Source: http://ny.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20170308_0005550.NY.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2018-07-22 01:21:37
Document Index: 142026995

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 590', '§ 590', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6']

The defendant's submissions in opposition to the motion for summary judgment also failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the note secured by the construction mortgage was funded. The defendant did not submit any evidence in support of his averment that the $650, 000 that he admittedly received was not intended to include the funds loaned pursuant to the $350, 000 note secured by the construction mortgage. Further, the defendant failed to raise a triable issue of fact concerning alleged violations of Banking Law §§ 590 and 6-l. Since construction mortgages are exempt from the requirements of article 12-D of the Banking Law (see 3 NYCRR 39.5[b]), Banking Law § 590, which is contained in article 12-D, and which requires entities engaged in the business of making mortgage loans to be licensed by New York State, does not apply to the subject construction mortgage. Banking Law § 6-l, which "imposes limitations and prohibits certain practices for high-cost home loans'" (Aries Fin., LLC v 12005 142nd St., LLC, 127 A.D.3d 900, 901, quoting Banking Law § 6-l[2]; see Lewis v Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 134 A.D.3d 777, 778), defines "home loan" as, among other things, a loan that is "secured by a mortgage or deed of trust on real estate improved by a one to four family dwelling" (Banking Law § 6-l[1][e][iv]). Here, it is undisputed that the real estate at issue was unimproved by any structure; indeed, the proceeds of the construction mortgage were to be used to improve the land by constructing a one- or two-family residence. Accordingly, the construction mortgage was not the type of loan, i.e., a home loan, to which Banking Law § 6-l applies.
The Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in adopting the referee's computation of the amount owed by the defendant. "In an action of an equitable nature, the recovery of interest is within the court's discretion. The exercise of that discretion will be governed by the particular facts in each case, including any wrongful conduct by either party" (US Bank N.A. v Williams, 121 A.D.3d 1098, 1102 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see CPLR 5001[a]; U.S. Bank N.A. v Zembova, 137 A.D.3d 1010, 1011; Norwest Bank Minn., NA v E.M.V. Realty Corp., 94 A.D.3d 835, 837; Dayan v York, 51 A.D.3d 964, 965; Danielowich v PBL Dev., 292 A.D.2d 414, 415). Contrary to the defendant's contention, the conduct of the plaintiffs in this action was not so egregious as to merit the imposition of sanctions against them, in the form of limiting the interest awarded to them or otherwise (see Bank of Am., N.A. v Lucido, 114 A.D.3d 714, 715). Moreover, the referee properly included in the calculation of the amount owed a sum the plaintiffs advanced to Rockland County in payment of delinquent real estate taxes owed on the subject property. Contrary to the defendant's contention, there is no evidence in the record that he had a payment plan with the Rockland County Commissioner of Finance to pay off the debt at the time the payment was advanced.