Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/535/681/23846/
Timestamp: 2020-08-11 01:14:11
Document Index: 13125407

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 301', '§ 416', '§ 402', '§ 416', '§ 402', '§ 416', '§ 416', '§ 416', '§ 402', '§ 404', '§ 405', '§ 402']

Maria Eisenhauer, on Her Own Behalf and on Behalf of Herchildren, Francis X. Eisenhauer and Brian F.eisenhauer, Appellant, v. David Mathews, Individually and in His Capacity As Secretaryof the Department of Health, Education Andwelfare, Appellee, 535 F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 1976) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Second Circuit › 1976 › Maria Eisenhauer, on Her Own Behalf and on Behalf of Herchildren, Francis X. Eisenhauer and Brian F....
Maria Eisenhauer, on Her Own Behalf and on Behalf of Herchildren, Francis X. Eisenhauer and Brian F.eisenhauer, Appellant, v. David Mathews, Individually and in His Capacity As Secretaryof the Department of Health, Education Andwelfare, Appellee, 535 F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 1976)
US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit - 535 F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 1976) Argued Dec. 19, 1975. Decided April 15, 1976
This appeal raises issues concerning the construction of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 301 et seq., (the Act). One issue involves a narrow question of statutory interpretation: whether the provisions of section 216(e) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 416(e), under which a child "shall be deemed the stepchild" of an individual who goes through a ceremonial marriage with the parent of such child, requires that the purported marriage be entered in good faith. The second issue concerns the application of the "deemed dependent" provisions of section 202(d) (4) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 402(d) (4).
Sonja's children by her marriage to Andreas Radauscher were held to qualify for survivor benefits as stepchildren of the deceased wage-earner. They were not, of course, the legal stepchildren of Francis Eisenhauer because the purported marriage between their mother and the deceased was invalid. Section 216(e), 42 U.S.C. § 416(e), however, which defines "child" for purposes of eligibility under section 202(d) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 402(d) (1), provides, in part, that:
"a person who is not the stepchild of an individual shall be deemed the stepchild of such individual if . . . the mother or adopting mother, or the father or adopting father, as the case may be, of such person went through a marriage ceremony resulting in a purported marriage between them which, but for a legal impediment described in the last sentence of subsection (h) (1) (B) of this section, would have been a valid marriage."
The last sentence of subsection 216(h) (1) (B) reads:
"If an applicant is a son or daughter of a fully or currently insured individual but is not (and is not deemed to be) the child of such insured individual under subparagraph (A), such applicant shall nevertheless be deemed to be the child of such insured individual if such insured individual and the mother or father, as the case may be, of such applicant went through a marriage ceremony resulting in a purported marriage between them which, but for a legal impediment described in the last sentence of paragraph (1) (B), would have been a valid marriage." Section 216(h) (2) (B), 42 U.S.C. § 416(h) (2) (B).
Prior to the 1960 amendments the benefit eligibility of illegitimate children was limited by the status such children enjoyed under state intestate succession law. See section 216(h) (2) (A), 42 U.S.C. § 416(h) (2) (A).
Sections 216(e) and 216(h) (2) (B) serve to confer child's benefits by deeming persons to hold the status of a child vis a vis the insured without reference to the motives of the participants in the ceremonial marriage. In sharp contrast to these sections is the provision conferring spousal status as the result of an invalid ceremonial marriage, also enacted as part of the 1960 amendments. Under section 216(h) (1) (B) the applicant for spousal benefits whose claim is predicated upon an invalid ceremonial marriage must, among other things, establish to the satisfaction of the Secretary that the applicant went through the marriage in good faith and at the time of the ceremony did not know of the legal impediment which precluded the marriage from being legally valid. Furthermore, the spousal status conferred by the ceremonial marriage provisions of section 216(h) (1) (B) is unavailable to the applicant if another individual is or is deemed to be the spouse of the insured under section 202(b), (c), (e), (f) or (g) and thus entitled to benefits.
Appellant seeks support for her argument that a good faith requirement is implicit in section 216(e) in two cases which make reference to the parallel provisions for illegitimate children in section 216(h) (1) (B) and (2) (B). Language in each of these cases, Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 635, 94 S. Ct. 2496, 2501, 41 L. Ed. 2d 363, 369 (1974) and Moots v. Secretary, United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 349 F.2d 518, 521 (4th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 996, 86 S. Ct. 582, 15 L. Ed. 2d 483 (1966) assumes that illegitimates are denied the status of child under the ceremonial marriage provisions of section 216(h) (1) (B) and (2) (B) absent good faith on the part of the parents. In neither of these cases, however, was the issue before the Court. In Jimenez the Supreme Court found that the provisions of the Act which control the entitlement of afterborn illegitimates to benefits as a result of the parent's disability irrationally discriminated against some illegitimate children. The question whether good faith is an essential element of a claim under any of the ceremonial marriage provisions conferring the status of child was not at issue. The Court's passing reference in dictum to "formal, non-obvious defects in their parents' ceremonial marriage," 417 U.S. at 635, 94 S. Ct. at 2501, 41 L. Ed. 2d at 369, can hardly be construed as a holding that the absence of good faith on the part of the parents disqualifies the child claimant. Dictum in Moots is no more compelling. Since the benefit applicant in Moots did not even establish that a ceremonial marriage took place, it cannot fairly be said that the issue of good faith was actually considered.
Appellant cites Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 95 S. Ct. 2457, 45 L. Ed. 2d 522 (1975), for the proposition that preventing the use of sham marriages to obtain Social Security benefits is fundamental to the Act. In Salfi the Court upheld the nine-month duration-of-relationship requirements in section 216(c) (5) and (e) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 416(c) (5) and (e) (2). The instant appeal, unlike that in Salfi, does not call into question the legislature's ability to fashion prophylactic rules to avoid spurious claims. Appellant does not ask to enforce a legislatively mandated requirement but asks that additional requirements be imposed. The Act draws a clear distinction between spouse and child benefit eligibility resulting from a ceremonial marriage. As to the former, Congress imposed a good faith requirement and denied eligibility to persons entering a purported marriage with knowledge of its invalidity; as to the latter such restrictive language is entirely absent.
Appellant raises a second challenge to the award of benefits to Sonja's children by her first marriage. Mrs. Eisenhauer contends that even if the Secretary correctly deemed the Radauscher children to be stepchildren of the deceased wage-earner, they nonetheless fail to satisfy the dependency requirements of section 202(d) (1) (C), 42 U.S.C. § 402(d) (1) (C). Section 202(d) (1) (C) provides that every child (as defined in section 216(e)) of an individual who dies fully or currently insured shall be entitled to child's insurance benefits if, among other things, such child was dependent upon the insured at the time of the insured's death. Section 202(d) (4), however, creates a statutory presumption of dependency. That section provides:
"A child shall be deemed dependent upon his stepfather or stepmother at the time specified in paragraph (1) (C) of this subsection, if, at such time, the child was living with or was receiving at least one-half of his support from such stepfather or stepmother."
Appellant argues that 20 C.F.R. § 404.1113, promulgated by the Secretary pursuant to rule-making authority conferred by section 205(a) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(a), requires a finding that the deceased exercised, or had the right to exercise, parental control over the children whose benefits she disputes. The regulation defines the term "living with" for purposes of the deemed dependent provision of section 202(d) (4) as including this control element.7 There was no specific finding by the Secretary as to control because the appellant, who bore the burden of refuting the children's eligibility, introduced no evidence indicating such control was absent. The eligibility of Sonja's children is presumptively valid and remains so until evidence is introduced rebutting their prima facie entitlement. With the competing claims against the deceased's account so postured, the Secretary was not required to make a specific finding that Sonja's children by her prior marriage were subject to the control of the deceased.
The Act contains other provisions wherein the disjunctive criteria of section 202(d) (4) are used in the conjunctive. See, e. g., section 202(d) (8) and (9), 42 U.S.C. § 402(d) (8) and (9)
" 'Living with' as used in sections 202(d) (3), 202(d) (4), 202(d) (8), 202(d) (9), and 216(h) (3) of the Act as amended and 'living in such individual's household' as used in section 216(e) of the Act mean the parent and child are sharing the same residence and that the parent is exercising or has the right to exercise parental control and authority over the child. As used in this section, the term 'parent' includes a natural parent, legally adopting parent, stepparent, the foster parent as to whom the child-claimant has the status of 'child' under a theory of 'equitable adoption,' and the grandparent or stepgrandparent."