Source: http://www.google.com/patents/US8028168?ie=ISO-8859-1&dq=6,757,710
Timestamp: 2015-05-05 06:33:08
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Patent US8028168 - System and method for verification of personal identity - Google PatentsSearch Images Maps Play YouTube News Gmail Drive More »Sign inAdvanced Patent SearchPatentsA system and method for storing identifying information and telephone numbers associated with individuals, and cross-referencing said information so as to link a first individual to other referee individuals capable of identifying the first individual as a result of a telephone conversation. When a relying...http://www.google.com/patents/US8028168?utm_source=gb-gplus-sharePatent US8028168 - System and method for verification of personal identityAdvanced Patent SearchPublication numberUS8028168 B2Publication typeGrantApplication numberUS 11/524,741Publication dateSep 27, 2011Filing dateSep 21, 2006Priority dateSep 23, 2005Also published asUS8782421, US20070074021, US20110320484, USRE44671Publication number11524741, 524741, US 8028168 B2, US 8028168B2, US-B2-8028168, US8028168 B2, US8028168B2InventorsChristopher P. K. Smithies, Jeremy M. NewmanOriginal AssigneeSmithies Christopher P K, Newman Jeremy MExport CitationBiBTeX, EndNote, RefManPatent Citations (8), Non-Patent Citations (1), Classifications (11), Legal Events (2) External Links: USPTO, USPTO Assignment, EspacenetSystem and method for verification of personal identity
Identity fraud presupposes a situation in which the parties to a transaction do not know one another, and one party (the �relying party�) seeks to verify the identity of the other. To date, solutions to the problem have followed three main routes.
The second solution involves what we might call �certification.� According to this model, the individual acquires a certificate of identity by applying to an authority with evidence of his identity. The authority checks the evidence and, if satisfied, issues a certificate. One time-honoured example of this approach has been the issuance of passports. In this case, the certificate is the passport. In order to acquire a passport, the applicant has to obtain photographs and present them in person to a reputable member of the community (the authority in this case) who either knows the applicant or who is able to assess the veracity of evidence produced by him. If satisfied, the authority signs the photographs. Trusting the authority, the passport office then issues the certificate bearing one of the photographs.
The third solution, which we will refer to as the �coherence� solution, is a relatively recent development. Here, identifying information volunteered by the individual is compared with a number of large databases containing identifying information. This approach, which is proposed by U.S. Pat. No. 6,871,287 to Ellingson and U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 20050165667 to Cox, relies upon the fact that in modern times, individuals interact with many institutions that build up records of identifying information. Credit records, health records, the electoral register, census returns and other large databases provide a wealth of collateral information that can be used to check identity.
All three approaches have significant drawbacks. In the case of the first and second approaches, as has already been mentioned, theft and forgery are all too possible. In addition, they both impose upon the individual the burden of carrying proofs of identity. In the third approach, it is possible for the malefactor to obtain access to databases of identifying information and so make a convincing, though fraudulent, claim. This is particularly a problem where �insiders� are party to fraud, for example call centre staff or bank employees (see, e.g. Data Security Chief arrested for Account Hacking at
The weakness that all three solutions have in common is that they tend to concentrate risk by seeking impersonal guarantors of identity�documents, certificates or a plurality of databases. To put it simply, they rely upon touchstones or criteria of identity that are all too easily identifiable by the impostor, who can therefore direct his resources to counterfeiting similar touchstones or satisfying the criteria. They may make it difficult, but the impostor knows exactly what he must do in order to circumvent the safeguards.
It also addresses the identity fraud problem from a different perspective. Instead of seeing the problem as that of a relying party who needs to identify an unknown individual, it approaches the question from the viewpoint of the individual who is at risk of identity fraud. In simple terms, it attempts to answer his question �how do I protect myself from identity fraud?�
The registration process principally involves the individual choosing a number of persons from among his family, friends and associates. For ease of reference, such chosen persons will be referred to herein as �referees.� The essential requirement for a referee is that he be able to recognize the applicant by voice in the course of a short conversation (typically, but not necessarily, by telephone). If a nominated referee agrees to act for the applicant, then a link is established. Typically this will be a reciprocal link, i.e., in the normal course of events, two people who know one another well will agree to act as referees for one another (for example, a mother and her daughter). When a referee agrees to act for an applicant, the proposed system will make a voice recording of the referee saying the applicant's name (or nickname or other appellation normally used by the referee to refer to the applicant), and this will be stored in the system as part of the linking information.
It is instructive to consider how difficult it is to perpetrate a fraud against someone using the present system and method. An impostor would be faced with creating and maintaining a convincing impersonation throughout the course of a live conversation, to the extent that even the victim's parent, spouse or sibling would not be able to detect the difference�assuming, that is, that the impostor had sufficient knowledge of the victim in the first place.
It might be objected that an impostor could set up a network of bogus referees, perhaps involving a conspiracy of several people each using multiple false identities. However, it is in the nature of a conspiracy that it must be disconnected from the law-abiding majority. It will be recognized that in the typical case, people's relationships are so widespread that it is said that there are only �six degrees of separation� between any two individuals in the world. Whether or not this is true, it is clear that interconnected communities of registrants and referees will tend to establish transitive links across the whole community of registrants. It is a relatively straightforward exercise for a computer program to detect the existence of small, isolated populations, whose very existence will tend to attract suspicion, as will an individual who acts as referee for an inordinate number of people.
It is useful to bear the foregoing point in mind when considering the motivational structure underlying the present invention, and contrasting it with other personal identification systems and methods. In the case of the evidential and �certification� methods, the relying party imposes on the individual the burden of carrying supporting evidence or certification of his identity. The �coherence� solution relies upon aggregation of personal data by institutions that are not directly answerable to the individuals concerned. By contrast, the present invention uses personal information only to link the individual to his chosen referees. Whereas the other identification systems require such specific evidence or information as satisfies the norms of those systems, the present invention allows individuals to contribute as much or as little personal identifying information as they require. For example, an individual might register his bank account or credit card numbers with the system of the present invention. Thereafter, any impostor who attempted to use that individual's stolen credit card or bank statement as evidence of identity would be automatically linked to the rightful owner's chosen referees, who would naturally detect the fraud. It should also be noted that whereas previous identification methods focus upon the relationship between an individual and certain authorities or institutions, the present invention focuses upon the relation between an individual and his peers. The relationship between an individual seeking to protect himself from identity fraud and his chosen referees is in principle a reciprocal one, so that in practice it is to be expected that individuals will voluntarily commit themselves to act co-operatively as referees for one another.
In operation, a relying party (not illustrate) seeking to verify the identity of a transacting party 4 contacts the system processor 1 using a data terminal 7 via the data communications system 8, providing information identifying the transacting party 4 and the telephone number on which he is currently available. The system processor 1 compares this information with the identity records in the database 3 and returns one of three status results: �not found,� �ambiguous� or �identified.� In the case that the result is �ambiguous,� the relying party must acquire additional collateral information and repeat the enquiry. In the case that the result is �identified,� the system processor 1 then obtains the Membership Identifier of the identified record and uses it to select from the link records those corresponding to the transacting party's referees. It then forms a list, in random order, of the Membership Identifiers of the referees. Until a call with a referee is established, the system processor 1 will then look up each referee in turn and obtain the referee's preferred telephone number. The system processor 1 then uses the telecommunications system 2 to place a call to the referee 6 and the answer detecting unit to determine whether the call was answered. The telecommunications system 2 then plays an introductory recording to the referee 6 using the replay unit, while simultaneously contacting the transacting party 4 in a similar way. The telecommunications system 2 then connects the transacting party 4 and the referee 6 so that they can converse. When the referee 6 presses a button on his telephone, the transacting party 4 and the referee 6 are separated. The transacting party 4 is instructed to hang up his telephone. The referee 6 is asked to indicate whether he identified the transacting party. If the referee 6 indicates that he did, he is asked to say the transacting party's 4 name, and the record unit of the telecommunications system 2 is used to make a recording of this response. Another brief prompt, thanking the referee 6, is played before terminating the call to the referee 6. The system processor 1 then retrieves the original recording from the link record of the database 3, supplies both to the voice sample comparator of the telecommunications system 2, and obtains a similarity score.
Patent CitationsCited PatentFiling datePublication dateApplicantTitleUS5042063Sep 9, 1988Aug 20, 1991Kabushiki Kaisha ToshibaTelephone apparatus with voice activated dialing functionUS6823454 *Nov 8, 1999Nov 23, 2004International Business Machines CorporationUsing device certificates to authenticate servers before automatic address assignmentUS6871287Jan 21, 2000Mar 22, 2005John F. EllingsonSystem and method for verification of identityUS6954525Jul 3, 2003Oct 11, 2005Mci, Inc.Method and apparatus for providing real-time execution of specific communications services in an intelligent networkUS7073195 *Jan 28, 2002Jul 4, 2006Intel CorporationControlled access to credential information of delegators in delegation relationshipsUS20020083008 *Dec 22, 2000Jun 27, 2002Smith Christopher F.Method and system for identity verification for e-transactionsUS20050165667Jan 27, 2004Jul 28, 2005Cox George C.System and method for customer video authentication to prevent identity theftUS20050203909 *Mar 12, 2004Sep 15, 2005Yongjun ZhaoDevice for searching for information from networked users and related methods* Cited by examinerNon-Patent CitationsReference1"Data security chief arrested for account hacking," Finextra.com, Aug. 19, 2005, http://www.finextra.com/fullstory.asp?id=14133.Classifications U.S. Classification713/176, 713/168, 726/6International ClassificationH04L29/00, H04L29/06, G06F21/32Cooperative ClassificationH04L63/0869, G06F2221/2115, G06F21/32European ClassificationG06F21/32, H04L63/08GLegal EventsDateCodeEventDescriptionJul 2, 2013RFReissue application filedEffective date: 20130312Mar 11, 2013ASAssignmentOwner name: NEW MODEL IDENTITY LIMITED, UNITED KINGDOMFree format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNORS:NEWMAN, JEREMY M.;SMITHIES, CHRISTOPHER P. K.;SIGNING DATES FROM 20130304 TO 20130307;REEL/FRAME:029958/0737RotateOriginal ImageGoogle Home - Sitemap - USPTO Bulk Downloads - Privacy Policy - Terms of Service - About Google Patents - Send FeedbackData provided by IFI CLAIMS Patent Services