Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/263/208/533788/
Timestamp: 2019-06-24 23:19:28
Document Index: 58614778

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 12112', '§ 12112', '§ 12102', '§ 12111', '§ 1630', '§ 12112', '§ 12111', '§ 12111', '§ 1630', '§ 1630', '§ 12112', '§ 12111', '§ 12111']

Diane Lovejoy-wilson, Plaintiff-appellant-cross-appellee, v. Noco Motor Fuel, Inc., Defendant-appellee-cross-appellant, 263 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 2001) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Second Circuit › 2001 › Diane Lovejoy-wilson, Plaintiff-appellant-cross-appellee, v. Noco Motor Fuel, Inc., Defendant-appell...
Diane Lovejoy-wilson, Plaintiff-appellant-cross-appellee, v. Noco Motor Fuel, Inc., Defendant-appellee-cross-appellant, 263 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 2001)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit - 263 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 2001)
Argued: March 20, 2001Decided: August 31, 2001
Affirmed in part, vacated in part and remanded. Cross-appeal dismissed. [Copyrighted Material Omitted] [Copyrighted Material Omitted]
We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 593 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1098 (2000). The statement of facts that follows therefore treats the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Summary judgment is appropriate where "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law," Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), i.e., " [w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). A fact is "material" for these purposes if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An issue of fact is "genuine" if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id.
Less than a month later, on May 20, 1994, NOCO nonetheless offered the plaintiff an assistant manager position at store number S-40 ("S-40"), one of the four with armored car service where driving in order to deposit store receipts was unnecessary. The plaintiff replied to NOCO's offer by letter dated May 23, 1994, expressing her reservations about working in the stores serviced by armored cars, referring to their locations as undesirable. She said that assigning her and others with similar disabilities to such stores would result in "a segregated employment population" and would "relegat [e] those people with disabilities to some of the least desirable [NOCO] locations." She again suggested what she thought to be a reasonable accommodation that would permit her to serve in a managerial position at S-44: for the assistant manager in a nearby store to drive her to the bank to deposit the S-44 receipts. Despite her reservations, however, the plaintiff ultimately accepted the promotion to assistant manger at S-40.
The ADA provides that " [n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). The plaintiff claims that NOCO discriminated against her because of her epilepsy by failing to promote her and retaliating against her for making complaints of discrimination. We consider her failure to promote claims separately with respect to the positions of assistant manager and manager.
Under the ADA, the term "discriminate" includes "not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee...." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (5) (A). The district court addressed only briefly the issue of reasonable accommodation as it relates to the plaintiff's assistant manager promotion claim before resolving the issue adversely to her as a matter of law. In so doing, it relied on the fact that her desire to become an assistant manager at S-44 was based on personal convenience, not her disability, and that NOCO accommodated her disability by promoting her to assistant manager at a store with armored car service in May 1994. The district court thereby misinterpreted and misapplied the requirements of reasonable accommodation under the ADA and failed to consider the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
1. The plaintiff's prima facie case. For a plaintiff who can perform a desired position with a reasonable accommodation to establish a prima facie case of discrimination because of disability, she must show "(1) that [s]he is an individual who has a disability within the meaning of the [ADA], (2) that an employer covered by the statute had notice of h [er] disability, (3) that with reasonable accommodation, [s]he could perform the essential functions of the position sought, and (4) that the employer has refused to make such accommodations." Stone v. City of Mt. Vernon, 118 F.3d 92, 96-97 (2d Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). We conclude that the plaintiff has come forward with sufficient evidence to meet her burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination foreclosing the granting of a motion for summary judgment against her on this aspect of her assistant manager promotion claim.
First, a person must be an "individual with a disability" in order to receive the protections provided by the ADA. A "disability" is "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of [the] individual." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (a). NOCO does not dispute that the plaintiff suffers from epilepsy or that epilepsy constitutes a disability under the ADA, a proposition that is well established. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. 1615.103(1) (ii) (including epilepsy in the definition of "physical or mental impairment"); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 488 (1999) (using epilepsy as an example of a condition that is included in the definition); LaChance v. Duffy's Draft House, Inc., 146 F.3d 832 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that epilepsy qualifies as a disability under the ADA); Martinson v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 104 F.3d 683 (4th Cir. 1997) (same).
Fourth, a reasonable jury could find that with reasonable accommodation the plaintiff could perform the essential functions of the job she sought. The ADA defines "reasonable accommodation" as including but not limited to "job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, [and] reassignment to a vacant position...." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (B). ADA regulations further state that an employer is required to make " [m]odifications or adjustments to the work environment, or to the manner or circumstances under which the position held or desired is customarily performed, that enable a qualified individual with a disability to perform the essential functions of that position." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (1) (ii).
NOCO neither asserts nor presents evidence to support an argument that the only way to satisfy the need for an assistant manager to deposit cash in the bank is for the assistant manager to drive herself to the bank. The plaintiff suggested several "plausible accommodation [s]" to enable her to be promoted at S-44, including having the manager of a nearby store drive her or hiring a car service or a driver at her own expense. The proposed accommodations are not, facially, an "undue hardship," 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (5) (A), which in any event is an affirmative defense, and would allow the plaintiff to accomplish the task of depositing the store's receipts in the bank.5 We therefore conclude that a rational jury could find that the plaintiff was able to perform the essential functions of the assistant manager position at S-44 with a reasonable accommodation.
We disagree that offering the desired position at an armored car store was, as a matter of law, a reasonable accommodation. By requiring reasonable accommodation, "Congress intended simply that disabled persons have the same opportunities available to them as are available to nondisabled persons." Wernick v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 91 F.3d 379, 384 (2d Cir. 1996). In that pursuit, the ADA defines a qualified individual with a disability as a person "who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (emphasis added); see also Jackan v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 205 F.3d 562, 565-66 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting § 12111(8) and emphasizing the words "or desires"). And it is discriminatory and a violation of the ADA to fail to "mak [e] reasonable accommodations to the known physical... limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant" for an employment position.
We also note that " [t]he ADA envisions an 'interactive process' by which employers and employees work together to assess whether an employee's disability can be reasonably accommodated." Jackan, 205 F.3d at 566 (citing Beck v. Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130, 1135 (7th Cir. 1996); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (3)). NOCO provides no evidence that it took any steps toward engaging in an interactive process, such as "meet [ing] with the employee who requests an accommodation, request [ing] information about the condition and what limitations the employee has, ask [ing] the employee what he or she specifically wants, show [ing] some sign of having considered [the] employee's request, and offer [ing] and discuss [ing] available alternatives when the request is too burdensome." Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 174 F.3d 142, 162 (3d Cir. 1999). NOCO's president's response to the plaintiff's request for an accommodation, that NOCO "will not be entertaining further communication on this matter," was the antithesis of participation in an interactive process. Because we find sufficient evidence of an outright refusal to accommodate to preclude summary judgment on this claim, however, we need not decide whether the refusal of NOCO to enter into an "interactive process" alone would foreclose summary judgment. See Cravens v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 214 F.3d 1011, 1021 (8th Cir. 2000) (citing Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc., 188 F.3d 944, 952 (8th Cir. 1999)).
Hamlin v. Charter Township of Flint, 165 F.3d 426, 432 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r)). The legislative history of the ADA also supports the premise that " [t]he plaintiff is not required to prove that he or she poses no risk." H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 46 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 469.
The plaintiff's neurologist also concluded that she did not pose a threat to herself or others and that the NOCO job was appropriate for her. The physician NOCO asked to review the plaintiff's conditionsuggested only that the plaintiff be examined "by a qualified neurologist for medical evaluation [] and treatment" and that "she not perform job duties [that] involve [] work at heights above ground level, operate heavy machinery or work in isolated areas where she would be alone for significant periods of time." He said nothing to indicate that she posed a significant risk of harm to herself or others in performing her duties. We decline to affirm the district court's grant of judgment for the defendant on the grounds that the plaintiff was not a qualified individual with a disability.
Second, NOCO asserts, as an alternative defense, undue hardship. To establish this defense, NOCO must show "(a) that making a reasonable accommodation would cause it hardship, and (b) that the hardship would be undue." Stone, 118 F.3d at 97; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (5) (A). NOCO has not made a showing that would permit the district court to decide in its favor on this issue as a matter of law.
The ADA defines undue hardship as "an action requiring significant difficulty or expense, when considered in light of the factors set forth in subparagraph (B)." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (A). The "factors in subparagraph (B)" include the cost of the accommodation, the overall financial resources of the employer, and the type of operation of the employer. See id. § 12111 (10) (B). We have recognized that undue hardship "is a relational term; as such, it looks not merely to the costs that the employer is asked to assume, but also the benefits to others that will result." Stone, 118 F.3d at 98 (internal quotation marks omitted). NOCO has provided no evidence that the accommodations suggested by the plaintiff would create an undue hardship. Indeed, in light of the plaintiff's suggestion that she pay for her own transportation to the bank, it would seem an uphill battle for NOCO to establish that an accommodation would necessarily create any hardship at all.
On January 20, 1994, the plaintiff wrote the letter to NOCO in which, inter alia, she cited the ADA and set forth her understanding of its requirements, suggesting several possibilities for accommodating her disability. In response to this letter, on January 26, 1994, NOCO's president wrote the short, sharp letter of rebuke quoted above. A jury could reasonably find that the letter's statement that " [i]f she continue [d] this behavior, [NOCO would] have no choice but to address [her] behavior through legal channels," and that that was NOCO's "final position on this matter and it [would] not be entertaining further communication on th [e] matter" served to "intimidate" or "threaten" her in the assertion of her right to make complaints or file charges under the ADA.
The plaintiff has also presented sufficient facts to show a causal connection between her protected activity and the adverse employment action. "The causal connection needed for proof of a retaliation claim can be established indirectly by showing that the protected activity was closely followed in time by the adverse action." Cifra, 252 F.3d at 216 (internal quotation marks omitted). We "ha [ve] not drawn a bright line to define the outer limits beyond which a temporal relationship is too attenuated to establish a causal relationship...." Gorman-Bakos v. Cornell Coop. Extension of Schenectady County, 252 F.3d 545, 554 (2d Cir. 2001). Although the plaintiff filed her complaint with the EEOC on February 4, 1994, the complaint was not served on NOCO until the beginning of April 1994. She was suspended later that month. This time span is short enough to permit a jury to infer a causal connection. See Richardson v. New York State Dep't of Corr. Serv., 180 F.3d 426, 446-47 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that abusive acts within one month of receipt of deposition notices may be retaliation for initiation of lawsuit more than one year earlier); Quinn v. Green Tree Credit Corp., 159 F.3d 759, 769 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding discharge less than two months after plaintiff filed a sexual harassment complaint with management and ten days after filing a complaint with state human rights office provided prima facie evidence of a causal connection between protected activity and retaliation).