Source: http://www.rishabhdara.com/sc/view.php?case=3001
Timestamp: 2020-07-04 09:50:43
Document Index: 388734523

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art. 352', 'Art. 32', 'Art.\n352', 'Art. 32', 'Art. 32', 'Art. 352', 'Art. 311', 'Art.\t352', 'Art.\t352']

P. L. LAKHANPAL versus UNION OF INDIA
1967 AIR 243	1966 SCR 209
P. L. LAKHANPAL V. UNION OF INDIA [1966] RD-SC 106 (19 April 1966)
19/04/1966 SARKAR, A.K. (CJ) SARKAR, A.K. (CJ) HIDAYATULLAH, M.
CITATION: 1967 AIR 243	1966 SCR 209
F	1967 SC 908	(1,5) OPN	1967 SC1507	(5) RF	1980 SC1789	(107)
Defence of India Rules, 1962 r. 30(1) (b)-If ultra vires s.
3(2)(15) (i) of Defence of India Act-Constitution of India, Art. 352-Proclamation-If to	state, satisfaction	of Emergency.
The petitioner, the editor of a newspaper, was detained under r. 30(1)(b) of the Defence of India Rules, 1962.	He filed a petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the legality of	the detention order on various	grounds. Dismissing	the petition, HELD:Rule 30 (1) (b) cannot be said to be ultra vires of s.
3 (2) (15)(i) of the Defence of India Act for	the reason that it does	not state that the satisfaction of	the authority making the order of detention has to be on grounds appearing to it to be reasonable. The rule requires	only that the detaining authority must be	satisfied that	the detention is necessary for the purposes mentioned and	that is what the latter part of the section under which it	was made also says.	This part does not contain any	requirement as to	satisfaction on reasonable grounds. The rule	has clearly	been made in terms of the section authorising	it.
[211 F] Article	352 of the Constitution does not	require	the proclamation to state the satisfaction of the President about	the Emergency. The	Article	requires only a declaration of emergency threatening the security of India by one of the causes mentioned.	The words "to that effect" can have no other meaning. A proclamation ceases to	have effect only by one of the events mentioned in cl. 2 of	Art.
352 of the Constitution.[212 C] Section 3(2)(15)(iv) of the Defence of India Act and r. 30-A of the Defence of India Rules, does not give a right to make a representation. Their effect is to provide a review of the detention	order by the authorities and in	the manner mentioned. Rule 23 of the Defence of India (Delhi Detenus) Rules,	1964, states that a detente will be	allowed to interview a legal practitioner for the Purpose of drafting his representation against his detention. [213 C-D].
The fact that newspapers and men connected with them may be dealt with under other provisions of the Art and Rules	does not prevent detention of such persons under r. 30(1)(b) of the Defence of India Rules. [213 H] The order need not mention the part of India which was to be Prejudicially affected by the acts of the detenue.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 47 of 1966.
Petition.under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for	the enforcemont of fundamental rights.
210 Niren De, Additional Solicitor-General, N. S. Bindra, R. H.
Dhebar and B.R.G.K. Achar, for the respondent.
R. V. S. Matti, for the intervener.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Sarkar,	CJ. The petitioner,	Puran	Lal Lakhanpal,	was arrested and detained under cl. (b) of sub-r. (1) of	Rule 301 of the Defence of India Rules. 1962 by an order passed on December 10, 1965 and directed to be detained in Central Jail, Tehar, New Delhi.	The order stated that:
"WHEREAS	the Central Government is satisfied that with a view to preventing Shri	P.L.
Lakhanpal. son of late	Shri Diwan Chand Sharma........from acting in	a manner prejudicial to the Defence of India and Civil Defence, public safety and the maintenance of public order, it is necessary that he should be detained;
NOW, THEREFORE..............the Central Government hereby directs that the said Shri P. L. Lakhanpal be detained." He has moved this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution by a petition presented on December 24, 1965 for	a writ of habeas	corpus	directing his release.	He challenges	the legality of the detention order on various grounds which we now proceed to consider.
The first ground is that r. 30(1)(b) is ultra vires s.
3(2)(15)(1) of the Defence of	India Act under which	the Rules were made. Sub-s.(1) of s. 3 contains the general power to make rules for certain purposes. Sub-section	(2) states that the rules made may provide for and many empower any authority to make orders providing for all or any of the following matters, namely:
"(15) notwithstanding anything in any other law for the time being	in force........................
(i) the	apprehension	and detention	in custody of any	person	whom the authority empowered.........suspects, on grounds appearing	to	that authority to	be reasonable .................... acting, being about to	act or being likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the defence of India and civil defence, the security of the State,	the public safety or interest,the maintenance of public order........or with respect to whom that authority	is satisfied	that	his apprehension and detention are necessary	for the purpose of preventing him from acting in any such prejudicial manner." 211 Rule 30(1)(b) is in these terms:
"The Central Government............... if it is satisfied with respect to any particular person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to	the defence of India and civil defence, the public safety,	the	maintenance of public order............... may make an order- (b) directing that he be detained." It will be noticed that the rule does not say that	the satisfaction mentioned in it shall be on grounds appearing to the	authority concerned to be reasonable.	It is	said that by omitting these words the rule has gone outside	the section which mentions them, and is, therefore, ultra vires.
This contention is untenable.	It overlooks the fact	that the latter part of the section states that the	rules	made under it may also provide for the apprehension and detention of a person "with respect to whom	that authority is satisfied that his apprehension and detention are necessary" for certain purposes;	this part does not	contain	any requirement as to satisfaction on reasonable grounds.	This part of the section is independent of the earlier part under which the apprehension and detention can be directed only when the authority suspects on certain grounds appearing to it to	be reasonable that a person is about to act in a certain manner. It is of some significance to point	out that the second part of the section is preceded by the	word 'or'.	That puts it beyond doubt that the rules made under it may provide for detention in two alternative cases,	for the first of which only it is necessary that the authority should	entertain a suspicion on grounds appearing to it to be reasonable.	That requirement is absent in the case of a rule made under the second part of	the section.	Rule 30(1)(b) cannot be said to be ultra vires the section	for the reason that it does not state that the satisfaction of the authority	making the order of detention has to be on grounds appearing to it to be reasonable. The rule requires only that the detaining authority must be satisfied that the detention is necessary for the purposes mentioned and	that is what the latter part of the section under which it	was made also says.	The rule has clearly been made in terms of the section authorising it.
It was next said that the Proclamation of Emergency made by the President	under Art. 352 of the	Constitution which prevented the Act from being illegal, was not in terms of the article as it did not state that	the President	was satisfied that a grave emergency existed. It is true	that the Proclamation did not do that. It stated:
"	In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (1) of article 352 of the Constitution, I	Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan, President	of India, by this Proclamation declare that a grave emergency exists whereby the security of India is threatened by external aggression." 212 We, however, find nothing in the Article which requires	the Proclamation to state the satisfaction of the President about the emergency. Article 352(1) reads, "If the President is satisfied that a grave emergency exists whereby the security of India or of any part of the territory	thereof is threatened, whether by	war or external aggression or internal disturbance, he may, by Proclamation, make a declaration to	that effect." The Article requires	only a	declaration of emergency threatening the security of India by one of	the causes mentioned. The words "to that effect" can have no other meaning. The power to make the declaration can no doubt be exercised only	when the President is satisfied about	the emergency, but we do not see that the Article requires the condition precedent for the exercise of the power, that	is, the President's satisfaction, to be stated in	the declaration. The declaration shows that the President	must have satisfied himself about the existence of the emergency for in	these	matters the rule that	official acts	are presumed to have been properly performed applies and there is nothing proved by	the petitioner to displace	that presumption. We were referred to certain other	provisions, viz., Art. 311(2)(c) of the Constitution and r. 30(1)(b) of the Rules and it was contended that these provisions require the satisfaction to be stated.	It is unnecessary to decide whether they so require. Even if they did, the	requirement of the	statement of the President's satisfaction in	the present	case has to be decided on the terms of Art.	352 alone.	We have said that this Article does not contain	any such requirement. It is of interest to point out here	that the petitioner stated in his petition that he extended	his full support to the Government on the Proclamation of Emergency. Obviously he could not have done so if he	had any doubt about the legality of the Proclamation. Then it was said that	the Proclamation should have	stated	the direction from	which	the external aggression which it mentioned was apprehended. We find nothing in the Article to require the Proclamation to state this. The Proclamation was issued on	October 26, 1962 when, it is	well known, India's integrity was threatened by China.
It was also stated that the continuance of Emergency which was declared over three years ago is a fraud on	the Constitution. We were told that the President in	his address	to the Parliament in February this year did	not state	that the Emergency continued to exist.	The President's address has not been produced, and we do	not know what it	contained. However that may be, Art.	352 itself by cl. (2) provides that a Proclamation issued under cl. (1) may be revoked by a subsequent Proclamation and shall cease to operate at the expiration of	two months unless	before	the expiration of that period it has	been approved by resolutions of both Houses of Parliament.	This clause	also states that the Proclamation shall be	laid before each House of Parliament. It has not 213 been stated that the Houses of Parliament did not approve of the Proclamation within the period of two months. It would appear,	therefore, that the only way a Proclamation ceases to have effect is by one of the events mentioned in	this clause.	None of them has happened. Nothing contained in an address	by the President to the Houses of Parliament	can operate	to terminate the Proclamation.	In this connection it was	also said that 'external aggression'	means armed aggression and	as for some time past there was no armed, aggression against the territory of India, the	continuance of the Proclamation was unjustified. This contention	must also fail, on the ground which we have just mentioned.
Another challenge to the legality of the detention was	that the petitioner had	not been allowed to	make	any representation against	his detention.	Our attention	was drawn in this connection to s. 3(2) (15)(iv) of the Act	and r. 30-A of the Rules and also to r. 23, of the	Defence of India (Delhi Detenues) Rules, 1964. The two first mentioned provisions do not, in our opinion, give a right to make a representation.	Their effect is to provide a review of	the detention order by the authorities	and in	the manner mentioned. The last	one states that a detenue will be allowed to interview a legal practitioner for the purpose of drafting his representation against his detention. It	has not been stated in the petition that the petitioner was pre- vented from making any representation or	denied	the opportunity to	consult a legal practitioner.	All hat is said is that he had not been furnished particulars of	his writing	s and materials on which the satisfaction of	the Central Government mentioned in the order was based and that had prevented	him from making a representation to	the Government against his detention. This contention seems to us unwarranted.	There is nothing to show that the detention order had been based on petitioner's writings, nor has	our attention been	drawn to any provision which requires	the detaining authority to supply the materials on	which they had formed their satisfaction about the necessity of	the detention.
Then it was said that the order of detention violated s. 44 of the Act and s. 3(2)(4)(b), (6), (7)(a)(b)(c) and (d)	and rr. 41, 42, 44, 45 and 46 of the Rules. The substance of the contention is that the petitioner was the editor of	and ran a newspaper and that action against him could only be taken under the sections and rules earlier mentioned and not under r. 30(1)(b). This contention seems to us to be entirely groundless. The provisions referred to no doubt deal with newspapers and the manner of controlling them	but they in no way lead to the conclusion that	a newspaper editor may not, if the occasion arises, be detained under r.
30(1)(b). The fact that newspapers and men connected	with them may be dealt with in a certain manner does not prevent detention of such persons under r. 30(1)(b). It was	also said that r. 30(1)(b) requires that the part of India which is to be prejudicially affected by the acts of the detenue has to	be mentioned	in the	order.	This	is an	idle contention. The 214 rule no doubt says that the detention may be	ordered to prevent a person from acting in a manner prejudicial to	the maintenance of peaceful conditions in any part of India, but it also says	that the detention can be ordered	for preventing a person from acting in a manner prejudicial to the defence of India, civil defence and public	safety	and maintenance of public order with regard to which there is no requirement provided that they should be confined to	any part of India or that part should be mentioned in the order of detention.	The order in this case was made on these grounds. The petition furnishes no material for saying that the terms of s. 44 have been violated.	There is nothing to show that the detention interfered with the	petitioner's avocation in life in a manner not justified by that section.
The last ground taken was that the detention order was	mala fide because the Home Minister had not sworn an affidavit to say that he was satisfied about the	necessity for	the detention. There is a bald allegation in the petition	that the detaining	authority had not applied its mind to	the matter	before making the order of detention. This part of the petition was verified as	true to the	petitioner's knowledge. This verification was plainly	false	and, therefore, the	allegation in	the petition	required no answer.	However, that may be, a Deputy Secretary to	the Home Ministry	of the Government of India has sworn an affidavit stating as	true to his knowledge that	the materials in	connection with the activities of	the petitioner were placed before the Union Home Minister	and, on a consideration of those materials, the Minister	was satisfied that the detention order was necessary.
The result is that this petition fails and it is accordingly dismissed.