Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/105011/watt-vs-alaska
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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 35', '§ 35', '§ 35', '§ 401', '§ 181', '§ 35', '§ 191', '§ 401', '§ 715', '§ 401', '§ 35', '§ 401', '§ 401', '§ 35', '§ 35', '§ 35', '§ 351', '§ 355', '§ 401', '§ 401', '§ 35', '§ 401', '§ 181', '§ 401', '§ 401', '§ 401', '§ 351', '§ 401', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 401', '§ 1', '§ 715', '§ 715', '§ 355', '§ 715', '§ 715', '§ 715', '§ 401', '§ 401', '§ 715', '§ 715']

Watt Vs Alaska - Citation 105011 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Save as PDF Add a Tag Add a Note Semantics Visualize Watt Vs. Alaska - Court Judgment	LegalCrystal Citationlegalcrystal.com/105011CourtUS Supreme CourtDecided OnApr-21-1981Case Number451 U.S. 259AppellantWattRespondentAlaskaExcerpt:
watt v. alaska - 451 u.s. 259 (1981)
the kenai national moose range was created in 1941 as a national wildlife refuge by withdrawing acreage from public lands in alaska. commercially significant quantities of oil underlie the range, and the secretary of the interior issued oil and gas leases for the range, beginning in the 1950's. the secretary has distributed revenues from these leases according to the formula provided in § 35 of the mineral leasing act of 1920, whereby 90% of the revenues..... Judgment:
Revenues generated by oil and gas leases on federal wildlife refuges consisting of reserved public lands, as here, must be distributed according to the formula provided in § 35 of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920. Absent any expression of congressional intention to repeal
§ 35 by implication, the term "minerals" in § 401(a) of the Wildlife Refuge Revenue Sharing Act applies only to minerals on land acquired for wildlife refuges. Pp.
POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, WHITE, BLACKMUN, REHNQUIST, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a concurring opinion,
451 U. S. 273
. STEWART, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C.J., and MARSHALL, J., joined,
451 U. S. 276
The Kenai National Moose Range was created in 1941 by the withdrawal of nearly two million acres from public lands on the Kenai Peninsula in Alaska.
Exec.Order No. 8979, 3 CFR 1043 (1938-1943 Comp.).
Public Land Order No. 3400, 29 Fed.Reg. 7094-7095 (1964) (adjusting the boundaries). The Kenai Moose Range, as its name suggests, provides a refuge and breeding ground for moose. The Fish and Wildlife Service in the Department of the Interior administers it as part of the national wildlife refuge system.
Commercially significant quantities of oil underlie the Kenai Moose Range. [
] Pursuant to authority under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. § 181
the Secretary of the Interior issued oil and gas leases for the Kenai Moose Range, beginning in the mid-1950's.
(1965). The United States has received substantial revenues from these leases. [
] From first receipt in 1954, the Secretary has distributed these revenues according to the formula provided in § 35 of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 450, as amended, 30 U.S.C. § 191. This formula prescribes that 90% of the revenues be paid to the State of Alaska and 10% to the United States Treasury. [
In 1975, the Director of the Fish and Wildlife Service inquired of the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior whether revenues from oil and gas leases in wildlife refuges created by withdrawal of public lands should be distributed according to § 401(c) of the Wildlife Refuge Revenue Sharing Act, 49 Stat. 383, as amended, 16 U.S.C. § 715s(c), rather than under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920. The Director's inquiry was prompted by the 1964 amendments to § 401(a), which added the word "minerals" to a list of refuge resources, the revenues from which were to be distributed according to the statutory formula. [
] Pub.L. 88-523, 78 Stat. 701. According to this formula, 25% of the revenues are paid to counties wherein the refuge lies, and remaining funds are used by the Department of the Interior for public purposes. [
The Solicitor ruled that the 1964 amendment governed, superseding § 35 of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920. App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 79-1890, p. 26a. The Comptroller General concurred in the view of the Solicitor. 55 Comp.Gen. 117 (1975). Upon request for reconsideration by the State of Alaska in 1976, the Comptroller General affirmed his initial decision.
Op.Comp.Gen. in File: B-118678, June 11, 1976, reprinted in App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 79--1890, p. 42a.
The Kenai Peninsula Borough then brought suit against the Secretary of the Interior in the United States District Court for the District of Alaska, seeking a declaration that the amended § 401(a) of the Wildlife Refuge Revenue Sharing Act governed the distribution of oil and gas revenues from the Kenai Moose Range. Kenai Borough is the "county" within which the Moose Range lies. If § 401(a) governs, it will receive 25% of the revenues, and the State none. The State of Alaska then filed suit in the same court against the Secretary and various federal officials, seeking a declaration that § 35 of the Mineral Leasing Act still governed distribution of these same oil and gas revenues. If that provision applies, the State will continue to receive 90% of the funds and, so far as federal law is concerned, Kenai Borough none. The District Court consolidated the lawsuits. [
of the apparently conflicting statutes, the court held that the term "minerals" in the amended Wildlife Refuge Revenue Sharing Act referred only to oil and gas found on land acquired for wildlife refuges.
at 292. Distribution of oil and gas revenues from leases on public land reserved for wildlife refuges, it held, continues to be determined by § 35 of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920. [
The court viewed the legislative history of the 1964 amendments as demonstrating that Congress was concerned primarily with the difficulties of acquiring land for refuges, and that Congress expected no increase in revenues from the Kenai Moose Range to result from the amendments.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 612 F.2d 1210 (1980). That court found the legislative history largely ambiguous.
at 1213. It refused to find that the addition of the word "minerals" to the amended Wildlife Refuge Revenue Sharing Act had repealed by implication the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 without a clear showing that this was the intent of Congress.
SeeMorton v. Mancari,
-551 (1974). The court further approved the District Court's holding because it gave effect to each statute. 612 F.2d at 1214-1215.
Sub nom. Andrus v. Alaska,
449 U.S. 818 (1980), [
"[A]ll revenues received by the Secretary of the Interior from the sale or other disposition of animals, salmonoid carcassas [
], timber, hay, grass, or other products of the soil, minerals, shells, sand, or gravel, [or] from other privileges . . . shall be . . . reserved in a separate fund for disposition as hereafter prescribed."
We agree with the Secretary that "[t]he starting point in every case involving construction of a statute is the language itself."
(1975) (POWELL, J., concurring).
See Rubin v. United States,
449 U. S. 424
(1981). But ascertainment of the meaning apparent on the face of a single statute need not end the inquiry.
-544 (1940). This is because the plain meaning rule is "rather an axiom of experience than a rule of law, and does not preclude consideration of persuasive evidence if it exists."
Boston Sand Co. v. United States,
(1928) (Holmes, J.). [
] The circumstances of the enactment of particular legislation may persuade a court that Congress did not intend words of common meaning to have their literal effect.
E.g., Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States,
legislative history is guided by another maxim: "
repeals by implication are not favored,'"
(1936). "The intention of the legislature to repeal must be `clear and manifest.'"
(1939), quoting
106 U. S. 602
(1883). We must read the statutes to give effect to each if we can do so while preserving their sense and purpose.
Mancari, supra,
see Haggar Co. v. Helvering,
308 U. S. 394
Congress gave extensive consideration to the purpose and probable effect of the 1964 amendments to the Wildlife Refuge Revenue Sharing Act. Pub.L. 88-523, 78 Stat. 701. Nonetheless, and we think it significant, there is no explanation in the legislative history for the addition of the single word "minerals" to the list of refuge resources subject to the Act.
H.R.Rep. No. 1753, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964) (hereinafter 1964 H.R.Rep.); S.Rep. No. 1096, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964) (hereinafter 1964 S.Rep.); 110 Cong.Rec.19882-19883 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Ostertag). Our study of the few legislative materials pertinent to the insertion of "minerals" persuades us that Congress intended to work no change in the preexisting formula for distribution of mineral revenues from federal wildlife refuges.
applicable statute, the then unamended Wildlife Refuge Revenue Sharing Act, Act of June 1, 1935, ch. 261, 49 Stat. 383 (hereinafter 1935 Refuge Act),
did not govern the disposal of revenues from mineral leases on wildlife refuges. 21 Comp.Gen. 873 (1942).
Comp.Gen., B-105133, Oct. 10, 1951, App. 82. [
Third, our opinion in
(1965), strongly suggests that the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 governed the distribution of revenues from reserved refuge lands prior to 1964. That case involved the authority of the Secretary to issue oil leases on the Kenai Moose Range after the lands had been withdrawn from the public domain by
Executive Order. In holding that the Executive Order did not deprive the Secretary of this power, this Court held that the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 conferred the necessary statutory authorization on the Secretary to grant the leases. "The Act excluded from its application certain designated lands, but did not exclude land within wildlife refuge areas."
380 U. S. 4
] Because § 35 of the Mineral Leasing Act prescribes the distribution formula for revenues received from all leases issued "under the provisions of this chapter," we think it an inescapable deduction from
that, prior to 1964, the Act continued to provide the formula for disposition of revenues generated by leases on public lands after the lands were withdrawn for wildlife refuges.
Neither the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 nor the 1935 Refuge Act authorized the Secretary to issue leases for mineral extraction from refuges created from acquired lands. 40 Op.Atty.Gen. 9 (1941) (Attorney General Jackson); 21 Comp.Gen. 873 (1942). Congress responded by passing the Mineral Leasing Act for Acquired Lands, Act of Aug. 7, 1947, ch. 513, 61 Stat. 913, 30 U.S.C. § 351
In addition to conferring authority on the Secretary to issue leases for specified minerals, including oil and gas, it provided that revenues from the leases be "distributed in the same manner as prescribed for other receipts from the lands affected by the lease." 30 U.S.C. § 355. As applied to wildlife refuges created from acquired lands, this provision requires that mineral revenues be distributed according to the formula in the 1935 Refuge Act.
The question presented by these cases is whether Congress intended to alter this program of revenue distribution when it amended the 1935 Refuge Act in 1964. The impetus for proposals leading to the passage of the amendments was the difficulty the Department had experienced in acquiring new refuge lands.
1964 S.Rep. 5; 1964 H.R.Rep. 2. Localities resisted having land removed from local tax roles. The purpose of the amendments was to "provide a more equitable formula for payments to counties as compensation for loss of taxable properties that have been acquired by the Federal wildlife refuge system." 1964 S.Rep. 2.
1964 H.R.Rep. 2-3. Public Law 88-523 met this problem by changing the formula for distribution of revenues from refuges consisting of acquired lands. § 401(c)(1), 78 Stat. 701. The new formula provided that counties within which acquired refuge lands lay could receive, at their option, a payment based on the adjusted cost of the lands, rather than on revenues produced. [
] Congress intended the Department to pay more to counties under the new law than it had under the old.
subject to the Wildlife Refuge Revenue Sharing Act. Such silence is suggestive, because Congress was concerned that the Department have sufficient funds to make the increased payments mandated by the amendments. [
1964 S.Rep. 12 (statement of Secretary Udall); 1964 H.R.Rep. 11. Congress might be expected to have mentioned a change wrought through the amendments which would increase refuge revenues by amounts exceeding total existing refuge revenues. [
During deliberations on the amendments, the Fish and Wildlife Service presented to Senate and House Committees tables showing present payments to counties containing refuges, and payments estimated under the proposed amendments. 1964 S.Rep. 13; 1964 H.R.Rep. 3. The relevant table shows no change in the expected payments to the Borough of Kenai Peninsula. This table assumed that oil and gas revenues were governed by the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 both before and after the amendments. [
The inference seems inescapable that Congress in 1964 did not intend by the insertion of "minerals" in § 401(a) of the Wildlife Refuge Revenue Sharing Act to subject revenues from oil leases on reserved refuge lands to its distribution formula. The more reasonable explanation for the intended effect of including "minerals" is provided by the Department of the Interior. The insertion of "minerals" appears first in 1962 in proposed bills supported by the Department as substitutes for other bills then pending before the House and Senate to increase payments to counties. S. 2138, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); H.R. 13176, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962). In its report to the Committees, the Department offered no particular explanation for this new term, but the Secretary here concedes that this change was included within the proposal's descriptive category of "various perfecting . . . provisions."
Letter from Frank P. Briggs, Assistant Secretary of the Interior, June 20, 1962, in S.Rep. No.1919, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 13 (1962); H.R.Rep. No. 2499, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 4 (1962).
construction carries persuasive weight.
. Such attention to contemporaneous construction is particularly appropriate in these cases, because the Department first proposed the amendment.
See SEC v. Sloan,
436 U. S. 120
(1978). The Department's current interpretation, being in conflict with its initial position, is entitled to considerably less deference.
(1976). In these cases, we find it wholly unpersuasive.
In summary, we hold that revenues generated by oil and gas leases on federal wildlife refuges consisting of reserved public lands must be distributed according to the formula provided in § 35 of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920. Finding no "clearly expressed congressional intention" to repeal this provision by implication,
, we conclude that the term "minerals" in § 401(a) of the Wildlife Refuge Revenue Sharing Act applies only to minerals on acquired refuge lands. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
* Together with No. 79-1904,
Kenai Peninsula Borough v. Alaska et al.,
Today, the Kenai Moose Range is the only national wildlife refuge created from public lands where oil is being pumped.
Brief for Federal Petitioners 4, n. 4. Substantial quantities of oil, however, are thought to underlie other reserved refuge lands in Alaska.
States other than Alaska receive only 50% of public land mineral revenues under the Act.
By its terms, the Mineral Leasing Act applies to specified minerals, including oil and gas, on all lands owned by the United States, except those lands excluded by the Act. 30 U.S.C. § 181.
, and n. 3 (1965).
Act of June 15, 1935, ch. 261, 49 Stat. 378, 383. The current version of § 401(a) is given in the text,
384 U. S. 65
, n. 2 (1966). The Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 applies only to public lands.
In 1978, Congress rejected new amendments to § 401(a) that would have defined minerals as "including, but not limited to, crude petroleum and natural gas." H.R. 8394, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). The House Report recommending this bill stated that the language was added to "insure" that, after the effective date, oil and gas revenues from Kenai would be distributed according to the formula in § 401(c). H.R.Rep. No. 95-1197, p. 8 (1978). The Report disclaims any intention to affect the outcome of these cases, then pending in the Court of Appeals.
The Senate then rejected even this amendment, Members stating that it would be inappropriate to make any judgment about the proper allocation of these resources while these cases were still in the courts. 124 Cong.Rec. 31436-31440 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Culver and Sen. Gravel).
148 F.2d 737, 739 (CA2) (L. Hand, J.),
U.S. 404 (1945)
The Secretary speculates that Congress in 1964 probably assumed that oil and gas revenues from refuges on reserved lands were governed by the 1935 Refuge Act. The basis for this argument is language in the 1935 Refuge Act, continued today, that the Act governed the disposition of "shell, sand, or gravel, and from other privileges on refuges."
It sometimes was contended that "other privileges" included oil and gas leases.
Memorandum of July 6, 1951, Chief Counsel of the Fish and Wildlife Service, App. 87.
As noted, the Comptroller General rejected this contention in 1942 and 1951. For the reasons elaborated in the text, we believe that it was understood by Congress that the 1935 Refuge Act did not govern the leasing of minerals; indeed, even the 1946 opinion of the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior that the provision authorized oil leases on acquired refuge lands, App. 68, is contradicted by Congress' passage of the Mineral Leasing Act for Acquired Lands, Act of Aug. 7, 1947, ch. 513, 61 Stat. 913, 30 U.S.C. § 351
which subsequently conferred this very authority on the Department.
40 Op.Atty.Gen. 9 (1941).
The dissent also speculates -- inconsistently, we think -- that Congress embraced this often discredited interpretation of the 1935 Refuge Act,
451 U. S. 279
-280, n. 3. The dissent criticizes the Court for concluding that Congress' insertion of "minerals" in § 401(a) did not change preexisting law.
451 U. S. 278
-279. The dissent then explains that Congress added "minerals" in 1964 not to change the law, but to reaffirm that the 1935 Refuge Act already governed disposition of oil revenues from reserved refuge lands.
-280, n. 3. In other words, the dissent contradicts itself and joins us in positing that the addition of "minerals" was never intended to work a substantive change, but disagrees merely about what the law provided prior to the 1964 amendments.
construction of the Mineral Leasing Act should not now be binding, because the Court did not need to construe the Act. This is incorrect. The Court was required to determine that the Secretary had statutory authority to issue oil leases on refuges withdrawn from public lands, before it could reach the question whether the Executive Orders withdrawing the refuge lands limited that authority. The Court examined the language of § 1 of the Act and found that it gave the Secretary the requisite authority.
The 1964 payment formula was liberalized further in 1978. Pub.L. 9469, § 1(a)(3), 92 Stat. 1319.
(quoting present law) .
The silence of Congress may provide a treacherous guide to its intent.
316 U. S. 11
(1942). Here, however, it is almost inconceivable that Congress knowingly would have changed substantially a longstanding formula for distribution of substantial funds without a word of comment. In 1978, Congress inserted "salmonoid carcass[e]s" into the list of resources governed by § 401(a) of the Wildlife Refuge Revenue Sharing Act. Pub.L. 95-469, § 1(a)(1), 92 Stat. 1319. Even for this comparatively trivial addition, Congress explicitly stated, "[s]almonoid carcasses have been included to allow for the sale of salmon used in hatchery operations." H.R.Rep. No. 95-1197, p. 8 (1978) .
The table indicated that 1963 payments to the Kenai Peninsula Borough under the Wildlife Refuge Revenue Sharing Act, amended or unamended, totaled $1,768. 1964 H.R.Rep. 3. This figure cannot include 25% of the revenues from oil and gas leases.
My colleagues periodically criticize the way the Court manages its docket. Most frequently, such criticism takes the form of a dissent from the denial of certiorari.
See, e.g., Brown Transport Corp. v. Atcon, Inc.,
439 U. S. 1014
(WHITE, J., dissenting). Although I consider the practice of dissenting from denials of certiorari counterproductive,
see Singleton v. Commissioner,
439 U. S. 940
, 942-946 (opinion of STEVENS, J.), in the context of the present cases it may be appropriate to suggest that the Court may misuse its scarce resources not only by occasionally denying certiorari in cases deserving plenary consideration, but also by granting certiorari
without adequate justification. [
] As long as the Court creates unnecessary work for itself in this manner, its expressions of concern about the overburdened federal judiciary will ring with a hollow echo.
In these cases, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit should have been permitted to provide the final answer to the unique question of statutory construction presented by the petitions for certiorari. The decision of the Court of Appeals did not conflict with any other judicial decision, and there is no reason to anticipate that a comparable issue will arise in another Circuit in the foreseeable future. [
] I fully agree with the majority's explanation of why the Court of Appeals correctly read these ambiguous statutes, but even if I were persuaded that JUSTICE STEWART had the better of the argument, I still would feel that the public interest would have been better served by allowing this litigation to terminate in the Court of Appeals.
The question of how to divide the revenues from oil and gas leases on public lands in the Kenai Peninsula is clearly a matter for Congress to decide. If Congress is displeased with the decisions of this Court and the Court of Appeals, it may promptly reverse them by revising the relevant statutes. If that is its view, it no doubt would have acted more promptly if we had simply denied certiorari. [
] On the other
hand, if we have correctly perceived the intent of the legislature, nothing has been gained by protracting this litigation. Admittedly, a significant amount of money was at stake,
451 U. S. 263
, n. 6, but the offsetting costs associated with holding the funds in escrow pending our review, as well as the costs associated with the expenditure of this Court's material and human resources, are also significant.
The federal judicial system is undergoing profound changes. Among the most significant is the increase in the importance of our courts of appeals. Today they are, in truth, the courts of last resort for almost all federal litigation. Like other courts of last resort -- including this one -- they occasionally render decisions that will not withstand the test of time. No judicial system is perfect, and no appellate structure can entirely eliminate judicial error. Most certainly, this Court does not sit primarily to correct what we perceive to be mistakes committed by other tribunals. Although our work is often accorded special respect because of its finality, [
] we possess no judicial monopoly on either finality or respect. The quality of the work done by the courts of appeals merits the esteem of the entire Nation, but, unfortunately, is not nearly as well or as widely recognized as it should be. Indeed, I believe that, if we accorded those dedicated appellate judges the deference that their work merits, we would be better able to resist the temptation to grant certiorari for no reason other than a tentative prediction that our review of a case may produce an answer different from theirs. In my opinion, that is not a sufficient reason for granting certiorari. [
Neither of the petitions for certiorari filed in these cases suggested that the Court of Appeals' decision conflicted with any other judicial decision. In addition, the Solicitor General, in the petition filed on behalf of the federal parties, observed that the question of statutory construction presented here was unlikely to arise in the foreseeable future in another Circuit.
Pet. for Cert. in No. 79-1890, p. 18.
In fact, Congress declined to clarify its intention with respect to the distribution of the Kenai oil and gas leasing revenues in part because of the concerns of some of its Members that such legislative action would be inappropriate while these cases were still pending in the federal courts.
451 U. S. 264
-265, n. 8;
451 U. S. 285
Indeed, as Justice Jackson once noted, "[w]e are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final."
(concurring in result).
Today the Court strains to conclude that Congress did not mean what it said, and judicially repeals a reasonable [
The Court argues that the addition of the word "minerals" to the Wildlife Refuge Revenue Sharing Act must be read to apply only to acquired refuge lands, and not to reserved refuge lands. But there is no support, in law or legislative history, for exempting mineral revenues from refuges consisting of reserved public lands from the distribution formula of the Wildlife Refuge Revenue Sharing Act. The District Court concluded that "there is nothing in 16 U.S.C. § 715s which would support a restrictive construction of the word
minerals,'" and that "a literal approach of statutory construction would dictate an expansive definition including both reserved and acquired lands." 436 F.Supp. 288, 291. Similarly, the Court of Appeals found that, "under the plain meaning of minerals and of the other provisions of § 715s, its language fairly brings the Kenai Moose Range oil and gas revenues within it scope." 612 F.2d 1210, 1213. It was a mistake for either court to proceed further.
The addition of the word "minerals" to the Wildlife Refuge Revenue Sharing Act in 1964 would be meaningless if it reached only leases of acquired lands. And, "[i]n construing a statute, we are obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word Congress used."
. Section 6 of the Mineral Leasing Act for Acquired Lands, 30 U.S.C. § 355, already provided that mineral leases of acquired lands "shall be distributed in the same manner as prescribed for other receipts from the lands affected by the lease." Accordingly, any allocation scheme established for wildlife refuges encompassing acquired lands would automatically apply to mineral revenues, as well as those from the resources specified in the Refuge Act. As there was no ambiguity on that point, there was no useful purpose for Congress to declare once again how mineral revenues from acquired lands within wildlife refuges would be allocated. [
The Court concludes that the statute does not mean what it says because the Wildlife Refuge Revenue Sharing Act of 1964 is in conflict with the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, [
and because "repeals by implication are not favored."
451 U. S. 267
. But that canon of construction has no force in this context. The challenged section in the 1964 Act, far from "repealing" the 1920 Act, merely established a limited and specific exception to one of the provisions in the earlier law. When the text of a new statute, dealing with a discrete subject, is unambiguous, it should be given effect even if it alters a previous law that dealt with the same general subject.
, the Court refused to find a repeal where the words of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, if taken literally, would have worked a repeal of an Indian preference policy consistently recognized by Congress for almost 40 years. The Court's description of
as "a prototypical case where an adjudication of repeal by implication is not appropriate,"
, is instructive:
Ibid.; see also Fussell v. Gregg,
. The contrast with these cases is obvious. The provision in the more recent enactment deals specifically with the same subject -- distribution of revenue from leases on federal lands -- that had been the object of an earlier, and more general, [
] statute. [
] In any case, there is more than enough evidence
The legislative history of the 1964 amendments to 16 U.S.C. § 715s (1976 ed., Supp. III) discloses that Congress had before it numerous bills from which to choose to compensate counties in which wildlife refuges were located, some of which omitted any reference to "minerals," S. 2138, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); S. 2678, 2770, 2927, 3201, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962); H.R. 12144, 12143, 11535, 11525, 10714 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962); S. 1720, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); and some that included such reference, H.R. 2393, 1004, 1127, 9030, 5996, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); H.R. 11008, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964); S. 179, 1363, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); S. 2498, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964). Presumably when Congress adopted a bill containing the term, it was aware of the difference. Moreover, the 1964 amendment was not a "technical" amendment, nor was it a last-minute addition from the floor.
See United States v. Batchelder,
. The suggestion that the word "minerals" be added to 16 U.S.C. § 715s (1976 ed., Supp. III) was raised in June, 1962, when the Interior Department submitted a substitute bill for those pending in the House and Senate. Report of the Department of the Interior dated June 20, 1962, in S.Rep. No.1919, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 13, 15 (1962); Report of the Department of the Interior of June 22, 1962, in Authorize Increased Payments to Counties for Wildlife Refuges: Hearings on H.R. 10714, H.R. 11525, H.R. 11535, H.R. 12143, and H.R. 12144 before the Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 7, 9 (1962).
The amendment was not highlighted, but it is unlikely that it escaped notice. [
] Later the same year, the relevant Committees of both the House and the Senate adopted the language. S.Rep. No.1919,
at 19; H.R.Rep. No. 2499, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 9 (1962), and the text was before Congress for the following two years.
It is therefore very difficult to conclude that the addition was inadvertent or unnoticed. [
] But, in any case, nothing in the legislative history demonstrates congressional intent different from that reflected in the words of the statute.
350 U. S. 433
The Court today is bothered because the literal meaning of a statute altered prevailing law. [
] But usually the very point of new legislation is to alter prevailing law.
T. Sedgwick, The Interpretation and Construction of Statutory and Constitutional Law 104 (2d ed. 1874). Congress does not have the affirmative obligation to explain to this Court why it deems a particular enactment wise or necessary, or to demonstrate that it is aware of the consequences of its action. [
See Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc.,
. And "[i]t
is not a function of this Court to presume that
Congress was unaware of what it accomplished.'"
450 U. S. 333
450 U. S. 342
Rather than join the Court in its speculative efforts to deal with the doctrine of implied repeal, I would rest decision of these cases upon an established rule of statutory construction:
leges posteriores, priores contrarias abrogant.
Sedgwick describes this rule with approval as follows:
See District of Columbia v. Hutton,
11 Wall. 652,
78 U. S. 657
78 U. S. 92
. Observance of this rule also allows the Court to respect the most basic of all canons of statutory construction: that statutes mean what they plainly say. [
] As Chief Justice Marshall said more than a century and a half ago:
While it is clear there is a conflict, it is not at all clear that the conflict is even relevant to these cases. The Court assumes that the 1964 amendment, if given its plain meaning, changed the allocation of oil and gas lease revenues to affected counties. Although, as the Court of Appeals correctly noted, "the legislative history of the 1964 amendments to 16 U.S.C. § 715s sheds no direct light on the issue here," 612 F.2d 1210, 1213, it is arguable that, before 1964, oil and gas lease receipts generated from lands in federal wildlife refuges were subject to § 401 of the Wildlife Refuge Act of 1935, ch. 261, 49 Stat. 383, and not to the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, despite the vigorous contentions of today's Court.
Indeed, Interior Department spokesmen in the 1962, 1963, and 1964 congressional hearings described the existing law for receipts collected from both reserved public lands and acquired lands as generally subject to § 401 of the 1935 Act.
S.Rep. No.1919,
at 2, 13; H.R.Rep. No. 2499,
at 4; H.R.Rep. No. 1753, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 14 (1964); S.Rep. No. 1096, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 25 (1964). The Secretary of the Interior stated that,
[u]nder existing law, enacted in 1935,
the counties in which our refuges are located receive 25 percent of the net revenue from operations on national wildlife refuges, such as
grazing, timber harvest, and the like."
But it is not important to decide today what the true rule for apportionment of mineral resources from refuge lands was before 1964. And, contrary to the Court's assertion, I do not do so here, and "explai[n] that Congress added
minerals' . . . to reaffirm" that the 1935 Act already controlled the disposition of oil revenues from reserved refuge lands.
451 U. S. 268
, n. 10. In 1964, Congress did not have to resolve the question of what the law had been before; its concern was properly with the future. Ideally, it could have prefaced § 715s with the language "notwithstanding any other provision of law." But it did not. Instead, it introduced an entirely unambiguous prospective rule with the phrase: "Beginning with the next full fiscal year and for each fiscal year thereafter. . . ." At least for me, it needed to do no more.
While the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 covers in general terms the distribution of revenue from federal lands, the later Wildlife Refuge Revenue Sharing Act, as amended in 1964, embraced new provisions that apply with particularity to wildlife refuges, without distinction between those reserved or acquired. To that extent, the later Act must constitute a repeal of the former. "[T]he narrowly drawn, specific . . . provision . . . must prevail over the broader . . . provision. . . ."
426 U. S. 158
These cases do not involve an apparent limitation on an important and pervasive statute, such as the Sherman Act.
See, e.g., United States v. Borden Co.,
. In such a case, as in
implied repeals are not found, because it would be unreasonable to assume Congress would alter fundamental policy without an unambiguous expression of its intent to do so. But it is equally unreasonable to expect Congress to specify, or indeed even to consider, the effect of a new statutory provision on all earlier provisions affecting the same subject that may be swept away by the enactment, particularly if the old provisions are unclear.
The Court makes much of the fact that a statistical table comparing revenues actually received by counties with those estimated to result from the amendment showed no change in the amounts from the Kenai Range, and if the amendment meant what a plain reading of it indicates, an increase should have been reflected.
451 U. S. 271
. That straw of evidence scarcely compels the conclusion that the amendment does not mean what it says. It would hardly be surprising if the legislators overlooked a single disparity in a single entry in a lengthy exhibit. And it is noteworthy that the table the Court refers to appeared in the 1964 Reports only, while the addition of the word "minerals" to § 715s was proposed in 1962, when the comparable statistical table did not include any indication of the anticipated payments to counties from public land areas under the proposed amendment.
S.Rep. No.1919, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 11, nn. 1 and 2 (1962).
That Congress explained the addition of "[s]almonoid carcasses,"
, n. 13, hardly supports the inference that Congress would also have explained the addition of the word "minerals." By the Court's strained logic, premised on the notion that " [t]he silence of Congress may provide a treacherous guide to its intent,"
Congress is put on notice that any time it explains one provision of a statute, no matter how trivial, it does so at its peril. For if it fails similarly to explain all provisions, no matter how important, a court would be free to strike those unexplained provisions as unintended. That, in my view, leads to far more "treacherous" results than those feared by today's Court.
This is not a case where the plain meaning of statutory language would lead to an absurd or futile result,
see, e.g., Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp.,
, or to an unreasonable result at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole.
See, e.g., United States v. American Trucking Assns., Inc.,
See also Shapiro v. United States,
The Court relies on the fact that the Department of the Interior ignored the 1964 amendment for a decade with respect to oil and gas revenues from the Kenai Range.
451 U. S. 272
-273. But administrative errors are not self-validating.
-288, n. 5;
Dion v. United States,
381 U. S. 78
. Unauthorized payments from the federal Treasury are not immune from correction, and the United States can retrieve money mistakenly dispersed by its officials.
303 U. S. 415
-416;
164 U. S. 212
. In any case, there is no indication that the administrative practice until 1975 was the result of considered evaluation of the 1964 amendments. Instead, it appears that it was the inertial continuation of earlier practice. A much more reliable indication of the administrative construction of the 1964 amendment is the "detailed and comprehensive" reevaluation by the Department in 1975, confirmed by the Comptroller General.
Andrus v. Sierra Club,
See also NLRB v. Iron Workers,
S.Rep. No. 95-1174, pp. 4, 8 (1978).
-265, n. 8.