Source: https://m.openjurist.org/426/us/200
Timestamp: 2019-09-20 20:50:52
Document Index: 249843768

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 313', '§ 313', '§ 118', '§ 313', '§ 313', '§ 313', '§ 313', '§ 510', '§ 116', '§ 313', '§ 510', '§ 510', '§ 313', '§ 510', '§ 313', '§ 313', '§ 313', '§ 402', '§ 402', '§ 402', '§ 313', '§ 313', '§ 402', '§ 505', '§ 1365', '§ 505', '§ 1365', '§ 505', '§ 505', '§ 1365', '§ 505', '§ 313', '§ 402', '§ 50', '§ 505', '§ 402', '§ 1342', '§ 505', '§ 505', '§ 505', '§ 301', '§ 505', '§ 510', '§ 505', '§ 313', '§ 313', '§ 505', '§ 402', '§ 402', '§ 313', '§ 402', '§ 313', '§ 304', '§ 124', '§ 125', '§ 1160', '§ 1160', '§ 1171', '§ 101', '§ 1251', '§ 1151', '§ 502', '§ 1362', '§ 1362', '§ 301', '§ 1311', '§ 1342', '§ 1342', '§ 303', '§ 1313', '§ 402', '§ 1342', '§ 124', '§ 1171', '§ 466', '§ 1857', '§ 1369', '§ 118', '§ 313', '§ 306', '§ 1316', '§ 212', '§ 1292', '§ 118', '§ 313', '§ 466', '§ 313', '§ 1171', '§ 313', '§ 304', '§ 1314', '§ 301', '§ 1857', '§ 510', '§ 1311', '§ 402', '§ 301', '§ 402', '§ 125', '§ 301', '§ 502', '§ 1362', '§ 402', '§ 1319', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 309', '§ 1319', '§ 306', '§ 1316', '§ 402', '§ 103', '§ 1253', '§ 402', '§ 402', '§ 1342', '§ 306', '§ 1316', '§ 306']

426 U.S. 200 - Environmental Protection Agency v. California State Water Resources Control Board
426 US 200 Environmental Protection Agency v. California State Water Resources Control Board
The ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY et al., Petitioners,
CALIFORNIA ex rel. STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD et al.
The EPA's position is that the Amendments make clear "only that facilities of the executive, legislative and judicial branches operating within the states must comply with the applicable effluent limitations and compliance schedules promulgated by the particular state pursuant to its E. P. A.-approved implementation plan," as incorporated in EPA-issued permits, not that they comply with "state regulations demanding that sources of discharges including federal facilities obtain discharge permits."25 The States claim that this distinction "between permits and effluent 'limitations' . . . ignores the fact that the mechanism by which such 'limitations' are formulated and applied to individual dischargers is by the permit system established in section 402."26 From this the States, recognizing that § 313 itself does not subject federal dischargers to their permit programs, derive their principal argument that a State's authority to subject federal installations to its EPA-approved permit program must be implied from the practical needs of administering an NPDES permit program, and that this implication is sufficiently clear to satisfy the governing constitutional standard. In their view, the EPA'sagreement that the States have authority to develop and set the substantive content of permits issued to federal dischargers is an empty concession; without being able to subject federal installations to its own NPDES program a State is without effective means to formulate and apply the conditions which the EPA must make part of the permit for each individual source.
Congress used virtually the same language in § 313 as in § 118 of the Clean Air Act; and our conclusion in Hancock v. Train, ante, p. 2006, that the Clean Air Act is without clear indication that Congress intended federal installations emitting air pollutants to be subject to the permit program of a State's implementation plan makes it difficult for the States to establish that for similar purposes the same language becomes sufficiently clear in § 313 of the Amendments. There are, of course, significant differences between the Clean Air Act and the Amendments. Only the Amendments expressly provide for a permit program to aid in abating pollution. In comparison with the Clean Air Act, the Amendments give the EPA a more prominent role in relation to the States; a State is not required to develop an NPDES permit program, and until a State does develop a permit program All dischargers in the State are subject to a permit program developed and carried out by the EPA. In addition, under the Amendments the EPA's role in developing the effluent limitations that serve as the basis for a State's NPDES permit conditions27 is more prominent than in developing the ambient air quality standards which are the foundation of the emission staards in a State's Clean Air Act implementation plan. In the aggregate, these differences tend to support the EPA's position and in any event they hardly require a conclusion contrary to Hancock v. Train, particularly since, in the Court of Appeals' words, "certain parts of the legislative history would seem to indicate that the 'requirements' language of Section 313 refers simply and solely to substantive" standards, to effluent limitations and standards and schedules of compliance. 511 F.2d, at 969.28
With these obstacles to the States' position in mind, we examine the reasons which collectively led the Court of Appeals to conclude and the States to contend that the Amendments clearly require federal installations to secure state NPDES permits. The Court of Appeals first concluded that such an implication appears in the final phrase of the first sentence of § 313 "including the payment of reasonable service charges." This language, it is argued, must refer to charges incident to a state permit program: If payment of such charges is a "requirement," it must be that Congress intended federal installations to secure state NPDES permits, for there would be no reason to order federal installations to pay fees for a permit which they are not required to obtain. However, the legislative history of § 313 casts no light on the meaning of this clause,29 and it is not immediately clear from the face of § 313 that the phrase does refer to application and service charges associated with an NPDES permit program. Indeed, the term "service charges" might as well be taken to refer to recurring charges for performing a service such as treating sewage, as to fees for accepting and processing a permit application. The EPA so reads the statute and it is not an unreasonable construction.30 At the very least, the "service charges" language hardly satisfies the rule that federal agencies are subject to state regulation only when and to the extent Congress has clearly expressed such a purpose.
The Court of Appeals also found textual support for its conclusion in § 510 of the Amendments.31 This section which is patterned after § 116 of the Clean Air Act,32 provides that the States may set more restrictive standards, limitations, and requirements than those imposed under the Amendments.33 Section 510 quite plainly was intended to strengthen state authority. It may also have been intended to permit the States to impose stricter standards and effluent limitations on federal installations than would have been imposed under an EPA permit in the absence of an approved state NPDES program. But this hardly answers the question before us, which is whether these higher standards are to be enforced through a state rather than an EPA permit system. It is nevertheless argued that the meaning of the phrase "requirements respecting control and abatement of pollution" used in § 313 is informed by its use in § 510, an argument akin to one made and rejected in Hancock v. Train, supra, 426 U.S. at 186-187, 96 S.Ct. at 2016-2017, 48 L.Ed.2d at 569, n. 47. We reject it here for much the same reasons: The phrase cannot have the same meaning in both sections, and there is scant reason to credit the States' position that treating "standards" and "requirements" disjunctively in § 510 somehow dictates that "requirements" in § 313 shall embrace more than "standards."
Another contention drawing upon § 510 is that a State's authority to impose stricter substantive standards on federal installations is meaningless if a State cannot subject federal dischargers to its permit system. This is simply an adjunct34 to the States' primary argument that no state NPDES permit systecan function effectively unless federal dischargers are required to obtain state permits and that federal installations are therefore impliedly, but clearly subject to state permit programs. We cannot agree.
The presence of the EPA as a permit-issuing authority means that although federal dischargers are not securing state NPDES permits they are nevertheless being subjected to the administrative authority of a federal agency which is required to make a State's "more stringent limitation(s), including those necessary to meet water quality standards, treatment standards, or schedules of compliance" part of the conditions of the permits it must issue.35 We recognize that there may be some problems of coordination between the EPA and the state pollution control agency in the implementation of state water quality standards. State officials may view the EPA implementation of a State's or its own water quality standards as placing a disproportionate share of the additional abatement effort on the nonfederal dischargers in the State, thereby obligating the State to impose undesirably restrictive effluent limitations on those nonfederal predominantly private dischargers. At the same time, Congress might have been apprehensive that state regulatory officials, if in the position to do so, would impose a disproportionate share of the burden on federal dischargers. However that may be, we believe that these possible problems of coordination in the administration of water quality standards fail to provide an adequate basis for finding a clear congressional intention to subject federal dischargers to the degree of control inherent in adhering to state permit requirements respecting water quality standards.36
The States make several other arguments in support of their position that Congress intended federal dischargers to be subject to state NPDES permit programs, that "requirements" in § 313 include securing a state NPDES permit. We find none of them persuasive. They assert that since the EPA's authority to issue permits to federal dischargers stems at least in part from § 313, it is "capricious" to conclude that the word "requirements" in § 313 refers to permits issued by the EPA under § 402(a), but not to permits issued by a State under § 402(b). The answer to this argument is that the EPA's authority to issue permits to federal as well as nonfederal dischargers is granted by § 402(a), not § 313. Nor does the "requirement" that a federal discharger secure a permit stem from § 313; that also arises from § 402(a) alone.37
The States, like the Court of Appeals, 511 F.2d at 973, also find support for their position in § 505 of the Amendments, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1970 ed., Supp. IV), which provides that a citizen may commence civil actions in district court "against any person (including . . . the United States . . .) who is alleged to be in violation of . . . an effluent standard or limitation under this Act . . . ." § 505(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). One of the definitions of "effluent standard or limitation" for purposes of § 505 is "a permit or condition thereof issued under section 402 of this Act, which is in effect under this Act (including a requirement applicable by reason of section 313 of this Act)." § 505(f)(6), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(f)(6) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). California reads § 505(f) to equate a "requirement" under § 313 with a permit issued under § 402, as if § 50f)(6) were phrased: "any permit or condition thereof issued under Section 402 of this Act, which is in effect under this Act (including one issued to a federal discharger)." In a similar vein, Washington asserts that "(c)itizens may bring suit to enforce permits issued under Section 402," including "permits and conditions thereof applicable because of Section 313." Brief 18. It is more reasonable, however, to interpret "requirement" in the parenthetical expression in § 505(f)(6) as referring principally to a "condition," not to a "permit." This is because of the Amendments' primary reliance on the NPDES as a means to abate and control water pollution. See Supra, at 205. For enforcement purposes § 402(k) deems a permit holder who is in compliance with the terms of its permit to be in compliance "with sections 301, 302, 306, 307, and 403, except any standard imposed under section 307 for a toxic pollutant injurious to human health." 33 U.S.C. § 1342(k) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). Thus, the principal means of enforcing the pollution control and abatement provisions of the Amendments is to enforce compliance with a permit. Of the six subdivisions of § 505(f) defining "effluent standard or limitation," only § 505(f)(6) refers to any of the standards or limitations As translated into the conditions of an NPDES permit. Thus, while §§ 505(f)(2)-(4) permit suits for violation of effluent standards or limitations promulgated under §§ 301, 302, 306, and 307, a suit against a permit holder will necessarily be brought under the definition in § 505(f)(6); unless the plaintiff can show violation of the permit condition, violation of the Amendments cannot be established. This is true both for conditions imposed in accordance with EPA-promulgated effluent limitations and standards and for those imposed in accordance with more stringent standards and limitations established by a State pursuant to § 510. The reference in § 505(f)(6) to requirements applicable by reason of § 313 is to be read as making clear that all discharges (including federal dischargers) may be sued to enforce permit conditions, whether those conditions arise from standards and limitations promulgated by the Administrator or from stricter standards established by the State.38 In short, we cannot accept the States' position that the meaning of "requirements" in § 313 they urge is supported by its use in § 505(f)(6).
Finally, it is argued that when a State submits a plan in conformity with § 402, the EPA must approve it and must then suspend the issuance of all EPA permits with respect to the waters covered by the plan, including permits to federal agencies.39 Because it is inconceivable that Congress would have inteed federal instrumentalities to operate without permits, it is contended that Congress anticipated the state permit system to apply. The difficulty with this position is that under § 402, the EPA obviously need not, and may not, approve a state plan which the State has no authority to issue because it conflicts with federal law.40 If § 313 expressly said that federal instrumentalities must comply with state discharge standards but need not secure state permits, it would be untenable to urge that a state plan which nevertheless attempts to subject federal agencies to state permit requirements would have to be approved simply because it was otherwise in compliance with § 402. As we construe § 313, this is the situation before us. By the same token, we do not think that EPA permit authority with respect to federal agencies terminates when the EPA purports to approve a state plan except for that portion of it which seeks to subject federal instrumentalities to the state permit regime.
From the outset of the EPA's administration of the NPDES and in its first regulations establishing the § 304(h)(2) guidelines for state NPDES permit programs, see 37 Fed.Reg. 28391 (1972), the EPA has taken the position that authority to suspend issuance of EPA permits extends only "to those point sources subject to such approved program." 40 CFR § 124.2(b) (1975). The implications that the state program would only embrace nonfederal dischargers on those navigable waters subject to the program and that the EPA was authorized to and would continue to issue permits to federal dischargers were soon made explicit in 40 CFR §§ 125.2(a)(2), (b) (1975),41 which provide that federal dischargers are to comply with the EPA permit program and that state NPDES permit programs do not cover federal agencies and instrumentalities. This construction by the agency charged with enforcement of the Amendments is reasonable and in the absence of any cogent argument that it is contrary to congressional intentions we sustain the EPA's understanding that the States are without authority to require federal dischargers to secure their NPDES permits.42
The States were to promulgate water quality standards and an implementation plan meeting certain criteria. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1160(c)(1), (3). If a State did not establish such standards and a plan, the Administrator was charged to promulgate water quality standards but not a plan in cooperation with state officials. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1160(c)(2), (4).
See Exec. Order No. 11574, 3 CFR 986 (1966-1970 Comp.). See also 84 Stat. 108, 33 U.S.C. § 1171(b).
§ 101(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1970 ed., Supp. IV) (emphasis added). Previously the purpose of the Act had been "to enhance the quality and value of our water resources and to establish a national policy for the prevention, control, and abatement of water pollution." 33 U.S.C. § 1151(a).
§ 502(11), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(11) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). Section 502(17) defines a "schedule of compliance" to be "a schedule of remedial measures including an enforceable sequence of actions or operations leading to compliance with an effluent limitation, other limitation, prohibition, or standard." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(17) (1970 ed., Supp. IV).
Point sources other than publicly owned treatment works must achieve effluent limitations requiring application of the "best practicable control technology currently available" by July 1, 1977, and application of the "best available technology economically achievable" by July 1, 1983. §§ 301(b)(1) (A), (2)(A), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(1)(A), (2)(A) (1970 ed., Supp. IV).
33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(3) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). Section 402(b) provides:
"(9) To insure that any industrial user of any publicly owned treatment works will comply with sections 204(b), 307, and 308." 86 Stat. 880, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (1970 ed., Supp. IV).
See also § 303(e), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(e) (1970 ed., Supp. IV).
§ 402(c)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(1) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). Title 40 CFR § 124.2(b) (1975) provides that upon approving a state permit program EPA "shall suspend (its) issuance of NPDES permits as to those point sources subject to such approved program."
In 1970, 84 Stat. 107, 33 U.S.C. § 1171(a), itself had amended the original measure, 70 Stat. 506, as amended, which had admonished federal agencies, "insofar as practicable and consistent with the interests of the United States and within any available appropriations, (to) cooperate" with federal and state officials "in preventing or controlling" water pollution. 33 U.S.C. § 466h (1964 ed., Supp. V). Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 1857f(a) (1964 ed., Supp. V) (Clean Air Act).
33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)(D) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). The California petition challenged "the failure of the Administrator to approve the California permit program . . . insofar as it applies to agencies and instrumentalities of the Federal government." App. 16. Washington's petition for review challenged the EPA's refusal to consider for approval that portion of its submitted program which "included a provision that discharges of pollutants to navigable waters from federal facilities were covered by the state program." Id., at 25.
Like § 118 of the Clean Air Act, see Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S., at 182, 96 S.Ct., at 2014, 48 L.Ed.2d, at 567 n. 41, § 313 goes on to authorize the President, upon a determination that it is "in the paramount interest of the United States to do so" and subject to several limitations, to exempt certain federal point sources from "compliance with any such a requirement." Any exemptions granted must be reported annually to the Congress. The President may grant no exemptions from the requirements of §§ 306 and 307 of the Amendments, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1316, 1317 (1970 ed., Supp. IV), which provide, respectively, for standards of performance regulating "new sources" of water pollution and for effluent standards regulating the discharge of "toxic pollutants" and the pretreatment of the discharges introduced into "treatment works," defined in § 212(2)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1292(2)(A) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). Like § 118 of the Clean Air Act, § 313 allows exemptions for lack of appropriations only when the Congress has failed to make a specific appropriation requested as a part of the budgetary process. Cf. 33 U.S.C. § 466h (1964 ed., Supp. V), n. 19, Supra.
The Court of Appeals appeared to recognize as much; for even after comparing § 313 with its predecessor, 33 U.S.C. § 1171(a), which "had required only that federal agencies comply with 'applicable water quality standards,' without specifying whether compliance was limited to the substantive content of the 'standards' referred to, and without specifying whether those standards included state standards," the court also concluded that the enactment of § 313 in and of itself would not sustain an inference that federal installations were to secure state permits. 511 F.2d 963, 967.
The precise relation between "guidelines for effluent limitations" to be promulgated by the EPA under § 304(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b) (1970 ed., Supp. IV), and the several degrees of § 301 effluent limitations which are to be achieved by 1977 and 1983, respectively, see n. 11, Supra, is at issue in No. 75-978, E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, cert. granted, 425 U.S. 933, 96 S.Ct. 1662, 48 L.Ed.2d 174, 1976.
42 U.S.C. § 1857d-1, quoted in Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S., at 186-187, 96 S.Ct., at 2016, n. 47. The Court of Appeals was in error when it stated, 511 F.2d, at 973, that § 510 had "no counterpart" in the Clean Air Act.
"(C) not later than July 1, 1977, any more stringent limitation, including those necessary to meet water quality standards, treatment standards, or schedules of compliance, established pursuant to any State law or regulations (Under authority preserved by section 510 ) or any other Federal law or regulation, or required to implement any applicable water quality standard established pursuant to this Act." 86 Stat. 844, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C) (1970 ed., Supp. IV) (emphasis added).
The authority to require permits rests on § 402 alone, not on § 301(a); and it was under § 402 that the Administrator issued his regulation subjecting federal instrumentalities to the EPA permit system. 40 CFR §§ 125.2(a)(2), (b) (1975), 38 Fed.Reg. 13528 (1973). Section 301(a) simply makes it "unlawful" for "any person" not to have the required permit. That federal agencies, departments, and instrumentalities are not "persons" within the meaning of § 301(a) and the Amendments, see § 502(5), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(5) (1970 ed., Supp. IV), does not mean either that federal dischargers are not required to secure NPDES permits, or that their obligation to secure an NPDES permit derives from a different provision of the Amendments. A federal discharger without a permit is no less out of compliance with § 402 than a nonfederal discharger; the federal discharge is however not "unlawful." Section 309 of the Amendments, 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (1970 ed., Supp. IV), which provides for federal enforcement of the Amendments, mirrors § 301(a)'s differing treatment of federal and nonfederal sources. Section 309(a)(3), for example, provides for the EPA to issue orders to "persons" in violation of, Inter alia, § 301 and to bring a civil action under § 309(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). See also §§ 306(e), 307(d), 505(f)(1), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1316(e), 1317(d), 1365(f)(1) (1970 ed., Supp. IV).
The legislative history on the EPA's authority to suspend its permit program is meager, but Congress does not appear to have concentrated its attention on the question of partial suspension of the EPA permit program within a State. Thus, from § 402(b), which permits a State to submit "a full and complete description of the program it proposes to establish and administer . . . under an interstate compact" (see § 103, 33 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970 ed., Supp. IV)), it is evident that Congress clearly contemplated that the EPA might suspend issuance of § 402(a) permits only as to some of a
We are also unpersuaded by the States' argument that by limiting the EPA's authority to withdraw approval of a state program to withdrawing approval as to the entire program, Congress emphasized that only one government shall operate an NPDES permit program within a State. § 402(c)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(3) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). In our view, rejection of the EPA's proposal that the bill should be changed to permit withdrawal as to categories or classes of sources, 1 Leg.Hist. 854-855, reflected a concern that the States be given maximum responsibility for the permit system and that the EPA's review authority be restricted as much as was consistent with its overall responsibility for assuring attainment of national goals. H.R.Rep.No.92-911, Supra, at 127, 1 Leg.
We also find unpersuasive on the issue before us the States' argument based upon §§ 306(c), 308(c), and 401(a)(6), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1316(c), 1318(c), 1341(a)(6) (1970 ed., Supp. IV), in which federal facilities are expressly exempted from certain forms of state regulation under the Amendments. The argument is that these sections demonstrate that Congress knew how to exempt federal facilities from state regulation, so that by not expressly providing that federal facilities need not secure state permits Congress clearly revealed an intention that federal facilities secure such permits. Although §§ 306, 308, and 401 are of obvious importance to the implementation of the goals and purposes of the Amendments, they are too incidental to the NPDES program for their treatment of federal facilities to offer any meaningful guidance on the question for decision in this case.