Source: http://kurzbanupdate.info/
Timestamp: 2018-12-15 19:10:22
Document Index: 433316072

Matched Legal Cases: ['§214', '§214', '§214', '§214', '§214', '§31', '§203', '§1153', '§245', '§245', '§245', '§316', '§237', '§239', '§1003', '§212', '§208', '§1003', '§237', '§237', '§242', '§237', '§237']

Kurzban's Sourcebook Update Page
Kurzban's Immigration Law Sourcebook, 16th Edition
Corrections, Clarifications, and Selected* Updates
Introduction | Corrections & Clarifications | Updates | About the Sourcebook | Contact Us
This Web page is a supplement to Kurzban's Immigration Law Sourcebook, containing corrections, clarifications, and selected* updates to the 16th Edition. (For information on purchasing Kurzban, see below.)
Corrections & Clarifications (See also Updates, infra.)
p. 1116 (Ch. 5, ¶ VII.C.7.e.3) | p. 1340 (Ch. 6, ¶ VII.D.4.f) | pp. 1487–88 (Ch. 7, ¶ VI.K.6) | p. 1570 (Ch. 7, ¶ IX.N.2.b.10) | p. 2163 (Ch. 13, ¶ II.A.3.d)
p. 1116 (Ch. 5, ¶ VII.C.7.e.3). Paragraph (3) should read as follows:
Extensions for Spouse/Children—The regulatory language at 8 CFR §214.2(h)(13)(iii)(D)(9) and 8 CFR §214.2(h)(13)(E)(6) and the regulatory history at 81 FR at 82452 appear to state that no extensions beyond the 6-year period will be given to anyone but a principal beneficiary. However, these regulations and regulatory history are addressing the unique problem of a spouse who also has H-1B status (not H-4 dependent status) and seeks to use the extensions under 104(c) and 106(a) granted to his or her spouse as a basis for his or her extension. Thus, an H-1B spouse may not rely on his or her spouse’s 104(c) or 106(a) extension, as he or she must obtain his or her own extension. These regulations and regulatory history are not addressing whether an H-4 dependent spouse/child may obtain an extension beyond the six year period. It is clear from 8 CFR §214.2(h)(9)(iv) that H-4 dependent spouses and children may be granted extensions beyond the 6-year period [“for the same period of admission or extension as the principal spouse or parent”]. Also denying an extension under 106(a) appears clearly contrary to 8 CFR §214.2(h)(9)(iv) which grants employment authorization to those spouses extended through 106(a) or (b). See 8 CFR §214.2(h)(9)(iv) [A spouse of an H-1 who has an H-4 may apply for work authorization if the H-1B has had his or her status extended under 106(a), (b) of AC21 or already has an approved I‑140 petition]. It is also clear from USCIS memos that an H-1B who has reached the 6-year maximum may C/S to H-4 and remain in the U.S. based on the principal’s status. Memo, Yates, Acting Assoc. Director, USCIS, HQBCIA 70/6.2.8-P (Apr. 24, 2003) at B, AILA Doc. No. 03050145; Memo, Yates, Assoc. Dir. Operations, USCIS, HQOPRD 70/6.2.8-P (May 12, 2005) at p.10, AILA Doc. No. 05051810. An H-4 or L-2 may change to H-1B or L-1, because the time spent in H-4 or L-2 is not counted toward the 6-years for H-1Bs, or 5/7 years for L-1s. Memo, Aytes, Assoc. Dir., Domestic Operations, USCIS, HQPRD 70/6.2.8, 70/6.2.12, AD 06-29 (Dec. 5, 2006), AILA Doc. No. 06122063; AFM §31.2(d)(2). An H-4 is also free to change to H-2 and H-3 categories and the time spent as an H-4 will not count against the maximum allowable period for H-2 and H-3 as well as H-1B. Policy Memo (Interim), USCIS, PM-602-0092, Additional Guidance on Determining Periods of Admission for [H-4], (Nov. 11, 2013), AILA Doc. No. 13111801; AFM 31.2(d)(2). See in this section ¶ 8.b (p.1117), infra.
p. 1340 (Ch. 6, ¶ VII.D.4.f). Paragraph 4.f should read as follows:
4.f. Same Preference Category—An accompanying or following-to-join beneficiary will be given the same preference category as his or her spouse or parent. INA §§203(d) [8 USC §1153(d)], 9 FAM 503.4-2(C).
pp. 1487–88 (Ch. 7, ¶ VI.K.6). Clarification: In the EB-5 community there has been a good deal of confusion regarding whether a conditional resident (CR) may readjust another way. In particular, some readers were mistakenly under the belief that you could adjust from one approved I-526 to the next, even if you were already a CR, as a result of a now-removed section of the AFM 22.4(c). This rewrite of paragraph K.6 clarifies the issue:
Adjustment of Status to LPR from CR Obtained through Different Immigrant Category or through Different I-526 Approval—USCIS regulation at 8 CFR §245.1(c)(5) would prohibit those in investor-based (or family-based) CR status from obtaining LPR status through a second AOS directly from that CR status if the second AOS application is based upon a second immigrant petition (e.g., a CR investor marries a USC and seeks to AOS on that basis, or an investor CR seeks to AOS based upon a second I-526 petition). However, applicable law for marriage-based CR status allows AOS through a separate marriage upon withdrawal of CR status. Matter of Stockwell, 20 I&N Dec. 309 (BIA 1991) [marriage to new USC]. It may be possible therefore to withdraw CR status and file a new AOS application if the second AOS is based upon an immediate relative. The issue is more complex when seeking AOS based upon an employment category (including a second approved I-526) given the bars to AOS under INA §245(c)(2) and INA §245(c)(7) permitting employment-based AOS only from an NIV status. One way to avoid all of these obstacles is simply to obtain an I-407 abroad and file for an immigrant visa through consular processing.
p. 1570 (Ch. 7, ¶ IX.N.2.b.10). Paragraph (10) should read as follows:
Part-Time Employment—Boodell & Domanskis, LLC, 2012-PER-1275 (May 11, 2016) [CO denial reversed where employer demonstrated he had listed the position as a one year of full or part-time experience and prospective employee had part-time experience]; I Grand Express, 2014-PER-783 (Jan. 26, 2018) [CO ultimately counted part time work toward 24 months experience in Head Graphic Designer position where employer argued that in graphic design employees often work as freelancers or contractors and therefore working 25 hours per week may be considered full time].
p. 2163 (Ch. 13, ¶ II.A.3.d). The first full paragraph on page 2163 (starting on the 7th line) should read as follows:
Reapply After a Break in Residency—If there is a break in residency due to absence, a person may reapply after 4 years and one day. If the person is able to naturalize after 3 years but had a break due to absence, she may reapply after 2 years and one day. 8 CFR §316.5(c)(1)(ii); 12 USCIS-PM, Pt. D, Ch. 3 ¶C.5
*Caveat: This site will present entries below represent selected items of major importance that occurred since the book was published in June 2018. This section does NOT reflect all decisions and other changes since publication.
Stop-Time Rule (Pereira v. Sessions) | Asylum and §237(a)(1)(H) Waivers (Hussam F. v. Sessions)
Stop-Time Rule Update:
In Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S.Ct. 2105, 2110 (2018), the Supreme Court determined that an NTA that fails to include the time and place of the removal hearing “is not a ‘notice to appear’ under section 1229(a),” and therefore cannot be the basis to trigger the stop-time rule. The Pereira decision has significant implications not only for the stop-time rule but if the NTA did not properly contain the date and time of the hearing and possibly other information required in §239(a), it could affect: (1) when subject-matter jurisdiction vests with the immigration court under 8 CFR §1003.14; Shogunle v. Holder, 366 Fed. Appx. 332 (4th Cir. 2009); (2) the validity of in absentia orders; (3) the ability to seek post conclusion VD; (4) inadmissibility under INA §§212(a)(9)(A), (a)(9)(C); and (5) immigration court jurisdiction for asylum/withholding when NTA is filed pursuant to 8 CFR §§208.2(b), 1208.2(b). See also Matter of Sanchez, 20 I&N Dec. 223 (BIA 1990), for interpretation under previous regulations. Venue lies where NTA filed. 8 CFR §1003.20.
Asylum / §237(a)(1)(H) Waivers Update
Hussam F. v. Sessions, 897 F.3d 707 (6th Cir. 2018). In the context of a review of the denial of asylum and an INA §237(a)(1)(H) waiver, the court made a number of important legal decisions. First, it determined it had the authority to review the BIA’s denial of a discretionary INA 237(a)(1)(H) waiver despite INA §242(a)(2)(B)(ii) because it was reviewing the BIA’s failure to follow the clearly erroneous rule. Second, it found that the BIA’s decision that Hussam had resettled in a third country could not be supported where the applicant contested it and the government waived the argument by not addressing it on appeal. Third, it held that the BIA erred in denying asylum where it ignored Pula and Kasinga and found that an applicant with a strong asylum claim should be denied on discretionary grounds for failure to disclose a Syrian passport that was fraudulently obtained. Fourth, the court relied on the final paragraph of INA §237(a)(1)(H) and determining that even if AOS was a second entry, granting the waiver for that entry would, on a derivative basis also waive the misrepresentation of the first entry. The court reversed the denial of asylum and INA §237(a)(1)(H) and remanded to the BIA.
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