Source: http://www.politikexpress.de/counter-terrorism-database-in-its-fundamental-structures-compatible-with-the-basic-law-but-not-regarding-specific-aspects-of-its-design-859667.html
Timestamp: 2017-09-20 00:14:38
Document Index: 35765067

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art. 51', 'Art. 101', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 5', '§ 6']

Counter-Terrorism Database in its Fundamental Structures Compatible with the Basic Law, but not Regarding Specific Aspects of its Design | PolitikExpress
1. The complainant challenges the Act on Setting up a Standardised Central Counter-Terrorism Database of Police Authorities and Intelligence Services of the Federal Government and the Länder (Counter-Terrorism Database Act – ATDG; Gesetz zur Errichtung einer standardisierten zentralen Antiterrordatei von Polizeibehörden und Nachrichtendiensten von Bund und Ländern, Antiterrordateigesetz).
2. The constitutional complaint provides no reasons for a preliminary ruling before the European Court of Justice. Clearly, the Counter-Terrorism Database Act and actions that are based on it do not constitute an implementation of Union law according to Art. 51 sec. 1 sentence 1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The Counter-Terrorism Database Act pursues nationally determined objectives which can affect the functioning of the legal relationships under EU law merely indirectly. Thus, the European fundamental rights are from the outset not applicable, and the European Court of Justice is not the lawful judge according to Art. 101 sec. 1 sentence 2 of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz – GG).The European Court of Justice?s decision in the case Åkerberg Fransson (judgment of 26 February 2013, C-617/10) does not change this conclusion. As part of a cooperative relationship, this decision must not be read in a way that would view it as an apparent ultra vires act or as if it endangered the protection and enforcement of the fundamental rights in the member states in a way that questioned the identity of the Basic Law?s constitutional order. The Senate acts on the assumption that the statements in the ECJ?s decision are based on the distinctive features of the law on value-added tax, and express no general view. The Senate?s decision on this issue was unanimous.
(1) First, § 2 sentence 1 no. 1 ATDG covers members, supporters, and support groups of terrorist organisations. However, the provision
enlarges this circle to persons who merely support a support group, without clarifying that a conscious support of activities which support terrorism is required. Thus persons can be covered who – prior to, and unaware of a relationship to, terrorist activities – support an organisation that seems unsuspicious to them. This violates the principle of the clarity of legal provisions and is incompatible with the prohibition of disproportionate measures. An interpretation in conformity with the Constitution is not possible in this case.
Because of a tie in the Senate?s votes, the terms „unlawful use of violence? („rechtswidrige Gewalt?) and „intentional incitement of such use of violence? („vorsätzliches Hervorrufen solcher Gewalt?) cannot be declared unconstitutional. According to the four members of the Senate who carry this part of the decision, the use of these criteria is compatible with the Basic Law as long as they are not accorded an overly wide meaning, and in particular the term „violence? is only understood as violence that is directed directly against life and limb or characterised by means that are dangerous to public safety. According to the view of the other four members of the Senate, the provision would have to be declared unconstitutional as a whole because of its lack of specificity and an overly wide reach; an interpretation in conformity with the Constitution would not be possible.
The mere „advocating? of violence („Befürworten von Gewalt?) within the meaning of this provision is, according to the Senate?s unanimous view, not sufficient for recording a person in the counter-terrorism database. The provision thus violates the prohibition of disproportionate measures. In this case, the law uses subjective convictions as its yardstick and thus lays out criteria which an individual can only control to a limited degree and which cannot be influenced by behaving in a perfectly legal way.
(3) § 2 sentence 1 no. 3 ATDG is unconstitutional. According to this provision, the basic data must be stored in the database if contact persons do not know about the protagonist?s connection to terrorism. If they do know about the protagonist?s connection to terrorism, the extended basic data must be stored as well. Consequently, the exchange of non-encoded information between the participating authorities also includes data concerning the contact persons. The provision is neither compatible with the principle of clarity of legal provisions nor with
the prohibition of disproportionate measures. However, it is not generally prohibited by constitutional law to make data of contact persons available in the anti-terror database. As a general rule, such persons are only of interest to the degree they can provide information about the protagonist who is thought to have a close connection to terrorism. This is what the legislation must have in mind as well. It would be possible in such a situation to store only some elementary data about contact persons and to store them, as information concerning the protagonist with a connection to terrorism, in such a way that they can only be searched covertly.
cc) The extent of the data stored, which is set out in § 3 sec. 1 nos. 1a and 1b ATDG, is constitutionally unobjectionable. However, with regard to some data, it is necessary to document and to publish the intermediate administrative steps by which they are specified. This duty of documentation and publication applies to the characteristics set out in § 3 sec. 1 no. 1b gg, hh, ii, kk, nn ATDG (for instance concerning the storage of data about skills which are relevant in connection with terrorism), which are phrased very broadly. They meet the requirement of the clarity of legal provisions because these characteristics can only be specified by the security authorities. The legislature, however, has to ensure that the way in which this is done is documented and published. Current practice is that the vague legal terms are specified, and standardised, by a catalogue of the characteristics which are to be stored; this list is part of the computer programme. The Federal Government has provided the Senate with a „Catalogue Manual? on this. The Counter-Terrorism Database Act, however, does not provide for a publication of this manual. Thus, the present legal situation does not satisfy the requirements of a legislation which is structured in accordance with the rule of law.
(3) There are no concerns under constitutional law against use of the extended basic data in an emergency (§ 5 sec. 2 in conjunction with § 6 sec. 2 ATDG), not even with regard to a reverse search. The conditions under which such a use is permitted are drafted in a manner that is restrictive enough as to justify the intervention. The provision complies with the prohibition of disproportionate measures and also
adheres to the principle of the separation of information between the police and the intelligence services.
ee) Due to the purpose and the functioning of the database, the Counter-Terrorism Database Act ensures transparency of the exchange of information only to a limited extent. Thus, only limited possibilities of legal protection are open to the persons affected. This is compatible with the Constitution if the conditions set out in constitutional law are adhered to when it comes to effectively organising the supervision. The supervisory instances at federal and state level – currently, the data protection commissioners – must have effective powers. There must be complete records of any access to sets of data, and of their modification; the records must be made available to the data protection commissioners in such a way that they can be evaluated in a practicable manner. There must be checks in appropriate intervals; the duration of such intervals may not exceed a certain maximum of approximately two years.