Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp/628/1557/2595927/
Timestamp: 2019-08-21 20:29:36
Document Index: 384517313

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 404', '§ 4332', '§ 1502', '§ 1502', '§ 1502', '§ 1502', '§ 1502', '§ 1278', '§ 7', '§ 404', '§ 4332', '§ 1502', '§ 1962', '§ 10']

Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Marsh, 628 F. Supp. 1557 (D. Or. 1986) :: Justia
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Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Marsh, 628 F. Supp. 1557 (D. Or. 1986)
US District Court for the District of Oregon - 628 F. Supp. 1557 (D. Or. 1986)
628 F. Supp. 1557 (1986)
OREGON NATURAL RESOURCES COUNCIL, et al., Plaintiffs,
John O. MARSH, Jr., in his official capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of the Army, et al., Defendants.
*1558 *1559 *1560 Neil S. Kagan, Roseburg, Or., for plaintiffs.
Charles H. Turner, U.S. Atty., Thomas C. Lee, Asst. U.S. Atty., John R. Seeronen, Asst. District Counsel, Army Corps of Engineers, Portland, Or., Dorothy R. Burakreis, Land & Natural Resources Div., U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., for defendants.
ONRC initially charged the Corps with violating both the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (WASRA).[1] Prior to the hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction, ONRC withdrew its WASRA claim.[2] At issue here, therefore, is only whether the Corps violated the requirements of NEPA in the preparation of its Final Environmental Impact Statement Supplement (FEISS) on the Elk Creek project.
The parties have thoroughly canvassed the facts (largely undisputed) of this case. The voluminous administrative record also contains a detailed accounting of the facts.[3] It is, therefore, unnecessary to review the facts in detail for either party's benefit. *1561 Any reader desiring more detail may consult the entire record filed with the court.
Briefly, the construction of the Elk Creek Dam was authorized in 1962 as part of a three dam Rogue River Basin project. The project's primary purpose was to control flooding in the Rogue River Basin in Southern Oregon. The other two dams, Lost Creek Dam and Applegate Dam, have already been completed.
In February, 1982 the Corp issued a Record of Decision for the Dam's construction, subject to Congressional authorization. A § 404 Water Quality study was conducted and completed in October, 1983.[4] Also during that year the dam's structure was redesigned to lower the anticipated water temperatures. An Environmental Assessment (EA), Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI), and a Supplemental Information Report (SIR) were completed on those changes.
Despite the Division Engineer's Decision of Record recommending construction of the dam, the Corps did not seek funding for it. Nevertheless, in August, 1985, after five years of extensive testimony (before the relevant committees) and study regarding Elk Creek, Congress appropriated moneys and directed the Corps to build the dam.[5] ONRC then filed this suit to enjoin the dam's construction.
II. DISCUSSIONPRELIMINARY INJUNCTION STANDARDS
The first test requires that a court find 1) the moving party will suffer irreparable injury if the injunctive relief is not granted; 2) there is a substantial likelihood that the moving party will succeed on the merits; 3) in balancing the equities *1562 the nonmoving party will not be harmed more than the moving party is helped; and 4) granting injunctive relief is in the public interest.... The second test requires the moving party to demonstrate either 1) a combination of probable success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable harm; or 2) that serious questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in his favor.
"The purpose of NEPA is to assure that federal agencies are fully aware of the impact of their decision on the environment." Friends of the Endangered Species v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976, 985 (9th Cir.1985). To satisfy this purpose, NEPA requires that federal agencies undertaking projects with significant environmental consequences must identify and discuss all those foreseeable environmental consequences in an EIS. 42 U.S.C. § 4332.[6]
An EIS serves two basic purposes. It a) "should provide decision-makers with an environmental disclosure sufficiently detailed to aid in the substantive decision whether to proceed with the project in light of its environmental consequences" and b) "the impact statement should provide the public with information on the environmental impact of a proposed project as well as encourage public participation in the development of that information." Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir.1974).
employ a "rule of reason" that inquires whether an EIS contains a "reasonably thorough discussion of the significant aspects of the probable environmental consequences." Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276, 1283 (9th Cir. 1974). This standard is not susceptible to refined calibration. It instead requires a reviewing court to make a pragmatic judgment whether the EIS's form, content and preparation foster both informed decision-making and informed public participation. Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 565 F.2d 549, 552 (9th Cir.1977) (per curiam); Trout Unlimited, Inc., 509 F.2d at 1283. This standard of review, however, does not authorize a reviewing court to substitute its judgment for that of the agency concerning the wisdom or prudence of a proposed action. Once satisfied that a proposing agency has taken a "hard look" at the decisions environmental consequences, the review is at an end. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n. 21, 96 S. Ct. 2718, 2730 n. 21, 49 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1976).
California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 761 (9th Cir.1982).
ONRC claims that the Corps has violated NEPA by 1) failing to consider the cumulative effects of the Rogue River Basin Project in a single EIS; 2) failing to adequately *1563 describe the area affected by the project; 3) failing to adequately describe the environmental consequences of the project; 4) failing to provide a clear basis for choice among reasonable alternatives; 5) failing to comply with their disclosure and research duties under the worst case analysis; and 6) failing to prepare a new supplemental EIS. ONRC's claims are all rejected.
In a prospective project consisting of connected, dependent actions, a single EIS is necessary to adequately assess the cumulative impact of the entire project. See Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association v. Peterson, 764 F.2d 581 (9th Cir.1985). (EIS which did not address the cumulative effects of a proposed road construction project and related timber harvesting project on water quality was inadequate); and Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754, (9th Cir.1985). (Where "timber sales cannot proceed without the road, and the road would not be built without the contemplated timber sales", EIS which did not address the cumulative impact of the two proposed projects was inadequate. Id. at 758.)
However, the Rogue River Basin Project is nearly complete. To retrospectively compile a single EIS on the entire project would be illogical.[7] Rather, the more valuable tool in assessing the environmental consequences of the proposed Elk Creek Dam is an analysis of the cumulative impact of this dam when added to the existing components of the project. The Corps has done this.
*1564 That the Corps did not specify in the body of the FEISS the proximity of the dam to the Wild and Scenic area of the Rogue River, located 57 miles downstream, does not render its analysis inadequate. Based on its water quality studies, the Corps determined that the project's impact on the wild and scenic area, if any, would be insignificant. Thus, the Corps concluded that it was unnecessary to specify the proximity of the Wild and Scenic area in the FEISS.
C. Environmental Consequences
40 C.F.R. § 1502.16 requires that the EIS contain a discussion of the environmental consequences of the proposed action. The Corps must include in that discussion the indirect effects and their significance, the possible conflicts between the proposed action and other federal mandates and the means to mitigate adverse environmental impacts. ONRC alleges that the Corps has failed to satisfy these requirements.
The Corps' studies on the project's effects on downstream turbidity, including the effects on fish and angling, are documented in the 1974 Rogue River Basin Temperature and Turbidity Report and the 1979 Water Quality Study; and the FEISS. Conflicts of opinion, however, persist. While the Corps is required to identify opposing views found in the comments, so differences of opinion are readily apparent, it is not required to resolve conflicts raised by opposing viewpoints. California v. Block, 690 F.2d at 773; Warm Springs Dam Task Force, 565 F.2d at 554. That the "EIS promotes both informed decision-making and public participation" is the requirement of NEPA. Enos v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 1363, 1372 (9th Cir.1985). The Corps' comprehensive study and its recognition of the persisting conflicts satisfy that requirement.
As previously discussed, the Corps determined that the dam would not significantly affect the wild and scenic portion of the Rogue River. This conclusion was substantiated when the Secretary of the Interior *1565 notified the Corps shortly after the FEISS was completed that the dam would not conflict with the WASRA requirements relative to the wild and scenic portion of the Rogue.[8] Congress was aware of the dam's proximity to the wild and scenic portion of the Rogue and the Corps' failure to examine the environmental consequences of that proximity in the FEISS was not in error.
It is true, as ONRC asserts, that the mere listing of mitigation measures in an EIS is inadequate to satisfy the NEPA requirements. Northwest Cemetery Protective Association, 764 F.2d at 588. However, in this case, for every adverse environmental effect the Corps has developed, or is developing, mitigation measures to minimize or alleviate the potential damage.[9]
NEPA does not require that the Corps reject all projects that have any adverse environmental effects, nor does it require the Corps to completely compensate for them. Rather, NEPA requires that the Corps recognize the adverse environmental effects that cannot be avoided and mitigate those effects to the greatest extent possible. Friends of the Endangered Species v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d at 987. See also Sierra Club v. Clark, 774 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir.1985). I find that the Corps' mitigation plans satisfy that obligation.
ONRC argues that the Corps failed to provide a clear basis for choice among reasonable alternatives as required by 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14.[10] It bases this argument on the Corps' use of the 3¼% interest rate to calculate the cost benefit ratio to the project.
"An EIS cost benefit analysis is sufficient if it gives the decision makers and other readers enough detail concerning all of these costs and benefits [of a proposed project] to permit a reasoned evaluation and decision." South La. Env. Council v. Sand, 629 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir.1980).
ONRC correctly explains that "An unreasonable comparison of alternatives does result where an EIS pretends that a cost benefit analysis of the basin project, using an artificially low discount rate represents a realistic assessment of the economic value of the proposed action." (Plaintiff's memorandum in support of motion for preliminary injunction, p. 19, citing Johnston v. Davis, 698 F.2d 1088, 1094-95 (10th Cir. 1983)). ONRC then asserts that "the SEIS here pretended that its cost benefit analysis of the basin project, using the same artificially low discount rate, [of 3¼%] represented a realistic assessment of the economic value of the proposed action. And, as in Johnston v. Davis, the SEIS suggested without qualification that the project would produce net economic benefits, making no mention of the artificially low discount rate." ONRC's assertion is incorrect.
*1566 While the Corps used an artificially low discount rate of 3¼%, as required by law,[11] it did not represent that as a realistic assessment of the value of the proposed action. Rather, the Corps also evaluated the project under the currently required 7½% discount rate and included both calculations in an incremental cost-benefit analysis which was included in the FEISS. That cost benefit analysis showed the economic justification for the project was shaky.
Congress was fully aware of the realistic assessment of the economic justification for the project when it directed that the dam be constructed. It is not my role to review or reevaluate Congress' decision. Enos v. Marsh, 769 F.2d at 1375.[12] As the 5th Circuit Appeals Court aptly concluded in Sand:
If we were to review the factors of the Corps' economic benefit analysis in the plenary fashion requested by plaintiffs, all chaos would ensue ... Projects such as the one considered here have an extremely long gestation period. This particular project has undergone studies since its inception in 1968. Over time, the economic realities do change. But once Congress has authorized a project, it is not for the courts to review its economic justification. Congress has allowed limited review of such projects under NEPA but we are to evaluate the economic justification only if it has become so flawed that it grossly distorts the environmental consideration... Barring the extreme case, it is for Congress to determine when to reevaluate the economic justification for a particular project. After just such a reevaluation, this project was continued. We refuse to substitute our judgment for that of Congress and the Corps.
This is not an extreme case. Congress was not misled by the Corps' use of the 3¼ % discount rate. The Corps presented Congress with a realistic assessment of the project and a clear basis for choice among reasonable alternatives. Thus, ONRC's allegation is without merit.
ONRC next argues that the Corps failed to comply with their disclosure and research *1567 duties under the worst case analysis regulation.
An agency must conduct a worst case analysis "when the information relevant to the adverse impacts is essential ... and is not known and the overall cost of obtaining it are exorbitant or ... the information ... is important and the means to obtain it are not known." Save Our Ecosystems v. Clark, 747 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir. 1984), citing 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22.
The Corps conducted studies on the turbidity potential resulting from the dam using state of the art modelling techniques.[13] The Corps concluded that, from a technical and scientific standpoint, its predictions were reliable. It, therefore, did not indicate a scientific uncertainty or conduct a worst case analysis in its FEISS. The FEISS does, however, include the comments of others who questioned the accuracy of the Corps' testing techniques. If uncertainty does, in fact, exist, these comments in the FEISS expose them. That is what worst case analysis under 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 requires. The Corps has complied with that requirement.
"[A] federal agency has a continuing duty to gather and evaluate new information relevant to the environmental impact of its actions even after the release of its EIS." Enos v. Marsh, 769 F.2d at 1373; Stop H-3 Association v. Dole, 740 F.2d 1442, 1463 (9th Cir.1984,) cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 105 S. Ct. 2344, 85 L. Ed. 2d 859 (1985). The agency must supplement its EIS if "(t)here are significant new circumstances or information relevant to environmental concerns and bearing on the proposed actions or its impacts. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c) (1) (i) and (ii) (1984). An agency's decision not to supplement an EIS in light of new information will be upheld if it is reasonable." Id., Stop H-3 Association, 740 F.2d at 1463; Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Lieutenant General William C. Gribble, 621 F.2d 1017 at 1024 (9th Cir.1980).
The new information ONRC asserts justifies a new EIS supplement consists of two studies: Oregon Fish and Wildlife Department an "OFWD" study indicating concerns that the project will reduce fish population and angling opportunities;[14] and a soil survey done by the U.S. Soil Conservation Service.[15]
The Corps has evaluated the draft OFWD study and memoranda by several OFWD biologists regarding this study and has concluded that it did not present new information significant enough to justify a *1568 new EIS supplement.[16] The Corps is continuing to study the concerns expressed in the final OFWD study and to date has determined that no significant new information has been discovered justifying a new EISS.[17]
The study conducted by the U.S. Soil Conservation Service and submitted to the Corps in 1982 was discussed at length during the preliminary injunction hearing. The Corps' erosion control and sediment specialist who received this survey testified he did not consider it in a reevaluation of the environmental consequences of the dam. He testified that, while the soil mapping information is helpful in looking at the management of the project, as a scientific document evaluating turbidity production it is not very helpful.[18] He concluded that this survey did not produce significant new information justifying a new EIS supplement.
Congress was very aware of the environmental problems which surrounded the project but chose to approve it (over the *1569 President's contrary recommendation) in spite of these problems. Congress became the ultimate decision-maker. Such a legislative decision effectively supplants the Corps' decision to build the project and precludes our review of that substantive decision.
Sand, 629 F.2d at 1013, citing Environmental Defense Fund, Inc., v. Corps of Engineers, 492 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir.1974).
FRCP 65(a) gives me the discretion to treat a hearing for preliminary injunction as a final adjudication on the merits so long as the procedure does not result in prejudice to either ONRC or the Corps of Engineers. Glacier Park Foundation v. Watt, 663 F.2d 882, 886 (9th Cir.1981). Because the merits of the NEPA claim were reached at the preliminary injunction hearing, I exercise my discretion and grant ONRC's motion to consolidate the hearing and the trial.
Because I find that there is no just reason for delay, I expressly direct the clerk to enter a final judgment against ONRC on the NEPA claim, pursuant to FRCP 54(b). I further direct the clerk to enter an order dismissing ONRC's WASRA claim, without prejudice, pursuant to FRCP 41(a) (2).
[1] ONRC's complaint also alleges that the Corps violated the Freedom of Information Act relative to ONRC's request for information of the Elk Creek project. That issue is not addressed in this opinion. It will be decided at a later date.
[2] WASRA, 16 U.S.C. § 1278, (§ 7(a)), requires the Secretary of the Interior to determine whether a water resources project would have an adverse environmental effect on any river established as a wild and scenic river. The proposed Elk Creek dam is 57 miles upstream from the designated wild and scenic portion of the Rogue River. In accordance with WASRA requirements the Corps notified the Secretary of Interior of the Elk Creek project when the FEISS was complete.
[3] The Administrative Record (A.R.) is a comprehensive compilation of the documents relevant to the Corps' decisions regarding the proposed Elk Creek project. The entire A.R. is part of the case record filed with the court.
[4] Section 404 of the Clean Water Act requires the Corps to evaluate for water quality all projects which will discharge fill material into navigable waters. The Elk Creek § 404 evaluation, along with comments and responses, is set out at A.R. 19-19n.
[5] Testimony from the hearing conducted by both the House and Senate appropriations Subcommittees on Energy and Water development Appropriations from 1980-85 relative to the Elk Creek project are set out in A.R. 37-47. The Supplemental Appropriations Act, P.L. 99-88, signed by the President August 15, 1985 appropriates funds for the main dam at Elk Creek.
Elk Creek, Or.The Congress in action on the 1985 Energy and Water appropriations bill, Public Law 98-360 directed the Corps of Engineers to resume construction of the Elk Creek Lake project. Notwithstanding this specific legislative language, the Corps has not proceeded to carry out the congressional intent on this project.
[6] Section 102 of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332, states in part:
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible: (2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall
[7] This is not to say that the Corps is in any way relieved from its obligation to continue monitoring the environmental effects of Lost Creek and Applegate Dams and to mitigate environmental harm to the greatest extent possible. However, the nature and purpose of an EIS is prospective: to give the decision makers an adequate and realistic assessment of a proposed action from which they can determine whether to proceed. The purpose of EIS could not be served by compiling such a statement on a completed project.
[9] See e.g., discussion of Cole M. River's Fish Hatchery, A.R. 7 at 35 which is designed to mitigate loss of anadromous fish-spawning habitat in Elk Creek, Applegate River and Upper Rogue, and to mitigate lost trout production by providing rainbow trout and kokanee for stocking in reservoirs.
[10] 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 requires, in part that:
ONRC does not challenge the alternatives the Corps included in its EIS. Rather, ONRC argues that, because of the Corps' reliance on the 3¼% discount rate, it did not provide the decision-makers with a clear basis for choice among the options.
[11] 42 U.S.C. § 1962d-17(b).
[12] In Plaintiff's Brief in Reply to Defendants' Memorandum In Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, ONRC argues that Enos v. Marsh "is inapposite." ONRC argues that Enos holds that "Congressional action upon a specific cost benefit analysis forecloses judicial review of that analysis but only for purposes of assessing the agency's compliance with the Water Resources Development Act." (Emphasis added). To support this statement ONRC quotes Enos as noting that "violations based upon invalid use of the WRDA discount rate formula under NEPA and WRDA are distinct." ONRC has taken this quote out of context.
In Enos the court noted that the "WRDA discount rate formula is applicable to the EIS" but, because they are separate acts, claims of violations of the two Acts must be alleged separately. Enos challenged the 3¼% discount rate in the EIS for the first time on appeal. Therefore the court refused to hear the NEPA claim, noting, as ONRC quoted, that they are distinct violations.
While the WRDA violation was the only one at issue in Enos the court did not hold that Congressional action on a cost benefit analysis only foreclosed judicial review of WRDA violations. The Enos court stated that "Plaintiff concedes that Congressional action based upon a specific cost benefit analysis forecloses judicial review of that analysis." The Court cited three cases for that proposition: Izaak Walton League of America v. Marsh, 655 F.2d 346 (D.C.Cir. cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092, 102 S. Ct. 657, 70 L. Ed. 2d 630 (1981)); Environmental Defense Fund Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 492 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir.1974); and South La. Envtl. Council v. Sand, 629 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir.1980). Two of those three cases (EDF and Sand) were based on alleged NEPA violations.
Even though the court did not entertain the NEPA challenge on appeal it nevertheless went on to note that "in its 1976 EIS, the Corps also included a cost-benefit ratio based upon the discount rate of 6 3/8 % thereby fulfilling the substantive purpose of NEPA to inform the decision-makers and the public of the realistic consequences of agency actions."
The Corp has done essentially the same thing in this case, including a 7½% discount rate in addition to the statutorily required 3¼%. I cannot understand how ONRC can think Enos is inapposite. For the principal for which it was cited, it appears to be directly analogous to this situation.
[13] The 1974 Water Quality and Turbidity Study, A.R. 4, vol. 1 at 34 describes how the turbidity measurement is calculated. The Corps used the WESTEX mathematical modelling technique to predict future turbidity potential. See A.R. 6, App. C, § 10 for explanation of mathematical modelling. To verify the accuracy of the WESTEX model the Corps studied actual turbidity data from Lost Creek Dam with predicted data from WESTEX. This study resulted in the 1979 Water Quality Update, A.R. 6, App. C.
[14] Phase I Completion Report, Lost Creek Evaluation (Draft), dated August 3, 1984, A.R. 88, and Final Phase I Report, dated August, 1985, A.R. 92, completed by ODFW under contract with the Corps. The final report is currently under review by the Corps and outside experts. ONRC's actual reliance in arguing that the Corps must supplement its FEISS is on memoranda of several OFWD biologists who base their concerns on the Phase I Report findings. Exhibit 14 to Plaintiff's Brief Supporting Preliminary Injunction.
[15] Plaintiff's hearing exhibits 1-8 include the Soil Survey results and accompanying maps submitted to the Corps on August 13, 1982.
[16] See December 13, 1985 Affidavit of Jeffrey C. Laufle, Corps fishery biologists responsible for managing the ODFW Rogue River Fishery Evaluation Studies. See also reference to December 9, 1985 deposition of Steven Cramer cited to in Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Plaintiff's Application for Injunctive Relief, pgs. 39-41.
[17] The final Phase I completion report has been under review since it was submitted to the Corps in August, 1985. The evaluation has been conducted by Jeffrey Laufle, Corps fishery biologist and outside experts. See Jeffry Laugle Affidavit, supra n. 36.
[18] Plaintiff's Hearing Exhibits 1-8. The survey documents and illustrates the composition of soils near the Elk Creek shoreline. It does not specifically identify soils with high turbidity potential, nor was it designed to evaluate turbidity potential.