Source: https://casetext.com/case/state-v-hendrickson-22
Timestamp: 2019-08-20 19:15:18
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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 22', '§ 7']

State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wn. 2d 61 | Casetext
129 Wn. 2d 61 (Wash. 1996)
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Statev.Hendrickson
The Supreme Court of Washington. En BancMay 9, 1996
129 Wn. 2d 61•917 P.2d 563•129 Wash. 2d 61•
No. 62473-9.
Michael Hendrickson, who was on work release, was arrested for selling cocaine to a fellow inmate at a location frequented by Wahkiakum County Jail inmates. Hendrickson's truck was impounded. Several days later, acting on an anonymous tip, police conducted a warrantless search of the truck and found cocaine in the vent of an audio speaker.
In order to participate in the work release program, Hendrickson was required to execute a document entitled Wahkiakum County Rules for Work Release Program. He executed the document on October 29, 1991, in the presence of a witness, Wahkiakum County Chief Deputy Sheriff Dan L. Bardsley. Bardsley testified that he and Hendrickson signed the document. Bardsley also testified that he both discussed the rules with Hendrickson and read them to him on the day Hendrickson signed the document. Hendrickson had no questions and stated he understood the rules. The key provisions of the work release rules are the following:
Two detectives from the Task Force came to Cathlamet, and informed Hendrickson that he was under arrest for delivering cocaine. The detectives advised him they were seizing his truck because it had been used to transport the cocaine to the jail. The detectives then performed a brief, warrantless, inventory search of the truck, but found nothing of interest. They seized the truck and it remained in the custody of the Wahkiakum County Sheriff, parked in the parking lot of the jail.
Based on the evidence seized from Hendrickson's truck, officers obtained a warrant the very next day to search the home workshop Hendrickson used during the work release program. Officers conducted the search on February 20. The search revealed no additional drugs, but yielded a piece of clothing from which Hendrickson's cocaine packaging material could have been cut, and some camouflage print fabric identical to the fabric found on the film canister in Hendrickson's truck.
[1] As Hendrickson has claimed a violation of his rights under both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. I, § 7 of the Washington Constitution, we will first analyze the alleged violation of the Washington Constitution. State v. Johnson, 128 Wn.2d 431, 909 P.2d 293 (1996); State v. Young, 123 Wn.2d 173, 178-79, 867 P.2d 593 (1994); State v. Coe, 101 Wn.2d 364, 373-74, 679 P.2d 353 (1984).
Hendrickson did not argue for the application of art. I, § 7, either in the trial court or the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals did not address Washington constitutional issues, either. Hendrickson argued for the application of the Washington Constitution for the first time in his Supplemental Br. of Pet'r at 9-12. On at least two occasions, this court has rejected issues raised for the first time in supplemental briefs: State v. Collins, 121 Wn.2d 168, 179, 847 P.2d 919 (1993) (not appropriate to consider an issue raised for the first time in a supplemental brief after review has been accepted); Douglas v. Freeman, 117 Wn.2d 242, 257-58, 814 P.2d 1160 (1991) (issue not raised in Court of Appeals or in answer to petition for review would not be heard after having been raised for first time in supplemental brief).
[2] Our analysis of art. I, § 7 of the Washington Constitution begins with the proposition that warrantless searches are unreasonable per se. In State v. Houser, 95 Wn.2d 143N 149, 622 P.2d 1218 (1980), we said:
As a general rule, warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564, 91 S. Ct. 2022 (1971). Nonetheless, there are a few "`jealously and carefully drawn' exceptions" to the warrant requirement which "provide for those cases where the societal costs of obtaining a warrant, such as danger to law officers of the risk of loss or destruction of evidence, outweigh the reasons for prior recourse to a neutral magistrate." Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 759, 61 L. Ed. 2d 235, 99 S. Ct. 2586 (1979). See Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1514, 78 S. Ct. 1253 (1958). The burden is on the prosecutor to show that a warrantless search or seizure falls within one of these exceptions.
(Footnotes omitted.) We first cited the per se unreasonable rule with approval in State v. Murray, 84 Wn.2d 527, 533, 527 P.2d 1303 (1974) (reversing conviction because "plain view" exception to warrantless seizure rule did not apply), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975), and we have frequently recognized this principle in our jurisprudence under art. I, § 7. State v. Chrisman, 100 Wn.2d 814, 817, 676 P.2d 419 (1984). See also State v. Ringer, 100 Wn.2d 686, 674 P.2d 1240 (1983) (analysis of historical context of art. I, § 7), overruled by State v. Stroud, 106 Wn.2d 144, 720 P.2d 436 (1986). There are, however, exceptions to the rule.
(Emphasis added.) Clerk's Papers at 36. The State has not assigned error to these findings, and they are verities on appeal.
[5] We disagree. The exceptions to the requirement of a warrant, including consent, are "`jealously and carefully drawn.'" State v. Bradley, 105 Wn.2d 898, 902, 719 P.2d 546 (1986) (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 29 L. Ed. 2d 120 (1971)). Hendrickson was no longer on work release status on February 19. Because Hendrickson waived his art. I, § 7 and Fourth Amendment rights and consented to searches of his vehicle in return for permission to participate in the work release program, his termination from that program terminated his consent to search without the necessity for him to take specific action to revoke the consent.
Finally, the State contends that a vehicle seized for purposes of civil forfeiture under RCW 69.50.505 may be searched at will, citing State v. McFadden, 63 Wn. App. 441, 449, 820 P.2d 53 (1991), review denied, 119 Wn.2d 1002 (1992). This court has generally discussed warrantless searches of vehicles under art. I, § 7 in the context of a search incident to arrest. We have been sensitive to the reality that the passenger compartment of a vehicle may harbor weapons for an occupant, and to the exigencies that an occupant could easily destroy evidence in the vehicle while a warrant was being sought, or even drive the vehicle away. State v. Johnson, supra; State v. Fladebo, 113 Wn.2d 388, 779 P.2d 707 (1989); State v. Patterson, 112 Wn.2d 731, 774 P.2d 10 (1989); State v. Stroud, 106 Wn.2d 144, 147, 720 P.2d 436 (1986); State v. Gluck, 83 Wn.2d 424, 518 P.2d 703 (1974). But this was not a warrantless search incident to Hendrickson's arrest. Hendrickson was arrested in jail, not in his truck.
See State v. Smith, 119 Wn.2d 675, 683, 835 P.2d 1025 (1992); State v. Hill, 68 Wn. App. 300, 842 P.2d 996 (delay between arrest and search of vehicle must not be unreasonably long), review denied, 121 Wn.2d 1020 (1993); State v. Boyce, 52 Wn. App. 274, 758 P.2d 1017 (1988).
The essence of the State's argument is that we should recognize a new exception to the requirement of a warrant where a civil forfeiture has been initiated under RCW 69.50.505. Not even McFadden approved so extensive a rule. In that case, McFadden was arrested while in possession of cocaine. The police then searched the van in which McFadden had arrived at the scene of his arrest. "The detectives testified that they decided to seize the vehicle based on the fact that it was used to facilitate a drug transaction." McFadden, 63 Wn. App. at 443. They found 83.9 grams of cocaine in an unlocked toolbox in the van. Id.
Some federal courts have held that where police have probable cause to believe a car is subject to forfeiture, or have validly seized a car for forfeiture, the police may search the car without a warrant. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 833 F.2d 724, 728-29 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Edge, 444 F.2d 1372, 1375 (7th Cir. 1971); United States v. $29,000 — U.S. Currency, 745 F.2d 853, 856 (4th Cir. 1984); United States v. Harris, 727 F.2d 401, 405 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. Merryman, 630 F.2d 780, 785 (10th Cir. 1980); Johnson, 572 F.2d at 234; United States v. Zaicek, 519 F.2d 412, 414-15 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Young, 456 F.2d 872, 875 (8th Cir. 1972). Contra United States v. Salmon, 944 F.2d 1106 (3rd Cir. 1991). These cases follow from Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 87 S. Ct. 788, 17 L. Ed. 2d 730 (1967), a case, like McFadden, where the police seized a vehicle pursuant to a forfeiture statute and happened to encounter incriminating evidence during an inventory search. In justifying its holding, the Court relied on the Rabinowitz test: "It is no answer to say that the police could have obtained a search warrant, for `[t]he relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether the search was reasonable.' United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66." Cooper, 386 U.S. at 62. In the term following Cooper, however, the Court explicitly abandoned the Rabinowitz test, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 768, 89 S. Ct. 2034, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685 (1969), and replaced it the next year with the "per se unreasonable" rule. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1969). Thus, it is at least questionable whether Cooper would come out the same way now under the "per se unreasonable" rule rather than the Rabinowitz test.
In this case, the police informed Hendrickson of their intent to forfeit his truck on February 15, but they did not serve the necessary formal summons to forfeit the truck until February 20, the day after they searched it. The police conducted an inventory search on February 15 and discovered no contraband. They parked the truck in the jail parking lot. The police search on February 19 was investigative in nature. There were no exigent circumstances present here: there is no indication that the police were in "hot pursuit" or their investigation was in any fashion imperiled by obtaining a warrant.
[8] Effective assistance of counsel is guaranteed by both U.S. CONST. amend. VI and WASH. CONST. art. I, § 22 (amend. x). Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984); State v. Mierz, 127 Wn.2d 460, 471, 901 P.2d 286 (1995). In Strickland, the Court established a two-part test for ineffective assistance of counsel. First, the defendant must show deficient performance. In this assessment, the appellate court will presume the defendant was properly represented. State v. Lord, 117 Wn.2d 829, 883, 822 P.2d 177 (1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856, 113 S. Ct. 164, 121 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1992); State v. Thomas, 109 Wn.2d 222, 226, 743 P.2d 816 (1987); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89. Deficient performance is not shown by matters that go to trial strategy or tactics. State v. Garrett, 124 Wn.2d 504, 520, 881 P.2d 185 (1994); State v. Mak, 105 Wn.2d 692, 718 P.2d 407, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 995 (1986).
Second, the defendant must show prejudice — "that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. This showing is made when there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the trial would have been different. Thomas, 109 Wn.2d at 226. If either part of the test is not satisfied, the inquiry need go no further. Lord, 117 Wn.2d at 894; State v. Fredrick, 45 Wn. App. 916, 729 P.2d 56 (1986).
In this case, the prosecution elicited the evidence of the prior convictions not from Hendrickson, but from Chief Deputy Sheriff Bardsley during the prosecution's presentation of the case. None of the conditions in ER 609(a) applies in this case, and we cannot discern a reason why Hendrickson's counsel would not have objected to such damaging and prejudicial evidence. Hendrickson could not have kept from the jury that he was incarcerated during the crime for which he was being tried, of course, but there was no compelling need for the jury to know the cause of that incarceration. Nor did the jury need to know at all that Hendrickson had a second prior conviction for a drug-related offense. Prior convictions that may enhance a current sentence need be presented only to the judge, not to the jury.
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness in a criminal or civil case, evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from the witness or established by public record during the examination of the witness but only if the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of 1 year under the law under which the witness was convicted, and the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs the prejudice to the party against whom the evidence is offered, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.
The State admits that "prior convictions, particularly if for crimes similar to those with which a defendant is currently charged are generally inadmissible because of the prejudicial effect they might have on a jury," Resp't's Br. at 17, but argues that allowing the State without objection to admit evidence of prior convictions was a tactical decision by Hendrickson: "Instead of letting the jury speculate about the reason why Defendant was in jail at the time the crime occurred, defense counsel made the tactical decision to be candid about the nature of Defendant's prior convictions." Resp't's Br. at 20. The State offers no support for this proposition, and nothing supporting it appears in the record.
First, we must determine if the trial court would have sustained Hendrickson's objection to the introduction of evidence of his prior, drug-related convictions. We hold that such evidence would not have been admissible because its prejudicial effect would have outweighed its probative value.
[9] Hendrickson challenges his enhanced sentence for delivering drugs in jail both on the sufficiency of the evidence to convict and the constitutionality of the statute. RCW 9.94A.310(5) provides for an enhanced sentence for delivery of drugs in a jail:
The following additional times shall be added to the presumptive sentence if the offender or an accomplice committed the offense while in a county jail or state correctional facility as that term is defined in this chapter. . . .
This vagueness challenge in a case not involving the First Amendment is determined on the basis of the statute's application to the facts of this case, rather than on a facial analysis of the statute. Douglass, 115 Wn.2d at 181-82. The statute is presumed to be constitutional, and the person challenging the statute for vagueness has a heavy burden in meeting the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard. Douglass, 115 Wn.2d at 178. Hendrickson has not met this burden.
We adhere to and reiterate the view that warrantless searches are unreasonable per se unless one of the narrow exceptions to that general constitutional standard is present and proved by the State. No exception is present here. Because the search of Hendrickson's truck on February 19 violated art. I, § 7 of the Washington Constitution, we reverse the Court of Appeals' decision on the count of possession with intent to deliver and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings in light of this opinion.
We affirm Hendrickson's conviction for delivery. He was not denied effective assistance of counsel because two prior drug convictions were admitted into evidence, given the powerful evidence of Hendrickson's guilt on the charge. His enhanced sentence under RCW 9.94A.310(5) is proper in light of the Legislature's clear intent to proscribe drugs in correctional facilities.