Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/170/1061/503013/
Timestamp: 2020-06-05 06:17:35
Document Index: 505814440

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1346', '§ 2674', '§ 2680', '§ 1346', '§ 51', '§ 51', '§ 2680']

Frank Whitley, Geraldine Whitley, As Parents of Michael M.whitley, Deceased, Frank Whitley, As Administratorof the Estate of Michael W. Whitley,deceased,plaintiffs-appellees,cross-appellants. v. United States of America, Defendant-appellant, Cross-appellee, 170 F.3d 1061 (11th Cir. 1999) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Eleventh Circuit › 1999 › Frank Whitley, Geraldine Whitley, As Parents of Michael M.whitley, Deceased, Frank Whitley, As Admin...
Frank Whitley, Geraldine Whitley, As Parents of Michael M.whitley, Deceased, Frank Whitley, As Administratorof the Estate of Michael W. Whitley,deceased,plaintiffs-appellees,cross-appellants. v. United States of America, Defendant-appellant, Cross-appellee, 170 F.3d 1061 (11th Cir. 1999)
US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit - 170 F.3d 1061 (11th Cir. 1999) March 26, 1999
Before ANDERSON and BIRCH, Circuit Judges, and PAINE* , Senior District Judge.
This appeal requires us to determine whether Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 71 S. Ct. 153, 95 L. Ed. 152 (1950), precludes recovery under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680, to the parents and estate of a foreign serviceman, who died in a motor vehicle accident while in the United States for a recreational event because of the negligence of an American military service member. Following a nonjury trial, the district judge determined that Feres did not prevent recovery under the FTCA. Because we have determined that the circumstances under which the accident occurred were not incident to military service, we affirm.
To decide whether Feres applies in this case to preclude recovery by the parents and estate of a foreign serviceman who died in the United States because of the negligence of an Army driver, we have direction from the Supreme Court's development of the Feres doctrine as it relates to the FTCA and consider the interpretation of our circuit cases. The FTCA permits a limited waiver of sovereign immunity that enables the government to be subject to tort liability as a private person would be in similar circumstances.12 The measure of recovery is the amount allowed by state law for the plaintiff's claim if the plaintiff were suing the United States as a private person. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674. While the FTCA exempts recovery for military injuries or death resulting from combat service, see 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j),13 liability of the government under the FTCA for peacetime injuries to military members was a void that the Supreme Court filled with Feres and its progeny, see Pierce v. United States, 813 F.2d 349, 351 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam). The Feres Court acknowledged that courts must determine "whether any claim is recognizable in law." Feres, 340 U.S. at 141, 71 S. Ct. at 157. "We review both questions of law and a district court's application of law to the facts de novo."14 Reich v. Davis, 50 F.3d 962, 964 (11th Cir. 1995).
The Court delineated the Feres doctrine, which creates an exception to FTCA recovery when a service member is injured or killed incident to military service, in a trilogy of cases, Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 69 S. Ct. 918, 93 L. Ed. 1200 (1949); Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 71 S. Ct. 153, 95 L. Ed. 152 (1950); United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 75 S. Ct. 141, 99 L. Ed. 139 (1954). See Parker v. United States, 611 F.2d 1007, 1009 (5th Cir. 1980). Analysis of these core cases is instructive for review of subsequent Supreme Court cases applying the Feres doctrine and in deciding this case because the "Court has never deviated from [its] characterization of the Feres bar. Nor has Congress changed this standard in the ... years since it was articulated.... Instead, the Feres doctrine has been applied consistently to bar all suits on behalf of service members against the Government based upon service-related injuries," and the Court has declined to modify it. United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 686, 687-88, 107 S. Ct. 2063, 2066-67, 95 L. Ed. 2d 648 (1987).
Prior to Feres, the Supreme Court determined that recovery was available under the FTCA for injuries unrelated to military service sustained by members of the United States armed forces. See Brooks, 337 U.S. 49, 69 S. Ct. 918, 93 L. Ed. 1200. Brooks involved a vehicle accident on a public highway when a father and his two servicemen sons were struck by an Army truck, driven by a civilian employee. One of the sons died; the father15 and other son suffered severe injuries.
In contrast, Feres concerned three consolidated cases wherein the decedents and plaintiff were in active duty and on a military base when the negligent government acts that resulted in their deaths or injuries occurred.16 In distinguishing Brooks, the Feres Court noted a "vital distinction": "The injury to Brooks did not arise out of or in the course of military duty. Brooks was on furlough, driving along the highway, under compulsion of no orders or duty and on no military mission." Feres, 340 U.S. at 146, 71 S. Ct. at 159. Based on this distinction, the Court held "that the Government is not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service." Id.
The Court subsequently applied Brooks rather than Feres to permit FTCA recovery to a veteran for injury caused during a knee operation at a Veterans Administration hospital, although the original knee injury occurred during active duty and resulted in honorable discharge. See Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 75 S. Ct. 141. The Court provided the principal underlying rationale for its holding in Feres:
Id. at 112, 75 S. Ct. at 143; see United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 57, 105 S. Ct. 3039, 3042, 87 L. Ed. 2d 38 (1985) (" 'In the last analysis, Feres seems best explained by [the military discipline rationale.]' " (citation omitted)).17 Nevertheless, the Court affirmed recovery under the FTCA, " [s]ince the negligent act giving rise to the injury in [Brown ] was not incident to the military service." Brown, 348 U.S. at 113, 75 S. Ct. at 144 (emphasis added).
The Court has reiterated that interfering with military discipline is the concern at "the heart of the Feres doctrine." Johnson, 481 U.S. at 692, 107 S. Ct. at 2069; see United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 702, 107 S. Ct. 3054, 3074, 97 L. Ed. 2d 550 (1987) (" [T]he concern for the instinctive obedience of soldiers to orders [ ] is of central importance in the Feres doctrine."). " [N]o military organization can function without strict discipline and regulation that would be unacceptable in a civilian setting." Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 300, 103 S. Ct. 2362, 2365, 76 L. Ed. 2d 586 (1983). Indeed, " [t]he special nature of military life--the need for unhesitating and decisive action by military officers and equally disciplined responses by enlisted personnel--would be undermined by a judicially created remedy exposing officers to personal liability at the hands of those they are charged to command." Id. at 304, 103 S. Ct. at 2367. Thus, the Feres doctrine addresses the Court's concern as to "whether [an FTCA] suit requires the civilian court to second-guess military decisions" and "whether the suit might impair essential military discipline."18 Shearer, 473 U.S. at 57, 105 S. Ct. at 3043. Furthermore, the Court has cautioned that plaintiffs cannot escape the Feres doctrine and focus by a claim of negligence when, in actuality, "a decision of command" is involved. Id. at 59, 105 S. Ct. at 3043.
The Court has instructed that " [t]he Feres doctrine cannot be reduced to a few bright-line rules; each case must be examined in light of the statute as it has been construed in Feres and subsequent cases." Id. at 57, 105 S. Ct. at 3043. At the outset of our analysis, we note that permitting recovery under the FTCA by Lieutenant Whitley's parents and estate will not impinge on military discipline, the primary concern of the Feres doctrine. Lieutenant Whitley was not acting under orders from the British military, of which he was a member, and he was in guest status with respect to the Army. Additionally, the Court has distinguished the negligence of the driver in Brooks, where FTCA recovery was allowed, from negligence in military decisions, which implicates military discipline.
This case involves the off-base negligence of the Army driver and, consequently, is apposite to Brooks rather than Feres. As the trial and appeal in this case have shown, "the alleged negligence is not of the sort that would harm the [Army] disciplinary system if litigated." Pierce, 813 F.2d at 354. The claim by Lieutenant Whitley's parents and estate that Specialist Kanney negligently caused a single-vehicle accident on a public highway while driving a British rugby team, composed of DWR and civilian members, from a civilian rugby match does not implicate military discipline, challenge military orders, or intrude upon the relationship of any service member with superior officers. Thus, the "dire consequences" that the government envisions are unfounded on the facts of this case. Brooks, 337 U.S. at 52, 69 S. Ct. at 920.
The former Fifth Circuit differentiated between the rationales or policy considerations that the Court used to justify the Feres doctrine and its application to decide the "incident to service" line of demarcation for compensation determination under the FTCA. See Parker, 611 F.2d at 1010-15. More analysis than "a purely causal" relationship with the military is required; that is, "one cannot merely state that but for the individual's military service, the injury would not have occurred." Id. at 1011; see Brooks, 337 U.S. at 52, 69 S. Ct. at 920 (recognizing that "all human events depend upon what has already transpired"). Our court derived from Parker, a three-part test, which considers (1) duty status, (2) location, and (3) activity, to determine whether a service member's injuries resulting from government negligence are compensable under the FTCA because they are incident to service. See Pierce, 813 F.2d at 353-54; Parker, 611 F.2d at 1013-15. After evaluating the totality of these factual circumstances, we decide whether the injury in question was incident to service. See Pierce, 813 F.2d at 353; Parker, 611 F.2d at 1013.
Critical to the Court's determination that the injuries to the three servicemen in Feres were incident to service was their active duty status. The Court specified that " [t]he common fact underlying the three cases is that each claimant, while on active duty and not on furlough, sustained injury due to negligence of others in the armed forces." Feres, 340 U.S. at 138, 71 S. Ct. at 155 (emphasis added). Our court has recognized that "the serviceman's duty status was the most important criterion in determining whether an injury was incident to military service." Jimenez v. United States, 158 F.3d 1228, 1229 (11th Cir. 1998) (per curiam).
In Pierce, the serviceman requested and received permission to leave the military base for the afternoon to take care of personal business. As Pierce was traveling on his motorcycle on a public highway, a naval recruiter, acting within the scope of his official duties, negligently collided with him and Pierce's resulting injuries caused him to be seventy-percent disabled. Aligning that case with Brooks and Parker, our court determined that by "exercis [ing] the right to be absent from regular duty, the serviceman attains a status much akin to being on furlough," which enables the service member on a pass to maintain an FTCA action. Pierce, 813 F.2d at 353; see Parker, 611 F.2d at 1013 (distinguishing the claimants in Zoula v. United States, 217 F.2d 81, 82-83 (5th Cir. 1954), "who had merely the unexercised right to a pass" (emphasis added)).
" [T]he situs of the injury is an important factor in determining whether the activity is 'incident to service,' " Pierce, 813 F.2d at 353, "especially with vehicular collisions," Parker, 611 F.2d at 1013. "If the soldier is on furlough and off the military reservation, Brooks teaches that an action lies under the FTCA." Id. at 1014. Even a service member's returning to a military base but outside the premises line permits an FTCA action.24 See id.; Pierce, 813 F.2d at 353 n. 6 (allowing FTCA recovery, although injured serviceman on a pass was "approximately 500 feet from the boundary of the military reservation" when the motor vehicular accident occurred).
We finally must consider the activity in which Lieutenant Whitley was engaged when he was killed. In distinguishing Brooks, the Feres Court determined that a service member injured on leave is "not analogous to that of a soldier injured while performing duties under orders." Feres, 340 U.S. at 146, 71 S. Ct. at 159 (emphasis added); see Zoula, 217 F.2d at 82 n. 1 ("A person on a furlough or leave is not subject to military duty, although he may actually spend the time provided in the furlough or the leave on a military reservation."). Significant to the Parker court's conclusion that the serviceman was not acting incident to service when he was injured was that he "was not directly subject to military control; he was not under the compulsion of military orders; he was not performing any military mission." Parker, 611 F.2d at 1014. In Pierce, we recognized that "to construe any conceivable personal activity as 'incident to service' because that activity happened to be performed by a member of the armed forces" would preclude service members from bringing FTCA actions "merely by virtue of the fact that the claimants are wearing a United States uniform." Pierce, 813 F.2d at 354. By contrast, we determined regarding the death of a United States Navy Airman Recruit while participating in sea rescue training that " [d]espite the extreme circumstances surrounding [his] death, we cannot escape the fact his death arose out of an activity incident to his military service." Kitowski v. United States, 931 F.2d 1526, 1530 (11th Cir. 1991).
Additionally, cases dealing with recreational activities made available to service members on a military reservation because they are serving in the armed forces are inapposite. Like sleeping, participating in recreational activities is part of the daily lives of service members residing on a military base. The former Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court and expressly adopted its reasoning in a case where an Army staff sergeant riding his motorcycle from a military softball practice was killed in a collision with a post shuttle bus. See Watkins v. United States, 462 F. Supp. 980 (S.D. Ga. 1977), aff'd, 587 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam). Determining that Feres barred FTCA recovery, the court reasoned that the serviceman's active duty status,28 the location of the accident on the military base, and the fact that he was leaving a military softball team practice made Feres dispositive.29 See id. at 988.
In contrast, the Watkins court observed "that an 'off-duty' serviceman who is injured off-base in a traffic accident totally unrelated to his military service should now receive the benefits of the Brooks rationale." Id. Pierce exemplifies this reasoning. Similarly, the court applied Brooks to allow an FTCA action when a serviceman on a twenty-four-hour pass was traveling from his off-base residence to an off-base bird hunt and his vehicle collided with a negligently driven Army vehicle. See Hand v. United States, 260 F. Supp. 38 (M.D. Ga. 1966). Holding that a pass is equivalent to a furlough with respect to military duties, the court explained: "There is no difference in the freedom which the man enjoys. In both instances the man is relieved from military duty during the period specified." Id. at 41 (emphasis added).
Having analyzed each of the three factors that our circuit uses to determine whether the activity in which a service member was engaged at the time of injury was incident to service, we must consider the totality of these circumstances. See Pierce, 813 F.2d at 353; Parker, 611 F.2d at 1013. First, Lieutenant Whitley was on a furlough-like or authorized off-duty status when he was killed because of the negligence of an Army driver. He was under no military orders for the duration of the rugby tour in the United States. He had volunteered for the trip and received permission to go from his commanding officer. He primarily financed his participation in the rugby tour, and he observed no military protocol during the tour, such as being addressed by his rank. Thus, his authorized absence from duty was analogous to furlough in Brooks, particularly given the duration and distance of the trip. See Hand, 260 F. Supp. at 41-42 ("We, therefore, attach no significance to the fact that in the Brooks case the man was on what is known as 'furlough' and in this case the Plaintiff was on what is known as a 'pass' and conclude that the fact that the man was on a pass instead of a furlough would not tend to make a quail hunt 'an activity incident to (his) military service.' " (alteration in original)).
Second, the single-vehicle accident that resulted in Lieutenant Whitley's death occurred on a public highway far from the Fort Benning military reservation, where he was staying with his rugby teammates while in the United States. Third, Lieutenant Whitley was asleep when he died and a passenger in a commercially leased van. There was nothing about the preceding rugby match and socialization with a civilian team or the travel involved with playing the rugby match that made it a military exercise. Considering these factors cumulatively, we conclude that Lieutenant Whitley was not engaged in an activity incident to service at the time of his death. See Brooks, 337 U.S. at 52, 69 S. Ct. at 920 (determining that the injuries sustained by the servicemen brothers in the automobile accident with another serviceman had "nothing to do with the Brooks' army careers"). Accordingly, Feres does not prevent the FTCA actions by Lieutenant Whitley's parents and estate in this case.
This case requires an additional step in the Feres analysis because it involves a foreign service member. Feres and its progeny involve United States service members. Since recovery is sought by or on behalf of a foreign service member under the FTCA, a United States law, and money damages from the United States government, the same Feres analysis that applies to American service members is appropriate for foreign service members who claim injury or death resulting from the negligence of United States armed forces. Otherwise, there would be two standards of FTCA recovery, American and foreign, which would impair military discipline, the principal Feres concern. " [M]ilitary discipline could be disrupted just as much by a foreign serviceman's law suit as by an American's; and liability for negligent orders would be equally detrimental whether the serviceman asserting a claim is a member of the United States or a foreign military." Daberkow v. United States, 581 F.2d 785, 788 (9th Cir. 1978); see In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 780 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (" [T]o rule that the United States government has waived sovereign immunity with respect to the tort claims of foreign servicemen but not with respect to the claims of American servicemen would distort the underlying purposes of the FTCA, defy common sense, and almost certainly be contrary to the intent of an elected Congress."), reconsideration in part on other grounds, 580 F. Supp. 1242 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
While not binding upon us, the few cases involving injuries or death to foreign service members support our conclusion. In Daberkow, the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany contracted to provide flight training at Luke Air Force Base in Arizona to German student pilots to produce "approximately 100 combat capable" pilots a year.32 Daberkow, 581 F.2d at 786. Attempting to follow the instructions of a United States Air Force pilot in another plane, a German officer assigned to the German squadron on a solo training flight crashed and was killed. Denying the FTCA action by the German officer's wife and son, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Feres prohibition on "actions brought for injuries to servicemen arising out of activity incident to their service [ ] should apply with equal force in this case, although the serviceman is not a member of the United States military." Id. at 788.
In re "Agent Orange" concerned, inter alia, claims by Australian veterans that they suffered injuries resulting from their exposure to the herbicidal, defoliating chemical, Agent Orange, used by the United States during the Vietnam war. The Australian veterans "concede [d] that their presence in southeast Asia during the period in question was the direct result of their country's participation in joint military operations with the United States." In re "Agent Orange," 506 F. Supp. at 780. The court recognized that the factual elements that determine the Feres incident-to-service standard include whether the activity in question has a " 'real and substantial relationship' " to the service member's military service, id. at 775 (citation omitted), or whether it is " 'inseparably entwined' with, and directly related to, plaintiffs' military service," id. at 779 (citation omitted). Applying the incident-to-service standard to the facts in that case, the court determined that Feres barred the claims of the Australian veterans.
In Aketepe v. United States, 925 F. Supp. 731 (M.D. Fla .1996), aff'd, 105 F.3d 1400 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S. Ct. 685, 139 L. Ed. 2d 632 (1998), crew members of a Turkish destroyer and their survivors brought a negligence suit against the United States to recover for the injuries and deaths that resulted when live missiles were fired from an American carrier during a naval exercise. The navies of several North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO") countries, including Turkey, were involved in a combined naval exercise "to simulate wartime encounters between opposing powers." Id. at 734. A United States Navy admiral was the commander in chief in charge of all the participating NATO forces. During the " 'enhanced tactical' or battle problem phase" of the exercise, forces that included an American aircraft carrier and a Turkish destroyer were "to actively seek and destroy each other" in a simulated attack. Id. There was no advance notice to the American naval team of the drill when they were awakened at night to conduct it. Additionally, the personnel involved in the missile firing were unaware that the exercise was a simulation. The naval officers conducting the drill failed to understand the terminology and commands, which resulted in a live missile attack on the Turkish destroyer.33 Consequently, members of the Turkish crew were injured or killed.
The district judge recognized that " [t]he Plaintiffs in this case were members of the Turkish Navy who, as an incident of their service, participated in military exercises in which they were under the supervision of an American supervisor." Id. at 737 (emphasis added). Although citing Daberkow and noting that Feres would provide an alternative basis for dismissing the case,34 see id. at n. 3, the district judge granted summary judgment to the United States because he determined that the case involved a nonjusticiable political question. Acknowledging the application of Feres to friendly fire cases involving American service members, the district judge noted that "the principle behind Feres, that a service member should be precluded from suing the government for injuries suffered as a result of actions by a fellow service member, should apply with equal force in this case [involving foreign service members]." Id. at 737 n. 2.
Federal courts must apply state law as it has been interpreted by the highest court of the state. See Wainwright v. Goode, 464 U.S. 78, 84, 104 S. Ct. 378, 382, 78 L. Ed. 2d 187 (1983) (per curiam). The operative statute, section 40-8-76.1(d), provides in pertinent part:
Lieutenant Whitley's parents contend on cross appeal that the district judge erred by not using the Georgia five percent discount rate in calculating the economic damages for their son's life. We use the clearly erroneous standard to review a damages award under the FTCA. See Meader ex rel. Long v. United States, 881 F.2d 1056, 1060 (11th Cir. 1989). To reverse the damages award, we must be " 'left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.' " Id. (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S. Ct. 525, 542, 92 L. Ed. 746 (1948)).
Because the United States is liable to the same extent as a private individual in an FTCA case, its liability is determined by the laws of the state where the negligent act or omission occurred. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b); Molzof v. United States, 502 U.S. 301, 305, 112 S. Ct. 711, 714, 116 L. Ed. 2d 731 (1992). The Georgia wrongful death statute provides recovery for "the full value of the life of the decedent," O.C.G.A. §§ 51-4-2 and -5(a), which consists of two categories of damages:
Regarding the first damages category, the Georgia Court of Appeals recognized in a wrongful death action by parents for the automobile death of their twenty-three-year-old son that " ' [i]n arriving at the value of the life of the decedent "the [factfinder] is not bound to find that lifetime earnings reduced to present value is the full value of the life of the decedent, but such is an aid only to the [factfinder] in making such determination." ' " Miller v. Jenkins, 201 Ga.App. 825, 826, 412 S.E.2d 555, 556 (1991) (citations omitted) (first alteration in original) (emphasis added); see Bulloch County Hosp. Auth. v. Fowler, 124 Ga.App. 242, 247, 183 S.E.2d 586, 590 (1971) (stating the factfinder's determination of gross sum that the decedent would have earned in his lifetime " 'depend [s] upon the facts of the case' " (citation omitted)), overruled on other grounds, Gilson v. Mitchell, 131 Ga.App. 321, 205 S.E.2d 421 (1974). The Miller court further acknowledged that " [t]he intangible factors which supplement the economic value to comprise the 'full value of the decedent's life' elude precise definition, particularly in situations ... in which the decedent was employed and thus a basis exists for determining the loss." Miller, 201 Ga.App. at 826, 412 S.E.2d at 556 (citations omitted). Thus, the trial court has considerable latitude in applying these components to the facts of a particular case in determining the full value of a decedent's life. Additionally, Georgia law requires that the calculated economic damages for potential future amounts be reduced to present value at five percent per year. See O.C.G.A. § 51-12-13; Barnes v. Wall, 201 Ga.App. 228, 228, 411 S.E.2d 270, 271 (1991).
The FTCA provides government immunity from lawsuits by members of the armed forces for " [a]ny claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war." 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j)
We review the district judge's findings of fact for clear error and conclusions of law de novo. See Horton v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 141 F.3d 1038, 1040 (11th Cir. 1998) (per curiam). Based on our review of the record, we find no clear error in the district judge's factual findings, which are substantiated by the trial testimony. Therefore, our analysis focuses on the legal issues, which we review de novo
In Brooks, the civilian father recovered independently under the FTCA, and the government did not contest his recovery. See Brooks, 337 U.S. at 50 n. 1, 69 S. Ct. at 919 n. 1
Feres was killed in a fire in his barracks that was alleged to be the result of "a defective heating plant" and the failure "to maintain an adequate fire watch." Feres, 340 U.S. at 137, 71 S. Ct. at 155. The other two consolidated cases involved medical malpractice that occurred at Army hospitals. See id
In addition to the concern for military discipline, the Feres Court provided two other rationales for the Feres doctrine: the " 'distinctively federal' " relationship between the United States and members of its armed forces, Feres, 340 U.S. at 143, 71 S. Ct. at 158 (citation omitted), and the availability of a military disability and death compensation source, id. at 144-45, 71 S. Ct. at 158-59. The distinctly federal relationship rationale was derived from the concern for having the government's liability depend on the "fortuity of where the soldier happened to be stationed at the time of the injury." Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 671, 97 S. Ct. 2054, 2058, 52 L. Ed. 2d 665 (1977). The alternative compensation source was premised on a statutory scheme that provides coverage to injured military personnel irrespective of negligence by the government as a substitute for tort liability. See Feres, 340 U.S. at 144-45, 71 S. Ct. at 158-59; cf. Brooks, 337 U.S. at 53, 69 S. Ct. at 920 (acknowledging that the Veterans Benefit Act is not an exclusive compensation system, which does not preclude a service member's recovery under the FTCA). Nevertheless, the Court subsequently stated that these two rationales are "no longer controlling." Shearer, 473 U.S. at 58 n. 4, 105 S. Ct. at 3043 n. 4; see Johnson, 481 U.S. at 696-97, 107 S. Ct. at 2072 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (concluding that the federal relationship rationale "is not a plausible estimation of congressional intent, much less a justification for importing that estimation, unwritten, into the statute"); id. at 698, 107 S. Ct. at 2073 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that " 'the presence of an alternative compensation system [neither] explains [n]or justifies the Feres doctrine; it only makes the effect of the doctrine more palatable' " (citation omitted) (alterations in original))
The Parker court also recognized that these two rationales provide no help in determining when an injury to a service member is incident to service. See Parker, 611 F.2d at 1012. Therefore, we will not address these two rationales further except to acknowledge that the existence of a British compensation system does not preclude FTCA recovery for Lieutenant Whitley's parents and estate any more than auxiliary military benefits barred FTCA compensation in Brooks, Parker, and Pierce. See Johnson, 481 U.S. at 697-98, 107 S. Ct. at 2073 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Furthermore, such alternative benefits may be inadequate to compensate for debilitating injuries or death.
Taber v. Maine, 67 F.3d 1029, 1047-48 (2d Cir. 1995).
The Parker court distinguished between a "pass," which "is a discretionary time off privilege granted by the supervising officer and not charged against the record," and "furlough" or "leave," which "is generally for a longer period and is charged against the soldier's record." Parker, 611 F.2d at 1013 n. 9; see Zoula v. United States, 217 F.2d 81, 82 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1954) ("The fundamental difference between a pass and a leave or furlough is that a furlough or leave is a right earned and to which the soldier is entitled. A pass is simply a privilege that may or may not be accorded him."). In either status, "the service member can be recalled to work." Parker, 611 F.2d at 1013 n. 9. Formal passes are not necessary for "off-duty" service members who are not serving their regular duty hours; they "technically have the same status as [service] members on 'pass.' " Parker, 611 F.2d at 1013 n. 9
We distinguish Lieutenant Whitley's off-duty status for the rugby tour in the United States from off-duty time experienced daily by all service members where Feres precludes negligence claims. See Flowers v. United States, 764 F.2d 759 (11th Cir. 1985) (off-duty serviceman returning from a grocery store sustained injuries in automobile accident resulting from the negligence of a military bus driver); Mason v. United States, 568 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (off-duty serviceman attending to personal business on his way home was injured in accident when his motorcycle was struck by a car negligently driven by a serviceman). As the Parker court explained, this sort of off-duty status, where service members are not acting during their regular service hours and need not report for duty until the next day, does not require formal passes or special permission to be off-duty. See Parker, 611 F.2d at 1013 n. 9. This clearly is different off-duty status from the special authorization granted by Lieutenant Colonel Santa-Olalla to Lieutenant Whitley and the DWRRT players to travel to the United States for the duration of the rugby tour
The location factor does not stand alone and is considered in conjunction with the service member's activity at the time of injury. See Parker, 611 F.2d at 1014. Indeed, we have allowed FTCA recovery although injuries to a service member occurred on a military reservation. See id. at 1013-15; see also Elliott ex rel. Elliott v. United States, 877 F. Supp. 1569, 1576 (M.D. Ga. 1992), aff'd by an equally divided en banc court, 37 F.3d 617, 618 (11th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (permitting FTCA action where off-duty serviceman watching television in his military housing on base suffered permanent, debilitating injuries from carbon monoxide poisoning because the Army had failed to maintain the hot-water-heater-venting system as required under Georgia landlord law). Nevertheless, such cases are inapposite to this case, where the injuries unquestionably occurred away from a military reservation
To the extent that the government attempts to transform the van in which Lieutenant Whitley and his British rugby teammates were riding when the accident occurred into a military vehicle similar to a military aircraft carrier or transport plane, we are unpersuaded. See, e.g., Potts v. United States, 723 F.2d 20 (6th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (determining that Feres barred an FTCA action by a serviceman who was injured returning in a naval landing craft to his duty station on a naval research vessel); Uptegrove v. United States, 600 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1979) (concluding that Feres precluded an FTCA action by surviving wife and children because serviceman was killed while riding in an Air Force transport plane as a military, space-available passenger). We see an obvious and significant distinction between a van commercially leased by the Army to transport the DWRRT to various rugby matches, specifically a civilian match, and a military vessel or plane that is clearly incident to service. Moreover, in this circuit, location means on or off a military base under Pierce and Parker.
" 'Active duty,' " defined by the Watkins court, meant "not on leave or furlough, in the contemplation of Feres itself and its progeny." Watkins, 462 F. Supp. at 987. The court further explained that passes to leave the base generally are limited as to duration and distance. Id. at 987. This distinction comports with our analogy of Lieutenant Whitley's authorized time to be absent from his regular duties for the rugby tour. Furthermore, because of the time change and overseas travel, plainly this time was not the same as daily off-duty status after responsibilities during official hours have been served
Similarly, other circuits have concluded that recreational activities on a military reservation necessarily involve privileges that accrue to service members incident to their military service and, thus, Feres precluded FTCA actions. See, e.g., Millang v. United States, 817 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (serviceman severely injured in vehicular accident during military picnic on base); Hass v. United States, 518 F.2d 1138 (4th Cir. 1975) (serviceman injured riding horse at military owned and operated stable); Chambers v. United States, 357 F.2d 224 (8th Cir. 1966) (serviceman drowned in swimming pool on military base)
See, e.g., Dreier v. United States, 106 F.3d 844, 853 (9th Cir. 1997) (regarding the drowning death of an off-duty service member, the court recognized that "as an individual drinking beer and swimming during his leisure time in an area to which the public has access, [the service member] was in the same position as any civilian would have been at the time of the government's negligence"); Taber, 67 F.3d at 1051 (concerning the severe injuries sustained by service member driving a civilian's car on weekend leave in car accident off base with another service member, the Second Circuit determined that " [t]here is nothing characteristically military" in a service member's "spend [ing] a romantic weekend with a companion"); Kelly v. Panama Canal Comm'n, 26 F.3d 597, 600 (5th Cir. 1994) (regarding death of off-duty Army officer who was killed when the mast of a catamaran that he was sailing struck hanging electrical wire, the court noted that "the Commission has not shown that [the officer] was directly subject to military control. Rather, [the officer] was engaged in the purely recreational activity of sailing a catamaran rented from a civilian-run marina")
The two governments divided the responsibilities for this flight training program: the German government supplied the aircraft and maintenance; the United States Air Force "provid [ed] base support facilities and instructional training." Daberkow, 581 F.2d at 786
Aketepe, 925 F. Supp. at 734.
We recognize that Daberkow, In re "Agent Orange," and Aketepe were analyzed under the three rationales used by the Court to justify Feres. As we have explained, supra note 17, the first two rationales apparently lack current vitality. See Shearer, 473 U.S. at 58 n. 4, 105 S. Ct. at 3043 n.4. Moreover, our analysis is bound by our circuit precedents, Pierce and Parker