Source: http://www.ecases.us/case/c339014/united-states-v-clarence-j-matya/
Timestamp: 2020-02-19 03:41:47
Document Index: 248957645

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2518', '§ 1955', '§ 2518', '§ 1955', '§ 1955', '§ 1955', '§ 1955', '§ 1952', '§ 2', '§ 1952', '§ 1955']

United States v. Clarence J. Matya, Eighth Circuit, US Court of Appeals Cases, Federal Courts, COURT CASE
In Kalustian, alternative means of investigation were discarded because "knowledge and experience" in investigating other gambling cases convinced government agents that normal techniques were unlikely to succeed. . . . But see United States v. Steinberg, 525 F.2d 1126, 1130 (2d Cir. 1975), (cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 96 S. Ct. 2167, 48 L. Ed. 2d 2167 (1976)). The court in Kalustian ordered the evidence suppressed because the alternative means were given little opportunity to succeed. As discussed above, government agents used alternative means in this case. Inspector Olk's affidavits explain why those investigative techniques were inadequate.
We recognize that Congress intended these sections to restrict wiretaps to those which are necessary as well as reasonable. But Congress did not require the exhaustion of "specific" or "all possible" investigative techniques before wiretap orders could be issued. United States v. Smith, 519 F.2d 516, 518 (9th Cir. 1975). Congress prohibited wiretapping only when normal investigative techniques are likely to succeed and are not too dangerous. "Merely because a normal investigative technique is theoretically possible it does not follow that it is likely." S.Rep. 90-1097, U.S.Code Cong. and Admin.News, pp. 2112, 2190 (1968). Sections 2518(1)(c) and 2518(3)(c) are only designed to ensure that wiretapping is "not to be routinely employed as the initial step in criminal investigation", United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 515, 94 S. Ct. 1820, 1826, 40 L. Ed. 2d 341, 353 (1974), and " * * * to assure that wiretapping is not resorted to in situations where traditional investigative techniques would suffice to expose the crime." United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 153 n. 12, 94 S. Ct. 977, 983, 39 L. Ed. 2d 225, 236 (1974). The government's showing must, of course, be tested in a "practical and commonsense fashion." United States v. Kirk, 534 F.2d 1262, at 1274 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Brick, 502 F.2d 219, 224 n. 14 (8th Cir. 1974), quoting, S.Rep. 90-1097, supra, at 2190. And as in other suppression matters, considerable discretion rests with the judge to whom the wiretap application is made. United States v. Smith, supra, 519 F.2d at 518.
Judged by these standards, the affidavit before us was sufficient. It differs only in minor respects from the affidavits approved in United States v. Brick, supra at 224, and United States v. Schaefer, 510 F.2d 1307, 1310 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 975, 978, 95 S. Ct. 1975, 44 L. Ed. 2d 466 (1975). It convinces us that the wiretap here was not "routinely employed as the initial step in the investigation." It explains that other techniques were used first, that these other techniques failed to yield specified pertinent facts, and it relates to a reasonable extent why the other procedures would not yield those facts. It was not necessary that the Government explain away all possible alternative techniques, since the Government is not required to use a wiretap only as a last resort. United States v. Smith, supra at 518, United States v. Kerrigan, supra at 38.
The Fourth Amendment requires in part that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation." It is this basic requirement which Congress wrote into 18 U.S.C. § 2518. United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 158, 94 S. Ct. 977, 39 L. Ed. 2d 225 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). At least since Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 54 S. Ct. 11, 78 L. Ed. 159 (1933), it has been clear that the purpose of the affidavit which accompanies a request for a search warrant is to advise the authorizing judge or magistrate of the "facts and circumstances" establishing probable cause. While the law in this area has been much refined over the years, the central focus on the facts recited in the affidavit has remained unaltered. United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 91 S. Ct. 2075, 29 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1971); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S. Ct. 584, 21 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1969); United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 85 S. Ct. 741, 13 L. Ed. 2d 684 (1965); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1964).
In a § 1955 context, knowledge of the state law purportedly violated is essential to the judge's or magistrate's task of determining whether the facts recited in the affidavit establish probable cause. However, citation of the statute in the affidavit is unnecessary to providing the judge or magistrate with that knowledge. We have no doubt that Judge Urbom either was familiar with the Nebraska gambling statutes or had ready access to such statutes and satisfied himself as to the Nebraska law before issuing the challenged order. Nor would the failure of the affidavit to specify which Nebraska law was purportedly violated in any way hamper this court in assessing whether Judge Urbom's probable cause determination was correct, if that determination were challenged. Defendants do not allege that Judge Urbom misconstrued or misapplied the Nebraska statute or that they have suffered any prejudice as a result of the failure of the affidavit to cite the statute. Consequently, neither the Fourth Amendment nor § 2518 supports defendants' position.10 We hold that the affidavit was not defective merely because it failed to cite the Nebraska statute. See United States v. Averell, 296 F. Supp. 1004, 1014 (E.D.N.Y.1969).
Defendants next contend that the Nebraska statute11 upon which the federal conviction rests is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The vagueness argument falters for the reason that: "(o)ne to whose conduct a statute clearly applies may not successfully challenge it for vagueness." Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756, 94 S. Ct. 2547, 2562, 41 L. Ed. 2d 439 (1974). See United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 92-94, 96 S. Ct. 316, 46 L. Ed. 2d 228 (1975); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550, 95 S. Ct. 710, 42 L. Ed. 2d 706 (1975); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 608, 93 S. Ct. 2908, 37 L. Ed. 2d 830 (1973); Big Eagle v. Andera, 508 F.2d 1293, 1297 (8th Cir. 1975). As stated by the district court, "the evidence clearly supports and the defendants admit to, a finding that they were engaged in bookmaking. This conduct is proscribed by the statute with sufficient clarity to satisfy constitutional scrutiny." Whatever else might be said about the statute, a vagueness argument will not, at least absent implication of the First Amendment, carry defendants beyond this initial observation.12
Defendants' overbreadth argument focuses upon the fact that, allegedly, the Nebraska statute might be read as encompassing such presumably innocent conduct as selling playing cards and reaching such presumably innocent persons as the itinerant purchaser of a lottery ticket. The Government admits that certain portions of the statute "may not be admirably as narrow and precise as possible", and we agree. Inasmuch as defendants do not contend that the Nebraska legislature either could not or did not intend to proscribe their bookmaking activities, however, the mere fact that the statute is in some respects imprecise is of no consequence here. The overbreadth doctrine, far from being an expansive license by which courts routinely invalidate statutes which might have been drafted with more precision, is a doctrine whose function is "limited . . . at the outset", Broadrick v. Oklahoma, supra, 413 U.S. at 615, 93 S. Ct. 2908, and, specifically, a doctrine by which:
Id. at 612, 93 S.Ct. at 2916. See Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 215-17, 95 S. Ct. 2268, 45 L. Ed. 2d 125 (1975); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 815-17, 95 S. Ct. 2222, 44 L. Ed. 2d 600 (1975). Defendants do not suggest, and they would be hard-pressed to do so, that any of the conduct arguably reached by the statute is properly characterized as free expression. Failing that, they cannot successfully invoke the overbreadth doctrine.13
The first two allegations just listed have been repeatedly rejected by this court. Schneider v. United States, 459 F.2d 540 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 877, 93 S. Ct. 129, 34 L. Ed. 2d 131 (1972); United States v. Meese, 479 F.2d 41, 42-43 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Wolk, 466 F.2d 1143, 1146 n. 2 (8th Cir. 1972). Accord, United States v. Morrison, 531 F.2d 1089, 1093 (1st Cir. 1976); United States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d 472, 477-78 (5th Cir. 1976). We adhere to our prior decisions.
We also reject defendants' contention that Congress did not intend to elevate a Nebraska misdemeanor into a federal felony. Although the underlying Nebraska statute in this case does define a misdemeanor, defendants' characterization of § 1955 as "elevating" that misdemeanor into a federal felony is not accurate. It must be recalled that violation of state law is not the sole element of a § 1955 offense. The Government must also establish that five or more persons are involved and that the gambling business remains in substantially continuous operation for a period in excess of thirty days or that the business has gross revenues of $2,000 in any single day. As the Supreme Court has observed, "(m)ajor gambling activities were a principal focus of congressional concern." Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 787, 95 S. Ct. 1284, 1295, 43 L. Ed. 2d 616 (1975). The requirements of § 1955 on their face effectuate this concern. More fundamentally, the Supreme Court has also observed that the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, of which § 1955 is a part, "is a carefully crafted piece of legislation." Id. at 789, 95 S.Ct. at 1296. It is thus significant that the statute makes no distinction whatsoever between state felonies and state misdemeanors. Similarly, the House Report which accompanied the 1970 Act14 makes no such distinction. Defendants cite no convincing authority indicating that or why the statute should not be construed as written,15 and we perceive no reason why it should not be so construed. We accordingly reject defendants' contention.16
Defendants separately allege that the Nebraska statute punishes status rather rather than criminal activity. Cf. Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 92 S. Ct. 839, 31 L. Ed. 2d 110 (1972). Papachristou rested on vagueness grounds and is accordingly subject to the standing requirement articulated in the text above. Since defendants' bookmaking activity was not mere status, it is immaterial in this case whether the statute might in some circumstances be read as punishing status or whether, if it may be so read, Papachristou would in such circumstances bar a conviction
Defendants do cite Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 91 S. Ct. 1056, 28 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1971), in which the Supreme Court reversed certain convictions under the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952, and the aiding and abetting statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2. Section 1952 prohibits interstate travel with intent to "promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate", inter alia, illegal gambling activity. In Rewis the Court held that operators of an illegal gambling business could not successfully be prosecuted under §§ 1952 and 2 merely because their customers crossed state lines to place bets. The following passage of Rewis, it is urged, supports defendants' contention that § 1955 was not intended to apply to state misdemeanors
DocketNumber： 74-1947
Citation Numbers： 541 F.2d 741
Filed Date： 9/9/1976
Robert Glenmore Simmons and Gladyce W. Simmons v. ... , 410 F.2d 881 ( 1969 )
Rudolph O. Schneider, Jr. And Steven Vitale v. United States , 459 F.2d 540 ( 1972 )
United States v. William c.wolk , 466 F.2d 1143 ( 1972 )
United States v. William F. Meese , 479 F.2d 41 ( 1973 )
United States v. Donald J. Quinn , 543 F.2d 640 ( 1976 )
united-states-v-attilio-joe-spagnuolo-thomas-guy-guglielmi-charles , 549 F.2d 705 ( 1977 )
united-states-v-glen-albert-clements-jr-jerry-delbert-basden-john , 588 F.2d 1030 ( 1979 )
William Edward Sodders v. Robert Parratt and Paul Douglas , 693 F.2d 811 ( 1982 )
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United States v. Ed J. Hagen, Also Known as J. Ewald Martha ... , 951 F.2d 261 ( 1991 )
United States v. Houston , 665 F.3d 991 ( 2012 )
United States v. Useni , 516 F.3d 634 ( 2008 )
United States v. Harvey , 560 F. Supp. 1040 ( 1983 )
United States v. Gruber , 994 F. Supp. 1026 ( 1998 )
State v. DiMauro , 205 Neb. 275 ( 1980 )
United States v. Van Horn , 579 F. Supp. 804 ( 1984 )