Source: http://oui-law.com/tag/conviction/
Timestamp: 2013-05-22 04:59:53
Document Index: 252661671

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 24', 'art. 1', '§ 9', '§ 24', 'Art 1', '§ 24', '§ 11', '§ 11', '§ 24', '§ 76', '§ 24', '§ 24', '§ 24', '§ 24', '§ 24', '§ 24', '§ 24', '§ 24', '§ 10', '§ 4', '§ 10', '§ 10', '§ 14', '§ 24', '§ 24', '§ 22', '§ 24', '§ 24', '§ 24', '§ 24', '§ 24', '§ 24', '§ 24', '§ 24', '§ 24', '§ 24']

Conviction	Massachusetts OUI Boston Lawyer Driving Influence Conviction Violation 90 24	Massachusetts OUI Boston Lawyer Driving Influence Conviction Violation 90 24
Defendant appealed his conviction by the Boston Court(Massachusetts) of a third offense of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor (OUI), in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, § 24(1)(a)(1) (1994). Defendant contended that his conviction was unconstitutional under U.S. Const. art. 1, § 9, U.S. Const. amend. XIV, and Mass. Const. Declaration of Rights arts. 12 and 24.
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Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, § 24(1)(a)(1) (1994) provides as follows: If the defendant has been previously convicted or assigned to an alcohol or controlled substance education, treatment, or rehabilitation program by a court of the commonwealth, or any other jurisdiction because of a like offense of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor two times within 10 years preceding the date of the commission of the offense for which he has been convicted, the defendant shall be punished by a sentence which may include a term of imprisonment in a state prison..
Ex post facto principles are not violated when a person convicted of operating while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, second offense, receives an enhanced penalty for previously having been convicted of a like offense, even though the prior offense occurred before the effective date of the law mandating an enhanced penalty. The enhanced punishment is imposed for a subsequent violation; it is not retroactive punishment for the first. The prior offense is not part of the crime charged; it relates only to punishment.
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Commonwealth v. Victor
Defendant was convicted by a jury of Belmont District Court Department (Massachusetts) of driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol (DUI), fourth offense, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, § 24(1)(a)(1). Defendant’s motion to dismiss the subsequent offense charge on the ground of double jeopardy was denied. After sentencing, defendant appealed.
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Whether the defendant’s double jeopardy rights are violated by charging him on subsequent offense charge?
Defendant’s sentencing involved Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, § 11A, which provided that if defendant was charged with a crime for which more severe punishment was provided for second and subsequent offenses, then before sentence was imposed, defendant was entitled to a trial by jury of the issue of conviction of a prior offense. Here, one judge sentenced defendant, a second judge determined that defendant had three prior offenses, and the first judge resentenced defendant. On appeal, defendant argued that subjecting him to a sentence enhancement after the imposition of sentence on the OUI offense exposed him to additional punishment for the same crime and violated his double jeopardy rights. The appellate court concluded that the violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, § 11A, did not subject defendant to double jeopardy because the proceeding had not concluded and jeopardy had not terminated when the first judge imposed sentence following conviction of the OUI offense. Defendant was on notice that he had been charged with a subsequent offense. He was afforded a trial on the subsequent offense portion of the complaint and was given a single sentence based on the findings therefrom.
Posted in Attorneys | Tagged 11a, Appellate Court, Belmont Massachusetts, Commonwealth, Conviction, Court Concluded That, Defendant, Double Jeopardy, Dui Lawyer, Imposition, Jeopardy, Massachusetts Lawyer, Massachusetts Lawyers, Motor Vehicle, Proceeding, Sentence Enhancement, Severe Punishment, Sris, Trial By Jury, Vehicle Enhancement	OUI Quincy Massachusetts Lawyer Motor Vehicle Probation Certificate	OUI Quincy Massachusetts Lawyer Motor Vehicle Probation Certificate
Commonwealth v. Samuel
A jury in the District Court Department (Massachusetts) convicted defendant of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol (OUI), and then, in a separate bench trial, a judge found that this was defendant’s fourth OUI offense, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, § 24(1)(a)(1). Defendant appealed.
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Whether there was error in the admission of the probation certification?
Defendant argued that his confrontation rights were violated by the introduction, at the subsequent offense trial, of Registry of Motor Vehicles (RMV) records and a probation record. The appellate court found that there was error in the admission of the probation certification. This record did not qualify as a non-testimonial business record under Melendez-Diaz, but, rather, had every appearance of having been prepared in anticipation of litigation, defendant’s criminal trial for OUI as a fourth offense. It was error to admit the document absent an opportunity to cross-examine the writer. However, the introduction was harmless because a certified copy of the conviction was introduced as another exhibit. There was no Melendez-Diaz error in admission of RMV records, which were kept in the ordinary course of the business of the RMV and were admissible as business records under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 233, §§ 76, 78. Finally, defendant’s claim that there was inadequate biographical and informational data to establish his identity with respect to the prior conviction of OUI as a third offense was rejected.
Posted in Attorneys | Tagged Admission, Anticipation, Appellate Court, Bench Trial, Business Record, Business Records, Commonwealth, Confrontation, Conviction, Criminal Trial, Defendant, Informational Data, Litigation, Massachusetts Lawyer, Massachusetts Lawyers, Motor Vehicle, Probation, Quincy Massachusetts, Registry Of Motor Vehicles, Sris	OUI Norfolk Massachusetts Lawyer License Revocation Restoration Authority	OUI Norfolk Massachusetts Lawyer License Revocation Restoration Authority
Harrison v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles
After plaintiff licensee’s third conviction of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicating liquor (OUI), the Massachusetts Registrar of Motor Vehicles revoked his license to operate a motor vehicle in Massachusetts for eight years. He appealed; the Massachusetts Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies and Bonds affirmed. He sought judicial review and moved for judgment on the pleadings.
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Whether the Registrar has authority to restore the license of a third-time OUI offender?
Plaintiff argued that his most recent OUI conviction, for which he alleged to have received a 45-day license suspension, had to be the “final decision” since both of his prior OUI convictions occurred over 20 years ago. The appellate court disagreed. Under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, § 24(1)(c)(3), the Registrar was prohibited from restoring the license of a third-time OUI offender such as plaintiff until eight years after the date of conviction. As plaintiff did not have a single prior OUI conviction more than 10 years before receiving his most recent conviction, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, § 24D, which provided for a suspension of between 45 and 90 days, did not apply. According, the Board did not err in applying § 24, as opposed to § 24D, when it affirmed the Registrar’s decision to suspend plaintiff’s license for eight years.
Posted in Attorneys | Tagged 24d, Appellate Court, Conviction, Final Decision, Judgment On The Pleadings, Judicial Review, Liability Policies, License Revocation, License Suspension, Licensee, Liquor, Massachusetts Board, Massachusetts Lawyer, Massachusetts Lawyers, Motor Vehicle Liability, Norfolk Massachusetts, Plaintiff, Registrar Of Motor Vehicles, Sris, Third Time	OUI Quincy Massachusetts Lawyer Suspension License	OUI Quincy Massachusetts Lawyer Suspension License
Peter John v. Commonwealth
After plaintiff licensee’s third conviction of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicating liquor (OUI), the Massachusetts Registrar of Motor Vehicles revoked his license to operate a motor vehicle in Massachusetts for eight years. Plaintiff argued that his most recent OUI conviction, for which he alleged to have received a 45-day license suspension, had to be the “final decision” since both of his prior OUI convictions occurred over 20 years ago. He appealed; the Massachusetts Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies and Bonds affirmed. He sought judicial review and moved for judgment on the pleadings.
Whether the Massachusetts Registrar of Motor Vehicles properly revoked the defendant’s license to operate a motor vehicle in Massachusetts for eight years?
Under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, § 24(1)(c)(3), the Registrar was prohibited from restoring the license of a third-time OUI offender such as plaintiff until eight years after the date of conviction. As plaintiff did not have a single prior OUI conviction more than 10 years before receiving his most recent conviction, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, § 24D, which provided for a suspension of between 45 and 90 days, did not apply. According, the Board did not err in applying § 24, as opposed to § 24D, when it affirmed the Registrar’s decision to suspend plaintiff’s license for eight years. Plaintiff’s motion was denied and the Board’s decision was affirmed
Posted in Attorneys | Tagged 24d, Conviction, Defendant, Final Decision, Judgment On The Pleadings, Judicial Review, Lawy, Lawyer Massachusetts, Liability Policies, License Suspension, Licensee, Massachusetts Board, Massachusetts Lawyer, Massachusetts Lawyers, Motor Vehicle Liability, Plaintiff, Quincy Massachusetts, Registrar Of Motor Vehicles, Sris, Third Time	OUI Norfolk Massachusetts Lawyer Unlicensed Riding Motor Vehicle	OUI Norfolk Massachusetts Lawyer Unlicensed Riding Motor Vehicle
Commonwealth v. Victory
Defendant appealed his conviction by the Norfolk Court (Massachusetts) for violating Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, § 10, (as amended by 1923 Mass. Act ch. 464, § 4, 1929 Mass. Act ch. 262), in that he, being a person licensed to operate motor vehicles, was riding with and accompanying an unlicensed operator, who was operating the motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
Whether the evidence supported defendant’s conviction?
Defendant excepted to the trial court’s rulings. On appeal, the court held that the evidence supported defendant’s conviction, but sustained his exceptions. The court held that the trial court’s charge to the jury improperly conveyed the impression that they could find defendant guilty even if he believed that his associate was duly licensed. The instructions were misleading and prejudicial to defendant’s rights. The jury was instructed that the burden was on defendant to ascertain whether his associate’s license was in effect at the time mentioned, and that if, in fact, the purported license had expired and defendant accompanied him, defendant would be liable under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, § 10. The instruction as given was based upon a wrong interpretation of the statute. Unless defendant had knowledge that his associate was not licensed as an operator, there did not exist the situation contemplated by § 10 of an unlicensed operator accompanied by a licensed operator, and it was immaterial what effort defendant made to ascertain the validity of the associate’s purported license. The court sustained defendant’s exceptions.
Posted in Attorneys | Tagged Amp, Cas, Commonwealth, Contact, Conviction, Defendant, Exceptions, Liquor, Massachusetts Lawyer, Massachusetts Lawyers, Motor Vehicle, Motor Vehicles, Norfolk Court, Norfolk Massachusetts, Sris, Trial Court, Validity, Victory	OUI Norfolk Massachusetts Lawyer Motor Vehicle Liability Policy	OUI Norfolk Massachusetts Lawyer Motor Vehicle Liability Policy
Plaintiff licensee filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings in his Mass. Gen. Laws ch.. 30A, § 14 action. The action challenged a decision of defendant, the Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies and Bonds (Massachusetts), which affirmed the decision of the Registry of Motor Vehicles to suspend the licensee’s driver’s license for two years following his second conviction for operating under the influence of liquor (OUI).
Whether Registry of Motor Vehicles erred in suspending the licensee’s driver’s license for two years?
The licensee pled guilty to his second OUI charge. The trial court ordered, and the docket sheet indicated, that the licensee’s license was suspended “by application of law.” The licensee had completed a treatment program, and had been terminated from probation, which had followed two years of supervision. Nonetheless, he received an additional revocation notice after the Registry received notification of the conviction. That notification was received two years after the conviction. The licensee’s appeal of the suspension to the Board failed. The Board argued that the revocation could not begin until the Registry received notification of it. The court disagreed. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, § 24(1)(b) (eff. July 21, 2002) clearly stated that the revocation occurred immediately upon the licensee’s OUI conviction and that the trial court would notify the Registry of that event. The notification was wholly independent of the revocation. Thus, the revocation/suspension of the licensee’s driving privileges occurred immediately up his conviction, notwithstanding the fact that notice to the registry was late in arriving. The licensee’s motion for judgment on the pleadings was allowed
Posted in Attorneys | Tagged Commonwealth, Conviction, Defendant, Docket Sheet, Driving Privileges, Eff, Judgment On The Pleadings, Liability Policies, Liability Policy, Licensee, Liquor, Massachusetts Lawyer, Motion For Judgment On The Pleadings, Motor Vehicle Liability, Norfolk Massachusetts, Plaintiff, Probation, Registry Of Motor Vehicles, S Driver, Trial Court	OUI Quincy Massachusetts Lawyer Motor Vehicle Liability Driver License	OUI Quincy Massachusetts Lawyer Motor Vehicle Liability Driver License
Charles Pal v. Commonwealth
The board of appeal on motor vehicle liability policies and bonds upheld defendant Massachusetts Registrar of Motor Vehicles’s revocation of plaintiff driver’s license until January 5, 2016 because he had been convicted in Connecticut of his third driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor (OUI) offense. The Superior Court Department (Massachusetts) upheld the board’s decision. The driver appealed.
Whether the Massachusetts Registrar of Motor Vehicles properly revokes the plaintiff driver’s license until January 5, 2016?
The appellate court held that Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, § 24(1)(c)(3) applied as the OUI was a third offense. Section 24(1)(c)(3) prohibited the Registrar from restoring the driving rights of a third-time offender until eight years after the date of conviction. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, § 22(c) did not speak the question of how long a suspension based on OUI convictions had to last, regardless of whether the convictions occurred in-state or out-of-state. The Registrar’s claim that relying on the date of conviction for out-of-state violations was against public policy as the Registrar had no control over the timeliness of the information entered by other states into the National Driver Register was rejected. The driver was prohibited from regaining his driving privileges until October 2012, which was more than eight years after his license was suspended. The Registrar could not restore the driver’s license until October 4, 2012, the eighth anniversary of the driver’s third OUI conviction. There was substantial doubt whether the driver’s request for a hardship license was properly before the board as the application was not filed with the Registrar as required by § 24(1)(c). The judgment was vacated, and a new judgment was entered directing the board to revise its decision consistent with the appellate court’s opinion to order the Registrar to correct the termination date for the mandatory revocation of the driver’s license to October 4, 2012
Posted in Attorneys | Tagged Appellate Court, Conviction, Defendant, Driver License, Driving Privileges, Eighth Anniversary, Hardship License, Liability Policies, Massachusetts Lawyer, Motor Vehicle Liability, National Driver Register, Plaintiff, Quincy Massachusetts, Registrar Of Motor Vehicles, Revocation, Section 24, Substantial Doubt, Third Time, Time Offender, Timeliness	OUI Boston Massachusetts Lawyer Suspended License	OUI Boston Massachusetts Lawyer Suspended License
After plaintiff licensee’s third conviction of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor (OUI), the Massachusetts Registrar of Motor Vehicles revoked his license to operate a motor vehicle in Massachusetts for eight years. He appealed; the Massachusetts Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies and Bonds affirmed. He sought judicial review and moved for judgment on the pleadings. Plaintiff argued that his most recent OUI conviction, for which he alleged to have received a 45-day license suspension, had to be the “final decision” since both of his prior OUI convictions occurred over 20 years ago.
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Whether the Board did not err in applying § 24, as opposed to § 24D?
The Court states that under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, § 24(1)(c)(3), the Registrar was prohibited from restoring the license of a third-time OUI offender such as plaintiff until eight years after the date of conviction. As plaintiff did not have a single prior OUI conviction more than 10 years before receiving his most recent conviction, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, § 24D, which provided for a suspension of between 45 and 90 days, did not apply. According, the Board did not err in applying § 24, as opposed to § 24D, when it affirmed the Registrar’s decision to suspend plaintiff’s license for eight years. Plaintiff’s motion was denied and the Board’s decision was affirmed
Posted in Attorneys | Tagged Boston Lawyer, Boston Massachusetts, Conviction, Convictions, Final Decision, Judgment On The Pleadings, Judicial Review, Lawyer Massachusetts, Liability Policies, License Suspension, Licensee, Liquor, Massachusetts Board, Massachusetts Lawyer, Massachusetts Lawyers, Motor Vehicle Liability, Plaintiff, Registrar Of Motor Vehicles, Sris, Third Time	OUI Quincy Massachusetts Lawyer Safety Erratic Speed	OUI Quincy Massachusetts Lawyer Safety Erratic Speed
Commonwealth v. Williams Park
The defendant was convicted of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. G. L. c. 90, § 24. The judge instructed the jury in the manner then approved. The jury was told that defendant could have been under the influence when the intake was so small that it did not impair any physical or mental faculty. Defense counsel had not objected to the charge. Four months later the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in another case, rejected that concept of the offense, holding that the crime under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, § 24 was not made out unless defendant’s consumption of alcohol diminished defendant’s ability to operate a motor vehicle safely. Defendant had acknowledged having had beer and wine to drink while at a family holiday dinner; but that had been at midday, and it was 7:15 P.M. when his van was stopped for running a red light. His explanation for running the light was plausible, and there was no other evidence relating to speeding, erratic operation, or the like. His Breathalyzer reading was .08 percent. Defendant appealed from the judgment of a trial court (Massachusetts), which convicted him of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, § 24.
Whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury that conviction was warranted if defendant was influenced “in some perceptible degree” by intoxicating liquor, regardless of whether it impaired his ability to drive safely?
This court held that there is a substantial likelihood that the jury may have been influenced in its verdict by the erroneous description of the elements of the offense. The defendant acknowledged having had beer and wine to drink. His explanation for running the light was plausible (though not for that reason excusable); there was no other evidence relating to speeding, erratic operation, or the like. When the police lights were activated, the defendant pulled to the roadside immediately, produced his license and registration, and was generally cooperative. While the arresting officer testified that the defendant showed symptoms of intoxication and failed a field sobriety test, the breathalyzer reading was .08 percent, in the range to which the statute attaches no presumption, either of sobriety or intoxication. On all the evidence the jury might well have concluded that the defendant was influenced by alcohol “to a perceptible degree” but had a reasonable doubt that alcohol had impaired his ability to operate a motor vehicle safely. In the circumstances there is a substantial likelihood that the jury may have been influenced in its verdict by the erroneous description of the elements of the offense. The evidence presented a genuine question of guilt or innocence, and counsel’s failure to object to the charge was clearly not tactical. In the interests of justice this court held that there should be a new trial on the charge of driving under the influence at which the defendant will have the benefit of jury instructions correctly describing the elements of the offense.
Posted in Attorneys | Tagged Commonwealth, Conviction, Defendant, Defense Counsel, Family Holiday, Four Months, Holiday Dinner, Lawyer Massachusetts, Liquor, Massachusetts Lawyer, Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, Mental Faculty, Midday, Motor Vehicle, Quincy Massachusetts, Red Light, Substantial Likelihood, Supreme Judicial Court, Trial Court, Williams Park	CLIENT MEETING LOCATIONS