Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/571/534/323292/
Timestamp: 2020-07-16 15:10:34
Document Index: 281174580

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1201', '§ 1201', '§ 111', '§ 1792', '§ 1201', '§ 1201', '§ 1201', '§ 1201']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Michael H. Cassidy, Defendant-appellant, 571 F.2d 534 (10th Cir. 1978) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Tenth Circuit › 1978 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Michael H. Cassidy, Defendant-appellant
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Michael H. Cassidy, Defendant-appellant, 571 F.2d 534 (10th Cir. 1978)
US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit - 571 F.2d 534 (10th Cir. 1978) Argued and Submitted Nov. 14, 1977. Decided March 3, 1978
Michael H. Cassidy, an inmate in the Federal Correctional Institute in Englewood, Colorado, tried to shoot his way out of the institution. The escape effort proved abortive and Cassidy, along with three others, was later charged in a six count indictment as follows: Count 1, unlawfully seizing and holding Raymond Trujillo, an officer at the Institute, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2); Count 2, unlawfully seizing and holding Mary Ann Wallace, a visitor to the Institute, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2); Count 3, assaulting one Jerome Goughan, an employee at the Institute, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111; and Counts 4, 5 and 6, unlawfully conveying into a federal penal institution three firearms (each firearm was the basis for a separate count) in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1792. Upon trial, Cassidy was convicted by a jury on all counts. Cassidy now appeals. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
On appeal, Cassidy raises ten grounds for reversal, three of which merit some comment. As his first ground for reversal, Cassidy argues that 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2), upon which the first two counts were based, is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2) provides that whoever unlawfully seizes, confines, inveigles, decoys, kidnaps, abducts or carries away and holds for ransom, reward, or otherwise, any person, when any such act against the person is done within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, shall be punished by imprisonment for any term of years or for life. Counts 1 and 2 were couched in language which parallels the statute. For example, Count 1 alleges that "Michael H. Cassidy . . . did unlawfully seize and confine one Raymond Danny Trujillo, and the said Raymond Danny Trujillo was held by said defendants for the purpose of aiding in the escape of Michael H. Cassidy . . ."
We think Counts 1 and 2 fully apprised Cassidy of the crime sought to be charged, and we fail to perceive any vagueness or overbreadth in the statute itself. We are not here concerned with common law kidnapping which may, or may not, have required some degree of asportation. The statute is designed to include much more than kidnapping for ransom, for example. United States v. Young, 512 F.2d 321 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 956, 96 S. Ct. 1432, 47 L. Ed. 2d 362 (1976). It includes confining, holding, or seizing a person for ransom, reward "or otherwise." In Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124, 56 S. Ct. 395, 80 L. Ed. 522 (1936), the Supreme Court interpreted the phrase "ransom or reward or otherwise" to encompass any benefit which a captor might attempt to receive for himself. This Circuit has held that holding and seizing a person for the purpose of effecting an escape from a penal institution constitutes a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201. United States v. Walker, 524 F.2d 1125 (10th Cir. 1975). While Cassidy at spasmodic moments in the ten-hour siege may have expressed hope that Trujillo and Wallace would not be harmed, the fact remains that Cassidy "seized" both Trujillo and Wallance with the hope that they could be used to his advantage in his escape effort. For example, Trujillo testified that at gunpoint Cassidy ordered him to go to a certain cell and release Cassidy's friend, Alfred Rollins. In short, 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2) is not unconstitutionally vague; Counts 1 and 2 set forth a violation thereof; and the evidence adduced at trial showed a violation of its provisions.
It is Cassidy's position that the Government failed to offer any evidence which would show that the United States accepted jurisdiction over the land on which the Federal Correctional Institute is situate. It is true that in 1940 Congress enacted legislation which provided that unless and until the United States has by affirmative action accepted jurisdiction over lands hereinafter acquired by the United States, it was to be conclusively presumed that no such jurisdiction has been accepted. However, the land here involved was acquired by the United States in 1938. Prior to the 1940 amendment, acceptance of jurisdiction over lands acquired by the United States was presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary. Atkinson v. Tax Commission, 303 U.S. 20, 23, 58 S. Ct. 419, 82 L. Ed. 621 (1938) and Silas Mason Co. v. Tax Commission, 302 U.S. 186, 207, 58 S. Ct. 233, 82 L. Ed. 187 (1937). As to lands acquired by the United States after 1940, it has been held that the United States does not acquire jurisdiction over lands acquired by it unless it gives notice of acceptance. Adams v. United States, 319 U.S. 312, 63 S. Ct. 1122, 87 L. Ed. 1421 (1943). See also People v. Sullivan,151 Colo. 434, 378 P.2d 633 (1963). However, the courts have consistently held that for land acquired by the United States prior to 1940, the presumption that jurisdiction was accepted remains. United States v. Johnson, 426 F.2d 1112, 1114 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 842, 91 S. Ct. 86, 27 L. Ed. 2d 78 (1970) and Markham v. United States, 215 F.2d 56 (4th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 939, 75 S. Ct. 360, 99 L. Ed. 735 (1955).
The transcript of the impaneling of the jury does not disclose any error. Counsel asserts in this regard that the trial court "refused" to voir dire the jury relative to Cassidy's Indian ancestry and the defense of insanity. We find no such "refusal." Counsel did submit a list of proposed questions, which included some relating to Indians and the defense of insanity. The Government in its brief suggests that these questions were in fact filed after the jury had been sworn. Be that as it may, the matter was apparently not pursued during the impaneling process. A trial court has broad discretion as to questions to be asked of jurors on voir dire. There was no abuse of that discretion here. Lowther v. United States, 455 F.2d 657, 666 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 857, 93 S. Ct. 139, 34 L. Ed. 2d 102 (1972).