Source: https://joelbrandes.blogspot.com/2019/04/
Timestamp: 2020-02-19 22:17:48
Document Index: 44897027

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art. 3', 'art. 1', 'art. 12', 'art. 12', '§ 9003', '§ 9007']

A Child is Missing: The International Child Abduction Blog: April 2019
In Castro v Renteria, 2019 WL 1761546 (D. Nevada, 2019) before the Court was Respondent Bertha Hernandez Renteria’s Objections to the Magistrate Judges First Report and Recommendation (“First R&R”), and “Second Report and Recommendation”. The Court denied the petition for return.
This case concerned a petition to return an eight-year old child to Mexico Z.F.M.Z, presently resided in the United States with Respondent (her grandmother). Petitioner was Z.F.M.Z.’s half-sister. Z.F.M.Z. was born in Las Vegas, Nevada on November 23, 2009, to Rusia Michel Zamora (“Rusia”), her mother, and Raul Flores Hernandez (“Raul”), her father. Rusia and Raul thereafter returned to Mexico with Z.F.M.Z. In Mexico, Z.F.M.Z. lived primarily with Rusia, and part of the time with Raul. In April of 2014, however, Rusia disappeared. After Rusia’s disappearance, Raul and Respondent both cared for Z.F.M.Z. through an informal arrangement. Respondent cared for Z.F.M.Z. on the weekdays, and Raul cared for her on the weekends. Z.F.M.Z. would also spend time with Petitioner. In May of 2017, Raul and Petitioner initiated custody proceedings against Respondent before a judge in the Sixth Judicial District Court of the State of Jalisco, Mexico (“Jalisco court”). Raul received custody over Z.F.M.Z, on May 8, 2017, for the pendency of those custody proceedings. Nevertheless, Z.F.M.Z. resided with Petitioner and her family on the weekends and some weekdays, and other times with Raul. That arrangement ended when Raul was arrested upon allegations of drug trafficking, after which, according to Petitioner’s testimony, Raul informally gave Petitioner custody over Z.F.M.Z. As the custody proceedings continued in the Jalisco court, Respondent received short-term “provisional custody” allowing her to take Z.F.M.Z. to be interviewed by a psychologist. That term of provisional custody was initially set for August 11, 2017, to August 18, 2017, when another custody hearing was to take place. However, after Respondent appeared at the August 18, 2017 hearing without Z.F.M.Z. and without a psychological report, Respondent received an extension of provisional custody to September 8, 2017. Respondent was not allowed to leave the State of Jalisco or Mexico with Z.F.M.Z. during those times.
On August 30, 2017, Petitioner informed the Jalisco court that Respondent had left Mexico with Z.F.M.Z. That same day, the Jalisco court entered an Order prohibiting Respondent from leaving Mexico with Z.F.M.Z., set a hearing for September 8, 2017, and authorized a warrant for Respondent’s arrest. Respondent, however, failed to appear at the September 8, 2017 hearing. The Jalisco court then received a letter on September 13, 2017, from Respondent, stating that she would be staying in the United States indefinitely with Z.F.M.Z. Moreover, as of August 31, 2017, Respondent had enrolled Z.F.M.Z. in a Las Vegas, Nevada elementary school. On July 4, 2018, Petitioner filed an initial application for the return of Z.F.M.Z. with the Jalisco court, naming the Jalisco court judge as the petitioner. That application was returned, however, as needing more information. Petitioner then submitted a complete application to the Mexican Central Authority on August 20, 2018. About three days later, the United States Department of State received that application. On September 7, 2018, Petitioner filed her Complaint with the Court. During a case-management conference on September 26, 2018, the Court imposed a visitation schedule. One day after the Court’s case-management conference, Respondent obtained a guardianship order over Z.F.M.Z. from the Family Division of the Eighth Judicial District Court for Clark County, Nevada.
The Court then held an evidentiary hearing on the merits of this case on November 9, 2018, with Judge Hoffman presiding. Judge Hoffman filed a Report and Recommendation concerning the merits of Petitioner’s Complaint on November 29, 2018. which recommended, among other things, that the Court grant Petitioner’s Complaint pursuant to the Hague Convention, and order Respondent to return Z.F.M.Z to Mexico.
On the merits of the petition, Judge Hoffman concluded that Petitioner “established by a preponderance of the evidence a claim for return of [Z.F.M.Z.] to Mexico under the Hague Convention.”. Specifically, Judge Hoffman found that “petitioner had custody rights and was exercising those rights at the time respondent absconded from the Mexican court’s jurisdiction and wrongfully retained [Z.F.M.Z.].” The basis for this finding was Respondent’s concession that Mexico was Z.F.M.Z.’s habitual residence, and Petitioner had been exercising custody rights in Mexico at the time of the wrongful act. see Hague Convention, Art. 3, 19 I.L.M at 1501; Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067, 1070 (9th Cir. 2001) (explaining that an act is “wrongful” under the Hague Convention when the petitioner’s rights “were actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised but for the removal or retention.”).
Respondent’s first objection to the Second R&R concerns the conclusion that this case is based on Respondent’s “wrongful retention” of Z.F.M.Z. in the United States, rather than “wrongful removal” of Z.F.M.Z. from Mexico. The focus of Respondent’s objection to classifying this case as one of wrongful retention lies with that classification’s practical effect on Respondent’s timeliness defense pursuant to the Hague Convention. Typically, wrongful removal refers to the respondent unilaterally taking the child out of their habitual residence in violation of the petitioner’s rights and without the petitioner’s permission. Cf. Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 572 U.S. 1, 9 (2014). By contrast, wrongful retention most often refers to the respondent keeping the child out of their habitual residence beyond the time authorized by the petitioner. Silverman v. Silverman, 338 F.3d 886, 897 (8th Cir. 2003); cf. Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1070–71, 1084–85. Determining whether a case is based on wrongful removal rather than retention not only decides the wrongful conduct at issue, but it also dictates the timeliness of a petition pursuant to the Hague Convention. A petition filed less than one year from wrongful removal or retention generally requires return of the child to her country of habitual residence. See Hague Convention, art. 1, I.L.M. at 1501; see also Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 7, 8, 20 (2010). Conversely, a petition filed more than one year after wrongful conduct is subject to a “well-settled” defense under Article 12 of the Hague Convention—a defense that permits courts to depart from the general mandate of “order[ing] the return of the child.” Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 572 U.S. 1, 19 (2014) (Alito, J., concurring); see Hague Convention, art. 12, 19 I.L.M at 1502.
Judge Hoffman’s Second R&R considered this case as one of wrongful retention because Respondent held “provisional custody” on August 11, 2017, until September 8, 2017; and Respondent “wrongfully retained” Z.F.M.Z. in the United States when Respondent failed to appear at the Jalisco court’s custody hearing on September 8, 2017. [R]espondent’s failure to appear at the court-ordered hearing on September 8, 2017, was the earliest unequivocal act when petitioner should have known that respondent had wrongfully retained [Z.F.M.Z.].”). The Second R&R alternatively noted that Respondent’s intent to remain in the United States became “unequivocally clear” when the Jalisco court received a letter from Respondent on September 13, 2017, declaring her intention to remain in Las Vegas with Z.F.M.Z. The commencement date for the one-year period under Article 12, according to the Second R&R, thus began on September 8, 2017, or, at the latest, on September 13, 2017. Based on those dates, the petition was timely filed. However, upon de novo review of the facts in this case, the Court found that this matter was one of wrongful removal. Though Respondent failed to appear at the Jalisco court’s hearing on September 8, 2017, and subsequently notified the Jalisco court on September 13, 2017, that she would not be returning to Mexico with Z.F.M.Z., Respondent had no right to take Z.F.M.Z. to the United States. On August 30, 2017, Petitioner notified the Jalisco court that Respondent had wrongfully left Mexico with Z.F.M.Z. The Jalisco court then entered an order that same day imposing travel restrictions on Respondent, preventing her from leaving Mexico with Z.F.M.Z. during the pendency of custody proceedings. As Petitioner stated in her verified petition, “Petitioner never acquiesced or consented to the relocation of Z.F.M.Z. in the United States.” Moreover, Respondent’s provisional custody over Z.F.M.Z. between August 11 and September 8, 2017, only allowed Respondent to obtain a psychological report of Z.F.M.Z., with no facts showing a corresponding right to leave Mexico to seek that report. Respondent’s relocation of Z.F.M.Z. in the United States—without permission from Petitioner nor the Jalisco court, and in violation of Petitioner’s existing rights—therefore constituted wrongful removal as of August 30, 2017.
Because the Court found that this case arose from Respondent’s wrongful removal of Z.F.M.Z. as of August 30, 2017, the petition for return of Z.F.M.Z. to Mexico was not timely filed with the Court within one year of the wrongful act that forms the basis of this case.; see, e.g., Muhlenkamp v. Blizzard, 521 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1152 (E.D. Wash. 2007) (“The petition must be filed with the court of record, not the Central Authority, to file within the one-year limitation.”).
In the Second R&R, Judge Hoffman found that Respondent proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Z.F.M.Z. was “well-settled” in the United States pursuant to Article 12 of the Hague Convention. Judge Hoffman based that finding on a thorough analysis of testimony from Z.F.M.Z., Z.F.M.Z.’s cousin, and Z.F.M.Z.’s teacher in Las Vegas. (Id. 15:14–16:2). No party objected to Judge Hoffman’s finding that Z.F.M.Z. is presently “well settled” in the United States. The Court could accept Judge Hoffman’s findings on this issue without further examination. Because Z.F.M.Z. was well-settled in the United States, the Hague Convention did not mandate the return of Z.F.M.Z. to Mexico for custody proceedings. See Hague Convention, art. 12, 19 I.L.M at 1502.
Nevertheless, Petitioner argued that even if Z.F.M.Z. was well-settled, the Court could still order her return to Mexico based on equitable considerations surrounding Respondent’s wrongful acts. In re B. Del C.S.B., 559 F.3d 999, 1016 (9th Cir. 2009); Margain v. Ruiz-Bours, 592 F. App’x 619, 621 (9th Cir. 2015); Lozano, 572 U.S. at 20, 23. However, the facts surrounding this case did not warrant such discretionary action. In deciding whether to order the return of Z.F.M.Z. to Mexico although she was well-settled in the United States, the Court’s analysis began with whether Respondent concealed Z.F.M.Z.’s whereabouts after the wrongful removal. Judge Hoffman’s factual findings on the “well-settled” issue, alongside evidence presented during the evidentiary hearing, guided the Court’s discretionary decision to not order the return of Z.F.M.Z to Mexico. Specifically, Judge Hoffman highlighted testimony from Z.F.M.Z.’s teacher in Las Vegas, which revealed Z.F.M.Z.’s significant improvement in English, her participation in school activities, and several school awards that she achieved. Testimony from the evidentiary hearing also revealed how Z.F.M.Z. made “three best-friends” in her new environment, and that Z.F.M.Z had family in the United States that supported her academic and recreational interests. Judge Hoffman thus concluded that Z.F.M.Z. “has established significant connections to Las Vegas.” Additionally, the record did not reveal an effort to conceal Z.F.M.Z. after her entry into the United States. Similar to In re B. Del C.S.B., 559 F.3d 999, 1016 (9th Cir. 2009), concealment was not a factor here, and thus did not favor returning Z.F.M.Z. to Mexico now that she was well-settled in the United States. Last, unlike in Fernandez, the party from whom the child was wrongfully taken (here, Petitioner) can litigate custody issues in the United States. Compare Fernandez, 909 F.3d at 365. By contrast, Respondent provided evidence that, because she removed Z.F.M.Z. from Mexico amid custody proceedings in the Jalisco court, Respondent had an outstanding warrant for her arrest in Mexico. Respondent therefore would likely be severely limited in litigating custody in Mexico, if capable of litigating at all. Further, Petitioner presented testimony from an expert in child psychology, revealing an opinion that Z.F.M.Z. “lives in constant fear” of separation from Respondent. Accordingly, the Court would not order discretionarily return Z.F.M.Z. to Mexico. See In re Robinson, 983 F. Supp. 1339, 1346 (D. Colo. 1997) (“[T]he Convention has essentially decided that, once settled in the new environment, to again uproot the children would be harmful. In that sense the ultimate best interests of the children are served by denying the petition.”). The Court denied the petition under the Hague Convention.
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In Saada v Golan, 2019 WL 1317868 (E.D. New York, 2019) the district court granted the petition of Isacco Jacky Saada, against Narkis Aliza Golan, for the return of his two-and-a-half-year-old son, B.A.S., to Italy.
The 31-year-old petitioner, an Italian citizen, was born and resided in Milan, Italy. The 28-year-old respondent, an American citizen, was born in Brooklyn, New York, and resided in New York. They were married on August 18, 2015, in Tel Aviv, Israel. The parties lived in Italy after the marriage. B.A.S. was born in Milan in June of 2016 and had dual Italian and American citizenship. Mr. Saada and Ms. Golan filled out and signed various documents for B.A.S.; they got him an Italian passport, medical coverage, identification cards, and a certificate of residence. They continued to live in the same apartment, and B.A.S. received all of his medical care in Italy. On July 28, 2017, while she and Mr. Saada were in the United States, Ms. Golan applied for a Social Security card for B.A.S., but did not tell Mr. Saada. Ms. Golan returned to Italy, because Mr. Saada promised to change, “work on” their marriage and go to counseling. On July 18, 2018, Ms. Golan and B.A.S. flew to the United States, with Mr. Saada’s consent, to attend Eldar Golan’s wedding. Although they were scheduled to return to Italy on August 15, 2018, Ms. Golan stayed in New York, and moved to a confidential domestic violence shelter. Ms. Golan claimed that she never agreed to live permanently in Italy or to have B.A.S. live there. But Mr. Saada never agreed to move to the United States. On September 19, 2018, Mr. Saada filed a criminal complaint in Milan, accusing Ms. Golan of kidnapping B.A.S. He initiated this action the next day. He also commenced civil proceedings in Italy. (Mr. Saada subsequently filed for sole custody of B.A.S. in Italy.
The evidence established that Mr. Saada and Ms. Golan fought frequently, and that Mr. Saada physically, psychologically, emotionally and verbally abused Ms. Golan. He admitted that he slapped, pushed, and grabbed Ms. Golan. He estimated that he slapped Ms. Golan five or six times, pulled her hair three or four times, pushed her four or five times, threw a glass bottle during an argument, yelled, swore, and called her names. He also told Ms. Golan’s family that he would kill her, although he said he made the threat only out of anger. Mr. Saada admitted that he tried to restrain Ms. Golan, got “violent,” was “impulsive,” “los[t] control” when he got “angry,” and hit Ms. Golan “to shut her up.” Mr. Saada and Ms. Golan fought “on a daily basis.” Mr. Saada was “sure” that B.A.S. heard “screaming and fighting and yelling.” Although Mr. Saada was far and away the more violent, there were times when Ms. Golan fought with and yelled at him. She conceded that she scratched and kicked Mr. Saada, and verbally abused him. According to Mr. Saada, Ms. Golan slapped him a few times, scratched him about ten times, bit him about five or six times, spit in his face, kicked him, and often yelled at him. She called him names, insulted his family, and at one point said that she wished his family would die. There was no significant evidence that Mr. Saada was intentionally violent to B.A.S. Ms. Golan frequently left B.A.S. with Mr. Saada while she ran errands, or went out with friends. She also testified that she wants B.A.S. and Mr. Saada to have a relationship.
The parties called four experts in the area of domestic abuse and its effects on children.
They agreed that domestic violence can have a significant effect on a child, even if the child is not the target of the violence. The experts also agreed that exposure to Mr. Saada’s undisputed violence toward Ms. Golan, including verbal, emotional, psychological, and physical abuse, posed a significant risk of harm to B.A.S. Two experts testified about the Italian legal system’s approach and capacity to handle cases of domestic violence.
The parties agreed that Ms. Golan removed B.A.S. from Italy with Mr. Saada’s consent, that she retained him in the United States without Mr. Saada’s consent, in breach of Mr. Saada’s “rights of custody,” as defined in Article 5(a) of the Hague Convention, under Italian law, and that Mr. Saada was exercising those rights when Ms. Golan kept B.A.S. in the United States. Mr. Saada proved that Italy was the child’s habitual residence at the time Ms. Golan kept him in the United States.
The district court noted that the Convention does not define “habitually resident,” but the Second Circuit instructs courts to make the following inquiries: First, the court should inquire into the shared intent of those entitled to fix the child’s residence (usually the parents) at the latest time that their intent was shared. In making this determination the court should look, as always in determining intent, at actions as well as declarations. Normally the shared intent of the parents should control the habitual residence of the child. Second, the court should inquire whether the evidence unequivocally points to the conclusion that the child has acclimatized to the new location and thus has acquired a new habitual residence, notwithstanding any conflict with the parents’ latest shared intent. Gitter, 396 F.3d at 134. “In the easy case,” the parents agree on the child’s habitual residence; in most Hague Convention cases, the parents do not agree on the issue. Id. at 133. “It then becomes the court’s task to determine the intentions of the parents as of the last time that their intentions were shared,” which “is a question of fact in which the findings of the district court are entitled to deference.” Id. The habitual residence inquiry requires consideration of “the unique circumstances of each case.” Holder v. Holder, 392 F.3d 1009, 1016 (9th Cir. 2004).
The Court concluded that Italy was B.A.S.’s habitual residence at the time Ms. Golan kept him in the United States. B.A.S. was born in Italy and lived there until the summer of 2018 when Ms. Golan brought him to the United States. The parties’ only shared residence was in Italy, where they lived for more than a year before B.A.S. was born, and it became B.A.S.’s home as well. He went to pre-school in Italy, his doctors were there, as was his extended family. Before Ms. Golan brought him to the United States, B.A.S. had left Italy only three times, for short trips. See Holder, 392 F.3d at 1020 (“[I]f a child is born where the parents have their habitual residence, the child normally should be regarded as a habitual resident of that country.”).
The Court rejected Ms. Golan’s argument that she and Mr. Saada never shared a settled intent that Italy would be B.A.S.’s habitual residence, that she conditioned her own residence in Milan on Mr. Saada’s promise to change, a promise he did not keep, and that she and B.A.S. lived in Italy only because Mr. Saada exercised coercive control over her. Ms. Golan’s actions showed that she intended that Italy be B.A.S.’s habitual residence. She established a home with Mr. Saada in Milan, and continued to live there with him after B.A.S. was born. Ms. Golan participated in decisions about B.A.S.’s life in Milan. She and Mr. Saada enrolled him in school, got him a pediatrician, and secured various forms of Italian identification for him. Cf. Guzzo, 719 F.3d at 104-05 (parents agreed mother would have custody of child and child would attend school in New York, mother home-schooled the child in English, and child was insured through Medicaid and received primary medical treatment in the United States). While Ms. Golan might have hoped to move to the United States, her actions established B.A.S. as a habitual resident of Italy. the parties’ last shared intent was to have B.A.S. live in Italy. Thus, Italy was the child’s habitual residence at the time Ms. Golan kept him in the United States.
The court found that Ms. Golan has met her burden of proving one affirmative defense— “grave risk of harm.” The Court pointed out that Article 13(b) of the Convention provides that “a grave risk of harm” from repatriating the child to the country of habitual residence arises “in cases of serious abuse or neglect, or extraordinary emotional dependence, when the court in the country of habitual residence, for whatever reason, may be incapable or unwilling to give the child adequate protection.” Souratgar, 720 F.3d at 103 According to the Second Circuit, “[t]he potential harm to the child must be severe, and the level of risk and danger required to trigger this exception has consistently been held to be very high.” The grave risk determination includes both “the magnitude of the potential harm” and “the probability that the harm will materialize.” Id. The grave risk exception “is to be interpreted narrowly, lest it swallow the rule.”. The respondent must prove grave risk of harm “by clear and convincing evidence.” 22 U.S.C. § 9003(e)(2)(A).
The Second Circuit instructs courts considering this question to take care to differentiate between “those situations where repatriation might cause inconvenience or hardship, eliminate certain educational or economic opportunities, or not comport with the child’s preferences,” and “situations in which the child faces a real risk of being hurt, physically or psychologically, as a result of repatriation.” Blondin v. Dubois (“Blondin II”), 238 F.3d 153, 162 (2d Cir. 2001). The former situations are not considered grave risks of harm; the latter are. The grave risk of harm need not take the form of direct physical abuse to the child. A history of spousal abuse “though not directed at the child, can support the grave risk of harm defense, as could a showing of the child’s exposure to such abuse.”); see also Ermini, 758 F.3d at 164–65 (spousal abuse can establish a grave risk of harm to the child in certain circumstances). “[A] sustained pattern of physical abuse and/or a propensity for violent abuse” that poses “an intolerably grave risk to the child” can establish the exception to the preference for repatriation. Souratgar, 720 F.3d at 104
However, the history of domestic violence is relevant only “if it seriously endangers the child.” Souratgar, 720 F.3d at 103-104. “The Article 13(b) inquiry is not whether repatriation would place the respondent parent’s safety at grave risk, but whether so doing would subject the child to a grave risk of physical or psychological harm. “Sporadic or isolated incidents” of physically disciplining the child, “or some limited incidents aimed at persons other than the child, even if witnessed by the child” are generally not grave risks of harm.
There was no dispute that Mr. Saada was violent—physically, psychologically, emotionally, and verbally—to Ms. Golan, or that B.A.S. was present for much of it. Nor was there any dispute that a child who is exposed to domestic violence, even though not the target of abuse, could face a grave risk of harm. Accordingly, Ms. Golan established by clear and convincing evidence that returning the child to Italy would subject the child to a grave risk of harm.
Having found that repatriation posed a grave risk of harm to B.A.S., the court had to consider whether there are “any ameliorative measures (by the parents and by the authorities of the state having jurisdiction over the question of custody) that can reduce whatever risk might otherwise be associated with the child’s repatriation.” Blondin I, 189 F.3d at 248. “In cases of serious abuse, before a court may deny repatriation on the ground that a grave risk of harm exists under Article 13(b), it must examine the full range of options that might make possible the safe return of a child to the home country.” Blondin II, 238 F.3d at 163, n.11. It directed the parties to propose ameliorative measures that could achieve this goal.
Ms. Golan took the position that there were no steps that would protect B.A.S., and no way to ensure that Mr. Saada would comply with them. Mr. Saada agreed to the following undertakings:” (1) he will give Ms. Golan $30,000 before B.A.S. is returned to Italy for housing accommodations without restriction on location in Italy, financial support, and legal fees; (2) he will stay away from Ms. Golan until the Italian courts address this issue; (3) he will pursue dismissal of criminal charges against Ms. Golan relating to her abduction of B.A.S.; (4) he will begin cognitive behavioral therapy in Italy; and (5) he waives any and all rights to legal fees or expenses under the Hague Convention and ICARA for the prosecution of this action. In addition, Mr. Saada is to provide the full record of these proceedings, including trial transcripts, court filings, exhibits, undertakings, expert reports, and decisions of this Court to the Italian court presiding over the custody proceeding. Mr. Saada is to provide a sworn statement with the measures he will take to assist Ms. Golan in obtaining legal status and working papers in Italy. Mr. Saada must also drop any current civil actions against Ms. Golan in Italy based on the abduction of B.A.S., and must not pursue any future criminal or civil actions against her in Italy based on the abduction.”
Based on these undertakings and conditions, which the Court concluded sufficiently ameliorated the risk of harm to B.A.S. upon repatriation, the petition was granted.
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Asumadu v Baffoe, --- Fed.Appx. ----, 2019 WL 1373306 (Mem) (9th Cir., 2019) [Canada] [Article 18] [petition granted]
In Asumadu v Baffoe, --- Fed.Appx. ----, 2019 WL 1373306 (Mem) (9th Cir., 2019) the district court ordered that the parties’ son, K.A.A., be returned to Mr. Asumadu in Canada, while allowing their daughter, A.K.A., to remain in the United States with Ms. Baffoe. Reviewing the district court’s factual findings for clear error, the Ninth Circuit affirmed. It found that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the parties had no “shared, settled intent” for Canada to become A.K.A.’s habitual residence. The district court, crediting Ms. Baffoe’s testimony that her move to Canada with A.K.A. was intended as a trial period to determine whether Mr. Asumadu would continue to abuse her, found that “there was never a shared intent for A.K.A. to live anywhere other than with [Ms.] Baffoe.” It also found that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the parties did have a “shared, settled intent” for Canada to become K.A.A.’s habitual residence. Murphy, 764 F.3d at 1150. It did not decide whether the district court erred in not excusing—due to Ghanaian cultural norms—Ms. Baffoe’s failure to use legal processes to ensure K.A.A.’s return to the United States, because it relied on other evidence too in reaching its determination about the parties’ intent. The Court declined to decide whether or under what circumstances abuse of a spouse may create a grave risk of harm to the spouse’s child because A.K.A. was to remain in the United States with Ms. Baffoe while K.A.A. would return to Canada with Mr. Asumadu. Ms. Baffoe indicated that she did not otherwise plan to return to Canada—given the parties will not be living together, there was no risk of spousal abuse or resulting harm to the children. Lastly, it held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by not implementing Article 18 of the Hague Convention to order A.K.A.’s return to Canada. Such a decision is discretionary, and the record did not show that equitable considerations required such a return. See In re B. Del C.S.B., 559 F.3d 999, 1015 (9th Cir. 2009) (“We decline to remand the case to the District Court for a discretionary determination under Article 18 as to whether Brianna should be returned to Mexico.”).
Asumadu v. Baffoe, 2019 WL 1531793 (D. Arizona, 2019) [Canada] [necessary expenses] [clearly inappropriate]
In Asumadu v. Baffoe, 2019 WL 1531793 (D. Arizona, 2019) the district court denied Petitioner Akwasi Damoah Asumadu’s motion for necessary expenses and granted Respondent Hannah Boahemaa Baffoe’s motion for review of the Clerk of Court’s judgment on taxation of costs as modified. Asumadu sought recovery of “necessary transportation expenses” pursuant to 22 U.S.C. § 9007(b)(3): (1) $1,201.73 for transportation and lodging related to the July 31, 2018 bench trial, and (2) $674.31 for transportation and lodging related to K.A.A.’s return to Canada. The Court noted that in relevant part, ICARA provides that: Any court ordering the return of a child...shall order the respondent to pay necessary expenses incurred by or on behalf of the petitioner, including...transportation costs related to the return of the child, unless the respondent establishes that such order would be clearly inappropriate. 22 U.S.C. 9007(b)(3). ICARA “contemplates the use of such awards to restore a petitioner to the financial position he or she would have been in had there been no removal or retention, as well as to deter violations of the Hague Convention.” Aguilera v. DeLara, No. 14-01209-PHX-DGC, 2014 WL 4204947, *1 (D. Ariz. Aug. 25, 2014). As the respondent, Baffoe had the burden of establishing that an award of fees and costs would be clearly inappropriate under the circumstances. Baffoe asserted that an assessment of the sought-after expenses against her was clearly inappropriate because her actions were a result of Asumadu’s physical abuse, and that any assessment of expenses would cause her financial hardship. Baffoe also argued that some of the sought-after expenses were unnecessary or excessive. The Court pointed out that generally, in determining whether expenses are ‘clearly inappropriate,’ courts have considered the degree to which the petitioner bears responsibility for the circumstances giving rise to the fees and costs associated with a petition. Souratgar (citing cases). For example, awarding expenses is clearly inappropriate where the prevailing petitioner physically abused the respondent, see, e.g., Aguilera, 2014 WL 4204947, at *1-2, because “a [parent] should not be required under the threat of monetary sanctions to choose between continued abuse (mental as well as physical) and separation from a young child[.]” Guaragno v. Guaragno, No. 09-CV-187, 2010 WL 5564628, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 19, 2010), adopted by 2011 WL 108946 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2011). The Court previously found that “the description of events provided by Baffoe is consistent with her having been the victim of some form of domestic violence,” and that “Asumadu likely struck Baffoe on more than one occasion.” Under the circumstances, the Court found that Baffoe “was faced with a cruel dilemma, whether to continue to receive the physical abuse...from [Asumadu], or retreat and suffer from the separation of the child.” Guaragno, 2010 WL 5564628, at *3. Accordingly, it held that an award of expenses would be clearly inappropriate in this case.
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Castro v Renteria, 2019 WL 1761546 (D. Nevada, 201...