Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/813/848/239995/
Timestamp: 2019-12-16 01:54:49
Document Index: 683067503

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1738', '§ 2000', '§ 1738', '§ 1738', '§ 1738', '§ 17389', '§ 1738', '§ 1738', '§ 1738', '§ 1738', '§ 1738', '§ 2000', '§ 1738', '§ 2000', '§ 1738', '§ 1738']

43 Fair Empl.prac.cas. 355,42 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 36,908franklin Brown, Plaintiff-appellant, v. J.i. Case Company, Defendant-appellee, 813 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1987) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Seventh Circuit › 1987 › 43 Fair Empl.prac.cas. 355,42 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 36,908franklin Brown, Plaintiff-appellant, v. J.i....
43 Fair Empl.prac.cas. 355,42 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 36,908franklin Brown, Plaintiff-appellant, v. J.i. Case Company, Defendant-appellee, 813 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1987)
US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit - 813 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1987) Argued June 4, 1986. Decided March 12, 1987
The plaintiff-appellant, Franklin Brown, appeals a grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant-appellee, J.I. Case Company, that his claims of employment discrimination are barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1738 and the doctrine of res judicata. We affirm.
On January 30, 1976, the ICRC issued a temporary emergency order in favor of the plaintiff.4 On February 19, 1976, a hearing was held before the ICRC in which the plaintiff, represented by counsel, had a full opportunity to present testimony and exhibits. On February 20, 1976, the ICRC made the temporary order of January 30, 1976, final ordering J.I. Case " [t]o make constant and sincere efforts to alleviate the hostile racial climate within the Terre Haute plant ..." Brown v. J.I. Case, No. 07519 (ICRC Feb. 20, 1976).
On August 9, 1983, after the district court denied Brown's request to proceed in forma pauperis, he filed a pro se complaint (September 9, 1983). The district court decided that the documents filed by the plaintiff on October 23, 1981 did not constitute the filing of a complaint and thus dismissed the action for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6). The district court also rejected Brown's contention that the filing of an application for appointment of counsel accompanied by a Notice of Right-to-Sue Letter tolled the statutory ninety-day filing period provided in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1).
The plaintiff appealed the district court's order dismissing his complaint, and on January 17, 1985, this Court reversed, Brown v. J.I. Case Co., 756 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1985), stating that:
On May 6, 1985, after the case was returned to the trial court, J.I. Case filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that since there was no genuine issue of material fact in dispute that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In support of its motion J.I. Case claimed that the doctrine of res judicata and 28 U.S.C. § 1738 applied. J.I. Case argued that the subject matter and issues raised by Brown's complaint had been litigated previously before separate tribunals (the ICRC and the Vigo Superior Court), thus Brown was barred from relitigating his claims. On June 20, 1985, Brown filed a memorandum opposing J.I. Case's motion for summary judgment asserting that J.I. Case was guilty of unreasonable delay in not timely asserting the doctrine of res judicata. On December 12, 1985, the district court granted J.I. Case's motion for summary judgment finding (1) that 28 U.S.C. § 1738 and res judicata barred the plaintiff from further litigating his claims and (2) that the defendant's use of the doctrine res judicata as the basis for its summary judgment motion was not untimely and not prejudicial to the plaintiff. Brown v. J.I. Case, TH 83-212-C, Mem. Op. (S.D. Ind. Dec. 12, 1985).
On appeal Brown raises two issues: (1) whether the district court properly found the doctrine of res judicata and 28 U.S.C. § 1738 precluded him from pursuing his Title VII action in federal court; and (2) whether the district court abused its discretion in allowing J.I. Case to file its motion for summary judgment premised on the doctrine of res judicata.
Title VII and the preclusive effect to be given decisions from state courts and administrative proceedings has been the subject of two recent Supreme Court decisions: University of Tennessee v. Elliott, --- U.S. ----, 106 S. Ct. 3220, 92 L. Ed. 2d 635 (1986)8 and Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 102 S. Ct. 1883, 72 L. Ed. 2d 262 (1982). In Kremer, the Supreme Court stated that 28 U.S.C. § 17389 " [r]equires federal courts to give the same preclusive effect to state court judgments that those judgments would be given in the courts of the State from which the judgments emerged." 456 U.S. at 466, 102 S. Ct. at 1889 (footnote omitted).
Brown asserts that the trial court erred in finding that his Title VII claim was barred by the doctrine of res judicata and 28 U.S.C. § 1738. His primary argument is that the Supreme Court's decision in Kremer compels the reversal of the district court's decision.
In Kremer, the plaintiff, Rubin Kremer, filed a Title VII discrimination suit against his employer with the EEOC who in turn referred the case to the New York Division of Human Rights, the agency responsible for administering New York's employment discrimination laws. The New York State Division of Human Rights rejected Kremer's discrimination claim--the judgment of rejection was affirmed at the agency appellate level and again by the reviewing state court. Kremer next brought a Title VII action in federal district court and his employer raised the doctrine of res judicata as a defense. The district court dismissed the complaint on grounds of res judicata, 477 F. Supp. 587 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), and the Second Circuit affirmed. 623 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1980). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that under 28 U.S.C. § 1738 the New York State Court's judgment affirming the New York State Division of Human Rights finding of no discrimination was entitled to preclusive effect.
456 U.S. at 470 n. 7, 102 S. Ct. at 1891 n. 7.
In its recent decision in University of Tennessee v. Elliott,10 the Supreme Court discussed its decision in Kremer: "While Kremer teaches that final state court judgments are entitled to full faith and credit in Title VII actions, it indicates that unreviewed determinations by state agencies stand on a different footing." 106 S. Ct. at 3223. In deciding whether res judicata and 28 U.S.C. § 1738 are applicable to the present case we must decide whether the Vigo Superior Court (1) "reviewed" the proceedings of the ICRC and (2) whether its decision was a final judgment entitled to full faith and credit.
The ICRC's final order of January 16, 1981, adopted the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Vigo Superior Court as final. When Brown failed to present new evidence, the ICRC dismissed his complaint pursuant to the order of the Vigo Superior Court. When the ICRC denied Brown's motion to reconsider the dismissal of his complaint the order became final. When Brown failed to appeal the final order within the fifteen days allowed under IC 4-22-1-14, judicial review was precluded. The district court noted that the ICRC Order of January 16, 1981 went unreviewed "because of the plaintiff's own neglect in effectuating an appeal." The district court's finding was proper in stating that "the plaintiff should not benefit by his own failure to avail himself with the full procedures provided by state law." Brown v. J.I. Case, TH 83-212-C, Mem.Op. at 15 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 12, 1985).
We must next determine whether the facts in the case support the invocation of the doctrine res judicata. In Lee v. City of Peoria, 685 F.2d 196 (7th Cir. 1982) we stated:
A reading of the Vigo Superior Court's decision convinces us that the trial judge reviewed the administrative proceedings of the ICRC. We are confident that Indiana would treat the decision as a final judgment and point out that the decision was not appealed. Therefore the decision of the Vigo Superior Court is entitled to preclusive effect under 28 U.S.C. § 1738 and the doctrine of res judicata. Because Brown, represented by counsel, had the opportunity to present evidence and exhibits before the Vigo Superior Court, we also hold that Brown had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claim.11 III.
456 U.S. at 473-74, 102 S. Ct. at 1893 (footnote omitted).
Earlier in this opinion we held that Brown had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claim in state court in that he was given every opportunity to present evidence and exhibits in that forum, thus under the doctrine of res judicata and 28 U.S.C. § 1738 he is precluded from relitigating his claim again in federal district court. The Supreme Court has stated that Congress did not envision the passage of Title VII as giving a party the opportunity to litigate a single claim in both state and federal forums. This would be needlessly repetitious and wasteful of resources of an already overburdened judicial system. We hold that since Brown had a full, fair, and complete opportunity to litigate his claim in state court, he is not now entitled to a de novo proceeding in the federal court system to test another theory. Some place, somewhere, somehow we must put an end to this repetitious litigation. Finality of judicial proceedings must be accepted if we are to manage the ever growing caseload.
" [T]he relevant inquiry is not how the reviewing judges would have ruled if they had been considering the case in the first place, but rather, whether any reasonable person could agree with the district court ... a judge abuses his discretion when his decision is based on an erroneous conclusion of law or where the record contains no evidence on which he rationally could have based that decision, ... or where the supposed facts found are clearly erroneous as found."
Deitchman v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 740 F.2d 556, 563-64 (7th Cir. 1984) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). We must thus decide whether there is any rational evidence on which the trial court could have based its decision.
On December 12, 1983, the trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the suit pursuant to Rule 12(b) (6), Fed. R. Civ. P., holding that Brown's filing of an application for an appointment of counsel in conjunction with a Notice of Right-to-Sue Letter did not toll the ninety-day filing period established by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1). The district court entered its judgment dismissing Brown's suit on January 5, 1984, and Brown appealed to this court. We reversed on January 17, 1985, Brown v. J.I. Case Co., 756 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1985), stating that " [B]rown's formal complaint, filed on September 9, 1983, was timely because the running of the ninety-day filing period should have been tolled until the November 2, 1983, district court denial of his request for appointed counsel." Id. at 51. On May 6, 1985, J.I. Case filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure claiming the doctrine of res judicata and 28 U.S.C. § 1738 precluded the plaintiff from relitigating a claim already decided by the ICRC and the Vigo Superior Court.
While the case was pending in the appellate court, the defendant could not have invoked the doctrine of res judicata in the trial court. In addition, the defendant had not received certification of the final dispositions of the Vigo Superior Court and the related ICRC proceedings when it originally challenged the defendant's filing as barred by the ninety-day time limitation established by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1). We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing J.I. Case to file its motion for summary judgment based on res judicata on May 6, 1985 since there was a thirteen month time lapse in which the action was in the appellate court and the defendants had not received the certification of the final dispositions of the Vigo Superior Court and the ICRC when it filed its motion challenging Brown's complaint as time barred. We also hold that the plaintiff suffered no prejudice since the motion was filed well in advance of any pre-trial conference or the setting of a trial date.
We hold that the district court's grant of summary judgment was proper since Brown's claim was barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1738 and the doctrine of res judicata. We also hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing J.I. Case to invoke the doctrine of res judicata as the basis for its motion for summary judgment.
Title 42, Secs. 2000(e)-(5) (f) (1) and (3), provide that if the EEOC concludes that there is no reasonable cause to believe that a charge is true, then it must dismiss the charge and issue the complainant a statutory Right-to-Sue Letter. Where the EEOC has not filed a civil action against the employer, it must, if requested, issue a Right-to-Sue Letter within 180 days after the charge was filed. Within 90 days of receiving the Right-to-Sue Letter, the complainant may file a civil action in federal district court against the party named in the charge
In the Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122, Congress required all federal courts to give such a preclusive effect to state court judgment "as they have by law or usage in the courts of the state from [which they are] taken." In essentially unchanged form, the Act, now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738 provides that:
In Elliott the Supreme Court held that the complainant was entitled to a trial de novo of his Title VII claim in federal court since " [C]ongress did not intend unreviewed state administrative proceedings to have preclusive effect on Title VII claims." 106 S. Ct. at 3225 (footnote omitted)
Brown argues that res judicata is not applicable when the defendant, not the plaintiff, chooses to take the controversy into state court. This Court's position on this argument was clearly stated in Unger v. Consolidated Food Corp., 693 F.2d 703 (7th Cir. 1982):