Source: https://www.oag.state.tx.us/opinions/opinions/49cornyn/op/2002/htm/jc0549.htm
Timestamp: 2015-03-01 19:22:54
Document Index: 60298040

Matched Legal Cases: ['art. 1', 'art. 26', 'art. 1', 'art. 1', 'art. 1', 'art. 1', 'art. 1']

require representation." Id. art. 1.051(c); see also id. art. 26.04(c) (authorizing court or its designee to appoint counsel if court determines that defendant charged with felony or misdemeanor punishable by confinement is indigent or interests of justice require representation). "Indigent," for the purposes of article 1.051, "means a person who is not financially able to employ counsel." Id. art. 1.051(b). Counsel appointed to represent an indigent defendant is entitled to ten days to prepare for a proceeding unless the preparation time is waived with the consent of the defendant. See id. art. 1.051(e). The ten-day period is counted from the date of appointment. See 42 George E. Dix & Robert O. Dawson, Texas Practice: Criminal Practice and Procedure � 24.62 (2d ed. 2001) (statute has been applied by requiring counsel to have ten days from appointment). Article 1.051 now provides a maximum time limit within which counsel must be appointed
time limit for the appointment. See Act of May 30, 1987, 70th Leg., R.S., ch. 979, � 1, 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws 3321, 3321-22. In 2001, the legislature adopted Senate Bill 7, the Texas Fair Defense
to represent indigent persons. See Texas Fair Defense Act, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 906, � 1, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 1800.(2) Senate Bill 7 amended, among other statutory provisions, article 1.051 to require a court or the court's designee to appoint counsel for an indigent defendant within specific time periods of the defendant's request. See id. � 2, at 1800-01; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.051(c), (i) (Vernon Supp. 2002). The time periods differ depending on the initiation of adverse judicial proceedings and the population of the county in which the court is located. Under article 1.051(c), if adverse judicial proceedings have been initiated, counsel must be appointed "as soon as possible, but not later than the end of the third working day after the date on which the court or court's designee receives the defendant's request for appointment of counsel." Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.051(c) (Vernon Supp. 2002) (emphasis added). But in counties with a population of 250,000 or more, counsel must be appointed "as soon as possible, but not later than the end of the first working day after the date on which the court or the court's designee receives the
laws," U.S. Const. amend. XIV, � 1, "which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly
situated should be treated alike." City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). Similarly, article I, � 3 of the Texas Constitution directing that "[a]ll free men, when they
art. I, � 3; Burroughs v. Lyles, 181 S.W.2d 570, 574 (Tex. 1944). Equal protection challenges under both the federal and state constitutional guarantees are reviewed under the same standard. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440; Richards v. League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 868 S.W.2d 306, 310-11 (Tex. 1993). The general rule is that a statute is presumed to be valid and will be upheld if the classification of persons drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440; Richards, 868 S.W.2d at 310-11. But the general rule gives way when the classification impinges on a fundamental, constitutionally protected right or distinguishes between persons, in terms of any right, on a "suspect" basis such as race or national origin. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440; Richards, 868 S.W.2d at 311. In those instances, the state action is subject to strict scrutiny and will be upheld only if the classification is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440; Richards, 868
triggering Sixth Amendment right to counsel); 42 George E. Dix & Robert O. Dawson, Texas Practice: Criminal Practice and Procedure � 24.52 (2d ed. 2001) (Texas Court of Criminal
Amendment guarantees defendants the right to effective assistance of counsel in state criminal trials. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) (emphasis added). The appointment of counsel within one day, rather than three days would not appear to be, as a matter of law, necessary to ensure effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. Cf. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (to prove that counsel was constitutionally ineffective, defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient and that deficient performance prejudiced the defense). In any case, under the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, unless waived by the defendant, counsel is entitled to a ten-day preparation period from the date of his or her appointment. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.051(e) (Vernon Supp. 2002). Significantly, this statutory provision "reflects only a legislative requirement and is not based on constitutional necessity." 42 George E. Dix & Robert O. Dawson, Texas Practice: Criminal Practice and Procedure � 24.61 (2d ed. 2001); see also Marin v. State, 851 S.W.2d 275, 281 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (en banc) (describing statutory requirement as prophylactic rule of procedure designed by legislature "to impose a uniform requirement where the fairness of a flexible rule is too uncertain.").
Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. � 61.006(b) (Vernon Supp. 2002) ("The minimum [indigent]