Source: http://openjurist.org/88/f3d/1393
Timestamp: 2013-05-21 18:07:17
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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2', '§ 1973', '§ 2', '§ 1973', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2']

88 F3d 1393 Clark | OpenJurist
88 F. 3d 1393 - Clark	Home88 f3d 1393 clark
88 F3d 1393 Clark 88 F.3d 1393
65 USLW 2068
James H. CLARK; Barbara Brown, Plaintiffs-Appellants,v.CALHOUN COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI; Calhoun County DemocraticExecutive Committee, By and Through its Chairperson, J.R.Denton; Calhoun County Republican Executive Committee, Byand Through its Chairperson, Henry Bailey; Calhoun CountyElection Commissions, By and Through its Chairperson, R.W.Bounds, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 95-60251.
Before LAY1, HIGGINBOTHAM and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
The basic facts of this case are fully described in our decision rendered the first time this case was before us. See Clark v. Calhoun County, Mississippi, 21 F.3d 92 (5th Cir.1994). To briefly summarize those facts: The plaintiffs, James Clark and Barbara Brown, are black residents and registered voters in Calhoun County, Mississippi. The county's districting plan divides the county into five districts, each of which elects one county supervisor, one board of education member, and one election commissioner.
After a bench trial, the district court granted judgment to the County, concluding that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that a geographically compact black majority district could be created. In addition, the court concluded that under the totality of circumstances, the plaintiffs had failed to prove a § 2 violation. The district court's written opinion did not address the plaintiff's constitutional claims, but the plaintiffs did not appeal the dismissal of those causes of action. We vacated the district court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings on the plaintiff's statutory claim. See Clark v. Calhoun County, 21 F.3d 92 (5th Cir.1994).
On remand, the parties submitted additional evidence regarding the feasibility of drawing a geographically compact majority-minority district and the existence of racially-polarized voting in the county. After reviewing the evidence, the district court found that a geographically compact black majority district could be created and that racially polarized voting existed in the county. Noting that the plaintiffs had satisfied the three preconditions from Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986), the court reconsidered its findings regarding the totality of the circumstances. Without elaboration, the court determined that its earlier findings were not erroneous and concluded that "when all the circumstances are considered, 'plaintiffs have not shown that as a result of the adopted supervisory plan, they do not have equal opportunity to participate in the political process and to elect candidates of their choice.' " The plaintiffs appeal the district court's judgment.
Section 2 of the 1965 Voting Rights Act prohibits any voting practice or procedure that "results in a denial or abridgment of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color." 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a). Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 49-51, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 2766-67, 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986), set forth three preconditions to establishing a § 2 violation: The plaintiff must demonstrate that 1) the minority group is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district; 2) the minority group is politically cohesive; and 3) the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate. Id. at 50-51, 106 S.Ct. at 2766-67; Concerned Citizens for Equality v. McDonald, 63 F.3d 413, 416 (5th Cir.1995). These preconditions apply to challenges to both single-member and multi-member districting schemes. Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 39-41, 113 S.Ct. 1075, 1084, 122 L.Ed.2d 388 (1993) (applying Gingles to single-member districts).
The three Gingles preconditions are necessary but not sufficient to prove vote dilution. Johnson v. DeGrandy, --- U.S. ----, ----, 114 S.Ct. 2647, 2657, 129 L.Ed.2d 775 (1994). If those preconditions are established, the plaintiffs must further prove that "under the 'totality of circumstances,' they do not possess the same opportunities to participate in the political process and elect representatives of their choice enjoyed by other voters." League of United Latin American Citizens v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831, 849 (5th Cir.1993) (en banc), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1071, 114 S.Ct. 878, 127 L.Ed.2d 74 (1994); see 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b). Although unlawful vote dilution "may be readily imagined and unsurprising" where the three Gingles preconditions exist, that conclusion "must still be addressed explicitly, and without isolating any other arguably relevant facts from the act of judgment." Johnson, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2657.
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 44-45, 106 S.Ct. at 2763. In addition, "evidence demonstrating that elected officials are unresponsive to the particularized needs of the members of the minority group and that the policy underlying the State's or the political subdivision's use of the contested practice or structure is tenuous may have probative value." Id. at 45, 106 S.Ct. at 2763.
Noting that the district court found on remand that the three Gingles preconditions were satisfied, the plaintiffs challenge the district court's conclusion that, under the totality of the circumstances, the plaintiffs failed to prove a § 2 violation. The plaintiffs refer to our statement in Clark that " 'it will be only the very unusual case in which the plaintiffs can establish the existence of the three Gingles factors but still have failed to establish a violation of § 2 under the totality of circumstances.' " 21 F.3d at 97 (quoting Jenkins v. Red Clay Consol. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 4 F.3d 1103, 1135 (3d Cir.1993)) (emphasis added); see also NAACP v. City of Niagara Falls, New York, 65 F.3d 1002, 1019 n. 21 (2d Cir.1995).
We initially note that our review is hampered by the district court's curt discussion regarding the totality of the circumstances. In our previous opinion, we instructed the district court on remand to "reconsider its findings with respect to the totality of circumstances." 21 F.3d at 97. We further instructed the district court that in cases where the three Gingles preconditions have been established, it " 'must explain with particularity why it has concluded, under the particular facts of that case, that an electoral system that routinely results in white voters voting as a bloc to defeat the candidate of choice of a politically cohesive minority group is not violative of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act.' " 21 F.3d at 97 (quoting Jenkins, 4 F.3d at 1135). Despite these instructions, the district court readopted its earlier findings without elaboration and summarily concluded that the existence of racially polarized voting in the county was not sufficient to tip the balance in favor of the plaintiffs. This discussion is far from the particularized explanation that we expected. Normally, we would remand this case for further consideration. However, we need not do so where the record establishes unlawful vote dilution. Harvell v. Blytheville School Dist. # 5, 71 F.3d 1382, 1390 (8th Cir.1995) (en banc), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 1876, 135 L.Ed.2d 172 (1996). We are persuaded that the district court's findings from its first opinion regarding the totality of the circumstances, which the court readopted on remand, support the conclusion that Calhoun County's redistricting scheme violates § 2 of the Voting Rights Act. We do not suggest that the totality of the circumstances is an empty formalism or that clearing the Gingles hurdles preordains liability. To the contrary, this final inquiry can be powerful indeed. At the same time, it is more than an intuitive call of the trial judge; the trial court must anchor its judgment in evidence.
As we made clear prior to Johnson, the existence of the three Gingles preconditions is necessary but not sufficient to prove a § 2 violation. See LULAC, 999 F.2d at 849. However, the existence of racially polarized voting and the extent to which minorities are elected to public office remain the two most important factors considered in the totality-of-circumstances inquiry. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 48 n. 15, 106 S.Ct. at 2765-66; Westwego Citizens for Better Government v. City of Westwego, 946 F.2d 1109, 1122 (5th Cir.1991) (Westwego III ).
In this case, the district court's finding that racially polarized voting exists is beyond question. In addition to the "uncontradicted" statistical evidence from the original trial, Dr. Richard Engstrom, a Professor of Political Science at the University of New Orleans, analyzed four, multiracial elections in Calhoun County. Using both regression and homogenous precinct analysis, Dr. Engstrom concluded that a "consistent relationship" existed between a voter's race and his voting preference in the four exogenous elections. For example, in the 1991 Democratic primary for Constable, the black candidate received an estimated 71.6% of the black vote but only 7.8% of the white vote. Although statistical evidence is not conclusive, see Clark, 21 F.3d at 96, the record here supports no other conclusion but that racially polarized voting exists in Calhoun County. Indeed, the County offers no other explanation of the divergent voting patterns. See Uno v. City of Holyoke, 72 F.3d 973, 983 (1st Cir.1995).
Moreover, the record demonstrates that black citizen have been unsuccessful in seeking public office. The County emphasizes that black residents have been elected as aldermen in several municipalities and, in one case, as an election commissioner. We previously addressed the probative value of these electoral successes and noted their "limited relevance." 21 F.3d at 96. Even so, "the election of a few minority candidates does not necessarily foreclose the possibility of dilution of the black vote." S.Rep. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 n. 115 (1982) (internal quotation omitted), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 207 n. 115; see also Gingles, 478 U.S. at 76, 106 S.Ct. at 2779-80; City of Niagara Falls, 65 F.3d at 1009; Harvell, 71 F.3d at 1390. Indeed, these isolated victories, one of which occurred in a race with no opponent, do not mitigate the force of the district court's finding that "[i]n this century, no black candidate has been elected in Calhoun County as supervisor, justice court judge, constable, sheriff, circuit clerk, chancery clerk, tax assessor, superintendent of education, school board member, coroner, county attorney, state senator, or state representative." Moreover, there is no suggestion that this striking lack of electoral success is due to low voter turnout or black support for non-minority candidates. Cf. Alonzo v. City of Corpus Christi, 68 F.3d 944, 947 (5th Cir.1995) (per curiam).
The County responds that few black residents have run for county office. As an initial matter, we note that the County overstates the political reality. The district court found in its first opinion that "since 1980 blacks have sought the positions of justice court judge, constable, sheriff, and school board member." More importantly, however, this argument begs the ultimate question whether blacks "possess the same opportunities to participate in the political process and elect representatives of their choice enjoyed by other voters." That few or no black citizens have sought public office in the challenged electoral system does not preclude a claim of vote dilution. Westwego Citizens For Better Government v. City of Westwego, 872 F.2d 1201, 1208 n. 9 (5th Cir.1989) (Westwego I ). "To hold otherwise would allow voting rights cases to be defeated at the outset by the very barriers to political participation that Congress has sought to remove." Id.
Second, under certain circumstances, the majority vote requirement "can operate to the detriment of minority voters" and negate their political strength. Westwego III, 946 F.2d at 1113 n. 4. Where more than two candidates run for a particular office, the majority vote requirement ensures that no candidate supported by only a minority, racial or otherwise, of the populace will succeed. In the presence of racially polarized voting, the majority vote requirement permits a white majority that scattered its votes among several white candidates in a election to consolidate its support behind the remaining white candidate in the run-off election, thereby defeating the minority-supported candidate. See Major v. Treen, 574 F.Supp. 325, 351 n. 32 (E.D.La.1983) (three judge panel); see also Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1306 (5th Cir.1973) (en banc) (noting that majority vote requirement tends "to submerge a political or racial minority"), aff'd sub nom. East Carroll Parish Sch. Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636, 96 S.Ct. 1083, 47 L.Ed.2d 296 (1976) (per curiam).
Two factors from the Senate Report focus on the effect of past discrimination on the plaintiffs' ability to participate in the political process: 1) the history of voting-related discrimination in the State or political subdivision, and 2) the extent to which minority group members bear the effects of past discrimination in areas such as education, employment, and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 44-45, 106 S.Ct. at 2762-64. In its pre-remand opinion, the district court found that "in the past blacks were prevented from exercising their right to vote by intentionally discriminatory mechanisms." Nevertheless, the court found this factor to be of "limited importance" because "past history cannot be forever faulted for failures at the election box." The district court explained that at some point past discrimination must take on "diminished importance." In addition, the district court found that "the socio-economic status of blacks is significantly lower than whites in Calhoun County" but questioned without elaboration the weight to be assigned to this finding.
S.Rep. 417 at 29 n. 116, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 207 n. 116; see also Westwego I, 872 F.2d at 1213 n. 15. Indeed, in Westwego III, we rendered judgment for the plaintiffs, even though we agreed with the district court that the plaintiffs had failed to prove a lack of responsiveness by city officials. 946 F.2d at 1123; see also Harvell, 71 F.3d at 1391 (noting that "[e]ven accepting the finding of responsiveness as not clearly erroneous, however, it is similarly insufficient to counter the other factors that censure this scheme").
Second, the district court's finding of responsiveness cannot be weighed in the abstract. Responsiveness, like many things, is a question of both kind and degree. While two cities may both be said to be responsive to minority needs, the two may vary greatly in approach and commitment. The totality-of-circumstances inquiry is not blind to those differences. Although we acknowledge that discerning those differences demands difficult qualitative judgments, see S.Rep. 417 at 29 n. 115, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 207 n. 115 (noting responsiveness is less objective factor than others), we are reminded that "[i]n countless areas of the law weighty legal conclusions frequently rest on methodologies that would make scientists blush." LULAC, 999 F.2d at 860. We offer no bright line here. We are content to note that paving roads left unpaved by years of discrimination and appointing a biracial redistricting commission do not reflect the comprehensive and systematic responsiveness to minority needs that is entitled to substantial weight in the totality-of-circumstances inquiry. Cf. City of Niagara Falls, 65 F.3d at 1023 (describing city's "numerous" efforts to address minority needs).
We find no merit to the suggestion that the County must prove that the challenged electoral system is necessary to achieve its interest in equalizing road mileage among districts. Id. at 875-76. We do, however, agree that this factor deserves little weight. In Jones v. City of Lubbock, 727 F.2d 364, 383 (5th Cir.1984), we described this factor as having "diminished importance," and we expressed doubt "that the tenuousness factor has any probative value for evaluating the 'fairness' of the electoral system's impact."
Our decision in LULAC does not undermine but rather supports that conclusion. In that case, we distinguished between a non-tenuous state interest and a substantial state interest. 999 F.2d at 870 (noting that Texas did not assert non-tenuous but rather substantial interest). Although we noted that "[t]he weight, as well as tenuousness, of the state's interest is a legitimate factor in analyzing the totality of circumstances," id. at 871, we reaffirmed that "[p]roof of a merely non-tenuous state interest discounts one Zimmer factor, but cannot defeat liability." Id.
In Gingles, the Court noted that the Senate Report advised that "there is no requirement that any particular number of factors be proved, or that a majority of them point one way or the other." Gingles, 478 U.S. at 45, 106 S.Ct. at 2763. In this case, we are persuaded that, under the totality of the circumstances, the plaintiffs have demonstrated a § 2 violation. Neither the County's responsiveness to its black citizenry nor its interest in equalizing road mileage among districts mitigates the striking lack of black electoral success in county elections and the "uncontradicted" existence of racially polarized voting. In short, this is not that "unusual case" in which the three Gingles preconditions are satisfied but the totality of circumstances fail to show a § 2 violation. See, e.g., City of Niagara Falls, 65 F.3d at 1020 (concluding that, under totality of circumstances, no § 2 violation existed where "many" of the Senate Report factors pointed against the plaintiffs). The district court's finding to the contrary is clearly erroneous.
As an alternative ground for affirming the judgment of the district court, the County argues that the proposed majority-minority district violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The County relies on the Supreme Court's decision in Miller v. Johnson, --- U.S. ----, ----, 115 S.Ct. 2475, 2488, 132 L.Ed.2d 762 (1995), which held that strict scrutiny applies to redistricting plans where "race was the predominant factor motivating the legislature's decision to place a significant number of voters within or without a particular district." The County claims that racial considerations dominated the drawing of the proposed black-majority district in Calhoun County and that, therefore, the proposed district is unconstitutional after Miller.
In Miller, the Supreme Court confronted the constitutionality of Georgia's Eleventh Congressional District, one of three majority-minority districts in the State. Drawn in response to the Justice Department's refusal to preclear earlier reapportionment plans pursuant to § 5 of the 1965 Voting Rights Act, the Eleventh District mimicked Sherman's March-to-the-Sea, traversing the 260 miles from Atlanta to Savannah. A three-judge district court panel found that race was the dominant purpose in creating the Eleventh District. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the appellants did not contest the district court's finding but rather claimed that the legislature's motivation by itself did not suffice to state a claim under Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 113 S.Ct. 2816, 125 L.Ed.2d 511 (1993). Rather, the appellants argued that the district court must find that the district's shape was so bizarre on its face as to be unexplainable on grounds other than race. The Supreme Court disagreed.
--- U.S. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 2486. The Court made clear that plaintiffs who challenge the constitutionality of reapportionment plans "are neither confined in their proof to evidence regarding the district's geometry and makeup nor required to make a threshold showing of bizarreness." Id. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 2488.
Id. Justice O'Connor added in her concurring opinion that this standard was "a demanding one," requiring the plaintiff to show that the legislature "has relied on race in substantial disregard of customary and traditional districting practices." Id. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 2497 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In those cases where the plaintiff successfully proves that race was the "predominant, overriding" consideration motivating the drawing of district lines, the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that its districting plan is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest. Id. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 2490.
Id. at ---- - ----, 115 S.Ct. at 2490-91.
The Court concluded that the Eleventh District was not required by the Voting Rights Act "under a correct reading of the statute." Id. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 2491. That Georgia drew the Eleventh District in order to obtain preclearance under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act did not mean that the plan was required by the Act. Id. To the contrary, the Eleventh District was not required under the Act "because there was no reasonable basis to believe that Georgia's earlier enacted plans violated § 5." Id. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 2492. Noting that the earlier plans had increased the number of majority-minority districts from the previous apportionment, the Court explained that such ameliorative plans did not violate § 5 "unless the new apportionment itself so discriminates on the basis of race or color as to violate the Constitution." Id.
The Court added that the Justice Department's interpretation of § 5 as authorizing it to preclear only those reapportionment plans that maximized majority-minority districts portended constitutional difficulties for § 5 and brought the Voting Rights Act "into tension with the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 2493. The Court eschewed reaching the constitutional question, however, noting only that there was no indication that Congress intended § 5 of the Voting Rights Act to reach as far as the Justice Department had pushed it. Id.
Second, while Miller left these issues unresolved, its condemnation of race-based districting decisions was loud and clear. The Court described the evils of race-based redistricting, declaring that " '[r]acial gerrymandering, even for remedial purposes, may balkanize us into competing racial factions; it threatens to carry us further from the goal of a political system in which race no longer matters--a goal that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments embody, and to which the Nation continues to aspire.' " Id. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 2486 (quoting Shaw, 509 U.S. at 656-58, 113 S.Ct. at 2832) (emphasis added).
The Court's recent decisions in Bush v. Vera, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 1941, --- L.Ed.2d ---- (1996), and Shaw v. Hunt, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 1894, --- L.Ed.2d ---- (1996) (Shaw II ), built upon the framework established by Miller and resolved several of the questions Miller had left unanswered. In Bush, the Court struck down three majority-minority Congressional districts in Texas as violative of the Equal Protection Clause. The three districts were the product of the Texas legislature's effort to increase the number of majority-minority districts in the State. No opinion commanded a majority. Justice O'Connor, writing for two other Justices, began her analysis by noting that strict scrutiny does not apply to all cases involving the intentional creation of majority-minority districts. --- U.S. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 1951. Rather, Justice O'Connor reaffirmed Miller 's predominant factor test and found that the three challenged districts all failed that test, thereby triggering strict scrutiny.2
In her opinion for the plurality, Justice O'Connor assumed without deciding that compliance with § 2 of the Voting Rights Act constituted a compelling governmental interest. Id. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 1960. Although strict scrutiny is a demanding standard, Justice O'Connor explained that the narrow tailoring prong of the test permitted the States "a limited degree of leeway" in drawing a remedial, majority-minority district. Id. To demonstrate that a majority-minority district is reasonably necessary to comply with § 2, the State must have a "strong basis in evidence" for finding that the three Gingles preconditions exist. Id.
Although Justice O'Connor was willing to assume the existence of the last two Gingles preconditions in the instant case, she concluded that the challenged districts' bizarre shape and lack of compactness "defeat[ed] any claim that the districts are narrowly tailored to serve the State's interest in avoiding liability under § 2." Id. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 1960. Although "[a] § 2 district that is reasonably compact and regular, taking into account traditional districting principles such as maintaining communities of interest and traditional boundaries, may pass strict scrutiny without having to defeat rival compact districts designed by plaintiffs' experts in endless 'beauty contests,' " id. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 1960, a non-compact majority-minority district is not required by § 2 and, therefore, fails the narrowly tailored prong of strict scrutiny. Id. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 1960. Justices Thomas and Scalia, concurring in the judgment, agreed without elaboration that the districts were not narrowly tailored. Id. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 1974.
Of particular significance, both Justice O'Connor and Justice Kennedy filed concurring opinions that further addressed the relationship between the Equal Protection Clause and § 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Although Justice O'Connor's opinion for the plurality only assumed that compliance with the Voting Rights Act was a compelling governmental interest, Justice O'Connor expressly adopted that position in her separate concurring opinion. See id. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 1968. On this point, at least four other Justices agreed with Justice O'Connor. See id. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 1988 (Stevens, J., joined by Ginsburg and Breyer, J.J., dissenting); id. at ----, ----, 116 S.Ct. at 1998, 2007 (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg and Breyer, J.J., dissenting). Moreover, Justice O'Connor opined that "if a State pursues that compelling interest by creating a district that 'substantially addresses' the potential liability, and does not deviate substantially from a hypothetical court-drawn § 2 district for predominantly racial reasons, its districting plan will be deemed narrowly tailored." Id. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 1969.
Justice Kennedy agreed that the three challenged districts were not narrowly tailored to serve the asserted interest in complying with § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, but his approach differed slightly from the plurality's. Id. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 1971. Justice Kennedy noted that the first Gingles precondition focuses not on the compactness of the contested district but rather the compactness of the minority population. Id. As a consequence, Justice Kennedy was willing to assume that Texas had a strong basis in evidence for concluding that all three Gingles preconditions existed. Indeed, only if all three Gingles preconditions were met would a court reach the question whether the challenged district was narrowly tailored to remedying the potential § 2 violation.
Nevertheless, the challenged districts' lack of compactness, which persuaded Justice O'Connor that the first Gingles factor was not met, persuaded Justice Kennedy that the districts did not substantially address the potential § 2 violation. Emphasizing the plurality's statement that the remedial district "must 'substantially address the § 2 violation' " to satisfy the narrow tailoring prong of strict scrutiny, Justice Kennedy attempted to give content to that phrase by noting that a State "may not engage in districting based on race except as reasonably necessary to cure the anticipated § 2 violation, nor may it use race as a proxy to serve other interests." Id. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 1972 (emphasis added). In Justice Kennedy's eyes, the inclusion of some minority communities that "could not possibly form part of a compact majority-minority district" belied the claim that Texas drew the district to remedy a potential § 2 violation. Id. Justice Kennedy cautioned, however, that the Court's focus on compactness did not mean that all majority-minority districts had to be compact to satisfy constitutional scrutiny. To the contrary, "[d]istricts not drawn for impermissible reasons or according to impermissible criteria may take any shape, even a bizzare one." Id. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 1973.
Shaw II, which was decided the same day as Bush, invalidated North Carolina's Twelfth Congressional District, a "serpentine" district 160 miles in length and often no wider than the interstate that it followed in its "snake-like" trek through the heart of the State. --- U.S. at ----, ----, 116 S.Ct. at 1899, 1900. Applying Miller 's predominant purpose test, the Court found that race was the predominant factor in drawing the challenged district. Id. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 1900. As in Bush, the Court assumed that compliance with the Voting Rights Act was a compelling governmental interest, see id. at ---- n. 4, ----, 116 S.Ct. at 1902 n. 4, 1905, but it concluded that District 12 was not narrowly tailored to that end. Id. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 1906. The Court explained that the majority-minority district "must, at a minimum, remedy the anticipated violation [of § 2] or achieve compliance to be narrowly tailored." Id. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 1905. Noting that the first Gingles precondition requires the existence of a geographically compact minority group, Chief Justice Rehnquist declared that "[n]o one looking at District 12 could reasonably suggest that the district contains a 'geographically compact' population of any race." Id. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 1906.
In contrast to Miller's focus on motivation, the first Gingles factor requires that the plaintiff demonstrate that the minority group is "sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district." Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50, 106 S.Ct. at 2766. Plaintiffs typically attempt to satisfy this requirement by drawing hypothetical majority-minority districts. When combined with the second Gingles factor requiring that minority voters demonstrate their political cohesiveness, the first Gingles factor ensures that the minority has the potential to elect a representative of its own choice in some single-member district. See Growe, 507 U.S. at 39-41, 113 S.Ct. at 1084; Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50 & n. 17, 106 S.Ct. at 2766 & n. 17. Absent a satisfactory showing on the first Gingles factor, minority voters cannot claim that it is the current districting system and not, for example, geographic dispersal that is the source of their disproportionately weak political strength. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50 n. 17, 106 S.Ct. at 2766 n. 17.
This is not to say that Bush does not insist that districting plans drawn to remedy potential violations of the Voting Rights Act escape scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. --- U.S. at ---- - ----, 116 S.Ct. at 1960-61. It is true that here, unlike Bush, there is an adjudicated violation of the Voting Rights Act, but that does not remove the constitutional constraints. See Dillard v. City of Greensboro, 74 F.3d 230, 233-34 (11th Cir.1996) (applying Miller to redistricting plan imposed by district court to remedy § 2 violation). It is also true that Miller, Bush, and Shaw II make clear that a majority-minority district is not per se unconstitutional. Calhoun County's argument to the contrary glosses over a number of required analytical steps.
Bush established a two-part inquiry for determining whether a majority-minority district passes constitutional muster. Such a district is constitutional if the State has a "strong basis in evidence" for concluding that the three Gingles preconditions are present and if the district drawn in order to satisfy § 2 does not "subordinate traditional districting principles to race substantially more than is 'reasonably necessary' to avoid § 2 liability." --- U.S. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 1961. Although a State need not await judicial findings to that effect, see id. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 1969 (O'Connor, J., concurring), we have already found that the three Gingles preconditions exist here.
To be narrowly tailored, the remedial district must use race at the expense of traditional political concerns no more than is reasonably necessary to remedy the found wrong. Stated another way, the remedial district must "substantially address" the violation and "not deviate substantially from a hypothetical court-drawn § 2 district for predominantly racial reasons." Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 1972 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Shaw II, --- U.S. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 1905 (holding that majority-minority district must, "at a minimum," remedy the violation to be narrowly tailored). As this language suggests, the proposed majority-minority district used to satisfy the first Gingles factor exemplifies the narrowly tailored district. Indeed, it is deviations from this district that raise problems. See Bush, --- U.S. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 1961; Shaw II, --- U.S. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 1906. And, of course, a district court supervising the development of a remedy may reject a proposed remedial district that "substantially deviates" from the hypothetical district.
There has been no finding that the plaintiffs' plans subordinate traditional race-neutral districting plans to racial considerations. The plaintiffs presented several redistricting plans to the district court, one of which allegedly made "minimal changes to existing districts and precinct lines." Compare Miller, --- U.S. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 2497 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that predominant factor test is "a demanding one") with Quilter v. Voinovich, 912 F.Supp. 1006, 1019 (N.D.Ohio) (holding that predominant factor test is satisfied where "a state substantially complies with traditional districting principles" but "gives them less weight in the apportionment process than racial considerations"), appeal dismissed, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 42, 133 L.Ed.2d 9 (1995). Whether those changes are truly "minimal" and, if not, whether the districts use race no more than is reasonably necessary to remedy the found violation are questions best left to the district court on remand.
Redistricting to remedy found violations of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act by definition employs race. Miller, Shaw II, and Bush, however, do not foreclose the ability of States to act "to remedy the reality of racial inequality in our political system." Bush, --- U.S. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 1970 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The limit is that the remedy must use race at the expense of traditional political concerns no more than is reasonably necessary to remedy the found wrong.
Justices Thomas and Scalia, who did not join Justice O'Connor's opinion for the plurality but provided a majority by concurring in the judgment, disagreed with the plurality on this point and concluded that the intentional creation of a majority-minority district was sufficient to trigger strict scrutiny. Id. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 1972. On this point, at least six Justices sided with Justice O'Connor's view of the law. Compare id. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 1951 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Kennedy, J.); id. at ---- & n. 7, 116 S.Ct. at 1977 & n. 7 (Stevens, J., joined by Ginsburg and Breyer, J.J., dissenting); id. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 2007 (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg and Breyer, J.J., dissenting) with id. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 1971 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (reserving the question) and id. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 1972 (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)
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