Source: http://www.chanrobles.com/usa/us_supremecourt/397/159/case.php
Timestamp: 2019-10-19 03:09:41
Document Index: 430209331

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 8', '§ 690', '§ 1444', '§ 1444', '§ 8', '§ 590', '§ 590', '§ 701', '§ 590', '§ 701', '§ 702', '§ 22']

BARLOW V. COLLINS, 397 U. S. 159 (1970) - US SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON-LINE
US Supreme Court Decisions On-Line> Volume 397 > BARLOW V. COLLINS, 397 U. S. 159 (1970)
Subscribe to Cases that cite 397 U. S. 159
District Court judgment and 398 F.2d 398, vacated and remanded. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The upland cotton program incorporates a 1938 statute. § 8(g) of the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act, as amended, 2 Stat. 35 and 205, 16 U.S.C. § 690h(g), thereby permitting participants in the program to assign payments only "as security for cash or advances to finance making a crop." [Footnote 1] The regulation chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
of the respondent Secretary of Agriculture in effect until 1966 defined "making a crop" to exclude assignments to secure "the payment of the whole or any part of a cash . . . rent for a farm." 20 Fed.Reg. 6512 (1955). [Footnote 2] Following passage of the 1965 Act, however, and before any payments were made under it, the Secretary deleted the exclusion and amended the regulation expressly to define "making a crop" to include assignments to secure chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Petitioner, cash-rent tenant farmer suing on behalf of themselves and other farmers similarly situated, filed this action in the District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. They sought a declaratory judgment that the amended regulation is invalid and unauthorized by statute, and an injunction prohibiting the respondent federal officials from permitting assignments pursuant to the amended regulation. [Footnote 4] Their complaint chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The District Court, in an unreported opinion, held that the petitioners "lack standing to maintain this action against these [respondent] governmental officials" because the latter "have not taken any action which directly invades any legally protected interest of the plaintiffs." The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, one judge dissenting. 398 F.2d 398. It held that petitioners lacked standing not only because they alleged chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Implicit in the statutory provisions and their legislative history is a congressional intent that the Secretary protect the interests of tenant farmers. Both of the relevant statutes expressly enjoin the Secretary to do so. The Food and Agriculture Act of 1965 states that '[t]he Secretary shall provide adequate safeguards to protect the interests of tenants. . . ." 79 Stat. 1196, 7 U.S.C. § 1444(d)(10) (1964 ed., Supp. IV). [Footnote 6] Title 7 U.S.C. § 1444(d)(13) (1964 ed., Supp. IV), as noted earlier, incorporates by reference § 8(g), as amended, 52 Stat. 35 and 205, 16 U.S.C. § 590h(g). Section 8(b) of that Act, in turn, provides that "the Secretary shall, as far as practicable, protect the interests of tenants. . . ." 52 Stat. 32, 16 U.S.C. § 590h(b). The legislative history of the ' making a crop" provision, though sparse, similarly indicates a congressional intent chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Third, judicial review of the Secretary's action is not precluded. The Court of Appeals rested its holding on the view that no provision of the Food and Agriculture Act of 1965 "expressly or impliedly . . . gives the Courts authority to review such administrative action." 398 F.2d 402. Whether agency action is reviewable often poses difficult questions of congressional intent, and the Court must decide if Congress has, in express or implied terms, precluded judicial review or committed the challenged action entirely to administrative discretion.
The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1964 ed., Supp. IV), allows judicial review of agency action except where "(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law." The amended regulation here under challenge was promulgated under 16 U.S.C. § 590d(3), which authorizes the Secretary to "prescribe such regulations, as he may deem proper to carry out the provisions of this chapter." Plainly, this provision does not expressly preclude judicial review, nor does any other provision in either the 1938 or 1965 Act. Nor does the authority to promulgate such regulations "as he may chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Court's approach to standing, set out in Data Processing, has two steps: (1) since "the framework of Article III . . . restricts judicial power to cases' and `controversies,'" the first step is to determine "whether chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
My view is that the inquiry in the Court's first step is the only one that need be made to determine standing. I had thought we discarded the notion of any additional requirement when we discussed standing solely in terms of its constitutional content in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83 (1968). By requiring a second, nonconstitutional step, the Court comes very close to perpetuating the discredited requirement that conditioned standing on a showing by the plaintiff that the challenged governmental action invaded one of his legally protected interests. [Footnote 2/1] Barlow is a typical illustration of the harm that resulted from that requirement. The only substantial issue in that case goes to the merits: does the statutory language "making a crop" create a legally protected interest for tenant farmers in the form of a prohibition against the assignment of their federal benefits to secure cash rent? By confusing the merits with the plaintiffs' standing to challenge the Secretary's action, both the District Court and the Court of Appeals denied the farmers the focused and careful decision on the merits to which they are clearly entitled. Although chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Id. at 392 U. S. 106. Thus, as we held in Flast, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In light of Flast, standing exists when the plaintiff alleges, as the plaintiffs in each of these cases alleged, that the challenged action has caused him injury in fact, economic or otherwise. [Footnote 2/5] He thus shows that he has the requisite "personal stake in the outcome" of his suit. Baker v. Carr, supra, at 369 U. S. 204. We may reasonably expect that a person so harmed will, as best he can, frame the relevant questions with specificity, contest the issues with the necessary adverseness, and pursue the litigation vigorously. [Footnote 2/6] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
When the legality of administrative action is at issue, standing alone will not entitle the plaintiff to a decision on the merits. Pertinent statutory language, legislative history, and public policy considerations must be examined to determine whether Congress precluded all judicial review, and, if not, whether Congress nevertheless foreclosed review to the class to which the plaintiff belongs. Under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), "statutes [may] preclude judicial review" or "agency action [may be] committed to agency discretion by law." 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1964 ed., Supp. IV). In either case, the plaintiff is out of court not because he had no standing to enter, but because Congress has stripped chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
5 U.S.C. § 702 (1964 ed., Supp. IV). Congressional intent that a particular plaintiff have review may be found either in express statutory language granting it to the plaintiff's class [Footnote 2/7] or, in the absence of such express language, in statutory indicia from which a right to review may be inferred. [Footnote 2/8] Where, as in the instant cases, there is no express grant of review, reviewability has ordinarily been inferred from evidence that Congress intended the plaintiff's class to be a beneficiary of the statute under which the plaintiff raises his claim. See, for example, the Chicago Junction Case, 264 U. S. 258 (1924); Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 390 U. S. 1 chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
If it is determined that a plaintiff who alleged injury in fact, is entitled to judicial review, inquiry proceeds to the merits -- to whether the specific legal interest claimed by the plaintiff is protected by the statute and to whether the protested agency action invaded that interest. [Footnote 2/10] It is true, of course, that matters relevant to the merits will already have been touched tangentially in the determination of standing and, in some cases, in the determination of reviewability. The aspect of the merits touched in establishing standing is the identification of injury in fact, the existence of which the plaintiff must prove. The merits are also touched in establishing reviewability in cases where the plaintiff's right to review must be inferred from evidence that his class is a statutory beneficiary. The same statutory indicia that afford the plaintiff a right to review also bear on the merits, because they provide evidence that the statute protects his class, and thus that he is entitled to relief if he can show that the challenged agency action violated the statute. Evidence that the plaintiff's class is a statutory beneficiary, however, need not be as strong for the purpose of obtaining review as chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The risk of ambiguity and injustice can be minimized by cleanly severing, so far as possible, the inquiries into reviewability and the merits from the determination of standing. Today's decisions, however, will only compound present confusion and breed even more litigation over standing. In the first place, the Court's formulation chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In the second place, though the Court insists that its nonconstitutional standing inquiry does not involve a determination of the merits, I have grave misgivings on this score. The formulation of the inquiry most certainly bears a disquieting similarity to the erroneous notion that a plaintiff has no standing unless he can establish the existence of a legally protected interest. Finally, assuming that the inquiry does not, in fact, focus on the merits, then surely it serves only to determine whether the challenged agency action is reviewable at the instance of the plaintiff in cases where there is no express statutory grant of review to members of his class. [Footnote 2/13] And, if this is so, it has no place in the determination of standing. In terms of treating related questions with one another, this inquiry is best made chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Flast v. Cohen, supra, at 392 U. S. 111 (concurring opinion). chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Accordingly, since Congress cannot expand the Article III jurisdiction of federal courts, Muskrat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346 (1911), it follows that injury in fact renders a party adverse under the Constitution. Cf. K. Davis, 3 Administrative Law Treatise § 22.02, at 211 (1958); Jaffe, supra, 397 U. S. 5, at 336.