Source: https://regulations.vlex.com/vid/counterintelligence-polygraph-examinations-23589932
Timestamp: 2020-06-04 02:50:14
Document Index: 146587013

Matched Legal Cases: ['arts 709', 'art 709', 'art 709', 'art 709', 'ART 709', 'art 710', 'art 710', 'art 710', 'ART 710', 'art 710']

Counterintelligence Evaluation Program; polygraph examinations use, - September 29, 2006 - Regulations - VLEX 23589932
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[DOCID:fr29se06-2]
10 CFR Parts 709 and 710
AGENCY: Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Department of Energy.
SUMMARY: The Department of Energy (DOE or Department) today is publishing a final rule to establish new counterintelligence evaluation regulations to minimize the potential for disclosure of classified information, data, and materials. The rule published today, which replaces the current DOE polygraph regulations contained at 10
CFR part 709, requires counterintelligence evaluations for applicants of certain high-risk positions and every five years for incumbents of those positions.
EFFECTIVE DATE: This rule is effective October 30, 2006.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Charles Costa, U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20585, (202) 586-5901; or Robert Newton, U.S. Department of Energy, Office of the General Counsel, GC-53, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20585, (202) 586-6980.
Introduction II. Background Information III. DOE's Response to Comments
Response to Comments on Specific Proposed Regulatory Provisions IV. Procedural Requirements
DOE's existing counterintelligence polygraph regulations are set forth at 10 CFR part 709. Under section 3152(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, Pub. L. 107-107 (NDAA for FY 2002), DOE is obligated to prescribe revised regulations for a new counterintelligence polygraph program the stated purpose of which is ``* * * to minimize the potential for release or disclosure of classified data, materials, or information'' (42 U.S.C. 7383h-1(a).) Section 3152(b) requires DOE to ``* * * take into account the results of the Polygraph Review,'' which is defined by section 3152 (e) to mean ``* * * the review of the Committee to Review the Scientific Evidence on the Polygraph of the National Academy of Sciences'' (42 U.S.C. 7383h-1(b), (e)).
Upon promulgation of final regulations under section 3152, and ``effective 30 days after the Secretary submits to the congressional defense committees the Secretary's certification that the final rule * * * has been fully implemented, * * *'' section 3154 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (NDAA for FY 2000) (42 U.S.C. 7383h), is repealed by operation of law. (42 U.S.C. 7383h-1(c).) The repeal of section 3154 would eliminate the existing authority which underlies DOE's current counterintelligence polygraph regulations but would not preclude the retention of some or all of those regulations through this rulemaking pursuant to the later-enacted section 3152 of the NDAA for FY 2002.
In order to carry out this directive, after initially proceeding through an internal order governing only Federal employees, on August 18, 1999 (64 FR 45062), the Department proposed a rule, entitled `Polygraph Examination Regulation,' that would govern the use of the polygraph as a screening tool. It proposed that employees at DOE facilities, contractor employees as well as Federal employees, with access to certain classified information and materials, as well as applicants for such positions, be subject to a counterintelligence polygraph before they received initial access to the information and materials and at five-year intervals thereafter.
In the NDAA for FY 2000, Congress directed that the Department administer a counterintelligence polygraph to all Department employees, consultants, and contractor employees in `high risk programs' prior to their being given access to the program. Congress specified that these programs were the `Special Access Programs' and `Personnel Security and Assurance Programs.'
On January 18, 2000, the Department finalized essentially the rule it had proposed, which included individuals with access to these programs and others in the screening requirement. Thereafter, on October 30, 2000, Congress enacted the NDAA of FY 2001, which added DOE employees, consultants, and contractor employees in programs that use `Sensitive Compartmented Information' and all others already covered by the Department's prior rule to those to whom the polygraph screening mandate applied.
The NAS study, entitled The Polygraph and Lie Detection, was published in October 2002 (hereinafter referred to as `NAS Report' or `NAS Study'). The Department published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on April 14, 2003 (68 FR 17886). In that Notice, the Department indicated its then-current intent to continue the current polygraph program under a new rule. As the Secretary of Energy said upon release of that proposed rule, he `concluded that it was appropriate at the present time to' retain the current system `in light of the current national security environment, the ongoing military operations in Iraq, and the war on Terrorism.' At the same time, the Secretary recognized that in the longer term some changes might be appropriate. Therefore, the Department explicitly asked for public comment during a period which ended on June 13, 2003. The Secretary also personally wrote all laboratory directors inviting their comments and views on the proposed rule.
Following the close of the comment period and consideration of public comments, DOE conducted an extensive review of the then current polygraph policy and its implementation history, the NAS Report, and the public and internal comments resulting from the April 2003 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. Following this review, DOE published a Supplemental NOPR at 70 FR 1383 (January 7, 2005). The Supplemental NOPR proposed a new mandatory counterintelligence (CI) evaluation program including mandatory polygraph screening for individuals with ``regular and routine access'' to DOE's most sensitive information, in particular all DOE-originated ``Top Secret'' information, including Top Secret ``Restricted Data'' and Top Secret ``National Security Information.'' The proposed rule, like the current polygraph regulations, provided for a mandatory CI evaluation and CI-scope polygraph exam prior to initial access being granted, as well as periodic CI evaluations at intervals not to exceed five years. In deciding to propose continued use of mandatory polygraph screening, the Supplemental NOPR noted that the NAS Report's conclusion on the use of the polygraph exam as a screening tool only addresses the use of polygraph results as the sole basis for access determinations. The Supplemental NOPR pointed out that, in fact, the NAS Report acknowledges that the use of the polygraph examination as an investigative lead, in conjunction with other investigative tools can ameliorate the problems the NAS Report attributes to polygraph screening. The NOPR emphasized that the proposed rule would make clear that polygraph exams are only one element to be used in counterintelligence evaluations. Reviews of personnel security files and, as necessary and appropriate, personal interviews and review of financial and credit information, net worth analyses, analyses of foreign travel and foreign contacts and connections, would be employed in conjunction with the polygraph.
The Supplemental NOPR proposed that some elements of the mandatory screening population remain essentially the same as under the current regulation. DOE also proposed a random CI evaluation program including polygraph intended to achieve the objectives of deterrence with the minimum reasonable percentage or number of individuals to which it would apply. In addition to the mandatory and random screening programs, DOE also proposed a provision for conducting ``specific- incident'' polygraph examinations in response to specific facts or circumstances with potential counterintelligence implications with a defined foreign nexus. That proposal also grew out of the NAS Report, which noted that this kind of use of the polygraph is the one for which the existing scientific literature provides the strongest support. The proposed rule also provided for employee-requested polygraph examinations in the context of a specific incident.
DOE's Response to Comments
The following discussion describes the major issues raised in the comments received from 10 sources, provides DOE's response to these comments, and describes any resulting changes in the final regulations. The comments overwhelmingly focused on the use of the polygraph examination in the proposed new Counterintelligence Evaluation Program. Only one of the commenters supported DOE's proposed reliance on the polygraph examination as an integral part of the Counterintelligence Evaluation Program. The remaining commenters strongly opposed DOE's proposal to continue with mandatory polygraph screening. Some of these commenters objected to the proposed random screening program
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and to the use of polygraph testing in specific incident investigations. Some of these commenters also raised objections with respect to specific elements of the proposed new polygraph examination regulations. DOE responds first to the general comments and thereafter to the specific comments.
The commenters opposed to DOE's continued reliance on the polygraph examination argued principally that polygraph testing is not supported by sound science. Most of these commenters cited the NAS Report to support their positions, and they challenged DOE's interpretation of the NAS Report's findings and conclusions. According to the commenters, because polygraph testing lacks scientific reliability, there is a high probability of an unacceptable number of ``false positives'' and, in part due to what they perceive as the efficacy of countermeasures, ``false negatives.'' [The phenomena of ``false positive'' and ``false negative'' examination findings are described in greater detail in the Supplemental NOPR at 70 FR 1383-1389.] Because of problems associated with examination results that produce ``false positives'' and ``false negatives,'' many of the commenters contended that continued use of polygraph testing would have a highly negative effect on employee morale, retention of present employees, and recruitment of new employees. Additionally, commenters asserted that the likelihood of false negatives undermined any deterrence value of polygraph testing. One commenter urged DOE to reject the use of polygraph testing in its Counterintelligence Evaluation Program and to focus instead on the development of new techniques for the behavioral, psychological, or physiological assessments of individuals in security and counterintelligence evaluations.
These changes to the proposed rule will significantly reduce the number of individuals who will undergo a polygraph examination. Under the rule, a counterintelligence evaluation consists of a counterintelligence-based review of a ``covered person's'' personnel security file, and review of other relevant information available in DOE. If the counterintelligence evaluation, including a possible polygraph exam, discloses unresolved foreign nexus issues, DOE may undertake a more comprehensive evaluation that may, in appropriate circumstances, include evaluation of financial, credit, travel, and other relevant information to resolve the issues. Participation by Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence personnel in this extended evaluation is subject to Executive Order 12333, the DOE ``Procedures for Intelligence Activities,'' and other relevant laws, guidelines, as may be applicable.
Response to Comments on Specific Proposed Regulatory Provisions
Random Screening Program
Two of the commenters questioned the scientific merits of the proposed random screening program (section 709.3(c)), contending, without offering support for the proposition, that random screening will neither contribute to good security nor to deterrence. As DOE noted in the Supplemental NOPR, the NAS Report observed that ``the value, or utility, of polygraph testing does not lie only in its validity for detecting deception. It may have a deterrent value * * * '' and ``predictable polygraph testing (e.g. fixed-interval testing of people in specific job classifications) probably has less deterrent value than random testing.'' This led DOE to conclude that it is appropriate to include random testing as a component of the new Counterintelligence Evaluation Program, to enhance the deterrent value of the polygraph. Another commenter, while expressing support for random screening as an alternative to the mandatory screening program, urged DOE to ensure that the system for identifying individuals who will be subject to random testing is fair. DOE's Energy Information Administration's Statistics and Methods Group has designed the statistical model which will be utilized in the random screening program, and DOE believes that the EIA model will ensure selection fairness.
Specific Incident Polygraph Examinations
Two commenters contended that the likelihood of a certain percentage of ``false negative'' and ``false positive'' responses in polygraph examinations, which could impede an investigation, argue against the use of polygraph testing in specific incident investigations. In DOE's view these comments are largely speculative. As DOE noted in the Supplemental NOPR, the proposed provision [section 709.3(d)] for conducting specific incident polygraph examinations grew out of the NAS Report, which observed that this kind of use of the polygraph is one for which the existing scientific literature provides the strongest support. In the absence of a showing which rebuts the NAS Report, DOE has determined not to abandon what the NAS Report considers a potentially useful investigative tool, employed in appropriate circumstances in conjunction with other investigative techniques, in specific incident investigations, and thus DOE retains the proposed provision in the final rule. 3. Other Information Provided to an Individual Prior to a Polygraph Examination
DOE will not establish a policy of releasing the polygraph reports or videotapes of examinations or permitting individuals to record all or any portion of the polygraph examination or related interviews. Such materials contain information concerning investigative procedures and techniques of the Department. However, an individual may file a request for the release of these materials under the Freedom of Information Act or the Privacy Act and the request will be processed in accordance with applicable regulations. 4. Topics Within the Scope of a Polygraph Examination; Defining Polygraph Examination Questions
Several commenters were critical of the question format DOE uses in polygraph examinations (section 709.11), which is known as the ``Test for Espionage and Sabotage Format.'' One commenter claimed that notwithstanding DOE's description of the question format in section 709.11, and section 709.12 (``Defining polygraph examination questions''), the TES methodology actually permits the examiner to go beyond national security questions and to engage in a ``fishing expedition'' in areas potentially unrelated to the stated scope of DOE's polygraph examination. DOE disagrees. The question format and question methodology employed by DOE examiners has been approved by the Department of Defense Polygraph Institute (DODPI) and is generally used throughout the Federal government. Additionally, DOE polygraph examiners are subject to rigorous training requirements and standards (sections 709.31 and 709.32) and examiners as well as polygraph program results are subject to bi-annual DODPI quality assurance reviews. DOE does not believe the commenters have supported the need for changes to the proposed provisions pertaining to the topics within the scope of a polygraph examination and defining polygraph examination questions, respectively. 5. Need for Independent Oversight
Three commenters who questioned the credibility and integrity of DOE's polygraph examination process recommended that DOE include in the regulations provision for independent oversight of the examination process by an independent board. DOE believes that the regulations provide sufficient safeguards to ensure the integrity of the examination process and is not persuaded that there is justification or need for independent oversight board. Following a polygraph examination, examinees have the opportunity and are encouraged to complete and to submit to DOE a quality assurance questionnaire and comments or complaints concerning the examination (section 709.24(f)). Examinees also might submit complaints to the appropriate line Program Manager or laboratory or facility manager. Secondly, as noted in the previous section, DOE polygraph examiners are subject to rigorous training requirements and standards (sections 709.31 and 709.32) and, additionally, as already noted DOE as well as other Federal Departments and agencies are subject to bi-annual DODPI quality assurance reviews. 6. Accelerated Access Authorization Program (AAAP)
The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has determined that today's regulatory action is a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 12866, ``Regulatory Planning and Review,'' 58 FR 51735 (October 4, 1993). OMB has completed its review of this notice of final rulemaking.
This rule was reviewed under the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.) which requires preparation of an initial regulatory flexibility analysis for any rule that is likely to have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. This rulemaking does not directly
regulate small businesses or small governmental entities. It applies principally to individuals who are employees of, or applicants for employment by, some of DOE's prime contractors, which generally are large businesses. There may be some affected small businesses that are subcontractors, but the rule will not impose unallowable costs. Accordingly, DOE certifies that the rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.
DOE has determined that this rulemaking does not contain any new or amended record keeping, reporting, or application requirements, or any other type of information collection requirements that require the approval of OMB under the Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq. OMB has defined the term ``information'' to exclude certifications, consents, and acknowledgments that entail only minimal burden (5 CFR 1320(h)(1)).
Executive Order 13132, ``Federalism,'' 64 FR 43255 (August 4, 1999) imposes certain requirements on agencies formulating and implementing policies or regulations that preempt State law or that have federalism implications. The Executive Order requires agencies to examine the constitutional and statutory authority supporting any action that would limit the policymaking discretion of the States and carefully assess the necessity for such actions. The Executive Order also requires agencies to have an accountable process to ensure meaningful and timely input by State and local officials in the development of regulatory policies that have federalism implications. On March 14, 2000, DOE published a statement of policy describing the intergovernmental consultation process it will follow in the development of such regulations (65 FR 13735). DOE has examined today's rule and has determined that it does not preempt State law and does not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. No further action is required by Executive Order 13132.
With respect to the revision of existing regulations and the promulgation of new regulations, section 3(a) of Executive Order 12988, ``Civil Justice Reform'' (61 FR 4729, February 7, 1996), imposes on Federal agencies the general duty to adhere to the following requirements: (1) Eliminate drafting errors and ambiguity; (2) write regulations to minimize litigation; and (3) provide a clear legal standard for affected conduct rather than a general standard and promote simplification and burden reduction. Section 3(b) of Executive Order 12988 specifically requires that Executive agencies make every reasonable effort to ensure that the regulation: (1) Clearly specifies the preemptive effect, if any; (2) clearly specifies any effect on existing Federal law or regulation; (3) provides a clear legal standard for affected conduct while promoting simplification and burden reduction; (4) specifies the retroactive effect, if any; (5) adequately defines key terms; and (6) addresses other important issues affecting clarity and general draftsmanship under any guidelines issued by the Attorney General. Section 3(c) of Executive Order 12988 requires Executive agencies to review regulations in light of applicable standards in section 3(a) and section 3(b) to determine whether they are met or it is unreasonable to meet one or more of them. DOE has completed the required review and determined that, to the extent permitted by law, this rule meets the relevant standards of Executive Order 12988.
The Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act, 2001 (44 U.S.C. 3516, note) provides for agencies to review most disseminations of information to the public under guidelines established by each agency pursuant to general guidelines issued by OMB. OMB's information quality guidelines were published at 67 FR 8452 (February 22, 2002), and DOE's implementing guidelines were published at 67 FR 62446 (October 7, 2002). DOE has reviewed today's notice under the OMB and DOE information quality guidelines and has concluded that it is consistent with applicable policies in those guidelines. DOE also has concluded that today's notice is consistent with OMB's ``Information Quality Bulletin for Peer Review'' applicable to agency disseminations of ``influential scientific information'' and ``highly influential scientific assessments,'' published at 70 FR 2664 (January 14, 2005). As discussed above, today's final regulations take into account the 2002 report entitled ``The Polygraph and Lie Detection'' of the Committee to Review the Scientific Evidence on the Polygraph of the National Academy of Sciences. OMB's Peer Review Bulletin permits agencies, as an alternative to the Bulletin's peer review requirements otherwise applicable to disseminations of influential scientific information and highly scientific assessments, to rely on the principal findings, conclusions and recommendations of a report produced by the National Academy of Sciences.
Executive Order 13211, ``Actions Concerning Regulations That Significantly Affect Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use,'' 66 FR 28355 (May 22, 2001) requires Federal agencies to
prepare and submit to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), Office of Management and Budget, a Statement of Energy Effects for any significant energy action under Executive Order 12866 that are likely to have a significant adverse effect on the supply, distribution, or use of energy. This rulemaking, although significant, will not have such an effect. Consequently, DOE has concluded that there is no need for a Statement of Energy Effects.
As required by 5 U.S.C. 801, DOE will report to Congress promulgation of today's rule prior to its effective date. The report will state that it has been determined that the rule is not a ``major rule'' as defined by 5 U.S.C. 804(2).
Lie detector test, Privacy.
Administrative practice and procedure, Classified information, Government contracts, Nuclear materials.
Issued in Washington, DC, on September 25, 2006. Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, Director, Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence.
0 For the reasons stated in the preamble, DOE hereby amends Chapter III of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations to read as follows: 0 1. Part 709 is revised to read as follows:
PART 709--COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EVALUATION PROGRAM
Subpart A--General Provisions Sec. 709.1 Purpose. 709.2 Definitions. 709.3 Covered persons subject to a CI evaluation and polygraph. 709.4 Notification of a CI evaluation. 709.5 Waiver of polygraph examination requirements. Subpart B--CI Evaluation Protocols and Protection of National Security 709.10 Scope of a counterintelligence evaluation. 709.11 Topics within the scope of a polygraph examination. 709.12 Defining polygraph examination questions. 709.13 Implications of refusal to take a polygraph examination. 709.14 Consequences of a refusal to complete a CI evaluation including a polygraph examination. 709.15 Processing counterintelligence evaluation results. 709.16 Application of Counterintelligence Evaluation Review Boards in reaching conclusions regarding CI evaluations. 709.17 Final disposition of CI evaluation findings and recommendations. Subpart C--Safeguarding Privacy and Employee Rights 709.21 Requirements for notification of a polygraph examination. 709.22 Right to counsel or other representation. 709.23 Obtaining consent to a polygraph examination. 709.24 Other information provided to the covered person prior to a polygraph examination. 709.25 Limits on use of polygraph examination results that reflect ``Significant Response'' or ``No Opinion''. 709.26 Protection of confidentiality of CI evaluation records to include polygraph examination records and other pertinent documentation. Subpart D--Polygraph Examination and Examiner Standards 709.31 DOE standards for polygraph examiners and polygraph examinations. 709.32 Training requirements for polygraph examiners.
Sec. 709.1 Purpose.
Sec. 709.2 Definitions.
Materials means any ``nuclear explosive'' as defined in 10 CFR 712.3, and any ``special nuclear material,'' hazardous ``source material,'' and hazardous ``byproduct material'' as those terms are defined by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014).
Secret means the security classification that is applied to DOE- generated information or material the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security.
Suspend means temporarily to withdraw an employee's access to information or materials protected under Sec. 709.3 of this part.
Sec. 709.3 Covered persons subject to a CI evaluation and polygraph.
(a) Mandatory CI evaluation. Except as provided in Sec. 709.5 of this part with regard to waivers, a CI evaluation, which may include a CI-scope polygraph examination, is required for any covered person in any category under paragraph (b) of this section who will have or has access to classified information or materials protected under this paragraph. Such an evaluation is required for covered persons who are incumbent employees at least once every five years. DOE, in its sole discretion, may require a CI-scope polygraph examination:
(3) With access to information that is protected within a non- intelligence Special Access Program (SAP) designated by the Secretary;
(6) Designated, with approval of the Secretary, on the basis of a risk
assessment consistent with paragraphs (e) and (f) of this section, by a Program Manager for the following DOE offices and programs (and any successors to those offices and programs): The Office of the Secretary; the Human Reliability Program; the National Nuclear Security Administration (including the Office of Emergency Operations); and the Office of Health, Safety and Security.
(c) Random CI evaluation. Except as provided in Sec. 709.5 of this part with regard to waivers, DOE may require a CI evaluation, including a CI-scope polygraph examination, of covered persons who are incumbent employees selected on a random basis from the following:
(1) All covered persons identified in Sec. 709.3(b);
(d) Specific incident polygraph examinations. In response to specific facts or circumstances with potential counterintelligence implications with a defined foreign nexus, the Director of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (or, in the case of a covered person in NNSA, the Administrator of NNSA, after consideration of the recommendation of the Director, Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence) may require a covered person with access to DOE classified information or materials to consent to and take an event- specific polygraph examination. Except as otherwise determined by the Secretary, on the recommendation of the appropriate Program Manager, if a covered person with access to DOE classified information or materials refuses to consent to or take a polygraph examination under this paragraph, then the Director of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (or, in the case of a covered person in NNSA, the Administrator of NNSA, after consideration of the recommendation of the Director, Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence) shall direct the denial of access (if any) to classified information and materials protected under paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section, and shall refer the matter to the Office of Health, Safety and Security for a review of access authorization eligibility under 10 CFR part 710. In addition, in the circumstances described in this paragraph, any covered person with access to DOE classified information or material may request a polygraph examination.
Sec. 709.4 Notification of a CI evaluation.
(a) If a polygraph examination is scheduled, DOE must notify the covered person, in accordance with Sec. 709.21 of this part.
(b) Any job announcement or posting with respect to any position with access to classified information or materials protected under Sec. 709.3(b) and (c) of this part should indicate that DOE may condition the selection of an individual for the position (709.3(b)) or retention in that position (709.3(b) and (c)) upon his or her successful completion of a CI evaluation, including a CI-scope polygraph examination.
(c) Advance notice will be provided to the affected Program Manager and laboratory/site/facility director of the covered persons who are included in any random examinations that are administered in accordance with provisions at Sec. 709.3(c).
Sec. 709.5 Waiver of polygraph examination requirements.
(a) General. Upon a waiver request submitted under paragraph (b) of this section, DOE may waive the CI-scope polygraph examination under Sec. 709.3 of this part for:
(c) Disposition of Waiver Requests. The Director, Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, shall issue a written decision on a request for waiver prior to the administration of a polygraph examination. The Director shall obtain the concurrence of the Secretary in his or her decision on a request for waiver under Sec. 709.5(a)(3) and shall obtain the concurrence of the
Administrator of NNSA in a decision on a waiver request from an NNSA covered person under Sec. 709.5(a)(1) and Sec. 709.5(a)(2). Notification of approval of a waiver request will contain information regarding the duration of the waiver and any other relevant information. Notification of the denial of a waiver request will state the basis for the denial and state that the covered person may request reconsideration of the denial by the Secretary under Sec. 709.5(d).
Subpart B--CI Evaluation Protocols and Protection of National Security
Sec. 709.10 Scope of a counterintelligence evaluation.
A counterintelligence evaluation consists of a counterintelligence- based review of the covered person's personnel security file and review of other relevant information available to DOE in accordance with applicable guidelines and authorities. As provided in Sec. 709.3(b), DOE also may require a CI-scope polygraph examination. As provided for in Sec. 709.3(c), a CI evaluation, if conducted on a random basis, will include a CI-scope polygraph examination. As set forth in Sec. 709.15(b) and (c) of this part, a counterintelligence evaluation may also include other pertinent measures to address and resolve counterintelligence issues in accordance with Executive Order 12333, the DOE ``Procedures for Intelligence Activities,'' and other relevant laws, guidelines and authorities, as applicable.
Sec. 709.11 Topics within the scope of a polygraph examination.
Sec. 709.12 Defining polygraph examination questions.
Sec. 709.13 Implications of refusal to take a polygraph examination.
(a) Subject to Sec. 709.14 of this part, a covered person may refuse to take a polygraph examination pursuant to Sec. 709.3 of this part, and a covered person being examined may terminate the examination at any time.
(b) If a covered person terminates a polygraph examination prior to the completion of the examination, DOE may treat that termination as a refusal to complete a CI evaluation under Sec. 709.14 of this part.
Sec. 709.14 Consequences of a refusal to complete a CI evaluation including a polygraph examination.
(b) If a covered person is an incumbent employee in an identified position subject to a CI evaluation including a polygraph examination under Sec. 709.3(b), (c), or (d), and the covered person refuses to complete a CI evaluation, DOE and its contractors must deny that covered person access to classified information and materials protected under Sec. 709.3(b) and (c) and may take other actions consistent with the denial of access, including administrative review of access authorization under 10 CFR part 710. If the covered person is a DOE employee, DOE may reassign or realign the DOE employee's duties, or take other action, consistent with that denial of access and applicable personnel regulations.
Sec. 709.15 Processing counterintelligence evaluation results.
(a) If the reviews under Sec. 709.10 or a polygraph examination present unresolved foreign nexus issues that raise significant questions about the covered person's access to classified information or materials protected under Sec. 709.3 of this part that justified the counterintelligence evaluation, DOE may undertake a more comprehensive CI evaluation that, in appropriate circumstances, may include evaluation of financial, credit, travel, and other relevant information to resolve any identified issues. Participation by Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence personnel in any such evaluation is subject to Executive Order 12333, the DOE ``Procedures for Intelligence Activities,'' and other relevant laws, guidelines, and authorities as may be applicable with respect to such matters.
(e) Utilizing the DOE security criteria in 10 CFR part 710, the Director, Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, makes a determination whether a covered person completing a CI evaluation has made disclosures that warrant referral, as appropriate, to the Office of Health, Safety and Security or the Manager of the applicable DOE/ NNSA Site, Operations Office or Service Center.
Sec. 709.16 Application of Counterintelligence Evaluation Review Boards in reaching conclusions regarding CI evaluations.
(c) Process. When making a final recommendation under Sec. 709.17 of this part, to a Program Manager, the Director of Intelligence and Counterintelligence shall report on the Counterintelligence Evaluation Review Board's views, including any consensus recommendation, or if the members are divided, a summary of majority and dissenting views.
Sec. 709.17 Final disposition of CI evaluation findings and recommendations.
Subpart C--Safeguarding Privacy and Employee Rights
Sec. 709.21 Requirements for notification of a polygraph examination.
Sec. 709.22 Right to counsel or other representation.
(b) A covered person has the right to consult with legal counsel or another representative at any time during an interview conducted in accordance with Sec. 709.15 of this part.
Sec. 709.23 Obtaining consent to a polygraph examination.
(a) Notifies the covered person of the polygraph examination in writing in accordance with Sec. 709.21 of this part; and
Sec. 709.24 Other information provided to a covered person prior to a polygraph examination.
Sec. 709.25 Limits on use of polygraph examination results that reflect ``Significant Response'' or ``No Opinion''.
(a) Take an adverse personnel action against a covered person or make an adverse access recommendation solely on the basis of a polygraph examination result of ``significant response'' or ``no opinion''; or
(b) Use a polygraph examination that reflects ``significant response'' or ``no opinion'' as a substitute for any other required investigation.
Sec. 709.26 Protection of confidentiality of CI evaluation records to include polygraph examination records and other pertinent documentation.
(c) DOE must afford the full privacy protection provided by law to information regarding a covered
person's refusal to participate in a CI evaluation to include a polygraph examination and the completion of other pertinent documentation.
Subpart D--Polygraph Examination and Examiner Standards
Sec. 709.31 DOE standards for polygraph examiners and polygraph examinations.
(2) The examiner must have a favorably adjudicated single-scope background investigation, complete a CI-scope polygraph examination, and must hold a ``Q'' access authorization, which is necessary for access to Secret Restricted Data and Top Secret National Security Information. In addition, he or she must have been granted SCI access approval.
Sec. 709.32 Training requirements for polygraph examiners.
PART 710--CRITERIA AND PROCEDURES FOR DETERMINING ELIGIBILITY FOR ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED MATTER OR SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL
0 2. The authority citation for part 710 is revised to read as follows:
0 3. Section 710.6 is amended by re-designating paragraph (a) as paragraph (a)(1) and by adding at the end of re-designated paragraph (a)(1) a new paragraph (a)(2) to read as follows:
Sec. 710.6 Cooperation by the individual.
(2) It is the responsibility of an individual subject to Sec. 709.3(d) to consent to and take an event-specific polygraph examination. A refusal to consent to or take such an examination may prevent DOE from reaching an affirmative finding required for continuing access authorization. In this event, DOE may suspend or terminate any access authorization. * * * * * [FR Doc. E6-16049 Filed 9-28-06; 8:45 am]