Source: http://www.muni-mail.com/2008/07/
Timestamp: 2017-09-19 18:54:09
Document Index: 799434581

Matched Legal Cases: ['§8', '§804', '§5', '§5', '§2360', '§1197']

July, 2008 | Muni-Mail.com
Ten Judges Referred to Atty General in Ticket Fixing Mess
In a report released late today, the Judiciary revealed that an intensive review of the disposition 15 million tickets that were resolved in municipal courts over the past three years has resulted in the referral of a total of 10 municipal court judges and 7 court staff members to the Attorney General for criminal investigation. In addition, 9 of the 10 subject judges have also been referred to the Advisory Committee on Judicial Conduct for possible judicial discipline. According to the report, all of these referrals were made for the purpose of further investigation and review. At this point, the referrals themselves do not constitute findings as to criminality or misconduct.
So far, two indictments have been returned in the current ticket fixing investigation. On July 14, 2008, Attorney General Anne Milgram announced that a state grand jury returned separate indictments charging former Chief Judge Wanda Molina and former Jersey City Municipal Court Administrator Virginia Pagan with official misconduct (2nd Degree) for allegedly fixing parking tickets.
The Judiciary’s report also details the steps that will be taken to implement the financial controls, computer-based oversight and judicial training that will eliminate this type of scandal in the future.
Download a copy of the Report on the Review of Ticket Dismissal Procedures in the Municipal Court System.
Laurick Works for Revoked Drivers Too! – State v. Thomas
In State v. Thomas, a Law Division decision, the Court ruled that the relief available to defendants seeking post-conviction (PCR) relief under State v. Laurick 120, N.J. 1 (1990) is also available to defendants who are facing jail terms for driving on the revoked list. In Thomas, the defendant drove a motor vehicle while her license was suspended for drunk driving. In addition to the normal, second offender level penalties for driving the revoked list, the State also sought an additional jail sentence as an enhancement since the underlying suspension was for DWI. The defendant, claiming that her DWI conviction had been uncounseled, sought and was granted PCR under Laurick in the municipal court where she had been convicted of drunk driving.
Based upon the Laurick PCR order, the Law Division ruled that the defendant could not be subject to an enhanced jail term for driving on the revoked list as a result of the DWI conviction, but merely the normal second offender level jail term of a maximum of 5-days.
A copy of State v. Thomas is reproduced below.
MORLEY, J.S.C.
In this trial de novo on an appeal from the Cinnaminson Township Municipal Court, the issue is whether State v. Laurick, 120 N.J. 1, 575 A.2d 1340, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 967, 111 S.Ct. 429, 112 L.Ed.2d 413 (1990), prohibits the imposition of an enhanced period of incarceration for driving while one’s license is suspended as the result of a driving while intoxicated (DWI) conviction, under N.J.S.A. 39:3-40(f)(2), when the underlying conviction was uncounseled.FN1
FN1. In the context of this case, as well as the authorities upon which it relies, an uncounseled conviction is one that was entered in the absence of a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel by a defendant.
On December 8, 2005, defendant pled guilty in the Pennsauken Township Municipal Court to driving while intoxicated, in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50. As part of her sentence, a seven-month suspension of her license to operate a motor vehicle was imposed.
On March 28, 2006, defendant was convicted in the Moorestown Township Municipal Court of the same offense,FN2 and was sentenced to, inter alia, a two-year license suspension.
FN2. The Moorestown offense had occurred more than 11 months before that which resulted in the Pennsauken conviction.
On April 20, 2006, defendant was convicted of driving while her license was suspended, in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:3-40. That suspension was not related to either of the aforementioned, or any other, DWI offense.
On August 13, 2006, defendant was charged in Cinnaminson Township with operating a motor vehicle during the period of suspension imposed on the Moorestown DWI conviction. Upon entry of a guilty plea on November 9, 2006, defendant was sentenced to 20 days in the Burlington County Jail, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:3-40(f)(2), as well as fines, costs and an additional one-year license suspension. Defendant served five days of the jail sentence before obtaining a stay pending this appeal.
On November 4, 2006, defendant was charged in Delran Township again with driving while intoxicated. Before the case could be heard there, defendant sought post-conviction relief (PCR) from the Moorestown court on the grounds that her DWI conviction there had been uncounseled. That court agreed, and relief was granted consistent with Laurick, so that the Moorestown conviction was not considered when defendant was sentenced as a second-time DWI offender on her plea of guilty to the Delran charge on August 10, 2007.
The only issue advanced in this appeal is whether an enhanced jail term may be imposed on the Cinnaminson charge of driving during a period of license suspension when the suspension resulted from the uncounseled Moorestown DWI conviction. The State does not argue that this court is not bound by the Moorestown court’s determination on defendant’s PCR, but only that it does not entitle her to the relief sought here. Instead, the State argues that, because defendant was charged with driving while her license was suspended, rather than DWI, Laurick is inapplicable.
In Laurick, the Supreme Court held that:
[i]t is constitutionally permissible that a prior uncounseled DWI conviction may establish repeat offender status for purposes of the enhanced penalty provisions of the DWI laws of the State of New Jersey. The only constitutional limit is that a defendant may not suffer an increased period of incarceration as the result of a Rodriguez violation that led to the uncounseled conviction.
[ Laurick, supra, 120 N.J. at 16, 575 A.2d 1340. (emphasis in original)]
A Rodriguez violation is a municipal court’s failure to comply with the administrative policy that requires it to notify defendants facing charges carrying possible “consequence[s] of magnitude” that they have a right to counsel and, if indigent, the appointment of counsel at no cost. Id. at 8, 575 A.2d 1340. See Rodriguez v. Rosenblatt, 58 N.J. 281, 277 A.2d 216 (1971).
Laurick was decided in at least partial reliance on Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 100 S.Ct. 1585, 64 L.Ed.2d 169 (1980), our Supreme Court being satisfied tha t, despite the lack of a majority opinion in Baldasar, it nevertheless articulated “a core value … that an uncounseled conviction without waiver of the right to counsel is invalid for the purpose of increasing a defendant’s loss of liberty.” Laurick, supra, 120 N.J. at 16, 575 A.2d 1340. Later, however, in Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 114 S.Ct. 1921, 128 L.Ed.2d 745 (1994), the United States Supreme Court held that it is constitutionally permissible to enhance a sentence, even as to the length of imprisonment, on the basis of an uncounseled prior conviction. Id. at 746-47, 114 S.Ct. at 1927, 128 L.Ed.2d at 754.
Following the Nichols decis ion, our Supreme Court reconsidered Laurick in State v. Hrycak, 184 N.J. 351, 877 A.2d 1209 (2005). There, the Court declared that:
[d]espite the Nichols holding … we are convinced that a prior uncounseled DWI conviction … is not sufficiently reliable to permit increased jail sanctions under the enhancement statute. A contrary conclusion would severely undermine the policy embodied in Rodriguez, and our Court Rules…. In short, we affirm the continuing vitality of Laurick as it applies to our jurisprudence.
[ Id. at 362-63, 877 A.2d 1209.]
Although the defendants in both Laurick and Hrycak faced enhanced sentences under the DWI statute, there is nothing in the language or the reasoning of either case that would permit the conclusion urged by the State: that their holdings apply only to sentences imposed under the DWI statute. Rather, although neither required by the federal constitution nor articulated as a state constitutional principle, it remains the law in New Jersey that no defendant may be sentenced to an increased period of incarceration for any offense on the basis of an uncounseled conviction.
Here, defendant has pled guilty to the offense=2 0of driving while her license was suspended, in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:3-40. The State seeks to have her sentenced, as she was in the municipal courtFN3, in accordance with subsection (f)(2) of that statute, due to the fact that the license suspension had been imposed as the result of the Moorestown DWI conviction.
FN3. Because the Moorestown PCR had not yet been decided when the instant case was heard in the Cinnaminson court, the issue addressed in this opinion was never raised there.
Subsection (f)(2) provides that “any person violating this section [during a] suspension issued pursuant to … [the DWI statute] … shall be imprisoned in the county jail for not less than 10 days or not more than 90 days.” Otherwise, a second conviction for driving during a period of suspension is punishable by imprisonment for no more than five days under N.J.S.A. 39:3-40(b).
At the time of the instant charge of driving while her license was suspended, defendant had only one prior conviction for the same offense. Therefore, a jail sentence exceeding five days here would subject her to an increased loss of liberty predicated solely on the fact that the underlying suspension was imposed for a DWI conviction. However, because the conviction on which the State would have the court predicate an enhanced jail sentence was uncounseled, to impose a sentence in excess of five days would violate the mandate of Laurick.
Accordingly, defendant must be sentenced as a second-time offender under N.J.S.A. 39:3-40(b).
401 N.J.Super. 180
Courts May Not Sentence Illegals to Report Themselves to ICE – State v. V.D.
In yesterday’s Appellate Division decision in State v. V.D., the Court established a limitation on sentencing that applies to people who are in the United States illegally. In the V.D. case, the defendant entered a plea of guilty to a document-related fourth degree crime. As a specific term and condition of probation, the sentencing judge (over the objection of defense counsel) ordered the defendant to report her illegal presence and her conviction in the Superior Court to the federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency (ICE).
The Appellate Division ruled that such a sentencing provision is improper under New Jersey law. The decision related to whether a person in the United States illegally is to be reported to ICE is an executive function and, as per Attorney General and AOC Directives, has been vested in the office of the prosecutor in criminal cases and drunk driving matters. Moreover, the threat of being required to report to ICE by order of the judiciary would have a chilling effect on people who seek relief and protection in the Courts in family matters, civil actions and criminal cases.
It should also be noted that the sentencing procedure used in this case had two additional errors that would entitled the defendant to vacate her plea. At sentencing, the trial judge inadvertently misrepresented to the defendant what her maximum exposure in jail could be. The judge also inserted the ICE reporting condition on his own and appended it the plea agreement. The ICE component of the sentence had never been part of the plea agreement. The Appellate Division reminded judges in this opinion that if the Court wishes to impose a sentence that contains elements that are not part of the plea agreement or that calls for more punishment than set forth in the agreement, the defendant has the right to vacate the plea and either re-negotiate the plea bargain or go to trial.
Click here to view a copy of State v. V.D.
Courts May Relax 5-Year Laurick Limitation Routinely – State v. Bringhurst
This morning’s Appellate Division decision in State v. Bringhurst creates a procedure by which defendants who seek to file a post-conviction relief (PCR) petition seeking relief under State v. Laurick, 120 N.J. 1 (1990) may obtain a relaxation of the 5-year limitation the filing of PCR applications. The Court ruled that a defendant who seeks relief under Laurick must first comply with the procedural requirements of Rule 7:10-2(g). In so doing, the defendant must establish a prima facie case in his verified pleadings that he is entitled to relief under Laurick in that he was not represented by an attorney at the time of his previous conviction, that he did not effectively waive his right to counsel and that he was either an indigent or having had an attorney would have made a difference in the outcome of his case. Once a defendant can establish these criteria in the verified pleadings, the motion court may, as a matter of routine, relax the 5-year limitation for PCR applications set forth under the Rule 7:10-2(g)(2).
Download a copy of State v. Bringhurst.
No More Plea Bargains for Holders of Graduated D/L’s : Attorney General
By way of a memorandum dated September 17, 2008, the Attorney General has directed that municipal prosecutors may neither offer nor accept plea agreements which result in non-point violations for cases involving defendants who have a graduated driver’s license (GDL). The reason for the new plea bargaining prohibition relates to the mandatory driver improvement program that holders of graduated licenses must attend upon receiving 3 or more penalty points. By receiving non-point downgrades, these drivers are able to avoid attending the driver improvement program.
The plea bargaining ban for this narrow class of defendants will continue indefinitely until such time as the Motor Vehicle Commission can mandate the driver improvement program for holders of the GDL on some basis other than points.
Download a copy of the Attorney General’s Memorandum of September 17th.
Municipal Court Can Only Enforce Consumer Fraud Judgments – State v. Tri-Way Kars
In Monday’s Appellate Division decision in State v. Tri-Way Kars, the Court ruled that the powers of the municipal court in consumer fraud actions are limited to the collection and enforcement of civil penalties. There is no statutory authority vested in the municipal court to assess or otherwise impose a penalty in a consumer fraud case. That function is left to the attorney general.
Beyond the subject-matter jurisdictional question, the Appellate Division also held that the complaint in municipal court should have been dismissed on other grounds, including territorial jurisdiction (case filed in the wrong venue) and due process (wrong municipal court summons and complaint form used to charge the offense).
Download a copy of State v. Tri-Way Ka.
Judges Need Not Suspend D/L Following CD with Guilty Plea – NJSA 2C:36A-1
Yesterday, the governor signed amendments to portions of the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act of 1987 related to suspension of driving privileges. As you may recall, last year, as a result of changes in federal law, the Legislature authorized judges to forego the suspension of driving privileges following a conviction for a drug offense when the defendant can demonstrate compelling circumstances that will result in extreme hardship. (See NJSA 2C:35-16(a). See also State v. Bendix, 396 N.J.Super. 91, 933 A.2d 1 (App. Div. 2007) defining compelling circumstances and extreme hardship.)
The amendments signed yesterday by the governor will now enable judges to forego a license suspension on grounds of hardship in those cases where a defendant seeks a conditional discharge under NJSA 2C:36A-1 following a plea of guilty or a finding of guilt after trial.
A second law signed by the governor amends NJSA 2C:35-16 to now authorize a judicial reconsideration of sentence based upon a showing of compelling circumstances for those defendants who have previously lost their driving privileges due to a drug conviction.
Notwithstanding the amendment to the law, this procedure was already available and authorized by the Rules of Court. (See generally R. 7:9-4)
The amended statutes and accompanying statement are as follows:
1. N.J.S.2C:36A-1 is amended to read as follows:
b. In no event shall the court require as a term or condition of supervisory treatment under this section, referral to any residential treatment facility for a period exceeding the maximum period of confinement prescribed by law for the offense for which the individual has been charged or convicted, nor shall any term of supervisory treatment imposed under this subsection exceed a period of three years. If a person is placed under supervisory treatment under this section after a plea of guilty or finding of guilt, the court as a term and condition of supervisory treatment shall suspend the person’s driving privileges for a period to be fixed by the court at not less than six months or more20than two years unless the court finds compelling circumstances warranting an exception. For the purposes of this subsection, compelling circumstances warranting an exception exist if the suspension of the person’s driving privileges will result in extreme hardship and alternative means of transportation are not available.
NJSA 2C:35-16 is amended as follows:
d. After sentencing and upon notice to the prose cutor, a person subject to suspension or postponement of driving privileges under this section may seek revocation of the remaining portion of any suspension or postponement based on compelling circumstances warranting an exception that were not raised at the time of sentencing. The court may revoke the suspension or postponement if it finds compelling circumstances.
This bill allows a court to make an exception to the mandatory driver’s license suspension under the State’s conditional discharge statute if it finds that compelling circumstances warrant an exception. The bill specifies that compelling circumstances exist if the suspension of the person’s driving privileges will result in extreme hardship and alternative means of transportation are not available.
Under current law, a person with no previous convictions for a State or federal drug offense who is charged with or convicted of a disorderly persons or petty disorderly persons under the State’s controlled dangerous substance or drug paraphernalia law, as set out in chapters 35 and 36 of the Criminal Code (Title 2C), may be placed by the court under supervisory treatment subject to certain terms and conditions. If the person complies with these terms and conditions and does not commit another offense, the court will dismiss the charges. This law requires the court to impose a six-month to two-year driver’s license suspension on persons under supervisory treatment who were found guilty or have pleaded guilty to the offense. This bill would make the suspension discretionary if the court finds compelling circumstances warrant an exception.
Prior to enactment of P.L.2005, c.343, every person convicted of an offense concerning controlled dangerous substances or drug paraphernalia was required to forfeit his or her driving privileges for a period of six months to two years. P.L.2005, c.343 changed the law to allow the court to refrain from imposing the driver’s license suspension if compelling circumstances warrant an exception. This bill extends the compelling circumstances exception to persons who proceed under the conditional discharge statute.
The bill also clarifies that a person whose driver’s license is suspended or postponed due to a controlled dangerous substance or drug paraphernalia conviction may seek to have the suspension or postponement revoked based on compelling circumstances warranting an exception that were not raised at sentencing.
No Supression Where Cops Did Not Appear Before Judge to Get Warrant
The Rules of Court generally require that a law enforcement officer who seeks the issuance of a search warrant personally appear before an authorized judge and swear to the contents of his affidavit in support of the warrant. (Rule 3:5-3(a)). In today’s Appellate Division decision in State v. Gioe, the Court ruled that when there is a procedural violation of this Rule, suppression of the evidence is not necessarily required. In Gioe, the police faxed an affidavit to the reviewing municipal court judge. (The application for the search warrant was not being made under exigent circumstances such as would normally justify a telephonic warrant.) The judge reviewed the paperwork and faxed a signed copy of the search warrant to the police. The execution of the warrant resulted in the recovery of criminal evidence.
The defendant’s challenge to the search warrant was based upon a violation of the Rule requiring a personal appearance by the officer seeking the warrant before the reviewing judge. In sustaining the trial court’s order denying suppression of the evidence, the Appellate Division adopted a new, two-part test, holding that before allowing suppression in a case like this, courts should consider:
1.) Whether there was prejudice in the sense that the search might not have occurred had the proper procedure in the Rule been followed and
2.) Whether there is evidence of bad faith by the police as shown by a deliberate disregard for the Rule.
Download a copy of State v. Gioe.
U.S. Supreme Court: Crawford Principles Make DV Statement Admissible – Giles v. California
Although a defendant who is on trial in a criminal case has no duty to assist the State in proving his guilt, such a defendant does have an affirmative duty to refrain from acting in ways that destroy the integrity of the criminal-trial system. Thus, a defendant who procures the absence of a witness by wrongdoing forfeits his constitutional right to confrontation as to statements made by the absent witness. This outcome is commonly referred to as the “Rule of Forfeiture by Wrongdoing.”
In this morning’s decision by the United States Supreme Court in Giles v. California, the Justices ruled that order for this Rule to apply, the defendant must have engaged in acts of misconduct that were specifically and intentionally designed to prevent the witness from testifying. In Giles, the police took a statement from the victim in a domestic violence case. The defendant was subsequently charged with killing the victim. At trial, the State sought to introduce the victim’s statement given on the domestic violence incident. The defendant objected and argued that under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) such a statement was testimonial in nature and thus excluded from evidence on confrontation clause grounds. The California state appeals court ruled that the statement was admissible against the defendant since the defendant had procured the absence of the victim by murder and thus forfeited his right of confrontation by misconduct.
The United States Supreme Court reversed and held that this Rule did not exist at common law at the time of the adoption of the Constitution except in situations where the misconduct demonstrated the defendant’s specific intention to procure the absence of the witness. Moreover, it was never applied at common law in a case of murder. Accordingly, the Court ruled that the victim’s statement had to be excluded at trial under the principles set forth in Crawford.
It should be noted that the New Jersey Rules of Evidence contain no provision for the exclusion of the confrontation clause right due to wrongdoing. State v. Byrd, 393 N.J. Super. 218 (App. Div. 2007). However, this issue is now before the New Jersey Supreme Court. State v. Byrd, 194 N.J. 445 (2008). Today’s decision may influence how the New Jersey Supreme Court will rule on this issue.
Today’s decision in Giles is reprinted below:
A jury convicted Giles of first-degree murder. He appealed. While his appeal was pending, this Court decided in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S. 36, 53–54 (2004) , that the Confrontation Clause requires that a defendant have the opportunity to confront the witnesses who give testimony against him, except in cases where an exception to the confrontation right was recognized at the time of the founding. The California Court of Appeal held that the admission of Avie’s unconfronted statements at Giles’ trial did not violate the Confrontation Clause as construed by Crawford because Crawford recognized a doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing. 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 843, 847 (2004) (officially depublished). It concluded that Giles had forfeited his right to confront Avie because he had committed the murder for which he was on trial, and because his intentional criminal act made Avie unavailable to testify. The California Supreme Court affirmed on the same ground. 40 Cal. 4th 833, 837, 152 P. 3d 433, 435 (2007). We granted certiorari. 552 U. S. ___ (2008).
King v. Dingler, 2 Leach 561, 168Eng. Rep. 383 (1791),applied the same test to exclude unconfronted statements by a murder victim. George Dingler was charged with killing his wife Jane, who suffered multiple stab wounds that left her in the hospital for 12 days before she died. The day after the stabbing, a Magistrate took Jane Dingler’s deposition—as in Woodcock, under oath—“of the facts and circumstances which had attended the outrage committed upon her.” 2 Leach, at 561, 168 Eng. Rep., at 383. George Dingler’s attorney argued that the statements did not qualify as dying declarations and were not admissible Marian examinations because they were not taken in the presence of the prisoner, with the result that the defendant did not “have, as he is entitled to have, the benefit of cross-examination.” Id., at 562, 168 Eng. Rep., at 384. The prosecutor agreed, but argued the deposition should still be admitted because “it was the best evidence that the nature of the case would afford.” Id.,at 563, 168 Eng. Rep., at 384. Relying on Woodcock, the court “refused to receive the examination into evidence.” Id., at 563, 168 Eng. Rep., at 384.
Many other cases excluded victims’ statements when there was insufficient evidence that the witness was aware he was about to die. See Thomas John’s Case, 1 East 357, 358 (P. C. 1790); Welbourn’s Case, 1 East 358, 360 (P. C. 1792); United States v. Woods, 28 F. Cas. 762, 763 (No. 16,760) (CC DC 1834); Lewis v. State, 17Miss. 115, 120 (1847); Montgomery v. State, 11 Ohio 424, 425–426 (1842); Nelson v. State, 26Tenn. 542, 543 (1847); Smith v. State, 28Tenn. 9, 23 (1848). Courts in all these cases did not even consider admitting the statements on the ground that the defendant’s crime was to blame for the witness’s absence—even when the evidence establishing that was overwhelming. The reporter in Woodcock went out of his way to comment on the strength of the case against the defendant: “The evidence, independent of the information or declarations of the deceased, was of a very pressing and urgent nature against the prisoner.” 1 Leach, at 501, 168Eng. Rep., at 352.
The State offers another explanation for the above cases. It argues that when a defendant committed some act of wrongdoing that rendered a witness unavailable, he forfeited his right to object to the witness’s testimony on confrontation grounds, but not on hearsay grounds. See Brief for Respondent 23–24. No case or treatise that we have found, however, suggested that a defendant who committed wrongdoing forfeited his confrontation rights but not his hearsay rights. And the distinction would have been a surprising one, because courts prior to the founding excluded hearsay evidence in large part because it was unconfronted. See, e.g., 2 Hawkins 606 (6th ed. 1787); 2 M. Bacon, A New Abridgment of the Law 313 (1736). As the plurality said in Dutton v. Evans, 400 U. S. 74, 86 (1970) , “[i]t seems apparent that the Sixth Amendment ’s Confrontation Clause and the evidentiary hearsay rule stem from the same roots.”
This Court first addressed forfeiture in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145 (1879) , where, after hearing testimony that suggested the defendant had kept his wife away from home so that she could not be subpoenaed to testify, the trial court permitted the government to introduce testimony of the defendant’s wife from the defendant’s prior trial. See id., at 148–150. On appeal, the Court held that admission of the statements did not violate the right of the defendant to confront witnesses at trial, because when a witness is absent by the defendant’s “wrongful procurement,” the defendant “is in no condition to assert that his constitutional rights have been violated” if “their evidence is supplied in some lawful way.” Id., at 158. Reynolds invoked broad forfeiture principles to explain its holding. The decision stated, for example, that “[t]he Constitution does not guarantee an accused person against the legitimate consequences of his own wrongful acts,” ibid., and that the wrongful-procurement rule “has its foundation” in the principle that no one should be permitted to take advantage of his wrong, and is “the outgrowth of a maxim based on the principles of common honesty,” id., at 159.
In 1997, this Court approved a Federal Rule of Evidence, entitled “Forfeiture by wrongdoing,” which applies only when the defendant “engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness.” Fed. Rule of Evid. 804(b)(6). We have described this as a rule “which codifies the forfeiture doctrine.” Davis v. Washington, 547 U. S. 813, 833 (2006) . Every commentator we are aware of has concluded the requirement of intent “means that the exception applies only if the defendant has in mind the particular purpose of making the witness unavailable.” 5 C. Mueller & L. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence §8:134, p. 235 (3d ed. 2007); 5 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein’s Federal Evidence §804.03[7][b], p. 804–32 (J. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2008); 2 S. Brown, McCormick on Evidence 176 (6th ed. 2006).2 The commentators come out this way because the dissent’s claim that knowledge is sufficient to show intent is emphatically not the modern view. See 1 W. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law §5.2, p. 340 (2d ed. 2003).
While American courts understood the admissibility of statements made at prior proceedings (including coroner’s inquests like the one in Harrison’s Case) to turn on prior opportunity for cross-examination as a general matter, see Crawford, 541 U. S., at 47, n. 2, no such limit was applied or expressed in early wrongful-procurement cases. In Rex v. Barber, 1 Root 76 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1775), “[o]ne White, who had testified before the justice and before the grand-jury against Barber, and minutes taken of his testimony, was sent away by one Bullock, a friend of Barber’s, and by his instigation; so that he could not be had to testify before the petit-jury. The court admitted witnesses to relate what White had before testified.” Two leading evidentiary treatises and a Delaware case reporter cite that case for the proposition that grand jury statements were admitted on a wrongful-procurement theory. See Phillipps, Treatise on Evidence, at 200, n. (a); T. Peake, Compendium of the Law of Evidence 91, n. (m) (American ed. 1824); State v. Lewis, 1 Del. Cas. 608, 609, n. 1 (Ct. Quarter Sess. 1818). (Of course the standard practice since approximately the 17th century has been to conduct grand jury proceedings in secret, without confrontation, in part so that the defendant does not learn the State’s case in advance. S. Beale, W. Bryson, J. Felman, & M. Elston, Grand Jury Law and Practice §5.2 (2d ed. 2005); see also 8 J. Wigmore Evidence §2360, pp. 728–735 (J. McNaughton rev. 1961)).4
The Georgia Supreme Court’s articulation of the forfeiture rule similarly suggests that it understood forfeiture to be a basis for admitting unconfronted testimony. The court wrote that Lord Morley’s Case established that if a witness “who had been examined by the Crown, and was then absent, was detained by the means or procurement of the prisoner,” “then the examination should be read” into evidence. Williams v. State, 19Ga. 402, 403 (1856). Its rule for all cases in which the witness “had been examined by the Crown” carried no confrontation limit, and indeed, the court adopted the rule from Lord Morley’s Case which involved not Marian examinations carrying a confrontation requirement, but coroner’s inquests that lacked one.
The leading American case on forfeiture of the confrontation right by wrongful procurement was our 1879 decision in Reynolds. That case does not set forth prior confrontation as a requirement for the doctrine’s application, and begins its historical analysis with a full description of the rule set forth in Lord Morley’s Case, which itself contained no indication that the admitted testimony must have been previously confronted. It followed that description with a citation of Harrison’s Case—which, like Lord Morley’s Case,applied wrongful procurement to coroner’s inquests, not confronted Marian examinations—saying that the rule in those cases “seems to have been recognized as the law of England ever since.” 98 U. S., at 158. The opinion’s description of the forfeiture rule is likewise unconditioned by any requirement of prior confrontation:
Having destroyed its own case, the dissent issues a thinly veiled invitation to overrule Crawford and adopt an approach not much different from the regime of Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U. S. 56 (1980) , under which the Court would create the exceptions that it thinks consistent with the policies underlying the confrontation guarantee, regardless of how that guarantee was historically understood. The “basic purposes and objectives” of forfeiture doctrine, it says, require that a defendant who wrongfully caused the absence of a witness be deprived of his confrontation rights, whether or not there was any such rule applicable at common law. Post, at 4.
Since it is most certainly not the norm that trial rights can be “forfeited” on the basis of a prior judicial determination of guilt, the dissent must go far afield to argue even by analogy for its forfeiture rule. See post, at 5 (discussing common-law doctrine that prohibits the murderer from collecting insurance on the life of his victim, or an inheritance from the victim’s estate); post, at 6 (noting that many criminal statutes punish a defendant regardless of his purpose). These analogies support propositions of which we have no doubt: States may allocate property rights as they see fit, and a murderer can and should be punished, without regard to his purpose, after a fair trial. But a legislature may not “punish” a defendant for his evil acts by stripping him of the right to have his guilt ina criminal proceeding determined by a jury, and on the basis of evidence the Constitution deems reliable and admissible.
3 Wrongful procurement was also described as grounds for admitting unconfronted testimony in Fenwick’s Case, 13 How. St. Tr. 537 (H. C. 1696), a parliamentary attainder proceeding. Although many speakers argued for admission of unconfronted testimony simply because Parliament was not bound by the rules of evidence for felony cases, see Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S. 36, 46 (2004) , it was also argued that witness tampering could be a basis for admitting unconfronted statements even in common-law felony trials: “[W]here persons do stand upon their lives, accused for crimes, if it appears to the court that the prisoner hath, by fraudulent and indirect means, procured a person that hath given information against him to a proper magistrate, to withdraw himself, so that he cannot give evidence as regularly as they used to do; in that case his information hath been read; which, I suppose, with humble submission, is this case . . . .” 13 How. St. Tr., at 594 (remarks of Lovel). The dissent responds that in most circumstances in which a witness had given information against a defendant before “ ‘a proper magistrate,’ ” the testimony would have been confronted. Post, at 20. Perhaps so, but the speaker was arguing that the wrongful-procurement exception applied in “this case”—Fenwick’s Case, in which the testimony was unconfronted, see 13 How. St. Tr., at 591–592.
4 Three commentators writing more than a century after the Barber decision, said, without explanation, that they understood the case to have admitted only confronted testimony at a preliminary examination. W. Best, The Principles of the Law of Evidence 473, n. (e) (American ed. 1883); J. Stephen, A Digest of the Law of Evidence 161 (1902); 2 J. Bishop, New Criminal Procedure §1197, p. 1024 (2d ed. 1913). We know of no basis for that understanding. The report of the case does not limit the admitted testimony to statements that were confronted.
5 The dissent attempts to reconcile its approach with Crawford by saying the wrongful-procurement cases used language “broad enough” to reach every case in which a defendant committed wrongful acts that caused the absence of a victim, and that there was therefore an “‘exception” “established at the time of the founding,’ ” post, at 3, reaching all such misconduct. But an exception to what? The dissent contends that it was not an exception to confrontation. Were that true, it would be the end of the Crawford inquiry.
6 The dissent identifies one circumstance—and only one—in which a court may determine the outcome of a case before it goes to the jury: A judge may determine the existence of a conspiracy in order to make incriminating statements of co-conspirators admissible against the defendant under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E). Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U. S. 171 (1987) , held that admission of the evidence did not violate the Confrontation Clause because it “falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception”—the test under Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U. S. 56, 66 (1980) , the case that Crawford overruled. In fact it did not violate the Confrontation Clause for the quite different reason that it was not (as an incriminating statement in furtherance of the conspiracy would probably never be) testimonial. The co-conspirator hearsay rule does not pertain to a constitutional right and is in fact quite unusual. We do not say, of course, that a judge can never be allowed to inquire into guilt of the charged offense in order to make a preliminary evidentiary ruling. That must sometimes be done under the forfeiture rule that we adopt—when, for example, the defendant is on trial for murdering a witness in order to prevent his testimony. But the exception to ordinary practice that we support is (1) needed to protect the integrity of court proceedings, (2) based upon longstanding precedent, and (3) much less expansive than the exception proposed by the dissent.
Feds & Penna Police Can Execute Pennsy Warrant in N.J. -St v. Aikens
In this morning’s Appellate Division holding in State v. Aikens, the Court ruled that members of the United States Marshals Service and their deputies may effect the arrest of wanted fugitives in New Jersey without the existence of a federal arrest warrant. In Aikens, the marshals, aided by deputized members of Pennsylvania law enforcement, located the defendant in New Jersey after she had escaped from custody in Pennsylvania. Without the aid of New Jersey law enforcement or a properly issued federal fugitive warrant, the marshals arrested the defendant inside a residence. While inside the residence, the officers located distribution amounts of controlled dangerous substances. The marshals thereafter arrested the fugitive and other people inside the residence.
The defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence, claiming that he and the others had been illegally arrested. The motion was granted by the motion court. However, the Appellate Division reversed this ruling and found that federal law authorized the marshals to arrest wanted fugitives from other states without the issuance of a formal federal fugitive warrant.
The Appellate Division also ruled that the State had been improperly denied its right to fully brief and argue its position by the motion judge.
Download a copy of State v. Aikens.