Source: https://casetext.com/case/nettles-v-wainwright-7
Timestamp: 2019-03-19 08:19:34
Document Index: 527965300

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 636', '§ 631', '§ 631', '§ 636', '§ 3401', '§ 2243', '§ 636', 'art, 616', '§ 636', '§ 636', '§ 753', '§ 3060']

Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 | Casetext
Nettles v. Wainwright
677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982)
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Nettlesv.Wainwright
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.[fn*] Unit BMay 17, 1982
A panel of this court affirmed the denial of appellant's (Nettles) petition for writ of habeas corpus and held that a state prisoner's failure to object to a magistrate's report and recommendation, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), served as a waiver of the right to appeal from the district court's judgment based on the report and recommendation. Nettles v. Wainwright, 656 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1981). By vote of the Unit B judges of this circuit, we granted en banc consideration to address the following question:
In 1975, a Florida jury convicted Ennis Nettles of robbery, aggravated assault, and aggravated battery. He was sentenced to seventy-five years imprisonment, and a state appellate court affirmed his conviction without opinion. Nettles v. State, 336 So.2d 614 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1976).
This en banc consideration requires an examination of the Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 631- 639, to discern its directives, if any, to an appellate court when confronted with an appellant who fails to object to a magistrate's report in the trial court, but seeks to object on appeal.
After several years of inquiry, Congress in 1968 enacted the Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 631- 639, for the purpose of revising the United States Commissioner System and "to cull from the ever-growing workload of the United States District Courts matters that are more desirably performed by a lower tier of judicial officers." H.R. Rep. No. 1629, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in U.S. Code Cong. Admin.News 4252, 4255. With these improvements in mind, the Act authorized magistrates to exercise those functions formerly exercised by United States Commissioners, and to discharge such additional duties assigned by the district court "as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). "Increasing the overall efficiency of the federal judiciary" was the goal in "permit[ting] . . . the U.S. district courts to assign magistrates, as officers of the courts, a variety of functions . . . presently performable only by the judges themselves." S.Rep. No. 12, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1967).
(a) Each United States magistrate serving under this chapter shall have within the territorial jurisdiction prescribed by his appointment —
(3) the power to conduct trials under section 3401, title 18, United States Code [ 18 USCS § 3401], in conformity with and subject to the limitations of that section.
(b) Any district court of the United States, by the concurrence of a majority of all the judges of such district court, may establish rules pursuant to which any full-time magistrate reasonably available, any part-time magistrate specially designated by the court, may be assigned within the territorial jurisdiction of such court such additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States. The additional duties authorized by rule may include, but are not restricted to —
The provision of section 636(b) permitting the district court to establish rules which authorize the magistrate to conduct a "preliminary review of applications for posttrial relief made by individuals convicted of criminal offenses," was the subject of Supreme Court review in Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461, 94 S.Ct. 2842, 41 L.Ed.2d 879 (1974). In Wingo, the Supreme Court held invalid a district court's local rule authorizing a magistrate to hold evidentiary hearings because 28 U.S.C. § 2243 requires the district judge to personally hold these hearings in federal habeas corpus cases. Therefore, by the terms of section 636(b), the local rule was "inconsistent with the . . . laws of the United States."
See TPO, Inc. v. McMillen, 460 F.2d 348 (7th Cir. 1972).
In 1976, Congress substantially amended section 636(b) of the Magistrates Act to "supply the congressional intent found wanting by the Supreme Court in Wingo v. Wedding." H.R. Rep. No. 1609, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in U.S. Code Cong. Admin.News 6162, 6171. Under the current version of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)
[n]otwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary —
(B) a judge may also designate a magistrate to conduct hearings, including evidentiary hearings, and to submit to a judge of the court proposed findings of fact and recommendations for the disposition, by a judge of the court, of [motions to suppress evidence in a criminal case], of applications for posttrial relief made by individuals convicted of criminal offenses and of prisoner petitions challenging conditions of confinement.
It is this particular addition that is the subject of the instant case. Absent from the statute is any statement as to the effect on appeal of a party's failure to object to the magistrate's findings where those findings are subsequently adopted by the district court. The statute does provide for the district court to amplify on the procedure for filing objections by enacting local rules, and some have done so. In order to establish uniformity throughout this circuit, however, we must interpret section 636(b)(1)(B) and the effect in this circuit of a failure to object to a magistrate's findings. In so doing, we find it appropriate to review the decisions of other appellate courts on this issue.
The purpose of the Federal Magistrates Act is to relieve courts of unnecessary work. Since magistrates are not Article III judges, it is necessary to provide for a redetermination by the court, if requested, of matters falling within subsection (b)(1)(B). To require it if not requested would defeat the main purpose of the Act. It is not burdensome on the parties to require such a request. We conclude that a party `may' file objections within ten days or he may not, as he chooses, but he `shall' do so if he wishes further consideration.
Park Motor Mart, 616 F.2d at 605 (footnote omitted).
A local district court rule was involved in Park Motor Mart, but the circuit court deemed the rule of no assistance to the issue before it.
The Sixth Circuit recently considered this issue in United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). The court established a prospective rule that failure to timely object under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) to a magistrate's report constitutes a waiver of the right to appeal the district court's order adopting the magistrate's recommendations. The court admitted that nothing in section 636(b)(1)(B) indicates that a failure to object to the report constitutes a waiver of the right to appeal. Going a step further, however, the Sixth Circuit recognized that "the fundamental congressional policy underlying the Magistrates Act — to improve access to the federal courts and aid the efficient administration of justice — is best served by our holding that a party shall file objections with the district court or else waive right to appeal." Walters, 638 F.2d at 949-50 (footnote omitted). The Walters court qualified its holding by requiring the magistrate to inform the parties in the report "that objections must be filed within ten days or further appeal is waived." Walters, 638 F.2d at 950.
In compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), the district judge must review the magistrate's findings and recommendations. If objections are filed, the district judge must make a de novo determination, a "fresh consideration," of those findings objected to. If no objections are filed, the district judge may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings and recommendations. It is arguable that, when no objections are filed, the parties have accepted the magistrate's report and have consented to his recommendations. If a party has objections, it is essential that he apprise the district court. Judicial efficiency and the objectives of the Magistrates Act dictate that the district judge must be aware of any objections to the report in order to properly comply with the duties under section 636(b)(1)(B).
The statutory command of section 636(b)(1) calling for the district court to make a "de novo determination" of those portions of the magistrate's recommendation to which objection has been made does not require a rehearing of any contested testimony upon which the magistrate based his findings. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 100 S.Ct. 2406, 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980).
In the magistrates' other functions there is no provision for how proceedings are to be recorded, notably, in habeas proceedings and in suppression hearings under section 636(b)(1)(B). It might be contended that, absent a specific provision to the contrary, 28 U.S.C. § 753(b) controls, which allows the use of sound recording only to augment mechanical recording. Following congressional intent, we reject this construction of section 753(b). In 1968, when Congress promulgated the Magistrate's Act, it enacted 18 U.S.C. §§ 3060(f) and 3401(e), the specific provisions relating to two magistrate functions. Each is phrased in mandatory terms ("proceedings shall be recorded"), demonstrating that Congress's purpose was to impose the otherwise absent duty to record rather than to lift or liberalize an otherwise existing requirement that mechanical means be used. The premise to this legislation, then, must be that section 753(b) does not apply to magistrates. In 1979, when Congress enacted section 636(c) governing civil trials conducted before magistrates, Congress explained that its purpose in providing for the recording of these proceedings was to "assure . . . an adequate record." H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 96-444, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S. Code Cong. Ad.News 1469, 1489. Again, this must be premised on the view that section 753(b) does not require recording of proceedings before magistrates. Finally, Congress envisioned the use of sound recordings in 1976 when it enacted section 636(b)(1)(B) even though there is no provision for sound recording of proceedings under this section.
The district court, on application, shall listen to the tape recording of the evidence and the proceedings before the magistrate. . . .
H.R. Rep. No. 94-1609, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. Ad.News 6162, 6163 (quoting Campbell v. United States District Court, 501 F.2d 196 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 879, 95 S.Ct. 143, 42 L.Ed.2d 119 (1974)) (emphasis added). In each of its three major enactments concerning magistrates, then, Congress consistently evinced the view that magistrate proceedings are not required to be taken down by an official court reporter using stenographic means but that electronic sound recording may be used instead. We defer to Congress's reading of section 753(b).
Cf. United States v. Marshall, 609 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1980). Marshall holds that it is error for a district judge to reject a magistrate's recommendation to which objections have been filed "without at least consulting the transcript of the hearing before the magistrate." Marshall, 609 F.2d at 155. We are in agreement that this is the state of the law in this circuit for those cases where objections are filed.
Furthermore, no undue burden exists in requiring an attorney or a pro se litigant to state his objections, if any, to the district court. We are not asking a litigant to give up his right to appeal, only to perfect it. We note that attorneys are officers of the court and are, therefore, in some part implicitly responsible for the efficient operation of the judicial system. Requiring them to assist the district court by stating their objections is a small order. It is even smaller when weighed against the consequences to their clients (or themselves if pro se) of having the circuit court refuse to entertain their arguments on appeal based on error in the magistrate's report. We will not sit idly by and observe the "sandbagging" of district judges when an appellant fails to object to a magistrate's report in the district court and then undertakes to raise his objections for the first time in this court.
See Katris v. Immigration Nat. Serv., 562 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1977).
Parties filing objections must specifically identify those findings objected to. Frivolous, conclusive or general objections need not be considered by the district court.