Source: http://www.ahem.info/Charles.html
Timestamp: 2019-02-24 06:16:45
Document Index: 762382036

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 24', '§ 2', '§ 24', '§ 2', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 24', '§ 24', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§1', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1', 'art. 2', 'art. 18', '§ 2', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 2', '§ 1']

Charles - AHEM
School and School Committee, Care and protection of minor. Education. Due Process of Law, Vagueness of statute. Constitutional Law,Delegation of powers. Parent and Child, Care and protection of minor, Education.
The school committee of a town was a proper party to maintain a proceeding under G. L. c. 119, § 24, seeking a determination that certain school-age children, whose parents wished to instruct them at home, were in need of care and protection "with respect to their educational care only." [328-329]
HENNESSEY, C.J. This case concerns the education of children at home by their parents. We are especially concerned here with the applicable constitutional law, as well as certain provisions of G. L. c. 119 (care and protection of children), . L. c. 71 (public schools), and G. L. c. 76 (attendance at school). Due to religious convictions, the parents desired to educate their three children, ages eleven, eight, and six, at home during the 1985-1986 school year.1 Although the parents instructed their children in their "home school," the school committee of Canton, on October 15, 1985, initiated truancy proceedings in Stoughton District Court, asserting a violation of G. L. c. 76, § 2. On October 16, 1985, a petition for care and protection of the children under G. L. c. 119, § 24, was filed by an attorney for the town, alleging that the three children were "without necessary and proper educational care and discipline" and that their parents were "unwilling and unable or unavailable to provide such care." At a hearing on October 25, the criminal complaints under G. L. c. 76, § 2, were dismissed, and a hearing on the care and protection issue was subsequently scheduled for and held on December 6, 1985. On May 13, 1986, the judge issued his "findings and order," which determined that the children were in need of care and protection within the meaning of G. L. c. 119 with respect to
1Two of the children attended Canton's Kennedy Elementary School during the 1984-1985 school year; however, none of the three children named in this petition attended public school during the 1985-1986 school year. The name assigned to this case is ficticious.
The parents first argue that G. L. c. 76, § 1, is inapplicable to proceedings under G. L. c. 119, §§ 1-39. Again, we disagree. General Laws c. 76, § 1, provides the standards by which the judge is to determine whether a child is "without . . . necessary and proper . . . educational care and discipline" and whether the "parents . . . are unwilling . . . or unavailable to provide any such care, discipline or attention . . . . " G. L. c. 119, § 24. Without such an implied reference under G. L. c. 119, § 24, to G. L. c. 76, § I , the judge would
4The Department of Social Services was never made a party to the proceedings.
5We acknowledge the helpful analysis provided by the Massachusetts Association of School Committees, Inc., as amicus curiae.
The parents next argue that G. L. c. 76, § 1, is constitutionally deficient due to vagueness because it fails to provide any standards for the approval of a home school proposal or to provide a procedure through which this determination is to be made.6 The parents couple this argument with a claim that G. L. c. 76, § 1, is an unlawful delegation of legislative power to the superintendent and school committee. We have stated that the "constitutional claims of 'void for vagueness' and unlawful delegation of legislative authority are closely related. The principal question posed by both claims is whether the statute is so vague 'that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.' Commonwealth v. Carpenter, 325 Mass. 519, 521 [1950]. O'Connell v. Brockton Bd. of Appeals,344 Mass. 208, 212 [1962]." Board of Appeals of Hanover v. Housing Appeals Comm., 363 Mass. 339, 363 (1973). Warren v. Hazardous Waste Facility Site Safety Council, 392 Mass. 107, 123-124 (1984). See Zwickler v. Koota 389 U.S. 241, 249 (1967); Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). Under this standard, we conclude that G. L. c. 76, § 1, is neither void for vagueness nor an unlawful delegation of legislative authority.
In Warren v. Hazardous Waste Facility Site Safety Council, supra, we determined that "[a] detailed specification of standards is not required" in order that a statute withstand our scrutiny against such a claim. Id. at 124. Indeed, we concluded that standards not expressly provided for may be found in the statute's necessary implications. "The purpose, to a substantial degree, sets the standards." Id.The purpose of G. L. c. 76, §1 is to ensure that "all the children shall be educated." Commonwealth v. Roberts, 159 Mass. 372, 374 (1893) (interpreting a predecessor statute). In order to effectuate this pur-
6We note the parents' additional contention that they need not obtain the school committee's approval of their home school proposal. Thus, their arguments concerning standards to be used in the approval process anticipate a ruling that school committee approval is required.
pose, the Legislature has provided a comprehensive statutory scheme setting the standards for the education of the State's youth. This statutory scheme includes standards under G. L. c. 71, §§ 1, 2, and 3, concerning the subjects that must be taught in public schools and the requirements for teacher qualification.7 Furthermore, G. L. c. 76, § 1 (1984 ed.), specifically provides that: "For the purposes of this section, school committees shall approve a private school when satisfied that the instruction in all the studies required by law equals in thoroughness and efficiency, and in the progress made therein, that in the public schools in the same town; but shall not withhold such approval on account of religious teaching.
7General Laws c. 71, § 1 (1984 ed.), provides in relevant part: "Such schools shall be taught by teachers of competent ability and good morals, and shall give instruction and training in orthography, reading, writing, the English language and grammar, geography, arithmetic, drawing, music, the history and constitution of the United States, the duties of citizenship, health education, physical education and good behavior."
As stated in that case, "[a] vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory applications." Id. at 498, quoting Grayned v. Rockford,408 U.S. 104, 108-109 (1972). Such is not the situation here since the school committee must implement the standards set out in the statutes described above. Furthermore, the Supreme Court indicated that the most important factor in this determination is whether the law "threatens to inhibit the exercise of constitutionally protected rights." Id. at 499. General Laws c. 76, § 1, specifically forbids the school committee from withholding approval of private schools "on account of religious teaching." Because we conclude that this legislative policy extends to home school proposals, no constitutionally protected right is implicated.
8We recognize that the parents also present arguments based on the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 2 and amended art. 18 of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution. Because
213.9 "Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment." Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). Attorney Gen. v. Bailey, 386 Mass. 367, 377, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 970 (1982). The Massachusetts Constitution itself proclaims the State's interest in ensuring that its citizens are educated. "Wisdom, and knowledge, as well as virtue, diffused generally among the body of the people, being necessary for the preservation of their rights and liberties; and as these depend on spreading the opportunities and advantages of education in the various parts of the country, and among the different orders of the people, it shall be the duty of Legislatures and Magistrates, in all future periods of this Commonwealth, to cherish the interests of literature and the sciences, and all seminaries of them; especially ... public schools and grammar schools in the towns; . . . ." Part II, c. 5, § 2, of the Massachusetts Constitution. We have made clear that, from the beginning of its history, the Commonwealth has emphasized the crucial importance in the education of children. Jenkins v. Andover, 103 Mass. 94, 96-97 (1869). However, like the parents' basic right in directing the education of their children, "the State's interest in universal compulsory education . . . is by no means absolute to the exclusion or subordination of all other interests." Wisconsin v. Yoder, supra at
9The Supreme Court has recognized two State interests in a system of compulsory education. "[S]ome degree of education is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our open political system if we are to preserve freedom and independence. Further, education prepares individuals to be self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in societv." Wisconsin v. Yoder, supra at 221.
The parents contend that, if the State has a substantial interest in this regard, the interest must be carefully defined as to its true nature. They argue that the extent of the State's interest is not in educating the children but only in knowing that the children are being educated. In the past we have had occasion to consider the State's interest under its compulsory education laws. In Commonwealth v. Roberts, supra at 374, we examined the predecessor statute to G. L. c. 76, § 1, and stated that "[t]he great object of these provisions of the statutes has been that all children shall be educated, not that they shall be educated in any particular way." Consequently, we agree with the parents that the State interest in this regard lies in ensuring that the children residing within the State receive an education, not that the educational process be dictated in its minutest detail. See Appeal of Peirce, 122 N.H. 762, 768 (1982) (Douglas and Brock, JJ., concurring specially) ("[W]hile the State may adopt a policy requiring that children be educated, it does not have the unlimited power to require that they be educated in a certain way at a certain place"). However, in order to ensure that "all the children shall be educated," we conclude that the approval process required under G. L. c. 76, § 1, is necessary to promote effectively the State's substantial interest.State v. McDonough, 468 A.2d 977, 980 (Me. 1983). Without such an approval process, the State would be powerless to assert its interest in the case of a child "who is being otherwise instructed." "There is no doubt as to the power of a State, having a high responsibility for education of its citizens, to impose reasonable regulations for the control and duration of basic education." Wisconsin v. Yoder, supra at 213. Thus, the school committee may enforce, through the approval process under G. L. c. 76, § 1, certain reasonable educational requirements similar to those required for public and private schools.10
(N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1983). If the home school proposal is rejected, the superintendent or the school committee must detail the reasons for the decision. The parents must then be given an opportunity to revise their proposal to remedy its inadequacies. However, if the parents commence the education of their children at home in the face of the school committee's refusal to approve the parents' home school proposal, the burden of proof under G. L. c. 119 or G. L. c. 76, § 2, shifts to the school committee to show that the instruction outlined in the home school proposal fails to equal "in thoroughness and efficiency, and in the progress made therein, that in the public schools in the same town . . . ... G. L. c. 76, § 1. See In re Monnig, 638 S.W.2d 782, 788 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).