Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/933/97/36075/
Timestamp: 2020-02-18 02:57:48
Document Index: 494114787

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 841', '§ 955', '§ 952', '§ 955', '§ 955', '§ 2', '§ 952']

United States of America, Appellee, v. Martha Cecilia Bernal-rojas, Defendant, Appellant, 933 F.2d 97 (1st Cir. 1991) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › First Circuit › 1991 › United States of America, Appellee, v. Martha Cecilia Bernal-rojas, Defendant, Appellant
United States of America, Appellee, v. Martha Cecilia Bernal-rojas, Defendant, Appellant, 933 F.2d 97 (1st Cir. 1991)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit - 933 F.2d 97 (1st Cir. 1991) Heard March 5, 1991. Decided May 17, 1991
Martha Cecilia Bernal-Rojas, a citizen of Colombia, was convicted of possessing cocaine with intent to distribute it, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1), and of possessing cocaine on board an aircraft arriving in the customs territory of the United States, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 955. She was acquitted of a third count, that of importing cocaine into the customs territory of the United States, 21 U.S.C. § 952(a).1 She appeals her conviction and her sentence, raising four issues: (1) whether the sentencing guidelines were applied in a manner that discriminated against her as a Colombian national; (2) whether the jury verdicts were inconsistent; (3) whether the facts comported with the statutory elements of the charge of possession on board an aircraft; and (4) whether her presence in the United States was voluntary. We find that none of appellant's contentions possess merit, and we affirm the judgment of the court below.
We assume for purposes of discussion that, were a criminal defendant to put forth evidence that a United States Attorney systematically refused to plea bargain with Colombian nationals, yet regularly reached agreements with otherwise similarly situated defendants, a prima facie equal protection claim would be made out. Although prosecutorial discretion is shielded from intense judicial review, McKlesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 296-97, 107 S. Ct. 1756, 1769, 95 L. Ed. 2d 262 (1987), it cannot be wielded in a manner which discriminates against a constitutionally protected class. Id. at 309 n. 30, 107 S. Ct. at 1776 n. 30; Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456, 82 S. Ct. 501, 505, 7 L. Ed. 2d 446 (1962). We also assume, for present purposes only, that citizens of Colombia constitute a suspect class, triggering strict scrutiny rather than mere rational basis review. See Dickerson v. Latessa, 872 F.2d 1116, 1119 (1st Cir. 1989) (setting forth equal protection standards of review). National origin has been termed a suspect class. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 n. 4, 96 S. Ct. 2562, 2566 n. 4, 49 L. Ed. 2d 520 (1976) (characterizing ancestry as a suspect class); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478-79, 74 S. Ct. 667, 670-71, 98 L. Ed. 866 (1954) (ancestry and national origin are classifications protected by the fourteenth amendment); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 640, 68 S. Ct. 269, 272, 92 L. Ed. 249 (1948) (forbidding discrimination based upon parents' country of origin); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369, 6 S. Ct. 1064, 1070, 30 L. Ed. 220 (1886) (Constitution protects "without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality"); see also United States v. Cammisano, 413 F. Supp. 886, 891 n. 5 (W.D. Mo.), vacated on other grounds, 546 F.2d 238 (8th Cir. 1976). Finally, it is evident that the plea agreement process must comport with constitutional standards. United States v. Bell, 506 F.2d 207, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("Similarly situated defendants should be afforded equal plea agreement opportunities" in order to "protect the process from attack on equal protection grounds") (quoting ABA, Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty 60 (Approved Draft 1968)).
Nonetheless, appellant's contention is fatally flawed. There is no evidentiary record from which this court could even begin to evaluate her claim of differential treatment. The issue was not raised until sentencing, and no hearing was conducted by the district court. We have only appellant's assertion that a single Spanish national in purportedly similar circumstances was accorded more favorable treatment. Appellant's brief also makes unsupported reference to two other Colombian nationals--circumstances unknown--who were denied plea agreements. This meager, unsubstantiated proof falls woefully short of demonstrating a consistent pattern of unequal administration of the law. See Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. at 456, 82 S. Ct. at 505. No doubt the breadth of a prosecutor's discretion creates the potential for abuse. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365, 98 S. Ct. 663, 669, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1978). On the evidence before us, however, we have no basis to question the United States Attorney's decision not to pursue a plea agreement in this case.
To begin with, the Supreme Court has held that inconsistency in a jury verdict is not ground for reversal provided that sufficient evidence supports the counts of conviction. United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 67, 105 S. Ct. 471, 477, 83 L. Ed. 2d 461 (1984); Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393, 52 S. Ct. 189, 190, 76 L. Ed. 356 (1932). Moreover, the verdicts do not appear to us to be inconsistent. The jury could have found, for example, that although appellant did possess the drugs on board the aircraft, and did intend to distribute them, she did not import them into the United States because her intent was to import them into Belgium.2 This possible interpretation of the facts does not undermine the conviction for possession with intent to distribute, as "the place of intended distribution is not important so long as such intent is established together with the fact of possession within the United States." United States v. Mejia-Lozano, 829 F.2d 268, 271 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. McKenzie, 818 F.2d 115, 118 (1st Cir. 1987). Finally, as Justice Holmes stated in Dunn, we may "interpret the acquittal as no more than [the jury's] assumption of a power which they had no right to exercise, but to which they were disposed through lenity." Dunn, 284 U.S. at 393, 52 S. Ct. at 190.
21 U.S.C. § 955. At trial, a customs agent confirmed that cocaine was not on the cargo manifest for appellant's flight, so that the statutory exception was inapplicable.
Appellant asserts that because she was under no obligation to prepare a manifest or otherwise make a declaration, 21 U.S.C. § 955 does not apply to her. This is professed to be so because checked baggage is not required to be listed on the manifest, and there is no mechanism for in-transit passengers such as appellant to declare the contents of their baggage. Thus, she claims that her conviction on this count resulted in criminal liability for her failure to declare a substance when no opportunity was provided for her to declare it.
Discussion of this assertion need not detain us long. The statute does not prohibit failure to make a declaration. It makes it illegal to carry on board an aircraft a controlled substance or a narcotic drug except where the substance or drug is legitimately part of the manifested cargo on board. The United States customs service has statutory authority to inspect in-transit baggage. United States v. Franchi-Forlando, 838 F.2d 585, 587 (1st Cir. 1988); McKenzie, 818 F.2d at 119-20. There is no merit to appellant's argument.D.
All three counts of the indictment were premised on aiding and abetting liability under 18 U.S.C. § 2
We are merely speculating as to the jury's reasoning. However, we note that conviction for importation under 21 U.S.C. § 952(a) does not require proof that the goods were actually unloaded in United States territory. United States v. McKenzie, 818 F.2d 115, 118 (1st Cir. 1987)