Source: http://openjurist.org/525/f2d/909
Timestamp: 2015-08-01 22:48:20
Document Index: 636466445

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1981', '§ 1331', '§ 1343', '§ 1981', '§ 1331', '§ 1343', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 232']

525 F2d 909 Ingraham v. J Wright I | OpenJurist
525 F. 2d 909 - Ingraham v. J Wright I Home
525 F2d 909 Ingraham v. J Wright I 525 F.2d 909
Eloise INGRAHAM, as next friend, etc., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants,v.Willie J. WRIGHT, I, Individually, etc., et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 73--2078.
Alfred Feinberg, Miami, Fla., for plaintiffs-appellants.
Frank A. Howard, Jr., Thomas G. Spicer, James A. Smith, Miami, Fla., for defendants-appellees.
Before BROWN, Chief Judge, RIVES, GEWIN, BELL, THORNBERRY, COLEMAN, GOLDBERG, AINSWORTH, GODBOLD, DYER, SIMPSON, MORGAN, CLARK, RONEY and GEE, Circuit Judges.*
Plaintiffs James Ingraham and Roosevelt Andrews, two junior high school students in Dade County, Florida, filed a complaint containing three counts on January 7, 1971. Counts one and two were individual actions for compensatory and punitive damages brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981--88, with jurisdiction claimed under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and § 1343. Plaintiffs claimed that personal injuries resulted from corporal punishment administered by certain defendants in alleged violation of their constitutional rights, in particular their right to freedom from cruel and unusual punishment. Specifically, plaintiff Ingraham alleges in count one that on October 6, 1970, defendants Principal Wright and Assistant Principals Deliford and Barnes struck plaintiff repeatedly with a wooden instrument, injuring plaintiff and causing him to incur medical expenses. Plaintiff testified that this paddling was precipitated by his and several other children's disruption of a class over the objection of the teacher. Defendant Wright removed plaintiff and the other disruptive students to his office whereupon he paddled eight to ten of them. Wright had initially threatened plaintiff with five blows, but when the latter refused to assume a paddling position, Wright called on defendants Deliford and Barnes who held plaintiff in a prone position while Wright administered twenty blows. Plaintiff complained to his mother of discomfort following the paddling, whereupon he was taken to a hospital for treatment. Plaintiff introduced evidence that he had suffered a painful bruise that required the prescription of cold compresses, a laxative, sleeping and pain-killing pills and ten days of rest at home and that prevented him from sitting comfortably for three weeks.
Plaintiff Andrews alleges two incidents of corporal punishment as the basis for his claim for damages in count two of the complaint. Plaintiff alleges that on October 1, 1970, he, along with fifteen other boys, was spanked in the boys' restroom by Assistant Principal Barnes. Plaintiff testified that he was taken by a teacher to Barnes for the offense of tardiness, but that he refused to submit to a paddling because, as he explained to Barnes, he had two minutes remaining to get to class when he was seized and was not, therefore, guilty of tardiness. Barnes rejected plaintiff's explanation and, when plaintiff resisted punishment, struck him on the arm, back, and across the neck.
Plaintiff Andrews was again spanked on October 20, 1970. Despite denials of guilt, plaintiff was paddled on the backside and on the wrist by defendant Wright in the presence of defendants Deliford and Barnes for having allegedly broken some glass in sheet metal class. As a result of this paddling, plaintiff visited a doctor and received pain pills for the discomfort, which lasted approximately a week.
Count three is a class action brought by plaintiffs Ingraham and Andrews as representatives of the class of students of the Dade County school system who are subject to the corporal punishment policies issued by defendant members of the Dade County School Board. This count seeks final injunctive and/or declaratory relief against the use of corporal punishment in the Dade County School System and can be divided into three constitutional arguments. First plaintiffs claim that infliction of corporal punishment on its face and as applied in the present case constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in that its application is grossly disproportionate to any misconduct in which plaintiffs may have engaged. Second, plaintiffs claim that because it is arbitrary, capricious and unrelated to achieving any legitimate educational goal, corporal punishment deprives all students of liberty without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs also allege that the failure of defendants to promulgate a list of school regulations and corresponding punishments increases the capriciousness of the punishment. Finally, plaintiffs claim that defendants' failure to provide any procedural safeguards before inflicting corporal punishment on students, including adequate notice of alleged misconduct, hearing, examination and cross-examination, representation and notice of rights, constitutes summary punishment and deprives students of liberty without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Plaintiffs presented their evidence in count three of the complaint in a week-long trial before the district court without a jury. At the close of plaintiffs' case, defendants moved for dismissal under Rule 41(b), F.R.Civ.P. which provides in part:
After the plaintiff, in an action tried by the court without a jury, has completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant, without waiving his right to offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The court as trier of the facts may then determine them and render judgment against the plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment until the close of all the evidence. If the court renders judgment on the merits against the plaintiff, the court shall make findings as provided in Rule 52(a). Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, for improper venue, or for failure to join a party under Rule 19, operates as an adjudication upon the merits.
By agreement of the parties the court considered the evidence offered to support count three as having been offered on counts one and two and as if upon motion for directed verdict for these two counts. The district court then dismissed count three of the complaint and, concluding that a jury could not lawfully find that either of the plaintiffs sustained a deprivation of constitutional rights, likewise dismissed counts one and two.
Defendants assert that there is no federal jurisdiction over count three under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981--1988 and 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and § 1343 because the Dade County School Board and the Superintendent of Schools, Edward L. Whigham, are not 'persons' and hence are not amenable to suit. Defendants rely on City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 93 S.Ct. 2222, 37 L.Ed.2d 109 (1973), in which the Supreme Court held that a municipality was not a 'person' within the meaning of § 1983. While it is well-settled that a school board is not a 'person' and thus cannot be sued under § 1983, it is clear that a school superintendent is a 'person' amenable to suit. Sterzing v. Fort Bend Independent School District, 496 F.2d 92, at 93, n. 2 (5th Cir. 1974). We, therefore, hold that jurisdiction was improperly granted against the Dade County School Board and, accordingly, that part of the complaint must be dismissed. Jurisdiction to proceed against Edward L. Whigham, Superintendent of Schools, was, however, properly granted.
II. Cruel and Unusual Punishment.
Plaintiff-appellants allege that the infliction of corporal punishment on public school children on its face, and as applied in the instant case, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment sufficient to entitle plaintiffs to damages and injunctive relief against the Dade County School Board under § 1983. We do not agree. It is the opinion of the majority of this court that the Eighth Amendment does not apply to the administration of discipline, through corporal punishment, to public school children by public school teachers and administrators.
The Eighth Amendment states: 'Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.' Not only the connotation of the words 'bail,' and 'fine,' but the legislative history1 concerning enactment of the bill of rights supports an argument that the Eighth Amendment was intended to be applied only to punishment invoked as a sanction for criminal conduct.2 Indeed, Supreme Court decisions which have interpreted the Amendment have focused on the inherent cruelty of penalties 'inflicted by a judicial triibunal in accordance with law and retribution for criminal conduct.' Negrich v. Hohn, 246 F.Supp. 173 (W.D.Pa.1965), affirmed on other grounds, 379 F.2d 213 (3rd Cir. 1967) (emphasis added). E.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972) (death penalty as cruel and unusual punishment); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 82 S.Ct. 1417, 8 L.Ed.2d 758 (1962) (state's imprisonment of narcotics addict as cruel and unusual punishment); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 30 S.Ct. 544, 54 L.Ed. 793 (1910) (disproportionate punishment of fifteen years to hard labor for conviction of strict liability offense as cruel and unusual punishment).
Although the Supreme Court has not yet discussed the applicability of the Eighth Amendment to corporal punishment administered in the public schools, a few lower courts have considered the issue and divided on its resolution.3 We concur with the approach taken by the two district courts that have held the Eighth Amendment to be inapplicable to corporal punishment in public schools. In Sims v. Waln, supra, the court dismissed an action for damages and injunctive relief arising out of facts similar to those present in the instant case, stating:
Regarding the Eighth Amendment claim there is an initial distinction that must be made between criminal penalties and civil penalties. The distinction must be made because the Eighth Amendment is not applicable in a civil context. Concerning the Cruel and Unusual Punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment the Supreme Court has stated that: 'the primary purpose of that clause has always been considered, and properly so, to be directed at the method or kind of punishment imposed for the violation of criminal statutes . . ..' Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 531--32, 88 S.Ct. 2145, 2154, 20 L.Ed.2d 1254 (1968). Id. at 549 (emphasis added).
Likewise, in Gonyaw v. Gray, supra, the district court of Vermont, in dismissing an action for damages and injunctive relief against a school board which imposed corporal punishment on its students, stated:
. . . it is, of course, essential to recovery in both cases under § 1983 that the plaintiff establish an invasion of federally protected constitutional rights . . .. Mere tortious conduct does not constitute a deprivation of constitutional rights under this statute.
This statute (authorizing corporal punishment) does not offend the protection against cruel and unusual punishment since this amendment provides a limitation against penalties imposed for criminal behavior. . . . Since neither plaintiff was punished for an offense which was criminal in nature, the Eighth Amendment does not proscribe the conduct assigned to the defendants. Id. at 368 (emphasis added.)4
In support of their argument that corporal punishment in a public school context is cruel and unusual punishment, appellants cite Jackson v. Bishop, 8 Cir. 1968, 404 F.2d 571 in which the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals enjoined the use of a strap in prisons. We do not find prisons and public schools to be analogous in the context of Eighth Amendment coverage. As discussed, supra, the function of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments was intended to prevent the imposition of unduly harsh penalties for criminal conduct. It is not an unreasonable interpretation of the Eighth Amendment to include within its coverage discipline imposed upon persons incarcerated for criminal conduct, since such discipline is part of the total punishment to which the individual is being subjected for his crime and, as such, is a proper subject for Eighth Amendment scrutiny. To extend the Jackson case from a prison context to a public school situation would, however, distort the intended scope of the Amendment.5
We do not mean to imply by our holding that we condone child abuse, either in the home or the schools. We abhor any exercise of discipline which could result in serious or permanent injury to the child. Indeed, if the force used by defendant teachers in disciplining plaintiff was as severe as plaintiffs allege, a Florida state court could find defendants civilly and criminally liable for tortious conduct exceeding the level of severity authorized by 232.27 of Fla.Stat.Ann. and by Dade County School Board policy 5144. The basis of such actions is, however, tort and criminal law, not federal constitutional law. We find it neither proper nor necessary to expand the Eighth Amendment beyond its intended and reasonable scope to encompass an action which is essentially based on the commission of a battery.
In short, scrutiny of the propriety of physical force used by a school teacher upon his or her student should be the function of a state court, with its particular expertise in tort and criminal law questions; the administration of corporal punishment in public schools, whether or not excessively administered, does not come within the scope of Eighth Amendment protection. Because the plaintiffs do not allege facts which could support a finding that defendants have deprived them of their right to freedom from cruel and unusual punishment, neither the legal action for damages included in counts one and two nor the equitable action for injunctive relief set out in count three can lie.
III. Substantive Due Process.
Plaintiffs allege that 'the infliction of corporal punishment on its face deprives all students as well as plaintiff . . . of 'liberty without due process of law' in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution since it is arbitrary, capricious, and unrelated to achieving any legitimate educational purpose.' In essence, plaintiffs here allege a deprivation of their right to substantive due process, as this right to freedom from arbitrary governmental action has come to be known. We find this argument unpersuasive.
Statutory authority for the use of corporal punishment in Florida public schools is found by implication in § 232.27 of Fla.Stat.Ann. which provides:
Each teacher or other member of the staff of any school shall assume such authority for the control of pupils as may be assigned to him by the principal and shall keep good order in the classroom and in other places in which he is assigned to be in charge of pupils, but he shall not inflict corporal punishment before consulting the principal or teacher in charge of the school, and in no case shall such punishment be degrading or unnecessarily severe in its nature. (Emphasis added.)
In addition the Dade County School Board Policy 5144, effective at the time plaintiff's cause of action arose, explicitly authorized corporal punishment, setting forth guidelines under which it was to be administered.6
After reviewing the record, we agree with the district court's finding that 'the evidence has not shown that corporal punishment in concept, or as authorized by the school board, or as applied throughout the school system, is arbitrary, capricious, or wholly unrelated to the legitimate state purpose of determining its educational policy.' The plaintiffs' right to substantive due process is
. . . a guaranty against arbitrary legislation, demanding that the law not be unreasonable and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained. The test is whether there be a matter touching the public interest which merits instant correction at the hands of the authorities and, if so, that the remedy adopted by the rule-making authorities be reasonably calculated to correct it. Sims v. Board of Education, supra, at 684.
Certainly, maintenance of discipline and order in public schools is a prerequisite to establishing the most effective learning atmosphere and as such is a proper object for state and school board regulation.7 Without the existence of disciplinary sanctions for misbehavior, students who desire to learn would be deprived of their right to an education by the more disruptive members of their class. We are unwilling to hold that corporal punishment, as one of the means used to achieve an atmosphere which facilitates the effective transmittal of knowledge, has no 'real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained.'
Certainly the guidelines set down in Policy 5144 establish standards which tend to eliminate arbitrary or capricious elements in any decision to punish. Having determined that corporal punishment itself and corporal punishment as circumscribed by the guidelines in Policy 5144 is not arbitrary, capricious, or unrelated to legitimate educational goals, we refused to look at each individual instance of punishment to determine if it has been administered arbitrarily or capriciously. We think it a misuse of our judicial power to determine, for example, whether a teacher has acted arbitrarily in paddling a particular child for certain behavior or whether in a particular instance of misconduct five licks would have been a more appropriate punishment than ten licks. We note again the possibility of a civil or criminal action in state court against a teacher who has excessively punished a child.8
We emphasize that it is not this court's duty to judge the wisdom of particular school regulations governing matters of internal discipline. Only if the regulation bears no reasonable relation to the legitimate end of maintaining an atmosphere conducive to learning can it be held to violate the substantive provision of the due process laws. Paddling of recalcitrant children has long been an accepted method of promoting good behavior and instilling notions of responsibility and decorum into the mischievous heads of school children. We do not here overrule it.
IV. Procedural Due Process.
Plaintiffs also allege as part of their claim for injunctive and declaratory relief that defendants have deprived the class which plaintiffs represent of its right to procedural due process. Plaintiffs argue that procedural due process requires (1) that a schedule of school regulations and punishments to be accorded for their breach be established; (2) that notice be given to the student of the offense for which he is to be punished, and (3) that a hearing with opportunity for examination and cross-examination and with a right to counsel be accorded before punishment is inflicted.
The concept of due process is premised upon fairness and reasonableness in light of the totality of circumstances. Hannah v. Larcht,363 U.S. 420, 80 S.Ct. 1502, 4 L.Ed.2d 1307 (1960); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 71 S.Ct. 624, 95 L.Ed. 817 (1951). '(W)hether any protections are due depends on the extent to which an individual will be 'condemned to suffer grievous loss." Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, supra, at 168, 71 S.Ct. at 646 (Frankfurter, J., concurring), quoted in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, at 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, at 2600, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972) (emphasis added). We do not believe that infliction of a paddling subjects a schoolchild to a grievous loss for which Fourteenth Amendment due process standards should be applied.
In its argument for procedural safeguards, the dissent relies on Baker v. Owen, supra, a three-judge district court judgment summarily affirmed by the Supreme Court. In Baker, the three-jud