Source: http://www.germanvictims.com/2016/02/reprisals-and-orders-from-higher-up-during-war/
Timestamp: 2017-02-25 15:50:30
Document Index: 146205162

Matched Legal Cases: ['§47', '§443', '§47', '§47', '§54', '§54', 'Art. 358', 'Art. 454', 'Art. 50', 'art 1918', '§48', 'art, 1941', 'art 1987', 'art 1995', 'art 1993', 'arts 1']

Reprisals and Orders From Higher Up During War | German Victims – Deutsche Opfer
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Posted on February 24, 2016 by eyes wide open	Reprisals and Orders From Higher Up
KARL SIEGERT, WITH COMMENTS BY GERMAR RUDOLF
In early 1944 the Allies landed in Italy, a few miles south of Rome. In order to keep the immense cultural treasures of Rome safe from harm, the German Field Marshal Kesselring declared Rome an “open city“, i.e., a battle-free zone. This made Rome the hotbed of all kinds of partisan groups and foreign secret service activities. Since Italy was at that time engaged in a sort of civil war (not all Italians agreed with the ousting of Mussolini and the betrayal of Germany), the situation in Rome, only a few miles behind the battle front, was explosive. These were the conditions under which Obersturmbannführer [Lieutenant Colonel] Herbert Kappler of the Security Police was charged with keeping peace and order in the city, a task at which he was indeed largely successful.
On March 23, 1944, however, something happened. On this day, as on many other days before, the police regiment “Bozen“, which was comprised almost entirely of South Tyroleans, marched through the Via Rasella. As the regiment passed by a street-sweeper’s cart, an enormous explosive charge in the cart, mixed with iron shrapnel, blew up. 32 of the German policemen were killed instantly, another 10 died later of their injuries. 60 policemen were badly wounded.
After the war, Kappler was sentenced to lifetime imprisonment for this act, but his subordinates were acquitted.[1] However, some left-wing lobbyists and the public prosecutor also wanted to imprison, for life, one Captain Erich Priebke, who had belonged to Kappler’s unit and had participated in the execution. The Argentinean government had extradited him to Italy in 1996. The Italian military court acquitted Priebke on August 2, 1996, on the grounds that the limitation period had expired. At this announcement an irate lynch mob gathered outside the court,[2] so that the judges ordered Priebke taken into custody again, and decided in early February 1997 that he would have to be retried before a military court.[3] This court eventually decided, on July 22, 1997, that Priebke would have to go to prison for five years.[4] Meanwhile, those partisans who had been responsible for the explosives attack and who are still living today are also being investigated, on charges of murder, even though it is rather unlikely that they will be tried.[5]
Requisitions are discussed in Article 52 of the Hague Land Warfare Convention of October 18, 1907. In this context, however, developments have since gone beyond the framework of the Convention […].[7]
This goes first and foremost for the application of the Hague Land Warfare Convention of 1907. At the time of its inception there were as yet only few automobiles, neither armored vehicles nor airplanes, neither carpet-bombing nor nuclear weapons, and also no “total war” where civilians are both actively and passively enlisted for participation. In this context, the problem of partisan warfare has attained a significance that could be in no way foreseen in 1907. As well, the inhabitants of occupied zones, even if they have not actively taken up arms, are subjected to the effects of war in a completely different way than was the case in earlier wars. The Belgian court-martial in Lüttich has stated that certain regulations of the Hague Land Warfare Convention are entirely outdated.[14] In his study of the development of the law governing occupation in wartime from 1863 to 1914, the American author Graber[15] wrote in 1949 that it is necessary to examine whether the regulations issued between 1863 and 1914 do in fact still represent the fundamental principles of international law as these pertain to wartime occupation, or whether it is necessary to work out an entirely new law incorporating the new aspects of war-time occupation in present times.
“Sensible and practical guidelines must be applied.”
The aforementioned American verdict in Case VII (SouthEast Trial) speaks of the fundamental principles of justice which most nations have adopted.[17] But justice is not the only thing to evolve and change. Views and judgments about facts of recent history are also subject to change based on the discovery of new historical sources. The view of history that prevailed in 1945 no longer agrees with today’s.
The best example of this is the 1940 war in Norway. The Nuremberg trial of the chief war criminals dealt with the Norwegian campaign as a case of German aggression.[18] Later publications, however, showed that long before the German plans were made, an attack on Norway’s neutrality was being prepared in England, under the direction of the then Minister of Defense, Churchill.[19] On February 5, 1940, the Allied Supreme Council of War decided to deploy three or four divisions to Narvik, in northern Norway.[20] In the night of April 7-8, 1940, British and French naval forces placed mines in Norwegian territorial waters.[21] Thus, the British and French governments prepared and partially implemented an attack on Norway and its neutral status before the Germans ever did. Consequently, the view of history expressed by the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg with respect to the case of Norway was wrong. We must ask that both sides be judged according to the same standards.
Concerning the concept of reprisals, Oppenheim-Lauterpacht’s definition has been most widely accepted.[28] According to this definition, a wartime reprisal is the case if one warring party retaliates against another by means which are otherwise unlawful acts of warfare, and with which he wants to force his opponent, his opponent’s branches and the members of the opposing armed forces to give up their illegal acts of war and to return to the principles of lawful warfare.
This definition shows better than most others[29] that a reprisal is not retrospective punishment or revenge for past injury.[30] Rather, a violation of international law by the opposing side is its prerequisite, and its purpose is to force this opposing side to restrict itself to internationally lawful behavior in future.[31] Reprisals differ from collective punishment in that they are directed against members of an enemy nation with no regard for their personal guilt, whereas collective punishment has such guilt as its particular requirement.[32] This difference is often overlooked. The American verdict in Case IX,[33] for example, speaks first of “reprisals” and then of “general penalty” in the sense of Article 50 of the Hague Land Warfare Convention. In this way the verdict comes to false conclusions with regard to “reprisals“.[34]
As early as July 30, 1863, the American President Lincoln threatened to execute prisoners of war in retaliation against the killing of Negroes; General Sherman ordered the execution of 54 prisoners of war as reprisal for the murder of 27 of his soldiers, whose bodies had been found bearing the notice “Death to the plunderers“.
After the First World War this practice was commonly retained and perpetuated. In December 1918, for example, the Belgian Commanders of occupied cities in the Rhineland ordered the taking of hostages whose lives were to guarantee the safety of the occupation troops.[49] In 1919, the Romanian General Madarescu demanded 500 hostages, of which he threatened to shoot 5 for each Romanian killed.[50] In Beuthen, Upper Silesia, the French took more than 20 reprisal prisoners in retaliation against the shooting death of one Major.[51] Further, during the invasion of the Ruhr region in 1923, French Commanders imposed severe prison sentences on German persons in retaliation for acts of sabotage committed against the invaders by the populace.[52] Security hostages were also taken there on railway trains serving the French and Belgian regime.[53] During the political upheavals in Ireland in 1919-1921, the British troops carried out numerous reprisal killings.[54] And we should also mention that the French active service order of 1924 instructs that, when occupying enemy territory, “prendre des ôtages“.[55]
Since the attitude of the civilians towards the German soldiers was more positive in Italy than in the other European countries, few executions of hostages and reprisal prisoners took place there, apart from the special incident of the “Fosse Ardeatine” (March 24, 1944).
“Regarding General Leclerq’s proclamation in Strassbourg, according to which 5 hostages were to be shot for every French soldier killed in ambush, Headquarters has ordered that Allied expedition troops operate in accordance with the Geneva Convention of 1929 and especially its Article 2, which states that reprisals against prisoners of war are prohibited.
Therefore, under certain circumstances – especially in cases where civilians have violated the orders of the Geneva Convention – the threat expressed by General Leclerq may be enforced, but not against prisoners of war.”
“[…] 4. If a German shoots at Frenchmen, or if any other incident whatsoever happens, 5 houses will be torched and 100 Germans executed.
[…] 6. I am responsible, on pain of my own death, to ensure that these orders are enforced […] the Mayor […]“
“Anyone who commits an attack on a member of the occupation forces or on a bearer of official functions, or who commits arson for reasons of political enmity, seals not only his own fate but that of 50 former members of the Nazi Party as well. Their lives are forfeit together with that of the assassin or arsonist.”
“However, I have come to the conclusion that there is nothing which makes it absolutely clear that in no circumstance and especially in the circumstances which I think are agreed in this case – that no innocent person properly taken for the purpose of a reprisal cannot be executed.”
Where prerequisites are concerned, Exner’s view[84] that there is nothing about this issue that is not disputed would seem to be accurate. However, there is much that can be eliminated from this dispute if we remember the difference between collective punishment and reprisals (cf. previous, p. 533). A reprisal does not in any way require blame or guilt on the part of the person affected. This is why, for example, the prosecutor in the Kesselring Trial falsely accused the defendant of having made use of innocent persons.[85] This is also why reprisals may be imposed on persons or groups of persons that were demonstrably innocent of the violation of international law that is to be avenged.[86]
Further, the application of reprisals requires that an appropriate investigation has been conducted first. Article 358b of the American Rules of Land Warfare speaks of a “careful inquiry“.[90] However, the circumstances surrounding the incident must also be considered. In reprisals, a quick reply to the violation of international law is important. If, for example, all likely participants in a crime have been arrested and their guilt has been established, it is not necessary to wait and see if more evidence might turn up in the future.
“Victory is necessary in order to vanquish the enemy, and this necessity justifies all the undescribable horrors of war, the immense sacrifices of human life and health and the inevitable destruction of property and the devastation of land. Aside from the limits imposed on the warring parties by international law, all kinds and degrees of force can and at times must be applied in war in order to achieve that goal, in spite of the cruelty and the extremes of misery that war brings with it. War is a struggle for existence waged between nations, and no degree of individual suffering and hardship can be specially taken into account; the national existence and independence of the warring nations is a higher consideration than any individual welfare.”
restriction of the people’s freedom of movement,
The matter of who is responsible for ordering the reprisals is not entirely clear. An individual soldier may not take reprisal measures on his own initiative. Article 358b of the American Rules, for example, states that the highest available office should be consulted, unless military necessity demands immediate action. According to Article 455 of the British Manual, “even though there are no international rules on the subject, reprisals should never be ordered by an individual soldier, but only ever by a commander.” In the case of France, Fauchille[98] states that the orders for a reprisal should come from the commanding General, if possible. According to Article 10, Section 2 of the Italian Martial Law of July 8, 1938, reprisals… if immediate and exemplary action is necessary,… may be ordered by any other “comandante” as well. Such a “comandante” can be a soldier, for example,[99] who has an operating unit under his command;… it must be a unit which allows its commander the opportunity for initiative, even if limited.
In Germany, reprisals were to be ordered by a higher commander, generally a divisional commander.[100] As Laternser comments aptly, there was no applicable rule of martial law here, especially since lower-ranking commanders were also responsible in the English, American and Italian armed forces. Therefore, since reprisal law in particular is governed by the principle of reciprocity,[101] other commanders could also lawfully order reprisals during the Second World War, despite this purely German regulation. This is why Waltzog[102] says, correctly, that the regulation stating that only a divisional commander could give the order was binding only for as long as the opponent also observed such a restriction. But since Germany’s opponents in World War Two acted differently even in their formal regulations, German commanders of lower rank similar to English commanders or Italian comandantes were also entitled to order reprisals.
“Il faut donc qu’elles (les réprésailles) soient de nature à faire impression sur ceuxlà-mêmes dont dépent la cessation de cette conduite.” (Therefore, the reprisals must be of a nature to make an impression on those on whom the cessation of this conduct depends.)
Thus, the extent of a reprisal ultimately becomes a matter of the military commander’s situational judgment.[110]
Not only the number of victims, but also the circumstances of the reprisal’s enforcement are determined by military necessity. Just as the ordering of a reprisal killing must be the last resort, the manner of its implementation must also be limited. Since a reprisal, in its individual case, suspends a norm of international law, its implementation must be limited and must observe the principles of humaneness as far as possible.[114]
If the foregoing considerations regarding reprisal law and requisitions had been consistently applied in the trials of the post-war years, then under the principle of “equality under the law” a large part of our prisoners of war would already have to have been acquitted. In the remaining cases, where such measures must be assumed to have been a violation of international law, one must consider the additional factor of higher orders. We shall investigate this in the following.
Superiors’ orders have always had special significance regarding the criminal liability of a subordinate obeying them. It would be impossible to command soldiers or police forces if the subordinates were authorized or perhaps even obliged to examine the lawfulness of an order before carrying it out. Alternatively, every military or police commando would have to be assigned its own legal adviser. For this reason, military law has everywhere and at all times depended on discipline, i.e., on the general principle that the subordinate must obey his superior’s orders if such orders are given within the limits of his jurisdiction. Consequently, if the carrying-out of the order constitutes a violation of some law, criminal liability is on principle restricted to the superior who had given the order, and conversely the subordinate who had obeyed the order on principle remains exempt from liability. This is explicitly set out by §47 of the German Military Criminal Code, by Article 18 of the Swiss Military Criminal Code, by Article 40 Sections 2 and 3 of the Italian Codice Penale Militare di Pace, and by other regulations.[117] For example, §443 of the British Manual of Military Law of 1914 decreed that members of the armed forces who violated accepted rules of warfare on the orders of their commanding officers are not war criminals and therefore cannot be punished by the enemy.[118] Similarly, Article 347 of the American Rules of Land Warfare ruled out the punishment of subordinates obeying orders.
In those countries that had rescinded the tradition by which a commanding officer’s orders exempted a subordinate from punishment, a return to the earlier principles was soon demanded. For example, in its verdict of June 29, 1951, against Lippert and others,[126] the Belgian court-martial in Lüttich rejected the criminal liability of the accused because these had acted under orders. The Brussels court-martial came to a similar decision on March 9, 1951, in its verdict against General von Falkenhausen.[127]
In light of these circumstances we cannot agree with the view expressed in the American verdict in the Nuremberg SouthEast Trial,[133] that the civilized nations had increasingly espoused the principle that higher orders could not be claimed as defense against criminal acts. This court’s opinion has already failed due to the military necessities of post-war times. Its implementation would have undermined all military authority. And this is why the latest (7th, 1952) edition of the well-known Manual by Oppenheim-Lauterpacht contains the following section:[134]
“Given a reference to higher orders for purposes of justifying a war crime, a court must unquestionably consider that obedience to any not blatantly illegal order is the duty of every member of the armed forces, and that under the conditions of war-time discipline one cannot expect a subordinate to carefully weigh the legal basis of the orders he receives. It must also be considered that the norms regarding the conduct of war are often controversial, and that an act intended to serve as reprisal, though it might at other times constitute a war crime, can be carried out in obedience to orders.”
These conditions in and of themselves already suffice to rid the disputed action [Kappler’s and Priebke’s involvement in reprisal shootings, E.G.] from the stigma of a war crime.
As a result, the Nuremberg court’s attempts to revise the general principles failed. Therefore, under international law, orders issued by a responsible superior on principle preclude criminal liability on the part of the subordinate obeying the orders; the superior giving the orders is criminally liable for their implementation.
There are individual exceptions to the general principle discussed here. In the passage quoted above, Lauterpacht acknowledges the exemption from punishment if the order given is “not blatantly illegal“. In Article 40 Section 4 of the Italian Codice Penale militare di Pace an exception is introduced to the principle of the superior’s sole liability, for the event that carrying out the order given does in fact obviously constitute a crime (costituisce manifestamente reato).[135] Article 18 Section 2 of the Swiss Military Criminal Code states that the subordinate is also criminally liable if he is aware that, by following the order, he contributes to a crime or misdemeanor. It is left to the judge’s personal discretion to moderate or dispense with punishment. Therefore, the subordinate has no clear-cut duty to evaluate his orders.[136] According to §47 Section 1 of the German Military Criminal Code, the subordinate obeying the orders was punished as participant in a criminal act if:
he knew that his superior’s orders pertained to an act whose aim was the commission of a general or military crime or misdemeanor.[137]
If the subordinate’s share of the blame was minor, his punishment might be dispensed with.
e) Significance of Führer’s Orders for a Subordinate’s Exemption from Liability
During World War Two Germany as well as other countries saw trends towards the limitation of exceptions to the general principles, and towards the introduction of strict discipline with a concomitant, absolute exemption from liability and punishment for the subordinate obeying orders. Today it is apparent that these views were wrong. But we must take into consideration the circumstances prevailing in those days in the “Führer state“. Since 1938 Hitler had been the Supreme Commander of the German Wehrmacht, and the highest Chief of the SS and the SD ever since their establishment. As a result, and in accordance with the organization of an authoritarian state, he was able to give direct orders to any office or position he chose. In this context, the American verdict at Nuremberg in Case XII (Wehrmacht Supreme Command Trial) stated:[138]
“Hitler’s personal decrees had the force of law.”
In Huber’s book Das Verfassungsrecht des Großdeutschen Reiches this was expressed as follows:[139]
“The Führer consolidates within his person all sovereign power of the Reich: all public power in the state as well as in the Movement is derived from his leadership power […] He is the carrier of all political power […] He is the highest carrier of all social functions […].”[140]
From today’s perspective we must deny an authoritarian head of state’s order its force of law if this order violates natural right. In other words, when retrospectively assessing the legitimacy of an act from those days, we cannot content ourselves with the simple observation that it was done on the basis of an order from the highest chief of state. If such an order violated natural right, we cannot consider it legitimate, and carrying out such an order may be regarded as unlawful. But before we treat the carrying-out of the order as a criminal offense, we must in any case consider the application of the aforementioned (in d) §47, Sections 1 and 2 of the Military Criminal Code. Further, we must then also consider whether there may not also be other grounds for ruling out liability, either as typical or as individual case. Let us take a brief look at these issues in the following.
Even in Germany there is much controversy about how someone who is unaware of the unlawfulness of his actions should be treated under the law.[142] It is beyond the scope of the present study to discuss this controversy in detail; suffice it to say that British and American criminal law do not require an awareness of the illegality of one’s actions.[143] In every case, however, it is important to determine whether the judicial system in question requires the affirmation of the guilt of an accused. Articles 5 and 47 of the Italian Criminal Code, for example, permit the consideration of a non-criminal error on the part of the accused. If an accused believes his actions to be permissible, for example on the basis of a misinterpretation of the Hague Land Warfare Convention, then he must not be punished for a deliberate offense. Under German law the element of intent would be inapplicable if, for example, someone charged with unlawful confiscations had erroneously believed that there was a pressing need for his actions, to serve the war effort.[144] These examples may indicate that the question of blame as pertaining to unlawful reprisals and requisitions must be of far greater significance than the post-war trials would in fact show.
The state of emergency is an aspect particularly important to the cases dating from the last war. We have already pointed out the tendency for commanding officers to demand unconditional obedience from their subordinates. This was accompanied by a considerable tightening of law and justice as it pertained to military disobedience and insubordination. Someone who sought to act on natural right and an accordingly lack of obligation to the orders of the state leadership (cf. p. 548), and thus disobeyed an order from a higher source, would have had to expect a severe backlash and harsh punishment. Especially in the last years of the war these dangers were by no means vague; they were very immediate indeed. Since not only the threats of punishment were draconic, but the sentences passed were also very severe, anyone who had dared insubordination would have put himself in immediate danger of his life. Thus, such cases always represented a state of emergency, as according to §54 of the German Criminal Code. A soldier could therefore not have been expected to act in keeping with natural right. Though he was obliged to stand up to dangers in battle, he could not have been expected to willingly run the risk of execution for insubordination.[145] Therefore his conduct would have been exempt from liability as per §54 of the German Criminal Code.[146]
V. Summary We have seen how a wide range of legal aspects bear upon an area of exceedingly practical significance and how international and national law, conventions and common law must all be considered in order to arrive at a just solution. In some respects, wartime saw a kind of intellectual confusion that did not allow for equal and balanced justice for all. The post-war years, and with them an increasing distance from the events of the war, provided the basis for a morally unexceptionable order. Reprisals were prohibited at the Convention of August 12, 1949, the theory and practice of requisitions have been reconciled, and the issue of higher orders has seen a return to principles that agree with criminal law per se. On the other hand, matters must also be put right for the past. First and foremost it is necessary to subject the cases of our prisoners of war still detained today by our erstwhile enemies to a review guided by the reformed legal perspectives. The way in which these cases are dealt with shows whether the path is now clear for equal justice for all, and thus for a new European peacetime order.
Naturally, the data to be found in the subject literature about the numbers of partisans and the damage they caused vary widely, since there are few reliable documents about this kind of unlawful warfare and since the Soviet Union also always had a strong propagandistic interest in the historiography of partisan warfare. The most reliable data seems to be that provided by Bernd Bonwetsch,[151] who gives the numbers of partisans as follows: late 1941: 90,000; early 1942: 80,000; mid-1942: 150,000; spring 1943: 280,000; by 1944, skyrocketing to approximately half a million. These figures are based both on Soviet and on contemporaneous Reich-German sources. The damage done by the partisans, especially in the area of Byelorussia, is considerably more difficult to quantify. Wilenchik tells of impressive quantities of weapons and ammunition that were allegedly at the partisans’ disposal, as well as of extensive crippling of the German supply lines through paralysis of railway lines, especially in 1944.[152] In general terms, this is confirmed by Werner.[153]
Regarding the numbers of German soldiers and civilians killed by partisans, Bonwetsch contrasts the claims from Soviet sources – up to 1.5 million – with those from the German side: 35,000 to 45,000,[154] which he considers to be more reliable, since allegedly the German sources would have had no reason to minimize the figures. However, he overlooks the fact that it is generally customary in war to downplay one’s own losses. Seidler[155] recently published a balanced up-to-date study about the Wehrmacht’s struggle in the partisan warfare, showing not only the disastrous and probably decisive effects of the partisan’s attacks against German units and especially their supplies, but he proves also that most of the German reactions were totally covered by international law – although not always most far-sighted. Furthermore, he shows that those orders from higher up which broke international laws (e.g., the infamous “Kommissar order“, which might be considered morally appropriate, but politically stupid and judicially untenable) were in most cases sabotaged by the front units, and that these orders, after long-lasting and massive protest, were eventually revoked.
“Within three years of the war, the Byelorussian partisans eliminated approximately 500,000 German soldiers and officers, 47 Generals, blew up 17,000 enemy military transports and 32 armored trains, destroyed 300,000 railway tracks, 16,804 vehicles and a great number of other material supplies of all kinds.”[156]
The data also diverge greatly regarding the personnel (and concomitant costs) involved in the Germans’ efforts to maintain security behind the frontlines: 300,000 to 600,000 persons were needed according to Soviet sources, vs. roughly 190,000 according to German sources.[154]
As we know today, the German Wehrmacht deployed in the East fought not only for the survival of the Third Reich, but after they abandoned all illusions of imperialism, they also fought for the freedom of all of Europe from Stalinism,[163] and therefore, in light of Prof. Siegert’s findings, we must observe that there was nothing unlawful and very little immoral about the merciless battle of the German security forces against unlawful Soviet partisans, even if that battle did involve draconic reprisals. If the official Soviet information about the numbers of German soldiers and/or their allies killed by partisans should be accurate, then it must be noted that reprisal killings of several millions of people (ratio 1:10) would have been theoretically justified. But even the numbers given by German authorities (some 40,000 victims) could have resulted theoretically in reprisal killings of about 400,000 civilians. It goes without saying that such numbers are horrific, and we can just be thankful that reprisal killings are forbidden nowadays and hope that the law will be observed. We must, however, ask whether such killings actually took place in those days.
Aside from all this, I consider it possible and even likely that German units in the hinterland shot countless civilians in the course of the so-called “gang battles“, and primarily in the form of reprisal killings.[174] Obviously, in selecting the victims of such reprisals, one would not choose Ukrainians, Byelorussians or members of the Balkan, Baltic or Caucasian peoples, of whom considerable numbers fought in German units. The fact that the Jews were predominantly unpopular amongst these peoples was mainly due to fairly recent causes. In the previous decades many people had had terrible experiences with Communist commissars, disproportionately many of whom were of Jewish descent, especially in the first few decades of Soviet Bolshevism.[175] The Russian Jewess Sonja Margolina has made some interesting points regarding the involvement of the Russian Jews in the Bolshevist reign of terror:[176]
In the early 1990s, Professor Dr. Ernst Nolte also pointed out the Jews’ intimate entanglement in Communism, though naturally he rejects equating the Jews with Bolshevism. Nolte writes:[177]
“For readily apparent social reasons, was not the percentage of persons of Jewish extraction particularly great among the participants in the Russian Revolution, different from the percentages of other minorities such as the Latvians? Even at the start of this century Jewish philosophers were still pointing with great pride to this extensive participation of the Jews in Socialist movements. After 1917, when the anti-Bolshevist movement – or propaganda – stressed the topic of the Jewish People’s commissars above all others, this pride was no longer expressed, […] But it took Auschwitz to turn this topic into a taboo for several decades.
‘If Jews were highly visible in the revolution in Russia and Germany, in Hungary they seemed omnipresent. […] Of the government’s 49 commissars, 31 were of Jewish origin […] Rakosi later joked that Garbai (a gentile) was chosen for his post ‘so that there would be someone who could sign the death sentences on Saturdays’. […] But the conspicuous role of Jews in the revolution of 1917-19 gave anti-Semitism (which ‘seemed on the wane by 1914’) a whole new impetus. […] Historians who have focussed on the utopian ideals espoused by revolutionary Jews have diverted attention from the fact that these Communists of Jewish origin, no less than their non-Jewish counterparts, were led by their ideals to take part in heinous crimes – against Jews and non-Jews alike.'”
“The Trotskies make the revolutions [i.e., the GULag] and the Bronsteins pay the bills [in the Holocaust].”[178]
Two detailed monographs appeared in Italy about the Priebke case: Pierangelo Maurizio, Via Rasella, cinquant’ anni di menzogne (Via Rasella, Fifty Years of Lies), Maurizio Editione, Roma 1996; Mario Spataro, Repressaglia (Reprisal), edizione Settimo Sigillo, Roma 1996). In Germany the Deutsche Rechtsschutzkreis was the first to publish a brief summary of the case, well worth reading: Günther Stübiger, Der Priebke-Prozeß in Italien, Schriftenreihe zur Geschichte und Entwicklung des Rechts im politischen Bereich, issue 5, Deutscher Rechtsschutzkreis, Postfach 40 02 15, D-44736 Bochum 1996, DM 5.-; more detailed: G. Gysecke, Der Fall Priebke, Verlagsgesellschaft Berg, Berg am Starnberger See 1997.
“SS man on trial again for caves massacre“, The Daily Telegraph, April 15, 1997, p. 16.
AP, “Priebke convicted in WWII massacre“, Rome, July 22, 1997. Priebke was sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment, of which 10 years were amnestied. The co-defendant, Karl Hass, was sentenced to 10 years, of which he served only 8 months before being freed under an amnesty. Meanwhile, Priebke has found refuge in an Italian monastery: Reuter, “Ex-Nazi Priebke rejects Italy court order to move“, Rome, August 7, 1997. In his appeal Priebke was given a life time sentence, ZDF-heute News, March 7, 1998.
Reuter, “Italian judge reopens 53-year-old bombing probe“, Rome, June 28, 1997; however, the matter will only proceed to trial if the court can force itself to interpret the bombing attack as not having been directed against the German occupation troops, for such things are not a punishable offense under present Italian law.
Evidence from Churchill’s Zweiter Weltkrieg and other sources, in W. Hubatsch, Die deutsche Besetzung von Dänemark und Norwegen, 1940, Musterschmidt, Göttingen 1952, pp. 13ff.
Cf. E. Vanselow, Völkerrecht, Mittler, Berlin 1931, p. 85; Hyde, op. cit. (note 11), v. III, p. 1840, says: “similar in kind“.
Similarly K. Strupp, Wörterbuch des Völkerrechts, v. I + II, de Gruyter, Berlin 1924f, p. 350; F. von Liszt, M. Fleischmann, Das Völkerrecht, 12th ed., Springer, Berlin 1925, p. 439; Schütze, op. cit. (note 10), p. 41; Guggenheim, op. cit. (note 11), v. II, p. 583; Art. 358 of the American Rules of 1940; Fauchille, op. cit. (note 30), n. 1022, describes reprisals as “moyen de coercition, non un châtiment“.
Laun, op. cit. (note 8), p. 43, even suggests that reprisals were usually deliberately and on principle directed against innocent persons. But then he speaks of collective punishment without regard for guilt, and thus leaves the way open for misunderstandings. Hyde, op. cit. (note 11), v. III, p. 1843, points out, as do we, the clear distinction between “relation” and “penalty“. Art. 454 of the British Manual of Military Law (by L.F.L. Oppenheim and J. E. Edmonds, Her Majesty Stationary Office, London 1929) emphasizes that “[…] reprisals […] in most cases inflict suffering upon innocent individuals […]”. R. v. Keller, Der Geisel im modernen Völkerrecht, Forchheim 1932, p. 57, aptly differentiates between reprisals and collective punishment by pointing out the different elements of liability and punishment.
The verdict overlooks the fact that Art. 50 of the Hague Land Warfare Convention regulates only the “general penalty“, but says nothing about retaliation and reprisals; similarly, Hyde, op. cit. (note 11), v. II, p. 1840, n. 1, unclear Guggenheim, op. cit. (note 11), v. II, p. 824.
Hoppe, op. cit. (note 14), p. 48, describes them as measure to force submission. v. Keller, op. cit. (note 32), p. 37, says that their nature is expressed in their guarantee function. The Italian verdict of the Tribunale Territoriale di limna of July 20,1948 says aptly (p. 44): “La rapressaglia deve avere scopo repressivo e preventivo, non vendicativo“.
But this was the wording of an order of Hitler’s of March 23, 1944, in the case of the Via Rasella in Rome; cf. Laternser, op. cit. (note 36), p. 63.
Numerous references in Laternser, op. cit. (note 36), p. 74, Hoppe, op. cit. (note 14), p. 43, and others [cf. Winston Churchill, The World in Crisis, vol. 5: “The Aftermath“, T. Butterworth, London 1929, pp. 278ff.]
Cf. collection of documents pertaining to the Falkenhausen Trial before the 2nd French Chamber, on March 9, 1951, No. 1658 crimes de guerre, des notices de 1948, No de l’affaire: 48 against von Falkenhausen and others; also Behling, Zeittafel und Materialien zur Frage der während des 2. Weltkrieges im Befehlsbereich Belgien-Nordfrankreich durchgeführten Exekutionen, Brüssel 1950, Zeittafel.
This was already pointed out by J. M. Spaight, War Rights on Land, Macmillan, London 1911, p. 465, and S. Glueck, War Criminals, Their Prosecution and Punishment, A. A. Knopf, New York 1944, p. 55, both cited in Laternser, op. cit. (note 36), p. 193. Much harsher measures, which in fact violate international law, are urged by the English Handbook of Modern Irregular Warfare, Pamphlet No 1: The Principles of Irregular Warfare (Document Warlimont No. 10 in Case V before the American Military Tribunal in Nuremberg). This work states, among other things: “[…] 7. […] best method of dealing with informers is their ruthless extermination as soon as discovered. Pin a note to the body saying why they were killed […] 8. for the time being every soldier must be a potential gangster […]: use the gangster methods […] 9. close combat […] you have to kill […] a strangle hold from behind […]”
Eg. cf. Vanselow, op. cit. (note 27), p. 241; J. C. Bluntschli, Das moderne Völkerrecht, 3rd ed., Beck, Nördlingen 1878, p. 319; F. von Liszt, M. Fleischmann, op. cit. (note 31), p. 493; J. Kohler, Grundlagen des Völkerrechts, Enke, Stuttgart 1918, p. 218; A. Waltzog, Recht der Landkriegsführung, Vahlen, Berlin 1942, p. 83; Hoppe, op. cit. (note 14), p. 134; Schütze, op. cit. (note 10), pp. 56, 74, 79, with co-authors; also, Lummert, op. cit. (note 39), p. 63, and H.-H. Jeschek, Die Verantwortlichkeit der Staatsorgane nach Völkerstrafrecht, Bonn 1959, p. 335. On a tangent, Schneeberger, “Reziprozität als Maxime des Völkerrechts“, Schweizerische Juristenzeitung, 1948, pp. 201-208, here p. 207; instead of reprisals he acknowledges only “negative reciprocity“.
Cf. Roosevelt, Bernadotte, Westlake, Wheaton, Melen, all of them cited in Hoppe, op. cit. (note 14), pp. 95f., also Nuvolone, La punizione dei crimini di guerra, 1945, p. 139. – Oppenheim-Lauterpacht op. cit. (note 28), 7th ed., v. II, p. 592, declares the killing of hostages to be a “war crime“; he completely overlooks the fact that it was used by all warring parties; cf. also his error already discussed in the previous, note 41.
On the other hand, the Oct. 25, 1952, verdict of the Italian Tribunale Supremo Militare in the Kappler case states (regarding B, 3): “L’inosservanza che legittma la rappresaglia del nemico deve essere effetto di azione od omissione imputabile allo Stato, rispettivamente in contrasto con divieti o comandi del diritto internazionale.” It disputes that these prerequisites were met in the case of the assassination in the Via Rasella on March 23, 1944, which was committed by partisans. With that, the Court is in opposition to the rules mentioned in the text, which must be regarded as expression of the international legal regulations that are in force.
Cf. R. Frank, Strafgesetzbuch, 18th ed., Mohr, Tübingen 1931, p. 153; Siegert, Notstand und Putativnotstand, Mohr, Tübingen 1931, p. 24; H. Henkel, Der Notstand nach gegenwärtigem und künftigem Recht, Beck, Munich 1932, pp. 43 ff.; Maurach, Kritik der Notstandslehre, Heymann, Berlin 1935, pp. 72 ff., esp. pp. 79ff. (reprint: Keip, Goldbach); E. Mezger, Strafrecht, I. Allgemeiner Teil. Ein Studienbuch, 4th ed., Beck, Munich 1952, §48; A. Schönke, Strafgesetzbuch, Kommentar, 6th ed., Beck, Munich 1952, p. 199; G. Bettiol, Diritto penale, parte generale, 2nd ed., Driulla, Palermo 1950, p. 251ss. The latter rightly calls for a “bilanciamento qualitative” (p. 254).
Accordingly, Section 9 of the Introduction to the Hague Land Warfare Convention after the “lois de l’humanité et les exigences de la conscience publique“; cf. Hoppe, op. cit. (note 14), p. 90.
Quoted according to Aschenauer, “Richterliche Nachprüfungspflicht und Handeln auf Befehl“, in Die andere Seite, Juni 1950, pp. 2-41, here p. 27. Another reference in E. Schwinge, “Angehörige der ehemaligen deutschen Wehrmacht und der SS vor französischen Militärgerichten“, Monatsschrift für deutsches Recht, 1949, pp. 650-654, here p. 650.
hoh, “Die Franzosenzeit hat begonnen“, Stuttgarter Zeitung, 25.4.1995
One exception is a recently publicized case of the unwarranted murder of 48 German soldiers who had already surrendered: Michael Sylverster Kozial, “US-Kripo ermittelt nach 51 Jahren“, Heilbronner Stimme, September 24, 1996; “Später Fahndung nach Mördern in US-Uniform“, Stuttgarter Zeitung, September 27, 1996, p. 7.
Relevant orders were issued by Stalin and were broadcast via all Soviet Russian stations; cf. Keesing’s Archiv der Gegenwart, 1941, July 3rd + 21st 1941; cf. Sowjetski Partisani, Moscow 1961, p. 326.
Bernd Bonwetsch, “Sowjetische Partisanen 1941-1944“, in Gerhard Schulz (ed.), Partisanen und Volkskrieg, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1985, pp. 99, 101.
Witalij Wilenchik, “Die Partisanenbewegung in Weißrußland“, in Hans Joachim Torke (ed.), Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte, v. 34, Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden 1984, pp. 280f., 285, 288f. This chapter has a certain anti-Fascist undertone.
B.S. Telpuchowski, Die Geschichte des Grossen Vaterländischen Krieges 1941-1945, Bernard & Graefe Verlag für Wehrwesen, Frankfurt/Main 1961, p. 284; comparable Seidler, op. cit. (note 155), p. 36f.; similar data may also be found in Heinz Kühnreich, Der Partisanenkrieg in Europa 1939-1945, Dietz, Berlin (East) 1965; for further interesting information, see I.I. Minz, I.M. Rasgon, A.L. Sidorow, Der Große Vaterländische Krieg der Sowjetunion, SWA Verlag, Berlin 1947; it is said that the Washington National Archive’s document copies regarding partisan warfare in the former Soviet Union have recently been made unavailable to the public. This information and the preceding references are courtesy of Fritz Becker; cf. also Becker, “Stalins völkerrechtswidriger Partisanenkrieg“, Huttenbriefe 15(4) (1997), pp. 3-6 (online: vho.org/D/Hutten/Becker15_4.html).
Cf. Walter N. Sanning, “Soviet Scorched-Earth Warfare“, in The Journal of Historical Review, vol. 6/No. 1, Spring 1985, pp. 92-116 (online (German): vho.org/D/DGG/Niederreiter29_1.html).
J. Hoffmann, Stalin’s War of Extermination 1941 – 1945, Theses & Dissertations Press, Capshaw, AL, 2001, pp. 305-327.
Cf. J. Hoffmann, “Die Sowjetunion bis zum Vorabend des deutschen Angriffs“, in Horst Boog et al., Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, vol. 4: Der Angriff auf die Sowjetunion, 2nd ed., Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart 1987; Hoffmann, “Die Angriffsvorbereitungen der Sowjetunion“, in B. Wegner (ed.), Zwei Wege nach Moskau, Piper, Munich 1991; V. Suvorov, Icebreaker: Who Started the Second World War?, Hamish Hamilton, London 1990; Suvorov, Der Tag M, Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart 1995; E. Topitsch, Stalin’s War: A Radical New Theory of the Origins of the Second World War, Fourth Estate, London 1987; cf. W. Post, Unternehmen Barbarossa, Mittler, Hamburg 1995; F. Becker, Stalins Blutspur durch Europa, Arndt Verlag, Kiel 1996; Becker, Im Kampf um Europa, 2nd ed., Leopold Stocker Verlag, Graz/Stuttgart 1993; W. Maser, Der Wortbruch. Hitler, Stalin und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Olzog Verlag, Munich 1994.
G. Reitlinger, Die SS, Tragödie einer deutschen Epoche, Desch, Munich 1957, p. 186; similar Efraim Zuroff, Beruf: Nazijäger. Die Suche mit dem langen Atem: Die Jagd nach den Tätern des Völkermordes, Ahriman, Freiburg 1996, p. 44, were he says that 3,000 men, “mobil killing units, whose task was to kill all Jews and communist officials in the area occupied by the Wehrmacht.” This included the huge area “from the suburbs of Leningrad in the north to the Asov sea in the south.[…] Their weapons were conventional firearms. Nevertheless they succeeded in killing 900,000 Jews in 15 months.” Zuroff wonders, but he has no doubts. This has been possible, according to Zuroff, because of the “fanatic support by the native population.” (p. 47) That there has been a massiv partisan warfare in the back of the fighting German army is either unknown to Zuroff or he is not interested in it.
Regarding the activities of the Einsatzgruppen as troops to combat partisans or to murder the Jews (depending on which view one takes), Udo Walendy has written three critical studies well worth reading: Historische Tatsache Nr. 16 & 17, “Einsatzgruppen im Verband des Heeres“, parts 1 & 2; Historische Tatsache Nr. 51, “Babi Jar – die Schlucht mit 33.771 ermordeten Juden?“; Verlag für Volkstum und Zeitgeschichtsforschung, Vlotho 1983, 1983, and 1992.
For the time between Jan. 1, 1943, and Oct. 31, 1944 (22 months), the German authorities have claimed 145,364 personens killed in the partisan warfare, 88,493 imprisoned, and 90,993 civilians “registered“, i.e., either sent into camps or otherwise punished; cf. F. W. Seidler, op. cit. (note 156).
Germar Rudolf, Sibylle Schröder “Partisanenkrieg und Repressaltötungen“, Vierteljahreshefte für freie Geschichtsforschung, 3(2) (1999), pp 145-153, have discussed this recently.
E. Nolte, “Abschließende Reflexionen über den sogenannten Historikerstreit“, in U. Backes, E. Jesse, R. Zitelmann (eds.), Die Schatten der Vergangenheit, Propyläen, Berlin 1992, pp. 83-109, here pp. 92f.
J.Z. Muller, “Communism, Anti-Semitism and the Jews“, in Commentary, issue 8, 1988, pp. 28-39; for a more ideological approach to National Socialist anti-Semitism cf. Erich Bischoff, Das Buch vom Schulchan aruch, Hammer Verlag, Leipzig 1929; on this expert opinion one of the best known National Socialist anti-Semites, Theodor Fritsch, relied heavily: T. Fritsch, Handbuch zur Judenfrage, 31st ed., Hammer-Verlag, Leipzig 1932; a comparison to modern Jewish critics of Judaism is extremely revealing, cf. Israel Shahak, Jewish History, Jewish Religion, Pluto Press, London 1994 (online: codoh.com/zionweb/zishahak/zishahakan01.html).
Germar Rudolf (ed.), Dissecting the Holocaust-pdf
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