Source: https://www.flra.gov/decisions/v52/52-004.html
Timestamp: 2016-08-25 06:15:47
Document Index: 116421366

Matched Legal Cases: ['§\n5596', '§ 3529', 'art 22', '§ 3529', '§ 3529', '§ 3529', '§ 550', '§ 550', '§ 3529', 'art 22', '§\n8908', '§ 7901', '§ 8101']

52:0046(4)AR - - DOT, FAA and National Air Traffic Controllers Association - - 1996 FLRAdec AR - - v52 p46 | FLRA
You are hereHome 52:0046(4)AR - - DOT, FAA and National Air Traffic Controllers Association - - 1996 FLRAdec AR - - v52 p46 52:0046(4)AR - - DOT, FAA and National Air Traffic Controllers Association - - 1996 FLRAdec AR - - v52 p46
[ v52 p46 ] 52:0046(4)AR The decision of the Authority follows: 52 FLRA No. 4 FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY WASHINGTON, D.C. _____ U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION (Agency) and NATIONAL AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS
ASSOCIATION (Union) 0-AR-2686 _____ DECISION August 16, 1996 _____ Before the Authority: Phyllis N. Segal, Chair; Tony Armendariz
Arbitrator Richard I. Bloch filed by the Agency under section 7122(a) of the
exceptions. The Arbitrator ordered the Agency to reimburse the grievant for monies
and sick leave expended as a result of the grievant's participation in an
in-patient alcohol counseling program. For the following reasons, we conclude
that the award is deficient because it is contrary to law. Therefore, we set
aside the award. II. Background and Arbitrator's Award The affected employee in this case, an air traffic controller,
contacted the Agency's Employee Assistance Program (EAP), which was
administered by Personal Performance Consultants (PPC), a contractor, to
discuss the employee's alcohol-related problems. PPC was responsible for
interviewing the employee and making recommendations to the Agency Flight
Surgeon concerning an appropriate rehabilitation program. PPC did not have
"readily available a list of rehabilitation . . . organizations," as required
by DOT Order 3910.1B, an Agency regulation. Award at 6. After interviewing the
employee, PPC recommended a 14-day out-patient program into which the employee
was accepted and began treatment. Eight days later, the Flight Surgeon concluded that out-patient
treatment was inadequate, and directed the employee to enter a 28-day
in-patient program. Because the employee's insurance would not cover the cost
of the in-patient program, the employee paid for the program herself.(1) The Union filed a grievance, requesting that the Agency reimburse the
employee for lost wages and leave expended during the period of time the
employee was attending the in-patient program, and the out-of-pocket expenses
for attending that program. When the grievance was not resolved, it was
submitted to arbitration, where the Arbitrator stated that the issue was: Did the Agency improperly require a second rehabilitation program as
a condition to continued employment? Award at 2. The Arbitrator sustained the grievance, finding that: management's agent, PPC, violated the requirements of DOT Order
3910.1B and, in so doing, caused [the employee] to enter the out-patient
program which, because it fell short of the requirements deemed essential by
management, caused the grievant to unnecessarily expend both contractual sick
day benefits and insurance coverages. Id. at 5. The Arbitrator determined that the Agency was responsible for any
"excess costs that would otherwise have been avoided had the referral been made
directly to in-patient treatment[.]" Id. at 8. According to the
Arbitrator, "[i]f it was error to refer the grievant to the out-patient
treatment initially, fairness requires that responsibility . . . must be borne
by the employer." Id. As his award, the Arbitrator directed the Agency
to make the grievant whole for "monies and sick leave expended as a result of
participation in the in-patient Rehabilitation Program." Id. at 9. III. Exceptions A. Agency's Contentions As relevant here, the Agency argues that the award of the grievant's
medical expenses is contrary to law because it violates the doctrine of
sovereign immunity.(2) The Agency argues that the Back Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. §
5596, does not waive sovereign immunity in this case because: (1) the
Arbitrator did not find that the Agency committed an unjustified or unwarranted
personnel action; and (2) even if there were an unjustified or unwarranted
personnel action, there is no causal connection between that action and any
loss of benefits by the employee. The Agency claims that because the employee's
health insurance policy did not cover in-patient alcohol treatment, the
Agency's action did not cause the employee to incur additional or unnecessary
medical expenses. B. Union's Opposition The Union argues that 31 U.S.C. § 3529 provides statutory
authority for the grievant's claim.(3) The Union also claims that "additional guidance" is contained
in GAO regulations at 4 C.F.R. Part 22.(4) IV. Analysis and Conclusions The United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit except as it
consents to be sued. United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976).
Thus, there is no right to money damages in a suit against the United States
without a waiver of sovereign immunity. Id. at 402. In order to waive
sovereign immunity, Congress must unequivocally express its desire to do so.
Lane v. Pena, 64 U.S.L.W. 4541, 4542-43 (June 20, 1996), quoting
Irwin v. Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990). The Government's
consent to a particular remedy also must be unambiguous. Department of Army
v. FLRA, 56 F.3d 273, 277 (1995). Absent a waiver of sovereign immunity,
the Arbitrator's award of medical expenses is contrary to law. For the following reasons, we conclude that neither of the two
potential waivers of sovereign immunity argued by the parties -- 31 U.S.C.
§ 3529 and the Back Pay Act -- provides a basis for the portion of the
award to which the Agency has excepted. A. 31 U.S.C. § 3529 Does Not Apply The Union's argument that the award is authorized by 31 U.S.C.
§ 3529 is without foundation. That provision simply permits agency
officials to request a decision from the Comptroller General on questions
regarding the payment of money. It does not, explicitly or implicitly,
authorize any payment itself. Accordingly, it does not constitute a waiver of
sovereign immunity permitting the Arbitrator to award medical expenses. B. The Back Pay Act Does Not Provide a Basis for the Award The Back Pay Act is a waiver of sovereign immunity. United States v.
Testan, 424 U.S. at 405. Under the Back Pay Act, an award of backpay,
defined as "pay, allowances, and differentials," is authorized only when an
arbitrator finds that: (1) the aggrieved employee was affected by an
unjustified or unwarranted personnel action; (2) the personnel action directly
resulted in the withdrawal or reduction of the grievant's pay, allowances or
differentials; and (3) but for such action, the grievant otherwise would not
have suffered the withdrawal or reduction. U.S. Department of Justice,
Immigration and Naturalization Service, San Diego, California and American
Service Council, 51 FLRA 1094, 1098 (1996). Unless an arbitrator finds that
an aggrieved employee was affected by an unjustified or unwarranted personnel
action, an award of backpay is deficient. Id. OPM defines "pay, allowances, and differentials" as "monetary and
employment benefits to which an employee is entitled by statute or regulation .
. . ." 5 C.F.R. § 550.805. No basis has been offered or is apparent
on which to conclude that the payment of personal medical expenses is a
monetary or employment benefit within the meaning of the Back Pay Act.(5) Cf. National Labor
Relations Board, Office of the General Counsel and National Labor Relations
Board Union, 36 FLRA 743, 746 (1990) (Back Pay Act did not waive
sovereign immunity because agency's denial of employee's request to engage in
outside employment did not deprive employee of "pay, allowances, or
differentials"); U.S. Customs Service, Chicago-O'Hare and National Treasury
Employees Union, Chapter 172, 23 FLRA 366, 367-68 (1986) (Back Pay Act
did not waive sovereign immunity because additional commuting expenses awarded
by arbitrator were not "pay, allowances, or differentials"). Moreover, even if
personal medical expenses constituted a monetary or employment benefit, within
the meaning of the Back Pay Act, no basis is argued or apparent for concluding
that the grievant is "entitled" to such benefit "by statute or regulation",
within the meaning of 5 C.F.R. § 550.805.(6) There is no support in this case for finding that the grievant's
personal medical expenses constitute "pay, allowances, [or] differentials,"
within the meaning of the Back Pay Act, as those terms are defined by OPM.
Accordingly, the Back Pay Act does not encompass such payment. As the Back Pay
Act does not provide a basis for awarding the medical expenses, and there is no
other basis for such award in this case, the portion of the award encompassing
medical expenses is deficient as contrary to the doctrine of sovereign
immunity.(7) V. Decision The portion of the award encompassing the grievant's medical expenses
is deficient because it is contrary to the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
Therefore, we set aside that portion of the award. FOOTNOTES: (If blank, the decision does not
have footnotes.) 1. The employee was released after 14
days in the in-patient program based, in part, on the employee's previous
out-patient treatment. 2. The Agency did not specifically
except to the portion of the award directing the Agency to restore the
grievant's sick leave, and made no reference to, or arguments regarding, sick
leave. Therefore, we construe the exceptions as not contesting the sick leave
portion of the award, and we do not address that portion of the award. 3. 5 U.S.C. § 3529 provides: (a) A disbursing or certifying official or the head of an agency may
request a decision from the Comptroller General on a question
involving-- (1) a payment the disbursing official or head of the agency will
make; or (2) a voucher presented to a certifying official for
certification. (b) The Comptroller General shall issue a decision requested under
this section. 4. 4 C.F.R. Part 22 is reserved.
Accordingly, it does not support the Union's claim and will not be addressed
further. 5. We note that the cost of private
health insurance obtained during the period of removal or suspension, may not
be included as part of a backpay award. See Matter of James B.
Ruch, Comptroller General Decision B-215626 (Jan. 7, 1985) (5 U.S.C. §
8908(a) provides only two remedies for employees who lose coverage under a
health benefits plan because they are removed or suspended improperly: after
reinstatement or restoration to duty, they may either enroll in a health
benefits plan as a new employee or have coverage restored to the same extent as
though the improper action had not taken place). 6. Although they are not relied on by
the Union, we note that neither 5 U.S.C. § 7901, which
authorizes federal employee health programs, nor 5 U.S.C.
§§ 8101 et seq., the Federal Employees
Compensation Act (FECA), which provides coverage for occupational disease or
illness, provides for payment of the medical expenses involved in this case.
Section 7901 "does not extend to treatment beyond that involving
on-the-job illness and dental conditions of a minor nature or requiring
emergency attention." National Treasury Employees Union and U.S. Department
of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, Washington, D.C., 49 FLRA 973,
979-80 (1994), quoting National Federation of Federal Employees,
Local 1287 and Defense Mapping Agency, 26 FLRA 785, 788 (1987) (emphasis in
original). FECA is "specifically designed to cover situations where employees
believe that they have sustained on-the-job injuries and are seeking payment or
reimbursement for expenses connected with such injuries." National Treasury
Employees Union, NTEU Chapter 51 and Internal Revenue Service, Wichita District
Office, 40 FLRA 614, 631 (1991). 7. Our conclusion that this portion of
the award is deficient should not be misconstrued as condoning the actions of
the Agency and its contractor in failing to act in a more timely and
responsible fashion in handling this grievant's request for assistance. These
actions served neither the interests of the Agency nor those of the grievant in
prompt and effective rehabilitation. Federal Labor Relations Authority