Source: http://law.justia.com/cases/wisconsin/supreme-court/2011/60383.html
Timestamp: 2013-12-10 11:22:48
Document Index: 476414789

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 908', '§ 904', '§ 904', '§ 904', '§ 904', '§ 904', '§ 904', '§ 904', '§ 948', '§ 948', '§ 948', '§ 908', '§ 904', '§ 908', '§ 904', '§ 948', '§ 904', '§ 904', '§ 904', '§ 908', '§ 904', '§ 904', '§ 904', '§ 904', '§ 904', '§ 904', '§ 904', '§ 904', '§ 404', '§ 904', '§ 904', '§ 904']

State v. Miguel E. Marinez, Jr. - 2011 WI 12 :: 2011 :: Wisconsin Supreme Court Decisions :: Wisconsin Case Law :: US Case Law :: US Law :: Justia
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State v. Miguel E. Marinez, Jr.Download as PDF
2011 WI 12
2009AP567-CR State of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, v. Miguel E. Marinez, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.
February 23, 2011 November 2, 2010
Circuit Jefferson Randy R. Koschnick
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner there were briefs by Rebecca Rapp St. John, assistant attorney general with whom on the briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. was argued by Rebecca Rapp St. John. For the defendant-appellant was a brief and oral argument by Ralph J. Sczygelski and Sczygelski & Pangburn Law Firm, LLC, Manitowoc. The cause
2009AP567-CR
2007CF491)
STATE OF WISCONSIN State of Wisconsin,
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, v. Miguel E. Marinez, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.
CROOKS, of the
admissibility of other-acts evidence referenced in an otherwiseadmissible videotaped statement of a child victim. In the
videotaped forensic interview,
victim, M.M.L., disclosed that she was sexually assaulted by the defendant, Miguel E. Marinez, Jr. (Marinez). During this
interview, M.M.L. also referred to a separate incident in which State v. Marinez, No. 2009AP567-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 18, 2010).
Marinez burned her hands with hot water. been convicted of child abuse for that
Marinez had already assault before this
interview took place. incident, attempt the to
After M.M.L. brought up the hand-burning referred the to that incident in an in
relation to that event. burning incident also
M.M.L.'s statements about the handserved to demonstrate that "Mikey,"
M.M.L.'s name for Marinez, perpetrated both acts.
M.M.L. also
referred to the hand-burning incident at other points during the videotaped interview. ¶2 In preparation for Marinez's trial for the sexual
assault of M.M.L., the State moved to admit this video interview under Wis. Stat. § 908.08 (2007-08)2 and the references to the hand-burning incident The within the video under Circuit Wis. Court, Stat. the
§ 904.04(2)(a).
Honorable Randy R. Koschnick presiding, admitted the video in its entirety, concluding that the other-acts evidence it
contained was admissible under Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2)(a)3 for the purposes of identity and context, and including within context,
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. The relevant portion of this statute provides that "evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith. This subsection does not exclude the evidence when offered for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident." Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2)(a). 2
the time and location of the assault, and in order to assist the jury in assessing M.M.L.'s credibility. To prevent unfair
prejudice to Marinez, the circuit court limited the details of the hand-burning incident that the State could present and also gave a cautionary instruction to the jury. Marinez was
convicted, and he appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in admitting the other-acts evidence relating to the hand-
The court of appeals reversed the circuit
court's judgment of conviction after concluding that the otheracts evidence was erroneously admitted and the error was not harmless. granted. issue for The State petitioned this court for review, which we In its petition, the State presented the following review: its whether in the circuit court M.M.L.'s erroneously videotaped
statements without excising the references to the separate handburning incident perpetrated by Marinez. ¶3 admitting We hold that the in circuit its We court did under the of not Wis. err in
entirety affirm
Stat. court's
§§ 904.04(2)(a) evidentiary
908.08. on the
other-acts
evidence because the circuit court "examined the relevant facts, applied a proper standard of law, used a demonstrated rational process, and reached a conclusion that a reasonable judge could reach." State v. Hunt, 2003 WI 81, ¶34, 263 Wis. 2d 1, 666
N.W.2d 771. ¶4 We conclude that in light of the greater latitude rule
and the fact that the other-acts evidence was so intertwined 3
with the otherwise admissible videotaped statement of the child victim, the circuit court properly determined that each of the three prongs of the Sullivan analysis supported admission. State (1998). court v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 772-73, 576 See
N.W.2d 30
Under the first prong, we conclude that the circuit reasonably concluded that, under Wis. Stat.
§ 904.04(2)(a), the hand-burning references were admissible for the proper purposes of establishing M.M.L.'s identification of Marinez as her abuser and providing context, including assisting the jury in assessing M.M.L.'s credibility, establishing the
time and location of the sexual abuse, and providing a complete story to the jury. the circuit Regarding the second prong, we conclude that determination--that the hand-burning
evidence was relevant to establish M.M.L.'s identification of Marinez, and the time and location of the sexual abuse, to
provide context, including regarding M.M.L.'s credibility, and to provide a more complete story to the jury--was reasonable, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 904.01. Under the third prong, we
conclude that the circuit court reasonably determined that, in accord with Wis. Stat. § 904.03, the probative value of the
entire video, including M.M.L.'s references to the hand-burning incident, was not substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice to Marinez. ¶5 burning We are also satisfied that any misuse of the handevidence by the prosecutor to make did the not "so infect[] the a
unfairness as
resulting conviction
denial of due process."
See State v. Mayo, 2007 WI 78, ¶43, 301 4
Wis. 2d 642, 734 N.W.2d 115.
appeals and affirm the circuit court's judgment of conviction. I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND ¶6 In 2005, Marinez married M.M.L.'s mother, Rachel
Marinez (Rachel) and became M.M.L.'s stepfather. family, Aiden, December including lived of in 2006. M.M.L. and two of her
The Marinez Evan and
brothers, October Aiden
Watertown, In this
Wisconsin, home, Evan
through shared a
bedroom, and M.M.L. slept in a separate bed in her parents' room. During this period, M.M.L. was subjected to physical
abuse and also alleged sexual abuse at the hands of Marinez. Because of the severity of the physical abuse, which required extended hospitalization for severe burns to her hands, M.M.L.'s family and law enforcement were aware of that abuse immediately after it happened.4 The alleged sexual abuse came to light some
time after the hand-burning incident occurred. ¶7 Marinez On December 27, 2006, when M.M.L. was four years old, severely burned her hands by holding them under
extremely hot water, injuring her so severely that M.M.L. was hospitalized for some time. As a result, Marinez was arrested
on December 28, 2006, and later convicted of intentional child abuse which creates a high probability of great bodily harm,
M.M.L.'s mother, Rachel, testified that M.M.L. was taken to the hospital on December 27, 2006, after the hand-burning incident took place and remained hospitalized for some time. Detective Brower testified that he went to the hospital on December 27, 2006, to investigate the physical abuse of M.M.L. 5
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.03(2)(c).5
M.M.L. lived with her father in Madison, Wisconsin, and Marinez apparently no longer had contact with her. ¶8 Approximately six months later, on June 25, 2007,
during a forensic interview by Kari Orn (Orn) at Safe Harbor Child Advocacy Office (Safe Harbor) in Madison, Wisconsin,
M.M.L. disclosed that Marinez had also sexually abused her when they lived together in Watertown, Wisconsin.6 Orn videotaped
this interview, which took place when M.M.L. was four years old. M.M.L. revealed that, on at least one occasion, "Mikey," which is what she called Marinez, instructed her to take off her
clothes and lie on her parents' bed, after which he touched what she called her "private area" with his hand. ¶9 abuse. M.M.L. provided only limited details about the sexual She described one particular incident,7 which happened
while her mother was at work and Evan and Aiden were playing
The relevant portion of this statute provides:
(2) Intentional causation of bodily harm. (c) Whoever intentionally causes bodily harm to a child by conduct which creates a high probability of great bodily harm is guilty of a Class F felony. Wis. Stat. § 948.03(2)(c). The record does not indicate why M.M.L. was brought to Safe Harbor for the interview. In the interview, M.M.L. disclosed that "Mikey" touched her private area "[m]ore than one time," though she provided the details of only one particular incident, which is the incident underlying the charge in this case. 6
together in their room.
M.M.L. stated that after she had taken
a bath and gotten dressed, "Mikey" told her to take off her clothes and lie on the bed that Marinez and Rachel shared. She
stated that he kept his clothes on and touched her private area with his hand. M.M.L. also stated that neither she nor Marinez At Orn's request,
said anything while he was touching her.
M.M.L. drew a picture of where she and Marinez were when this took place. In response to one of Orn's questions, M.M.L. also
spontaneously brought up the hand-burning incident, indicating that "Mikey" was the person who burned her hands. Orn used this
hand-burning incident to try to establish when the sexual abuse occurred, but M.M.L. was unable to recall which happened first, the physical or sexual abuse. ¶10 Additional details about the assault could be inferred
from M.M.L.'s statements when considered along with other known facts. Her description of the living arrangements at the time
this took place, when M.M.L., Marinez, Rachel, Evan, and Aiden lived together and Evan and Aiden shared a room, indicated that the sexual abuse occurred when they lived in Watertown,
M.M.L. was unable to remember when this happened,
but given her description of the living arrangements, it was limited to the period during which the Marinez family lived in Watertown, Wisconsin, from October through December of 2006.
M.M.L. identified Marinez as the person who sexually assaulted her because, while she simply called him "Mikey," she stated elsewhere in the video that "Mikey" was also the person who
burned her hands and was married to her mother, thus identifying "Mikey" as Marinez. II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶11 As a result of M.M.L.'s allegations, Marinez was
charged on November 21, 2007, with sexual contact with a child under the age of thirteen contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1).8 Given M.M.L.'s age--she was five years old at the time of the hearing--the State sought to admit the video of her interview with Orn under Wis. Stat. § 908.089 in lieu of having her testify in court about the details of this incident. The State moved to
admit the other-acts evidence referenced in the video regarding the hand-burning incident under Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2)(a).
During the motion hearing, the State argued that such evidence
(1) First degree sexual assault. (e) Whoever has sexual contact with a person who has not attained the age of 13 years is guilty of a Class B felony. Wis. Stat. 948.02(1)(e). In relevant part, this statute provides an exception to the hearsay rule: (1) In any criminal trial or hearing, juvenile factfinding hearing under s. 48.31 or 938.31 or revocation hearing under s. 302.113(9)(am), 302.114(9)(am), 304.06(3), or 973.10(2), the court or hearing examiner may admit into evidence the audiovisual recording of an oral statement of a child who is available to testify, as provided in this section. Wis. Stat. § 908.08(1). 8
was admissible for the purposes of establishing the time and location of the alleged assault, explaining M.M.L.'s
identification of Marinez, providing context, and allowing the jury to better assess M.M.L.'s credibility. ¶12 Marinez objected to the admission of the sections of Marinez
the videotape that refer to the hand-burning incident.
addressed each of the purposes for which the State sought to admit the hand-burning references. Marinez argued that M.M.L.'s
identification of who assaulted her could be established by her other statements in the interview and Detective David Brower's10 verification period. of who lived with M.M.L.'s mother during this
He also argued that this separate hand-burning incident
was not related enough to the sexual assault to provide any context or to assist the jury in assessing M.M.L.'s credibility. Marinez further argued that, instead, the State was actually seeking "pattern to of admit the hand-burning truth telling" evidence by to establish to boost a
credibility, which, he argued, is prohibited by Whitty v. State, 34 Wis. 2d 278, asserted 149 that N.W.2d 557 other-acts (1967). evidence Regarding is context, to
provide context only to show the "context of the crime itself, not supporting a victim's statement about the crimes
He argued that the hand-burning references could
not provide context because that incident was entirely unrelated Detective Brower investigated both the physical and sexual assault of M.M.L. He also testified at the preliminary hearing and at trial in this case. 9
events asserted
frame of the sexual assault would be adequately established by Detective Brower's investigation and testimony and M.M.L.'s
other statements in the video.11
Turning to the danger of unfair
prejudice to Marinez, he asserted that the probative value of this evidence was low and that there was a very high risk of unfair prejudice to him. Marinez argued that the State lacked
any physical evidence or a confession, and thus the inflammatory nature of M.M.L.'s references to the hand-burning would unduly prejudice Marinez. ¶13 The circuit court admitted the hand-burning references
in the video because it concluded that the State offered that evidence for proper purposes under Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2)(a), for which this evidence was relevant and not unduly prejudicial. Noting that M.M.L. was a very young child, five years old at the
Initially, Marinez sought to enter into a stipulation regarding the time frame of the alleged assault to avoid the admission of the hand-burning references to establish when the assault could have occurred. The State noted that there were other purposes for which the hand-burning references were admissible and thus declined to enter into a stipulation for that purpose. The circuit court did accept a stipulation that Marinez did not have any contact with M.M.L. after the handburning incident for the purposes of excluding any evidence that Marinez had been in continuous custody since then for the charge and conviction related to that incident. After accepting the stipulation, the circuit court directed Marinez's counsel to address each of the state's grounds for admitting the other-acts evidence including "identity, the time frame to establish the date of the alleged violation and venue, as well as context as it relates to credibility." 10
time of the motion hearing and the trial, the circuit court stated that the greater latitude rule strengthened its
conclusion that this evidence was admissible for these purposes. The circuit court also minimized the risk of unfair prejudice to Marinez by giving a cautionary instruction to the jury, limiting the admission of details about the hand-burning incident, and prohibiting the State's witnesses from dwelling on the handburning incident.12 ¶14 child The jury found Marinez guilty of sexual contact with a the age of thirteen contrary to Wis. Stat.
§ 948.02(1).
Marinez appealed, arguing that the circuit court's
admission of the hand-burning evidence was an erroneous exercise of discretion. limits placed Marinez also argued that the State exceeded the on the admission of the hand-burning evidence The
while questioning witnesses and during closing arguments.
State responded that the circuit court properly admitted the other-acts evidence. Further, the State argued that it stayed
within the circuit court's limitations for the use of the handburning evidence and that, in any event, Marinez forfeited any argument to the contrary by failing to object.
Marinez's counsel also asked whether the State's witnesses would be permitted to testify about the hand-burning incident under the circuit court's ruling. The circuit court clarified that other witnesses would be permitted to mention the hand-burning incident only within the limits of its ruling and would not be allowed to bring up extraneous details or dwell on the incident. 11
erroneously admitted the hand-burning evidence because it was not admitted for a proper purpose under Wis. Stat.
§ 904.04(2)(a) and that such error was not harmless. No. 2009AP567-CR, ¶¶17, 25.
While the court of appeals stated
that context and credibility were proper purposes for which to admit other-acts evidence in certain circumstances, it concluded that the hand-burning evidence was not properly admitted for those purposes in this case, distinguishing Hunt, 263 Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶58-59, a case in which a defendant's prior drug use was
properly admitted for the purposes of context and credibility. Marinez, No. 2009AP567-CR, ¶¶10-15. The court of appeals noted
that even the application of the greater latitude rule could not overcome the lack of a proper purpose. Id., ¶17. Further, the
court of appeals concluded that the circuit court's error in admitting the other-acts evidence was not harmless because of how the State used that evidence, the fact that there was little actual evidence of the sexual abuse, and the likelihood that the hand-burning ¶¶23-25. evidence the influenced court of the jury improperly. the Id., circuit
court's judgment of conviction on this basis, it did not reach the question of whether the State exceeded the circuit court's limitations on the admission of the hand-burning evidence. ¶8. Therefore, the court of appeals reversed the Id.,
court's judgment of conviction. III. ANALYSIS
¶16 following
admitted M.M.L.'s videotaped interview without excision of the hand-burning references under Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2)(a). Since
M.M.L. was five years old at the time of the motion hearing and the trial, the greater latitude rule, which provides for the more liberal admission of other-acts evidence in child sexual assault cases, applies in this case. 92, ¶23, 236 Wis. 2d 686, 613 State v. Hammer, 2000 WI The three-prong
N.W.2d 629.
analysis from Sullivan governs the propriety of admitting otheracts evidence under Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2)(a) and the greater latitude rule applies to our review of each prong. 216 Wis. 2d 768, ¶¶5-8; Hammer, 236 Sullivan, ¶23.
Wis. 2d 686,
Additionally, while Marinez did not directly petition this court for review of the in his claim that the State we exceeded will of the order his
admitting arguments
hand-burning this regard as
misconduct. ¶17
See Mayo, 301 Wis. 2d 642, ¶43.
We review a circuit court's admission of other-acts Hunt, 263
evidence for an erroneous exercise of discretion. Wis. 2d 1, ¶34. ruling if standard
We will uphold a circuit court's evidentiary relevant facts, applied a proper and Id.
it "examined the of law, used a
reached a conclusion that a reasonable judge could reach."
Even if a circuit court fails to set forth the basis for its ruling, we will nonetheless independently "review the record to determine whether it provides 13 an appropriate basis for the
decision." its
Id. reasons
court hand-
burning evidence. A. General Principles Regarding the Admissibility of OtherActs Evidence ¶18 Several overlapping M.M.L.'s rules and principles govern the
hand-burning evidence more specifically.
When child witnesses
are available for cross examination, Wis. Stat. § 908.08 allows for the admission of videotaped child witness interviews that meet certain requirements. Wisconsin See Daniel D. Blinka, (3d Wisconsin 2008).
Marinez did not and does not challenge the admissibility of the video itself, but rather the the references and other to the hand-burning testimony Stat. of a
incident regarding
hand-burning prohibits the
incident. admission of
§ 904.04(2)(a)
defendant's other bad acts to show that the defendant has a propensity to commit crimes. However, other-acts evidence that
is offered for a purpose other than the prohibited propensity purpose is admissible if it is relevant to a permissible purpose and is not unfairly prejudicial. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 783. Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2)(a);
Wisconsin Stat. § 904.04(2)(a)
contains an illustrative, and not exhaustive, list of some of
admissible, none of which applies here.13 ¶19 To guide courts in determining whether other-acts
evidence is admissible for a proper purpose under Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2)(a), we developed a three-prong test. Wis. 2d at 772-73. Sullivan, 216
Other-acts evidence is properly admissible
(1) if it is offered for a permissible purpose, other than the prohibited propensity purpose, pursuant to Wis. Stat.
§ 904.04(2)(a), (2) if it is relevant under the two relevancy requirements in Wis. Stat. § 904.01,14 and (3) if its probative value is not substantially outweighed by the risk or danger of
The circuit court stated that one of the purposes for which it admitted the other-acts evidence was identity; however, it was not actually offered for identity as that term is used in Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2)(a). As explained in more detail below, see infra, ¶25 n.17, identity, within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2)(a), relates to a defendant's signature or imprint that would allow the perpetrator of a crime in a particular case to be identified through his modus operandi in connection to a separate crime he was known to have committed. Blinka, supra § 404.7 at 212-13. In this case, the State sought to admit M.M.L.'s references to the hand-burning incident to provide a full explanation of her identification of Marinez via her reference to "Mikey" as the perpetrator of both assaults when it had been established that Marinez burned M.M.L.'s hands. Wisconsin Stat. § 904.01 defines relevant evidence as "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 904.01, evidence is relevant if it (1) "relates to a fact or proposition that is of consequence to the determination of the action" and (2) "has a tendency to make a consequential fact more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 785-86. 15
unfair prejudice under Wis. Stat. § 904.03. 2d at 772-73. The party seeking to
Sullivan, 216 Wis. the other-acts
evidence bears the burden of establishing that the first two prongs are met by a preponderance of the evidence. Payano, 2009 WI 86, ¶¶63, 68 n.14, 320 State v. 768
Wis. 2d 348,
N.W.2d 832; Hunt, 263 Wis. 2d 1, ¶53. other-acts evidence establishes the
Once the proponent of the first two prongs of the
test, the burden shifts to the party opposing the admission of the other-acts evidence to show that the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the risk or danger of unfair prej