DHS
holding delay in considering Section 2255 motion in pending appeal not sufficient to make Section 2255 remedy "inadequate or ineffective"
holding remedy under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and § 2255 unavailable while direct appeal is open
Summary of this case from United States v. Horner
Summary of this case from Mann v. Apker
holding that a pre-sentencing petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 was inappropriate
Summary of this case from U.S. v. Hanakis
finding pendency of direct appeal does not render §2255 inadequate or ineffective
finding pendency of direct appeal does not render § 2255 inadequate or ineffective
Summary of this case from Sandlin v. Joslin
Summary of this case from Rivera v. Joslin
determining that the delay in submitting a § 2255 motion until the direct appeal is resolved does not render § 2255 inadequate or ineffective
Summary of this case from Bartok v. Loretto
noting that this rule was created "for reasons of judicial economy"
stating that mere delay in considering a § 2555 motion does not render a remedy under § 2255 inadequate or ineffective
Summary of this case from Thorson v. United States
providing delay in deciding a petitioner's § 2255 motion does not render that remedy inadequate or ineffective, such that he can resort to seeking contemporaneous relief under § 2241
Summary of this case from Boden v. Chandler
noting that a habeas corpus petition, rather than a motion for a new trial under Rule 33, is the "customary procedure for challenging the effectiveness of defense counsel in a federal criminal trial."
Summary of this case from United States v. Hawkins
In Pirro, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a § 2241 petition filed prior to sentencing, holding that the filing of a pre-sentence petition for habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 was not appropriate. The Ninth Circuit expressed concern that giving defendants the opportunity to utilize § 2241 prior to sentencing to raise claims that were otherwise available in a Section 2255 motion "would allow all incarcerated defendants simultaneously to pursue both section 2241 petitions challenging the validity of their convictions and sentences and direct appeals challenging the same.
Summary of this case from U.S. v. Arakelian