Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/98989/united-states-vs-bramblett
Timestamp: 2020-02-29 12:50:43
Document Index: 783904775

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1001', '§ 6', '§ 1001', '§ 1001', '§ 3731', '§ 1001', '§ 287']

United States Vs Bramblett - Citation 98989 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
United States Vs. Bramblett - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/98989
Case Number 348 U.S. 503
Respondent Bramblett
.....of the statute is broad, although its application was limited to military personnel. false statements were proscribed in the following clause of the same section in these terms: "any person in such forces or service who shall, for the purpose of obtaining, or aiding in obtaining, the approval or payment of such claim, make, use, or cause to be made or used, any false bill, receipt, voucher, entry, roll, account, claim, statement, certificate, affidavit, or deposition, knowing the same to contain any false or fraudulent statement or entry." it will be noted that there is here no specification as to the group to whom the false statements had to be made. the provision in the false claims section which made the presentation of false claims to "any person or officer in.....
United States v. Bramblett - 348 U.S. 503 (1955)
U.S. Supreme Court United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503 (1955)
The Disbursing Office of the House of Representatives is a "department or agency" of the United States within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, which forbids the willful falsification of a material fact "in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States." Pp. 348 U. S. 503 -510.
(a) The legislative history of this section shows that it was the intention of Congress to make it applicable to the legislative and judicial branches of the Government. Pp. 348 U. S. 504 -508.
(b) A different result is not required by the definitions of "department" and "agency" in 18 U.S.C. § 6. Pp. 348 U. S. 508 -509.
(c) The development, scope and purpose of § 1001 shows that "department," as used in this context, was meant to describe the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the Government. p. 348 U. S. 509 .
(d) That criminal statutes must be construed strictly does not mean that every criminal statute must be given the narrowest possible meaning in complete disregard of the purpose of the legislature. Pp. 348 U. S. 509 -510.
of Congress, with violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. [ Footnote 1 ] During the course of the trial, a judgment of acquittal was ordered on counts 8 through 18 of the indictment. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on the remaining 7 counts, which charged the appellee with having falsely and fraudulently represented to the Disbursing Office of the House of Representatives that a named woman was entitled to compensation as his official clerk. The District Court granted appellee's motion in arrest of judgment, holding that he had not falsified a material fact "within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States," since the Disbursing Office was not a department or agency within the meaning of the statute. The District Court was of the opinion that the statute does not afford protection to the legislative and judicial branches of the Government. The Government brought this case here on direct appeal pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3731. Reference to the evolution of § 1001 will assist in determining the correctness of the decision below. A detailed analysis appears in the opinion of the trial court. 120 F.Supp. 857, 858.
scope of the false statements provision to the executive branch. [ Footnote 2 ]
The 1934 revision was largely the product of the urging of the Secretary of the Interior. [ Footnote 3 ] The Senate Report, S. Rep. No. 1202, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., indicates that its purpose was to broaden the statute so as to reach not only false papers presented in connection with a claim against the Government, but also nonmonetary frauds such as those involved in the "hot oil" shipments. A greater variety of false statements were meant to be included. [ Footnote 4 ] There is no indication in either the committee reports [ Footnote 5 ] or in the congressional debates [ Footnote 6 ] that the scope of the statute was to be in any way restricted. There was certainly no suggestion that the new phrase was to be interpreted so that only falsifications made to executive agencies would be reached. [ Footnote 7 ] Apparently the italicized phrase was inserted simply to compensate for the deleted
The 1948 revision put the statute into its present form. [ Footnote 8 ] 62 Stat. 683. The false claims provision became § 287 of Title 18, and retained its prior form without significant change. Section 1001 is the "false statements" section. Except for housekeeping changes in language which are of no particular significance, the deletion of the reference to corporations, and the transposition of the "in any matter" clause to the beginning of the section, there has been no change since the 1934 statute. There is no indication that the revision was intended to work any substantive change. It would thus be supposed that the statute retained its broad scope, a scope at least as broad as the false claims section, and could not be limited to falsifications made to executive agencies.
But this does not mean that every criminal statute must be given the narrowest possible meaning, in complete disregard of the purpose of the legislature. [ Footnote 9 ]
For a discussion of the legislative history of the Act, see United States v. Gilliland, 312 U. S. 86 , 312 U. S. 93 -95.
In United States v. Cohn, 270 U. S. 339 , the Court held that the 1918 Act did not proscribe false statements made to a customs collector where the purpose was not to defraud the Government of either its money or property. After the 1934 amendment, however, the Court sustained an indictment charging the defendants with willfully falsifying reports required to be filed under the "Hot Oil" Act of February 22, 1935. The Court stated that the purpose of the 1934 amendment was to remove the prior "restriction to cases involving pecuniary or property loss to the government." United States v. Gilliland, 312 U. S. 86 , 312 U. S. 93 .
Cf. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U. S. 537 ; Spivey v. United States, 109 F.2d 181.