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| County of Knox ex rel Masterson v. Highlands
County of Knox ex rel Masterson v. Highlands
THE COUNTY OF KNOX EX REL. ROBERT MASTERSON, KNOX COUNTY ZONING DEPARTMENT ADMINISTRATOR, ET AL., APPELLANTS, V. THE HIGHLANDS, L.L.C., ET AL., APPELLEES.
-Agenda 28-September 1999.
The Highlands, L.L.C., filed a complaint in the circuit court of Knox County against the Knox County zoning board of appeals (board), Knox County State's Attorney Paul Mangieri, and John Leonard, one of others hereafter collectively referred to as "Objectors." The Highlands sought a determination that it could proceed to construct and operate a large- scale hog confinement facility. In two separate complaints against the Highlands, Knox County (county) and Leonard sought an injunction barring the construction of the facility.
The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the Highlands. The appellate court, with one Justice Dissenting, upheld the judgment of the circuit court. 302 Ill. App. 3d 342. We allowed the county's and Leonard's separate petitions for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315) and consolidated the causes for review. We now affirm the appellate court.
The record contains the following pertinent facts. Patricia Baird, a co-owner of the Highlands, and her husband James, own land in a rural, unincorporated area of the county. The Highlands applied to the county zoning department for a construction permit to erect six buildings as part of a hog confinement facility. Several days later, the zoning department issued the permit.
Approximately three months later, the Objectors appealed the issuance of the construction permit to the board. They contended, inter alia, that "the use of the property [i.e., a large-scale hog confinement facility] is not a customary agricultural use in this area." They sought to "cancel construction permit and maintain `F' [farming] zoning." The permit was suspended, thereby staying construction pending the appeal.
The appellate court, with one Justice Dissenting, upheld the judgment of the circuit court. 302 Ill. App. 3d 342. The appellate court held that: (1) the circuit court could hear the Highlands' motions for summary judgment (302 Ill. App. 3d at 344-45); and (2) the county lacked zoning authority over the Highlands (302 Ill. App. 3d at 345-48). The county and Leonard appeal to this court.
In reviewing a trial court's entry of summary judgment, the only issue on appeal is whether "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 1998). This case turns on the meaning of the term "agriculture" found in the Counties Code. 55 ILCS 5/5-12001 (West 1998). The interpretation of a statute is a matter of law for the court and appropriate for summary judgment. Matsuda v. Cook County Employees' & Officers' Annuity & Benefit Fund, 178 Ill. 2d 360, 364 (1977); see Lane v. Titchenel, 204 Ill. App. 3d 1049, 1053 (1990); People ex rel. Rappaport v. Drazek, 30 Ill. App. 3d 310, 313-14 (1975). Review is de novo. Matsuda, 178 Ill. 2d at 364. Prior to addressing the merits, however, we must first address a preliminary matter.
In support of their position, the county and Leonard correctly note that, pursuant to the Counties Code, the county has the power to regulate the location and use of buildings on unincorporated land. See 55 ILCS 5/5-12001 (West 1998). Further, the Counties Code provides that all final decisions of zoning boards of appeals are subject to judicial review pursuant to the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq. (West 1998)). See 55 ILCS 5/5-12012 (West 1998). The county and Leonard then rely on the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies: a party aggrieved by an administrative decision ordinarily cannot seek judicial review without first pursuing all available administrative remedies. Castaneda v. Illinois Human Rights Comm'n, 132 Ill. 2d 304, 308 (1989). The exhaustion doctrine includes administrative review in the circuit court. Where the Administrative Review Law is applicable and provides a remedy, a circuit court may not redress a party's grievance through any other type of action. The court's power to resolve factual and legal issues arising from an agency's decision must be exercised within its review of the agency's decision and not in a separate proceeding. Dubin v. Personnel Board, 128 Ill. 2d 490, 498-99 (1989); see Midland Hotel Corp. v. Director of Employment Security, 282 Ill. App. 3d 312, 316-17 (1996).
This aspect of the exhaustion doctrine is well established. However, it has several exceptions that are equally established. Two such exceptions are "where no issues of fact are presented or agency experience is not involved *** or where the agency's jurisdiction is attacked because it is not authorized by statute." Castaneda, 132 Ill. 2d at 309. This court has held that where an administrative assertion of authority to hear or determine certain matters is challenged on its face as not authorized by the enabling legislation, such a facial attack does not implicate the exhaustion doctrine and exhaustion is not required. This court has explained that where an agency's statutory authority to exercise jurisdiction is at issue, no questions of fact are involved. The agency's particular expertise is not implicated in the necessary statutory interpretation. Board of Governors of State Colleges & Universities for Chicago State University v. Illinois Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 78 Ill. 2d 143, 147-48 (1979), quoting Landfill, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board, 74 Ill. 2d 541, 550-51 (1978); accord Reiter v. Neilis, 125 Ill. App. 3d 774, 777-78 (1984) ("plaintiffs did not have to comply with the Administrative Review Act in order to challenge the subject matter jurisdiction of the zoning board of appeals"). In the present case, the appellate court relied on this exception to conclude that the circuit court could hear the Highlands' claim for equitable relief. 302 Ill. App. 3d at 344-45.
"While the Code prohibits the county from requiring permits on land used for agricultural purposes, it is the county that must determine for what purpose land is being used. Its jurisdiction does not depend on the correctness of its decision. It has the right to be wrong; it therefore has jurisdiction over the matter." 302 Ill. App. 3d at 349 (McLaren, J., Dissenting).
"An administrative agency is different from a court because an agency only has the authorization given to it by the legislature through the statutes. Consequently, to the extent an agency acts outside its statutory authority, it acts without jurisdiction. [Citation.] `The term "jurisdiction," while not strictly applicable to an administrative body, may be employed to designate the authority of the administrative body to act ***.' [Citation.] Thus, in administrative law, the term `jurisdiction' has three aspects: (1) personal jurisdiction-the agency's authority over the parties and intervenors involved in the proceedings, (2) subject matter jurisdiction-the agency's power `to hear and determine cases of the general class of cases to which the particular case belongs' [citation], and (3) an agency's scope of authority under the statutes." Business & Professional People for the Public Interest v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 136 Ill. 2d 192, 243 (1989).
Thus, it is not entirely accurate to characterize the appellate court as having held that the board "has no jurisdiction over zoning." 302 Ill. App. 3d at 349 (McLaren, J., Dissenting). Rather, it is more accurate to state that the board has no jurisdiction over zoning where the board's enabling legislation expressly denies the board zoning authority over land used for agricultural purposes. See 55 ILCS 5/12001 (West 1998).
The Dissent viewed the Highlands as not attacking the board's jurisdiction, but rather as attacking the correctness of "the Board's decision that the use of the land was not exempt from permit requirements. This is an attack on the correctness of the Board's decision, which should only be attacked through administrative review." 302 Ill. App. 3d at 349 (McLaren, J., Dissenting).
"This court has consistently held that, inasmuch as an administrative agency is a creature of statute, any power or authority claimed by it must find its source within the provisions of the statute by which it is created." Bio-Medical Laboratories, Inc. v. Trainor, 68 Ill. 2d 540, 551 (1977). The issue of an administrative body's authority presents a question of law and not a question of fact. The determination of the scope of the agency's power and authority is a judicial function and is not a question to be finally determined by the agency itself. Lake County State's Attorney v. Illinois Human Rights Comm'n, 200 Ill. App. 3d 151, 156 (1990) (and cases cited therein); accord Rockford Memorial Hospital v. Department of Human Rights, 272 Ill. App. 3d 751, 759 (1995). Of course, administrative agencies often determine the scope of their jurisdiction. When an agency acts or refuses to act in a case, it necessarily determines whether the subject matter and its activity are or are not within the purview of the statute creating the agency. Again, however, "this is a question of law and not of fact." People ex rel. Thompson v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 22 Ill. App. 3d 316, 321 (1974); accord 2 Am. Jur. 2d Administrative Law §77 (1994); 73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Law & Procedure §64 (1983).
"The powers by this Division given shall not be exercised *** so as to impose regulations *** or require permits with respect to land used for agricultural purposes, which includes the growing of farm crops, truck garden crops, animal and poultry husbandry, apiculture, aquaculture, dairying, floriculture, horticulture, nurseries, tree farms, sod farms, pasturage, viticulture, and wholesale greenhouses *** other than parcels of land consisting of less than 5 acres *** or with respect to the erection, maintenance, repair, alteration, remodeling or extension of buildings or structures used or to be used for agricultural purposes upon such land except that such buildings or structures for agricultural purposes may be required to conform to building or set back lines ***." 55 ILCS 5/5-12001 (West 1998).
The fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intention of the legislature. A court first looks to the words of the statute. The language of the statute is the best indication of the legislative intent. When the statutory language is clear, it must be given effect without resort to other tools of interpretation. In interpreting a statute, it is never proper for a court to depart from plain language by reading into a statute exceptions, limitations, or conditions which conflict with the clearly expressed legislative intent. Nottage v. Jeka, 172 Ill. 2d 386, 392 (1996); Illinois Graphics Co. v. Nickum, 159 Ill. 2d 469, 479 (1994).
In the present case, we agree with the appellate and circuit courts that a hog confinement facility falls within the "agricultural purposes" exemption from zoning regulation, except for conforming to building or set back lines. 55 ILCS 5/5-12001 (West 1998). "Agriculture" literally refers to "the science or art of cultivating the soil, harvesting crops, and raising livestock." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 44 (1993); accord Black's Law Dictionary 69 (7th ed. 1999); 3 Am. Jur. 2d Agriculture §1, at 934-35 (1986). "Husbandry" is literally a synonym for "agriculture." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 44, 1104 (1993) (definitions of "agriculture" and "husbandry," respectively); accord 3 C.J.S. Agriculture §2, at 524-25 (1973). "Animal husbandry" is literally "a branch of agriculture concerned with the production and care of domestic animals." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 85 (1993); accord 3 C.J.S. Agriculture §2, at 525 (1973).
The literal meanings of these terms are broad and inclusive. We are not at liberty to say that they mean something else. Also, as the above definitions show, the meanings of these terms are current. They are not based on some archaic court decision, or on any particular case, old or recent. "In modern usage, agriculture is a wide and comprehensive term, and statutes using it without qualification must be given an equally comprehensive meaning." 3 C.J.S. Agriculture §2, at 524 (1973). Illinois courts have recognized this wide-ranging definition of the term "agriculture." E.g., People ex rel. Pletcher v. City of Joliet, 321 Ill. 385, 388-89 (1926); County of Lake v. Cushman, 40 Ill. App. 3d 1045, 1048 (1976).
"Where the words employed in a legislative enactment are free from ambiguity or doubt, they must be given effect by the courts even though the consequences may be harsh, unjust, absurd or unwise. [Citations.] Such consequences can be avoided only by a change of the law, not by judicial construction ***." People ex rel. Pauling v. Misevic, 32 Ill. 2d 11, 15 (1964). Accord Powers v. Retirement Board of the Policemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund, 249 Ill. App. 3d 280, 282 (1993).
It is our duty to give effect to the intent of the legislature as expressed in the plain language of the Counties Code.
The appellate court reached this Conclusion, as we have, based on the language of the Counties Code. 302 Ill. App. 3d at 345-46. We note that the appellate court additionally referred to the Livestock Management Facilities Act (510 ILCS 77/1 et seq. (West 1998) (effective May 21, 1996)) to bolster its Conclusion that a county lacks the power to assert zoning authority over land used for agricultural purposes. Pointing to this act, the appellate court surmised that "the legislature appears to have continued to preempt agriculture from local zoning and reserved unto state government the uniform regulation of such facilities." 302 Ill. App. 3d at 348. However, we express no opinion as to this act. Since the language of Counties Code section 5-12001 (55 ILCS 5/5-12001 (West 1998)) is plain and unambiguous, we do not resort to other tools of interpretation (see Envirite Corp. v. Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, 158 Ill. 2d 210, 216 (1994)), including looking to other statutes (see Kozak v. Retirement Board of the Firemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund, 95 Ill. 2d 211, 219-20 (1983)).
We disagree. The holding of the appellate court shifts this debate from the judiciary to where it properly lies-with the legislature. It is for the legislative branch of the government-not the judicial branch-to determine when and where conditions exist requiring an exercise of the police power to meet existing evils. 11 Ill. L. & Prac. Constitutional Law §149, at 498 (1981). Clearly, "the legislature has broad discretion to determine not only what the public interest and welfare require, but to determine the measures needed to secure such interest." Chicago National League Ball Club, Inc. v. Thompson, 108 Ill. 2d 357, 364 (1985).
At what level of activity does a hog production facility cease to be "agricultural" and becomes "industrial"? This is an exercise in line- drawing classically meant for the legislature.
We note that the legislature knows how to limit the agricultural exemption from zoning regulation by specifying what "agricultural purposes" do not include. See County of Kendall v. Aurora National Bank Trust No. 1107, 219 Ill. App. 3d 841, 845 (1991) (explaining Public Act 85-1421, art. I, §3, eff. December 15, 1988, which excluded certain mining activities from "agricultural purposes").