Source: http://iccforum.com/forum/oversight
Timestamp: 2017-10-20 05:17:44
Document Index: 405854101

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art. 87', 'art. 38', 'art. 43', 'art. 46', 'art. 112', 'art. 40', 'art. 53', 'art. 53', 'art. 54', 'art. 67', 'art. 31', 'art. 31', 'art. 40', 'art. 42', 'art. 42', 'art. 42', 'art. 112', 'art. 43', 'art. 15', 'art. 17', 'art. 1', 'art. 46', 'art. 42']

The Oversight Question — Comments | International Criminal Court Forum
The Oversight Question — Comments
There are two dominant theories that inform the current debate. The first theory focuses on agency costs, while the second makes the concept of trusteeship the focal point of the analysis. In this essay, I will argue that the agency framework is not appropriate in the context of the ICC.
Under the trusteeship model, trustees are actors who are given authority to make meaningful decisions according to their own best judgment and professionalism on behalf of a beneficiary. The trustee is usually chosen based on their personal and/or professional reputation.1 Unlike traditional agents, trustees are not expected to strictly act in line with recommendations by the principal who delegated authority to them. Rather, trustees have what is termed “rational-legal authority” or “expert authority.” Rational-legal authority refers to the notion of a disinterested trustee who follows pre-existing rules and procedural justice in his/her decisions, while expert authority means that the trustee may have specialized knowledge. Principals delegate to trustees in order “to capture the benefits of the trustee’s decision-making reputation and/or to remove the taint of “politics” as shaping trustee decision-making.”2
Global interdependence has brought about a situation, however, where States often consider it beneficial to relinquish some degree of their autonomy and delegate to international institutions.3 This is particularly relevant in the international criminal law arena where the apprehension and prosecution of suspected war criminals requires a high level of inter-state cooperation.
The ICC Prosecutor may be viewed as a “trustee” of the parties to the Rome Statute . The ICC Prosecutor brings with him personal and professional authority and exercises a certain degree of discretional authority.4 Under the trusteeship model, there is a presumption in favor of prosecutorial independence over control by the Member States.
This has a number of important consequences. First, for any mechanism to actively interfere with the functioning of the ICC Prosecutor would amount to States’ reneging on their primary commitment to the independence and authority of the ICC. Second, justice cannot be administered except under conditions of freedom from special interests whether national, economic or otherwise. Subjecting the ICC Prosecutor to excessive oversight from Member nations and special interest groups creates a substantial risk that such conditions would be inherently undermined. To expect Prosecutors to maintain objectivity and independence in the face of such constraints is highly unrealistic. The ICC Prosecutor must have a considerable degree of autonomy to carry out his or her functions. It is perhaps difficult for States to allow such autonomy from the perspective of their own particular short-term interests. However, if international justice is truly their aim, no less can be expected of them. The Prosecutor is not an agent of politics but an agent of international justice. Justice should stand in opposition to politics and power.
Under the agency framework, the relationship between the ICC and the States which created the Court under the Rome Statute is conceptualized as a principal-agent relationship. The States act as the principal in this context and confer some of their powers onto the ICC. The ICC, on the other hand, undertakes to act on behalf of the States.
Because the relationship is defined as a principal-agent relationship, it is presumed that the States must exercise a certain degree of control over the agent. Control “is generally recognized as being an essential element of an agency relationship.”5 Owing to the risk of “agency costs”—i.e. the risk that the ICC may act more broadly than intended and exceed the powers conferred on it by the Member States—there is a need to create various mechanisms to mitigate such costs. The theory holds that States should be reluctant to grant broad powers to the institutions they set up given the possibility that such institutions may take on a life on their own and transform themselves into disloyal agents. Moreover, the States should seek to impose “monitoring constraints” to reign in the institutions they established.
Existing Accountability Mechanisms
The powers of the ICC Prosecutor are delineated in the Rome Statute . The Rome Statute provides that the Prosecutor is responsible for examining information on crimes, conducting investigations and prosecutions before the Court. This is stipulated in Article 42(1) of the Statute. The Prosecutor has “full authority over the management and administration of the Office, including the staff, facilities and other resources thereof.”6 The ICC Prosecutor must act independently when receiving referrals or information on crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC. This obligation also extends to Deputy Prosecutors who are authorized to act on behalf of the Prosecutor and whose function is to assist the Prosecutor. Both the Prosecutor and Deputy Prosecutor must be of a high moral character, as required by Article 42(3) of the Rome Statute . Article 42(3) expressly provides that the “Prosecutor and the Deputy Prosecutors shall be persons of high moral character, be highly competent in and have extensive practical experience …”7
Article 40(2) addresses the question of judicial independence, stating that “judges shall not engage in any activity which is likely to interfere with their judicial functions or to affect confidence in their independence.” The equivalent of Article 40(2) is Article 42(5) which applies to the Prosecutor. Article 42(5) states that: “Neither the Prosecutor nor a Deputy Prosecutor shall engage in any activity which is likely to interfere with his or her prosecutorial functions or to affect confidence in his or her independence.” Thus, the language of Article 20(2) and Article 42(5) is virtually identical, which suggests that the Rome Statute imposes the same standards of independence on both judges and the Prosecutor and Deputy Prosecutors. The Prosecutor is an officer of the Court and, like a judge, the Prosecutor must be impartial in the exercise of his powers and functions. Article 42(7) further states:
Neither the Prosecutor nor a Deputy Prosecutor shall participate in any matter in which their impartiality might reasonably be doubted on any ground. They shall be disqualified from a case in accordance with this paragraph if, inter alia, they have previously been involved in any capacity in that case before the Court or in a related criminal case at the national level involving the person being investigated or prosecuted.8
Article 42(7) is a stringent provision. Its primary objective is to remove the possibility of the Prosecutor acting as a self-interested, opportunistic and politically-motivated party.
The Prosecutor is also accountable to the ICC Assembly of States Parties. Article 42(4) of the Rome Statute states as follows:
The Prosecutor shall be elected by secret ballot by an absolute majority of the members of the Assembly of States Parties. The Deputy Prosecutors shall be elected in the same way from a list of candidates provided by the Prosecutor. The Prosecutor shall nominate three candidates for each position of Deputy Prosecutor to be filled. Unless a shorter term is decided upon at the time of their election, the Prosecutor and the Deputy Prosecutors shall hold office for a term of nine years and shall not be eligible for re-election.9
Article 42(4) was inserted into to the Rome Statue to ensure that the Prosecutor and the Deputy Prosecutors would act for a limited time and carry out their function with utmost regard to their prosecutorial functions and independence. Article 42(4) is supported by Article 46(1) which deals with the removal of judges, the Prosecutor and Deputy Prosecutors. The Article states:
A judge, the Prosecutor, a Deputy Prosecutor, the Registrar or the Deputy Registrar shall be removed from office if a decision to this effect is made in accordance with paragraph 2, in cases where that person: (a) Is found to have committed serious misconduct or a serious breach of his or her duties under this Statute, as provided for in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence; or (b) Is unable to exercise the functions required by this Statute.10
The provision operates in conjunction with Article 46(2) which provides:
A decision as to the removal from office of a judge, the Prosecutor or a Deputy Prosecutor under paragraph 1 shall be made by the Assembly of States Parties, by secret ballot: (a) In the case of a judge, by a two-thirds majority of the States Parties upon a recommendation adopted by a two-thirds majority of the other judges; (b) In the case of the Prosecutor, by an absolute majority of the States Parties; (c) In the case of a Deputy Prosecutor, by an absolute majority of the States Parties upon the recommendation of the Prosecutor.11
Finally, the Prosecutor is accountable to the States themselves. The ICC is dependent on states to carry out its functions. The ICC Prosecutor is particularly dependent on states when carrying out investigations. Article 86 of the Rome Statute states: “States Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Statute, cooperate fully with the Court in its investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court. However, the legal consequence of non-compliance with requests from the ICC is rather weak. Art. 87(7) of the Rome Statute provides:
Where a State Party fails to comply with a request to cooperate by the Court contrary to the provisions of this Statute, thereby preventing the Court from exercising its functions and powers under this Statute, the Court may make a finding to that effect and refer the matter to the Assembly of States Parties or, where the Security Council referred the matter to the Court, to the Security Council.12
State Parties can deny requests for assistance, either wholly or partly. They are not responsible for the production of any documents or disclosure of evidence which relates to their “national security.” The concept of national security is arguably broad, and many requests could be denied under this rubric. The Rome Statute gives the States wide discretion in their dealings with the ICC Prosecutor. The States can use these discretions to influence the Prosecutor and ultimately hold him accountable to them. Moreover, States can intervene to remove a case from the ICC. They can also act to limit financial assistance provided to the ICC.
Viewing the ICC as an agent of its Member States implies that certain control measures are appropriate. However, the principal-agent framework does not provide a precise answer as to what degree of control is appropriate, although it may be argued that the theory supports a high degree of control given the focus of the theory on agency costs.
It is highly questionable whether the relationship between the ICC and its Member States should be viewed as a classical principal-agent relationship. There is a presumption in international law against the creation of principal-agent relationships between international organizations and their Member States. As Sarooshi notes:
When Member States ratify a constituent treaty that confers powers on an organization they are consenting thereby to the organization exercising the power in question, but they are not necessarily consenting to the organization exercising the power on their behalf (as an agent) such that it can change their legal rights and obligations.13
This presumption, however, can be displaced if there is evidence of de facto agency.14 The notion of de facto agency may be defined as “control being exercised by Member States over an organization which is outside the confines of the decision-making processes of the organization.”15
The theory, when applied to the ICC, would seem to suggest that the general presumption holds and is thus not rebutted. States, acting collectively through the ICC Assembly of the States, can exercise some control over the ICC, but they are constrained in the sense that they cannot interfere with the decision making processes of the Court and the Prosecutor itself. The ICC has been established with a clear mandate and is obligated to act independently of the States in pursuit of this mandate. This mandate is clearly spelled out in Article 1 of the Rome Statute which says that the ICC is a permanent institution that is created with the purpose of exercising jurisdiction over persons “for the most serious crimes of international concern.”16
The ICC is a separate juridical person from the Member States. This is reinforced by Article 4(1) of the Rome Statute which states that the “Court shall have international legal personality. It shall also have such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfillment of its purposes.”17 Further, the Article states that the “Court may exercise its functions and powers, as provided in this Statute, on the territory of any State Party and, by special agreement, on the territory of any other State.”18 Hence, the Court must act in accordance with this mandate and is not obliged to act in conformity with the interests of a particular Member State or groups of Member States.
It is inappropriate to view the Rome Statute as a principal-agent contract between the ICC and the Member States. “The relationships … [created by the Treaty] are not those of partners or of principal and agent but of an organization and its members.”19 I have argued in this essay that a better view is to conceptualize the ICC Prosecutor as a trustee of the States rather than an agent. The terms of the trusteeship are clearly set out in the Rome Statute , and the ICC Prosecutor is subject to a wide range of constraints which render the imposition of additional oversight mechanisms largely obsolete. By signing the Rome Statute , the Member States have impliedly consented to be bound by the actions of the ICC, including the ICC Prosecutor. Moreover, the States have stipulated a range of measures in the Rome Statute to reduce the risk of agency costs. These measures are extensive and sufficient to reduce agency costs. States are only bound by the actions of the international bodies such as the ICC because they have consented to grant authority to them.
Karen Alter, Agents or Trustees? International Courts in Their Political Context, European Journal of International Relations 14 (1) 2008: 33-63. (Alternate PDF Version, Sage Journals paywall, SSRN paywall) ↩
Id. 7. ↩
Oona A. Hathaway, “International Delegation and State Sovereignty,” 71 Law and Contemp. Probs. 115, (Winter 2008). (PDF Version, SSRN paywall) ↩
Alter, supra note 1, at 7. ↩
Dan Sarooshi, Some Preliminary Remarks on the Conferral by States of Powers on International Organizations (2003, Jean Monnet Working Paper 4/03) available online (last accessed April 22, 2011). ↩
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, July 17 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9 [hereinafter cited as Rome Statute ], Article 42(2). ↩
Id., Article 42(3). ↩
Id., Article 42(7). ↩
Id., Article 42(4). ↩
Id., Article 46(1). ↩
Id., Article 46(2). ↩
Id., Article 87(7). ↩
Sarooshi, supra note 5, at 50. ↩
Rome Statute , supra note 6, Article 1. ↩
Id., Article 4(1). ↩
Id., Article 4(2). ↩
Maclaine Watson v. International Tin Council, Chancery Division, [1989] Ch. 253, 257. ↩
During the Ninth Session of the Assembly of States Parties (“ASP”), the Independent Oversight Mechanism (“IOM”) became operationalized in its investigative function. However, the IOM, as it is currently structured, would be redundant in light of existing institutional checks in the International Criminal Court (“ICC”).
The IOM’s functions are outlined broadly by the Rome Statute and more specifically by the operational mandate established by the Assembly of States Parties. The IOM’s mandate describes three general functions: investigation, evaluation, and inspection. The investigative function was operationalized in December 2010 while the evaluation and inspection functions are currently in the planning phases. Part II of this comment will discuss the existing oversight structures and Part III will consider what the investigative function of the IOM could contribute when incorporated to the current framework. Lastly, Part IV will analyze the possibilities of the prospective evaluation and inspection function.
II. Existing Oversight Infrastructure
Under the existing oversight infrastructure, investigation of misconduct allegations are not specifically delineated but disciplinary actions are—presumably, investigations are part of these disciplinary processes. The Rome Statute provides the overall framework for oversight while its implementing instruments provide more specific provisions.
For misconduct by staff members1, the Rome Statute grants broad authority to the heads of each organ over their respective staff members. Article 42 states that, “[t]he Prosecutor shall have full authority over the management and administration of the Office [of the Prosecutor], including the staff, facilities and other resources thereof.”2 Outside the Office of the Prosecutor, the Presidency is in charge of the administration of the Court3 with the Registrar acting at the principal administrative officer.4 The Staff Regulations, adopted by the ASP under Resolution ICC-ASP/2/Res. 2 , detail the duties of the staff and disciplinary measures for violations of those duties. In line with articles 42 and 43, the Staff Regulations grant the Registrar and the Prosecutor the authority to “establish administrative machinery” for disciplinary cases5 and impose disciplinary sanctions for their respective staffs.6 As such, the Organs already have mechanisms in place for examining allegations of misconduct and administering disciplinary sanctions.
In regards to elected officials (judges, the Prosecutor, Deputy Prosecutors, the Registrar, and the Deputy Registrar), the Rome Statute provides several levels of disciplinary measures. Broadly speaking, all elected officials are held directly accountable by the ASP since the ASP elects them7 and can remove them by vote8 for acts of serious misconduct. For less serious offenses that do not merit removal from office, elected officials are subject to discipline under the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (“Rules”), as adopted by the ASP in Resolution ICC-ASP/1/Res.3 in accordance to article 47. Different officials are held accountable by different aspects of the Court. The Presidency handles disciplinary measures for judges, the Registrar and Deputy Registrar. The ASP determines such actions for the Prosecutor while the Prosecutor and the ASP jointly oversee the Deputy Prosecutor.9 Additionally, disciplinary measures for misconduct before the Court under article 71 are determined by the Presiding Judge.10 As such, officials are currently held accountable by various external disciplinary measures for different forms of misconduct.
III. Investigative Function of the IOM
Resolution ICC-ASP/9/Res.5 establishes the framework of the IOM’s investigative function. According to that resolution, the IOM has authority to investigate reports of “misconduct or serious misconduct, including possible unlawful acts by a judge, the Prosecutor, a Deputy Prosecutor, the Registrar and the Deputy Registrar […], all staff […] and all contractors and/or consultants.”11 “Misconduct”, also characterized as “unsatisfactory conduct,” is defined as “any act or omission by elected officials, staff members or contractors in violation of their obligations to the Court pursuant to the Rome Statute and its implementing instruments, Staff and Financial Regulations and Rules, relevant administrative issuances and contractual agreements […]”.12 By this definition, the IOM’s scope is limited to “misconduct” as characterized by existing documents. Thus, the IOM, at most, has the authority to investigate the same types of allegations that the current framework already allows and does not expand oversight in terms of breadth.
Furthermore, the IOM would not lead to deeper or more thorough investigations. In regards to misconduct by staff members and contractors, the existing institutional checks provide broad oversight through the Staff Regulations. IOM’s mandate is actually more limited in investigations than these current checks. The operational mandate states that the IOM “will not investigate contractual disputes or human resource management issues, including work performance, conditions of employment or personnel-related grievances.”13 For the allegations that the IOM does have authority over, the investigations would merely duplicate the organs’ own efforts during their disciplinary processes.
As stated in Part II, misconduct by elected officials is governed by the Rome Statute and the Rules. However, the interaction between those existing disciplinary mechanisms and the new IOM’s mandate is not entirely clear. An earlier draft of the operational mandate, Resolution ICC-ASP/8/Res.1 , stated that “the functions of the independent oversight mechanism shall replace the investigative role of the Presidency in respect of complaints received against elected officials.”14 This would mean that the Presidency would no longer investigate as part of their disciplinary process and would instead defer to the IOM. However, this language does not appear in the current operational mandate. Resolution ICC-ASP/9/Res.5 does state that the IOM “shall not affect the Presidency, Registrar or Prosecutor’s power to impose disciplinary measures pursuant to the relevant regulations and rules.”15 While, this provision does not directly relate to the investigative aspect of those disciplinary powers, it could imply that the Organs are not obligated to defer to the IOM’s findings and recommendations. Thus, the Organs would still investigate allegations of misconduct themselves. Since the IOM has not yet been tested in action, the operational mandate remains ambiguous as to whether the IOM is meant to entirely replace or merely supplement the investigative roles of the Organs.
If the IOM is meant to entirely replace the Court’s extant investigative capacity, then its investigative function would not be redundant. However, in execution, it would likely prove less effective than the current scheme. Again, the scope of the IOM mandate does not encompass all possible misconduct by elected officials. The mandate expressly excludes offenses under article 70 of the Rome Statute.16 As such, the Court would still need to retain some investigative capacity, creating a patchwork investigative system open to overlap and conflict. Additionally, IOM’s investigation processes would not improve on the current structure. At best, the IOM could receive the same information that the present institutional checks would receive. However, in practice, the IOM would likely receive less information since the independence of the IOM separates it from the Court. Routing information to an external body creates an extra layer of red tape. Furthermore, increased disclosures, especially to an external body, create a security risk for potentially confidential information. As such, information sharing may be more contested. Moreover, the Court is still responsible for the final disciplinary action; thus any results of IOM investigations still needs to be reported to the Court, creating an added layer of bureaucracy with no corresponding benefit.
If the IOM is meant to supplement the present investigation processes, then the IOM would be entirely redundant. The ASP did not mandate broader investigative authority to the IOM beyond what the organs are already capable of—the IOM would not have investigative capabilities in any greater breadth or depth. Introducing an external investigative body would only be relevant if the existing institutions have proven themselves wholly unable to execute the disciplinary framework and incapable of improvement. This has not been the case. These mechanisms were tested in the very first case when allegations arose that the Prosecutor wrongly withheld information from the defense in The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo . The institutional checks succeeded and sanctioned the Prosecutor for misconduct.17 The system again proved effective in investigating and disciplining the OTP when the Prosecutor failed to disclose identifying information regarding an intermediary.18
Since the current Court disciplinary mechanisms already encompass functional investigative capabilities, the IOM has limited value to the Organs. Arguably, the IOM could be valuable playing an investigative role for ASP actions—i.e. investigating elected officials for possible removal from office or determining disciplinary actions for the Prosecutor under the Rules. However, while the ASP undoubtedly needs an investigative mechanism in such situations, these cases do not arise often. If the IOM’s only unique contribution to the Court is to investigate these situations, it would not need to be established as a standing body. Such a set-up would be unwarranted and counter-productive as an unnecessary use of resources.
IV. Other Possible Functions of the IOM
The IOM does not contribute to the efficiency of the Court with only an investigative function. However, as noted in the opening, the ASP alluded to adding evaluation and inspection functions to the IOM’s mandate in Resolution ICC-ASP/8/Res.1 . These functions have not yet been operationalized and may never be operationalized. The ASP will consider this issue in the next Session.
If an evaluation and inspection function is activated, the IOM could improve the Court by assessing current Court practices or anticipated changes in Court practices and issuing advisory reports to the relevant Organ and/or the ASP. Such a function could prove beneficial in identifying problems and suggesting solutions for issues of efficiency in general daily practices and procedures. Presumably, Organs already contemplate efficiency concerns in enacting their protocols but the IOM would have a broader and more neutral view. The practical execution of such a function may create greater inefficiencies than it would yield since such assessments would require constant monitoring and considerable information-gathering. For such a function to be beneficial, the IOM would need to coordinate with existing bodies that have similar functions, such as the Audit Committee, and have a clearly defined and limited mandate. A well-tailored evaluation and inspection mandate could create a constructive and beneficial IOM.
The IOM’s goals of ensuring efficient oversight are laudable, but with the current mandate, the IOM’s investigative function is almost completely duplicative of existing oversight mechanisms. In practice, it would be at best redundant and at worst a new bureaucratic hurdle. However, if the ASP expands its functions to include evaluation and inspection, the IOM could prove to be a useful institution.
For the purposes of this comment, “staff” will refer to staff members under the terms of article 44 of the Rome Statute—namely, those appointed by the Prosecutor and the Registrar as required for their respective offices. ↩
Id. art. 38. ↩
Id. art. 43. ↩
Staff Regulations reg. 10.1, ICC-ASP/2/Res. 2 (Sept. 12, 2003). ↩
Id. reg. 10.2. ↩
Rome Statute , supra note 2, arts. 36, 42, 43. ↩
Id. art. 46. ↩
Rules of Procedure and Evidence r. 30, ICC-ASP/1/3 (Sept. 2002) [hereinafter Rules]. ↩
Id. rs. 170, 171. ↩
Independent Oversight Mechanism, Annex ¶ 2, ICC-ASP/9/Res.5 (Dec. 10, 2010). ↩
Id. fn. 2. ↩
Establishment of an independent oversight mechanism, Annex ¶ 10, ICC-ASP/8/Res.1 (Nov. 26, 2009). ↩
Resolution ICC-ASP/9/Res.5 , supra note 11, Annex ¶ 19. ↩
Id. ¶ 6. Article 70 pertains to offenses against the administration of justice, such as present false evidence. Article 71 is about misconduct before the Court, such as disrupting proceedings. Rome Statute arts. 70, 71. Because the same conduct can be both an article 70 and 71 offense, this exception to the IOM mandate creates another area of ambiguity. The Rules of Procedure and Evidence state that if such an overlap exists under both articles 70 and 71, the Court is to proceed according to the Rules for an article 70 offense only. Rules r.172. The mandate does not state whether the IOM will defer to this rule or proceed with its parallel investigation as an offense under article 71. Another possibility is that the ASP will modify the Rules to better incorporate the IOM. ↩
Press Release, ICC, Trial Chamber Imposes a Stay on the Proceedings of the Case Against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, (Jun. 18, 2008). ↩
Press Release, ICC, The Appeals Chamber Reversed the Decisions to Stay Proceedings and to Release Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, (Oct. 08, 2010) ↩
The creation of the Independent Oversight Mechanism (IOM) presents a new set of challenges and opportunities for the International Criminal Court (ICC). In order to capitalize on the benefits that the IOM may be able to provide, the Assembly of States Parties (ASP) must ensure that it is built upon a solid foundation: a properly tailored mandate. The Rome Statute provision that allowed the ASP to create the IOM, Article 112(4), dictates that its objective must be to enhance the “efficiency and economy” of the court.1 Thus, the mandate must be limited to matters closely linked to that objective, and more specifically, to a reading of the phrase that does not allow the IOM to interfere, through investigation or reporting, with the substantive legal decisions made by the organs of the court.2
Three separate reasons necessitate this limited mandate. First, the Rome Statute itself lays the groundwork for an IOM that plays no role in the legal decision making processes of the court’s organs. On top of the limitations imposed by the “efficiency and economy” language, the Statute contains additional structural elements that require a restricted mandate. Article 42 lays out the requirement of independence for the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP), and Article 40 does the same for Chambers.3 A bureaucratic body with the ability to review legal decisions would go against the strong structural emphasis on independence built into the Rome Statute .
A second argument for a limited mandate is found in the distinct goals of the IOM and two of the ICC’s organs, Chambers and OTP. While the IOM is designed to improve the efficiency and economy of the ICC, judges and prosecutors must have the interests of justice in mind when they make substantive legal decisions.4 These goals could potentially come into conflict in a variety of situations, and good policy dictates that the interests of justice must be given primacy. Restricting the IOM’s ability to interfere in the “justice” decisions of the court would eliminate this problem.
An IOM with an overbroad mandate poses a threat to confidential information as well. If the IOM were allowed to look into all decisions made by the various organs of the court, new challenges regarding the protection of sensitive information would be created. For all of these reasons, the IOM mandate must be restricted to powers in line with improving the efficiency and economy of the court, read narrowly.
I. The Current IOM Mandate Allows Interference in Legal Decision-Making
As it currently drafted, the IOM mandate could permit major interference with substantive legal decisions. Resolution ICC-ASP/9/Res.5, establishing the Independent Oversight Mechanism (IOM), charges the organization with “receiving and investigating” possible acts of misconduct.5 This mandate seems narrow enough, until one examines the definition of misconduct provided in footnote 2. Misconduct is equated to “unsatisfactory conduct”, and includes “any act or omission by elected officials, staff members or contractors in violation of their obligations to the Court pursuant to the Rome Statute and its implementing instruments.”6
So what are the obligations to the Court of various staff and elected officials? And how might an act or omission be considered a violation of those obligations? The IOM is still in its infancy, so with no institutional precedent to examine, we must instead look to the Rome Statute for answers. Unsurprisingly, the Statute is full of provisions that create obligations for Court personnel. For the purposes of this comment, I will point out three linked to substantive legal decisions that the Prosecutor must make on a regular basis: initiating an investigation, what to cover in an investigation, and what evidence to share with the defense.
Article 53(1) states that the Prosecutor “shall” initiate an investigation unless he determines that there is no reasonable basis to proceed.7 This creates an obligation for the Prosecutor: when he determines that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation, he must proceed (unless it is not in the interests of justice, a separate substantive decision.)8 As the IOM mandate stands now, a complaint about the Prosecutor’s failure to launch a specific investigation could trigger an investigation into whether there was a reasonable basis to proceed, thereby second guessing his legal decision.
After initiating an investigation, Article 54 states that the Prosecutor “shall....extend the investigation to cover all facts and evidence relevant to an assessment of whether there is criminal responsibility under this Statute, and, in doing so, investigate incriminating and exonerating circumstances equally.”9 Again, an obligation is created for the Prosecutor that would pave the way for IOM review of his or her decisions. In conducting an investigation, the Prosecutor may disregard a body of evidence after coming to the conclusion that it is legally insignificant to the case being built. But if the IOM were to receive a complaint about this decision, it could question the Prosecutor’s decision on the grounds that this evidence is relevant.
The final example pertains to the evidence sharing process known as discovery in U.S. courts. Article 67(2) dictates that the Prosecutor shall “disclose to the defence evidence in the Prosecutor’s possession or control which he or she believes shows or tends to show the innocence of the accused, or to mitigate the guilt of the accused, or which may affect the credibility of prosecution evidence.”10 This is a legal decision in which the Prosecutor must consider the evidence in light of the case at hand in order to determine if it meets any of these criteria. It would be simple enough for defense lawyers to complain to the IOM that relevant evidence was not shared, an omission in violation of the Article 67(2) obligation. This would then allow the IOM to review the Prosecutor’s entire case and rationale for non-disclosure.
The above examples are just a small subset of ways in which the current IOM mandate would allow interference in substantive legal decisions. With the possibility of interference established, my analysis can now turn to the reasons why it must be prevented.
II. Treaty Limitations
The first reason that the IOM mandate must be modified is the most straightforward: the Rome Statute does not provide support for its current powers. Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) states that a treaty shall be interpreted “in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”11 There is no context in Article 112 with which to interpret “efficiency and economy”, which leaves us with two questions: What is the object and purpose of the Rome Statute and how does it shape the ordinary meaning of “efficiency and economy”?
Article 31(2) of the VCLT allows us to examine the entire text and preamble of the treaty in order to determine its object and purpose.12 Language like “ending impunity” and “must not go unpunished” found in several lines of the preamble tells us that furthering justice in the international system is the primary goal of the court.13 However, it is the final line of the Rome Statute ’s preamble that is the most telling. The drafters of the Statute were “resolved to guarantee lasting respect for and the enforcement of international justice.”14
The Rome Statute also contains important structural elements that highlight the furtherance of justice as its primary object and purpose. Paramount among these is the focus on independence for Chambers and OTP. Article 40(1) states that “judges shall be independent in the performance of their functions.”15 Article 42(1) does the same for the Prosecutor.16 The importance of independence is also evident in the provisions demanding the recusal or dismissal of judges or Prosecutors acting in cases where they have a conflict of interest.17 In fact, Article 42(5) goes beyond traditional conflict of interest concerns, and forbids the Prosecutor or Deputy Prosecutor from engaging in any activity likely “to affect confidence in his or her independence.”18 The need for these provisions is obvious in light of the Court’s purpose of furthering justice; judges and prosecutors must be free of outside influence in order to make legal decisions based on the merits alone.
The Court’s primary objective and the structural elements of the Rome Statute designed to further it place important limitations on the meaning of “efficiency and economy” as read in Article 112(4). The ordinary meaning of this phrase is tied to the costs of the Court, internal administrative processes, and other factors that have an effect on productivity, such as procedural and budgetary auditing. The expansion of Commerce Clause powers in the U.S. Constitution demonstrates how far similar language can be stretched however, and there are arguments that could expand “efficiency and economy” into all areas of the Court’s work.19 This is where the aforementioned limitations come into play. The Court’s object and purpose of justice and related requirement of independence restricts the ordinary meaning of the statute to those areas that do not deal with substantive legal decisions. Thus, the Rome Statute requires an IOM mandate based firmly around a narrow reading of enhancing “efficiency and economy.”
As the mandate stands now, the IOM may read “efficiency and economy” as broadly as it likes. Reform is required to bring the mandate in line with the standards created by the language and structure of the Rome Statute .
III. Bureaucratic Review of the Court’s Legal Processes is Not in the Interests of Justice
In addition to the treaty based restraints on the IOM mandate, policy grounds also call for reform. The previous section established the object and purpose of the Rome Statute and the ordinary meaning of “efficiency and economy” in order to highlight the disconnect between the current IOM mandate and that envisaged by the Rome Statute . These two concepts also introduce a second problem with the current mandate: it risks conflict between the distinct objectives of the IOM and those of Chambers and OTP. Allowing the IOM, with its “efficiency and economy” concerns, to review the legal decisions of OTP and Chambers, who base their decisions on the interests of justice, will lead to unnecessary organizational friction.
For this very reason, successful domestic criminal justice systems do not possess bureaucratic oversight agencies with authority over legal decisions.20 Whether in the U.S. or Venezuela, prosecutors do not worry about an IOM criticizing their decision to proceed with a trial because it would too expensive or time consuming.21 So why shouldn’t the interests of justice enjoy the same manner of primacy at the ICC? The answer can be found in the following framing: When founding an international court designed to end impunity and bring war criminals and human rights violators to justice, upon what should the staff of the court base their legal decisions? “Efficiency and economy” or the interests of justice?
Good policy dictates a limited role for the IOM. What happens if the example dealing with the scope of investigation from Section II is flipped? This time, the Prosecutor chooses to dedicate investigatory resources to a body of evidence because doing so is important to victim advocacy groups, though it is unnecessary to prove criminal responsibility in light of other available facts. If the IOM chooses to investigate on the grounds that resources were inefficiently utilized, it would be second guessing a legal decision made by the Prosecutor in the interest of justice. Who should triumph here? Though it may be more expensive and time consuming to do so, the Prosecutor may decide that in the interests of justice the investigation should include evidence of great import to the victims. There is no reason to have an oversight body investigate and report on substantive legal decisions if objections raised on efficiency grounds may be overruled by the interests of justice. Yet no one is likely to suggest that the roles be reversed and the IOM’s objectives should become paramount. Thus, the problem should be avoided altogether by reforming the IOM’s mandate in a way that prevents it from investigating and reporting on substantive legal decisions. Without modification of the mandate, the possibility of future objectives-based conflicts will remain.
IV. Risk to Confidentiality
An IOM mandate that permits investigations into any perceived violation of Rome Statute obligations, legal decisions included, will require complete access to information. Resolution ICC-ASP/9/Res.5 attempted to address this by applying the same standards of confidentiality that bind OTP and other court staff to the IOM.22 Yet, if the IOM mandate were restricted to the areas that the Rome Statute and policy consideration demand, little sharing of sensitive information would be necessary. The more that information must change hands, and the more hands it ends up in, the greater the chance that sensitive case facts or victim details could be leaked.
The current IOM mandate, by allowing for interference in legal decision making, oversteps the objectives laid out for it in the Rome Statute , poses a risk to institutional harmony, and presents confidentiality concerns. However, this is not to say that the IOM must be scrapped altogether. Reforming the mandate so that it does not allow for interference in legal decision making would be relatively straightforward. If the ASP were to add a clause to the IOM’s investigative function that specifically delineates the Rome Statute obligations (only those tied to “efficiency and economy” read narrowly) that the IOM can investigate, these problems can be avoided. Alternatively, the ASP can add a clause that lists the obligations tied to substantive legal decision making that the IOM cannot investigate in any circumstances. This comment provides a small sampling of such obligations that would be included on such a list. Either of these solutions would resolve the potential problems highlighted in this comment while still preserving the potentially beneficial functions of the IOM.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, July 17 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9 [hereinafter cited as Rome Statute ], at art. 112(4). ↩
I am not arguing that review of legal decisions is unnecessary, only that it should remain solely within the judicial organs of the court, and in rare cases, the ASP. Between Pre-Trial Chambers, Trial Chambers, Appellate Chambers, The Presidency, the Prosecutor, and the ASP, there are already enough review mechanisms in place for legal decisions. For a more complete discussion of this argument, see Grace Lo’s comment. ↩
Rome Statute , supra note 1, at art. 40 and 42. ↩
See id., at art. 53, 55, 61, 65, 67 (each article referencing importance of “interests of justice” in different contexts). ↩
Rome Statute , supra note 1, at art. 53(1). ↩
Id., at art. 54(1)a. ↩
Id., at art. 67(2). ↩
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, at art. 31(1). ↩
Id., at art. 31(2). ↩
Rome Statute , supra note 1, Preamble, at para. 4 and 5. ↩
Id., at para. 11. ↩
Id., at art. 40(1). ↩
Id., at art. 42(1). ↩
Id., at art. 42(5)(6)(7) and 41(2). ↩
Id., at art. 42(5) ↩
Returning to the example from Section II, would opening a new investigation (with reasonable basis) spread OTP resources too thin and have a negative impact on other ongoing activities? This possible scenario, along with many others, highlights the presence of both efficiency and justice concerns in commonplace legal decisions. ↩
See Bureau of Justice Statistics, for a compilation of summaries and statistics on 45 domestic criminal justice systems worldwide, available online. ↩
Instead, change comes in the form of checks within the judicial system (i.e. U.S. courts suppress evidence that police have obtained in violation of certain rights) or through legislative action. ↩
Resolution ICC-ASP/9/Res.5 , supra note 5, para. 17. ↩
The IOM may not be needed for financial supervision or administrative management of the ICC, but it would be significantly beneficial to the Court for oversight of misconduct and making recommendations to the ASP.
I. Financial Supervision
Past international tribunals are probative in distilling the need for financial supervision. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) was widely criticized for spending vast sums of money to conduct very few trials2 while the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”) suffered from an inept fiscal infrastructure.3 For example, the ICTR “had no accounting system and could not produce allotment reports, so that neither the Registry nor United Nations Headquarters had budget expenditure information.”4 The need for financial oversight is heightened for the ICC because it is a permanent tribunal, which brings with it permanent costs and a constant need to justify its existence.5 This is because “[n]o international—or federal, for that matter—organization has decreased its size or mandate without being forced to sunset or make drastic cuts. Some official is always finding more to do, and this will be the particular case for an organization that sees itself as the arbiter of international justice.”6 A supervisory body could help prevent serious financial missteps from occurring.
Under Article 112(4) of the Rome Statute , the ASP “may establish such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary, including an independent oversight mechanism for inspection, evaluation and investigation of the Court, in order to enhance its efficiency and economy.”7 While it is true that a subsidiary body like the IOM could fulfill the need for fiscal oversight, the ICC has already established such supervisory bodies. The Office of Internal Audit (“OIA”), which is part of the Registry of the ICC, is charged with providing “the heads of organs of the Court with objective and timely information about the Court’s internal controls, management systems and practices, composing a framework of risk management of the Court, and undertaking an in-depth performance audit.”8 On top of the financial accountability provided by the OIA, the ASP has also brought in the National Audit Office (“NAO”) of the United Kingdom to serve as an external auditor of the Court.9 Moreover, for financial or budgetary issues, the IOM must answer to both the ASP’s Committee on Budget and Finance and the Oversight Committee on Permanent Premises.10 Thus, unless the OIA is subsumed by the IOM, the financial monitoring functions of both the internal OIA and the external NAO, along with the two existing ASP committees, preclude the need for the IOM to perform the function of fiscal oversight over the ICC.
II. Administrative Management
Past international tribunals are also helpful in establishing the need for administrative management. In the ICTR, the Office of the Prosecutor in Kigali faced major operational deficiencies. For example, “[f]unctions were hampered by lack of experienced staff as well as lack of vehicles, computers and other office equipment and supplies. Lawyer posts were vacant and, of the almost 80 investigator posts, only 30 had been filled.”11 Moreover, “there were no formal developed qualification criteria for recruitment. In addition, key positions in personnel management had no required qualifications.”12
The ICTY had similar problems, including “inefficient and non-transparent arrangements for the construction, rental and maintenance of the office building and detention facilities. Also, the ICTY faced delays in delegation of procurement authority and…unauthorized recruitment actions.”13 Although the ICTY may have faced less extreme administrative difficulties than the ICTR, it was the judges themselves who were forced to “spend considerable time debating proposals to improve efficiency, and…more time still responding to the suggestions and criticisms of others.”14 An external oversight mechanism like the IOM that is dedicated to ensuring the performance, productivity, and efficiency of the ICC could ensure that similar administrative lapses do not occur.
However, although the IOM is charged with the task of administrative management of the Court, its operational mandate is limited: “The Independent Oversight Mechanism will not investigate contractual disputes or human resource management issues, including work performance, conditions of employment or personnel-related grievances.”15 In contrast, the Registry of the ICC has an expansive mandate that includes such non-judicial aspects of the administration and servicing of the Court.16 This includes communicating with the staff in “identifying, examining and resolving issues relating to staff welfare, including conditions of work, general conditions of life and other personnel policies.”17 The Registry is also tasked with evaluating the “efficiency, competence and integrity [of the staff] in the discharge of their functions.”18
As a result of these internal mechanisms, the Registry has enhanced the ICC’s recruitment process for staff on established posts while reducing the number of temporary posts.19 Moreover, from January 1, 2009 to April 30, 2009, the Registry has helped the ICC hold 65 hearings in 217 hours, appoint legal representatives for 52 victims, register 1,927 documents, and delivery 269 decisions, orders, or judgments.20 Thus, not only does the Registry already have broader authority and greater responsibilities than the IOM over the administrative management of the ICC, but it has also been performing that function effectively. An oversight body like the IOM that also supervises the administration of the ICC alongside the Registry would not fill any need or provide any additional benefit to the Court.
III. Oversight of Misconduct
The ICC faces a greater challenge than past international tribunals. Both the ICTY and ICTR not only focused on one conflict, but “the fundamental decision[s] as to where to investigate [were] made at the outset.”21 As a result, there was little need for oversight of larger issues such as legal policy or prosecutorial misconduct because the main problems that arose were often limited to administration and finances.22 In contrast, the Office of the Prosecutor (“OTP”) has a much broader reach in terms of jurisdiction and much more discretion in making substantive legal decisions such as where to launch new investigations and whom to prosecute.23
Moreover, the ICC can be distinguished from the Nuremberg trials. Whereas Nuremberg involved the collective decision of all of the Allied nations to prosecute defendants who had committed unanimously heinous atrocities in the past, the ICC is unique in that it involves the decisions of a few people to investigate or prosecute defendants in new or ongoing situations where culpability is often disputed.24 Such fundamental decision-making authority demands strict accountability to an oversight body in case of misconduct.
Without the appropriate checks, an international body like the ICC and its various organs is susceptible to misconduct in various ways. For example, among all of the ICC’s active cases, the ICC has “targeted crimes against humanity committed [only] in the African states of Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Uganda and Kenya.”25 In response, the African Union has recently accused the ICC of bias against African countries.26 Another potential danger is that the Prosecutor can initiate an investigation proprio motu so long as two of the three judges on the Pre-Trial chamber agree.27 The fact that major decisions of the ICC are placed in the hands of so few people raises the possibility of improper or even politically motivated investigations, prosecutions, and cases.
In addition, although it is claimed that the Rome Statute has robust mechanisms in place to ensure that the ICC will defer to national criminal jurisdictions and only be used as a last resort, “the strength of those mechanisms is questionable when the ICC is the body that ultimately decides if a nation is willing and able to prosecute the accused.”28 More specifically, under Article 17 of the Rome Statute , a case is inadmissible if it has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and the State has decided not to prosecute, unless the Court determines that the decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute.29 In other words, according to this statute, even if a State Party decides not to prosecute an accused in good faith, it is possible for the Court to second-guess the State and determine that the State is simply unwilling to do so, and then prosecute anyway against the State’s objection.30 Consequently, although the Rome Statute states that the ICC “shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdiction,”31 the ICC has the authority to “substitute its judgment anytime it disagrees with the outcome of the State proceedings” in a way that does not defer to, but rather preempts national criminal jurisdiction.32
There are various sets of rules that govern misconduct of officials within the ICC, including Articles 46 and 47 of the Rome Statute , Rules 23-32 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, and Regulations 119-125 of the Regulations of the Court.33 Serious misconduct and serious breaches of duty result in removal from office, while misconduct of a less serious nature results in disciplinary measures.34 All complaints of such conduct are transmitted to the Presidency of the ICC, which may also initiate proceedings on its own motion.35
However, while a prosecutor or a judge who is accused of misconduct may be removed from office by the ASP, such a decision requires either an “absolute majority,” or even more difficult, “a two-thirds majority of the States Parties upon a recommendation adopted by a two-thirds majority of the other judges.”36 Even less serious violations of the Prosecutor that merit discipline instead of removal require an absolute majority of the States Parties as well, and disciplinary measures are limited to either a simple reprimand or a short “pecuniary sanction that may not exceed six months of the salary paid by the Court.”37 Thus, although the threat of removal or discipline may deter the most serious offences, that threat is significantly minimized for less serious misconduct. Yet, even if the remote possibility of removal or discipline provided an effective check to the ICC, there is a problem. While the Rome Statute demands that the Prosecutor “act independently,”38 the ASP ultimately has the power to elect and fire the Prosecutor; this gives the Prosecutor at least one incentive “to act in favor of the interests of the majority of the States Parties” instead of in the interests of justice.39
In light of the need for oversight of misconduct and the lack of vigorous mechanisms within the ICC or ASP, a specialized oversight mechanism like the IOM that is independent and external to the Court could provide a powerful check against improper investigations, prosecutions, or decisions by the Court.40 Such a subsidiary organ could monitor the ICC for all degrees of misconduct and keep the ICC’s actions accountable in a more effective way than existing mechanisms while minimizing the appearance of impropriety.41
IV. Recommendations to the ASP
The need for and effectiveness of an oversight body that makes informed recommendations is evidenced by the ICTY and ICTR. During the early years of the ICTY, a range of issues arose, including “the policy on selectivity of charges, the threshold level of seniority of indictees, the policy of plea-bargaining and sentencing policy that [had] not been seriously addressed by the Security Council or any other independent oversight body.”42 However, after a comprehensive evaluation by the Office of Internal Oversight Services (“OIOS”) of the United Nations revealed several problems in all of the ICTY’s organs, OIOS made a number of recommendations. As a result, “the ICTY was able to achieve savings as well as to reduce the expenditures by strengthening existing controls and procedures. In addition, a number of initiatives had been undertaken to improve the ICTY’s performance through the use of information technology and by making changes in working methods.”43 OIOS also made recommendations to the ICTR with positive results, such as “noticeable improvements in financial management as well as in filling vacant positions” and increased productivity.44
In this paper, I have presented four primary functions that are necessary for effective oversight of an international body like the ICC. While an oversight mechanism like the IOM may not be needed for financial supervision or administrative management of the ICC, it would be significantly beneficial to the ICC for oversight of misconduct and making recommendations to the ASP to improve the Court.
Dominic Raab, Evaluating the ICTY and its Completion Strategy: Efforts to Achieve Accountability for War Crimes and their Tribunals, 3 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 82, 98 (Mar. 2005) (Oxford Journals paywall, SSRN paywall). ↩
Nancy Amoury Combs, Copping a Plea to Genocide: The Plea Bargaining of International Crimes, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 142 (Nov. 2002), available online. ↩
Report of the Secretary-General on the Activities of the Office of Internal Oversight Services, UN GAOR, 51st Sess., Annex, Agenda Items 139 and 141, at 2, UN Doc. A/51/789 (1997), [hereinafter cited as Report of the Secretary-General], available online. ↩
Patricia McNerney, The International Criminal Court: Issues for Consideration By the United States Senate, 64 Law and Contemp. Probs. 181, 189 (Winter 2001), (PDF Version). ↩
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, July 17 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9 [hereinafter cited as Rome Statute ], art. 112(4) ↩
Agata Porter, An Independent Oversight Mechanism for the International Criminal Court, AMICC at 6, (Feb. 6, 2008), available online. ↩
Agata Porter, Recommendations For the Establishment of an Independent Oversight Mechanism for the ICC, AMICC at 1-2, (July 28, 2009), available online. ↩
Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 4, at 2. ↩
Porter, supra note 8. ↩
Combs, supra note 2, at 142. ↩
Operational Mandate of the Independent Oversight Mechanism, Resolution ICC-ASP/9/Res.5, Annex, at 36, Doc. ICC-ASP/9/20 (Dec. 10, 2010), [hereinafter cited as Operational Mandate], available online. ↩
Rome Statute , supra note 7, at art. 43(1). ↩
Staff Regulations of the International Criminal Court, Resolution ICC-ASP Res.2, at 11, Doc. ICC-ASP/2/10 (Sept. 12 2003), available online. ↩
Coalition for the Int’l Crim. Court, Facts and Figures from Registry as at 30 April 2009 at 1, (June 4, 2009), available online. ↩
Id. at 2, 4. ↩
Raab, supra note 1, at 100. ↩
Id. See Rome Statute , supra note 7, at art. 15. ↩
Tonya J. Boller, The International Criminal Court: Better Than Nuremberg?, 14 Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 279, 313 (2003), (Lexis/Nexis paywall). ↩
Reuters, African Union Accuses ICC Prosecutor of Bias, Jan. 30, 2011, available online. ↩
Boller, supra note 24, at 297. See Rome Statute , supra note 7, at arts. 15, 17. ↩
Rome Statute , supra note 7, at art. 17. Italics added. ↩
Jimmy Gurule, United States Opposition to the 1998 Rome Statute Establishing an International Criminal Court: Is the Court’s Jurisdiction Truly Complementary to National Criminal Jurisdictions?, 35 Cornell Int’l L.J. 1, 27 (2002), (Lexis/Nexis paywall). ↩
Rome Statute , supra note 7, at art. 1. ↩
Gurule, supra note 30, at 27-28. ↩
Porter, supra note 8, at 7. ↩
Rules of Procedure and Evidence Adopted by the Assembly of States Parties, ICC-ASP/1/3, Rule 30, 32 (Sept. 3-10, 2002), available online [hereinafter cited as Rules of Procedure]. ↩
Rome Statute , supra note 7, at art. 46. ↩
Rules of Procedure, supra note 35, at Rule 30, 32. ↩
Rome Statute , supra note 6, at art. 42. ↩
Boller, supra note 24, at 297. ↩
See Operational Mandate, supra note 15, at 36 (“The Independent Oversight Mechanism may receive and investigate reports of misconduct or serious misconduct, including possible unlawful acts by a judge, the Prosecutor, a Deputy Prosecutor, the Registrar and the Deputy Registrar of the Court…, all staff subject to the Staff and Financial Regulations and Rules of the Court…and all contractors and/or consultants retained by the Court and working on its behalf…”). ↩
See id. at 36 n.2 (“Misconduct, also described in the Staff Rules as “unsatisfactory conduct”, which includes any act or omission by elected officials, staff members or contractors in violation of their obligations to the Court pursuant to the Rome Statute and its implementing instruments, Staff and Financial Regulations and Rules, relevant administrative issuances and contractual agreements, as appropriate.”). ↩
Raab, supra note 1, at 99. ↩
Porter, supra note 8, at 10-11. ↩
See, e.g., Rome Statute , supra note 7, at arts. 56(2), 59(5), 112(2). ↩
Raab, supra note 1, at 101. ↩
(a reply to 931)
The non-binding decisions of the ICJ depend upon where you sit. Many academics in the internatonal legal arena take these "non-binding" decisions as if they were the rule of law.
You readily see the ASP role in the evisceration of victim participation because of cost. So while the IOM, Annex, may issue recommendations, are they policy or practice? Cost is implicit in both Trial Chamber II and III decisions on Victim Participation.
Under Domestic United States Law you see this all the time in civil rights cases, written policy mandates a central policy and practice is directly opposite.
(a reply to 932)
I take your point regarding ICJ decisions; maybe many take these non-binding decisions as law.
But ultimately, I disagree on construing "recommendations" as obligations. Though some may desire a more binding nature, a recommendation does not obligate anything.
Say, for instance, the Security Council issued a resolution recommending all states to cooperate with an ICC investigation. This doesn't obligate states to cooperate. Even if the Council recommends state cooperation more forcefully by "urging" it—as it did in Resolution 1593—it still doesn't obligate states.
Should they cooperate? Maybe. Must they? No. If the Council had intended to bestow such an obligation, it would have written, "all States shall cooperate fully"—as the Council wrote in Resolution 827, where it created the ICTY and required all states to cooperate with that tribunal.
Article 112 provides the assembly with responsibility and duties for the operation of the Court- including enforcement procedures,
The oversight role did not include the Court as responsible for anything omitted to be done, where an Organ exists that must do what requires to be done consistent with[in] the Framework called the Rome Statute.
I also believe to show the Court as Independent Constitutionally all Judges cannot be from the State of the National Security Counsel, and state Cannot be classified as more then Observer at Time of Judicial Appointment.
Section 36 provides a minimum Number of Judges in good standing are appointed, that number can be increased,
Section 87 provides questions questions related to enforcement procedure, whether by Member State, or not.
In my view, the I.C.C. should adopt a policy of having the most senor Court Officer [Chief Justice, state], subject to review by the Majority of Members, for the purpose of Child[ren] Protection [victims] [General mental health negatively effected by criminal mind] [disabled are youth for the purpose of law] [victim are youth for the purpose of Law].
For the purpose of trial division, with onset Warning can be called for appeal by the state assembling to the I.C.C. Administration, or Chief Justice to review [registrar as a right at Bar review expense and accounts of Lawyers, including recommending adoption of policies to adapt to changing needs].
In this context of operation the I.C.C. becomes an enforcement agent as a whole and complete superior Court, and Inferior as well making those Courts available as a resource effecting expenses of the international obligation to provide that already exists at there home as inferior to the majority. [there is a context of land mass earth walking is natural].
It is noteworthy that "policing is a provincial function, or city function, a Supreme Court is inherent jurisdiction for code [local cultural and customary]". therefore access to funding is in international obligations for the purpose of the I.C.C. becomes available for policing [re: Afghanistan act] [Canada citation: peacekeepers]