Source: http://www.juricaf.org/arret/CONSEILDELEUROPE-COUREUROPEENNEDESDROITSDELHOMME-19850307-983382
Timestamp: 2017-04-28 08:56:27+00:00
Document Index: 161481364

Matched Legal Cases: ['arrêt ', "l'article 2", "l'article 1", "l'article 25", "l'article 26", "l'article 26", "l'article 26", "l'article 26", "l'article 27"]

H. contre le ROYAUME-UNI et l'IRLANDE
Page d'accueil > Résultats de la recherche H. contre le ROYAUME-UNI et l'IRLANDE
Type d'affaire : DecisionType de recours : Partiellement irrecevable ; partiellement recevableNumérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 9833/82Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1985-03-07;9833.82 Analyses : (Art. 13) DROIT A UN RECOURS EFFECTIF, (Art. 14) DISCRIMINATION, (Art. 3) PEINE DEGRADANTE, (Art. 3) PEINE INHUMAINEParties : Demandeurs : H.Défendeurs : le ROYAUME-UNI et l'IRLANDETexte : APPLICATION/REQUÃTE NÂ° 9833/82 H . v/the UNITED KINGDOM and IRELAN D H . c/ROYAUME-UNI et IRLAND E DECISION of 7 March 1985 on the admissibility of the application DÃCISION du 7 mars 1985 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªt e
Article 25 of the Convention : 7he mother ofa murdered person regarded as victim of an alleged violation of Article 2 of the Convention . Arficle 26 of the Convention : a) In the absence of domestic remedies the six months' period runs from the act complained of in the application. b) Alleged failure to act on the pan of the authorities which, according to the applicant, made possible the murder of her daughter, does not give rise, after the murder, to a continuing situation which would prevent time from running . c) For the running of the period to be intermpted, clear and decisive considerations must be raised. Examination of the faclual circumstances (state of health) regarded by the applicant as sufficient to interrupt the running of the period.
Article 25 de la Convention : MÃ©re d'une personne assassinÃ©e considÃ©rÃ©e comme victime d'une violation allÃ©guÃ©e de l'article 2 de la Convenlion . Article 26 de la Convention : a) En l'absence de voie de recours inteme le dÃ©lai de six mois court Ã parrir de l'acte incriminÃ© dans la requÃªte . b) La prÃ©tendue inaction des autoritÃ©s, qui aurait permis, selon la requÃ©rante . l'assassinat de sa fille n'engendre pas, aprÃ¨s l'a.ssassinat, une situation continue empÃªchant le dÃ©lai de cour(r.
c) Pour se prÃ©valoir d'une suspension du dÃ©lai il faut invoquer des Ã©lÃ©ments clairs et dÃ©cisifs . Examen des circonstances de fait (Ã©tat de santÃ©) qui, selon la requÃ©rante, devraient Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ©es comme ayant suspendu le cours du dÃ©lai .
((ranÃ§ais : voir p . 58)
The applicant (1) is a United Kingdom citizen who lives in Northern Ireland . On 8 December 1977, one of the applicant's daughters was killed by gunmen . After the conviction of three neighbours in 1979 for the murder of their daughter, the applicant and her husband sold their farm and moved elsewhere . 77te husband was killed in September 1980. 7he application was introduced on 3 December 1981 . !n correspondence with the Commission's Secretariat, the applicant's representatives stated that "the applicant suffers from considerable grief but states that she is not afraid . . . ". In subsequent correspondence the applicant's representatives submitted medical evidence that the applicant "is still under treatment for her anxiety" . 7he application was nmde on behalf of the applicant herself, two dependent children and her granddaughter . 7he applicant alleged a violation of Articles 1, 2, 8 and 13 of the Convention and Article f of Protocol No . 1 .
THE LAW (Extract ) . .. . .. . . . . . . . . . U . As to the complaint concerning the murder of the appGeant's daughter on 8 December 1977 4 . The Commission holds that the applicant, as the mother who was affected by the death of her daughter, may in this respect claim to be a"victim", in the sense of Article 25 . The Commission here refers to its decisions on the admissibility of Application No . 2758/66 (Collection 30 p . 11 = Yearbook 12 p . 175), as confirmed in Application No . 8416/79 (D .R . 19 pp . 244, 248) and of Applications No . 9348/81, D .R . 32 p . 190, and No . 9360/81, D .R . 32 p . 211) . 5 . The applicant submits that the murder of her daughter by terrorists was made possible by the respondent States' failure to prevent terrorism ; that no domestic (1) The applicant was represented before the Conunission by Messrs . Cleever, Fulton and Renlrin, solicitors, Belfast.
remedy was available in respect of this failure ; that the six months' mle does not apply to this complaint ; and that, if it applied, the running of the period was suspended or intermpted . 6 . Article 26 of the Convention provides that the Commission may only deal with a matter "after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally recognised rules of intemational law, and within a period of six months from the date on which the final decision was taken" . 7 . The Commission does not find that there was a domestic remedy which the applicant was required to exhaust . She complains that the respondent States failed to prevent that a criminal act-the murder of her daughter-was committed by private individuals . The applicant states that no domestic remedy was available in respect of this failure of the respondent States . The Commission has already held in Application No . 9360/81 (referred to above), in respect of a complaint against Ireland, that there was no domestic remedy in the Republic of Ireland, in respect of the alleged failure of the Republic to prevent the murder of Mr . W ., which Mrs . W . was required to exhaust . Confirrning that finding the Commission holds that, in the present case, there was neither in Ireland nor in the United Kingdom a domestic remedy which the applicant was required to exhaust in respect of the a ll eged failure of those States to prevent the murder of her daughter . 8 . The Commission in particular does not find that proceedings conceming the criminal prosecution of those individuals who committed the murder, or relating to a compensation claim which the applicant could bring under the domestic legislation, could be considered as remedies in respect of the respondent States' alleged failure to prevent the murder . It notes that such proceedings are not referred to by the applicant as domestic remedies, but only as relevant for the determination of the six months' period . 9 . The applicant submits that the six months' mle is inapplicable in respect of her complaint conceming the murder of her daughter because her case is based upon continuing violations of the Convention . The Commission has previously stated that, where there is a"permanent state of affairs which is still continuing", the question of the six months' mle "could only arise after the state of affairs has ceased to exist" (De Becker case. Yearbook 2 pp . 214, 244 ; First Greek Case, second decision on admissibility, Collection 26, 80, 110 = Yearbook 1I pp . 730, 778) . The Commission does not find, however, that the respondent Governments' alleged failure to prevent the murder of the applicant's daughter can be regarded as a violation of the Convention which continued after the murder . It follows that the application of the six months' mle cannot in respect of the applicant's complaint concerning the murder of her daughter be excluded on the ground that this complaint relates to a violation which continued after her daughter's death .
10 . The applicant further submits that the six months rule is inapplicable because Article 26 refers to a final decision by a State and not to an act such as murder, committed by a third party ; moreover, Application No . 7379/76, relied on by the Commission in the W . case (referred to above) and conceming a right to property, may be distinguished from the present complaint, which is grounded in a deprivation of life or family rights . The Commission observes, however, that the application does not, according to the applicant's own statements, relate to an act of private individuals-the murder of her daughter-but to the authorities' alleged failure to prevent this act . Moreover, the considerations announced by the Commission in Application No . 7379/76 are not limited to property rights but state a general principle concerning the six months' rule which is valid also for complaints conceming other Convention rights and freedoms . 11 . The Commission held in Application No . 7379/76 that "where no domestic remedy is available, the act or decision complained of must itself norrnally be taken as the 'final decision' for the purposes of Article 26" (X . v/the United Kingdom, D .R . 8 p . 211, at pp . 212 - 213) . In the present case the Commission has already found that there was no domestic remedy to be exhausted with regard to the alleged failure of the respondent States to prevent the murder of the applicant's daughter . It has also observed that this failure cannot be regarded as a violation of the Convention which continued after the death of the applicant's daughter . It follows that, in the present case, the six months limitation period ran from 8 December 1977, the date of the death of the applicant's daughter, unless the rvnning of this period was interrupted or suspended . 12 . The Commission here notes that the applicant, when introducing the application in December 1981, did not claim that, during a prolonged period of time after the murder of her daughter, her state of health had prevented her from writing to the Commission . By a letter of 26 January 1982 from the Secretariat the applicant's attention was drawn to the six months' rule laid down in Article 26 . The statement of facts then filed by the applicant in February 1982 contained the following passage :"The applicant suffers from considerable grief but states that she is not afraid . Several of her family have required medical treatment, in particular David who is most affected as he feels unsecure . However, the applicant and her family try and make as little as possible of their afflictions . " On 28 Febrvary 1983 the Commission held that Mrs W . complaint, conceming the murder of her husband (Application No . 9360/81), was inadmissible for nonobservance of the six months' rule . Only then counsel for the present and the other remaining applicants, by a telex communication of 30 March 1983, requested the Commission to consider "each case where the applicant states that she was in a severe state of shock, under medical treatment and unable to deal with her affairs for considerable periods of time after the incidents complained of . It is submitted tha t
such facts constitute a suspension or interruption of the time limit rule under Anicle 26 of the Convention and accordingly such cases should not be declared inadmissible for non-observance of the six months' rule" . In a letter of 4 May 1983 counsel confirmed "that we are requesting from each applicant a medical report to substantiate the statements already contained in the particulars of each application that the applicant was under medical supervision for considerable periods after the murder and in no condition to present an application to the Commission . We shall also specify the specific period of time during which this condition persisted with each particular applicant" . Under cover of a letter of 24 June counsel filed a medical certificate of 13 June 1983 . 13 . The Commission recalls that the six months' rule, in reflecting the wish of the High Contracting Parties to prevent the examination of past events after an indefinite lapse of time, serves the interests of legal certainty . It marks out the temporal limits of supervision carried out by the organs of the Convention and signals to both individuals and State authorities the period beyond which such supervision is no longer possible (Application No . 9587/81, X . v . France, D .R . 29 p . 228 at paras . 13 - 16 ; Application No . 10416/83, D .R . 38 p . 158) . The Commission therefore considers that any claim, which asserts that the six months' limitation period was suspended or interrupted, must, in order to be successful, be based on clear and conclusive evidence . 14 . The medical certificate submitted by the present applicant states that she "was still under medical and psychiatric care following the first killing" (of her daughter on 8 December 1977) "when her husband died" (on 4 September 1980) and that she "was in no position to submit a report within the statutory six months time" . Dr G . adds that the applicant "is still under treatment for her anxiety and I doubt if she will ever fully recover from her ordeal" . 15 . The Commission, having regard to the above certificate, accepts that, during a certain time following the death of her daughter on 8 December 1977, the applicant may have been prevented by her state of health from filing an application under Article 25 of the Convention, and that the running of the limitation period was suspended during this time . 16 . The Commission does not find it established, however, that the applicant's state of health prevented her for a very long time from filing an application . It here notes that, after their daughter's death, the applicant and her husband looked after their granddaughter, and that, after the conviction of their daughter's murderers in 1979, they sold their farm and moved to a new residence . This would in the Commission's view imply that the applicant was also able to address herself to the Commission . 17 . However, the present application was not introduced until 3 December 198 1
18 . The Commission concludes that the applicant has failed to show that she has complied with the six months' mle laid down in Anicle 26 of the Convention . It follows that her complaint conceming the murder of her daughter must be rejected under Article 27 para . 3 of the Convention .
RÃ©sumÃ© des faiLs pertinents La requÃ©rante (1) est une ressortissante britannique domiciliÃ©e en Irlande du Nord . Le 8 dÃ©cembre 1977, l'une des filles de la requÃ©rante fut tuÃ©e par des terrorisres. AprÃ¨s la condamnation en 1979 de trois de leurs voisins pour le meu rtre de /eur fdle . la requÃ©rante et son mari vendirent leur ferme et dÃ©mÃ©nagÃ¨rent . Le mari fut tuÃ© en septembre 1980 requÃªte a Ã©tÃ© introduite le 3 dÃ©cembre 1981 . Dans un courrier adressÃ© au .[n SecrÃ©tariat de la Commission, les reprÃ©sentants de la requÃ©rame ont dÃ©clarÃ© que Â« la requÃ©rante a un chagrin considÃ©rable mais affirme ne pas avoir peur. . . . Â» . Dans une autre correspondance, les reprÃ©sentants de la requÃ©rante ont produit une attestation mÃ©dicale selon laquelle la requÃ©rante â¢est toujours sous traitement pour ses angoisses â¢ .
La requ@te a Ã©tÃ© prÃ©sentÃ©e au nom de la requÃ©rante, de ses deu .r enfants Ã charge et de sa petite-fdle . Ia requÃ©rante a allÃ©guÃ© une violation des a rt icles 1, 2, 8 et 13 de la Convention, ainsi que de l'article 1 du Protocole additionnel.
( I ) U requÃ©rnme Ã©uit reprÃ©sentÃ©e devant la Commission par le Cabinet Cleaver, Fulton et Rankin . AvouÃ©s d Belfxs .
II . Sur le grief relatif au meu rt re de la ftlle de la requÃ©rante, commis le 8 dÃ©cembre 1977 4 . La Commission dÃ©clare que la requÃ©rante, en sa qualitÃ© de mÃ¨re affectÃ©e par le dÃ©cÃ¨s de sa fille, peut Ã cet Ã©gard se prÃ©tendre â¢ victime . au sens de l'article 25 . Elle renvoie sur ce point Ã ses dÃ©cisions sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃ¨te No 2758/66 (Recueil 30 p . 11 = Annuaire 12 p . 175), confirtnÃ© pour la requÃ¨te No 8416/79 (D .R . 19 pp . 244, 257), et des requÃ©tes No 9348/81, D .R . 32 p . 190 et 9360/81, D .R . 32 p . 211 . 5 . La requÃ©rante soutient que c'est parce que les Etats dÃ©fendeurs ne luttent pas contre le terrorisme que le meurtre de sa fille par des terroristes a Ã©tÃ© possible ; qu'aucune voie de recours interne ne lui Ã©tait offerte pour s'en plaindre : que la rÃ¨gle des six mois ne s'applique pas Ã ce grief et que, dans le cas contraire, il y a eu suspension ou interrUption du dÃ©lai . 6 . L'article 26 de la Convention prÃ©voit que la Commission ne peut Ã¨tre saisie â¢qu'aprÃ¨s l'Ã©puisement des voies de recours internes, tel qu'il est entendu selon les principes de droit international gÃ©nÃ©ralement reconnus et dans le dÃ©lai de six mois, Ã partir de la date de la dÃ©cision inteme dÃ©finitiveâ¢ . 7 . La Commission n'estime pas qu'il existait un recours inteme que la requÃ©rante Ã©tait tenue d'exercer . Celle-ci se plaint en effet de ce que les Etats dÃ©fendeurs n'ont pas empÃªchÃ© qu'un acte criminel - le meunre de sa fille - soit commis par des particuliers et dÃ©clare qu'aucun recours interne ne lui Ã©tait offen pour se plaindre de cette inaction des Etats dÃ©fendeurs . La Commission a dÃ©jÃ dÃ©clarÃ© Ã propos d'un grief contre l'Irlande formulÃ© dans la requÃ¨te No 9360/81, Ã©voquÃ©e plus haut, qu'il n'existait pas en RÃ©publique d'Irlande de voie de recours pour se plaindre de ce que la RÃ©publique n'aurait pas empÃªchÃ© le meunre de M . W . et que sa veuve Ã©tait tenue d'Ã©puiser . Confirrnant cette constatation, la Commission dÃ©clare qu'en l'espÃ¨ce il n'existait, ni en Irlande ni au Royaume-Uni, de recours interne que la requÃ©rante aurait Ã©tÃ© tenue d'exercer pour se plaindre de ce que ces Etats n'ont pas empÃ¨chÃ© le meurtre de sa fille . 8 . En particulier, la Commission n'estime pas que les procÃ©dures concernant la poursuite pÃ©nale des particuliers auteurs du meurtre ou une demande d'indemnisation, que la requÃ©rante pouvait engager conformÃ©ment Ã la lÃ©gislation interne, ne peuvent pas Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ©es comme des voies de recours pour se plaindre du fait que les Etats dÃ©fendeurs n'ont pas empÃªchÃ© le meurtre . La Commission relÃ¨ve que ces procÃ©dures ne sont d'ailleurs pas citÃ©es par la requÃ©rante comme des recours intemes mais comme servant seulement Ã dÃ©terrniner le dÃ©part du dÃ©lai de six mois .
9 . Selon la requÃ©rante, la rÃ©gle des six mois est inapplicable au grief concernant le meurtre de sa fille car l'affaire se fonde sur des violations continues de la Convention . La Commission a dÃ©clarÃ© antÃ©rieurement que lorsqu'il s'agit â¢d'une situation qui dure encore - , la question de la rÃ¨gle des six mois - ne pourra se poser que lorsque cette situation aura cessÃ© . (affaire De Becker, Annuaire 2 pp . 214, 244 ; PremiÃ¨re affaire grecque, deuxiÃ¨me dÃ©cision sur la recevabilitÃ©, Recueil 26 pp . 80. 110 = Annuaire 11 pp . 730 . 778) . La Commission estime cependant que que le fait pour les Gouvernements dÃ©fendeurs de n'avoir pas empÃªchÃ© le meurtre de la fille de la requÃ©rante ne saurait Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ© comme une violation de la Convention se poursuivant aprÃ¨s le meurtre . 11 s'ensuit que, s'agissant du grief de la requÃ©rante concernant le meurtre de sa fille, l'application de la rÃ¨gle des six mois ne saurait Ãªtre exclue au motif que le grief concemerait une violation qui a continuÃ© aprÃ¨s le dÃ©cÃ¨s de la jeune fille . 10 . La requÃ©rante soutient en outre que la rÃ¨gle des six mois est inapplicable parce que l'article 26 renvoie Ã une dÃ©cision dÃ©finitive rendue par un Etat et non pas Ã un acte tel qu'un assassinat commis par un tiers ; en outre, la requÃªte No 7379/76, invoquÃ©e par la Commission dans l'affaire W . (voir plus haut) et concernant un droit de propriÃ©tÃ©, se distingue de la prÃ©sente affaire qui touche Ã une privation de vie ou de droits familiaux . La Commission observe cependant que, d'aprÃ¨s la requÃ©rante ellemÃ©me, la requÃªte ne concerne pas un acte commis par des particuliers - le meurtre de sa ftlle - mais le fait allÃ©guÃ© que les autoritÃ©s n'ont pas empÃ©chÃ© cet acte . En outre, les considÃ©rations Ã©noncÃ©es par la Commission dans la requÃªte No 7379/76 ne se limitent pas Ã des droits de propriÃ©tÃ©, mais Ã©noncent pour la rÃ¨gle des six mois un principe gÃ©nÃ©ral valable aussi pour les griefs concernant d'autres droits et libertÃ©s garantis par la Convention . 11 . Dans la requÃ©te No 7379/76, la Commission a dÃ©clarÃ© que Â« lorsqu'il n'existe pas de voies de recours intemes, l'acte ou la dÃ©cision incriminÃ©s doivent eux-mÃªmes Ãªtre normalement considÃ©rÃ©s comme la 'dÃ©cision interne dÃ©finitive' visÃ©e Ã l'article 26â¢ (X . c/Royaume-Uni, D .R . 8 pp . 211, 215) . En l'espÃ¨ce, la Commission a dÃ©jÃ constatÃ© qu'il n'y avait pas de recours inteme Ã exercer s'agissant du fait allÃ©guÃ© que les Etats dÃ©fendeurs n'ont pas empÃªchÃ© le meurtre de la fille de la requÃ©rante . Elle a Ã©galement fait observer que ce fait ne saurait Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ© comme une violation de la Convention qui se serait poursuivie aprÃ¨s le dÃ©cÃ¨s de la fille de la requÃ©rante . Il s'ensuit qu'en l'occurrence le dÃ©lai de six mois a commencÃ© Ã courir le 8 dÃ©cembre 1977, date du dÃ©cÃ¨s de la fdle de la requÃ©rante, sauf interruption ou suspension . 12 . La Commission relÃ¨ve ici que lorsqu'elle a introduit sa requÃ©te en dÃ©cembre 1981, la requÃ©rante n'a pas prÃ©tendu que longtemps aprÃ©s le meurtre de sa fille, son Ã©tat de santÃ© l'avait empÃªchÃ©e d'Ã©crire Ã la Conunission . Par lettre du 26 janvier 1982, le SecrÃ©tariat de la Commission a attirÃ© l'attention de la requÃ©rante sur la rÃ¨gle des six mois Ã©noncÃ©e Ã l'article 26 . En effet ,
l'exposÃ© des faits dÃ©posÃ© en fÃ©vrier 1982 contenait le passage suivant : Â« La requÃ©rante a un chagrin considÃ©rable mais affirme ne pas avoir peur . Plusieurs membres de sa famille ont eu besoin d'un traitement mÃ©dical, notamment David qui est trÃ¨s affectÃ© car il ne se sent pas en sÃ©curitÃ© . Cependant, la requÃ©rante et sa famille essaient autant que faire se peut de ne pas montrer leur peine . Le 28 fÃ©vrier 1983, la Commission a dÃ©clarÃ© que le grief de M"'Â° W . concernant le meurtre de son mari (requÃªte No 9360/81) Ã©tait irrecevable pour non-respect de la rÃ¨gle des six mois . C'est alÃ´rs seulement que l'avocat de la prÃ©sent requÃ©rante et des requÃ©rants restants, a demandÃ© Ã la Commission, par tÃ©lex du 30 mars 1983, de tenir compte Â«de chaque fois oÃ¹ la requÃ©rante dÃ©clare avoir Ã©tÃ© en Ã©tat de choc grave, sous traitement mÃ©dical et dans l'incapacitÃ© de s'occuper de ses affaires pendant de longues pÃ©riodes aprÃ¨s les faits reprochÃ©s . Selon l'avocat, cette situation entraine suspension ou interruption du dÃ©lai prÃ©vu Ã l'article 26 de la Convention et en consÃ©quence ce genre de requÃªte ne doit pas Ãªtre dÃ©clarÃ©e irrecevable pour nonrespect de la rÃ¨gle des six mois Â» . Dans une lettre du 4 mai 1983, l'avocat conftrmait â¢ que nous demandons Ã chaque requÃ©rante de fournir un rapport mÃ©dical pour Ã©tayer les dÃ©clarations figurant dÃ©jÃ dans les dÃ©tails de chaque requÃªte, selon lesquelles l'intÃ©ressÃ©e a Ã©tÃ© sous surveillance mÃ©dicale pendant de longues pÃ©riodes aprÃ¨s l'assassinat et n'Ã©tait pas en Ã©tat de prÃ©senter une requÃ¨te Ã la Commission . Nous prÃ©ciserons Ã©galement la pÃ©riode exacte pendant laquelle cet Ã©tat a persistÃ© pour chacune des requÃ©rantesÂ» . Sous le couvert d'une lettre du 24 juin, l'avocat dÃ©posa un certificat mÃ©dical en date du 13 juin 1983 . 13 . la Contmission rappelle que la rÃ¨gle des six mois, qui traduit le dÃ©sir des Parties Contractantes d'emp@cher que ne soient examinÃ©s des Ã©vÃ©nements remontant loin dans le passÃ© aprÃ¨s un dÃ©lai indÃ©fini, est un facteur de sÃ©curitÃ© juridique . Elle dÃ©finit les limites temporelles du contrÃ´le exercÃ© par les organes de la Convention et indique tant aux particuliers qu'aux Etats la pÃ©riode au-delÃ de laquelle ce contrÃ´le n'est plus possible (requÃªte No 9587/81, X . c/ France, D .R . 29 p . 228, par . 13-16 ; requÃ©te No 10416/83, D .R . 38 p . 158) . La Commission estime, dÃ¨s lors, que le requÃ©rant qui prÃ©tend que le dÃ©lai de six mois a Ã©tÃ© suspendu ou interrompu, doit, pour aboutir, se fonder sur des Ã©lÃ©ments clairs et dÃ©cisifs . 14 . Le certificat mÃ©dical produit par la prÃ©sente requÃ©rante atteste qu'elle Â« Ã©tait toujours sous contrÃ´le mÃ©dical et psychiatrique suite au premier assassinat- (de sa fille, le 8 dÃ©cembre 1977) Â« lorsque son mari est dÃ©cÃ©dÃ© . (le 4 septembre 1980) et qu'elle â¢ n'Ã©tait pas en Ã©tat de produire un rapport dans le dÃ©lai rÃ©glementaire de six moisÂ» . Le Dr G . ajoute que la requÃ©rante .est toujours sous traitement pour ses angoisses etje ne crois pas qu'elle se remette jamais complÃ©tement de ses Ã©preuves- .
15 . La Commission, eu Ã©g ard Ã ce cenificat mÃ©dical, admet que pendant un certain temps aprÃ¨s le dÃ©cÃ¨s de sa fille, le 8 dÃ©cembre 1977, la requÃ©rante ait pu Ã©tr e empÃªchÃ©e par son Ã©tat de santÃ© de dÃ©poser une requÃ©te conformÃ©ment Ã l'anicle 25 de la Convention et qu'il y a eu, dÃ¨s lors, suspension du dÃ©lai pendant ce tte pÃ©riode . 16 . Cependant, la Commission n'estime pas Ã©tabli que l'Ã©tat de santÃ© de la requÃ©rante l'ait emp@chÃ© trÃ¨s longtemps de dÃ©poser une requÃ©te . Elle relÃ¨ve, en l'occurrence, qu'aprÃ©s le dÃ©cÃ¨s de leur fille, la requÃ©rante et son mari ont pris en charge leur petite fille et qu'aprÃ¨s la condamnation des meurtriers de leur fille, en 1979, ils ont vendu leur fertne et dÃ©mÃ©nagÃ© . Pour la Commission, cela signifie que la requÃ©rante Ã©tait Ã© galement en mesure de s'adresser Ã elle . 17 . Or, la prÃ©sente requÃ©te n'a Ã©tÃ© introduite que le 3 dÃ©cembre 1981 . 18 . La Commission en conclut que la requÃ©rante n'a pas montrÃ© avoir satisfait Ã la rÃ¨gle des six mois Ã© noncÃ©e Ã l'art icle 26 de la Convention . Il s'ensuit que le grief concemant le meu rt re de sa fille doit Ãªtre rejetÃ© conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 27 par . 3 de la Convention .
62Origine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Commission (plénière)Date de la décision : 07/03/1985Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page