Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/454/100/case.html
Timestamp: 2018-02-24 00:14:56
Document Index: 375930137

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1343', '§ 1983', '§ 1341', '§ 1341', '§ 1341', '§ 1342', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1988', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1341', '§ 1981', '§ 1343', '§ 1343', '§ 1331', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1997', '§ 1983', '§ 2254', '§ 1331', '§ 1343', '§ 1', '§ 1341', 'art, 64']

Fair Assessment in Real Estate Assn. v. McNary, (full text) :: 454 U.S. 100 (1981) :: Justia US Supreme Court Center
Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 454 › Fair Assessment in Real Estate Assn. v. McNary › Case
Held: The principle of comity bars taxpayers' damages actions brought in federal courts under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to redress the allegedly unconstitutional administration of a state tax system. Because the principle of comity bars federal courts from granting damages relief in such cases, it is not necessary to decide whether the Tax Injunction Act, standing alone, would bar such actions. Pp. 454 U. S. 107-117.
(a) Prior to enactment in 1937 of the Tax Injunction Act -- which prohibits district courts from enjoining, suspending, or restraining the assessment, levy, or collection of any state tax where a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy may be had in state courts -- this Court's decisions in cases seeking federal court equitable relief against state taxation (handed down both before and after the enactment in 1871 of 42 U.S.C. § 1983's predecessor) recognized that the doctrine of equitable restraint when remedies at law are adequate was particularly applicable in suits challenging the constitutionality of state tax laws because of the delicate balance between the federal authority and state governments, and the concomitant respect that should be accorded state tax laws in federal court. Pp. 454 U. S. 107-109.
(b) The legislative history of the Tax Injunction Act does not suggest that Congress intended that federal court deference in state tax matters be limited to the actions enumerated in the Act. Thus, the principle of comity which predated the Act was not restricted by its passage. Pp. 454 U. S. 109-110.
(c) The post-Act vitality of the comity principle is demonstrated by this Court's 1943 decision in Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U. S. 293, that federal courts may not render declaratory judgments as to the constitutionality of state tax laws. Although the Act was raised as a possible bar to the suit (as it has been raised in this case), it was found to be unnecessary to determine whether the Act could be construed to prohibit declaratory relief. The decision was based instead on principles of federalism and the necessity of federal court respect for state taxing schemes, thus demonstrating not only the post-Act vitality of the comity principle, but also its applicability to actions seeking a remedy other than injunctive relief. Pp. 454 U. S. 110-111.
(d) Damages actions under § 1983 would be no less disruptive of state tax systems than actions to enjoin the collection of taxes. Recovery of damages under § 1983 would first require a determination of the unconstitutionality of the state tax scheme that would be fully as intrusive as the equitable actions that are barred by comity principles. Moreover, the intrusiveness of such § 1983 actions would be exacerbated by the doctrine of Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, authorizing immediate resort to a federal court under § 1983 without first exhausting state remedies -- whenever state actions allegedly infringe constitutional rights. In addition to the intrusiveness of the judgment, the very maintenance of the suit itself would intrude on the enforcement of the state scheme. Pp. 113-115.
REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and WHITE, BLACKMUN, and POWELL, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which MARSHALL, STEVENS, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined, post, p. 454 U. S. 117.
of comity, and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed by an equally divided court sitting en banc. [Footnote 1] We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals, [Footnote 2] 450 U.S. 1039, and we now affirm. Before setting forth the facts, we think that a description of the past and at times divergent decisions of this Court may shed light upon the proper disposition of this case.
who was able to prove that his constitutional or federal rights had been denied by any State. In addition, the statute made no mention of any requirement that state remedies be exhausted before resort to the federal courts could be had under 28 U.S.C. § 1343. [Footnote 3] The combined effect of this newly created federal cause of action and the absence of an express exhaustion requirement was not immediately realized. It was not until our decision in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961), that § 1983 was held to authorize immediate resort to a federal court whenever state actions allegedly infringed constitutional rights:
365 U.S. at 365 U. S. 183.
Id. at 404 U. S. 251. See also Damico v. California, 389 U. S. 416 (1967); Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U. S. 639, 392 U. S. 640 (1968); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452,4 415 U. S. 72-473 (1974).
As indicated by our discussion in 454 U. S. § 1341 and our comity cases have thus far barred federal courts from granting injunctive and declaratory relief in state tax cases. Because we decide today that the principle of comity bars federal courts from granting damages relief in such cases, we do not decide whether that Act, standing alone, would require such a result. [Footnote 4] The correctness of the result in this case is demonstrated by an examination of the pre-Act decisions of this Court, the legislative history of the Act, our post-Act decision in the Great Lakes case, and more recent recognition of the principles of federalism.
Prior to enactment of § 1341, virtually all federal cases challenging state taxation sought equitable relief. [Footnote 5] Consequently,
federal court restraint in state tax matters was based upon the traditional doctrine that courts of equity will stay their hand when remedies at law are plain, adequate, and complete. See, e.g., Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U. S. 521 (1932); Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Benedict, 229 U. S. 481 (1913); Boise Artesian Water Co. v. Boise Cty, 213 U. S. 276 (1909). Even with this basis in equity law, these cases recognized that the doctrine of equitable restraint was of "notable application," Boise Artesian Water Co., supra, at 213 U. S. 281, and carried "peculiar force," Matthews, supra, at 284 U. S. 525, in suits challenging the constitutionality of state tax laws. Such restraint was particularly appropriate because of the delicate balance between the federal authority and state governments, and the concomitant respect that should be accorded state tax laws in federal court. As the Court in Matthews explained:
284 U.S. at 284 U. S. 525. [Footnote 6]
Boise Artesian Water Co., supra, at 213 U. S. 282.
This policy of equitable restraint based on notions of comity did not completely clear the federal courts of state tax cases. Indeed, the Senate Report on the bill that was to become § 1341 referred to "[t]he existing practice of the Federal courts in entertaining tax injunction suits against State officers. . . ." S.Rep. No. 1035, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1937). An examination of the cases of that era demonstrates, however, that this practice resulted not from a repudiation of the principle of comity, but from federal court determinations that available state remedies did not adequately protect the federal rights asserted. See, e.g., Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, 297 U. S. 242 (1936); Gully v. Interstate Natural Gas Co., 82 F.2d 145 (CA5), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 688 (1936). See also Note, Federal Court Interference with the Assessment and Collection of
Rosewell v. LaSalle National Bank, 450 U. S. 503, 450 U. S. 522 (1981) (footnote omitted). Neither the legislative history of the Act nor that of its precursor, 28 U.S.C. § 1342, suggests that Congress intended that federal court deference in state tax matters be limited to the actions enumerated in those sections. See H.R.Rep. No. 1503, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1937); 81 Cong.Rec. 1415 (1937) (remarks of Sen. Bone). Thus, the principle of comity which predated the Act was not restricted by its passage.
319 U.S. at 319 U. S. 299. Instead,
Id. at 319 U. S. 298 (quoting Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U.S. at 284 U. S. 525).
The Court's reliance in Great Lakes upon the necessity of federal court respect for state taxing schemes demonstrates not only the post-Act vitality of the comity principle, but also its applicability to actions seeking a remedy other than injunctive relief. The focus was not on the specific form of relief requested, but on the fact that, "in every practical sense, [it] operate[d] to suspend collection of the state taxes until the litigation [was] ended." 319 U.S. at 319 U. S. 299. As will be seen below, the relief sought in this case would have a similarly disruptive effect.
Id. at 401 U. S. 44-15.
taxation] are just as compelling today as they were in 1937." 450 U.S. at 450 U. S. 527. As will be seen in the next part, petitioners' § 1983 action would be no less disruptive of Missouri's tax system than would the historic equitable efforts to enjoin the collection of taxes, efforts which were early held barred by considerations of comity.
We disagree. Petitioners will not recover damages under § 1983 unless a district court first determines that respondents' administration of the County tax system violated petitioners' constitutional rights. In effect, the district court must first enter a declaratory judgment like that barred in Great Lakes. We are convinced that such a determination would be fully as intrusive as the equitable actions that are barred by principles of comity. [Footnote 7] Moreover, the intrusiveness
old property and retaliatory assessment of property belonging to those who successfully appeal to the Board of Equalization -- may well be the result of policies or practicalities beyond the control of any individual officer. For example, failure annually to reassess old property may well result from a practical allocation of limited resources. In addition, according to respondents' attorney at oral argument, Missouri law requires that all property, including property which belongs to those who successfully appeal to the Board of Equalization, be assessed at 33 1/3% of market value. Thus, a judicial determination of official liability for the acts complained of, even though necessarily based upon a finding of bad faith, would have an undeniable chilling effect upon the actions of all County officers governed by the same practicalities or required to implement the same policies. There is little doubt that such officials, faced with the prospect of personal liability to numerous taxpayers, not to mention the assessment of attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, would promptly cease the conduct found to have infringed petitioners' constitutional rights, whether or not those officials were acting in good faith. In short, petitioners' action would "in every practical sense operate to suspend collection of the state taxes . . . ," Great Lakes, 319 U.S. at 319 U. S. 299, a form of federal court interference previously rejected by this Court on principles of federalism.
to be contrary to "[t]he scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of state governments which should at all times actuate the federal courts." Matthews, 284 U.S. at 284 U. S. 525.
Therefore, despite the ready access to federal courts provided by Monroe and its progeny, we hold that taxpayers are barred by the principle of comity from asserting § 1983 actions against the validity of state tax systems in federal courts. Such taxpayers must seek protection of their federal rights by state remedies, provided of course that those remedies are plain, adequate, and complete, [Footnote 8] and may ultimately seek review of the state decisions in this Court. See Huffman v. Pursue, Inc., 420 U.S. at 420 U. S. 605; Matthews v. Rodgers, supra, at 284 U. S. 526.
"even where the Tax Injunction Act would not bar federal court interference in state tax administration, principles of federal equity may nevertheless counsel the withholding of relief. See Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U. S. 293, 319 U. S. 301 (1943)."
Id. at 450 U. S. 525-526, n. 33. We need not decide in this case whether the comity spoken of would also bar a claim under § 1983 which requires no scrutiny whatever of state tax assessment practices, such as a facial attack on tax laws colorably claimed to be discriminatory as to race.
Of course, the Court had not yet broadly interpreted the Civil Rights Act to permit federal damages actions for state violations of constitutional rights, brought prior to exhaustion of state remedies. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961). The closest pre-Act case to a federal damages action was a suit for refund of state taxes allegedly assessed in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. First National Bank v. Board of County Commissioners, 264 U. S. 450 (1924). Consistent with the federal court deference for state tax matters of which we speak today, the Court held that the action was barred by the parties' failure to exhaust their available state remedies. Id. at 264 U. S. 456. Although declaratory actions were available before 1937, they were seldom used. See Note, Federal Declaratory Judgments on the Validity of State Taxes, 60 Yale L.J. 927, 929-930, and n. 14 (1941).
Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U. S. 82, 401 U. S. 128, n. 17 (1971) (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
We discern no significant difference, for purposes of the principles recognized in this case, between remedies which are "plain, adequate, and complete," as that phrase has been used in articulating the doctrine of equitable restraint, and those which are "plain, speedy and efficient," within the meaning of § 1341. See, e.g., Tully v. Griffin, Inc., 429 U. S. 68, 429 U. S. 73-74 (1976); Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U. S. 620, 326 U. S. 622-623 (1946); Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. at 319 U. S. 297-299; Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U.S. at 284 U. S. 525-526. Both phrases refer to the obvious precept that plaintiffs seeking protection of federal rights in federal courts should be remitted to their state remedies if their federal rights will not thereby be lost. Numerous federal decisions have treated the adequacy of state remedies, and it is to that body of law that federal courts should look in seeking to determine the occasions for the comity spoken of today.
The District Court dismissed the complaint, holding that the action was barred by the Tax Injunction Act and principles of comity. [Footnote 2/1] 478 F.Supp. 1231. The judgment of the District Court was affirmed by an equally divided vote of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit sitting en banc. 622 F.2d 415.
As employed by the Court in several recent opinions, and in the opinion of the Court today, the "principle of comity" refers to the "proper respect for state functions" that organs of the National Government, most particularly the federal courts, are expected to demonstrate in the exercise of their own legitimate powers. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37, 401 U. S. 445 (1971). So employed, the "principle of comity" is nothing more than an encapsulation of policy, albeit policy with roots in the Constitution and our federal system of government. [Footnote 2/2]
While the "principle of comity" may be a source of judicial policy, it is emphatically no source of judicial power to renounce jurisdiction. [Footnote 2/3] The application of the comity principle
has thus been limited to a relatively narrow class of cases: only where a federal court is asked to employ its historic powers as a court of equity, and is called upon to decide whether to exercise the broadest and potentially most intrusive form of judicial authority, does "comity" have an established and substantial role in informing the exercise of the court's discretion. [Footnote 2/4] There is little room for the "principle of
comity" in actions at law where, apart from matters of administration, judicial discretion is at a minimum. [Footnote 2/5] Surely no judicial power to fashion novel doctrine concerning the jurisdiction of the federal courts is to be found in the Constitution itself, which provides that the judicial power "shall be vested
The Court relies primarily on Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U. S. 293 (1943), to support its sweeping view of the comity principle. Great Lakes presented the question whether the Tax Injunction Act could be "so construed as to prohibit a declaration by federal courts concerning the invalidity of a state tax." Id. at 319 U. S. 299. We found no need to address that question, holding instead that
Ante at 454 U. S. 113.
Great Lakes does not support this reasoning. Our opinion there suggests nothing intrusive in bringing a claim involving a question of state taxation to a federal forum. Dismissal of the suit was permissible only because the claim for declaratory relief was designed to gain "an adjudication of rights in anticipation of their threatened infringement." [Footnote 2/6] Such a
suit, precisely like one for an injunction, would "in every practical respect operate to suspend collection of the state taxes until the litigation is ended." [Footnote 2/7] 319 U.S. at 319 U. S. 299. No similar concern is raised by the present case. [Footnote 2/8]
Ante at 454 U. S. 103-104. In addition, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 provides that "[a]ll persons . . . shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other." [Footnote 2/9] (Emphasis added.) Congress has expressly provided jurisdiction over such claims in the district courts. [Footnote 2/10] 28 U.S.C. § 1343; see
Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U. S. 241, 389 U. S. 245-248 (1967). [Footnote 2/11] Where Congress has granted the federal courts jurisdiction, we are not free to repudiate that authority. Ibid.; [Footnote 2/12] England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U. S. 411 (1964). In England, we said:
Subject, of course, to constitutional constraints, the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts is subject to the plenary control of Congress. Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U. S. 226, 260 U. S. 233-234 (1922); Cary v. Curtis, 3 How. 236, 44 U. S. 245 (1845). As pointed out supra at 454 U. S. 123-124, and n. 11, this case appears to fall squarely within the jurisdictional grant of 28 U.S.C. § 1343, and perhaps of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 as well. The question, then, is whether Congress has anywhere contradicted that presumptive grant of judicial authority.
If a suit brought under § 1983 for damages is to come within the prohibition of the Act, it would seem necessary to demonstrate that such a suit is one to "enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection" of a state tax. Respondents argue that the terms "suspend" and "restrain" are words of ordinary usage, and that they are sufficiently broad to bring the present suit for damages, which respondents assert will "chill" state tax collection within the proscriptions of the Act. In my view, the legislative history of the Act, and the case law background against which it was written, directly refute the suggestion that Congress intended those words to have the encompassing meaning respondents suggest. [Footnote 2/13]
Id. at 78 U. S. 110. Thus it was early held that the illegality or unconstitutionality of a state or municipal tax would not, in itself, provide the foundation for equitable relief in the federal courts. Id. at 78 U. S. 109; see Boise Artesian Water Co. v. Boise City, 213 U. S. 276, 213 U. S. 282-285 (1909). [Footnote 2/14] Consistent with equity practice, the federal courts would not enjoin the collection of state taxes, despite the possible unconstitutionality of the exaction, where there existed a "plain, adequate and complete remedy at law." Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Benedict, 229 U. S. 481, 229 U. S. 488 (1913).
stated the contrary. See id. at 229 U. S. 486; Henrietta Mills v. Rutherford County, 281 U. S. 121, 281 U. S. 127 (1930); Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Osborne, 265 U. S. 14, 265 U. S. 16 (1924). For example, in Henrietta Mills, a unanimous Court concluded that there was no basis for equitable relief, relying on the fact that there would have been "an adequate remedy at law, not only in the state court, but also in the Federal court if petitioner had been able to show a violation of the Federal Constitution." 281 U.S. at 281 U. S. 127 (emphasis added). And indeed, damages actions for wrongful collection of taxes, brought against both the taxing authority and the taxing officials, were not unknown to the lower federal courts. See, e.g., Tyler v. Dane County, 289 F. 843 (WD Wis.1923); International Paper Co. v. Burrill, 260 F. 664 (Mass.1919). In Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U. S. 521 (1932), only five years prior to the enactment of the Tax Injunction Act, we summarized the federal practice:
"Whenever the question has been presented, this Court has uniformly held that the mere illegality or unconstitutionality of a state or municipal tax is not, in itself, a ground for equitable relief in the courts of the United States. If the remedy at law is plain, adequate, and complete, the aggrieved party is left to that remedy in the state courts, . . . or to his suit at law in the federal courts if the essential elements of federal jurisdiction are present."
Id. at 284 U. S. 525-526 (citations omitted; emphasis added).
ibid., the rule was soon honored more in breach than in observance. Purporting to construe these equitable principles in state tax cases, the federal courts had become "free and easy with injunctions." [Footnote 2/15] Thus, federal remedial practice began to contrast sharply with the limits on state remedial authority, with the result that the federal court became the preferred forum for those who could properly invoke its jurisdiction: principally large out-of-state corporations. The legislative history of the Tax Injunction Act makes plain Congress'
"[U]njust discrimination between citizens of the State and foreign corporations doing business in such State has been the cause of much controversy. The controversies arising out of the use of the injunctive process in State tax cases would be eliminated by the passage of this bill."
S.Rep. No. 1035, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1937) (emphasis added). [Footnote 2/16]
"You ask for some assistance on the question of whether the existence of an adequate remedy at law or in equity in the State courts, such as a tax refund action, would prevent a foreign corporation pursuing the same remedy in the Federal court. In answer, [sic] will say that there might be circumstances under which the Federal courts would have no jurisdiction of such actions; for instance, where the refund action could be brought only against the State, or against the State officers under such circumstances as to amount to a suit against the State. Under the eleventh amendment to the Federal Constitution, of course, suits against the State, or suits which are in effect suits against the State, are not maintainable in the Federal courts."
H.R.Rep. No. 1503, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 3 (1937). [Footnote 2/17]
As understood and applied by this Court prior to the passage of the Tax Injunction Act, [Footnote 2/18] and by Congress in enacting the Tax Injunction Act, the "principle of comity" which demanded respect for state tax administration extended precisely as far as was necessary to ensure that the federal courts not become party to the abuse of their equity power. Congress intended that federal authority be exercised with the same restraint that the States applied in the administration of their own tax system, and thus to restore the parity between the two judicial systems. But there is absolutely no support in either the cases of this Court, or in Congress'
In First National Bank of Greeley v. Board of Commissioners of Weld County, 264 U. S. 450 (1924), we held that, before a litigant complaining of alleged overassessment of taxes may bring a damages action grounded on the Constitution or statutes of the United States, that litigant must fully exhaust any administrative remedies afforded by the State. [Footnote 2/19] In Weld County, plaintiff in error brought its action under federal question jurisdiction to recover the amount of taxes levied for the years 1913 and 1914. It alleged that the taxes were assessed and collected in contravention of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and a federal statute [Footnote 2/20] setting forth certain limitations
on state and local taxation in regard to national banks. [Footnote 2/21] The Court paused before addressing plaintiff in error's substantive claim:
Id. at 264 U. S. 453. Because the plaintiff in error had not exhausted its state administrative remedies, the Court declined to consider the "question whether the tax [was] vulnerable to the challenge in respect of its validity upon any or all of the grounds set forth. . . ." [Footnote 2/22] Id. at 264 U. S. 456.
Although the Court did not elaborate on the underpinnings of that holding, it seems clear that it was grounded on the considerations of sound judicial administration [Footnote 2/23] and parity between the state and federal judicial systems that had historically
Petitioners seek to avoid the reach of Weld County by arguing that this case is to be controlled by the general rule stated in McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U. S. 668 (1963), that, in cases brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, resort to state administrative remedies is not a precondition to federal suit. As a factual matter, of course, it is difficult to distinguish Weld County, which raised factual allegations that closely parallel those of the complaint at issue here. [Footnote 2/24]
see, e.g., Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U. S. 426, 421 U. S. 432-433 (1975); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452, 415 U. S. 472-473 (1974); Carter v. Stanton, 405 U. S. 669, 405 U. S. 670-671 (1972); Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U. S. 249, 404 U. S. 251 (1971) (per curiam); King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309, 392 U. S. 312, n. 4 (1968); Damico v. California, 389 U. S. 416, 389 U. S. 416-417 (1967) (per curiam), that conclusion rests firmly on the understanding that such was the intention of Congress in enacting § 1983. Where Congress has provided that, in a particular class of cases, the federal courts should refrain from hearing suits brought under § 1983 until administrative remedies have been exhausted, see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (1976 ed., Supp. IV), there is no doubt that the federal courts are bound by that limitation. Cf. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 475, 411 U. S. 489-490 (1973). My view has always been that displacement of § 1983 remedies can only
"be justified by a clear statement of congressional intent, or, at the very least, by the presence of the most persuasive considerations of policy. [Footnote 2/25]"
the requisite elements of Federal jurisdiction existed." H.R.Rep. No. 1603, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1937). [Footnote 2/26] In 1937, the requirement of exhaustion of state administrative remedies was certainly a mandatory precondition to suit, and, in that sense, a "jurisdictional prerequisite." Nevertheless, we need not reach the conclusion that Congress intended, by enactment of the Tax Injunction Act, to freeze the then-operative jurisdictional practice of the federal courts in order to recognize that the administrative exhaustion requirement is entirely consonant with the principal purposes of the Act: to provide assurance that federal courts exercise at least the same restraint in dealing with questions of state tax administration as the courts of the State that levied the tax. Where administrative remedies are a precondition to suit for monetary relief in state court, absent some substantial consideration compelling a contrary result in a particular case, those remedies should be deemed a precondition to suit in federal court as well. [Footnote 2/27]
Id. at 319 U. S. 297-298 (citations omitted; emphasis added).
"Abstention" is often cited as an application of the comity principle. See, e.g., Wells, The Role of Comity in the Law of Federal Courts, 60 N.C.L.Rev. 59, 63-68 (1981). Not surprisingly, then, we have applied the abstention doctrine only in equity actions. See Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496, 312 U. S. 500 (1941) ("The resources of equity are equal to an adjustment that will avoid the waste of a tentative decision as well as the friction of a premature constitutional adjudication"); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U. S. 315, 319 U. S. 318 (1943) ("as a matter of sound equitable discretion").
312 U.S. at 312 U. S. 500.
Abstention is thus narrowly drawn to meet the particularized need it serves. The federal court remains open to the litigant to present his federal claim should the action for which he is remitted to state court fail to afford relief. England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U. S. 411 (1964). See also Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U. S. 25, 360 U. S. 29 (1959) ("This course does not constitute abnegation of judicial duty. On the contrary, it is a wise and productive discharge of it. There is only postponement of decision for its best fruition").
Principles of comity are also reflected in federal habeas practice. While current habeas jurisdiction is wholly a statutory matter, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, comity surely played a part in the development of the exhaustion requirement. See Ex parte Royall, 117 U. S. 241 (1886). But the judicial creation of that requirement reflected no usurpation of judicial power. Issuance of the Great Writ was historically regarded as a matter of equitable discretion. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 372 U. S. 438 (1963).
This is not to suggest that there is no occasion to apply principles of comity in actions at law. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, while based primarily on concerns of judicial administration, see Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41, 303 U. S. 50-51 (1938), and which reflects principles of avoidance of unnecessary litigation, deference to administrative expertise, and "notions of administrative autonomy," see McKart v. United States, 395 U. S. 185, 395 U. S. 194-195 (1969), is surely broad enough to encompass comity concerns as well. Cf. First National Bank of Greeley v. Board of Commissioners of Weld County, 264 U. S. 450 (1924). But the role of comity must narrow with the scope of judicial discretion, and, in regard to suits seeking monetary relief, that discretion is limited.
319 U.S. at 319 U. S. 300.
A similar desire to ensure that state and local governments not be deprived of the use of tax proceeds until the lawfulness of the levy was finally determined was largely responsible for enactment of the Tax Injunction Act. See infra at 454 U. S. 129-130, and n. 16.
The Court suggests that, if the District Court determines that the assessments in question here were unlawful, the state officials "would promptly cease the conduct found to have infringed petitioners' constitutional lights," and thus the determination of unlawfulness would operate to "suspend" collection of state taxes. Ante at 454 U. S. 115. But I would never have thought this result something to be avoided. The Great Lakes rule seeks to avoid withholding tax funds from local authorities until the tax is determined to be unlawful, not afterwards.
Actions challenging the constitutionality of state taxation have also been held to fall within the general federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See, e.g., Raymond v. Chicago Union Traction Co., 207 U. S. 20, 207 U. S. 35 (1907) ("The claim that the action of the state board of equalization in making the assessment under consideration was the action of the State, and, if carried out, would violate the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States by taking property of the appellee without due process of law, and by failing to give it the equal protection of the laws, constitutes a Federal question beyond all controversy"); County of San Mateo v. Southern Pacific R. Co., supra; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Bosworth, 230 F.191 (ED Ky.1915).
The jurisdictional grant reflects a congressional policy pronouncement on the role of the federal courts in our federal system. The Civil Rights Acts, passed between 1866 and 1875 and made federally cognizable by 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), were followed by the Act of Mar. 3, 1875, which granted the federal courts jurisdiction over all federal statutory and constitutional questions where the requisite amount in controversy was met. § 1, 18 Stat. 470. It hardly disparages the current standing of the state courts as qualified adjudicators of federal rights exercising jurisdiction concurrent with that of the federal courts to note that, at the time of the enactment, there was a more than modest distrust of the state courts as protectors of federal rights, see Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U. S. 225, 407 U. S. 238-242 (1972), and that,
Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U. S. 241, 389 U. S. 247 (1967) (emphasis in the opinion), quoting F. Frankfurter & J. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court: A Study in the Federal Judicial System 65 (1927).
State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 575, 92 U. S. 614 (1876). The limitations of federal equity practice in 1876 intensified the need for restraint. Because the equity court was limited to enjoining the collection of the tax as a whole, the effect of injunctive relief was to allow the complainant to escape payment of all taxes due, even though the portion that reflected the lawful assessment should, in justice, have been paid. Id. at 92 U. S. 614-615.
Two features of federal equity practice explained this willingness to grant equitable relief. The first was the construction that this Court placed on the equitable maxim that equity jurisdiction does not lie where there exists an adequate legal remedy. The Court had held that the "adequate legal remedy" must be one cognizable in federal court. City Bank Co. v. Schnader, 291 U. S. 24, 291 U. S. 29 (1934). Where the limitations on federal jurisdiction would preclude adjudication of the suit for monetary relief, either because of the mandate of the Eleventh Amendment or otherwise, the barrier to federal injunctive intervention was thus removed. The States had, for the most part, denied their courts the power to grant anticipatory relief against the collection of taxes. See Culp, The Powers of a Court of Equity in State Tax Litigation, 38 Mich.L.Rev. 610, 618-631 (1940). It was this imbalance in the powers of the state and federal judicial systems that was "particularly remedied" by passage of the Tax Injunction Act. H.R.Rep. No. 1503, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1937).
The second feature was that the federal courts, in construing strictly the requirement that the remedy available at law be "plain, adequate and complete," see supra at 454 U. S. 127, had frequently concluded that the procedures provided by the State were not adequate. See Note, Federal Court Interference with the Assessment and Collection of State Taxes, 59 Harv.L.Rev. 780, 782-783 (1946). The Tax Injunction Act set forth a more deferential standard by which to evaluate the adequacy of the state remedy. See Rosewell v. LaSalle National Bank, 450 U. S. 503 (1981). Thus, in this respect too, the Tax Injunction Act limited the equitable range of the district court and brought federal court practice more closely into line with that of state courts -- which assuredly were required to act within the bounds of state law and procedure without regard to whether the federal courts considered that law and procedure "plain, adequate and complete."
To be sure, the House and Senate Reports focus on actions brought under diversity jurisdiction. But this emphasis merely reflects the fact that Congress was particularly concerned about the advantage conferred on out-of-state corporations by virtue of diversity jurisdiction. Just as it was unlikely that Congress, by enacting 28 U.S.C. § 1341, sought to limit federal equity power only in diversity cases, see Rosewell v. LaSalle National Bank, 450 U.S. at 450 U. S. 522-523, n. 29, it is implausible that Congress wished to ensure the continued availability of diversity jurisdiction in actions at law while implicitly barring damages actions arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States.
See Apartments Bldg. Co. v. Smiley, 32 F.2d 142, 143 (CA8 1929). A like rule applied in equity actions. See Gorham Mfg. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 266 U. S. 265, 266 U. S. 269-270 (1924); First National Bank of Greenville v. Gildart, 64 F.2d 873, 874-875 (CA5 1933); McDougal v. Mudge, 233 F. 235, 237 (CA8 1916).
264 U.S. at 264 U. S. 452-453.
The exhaustion rule stated in Weld County, reflecting the established practice in state tax matters, was limited to exhaustion of administrative, but not judicial, remedies. See id. at 264 U. S. 456; Stason, Judicial Review of Tax Errors -- Effect of Failure to Resort to Administrative Remedies, 28 Mich.L.Rev. 637, 659, and n. 47 (1930) ("In no case, so far as the present examination of authorities has disclosed, has it been held that the taxpayer must resort to available modes of direct attack by judicial proceedings, before proceeding with collateral attack, except in injunction cases in which an injunction is refused because of the adequacy of the legal remedy").
In Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41 (1938), which set forth the exhaustion requirement with respect to federal administrative remedies, Justice Brandeis noted that the exhaustion rule had frequently been applied in equity cases. Id. at 303 U. S. 51, n. 9. "But," he added, "because the rule is one of judicial administration -- not merely a rule governing the exercise of discretion -- it is applicable to proceedings at law as well as suits in equity," ibid., citing Weld County.
Finally, petitioners' argument is particularly inapt in this case. Many of the officials named as defendants have no small involvement in the administrative process. It surely seems appropriate that, before being held accountable in court, those officials have the opportunity fully to consider petitioners' claims within the administrative forum that provides the only basis for their involvement in this matter. See McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. at 395 U. S. 195.
See also H.R.Rep. No. 1503, at 4: "[T]he aggrieved party is left to . . . his suit at law in the Federal courts if the essential elements of Federal jurisdiction are present'" (quoting Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U. S. 521, 284 U. S. 525-526 (1932)).
In Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U. S. 82, 401 U. S. 128, n. 17 (1971) (concurring in part and dissenting in part), I noted the policies that have motivated both judicial and congressional restraint in this field: