Source: http://www2.bloomberglaw.com/public/desktop/document/RentACtr_West_Inc_v_Jackson_130_S_Ct_2772_177_L_Ed_2d_403_2010_Co
Timestamp: 2013-05-25 18:28:05
Document Index: 28842700

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2', '§ 3', '§ 4', '§ 2', '§ 3', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 4', '§ 2', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 4', '§ 2', '§ 3', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 4', '§ 2', '§ 3', '§ 1', '§ 1977', '§ 1981', '§ 3', '§ 4', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 3', '§ 4', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 3', '§ 4', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 4', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 3', '§ 10', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 116', '§ 197742', '§ 19819', '§ 3', '§ 4', '§ 2', '§ 3', '§ 4', '§ 2', '§ 3', '§ 4', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 4', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 3', '§ 10', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 1', '§ 2', '§ 208', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 3', '§ 2', '§ 208', '§ 2', '§ 116', '§ 2', '§ 208', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 3', '§ 2', '§ 2388']

Rent-A-Ctr., West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 177 L. Ed. 2d 403, 109 FEP Cases 897, 9 EXC 15 (2010), Court Opinion
Rent-A-Ctr., West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 177 L. Ed. 2d 403, 109 FEP Cases 897, 9 EXC 15 (2010) [2010 BL 138828]
RENT-A-CENTER, WEST, INC. v. JACKSON.
RENT-A-CENTER v. JACKSON, 09-497 (U.S. 6-21-2010)
130 S.Ct. 2772
Argued April 26, 2010.
[*2773] Argued April 26, 2010.
[*2773] [*2773] Hide Headnotes
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866 and FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT
[1] Arbitration ►108.6901 ►108.6984 ►108.7181 [Show Topic Path]
Rule that questions of arbitrability are for court to decide unless parties “clearly and unmistakably”
agree to arbitrate them applies to text of agreement, and does not mean that it must be clear and unmistakable that race discrimination claimant's agreement to allegedly unconscionable terms was valid, since clear and unmistakable requirement pertains to manifestation of intent, and validity of agreement is governed by FAA § 2, which does not include any requirement that lack of unconscionability must be clear and unmistakable.
[2] Arbitration ►108.6901 ►108.6984 ►108.7181 [Show Topic Path]
Question of whether arbitration agreement is unconscionable is for arbitrator rather than court to decide, where agreement between employer and employee claiming race discrimination
(1) provides for arbitration of all “past, present or future”
disputes and (2) delegates to arbitrator “exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to the … enforceability …
of this Agreement … ,” employer seeks to enforce delegation provision, which is severable from remainder of agreement, and employee's arguments—that agreement is unconscionable because of one-sided coverage and unfairness of discovery and fee-sharing procedures—challenge agreement as a whole and not delegation provision specifically.
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866 and FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT[1]Arbitration 108.6901108.6984108.7181CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866 and FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT[1]Arbitration 108.6901108.6984108.7181CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866 and FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT[1]Arbitration 108.6901108.6984108.7181Rule that questions of arbitrability are for court to decide unless parties “clearly and unmistakably”
[2]Arbitration 108.6901108.6984108.7181[2]Arbitration 108.6901108.6984108.7181[2]Arbitration 108.6901108.6984108.7181Question of whether arbitration agreement is unconscionable is for arbitrator rather than court to decide, where agreement between employer and employee claiming race discrimination
[**407] Respondent Jackson filed an employment-discrimination suit against
petitioner Rent-A-Center, his former employer, in a Nevada
Federal District Court. Rent-A-Center filed a motion, under the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), to dismiss or stay the
proceedings, 9 U.S.C. § 3, and to compel
arbitration, § 4, based on the arbitration agreement (Agreement)
Jackson signed as a condition of his employment. Jackson opposed the
motion on the ground [*2774] that the Agreement was unenforceable in that it
was unconscionable under Nevada law. The District Court granted
Rent-A-Center's motion. The Ninth Circuit reversed in relevant part.
Held: Under the FAA, where an agreement to arbitrate includes
an agreement that the arbitrator will determine the enforceability
of the agreement, if a party challenges specifically the
enforceability of that particular agreement, the district court
considers the challenge, but if a party challenges the
enforceability of the agreement as a whole, the challenge is for the
arbitrator. Pp. 3-12.
(a) Section 2 of the FAA places arbitration agreements on an equal
footing with other contracts, Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v.
Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443, and requires courts to enforce
them according to their terms, Volt Information Sciences,
Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ.,
489 U.S. 468, 478, "[**408] save upon such grounds as exist under law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract," § 2. Here, the Agreement
included two relevant arbitration provisions: it provided for
arbitration of all disputes arising out of Jackson's employment,
including discrimination claims, and it gave the "Arbitrator . . .
exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to the
[Agreement's] enforceability . . . including . . . any claim
that all or any part of this Agreement is void or voidable."
Rent-A-Center seeks enforcement of the second provision, which
delegates to the arbitrator the "gateway" question of
enforceability. See, e.g., Howsam v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83-85. The court must enforce the
delegation provision under §§ 3 and 4 unless it is unenforceable
under § 2. Pp. 3-6.
(b) There are two types of validity challenges under § 2: one
"challenges specifically the validity of the agreement to
arbitrate," and "[t]he other challenges the contract as a whole,"
Buckeye, supra, at 444. Only the first is relevant to a court's
determination of an arbitration agreement's enforceability, see,
e.g., Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.,
388 U.S. 395, 403-404, because under § 2 "an arbitration provision
is severable from the remainder of the contract," Buckeye,
supra, at 445. That does not mean that agreements to arbitrate
are unassailable. [1] If a party challenges the validity
under § 2 of the precise agreement to arbitrate at issue, the
federal court must consider the challenge before ordering compliance
with the agreement under § 4. That is no less true when the precise
agreement to arbitrate is itself part of a larger arbitration
agreement. Because here the agreement [***2] to arbitrate enforceability
(the delegation provision) is severable from the remainder of the
Agreement, unless Jackson challenged the delegation provision
specifically, it must be treated as valid under § 2 and enforced
under §§ 3 and 4. Pp. 6-9.
(c) The District Court correctly concluded that Jackson challenged
only the validity of the contract as a whole. In his brief to this
Court he raised a challenge to the delegation provision for the
first time, but that is too late and will not be considered. See
14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. ___, ___. Pp. 9-12.
ROBERTS, C. J., and KENNEDY, THOMAS, and ALITO, JJ.,
joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG,
[*2775] [**407] Respondent Jackson filed an employment-discrimination suit against
[**407] 9 U.S.C. § 3§ 4[*2774] Held: Under the FAA, where an agreement to arbitrate includes
Section 2Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc.Cardegna546 U.S. 440443Volt Information Sciences,Inc.Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ.489 U.S. 468478[**408] § 2e.g.HowsamDean WitterReynolds, Inc.537 U.S. 7983-85§§ 3§ 2
§ 2Buckeye, suprasuprae.g.Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.388 U.S. 395403-404§ 2Buckeye,suprasupra [1] [1] § 2§ 4[***2] § 2§§ 3
14 Penn Plaza LLCPyett556 U.S. ___
581 F. 3d 912
[*2775] [*2775] JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.
We consider whether, under the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA or Act), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, a district court may decide a claim
that an arbitration agreement is unconscionable, where the agreement
explicitly assigns that decision to the arbitrator.
On February 1, 2007, the respondent here, Antonio Jackson, filed
an [**409] employment-discrimination suit under Rev.
Stat. § 1977, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, against his former employer in
the United States District Court for the District of Nevada. The
defendant and petitioner here, Rent-A-Center, West, Inc., filed a
motion under the FAA to dismiss or stay the
proceedings, 9 U.S.C. § 3, and to compel arbitration, § 4.
Rent-A-Center argued that the Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Claims
(Agreement), which Jackson signed on February 24, 2003 as a
condition of his employment there, precluded Jackson from pursuing
his claims in court. The Agreement provided for arbitration of all
"past, present or future" disputes arising out of Jackson's
employment with Rent-A-Center, including "claims
for discrimination" and "claims for violation of any federal . . .
law." App. 29-30. It also provided that "[t]he Arbitrator, and not
any federal, state, or local court or agency, shall have exclusive
authority to resolve any dispute relating to the interpretation,
applicability, enforceability or formation of this Agreement
including, but not limited to any claim that all or any part of this
Agreement is void or voidable." Id., at 34.
Jackson opposed the motion on the ground that "the arbitration
agreement in question is clearly unenforceable in that it is
unconscionable" under Nevada law. Id., at 40. Rent-A-Center
responded that Jackson's unconscionability claim was not properly
before the court because Jackson had expressly agreed that the
arbitrator would have exclusive authority to resolve any dispute
about the enforce-ability of the Agreement. It also disputed the
merits of Jackson's unconscionability claims.
The District Court granted Rent-A-Center's motion to dismiss the
proceedings and to compel arbitration. The court found that the
Agreement "`"clearly and unmistakenly [sic]"`" gives the
arbitrator exclusive authority to decide whether the Agreement is
enforceable, App. to Pet. for Cert. 4a. (quoting Howsam v.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002)), and,
because Jackson challenged the validity of the Agreement as a
whole, the issue [***3] was for [*2776] the arbitrator, App. to Pet. for
Cert. 4a (citing Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v.
Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 444-445 (2006)). The court noted
that even if it were to examine the merits of Jackson's
unconscionability claims, it would have rejected the claim that the
agreement to split arbitration fees was substantively unconscionable
under Nevada law. It did not address Jackson's procedural or other
substantive unconscionability arguments.
Without oral argument, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit reversed in part, affirmed in part, and
remanded. 581 F. 3d 912 (2009). The court
reversed on the question of who (the court or arbitrator) had the
authority to decide whether the Agreement is enforceable. It noted
that "Jackson does not dispute that the language of the Agreement
clearly assigns the arbitrability determination to the arbitrator,"
but held that where "a party challenges an arbitration agreement as
unconscionable, and thus asserts that he could not meaningfully
assent to the agreement, the threshold question of unconscionability
is for the court." Id., at 917. The Ninth Circuit affirmed
the District Court's alternative conclusion that the fee-sharing
provision was not substantively unconscionable and remanded for
consideration [**410] of Jackson's other unconscionability arguments.
Id., at 919-920, and n. 3. Judge Hall dissented on the ground
that "the question of the arbitration agreement's validity should
have gone to the arbitrator, as the parties `clearly and
unmistakably provide[d]' in their agreement." Id., at 921. We
granted certiorari, 558 U.S. (2010).
The FAA reflects the fundamental principle that arbitration is a
matter of contract. Section 2, the "primary substantive provision of
the Act," Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr.
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983), provides:
"A written provision in . . . a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to
settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter
arising out of such contract . . . shall be
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2.
[2] [3] The FAA thereby places arbitration agreements on an equal footing
with other contracts, Buckeye, supra, at 443, and requires
courts to enforce them according to their
terms, Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees
of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989). [4] Like
other contracts, however, they may be invalidated by "generally
unconscionability." Doctor's Associates, Inc. v.
Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996).
The Act also establishes procedures by which federal courts
implement § 2's substantive rule. Under § 3, a party may apply to a
federal court for a stay of the trial of an action "upon any issue
referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such
arbitration." Under § 4, a party "aggrieved" by the failure of
another party "to arbitrate under a written agreement for
arbitration" may petition a federal court "for an order directing
agreement." The court "shall" order arbitration "upon being
satisfied that the making [***4] of the agreement for arbitration or the
failure to comply therewith is not in issue." [*2777] Ibid.
The Agreement here contains multiple "written provision[s]" to
"settle by arbitration a controversy," § 2. Two are relevant to our
discussion. First, the section titled "Claims Covered By The
Agreement" provides for arbitration of all "past, present or future"
disputes arising out of Jackson's employment with
Rent-A-Center. App. 29. Second, the section titled "Arbitration
Procedures" provides that "[t]he Arbitrator . . . shall have
exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to the . . .
enforce-ability . . . of this Agreement including, but not limited
to any claim that all or any part of this Agreement is void or
voidable." Id., at 32, 34. The current "controversy" between
the parties is whether the Agreement is unconscionable. It is the
second provision, which delegates resolution of that controversy to
the arbitrator, that Rent-A-Center seeks to enforce. Adopting the
terminology [**411] used by the parties, we will refer to it as the
delegation provision.
[1] The delegation provision is an agreement to arbitrate threshold
issues concerning the arbitration agreement. We have recognized
that parties can agree to arbitrate "gateway" questions of
"arbitrability," such as whether the parties have agreed to
arbitrate or whether their agreement covers a particular
controversy. See, e.g., Howsam, 537 U.S., at 83-85;
539 U.S. 444, 452 (2003) (plurality opinion). [5] This line of cases
merely reflects the principle that arbitration is a matter of
contract.[fn1] See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v.
Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995). [6] [7] An agreement to arbitrate a
gateway issue is simply an additional, antecedent agreement the
party seeking arbitration asks the federal [*2778] court to enforce, and the
FAA operates on this additional arbitration agreement just as it
does on any other. The additional agreement is valid
under § 2 "save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract," and federal courts can enforce the
agreement by staying federal litigation under § 3 and compelling
arbitration under § 4. The question before us, then, is whether the
delegation provision is valid under § 2.
[8] [9] There are two types of validity challenges under § 2: "One type
challenges specifically the validity of the agreement to arbitrate,"
and "[t]he other challenges the contract as a whole, either on a
ground that directly affects the entire agreement
(e.g., the agreement was fraudulently induced), or on the
ground that the [**412] illegality of one of the contract's provisions
renders the whole contract invalid." Buckeye, 546 U.S., at 444.
[10] In a line of cases neither party has asked us to overrule, we held
that only the first type of challenge is relevant to a court's
determination whether the arbitration agreement at issue is
enforceable.[fn2] See Prima Paint Corp. v.
Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-404 (1967);
Buckeye, supra, at
Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 353-354 (2008). That is
because § 2 states that a "written provision" "to settle by
arbitration a controversy" is "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable"
without mention of the validity of the contract in which it is
contained. Thus, a party's challenge to another [***5] provision of the
contract, or to the contract as a whole, does not prevent a court
from enforcing a specific agreement to arbitrate. [11] "[A]s a matter of
substantive federal arbitration law, an arbitration provision is
severable from the remainder of the contract." Buckeye,
546 U.S., at 445; see also id., at 447 (the
severability rule is based on § 2).
[12] But that agreements to arbitrate are severable does not mean
that they are unassailable. If a party challenges the validity
with that agreement under § 4. In Prima Paint, for example, if
the claim had been "fraud in the inducement of the arbitration
clause itself," then the court would have considered
it. 388 U.S., at 403-404. "To immunize an arbitration agreement from
judicial challenge on the ground of fraud in the inducement would be
to elevate it over other forms of contract,"
id., at 404, n. 12. In some cases the claimed basis of
invalidity for the contract as a whole will be much easier to
establish than the same basis as applied only to the severable
agreement to arbitrate. Thus, in an employment contract many
elements of alleged unconscionability applicable to the entire
contract (outrageously low wages, for example) would not affect the
agreement to arbitrate alone. [13] But even where that is not the
case — as in Prima Paint itself, where the alleged fraud
that induced the whole contract equally induced the agreement to
arbitrate which was part of that contract — we nonetheless require
the basis of challenge to be directed specifically to the agreement
to arbitrate before the court will intervene.
[*2779] Here, the "written provision . . . to settle by arbitration a
controversy," 9 U.S.C. § 2, that Rent-A-Center asks us to enforce is
the delegation provision — the provision that gave the arbitrator
"exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to the . . .
enforceability . . . of this Agreement," App. 34. The "remainder of
the contract," Buckeye, supra, at 445, is the rest of the
agreement to arbitrate claims arising out of Jackson's employment
with Rent-A-Center. To be [**413] sure this case differs from Prima
Paint, Buckeye, and Preston, in that the arbitration
provisions sought to be enforced in those cases were contained in
contracts unrelated to arbitration — contracts for consulting
services, see Prima Paint,
supra, at 397, check-cashing services, see Buckeye,
supra, at 442, and "personal management" or "talent agent"
services, see Preston, supra, at 352. In this case, the
underlying contract is itself an arbitration agreement. But
that makes no difference.[fn3] [14] Application of the
severability rule does not depend on the substance of the remainder
of the contract. Section 2 operates on the specific "written
provision" to "settle by arbitration a controversy" that the party
seeks to enforce. [15] Accordingly, unless Jackson challenged the
delegation provision specifically, we must treat it as valid
under § 2,
and must enforce it under §§ 3 and 4, leaving any challenge to the
validity of the Agreement as a whole for the arbitrator.
The District Court correctly concluded that Jackson challenged
only the validity [***6] of the contract as a whole. Nowhere in his
opposition to Rent-A-Center's motion to compel arbitration did he
even mention the delegation provision. See App. 39-47. Rent-A-Center
noted this fact in its reply: "[Jackson's response] fails to rebut
or otherwise address in any way [Rent-A-Center's] argument that the
Arbitrator must decide [Jackson's] challenge to the enforceability
of the Agreement. Thus, [Rent-A-Center's] argument is
uncontested." Id., at 50 (emphasis in original).
The arguments Jackson made in his response to Rent-A-Center's
motion to compel arbitration support this conclusion. Jackson stated
that "the entire agreement seems drawn to provide
[Rent-A-Center] with undue advantages should an employment-related
dispute arise." Id., at 44 (emphasis added). At one point, he
argued that the limitations on discovery "further suppor[t] [his]
contention that the arbitration agreement as a whole is
substantively unconscionable." Ibid. (emphasis added). And
before this Court, Jackson describes his challenge in
the District Court as follows: He "opposed the motion to compel on
the ground that the entire arbitration agreement, including the
delegation clause, was unconscionable." Brief for Respondent
55 (emphasis added). [*2780] That is an accurate description of his filings.
[16] As required to make out a claim of unconscionability under Nevada
law, see 581 F. 3d, at 919, he contended that the Agreement was both
procedurally and substantively unconscionable. It was procedurally
unconscionable, [**414] he argued, because it "was imposed as a condition of
employment and was non-negotiable." App. 41. But we need not
consider that claim because none of Jackson's substantive
unconscionability challenges was specific to the delegation
provision. First, he argued that the Agreement's coverage was one
sided in that it required arbitration of claims an employee was
likely to bring — contract, tort, discrimination, and statutory
claims — but did not require arbitration of claims Rent-A-Center was
likely to bring — intellectual property, unfair competition, and
trade secrets claims. Id., at 42-43. This one-sided-coverage
argument clearly did not go to the validity of the delegation
Jackson's other two substantive unconscionability arguments
assailed arbitration procedures called for by the
contract — the fee-splitting arrangement and the limitations on
discovery — procedures that were to be used during arbitration under
both the agreement to arbitrate employment-related disputes
and the delegation provision. It may be that had Jackson
challenged the delegation provision by arguing that these common
procedures as applied to the delegation provision rendered
that provision unconscionable, the challenge should have been
considered by the court. To make such a claim based on the discovery
procedures, Jackson would have had to argue that the limitation upon
the number of depositions causes the arbitration of his claim
that the Agreement is unenforceable to be unconscionable. That would
be, of course, a much more difficult argument to sustain than the
argument that the same [***7] limitation renders arbitration of his
factbound employment-discrimination claim unconscionable. Likewise,
the unfairness of the fee-splitting arrangement may be more
difficult to establish for the arbitration of enforceability than
for arbitration of more complex and fact-related aspects of the
alleged employment discrimination. [17] Jackson, however, did not make
any arguments specific to the delegation provision; he argued
that the fee-sharing and discovery procedures rendered the
entire Agreement invalid.
Jackson's appeal to the Ninth Circuit confirms that he did not
contest the validity of the delegation provision in particular. His
brief noted the existence of the delegation provision, Brief for
Appellant in No. 07-16164, p. 3, but his unconscionability arguments
made no mention of it, id., at 3-7. He also repeated the
arguments he had made before the District Court, see
supra, at 9, that the "entire agreement" favors Rent-A-Center
and that the limitations on discovery further his "contention
that the arbitration agreement as a whole is substantively
unconscionable," Brief for Appellant 7-8. Finally, he repeated the
argument made in his District Court filings, that under
state law the unconscionable clauses could not be severed from the
arbitration agreement, see id., at 8-9.[fn4] The [*2781] point of this
argument, [**415] of course, is that the Agreement as a whole is
unconscionable under state law.
Jackson repeated that argument before this Court. At oral
argument, counsel stated: "There are certain elements of the
arbitration agreement that are unconscionable and, under Nevada law,
which would render the entire arbitration agreement
unconscionable." Tr. of Oral Arg. 43 (emphasis added). And again, he
stated, "we've got both certain provisions that are unconscionable,
that under Nevada law render the entire agreement
unconscionable . . ., and that's what the Court is to rely on."
Id., at 43-44
In his brief to this Court, Jackson made the contention, not
mentioned below, that the delegation provision itself is
substantively unconscionable because the quid pro quo he was
supposed to receive for it — that "in exchange for initially
allowing an arbitrator to decide certain gateway questions," he
would receive "plenary post-arbitration judicial review" — was
eliminated by the Court's subsequent holding in Hall
Street Associates, L. L. C. v. Mattel, Inc.,
552 U.S. 576 (2008), that the nonplenary grounds for judicial review
in § 10 of the FAA are exclusive. Brief for Respondent 59-60. He
brought this challenge to the delegation provision too late, and we
will not consider it.[fn5] See 14 Penn Plaza LLC v.
Pyett, 556 U.S. ___, ___ (2009) (slip op., at 24).
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
[fn1] [18] There is one caveat. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v.
Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995), held that "[c]ourts should
not assume that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless
there is `clea[r] and unmistakabl[e]' evidence that they did so."
The parties agree the heightened standard applies here. See Brief
for Petitioner 21; Brief for Respondent 54. The District Court
concluded the "Agreement to Arbitrate clearly and unmistakenly
[sic] provides the arbitrator with the exclusive authority to
decide whether the Agreement to Arbitrate is enforceable." App. to
Pet. for Cert. 4a. The Ninth Circuit noted that Jackson did not
dispute that the text of the Agreement was clear and unmistakable on
this point. 581 F. 3d 912, 917 (2009). He also does not dispute it
here. What he argues now, however, is that it is not "clear and
unmistakable" that his agreement to that text was valid,
because of the unconscionability claims he raises. See Brief for
Respondent 54-55. The dissent makes the same argument. See
post, at 5-8 (opinion of STEVENS, J.).
[19] This mistakes the subject of the First Options "clear and
unmistakable" requirement. It pertains to the parties'
manifestation of intent, not the agreement's validity. As
explained in Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,
537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002), it is an "interpretive rule," based on an
assumption about the parties' expectations. [20] In "circumstance[s]
where contracting parties would likely have expected a court to have
decided the gateway matter," ibid., we assume that is what they
agreed to. [21] Thus, "[u]nless the parties clearly and unmistakably
provide otherwise, the question of whether the parties agreed to
arbitrate is to be decided by the court, not the arbitrator."
AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers,
475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986).
The validity of a written agreement to arbitrate (whether it
is legally binding, as opposed to whether it was in fact agreed
to — including, of course, whether it was void for
unconscionability) is governed by § 2's provision that it shall be
valid "save upon such grounds as exist at law or equity for the
revocation of any contract." [22] Those grounds do not include, of
course, any requirement that its lack of unconscionability must be
"clear and unmistakable." And they are not grounds that First
Options added for agreements to arbitrate gateway
issues; § 2 applies to all written agreements to arbitrate.
[fn2] [23] The issue of the agreement's "validity" is different from the
issue whether any agreement between the parties "was ever
concluded," and, as in Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v.
Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006), we address only the former.
Id., at 444, n. 1.
[fn3] The dissent calls this a "breezy assertion,"
post, at 1, but it seems to us self-evident. When the dissent
comes to discussing the point, post, at 11, it gives no logical
reason why an agreement to arbitrate one controversy
(an employment-discrimination claim) is not severable from an
agreement to arbitrate a different controversy (enforceability).
There is none. Since the dissent accepts that the invalidity of one
provision within an arbitration agreement does not necessarily
invalidate its other provisions, post, at 7, n. 7, it cannot
believe in some sort of magic bond between arbitration provisions
that prevents them from being severed from each other. According to
the dissent, it is fine to sever an invalid provision within an
arbitration agreement when severability is a matter of state law,
but severability is not allowed when it comes to applying Prima
388 U.S. 395 (1967).
[fn4] Jackson's argument fails. The severability rule is a "matter
of substantive federal arbitration law," and we have repeatedly
"rejected the view that the question of `severability' was one of
state law, so that if state law held the arbitration provision not
to be severable a challenge to the contract as a whole would be
decided by the court." Buckeye, 546 U.S., at 445 (citing
Prima Paint, 388 U.S., at 400, 402-403; Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10-14 (1984); Allied-Bruce Terminix
Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270-273 (1995)). For the same
reason, the Agreement's statement that its provisions are severable,
see App. 37, does not affect our analysis.
[fn5] Hall Street Associates, L. L. C. v. Mattel, Inc.,
552 U.S. 576 (2008), was decided after Jackson submitted his brief
to the Ninth Circuit, but that does not change our conclusion
that he forfeited the argument. Jackson could have submitted a
supplemental brief during the year and a half between this
Court's decision of Hall Street on March 25, 2008 and the Ninth
Circuit's judgment on September 9, 2009. Moreover, Hall
Street affirmed a rule that had been in place in the Ninth
Circuit since 2003. Id., at 583-584, and n. 5.
9 U.S.C. §§ 116
[**409] § 197742 U.S.C. § 19819 U.S.C. § 3§ 4Id.Id
[sic]HowsamDean Witter Reynolds, Inc.537 U.S. 7983as awhole[***3] [*2776] Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc.Cardegna546 U.S. 440444-445
581 F. 3d 912Id.Id[**410] Id.IdId.Id558 U.S. (2010
Section 2Moses H. Cone Memorial HospitalMercury Constr.Corp.460 U.S. 124
[2] [3] [2] [3] Buckeye, suprasupraVolt Information Sciences, Inc.Board of Trusteesof Leland Stanford Junior Univ.489 U.S. 468478 [4] [4] Doctor's Associates, Inc.Casarotto517 U.S. 681687
§ 2§ 3§ 4[***4] [*2777] Ibid.Ibid
Id.[**411] [1] The delegation provision is an agreement to arbitrate threshold
[1] e.g.Howsam537 U.S., at 83-85Green Tree Financial Corp.Bazzle539 U.S. 444452 [5] [5] [fn1]First Options of Chicago, Inc.Kaplan514 U.S. 938943 [6] [7] [6] [7] [*2778] § 2§ 3§ 4§ 2
[8] [9] [8] [9] § 2e.g.[**412] Buckeye546 U.S., at 444 [10] [10] [fn2]Prima Paint Corp.Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.388 U.S. 395403-404BuckeyesuprasupraPrestonFerrer552 U.S. 346353-354§ 2without mention[***5] [11] [11] Buckeye546 U.S., at 445id.id§ 2
[*2779] [12] [12] § 2§ 4Prima Paint388 U.S., at 403-404id.id [13] [13] Prima Paint[*2779] Here, the "written provision . . . to settle by arbitration a
9 U.S.C. § 2App. 34Buckeyesuprasupra[**413] PrimaPaintBuckeyePrestonPrima PaintsuprasupraBuckeyesuprasupraPrestonsuprasupra[fn3] [14] [14] Section 2 [15] [15] § 2§§ 3
[***6] Thus, [Rent-A-Center's] argument isuncontested.Id.Id
entire agreementId.Idarbitration agreement as a wholeIbid.Ibidentire arbitration agreement[*2780] [16] As required to make out a claim of unconscionability under Nevada
[16] [16] 581 F. 3d, at 919[**414] Id.Id
bothandas appliedthat provision[***7] [17] [17] entire
id.idsuprasupraid.id[fn4][*2781] [**415] as a whole
entire arbitration agreemententire agreementId.Id
quid pro quoHallStreet Associates, L. L. C.Mattel, Inc.552 U.S. 576§ 10[fn5]14 Penn Plaza LLCPyett556 U.S. ___
[fn1] [18] [18] First Options of Chicago, Inc.Kaplan514 U.S. 938944[sic]581 F. 3d 912917agreementpost
[19] [19] First Optionsmanifestation of intentvalidityHowsamDean Witter Reynolds, Inc.537 U.S. 7983 [20] [20] ibid.ibid [21] [21] AT&T Technologies, Inc.Communications Workers475 U.S. 643649
validity§ 2 [22] [22] FirstOptions§ 2
[fn2] [23] [23] Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc.Cardegna546 U.S. 440Id.Id
[fn3]postpostwithin an arbitration agreementpostPrimaPaint Corp.Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.388 U.S. 395
[fn4]Buckeye546 U.S., at 445Prima Paint388 U.S., at 400402-403Southland Corp.Keating465 U.S. 110-14Allied-Bruce TerminixCos.Dobson513 U.S. 265270-273
[fn5]Hall Street Associates, L. L. C.Mattel, Inc.552 U.S. 576year and a halfHall StreetHallStreetId.Id
Neither petitioner nor respondent has urged us to adopt
the rule the Court does today: Even when a litigant has specifically
challenged the validity of an agreement to arbitrate he must submit
that challenge to the arbitrator unless he has lodged an
objection to the particular line in the agreement that purports to
assign such challenges to the arbitrator — the so-[***8] called "delegation
The Court asserts that its holding flows logically from Prima
388 U.S. 395 (1967), in which the Court held that consideration of a
contract revocation defense is generally a matter for the
arbitrator, unless the defense is specifically directed at the
arbitration clause, id., at 404. [**416] We have treated this holding
as a severability rule: When a party challenges a contract, "but not
specifically its arbitration provisions, those provisions are
enforceable apart from the remainder of the contract." Buckeye
Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 446 (2006).
The Court's decision today goes beyond Prima Paint. Its breezy
assertion that the subject matter of the
contract at issue — in this case, an arbitration [*2782] agreement and
nothing more — "makes no difference," ante, at 7, is simply
wrong. This written
arbitration agreement is but one part of a broader employment
agreement between the parties, just as the arbitration clause in
Prima Paint was but one part of a broader contract for services
between those parties. Thus, that the subject matter of the
agreement is exclusively arbitration makes all the difference
in the Prima Paint analysis.
Under the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, parties generally have substantial leeway to
define the terms and scope of their agreement to settle disputes in
an arbitral forum. "[A]rbitration is," after all, "simply a matter
of contract between the parties; it is a way to resolve those
disputes — but only those disputes — that the parties have agreed to
submit to arbitration." First Options of Chicago, Inc. v.
Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995). The FAA, therefore, envisions
a limited role for courts asked to stay litigation and refer
Certain issues — the kind that "contracting parties would likely
have expected a court to have decided" — remain within the province
of judicial review. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002); see also Green Tree Financial
Corp. v. Bazzle,
539 U.S. 444, 452 (2003) (plurality opinion); AT&T Technologies,
Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986).
These issues are "gateway matter[s]" because they are necessary
antecedents to enforcement of an arbitration agreement; they raise
questions the parties "are not likely to have thought that they had
agreed that an arbitrator would" decide. Howsam,
537 U.S., at 83. [24] Quintessential gateway matters include "whether the
parties have a valid arbitration agreement at all," Bazzle,
539 U.S., at 452 (plurality opinion); "whether the parties are bound
by a given arbitration clause," Howsam, 537 U.S., at 84; and
"whether an arbitration clause in a concededly binding contract
applies to a particular type of controversy," ibid. It would be
bizarre to send these types of gateway matters to the arbitrator as
a matter of course, because they raise a "`question of
arbitrability.'"[fn1] See, e.g., ibid.; First Options,
514 U.S., at 947.
"[Q]uestion[s] of arbitrability" thus include questions regarding
the existence of a legally binding and valid arbitration agreement,
as well as questions regarding the scope of a [**417] concededly binding
arbitration agreement. In this case we are concerned with the first
of these categories: whether the parties have a valid [***9] arbitration
agreement. This is an issue the FAA assigns to the
courts.[fn2] Section 2 of the FAA dictates that covered arbitration
agreements "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract." [*2783] 9 U.S.C. § 2. "[S]uch grounds," which relate to contract
validity and formation, include the claim at issue in this case,
unconscionability. See Doctor's Associates, Inc. v.
Two different lines of cases bear on the issue of who decides
a question of arbitrability respecting validity, such as whether an
arbitration agreement is unconscionable. Although this issue, as a
gateway matter, is typically for the court, we have explained
that such an issue can be delegated to the arbitrator in some
the parties have purportedly done so, courts must examine two
distinct rules to decide whether the delegation is valid.
The first line of cases looks to the parties' intent. In
AT&T Technologies, we stated that "question[s] of
arbitrability" may be delegated to the arbitrator, so long as the
delegation is clear and unmistakable. 475 U.S., at 649. We
reaffirmed this rule, and added some nuance, in First
Options. Against the background presumption that questions of
arbitrability go to the court, we stated that federal courts should
"generally" apply "ordinary state-law principles that govern the
formation of contracts" to assess "whether the parties agreed to
arbitrate a certain matter (including arbitrability)."
514 U.S., at 944. But, we added, a more rigorous standard applies
when the inquiry is whether the parties have "agreed to arbitrate
arbitrability": "Courts should not assume that the parties agreed to
arbitrate arbitrability unless there is clear and unmistakable
evidence that they did so."[fn3] Ibid. (internal quotation
marks and brackets omitted). JUSTICE BREYER's unanimous opinion for
the Court described this standard as a type of "revers[e]"
"presumption"[fn4] — one in favor of a judicial, rather than an
arbitral, forum. Id., at 945. Clear and unmistakable "evidence"
of agreement to arbitrate arbitrability might include, as was urged
in First Options, a course of conduct demonstrating
assent, [fn5] id., at 946, or, as: 561 U.S. ____ (2010)
is urged in this case, an express [**418] agreement to do so. In any event,
whether such evidence exists is a matter for the court to determine.
The second line of cases bearing on who decides the validity of an
arbitration agreement, as the Court explains, involves the Prima
Paint rule. See ante, at 6. That rule recognizes two types
of validity challenges. One type challenges the validity of the
arbitration agreement itself, on a ground arising from an infirmity
in that agreement. The other challenges the validity of the
arbitration agreement tangentially — via a claim that the entire
contract (of which the arbitration agreement is but a part) is
invalid for [*2784] some reason. See Buckeye, 546 U.S., at 444. Under
Prima Paint, a challenge of the first type goes to the court; a
challenge of the second type goes to the arbitrator. See
388 U.S., at 403-404; see also Buckeye, 546 U.S., at 444-445.
The Prima Paint rule is akin to a pleading standard, whereby a
party seeking to challenge the validity [***10] of an arbitration agreement
must expressly say so in order to get his dispute into court.
In sum, questions related to the validity of an arbitration
agreement are usually matters for a court to resolve before it
refers a dispute to arbitration. But questions of arbitrability
may go to the arbitrator in two instances: (1) when the parties have
demonstrated, clearly and unmistakably, that it is their intent to
do so; or (2) when the validity of an arbitration agreement depends
exclusively on the validity of the substantive contract of which it
We might have resolved this case by simply applying the
conduct. Respondents in that case had participated in the
arbitration, but only to object to proceeding in arbitration and to
challenge the arbitrators' jurisdiction. That kind of
participation — in protest, to preserve legal claims — did not
constitute unmistakable assent to be bound by the result.
Id., at 946-947.
First Options rule: Does the arbitration agreement at issue
"clearly and unmistakably" evince petitioner's and respondent's
intent to submit questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator?[fn6]
The answer to that question is no. Respondent's claim that the
arbitration agreement is unconscionable undermines any suggestion
that he "clearly" and "unmistakably" assented to submit questions of
arbitrability to the arbitrator. See Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 208, Comment d (1979) ("[G]ross inequality of
bargaining power, together with terms unreasonably favorable to the
stronger party, may confirm indications that the transaction
involved elements of deception or compulsion, or may show that the
weaker party had no meaningful choice, no real alternative, or did
not in fact assent or appear to assent to the unfair terms");
American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens,
513 U.S. 219, 249 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment and
dissenting in part) ("[A] determination that a contract is
`unconscionable' may in fact be a determination that one party did
not intend to agree to the terms of the [**419] contract").[fn7] The fact
that the [*2785] agreement's "delegation" provision suggests assent is
beside the point, because the gravamen of respondent's claim is
that he never consented to the terms in his agreement.
that the agreement's "delegation" provision suggests assent is
In other words, when a party raises a good-faith validity
challenge to the arbitration agreement itself, that issue must be
resolved before a court can say that he clearly and unmistakably
intended to arbitrate that very validity question. This
case well illustrates the point: If respondent's unconscionability
claim is correct — i.e., if the terms of the agreement are so
one-sided and the process of its making so unfair — it would
contravene the existence of clear and unmistakable assent to
arbitrate the very question petitioner now seeks to
arbitrate. Accordingly, it is necessary for the court to resolve the
merits of respondent's unconscionability claim in order to decide
whether the [***11] parties have a valid arbitration agreement
under § 2. Otherwise, that section's preservation of revocation
issues for the Court would be meaningless.
This is, in essence, how I understand the Court of Appeals to have
decided the issue below. See 581 F. 3d 912, 917 (CA9 2009) ("[W]e
hold that where, as here, a party challenges an arbitration
agreement as unconscionable, and thus asserts that he could not
meaningfully assent to
the agreement, the threshold question of unconscionability is for
the court"). I would therefore affirm its judgment, leaving, as it
did, the merits of respondent's unconscionability claim for
the District Court to resolve on remand.
Rather than apply First Options, the Court takes us down a
different path, one neither briefed by the parties nor relied upon
by the Court of Appeals. In applying Prima Paint, the Court has
unwisely extended a "fantastic" and likely erroneous
decision. 388 U.S., at 407 (Black, J., dissenting).[fn8]
As explained at the outset, see supra, at 3-7, [**420] this
case lies at a seeming crossroads in our arbitration jurisprudence.
It implicates cases such as First Options, which address
whether the parties intended to delegate questions of arbitrability,
and also those cases, such as Prima Paint, which address the
severability of a presumptively valid arbitration agreement from a
potentially invalid contract. The question of "Who
decides?" — arbitrator or court — animates both lines of cases, but
they are driven by different concerns. In cases like First
Options, we are concerned with the parties' intentions. In cases
like Prima Paint, we are concerned with how the parties
challenge the validity of the agreement.
Under the Prima Paint inquiry, recall, we consider whether
the parties are actually challenging the validity of the arbitration
agreement, or whether they are challenging,
[*2786] more generally, the contract within which an arbitration clause is
nested. In the latter circumstance, we assume there is no infirmity
per se with the arbitration agreement, i.e., there
are no grounds for revocation of the arbitration agreement itself
under § 2 of the FAA. Accordingly, we commit the parties' general
contract dispute to the arbitrator, as agreed.
The claim in Prima Paint was that one party would not have
agreed to contract with the other for services had it known the
second party was insolvent (a fact known but not disclosed at the
time of contracting). 388 U.S., at 398. There was, therefore,
allegedly fraud in the inducement of the contract — a contract which
also delegated disputes to an arbitrator. Despite the fact that the
claim raised would have, if successful, rendered the embedded
arbitration clause void, the Court held that the merits of the
dispute were for the arbitrator, so long as the claim of "fraud in
the inducement" did not go to validity of "the arbitration
clause itself." Id., at 403 (emphasis added). Because, in
Prima Paint, "no claim ha[d] been advanced by Prima Paint
that [respondent] fraudulently induced it to enter into the
agreement to arbitrate," and because the arbitration agreement was
broad enough to cover the dispute, the arbitration agreement was
enforceable [***12] with respect to the controversy at hand.
Id., at 406.
The Prima Paint rule has been denominated as one related to
severability. Our opinion in Buckeye, set out these guidelines:
"First, as a matter of substantive federal arbitration law, an
arbitration provision is severable from the remainder of the
contract. Second, unless the challenge is to the arbitration clause
itself, the issue of the contract's validity is considered by the
arbitrator in the first instance." 546 U.S., at 445-446.
Whether the general contract defense renders the entire
agreement void or voidable is irrelevant. Id., at 446. All
that matters is whether the party seeking to present the issue to a
court [**421] has brought a "discrete challenge," Preston v.
Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 354 (2008), "to the validity of the . . .
arbitration clause." Buckeye, 546 U.S., at 449.
Prima Paint and its progeny allow a court to pluck from a
potentially invalid contract a potentially valid
arbitration agreement. Today the Court adds a new layer of
severability — something akin to Russian nesting dolls — into the
mix: Courts may now pluck from a potentially invalid arbitration
agreement even narrower provisions that refer particular
arbitrability disputes to an arbitrator. See ante, at 6-7. I do
not think an agreement to arbitrate can ever manifest a clear and
unmistakable intent to arbitrate its own validity. But even assuming
otherwise, I certainly would not hold that the Prima
Paint rule extends this far.
In my view, a general revocation challenge to a standalone
arbitration agreement is, invariably, a challenge to the "`making'"
of the arbitration agreement itself, Prima Paint,
388 U.S., at 403, and therefore, under Prima Paint, must be
decided by the court. A claim of procedural unconscionability aims
to undermine the formation of the arbitration agreement, much like a
claim of unconscionability aims to undermine the
clear-and-unmistakable-intent requirement necessary for a valid
delegation of a "discrete" challenge to the validity of the
arbitration agreement itself, Preston, 552 U.S., at 354.
Moreover, because we are dealing in this case with a challenge [*2787] to an
independently executed arbitration agreement — rather than a clause
contained in a contract related to another subject
matter — any challenge to the contract itself is also, necessarily,
a challenge to the arbitration agreement.[fn9] They are
The Court, however, reads the delegation clause as a distinct
mini-arbitration agreement divisible from the contract in which it
resides — which just so happens also to be an arbitration agreement.
Ante, at 6-7. Although the Court simply declares that it
"makes no difference" that the underlying subject matter of the
agreement is itself an arbitration agreement,
ante, at 7, that proposition does not follow
from — rather it is at odds with — Prima Paint's severability
Had the parties in this case executed only one contract, on two
sheets of paper — one sheet with employment terms, and a second with
arbitration terms — the contract would look much like the one in
Buckeye. There would be some substantive terms, followed by
some arbitration terms, including what we now call a delegation
[***13] clause — i.e., a sentence or two assigning to the arbitrator
any disputes related to the validity of the arbitration provision.
See Buckeye, 546 U.S., at 442. If respondent then came into
court claiming that the contract was illegal as a whole for some
reason unrelated to the arbitration provision, the Prima
Paint rule would [**422] apply, and such a general challenge to the
subject matter of the contract would go to the arbitrator. Such a
challenge would not call into question the making of the arbitration
agreement or its invalidity per se.
Before today, however, if respondent instead raised a challenge
specific to "the validity of the agreement to arbitrate" — for
example, that the agreement to arbitrate was void under state
law — the challenge would have gone to the court. That is
what Buckeye says. See 546 U.S., at 444. But the Court now
declares that Prima Paint's pleading
rule requires more: A party must lodge a challenge with even greater
specificity than what would have satisfied the Prima Paint
Court. A claim that an entire arbitration agreement is invalid
will not go to the court unless the party challenges the
particular sentences that delegate such claims to the
arbitrator, on some contract ground that is particular and unique to
those sentences. See ante, at 8-10.
It would seem the Court reads Prima Paint to require, as a
matter of course, infinite layers of severability: We must always
pluck from an arbitration agreement the specific delegation
mechanism that would — but for present judicial
review — commend the matter to arbitration, even if this delegation
clause is but one sentence within one paragraph within a standalone
agreement. And, most importantly, the party must identify this one
sentence and lodge a specific challenge to its validity. Otherwise,
he will be bound to pursue his validity claim in arbitration.
Even if limited to separately executed arbitration agreements,
however, such an infinite severability rule is divorced from the
underlying rationale of Prima Paint. The notion that a party
may be bound by an arbitration clause in a contract that is
nevertheless invalid may be difficult for any lawyer — or any
person — to accept, but this is the law of [*2788] Prima Paint. It
reflects a judgment that the "`national policy favoring
arbitration,'" Preston, 552 U.S., at 353, outweighs the
interest in preserving a judicial forum for questions of
arbitrability — but only when questions of arbitrability are bound
up in an underlying dispute. Prima Paint, 388 U.S., at 404.
When the two are so bound up, there is actually no gateway
matter at all: The question "Who decides" is the entire ball game.
Were a court to decide the fraudulent inducement question in
Prima Paint, in order to decide the antecedent question of the
validity of the included arbitration agreement, then it would also,
necessarily, decide the merits of the underlying
dispute. Same, too, for the question of illegality in
Buckeye; on its way to deciding the arbitration agreement's
validity, the court would have to decide whether the contract was
illegal, and in so doing, it would decide the merits of the entire
In this case, [***14] however, resolution of the unconscionability
question will have no bearing on the merits of the underlying
employment dispute. It will only, as a preliminary matter, resolve
who should decide the merits of that dispute. Resolution of the
unconscionability question will, however, decide whether the
arbitration agreement itself is "valid" under "such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for [**423] the revocation of any
contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2. As Prima Paint recognizes, the FAA
commits those gateway matters, specific to the arbitration
agreement, to the court. 388 U.S., at 403-404. Indeed, it is clear
that the present controversy over whether the arbitration agreement
is unconscionable is itself severable from the merits of the
underlying dispute, which involves a claim of employment
discrimination. This is true for all gateway matters, and for this
reason Prima Paint has no application in this case.
While I may have to accept the "fantastic" holding in Prima
Paint, id., at 407 (Black, J., dissenting), I most certainly
do not accept the Court's even more fantastic reasoning today. I
would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and therefore
[fn1] Although it is not clear from our precedents, I understand
"gateway matters" and "questions of arbitrability" to be roughly
synonymous, if not exactly so. At the very least, the former
includes all of the latter.
[fn2] Gateway issues involving the scope of an otherwise valid
arbitration agreement also have a statutory origin. Section 3 of the
FAA provides that "upon being satisfied that the issue involved in
such suit . . . is referable to arbitration under such an
agreement," a court "shall . . . stay the trial of the action until
such arbitration has been had." 9 U.S.C. § 3.
[fn3] We have not expressly decided whether the First Options
delegation principle would apply to questions of arbitrability
that implicate § 2 concerns, i.e., grounds for contract
revocation. I do not need to weigh in on this issue in order to
resolve the present case.
[fn4] It is a "revers[e]" presumption because it is counter to the
presumption we usually apply in favor of arbitration when the
question concerns whether a particular dispute falls within the
scope of a concededly binding arbitration agreement. First
Options, 514 U. S., at 944-945.
[fn5] In First Options we found no clear and unmistakable
assent to delegate to the arbitrator questions of arbitrability,
given the parties' conduct. Respondents in that case had
participated in the arbitration, but only to object to proceeding in
arbitration and to challenge the arbitrators' jurisdiction.
That kind of participation — in protest, to preserve legal
claims — did not constitute unmistakable assent to be bound by the
result. Id., at 946-947.
[fn6] Respondent has challenged whether he "meaningfully agreed to
the terms of the form Agreement to Arbitrate, which he contends is
procedurally and substantively unconscionable."
581 F. 3d 912, 917 (CA9 2009). Even if First Options relates
only to "manifestations of intent," as the Court states, see
ante, at 5-6, n. 1 (emphasis deleted), whether there has been
meaningful agreement surely bears some relation to whether one party
has manifested intent to be bound to an agreement.
[fn7] The question of unconscionability in this case is one of state
law. See, e.g., Perry v. Thomas,
482 U. S. 483, 492, n. 9 (1987). Under Nevada law, unconscionability
requires a showing of "`both procedural and substantive
unconscionability,'" but "less evidence of substantive
unconscionability is required in cases involving great procedural
unconscionability." D. R. Horton, Inc. v. Green,
120 Nev. 549, 553-554, 96 P. 3d 1159, 1162 (2004). I understand
respondent to have claimed, in accord with Nevada law, that the
arbitration agreement contained substantively unconscionable
provisions, and was also the product of procedural unconscionability
as a whole. See Brief for Respondent 3 ("[Respondent] argued
that the clause is procedurally unconscionable because he was in a
position of unequal bargaining power when it was imposed as a
condition of employment"); id., at 3-4 (identifying three
distinct provisions of the agreement that were substantively
unconscionable); accord, 581 F. 3d, at 917.
Some of respondent's arguments, however, could be understood
as attacks not on the enforceability of the agreement as a whole but
merely on the fairness of individual contract terms. Such
term-specific challenges would generally be for the arbitrator to
resolve (at least so long as they do not go to the identity of the
arbitrator or the ability of a party to initiate arbitration). Cf.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208 (1979) (providing that "a
contract or term thereof [may be] unconscionable" and that in the
latter case "the remainder of the contract without the
unconscionable term" may be enforced).
[fn8] Justice Black quite reasonably characterized the Court's
holding in Prima Paint as "fantastic,"
id., at 407 (dissenting opinion), because the holding was, in
his view, inconsistent with the text of § 2 of the FAA,
388 U.S., at 412, as well as the intent of the draftsmen of the
legislation, id., at 413-416. Nevertheless, the narrow holding
in that case has been followed numerous times, see Buckeye Check
Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006), and
Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346 (2008), and, as the Court
correctly notes today, neither party has asked us to revisit those
cases, ante, at 6.
[fn9] As respondent asserted in his opposition to petitioner's
motion to compel arbitration, "the lack of mutuality regarding the
type of claims that must be arbitrated, the fee provision, and the
discovery provision, so permeate the Defendant's arbitration
agreement that it would be impossible to sever the offending
provisions." App. 45.
to the arbitrator[***8] The Court asserts that its holding flows logically from Prima
PrimaPaint Corp.Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.388 U.S. 395id.id[**416] BuckeyeCheck Cashing, Inc.Cardegna546 U.S. 440446Prima Paint.[*2782] antePrima PaintallPrima Paint
9 U.S.C. §§ 116First Options of Chicago, Inc.Kaplan514 U.S. 938943
HowsamDean Witter Reynolds,Inc.537 U.S. 7983Green Tree FinancialCorp.Bazzle539 U.S. 444452AT&T Technologies,Inc.Communications Workers475 U.S. 643649Howsam537 U.S., at 83 [24] [24] Bazzle539 U.S., at 452Howsam537 U.S., at 84ibid.ibid[fn1]e.g.ibid.; First Optionsibid514 U.S., at 947
[**417] [***9] [fn2]Section 2[*2783] 9 U.S.C. § 2Doctor's Associates, Inc.Casarotto517 U.S. 681687
AT&T Technologies475 U.S., at 649FirstOptions514 U.S., at 944[fn3]Ibid.Ibid[fn4]Id.First Options[fn5]id.561 U.S. ____[**418] The second line of cases bearing on who decides the validity of an
PrimaPaintanteat 6[*2784] Buckeye546 U.S., at 444Prima Paint388 U.S., at 403-404Buckeye546 U.S., at 444-445Prima Paint[***10] In sum, questions related to the validity of an arbitration
Id.IdFirst Options[fn6]§ 208dAmerican Airlines, Inc.Wolens513 U.S. 219249[**419] [fn7][*2785] In other words, when a party raises a good-faith validity
arbitratei.e.[***11] § 2
581 F. 3d 912917
First OptionsPrima Paint388 U.S., at 407[fn8]
suprasupra[**420] First OptionsPrima PaintFirstOptionsPrima Painthow
Prima Paint[*2786] per sei.e.§ 2
Prima Paint388 U.S., at 398the arbitrationclauseId.IdPrima Paint[***12] Id.Id
Prima PaintBuckeye
546 U.S., at 445-446
Id.Id[**421] PrestonFerrer552 U.S. 346354Buckeye546 U.S., at 449
Prima Paintcontractarbitration agreementarbitrationagreementanteat 6PrimaPaint
Prima Paint388 U.S., at 403Prima PaintPreston552 U.S., at 354[*2787] [fn9]
Anteat 6antePrima Paint
Buckeye[***13] i.e.Buckeye546 U.S., at 442PrimaPaint[**422] per se
Buckeye546 U.S., at 444Prima PaintPrima Paintentireparticular sentencesante
Prima Paint[*2788] Prima PaintPreston552 U.S., at 353but only when questions of arbitrability are boundup in an underlying disputePrima Paint388 U.S., at 404Prima PaintBuckeye;
[***14] itself[**423] 9 U.S.C. § 2Prima Paint388 U.S., at 403-404itself severablePrima Paint
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[fn2]Section 39 U.S.C. § 3
[fn3]First Options§ 2i.e.
[fn4]FirstOptions514 U. S., at 944-945
[fn5]First OptionsId.Id
[fn6]581 F. 3d 912917First Optionsante
[fn7]e.g.PerryThomas482 U. S. 483492D. R. Horton, Inc.Green120 Nev. 549553-55496 P. 3d 11591162id.id581 F. 3d, at 917
[fn8]Prima Paintid.id§ 2388 U.S., at 412id.idBuckeye CheckCashing, Inc.Cardegna546 U.S. 440PrestonFerrer552 U.S. 346anteat 6