Source: http://sc.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20190702_0001662.DSC.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-08-25 03:51:47
Document Index: 489581795

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2255', '§ 1951', '§ 924', '§ 1951', '§ 922', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 924']

FindACase™ | Vos v. United States
Vos v. United States
Michael Douglas Vos, Petitioner,
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Michael Douglas Vos's pro se motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. ECF No. 54.[1] The Court denies the motion for the reasons herein.[2]
In January, 2003, Petitioner pled guilty pursuant to a written plea agreement to: (1) one count of Hobbs Act robbery and aiding and abetting the same, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951(a), and (2); (2) one count of using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to, and possessing a firearm in furtherance of, a crime of violence-here the aforementioned Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); (3) a second count of Hobbs Act robbery and aiding and abetting the same, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951(a), and (2); and (4) being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), and 924(a). ECF Nos. 1, 40, 44. In June, 2003, the Court sentenced Petitioner to an aggregate term of 300 months' imprisonment (120 months each for the two Hobbs Act robberies and the felon in possession charge, those terms to run concurrently, and 180 months for the firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence charge, to run consecutively to the other terms), followed by five years' supervised release. ECF No. 52. Judgment was entered on July 23, 2003. Id. Petitioner did not file a direct appeal or a prior § 2255 motion.
On January 23, 2019, Petitioner filed the instant § 2255 motion. ECF No. 54. The Government filed a response in opposition and a motion for summary judgment, ECF Nos. 71, 72, to which Petitioner responded, ECF No. 75.[3]
Petitioner challenges his § 924(c) conviction by arguing the underlying Hobbs Act robbery and aiding and abetting the same to which he pled guilty is categorically not a crime of violence under § 924(c)'s force clause, and Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015), and Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S.Ct. 1204 (2018), render § 924(c)'s residual clause unconstitutionally vague. ECF Nos. 54, 75. Accordingly, Petitioner avers, he cannot be guilty of a § 924(c) crime.[4] Id. The Government contends Petitioner's claim is untimely and fails on the merits. ECF Nos 71, 72.
As a preliminary matter, to the extent Petitioner argues he only aided and abetted Hobbs Act robbery, and aiding and abetting is not a crime of violence, that argument fails for two reasons. First, Petitioner pled guilty to the substantive Hobbs Act robbery and aiding and abetting the same. ECF Nos. 1, 40, 44. Second, an aider or abettor “is punishable as a principal.” 18 U.S.C. § 2(a). “Under § 2, the acts of the principal become those of the aider and abettor as a matter of law.” United States v. Williams, 334 F.3d 1228, 1232 (11th Cir. 2003). “[N]othing in the language of § 924(c)(1) indicat[es] that Congress intended to vitiate ordinary principles of aiding and abetting liability for the purposes of sentencing under that subsection.” Id. at 1233. Accordingly, even if Petitioner only aided and abetted the underlying Hobbs Act robbery, he is still liable for the substantive Hobbs Act robbery.