Source: http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/opinions/displayOpinion.cfm?caseNo=3346
Timestamp: 2013-05-24 20:25:43
Document Index: 71389048

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 11', '§ 22', '§ 22', '§ 22', '§ 16', '§ 14']

The State of South Carolina, Respondent, v. Thomas Ray Ballington, Appellant.
Heard April 3, 2001 - Filed May 29, 2001 AFFIRMED
HEARN, C.J.: Thomas Ray Ballington was convicted of murdering his wife, Edna Lynn Ballington (Wife). He was sentenced to life imprisonment. He appeals, arguing that (1) because a magistrate reduced the grand jury's murder indictment to a charge of manslaughter, the court of general sessions lacked jurisdiction to try him for murder; (2) the trial court erred in admitting an incriminating statement he made to police; and (3) the trial court erred in failing to grant his directed verdict motion. We affirm. FACTS
Furthermore, the circuit court judge could not restore the right to a preliminary hearing by ordering a post-indictment preliminary hearing. The trial court obtained jurisdiction over Ballington by way of the grand jury's indictment. See S.C. Const. art. I, § 11 ("No person may be held to answer for any crime the jurisdiction over which is not within the magistrate's court, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury. . . ."). (2) Rule 2, SCRCrimP terminates a magistrate's jurisdiction over a non-magistrate level offense when the defendant is indicted by a grand jury. Murder is not an offense within the magistrate court's jurisdiction. S.C. Code § 22-3-540 (1989) (stating magistrates have exclusive jurisdiction of all criminal cases where the punishment does not exceed a $100 fine or thirty days imprisonment); S.C. Code Ann. § 22-3-550 (1989) (stating magistrates have jurisdiction over offenses subject to fines or forfeitures of no more than $200 or thirty days imprisonment); S.C. Code Ann. § 22-3-545 (Supp. 2000) (stating cases involving crimes punishable by no more than $5,000, one year imprisonment, or both may be transferred from general sessions to magistrate's court); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20 (Supp. 2000) (stating murder is punishable by death, life imprisonment, or a mandatory minimum term of thirty years imprisonment). The magistrate in this case was without jurisdiction to reduce the grand jury's indictment from murder to manslaughter. Accordingly, Ballington's argument that the magistrate's reduction of the charge to manslaughter prevented the circuit court from trying him for murder is unavailing.
This evidence permits the conclusion that Wife was severely beaten and strangled for an extended period of time. Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, we find the testimony regarding Wife's injuries, as well as the force necessary to cause these injuries, constituted sufficient evidence of malice to support the trial court's refusal to grant a directed verdict. In addition, evidence Ballington attempted to cover up how his wife died suggests he killed her with a wicked or depraved spirit. See Arnold v. State, 309 S.C. 157, 169, 420 S.E.2d 834, 841 (1992) (including attempt by defendant to mislead police as to who committed crime as one indicator of malice); see also State v. Judge, 38 S.E.2d 715, 719, 208 S.C. 497, 505 (1946) (defining malice as "a wicked condition of the heart . . . a wicked purpose . . . a performed purpose to do a wrongful act"). Ballington left his home after attacking Wife and went back to his workplace. While there, he washed his shirt and a bloody towel. When he learned she had not returned to work, he asked her employers if they had tried phoning her at his home. When Ballington borrowed a car to return home, he said he was concerned because he could not reach Wife by phone. He said she had been ill. Ballington then returned to the home and led authorities to believe his wife fell down the stairs. The location of one shoe on a stair several steps above her body permits the inference he placed it there to stage a fall. In addition to Wife's injuries and the force necessary to inflict them, Ballington's attempt to mislead others as to the cause of his wife's death is also evidence he killed her with malice.
For the reasons discussed, Ballington's conviction and sentence are AFFIRMED.
1. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 2. Ballington argued at trial and appears to argue on appeal that the circuit court judge's order granting him a post-indictment preliminary hearing and giving the magistrate all powers appurtenant to that office is the law of the case because the State did not appeal the order. As a result, Ballington contends the solicitor could not argue at trial and on appeal that the hearing was limited strictly to discovery issues. An unappealed order, right or wrong, is ordinarily law of the case. Charleston Lumber Co. v. Miller Hous. Corp., 338 S.C. 171, 175, 525 S.E.2d 869, 871 (2000). However, intermediate orders are appealable only when they involve the merits or impair a substantial right. See S.C. Code Ann. § 14-3-330(2)-(3) (1976). Examples of pre-trial orders the State may appeal immediately are: (1) the suppression of evidence where the suppression significantly impairs the prosecution, (2) the exclusion of an entire class of persons from serving on a jury venire, and (3) the refusal to allow the State to withdraw a plea offer. See State v. McKnight, 287 S.C. 167, 168, 337 S.E.2d 208, 209 (1985) (allowing appeal of suppression of evidence); State v. Royster, 181 S.C. 269, 273, 186 S.E. 921, 923 (1936) (finding exclusion of class of persons from jury venire immediately appealable); Reed v. Becka, 333 S.C. 676, 681, 511 S.E.2d 396, 399 (Ct. App. 1999) (holding refusal to allow withdrawal of plea offer is directly appealable). The circuit court judge's order granting Ballington a preliminary hearing did not involve the merits of the case or impair a substantial right. Therefore, it was not directly appealable and did not become the law of the case through the State's failure to immediately appeal it. 3. Federal courts have held it is permissible to tell a suspect he must tell the truth if he is going to say anything. See United States v. Braxton, 112 F.3d 777, 782 (4th Cir. 1997) (stating officer's statement of the sentence a suspect could receive if he did not tell the truth did not render subsequent confession invalid; officer did not indicate suspect had a duty to speak but merely said if he did speak, he must tell the truth); United States v. Vera, 701 F.2d 1349, 1364 (11th Cir. 1983) ("[A] mere admonition to the accused to tell the truth does not render a confession involuntary."); Rivers v. United States, 400 F.2d 935, 943 (5th Cir. 1968) (stating officer's admonition to suspect to tell the truth did not render statement invalid). © 2000-2013 South Carolina Judicial Department