Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/857/623/114715/
Timestamp: 2019-10-15 18:34:48
Document Index: 362607088

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2113', '§ 3231', '§ 1291', '§ 2113', '§ 2113', '§ 2113', '§ 2113', '§ 2113', '§ 2113', '§ 846']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Daniel Darby, Defendant-appellant, 857 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1988) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Ninth Circuit › 1988 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Daniel Darby, Defendant-appellant
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Daniel Darby, Defendant-appellant, 857 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1988)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 857 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1988) Argued and Submitted Feb. 1, 1988. Decided Sept. 15, 1988
Daniel Darby appeals from his conviction for attempted bank robbery under the first paragraph of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (1982). The district court had jurisdiction based on 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The issues before us on appeal are (1) whether the court properly instructed the jury on the intent required to support a conviction under Sec. 2113(a), and (2) whether expert psychiatric testimony corroborating Darby's testimony should have been admitted. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse Darby's conviction and remand to the district court.
Jury instructions are reviewed for abuse of discretion and the adequacy of the entire charge must be evaluated in the context of the trial. United States v. Frazin, 780 F.2d 1461, 1468 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 844, 107 S. Ct. 158, 93 L. Ed. 2d 98 (1986). We consider whether as a whole the instructions were misleading or inadequate to guide the jury's determination. United States v. Washington, 819 F.2d 221, 226 (9th Cir. 1981).
The trial court has broad discretion to admit expert testimony, and we will sustain the court's action unless it is manifestly erroneous. Salem v. United States Lines Co., 370 U.S. 31, 35, 82 S. Ct. 1119, 1122, 8 L. Ed. 2d 313 (1962); Bergen v. F/V St. Patrick, 816 F.2d 1345, 1352 (9th Cir. 1987).
A conviction for attempted bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a)1 requires the government to prove both " 'culpable intent' and 'conduct constituting a substantial step toward commission of the crime that is in pursuit of that intent.' " United States v. Still, 837 F.2d 871, 873 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting United States v. Buffington, 815 F.2d 1292, 1301 (9th Cir. 1987)); see United States v. Snell, 627 F.2d 186, 187 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 957, 101 S. Ct. 1416, 67 L. Ed. 2d 382 (1981). "Culpable intent can be inferred from a particular defendant's conduct and from the surrounding circumstances." Still, 837 F.2d at 873; Buffington, 815 F.2d at 1302. A substantial step is "conduct that is strongly corroborative of the firmness of a defendant's criminal intent." Buffington, 815 F.2d at 1301; see United States v. Mandujano, 499 F.2d 370, 376 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1114, 95 S. Ct. 792, 42 L. Ed. 2d 812 (1975).
The district court, relying upon United States v. Hartfield, 513 F.2d 254 (9th Cir. 1975), premised its rulings throughout trial on the theory that the government need only prove that the defendant acted knowingly and voluntarily in order to convict under Sec. 2113(a). In Hartfield, an attempted bank robbery case, we stated that Sec. 2113(a) does not require specific intent. We found evidence of voluntary drug intoxication inadmissible to establish Hartfield's lack of capacity to form specific intent, although the evidence was ruled admissible on the issue of Hartfield's sanity at the time of the offense. Id. at 259; see also United States v. Smith, 638 F.2d 131, 132 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Burnim, 576 F.2d 236, 237 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1337 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Lemon, 550 F.2d 467, 470 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Klare, 545 F.2d 93, 94 (9th Cir. 1976) (all completed bank robbery cases).
However, in Hartfield, we relied upon United States v. Porter, 431 F.2d 7 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 960, 91 S. Ct. 360, 27 L. Ed. 2d 269 (1970), to form our conclusions on the intent element. In Porter, a completed bank robbery case involving an insanity defense, we held that an instruction on diminished capacity was not necessary because the jury had been instructed that a mere finding of sanity was not sufficient to warrant a guilty verdict and had also been instructed that specific intent must be demonstrated. We said that conviction under the first paragraph of Sec. 2113(a) does not require "intent to commit ... any felony." Id. at 10. However, we explained that " [w]here a person has the mental capacity for criminal responsibility, proof that he took property of another by force or violence, or by intimidation, necessarily establishes the required criminal intent, whether or not characterized as 'specific' intent." Id. Thus, in order to convict for bank robbery, the government must prove that the defendant took the property. This act of taking by force, violence, or intimidation is sufficient to constitute the crime of bank robbery. It is not necessary to prove an intent to steal. When the charge is one of attempted bank robbery, however, the transaction in question is at an earlier stage. There has not been a taking of the property. We are thus concerned with whether attempted bank robbery requires an intent to take the property. We agree with the dissent that it is not necessary to prove that the defendant intended to steal, but it is necessary to prove that he intended to take the property. In order to prove an attempt to commit a crime, the government must prove an intent to commit the acts that constitute the crime. Thus, in order to prove attempted bank robbery, it is necessary to prove that the defendant intended to take the property by force, violence or intimidation.
The district court ruled without the benefit of United States v. Still, 837 F.2d 871 (9th Cir. 1988) and United States v. Buffington, 815 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir. 1987), which clarify that a conviction for attempt requires proof not only that a defendant knowingly and voluntarily acted, but also that the defendant intended to take the money. In Buffington, we found that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient for a jury to find either the intent to rob a federal bank or conduct constituting a substantial step toward the commission of a robbery. Buffington, 815 F.2d at 1302. Although the government provided substantial evidence to establish the defendant's intent to rob, the Buffington court found the evidence insufficient because the defendants were thwarted from entering the federal bank by a power outage, and therefore their intent to rob could have been directed against another nearby store or state bank. Id. In Still, we determined that the evidence was conclusive as to the defendant's intent, but was insufficient to meet the "substantial step" requirement. The defendant in Still admitted to the police that he intended to rob a bank. We found that these statements clearly established his unequivocal intent to rob the bank. "Therefore, the first aspect of an attempt, a culpable intent, was established beyond a reasonable doubt." Still, 837 F.2d at 874.
Again, what constitutes a crime of attempted robbery is that the defendant attempted to take money from another person, money which belonged to the bank [;] that he did it knowingly or voluntarily and I think if you listen very hard you will not hear an instruction that when he went in there he had to intend to rob the bank, [that] he had to intend to take money from the bank. I don't believe you will hear that in the jury instructions that you receive today....
We conclude that the instructions, taken in the context of the trial, did not adequately charge the jury on the issue of culpable intent. The jury was misled as to the specific intent necessary for a conviction of an attempted bank robbery, i.e., the intent to take money from a federal bank by force and violence or intimidation. " [A] conviction should not rest on ambiguous and equivocal jury instructions on a basic issue." Washington, 819 F.2d at 226. Assuming, without deciding, that application of the harmless error doctrine is appropriate in this context, we cannot conclude that the instructions were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.; cf. Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 106 S. Ct. 3101, 3105, 92 L. Ed. 2d 460 (1986).
Whoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes, or attempts to take, from the person or presence of another, or obtains or attempts to obtain by extortion any property or money or any other thing of value belonging to, or in the care, custody, control, management, or possession of, any bank, credit union, or any savings and loan association ... [shall be fined ...] (emphasis added). 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
Whoever enters or attempts to enter any bank, credit union, or any savings and loan association, or any building used in whole or in part of a bank, credit union, or as a savings and loan association, with intent to commit in such bank, credit union, or in such savings and loan association, or building, or part thereof, so used, any felony affecting such bank, credit union, or such savings and loan association and in violation of any statute of the United States, or any larceny ... (emphasis added). 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (1982).
These differences are reflected in the remaining provisions of the statute as well. For example, an intent element is specifically incorporated into Sec. 2113(b), the taking and carrying away of bank money or property "with intent to steal or purloin." But intent is not a part of Sec. 2113(d), which proscribes "assault [ing] or put [ting] in jeopardy the life of any person by the use of a dangerous weapon," or Sec. 2113(e), "kill [ing] any person, or forc [ing] any person to accompany him without the consent of such person." See 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b), (d), (e).
These distinctions in the language of the statute make good sense and we have noted and confirmed them before. See, e.g., United States v. Klare, 545 F.2d 93, 94 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 905, 97 S. Ct. 1699, 52 L. Ed. 2d 390 (1977) (per curiam). Because the "entering" set out in the second paragraph of Sec. 2113(a) could be construed as an "innocent" act, the statute requires "felonious intent" for that act to constitute a crime. However, the statute requires no mental element for several of the other offenses described in Sec. 2113, including the acts of assault, killing, or taking or attempted taking "by force and violence, or by intimidation", because those provisions "describe acts which, when performed, are so unambiguously dangerous to others that the requisite mental element is necessarily implicit in the description." United States v. DeLeo, 422 F.2d 487, 491 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1037, 90 S. Ct. 1355, 25 L. Ed. 2d 648 (1970); see also, Klare, 545 F.2d at 94 (statutory offense set forth in the first paragraph of section 2113(a) proscribes violent or intimidating acts; reasonable to conclude that Congress intended to punish persons who engage in such acts without requiring that the Government prove every element of common law robbery) (citing DeLeo, 422 F.2d at 490-91).
Thus, the language of the statute itself suggests that for crimes charged under the first paragraph of section 2113(a), it is not material whether the subjective or specific intent of the bank robber is to take; the crime rather "is his resort to force and violence, or intimidation, in the presence of another person to accomplish his purposes." DeLeo, 422 F.2d at 491. See also, United States v. Porter, 431 F.2d 7, 10 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 400 U.S. 960, 91 S. Ct. 360, 27 L. Ed. 2d 269 (1970) (" [w]here a person has the mental capacity for criminal responsibility, proof that he took property of another by force or violence, or by intimidation, necessarily establishes the required criminal intent, whether or not characterized as 'specific' intent").
We have previously and consistently stated that a completed bank robbery under the first paragraph of Sec. 2113(a) is "a general intent crime, not a specific intent crime." United States v. Burnim, 576 F.2d 236, 237 (9th Cir. 1978) (citing United States v. Hartfield, 513 F.2d 254, 259 (9th Cir. 1975); Porter, 431 F.2d at 10). See also, United States v. Smith, 638 F.2d 131, 132 (9th Cir. 1981) (noting " [i]n the Ninth Circuit, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) is a general intent and not a specific intent crime") (citing United States v. Lemon, 550 F.2d 467, 470 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1977); Klare, 545 F.2d at 94; Hartfield, 513 F.2d at 259; Porter, 431 F.2d at 10). We have also explained that this "general intent" requires that the acts of taking a bank's money by force and violence or by intimidation be done "knowingly" and " 'knowingly' mean [s] 'voluntarily and intentionally.' " Smith, 638 F.2d at 133. Ordinarily, the mens rea required for a criminal attempt is the same as the culpability otherwise required for the commission of the completed crime. United States v. Mandujano, 499 F.2d 370, 376 & n. 6 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1114, 95 S. Ct. 792, 42 L. Ed. 2d 812 (1975); see also, United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 117 & n. 6 (2nd Cir.) cert. denied, 434 U.S. 941, 98 S. Ct. 434, 54 L. Ed. 2d 301 (1977) (conviction of attempted bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a)). Thus, the intent required for attempted bank robbery under the first paragraph of Sec. 2113(a) should be the same as that required for completed robberies, namely, "a general intent to commit the acts proscribed by the statute." Klare, 545 F.2d at 94.
A panel of this Court reached this conclusion precisely in United States v. Hartfield, 513 F.2d 254 (9th Cir. 1975), a case involving a defendant charged with attempted bank robbery under the first paragraph of Sec. 2113(a). There, we considered whether certain evidence was admissible to show Hartfield's lack of mental capacity to form a specific criminal intent. We concluded that the first paragraph of Sec. 2113(a) "does not require proof of a specific intent" and therefore, that evidence of voluntary drug intoxication could not be considered. Hartfield, 513 F.2d at 259 (citing Porter, 431 F.2d 7).1 This case is no different.
The Tenth Circuit has rejected a defense theory strikingly similar to that presented by Darby herein. United States v. Lewis, 628 F.2d 1276 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 924, 101 S. Ct. 1375, 67 L. Ed. 2d 353 (1981). In Lewis, the defendant was charged under the second paragraph of Sec. 2113(a) which requires specific intent to commit a felony in a bank. The defense theory was that Lewis, an alcoholic, decided to rob a bank so that he would be caught and returned to prison for treatment; thus, like Darby, Lewis claimed he lacked the intent to separate the bank from its money. The Tenth Circuit rejected this argument and concluded that "an individual who enters a bank with the intention of taking money by intimidating employees of the bank, is answerable for the consequences of his actions, if he is mentally competent, even assuming his motive for committing the act was to be caught and returned to prison." Lewis, 628 F.2d at 1279. Ironically, then, even under a stricter specific intent standard, at least one circuit court has found sufficient criminal intent to convict, despite the presence of a seemingly "innocent" motive and on facts similar to those of this case. The reason given again derives from DeLeo: culpable intent under Sec. 2113(a) most commonly inheres in the unambiguously dangerous nature of the acts. See Lewis at 1279.
The majority's opinion of course, is premised not on Hartfield but on the statement in United States v. Buffington, 815 F.2d 1292, 1301 (9th Cir. 1987), that a conviction for attempted bank robbery requires proof of "culpable intent." Curiously, neither Buffington or the later case United States v. Still, 837 F.2d 871, 873 (9th Cir. 1988), rely on or otherwise make reference to the Hartfield line of cases. Instead, those cases rely on United States v. Snell, 627 F.2d 186, 187-88 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 957, 101 S. Ct. 1416, 67 L. Ed. 2d 382 (1981) (per curiam), which in turn cites the Fifth Circuit case, United States v. Mandujano, 499 F.2d 370 (5th Cir. 1974). Mandujano, however, as noted above, suggested that the culpability required for an attempt is the same as that required for the completed crime; thus, its account of the culpability required for criminal attempts is of only limited utility. See Mandujano, 499 F.2d at 376 (holding conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 846 for attempted distribution of heroin requires showing of culpable intent and conduct constituting a substantial step). Nor do any of the cases relied on by the majority--Still, Buffington or Snell--provide much guidance on the meaning of "culpable intent."2 Both Still and Buffington turned principally on the second, "substantial step" aspect of an attempt and neither involved "actual movement" toward a bank, let alone an actual entry, as is present here. Still, 837 F.2d at 873-74; Buffington, 815 F.2d at 1302-03.
Under this standard, Darby's actions in the bank, acts which had the effect of intimidating the bank teller, bank security guards and bank customers, were sufficient to infer the requisite culpable intent to take or attempt to take property of the bank. Darby's actions and in particular, his presentation of a demand note, placed numerous persons in the bank in fear and were strongly corroborative that a taking or attempted taking was imminent. That he intended to get arrested so as to obtain psychiatric care is immaterial. The instructions given by the district court, which required that the government establish (1) "the act or acts of attempting to take," (2) "by force or violence or by means of intimidation," and (3) " [d]oing such act or acts knowingly," adequately informed the jury of the intent requirement necessary to convict. See United States v. Miller, 688 F.2d 652, 662 (9th Cir. 1982). Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the district court.