Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/95579/continental-baking-co-vs-woodring
Timestamp: 2018-02-20 08:14:10
Document Index: 245408169

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2', '§ 3', '§ 4', '§ 5', '§ 6', '§ 7', '§ 8', '§ 13', '§ 15', '§ 16', '§ 18', '§ 21', '§ 22', '§ 23', '§ 8', '§ 21', '§ 2', '§ 5', '§ 22', '§ 2']

Continental Baking Co Vs Woodring - Citation 95579 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Continental Baking Co. Vs. Woodring - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/95579
Case Number 286 U.S. 352
Appellant Continental Baking Co.
Respondent Woodring
continental baking co. v. woodring - 286 u.s. 352 (1932) u.s. supreme court continental baking co. v. woodring, 286 u.s. 352 (1932) continental baking co. v. woodring no. 677 argued april 25, 1932 decided may 23, 1932 286 u.s. 352 appeal from the district court of the united states for the district of kansas syllabus 1. the use of public highways by private intrastate and interstate carriers of goods by motor may be conditioned by the state upon the carrier's obtaining a license, complying with reasonable regulations, paying a reasonable license fee and a tax, for expenses of highway administration and maintenance and reconstruction of the highways covered by the license, and upon the filing of an insurance policy.....
Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring - 286 U.S. 352 (1932)
U.S. Supreme Court Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring, 286 U.S. 352 (1932)
1. The use of public highways by private intrastate and interstate carriers of goods by motor may be conditioned by the state upon the carrier's obtaining a license, complying with reasonable regulations, paying a reasonable license fee and a tax, for expenses of highway administration and maintenance and reconstruction of the highways covered by the license, and upon the filing of an insurance policy as security against injuries from the carrier's negligent operations to persons and property other than the passengers and property he carries. P. 286 U. S. 365 .
3. The Kansas Motor Vehicle Act taxes motor carriers on a basis of gross ton miles for the use of state highways, but exempts (a) those operating wholly within a city or village and (b) private motor carriers operating "within a radius of twenty-five miles beyond the corporate limits of such city, or any village." In the latter aspect, it is construed as confined to carriers having an established place of business or base of operations within a city or village, and exempting them as to their truck movements there and within the extended zone, but as subjecting them to the tax on mileage outside of the zone. Held that the exemption is not so uncertain as to render the tax void. P. 286 U. S. 366 .
(1) Apprehension that the Commission may, under this authority, invade the constitutional rights of private carriers by regulations lawful only in respect of common carriers is not ground for injunction in the absence of any action or threat of action on its part. Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U. S. 553 , distinguished. P. 286 U. S. 367 .
5. The declaration of this statute that all powers of the Kansas Public Service Commission over common carriers are thereby made applicable "to all such motor carriers" applies to public, and not to private, carriers. P. 286 U. S. 369 .
7. A state law regulating motor carriers and taxing them on a mileage basis is not offensive to the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it does not extend to those who operate wholly within a city or village and who are subject to the regulations of the municipality. P. 286 U. S. 369 .
8. It is also permissible classification to extend such exemption to private carriers, having headquarters or base of operations within the municipality, in respect of the movements of their delivery trucks within a zone surrounding the municipality, because of the slight use by such carriers of the state highways outside of the municipality, and because of the practical difficulty, and the cost, of keeping track of the mileage of the trucks for the purpose of assessing a mileage tax. P. 286 U. S. 370 .
10. The provision in the Kansas Motor Vehicle Act that it shall not apply to "the transportation of livestock and farm products to market by the owner thereof or supplies for his own use in his own motor vehicle" is likewise based on permissible clarification. Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U. S. 553 , distinguished. Pp. 286 U. S. 371 -373.
11. The legislature, in making its classification, was entitled to consider frequency and character of use and to adapt its regulations to the classes of operations which, by reason of their habitual and constant use of the highways, brought about the conditions making regulation imperative and created the necessity for the imposition of a tax for maintenance and reconstruction. P. 286 U. S. 373 .
The statute relates to motor vehicles, comprehensively defined, when used upon any public highway of the state for the purpose of transporting persons or property. It applies to those who are engaged in such transportation as "public motor carriers" of property and passengers, "contract motor carriers" of property and passengers, and "private motor carriers of property." "Public motor carrier" means one transporting "for hire as a common carrier having a fixed termini or route." "Contract motor carrier" of property means one who is not a "public motor carrier" and is engaged in transportation "for hire as a business." "Private motor carrier of property" means one transporting "property sold or to be sold by him in furtherance of any private commercial enterprise." Section 1. [ Footnote 1 ] The Act does not apply
to (1) motor carriers operating wholly within any city or village of the state, (2) private motor carriers operating within a radius of twenty-five miles beyond the corporate limits of such city or village, (3) the transportation of livestock and farm products to market "by the owner thereof or supplies for his own use in his own motor vehicle," and (4) the transportation of children to and from school. § 2. [ Footnote 2 ] Public motor carriers are declared to be common carriers within the meaning of the public utility laws of the state, and subject to regulation accordingly,
including that of rates and charges. § 3. [ Footnote 3 ] Public motor carriers, contract motor carriers, and private motor carriers of property are forbidden to operate motor vehicles for compensation on any public highway except in accordance with the provisions of the Act. § 4. [ Footnote 4 ] The public service Commission is vested with supervision of these carriers in all matters affecting their relationship "with the traveling and shipping public" and, specifically, to prescribe regulations in certain particulars hereinafter mentioned. § 5. [ Footnote 5 ] All transportation charges made
by public motor carriers must be just and reasonable. § 6. Public motor carriers in intrastate commerce must obtain certificates of convenience and necessity. § 7. Contract motor carriers and private motor carriers of property, "either in intrastate commerce or in interstate commerce," must obtain licenses. Application therefor must give information as to ownership, financial condition and equipment, and such further facts as the public service Commission may request. The Commission is required, upon receipt of this information and on compliance with the regulations and payment of fees, to issue a license. § 8. [ Footnote 6 ] In addition to license fees, public motor carriers, contract motor carriers, and private motor carriers of property must pay a tax of "five-tenths mill per gross ton mile," computed in the manner described, for the administration
of the Act and for the maintenance and reconstruction of the public highways. § 13. [ Footnote 7 ] Every motor carrier covered by the Act must keep daily records, upon prescribed forms, of all vehicles used, and must certify under oath summaries showing the ton-miles traveled monthly and such other information as the Commission may require. § 15. [ Footnote 8 ] The Commission is empowered to enforce the provisions of the Act and to inspect the books and documents of all carriers to which the Act applies. § 16. [ Footnote 9 ]
Of the moneys received under the provisions of the Act, 20 percent is to be applied to administration and enforcement, and the remainder is to be placed to the credit of the state's highway fund. § 18. [ Footnote 10 ] No certificate or license is to be issued by the Commission to any of the described motor carriers until a liability insurance policy approved by the Commission has been filed
No other or additional bonds or licenses than those prescribed in the Act are to be required by any city or town or other agency of the state. § 21. [ Footnote 11 ] The Commission may promulgate
rules relating to the maintenance of vehicle units in a safe and sanitary condition, and making provision as to qualifications and hours of service of operators and for the reporting of accidents. § 22. [ Footnote 12 ] Violation of the Act or of any order of the Commission is made a misdemeanor. § 23. [ Footnote 13 ]
It is apparent that Kansas, in framing its legislation to meet these conditions, did not attempt to compel private carriers to become public carriers. The legislature did not purport to put both classes of carriers upon an identical footing and subject them to the same obligations. See Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U. S. 553 , 283 U. S. 563 ; Michigan Public Utilities Commission v. Duke, 266 U. S. 570 , 266 U. S. 576 -578; Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U. S. 583 , 271 U. S. 592 . It recognized and applied distinctions. "Public" or common carriers, and not private carriers, are required to obtain certificates of public convenience and necessity. The former, and not the latter, are put under regulations as to fares and charges. While, with respect to certain matters, both are placed under the general authority given to the Public Service Commission to prescribe regulations, it does not appear from the bill of complaint that any regulation has
First. "Private motor carriers of property" must obtain a license, pay a tax, and file a liability insurance policy. The Public Service Commission has no authority to refuse a license if the described information is given with the application, the liability insurance policy is filed, and there is compliance with the regulations and payment of the license fee. § 8. [ Footnote 14 ] It is not shown that either regulations or license fees are unreasonable. The tax and the license fees, over the expenses of administration, go to the highway fund of the state for the maintenance and reconstruction of the highways the carrier is licensed to use. The insurance policy is to protect the interests of the public by securing compensation for injuries to persons and property from negligent operations of the carriers. § 21. [ Footnote 15 ] The district court approved an earlier decision, also by a district court of three judges, that this provision was not intended to require "security for passengers or cargoes carried, but only to protect third persons from injuries to their persons or property." 55 F.2d at 357; Louis v. Boynton, 53 F.2d 471, 473. This is an admissible construction, and no different application of the provision appears to have been made by either the state court or the Commission.
traffic, and, where there is no discrimination against the interstate commerce which may be affected, do not impose an unconstitutional burden upon that commerce. Motor vehicles may properly be treated as a special class, because their movement over the highways, as this Court has said, "is attended by constant and serious dangers to the public, and is also abnormally destructive to the ways themselves." Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610 , 235 U. S. 622 ; Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U. S. 160 , 242 U. S. 167 ; Michigan Public Utilities Commission v. Duke, supra; Interstate Busses Corp. v. Blodgett, 276 U. S. 245 , 276 U. S. 250 -251; Sprout v. South Bend, 277 U. S. 163 , 277 U. S. 169 -170; Hodge Drive-It-Yourself Co. v. Cincinnati, 284 U. S. 335 , 284 U. S. 337 .
Objection to the tax is made on the score of uncertainty, in view of the exemptions of motor carriers operating wholly within a city or village, and of private motor carriers operating "within a radius of twenty five miles beyond the corporate limits of such city, or any village." § 2. [ Footnote 16 ] This objection is distinct from that of unconstitutional discrimination, shortly to be considered. We perceive no uncertainty by reason of the first exemption, which definitely applies to cases of operation exclusively within the limits of a city or village. As to the second exemption, the state authorities assert, and it is not denied, that, in the administration of the Act, the Public Service Commission has taken the exemption to mean that,
The objection to the authority given to the Public Service Commission "to regulate and supervise the accounts, schedules, service and method of operation," "to prescribe a uniform system and classification of accounts," to require the filing of reports and data, and generally to "supervise and regulate" all the carriers to which the Act applies "in all matters affecting the relationship" between such carriers and "the traveling and shipping public." (§ 5) [ Footnote 17 ] similarly raises no question which can now be
The duty laid upon the Commission (§ 22) [ Footnote 18 ] to insist that motor vehicles shall be maintained "in a safe and sanitary condition," to prescribe qualifications of operators as to age and hours of service, and to require the reporting of accidents has manifest reference to considerations of safety. The terms of the statute do not require action by the Commission which does not have reasonable relation to that purpose. In this respect, as well as in relation to the other matters above mentioned, appellants had no right to resort to equity merely because of an anticipation of improper or invalid action in administration. Smith v. Cahoon, supra, at 283 U. S. 562 ; Dalton Adding Machine Co. v. State Corporation Commission, 236 U. S. 699 , 236 U. S. 700 -701; Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, ante, p. 286 U. S. 210 .
Second. The challenged exemptions are set forth in § 2. [ Footnote 19 ] The first, which excludes from the application of the Act motor carriers who operate wholly within a city or village of the state, has an obviously reasonable basis, as such operations are subject to local regulations. In
and unquestionably it had a broad discretion as to where the line should be drawn. In exercising that discretion, the legislature was not bound to resort to close distinctions or to attempt to define the particular differentiations as to traffic conditions in territory bordering on its various municipalities. Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 281 U. S. 146 , 281 U. S. 159 . This Court has frequently held that the mere selection of a mileage basis in the regulation of railroads cannot be considered a violation of the Federal Constitution. The practical convenience of such a classification is not to be disregarded in the interest of a purely theoretical or scientific uniformity. Columbus & Greenville Ry. Co. v. Miller, 283 U. S. 96 , 283 U. S. 101 ; Dow v. Beidelman, 125 U. S. 680 , 125 U. S. 691 ; New York, N.H. & H. R. Co. v. New York, 165 U. S. 628 , 165 U. S. 633 -634; Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Arkansas, 219 U. S. 453 ; Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Conley, 230 U. S. 513 , 230 U. S. 522 ; St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Arkansas, 240 U. S. 518 , 240 U. S. 521 ; Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332 , 243 U. S. 341 , 243 U. S. 354 ; Clark v. Maxwell, 282 U.S. 811; Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co. v. United states, 284 U. S. 80 , 284 U. S. 93 . No controlling considerations have been presented to overcome the presumption attaching to the legislative action in this case in fixing the radius of the zone for the purpose of establishing an exemption otherwise valid.
and fanciful illustrations of possible discriminations which had no basis in the actual experience to which the statute was addressed. The Court found a practical difference between the case of the appellants "who operate fleets of trucks in the conduct of their business and who use the highways daily in the delivery of their products to their customers," and that of "a farmer who hauls his wheat or livestock to town once or twice a year." The legislature, in making its classification, was entitled to consider frequency and character of use, and to adapt its regulations to the classes of operations which, by reason of their habitual and constant use of the highways, brought about the conditions making regulation imperative and created the necessity for the imposition of a tax for maintenance and reconstruction. As the Court said in Alward v. Johnson, 282 U. S. 509 , 282 U. S. 513 -514:
See also Bekins Van Lines v. Riley, 280 U. S. 80 , 280 U. S. 82 ; Carley & Hamilton v. Snook, 281 U. S. 66 , 281 U. S. 73 .