Source: https://www.scribd.com/doc/297520133/Tuaua-v-US-Cert-Petition-Appendix
Timestamp: 2018-12-10 10:59:46
Document Index: 738922605

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1', '§ 1408', '§ 2', '§ 3', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1101', '§ 1408', '§ 1440', '§ 532', '§ 1661', '§ 1662', '§ 1125', '§ 1141', '§ 1320', '§ 2', '§ 3', '§ 8', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 2', '§ 1', '§ 25', '§ 1', '§ 1101', '§ 1408', '§ 1440', '§ 532', '§ 1254', '§ 1391', '§ 1661', '§ 1662', '§ 1031', '§ 121', '§ 134', '§ 11', '§ 2', '§ 41', '§ 41', '§ 1125', '§ 1141', '§ 1320', '§ 1254', '§ 1', '§ 1408', '§ 2', '§ 3', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1661', '§ 1662', '§ 1101', '§ 1408', '§ 1101', '§ 1125', '§ 2', '§ 3', '§ 1', '§ 532', '§ 1', '§ 25', '§ 2', '§ 41', '§ 1031', '§ 121', '§ 11', '§ 134', '§ 2', '§ 1101', '§ 1440', '§ 1661', '§ 1', '§ 2', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1101', '§ 8', '§ 1391', '§ 1408', '§ 1125', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1101', '§ 308', '§ 3', '§ 101', '§ 1101', '§ 308', '§ 1408', '§ 1125', '§ 2401', '§ 3', '§ 8', '§ 2', '§ 3', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1101', '§ 1408', '§ 1440', '§ 532', '§ 1661', '§ 1662', '§ 1125', '§ 1141', '§ 1320']

Tuaua v US, Cert Petition & Appendix | United States Nationality Law | U.S. State
Petition for Certiorari to Supreme Court and Appendix Tuaua v. United States is a federal lawsuit brought by Leneuoti Tuaua, the Samoan Federation of America, and others born in American Samoa who believe that so long as American Samoa is a part of the United States, people born in American Samoa have a right to U.S. citizenship under the Constitution. Plaintiffs are represented by Theodore B. Olson at Gibson, Dunn, & Crutcher, a global law firm, Neil C. Weare, President of We the People Project, a national organization dedicated to achieving equal rights and representation for the nearly 5 million Americans living in U.S. territories and the District of Columbia; and Charles V. Ala'ilima, a prominent American Samoan attorney.
Tuaua v US, Cert Petition &amp; Appendix
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LENEUOTI FIAFIA TUAUA,
VA’ALEAMA TOVIA FOSI, FANUATANU F. L. MAMEA,
ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND HIS THREE MINOR CHILDREN,
TAFFY-LEI T. MAENE, EMY FIATALA AFALAVA, AND
SAMOAN FEDERATION OF AMERICA, INC.,
CHARLES V. ALA’ILIMA
ALA’ILIMA AND ASSOCIATES P.C.
(684) 699-6732
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship
Clause provides that “[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States.” U.S.
Const. amend. XIV, § 1. American Samoa has been a
United States Territory for more than a century. Yet
persons born in American Samoa, alone among those
born within the sovereign territorial limits of the
United States, are denied recognition as U.S. citizens
at birth. 8 U.S.C. § 1408(1).
The question presented is whether the Citizenship Clause entitles persons born in American Samoa, a U.S. Territory, to birthright citizenship.
All petitioners in this Court (plaintiffs-appellants
below) are named in the caption.
Defendants-appellees below (respondents here)
were the United States of America; the U.S. Department of State; John F. Kerry, in his official capacity
as U.S. Secretary of State; and Michelle Bond, in her
official capacity as U.S. Assistant Secretary of State
for Consular Affairs.
The American Samoa Government and Aumua
Amata, American Samoa’s delegate to Congress, intervened in the court of appeals in support of defendants-appellees, and are therefore also respondents in
Petitioner Samoan Federation of America, Inc., is
a 501(c)(3) non-profit organization that has no parent
REGULATORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED .............. 1
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ....... 15
THE QUESTION WHETHER CONGRESS
MAY WITHHOLD BIRTHRIGHT
CITIZENSHIP FROM PERSONS BORN IN A
UNITED STATES TERRITORY IS
EXCEPTIONALLY IMPORTANT .......................... 16
II. THE DECISION BELOW CONTRAVENES
THE CONSTITUTION AND THIS COURT’S
PRECEDENT .................................................... 19
A. The Court Of Appeals’ Holding
Cannot Be Reconciled With The
Constitutional Text, Structure,
History, Or Purpose ............................... 20
B. The Decision Below Conflicts With
This Court’s Precedent Construing
The Citizenship Clause .......................... 24
C. The Insular Cases Are Inapposite
And Cannot Justify The Court Of
Appeals’ Reading Of The
Citizenship Clause ................................. 27
TO RESOLVE THIS IMPORTANT
QUESTION ...................................................... 34
APPENDIX A: Court of Appeals’ Opinion,
788 F.3d 300 (D.C. Cir. June 5, 2015) ................ 1a
APPENDIX B: District Court’s Opinion,
951 F. Supp. 2d 88 (D.D.C. June 26, 2015) ...... 24a
APPENDIX C: Court of Appeals’ Order
Denying Rehearing (D.C. Cir. Oct. 2, 2015)..... 44a
APPENDIX D: Constitutional, Statutory,
and Regulatory Provisions Involved ................ 46a
U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 ................... 46a
U.S. Const. art. I, § 3, cl. 3 ................... 46a
U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 ................. 46a
U.S. Const. amend. XIII, § 1 ................ 47a
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §§ 1-2 ........... 47a
8 U.S.C. § 1101 (excerpt) ...................... 48a
8 U.S.C. § 1408 ..................................... 48a
8 U.S.C. § 1440 ..................................... 50a
10 U.S.C. § 532 (excerpt) ...................... 53a
48 U.S.C. § 1661 ................................... 54a
48 U.S.C. § 1662 ................................... 55a
Dep’t of State, Foreign Affairs Manual:
7 F.A.M. § 1125.1 ................................. 55a
7 F.A.M. § 1141 .................................... 56a
7 F.A.M. § 1320, App. B (excerpt) ........ 59a
387 U.S. 253 (1967) .................... 2, 7, 19, 23, 30, 32
133 S. Ct. 2247 (2013) ..........................................28
258 U.S. 298 (1922) .............................................. 30
553 U.S. 723 (2008) ........................ 4, 28, 30, 32, 33
7 Co. Rep. 1a, 77 Eng. Rep. 377 (1608) .................5
96 F. 202 (D. Wash. 1899)....................................22
8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 321 (1808) .................................5
182 U.S. 1 (1901) ..................................................29
554 U.S. 570 (2008) ........................................ 20, 26
195 U.S. 138 (1904) .............................................. 29
182 U.S. 144 (1901) ........................................ 28, 33
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) .................................6
112 U.S. 94 (1884) ................................................25
Examining Bd. of Eng’rs, Architects &
Surveyors v. Flores de Otero,
426 U.S. 572 (1976) ........................................ 29, 30
2 Mass. 244 (1805) .................................................6
192 U.S. 1 (1904) ..................................................29
28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99 (1830) .......................................5
491 U.S. 701 (1989) ........................................ 23, 24
372 U.S. 144 (1963) .............................................. 30
138 F.3d 518 (3d Cir. 1998) .................................34
13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 73 (1829) ......................................6
18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 317 (1820) ..............................21
1 Sand. Ch. 583 (N.Y. Ch. 1844) ............................6
561 U.S. 742 (2010) .............................................. 31
88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1875) .................................5
3 Am. Samoa 82 (1953) ..........................................8
Nat’l Bank v. County of Yankton,
101 U.S. 129 (1880) .............................................. 27
134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014) ..........................................20
611 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2010) ................................34
19 F. Cas. 609 (C.C.D. Mass. 1828) ................. 6, 26
35 F.3d 1449 (9th Cir. 1994) ................................34
354 U.S. 1 (1957) ............................................ 28, 29
464 U.S. 16 (1983) ................................................21
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) ......................... 3, 7, 24
124 U.S. 465 (1888) ................................................5
522 U.S. 3 (1997) ..................................................35
442 U.S. 465 (1979) .............................................. 28
356 U.S. 86 (1958) ................................................30
27 F. Cas. 785 (C.C.D. Ky. 1866) ...........................6
169 U.S. 649 (1898) ........ 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 13, 23, 25, 26
136 F.3d 914 (2d Cir. 1998) .................................34
132 S. Ct. 1421 (2012) ..........................................20
art. I, § 2, cl. 2 .................................................. 5, 10
art. I, § 3, cl. 3 .................................................. 5, 10
art. I, § 8, cl. 1 ......................................................28
art. II, § 1, cl. 5 ................................................. 5, 10
amend. XIV, § 1 ...................................... 2, 7, 20, 29
amend. XIV, § 2 .............................................. 13, 21
Haw. Const. art. II, § 1 ..............................................11
Wash. Const. art. III, § 25 ......................................... 11
Ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866)..............................24
8 U.S.C. § 1101 ......................................... 10, 17, 27
8 U.S.C. § 1408 ................................................. 2, 10
8 U.S.C. § 1440 .....................................................17
STATUTES (continued)
United States Code (continued)
10 U.S.C. § 532 ..................................................... 11
28 U.S.C. § 1254 .....................................................1
28 U.S.C. § 1391 ................................................... 34
48 U.S.C. § 1661 ............................................... 8, 18
48 U.S.C. § 1662 ............................................... 8, 18
Cal. Gov’t Code § 1031 .............................................. 11
§ 121-14 ................................................................ 11
§ 134-2 .................................................................. 11
24 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 11-1109 .....................................11
§ 2.36.070..............................................................11
§ 41.08.060............................................................11
§ 41.08.070............................................................ 11
INSTRUMENTS OF CESSION
Instrument of Cession by Chiefs of Manu’a
Islands to U.S. Gov’t (July 14, 1904) ..................... 8
Instrument of Cession by Chiefs of Tutuila
to U.S. Gov’t (Apr. 17, 1900) .................................. 8
Dep’t of State, Foreign Affairs Manual
7 F.A.M. § 1125.1 .................................................10
7 F.A.M. § 1141 ....................................................10
7 F.A.M. § 1320, App. B ....................................... 10
Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (1866)
p. 2890 .............................................................. 7, 23
p. 2893 .............................................................. 7, 23
p. 2894 .............................................................. 7, 23
p. 2896 ....................................................................7
Flag Day 2015 at Veterans Memorial
Stadium, Samoa News (Apr. 17, 2015),
http://tinyurl.com/gt2qygr .....................................9
Ltr. from J.B. Henderson to Hon. C.E.
Littlefield (June 28, 1901), reproduced in
Charles E. Littlefield, The Insular Cases
(II: Dred Scott v. Sandford),
15 Harv. L. Rev. 281 (1901) ........................... 21, 22
Reuel S. Moore & Joseph R. Farrington, The
American Samoan Commission’s Visit to
Samoa, September-October 1930 (1931)..............32
(2d ed. 1829) ..................................................... 6, 26
OTHER AUTHORITIES (continued)
Anna Williams Shavers, A Century of
Developing Citizenship Law and the
Nebraska Influence: A Centennial Essay,
70 Neb. L. Rev. 462 (1991) ...................................25
Juan R. Torruella, The Insular Cases: A
Declaration of Their Bankruptcy and
My Harvard Pronouncement, in
Reconsidering the Insular Cases 61
(Gerald L. Neuman & Tomiko
Brown-Nagin eds., 2015) .....................................33
U.S. Army Reserve, American Samoa and
the United States Army Reserve,
http://tinyurl.com/zcdw3dq ....................................9
U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs.,
The Citizen’s Almanac (2014),
http://tinyurl.com/qfesah6 .....................................3
Veterans Take Center Stage in 2015 Flag
Day, Talanei.com (Apr. 17, 2015),
http://tinyurl.com/hjzb44c ......................................9
Petitioners respectfully submit this petition for a
writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
The court of appeals’ opinion (Pet. App. 1a-23a)
is reported at 788 F.3d 300. The district court’s opinion (Pet. App. 24a-43a) is reported at 951 F. Supp. 2d
88. The court of appeals’ order denying rehearing
(Pet. App. 44a-45a) is not reported.
The court of appeals entered its judgment on
June 5, 2015. A timely rehearing petition was denied on October 2, 2015. Pet. App. 44a-45a. On December 14, 2015, the Chief Justice extended the time
for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari until February 1, 2016. No. 15A623. This Court’s jurisdiction
is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
Pertinent constitutional, statutory, and regulatory provisions are reproduced at Pet. App. 46a-59a.
Few questions are more fundamental to the Nation’s constitutional design than which persons are
unconditionally entitled to claim the Nation as their
own and to bear the rights and responsibilities of citizens. Only United States citizens can serve as voting members of Congress or as President, and States
permit only citizens to vote. The scope of U.S. citizenship lay at the heart of the Civil War that nearly
tore the Nation apart. A central feature of the Republic’s response to that crisis was a constitutional
amendment that, in its opening sentence, cemented
the well-established common-law rule of jus soli—the
right of the soil—into the Constitution’s text. The
Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause provides that “[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the
wherein they reside.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
The Clause’s purpose was “‘to put th[e] question of
citizenship and the rights of citizens … beyond the
legislative power.’” Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253,
263 (1967) (citation omitted). This case concerns
whether Congress may, by fiat, subvert that constitutional safeguard to individual rights and limitation
on its power by denying birthright citizenship to persons born within the sovereign limits of the United
States who owe allegiance to this country.
Notwithstanding the Citizenship Clause’s unequivocal promise of birthright citizenship, Congress
has singled out persons born in American Samoa—
part of the United States since 1900—as “nationals,
but not citizens, of the United States.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1408(1) (emphasis added). Despite their birth in
and allegiance to the United States, and despite the
sacrifices many have made defending the Nation in
the military, persons born in American Samoa are
branded with the label of “non-citizen national.”
That inferior, subordinate status deprives them of
the full rights many of them have fought to defend—
the right to vote, to bear arms, and to run for public
office, among others. As every new citizen learns,
Justice Brandeis once observed that “‘[t]he only title
in our democracy superior to that of President is the
title of citizen.’”1 Absent action by this Court, persons born in American Samoa will continue to be deprived of the latter, and forever barred from holding
The court of appeals upheld Congress’s classification of American Samoans as non-citizens, but the
stakes of its departure from this Court’s precedent
merit further review. The Fourteenth Amendment’s
text, structure, history, and purpose all point to one
conclusion: Birthright citizenship extends to persons
born in U.S. Territories. Just five years after the
Citizenship Clause was ratified, this Court recognized that it applies in States and Territories alike.
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 72-73
(1873). And just two years before American Samoa
ceded sovereignty to the United States, this Court
held that the Clause constitutionalized the commonlaw rule that birthright citizenship extends throughout the country’s territorial limits. United States v.
Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 675-705 (1898).
U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., The Citizen’s Almanac 2 (2014), http://tinyurl.com/qfesah6 (brackets and citation
omitted) (all Internet sites last visited Jan. 31, 2016).
The court of appeals disregarded these relevant
precedents. It relied instead on the Insular Cases, a
series of decisions that concerned neither the Citizenship Clause nor American Samoa, but rather addressed issues of revenue collection and criminal
procedure in newly acquired Territories. Yet as this
Court recently explained, “[t]he Constitution grants
Congress and the President the power to acquire,
dispose of, and govern territory,” but “not the power
to decide when and where [the Constitution’s] terms
apply.” Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765
(2008). Whatever the merit of the Insular Cases’ territorial-incorporation doctrine, it does not govern the
Citizenship Clause, which defines its own geographical scope. The court of appeals went even beyond
the Insular Cases, narrowing the scope of constitutional rights applicable in Territories and subordinating them to the views of elected officials.
Without this Court’s intervention, however, the
court of appeals’ decision is likely to be the final word
for the foreseeable future. Other circuits share its
misapprehension of the Insular Cases and Wong Kim
Ark. And, because Congress currently singles out
only American Samoa for such treatment, other cases presenting the issue are unlikely to arise.
Tens of thousands of persons born in American
Samoa—whose citizenship has been uncertain for
decades, and many of whom have defended the country with valor—should not be kept waiting for a definitive determination of whether they and their
children may call themselves citizens. And the
rights of four million Americans who live in other
Territories should not be left in limbo by the court of
appeals’ troubling decision.
1. Birthright citizenship for persons born in the
United States has long been a fundamental tenet of
American law. Although the Constitution referred to
“Citizen[s] of the United States,” and made citizenship a prerequisite to serving in Congress or the
Presidency, U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 2, § 3, cl. 3; id.
art. II, § 1, cl. 5, it originally did not define who was
a “Citizen.” Consistent with the principle that terms
not defined in a Constitution “framed in the language of the English common law” should be read “in
the light of” that common-law tradition, Smith v.
Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 478 (1888), courts looked to
the common law to determine who was a citizen.
See, e.g., Dawson’s Lessee v. Godfrey, 8 U.S.
(4 Cranch) 321, 322-24 (1808); Minor v. Happersett,
88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 166 (1875).
The common-law rule regarding birthright citizenship was straightforward: “‘the party must be
born within a place where the sovereign is at the
time in full possession and exercise of his power, and
the party must also at his birth … owe obedience or
allegiance to … the sovereign.’” Wong Kim Ark,
169 U.S. at 659 (quoting Inglis v. Trs. of Sailor’s
Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99, 155 (1830) (Story,
J., concurring)). The geographic scope of birthright
citizenship at common law was “birth locally within
the dominions of the sovereign.” Ibid.; id. at 655-58
(canvassing English cases); see also, e.g., Calvin’s
Case, 7 Co. Rep. 1a, 77 Eng. Rep. 377 (1608).
Prior to American Independence, it was “universally admitted … that all persons within the colonies
of North America, whilst subject to the crown of
Great Britain, were natural born British subjects.”
Inglis, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 120. After the Revolution,
nothing “displaced in this country the fundamental
rule of citizenship by birth within its sovereignty.”
Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 658-63, 674; accord, e.g.,
United States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785, 789 (C.C.D.
Ky. 1866); Lynch v. Clarke, 1 Sand. Ch. 583, 663
(N.Y. Ch. 1844); Leake v. Gilchrist, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.)
73, 76 (1829); Gardner v. Ward, 2 Mass. 244 (1805).
That included U.S. Territories. As Justice Story explained, “[a] citizen of one of our territories is a citizen of the United States.”
19 F. Cas. 609, 616 (C.C.D. Mass. 1828); see also, e.g.,
William Rawle, A View of the Constitution of the
United States of America 86 (2d ed. 1829) (“[E]very
person born within the United States, its territories
or districts, whether the parents are citizens or aliens, is a natural born citizen in the sense of the
Constitution.”); C.A. Citizenship Scholars Amicus Br.
2. The settled jus soli rule was temporarily disturbed by Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.)
393 (1857). Dred Scott infamously concluded, over
powerful dissents, that one group of persons—
African Americans—were not U.S. citizens regardless of birth in the United States because (the Court
said) “they were … considered as a subordinate and
inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated by
the dominant race … and had no rights or privileges
but such as those who held the power and the Government might choose to grant them.” Id. at 404-05.
After the Civil War, Congress and the States
emphatically repudiated Dred Scott by adopting the
Fourteenth Amendment, which expressly codified
the pre-existing common-law rule of birthright citizenship. The first sentence of Section 1 (the Citizenship Clause) provides that “[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the ju-
risdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States.”
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Both the Clause’s advocates and opponents in Congress understood that
it accorded citizenship to all persons born anywhere
in the United States, including its Territories. See,
e.g., Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2890 (1866)
(Sen. Howard) (explaining, in introducing the
Clause, that it declared what was “the law of the
land already, that every person born within the limits of the United States, and subject to their jurisdiction, is by virtue of natural law and national law a
citizen of the United States”); id. at 2894 (Sen.
Trumbull) (Clause “refers to persons everywhere,
whether in the States or in the Territories or in the
District of Columbia”); id. at 2893 (Sen. Johnson)
(there is “no better way to give rise to citizenship
than the fact of birth within the territory of the
As this Court explained, the Clause was adopted
to “overtur[n] the Dred Scott decision” and to “pu[t]
at rest” the proposition that “[t]hose … who had been
born and resided always in the District of Columbia
or in the Territories, though within the United States,
were not citizens.” Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) at 72-73 (emphases added). The Clause
“reaffirmed in the most explicit and comprehensive
terms” “the fundamental principle of citizenship by
birth within the dominion.” Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S.
at 675. By codifying in the Constitution this “ancient
and fundamental rule of citizenship by birth within
the territory, in the allegiance and under the protection of the country,” id. at 693, its Framers sought
“‘to put th[e] question of citizenship and the rights of
citizens … beyond the legislative power.’” Afroyim,
387 U.S. at 263 (quoting Cong. Globe, 39th Cong.,
1st Sess. 2896 (Sen. Howard)).
In 1898, this Court held that, in light of the Citizenship Clause, the “established rule of citizenship
by birth within the dominion” could not be “superseded or restricted, in any respect,” by any “authority, legislative, executive or judicial.” Wong Kim Ark,
169 U.S. at 674. Thus, “no act or omission of Congress … can affect citizenship acquired as a birthright, by virtue of the Constitution itself.” Id. at 703.
“Congress” had “no authority … to restrict the effect
of birth, declared by the Constitution to constitute a
sufficient and complete right to citizenship.” Ibid.
3. Less than two years after Wong Kim Ark,
American Samoa—the eastern islands of an archipelago in the South Pacific—became a U.S. Territory.
Pet. App. 2a. In 1900, the traditional leaders of the
Samoan islands of Tutuila and Aunu’u voluntarily
ceded “all sovereign rights” in those islands “unto the
Government of the United States of America.” Instrument of Cession by Chiefs of Tutuila to U.S.
Gov’t, at 2 (Apr. 17, 1900). Four years later, the traditional leaders of the Samoan islands comprising
the Manu’a island group also voluntarily ceded their
lands “under the full and complete sovereignty of the
United States.” Instrument of Cession by Chiefs of
Manu’a Islands to U.S. Gov’t, at 2 (July 14, 1904); see
also Mulu v. Taliutafa, 3 Am. Samoa 82, 89-90
(1953) (“cession of the Islands passed the sovereignty … to the United States”); 48 U.S.C. § 1661. In
1925, U.S. “sovereignty” over American Samoa was
“extended” to include Swains Island, defined as “a
part of American Samoa.” 48 U.S.C. § 1662.
American Samoa has been part of the Nation ever since. Over the past century, its ties to the rest of
the country have strengthened significantly as it has
become part of the Nation’s political, economic, and
cultural identity. C.A. App. 20-23. Approximately
55,000 people reside on the islands today, with many
more American Samoans living throughout the rest
of the Nation. Id. at 20-21. Students in public
schools on the islands are taught in English using an
American curriculum. Id. at 21. American Samoa’s
relationship with the United States is commemorated on quarters and postage stamps, and it is home to
a National Park, National Marine Sanctuary, and
National Historical Landmarks. Id. at 22.
American Samoans have blended fervent American patriotism with the proud continuation of Samoan culture and language. Each year this is on full
display as American Samoan communities throughout the United States celebrate joining the Nation on
“Flag Day,” through lively parades and performances, including Vietnam veterans marching alongside
cultural dancers and military honor guards raising
the American flag, followed by traditional Samoan
oratorical and musical ceremonies.2
American Samoans also have a rich history of
U.S. military service. C.A. App. 21-22. “American
Samoa yields the highest rate of military enlistment
of any U.S. state or territory,” and, as of 2014, the
U.S. Army’s full-time recruiting station in American
Samoa “ranked #1 in recruitment out of the 885 Army recruiting stations and centers.”3 American Samoans have served in every major war of the 20th
See, e.g., Veterans Take Center Stage in 2015 Flag Day, Talanei.com (Apr. 17, 2015), http://tinyurl.com/hjzb44c; Flag Day
2015 at Veterans Memorial Stadium, Samoa News (Apr. 17,
2015), http://tinyurl.com/gt2qygr.
U.S. Army Reserve, American Samoa and the United States
Army Reserve, http://tinyurl.com/zcdw3dq.
and 21st centuries, and on a per capita basis, its
population has made a greater sacrifice in Iraq and
Afghanistan than any State or Territory. C.A. App.
Yet, today, persons born in American Samoa are
the only U.S. nationals not recognized as U.S. citizens. Section 101(a)(29) of the Immigration and Nationality Act classifies American Samoa (including
Swains Island)—and only American Samoa—as an
“outlying possessio[n] of the United States.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(29). Section 308(1) of the Act, in turn, provides that “person[s] born in an outlying possession
of the United States”—i.e., American Samoa—are
“nationals, but not citizens, of the United States at
birth.” Id. § 1408(1) (emphasis added). As nationals,
however, they “ow[e] permanent allegiance to the
United States.” Id. § 1101(a)(22). And they have no
citizenship under or allegiance to any other sovereign.
Non-citizen nationals born in American Samoa
may hold U.S. passports. But State Department policies require such passports to be imprinted with a
stigmatizing disclaimer (“Endorsement Code 09”)
stating that “THE BEARER IS A UNITED STATES
NATIONAL AND NOT A UNITED STATES
CITIZEN.” C.A. App. 27, 36-37; see 7 Dep’t of State,
Foreign Affairs Manual §§ 1125.1(b), (d), 1141(e),
1320 App. B.
American Samoans’ “non-citizen national” status
carries significant adverse consequences. Such persons are constitutionally barred from serving as Representatives or Senators in Congress and from ever
running for President. U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 2,
§ 3, cl. 3; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. Federal law forbids
non-citizen nationals from serving as officers in the
U.S. military or U.S. Special Forces, e.g., 10 U.S.C.
§ 532, and many federal jobs, including in the federal
judiciary, are advertised as limited to U.S. citizens.
States bar non-citizen nationals from exercising
many rights and freedoms accorded to citizens—for
example, voting in federal, state, or local elections,
e.g., Haw. Const. art. II, § 1; holding public office,
e.g., Wash. Const. art. III, § 25; serving on juries,
e.g., Wash. Rev. Code § 2.36.070; serving as lawenforcement officers, firefighters, public-school
teachers, or in other public-service positions, e.g., id.
§§ 41.08.060-.070; Cal. Gov’t Code § 1031; Haw. Rev.
Stat. § 121-14; 24 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 11-1109; and exercising the right to bear arms, e.g., Haw. Rev. Stat.
§ 134-2(d); see also C.A. D. Cohen Amicus Br. 6-28.
4. Petitioners are five individuals born in American Samoa who are denied recognition as U.S. citizens, as well as the Samoan Federation of America,
Inc.—a non-profit organization that serves the Samoan community in Los Angeles, California. C.A.
App. 11-17. Their experiences exemplify the harms
associated with non-citizen national status.
When Leneuoti Tuaua lived in California as a
young man in the 1970s, he registered for the
military draft, but under California law could
not vote or pursue his chosen career in law enforcement. C.A. App. 11-12.
Va’aleama Fosi, a resident of Hawaii, is denied
the rights to vote and to bear arms under Hawaii law, despite a decade of military service.
C.A. App. 12-13.
Fanuatanu Mamea, a Vietnam veteran living
in American Samoa, was awarded two Purple
Hearts and has a disability rating of 80%, yet
because of his non-citizen national status, his
application to serve in the U.S. Special Forces
was denied, and his foreign-national wife faces
special immigration restrictions. C.A. App.
Taffy-lei Maene, a resident of Seattle, Washington, cannot vote and lost her job in a state
agency (and with it her income and health insurance) because her passport says she is not
a citizen. C.A. App. 15-16.
Emy Afalava, who now lives in American Samoa, served in Kuwait during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, but, as a noncitizen then residing in Texas, could only
watch as his fellow infantrymen voted in the
1992 presidential election. C.A. App. 16-17.
Petitioners brought this action against respondents in 2012, challenging Section 308(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act as unconstitutional under the Citizenship Clause, and seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief. C.A. App. 31-33. Petitioners
also challenged the State Department’s implementing policies and practices. Ibid.
Respondents moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. Pet. App.
25a. The district court rejected respondents’ jurisdictional arguments, but dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim. Id. at 29a-43a.
5. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that
“the Citizenship Clause does not extend birthright
citizenship to those born in American Samoa.” Pet.
App. 2a. The court reasoned that “it remains ambiguous whether territories situated like American Samoa are ‘within’ the United States for purposes of
the Clause.” Id. at 6a. The court found not “fully
persuasive” the difference in wording of the Citizenship Clause (“in the United States”) and of the
neighboring Apportionment Clause (“among the several States,” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 2). Pet. App.
5a-6a. It also dismissed as “‘not impressive’” statements of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Framers confirming that it extended birthright citizenship to
Territories. Id. at 6a-7a (citation omitted).
The D.C. Circuit also was “unconvinced” that
Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, “reflects the constitutional codification of the common law rule” of jus soli
“as applied to outlying territories.” Pet. App. 8a. It
dismissed this Court’s “expansive language” as dictum because the individual in that case was born in
California, not a Territory. Id. at 8a-9a. “[E]ven assuming” the Citizenship Clause “constitutionally codif[ied] jus soli principles,” the court opined, it would
bestow birthright citizenship only on persons who
owe “allegiance to the sovereign,” and the court was
“skeptical the framers plainly intended to extend
birthright citizenship to distinct, significantly selfgoverning political territories within the United
States’ sphere of sovereignty.” Id. at 9a, 11a.
The court of appeals “resort[ed] to the … analytical framework” of the “sometimes contentious Insular Cases”—a series of early 20th century decisions
addressing issues of revenue collection and criminal
procedure in the context of newly acquired Territories. Pet. App. 11a-12a. It construed those decisions
to “announc[e]” a “doctrine of territorial incorporation” that “distinguishes between” so-called “incorporated territories … in which the entire Constitution
applies ex proprio vigore,” from “unincorporated territories such as American Samoa … in which only
brackets omitted). Under the “framework” of those
cases, the court held, whether a particular constitutional right applies in “unincorporated territories”
turns on whether it is “fundamental”—a category
limited to “principles which are the basis of all free
government” and are “so basic as to be integral to
free and fair society”—and whether “recognition of
the right … would prove impracticable and anomalous.” Id. at 15a, 18a (internal quotation marks
Applying this framework, the court held that
birthright citizenship does not extend to American
Samoa. Pet. App. 14a-23a. Birthright citizenship
based on birth within the Nation’s territory, it reasoned, is not “fundamental” because “numerous free
and democratic societies principally follow jus sanguinis—‘right of the blood’—where birthright citizenship is based upon nationality of a child’s parents.”
The court also concluded that extending birthright citizenship to American Samoa would be
“anomalous” because the American Samoan government and its congressional delegate had intervened
to argue that the question of citizenship should be
decided politically by Congress, not the courts. Pet.
App. 18a-20a. The court reasoned that construing
the Citizenship Clause to apply to American Samoa
would amount to “forcible imposition of citizenship
against the majoritarian will.” Id. at 22a.
Petitioners sought rehearing en banc. After requesting a response, the court of appeals denied their
petition. Pet. App. 44a-45a.
Certiorari is warranted because this case squarely presents a constitutional question of exceptional
importance: Whether Congress, notwithstanding the
Fourteenth Amendment’s explicit guarantee of birthright citizenship to those born within the sovereign
territorial limits of the United States, may deny that
right by fiat to persons born in a U.S. Territory. The
answer governs whether tens of thousands of Americans born in American Samoa—many of whom have
patriotically defended their country in the military—
may finally call themselves American citizens. And
it determines whether millions of others born in U.S.
Territories hold citizenship as a constitutional right
or as a matter of legislative grace.
This Court’s intervention is also warranted because the court of appeals’ holding that the scope of
the Citizenship Clause is “ambiguous” is irreconcilable with this Court’s precedents and the Clause itself. The Fourteenth Amendment’s text, structure,
history, and purpose all demonstrate that the Clause
was intended and originally understood to confer
birthright citizenship in all parts of the United
States, including its Territories. This Court’s decisions confirm that the Clause constitutionalized the
common-law rule of jus soli, which recognized as citizens all persons born within the territorial limits and
allegiance of the sovereign. The decision below cannot be squared with these precedents.
The court of appeals improperly relied on the Insular Cases to defer to Congress and the views of
elected officials in American Samoa as to the scope of
the Citizenship Clause. Neither the holdings nor
reasoning of those cases have any application to that
Clause or to citizenship generally. And construing
those decisions to require deference to elected officials contravenes the purpose of the Clause, which
was adopted precisely to remove the scope of birthright citizenship from the sphere of politics. The
court of appeals exacerbated its error by confining
the “fundamental rights” applicable in unincorporated Territories under the Insular Cases to rights
essential to any civilized society, irrespective of this
Nation’s traditions. The Insular Cases do not require that illogical and unjust result. To the extent
they could be construed as doing so, they should be
modified or overruled.
This case provides an excellent opportunity for
the Court to resolve this important constitutional
question, which was thoroughly litigated and decided
below and is outcome-determinative. There is no
reason to delay review to await a circuit conflict. Because Congress currently singles out only American
Samoa, other cases are unlikely to arise. The court
of appeals’ error, moreover, rests on a misunderstanding of this Court’s decisions—shared by other
circuits—which only this Court can correct.
THE QUESTION WHETHER CONGRESS MAY
WITHHOLD BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENSHIP FROM
PERSONS BORN IN A UNITED STATES
TERRITORY IS EXCEPTIONALLY IMPORTANT.
The importance of the question presented is indisputable. At stake is the meaning of a core constitutional provision that defines the boundaries of a
foundational right—U.S. citizenship—on which
many other rights are premised. Whether Congress
may nullify the Citizenship Clause’s explicit guarantee of birthright citizenship in a Territory that has
been part of the United States for more than a century is an issue of tremendous legal and practical sig-
nificance. The rights and day-to-day lives of thousands of persons born in American Samoa hang in
the balance. And the correct interpretation of that
Clause governs Congress’s ability to carve out other
Territories from the Clause’s scope in the future.
American Samoa is home to more than 55,000
individuals; tens of thousands more who were born
in American Samoa live elsewhere the United States.
C.A. App. 20-21. The answer to the question presented is critical to those living in American Samoa,
who are barred from recognition as citizens unless
they first undergo the costly and burdensome naturalization process. Id. at 26. For most American
Samoans, that process requires uprooting themselves
thousands of miles to establish residency in another
part of the country, and then navigating the same
naturalization procedures as foreign nationals, including paying a $680 fee, passing English and civics
tests, submitting to fingerprinting and a “good moral
character” determination, and taking an oath renouncing “‘all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign’”
sovereign of which they “‘have heretofore been a subject or citizen,’” id. at 25-26 (citation omitted)—even
though those born in American Samoa already owe
allegiance to this Nation and are not citizens of any
other. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22).4 No other Americans
are asked to complete these burdensome and invasive steps to be recognized as citizens. Neither
should those born in American Samoa.
Petitioners’ experiences illustrate the impact of
being deprived recognition as citizens. Petitioners
are reminded of their unequal status whenever they
Certain active-duty veterans of particular foreign wars may
seek naturalization without relocating. 8 U.S.C. § 1440(a).
open their passports, which are imprinted with a disclaimer that the bearer is “NOT A UNITED STATES
CITIZEN.” C.A. App. 27, 36-37. That stigmatizing
classification means American Samoans are citizens
nowhere: American Samoa is not a country, nor part
of any other besides the United States. Pet. App. 2a3a; 48 U.S.C. §§ 1661-1662.
The subordinate, inferior non-citizen national
status relegates American Samoans to second-class
participation in the Republic. As non-citizens, for
example, they cannot run for President or serve as
Representatives or Senators in Congress. And many
are barred from voting for the federal, state, and local elected officials who determine what rights noncitizen nationals enjoy. Many, like petitioners Tuaua
and Maene, have also had their livelihood impacted
by state laws barring them certain public-service occupations, such as law enforcement. Other state
laws bar non-citizens—even military veterans like
petitioner Fosi—from exercising the right to bear
arms. Non-citizen nationals also face discrimination
at the federal level, from serving as officers in the
U.S. military, to how foreign-national family members are treated under immigration law. Supra pp.
Continued discrimination is particularly troubling given the sacrifice American Samoans, including petitioners, have made through military service.
Individuals that have defended the United States in
battle are entitled at a minimum to know whether
the Nation they protected at great personal sacrifice
will accept them and their children as citizens.
Moreover, whatever advances toward equality
non-citizen nationals might make under state or federal law are illusory because they can be taken away
by the political process. Only this Court can ensure
that persons born in American Samoa enjoy the
same rights and dignity as their fellow Americans.
The question presented also matters greatly to
millions of Americans living in other U.S. Territories.
While Congress has by statute recognized birthright
citizenship in Puerto Rico, Guam, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the Northern Mariana Islands, on the
court of appeals’ view, Congress did so purely as a
matter of grace. If the decision below is allowed to
stand, the Framers of the Citizenship Clause will
have failed in their objective “‘to put th[e] question of
legislative power.’” Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 263 (citation omitted). Instead, persons born in U.S. Territories will remain at the mercy of legislative whim.
II. THE DECISION BELOW CONTRAVENES THE
CONSTITUTION AND THIS COURT’S PRECEDENT.
The decision below also merits review because it
conflicts with this Court’s precedent and the Citizenship Clause itself. Contrary to this Court’s teaching,
the court of appeals gave short shrift to the pertinent
constitutional text, structure, history, and purpose—
finding ambiguity where those dispositive sources of
constitutional meaning speak clearly. It also failed
to heed this Court’s case law construing the Clause,
arbitrarily confining this Court’s decision in Wong
Kim Ark to its facts. Instead of faithfully applying
this Court’s relevant precedent, the court below erroneously looked to—and unjustifiably expanded—the
Insular Cases’ territorial-incorporation doctrine,
which is inapposite here. Even if the Insular Cases
could be read to support the decision below, they
themselves are inconsistent with the Constitution
and should be modified or overruled.
A. The Court Of Appeals’ Holding Cannot
Be Reconciled With The Constitutional
Text, Structure, History, Or Purpose.
“[I]n all cases,” the Constitution should be interpreted “in light of its text, purposes, and our whole
experience as a Nation.” NLRB v. Noel Canning,
134 S. Ct. 2550, 2578 (2014) (internal quotation
marks omitted). A court’s duty is to conduct a “careful examination of the textual, structural, and historical evidence” presented.
132 S. Ct. 1421, 1430 (2012). The court of appeals
defaulted on that duty here. It held that the Citizenship Clause is “ambiguous” simply because arguments for competing interpretations had been advanced. Rather than resolve that purported ambiguity by carefully examining the textual and contextual
evidence of the Clause’s meaning, the court threw up
its hands and concluded that the text, structure, history, and purpose provide no answer. Both its approach and conclusion are incorrect.
1. The Fourteenth Amendment’s text and structure forcefully demonstrate that it extends birthright
citizenship to persons born in Territories like American Samoa. The Citizenship Clause states that “[a]ll
persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
United States and of the state wherein they reside.”
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). Because American Samoa is “in the United States,”
persons born there are entitled to U.S. citizenship.
“Constitutional rights are enshrined with the
(yes) even future judges think that scope too broad.”
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634-35
(2008). From the early decades of the Republic, the
term “the United States” has been understood to
“designate the whole … of the American Empire.”
Loughborough v. Blake, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 317, 319
(1820) (Marshall, C.J.). As Chief Justice Marshall
explained, “the United States” is “the name given to
our great republic, which is composed of States and
territories.” Ibid. (emphasis added). “The district of
Columbia, or the territory west of the Missouri, is
not less within the United States, than Maryland or
Pennsylvania.” Ibid. When the Citizenship Clause
was debated in the 1860s, “[e]ach member [of Congress] knew and properly respected the old and
revered decision in the Loughborough-Blake case,
which had long before defined the term ‘United
States.’” Ltr. from J.B. Henderson to Hon. C.E. Littlefield (June 28, 1901), reproduced in Charles E.
Littlefield, The Insular Cases (II: Dred Scott v. Sandford), 15 Harv. L. Rev. 281, 299 (1901) (“Henderson
Ltr.”).
The broad scope of “in the United States” in the
Citizenship Clause is confirmed by comparing it with
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment. That adjoining, contemporaneous provision uses the narrower phrase “among the several States” to provide that
Representatives are to be apportioned only among
States. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 2 (emphasis added). Just as courts presume that Congress’s use of
different language in neighboring statutory provisions is “‘intentiona[l] and purpose[ful],’” Russello v.
United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (citation omitted), the Framers’ choice of different language in
these adjacent, simultaneously adopted constitutional provisions is strong evidence that they did not intend the provisions’ geographic scope to be identical.
The court of appeals noted this “difference between the Citizenship and Apportionment Clauses,”
which it conceded “could suggest the former has a
broader reach than the latter.” Pet. App. 6a. But it
did not attempt to determine what that broader
scope of the Citizenship Clause is, or why it would
not include Territories such as American Samoa. See
ibid. And it did not address the evidence and case
law confirming the original understanding that “in
the United States” includes such Territories.
The court of appeals also noted but did not adopt
respondents’ argument that the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition of slavery “within the United
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction,”
suggests that the Constitution “contemplates areas
not a part of the Union, which are still subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States.” Pet App. 5a (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
And for good reason: The areas to which the Thirteenth Amendment refers that are not “within the
United States,” yet are within U.S. jurisdiction, do
not include Territories; instead, they include locations beyond the Nation’s sovereign limits but nevertheless under U.S. control—such as vessels outside
U.S. territorial waters, embassies abroad, and military installations on foreign soil—where Congress
also sought to forbid slavery. See, e.g., In re Chung
Fat, 96 F. 202, 203-04 (D. Wash. 1899) (slavery
aboard U.S. vessel would violate Thirteenth
Amendment). As the Thirteenth Amendment’s coauthor explained, “[w]hatever else these words”—i.e.,
“or any place subject to their jurisdiction”—“may refer to, they surely were not intended to embrace or
refer to the territories of the United States.”
Henderson Ltr. at 299.
2. The natural reading of the Citizenship
Clause’s text is confirmed by its history, which is
“valuable as contemporaneous opinions of jurists and
statesmen upon the legal meaning of the words
themselves.” Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 699. That
history reflects the Framers’ understanding that the
Clause applies to Territories. Senator Trumbull, for
example, explained that “[t]he second section” of the
Fourteenth Amendment “refers to no persons except
those in the States of the Union; but the first section
refers to persons everywhere, whether in the States
or in the Territories or in the District of Columbia.”
Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2894 (emphasis
Both supporters and opponents of the
Amendment agreed. See, e.g., id. at 2890 (Sen. Howard); id. at 2893 (Sen. Johnson).
The court of appeals brushed aside these uncontradicted statements of the Clause’s Framers as “‘isolated,’” and invoked this Court’s observation that on
other topics the Fourteenth Amendment’s history
“‘contains many statements from which conflicting
inferences can be drawn.’” Pet. App. 6a (quoting
Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 267; brackets and other citation
omitted). But the court pointed to no contrary
statements on this issue regarding the Citizenship
Clause’s geographic scope. Ambiguity on other matters is immaterial. In any event, this Court has
turned to the Amendment’s history even where some
evidence points in different directions. See, e.g.,
Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 266-67.
The “‘initial blueprint’” for the Amendment—
Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 721 (1989) (plurality opinion) (citation omitted)—further confirms
that the original understanding of “in the United
States” included States and Territories. “Many of
the Members of the 39th Congress viewed § 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment as ‘constitutionalizing’ and
expanding the protections of the 1866 [Civil Rights]
Act.” Ibid. That Act “declared” that (inter alia) “all
persons born in the United States and not subject to
any foreign power” are “citizens of the United States”
and “shall have the same right, in every State and
Territory in the United States, … to full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of
person and property.” Ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27
(1866) (emphasis added). The court of appeals never
addressed this additional evidence of the original
understanding of the Amendment.
Court’s Precedent Construing The
The court of appeals’ decision also contradicts
this Court’s precedent addressing the Citizenship
Clause specifically. In a series of decisions in the
three decades after the Fourteenth Amendment’s
ratification, this Court authoritatively construed the
Clause, making clear that it applies to Territories
like American Samoa.
Just five years after the Clause was ratified, this
Court concluded in the Slaughter-House Cases that
the Fourteenth Amendment “pu[t] at rest” any notion that “[t]hose … who had been born and resided
always in the District of Columbia or in the Territories, though within the United States, were not citizens.” See 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 72-73 (emphasis
added). The Amendment, the Court explained, “declares that persons may be citizens of the United
States without regard to their citizenship of a particular State.” Id. at 73.
The Court confirmed this understanding in Elk
v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884), where it explained
that “Indians born within the territorial limits of the
United States”—there, evidently in the Iowa Territory—were “in a geographical sense born in the United
States.” Id. at 102 (emphasis added); see Anna Williams Shavers, A Century of Developing Citizenship
Law and the Nebraska Influence: A Centennial Essay, 70 Neb. L. Rev. 462, 480 (1991). Such “Indians”
who were “members of, and owing allegiance to, one
of the Indian tribes” were not covered by the Clause
for a different reason: As members of tribes, they did
not owe allegiance to, and were not “subject to the
jurisdiction” of, the United States. 112 U.S. at 102.
Just two years before the United States obtained
sovereignty over American Samoa, the Court spoke
directly to the Citizenship Clause’s geographic scope
in Wong Kim Ark. The Clause, the Court held, “must
be interpreted in the light of the common law, the
principles and history of which were familiarly
known to the framers of the Constitution.” 169 U.S.
at 654. Based on a painstaking survey of commonlaw authorities and the Fourteenth Amendment’s
history, the Court held that the Clause “reaffirmed”
the “fundamental principle of citizenship by birth
within the dominion”—i.e., jus soli—using “the most
explicit and comprehensive terms.” Id. at 675 (emphasis added). The Clause, “in clear words and in
manifest intent, includes the children born, within
the territory of the United States, … of whatever race
or color, domiciled within the United States.” Id. at
693 (emphasis added). Applying that principle, the
Court rejected the government’s claim that a person
born within the United States’ sovereign territorial
limits (there, California) could be deprived of citizenship based on his parents’ place of birth: “The Four-
teenth Amendment ha[d] … conferred no authority
upon Congress to restrict the effect of birth, declared
by the [C]onstitution to constitute a sufficient and
complete right to citizenship.” Id. at 703.
As “legal … sources” demonstrating “the public
understanding of [the Fourteenth Amendment] in
the period after its enactment or ratification,” these
early cases are “critical tool[s] of constitutional interpretation.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 605 (emphasis
omitted). The court of appeals, however, failed to
apply them. It did not address the Slaughter-House
Cases at all, and never confronted the relevant aspect of Elk concerning the meaning of “in the United
States” as used in the Citizenship Clause.
The court of appeals did address Wong Kim Ark,
but it sidestepped that decision by concluding that
this Court did not mean what it said. The D.C. Circuit reasoned that Wong Kim Ark is irrelevant because that case “involved a person born in San Francisco.” Pet. App. 8a (internal quotation marks omitted). The constitutional principle this Court articulated and applied, however, speaks directly to the
question presented here: The Citizenship Clause’s
geographic scope incorporated the common-law jus
soli rule. See 169 U.S. at 675, 693. Whether Territories like American Samoa are “within the dominion”
of the United States must therefore be determined by
looking to that common-law principle. Cf. Heller,
554 U.S. at 592 (where Constitution “codified a preexisting right,” courts must look to its “historical
background” to discern its contours). And it was
clear at common law that “[a] citizen of one of our
territories is a citizen of the United States.” Picquet,
19 F. Cas. at 616; accord Rawle, supra, at 86. Indeed, in the decades before Wong Kim Ark, this
Court recognized that “[t]he Territories are but political subdivisions of the outlying dominion of the
United States.” Nat’l Bank v. County of Yankton,
101 U.S. 129, 133 (1880) (emphasis added). The
court of appeals had no basis to limit this Court’s decision in Wong Kim Ark to its facts.
The court of appeals’ only other ground for disregarding Wong Kim Ark was its “skeptic[ism]” that
American Samoans owe “direct and immediate allegiance” to the United States, and thus might not be
“‘subject to the jurisdiction thereof.’” Pet. App. 10a11a (citation and brackets omitted). That skepticism
is unfounded. Even Congress recognizes that American Samoans “ow[e] permanent allegiance to the
United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22). And respondents conceded below that American Samoa is
“‘subject to the jurisdiction’ of the United States.”
C.A. Resp. Br. 23; see also Pet. App. 33a. The court
of appeals questioned whether American Samoans
are “‘completely subject to [the United States’] political jurisdiction,’” yet it acknowledged that “ultimate
governance remains statutorily vested with the
United States Government.” Pet. App. 10a-11a (citation omitted). Under the settled common-law rule
the Citizenship Clause codified, persons born in
American Samoa are natural-born U.S. citizens.
C. The Insular Cases Are Inapposite And
Cannot Justify The Court Of Appeals’
Reading Of The Citizenship Clause.
While adopting an untenably narrow view of this
Court’s Citizenship Clause jurisprudence, the court
of appeals relied on an insupportably expansive view
of the Court’s inapposite decisions in the Insular
Cases and an “analytical framework” that the D.C.
Circuit derived from them. Pet. App. 12a. Those de-
cisions have no application to the Citizenship Clause,
and in any event they provide no basis to deprive
American Samoans of birthright citizenship. To the
extent the Insular Cases could be construed as allowing Congress to restrict birthright citizenship in
American Samoa, those cases are inconsistent with
the Constitution and should be modified or overruled.
1. “‘Whatever the validity of the Insular Cases in
the particular historical context in which they were
decided,’” Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 758 (brackets and
citation omitted), they are irrelevant here. None involved the Citizenship Clause or defined “in the
United States” as it is used in the Fourteenth
Amendment. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 144
(1901), on which the decision below relied, concerned
the Uniformity Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1—a
provision that arose in a different historical background with a different purpose unrelated to codifying any common-law right. 182 U.S. at 249. And the
opinion of Justice Brown, whose “dictum” the court of
appeals expressly “adopt[ed],” Pet. App. 16a, commanded only his vote. 182 U.S. at 244 n.1 (syllabus).
Indeed, because the fractured decision in Downes
“lacked a majority rationale,” it “is of minimal precedential value.” Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of
Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2258 n.8 (2013). Members of this Court have accordingly cautioned that
“neither the [Insular C]ases nor their reasoning
should be given any further expansion.” Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 14 (1957) (plurality opinion); see also
Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 475-76 (1979)
Extending those cases’ “framework” to the Citizenship Clause is especially inappropriate because
that Clause expressly defines its own geographic
scope. This Court has characterized Dorr v. United
States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904), as holding “that the
Constitution, except insofar as required by its own
terms, did not extend to” unincorporated Territories.
Examining Bd. of Eng’rs, Architects & Surveyors v.
Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 589 n.21 (1976) (emphasis added). The Citizenship Clause is “applicable” in American Samoa “by its own terms” because
it codifies birthright citizenship to persons born anywhere “in the United States,” including Territories.
The Insular Cases are not to the contrary. For
example, in 1904 this Court explained that the people of Puerto Rico, “whose permanent allegiance is
due to the United States, … live in the peace of the
dominion of the United States.” Gonzales v. Williams, 192 U.S. 1, 13 (1904) (emphases added). Gonzales was referring to what Wong Kim Ark had described just six years earlier as the touchstones for
birthright citizenship. And in De Lima v. Bidwell,
182 U.S. 1 (1901), decided the same day as Downes,
this Court rejected the notion that Puerto Rico was
“without the sovereignty of the United States.” Id. at
The Insular Cases’ rationale for adopting special
rules for certain Territories also does not extend to
American Samoa. Those cases “involved the power of
temporarily territories with wholly dissimilar traditions and institutions,” Covert, 354 U.S. at 14 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). “The Court … was
reluctant to risk the uncertainty and instability that
could result from a rule that displaced altogether the
existing legal systems in these newly acquired Terri-
tories.” Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 757 (emphasis added). Those cases’ reasoning has no bearing on Territories, including American Samoa, that have now
been a part of the United States for more than a century, in which “over time the ties [with] the United
States” have “strengthen[ed] in ways that are of constitutional significance.” Id. at 758; supra pp. 8-10.
2. Even if the Insular Cases’ “framework” were
relevant to the Citizenship Clause, it would not support the court of appeals’ conclusion that the Clause
does not apply to American Samoa. The court below
reached its result only by distorting that framework
in a manner that warrants this Court’s correction.
As this Court has made clear, even under the Insular Cases, “‘guaranties of certain fundamental personal rights declared in the Constitution’” apply
“even in unincorporated Territories.” Boumediene,
553 U.S. at 758 (quoting Balzac v. Porto Rico,
258 U.S. 298, 312 (1922)); see also Flores de Otero,
426 U.S. at 599 n.30. And citizenship is a “fundamental right.” Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 103
(1958) (plurality opinion); see also, e.g., Afroyim,
387 U.S. at 267-68 (“Citizenship is no light trifle to
be jeopardized any moment Congress decides to do so
under the name of one of its general or implied
grants of power.”); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,
372 U.S. 144, 159 (1963) (“Citizenship is a most precious right. It is expressly guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which
speaks in the most positive terms.”).
In reaching a contrary conclusion, the court of
appeals advanced an exceptionally narrow understanding of the “fundamental rights” prong of the
territorial-incorporation doctrine.
In the court’s
view, only “universally fundamental” rights that are
“so basic as to be integral to free and fair society” and
that are “‘the basis of all free government’” qualify,
while rights that are “idiosyncratic to the American
social compact or to the Anglo-American tradition of
jurisprudence” do not. Pet. App. 15a (citation omitted). Applying its narrow view of fundamental
rights, the court deemed our Nation’s jus soli tradition “non-fundamental” under that standard because
other “democratic societies principally follow jus sanguinis,” and accord citizenship based on one’s parentage. Id. at 15a-16a.
That approach makes little sense. In determining whether certain aspects of the U.S. Constitution
apply in certain places, the benchmark should be—as
in other contexts where courts consider whether
rights are “fundamental”—whether the rights are
“fundamental from an American perspective.”
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 784
(2010) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). After
all, “numerous free and democratic societies” (Pet.
App. 16a) do not recognize, or construe more narrowly, various rights that are undoubtedly central to the
American Constitution. Many free societies, for example, “have established state churches,” “ban or severely limit handgun ownership,” or do not share
this Nation’s understanding of “the right against
self-incrimination” and “the right to counsel.”
McDonald, 561 U.S. at 781-83 (plurality opinion).
Absent review by this Court, residents of the Territories will find an array of core American rights put in
limbo by the court of appeals’ narrow view of which
constitutional rights are universally fundamental.
The court of appeals’ application of the “impractical and anomalous” prong of the territorial incorporation doctrine to deny recognition of birthright citi-
zenship in American Samoa is also deeply misguided.
Rather than examine “practical considerations” outlined by this Court’s precedent, see Boumediene,
553 U.S. at 759-60, the court of appeals created from
whole cloth a rule of dispositive deference to the
views of the Territory’s government in an amicus
brief, which argued that the question of citizenship
should be answered through the political process rather than by the courts’ interpretation of the Constitution. The court of appeals inferred from that submission that according birthright citizenship would
be “anomalous” and contrary to the “majoritarian
will” of the American Samoan people as “expressed
through their democratically elected representatives.” Pet. App. 18a-20a, 22a.
That inference is untenable. The people of American Samoa did choose birthright citizenship when
they voluntarily joined the United States after the
Citizenship Clause had been ratified and authoritatively construed by this Court to recognize that right.
See Reuel S. Moore & Joseph R. Farrington, The
American Samoan Commission’s Visit to Samoa,
September-October 1930, 53 (1931) (when American
Samoa ceded sovereignty to the United States, “the
people [of American Samoa] thought they were
American Citizens”).
Moreover, this Court has repudiated the notion
that elected officials “have the power to switch the
Constitution on or off at will.” Boumediene, 553 U.S.
at 765. The whole “purpose” of the Citizenship
Clause was to put the “‘question of citizenship and
the rights of citizens … under the civil rights bill beyond the legislative power.’” Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 263
(emphasis added) (omission in original) (citation
omitted). Subjecting individual constitutional rights
like birthright citizenship to the shifting winds of political majorities is antithetical to the value of a written Constitution. While American Samoa’s future
political status remains open to Congress and American Samoa’s elected leaders, the question of the application of the Citizenship Clause on sovereign U.S.
soil is not.
3. If and to the extent the Insular Cases do support the decision below, they should be modified or
overruled. Those decisions rest in significant part on
outdated, indefensible racial biases that have no
place in this Court’s constitutional jurisprudence today. See, e.g., Downes, 182 U.S. at 279-80, 282, 287
(opinion of Brown, J.) (different rules appropriate for
“alien races, differing from us”); id. at 302, 306
(White, J., concurring in judgment) (different rules
appropriate for an “uncivilized race” of “fierce, savage, and restless people”); see also C.A. Constitutional-Law Scholars Amicus Br. 24-30; Juan R. Torruella, The Insular Cases: A Declaration of Their Bankruptcy and My Harvard Pronouncement, in Reconsidering the Insular Cases 61, 62 (Gerald L. Neuman
& Tomiko Brown-Nagin eds., 2015) (“[T]he Insular
Cases represent classic Plessy v. Ferguson legal doctrine and thought that should be eradicated from
present-day constitutional reasoning.” (footnote
Moreover, “[t]he Constitution grants Congress
and the President the power to acquire, dispose of,
and govern territory,” but “not the power to decide
when and where [the Constitution’s] terms apply.”
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 765 (emphasis added). Insofar as the Insular Cases establish a contrary principle, they are incompatible with the Constitution
RESOLVE THIS IMPORTANT QUESTION.
This case provides a prime opportunity for this
Court to provide definitive guidance on these important constitutional issues. The question presented was pressed and passed upon in both courts below, and it is outcome-determinative in this case.
Pet. App. 4a-23a, 33a-43a.
There is no reason to await a direct circuit split.
American Samoa is the only Territory Congress currently excludes from the Constitution’s guarantee of
birthright citizenship. Other suits by current residents of American Samoa are unlikely to arise in
other circuits. American Samoa lacks a U.S. district
court, and the only proper venue for many actions by
its current residents may be the District of Columbia—where the defendants reside and the relevant
acts occur, see 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1), but where the
decision below now controls.
Moreover, the court of appeals here mistakenly
believed that the Insular Cases compelled its conclusion, Pet. App. 11a-23a, and other circuits similarly
have relied on erroneous interpretations of those inapposite decisions to hold that the Citizenship
Clause does not apply in U.S. Territories. See, e.g.,
Nolos v. Holder, 611 F.3d 279, 283-84 (5th Cir. 2010)
(per curiam); Lacap v. INS, 138 F.3d 518, 519 (3d
Cir. 1998) (per curiam); Valmonte v. INS, 136 F.3d
914, 918 (2d Cir. 1998); Rabang v. INS, 35 F.3d 1449,
1452 (9th Cir. 1994). Only this Court can correct the
widespread misapprehension of the meaning and
relevance of its own precedents. Even if the circuits’
reading of the Insular Cases were correct, none could
entertain arguments that those cases should be abrogated. This Court “alone” has the “prerogative” to
overrule or modify its own decisions. State Oil Co. v.
Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997).
AMERICAN SAMOA GOVERNMENT AND AUMUA AMATA,
(No. 1:12-cv-01143)
Before: BROWN, Circuit Judge, and SILBERMAN
and SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judges.
BROWN, Circuit Judge: In our constitutional republic, Justice Brandeis observed, the title of citizen
is superior to the title of President. Thus, the questions “[w]ho is the citizen[?]” and “what is the meaning of the term?” Aristotle, Politics bk. 3, reprinted
in part in READINGS IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 55, 61
(Francis W. Coker ed., 1938), are no less than the
questions of “who constitutes the sovereign state?”
and “what is the meaning of statehood as an association?” We are called upon to resolve one narrow circumstance implicating these weighty inquiries. Appellants are individuals born in the United States
territory of American Samoa. Statutorily deemed
“non-citizen nationals” at birth, they argue the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause affords
them citizenship by dint of birthright. They are opposed not merely by the United States but by the
democratically elected government of the American
Samoan people. We sympathize with Appellants’ individual plights, apparently more freighted with duty and sacrifice than benefits and privilege, but the
Citizenship Clause is textually ambiguous as to
whether “in the United States” encompasses America’s unincorporated territories and we hold it “impractical and anomalous,” see Reid v. Covert,
354 U.S. 1, 75 (1957), to impose citizenship by judicial fiat—where doing so requires us to override the
democratic prerogatives of the American Samoan
people themselves. The judgment of the district
court is affirmed; the Citizenship Clause does not extend birthright citizenship to those born in American
The South Pacific islands of American Samoa
have been a United States territory since 1900, when
the traditional leaders of the Samoan Islands of Tutuila and Aunu’u voluntarily ceded their sovereign
authority to the United States Government. See Instrument of Cession by the Chiefs of Tutuila Islands
to United States Government, U.S.-Tutuila, Apr. 17,
1900. Today the American Samoan territory is par-
tially self-governed, possessing a popularly elected
bicameral legislature and similarly elected governor.1
Complaint at 13 ¶ 27, Tuaua v. United States,
951 F. Supp. 2d 88 (D.D.C. 2013) (No. 12-cv-01143).
The territory, however, remains under the ultimate
supervision of the Secretary of the Interior. See Exec. Order No. 10,264 (June 29, 1951) (transferring
supervisory authority from the Secretary of the Navy
to the Secretary of the Interior).
Unlike those born in the United States’ other
current territorial possessions—who are statutorily
deemed American citizens at birth—section 308(1) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 designates persons born in American Samoa as noncitizen nationals.2 See 8 U.S.C. § 1408(1). Below,
Appellants challenged section 308(1), as well as
State Department policies and practices implementing the statute, see, e.g., 7 FAM § 1125.1(b), on Citizenship Clause grounds and under the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court rejected Appellants’ arguments and dismissed the case for failure
Tuaua v. United States, 951 F. Supp. 2d 88, 94
(D.D.C. 2013); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). On
appeal Appellants reassert only their constitutional
claim. Our review is de novo. Atherton v. D.C. Office
of Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
Although it possesses significant institutions of local selfgovernance American Samoa is classified as a “non-selfgoverning territory” by the United Nations General Assembly.
See generally U.N. Charter ch. XI.
Persons born in the Philippines during the territorial period, which ended in 1946, were likewise statutorily designated
The Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment provides that “[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States
and of the State wherein they reside.” U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1. Both Appellants and the
United States government3 agree the text and structure of the Fourteenth Amendment unambiguously
leads to a single inexorable conclusion as to whether
American Samoa is within the United States for
purposes of the clause. They materially disagree only as to whether the inescapable conclusion to be
drawn is whether American Samoa “is” or “is not” a
part of the United States. See generally JOHN BARTLETT, BARTLETT’S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS (17th ed.
2002) (“The devil is in the detail[s].”).
Appellants rely on a comparison of the first and
second clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment—the
Citizenship and Apportionment Clauses, respectively. They argue the former is framed expansively
through use of the overarching term “in the United
States,” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1, while the
latter speaks narrowly in terms of apportionment of
representatives “among the several States,” U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2 (emphasis added). In
contrast, the Appellees look to differences between
Unlike the United States Government, Intervenors—the
American Samoan Government and Congressman Faleomavaega—exclusively argue Appellants’ interpretation is foreclosed by precedents from the Insular case line.
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment.4 Partly
relying on dictum from Justice Brown’s judgment for
the Supreme Court in Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S.
244 (1901), the United States Government argues
the Thirteenth Amendment prohibits slavery “within
the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction,” id. at 251 (emphasis added), while the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause applies to
persons “born … in the United States, and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof,” id. (emphasis added). According to the Government the Thirteenth Amendment’s phraseology contemplates areas “not a part of
the Union, [which] [a]re still subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,” while the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporates a “limitation to persons
born or naturalized in the United States, which is
not extended to persons born in any place ‘subject to
their jurisdiction.’” Id.
Neither argument is fully persuasive, nor does it
squarely resolve the meaning of the ambiguous
phrase “in the United States.” The text and structure alone are insufficient to divine the Citizenship
The United States Government also argues, “even if Plaintiffs were correct that … the Fourteenth Amendment should
generally confer birthright citizenship[,] … Congress’s direct
modification of that status by statute trumps that interpretation.” Brief of Respondent-Appellee at 26, No. 13-5272 (D.C.
Cir. Aug. 11, 2014) (relying on Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815,
828 (1971)). This argument is novel, if curious. Yet it erroneously conflates Congress’s broad powers over naturalization
with authority to statutorily abrogate the scope of birthright
citizenship available under the Constitution itself. Congress’s
authority for the latter is wanting. See generally Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803) (“[T]he constitution
is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature.”).
Clause’s geographic scope. The difference between
the Citizenship and Apportionment Clauses could
suggest the former has a broader reach than the latter. See United States v. Diaz-Guerrero, 132 F. App’x
739, 740-41 (9th Cir. 2005) (“It is a well-established
canon of statutory interpretation that the use of different words or terms within a statute demonstrates … [intent] to convey a different meaning for
those words….”). But, even if this is the case, Appellants’ argument does not resolve the question at issue because both text and structure are silent as to
the precise contours of the “United States” under the
Even if “United States” is
broader than “among the several States,” it remains
ambiguous whether territories situated like American Samoa are “within” the United States for purposes of the clause. The Government’s argument is
similarly incomplete. While the language of the
Thirteenth Amendment may be broader than that
found in the Citizenship Clause, this comparison
yields no dispositive insight as to whether the Citizenship Clause’s use of the term “United States” includes American Samoa or similarly situated territories.
Appellants rely on scattered statements from the
legislative history to bolster their textual argument.
See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 2890,
2894 (1866) (“[The Citizenship Clause] refers to persons everywhere, whether in the States, or in the
Territories or in the District of Columbia.”) (statement of Sen. Trumbull). “[T]he legislative history of
the Fourteenth Amendment … like most other legislative history, contains many statements from which
conflicting inferences can be drawn….” Afroyim v.
Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 267 (1967). Here, and as a general matter, “[i]solated statements … are not impres-
sive legislative history.”
469 U.S. 70, 78 (1984).
Appellants and Amici Curiae further contend the
Citizenship Clause must—under Supreme Court
precedent—be read in light of the common law tradition of jus soli or “the right of the soil.” See United
States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 654 (1898)
(“The constitution nowhere defines the meaning
of … [the word “citizen”], either by way of inclusion
or of exclusion, except in so far as this is done by the
affirmative declaration that ‘all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States.’
In this, as in other respects, it must be interpreted in
the light of the common law, the principles and history of which were familiarly known to the framers of
the constitution.”) (internal citation omitted).
The doctrine of jus soli is an inheritance from the
English common law. Those born “within the King’s
domain” and “within the obedience or ligeance of the
King” were subjects of the King, or “citizens” in modern parlance. See Calvin’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 377,
399 (1608). The domain of the King was defined
broadly. It extended beyond the British Isles to include, for example, persons born in the American colonies. Inglis v. Trustees of Sailor’s Snug Harbor,
28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99, 120-21 (1830).
After independence the former colonies continued
to look to the English common law rule. See, e.g., id.
at 164-65. Following the Constitution’s ratification
the principal exception to jus soli was for African
Americans born in the United States, see Dred Scott
v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404-05 (1857); an
exception necessarily repudiated with the ratification
of the Fourteenth Amendment.5 Relying on the Supreme Court’s opinion in United States v. Wong Kim
Ark, 169 U.S. 649, Appellants and Amici Curiae accordingly argue the geographic scope of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause should be
read expansively as the “domain” of the sovereign
under background jus soli principles.
We are unconvinced, however, that Wong Kim
Ark reflects the constitutional codification of the
common law rule as applied to outlying territories.
As the Ninth Circuit noted in Rabang v. INS, the expansive language of Wong Kim Ark must be read
with the understanding that the case “involved a
person born in San Francisco, California. The fact
that he had been born ‘within the territory’ of the
United States was undisputed, and made it unnecessary to define ‘territory’ rigorously or decide whether
‘territory’ in its broader sense meant ‘in the United
States’ under the Citizenship Clause.” 35 F.3d 1449,
1454 (9th Cir. 1994); accord Nolos v. Holder,
611 F.3d 279, 284 (5th Cir. 2010); Valmonte v. INS,
During the pre-constitutional period of confederation,
“[p]aupers, vagabonds and fugitives from justice” were excepted
from the “privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States.” ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. IV (emphasis
added). It was only after “the adoption of the Constitution
[that] it became necessary in many cases to determine whether
an individual in a given case was a citizen of the United States.”
Peter Hand Co. v. United States, 2 F.2d 449, 452 (7th Cir. 1924)
136 F.3d 914, 920 (2d Cir. 1998).6 “It is a maxim, not
to be disregarded, that general expressions, in every
opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case
in which those expressions are used. If they go beyond the case, they may be respected, but ought not
to control the judgment in a subsequent suit when
the very point is presented for decision.” Wong Kim
Ark, 169 U.S. at 679.
And even assuming the framers intended the Citizenship Clause to constitutionally codify jus soli
principles, birthright citizenship does not simply follow the flag. Since its conception jus soli has incorporated a requirement of allegiance to the sovereign.
To the extent jus soli is adopted into the Fourteenth
Amendment, the concept of allegiance is manifested
by the Citizenship Clause’s mandate that birthright
citizens not merely be born within the territorial
boundaries of the United States but also “subject to
the jurisdiction thereof,” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 1, cl. 1; see Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 655 (“The
principle embraced all persons born within the king’s
Because it may also bear upon the impractical and anomalousness inquiry, we note the vast practical consequences of
departing from our sister circuits’ decisions. Despite Appellants’ contentions to the contrary, there is no material distinction between nationals born in American Samoa and those born
in the Philippines prior to its independence in 1946. Contra
Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 42-43 (attempting to distinguish the Philippines context because that territory was acquired via conquest and because it was always the purpose of
the United States to eventually withdraw its sovereignty). The
extension of citizenship to the American Samoan people would
necessarily implicate the United States citizenship status of
persons born in the Philippines during the territorial period—
and potentially their children through operation of statute.
allegiance, and subject to his protection…. Children,
born in England, of [] aliens, were [] natural-born
subjects. But the children, born within the realm, of
foreign ambassadors, or the children of alien enemies, born during and within their hostile occupation
of part of the king’s dominions, were not naturalborn subjects, because not born within the allegiance, the obedience, or the power, or, as would be
said at this day, within the jurisdiction, of the
king.”).
Appellants would find any allegiance requirement of no moment because, as non-citizen nationals,
American Samoans already “owe[] permanent allegiance to the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22);
see also Sailor’s Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. at 155
(“[A]llegiance is nothing more than the tie or duty of
obedience of a subject to the sovereign under whose
protection he is; and allegiance by birth, is that
which arises from being born within the dominions
and under the protection of a particular sovereign.”).
Yet, within the context of the Citizenship Clause,
“[t]he evident meaning of the[] … words [“subject to
the jurisdiction thereof”] is, not merely subject in
some respect or degree to the jurisdiction of the
United States, but completely subject to their political jurisdiction, and owing them direct and immediate allegiance.” Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 102
(1884) (emphasis added). It was on this basis that
the Supreme Court declined to extend constitutional
birthright citizenship to Native American tribes. See
id. at 99 (“The Indian tribes, being within the territorial limits of the United States, were not, strictly
speaking, foreign states; but they were alien nations,
distinct political communities….”). As even the dissent to Elk recognized, “it would be obviously inconsistent with the semi-independent character of such
a tribe, and with the obedience they are expected to
render to their tribal head, that they should be vested with the complete rights—or, on the other, subjected to the full responsibilities—of American citizens. It would not for a moment be contended that
such was the effect of this amendment.” Id. at 11920 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Even assuming a background context grounded in principles of jus soli, we
are skeptical the framers plainly intended to extend
States’s sphere of sovereignty—even where, as is the
case with American Samoa, ultimate governance remains statutorily vested with the United States Government. See Downes, 182 U.S. at 305 (White, J.,
concurring) (doubting citizenship naturally and inevitably extends to an acquired territory regardless of
Analysis of the Citizenship Clause’s application
to American Samoa would be incomplete absent invocation of the sometimes contentious Insular Cases,
where the Supreme Court “addressed whether the
Constitution, by its own force, applies in any territory that is not a State.” Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S.
723 (2008). See also King v. Morton, 520 F.2d 1140,
1153 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (“The Insular Cases, in the
manner in which the results were reached, the incongruity of the results, and the variety of inconsistent views expressed by the different members of
the court, are, I believe, without parallel in our judicial history.”).
“The doctrine of ‘territorial incorporation’ announced in the Insular Cases distinguishes between
incorporated territories, which are intended for
statehood from the time of acquisition and in which
the entire Constitution applies ex proprio vigore, and
unincorporated territories [such as American Samoa], which are not intended for statehood and in
which only [certain] fundamental constitutional
rights apply by their own force.” Commonwealth of
N. Mariana Islands v. Atalig, 723 F.2d 682, 688 (9th
Appellants and Amici contend the Insular Cases
have no application because the Citizenship Clause
textually defines its own scope. See Examining Bd.
of Engineers, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de
Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 590 n.21 (1976) (“[T]he Court in
Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 143
(1904) … [held] that the Constitution, except insofar
as required by its own terms, did not extend to the
Philippines.”) (emphasis added). We conclude the
scope of the Citizenship Clause, as applied to territories, may not be readily discerned from the plain text
or other indicia of the framers’ intent, absent resort
to the Insular Cases’ analytical framework. See
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 726 (While the “Constitution has independent force in the territories that [is]
grace[,] … because of the difficulties and disruptions
inherent in transforming … [unincorporated territories] into an Anglo-American system, the Court
adopted the doctrine of territorial incorporation, under which the Constitution applies … only in part in
unincorporated territories”).
Amici Curiae suggest territorial incorporation
doctrine should not be expanded to the Citizenship
Clause because the doctrine rests on anachronistic
views of race and imperialism. But the Court has
continued to invoke the Insular framework when
dealing with questions of territorial and extraterritorial application. See id. at 756-64. Although some
aspects of the Insular Cases’ analysis may now be
deemed politically incorrect, the framework remains
both applicable and of pragmatic use in assessing the
applicability of rights to unincorporated territories.
See id. at 758-59 (“[T]he Court devised in the Insular
Cases a doctrine that allowed it to use its power
sparingly and where it would be most needed” in
recognition of the “inherent practical difficulties of
enforcing all constitutional provisions always and
everywhere.”).
See also Balzac v. Porto Rico,
258 U.S. 298, 312 (1922) (“The Constitution … contains grants of power, and limitations
which in the nature of things are not always and
everywhere applicable and the real issue in the Insular Cases [is] … which [] of [the Constitution’s] provisions [a]re applicable by way of limitation upon the
exercise of executive and legislative power in dealing
with new conditions and requirements” arising in the
territorial context).
As the Supreme Court in Boumediene emphasized, the “common thread uniting the Insular Cases … [is that] questions of extraterritoriality turn on
objective factors and practical concerns, not formalism.” 553 U.S. at 764. While “fundamental limitations in favor of personal rights” remain guaranteed
to persons born in the unincorporated territories, id.
at 758 (quoting Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S.
1, 44 (1890)), the Insular framework recognizes the
difficulties that frequently inure when “determin[ing] [whether a] particular provision of the Constitution is applicable,” absent inquiry into the impractical or anomalous. See id.; see also Downes,
182 U.S. at 292 (White, J., concurring) (“[T]he de-
termination of what particular provision of the Constitution is applicable, generally speaking, in all cases, involves an inquiry into the situation of the territory and its relations to the United States.”).
American citizenship “is one of the most valuable
rights in the world today.” Kennedy v. MendozaMartinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963). “The freedoms
and opportunities secured by United States citizenship long have been treasured by persons fortunate
enough to be born with them, and are yearned for by
countless less fortunate.”
Fedorenko v. United
States, 449 U.S. 490, 522 (1981). Accordingly, even if
the Insular framework is applicable, Appellants cite
to a bevy of cases to argue citizenship is a fundamental right. See, e.g., Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253
(1967); Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963); Trop
v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 103 (1958) (plurality op.). But
those cases do not arise in the territorial context.
Such decisions do not reflect the Court’s considered
judgment as to the existence of a fundamental right
to citizenship for persons born in the United States’
Cf. Wong Kim Ark,
169 U.S. at 679.7
This Court, like the lower court, “is [also] mindful of the
years of past practice in which territorial citizenship has been
treated as a statutory, and not a constitutional right.” Tuaua,
951 F. Supp. 2d at 98. “[N]o one acquires a vested or protected
right in violation of the Constitution by long use…. Yet an unbroken practice … openly [conducted] … by affirmative state
action … is not something to be lightly cast aside.” Walz v. Tax
Comm’n of City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970).
“Fundamental” has a distinct and narrow meaning in the context of territorial rights. It is not sufficient that a right be considered fundamentally important in a colloquial sense or even that a right be
“necessary to [the] []American regime of ordered liberty.” Wabol v. Villacrusis, 958 F.2d 1450, 1460 (9th
Cir. 1990) (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145, 149 n.14 (1968)). Under the Insular framework
the designation of fundamental extends only to the
narrow category of rights and “principles which are
the basis of all free government.” Dorr v. United
States, 195 U.S. 138, 147 (1904) (emphasis added);
Downes, 182 U.S. at 283 (“Whatever may be finally
decided by the American people as to the status of
these islands and their inhabitants … they are entitled under the principles of the Constitution to be
protected in life, liberty, and property … even [if they
are] not possessed of the political rights of citizens of
the United States.”).
In this manner the Insular Cases distinguish as
universally fundamental those rights so basic as to
be integral to free and fair society. In contrast, we
consider non-fundamental those artificial, procedural, or remedial rights that—justly revered though
they may be—are nonetheless idiosyncratic to the
American social compact or to the Anglo-American
tradition of jurisprudence. E.g., Balzac, 258 U.S. 298
(constitutional right to a jury trial does not extend to
unincorporated territories as a fundamental right);
see also Downes, 182 U.S. at 282 (“We suggest, without intending to decide, that there may be a distinction between certain natural rights enforced in the
Constitution by prohibitions against interference
with them, and what may be termed artificial or remedial rights which are peculiar to our own system
of jurisprudence.”).
We are unconvinced a right to be designated a
citizen at birth under the jus soli tradition, rather
than a non-citizen national, is a “sine qua non for
‘free government’” or otherwise fundamental under
the Insular Cases’ constricted understanding of the
term. Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Hodel, 830 F.2d 374,
386 n.72 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Regardless of its independently controlling force, we therefore adopt the
conclusion of Justice Brown’s dictum in his judgment
for the Court in Downes. See 182 U.S. at 282-83.
“Citizenship by birth within the sovereign’s domain
[may be] a cornerstone of [the Anglo-American]
common law tradition,” Brief for PetitionerAppellant at 48, Tuaua v. United States, No. 135272 (D.C. Cir. April 25, 2014), but numerous free
and democratic societies principally follow jus sanguinis—“right of the blood”—where birthright citizenship is based upon nationality of a child’s parents.8 See Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 477
(1998) (citing various authority “noting the ‘widespread extent of the rule of jus sanguinis.’”); Graziella Bertocchi & Chiara Strozzi, The Evolution of Citizenship: Economic and Institutional Determinants,
53 J.L. & ECON. 95, 99-100 (2010) (jus sanguinis has
traditionally predominated in civil law countries,
whereas jus soli has historically been the norm in
common law countries).
In states following a jus sanguinis tradition birth
in the sovereign’s domain—whether in an outlying
“In the United States, nationality may be predicated either
on jus soli … or on jus sanguinis….” Acheson v. Maenza,
202 F.2d 453, 459 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (the latter is conferred statutorily).
territory, colony, or the country proper—is simply
irrelevant to the question of citizenship. Nor is the
asserted right so natural and intrinsic to the human
condition as could not warrant transgression in civil
See generally Dorr, 195 U.S. at 147.
“[C]itizenship has no meaning in the absence of difference.” Peter J. Spiro, The Impossibility of Citizenship, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1492, 1509 (2003). The
means by which free and fair societies may elect to
ascribe the classification of citizen must accommodate variation where consistent with respect for other, inherent and inalienable, rights of persons. To
find a natural right to jus soli birthright citizenship
would give umbrage to the liberty of free people to
govern the terms of association within the social
compact underlying formation of a sovereign state.
Cf. Aristotle, Politics bk. 3, reprinted in part in READINGS IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 55, 87 (Francis W.
Coker ed., 1938) (“The basis of a democratic state is
liberty; which, according to the common opinion of
men, can only be enjoyed in such a state[.]”).9
The absence of a fundamental territorial right to
jus soli birthright citizenship does not end our inquiry. “The decision in the present case does not depend on key words such as ‘fundamental’ or ‘unincorporated territory[,]’ … but can be reached only by
applying the principles of the [Insular] [C]ases, as
controlled by their respective contexts, to the situa9
The case before us pertains only to the permissibility of designating American Samoans as nationals, rather than citizens.
We need not decide whether constitutional impropriety would
arise if persons born in an unincorporated territory were also
denied national status.
tion as it exists in American Samoa today.” King,
520 F.2d at 1147. Cf. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 758
(“It may well be that over time the ties between the
United States and any of its unincorporated Territories strengthen in ways that are of constitutional
significance.”). “[T]he question is which guarantees
of the Constitution should apply in view of the particular circumstances, the practical necessities, and
the possible alternatives which Congress had before
it.” Reid, 354 U.S at 75. In sum, we must ask
whether the circumstances are such that recognition
of the right to birthright citizenship would prove
“impracticable and anomalous,” as applied to contemporary American Samoa. Id. at 74.
Despite American Samoa’s lengthy relationship
with the United States, the American Samoan people
have not formed a collective consensus in favor of
United States citizenship. In part this reluctance
stems from unique kinship practices and social structures inherent to the traditional Samoan way of life,
including those related to the Samoan system of
communal land ownership. Traditionally aiga (extended families) “communally own virtually all Samoan land, [and] the matais [chiefs] have authority
over which family members work what family land
and where the nuclear families within the extended
family will live.” King, 520 F.2d at 1159. Extended
families under the authority of matais remain a fundamentally important social unit in modern Samoan
Representatives of the American Samoan people
have long expressed concern that the extension of
United States citizenship to the territory could potentially undermine these aspects of the Samoan
way of life. For example Congressman Faleoma-
vaega and the American Samoan Government posit
the extension of citizenship could result in greater
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, imperiling American Samoa’s traditional, racially-based land alienation
rules. Appellants contest the probable danger citizenship poses to American Samoa’s customs and cultural mores.
The resolution of this dispute would likely require delving into the particulars of American Samoa’s present legal and cultural structures to an extent ill-suited to the limited factual record before us.
See King, 520 F.2d at 1147 (“The importance of the
constitutional right at stake makes it essential that a
decision in this case rest on a solid understanding of
the present legal and cultural development of American Samoa. That understanding cannot be based on
unsubstantiated opinion; it must be based on facts.”).
We need not rest on such issues or otherwise speculate on the relative merits of the American Samoan
Government’s Equal Protection concerns. The imposition of citizenship on the American Samoan territory is impractical and anomalous at a more fundamental level.
We hold it anomalous to impose citizenship over
the objections of the American Samoan people themselves, as expressed through their democratically
elected representatives.10 See Brief for Intervenors,
or in the Alternative, Amici Curiae the American
Samoa Government and Congressman Eni F.H.
Faleomavaega at 23-35, Tuaua v. United States, No.
13-5272 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 25, 2014) (opposing constitutional birthright citizenship). A republic of people “is
not every group of men, associated in any manner,
[it] is the coming together of … men who are united
by common agreement….” MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO,
DE RE PUBLICA bk. I, ch. 25, 26-35 (George H. Sabine
& Stanley B. Smith trans., Prentice Hall 1929). In
this manner, we distinguish a republican association
from the autocratic subjugation of free people. And
from this, it is consequently understood that democratic “governments … deriv[e] their [] powers from
the consent of the governed,” Kennett v. Chambers,
55 U.S. (14 How.) 38, 41 (1852); under any just system of governance the fount of state power rests on
the participation of citizens in civil society—that is,
We address only whether the Citizenship Clause mandates
the imposition of birthright citizenship where doing so overrides the wishes of an unincorporated territory’s people. We do
not doubt Congress’s general authority to, in its discretion, naturalize persons living in the United States’s unincorporated
territories nor do we question the expansive scope of birthright
citizenship in the incorporated territories or opine on the general scope of Congress’s powers under the Territorial Clause,
through the free and full association of individuals
with, and as a part of, society and the state.11
“Citizenship is the effect of [a] compact[;] … [it] is
a political tie.” Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133,
141 (1795) (distinguishing citizenship from the feudal doctrine of perpetual allegiance). “[E]very []
question of citizenship[] … [thus] depends on the
terms and spirit of [the] social compact.” Id. at 142.
The benefits of American citizenship are not understood in isolation; reciprocal to the rights of citizenship are, and should be, the obligations carried by all
citizens of the United States. See Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86, 92 (1958) (“The duties of citizenship are
numerous, and the discharge of many of these obligations is essential to the security and well-being of the
Nation.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 14 (James Madison)
(“[T]he kindred blood which flows in the veins of
American citizens, the mingled blood which they
have shed in defense of their sacred rights, consecrate their Union.”).
Citizenship is not the sum of its benefits. It is no
less than the adoption or ascription of an identity,
that of “citizen” to a particular sovereign state, and a
Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 22 (Alexander Hamilton) (“It has
not a little contributed to the infirmities of the existing federal
system, that it never had a ratification by the People… Owing
its ratification to the law of a State, it has been contended that
the same authority might repeal the law by which it was ratified…. The possibility of a question of this nature proves the
necessity of laying the foundations of our national government
deeper than in the mere sanction of delegated authority. The
fabric of American empire ought to rest on the solid basis of the
consent of the People. The streams of national power ought to
flow immediately from that pure, original fountain of all legitimate authority.”) (emphasis omitted).
ratification of those mores necessary and intrinsic to
association as a full functioning component of that
See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S.
(21 Wall.) 162, 165-66 (1874) (“There cannot be a nation without a people. The very idea of a political
community, such as a nation is, implies an association of persons for the promotion of their general welfare. Each one of the persons associated becomes a
member of the nation formed by the association.”).
At base Appellants ask that we forcibly impose a
compact of citizenship—with its concomitant rights,
obligations, and implications for cultural identity12—
on a distinct and unincorporated territory of people,
in the absence of evidence that a majority of the territory’s inhabitants endorse such a tie and where the
territory’s democratically elected representatives actively oppose such a compact.
We can envision little that is more anomalous,
under modern standards, than the forcible imposition of citizenship against the majoritarian will.13
See, e.g., U.N. Charter arts. 1, 73 (recognizing selfdetermination of people as a guiding principle and
obliging members to “take due account of the politi12
See also, e.g., Robert B. Porter, The Demise of the Ongwehoweh and the Rise of the Native Americans: Redressing the
Genocidal Act of Forcing American Citizenship Upon Indigenous Peoples, 15 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 107, 169 (1999) (arguing that statutorily “[f]orcing American citizenship upon Indigenous [Native American] people [destructively] transformed
[their] political identity”).
Complex questions arise where territorial inhabitants democratically determine either to pursue citizenship or withdraw
from union with a state. Such scenarios may implicate the reciprocal associational rights of the state’s current citizens or the
right to integrity of the sovereign itself.
cal aspirations of the peoples” inhabiting non-selfgoverning territories under a member’s responsibility);14 Atlantic Charter, U.S.-U.K., Aug. 14, 1941 (endorsing “respect [for] the right of all peoples to
live”); Woodrow Wilson, President, United States,
Fourteen Points, Address to Joint Session of Congress (Jan. 8, 1918) (“[I]n determining all [] questions
of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable
claims of the government whose title is to be determined.”) (Point V). See also Tuaua, 951 F. Supp. 2d
at 91 (“American Samoans take pride in their unique
political and cultural practices, and they celebrate its
history free from conquest or involuntary annexation
by foreign powers.”). To hold the contrary would be
to mandate an irregular intrusion into the autonomy
of Samoan democratic decision-making; an exercise
of paternalism—if not overt cultural imperialism—
offensive to the shared democratic traditions of the
United States and modern American Samoa. See
King v. Andrus, 452 F. Supp. 11, 15 (D.D.C. 1977)
(“The institutions of the present government of
American Samoa reflect … the democratic tradition….”).
But see Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
LENEUOTI FIAFIA TUAUA, )
June 26th, 2013 [# 9]
Plaintiffs are five non-citizen U.S. nationals born
in American Samoa and the Samoan Federation of
America, a nonprofit organization serving the Samoan community in Los Angeles. Compl. ¶¶ 10-15.1
They seek declaratory and injunctive relief against
defendants, the United States and the related parties that execute its citizenship laws. Id. ¶¶ 16-19.2
They assert that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citi1
The five individual plaintiffs are Leneuoti Fiafia Tuaua
(“Tuaua”), Va’aleama Tovia Fosi (“Fosi”), Fanuatanu Fauesala
Lifa Mamea (“Mamea”), Taffy-Lei T. Maene (“Maene”), and
Emy Fiatala Afaleva (“Afaleva”). Mamea also brings his claims
on behalf of his three minor children. Id. ¶ 12(a).
Defendants are the United States, the State Department,
the Secretary of State, and the Assistant Secretary of State for
zenship Clause extends to American Samoa and that
people born in American Samoa are therefore U.S.
citizens at birth. Id. at 25-26. Plaintiffs also argue
that Immigration and Naturalization Act § 308(1) is
unconstitutional because it provides that American
Samoans are noncitizen U.S. nationals. See id. at 26.
Further, they ask the Court to hold that a State Department policy and practice are unconstitutional
and invalid under the Administrative Procedure Act
(“APA”). See Compl. at 26. Underlying all of these
claims is the same legal argument: the Citizenship
Clause applies to American Samoa, so contrary law
and policy must be invalidated. The United States
and related parties move to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. See Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of
Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss (“Defs.’ Mem.”) [Dkt. # 9] at 1.
Because plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, the Court GRANTS defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.
American Samoa is located on the eastern islands of an archipelago in the South Pacific. Compl.
¶ 3. The United States claimed this territory in a
1900 treaty with Great Britain and Germany,
31 Stat. 1878, and Samoan leaders formally ceded
sovereignty to the United States in 1900 and 1904,
45 Stat. 1253. American Samoa was administered by
the Secretary of the Navy until 1951, when President
Truman transferred administrative responsibility to
American Samoa’s current supervisor, the Secretary
of the Interior. Exec. Order No. 10,264, 16 Fed. Reg.
6,417 (July 3, 1951).
Over the past half-century, American Samoa has
strengthened its ties to the United States. The Constitution of American Samoa was approved by the
Secretary of the Interior in 1967 and provides for an
elected bicameral legislature, an appointed governor,
and an independent judiciary. Compl. ¶ 27. In 1977,
the Secretary permitted the governor to be selected
by popular vote. Id. One year later, Congress voted
to give American Samoa a nonvoting delegate in the
U.S. House of Representatives. Id.3 American Samoans have served in the U.S. military since 1900
and, most recently, in the wars in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Id. ¶ 31. In signing the 1978 legislation
granting American Samoa a delegate in Congress,
President Carter acknowledged the islands’ contributions to American sports and culture and their role
as “a permanent part of American political life.”
Jimmy Carter, Presidential Statement on Signing
H.R. 13702 into Law (Oct. 31, 1978), cited in Pls.’
Mem. of P. & A. in Opp’n to Gov’t’s Mot. Dismiss
(“Pls.’ Opp’n”) [Dkt. # 18] at 5 n.7.
At the same time, however, American Samoa has
endeavored to preserve its traditional way of life
known as fa’a Samoa. Indeed, its constitution protects the Samoan tradition of communal ownership
of ancestral lands by large, extended families:
It shall be the policy of the Government of
American Samoa to protect persons of Samoan ancestry against alienation of their lands
and the destruction of the Samoan way of life
The current delegate, Eni F. H. Faleomavaega, appears as
Amicus Curiae in this case opposing the plaintiffs’ suit. See
generally Br. of the Hon. Eni F.H. Faleomavaega as Amicus Curiae in Supp. of Defs. (“Amicus Br.”) [Dkt. # 12].
and language, contrary to their best interests. Such legislation as may be necessary
may be enacted to protect the lands, customs,
culture, and traditional Samoan family organization of persons of Samoan ancestry,
and to encourage business enterprises by
such persons. No change in the law respecting the alienation or transfer of land or any
interest therein, shall be effective unless the
same be approved by two successive legislatures by a two-thirds vote of the entire membership of each house and by the Governor.
Rev. Const. of Am. Samoa art. I, § 3; see also
Craddick v. Territorial Registrar, 1 Am. Samoa 2d
11, 12 (1980); Amicus Br. at 4-5. American Samoans
take pride in their unique political and cultural practices, and they celebrate its history free from conquest or involuntary annexation by foreign powers.
Federal law classifies American Samoa as an
“outlying possession” of the United States. Immigration and Naturalization Act (“INA”) § 101(a)(29),
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(29). As such, people born in
American Samoa are U.S. nationals but not U.S. citizens at birth. INA § 308(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1408(1). The
State Department’s Foreign Affairs Manual (“FAM”)
accordingly categorizes American Samoa as an unincorporated territory and states that “the citizenship
provisions of the Constitution do not apply to persons
born there.” 7 FAM § 1125.1(b). In accordance with
INA and FAM, the State Department stamps the
passports of people born in American Samoa with
“Endorsement Code 09,” which declares that the
holder of the passport is a U.S. national but not a
U.S. citizen. See Compl. ¶ 7; Defs.’ Mem. at 6-7.
American Samoans have been permitted to become
naturalized U.S. citizens since 1952, but plaintiffs
describe that process as “lengthy, costly, and burdensome.” Compl. ¶¶ 47-48. American Samoans must
relocate to another part of the United States to begin
the naturalization process, and the citizenship application requires a $680 fee, a moral character assessment, fingerprinting, and an English and civics examination. Pls.’ Opp’n at 11.
All of the individual plaintiffs were issued passports by the State Department bearing Endorsement
Code 09. See id. ¶¶ 10-14. Plaintiffs allege a variety
of harms that have befallen them due to their noncitizen national status. Several plaintiffs, despite
long careers in the military or law enforcement, remain unable to vote or to work in jobs that require
citizenship status. Id. ¶ 10(c), 11(c)-(e), 14(c)-(d).
Other harms include: ineligibility for federal workstudy programs in college, id. ¶ 11(c); ineligibility for
firearm permits, id. ¶ 11(e); and inability to obtain
travel and immigration visas, id. ¶ 12(e), 13(d-e).
defendants have moved to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under
Rule 12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim under
Rule 12(b)(6). See Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss Pls.’ Compl.
(“Defs.’ Mot.”) [Dkt. # 9] at 1. For a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), “the plaintiff bears the
burden of establishing the factual predicates of jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.” Erby v.
United States, 424 F. Supp. 2d 180, 182 (D.D.C.
2006) (citing, inter alia, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)). “[P]laintiff s factual
allegations in the complaint … will bear closer scru-
tiny in resolving a 12(b)(1) motion than in resolving a
12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim.” U.S. ex
rel. Digital Healthcare, Inc. v. Affiliated Computer,
778 F. Supp. 2d 37, 43 (D.D.C. 2011) (citation and
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests
whether the plaintiff has pleaded facts sufficient to
“raise a right to relief above the speculative level,”
assuming that the facts alleged are true. Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “While
a complaint should not be dismissed unless the court
determines that the allegations do not support relief
on any legal theory, the complaint nonetheless must
set forth sufficient information to suggest that there
is some recognized legal theory upon which relief
may be granted.” District of Columbia v. Air Fla.,
Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
In considering motions under both Rule 12(b)(1)
and Rule 12(b)(6), a court must construe the complaint in a light favorable to the plaintiff and must
accept as true plaintiff’s reasonable factual inferences. See Howard v. Fenty, 580 F. Supp. 2d 86, 8990 (D.D.C. 2008); Smith v. United States,
475 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2006) (citing EEOC v.
St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624
(D.C. Cir. 1997)).
Before the Court can reach the merits of this
case, it must, of course, ensure that the dispute falls
within its jurisdiction. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v.
EPA, 320 F.3d 272, 277 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Defendants
put forth three arguments contesting this Court’s jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claims: 1) two of plaintiffs’
APA claims are jurisdictionally time-barred, 2) the
Samoan Federation of America lacks standing, and
3) plaintiffs’ complaint is barred by the political
question doctrine. See Defs.’ Mem. at 17-18, 19-23.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that
First, defendants allege that two of the five individual plaintiffs’ APA claims are time-barred because
their passports, bearing Endorsement Code 09, were
issued outside the six year limitations period. See
Defs.’ Mem. at 20-21.4 Putting aside the merits of
defendants’ argument, however, the fact remains
that the three other plaintiffs have, in essence,
raised the identical APA claim. Thus, having jurisdiction to hear those claims effectively provides this
Court with the very jurisdiction necessary to evaluate the merits of these claims.
Similarly, defendants’ assertion that the Samoan
Federation of America lacks standing to sue either
on its own behalf or on behalf of its members, see
Defs.’ Mem. at 21-23, is an argument that is of no real consequence.5 It is well-established that a court
need not consider the standing of the other plaintiffs
The APA time bar issue is best understood as a jurisdictional matter. Our Circuit has held that the general section
2401(a) statute of limitations applies to APA claims unless another statute provides otherwise, see Harris v. FAA, 353 F.3d
1006, 1009 (D.C. Cir. 2004), and that, “[u]nlike an ordinary
statute of limitations, § 2401(a) is a jurisdictional condition,”
Spannaus v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 824 F.2d 52, 55 (D.C. Cir.
“A … motion to dismiss for lack of standing implicates subject matter jurisdiction….” Edwards v. Aurora Loan Serv.,
791 F. Supp. 2d 144, 150 (D.D.C. 2011).
when at least one plaintiff has standing. See In re
Navy Chaplaincy, 697 F.3d 1171, 1178 (D.C. Cir.
2012); Tozzi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
271 F.3d 301, 310 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see also Watt v.
Energy Action Educ. Found., 454 U.S. 151, 160
(1981); Mountain States Legal Found. v. Glickman,
92 F.3d 1228, 1232 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The bottom line
here is clear: defendants do not allege that the individual plaintiffs lack standing, nor is there any reason for this Court to believe that they do. As such,
the Court need not address the standing of the Samoan Federation of America in order to determine
whether it has jurisdiction.
Finally, defendants advance the novel and
somewhat exotic jurisdictional argument that plaintiffs’ suit raises a nonjusticiable political question.6
See Defs.’ Mem. at 17-18. The Government argues
that, “at bottom,” plaintiffs are arguing for a grant of
statehood to American Samoa, and that such a determination is a political question committed by the
Constitution to Congress. See id. at 18. Plaintiffs
respond that their complaint does not argue for
statehood, but instead argues for the application of a
particular constitutional provision to a territory, a
The political question doctrine is a jurisdictional matter.
“[T]he concept of justiciability, which expresses the jurisdictional limitations imposed on federal courts by the ‘case or controversy’ requirement of Art. III, embodies … the … political
question doctrine[]…. [T]he presence of a political question
[thus] suffices to prevent the power of the federal judiciary from
being invoked by the complaining party.” Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 215 (1974) (quoted in
Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan, 413 F.3d 45, 47-48 (D.C. Cir.
claim “eminently fit for judicial resolution.”
Opp’n at 33.
To the extent they view plaintiffs as petitioning
for statehood, however, defendants misread the complaint. The complaint clearly urges the application
of the Citizenship Clause to American Samoa, but it
never “demands” recognition of American Samoa as a
state or even mentions the word “statehood.” See
generally Compl. The actual task before the Court—
determining whether the Citizenship Clause applies
to American Samoa—is, indeed, a proper judicial inquiry.7
The Supreme Court has decided similar questions throughout its history. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723
(2008) (finding Suspension Clause applicable to U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay); Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298
(1922) (Sixth Amendment jury trial right inapplicable to unincorporated territory of Puerto Rico); Downes v. Bidwell, 182
U.S. 244 (1901) (Revenue Clauses inapplicable to Puerto Rico).
Most recently, in Boumediene, the Supreme Court expressly
rejected the contention that the Constitution’s extraterritorial
application presents a political question. 553 U.S. at 754-55.
In fact, defendants themselves rely on several cases in which
courts exercised their jurisdiction to determine whether the Citizenship Clause extended to the Philippines while it was an unincorporated territory of the United States. See Defs.’ Mem. at
12-15 (citing, inter alia, Nolos v. Holder, 611 F.3d 279 (5th Cir.
2010); Lacap v. INS, 138 F.3d 518 (3d Cir. 1998); Valmonte v.
INS, 136 F.3d 914 (2d Cir. 1998); Rabang v. INS, 35 F.3d 1449
(9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied sub nom. Sanidad v. Immigration
& Naturalization Serv., 515 U.S. 1130 (1995); Licudine v. Winter, 603 F. Supp. 2d 129 (D.D.C. 2009)).
Having jurisdiction, the Court turns to defendants’ motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Plaintiffs’ claims all hinge upon
one legal assertion: the Citizenship Clause guarantees the citizenship of people born in American Samoa. Defendants argue that this assertion must be
rejected in light of the Constitution’s plain language,
rulings from the Supreme Court and other federal
courts, longstanding historical practice, and pragmatic considerations. See generally Defs.’ Mem.;
Gov’t’s Reply in Supp. of Their Mot. to Dismiss
(“Defs.’ Reply”) [Dkt. # 20]; Amicus Br. Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, I agree. The Citizenship Clause
does not guarantee birthright citizenship to American Samoans. As such, for the following reasons, I
must dismiss the remainder of plaintiffs’ claims.
Amendment provides that [a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and
of the State wherein they reside.” U.S. Const.
amend. XIV, section 1. Both parties seem to agree
that American Samoa is “subject to the jurisdiction”
of the United States, and other courts have concluded as much. See Pls.’ Opp’n at 2; Defs.’ Mem. at 14
(citing Rabang as noting that the territories are
“subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States).
But to be covered by the Citizenship Clause, a person
must be born or naturalized “in the United States
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof.” Thus, the
key question becomes whether American Samoa
qualifies as a part of the “United States” as that is
used within the Citizenship Clause.8
The Supreme Court famously addressed the extent to which the Constitution applies in territories
in a series of cases known as the Insular Cases.9 In
these cases, the Supreme Court contrasted “incorporated” territories—those lands expressly made part
of the United States by an act of Congress—with
“unincorporated territories” that had not yet become
part of the United States and were not on a path toward statehood. See, e.g., Downes, 182 U.S. at 312;
Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 143 (1904); see
also United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S.
259, 268 (1990); Eche v. Holder, 694 F.3d 1026, 1031
(9th Cir. 2012) (citing Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S.
The Court is also guided by the familiar principle that
“‘[p]roper respect for a coordinate branch of the government’
requires that we strike down an Act of Congress only if ‘the lack
of constitutional authority to pass [the] act in question is clearly
demonstrated.’”
132 S. Ct. 2566, 2579 (2012) (quoting United States v. Harris,
106 U.S. 629, 635 (1883)). Unless it can be clearly shown that
the Citizenship Clause extends to American Samoa, plaintiffs’
legal theory should be rejected.
The Insular Cases include De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1
(1901); Goetze v. United States, 182 U.S. 221 (1901); Dooley v.
United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901); Armstrong v. United States,
182 U.S. 243 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901);
and Huus v. N.Y. and Porto Rico Steamship Co., 182 U.S. 392
723, 757-58 (2008)).10 In an unincorporated territory,
the Insular Cases held that only certain “fundamental” constitutional rights are extended to its inhabitants. Dorr, 195 U.S. 148-49; Balzac v. Porto Rico,
258 U.S. 298, 312 (1922); see also Verdugo-Urquidez,
494 U.S. at 268. While none of the Insular Cases directly addressed the Citizenship Clause, they suggested that citizenship was not a “fundamental”
right that applied to unincorporated territories.11
For example, in the Insular Case of Downes v.
Bidwell, the Court addressed, via multiple opinions,
whether the Revenue Clause of the Constitution applied in the unincorporated territory of Puerto Rico.
In an opinion for the majority, Justice Brown intimated in dicta that citizenship was not guaranteed
to unincorporated territories. See Downes, 182 U.S.
at 282 (suggesting that citizenship and suffrage are
not “natural rights enforced in the Constitution” but
rather rights that are “unnecessary to the proper
Plaintiffs do not contest whether American Samoa is an “incorporated” or “unincorporated” territory; rather they reject this
dichotomy altogether. See Pls.’ Opp’n at 25-33. For the purposes of this characterization, the Court assumes that American
Samoa is an “unincorporated” territory, as no act of incorporation has been identified.
Plaintiffs cite two cases to support the conclusion that citizenship is a fundamental right: Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
103 (1958) (plurality op.) (mentioning the “fundamental right of
citizenship”) and Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 267-68 (1967)
(citizenship is “no light trifle”). Each of these cases discusses
the fundamentality of citizenship in dicta, and neither case has
anything to do with territorial citizenship. Such precedent is
unpersuasive in light of the voluminous federal case law discussed herein that concludes that citizenship is not guaranteed
to people born in unincorporated territories.
protection of individuals.”). He added that “it is
doubtful if Congress would ever assent to the annexation of territory upon the condition that its inhabitants, however foreign they may be to our habits, traditions, and modes of life, shall become at once citizens of the United States.” Id. at 279-80. He also
contrasted the Citizenship Clause with the language
of the Thirteenth Amendment, which prohibits slavery “within the United States, or in any place subject
to their jurisdiction.” Id. at 251 (emphasis added).
[T]he 14th Amendment, upon the subject of
citizenship, declares only that “all persons
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States, and of the state
wherein they reside.” Here there is a limitation to persons born or naturalized in the
United States, which is not extended to persons born in any place “subject to their jurisdiction.”
Id. (emphasis added). In a concurrence, Justice
White echoed this sentiment, arguing that the practice of acquiring territories “could not be practically
exercised if the result would be to endow the inhabitants with citizenship of the United States.” Id. at
Plaintiffs rightly note that Downes did not possess a singular majority opinion and addressed the
right to citizenship only in dicta. Pls.’ Opp’n at 2527. But in the century since Downes and the Insular
Cases were decided, no federal court has recognized
birthright citizenship as a guarantee in unincorporated territories. To the contrary, the Supreme
Court has continued to suggest that citizenship is not
guaranteed to people born in unincorporated territories. For example, in a case addressing the legal status of an individual born in the Philippines while it
was a territory, the Court noted—without objection
or concern—that “persons born in the Philippines
during [its territorial period] were American nationals” and “until 1946, [could not] become United
States citizens. Barber v. Gonzales, 347 U.S. 637,
639 n.1 (1954). Again, in Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S.
420, 467 n.2 (1998), Justice Ginsberg noted in her
dissent that “the only remaining noncitizen nationals
are residents of American Samoa and Swains Island”
and failed to note anything objectionable about their
noncitizen national status.
Boumediene v. Bush, the Court reexamined the Insular Cases in holding that the Constitution’s Suspension Clause applies in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
553 U.S. 723, 757-59 (2008). The Court noted that
the Insular Cases “devised … a doctrine that allowed
[the Court] to use its power sparingly and where it
would most be needed. This century-old doctrine informs our analysis in the present matter.” Id. at 759.
Plaintiffs argue that Boumediene did not reaffirm—but instead narrowed—the Insular Cases.
Pls.’ Opp’n at 28-29. They point to the Court’s
statement that “[i]t may well be that over time the
ties between the United States and any of its unincorporated Territories strengthen in ways that are of
constitutional significance.” Boumediene, 553 U.S. at
758 (citing Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 475476 (1979) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment)
(“Whatever the validity of the [Insular Cases] in the
particular historical context in which they were decided, those cases are clearly not authority for questioning the application of the Fourth Amendment—
or any other provision of the Bill of Rights—to the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in the 1970’s.”)). Id.
This vague statement crafted in a vastly different
context, however, does not license this Court to turn
its back on the more direct and more persuasive
precedent and the legal framework that has predominated over the unincorporated territories for more
Indeed, other federal courts have adhered to the
precedents of the Insular Cases in similar cases involving unincorporated territories. For example, the
Second, Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have held
that the term “United States” in the Citizenship
Clause did not include the Philippines during its
time as an unincorporated territory. See generally
Nolos v. Holder, 611 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2010);
Valmonte v. INS, 136 F.3d 914 (2d Cir. 1998); Lacap
v. INS, 138 F.3d 518 (3d Cir. 1998); Rabang, 35 F.3d
1449. These courts relied extensively upon Downes
to assist with their interpretation of the Citizenship
Clause. See Nolos, 611 F.3d at 282-84; Valmonte,
136 F.3d at 918-21; Rabang, 35 F.3d at 1452-53. Indeed, one of my own distinguished colleagues in an
earlier decision cited these precedents to reaffirm
that the Citizenship Clause did not include the Philippines during its territorial period. See Licudine v.
Winter, 603 F. Supp. 2d 129, 132-34 (D.D.C. 2009)
(Robinson, J.).12
Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish these cases by
noting that the Philippines, unlike American Samoa,
was a territory only “temporarily.” Pls.’ Opp’n at 31.
But none of these cases based their decision on the
fact that the Philippines was a temporary territory.
Even if this distinction made a difference, plaintiffs
fail to rebut the Ninth Circuit’s recent holding that
the Northern Mariana Islands—a current and
longstanding territory—is not included within the
bounds of the Citizenship Clause. Eche v. Holder,
694 F.3d 1026, 1027-28 (9th Cir. 2012).13 In short,
federal courts have held over and over again that unincorporated territories are not included within the
The Philippines cases also reject the applicability of United
States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898), in which the Supreme Court addressed whether a child born to alien parents in
the United States was a citizen. See Nolos, 611 F.3d at 284;
Valmonte, 136 F.3d at 920; Rabang, 35 F.3d at 1454; see also
Pls.’ Opp’n at 13, 24 (citing Wong Kim Ark). Because the child
was born in San Francisco, the Court did not need to address
the territorial scope of the Citizenship Clause in that case.
Plaintiffs address Eche in a footnote, stating simply that it
“relies on the same flawed arguments as the other cases cited
by Defendants.” Pls.’ Opp’n at 31 n.25.
Citizenship Clause, and this Court sees no reason to
do otherwise!14
In both their brief and in oral argument, plaintiffs placed great weight on our Circuit’s decision in
King v. Morton, 520 F.2d 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1975). In
that case, the Court addressed whether an American
citizen was guaranteed the right to trial by jury in
American Samoa. Id. at 1146. Rejecting the reliance
on “key words such as ‘fundamental’ or ‘unincorporated territory’” in the Insular Cases and other cases,
the court instead employed the test from Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 75 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring):
asking whether the right to trial by jury would be
“‘impractical and anomalous.’” King, 520 F.2d at
1147 (quoting Reid, 354 U.S. at 75). As defendants
rightly note, this case addressed the rights of an existing citizen in American Samoa—not the right of
persons born in American Samoa to citizenship itself.
Defs.’ Reply at 9. This distinction was critical in
Unpersuasively, plaintiffs attempt to use legislative history
to support the territorial reach of the Citizenship Clause. See
Pls.’ Opp’n at 13-18. Plaintiffs cite, inter alia, a senator’s comment that the Citizenship Clause declares that “every person
born within the limits of the United States [is] a citizen.” Id. at
13. This comment fails to shed any light on whether the “United States” includes its territories. Plaintiffs also rely upon contemporaneous language from another senator, President Jackson, and other legislation that include people in the “Territories” within the bounds of the Citizenship Clause. Id. at 13-15.
However, it is unclear from this language whether the “Territories” included only incorporated territories on the path to statehood or also unincorporated territories—particularly unincorporated territories such as American Samoa that had not yet
come into existence. Even if this legislative history were clear,
these stray comments are not sufficient to upend years of contrary legal precedent.
Reid, the case upon which King relied. As the Supreme Court noted in Boumediene, “That the petitioners in Reid were American citizens was a key factor in the case and was central to the plurality’s conclusion that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments apply
to American civilians tried outside the United
States.” 553 U.S. at 760. Further, neither King nor
Reid discussed the right to citizenship—a right that
other federal courts have addressed directly and, in
doing so, have refused to extend to unincorporated
Morever, our Circuit appeared to reaffirm its
commitment to Insular Cases—in terms of extending
only “fundamental” rights to unincorporated territories—in a case following King that involved a due
process claim in American Samoa. Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of the LatterDay Saints v. Hodel, 830 F.2d 374, 385 (D.C. Cir.
1987). In that case, the Circuit stated that “the Supreme Court long ago determined that in the ‘unincorporated’ territories, such as American Samoa, the
guarantees of the Constitution apply only insofar as
its ‘fundamental limitations in favor of personal
rights’ express ‘principles which are the basis of all
free government which cannot be with impunity
transcended.’” Id. (citing Dorr, 195 U.S. at 146-47).
The court held that access to a court independent of
the executive branch is not a “fundamental” right extending to American Samoa. Id. at 386. In light of
this later case and King’s distinct context, this Court
does not find King to be an appropriate guidepost for
this case.15
Finally, this Court is mindful of the years of past
practice in which territorial citizenship has been
treated as a statutory, and not a constitutional,
right. In the unincorporated territories of Puerto Rico, Guam, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the Northern
Mariana Islands, birthright citizenship was conferred upon their inhabitants by various statutes
many years after the United States acquired them.
See Amicus Br. at 10-11. If the Citizenship Clause
guaranteed birthright citizenship in unincorporated
territories, these statutes would have been unnecessary. While longstanding practice is not sufficient to
demonstrate constitutionality, such a practice requires special scrutiny before being set aside. See,
e.g., Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 31
(1922) (Holmes, J.) (“If a thing has been practiced for
two hundred years by common consent, it will need a
strong case for the Fourteenth Amendment to affect
it[.]”); Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970)
(“It is obviously correct that no one acquires a vested
or protected right in violation of the Constitution by
long use…. Yet an unbroken practice … is not some15
In a brief, per curiam opinion, our Circuit declined to address the question of whether the Citizenship Clause applied to
the Philippines in Mendoza v. Soc. Security Comm’r,
92 F. App’x 3, 3 (2004). In claiming that Mendoza suggests that
birthright citizenship in the territories is “an open question in
the Circuit,” plaintiffs attempt to make a mountain out of a
molehill. The Mendoza court sidestepped the issue not because
it was necessarily “an open question”—but rather because the
issue was simply unnecessary to the disposition of the case. See
id. (“We need not decide any of the constitutional questions presented by Amicus….”).
thing to be lightly cast aside.”). And while Congress
cannot take away the citizenship of individuals covered by the Citizenship Clause, it can bestow citizenship upon those not within the Constitution’s
breadth. See U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (“Congress
shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful
Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory belonging to the United States.”); id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 4
(Congress may “establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization….”). To date, Congress has not seen fit to
bestow birthright citizenship upon American Samoa,
and in accordance with the law, this Court must and
will respect that choice.16
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS
defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. An order consistent
with this decision accompanies this Memorandum
Because the Court finds statutory interpretation and legal
precedent sufficient to grant defendants’ motion to dismiss, it
need not address the Amicus’s arguments about the potentially
deleterious effects of mandating birthright citizenship on American Samoa’s traditional culture. See Amicus Br. at 12-18.
1:12-cv-01143-RJL
Filed On: October 2, 2015
-----------------------------American Samoa Government and
Garland, Chief Judge; Henderson,
Rogers, Tatel, Brown, Griffith,
Kavanaugh, Srinivasan, Millett, Pillard,
and Wilkins, Circuit Judges; Silberman
and Sentelle, Senior Circuit Judges
Upon consideration of appellants’ petition for rehearing en banc, the response thereto, and the absence of a request by any member of the court for a
vote, it is
U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 2:
U.S. Const. art. I, § 3, cl. 3:
attained to the Age of thirty Years, and been nine
Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall
not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for
U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 5:
Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President; neither shall any Person be eligible
to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age
U.S. Const. amend. XIII, § 1:
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §§ 1-2:
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons
in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when
the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United
States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive
and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the
Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of
age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way
abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be
reduced in the proportion which the number of such
male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male
8 U.S.C. § 1101. Definitions (excerpt):
(22) The term “national of the United States”
means (A) a citizen of the United States, or (B) a
person who, though not a citizen of the United
States, owes permanent allegiance to the United
(29) The term “outlying possessions of the
United States” means American Samoa and
8 U.S.C. § 1408. Nationals but not citizens of
the United States at birth:
Unless otherwise provided in section 1401 of this
title, the following shall be nationals, but not citizens, of the United States at birth:
(1) A person born in an outlying possession of the
United States on or after the date of formal acquisition of such possession;
(2) A person born outside the United States and
its outlying possessions of parents both of whom are
nationals, but not citizens, of the United States, and
have had a residence in the United States, or one of
its outlying possessions prior to the birth of such
(3) A person of unknown parentage found in an
outlying possession of the United States while under
the age of five years, until shown, prior to his attaining the age of twenty-one years, not to have been
(4) A person born outside the United States and
its outlying possessions of parents one of whom is an
alien, and the other a national, but not a citizen, of
the United States who, prior to the birth of such person, was physically present in the United States or
its outlying possessions for a period or periods totaling not less than seven years in any continuous period of ten years—
(A) during which the national parent was not
outside the United States or its outlying possessions for a continuous period of more than one
The proviso of section 1401(g) of this title shall apply
to the national parent under this paragraph in the
same manner as it applies to the citizen parent under that section.
8 U.S.C. § 1440. Naturalization through activeduty service in the Armed Forces during World
War I, World War II, Korean hostilities,
Vietnam hostilities, or other periods of military
Any person who, while an alien or a noncitizen
national of the United States, has served honorably
as a member of the Selected Reserve of the Ready
Reserve or in an active-duty status in the military,
air, or naval forces of the United States during either
World War I or during a period beginning September
1, 1939, and ending December 31, 1946, or during a
period beginning June 25, 1950, and ending July 1,
1955, or during a period beginning February 28,
1961, and ending on a date designated by the President by Executive order as of the date of termination
of the Vietnam hostilities, or thereafter during any
other period which the President by Executive order
shall designate as a period in which Armed Forces of
the United States are or were engaged in military
operations involving armed conflict with a hostile
foreign force, and who, if separated from such service, was separated under honorable conditions, may
be naturalized as provided in this section if (1) at the
time of enlistment, reenlistment, extension of enlistment, or induction such person shall have been in
the United States, the Canal Zone, American Samoa,
or Swains Island, or on board a public vessel owned
or operated by the United States for noncommercial
service, whether or not he has been lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence, or
(2) at any time subsequent to enlistment or induction
such person shall have been lawfully admitted to the
United States for permanent residence. The executive department under which such person served
shall determine whether persons have served honorably in an active-duty status, and whether separation from such service was under honorable conditions: Provided, however, That no person who is or
has been separated from such service on account of
alienage, or who was a conscientious objector who
performed no military, air, or naval duty whatever or
refused to wear the uniform, shall be regarded as
having served honorably or having been separated
under honorable conditions for the purposes of this
section. No period of service in the Armed Forces
shall be made the basis of an application for naturalization under this section if the applicant has previously been naturalized on the basis of the same period of service.
A person filing an application under subsection
(a) of this section shall comply in all other respects
with the requirements of this subchapter, except
(1) he may be naturalized regardless of age,
and notwithstanding the provisions of section
1429 of this title as they relate to deportability
and the provisions of section 1442 of this title;
(2) no period of residence or specified period
of physical presence within the United States or
any State or district of the Service in the United
States shall be required;
(3) service in the military, air or naval forces
of the United States shall be proved by a duly
authenticated certification from the executive
department under which the applicant served or
is serving, which shall state whether the applicant served honorably in an active-duty status
during either World War I or during a period beginning September 1, 1939, and ending December 31, 1946, or during a period beginning June
25, 1950, and ending July 1, 1955, or during a
period beginning February 28, 1961, and ending
on a date designated by the President by Executive order as the date of termination of the Vietnam hostilities, or thereafter during any other
period which the President by Executive order
shall designate as a period in which Armed Forces of the United States are or were engaged in
military operations involving armed conflict with
a hostile foreign force, and was separated from
such service under honorable conditions; and
(4) notwithstanding any other provision of
law, no fee shall be charged or collected from the
applicant for filing a petition for naturalization
or for the issuance of a certificate of naturalization upon citizenship being granted to the applicant, and no clerk of any State court shall charge
or collect any fee for such services unless the
laws of the State require such charge to be made,
in which case nothing more than the portion of
the fee required to be paid to the State shall be
charged or collected.
Citizenship granted pursuant to this section may
be revoked in accordance with section 1451 of this
title if the person is separated from the Armed Forces under other than honorable conditions before the
person has served honorably for a period or periods
aggregating five years. Such ground for revocation
shall be in addition to any other provided by law, including the grounds described in section 1451 of this
title. The fact that the naturalized person was separated from the service under other than honorable
conditions shall be proved by a duly authenticated
certification from the executive department under
which the person was serving at the time of separation. Any period or periods of service shall be proved
by duly authenticated copies of the records of the executive departments having custody of the records of
10 U.S.C. § 532. Qualifications for original appointment as a commissioned officer (excerpt):
(a) Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense, an original appointment as a commissioned officer (other than as a commissioned warrant officer) in the Regular Army, Regular Navy,
Regular Air Force, or Regular Marine Corps may be
given only to a person who—
(2) is able to complete 20 years of active
commissioned service before his sixty-second
(4) is physically qualified for active service;
(5) has such other special qualifications as
the Secretary of the military department concerned may prescribe by regulation.
48 U.S.C. § 1661. Islands of eastern Samoa:
The cessions by certain chiefs of the islands of
Tutuila and Manua and certain other islands of the
Samoan group lying between the thirteenth and fifteenth degrees of latitude south of the Equator and
between the one hundred and sixty-seventh and one
hundred and seventy-first degrees of longitude west
of Greenwich, herein referred to as the islands of
eastern Samoa, are accepted, ratified, and confirmed,
as of April 10, 1900, and July 16, 1904, respectively.
The existing laws of the United States relative to
public lands shall not apply to such lands in the said
islands of eastern Samoa; but the Congress of the
United States shall enact special laws for their management and disposition: Provided, That all revenue
from or proceeds of the same, except as regards such
part thereof as may be used or occupied for the civil,
military, or naval purposes of the United States or
may be assigned for the use of the local government,
shall be used solely for the benefit of the inhabitants
of the said islands of eastern Samoa for educational
Until Congress shall provide for the government
of such islands, all civil, judicial, and military powers
shall be vested in such person or persons and shall
be exercised in such manner as the President of the
United States shall direct; and the President shall
have power to remove said officers and fill the vacancies so occasioned.
48 U.S.C. § 1662. Sovereign of United States
extended over Swains Island:
The sovereignty of the United States over American Samoa is extended over Swains Island, which is
made a part of American Samoa and placed under
the jurisdiction of the administrative and judicial authorities of the government established therein by
7 Dep’t of State, Foreign Affairs Manual
§ 1125.1. Current Law:
a. As defined in Section 101(a)(29) INA, the term
“outlying possession” of the United States applies only to American Samoa and Swains Island.
b. American Samoa and Swains Island are not
incorporated territories, and the citizenship provisions of the Constitution do not apply to persons born
c. Section 301(e) INA provides for acquisition of
U.S. citizenship by birth in outlying possessions to
one U.S. citizen parent who has been physically present in the United States or one of its outlying possessions for a continuous period of one year at any
time prior to the birth of such person. Section 309
INA made Section 301(e) applicable to children born
out of wedlock under certain conditions (see 7 FAM
1133.4).
d. Section 308(1) and (3) INA provides noncitizen U.S. nationality for the people born (or foundlings) in American Samoa and Swains Island (see
7 FAM 1121.4-2 for text of Sec 308 (1) and (3) INA).
e. By its wording, Section 308(1) INA is retroactive, effectively granting U.S. non-citizen nationality
status to anyone born in American Samoa or Swains
Island after annexation (February 16, 1900 for American Samoa and March 4, 1925 for Swains Island)
and before December 24, 1952, who did not acquire
non-citizen U.S. nationality at the time of birth.
7 Dep’t of State, Foreign Affairs Manual § 1141.
a. The acquisition of non-citizen U.S. nationality
by birth abroad is governed by treaty or congressional legislation. The law in effect when a person was
born governs that person’s acquisition of non-citizen
U.S. nationality, unless the legislation specifically
provides otherwise such as retroactive application.
See 7 FAM 1120 regarding acquisition of U.S. nationality by birth in U.S. territories and possessions.
See 7 FAM 1330 regarding documentary evidence to
establish a citizenship claim.
(1) The national or nationals through whom
a child claims non-citizen U.S. nationality must
have been U.S. non-citizen nationals when the
child was born and previously must have resided
or been physically present in the United States
or one of its outlying possessions as required by
(2) See 7 FAM 1125 regarding acquisition of
U.S. non-citizen nationality by persons born in
American Samoa and Swains Island and 7 FAM
1126 regarding the non-citizen national option
provided for persons born in the Commonwealth
of the Northern Mariana Islands in Section 302
with the United States of America (Public Law
94-241. 90 Stat. 263) (“Covenant”) of March 24,
1976, entered fully into force November 3, 1986.
b. Blood Relationships: The considerations in
7 FAM 1131, relating to blood relationships, and
7 FAM 1180, concerning posthumous children also
apply to persons claiming non-citizen U.S. nationality through their parents.
c. Retention Provisions: Persons who acquired
non-citizen U.S. nationality at birth were never subject to special requirements for retaining their U.S.
d. Birth to One U.S. Citizen and One U.S. NonCitizen National: A child born to one U.S. citizen
parent and one U.S. non-citizen national parent ac-
quires U.S. citizenship if the parent meets the requirements of INA 301(d) (8 U.S.C. 1401(d)) (or prior
statutes) and, in cases of children born out of wedlock, INA 309 (8 U.S.C. 1409) (or prior statutes). The
person may not opt for U.S. non-citizen national status. A person cannot be both a citizen and noncitizen national. Non-citizenship nationality under
Section 308 of the INA is only acquired when there is
no U.S. citizen parent.
e. Certificate of Non-Citizen National Status:
See INA 341(b) (8 U.S.C. 1452(b)).
NOTE: Only persons who acquired
U.S. non-citizen national status pursuant to INA 308 (8 U.S.C. 1408) or Section 204 NA are eligible for such a certificate. The Department implements
INA 341(b) (8 U.S.C. 1452(b)) by annotating the person’s U.S. passport to indicate that he or she is a non-citizen national and not a citizen, using endorsement code 09. (See 7 FAM 1300 Appendix B.)
Endorsement Code 09 Text:
THE BEARER IS A UNITED STATES NATIONAL AND NOT A UNITED STATES
Explanation: Placed in a passport issued to a U.S. national who is not a
f. Naturalization of a U.S. Non-Citizen National:
A person who is a U.S. non-citizen national may apply for naturalization as a U.S. citizen pursuant to
INA 325 (8 U.S.C. 1436) and 8 CFR 325.
7 Dep’t of State, Foreign Affairs Manual § 1320,
App. B. List of current Endorsements (excerpt):
WORDING OF ENDORSEMENT (TEXT FIELD) or
(DROPDOWN/ TEXT)
Explanatory notes appear
below endorsement text
in this font and color.
THE BEARER IS A UNITED
STATES NATIONAL AND
NOT A UNITED STATES
Placed in a passport
book issued to a U.S.
national who is not a
“U.S. National” will be
printed instead of
“USA” on the front of
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