Source: http://www.narf.org/icwa/state/alaska/case/dh1.html
Timestamp: 2014-12-22 18:25:38
Document Index: 231695475

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 102', '§ 1912', '§ 102', '§ 1912', '§ 102', '§ 1911', '§ 671', '§ 1912', '§ 1912', '§ 1912', '§ 1912']

ICWA Guide Online | Alaska Cases Federal Resources | Resources by State | Cases A-Z (Cite as: 929 P.2d 650)
of Alaska, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & SOCIAL SERVICES, Appellee.
S-7590.
Fabe, J., dissented and filed opinion.
Determination that child was in need of aid as a result of mother's neglect was supported by evidence that mother failed to make any sustained effort to establish a parent-child relationship by remaining available to provide for daughter's daily care. AS 47.10.010(a)(2)(F) (1995).
threshold jurisdictional determination is made that child is in need
of aid, court is required to make findings of fact
under appropriate child in need of aid (CINA) rules. AS
47.10.010.
that reasonable efforts were made to prevent or eliminate need
for removing child from home was supported by evidence pertaining
to state's efforts to help mother enroll in and complete
drug rehabilitation programs. AS 47.10.010; Child in Need of Aid
Rule 15(g).
attempts to help mother enroll in and complete drug rehabilitation
programs were "active efforts" to provide "remedial services and rehabilitation
programs," within meaning of Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and
Child in Need of Aid (CINA) rule. Indian Child Welfare
Act of 1978, § 102(d),
25 U.S.C.A. § 1912(d);
Child in Need of Aid Rule 17(c)(2). State
has burden of proving by preponderance of evidence that child
is a child in need of aid (CINA). Child in
Need of Aid Rule 15.
child may not be removed from parent's custody, under Indian
Child Welfare Act and corresponding Child in Need of Aid
(CINA) rule, unless there is clear and convincing evidence, including
testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that custody of Indian child
by parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in
serious emotional or physical damage to child. Indian Child Welfare
Act of 1978, § 102(e),
25 U.S.C.A. § 1912(e);
Child in Need of Aid Rule 17(c)(2).
court was required, under Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and
corresponding Child in Need of Aid (CINA) rule, to make
specific findings focusing explicitly on likelihood that child would suffer
physical or emotional damage if left in mother's custody before
court could adjudicate Indian child to be a child in
need of assistance. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, § 102(e),
D. Rebecca Snow, Assistant Attorney General, Fairbanks, and Bruce M.
Botelho, Attorney General, Juneau, for Appellee.
Before COMPTON, C.J., and RABINOWITZ, MATTHEWS, EASTAUGH and FABE, JJ.
This is an appeal of an order adjudicating T.H. a
child in need of aid pursuant to AS 47.10.010(a)(2)(F). The
superior court determined that the child's mother D.H. was addicted
to drugs at the time of her pregnancy, that she
continues to be addicted, and that T.H. has been neglected
by both D.H. and her father F.H. since birth. Based
on the evidence before it, the court adjudicated T.H. a
child in need and placed her in State custody for
a period of up to two years. D.H. contends that
T.H. was improperly removed from her custody and appeals the
superior court's adjudication, asserting that there is insufficient evidence under
AS 47.10.010(a)(2)(F) and Child in Need of Aid (CINA) Rules
to support the superior court's determination.
T.H. was born on July 5, 1995, to D.H. and
[FN1] The newborn tested positive for cocaine when a urine
toxicology screen was performed. The State took
emergency custody of T.H. shortly after birth, based on this
positive toxicology as well as concerns for T.H.'s safety should
she remain in the care of an allegedly drug addicted
T.H. is an Indian child within the meaning of the
federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). 25 U.S.C. § 1911
After receiving a referral from the hospital informing the State
of T.H.'s positive toxicology, an investigation revealed that D.H. had
been treated in the hospital emergency room in March 1995,
at which time she admitted using both cocaine and marijuana.
Needle track marks on both arms indicated chronic drug use,
and D.H. appeared to be under the influence of a
controlled substance. A toxicology screen confirmed the presence of both
marijuana and cocaine.
On July 17, 1995, D.H. signed a stipulation granting the
Department of Health and Social Services (Department) custody of T.H.
through October 8, 1995. With the agreement of D.H. and
F.H., the State placed T.H. with Eva and John, the
[FN3] For a few weeks D.H. resided with Eva and
John and T.H. Thereafter, the parties came to an understanding
regarding visitation which allowed D.H. and F.H. to take T.H.
from her grandparents' home between
10:00 a.m. and 2:00 p.m. daily. D.H.'s visits were sporadic,
though it "never reached a point where [visitation] wasn't happening
at all." [FN4]
At the time of the CINA adjudication, T.H.'s placement with
Eva and John had been continuous. What apparently motivated the
State to file its CINA petition was the fear that
D.H. would increasingly assert her legal rights as parent, to
the detriment of T.H., were these rights not curtailed. The
State indicated as much in the proceedings below: [I]f
the court dismisses this petition and does not end up
ordering the child into somebody's custody, the child goes back
to the parents ['] custody. And even though the child
would stay with [Eva and John] until the parents showed
up on the doorstep and asked for the child ...,
they couldn't keep the child from the parents. ... Entirely
how much influence, how much persuasion can the grandparents bring
to bear on the parents to leave the child where
she would best be cared for. We would submit that
the evidence is pretty strong with regard to Samantha [D.H.'s
other daughter] that the parents have not been willing to
leave her where she would be better cared for, that
is with the grandmother. They have dropped her off there
when it was convenient for them and then they've come
and picked her back up again and they've dropped her
off there again and then
they've picked her up there--from there again. And it's entirely
based on their whims and convenience and it is our
position ... that kind of treatment of this age child
is going to cause her emotional damage.
Regarding this period of time, the superior court stated in
its factual findings that D.H. made "no real bonding efforts"
and that "no significant nurturing" took place. The superior court
also determined: Immediately
after her birth, [T.H.] was placed by the State in
the custody of her paternal grandparents.... [They] have cared well
for [T.H.] and have bonded with her. Their successes, however,
are not due at all to either [F.H.] or [D.H.].
[The parents] cannot assume credit for the efforts of John
and Eva [ ], nor can their neglect be justified
or excused by the good works of [T.H.]'s grandparents. The
"home" in which [T.H.] now resides is the home of
John and Eva [ ]. It is not the home
of [D.H.] or [F.H.]. To suggest that [D.H.] and [F.H.]
have provided a home for [T.H.] is factually unfounded, ignores
the role of the State, and gives [D.H.] and [F.H.]
far more credit than they are entitled to.
During this period the State attempted to assist D.H. in
her expressed desire to participate in a substance abuse treatment
program. This effort included various evaluations and programs, all of
which D.H. left prior to completion. D.H.'s
mother testified that D.H. stated "she wanted to go, but
her--for some reason or another she'd say, but I'm not
going to go if I can't have the baby. I'm
not going to go if I have to go to
group because I don't like talking." [FN5]
The discharge summaries from D.H.'s treatment efforts indicate that she
was concerned with access to her child while participating in
in-patient treatment. Other factors possibly contributing to D.H.'s premature departures
from the programs are alluded to throughout the summaries.
On September 25, 1995, the Department filed a Petition for
Adjudication of Child in Need of Aid. Temporary State custody
of T.H. was extended through completion of the hearing. On
February 23, 1996, the superior court entered a judgment placing
T.H. in the custody of the State for a period
not to *653
exceed two years, pursuant to AS 47.10.080(c)(1).
[FN6] In so doing the court found that D.H. suffers
from a serious drug addiction that she is "not currently
motivated to seriously address or resolve." The superior court additionally
AS 47.10.080(c) reads: If
the court finds that the minor is a child in
need of aid, it shall (1)
order the minor committed to the department for placement in
an appropriate setting for a period of time not to
exceed two years ... except that the department may petition
for and the court may grant in a hearing (A)
two-year extensions of commitment that do not extend beyond the
minor's 19th birthday if the extension is in the best
interests of the minor and the public.... [d]rugs
and alcohol remain the single most important part of [D.H.]'s
life.... [D.H.] is not motivated to care for or nurture
[T.H.]. [D.H.]'s refusal to take part in these proceedings demonstrates
a lack of interest on her behalf.... [D.H.] has neglected
[T.H.] since [her] birth. There has been no real bonding
efforts on [D.H.]'s part and no significant nurturing has taken
place.... The evidence is clear and convincing that neither [D.H.]
nor [F.H.] have provided [T.H.] with a home since [her]
birth or displayed any sincere desire to do so. It
is in [T.H.]'s best interest to be placed in the
custody of the State of Alaska. [Eva and John] appear
to be the appropriate custodians for [T.H.] however this matter
has not been fully addressed or litigated in these proceedings.
The superior court's findings were later amended nunc
pro tunc
to reflect its determination that "[t]he State actively pursued efforts
to prevent removal
of [T.H.] from her parents and made reasonable efforts toward
reunification." D.H. appeals the superior court's judgment granting custody of
T.H. to the State.
D.H. has another child, Samantha, born April 14, 1991. At
the time of the hearing Samantha was in the custody
of D.H. Her custody is not at issue in this
case. Nor is the parental fitness of F.H. at issue
the State Present Sufficient Evidence for the Superior Court to
Adjudicate T.H. a Child in Need of Aid Under AS
47.10.010(a)(2)(F)?
This court reviews adjudication decisions and the factual findings that
support them under the clearly erroneous standard, unless they raise
questions of statutory interpretation. E.g.,
In re J.L.F. & K.W.F.,
828 P.2d 166, 170 n. 12 (Alaska 1992).
D.H. argues that the State's evidence of abuse or neglect
is insufficient to meet the threshold requirements of AS 47.10.010(a)(2)(F).
[FN9] In interpreting
this statute, we have said that the legislature intended that
the State "assume custody of minors only to remedy severe
parenting deficiencies and prevent significant harm to children." In
re J.L.F. & K.W.F.,
912 P.2d 1255, 1261 (Alaska 1996). D.H. asserts that the
State failed to present sufficient evidence to make this showing.
AS 47.10.010 reads in relevant part: Jurisdiction.
(a) Proceedings relating to a minor under 18 years of
age residing or found in this state are governed by
this chapter, except as otherwise provided in this chapter, when
the court finds the minor
to be a child in need of aid as a
the child having suffered substantial physical abuse or neglect as
a result of conditions created by the child's parent, guardian,
The only argument that D.H. makes to support this claim
is that T.H. was born, and continues to be, a
physically healthy child. As the statute and this court's treatment
of it make abundantly clear, however, the
superior court is not meant to confine its inquiry to
the physical well-being of the child.
The State contends that the record fully supports the superior court's determination that T.H. was a child in need of aid as a result of her mother's neglect since birth. According to the State, the evidence before the superior court demonstrated the
mother's failure to make any sustained effort after her daughter
was born to establish a parent-child relationship with [T.H.] by
remaining available to provide for her daily care. The explanation
for *654
[D.H.'s] neglect lay at least partially in her polysubstance abuse
which had gone on for several years. Neither her pregnancy
nor the birth of her daughter changed her priorities.
The superior court determined that by failing to take responsibility
for T.H. or to make any appreciable effort to do
so, D.H. substantially neglected her daughter. We conclude that the
court had an ample evidentiary basis for adjudicating T.H. a
child in need of aid pursuant to AS 47.10.010(a)(2)(F). Thus,
the superior court's finding is not clearly erroneous.
the Superior Court's Finding that the State "Actively Pursued Efforts
to Prevent Removal of [T.H.] from Her Parents and Made
Reasonable Efforts Toward Reunification" Adequate under CINA Rules 15(g) and
17(c)(2) and Supported by
Whether the findings were adequate to satisfy the CINA rule
is a question of law. This court interprets statutory language
and rule language, such as the requirements of the CINA
rules at issue in this case, de
novo. Langdon v. Champion,
745 P.2d 1371, 1372 n. 2 (Alaska 1987). The question
of whether the findings were erroneous is reviewed for clear
error. A.H.
779 P.2d 1229, 1231 (Alaska 1989).
Once the threshold jurisdictional determination called for by AS 47.10.010 is made, the superior court is required to make findings of fact under the appropriate CINA rules. D.H. asserts that the superior court's requisite CINA findings are not adequately supported by the evidentiary record. [FN12]
D.H. argues in particular that the trial court's findings under
CINA Rule 10 are unsupported by the evidence. However, as
noted by the State, [t]he
trial court did not claim to make any findings under
CINA Rule 10 nor was it asked to. CINA Rule
10 relates to temporary custody hearings. CINA Rule 15 controls
adjudication decisions like the one appealed
from this case and CINA Rule 17 controls disposition decisions.
any case, since "Rules 15 and 17 do include substantive
requirements similar to those in CINA Rule 10 that D.H.
argues were not proved," the State proceeds to address the
substantive arguments made by D.H. as if they reference the
appropriate CINA Rule. We treat D.H.'s claims in a similar
CINA Rule 15(g), governing the adjudication hearing, requires that in cases where the trial court authorizes removal of the child from the parent, the court make findings pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) "as to whether, under the circumstances of the case, reasonable efforts were made to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child from the home and to make it possible for the child to return to the home." Rule 15(g) (emphasis added).
CINA Rule 17(c)(2), regarding disposition of a child who has been adjudicated a child in need, requires additional findings of fact in cases involving an Indian child. Before removing the child from his or her parents, [t]he
court must find ... by a preponderance of the evidence
that the party requesting removal of the Indian child has
shown that active
efforts have been made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative
programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family,
and that these efforts have proved unsuccessful.
Rule 17(c)(2) (emphasis added).
This language is derived from the ICWA at 25 U.S.C.
§ 1912(d),
which reads: Any
The State concedes that in its initial preparation of the
written findings and order, the superior court "overlooked" the provisions
of CINA Rules 15(g) and 17(c)(2) that require it to
make explicit determinations related to services provided to the family.
Upon a motion by the State the superior court entered
an amended order which included a finding related to the
State's efforts. The State claims that this amendment rectified the
superior court's initial oversight.
The superior court simply amended its order to include one
additional finding of fact: "The State actively pursued efforts to
prevent removal
reunification." See
R.R. v. State,
919 P.2d 754, 756 (Alaska 1996) (rejecting a claim that
a superior court's findings as to reasonableness were inadequate solely
because they were only "mentioned in passing" and holding that
"CINA Rule 15(g) does not require that each element of
the 'reasonable efforts' be discussed individually and in detail.").
D.H. asserts that the superior court's inclusion of these required
findings was "simply *655
and not supported by the evidence." She alleges that the
State wrongly assumed emergency legal custody of T.H. immediately following
birth, contending that the State's action was based solely on
"unsupported concern ... for what the mother might do in
the future (or might never do)." D.H. further claims that
subsequent to this emergency legal custody, "[t]he Division apparently made
no efforts whatsoever to leave the infant with her mother."
The State correctly asserts that "[t]he primary obstacle to the
mother having custody of the child was her substance abuse,"
and describes in detail the evidence pertaining to its efforts
to arrange for D.H.'s admission to a treatment program.
[FN15] Based upon our review of the relevant evidence, we
conclude that there is substantial evidentiary support for the superior
court's findings under CINA Rules 15(g) and 17(c)(2). In short,
attempts to assist D.H. in enrolling and completing drug rehabilitation
programs qualify as "active efforts to provide remedial services and
rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian
The State also contends that it made efforts more directly
targeted at preventing the breakup of the family. It notes
that the Department placed T.H. in the home of relatives,
"where the mother could have stayed with her, participating in
her daily care and establishing the parent-child relationship the family
needs." Further
efforts described by the State specifically intended to foster the
development of a relationship between D.H. and T.H. were attributable
to the child's grandparents--not to the State--and thus are relevant
only to the extent they suggest that certain actions not
taken by the State might have been duplicative.
the Superior Court's Findings Adequate on the Issue of Likely
Serious Physical or Emotional Damage to T.H. if She Were
Placed in Her Mother's Custody?
and rule language,
such as the requirements of the CINA rules at issue
in this case, de
Under CINA Rule 15, the State has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the child is in need of aid. When the case involves an Indian child the court must also find "based on clear and convincing evidence, including the testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that custody of the Indian child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child." Rule 17(c)(2) (emphasis added). [FN17]
The ICWA mandates that this determination be made. 25 U.S.C.
§ 1912(e).
D.H. contends that the superior court's finding regarding the likelihood
of serious harm is not supported by the evidence.
[FN18] In particular she argues that the testimony of the
State's only expert witness, Kaye Wallis, [FN19]
is insufficient to carry the State's burden. D.H. characterizes Wallis's
D.H. incorrectly makes this claim under CINA Rule 10(c)(3)(B), which
is identical to the applicable Rule 17(c)(2).
Wallis is an ICWA specialist and consultant for the Native
Village of Ft. Yukon. Wallis
described the matter [sic] as "an excellent mother" when she
was not using drugs. Wallis did not know the nature
and extent of the mother's drug problem, if any. Wallis
conceded that the infant's grandparents were part of the infant's
traditional and cultural home. The mother would have had this
cultural support system in place, independent of the State's involvement....
Wallis herself never articulated with any conviction that either of
the mother's two children was "likely to suffer physical or
emotional damage" if left in the mother's custody.[
[FN20]]
In fact, when asked whether there would be a risk
to T.H. "of serious physical or emotional damage" if left
in D.H.'s care, Wallis answered: "Yes, during the time of
her chemical dependency." Noting that D.H. "take[s] her child out
of the environment" when she uses drugs, Wallis added that
"when the focus is on getting the next fix or
the next high ... she
cannot at this time care for her child without seeking
Apart from challenging the sufficiency of the expert's testimony, D.H.
asserts that the *656
State's additional witnesses did not present clear and convincing evidence
that T.H. would likely suffer substantial harm if left in
the custody of D.H. In support of this contention D.H.
points to medical records suggesting that during hospitalization the mother
properly cared for T.H.; John's testimony that in his view
D.H. loves her child; and T.H.'s social worker's admission that
she had never seen D.H. with the child and thus
had no information as to how D.H. cares for her.
The State claims that the evidence before the court fully
satisfies the requirements of CINA Rule 17. [Wallis]
testified that D.H.'s "chemical dependency" created concerns that T.H. would
suffer serious physical or emotional damage if she were left
in her mother's care. She based her opinion on her
realization that a chemically dependent person is not able to
put her child first or to care properly for her.
other evidence at trial supports Ms. Wallis's opinion. D.H. argues
that because the mother handled the baby acceptably in the
hospital for a day with the help of the nursing
staff, T.H. was not at risk for physical or emotional
damage in her mother's care. She would have the court
ignore the fact that if T.H.
were discharged from the hospital to her mother's custody, T.H.
would no longer have had the assurance of professional adults
supervising her care or even of other sober and attentive
adults. Neither of T.H.'s grandparents thought she would be safe
with her mother until D.H. controlled her drug problem.
With respect to the likelihood that T.H. would suffer serious
damage if left in D.H.'s custody, we conclude that although
there was arguably support for such a conclusion in the
record, the superior court never made a determination which specifically
addressed the requirements of the ICWA and CINA Rule 17(c)(2).
The nearest formulation is the superior court's finding that "[t]he
evidence is clear and convincing that neither [D.H.] nor [F.H.]
have provided [T.H.] with a home since her birth or
displayed any sincere desire to do so." The State attempts
to equate this finding with the conclusion that "placing T.H.
in the custody of D.H. would have likely led to
serious physical or emotional damage to her." And yet the
State implicitly acknowledges that the two findings are hardly synonymous,
stating that "[e]ven if the trial court's formulation of [its]
conclusion was inartful, it can be upheld on the basis
of the evidence in the record as a whole."
Given that the superior court made no specific findings which focused explicitly on this issue of likelihood of future harm, as well as the importance of such a determination, we believe that question should be remanded to the superior court. On remand the superior court is directed to enter findings of fact which specifically address the criteria of CINA Rule 17(c)(2) and 25 U.S.C. § 1912(e). [FN21] Pursuant to our remand the superior court has the discretion to conduct such supplementary proceedings it deems appropriate. In order to expedite the resolution of this case we retain jurisdiction of the matter and direct the superior court to forward to this court its supplemental findings of fact within thirty days of the date of this opinion.
In re J.L.F.,
828 P.2d 166, 172 (Alaska 1992) (holding that CINA Rule
15(g) requires an explicit finding of reasonableness). We believe that
CINA Rule 17(c)(2) requires a similarly explicit finding regarding the
likelihood of serious physical or emotional damage to the child.
e.g., K.N. v. State,
856 P.2d 468, 475 (Alaska 1993) (upholding the trial court's
that "the evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt that the
children would continue to suffer substantial and serious harm in
the future, physical and emotional, if they were placed with
[the father].").
The superior court's decision is AFFIRMED in part and REMANDED
in part. The case
is REMANDED to the superior court for the purpose of
permitting that court to enter supplemental findings of fact under
CINA Rule 17(c)(2) and 25 U.S.C. § 1912(e).
Jurisdiction of this appeal is RETAINED.
[FN22]
Our disposition of the issues discussed above obviates the need
to address any of the other issues raised in this
FABE, Justice, dissenting.
I dissent from the court's conclusion that the superior court
did not satisfy the requirements of Alaska Child in Need
of Aid Rule 17(c)(2) and the Indian Child Welfare Act
(ICWA). The record is replete with evidence of D.H.'s serious
drug addiction and the detrimental effects that this addiction has
had on her relationship with T.H.
When D.H. visited the emergency room during her pregnancy, she
had needle tracks on both arms and admitted using cocaine
and marijuana. The treating physician was so concerned for the
safety of D.H. and the fetus that he arranged to
hold D.H. in the hospital for seventy-two hours.
After T.H.'s birth, the State placed T.H. in the paternal
grandparents' home so that D.H. could maintain contact with the
child. However, the record demonstrates that D.H. visited only sporadically
and that when she did so, she was
not particularly attentive to the baby. By the time of
trial, D.H. had departed for Barrow, without providing the paternal
grandparents with any means of contacting her.
The record also reveals that D.H. repeatedly failed to follow
through with drug rehabilitation, even though doing so could have
allowed her to be reunited with T.H. Indeed, D.H. left
three residential treatment programs against staff advice within a five-month
period, without making any significant progress toward recovery.
At trial, ICWA expert Kaye Wallis, who was acting as
a consultant for T.H.'s tribe, was asked whether T.H. would
be at risk of serious physical or emotional damage if
she were left in the care of D.H. Wallis responded
that the tribe "would have concerns ... because of [D.H.'s]
chemical dependency." Thus, she concluded that D.H. "cannot at this
time care for her child without seeking treatment." In particular,
Wallis was troubled by the fact that because of D.H.'s
drug addiction and the priority that drugs were taking in
her life, T.H. would lack "consistency in ... care," leading
to "dysfunction[al]" emotional health.
The superior court recognized all of this evidence when it
drafted its written findings. It noted that D.H. had more
concern for drugs and alcohol than for T.H., and it
concluded that due to her drug addiction, D.H. had repeatedly
demonstrated that she "is not motivated to care for or
nurture" T.H.
I cannot agree that these findings are inadequate. In a
recent child custody case, we recognized that a trial court's
findings are important because they permit us to review the
factual and legal steps in the trial court's decision. Bird
v. Starkey,
914 P.2d 1246, 1249 (Alaska 1996). Consistent with this conclusion,
we stated that findings "need not be extensive" if they
allow us to glean from the record the considerations underlying
the trial court's decision. Id.
at 1249 n. 4. For example, in Julsen
v. Julsen,
741 P.2d 642, 649 n. 10 (Alaska 1987), we noted
that the trial court did not make express findings on
all statutorily mandated factors. Nevertheless, we affirmed its decision because
"the record reflect[ed] that [the trial court] ... considered those
factors pertinent to the case" and had reached "a sound
decision." Id.
We concluded that a custody determination need not be overturned
"merely because a judge fails to tally the statutory factors
like runs, hits and errors in a box score." Id.
Although Judge Beistline may not have made an express finding
that return of T.H. to her mother at this time
would be "likely to result in serious emotional or physical
damage" to T.H., he gave careful consideration to the record,
which established that D.H. was placing her need for drugs
above the needs of her baby. Judge Beistline recognized that
D.H. made drugs her highest priority and
that she was not taking the steps to recover from
her addiction so that she might care for her child.
He also determined that D.H. had "neglected" T.H. since her
birth, noting that "[t]here has been no real bonding effor[t]
on [D.H.'s] part and no significant nurturing has taken place."
His findings on these issues *658
were tantamount to a determination that T.H. would likely suffer
serious emotional or physical damage if returned to her mother.
Indeed, given the trial court's findings, it would be hard
to imagine how T.H.'s emotional and physical well-being would not
be at serious risk if she were placed in the
care of D.H. These findings are consistent with the evidence
in the record, which establishes that D.H.'s chemical dependency substantially
interferes with her motivation and ability to care for T.H.
Therefore, I would affirm the superior court's decision.
929 P.2d 650