Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/470/216/635206/
Timestamp: 2017-11-17 17:30:14
Document Index: 270014203

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1252', '§ 1158', '§ 1101', '§ 1252', '§ 1252', '§ 1252', '§ 1252']

Arvindbhai Hargovandas Patel, Petitioner, v. Alberto Gonzales, Respondent, 470 F.3d 216 (6th Cir. 2006) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Sixth Circuit › 2006 › Arvindbhai Hargovandas Patel, Petitioner, v. Alberto Gonzales, Respondent
Arvindbhai Hargovandas Patel, Petitioner, v. Alberto Gonzales, Respondent, 470 F.3d 216 (6th Cir. 2006)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit - 470 F.3d 216 (6th Cir. 2006)
"Where the BIA adopts the IJ's reasoning, the court reviews the IJ's decision directly to determine whether the decision of the BIA should be upheld on appeal." Gilaj v. Gonzales, 408 F.3d 275, 282-83 (6th Cir. 2005). Thus, we examine the IJ's decision, except with respect to the finding that Patel was a persecutor.
We have jurisdiction to review the BIA's asylum determination under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. Under the INA, the Attorney General may grant asylum to an alien who qualifies as a "refugee," which is defined as one "who is unable or unwilling to return to . . . [his or her home country] because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion...." 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b) (1), 1101(a) (42) (A). When an alien qualifies as a refugee, the IJ may exercise discretion to grant or deny asylum. Yu v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 700, 702 (6th Cir. 2004).
Asylum analysis, therefore, "`involves a two-step inquiry: (1) whether the applicant qualifies as a `refugee' as defined in § 1101(a) (42) (A), and (2) whether the applicant merits a favorable exercise of discretion by the [IJ].'" Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Ouda v. INS, 324 F.3d 445, 451 (6th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). "At the first step, we review the IJ's factual determination as to whether the alien qualifies as a refugee under a substantial [-]evidence test," meaning that "findings of fact are `conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.'" Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (4) (B)). At step two, "the discretionary judgment to grant asylum to a refugee is `conclusive unless manifestly contrary to the law and an abuse of discretion.'" Id. at 703 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (4) (D)).
Because Patel does not challenge the IJ's discretionary decision to deny asylum, Patel has forfeited this argument, and the discretionary ground for denying Patel asylum stands. Thus, we deny Patel's petition for review of his asylum claim. See Rawe v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 462 F.3d 521, 525 n. 4 (6th Cir. 2006) (stating that a party forfeits any argument which is merely stated, but for which the party makes no argument).
According to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (2) (B) (i), "no court shall have jurisdiction to review any judgment regarding the granting of relief under section . . . 1229c [the section regarding voluntary departure]." However, according to § 1252(a) (2) (D), subsection (B) does not preclude this court from reviewing constitutional claims or questions of law. Thus, while our jurisdiction is limited with respect to voluntary departure determinations, where voluntary departure raises a constitutional or legal question, we retain jurisdiction. Patel makes two arguments with respect to voluntary departure. The first argument is constitutional and the second is a question of law. Therefore, we have jurisdiction to review both arguments and will examine each in turn.
Questions of law in a deportation order are reviewed de novo. Huicochea-Gomez v. INS, 237 F.3d 696, 699 (6th Cir. 2001). "Fifth Amendment guarantees of due process extend to aliens in deportation proceedings, entitling them to a full and fair hearing." Id. The Fifth Amendment prohibits "depriv [ation] of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend V; Voyticky v. Vill. of Timberlake, 412 F.3d 669, 679 (6th Cir. 2005).
To prevail, Patel first must show that the BIA's failure to consider his voluntary departure claim deprived him of a liberty interest. However, we have previously held that "` [t]he failure to be granted discretionary relief [such as voluntary departure] does not amount to a deprivation of a liberty interest.'" Ali v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 407, 412 (6th Cir. 2004) (alterations in original) (quoting Huicochea-Gomez, 237 F.3d at 700). Because there was no deprivation of a liberty interest, Patel's due process claim is without merit.