Source: https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/416-u-s-562-606785906
Timestamp: 2020-08-12 21:33:18
Document Index: 187832532

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2518', '§ 2518', '§ 2516', '§ 2515', '§ 2518', '§ 2518', '§ 2510', '§ 2516', '§ 2518', '§ 2518']

416 U.S. 562 (1974), 72-1319, United States v. Chavez - Federal Cases - Case Law - VLEX 606785906
416 U.S. 562 (1974), 72-1319, United States v. Chavez
Docket Nº: No. 72-1319
Citation: 416 U.S. 562, 94 S.Ct. 1849, 40 L.Ed.2d 380
Party Name: United States v. Chavez
416 U.S. 562 (1974)
94 S.Ct. 1849, 40 L.Ed.2d 380
Under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 each application for a court order authorizing the interception of a wire or oral communication, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(a), and each interception order, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4)(d), must identify the officer authorizing the application, and the Attorney General, or an Assistant Attorney General specially designated by him, may authorize the application, 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1). The contents of intercepted communications, or evidence [94 S.Ct. 1850] derived therefrom, may not be received in evidence at a trial if the disclosure of the information would be "in violation of" Title III, 18 U.S.C. § 2515, and may be suppressed on the grounds, inter alia, that the communication was "unlawfully intercepted," 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a)(i), or that the interception order was "insufficient on its face," 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a)(ii). In this case, the applications and orders to wiretap the telephones of respondents Chavez and Fernandez, two narcotics offense suspects, incorrectly identified an Assistant Attorney General as the official authorizing the applications, whereas, with respect to Chavez, it had been the Attorney General, and, with respect to Fernandez, the Attorney General's Executive Assistant. After Chavez, Fernandez, and the other respondents were indicted, the District Court, on respondents' motions, held that the evidence secured through both wiretaps had to be suppressed for failure of the applications or orders to identify the individual who actually authorized the application, and further, as to the Fernandez wiretap, because neither the Attorney General nor a specially designated Assistant Attorney General authorized the application. The Court of Appeals affirmed in all respects.
was properly suppressed. United States v. Giordono, ante, p. 505. Pp. 569-570.
[94 S.Ct. 1851] MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case, like United States v. Giordano, ante, p. 505, concerns the validity of procedures followed by the justice Department in obtaining judicial approval to intercept wire communications under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 211-225, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520, and the propriety of suppressing evidence gathered from court-authorized wiretaps where the statutory application procedures have not been fully satisfied. As is more fully described in Giordano, Title III limits who, among federal officials, may approve submission of a wiretap application to the appropriate district court, to the Attorney General, or an Assistant Attorney General he specially designates, 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1), and delineates the information each application must contain, upon what findings an interception order may be granted, and what the order shall specify, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(1), (3), (4).1 Within this general framework, two statutory requirements are of particular relevance to this case. Section 2518(1)(a) provides that each application for a court order authorizing or approving the interception of a wire or oral communication shall include, among other information, "the identity of the . . . officer authorizing the application." Similarly, § 2518(4)(d) provides that the order of authorization or approval itself shall specify, in part, "the identity of . . . the person authorizing the application."
you are hereby authorized under the power specially delegated to me in this proceeding by the Attorney General . . pursuant to the power conferred on him by Section 2516 . . . to make application
pursuant to the application authorized by . . . Will Wilson, who has been specially designated in this proceeding by the Attorney General . . . John N. Mitchell, to exercise the powers conferred on the Attorney General
The discrepancy between who had actually authorized the respective applications to be made, and the information transmitted to the District Court clearly indicating that Assistant Attorney General Wilson was the authorizing official, was explained as the result of a standard procedure followed within the Justice...
196 N.W. 233 (Wis. 1923), Foster v. State