Source: http://wi.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20191016_0001534.EWI.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2020-08-12 09:17:28
Document Index: 196043277

Matched Legal Cases: ['§5861', '§2331', '§2332', '§2332', '§2232', '§921', '§5261', '§5261']

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART GOVERNMENT'S CONSOLIDATED MOTIONS IN LIMINE REGARDING DEFENDANT'S RECORDED STATEMENTS (DKT. NO 272), GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S THIRD MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE OR LIMIT EVIDENCE AND ARGUMENT RELATING TO CONVERSATIONS ABOUT ISRAEL AND MASONS (DKT. NO. 277, MOTION I), GRANTING THAT PORTION OF SECTION X OF GOVERNMENT'S MOTIONS IN LIMINE WHICH ASKS THE COURT TO EXCLUDE DR. MARC SAGEMAN AS EXPERT WITNESS (DKT. NO. 276, MOTION X, PP. 18-21) AND GRANTING DEFENDANT'S FOURTH MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE DR. LEVITT'S TESTIMONY (DKT. NO. 278)
In less than a week, the defendant faces a trial at which a jury will decide whether the government can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that on January 25, 2016, the defendant possessed two unregistered machineguns and one unregistered silencer in violation of 26 U.S.C. §5861(d). One would think that such a trial would be brief and straightforward-the government might present a couple of witnesses to testify that the defendant possessed the items, and a witness to testify about registration requirements and whether the items were registered to the defendant. One might think that such a trial would be the work of two, perhaps three days.
In this case, one would be incorrect in such thoughts. Because of events that occurred in the months leading up to January 25, 2016, the defendant has asked to present the affirmative defense of entrapment, and the court has granted that request. Because of events that occurred in the months leading up to January 25, 2016, the government seeks to present evidence that it believes shows that the defendant wanted to obtain the machineguns and the silencer for the purpose of committing mass murder; the government asserts that this evidence is relevant and is necessary for the government to rebut the entrapment defense. The defendant argues that the court should exclude the evidence because it shows only that the defendant had bad judgment, a desire to impress his friends and a wild imagination, and because admitting the evidence would be more prejudicial than probative.
Determining whether a piece of evidence is “relevant” to the question of whether the defendant committed the charged crimes is more complicated in this case than it might be in others. Some of the events that occurred prior to January 25, 2016 reveal a possible motive for the defendant to have possessed the charged items. Some arguably reveal that it wasn't the defendant, but undercover informants working with the government, who suggested and pushed the idea of obtaining the charged items. If one credits the government's view of the evidence, some show that the defendant was disturbingly interested in committing acts of mass violence; if one credits the defense view, those same facts show that the defendant had a misguided sense of religious and political zeal that caused him to bloviate and talk big about things he had no intent or ability to do. The evidence resembles the paintings of the Dutch graphic artist M.C. Escher; what you see depends on where you stand.
The parties have filed several pretrial motions asking the court to allow, or to restrict or preclude, evidence. This order resolves those motions, to enable the parties to complete preparations for trial.
The following factual summary comes from the court's review of various pleadings, transcripts of recorded conversations filed by the parties and the court's own decision granting the defendant leave to present an entrapment defense. The court has not cited to pleadings and transcripts, and it cites to its own decision only occasionally.
As the court recounted in its order regarding the entrapment defense, the defendant is an American of Pakistani descent in his late twenties who lived in Jordan from the time he was little until he was eighteen. Dkt. 295 at 2. He is Muslim. Id. He had no criminal history prior to being charged in this case. Dkt. No. 2. The defendant came to law enforcement's attention in August or September of 2015, when a friend of the defendant's contacted the FBI, reporting that the defendant had been talking about going to Egypt for “terrorist training, ” getting a commercial driver's license to commit a terrorist attack in the name of ISIS[1] and getting a pistol. Id. at 2. Whether the defendant had said these things to his friend-referenced in the evidence as “Steve”-and whether he meant them even if he did say them, is questionable; even Steve appears subsequently to have told law enforcement that the defendant had changed his mind, and that the defendant was a liar. Id.
Regardless, in late September 2015, the FBI placed an informant, referred to as “Mike” in the evidence, at the restaurant where the defendant and Steve worked. Id at 3. The defendant and Mike saw each other frequently over the next three and a half to four months. Id. In early October 2015, Mike showed the defendant and Steve a gun, and the defendant appears to have believed that Mike owned a “Kalashnikov”-a term often used to refer to an AK-47 automatic assault rifle, although the Kalashnikov company manufactures other weapons, including semi-automatic sporting weapons. Id. See https://kalashnikov-usa.com. The parties don't dispute that the defendant, Mike and Steve used the word “Kalashnikov” interchangeably with the word “machinegun.” Id.
Starting November 2, 2015, Mike began recording the conversations he had with the defendant; Steve recorded some of his conversations as well. Id. The recorded conversations include more than one instance of the defendant talking about going to Israel and taking Kalashnikovs from Israeli soldiers and shooting Jews, or “spraying” Jews and trying to kill as many people as possible. Id. The conversations were, at time, detailed. The defendant spoke of how he could get into Israel because he had an American passport, of how the “Al Buraq” wall-also known as the Western Wall, or the Wailing Wall-in Jerusalem would be a good target because of how many people visit the location, of how killing many people would make the defendant a martyr. He spoke of the difficulty in leaving his mother, and how upset she was over his plans. He spoke of wearing an explosive vest. Conversations in this vein took place between November 2 and December 14, 2015, and at times, it sounded as if the defendant was on the cusp of going overseas-he talked about having gotten a plane ticket and having to leave his mother.
During this same period, however, the defendant talked about his desire to obtain a handgun for self-protection. There are multiple conversations in which he talks about wanting a handgun, and there is more than one conversation in which the defendant rejects Mike's suggestion that he might want a machinegun. Id. at 4-5. On December 7, 2015, the defendant and Mike traveled together to Gander Mountain sporting goods store to look at handguns. Id. at 4.
Finally, during this period the defendant talked about purchasing “Kalashnikovs” from a contact Mike allegedly had in Texas. The men went to a shooting range more than once, and on one such trip on December 14, 2015, the defendant questioned why Mike hadn't brought his Kalashnikov to the shooting range. Id. at 5.
After the December 14, 2015 trip to the shooting range, Mike stopped recording conversations with the defendant; the evidence sheds no light on why. Id. at 6. The men continued to talk, but by January 8, 2016, Mike reported that the defendant was no longer talking about jihad, and he'd mentioned traveling to Jordan only in the context of taking a vacation. Id.
On January 19, 2016, Mike resumed recording conversations with the defendant, after Mike reported to the agents that the defendant had started talking about attacking a Masonic lodge in Milwaukee. Id. at 7. When Mike resumed recording, the defendant was recorded discussing the Masons as enemies of Islam. Id. at 7-8. There was more than talk; on January 19, the defendant, Mike and Steve toured the Masonic Center in downtown Milwaukee, and the conversations that followed that tour involved the defendant discussing with precision how the three man might carry out a shooting attack at that location. Id. at 8-9. No. one disputes that the conversations were chilling, with the men-including the defendant-talking about shooting the receptionist first, then moving to the people meeting upstairs, as well as discussing whether to avoid shooting children.
Over the next five or six days, the men continued to talk, but the conversations took various turns. At one point, it appears that the defendant may have suggested conducting an attack on a Masonic temple in Texas, rather than in Milwaukee. In other conversations, he notifies Mike and Steve that he has talked with an Imam, who advised him that it would not be a good idea to attack the Masons because it would make Muslims look bad. By January 24, 2016, the defendant had indicated that he no longer wished to go through with the attack, but that he still wanted weapons for protection. The next day, the defendant and Mike purchased the machineguns and silencer from undercover FBI agents for far below retail price; the defendant was arrested after putting the guns in the car.
The government filed a motion in limine asking the court to deem the recorded in-person conversations authentic, to admit them as evidence and to admit the English language transcripts of the conversations. Dkt. No. 272. The government also asked the court to rule that the defendant's attempt to use any of the recorded statements should be deemed hearsay in advance of trial. Id. The government attached to the motion the portions of the conversations it wished to present at trial. Dkt. No. 272-1. The parties have resolved the authenticity issue and the issue of the admissibility of the English translations of any conversations the court allows the parties to present. They have agreed that for each conversation the court admits into evidence, the government will play the Arabic language recordings and will simultaneously display the English-language translations to the jury. What is left is for the court to decide which conversations to admit and which to exclude.
The defendant has asked the court to exclude, or at the least limit, “evidence and arguments related to conversations about Israel and the Masons.” Dkt. No. 277, Motion I.
The defendant has asked the court to exclude the testimony of the government's proposed expert, Dr. Matthew Levitt, who would testify about the Arab-Israeli conflict, the relationships among organizations such as Hamas and ISIS and the significance of certain events or locations to the conflict. Dkt. No. 278. In turn, the government has asked the court to exclude the defendant's expert on the same topic, Dr. Marc Sageman. Dkt. No. 276, Motion X.
C. Conversations about Killing People in the Middle East
The defendant argues that the court should preclude the government from presenting to the jury any of the conversations where the defendant talked about killing people in Israel. It argues that these conversations are not relevant to the question of whether the defendant possessed the three items charged in the complaint, and that the nature of the conversations would be more prejudicial than probative and would inflame the jury. The government responds that the conversations are relevant, because they show that the defendant was interested in obtaining machineguns and that he wanted them so that he could kill a lot of people at once.
The indictment alleges only unlawful possession of unregistered machineguns and a silencer, on a single date, and it charges only the defendant with possessing those items. The indictment does not allege that the defendant planned or conspired to commit a terrorist act. There are reasons for this. Federal law prohibits and criminalizes international terrorism, terrorist acts against U.S. nationals that “occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum . . . .” 18 U.S.C. §§2331, 2332. Even if the defendant was plotting or planning a terrorist act in Israel, such an act would have violated 18 U.S.C. §2332 only if its target was “a national”-or nationals-“of the United States.” 18 U.S.C. §2332(b). The law also prohibits the use, threat, attempt or conspiracy to use a weapon of mass destruction against United States nationals if a facility of interstate commerce is used in the offense, or the perpetrator travels in interstate commerce to commit the offence or the offense affects interstate commerce. 18 U.S.C. §2232a. But it defines “weapons of mass destruction” by referring to the definition of “destructive device” in 18 U.S.C. §921(a)(4)-“any explosive, incendiary, or poison gas-bomb, grenade, rocket having a propellant charge of more than four ounces, missile having an explosive or incendiary charge of more than one-quarter ounce, mine, or device similar to any of the devices described in the preceding clauses.” Machineguns do not meet the definition of “weapons of mass destruction.”
Even if there were a criminal statute prohibiting acts of international terrorism against citizens of other countries, the evidence suggests that the government could not have charged the defendant with conspiring to commit such an act. As far as the court can tell, the evidence shows that the defendant talked with Steve and Mike about going to Israel and shooting people. Steve and Mike were government informants. “[A]n agreement must exist among conconspirators, that is, those who actually intend to carry out the agreed-upon criminal plan. A defendant is not liable for conspiring solely with an undercover government agent or a government informant.” United States v. Corson, 579 F.3d 804, 811 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. Mahkimetas, 991 F.2d 379, 383 (7th Cir. 1993)). The evidence may not even have supported an attempt charge; a defendant is not guilty of “attempt” unless he both intended to commit the crime and “committed an overt act qualifying as a substantial step toward completion of his goal.” United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. 102, 107 (2007).[2]
While there are valid reasons why the government did not charge the defendant with planning or conspiring to commit an act of terrorism in Israel, the fact that the law currently does not provide criminal penalties for the sorts of actions the defendant was discussing does not require the conclusion that the government ought to be able to use the offense it could charge-possession of the two guns and the silencer-as a round-about way to introduce evidence of, and seek conviction of the defendant for, the crimes with which it could not charge him. While the defendant's descriptions of killing people in Israel were arguably racist, violent and disturbing, the court must try to ensure that a jury would not be tempted to convict the defendant for racist, violent and disturbing talk, rather than focusing on whether the government proved the elements of possession of unregistered firearms and a silencer beyond a reasonable doubt.
The government implies that the court should allow it to present the conversations about killing people in Israel because those conversations show why the defendant wanted a machinegun. In other words, the government argues that the conversations show motive. Motive, however, is not an element of a §5261(d) violation. A transferee of an item prohibited under §5261(d) “may . . . be held criminally liable if he takes possession of the weapon before receiving official approval of the registration; this liability attaches regardless of the motives of either party to the transaction. Thus, it is irrelevant what the transferor did or why he did it or why the transferee wanted the gun.” United States v. Brown, 548 F.2d 204, 209 (7th Cir. 1977) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Khatib, 706 F.2d 213, 216 (7th Cir. 1983) (citing Brown).
The evidence of the talk about going to Israel, taking Kalashnikovs and shooting people also smacks uncomfortably of prohibited “other acts” evidence under Fed.R.Evid. 404(a)(1). Under that rule, “[e]vidence of a person's character or character trait is not admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character or trait.” Rule 404(b)(1) prohibits the use of evidence of any “crime, wrong, or other act” to “prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” There are exceptions for proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, absence of mistake or lack of accident, and the government might respond that the defendant's talk about Israel showed his motive for obtaining the machineguns and silencer, or his intent to obtain a machinegun, or his plan to do so. But the conversations about Israel do not involve the defendant stating that he is going to obtain a machinegun here and take it overseas to commit a crime. He talks of going there and either taking a gun from an Israeli soldier or obtaining a weapon when he is there.
The government also argues that the court should admit the conversations about killing people in Israel because it rebuts the defendant's defense that he was entrapped by Steve and Mike. The government asserts that the defendant's talk of taking “Kalashnikovs” from Israelis and Israeli soldiers, and his talk of “spraying” people (presumably with bullets) shows that in his earliest conversations with Steve and Mike, he was expressing a desire for a machinegun-in other words, that the defendant was predisposed to the offense of obtaining an unregistered machinegun, and wasn't induced to commit the crime by Steve and Mike.
This argument has more purchase. In United States v. Mayfield, the Seventh Circuit held that a defendant is predisposed to commit “the charged crime if he was ready and willing to do so and likely would have committed it without the government's intervention, or actively wanted to but hadn't yet found the means.” Mayfield, 771 F.3d 417, 438 (7th Cir. 2014). A jury might find that the defendant's statements about taking Kalashnikovs from Israelis showed that he was “ready and willing” to obtain a machinegun. The defendant argues that the statements the defendant made to Steve and/or Mike after the investigation began cannot show predisposition, pointing to the Mayfield court's emphasis on the fact that “predisposition is measured prior to the government's attempts to persuade the defendant to commit the crime.” Id. at 436 (citing United States v. Theodosopoulos, 48 F.3d 1438, 1444 (7th Cir. 1995)). But the Seventh Circuit followed that statement by clarifying that “[w]e are not suggesting that the defendant's conduct after he encountered the government's agents is irrelevant to the determination of predisposition.” Id. at 437. The court explained that the defendant's “response to the government's offer may be important evidence of his predisposition.” Id. (citing United States v. Kaminski, 703 F.2d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir. 1983)). In Kaminski, the court discussed the “peculiar nature” of the inducement prong of the entrapment defense, noting that “[i]n many cases . . . there is little direct evidence of the defendant's state of mind prior to interaction with Government agents and we must instead rely upon indirect proof available through examination of the defendant's conduct after contact with the agents.” Kaminski, 703 F.2d at 1008. A jury could conclude that the defendant made the statements about taking Kalasnikovs from Israelis on his own, without being induced. It could conclude that by engaging in this talk, rather than refuting it, the defendant showed a willingness-separate and apart from any inducement by Steve or Mike-to obtain a machinegun.
The defendant asserts that even if the statements about going to Israel and obtaining a gun and shooting people bear some relevance to predisposition-and the defendant vehemently maintains that they do not-the probative value of the statements are outweighed by the unfair prejudice to the defendant. Fed.R.Evid. 403 allows the court to exclude evidence despite its relevance “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”
To determine whether to exclude relevant evidence because of the risk of unfair prejudice, a court must “weigh whether the evidence's probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant.” United States v. Gorman, 613 F.3d 711, 718 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Fed.R.Evid. 403). “[T]o warrant exclusion under Rule 403, the ‘probative value [of evidence] must be insignificant compared to its inflammatory nature so that the evidence unfairly prejudices the defendant.” Id. (quoting United States v. Gougis, 432 F.3d 735, 743 (7th Cir. 2005)).
The following is the result of the court's weighing of these factors in relation to the excerpts of the recorded statements which the government asked the court to admit. The court notes that all the statements in all the transcript excerpts were made after the defendant met government informant Mike, and after Steve began working with the government. The court is mindful of the defendant's insistence that any statements that he made after inducement are not probative of predisposition. When the court opines below that a particular statement is probative of the defendant's predisposition, it means that the statement is relevant for the jury to consider in determining whether the statement shows predisposition or was the result of inducement.
Disk 11, page 3 line 18 to page 16 line 46:
The portion of the conversation on page 3 appears to have little probative value; the court will exclude it.
Page 4, lines 1-7 have little probative value regarding the defendant's predisposition to obtain a machinegun; the court will exclude those lines.
Page 4, lines 8-30 have some probative value, because they indicate the defendant's intent to obtain a weapon; a machinegun is a weapon. They are not particularly inflammatory and admitting them would not cause undue prejudice to the defendant. The government may present them.
Page 4, lines 31-38 are not probative; the court will exclude them.
Page 4, lines 39-41 may have some probative value, but that value is insignificant relative to their unquestionably inflammatory nature. The court will exclude them.
Page 4, lines 42-46: Line 42 is probative of predisposition, because it is Steve, not the defendant, who mentions a machinegun. While lines 42-44 are somewhat inflammatory, they are necessary to understand the context in which line 46 occurs. The government may present lines 42-46.
Pages 5-6: the danger of unfair prejudice outweighs any probative value the statements on these pages of the transcript may have. The court will exclude them.
Page 7, lines 1-3: The defendant's statement of his intention to buy a weapon is somewhat probative, as it shows the defendant's intent to obtain a weapon. While the other statements on these lines are prejudicial, they provide context for the statement about the weapon. The government may present them.
Page 7, lines 4-26, pages 8-10: The statements on these pages either are not probative or carry the risk of undue prejudice that would outweigh any probative value. The court will exclude them.
Page 11, lines 1-11: These statements either are not probative of predisposition or carry the risk of substantial prejudice. The court will exclude them.
Page 11, lines 12-13: These lines are probative of predisposition. The defendant has argued that he wanted only a handgun, and here he indicates that he will try to buy a handgun. The reference to an explosive belt is prejudicial, but it is not clear that the risk of unfair prejudice outweighs the probative value of the statement about the handgun. The court will allow the government to present these lines.
Page 11, lines 14-46, page 12: These statements either are not probative of predisposition or carry a risk of unfair prejudice that would outweigh any probative value. The court will exclude them.
Page 13, lines 1-4: These lines are probative of disposition, as they imply that the defendant wanted to obtain a handgun, not a machinegun. The court will allow the government to present these lines.
Page 13, lines 5-46: These statements either are not probative of predisposition or carry a risk of unfair prejudice that would outweigh any probative value. The court will exclude them.
Page 14, lines 1-44: These statements either are not probative of predisposition or carry a risk of unfair prejudice that would outweigh any probative value. The court will exclude them.
Page 14, lines 45-46, page 15, lines 14-17: These lines are probative on the question of whether the defendant had the ability to purchase a machinegun-so-called “positional predisposition.” The defendant talks about how his uncle has offered to give him money to buy a weapon. The lines do not carry the risk of unfair prejudice. The government may present these lines.
Page 15, lines 18-46: These statements either are not probative of predisposition or carry a risk of unfair prejudice that would outweigh any probative value. The court will exclude them.
Page 16, lines 1-32: These statements either are not probative of predisposition or carry a risk of unfair prejudice that would outweigh any probative value. The court will exclude them.
Page 16, lines 33-36: Steve's statement is probative of predisposition, given the defendant's argument that it was Steve, not the defendant, who brought up machineguns. The defendant's response is arguably inflammatory and prejudicial to him, but necessary to avoid the impression that Steve brought up the idea of a machinegun and the defendant said nothing. The government may present these lines.
Page 16, lines 37-46: These lines either are not probative of predisposition or carry a risk of unfair prejudice that would outweigh any probative value. The court will exclude them.
Disk 11, page 18 line 5 to page 26 line 41:
This entire excerpt is a discussion of the defendant's views on Israel and his plans to go to Israel and fight with Hamas against Jews. None of it is probative of the defendant's predisposition to obtain a machinegun, and all of it carries the risk of unfair prejudice that would outweigh any probative value. The court will exclude it.
Disk 11, page 32 line 43 to page 33 line 18:
Disk 11, page 39 line 10 to page 39 line 12:
These lines discuss how the defendant's martyrdom will motivate people. They are not probative of the defendant's predisposition to obtain a machinegun and it carries the risk of undue prejudice that would outweigh any probative value. The court will exclude them.
Disk 14, page 4 line 17 to page 8 line 25:
This entire excerpt is a discussion of how the defendant's mother became ill and went to the hospital, discouraging him from any plans to martyr himself at that time, as well as further discussion about traveling to Israel/Palestine to join the fight there. It is not probative of the defendant's predisposition to obtain a machinegun and it carries the risk of undue prejudice that would outweigh any probative value. The court will exclude it.
Disk 14, page 15 line 15 to page 15 line 17:
These lines are somewhat probative, as the last line discusses the fact that if the defendant cannot get to Gaza, he will buy a weapon “or something and that's it.” They are not unfairly prejudicial. The government may present these lines.
Disk 22, page 16 line 6 to page 16 line 43:
This excerpt concerns plans to travel to Palestine and the logistics of that travel. It is not probative of the defendant's predisposition to obtain a machinegun and it carries the risk of undue prejudice that would outweigh any probative value. The court will exclude it.
Disk 22, page 19 line 16:
This single line is inflammatory, carries a high risk of undue prejudice and is not probative of the defendant's predisposition to obtain a machinegun. The court will exclude it.
Disk 22, page 20 line 5 to page 20 line 24:
This excerpt relates to the defendant's purported plans to shoot people in Israel. It is inflammatory, carries a high risk of undue prejudice and is not probative of the defendant's predisposition to obtain a machinegun. The court will exclude it.
Disk 22, page 34 line 30 to page 34 line 35:
This excerpt contains statements by the defendant about his prayer for martyrdom. It is inflammatory, carries a high risk of undue prejudice and is not probative of the defendant's ...