Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/95689/atlantic-coast-line-railroad-co-vs-united-states
Timestamp: 2016-12-06 18:24:30
Document Index: 798966040

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 15', '§ 15', '§ 5', '§ 15', '§ 15', '§ 15', '§ 15', '§ 15', '§ 7']

Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co Vs United States - Citation 95689 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Save as PDF Add a Tag Add a Note Semantics Visualize Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. Vs. United States - Court Judgment	LegalCrystal Citationlegalcrystal.com/95689CourtUS Supreme CourtDecided OnJan-04-1932Case Number284 U.S. 288AppellantAtlantic Coast Line Railroad Co.RespondentUnited StatesExcerpt:.....as a separate organization and its line constitute a separate operating unit; that existing routes of traffic, gateways of interchange, and neutrality in handling traffic be continued, so as to preserve equal service, routing, and movement of competitive traffic to and from all connecting lines reached by the leased line; that the lessees permit carriers then connecting with the leased line, or which might thereafter connect with it, to participate, without discrimination, in through routes and joint rates on traffic moving over it as an intermediate road between regions designated in the order, and that, to this end, the leased line should be maintained as an open route equally available to all carriers connecting with it.
(1) that the conditions applied in favor..... Judgment:
Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. United States - 284 U.S. 288 (1932)
(1) That the conditions applied in favor of a railroad whose line was extended, several years after the order was made, to the line of another carrier by which it was linked to the leased line. P.
284 U. S. 293
(2) That tariff provisions by which the lessee companies established exclusive through routes over the leased line violated the
conditions, and that an order for their cancellation made by the Commission under § 15(7) was valid. P.
2. The term "connecting lines" is not limited in meaning to railroads having direct connection, but is commonly used as referring to all of the lines making up a through route. P.
3. The limitation imposed by § 15(4) of the Interstate Commerce Act, prohibiting the Commission from requiring a carrier to establish, "without its consent," any through route which does not embrace substantially the entire length of its line between the termini of the route proposed is designed to protect the existing long haul routes of carriers, and applies only when the Commission is exercising the power conferred by paragraph 15(3). It is not a limitation upon the power of the Commission to affix conditions when approving new combinations of carriers under § 5(2). P.
284 U. S. 294
This suit, under the Act of October 22, 1913, c. 32, 38 Stat. 208, 220 was brought in the federal court for Western South Carolina to set aside an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission dated June 9, 1930. Restriction
The Clinchfield Railway extends in a southerly direction from Elkhorn City, Kentucky, to Spartanburg, South Carolina, a distance of 276.85 miles. The Atlantic Coast Line system lies to the east and south. To the west and south lies the Louisville & Nashville, of whose stock 51 percent is owned by the Coast Line. The Clinchfield is a link in many possible routes between points in the Southeastern States and the North, in addition to those routes which are over the Atlantic Coast Line or the Louisville & Nashville. At Elkhorn City, the Clinchfield connects with the Chesapeake & Ohio Railway, whose system extends east, north, and west. At Spartanburg, the Clinchfield connects with the Piedmont & Northern, which extends in a southerly direction to Greenwood, South Carolina. And at Greenwood, the Piedmont & Northern connects with a recently built extension of the Georgia &
In 1923, the Atlantic Coast Line and the Louisville & Nashville applied to the Commission for leave jointly to lease the Clinchfield. The extension of the Georgia & Florida to Greenwood was then in contemplation. The Piedmont & Northern and the Georgia & Florida opposed authorization of an unconditional lease on the ground that, if joint rates on traffic moving over the Clinchfield should be closed to them, they would be deprived of much traffic which might otherwise move over their lines or future extensions thereof. In order to preserve, among other things, the existing and possible though routes via the Clinchfield on railroads other than the Atlantic Coast Line and the Louisville & Nashville, the Commission, in authorizing the lease, made it subject to five conditions which the lessees accepted. [
] Condition 1 requires the maintenance of a separate organization for the Clinchfield so that the road "shall constitute
a separate operating unit." Condition 3 requires the continuance of existing routes and channels of trade, existing gateways for the interchange of traffic, and "the present neutrality of handling the traffic inbound and outbound" so as to permit equal service, routing, and movement of competitive traffic to and from all connecting lines reached by the Clinchfield. [
] Condition 4 requires the lessees to permit carriers then connecting with the line of the Clinchfield, or which may thereafter connect with it, to participate, without discrimination, in through routes and joint rates on traffic moving over the Clinchfield as an intermediate road between points at and beyond the Ohio river, on the one hand, and points in Southeastern and Carolina territory, on the other, and that, to this end, the Clinchfield shall be maintained as an open route for traffic available to all carriers connecting with it. [
] The order of June 9, 1930, here
The plaintiffs contend that the restrictive schedules are consistent with the conditions because the Georgia & Florida is not a carrier "connecting with the Clinchfield." The argument is that the Georgia & Florida does not connect, since its own rails do not physically abut on the Clinchfield's rails, the connection being made over the Piedmont & Northern, an intermediate carrier. There is no warrant for limiting the meaning of "connecting lines" to those having a direct physical connection with the Clinchfield. The term is commonly used as referring to all the lines making up a through route. [
The plaintiffs contend that the restrictive schedules are consistent with the conditions, because these assure equality of treatment only to connections existing at the time the order was entered authorizing the
The plaintiffs contend that, as construed, conditions 3 and 4 conflict with the provisions of § 15(4) of the Act which prohibits the Commission from requiring a carrier to establish "without its consent" any through route which does not embrace substantially the entire length of its line (including lines of controlled carriers) between the termini of the proposed route. [
] The argument is that the order short-hauls traffic which would otherwise pass over the Charleston & Western, and that this road is a part of the Atlantic Coast Line System. The Commission's order of June 3, 1924, which prescribed
the conditions, did not require the lessees to abandon any protection given by § 15(4) in respect to their then existing lines. It was not an order establishing a through route within the meaning of § 15(3). In respect to the Clinchfield, which the carriers sought to acquire, the Commission gave them the option of either consenting to certain through routing over that road or abandoning their plan to lease the road. In effect, the Commission found that, without such a condition, the proposed lease was not in the public interest. With that condition, it was.
. It was within the powers of the Commission to make such a condition. [
] Obviously the condition was not arbitrary. The provision was requested by the carriers interested, and it was required in order that competition, which the Commission deemed to be in the public interest, be preserved.
Compare Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. United States,
. The limitation imposed by § 15(4) of the Act upon the Commission's power under § 15(3) to establish through routes is designed to protect the existing long haul routes of carriers.
278 U. S. 277
. It applies only when the Commission is exercising the power conferred by that paragraph. It is not a limitation upon the power of the Commission to approve new combinations of carriers.
Clinchfield Railway Lease, 90 I.C.C. at 139.
Control of Alabama & Vicksburg Railway, 111 I.C.C. 161, 182.
cases under the Carmack Amendment. Act of June 29, 1906, c. 3591, § 7, 34 Stat. 584, 595;
223 U. S. 489
254 U. S. 358
The Commission has frequently attached similar conditions to orders authorizing acquisitions of control.
Chicago Junction case, 71 I.C.C. 631, 639; Control of Alabama & Vicksburg Railway, 111 I.C.C. 161, 178, 179; Control of Columbia, Newberry & Laurens, 117 I.C.C. 219, 227; Control of Chicago Heights Terminal Transfer R. Co., 124 I.C.C. 753, 760; Acquisition of Control by Illinois Terminal Co., 138 I.C.C. 487, 498; Acquisition of Control by Wabash Ry. Co., 154 I.C.C. 155, 162, 163.