Source: http://va.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20160908_0000975.EVA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2018-02-21 21:25:04
Document Index: 329853402

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2255', '§ 924', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 1951', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 2255', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255']

Defendant, by counsel, has filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence imposed on him a decade ago on the ground that the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015), operates to invalidate his conviction for one count of using a firearm in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). At issue on the government's motion to dismiss is whether defendant's § 2255 motion is untimely pursuant to the one-year statute of limitations set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)-Also at issue, assuming defendant's § 2255 motion is timely, is whether Johnson operates to invalidate defendant's § 924(c) conviction. Because the matter has been fully briefed and the facts and law are fully set forth in the existing record, neither oral argument nor an evidentiary hearing would aid the decisional process.[2] Accordingly, the matter is now ripe for disposition.
On December 12, 2006, defendant pled guilty to one count of using a firearm during a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A); the predicate offense for this count is a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (Hobbs Act robbery). Specifically, defendant admitted, inter alia, that on or about December 13, 2014, defendant possessed and discharged a firearm in furtherance of a cocaine-related robbery in Centreville, Virginia, in the Eastern District of Virginia. On December 21, 2006, after defendant pled guilty to this crime, defendant received a sentence of 120 months' imprisonment, followed by five years' supervised release.
Pursuant to § 924(c), a defendant who "during and in relation to any crime of violence ... uses or carries a firearm ... shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence ... if the firearm is discharged, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 10 years." 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). In order to prove a violation of § 924(c), the government must establish: (1) that the defendant possessed and discharged a firearm; and (2) that he did so during and in relation to a crime of violence. United States v. Strayhorn, 743 F.3d 917, 922 (4th Cir. 2014). Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3), a "crime of violence" is any felony:
On June 26, 2015, nearly six years after defendant's sentence was imposed, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015), addressing the definition of'Violent felony" in the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). Specifically, the Supreme Court in Johnson held that the ACCA residual clause-the provision that defines a "violent felony" to include an offense that "otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another, " 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)-is unconstitutionally vague, and therefore that "imposing an increased sentence under the residual clause of the [ACCA] violates the Constitution's guarantee of due process." Id. at 2563. Thereafter, on April 18, 2016, the Supreme Court held that Johnson announced a new "substantive rule that has retroactive effect in cases on collateral review." Welch v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 1257, 1268 (2016).
On June 23, 2016, shortly after the Supreme Court's decision in Welch, defendant filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence imposed on him for his § 924(c) conviction on the ground that the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson operates to invalidate this conviction. Specifically, defendant contends that the residual clause of § 924(c) is indistinguishable from the ACCA residual clause, and accordingly, the residual clause of § 924(c) is unconstitutionally vague under the rationale of Johnson.
The Fourth Circuit has explained that "to obtain the benefit of the limitations period stated in § 2255(f)(3), [a movant] must show: (1) that the Supreme Court recognized a new right; (2) that the right 'has been ... made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review'; and (3) that [me movant] filed his motion within one year of the date on which the Supreme Court recognized the right." United States v. Mathur, 685 F.3d 396, 398 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting § 2255(f)(3)). Importantly, however, there is a question as to the meaning of the term "right" as used in § 2255(f)(3). As neither the Supreme Court nor the Fourth Circuit has grappled with this question, [4] it is appropriate, indeed necessary, to do so here.[5]
The Supreme Court has made clear that when interpreting a statute, "the starting point... is the language itself." Consumer Prod. Safety Comm 'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., AA1 U.S. 102, 108 (1980). In this regard, it is axiomatic that "[i]f the statutory language is plain, " a court "must enforce it according to its terms." King v. Burwell, 135 S.Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015). At the same time, the Supreme Court has recently explained that statutory interpretation properly proceeds "with reference to the statutory context, 'structure, history, and purpose, ' " as well as "common sense." Abramski v. United States, 134 S.Ct. 2259, 2267 (2014) (quoting Maracich v. Spears, 133 S.Ct. 2191, 2209 (2013)). Thus, "although the analysis properly focuses on the text, the analysis is not necessarily limited to the text." Angiotech Pharms. Inc. v. Lee, - F.Supp.3d -, No. 1:15-cv-1673, 2016 WL 3248352, at *9 (E.D. Va. June 8, 2016).
There can be no doubt that Congress was aware of the Teague framework when it enacted the AEDPA in 1996, as (i) Teague was-and is-the leading case on the non-retroactivity doctrine, [8] (ii) Teague was an interpretation of the very statutory scheme Congress amended with the AEDPA, [9] (iii) several provisions of the AEDPA contain language that tracks the Teague framework, [10] and (iv) the legislative history refers to the principles of habeas retroactivity on collateral review."[11] Thus, the Teague framework sheds light on Congress's choice of language in § 2255(f)(3). Indeed, the language of § 2255 incorporates the Teague framework in some respects and deviates from that framework in other respects. Of particular relevance here, § 2255(f)(3) specifically incorporates the Teague framework insofar as that provision refers to Supreme Court decisions that have been "made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review, " but § 2255(f)(3) deviates from the language of Teague insofar as § 2255(f)(3) refers to a newly recognized "right" rather than a "new rule, " the term used by the Supreme Court in Teague and its progeny.[12]
If Congress intended for "right" and "rule" to have different meanings, as the foregoing analysis suggests, mere is good reason to conclude that "right" should be interpreted as a broad principle rather than as a narrow application of a principle to a particular set of facts or to a particular statute. To begin with, the terms "right" and "rule, " as generally understood, have distinct meanings. A "right, " as already noted, is generally understood to mean a protected interest that one may claim against another, [14] whereas a "rule" is generally understood to mean a principle that is a statement of a legal right as applied to a particular set of facts.[15] This understanding accords with the Supreme Court's use of "rule" in the Teague framework. For example, in Johnson, the Supreme Court applied a broad right-the right to fair notice of prohibited conduct-to a particular statute, and as a result, announced a new rule made retroactive under Teague, namely that the ACCA residual clause is unconstitutional. See Johnson, 135 S.Ct. at 2556-57, 2563. Thus, if a "rule" is a narrow application of a legal right, and if "rule" and "right" have different meanings, then under a plain reading of § 2255(f)(3), the term "right" refers to a general protected interest that a defendant may claim rather than a particular application of that protected interest to a particular set of facts. Under this reading of the statute, § 2255(f)(3) does not apply to defendant's case because the Supreme Court in Johnson did not recognize a new right, but instead applied a well-settled right to a particular statute, and therefore announced a new rule.
As already noted, the Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit have not yet grappled with the ambiguity of the term "right" in § 2255(f)(3).[16] Nor has any decision of another circuit been found that adequately addresses the issue. The widespread inattention may have a simple explanation; when the Supreme Court announces a new rule made retroactive under the Teague framework, it usually also announces a new right, [17] and therefore, the distinction between a right and rule is not typically material to the application of § 2255(f)(3). Thus, in most instances it is unnecessary to resolve the ambiguity of the scope of the term "right" in § 2255(0(3).
Importantly, however, with respect to the Supreme Court's recent decision in Johnson, the distinction between a right and a rule is material to the application of § 2255(0(3). This is so because as already noted, the right in issue in Johnson was not a new right, but was instead the well-settled prohibition against unconstitutional vagueness in criminal statutes, whereas the application of that right resulted in a newly recognized rule, namely that the ACCA residual clause is unconstitutionally vague. See Johnson 135 S.Ct. at 2556, 2557 ("Our cases establish that the [g]overnment violates [the Due Process Clause] by taking away someone's life, liberty, or property under a criminal law so vague that it fails to give ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it punishes, or so standardless that it invites arbitrary enforcement.") (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 (1983)).[18] Thus, under a construction of the term "right" in § 2255(f)(3) that distinguishes that term from the term "rule" as used in the Teague framework, the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson did not trigger a new one-year limitations period pursuant to § 2255(f)(3) because that decision simply recognized a new rule, which was made retroactive in Welch, but did not recognize a new right within the meaning of § 2255(f)(3), as the right asserted by the petitioner in Johnson was the well-settled right not to be convicted or sentenced pursuant to an unconstitutionally vague law. In this regard, the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson brings the ambiguity of the term "right" in § 2255(f)(3) to the surface, perhaps for the first time.
For one, this construction avoids an anomalous result that would follow from the construction of § 2255(0(3) articulated in Part II-A, supra. Specifically, under an interpretation of "right" that distinguishes that term from the term "rule" in the Teague sense, no defendant could bring a § 2255 motion relying on Johnson pursuant to § 2255(f)(3). Such a conclusion, though seemingly consistent with the text of the statute, would be at odds with the spirit of the Supreme Court's decision in Welch, which has the effect of enabling prisoners sentenced under the ACCA residual clause before Johnson was decided to bring collateral attacks on their sentences on the basis of Johnson. See Welch, 136 S.Ct. at 1268. Indeed, it could be argued that the Supreme Court in Welch rejected by implication a construction of the term "right" that precludes the effective vindication of most § 2255 motions premised on Johnson[19]in favor of a construction that equates the term "right" with the term "rule" in the Teague sense.
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;In this regard, the result in Welch comports only with an interpretation of &sect; 2255(f)(3) that takes the term "right" to mean "rule" in the Teagite sense. In Welch, the petitioner had been sentenced pursuant to the ACCA residual clause in 2010, and did not file his &sect; 2255 motion until December 2013, long after the expiration of the general one-year limitations period set forth in &sect; 2255(f)(1). See Id. at 1262-63. Thus, in Welch, the petitioner&#39;s &sect; 2255 motion was timely only if petitioner was relying on &sect; 2255(f)(3).[20] Importantly, the Supreme Court in Welch made no mention that petitioner could not rely on &sect; 2255(f)(3) pursuant to Johnson. Thus, although the Supreme Court in Welch did not squarely address the issue, the result reached in Welch rests on the premise that once Johnson was made retroactive, a new one-year statutory period began to run pursuant to § 2255(f)(3); without this premise, the petitioner's ...