Source: http://ca10.washburnlaw.edu/cases/2005/06/03-5043.htm
Timestamp: 2019-01-20 05:13:09
Document Index: 190390130

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3161', '§ 1291', '§ 846', '§ 1956', '§ 982', 'in fine', '§ 851', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 846', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 851', '§ 851', '§ 841']

03-5043 -- U.S. v. Stiger -- 06/30/2005
| Keyword | Case | Docket | Date: Filed / Added | (74096 bytes) (61583 bytes)
Susan G. James, Law Office of Susan G. James & Associates, Montgomery, AL, appearing for Appellant.
This is an opinion on a petition for rehearing, which raised several issues for our reconsideration. We granted the petition only with respect to alleged sentencing errors under United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. --, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), which was decided after our initial opinion. We therefore withdraw our earlier opinion, United States v. Stiger, 371 F.3d 732 (10th Cir. 2004) ("Stiger I"), and substitute this opinion.
A jury found Defendant-Appellant Kenneth Wayne Stiger guilty of numerous counts of conspiring to possess and distribute narcotics. On appeal, he alleges seven grounds for us to find reversible error: (1) use of defective verdict forms; (2) a violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), as well as Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. --, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), and Booker; (3) insufficiency of the evidence; (4) improper denial of his mistrial motion; (5) refusal to try him separately from his codefendants; (6) admission of summary testimony and exhibits; and (7) a violation of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq. We take jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in part, and REMAND. I. BACKGROUND
A federal grand jury indicted Mr. Stiger for conspiring to possess and distribute cocaine, crack cocaine, and marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; conspiring to launder money in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h); and one count of forfeiture pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 982 and 1956(h). After a twenty-three-day trial involving over fifty witnesses, a jury convicted Mr. Stiger on all counts. The District Court sentenced Mr. Stiger to life in prison to be followed by ten years' supervised release and imposed $25,200 in fines and assessments. Mr. Stiger filed timely notice of appeal, raising seven issues. We address each below.
Mr. Stiger first argues that the verdict forms used at trial were defective. We review verdict forms under the same "abuse of discretion standard we apply to jury instructions." United States v. Jackson, 213 F.3d 1269, 1285 (10th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 531 U.S. 1033 (2000). "A district court does not abuse its discretion so long as the charge as a whole adequately states the law." United States v. Starnes, 109 F.3d 648, 651 (10th Cir. 1997) (internal quotations omitted). To make this latter determination, we review de novo whether the charge as a whole "accurately informed the jury of the governing law." United States v. Cerrato-Reyes, 176 F.3d 1253, 1262 (10th Cir. 1999).
Even if we conclude that the District Court erred, we must also determine whether the error is "harmless error." Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a). The government bears the burden to show that a nonconstitutional error is harmless by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Wittgenstein, 163 F.3d 1164, 1169 (10th Cir. 1998). An error "is harmless unless it had a 'substantial influence' on the outcome or leaves one in 'grave doubt' as to whether it had such effect." United States v. Cestnik, 36 F.3d 904, 910 (10th Cir. 1994).
Although we harbor grave doubts about the propriety of the use of these verdict forms, we need not decide whether their use constitutes error or whether the jury instructions cured any possible error because, even if we found error, the use of the verdict forms did not substantially influence the outcome of the trial. See United States v. Magleby, 241 F.3d 1306, 1318 (10th Cir. 2001) ("Notwithstanding our doubts regarding the relevance of this testimony, we need not decide whether the district court abused its discretion in admitting it because we find that it was harmless error.").
Mr. Stiger next argues that the District Court violated his Sixth Amendment rights by not requiring the jury to make a specific finding as to the amount of drugs for which he was personally responsible. Because Mr. Stiger made this constitutional argument at sentencing, we review the issue de novo. United States v. Lampley, 127 F.3d 1231, 1237 (10th Cir. 1997).
Below, the Government, in accordance with 21 U.S.C. § 851(a), notified Mr. Stiger that it would seek the application of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). "Section 841(b)(1)(A) requires imposition of a 'mandatory term of life imprisonment without release' if (1) a defendant is convicted of violating
§ 841(a), (2) that conviction involved a certain requisite amount of drugs, and (3) the crime was committed 'after two or more prior convictions for a felony drug offense have become final.'" United States v. Harris, 369 F.3d 1157, 1167 (10th Cir. 2004). In this case, the jury found that the conspiracy as a whole violated 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) by trafficking 5 or more kilograms of a substance containing cocaine, 1000 or more kilograms of a substance containing marijuana, and 50 grams of a substance containing crack cocaine. In addition, the amounts and types of drugs that the jury found attributable to the conspiracy as a whole are sufficient to satisfy the second prong of the § 841(b)(1)(A) mandatory life sentence requirement.
At sentencing, Mr. Stiger objected to the jury's finding as to drug type and amount for the entire conspiracy, arguing that Apprendi and now, Booker, require the jury also to make specific findings as to the amount and type of drug attributable to him individually.(4) The District Court concluded that Apprendi does not require the jury in a conspiracy case to make individual findings as to each member of the conspiracy, determined Mr. Stiger was integral to the conspiracy and could be sentenced as though he were responsible for the full drug types and quantities, found that Mr. Stiger had two previous felony drug convictions, and therefore sentenced him to life imprisonment. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). On appeal, Mr. Stiger raises two objections to the application of § 841(b)(1)(A).
First, Mr. Stiger argues that Apprendi and Booker require the jury, rather than the judge, to determine whether he had two prior felony drug convictions. In essence, he asserts that Booker overrules Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), which holds that the fact of a prior conviction may be found by a sentencing judge. We have previously dismissed this argument. United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d 727, 731 n.1 (10th Cir. 2005) (en banc); United States v. Moore, 401 F.3d 1220, 1223­24 (10th Cir. 2005). Thus, the fact that the District Court found that Mr. Stiger had two prior felony drug convictions does not render his sentence under § 841(b)(1)(A) constitutionally infirm.
The second issue Mr. Stiger raises--whether a jury, after Apprendi and Booker, must determine the amount and type of drug attributable to individual coconspirators rather than simply attributable to the entire conspiracy--is one of first impression before this Court. Prior to Booker, however, at least five other circuits addressed it; each held that Apprendi only requires the jury to make a finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, as to the amount of drugs for which the entire conspiracy is liable. See United States v. Phillips, 349 F.3d 138, 141­43 (3d Cir. 2003), vacated on other grounds, Barbour v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 992 (2005); United States v. Knight, 342 F.3d 697, 709­12 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Allen, 65 Fed. Appx. 476, 480­81 (4th Cir. 2003) (Table); United States v. Turner, 319 F.3d 716, 722­23 (5th Cir. 2003); Derman v. United States, 298 F.3d 34, 42­43 (1st Cir. 2002).
The reasoning of these courts is simple. First, Apprendi held that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. Second, in the conspiracy context, a finding of drug amounts for the conspiracy as a whole sets the maximum sentence that each coconspirator could be given. Derman, 298 F.3d at 42 (discussing Edwards v. United States, 523 U.S. 511 (1998)). Because the subsequent attribution of drug amounts to individual coconspirators cannot increase their maximum sentence, "the judge lawfully may determine the drug quantity attributable to that defendant and sentence him accordingly (so long as the sentence falls within the statutory maximum made applicable by the jury's conspiracy-wide drug quantity determination)." Id. at 43.
We agree with the reasoning of our sister circuits that Apprendi requires the jury only to set the "maximum sentence ([i.e., the] ceiling)" under which each coconspirator's sentence must fall. See Knight, 342 F.3d at 711. The judge, however, may determine the "floor" by finding the precise drug quantity attributable to each coconspirator. See id. The jury is not required to make individualized findings as to each coconspirator because "[t]he sentencing judge's findings do not, because they cannot, have the effect of increasing an individual defendant's exposure beyond the statutory maximum justified by the jury's guilty verdict." Id.
We also conclude that Booker does not call this practice into question. The primary innovation that the Court introduced in Booker was to clarify what the term "statutory maximum" means for Apprendi purposes. "Our precedents . . . make clear that the 'statutory maximum' for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant." Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 749. Thus, under Booker, the "statutory maximum" is the sentence prescribed by any applicable mandatory sentencing regime, including the United States Code, when that sentence is calculated solely upon jury-found facts, admitted facts, or the fact of prior convictions. See id. at 756. In addition, Booker does not alter the well-established rule that a finding of drug type and quantity for the conspiracy as a whole sets the maximum sentence that each coconspirator can constitutionally be given. See Derman, 298 F.3d at 42; see also 21 U.S.C. § 846 ("Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined in this subchapter shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense."). Therefore, the practice outlined above is entirely consistent with Apprendi and Booker because the jury sets the applicable "statutory maximum" by determining the type and quantity of drugs attributed to the conspiracy as a whole while the judge's findings have the effect only of potentially decreasing an individual defendant's sentence.
Our analysis of the constitutionality of Mr. Stiger's sentence might be different if the District Court had relied upon judge-found facts and the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, instead of § 841(b)(1)(A), to sentence Mr. Stiger to life imprisonment. Here, the record is not clear whether the District Court sentenced under the Guidelines, and thus relied upon judge-found facts in the context of a mandatory sentencing regime, or § 841(b)(1)(A). See R. Vol. XXXVIII at 26 (sentencing Mr. Stiger "under the law and the guidelines"). Nonetheless, even if we assume the District Court erroneously found facts and mandatorily applied the Guidelines, see Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 731­32, such an error would be rendered harmless beyond a reasonable doubt by the presence of the mandatory sentence outlined in § 841(b)(1)(A). See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). As such, we affirm the District Court's sentence.
Well into the trial, Mr. Stiger's counsel moved for a mistrial based on the fact that attorney Robert Burton visited with him on several occasions about representing him in this case. The visits were unfruitful for Mr. Burton, as the District Court ultimately appointed another attorney to represent Mr. Stiger. The District Court, however, appointed Mr. Burton and his law partner to represent Richard Taylor, one of Mr. Stiger's codefendant's. Mr. Taylor entered a guilty plea prior to Mr. Stiger's arraignment and became a witness for the government at Mr. Stiger's trial. Mr. Burton continued to represent Mr. Taylor throughout the course of this testimony.
Mr. Stiger's trial counsel claims that he was not initially aware of Mr. Burton's conversations with Mr. Stiger. Upon learning of these conversations, however, trial counsel moved for a mistrial based upon a conflict of interest. Trial counsel stated that Mr. Burton "visited [his] client three times before th[e] trial started" and that the two spoke "several times about the case," although he could not say with certainty whether those conversations would prejudice his client. Counsel sought an evidentiary hearing to determine whether an attorney-client relationship existed between Messrs. Stiger and Barton. The District Court denied the mistrial motion without conducting an evidentiary hearing.
In response, the government asserts that Mr. Burton never represented Mr. Stiger and that a new trial would gain Mr. Stiger nothing because his remedy would be a new trial in which co-defendant Taylor would again testify.(5)
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma has adopted the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct.(6) Here, Oklahoma Rule of Professional Conduct Rule 1.9 provides the relevant rule.(7) Oklahoma Rule 1.9 tracks exactly the text of Rule 1.9 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which "we believe reflect[s] the national standard to be used in ruling on disqualification motions." Cole, 43 F.3d at 1383.
Under Rule 1.9, a party seeking to disqualify opposing counsel must establish that "(1) an actual attorney-client relationship existed between the moving party and the opposing counsel; (2) the present litigation involves a matter that is 'substantially related' to the subject of the movant's prior representation; and (3) the interests of the opposing counsel's present client are materially adverse to the movant." Cole, 43 F.3d at 1383 (citing ABA Model Rule 1.9(a) & (c)). If the movant establishes the first two prongs, an irrebuttable "presumption arises that a client has indeed revealed facts to the attorney that require his disqualification." Smith v. Whatcott, 757 F.2d 1098, 1100 (10th Cir. 1985).(8)
Mr. Stiger next argues that the District Court erred in refusing to sever his trial from those of his alleged coconspirators because the government sought to introduce highly prejudicial evidence of codefendant Marlin Mack's alleged murdering of two people. In United States v. Evans, we held that:
The decision whether to grant a severance is within the sound discretion of the trial court. We will not disturb the trial court's decision absent an affirmative showing of abuse of discretion and a strong showing of prejudice. To establish abuse of discretion more is required than that separate trials might have offered a better chance for acquittal of one or more of the accused. 970 F.2d 663, 676 (10th Cir. 1992) (internal citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis added).
As this Court has noted, a party may only admit summary testimony under Fed. R. Evid. 611(a) if the District Court previously admitted at trial the evidence that forms the basis of the summary. See United States v. Ray, 370 F.3d 1039 (10th Cir. 2004), vacated on other grounds by 125 S. Ct. 995 (Jan. 24, 2005). Because Officer Adair's own testimony indicates that he constructed the organizational chart from non-trial sources, the District Court could not have properly admitted it pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 611(a). We need not decide, however, whether it fell within the ambit of some other evidentiary rule because any possible error did not substantially influence the outcome of the trial. See Magleby, 241 F.3d at 1318; see also supra pp. 2-3.
Third, Officer Adair offered a chart of the total drug amounts testified to at trial. He testified that the chart was based exclusively on evidence admitted at trial. Mr. Stiger lodged an ambiguous objection against the chart. Reviewing the record evidence, we find that the District Court properly admitted the chart pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 611(a) because it was undoubtedly helpful to the jury in this particularly complex case, the District Court offered extensive limiting instructions, and the chart was based exclusively on previously admitted evidence. See Ray, 370 F.3d at 1046­48.
On April 30, 2002, the government filed an information pursuant to § 851(a)(1), notifying Mr. Stiger of its intent to use his prior felony convictions to enhance any sentence resulting from the current prosecution. On July 11, 2002, Mr. Stiger filed a motion to dismiss this information, claiming that the Speedy Trial Act required the government to commence trial against him on the
§ 851(a)(1) information within seventy days of its filing. The District Court denied his motion, finding that the "plain language" of the "Speedy Trial Act only applies to informations and indictments which charge 'the commission of an offense.'" For the reasons provided in a companion case, we affirm the District Court's Speedy Trial Act ruling. See United States v. Vaughn, 370 F.3d 1049, 1054­55 (10th Cir. 2004).
Therefore, we AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court except as to the mistrial claim, which we REVERSE and REMAND with instructions to hold an evidentiary hearing in accordance with this opinion. Our opinion in Stiger I is VACATED.
3.To be clear, we do not approve of the District Court's use of the verdict forms at issue. The District Court should have employed forms that required a finding as to guilt for the conspiracy. Rather, we hold only that any resulting error did not affect the outcome of the trial as required by Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
4.Had this occurred, Mr. Stiger appears to contend, he would not have been subject to the ten-year or life mandatory minimum because § 841(b)(1)(B) provides for a mandatory minimum of only five years' imprisonment for trafficking in lesser quantities of controlled substances and only ten years if there is a prior felony drug conviction.
5. On appeal, the government has not argued that Mr. Stiger's claim is essentially an untimely motion to disqualify, which we would review for plain error. Thus, we assume for purposes of this appeal that Mr. Stiger timely raised this issue in the context of a mistrial motion during trial.
6.See N.D. Okla. R. 83.2 ("Attorneys practicing in this court are expected to conduct themselves in accordance with the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct, as adopted by the Oklahoma Supreme Court, as the standard of conduct of all members of the Oklahoma Bar Association."); see also N.D. Okla. R. 83.4 (oath requiring an attorney to "solemnly swear" to "be bound by the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct and [to] conduct [himself] in compliance therewith at all times.").
7.This rule reads:
URL: http://ca10.washburnlaw.edu/cases/2005/06/03-5043.htm.