Source: http://theprivacylawyer.blogspot.com/2004_07_01_archive.html
Timestamp: 2018-02-25 15:52:36
Document Index: 349412775

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2510', '§ 2510', '§ 2510', 'art, 328', '§ 2511', '§ 2703', '§ 2703', 'art, 328']

FT.com / WorldHow far can you go in corporate investigations and surveillance? Walking th fine line between agrressive business intelligence and illegal activities.
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Protect Your Privacy: Identity Theft InsuranceInteresting. I'll look into this further for my column at Information Week.
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InformationWeek > Cyberdating > Looking For Love In All The Cyber Places > July 26, 2004Parry's column this week on cyberdating and safety.
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InformationWeek > Cyberdating > Dating Online: The Basics > July 26, 2004 How to's for cyberdating novices.
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Isn't there a value to private sphere anymore?
Feedster :: RSS Search EngineI just tried this for the first time, it's easy and works with blogger. The support people are also very friendly and patient. :-) You can now subscribe to my feed.
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InformationWeek > Identity Theft > President Signs Identify-Theft Law > July 16, 2004
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InformationWeek > Customer Data > Breach Of Trust > May 3, 2004
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Privacy is often seen as a shield and a sword. You're on one side of the issue or another. Never in-between. Yet, as this writer pointed out after a half-hour interview, it's mostly a case-by-case basis. What makes sense under the circumstances? What's the balance? Are we really worried about the United States becoming a nazi-like government? How much are we willing to give up for convenience or efficiency? Bob Evans of Information Week wrote about the over-reaction to the airlines sharing passenger name records...who cares if the airlines share information about your meal preferences, he posed. But in Europe this is considered especially problematic, since a meal preference may divulge your religious orientation or health conditions.
While I agree with Bob here, and think that privacy issues are often overblown in the press and by certain advocacy groups to get mentioned in the press, there is always the other side. And the issue of whether or not the passengers were given the choice of sharing this information with third parties, government or otherwise. Airlines and others may be surprised at how many passengers or customers would allow their personal information to be shared, responsibly, with government agencies to help improve security. Heck, it's worth the try...
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Marcus P. Zillman, M.S., A.M.H.A. Author/Speaker/ConsultantA blog everyone should check out, with tons of information from a knowedlgeable expert...how refreshing! :-)
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Archives: St. Petersburg TimesAnnouncement of the InternetSuperheroes.org programs.
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Online Safety at SchoolParry praises library-media specialists...the unsung heroesof education.
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The size of the fine, IMHO, means that the FTC didn't think that HOP acted in bad faith.
This is the first of the "material changes" cases for the FTC on website privacy policies. I expect more as we seek more guidance about what a site cna and can't do.
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Government Enterprise > Opinions > Visible, Vulnerable Target
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Security Pipeline | Trends | The Privacy Lawyer: Cyberloafing Drains Productivity
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Parry Aftab and Nancy L. SavittParry's support of the COPPA amendment to extend the e-mail notification and consent rule. Note that Parry's address has changed, as has her telephone numbers. Also the group for which she acts as executive director has changed it's name to wiredsafety.org.
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about_aftab
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Parry Aftab says the real world provides five good reasons why you should keep a tight rein on employeesParry discusses the risks of workplace Internet communications to employers
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About Parry Aftab, cyberlawyer and privacy and security expertfrom Parry's own main site.
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Parry Aftab's Privacy and Cyberlaw SiteParry's main site. Look to it for articles on privacy and cyberlaw.
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MSNBC - Hooked on Phonics fined by FTCBob Sullivan's report on Hooked on Phonics FTC action settlement, quoting Parry.
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The new enforcement action against :"Hooked on Phonics" company for sharing information in violation of its privacy policy and for trying to change its privacy policy retroactively to permit such sharing. No consent was given for the change.
A great opinion piece by Bob Evans about keeping our privacy priorities straight.
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A great primer on blogging for business.
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We begin our analysis by highlighting the difference between the definitions of "wire communications" and "electronic communications" in the Wiretap Act, mindful that the communications at issue in this appeal are electronic in nature. Under 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1), a
*3 "wire communication" means any aural transfer made in whole or in part through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable or other like connection between the point of origin and the point of reception furnished or operated by any person engaged in providing or operating such facilities ... and such term includes any electronic storage of such communication....
18 U.S.C. § 2510(1). By comparison, " 'electronic communication' means any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system ." Id. at § 2510(12). No mention is made of electronic storage of electronic communications. See generally In re Hart, 328 F.3d 45, 49 (1st Cir.2003)("[W]hen Congress includes a particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.").
*6 The government argues, and the dissent is persuaded by this argument, that the legislative history of the statute demonstrates that if an electronic communication is obtained while it is simultaneously in transmission and in storage, then an intercept occurs. Notwithstanding the fact that we find the language of the statute unambiguous, exploring this contention merely confirms our position as to the meaning of the statute. The government points to dicta in Pharmatrak as supporting the conclusion that electronic communications are protected when they are in storage, because by their nature, they exist in storage and transit at the same time.
[T]he storage-transit dichotomy adopted by earlier courts may be less than apt to address current problems. As one court recently observed, "[t]echnology has, to some extent, overtaken language. Traveling the internet, electronic communications are often--perhaps constantly--both 'in transit' and 'in storage' simultaneously, a linguistic but not a technological paradox."
329 F.3d at 21-22 (quoting Councilman, 245 F.Supp.2d at 321). However, the legislative history of the Act clearly states that the definition of intercept was not altered by the amendments. See S.Rep. No. 99-541, at 12, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3566 (stating that "[t]he definition of 'intercept' under current law is retained with respect to wire and oral communications except that the term 'or other' is inserted after 'aural' "). Even assuming arguendo that we should look outside the text, the government's arguments based on the legislative history are unavailing.
*8 Congress passed the 1968 Wiretap Act to "protect[ ] the privacy of wire and oral communications, and [to] delineat[e] on a uniform basis the circumstances and conditions under which the interception of wire and oral communications may be authorized." Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 48, 92 S.Ct. 2357, 33 L.Ed.2d 179 (1972) (quoting S.Rep. No. 90-1097, at 66 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2153, 2153). By the mid-1980s, however, technology had outpaced the privacy protections in the Act, creating uncertainty and gaps in its coverage. As one member of the House Judiciary Committee lamented: [I]n the almost 20 years since Congress last addressed the issue of privacy of communications in a comprehensive fashion, the technologies of communication and interception have changed dramatically. Today we have large-scale electronic mail operations ... and a dazzling array of digitized information networks which were little more than concepts two decades ago. These new modes of communication have outstripped the legal protection provided under statutory definitions bound by old technologies.
Electronic Communications Privacy Act: Hearings on H.R. 3378 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Adminstration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 1 (1985-1986) (statement of Chairman Kastenmeier); See also id. at 3 ("[T]he American people and American businesses are no longer assured that the law protects their right to communicate privately.") (Statement of Sen. Leahy). Congress passed the ECPA to remedy these perceived weaknesses and to update and expand the privacy protections in the 1968 Act. See Sen. Rep. No. 99-541, at 1 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3555 ("The bill amends the 1968 law to update and clarify Federal privacy protections and standards in light of dramatic changes in new computer and telecommunications technologies.").
Defendant-Appellee Bradford Councilman was indicted on July 11, 2001 for violating Title I of the ECPA, the Wiretap Act, but was not charged with violating Title II, the Stored Communications Act. Determining the legality of this indictment requires us to explore the dividing line between these two titles. Councilman claims that the e-mails at issue were stored communications when they were being processed for delivery in his company's computers, and, therefore, they were not the type of "evanescent" transmissions, i.e., telephone calls traveling through a wire, that the Wiretap Act addresses. [FN9] Under his approach, an e-mail would only be subject to the Wiretap Act when it is traveling through cables and not when it is being processed by electronic switches and computers during transit and delivery. According to Councilman:
*10 The reason that the stored v. evanescent distinction is a key determinant of the extent of privacy protection afforded by the ECPA to both wire and electronic communications is simply that, because of their lasting nature, stored communications are inherently more vulnerable to intrusion than evanescent communications, which must be intruded upon simultaneously with the communication, or not at all.
*13 Congress requested a report from the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) shortly before undertaking its consideration of the Wiretap Act in 1983. The report, Electronic Surveillance and Civil Liberties, used stark language to describe the existing privacy protections:
In the last 20 years, there has been a virtual revolution in the technology relevant to electronic surveillance. Advances in electronics, semiconductors, computers, imaging, databases and related technologies have greatly increased the technical options for surveillance activities ... The existing statutory framework and jurisdictional interpretations thereof do not adequately cover new electronic surveillance applications.
The report then identified threats associated with five different types of surveillance--telephone, e-mail, electronic physical, electronic visual, and database--and suggested statutory reforms to protect individual privacy from those threats. This report was important in shaping the ECPA. Congress repeatedly cited it during its deliberations.
Indeed, while the legislative history includes a few statements regarding the balance between law enforcement and individual liberty, the perceived need to protect privacy was the overarching motivation for the bill. According to the Senate Report:
*14 S.Rep. No. 99-541, at 5 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3559 (1986). Congress did not express any desire to accord less protection to electronic communications. In fact, one of the authors of the ECPA said that the legislation constituted
132 Cong. Rec. H4039 (Statement of Rep. Kastenmeier).
Although we discussed the ongoing debate about how strictly courts should construe the contemporaneity requirement, we concluded that we did not have to resolve that issue because "[e]ven those courts that narrowly read 'interception' would find that Pharmatrak's acquisition was an interception." Id. We quoted the Steiger court:
[U]nder the narrow reading of the Wiretap Act we adopt ..., very few seizures of electronic communications from computers will constitute 'interceptions.' ... 'Therefore, unless some type of automatic routing software is used (for example, a duplicate of all of an employee's messages are automatically sent to the employee's boss), interception of E-Mail within the prohibition of [the Wiretap Act] is virtually impossible.'
*17 The Wiretap Act explicitly states that "any person who intentionally intercepts ... [any] electronic communication ... shall be punished...." As the Government aptly observes in its brief:
Although Councilman claims that his scheme to copy and review incoming e- mails was no different than the monitoring and junk e-mail filtering that employers, schools, and other institutions routinely implement, he fails to note that these entities do so with notice and the consent of their users, and, therefore, that their conduct is not illegal. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) ( "It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person ... to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication ... where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception...."). There is nothing vague about the Wiretap Act, and Councilman should not have been surprised that his conduct constituted an illegal interception.
*19 In one of the few instances in which Congress discussed message storage within the context of the Wiretap Act, it explicitly distinguished messages in transit from messages in storage. In the section of the report discussing the responsibilities of service providers to keep communications confidential, the House Committee stated:
Section 2702(a) [the Stored Communications Act] generally prohibits the provider of a wire or electronic communication service to the public from knowingly divulging the contents of any communication while in electronic storage.... Similarly section 2511(3) of title 18 [the Wiretap Act], as amended, prohibits such a provider from divulging the contents of a communication while it is in transmission.
H.R.Rep. No. 99-647, at 65.
FN1. Interloc also did business under the name Valinet. Valinet
functioned as an electronic service provider to the general public, not just bookdealers, for a monthly fee using the domain name @valinet.com. None of the e-mails at issue in this case were addressed by its sender to any addressee using the domain @valinet.com.
FN8. Prior to the 1986 amendments, the Wiretap Act's definition of "wire communication" read:
"[W]ire communication" means any communication made in whole or in part through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other like connection between the point of origin
and the point of reception furnished or operated by any person engaged as a common carrier in providing or operating such facilities for the transmission of interstate or foreign communications.
The post-ECPA version of that definition read:
"[W]ire communication" means any aural transfer made in whole or in part through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other like connection between the point of origin and the point of reception (including the use of such connection in a switching station) furnished or operated by any person engaged in providing or operating such facilities for the transmission of interstate or foreign communications or communications affecting interstate or foreign commerce and such term includes any electronic storage of such communication.
Congress deleted the phrase "and such term includes any electronic storage of such communication" in 2001.
FN10. According to the Stored Communications Act:
electronic communication service of the contents of an electronic communication, that is in electronic storage in an electronic communications system for one hundred and eighty days or less, only pursuant to a warrant issued using the procedures described in the Federal rules of Criminal Procedure ... or equivalent State warrant.
18 U.S.C. § 2703(a). See also id. § 2703(b)(1) ("A governmental entity may require a provider of remote computing service to disclose the contents of any [stored e-mail] without required notice to the subscriber or customer, if the governmental entity obtains a warrant issued using the procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure ... or equivalent State warrant....").
FN12. "Electronic communication" is defined as:
any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or
intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign commerce, but does not include--
FN13. My colleagues quote the maxim: "[W]hen Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion," see, e.g., In re Hart, 328 F.3d 45, 49 (1st Cir.2003). This maxim is a canon of construction, see, e.g., Trenkler v. United States, 268 F.3d 16, 23 (1st Cir.2001) (characterizing the maxim as a canon of construction). This reliance on the canon to support the inferential leap belies the
availability of a plain text argument. Cf. Springer v. Government of Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 206, 48 S.Ct. 480, 72 L.Ed. 845 (1928) ( "The general rule that the expression of one thing is the exclusion of others is subject to exceptions. Like other canons of statutory construction, it is only an aid in the ascertainment of the meaning of the law, and must yield whenever a contrary intention on the part of the lawmaker is apparent.").
FN15. My colleagues attempt to distinguish the interception in
Pharmatrak from the interception here by claiming that the communications in Pharmatrak "were not placed in any type of storage before their interception." In fact, the Pharmatrak defendant's Java/Javascript programs recorded the URLs that the users visited, which means that they copied the users' web commands before those commands were sent over the Internet. The web commands were in the same type of temporary, intermediate, and incidental storage that the e-mails at issue in this case were in when they were intercepted; therefore, our conclusion that there was an interception in Pharmatrak should control our analysis here.