Source: http://echr.ketse.com/doc/10890.84-en-19900328/view/
Timestamp: 2018-04-26 16:58:46
Document Index: 387861695

Matched Legal Cases: ['Application no. 10890', 'art. 31', 'art. 10', 'art. 13', '§ 48', '§ 59', '§ 55', '§ 39', '§ 32', '§ 10', '§ 33', '§ 38', '§ 72', '§ 75', '§ 177', '§ 64', '§ 41', '§ 28', '§ 58', '§ 49', '§ 65', '§ 41', '§ 32']

GROPPERA RADIO AG AND OTHERS v. SWITZERLAND About Project
(Application no. 10890/84)
In the case of Groppera Radio AG and Others*,
44. The Commission declared the application admissible on 1 March 1988. In its report of 13 October 1988 (made under Article 31) (art. 31), the Commission found that there had been a breach of Article 10 (art. 10) (by seven votes to six) but not of Article 13 (art. 13) (unanimously). The full text of the Commission’s opinion and of the three separate opinions contained in the report is reproduced as an annex to this judgment*.
I. The licensing power of States in respect of radio and television broadcasting cannot be arbitrary or even discretionary. It can only be justified inasmuch as the exercise of it is necessary in order that over-the-air communications may function in an efficient and orderly manner and, above all, in order that freedom of expression should be secured as fully as possible3.
It is only a policing power, under which States may at most take the measures necessary, having regard to the technical characteristics of the type of communication concerned, for satisfying as far as possible the needs and wishes of all interested parties and to enable them as far as possible to broadcast and receive what they wish to broadcast and receive, just as, in the same spirit, States may take measures to regulate the practical arrangements4 for this kind of communication. The power can only affect radio and television broadcasting as means of communication and not the communication by these means itself - it cannot include a right to interfere with what is communicated, the content of the communication.
They are not legitimate unless they are restrictions which answer a pressing social need, which are proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and which are justified on grounds that are not merely reasonable but relevant and sufficient5; or else are non-discriminatory distinctions, that is to say distinctions which are objectively and reasonably justified and likewise proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued6.
III. In the instant case there is no doubt that by prohibiting the retransmission of the broadcasts in issue, which they considered to be unlawful, the authorities of the respondent State were, in all good faith, pursuing legitimate aims, and more particularly "the prevention of disorder" and the "protection of the rights of others"7.
But it was not certain that these broadcasts were unlawful. They were still the subject of proceedings in Italy and, moreover, none of the methods of settlement provided for in Article 50 of the International Telecommunication Convention had been used8. "Due regard being had to the importance of freedom of expression in a democratic society"9, such unlawfulness could not, so long as it had not been established with certainty, be relied on to justify the ban on retransmitting the programmes10 or, a fortiori, the need for such a ban in a democratic society.
Ultimately, even if the unlawfulness of the broadcasts in issue had been duly established, it could not have sufficed on its own to justify the ban on retransmitting the programmes. It would still have been necessary to show why, in March and July 198411, it was essential to put an end to the reception, via a local cable network12, of programmes broadcast from the territory of another State and which had in fact, since November 1979, been able to be received over a wide area of the respondent State's territory, containing nearly a third of the State's population13, when, in particular, the financial viability of the broadcasts in issue had already been seriously jeopardised by the operation since November 1983 of local radio stations, which had been made legal in June 198214.
* Note by the registry: The case is numbered 14/1988/158/214. The first number is the case's position on the list of the cases referred to the Court in the relevant year (second number). The last two numbers indicate the case's position on the list of cases referred to the Court since its creation and on the list of the corresponding originating applications to the Commission.
* Note by the Registrar. For practical reasons this annex will appear only with the printed version of the judgment (volume 173 of Series A of the Publications of the Court), but a copy of the Commission's report is obtainable from the registry.
3 These principles have been clearly laid down by the United States Supreme Court: see Red Lion Broadcasting Co v. the Federal Communications Commission and US v. Radio Television News Directors Association (1969), 395 US 367, 23 LEd 2d 371, 89 SCt 1794; Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic National Committee (1973), 412 US 94, 36 LEd 2d 772, 93 SCt 2080; Federal Communications Commission v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting (1978), 436 US 775, 56 LEd 2d 697, 98 SCt 2896; Columbia Broadcasting System, American Broadcasting Companies & National Broadcasting Company v. Federal Communications Commission & al. (1981), 453 US 367, 69 LEd 2d 706, 101 SCt 2813; Federal Communications Commission v. League of Women Voters of California & al. (1984), 468 US 364, 82 LEd 2d 278, 104 SCt 3106; and City of Los Angeles & Department of Water and Power v. Preferred Communications (1986), 476 US 488, 90 LEd 2d 480, 106 SCt 2034.
4 See on this point the case-law of the United States Supreme Court on "time, place and manner regulation" and, in particular, mutatis mutandis, Virginia State Board of Pharmacy & al. v. Virginia Citizens Consumers Council & al. (1976), 425 US 748, 48 LEd 2d 346, 96 SCt 1817, and Cox v. New Hampshire (1941), 312 US 569, 85 LEd 2d 1049, 61 SCt 762.
5 See the following judgments: Handyside, 7 December 1976, Series A no. 24, pp. 22-24, §§ 48-50; The Sunday Times, 26 April 1979, Series A no. 30, pp. 36 and 38, §§ 59 and 62; Barthold, 25 March 1985, Series A no. 90, p. 25, § 55; Lingens, 8 July 1986, Series A no. 103, pp. 25-26, §§ 39-40; and Müller and Others, 24 May 1988, Series A no. 133, p. 21, § 32.
6 See the following judgments: Case "relating to certain aspects of the laws on the use of languages in education in Belgium", 23 July 1968, Series A no. 6, p. 24, § 10; Marckx, 13 June 1979, Series A no. 31, p. 16, § 33; Rasmussen, 28 November 1984, Series A no. 87, p. 14, § 38; Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali, 28 May 1985, Series A no. 94, pp. 35-36, § 72; James and Others, 21 February 1986, Series A no. 98, p. 44, § 75; Lithgow and Others, 8 July 1986, Series A no. 102, p. 66, § 177; Gillow, 24 November 1986, Series A no. 109, pp. 25-26, § 64; and Inze, 28 October 1987, Series A no. 126, p. 18, § 41.
7 See paragraphs 69 and 70 of the judgment.
8 See paragraphs 26-32 of the judgment and the extract of the Swiss Federal Court's decision of 14 June 1985, reproduced in paragraph 25.
9 Barfod judgment of 22 February 1989, Series A no. 149, p. 12, § 28. (See also the Barthold judgment previously cited, p. 26, § 58, and the previously cited judgments in the cases of Handyside, p. 23, § 49, The Sunday Times, p. 40, § 65, Lingens, p. 26, § 41, and Müller and Others, p. 21, § 32.
10 See paragraphs 149-157 of the Commission's report.
11 See paragraphs 19 and 20 of the judgment.
12 According to Mr Jacot-Guillarmod's reply to Mr Walsh, at the end of the hearing on 21 November 1989, there were not very many subscribers to this network.
13 See paragraph 11 of the judgment.
14 See paragraphs 13-16 of the judgment. See also the Federal Court's decision cited in paragraph 25.
CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE MATSCHER, APPROVED BY JUDGE