Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/97670/bowles-vs-willingham
Timestamp: 2018-05-21 03:47:08
Document Index: 533036900

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 205', '§ 24', '§ 204', '§ 265', '§ 205', '§ 24', '§ 204', '§ 265', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 204', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 1388', '§ 1388', '§ 1388', '§ 1388', '§ 1388', '§ 201', '§ 203', '§ 265', '§ 205', '§ 4', '§ 2', '§ 204', '§ 204', '§ 265', '§ 205', '§ 24', '§ 205', '§ 302', '§ 1', '§ 2', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 2', '§ 203', '§ 204', '§ 717', '§ 4', '§ 901']

Bowles Vs Willingham - Citation 97670 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Bowles Vs. Willingham - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/97670
Case Number 321 U.S. 503
Respondent Willingham
bowles v. willingham - 321 u.s. 503 (1944) u.s. supreme court bowles v. willingham, 321 u.s. 503 (1944) bowles v. willingham no. 464 argued january 7, 10, 1944 decided march 27, 1944 321 u.s. 503 appeal from the district court of the united states for the middle district of georgia syllabus l. under § 205(a) of the emergency price control act of 1942 and § 24(1) of the judicial code, and in view of § 204(d) of the act, a federal district court, in a suit by the administrator, has authority to enjoin a proceeding in a state court to restrain issuance by the administrator of rent orders, and § 265 of the judicial code, forbidding federal courts to enjoin proceedings in state courts, is inapplicable. p. 321 u......
Bowles v. Willingham - 321 U.S. 503 (1944)
U.S. Supreme Court Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944)
l. Under § 205(a) of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 and § 24(1) of the Judicial Code, and in view of § 204(d) of the Act, a federal district court, in a suit by the Administrator, has authority to enjoin a proceeding in a state court to restrain issuance by the Administrator of rent orders, and § 265 of the Judicial Code, forbidding federal courts to enjoin proceedings in state courts, is inapplicable. P. 321 U. S. 510 .
(a) Congress may determine whether the federal courts should have exclusive jurisdiction of controversies which arise under the Constitution and laws of the United States and which are therefore within the judicial power of the United States as defined in Art. III, § 2 of the Constitution, or whether they should exercise that jurisdiction concurrently with the courts of the States. P. 321 U. S. 511 .
(b) The authority of Congress to withhold from state courts all jurisdiction of controversies arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States includes the power to restrict the occasions when that jurisdiction may be invoked. P. 321 U. S. 512 .
2. By the rent control provisions of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, authorizing the Price Administrator to fix maximum rents for housing accommodations in defense rental areas, Congress did not delegate its legislative power. Yakus v. United States, ante, p. 321 U. S. 414 . P. 321 U. S. 514 .
3. The requirement that the maximum rent or rents established by the Administrator be "generally" fair and equitable, § 2(b), does not render the Act violative of the Fifth Amendment. P. 321 U. S. 516 .
(a) That price-fixing is on a class basis, rather than on an individual basis, does not render it invalid. P. 321 U. S. 518 .
(b) The restraints imposed on the national government in this regard by the Fifth Amendment are no greater than those imposed on the States by the Fourteenth. P. 321 U. S. 518 .
(c) Congress was dealing here with conditions created by activities resulting from a great war effort; it was under no constitutional necessity of providing a system of price control which would assure each landlord a "fair return" on his property. P. 321 U. S. 519 .
(d) And though the legislation may have reduced the value of the property being regulated, there was no "taking" of it. P. 321 U. S. 517 .
4. That landlords are not afforded a hearing before the order or regulation fixing rents becomes effective does not render the Act violative of the Fifth Amendment. Provision for judicial review after the order or regulation become effective satisfies the requirements of due process under these circumstances. P. 321 U. S. 519 .
5. Questions as to the validity of orders or regulations issued pursuant to the Act may be considered only by the Emergency Court of Appeals on the review provided by § 204. P. 321 U. S. 521 .
Pursuant to that authority, the Administrator, on April 28, 1942, issued a declaration designating twenty-eight areas in various parts of the country, including Macon, Georgia, as defense rental areas. 7 Fed.Reg. 3193. That declaration stated that defense activities had resulted in increased housing rents in those areas, [ Footnote 1 ] and that it was necessary and proper, in order to effectuate the purposes of the Act, to stabilize and reduce such rents. It also contained a recommendation pursuant to § 2(b) that the maximum rent for housing accommodations rented on April 1, 1941, should be the rental for such accommodations on that date, [ Footnote 2 ] and that, in case of accommodations
not rented on April 1, 1941, or constructed thereafter provisions for the determination, adjustment, and modification of maximum rents should be made, such rents to be in principle no greater than the generally prevailing rents in the particular area on April 1, 1941. The declaration also stated, in accordance with the provisions of § 2(b), [ Footnote 3 ] that if, within sixty days after April 28, 1942, such rents within the areas in question had not been
On June 30, 1942, the Administrator issued Maximum Rent Regulation No. 26, effective July 1, 1942, establishing the maximum legal rents for housing in these defense areas, including Macon, Georgia. 7 Fed.Reg. 4905. It recited that the rentals had not been reduced or stabilized since the declaration of April 28, 1942, and that defense activities had resulted in increases in the rentals on or about April 1, 1941, but not prior to that date. The maximum rentals fixed for housing accommodations rented on April 1, 1941, were the rents obtained on that date. § 1388.1704(a). As respects housing accommodations not rented on April 1, 1941, but rented for the first time between that date and the effective date of the regulation, July 1, 1942 -- the situation involved in this case -- it was provided that the maximum rent should be the first rent charged after April 1, 1941. § 1388.1704(c). But, in that case, it was provided that the Rent Director (designated by § 1388.1713) might order a decrease on his own initiative on the ground, among others, that the rent was higher than that generally prevailing in the area for comparable housing accommodations on April 1, 1941. § 1388.1704(c), § 1388.1705(c)(1). By Procedural Regulation No. 3, as amended (8 Fed.Reg. 526, 1798, 3534, 5481, 14811) issued pursuant to § 201(d) and § 203(a) of the Act [ Footnote 4 ] provision was made that, when the Rent Director
We recently had occasion to consider the history of § 265 and the exceptions which have been engrafted on it. Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U. S. 118 . In that case, we listed the few Acts of Congress passed since its first enactment in 1793 which operate as implied legislative amendments to it. 314 U.S. pp. 314 U. S. 132 -134. There should now be added to that list the exception created by the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942. By § 205(a), the Administrator is given authority to seek injunctive relief in the appropriate court (including the federal district courts) against acts or practices in violation of § 4 -- e.g., the receipt of rent in violation of any regulation or order under § 2. Moreover, by § 204(d) of the Act, one who seeks to restrain or set aside any order of the Administrator or any provision of the Act is confined to the judicial review granted to the Emergency Court of Appeals, which was created by § 204(c), and to this Court. [ Footnote 5 ] As
we recently held in Lockerty v. Philips, 319 U. S. 182 , 319 U. S. 186 -187, Congress confined jurisdiction to grant equitable relief to that narrow channel and withheld such jurisdiction from every other federal and state court. Congress thus preempted jurisdiction in favor of the Emergency Court to the exclusion of state courts. [ Footnote 6 ] The rule expressed in § 265 which is designed to avoid collisions between state and federal authorities ( Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., supra ) thus does not come into play. The powers of the District Court under § 205(a) of the Act and § 24(1) of the Judicial Code are ample authority for that court to protect the exclusive federal jurisdiction which Congress created.
Hence, Congress could determine whether the federal courts which it established should have exclusive jurisdiction of such cases or whether they should exercise that jurisdiction concurrently with the courts of the States. Plaquemines Tropical Fruit Co. v. Henderson, 170 U. S. 511 , 170 U. S. 517 ; The Moses Taylor, 4 Wall. 411, 71 U. S. 428 -430. And see Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U. S. 257 ; McKay v. Kalyton, 204 U. S. 458 , 204 U. S. 468 -469. Under the present Act, all jurisdiction has not been withheld from state courts, since they have concurrent jurisdiction over all civil enforcement suits brought by the Administrator. § 205(c). But the authority of Congress to withhold all jurisdiction from the state courts obviously includes the power to restrict the occasions when that jurisdiction may be invoked.
II. The question of the constitutionality of the rent control provisions of the Act [ Footnote 7 ] raises issues related to those considered in Yakus v. United States ante, p. 321 U. S. 414 .
When it came to rents, Congress pursued the policy it adopted respecting commodity prices. It established standards for administrative action and left with the Administrator the decision when the rent controls of the Act should be invoked. He is empowered to fix maximum rents for housing accommodations in any defense rental area, [ Footnote 8 ] whenever in his judgment that action is necessary or proper in order to effectuate the purpose of the Act. A defense rental area is any area
of the Act. § 302(d). The controls adopted by Congress were thought necessary "in the interest of the national defense and security" and for the "effective prosecution of the present war." Sec. 1(a). They have as their aim the effective protection of our price structures against the forces of disorganization and the pressures created by war and its attendant activities. [ Footnote 9 ] § 1(a); S.Rep. No. 931, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 1-5. Thus, the policy of the Act is clear. The maximum rents fixed by the Administrator are those which, "in his judgment," will be "generally fair and equitable and will effectuate the purposes of this Act." § 2(b). But Congress did not leave the Administrator with that general standard; it supplied criteria for its application by stating that, so far as practicable, the Administrator, in establishing any maximum rent
The considerations which support the delegation of authority under this Act over commodity prices ( Yakus v. United States ) are equally applicable here. The power to legislate which the Constitution says "shall be vested" in Congress (Art. I, § 1) has not been granted to the Administrator. Congress, in § 1(a) of the Act, has made clear its policy of waging war on inflation. In § 2(b), it has defined the circumstances when its announced policy is to be declared operative and the method by which it is to be effectuated. Those steps constitute the performance of the legislative function in the constitutional sense. Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator, 312 U. S. 126 , 312 U. S. 144 .
be in a given area. The criteria to guide the Administrator are certainly not more vague than the standards governing the determination by the Secretary of Agriculture in United States v. Rock Royal Co-op, 307 U. S. 533 , 307 U. S. 576 -577, of marketing areas and minimum prices for milk. The question of how far Congress should go in filling in the details of the standards which its administrative agency is to apply raises large issues of policy. Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U. S. 381 , 310 U. S. 398 . We recently stated in connection with this problem of delegation,
Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator, supra, 312 U. S. 145 . In terms of hard-headed practicalities, Congress frequently could not perform its functions if it were required to make an appraisal of the myriad of facts applicable to varying situations, by area throughout the land, and then to determine in each case what should be done. Congress does not abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority. In our complex economy, that indeed is frequently the only way in which the legislative process can go forward. Whether a particular grant of authority to an officer or agency is wise or unwise raises questions which are none of our concern. Our inquiry ends with the constitutional issue. Congress here has specified the basic conclusions of fact upon the ascertainment of which by the Administrator its statutory command is to become effective. But that is not all. The Administrator, on the denial of protests, must inform the protestant of the "grounds upon which" the decision is based and of any "economic data and other facts of which the Administrator has taken official notice." § 203(a). These materials and the grounds for decision which they furnished are included in the transcript on which judicial review is based. § 204(a). We fail to see how more
could be required ( Taylor v. Brown, 137 F.2d 654, 658, 659) unless we were to say that Congress, rather than the Administrator, should determine the exact rentals which Mrs. Willingham might exact.
Thus, so far as delegation of authority is concerned, the rent control provisions of the Act, like the price control provisions ( Yakus v. United States, supra ), meet the requirements which this Court has previously held to be adequate for peacetime legislation.
provide for a fair rental to each landlord is unconstitutional. During the first World War, the statute for the control of rents in the District of Columbia provided machinery for securing to a landlord a reasonable rental. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135 , 256 U. S. 157 . And see Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U. S. 242 . And under other price-fixing statutes such as the Natural Gas Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 821, 15 U.S.C. § 717 et seq., Congress has provided for the fixing of rates which are just and reasonable in their application to particular persons or companies. Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591 . Congress departed from that pattern when it came to the present Act. It has been pointed out that any attempt to fix rents, landlord by landlord, as in the fashion of utility rates, would have been quite impossible. Wilson v. Brown, 137 F.2d 348, 352-354. Such considerations of feasibility and practicality are certainly germane to the constitutional issue. Jacob Ruppert v. Caffey, 251 U. S. 264 , 251 U. S. 299 ; Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator, supra, p. 312 U. S. 145 . Moreover, there would be no constitutional objection if Congress, as a war emergency measure, had itself fixed the maximum rents in these areas. We are not dealing here with a situation which involves a "taking" of property. Wilson v. Brown, supra. By § 4(d) of the Act, it is provided that "nothing in this Act shall be construed to require any person to sell any commodity or to offer any accommodations for rent." There is no requirement that the apartments in question be used for purposes which bring them under the Act. Of course, price control, the same as other forms of regulation, may reduce the value of the property regulated. But, as we have pointed out in the Hope Natural Gas Co. case (320 U.S. p. 320 U. S. 601 ), that does not mean that the regulation is unconstitutional. Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the Court, stated in Block v. Hirsh, supra, p. 256 U. S. 155 :
A member of the class which is regulated may suffer economic losses not shared by others. His property may lose utility and depreciate in value as a consequence of regulation. But that has never been a barrier to the exercise of the police power. L'Hote v. New Orleans, 177 U. S. 587 , 177 U. S. 598 ; Welch v. Swasey, 214 U. S. 91 ; Hebe Co. v. Shaw, 248 U. S. 297 ; Pierce Oil Corp. v. City of Hope, 248 U. S. 498 ; Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 251 U. S. 146 , 251 U. S. 157 ; Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365 ; West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 . And the restraints imposed on the national government in this regard by the Fifth Amendment are no greater than those imposed on the States by the Fourteenth. Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., supra; United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100 , 657.
It is implicit in cases such as Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502 , which involved the power of New York to fix the minimum and maximum prices of milk, and Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, supra, which involved the power of the Bituminous Coal Commission to fix minimum and maximum prices of bituminous coal, that high cost operators may be more seriously affected by price control than others. But it has never been thought that price-fixing, otherwise valid, was improper because it was on a class, rather than an individual, basis. Indeed, the decision in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 , the pioneer case in this Court, involved a legislative schedule of maximum prices for a defined class of warehouses, and was sustained
IV. It is finally suggested that the Act violates the Fifth Amendment because it makes no provision for a hearing to landlords before the order or regulation fixing rents becomes effective. Obviously, Congress would have been under necessity to give notice and provide a hearing before it acted, had it decided to fix rents on a national basis the same as it did for the District of Columbia. See 55 Stat. 788. We agree with the Emergency Court of Appeals ( Avant v. Bowles, 139 F.2d 702) that Congress need not make that requirement when it delegates the task to an administrative agency. In Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board, 239 U. S. 441 , a suit was brought by a taxpayer and landowner to enjoin a Colorado Board from putting in effect an order which increased the valuation of all taxable property in Denver 40 percent. Such action, it was alleged, violated the Fourteenth Amendment, as the plaintiff was given no opportunity to be heard. Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the Court, stated, p. 239 U. S. 445 :
We need not go so far in the present case. Here, Congress has provided for judicial review of the Administrator's action. To be sure, that review comes after the order has been promulgated, and no provision for a stay is made. But as we have held in Yakus v. United States, supra, that review satisfies the requirements of due process. As stated by Mr. Justice Brandeis for a unanimous Court in Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U. S. 589 , 283 U. S. 596 :
"Where only property rights are involved, mere postponement of the judicial enquiry is not a denial of due process if the opportunity given for the ultimate judicial determination of the liability is adequate. Springer v. United States, 102 U. S. 586 , 102 U. S. 593 ; Scottish Union & National Ins. Co. v. Bowland, 196 U. S. 611 , 196 U. S. 631 . Delay in the judicial determination of property rights is not uncommon where it is essential that governmental needs be immediately satisfied."
Language in the cases that due process requires a hearing before the administrative order becomes effective ( Morgan v. United States, 304 U. S. 1 , 304 U. S. 19 -20; Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator, supra, pp. 312 U. S. 152 -153) is to be explained on two grounds. In the first place, the statutes there involved required that procedure.
Secondly, as we have held in Yakus v. United States, supra, Congress was dealing here with the exigencies of wartime conditions and the insistent demands of inflation control. Cf. Porter v. Investors' Syndicate, 286 U. S. 461 , 286 U. S. 471 . Congress chose not to fix rents in specified areas or on a national scale by legislative fiat. It chose a method designed to meet the needs for rent control as they might arise and to accord some leeway for adjustment within the formula which it prescribed. At the same time, the procedure which Congress adopted was selected with the view of eliminating the necessity for
We fully recognize, as did the Court in Home Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398 , 290 U. S. 426 , that "even the war power does not remove constitutional limitations safeguarding essential liberties." And see Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., supra, 251 U. S. 155 . But, where Congress has provided for judicial review after the regulations or orders have been made effective, it has done all that due process under the war emergency requires.
I concur in the result and substantially in the Court's opinion, except for qualifications expressed below. In view of these and my difference from the Court's position in Yakus v. United States, ante, p. 321 U. S. 414 , a statement of reasons for concurrence here is appropriate.
The single exception was the power of the Emergency Court, by its final judgment, or of this Court on final disposition in review thereof, Section 204(a), (b), to set aside an order or regulation. Congress clearly had the power thus to confine the equity jurisdiction of the federal courts and to make its mandate for uninterrupted operation of the rent control system effective by prohibiting the state courts so to interfere with the statutory plan at least until it should be shown invalid by the channel created for this purpose. [ Footnote 2/1 ] Any effort of the state court therefore to enjoin the issuance of rent orders or suspend their operation, whether on constitutional or other grounds, was directly in the teeth of the statute's explicit provisions and a violation of its terms. By this mandate, the state courts were not required to give their sanction to enforcement of an unconstitutional act or regulation or even of one which might turn out to be such. They were merely commanded to keep hands off and leave decision upon the validity of the statute or the regulations, for purposes of suspending or setting them aside, to another forum established for that purpose. Congress clearly had the power and the intent to authorize federal courts to enforce this command, by injunction if necessary.
In this case, in my judgment, these conditions concur to justify the procedure Congress has specified. Except for the charge that the regulations, or some of them, are so vague and indefinite as to be incapable of enforcement, there is nothing to suggest they are invalid on their face. And they clearly are not so, either in the respect specified or otherwise. [ Footnote 2/2 ] The proceeding by protest and appeal through the Emergency Court, even for civil consequences
only, approaches the limit of adequacy in the constitutional sense, both by reason of its summary character [ Footnote 2/3 ] and because of the shortness of the period allowed for following it. [ Footnote 2/4 ] A reservation perhaps is in order in the latter respect, when facts are discovered after the period which, if proven, would invalidate the regulation and which, by reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered before the period ends. Finally, it hardly can be disputed that the substantive problem and the circumstances which created and surrounded it were such as, if ever they could be, to justify a procedure of this sort. [ Footnote 2/5 ]
Other issues raised by the appellee with respect to the regulations likewise are disposed of by the rulings upon the statute's provisions. [ Footnote 2/6 ] Insofar as the regulations are identical with the statute, therefore, and the objections to them are identical, the disposition of these objections to the Act disposes also of those made to the regulations. Insofar as the latter raised questions not raised concerning the statute, and since none of these, except as mentioned above, called attention to any feature making a regulation void on its face, the appellee has foreclosed her opportunity to assert them, as to facts existing when the suit was begun, by her failure to follow the prescribed special remedy. It is not unreasonable, in a matter of this importance and urgency, to require one whose only valid objection to the law, including the regulations, rests in proof of facts not apparent to the administrator or the
The Moses Taylor, 4 Wall. 411; cf. Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U. S. 130 ; Plaquemines Tropical Fruit Co. v. Henderson, 170 U. S. 511 .
Cf. the writer's dissenting opinion in Yakus v. United States, ante, p. 321 U. S. 460 .
This brings me to a consideration of the appellees' principal contention -- namely, that, as applied to rent control, the Emergency Price Control Act is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to an administrative officer. In approaching this question, it is hardly necessary to state the controlling principles, which have been reiterated in recent decisions. [ Footnote 3/1 ] Congress may perform its legislative function by laying down policies and establishing standards while leaving administrative officials free to make rules within the prescribed limits and to ascertain facts to which the declared policy is to apply. But any delegation which goes beyond the application and execution of the law as declared by Congress is invalid.
"The term 'defense rental area' means the District of Columbia and any area designated by the Administrator as an area where defense activities have resulted or threaten to result in an increase in the rents for housing accommodations inconsistent with the purposes of this Act. "
But is not the Administrator's judgment channeled and confined by the final limitation that his action must be the promotion of the "purposes of this Act"? What are they? So far as material, they are: "To prevent speculative, unwarranted, and abnormal increases in . . . rents" (50 U.S.C. § 901(a)). There are other general phrases in the section which may be claimed to throw some light on the considerations the Administrator may entertain, but, so far as rents are concerned, they are so vague as to be useless -- as, for example, the protection of persons with relatively fixed and limited incomes, consumers, wage earners, investors, and persons dependent on life insurance, annuities, and pensions from undue impairment of their standard of living, and more of the same. I have discussed the "standards" in an opinion filed in Yakus v. United States, ante, p. 321 U. S. 448 .
Language could not more aptly fit this grant of power than that used in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, supra, 295 U. S. 551 : "Here, in effect, is a roving commission to inquire into evils and, upon discovery, correct them." Equally apposite is what was said at p. 295 U. S. 541 :
I am far from urging that, in the present war emergency, rents and prices shall not be controlled and stabilized. But I do insist that, war or no war, there exists no necessity, and no constitutional power, for Congress' abdication of its legislative power and remission to an executive official of the function of making and repealing laws applicable to the citizens of the United States. No truer word was ever said than this Court's statement in the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Case [ Footnote 3/2 ] that emergency does not create power, but may furnish the occasion for its exercise. The Constitution no more contemplates the elimination of any of the coordinate branches of the Government during war than in peace. It will not do to say that no other method could have been adopted consonant with the legislative power of Congress. "Defense rental areas" and "defense activities" could have been reasonably defined. Rents in those areas could have been frozen as of a given date, or reasonably precise standards could have been fixed, and administrative or other tribunals could have been given power according to the rules and standards prescribed to deal with special situations after hearing and findings and exposition of the reasons for action. I say this only because
judicial review is in fact. I have spoken more at length on this subject in my opinion in Yakus v. United States, ante, p. 321 U. S. 448 .
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 ; Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 .
Home Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398 , 290 U. S. 425 -426.