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Gurudas Sen Vs Gobinda Chandra Sinha and ors - Citation 881557 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Gurudas Sen Vs. Gobinda Chandra Sinha and ors. - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/881557
Decided On Aug-11-1919
Judge Chatterjea and Duval, JJ.
Reported in 54Ind.Cas.914
Appellant Gurudas Sen
Respondent Gobinda Chandra Sinha and ors.
Cases Referred Afar v. Surja Kumar Ghose
landlord and tenant - rent, payment of, partly in kind and partly in cash--kabuliyat, provision in, in case of default--tenant agreeing to pay definite sum as value--landlord, whether entitled to market value. - .....question is whether the plaintiff is entitled to realize anything more than rs 36 the value of the paddy mentioned in the kabuliyat, on default of payment of the paddy by the tenant. contracts for payment of rent in kind (bhag paddy) are very common, and have come up for consideration to this court in many cases. the decisions, however, are not uniform. the question is no doubt one of construction of the kabuliyat in each case, but the kabuliyats in some of the cases are similar in nature though differently worded and as we have been asked oh behalf of the appellant to refer the case to the full bench, it is necessary to examine the cases on the point.6. in sohobut ali v. abdool ali 3 c.w.n. 151; baneswar mukherji v. umesh chandra chakrabarti 7 ind. cas. 875 : 37 c. 626; sheikh isaf v......
1. This appeal arises out of a suit for rent based upon a Kabuliyat providing for payment of sash rent as well as Bhag paddy, and the question is whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover the market value of the Bhag paddy or the value thereof as stated in the Kabuliyat.
2. The Kabuliyat provides that the tenant would pay four rupees as rent and 91 aris of Bhag paddy, the paddy to be delivered at the house of the lesson in the month of Pous every year according to a certain measure and the cash rent within the course of the year. The Kabuliyat then says: 'if I fraudulently do not pay the aforesaid rent and share of paddy, you shall be competent to realize the said rent and Rs. 36 as price of the paddy together with interest and damages by bringing rent suit under the current Act or under any other Act which may some in future, to which I shall raise no objection. To this effect I execute this Kabuliyat for permanently enjoying the land in succession to sons and grandsons.' The court below held that the case comes within the scope of the ruling in Afar v. Surja Kumar Ghose 7 Ind. Cas. 842 : 15 C.W.N. 249 : 12 C.L.J. 649 and that the plaintiff was not entitled to the market value of the paddy.
3. The plaintiff has appealed to this Court.
4. It appears that a previous suit for rent was compromised and reliance is placed on the fact that the Solenama did not mention the value of the paddy. But the Solenama only dealt with the Claim for rent of a particular year and, moreover, provided that the defendant 'shall pay in accordance with the purport of the Kabuliyat of 2nd Falgun 1240 M.S. to the plaintiff the amount of rent, cesses and share of the paddy.' I think that the Solenama did not vary the terms of the contract contained in the Kabuliyat as contended for on behalf of the appellant.
5. The question, therefore, is whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover (besides rupees four described as rant) Rs. 36 only as the value of the paddy, or the market value of the paddy. As to the intention of the parties there cannot be any doubt that a portion of the rent was to be paid in kind, viz., 91 aris of paddy : and this is made clear by the provision that the paddy was to be delivered according to a certain measure at the house of the plaintiff in the month of Pous every year. But the question is whether the plaintiff is entitled to realize anything more than Rs 36 the value of the paddy mentioned in the Kabuliyat, on default of payment of the paddy by the tenant. Contracts for payment of rent in kind (Bhag paddy) are very common, and have come up for consideration to this Court in many cases. The decisions, however, are not uniform. The question is no doubt one of construction of the Kabuliyat in each case, but the Kabuliyats in some of the cases are similar in nature though differently worded and as we have been asked oh behalf of the appellant to refer the case to the Full Bench, it is necessary to examine the cases on the point.
6. In Sohobut Ali v. Abdool Ali 3 C.W.N. 151; Baneswar Mukherji v. Umesh Chandra Chakrabarti 7 Ind. Cas. 875 : 37 C. 626; Sheikh Isaf v. Gopal Chandra Dey 8 Ind. Cas. 896 : 12 C.L.J. 593; Akbar Ali v. Durga Kripa Sen 8 Ind. Cas. 944 : 12 C.L.J. 589 and Sarat Chandra Roy v. Abbas Mandal 41 Ind. Cas. 833 : 21 C.W.N. oxl (140) it was held that the lessor was entitled to the market value of the paddy while in Afar v. Surja Kumar Ghose 7 Ind. Cas. 842 : 15 C.W.N. 249 : 12 C.L.J. 649; Nilmadhab Mahapntra v. Keshab Lal 40 Ind. Cas. 819 : 26 C.L.J. 94 : 47 C. 139n; Bwarika Nath v. Dwijendra Nath 63 Ind. Cas. 103 : 30 C.L.J. 37 and Asutosh Mukkopadhya v. Haran Chandra Mukerjee 53 Ind. Cas. 382 : 30 C.L.J. 41 : 23 C.W.N. 1021 : 47 C. 133 it was held that the lessor was entitled to recover only the value of the paddy mentioned in the Kabuliyat and not the market value thereof. In all these cases a certain quantity of paddy was stipulated to be paid, and in each the price of the paddy was mentioned in the Kabuliyat, but in some of the cases it was not expressly stated that on default of payment of the paddy the price mentioned in the Kabuliyat was to be paid. This may be a ground of distinction. The decisions in the cases, however, except in the case of Sarat Chandra Roy v. Abbas Mandal 41 Ind. Cas. 833 : 21 C.W.N. oxl (140) did not proceed upon the said distinction. In the case of Sohobut Alt v. Abdool Ali 3 C.W.N. 151; Baneswar Mukherji v. Umesh Chandra Chakrabarti 7 Ind. Cas. 875 : 37 C. 626 and Sarat Chandra Roy v. Abbas Mandal 41 Ind. Cas. 833 : 21 C.W.N. oxl (140) there was no express stipulation that the value of the paddy mentioned in the contract was to be paid on default of delivery of the paddy. But the value of the paddy was mentioned, and in construing the document in the first case the learned Judges (Ameer Ali and Pratt, JJ.) held that Its. 10 was put down in the Kabuliyat as the value of the paddy 'for the sake of convenience or to meet the requirements of the law,' and in the second (where the rent agreed to be paid was Rs. 12-14 and '40 maunds of paddy of which the value is Rs. 37 in all a rent of Rs. 49-14') Sir Lawrence Jenkins, C.J., (Doss, J., concurring) held: 'The terms of that document clearly pointed to the fact that the rent is to be as to part in money and as to part in kind, and this is emphasized by the express provision relating to the delivery of paddy in the month of Pous every year. I think it is impossible to read the document otherwise than as it has been read by the learned Judicial Commissioner, It is quite true that the paddy has a money-value attributed to it, but that is explicable by the desirability of stating that amount for the purpose of fixing the stamp duty.' In the third case Sarat Chandra Roy v. Abbas Mandal 41 Ind. Cas. 833 : 21 C.W.N. oxl (140) the agreement was to pay Rs. 6 as the cash rent and 5f act's of paddy, whose price was Rs. 11-8-0 as paddy rent, in all Rs. 17-8-0. Fletcher and. Newbould, JJ' held that 'whose price is' meant 'the present price of which is' and allowed the value of the paddy at the market rate. The learned Judges observed that there was no universal rule that if no paddy is delivered the tenant has the right to pay the amount mentioned for the paddy, that it must depend upon the words in each case, and that in cases where the tenant had been held entitled to deliver the paddy or pay the price thereof, the tenant had an absolute right under the terms of the leases either to deliver the paddy or to pay to the landlord the sums of money mentioned in the Kabuliyats.
7. In the cases of Sheik Isaf v. Gopal Chandra Roy 8 Ind. Cas. 896 : 12 C.L.J. 598 and Akbar Ali v. Durga Kripa Sen 8 Ind. Cas. 944 : 12 C.L.J. 589 however, the contract provided for delivery of the paddy and on default the value mentioned in the Kabuliyat. In the first case the tenant agreed to pay every year 80 cottas of paddy and 10 cottas of Kalai measured by a cotta of 14 seers, and the Kabuliyat stated 'if we fail to give the same then we will pay you its price amounting to Rs. 30.' The learned Judges, Brett and Richardson, JJ., observed: The tenants agreed to pay to the landlord produce rent of a certain amount and on their failure to do so, to pay its price and the document only merely for the convenience of the parties or for the purpose of registration goes on to state the value of the produce rent as existing at the time when the document was executed. In our opinion that estimate of the value was not intended to modify in any way the terms of the contract between the parties, which was that the tenants should pay a yearly rent in kind and that on their failure to do so, they should pay its price,' and held that the plaintiff was entitled to the market value of the paddy. In the second case Akbar Ali v. Durga Kripa Sen 8 Ind. Cas. 944 : 12 C.L.J. 589 the agreement was to deliver 128 aris of paddy measured with a measure to be supplied by the landlord. In the tabular statement was entered 28 aris of paddy, value 32 rupees, but in the body of the lease it was said that if the tenant failed to pay the measure of paddy, then the arrears of rent in paddy or the price thereof with damages and costs shall be realizable by legal prosecution. Stevens and Handley, JJ., held that what was contemplated was payment of the rent by delivery of the paddy itself and the tenant was not at liberty to deliver either paddy or to pay Rs. 32 and that the tenant was to pay the market value of the paddy. The learned Judges observed: 'Now it is obvious that if by the term the price thereof is meant the sum of Rs. 32, entered in the tabular statement, the tenant could at any time when paddy was dear evade the stipulation that he was to pay by delivery of paddy to his own gain. This, we think, could never have been intended : whether the entry of the nominal value in the tabular statement was made as representing the market value of the paddy at the time when the lease was granted or whether it was made for some other object can only be a matter of conjecture, but in view of the stringent provisions relating to the delivery of the paddy we are not prepared to hold that the entry was made with a view to leave it to the tenant at his option either to deliver the paddy or to pay what might at a particular time be a very inadequate sum as the value of it.'
8. On the other hand in the cases of Afar v. Surja Kumar Ghose 7 Ind. Cas. 842 : 15 C.W.N. 249 : 12 C.L.J. 649; Nilmqdhab Mahapztra v. Keshab Lal 40 Ind. Cas. 819 : 26 C.L.J. 94 : 47 C. 139n; Dwarika Nuth v. Dioiendra Nath 63 Ind. Cas. 103 : 30 C.L.J. 37 and Asutosh Mukhopadhya v. haran Chandra Mukerjee 53 Ind. Cas. 382 : 30 C.L.J. 41 : 23 C.W.N. 1021 : 47 C. 183 a contrary view was taken. In Afar's case 7 Ind. Cas. 842 : 15 C.W.N. 249 : 12 C.L.J. 649 the lease provided for payment of 3 art's of paddy on account of 4 bighas of land and certain cash rent for other lands and also provided that if the tenant neglected to pay the fixed rent and paddy, the landlord would be entitled to realize amicably or by action at law Rs. 12 as the price of the paddy and the cash rent, Mookerjee and Sharfuddir, J I., held that the plaintiffs were entitled, on failure to deliver the paddy, to realize only Rs. 12 as its value, and not the market value. Referring to the suggestion that Rs. 12 was mentioned in the lease as the value of the paddy only for the purpose of ascertainment of the registration fee payable, the learned Judges observed: The plaintiffs have attempted to prove this allegation by oral evidence. In oar opinion it was not competent to them to do so in view of the provisions of Section 92 of the Evidence Act,' and pointed out that in the cases of Sohobut Mi v. Ablool Alt 3 C.W.N. 151; Akbar Ah v. Birgi Kripi Sen 8 Ind. Cas. 944 : 12 C.L.J. 589 and Sheik leaf v. Gopal Chanira Day 8 Ind. Cas. 896 : 12 C.L.J. 598 the Court was no invited to consider the effect of Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act.
9. In Nilmadhab Mahapatra v. Keshab Lal 40 Ind. Cas. 819 : 26 C.L.J. 94 : 47 C. 139(sic) the agreement was to pay Rs. 8 in cash and 29 1/2 maunds of paddy as rent, the paddy to be delivered in the month of Magh of each year, and there was a provision that if the tenant could not deliver the paddy he was to pay its price at the rate of 1 maund 10 seers per rupee. J that rate the value of the paddy would be Rs. 23-9-2 but Rs. 24 was stated in the schedule. On second appeal it was held that had the parties really agreed that a particular fixed sum was to be paid in lieu of the paddy, there would not have been this difference : that the mention of the price of the paddy did not modify the contract to deliver the paddy, and seemed to have been made only for the purpose of fixing the stamp duty and registration fee, and that it was not left to the tenant at his option either to deliver the paddy or to pay what might at a particular time be a very inadequate sum as the value of it. That decision was reversed on Letters Patent Appeal. The learned Chief Justice (Mookerjee, J., agreeing) held that thereat was payable at the price mentioned in the contract and not at the market rate of paddy at the time the suit was instituted : and observed: 'we have no right to make any speculation as to whether certain passages were entered in the contract for some motive which is not apparent on the contract itself : for instance, it has been said that this power to substitute a money payment for the delivery of paddy and the mention of the 24 rupees have been put in for the purpose of registration.'
10. In an earlier case on the point (though recently reported) Dwarika Nath v. Dwijenira Nath 63 Ind. Cas. 103 : 30 C.L.J. 37 the Kabuliyat provided for rent Rs. 59-10-0 and also the payment of 1 1/2 Bish of paddy 'which may be valued at Rs. 30 by guess' making a total of Rs. 89-10-0 as the assessed rent. The total rent was described as Abadharita Jama (fixed rent) in the lease, which was a Mourashi Mokarari lease and the learned Judges (Maclean, C. J., and Banerjee, J.) held that the rent was fixed at Rs. 89-10-0, and that though the parties intended to pay so much rent in money and so much in kind, in order to avoid disputes and the going into any question as to the value of the paddy in the event of its non delivery, the parties agreed that it should be valued at Rs. 30 by estimation and that view was supported by the words making a total of Rs. 89-10-0 as the assessed rent.'
11. The latest case on the point is that of Asutosh Mukhopadhyn v. Haran Chandra Mukerjee 53 Ind. Cas. 382 : 30 C.L.J. 41 : 23 C.W.N. 1021 : 47 C. 183 and the terms of the contract were similar to those in Dwarika Nath v. Dwijendra Nath 63 Ind. Cas. 103 : 30 C.L.J. 37. It stipulated for sash rent at the rate of Rs 1-6-8 and paddy rent was payable at the rate of Rs. 7-3-18 an ari. It further stated that the market value of the paddy was Rs. 15 and that the total rent was Rs 16-6-8 obtained by the addition of the rent in sash and the money value of the rent in kind, and that there should be no increase or abatement in the Jama. It was held by the learned Chief Justice (Sanderson, C. J.) and Mookerjee, J. that the rent was fixed at Rs. 16-6-8 if the tenant should fail to deliver the paddy under the terms of the contract. Newbould, J., was of a contrary opinion. He followed Baneswar Mukherji v. Umesh Chandra Chakrabarti 7 Ind. Cas. 875 : 37 C. 626 and held that in the absence of any agreement in the Kabuliyat to pay the total rent in cash, the statement fixing the total rent at Rs. 16-6-8 was added to the document for the purpose of fixing the stamp duty and registration fee.
12. The learned Chief Justice in this case also observed: 'I do not see why the Court should speculate and as a result of that speculation arrive at the conclusion that the important provision to which I have referred had been inserted merely for the purpose of determining the registration fee.' Both the learned Chief Justice and Mookerjee, J., in construing the document in that case relied upon the words Dharjya Jama(the fixed rent),which was practically similar to the words (Abadharita Jama) which had to be construed by Maclean, C.J., and Banerjee, J. in Dwarika Nath v. Dwijendra Nath 63 Ind. Cas. 103 : 30 C.L.J. 37. Mookerjee, J. observed that the suggestion that the money value of the paddy is stated in contracts of this character for purpose of Registration Law was made in the cases reported as Sohobut Ali v. Abdool Ali 3 C.W.N. 151; Sheik Isaf v. Gopal Chandra Dey 8 Ind. Cas. 896 : 12 C.L.J. 598; Akbar Alt v. Durga Kripa Sen 8 Ind. Cas. 944 : 12 C.L.J. 589 and Baneswar Mukherji v. Umesh Chandra Chakrabarti 8 Ind. Cas. 896 : 12 C.L.J. 598 while the agreement was construed strictly without traveling beyond the terms expressed there in the cases reported as Bipro Charan v. Suchand Roy 8 Ind. Cas. 945 : 12 C.L.J. 595; Afar v. Surja Kumar Ghose 8 Ind. Cas. 945 : 12 C.L.J. 595 8 Ind. Cas. 945 : 12 C. L. J. 695 and Nilmadhab Mahapatra v. Reshab Lal 40 Ind. Cas. 819 : 26 C.L.J. 94 : 47 C. 139n and that had the decision of Sir Francis Maclean, C.J. and Bwerjee, J. in Dwarika Nath v. Dwijendra Nath 63 Ind. Cas. 103 : 30 C.L.J. 37 been reported the current of decisions of this Court might have been uniform.
13. As stated above in Afar's case 7 Ind. Cas. 842 : 15 C.W.N. 249 : 12 C.L.J. 649, the plaintiff attempted to prove by oral evidence that the value of the paddy was mentioned in the lease for the purpose of ascertainment of the registration fee payable, and Mookerjee, J., accordingly held that it was not competent to the plaintiff to do so having regard to the provisions of Section 92 of the Evidence Act while in the cases reported as Sohobut Ali v. Abdool Ali 3 C.W.N. 151; Shetk Isaf v. Gopal Chandra Dey 8 Ind. Cas. 896 : 12 C.L.J. 598; Akbar Ali v. Durga Kripa Sen 8 Ind. Cas. 944 : 12 C.L.J. 589 and Baneswar Mukherji v. Umesh Chandra Chakrabarti 7 Ind. Cas. 875 : 37 C. 626 the learned Judges in construing the contract were of opinion (as a matter of construction T that the value of the paddy might have been mentioned for the purpose of ascertaining the registration fee, and in Dwarika Nath v. Dwijendra Nath 63 Ind. Cas. 103 : 30 C.L.J. 37 Banerjee, J. observed: whatever weight the explanation offered for the plaintiff that the estimated value of the paddy is given in the Kabuliyat for the purpose, of determining the amount of stamp duty might have had if the Kabuliyat had not contained the words making a total of Ra. 89-100 only as the assessed rent,' in the presence of those words that explanation loses all its force.'
14. It appears that in the two cases reported as Dwarika Nath v. Dwijendra Nath 63 Ind. Cas. 103 : 30 C.L.J. 37 and Asutosh Mukhopadhya v. Haran Chandra 53 Ind. Cas. 382 : 30 C.L.J. 41 : 23 C.W.N. 1021 : 47 C. 183 the decision mainly turned upon the particular words used, viz., Dharjya Jama or Abadharita Jama, in connection with the total rent including the value of the paddy rent. It is to be observed, however, that in the case of Baneswar Mukherji v. Umesh Chandra Chakrabarti 7 Ind. Cas. 875 : 37 C. 626 also decided by Jenkins, 0. J , and Doss, J. the total rent was fixed at Rs. 49-14 C which included Rs. 37 the value of the paddy and the lease was a Mokrari one, and yet the market value of the paddy was allowed In the Case of Sheikh Isaf v Gopal Chandra Dey 8 Ind. Cas. 896 : 12 C.L.J. 598 and Akbar Ali v Durga Kirpa sen 8 Ind. Cas. 944 : 12 C.L.J. 589 as well as in Afar v. Suria Kumar Ghose 7 Ind. Cas. 842 : 15 C.W.N. 249 : 12 C.L.J. 649 and Nilmadhab Maharatra. v. keshab Lal 40 Ind. Cas. 819 : 26 C.L.J. 94 : 47 C. 139n there was express stipulation that in default of payment of the paddy, the value thereof mentioned in the contrast was to be paid But while in the first two cases the learned Judges held that the plaintiff was entitled to the market value of the paddy, in the third and fourth cases the contrary view was taken. There is, therefore, a conflict of judicial opinion on the point. In the second case it may be open to doubt whether the words the price thereof' referred to the price mentioned in the tabular statement, but in the first case the provision was clear. I have omitted to mention the case of Bipro Uharan v. Suchand Roy 8 Ind. Cas. 945 : 12 C.L.J. 595. But in that case the contract was to pay Rs. 35 as the rent and in lieu thereof a certain quantity of paddy was agreed to be paid. Woodroffe, J., held that the contract was to pay a money rent, and that the question had been decided in a previous suit. The other learned Judge (Richardson, J.) based his decision on the ground that the decision in the previous suit operated as res judicita. That case, therefore, does not help us in deciding the question before us, I have discussed the cases on the point at some length, because these cases frequently come up to this Court, and the learned Pleader for the appellant pressed us to refer the matter to the Full Bench.
15. Contracts for payment of Bhag paddy as stated above are very common, and it is well known that middle class people, specially of the Bhadralogue class who cannot cultivate lands themselves, let out their lands for getting paddy for the consumption of their family and in somecases the Bhag paddy is the only means of subsistence of the family, A certain value has to be fixed for the paddy in the Kabuliyat not only for the ascertainment of the registration fee, but also (and specially) for fixing the stamp duty payable, though it is not so expressly stated in the Kabuliyat. It is said that the parties may agree as to the value of the paddy in order to avoid disputes and the going into any question as to the value in the event of its non-delivery. But that would be a question of intention, and if it is dear from the Kabuliyat (for instance where it is provided that the paddy is to be delivered in a particular month or measured with a certain measure) that it is only paddy which the parties intended should be paid, it would be inconsistent with that intention to hold that a fixed sum (which might be a wholly inadequate value of the paddy at the date of the suit) was agreed upon to be paid in the event of nondelivery of the paddy in order to avoid any question as to its value, in cases where the value is merely mentioned without any express stipulation to pay such value in the event of non-delivery of the paddy.
16. It is a matter of great hardship in such cases, as the value of the paddy at the date of the Kabuliyat might be one rupee a maund, while at the date of the suit, it might be four rupees per maund, and if he is to get the value of the paddy mentioned in the Kabuliyat, he would get only one-fourth of the paddy agreed upon to be paid.
17. A distinction may perhaps be drawn between such cases' and cases where there is an express stipulation to pay the sum mentioned in the Kabuliyat as the value of the paddy in the event of its non delivery. But as stated above, even where there is such an express stipulation to pay the value mentioned in the Kabuliyat in the event of non-delivery of the paddy, it has been held, upon a construction of the contract in some cases, that the value mentioned was the value of the paddy at the date of the contract or stated for the purposes of registration, while a contrary view has been taken in some other cases. The view taken in the case of Afar v. Surja Kumar Ghose 7 Ind. Cas. 842 : 15 C.W.N. 249 : 12 C.L.J. 649 and the recent decisions, viz., that it is not open to the Court to hold that the value of the paddy mentioned in the Kabuliyat is explicable on the ground that it was so done for fixing the stamp duty or registration fee, affects not only the latter class of cases, but the former class also where a money value is merely stated without any agreement to pay such value. It is desirable, therefore, that the question should be settled by a Full Bench.
18. In the present case, however, there is an express contract that if the tenant did not deliver the paddy, the landlord would be entitled to realize by suit Rs. 36 as the price of the paddy. There was no such express stipulation for realizing by suit the sum mentioned in the Kabuliyat as the value of the paddy in the other cases, except in the case of Afar v. Surja Kumar Ghose 7 Ind. Cas. 842 : 15 C.W.N. 249 : 12 C.L.J. 649 and it was held in that case that the landlord was entitled only to the value mentioned in the Kabuliyat. There being thus some distinction between the present case and the cases in which it was held that the landlord was entitled to the market value of the paddy, the case cannot be referred to the Full Bench, and having regard to the decision in the case of Afar v. Surja Kumar Ghose 7 Ind. Cas. 842 : 15 C.W.N. 249 : 12 C.L.J. 649 and the recent decisions on the point, the appeal must be dismissed with costs.
Doval, J.
19. In my opinion, this appeal should he dismissed with costs.
20. As I read the contract in the Kabuliyat, it says: 'I execute this Kabuliyat in respect of the aforesaid land promising to pay Rs. 4 as rent and 91 aris of paddy as share of paddy for permanently enjoying and possessing the paid land in succession to sons and grandsons.' The document then goes on to say: 'if I fraudulently do not pay the aforesaid rent and share of paddy, you shall be competent to realise the said rent and Rs. 36 as price of the paddy together with interest and damages by bringing a rent suit under the current Act or under any other Act which may come in force, to which I shall raise no objection.'
21. The recent rulings on the disputed point as to the realisation of paddy rent go to show that each case should be decided on the terms of the contract.
22. In the present case, from the wording of the Kabuliyat, it appears to me clear that the only amount which could be realised on default of payment of the share of paddy was Rs. 36 as its value, even though Rs. 36 is by no means the proper value at the present day for 91 arts of paddy.
23. It is urged that by the Solenamah a different contract had been created : but the Solenamah only related to the amount of rent to be paid for the years for which the former suit was brought and was not a binding document for subsequent years.
24. In my :opinion, therefore, the appeal should be dismissed with costs.