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United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Ray C. Broce and Broce Construction Company, Inc.,defendants-appellants, 781 F.2d 792 (10th Cir. 1986) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Tenth Circuit › 1986 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Ray C. Broce and Broce Construction Company, Inc.,d...
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Ray C. Broce and Broce Construction Company, Inc.,defendants-appellants, 781 F.2d 792 (10th Cir. 1986)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit - 781 F.2d 792 (10th Cir. 1986) Jan. 2, 1986
On November 7, 1981, a two count indictment was returned charging defendants, Ray C. Broce and Broce Construction Co., Inc., with conspiracy to violate the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. In the second count, Mr. Broce was charged with mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1341. On February 4, 1982, a second indictment was returned charging Mr. Broce and the corporation in one count with violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1.
One year later, both defendants filed motions pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a) to vacate the judgments alleging their conviction on the second indictment violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The defendants asserted the conspiracy counts charged a single transaction rather than two separate conspiracies; hence, the second charge was unconstitutionally duplicitous and void. This contention was motivated by a ruling from another judge in the same district dismissing an indictment in a companion case.
The defendants, Broce and the Broce Construction Company, were actively engaged in the highway construction business in the state of Kansas for a number of years prior to the indictments. Indeed, these indictments grew out of that very activity, as did the indictment in the companion case, United States v. Beachner Construction Co., Inc., 555 F. Supp. 1273 (D. Kan. 1983). In Beachner, as here, the defendants had been indicted on a charge of conspiracy to rig bids on a particular Kansas highway project. After trial and acquittal on this charge, the defendants were again indicted on a second conspiracy charge connected to a different highway project. Id. at 1274. Prior to trial, the defendants moved to dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds. After a three-day evidentiary hearing pursuant to Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 97 S. Ct. 2034, 52 L. Ed. 2d 651 (1977), the trial court concluded there had been a pervasive conspiracy to rig bids in the Kansas highway construction industry that had existed for "in excess of twenty-five years." Beachner, supra, at 1277. Accordingly, the court dismissed the indictment and the government appealed. The ruling was affirmed by this court. United States v. Beachner Construction Co., Inc., 729 F.2d 1278 (10th Cir. 1984).
The panel which originally heard this case ordered reversal of the trial court's judgment. United States v. Broce, 753 F.2d 811 (10th Cir. 1985). That opinion was vacated and rehearing was granted to consider whether the guilty pleas are admissions by the defendants that there were actually two conspiracies and whether the defendants could collaterally attack the foundations of an indictment following a plea of guilty.
The government contends a fundamental principle in this circuit is that the double jeopardy defense is personal and subject to waiver. Cox v. Crouse, 376 F.2d 824 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 865, 88 S. Ct. 128, 19 L. Ed. 2d 136 (1967); Caballero v. Hudspeth, 114 F.2d 545 (10th Cir. 1940). On that premise the government argues that an unconditional plea of guilty constitutes that waiver, Caballero, supra, and precludes a challenge of the indictment. Although the panel held that Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 96 S. Ct. 241, 46 L. Ed. 2d 195 (1975), and Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 94 S. Ct. 2098, 40 L. Ed. 2d 628 (1974), compel a reversal of Caballero, the government takes issue with this result. The government further postulates allowing a collateral attack will encourage defendants to challenge their sentences "long after their guilty pleas are entered, thus undermining the finality of convictions and increasing the already heavy workload of the federal courts."
These contentions were considered and rejected in Blackledge, supra.1 There, in response to an argument that a due process claim could not be asserted following a guilty plea, the Supreme Court stated when the claim of constitutionality goes to "the very power of the State to bring the defendant into court to answer the charge," a guilty plea does not waive the constitutional issue. Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 30, 94 S. Ct. at 2103.
The essential right with which the court dealt in Blackledge and with which we are concerned here is the "right not to be haled into court at all." Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 30, 94 S. Ct. at 2104. Indeed, as the court noted in Robinson v. Neil:
409 U.S. 505, 509, 93 S. Ct. 876, 878, 35 L. Ed. 2d 29 (1973) (emphasis added).
Hence, the Broce guilty pleas do not constitute a bar to questioning whether the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits the institution of the second indictment and vitiates those very pleas. It also follows that if the institution of the charge under attack is constitutionally defective, it is not a significant concern that collateral attack affects the finality of the judgment. If the charge upon which the judgment is based is constitutionally infirm, either on due process or double jeopardy grounds, that judgment cannot be "final." Cf. Haring v. Prosise, 461 U.S. 954, 103 S. Ct. 2424, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1313 (1983).
The government argues that "almost every other court of appeals that has considered the issue [of waiver] since Blackledge and Menna has held that double jeopardy is a personal defense that is waived by a guilty plea where, as here, the plea is the result of a plea bargain." This argument is not well-founded. Examination of the cases cited in support of the government's proposition discloses neither Blackledge nor Menna were considered. See United States v. Solomon, 726 F.2d 677 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v. Herzog, 644 F.2d 713 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1018, 101 S. Ct. 3008, 69 L. Ed. 2d 390 (1981); Brown v. State, 618 F.2d 1057 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, sub nom. Brown v. Maryland, 449 U.S. 878, 101 S. Ct. 224, 66 L. Ed. 2d 100 (1980); and United States v. Perez, 565 F.2d 1227 (2d Cir. 1977).
In addition, the government suggests allowing the defendants to challenge their pleas is both inconsistent and inequitable. In reliance upon Kerrigan v. United States, 644 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1981), the government argues a defendant who pled guilty cannot be permitted to make arguments "inconsistent with the factual and theoretical foundations of the indictment." On this premise, the government contends Kerrigan supports the government's waiver theory. Yet, in discussing the issue of the defendant's waiver, the Kerrigan court did not consider Blackledge or its effect on the issue. Since Blackledge is the keystone in the issue of waiver under consideration here, Kerrigan cannot be regarded as persuasive authority.4 Accordingly, the cardinal principle that the government's authority to charge is not subject to waiver by the accused has not been undercut since Blackledge and must remain the principle by which we are guided here.
The government has also argued the defendants' pleas of guilty must be considered admissions of all the facts alleged in the indictments; therefore, they cannot contest the validity of the second charge. The prosecution contends that the indictments effectively alleged the existence of two conspiracies; therefore, having admitted that allegation by their pleas of guilty, the defendants cannot be heard to contend there was only one conspiracy in fact. United States v. Kerrigan, supra. The argument is unpersuasive. First, as distinguished from Kerrigan, the present indictments did not specifically allege separate conspiracies. While the second indictment alleged a conspiracy to rig bids on particular highway projects, it contained no specific charge that the conspiracy itself was separate from the conspiracy alleged in the first indictment. Second, the admissions of factual guilt subsumed in the pleas of guilty go only to the acts constituting the conspiracy and not to whether one or more conspiracies existed. Launius v. United States, 575 F.2d 770 (9th Cir. 1978).
When the two indictments are viewed in this factual matrix, a significant question arises whether, under the unique circumstances of this case, the defendants stood charged with participation in only one long-standing conspiracy. Moreover, on the face of the indictments, it appears the transactions set forth were mere elements in that conspiracy, and not independent conspiracies themselves. Compare United States v. Behrens, 689 F.2d 154 (10th Cir. 1982); United States v. McMurray, 680 F.2d 695 (10th Cir. 1981); United States v. Palermo, 410 F.2d 468 (7th Cir. 1969).
Notwithstanding, the question of whether the indictments charged one or two conspiracies is, in the context of this case, wholly factual. Despite the existence of the Beachner record and our opinion in that case, the trial court has made no determination of those essential facts, and we are not wont to do so. While Beachner could logically be regarded as a significant signpost, our system requires the road to be first chosen by the trial court and not by us. In this instance, what must follow is a determination of the kind mandated in Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 97 S. Ct. 2034, 52 L. Ed. 2d 651 (1977), and we must remand for that purpose. We are therefore returning this case for further proceedings at the point at which the trial court arrived at an erroneous conclusion.
I concur fully in part I of the majority's opinion. I join in part II of the majority opinion insofar as it remands to the trial court to give it the first opportunity to consider that issue. I do so reluctantly because I believe the matter is clear enough on the record before us to establish as a matter of law that the second indictment charging the defendant with violation of the Sherman Act in connection with a conspiracy to rig bids on another Kansas highway construction project violates the double jeopardy clause. I base this conclusion upon my agreement with this court's panel opinion in the instant case, authored by Judge Bohanon. United States v. Broce, 753 F.2d 811 (10th Cir. 1985). In that opinion, this court stated:
The rationale behind my view that this court should vacate the judgment and sentence entered in Case No. 83-2558 can be found in Short v. United States, 91 F.2d 614 (4th Cir. 1937):
The notion of waiver embodies the aspiration that individuals should be entitled to decide for themselves whether to invoke constitutional protections. As the Supreme Court stated in Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279-80, 63 S. Ct. 236, 241-42, 87 L. Ed. 268 (1942):
" [T]he procedural safeguards of the Bill of Rights are not to be treated as mechanical rigidities. What were contrived as protections for the accused should not be turned into fetters....
The Court has thus consistently allowed criminal defendants to relinquish constitutional rights. See, e.g., Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 96 S. Ct. 1178, 47 L. Ed. 2d 370 (1976) (freedom from self-incrimination); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972) (speedy trial); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969) (trial of any kind); Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 86 S. Ct. 1245, 16 L. Ed. 2d 314 (1966) (confrontation of witnesses); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 83 S. Ct. 822, 9 L. Ed. 2d 837 (1963) (claims otherwise reviewable via habeas corpus); Adams, 317 U.S. 269, 63 S. Ct. 236 (counsel and jury trial). To be sure, the waiver of any such right must be knowing and voluntary, and courts should " 'indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver....' " Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L. Ed. 1461 (1938) (citations omitted); see also Tigar, The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, Forward: Waiver of Constitutional Rights: Disquiet in the Citadel, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1970). When these conditions are properly fulfilled, the relinquishment of constitutional rights is permissible.
The Court has countenanced no exception for the Double Jeopardy Clause. In the seminal case of Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 24 S. Ct. 797, 49 L. Ed. 114 (1904), the Court characterized freedom from double jeopardy as a right which may not be denied a defendant " 'without his consent.' " Id. at 131, 24 S. Ct. at 805 (quoting 1 Bishop, Criminal Law Sec. 1026 (5th ed.)). In Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 78 S. Ct. 221, 2 L. Ed. 2d 199 (1957), the Court described the right in ostensibly personal terms:
Id. at 187-88, 78 S. Ct. at 223.2 The Court then held that the right had not been waived in the circumstances of that case:
"Nevertheless the Government contends that Green 'waived' his constitutional defense of former jeopardy to a second prosecution on the first degree murder charge by making a successful appeal of his improper conviction of second degreee murder. We cannot accept this paradoxical contention. 'Waiver' is a vague term used for a great variety of purposes, good and bad, in the law. In any normal sense, however, it connotes some kind of voluntary knowing relinquishment of a right. Cf. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 [58 S. Ct. 1019]."
Id. at 191, 78 S. Ct. at 225 (emphasis in original). In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 237-38, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 205253, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1973), the Court listed "the right to be free from twice being placed in jeopardy" as one of those rights to which the Zerbst standard of knowing and intelligent waiver had been applied, specifically citing Green.
The subsequent cases of Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 94 S. Ct. 2098, 40 L. Ed. 2d 628 (1974), and Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 96 S. Ct. 241, 46 L. Ed. 2d 195 (1975) (per curiam), in no way mark a retrenchment from the Court's waiver jurisprudence or its conception of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Blackledge and Menna characterize the right in "jurisdictional" terms in order to delimit the circumstances under which a valid forfeiture--not waiver--may occur. Both cases hold that a mere guilty plea does not forfeit an unambiguous claim that the prosecution lacked all power to hale a defendant into court.3 As explained in Menna:
"Neither Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 [93 S. Ct. 1602, 36 L. Ed. 2d 235] (1973), nor our earlier cases on which it relied, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 [90 S. Ct. 1463, 25 L. Ed. 2d 747] (1970), and McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 [90 S. Ct. 1441, 25 L. Ed. 2d 763] (1970), stand for the proposition that counseled guilty pleas inevitably 'waive' all antecedent constitutional violations.... [I]n Tollett we emphasized that waiver was not the basic ingredient of this line of cases, 411 U.S. at 266 [93 S. Ct. at 266]. The point of these cases is that a counseled plea of guilty is an admission of factual guilt so reliable that, where voluntary and intelligent, it quite validly removes the issue of factual guilt from the case. In most cases, factual guilt is a sufficient basis for the State's imposition of punishment. A guilty plea, therefore, simply renders irrelevant those constitutional violations not logically inconsistent with the valid establishment of factual guilt and which do not stand in the way of conviction, if factual guilt is validly established. Here, however, the claim is that the State may not convict petitioner no matter how validly his factual guilt is established. The guilty plea, therefore, does not bar the claim."
423 U.S. at 62-63 n. 2, 96 S. Ct. at 242 n. 2 (emphasis added); see also Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 319-21, 103 S. Ct. 2368, 2376-77, 76 L. Ed. 2d 595 (1983).4 Blackledge and Menna recall Green: the nature of the guarantee against double jeopardy restricts what may qualify as a valid forfeiture, but does not negate the possibility of a deliberate waiver. The Menna Court thus explicitly declined to rule that a double jeopardy claim may never be waived. See 423 U.S. at 62-63 n. 2, 96 S. Ct. at 242 n. 2.
304 U.S. at 467-68, 58 S. Ct. at 1024 (emphasis added). Like the guarantee against double jeopardy described in Menna, the right to counsel deprives a court of power to proceed against an accused who is unrepresented. Yet Zerbst was a landmark decision precisely because of its statement that such a right may be knowingly and voluntarily relinquished. See id. at 465, 58 S. Ct. at 1023. It thus does not follow from the Court's jurisdictional characterization that the guarantee against double jeopardy is somehow exceptional and may never be deliberately relinquished.5 Accord Launius v. United States, 575 F.2d 770, 772 (9th Cir. 1978).
Although I conclude that a double jeopardy claim may be waived, I agree with Judge Bohanon, author of the panel opinion, that there has been no waiver in this case. Menna confirms that any waiver of a double jeopardy claim must be deliberate in the sense envisioned by Zerbst. The defendant in Menna had raised the defense prior to pleading guilty. The New York Court of Appeals therefore construed his guilty plea as a knowing and voluntary waiver. See People v. Menna, 36 N.Y.2d 930, 373 N.Y.S.2d 541, 335 N.E.2d 848 (1975). In reversing, the Supreme Court held that a guilty plea relates only to factual guilt and does not by itself imply a deliberate decision to relinquish a legal claim, notwithstanding that the defendant was aware of the claim at the time of his plea. See Menna, 423 U.S. at 62-63 n. 2, 96 S. Ct. at 242 n. 2. An affirmative and unambiguous indication of waiver is thus required. Indeed, as a practical matter, " [a] double jeopardy defense is normally not the type of claim that would be foregone for some strategic purpose." United States v. Anderson, 514 F.2d 583, 586 (7th Cir. 1975).
In dissent, Judge Barrett argues that defendants forfeited their double jeopardy claim by failing to raise the issue below as required by Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b) (2). See Barrett Dissent at 813-815. The rule provides:
Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b) (2) (emphasis added). Professor Wright has answered the Rule 12 forfeiture argument as follows: "As a pleading matter this may well be true. The vice however, of multiplicity is that defendant may be given multiple sentences for a single offense. If this happens, the sentence is illegal and may be corrected at any time." 1 C. Wright, Federal Practice & Procedure Sec. 193, at 702 n. 31 (2d ed. 1982); see also id. Sec. 145, at 525-26 & n. 14.
" 'The argument that one waives his right to object to the imposition of multiple sentences by his fail [ing] to object to the multiplicious nature of an indictment is a non sequitur. Rule 12 applies only to objections with regard to the error in the indictment itself; the effect of Rule 12 is that dismissal of a multiplicious indictment is not required; however, if sentences are imposed on each count of that multiplicious indictment the defendant is not forced to serve the erroneous sentence because of any waiver.' "
Launius, 575 F.2d at 772 (quoting United States v. Rosenbarger, 536 F.2d 715, 721-22 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 965, 97 S. Ct. 2920, 53 L. Ed. 2d 1060 (1977)); see also United States v. Mastrangelo, 733 F.2d 793, 800 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v. Marino, 682 F.2d 449, 454 n. 3 (3d Cir. 1982). It is noteworthy that Rule 12(b) (2) excepts jurisdictional issues from those which must be raised pretrial. Given the Supreme Court's characterization of double jeopardy and the facts of Blackledge, it is apparent that Rule 12(b) (2) is no bar to raising a double jeopardy claim even post trial. Although Broce's prison sentences ran concurrently, both he and his company received cumulative fines on the two indictments. They did not forfeit the right to contest the constitutionality of those fines by failing to raise the issue during the brief interval before pleading guilty.
If the indictments in this case alleged two separate conspiracies with sufficient clarity and specificity, then a plea of guilty to each arguably could be construed as establishing that two such conspiracies existed. As an example, Judge Barrett relies upon the case of Kerrigan v. United States, 644 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1981). The indictments against Kerrigan clearly charged two separate conspiracies to transport stolen goods in interstate commerce. One conspiracy allegedly occurred between the specific dates of August 25 and September 1, 1977, with two named coconspirators. The other, involving different goods, allegedly occurred between September 1 and September 22, 1977, with only one of the previously named co-conspirators. The court held that Kerrigan could raise a double jeopardy claim only by repudiating the alleged facts to which he had pleaded guilty:
These features raise a presumption that the two indictments concerned a single conspiracy. See United States v. Novak, 715 F.2d 810, 818 (3d Cir. 1983) (citing United States v. Mallah, 503 F.2d 971, 985-87 (2d Cir. 1974)), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1030, 104 S. Ct. 1293, 79 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1984). " [I]t is the government which has control over the drafting of indictments. Any burden imposed by the imprecision in the description of separate offenses should be borne by it." United States v. Inmon, 568 F.2d 326, 332 (3d Cir. 1977).
Short v. United States, 91 F.2d 614, 624 (4th Cir. 1937); see also United States v. Abbamonte, 759 F.2d 1065, 1070 (2d Cir. 1985).
Given the vagueness of the indictments, defendants could not and did not admit the existence of separate conspiracies merely by pleading guilty to the facts alleged.7 They are therefore not barred from establishing the existence of one continuing conspiracy. While the majority agrees with this view of the indictments, it would remand for an initial determination of the factual question. I submit, however, that the issue has already been resolved. In United States v. Beachner Construction Co., 729 F.2d 1278 (10th Cir. 1984), this court upheld the factual finding of a single continuing conspiracy to rig bids within the Kansas asphalt industry. After this finding was made but before it was affirmed, the Government in this case stipulated that the record in Beachner could be considered in deciding defendants' Rule 35 motion. I read the stipulation as conceding, apart from the issues of waiver and forfeiture, that the factual circumstances presented here are indistinguishable from those in Beachner with respect to the existence of a double jeopardy violation.
Even Judge Barrett agrees that the district court's factual determination in Beachner should control future cases involving the Kansas asphalt industry:" [F]ollowing the filing of that opinion, all subsequent prosecutions in the District of Kansas or elsewhere in this circuit involving the identical factual bid-rigging scenario would be controlled by our holding in Beachner: that the scheme constituted a single, on-going, continuous conspiracy."
Judge O'Connor, in my view, correctly denied relief to the Broce defendants pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a) which provides that " [T]he court may correct an illegal sentence at any time and may correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner within the time provided herein for the reduction of sentence." (Emphasis supplied.) At the time the guilty pleas were voluntarily entered in Broce, the Beachner opinion had not been filed. In fact, Beachner did not come down for more than two years after the Broce pleas were entered. There was, then, absolutely nothing facially illegal about the two indictments to which Broce pled guilty. They charged separate, independent conspiratorial acts in violation of the antitrust laws. There had been no judicial precedent at that time finding, as a matter of fact, that the separate "rigged" highway bids were other than separate conspiracies. Although the parties stipulated that Judge O'Connor "may consider the record made in the evidentiary hearing on the Motion to Dismiss [in Beachner ] ... in ruling on the merits of defendants' Motion to Vacate Sentence Pursuant to Rule 35(a) ..." (R., Vol. I, p. 97), the district court was not required to apply Beachner retroactively. Judge O'Connor did, however, consider the Beachner record.1
The facts of this case are not in dispute. The Broce defendants were initially charged on November 7, 1981, by a two-count indictment for violations of the federal antitrust laws (15 U.S.C. § 1) and the mail fraud statute (18 U.S.C. § 1341) in relation to a specific Kansas highway construction project. Thereafter, on February 4, 1982, the Broce defendants were charged in a second indictment with a one-count violation of the federal antitrust laws in relation to a separate, distinct Kansas highway construction project. On February 8, 1982, pursuant to a plea bargain agreement the Broce defendants entered guilty pleas to the charges contained in both indictments. The trial court, prior to sentencing, conducted a detailed, thorough Rule 11 proceeding. There is no contention that the Broce defendants were represented other than by competent counsel or that the district court did not meticulously conduct the Rule 11 proceeding. Sentences were entered March 15, 1982. The Broce defendants filed their Motion to Vacate Sentence on the ground that their sentences were in violation of the double jeopardy clause on February 22, 1983. Id. at 34.
"The defendants' recent double jeopardy claim was inspired by the January 31, 1983 Memorandum and Order by Judge Dale E. Saffels of this court, in another case involving bid-rigging in Kansas highway construction projects, United States v. Beachner Construction Co., Inc., et al., 555 F. Supp. 1273, No. 82-20076-01. Beachner Construction Co., Inc., was indicted on February 4, 1982, for a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act and a mail fraud violation. Both charges related to a Kansas highway project let by the state of Kansas on February 7, 1980. Robert Beachner was subsequently indicted for the same alleged offenses. The case proceeded to trial on May 3, 1982 ('Beachner I '). By a verdict rendered on May 7, 1982, a jury acquitted both defendants of the conspiracy and mail fraud charges.
"The defendants in the instant case, Broce Construction Co., Inc., and Ray C. Broce, contend that in light of Judge Saffels' decision in Beachner II, the judgment and sentence in Case No. 82-20011-01 constitutes a violation of the double jeopardy clause because it sentenced the defendants on two separate highway projects, as separate conspiracies, although they were both part of a single overall conspiracy to rig bids on Kansas highway construction projects. In addition, Broce Construction Co., Inc., contends that the total of 1.5 million dollars in fines imposed by the court was illegal because it exceeded the legal penalty of one million dollars per violation, as prescribed by 15 U.S.C. § 1.
"It is certainly clear that the double jeopardy clause does protect a defendant against multiplicity of punishment. In North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S. Ct. 2072, 2076, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1969), the Court stated:
"The defendants thus contend that they should be entitled to take advantage of Judge Saffels' Beachner II ruling because a Rule 35(a) motion can be raised 'at any time.' Although it is the general rule that a Rule 35(a) motion can be raised at any time [Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415, 79 S. Ct. 451, 3 L. Ed. 2d 407 (1959); United States v. Golay, 560 F.2d 866, 870 (8th Cir. 1977) ], the government argues that the defendants waived their double jeopardy claim because it was not timely raised and because the defendants pleaded guilty to two separate conspiracies. The issue in the case is therefore whether a plea of guilty to counts alleging two separate conspiracies constitutes a waiver of a claim of double jeopardy on the ground that the defendants are being subjected to multiple punishment for a single offense.
"Our research reveals that few courts have squarely confronted this question left unanswered by the Supreme Court in Menna. Although the defendants have cited two broadly-worded opinions for the proposition that a guilty plea does not constitute a waiver of a double jeopardy claim, United States v. Broussard, 645 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1981); Launius v. United States, 575 F.2d 770 (9th Cir. 1978), neither of these cases involved a plea of guilty to an indictment or information that was not multiplicious on its face. In other words, the cases cited by the defendants are entirely within the scope of the rule announced in Menna.
"The defendants point out that there is broad language in the Launius opinion to the effect that a waiver of a double jeopardy claim must be a ' "waiver" as defined in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S. Ct. 1019 [1023], 82 L. Ed. 1461 (1938)--the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.' 575 F.2d at 772. The government, in response, has cited to a line of cases in the Eighth and Second Circuits to the effect that a claim of double jeopardy is non-jurisdictional and is waived if not timely and affirmatively pleaded. United States v. Herzog, 644 F.2d 713, 716 (8th Cir. 1981); McClain v. Brown, 587 F.2d 389, 391 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Perez, 565 F.2d 1227, 1232 (2d Cir. 1977). The Tenth Circuit apparently had not addressed the question of waiver of a double jeopardy claim. We are not convinced, however, that the waiver theories announced in either Launius or the Herzog line of cases should be applied to the facts of the instant case.
"We believe that the resolution of the pending motion should be controlled by the opinion in Kerrigan v. United States, 644 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1981), which more closely resembles the facts and the resulting legal issues of the matter at bar than does any other case cited by the parties or uncovered by the court's research. Kerrigan was indicted in two separate indictments by a federal grand jury. The first indictment charged that Kerrigan conspired with others, between August 25, 1977, and September 1, 1977, to transport and to sell stolen lithographs. The second indictment charged that Kerrigan conspired with one of his previous co-conspirators, between September 1, 1977, and September 22, 1977, to transport and to sell stolen Indian jewelry. The second indictment also charged Kerrigan with a substantive count of transporting the stolen jewelry in interstate commerce. Kerrigan pleaded guilty to the two conspiracy charges, each before a different judge, and in exchange the government dismissed the substantive count. On March 15, 1978, Kerrigan was sentenced to three years for the jewelry conspiracy and two years (consecutively) for the lithograph conspiracy. After his sentencing, Kerrigan challenged the two-year sentence on the ground that the two charges involved parts of a single conspiracy. The district court adopted the magistrate's finding that the indictments charged separate conspiracies, and rejected Kerrigan's challenge to his sentence.
"There remains, however, the defendants' suggestion that, notwithstanding their pleas of guilty, Judge Saffels' subsequent ruling in Beachner II, that there was only one agreement among Kansas contractors to rig bids, rendered their sentences invalid and that it now 'appears from the face of the indictments that but one conspiracy existed for which defendants have been twice punished.' (Defendant's Reply, at 9.) In support of this theory that an intervening court decision can merge the contents of previous indictments alleging two conspiracies into a single conspiracy, the defendants cite Smith v. United States, 287 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961).
"In Smith, the defendant pleaded guilty to a three-count information arising out of a bank robbery. Each count charged the defendant with violating a different subsection of 18 U.S.C. § 2113. After the defendant was sentenced, the Supreme Court of the United States, in another case, held that the subdivisions of 18 U.S.C. § 2113 charged but one offense and that the imposition of more than one sentence was illegal. As a result, the defendant's sentence was corrected.
"We are not persuaded that this line of reasoning is applicable here. Smith v. United States is distinguishable from the situation at bar in that the intervening decision in that case involved a question of law: the operation of a statute. Consequently, the Supreme Court's decision was applicable to Smith's case. Judge Saffels' finding of a single conspiracy in Beachner II, however, was a factual determination made in light of the evidence produced at an evidentiary hearing in that particular case. It is well settled that the question whether a single conspiracy or multiple conspiracies exist is a question of fact. United States v. Elam, 678 F.2d 1234, 1245 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. James, 576 F.2d 1121, 1126 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Armedo-Sarmiento, 545 F.2d 785, 789 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 917 [97 S. Ct. 1331, 51 L. Ed. 2d 595] (1977); United States v. Ippolito, 509 F. Supp. 1205, 1208 (E.D.N.Y. 1981). Accordingly, we do not believe that at this late date the defendants should be permitted to take advantage of a factual determination that is inconsistent with the facts the defendants admitted in pleading guilty to the indictments alleging two separate conspiracies.
"We do not agree with the defendants' allegation that ' [t]he position of the government would effectively deprive any defendant who pleads guilty of the right to file a Rule 3 motion which specifically preserves this right to those who plead guilty.' (Defendants' Reply, at 10.) We hold merely that where a defendant by pleading guilty admits facts that do not give rise to a double jeopardy claim, he will not later be permitted to raise a double jeopardy claim that depends upon a version of the facts different from that he has admitted."
The trial court, unlike the majority, found that Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 96 S. Ct. 241, 46 L. Ed. 2d 195 (1975) was not applicable here. By analogy, the same rationale would apply to Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 94 S. Ct. 2098, 40 L. Ed. 2d 628 (1974), which case was not addressed by the trial court. I agree with the trial court's analysis. Thus, I conclude that Menna and Blackledge do not apply to the case at bar.
Significantly, in both Menna and Blackledge, the double jeopardy challenge was posited (like Beachner) prior to trial. I recognize that this is not always conclusive, but it weighs heavily here. It was not of significance in Menna because plainly--without the need of an evidentiary hearing--Menna had been twice placed in jeopardy: Menna had initially been incarcerated on a contempt charge for refusal to obey a court order to appear and testify before the grand jury. Thereafter, following denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment for refusal to answer questions before the same grand jury, he entered a guilty plea thereto and was sentenced. The Supreme Court logically held that Menna's earlier conviction for contempt was a criminal conviction "for the same crime as the one charged in the instant indictment." * 423 U.S. at 62, n. 1, 96 S. Ct. at 242, n. 1 (emphasis supplied). No evidentiary hearing involving the fact-finding process was required to arrive at that logical conclusion.
In Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 94 S. Ct. 2098, 40 L. Ed. 2d 628 (1974), again there was no fact-finding evidentiary hearing required in order for the Supreme Court to conclude that after Blackledge had been charged, tried and convicted by the state authorities on a misdemeanor charge that he could not subsequently be charged, tried and convicted by those same state authorities on a felony charge involving the identical facts and circumstances. The Supreme Court held that the felony charge was lodged against Blackledge in retaliation to his filing of a petition for trial de novo of his misdemeanor conviction, constituting a deprivation of due process of law. Neither Menna nor Blackledge involve the rule at the heart of the case at bar: absent a statutory impediment (i.e., lack of subject matter jurisdiction) or a Due Process deprivation (i.e., filing a subsequent charge in retaliation to a defendant taking appeal from an earlier conviction), the rule in this circuit has long been--and continues to be after Menna and Blackledge --that an accused waives his claim of double jeopardy to a subsequent criminal charge if the crimes charged, on their faces, are separate and distinct and if the evidence necessary to establish guilt as to one charge differs from that necessary to establish guilt as to another. In such case, we have held that the right not to be placed in jeopardy twice for the offense is a personal right which may be waived by a guilty plea. Caballero v. Hudspeth, 114 F.2d 545 (10th Cir. 1940); Cox v. Crouse, 376 F.2d 824 (10th Cir. 1967); Cox v. State of Kansas, 456 F.2d 1279 (10th Cir. 1972); United States v. Rich, 589 F.2d 1025 (10th Cir. 1978); Meyer v. State, 47 Md.App. 679, 425 A.2d 664; 24 A.L.R.4th 1313.
These cases are consistent with Judge O'Connor's reliance on Kerrigan v. United States, 644 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1981). This is the only case, in the course of our research, which closely fits the niche of the facts of the instant case. Kerrigan pled guilty and was sentenced under two indictments, both of which charged him with conspiracy to transport stolen goods in interstate commerce. Thereafter, Kerrigan brought a habeas corpus action contending that his sentence should be vacated on the ground that it violated his Fifth Amendment rights not to be twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's denial of relief and pertinently observed:
Menna and Launius do indeed indicate that a double jeopardy claim may lie notwithstanding a guilty plea, but in neither case did the double jeopardy claim depend upon a repudiation of the allegations in the indictment to which the plea had been entered. These cases do not hold, as Kerrigan suggests, that a defendant who pleaded guilty may later contest the factual and theoretical foundations of the indictment to which he pleaded, so as to show that, in fact, he committed only a single conspiracy. The court in Launius explicitly and correctly stated that "By pleading guilty the appellants admitted the facts alleged in the information." Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 [90 S. Ct. 1463, 1468, 25 L. Ed. 2d 747] ... (1970); Willard v. United States, 445 F.2d 814, 816 (7th Cir. 1971). Kerrigan's claim of double jeopardy must be evaluated under the version of facts stated in the indictment, not against an alternative version of events which Kerrigan now claims is more accurate. Evaluated in this way, Kerrigan's claim is quite different from that asserted in Launius; far from being facially multiplicitious, as in Launius, Kerrigan's indictments sufficiently describe two separate and distinct offenses, for which Kerrigan could be constitutionally sentenced to two separate terms of imprisonment.
In Cox v. State of Kansas, supra, Cox, a state prisoner, appealed a district court denial of his petition for federal habeas corpus relief. Cox had been convicted, following his guilty plea in 1966, to a charge of second degree kidnapping. Cox relied on Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S. Ct. 2056, 23 L. Ed. 2d 707 (1969). There, Benton had been tried in a Maryland state court for burglary and larceny. He was acquitted of larceny but found guilty of burglary. Because the jury had been selected under an invalid Maryland constitutional provision, Benton was given the option of demanding re-indictment and retrial. He was re-indicted for both larceny and burglary. Prior to retrial, Benton moved to dismiss the larceny charge on the ground of double jeopardy. The motion was denied and Benton was subsequently convicted of both larceny and burglary. The Supreme Court struck down the larceny conviction because of his acquittal of this charge in the first trial. There was no contention made that the charges (larceny and burglary) were facially invalid and other than separate, distinct offenses. Cox, unlike Benton, did not challenge the indictment prior to trial. In denying Cox federal habeas relief this court quoted Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 757, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 1473, 25 L. Ed. 2d 747 (1970): " [A] voluntary plea of guilty intelligently made in the light of the then applicable law does not become vulnerable because later judicial decisions indicate that the plea rested on a faulty premise."
The indictments in the case before us do on their faces allege separate offenses. By the guilty pleas the defendants admitted the recitations in the indictments, and these are the facts to be used in evaluating the double jeopardy claims. Kerrigan v. United States, 644 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1981). These facts recite separate offenses.
The case which upholds appellants' position that Menna precludes waiver, and it may be the only case, is Launius v. United States, 575 F.2d 770 (9th Cir. 1978). The post-Menna cases with contrary holdings (or which consider situations where the defense was raised at or before trial and so hold no waiver) include: United States v. Pratt, 657 F.2d 218 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v. Broussard, 645 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Gaertner, 583 F.2d 308 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v. Inmon, 568 F.2d 326 (3rd Cir. 1977); United States v. Wild, 551 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir. 1977)....
753 F.2d 811, 824 (10th Cir. 1985) (emphasis at the end of the first paragraph supplied).
Broce does not present a jurisdictional problem. Thus, our well-recognized rule that a claim of double jeopardy is a personal right which may be waived is fully applicable. Broce, just as Beachner, presented a factual issue as to whether the conspiracies charged in the separate indictments arose out of one continuous, ongoing scheme (and thus one conspiracy) or separate, distinct conspiracies. There is nothing unique in challenges to such indictments under the Double Jeopardy Clause. In making such determinations, the issue presented is one of fact for the court or jury. United States v. Dickey, 736 F.2d 571, 581 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 105 S. Ct. 957, 83 L. Ed. 2d 964 (1984); United States v. Beachner Const. Co., Inc., supra; United States v. Watson, 594 F.2d 1330, 1340 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 840, 100 S. Ct. 78, 62 L. Ed. 2d 51 (1979); United States v. Petersen, 611 F.2d 1313, 1327 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 905, 100 S. Ct. 2986, 64 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1980).
In Dickey, supra, the prosecution charged a single, ongoing conspiracy among the defendants involving possession and distribution of drugs for profit. On appeal the defendants urged that the evidence was insufficient to prove one conspiracy and that it disclosed multiple conspiracies. Thus, the contention was that reversal was required on the ground of variance between the charge and the evidence. This court affirmed the jury's factfinding of a single, ongoing conspiracy under the clearly erroneous rule. In United States v. Hines, 728 F.2d 421 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S. Ct. 3523, 82 L. Ed. 2d 831 (1984), we held, in the same vein as the Blackledge Court, that various counts of the indictment charging the defendant with breaking and entering a Post Office with intent to commit larceny and steal separate matters (as charged) such as letters containing credit cards, checks, etc., were not multiplicious because the statutes enacted by the Congress made each taking a separate crime and that each required proof of facts which were not required of the other. And in United States v. DuFriend, 691 F.2d 948 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1173, 103 S. Ct. 820, 74 L. Ed. 2d 1017 (1983), we held that there was no inherent double jeopardy problem raised by defendant's conviction of both conspiracy to possess marijuana and conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute, relying on Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 101 S. Ct. 1137, 67 L. Ed. 2d 275 (1981) for the proposition that " [T]here clearly is no inherent double jeopardy problem raised by appellant's convictions for both conspiracy to import and conspiracy to distribute marijuana." 691 F.2d at 952.
Rule 12(b) (2), Fed. R. Crim. P. requires that a complaint about the multiplicity of an indictment and its inherent double jeopardy problems must be raised before trial. Any defense, objection or request that is capable of determination without a trial of the general issue may be raised before trial by motion. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal 2d, Sec. 193, pp. 692-93. Nothing in Menna or Blackledge dilutes compliance with this rule if the charges to which the defendant pled guilty or was convicted were valid on their face, that is: at the time of the plea, the separate charges were not subject to the impediment of lack of subject matter jurisdiction or brought in retaliation or some other deprivation of a due process right of the defendant.
It is important to recall that the Broce pleas of guilty were entered on February 8, 1982. Judge Saffels entered his order finding a single conspiracy in Beachner following a second indictment filed on November 16, 1982, some nine months after the Broce pleas had been entered. Our Beachner opinion was not filed until March 22, 1984. Beachner did, as previously noted, preserve the double jeopardy challenge by virtue of a pre-trial Rule 12(b) (2) motion, which generated the pre-trial evidentiary hearing conducted by Judge Saffels leading to the court's finding that only one conspiracy existed involving the Kansas highway construction bid-rigging scheme. In addition to Rule 12(b) (2), it is to be noted that the Broce defendants could have availed themselves of Rule 11(b), Fed. R. Crim. P. by entering a conditional plea of guilty manifesting a knowledgeable admission of the facts contained in the indictments, while preserving the issue of double jeopardy. United States v. Moskow, 588 F.2d 882 (3rd Cir. 1978); United States v. Zudick, 523 F.2d 848 (3rd Cir. 1975); 33 ALR Fed. 385.
The record before us shows conclusively that the trial court meticulously met all of the requirements of Rule 11 for acceptance of the Broce pleas, including full and complete advisement of the nature of the charges, the length of possible incarceration and other punishment, and advisement that the court was not bound by the plea agreement. The court established the existence of a factual basis for the pleas, the competency of the defendants to plead, the assistance of competent counsel, the voluntariness of the pleas based on the plea agreement, and the defendants' complete understanding of the consequences of the guilty pleas. (R., Vol. II, pp. 102-91.) The court also fully complied with the ABA Standards, Pleas of Guilty Sec. 1.4. Menna recognizes that a counseled guilty plea validly removes the issue of factual guilt from the case. I conclude that the Broce defendants effectively waived their right to collaterally attack their guilty pleas by virtue of their failure to raise the double jeopardy challenge pursuant to Rule 12(b) (2) or Rule 11(b). This, in my view, is precisely the type of case the Supreme Court made reference to in Menna when it opined that its holding was not to be considered as one which closed the door to a waiver of a double jeopardy claim by virtue of all guilty pleas. 423 U.S. at 63 n. 2, 96 S. Ct. at 242 n. 2.
I turn now to the Rule 35, Fed.Rules Crim.P. motion filed by Broce and denied by the district court. That rule provides, inter-alia: The court "may correct an illegal sentence at any time and may correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner within the time provided herein for the reduction of sentence." Note that an illegal sentence may be corrected at any time. Menna and Blackledge clearly fall in that category. Broce, on the other hand, does not. A sentence is illegal under Rule 35 if it is in excess of the statute under which the charge is lodged, or in some other manner violative of an applicable statute. Simply stated, such a sentence is one that the judgment of conviction does not authorize. United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 74 S. Ct. 247, 98 L. Ed. 248 (1954). Thus, in Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415, 79 S. Ct. 451, 3 L. Ed. 2d 407 (1959) the Supreme Court upheld relief afforded under Rule 35 to correct an illegal sentence. The Court set aside separate sentences imposed under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(e) involving a bank robbery. The Court set aside the sentence on the count which charged that the defendant received stolen property, holding that the subsection of the statute relied on by the Government was not designed to punish one who robs a bank, but rather one who receives the loot from the robber. Thus, unlike Broce, the charge was deficient for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. No fact finding process was involved. In like manner, the Court in Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322, 77 S. Ct. 403, 1 L. Ed. 2d 370 (1957) construed a statute and, as a matter of law, held that the crime of entry into a bank with intent to rob was not a crime separate and distinct from the offense of robbery proper. This case, too, involved the construction and interpretation of a statute leading to the legal conclusion that the sentence was illegal. Congressional intent was carefully considered. Again, the distinction between these cases and Broce and Beachner is clear.
In Marteney v. United States, 216 F.2d 760 (10th Cir. 1954), we held that a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 habeas proceeding should be treated as a motion to vacate sentence and proceeded to hold that it affirmatively appeared on the face of the challenged indictment that no federal offense was committed. We there clearly distinguished between indictments which, as a matter of law, do not, on their face, charge an offense and those which do not involve jurisdictional challenges:
216 F.2d at 762. See also, United States v. Donohoe, 458 F.2d 237 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 865, 93 S. Ct. 157, 34 L. Ed. 2d 113 (1972) (a guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional defenses); United States v. Watkins, 709 F.2d 475 (7th Cir. 1983) (an indictment not challenged before trial will be upheld unless it is so defective that it does not, by any reasonable construction, charge an offense for which the defendant was convicted; however, an indictment which fails to state an offense is a fatal defect which may be raised at any time).
Comes now the parties and stipulate that the Court may consider the record made in the evidentiary hearing on the Motion to Dismiss filed by Beachner Construction Co., Inc. in United States v. Beachner Construction Co., Inc., et al., [555 F. Supp. 1273] Case No. 82-20076-01 [ (D. Kan. 1983) ] in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas in ruling on the merits of defendants' Motion to Vacate Sentence Pursuant to Rule 35(a) in the instant case.
First, even though the majority opinion finds that "on their face the two (Broce) indictments do not appear to charge different conspiracies" (p. 797), neither Judge Saffels, in Beachner, nor Judge O'Connor, in Broce, so found. Each found to the contrary. Indeed, if Judge Saffels had so found, in Beachner, there would have been no reason to conduct the evidentiary hearing on the Motion to Dismiss to determine the issue of the single conspiracy versus multiple conspiracies. In my view, Judge O'Connor was on target (and Judge Saffels obviously agreed) when he found that "on their faces, the indictments alleged two distinct criminal conspiracies, and the defendants pleaded guilty to each, acknowledging the validity of the facts contained in each indictment." (R., Vol. II, p. 288.)
Second, the Stipulation clearly states only that Judge O'Connor "may consider" the Beachner record made by Judge Saffels. That he did. To suggest that he was legally bound by Judge Saffels' finding is a distortion of the language of the Stipulation. I submit that Judge O'Connor would have considered the Beachner record regardless of the Stipulation because Beachner was the basis for the Broce Rule 35 motion. The Beachner record was in the same court presided over by Chief Judge O'Connor. A court may, sua sponte, take judicial notice of its own records and preceding records if called to the court's attention by the parties. St. Louis Baptist Temple v. F.D.I.C., 605 F.2d 1169 (10th Cir. 1979); Ginsberg v. Thomas, 170 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1948). Thus to remand this case to the district court for a "hearing" to look behind the indictments appears to be an attempt by the majority to advise the district court to apply Beachner retroactively when the district court has already considered its effect on this case.
Because there is no infirmity in the statutes under which Broce or Beachner were indicted and convicted or any other statutory infirmity involved, the only basis upon which Beachner can be applied retroactively to render the Broce pleas invalid under the double jeopardy clause is to do so in reliance on Judge Saffels' finding of fact which occurred subsequent to the Broce guilty pleas to facially valid indictments. This, I submit, is in violation of the Stipulation and the rule that a voluntary, counseled plea of guilty entered following full compliance with Rule 11 constitutes an admission of facts and all elements contained in the indictment. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 89 S. Ct. 1166, 22 L. Ed. 2d 418 (1969); Menna, supra at n. 2.
In Chevron Oil Company v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 92 S. Ct. 349, 30 L. Ed. 2d 296 (1971) the Supreme Court discussed the retroactive versus nonretroactive application of judicial decisions. Assuming, as I do here, that Beachner did announce the controlling rule applicable, i.e., that the highway bid rigging in Kansas was a single, ongoing conspiracy rather than separate conspiracies based upon the distinct contracts for each highway construction project, I do not believe that Beachner should be given retroactive application.
In our cases dealing with the nonretroactivity question, we have generally considered three separate factors. First, the decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied ... or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed.... Second, ... "we must ... weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation." Finally, we have weighed the inequity imposed by retroactive application for " [w]here a decision of this Court could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding the 'injustice or hardship' by a holding of nonretroactivity."
In applying the above test, I conclude: First, the Beachner decision did decide a factual issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed, i.e., whether the highway bid-rigging contracts constitute a single, ongoing conspiracy or multiple, separate conspiracies. Second, the application of Beachner, based on the fact-finding process, has only a single purpose and effect and that is to control all prosecutions of highway bid-rigging contractors involved in the conspiratorial enterprise identified in Beachner pursued after Beachner. Third, it would be inequitable and unjust to void the Broce guilty pleas because the defendants were fully counseled and advised. The Broce defendants entered the guilty pleas to separate, distinct conspiracies and all parties, including Judge O'Connor, accepted the factual basis for the separate indictments; however, and in addition, the Broce pleas were predicated upon a plea bargain agreement. The fact that the guilty pleas in this case were entered pursuant to a plea bargain has a special significance. A plea agreement involves quid pro quo. United States v. Cross, 638 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir. 1981). Here, the Government agreed not to charge or prosecute certain counts in exchange for the Broce guilty pleas. There is no challenge before us that the plea bargain was not handled by the court and counsel in full compliance with the guidelines set forth in Fed. R. Crim. P., Rule 11(e). It is implicit that in accepting the Broce pleas, Judge O'Connor did not look upon the indictments as charging other than separate, distinct conspiracies. No challenge had been posited by the Broce defendants prior to entry of the pleas.
In United States v. Allen, 724 F.2d 1556 (11th Cir. 1984), following a plea bargain, the defendant pleaded guilty to four counts of an indictment and the Government dismissed thirteen counts. Thereafter, defendant collaterally attacked his conviction, on the ground that two counts he pleaded guilty to constituted only a single offense; the court held that the defendant had waived his right to contest the maximum sentence and particularly so in that he had benefitted from the dismissal of thirteen other charges and therefore could not "renege on his part of the bargain." Id. at 1558; United States v. Solomon, 726 F.2d 677 (11th Cir. 1984).
Generally, the doctrine of Double Jeopardy is that one may not be tried or prosecuted a second time for the same offense and it is essential that the second prosecution involve the same act and crime both in law and in fact. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165, 97 S. Ct. 2221, 2225, 53 L. Ed. 2d 187 (1977); United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 606, 96 S. Ct. 1075, 1079, 47 L. Ed. 2d 267 (1976); United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 343, 95 S. Ct. 1013, 1021, 43 L. Ed. 2d 232 (1975); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S. Ct. 2072, 2076, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1969); Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399, 58 S. Ct. 630, 633, 82 L. Ed. 917 (1938) (the Double Jeopardy Clause "prohibits merely punishing twice, or attempting a second time to punish criminally for the same offense").
I respectfully submit that Broce was not subjected to the bar of Double Jeopardy. In an evidentiary sense, the Double Jeopardy Clause comes into play as "to preclude retrial after reversal of a conviction only when the appellate court has set aside the conviction on the ground that the evidence was legally insufficient to support conviction." Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 102 S. Ct. 2211, 72 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1982); United States v. Di Francesco, 449 U.S. 117, 101 S. Ct. 426, 66 L. Ed. 2d 328 (1980).
I would affirm the trial court's order denying defendants' motion to vacate the judgment of conviction pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a).
This is a case in which the United States of America prosecuted Broce Construction Company and its President, Raymond C. Broce. The defendants plead guilty to two counts of conspiracy in restraint of trade, in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. Ray Broce also plead guilty to one count of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1341. Broce received a two year prison sentence and $101,000 in fines, $50,000 per conspiracy and $1,000 for the mail fraud conviction. Broce Construction was required to pay $1,500,000 in fines, $750,000 per conspiracy. The contention of the defendants is that these two conspiracies were so connected that they must be considered as a single conspiracy, an argument which is an important issue in the case. We maintain that there are two transactions and two conspiracies.
The first indictment was filed November 17, 1981 in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas, Case No. 81-20119-01. This charged the appellants in this case and Gerald R. Gumm, an employee of the company, with conspiracy to violate the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, and mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, in connection with Project No. 23-60-RS-1080(9), a federal aid highway project let by the State of Kansas.
On February 4, 1982, a second indictment, Case No. 82-20011-01, was returned by the same grand jury, charging the appellants with conspiracy to violate the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. The latter Project No. KRL 29-2(26), was a public highway project also let by the State of Kansas (R.O.A. Vol. 1, p. 1). For purposes of this dissent the indictment filed on November 17, 1981, is referred to as Indictment 1 and the indictment filed on February 4 is treated as Indictment 2.
The general rule on waiver of constitutional claims is that a defendant waives all objections of a constitutional nature when he voluntarily and knowingly enters a plea of guilty. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 93 S. Ct. 1602. " [A] guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in the criminal process. When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea." Id at 267, 93 S. Ct. at 1608.
The leading case concerning waiver of the double jeopardy provisions of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution is Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 96 S. Ct. 241, 46 L. Ed. 2d 195 (1975) (per curiam). In that case Menna had refused to answer questions before a New York State Grand Jury after a grant of immunity. He was adjudged in contempt and sentenced to 30 days in jail. This he served. Approximately ten years later he was indicted for the same conduct. After asserting unsuccessfully, in state court, that the indictment violated the double jeopardy prescription of the Fifth Amendment, he pleaded guilty to the indictment. He then appealed again raising the double jeopardy claim. The New York Court of Appeals declined to address the double jeopardy claim on the merits, holding that it had been waived by Menna's counseled plea of guilty.
The majority of the circuit has not come to grips with the various features of double jeopardy. However, it seems likely that it would follow the fundamentals. Seemingly it would follow the principle that a plea of guilty is an admission of the elements and material facts of the formal criminal charge contained in the indictment. See McCarthy v. U.S. 394 U.S. 459, 89 S. Ct. 1166. All non-jurisdictional defects are accepted.
This circuit has no extraordinary knowledge to address these questions. At the same time other circuits have taken opposing positions. The Fifth and Ninth Circuits have had no trouble holding that a guilty plea does not result in the waiver of a double jeopardy claim. United States v. Broussard, 645 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1981); Launius v. United States, 575 F.2d 770 (9th Cir. 1978). This Ninth Circuit decision indicates that a waiver of a double jeopardy claim must be a waiver as defined in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461 (1938). There the court defined a waiver as the knowing relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. The Eighth and Second Circuits have ruled that a claim of double jeopardy is non-jurisdictional and is waived if not timely and effectively pleaded. United States v. Herzog, 644 F.2d 713 (8th Cir. 1981); McClain v. Brown, 587 F.2d 389 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Perez, 565 F.2d 1227 (2nd Cir. 1977). These decisions thus seem to conflict with the decision in Menna, supra. The court below nevertheless chose not to apply the waiver theories of either the Launius or Herzog line of cases. Rather the court chose as controlling the opinion in Kerrigan v. United States, 644 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1981). It stated that the case more closely resembled the facts and issues in terms of the instant one.
In Kerrigan the court proceeded to analyze the indictment according to tests for double jeopardy in conspiracy cases. In United States v. DeFillipo, 590 F.2d 1228 (2nd Cir. 1979), the relevant factors examined were the dates of the purported agreements, the identity of each of the alleged conspirators, and the specific criminal acts to the commission of which the defendants were alleged to have agreed. The court found that based on these factors the two indictments were not multiplicious on their face.
Paragraph 8 states that Kansas requires that highway projects over $1,000 be bid competitively. Paragraph 9 explains that Kansas bidding regulations require a statement of non-collusion in it. Paragraph 10 states that materials travelling in interstate commerce were used in Kansas highway projects including the one which is the subject of the indictments. To say that the Kansas bidding regulations require a statement of non-collusion in each bid is superfluous inasmuch as there is nothing but collusion throughout all of these briefs. They have undertaken to set forth all of the contractual matters; but at the same time they allege that these were evidences of collusion. At the same time they back away from this conclusion any time a law violation comes into view. Unquestionably the appellants and Gerald R. Gumm and others unknown conspired to suppress and eliminate competition for the construction of Kansas Highway Project No. 23-60-R.S.1080(9) in violation of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 1).
Paragraph 6 is identical to Section IV, Paragraph 7 of Indictment No. 1. Paragraph 7 is identical to Section IV, Paragraph 8 of Indictment No. 1. Paragraph 8 is identical to Section IV, Paragraph 9 of Indictment No. 1. Paragraph 9 is identical to Paragraph 10 of Indictment No. 1. The only major difference between Sections IV of the two indictments is that Indictment No. 1 contains a paragraph describing state and federal co-operation under the Federal Aid Highway Act (15 U.S.C. § 101, et seq.). See Paragraph 6 of Indictment No. 1.
The question was raised but not dealt with in Bromley v. Crisp, 561 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908, 98 S. Ct. 1458, 55 L. Ed. 2d 499 (1978)
The government argues our holding in United States v. Rich, 589 F.2d 1025 (10th Cir. 1978) decided after Blackledge and Menna indicates our adherence to the concept of waiver despite the assertion of a constitutional defect. The government urges the panel ignored the established law in the circuit. That argument is based upon an overbroad reading of Rich, for that case did not deal with the Double Jeopardy Clause in the context presented here. Additionally, the pre-Blackledge cases from this circuit relied upon by the government are equally inapposite. See Bracey v. Zerbst, 93 F.2d 8 (10th Cir. 1937); Cox v. Crouse, 376 F.2d 824 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 865, 88 S. Ct. 128, 19 L. Ed. 2d 136 (1967). The government also cites United States v. Bascaro, 742 F.2d 1335 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 105 S. Ct. 3476, 87 L. Ed. 2d 613 (1985), as a "waiver" case. Examination shows, however, the "waiver" was a failure to preserve the issue for appeal by failing to raise it in the trial court. The reliance is misplaced
See also United States v. Broussard, 645 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1981)
For purposes of consistent analysis, forfeiture may be defined as the loss of a constitutional defense through the operation of law and without regard for a defendant's intentions. In contrast, waiver connotes an informed, deliberate, and uncoerced decision to relinquish such a defense. See Westen, Away from Waiver: A Rationale for the Forfeiture of Constitutional Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1214 (1977)
See also Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505, 509, 93 S. Ct. 876, 878, 35 L. Ed. 2d 29 (1973) (describing guarantee against double jeopardy as "a constitutional right of the criminal defendant")
I would overrule Caballero v. Hudspeth, 114 F.2d 545, 547-48 (10th Cir. 1940), to the extent it holds otherwise, but would leave intact its characterization of the guarantee against double jeopardy as a personal right
In Haring, the Court held that a guilty plea does not establish that a defendant has waived any Fourth Amendment claims he seeks to pursue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, notwithstanding that he may have forfeited the opportunity to raise the identical issue in a habeas corpus proceeding
Lower federal courts, including this one, have actually gone further in another context: litigants may consent to the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction and attendant Article III powers by non-Article III magistrates, irrespective of the rights being adjudicated. See, e.g., United States v. Dobey, 751 F.2d 1140 (10th Cir. 1985) (appeal pending); Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of America, Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 105 S. Ct. 100, 83 L. Ed. 2d 45 (1984); Wharton-Thomas v. United States, 721 F.2d 922 (3d Cir. 1983)
I do not dispute that a defendant is bound by that to which he pleads and by whatever he states in open court as the basis for his plea. In my view, however, a defendant remains free to offer evidence in support of a surviving double jeopardy claim which does not contradict these admitted facts. See Menna, 423 U.S. at 62-63 n. 2, 96 S. Ct. at 242 n. 2; see also Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 659, 97 S. Ct. 2034, 2040, 52 L. Ed. 2d 651 (1977)
The panel of this court that handed down United States v. Beachner Const. Co., Inc., 729 F.2d 1278 (10th Cir. 1984) (Beachner), consisted of then Chief Judge Seth, O'Connor, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the District of Kansas, and Barrett, Circuit Judge, who authored the opinion. We there held in a case involving the same and identical factual scenario as that before us here that Judge Saffels was not clearly erroneous in concluding that because a common objective was shared by each participating contractor as a single, common and continuous scheme, the record supported the trial court's finding of a single conspiracy
In the original panel Broce opinion reported as United States v. Broce, 753 F.2d 811 (10th Cir. 1985), it is interesting to note that Judge O'Connor was the trial judge whose order denied the Rule 35 motion to vacate guilty pleas to a second indictment charging separate bid-rigging conspiracies. On appeal Judge Seth dissented from the holding that Broce had been subjected to double jeopardy by pleading guilty to two indictments charging conspiracy to violate the antitrust laws.