Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/419/477
Timestamp: 2016-07-23 19:29:52
Document Index: 419593361

Matched Legal Cases: ['ART\n1', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 1', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 7']

William COUSINS et al., Petitioners, v. Paul T. WIGODA et al. | US Law | LII / Legal Information Institute
Supreme Court aboutsearch liibulletin subscribe previews William COUSINS et al., Petitioners, v. Paul T. WIGODA et al.
419 U.S. 477 (95 S.Ct. 541, 42 L.Ed.2d 595)
Decided: Jan. 15, 1975.
[HTML] concurrence, REHNQUIST, STEWART
1. This Court's per curiam unqualifiedly suspended the operative effects of the Court of Appeals judgment without resolving the merits of the controversy; and petitioners' res judicata contention is not open for consideration, not having been pleaded and proved in the Circuit Court as required by state law. Pp. 485487.
2. In the selection of candidates for national office a National Party Convention serves the pervasive national interest, which is paramount to any interest of a State in protecting the integrity of its electoral process, and the Circuit Court erred in issuing an injunction that abridged the associational rights of petitioners and their Party and the Party's right to determine the composition of its National Convention in accordance with Party standards. Pp. 487491.
At the March 1972 Illinois primary election, Chicago's Democratic voters elected the 59 respondents (Wigoda delegates) as delegates to the 1972 Democratic National Convention to be held in July 1972 in Miami, Fla. Some of the 59 petitioners (Cousins delegates) challenged the seating of the Wigoda delegates before the Credentials Committee of the National Democratic Party on the ground, among others, that the slate-making procedures under which the Wigoda delegates were selected violated Party guidelines incorporated in the Call of the Convention. On June 30, 1972, the Credentials Committee sustained the Findings and Report of a Hearing Officer that the Wigoda delegates had been chosen in violation of the guidelines,
and also adopted the Hearing Officer's recommendation that the Wigoda delegates be unseated and the Cousins delegates (who had been chosen in June at private caucuses in Chicago) be seated in their stead.
On July 8, 1972, two days before the Convention opened, the Wigoda delegates obtained from the Circuit Court of Cook County, Ill., an injunction that enjoined each of the 59 petitioners 'from acting or purporting to act as a delegate to the Democratic National Convention . . . (and) from performing the functions of delegates . . . (and) from receiving or accepting any credentials, badges or other indicia of delegate status . . ..'
The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the injunction, 14 Ill.App.3d 460, 302 N.E.2d 614 (1973),
and the Supreme Court of Illinois, without opinion, on November 29, 1973, denied leave to appeal. The Appellate Court held that '(t) he right to sit as a delegate representing Illinois at the national nominating convention is governed exclusively by the Election Code,' id., at 472, 302 N.E.2d, at 626, and rejected the Cousins delegates' contention that the injunction attempting to enforce that Code, by preventing them from participating as delegates at the Convention, violated their right, and the right of the National Democratic Party, to freedom of political activity and association assured them under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Appellate Court stated:
'(T)he purposes and guidelines for reform adopted by the Democratic National Party in its Call for the 1972 Democratic National Convention . . . in no way take precedence in the State of Illinois over the Illinois Election Code (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1971, ch. 46, § 71 et seq.). The opening section of Article 7 of the Election Code, which deals with the making of nominations by political parties (§ 71), is most clear when in discussing the selection of delegates to National nominating conventions, it states:
We granted certiorari to decide the important question presented whether the Appellate Court was correct in according primacy to state law over the National Political Party's rules in the determination of the qualifications and eligibility of delegates to the Party's National Convention. 415 U.S. 956, 94 S.Ct. 1483, 39 L.Ed.2d 571 (1974).
* There is a threshold question to be decided before we discuss the merits of the constitutional issue. During June and July 1972 the District Court for the District of Columbia and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit twice considered an action brought by one of the Wigoda delegates, Thomas E. Keane, against the National Democratic Party. That action challenged the constitutionality of the Party guidelines allegedly violated in the selection of the Wigoda delegates. The Cousins delegates intervened and the Party counter-claimed for an injunction enjoining the Wigoda delegates from proceeding with the state-court action. The case was initially dismissed on appeal because the Credentials Committee had not yet decided the petitioners' challenge, Keane v. National Democratic Party, No. 101072 (DC June 19, 1972); Keane v. Na- ( DC Cir. June 20, 1972). After the Credentials Committee announced its adoption of the Hearing Officer's Findings and Report, the suit proceeded. The District Court sustained the constitutional Democratic Party, No. 721562 pra, and dismissed Keane's suit, while denying the counterclaim. The Court of Appeals, on July 5, affirmed the dismissal but granted the counterclaim directing the entry of an order enjoining the Wigoda delegates from proceeding with tutionality of Guideline C6, see n. 1, supra the Circuit Court suit. Brown v. O'Brien, 152 U.S.App.D.C. 157, 469 F.2d 563. This Court, however, at a Special Term on July 7, stayed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, 409 U.S. 1, 92 S.Ct. 2718, 34 L.Ed.2d 1. On October 10, 1972, we granted Keane's petition for certiorari, vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and remanded for a determination of mootness. 409 U.S. 816, 93 S.Ct. 67, 34 L.Ed.2d 73. The Court of Appeals, on February 16, 1973, held the case moot insofar as it concerned seating of delegates at the July Convention, found no basis for relief as to any other matter, and entered a judgment affirming the District Court's order of July 3 dismissing Keane's suit, 155 U.S.App.D.C. 18, 475 F.2d 1287.
Based upon these events, petitioners argue that the Illinois Circuit Court was without jurisdiction to enter its July 8 injunction notwithstanding this Court's July 7 stay of the Court of Appeals' judgment. The argument relies upon the reference in the Court's per curiam opinion supporting the stay to 'the large public interest in allowing the political processes to function free from judicial supervision,' 409 U.S., at 5, 92 S.Ct., at 2720, which, petitioners argue, 'established the right, in the particular circumstances of this case, of the 1972 Democratic National Convention to decide the Chicago credentials contest.' Brief for Petitioners p. 20. The argument is without merit. The per curiam did not decide the question before us in this case. The stay order, in terms, unambiguously suspended the operative effect of the Court of Appeals' judgment without qualification and in its entirety, and nothing in the quoted excerpt from the per curiam opinion in any wise qualified that effect.
We agree with the Illinois Appellate Court, therefore, that the stay order 'completely froze the order of the Court of Appeals including the injunction order directed to the Circuit Court of Illinois, thereby allowing the Circuit Court to proceed.' 14 Ill.App.3d, at 468, 302 N.E.2d, at 622623.
Petitioners argue further that in any event the stay order 'did not alter the binding collateral estoppel and res judicata effect of that (Court of Appeals) judgment so as to permit collateral attack in the Illinois state courts.' Brief for Petitioners p. 28. We need not address the merits of that argument. The Illinois Appellate Court rejected it on the ground that the res judicata defense had not been pleaded and proved in the Circuit Court as required by Illinois law established in Svalina v. Saravana, 341 Ill. 236, 173 N.E. 281 (1930). 14 Ill.App.3d, at 469, 302 N.E.2d, at 623.
We have no basis for disagreement with the holding of the Appellate Court 'that the (petitioners) neither formally pleaded nor attempted to prove their claim of res judicata based on the decision of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.' Ibid.
This constitutes an adequate state ground that forecloses any jurisdiction that we might possess to review the merits of the res judicata defense. See, e.g., Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Woodford, 234 U.S. 46, 34 S.Ct. 739, 58 L.Ed. 1202 (1914). Accordingly, we turn to consideration of the merits of the constitutional question.
The National Democratic Party and its adherents enjoy a constitutionally protected right of political association. 'There can no longer be any doubt that freedom to associate with others for the common advancement of political beliefs and ideas is a form of 'orderly group activity' protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. . . . The right to associate with the political party of one's choice is an integral part of this basic constitutional freedom.' Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 5657, 94 S.Ct. 303, 307, 38 L.Ed.2d 260 (1973). 'And of course this freedom protected against federal encroachment by the First Amendment is entitled under the Fourteenth Amendment to the same protection from infringement by the States.' Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 3031, 89 S.Ct. 5, 10, 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968). Moreover, '(a)ny interference with the freedom of a party is simultaneously an interference with the freedom of its adherents.' Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250, 77 S.Ct. 1203, 1212, 1 L.Ed.2d 1311 (1957); see NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 431, 83 S.Ct. 328, 337, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963).
We observe at the outset that petitioners' compliance with the injunction would not have assured effectuation of the state objective to seat respondents at the Convention. The Convention was under no obligation to seat the respondents but was free, as respondents concede,
to leave the Chicago seats vacant and thus defeat the objective.
Respondents argue that Illinois had a compelling interest in protecting the integrity of its electoral processes and the right of its citizens under the State and Federal Constitutions to effective suffrage. They rely on the numerous statements of this Court that the right to vote is a 'fundamental political right, because preservative of all rights.' Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 1071, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 1381, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S., at 31, 89 S.Ct., at 10; Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U.S. 621, 626, 89 S.Ct. 1886, 1889, 23 L.Ed.2d 583 (1969); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336, 92 S.Ct. 995, 999, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972). But respondents overlook the significant fact that the suffrage was execised at the primary election to elect delegates to a National Party Convention. Consideration of the special function of delegates to such a Convention militates persuasively against the conclusion that the asserted interest constitutes a compelling state interest. Delegates perform a task of supreme importance to every citizen of the Nation regardless of their State of residence. The vital business of the Convention is the nomination of the Party's candidates for the offices of President and Vice President of the United States. To that end, the state political parties are 'affiliated with a national party through acceptance of the national call to send state delegates to the national convention.' Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 225, 72 S.Ct. 654, 659, 96 L.Ed. 894 (1952). The States themselves have no constitutionally mandated role in the great task of the selection of Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates.
If the qualifications and eligibility of delegates to National Political Party Conventions were left to state law 'each of the fifty states could establish the qualifications of its delegates to the various party conventions without regard to party policy, an obviously intolerable result.' Wigoda v. Cousins, 342 F.Supp. 82, 86 (N.D.Ill.1972). Such a regime could seriously undercut or indeed destroy the effectiveness of the National Party Convention as a concerted enterprise engaged in the vital process of choosing Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidatesa process which usually involves coalitions cutting across state lines.
The Convention serves the pervasive national interest in the selection of candidates for national office, and this national interest is greater than any interest of an individual State. The paramount necessity for effective performance of the Convention's task is underscored by Mr. Justice Pitney's admonition 'that the likelihood of a candidate succeeding in an election without a party nomination is practically negligible. . . . As a practical matter, the ultimate cloice of the mass of voters is predetermined when the nominations have been made.' Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 286, 41 S.Ct. 469, 484, 65 L.Ed. 913 (1921) (dissenting opinion).
Thus, Illinois' interest in protecting the integrity of its electoral process cannot be deemed compelling in the context of the selection of delegates to the National Party Convention. Whatever the case of actions presenting claims that the Party's delegate selection procedures are not exercised within the confines of the Constitutionand no such claims are made herethis is a case where 'the convention itself (was) the proper forum for determining intraparty disputes as to which delegates (should) be seated.' O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1, 4, 92 S.Ct. 2718, 2720, 34 L.Ed.2d 1 (1972).
'It has been understood since our national political parties first came into being as voluntary associations of individuals that the convention itself is the proper forum for determining intra-party disputes as to which delegates shall be seated. Thus, these cases involve claims of the power of the federal judiciary to review actions heretofore thought to lie in the control of political parties. Highly important questions are presented concerning justiciability, whether the action of the Credentials Committee is state action, and if so the reach of the Due Process Clause in this unique context. Vital rights of association guaranteed by the Constitution are also involved. While the Court is unwilling to undertake final resolution of the important constitutional questions presented without full briefing and argument and adequate opportunity for deliberation, we entertain grave doubts as to the action taken by the Court of Appeals.' 409 U.S., at 45, 92 S.Ct., at 2720. (Emphasis supplied.)
'Whatever the case of actions presenting claims that the Party's delegate selection procedures are not exercised within the confines of the Constitutionand no such claims are made herethis is a case where '. . . the convention itself (was) the proper forum for determining intra-party disputes as to which delegates (should) be seated.' O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1, 4, 92 S.Ct. 2718, 2720, 34 L.Ed.2d 1 (1972).'
The Court states, ante, at 490, that the National Convention 'serves the pervasive national interest in the selection of candidates for national office, and this national interest is greater than any interest of an individual State.' While this may be a perfectly apt statement of a political fact, we believe it is an unnecessarily broad and vague statement to be contained in an opinion of this Court. The political factthat the interest served by national political conventions transcends the boundaries of any single Stateweighs in favor of petitioners on the scale which balances their constitutional claim against the State's interest in the integrity of its electoral process. But the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Pitney in New-berry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 285, 41 S.Ct. 469, 484, 65 L.Ed. 913 (1921), without more, does not establish for us that there is a 'national interest' which standing alone, apart from valid congressional legislation or constitutional provision, would override state regulation in this situation.
Nor can we agree with the Court's characterization of the role of the States in this process when it says that '(t)he States themselves have no constitutionally mandated role in the great task of the selection of Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates.' Ante, at 489490. Under Art. II, § 1, the States are given the power to 'appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct' Presidential electors.
See In re Green, 134 U.S. 377, 379, 10 S.Ct. 586, 587, 33 L.Ed. 951 (1890); McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 2728, 13 S.Ct. 3, 7, 36 L.Ed. 869 (1892); Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 72 S.Ct. 654, 96 L.Ed. 894 (1952); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 291, 91 S.Ct. 260, 347, 27 L.Ed.2d 272 (1970) (opinion of Stewart, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Blackmun, J.). Under our constitutional system, the States also have residual authority in all areas not taken from them by the Constitution or by validly enacted congressional legislation. The question for us, therefore, is not whether the States have a 'constitutionally mandated role' in the task of selecting Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates, but whether the authority of the State of Illinois is sufficient in this case to authorize an injunction flatly prohibiting petitioners from asserting before the Democratic National Convention their claim to be seated as delegates. We do not believe that it is, and therefore concur in the result reached by the Court. But we would rest the result unequivocally on the freedom to assemble and associate guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and neither discuss nor hint at resolution of issues neither presented here nor previously resolved by our cases.
The Illinois Legislature has enacted a comprehensive scheme for regulating the election of delegates to national party conventions, Ill.Rev.Stat., c. 46, § 71 et seq. (1973), including a means by which a defeated candidate may challenge the election. § 763. Respondents were duly elected in primaries held in various election districts in the city of Chicago. Petitioners, for the most part, were people who had lost in these primaries and who eventually were selected in private caucuses as a challenge delegation. They made no challenge under state law but, rather, they successfully unseated respondents at the Convention and had themselves seated as delegates representing the districts in which the ousted delegates had been elected.
I agree with this statement. Had the court's decision been limited to this conclusion, it would not have infringed in any way the associational rights of petitioners or the Democratic Party. The National Convention of the Party may seat whomever it pleases, including petitioners, as delegates at large. The State of Illinois, on the other hand, has a legitimate interest in protecting its citizens from being represented by delegates who have been rejected by these citizens in a democratic election. Accordingly I would affirm the injunctions of the trial court insofar as they barred petitioners from purporting, contrary to Illinois law, to represent certain election districts of that Stat.
The Hearing Officer found violations of Guidelines A1 (minority group participation), A2 (women and youth participation), A5 (existence of party rules), C1 (adequate public notice of party affairs), C4 (timing of delegate selection), and C6 (slate-making). Findings and Report of Cecil F. Poole, Hearing Officer (June 25, 1972). Guideline C6 was as follows:
'C6 Slate-making
The injunction was obtained in a Circuit Court action filed April 19, 1972, by the Wigoda delegates against the Cousins delegates. In the interval between the filing of the suit and the action of the Credentials Committee on June 30, 1972, two proceedings occurred in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois related to the suit. On April 20 petitioners removed the case to that federal court. On May 17 the case was remanded on the ground that there was no basis for federal jurisdiction. Wigoda v. Cousins, D.C., 342 F.Supp. 82. On June 30, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in an unpublished order, affirmed the remand. Wigoda v. Cousins, No. 721384.
(3) whether or to what extent national political parties and their nominating conventions are regulable by, or only by, Congress. See Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 275, 41 S.Ct. 469, 480, 65 L.Ed. 913 (1921) (Pitney, J., dissenting); R. Horn, Groups and the Constitution, 1718 (1956); Note, Freedom of Association and the Selection of Delegates to National Political Conventions, 56 Cornell L.Rev. 148, 152160 (1970).
'The issue which is central to the instant cause is the Illinois Election Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 46, § 71 et seq.), and the right of the plaintiffs who were elected pursuant to its provisions to serve in their elective office. The issue which was central to the litigation which ensued in Keane v. National Democratic Party was the constitutionality of the guidelines of the National Democratic Party . . ..' 14 Ill.App.3d 460, 468469, 302 N.E.2d 614, 623.
Indeed, petitioners maintain only that the Court of Appeals' decision was 'presented' and 'argued' before the Circuit Court judge, not that res judicata was formally pleaded. See Brief for Petitioners 16, 45. Moreover, while petitioners argued in the Circuit Court that the Court of Appeals' injunction against the state proceeding was effective despite this Court's stay, they did not couch the argument in terms of the Court of Appeals' decision having res judicata effect. Transcript of July 8, 1972, pp. 2530, 32 et seq.
Early Presidential nominations were made by caucuses of Members of Congress belonging to the National Parties. See W. Goodman, The Two-Party System in the United States 153158 (3d ed. 1964). There have been recent proposals that parties use regional or national primaries to choose their nominees. See, e.g., New York Times, Apr. 18, 1972, 12, col. 5 (five regional primaries proposed by Senator Packwood; national primary proposed by Senators Mansfield and Aiken).
Several delegations selected according to state law have been denied seating in Convention resolution of disputes. See, e.g., R. Bain & J. Parris, Convention Decisions and Voting Records 283284, 323 (2d ed. (1973) (1952 Republican Convention, Georgia delegation; 1968 Democratic Convention, Mississippi delegation).