Source: http://www.leagle.com/decision/19891756719FSupp1037_11627/CLARK%20v.%20JIM%20WALTER%20HOMES,%20INC.
Timestamp: 2017-03-24 15:53:09
Document Index: 579474330

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 7', '§ 313', '§ 302', '§ 7', '§ 9', '§ 10', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 6']

CLARK v. JIM WALTER HOMES, INC. | 719 F.Supp. 1037 (1989) | Leagle.com
719 F.Supp.
719 F.Supp. 1037 (1989)
CLARK v. JIM WALTER HOMES, INC.
Civ. A. No. 88-T-1117-S.
Wavie C. CLARK, et al., Plaintiffs,
John L. Knowles, Kelly & Knowles, Charles W. Fleming, Jr., Lee & Fleming, Geneva, Ala., for plaintiffs.
Richard H. Gill, Lee H. Copeland, Copeland, Franco, Screws & Gill, Montgomery, Ala., for defendant.
FootNotes 1. This type of house is composed of large, preformed sections, which are assembled on the construction site by the seller. See, e.g., Fuqua Homes, Inc. v. Evanston Building & Loan Co., 52 Ohio App.2d 399, 370 N.E.2d 780 (1977) (per curiam).
2. Jim Walter Homes suggests in its brief regarding this count that the fact that the Clarks cannot identify a specific duration for their alleged express warranty defeats their claim. Essentially, Jim Walter Homes argues that since the Clarks cannot characterize the express warranty as a "one-year" warranty or a "two-year" warranty, they should not be able to invoke it as grounds for relief. Jim Walter Homes cites no law for this proposition, however. It appears to the court that the scope of § 7-2-313 will often present this question of the length of effect of the warranty, and the court has no reason to believe that Alabama courts follow other than the general rule of "reasonable construction" of the proposed warranty. 77 C.J.S. Sales § 313(a) (1952). Warranties by their nature extend beyond the close of the contract on which they are based, and may be either continuing or limited in duration. Id. at § 302(d). The court rejects the position urged by Jim Walter Homes and finds the Clarks' reliance on § 7-2-313 reasonable in the context of this case.
3. Section 9-109 defines consumer goods as those goods which "are used or bought for use primarily for personal, family or household purposes." For a discussion of the relationship between real property concepts and § 9-109's definition of consumer goods, see 1 G. Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property § 10.6 at 310-12 (1965).
4. The court notes also that jurisdictions are divided over the related question of whether mobile homes are consumer goods under § 9-109. See Annotation, Secured Transactions: What Constitute Consumer Goods Under UCC § 9-109(1), 77 A.L.R.3d 1225, 1243-47 (1977 & Supp.1988).
5. The statute as amended reads:
§ 6-2-3.