Source: https://openjurist.org/525/f2d/1184/united-states-v-atchison-topeka-and-santa-fe-railway-co
Timestamp: 2017-08-21 05:31:14
Document Index: 664946300

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 64', '§ 61', '§ 61', '§ 62', '§ 61', '§ 61', '§ 61', '§ 61', '§ 61', '§ 62', '§ 62', '§ 61', '§ 62']

525 F2d 1184 United States v. Atchison Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co | OpenJurist
525 F. 2d 1184 - United States v. Atchison Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co
525 F2d 1184 United States v. Atchison Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co
525 F.2d 1184
22 Wage & Hour Cas. (BN 667, 78 Lab.Cas. P 33,320
The ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND SANTA FE RAILWAY CO., Defendant-Appellee.
No. 74--1061.
The United States sued the Santa Fe Railway under 45 U.S.C. § 64a(a) for statutory penalties for violations of the railroad Hours of Service Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 61--64b. The only question is what Congress meant when it used the term 'designated terminal' in 45 U.S.C. § 61(b)(3). On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court refused to impose the penalties and entered judgment for the Santa Fe. United States v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co., N.D.Cal., 1973, 363 F.Supp. 644. The government appeals, and we reverse.
On the date in question, it was unlawful under 45 U.S.C. § 62(a)(1) for the Santa Fe to require or permit an employee to continue on duty for more than fourteen hours (now the limit is twelve hours) until the employees had at least ten consecutive hours off duty. With some indirection, 45 U.S.C. § 61(b)(3) excludes from the computation of time on duty any period of four or more hours available for rest at a 'designated terminal':
The district court agreed with the Santa Fe and held that the government had failed to 'convince the Court that Stockton is not a 'designated terminal." 363 F.Supp. at 648 (emphasis by the district court). However, for the reasons discussed below, the government has convinced us.
The Congress introduced the term 'designated terminal' into section 1(b)(3) of the Hours of Service Act, 45 U.S.C. § 61(b)(3), by the Act of December 26, 1969, P.L. 91--169, 83 Stat. 463, which was designed to bring the safety provisions of the Hours of Service Act, originally enacted in 1907, up to date. While these 1969 amendments to the Act were under consideration, the Congress was amply forewarned that 'designated terminal' would prove to be a troublesome term unless it was specifically defined. Reginald Whitman, then Administrator of the Federal Railroad Administration, Department of Transportation, told a Senate subcommittee:
Section 1(b)(3) is new. It defines 'time on duty' but in so doing adds new undefined terms to the Hours of Service Law which could generate considerable litigation and result in conflicting court decisions.
The phrase 'designated terminals' in section 1(b)(3)(A) and (B) is intended to have that meaning commonly recognized in the railroad industry. The committee is advised that collective bargaining agreements provide a commonly understood definition for this term. As a minimum the committee intends that the term should mean generally a place where suitable food and lodging are available for employees.
First, we note that Mr. Manion said that certain terminals are designated (i.e., specified or identified--see note 2 infra) in collective bargaining agreements--not, as the committee report might be read to suggest, that such agreements contain a universal description or dictionary-style definition of a 'designated terminal,' or that such agreements label certain places as 'designated.' As the district court below observed, 363 F.Supp. at 647, the terminals which collective bargaining agreements commonly designate are the 'home terminal' and the 'away-from-home terminal' for each crew assignment. Sometimes the terminals so designated are indeed labelled as 'designat terminals. Id. Indeed, the pertinent collective bargaining agreements of the Santa Fe use these terms in this way. We think that this designation process, effected by collective bargaining agreement, must be the referent of the statutory shorthand 'designated terminal.'
Second, we note that Mr. Manion supplemented his comments and criticisms by proposing on behalf of the railroads specific amendments to the then pending bill. Hearings on S. 1938, supra, at 127--28. By one such amendment the railroads would have substituted for the words 'designated terminal' that now appear in 43 U.S.C. § 61(b)(3) the words 'place where reasonable facilities for food and rest are available to employees.' Id. at 153.2 That Congress did not adopt this proposal indicates that Congress rejected the notion that any place with a coffee shop and motel or something similar would serve as a suitable rest stop.
The definition of 'designated terminal' which the Santa Fe now urges is virtually the same as that which Congress rejected--except that the Santa Fe adds two new elements: (1) that the place having adequate facilities also be a 'terminal' and (2) that it be 'designated' in some way by railroad management. Neither additional element makes any difference. In railroad parlance, the word 'terminal' has reference to a particular crew and run. United States v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co., D.Ariz., 1914, 212 F. 1000, 1007. See also Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad Co. v. United States, 1917, 244 U.S. 336, 341--42, 37 S.Ct. 635, 61 L.Ed. 1175 (stipulated fact). We think, therefore, that § 61(b)(3) refers to the 'terminals' which are designated for the particular crew and run involved. The Santa Fe has advanced no reasons, and we can think of none, why a stop at any place with minimum facilities would be any more conducive to rest just because it happened to be a 'terminal' for other trains and other crews. And certainly to add that the place must be unilaterally designated by management would be to require a pointless formality. We think that Congress must have intended to require a bilateral designation process.
We are guided here by the Supreme Court's admonition in Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. United States, supra, 244 U.S. at 343, 37 S.Ct. at 637, that '(the Hours of Service Act) is remedial and in the public interest, and should be construed in light of its humane purpose.' Accordingly, we think that Congress could sensibly have concluded that rest periods best serve their function at a known location at the mid-point of a run where the crew has its established 'away-from-home' terminal or at the end of a run where the crew has its established 'home' terminal.
The facts of this case are illustrative. The crewmen were awakened at a very early hour; they were on duty for only about four and one-half hours before they were released for 'rest'--if any they needed then. After being 'off' for about five and a half hours, they were 'on' again for almost six straight hours. It would not surprise us if at the end of their sixteen hour day the crewmen were fatigued and their abilities to perform their duties impaired. See id. at 342, 37 S.Ct. 635.
We hold that the term 'designated terminal' as used in the Hours of Service Act, 45 U.S.C. § 61(b)(3), refers to terminals designated in or under collective bargaining agreements. Because Stockton was not so designated for the instant crew, the layover at Stockton should have been counted as time on duty. The Santa Fe therefore violated the Hours of Service Act.
United States v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co., 363 F.Supp. 644, 648 (N.D.Cal.1973).
By making it unlawful to require or permit an employee 'to continue on duty or to go on duty when he has not had at least eight consecutive hours off duty during the preceding twenty-four hours,' 45 U.S.C. § 62(a)(2) appears to limit the elapsed time from going on duty to going off in this hypothetical example to sixteen hours (one hour on, four off, plus eleven on)
Using the majority's definition it is possible for the railroad to accomplish the dire result which the majority relates at page 1190 without violating the Act. Riverbank would be the home terminal and Stockton and Richmond would be away-from-home terminals for this crew. It seems clear that the Hours of Service Act will permit the railroad to take its employees away from their homes for up to 16 hours per day, e.g., 12 hours on duty (45 U.S.C. § 62(a)(1)), 4 hours off at a designated terminal (45 U.S.C. §§ 61(b)(3) A, B), and 8 hours at home (45 U.S.C. § 62(a)(2))