Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/860/357/465363/
Timestamp: 2020-07-13 09:26:08
Document Index: 665052505

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1962', '§ 1962', '§ 1962', '§ 1962', '§ 1961', '§ 1961']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Carrie Renee Gaudreau and Conrad Paul Gaudreau, Aka Josephgaudreau, Defendants-appellees, 860 F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1989) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Tenth Circuit › 1989 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Carrie Renee Gaudreau and Conrad Paul Gaudreau, Ak...
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Carrie Renee Gaudreau and Conrad Paul Gaudreau, Aka Josephgaudreau, Defendants-appellees, 860 F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1989)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit - 860 F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1989) Oct. 17, 1988. Rehearing Denied Jan. 9, 1989
This appeal involves a constitutional challenge to Colorado's commercial bribery statute, Colorado Revised Statutes Secs. 18-5-401(1) (a) and (1) (d) (1986), when used as a component of a RICO prosecution. The defendants-appellees Carrie and Joseph Gaudreau, the remaining defendants involved on this appeal, argue that the state statute's prohibition of a "knowing violation of a duty of fidelity" is unconstitutionally vague and therefore cannot form the basis of a racketeering charge. The district court agreed and dismissed the RICO counts of the indictment. 667 F. Supp. 1404. The government appeals. We reverse.
This alleged agreement between Mr. Lee and the Gaudreaus allegedly amounted to a conspiracy to conduct the affairs of Public Service through a pattern of racketeering activity3 in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), generally known as the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).4
Subsections (1) (a) and (1) (d) of the Colorado commercial bribery statute, C.R.S. Sec. 18-5-401, are void for vagueness, both facially and as applied in this case. Because alleged violations of that statute are the predicate offense for the RICO violations, Counts One and Two of the indictment must be dismissed.
667 F. Supp. at 1414. The government appeals.
The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 103 S. Ct. 1855, 1858, 75 L. Ed. 2d 903 (1983). The same facets of a statute usually raise concerns of both fair notice and adequate enforcement standards. Hence the analysis of these two concerns tends to overlap. The Supreme Court, however, while recently recognizing the second concern as more important, continues to treat each as an element to be analyzed separately. See id. at 357-58, 103 S. Ct. at 1858.
The degree of specificity which the Constitution demands depends on the nature of the statute. Criminal statutes must be more precise than civil statutes because the consequences of vagueness are more severe.5 Further, a scienter requirement may mitigate a criminal law's vagueness by ensuring that it punishes only those who are aware their conduct is unlawful.6 Also, regulatory statutes governing business activities may be less precise because the conduct proscribed is usually in a narrow category and the regulated enterprise may have the ability to clarify the meaning of the regulation by inquiring of an administrative agency or resort to an administrative process.7 Finally, the Constitution demands more clarity of laws which threaten to inhibit constitutionally protected conduct, especially conduct protected by the First Amendment.8 The defendants have not argued, nor do we perceive, that the Colorado commercial bribery statute threatens to chill constitutionally protected conduct. Nevertheless, the statute imposes criminal penalties and is not merely a business regulation. " [C]riminal responsibility should not attach where one could not reasonably understand that his contemplated conduct is proscribed." United States v. National Dairy Products Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32-33, 83 S. Ct. 594, 598, 9 L. Ed. 2d 561 (1963).
We address two preliminary issues. The Gaudreaus argue that the statute is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to them. Their facial challenge is inappropriate. Facial challenges are proper in two circumstances. First, a statute may be challenged on its face when it threatens to chill constitutionally protected conduct,9 especially conduct protected by the First Amendment. If a statute is so vague that it can reasonably be interpreted to prohibit constitutionally protected speech as well as conduct the state may constitutionally forbid, people may choose to refrain from speaking rather than challenge the statute's constitutionality in their criminal prosecution. Thus, freedom of speech will be chilled. We allow a person who is prosecuted for conduct which the state may constitutionaly forbid to challenge the statute as vague on its face, rather than restricting him to challenging it as applied to his conduct, because those who refrain from speech will never have a chance to make their claims in court. In this way the claims of those who would be silenced are heard. Vagueness and overbreadth challenges are similar in this respect. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358-59 n. 8, 103 S. Ct. at 1859 n. 8.
Second, a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute may in some instances be appropriate on pre-enforcement review. In a declaratory judgment action no one has been charged so the court cannot evaluate the statute as applied. In these cases, the challenger may attempt to facially attack the statute as "vague in all of its applications." Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 497, 102 S. Ct. 1186, 1193, 71 L. Ed. 2d 362 (1982). If a statute is vague in all its applications then it will necessarily be vague "as applied" in every case. The statute would thus be void on its face. On the other hand, since the Colorado statute challenged here does not threaten to chill constitutionally protected conduct, and has been applied to the challengers, we hold that we must examine the statute as applied for vagueness in light of the conduct with which the Gaudreaus are charged.10
We turn now to the first element of our vagueness analysis, the fair notice question. The Supreme Court has stated the test as follows: "As generally stated, the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited...." * Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357, 103 S. Ct. at 1858.
Such broad arguments are foreclosed by decisions of the Supreme Court. The Court has consistently held statutes sufficiently certain when they employ words or phrases with "a well-settled common law meaning, notwithstanding an element of degree in the definition as to which estimates might differ...." Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S. Ct. 126, 128, 70 L. Ed. 322 (1926).14
Additionally, the Supreme Court has recognized that "a scienter requirement may mitigate a law's vagueness, especially with respect to the adequacy of notice to the complainant that his conduct is proscribed...." Flipside, 455 U.S. at 499, 102 S. Ct. at 1193; see e.g., Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 395, 99 S. Ct. 675, 685, 58 L. Ed. 2d 596 (1979); Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 342, 72 S. Ct. 329, 331-32, 96 L. Ed. 367 (1952); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101-03, 65 S. Ct. 1031, 1035-36, 89 L. Ed. 1495 (1945); see also Murphy v. Matheson, 742 F.2d 564, 573-74 (10th Cir. 1984); M.S. News Co. v. Casado, 721 F.2d 1281, 1290 (10th Cir. 1983); United States v. Salazar, 720 F.2d 1482, 1485-86 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1110, 105 S. Ct. 789, 83 L. Ed. 2d 783 (1985).18 The Colorado statute prohibits enumerated classes of people from "knowingly violating or agreeing to violate a duty of fidelity...." The type of scienter which the prosecution must prove is precisely the type that overcomes the objection that the Colorado statute may punish without fair warning to the accused;19 the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew his duty of fidelity and knew he was violating it.20
We now address the second element of our vagueness analysis, the adequacy of the enforcement standards. Due process requires that legislation state reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement officials, juries, and courts to follow in discharging their responsibility of identifying and evaluating allegedly illegal conduct.21 Criminal statutes that fail to provide minimal guidelines may permit "a standardless sweep [that] allows policemen, prosecutors and juries to pursue their personal predilections." Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358, 103 S. Ct. at 1858 (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 575, 94 S. Ct. 1242, 1248, 39 L. Ed. 2d 605 (1974)); Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 165, 92 S. Ct. 839, 845, 31 L. Ed. 2d 110 (1972).
The Gaudreaus argue that the term "duty of loyalty" fails to specify any standard of conduct at all; it "simply has no core," citing Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. at 578, 94 S. Ct. at 1249-50 (1974), and Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 91 S. Ct. 1686, 29 L. Ed. 2d 214 (1971). We disagree. In Coates the Court held unconstitutionally vague a statute criminalizing acts of three or more persons assembling on any sidewalk who "there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by...." The statute was impermissibly vague because whether or not a person's behavior is "annoying" depends entirely upon the subjective judgment of the "persons passing by," or any police officer. As the Court said, " [t]he ordinance is vague, not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all." 402 U.S. at 614, 91 S. Ct. at 1688. Similarly, in Smith the Court held invalid a statute imposing criminal liability on one who, inter alia, "publicly ... treats contemptuously the flag of the United States...." Again the statute was held impermissibly vague because the standard depended on nothing more than the preference of the police, the court, and the jury for treatment of the flag. 415 U.S. at 578, 94 S. Ct. at 1249-50.22
In sum, the Colorado commercial bribery statute provides sufficient enforcement standards to satisfy "the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement." Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358, 103 S. Ct. at 1858 (quoting Smith, 415 U.S. at 574, 94 S. Ct. at 1248).
At this stage of the case the allegations in the indictment must be taken as true. Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 343 n. 16, 72 S. Ct. 329, 332 n. 16, 96 L. Ed. 367 (1952)
Similar commercial bribery statutes have been uniformly upheld in the face of vagueness challenges. See United States v. Perrin, 580 F.2d 730, 735 (1978); Ex Parte Mattox, 683 S.W.2d 93 (Tex.App. 3 Dist.1984); State v. Brewer, 258 N.C. 533, 129 S.E.2d 262, 277 (1963), appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question, 375 U.S. 9, 84 S. Ct. 72, 11 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1963); People v. Nankervis, 330 Mich. 17, 46 N.W.2d 592, 595 (1951).
18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate ... [18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) ]."
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person employed by ... any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate ... commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity...."
18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) defines "pattern of racketeering activity" to require at least two acts of racketeering activity.
18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) defines "racketeering activity" as "any act ... involving ... bribery ... which is chargeable under state law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year."
Colo.Rev.Stat. Sec. 18-1-105(1) (a) (1986) makes commercial bribery, a class 5 felony, punishable by one to two years' imprisonment.
Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515, 68 S. Ct. 665, 670, 92 L. Ed. 840 (1948); see also Kolender, 461 U.S. at 359 n. 8, 103 S. Ct. at 1859 n. 8
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101-04, 65 S. Ct. 1031, 1035-37, 89 L. Ed. 1495 (1945) (plurality opinion)
Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498, 102 S. Ct. 1186, 1193, 71 L. Ed. 2d 362 (1981); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 95 S. Ct. 710, 42 L. Ed. 2d 706 (1975); see also Joseph Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 49, 86 S. Ct. 1254, 1263, 16 L. Ed. 2d 336 (1966); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 428, 81 S. Ct. 1101, 1106, 6 L. Ed. 2d 393 (1961)
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 n. 5, 92 S. Ct. 2294, n. 5, 33 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1972); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372, 84 S. Ct. 1316, 1322-23, 12 L. Ed. 2d 377 (1964); United States v. National Dairy Products Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 36, 83 S. Ct. 594, 599-600, 9 L. Ed. 2d 561 (1963); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151, 80 S. Ct. 215, 217-18, 4 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1959); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515, 68 S. Ct. 665, 670, 92 L. Ed. 840 (1948)
Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 390-91, 394, 396, 99 S. Ct. 675, 683, 685, 686, 58 L. Ed. 2d 596 (1979) (statute subjecting doctors to criminal liability if they fail to use certain abortion procedures when the fetus is viable or there is sufficient reason to believe that the fetus may be viable held unconstitutionally vague on its face); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 59 S. Ct. 618, 83 L. Ed. 888 (1939) (statute making it a crime to be a "gangster"--"a member of any gang consisting of two or more persons," who has been convicted for certain prior offenses--held facially void for vagueness)
Flipside, 455 U.S. at 494-95, 102 S. Ct. at 1191; United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 92-93, 96 S. Ct. 316, 319-20, 46 L. Ed. 2d 228 (1975); Mazurie, 419 U.S. at 550, 95 S. Ct. at 714; National Dairy, 372 U.S. at 32-33, 36, 83 S. Ct. at 599-600; Robinson v. United States, 324 U.S. 282, 285-86, 65 S. Ct. 666, 668-69, 89 L. Ed. 944 (1945); United States v. Hines, 696 F.2d 722, 727 (10th Cir. 1982) (Oklahoma commercial gambling statute upheld against vagueness challenge and "appellants lack [ed] standing to attack the statute on the basis that it might be unconstitutionally vague as applied to the conduct of others")
Flipside, 455 U.S. at 494 n. 5, 102 S. Ct. at 1191; Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21, 22-23, 94 S. Ct. 190, 192, 38 L. Ed. 2d 179 (1973) ("For the purpose of determining whether a state statute is too vague and indefinite ... we must take the statute as though it read precisely as the highest court of the State has interpreted it.")
See also Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 50, 96 S. Ct. 243, 244, 46 L. Ed. 2d 185 (1975) ("crimes against nature" sufficiently defined to include conduct of defendant in light of prior state court decisions); Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377, 33 S. Ct. 780, 781, 57 L. Ed. 1232 (1913) (Sherman Act's criminal prohibition of conspiracy in restraint of trade, adopting common law interpretation, valid); Screws, 325 U.S. at 103-05, 65 S. Ct. at 1036-37 (plurality opinion upholding civil rights criminal prohibition of willful deprivation of constitutional rights, as made specific by express terms of the Constitution or decisions interpreting them); but cf. International Harvester v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 223, 34 S. Ct. 853, 855-56, 58 L. Ed. 1284 (1914). For criticism of the Court's application of the fair notice requirement see John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 Va. L. Rev. 189, 205-12 (1985)
"Unless otherwise agreed, an agent who makes a profit in connection with transactions conducted by him on behalf of the principal is under a duty to give such profits to the principal." Restatement (Second) of Agency, Sec. 388 (1958). See Byer v. International Paper Co., 314 F.2d 831 (10th Cir. 1963) (manager of lumber yard held liable for kickbacks he received in exchange for extending credit of employer to a customer)
Laws cannot define the boundaries of impermissible conduct with mathematical certainty. "Whenever the law draws a line there will be cases very near each other on opposite sides. The precise course of the line may be uncertain, but no one can come near it without knowing that he does so, if he thinks, and if he does so it is familiar to the criminal law to make him take the risk. Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 [33 S. Ct. 780]." United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396, 399, 50 S. Ct. 167, 169, 74 L. Ed. 508 (1930)
" [T]he requirement of a specific intent to do a prohibited act may avoid those consequences to the accused which may otherwise render a vague or indefinite statute invalid.... The requirement that the act must be willful or purposeful may not render certain, for all purposes, a statutory definition of the crime which is in some respects uncertain. But it does relieve the statute of the objection that it punishes without warning an offense of which the accused was unaware." Screws, 325 U.S. at 101-02, 65 S. Ct. at 1035-36 (quoted in Colautti, 439 U.S. at 395 n. 13, 99 S. Ct. at 685 n. 13)
" [I]t is evident that ... the 'scienter' [which mitigates vagueness] must be some other kind of scienter than that traditionally known to the common law--the knowing performance of an act with the intent to bring about that thing, whatever it is, which the statute proscribes, knowledge of the fact that it is so proscribed being immaterial.... Such scienter would clarify nothing; a clarificatory 'scienter' must envisage not only a knowing what is done but a knowing that what is done is unlawful or, at least so wrong that it is probably unlawful." Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 67, 87 n. 98 (1960) (cited in Flipside, 455 U.S. at 499 n. 14, 102 S. Ct. at 1193 n. 14)
Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357-58, 103 S. Ct. at 1858; Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108, 92 S. Ct. at 2298-99; Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574-75, 94 S. Ct. 1242, 1248, 39 L. Ed. 2d 605 (1974); United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 89, 41 S. Ct. 298, 300, 65 L. Ed. 516 (1921); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221, 23 L. Ed. 563 (1876)
See also Kolender, 461 U.S. at 360-61, 103 S. Ct. at 1859-60, (statute requiring persons to provide "credible and reliable" identification to police held unconstitutionally vague because the credibility and reliability of identification was determined by the subjective judgment of police)