Source: https://openjurist.org/329/f3d/1286
Timestamp: 2019-12-13 03:34:10
Document Index: 324451269

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 39', '§ 39', '§ 39', '§ 39', '§ 39', '§ 39', '§ 1291', '§ 39']

329 F3d 1286 Doe Dm No Bo v. A Kearney | OpenJurist
329 F. 3d 1286 - Doe Dm No Bo v. A Kearney
329 F3d 1286 Doe Dm No Bo v. A Kearney
329 F.3d 1286
John DOE, Jane Doe, individually and on behalf of their minor children, D.M., N.O., and B.O., and on behalf of a class of similarly situated persons in the State of Florida, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
Kathleen A. KEARNEY, Secretary of Florida Department of Children and Family Services, Dox Dixon, District Administrator for District 6 of Florida Department of Children and Family Services, in their official capacities, Deborah O'Brien, in her personal capacity, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 02-13874.
Mark R. Brown, St. Petersburg, FL, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
The third criterion — redressability — presents a greater hurdle for Appellants. The alleged injury — Florida's temporary removal of their children — has already occurred and will not necessarily occur again. See Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105-06, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 1667, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) (no redressability in the absence of "a real and immediate threat" that challenged state action will re-occur). Nevertheless, the redressability requirement will usually be satisfied where there is evidence that the plaintiff is likely to encounter the same injurious conduct in the future. See City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 459 n. 7, 107 S.Ct. 2502, 2508 n. 7, 96 L.Ed.2d 398 (1987); see also Lynch, 744 F.2d at 1456-57 (recognizing that "[p]ast wrongs do constitute evidence bearing on whether there is a real and immediate threat of repeated injury which could be averted by the issuing of an injunction").
Though a close issue, we conclude the redressability requirement is satisfied in this case. DCF has classified John Doe as fitting a "pattern of sexual offenders" and has now investigated him on two separate occasions. Given this classification and history, it seems reasonably likely that Appellants could encounter future state action under § 39.401(1). Moreover, the Supreme Court has recognized an exception to the basic standing requirement in cases where a plaintiff's claims are "capable of repetition, yet evading review." Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 110 n. 11, 95 S.Ct. 854, 861 n. 11, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975); see also Lynch, 744 F.2d at 1457. Pretrial detention falls into this category because it is "by nature temporary, and it is most unlikely that any given individual could have his constitutional claim decided on appeal before he is either released or convicted." Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 110 n. 11, 95 S.Ct. at 861 n. 11. The removal of Appellants' children — though not a criminal detention as in Gerstein — is nevertheless a form of pretrial detention that will typically have ended by the time a legal challenge can be mounted. See Fla. Stat. § 39.401(3) (requiring a hearing within 24 hours of state's removal of children). Consequently, any constitutional injury will likely be too fleeting to be redressed and hence qualifies as being capable of repetition yet evading review.
The Supreme Court has held that parents have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the care, custody and management of their children. See Santosky, 102 S.Ct. at 1397. "As a general rule, therefore, before parents may be deprived of the care, custody or management of their children without their consent, due process — ordinarily a court proceeding resulting in an order permitting removal — must be accorded to them." Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 593 (2d Cir.1999) (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 1212, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972)). "At the same time, however, the State has a profound interest in the welfare of the child, particularly his or her being sheltered from abuse." Id. at 593-94. Consequently, courts have recognized that a state may constitutionally remove children threatened with imminent harm when it is justified by emergency circumstances. See, e.g., Mabe v. San Bernardino County, Dep't of Pub. Soc. Servs., 237 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir.2001); Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d 1000, 1020 (7th Cir.2000); Tenenbaum, 193 F.3d at 593-94; Hollingsworth v. Hill, 110 F.3d 733, 739 (10th Cir.1997); Jordan by Jordan v. Jackson, 15 F.3d 333, 346 (4th Cir.1994); cf. United States v. Edmondson, 791 F.2d 1512, 1514 (11th Cir.1986) (allowing warrantless search and seizure in criminal cases where exigent circumstances exist). By limiting warrantless removals to true emergencies, the law "seeks to strike a balance among the rights and interests of parents, children, and the State." Tenenbaum, 193 F.3d at 594.
The problem with this argument — as far as Appellants' facial challenge is concerned — is that it is aimed at DCF's application of § 39.401(1). Section 39.401(1) authorizes the state's warrantless removal of children in cases where the child is believed to be in imminent danger of abuse. Although Appellants contend that DCF has artificially inflated the meaning of "imminent danger," the face of the statute is silent as to what circumstances may reasonably be considered to constitute "imminent danger." As Appellants have themselves acknowledged, it is possible to apply § 39.401(1) in a manner that does not offend due process. By definition, then, § 39.401(1) is not facially unconstitutional.
Appellants' as-applied challenge — like their facial challenge — hinges on their argument that O'Brien's warrantless removal of their children was not actually supported by emergency circumstances and therefore violated due process. The issue boils down to how we define an emergency.10 Appellants assert an emergency must be defined by reference to the feasibility of obtaining a court order before effecting a removal. Stated differently, they argue that if there is time to obtain a court order without exacerbating the risk to the child, then there can never be an emergency and the state must obtain a court order no matter how emergent the child's circumstances otherwise appear. They would have us craft a rule that reads something like this: Due process requires that a state official obtain a court order prior to removing a suspected victim of child abuse from parental custody, unless: (1) the official has probable cause to believe the child is in imminent danger of abuse; and (2) the official reasonably determines that there is insufficient time to obtain judicial permission before temporarily removing the child.
None of the cases cited by Appellants — with one exception which we will address — supports the proposition that a child welfare worker must specifically determine whether there is time to obtain a court order before conducting an emergency removal. To the contrary, these cases simply recognize — as we do — that a state may not remove a child from parental custody without judicial authorization unless there is probable cause to believe the child is threatened with imminent harm. See, e.g., Roska v. Peterson, 304 F.3d 982, 993 (10th Cir.2002) (recognizing that while "the mere possibility of danger" does not justify a warrantless removal, "emergency circumstances which pose an immediate threat to the safety of a child" do); Brokaw, 235 F.3d at 1020 (observing that due process requires "that governmental officials will not remove a child from his home without an investigation and pre-deprivation hearing resulting in a court order of removal, absent exigent circumstances"); Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1138 (9th Cir.2000) ("Officials may remove a child from the custody of its parent without prior judicial authorization only if the information they possess at the time of the seizure is such as provides reasonable cause to believe that the child is in imminent danger of serious bodily injury and that the scope of the intrusion is reasonably necessary to avert that specific injury."); Hollingsworth, 110 F.3d at 739 ("Removal of children from the custody of their parents requires pre-deprivation notice and a hearing `except for extraordinary situations where some valid governmental interest is at stake that justifies postponing the hearing until after the event.'") (citation omitted); Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. for City of Baltimore, 901 F.2d 387, 393 (4th Cir.1990) ("Due process does not mandate a prior hearing in cases where emergency action may be needed to protect a child."). Contrary to Appellants' position, none of these cases held that imminent danger must be defined by reference to a court's schedule.
Applying this standard to the facts of Tenenbaum, the Second Circuit observed that CWA employees routinely failed to consider whether there was time to obtain court authorization before taking children — and did not do so in Sarah's case. Id. at 591, 595. Thus, the court concluded the plaintiffs could demonstrate a violation of their procedural due process rights.12 Id. at 595.
We agree that the sole focus should not be whether there is time to obtain a court order. The Second Circuit's holding in Tenenbaum, which seems "so measured and reasonable in the pages of a federal appellate opinion, will work serious harm in an exceptionally sensitive area of state responsibility." Id. at 610 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).13 As we have previously alluded to, due process is a flexible concept — particularly where the well-being of children is concerned — and deciding what process is due in any given case requires a careful balancing of the interests at stake, including the interests of parents, children, and the state. Those interests may be implicated to varying degrees depending on the facts of an individual case, which will necessarily affect the degree of procedural due process required. This kind of subtle balancing cannot be properly accomplished when courts blunt the inquiry by simply asking whether there was time to get a warrant.
Appellants are referred to herein pseudonymously
Appellants filed this action as a class action, but the district court denied class certification and struck all class action allegations. The district court also dismissed claims for damages against state officials in their official capacities on the basis of Eleventh Amendment immunity. These rulings have not been appealed
D.M. is Jane Doe's daughter from a previous marriage. N.O. and B.O. are Appellants' children from their marriage
Appellants contend there is no evidence such a determination was ever made
John Doe was also previously convicted of four counts of burglary, for which he served approximately nine years in prison
O'Brien appears to have mistakenly read the FDLE report as reflecting a conviction for "child fondling." In actuality, John Doe was convicted of lewd and lascivious behavior for fondlinghimself in front of children. It appears from the police report that John Doe was masturbating in his vehicle in close proximity to two young girls standing at a school bus stop. He claimed he was unaware that the girls were nearby.
O'Brien testified she arrived at this conclusion only after interviewing the Does and in light of the evidence she had gathered up to that point, including T.O.'s allegation of abuse, the 1995 DCF report of abuse, and John Doe's criminal past. O'Brien's conclusion that Jane Doe could not adequately protect the children may have been influenced by the 1995 report of abuse indicating that John Doe had abused a three-year old boy whom Jane Doe was babysitting. O'Brien also testified that she was concerned by Appellants' refusal to make any statements concerning allegations of child abuse, and that she found Jane Doe to be "very protective of her husband."
In the event the state determines a child needs to be sheltered, a hearing must be held no more than 24 hours after the removal. Fla. Stat. § 39.401(3)
Appellants appealed the district court's April 9, 2001, order denying their motion for partial summary judgment. On April 4, 2002, this Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the district court had not actually resolved the claims for injunctive reliefSee 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Subsequently, on June 26, 2002, the district court entered an amended order concluding § 39.401(1) is facially constitutional and that O'Brien did not apply the statute in an unconstitutional manner when she removed the Doe children. Appellants then commenced the instant appeal.
The term "emergency" as used in this context is synonymous with "exigency" and "imminent danger." We have found that courts use them interchangeablySee, e.g., Mabe, 237 F.3d at 1106 ("Government officials are required to obtain prior judicial authorization before intruding on a parent's custody of her child unless they possess ... reasonable cause to believe that the child is in imminent danger....") (quotation omitted); Brokaw, 235 F.3d at 1020 (stating that due process requires "that government officials will not remove a child from his home without an investigation and pre-deprivation hearing resulting in a court order of removal, absent exigent circumstances"); Tenenbaum, 193 F.3d at 594 ("In emergency circumstances a child may be taken into custody by a responsible State official without court authorization or parental consent.") (quotation omitted).
We recognize that it is important for courts to scrutinize officials' conduct as well as the objective danger to the child. Otherwise, child welfare workers could conceivably manufacture an emergency by unreasonably failing to act until it became necessary to remove a child from parental custody without prior court authorization. But officials' conduct is only one of several relevant factors that may be considered
Despite finding evidence of a constitutional violation inTenenbaum, the Second Circuit upheld the dismissal of the claims against the individual defendants based on qualified immunity. Tenenbaum, 193 F.3d at 596.
We also note some important factual distinctions betweenTenenbaum and the instant case. In Tenenbaum, child welfare workers admitted their motivation in removing Sarah was to examine the child in order to rule out the possibility of abuse, rather than to protect her from any imminent danger of abuse. 193 F.3d at 590. Moreover, there was an unexplained day-long delay between the decision to remove Sarah from school and her actual removal. Id. Finally, child welfare workers did not seek legal advice despite the availability of CWA lawyers. Id. Thus, while we disagree with the Second Circuit in terms of how emergency circumstances should be defined, we agree with that court's conclusion that the circumstances in Tenenbaum did not demonstrate an emergency sufficient to obviate the need for a warrant. In contrast, the record in this case shows that O'Brien removed the Doe children in order to protect them from what she believed to be imminent danger of abuse, consulted with legal counsel, and acted swiftly once the decision was made to remove the children.
Although O'Brien may have misconstrued parts of the FDLE report — including her apparently erroneous conclusion that John Doe had been convicted of "child fondling" — it was not unreasonable for her to infer that John Doe had some dangerous proclivities based on his undisputed criminal record
Additionally, insofar as Appellants may be challenging O'Brien's warrantless entry into their home, the record demonstrates that they gave her consent to enter. Under those circumstances, a warrantless entry does not violate the Fourth AmendmentSee Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 2797, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990). Even if Appellants had not given O'Brien consent to enter their home, the warrantless entry was justified in this case by exigent circumstances.