Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/104436/stump-vs-sparkman
Timestamp: 2018-03-22 10:13:03
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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1', '§ 1983', '§ 33', '§ 1983', '§ 16', '§ 16']

Stump Vs Sparkman - Citation 104436 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Stump Vs. Sparkman - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/104436
Case Number 435 U.S. 349
Appellant Stump
Respondent Sparkman
stump v. sparkman - 435 u.s. 349 (1978) u.s. supreme court stump v. sparkman, 435 u.s. 349 (1978) stump v. sparkman no. 76-1750 argued january 10, 1978 decided march 28, 1978 435 u.s. 349 certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the seventh circuit syllabus a mother filed a petition in affidavit form in an indiana circuit court, a court of general jurisdiction under an indiana statute, for authority to have her "somewhat retarded" 15-year-old daughter (a respondent here) sterilized, and petitioner circuit judge approved the petition the same day in an ex parte proceeding without a hearing and without notice to the daughter or appointment of a guardian ad litem. the operation was performed.....
Stump v. Sparkman - 435 U.S. 349 (1978)
U.S. Supreme Court Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978)
Held: The Indiana law vested in the Circuit Judge the power to entertain and act upon the petition for sterilization, and he is, therefore, immune from damages liability even if his approval of the petition was in error. Pp. 435 U. S. 355 -364.
(a) A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority, but, rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the "clear absence of all jurisdiction," Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 80 U. S. 351 . Pp. 435 U. S. 355 -357.
(b) Here, there was not "clear absence of all jurisdiction" in the Circuit Court to consider the sterilization petition. That court had jurisdiction under the Indiana statute granting it broad general jurisdiction, it appearing that neither by statute nor by case law had such jurisdiction been circumscribed to foreclose consideration of the petition. Pp. 435 U. S. 357 -358.
(c) Because the Circuit Court is a court of general jurisdiction, neither the procedural errors the Circuit Judge may have committed nor the lack of a specific statute authorizing his approval of the petition in question rendered him liable in damages for the consequences of his actions. Pp. 435 U. S. 358 -360.
(d) The factors determining whether an act by a judge is "judicial" relate to the nature of the act itself (whether it is a function normally performed by a judge) and the expectation of the parties (whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity), and here, both of these elements indicate that the Circuit Judge's approval of the sterilization petition was a judicial act, even though he may have proceeded with informality. Pp. 435 U. S. 360 -363.
(e) Disagreement with the action taken by a judge does not justify depriving him of his immunity, and, thus, the fact that, in this case, tragic consequences ensued from the judge's action does not deprive him of his immunity; moreover, the fact that the issue before the judge is a controversial one, as here, is all the more reason that he should be able to act without fear of suit. Pp. 435 U. S. 363 -364.
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and BLACKMUN, REHNQUIST, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. STEWART, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which MARSHALL and POWELL, JJ., joined, post, p. 435 U. S. 364 . POWELL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 435 U. S. 369 . BRENNAN, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
The relevant facts underlying respondents' suit are not in dispute. On July 9, 171, Ora Spitler McFarlin, the mother of respondent Linda Kay Spitler Sparkman, presented to Judge Harold D. Stump of the Circuit Court of DeKalb County, Ind., a document captioned "Petition To Have Tubal Ligation Performed On Minor and Indemnity Agreement." The document had been drafted by her attorney, a petitioner here. In this petition, Mrs. McFarlin stated under oath that her daughter was 15 years of age and was "somewhat retarded," although she attended public school and had been promoted each year with her class. The petition further stated that Linda had been associating with "older youth or young men" and had stayed out overnight with them on several occasions. As a result of this behavior and Linda's mental capabilities, it was stated that it would be in the daughter's best interest if she underwent a tubal ligation in order "to prevent unfortunate circumstances. . . ." In the same document, Mrs. McFarlin also undertook to indemnify and hold harmless Dr. John Hines, who was to perform the operation, and the DeKalb Memorial Hospital, where the operation was to take place, against all causes of action that might arise as a result of the performance of the tubal ligation. [ Footnote 1 ]
Approximately two years after the operation, Linda Spitler was married to respondent Leo Sparkman. Her inability to become pregnant led her to discover that she had been sterilized during the 1971 operation. As a result of this revelation, the Sparkmans filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana against Mrs. McFarlin, her attorney, Judge Stump, the doctors who had performed and assisted in the tubal ligation, and the DeKalb Memorial Hospital. Respondents sought damages for the alleged violation of Linda Sparkman's constitutional rights; [ Footnote 2 ] also asserted were pendent state claims for assault
Sparkman v. McFarlin, Civ. No. F 75-129 (ND Ind., May 13, 1976). Accordingly, under Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 80 U. S. 351 (1872), Judge Stump was entitled to judicial immunity. [ Footnote 3 ]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the judgment of the District Court, [ Footnote 4 ] holding that the "crucial issue" was "whether Judge Stump acted within his jurisdiction" and concluding that he had not. 52 F.2d at 174. He was accordingly not immune from damages liability under the controlling authorities. The Court of Appeals also held that the judge had forfeited his immunity "because of his failure to comply with elementary principles of procedural due process." Id. at 176.
Bradley v. Fisher, supra at 80 U. S. 347 . [ Footnote 5 ] For that reason, the Court held that
of courts of superior or general jurisdiction are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly. [ Footnote 6 ]"
13 Wall. at 80 U. S. 351 . Later, we held that this doctrine of judicial immunity was applicable in suits under § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for the legislative record gave no indication that Congress intended to abolish this long-established principle. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547 (1967).
Bradley, supra, at 80 U. S. 352 , the scope of the judge's jurisdiction must be construed broadly where the issue is the immunity of the judge. A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only
when he has acted in the "clear absence of all jurisdiction." [ Footnote 7 ] 13 Wall. at 80 U. S. 351 .
Ind.Code § 33 l l 3 (1975). [ Footnote 8 ] This is indeed a broad jurisdictional grant; yet the Court of Appeals concluded that Judge Stump did not have jurisdiction over the petition authorizing Linda Sparkman's sterilization.
Perhaps realizing the broad scope of Judge Stump's jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals stated that, even if the action taken by him was not foreclosed under the Indiana statutory scheme, it would still be "an illegitimate exercise of his common law power because of his failure to comply with elementary principles of procedural due process." 552 F.2d at 176. This misconceives the doctrine of judicial immunity. A judge is absolutely immune from liability for his judicial acts even if his exercise of authority is flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors. The Court made this point clear in Bradley, 13 Wall. at 80 U. S. 357 , where it stated:
Id. at 325 U. S. 567 . Because the Illinois court took cognizance of the petition for admission and acted upon it, the Court held that a case or controversy was presented.
McAlester v. Brown, 469 F.2d 1280, 1282 (1972). [ Footnote 9 ] Among the factors relied upon by the Court of Appeals in deciding that the judge was acting within his judicial capacity was the fact that "the confrontation arose directly and immediately out of a visit to the judge in his official capacity." Ibid. [ Footnote 10 ]
The relevant cases demonstrate that the factors determining whether an act by a judge is a "judicial" one relate to the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity. Here, both factors indicate that Judge Stump's approval of the sterilization petition was a judicial act. [ Footnote 11 ] State judges with general jurisdiction not infrequently are called upon in their official capacity to approve petitions relating to the affairs of minors, as for example, a petition to settle a minor's claim. Furthermore, as even respondents have admitted, at the time he approved the petition presented to him by Mrs. McFarlin, Judge Stump was "acting as a county circuit court judge." See supra at 435 U. S. 360 . We may infer from the record that it was only because Judge Stump served in that position that Mrs. McFarlin, on the advice of counsel, submitted the petition to him for his approval. Because Judge Stump performed the type of act normally performed only by judges, and because he did so in his capacity as a Circuit Court Judge, we find no
merit to respondents' argument that the informality with which he proceeded rendered his action nonjudicial and deprived him of his absolute immunity. [ Footnote 12 ]
Wall. at 80 U. S. 347 . The fact that the issue before the judge is a controversial one is all the more reason that he should be able to act without fear of suit. As the Court pointed out in Bradley:
Id. at 80 U. S. 348 .
The Indiana law vested in Judge Stump the power to entertain and act upon the petition for sterilization. He is, therefore, under the controlling cases, immune from damages liability even if his approval of the petition was in error. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. [ Footnote 13 ]
" PETITION TO HAVE TUBAL LIGATION PERFORMED ON"
" MINOR AND INDEMNITY AGREEMENT"
"Said affiant does hereby in consideration of the Court of the DeKalb Circuit Court approving the Tubal Ligation being performed upon her minor daughter does hereby [ sic ] covenant and agree to indemnify and keep indemnified and hold Dr. John Hines; Auburn, Indiana, who said affiant is requesting perform said operation and the DeKalb Memorial Hospital, Auburn, Indiana, whereas [ sic ] said operation will be performed, harmless from and against all or any matters or causes of action that could or might arise as a result of the performing of said Tubal Ligation."
Id. at 74 U. S. 537 . In Bradley, the Court reconsidered that earlier statement and concluded that "the qualifying words used were not necessary to a correct statement of the law. . . ." 13 Wall. at 80 U. S. 351 .
Id. at 80 U. S. 351 -352.
In Bradley, the Court illustrated the distinction between lack of jurisdiction and excess of jurisdiction with the following examples: if a probate judge, with jurisdiction over only wills and estates, should try a criminal case, he would be acting in the clear absence of jurisdiction, and would not be immune from liability for his action; on the other hand, if a judge of a criminal court should convict a defendant of a nonexistent crime, he would merely be acting in excess of his jurisdiction, and would be immune. Id. at 80 U. S. 352 .
MR. JUSTICE STEWART's dissent, post at 435 U. S. 369 , suggests that Judge Stump's approval of Mrs. McFarlin's petition was not a judicial act, because of the absence of what it considers the "normal attributes of a judicial proceeding." These attributes are said to include a "case," with litigants and the opportunity to appeal, in which there is "principled decisionmaking." But, under Indiana law, Judge Stump had jurisdiction to act as he did; the proceeding instituted by the petition placed before him was sufficiently a "case" under Indiana law to warrant the exercise of his jurisdiction, whether or not he then proceeded to act erroneously. That there were not two contending litigants did not make Judge Stump's act any less judicial. Courts and judges often act ex parte. They issue search warrants in this manner, for example, often without any "case" having been instituted, without any "case" ever being instituted, and without the issuance of the warrant being subject to appeal. Yet it would not destroy a judge's immunity if it is alleged and offer of proof is made that, in issuing a warrant, he acted erroneously and without principle.
judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly." Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 80 U. S. 351 . It is also established that this immunity is in no way diminished in a proceeding under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547 . But the scope of judicial immunity is limited to liability for "judicial acts," and I think that what Judge Stump did on July 9, 1971, was beyond the pale of anything that could sensibly be called a judicial act.
Neither in Bradley v. Fisher nor in Pierson v. Ray was there any claim that the conduct in question was not a judicial act, and the Court thus had no occasion in either case to discuss the meaning of that term. [ Footnote 2/1 ] Yet the proposition that judicial immunity extends only to liability for "judicial acts" was emphasized no less than seven times in Mr. Justice Field's opinion for the Court in the Bradley case. [ Footnote 2/2 ] Cf. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409 , 424 U. S. 430 . And if the limitations inherent in that concept have any realistic meaning at all, then I cannot believe that the action of Judge Stump in approving Mrs. McFarlin's petition is protected by judicial immunity.
treatment generally, or that a judge "normally" is asked to approve a mother's wish to have her daughter sterilized. But whichever way the Court's statement is to be taken, it is factually inaccurate. In Indiana, as elsewhere in our country, a parent is authorized to arrange for and consent to medical and surgical treatment of his minor child. Ind.Code § 16-8-4-2 (1973). And when a parent decides to call a physician to care for his sick child or arranges to have a surgeon remove his child's tonsils, he does not, "normally" or otherwise, need to seek the approval of a judge. [ Footnote 2/3 ] On the other hand, Indiana did, in 1971, have statutory procedures for the sterilization of certain people who were institutionalized. But these statutes provided for administrative proceedings before a board established by the superintendent of each public hospital. Only if, after notice and an evidentiary hearing, an order of sterilization was entered in these proceedings could there be review in a circuit court. See Ind.Code §§ 16-13-13-1 through 16-13-13-4 (1974). [ Footnote 2/4 ]
If, on the other hand, the Court's test depends upon the fact that Judge Stump said he was acting in his judicial capacity, it is equally invalid. It is true that Judge Stump affixed his signature to the approval of the petition as "Judge, De Kalb Circuit Court." But the conduct of a judge surely does not become a judicial act merely on his own say-so. A judge is not free, like a loose cannon, to inflict indiscriminate damage whenever he announces that he is acting in his judicial capacity. [ Footnote 2/5 ]
If the standard adopted by the Court is invalid, then what is the proper measure of a judicial act? Contrary to implications in the Court's opinion, my conclusion that what Judge Stump did was not a judicial act is not based upon the fact that he acted with informality, or that he may not have been "in his judge's robes," or "in the courtroom itself." Ante at 435 U. S. 361 . And I do not reach this conclusion simply
"because the petition was not given a docket number, was not placed on file with the clerk's office, and was approved in an ex parte proceeding without notice to the minor, without a hearing, and without the appointment of a guardian ad litem. "
Ante at 435 U. S. 360 .
It seems to me, rather, that the concept of what is a judicial act must take its content from a consideration of the factors that support immunity from liability for the performance of such an act. Those factors were accurately summarized by the Court in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. at 386 U. S. 554 :
The petitioners' brief speaks of "an aura of deism which surrounds the bench . . . essential to the maintenance of respect for the judicial institution." Though the rhetoric may be overblown, I do not quarrel with it. But if aura there be, it is hardly protected by exonerating from liability such lawless conduct as took place here. And if intimidation would serve to deter its recurrence, that would surely be in the public interest. [ Footnote 2/6 ]
See 13 Wall. at 80 U. S. 347 , 80 U. S. 348 , 80 U. S. 349 , 80 U. S. 351 , 80 U. S. 354 , 80 U. S. 357
Contrary to the Court's conclusion, ante at 435 U. S. 359 , that case does not in the least demonstrate that an Indiana judge is or ever was empowered to act on the merits of a petition like Mrs. McFarlin's. The parent in that case did not petition for judicial approval of her decision, but rather
Believing that the conduct of Judge Stump on July 9, 1971, was not a judicial act, I do not need to inquire whether he was acting in "the clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject matter." Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. at 80 U. S. 351 . "Jurisdiction" is a coat of many colors. I note only that the Court's finding that Judge Stump had jurisdiction to entertain Mrs. McFarlin's petition seems to me to be based upon dangerously broad criteria. Those criteria are simply that an Indiana statute conferred "jurisdiction of all . . . causes, matters and proceedings," and that there was not in 1971 any Indiana law specifically prohibiting what Judge Stump did.
Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 (1872), which established the absolute judicial immunity at issue in this case, recognized that the immunity was designed to further the public interest in an independent judiciary, sometimes at the expense of legitimate individual grievances. Id. at 80 U. S. 349 ; accord, Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547 , 386 U. S. 554 (1967). The Bradley Court accepted those costs to aggrieved individuals because the judicial system itself provided other means for protecting individual rights:
13 Wall. at 80 U. S. 354 . Underlying the Bradley immunity, then, is the notion that private rights can be sacrificed in some degree to the achievement of the greater public good deriving from a completely independent judiciary, because there exist alternative forums and methods for vindicating those rights. [ Footnote 3/1 ]
But where a judicial officer acts in a manner that precludes all resort to appellate or other judicial remedies that otherwise would be available, the underlying assumption of the Bradley doctrine is inoperative. See Pierson v. Ray, supra at 386 U. S. 554 . [ Footnote 3/2 ] In this case, as MR. JUSTICE STEWART points out, ante at 435 U. S. 369 , Judge Stump's unjudicial conduct insured that "[t]here was and could be no appeal." The complete absence of normal judicial process foreclosed resort to any of the "numerous remedies" that "the law has provided for private parties." Bradley, supra at 80 U. S. 354 .