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Timestamp: 2017-04-23 11:53:34
Document Index: 721226742

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2']

| Premium Partners, L.P. v. Davis
Premium Partners, L.P. v. Davis
This matter is before the court on Defendant Massachusetts Financial Services Company's ("MFS") motion for summary judgment and on Defendant Goldman Sachs & Company's ("Goldman") motion for summary judgment. For the reasons stated below, we grant MFS's motion and we grant in part and deny in part Goldman's motion.
Plaintiff Premium Partners, L.P. ("Premium") alleges that it held substantial short positions in 30-Year Treasury Options at 9:25 a.m. on October 31, 2001. Premium contends that Goldman and MFS paid Defendant Peter J. Davis ("Davis") to funnel to them nonpublic information that Davis discovered at a confidential United States Department of Treasury ("Treasury Department") quarterly refunding meeting ("Meeting"), including a conference that took place between 9:00 a.m. and 9:25 a.m. on October 31, 2001. Davis allegedly learned during the Meeting that the Treasury Department would suspend the 30-Year Treasury Bond. Premium contends that when the information was released to the public, the demand for 30-Year Treasury Bonds increased and, in turn, the costs increased for investors that had to cover short positions in 30-Year Treasury Futures and 30-Year Treasury Bond Options.
According to Premium, after the Meeting at 9:35 a.m. Davis called Defendant John M. Youngdahl ("Youngdahl"), who works for Goldman, and at approximately 9:38 a.m. Davis called Defendant Steven E. Northern ("Northern"), who works for MFS. Davis allegedly informed Youngdahl and Northern that the Treasury Department was going to suspend the 30-Year Treasury Bond. Goldman then allegedly immediately purchased $84 million in 30-Year Treasury Bonds and significant amounts of 30-Year Treasury Futures. MFS also allegedly immediately purchased $65 million in 30-Year Treasury Bonds before public disclosures. Premium claims that Defendants manipulated the 30-Year Treasury Bond market, artificially influencing the price of 30-Year Treasury Bonds, Futures, and Options. That in turn allegedly required investors such as Premium to pay additional costs to cover short positions in 30-year Treasury Futures and Options.
Premium includes in its complaint Commodity Exchange Act ("CEA"), 7 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., claims brought against Goldman and Youngdahl (Count I), CEA claims brought against MFS and Northern (Count II), a CEA claim brought against Davis (Count III), Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 ILCS 505/1 et seq., claims brought against all Defendants (Count IV), civil conspiracy claims brought against Goldman, Youngdahl, and Davis (Count V), civil conspiracy claims brought against MFS, Northern, and Davis (Count VI), Sherman Antitrust Act claims brought against Goldman, Youngdahl, and Davis (Count VII), and Sherman Antitrust Act claims brought against MFS, Northern, and Davis (Count VIII). The prior judge in this case granted in part and denied in part Defendants' motions to dismiss, dismissing all claims brought against Northern, and all state law claims (Counts IV-VI). The prior judge also dismissed all Sherman Act claims without prejudice. Premium indicates that the only remaining claims that it is pursuing are the CEA claims brought against Youngdahl, Goldman, and MFS. (4/11/08 Mot. Reinst. 4). Goldman and MFS have each moved for summary judgment on the remaining claims pending against them. Premium has also filed a motion for leave to conduct additional discovery and motions to strike.
I. Bond Trading
MFS and Goldman argue that they are entitled to summary judgment to the extent that Premium's CEA claims are based upon trading in 30-Year Treasury Bonds. The Treasury Amendment, which limits the scope of the CEA, provides that, "[e]xcept as provided in paragraph (2)" of 7 U.S.C. § 2(c), "nothing" in the chapter of the Treasury Amendment that establishes the scope of the CEA applies to "an agreement, contract, or transaction in" certain categories, such as "government securities. . . ." 7 U.S.C. § 2(c)(1).
Premium does not deny that certain trades that are the basis for its claims against MFS and Goldman involved transactions in 30-Year Treasury Bonds, which are government securities. (Ans. GSJ 8). Premium instead points to 7 U.S.C. § 2(c)(2), which states that CEA claims can be based upon "an agreement, contract, or transaction described in paragraph (1) that is . . . a contract of sale of a commodity for future delivery (or an option on such a contract), or an option on a commodity (other than foreign currency or a security or a group or index of securities), that is executed or traded on an organized exchange. . . ." 7 U.S.C. § 2(c)(2). Premium argues that although 30-Year Treasury Bonds are government securities, they are traded on an organized exchange and can therefore be a basis for CEA liability. Although 7 U.S.C. § 2(c)(2) makes reference to trades on an organized exchange, and provides certain exceptions for when the CEA does apply, there is no specific language in that section that expressly nullifies the statement in 7 U.S.C. § 2(c)(1) that the CEA does not govern transactions in government securities. We are bound by the language in 7 U.S.C. § 2(c)(1), and will not interpret the section in a manner contrary to its plain meaning. Premium's position in emphasizing the applicability of 7 U.S.C. § 2(c)(2), would undermine the direct prohibitions provided in 7 U.S.C. § 2(c)(1). See Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U.S. 237, 249 (1985)(referring to "'the elementary canon of construction that a statute should be interpreted so as not to render one part inoperative'")(quoting Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392 (1979)). The reference in 7 U.S.C. § 2(c)(2) clearly was not intended to nullify the explicit exclusion of transactions in government securities.
Our conclusion is also consistent with the recognition by the United States Supreme Court that the Treasury Amendment serves as a substantive limitation on the scope of the CEA. See Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading Com'n, 519 U.S. 465, 469, 475-76 (1997)(addressing transactions in foreign currencies and referring to one aspect of the Treasury Amendment as a "complete exclusion"); see also Commodity Futures Trading Com'n v. Zelener, 2003 WL 22284295, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 2003)(explaining that "[w]hen Congress created the CFTC in 1974 and expanded the statute's coverage to include non-agricultural commodities, it also enacted an exemption referred to as the 'Treasury Amendment,'" which "'limits [the statute's] coverage and the CFTC's jurisdiction to futures'")(quoting in part Bank Brussels Lambert, S.A. v. Intermetals Corp., 779 F.Supp. 741, 750 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)). In addressing the Treasury Amendment, the United States Supreme Court has also warned courts not to treat the Treasury Amendment as "mere surplusage." Dunn, 519 U.S. at 472.
We also note that in Commodity Futures Trading Com'n. v. Baragosh, 278 F.3d 319 (4th Cir. 2002), the Fourth Circuit rejected a proposed interpretation of the Treasury Amendment that would limit the scope of the Treasury Amendment stating that such an interpretation "would also frustrate the Amendment's very purpose." Id. at 327. The Court recognized that as to the foreign currency exemption in the Treasury Amendment, an overly broad interpretation of another "clause would sweep all, or almost all, such transactions back in." Id. Likewise, it would not make sense to read 7 U.S.C. § 2(c)(1) to exclude transactions involving government securities from the scope of the CEA and to read 7 U.S.C. § 2(c)(2) to provide a basis to include most of such transactions as a basis for CEA liability. Premium also points to certain non-controlling precedent in which Premium contends courts had the opportunity to adopt Goldman's position as to government securities, but instead the courts made no comment concerning the exemption of government securities from the CEA. (Ans. GSJ 9-10). However, such cases are not on point and do not address the issue before this court. The ...