Source: https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/pasadena-unified-sch-dist-v-commission-professional-competence-28096
Timestamp: 2020-08-12 07:21:13
Document Index: 585779656

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 44945', '§ 11523', '§ 1094', '§ 44945', '§ 44882', '§ 5224', '§ 44948']

Pasadena Unified Sch. Dist. v. Commission on Professional Competence - 20 Cal.3d 309 - Thu, 12/15/1977 | California Supreme Court Resources
Home > Opinions > Pasadena Unified Sch. Dist. v. Commission on Professional Competence
Citation 20 Cal.3d 309
Pasadena Unified Sch. Dist. v. Commission on Professional Competence , 20 Cal.3d 309
(Opinion by Bird, C. J., expressing the unanimous view of the court.) [20 Cal.3d 310]
Appellant, the Pasadena Unified School District, appeals from a superior court judgment which denied the district's petition for a writ of mandate to set aside the decision of a Commission on Professional Competence. fn. 1 The commission had found that the district had violated its own procedures and for that reason lacked cause to dismiss respondent, Sulochna Bedi, from her position as a public school teacher. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reached the same conclusion. This court affirms, since the factual findings of the superior court are supported by substantial evidence. [20 Cal.3d 312]
Between September 16th and October 11th, Bedi regularly made telephone calls to the district to indicate that she would be absent from work because of illness. Thereafter, she made no further telephone calls because she believed that the board was reviewing her assignment. This belief was based on representations made by the board to her lawyer at a meeting on October 1st. [1] However, on November 26th, [20 Cal.3d 313] the school board decided to dismiss Bedi. fn. 5 When served with the board's charges, Bedi demanded a hearing before a Commission on Professional Competence on her dismissal.
The decision of a Commission on Professional Competence may be challenged in superior court by means of a petition for a writ of [20 Cal.3d 314] mandate. (See § 44945; Gov. Code, § 11523; Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5.) In reviewing a commission's decision, the superior court "shall exercise its independent judgment on the evidence." (§ 44945.) [2] Where a superior court is required to make such an independent judgment upon the record of an administrative proceeding, the scope of review on appeal is limited. An appellate court must sustain the superior court's findings if substantial evidence supports them. (Moran v. Board of Medical Examiners (1948) 32 Cal.2d 301, 308-309 [196 P.2d 20]; Yakov v. Board of Medical Examiners (1968) 68 Cal.2d 67, 71-73 [64 Cal.Rptr. 785, 435 P.2d 553]; Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 143, fn. 10 [93 Cal.Rptr. 234, 481 P.2d 242]; Harlow v. Carleson (1976) 16 Cal.3d 731, 739 [129 Cal.Rptr. 298, 548 P.2d 698].) In reviewing the evidence, an appellate court must resolve all conflicts in favor of the party prevailing in the superior court and must give that party the benefit of every reasonable inference in support of the judgment. When more than one inference can be reasonably deduced from the facts, the appellate court cannot substitute its deductions for those of the superior court. (Moran v. Board of Medical Examiners, supra, 32 Cal.2d at p. 308.)
[3a] In the present case, the key finding of the superior court was that no emergency existed at the time of Bedi's transfer. Absent an emergency, the district violated its own policy by not notifying Bedi before May 15th of the involuntary transfer. (See fn. 4, ante.) Education Code section 35035, subdivision (d), provides that when a school district adopts a policy concerning transfers of teachers, the superintendent has authority to transfer teachers "consistent with such policy." If in seeking to transfer Bedi, the superintendent acted contrary to district policy, the transfer order was invalid. (See Hamilton v. Stockton Unified Sch. Dist. (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 944, 950 [54 Cal.Rptr. 463]; Frates v. Burnett (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 63, 71 [87 Cal.Rptr. 731].) [4] The district does not contend that Bedi's refusal to obey an invalid transfer order could be grounds for her dismissal. fn. 7 [3b] Thus, the question before this court is whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Bedi, reveals substantial support for the finding that no emergency existed. [20 Cal.3d 315]
From this course of events, it appears that the friction between Bedi and her superiors had existed for a long time prior to her involuntary transfer. Therefore, even if the term "emergency" encompassed conflicts between teachers and their superiors rather than being limited to matters which generally affect the operations of the district, fn. 8 it was reasonable for the superior court to conclude that this particular situation never constituted an emergency. Bedi's request for a transfer in February 1974 and her discrimination complaint in April put the district on notice of the situation before the May 15th deadline for notifying her of an involuntary transfer. The district did not transfer her until almost four months after that deadline. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Bedi and giving her the benefit of all reasonable inferences, this court finds substantial evidence to support the superior court's [20 Cal.3d 316] determination that no emergency existed at the time of her involuntary transfer. fn. 9
­FN 1. Education Code section 44944, subdivision (b), provides for the appointment of a three-member Commission on Professional Competence to conduct a hearing to determine whether cause exists for a school district to dismiss a public school employee. The State Office of Administrative Procedure appoints one member, a hearing officer who chairs the hearing; the governing board of the district selects a second member; and the employee chooses a third. The latter two members must hold currently valid teaching credentials and must have at least five years' experience in employee disciplinary matters within the last ten years.
­FN 2 Generally, a teacher is on probationary status during the first three years of employment. (See §§ 44882 and 44915; Turner v. Board of Trustees (1976) 16 Cal.3d 818, 822 [129 Cal.Rptr. 443, 548 P.2d 1115].)
­FN 3. During the visit, she discovered that her classroom was isolated from the rest of the school. A staff psychologist also informed her that her assignment was probably one of the most difficult in the district.
­FN 4. The district's written employment policy specified that except in emergencies teachers must be notified of involuntary transfers no later than May 15th. (Pasadena Unified School District Certificated Employees Handbook (1973-74) § 5224, subd. (B).)
­FN 5. The board prepared the following written statement of charges against Bedi: "1. Persistent and willful refusal to perform regular assignments without reasonable cause, 2. Willful and persistent refusal to obey the school laws of the State and reasonable regulations prescribed for the government of the public schools by the governing board of the school district employing her, and 3. Evident unfitness for service."
Although section 44932 by its terms refers only to permanent employees, the statute also applies to dismissals of probationary employees that occur during the school year. (See § 44948; Titus v. Lawndale School Dist. (1958) 157 Cal.App.2d 822, 827 [322 P.2d 56]; Lunderville v. Emery Unified Sch. Dist. (1968) 262 Cal.App.2d 459, 463 [68 Cal.Rptr. 768].)
­FN 6. The commission first heard the matter in early 1975 and decided in Bedi's favor. The district then successfully petitioned the superior court for a writ of mandate directing the commission to set aside its decision and to make further findings and/or to take further evidence. Pursuant to the writ, the commission conducted a second hearing on the matter in November 1975. After making additional findings, it rendered a second decision in Bedi's favor.
­FN 7. "'Insubordination can be rightfully predicated only upon a refusal to obey some order which a superior officer is entitled to give and entitled to have obeyed.' (Garvin v. Chambers (1924) 195 Cal. 212, 224 [232 P. 696]; Sheehan v. Board of Police Comrs. (1925 197 Cal. 70, 78 [239 P. 844]; Forstner v. City & County of San Francisco (1966) 243 Cal.App.2d 625, 632 [52 Cal.Rptr. 621].)" (Parrish v. Civil Service Commission (1967) 66 Cal.2d 260, 264 [57 Cal.Rptr. 623, 425 P.2d 223].)
­FN 8. The district's policy handbook provides no definition of the term "emergency." The district is not precluded from setting forth its own definition of this term.
­FN 9. The district contends that the evidence establishes the existence of "some sort of educational emergency ... at Roosevelt School." However, the reviewing court's role is not to determine which of two competing conclusions is better sustained by the evidence. (Moran v. Board of Medical Examiners, supra, 32 Cal.2d at p. 308; Yakov v. Board of Medical Examiners, supra, 68 Cal.2d at p. 72.) Here, the superior court's determination that no emergency existed, supported as it is by substantial evidence, may not be disturbed on appeal.
Thu, 12/15/1977 20 Cal.3d 309 Review - Criminal Appeal Opinion issued
1 PASADENA UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONAL COMPETENCE et al. (Defendants and Respondents)
2 ; SULOCHNA BEDI, Real Party in Interest and Respondent (; SULOCHNA BEDI)
3 COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONAL COMPETENCE et al. (Defendants and Respondents)
4 ; SULOCHNA BEDI, Real Party in Interest and Respondent (; SULOCHNA BEDI)
Dec 15 1977 Opinion: Affirmed
SCOCAL, Pasadena Unified Sch. Dist. v. Commission on Professional Competence , 20 Cal.3d 309 available at: (https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/pasadena-unified-sch-dist-v-commission-professional-competence-28096) (last visited Wednesday August 12, 2020).