Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/663/443/147105/
Timestamp: 2019-11-15 20:17:43
Document Index: 652072433

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1988', '§ 706', '§ 706', '§ 706', '§ 706', '§ 706', '§ 706', '§ 706', '§ 706', '§ 1988', '§ 706', '§ 1988', '§ 706', '§ 1988', '§ 1983', '§ 1988', '§ 706', '§ 1988']

27 Fair Empl.prac.cas. 185,27 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 32,201anna Sullivan, Appellant, v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Labor Andindustry, Bureau of Vocational Rehabilitation; James Bonner,assistant Director, Field Operations; Anthony Renzi,regional Administrator; and John Nolan, Districtadministrator, Appellees, 663 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1981) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Third Circuit › 1981 › 27 Fair Empl.prac.cas. 185,27 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 32,201anna Sullivan, Appellant, v. Commonwealth of...
27 Fair Empl.prac.cas. 185,27 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 32,201anna Sullivan, Appellant, v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Labor Andindustry, Bureau of Vocational Rehabilitation; James Bonner,assistant Director, Field Operations; Anthony Renzi,regional Administrator; and John Nolan, Districtadministrator, Appellees, 663 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1981)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit - 663 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1981) Argued Sept. 17, 1981. Decided Oct. 26, 1981
In the meantime, the efforts of Sullivan's retained counsel spurred on the EEOC inquiry. Her counsel assisted the EEOC in uncovering substantial pertinent information. See Sullivan v. Bureau of Vocational Rehabilitation, 504 F. Supp. 582, 583 (E.D. Pa. 1980). On June 30, 1978, the EEOC concluded that there was reasonable cause to believe that BVR had engaged in an unlawful employment practice under Title VII.
The district court denied her motion on December 24, 1980. The district court noted that in New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 100 S. Ct. 2024, 64 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1980), the Supreme Court held that attorneys' fees could be recovered under section 706(k) for work done in state administrative and judicial proceedings that were a statutory prerequisite to Title VII relief in federal court. From this, the district court reasoned that because the arbitration in which Sullivan prevailed was an enforcement mechanism additional to, and not required by, Title VII's enforcement scheme, it was not an "action or proceeding under" Title VII within the meaning of section 706(k), and hence attorneys' fees under that section were not available. 504 F. Supp. at 584-85. Because Sullivan had obtained all the other relief she had sought in her suit from the arbitrator, on January 6, 1981, the district court dismissed Sullivan's entire complaint as moot.
The Supreme Court, this court, and other courts of appeals have given section 706(k) a liberal reading, in line with Congress' intent to facilitate the bringing of discrimination complaints. See Carey, supra, 447 U.S. at 63, 100 S. Ct. at 2030.4 In particular, the courts have stressed that an award of attorneys' fees under section 706(k) and its companion provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1988,5 is not limited to the situation in which the plaintiff prevails by a judgment in the Title VII action itself, by a favorable resolution of state administrative proceedings, or by a judgment in any other civil rights action. Rather, they have held that attorneys' fees are available whenever a civil rights cause of action ultimately results in the plaintiff's having obtained relief, even when there are several links in the chain of events connecting the claim brought and the relief granted. In Maher v. Gagne, 100 S. Ct. 2570, 65 L. Ed. 2d 653, 448 U.S. 122 (1980), for example, the Supreme Court upheld an award of attorneys' fees under section 1988 where the plaintiff's case was settled by a consent decree that gave the plaintiff substantially all the relief she had sought in her complaint. The Court stated:
In Ross v. Horn, 598 F.2d 1312 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 906, 100 S. Ct. 3048, 65 L. Ed. 2d 1136 (1980), the plaintiffs filed suit in district court challenging New Jersey's procedure for handling suspected fraud in unemployment benefits. After the suit was filed, New Jersey made changes in its benefit processing system that cured the alleged faults in the system. This action then led to judgment being entered against the plaintiffs. Nevertheless, this court ruled that the plaintiffs might still be entitled to attorneys' fees:
Similarly, in Morrison v. Ayoob, 627 F.2d 669 (3d Cir. 1980) (per curiam), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1102, 101 S. Ct. 898, 66 L. Ed. 2d 828 (1981), the plaintiffs' complaint that certain Pennsylvania county district justices were violating criminal defendants' right to counsel was mooted when the justices stopped violating that right after the suit was filed. The district court's finding that the suit was a "material factor" in bringing about the relief sought was upheld on the basis of the connection between the institution of the suit and the cessation of the justices' activity. In doing so, this court observed that the challenged activity terminated only after the plaintiffs' action had been filed and counsel for both sides had conferred.6 In discussing the question of attorneys' fees under section 1988, the court stated:
BVR's position, adopted by the district court, is that although Sullivan may have prevailed in her collective bargaining arbitration, she was not a prevailing party in an "action or proceeding under" Title VII, inasmuch as an arbitration is not an "action or proceeding under" that title. See 504 F. Supp. at 585. Thus, BVR claims, and the district court held, that the literal requirements of section 706(k) had not been met.
Here, the determination that Sullivan's lawsuit was a material factor in bringing about her success in the arbitration is not contested. The record shows that before the EEOC made its determination favorable to Sullivan, the union was uncertain as to the merits of her grievance, and had ceased acting on it for a full year pending the outcome of the EEOC proceedings. App. at 16. The EEOC's decision encouraged the union to bring Sullivan's case to arbitration. Id. at 17. The union's presentation of Sullivan's case at the arbitration was largely based on the information developed by Sullivan's retained counsel during the EEOC and discovery phases of Sullivan's Title VII action. 504 F. Supp. at 583.9 The record, therefore, is sufficient to establish the necessary causal link between the efforts of Sullivan's counsel in the Title VII proceedings and the successful resolution of Sullivan's claim. We are satisfied that if attorneys' fees compensating counsel for Title VII activities are to be awarded when Title VII rights are vindicated after a full trial in the district court, such fees for the same activities should similarly be awarded when Title VII rights are vindicated through other means, such as, in this case, arbitration.10 IV.
I am not unsympathetic with the argument of the appellant, whose pursuit of her Title VII rights contributed to her eventual success at arbitration, but who, until now, was denied an award of attorney's fees. Nonetheless, I am constrained both by the language of § 706(k) and by the Supreme Court's recent decision in New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 100 S. Ct. 2024, 64 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1980), to dissent.
The district court relied on New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 100 S. Ct. 2024, 64 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1980), in holding that, because the arbitration proceeding was not an action or proceeding under Title VII, Sullivan was not entitled to an attorney's fee award. In Gaslight Club, the Supreme Court concluded that state proceedings "to which the complainant was referred pursuant to the provisions of Title VII " were "proceedings" under that title for purposes of § 706(k). 447 U.S. at 71, 100 S. Ct. at 2034 (emphasis added). The district court viewed Gaslight Club as controlling, declaring that
504 F. Supp. at 584 (emphasis added).
The majority accepts this contention by Sullivan. In so doing it relies on a line of cases, unrelated to Gaslight Club, which hold, in effect, that if the plaintiff's Title VII lawsuit is a catalyst in achieving her objective, she is a "prevailing party" for purposes of § 706(k) whether or not the Title VII action proceeded to judgment. E. g., Morrison v. Ayoob, 627 F.2d 669 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1102, 101 S. Ct. 898, 66 L. Ed. 2d 828 (1981); Ross v. Horn, 598 F.2d 1312 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 906, 100 S. Ct. 3048, 65 L. Ed. 2d 1136 (1980). See also Robinson v. Kimbrough, 620 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1980); Criterion Club of Albany v. Commissioners of Dougherty County, 594 F.2d 118 (5th Cir. 1979).
Unfortunately for the plaintiff, none of the "catalyst" cases are dispositive in the present proceeding. On the whole, they address the situation in which the plaintiff's suit itself motivates the defendants voluntarily to change their conduct. In Morrison v. Ayoob, supra, for example, the plaintiffs filed suit alleging that the district justices of Beaver County, Pennsylvania, had violated the right-to-counsel rule of Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S. Ct. 2006, 32 L. Ed. 2d 530 (1972). While the action was pending, the defendants voluntarily began to comply with Argersinger. The court held that because the suit filed by the plaintiff was a material factor in bringing about the change in the defendant's conduct, the plaintiff could be deemed the "prevailing party." 627 F.2d at 671. Similarly, in Ross v. Horn, supra, this Court concluded that the chronology of events strongly suggested a causal relationship between the case at bar challenging the procedures used by the New Jersey Department of Labor and Industry to prevent fraud in the receipt of unemployment benefits and the new procedures voluntarily adopted by the Department, which effectively mooted the claims in the case. Judge Higginbotham, for a unanimous panel, stated that "(i)n assessing who is a prevailing party, we look to the substance of the outcome. If the new procedures, which provided much of the relief appellants had initially sought, were implemented as a result of this lawsuit, the appellants were prevailing parties...." 598 F.2d at 1322. Other circuits have announced a similar formulation. See e. g., Robinson v. Kimbrough, supra at 476 ("plaintiffs may recover attorneys' fees if their lawsuit is a substantial factor or a significant catalyst in motivating the defendants to end their unconstitutional behavior") (emphasis added).
It is important to emphasize the rationale underlying Mitchell, Ross, and the other "catalyst" cases. In such situations, the defendants, faced with the prospect of Title VII litigation, have three choices: they can litigate, risking an unfavorable judgment; they can accede to a consent decree; or they can spontaneously modify their conduct so as to moot the lawsuit. Clearly, if the parties choose to litigate, attorney's fees are available, under § 706(k), to the prevailing party. A similar result ensues if the parties negotiate a settlement in which the plaintiff receives the relief he or she seeks. See Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 100 S. Ct. 2570, 65 L. Ed. 2d 653 (1980). Mitchell and Ross merely applied § 706(k) to the situation in which the defendants chose not to litigate or to settle the lawsuit, but voluntarily decided, in response to the lawsuit, to alter their discriminatory behavior. The cases are thus consistent with the expression of congressional intent found in the legislative history of the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976, S.Rep.No.94-1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in (1976) U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 5908, 5912: "(F)or purposes of the award of counsel fees, parties may be considered to have prevailed when they vindicate rights through a consent judgment or without formally obtaining relief " (emphasis added). As Congress recognized, the plaintiff's institution of a lawsuit can evoke several responses from his or her adversary; as long as the plaintiff obtains the relief sought as a result of the lawsuit, no specific form of relief is required.
While there may be a causal link here, in my view it is simply too attenuated to warrant a holding, by this Court, that Sullivan prevailed in an "action or proceeding under (Title VII)." It must be stressed that § 706(k) is an exception to the general "American" rule that each party pay its own attorney's fee. See Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 95 S. Ct. 1612, 44 L. Ed. 2d 141 (1975). Thus, though we may construe this civil rights statute broadly, we are limited by its terms: "In any action or proceeding under (Title VII) the court ... may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fee...." As Gaslight Club made clear-and as Sullivan concedes-the arbitration proceeding under which Sullivan prevailed is not an "action or proceeding" under Title VII. Nonetheless, the majority today holds that a plaintiff who pursues her rights under both Title VII and her union contract, and who prevails under the latter, is entitled to a counsel fee under § 706(k) of Title VII if the Title VII lawsuit "encourages" the union to fulfill its duty to represent fairly its aggrieved member, and if the union uses the work product of plaintiff's Title VII counsel in successfully pursuing plaintiff's contract claim. In stretching § 706(k) to accommodate this scenario, the majority has, I fear, twisted both the language of the statute and Congress' stated intent in enacting the fee-shifting provision of Title VII.
F. Supp. at 583. These observations made by the district court are consistent with the union affidavits that we have quoted. BVR's affidavits do not contradict the union's affidavits or these claims
As the Supreme Court noted in New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 63, 100 S. Ct. 2024, 2030, 64 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1980), "Because Congress has cast the Title VII plaintiff in the role of 'a private attorney general,' vindicating a policy 'of the highest priority,' a prevailing plaintiff 'ordinarily is to be awarded attorney's fees in all but special circumstances' " (quoting Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 416-17, 98 S. Ct. 694, 697-98, 54 L. Ed. 2d 648 (1978))
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of section() ... 1983 ..., the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.
Since § 1988 is similar in purpose and design to § 706(k) of Title VII, see S.Rep.No.94-1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in (1976) U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 5908, 5912; Carey, supra, 447 U.S. at 70 n.9, 100 S. Ct. at 2034, cases interpreting § 1988 can be applied to § 706(k) as well.
We reject BVR's argument that for attorneys' fees to be available under a "catalyst theory," "the relief sought and obtained must affect a class or a large section of the public, no(t) merely the individual plaintiff bringing the suit." Appellees' Brief at 19. There is no support in the statute, legislative history, or cases for such a requirement. Section 706(k) expressly applies to "any action or proceeding under (Title VII)" (emphasis added). Cf. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 9, 100 S. Ct. 2502, 2506, 65 L. Ed. 2d 555 (1980) (under § 1988, "(attorneys') fees are available in any § 1983 action"). As the Second Circuit observed in Zarcone v. Perry, 581 F.2d 1039, 1042 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1072, 99 S. Ct. 843, 59 L. Ed. 2d 38 (1979):
Accord, Milwe v. Cavuoto, 653 F.2d 80, 83 (2d Cir. 1981); Perez v. University of P. R., 600 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1979). See also Comment, Attorney's Fees in Damage Actions Under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 47 U. Chi. L. Rev. 332, 343 (1980) ("Congress intended that fees be recoverable in all suits brought under the statutes listed in section 1988-not because of the number of persons affected, but because of the nature of the substantive rights they protect"). We are not persuaded that we should depart from these principles when the "catalyst theory" is invoked. The mere fact that many cases applying the "catalyst theory" have involved broad-based relief does not mean that such broad relief is a requisite for application of the theory. Cf. Gibbs v. Town of Frisco City, Alabama Police Dep't, 626 F.2d 1218, 1221 (5th Cir. 1980) ("This court ... has warned against distinguishing for § 1988 purposes among cases depending on the category of the right vindicated.").
We recognize that the district court relied on Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 94 S. Ct. 1011, 39 L. Ed. 2d 147 (1974), in concluding that attorneys' fees could not be awarded to Sullivan. However, Alexander holds no more than that Title VII rights may be enforced in federal court without regard to the availability of a remedy under a collective bargaining agreement. Alexander does not speak to the issue that we have discussed and resolved here; i. e., the availability of § 706(k) and § 1988 attorneys' fees where there is a causal nexus between the result obtained by the plaintiff and the civil rights lawsuit
This discussion does not address the question whether a prevailing defendant is entitled to attorney's fees in a case such as the one at hand. See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 434 U.S. 412, 98 S. Ct. 694, 54 L. Ed. 2d 648 (1978)
See, e. g., United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 555, 99 S. Ct. 2470, 61 L. Ed. 2d 68 (1979) ("Under our constitutional framework, federal courts do not sit as councils of revision, empowered to rewrite legislation in accord with their own conceptions of prudent public policy. See Anderson v. Wilson, 289 U.S. 20, 27, 53 S. Ct. 417, 77 L. Ed. 1004 (1933). Only when a literal construction of a statute yields results so manifestly unreasonable that they could not fairly be attributed to congressional design will an exception to statutory language be judicially implied. See TVA v. Hill, (437 U.S. 153, 187, 98 S. Ct. 2279, 57 L. Ed. 2d 117 (1978)).")