Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/807/1000/311568/
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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1292', '§ 2310', '§ 2301', '§ 2310', '§ 1412', '§ 2301', '§ 2311', '§ 2310', '§ 2301', '§ 2310', '§ 2302', '§ 1517', '§ 2310', '§ 1331', '§ 1331', '§ 2301', '§ 2310', '§ 2310', '§ 2301', '§ 2304', '§ 2301']

John F. "jack" Walsh, et al., Appellees, v. Ford Motor Company, Appellant, 807 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1985) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › D.C. Circuit › 1985 › John F. "jack" Walsh, et al., Appellees, v. Ford Motor Company, Appellant
John F. "jack" Walsh, et al., Appellees, v. Ford Motor Company, Appellant, 807 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit - 807 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
Given the importance of the legal questions at issue, and the enormity of the litigation presently contemplated, the District Court approved appellant's request for interlocutory review under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). On November 7, 1985, this court granted interlocutory appeal on the issue of class certification.2
The plaintiffs-appellees brought this action under section 110 of Magnuson-Moss,3 alleging that the defendant-appellant, Ford Motor Company, breached both its implied and written warranties of merchantability by marketing defectively designed automobiles. In particular, the appellees alleged that 1976-79 (and 1980 pre-design change) Ford vehicles equipped with FMX, C-3, C-4 and C-6 automatic transmissions suffer from a defect that causes the automobiles to slip out of the "park" position and into "reverse."4 The appellees, claiming to represent several million Ford owners, sought to pursue their breach of warranty claims by means of class actions. For the purpose of obtaining class action certification, they grouped their principal claims into three broad categories. The first group ("written warranty incidents" class) consisted of all Ford owners who allegedly experienced a park-to-reverse incident within Ford's 12,000 mile/12 month written warranty period. This group sought certification under Rule 23(b) (3) to recover property damages incurred in these incidents.5 The second group ("implied warranty incidents" class) consisted of all Ford owners who allegedly experienced a park-to-reverse incident. This group also sought certification under Rule 23(b) (3) to recover property damages. The third group ("all-owners" class) consisted of all owners of an allegedly defective Ford vehicle, without regard to whether the owner had experienced an actual park-to-reverse incident.6 This group sought certification under Rule 23(b) (3) to recover damages equal to the difference in value between the transmissions as received and as warranted; or, in the alternative, certification under Rule 23(b) (2) to compel Ford to repair the defective vehicles.7 The appellees also asked the District Court to certify two additional "incidents" classes, one to recover punitive damages and the other to pursue personal injury claims.
Before the District Court, Ford opposed class certification on numerous grounds.8 Under Rule 23(b) (3), Ford observed, a district court may not certify a class unless it finds that "questions of law or fact common to the members of the [proposed] class predominate over any question affecting only individual members." With respect to the implied warranty classes, Ford argued, it could not be found that common questions of law predominated, because Magnuson-Moss defines implied warranties as those arising under state law,9 and there are material variations in state laws governing the interpretation of implied warranties.10 With respect to all the proposed classes, Ford argued, it could not be found that common questions of fact predominated, because the appellees had not proffered any proof that the four different transmissions (the FMX, C-3, C-4 and C-6) suffered from a common defect.11 With respect to the "incidents" classes, Ford argued, it again could not be found that common questions of fact predominated, because each plaintiff would be required to make an individual showing that her accident was caused by Ford's allegedly defective design.
Ford also argued that certification of an "all-owners" class was improper in light of the appellees' concession that they could not bear the cost of providing individual notice of the action to the several million absentee class members. As interpreted in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, Ford observed, Rule 23(c) (2) requires proposed plaintiff class representatives to send individual notice to all class members whose names and addresses may be ascertained through reasonable effort, irrespective of the financial burden placed on the plaintiffs by this requirement. 417 U.S. 156, 176, 94 S. Ct. 2140, 2151, 40 L. Ed. 2d 732 (1974) (" [I]ndividual notice to identifiable class members is not a discretionary consideration to be waived in a particular case. It is, rather, an unambiguous requirement of Rule 23.... There is nothing in Rule 23 to suggest that the notice requirements can be tailored to fit the pocketbooks of particular plaintiffs.") In addition, Ford argued, individual notice was required by procedural due process, for without such notice, absentee class members would be deprived of the opportunity to be heard or to opt out of the litigation.
The District Court found that none of the above arguments foreclosed class certification under Rule 23(b) (3). Accordingly, the trial judge conditionally certified an "all-owners" class,12 an "implied warranty incidents" class and a "written warranty incidents" class.13
The District Court wisely rejected this contention, refusing to "read section 110 [15 U.S.C. § 2310 (1982) ] so broadly as to have it supersede the Rule 23 class action provision."18 However, the court did interpret Magnuson-Moss as mandating a somewhat looser application of Rule 23. In particular, the court found that it should apply Rule 23 only where "it is consistent with the terms and intent of Magnuson-Moss."19
Second, the court refused to accept Ford's argument that state law variations precluded a finding that common questions of law predominated. Importantly, the court did not reject Ford's contention that state law variations existed. Rather, the court found it unnecessary for purposes of class certification to decide which state law applied,24 maintaining that " [t]o conclude that a court must look to the many States, with their varying judicial interpretations of what constitutes breach of implied warranty, would make it virtually impossible to apply the Act in multi-State class actions for Magnuson-Moss breach of implied warranty claims."25 The court thus concluded that it could not deny class certification because of "potential" state law variations, for to do so would, in effect, repeal a "congressionally-mandated Federal cause of action."26 The court further concluded that potential state law variations did not bar certification of a written warranty class, because Magnuson-Moss "explicitly defines written warranty and establishes a cause of action for breach of said warranty."27
The District Court's most conspicuous departure from Rule 23 standards was its decision to relieve the appellees of their obligation to provide individual notice to all members of the proposed "all-owners" class. Rule 23(c) (2), as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Eisen, requires that individual notice be sent to all class members whose names and addresses may be ascertained through reasonable effort.41 The appellees did not contend before the District Court that they would be unable to identify the absentee class members through reasonable effort. Rather, they maintained that they would be financially unable to send the requisite notice. Eisen, however, explicitly held that individual notice is an absolute requirement of Rule 23(c) (2), not to be "tailored to fit the pocketbooks of particular plaintiffs."42 Accordingly, unless Eisen is somehow inapplicable to class actions brought under Magnuson-Moss, the District Court erred in relieving the proposed representatives of the "all-owners" class of their obligation to provide individual notice to absentee class members.
As noted above, the Supreme Court has held that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are to be applied in all civil actions absent a "direct expression" of congressional intent to the contrary.43 The statutory language of Magnuson-Moss contains no reference to Rule 23(c) (2) or to Eisen, much less a "direct expression" that the requirement of individual notice is not to obtain in class actions brought under the Act. When Congress has meant to limit Eisen it has known precisely how to do so, as evidenced by its treatment of the notice requirement in the Deepwater Port Act of 1974. In that Act, Congress specified in the statute that when the size of the proposed class exceeded one thousand, Rule 23(c) (2) would be satisfied by notice in the Federal Register and in local newspapers.44 Magnuson-Moss contains no comparable language evincing a congressional intent to modify Rule 23(c) (2).
Of greater significance is the fact that the House Committee's views on individual notice were never considered or adopted by the full Congress. As the District Court observed, the Senate-House conferees adopted the class action provisions contained in the House bill.57 However, neither the statutory language agreed upon in conference nor the Conference Committee Report58 made any reference to Rule 23(c) (2) or Eisen.59 At most, then, the House Committee's desire to soften the individual notice requirement was shared only by members of the House, perhaps only by a majority of the House Committee. The matter was never pursued in the Senate, either by means of statutory amendment or in the Conference Committee Report. More important, neither body of Congress focused on the applicability of Eisen to class actions brought under Magnuson-Moss, much less expressed a definite intent that Eisen not apply.60
In short, there is nothing in the language of Magnuson-Moss to suggest that Congress meant to eliminate the individual notice requirement as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Eisen. Nor can such an intent be inferred from those pieces of legislative history indicating some congressional discontent with the individual notice requirement. When Congress has intended to limit Eisen, it has done so expressly, as in the Deepwater Port Act of 1974. We therefore hold that the District Court erred in relieving the appellees of their obligation to adhere to Eisen's individual notice requirement with respect to any class properly certifiable under Rule 23(b) (3). It is to this latter issue--i.e., whether any class met the standards for certification established by Rule 23(b) (3)--that we now turn. In light of our holding that Rule 23(c) (2) applies to class actions brought under Magnuson-Moss, we need not reach the question whether individual notice is mandated by due process.
As recounted in Part I.B., the District Court conditionally certified three classes, each pursuant to Rule 23(b) (3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.61 Two of the certified classes involved implied warranty claims, one concerned written warranties. For each of the three conditionally certified classes, the District Court announced the requisite Rule 23(b) (3) "find [ing] that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members." That essential finding, we conclude, is flawed and must be vacated so that the District Court can consider the matter anew.
The District Court initially demonstrated full appreciation of the inquiry a court must make to determine whether, as Rule 23(b) (3) requires, "questions of law or fact common to members of the [alleged] class predominate."69 Thus, the trial judge identified as key to the commonality of law determination in this case "the impact of potentially varying State laws," and as critical to the commonality of fact determination "the availability of class-wide proof."70 Her analysis veered off course, it appears, because she regarded Magnuson-Moss as an Act intended to facilitate nationwide class actions; she therefore thought it necessary to take a "liberal" or "less strict" approach to Rule 23 certifications.71 We have already held that Rule 23 applies in Magnuson-Moss cases as it does in federal court cases generally. Had the trial judge felt no Act-prompted pressure to certify, she might not have resisted close analysis of state laws governing the existence, scope, and contours of implied warranties. Furthermore, she might not have assumed that federal law alone governed the alleged written warranty claims. Finally, she might not have proceeded so swiftly to the conclusion that differences in the transmission systems at issue "are either not material or can easily be [handled by establishing] subclasses pursuant to Rule 23(c) (4)."72
Tellingly, the $50,000 amount-in-controversy threshold for federal court jurisdiction stated in section 110(d) (3) confines the mine-run of Magnuson-Moss consumer civil actions to state courts.77 A responsible Congress would not, without offering rhyme or reason, place the laboring oar in developing a corpus of federal consumer product warranty law in the hands of over fifty diverse, non-federal court systems.78
a. Implied Warranty. The Act, in section 101(7) (set out note 62 supra), defines "implied warranty" by explicit reference to state law as modified by federal standards detailed in sections 108 and 104(a).79 There is nothing obscure about the interplay Congress ordered: state law creates the warranty80 and also governs its dimensions, except as otherwise prescribed with particularity in Magnuson-Moss itself. The Federal prescriptions apply as written; where the Act states no prescription, state law continues in force.81
b. Written Warranty. The Act, in section 101(6), sets out a self-contained definition of "written warranty"; in contrast to the subsection defining "implied warranty" (section 101(7), set out note 62 supra), the written warranty definition does not refer to state law.82 An argument that Magnuson-Moss federalizes written warranty law therefore has surface plausibility.
Thus, Ford's unsharp roostercombs cannot carry the day for appellees. If Ford transmissions engaged in park-to-reverse more frequently than other automobile transmissions, then something in addition to the roostercomb tooth contour must have brought about the defect. That something else has not been identified as common to all Ford transmission configurations at issue. So far as we can tell from the current record, the unsharp roostercomb theory still leaves the appellees with the need to show that each configuration had special characteristics which, singularly or in combination, caused lack of automatic self-centering. Before reaching a common fact predominance determination under Rule 23(b) (3), the District Court should have inquired further in order to estimate how varied (configuration-specific) the transmission design defect proof would likely be.
In finding that individual notice to each potential class member was unnecessary, and that common questions of law or fact predominated, the District Court was swayed by the view, which we have found incorrect, that Congress sought to facilitate nationwide class actions under Magnuson-Moss, and therefore expected an indulgent approach by judges to Rule 23(b) (3) certifications.111 Having clarified that Rule 23 applies in Magnuson-Moss cases as it does in federal litigation generally, i.e., sensibly but without special dispensations, we return the case to the District Court with no prejudgment as to the outcome of a renewed predominance inquiry.112
15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1982)
The decision whether to grant an interlocutory appeal from an order of a district court under Sec. 1292(b) is within the discretion of the court of appeals. Before the court of appeals may exercise that discretion, however, the district court must certify that the order involves "a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion," and that an immediate appeal "may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation." In the instant case, the District Court certified as "controlling" only one of the legal issues that we deem it necessary to address on appeal. See Memorandum Opinion, reprinted in Record Excerpts ("R.E.") Tab 8 (certifying the question whether class representatives in class actions brought under Magnuson-Moss are required to send individual notice to all class members whose names and addresses may be ascertained through reasonable effort). Section 1292(b) explicitly provides, however, that the appeal is from an order of the district court, not from the particular question that the district court found controlling. We are therefore called upon to decide an appeal, not a single question of law. Accordingly, we must decide all questions of law necessary to the proper disposition of this appeal. See, e.g., Nuclear Eng'g Co. v. Scott, 660 F.2d 241, 246 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 993, 102 S. Ct. 1622, 71 L. Ed. 2d 855 (1982); Johnson v. Alldredge, 488 F.2d 820, 822-23 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 822, 95 S. Ct. 148, 42 L. Ed. 2d 122 (1974). Neither party to this appeal disputes this well-established principle
15 U.S.C. § 2310 (1982)
In 1977, in response to similar complaints of park-to-reverse incidents involving Ford automobiles, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA") initiated an investigation to determine whether Ford transmissions were defective. That investigation culminated in a settlement in which Ford agreed to send warning labels to Ford owners instructing them to place their transmissions securely in "park," turn off the engine and set the parking brake before leaving their car. See Center for Auto Safety, Inc. v. Lewis, 685 F.2d 656, 661 (D.C. Cir. 1982). NHTSA did not, however, make a final determination under 15 U.S.C. § 1412(b) (1982) that the Ford transmissions were defective. 685 F.2d at 662-63. In the absence of such a final determination, this court rejected a challenge by the Center for Auto Safety to the authority of NHTSA to settle the case without compelling Ford to repair or replace the allegedly defective transmissions. Id
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (3) authorizes a district court to certify a class if it finds that questions of law or fact common to the class predominate over questions affecting only individual members and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (2) authorizes a district court to certify a class to pursue injunctive or declaratory relief if it finds that the defendant "has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class." Rule 23(b) (2) may not be invoked, however, where "the appropriate final relief relates exclusively or predominantly to money damages." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (2) advisory committee's note (1966 amendment)
See 15 U.S.C. § 2301(7) (1982)
At an earlier stage of the litigation, the District Court had recognized that states differed on the question whether a party not in vertical privity with a manufacturer may recover from the manufacturer for breach of implied warranty. In light of this problem, the District Court excluded from the proposed implied warranty classes those members who resided in states that required vertical privity. See Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 588 F. Supp. 1513, 1524-35 (D.D.C. 1984).
The District Court rejected the appellees' alternative motion for certification of a Rule 23(b) (2) recall/retrofit equitable relief class, finding that the principal relief they sought was damages. Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 106 F.R.D. 378, 391-92 (D.D.C. 1985); see note 7 supra
Walsh, 106 F.R.D. at 414. The District Court did not certify either a personal injury incidents class or a punitive damages incidents class. It explicitly rejected certification of a personal injury class, finding that the appellees' personal injury claims, unlike their Magnuson-Moss warranty claims, arose "exclusively" under state law. Id. at 405 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 2311(b) (2), which provides that personal injury claims may not be brought under Magnuson-Moss) (emphasis in opinion). The court found that the application of "56" potentially variant state laws would present "intractable management problems." Id. While the Magnuson-Moss claims also presented "formidable" manageability problems, the court felt obliged to tackle those problems "because of the expressed intent by Congress to afford consumers effective methods to pursue their claims for breach of warranty through the class-action vehicle." Id
The court reserved judgment on the punitive damages class pending briefing on the question whether punitive damages are available under Magnuson-Moss. Id. at 408-09. The court has since refused to certify a punitive damages class, finding that Magnuson-Moss does not displace the various state laws on the availability of punitive damages for breach of warranty. Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 627 F. Supp. 1519, 1522-26 (D.D.C. 1986).
15 U.S.C. § 2310(d) (3) (1982)
Id. at 404 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301(6), 2302-2304, 2310(d) (1) (1982))
See, e.g., Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 756 (3d Cir.) (en banc) ("If the district court has properly identified the issues common and diverse, we would undoubtedly defer in most instances to its conclusion as to predominance, since that requirement relates to the conservation of litigation effort, and the trial court's judgment probably will be as good as ours."), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885, 95 S. Ct. 152, 42 L. Ed. 2d 125 (1974)
See Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 100-01, 101 S. Ct. 2193, 2200, 68 L. Ed. 2d 693 (1981) (district court's discretion to administer class actions is bounded by the relevant provisions of the Federal Rules, and exercise of this discretion is subject to appellate review); Katz, 496 F.2d at 756 (appellate court must decide whether mandates of Rule 23 have been satisfied)
15 U.S.C. § 2310(d) (1) (B) (1982)
The Act itself is entitled "AN ACT [t]o provide minimum disclosure standards for written consumer product warranties; to define minimum Federal content standards for such warranties; to amend the Federal Trade Commission Act in order to improve its consumer protection activities; and for other purposes." Magnuson-Moss Warranty--Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975); see also C. REITZ, supra note 16, at 23 ("The principal threefold purposes of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, declared in the Act itself, are 'to improve the adequacy of information available to consumers, prevent deception, and improve competition in the marketing of consumer products.' ") (citing 15 U.S.C. § 2302(a)); id. at 1 ("The Act is also concerned with the means of vindicating the warranty rights of buyers.... This is accomplished mainly by providing easy and realistic access by aggrieved consumers to state courts.") (emphasis added)
Cf. Board of Governors v. Dimension Fin. Corp., --- U.S. ----, 106 S. Ct. 681, 688-89, 88 L. Ed. 2d 691 (1986):
Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700, 99 S. Ct. 2545, 2557, 61 L. Ed. 2d 176 (1979); cf. East Texas Motor Freight Sys. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 405, 97 S. Ct. 1891, 1897, 52 L. Ed. 2d 453 (1977) (although suits alleging racial or ethnic discrimination are often by their very nature class suits, careful attention to the requirements of Rule 23 remains indispensable); Windham v. American Brands, Inc., 565 F.2d 59, 64 n. 6 (4th Cir. 1977) (en banc) (rejecting view of panel opinion, 539 F.2d 1016, 1021, that remedial purposes of Sherman Act created a "rebuttable presumption" in favor of class action treatment for anti-trust suits; such a view would conflict with the rule that the proponent of class certification bears the burden of establishing the right to certification under Rule 23), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 968, 98 S. Ct. 1605, 56 L. Ed. 2d 58 (1978)
417 U.S. at 173, 94 S. Ct. at 2150
Id. at 176, 94 S. Ct. at 2152
Califano, 442 U.S. at 700, 99 S. Ct. at 2557
33 U.S.C. § 1517(i) (2) (1982)
Cf., e.g., Washington Water Power Co. v. FERC, 775 F.2d 305, 315 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("The Act itself is sufficiently clear on its face so as not to require or authorize recourse to legislative history.")
15 U.S.C. § 2310(e) (1982)
Cf. In re General Motors Corp. Engine Interchange Litig., 594 F.2d 1106, 1134-35 n. 50 (7th Cir.) ("The explicit mention of the applicability of Rule 23 bolsters our conclusion that Rule 23(e) [governing approval of class action settlements] is applicable to class actions maintained under [Magnuson-Moss]."), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 870, 100 S. Ct. 146, 62 L. Ed. 2d 95 (1979)
This bill addresses only the jurisdictional questions involving the use of class actions in breach of warranty cases. The Committee did not address the questions involved with the requirements of Rule 23 and, inasmuch as the United States Supreme Court in the recent Eisen case made it clear that "the express language and intent of Rule 23(c) (2) leave no doubt that individual notice must be provided to those class members who are identifiable through reasonable effort", we feel that those whose rights are potentially affected by a class action are now protected by that notice.
Statements in conference committee reports are "particularly weighty" indicators of congressional intent, as they reflect the final legislative compromise between the delegations from the two Houses of Congress. Planned Parenthood Fed'n v. Heckler, 712 F.2d 650, 657-58 n. 36 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (quoting Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L.REV. 195, 201 & n. 49 (1983))
As noted earlier, see note 49 supra, the Senate bill made no special provision for class actions. Indeed, under the jurisdictional requirements imposed by the Senate bill, class actions in federal court would have been virtually impossible. See note 60 infra. The compromise reached in Congress was to alter the Senate's jurisdictional requirements in order to create the possibility of class actions in federal court. Id. There is absolutely no evidence that the conferees considered the question whether Rule 23(c) (2), as interpreted in Eisen, applied to class actions brought under the Act
We assign no value to the statements of Representatives Vanik and Badillo, who were neither sponsors of the bill nor members of the committee which reviewed the legislation. Their isolated comments about individual notice reflect their personal views of the legislation rather than the intent of the legislative body. Cf. Castaneda-Gonzalez v. Immigration and Natur. Serv., 564 F.2d 417, 424 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("Statements by individual legislators should generally be given little weight when searching for the intent of the entire legislative body.")
According to the appellees, one of the "restrictions" to which Magnuson-Moss class actions would not be subject was the requirement of individual notice. From the context of Representative Moss' remarks, however, it is clear that he was not referring to Rule 23 or the individual notice requirement. Under the Senate bill, a breach of warranty claim could only be brought in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See S.REP. NO. 151, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1973). At that time, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 had been interpreted to require each member of a proposed class to assert a claim in excess of $10,000. See Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 94 S. Ct. 505, 38 L. Ed. 2d 511 (1973). In conference, this potentially insuperable obstacle to federal court jurisdiction over class actions was removed in favor of the jurisdictional requirements described by Representative Moss. See S.CONF.REP. NO. 1408, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 27, reprinted in 1974 U.S.CODE CONG. & ADMIN.NEWS 7702, 7759. In describing this compromise, Representative Moss could only have been referring to the elimination of this barrier to federal court jurisdiction. Read otherwise, his comments would make little sense, for they would suggest that a class action could always be brought in federal court notwithstanding any federal law (e.g., Rule 23) barring such an action.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (3) provides:
15 U.S.C. § 2301(7) (1982). This definition provision reads:
In a separate opinion refusing to certify a punitive damages class, the District Court stated its understanding that the Act "add [ed] a new layer of federal warranty law to existing state warranty doctrines," but for the most part did not supplant state law. Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 627 F. Supp. 1519, 1525 (D.D.C. 1986) (quoting Schroeder, Private Actions under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 66 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 35 (1978)). See note 13 supra
Id. at 395. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (4) provides:
See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (1) (class action order may be altered or amended before the decision on the merits).
Congress sought particularly to encourage warrantors to avoid litigation by establishing informal mechanisms for the fair and expeditious resolution of consumer disputes. See 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a) (1982) (informal dispute settlement procedures)
15 U.S.C. § 2310(d) (1982). This section provides:
(1) Subject to subsections (a) (3) and (e) of this section, a consumer who is damaged by the failure of a supplier, warrantor, or service contractor to comply with any obligation under this chapter, or under a written warranty, implied warranty, or service contract, may bring suit for damages and other legal and equitable relief--
(3) No claim shall be cognizable in a suit brought under paragraph (1) (B) of this subsection--
Id. Sec. 2310(d) (1) (emphasis added)
Federal common law should not supply the regulating rules, for the application of state law here is not inconsistent with federal interests. See Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640-42, 101 S. Ct. 2061, 2066-68, 68 L. Ed. 2d 500 (1981) (federal common law comes into play when there is a uniquely federal interest in need of protection or when Congress has clearly signalled its intent that the courts develop federal substantive law). See generally Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 881 (1986)
The Act applies to all fifty states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, the Canal Zone and American Samoa. See 15 U.S.C. § 2301(15) (1982)
These sections, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2304(a) & 2308 (1982), provide:
For purposes of this chapter (other than section 2304(a) (2) of this title), implied warranties may be limited in duration to the duration of a written warranty of reasonable duration, if such limitation is conscionable and is set forth in clear and unmistakable language and prominently displayed on the face of the warranty.
In support of their contentions as to the nearly total governance of uniform federal law, plaintiffs cite statements of Representative Eckhardt in a 1971 Hearing on a predecessor bill. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 390-93 (1971). The statements are not crystalline. They include something for each side. Indeed, Ford cites lines from Rep. Eckhardt to the effect that, as in diversity cases, state law looms large in Magnuson-Moss consumer actions for breach of warranty. Compare Brief of Appellees at 42-43 with Brief of Appellant at 40-41. These murky and inconsistent statements, we are satisfied, are not entitled to heavy weight. See Castaneda-Gonzalez v. Immigration and Natur. Serv., 564 F.2d 417, 424 (D.C. Cir. 1977); March v. United States, 506 F.2d 1306, 1314 & nn. 31-32 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
This definition section, 15 U.S.C. § 2301(6) (1982), provides:
Cf. note 81 supra. We are mindful that " [i]f judges readily created federal common law whenever they spotted a gap in federal statutory or constitutional directives, those actions would threaten the classic view of federal law as largely interstitial; there would be much less room in which state law could operate, and the importance of state law would diminish accordingly." Field, supra note 76, at 931
Id. at 396 & n. 12. The judge did not say whether she had in mind applying the law of one particular state to all members of the nationwide class. Cf. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 105 S. Ct. 2965, 2980, 86 L. Ed. 2d 628 (1985) (application of Kansas law to all claimants in nationwide class action would be "arbitrary and unfair" absent showing that Kansas had a significant relationship to each class member's claim)
See, e.g., Horton v. Goose Creek Ind. School Dist., 677 F.2d 471, 490 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1207, 103 S. Ct. 3536, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1387 (1983)
Cf. General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160-61, 102 S. Ct. 2364, 2372, 72 L. Ed. 2d 740 (1982) (court of appeals judgment affirming class action certification reversed where court of first instance did not engage in rigorous analysis)
789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1986), aff'g 104 F.R.D. 422 (E.D. Pa. 1984), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 107 S. Ct. 318, 93 L. Ed. 2d 291 (1986)
Id. at 1010. We set out below more completely the Third Circuit's statement in Asbestos upholding the District Court's Rule 23(b) (3) certification:
Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 470 (5th Cir. 1986); see also Deadwyler v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., No. ST-85-38 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 7, 1986) (implied warranty claims involving common defect in a common product)
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177-78, 94 S. Ct. 2140, 2152-53, 40 L. Ed. 2d 732 (1974)
We do not reach appellees' argument that the District Court erred in rejecting their alternatively proposed Rule 23(b) (2) declaratory and equitable (recall/retrofit) relief class. We note, however, that manageability problems that might block a class action under Rule 23(b) (3) may be entailed as well in the Rule 23(b) (2) format. We note, too, that the Department of Transportation, when it declined to continue an investigation against Ford for the very defect alleged by appellees here, determined that injunctive relief similar to that which appellees requested in the District Court was inappropriate. See Center for Auto Safety, Inc. v. Lewis, 685 F.2d 656 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
The District Court recognized that, with respect to the two classes seeking to pursue property damage claims based on specific park-to-reverse incidents, potentially individual issues were present "such as causation, affirmative defenses, and damages." Walsh, 106 F.R.D. at 399. Such issues, the trial judge observed and we agree, are not necessarily dispositive against certification. "The Court [can] certify a strictly limited group of issues, establish various subclasses, or address the common issue on a class-wide basis and manage the individual issues ... at the conclusion of the class-wide trial." Id. See Joseph v. General Motors Corp., 109 F.R.D. 635, 642 (D. Colo. 1986) (certifying a state-wide Magnuson-Moss class because individual questions of causation "can be resolved in separate proceedings")