Source: http://www.scribd.com/doc/86243986/Howard-v-United-States-No-94S00-1106-CQ-333-Mar-20-2012
Timestamp: 2015-09-04 01:02:46
Document Index: 540584887

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1274', '§ 1274', '§ 10903', '§ 1247', '§ 1247', '§ 1491', '§ 32', '§ 32', '§ 1247']

P. 1Howard v. United States, No. 94S00-1106-CQ-333 (Mar. 20, 2012)Howard v. United States, No. 94S00-1106-CQ-333 (Mar. 20, 2012)Ratings: (0)|Views: 4,340|Likes: 0Published by robert_thomas_5More info:Categories:Types, Business/Law, Court FilingsPublished by: robert_thomas_5 on Mar 21, 2012Copyright:Attribution Non-commercialAvailability:Read on Scribd mobile: iPhone, iPad and Android.download as PDF, TXT or read online from ScribdFlag for inappropriate content|Add to collectionSee moreSee lesshttps://www.scribd.com/doc/86243986/Howard-v-United-States-No-94S00-1106-CQ-333-Mar-20-201203/21/2012pdftextoriginal A
Brent W. Baldwin Ignacia S. MorenoJ. Robert Sears Assistant Attorney GeneralBaker Sterchi Cowden & Rice, L.L.C.St. Louis, MO David C. ShiltonUnited States Department of JusticeBryan H. Babb Environment & Natural Resources DivisionAlan S. Townsend Washington, DCBose McKinney & Evans LLPIndianapolis, IN Joseph H. HogsettUnited States AttorneySouthern District of IndianaShelese WoodsUnited States Attorneys OfficeIndianapolis, IN
_________________________________No. 94S00-1106-CQ-333H
Defendant ._________________________________Certified Question from the United States Court of Federal Claims,No. 1:09-CV575-MBH,The Honorable Marian Blank Horn, Judge_________________________________
March 20, 2012Dickson, Justice.
The United States Court of Federal Claims has certified for our resolution the followingquestion:Under Indiana law, are railbanking and interim trail use pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 1274(d)uses that are within the scope of the easements acquired by the railroad companies eitherby prescription, condemnation, or the deed at issue; and if either is not within the scope
2of the easements originally acquired, is railbanking with interim tr[ai]l use a shifting pub-lic use?Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 64, we accepted the question and now answer both parts inthe negative. Under Indiana law, railbanking and interim trail use pursuant to 16 U.S.C.§ 1274(d) are not uses within the scope of the easements, and railbanking with interim trail usedoes not constitute a permissible shifting public use.The underlying suit is what is commonly referred to as a "Rails to Trails" case.
Consol. Rail Corp., Inc. v. Lewellen, 682 N.E.2d 779 (Ind. 1997) (holding that railroad ease-ments had been abandoned and thus could not be transferred to railroad corridor trails group).The question arises from a federal lawsuit brought by 128 Indiana landowners whose lands areburdened by railroad easements. Together these easements compose a railroad corridor approx-imately twenty-one miles in length. Because the rail lines are no longer in use, the railroad, pur-suant to federal law, 49 U.S.C. § 10903, sought authorization from the Surface TransportationBoard ("STB") to abandon the easements. The STB authorized the railroad to negotiate transferof the railroad corridor to the Indiana Trails Fund for use as a public trail ("interim trail use") inaccordance with the National Trails System Act ("Trails Act"), 16 U.S.C. § 1247. The Trails Actauthorizes the STB to facilitate such transactions in order to "preserve established railroad rights-of-way for future reactivation,"
§ 1247(d), a process frequently called "railbanking."The Court of Federal Claims certified this question to us in accordance with Preseault v.I.C.C., which upheld the constitutionality of the Trails Act but noted that "[s]tate law generallygoverns the disposition of reversionary interests" and that, "[b]y deeming interim trail use to belike discontinuance rather than abandonment, Congress prevented property interests from revert-ing under state law." 494 U.S. 1, 8, 110 S. Ct. 914, 920, 108 L. Ed. 2d 1, 11 (1990) (citationomitted). In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor stated, "Determining what interest petitionerswould have enjoyed under [state] law, in the absence of the [Interstate Commerce Commission]'srecent actions, will establish whether petitioners possess the predicate property interest that mustunderlie any takings claim."
at 21, 110 S. Ct. at 926, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 20 (O'Connor, J., con- 1
The Interstate Commerce Commission ("ICC") was the predecessor to the STB. The ICC wasabolished in 1995 and replaced with the STB. ICC Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-88, 109Stat. 803.
3curring). The Court concluded that any remedy to which a landowner may be entitled must besecured through the provisions of the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1).
Preseault, 494U.S. at 11
– 17, 110 S. Ct. at 921
– 24, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 13
– 17.To determine whether railbanking and interim trail use pursuant to the Trails Act arepermitted uses within the scope of the easements under Indiana law, we first consider Indianalaw regarding the abandonment and the preservation of railroad rights-of-way. The General As-sembly has specifically delineated when and how a railroad easement may be deemed aban-doned.
Ind. Code §§ 32-23-11-6 to -8; Lewellen, 682 N.E.2d at 783 ("[T]he common law onwhether abandonment [of railroad easements] has occurred was superseded by the General As-sembly."). One means of preserving the railroad easements is by converting it to a recreationaltrail under the Trails Act. Ind. Code § 32-23-11-7 ("A right-of-way is not considered abandonedif the [ICC] or [STB] imposes on the right-of-way a trail use condition under 16 U.S.C.§ 1247(d)."). Accordingly, such rights-of-way may be "railbanked" indefinitely because suchaction does not abandon the easement but rather preserves it. This informs, but does not settlethe first part of the certified question, which asks whether, under Indiana law, such Trails Actuses are within the scope of the easements acquired. This question
— regarding the use of therailroad rights-of-way as public recreational trails
— is governed by the Indiana common law oneasements.Indiana law with respect to the scope of easements
is well settled. The extent of theeasement interest is determined by the purpose served by the easement. New York Cent. R.R.Co. v. Yarian, 219 Ind. 477, 482
– 83, 39 N.E.2d 604, 606 (1942) ("It is sometimes said that res-ervations of easements are strictly limited to the purposes in the minds of the parties, but we be-lieve a proper application of the rule puts the limitation not upon the character of traffic upon areserved way, but upon the purpose to be served by the traffic.");
McCauley v. Harris,
An easement is:An interest in land owned by another person, consisting in the right to use or control the land, oran area above or below it, for a specific limited purpose (such as to cross it for access to a publicroad). The land benefitting from an easement is called the
; the land burdened byan easement is called the
.Black's Law Dictionary 585
– 86 (9th ed. 2009). The "scope" of an easement refers to the extent or bound-aries of that "specific limited purpose" which benefits the dominant estate and burdens the servient estate.