Source: https://dopus.uni-speyer.de/solrsearch/index/search/searchtype/all/start/0/rows/10/languagefq/eng/subjectfq/Europ%C3%A4ische+Union
Timestamp: 2019-09-20 02:25:58
Document Index: 645058494

Matched Legal Cases: ['arts 290', 'arts 290', 'Art. 290', 'Art. 291', 'Art. 290', 'Art. 291']

Tauschinsky, Eljalill (4)
von Arnim, Hans Herbert (1)
Europäische Union (6) (remove)
Tauschinsky, Eljalill ; Weiß, Wolfgang
EU administrative law scholarship and practice remain confused about the reach and interrelation of arts 290 and 291 TFEU, which created the categories of delegated and implementing Commission acts. The introduction of these two different instruments of executive rule-making by the Lisbon Treaty has prompted attempts in delineating them, based on constitutional theories of separation of powers or functional differentiation. These attempts have failed to a large extent, all the more since the CJEU’s relevant case law has not been helpful in constructing a proper distinction. Today, recourse to arts 290 and 291 TFEU by the legislator takes place in the tension created between the fact that the Treaties, informed by an abstract constitutional distinction between legislation and execution, appear to have created categorically different acts, and the fact that delegated and implementing rule-making procedures in practice have become increasingly similar to each other. In simplified terms, the problem is that delegated and implementing acts appear – in terms of their foundation in primary law – as fundamentally different acts that are, however, adopted in practice through similar procedures, at the same time as their content and legal effects are indistinguishable in many or even in most cases. Yet, if we accept that the creation of two forms of Commission acts was prompted by some form of legal necessity or legitimate political will, then understanding the difference between delegating and implementing acts remains paramount.
Instead of Conclusions - More Questions (2018)
Arts. 290 and 291 TFEU are notoriously hard to differentiate. However, there is some evidence that a separation on the basis of substantive regulation through delegated acts and procedural specifications by implementing acts is forthcoming. The substantive – procedural differentiation is not very clear cut, but it affords the institutions flexibility in answering new challenges while at the same time exerting some guiding force. This Conclusion describes the separation of delegated and implementing acts along the substantive – procedural differentiation but also points to problems ahead. Thus, constitutional ambiguity, an inappropriate reliance on pre-Lisbon doctrine and the lack of a common vision continue to plague the law on EU administrative rule-making. To find a way to fulfil the promise of simplification that is part of the Lisbon reform, the EU institutions will all need to take the procedural safeguards around delegated and implementing acts more seriously.
Do we still need Article (6)2 TEU? Considerations on the absence of EU accession to the ECHR and its consequences (2018)
Callewaert, Johan
Article 6(2) TEU provides that the EU shall accede to the European Convention on Human Rights. However, the EU accession project has been significantly delayed by Opinion 2/13 of the ECJ. At the same time, there appears to be some harmony in the case law of the two European Courts, which could lead to the status quo being considered as a valid alternative to EU accession. It might therefore be tempting to remove Article 6(2) altogether from the TEU at the next revision of the Treaties. This paper argues that Article 6(2) should stay in the TEU, because a closer look reveals that the current status quo is not satisfactory: it does not allow an adequate representation of the EU in the procedure before the European Court of Human Rights, nor is it capable of ensuring in the long-term comprehensive and stable consistency between EU law and the Convention. Moreover, removing Article 6(2) TEU would undermine the very idea of a collective understanding and enforcement of fundamental rights. This could initiate a process leading to the current European architecture of fundamental rights protection being unravelled altogether. Hence, there is no return from Article 6(2) TEU. Neither is there from actually implementing it.
Inuit and Subjects in EU law (2017)
Tauschinsky, Eljalill
Vortrag auf der ICON Konferenz 2017 in Kopenhagen zur Konstruktion des EU Rechtssubjekts anhand der Inuit Rechtsprechung des EuGH
Searching for Order. Exploring the use of delegated and implementing acts in the EU customs code (2017)
Artikel über Unterschiede in der gesetzgeberischen Ermächtigung der Kommission unter Art. 290 AEUV gegenüber Art. 291 AEUV anhand des EU Zollkode. Der Artikel findet empirische Unterschiede insofern als Art. 290 AEUV für die Ermächtigung der Festsetzung von 'Bedingungen' verwendet wird, und Art. 291 AEUV für die Ermächtigung zur Festsetzung von Verfahrensregeln.
The new EU party financing regulation (2005)