Source: https://casetext.com/case/yorke-management-v-castro-1
Timestamp: 2020-06-01 19:23:24
Document Index: 485288560

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 14', '§ 9', '§ 14', '§ 9', '§ 14', '§ 18', '§ 2', '§ 14', '§ 9', '§ 14', '§ 18', '§ 9', '§ 15', '§ 9', '§ 9']

Yorke Management v. Castro, 406 Mass. 17 | Casetext Search + Citator
Yorke Management v. Castro
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Full title:YORKE MANAGEMENT vs. ELIZABETH CASTRO another
Date published: Nov 7, 1989
406 Mass. 17 (Mass. 1989)
546 N.E.2d 342
describing procedure then in effect for seeking appellate attorney's fees; indicating that " party who seeks an award of appellate attorney's fees should request them in his brief"
Summary of this case from Beal Bank, SSB v. Eurich
Present: LIACOS, C.J., WILKINS, NOLAN, LYNCH, JJ.
Landlord and Tenant, Attorney's fees. Consumer Protection Act, Attorney's fees. Practice, Civil, Appeal, Attorney's fees.
A party's right to recover attorney's fees pursuant to G.L.c. 186, §§ 14 18, and c. 93A, § 9(4), includes attorney's fees for an appeal. [18-19] Appellate attorney's fees under G.L.c. 186, §§ 14 18, and c. 93A, § 9(4), may be awarded only as directed by an appellate court. [19-20] Statement of the procedure to be followed by a party seeking appellate attorney's fees in a case where the rule announced in Mellor v. Berman, 390 Mass. 275 (1983), is applicable. [20]
SUMMARY PROCESS. Writ in the Framingham Division of the District Court Department dated January 15, 1986.
On appeal to the Superior Court Department the case was heard by Jeremiah J. Sullivan, J., sitting under statutory authority.
Joseph L. McQuade for the plaintiff.
Toni Lee Pearson for the defendant.
Joseph L. Kociubes, David L. Smith, Allan G. Rodgers, Daniel S. Manning, Marjorie Heins, J. Paterson Rae, Benjamin Fierro, III, Rudolph F. Pierce for Massachusetts Law Reform Institute others, amici curiae, submitted a brief.
The plaintiff (Yorke) filed a summary process action in the Framingham Division of the District Court Department seeking unpaid rent and possession. The defendant (Castro) counterclaimed for damages for breach of warranty of habitability and interference with quiet enjoyment under G.L.c. 186, § 14 (1988 ed.), for retaliatory eviction pursuant to G.L.c. 186, § 18 (1988 ed.), and for unfair and deceptive practices under G.L.c. 93A, § 2 (1988 ed.). The complaint for possession was dismissed as moot because Castro vacated the premises. A judgment was entered on Castro's counterclaims and Castro's motion for attorney's fees and costs was allowed.
On Yorke's appeal, a bench trial de novo was held in the Superior Court. A stipulation was filed to the effect that no rent was due. The counterclaims remained and a judgment on them was entered for Castro. The judge made detailed findings and substantially correct conclusions of law. Attorney's fees and costs for the District Court proceeding were awarded and a motion for attorney's fees and costs of the Superior Court action was allowed. Yorke appealed to the Appeals Court.
In an unpublished memorandum and order under Appeals Court Rule 1:28, the judgment of the Superior Court was affirmed. However, the Appeals Court was silent as to Castro's request for appellate attorney's fees.
We treat as entirely correct the memorandum of the Appeals Court. We granted Castro's application for further appellate review to consider the question of attorney's fees for appeals under G.L.c. 186, §§ 14, 18 and c. 93A, § 9 (4) (1988 ed.).
We gratefully acknowledge the consolidated brief of amici curiae in behalf of Greater Boston Legal Services, Western Massachusetts Legal Services, Inc., Boston Bar Association, Massachusetts Law Reform Institute, Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts, and Massachusetts Bar Association.
1. The appropriateness of appellate attorney's fees. The commonly accepted American rule is that the prevailing party is not entitled to attorney's fees, except in four limited instances: (1) as costs, in accordance with specific statutes or rules of court; (2) as damages, in certain circumstances; (3) consistent with statutory provisions "under some of which the allowance may not be clearly categorized or may not be categorized at all"; (4) pursuant to a valid contractual provision or stipulation. Bournewood Hosp., Inc. v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 371 Mass. 303, 311-312 (1976).
We have recognized the explicit language of G.L.c. 186, § 14, which provides for payment of attorney's fees, and this language is not limited to attorney's fees for trial proceedings. See Darmetko v. Boston Hous. Auth., 378 Mass. 758, 765 (1979). Similarly, we approved the award of attorney's fees under G.L.c. 186, § 18, where the statutory language is equally clear and not limited to attorney's fees for trial proceedings. See Ianello v. Court Management Corp., 400 Mass. 321, 325 (1987). The language of G.L.c. 93A, § 9 (4), leaves no doubt as to the right to recover attorney's fees without any suggestion that fees for the appeal are excluded. See Kohl v. Silver Lake Motors, Inc., 369 Mass. 795, 801 (1976). The statutory provisions for a "reasonable attorney's fee" would ring hollow if it did not necessarily include a fee for the appeal. The right to appellate attorney's fees under these statutes is beyond dispute.
2. Procedure for the award of attorney's fees for appellate work. A more difficult question is whether the rule which we announced in Mellor v. Berman, 390 Mass. 275, 284 (1983), to the effect that "[n]either appellate costs nor attorney's fees for the appeal can be imposed by a trial court absent authorization by an appellate court or by virtue of a rule or statute," applies to attorney's fees for appellate work under the statutes in the present case. We have treated as discretionary in the appellate court the award of attorney's fees on appeal where a statute provides for the payment of reasonable attorney's fees. Patry v. Liberty Mobilehome Sales, Inc., 394 Mass. 270, 272 (1985). Although, in Mellor, the court was deciding the issue under G.L.c. 186, § 15B, a statute which does not figure in the present case, the rule has been extended to the award of appellate attorney's fees under the statutes in the present case. See Patry v. Liberty Mobilehome Sales, Inc., supra.
prevailing plaintiff entitled to appellate attorney's fees in action under G. L. c. 93A, § 9, because "statutory provisions for a `reasonable attorney's fee' would ring hollow if it did not necessarily include a fee for the appeal"
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noting that attorney's fees are allowable as damages
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In Yorke Mgt. v. Castro, 406 Mass. 17, 19 (1989), the Supreme Judicial Court said that a prevailing plaintiff was entitled to appellate attorney's fees in an action under G.L. c. 93A, § 9, because "statutory provisions for a `reasonable attorney's fee' would ring hollow if it did not necessarily include a fee for the appeal."
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explaining procedure to recover appellate attorneys fees requires the party seeking attorneys fees request an award of fees in their appellate brief
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