Source: http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/opinions/displayOpinion.cfm?caseNo=4350
Timestamp: 2014-11-24 02:46:50
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4350 - Hooper v. Ebenezer Senior Services THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
Hooper, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Albert L. Clinton,
Senior Services and Rehabilitation Center, Respondent.
S. Jackson Kimball, Special Circuit Court
Opinion No. 4350
Heard March 4, 2008 – Filed March 10, 2008
John S. Nichols, of Columbia and Robert V. Phillips, of Rock Hill,
R. Gerald Chambers and R. Hawthorne Barrett, both of Columbia, for Respondent.
ANDERSON, J.: In
this action for wrongful death and negligence under the survival statute,
Floree Hooper appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment toEbenezer Senior Services and Rehabilitation Center (Ebenezer) based on the statute of limitations. We affirm.
In February 2003, Albert Clinton became a resident of
Ebenezer, a nursing home facility. Two months later, Clinton was taken to a
hospital and remained there until his death on May 15, 2003. Hooper, as
Personal Representative of Clinton’s Estate, filed an action against Ebenezer on
February 6, 2006, for negligence under the survival statute and wrongful death.
When Hooper’s attorney (Counsel) received the filed
pleadings from the clerk of court, he called Ebenezer’s telephone number. A
receptionist answered, “Agape Rehabilitation.” Counsel inquired about Ebenezer
Senior Services and was told the business had been sold and was now Agape
Rehabilitation (Agape). A telephone search revealed Agape had the same street
address as Ebenezer. Counsel drove to the location, and signage identified the
facility as “Agape Rehabilitation of Rock Hill.” Counsel searched the South Carolina Secretary of
State’s website and found a current listing for Ebenezer as a domestic entity
in good standing listing a registered agent: “Jack G. Hendrix, Jr., 1415 Richland Street, Columbia, SC.” Counsel forwarded the pleadings to the Richland County
Sheriff’s office for service upon Hendrix, but service was not accomplished
because he “moved to an unknown address on Assembly St.” Counsel hired an investigator to locate Hendrix. The
investigator discovered an address in Pelion, and Counsel again sent the
pleadings to the Richland County Sheriff’s Department for service. The
Richland County Sheriff’s Department returned the pleadings because the address
was in Lexington County. Counsel transmitted the pleadings to the Lexington
County Sheriff’s Department for service, and the Sheriff’s office responded
with an affidavit stating the department was unable to serve the pleadings
because “per neighbor [Hendrix] left his wife a year ago and unknown where he
lived now.” Having exhausted his options of service by sheriff,
Counsel hired an investigator to take the papers to Agape. The investigator
served the pleadings upon Janet Inkelaar, the administrator of Agape
Rehabilitation, on June 15, 2006, at the facility. Inkelaar indicated she was authorized
to accept service on Ebenezer’s behalf. By Hooper’s calculation, service was
completed 129 days after the filing of the summons and complaint. Ebenezer moved the circuit court to dismiss the
action, asserting it was not commenced in a timely fashion pursuant to Rule 3,
SCRCP, and section 15-3-530 of the South Carolina Code, the three year statute
of limitations. Hooper argued: (1) the statute of limitations should be
equitably tolled; (2) the 120-day period under Rule 3(a), SCRCP, should not begin
to run until the end of the limitations period; (3) Ebenezer should be estopped
from asserting the statute of limitations due to its own unlawful actions; and
(4) under Rule 86, SCRCP, the former version of Rule 3, SCRCP, should apply to
permit service within a reasonable time after filing following delivery to the
sheriff. The Master in Equity, sitting as a Special Circuit Judge,
ruled the action was not timely commenced because it was not served within 120
days of filing. Hooper sought reconsideration of the court’s order, and a
hearing was scheduled. Hooper then served notice of appeal from the dismissal,
and the hearing on reconsideration was not held.
1. Did the 120 day period for service under Rule 3(a), SCRCP, commence when the action was filed or when the limitations period
2. Did the circuit court properly refuse to equitably toll the statute of limitations?
Is it unjust and inequitable to permit Ebenezer to assert the statute of limitations as a defense?
4. Should the circuit court have applied the former Rule 3(a), pursuant to Rule 86, SCRCP, and determined that service was timely when
completed within a reasonable time after delivery to the sheriff?
Summary judgment is defined by Rule 12(c), SCRCP:
If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters
outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the Court, the
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided
in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present
all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the appellate court applies the same
standard which governs the trial court under Rule 56(c), SCRCP: summary
judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Pye v. Estate
of Fox, 369 S.C. 555, 633 S.E.2d 505 (2006); Houck v.
State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 366 S.C. 7, 11, 620 S.E.2d 326,
329 (2005); Bradley v. Doe, 374 S.C. 622, 649
S.E.2d 153 (Ct. App. 2007); Bennett v. Investors Title Ins. Co. 370 S.C. 578, 635 S.E.2d 649 (Ct. App. 2006); see Rule 56(c), SCRCP (“The judgment sought
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”). In determining whether
any triable issues of fact exist, the evidence and all reasonable inferences
therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Helms
Realty, Inc. v. Gibson-Wall Co., 363 S.C. 334, 611 S.E.2d 485
(2005); Medical Univ. of S.C. v. Arnaud, 360 S.C. 615, 602 S.E.2d
747 (2004); Hackworth v. Greenville County, 371 S.C. 99, 102, 637 S.E.2d
320, 322 (Ct. App. 2006); Rife v. Hitachi Constr. Mach. Co., Ltd., 363 S.C. 209, 609 S.E.2d 565 (Ct. App. 2005).
not require the services of a fact finder. Dawkins v. Fields, 354 S.C.
440, 452, 548 S.E.2d 868, 874 (2001)); Moore v. Weinberg, 373 S.C. 209,
217, 644 S.E.2d 740, 744 (Ct. App. 2007); Mulherin-Howell v. Cobb, 362
S.C. 588, 596-97, 608 S.E.2d 587, 592 (Ct. App. 2005). Because it is a drastic
remedy, summary judgment should be cautiously invoked to ensure that a litigant
is not improperly deprived of a trial on disputed factual issues. Helena
455, 462 (2004); B & B Liquors, Inc. v. O’Neil, 361 S.C. 267, 270,
603 S.E.2d 629, 631 (Ct. App. 2004).
I. Timely Service under Rule 3(a)
maintains the trial court erred in granting Ebenezer summary judgment, arguing
under Rule 3(a), SCRCP, the 120 days for service did not commence until the
date the limitations period expired, as opposed to the filing date. We
3(a), SCRCP, provides:
A civil action is commenced when the summons and
complaint are filed with the clerk of court if:
(1) the summons and complaint are served within the
statute of limitations in any manner prescribed by law; or
(2) if not served within the statute of limitations,
actual service must be accomplished not later than one hundred twenty days
rule is consistent with section 15-3-20 of the South Carolina Code:
Civil actions may only be commenced within the periods prescribed in this title
after the cause of action has accrued, except when, in special cases, a
different limitation is prescribed by statute.
civil action is commenced when the summons and complaint are filed with the
clerk of court if actual service is accomplished within one hundred twenty days
Court explained the importance of statutes of limitation in Blyth v. Marcus,
322 S.C. 150, 470 S.E.2d 389 (Ct. App. 1996):
statute of limitations reduces the interval between the accrual and
commencement of a right of action to a fixed period, thereby putting to rest
claims after the passage of time. This procedural device operates as a defense
to limit the remedy available from an existing cause of action. Unless an action
is commenced before expiration of the limitations period, the plaintiff's claim
is normally barred.
Id. at 152, 470 S.E.2d at 390
of statutes of limitation is to ensure litigation is “brought within a
reasonable time in order that evidence be reasonably available and there be
some end to litigation.” City of North Myrtle Beach v. Lewis-Davis, 360
S.C. 225, 231, 599 S.E.2d 462, 464 (Ct. App. 2004) (quoting Webb v.
Greenwood County, 299 S.C. 267, 276, 92 S.E.2d 688, 691 (1956)). “[S]tatutes are designed to promote
justice by forcing parties to pursue a case in a timely manner. Parties should
act before memories dim, evidence grows stale or becomes nonexistent, or other
people act in reliance on what they believe is a settled state of public affairs.” State ex
rel. Condon v. City of Columbia, 339 S.C. 8, 19, 528 S.E.2d 408, 413-14
of limitation . . . protect people from being forced to defend themselves
against stale claims. The statutes recognize that with the passage of time,
evidence becomes more difficult to obtain and is less reliable. Physical
evidence is lost or destroyed, witnesses become impossible to locate, and
memories fade. With passing time, a defendant faces an increasingly difficult
task in formulating and mounting an effective defense. Additionally, statutes
of limitation encourage plaintiffs to initiate actions promptly while evidence
is fresh and a court will be able to judge more accurately.
Moriarty v. Garden
Sanctuary Church of God, 334 S.C. 150, 163-64, 511 S.E.2d 699, 706 (Ct. App.
1999), aff’d, 341 S.C. 320, 534 S.E.2d 672 (2000).
of limitations are not simply technicalities. On the contrary, they have long
been respected as fundamental to a well-ordered judicial system. Statutes of
limitations embody important public policy considerations in that they
stimulate activity, punish
negligence, and promote repose by giving security and stability to human
affairs. One purpose of a statute of limitations is to relieve the courts of
the burden of trying stale claims when a plaintiff has slept on his rights. Another purpose of a statute of limitations is to protect potential defendants
from protracted fear of litigation. Moates v. Bobb, 322 S.C. 172,
176, 470 S.E.2d 402, 404 (Ct. App. 1996) (internal citations and quotations
cornerstone policy consideration underlying statutes of limitations is the
laudable goal of law to promote and achieve finality in litigation. Significantly, [s]tatutes of limitations provide potential defendants with certainty that after a set period of time, they will not be hailed [sic]
into court to defend time-barred claims. Moreover, limitations periods
discourage plaintiffs from sitting on their rights. Statutes of limitations
are, indeed, fundamental to our judicial system.
Carolina Marine Handling,
Inc. v. Lasch, 363 S.C. 169, 175-76,
609 S.E.2d 548, 552 (Ct. App. 2005) (alterations in original) (internal
statute of limitations period for wrongful death and negligence actions is
three years. S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-530(5), (6) (2005) (“Within three years: (5) an action for assault, battery, or any injury to the
person or rights of another, not arising on contract and not enumerated by law,
and those provided for in Section 15-3-545; (6) an action under Sections
15-51-10 to 15-51-60 for death by wrongful act, the period to begin to run upon
the death of the person on account of whose death the action is brought”); S.C.
Code Ann. § 15-3-20(A) (2005) (“Civil actions may only be commenced within the
periods prescribed in this title after the cause of action has accrued, except
when, in special cases, a different limitation is prescribed by statute.”). The statute of limitations on a negligence claim accrues at the
time of the negligence or when facts and circumstances would put a person of
common knowledge on notice that he might have a claim against another party. Kreutner v.
David, 320 S.C. 283, 285, 465 S.E.2d 88,
90 (1995). This standard is known as the discovery rule. Id. “The statute is not
delayed until the injured party seeks advice of counsel or develops a
full-blown theory of recovery; instead, reasonable diligence requires a
plaintiff to ‘act with some promptness.’” Maher v. Tietex Corp., 331
S.C. 371, 377, 500 S.E.2d 204, 207 (Ct.
App. 1998) (citations omitted). “Under
Rule 3(a), SCRCP, a civil action is commenced by the filing and service of a
summons and complaint.” Louden v. Moragne, 327 S.C. 465, 468, 486
S.E.2d 525, 526 (Ct. App. 1997). “Service of the summons brings the defendant
within the court’s jurisdiction and gives the court the power to render a
personal judgment against the person served.” Id. (citing James F.
Flanagan, South Carolina Civil Procedure 7 (2d ed. 1996)). If the
defendant is “not served within the statute of limitations, actual service must
be accomplished not later than one hundred twenty days after filing.” Rule
3(a)(2), SCRCP; see also S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-20(B) (2005) (“A civil action is commenced when the summons and complaint are filed with the clerk of
court if actual service is accomplished within one hundred twenty days after
filing.”).
statute’s terms are clear, the court must apply the terms according to their
literal meaning. Brown v. S.C. Dep’t of Health & Envtl.
Control, 348
S.C. 507, 515, 560 S.E.2d 410, 414 (2002). “An appellate court cannot construe a
statute without regard to its plain meaning and may not resort to a forced
interpretation in an attempt to expand or limit the scope of a statute.” Id. Section 15-3-20 and Rule 3 pellucidly state if the defendant is not served
within the limitations period, service must occur within 120 days after the
pleadings are filed.
Hooper does not
dispute Ebenezer was served after the limitations period expired and 129 days
after she filed the complaint. As evidenced by the transpicuous language in
both Rule 3 and section 15-3-20, service must be completed within 120 days of
the filing of the complaint if service is not completed during the limitations
period. Hooper did not commence the action within the statutory period. The
trial court did not err in granting Ebenezer summary judgment based on the
II. Equitable Tolling/Statute of Limitations
Hooper avers the statute of limitations should be
tolled. South Carolina has rarely applied the doctrine of equitable tolling to
halt the running of the statute of limitations. Equitable tolling is reserved
for extraordinary circumstances. This case does not present such exceptional
In Hopkins v. Floyd’s Wholesale, 299 S.C. 127,
382 S.E.2d 907 (1989), our Supreme Court determined the statute of limitations
is tolled for a workers’ compensation claim during a reliance period in “which
an employee is induced by the employer to believe his claim is compensable and
will be taken care of without the employee filing a claim.” Id. at 129,
382 S.E.2d at 908. The Court announced: We believe the rule . . .
which tolls the statute of limitations during the reliance period is the better
rule. The fact finder in these types of cases must necessarily determine that
a reliance period existed and that the claim is otherwise compensable. To hold
that claims must be filed within a reasonable time following the end of the
reliance period would add yet another layer of fact finding resulting in
greater uncertainty as to which claims are compensable. This uncertainty would
inevitably result in an increase in litigation associated with such claims.
Id. at 129-130, 382 S.E.2d at 909.
Tiralango
v. Balfry, 335 S.C. 359, 517 S.E.2d
430 (1999), addressed tolling the statute of limitations with respect to
non-resident motorists. Tiralango, a New York resident, and Balfry, a Quebec resident, were involved in an auto accident in Myrtle Beach on April 5, 1992. Balfry’s address was recorded on the police report the day of the accident, but
Tiralango did not request and receive a copy of the report for approximately
one month. Tiralango filed a summons and complaint against Balfry on March 21, 1995, and served Balfry on April 11, 1995. The action was filed before the
running of the three year statute of limitations, but Balfry was not served
within three years. (The former Rule 3, SCRCP, did not include the provision
allowing for service within 120 days of the filing of the summons and complaint
and required service within the statute of limitations.) The South Carolina Supreme
Court granted certiorari to review whether the statute of limitations should be
tolled while the defendant’s address is unknown to the plaintiff.
of this issue turns upon construction of the phrase “known to the plaintiff” in Meyer. If construed as a requirement of actual, subjective
knowledge, then the statute is tolled for the period during which Tiralango did
not “know” Balfry's address. If construed as an objective knowledge
requirement, i.e., “could have/should have known,” then the statute is not
tolled as Balfry's address was at all times available. We find the latter
construction more consistent with our opinion in Meyer, and with
the reasoning in other jurisdictions.
In Meyer, we addressed the rationale for holding the statute is not tolled when the
defendant is amenable to service, stating, “[t]o construe the tolling statute
in the manner urged by the plaintiff (i.e., as being tolled until the plaintiff
decides to serve the defendant) would allow suits to be postponed indefinitely,
for no good purpose, and to be brought in some cases at the virtually unlimited
pleasure of the plaintiff.” 330 S.C. at 183, 498 S.E.2d at 639. In the
present case, were we to apply an actual knowledge requirement, Tiralango would
have been free to wait six months or one year (or longer) to obtain the report
and the statute would nonetheless be tolled, notwithstanding the address was at
all times available to him. Such a result is patently inconsistent with our
holding in Meyer and, accordingly, we decline to so hold.
Id., 335 S.C. at 362, 517 S.E.2d at 432 (footnote
doctrine of equitable tolling is articulated with exactitude:
time requirements in lawsuits between private litigants are customarily subject
to equitable tolling if such tolling is necessary to prevent unfairness to a
diligent plaintiff. However, equitable tolling, which allows a plaintiff to
initiate an action beyond the statute of limitations deadline, is typically
available only if the claimant was prevented in some extraordinary way from
exercising his or her rights, or, in other words, if the relevant facts present
sufficiently rare and exceptional circumstances that would warrant application
tolling has been deemed available where— — extraordinary circumstances
prevented the plaintiff from filing despite his or her diligence.
— the plaintiff actively pursued his
or her judicial remedies by filing a defective pleading during the statutory
period or the claimant has been induced or tricked by the defendant's
misconduct into allowing the filing deadline to pass.
— the plaintiff, despite all due
diligence, is unable to obtain vital information bearing on the existence of
his or her claim. It has
been held that equitable tolling applies principally if the plaintiff is
actively misled by the defendant about the cause of action or is prevented in
some extraordinary way from asserting his or her rights. However, it has also
been held that the equitable tolling doctrine does not require wrongful conduct
on the part of the defendant, such as fraud or misrepresentation.
Am. Jur. 2d Limitation of Actions § 174 (2007).
Supreme Court of Alaska distinguished the concepts of equitable tolling and
precedent permits equitable estoppel or equitable circumstances to extend the
three-year limitations period. Many federal cases seem to merge these two
doctrines. For example, Seattle Audubon Society
v. Robertson [931 F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1991), rev’d on
other grounds, 503 U.S. 429 (1992)] stated
that equitable tolling may be applied when plaintiffs are “prevented from
asserting their claims by some kind of wrongful conduct on the part of the
defendant.” But it is only equitable estoppel that requires
wrongful conduct on the part of the defendant, i.e., fraud or
misrepresentation. The federal
equitable tolling doctrine, on the other hand,
does not require any conduct by the defendant.
Abbott v. State, 979 P.2d 994, 997-998 (Alaska 1999)
United States Supreme Court elucidated:
courts have typically extended equitable relief only sparingly. We have allowed
equitable tolling in situations where the claimant has
actively pursued his judicial remedies by filing a defective pleading during
the statutory period, or where the complainant has
been induced or tricked by his adversary's misconduct into allowing the filing
deadline to pass. We have generally been much less forgiving in
receiving late filings where the claimant failed to exercise due diligence in
preserving his legal rights.
Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans
Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990) (footnotes and citations omitted). The Court annunciated: “But the principles of
equitable tolling described above do not extend to what is at best a garden
variety claim of excusable neglect.” Id.
often apply equitable tolling when a plaintiff has timely pursued his rights
through an administrative body or where a plaintiff was enjoined or otherwise
legally prohibited from bringing his claims in a timely manner.
Arizona courts have recognized and applied the equitable
tolling doctrine. See Hosogai v. Kadota, 145 Ariz. 227,
229, 700 P.2d 1327, 1329 (1985) (applying doctrine when second wrongful death
claim untimely filed after successful verdict on first claim overturned on
appeal due to defective service of process); Kosman [v. State], 199
Ariz. 184, ¶¶ 6, 10, 16 P.3d at 213 (applying doctrine where plaintiff prisoner
failed to timely file notice of claim against state because he first pursued
claim through prison's administrative grievance procedure); Kyles v.
Contractors/Eng'rs Supply, Inc., 190 Ariz. 403, 404, 406, 949 P.2d 63, 64,
66 (App.1997) (applying doctrine when right-to-sue letter from Arizona Attorney
General's office contained incorrect date by which plaintiff was required to
sue on his claim).
McCloud v. State, Ariz. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 170 P.3d 691,
696 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).
Supreme Court of California enunciated:
tolling is a judge-made doctrine which operates independently of the literal
wording of the Code of Civil Procedure to suspend or extend a statute of
limitations as necessary to ensure fundamental practicality and fairness. This
court has applied equitable tolling in carefully considered situations to
prevent the unjust technical forfeiture of causes of action, where the
defendant would suffer no prejudice.
Lantzy v. Centex Homes, 73 P.3d 517, 523 (Cal. 2003) (quotations and citations
Delaware Supreme Court examined the application of equitable tolling where
defendants were subject to substituted service:
event, whatever the precise argument made may be, we think that the Delaware statute of limitations on actions for personal injuries runs continuously without
interruption when there is available to the plaintiff throughout the period an acceptable means
of bringing the defendant into court. Therefore, the answer to the first
question posed is that there has been no tolling of the statute of limitations
since these defendants, at all times, were subject to substituted service.
v. Adams, 155 A.2d 591,594 (Del.
The Florida court observed, as an equitable remedy,
the prejudice to the defendant must be considered before application:
The doctrine of equitable
tolling was developed to permit under certain circumstances the filing of a
lawsuit that otherwise would be barred by a limitations period. See Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342, 22 L.Ed. 636 (1874). The tolling doctrine is used in the interests of
justice to accommodate both a defendant's right not to be called upon to defend
a stale claim and a plaintiff's right to assert a meritorious claim when
equitable circumstances have prevented a timely filing. Equitable tolling is a
type of equitable modification which “‘focuses on the plaintiff's excusable
ignorance of the limitations period and on [the] lack of prejudice to the
defendant.’” Cocke v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 817 F.2d 1559, 1561
(11th Cir.1987) (quoting Naton v. Bank of California, 649 F.2d 691, 696
(9th Cir.1981)). Contrary to the analysis of the majority below, equitable
tolling, unlike estoppel, does not require active deception or employer
misconduct, but focuses rather on the employee with a reasonably prudent regard
Machules v. Dep’t of
Admin., 523 So.2d 1132,
1133-1134 (Fla. 1988) (footnotes omitted).
disfavors tolling the statute of limitations:
We have long maintained a
rule of strict construction concerning the tolling of the statute of
limitations. Absent legislative creation of an exception to the statute of
limitations, we will not allow any implied and equitable exception to be
engrafted upon it.
v. Resolution Trust Corp., 635 A.2d
394, 399 (Md. 1994) (quotations and citations omitted).
appellees were on notice of Walko's claim once the motion to intervene was
filed. As we have indicated, however, Walko's approach to this case was hardly
one of vigilance. The statute of limitations reflects a legislative judgment
of what is deemed an adequate period of time in which “a person of ordinary
diligence” should bring his action. Ferrucci v. Jack, 255 Md. 523, 526, 258 A.2d 414 (1969); McMahan v. Dorchester Fert. Co., 184 Md. at 159, 40 A.2d 313. The unexplained delay in bringing a timely action here hardly
bespeaks the “ordinary diligence” required of one seeking to toll the statute
of limitations. Cromwell v. Ripley, 11 Md.App. at 182, 273 A.2d 218. In
a very real sense, Walko has slept on its rights, Johnson v. Railway Express
Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 466, 95 S.Ct. 1716, 44 L.Ed.2d 295 (1975), and cannot
be heard to complain now for its own tarriance. See Braxton v.
Virginia Folding Box Co., 72 F.R.D. at 126-27 (Before limitations had run,
plaintiffs successfully intervened in pending civil rights action, but later
voluntarily withdrew motion and commenced independent action seeking same
relief after statutory period had expired; court held that limitations
had not been tolled by timely and successful intervention, thus barring
plaintiffs' independent action.).
Walko Corp. v. Burger Chef
Sys., Inc., 378 A.2d 1100,
1104 (Md. 1977).
of Appeals of Michigan explicated that the plaintiff must exercise due
diligence in order to invoke equitable tolling:
of the strong policy considerations favoring statutes of limitation, we hold
that plaintiff's reliance upon a misdated court order did not constitute due
diligence sufficient to toll the running of the statutory period of limitation. Defendant Pukoff should not be denied the protections afforded by the statute
on so casual a basis. We hold that a minimum standard of due diligence in the
case at bar would have included an investigation by plaintiff of the primary
source of records of liquor licensees as of the date of the accident. A
plaintiff's right to obtain information as to the identity of liquor licensees
from the Michigan Liquor Control Commission is provided by the Michigan Freedom
of Information Act. . . .
Ray v. Taft, 336 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
Mississippi courts require earnest efforts by plaintiffs seeking
parties do not provide nor can we find any instance where “excusable neglect”
has tolled or otherwise stayed a statute of limitations. That today's decision
works to preclude McKinley's and Dixon's representatives' day in court is of no
consequence. Watters v. Stripling, 675 So.2d 1242, 1244 (Miss.1996) (citing
Traina v. United States, 911 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1990)). There is
nothing in the record to indicate that the representatives' failure to file was
anything other than a result of their own inactions or omissions.
City of Tupelo v. Martin, 747 So.2d 822, 829 (Miss. 1999).
Supreme Court of New Mexico opined:
tolling is a nonstatutory tolling theory which suspends a limitations period. See Gathman-Matotan Architects and Planners, Inc. v. State Dep't of Fin. &
Admin., 109 N.M. 492, 494, 787 P.2d 411, 413 (1990). Equitable tolling
typically applies in cases where a litigant was prevented from filing suit
because of an extraordinary event beyond his or her control. Martinez v. Orr, 738 F.2d 1107, 1110 (10th Cir.1984). However, where a plaintiff
fails to receive notice of the right to sue through his or her own fault,
equitable tolling does not apply. See Baldwin County Welcome Ctr. v.
Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 151, 104 S.Ct. 1723, 80 L.Ed.2d 196 (1984) (“One who
fails to act diligently cannot invoke equitable principles to excuse that lack
of diligence.”). Ocana v. American
Furniture Co., 91 P.3d 58,
66 (N.M. 2004).
North Dakota Supreme Court determined a plaintiff’s failure to timely serve the
defendants did not warrant equitable tolling:
we were to adopt the equitable tolling doctrine in this case, Riemers' failure
to commence his action against the defendants within the statute of limitations
was not the result of his timely pursuit of one of several other available
legal remedies which may have tolled the statute of limitations. Rather, as in
Reid, 2000 ND 108, ¶ 16, 611 N.W.2d 187, Riemers' failure to commence
his action within the statute of limitations resulted from his failure to
effectuate timely service of process on the defendants. We therefore conclude
the equitable tolling doctrine would not apply to Riemers' claims.
Riemers v. Omdahl, 687 N.W.2d 445, 454 (N.D. 2004).
equitable tolling argument relies on an unpublished order of the United States
District Court in Snyder v. Roberts, No. 0:04-22910-CMC-BM, 2006 WL
22181 (D.S.C. 2006). We are not bound by that court’s interpretation of South Carolina law. Santee River Cypress Lumber Co. v. Query, 168 S.C. 112, 117, 167
S.E. 22, 24 (1932) (“We are not bound by the construction placed upon the Statute
by any Federal Court, and the Federal Courts should adopt and follow our
construction.”). In Snyder, the plaintiff filed a pro se action
arising out of an automobile accident. Under the federal procedure, which
differs from South Carolina procedure, the court issues the summons and
complaint. When a pro se complaint is filed in district court, it is
forwarded to a staff attorney who makes a recommendation to a Magistrate Judge.
Snyder, 2006 WL 22181 at *1. The Magistrate Judge decides whether a
summons should issue or whether to recommend dismissal of some or all claims. Id. In Snyder, there was some delay because one plaintiff did not submit an
original signature on a document, but that defect was cured. The summonses were
ultimately issued 101 days after the action was filed. Plaintiffs effected
service 31 days later; service occurred 132 days after the action was filed. Id. at *2.
order authorizing issuance of the summonses advised Plaintiffs service was
required to be accomplished within 120 days of filing of the complaint. . . . The order made no reference to the corresponding state court rules which govern
when actions are ‘commenced’ for statute of limitations purposes.” Id. The court analyzed the situation where the state rule did not contemplate
delays by the court that arose under the federal procedure:
court is, therefore, faced with a state court rule and statute which suggest no
leeway in the requirement for service within 120 days but which do not envision
court imposed delays in issuance of the summons such as are required or
authorized in federal court. The state court rule (and corresponding statute)
do not, in any case, appear to anticipate court imposed delay of service which
leaves plaintiffs with only the most minimal time (19 or fewer days in the
present case) within which to serve the complaint before expiration of the 120
day period allowed under S.C.R. Civ. P. 3(a)(2). The situation is further
complicated in the case at bar because the order which was forwarded to
Plaintiffs with the summonses referred only to the federal service requirements
and, in doing so, suggested the time could be extended for “good cause.” See Dkt No. 5 (advising Plaintiffs the 120 day service requirement of Fed.R.Civ.P.
4(m) could only be extended upon a showing of good cause).
court explained: [t]hat
trial courts have the inherent authority to extend the time for service under
the state court's commencement rules where the delay in service is the result
of the court's delay in authorizing service and where such delay is so
substantial as to significantly impair the plaintiff's ability to effect timely
did not ask the court to allow service by publication pursuant to section
15-9-710 of the South Carolina Code. Wachovia Bank of S.C., N.A. v. Player,
341 S.C. 424, 428-429, 535 S.E.2d 128,130 (2000) (“An order for service by
publication may be issued pursuant to [the code] when an affidavit,
satisfactory to the issuing officer, is made stating that the defendant, a
resident of the state, cannot, after the exercise of due diligence, be found,
and that a cause of action exists against him.”); Montgomery v. Mullins,
325 S.C. 500, 505, 480 S.E.2d 467, 470 (Ct. App. 1997) (“Service of process by
publication is authorized . . . where the defendant is a resident of this
state, but after a diligent search cannot be found in this state.”).
the instant case, the court did not create the delay in service. Hooper failed
to diligently investigate the relationship between Ebenezer and Agape soon
after filing to see if personal service could be accomplished at the facility. After determining the registered agent was not at the address provided in Columbia, Hooper did not seek leave from the court to effect service by publication. The
present litigation does not rise to the level necessary for the application of the
salutary and salubrious doctrine of equitable tolling. Concomitantly, we
refuse to actualize the doctrine of equitable tolling to the relevant statute
of limitations in this case.
contends Ebenezer should be estopped from asserting the statute of limitations
as a defense due to its failure to maintain current information for a
registered agent with the Secretary of State. Her asseveration fails because
the elements of estoppel are not fulfilled.
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine differentiated the concepts of equitable
tolling and equitable estoppel in Dasha v. Maine Medical Center, 665
A.2d 993 (Me. 1995).
doctrine of equitable estoppel is distinct from the doctrine of equitable
tolling. In cases of equitable estoppel, the statute of limitations has expired
and the defendant asserts the running of the statute of limitations as a
defense. The defendant, however, is estopped from benefitting from the statute
of limitations as a defense because the defendant has acted in such a way as to
cause the claimant to forego filing a timely cause of action. See Vacuum
Sys., Inc. v. Bridge Constr. Co., 632 A.2d 442, 444 (Me.1993); Hanusek
v. Southern Me. Medical Ctr., 584 A.2d 634, 637 (Me.1990). In contrast, in
cases involving the doctrine of equitable tolling, the defendant does not have
the statute of limitations as a valid defense because it has not yet run. Rather,
the statute of limitations is tolled when strict application of the statute of
limitations would be inequitable. Lambert v. United States, 44 F.3d 296,
298 (5th Cir.1995).
Id. at 996 n.2.
Court previously expounded upon equitable estoppel in Dillon County School
Dist. No. Two v. Lewis Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 286 S.C. 207, 332 S.E.2d
555 (Ct. App. 1985), overruled on other grounds, Atlas Food Sys. &
Servs., Inc. v. Crane Nat. Vendors Div. of Unidynamics Corp., 319 S.C. 556,
462 S.E.2d 858 (1995). In a
proper case, the doctrine of equitable estoppel may prevent resort to the
statute of limitations. Servomation Corporation v. Hickory Construction Co.,
70 N.C.App. 309, 318 S.E.2d 904 (1984), remanded, 312 N.C. 794, 325
S.E.2d 632 (1985); City of Bedford v. James Leffel & Co., 558 F.2d
216 (4th Cir.1977); 51 Am.Jur.2d Limitation of Actions § 431 at 900
(1970); see Clements v. Greenville County, 246 S.C. 20, 142
S.E.2d 212 (1965). A defendant will be estopped to assert the statute of
limitations in bar of a plaintiff's claim when the delay that otherwise would
give operation to the statute has been induced by the defendant's conduct. 53
C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 25 at 962-64 (1948).
Dillon County School Dist.
No. Two, 286 S.C. at 218, 332 S.E.2d at
Supreme Court defined the essential elements of equitable estoppel:
of equitable estoppel as to the party estopped are: (1) conduct by the party
estopped which amounts to a false representation or concealment of material
facts; (2) the intention that such conduct shall be acted upon by the other
party; and (3) knowledge, actual or constructive, of the true facts. Ingram
v. Kasey’s Assocs., 340 S.C. 98, 531 S.E.2d 287 n. 2 (2000). Essential
elements of estoppel as related to the party claiming the estoppel are: (1)
lack of knowledge and of means of knowledge of truth as to facts in question;
(2) reliance upon conduct of the party estopped; and (3) prejudicial change in
position. Mayes v. Paxton, 313 S.C. 109, 437 S.E.2d 66 (1993). “Estoppel
cannot exist if the knowledge of both parties is equal and nothing is done by
one to mislead the other.” Evins v. Richland County Historic Pres. Comm’n,
341 S.C. 15, 15, 532 S.E.2d 876, 878 (2000).
Zabinski v. Bright Acres
Assocs., 346 S.C. 580, 589, 553
S.E.2d 110, 114 (2001).
Under South Carolina law, a defendant may be estopped from claiming the statute of limitations as
a defense if the delay that otherwise would give operation to the statute had
been induced by the defendant's conduct. Such inducement may consist of an
express representation that the claim will be settled without litigation or
conduct that suggests a lawsuit is not necessary. The defendant's conduct may
also involve inducing the plaintiff either to believe that an amicable
adjustment of the claim will be made without suit or to forbear exercising the
Kleckley v. Nw. Nat. Cas. Co., 338 S.C. 131, 136-137, 526 S.E.2d 218, 220
(2000) (quotations and citations omitted).
previously illuminated the application of estoppel when a party portrays the
claim will be settled: Similarly,
in situations involving settlements in civil cases, one will be equitably estopped
to defend with the statute of limitations by either (a) expressly representing
that the claim will be settled without litigation, or (b) conduct which
suggests that a lawsuit is not necessary. See, e.g. Black v. Lexington Sch. Dist. No. Two, 327 S.C. 55, 488 S.E.2d 327 (1997) (citing and discussing
various other cases on this issue). In Strong v. University of South
Carolina School of Medicine, 316 S.C. 189, 447 S.E.2d 850 (1994), the court
discussed the fraudulent concealment defense to the statute of limitations,
which flows from the duty to disclose inherent in the relationship between
the general doctrine of equitable estoppel has been applied to affect the
running of the statute of limitations in other situations besides those of
unconsummated settlement. Equitable estoppel operates to deny a party “the
right to plead or prove an otherwise important fact.” Parker v. Parker,
313 S.C. 482, 487, 443 S.E.2d 388, 391 (1994).
Maher v. Tietex Corp., 331 S.C. 371, 380-381, 500 S.E.2d 204, 209 (Ct. App.
South Carolina Supreme Court upheld a trial court’s refusal of an equitable
estoppel contention where the plaintiff had not proved the delay was due to the
defendant’s conduct:
[v. Self Memorial Hospital], 314 S.C. 305, 443 S.E.2d 909, which was
brought under the Tort Claims Act, the defendant claimed the statute of
limitations as a bar, and the plaintiff argued the defendant was equitably
estopped from asserting the statute. The plaintiff based her equitable
estoppel argument on the fact the defendant's employees assisted her in
completing certain claim forms. She argued that this assistance “caused her to
believe she had done all that she needed to do.” Vines, 314 S.C. at
308, 443 S.E.2d at 911. The trial court rejected this argument and granted the
defendant's motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations. On
appeal, this Court affirmed, finding there was no showing that the plaintiff
had delayed filing suit in reliance on the defendant hospital’s conduct. Id.
Black v. Lexington School
Dist. No. 2, 327 S.C. 55, 61, 488
S.E.2d 327, 330 (1997).
the case at bar, Hooper was not delayed from filing her action, but she
advances Ebenezer’s failure to maintain a registered agent’s current address hindered
service. No evidence suggests Ebenezer’s omission in updating the Secretary of
State was intended to defraud or conceal facts from Hooper. Ebenezer had no
knowledge Hooper would rely on the information to attempt service. When
questioned by Hooper’s investigator, Inkelaar freely admitted she was
authorized to accept service for Ebenezer.
did not engage in conduct warranting estoppel to preclude the assertion of the
statute of limitations as a defense. The trial court correctly rejected
Hooper’s estoppel argument.
IV. Rule 86 to Resurrect
Hooper posits because of Rule 86, SCRCP, the trial
court erred in failing to apply the previous version of Rule 3, SCRCP, instead
of the current rule. We disagree.
Rule 86(a) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil
These rules shall take effect
on July 1, 1985. They govern all proceedings in civil actions brought after
they take effect and also all further proceedings in actions then pending, except
to the extent that in the opinion of the court their application in a
particular action pending when the rules take effect would not be feasible or
would work injustice, in which event the former procedure applies.
The former “Rule
3(b), SCRCP, tolls the statute of limitations once a plaintiff files his
summons and complaint and delivers the pleadings to the sheriff of the county
where the defendant was known to last reside for service upon the defendant,
provided actual service occurs within a reasonable time thereafter.” Montgomery
v. Mullins, 325 S.C. at 504, 480 S.E.2d at 469 (citing Hughes v. Water
World Water Slide, Inc., 314 S.C. 211, 442 S.E.2d 584 (1994)).
2002, the legislature amended S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-20 to add: “(B) A civil action is commenced when the summons and complaint are filed with the clerk of
filing.” Id. Rule 3, SCRCP, was revised to conform it to the amended
statute. The revised rule took effect April 27, 2004.
86, SCRCP, only applies to cases pending when the new rule takes effect. In
the case sub judice, the rule changed almost two years before Hooper
filed the complaint on February
8, 2006. This case was not
pending when the rules changed, and Rule 86 does not apply. The trial court
did not err in failing to apply the former version of Rule 3 in lieu of the
hold Hooper did not commence her action within the statute of limitations due
to the fact she served Ebenezer after the running of the statute and outside
120 days of filing. We rule the doctrine of equitable tolling is inapposite because
nothing prevented Hooper from timely filing her suit, and there were no extraordinary circumstances or encumbrances to hinder
timely service by a diligent plaintiff. We conclude Ebenezer’s failure to
update its registered agent’s information with the Secretary of State did not
rise to false representation or concealment to warrant estoppel. Current Rule
3, SCRCP, is controlling rather than a former version.
order of the circuit court is
AFFIRMED. SHORT