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Timestamp: 2020-01-19 18:52:53
Document Index: 550028706

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 101', '§ 1151', '§ 101', '§ 101', '§ 1101', '§ 201', '§ 1151', '§ 201', '§ 1151', '§ 101', '§ 1101', '§ 101', '§ 1154', '§ 1182']

FIALLO V. BELL, 430 U. S. 787 (1977) - US SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON-LINE
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FIALLO V. BELL, 430 U. S. 787 (1977)
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406 F.Supp. 162, affirmed. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J.,and STEWART, BLACKMUN, REHNQUIST, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. WHITE, J., filed a dissenting statement, post, p. 430 U. S. 816. MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, J., joined, post, p. 430 U. S. 800.
The Act grants special preference immigration status to aliens who qualify as the "children" or "parents" of United States citizens or lawful permanent residents. Under § 101(b)(1), a "child" is defined as an unmarried person under 21 years of age who is a legitimate or legitimated child, a stepchild, an adopted child, or an illegitimate child seeking preference by virtue of his relationship with his natural mother. [Footnote 1] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The special preference immigration status provided for those who satisfy the statutory "parent-child" relationship depends on whether the immigrant's relative is a United States citizen or permanent resident alien. A United States citizen is allowed the entry of his "parent" or "child" without regard to either an applicable numerical quota or the labor certification requirement. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(a), (b), 1182(a)(14). On the other hand, a United States permanent resident alien is allowed the entry of the "parent" or "child" subject to numerical limitations but without regard to the labor certification chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Appellants are three sets of unwed natural fathers and their illegitimate offspring who sought, either as an alien father or an alien child, a special immigration preference by virtue of a relationship to a citizen or resident alien child or parent. In each instance, the applicant was informed that he was ineligible for an immigrant visa unless he qualified for admission under the general numerical limitations and, in the case of the alien parents, received the requisite labor certification. [Footnote 3] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A three-judge District Court was convened to consider the constitutional issues. After noting that Congress' power to fashion rules for the admission of aliens was "exceptionally broad," the District Court held, with one judge dissenting, that the statutory provisions at issue were neither "wholly devoid of any conceivable rational purpose" nor "fundamentally aimed at achieving a goal unrelated to the regulation of immigration." Fiallo v. Levi, 406 F.Supp. 162, 165, 166 chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
At the outset, it is important to underscore the limited scope of judicial inquiry into immigration legislation. This Court has repeatedly emphasized that "over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over" the admission of aliens. Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U. S. 320, 214 U. S. 339 (1909); accord, Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U. S. 753, 408 U. S. 766 (1972). Our cases "have long recognized the power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government's political departments largely immune from judicial control." Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U. S. 206, 345 U. S. 210 (1953); see, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U. S. 580 (1952); Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U. S. 538 (1895); Fon Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698 (1893); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U. S. 581 (1889). Our recent decisions have not departed from this long-established rule. Just last Term, for example, the Court had occasion to note that "the power over aliens is of a political character, and therefore subject only to narrow judicial review." Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U. S. 88, 426 U. S. 101 n. 21 (1976), citing Fong Yue Ting v. United States, supra at 149 U. S. 713; accord, Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U. S. 67, 426 U. S. 81-82 (1976). And we observed recently that, in the exercise of its broad power over immigration and naturalization, "Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens." Id. at 426 U. S. 80. [Footnote 4] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Appellants apparently do not challenge the need for special judicial deference to congressional policy choices in the immigration context, [Footnote 5] but instead suggest that a "unique coalescing of factors" makes the instant case sufficiently unlike prior immigration cases to warrant more searching judicial scrutiny. Brief for Appellants 52-55. Appellants first observe that, since the statutory provisions were designed to reunite families wherever possible, the purpose of the statute was to afford rights not to aliens, but to United States citizens and legal permanent residents. Appellants then rely on our border search decisions in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266 (1973), and United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873 (1975), for the proposition that the courts must chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
408 U.S. at 408 U. S. 770. We can see no reason to review the broad congressional policy choice at issue here under a more exacting standard than was applied in Kleindienst v. Mandel, a First Amendment case. [Footnote 6] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
342 U.S. at 342 U. S. 596-597. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
This distinction is just one of many drawn by Congress pursuant to its determination to provide some -- but not all -- families with relief from various immigration restrictions that would otherwise hinder reunification of the family in this country. In addition to the distinction at issue here, Congress chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Appellants suggest that the distinction drawn in § 101(b)(1)(D) is unconstitutional under any standard of review, since it infringes upon the constitutional rights of citizens and legal permanent residents without furthering legitimate governmental interests. Appellants note in this regard that the statute makes it more difficult for illegitimate children and their natural fathers to be reunited in this country than for legitimate or legitimated children and their parents, or for illegitimate children and their natural mothers. And appellants also note that the statute fails to establish a procedure under which illegitimate children and their natural fathers could prove the existence and strength of their family relationship. Those are admittedly the consequences of the chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
We hold that §§ 101(b)(1)(D) and 101(b)(2) of the chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq., establishes the terms and conditions for entry into the United States. Among its various conditions, the Act requires that an alien seeking to enter the United States as a legal permanent resident must come within a restrictive numerical quota and must satisfy certain labor certification requirements. INA §§ 201, 202, 212(a)(14), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151, 1152, 1182(a)(14) (1976 ed.), as amended by the Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1976, 90 Stat. 2703 (hereinafter 1976 Amendments). In recognition of the fact that such requirements frequently separate families, Congress has provided that American citizens may petition chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
to have the requirements waived for their immediate families -- spouse, parents, children. INA §§ 201(a), (b), 212(a)(14), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(a), (b), 1182(a)(14). [Footnote 2/1] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The privilege is accorded only to those parents and children who satisfy the statute's definitions. Under INA § 101(b)(1), a "child" is defined as an unmarried person under 21 years of age who is a legitimate or legitimated child, a stepchild, an adopted child, or an illegitimate child by whom or on whose behalf a privilege is sought by virtue of the relationship of the child to its biological mother. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1). [Footnote 2/2] A "parent" is defined under INA § 101(b)(2) solely chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The unfortunate consequences of these omissions are graphically illustrated by the case of appellant Cleophus Warner. [Footnote 2/4] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Government contends that this legislation is not subject to judicial review. Pointing to the fact that aliens have no constitutional right to immigrate to the United States and to a long line of cases that recognize that policies pertaining to chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
My disagreement with the Court arises from its application of the principle in this case. The review the majority purports to require turns out to be completely "toothless." Cf. Trimble v. Gordon, ante at 430 U. S. 767. After observing the effects of the denial of preferential status to appellants, the majority concludes: "[B]ut the decision nonetheless remains one solely for the responsibility of the Congress and wholly outside the power of this Court to control.'" Ante at 799. Such "review" reflects more than due deference; it is abdication. [Footnote 2/6] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
This case, unlike most immigration cases that come before the Court, directly involves the rights of citizens, not aliens. "[C]oncerned with the problem of keeping families of United States citizens and immigrants united," H.R.Rep. No. 1199, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (1957), Congress extended to American citizens the right to choose to be reunited in the United States with their immediate families. The focus was on citizens and their need for relief from the hardships occasioned by the immigration laws. The right to seek such relief was given only to the citizen, not the alien. 8 U.S.C. § 1154. [Footnote 2/7] If the citizen does not petition the Attorney General for the special "immediate relative" status for his parent or child, the alien, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The majority responds that, in Kleindienst v. Mandel, supra, the Court recognized that First Amendment rights of citizens were "implicated," but refused to engage in the close scrutiny usually required in First Amendment cases. Therefore, it argues, no more exacting standard is required here. In that case, Mandel, a Belgian "revolutionary Marxist," could visit this country only if the Attorney General waived the statutory prohibition of visas to "[a]liens who advocate the economic, international, and governmental doctrines of World communism." 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28)(D). The Attorney General denied the waiver, and suit was brought by Mandel and several citizens who claimed their First Amendment right to hear Mandel in person was abridged by the denial. Rejecting the Government's contention that it had "unfettered discretion, and any reason or no reason [for denying a waiver] may be given," the Court upheld the denial only after finding that it was based on a "legitimate and bona fide" reason -- Mandel's abuses of visa privileges on a prior visit. 408 U.S. at 408 U. S. 769. At the same time, however, the Court chose not to scrutinize more closely and accepted the reason without weighing against it the claimed First Amendment interest. It feared becoming embroiled in the "dangerous and undesirable" task of considering, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Whatever the merits of the Court's fears in Mandel, cf. id. at 408 U. S. 774 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting), the present case is clearly distinguishable in two essential respects. First, in Mandel, Congress had not focused on citizens and their need for relief. Rather, the governmental action was concerned with keeping out "undesirables." The impact on the citizens' right to hear was an incidental and unavoidable consequence of that political judgment. The present case presents a qualitatively different situation. Here, the purpose of the legislation is to accord rights not to aliens, but to United States citizens. In so doing, Congress deliberately chose, for reasons unrelated to foreign policy concerns or threats to national security, to deny those rights to a class of citizens traditionally subject to discrimination. [Footnote 2/8] Second, in Mandel, unlike the present case, appellees conceded the ability of Congress to enact legislation broadly prohibiting the entry of all aliens with Mandel's beliefs. [Footnote 2/9] Their concern was directed instead to the exercise of the discretion granted the Attorney General to waive the prohibition. In the present case, by contrast, we are asked to engage in the traditional task of reviewing the validity chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The class of citizens denied the special privilege of reunification in this country is defined on the basis of two traditionally disfavored classifications -- gender and legitimacy. Fathers cannot obtain preferred status for their illegitimate children; mothers can. Conversely, every child except the illegitimate -- legitimate, legitimated, step-, adopted -- can obtain preferred status for his or her alien father. The Court has little tolerance for either form of discrimination. We require that gender-based classifications "serve important governmental objectives, and . . . be substantially related to achievement of those objectives." Califano v. Webster, ante at 430 U. S. 317; Califano v. Goldfarb, ante at 430 U. S. 210-211; Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 429 U. S. 197 (1976); see also Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S. 636 (1975); Stanton v Stanton, 421 U. S. 7 (1975); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U. S. 522 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71 (1971). We are similarly hostile to legislation excluding illegitimates from governmental beneficence, finding it "illogical and unjust" to deprive a child "simply because its natural father has not married its mother." Gomez v. Perez, 409 U. S. 535, 409 U. S. 538 (1973). See also Trimble v. Gordon, ante p. 430 U. S. 762; Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U. S. 628 (1974); Beaty v. Weinberger, 478 F.2d 300 (CA5 1973), summarily aff'd, 418 U.S. 901 (1974); chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, supra at 420 U. S. 652. In view of the legislation's denial of this right to these classes, it is clear that, whatever the verbal formula, the Government bears a substantial burden to justify the statute. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The legislative history, however, gives no indication of why these privileges were absolutely denied illegitimate children and their fathers. [Footnote 2/10] The Government suggests that Congress may have believed that "such persons are unlikely to have maintained a close personal relationship with their offspring." Brief for Appellees 17. If so, Congress' chosen shorthand for "closeness" is obviously overinclusive. No one can dispute that there are legitimate, legitimated, step-, and adoptive parent-child relationships and mother-illegitimate child relationships that are not close, and yet are accorded the preferential status. Indeed, the most dramatic illustration of the overinclusiveness is the fact that, while Mr. Warner can never be deemed a "parent" of Serge, nevertheless, if he should marry, his wife could qualify as a step-parent, entitled to obtain for Serge the preferential status that Mr. Warner cannot chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Government suggests that Congress may have decided to accept the inaccurate classifications of this statute because they considered a case-by-case assessment of closeness and chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Given such hostility to the administrative convenience argument when invidious classifications and fundamental rights are involved, it is apparent that the rationale is inadequate in the present case. As I observed earlier, since Congress gave no indication that administrative costs were its concern, we should scrutinize the hypothesis closely. The likelihood of such a rationale is diminished considerably by the comprehensive and elaborate administrative procedures chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Nor is a fear of involvement with foreign laws and records a persuasive explanation of the omission. In administering the Act with respect to legitimated children, for example, the critical issue is whether the steps undertaken are adequate under local law to render the child legitimate, and the INS has become expert in such matters. [Footnote 2/14] I note, in this connection, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Given the existence of these procedures and expertise, it is difficult indeed to give much weight to the hypothesized administrative convenience rationale. Moreover, as noted previously, this Court will not allow concerns with proof to justify "an impenetrable barrier that works to shield otherwise invidious discrimination." Gomez, supra at 409 U. S. 538. As the facts of this case conclusively demonstrate, Congress has "failed to consider the possibility of a middle ground between the extremes of complete exclusion and case-by-case determination of paternity." Trimble, ante at 430 U. S. 770-771. Mr. Warner is a classic example of someone who can readily prove both paternity and closeness. Appellees concede this. Tr. of Oral Arg. 21-22. The fact that he is denied the opportunity demonstrates beyond peradventure that Congress has failed to "carefully tun[e] [the statute] to alternative considerations.'" Trimble, ante at 430 U. S. 772, quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. at 427 U. S. 513. That failure is fatal to the statute. Trimble, ante at 430 U. S. 772-773. [Footnote 2/16] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(Emphasis added.) For the significance of the 1976 Amendments on this section, see 430 U. S. 4, infra.
The citizen seeking "immediate relative" status for his or her spouse, parent, or child must file a so-called Form I-130 petition with the Attorney General. See text accompanying 430 U. S. 7, infra for a description of the procedure.
Since resident aliens are also not to be arbitrarily denied privilege on the basis of gender and legitimacy, Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U. S. 88 (1976); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U. S. 634 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 (1971), it is clear that appellants Earl and Trevor Wilson, if they meet the terms of the saving clause of the 1976 Amendments, should also be entitled to relief. See 430 U. S. 5, supra.