Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/102561/schacht-vs-united-states
Timestamp: 2016-10-26 19:16:10
Document Index: 584109541

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 702', '§ 772', '§ 772', '§ 772', '§ 702', '§ 702', '§ 772', '§ 702', '§ 702', '§ 772', '§ 772', '§ 772', '§ 772', '§ 3772', '§ 3772', '§ 3772', '§ 3772', '§ 2101']

Schacht Vs United States - Citation 102561 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Save as PDF Add a Tag Add a Note Semantics Visualize Schacht Vs. United States - Court Judgment	LegalCrystal Citationlegalcrystal.com/102561CourtUS Supreme CourtDecided OnMay-25-1970Case Number398 U.S. 58AppellantSchachtRespondentUnited StatesExcerpt:
schacht v. united states - 398 u.s. 58 (1970)
petitioner, who participated in a skit performed several times in front of an armed forces induction center demonstrating opposition to american involvement in the vietnam conflict, was convicted by a jury of violating 18 u.s.c. § 702, which makes criminal the unauthorized wearing of an american military uniform or part thereof. petitioner alleged that he was authorized to wear the uniform by 10 u.s.c. § 772(f), which permits wearing of a.....Judgment:
1. The street skit in which petitioner participated was a "theatrical production" within the meaning of § 772(f). Pp.
398 U. S. 61
2. The words "if the portrayal does not tend to discredit that armed force" in § 772(f) impose an unconstitutional restraint on freedom of speech, and must be stricken from the section to preserve its constitutionality. Pp.
398 U. S. 62
The petitioner, Daniel Jay Schacht, was indicted in a United States District Court for violating 18 U.S.C. § 702, which makes it a crime for any person "without authority [to wear] the uniform or a distinctive part thereof . . . of any of the armed forces of the United States. . . ." [
] He was tried and convicted by a jury, and on February 29, 1968, he was sentenced to pay a fine of $250 and to serve a six-month prison term, the maximum sentence allowable under 18 U.S.C. § 702. There is no doubt that Schacht did wear distinctive parts of the uniform of the United States Army [
] and that he was not a member of the Armed Forces. He has defended his conduct since the beginning, however, on the ground that he was authorized to wear the uniform by an Act of Congress, 10 U.S.C. § 772(f), which provides as follows:
theatrical or motion-picture production may wear the uniform of that armed force
if the portrayal does not tend to discredit that armed force.
Our previous cases would seem to make it clear that 18 U.S.C. § 702, making it an offense to wear our military uniforms without authority is, standing alone, a valid statute on its face.
(1968). But the general prohibition of 18 U.S.C. § 702 cannot always stand alone in view of 10 U.S.C. § 772, which authorizes the wearing of military uniforms under certain conditions and circumstances, including the circumstance of an actor portraying a member of the armed services in a "theatrical production." 10 U.S.C. § 772(f). The Government's argument in this case seems to imply that somehow what these amateur actors did in Houston should not be treated as a "theatrical production" within the meaning of § 772(f). We are unable to follow such a suggestion. Certainly theatrical productions need not always be performed in buildings, or even on a defined area such as a conventional stage. Nor need they be performed by professional actors or be heavily financed or elaborately produced. Since time immemorial, out-door theatrical performances, often performed by amateurs, have played an important part in the entertainment and the education of the people of the world. Here, the record shows without dispute the preparation and repeated presentation by amateur actors of a short play designed to create in the audience an understanding of and opposition to our participation in the Vietnam war.
398 U. S. 60
and this page. It may be that the performances were crude and
amateurish and perhaps unappealing, but the same thing can be said about many theatrical performances. We cannot believe that, when Congress wrote out special exception for theatrical productions, it intended to protect only a narrow and limited category of professionally produced plays. [
] Of course, we need not decide here all the questions concerning what is and what is not within the scope of § 772(f). We need only find, as we emphatically do, that the street skit in which Schacht participated was a "theatrical production" within the meaning of that section.
view that this time requirement is jurisdictional, and cannot be waived by the Court. Rule 22(2) contains no language that calls for so harsh an interpretation, and it must be remembered that this rule was not enacted by Congress, but was promulgated by this Court under authority of Congress to prescribe rules concerning the time limitations for taking appeals and applying for certiorari in criminal cases.
18 U.S.C. § 3772; Rule 37, Fed.Rules Crim.Proc. The procedural rules adopted by the Court for the orderly transaction of its business are not jurisdictional, and can be relaxed by the Court in the exercise of its discretion when the ends of justice so require. This discretion has been expressly declared in several opinions of the Court.
See Taglianetti v. United States,
, n. 1 (1969);
358 U. S. 418
R. Stern & E. Gressman, Supreme Court Practice 242-244 (4th ed.1969), and the cases cited therein. It is true that the
cases dealt with this time question only in footnotes. But this is no reason to disregard their holdings, and, in fact, indicates the Court deemed a footnote adequate treatment to give the issue.
The Court's opinion does not fully come to grips with the Solicitor General's position. The Court rejects the argument that untimeliness under Rule 22(2) should be given jurisdictional effect by stating, in part, that the Rule "contains no language that calls for so harsh an interpretation." In this regard, however, the time limitation found in Rule 22(2) is no different from those established by statute; [
] neither makes explicit reference to waivers of the limitation. In the absence of language providing for waiver, we have without exception treated the statutory limitations as jurisdictional. [
] The Solicitor General asks why we should not do the same under our Rule. This issue,
why we treat time requirements
under our Rule differently from the requirements imposed by statute, is hardly acknowledged in the Court's opinion. Moreover, although it is true that
Talianetti v. United States,
n. 1 (1969), and
418 n. 7 (1959), held that the Court could waive untimeliness under our Rule, neither opinion explained why this is so. The Solicitor General does not belittle those two cases merely because each dealt with the problem in a footnote, but rather urges that they are inconclusive because neither gave reasons for the conclusion. [
My own analysis of the issue presented here begins with an examination of the statutory authority for Rule 22(2). This is found in what is now 18 U.S.C. § 3772, [
] a provision authorizing this Court to prescribe
post-verdict rules of practice and procedure in criminal cases. Section 3772 specifically delegates to this Court the power to promulgate rules prescribing "the times for and manner of taking appeals [to the Courts of Appeals] and applying for writs of certiorari. . . ." While the legislative history of this provision evinces a congressional concern over undue delays in the disposition of criminal cases, [
] the broad terms of the statutory language, as well as what was written in the committee reports, [
] convince me that Congress' purpose was to give this Court the freedom to decide what time limits should apply.
Under the unqualified delegation found in § 3772, I have no doubts concerning this Court's authority to promulgate a rule that required certiorari petitions to be filed within 30 days of the judgment below, but that expressly provided that this requirement could be waived for good cause shown, in order to avoid unfairness in extraordinary cases. I also think the Court might promulgate a rule that expressly provided that untimeliness could not be waived even for "excusable neglect" -- in other words a "jurisdictional rule." [
Rule 22(2), as promulgated, contains no express provision allowing for waiver. It is clear from prior decisions that the Court has interpreted the rule to allow for such a waiver, however. [
] So interpreted, I find Rule 22(2) no less authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 3772 than would be a rule that, by its terms, provided expressly for the possibility of a waiver.
American Farm Lines v. Black Ball,
397 U. S. 532
397 U. S. 539
(1970), quoting from
NLRB v. Monsanto Chemical Co.,
205 F.2d 763, 764 (C.A. 8th Cir.1953).
28 U.S.C. §§ 2101(b), (c). Both the Rule and this statute provide for limited extensions of time. There was, however, no extension in the case before us.
E.g., Matton Steamboat Co., Inc. v. Murphy,
The Government relies on language in
316 U. S. 342
(1942), a case not cited by the Court, as support for its claim that the 30-day limit established by rule was "jurisdictional." The issue in that case was which time limit -- the 30-day limit imposed by what was then Rule XI or instead the 90-day limit of the general statutory provision -- applied to a petition for certiorari for review of a circuit court affirmance of a district court denial of a motion to correct sentence in a criminal case. After noting that the petition was filed more than 30 days after the judgment of the Court of Appeals, the Court said:
316 U. S. 344
. In disposing of the case, however, the opinion simply stated that the "writ will . . . be dismissed for failure to comply with Rule XI,"
316 U. S. 346
, not for want of jurisdiction. In any event, the Court in
did not focus on the issue of whether for good cause Rule XI might be waived, thereby removing a time limitation that otherwise might be termed jurisdictional.
H.R.Rep. No. 2047, 72d Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1933); S.Rep. No. 257, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1934).
H.R.Rep. No. 2047,
at 2 ("A statutory code of procedure is not flexible; changes made desirable by experience cannot be promptly made. The overwhelming weight of opinion among judges and lawyers is that matters of practice and procedure may better be controlled by rule than by statute.").
(1960), where we held that, under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Court of Appeals could not enlarge the time for filing an appeal even though it has found "excusable neglect." The Court thought,
that time extensions were inconsistent with the express language of Rule 45(b) and the "deliberate intention" of its drafters.
In that case, the Court decided that the "conflicting considerations" in favor of or against an "excusable neglect" provision should be "resolved through the rulemaking process, and not by judicial decision," given the rather clear indications from the language and background of the existing rule that the omission had been deliberate. Although the Government relies heavily on
here, neither the language nor the background of Rule 22(2) indicates a "deliberate intention" to preclude waiver.
Under proper instructions, then, a jury could have concluded that no theatrical production was involved, in which case the verdict should be sustained. However, the judge's instructions also permitted conviction on a finding that petitioner was engaged in a theatrical production, but that the production tended to discredit the military.
App. 51-54. Since the general verdict does not disclose which of these findings -- only one of which can constitutionally entail conviction -- was the actual finding, the conviction must of course be reversed.
(1931). I thus join the judgment of reversal, but find it neither necessary nor correct to hold that petitioner's "theatrics" perforce amounted to a "theatrical production."