Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/414/858/622185/
Timestamp: 2019-03-23 09:04:39
Document Index: 248342086

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 10501', '§ 10904', '§ 10501', '§ 10102', '§ 706', '§ 10102', '§ 10102', '§ 556', '§ 10901']

City of Lincoln, Petitioner, v. Surface Transportation Board; United States of America, Respondents, 414 F.3d 858 (8th Cir. 2005) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Eighth Circuit › 2005 › City of Lincoln, Petitioner, v. Surface Transportation Board; United States of America, Respondents
City of Lincoln, Petitioner, v. Surface Transportation Board; United States of America, Respondents, 414 F.3d 858 (8th Cir. 2005)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit - 414 F.3d 858 (8th Cir. 2005)
Charles H. Montange, argued, Seattle, WA, for appellant.
Alice C. Saylor, argued, the Surface Transportation Board, Washington, D.C, for appellee.
The City of Lincoln, Nebraska sought to acquire a portion of the right of way of a rail line owned by Lincoln Lumber Company (LLC) to use as a bicycle and pedestrian trail and to improve the city's storm drainage system. Lincoln planned to acquire the property through state eminent domain law and petitioned the Surface Transportation Board for a declaratory order that the proposed acquisition would not be federally preempted as state regulation of rail transportation under 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b). The Board determined that the proposed taking was preempted, and Lincoln seeks review of this order. We affirm.
The rail line at issue runs between 19th Street and 24th Street in Lincoln and has a 100 foot right of way. LLC acquired this segment from the Union Pacific Railroad Company in 2000 through the offer of financial assistance procedures provided in 49 U.S.C. § 10904. LLC is currently the only rail customer on the dead end line and receives approximately 50 carloads annually. The Omaha, Lincoln & Beatrice Railway Company (OLB) owns a connecting line and provides rail service to LLC pursuant to an operating agreement. LLC has leased portions of the right of way to neighboring entities which have primarily used the space for parking, but LLC is trying to terminate these long term leases. LLC uses other portions of the right of way for storage.
In its order the Board framed the issue as whether the proposed taking would prevent or unduly interfere with railroad operations and interstate commerce. If so, it would be preempted by 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b), as broadened by the ICC Termination Act of 1995 (ICCTA). The Board distinguished the cases relied on by Lincoln. It said that State of Texas1 dealt with a relocation of a right of way instead of a narrowing and that the railway in Sacramento Regional Transit District2 had voluntarily sold the right of way to the local government entity. The Board found that Lincoln had not adequately refuted LLC's contention that it needed all of the right of way to satisfy its present and future rail needs. LLC had argued to the Board that it currently used the space to move freight, store lumber, unload railroad cars, and stage unloaded freight for further movement into shipper facilities, and it asserted that it might rebuild a sidetrack and construct a terminal facility. According to the Board all of these activities are part of transportation by rail as defined in 49 U.S.C. § 10102(9), and the proposed trail could interfere with these transportation activities. Additionally, the Board determined that Lincoln had not adequately refuted LLC's contentions that the trail would create safety hazards. In conclusion it urged the parties to renew negotiations to resolve their dispute.
Under the Administrative Procedure Act the Board decision can be overturned only if it is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, unsupported by substantial evidence, or otherwise not in accordance with law. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). The scope of judicial review is therefore quite narrow, and we are not allowed to substitute our judgment for that of the Board. Middlewest Motor Freight Bureau v. ICC, 867 F.2d 458, 460 (8th Cir. 1989). As long as the Board's findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole, we will accept its findings and the reasonable inferences it drew from them. Trans-Allied Audit Co. v. ICC, 33 F.3d 1024, 1030 (8th Cir. 1994).
The jurisdiction of the Board over —
(1) transportation by rail carriers and the remedies provided in this part with respect to rates, classifications, rules (including car service, interchange, and other operating rules), practices, routes, services, and facilities of such carriers; and
The statute also defines rail transportation expansively to encompass any property, facility, or equipment related to the movement of passengers and property by rail and any related services, including "receipt, delivery, elevation, transfer in transit, refrigeration, icing, ventilation, storage, handling, and interchange of passengers and property." 49 U.S.C. § 10102(9). Courts have recognized that Congress intended to give the Board extensive authority in this area. See City of Auburn v. United States, 154 F.3d 1025, 1029-31 (9th Cir. 1998) (reviewing the history of railway preemption, text of the ICCTA, and court decisions to reject the argument that preemption is limited to economic regulation). We consider Lincoln's arguments in the context of the Board's broad authority over rail transportation and our narrow review of its decisions.
We disagree with Lincoln's assessment of the Board's decision making. The Board is entitled to rely on its own expertise in rail operations and that of the rail user to determine that losing a 20 foot strip from the right of way along four blocks of the line would leave insufficient room for storage, loading, and unloading, as well as access to the track for maintenance and derailment response. Although the ICCTA classifies storage of materials moved by rail as part of "transportation," 49 U.S.C. § 10102(9) (B), Lincoln's consultant characterized storage of lumber as one of LLC's "nontransportation" obstructing uses of the right of way. The Board could legitimately consider that Lincoln's evidence about use of the right of way for such storage weighed against its petition instead of supporting it. LLC's representation to the Board that at one point there would only be 7.5 feet of clearance was based on its president's measurements and a conversation with the lead surveyor. While there was some conflicting evidence about the clearance distance from which the Board could have drawn varying inferences, we cannot say that its stated safety concerns are unsupported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. See Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620, 86 S. Ct. 1018, 16 L. Ed. 2d 131 (1966).
Finally, the Board can consider the railway's future plans as well as its current uses and make its own evaluation of how likely it is that the plans will come to fruition. Condemnation is a permanent action, and "it can never be stated with certainty at what time any particular part of a right of way may become necessary for railroad uses." Midland Valley R.R. Co. v. Jarvis, 29 F.2d 539, 541 (8th Cir. 1928). We conclude that the Board did not act arbitrarily or capriciously or make a decision unsupported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.
Lincoln argues that federal preemption is an affirmative defense and that the burden falls on the party asserting it, but by statute the burden of proof is on the petitioner seeking a declaratory order from an administrative agency. See 5 U.S.C. § 556(d). Lincoln's citation to Iowa, Chicago & Eastern Railroad Corp. v. Washington County, Iowa, 384 F.3d 557 (8th Cir. 2004), does not help it. Although the burden was placed on the railroad in that case, the matter had started as a judicial proceeding rather than an administrative one. The railroad, rather than a governmental entity, had sought a declaratory judgment that a state statute was preempted by the ICCTA. We conclude that the Board did not err by placing the burden of proof on Lincoln.
Finally, Lincoln says that it needs clarification of the Board's action about the storm sewer project because the Board's disposition was not clear from its order. Lincoln acknowledges that LLC has stated on the record that it does not oppose the project, but it seeks a remand and a ruling that the condemnation for the storm sewer will not be an acquisition or abandonment of a rail line for purposes of 49 U.S.C. §§ 10901-10903. The Board responds that there was no need to rule on that project because there was no dispute and that it is well established that nonconflicting, nonexclusive easements across railroad property are not preempted if they do not hinder rail operations or pose safety risks. To the extent that the Board's intentions were ambiguous, they have now been clarified, making a remand unnecessary.
State of Texas, Department of Transportation—Petition for Declaratory Order Regarding Highway Construction in Tarrant County, TX, Finance Docket No. 32589 (ICC served Feb. 7, 1995).
Sacramento Regional Transit District—Petition for Declaratory Order Regarding Carrier Status, STB Finance Docket No. 33796 (STB served July 5, 2000).