Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/washington/supreme-court/1953/32005-1.html
Timestamp: 2020-05-30 03:21:13
Document Index: 155884680

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2', '§ 7306', '§ 23', '§ 2', '§ 23', '§ 2', '§ 86', '§ 2', '§ 11', '§ 38', '§ 38', '§ 2']

Derby Club, Inc. v. Becket :: 1953 :: Washington Supreme Court Decisions :: Washington Case Law :: Washington Law :: US Law :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Washington Case Law › Washington Supreme Court Decisions › 1953 › Derby Club, Inc. v. Becket
Derby Club, Inc. v. Becket
41 Wn.2d 869 (1953)
252 P.2d 259
THE DERBY CLUB, INC., et al., Appellants, v. EVRO BECKET et al., Respondents.[1]
"AN ACT relating to intoxicating liquors; regulating the sale and use thereof, amending section 66.44.190, R.C.W., and prescribing penalties."
"Sec. 2. There is added to title 66, R.C.W., as derived from *871 chapter 62, Laws of 1933, Extraordinary Session, a new section to read as follows:
The trial court issued an order restraining any attempt to enforce § 2, which temporary restraining order was, after a hearing, continued as an injunction pendente lite by an order made and entered November 5, 1951. Demurrers were thereafter sustained to the complaint of The Derby Club, Inc., and to the complaints in intervention, and, December 5, 1951, an order was entered dismissing the complaint and the complaints *872 in intervention. The plaintiff and the three plaintiffs in intervention have appealed and attack the constitutionality of the legislation upon four grounds:
While the appellants, in their complaints, make allegations concerning their leases, obligations, commitments to orchestras, and the amounts expended for furniture, fixtures, equipment and decorations, we do not understand them to contend that either the "due process" or the "equal protection" clause of the Federal or state constitution prevents the legislature from enacting a law making their operations unlawful. The termination of the right to engage in the business of operating a bottle club does not violate any inherent or constitutional right. When appellants made their investments and their commitments, it was with knowledge that their business existed not by right but by sufferance and that *873 there was no guarantee, express or implied, of its continued existence.
[1] Legislation regulating or even prohibiting the manufacture, sale, serving or possession of intoxicating liquor is regarded as "an exercise of the police power of the state, for the protection of the welfare, health, peace, morals, and safety of the people of the state...." RCW 66.08.010; cf. Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.), § 7306-2. That the police power of the state is plenary with respect to intoxicating liquor is so well established as to need no citation of authority; however, see State v. Nicolls, 61 Wash. 142, 112 Pac. 269 (1910); Tacoma v. Keisel, 68 Wash. 685, 124 Pac. 137 (1912); Bungalow Amusement Co. v. Seattle, 148 Wash. 485, 269 Pac. 1043, 60 A.L.R. 166 (1928); Ajax v. Gregory, 177 Wash. 465, 32 P. (2d) 560 (1934); State ex rel. Thornbury v. Gregory, 191 Wash. 70, 70 P. (2d) 788 (1937); State v. Lake City Bowlers' Club, 26 Wn. (2d) 292, 173 P. (2d) 783 (1946); Randles v. Washington State Liquor Control Board, 33 Wn. (2d) 688, 206 P. (2d) 1209, 9 A.L.R. (2d) 531 (1949).
*874 The Washington state liquor act (Chapter 62, Laws of 1933, Ex. Ses.) made provision for licensing bottle clubs in § 23 (7), p. 186, which read as follows:
During this period, in answer to an inquiry from a member *875 of the legislature as to the legal status of bottle clubs under initiative No. 171, the attorney general rendered an opinion (November 22, 1950) concluding as follows:
[2] If the intent had been to prohibit bottle clubs entirely, it would have been a simple matter for the legislature to have done so in express words. It did not do so, but provided that, "except as permitted under a license issued by the Washington state liquor control board," no one shall operate a bottle club. Under the firmly established rules of statutory interpretation, with which the members of the legislature were *876 doubtless familiar, the clause quoted in the preceding sentence cannot be regarded as mere surplusage. Groves v. Meyers, 35 Wn. (2d) 403, 213 P. (2d) 483, and cases cited.
These types of license all refer to the sale of alcoholic beverages. They are obviously not designed for the licensing of a bottle club, which, as defined in § 2, is a club in which the members are permitted to keep and consume their own liquor on the premises. Appellants do not seek to engage in the sale of alcoholic beverages. They desire to operate as a bottle club under a license similar to that which was formerly *877 obtainable under § 23 (7) of chapter 62, Laws of 1933, Ex. Ses. This provision was repealed in December, 1948, and the legislature in enacting § 2 failed to make provision for the issuance of such license, nor did it prescribe any standards by which the liquor control board might grant or deny a bottle club license. Appellants are threatened with prosecution for operating a bottle club without a license when no such license is obtainable because the legislature has made it impossible for appellants to apply for or obtain one.
In People v. Briggs, 193 N.Y. 457, 86 N.E. 522, the defendant was held liable in the trial court for penalties imposed by an act of the legislature relating to the sale of certified milk. The defendant had sold such milk without marking it with the name of the association certifying it as required by the statute. In reversing the judgment and ordering the case dismissed because the statute was doubtful and uncertain, the court of appeals said:
"The only default on the part of the defendant was, therefore, in not having the bottles in which the milk was sold `conspiciously marked with the name of the association certifying it.' What is meant by the term `association?' Did the *878 legislature intend by its use to refer to an association of milk dealers? Evidently not, for the purpose of the entire statute is to place restrictions upon the sale, by dealers, of milk that does not conform to its requirements. Did the legislature intend to refer to some association of doctors, lawyers or ministers? If so, to which? Is it a self-constituted, voluntary association, and if so, who are the persons composing it? It is quite possible that the legislature had in mind some sort of a medical association, but unfortunately it has failed to designate any particular association or individuals composing it, to whom the milk dealer could apply for the certification of his milk. This is a penal statute and a violator is not only liable for penalties but is also liable to be convicted for a misdemeanor, under which he may be punished by both fine and imprisonment. In construing penal statutes it is not our practice to go beyond the clear meaning and purpose of the statute and we should not attempt to spell out the creation of a new offense which is not clearly indicated by the ordinary meaning of the words used. (Jones v. Estis, 2 Johns. 379.) If a statute is doubtful and uncertain, or is such as to make it difficult or impossible to comply with its provisions it will be held to be of no force and effect."
"The question remains whether the provisions of section 24 are unconstitutional. They are as follows: `No person or persons licensed to sell liquor at retail for consumption on the premises shall use in such sales or possess on such premises any glass or other container so constructed as to be deceptive in appearance or to mislead the consumer as to its true capacity.' (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, chap. 43, par. 144b.) Plaintiff's attack on the validity of this section is based upon two contentions: First, that its provisions are so vague and indefinite that persons subject to the act cannot ascertain whether the use of any particular container will render them liable to the penalties; and, second, that by prohibiting the mere possession of any container `deceptive in appearance' the act is unreasonable and arbitrary.
"It is axiomatic that a statute, to be valid, must not be vague, indefinite and uncertain. It must be sufficiently explicit to advise those whom it purports to affect as to what their rights are and how they will be affected by its operation. *879 Statutes which are so incomplete, vague, indefinite and uncertain that men of ordinary intelligence must necessarily guess at their meaning and differ as to their application, will not be upheld by the courts. (Ill. Liquor Control Com. v. Chicago's Last Liquor Store, 403 Ill. 578; Krebs v. Thompson, 387 Ill. 471, 477.) Applying this rule to the present provisions, it is apparent that they fail to satisfy its requirements. The phrases `deceptive in appearance' or `misleading as to capacity' convey no precise guide which the citizen can follow with any assurance that he is complying with the law. The determination of whether a particular glass is so constructed as to be deceptive in appearance or to mislead the consumer as to its true capacity must, in many cases, be wholly conjectural, and susceptible to differing answers by persons of ordinary intelligence."
"But if some parts of an act are bad, fundamentally, or otherwise incapable of execution, yet such parts were not so far the inducement to the entirety that the legislature would probably not have enacted the balance by itself, then the residue is to be approved and the invalid or fatally indefinite or contradictory parts condemned. If the enactment is so uncertain that the court is unable to determine, with any reasonable degree of certainty, what the legislature intended, or it is so incomplete that it cannot be executed, there is no other course open but to condemn it as void for uncertainty, as this court has done on other occasions, and other courts have done so often that the duty in that regard has become a matter of unwritten law. Norton v. Reed, 6 Wis. 522; State v. Wentler, 76 Wis. 89, 44 N.W. 841, 45 N.W. 816; Lewis's Sutherland, Stat. Constr. (2d ed.) § 86 and cases cited. As well said in State ex rel. Crow v. West Side St. R. Co. 146 Mo. 155, 47 S.W. 959:
"`An act of the legislature, to be enforceable as a law, must prescribe a rule of action, and such rule must be intelligibly expressed.... It is manifest that an act of the legislative department cannot be enforced when its meaning cannot be determined by any known rules of construction. The courts cannot venture upon the dangerous path of judicial legislation to supply omissions, or remedy defects in matters committed to a co-ordinate branch of the government. It is far better to wait for necessary corrections by those authorized *880 to make them, or, in fact, for them to remain unmade, however desirable they may be, than for judicial tribunals to transcend the just limits of their constitutional powers.'" (Italics ours.)
Other cases applying this rule are: State v. Partlow, 91 N.C. 550; Hilburn v. St. Paul, M. & M.R. Co., 23 Mont. 229, 58 Pac. 551; Jones v. Lawson, 143 Ark. 83, 220 S.W. 311.
The principle of law stated in the foregoing decisions was applied to a state statute by the supreme court of the United States in Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 70 L. Ed. 322, 46 S. Ct. 126, where a criminal statute was held violative of the fourteenth amendment because of indefiniteness. See, also, decisions cited therein.
*881 HILL, J. (concurring in the result)
The majority opinion sets forth the four grounds on which the constitutionality of § 2 is assailed. The majority relies on the fourth ground, that the section in question is vague, uncertain, and indefinite.
"That Chapter 120 originated as Senate Bill No. 174 and as shown by the legislative Journal of the Senate and House of Representatives, 1951 Session, was introduced January 31, 1951 at which time it was an act `Prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors on or near the grounds of the University of Washington, and amending Section 66.11.19 R.C.W.'. That on the 58th day of the legislative Session, on March 6, 1951, Senate Bill No. 174, as shown by the Journal of the House of Representatives, was amended in the House of Representatives by adding to Senate Bill No. 174, Section *882 2 of Chapter 120 and by obtaining the present title of this act."
As indicated, the respondents here rely upon the "enrolled bill rule," which is that an enrolled bill, when fair upon its face, must be accepted by the courts as having been regularly enacted by the legislature. There is no doubt that this court has long since committed itself to that rule and has frequently restated it. No better statement of the reasons for the rule can be found than in Judge Hoyt's frequently quoted and widely praised opinion in State ex rel. Reed v. Jones, 6 Wash. 452, 34 Pac. 201, 23 L.R.A. 340 (1893). See, also, Parmeter v. Bourne, 8 Wash. 45, 35 Pac. 586, 757 (1894); Scouten v. Whatcom, 33 Wash. 273, 74 Pac. 389 (1903); Gottstein v. Lister, 88 Wash. 462, 153 Pac. 595 *883 (1915); State ex rel. Dunbar v. State Board of Equalization, 140 Wash. 433, 249 Pac. 996 (1926); Morrow v. Henneford, 182 Wash. 625, 47 P. (2d) 1016 (1935); Shelton Hotel Co. v. Bates, 4 Wn. (2d) 498, 104 P. (2d) 478 (1940); State ex rel. Bugge v. Martin, 38 Wn. (2d) 834, 232 P. (2d) 833 (1951).
I concur in the result reached by the majority opinion but for a different reason.
The purpose, necessity, and importance of this constitutional provision are apparent to everyone acquainted with the legislative process.
The house and senate journals are public records. Art. II, § 11, Washington constitution. When the challenge of *884 the constitutionality of the enactment process is based upon these records, and brings them before us, we may and must consider them. If they disclose that a statute has been adopted in a manner contrary to Art. II, § 38, we should follow the express terms of the constitution and declare the statute thus adopted unconstitutional.
"Public policy and convenience" are given as the reasons supporting the "enrolled bill" rule announced in State ex rel. Reed v. Jones, 6 Wash. 452, 34 Pac. 201, 23 L.R.A. 340. However, when the legislative journals themselves disclose a constitutional defect, which is the situation pleaded in this case, neither reason, to my mind, overbalances the scale in favor of disregarding Art. II, § 38.
I find nothing vague or uncertain about § 2, p. 303, of chapter 120 of the Laws of 1951 relating to bottle clubs. The statute is a part of the legislative evolution of the control of intoxicating liquor used as a beverage. Bottle clubs as defined must be strictly regulated or they are capable of great harm by reason of overindulgence on the part of their patrons. In aid of such regulations, such clubs may be required to secure a license from public authority. That authority may impose conditions and prescribe rules and regulations of conduct. The statute makes it unlawful to conduct or maintain a bottle club unless a license so to do is secured from the state liquor control board. The legislature has chosen to leave it to the board to determine whether bottle clubs may operate instead of so providing directly. Inasmuch as the use of intoxicating liquor as a beverage may be prohibited, regulatory legislation does not present any question of unlawful delegation of power. The plain purpose and effect of the statute is to authorize the liquor board to issue licenses to operate, conduct and maintain bottle clubs. The board is vested with authority to issue the special kind of a license needed, and it is not limited to the kinds of licenses authorized by other legislation.
*885 It may be that the title is not sufficiently definite so that one who might violate its terms could be properly charged with a criminal offense, but this does not render it unconstitutional so as to prevent a bottle club from being operated and maintained pursuant to the terms and conditions of a license. Much greater latitude with reference to the issuance of a license can be extended to the liquor board than is the case where the subject matter is a business which a person has a legal right to engage in but which may be licensed for the purpose of regulation, or revenue, or both. In the latter case, the due process and equal protection clause of the Federal and state constitution must be given full force and effect, while in the former case they apply, if at all, to a very limited extent. I find no constitutional objections to the act in question with reference to such provisions of the constitution.
[1] Reported in 252 P. (2d) 259.