Source: http://docs.dos.ny.gov/coog/ftext/13107.htm
Timestamp: 2016-05-29 11:28:25
Document Index: 792676139

Matched Legal Cases: ['§87', '§87', '§87', '§87', '§87', '§87']

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FOIL-AO-13107
December 28, 2001 Dear
I appreciate having received a copy of Mr. Olivieri's determination of an appeal made under the Freedom of Information Law by Ms. Paula Chabrowe. Her request involved "written documentation of the procedure for the issuance of summonses for unleashed dogs in the park by Parks Enforcement Patrol officers." Both you and Mr. Olivieri denied access on the basis of §87(2)(e)(i), stating that the records sought were compiled for law enforcement purposes and would, if disclosed, "interfere with law enforcement investigations or judicial proceedings..."
With all due respect, in consideration of the general subject of the request, dealing with unleashed dogs, it is difficult to understand how every aspect of the procedures in question would, if disclosed, result in harm or disadvantage to the Department, let alone interference with law enforcement investigations or judicial proceedings. I would conjecture that enforcement of matters relating to unleashed dogs rarely results in detailed investigations or judicial proceedings that involve incidents resulting in penalties more serious than violations. Even if some aspects of the records sought could justifiably be withheld, based on the language of the law and its judicial construction, a "blanket" denial of access would be inappropriate. As you are aware, the Freedom of Information Law is based upon a presumption of access. Stated differently, all records of an agency are available, except to the extent that records or portions thereof fall within one or more grounds for denial appearing in §87(2)(a) through (i) of the Law. It is emphasized that the introductory language of §87(2) refers to the authority to withhold "records or portions thereof" that fall within the scope of the exceptions that follow. In my view, the phrase quoted in the preceding sentence evidences a recognition on the part of the Legislature that a single record or report, for example, might include portions that are available under the statute, as well as portions that might justifiably be withheld. That being so, I believe that it also imposes an obligation on an agency to review records sought, in their entirety, to determine which portions, if any, might properly be withheld or deleted prior to disclosing the remainder.
The Court of Appeals reiterated and expressed its general view of the intent of the Freedom of Information Law in Gould v. New York City Police Department [87 NY 2d 267 (1996)], stating that:
"...to invoke one of the exemptions of section 87(2), the agency must articulate 'particularized and specific justification' for not disclosing requested documents (Matter of Fink v. Lefkowitz, supra, 47 N.Y.2d, at 571, 419 N.Y.S.2d 467, 393 N.E.2d 463). If the court is unable to determine whether withheld documents fall entirely within the scope of the asserted exemption, it should conduct an in camera inspection of representative documents and order disclosure of all nonexempt, appropriately redacted material (see, Matter of Xerox Corp. v. Town of Webster, 65 N.Y.2d 131, 133, 490 N.Y.S. 2d, 488, 480 N.E.2d 74; Matter of Farbman & Sons v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., supra, 62 N.Y.2d, at 83, 476 N.Y.S.2d 69, 464 N.E.2d 437)" (id.). In a recent decision that relates in some respects to the instant situation, Capruso v. New York State Police (Supreme Court, New York County, NYLJ, July 11, 2001), the request involved the "operator's manual for any radar speed detection device used" by the New York State Police and the New York City Police Department. The Division of State Police contended that disclosure would interfere with the ability to effectively enforce the law concerning speeding. Nevertheless, following an in camera inspection of the records, it was found that the Division could not meet it burden of proving that the harmful effects of disclosure appearing in the exceptions to rights of access would in fact arise.
In its attempt to deny access to the records, the Division relied upon §87(2)(e)(i) and (iv) of the Freedom of Information Law as a means of justifying its denial. The latter permits an agency to withhold records that are "compiled for law enforcement purposes" to the extent that disclosure would "reveal criminal investigative techniques or procedures, except routine techniques and procedures."
With respect to the possibility that disclosure would interfere with law enforcement investigations or judicial proceedings, it was found that there was no "causal link" that justified such a contention and that the Division's claims were "speculative." With regard to reliance on §87(2)(e)(iv), the court referred to the leading decision on the matter, Fink v. Lefkowitz [47 NY2d 567 (1979)], which was cited in Gould, supra. That decision involved access to a manual prepared by a special prosecutor that investigated nursing homes in which the Court of Appeals held that: "The purpose of this exemption is obvious. Effective law enforcement demands that violators of the law not be apprised the nonroutine procedures by which an agency obtains its information (see Frankel v. Securities & Exch. Comm., 460 F2d 813, 817, cert den 409 US 889). However beneficial its thrust, the purpose of the Freedom of Information Law is not to enable persons to use agency records to frustrate pending or threatened investigations nor to use that information to construct a defense to impede a prosecution. "To be distinguished from agency records compiled for law enforcement purposes which illustrate investigative techniques, are those which articulate the agency's understanding of the rules and regulations it is empowered to enforce. Records drafted by the body charged with enforcement of a statute which merely clarify procedural or substantive law must be disclosed. Such information in the hands of the public does not impede effective law enforcement. On the contrary, such knowledge actually encourages voluntary compliance with the law by detailing the standards with which a person is expected to comply, thus allowing him to conform his conduct to those requirements (see Stokes v. Brennan, 476 F2d 699, 702; Hawkes v. Internal Revenue Serv., 467 F2d 787, 794-795; Davis, Administrative Law [1970 Supp], section 3A, p 114). "Indicative, but not necessarily dispositive of whether investigative techniques are nonroutine is whether disclosure of those procedures would give rise to a substantial likelihood that violators could evade detection by deliberately tailoring their conduct in anticipation of avenues of inquiry to be pursued by agency personnel (see Cox v. United States Dept. of Justice, 576 F2d 1302, 1307-1308; City of Concord v. Ambrose, 333 F Supp 958)."
In applying those criteria to specific portions of the manual, which was compiled for law enforcement purposes, the Court found that: "Chapter V of the Special Prosecutor's Manual provides a graphic illustration of the confidential techniques used in a successful nursing home prosecution. None of those procedures are 'routine' in the sense of fingerprinting or ballistic tests (see Senate Report No. 93-1200, 93 Cong 2d Sess [1974]). Rather, they constitute detailed, specialized methods of conducting an investigation into the activities of a specialized industry in which voluntary compliance with the law has been less then exemplary. "Disclosure of the techniques enumerated in those pages would enable an operator to tailor his activities in such a way as to significantly diminish the likelihood of a successful prosecution. The information detailed on pages 481 and 482 of the manual, on the other hand, is merely a recitation of the obvious: that auditors should pay particular attention to requests by nursing homes for Medicaid reimbursement rate increases based upon projected increase in cost. As this is simply a routine technique that would be used in any audit, there is no reason why these pages should not be disclosed" (id. at 573). As the Court of Appeals has suggested, to the extent that the records in question include descriptions of investigative techniques which if disclosed would enable potential lawbreakers to evade detection or endanger the lives or safety of law enforcement personnel or others [see also, Freedom of Information Law, §87(2)(f)], a denial of access would be appropriate. Again, even if there may be portions of the records sought which if disclosed would result in those deleterious effects, the remainder of the records must, in my view, be disclosed.
RJF:jm cc: Alessandro G. Olivieri Paula Chabrowe DOS Home