Source: https://m.openjurist.org/533/f2d/353
Timestamp: 2020-06-05 08:15:20
Document Index: 217287276

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2000', '§ 706', '§ 706', '§ 706', '§ 706', '§ 706', '§ 706', '§ 706']

533 F2d 353 Lacy v. Chrysler Corp Harris | OpenJurist
533 F. 2d 353 - Lacy v. Chrysler Corp Harris
533 F2d 353 Lacy v. Chrysler Corp Harris
12 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 471,
Although we previously decided this issue in Tuft v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 517 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 96 S.Ct. 782, 46 L.Ed.2d 641, 44 U.S.L.W. 3394 (1976), we granted an en banc hearing in this case to pass upon procedures of the Commission in factual settings varying from those in Tuft.
We reverse the district court judgments in Lacy v. Chrysler Corp., No. 74-1949, and Harris v. Sherwood Medical Industries, E.D.Mo., 386 F.Supp. 1149 and reinstate the appellants' actions. We affirm the dismissal in Whitfield v. Certain-Teed Products, E.D.Mo., 389 F.Supp. 274.
Yvonne Costello Harris, a black former employee of Sherwood Medical Industries, filed a complaint with the EEOC that Sherwood had discriminated against her with regard to supervision and promotion and had discharged her on the basis of her race. On March 16, 1972, the EEOC referred her charge to the Missouri Commission on Human Rights as required by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d). The state commission, without resolving the complaint, returned the plaintiff's file to the EEOC on June 30, 1972. Thereafter, more than one year later on September 21, 1973, the EEOC's district office in St. Louis wrote Ms. Harris and advised her that conciliation efforts on her behalf had failed. The text of the letter was the same as the initial letter mailed to Mary Lacy, referred to above. Thereafter, on February 4, 1974, the district director in St. Louis sent Ms. Harris a formal Right to Sue letter with the text identical to the Right to Sue letter mailed to Ms. Lacy and quoted in note 2 supra. She filed her Title VII action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri against Sherwood Medical Industries on March 1, 1974, more than 90 days after receiving the letter from the EEOC office in St. Louis advising that conciliation efforts in her case had failed but only 24 days after receiving the formal Right to Sue letter. The district court dismissed the action on defendant's motion for summary judgment on grounds that the suit had not been commenced within the 90-day period prescribed by § 706(f)(1). Harris v. Sherwood Medical Industries, 386 F.Supp. 1149 (E.D.Mo.1974). This appeal followed.
In Tuft v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 517 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 96 S.Ct. 782, 46 L.Ed.2d 641, 44 U.S.L.W. 3394 (1976), we considered the identical two-letter procedure followed by the Commission and we held that the first letter advising the complainant of the failure of conciliation efforts did not initiate the running of the 90-day period. In that case we undertook an extensive review of the 1972 amendments to the Act, noting in particular that Congress by these amendments had now authorized the Commission to institute legal actions under Title VII. We determined that the amended statute required notification to the aggrieved party at the conclusion of the final step in the administrative process, i. e., after the 1972 amendments, upon the Commission's determination not to file suit.
GIBSON, Chief Judge, joined by HENLEY, Circuit Judge, concurs in Whitfield v. Certain-Teed Prod., et al., E.D.Mo., 389 F.Supp. 274 and dissents in Mary Lacy v. Chrysler Corp., No. 74-1949, and Harris v. Sherwood Medical Ind., E.D.Mo., 386 F.Supp. 1149.
I respectfully dissent from the majority's disposition of the Lacy and Harris cases, which, in my opinion, has perpetuated an error initially promulgated in Tuft v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 517 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 96 S.Ct. 782, 46 L.Ed.2d 641, (1976). The majority's interpretation contravenes the clear language of § 706(f)(1), nullifies the manifest congressional desire to expeditiously resolve employment discrimination controversies and effects an impermissible prejudice against employers or other respondents in Title VII cases.
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485, 37 S.Ct. 192, 194, 61 L.Ed. 442, 452 (1917). (Citations omitted.) If a court feels compelled to resort to extrinsic material for the purpose of gleaning the intent of the legislature, all efforts should be made to construe this material in a manner that will give effect to the clear wording of the statute. My review of the statute and its legislative history convinces me that the majority has misinterpreted the congressional intent, failed to give proper weight to the statutory language and rewritten the statute.
The 180-day period contained in § 706(f)(1) is construed by the majority to be a mere time limitation upon the aggrieved person's right to demand the statutory notice required as a prerequisite to a private suit. However, § 706(f)(1), by its language, imposes no obligation on the aggrieved person to do anything until notice is actually received from the EEOC. The onus of tendering unsolicited notification to the aggrieved person is properly placed with the EEOC. The statute provides that the EEOC "shall so notify the person aggrieved" if the charge is dismissed or, within 180 days, a civil suit has not been filed or a conciliation agreement has not been negotiated. There is nothing in the statute to support the majority's interpretation that the EEOC's duty to notify is dependent upon receiving a request from the aggrieved party. Cf. DeMatteis v. Eastman Kodak Co., 511 F.2d 306, 310-11 & n. 6 (2d Cir. 1975); E. E. O. C. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 511 F.2d 1352, 1356 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 96 S.Ct. 420, 46 L.Ed.2d 368 (1975).
E. E. O. C. v. Cleveland Mills Co., 502 F.2d 153, 156 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 946, 95 S.Ct. 1328, 43 L.Ed.2d 425 (1975).
In addition to the three District Court opinions under consideration in the present appeal, federal district courts have consistently construed § 706(f)(1) to reach a result contrary to that reached by the majority here. Keeling v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 10 E.P.D. P 10,567 (W.D.Tenn.1975); Bottoms v. St. Vincents Hospital, Inc., 11 F.E.P. 392 (S.D.Ind.1975); Bradshaw v. Zoological Society, 10 F.E.P. 1268 (S.D.Cal.1975); Barfield v. A.R.C. Security, Inc., 9 E.P.D. P 10,136 (N.D.Ga.1975); Garner v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., Civ. No. 75-526 (D.S.C. June 11, 1975). Many courts have acknowledged the Tuft decision and proceeded to disregard its interpretation. Williams v. Sheraton Corp., 11 F.E.P. 897 (E.D.La.1975); Turner v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 401 F.Supp. 1179, 11 F.E.P. 748 (N.D.Tex.1975); Wilson v. Sharon Steel Corp., 399 F.Supp. 403, 11 F.E.P. 145 (W.D.Pa.1975); Mungen v. Choctaw, Inc., 402 F.Supp. 1349, 10 F.E.P. 1345 (W.D.Tenn.1975); Kelly v. Southern Products, Civ. No. 19243 (N.D.Ga. June 14, 1975).4 The court in Taylor v. Pacific Intermountain Express Co., 394 F.Supp. 72, 9 E.P.D. P 10,170 (N.D.Ill.1975), concluded that the failure of conciliation letter commenced the statutory 90-day period. However, the court held that its decision would not be applied to the plaintiff in that case because of equitable considerations. Two other cases which invalidated the EEOC's two-letter procedure were permitted to have prospective effect only. Stansell v. Sherwin Williams Co., 404 F.Supp. 696, 10 E.P.D. P 10,592 (N.D.Ga.1975); Roberts v. H. W. Ivey Construction Co., 408 F.Supp. 622, 10 E.P.D. P 10,588 (N.D.Ga.1975). In my opinion, these numerous courts have properly construed § 706(f)(1).
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 2373, 45 L.Ed.2d 280, 298 (1975). (Citation omitted.)
Tuft also held that an aggrieved party is permitted to sue after the expiration of the 90-day period if he reasonably relied upon the EEOC's erroneous advice. This approach, in my opinion, fails to account for the fundamental distinction between a failure to comply with mere administrative rules and noncompliance with jurisdictional requirements. It is clear that an aggrieved party is not necessarily deprived of his day in court merely because there has been a failure to adhere to a non-jurisdictional administrative rule of the EEOC. E. E. O. C. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 511 F.2d 1352, 1360-61 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 96 S.Ct. 420, 46 L.Ed.2d 368, (1975); Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 402 F.2d 357, 359-60 (7th Cir. 1968). This general precept does not permit a waiver of jurisdictional requirements merely because the EEOC has misadvised the aggrieved person.
Instituting suit within 90 days of receiving proper § 706(f)(1) notice from the EEOC is a jurisdictional requirement. DeMatteis v. Eastman Kodak Co., supra at 309. "The jurisdiction of the federal courts is carefully guarded against expansion by judicial interpretation or by prior action or consent of the parties." American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17-18, 71 S.Ct. 534, 542, 95 L.Ed. 702, 710 (1951). Courts may not waive jurisdictional defects merely because the EEOC, in conferring the proper statutory notification, gave erroneous advice to the aggrieved party or followed an improper procedure. DeMatteis v. Eastman Kodak Co., supra at 311; Cleveland v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 509 F.2d 1027, 1030 (9th Cir. 1975). Consequently, the erroneous EEOC advice given to the aggrieved persons in Tuft and the present cases regarding their right to sue would not permit the courts to waive a jurisdictional defect. I do not believe that jurisdictional requisites are so flexible that a court is permitted to disregard them merely because of an administrative agency's misinterpretation of a statute and erroneous advice. Such an approach in this case would leave jurisdiction to the discretion and convenience of the EEOC and explicitly sanction "a hodgepodge of ad hoc determinations by the EEOC." Cleveland v. Douglas Aircraft Co., supra at 1030.
There is one clearly delineated area in which erroneous administrative agency advice and the equities of a particular case may permit a party to litigate despite noncompliance with jurisdictional prerequisites. If a court concludes that an individual has relied to his detriment on an interpretation of a statute which has subsequently been judicially overruled or substantially redefined, the court may weigh the equities of the situation and allow the new decision to have prospective effect only. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07, 92 S.Ct. 349, 355, 30 L.Ed.2d 296, 305 (1971). This principle was invoked by the Second Circuit in DeMatteis v. Eastman Kodak Co., supra. In its original decision in DeMatteis the court recognized that the 90-day statutory period for private suits commenced with notification that the charge had been dismissed; the EEOC requirement that the aggrieved party must request and receive a right to sue letter before the period commences was not sanctioned by the statute. DeMatteis v. Eastman Kodak Co., supra. The court refused to adopt the position that reliance upon the EEOC's erroneous advice should permit the statutory period to commence only upon receipt of the right to sue letter, as urged by the EEOC. This would have effected an administrative modification of the jurisdictional requirements contained in the statute. Upon rehearing of that case the court realized that there had been substantial reliance on the procedure impermissibly adopted by the EEOC and invalidated in the original opinion. The court therefore ruled that its previous ruling invalidating the EEOC procedure would be applied prospectively only. DeMatteis v. Eastman Kodak Co., 520 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1975).
Chrysler refers to Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975), and the discussion therein relating to backpay
In Craig v. Eastern Airlines, 410 F.Supp. 428, 10 FEP cases 1307 (D.Conn.1975), Judge Blumenfeld, a district judge in the Second Circuit, followed the Tuft case, and considered the holding in DeMatteis as consistent with Tuft. This opinion stated:
Congress was acutely aware that the short 30-day period was creating a backlog of charges and rendering it difficult for the EEOC to process the charges and to perform its conciliatory functions. H.R.Rep.No.92-238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 3-5, 12 (1971); 1972 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 2137, 2139-43 (1972). Extending this period to 180 days would permit the EEOC to more fully investigate and to make a more informed determination as to how to proceed with a charge. Even if a charge could not be fully processed in the six-month period, as many could not, it was hoped that the aggrieved party would forego his private remedies and place his primary reliance for resolution upon the conciliation and adjudicatory authority of the EEOC. See E. E. O. C. v. Cleveland Mills Co., 502 F.2d 153, 157 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 946, 95 S.Ct. 1328, 43 L.Ed.2d 425 (1975)