Source: https://m.openjurist.org/401/us/996
Timestamp: 2019-12-12 04:36:51
Document Index: 407914132

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2510', '§ 2516', '§ 2518', '§ 2518', '§ 2517', '§ 2517', '§ 2520', '§ 2518', '§ 2518', '§ 2518', '§ 2518', '§ 2519', '§ 2517']

401 U.S. 996 - Cook v. United States
401 US 996 Cook v. United States
The Omnibus Crime Act, 82 Stat. 197, 212, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (Supp. V), provides for electronic surveillance either on warrants issued by a magistrate, § 2516, or on the sole initiative of the designee of the Attorney General who 'reasonably determines' that there is 'an emergency situation' respecting 'conspiratorial activities' which threaten the national security or which involve 'organized crime.' § 2518(7). The officer must apply for an order approving the interception within 48 hours, complying with procedures for obtaining an order of authorization. If the application is denied, or approval is not issued before the interception is terminated, the contents of any intercepted communication are to be treated as illegally obtained. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(7).
The Act sanctions free use of intercepted information among investigative personnel, § 2517(1). It also widely protects 'evidence derived therefrom,' § 2517(1)(2)(3), including the giving of testimonial evidence.6 But any person whose 'wire or oral communication is intercepted, disclosed, or used' in violation of the ways I have enumerated has suit for actual and punitive damages and reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. § 2520.
The issue of 'illegality' raised by the Government's defense would raise a myriad of questions depending on the facts. They would pertain to the question of whether the showing required by § 2518(1) of the Act had been made to the magistrate and raise the basic question whether, if a magistrate issued a warrant, there was 'probable cause,' § 2518(3). If there were a warrant, the question would also be whether the 'search' was confined to the person, place, and time which were authorized. § 2518(4)(5). If there were no warrant but only the action of the Attorney General under § 2518(7), a host of different questions would be raised on the issue of 'illegality.'
While Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 89 S.Ct. 961, 22 L.Ed.2d 176, was pending here, it was revealed that the United States had engaged in wiretapping which may have violated the Fourth Amendment and tainted the convictions of petitioner. We had earlier refused to accept 'the ex parte determination' of the issues by the Department of Justice Kolod v. United States, 390 U.S. 136, 137, 88 S.Ct. 752, 19 L.Ed.2d 962, and in Alderman worked out the procedures whereby the District Court would determine whether the evidence obtained was 'the product of illegal surveillance.' 394 U.S., at 168, 89 S.Ct. 961. The questions in that case concerned the use of 'evidence originating in electronic surveillance violative of his own Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures.' Id., at 176, 89 S.Ct., at 968. That is the question here and is obviously not controlled by administrative practice or the Omnibus Crime Act, both of which are subordinate to the Constitution.
Electronic surveillance is today common and pervasive, as we know from reports filed pursuant to § 2519(3) of the Act7 and from various Senate and House investigations, including the one just concluded by Senator Ervin.8 These invasions of privacy apparently touch not only criminals but reputable people whose only offense is political, social, or ideological non-conformity. As stated in Westin, Privacy & Freedom, pp. 365-366 (1967).
Defense counsel gave as his reason 'For example, on cross eamination there was some question about a conversation, a phone conversation that the defendant had.'
'[W]e are not going to make it a practice in our office to show the Court during each trial what eavesdropping devices we used, because on its face it might be illegal.'
'I don't think that we have to commit ourselves in any case and say, 'Judge, since it might be illegal, we did not use it,' so that we can make a record.'
'I represent only to your Honor in this case, and we will in other cases, that there was nothing illegal about any of the evidence we presented, no illegal eavesdropping devices were used, and I don't think that I have to tell defense counsel whether or not we used eavesdropping equipment.'
'[T]hey have sort of a practice that the one who is honored to reveal these things has been left to the Solicitor General of the United States. I know of no district attorney that has made a disclosure yet. They either make it in the Supreme Court or they make it in the Seventh Circuit, but we haven't got down to the lower echelon yet where that has been disclosed even by the Solicitor General.'
'While the defendant takes the position that disclosure in open court is the constitutionally preferred procedure, he submits at the same time that an in camera determination of legality or illegality was required as an absolute constitutional minimum under the Fourth Amendment.' (App. brief in C.A., 62-63.)
There is the initial question whether any intercepted communications relating to the offense of which petitioner was convicted are evidence of 'offenses other than those specified in the order of authorization or approval,' § 2517(5). If so, 'Such contents and any evidence derived therefrom may be used [as testimony at trial] when authorized or approved by a judge of competent jurisdiction where such judge finds on subsequent application that the contents were otherwise intercepted in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.' This would seem to place upon the Government the burden of knowing the source of its evidence, even without challenge from a defendant.
The number of reported interceptions of communications made pursuant to the Act indicates the problem is not small. In the last six months of 1968 there were 174 authorizations issued, all to State officers. 147 devices were installed. The average period of time authorized was 20 days. There were 128 extensions, averaging 20 days. Approximately 4,263 persons were involved in 66,738 intercepted communications. 126 intercepts were in dwellings and 45 were in business establishments.
What number of interceptions are made in cases which involve the so-called 'national security' is not known.
..  Total      Federal      State
Number of Applications.....  304           34         270
Authorizations issued......  302           33         269
Authorization.............. 26 days       16 days    ---
Extensions granted.........  194           11         183
Average length of Extension  22 days       14 days    ---
Total period authorized....  9,019 days  462 days    8,557 days
Number of Devices installed  271           30         241
Telephone wiretap.........   250           27         223
Both......................   6             2          4
Facility or place authorized in
Residence.................  135           10         125
Apartment.................  68            7          61
Multiple dwelling.........  14            3          11
Business establishment....  71            10         61
Business & Living quarters  5             2          3
Other.....................  9             1          8
Average number of intercepts per
authorized device.........  641          1,498      ---
involved per wiretap......  116           152       ---
(approx.)................. 173,000       42,000     131,000
involved (approx.)........ 13,410        4,560       8,850
See Hearings before Gallagher Subcommittee on H. Government Operations, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., July 26, 27, and 28, 1966; Address of Cong. Gallagher—Technology and Society: A Conflict of Interest?, 115 Cong.Rec., April 1, 1969; H.Rep.No.1842, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., Privacy and the National Data Bank on Administrative Practice & on Adminsitrative Practice & Procedure of S. Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pursuant to S.Res.39, Pt. 2, April 13, 27, 28, 29; May 5, 6; and June 7, 1965.