Source: https://casetext.com/case/quinn-v-syracuse-model-neighborhood-corp
Timestamp: 2020-01-24 09:27:48
Document Index: 360819730

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 214', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 50', '§ 1983', '§ 214', '§ 213', '§ 1983', '§ 214', '§ 1983', 'In Fine', '§ 50', 'in Fine', '§ 1983', '§ 50', '§ 1983']

Quinn v. Syracuse Model Neighborhood Corp., 613 F.2d 438 | Casetext
Quinn v. Syracuse Model Neighborhood Corp.
I. Statute of Limitations Defendants do not contend that plaintiffs' cause of action is time-barred under the…
Plaintiff alleges that he was deprived of his property interest in continued employment with the SPD when he…
Full title:LEO A. QUINN, APPELLANT, v. SYRACUSE MODEL NEIGHBORHOOD CORPORATION;…
613 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1980)
holding that fact stated in legal memoranda insufficient to defeat summary judgment
Summary of this case from Known v. City of New York
William R. Morgan, Syracuse, N.Y., for plaintiff-appellant.
David M. Garber, Syracuse, N.Y. (James L. Gelormini, Syracuse, N.Y., of counsel), for defendants-appellees City of Syracuse, Lee Alexander, David S. Michel and John Mungovan.
William S. Andrews, Syracuse, N.Y., for defendants-appellees Syracuse Model Neighborhood Corp. and Peter White.
The appellant, Leo A. Quinn, seeks damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Fourteenth Amendment violations arising from his discharge as Rehabilitation Director of the Syracuse Model Neighborhood Corporation (SMNC). Because Quinn's claims were dismissed on summary judgment, the facts underlying this case must be considered in a light most favorable to him.
SMNC is a not-for-profit corporation created under New York law. At all times relevant to this suit, the vast majority of its funding was provided by the federal government and allocated by the City of Syracuse. The district court apparently assumed, for purposes of summary judgment, that SMNC acted "under color of state law" as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and that its actions constitute "state action" under the Fourteenth Amendment. We do not have occasion to resolve this question here, but we contemplate that the district court will address it at an appropriate juncture below.
Appellee Michel and his deputy, appellee John Mungovan, then attempted to elicit an explanation from White, Quinn, and SMNC treasurer James Barbour. When none was forthcoming, Michel notified the SMNC Board, by letter dated January 12, 1976, that "the Mayor has requested that all further Community Development funding . . be suspended until the police investigation is completed." A series of meetings with SMNC officials followed, as a result of which Michel, Mungovan, and Alexander demanded the resignations of White, Quinn, and Barbour as a prerequisite to restoring funding. Michel informed the SMNC Board of this decision on January 20, in a letter explaining that the City had "lost confidence" in the SMNC administration. Michel "emphasized" that "this position does not imply that criminal actions have occurred but only responds to the clear evidence that there is a complete lack of administrative control."
The Grand Jury reported the results of its investigation the following April, concluding that no criminal prosecutions were warranted. Significantly, it affirmatively stated that Quinn had no responsibility for the financial management of SMNC, that he was wrongfully discharged, and that he should be reinstated. After a number of unsuccessful attempts to win reinstatement, Quinn initiated a state court action, which is still pending, seeking restoration and back pay. On June 20, 1978, more than two years after his discharge, Quinn also commenced the instant suit in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging deprivations of his liberty and property without due process of law. He named as defendants the City, SMNC, White, Alexander, Michel, and Mungovan, requesting several million dollars in damages from each. In his complaint, he alleged that his "wrongful discharge" by SMNC and the activities of the other defendants, including the City of Syracuse, were deliberate acts "designed to create the public impression that plaintiff was in some manner responsible for the shortage of funds . . . and that the problem of said shortage of funds was being solved with [his] termination." The complaint further stated that Quinn had been a "permanent employee of defendant, SMNC, with the understanding that he would remain so employed as long as he faithfully performed his duties and the defendant corporation remained in existence." Accordingly, the complaint asserted that Quinn's dismissal, without a prior hearing, deprived him of his liberty and property without due process.
Assuming for the moment that the district court correctly explicated the applicable law, we are compelled to conclude that summary judgment was not warranted on the record before us. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) provides that summary judgment is appropriate only when a review of the entire record demonstrates "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact." The burden, therefore, is on the moving party to establish that no relevant facts are in dispute. See Heyman v. Commerce Industry Insurance Co., 524 F.2d 1317, 1319 (2d Cir. 1975); accord, Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). Indeed, the court "must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought." Heyman, supra, 524 F.2d at 1320; accord, 6 Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 56.02[1] (2d ed. 1976). Thus, when the party against whom summary judgment is sought comes forth with affidavits or other material obtained through discovery that generates uncertainty as to the true state of any material fact, the procedural weapon of summary judgment is inappropriate. Indeed, it is the very purpose of the trial to establish which party's version of the contested circumstances best comports with reality.
We are not unmindful that, properly employed, summary judgment is a useful device for unmasking frivolous claims and putting a swift end to meritless litigation. See Donnelly v. Guion, 467 F.2d 290, 293 (2d Cir. 1972); American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v. American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc., 388 F.2d 272, 278 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1063, 92 S.Ct. 737, 30 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972); 6 Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 56.15[1.-0] (2d ed. 1976). Thus, the mere possibility that a factual dispute may exist, without more, is not sufficient to overcome a convincing presentation by the moving party. See Gatling v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 577 F.2d 185, 187-88 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 868, 99 S.Ct. 181, 58 L.Ed.2d 169 (1979). The litigant opposing summary judgment, therefore, "may not rest upon mere conclusory allegations or denials" as a vehicle for obtaining a trial. SEC v. Research Automation Corp., 585 F.2d 31, 33 (2d Cir. 1978). Rather, he must bring to the district court's attention some affirmative indication that his version of relevant events is not fanciful.
Quinn's showing appears stronger still in light of defendants' successful efforts to resist discovery. Judge Munson's decision, after oral argument on the motions, to treat defendants' motions as a request for summary judgment denied plaintiff a reasonable opportunity to elicit information within the control of his adversaries. At least when the party opposing the motion has not been dilatory in seeking discovery, summary judgment should not be granted when he is denied reasonable access to potentially favorable information. See Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215, 218 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom., Manley v. Schoenbaum, 395 U.S. 906, 89 S.Ct. 1747, 23 L.Ed.2d 219 (1969); Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561, 565 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 928, 943, 93 S.Ct. 1364, 35 L.Ed.2d 590 (1973); 6 Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 56.15[5]; cf. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(f). See generally, Judge v. City of Buffalo, 524 F.2d 1321 (2d Cir. 1975).
It is well-settled that an individual's liberty can be implicated when a governmentally imposed stigma restricts his ability to seek and obtain employment. This "broad and majestic" principle, Roth, supra, 408 U.S. at 571, 92 S.Ct. 2701, embraces interference with "the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life." Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 626, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923). And it is also established that such governmental action cannot be undertaken unless the individual is afforded an opportunity to be heard and to "clear his name." Roth, supra, 408 U.S. at 573 n. 12, 92 S.Ct. 2701, accord, Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436, 91 S.Ct. 507, 27 L.Ed.2d 515 (1971).
Appellees' contention that a hearing is the sole remedy available to appellant for deprivation of his liberty is without merit. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 1054, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978) ("the denial of procedural due process should be actionable for nominal damages without proof of actual injury").
The case law has set forth a number of elements which, taken together, constitute a protected interest in liberty. This court stated these requisites succinctly in Gentile v. Wallen, 562 F.2d 193, 197 (2d Cir. 1977): "to constitute deprivation of a liberty interest, the stigmatizing information must be both false . . . and made public . . . by the offending governmental entity." For the purpose of surviving a motion for summary judgment, Quinn's complaint and supporting papers satisfy these requirements.
The information involved must, initially, be stigmatizing. Roth, supra, 408 U.S. at 573, 92 S.Ct. 2701. It must, therefore, call into question the plaintiff's "good name, reputation, honor, or integrity." Constantineau, supra, 400 U.S. at 437, 91 S.Ct. at 510. In this case, if Quinn can prove the facts he alleges, he will have established a governmentally imposed stigma. He claims that the defendants, acting in concert, labored to create a public impression that he was criminally responsible for the missing funds. As a result, his complaint states, he "continued to suffer great damage to his reputation; his standing in the community has been greatly affected; he has become an object of derision and a target for innuendo and he has been forced to endure great emotional pain and suffering." These allegations are reiterated in Quinn's affidavit in opposition to summary judgment, in which he states he has "encountered countless references to the missing money and my dismissal in both employment and social relationships."
The district court, relying on Roth v. Board of Regents, 408 U.S. 564, 573, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972), suggested that "the charges must involve imputations of illegal, dishonest, or immoral conduct." Quinn v. Syracuse Model Neighborhood Corp., No. 78-CV-293, slip op. at 7 (N.D.N.Y. June 5, 1979). Since Quinn alleges that defendants accused him of criminal conduct, his complaint would survive an application of this restrictive view of Roth. Still, we are constrained to note that the relevant language in Roth is prefaced by the crucial phrase "for example." 408 U.S. at 573, 92 S.Ct. 2701. Our review of analogous cases indicates that stigmatizing information is not limited to charges of illegality, dishonesty or immorality. See, Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 95 S.Ct. 729, 42 L.Ed. 725 (1975) (suspension from school on grounds of misconduct stigmatizing); Lombard v. Board of Education, 502 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1974) (charge of mental illness stigmatizing).
Further, the offending governmental entity or actor must make these false and stigmatizing charges "public." Gentile, supra, 562 F.2d at 197; Codd, supra, 429 U.S. at 628, 97 S.Ct. 882; Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 348, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976). The district court held that Quinn failed to satisfy this requirement because he had not demonstrated that "a City official made any outright charge." Quinn, supra, slip op. at 7 (emphasis added). Apparently, the district judge would demand an explicit public statement by a municipal official accusing the discharged employee of "immoral or illegal" conduct. The cases, however, do not support such a principle. A subtle campaign designed by city officials to make plaintiff the scapegoat for an episode of municipal misfeasance may impose no less an indelible stigma than a public proclamation announced at high noon from the steps of City Hall. Indeed, a carefully conceived scheme of suggestion and innuendo may be all the more devastating to individual liberty because it is more difficult to refute, especially when its architects sit in the highest offices of local government. Codd v. Velger simply requires dissemination of a "false and defamatory impression," not a detailed bill of particulars. 429 U.S. at 628, 97 S.Ct. 882 (emphasis added). Such an impression was arguably created here, at least for purposes of defeating summary judgment. See Birnbaum v. Trussell, 371 F.2d 672 (2d Cir. 1966).
The appellees raise a number of factual issues, none of which can be resolved in this court. They claim, for example, that any stigma resulted from the "tone" of newspaper accounts, not from their specific statements. Further, they allege that any stigma has been erased by the Grand Jury Report, which vindicated Quinn's reputation. These factual disputes as well as questions concerning the appellees' "good faith" and actual involvement in the alleged "conspiracy," must await resolution by the trier of fact. See Gentile v. Wallen, 562 F.2d 193, 195 n.2 (2d Cir. 1977).
Judge Munson's decision that Quinn lacked a protected "property" interest in his job stands on a different footing. The judge held that a property interest is defined by reference to state law. Quinn, supra, slip op. at 7 (quoting Bishop, supra, 426 U.S. at 344, 96 S.Ct. 2074). Thus, he looked first to the New York Not-For-Profit Corporation Law which, in Section 714(a), provides that "[a]ny officer elected or appointed by the board may be removed by the board with or without cause." Section 714(b), however, adds that "[t]he removal of an officer without cause shall be without prejudice to his contract rights, if any." Judge Munson, therefore, examined New York contract law and concluded, based primarily on Weiss v. Opportunities for Cortland County, Inc., 40 A.D.2d 45, 337 N.Y.S.2d 409, 411-12 (3d Dept. 1972), that "unless there is a definite period of employment specified by contract, the hiring is one at will." Accordingly, he held that Quinn has no cognizable property interest in his employment. We believe that this conclusion is sound.
"Property" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment is, like liberty, potentially all-embracing. Roth, supra, 408 U.S. at 571, 92 S.Ct. 2701. Although the long line of cases under Section 1983 attempting to pour content into this concept is confusing at best, there appears to be general agreement that a property interest arises only when an individual possesses "a legitimate claim of entitlement" to continued job tenure. Id. at 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701. The requisite origin of this "entitlement" is unsettled, but it apparently must arise from "existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law." Id. The Supreme Court has suggested, on occasion, that state law is the sole vehicle for the creation of property rights, Bishop, supra, 426 U.S. at 344, 96 S.Ct. 2704, but it has, more recently, instructed that "federal constitutional law determines whether [an] interest rises to the level of a `legitimate claim of entitlement' protected by the Due Process Clause." Memphis Light, Gas Water Division v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9, 98 S.Ct. 1554, 1560, 56 L.Ed.2d 30 (1978). See generally, Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property," 62 Cornell L.Rev. 405, 434-44 (1977). Thus, although the primary source of property rights is state law, the state may not magically declare an interest to be " non property" after the fact for Fourteenth Amendment purposes if, for example, a longstanding pattern of practice has established an individual's entitlement to a particular governmental benefit. See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972); Demorest v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 321 U.S. 36, 42-43, 64 S.Ct. 384, 88 L.Ed. 526 (1944).
In a footnote, the district court granted summary judgment for appellee City of Syracuse, on the ground that Quinn had not alleged an "official municipal policy" as required by Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). To be sure, "the touchstone of the § 1983 action against a government body is an allegation that official policy is responsible for a deprivation of rights protected by the Constitution." Id. at 690, 98 S.Ct. at 2036. But although the Supreme Court in Monell declared that a municipality cannot be held liable "on a respondeat superior theory," id. at 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, it explicitly recognized that a "government's policy or custom" may be promulgated either "by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy." Id. at 694, 98 S.Ct. at 2038. Quinn has alleged the implementation of a deliberate scheme to invoke municipal authority in an effort to hold him responsible for the missing funds, a plan approved by the Mayor and the Commissioner of the relevant municipal department. Surely the mayor is the one city official whose edicts and acts represent municipal policy, especially when he joins other high-ranking municipal officers in devising and successfully implementing the plan. We hold that if Quinn can prove that Mayor Alexander directed such a campaign to stigmatize Quinn, he will have stated a claim for municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242 (2d Cir. 1979).
Finally, we must determine the appropriate statute of limitations to govern suits against New York municipalities under § 1983, a question Judge Munson did not address below. The three-year limitations period embodied in New York Civil Practice Law and Rules § 214(2) has traditionally governed § 1983 suits against individuals, see note 6 supra, but we have not, until now, had occasion to pass on the period applicable to claims against municipalities. Our point of reference, of course, is the law of New York, since where "there is no specifically or otherwise relevant federal statute of limitation . . . the controlling period would ordinarily be the most appropriate one provided by state law." Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 462, 95 S.Ct. 1716, 1721, 44 L.Ed.2d 295 (1975).
Judge Munson did not reach this question because he could discern no municipal policy on which to base § 1983 liability, regardless of the applicable statute of limitations.
Appellees' argument that the one year and 90 day period set forth in N.Y.Gen.Mun.Law § 50-i(1) governs claims for damages against individuals under § 1983 must fall before the unbroken line of cases applying the three-year limitations period of N.Y.Civ.Prac.Law and Rules § 214(2) to such claims. See, e. g., Leigh v. McGuire, 613 F.2d 380 (2d Cir. 1979); Meyer v. Frank, 550 F.2d 726 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 830, 98 S.Ct. 112, 54 L.Ed.2d 90 (1977); Swan v. Board of Higher Education, 319 F.2d 56 (2d Cir. 1963). Indeed, we note that recent developments suggest the applicability of N.Y.Civ.Prac.Law and Rules § 213(1), the six-year residual statute of limitations, to suits arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Compare State v. Cortelle Corp., 38 N.Y.2d 83, 378 N.Y.S.2d 654, 655, 341 N.E.2d 223, 224 (1975) (Breitel, C. J.) (§ 214(2) does not apply to "[s]tatutory provisions which provide only additional remedies or standing [but] do not create or impose new obligations") with Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 618, 99 S.Ct. 1905, 1916, 60 L.Ed.2d 508, 523 (1979) ("by its terms, as well as its history, [§ 1983] does not provide any rights at all.")
In Fine v. City of New York, 529 F.2d 70, 76 (2d Cir. 1975), we suggested, in dictum, that N.Y.Gen.Mun.Law § 50-i(1) "would appear to be the most appropriate" period of limitations for suits against municipalities based squarely on the Fourteenth Amendment. This question is not before us, and our cautious suggestion in Fine in no wise answers the question as to the appropriate limitations period for § 1983 suits against municipalities.
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