Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/354191035/62-CV-17-3601-OrderforJudgment-7-19-17
Timestamp: 2018-07-16 16:48:37
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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 23', '§ 23', '§ 12', '§ 1', '§ 555', '§ 1', '§ 23', '§ 9', '§ 23']

62-CV-17-3601_OrderforJudgment_7-19-17 | Veto | Separation Of Powers
62-CV-17-3601_OrderforJudgment_7-19-17
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Description: Ramsey County District Court rules against Governor Mark Dayton in the legislature's case against him. Dayton line-item vetoed the legislatures funding as a way to force it back to the bargaining t...
Ramsey County District Court rules against Governor Mark Dayton in the legislature's case against him. Dayton line-item vetoed the legislatures funding as a way to force it back to the bargaining table on other issues.
62-CV-17-3601
The Ninetieth Minnesota State Senate and the File No.: 62-CV-17-3601
Ninetieth Minnesota State House of Judge: John H. Guthmann
v. ORDER GRANTING
Mark B. Dayton, in his official capacity as
Governor of the State of Minnesota, and Myron
Frans, in his official capacity as Commissioner
of the Minnesota Department of Management
The above-captioned matter came before the Honorable John H. Guthmann, Chief Judge
of the Second Judicial District on June 26, 2017, at the Ramsey County Courthouse, St. Paul,
Minnesota. Douglas A. Kelley, Esq., represented plaintiffs. Sam L. Hanson, Esq., represented
defendants. Based upon all of the files, records, submissions and arguments of counsel herein, the
court issues the following:
At the June 26 hearing, the parties agreed that the facts necessary to determine the instant
legal dispute are undisputed. Accordingly, the court compiled the following Statement of
Undisputed Facts from the party submissions:
1. The court adopts and restates by reference paragraphs 1-16 from the Statement of
Undisputed Facts contained in its June 26, 2017 Order.
2. The legislative appropriations as approved in the Omnibus State Government
Appropriations Bill and later vetoed by Governor Dayton were identical in amount to the
recommendations contained in Governor Dayton’s budget, which was submitted to the Legislature
on March 27, 2017. (Reinholdz Aff. ¶ 11; id., Ex. 3.)
3. The Tax Bill passed by the Legislature during its special session contained a provision
that would have defunded the Department of Revenue if Governor Dayton vetoed it. (Compl.,
Attach. to Ex. 1.) Governor Dayton allowed the Tax Bill to become law without signing it, despite
his opposition to the bill. (Id.)
4. On May 30, 2017, Governor Dayton line-item vetoed the lump-sum appropriations for
the Senate and House for fiscal years 2018 and 2019. (Id., Ex. 1.) Governor Dayton’s veto
message listed the reasons for the veto. (Id., Ex. 1.) In addition to referencing the Tax Bill
provision, Governor Dayton cited his objection to bills eliminating the automatic indexing of
tobacco taxes to inflation, an estate tax exclusion increase, the C-I property tax freeze, a provision
precluding the Executive Branch from issuing driver’s licenses to undocumented residents, and a
provision modifying teacher licensure. (Id., Attach. to Ex. 1.) The Governor offered to “allow” a
Special Session only if plaintiffs agreed to pass new legislation removing these items from the bills
that he signed into law or permitted to become law without his signature. (Id.)
5. Governor Dayton could have vetoed each bill referenced in his statement
accompanying the line-item vetoes. MINN. CONST. art. IV, § 23. He chose not to do so.
6. The statement accompanying Governor Dayton’s line-item vetoes expressed no
objection to the level of funding the Legislature appropriated to fund the Legislative Branch.
7. At no time has Governor Dayton or his counsel suggested that the Governor vetoed the
Legislature’s appropriation for any reason specific to the appropriation.
8. Plaintiffs could have remained in session in anticipation of possible vetoes or line-
item vetoes. Instead, on May 22, 2017, both houses entered into a written agreement with the
Governor in which they agreed to adjourn following passage of seven outstanding budget and tax
bills. (Kelly Aff., Ex. 1.) Therefore, the Legislature negotiated away its constitutional right to
meet in session to consider overriding vetoes or line-item vetoes. See MINN. CONST. art. IV, § 23.
9. Governor Dayton may call a special session at any time. MINN. CONST. art. IV, § 12.
10. But for the Order issued by this court on June 26, 2017, and with the exception of
some carry-over funds, plaintiffs would have been without funding to cover the core functions of
the Legislative branch starting on July 1, 2017. With carry-over funds, the House would have
ceased operations by September 1, 2017 and the Senate by July 27, 2017. (Reinholdz Aff. ¶ 18;
Ludeman Aff. ¶ 17.) The June 26, 2017 Order approved the parties’ stipulation for an injunction
requiring emergency temporary funding for the Legislature through at least October 1, 2017.
1. The court adopts and restates by reference paragraphs 1-22 from the Conclusions of
Law contained in its June 26, 2017 Order.
2. The court finds that plaintiffs are entitled to the following declaration of their legal
rights pursuant to the Minnesota Declaratory Judgments Act:
a. The Omnibus State Government Appropriations bill became law when Governor
Dayton signed it on May 30, 2017.
b. The Governor’s vetoes of the two items of appropriation in the Omnibus State
Government Appropriations bill, chapter 4, article 1, section 2, subdivisions 2
and 3, violate the Separation of Powers clause of the Minnesota Constitution by
impermissibly preventing the Legislature from exercising its constitutional
powers and duties. MINN. CONST. art. IV, § 1; see id. art. III.
c. As a result of violating the Separation of Powers clause of the Minnesota
Constitution, the Governor’s line-item vetoes are unconstitutional, null, and void.
d. Because the Governor’s line-item vetoes are unconstitutional, null, and void,
those two items of appropriation became law with the rest of the bill.
3. The defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings/summary judgment is denied.
4. Per the parties’ Stipulation, and with the exception of the injunction already in place,
any further action in connection with Counts II and III of the Complaint is stayed until all appellate
review has been completed and the mandate of the appellate courts has issued, or until further
5. Per the parties’ Stipulation, the court concludes that there is no just reason for the
delay in entry of judgment on this Order and, pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P. 54.02, the Court
Administrator is directed to enter judgment forthwith and without the stay provided for by Rule
125 of the Minnesota General Rules of Practice. The issues decided in this Order are central to
the disputes and relationships between the parties, and the prompt and final resolution of any
appellate issues by the Minnesota Supreme Court will be in the best interests of the parties to this
action and State of Minnesota and will expedite the full and complete resolution of any disputes
between the parties and will advance the just, inexpensive, and efficient resolution of this case in
accordance with Minn. R. Civ. P. 1.
6. The following memorandum is made part of this Order.
Dated: July 19, 2017 BY THE COURT:
Chief Judge, Second Judicial District
The Legislature filed the instant action seeking a Chapter 555 declaratory judgment that
the Governor’s line-item vetoes of Legislative Branch funding are unconstitutional. (Compl. ¶¶
31-35 (Count I).) In addition, the Legislature asks for an injunction compelling the Minnesota
Management and Budget (“MMB”) “to allot such funds as necessary to pay for [the] obligations
of the Legislature.” (Compl. ¶ 39 (Count II).) Finally, in Count III of the Complaint, the
Legislature requests a Writ of Mandamus to compel the MMB “to allot such funds as necessary to
pay for [the] obligations of the Legislature.” (Compl. ¶ 46.) In response, the Governor moves for
judgment on the pleadings, arguing that his line-item vetoes were constitutional exercises of
In a separate Order, the court issued a Temporary Injunction that provides emergency
funding to the Legislature through October 1, 2017. This Order solely addresses the Count I claim.
A. Declaratory Judgments.
The purpose of a declaratory judgment action is to “declare the existence of rights in doubt
or uncertainty, rather than create new rights.” Ketterer v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1 of Chippewa
Cnty., 248 Minn. 212, 226, 79 N.W.2d 428, 439 (1956). “The main characteristic of the
declaratory judgment which distinguishes it from other judgments is that, by the act authorizing it,
courts are empowered to adjudicate upon disputed legal rights whether or not further relief is or
could be claimed.” Id. at 439; see Minn. Stat. § 555.01 (2016); see also Minn. R. Civ. P. 57 (“The
procedure for obtaining a declaratory judgment pursuant to [Chapter 555], shall be in accordance
with these rules. . . . The existence of another adequate remedy does not preclude a judgment for
declaratory relief in cases where it is appropriate.”).
A complaint requesting declaratory relief must ordinarily present a substantive cause of
action “that would be cognizable in a nondeclaratory suit.” Weavewood, Inc. v. S & P Home Inv.,
LLC, 821 N.W.2d 576, 579 (Minn. 2012); see McCaughtry v. City of Red Wing, 808 N.W.2d 331,
337–39 (Minn. 2011) (a declaratory judgment action must present an actual justiciable controversy
when challenging the constitutionality of a law). On repeated occasions, the Minnesota Supreme
Court has held that any claim to determine the validity of a Governor’s veto must proceed by a
declaratory judgment action venued in Ramsey County District Court. Seventy-Seventh Minnesota
State Senate v. Carlson, 472 N.W.2d 99, 99-100 (Minn. 1991) (declining to exercise original
jurisdiction); see Johnson v. Carlson, 507 N.W.2d 232 (Minn. 1993) (challenging veto through a
declaratory judgment action); Inter Faculty Organization v. Carlson, 478 N.W.2d 192, 193 (Minn.
1991) (accepting jurisdiction even though matter proceeded by mandamus and the parties
“inexplicably” failed to file the case as a declaratory judgment action).
Based upon the admonitions of the Supreme Court, the constitutionality of Governor
Dayton’s veto may be reviewed only through the lens of the Legislature’s Count I request for
declaratory judgment. As such, the Count II and Count III claims for injunctive relief and for a
Writ of Mandamus are inapplicable to the court’s judicial review of the Governor’s vetoes.
B. Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings.
Governor Dayton moves for judgment on the pleadings in connection with the
Legislature’s request for a declaration that the line-item vetoes at issue are unconstitutional. A
district court may grant judgment on the pleadings if a complaint fails to set forth a legally
sufficient claim for relief. Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.03. By rule:
party may move for judgment on the pleadings. If, on such motion, matters outside
the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided for in Rule 56,
and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made
pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
Id. In deciding a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court must treat the facts alleged in
the complaint as true and draw all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. See, e.g., Bodah v.
Lakeville Motor Express, Inc., 663 N.W.2d 550, 553 (Minn. 2003). “Only if the pleadings create
no fact issues should a motion for judgment on the pleadings be granted.” Ryan v. Lodermeier,
387 N.W.2d 652, 653 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). Here, the parties agree that there are no genuine
issues of material fact and they rely on both the pleadings and affidavits. Accordingly, it is
appropriate for the court to apply the undisputed facts to the law and issue a ruling per Rule 56.
II. THE LEGISLATURE IS ENTITLED TO ITS REQUESTED DECLARATION
Ambition must be made to counteract ambition . . . . It may be a reflection on human
nature that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government.
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. . . . In framing a
government…to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this:
you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place,
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (discussing the
separation of Executive and Legislative authority).
The Federalist Papers passage brings into focus the genesis of the separation of powers
doctrine in this country—a system of checks and balances built into the Federal Constitution and
the Constitutions of most states, including Minnesota. “The separation of powers doctrine is based
on the principle that when the government’s power is concentrated in one of its branches, tyranny
and corruption will result.” Holmberg v. Holmberg, 588 N.W.2d 720, 723 (Minn. 1999). By
creating three separate but equal Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Branches of government, our
founders designed a system with the greatest potential for effective governance and self-control.
Of course, achieving a functional balance between the three branches of government while
maintaining their separateness sometimes proves more difficult in practice than in theory.
This case presents a stark illustration of seemingly irreconcilable conflicts in the
application of separation of powers principles. When the positions of the Legislative and
Executive branches are examined in isolation, it is easy to see why each branch believes it should
prevail. The Governor relies on the “explicit and unqualified” language of the state constitution
and the "constitutional test" that was developed to interpret the validity of a line-item veto. (Mem.
in Resp. to Order to Show Cause and in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. for J. on the Pleadings at 2, 14
[hereinafter “Governor’s Brief”].) The Legislature points to the Separation of Powers clause in
the Minnesota Constitution and the Minnesota Supreme Court's separation of powers
jurisprudence, which holds that one branch of government cannot abolish or nullify another and
which recognizes that the Governor’s veto authority is to be narrowly construed to prevent the
Executive Branch from encroaching upon or usurping Legislative Branch powers. (Plfs.’ Mem.
in Resp. to Order to Show Cause at 16-22 [hereinafter “Legislature’s Brief”].) The challenge for
the court is the fact that both positions are technically correct. Resolving this issue of first
impression requires moving beyond the veneer of the parties’ arguments.
A. The Governor’s Veto Authority and Separation of Powers: Placing the Parties’
Positions into their Constitutional Context.
When interpreting the Minnesota Constitution, “[t]he primary purpose of the courts is to
ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature and the people in adopting the article
in question.” State v. Babcock, 175 Minn. 103, 107, 220 N.W. 408, 410 (1928). Just as a statute
must be construed as a whole, the constitution “must be taken by its four corners, and effect given
to all its language, and the main purpose and object as thus made manifest effectuated.” State v.
Twin City Telephone Co., 104 Minn. 270, 285, 116 N.W. 835, 836 (1908).
According to the Minnesota Constitution: “Government is instituted for the security,
benefit, and protection of the people in whom all political power is inherent, together with the right
to alter, modify or reform government whenever required by the public good.” MINN. CONST. art
I, § 1. The separation of powers principles implied in our Federal Constitution are imbedded
expressly in the Minnesota Constitution:
The powers of government shall be divided into three distinct departments:
legislative, executive and judicial. No person or persons belonging to or
constituting one of these departments shall exercise any of the powers properly
belonging to either of the others except in the instances expressly provided in this
Id. art. III. The powers of the “legislative department” are set forth in Article IV of the constitution
while those of the Executive Branch, including the Governor, are stated in Article V. Id. art. IV-
V. The sole express instance in which the Governor may perform a legislative function is in the
prerogative to approve or veto legislation. The Governor’s limited role in the legislative process
was explained in a passage from Brayton v. Pawlenty, which both parties quote in their briefs:
The Legislature has the primary responsibility to establish the spending priorities
for the state through the enactment of appropriation laws. The executive branch
has a limited defined role in the budget process. The Governor may propose
legislation, including a budget that includes appropriation amounts, which
proposals the Legislature is free to accept to reject. But the only formal budgetary
authority granted the Governor by the constitution is to approve or veto bills passed
by the Legislature. With respect to appropriation bills, the constitution grants the
Governor the more specific line-item veto authority, through which an item of
appropriation can be vetoed without striking the entire bill. If the Governor
exercises the veto power, the Legislature may reconsider the bill or items vetoed,
and if approved by a two-thirds vote, the vetoed bill or item becomes law.
781 N.W.2d 357, 365 (Minn. 2010) (citations omitted); (see Governor’s Brief at 2-3; Legislature’s
Brief at 15.) As noted in Brayton, the Governor’s legislative authority, found in Article IV,
consists only of a power to veto entire bills and the power to veto “items of appropriation”, the
latter being known colloquially as the “item veto” or “line-item veto”:
of the two houses shall be presented to the governor. If he approves a bill, he shall
sign it, deposit it in the office of the secretary of state and notify the house in which
it originated of that fact. If he vetoes a bill, he shall return it with his objections to
the house in which it originated. His objections shall be entered in the journal. If,
after reconsideration, two-thirds of that house agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent,
together with the governor's objections, to the other house, which shall likewise
reconsider it. If approved by two-thirds of that house it becomes a law and shall be
deposited in the office of the secretary of state. In such cases the votes of both
houses shall be determined by yeas and nays, and the names of the persons voting
for or against the bill shall be entered in the journal of each house. Any bill not
returned by the governor within three days (Sundays excepted) after it is presented
to him becomes a law as if he had signed it, unless the legislature by adjournment
within that time prevents its return. Any bill passed during the last three days of a
session may be presented to the governor during the three days following the day
of final adjournment and becomes law if the governor signs and deposits it in the
office of the secretary of state within 14 days after the adjournment of the
legislature. Any bill passed during the last three days of the session which is not
signed and deposited within 14 days after adjournment does not become a law.
If a bill presented to the governor contains several items of appropriation of
money, he may veto one or more of the items while approving the bill. At the time
he signs the bill the governor shall append to it a statement of the items he vetoes
and the vetoed items shall not take effect. If the legislature is in session, he shall
transmit to the house in which the bill originated a copy of the statement, and the
items vetoed shall be separately reconsidered. If on reconsideration any item is
MINN. CONST. art. IV, § 23; see Johnson v. Carlson, 507 N.W.2d 232, 235 (Minn. 1993) (calling
the Governor’s authority to veto “items of appropriation” a “line item veto”); Inter Faculty
Organization v. Carlson, 478 N.W.2d 192, 194, 196 (Minn. 1991) (calling the Governor’s
authority to veto “items of appropriation” an “item veto”). See generally Duxbury v. Donovan,
272 Minn. 424, 426-33, 138 N.W.2d 692, 694-98 (1965) (discussing the history of the veto and its
dual purpose as a check on unfettered legislative power and on “hasty and unwise legislation”).
In Johnson v. Carlson, the court held that "veto power [is] to be narrowly construed so as
not to exceed its limited function as contemplated by the constitution." 507 N.W.2d at 235. The
court went on to identify the purpose of the line-item veto in state constitutions and articulate the
scope of a Minnesota Governor’s line-item veto authority:
Historically, the line item veto was put in state constitutions to counteract
legislative “pork-barreling,” the practice of adding extra items to an appropriation
bill which the governor could not veto without vetoing the entire appropriation bill.
See, e.g., Rios v. Symington, 833 P.2d 20, 23 (Ariz.1992). Our inquiry, however,
is not into whether “pork-barreling” has occurred—indeed, Governor Carlson
makes no claim that it has occurred in this case; rather, our focus is simply on
whether Governor Carlson has vetoed an “item of appropriation of money.” The
state constitution, recognizing the governor's oversight responsibilities for the
state's budget, provides a gubernatorial line item veto to enable the state's chief
executive officer to engage in cost-containment, subject, of course, to the
possibility of the veto being overturned. In this case, for example, the governor
indicated in his veto message that he was concerned with “long-term cost
implications.” 3 Sen. J. 5560 (1991). It is not for this court to judge the wisdom of
a veto, or the motives behind it, so long as the veto meets the constitutional test.
And in this case the test is met.
Id. (upholding line-item veto of an appropriation from taconite tax revenue).
Two years before Johnson, the Supreme Court, in Inter Faculty Org. v. Carlson, discussed
the limited nature of line-item veto authority in a slightly different way. 478 N.W.2d 192, 194
(Minn. 1991). Its placement in Article IV demonstrates “that the authority is not an executive
function in the traditional or affirmative sense, but rather an exception to the authority granted the
legislature. As an exception, the power must be narrowly construed to prevent an unwarranted
usurpation by the executive of powers granted the legislature . . ..” Id. at 194. Line-item veto
power is a “negative authority, not a creative one—in its exercise the power is one to strike, not to
add to or even to modify the legislative strategy.”1 Id. The principles of Johnson and Inter Faculty
were reaffirmed in Brayton v. Pawlenty. 781 N.W.2d at 366 (“we have recognized that the special
line-item veto power the constitution confers on the Governor for appropriation bills must be
construed narrowly to prevent usurpation of the Legislature’s proper authority”). So, the limited
function of a line-item veto as contemplated by the constitution is to strike entire items of
appropriation. The line-item veto may not be used to strike down pure policy enactments.
In Johnson v. Carlson, the court distinguished this quote from Inter Faculty to address an argument that
the Governor’s line-item veto diverted money “from a purpose determined by the legislature to some other
purpose desired by the governor.” 507 N.W.2d at 234 (quoting Interfaculty, 478 N.W.2d at 194)). The
Johnson court stated that plaintiffs “misconceive the role of the line item veto” and contrasted the matter
under consideration with an Iowa Supreme Court decision invalidating an item veto that struck “a
qualification imposed on the appropriation not the appropriation itself as an entire item.” Id. (citing Rush
v. Ray, 362 N.W.2d 479 (Iowa 1985)). The court does not read Johnson’s discussion of Inter Faculty as
endorsing use of a line-item veto to strike pure policy measures. Rather, in order to meet the “constitutional
test,” the line-item veto must strike a whole “self-contained appropriation of a distinct sum for a specific
purpose.” Id. Of course, if a line-item veto is validly exercised, any policy behind the appropriation of the
distinct sum for a specific purpose goes with it.
Johnson references the “constitutional test” used to judge the facial validity of a line-item
veto. 507 N.W.2d at 235. The two-part constitutional test is whether the Governor vetoed an item
of appropriation and whether the appropriated funds were dedicated to a specific purpose. Id. at
233 (quoting Inter Faculty Org. v. Carlson, 478 N.W.2d at 195). Here, the parties agree that the
Governor vetoed two items of appropriation dedicated to the specific purpose of funding each
house of the Legislature. Accordingly, the vetoes meet the “constitutional test.” Governor Dayton
argues that the inquiry must end once it is determined that the vetoes meet the “constitutional test.”
The difficulty with the Governor’s position, and the origin of what is a Hobson’s Choice2
for any reviewing court, becomes apparent when the court obeys the mandate to construe and give
effect to the entire constitution. Searching for the reasoning behind the limitations placed on the
Governor’s veto authority, the court stated in Duxbury v. Donovan:
It is to be assumed that the framers of our constitution would not place the
veto power in the governor with respect to legislative action in some cases and not
in others without good reason. If exceptions were to be made to the general
authority to negative legislative action reposed in the governor, the basis of such
exception, one would anticipate, should be either that the exercise of such authority
by the chief executive would offend some other basic constitutional principle; or
that the matter involved would lack that degree of statewide significance making
the requirement of concurrence by two-thirds of each branch of the legislature
272 Minn. at 433, 138 N.W.2d at 698 (emphasis added). In essence, the Legislature claims that
the “other basic constitutional principle” is found in the Separation of Powers clause. The
Separation of Powers clause imposes a “constitutional test” of its own. Just as the constitution
“implicitly places a limitation on the power of the legislature” so that it may not abridge the core
functions of a constitutional officer, State ex rel. Mattson v. Kiedrowski, 391 N.W.2d 777, 782
A Hobson’s Choice is “the necessity of accepting one of two or more equally objectionable alternatives.”
Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/Hobson’s%20choice (last
visited July 17, 2017).
(Minn. 1986), the failure to fund the core functions of the Legislative Branch arguably nullifies a
branch of government, which in turn contravenes the Separation of Powers clause. As the
Minnesota Supreme Court observed in State ex rel. Birkeland v. Christianson:
The Governor is the head of the executive department and the chief executive of
the state. The three departments of state government, the legislative, executive, and
judicial, are independent of each other. Neither department can control, coerce, or
restrain the action or nonaction of either of the others in the exercise of any official
power or duty conferred by the Constitution, or by valid law, involving the exercise
of discretion. The Legislature cannot change our constitutional form of government
by enacting laws which would destroy the independence of either department or
permit one of the departments to coerce or control another department in the
exercise of its constitutional powers.
179 Minn. 337, 339-46, 229 N.W. 313, 314-16 (1930).
The Supreme Court recognized the potential application of separation of powers principles
to invalidate the act of another branch of government in In re Clerk of Court’s Compensation for
Lyon County, which considered whether judges could use their inherent judicial power to set the
salary of the clerk of district court rather than the Legislature, as the constitution then provided:
At bottom, inherent judicial power is grounded in judicial self-preservation.
Obviously, the legislature could seriously hamper the court’s power to hear and
decide cases or even effectively abolish the court itself through its exercise of
financial and regulatory authority. If the court has no means of protecting itself
from unreasonable and intrusive assertions of such authority, the separation of
powers becomes a myth.
308 Minn. 172, 176-77, 241 N.W.2d 781, 784 (1976) (citation omitted). Here, the Legislature’s
only forum to seek its “self-preservation” is by invoking the Separation of Powers clause in court.
An analogy to the instant case is found in State ex rel. Mattson v. Kiedrowski, which
involved the judicial review of a law transferring virtually all the functions of the constitutional
office of State Treasurer to the Commissioner of Finance. 391 N.W.2d at 778. Although
enactment of the legislation complied with the constitutional prerequisites for passing a valid
statute, including express constitutional authority to modify the duties of state executive officers,
the legislation was overturned. Id. at 782-83. The court held that the constitutional authority to
modify the duties of state constitutional officers “does not authorize legislation . . . that strips such
an office of all its independent core functions.” Id. at 782. Thus, "[b]y statutorily abolishing all
of the independent core functions of a state executive office, the legislature, in effect, abolishes
that office, and the will of the drafters . . . is thereby thwarted." Id.
Abolishing an office or branch of government by starving it of funding is not materially
different from abolishing the office or branch by starving it of functionality. “To permit the
legislature to gut an executive office . . . is to hold that our state constitution is devoid of any
meaningful limitation on legislative discretion in this area." Id. at 783. The lessons from Mattson
are clear. Meeting the "constitutional test" for passing a valid statute is not necessarily enough to
survive the Separation of Powers “constitutional test.” Moreover, a separation of powers violation
is not immune from judicial review simply because it involves an otherwise constitutional act of
legislative or executive discretion. Examining the result of an action is an important component
of judicial review. The Legislature argues that the inquiry must end once it is determined that the
line-item vetoes effectively abolished the Legislative Branch by starving it of funding. The
foregoing analysis frames the constitutional impasse now foisted upon the Judicial Branch.
B. Count I is Justiciable Because the Governor Effectively Abolished the Legislature.
Before reconciling the parties’ positions, is the Legislature’s premise correct? Did the
vetoes effectively abolish the legislature? For several reasons, the court answers “yes.”3
If the answer was “no”, the Legislature would have difficulty arguing that it was injured in fact—a
justiciability prerequisite. See, e.g., Onvoy, Inc v. Allete, Inc., 736 N.W.2d 611, 617-18 (Minn. 2007)
(citations omitted) (a justiciable controversy requires a definite and concrete assertion of right emanating
from a legal source involving a genuine conflict in tangible interests between parties with adverse interests
that is capable of specific resolution by judgment); State by Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., 551 N.W.2d
490, 493 (Minn. 1996) (citations omitted) (an injury-in-fact is required for a justiciable controversy to
First, legislators have a constitutional right to be paid. MINN. CONST. art. IV, § 9 (providing
for legislative pay). The constitutional obligation to serve once elected should be given no greater
weight than the constitutional provision of legislative salaries. The Legislature also has a
constitutional right to the funds necessary for the staff, supplies, and working space needed to
perform its core functions. The Governor agrees. (Governor’s Brief at 4-5, 17-20.) Preserving
the core operations of the Legislative Branch between sessions while the current legal conflict is
litigated is so important and genuine that the parties stipulated to the entry of a court injunction
mandating temporary funding during the pendency of the instant litigation.4
Second, the Legislature cannot reconvene when it is out of session unless the Governor
calls a special session. Although the Minnesota Constitution calls for the Legislature to reconvene
in 2018, it is unable to conduct its between-session core business of meeting with constituents,
researching and drafting legislation, and conducting hearings without funding for itself, its staff,
its supplies, and its physical office space. In addition, absent funding, the Legislature likely cannot
function, or function effectively, once in session. Under the present circumstances, the court is
compelled to hold that the Governor effectively abolished the Legislature.
Third, absent emergency court funding, the effective abolition will exist as long as the
Governor decides to veto legislative funding bills submitted to him, which the Governor’s counsel
conceded could occur through the remainder of the Governor’s term. (Hrg. Tr. June 26, 2017 at
43-44.) The Governor argues that the availability of emergency funding eliminates any argument
Before entering into the Stipulation, which included an agreement that the issues presented are ripe for
judicial review, Governor Dayton argued that the vetoes did not abolish or defund the Legislature because
he did not veto funding for the Legislative Coordinating Commission and carry-over funds are available.
(Governor’s Brief at 4, 16-17.) However, it is undisputed that funding of the Legislative Coordinating
Commission does not cover legislative salaries, staff, building rental, or office administration. It is equally
undisputed that even with carry-over funds, the House would cease operations by September 1, 2017 and
the Senate by July 27, 2017. (Reinholdz Aff. ¶ 18; Ludeman Aff. ¶ 17.)
that the vetoes abolished or defunded the legislature. (Governor’s Brief at 17-20.) However,
emergency funding is at most a temporary measure to preserve the constitutional rights of the
people while the Executive and Legislative Branches resolve their differences. Emergency funding
is not a remedy for arguably unconstitutional actions by one branch of government against another.
Finally, the Governor argues that the Legislature presents a non-justiciable political
question because the Legislature asks the Judicial Branch to embroil itself in the politics of the two
other branches. Unfortunately, the court must step in political quicksand whichever way it
rules. The Legislature seeks court intervention to declare the veto unconstitutional and the
Governor concedes that his veto is invalid unless the court institutionalizes the extra-constitutional
remedy of emergency funding by the Judicial Branch. The fact that the legal action submitted to
the court has its roots in politics neither represents a non-justiciable political question nor shields
the Governor’s vetoes from judicial review.5
C. Under the Limited and Unique Circumstances of this case, the Governor’s Use of
Line-Item Veto Authority Constituted a Separation of Powers Violation.
For reasons that follow, the court concludes that the Governor’s vetoes violated the
Separation of Powers clause of the Minnesota Constitution because they both nullified a branch of
government and refashioned the line-item veto as a tool to secure the repeal or modification of
policy legislation unrelated to the vetoed appropriation. Each party’s description of the potentially
deleterious implications of the other party’s position offers an analytical framework for the court’s
reconciliation of line-item veto authority and the Separation of Powers clause.
Addressing the political-question issue, the United States Supreme Court stated in Baker v. Carr:
“Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the constitution to another branch of
government, or whether the action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself
a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court as the ultimate
interpreter of the Constitution.” 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962). This case involves the judicial review of action
taken by another branch of government and clearly falls in the latter category.
The Governor’s stance permits one branch of government to nullify another. The
Governor’s answer to such an outcome is emergency funding by the courts. Or, as the Governor’s
counsel put it: “You have a constitutional right to funding as a department of the government. You
don't have a constitutional right to an appropriation.” (Hrg. Tr. June 26, 2017 at 39-40; see
Governor’s Brief at 4, 17.) However, the Governor’s view requires institutionalization of an extra-
constitutional process whereby the Judicial Branch becomes a temporary legislature. The use of
emergency funding from the Judicial Branch has heretofore been limited to funding only the
government’s existing core functions to temporarily protect the rights of the citizenry. Previous
orders from this court speak primarily of funding programs involving agreements with the federal
government, the right of citizens to a public education, the life, health and safety of citizens, or the
preservation of public property. See In re Temporary Funding of Core Functions of the Executive
Branch of the State of Minnesota, 62-CV-11-5203, slip op. at 6-9 (Minn. Dist. Ct. June 29, 2011)
(Gearin, J.); In re Temporary Funding of Core Functions of the Judicial Branch of the State of
Minnesota, 62-CV-11-5203, slip op. at 4-5 (Minn. Dist. Ct. June 28, 2011) (Christopherson, J.);
In re Temporary Funding of Core Functions of the Executive Branch of the State of Minnesota,
C0-05-5928, slip op. at 7-8 (Minn. Dist. Ct. June 23, 2005); In re Temporary Funding of Core
Functions of the Executive Branch of the State of Minnesota, C9-01-5725, slip op. at 7-8 (Minn.
Dist. Ct. June 29, 2001). Uncomfortable as it was for the Judicial Branch to consider which
functions to fund, a specific and objective standard governing the process was at least achievable.
Moreover, the process involved existing programs that were currently funded and which had been
the subject of legislation passed and signed into law by the executive and legislative branches.
In the case of operating funding for an entire branch of government, such as the Legislature,
parsing through legislative functions to determine which constitute a “core” operation is
subjective, hypothetical, and involves judicial micromanagement of a discretionary process.6 It
should not be for the court to determine which legislative operations get funding and which do not.
Subject to executive veto authority, the Legislature determines what the government should do
and what resources should be committed to those activities, not the courts. Cf. Associated Builders
& Contractors v. Ventura, 610 N.W.2d 293, 304 (Minn. 2000) (“the legislative process is
complicated and the rationale for pursuing one particular process or another is not always clear”).
Ironically, in the name of separation of powers, the Governor’s solution would use the courts as a
substitute legislature to facilitate enlarging the executive’s line-item veto authority so it is virtually
coextensive with general veto authority. Again, emergency funding is not a remedy for the
unconstitutional acts by one branch of government against another—it is a remedy for citizens.
The Governor’s position also requires an expansive view of the Chief Executive’s line-
item veto power as a tool permitting the use of budgetary coercion to induce policy changes that
are unrelated to the vetoed appropriation. Consequently, the Governor concedes that a consistent
application of his position permits “unsavory” use of the line-item veto. (Hrg. Tr. June 26, 2017
at 42.) According to the Governor’s counsel, line-item veto authority may be used to veto the
Judicial Branch appropriation unless a ruling favorable to the Governor is issued in some pending
litigation. (Id.) Similarly, the Governor concedes that he may use his item veto authority to
eliminate funding for the Legislature through the end of his term if it does not pass the policy
legislation he demands. (Id. at 43-44.) According to the Governor, the only constitutional response
to this kind of coercion is emergency funding from the courts or for the Legislature to override the
veto or impeach the Governor. (Id. at 42-43; Email from Sam Hanson, Attorney for Defendants,
Before agreeing to the Stipulation, the Governor advocated for a court-appointed special master to take
evidence and make recommendations to the court regarding which activities of the Legislature should be
deemed fundable “core functions.” (Governor’s Brief at 28-30.)
Briggs and Morgan, P.A. to Matt Anderson, Law Clerk to the Honorable John H. Guthmann (June
26, 2017) (contained in Court File No. 62-CV-17-3601).7) Yet, the Governor’s view contradicts
the oft-repeated pronouncement from the Supreme Court that line-item veto power must be
narrowly construed. Moreover, the Supreme Court has made it equally clear that use of the line-
item veto is limited to striking appropriations—not policy measures. In the face of this blunt
guidance, the court is loath to endorse such a sprawling notion of executive authority.
On the other hand, the Legislature’s position requires court intrusion upon the executive’s
motives when exercising an otherwise valid veto. Minnesota Supreme Court decisions emphasize
that separation of powers principles usually require the judiciary to avoid considering the motive
behind a valid exercise of authority by a co-equal branch of government. See, e.g., Johnson, 507
N.W.2d at 235. But, it is equally clear that caution should not be thrown to the wind when the
issue involves judicial review of an action that produces a constitutionally suspect result. The
Governor's argument stifles the court's judicial review role. In Starkweather v. Blair, the Supreme
Court discussed the circumstances under which the motive behind the exercise of authority by
another branch of government, the Legislative Branch, may be considered:
We have frequently held that the motives of the legislative body in enacting any
particular legislation are not the proper subject of judicial inquiry. . . . As long as
the legislature does not transcend the limitations placed upon it by the constitution,
its motives in passing legislation are not the subject of proper judicial inquiry. That
does not mean that the legislature may use a constitutional power to accomplish an
unconstitutional result, but, before it can be held that the latter has been done, it
must appear that the end result of the act accomplished some purpose proscribed
245 Minn. 371, 379-80, 71 N.W.2d 869, 875-76 (1955). The court later repeated: “It is also true
that the legislature may not use a constitutional power to accomplish an unconstitutional result.”
Between sessions, the latter two options are unavailable unless the Governor calls a special session.
Id. at 385, 71 N.W.2d at 879. The principles discussed in Starkweather are equally applicable to
the Executive Branch’s exercise of legislative authority through use of the veto.
Governor Dayton’s line-item vetoes implicate the concerns raised by Starkweather in two
ways. First, one branch of government may not effectively abolish or nullify another. Second, a
line-item veto may not be used to strike policy legislation. Based on the rationale of Starkweather,
the Governor opened the door to an examination of the reason behind his vetoes.
The motive for the vetoes are within the scope of the court’s judicial review for another
reason. The Governor's general and line-item veto powers cannot be exercised constitutionally
unless the Governor returns the vetoes to the Legislature with a statement of objection to the
legislature—the veto message. MINN. CONST. art IV, § 23. The court's judicial review function
cannot be complete or meaningful unless it is permitted to consider every action the Governor took
to exercise his line-item veto authority—including the veto message.8 Borrowing from the Rules
of Evidence, consideration of the reason for a veto should go to the weight given the motivation,
not its admissibility. Accordingly, the court’s consideration of motive should not extend to the
wisdom of the Governor’s decision. Rather, motive will be considered only to the extent relevant
to determining whether the veto, whatever its rationale, produced an unconstitutional result.9
The Governor concedes that but for the availability of extra-constitutional emergency funding from the
Judicial Branch, his line-item vetoes infringe on the Legislative Branch in violation of the Separation of
Powers clause. For this reason, the Governor’s argument that a reviewing court’s consideration of his
motives represents a separation of powers violation is incongruent.
The Governor’s use of State v. Bates as a framework for analyzing the Separation of Powers clause
artificially narrows the required judicial review by excluding consideration of the result of the veto. 96
Minn. 110, 117, 104 N.W. 709, 712 (1905) (the Separation of Powers clause consists of a “distributive
clause”, a “prohibitive clause” and an “exception clause”). Therefore, the Governor’s argument only begs
the issue. The Governor asserts that exercise of his item veto was technically proper under the exception
clause and therefore does not implicate the prohibitive clause. (Governor’s Brief at 12-13.) However, the
court is being asked by the Legislature to declare the vetoes invalid based upon their impact on the
Legislature as an independent branch of government without regard to the mechanics of how those vetoes
were exercised. The outcome in Mattson would not have been possible had the court applied Bates as
advocated by the Governor.
Here, the Governor’s veto message makes it clear that the intended “end result of the act”
is to force legislation to repeal certain policy measures he signed into law that are unrelated to the
vetoed appropriations, which is a use of the line-item veto proscribed by the constitution. The
Governor makes no claim that his line-item vetoes were issued for purposes of cost containment.
Indeed, it is undisputed that the vetoed appropriations were supported by the Governor and enacted
exactly as set forth in the budget he submitted to the Legislature. Requiring a relationship between
the purpose of the veto and the vetoed appropriation in no way limits the Governor’s authority to
influence policy legislation as contemplated by the constitution. The Governor may always use
his general veto power to veto any bill that contains policy provisions to which he objects.
The Governor is justifiably concerned that prohibiting an item veto of the Legislature’s
appropriation under all circumstances gives the Legislature unfettered license to engage in the kind
of “pork-barrel” self-indulgence the line-item veto was designed to prevent. The court’s ruling is
by no means intended to prevent governors from issuing a line-item veto of the Legislature’s
appropriation if they actually object to the manner in which the Legislature funded itself. No such
concern exists in this case because the Governor concedes his vetoes had nothing to do with the
Legislature’s appropriation. Likewise, the court envisions no constitutional impediment to the use
of item-veto authority to “coerce” policy legislation so long as vetoing the appropriation does not
nullify or effectively eliminate a branch of government or a constitutional office.10
The Legislature suggests that one branch of government is categorically barred from coercing another.
(Legislature’s Brief at 16-17.) It is true that using the right constitutional procedure to line-item veto an
appropriation cannot presuppose the absence of an unconstitutional encroachment upon another branch of
government under the Separation of Powers clause. However, our system of checks and balances allows
for a certain amount of coercion so long as the branches do not engage in unconstitutional coercion. One
of the accepted uses of veto power and the veto message has always been to extract concessions from the
Legislature. As such, like the Governor, some of the Legislature’s arguments swing the pendulum too far.
To conclude, the court holds that Governor Dayton improperly used his line-item veto
authority to gain a repeal or modification of unrelated policy legislation by effectively eliminating
a co-equal branch of government. Therefore, under the unique and limited circumstances of this
case, the Governor’s line-item veto of the Legislature’s appropriations offended the Separation of
Powers clause of the Minnesota Constitution. They are null and void.
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