Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp/288/254/1641914/
Timestamp: 2019-05-22 20:43:43
Document Index: 632154131

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1346', '§ 2671', '§ 2674', '§ 2674', '§ 185', '§ 1346', '§ 1346', '§ 2671', '§ 1346', '§ 2674', '§ 78', '§ 5', 'art, 17']

Platis v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 254 (D. Utah 1968) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › District Courts › Utah › District of Utah › 1968 › Platis v. United States
Platis v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 254 (D. Utah 1968)
U.S. District Court for the District of Utah - 288 F. Supp. 254 (D. Utah 1968)
288 F. Supp. 254 (1968)
*255 *256 Paul N. Cotro-Manes and Tom G. Platis, Salt Lake City, Utah, Therald N. Jensen, Price, Utah, for plaintiffs.
The present actions, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(b), § 2671, and § 2674,[1] arise out of a head-on collision which occurred in Utah when Airman First Class Williams, a member of the military forces of the United States, driving his own automobile, ran into an automobile driven by Norman Day. Norman Day was killed, and three other men, passengers in the car driven by him, were seriously injured, one of them suffered a broken back and is 100% disabled. Helen N. Day, the widow of Norman Day, for herself, and as the guardian of their minor child, Roban Day, the three passengers, Platis, Jones and Maricich brought these suits against the United States, alleging that Airman First Class *257 Williams was negligent, that his negligence was the direct and proximate cause of the accident, that he was an employee of the government acting within the scope of his employment, and that his employer, the United States was liable vicariously under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
To the judge advocate[2] at Hill Air Force Base, 19 days after the accident, Airman Williams gave a written sworn *258 statement in which he said: "I later found the vehicle in question (white car) was stopped and was going to make a left turn. At the time I observed the vehicle initially no signal was apparent; however between the time I first observed the vehicle and the time I realized that he was stopped, he did signal for a left turn." This sharply conflicts with his deposition taken nearly two years after the accident in which he says he saw no hand signal from the car and no turn light signal.
That Williams was attempting to avoid a rear end collision with the stopped white vehicle is admitted in the written sworn statement to the judge advocate 19 days after the accident: "I attempted to brake my vehicle to avoid a rear end collision with the stopped vehicle." And again he admitted it in his statement, two months after the accident, to an insurance adjuster in Portland: "I remember I was trying to avoid rear-ending another car." But, when his deposition was taken nearly two years after the accident, he said in reference to this statement, "At that time (in Portland) I didn't know exactly what happened."
*259 When did Williams see the Day vehicle? His testimony is: "Upon hitting my brakes I began an immediate swerve into the left lane of traffic. At this time I saw there was an oncoming vehicle in the left lane." He also says at no time prior to the collision did he see the vehicle he hit.
*260 "A. No, I don't. As I said, it was just when the car got into the other lane that I lost control. I may have panicked. I don't know what happened.
Williams' deposition is confusing and contradictory. The government attorney cross-examined his own witness, led him, suggesting his answers, which never tends to strengthen a witness' credibility. For example, the witness Williams was led and his answers suggested when he testified that he did not intend to pass the white car, he was going to stop behind it, and also when the witness denied that he voluntarily turned or swerved into the opposite lane of traffic. The answers are not his; they are the attorney's.[3] Neither one of them answers the question was Williams looking ahead, on the watch for approaching cars. We wonder why?
"A. With myNot that tire. With our experience, if it had been flat before the impact, a flat tire leaves a mark down the highway.
*261 Williams testified in his deposition that his car had a state inspection sticker on the windshield at the time of the accident. The car had been inspected in May 1965, around mid-month. He said the inspection consisted of: "a general safety check of the automobile, check of the tire treads, all your glass in the car, check the brakes, the steering, your ball joints, and what have you in the front, shocks, muffler, horn. They go through and pull off your brake drum and inspect your shoes and the lining, brake lining, and check your master cylinder and hose feed for your hydraulic brakes."
4. In failing to keep a reasonable and prudent look-out for approaching traffic. Covington v. Carpenter, 4 Utah 2d 378, 294 P.2d 788 (1956).
5. In failing to exercise ordinary and reasonable care and prudence to keep his car under control. Wardel v. Jerman, 18 Utah 2d 359, 423 P.2d 485 (1967).
(1) To drive his car on the right half of the highway.[4]
*262 (2) When overtaking and passing a vehicle proceeding in the same direction to pass to the left of such vehicle at a safe distance.[5]
(3) Not to drive to the left side of the roadway when approaching, within 100 feet of or traversing any intersection.[6]
(4) Not to follow another vehicle more closely than was reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of such vehicles and the traffic upon and the condition of the highway.[7]
(5) To drive his vehicle as nearly as practical entirely within a single lane and not to move from such lane until he first ascertained that such movement could be made with safety.[8]
(6) Not to drive along the highway to the left of the double yellow lines painted on the pavement.[9]
Williams' violations of the standards of safety set by these statutes "is to be regarded as prima facie evidence of negligence, but is subject to justification or excuse." Klafta v. Smith, 17 Utah 2d 65, 68, 404 P.2d 659, 661 (1965). The government's evidence falls far short of fairly or reasonably warranting a finding of justification or excuse.
Airman First Class Williams, who had been in the Air Force over four years, was issued military orders which directed him to proceed on permanent change of station travel status[10] from one permanent duty station to another.
Air Force Regulations provide members "shall be deemed to be in a travel status while performing travel away from their permanent duty station, upon public business, pursuant to competent travel orders." * * * "Travel Status", the Regulations say, "will commence with departure from permanent duty station," and includes, "Permanent change of station: Travel from one permanent duty station to another permanent duty station."[11]
The unit and major air command from which he was relieved by his orders was 4608th Support Squadron, Air Defense Command, Ent Air Force Base, Colorado.[12] The new unit, major air command and duty station to which he was assigned was 337th Fighter Group, Air Defense Command, Portland International Airport, Oregon.[13]
Before departing Ent Air Force Base, Colorado, he was handed "PERMANENT CHANGE OF STATION ORDER MILITARY,"[14] "Special Order Number A-429,"[15] which was issued by "Commander, Headquarters 4600th Air Base Wing, Air Defense Command, U. S. Air Force, Ent Air Force Base, Colorado, dated 5 April 1965."[16]
The reassignment of Williams to Portland, Oregon was for the purpose of Air Force duty.[17] He was ordered to report to the commander at the new assignment not later than 1 August 1965.[18]
Williams requested delay en route, which was authorized, provided it "does not interfere with reporting on date specified and provided individual has *263 sufficient accrued leave." This is indicated by code in his orders.[19]
Williams' travel orders authorized him to use his own private automobile. This, too, is indicated by code in his orders.[20]
Furthermore, Williams' travel order authorizes remuneration for this movement of his personal belongings, furniture, household goods, etc.[21]
The date on which Williams was to be picked up on the rolls of the 337th Fighter Group (ADC) Portland International Airport, Oregon, was 7 July '65.[22]
The travel orders included a direction to the Airman to report to the nearest active Air Force Installation as soon as possible "in the event of general war or if the CONUS[23] is attacked."[24]
This is a matter of record which the government could, and should, have produced. In the absence of the record the court received secondary evidence. There are several other records the government did not produce which would have been substantial aids in the search for the truth of this matter.[25]
Williams did not report to the commander at the new assignment as ordered, *264 i. e. "not later than 1 August 1965."[26] One result of Williams' negligent driving is that he didn't arrive on time at Portland. It was in the interest of the Air Force that he drive carefully so he would do so. And to that end, at all times during the trip, Williams was accountable to the Air Force for all of his actions, including the driving of his private automobile. Can it seriously be claimed that the Air Force did not have the right and the power to control him in those activities affecting his safety and punctual reporting for duty?
He was admitted to the hospital in Portland 18 August 1965. He did not return to duty until some time later than that.[27]
The Greenfeather case involved a fact situation comparable to that being considered in the instant cases.[28]
At the time of the accident, Williams was in fact on the most direct route from Colorado to Portland, Oregonthe route over which the "official highway distance",[29] for mileage allowance purposes had been computed. He had not deviated from that route in the slightest, and didn't intend to. While "delay en route chargeable as ordinary leave" was authorized in his travel order, he had taken no leave and didn't intend to take any until he reached his wife's folks home at Rockaway. He had planned no side trips.
Williams further testified he was travelling under orders at the request of the United States. He was ordered to remove himself from Ent Air Force *265 Base, Colorado, to the International Airport, Portland, Oregon. He didn't have any choice in the matter; he didn't have "any say about it".
In a two-sentence[30]per curiam decision, in 1955, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the state law of respondeat superior controlled the determination whether a soldier in the United States Army was "acting within the scope of his employment."
Many cases were decided in the federal courts before Williams v. United States, supra, and a considerable number since. Those which have applied "federal law", or the law of different states, or which involved different factual situations, or are conflicting have not been useful in the consideration of these cases. The court in O'Brien v. United States, 236 F. Supp. 792, pp. 794-795 (District of Maine, 1964) summarizes them, as well, in our judgment, as it can be done:
"Both parties attempt to draw support from cases decided by federal courts throughout the country arising from accidents involving servicemen travelling by privately owned automobile between permanent duty stations. These cases, however, are of little help, both because of the different factual situations presented and because they have applied the law of other states or, in some instances before Williams v. United States, supra, federal law. Furthermore, they are conflicting. Generally, these cases have imposed liability upon the Government when the serviceman at the time of the accident was in travel status proceeding directly from his former to his new duty station. Cooner v. United States, 276 F.2d 220 (4th Cir. 1960); Hinson v. United States, 257 F.2d 178 (5th Cir. 1958); United States v. Mraz, 255 F.2d 115 (10th Cir. 1958); cf. Sample v. United States, 178 F. Supp. 259 (D.C.Minn.1959); Satterwhite v. Bocelato, 130 F. Supp. 825 (E.D.N.C. 1955); Purcell v. United States, 130 F. Supp. 882 (N.D.Cal.1955); Whittenberg v. United States, 148 F. Supp. 353 (S.D.Tex.1956) (civilian employee). Under similar conditions, however, other courts have reached the opposite conclusion. Chapin v. United States, 258 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 924, 79 S. Ct. 607, 3 L. Ed. 2d 627 (1959); United States v. Sharpe, 189 F.2d 239 (4th Cir. 1951); cf. Jozwiak v. United States, 123 F. Supp. 65 (S.D.Ohio 1954) (civilian employee). On the other hand, in most cases the courts have refused to hold the Government liable when the accident occurred while the serviceman was on leave or delay en route status. United States v. Eleazer, 177 F.2d 914 (4th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 903, 70 S. Ct. 517, 94 L. Ed. 1333 (1950); Noe v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 639 (E.D.Tenn. 1956); cf. Kunkler v. United States, 295 F.2d 370 (5th Cir. 1961) (deviation). To the contrary, however, is United States v. Kennedy, 230 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1956); cf. Marquardt v. United States, 115 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.Cal.1953) (civilian employee). Because of the different facts involved and the differences in the laws of the several states in which they have arisen, no good purpose will be served by further discussion of these federal cases. This case must be decided upon its own facts and is governed by Maine law."
Under Williams v. United States, supra, we are obliged to apply the law of the State of Utah, which was the place of the accident, although cases involving the responsibility of the United States for damage caused in this type of situation can never arise in the state courts. This is due to the singular relationship of the United States to its military personnel, and, to the provision of the Tort *266 Claims Act conferring exclusive jurisdiction upon the federal courts.[31]
The unanimous decision of the Utah Supreme Court which, factually, comes closest to the cases at bar, and which may be as close as any civilian case we will ever be able to find,[32] is Chatelain v. Thackeray et al., 98 Utah 525, 100 P.2d 191 (1940). The Supreme Court affirmed a judgment entered upon the verdict of the jury, and held that the insurance agent was not an independent contractor, that he "was engaged partly to effect contractual relations" between the company and third persons, and "partly to do physical errands for it as when he delivered policies, made collections or turned over money" to the company. "The purpose of his trip to Salt Lake City on the day of the accident comprised all of these duties, as well as the duty of soliciting sales of insurance." The court deemed it unnecessary to discuss the distinction between an agent and a servant. "Where the superior has right of control over his subordinate as to the means used by the latter in the conduct of the purposes of the relationship, that distinction becomes merely academic, since in either event the rule of respondeat superior applies." (98 Utah at pages 548-549, 100 P.2d at page 201).
Thackeray was a life insurance agent who travelled in his own car, and who was "authorized and, in effect, directed," to use the car in pursuit of the company's *267 business. He paid his own car and travel expenses.
Thackeray intended to work on the company business that evening upon his return to Ogden. See 98 Utah 525 at page 547, 100 P.2d 191.
*268 Williams intended also to go through Portland and on beyond to visit his wife's folks. Thackeray intended to finish some work on company business in the Ogden office, and then go home to Morgan.
Professor Mechem[33] explains the point by saying, "* * * considering the nature of the job, the smoking cannot be thought of independently but must be thought of rather as a (bad) way of doing the job. If a truck driver uses both hands to light his pipe and loses control of the truck, we do not exonerate the master by saying that smoking is not within the scope of his employment; we say that driving is, and that this was a bad way of driving. On the other hand if the driver throws away the match and ignites the neighboring field, presumably the master is not liable; that is not a way of driving a truck at all.
"* * * In the cases under discussion the servant is most commonly one employed to handle gasoline or some other highly inflammable substance. When his cigarette ignites the gasoline, we do not say it was a poor way to smoke but smoking is no part of the employment; we say it was a poor way to pour gasoline."
It is significant and emphasizes the point of Chatelain v. Thackeray, supra, that the Utah court (98 Utah at page 544, 100 P.2d 191) rejected the Missouri case of Vert v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 342 Mo. 629, 117 S.W.2d 252, 116 A.L.R. 1381. The government, in the *269 cases at bar, relies heavily upon Bissell v. McElligott, 248 F. Supp. 219 (D.C. 1965); 369 F.2d 115 (8 Cir. 1966). That case was decided by both the district court and court of appeals upon the authority of Vert v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., and the Missouri law, which was stated to be: that an employer cannot be held liable unless "the right of the employer to control the physical acts or movements of the employee at the very moment of the occurrence", is established as a necessary element of plaintiff's cause of action.
The Fourth Circuit in Cooner v. United States[34] also rejects Vert v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., and the Missouri view which requires a showing that at the time of the accident, the master had the right to control the details and manner of the servant's driving.
The Missouri anomaly[35] also is rejected in the Tenth Circuit by Chief Judge Murrah in United States v. Mraz, 255 F.2d 115 (1958), and by Chief Judge Arraj of the Colorado District, in Court-right v. Pittman, 264 F. Supp. 114 (1967).
Four years before Chatelain v. Thackeray, the Utah Supreme Court decided the leading case of Fox v. Lavender, 89 Utah 115, 56 P.2d 1049, 109 A.L.R. 105 (1936). The case has had a profound influence upon the law of agency in Utah.
It is cited here for the illuminating opinion of Mr. Justice Wolfe,[36] in which he said:
"Control as applied to the operation of an automobile may be broken down into its elementsthe when, the where, and the how.[37] Complete control means that the principal could dictate when the car was to be used, the destination or where it should go, the route it should take, and how it should be driven, whether slow or fast, behind or around traffic, inside or outside the lane of traffic, etc. It is not necessary that the principal should be physically able to so direct or control, *270 but only that he has the right to. Such legal right of control arises out of the relationship of master and servant, where the servant is the operator of the car. In contemplation of law, an individual employing a chauffeur or a corporation employing a hundred truck drivers has the right of control over the servants driving their cars, although it would be, in fact, an impossibility to exercise it. Each of such servants is in contemplation of law the agent or instrumentality through which the master acts, and in contemplation of law each is acting in place of the master or principal. Improvement in means of communication between a driver and an absent master may in time make possible actual driving by remote control. In such case the master will be actually doing what in law he already has the right to do."
Although the point was necessary to the decision in Chatelain v. Thackeray, and the court referred to it, the case which establishes the "dual purpose" doctrine in Utah law is Carter v. Bessey et al., 97 Utah 427, 93 P.2d 490 (1939) where an employee of the Jewel Tea Company took orders, made deliveries of merchandise and collections. He chose his own routes in the area assigned to him but was instructed not to drive the company truck for personal use. He, at night, after making his last call, purchased a Christmas tree for his personal use, placed it on the running board and was proceeding at the time of accident along the most direct route to employer's garage situated across the street from employee's home. When driving around the corner and into the street to his home and the company garage, he ran into the plaintiff. At that time he was on his master's business to put the car, containing some of the company's undelivered goods, in the garage for the night, and on his own business to deliver the Christmas tree to his home across the street. The Supreme Court said:
"Appellant relies principally upon the case of Cannon v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 60 Utah 346, 208 P. 519 (1922), but the facts in that case are widely different from those in the case at bar. There the driver worked definite hours, and the accident occurred several hours after he had ceased his employment for the master and while he was using the truck upon business wholly and exclusively his own. Though he was driving the company's truck he was completely dissevered from the master's control or service. In the case before us, Bessey had not completed his day's work for the master. He was still about his master's business though also incidentally attending to some purposes of his own. That such dual activity does not ipso facto discharge the master from liability is settled by the overwhelming weight of authority. A slight deviation from orders or attending incidentally to other business than the master's, but which does not dissever the servant from the master's business does not relieve the master from liability for the servant's negligence. If the servant is about the master's business even though also attending to private affairs, he is within the scope of his employment and the master is liable. But when the servant, for purposes of his own or for purposes other than the master's business, is engaged *271 in activity which has no relation to the master's business, to his employment, he has for such time departed from the scope of his employment and the master is not liable for his negligence.
In the excellent case note in 45 Minnesota Law Review 275, at 277, the author says "* * * if the right to control present in the military situation were found in a civilian situation, the existence of the master-servant relationship would be clear."[38] The insurance company's right of control in Chatelain v. Thackeray, supra, and generally in insurance salesmen cases, comes pretty close. They "are full time employees, most emphatically doing the business of their employer * * * and functioning under constant exhortation and direction as to the manner at least in which they negotiate. Indeed, when one reads in some of the cases of the daily routine of the insurance salesman, beginning with a pep meeting at eight a. m. and terminating with another one at six p. m., with statements of sales made, rewards for those who have been successful and reprimand for those who haven't, one gets the impression that it is not adequate to call these salesmen servants; they are more like slaves."[39]
*272 Even the young airman gave a better analysis than that (Deposition page 70):
The government cited the so-called "going to and coming from work" cases.[40] The Fifth Circuit, in Hinson v. United States, supra, distinguishes these cases by asserting: "* * * The battle lines here drawn on scope of employment separate the camps into the question in its simplest, most graphic form: Was Capt. Westcott `going to work' or was he then already `at work' in making his way to Texas? The total circumstances under Georgia law compel the latter view.
"* * * Thus it is controlling that at the time of this collision, Capt. Westcott was performing a specific duty which had been assigned himto travel to Fort Sam Houston. In executing this order to proceed, he made use of his private automobile with the express authority of the Army. For this the Army bore the expenses which were `necessary in the military service.' In so doing he was not going to work, he was then engaged in the performance of one of the very duties specifically assigned to him, receiving Army pay, subject to military discipline and not on leave. His only choice was the immaterial one of route and means of travel.
1He was issued military orders to "proceed" on permanent change of station travel status from one permanent duty station to another. (Travel Order, Item 1, "Individual WP on PCS.").
2The reassignment of Williams to Portland, Oregon was for the purpose of Air Force duty. (Travel Order, Item 8.).
3His travel order states that "travel as directed is necessary in the military service." (Travel Order, Item 45 "TDN".).
4At all times during the trip Williams was accountable to his superior officers in the Air Force for all of his actions, including the driving of his private automobile.
5By statute he was subject to discipline for driving any vehicle in a reckless manner.
6The accident occurred less than 24 hours after he departed his permanent duty station in Colorado.
7The time between departure and accident was not charged against his leave record.
*273 8He was specifically authorized to use his own private automobile.
9He was reimbursed at a rate of 6¢ per mile for using his personal car.
10His personal belongings, furniture, household goods, etc., were moved for him by and at the expense of the government.
11He was entitled to travel and transportation allowances only if he was in "travel status", which requires that he be travelling on "public business".
12If the government is right in its contention here, the General Accounting Office must file a claim against him.
13While "delay en route chargeable as ordinary leave" was authorized, he had taken no leave and didn't intend to take any until he reached his wife's folks' home at Rockaway, Oregon. Moreover, he was entitled to a delay en route only if "individual has sufficient accrued leave." There was no evidence that he had any accrued leave.
14He had to go through Portland and beyond the permanent duty station to which he had been assigned to get to Rockaway.
15The first time he intended to take any leave was at Rockaway, nearly 800 miles down the road from the accident.
16Williams intended to go by way of the most direct route to Portland.
17At the time of the accident, Williams was in fact on the most direct route.
18He had not deviated from that route in the slightest and didn't intend to.
19Williams testified he was travelling under orders at the request of the United States. He didn't have any "say about it."
The world's work is done by agents, most of it by corporations which can act only through agents. "The present status of the corporation as the dominant factor in modern business nearly furnishes an automatic justification of respondeat superior. The corporation could not exist without the law of principal and agent. A corporation can only act through agents; no one would deal with it if it were not bound by the acts of its agents. "* * * The present writer has observed elsewhere that if there were no law of Agency it would be necessary to invent one. Large scale business would be impossible without it. Thus the rule of respondeat superior is congenial to and consistent with our industrial civilization. It may need no other justification."[41]
A good deal has been written on the subject of the raison d'etre of respondeat superior. "The explanation or justification of master's liability which undoubtedly finds the widest acceptance today is one that goes under the rather pretentious name of the Entrepeneur Theory. Every industry, it is suggested, takes a regular and more or less predictable annual toll, both in property and in flesh and blood. If, e. g., the records of the Shantytown & Southern Railroad were examined and subjected to a statistical computation, it could be predicted with considerable accuracy how many people would be killed and maimed in the coming year, how many cars wrecked, and the like. Restaurants doubtless have an accounting item named `breakage'; this is breakage, too, if on a bigger and more distressing scale. On whom should the replacement cost fall? Unlike the restaurant, the railroad can get new victims without cost; to do so, however, leaves a tragic list of innocent and uncompensated victims. Why not treat it as a cost of the business, as the restaurant does? If the railroad pays, it will easily be able to spread the cost by raising its charges. The expense then ultimately rests, like other expenses of running a railroad, on that part of the public which needs, patronizes, and presumably profits by the existence of, a railroad. The cost, to each individual member of the railroad-interested public, is, per accident, insignificant; *274 if left to lie on the victim of the particular accident it may be ruinous.
"Thus in the light of the Entrepreneur Theory, respondeat superior achieves an allocation of the loss which is fair and reasonable; no better justification, it is thought, could be needed."[42]
We have come a long way since Holmes wrote in 1882:[43] "I assume that commonsense is opposed to making one man pay for another man's wrong * * *. I therefore assume that common sense is opposed to the fundamental theory of agency * * *."
The measure of compensatory damages for pecuniary injuries in Federal Tort Claims cases is governed by the law of the state where the injuries occur, in these cases, Utah.[44] Punitive damages may not be recovered in a death case under the Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2674. The Supreme Court of Utah has interpreted its Wrongful Death Act to allow recovery only for "the deprivation of some service, attention, or care that has in it the element of pecuniary value, * * *". Burbidge v. Utah Light & Traction Co., 57 Utah 566, 571, 196 P. 556, 558 (1921); Evans v. Oregon Shortline Railroad Co., 37 Utah 431, 108 P. 638 (1910)., Ann.Cas. 1912C, 259; 16 Am.Jur. ¶ 124, § 185; Morrison v. Perry, 104 Utah 151, 140 P.2d 772 (1943). The policy is to compensate survivors rather than punish the tortfeasor.
Whether charging a jury or acting as the trier of the fact, the judge must *275 conclude as the Utah Supreme Court does:
"In the final analysis there is no actual quid pro quo for wrongful death. The loss of a loved one cannot be measured with any degree of exactness although the right of action granted for wrongful death provides for indemnity only in terms of money."[45]
We tell the jurors that we wish we could give them a more precise means of measuring the reparation for a death, but there is none. And in the end we charge that it is their duty to exercise their sound judgment and good common sense, and to assess such damages as "under all the circumstances of the case may be just."[46] How much is that?
The actual compensation recovered will vary with the valuation of each element of recovery in each case. An award must be tested against the facts of the case itself. Van Cleave v. Lynch, supra; Morrison v. Perry, supra; Parker v. Bamberger, 100 Utah 361, 116 P.2d 425 (1945); Burbidge v. Utah Light & Traction Co., supra.[47]
At least[48] four elements of recovery for wrongful death are recognized in the Utah decisions: (1) loss of support,[49] (2) loss of assistance and services to the family, (3) loss of probability of an inheritance,[50] and (4) loss of society, companionship, happiness of association with a husband and father,[51] and, in the case of the child, the loss of the nurture, guidance and training. Each survivor is entitled to recover for each of these elements. Burbidge v. Utah Light & Traction Co., supra.
Day is a death case. Helen N. Day is the surviving wife of decedent. At the time of the accident, June 25, 1965, they were both 40 years old. They were married in 1948. Their 10 year old daughter, Roban, was born in 1955. Under the stipulated life expectancy tables decedent had a life expectancy of 31.6 years, and both survivors had life expectancies in *276 excess of the decedent: the wife 33.1, the daughter 65.4.
Decedent had established habits of industry and frugality. He liked to work around the home, and performed many tasks about the house. He had considerable mechanical aptitude. At one time he had been a watchmaker and liked to keep his hand in. He maintained all the family mechanical equipment, the car, the truck, the motor boat. He was handy at fixing thingsanything around the home that needed repairs, all household appliances, the lawnmower, etc. A family room which he had been building was incomplete at the time of his death. Mrs. Day hired help to finish it. She has been compelled to pay out money to get these items taken care of since his death. In the wife's judgment it has cost and will cost her probably an average of $25.00 a month to pay for the things furnished by her husband through his own industry.
The husband's attitude and demeanor and relationship with their child was "wonderful". He counselled and taught his daughter in the manner of a good, conscientious, loving father. He was a good husband to his wife. A photograph of the family, the husband, wife and child, taken in 1960, Exhibit 15, shows them up in the mountains at one of the Thousand Lakes, a favorite fishing and picnicking spot. It is a beautiful picture of family felicitya fine looking man on an outing together with his wife and daughter.
The wife was employed at the Carbon-Emery Bank in Price. Her salary was "probably" $390.00 a month. Her check would go to make payments on the car, a chain link fence around the house, and the like. It was deposited in a common account, but it was pretty well earmarked. The balance was transferred into savings. Between $25.00 and $50.00 a month from her check went into savings. *277 The wife was not employed at time of trial.
Day was 40 years of age at the time of the accident and had a life expectancy of 31.6 years. The parties stipulated, as shown by Day's W-2 statements, that during the last three full years of his life his earnings increased $1497, or an average of nearly $500 a year.[52]
The basis in the evidence for this is: first, the actual experience: his W-2 statements show an average increase during the last three full years of his life of $500.00 a year; second, Maricich's salary at time of accident (June 25, 1965) was approximately $10,000.00 annually, and at time of trial (May 10, 1967) $12,000.00 annually. Maricich (41) was about the same age as Day, working at same plant, similar kind of work, Day as a materiel record's auditor, Maricich as a materiel program analyst. It appears reasonable to the court to suppose that 15 years after the date of the accident Day would have attained a wage comparable to what Maricich was drawing at the time of the trial. (Day $13,214Maricich $12,000). Third, Day was presumably assured lifetime employment with regular promotions and steadily increasing salary, because his services were in demand by such employers as United States Steel and Atlantic Research & Missile Corporation, strong, stable, and responsible types of employers. Fourth, also, Day was the kind of man himself who would be expected to advance in his job. He had established habits of industry and frugality. He liked to work, and was steadily employed. He brought his earnings home to support his wife and daughter. He and his wife had accumulated savings, and he had acquired United States Steel stock through the corporation. Fifth, his work as a cost accountant and materiel records auditor in a missile plant was professional in character, in growing demand in this area of sophisticated weapons, missile and space age technology all involving, as a matter of common knowledge, huge government contracts. And, the corporation must have trained and competent men whose cost projections are sound and reliable enough to keep the corporation in business. And, sixth, employer-employee relations being what they are in the modern world, Day's employers most likely would have established schedules of grades and salaries and a program of regular promotions and increases.
The computations start with Day's gross earnings for 1964 ($7614.00) from which $2200.00 was deducted ($1200.00, which is the sum Mrs. Day testified her husband used for his own personal needs, and $1000.00 for mileage allowances being paid him annually at time of death). The sum of $300.00 was added to reflect the value of repairs and work performed each year around the home. The resultant figure was $5714.00 for the year 1964. To this figure was added a projected increase in earnings of $500.00 for the first year following his death, and a similar amount for each of the succeeding 14 years.[53] The computations assume that the yearly increases of $500.00 were paid on the last day of each year, rather than semi-annually, *278 monthly or otherwise. The results are illustrated in detail found in the note.[54]
*279 Considering the "wonderful" relationship between daughter and father in this case, the age of the child at the time of his death, and her need for support, advice, companionship and comfort, the court is convinced that $75,000 is a fair, just and reasonable award for the child.
The reasonableness of this award is tested by dividing that sum by 11 years, which would bring her to age 21 through all of those difficult teenage years when a girl is growing up, without her father's support, without the services and assistance which only a father can provide, without his society, companionship, happy association, without the care, nurture, guidance and training of a loving father. If one-half of the award is deemed for support and the balance for all the rest, this award gives her the sum of about $9 a day for support, and another $9 a day for all the rest.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that in such cases damages may be assessed for "loss of wages, permanent disability, loss of bodily function, gross disfigurement, prolonged pain and suffering", and, in addition, "such factors as the decreased purchasing power of the dollar, the increased cost of living, the possible continuation of the present inflationary spiral * * *." Duffy v. Union Pac. R. R. Co., 118 Utah 82, 218 P.2d 1080 (1950).
A plaintiff may also recover as special damages medical costs, property damage, and the cost of household help necessitated by the injury, Robinson v. Hreinson, 17 Utah 2d 261, 409 P.2d 121 (1965), Jorgensen v. Gonzales, 14 Utah 2d 333, 383 P.2d 934 (1963), Paul v. Kirkendall, 1 Utah 2d 1, 261 P.2d 670 (1953).
During the operation bone was removed to relieve the block between the third and fourth lumbar vertebrae disclosed by a myelogram. Following surgery in March, 1966, according to the doctor, Platis was somewhat more comfortable but when he began to get up and around and increase his activity he had an increasing amount of discomfort. He was readmitted to the hospital in June, 1966, for a repeat myelogram which disclosed *280 that he still had some blocking between the third and fourth lumbar vertebrae. The doctor testified that "when this defect in the myelogram was noted we felt that he needed further protection and a body cast was applied." After about 21 days the body cast was removed and he was fitted with a corset. The decision that a further operation is needed was made after X-rays were taken in July, 1966, which disclosed "some motion in the fusion."
"The cervical spine is an area in which there is considerable conflict right now in medical circles. The fact that no fracture shows or the fact that no myelogram defect shows, certainly isn't any indication that there isn't injury because we know that the majority of the injuries to the neck are of a ligamentous and soft tissue nature, and these don't show on X-rays or they don't show on the myelogram. There's still at present a lot of research work being done on this particular area, but there isit all points to the fact that there is a lot of individual variation in regard to tolerance for the neurological structures in the cervical area. What I'm trying to say is that one X-ray may look terrible and the patient be fine, and another one you can hardly find anything wrong with the X-ray and the patient be in considerable difficulty from pressure on a nerve root."
*281 The doctor testified as to Platis' disability as follows:
"I think he's temporarily totally disabled. He can only remain up for an hour and a half, two hours without having severe pain, and in particular a drivehe's told me on several occasions that a drive from here to Price puts him in bed the next day. So I think, as far as his condition is now, he's temporarily totally disabled."
"Well, we expect to proceed with further surgery in the near future, and it is going to be problematical as to what relief he gets. If I could guaranty him a good fusion in this damaged area, I think over a period of time he would begin to increase hisbe able to increase his activity."
Kenneth Jones, age 26 at the time of the accident, was a materiel control clerk, *282 and now is a materiel records auditor, with Atlantic Research Corporation in Green River, Utah. He is married and the father of two children.
He suffered a mild compression fracture of the fifth lumbar vertebra, and injury to the soft tissue structure, which resulted in his hospitalization for about 12 days. Exhibit 13 discloses that he was given hospital care for compression of lumbar vertebrae "concussion and contusions and abrasions forehead and right knee." He testified that sometimes his *283 leg gives out on him after he has been sitting down for a period of time, or when he bowls. He also has continued to have considerable discomfort in his back, which is aggravated on coughing, sneezing, stooping, bending and climbing.
"Of course, I think that the tendency is to get to place too much emphasis sometimes on the X-ray appearance, because anything any injury severe enough to fracture a bone is bound to cause a certain amount of injury to the soft tissues, and this may or may not be evident at the time."
"The opinion, of course, here is to a great extent dependent upon experience and judgment instead of any one individual case, but it isn't frequently the average case goes on for several, maybe two or three years with a certain amount of reparative changes going on during that period of time. Now, as I mentioned before, there is no way of knowing whether he is going to get over it in that period of time or whether he's always going to have certain changes that will cause discomfort."
Taking into account his disability of from 5 to 10 per cent, the prolonged pain and suffering he has suffered, the probabilities of inflation, increase *284 or decrease in income, increase or decrease in cost of living, periods of economic depression, and retirement, the court concludes that Maricich should be awarded general damages of $16,000.
[1] 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(b):
"As used in this chapter and sections 1346(b) and 2401(b) of this title, the term
[2] Airman Williams made four statements: One at the scene of the accident to the highway trooper, one 19 days after the accident to an air force judge advocate at Hill Air Force Base in Utah, another two months after the accident to an insurance adjuster in Portland, Oregon, and finally, a year and ten months after the accident, April 19, 1967, his deposition was taken.
[3] "The voice is Jacob's voice, but the hands are the hands of Esau," Genesis xxvii 22.
[4] 1953 Utah Code Ann.Sec. 41-6-53(a).
[5] 1953 Utah Code Ann.Sec. 41-6-55(a).
[6] 1953 Utah Code Ann.Sec. 41-6-58(a) (2).
[7] 1953 Utah Code Ann.Sec. 41-6-62(a).
[8] 1953 Utah Code Ann.Sec. 41-6-61(a).
[9] 1953 Utah Code Ann.Sec. 41-6-63.
[10] Item 1.
[11] Ch. 3, Part B: Travel Status 3050.
[12] Item 6.
[13] Item 7.
[14] This is Air Force form Aug. '63, designated AF 899.
[15] Item 39.
[16] Items 45, 40.
[17] Item 8.
[18] Item 9.
[19] Item 11, "DALVP", Air Force Manual (AFM 11-2) of Abbreviations (1 July 1965) p. 13, Department of the Air Force: "delay en route authorized chargeable as ordinary leave provided it does not interfere with reporting on date specified and provided individual has sufficient accrued leave."
[20] Item 27: "TPA". Defined in Air Force Manual p. 28: "Travel by privately owned conveyance authorized." This, needless to say, does not mean he was required to use his car.
[21] Item 29. "Dislocation allowance category." The word "other" is typewritten.
[22] Item 12: "EDCSA": AFM 11-2 supra, p. 15: "Effective date of change of strength accountability."
[23] Continental United States.
[24] Item 35c.
[25] (1) Williams' Military "201 file", which is the record of the individual in the service that goes along with him from station to station. It contains documents, orders, reports, accounting and personal history records, accrued leave, travel time, his status at various times, and one would suppose much valuable information concerning the events that this law suit is all about; (2) records of the admitting personnel at the Military Hospital in Portland; (3) date of Williams' return to duty; (4) records and papers of line of duty investigation relative to man's status on day of accident; (5) records and papers of the accident investigation; (6) regulations, etc. to enable Air Force to reach man on travel, leave, or delay en route status; (7) same as to ordering him to temporary duty at any time; (8) same requiring him at all times to conform to "standards of conduct, appearance, and safety expected of members of the Air Force."
[26] Item 9 of Travel Order.
[27] The date we do not know, see supra, Note 25.
[28] The prosecution Williams was afraid of was the state prosecution, see supra, page 260.
[29] M4155 subd. 1, 2b Travel Regulations.
[30] "This case is controlled by the California doctrine of respondeat superior. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded for consideration in the light of that governing principle." Williams v. United States, 350 U.S. 857, 76 S. Ct. 100, 100 L. Ed. 761.
[31] 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(b).
[32] Transfer of a civilian employee by the corporation employer from his permanent duty assignment in Colorado to his new permanent duty assignment in Portland, though closer to a "churn case", wouldn't make the precedent any weightier.
[33] Outlines of Agency (4th edition, 1952) page 253.
[34] 276 F.2d 220, at pages 227, 230-231 (4th Cir. 1960).
[35] See Mechem, supra, at page 307, "the Pennsylvania anomaly."
[36] One of the more eminent justices of the Utah high court.
[37] See Riley v. Standard Oil Co. (1921), 231 N.Y. 301, 132 N.E. 97, 22 A.L.R. 1382: "* * * the answer depends upon a consideration of what the servant was doing, and why, when, where, and how he was doing it."
[38] Hinson v. United States, 257 F.2d 178, 181 (5th Cir. 1958), "If control of the servant is thought to be the touchstone of vicarious liability, it is as adequately supplied here as is ever possible when driving servants are involved. For the Uniform Code of Military Justice made Capt. Westcott accountable to the Army for all of his actions, including the driving of automobiles, from the date of his entrance upon active duty. This was in no way altered by the indifference of the Army to the route or mode of travel selected. While `acting in line of duty,' 28 U.S.C.A. § 2671, is generally equated with traditional notions of scope of employment, Cannon v. United States, 5 Cir., 243 F.2d 71, 73, the phrase reflects that Congress had in mind, and so must we, the special factors characteristic of military activity and discipline."
[39] Mechem Outlines of Agency, (4th Ed., 1952) pages 305-6.
[40] Cobb v. Kumm, 367 F.2d 132, pages 133, 134 (7th Cir. 1966), decided under Illinois law, "It is well established in Illinois that an employee who is on vacation cannot render his employer liable for that which he does in furtherance of his private pursuits during such period", Voytas v. United States, 256 F.2d 786, 789 (7th Cir. 1958). Denver & R. G. W. R. R. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 72 Utah 199, 269 P. 512, 62 A.L.R. 1436 (1928); Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Industrial Commission, 79 Utah 189, 8 P.2d 617 (1932). That these are Industrial Commission cases, under modern social legislation, suffices to distinguish them quite apart from the point made in Hinson v. United States, infra.
[41] Mechem, supra. pp. 244-245.
[42] Mechem, 4th Ed. Outlines of Agency, supra, Section 359.
[43] Vol. 3, Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History at pages 404-5, 4 Harv.L.Rev. 345, 5 Harv.L.Rev. 1, 14.
[44] 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), and § 2674, Beesley v. United States, 364 F.2d 194 (10 Cir. 1966), Bartch v. United States, 330 F.2d 466 (10 Cir. 1964), Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 82 S. Ct. 585, 7 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1962).
[45] Van Cleave v. Lynch, 109 Utah 149, 161, 166 P.2d 244, 250 (1946).
[46] § 78-11-7, U.C.A., 1953; § 5 of Article XVI Constitution of Utah declares: "The right of action to recover damages for injuries resulting in death should never be abrogated, and the amount recoverable shall not be subject to any statutory limitation."
[47] Cf. Evans v, Stuart, 17 Utah 2d 308, 410 P.2d 999 (1966).
[48] That there may be others is stated in the next note.
[49] Spiking v. Consolidated Railway & Power Co., 33 Utah 313, 339, 93 P. 838, 847 (1908), "Under our statute, both the wife and the children were heirs of the deceased, and as such were entitled to recover, not only for the loss of support, companionship, and the assistance he would naturally and probably be to them but were entitled to all the pecuniary loss that they may have sustained by reason of his death, which could be established with reasonable certainty in view of all the circumstances pertaining to the subject matter." This case is cited by the 3rd Circuit where the cases are collected. O'Toole v. United States, 242 F.2d, 308, 312 (3rd Cir. 1957).
[50] Burbidge v. Utah Light & Traction Co., 57 Utah 566, 571, 196 P. 556, 558, "It has also been held that the right of inheritance, that is the probability or improbability of the deceased during his lifetime of acquiring an estate which the heirs would inherit, might be considered in determining the damages, if any, which the heirs had sustained."
[51] Burbidge v. Utah Light & Traction Co., 57 Utah 566, 571, 196 P. 556, 558, "It has been repeatedly held by this court that it was proper to submit to the jury, as an element of damages, the loss of the society and companionship as well as the habits of the deceased in respect to his family and what he might be expected to do in the future."
[52] There is an error in Exhibit 18. This Exhibit was prepared by the attorneys to illustrate the computation of "present worth" of earnings using life expectancies and a 4 per cent factor. Applying the 4 per cent factor to an illustrative wage of $8,000 the Exhibit erroneously shows the "present worth" of earnings to be $91,468. Multiplication of $8,000 by the 4 per cent factor (17.59) produces a figure of $140,720.
[53] The propriety of taking into consideration projected increases in earnings is well established. United States v. Sommers, 351 F.2d 354 (10 Cir. 1965); Furumizo v. United States, 245 F. Supp. 981 (D.C.Hawaii, 1965), affirmed 381 F.2d 965 (9 Cir. 1967).
[54] 4% DISCOUNT PRESENT CONVERSION PRESENT WORTH COUNT WORTH FACTOR TO CONVERTED TO ANNUAL EARNINGS FACTOR ANNUITY PRESENT WORTH 6-25-65 6-25-65 to 6-25-96 $6214 17.5885 $109,294.94 1.0000 $109,294.94 6-25-66 " " 500 17.2920 8,646.00 .9615 8,313.13 6-25-67 " " 500 16.9837 8,491.85 .9246 7,851.56 6-25-68 " " 500 16.6631 8,331.55 .8890 7,406.75 6-25-69 " " 500 16.3296 8,164.80 .8548 6,979.27 6-25-70 " " 500 15.9828 7,991.40 .8219 6,568.13 6-25-71 " " 500 15.6221 7,811.50 .7903 6,173.43 6-25-72 " " 500 15.2470 7,623.50 .7599 5,793.10 6-25-73 " " 500 14.8568 7,428.40 .7306 5,427.19 6-25-74 " " 500 14.4511 7,225.55 .7025 5,075.95 6-25-75 " " 500 14.0292 7,014.60 .6756 4,739.06 6-25-76 " " 500 13.5903 6,795.15 .6496 4,414.13 6-25-77 " " 500 13.1339 6,566.95 .6246 4,101.72 6-25-78 " " 500 12.6593 6,329.65 .6006 3,801.59 6-25-79 " " 500 12.1657 6,082.85 .5775 3,512.85 ____________ $189,452.80