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American Party of Texas v. White (full text) :: 415 U.S. 767 (1974) :: Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center Log In
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American Party of Texas v. White 415 U.S. 767 (1974)
U.S. Supreme CourtAmerican Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974)American Party of Texas v. WhiteNo. 72-887Argued November 5, 1973Decided March 26, 1974*415 U.S. 767APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
Texas laws involved in this litigation provide four methods for nominating candidates in a general election: (1) candidates of parties whose gubernatorial choice polled more than 200,000 votes in the last general election are nominated by primary election only, and the nominees of these parties automatically appear on the ballot; (2) candidates whose parties poll less than 200,000 votes, but more than 2% of the total vote cast for governor in that election are nominated by primary election or nominating conventions; (3) if the foregoing procedures do not apply, precinct conventions can, pursuant to Tex.Election Code, Art. 13.45(2) (Supp. 1973), nominate candidates if the party is able, by notarized signatures, to evidence support by at least 1% of the total gubernatorial vote at the last preceding general election or (by a process to be completed within 55 days after the general May primary election) can produce sufficient supplemental petitions with notarized signatures (not including voters who have already participated in any other party's primary election or nominating process) to make up a combined total of the 1%; and (4) under Arts. 13.50 and 13.51, an independent candidate, regardless of the office sought, can qualify by filing within the time prescribed a petition signed by a certain percentage of voters for governor at the last preceding general election in a specified locality, the percentages varying with the offices sought (in this case 3% in a congressional district and 5% in a State Representative's district). In no event, are more than 500 signatures required of a candidate for any "district office." No voter, participating in any other political party nominating process or signing a nominating petition for the same office, may sign an independent's petition. Appellants, minority political parties and their candidates and supporters, and unaffiliated candidates, Page 415 U. S. 768 brought actions in the District Court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the enforcement of the Texas election laws, which they claimed infringed their associational rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and were invidiously discriminatory. They also challenged the practice of printing on absentee ballots only the names of the two major political parties and the State's failure to require printing minority party and independent candidates' names on absentee ballots and the exclusion of minority parties from the benefits of the McKool-Stroud Primary Financing Law of 1972, which provided for public financing from state revenues for primary elections of political parties casting 200,000 or more votes in the last preceding general election for governor. The District Court upheld the constitutionality of the State's election scheme.
(d) The 55-day period provides sufficient time for circulating Page 415 U. S. 769 supplemental petitions, and is not unduly burdensome, nor is the notarization requirement. Pp. 415 U. S. 786-787.
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and BRENNAN, STEWART, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. DOUGLAS, J., filed an opinion dissenting in part, post, p. 415 U. S. 795. Page 415 U. S. 770
The American Party of Texas sought ballot position at the general election in 1972 for a slate of candidates for various state-wide and local officers, including governor and county commissioner. [Footnote 1] The New Party of Texas wanted ballot recognition for its candidates for the general election for governor, Congress, state representative and county sheriff. The Socialist Workers Party made similar claims with respect to its candidates for governor, lieutenant governor and United States Senator. [Footnote 2] Laurel Dunn, a nonpartisan candidate, attempted Page 415 U. S. 771 to run for the United States House of Representatives from the Eleventh Congressional District. In his action, he represented himself and other named independent candidates for state and local offices. Finally, Robert Hainsworth sought election as state representative from District No. 86.
In these actions, it was alleged that, by excluding appellants from the general election ballot, various provisions of the Texas Election Code infringed their First and Fourteenth Amendment right to associate for the advancement of political beliefs and invidiously discriminated against new and minority political parties, as well as independent candidates. Appellants sought to enjoin the enforcement of the challenged provisions in the forthcoming November, 1972, general election. They also challenged the failure of the Texas law to require printing minority party and independent candidates on absentee ballots and the exclusion of minority parties from the benefits of the McKool-Stroud Primary Law of 1972. The individual cases involving the parties in No. 72-887 were consolidated, and a statutory three-judge District Court was convened. Following a trial, the District Court denied all relief after holding that, in their totality, the challenged provisions served a compelling state interest and did not suffocate the election process. Raza Unida Party v. Bullock, 349 F.Supp. 1272 (WD Tex.1972). Hainsworth, appellant in No. 72-942, was Page 415 U. S. 772 also subsequently denied relief on similar grounds. Two separate appeals were taken, and we noted probable jurisdiction. 410 U.S. 965. We affirm the judgment of the District Court in No. 72-942, and in No. 72-887, except as the latter relates to the Socialist Workers Party and Texas' absentee ballot provisions.
Candidates of political parties whose gubernatorial candidate polled more than 200,000 votes in the last general election may be nominated by primary election only, and the nominees of these parties automatically appear on the ballot. Tex.Election Code, Art. 13.02 (1967). [Footnote 4] Texas holds a state-wide primary for these Page 415 U. S. 773 major parties or the first Saturday in May, with a runoff primary the first Saturday in June, should no candidate garner a majority. Art. 13.03 (1967).
Candidates of parties whose candidate polled less than 200,000 votes, but more than 2% of the total vote cast for governor in the last general election may be nominated, and thereby qualify for the general election ballot, by primary election or nominating conventions. Art. 13.45(1) (Supp. 1973). [Footnote 5] The nominating conventions Page 415 U. S. 774 are held sequentially, with the precinct conventions on the same date as the state-wide primaries for the major parties (the first Saturday in May), the county conventions on the following Saturday, and the state convention on the second Saturday in June. Art. 13.47 (Supp. 1974); Art. 13.48 (1967).
Because their candidates polled less than 2% of the total gubernatorial vote in the preceding general election or they did not nominate a candidate for governor, the political parties in this litigation were required to pursue the third method for ballot qualification: precinct nominating conventions, and, if the required support was not evidenced at the conventions, the circulation of petitions for signature. Art. 13.45(2) (Supp. 1973). [Footnote 6] Page 415 U. S. 775
Finally, unaffiliated nonpartisan or independent candidates such as Dunn and Hainsworth could qualify by filing within a fixed period a written application or petition signed by a specified percentage of the vote cast for governor in the relevant electoral district in the last general election. Arts. 13.50, 13.51 (1967). [Footnote 7] Page 415 U. S. 776
We consider first the appeals of the political parties and their supporters. Article 13.45(2) (Supp. 1973) of the Texas Election Code, the validity of which is at issue Page 415 U. S. 777 here, requires that the political parties to which it applies nominate candidates through the process of precinct, county, and state conventions. The party must also evidence support by persons numbering at least lo of the total vote cast for governor at the last preceding general election. In 1972, this number was approximately 22,000 electors. Two opportunities are offered to satisfy the lo signature requirement. At the statutorily mandated Page 415 U. S. 778 precinct nominating conventions, held on the first Saturday in May and the same day as the major party primary, the party must prepare a list of all participants, who must be qualified voters, along with other pertinent information. The list is to be forwarded to the Secretary of State within 20 days after the convention. If it reveals the necessary support and if the party has satisfied the other statutory requirements imposed upon all political parties, the Secretary of State will certify that the party is entitled to be placed on the general election ballot.
The American Party of Texas was able to secure only 2,732 signatures at its precinct conventions in May, 1972. By the deadline for filing the precinct lists and supplemental petitions, the total had risen to 7,828, far short of the over 22,000 required signatures. Brief for American Party of Texas 2-3. [Footnote 8] The Texas New Party apparently Page 415 U. S. 779 made no effort to comply with the 1% requirement. [Footnote 9] Two relatively small parties, however, which were also plaintiffs in this litigation, La Raza Unida Party and the Socialist Workers Party, complied with the qualification provisions of Art. 13.45(2) (Supp. 1973) and were placed on the general election ballot.
The party appellants challenge various aspects of the Texas ballot qualification system as they interact with each other: the 1% support requirement with its precinct conventions and petition apparatus, the pre-primary ban on petition circulation, the disqualification from signing of those voters participating in another party's nominating process, the 55-day limitation on securing signatures, and the notarization requirement. [Footnote 10] They assert that Page 415 U. S. 780 these preconditions for access to the general election ballot are impermissible burdens on rights secured by the First and Fourteenth Amendments and violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as invidious discriminations against new or small political parties.
We have concluded that these claims are without merit. We agree with the District Court that whether the qualifications for ballot position are viewed as substantial burdens on the right to associate or as discriminations against parties not polling 2% of the last election vote, their validity depends upon whether they are necessary to further compelling state interests, Storer v. Brown, ante at 415 U. S. 729-733. [Footnote 11] But we also agree with the District Page 415 U. S. 781 Court that the foregoing limitations, whether considered alone or in combination, are constitutionally valid measures, reasonably taken in pursuit of vital state objectives that cannot be served equally well in significantly less burdensome ways.
It is too plain for argument, and it is not contested here, that the State may limit each political party to one candidate for each office on the ballot and may insist that intra-party competition be settled before the general election by primary election or by party convention. See Storer v. Brown, ante at 415 U. S. 733-736. Neither can we take seriously the suggestion made here that the State has invidiously discriminated against the smaller parties by insisting that their nominations be by convention, rather than by primary election. We have considered the arguments presented, but we are wholly unpersuaded by the record before us that the convention process is invidiously more burdensome than the primary election, followed by a runoff election where necessary, particularly where the major party, in addition to the elections, must also hold its precinct, county, and state conventions to adopt and promulgate party platforms and to conduct other business. [Footnote 12] If claiming an equal protection violation, the appellants' burden was to demonstrate in the first instance a discrimination against them of some substance. "Statutes create many classifications which do not deny equal protection; it is only invidious discrimination' which offends the Constitution." Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U. S. 726, 372 U. S. 732 (1963) (footnote omitted). Appellants' burden is not satisfied by mere assertions that small parties must proceed by convention when major parties are permitted to choose their candidates by primary election. The procedures are different. but Page 415 U. S. 782 the Equal Protection Clause does not necessarily forbid the one in preference to the other. [Footnote 13]
To obtain ballot position, the parties subject to Art. 13.45(2) (Supp. 1973), as were these appellants, were also required to demonstrate support from electors equal in number to 1% of the vote for governor at the last general election. Appellants apparently question whether they must file any list of supporters where the major parties are required to file none. But we think that the State's admittedly vital interests [Footnote 14] are sufficiently implicated to insist that political parties appearing on the general ballot demonstrate a significant, measurable quantum of community support. So long as the larger parties must demonstrate major support among the electorate at Page 415 U. S. 783 the last election, whereas the smaller parties need not, the latter, without being invidiously treated, may be required to establish their position in some other manner. Of course, what is demanded may not be so excessive or impractical as to be in reality a mere device to always, or almost always, exclude parties with significant support from the ballot. The Constitution requires that access to the electorate be real, not "merely theoretical." Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U. S. 431, 403 U. S. 439 (1971).
The District Court recognized that any fixed percentage requirement is necessarily arbitrary, but we agree with it that the required measure of support -- 1% of the vote for governor at the last general election, and, in this instance, 22,000 signatures -- falls within the outer boundaries of support the State may require before according political parties ballot position. [Footnote 15] To demonstrate this degree of support does not appear either impossible or impractical, and we are unwilling to assume that the requirement imposes a substantially greater hardship on minority party access to the ballot. [Footnote 16] Two political parties Page 415 U. S. 784 which were plaintiffs in this very litigation qualified for the ballot under Art. 13.45(2) (Supp. 1973) in the 1972 election. It is not, therefore, immediately obvious that the Article, on its face or as it operates in practice, imposes insurmountable obstacles to fledgling political party efforts to generate support among the electorate and to evidence that support within the time allowed.
The aspiring party is free to campaign before the primary and to compete with the major parties for voter support on primary election and precinct convention day. Any voter, however registered, may attend the new party's precinct convention and be counted toward the necessary 1% level. Unlike the independent candidate under Texas law, see infra at 415 U. S. 788, and his California counterpart, see Storer v. Brown, ante at 415 U. S. 738, a party qualifying under Art. 13.45(2) (Supp. 1973) need not wait until the primary to crystallize its support among the voters. It is entitled to compete before the primary election and to count noses at its convention on primary day, just as the major parties and their candidates count their primary votes. Furthermore, should they fall short of the magic figure, they have another chance -- they may make up the shortage and win ballot position by circulating petitions for signature for a period of 55 days beginning after the primary and ending 120 days prior to the general election. Page 415 U. S. 785
"Thus, the state's scheme attempts to ensure that each qualified elector may, in fact, exercise the political franchise. He may exercise it either by vote or by signing a nominating petition. He cannot have it both ways. [Footnote 17] "Page 415 U. S. 786
Neither do we consider that the 55 days is an unduly short time for circulating supplemental petitions. Given that time span, signatures would have to be obtained only at the rate of 400 per day to secure the entire 22,000, or four signatures per day for each 100 canvassers -- only two each per day if half the 22,000 were obtained at the precinct conventions on primary day. A petition procedure may not always be a completely precise or satisfactory barometer of actual community support for a political party, but the Constitution has never required Page 415 U. S. 787 the States to do the impossible. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 405 U. S. 360 (1972). Hard work and sacrifice by dedicated volunteers are the lifeblood of any political organization. Constitutional adjudication and common sense are not at war with each other, and we are thus unimpressed with arguments that burdens like those imposed by Texas are too onerous, especially where two of the original party plaintiffs themselves satisfied these requirements. [Footnote 18]
In sum, Texas "in no way freezes the status quo, but implicitly recognizes the potential fluidity of American political life." Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. at 403 U. S. 439. It Page 415 U. S. 788 affords minority political parties a real and essentially equal opportunity for ballot qualification. Neither the First and Fourteenth Amendments nor the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires any more.
Dunn and Hainsworth contend that the First and Fourteenth Amendments, including the Equal Protection Clause, forbid the State to impose unduly burdensome conditions on their opportunity to appear on the general election ballot. The principle is unexceptionable, Page 415 U. S. 789 cf. Storer v. Brown, ante at 415 U. S. 738, 415 U. S. 739, 415 U. S. 740, 415 U. S. 746; but requiring independent candidates to evidence a "significant modicum of support" [Footnote 20] is not unconstitutional. Demanding signatures equal in number to 3% or 5% of the vote in the last election is not invalid on its face, see Jenness v. Fortson, supra, and with a 500-signature limit in any event, the argument that the statute is unduly burdensome approaches the frivolous.
It is true that those who have voted in the party primaries are ineligible to sign an independent candidate's petition. In theory, at least, the consequence of this restriction is that the pool of eligible signers of an independent candidate's petition, calculated by subtracting from all eligible voters in the 1972 primaries all those who voted in the primary and then adding new registrations since the closing of the registration books, could be reduced nearly to zero or to so few qualified electors that securing even 500 of them would be an impractical undertaking. But this likelihood seems remote, to say the least, particularly when it will be very likely that a substantial percentage, perhaps 25%, of the total registered voters will not turn out for the primary, and will thus be eligible to sign petitions, [Footnote 21] along with all new registrants Page 415 U. S. 790 since the losing of the registration books prior to the primary. In any event, nothing in the record before us indicates what the total vote in the last election was in the districts at issue here, nothing showing what the primary vote would be or was in 1972, and nothing suggesting what the size of the pool of eligible signers might be. As the District Court noted, the independent candidates presented "absolutely no factual basis in support of their claims" that Art. 13.50 imposed unduly burdensome requirements. 349 F.Supp. at 1284. Dunn and Hainsworth relied solely on the minimal 500-signature requirement. This was simply a failure of proof, and, Page 415 U. S. 791 for that reason, we must affirm the District Court's judgments with respect to these appellants. [Footnote 22]
In response to this Court's decision in Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 134 (1972), invalidating the Texas filing fee requirements, the state legislature enacted as a temporary measure the McKool-Stroud Primary Financing Law of 1972. Tex.Election Code, Art. 13.08c-1. [Footnote 23] The statute Page 415 U. S. 792 generally provided for public financing from state revenues for primary elections of only those political parties casting 200,000 or more votes for governor in the last preceding general election. On its face, therefore, the law precluded any payment of state funds to minor political parties to reimburse them for the costs incurred in conducting their nominating and ballot qualification processes. [Footnote 24] In all, over $3,000,000 was appropriated by the state legislature to the two major political parties to defray their expenses in connection with the 1972 primary elections. Brief for American Party of Texas 19-20, n. 41.
"[w]e are not persuaded that Texas would be faced with an impossible task in distinguishing Page 415 U. S. 793 between political parties for the purpose of financing primaries."
We affirm the judgment of the District Court. All political parties who desire ballot position, including the major parties, must hold precinct, county, and state conventions. See, e.g., Tex.Election Code, Arts. 13.33, 13.34, 13.35, 13.38, 13.45, 13.45a, 13.47 (1967, Supp. 1973, Supp. 1974). The State reimburses political parties for none of the expenses in carrying out these procedures. New parties and those with less than 2% of the vote in the last election are permitted to nominate their candidates for office in the course of their convention proceedings. The major parties may not do so, and must conduct separate primary elections. As we understand it, it is the expense of these primaries that the State defrays in whole or in part. As far as the record before us shows, none of these reimbursed primary expenses are incurred by minority parties not required to hold primaries. They must undergo expense, to be sure, in holding their conventions and accumulating the necessary signatures to Page 415 U. S. 794 qualify for the ballot, but we are not persuaded that the State's refusal to reimburse for these expenses is any discrimination at all against the smaller parties, and, if it is, that it is also a denial of the equal protection of the laws within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. We are unconvinced, at least based upon the facts presently available, that this financing law is an "exclusionary mechanism" which "tends to deny some voters the opportunity to vote for a candidate of their choosing," or that it has "a real and appreciable impact on the exercise of the franchise." Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. at 405 U. S. 144.
The District Court sustained the exclusion of minority parties from the absentee ballot, relying on the presumption of constitutionality of state laws, McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U. S. 802 (1969), and the rationality of not incurring the expense of printing absentee ballots for parties without substantial voter Page 415 U. S. 795 support. The Socialist Workers Party, however, satisfied the statutory requirement for demonstrating the necessary community support needed to win general ballot position for its candidates, and, with respect to this appellant, the unavailability of the absentee ballot is obviously discriminatory. The State offered no justification for the difference in treatment in the District Court, did not brief the issue here, and had little to say in oral argument to justify the discrimination.
While I agree with the Court on the absentee ballot aspect of these cases, I dissent on the main issue. These cases involve appeals from the dismissal of actions seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against provisions of the Texas Election Code relating to Page 415 U. S. 796 minority parties and independent candidates. The District Court noted that:
"We said in Jenness v. Fortson, supra, at 403 U. S. 438, 'Georgia's election laws, unlike Ohio's, do not operate to freeze the status quo.' Texas, though not as severe as Ohio, works in that direction. It therefore seems to me, at least prima facie, to impose an Page 415 U. S. 797 invidious discrimination on the unorthodox political group."
An analysis of the requirements imposed on independent candidates leads me to the same conclusion. [Footnote 2/2] Under Page 415 U. S. 798 the Procedures reviewed in Jenness, independent candidates seeking a ballot position had six months to secure the signatures of 5% of the eligible electorate for the office in question. The percentage required in Texas ranges, according to the office, from 1% of the last state-wide gubernatorial vote to 5% of the last local gubernatorial vote, and in any case no more than 500 signatures are required; the candidate, however, has only 30 days in which to gather them. In Jenness, a voter could Page 415 U. S. 799 sign a candidate's petition even though he had already signed or would sign others. Here no voter may sign the application of more than one candidate. In Jenness, a voter who signed the petition of an independent was free thereafter to participate in a party primary and a voter who previously voted in a party primary was fully eligible to sign a petition. Here independents are not even allowed to seek signatures until after the major party primaries, and no voter who has participated in a party primary is allowed to sign an independent candidate's application. In Jenness, no signature on a nominating petition had to be notarized, but that is not the case here.