Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/13/1297/631878/
Timestamp: 2019-02-17 04:08:25
Document Index: 653328998

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1121', '§ 1338', '§ 1291', '§ 1114', '§ 1125', '§ 1114', '§ 1057', '§ 1052', '§ 1052', '§ 1125', '§ 1125']

Qualitex Company, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Jacobson Products Company, Inc., Defendant-appellant, 13 F.3d 1297 (9th Cir. 1994) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Ninth Circuit › 1994 › Qualitex Company, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Jacobson Products Company, Inc., Defendant-appellant
Qualitex Company, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Jacobson Products Company, Inc., Defendant-appellant, 13 F.3d 1297 (9th Cir. 1994)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 13 F.3d 1297 (9th Cir. 1994)
Argued and Submitted Feb. 2, 1993. Decided Jan. 3, 1994
The district court's jurisdiction was based upon 15 U.S.C. § 1121 and 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) and (b). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm the judgment against Jacobson for unfair competition but hold that the Qualitex trademark for color alone is invalid.
Qualitex initiated this action on March 9, 1990, by filing a complaint seeking injunctive relief and damages from Jacobson on the grounds that (1) Jacobson infringed Qualitex's trade dress in violation of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act; and (2) Jacobson "passed off" its goods as those of Qualitex, and thus was guilty of unfair competition in violation of section 43 of the Lanham Act. During the pendency of this action, Qualitex filed for registration of the green-gold color. Registration was granted by the Patent and Trademark Office on February 5, 1991, and Qualitex added to its complaint the claim that Jacobson infringed Qualitex's federally registered trademark, in violation of Section 32(1) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1).
Jacobson argued that its actions were not prohibited by Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), as unfair competition. Further, Jacobson counterclaimed for the cancellation of Qualitex's registered trademark, arguing that no valid interest existed because color per se is not protectable; the color is functional and thus not protectable; no likelihood of confusion existed; and no secondary meaning was associated with Qualitex's trademark.
use [s] in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive....
15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (a); see also Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Sandlin, 846 F.2d 1175, 1178 (9th Cir. 1988).
A certificate of registration is prima facie evidence of the validity of the mark and relieves the holder, Qualitex, of the burden of proving nonfunctionality and secondary meaning. 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b). It shifts the burden of proof to the contesting party, who must introduce sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of the holder's right to protected use. See Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enterprises, Inc., 644 F.2d 769, 775 (9th Cir. 1981). Jacobson contends that it met that burden by showing that Qualitex's green-gold color alone is not protectable, and that the trademark is invalid.
The district court ruled that Jacobson infringed on Qualitex's registered trademark, the green-gold color of the press pads. A district court's findings of facts are reviewed for clear error. See Clamp Mfg. Co. v. Enco Mfg. Co., 870 F.2d 512, 514 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 872, 110 S. Ct. 202, 107 L. Ed. 2d 155 (1989). Whether color per se qualifies for trademark protection is a legal question to be reviewed de novo. See id. (" [i]ssues concerning the correct test to be used in evaluating trademark infringement are reviewed de novo ").
Registration of mere color is not explicitly barred by the Lanham Act, which provides that " [n]o trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be distinguished from the goods of others shall be refused registration," 15 U.S.C. § 1052, unless one of the specific exceptions to registrability set forth in 15 U.S.C. § 1052 applies. Color is not listed as an exception. See In re Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1119 (Fed. Cir. 1985). However, the courts of appeals generally have refused to grant trademark protection for color alone. See Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1128 & n. 2, 1129 (Bissell, J., dissenting) (collecting circuit decisions denying trademark protection for color alone); 1 J. Thomas McCarthy, Trademarks & Unfair Competition Secs. 7:16, 7:17 (2d ed. 1984) (color per se, unconfined by any defined design, generally cannot be the subject of a trademark; the use of one color as the color of a product usually does not have trademark significance).
In a more recent decision, the Eighth Circuit refused to establish a per se rule prohibiting the registration of color as a trademark. Master Distributors, Inc. v. Pako Corp., 986 F.2d 219, 223 (8th Cir. 1993). In Master Distributors, the district court held, as a matter of law, that color alone could not be protected as a trademark. The court of appeals reversed, declining to establish that as a matter of law a color alone could not be protected. The court ruled that if a party can establish all the normal trademark requirements arising from the color of its product, the party can register that color as a trademark. Id. at 224.
The majority of the other circuits have refused to give a color the protection of a registered trademark. The Seventh Circuit recently affirmed its rule that the overall color of a product cannot be a trade identity designation, and is not entitled to registration. See NutraSweet Co. v. Stadt Corp., 917 F.2d 1024, 1027 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 983, 111 S. Ct. 1640, 113 L. Ed. 2d 735 (1991). NutraSweet held that color alone cannot be protected as a trademark, although it may be protected if used "in connection with some symbol or design or impressed in a particular design." Id. at 1027.
We discussed the question of whether color alone could be validly registered as a trademark in First Brands Corp. v. Fred Mayer, Inc., 809 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1987), in the context of a trade dress case. We noted that when " [c]onfronted with an unusual set of facts the court in Owens-Corning established a very limited rule that in certain situations a particular color could itself be registered as a trademark." Id. at 1382. We did not adopt the Owens-Corning rule, as we were merely referring to it in the context of a trade dress case, where we ultimately held that a yellow ordinarily shaped antifreeze container was not protectable trade dress. Id. at 1381, 1385.
In this case, we confront the issue of whether to follow the majority of circuits in holding that color alone cannot form the basis for a trademark, or to acknowledge the exception of Owens-Corning. We conclude that the better rule is that a trademark should not be registered for color alone. As many cases have noted, under the color depletion theory, no person should have a monopoly on a primary color. We recognize that there are countless shades of colors that could not be depleted, but then, we could well become involved in "shade confusion" as noted in NutraSweet, 917 F.2d at 1027, and in Judge Bissell's dissent in Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1131. Drawing distinctions between close shades of color could present unnecessary problems. Adequate protection is available when color is combined in distinctive patterns or designs or combined in distinctive logos. See Vision Sports, Inc. v. Melville Corp., 888 F.2d 609, 613 (9th Cir. 1989). Furthermore, as we discuss hereafter, further protection is afforded by the Lanham Act's unfair competition provisions.
The basic test for unfair competition is whether consumer confusion or deception is likely as a result of the defendant's acts. Century 21, 846 F.2d at 1178. Registration of a trademark is not a prerequisite for recovery under section 43(a), but a party must have a "reasonable interest to be protected." New West Corp. v. NYM Co. of California, Inc., 595 F.2d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 1979), quoted in Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602, 605 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Metric & Multistandard Components Corp. v. Metric's, Inc., 635 F.2d 710, 714 (8th Cir. 1980) (a mark not entitled to trademark protection may be entitled to unfair competition protection).
(a) (1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which--
15 U.S.C. § 1125. Traditionally, many courts restricted claims for unfair competition to situations where there was "passing off," which is the selling of a good of one's own creation under the name or mark of another. See Smith, 648 F.2d at 604. "Express passing off occurs when an enterprise labels goods or services with a mark identical to that of another enterprise, or otherwise expressly misrepresents that the goods originated with another enterprise." Id. However, a claim of unfair competition under section 43(a) is no longer limited to cases of passing off. Professor McCarthy has noted that:
Another way a party may be guilty of unfair competition under section 43(a) is a "trade dress" infringement. The trade dress of a product is its overall image as it is presented to the consumer and includes aspects such as the size, shape, color, or design of the product. See NutraSweet, 917 F.2d at 1027 n. 7; 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). For a successful trade-dress claim, the plaintiff must show that its trade dress is protectable and that the defendant's use of similar trade dress is likely to confuse customers. See Vision Sports, 888 F.2d at 613. There are yet other ways of violating section 43(a), such as by using false or misleading geographical terms. As we noted in New West:
Trade-dress infringement is proved by showing (1) the trade dress is nonfunctional, (2) it has acquired secondary meaning, and (3) there is a likelihood of confusion between the products. First Brands, 809 F.2d at 1381; Vision Sports, 888 F.2d at 613. In a trade-dress infringement claim, the trier of fact must look at the "total impression of the package, size, shape, color, design, and name" to determine if it is likely to confuse the consumer as to the origin of the product. 1 McCarthy 2:2 (quoting Jean Patou, Inc., v. Jacqueline Cochran, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 861 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd, 312 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1963)); Vision Sports, 888 F.2d at 613. In other words, whereas in a registered trademark infringement case, the court must look at a single aspect of the product--the trademark itself--a court in an trade-dress infringement case must look at the product as a whole. Therefore, it is possible to succeed on a suit for unfair competition even when there is no registered trademark to begin with or even if no aspect of the package, taken alone, is registrable as a trademark. Id.
First, the district court found that the trade dress of the "SUN GLOW" press pad was nonfunctional. If a feature is functional, it is not protectable under the law of unfair competition. First Brands, 809 F.2d at 1381. "A product feature is functional if it is essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article." Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n. 10, 102 S. Ct. 2182, 2187 n. 10, 72 L. Ed. 2d 606 (1982); see also Vuitton et Fils S.A., 644 F.2d at 773 (reversing district court's order invalidating registered trademark, and remanding for trial on the functionality issue).
Third, the court found that the sale of the Jacobson pad had created the likelihood of confusion, deception or mistake in the marketplace. Factors that may be considered in determining a likelihood of confusion include the strength of the mark, the similarity of the mark, the class of goods and marketing channels, evidence of actual confusion, the intent of the second user, the degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser, and the likelihood of expansion of the product lines. See Eclipse Assoc. Ltd. v. Data General Corp., 894 F.2d 1114, 1117-18 (9th Cir. 1990); AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979). These factors are nonexclusive guidelines and are not to be applied as a rigid formula. Eclipse, 894 F.2d at 1118.