Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/519/794/85575/
Timestamp: 2019-07-15 18:09:52
Document Index: 291036739

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1202', '§ 242', '§ 1202', '§ 242', '§ 1202', '§ 1202', '§ 1202', '§ 1203', '§ 1202', '§ 1202']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Robert P. Kelly, Defendant-appellee, 519 F.2d 794 (8th Cir. 1975) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Eighth Circuit › 1975 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Robert P. Kelly, Defendant-appellee
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Robert P. Kelly, Defendant-appellee, 519 F.2d 794 (8th Cir. 1975)
US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit - 519 F.2d 794 (8th Cir. 1975)
Submitted May 15, 1975. Decided June 11, 1975. Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied July 2, 1975
Robert P. Kelly was indicted for violation of 18 U.S.C. App. § 1202(a) (1), which prohibits possession of a firearm by one who has previously been convicted of a felony. The District Court dismissed the indictment, holding that Kelly was not a convicted felon within the meaning of the statute. We reverse.
The parties stipulated that Kelly had been convicted in Minnesota state court in 1970 of the crime of simple robbery, that he had served time in a reformatory pursuant to that conviction, and that, upon his release in August, 1973, he was granted a restoration of civil rights by the Minnesota Department of Corrections Youth Conservation Commission pursuant to Minn.Stat.Ann. § 242.31.1 They further stipulated, in effect, that all elements of § 1202(a) (1) had been met, with the exception of the disputed convicted felon issue. The District Court held that the restoration of civil rights pursuant to Minn.Stat.Ann. § 242.31 obliterated Kelly's felony conviction for purposes of § 1202(a) (1). We cannot agree.
Congress has expressly exempted from the operation of § 1202(a) (1)
As was true in United States v. Mostad, 485 F.2d 199, 200 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 947, 94 S. Ct. 1468, 39 L. Ed. 2d 563 (1974), "(t)he defendant is not such a person."3 He was neither pardoned by the Governor nor expressly authorized to possess a firearm. Instead,
Thrall v. Wolfe, 503 F.2d 313, 316 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, 95 S. Ct. 1392, 43 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1975).
Although the statute involved in Mostad, unlike the statute involved here, did not speak of "purging" and "nullifying" the conviction, the distinction is not a relevant one for purposes of § 1202(a) (1). Neither state rehabilitative program comes within the purview of § 1203(2), and the reasoning in Mostad is equally applicable here. In United States v. Glasgow, 478 F.2d 850 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 845, 92 S. Ct. 96, 30 L. Ed. 2d 95 (1973), the defendant had pleaded guilty to a felony, yet was classified under state law as a gross misdemeanant due to his light sentence. We held that he was still a convicted felon for purposes of § 1202(a) (1).
* * * (u)nder § 1202(a) (1), the government need not prove specific intent to violate the law or knowledge on the part of the defendant that he is violating the law. * * *
United States v. Mostad, 485 F.2d 199, 200 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 947, 94 S. Ct. 1468, 39 L. Ed. 2d 563 (1974).