Source: http://ia.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20190813_0000545.NIA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2020-01-23 13:49:57
Document Index: 753468648

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2412', '§ 2412', '§ 2412', 'art, 321', 'art, 398', '§ 2412', 'art, 459']

This matter is before me on plaintiff's motion (Doc. No. 22) for attorney fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). On March 18, 2019, I entered an order (Doc. No. 20) reversing and remanding the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (Commissioner). On June 5, 2019, plaintiff timely filed a motion (Doc. No. 22) requesting attorney fees in the amount of $5, 183.28 and reimbursement of the filing fee of $400. He requests that the attorney fees be delivered to Kappelman Law Firm and the reimbursement of the filing fee to Thomas Krause. See Doc. No. 22 at 2. Plaintiff submitted a declaration (Doc. No. 22-1) from his attorney, an itemization (Doc. No. 22-2) of his attorneys' services and proof of the change in the Consumer Price Index (Doc. No. 22-3) in support of his motion.
The Commissioner has filed a response (Doc. No. 23) indicating that he has no objection to the request for attorney fees and reimbursement of the filing fee.[2] He requests that I make the EAJA award payable to plaintiff, however, so that it is subject to offset to satisfy any pre-existing debts that plaintiff may owe to the United States. See Doc. No. 23.
Attorney fees may be awarded to a “prevailing party” in a Social Security appeal under the EAJA. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). The statute provides as follows:
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has had little occasion to elaborate on what constitutes “special circumstances.” See Koss v. Sullivan, 982 F.2d 1226, 1229 (8th Cir. 1993) (finding no special circumstances but stating “the denial of fees to counsel whose efforts brought about the Secretary's change of position is unjust”). The Eighth Circuit has, however, specifically addressed when a position is “substantially justified.” See, e.g., Lauer v. Barnhart, 321 F.3d 762, 764-65 (8th Cir. 2003); Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978, 981-82 (8th Cir. 1984).
Goad v. Barnhart, 398 F.3d 1021, 1025 (8th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted); see Lauer, 321 F.3d at 765 (recognizing “the overriding, fundamental principal [sic] that the government's position must be well founded in fact to be substantially justified”); Sawyers v. Shalala, 990 F.2d 1033, 1034 (8th Cir. 1993) (“To be substantially justified, the [Commissioner] must show that her position was ‘justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person.'”) (quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988))).
To obtain an EAJA award, the party must apply for the award “within thirty days of final judgment in the action” and “allege that the position of the United States was not substantially justified.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). However, “the provision's 30-day deadline for fee applications and its application-content specifications are not properly typed ‘jurisdictional, '” but instead are “ancillary to the judgment of a court.” Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401, 413-14 (2004). The government may waive this requirement because it is present to protect the government's interests. See Vasquez v. Barnhart, 459 F.Supp.2d 835, 836 (N.D. Iowa 2006).
[A]ttorney fees shall not be awarded in excess of $125 per hour unless the court determines that an increase in the cost of living or a special factor, such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys for ...