Source: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/479/462
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CITY OF PLEASANT GROVE, Appellant v. UNITED STATES. | Supreme Court | LII / Legal Information Institute
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479 U.S. 462 (107 S.Ct. 794, 93 L.Ed.2d 866)
Argued: Dec. 10, 1986.
Decided: Jan. 21, 1987.
[HTML] Syllabus Appellant, an Alabama city that has a long history of racial discrimination and that until recently had an all-white population, is covered by § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (Act) and accordingly must seek preclearance before instituting any change in a standard, practice, or procedure affecting voting. Appellant sought approval by the Attorney General for the annexation of two parcels of land, one vacant (hereinafter called the Western Addition) and the other (Glasgow Addition) added at the request of its inhabitants, an extended white family who wished their children to attend appellant's then all-white school system. The Attorney General objected to the annexations, finding with respect to the Western Addition that appellant's refusal to annex an adjacent black neighborhood (Highlands) was indicative of an intent to annex only white areas. Pursuant to § 5 of the Act, appellant then filed this declaratory action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, which denied relief, finding that the Western Addition's location and appellant's plans for relatively expensive housing there indicated that it was likely to be developed for use by white persons only. The court further found that appellant failed to carry its burden of proving that the annexations at issue did not have the purpose of abridging or denying the right to vote on account of race.
Held: 1. Fundamental principles of the Act, governing this case, are that an annexation of inhabited land constitutes a change in voting practice or procedure subject to preclearance under § 5, and even the annexation of vacant land on which residential development is anticipated must be precleared before those moving into the area may vote in the annexing jurisdiction. Moreover, Congress intended that a voting practice not be precleared unless both discriminatory purpose and effect are absent, and the burden of proving absence of discriminatory purpose and effect is on the covered jurisdiction. Pp. 467-469.
Appellant, Pleasant Grove, a city in Alabama that until recently had an all-white population, is covered by § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 439, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 1973c, and accordingly must seek preclearance before instituting any change in a standard, practice, or procedure affecting voting.
Appellant unsuccessfully sought preclearance by the Attorney General for the annexation of two parcels of land, one vacant and the other inhabited by a few whites. Appellant also failed to convince a three-judge District Court that the annexations did not have the purpose of abridging or denying the right to vote on account of race. We noted probable jurisdiction, 476 U.S. 1113, 106 S.Ct. 1966, 90 L.Ed.2d 651 (1986), and now affirm.
* Appellant, whose population numbers approximately 7,000, was described by the District Court as "an all-white enclave in an otherwise racially mixed area of Alabama."
568 F.Supp. 1455, 1456 (DC 1983). The city has a long history of racial discrimination. The District Court's opinions chronicle the city's past discriminatory practices in some detail, and we will not repeat that history fully here. See 623 F.Supp. 782, 787-788 (DC 1985); 568 F.Supp., at 1456-1457. Suffice it to say that in housing, zoning, hiring, and school policies appellant's officials have shown unambiguous opposition to racial integration, both before and after the passage of the federal civil rights laws.
The Western Addition is uninhabited, but the District Court found that "its location and the City's plans for relatively expensive housing indicate that it is likely to be developed for use by white persons only." 623 F.Supp., at 784, n. 5.
The city then filed this declaratory action in the District Court for the District of Columbia.
In denying appellant's motion for summary judgment, the court held, over one judge's dissent, that "a community may not annex adjacent white areas while applying a wholly different standard to black areas and failing to annex them based on that discriminatory standard." 568 F.Supp., at 1460. In its subsequent decision on the merits, the court, with one judge dissenting, denied declaratory relief, holding that the city had failed to carry its burden of proving that the two annexations at issue did not have the purpose of abridging or denying the right to vote on account of race.
First. An annexation of inhabited land constitutes a change in voting practice or procedure subject to preclearance under § 5. City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 368, 95 S.Ct. 2296, 2302, 45 L.Ed.2d 245 (1975); Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 388, 91 S.Ct. 431, 436, 27 L.Ed.2d 476 (1971)). Even the annexation of vacant land on which residential development is anticipated must be precleared before those moving into the area may vote in the annexing jurisdiction. In City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 100 S.Ct. 1548, 64 L.Ed.2d 119 (1980), this Court affirmed the denial of preclearance to 13 annexations, 9 of which were vacant land. See id., at 194, 196, 100 S.Ct., at 1570, 1571 (POWELL, J., dissenting); City of Rome, Ga. v. United States, 472 F.Supp. 221, 246 (DC 1979). This holding is consistent with the well-established teaching of Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 89 S.Ct. 817, 22 L.Ed.2d 1 (1969), that Congress intended the preclearance provisions of the Voting Rights Act to be given "the broadest possible scope," id., at 567, 89 S.Ct., at 832, and to reach "any state enactment which alters the election law of a covered State in even a minor way," id., at 566, 89 S.Ct., at 832. Allowing a State to circumvent the preclearance requirement for annexations by annexing vacant land intended for white developments would disserve Congress' intent to reach "the subtle, as well as the obvious, state regulations which have the effect of denying citizens their right to vote because of their race." Id., at 565, 89 S.Ct., at 831. Moreover, the Attorney General, whose interpretation of the Voting Rights Act is entitled to considerable deference, see, e.g., United States v. Sheffield Board of Comm'rs, 435 U.S. 110, 131, 98 S.Ct. 965, 979, 55 L.Ed.2d 148 (1978), has consistently interpreted § 5 to reach the annexation of vacant land intended for residential development.
Finally, Congress was aware of the Attorney General's view in this regard, and implicitly approved it, when it reenacted the Voting Rights Act in 1982.
Cf. id., at 131-135, 98 S.Ct., at 979-981.
The city does not claim that either of the two annexations was not a change in voting practices subject to preclearance under § 5, even though the Western Addition was at the time uninhabited.
Neither does it disagree that it must prove that the two annexations had neither the discriminatory purpose nor effect prohibited by § 5 of the Act. Its challenge is to the District Court's conclusion that the city had not carried its burden of showing that the annexations were untainted by a racially discriminatory purpose. In arriving at this judgment, the District Court relied on a variety of evidence, principally its finding that the refusal to annex the Highlands while annexing other areas was racially motivated. These findings, both as to the purpose of not annexing the Highlands and with respect to the weight of the evidence regarding the purpose of the two annexations at issue, are findings of fact that we must accept unless clearly erroneous. The city has not convinced us that they are.
Appellant argues that even if its decision not to annex the Highlands was racially motivated, that decision was not a change respecting voting and hence not subject to § 5. That point is correct but not dispositive; as the Solicitor General argues: "The failure to annex black areas, while the city was simultaneously annexing non-black areas, is highly significant in demonstrating that the city's annexation here was purposefully designed to perpetuate Pleasant Grove as an enlarged enclave of white voters." Brief for United States 21, n. 12.
Appellant also relies on the fact that there were no black voters in Pleasant Grove at the time the relevant annexation decisions were made, so that the annexations did not reduce the proportion of black voters or deny existing black voters representation equivalent to their political strength in the enlarged community. Cf. City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S., at 370-371, 95 S.Ct., at 2303-2304. Appellant contends that since the annexations could not possibly have caused an impermissible effect on black voting, it makes no sense to say that appellant had a discriminatory purpose. This argument is based on the incorrect assumption that an impermissible purpose under § 5 can relate only to present circumstances. Section 5 looks not only to the present effects of changes, but to their future effects as well, as shown by the fact that annexations of vacant land are subject to preclearance even though no one's right to vote is immediately affected. See supra, at 467-468, and n. 8. Likewise, an impermissible purpose under § 5 may relate to anticipated as well as present circumstances.
It is quite plausible to see appellant's annexation of the Glasgow and Western Additions as motivated, in part, by the impermissible purpose of minimizing future black voting strength.
Common sense teaches that appellant cannot indefinitely stave off the influx of black residents and voters indeed, the process of integration, long overdue, has already begun. See supra, at 465, n. 2. One means of thwarting this process is to provide for the growth of a monolithic white voting block, thereby effectively diluting the black vote in advance. This is just as impermissible a purpose as the dilution of present black voting strength. Cf. City of Richmond, supra, 422 U.S., at 378, 95 S.Ct., at 2307. To hold otherwise would make appellant's extraordinary success in resisting integration thus far a shield for further resistance. Nothing could be further from the purposes of the Voting Rights Act.
The Court today affirms the decision of the District Court, holding that a city can act with a purpose to "deny or abridge" black voting rights, 42 U.S.C. 1973c, even when the city's actions can have no present effect on the voting rights of any black individual and any future effect on black voting rights is purely speculative. Because the Court's finding of a violation of the Voting Rights Act is inconsistent with the language and purpose of the Act, I dissent.
* Before examining the decision in this case, it is appropriate to restate the principles articulated in this Court's decisions under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act. We have consistently noted: "The language of § 5 clearly provides that it applies only to proposed changes in voting procedures." Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 138, 96 S.Ct. 1357, 1362, 47 L.Ed.2d 629 (1976) (emphasis added). See Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 566, 89 S.Ct. 817, 832, 22 L.Ed.2d 1 (1969). In Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 91 S.Ct. 431, 27 L.Ed.2d 476 (1971), the Court first found that a proposed annexation could constitute a "change" in voting procedures covered by § 5. It explained the reason for this holding: "Section 5 was designed to cover changes having a potential for racial discrimination in voting, and such potential inheres in a change in the composition of the electorate affected by an annexation." Id., at 388-389, 91 S.Ct., at 436-437 (emphasis added). See Port Arthur v. United States, 459 U.S. 159, 161, 103 S.Ct. 530, 532, 74 L.Ed.2d 334 (1982) ("Perkins . . . held that changes in the boundary lines of a city by annexations that enlarge the number of eligible voters are events covered by § 5") (emphasis added). Thus, this Court's decisions establish that preclearance under § 5 is required when and only whenan annexation changes the previous "voting procedures" by altering the number or racial composition of the municipal voters.
We also have defined the type of change in voting procedures that violates the Voting Rights Act: " 'The purpose of § 5 has always been to insure that no voting-procedure changes would be made that would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the franchise.' " Lockhart v. United States, 460 U.S. 125, 134, 103 S.Ct. 998, 1004, 74 L.Ed.2d 863 (1983) (quoting Beer v. United States, supra, 425 U.S., at 141, 96 S.Ct., at 1363). An annexation can have such a retrogressive effect on the voting rights of blacks by "diluting the weight of the votes of the voters to whom the franchise was limited before the annexation." Perkins v. Matthews, supra, 400 U.S., at 388, 91 S.Ct., at 437. But the Court's inquiry has not terminated with a finding that a proposed annexation "reduces the relative political strength of the minority race in the enlarged city as compared with what it was before the annexation." City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 378, 95 S.Ct. 2296, 2307, 45 L.Ed.2d 245 (1975). An annexation that dilutes the minority vote "is not a statutory violation as long as the post-annexation electoral system fairly recognizes the minority's political potential." Ibid.
"An official action, whether an annexation or otherwise, taken for the purpose of discriminating against Negroes on account of their race has no legitimacy at all under our Constitution or under the statute. Section 5 forbids voting changes taken with the purpose of denying the vote on the grounds of race or color. Congress surely has the power to prevent such gross racial slurs, the only point of which is 'to despoil colored citizens, and only colored citizens, of their theretofore enjoyed voting rights.' Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347 81 S.Ct. 125, 130, 5 L.Ed.2d 110 (1960)." City of Richmond v. United States, supra, 422 U.S., at 378, 95 S.Ct., at 2307 (emphasis added).
The Court today affirms a finding that in annexing the two parcels of land at issue, the city had the purpose, prohibited by the Voting Rights Act, "of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color." 42 U.S.C. 1973c. Because the actions challenged in this case could not have had any effect on minority voting rights, much less a retrogressive effect, it is clear that the city of Pleasant Grove could not have acted with such an intent respecting either of the annexations at issue in this case.
When the Glasgow Addition was annexed in 1969, it contained only one family of 12 white voters. Now, more than 15 years later, this 40-acre tract still contains only one family that currently numbers 20 white voters. Of course, one can say that the addition of a handful of white voters to a community of some 7,000 white residents "enlarged the number of eligible voters." Port Arthur v. United States, supra, 459 U.S., at 161, 103 S.Ct., at 532. The same could be said if an annexation added only one white voter. But a finding that either annexation was motivated by its anticipated effect on voting rights is out of touch with reality. The "dilution" of any resident's voting rights from an annexation such as the Glasgow Addition20 votes in a city of 7,000 residentscould not constitute a retrogression in voting rights under the Act. No showing has been madeand indeed none could be madethat a change of this number of white voters over a 15-year period has had any effect on voting rights. Nor has the annexation in any way "changed . . . the composition of the electorate." Perkins v. Matthews, supra, 400 U.S., at 389, 91 S.Ct., at 437. The city was composed solely of white voters before and after the annexation of the Glasgow Addition. The annexation therefore could not have had any effect whatsoever on minority voting rights, and the city could not have acted with a purpose to dilute the voting rights of black municipal voters.
The Court attempts to avoid this conclusion by finding that a retrogression in voting rights, for the purpose of ascertaining discriminatory motivation, can be gauged by the effect of the annexation on some hypothetical future black municipal voters. According to this speculative reasoning, if one assumes that some hypothetical black voters will move into Pleasant Grove in the future, and if one further assumes that the racial composition of the Glasgow Addition will remain unchanged, the hypothetical black voters will find their voting strength diluted from what it would have been absent the annexation.
But such speculation in finding a discriminatory purpose on the part of a state actor is illogical and unprecedented. Although we have stated that § 5 reaches changes with the "potential for racial discrimination in voting," Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S., at 389, 91 S.Ct., at 437, the "potential" refers to present and concrete effects, not effects based only on speculation as to what might happen at some time in the future. Under § 5, the Court consistently has looked to the effect of a voting change on the present minority residents of the relevant political subdivision. See City of Richmond v. United States, supra, 422 U.S., at 378, 95 S.Ct., at 2307. (The relevant comparison in assessing whether "the post-annexation electoral system fairly recognizes the minority's political potential" is between "the relative political strength of the minority race in the enlarged city as compared with what it was before the annexation").
Where an annexation's effect on voting rights is purely hypothetical, an inference that the city acted with a motivation related to voting rights is unsupportable.
The Court again relies on future hypothetical black voters to find that the city acted with a "purpose of denying the vote on the grounds of race or color." City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S., at 378, 95 S.Ct., at 2307. Under the same reasoning employed to invalidate the annexation of the Glasgow Addition, the Court relies on its speculation that if the Western Addition became populated with whites and if black voters moved into the city at some time in the future, their vote would be less effective than it would have been had the annexation not occurred. But the Court's theory is even more speculative when applied to the annexation of the vacant Western Addition. There is no way for the city to ensure that black individuals do not move into the Western Addition. The Fourteenth Amendment and various civil rights laws prohibit racially discriminatory state action, and fair housing laws prevent private action that would discourage black individuals from moving into the area. The District Court's conclusion that the Western Addition "is likely to be developed for use by white persons only," 568 F.Supp. 1455, 1457, n. 8 (DC 1983), is sheer speculation. Whites as well as blacks lawfully can move into this area, and not even the prescience of federal courts can predict the extent to which this will occur or whether there ever will be any denial or dilution of the voting rights of blacks.
The Court seeks support for its finding that the city acted with discriminatory motivation in the fact that it has declined in the past to annex three predominantly black communities.
In his dissent from the decision of the District Court, Judge MacKinnon persuasively pointed out that the city's economic justification for its annexation policy is plausible. 623 F.Supp. 782, 793-795 (DC 1985). Even if one agreed with the District Court's view that the economic justification was flawed, this would not support the conclusion that the city acted in this case with a discriminatory motivation prohibited by the Voting Rights Act. The Government concedes that a failure to annex is not a voting-procedure "change" covered by § 5. See Brief for United States 21, n. 12. Nothing in the legislative history of § 5 or in any decision of this Court is to the contrary. The only possible relevance of the failure to annex is to the city's intent respecting the annexations that did occur. The desire of the city to annex a vacant parcel of land and a parcel inhabited by one white family, combined with the failure to annex black communities, is relevant if at allonly if the motivation inferred fairly can be said to relate to voting. Even if the city desired to exclude persons from the city because of their race, the annexations at issue could not possibly deny, abridge, or in any way effect a retrogression in any black individual's municipal voting rights. The Court's holding that the city nevertheless intended to impair black voting rights is without justification.
In sum, the Court's reading of the Voting Rights Act divorces the Act from its constitutional justificationprotecting voting rightsand represents an extension of the Act beyond even its "broadest possible scope," Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S., at 567, 89 S.Ct., at 832. Accordingly, I dissent.
Section 5, as set forth in 42 U.S.C. 1973c, provides in relevant part:
The dissent finds it "difficult to see how the Court justifies applying § 5 preclearance procedures at all" to the annexation of the Western Addition, because the annexation did not immediately enlarge the number of eligible voters. Post, at 477. It may be that Pleasant Grove could have delayed seeking preclearance for the Western Addition until that area had inhabitants desiring to vote, see n. 8, supra, but it is understandable that the city chose to seek preclearance at an earlier juncture: developing a tract of land is an expensive proposition, and the marketability of the new homes may depend on assurances that buyers will be entitled to all the benefits of residency in the cityincluding voting. The Attorney General's decision to permit Pleasant Grove to seek preclearance at the time it did accommodates the city's interests and was surely not forbidden by § 5.