Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/178/184/601789/
Timestamp: 2020-02-24 18:36:49
Document Index: 648279434

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 2', '§ 3553', '§ 3553', '§ 5']

United States of America, v. Da Ping Huang, Appellant, 178 F.3d 184 (3d Cir. 1998) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Third Circuit › 1998 › United States of America, v. Da Ping Huang, Appellant
United States of America, v. Da Ping Huang, Appellant, 178 F.3d 184 (3d Cir. 1998)
US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit - 178 F.3d 184 (3d Cir. 1998)
Third Circuit.Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
A federal grand jury for the District of New Jersey indicted the defendant Da Ping Huang for conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 700 grams of heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) (1) and 846 (Count I), as well as with the crime of possession with intent to distribute 700 grams of heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count II).
Unfortunately for the defendant, a cooperative plea agreement in a criminal sentencing proceeding under current law is not altogether the same as a civil contract dispute, although civil contract law is important and useful in its interpretation. United States v. Khan, 920 F.2d 1100, 1105 (2nd Cir. 1990). The agreement must also be construed in light of the applicable federal statute and related Sentencing Guidelines. Judge Cooper, in a carefully analyzed opinion, examined the law pertaining to plea agreements and focused on the absence in this plea agreement of any provision in which the Government expressly reserved the sole discretion to determine whether the defendant is entitled to a motion for a section 5K1.1 departure. The Government concedes that the agreement contained no such provision. However, it argues, as it did in the district court, that the plea agreement should be interpreted similarly to those agreements which expressly reserves to the Government "sole discretion" in the matters of 5K1.1 motions and the exercise of that discretion by the Government on a subjective basis. We are constrained to agree.
Thus, although the agreement did not specifically reserve to the Government the sole discretion to evaluate whether the defendant has rendered substantial assistance, it "contemplate [d] that any downward departure motion must be made 'pursuant to' 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) and Guidelines 5K1.1." United States v. Rexach, 896 F.2d 710, 714 (2nd Cir. 1990). The statute and the policy statement of the Guidelines 5K1.1 both provide for downward departures when a defendant furnishes substantial assistance. Such departures may be made upon motion of the Government. When Congress amended the sentencing statute to add subsection (e) to 18 U.S.C. § 3553, it limited the district court's power to impose a sentence below the level established as a minimum "to motions by the Government and in accordance with the guidelines and policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission."
Thus, the district court had a very limited role in reviewing the Government's refusal to move for a downward departure. In United States v. Isaac, 141 F.3d 477 (3d Cir. 1998), this court held that a cooperative plea agreement providing for a motion for downward departure conditioned on satisfaction of the obligation does not altogether strip the district court of power to review the Government's performance under the contract. We were persuaded by the analysis in Rexach that "a district court is empowered to examine for 'good faith' a prosecutor's refusal to file a § 5K1.1 motion pursuant to a plea agreement that gives the prosecutor 'sole discretion' to determine whether the defendant's assistance was substantial." 141 F.3d at 483. This requirement is common in contract law and merely requires "that the Government's position be based on an honest evaluation of the assistance provided and not on considerations extraneous to that assistance." Id. at 484.