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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1', '§ 52', '§ 528', '§ 666', '§ 4', 'art 2', '§ 2', 'art. 1', '§ 2', '§ 1360', '§ 1162', '§ 1321', '§ 2', '§ 85', '§ 85', '§ 85', '§ 85', 'APPLICATION NO. 41', '§ 1', '§ 52', '§ 528', '§ 666', '§ 4', 'art 2', '§ 2', 'art. 1', '§ 2', '§ 1360', '§ 1162', '§ 1321', '§ 2', '§ 85', '§ 85', '§ 85', '§ 85', 'APPLICATION NO. 41']

Montana Water Law :: Chippewa Cree Tribe Water Rights Settlement Records
Home Chippewa Cree Tribe Water Rights Settlement Records Montana Water Law
RATIONAL INDIAN LAW LIBRARY
TAMING THE RAPIDS: NEGOTIATION OF FEDERAL RESERVED WATER RIGHTS IN MONTANA
. . . Myjoy was boundless. I had learnt the true practice of law. 1 had learnt to find out the better side of human nature and to enter men s hearts. I realized that the true function of a lawyer was to unite parties riven asunder. The lesson was so indelibly burnt into me that a large part of my time during the twenty years of my practice as a lawyer was occupied in bringing about private compromises of hundreds of cases. I lost nothing thereby—not even money, certainly not my soul.
Water, one of the West’s most treasured resources, is the center of numerous volatile controversies. Water issues evoke emotional responses; ranchers, recreationists, and developers, as well as government agencies and Indian tribes, each have their own views on the best use of water. Thus, when controversies arise over water rights, disagreement and conflict over a wide range of philosophical and economical interests ensue.
This comment addresses one of the chief sources of water rights controversies, the doctrine of federal,reserved water rights. This judicial doctrine, first recognized in 19081 to insure that lands set aside by Congress for a particular purpose had adequate water,2 has from its inception juxtaposed private and state interests against the federal government. Traditionally, reserved rights conflicts have been resolved through litiga­tion. But each new conflict over reserved water rights has required a turbulent journey down a course fraught with uncertainties. After nearly 80 years of shaping and defining the nature of reserved rights in the courts, many aspects of reserved rights still remain unresolved.
Since 1979, Montana has accelerated its efforts to determine water rights statewide;8 but the scores of unquantified and unqualified reserved rights for both Indian and non-Indian federal reservations leave the state in a worrisome quandry, and threaten to stall or even bring to a stop the slate's adjudicatory process. Rather than forcing the resolution of reserved rights through the courts, Montana has taken an innovative approach to solve the unresolved reserved rights by initiating negotiations between the Indian
1. Winers v. United Slates, 207 U.S. 564 {190S). infra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
2. D. Getches. Water Law in a Nutshell 291 (1984).
3. S. Bill 76. enacted May 11,1979. i 979 Mont. Laws 1901 (codified at Mont. Code Ann S 8«-
2-211 to -243 (1983)). ' ‘168
PUBLIC LAXD LAW REVIEW
AN Overview of Federal Reserved Water Rights
priority over diversions made by settlers upstream after the reservation w
and ^1“court explicitly8 addressed the firs, issue, whether
— -SU.
^ z * *<5
4. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
6. By £ m^nl-eteenth century. — „» had on the.prtor appropriations doctrine Founded upon concep«««Ily P»> »l»l
’S. ^oi^Conrthadintp,
purposes was also an implies. ,, w, This case distinpuished •'public lands" which were
Power Commission v. Oregon. 349 U.S. 4 . .. land}> which had been withdrawn from
unqualifiedly subject Cmn hcld lhat the Desert Und Act did not apply to
the public domain for some olbe, purpose hw. See A. Stone.
reservations; hence all reserved lands were essentia 1> fre.c .rent Montana Water Law Fos The 19«rs 110 11*11[Vol. 6
commis- reserved ucated as i consider
jnt of the Montana’s plores the ;te parties ved water
result of a 3d States.4 that when \ Montana Indians to iter rights ative water -vation had. rights had rvation was
i torrent of iding: (1) dates; (3) urisdiction;
ie, whether
:s systems based prior appropria- put to good use. over later users.
is for non-Indian lands in Federal nds” which were withdrawn from did not apply to Sec A. Stone,
reserved rights applied to non-Indian reservations, in 1963, in Arizona v. California.* In Arizona, the Court assigned reserved rights to both Indian10 and non-Indian11 federal reservations. One year later, the decree quantifying these rights12 treated the two types of reserved rights identi­cally.13 Arizona's extension of the Winters rationale is logical: if Congress reserves public land for a particular purpose which requires the use of water, the Congressional act of reserving such land, Indian or non-Indian, implies an intention to reserve sufficient water to carry out that purpose. Since Arizona, no question remains that the reserved rights doctrine extends to all federal reservations.
The Supreme Court appeared to settle the second issue, priority dates for Indian reserved water rights, by designating priority as of the date the reservation was created by Congress.14 A recent Ninth Circuit case, United States v. Adairhowever, carved out an exception to the longstanding rule by extending the priority date back to time immemorial for certain Indian rights.16 Adair is of little consequence for most Indian reservations created before other rights were established, since the Indian right would already have priority over other state users.17 Priority dates for reserved water rights on non-Indian reservations have unequivocably been held to be the date the reservation was created.18
The third issue, quantification of federal reserved rights, has been defined and limited by courts based on the reservation’s “purpose.”18 Although Congress usually fixed the purpose of a reservation at the time of creation, the quantity of water necessary to meet this purpose was not fixed. A reservation's stated purpose may be interpreted as requiring varying quantities of water; thus, quantification of reserved rights has become a
9. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
10. The following five Indian reservations in Arizona, California and Nevada were involved: Chemchuevi, Cocopah, Yuma, Colorado River and Fort Mohave. Id. at 595 n.97.
11. The following non-Indian federal reservations were involved: Lake Mead National Recrea­tional Area, Havasu Lake National Wildlife Refuge. Imperial National Wildlife Refuge, Gila National Forest, and Boulder City, Nevada. Id. at 601.
12. 376 U.S. 340 (1964).
13. Id. See also Stone, supra note 8, at 112.
14. 207 U.S. at 577.
15. 723 F.2d 1394 (1984). In Adair, the treaty creating the Klamath Indian reservation recognized the Tribe’s continued right to support its hunting and fishing lifestyle. Thus, the Ninth Circuit held that the reserved federal right's priority date was the time the use began—lime immemorial.
17. Getches. supra note 2. at 302.
18. See. e.g., Arizona v. California. 376 U.S. at 343-44.
19. Cappaert v. United Stales. 426 U.S. 128, 141 (1976). “The implied-reservation-of-water-
rights doctrine, however, reserves only that amount of water necessary to fulfill the purpose of the reservation, no more.”170
rL BLIC LAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6
maior issue 26 For Indian reservations in particular, where the specific “purpose" was often unarticulated,2' the reserved right may be potentially
Ver>' S'for non-Indian reservations, where the Congressional purpose was usually more explicit, quantification of reserved n;ghtsj.* been
Su^renKC ou n q u a mified reserved rights for the Rio Mimbres River in the
pS,rl^ded
management obligations from the Multiple Use Susta,"ef Yiel‘!hACt ^ 1960 (MUSYA).21 The Court rejected this claim, holding that the
purposes were limited to those expressly stated in the Organic Act of
which created the National Forest system.25 ,
New Mexico not only established that reserved rights do not exist for the secondary purposes of a federal reservation;26 it also explicitly refused to grant reserved rights for instream flows on national forests. ■ Althoug the extent of New Mexico’s rejection of reserved rights for instream flows continues to be tested, arguments m two subsequent non-Indiani cases have failed to convince courts that reserved rights can be granted fo
instream flow uses.29
£ SSXU «7 F.2d .2. 42 C,). U.S.
1092 (1981).
22. 43b U.S. 696 (1978).
23. Id. at - »>J. g6*517 § 1 74Slat.215 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 52b (1952)).
MUSYA r^nbTlha'; -the'na.ionalfbrests established and shall be administered for outdoor
A ‘ . 1 -. ._ m„..n, waler flows- and (2) to furnish a continuous supply of .imber fo. th
d,te f«r r™ must be cUHned
fo, one °YX’««7rr'^on/iry pulses were those established by MUSYA, see supra note 24.
o7 4W U S e.^Of RiEhtsto^nstreamflows^reservetheflowofwaterwothmthe^ueentbed
and a"re genera 11 v the type of flows needed forthefish.wildlifeand recreational purposes of MUSV A. as
purpose of, he le^entio- wns tomatntain a huntingand fishing way ofhfe.Ser. e.g.. » n,ton. 64, F..d
at 48; and Adair. 723 F 2d at 1410. (1982). the
»• S- " wildlife protection
Fores, Service med v rum the MUSYA declaration in Aew
S S»« v. A,pin; Land * Reservoir Co.. 692 F,d 85, ,9th Cir.,. eer,.[Vol. 6
ere the specific sy be potentially
^ssional purpose rights has been xico,2Z the U.S. bres River in the or creating the jrposes included •ed Yield Act of olding that the anic Act of 1897
.s do not exist for explicitly refused rests.27 Although or instream flows Dn-Indian cases26 n be granted for
). ceri. denied. 454 U.S.
16 U.S.C. § 528 (1982)). administered for outdoor
. two purposes under the supply of limber for the essing an intent to insure 1W .Id. at 712. The Court forests must be claimed
JSYA. see supra note 24. jer within the streambed.
1 purposes of MUSY A, as -,a.
•,as been established that a ce.c.g.. Walton. 647 F.2d
656 P.2d 1 (1982), the and wildlife protection SYA declaration in New d this argument, claiming essal of this issue in New F.2d 851 (9th Cir.), cert.
Quantification of reserved rights involves determining not only the purpose for which the water was reserved, but also how to measure water for that purpose. In Arizona v. California,ao the Supreme Court pro­nounced a method of using “practicably irrigable acres” to determine the quantity of reserved water for Indian reservations with an agricultural purpose. No other consistently applied methods have evolved.
The fourth issue, permissible uses, was settled for Indian situations in a 1979 Supplemental Decree to Arizona v. California.31 There, the Supreme Court held that although the quantity of reserved rights for Indian reservations was based on practicably irrigable acres, this “shall not constitute a restriction of the usage of [the rights] to irrigation or other agricultural application.”32 Thus, while the purpose of the Indian reserva­tion limits the quantity of rights reserved, once quantified, the rights may be put to uses other than those for which they were quantified.33
Confusion arises, however, when an Indian reserved water right is used by either a successor or lessee of the original holder. A recent case on this issue, Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton?* held that when an Indian allottee conveyed his individual allotment to a non-Indian, the Indian also conveyed his share of the tribes’ reserved water right, provided that the non-Indian purchaser used the right diligently.36 Non-use by successors of the Indian allottee, therefore, would result in the loss of the
dented, 104 S. Ct. 193 (1983), the Forest Service again tried to win instream flow rights for a National Forest river. This time, the Forest Service argued that instream flows for the the Carson River were necessary to fulnil purposes of the Toiyabe National Forest under the Organic Act. The Court rejected this claim, holding that the existing water rights of users located downstream of the Toiyabe National Forest alone would suffice to ensure that the national forest would have the minimal flows essential for Organic Act purposes. Id. at 859.
In a case currently before the United Stales District Court in Colorado, In re Application for ater Rights of the United States in Water Division 3, Slate of Colorado, No. 79-CW85 (D. Colo filed .U 2d •' 9I9K Xie .United Slates is cIaimin? reserved water rights for instream flows to national forests »n the Rio Grande basin of southern Colorado. The United States claims certain flows are needed to prevent the clogging of stream channels by sediment to maintain the ability of the channels to handle high flows that might otherwise cause erosion and degrade timber resources. This time, the Forest Service hopes to have perfected hydrological field techniques which definitely quantify an instream flow need for the Organic Act purpose of conserving water flows which was identified in New Mexico
30. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
31. 439 U.S. 419 (1979).
32. Id. at 4*22.
33. In the supplemental decree to Arizona, the Supreme Court further indicated that once quantified, the right is fixed; changing the type of use made of the reserved water will not disturb the initial quantification. Id.
34. 647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
35. Id. at 51. The Ninth Circuit has since clarified this holding in the appeal of the District
Court s decision on remand. Colville Confederated Tribe* v. Walton. 752 F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1985). It is the immediate grantee of the original Indian allottee who must exerciseduediiigence to perfect his or her inchoate right to the allottee's share of the reserved right, not later successors. Id. at 402.172
unused portion of his reserved right.86 This holding potentially gives non- Indian successors of Indian allottees a superior right over homestead­ers—at least to the extent that the non-Indian successor diligently uses his share of the reservation's reserved water—since homesteaders usually have priority dates later than the date the reservation was established. Although the Ninth Circuit asked the Supreme Court for a more definitive resolution of the issues before it, none have been forthcoming.37
The fifth issue, jurisdiction, centers on the United States’ waiver of immunity in the McCarren Amendment.88 The Supreme Court has unequivocably declared that the McCarren Amendment subjects the United States to the jurisdiction of state courts for the adjudication of federal reserved water rights.86 Enabling Acts for some states, like Montana, however, disclaim jurisdiction over Indian lands;40 thus, whether these disclaimer clauses remove state jurisdiction for adjudicating reserved rights on Indian lands remains to be decided. Recently, in Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Arizona,41 the Supreme Court held that even in states with these disclaimer clauses, the McCarren Amendment still allows state jurisdiction for the quantification of Indian water rights if a general stream adjudication is underway.42
The sixth issue, administration of reserved water rights, might also be resolved by looking to the McCarren Amendment, since section (a)(2) of the Amendment waived the United States’ immunity from being joined in
36. 647 F.2d at 51.
37. Id. at 54 n.18.
38. The McCarren Amendment provides in relevant part:
(a) consent is given to join the United States as a defendant in any suit (1) for the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system or other source, or (2) for the administration of such rights, where it appears that the United States is the owner of or is in the process of acquiring water rights by appropriation under state law. by purchase, by exchange, or otherwise, and the United States is a necessary party to such suit.
43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1982).
39. Stone, supra note 8, at 118, citing United States v. Dist. Court in and for the County of Eagle. 401 U.S. 520 (1971); United Slates v. Dist. Court in and for the Water Div. Number 5.401 U.S. 527 (1971); and Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
40. The Federal Enabling Act for the State of Montana, Act of Feb. 22,1889, ch. 180. § 4. part 2, 25 Slat. 676. con tains a disclaimer of any state jurisdiction with respect to Indian lands. This disclaimer was incorporated into both the 1889 Montana Constitution. Mont. Const, of 1889, art. I, § 2. and the 1972 Montana Constitution, Mont. Const art. I:
All provisions of the enabling act of Congress including the agreement and declaration
that all lands owned or held by any Indian or Indian tribes shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United Stales, continue in full forceand effect until revoked b> the consent of the United Slates and the people of Montana.
41. 103 S. Cl. 3201 (1983).
42. Id. at 3214-15. See also State ex rel. Grecly v. Water Court, infra note 67 and accompanying1985]
itially gives non- over homcstead- '.iligently uses his steaders usually was established, a more definitive ocoming.37 States’ waiver of reme Court has :ent subjects the e adjudication of ;ome states, like in lands;40 thus, n for adjudicating cently,in/4r/rono e Court held that rren Amendment iian water rights if
ghts, might also be e section (a)(2) of om being joined in
my suit (I) for the •ource, or (2) for the s the owner of or is in aw, by purchase, by v to such suit.
t in and for the County of :rDiv.Numbcr5.40! U.S. tes, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). 2.1889.ch. 180,14. pan 2, dian lands. This disclaimer of 5 889,art. 1, § 2,and the
ment and declaration :in under the absolute in full force and effect of Montana.
any suil for the administration of water rights.43 As in the jurisdictional issues, the Supreme Court has consistently deferred to stale water law for administration of reserved rights for non-Indian reservations.44 at least to the extent that it does not interfere with the purpose for which a reservation was created.
Administration of reserved water rights differs for Indian reserva­tions, however, since it is presumed that no state regulatory powers exist over Indian reservations.46 Although the U.S. Supreme Court never ruled on who should administer Indian reserved water rights, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals formulated a balancing test between stale and tribal interests.46 Factors considered in this test include: infringement on the tribe's right to self government, impact on the tribe's economic welfare, impacts from the use of reserved water off the reservation, whether the water is navigable or entirely within the reservation, and the extent to which the reservation uses water for agricultural or fishery needs.47 Administration of reserved water rights on Indian reservations thus varies considerably depending on the facts of each situation.
Although all of the six issues which resulted from creation of the reserved rights doctrine in 1908 have at least been judicially addressed, several of the issues—quantification, permissible uses, jurisdiction, and administration—still remain unclear. Montana's approach to resolving these unclear issues through negotiation is described in the following section.
III. Montana’s Negotiating Framework
Since the early 1970's, Montana has undertaken massive efforts to systematically determine water rights statewide. In 1979, Montana’s legislature revised the adjudication provisions of the 1973 Water Use Act,48 by creating an independent water courts for the comprehensive adjudication of water rights in the state. Recognizing the inherent difficulties of litigating federal reserved water rights, the 1979 legislature also created the Montana Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission
44. Mexico, 438 U.S. at 701-02 n.5.
45. See Act of Aug. 15,1953, ch. 505. Pub. L. No. 280, §£ 2.4, 67 Stat. 588. 589. which excepts the grant to certain stales jursidiction over water rights or the regulation thereof (codified in relevant part at 28U.S.C.§ 1360(b) and 18 U.S.C.§ 1162(b) (1982)).See25 U.S.C. §§ 1321(b). 1322(b)
46. United States v. Anderson. 736 F.2d 1358, 1365 (9th Cir. 1984).
47. Id. at 1365-66.
48. S. Bill 76. see supra note 3. revised the Montana Water Use Act of 1973,1973 Laws of Mont. 1121. See Stone, supra note 8. at 1-9 for the background and implementation of S. Bill 76 and the Montana Water Use Act.
.i note 67 and accompanying174 PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6
(Commission)*® to negotiate reserved water claims by Indian tribes and federal agencies in Montana. The nine permanently appointed members the Commission have full power to negotiate and sign compacts on beha
The legislature designed the negotiating process to be an integral part of the water courts adjudications. If an Indian tribe or federal agenc chooses to negotiate its claim to federal reserved water rights, adjudicat on is suspended in the water courts.®' A compact, once signed b the negotiating parties, must be ratified by the state legislature and he tribal governing body and approved by the appropriate federal authority. Upon ratification, the water courts will incorporate the terms of the compact int a preliminary decree for the appropriate basin.®3 Hopefully this process wifi expedite Montana's journey down the uncertain course of reserved
n8htTheS°key to running the rapids along this course is flexibility. Montana’s framework for resolving reserved rights gives the parties far greater flexibility to create options for mutual gam than are available through litigation. The next section examines these opportunities.
IV. Opportunities Presented by Negotiations
The foremost opportunity presented by the Commission’s negotiation process is the chance to resolve reserved rights more efficiently. Litigation often gets mired in procedural issues; hence, many cases are tried primarily
49. Mont. Code Ann. § 2-15-212 (1983).
51' W § 85-2-217. as amended by S. Bill 28, which was passed by the 49lh Montana leeislatore on April 24, 1985, and signed into law on April 30.1985. The snspens.on is effect,ve un.,1 July 1.198 .
52 Id $ 85-2-702(3), as amended by S. Bill 28. See supra note 51.
53'. ACS. Bill 16,supra note ^'se^®®'^'^Q®^e*jQ2^nJ83^Si(Jadju!iiMtr watertight! All
this writing May 1985. the Commission has completed negotiations with the Assimbome,,nd Siou and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, and'^tbe ^1 ackfcet Tribe are considering
SSSSSSSSa^ssg
Defense has had preliminary discussions with the Comm.sston. Interv.ew wuh Marc. Rundle. M y
10. 1985.[Vol. 6
TAM1SG THE RAPIDS
an tribes and d members of icts on behalf
a integral part ideral agency , adjudication igned by the and the tribal hority.62 Upon t compact into iy this process ■se of reserved
is flexibility, the parties far i are available artunities.
an's negotiation rntly. Litigation i tried primarily
h Montana legislature ;ive until July 1.1987.
•r divisions and created icate water rights. All ies and corporations by tune 30,1983. Id. § 85- iistrict, or part thereof. -2-234.
tions. As of the time of Assiniboinc and Sioux eyenne Tribe, the Fort he Confederated Salish Turtle Mountain Tribe ; Tribe are considering with the National Park it. The Department of h Marcia Rundle, May
on procedural questions alone. While procedural protections are vital to fair litigation, it is the substantive issues, not the procedure, which usually motivate the parties to resort to litigation in the first place.65 Negotiations can bypass these procedural issues inherent in litigation, and bring the parties to the substantive problems of resolving reserved rights more efficiently. Thus, bypassing procedural issues not only reduces emotional rivalry between parties, but may also result in saving court time and expenses.
Some expenses involved in resolving reserved rights, however, simply cannot be avoided. For example, accumulation of enough technical data for the parties to make a reasonable assessment of the extent of the tribe or federal agency’s claim5® is needed whether the parties negotiate or litigate. Therefore, although negotiating reserved rights may reduce court ex­penses, negotiating is not free of cost.
Although Montana’s negotiation process could conceivably be more efficient than litigation, to date this efficiency has yet to be demonstrated. The Commission was formed in 1979, and six years later only one Indian tribe has signed a compact.67 Since this is Montana’s first attempt to settle reserved rights, the initial delay may be understandable. Time is needed to educate Commission members, gather technical data, and decide upon procedures between the negotiating tribes and agencies. While these functions of the negotiating process seem time consuming, they do add to the long-term benefits of negotiation. For example, educating opposing parties will have positive future effects. When leaders of these parties debate related issues in the future, the education gained through this negotiation process will surface, bringing unprecedented appreciation of the opposing parties’ purposes.68 Much of the time required to educate parties and collect data is now behind the Commission, the negotiating tribes and the federal agencies; the process of writing compacts is now underway. Clearly, Montana has recognized the opportunity of efficiency presented by negotiating reserved rights; the next few years will tell whether this opportunity will be fully realized.
55. L. Patton. Sealing Environmental Disputes: The Experience with and Future of
Environmental Mediation, 14 Envtl. L. Rev. 547. 550 (1984).
56. To illustrate, the technical data needed to prove a reserved rights agricultural claim includes:
a soils irrigation suitability lest, tests of groundwater quantity and quality, possibility of constructing a water delivery system and the economic feasibility of agricultural development. D. Getches. D. Rosenfeit, C. Wilkenson, Federal Indian Law (Supp. 1979 at 161).
57. Fort Peck - Montana Compact, signed into law by Governor Scbwinden on May 15, 1985.
approved by the Tribal Executive Council on April 29. 1985.
58. Watson &. Danielson, Environmental Mediation, 15 Nat. Resources Law 687. 714
(1983)176
B. Belter Resuhs
Negotiating, rather than adjudicating, reserved water presents the opportunity for better results Enhanced results are pomWe because negotiations free parties both from str.ct adherence to legal precedence and from the uncertainties of the courtroom.
Although the parties rely on legal precedent to define negotm g positions, compacts reached through negotiations can dev'ate from the exact outcome expected in the courts-perhaps to the benefit of bo h parties. A look at Forest Service claims to reserved water rights in
Montana illustrates this point. .
If the Forest Service’s reserved rights were adjudicated in Montana s
water court, the court would be bound by New Mexico’s- legal precedent In New Mexico, conflicts between private diversionary uses caused the litigation over water rights to the Rio Mimbres River. In contrast, National Forest streams in Montana are generally not overappropnated, hence conflicts over private rights are rare." Despite this factual differ- ence the Forest Service in Montana would remain bound by New Mexico s denial of instream flow rights" for purposes of MUSYA. To win.reserve rights for instream flows in Montana through adjudication the Forest Service would have to prove the instream flow needs as one of the PurP«f of the Organic Act." Clearly, negotiating reserved rights would benefit the Forest Service by freeing it from these confines of case law. ^
For the state and people of Montana, negotiating the Forest Service s reserved rights is also desirable-even though judicial precedent has thus far favored the states on non-Indian instream flow issues First, grant ng instream flows for Montana’s National Forests causes no hardships to the state Even if the Forest Service is granted all the instream flows it desires, enough water will remain to satisfy most state uses." Thus, the infringing on upstream users’ diversionary rights would be rare. Second, Montana benefits from negotiating instream flows for the Forest Service becausetnstream flows are never diverted or “used up”; downstream users would essentially be guaranteed the amount of water reserved ins ream for the Forest Service. Granting reserved rights to National Forest stream
59. 438 U.S. 696 (1978). See supra notes 22-29 and accompanying text.
t?: Imcw wah urr, JaKub. Oita of ,he GeeenU Cunee!. United States Forest Service.
R Russell Federal/State/Tribal Compact Negotiat.on-An Opportum > to Quantify Fetera
Rraerred and Indian Water Rights in Montana 73 (Mar. 2. 1981) (unpubhshed thes,s, avatlable m Environmental Studies Library. University of Montana).
63. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
64. Jakub. supra note 61.[Vol. 6
iter rights also jits are possible erence to legal
ine negotiating eviate from the benefit of both water rights in
:d in Montana’s legal precedent, uses caused the .fl0 In contrast, erappropriated, s factual difler- y New Mexico’s To win reserved •ion, the Forest : of the purposes ould benefit the : law.
Forest Sendee’s tcedent has thus . First, granting hardships to the ; flows it desires, ;, the problem of 3e rare. Second, e Forest Service ■wnstream users zed instream for Forest streams
Stales Forest Service,
of Forest Service uses, to Quantify Federal ed thesis, available in
will also insure the protection of a large portion of the state's water resources both for public recreation and for the conservation of wildlife and aquatic life.66
Negotiations can also achieve better results concerning reserved rights by allowing the parties to define solid compacts, thereby avoiding the uncertainties of the courtroom caused by the imprecise nature of the reserved rights doctrine. This imprecision, however, could be considered an obstacle to negotiations because it leaves the parties ill-equipped to define bargaining positions.66 Despite this obstacle, the parties will gain by forging ahead with negotiations of reserved rights.
For instance, one reason the reserved rights doctrine remains impre­cise in Montana is because courts have never determined whether Montana s water courts are an adequate forum to adjudicate Indian reserved rights. The Montana Supreme Court's recent acceptance of a petition for a writ of supervisory control on this issue67 has a potential effect on negotiations. The inability of the state water courts to adjudicate Indian reserved water rights would enhance a tribe’s bargaining position, given the state s desire to complete adjudications in the near future. Neverthe­less, even if the Montana Supreme Court rules that the water courts are inadequate, rectifying legislation will undoubtedly be introduced to resolve the water courts’jurisdictional dilemmas. In this light, the parties benefit little by awaiting the outcome of current litigation which might make the reserved rights doctrine more precise. Instead, parties can base negotiating positions on objective, non-legal criteria. Thus, by negotiating, parties can avoid both the uncertainty of judicial precedence and the likelihood of a dissatisfactory court decree and numerous appeals.
A good example of the problems caused by the uncertainty of litigation is Wyoming’s litigation of Indian reserved rights for the Wind River system. In 1983, a Wyoming district court decided the nature of reserved water rights for the Arapahoe and Shoshone tribes of the Wind River Reservation.68 The district court’s ruling significantly reduced the
65. Proleciion of these resources isa state water policvconsidcration for Montana Mont Code Ann. §§ 85-1-101(5); 85-2-101(2) (1983).
66. G ETCHES, supra note 55 at 158.
67. See State ex re!. Greely v. Water Court, No. 84-333 (Mont. Dec. 18, 1984) (41 St. Rep. 2373). Two distinct legal issues are currently unresolved: (1) Does a state court have subject matter over Indians* reserved water rights pursuant to the McCarren Amendment—which waived the United States sovereign immunity for adjudication of federal water rights in river svstems—or does the disclaimer provision in Montana’s Enabling Act, now incorporated in the stale Constitution—which disclaims jurisdiction over Indian lands—take precedent, prohibiting state water courts from adjudication of Indian water rights? (2) Can the United States adequate!} represent the potentially conflicting interests of both Indian and non-Indian reservations simultaneously in adjudications before the water courts?
68. The General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System and All17g PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW |VoL 6
c p;-,I W-ucr Master's recommendations for tribal water rights; simuha-
ssxzzzxz
number of risks. The next section d.scusses these risks.
V. Risks Involved in Negotiation
A. Failure to Settle
Failure to settle is a visible risk of negotiations. If no compactms reached after many months and many dollars a once pos. tve
transforms into what appears to be , tw0 ears t0
Originally, the legislature^ave: he G™- ^ d J!ine t0
^“SSSSil SSSHglis
officials risk allegations that the stat i gi i g iation syslem
VVhil^neither^f these contentions are based on fact or Judical precedent,
Other Sources, State of Wyoming- No. 101-234 (D. Wyo. May 5, 1983).
Z Interview with Michae, White, Assistant Attorney General for Wyoming (Feb. ,9. ,985).
I Appeals seem particuiarly htely with respect to,he interpretation of thebecrec as i, applies
to the private parties involved. Id. accompanying text, illustrate the risk
af or .nten. ne,0t,ri0nS yrle,^ ne,
75. Ch. 26k. § X, Laws of Mont. (19X1).
7(, s Bill 28. supra note 51.
77. Gnrnvs. supra note 55. at 85.
7is. Id.1985]
the emotional response that water issues evoke make such contentions realistic problems for the negotiating parties.
If these political obstacles become strong enough to preclude the possibility of finding some middle ground between the state and federal interests, the chances of reaching a compact are severely reduced. To give reserved rights negotiations a chance of success, the parties must at a minimum agree on three basic principles:
(1) The state must recognize Indian property rights in water, and Indian desires to make their reservations economically viable entities.79
(2) The state must recognize federal rights for instream flow uses on non-Indian federal lands.80
(3) The Indians and federal agencies must recognize the state’s interest in upholding state water users’ appropriative rights.81
Political divisions within either party could easily preclude mutual acceptance of these basic premises. The Commission attempts to avoid the emotional political issues by maintaining an open, cooperative negotiating environment while providing respect for each other’s interests. Instead of resolving political unrest, the Commission works on resolving the practical problems of water supply and demand.88 To date this attitude has allowed at least initial acceptance of these three basic premises by the negotiating parties and has kept talks progressing forward.
Although the risk of no settlement appears great, the negative effects of no settlement are mitigated by the education gained by the parties through the negotiating process. Even if no settlement is reached, the parties will have addressed much of the legal and technical work necessary to litigation and will have gained an inside view of the other party’s concerns. Thus, the time spent on the negotiating process is never wasted time.
B. Inability to Abide by Compacts
A second risk in negotiations is the possibility that one of the parties will not ratify or abide by a signed agreement.88 The Commission’s initial negotiations with the Fort Peck Indian Tribe illustrate this second risk.
In early 1983, a compact between the Fort Peck Tribe and the Commission was reached. The Tribe then began securing approval for the
79. Russell, supra note 61 at 85.
81. Marcia Rundic, supra note 54.
82. C. Marseille, Conflict Management: Negotiating Indian Water Rights 18 (Lincoln Institute of Land Policy (1983)).
83. Patton, supra note 55, at 551.i7i«fiPiTT'-i niffs
180 PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6
compact from their Council.81 On March 4, 1983. however, the Commis­sion decided not to seek legislative ratification. Their decision w as based on several factors.
First, other state agencies—The Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (DNRC), the Attorney General's Office, and the Umernor s Office, all expressed strong reservations about the jurisdiction, administration and enforcement terms in the compact. Representatives rom these agencies attended the negotiation sessions, but the Commission and hort Peck Tribe negotiators—each endowed with full negotiating powers-wrote the compact without input from the state agencies Lacking the support of these executive agencies, the Commission felt there was little chance of getting legislative approval.86
Second, the state was still anxiously awaiting the United States Supreme Court decision m Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Aruona San Carlos could have changed the bargaining positions of the parties by eliminating Montana’s jurisdiction of Indian reserved water rights. Although San Carlos has since been decided, the jurisdictional issue remains in question in Montana.87
Finally, the 1983 legislative session was nearing an end. Ratification of a new compact which covered such a controversial matter was unlikely during the 1983 session. y
The state’s inability to ratify the 1983 Fort Peck Compact was in large
part due to lack of communication between the Commission and state agencies^ o strengthen the cohesiveness and communication between itself and slate agencies, the Commission signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the agencies after the failure of the Fort Peck Compact. 8 This agreement provides that the Commission shall give sufficient notice to the Governor, Attorney General's Office and the DNRC ofallits meetings, mcludingall.strategy meetings and negotiating sessions to insure the state agencies’ participation. As a result, the agencies’ representatives now actually voice their comments and advice during
8*1. M ARsi iLi.ti, supra.
Oci.*5. XT'™' WllH ° SC0U Br0W"' Pr°gram Manager for lhc Wa,er C^mpact Commission.
86. San Carlas Apache Tribe, 103 S. Ct. 3201 (1983)
as a mLcrol <*“•* held the,whelher a sla.e court hasjurisdiclion
h h J adjudicate federal reserved water rights held by the U.S in trust for Indians
,187 II 1 SlalC C0U,t- NOrlhern Chc>cnm *-Adsi,.72I F.2d
• 10/. i iviii Lir. 1983). See also Greelv. supra note 67
(Nov'8:,. in"rVi'“ W,‘h Chrb TWKI���’ Attorney General, Helena. Montana
Rieht!f „n!n"Tr‘iUm-°r ***”“< °c' l0«S I9M (Momma Reserved Water
nights ( omputt Commission. Helena. Montana).[Vol. 6
the Commis- was based on
a! Resources ice, and the jurisdiction, Dresentatives Commission negotiating te agencies, ion felt there
nited States he Tribe of sitions of the >erved water urisdictional
Ratification was unlikely
.was in large Dn and state ion between orandum of • Fort Peck i shall give 1 the DNRC ing sessions, te agencies’ vice during
.iCt Commission,
hasjurisdiclion trust for Indians Adsit.72I F.2d
elena, Montana
meetings and regularly submit written comments to the Commission *° This involvement during the entire compact process will hopefully strengthen the state’s organization, provide agency input at the most opportune time, and increase the support for a negotiated settlement within state government.
Even after ratification, the risk that a compact will not be incorpo­rated into a final decree for a water basin remains. Recent state legislation clarifying Montana’s position on the treatment of a ratified compact in the water court significantly reduces this risk. This legislation better informs the negotiating tribes and federal agencies of the possible objections to the compact that the state may entertain from parties not involved in the negotiations.
Senate Bill 28, passed by the 1985 Montana legislature,*1 states that after a compact is incorporated into the preliminary decree for a water basin, the water courts have authority to hear objections to the compact by the DN RC, a person named in the preliminary decree, or any person upon a showing of good cause. If a court sustains an objection, it may declare the compact void, but the court may not modify the negotiated compact in any way except with the prior written consent of the compacting parties. Unless the water courts sustain an objection, the terms of negotiated compacts must be included in the final decree.
The extent to which negotiated compacts might be either changed through negotiations after a hearing on objections or declared void by the water courts remains unknown. Nevertheless, by creating an orderly process by which objections can be made to compacts during preliminary decree proceedings in the water courts. Montana has increased the likelihood that compacts will be incorporated into final decrees.
Despite the presence of these two risks, the Commission’s steps to reduce them demonstrate that the risks are not insurmountable. Even with inherent risks, negotiating reserved rights presents clear advantages over the traditional methods of resolving the rights through court.
On April 24,1985, the Montana legislature ratified the newly written Fort Peck Compact—the first reserved water rights compact to be submitted to the state legislature. The 1985 Fort Peck Compact is solid evidence that Montana will realize the opportunities presented by negoti­ating federal reserved water rights. Fort Peck negotiations have avoided
90. Randle, supra note 84.
91. S. Bill 28, supra note 51. amending Mont. Code Ann. §§ 85-2-217,-224,-223,-233,-234,- 702, and -704 (1983).182
extensive court costs and potentially yield a better result for both the Fort Peck tribe and the people of Montana.*1 In addition, the Fort Peck negotiations demonstrate that the risks of either failing to settle or to gain state ratification can be overcome.
The Commission has cleared the major hurdles in the negotiating process: much technical data is collected, formats for negotiating are designed, compacts are being drafted, and the negotiating parties are now educated on the other parties’ motivations and concerns. As evidenced by the Fort Peck Compact, the Commission is now ready to form tight, feasible reserved rights compacts statewide. Clearly, the high water is subsiding; with each negotiating session, the rapids along the course of reserved rights resolution become more manageable.
92. For example, the Fort Peck-Montana Compact allows for possible future economic opportunities to the Tribes in water marketing, insures the state that theTribes will not claim any water frpm the nearby and overappropriated Milk River Basin, and provides that neither party will be permitted to degrade or deplete the groundwater resource.
SOCATS: |
On Novemb Appeals handed: Toxic Sprays, Management (Bl environmental as the safety of a I subsequent Nati; brought against c disclosure mand* mandate heralckj environmental acj
In 1979, a gr- enjoin the BLM
1. 720F.2d 1475(1 [hereinafter cited as S
2. The worst case promulgated in 1979,
I 1502.22 incomp!
When an agemi an environmental ir: uncertainty, the ag> uncertainty exists. I
(a) If the inf among alternatives the agency shall ini
(b) If(I)the among alternatives; (2) the information i obtain it are not kno agency shall weigh t impacts were the act include a worst case occurrence.
3. 42 U.S.C. IS 4:PUBLIC
NOTICE TO WATER USERS (PURSUANT TO SECTION 85-2-307, MCA)
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT THE FOLLOWING APPLICATION HAS BEEN SUBMITTED FOR CHANGE OF APPROPRIATION WATER RIGHT IN THE
APPLICATION NO. 41T-G(WU61638-00
IX RANCH CO PO BOX 489
CLAIMED WATER RIGHT
WATER RIGHT NO:41T-W161638-Q0 WITH A
41T-W161639-00 WITH A 41T-W161665-00 .WITH A 41T-W161666-00 WITH A
PRIORITY DATE OF AUGUST 3, 189 6 PRIORITY DATE OF MARCH 3, 1897 PRIORITY DATE OF AUGUST 4, 1899 PRIORITY DATE OF JUNE 25, 1898-
PAST USE OF WATER
WATER IS DIVERTED FROM EAGLE CREEK AT THREE SEPARATE POINTS LOCATED IN THE NESESW, SEC 28, TWP 27N, RGE 15E, NWSWNW, SEC 20, TWP 2 6N, RGE 15E, AND SENWSE, SEC 17, TWP 26N, RGE 15E, CHOUTEAU COUNTY. WATER FROM THE DIVERSION IN SEC 17 IS STORED IN AN EXISTING 1003 ACRE-FOOT OFFSTREAM RESERVOIR LOCATED IN THE W2SW, SEC 28, TWP 26N, RGE 15E. DIVERSION FOR THESE FOUR WATER RIGHTS OCCURS FROM MARCH 1 TO SEPTEMBER 30. THE COMBINED CLAIMED RATE IS 37.5 CFS UP TO 3160 ACRE-FEET PER YEAR. USE IS FLOOD IRRIGATION ON A TOTAL OF 417 ACRES IN SECTIONS 5, 20, 32, AND 33 OF TWP 2 6N, RGE 15E, AND SECTIONS 32 AND 33 OF TWP 27N, RGE 15E, CHOUTEAU COUNTY.
PROPOSED CHANGE IN POINT OF DIVERSION-, PLACE OF STORAGE, AND PLACE OF
REMARK: APPLICANT PROPOSES TO INSTALL A 350 ACRE PIVOT, IRRIGATING
155 EXISTING ACRES AND 195 NEW ACRES. TO COMPENSATE FOR THESE NEW ACRES, 195 ACRES OF EXISTING FLOOD IRRIGATED LAND WILL BE TAKEN OUT OF PRODUCTION. TWO EXISTING POINTS OF DIVERSION WILL BE USED. A 67 ACRE FIELD WILL CONTINUE TO BE FLOOD IRRIGATED USING THE DIVERSION IN THE NESESW, SEC 28, TWP 27N, RGE 15E. WATER FOR THE PIVOT WILL. BE DIVERTED IN THE SENWSE, SEC 17, TWP 26N, RGE 15E, AND DITCHED TO THE EXISTING OFFSTREAM STORAGE RESERVOIR. WATER WILL BE PUMPED AT 22 00 GPM FROM THE RESERVOIR TO THE PIVOT.
POINTS OF DIVERSION: NESESW, SEC 28, TWP 27N, RGE 15E, AND
SENWSE, SEC 17, TWP 2 6N, RGE 15E, CHOUTEAU COUNTY
PLACE OF USE: 67 ACRES IN THE SE OF SEC 32 AND W2 OF SEC 33, TWP 27N, RGE 15E, AND 350 ACRES IN SECTIONS 32 AND 33 OF TWP 26N, RGE 15E, CHOUTEAU COUNTY
PLACE OF STORAGE: AN EXISTING 1003 ACRE-FOOT OFFSTREAM STORAGE
RESERVOIR IN THE W2SW, SEC 28, TWP 26N, RGE 15E, CHOUTEAU COUNTY® 0 2 ISM
__ OBJECTIONS TO THE ISSUANCE OF THIS APPLICATION MUST BE FILED ON FORM NO. 611, OBJECTION TO APPLICATION. SEND COMPLETED OBJECTION
AND $50*00 FILING FEE TO THE DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND CONSERVATION, 1520 E. 6TH AVE. , HELENA, MT 59620-2301. OBJECTION MUST BE POSTMARKED ON OR BEFORE FEBRUARY 18. 1994. OBJECTION TO
^L^^I0N (F0RM 611) IS AVAILABLE AT THE OFFICE OF THE COUNTY CLERK AND RECORDER OR FROM THIS DEPARTMENT UPON REQUEST. ASSISTANCE OR QUESTIONS REGARDING THIS APPLICATION SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO THE LOCAL
5950X> :pH^y406^2 65-5516FF"''C^/ 1?°8 " 2“ ^ ?° B°X 1828'
PUBLISHED IN: THE MOUNTAINEER ON 2/2/94
Regional Director, Bureau of Reclamation Attn: Jim Rawlings
Attn: Dave Pennington FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND COMMENT
John Lange, Department of Justice
Yvomie—Knight, Native American Rights Fund
Title Montana Water Law
Date Original 1984; 1985; 1986; 1987; 1988; 1989; 1990
Filename 3H Montana Water Law.pdf
Transcript RATIONAL INDIAN LAW LIBRARY 005353 TAMING THE RAPIDS: NEGOTIATION OF FEDERAL RESERVED WATER RIGHTS IN MONTANA Jody Miller . . . Myjoy was boundless. I had learnt the true practice of law. 1 had learnt to find out the better side of human nature and to enter men s hearts. I realized that the true function of a lawyer was to unite parties riven asunder. The lesson was so indelibly burnt into me that a large part of my time during the twenty years of my practice as a lawyer was occupied in bringing about private compromises of hundreds of cases. I lost nothing thereby—not even money, certainly not my soul. —Mahatma Gandhi I. Introduction Water, one of the West’s most treasured resources, is the center of numerous volatile controversies. Water issues evoke emotional responses; ranchers, recreationists, and developers, as well as government agencies and Indian tribes, each have their own views on the best use of water. Thus, when controversies arise over water rights, disagreement and conflict over a wide range of philosophical and economical interests ensue. This comment addresses one of the chief sources of water rights controversies, the doctrine of federal,reserved water rights. This judicial doctrine, first recognized in 19081 to insure that lands set aside by Congress for a particular purpose had adequate water,2 has from its inception juxtaposed private and state interests against the federal government. Traditionally, reserved rights conflicts have been resolved through litiga­tion. But each new conflict over reserved water rights has required a turbulent journey down a course fraught with uncertainties. After nearly 80 years of shaping and defining the nature of reserved rights in the courts, many aspects of reserved rights still remain unresolved. Since 1979, Montana has accelerated its efforts to determine water rights statewide;8 but the scores of unquantified and unqualified reserved rights for both Indian and non-Indian federal reservations leave the state in a worrisome quandry, and threaten to stall or even bring to a stop the slate's adjudicatory process. Rather than forcing the resolution of reserved rights through the courts, Montana has taken an innovative approach to solve the unresolved reserved rights by initiating negotiations between the Indian 1. Winers v. United Slates, 207 U.S. 564 {190S). infra notes 4-7 and accompanying text. 2. D. Getches. Water Law in a Nutshell 291 (1984). 3. S. Bill 76. enacted May 11,1979. i 979 Mont. Laws 1901 (codified at Mont. Code Ann S 8«- 2-211 to -243 (1983)). ' ‘168 PUBLIC LAXD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6 mmmm rights. II. AN Overview of Federal Reserved Water Rights issssssss priority over diversions made by settlers upstream after the reservation w j;| and ^1“court explicitly8 addressed the firs, issue, whether — -SU. ^ z * *<5 «s 4. 207 U.S. 564 (1908). 6. By £ m^nl-eteenth century. — „» had on the.prtor appropriations doctrine Founded upon concep«««Ily P»> »l»l ’S. ^oi^Conrthadintp, purposes was also an implies. ,, w, This case distinpuished •'public lands" which were Power Commission v. Oregon. 349 U.S. 4 . .. land}> which had been withdrawn from unqualifiedly subject Cmn hcld lhat the Desert Und Act did not apply to the public domain for some olbe, purpose hw. See A. Stone. reservations; hence all reserved lands were essentia 1> fre.c .rent Montana Water Law Fos The 19«rs 110 11*11[Vol. 6 1985] TAMING THE RAPIDS 169 commis- reserved ucated as i consider jnt of the Montana’s plores the ;te parties ved water ghts result of a 3d States.4 that when \ Montana Indians to iter rights ative water -vation had. rights had rvation was i torrent of iding: (1) dates; (3) urisdiction; ie, whether :s systems based prior appropria- put to good use. over later users. is for non-Indian lands in Federal nds” which were withdrawn from did not apply to Sec A. Stone, reserved rights applied to non-Indian reservations, in 1963, in Arizona v. California.* In Arizona, the Court assigned reserved rights to both Indian10 and non-Indian11 federal reservations. One year later, the decree quantifying these rights12 treated the two types of reserved rights identi­cally.13 Arizona's extension of the Winters rationale is logical: if Congress reserves public land for a particular purpose which requires the use of water, the Congressional act of reserving such land, Indian or non-Indian, implies an intention to reserve sufficient water to carry out that purpose. Since Arizona, no question remains that the reserved rights doctrine extends to all federal reservations. The Supreme Court appeared to settle the second issue, priority dates for Indian reserved water rights, by designating priority as of the date the reservation was created by Congress.14 A recent Ninth Circuit case, United States v. Adairhowever, carved out an exception to the longstanding rule by extending the priority date back to time immemorial for certain Indian rights.16 Adair is of little consequence for most Indian reservations created before other rights were established, since the Indian right would already have priority over other state users.17 Priority dates for reserved water rights on non-Indian reservations have unequivocably been held to be the date the reservation was created.18 The third issue, quantification of federal reserved rights, has been defined and limited by courts based on the reservation’s “purpose.”18 Although Congress usually fixed the purpose of a reservation at the time of creation, the quantity of water necessary to meet this purpose was not fixed. A reservation's stated purpose may be interpreted as requiring varying quantities of water; thus, quantification of reserved rights has become a 9. 373 U.S. 546 (1963). 10. The following five Indian reservations in Arizona, California and Nevada were involved: Chemchuevi, Cocopah, Yuma, Colorado River and Fort Mohave. Id. at 595 n.97. 11. The following non-Indian federal reservations were involved: Lake Mead National Recrea­tional Area, Havasu Lake National Wildlife Refuge. Imperial National Wildlife Refuge, Gila National Forest, and Boulder City, Nevada. Id. at 601. 12. 376 U.S. 340 (1964). 13. Id. See also Stone, supra note 8, at 112. 14. 207 U.S. at 577. 15. 723 F.2d 1394 (1984). In Adair, the treaty creating the Klamath Indian reservation recognized the Tribe’s continued right to support its hunting and fishing lifestyle. Thus, the Ninth Circuit held that the reserved federal right's priority date was the time the use began—lime immemorial. 16. Id. 17. Getches. supra note 2. at 302. 18. See. e.g., Arizona v. California. 376 U.S. at 343-44. 19. Cappaert v. United Stales. 426 U.S. 128, 141 (1976). “The implied-reservation-of-water- rights doctrine, however, reserves only that amount of water necessary to fulfill the purpose of the reservation, no more.”170 20 rL BLIC LAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6 maior issue 26 For Indian reservations in particular, where the specific “purpose" was often unarticulated,2' the reserved right may be potentially Ver>' S'for non-Indian reservations, where the Congressional purpose was usually more explicit, quantification of reserved n;ghtsj.* been Su^renKC ou n q u a mified reserved rights for the Rio Mimbres River in the pS,rl^ded management obligations from the Multiple Use Susta"ef Yiel‘!hACt ^ 1960 (MUSYA).21 The Court rejected this claim, holding that the purposes were limited to those expressly stated in the Organic Act of which created the National Forest system.25 , New Mexico not only established that reserved rights do not exist for the secondary purposes of a federal reservation;26 it also explicitly refused to grant reserved rights for instream flows on national forests. ■ Althoug the extent of New Mexico’s rejection of reserved rights for instream flows continues to be tested, arguments m two subsequent non-Indiani cases have failed to convince courts that reserved rights can be granted fo instream flow uses.29 £ SSXU «7 F.2d .2. 42 C,). U.S. 1092 (1981). 22. 43b U.S. 696 (1978). 23. Id. at 700. 23. Id. at - »>J. g6*517 § 1 74Slat.215 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 52b (1952)). MUSYA r^nbTlha'; -the'na.ionalfbrests established and shall be administered for outdoor A ‘ . 1 -. ._ m„..n, waler flows- and (2) to furnish a continuous supply of .imber fo. th d,te f«r r™ must be cUHned fo, one °YX’««7rr'^on/iry pulses were those established by MUSYA, see supra note 24. o7 4W U S e.^Of RiEhtsto^nstreamflows^reservetheflowofwaterwothmthe^ueentbed and a"re genera 11 v the type of flows needed forthefish.wildlifeand recreational purposes of MUSV A. as purpose of, he le^entio- wns tomatntain a huntingand fishing way ofhfe.Ser. e.g.. » n,ton. 64, F..d at 48; and Adair. 723 F 2d at 1410. (1982). the »• S- " wildlife protection Fores, Service med v rum the MUSYA declaration in Aew S S»« v. A,pin; Land * Reservoir Co.. 692 F,d 85, ,9th Cir.,. eer,.[Vol. 6 ere the specific sy be potentially ^ssional purpose rights has been xico,2Z the U.S. bres River in the or creating the jrposes included •ed Yield Act of olding that the anic Act of 1897 .s do not exist for explicitly refused rests.27 Although or instream flows Dn-Indian cases26 n be granted for 1985] TAMING THE RAPIDS 171 ). ceri. denied. 454 U.S. 16 U.S.C. § 528 (1982)). administered for outdoor . two purposes under the supply of limber for the essing an intent to insure 1W .Id. at 712. The Court forests must be claimed JSYA. see supra note 24. jer within the streambed. 1 purposes of MUSY A, as -,a. •,as been established that a ce.c.g.. Walton. 647 F.2d 656 P.2d 1 (1982), the and wildlife protection SYA declaration in New d this argument, claiming essal of this issue in New F.2d 851 (9th Cir.), cert. Quantification of reserved rights involves determining not only the purpose for which the water was reserved, but also how to measure water for that purpose. In Arizona v. California,ao the Supreme Court pro­nounced a method of using “practicably irrigable acres” to determine the quantity of reserved water for Indian reservations with an agricultural purpose. No other consistently applied methods have evolved. The fourth issue, permissible uses, was settled for Indian situations in a 1979 Supplemental Decree to Arizona v. California.31 There, the Supreme Court held that although the quantity of reserved rights for Indian reservations was based on practicably irrigable acres, this “shall not constitute a restriction of the usage of [the rights] to irrigation or other agricultural application.”32 Thus, while the purpose of the Indian reserva­tion limits the quantity of rights reserved, once quantified, the rights may be put to uses other than those for which they were quantified.33 Confusion arises, however, when an Indian reserved water right is used by either a successor or lessee of the original holder. A recent case on this issue, Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton?* held that when an Indian allottee conveyed his individual allotment to a non-Indian, the Indian also conveyed his share of the tribes’ reserved water right, provided that the non-Indian purchaser used the right diligently.36 Non-use by successors of the Indian allottee, therefore, would result in the loss of the dented, 104 S. Ct. 193 (1983), the Forest Service again tried to win instream flow rights for a National Forest river. This time, the Forest Service argued that instream flows for the the Carson River were necessary to fulnil purposes of the Toiyabe National Forest under the Organic Act. The Court rejected this claim, holding that the existing water rights of users located downstream of the Toiyabe National Forest alone would suffice to ensure that the national forest would have the minimal flows essential for Organic Act purposes. Id. at 859. In a case currently before the United Stales District Court in Colorado, In re Application for ater Rights of the United States in Water Division 3, Slate of Colorado, No. 79-CW85 (D. Colo filed .U 2d •' 9I9K Xie .United Slates is cIaimin? reserved water rights for instream flows to national forests »n the Rio Grande basin of southern Colorado. The United States claims certain flows are needed to prevent the clogging of stream channels by sediment to maintain the ability of the channels to handle high flows that might otherwise cause erosion and degrade timber resources. This time, the Forest Service hopes to have perfected hydrological field techniques which definitely quantify an instream flow need for the Organic Act purpose of conserving water flows which was identified in New Mexico 30. 373 U.S. 546 (1963). 31. 439 U.S. 419 (1979). 32. Id. at 4*22. 33. In the supplemental decree to Arizona, the Supreme Court further indicated that once quantified, the right is fixed; changing the type of use made of the reserved water will not disturb the initial quantification. Id. 34. 647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981). 35. Id. at 51. The Ninth Circuit has since clarified this holding in the appeal of the District Court s decision on remand. Colville Confederated Tribe* v. Walton. 752 F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1985). It is the immediate grantee of the original Indian allottee who must exerciseduediiigence to perfect his or her inchoate right to the allottee's share of the reserved right, not later successors. Id. at 402.172 PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6 unused portion of his reserved right.86 This holding potentially gives non- Indian successors of Indian allottees a superior right over homestead­ers—at least to the extent that the non-Indian successor diligently uses his share of the reservation's reserved water—since homesteaders usually have priority dates later than the date the reservation was established. Although the Ninth Circuit asked the Supreme Court for a more definitive resolution of the issues before it, none have been forthcoming.37 The fifth issue, jurisdiction, centers on the United States’ waiver of immunity in the McCarren Amendment.88 The Supreme Court has unequivocably declared that the McCarren Amendment subjects the United States to the jurisdiction of state courts for the adjudication of federal reserved water rights.86 Enabling Acts for some states, like Montana, however, disclaim jurisdiction over Indian lands;40 thus, whether these disclaimer clauses remove state jurisdiction for adjudicating reserved rights on Indian lands remains to be decided. Recently, in Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Arizona,41 the Supreme Court held that even in states with these disclaimer clauses, the McCarren Amendment still allows state jurisdiction for the quantification of Indian water rights if a general stream adjudication is underway.42 The sixth issue, administration of reserved water rights, might also be resolved by looking to the McCarren Amendment, since section (a)(2) of the Amendment waived the United States’ immunity from being joined in 36. 647 F.2d at 51. 37. Id. at 54 n.18. 38. The McCarren Amendment provides in relevant part: (a) consent is given to join the United States as a defendant in any suit (1) for the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system or other source, or (2) for the administration of such rights, where it appears that the United States is the owner of or is in the process of acquiring water rights by appropriation under state law. by purchase, by exchange, or otherwise, and the United States is a necessary party to such suit. 43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1982). 39. Stone, supra note 8, at 118, citing United States v. Dist. Court in and for the County of Eagle. 401 U.S. 520 (1971); United Slates v. Dist. Court in and for the Water Div. Number 5.401 U.S. 527 (1971); and Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). 40. The Federal Enabling Act for the State of Montana, Act of Feb. 22,1889, ch. 180. § 4. part 2, 25 Slat. 676. con tains a disclaimer of any state jurisdiction with respect to Indian lands. This disclaimer was incorporated into both the 1889 Montana Constitution. Mont. Const, of 1889, art. I, § 2. and the 1972 Montana Constitution, Mont. Const art. I: All provisions of the enabling act of Congress including the agreement and declaration that all lands owned or held by any Indian or Indian tribes shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United Stales, continue in full forceand effect until revoked b> the consent of the United Slates and the people of Montana. id. 41. 103 S. Cl. 3201 (1983). 42. Id. at 3214-15. See also State ex rel. Grecly v. Water Court, infra note 67 and accompanying1985] TAMING THE RAPIDS 173 [Vol. 6 itially gives non- over homcstead- '.iligently uses his steaders usually was established, a more definitive ocoming.37 States’ waiver of reme Court has :ent subjects the e adjudication of ;ome states, like in lands;40 thus, n for adjudicating cently,in/4r/rono e Court held that rren Amendment iian water rights if ghts, might also be e section (a)(2) of om being joined in my suit (I) for the •ource, or (2) for the s the owner of or is in aw, by purchase, by v to such suit. t in and for the County of :rDiv.Numbcr5.40! U.S. tes, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). 2.1889.ch. 180,14. pan 2, dian lands. This disclaimer of 5 889,art. 1, § 2,and the ment and declaration :in under the absolute in full force and effect of Montana. any suil for the administration of water rights.43 As in the jurisdictional issues, the Supreme Court has consistently deferred to stale water law for administration of reserved rights for non-Indian reservations.44 at least to the extent that it does not interfere with the purpose for which a reservation was created. Administration of reserved water rights differs for Indian reserva­tions, however, since it is presumed that no state regulatory powers exist over Indian reservations.46 Although the U.S. Supreme Court never ruled on who should administer Indian reserved water rights, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals formulated a balancing test between stale and tribal interests.46 Factors considered in this test include: infringement on the tribe's right to self government, impact on the tribe's economic welfare, impacts from the use of reserved water off the reservation, whether the water is navigable or entirely within the reservation, and the extent to which the reservation uses water for agricultural or fishery needs.47 Administration of reserved water rights on Indian reservations thus varies considerably depending on the facts of each situation. Although all of the six issues which resulted from creation of the reserved rights doctrine in 1908 have at least been judicially addressed, several of the issues—quantification, permissible uses, jurisdiction, and administration—still remain unclear. Montana's approach to resolving these unclear issues through negotiation is described in the following section. III. Montana’s Negotiating Framework Since the early 1970's, Montana has undertaken massive efforts to systematically determine water rights statewide. In 1979, Montana’s legislature revised the adjudication provisions of the 1973 Water Use Act,48 by creating an independent water courts for the comprehensive adjudication of water rights in the state. Recognizing the inherent difficulties of litigating federal reserved water rights, the 1979 legislature also created the Montana Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission 43. See supra note 37. 44. Mexico, 438 U.S. at 701-02 n.5. 45. See Act of Aug. 15,1953, ch. 505. Pub. L. No. 280, §£ 2.4, 67 Stat. 588. 589. which excepts the grant to certain stales jursidiction over water rights or the regulation thereof (codified in relevant part at 28U.S.C.§ 1360(b) and 18 U.S.C.§ 1162(b) (1982)).See25 U.S.C. §§ 1321(b). 1322(b) (1982). 46. United States v. Anderson. 736 F.2d 1358, 1365 (9th Cir. 1984). 47. Id. at 1365-66. 48. S. Bill 76. see supra note 3. revised the Montana Water Use Act of 1973,1973 Laws of Mont. 1121. See Stone, supra note 8. at 1-9 for the background and implementation of S. Bill 76 and the Montana Water Use Act. .i note 67 and accompanying174 PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6 (Commission)*® to negotiate reserved water claims by Indian tribes and federal agencies in Montana. The nine permanently appointed members the Commission have full power to negotiate and sign compacts on beha The legislature designed the negotiating process to be an integral part of the water courts adjudications. If an Indian tribe or federal agenc chooses to negotiate its claim to federal reserved water rights, adjudicat on is suspended in the water courts.®' A compact, once signed b the negotiating parties, must be ratified by the state legislature and he tribal governing body and approved by the appropriate federal authority. Upon ratification, the water courts will incorporate the terms of the compact int a preliminary decree for the appropriate basin.®3 Hopefully this process wifi expedite Montana's journey down the uncertain course of reserved n8htTheS°key to running the rapids along this course is flexibility. Montana’s framework for resolving reserved rights gives the parties far greater flexibility to create options for mutual gam than are available through litigation. The next section examines these opportunities. IV. Opportunities Presented by Negotiations A. Process Efficiency The foremost opportunity presented by the Commission’s negotiation process is the chance to resolve reserved rights more efficiently. Litigation often gets mired in procedural issues; hence, many cases are tried primarily 49. Mont. Code Ann. § 2-15-212 (1983). 51' W § 85-2-217. as amended by S. Bill 28, which was passed by the 49lh Montana leeislatore on April 24, 1985, and signed into law on April 30.1985. The snspens.on is effect,ve un.,1 July 1.198 . 52 Id $ 85-2-702(3), as amended by S. Bill 28. See supra note 51. 53'. ACS. Bill 16,supra note ^'se^®®'^'^Q®^e*jQ2^nJ83^Si(Jadju!iiMtr watertight! All this writing May 1985. the Commission has completed negotiations with the Assimbome,,nd Siou and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, and'^tbe ^1 ackfcet Tribe are considering SSSSSSSSa^ssg Defense has had preliminary discussions with the Comm.sston. Interv.ew wuh Marc. Rundle. M y 10. 1985.[Vol. 6 1985] TAM1SG THE RAPIDS 175 an tribes and d members of icts on behalf a integral part ideral agency , adjudication igned by the and the tribal hority.62 Upon t compact into iy this process ■se of reserved is flexibility, the parties far i are available artunities. TIONS an's negotiation rntly. Litigation i tried primarily h Montana legislature ;ive until July 1.1987. •r divisions and created icate water rights. All ies and corporations by tune 30,1983. Id. § 85- iistrict, or part thereof. -2-234. tions. As of the time of Assiniboinc and Sioux eyenne Tribe, the Fort he Confederated Salish Turtle Mountain Tribe ; Tribe are considering with the National Park it. The Department of h Marcia Rundle, May on procedural questions alone. While procedural protections are vital to fair litigation, it is the substantive issues, not the procedure, which usually motivate the parties to resort to litigation in the first place.65 Negotiations can bypass these procedural issues inherent in litigation, and bring the parties to the substantive problems of resolving reserved rights more efficiently. Thus, bypassing procedural issues not only reduces emotional rivalry between parties, but may also result in saving court time and expenses. Some expenses involved in resolving reserved rights, however, simply cannot be avoided. For example, accumulation of enough technical data for the parties to make a reasonable assessment of the extent of the tribe or federal agency’s claim5® is needed whether the parties negotiate or litigate. Therefore, although negotiating reserved rights may reduce court ex­penses, negotiating is not free of cost. Although Montana’s negotiation process could conceivably be more efficient than litigation, to date this efficiency has yet to be demonstrated. The Commission was formed in 1979, and six years later only one Indian tribe has signed a compact.67 Since this is Montana’s first attempt to settle reserved rights, the initial delay may be understandable. Time is needed to educate Commission members, gather technical data, and decide upon procedures between the negotiating tribes and agencies. While these functions of the negotiating process seem time consuming, they do add to the long-term benefits of negotiation. For example, educating opposing parties will have positive future effects. When leaders of these parties debate related issues in the future, the education gained through this negotiation process will surface, bringing unprecedented appreciation of the opposing parties’ purposes.68 Much of the time required to educate parties and collect data is now behind the Commission, the negotiating tribes and the federal agencies; the process of writing compacts is now underway. Clearly, Montana has recognized the opportunity of efficiency presented by negotiating reserved rights; the next few years will tell whether this opportunity will be fully realized. 55. L. Patton. Sealing Environmental Disputes: The Experience with and Future of Environmental Mediation, 14 Envtl. L. Rev. 547. 550 (1984). 56. To illustrate, the technical data needed to prove a reserved rights agricultural claim includes: a soils irrigation suitability lest, tests of groundwater quantity and quality, possibility of constructing a water delivery system and the economic feasibility of agricultural development. D. Getches. D. Rosenfeit, C. Wilkenson, Federal Indian Law (Supp. 1979 at 161). 57. Fort Peck - Montana Compact, signed into law by Governor Scbwinden on May 15, 1985. approved by the Tribal Executive Council on April 29. 1985. 58. Watson &. Danielson, Environmental Mediation, 15 Nat. Resources Law 687. 714 (1983)176 PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6 B. Belter Resuhs Negotiating, rather than adjudicating, reserved water presents the opportunity for better results Enhanced results are pomWe because negotiations free parties both from str.ct adherence to legal precedence and from the uncertainties of the courtroom. Although the parties rely on legal precedent to define negotm g positions, compacts reached through negotiations can dev'ate from the exact outcome expected in the courts-perhaps to the benefit of bo h parties. A look at Forest Service claims to reserved water rights in Montana illustrates this point. . If the Forest Service’s reserved rights were adjudicated in Montana s water court, the court would be bound by New Mexico’s- legal precedent In New Mexico, conflicts between private diversionary uses caused the litigation over water rights to the Rio Mimbres River. In contrast, National Forest streams in Montana are generally not overappropnated, hence conflicts over private rights are rare." Despite this factual differ- ence the Forest Service in Montana would remain bound by New Mexico s denial of instream flow rights" for purposes of MUSYA. To win.reserve rights for instream flows in Montana through adjudication the Forest Service would have to prove the instream flow needs as one of the PurP«f of the Organic Act." Clearly, negotiating reserved rights would benefit the Forest Service by freeing it from these confines of case law. ^ For the state and people of Montana, negotiating the Forest Service s reserved rights is also desirable-even though judicial precedent has thus far favored the states on non-Indian instream flow issues First, grant ng instream flows for Montana’s National Forests causes no hardships to the state Even if the Forest Service is granted all the instream flows it desires, enough water will remain to satisfy most state uses." Thus, the infringing on upstream users’ diversionary rights would be rare. Second, Montana benefits from negotiating instream flows for the Forest Service becausetnstream flows are never diverted or “used up”; downstream users would essentially be guaranteed the amount of water reserved ins ream for the Forest Service. Granting reserved rights to National Forest stream 59. 438 U.S. 696 (1978). See supra notes 22-29 and accompanying text. t?: Imcw wah urr, JaKub. Oita of ,he GeeenU Cunee!. United States Forest Service. R Russell Federal/State/Tribal Compact Negotiat.on-An Opportum > to Quantify Fetera Rraerred and Indian Water Rights in Montana 73 (Mar. 2. 1981) (unpubhshed thes,s, avatlable m Environmental Studies Library. University of Montana). 63. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 64. Jakub. supra note 61.[Vol. 6 1985) TAMING THE RAPIDS 177 iter rights also jits are possible erence to legal i. ine negotiating eviate from the benefit of both water rights in :d in Montana’s legal precedent, uses caused the .fl0 In contrast, erappropriated, s factual difler- y New Mexico’s To win reserved •ion, the Forest : of the purposes ould benefit the : law. Forest Sendee’s tcedent has thus . First, granting hardships to the ; flows it desires, ;, the problem of 3e rare. Second, e Forest Service ■wnstream users zed instream for Forest streams ext. Stales Forest Service, of Forest Service uses, to Quantify Federal ed thesis, available in will also insure the protection of a large portion of the state's water resources both for public recreation and for the conservation of wildlife and aquatic life.66 Negotiations can also achieve better results concerning reserved rights by allowing the parties to define solid compacts, thereby avoiding the uncertainties of the courtroom caused by the imprecise nature of the reserved rights doctrine. This imprecision, however, could be considered an obstacle to negotiations because it leaves the parties ill-equipped to define bargaining positions.66 Despite this obstacle, the parties will gain by forging ahead with negotiations of reserved rights. For instance, one reason the reserved rights doctrine remains impre­cise in Montana is because courts have never determined whether Montana s water courts are an adequate forum to adjudicate Indian reserved rights. The Montana Supreme Court's recent acceptance of a petition for a writ of supervisory control on this issue67 has a potential effect on negotiations. The inability of the state water courts to adjudicate Indian reserved water rights would enhance a tribe’s bargaining position, given the state s desire to complete adjudications in the near future. Neverthe­less, even if the Montana Supreme Court rules that the water courts are inadequate, rectifying legislation will undoubtedly be introduced to resolve the water courts’jurisdictional dilemmas. In this light, the parties benefit little by awaiting the outcome of current litigation which might make the reserved rights doctrine more precise. Instead, parties can base negotiating positions on objective, non-legal criteria. Thus, by negotiating, parties can avoid both the uncertainty of judicial precedence and the likelihood of a dissatisfactory court decree and numerous appeals. A good example of the problems caused by the uncertainty of litigation is Wyoming’s litigation of Indian reserved rights for the Wind River system. In 1983, a Wyoming district court decided the nature of reserved water rights for the Arapahoe and Shoshone tribes of the Wind River Reservation.68 The district court’s ruling significantly reduced the 65. Proleciion of these resources isa state water policvconsidcration for Montana Mont Code Ann. §§ 85-1-101(5); 85-2-101(2) (1983). 66. G ETCHES, supra note 55 at 158. 67. See State ex re!. Greely v. Water Court, No. 84-333 (Mont. Dec. 18, 1984) (41 St. Rep. 2373). Two distinct legal issues are currently unresolved: (1) Does a state court have subject matter over Indians* reserved water rights pursuant to the McCarren Amendment—which waived the United States sovereign immunity for adjudication of federal water rights in river svstems—or does the disclaimer provision in Montana’s Enabling Act, now incorporated in the stale Constitution—which disclaims jurisdiction over Indian lands—take precedent, prohibiting state water courts from adjudication of Indian water rights? (2) Can the United States adequate!} represent the potentially conflicting interests of both Indian and non-Indian reservations simultaneously in adjudications before the water courts? 68. The General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System and All17g PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW |VoL 6 c p;-,I W-ucr Master's recommendations for tribal water rights; simuha- ssxzzzxz number of risks. The next section d.scusses these risks. V. Risks Involved in Negotiation A. Failure to Settle Failure to settle is a visible risk of negotiations. If no compactms reached after many months and many dollars a once pos. tve transforms into what appears to be , tw0 ears t0 Originally, the legislature^ave: he G™- ^ d J!ine t0 ^“SSSSil SSSHglis officials risk allegations that the stat i gi i g iation syslem VVhil^neither^f these contentions are based on fact or Judical precedent, Other Sources, State of Wyoming- No. 101-234 (D. Wyo. May 5, 1983). Z Interview with Michae, White, Assistant Attorney General for Wyoming (Feb. ,9. ,985). I Appeals seem particuiarly htely with respect to,he interpretation of thebecrec as i, applies to the private parties involved. Id. accompanying text, illustrate the risk af or .nten. ne,0t,ri0nS yrle,^ ne, 75. Ch. 26k. § X, Laws of Mont. (19X1). 7(, s Bill 28. supra note 51. 77. Gnrnvs. supra note 55. at 85. 7is. Id.1985] TAMING THE RAPIDS 179 the emotional response that water issues evoke make such contentions realistic problems for the negotiating parties. If these political obstacles become strong enough to preclude the possibility of finding some middle ground between the state and federal interests, the chances of reaching a compact are severely reduced. To give reserved rights negotiations a chance of success, the parties must at a minimum agree on three basic principles: (1) The state must recognize Indian property rights in water, and Indian desires to make their reservations economically viable entities.79 (2) The state must recognize federal rights for instream flow uses on non-Indian federal lands.80 (3) The Indians and federal agencies must recognize the state’s interest in upholding state water users’ appropriative rights.81 Political divisions within either party could easily preclude mutual acceptance of these basic premises. The Commission attempts to avoid the emotional political issues by maintaining an open, cooperative negotiating environment while providing respect for each other’s interests. Instead of resolving political unrest, the Commission works on resolving the practical problems of water supply and demand.88 To date this attitude has allowed at least initial acceptance of these three basic premises by the negotiating parties and has kept talks progressing forward. Although the risk of no settlement appears great, the negative effects of no settlement are mitigated by the education gained by the parties through the negotiating process. Even if no settlement is reached, the parties will have addressed much of the legal and technical work necessary to litigation and will have gained an inside view of the other party’s concerns. Thus, the time spent on the negotiating process is never wasted time. B. Inability to Abide by Compacts A second risk in negotiations is the possibility that one of the parties will not ratify or abide by a signed agreement.88 The Commission’s initial negotiations with the Fort Peck Indian Tribe illustrate this second risk. In early 1983, a compact between the Fort Peck Tribe and the Commission was reached. The Tribe then began securing approval for the 79. Russell, supra note 61 at 85. 80. Id. 81. Marcia Rundic, supra note 54. 82. C. Marseille, Conflict Management: Negotiating Indian Water Rights 18 (Lincoln Institute of Land Policy (1983)). 83. Patton, supra note 55, at 551.i7i«fiPiTT'-i niffs 180 PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6 compact from their Council.81 On March 4, 1983. however, the Commis­sion decided not to seek legislative ratification. Their decision w as based on several factors. First, other state agencies—The Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (DNRC), the Attorney General's Office, and the Umernor s Office, all expressed strong reservations about the jurisdiction, administration and enforcement terms in the compact. Representatives rom these agencies attended the negotiation sessions, but the Commission and hort Peck Tribe negotiators—each endowed with full negotiating powers-wrote the compact without input from the state agencies Lacking the support of these executive agencies, the Commission felt there was little chance of getting legislative approval.86 Second, the state was still anxiously awaiting the United States Supreme Court decision m Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Aruona San Carlos could have changed the bargaining positions of the parties by eliminating Montana’s jurisdiction of Indian reserved water rights. Although San Carlos has since been decided, the jurisdictional issue remains in question in Montana.87 Finally, the 1983 legislative session was nearing an end. Ratification of a new compact which covered such a controversial matter was unlikely during the 1983 session. y The state’s inability to ratify the 1983 Fort Peck Compact was in large part due to lack of communication between the Commission and state agencies^ o strengthen the cohesiveness and communication between itself and slate agencies, the Commission signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the agencies after the failure of the Fort Peck Compact. 8 This agreement provides that the Commission shall give sufficient notice to the Governor, Attorney General's Office and the DNRC ofallits meetings, mcludingall.strategy meetings and negotiating sessions to insure the state agencies’ participation. As a result, the agencies’ representatives now actually voice their comments and advice during 8*1. M ARsi iLi.ti, supra. Oci.*5. XT'™' WllH ° SC0U Br0W"' Pr°gram Manager for lhc Wa,er C^mpact Commission. 86. San Carlas Apache Tribe, 103 S. Ct. 3201 (1983) as a mLcrol <*“•* held the,whelher a sla.e court hasjurisdiclion h h J adjudicate federal reserved water rights held by the U.S in trust for Indians ,187 II 1 SlalC C0U,t- NOrlhern Chc>cnm *-Adsi,.72I F.2d • 10/. i iviii Lir. 1983). See also Greelv. supra note 67 (Nov'8:,. in"rVi'“ W,‘h Chrb TWKI���’ Attorney General, Helena. Montana Rieht!f „n!n"Tr‘iUm-°r ***”“< °c' l0«S I9M (Momma Reserved Water nights ( omputt Commission. Helena. Montana).[Vol. 6 1985) TAMING THE RAPIDS 181 the Commis- was based on a! Resources ice, and the jurisdiction, Dresentatives Commission negotiating te agencies, ion felt there nited States he Tribe of sitions of the >erved water urisdictional Ratification was unlikely .was in large Dn and state ion between orandum of • Fort Peck i shall give 1 the DNRC ing sessions, te agencies’ vice during .iCt Commission, hasjurisdiclion trust for Indians Adsit.72I F.2d elena, Montana meetings and regularly submit written comments to the Commission *° This involvement during the entire compact process will hopefully strengthen the state’s organization, provide agency input at the most opportune time, and increase the support for a negotiated settlement within state government. Even after ratification, the risk that a compact will not be incorpo­rated into a final decree for a water basin remains. Recent state legislation clarifying Montana’s position on the treatment of a ratified compact in the water court significantly reduces this risk. This legislation better informs the negotiating tribes and federal agencies of the possible objections to the compact that the state may entertain from parties not involved in the negotiations. Senate Bill 28, passed by the 1985 Montana legislature,*1 states that after a compact is incorporated into the preliminary decree for a water basin, the water courts have authority to hear objections to the compact by the DN RC, a person named in the preliminary decree, or any person upon a showing of good cause. If a court sustains an objection, it may declare the compact void, but the court may not modify the negotiated compact in any way except with the prior written consent of the compacting parties. Unless the water courts sustain an objection, the terms of negotiated compacts must be included in the final decree. The extent to which negotiated compacts might be either changed through negotiations after a hearing on objections or declared void by the water courts remains unknown. Nevertheless, by creating an orderly process by which objections can be made to compacts during preliminary decree proceedings in the water courts. Montana has increased the likelihood that compacts will be incorporated into final decrees. Despite the presence of these two risks, the Commission’s steps to reduce them demonstrate that the risks are not insurmountable. Even with inherent risks, negotiating reserved rights presents clear advantages over the traditional methods of resolving the rights through court. VI. Conclusion On April 24,1985, the Montana legislature ratified the newly written Fort Peck Compact—the first reserved water rights compact to be submitted to the state legislature. The 1985 Fort Peck Compact is solid evidence that Montana will realize the opportunities presented by negoti­ating federal reserved water rights. Fort Peck negotiations have avoided Reserved Water 90. Randle, supra note 84. 91. S. Bill 28, supra note 51. amending Mont. Code Ann. §§ 85-2-217,-224,-223,-233,-234,- 702, and -704 (1983).182 PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6 extensive court costs and potentially yield a better result for both the Fort Peck tribe and the people of Montana.*1 In addition, the Fort Peck negotiations demonstrate that the risks of either failing to settle or to gain state ratification can be overcome. The Commission has cleared the major hurdles in the negotiating process: much technical data is collected, formats for negotiating are designed, compacts are being drafted, and the negotiating parties are now educated on the other parties’ motivations and concerns. As evidenced by the Fort Peck Compact, the Commission is now ready to form tight, feasible reserved rights compacts statewide. Clearly, the high water is subsiding; with each negotiating session, the rapids along the course of reserved rights resolution become more manageable. 'i \ sr. 92. For example, the Fort Peck-Montana Compact allows for possible future economic opportunities to the Tribes in water marketing, insures the state that theTribes will not claim any water frpm the nearby and overappropriated Milk River Basin, and provides that neither party will be permitted to degrade or deplete the groundwater resource. SOCATS: | On Novemb Appeals handed: Toxic Sprays, Management (Bl environmental as the safety of a I subsequent Nati; brought against c disclosure mand* mandate heralckj environmental acj In 1979, a gr- enjoin the BLM 1. 720F.2d 1475(1 [hereinafter cited as S 2. The worst case promulgated in 1979, I 1502.22 incomp! When an agemi an environmental ir: uncertainty, the ag> uncertainty exists. I (a) If the inf among alternatives the agency shall ini (b) If(I)the among alternatives; (2) the information i obtain it are not kno agency shall weigh t impacts were the act include a worst case occurrence. 3. 42 U.S.C. IS 4:PUBLIC NOTICE L NOTICE TO WATER USERS (PURSUANT TO SECTION 85-2-307, MCA) NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT THE FOLLOWING APPLICATION HAS BEEN SUBMITTED FOR CHANGE OF APPROPRIATION WATER RIGHT IN THE STATE OF MONTANA: APPLICANT: APPLICATION NO. 41T-G(WU61638-00 IX RANCH CO PO BOX 489 BIG SANDY, MT 59520 CLAIMED WATER RIGHT DECEIVED FEB 11 1994 NATIVE AMERICAN RIGHTS FUND WATER RIGHT NO:41T-W161638-Q0 WITH A 41T-W161639-00 WITH A 41T-W161665-00 .WITH A 41T-W161666-00 WITH A PRIORITY DATE OF AUGUST 3, 189 6 PRIORITY DATE OF MARCH 3, 1897 PRIORITY DATE OF AUGUST 4, 1899 PRIORITY DATE OF JUNE 25, 1898- PAST USE OF WATER WATER IS DIVERTED FROM EAGLE CREEK AT THREE SEPARATE POINTS LOCATED IN THE NESESW, SEC 28, TWP 27N, RGE 15E, NWSWNW, SEC 20, TWP 2 6N, RGE 15E, AND SENWSE, SEC 17, TWP 26N, RGE 15E, CHOUTEAU COUNTY. WATER FROM THE DIVERSION IN SEC 17 IS STORED IN AN EXISTING 1003 ACRE-FOOT OFFSTREAM RESERVOIR LOCATED IN THE W2SW, SEC 28, TWP 26N, RGE 15E. DIVERSION FOR THESE FOUR WATER RIGHTS OCCURS FROM MARCH 1 TO SEPTEMBER 30. THE COMBINED CLAIMED RATE IS 37.5 CFS UP TO 3160 ACRE-FEET PER YEAR. USE IS FLOOD IRRIGATION ON A TOTAL OF 417 ACRES IN SECTIONS 5, 20, 32, AND 33 OF TWP 2 6N, RGE 15E, AND SECTIONS 32 AND 33 OF TWP 27N, RGE 15E, CHOUTEAU COUNTY. PROPOSED CHANGE IN POINT OF DIVERSION-, PLACE OF STORAGE, AND PLACE OF USE REMARK: APPLICANT PROPOSES TO INSTALL A 350 ACRE PIVOT, IRRIGATING 155 EXISTING ACRES AND 195 NEW ACRES. TO COMPENSATE FOR THESE NEW ACRES, 195 ACRES OF EXISTING FLOOD IRRIGATED LAND WILL BE TAKEN OUT OF PRODUCTION. TWO EXISTING POINTS OF DIVERSION WILL BE USED. A 67 ACRE FIELD WILL CONTINUE TO BE FLOOD IRRIGATED USING THE DIVERSION IN THE NESESW, SEC 28, TWP 27N, RGE 15E. WATER FOR THE PIVOT WILL. BE DIVERTED IN THE SENWSE, SEC 17, TWP 26N, RGE 15E, AND DITCHED TO THE EXISTING OFFSTREAM STORAGE RESERVOIR. WATER WILL BE PUMPED AT 22 00 GPM FROM THE RESERVOIR TO THE PIVOT. POINTS OF DIVERSION: NESESW, SEC 28, TWP 27N, RGE 15E, AND SENWSE, SEC 17, TWP 2 6N, RGE 15E, CHOUTEAU COUNTY PLACE OF USE: 67 ACRES IN THE SE OF SEC 32 AND W2 OF SEC 33, TWP 27N, RGE 15E, AND 350 ACRES IN SECTIONS 32 AND 33 OF TWP 26N, RGE 15E, CHOUTEAU COUNTY PLACE OF STORAGE: AN EXISTING 1003 ACRE-FOOT OFFSTREAM STORAGE RESERVOIR IN THE W2SW, SEC 28, TWP 26N, RGE 15E, CHOUTEAU COUNTY® 0 2 ISM __ OBJECTIONS TO THE ISSUANCE OF THIS APPLICATION MUST BE FILED ON FORM NO. 611, OBJECTION TO APPLICATION. SEND COMPLETED OBJECTION AND $50*00 FILING FEE TO THE DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND CONSERVATION, 1520 E. 6TH AVE. , HELENA, MT 59620-2301. OBJECTION MUST BE POSTMARKED ON OR BEFORE FEBRUARY 18. 1994. OBJECTION TO ^L^^I0N (F0RM 611) IS AVAILABLE AT THE OFFICE OF THE COUNTY CLERK AND RECORDER OR FROM THIS DEPARTMENT UPON REQUEST. ASSISTANCE OR QUESTIONS REGARDING THIS APPLICATION SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO THE LOCAL 5950X> :pH^y406^2 65-5516FF"''C^/ 1?°8 " 2“ ^ ?° B°X 1828' PUBLISHED IN: THE MOUNTAINEER ON 2/2/94 2/9/94 cc: Regional Director, Bureau of Reclamation Attn: Jim Rawlings Area Director, Bureau of Indian Affairs Attn: Dave Pennington FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND COMMENT Bob Delk John Lange, Department of Justice Yvomie—Knight, Native American Rights Fund Richard K. Aldrich
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