Source: http://mincovlaw.com/doc/Theberge_v_Galerie_dArt_du_Petit_Champlain_inc-SCC2002
Timestamp: 2017-03-29 03:21:48
Document Index: 507139018

Matched Legal Cases: ['art. 734', 'art. 734', 'art. 19', 'art. 734', 'art. 734', 'art. 738', 'art. 738', 'art. 738', 'art. 734', 'art. 1431', 'art. 19']

CITATION: Théberge v. Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain inc., [2002] 2 S.C.R. 336, 2002 SCC 34DATE: October 11, 2001DOCKET: 27872
BETWEEN: Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain inc., Galerie d’Art Yves Laroche inc., Éditions Multi-Graph ltée, Galerie d’Art Laroche, Denis inc. and Serge Rosa Appellants
and Claude Théberge Respondent
PRESENT:McLachlin C.J. and L’Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier, Iacobucci, Major, Binnie and LeBel JJ.
REASONS FOR THE JUDGMENT: paras. 1 – 80Binnie J.
Dissent: paras. 81 – 181Gonthier J.
ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR QUEBEC Copyright � Infringement � Civil remedies � Ownership of copies � Definition of copyright � Art galleries transferring authorized reproductions of painter’s works from paper-backed posters to canvas for purposes of resale � Whether galleries “copied” artist’s works � Whether new artistic work was produced “in any material form” within meaning of s. 3(1) of Copyright Act � Whether painter’s copyright infringed � Whether seizure before judgment justified � Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, ss. 3, 38(1).
Held (L’Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier and LeBel JJ. dissenting): The appeal should be allowed. The order of the motions judge setting aside the seizure and ordering that the seized goods be returned to the appellants should be restored. Per McLachlin C.J. and Iacobucci, Major and Binnie JJ.: The Copyright Act provides the respondent with both economic and moral rights to his work. The economic rights are based on a conception of artistic and literary works essentially as articles of commerce. Such rights can be assigned and the respondent can only assert under the Act the economic rights he has retained. Moral rights, which are not assignable, treat the ?uvre as an extension of the artist’s personality, possessing a dignity which is deserving of protection. The integrity of the work is infringed only if the work is modified to the prejudice of the honour or reputation of the author. Moral rights act as a continuing restraint on what purchasers can do with a work once it passes from the author, but respect must be given to the limitations that are an essential part of the moral rights created by Parliament. Economic rights should not be read so broadly that they cover the same ground as the moral rights, making inoperative the limits Parliament has imposed on moral rights. In this case, the respondent is asserting a moral right in the guise of an economic right, and the attempt should be rejected. The appellants purchased lawfully reproduced posters of the respondent’s paintings and used a chemical process that allowed them to lift the ink layer from the paper (leaving it blank) and to display it on canvas. They were within their rights to do so as owners of the physical posters. There was no production (or reproduction) of a new artistic work “or any substantial part thereof in any material form” within the meaning of s. 3(1) of the Copyright Act. The image “fixed” in ink on the posters was not reproduced. It was transferred from one display to another. An expansive reading of the economic rights whereby substitution of one backing for another constitutes a new “reproduction” that infringes the copyright holder’s rights even if the result is not prejudicial to his reputation tilts the balance too far in favour of the copyright holder and insufficiently recognizes the proprietary rights of the appellants in the physical posters which they purchased. The historical scope of the notion of “reproduction” under the Copyright Act should be kept in mind. “Reproduction” has usually been defined as the act of producing additional or new copies of the work in any material form. While the Act recognizes that technologies have evolved by which expression could be reproduced in new ways, the important evolution of legal concepts in the field of copyright is not engaged by the facts here. This is a case of literal physical, mechanical transfer in which no multiplication takes place.
The separate structures in the Act to cover economic rights and moral rights show that a clear distinction and separation was intended. In terms of remedies, Parliament intended modification without reproduction to be dealt with under the provisions dealing with moral rights rather than economic rights. A contrary view would allow an artist who objected to a “modification” of an authorized reproduction to sidestep the important requirement of showing prejudice to honour or reputation in order to establish an infringement of moral rights. Since the respondent has not brought himself within s. 38 of the Copyright Act, he had no authority to obtain a seizure of the appellants’ copies under art. 734 C.C.P. The respondent’s real complaint is more properly characterized as the alleged infringement of his “moral” rights and its potential impact on the market for his works. An art. 734 seizure before judgment is not available to an artist or author who relies on the alleged infringement of a moral right. The evaluation of a potential breach of moral rights calls for the exercise of a good deal of judgment. A distortion, mutilation or modification of a work is only actionable if it is to “the prejudice of the honour or reputation of the author”. The artist or writer should not become the judge in his own cause on such matters and it is therefore entirely understandable that Parliament should insist on prior judicial review before any seizure takes place based on an assertion of violation of moral rights. Whether a fuller record adduced at trial will demonstrate a breach of economic rights or moral rights will be for the trial judge to determine. At this stage, we need to decide only that the interlocutory record did not justify the seizure before judgment.
In this case the appellants unlawfully reproduced the respondent’s works in a material form in breach of s. 3(1) of the Copyright Act. In order for a work to be reproduced, there is no requirement to establish that there has been an increase in the total number of copies of the work. Parliament did not protect the right only to reproduce the work as a whole but also to reproduce a substantial part of the work. It is therefore necessary to consider not only the quantitative aspect, but also the qualitative aspect. A restrictive analysis based solely on multiplication of the work could not provide the work with the necessary protection and would ignore the concept of “substantial part thereof”, which is protected by s. 3(1). The concept of “work” refers to any materialized and original form of expression. Fixation of the work in a medium is a condition sine qua non of the production of a work. Therefore, “producing” a work refers to the initial materialization and “reproducing” it refers to any subsequent material fixation that is modelled (in the causal sense) on its first fixation. Fixation of the work in a new medium is therefore the fundamental element of the act of “reproduc[ing] …in any material form whatever” what already existed in a first, original material form. That type of conduct amounts to plagiarism and constitutes an infringement of copyright under s. 3(1).
By Binnie J. Distinguished: Apple Computer, Inc. v. Mackintosh Computers Ltd., [1987] 1 F.C. 173, aff’d [1988] 1 F.C. 673, aff’d [1990] 2 S.C.R. 209; approved: Snow v. The Eaton Centre Ltd. (1982), 70 C.P.R. (2d) 105; Fetherling v. Boughner (1978), 40 C.P.R. (2d) 253; No Fear, Inc. v. Almo-Dante Mfg. (Canada) Ltd. (1997), 76 C.P.R. (3d) 414; referred to: Compo Co. v. Blue Crest Music Inc., [1980] 1 S.C.R. 357; R. v. Stewart, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 963; Bishop v. Stevens, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 467; Morang and Co. v. LeSueur (1911), 45 S.C.R. 95; Millar v. Taylor (1769), 4 Burr. 2303, 98 E.R. 201; Underwriters’ Survey Bureau Ltd. v. Massie & Renwick Ltd., [1937] Ex. C.R. 15, rev’d [1940] S.C.R. 218; Tom Hopkins International, Inc. v. Wall & Redekop Realty Ltd. (1984), 1 C.P.R. (3d) 348; Walter v. Lane, [1900] A.C. 539; Compagnie Générale des Établissements Michelin�Michelin & Cie v. National Automobile, Aerospace, Transportation and General Workers Union of Canada (CAW-Canada), [1997] 2 F.C. 306; Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341 (1988); Crim., January 28, 1888, Bull. crim., No. 46, p. 68; Crim., December 2, 1964, Bull. crim., No. 320, p. 672; Crim., October 20, 1977, Bull. crim., No. 315, p. 801; Civ. 1st, May 5, 1976, Bull. civ., No. 161, p. 128; Paris, March 18, 1987, D. 1988.Somm.209, note Colombet; Civ. 1st, April 19, 1988, Bull. civ., No. 112, p. 76; Paris, April 27, 1945, Gaz. Pal. 1945.1.192; Hovener/Poortvliet, HR January 19, 1979, NJ 412; Frost v. Olive Series Publishing Co. (1908), 24 T.L.R. 649; C. M. Paula Co. v. Logan, 355 F.Supp. 189 (1973); Peker v. Masters Collection, 96 F.Supp.2d 216 (2000); Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580 (1997); King Features Syndicate, Inc. v. O. and M. Kleeman, Ltd., [1941] A.C. 417; Thériault v. Succession de Rémi Thériault, [1977] C.S. 1120.
Braithwaite, William J. “Derivative Works in Canadian Copyright Law” (1982), 20 Osgoode Hall L.J. 191. Brunet, Claude. “Copyright: The Economic Rights”, in Gordon F. Henderson, ed., Copyright and Confidential Information Law of Canada. Scarborough, Ont.: Carswell, 1994, 129. Canadian Oxford Dictionary. Edited by Katherine Barber. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1998, “reproduce”.
Colas, Émile. “Le droit moral de l’artiste sur son ?uvre” (1981), 59 Can. Bar Rev. 521. Gendreau, Ysolde. “Moral Rights”, in Gordon F. Henderson, ed., Copyright and Confidential Information Law of Canada. Scarborough, Ont.: Carswell, 1994, 161. Goudreau, Mistrale. “Le droit moral de l’auteur au Canada” (1994), 25 R.G.D. 403.
McKeown, John S. Fox Canadian Law of Copyright and Industrial Designs, 3rd ed. Scarborough, Ont.: Carswell, 2000. Moyse, Pierre-Emmanuel. “La nature du droit d’auteur: droit de propriété ou monopole?” (1998), 43 McGill L.J. 507.
Richard, Hugues G., and L. Carrière et al., eds. Canadian Copyright Act Annotated, vol. 1. Scarborough, Ont.: Carswell, 1993 (loose-leaf updated 2001, release 4). Stewart, Stephen M. International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, 2nd ed. Toronto: Butterworths, 1989.
Tamaro, Normand. Le droit d’auteur: Fondements et principes. Montréal: Presses de l’Université de Montréal, 1994. Vaver, David. Intellectual Property Law: Copyright, Patents, Trade-marks. Concord, Ont.: Irwin Law, 1997. APPEAL from a judgment of the Quebec Court of Appeal (2000), 9 C.P.R. (4th) 259, J.E. 2000-531, [2000] Q.J. No. 412 (QL), setting aside a judgment of the Superior Court, J.E. 99-1991, [1999] Q.J. No. 4472 (QL). Appeal allowed, L’Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier and LeBel JJ. dissenting. Marzia Frascadore, for the appellants Galerie d’Art Yves Laroche inc. and Éditions Multi-Graph ltée.
Vincent Chiara, for the appellants Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain inc., Galerie d’Art Laroche, Denis inc. and Serge Rosa. Louis Linteau, for the respondent.
1 We are required in this appeal to determine the extent to which an artist, utilizing the statutory rights and remedies provided by the Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, can control the eventual use or display of an authorized reproduction of his or her work in the hands of a third party purchaser. 2 Claude Théberge, a well-established Canadian painter with an international reputation, seeks to stop the appellants, who amongst other things produce poster art, from transferring authorized reproductions of his artistic works from a paper substrate (or support) to a canvas substrate for purposes of resale. In my opinion, for the reasons which follow, the appellants did not thereby “copy” the respondent’s artistic works. They purchased lawfully reproduced posters of his paintings and used a chemical process that allowed them to lift the ink layer from the paper (leaving it blank) and to display it on canvas. They were within their rights to do so as owners of the physical posters (which lawfully incorporated the copyrighted expression). At the end of the day, no new reproductions of the respondent’s works were brought into existence. Nor, in my view, was there production (or reproduction) of a new artistic work “in any material form” within the meaning of s. 3(1) of the Copyright Act. What began as a poster, authorized by the respondent, remained a poster. 3 Nevertheless, on August 19, 1999, the respondent arranged to have the bailiff seize canvas-backed reproductions from the appellants without ever satisfying a judge that the appellants had violated the Copyright Act. Although seizure before judgment is designed purely as a conservation measure divorced from the merits of the case, the appellants claim that the seizure of their inventory caused them a significant loss, both in sales and reputation. The respondent has not proceeded with his action on the merits since the date of the seizure two and a half years ago.
5 Copyright in this country is a creature of statute and the rights and remedies it provides are exhaustive: Compo Co. v. Blue Crest Music Inc., [1980] 1 S.C.R. 357, at p. 373; R. v. Stewart, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 963; Bishop v. Stevens, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 467, at p. 477. 6 This is not to say that Canadian copyright law lives in splendid isolation from the rest of the world. Canada has adhered to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1886) and subsequent revisions and additions, and other international treaties on the subject including the Universal Copyright Convention (1952), Can. T.S. 1962 No. 13. In light of the globalization of the so-called “cultural industries”, it is desirable, within the limits permitted by our own legislation, to harmonize our interpretation of copyright protection with other like-minded jurisdictions. That being said, there are some continuing conceptual differences between the droit d’auteur of the continental civiliste tradition and the English copyright tradition, and these differences seem to lie at the root of the misunderstanding which gave rise to the present appeal.
12 Generally speaking, Canadian copyright law has traditionally been more concerned with economic than moral rights. Our original Act, which came into force in 1924, substantially tracked the English Copyright Act, 1911 (U.K.), 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 46. The principal economic benefit to the artist or author was (and is) the “sole right to produce or reproduce the work or any substantial part thereof in any material form whatever” (s. 3(1)) for his or her life plus fifty years (s. 6). The economic rights are based on a conception of artistic and literary works essentially as articles of commerce. (Indeed, the initial Copyright Act, 1709 (U.K.), 8 Ann., c. 21, was passed to assuage the concerns of printers, not authors.) Consistently with this view, such rights can be bought and sold either wholly or partially, and either generally or subject to territorial limitations, and either for the whole term of the copyright or for any part thereof (s. 13(4)). The owner of the copyright, thus, can be, but need not be, the author of the work. It was the respondent’s economic rights in enumerated works that were the subject-matter of an assignment to two poster manufacturers, Éditions Galerie L’Imagerie É.G.I. Ltée (“É.G.I.”) by contract dated October 29, 1996, and New York Graphic Society, Ltd. by contract dated February 3, 1997. 13 We are told that all of the reproductions at issue here were printed by É.G.I., art. 19 of whose contract with the respondent provided that:
15 Moral rights, by contrast, descend from the civil law tradition. They adopt a more elevated and less dollars and cents view of the relationship between an artist and his or her work. They treat the artist’s ?uvre as an extension of his or her personality, possessing a dignity which is deserving of protection. They focus on the artist’s right (which by s. 14.1(2) is not assignable, though it may be waived) to protect throughout the duration of the economic rights (even where these have been assigned elsewhere) both the integrity of the work and his or her authorship of it (or anonymity, as the author wishes). 16 The civiliste tradition surfaced at an early date in this Court in Morang and Co. v. LeSueur (1911), 45 S.C.R. 95, where Fitzpatrick C.J. approached the interpretation of a contract between a publisher and the author of an unpublished work on William Lyon Mackenzie with the civil law notions of “droit moral” in mind, at pp. 97-98:
shall not, by that act alone, constitute a distortion, mutilation or other modification of the work. (3) Pour l’application du présent article, ne constitue pas nécessairement une déformation, mutilation ou autre modification de l’?uvre un changement de lieu, du cadre de son exposition ou de la structure qui la contient ou toute mesure de restauration ou de conservation prise de bonne foi. [Emphasis added.]
19 The evidence here suggests that, at least in some instances, the respondent’s name was deleted and was no longer on the posters when they were offered for resale. The respondent could have asserted a moral right to be publicly identified with his artistic work in this respect. IV. The Respondent’s Complaint
A. Because, first and foremost, it is once again a dilution of my work; it is an abusive commercialization of my work, without authorization; it is a manipulation of the work because, in many cases, my signature does not appear on the reproduction; it is an anonymization, if I can use that word without being scholarly. There is no Théberge on my work, it is not signed. Turn it around and there is nothing on the back. Where does it come from, who sells it? Not a word. These things are all over the place. And, furthermore, the final argument, Mr. Charia, is that clients and friends of mine call me, they won’t accept it anymore and they are asking me whether I am a party to the distribution of these things. Q. So, is it ….
A. Being a party to the distribution of these things means that they assume that I hatched a plot in which I am a participant. I’m getting money, royalties or …that I make money off of it -- “otherwise, it’s just not possible. How can you allow such a thing, Mr. Théberge?” So there are clients who have originals, who have paid eight thousand dollars ($8,000), nine thousand dollars ($9,000) that they find reproduced on canvas all over, in slightly smaller or medium sizes, or depending on the size, and for forty dollars ($40), sixty dollars ($60), eighty dollars ($80) or one hundred and twenty dollars ($120)…. Me, Claude Théberge, the artist, I have nothing whatsoever to do with it, and want to put a stop to it. It’s just unreal. And especially, if I accepted money for that manoeuvre, I wouldn’t dare look myself in the mirror, Sir. Q. So, this morning, it is your testimony, Mr. Théberge, that it is not a question of money ….
A. Absolutely not. 21 Apart from the complaint of non-attribution (which is a moral rights issue), it seems the respondent as an artist simply wishes to stop the appellants from catering to the market for canvas-backed reproductions that apparently exists. To do so, however, he must as a litigant demonstrate a statutory right that overrides what the owners of the authorized poster could otherwise do with their tangible property.
27 On this view, it does not matter that the appellants were multiple offenders at “ink transfers” or that they were commercial entities participating in the resale market. The copyright infringement occurred at the moment of “reproduction” in each instance, and would have been similarly objectionable, according to my colleague’s approach, if done to a single copy by the individual appellant to hang in his own living-room. 28 In my view, with respect, this expansive reading of the s. 3(1) economic rights tilts the balance too far in favour of the copyright holder and insufficiently recognizes the proprietary rights of the appellants in the physical posters which they purchased. Adoption of this expanded interpretation would introduce the civiliste conception of “droit de destination” into our law without any basis in the Copyright Act itself, and blur the distinction between economic and moral rights imposed by Parliament.
It is wise in any state, to encourage letters, and the painful researches of learned men. The easiest and most equal way of doing it, is, by securing to them the property of their own works…. He who engages in a laborious work, (such, for instance, as Johnson’s Dictionary,) which may employ his whole life, will do it with more spirit, if, besides his own glory, he thinks it may be a provision for his family.
31 The proper balance among these and other public policy objectives lies not only in recognizing the creator’s rights but in giving due weight to their limited nature. In crassly economic terms it would be as inefficient to overcompensate artists and authors for the right of reproduction as it would be self-defeating to undercompensate them. Once an authorized copy of a work is sold to a member of the public, it is generally for the purchaser, not the author, to determine what happens to it. 32 Excessive control by holders of copyrights and other forms of intellectual property may unduly limit the ability of the public domain to incorporate and embellish creative innovation in the long-term interests of society as a whole, or create practical obstacles to proper utilization. This is reflected in the exceptions to copyright infringement enumerated in ss. 29 to 32.2, which seek to protect the public domain in traditional ways such as fair dealing for the purpose of criticism or review and to add new protections to reflect new technology, such as limited computer program reproduction and “ephemeral recordings” in connection with live performances.
34 To illustrate the level of intrusiveness that would result from my colleague’s interpretation, it is useful to describe in greater detail the process applied by the appellants. 35 The appellants purchased on the open market a quantity of posters of the respondent’s artistic works. They subjected these posters to a technique which involved spreading a special resin or laminating liquid across the face of a poster. The resin is designed to bond with the surface inks. After the applied coating is dried (or cured), the coated poster is submerged in a bath of solvent which loosens the paper substrate but leaves intact the fixed ink/resin layer, thus allowing the latter to be peeled off the former. The rear of the ink/resin layer is then coated with a suitable adhesive resin and transferred to a canvas substrate, which is then smoothed and finished. 36 It is not suggested that “reproduction” occurred when the resin was spread on the poster. This is part of the laminating process envisaged by the É.G.I. contract, and the respondent does not regard it as objectionable.
41 I do not foreclose the possibility that a change of substrate could, as part of a more extensive set of changes, amount to reproduction in a new form (perhaps, for example, if the respondent’s work were incorporated by the ink transfer method into some other artist’s original work) but the present case does not rise to that level. B. The Proposed Test Would Depart from the General Principle that Breach of Copyright Requires Copying
48 It is of interest that our courts have not given an independent meaning to “produce” as distinguished from “reproduce” in s. 3(1) of the Act. Nor have the courts done so under the English Act. In fact, in that country, the word “produce” was thought to be of such little consequence that it was eliminated from the Act by amendment in 1956 (H. G. Richard and L. Carrière, eds., Canadian Copyright Act Annotated (loose-leaf), vol. 1, at p. 3-7). See also C. Brunet, “Copyright: The Economic Rights”, in G. F. Henderson, ed., Copyright and Confidential Information Law of Canada (1994), 129, at pp. 136-37, and McKeown, supra, at p. 421. 49 The U.S. legislation expressly incorporates a definition of “derivative work”, as happens for example when a cartoon character is turned into a puppet, or a tragic novel is turned into a musical comedy. In such circumstances there is, in a sense, a “production” rather than a reproduction. However, the examples of what might be called derivative works listed in s. 3(1)(a) to (e) of our Act are consistent with the notion of reproduction because they all imply the creation of new copies or manifestations of the work. In the application of the ink transfer method, however, there is no derivation, reproduction or production of a new and original work which incorporates the respondent’s artistic work.
52 If the respondent’s attempt to extend the concept of reproduction “in substantial part” to situations where there is no multiplication were correct, one would expect to find decided cases in support of his thesis but none have been brought to our attention. D. The Quebec Court of Appeal Test of “Unanticipated Market” Similarly Exceeds Statutory Copyright Limits
[translation] When we take a reproduction on paper and transfer it onto canvas, it is perhaps not an infringement of the right of the person who is authorized to reproduce the painting on paper (since there is no multiplication of the paper reproduction), but it is an infringement of one of the rights of the artist who painted it. The value of a paper reproduction is no different whether the reproduction is framed or “laminated”. The purchaser of a paper reproduction that is framed or “laminated” pays for the value of the paper reproduction and the cost of framing or “lamination”.
On the other hand, the record shows that a canvas made from a paper reproduction allows the vendor to charge an amount that consists of more than the value of the paper reproduction and the cost of the canvas transfer process. 54 The respondent, as stated, says that money is not the issue. If it were, he could presumably amend his contract with É.G.I. to permit them to sell reproductions on canvas. Equally, he could theoretically have insisted that É.G.I. obtain agreement from its customers not to engage in the ink transfer process, and so on down the line of vendors and purchasers, thereby dealing with the issue of control through a chain of contracts. Indeed, É.G.I. did print such a prohibition on some of the posters, but if any contract resulted, it was not between the appellants and the respondent, and É.G.I. has not come before the court to complain.
57 As previously noted, s. 28.2(1) of the Act provides that even a purchaser of the tangible object may not “distor[t], mutilat[e] or otherwise modif[y]” (emphasis added) the work “to the prejudice of the honour or reputation of the author”. It seems clear, at least by negative implication, that a modification of a work by the purchaser which does not “prejudice …the honour or reputation of the author” was intended by Parliament to be within the purchaser’s rights. 58 In addition, as a secondary point, s. 28.2(3) of the Act provides that a change in “the physical … structure containing a work …shall not, by that act alone, constitute a distortion, mutilation or other modification of the work”. To the extent a change in substrate can be said to change the “physical structure” containing the respondent’s work, it does not “by that act alone” amount to a violation of a moral right either.
(Y. Gendreau, “Moral Rights”, in G. F. Henderson, ed., Copyright and Confidential Information Law of Canada (1994), 161, at p. 171) (See also R. G. Howell, L. Vincent and M. D. Manson, Intellectual Property Law: Cases and Materials (1999), at p. 383.) This is not to say that moral rights do not have an economic dimension (e.g., there may be an economic aspect to being able to control the personality-invested “moral” rights of integrity and attribution) or to deny that there is a moral rights aspect to copyright (e.g., a critic may reproduce parts of the text of a book when reviewing it, but it will be considered a breach of the author’s economic rights unless his or her authorship is attributed). However, in terms of remedies, the distinction in the Act between the two sets of rights is clear.
64 The “droit de destination” applies in other civiliste jurisdictions. Thus in Hovener/Poortvliet, HR January 19, 1979, NJ 412, brought to our attention by counsel for the respondent, the Netherlands Supreme Court found a violation of the droit d’auteur where a purchaser of an authorized art calendar cut out the pictures, stuck them to coasters, and resold them. This was regarded by the court as an altogether new and different “publication”. In Frost v. Olive Series Publishing Co. (1908), 24 T.L.R. 649 (Ch. Div.), by contrast, the English court did not regard as an infringement the cutting out of pictures from books, pasting them on cards, and reselling. “[The recirculation of] objects already in existence is not reproduction in a material form”: Laddie et al., supra, at p. 614. 65 It seems to me that the respondent is pursuing a form of “droit de destination” in this case. But, under our Copyright Act, the “right of destination” as such does not exist. Generally, the copyright holder does not by virtue of his or her economic rights retain any control over the subsequent uses made of authorized copies of his work by third party purchasers. Where in specified situations the Act gives the copyright holder some power to control or benefit from subsequent uses of authorized copies of his work, the relevant provisions are narrowly framed to apply only to very specific forms of reproduction, as in the case of sound recordings (s. 15(1)) or computer programs (s. 3(1)(h)). If a general right to control subsequent usage existed, it would not have been necessary to make specific provision in these cases.
71 The concept of a derivative work is found in the Berne Convention, and in the copyright legislation of the United States, England, Australia, New Zealand and Canada. All these provisions reflect a common progression in copyright legislation from a narrow protection against mere literal physical copying to a broader view which allows the copyright owner control over some changes of medium and adaptations of the original work. While the idea of “derivative works” therefore has parallels in other jurisdictions, including Canada, the American statutory language is particularly expansive, including in particular the words “any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted”, that have no precise counterpart in Canadian legislation. 72 The poster art industry in the United States has been actively litigating the broad statutory “derivative works” provision against owners of the material objects that embody the copyrighted work. In Mirage Editions, supra, for example, the copyrighted image was applied to a ceramic tile. The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the ceramic was an infringing “new” derivative work, a conclusion expressly rejected by the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals in Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580 (1997), which concluded that the fixation did not infringe the copyright. Easterbrook J., for the 7th Circuit, reasoned that “[a]n alteration that includes (or consumes) a complete copy of the original lacks economic significance” (p. 581). He further found that there was no distinction between framing works of art, an acceptable practice under copyright law, and more permanent methods of display, such as re-fixing the art work on tile. The 9th Circuit has taken a different view: see Mirage Editions, supra. These cases and their progeny typically turn on conflicting interpretations of the words “recast, transformed, or adapted” in the U.S. statutory definition, but even under that more expansive U.S. definition of “derivative works” the 7th Circuit concluded that permanently mounting the artwork on tile did not “recast, transform, or adapt” the work. If these words appeared in our Act, there would presumably be a similar battle of statutory construction here, with the respondent saying the work was “recast, transformed, or adapted”, and the appellants denying that characterization, but the conflict between the scope of the copyright holders’ economic rights to control the end uses of his work and the purchasers’ rights as owners of the material object is the same. In the absence of the “recast, transformed, or adapted” language (or equivalent) in our Act, however, the respondent is unable to rely on it as an additional basis of copyright liability. As Estey J. noted in Compo, supra, at p. 367:
73 I should note that while there is no explicit and independent concept of “derivative work” in our Act, the words “produce or reproduce the work …in any material form whatever” in s. 3(1) confers on artists and authors the exclusive right to control the preparation of derivative works such as the union leaflet incorporating and multiplying the Michelin man in the Michelin case, supra. See generally, McKeown, supra, at p. 64. In King Features Syndicate, Inc. v. O. and M. Kleeman, Ltd., [1941] A.C. 417 (H.L.), under a provision in the English Act similar to s. 3(1) of our Act, the plaintiff’s copyright in the cartoon character “Popeye the Sailor” was held to be infringed by an unauthorized doll, i.e., the two dimensional character was reproduced without authorization in a new three-dimensional form. See also W. J. Braithwaite, “Derivative Works in Canadian Copyright Law” (1982), 20 Osgoode Hall L.J. 191, at p. 203. To the extent, however, that the respondent seeks to enlarge the protection of s. 3(1) by reading in the general words “recast, transformed, or adapted” as a free-standing source of entitlement, his remedy lies in Parliament, not the courts. VI. Conclusion with Respect to the Substantive Issue
(b) take proceedings for seizure of those copies or plates before judgment if, under the law of Canada or of the province in which those proceedings are taken, a person is entitled to take such proceedings, as if those copies or plates were the property of the copyright owner. (Emphasis added.)
A. Quebec Superior Court 90 Bélanger J. concluded that transferring an authorized paper reproduction onto canvas did not amount to infringement within the meaning of the C.A.: [1999] Q.J. No. 4472 (QL).
94 Since this was an interlocutory proceeding, the respondent had to bring a motion for leave to appeal under arts. 26 and 511 C.C.P. Nuss J.A., sitting as a single judge, allowed the motion but [translation] “only as it relates to the quashing of the seizure and the release ordered with respect to goods that are reproductions on canvas” (emphasis added). The issue in the Court of Appeal was therefore substantially narrower. This Court may not dispose of any issue that was not before the Court of Appeal. 95 The three judges agreed that the respondent’s appeal should be allowed: [2000] Q.J. No. 412 (QL). Michaud C.J.Q. and Delisle J.A. wrote separate reasons, however, each emphasizing different aspects. Beauregard J.A. concurred in their analysis.
98 Delisle J.A, reviewed a number of relevant sections of the C.A. He first considered the definition of “infringing” in s. 2, that is any copy of a work made or dealt with in contravention of that Act. Then he referred to the sole right to “produce or reproduce …in any material form whatsoever” in s. 3(1). He then cited the description in s. 27 of what constitutes an infringement of copyright: “for any person to do, without the consent of the owner of the copyright, anything that by this Act only the owner of the copyright has the right to do”. He then interpreted those provisions and concluded that the canvas-backed reproductions in question, which had been made without the consent of the respondent, constituted a reproduction of his works in a different form, and was therefore infringement. 99 The Court of Appeal accordingly allowed the appeal and upheld the seizure before judgment with respect to the canvas-backed reproductions.
105 In this case, however, the question of the connection between the facts and the right to seize is completely indistinguishable from the question of the infringement of the respondent’s copyright. This is so by reason of s. 38(1) C.A., which states that “the owner of the copyright in a work …may recover possession of all infringing copies of that work …and take proceedings for seizure of those copies …before judgment if, under the law of Canada or of the province in which those proceedings are taken, a person is entitled to take such proceedings, as if those copies …were the property of the copyright owner” (emphasis added). “Infringing”, as defined by s. 2 C.A., requires an infringement of the copyright. In other words, in order to conclude that the process of transferring onto canvas gives rise to an act of infringement, it must first be established that it constitutes a copyright infringement. 106 In short, in order for the facts in the affidavit to meet the sufficiency requirement in the C.C.P.,they must establish that an infringement has occurred. The issues of sufficiency and copyright infringement therefore involve the same elements of fact and law. Since the relevant facts were admitted, the legal issue is all that remains to be decided. That issue is a narrow one, and calls for a determination of whether the process of transferring onto canvas amounts to infringement. (2) Risk of Abuse
107 Counsel for the appellants argued that we should apply the rigorous tests relating to recognition of the validity of seizures before judgment under art. 734 C.C.P. Those tests refer to, inter alia, the possibility of abuse and the devastating effects that such proceedings may have on the parties involved. 108 While a seizure before judgment under art. 734 C.C.P. may be carried out without prior approval by a judge, it must also be noted that this is a conservatory measure the purpose of which is simply to [translation] “obtain possession of property that is in dispute …and place it under the authority of the court until it has determined the respective rights of the parties” (see C. Belleau, “Des mesures provisionnelles”, in D. Ferland and B. Emery, eds., Précis de procédure civile du Québec (3rd ed. 1997), vol. 2, 301, at p. 307; Molloy v. Bouchard, [1990] R.J.Q. 1941 (Sup. Ct.)). As was previously mentioned, seizure before judgment does not, strictly speaking, call for a determination of the merits of the case. That is in fact why the affidavit in support of the application for a writ need only set out sufficient supporting facts, and those facts must be accepted by the judge who hears the motion to quash under art. 738 C.C.P. 109 Furthermore, the guarantees provided by the provisions of the C.C.P. limit the opportunities for abuse. First, art. 738 C.C.P. allows the defendant to apply, by motion, for the seizure to be quashed because of the insufficiency or the falsity of the affidavit on the strength of which the writ was issued. This means that if an affidavit is too brief or contains false allegations, the seizure will be quashed. Furthermore, under art. 738 C.C.P. when the affidavit is contested, the burden is on the seizing party to prove the allegations in the affidavit. As Professor Belleau observes, supra, at p. 303:
[translation] Subsection 38(1) allows the copyright owner to claim possession of all infringing copies of a work, as the owner, and henceforth provides a statutory basis for proceedings to recover possession and seizure before judgment “if, under the law of Canada or of the province in which those proceedings are taken, a person is entitled to take such proceedings….” In Quebec, the proceedings will be instituted under art. 734(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure…. We would recall that under that article, the seizing party is not required to argue that his debt may be put in jeopardy. [Emphasis in original; citations omitted.]
120 Moral rights, inspired by the continental civil law concept of droit d’auteur, are concerned primarily with protecting the integrity and paternity of the work (s. 14.1(1) C.A.), which is then regarded as an extension of the author’s personality. These are extra-patrimonial rights, which, by definition, are not assignable (s. 14.1(2) C.A.). (For an analysis on the scope and application of moral rights in Canada, see: É. Colas, “Le droit moral de l’artiste sur son ?uvre” (1981), 59 Can. Bar Rev. 521; M. Goudreau, “Le droit moral de l’auteur au Canada” (1994), 25 R.G.D. 403.) 121 Furthermore, my colleague, Binnie J., suggests that this case arises out of the conceptual differences between “the droit d’auteur of the continental civiliste tradition and the English copyright tradition” (para. 6). I cannot subscribe to that view. The disposition of this case is determined solely by the aspects that derive from the English concept of copyright. The concepts of moral rights, as I will explain later, are inapplicable to the facts of this case.
128 “Infringing”, in relation to a work in which copyright subsists, is defined in s. 2 C.A. as “any copy, including any colourable imitation, made or dealt with in contravention of this Act”. Infringement can therefore arise from two distinct sources: (i) a copy made in contravention of the C.A. or (ii) a copy dealt with in contravention of that Act. 129 In the case of a copy made in contravention of the Act, it is the act of copying itself that is unlawful. What that element of the definition is referring to is copies of works made in contravention of s. 3(1) C.A., which prohibits the production or reproduction of a work in any material form whatever.
132 First, infringement of a work, in its most common sense, is synonymous with plagiarism or unlawful appropriation. Generally speaking, we consider that infringing therefore requires copying or unlawful appropriation regardless of any other concurrent wrongful act (for example, an infringement of moral rights). In my view, it is that definition that has been adopted in the Act. 133 Section 38(1) C.A. provides that the owner of the copyright may recover possession of all infringing copies of that work or other subject-matter. This means that the right to recover possession of infringing copies is given to the owner of the copyright and not to the author himself or herself. The owner of the copyright and the author may be one and the same person or two different persons. In the latter case, it would be illogical for a copyright owner other than the author himself or herself to be entitled to recover possession of copies of a work the reproduction of which was an infringement only of the author’s moral rights. Although, as I observed earlier, those rights attach solely to the person of the author and may not be assigned, the expanded interpretation of the expression “copy …dealt with in contravention of [the] Act” proposed by the respondent would lead to just that outcome.
138 My colleague, Binnie J., accepts the appellants’ arguments and adopts a narrow interpretation of the concept of reproduction. Reproduction can only occur if there is multiplication. With respect, I do not agree with that interpretation. It is suggested that the verb “reproduce” implies an increase in the total number of copies. At first glance, that is not an interpretation that is readily supported by the ordinary meaning of that verb. I note that the Canadian Oxford Dictionary (1998) defines it as follows: …1. produce a copy or representation of 2. …cause to be seen or heard etc. again …5. …give a specified quality or result when copied …. [Emphasis added.]
140 As Reed J. stated in Apple Computer, supra, at p. 193, aff’d [1998] 1 F.C. 673 (C.A.), and by this Court, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 209, which we would recall adopted the reasons of Reed J. in their entirety, the concept of reproduction must be interpreted broadly. The legislation is written in general terms so as to include new reproduction technologies: [T]|he opening words of subsection 1(2), now section 3 of the Act, were purposely drafted broadly enough to encompass new technologies which had not been thought of when the Act was drafted.
143 An analysis of the qualitative aspect is therefore an essential element of the analysis under s. 3(1) C.A. If we consider only the quantitative aspect, any individual could in fact appropriate a substantial part of a work and reproduce it on a large scale, and claim that the work had not been multiplied and therefore the C.A. had been complied with. Such a restrictive interpretation would be contrary to the aim and purpose of the C.A. As Tamaro, supra, at p. 93, pointed out in his text on copyright: [translation] The right to reproduce the work or a substantial part thereof means to recreate the work in a modified form. This brings us back to the concept of “substantial part of a work”, which implies that the right to reproduce a work includes the right to reproduce it in all its essential parts. [Emphasis added.]
148 It may be pointed out that the expressions “reproduce a work” and “reproduce a work in any material form” are pleonastic since in all cases, reproducing a work involves a new materialization derived from the original one. However, s. 3(1) does not say only “reproduce …in a material form”; rather, it says “reproduce [a] work …in any material form whatever” (emphasis added). That is an appropriate and carefully worded recognition that a work may be reproduced even if the new medium is different. 149 Having regard to the foregoing, it is clear that multiplication of the number of copies of a work is not an essential element of the act of “reproduc[ing] …in any material form whatever”. It does not matter that the process which produces a new materialization eliminates another; all that matters is that a new act of fixation occurs. Therefore, what we must count in order to determine whether a work has been reproduced is not the total number of copies of the work in existence after the rematerialization, but the number of materializations that occurred over time. 150 On that point, the analysis by Hugessen J.A. made in Apple Computer, Inc. v. Mackintosh Computer Ltd., [1988] 1 F.C. 673 (C.A.), at p. 694, of the concept of “in any material form whatever” is directly relevant to the disposition of this case:
28.2 … (3) Pour l’application du présent article, ne constitue pas nécessairement une déformation, mutilation ou autre modification de l’?uvre un changement de lieu, du cadre de son exposition ou de la structure qui la contient ou toute mesure de restauration ou de conservation prise de bonne foi.
28.2 … (3) For the purposes of this section, (a) a change in the location of a work, the physical means by which a work is exposed or the physical structure containing a work, or
13. … (4) The owner of the copyright in any work may assign the right, either wholly or partially, and either generally or subject to limitations relating to territory, medium or sector of the market or other limitations relating to the scope of the assignment, and either for the whole term of the copyright or for any other part thereof, and may grant any interest in the right by licence, but no assignment or grant is valid unless it is in writing signed by the owner of the right in respect of which the assignment or grant is made, or by the owner’s duly authorized agent. [Emphasis added.]
In considering whether a substantial part has been taken, particular emphasis must be given to the fact that the defendant’s work competes with the plaintiff’s work, or may serve as a substitute for it, or will interfere with a work that the plaintiff may publish in the future. 166 Prima facie, the question of the legal nature of the contract between the respondent and É.G.I. might generate some disagreement. We might well ask whether it comprised an assignment or a mere concession (or licence). In the first case, it would amount to the assignment of the sole right, which may be set up against everyone to produce and reproduce in any material form whatever, while in the second case, it would amount only to the grant of a personal “interest”, and the respondent would retain his right in full. The limitation on the number of paintings, in particular, suggests that this was a mere concession, or licence. In any event, I do not believe that this kind of characterization is necessary for the purposes of this case. We may conclude, simply by reviewing the contractual provisions with respect to the authorized medium, that the respondent never intended to assign in full his right to reproduce the works in question in any material form whatever. The only right that he assigned was the right to reproduce his works on paper, thereby excluding reproduction in any other material form. 167 The contract must be interpreted in accordance with the general requirements of arts. 1425 to 1432 of the Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64 (“C.C.Q.”). The following articles are particularly relevant:
This is therefore, prima facie, the grant of a right to publish certain products produced from the original work, not an unqualified right to distribute copies of that work in any material form whatever (art. 1431 C.C.Q.). 169 The contractual provisions, when construed as a whole, show that the right conferred is limited solely to reproduction on paper products (posters, cards or other stationery products). No mention was made of the possibility of marketing products on any medium other than paper. The rights granted therefore do not include the right to affix an image representing the respondent’s work onto a canvas. Several elements of the contract support that conclusion.
The use of the expression “other stationery products” implies that the products that are expressly authorized are also stationery products. In order for there to be “other” stationery products, there would have to be products of that nature in the first place. 174 Moreover, art. 19, entitled [translation] “Free use of the product”, stipulates:
Solicitors for the respondent: Laurin, Lamarre, Linteau & Montcalm, Montréal. This page has been generated using Mincov Legal Markup Language (“MLML”). While every effort has been made to ensure accuracy and currency of this document, Mincov Law Corporation makes no warranty, representation or undertaking, expressed or implied, nor does it assume any liability, direct or indirect, or responsibility for the accuracy, currency, usefulness or continued availability of this document.The official version of this document is located at http://scc.lexum.org/en/2002/2002scc34/2002scc34.html.