Source: http://retro.kluwercompetitionlaw.com/CommonUI/book-toc.aspx?book=TOC-Areeda-2016
Timestamp: 2017-03-30 14:29:28
Document Index: 285705368

Matched Legal Cases: ['§2', '§2', '§2', '§2', '§2', '§2', '§2', '§7', '§5', '§3', '§5', '§2', '§2', '§2']

Title Antitrust Law - An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application
Phillip E. AreedaHerbert Hovenkamp
Supplement 9/2016, September 2016
0-7355-6079-X
Antitrust Law - An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application, Areeda and Hovenkamp (1978)
Part One: Preliminary and Pervasive Issues: Antitrust Goals, Coverage, Procedure, and Economics
Chapter 1 The Objectives of Antitrust Law ¶100. Appropriate and Inappropriate Antitrust Objectives 1A Economic Concerns Dominate Historical Development of Competition Policy ¶101. Legal, Political, and Economic Background of Sherman Act: General Conclusions ¶102. Earliest “Anti-Trust” Policy in State Corporate Law ¶103. The Sherman Act: Intent of the Framers ¶104. The Common Law, Economics, and the Evolution of Antitrust 1B Economic Concerns Trump Inconsistent Policy Concerns ¶110. Governing Principles Summarized ¶111. Noneconomic Antitrust Goals Incoherent and Indefensible ¶112. Exclusively Economic Approach Coherent but Imperfect ¶113. Economics Limits Role of Intent ¶114. Antitrust's “Welfare” Goals Chapter 2 The Domain of the Antitrust Laws: Jurisdiction, Immunities, and Exclusions from Coverage The Domain of the Antitrust Laws: Jurisdiction, Immunities, and Exclusions from Coverage ¶200. Regulatory Immunities and Exemptions; General Principle Stated 2A "Political Action" and Petitions to the Government ¶201. Introduction and Summary; Noerr and Pennington Decisions ¶202. Anticompetitive Purpose and Burden on Rivals or Rivalry Not Intrinsically Wrongful; Causation Often Lacking ¶203. Influencing Government Action by Improper, Deceitful, or Unnecessarily Harmful Means 2A-1 "Sham" Petitioning ¶204. “Sham” or Bad Faith Action ¶205. Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Petitions: “Sham” and False Claims ¶206. Requests for Government Actions That Are Unconstitutional, Unauthorized, or Otherwise Improper ¶207. Pleading and Proving Sham ¶208. Sham as Antitrust Violation 2A-2 Non-Immunity Outside of "Sham"; Collateral Issues ¶209. “Commercial Exception”: Government as Buyer, Seller, Lessor, Lessee, Franchisor ¶210. Compulsory Filings with Government Agencies ¶211. Petitions to Non-governmental Bodies ¶212. Evidentiary Use of Protected Activities; Discovery of “Sham” Litigation Documents 2B Antitrust in a Federal System: Relationship with State Regulation ¶215. Introduction; Collateral Concerns of Federalism 2B-1 General Interplay of State Law and Federal Antitrust Law ¶216. Concurrent Authority: Overlapping State and Federal Antitrust Laws ¶217. Concerns for Competition and Federal Preemption of State or Local Regulation 2B-2 Areas of Federally Created Express Primacy for State Law ¶218. Express Federal Deference Generally ¶219. Federal Antitrust Immunity for “the Business of Insurance” ¶220. Insurance Immunity: “Boycott” Exception 2B-3 Implied Antitrust Immunity For “State Action” ¶221. Introduction: The Meaning of Parker v. Brown ¶222. Scope of Parker Immunity Outlined; Summary Disposition of Parker Claims ¶223. Antitrust Liability for Governmental Subdivisions; Corrective Legislation ¶224. State Authorization to Displace Antitrust Law ¶225. Ambiguities in Authorizing Provision ¶226. Active Supervision Requirement: Domain and Nature ¶227. The Need for Supervision: Identifying and Classifying the Relevant Actor ¶228. Non-Immunity But No Antitrust Violation or Penalty; Appeals of Parker Immunity Denial ¶229. Relationship of Noerr and Parker Immunities ¶230. Possible Alternative Criteria for Parker Immunity ¶231. The “State Action” Doctrine in the Federal Trade Commission 2B-4 Non-Antitrust Limitations on Anticompetitive State Activities ¶232. Miscellaneous Federal Limitations ¶233. Commerce Clause 2C Antitrust Policy Under Federal Regulation and Deregulation 2C-1 Federal Regulation Generally ¶240. Federal Regulation Qualifies Antitrust Mandate ¶241. Deregulation Revises and Expands Antitrust Mandate ¶242. Relationship Between Antitrust and Federal Regulatory Regime; General Conclusions Summarized ¶243. When Does Regulation Oust Federal Antitrust Authority? ¶244. Judicial Deferral to Agency Decision Making ¶245. Antitrust Deference to Nonfederal Tribunal or Decision Maker ¶246. Good Faith Regulatory Compliance as Defense to Non-Immune Conduct ¶247. The “Filed Rate” Doctrine and Its Limitations ¶248. Noerr, Parker, and Federal Regulatory Immunities Compared 2C-2 Particular Federal Exemptions Particular Federal Exemptions ¶249. Agricultural Cooperatives and Related Producer Organizing ¶250. Health Care Quality Improvement Act ¶251. Other Miscellaneous Exemptions ¶252. National Sovereign Immunity 2C-3 Antitrust and Federal Labor Policy ¶255. Basic Antitrust Immunity for Labor Organizing ¶256. “Nonstatutory Exemption” — Restraints Implicating Employers or Other Nonlabor Groups ¶257. Multi-Employer Bargaining, Employer Restraints, and Brown Decision 2D Noncommercial Entities and Activities ¶260. Introduction; Antitrust's Purpose to Regulate “Commerce” ¶261. Nonprofit Organizations Generally Not Immune ¶262. Noncommercial Activities Generally Immune 2E The Jurisdictional Reach of the Antitrust Laws: Interstate Commerce ¶265. Interstate Commerce: The General Requirement ¶266. Sherman Act Reach Broad but Not Infinite ¶267. The “In Commerce” Provisions 2F The Jurisdictional Reach of the Antitrust Laws: Foreign Commerce ¶270. Introduction ¶271. Judicial Jurisdiction in Antitrust Suits Against Nondomestic Actors ¶272. Extraterritorial Reach: “Effects” Test and Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act ¶273. Appraising Restraints Abroad; Comity with Foreign Nations ¶274. Foreign Government Involvement ¶275. Antitrust Remedies in Foreign Commerce ¶276. National Adjudication versus Diplomacy Chapter 3 The Antitrust System of Remedies ¶300. Introduction 3A Statutory Structure; Relationship of Provisions ¶301. The Relationship of the Antitrust Laws to the Common Law and to One Another ¶302. The Federal Trade Commission Act and the FTC ¶303. Relationship of Sanctions and Liability 3B Rule Determination in the Litigation Process ¶305. Per Se Rules, Presumptions, and Stare Decisis ¶306. Jury Trial ¶307. The Antitrust Complaint: Prediscovery Summary Disposition; Sanctions ¶308. Summary Judgment ¶309. Judicial Control of Expert Testimony ¶310. Aggregation of Claims Greater than Sum of Parts? The Many Meanings of Continental Ore ¶311. Simplifying Antitrust Litigation; Alternative Dispute Resolution 3C Repose in Antitrust Litigation Repose in Antitrust Litigation ¶315 Guidelines, Clearances, and Advisory Opinions ¶316. Mistake or Change of Law ¶317. Res Judicata ¶318. Issue Preclusion (Collateral Estoppel), Particularly Non-Mutual ¶319. Effect of Government Victory on Subsequent Private Suit ¶320. The Antitrust Statute of Limitation ¶321. Government Suit Tolls Statute of Limitation 3D Equitable Relief ¶325. Nature, Objectives, and Scope ¶326. Private Suits in Equity ¶327. Consent Decrees 3E Private Antitrust Actions Generally ¶330. Statutory Scheme ¶331. Antitrust Class Actions 3F "Standing" of Private Plaintiffs 3F-1 General Standing Doctrine ¶335. “Standing” ¶336. “Business or Property” ¶337. “Antitrust Injury” ¶338. Causation and Injury-in-Fact ¶339. Remote, Derivative, Duplicative, or Inferior Plaintiff ¶340. Reasonably Ascertainable Damages 3F-2 Recurring "Standing" Situations ¶345. Consumers and Other Buyers ¶346. Indirect Purchasers ¶347. “Umbrella” Transactions ¶348 Competitor Suits ¶349. Nascent Firms ¶350. Suppliers ¶351. Licensors and Landlords ¶352. Employees ¶353. Taxpayers (or Citizens), Creditors, or Shareholders ¶354. Associations ¶355. Governments ¶356. Special Problems of Private Merger Suits ¶357. Intrabrand Distribution Restraints ¶358. Challenges to Tying and Exclusive Dealing ¶359. Robinson-Patman Act Violations ¶360. Defenses and Declaratory Judgments ¶361. Plaintiff's Own Improper Conduct Barring Antitrust Prosecution ¶362. Assignment of Antitrust Claims; Indirect Purchaser Issues ¶363 Harm to Competition Under Packers and Stockyards Act 3G The Economics of Impact, Antitrust Injury, and Antitrust Damages ¶390. Introduction ¶391. Antitrust Injury and Economic Analysis ¶392. Evidentiary Standards ¶393. Timing, Interest, Present Values ¶394. Econometrics and Statistical Inference ¶395. Damages in Overcharge Cases ¶396. Damages for Indirect Purchasers ¶397. Damages for Exclusionary Practices ¶398. Economic Issues in Class Certification ¶399. Daubert and the Admissibility of Expert Testimony Chapter 4 The Economic Basis for Antitrust Policy ¶400. Introduction ¶401. The Rationale of Antitrust Policy 4A The Basic Economics of Competition, Monopoly, Oligopoly, and Cartels ¶402. The Nature and Economic Consequences of a Perfectly Competitive Economy ¶403. The Nature and Economic Consequences of Monopoly ¶404. Oligopoly: Nature, Economic Consequences, and Measurement ¶405. Cartels 4B Departures from the Competitive Model: Implications for Antitrust Policy ¶406. Essential Points ¶407. Progressiveness—Accounting for Innovation ¶408. Economies of Scale and Antitrust Policy ¶409. Product Differentiation: Monopolistic Competition ¶410. Information Asymmetry ¶411. Agency and Free Rider Problems ¶412. “Second Best” Problems ¶413. Resource Immobility: “Ruinous” Competition ¶414. Externalities; Transaction Costs 4C Barriers to Entry: Meaning, Identification, and Antitrust Policy Consequences ¶420. Entry Barriers Generally ¶421. Sources of Entry Barriers ¶422. Assessing Likelihood and Effectiveness of Entry; Government Guidelines ¶423. Potential Competition and Market Definition Part Two: Market Structure Issues
Chapter 5 Market Power and Market Definition ¶500. Introduction and Preview 5A Defining Market Power ¶501. Market Power Defined ¶502. The Social Cost of Market Power ¶503. Formal Price-Cost Measure of Market Power: The Theory ¶504. Formal Price-Cost Measure of Market Power: Difficulties ¶505. Complex and Changing Power ¶506. Buyer Response and Substitutes Check Market Power ¶507. *Economic Relationship Among Market Power, Elasticity of Demand, and Elasticity of Supply ¶508. “Unexercised” Market Power 5B "Alternative," Non-Market-based Proofs of Market Power “Alternative,” Non–Market-Based Proofs of Market Power ¶515. Introduction: Market Definition and Alternatives ¶516. Inferring Power from Excess Returns or Accounting Data ¶517. Price Discrimination and Market Power ¶518. Intellectual Property as Proof of Market Power ¶519. Post-Contract Power: Contract Lock-in Does Not Create Power for Antitrust Purposes ¶520. Conduct Indicating Market Power ¶521. Direct Estimates of Market Power from Computation of Residual Demand Curves ¶522. Concluding Comment 5C Market Definition – General Considerations ¶530. Introduction and Preview ¶531. Legal Functions of Market Definition; Pleading Requirements ¶532. Meaning of Market Shares; Relation to Market Definition ¶533. “Submarket” Confusion ¶534. Delineating Markets from Price Relationships, Purchasing Patterns, or Price Discrimination ¶535. Measuring Share Within a Given Market ¶536. Hypothetical Price Increase Methodology to Define Market ¶537. “Significant” Price Increase Required and Defined ¶538. Predicting Effects of Hypothetical Price Increase ¶539. The Cellophane Fallacy: Misleading Elasticities at Current Prices 5D Geographic Markets Geographic Markets ¶550. Geographic Market: Price Relationships and Trading Patterns ¶551. Economics of Geographic Markets ¶552. Geographic Market: Transport Costs ¶553. Geographic Market: Customer Convenience and Preference ¶554. Geographic Markets: Government Guidelines ¶555. Geographic Market: Foreign Competition ¶556. Geographic Market Definition: Effect of Private Restraints on Dealer Location, Shipment, or Sales 5E Product Markets ¶560. Introduction ¶561. Product Market: Producer Substitutes ¶562. Product Market: User Substitutes ¶563. Differentiated Products; Markets and Brands ¶564. Derivative Markets, Aftermarkets, and Lock-in Issues ¶565. Distinguishing Substitutes from Complements; Cluster Markets ¶566. Distribution Modes 5F Special Situations ¶570. Market Definition to Assess Vertical Foreclosure ¶571. Mergers Across Market Boundaries ¶572. Government Regulation and Market Power ¶573. Market Power in Durable Products That Are Reusable or Resalable ¶574. Multifirm Exercises of Market Power; Relevance of Concerted Action ¶575. Measuring Monopsony Power Chapter 6 Monopolization ¶600. Introduction: The Monopolization Problem ¶601. Definitions; Qualification on “Intent” 6A Key Monopolization Cases ¶605. Introduction ¶606. Standard Oil; Early “Rule of Reason” Formulation ¶607. American Tobacco ¶608. American Can ¶609. United States Steel ¶610. International Harvester ¶611. Alcoa ¶612. American Tobacco ¶613. Griffith ¶614. United Shoe (USM) ¶615. Grinnell ¶616. IBM Cases ¶617. Microsoft ¶618. Summary 6B The Dilemma: The Evils of Monopoly Versus Compunctions Against Condemning "Mere Monopoly" ¶630. Introduction and Summary ¶631. Monopoly as the Statutory Concern ¶632. Language of §2 ¶633. Legislative History of §2 ¶634. Monopoly as Self-Correcting ¶635. Condemning Mere Monopoly Impractical or Wasteful? ¶636. Condemning Mere Monopoly Unfair? ¶637. Condemning Mere Monopoly Counterproductive? ¶638. Conclusion: Persistent and Not-Inevitable Monopoly in Government Equity Proceedings 6C The Nature and Definition of "Monopolizing" Conduct: Relationship to Remedies ¶650. Monopolization Offense Requires Both Power and Conduct ¶651. Monopolizing Conduct Defined ¶652. Monopoly “Leveraging”: Advantage in Secondary Market as Distinct §2 Offense ¶653. Remedies for Exclusionary Conduct: Injunctions and Beyond ¶654. “Ancient” Exclusionary Acts ¶655. Changing Legal Standards for Exclusionary Conduct ¶656. Criminal Sanctions and Treble Damages ¶657. Causation and Injury in §2 Cases: “Disaggregation” of Damages ¶658. Defenses and Immunities Chapter 7 Monopolization: Particular Exclusionary Practices ¶700. Introduction 7A Horizontal Acquisitions and Agreements ¶701. Mergers with Actual or Potential Competitors ¶702. Acquiring Talent; Predatory Hiring of Rivals' Employees ¶703. Price Fixing, Market Division, and Noncompetition Covenants 7B Exclusionary Practices: Patents and Other Intellectual Property Rights ¶704. The Patent System, Anticompetitive Exclusions, and Antitrust Policy ¶705. Improprieties in Patent Procurement ¶706. Unreasonably Exclusionary Infringement Lawsuits and Related Enforcement Conduct ¶707. Patent Acquisitions and Accumulation; Grantbacks ¶708. Non-Use; Equity Alternative to Antitrust Relief ¶709. Refusal to License as Antitrust Violation; Equity Alternative and FRAND-Encumbered Patents ¶710. Compulsory Licensing as an Antitrust Remedy ¶711. Exclusionary Practices Involving Non-Patent Intellectual Property ¶712. IP Deceptions: Exclusionary Manipulation of Standard-Setting Process ¶713. The Federal Circuit; Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Antitrust Suits Involving Patents 7C Exploitative, Predatory, and Strategic Pricing ¶720. Exploitative Pricing Lawful and Justified by Aversion to Price Regulation ¶721. Price Discrimination 7C-1 Strategic and Predatory Pricing: General Issues ¶722. Competitive, Monopolistic, and Strategic Pricing Compared ¶723. Preliminary Considerations; Selection of Optimal Predatory Pricing Rule ¶724. Predatory Pricing: Brief Summary of Conclusions 7C-2 Predatory Pricing: Structural and Behavioral Prerequisites ¶725. Predation Claims Require Strict Appraisal of Market Structure; Difficulties in Quantifying Recoupment ¶726. “Recoupment”; Brooke Decision ¶727. Monopoly and Oligopoly Recoupment Compared; Predation Benefitting Multiple Markets ¶728. Predatory Pricing as Monopolization or “Attempt”; Relationship Between Structure and Intent ¶729. Barriers to Entry or Expansion; Excess Capacity; Disposition of Victims’ Assets ¶730. Output Data 7C-3 Predatory Pricing: Pricing Strategies and Price-Cost Relationships ¶735. Introduction; Definitions ¶736. Long-Run Anticompetitive Pricing Strategies ¶737. Judicial Recognition of Long-Run Anticompetitive Pricing ¶738. Intent Evidence in Predation Cases ¶739. Marginal-Cost Pricing Both Competitive and Lawful ¶740. Average Variable Cost as Surrogate; Average Avoidable Cost ¶741. Average Total Cost; Long-Run Incremental Cost ¶742. Cost Measurement for Multiple Products or Differential Returns 7C-4 Predatory Pricing: Additional Problems and Situations ¶745. Price Discrimination and Selective Price Cuts; “Primary Line” Provisions of Robinson-Patman Act ¶746. Promotional Pricing; “Excessive” Promotional Spending ¶747. Predatory Purchasing and Investment; Weyerhaeuser Decision ¶748. Meeting Competition as a Defense ¶749. Bundled Pricing 7D Exclusionary Practices by Vertically Integrated Dominant Firms ¶755. Vertical Integration: Definitions and General Conclusions 7D-1 Vertical Integration Generally: Gains, Possible Harms, and Appropriate Antitrust Rules ¶756. Potential Competitive Harms: Market Power a Necessary but Not Sufficient Condition ¶757. Cost Savings from Vertical Integration: Production and Transactional Economies ¶758. Cost Savings from Vertical Integration: Double Marginalization ¶759. Vertical Integration by the Monopolist: Appropriate Rules or Presumptions ¶760. Vertical Integration and Restricted Distribution Distinguished ¶761. Power Inquiry in §2 Vertical Integration Cases ¶762. Self-Distribution in Aftermarkets ¶763. Vertical Acquisitions ¶764. Vertical Integration: Judicial Formulations on Conduct and Intent ¶765. Vertical Integration and Equity; Scope and Terms of Duty to Deal ¶766. Illustrative Vertical Integration Decisions 7D-2 Vertically Integrated Monopolist's Contract Practices Affecting Unintegrated Rivals Vertically Integrated Monopolist's Contract Practices Affecting Unintegrated Rivals ¶767. Integrated Monopolist's Price and Supply Policies Toward Non-Integrated Rivals ¶768. Contractual Preemption of Supply or Market; Exclusive Dealing; Above-Cost Discount Policies ¶769. Lease-Only and Other Resale Restrictions 7D-3 Unilateral Refusals to Deal and the "Essential Facility" Doctrine ¶770. “Arbitrary” Refusal to Deal ¶771. Unilateral Refusals to Deal and the “Essential Facility” Doctrine: Preliminary Considerations ¶772. Unilateral Refusals to Deal and “Essential Facility” Doctrine—Intuitive and Historical Rationales Through Aspen Skiing and Trinko ¶773. Unilateral Refusal to Deal and “Essential Facility” Doctrine—Technical Requirements ¶774. Unilateral Refusal to Deal and “Essential Facility” Doctrine—Standing, Antitrust Injury, and Scope of Equitable Relief 7D-4 Monopolist's Practices Affecting Collateral and Complementary Markets ¶775. Introduction ¶776. Strategic Creation of Incompatibility; Innovation of Complementary Products as Antitrust Violation ¶777. “Implicit” Tying by the Monopolist; Innovation Excluding Rivals’ Complementary Products 7E Unfair, Predatory, and Tortious Competition Unrelated to Pricing Policies ¶780. Introduction; Potential Conflicts Between Antitrust Law and “Unfair Competition” Law ¶781. “Predatory” Product Innovation Without Implicit Tying ¶782. Specific Tortious Practices 7F Exclusionary Practices by the Regulated Monopolist ¶785. Scope; Relationship Between Antitrust Liability and Regulatory Immunities and Jurisdiction ¶786. Strategic and Predatory Pricing by Regulated Monopolist ¶787. Regulated Monopolist's Integration into Unregulated Markets: Refusal to Deal and Price-Squeeze Claims Chapter 8 Power and the Power-Conduct Relationship in Monopolization and Attempt ¶800. Introduction 8A Substantial, or "Monopoly," Power Defined and Related to Conduct ¶801. When Is Market Power “Substantial”?; Tentative Presumptions ¶802. Monopolization Offense Requires “Substantial” Power ¶803. Anticompetitive Conduct by Firms Acquiring “Substantial” Market Power 8B Attempt to Monopolize ¶804. Introduction; Continued Importance ¶805. Intent Requirement in Attempt Cases ¶806. Conduct Requirement and Attempt to Monopolize ¶807. “Dangerous Probability of Success”; Attempt's Power Requirement ¶808. Remedies for Attempt 8C Multiple Actors and §2 ¶809. Conspiracy to Monopolize ¶810. “Shared” Monopoly or Oligopoly Facilitator as §2 Violation Chapter 9 Mergers: Generally and Horizontal ¶900. Introduction; Basic Definitions ¶901. The Antitrust Concern with Horizontal Mergers: An Overview 9A General Guides to Interpretation ¶902. Brief Historical Review of Merger Law Interpretation ¶903. Legislative History of Current §7 ¶904. Limited Role of Noneconomic Values in Merger Policy ¶905. Necessity and Danger of “Simple” Merger Rules; Presumptions; Burdens of Proof ¶906. Congruent Application of Sherman Act to Horizontal Mergers ¶907. Meaning and Context of “Lessen Competition” Standard ¶908. General Conclusions Summarized 9B The Antitrust Concern with Horizontal Mergers ¶910. Identifying the Issues; Prerequisites for Lessening of Competition 9B-1 Mergers Facilitating Single Firm Exercises of Market Power ¶911. Mergers Creating Monopolist or Dominant Firms ¶912. Monopolist's or Dominant Firm's Acquisition of Nascent Rival; Potential Competition Merger Distinguished ¶913. Power Assessment and Market Definition in Unilateral Effects Cases ¶914. Unilateral Effects in Product-Differentiated Markets ¶915. Unilateral Effects Facilitated by Capacity Constraints or Differential Costs 9B-2 Mergers Facilitating Coordinated Interaction ¶916. Overview; Pervasive issues ¶917. Express Collusion Attempts Create Stricter Standard ¶918. Mergers and Oligopoly; Fundamental Concern with Pricing ¶919. Coordinated Action Under 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines 9C Structural Indicators of Prima Facie Illegality 9C-1 Pervasive Issues; General Relevance of Market Structure ¶925. Relevance of Structural Inquiry ¶926. Historical Judicial and Agency Reliance on Structural Factors ¶927. Concentration Evidence Indicating Probable “Substantial” Lessening of Competition ¶928. Summary ¶929. Market Definition Problems Affecting Horizontal Merger Analysis 9C-2 Concentration Indexes: Utility, Use, and Limitations ¶930. Do Concentration Indexes Improve the Accuracy of Merger Predictions? ¶931. Concentration Indexes Compared ¶932. Structural Criteria for Presumptive Illegality 9C-3 Structural Factors Other Than Seller Number or Shares ¶940. Introduction; Significance of Factors Unrelated to Market Nonconcentration ¶941. Barriers and Impediments to Entry ¶942. Heterogeneous Products, Processes, and Costs ¶943. Buyer Sophistication, Size, and Concentration ¶944. Other Factors Affecting the Competitive Significance of Concentration Measures; Government Guidelines 9D The Failing Company Defense ¶950. Introduction; Market-Share Statistics May Overstate Firm's Viability or Competitive Impact 9D-1 The Failing Company Defense ¶951. Introductory Issues ¶952. Appropriate Rationales and Limits of a Failing Firm Defense ¶953. Defining “Failing” Company ¶954. Varying Proof Requirements; Search for Preferred Alternative Purchaser ¶955. Newspaper Preservation Act 9D-2 Firm-Specific Factors Other than Failure ¶960. Factors Bearing on Firm Vitality Generally ¶961. Preexisting Relationships. ¶962. Inadequate Resources ¶963. Financial and Management Difficulties Falling Short of Failure ¶964. Relevance of Intent ¶965. Simple Structural Analysis Understates Competitive Significance of Merger 9E Economies as Defense to Prima Facie Illegality ¶970. Introduction; Principle and History Justify Economies Defense ¶971. Must Qualifying Efficiencies Be “Passed on” to Consumers? ¶972. Offsetting Benefits in Second Market ¶973. Necessity and Identification of “Merger-Specific” Economies ¶974. General Magnitude and Nature of Provable Economies ¶975. Classification of Permissible Economies ¶976. Conclusion: Presumptive Rules for Efficiency Claims 9F Horizontal Merger Rules for Buyers ¶980. Introduction; 2010 Government Guidelines ¶981. Asymmetries Between Buyer and Seller Concentration Effects ¶982. Conclusion; Presumptive Rules 9G Remedies ¶990. Remedies: A Brief Introduction and Government Guides Chapter 10 Vertical Mergers ¶1000. Introduction ¶1001. Preview and Summary ¶1002. Statutory Language and History 10A Economic Consequences of Vertical Mergers 10A-1 Potential Harms Potential Harms ¶1003. Vertical Integration Fallacies: Increased Monopoly Profit and “Unfair” Advantages over Rivals ¶1004. Foreclosure ¶1005. Reduced Competitiveness in Either Market; Facilitation of Coordination ¶1006. Disruptive Buyer Eliminated ¶1007. Second-Level Concentration Increased ¶1008. Raising Rivals' Costs—Deprivation of Efficient Inputs or Scale ¶1009. Rivals Destabilized ¶1010. Consumer Choice Reduced ¶1011. Entry Barriers ¶1012. Price Discrimination; Possible Relationship to Foreclosure ¶1013. Rate Regulation Evasion 10A-2 Potential Economic Benefits and Other Economic Effects of Vertical Mergers ¶1020. Introduction; Overview ¶1021. Production and Transaction Cost Savings ¶1022. Vertical Mergers and Double Marginalization ¶1023. Obstruct Oligopolistic Coordination or Collusion ¶1024. Eliminate or Vary Input Substitution 10B Assessing Competitive Effects of Vertical Mergers Assessing Competitive Effects of Vertical Mergers ¶1030. Special Market Definition Problems for Measuring the Effects of Vertical Mergers ¶1031. Initial and Cumulative Foreclosures; Trends ¶1032. Suggested Presumptions for Vertical Merger Illegality 10C Efficiencies, Failing Firms, and Other Defenses ¶1040. Efficiencies Defense to Prima Facie Illegality ¶1041. Vertical Acquisitions Involving Failing Firms Appendix A, Horizontal Merger Decisions Summarized Appendix B, Vertical Merger Decisions Summarized Chapter 11 Potential Competition and Other "Conglomerate" Mergers ¶1100. Definition and General Approach 11A Merger Motivations and Their Relevance to Tests of Illegality ¶1101. Introduction 11A-1 Economies Generally ¶1102. The Relevance of Economies 11A-2 Particular Cost Motivations ¶1103. Purchasing ¶1104. Capital Cost Savings and Other Purely Financial Motives ¶1105. Economies, Mainly of Scale and Scope; Product Complementarity. ¶1106. Marketing Gains 11A-3 Other Merger Motivations ¶1107. Protective Mergers ¶1108. Summary: A Free Market for Capital Assets 11B Structural and Other Market Indicators of Likely Anticompetitive Effects ¶1120. Introduction 11B-1 Mergers Reducing or Eliminating Potential Competition ¶1121. Overview: Possible Effects and Key Issues ¶1122. Monopolist's Acquisition of Nascent Rival Recalled ¶1123. Actual Present Competitor Distinguished; Merger Guidelines ¶1124. Statutory Coverage ¶1125. Noncompetitive Target Market Prerequisite to Present or Future Effect from Potential Entry ¶1126. Additional Prerequisites for Present Effect from Potential Entry ¶1127. Actual and Perceived Potential Entrant Doctrines Summarized; Government Guidelines ¶1128. Outside Firm as Probable Future Entrant ¶1129. Outside Firm as Perceived Potential Entrant. ¶1130. Universe of Potential Entrants ¶1131. Non- “Toehold” Acquisitions Forbidden? ¶1132. Procompetitive Effects Balanced; Toeholds Permitted? ¶1133. Distinguishing Vertical and Potential Competition Merger; Other Vertical Effects ¶1134. Conclusion: Continued Viability of Potential Competition Merger Doctrine ¶1135. Common Carrier Immunity for Potential Competition Mergers 11B-2 Other Possible Anticompetitive Effects ¶1140. Introduction. ¶1141. Extended Interdependence from Cross-Market Mergers ¶1142. Mergers Uniting Imperfect Substitutes ¶1143. Mergers Facilitating Reciprocity ¶1144. Transferred Leverage: Tying ¶1145. Other Possible Competitive Effects from Resource Aggregation ¶1146. Facilitation of Predatory Practices ¶1147. Disciplinary Pricing in Oligopoly; Price Leadership ¶1148. Failure to Maximize; Other Unfair Pricing Practices ¶1149. Condemning Asset Aggregation for Its Own Sake 11C Statutory Meaning, Proof of Effects, Defenses ¶1160. Proof of Anticompetitive Effects Required ¶1161. Redeeming Virtues; Relationship to Prohibition Standards ¶1162. Efficiencies ¶1163. Failing Firms ¶1164. Weak Firms Chapter 12 Scope of Covered Acquisitions and Relevant Time of Appraisal ¶1200. Introduction: Issues ¶1201. “Acquire”—Scope and Timing of Covered Acquisitions ¶1202. Partial Asset Acquisitions ¶1203. Partial Stock Acquisitions ¶1204. Stock Acquisitions “Solely for Investment” ¶1205. Consummated Mergers; Post-Acquisition Evidence Chapter 13 Interlocking Directors and Other Officers ¶1300. Introduction; the Problem ¶1301. Relevant Statutes ¶1302. Horizontal Interlocks ¶1303. Vertical Interlocks ¶1304. Indirect Interlocks ¶1305. Mootness Part Three: Restraints of Trade: Horizontal and Vertical
Chapter 14 Conspiracy, Horizontal and Vertical ¶1400. Introduction 14A Pervasive Issues and Critical Distinctions ¶1401. Preview 14A-1 Statutory Rationale and General Issues ¶1402. Statutory Rationale for Conspiracy Requirement ¶1403. Distinction Between “Combination” and “Conspiracy” Generally Unnecessary ¶1404. How Much Assent? ¶1405. Proof Criteria and Burdens; Judge and Jury ¶1406. Interfirm Contact as Agreement ¶1407. Facilitating Practices; Statutory Remedies ¶1408. Coerced Agreements; Acts Motivated by Fear of Another 14A-2 Steps in Finding Agreement ¶1409. Identifying Agreeing Parties and Content of Agreement ¶1410. Distinguishing Commitment from Interdependence ¶1411. Interdependence I: No Conspiracy Inference from Parallelism Without It ¶1412. Interdependence II: Motivation for Agreement ¶1413. Interdependence III: No Independent Reason for Challenged Behavior; Lower Court Decisions ¶1414. Interdependence IV: Benefit from Agreement ¶1415. Interdependence V: Action Against Self-Interest 14B Traditional Conspiracy ¶1416. Introduction; Topics Considered ¶1417. Conspiratorial Opportunity, Unexplained Meetings, Furtive Behavior, and Cover-ups ¶1418. Discussions and Participant Admissions: Meaning—Facilitating Practice or More—and Reliability ¶1419. Solicitations: Accepted or Not; Remedy Under FTC Act §5 ¶1420. Identical or Sham Bidding; Refusal to Bid ¶1421. Conspiracy or Competition in Other Markets or Times ¶1422. Information or Inquiry as Facilitating Practice or as Evidence of Further Conspiracy—Generally ¶1423. Information Exchanges About Customers or Suppliers as Establishing Unlawful Agreement ¶1424. Threat to Potential Victim of Concerted Action ¶1425. “Unnatural Parallelism” Too Close for Coincidence; Simultaneous Versus Sequential Actions ¶1426. Interstate Circuit ¶1427. Masonite 14C Parallel Behavior Among Oligopolists ¶1428. Introduction and Summary ¶1429. Oligopoly Makes Interdependent Behavior Inevitable ¶1430. Factors Affecting Likelihood of Oligopolistic Coordination ¶1431. Appraising Oligopoly Markets ¶1432. Tacit Oligopolistic Price Coordination as Conspiracy ¶1433. What Courts Actually Do: Interdependent Parallelism Without “Plus Factors” ¶1434. Parallelism with “Plus Factors”; Decisions ¶1435. Collective and Unilateral Facilitating Practices: Business Utilities and Market Effects ¶1436. Facilitating Practices and Other Interdependence Remediable Under Federal Trade Commission Act or Sherman Act 14D Vertical Agreement and Refusals to Deal ¶1437. Vertical Agreements Generally ¶1438. Vertical Agreements: Summary 14D-1 Supplier's Refusal to Deal with Those Not Complying with Announced Conditions ¶1439. Degrees of Refusal to Deal ¶1440. Suggested Resale Prices or Other Behavior ¶1441. Initial Selection and Subsequent Replacement of Dealers. ¶1442. Announced Conditions for Future Dealing ¶1443. Complying Dealers as Co-Conspirators— Extended Agreement Theory I: Knowing Purchaser Accepts Seller's Terms ¶1444. Complying Dealers as Co-Conspirators— Extended Agreement Theory II: Widespread Compliance with Announced Condition Reflects Coercion and Therefore Agreement ¶1445. Colgate Case Allows Announced Conditions on Future Dealing ¶1446. Monsanto's Revitalization of Colgate ¶1447. Individualized “Negotiation” as Agreement Under Monsanto and Parke, Davis; Dealer “Admits Agreement” ¶1448. Implied Agreements or Firmly Resolute Enforcement Under Schrader's, Frey, Beech-Nut, Bausch & Lomb, and Schwinn Cases; Status After Monsanto ¶1449. Using Wholesalers or Other Complex Enforcement of Announced Conditions: Status of Parke, Davis After Monsanto ¶1450. Agreements with “Pawns” or Other Third Parties: Status of Albrecht After Monsanto ¶1451. Coerced or Unwilling Compliance by Terminated Dealer ¶1452. Termination as Proof of Agreement with Others 14D-2 Dealer Complains to Supplier About Rival Dealer ¶1453. The Problem: Inherent Ambiguities of Complaint, Termination, and Antitrust Policy ¶1454. Monsanto and Conspiracy with Complaining Dealers ¶1455. Termination Merely “After” Complaint ¶1456. Plaintiff Terminated “In Response To” Rival's Complaint ¶1457. Manufacturer Terminates in Response to Rival's Complaint: Coerced Suppliers ¶1458. Complaint and Termination as Meeting of Minds; Lower Court Decisions ¶1459. Damage and Standing Issues ¶1460. Clayton Act §3 and Federal Trade Commission Act §5 14E Intraenterprise Conspiracy: Corporate Affiliates, Employees, Agents, Pawns, Associations and Joint Ventures ¶1462. The Firm as a Single Actor and the Conspiracy Concept 14E-1 Corporations Wholly Owned in Common ¶1463. Supreme Court Intraenterprise Conspiracy Cases from Yellow Cab to Copperweld ¶1464. Commonly Owned Corporations: Statutory Language and Policy ¶1465. “Holding Out” or Intended Independence 14E-2 Common Control Without Completely Common Ownership ¶1466. Less than Complete Common Ownership; Introductory Issues ¶1467. Identifying a Single Economic Unit ¶1468. Agreement in Fact? ¶1469. Broader Criteria of Reasonableness 14E-3 Employees, Divisions, and Agents ¶1470. Employees Generally and Unincorporated Divisions ¶1471. Employee or Board Member with “Independent” Interest ¶1472. Employees Acting Without Authorization ¶1473. Distribution Agents Restrained ¶1474. Agents and “Pawns” Aiding a Restraint 14E-4 Conspiracies Among members of Associations And Joint Ventures ¶1475. The Problem and Initial Distinctions ¶1476. Usual Business Entity: Formation and Later Merger or Cartel ¶1477. Trade or Professional Associations and Concerted Rule Making ¶1478. Productive Joint Ventures as Single Entity or Continuing Conspiracy; Supreme Court's American Needle Decision Chapter 15 The "Rule of Reason" and "Per Se" Rule - General Issues ¶1500. Why Reasonableness Matters ¶1501. “Every” Restraint Embraces Only “Unreasonable” Restraints ¶1502. “Restraint of Trade” Means Restraint on Competition ¶1503. Competitive Evil: Tendency and Magnitude ¶1504. Legitimate Objectives ¶1505. Restraint Reasonably Necessary for Legitimate Objective: Actual Connection Without Less Restrictive Alternative ¶1506. Role of Intent ¶1507. Tentative Presumptions: Balancing ¶1508. Applying the Rule of Reason Summarily; “Quick Look” ¶1509. Per Se Rationale: Class Unreasonableness ¶1510. Per Se Rules: Different Meanings; Redeeming Virtue Recognized Through Exceptions or Classification ¶1511. Collapsing Reasonableness–Per Se Distinction Single Inquiry with Varying Presumptions? ¶1512. The Rule of Reason for Unilateral Conduct Chapter 16 Vertical Distribution Restraints Limiting Intrabrand Competition 16A Pervasive Legal and Economic Issues 16A-1 Introduction: Possible Effects Summarized ¶1600. Introduction to Distribution Restraints ¶1601. Motives and Effects of Intrabrand Restraints; Preview ¶1602. Availability of Business Alternatives. 16A-2 Legal Analogies and Major Harms ¶1603. Vertical Restraint Less Dangerous Than Horizontal Restraint ¶1604. Intrabrand Restraints Serving Dealer Power ¶1605. Dual Distribution ¶1606. Parallel Action by Manufacturers ¶1607. Manufacturer Self-Interest or Error ¶1608. Vertical Integration Compared ¶1609. Dealer Freedom Impaired ¶1610. Distribution Restraint Exchanged for Exclusive Dealing or Tying 16A-3 Procompetitive Potential of Distribution Restraints ¶1611. Distribution Restraints Presumptively Efficient ¶1612. Dealer Services Efficient or “Excessive”? ¶1613. Less Tangible Image Service and Free Riders Generally ¶1614. Dealer Goodwill, Recommendations, and Inventory Management ¶1615. Scale Economies of Distribution Protected or Obstructed ¶1616. Intensive Market Penetration, Dealer Specialization, and Price Discrimination ¶1617. Promoting New Entry, Expansion, or Survival ¶1618. Product Quality and Safety ¶1619. Loss Leaders 16B Minimum Resale Price Maintenance 16B-1 RPM: The Per Se Rule and Its Limits RPM: From the Per Se Rule to a Rule of Reason ¶1620. From Dr. Miles to Leegin ¶1621. Agencies and Products Copyrighted or Patented; Relevance of First Sale Doctrine ¶1622. “Resale” Distinguished from Other Prices ¶1623. Influencing Resale Prices Without Traditional Agreements: Suggested Prices, Announced Conditions, Coerced Dealers, or Rivals' Complaints; Remedial Problems ¶1624. Identifying Anticompetitive Price Agreement in Presence of Explicit Nonprice Agreement ¶1625. Price-Affecting Dealer Discipline; Nonprice Restrictions Less Formal or Absent ¶1626. Conditional Reimbursements; Cooperative Advertising ¶1627. Wholesale Price Formula or “Condition” 16B-2 Reforming the Dr. Miles Rule of Per Se Illegality ¶1628. Reform Impulses; Types and Costs ¶1629. Implications of Repealing Fair Trade ¶1630. Asymmetrical Legal Treatment of Price and Nonprice Restraints ¶1631. Potential Benefits of RPM Weighing Against Harsh Treatment ¶1632. Potential Evils; Structural Characteristics Facilitating Competitive Harm ¶1633. The Rule of Reason for Resale Price Maintenance 16C Maximum Resale Price Limitations ¶1634. Introduction ¶1635. Principal Supreme Court Decisions: Albrecht and Khan ¶1636. Maximum RPM Justified: Limiting Dealer Monopoly ¶1637. Possible Competitive Evils ¶1638. The Future of Maximum Resale Price Limitations ¶1639. Indirect Influences on Maximum Resale Prices ¶1640. Attacking Price Ceilings: Standing and Antitrust Injury 16D Territorial or Customer Limitations on Dealers ¶1641. Preview: “Restraints” Defined and “Agreement” Recalled ¶1642. Legal Developments Through White Motor and Schwinn Cases ¶1643. Sylvania ¶1644. Rejecting Per Se Illegal Price, Boycott, or Horizontal Restraint Characterizations ¶1645. Post- Sylvania Cases Applying Rule of Reason ¶1646. Business Justifications: General Issues ¶1647. Particular Business Justifications: Legitimacy and Necessity of Restraint ¶1648. Identifying Anticompetitive Dangers ¶1649. Structured Rule of Reason for Customer and Territorial Restraints 16E Single Dealer Appointed for Region or Customer Class ¶1650. Introduction and Definitions ¶1651. Intensity of Intrabrand Restraint ¶1652. Related Legal Concepts Compared ¶1653. Sole Outlet Threat to Market Competition; Lower Court Decisions ¶1654. Detriments—Mainly Dealer Power—and Remedies ¶1655. Justifications Chapter 17 Tying Arrangements and Related Practices Tying Arrangements and Related Practices ¶1700. Introduction I: Definitions, Concerns, and Statutory Coverage ¶1701. Introduction II: Capsule History ¶1702. Introduction III: Black Letter Doctrine 17A Anti- and Procompetitive Impact ¶1703. Effects and Motivations Summarized ¶1704. Foreclosure Mechanism: Creating Monopoly or Oligopoly in Tied Market ¶1705. Long-Run Entrenchment and Stagnation ¶1706. Price-Output Effects of New Monopoly or Oligopoly in Tied Market; Leveraging of Sequential Monopolies ¶1707. Facilitating Coordination Among Tied Market Oligopolists ¶1708. Excluded Dealer Claims Foreclosure by Tying of Product to Distribution Services ¶1709. Assessing Market Foreclosure ¶1710. Intensified Exploitation of Preexisting Market Power; Leveraging Without Foreclosure ¶1711. Tying and Price Discrimination ¶1712. Double marginalization; other price or output effects in secondary markets ¶1713. Tying by New Entrant or Weak Firm ¶1714. Temporary Promotion in Either Market ¶1715. Indirect, Selective, or Disguised Price Cuts in Either Market ¶1716. Asset Specificity and Transaction Costs: Tying to Achieve Quality Control in Contractual Distribution Mechanisms ¶1717. Cost Savings and Product Improvements ¶1718. Miscellaneous Additional Functions or Effects 17B Effects Required for Illegality ¶1719. Overview; Tying Tests Under Several Statutes 17B-1 Effects Required by So-Called Rule of Per Se Illegality ¶1720. The Per Se Rule ¶1721. Defining “Not Insubstantial” Volume of Tied Commerce 17B-2 Qualifications When Foreclosure or Tied Market Are Absent ¶1722. Per Se Threshold: Potential Anticompetitive Effects or Power in Tied-Product Market ¶1723. Zero Foreclosure: No Rival Sellers ¶1724. Zero Foreclosure: Rivals Would Not Supply Tied Product in Any Event; Unwanted Tied Product ¶1725. Intrinsically Insignificant Foreclosures, Especially of Dealers and Franchisees ¶1726. No Relevant Foreclosure: No Financial Interest in Suppliers of Tied Product ¶1727. Relevant Foreclosure Tests: Arguable Financial Interests 17B-3 Rules of Reason Reforms Rule of Reason Reforms ¶1728. Residual Reasonability Test for Non–Per Se Ties ¶1729. Proving Unreasonable Effects Under the Rule of Reason ¶1730. Per Se Rule Critique; Recommended Reform 17C Power in Market for Tying Product ¶1731. Power in Tying Doctrine and Analysis: Introduction and Preview ¶1732. Identifying the Tying Product ¶1733. The Supreme Court and Power ¶1734. Relevance of Power in Tying-Product Market ¶1735. Substantial Power Required Beyond Opportunistic Exploitation ¶1736. Market Analysis to Prove Power ¶1737. Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Trade Secrets ¶1738. Power Inferred from Tied-Product Price or from Appreciable Number of Ties ¶1739. Unique, Distinctive, or Differentiated Product ¶1740. Market Imperfections, “Lock-in,” and Single-Brand “Aftermarket” 17D Identifying Ties Identifying Ties 17D-1 Separate Products? Separate Products? ¶1741. Separate-Products Methodology: Natural Law, Policy, or Screen? ¶1742. Different Tests Under Per Se Rule and Rule of Reason? ¶1743. Threshold Requirements and Burdens: Buyer Interest and Seller Ability ¶1744. The Primary Tests: Competitive Market Practices and Joint Provision Economies ¶1745. The Primary Tests and Precedent ¶1746. The New-Product Rationale ¶1747. The Same-Product Rationale ¶1748. The Finished-Product Rationale; Vertical Integration as Tying ¶1749. Bundling Encouraged by Intellectual Property Provisions or Other Legislation ¶1750. The Phantom Separate Product ¶1751. Rejected or Severely Limited Tests 17D-2 Tied Together ¶1752. Basic Rules and Preview ¶1753. Express Tying Contract ¶1754. Tying Condition Triggers Sherman and Clayton Acts ¶1755. Uncommunicated Tying Condition ¶1756. Proving Understood Conditions ¶1757. Technological Tie ¶1758. Package or Bundled Discounts 17E Defenses Defenses ¶1760. The Role of Justifications in Tying Jurisprudence ¶1761. Protect or Create Goodwill, Create or Ensure Product Quality, Control Free Riding ¶1762. Cost Savings ¶1763. Metering for Price Discrimination, Risk Allocation, and Royalties ¶1764. Other Possible Justifications 17F Injury-In-Fact, Causation, Antitrust Injury, and Damages Injury-in-Fact, Causation, Antitrust Injury, and Damages ¶1766. Standing Concepts Recalled and Summarized ¶1767. Suits by Foreclosed Rivals ¶1768. Suits by Suppliers to Defendant or to Foreclosed Rivals ¶1769. Suits by Buyers ¶1770. Suits by Would-Be Buyers 17G Tying Analogies and Extensions Tying Analogies and Extensions 17G-1 Reciprocity and Other Buying-Power Leverage ¶1775. Reciprocity: Introduction and Summary ¶1776. Possible Threats to Competition ¶1777. Procompetitive Effects of Reciprocity ¶1778. Minimum Conditions for Illegality ¶1779. Conditioning Purchase (or Sale) of One Product on Supply of Second Product 17G-2 Patent Tying and Quasi-Tying Practices Patent Tying and Quasi-Tying Practices ¶1780. Antitrust and Patent Policy ¶1781. Patent “Misuse”; Doctrinal Development and Meaning for Tying and Other Practices ¶1782. Misuse Beyond Tying ¶1783. Government Policy Chapter 18 Exclusive Dealing and Related Practices 18A Meaning and Development of Antitrust Law of Exclusive Dealing ¶1800. Exclusive Dealing: Definitions; Statutory Coverage ¶1801. Principal Exclusive Dealing and Output Contract Decisions—Power, Effects, and Possible Benefits 18B Possible Anticompetitive Harms Possible Anticompetitive Harms ¶1802. Requirements Contracts Foreclosing Markets and Deterring Entry ¶1803. Output Contract Foreclosing Rival's Access to Supply ¶1804. Exclusive Contracts Raising Rivals' Costs ¶1805. Facilitation of Collusion or Oligopoly ¶1806. Exclusive Dealing as Price Discrimination or Metering Device ¶1807. Anticompetitive Discounting, Slotting Allowance, and Related Practices 18C Economic Benefits of Exclusive Dealing ¶1810. Introduction ¶1811. Assurance of Outlet or Supply; Bidding for Markets ¶1812. “Interbrand” Free Riding ¶1813. Risk Management, Quality Control, and Natural Monopoly ¶1814. Benefits of Co-Investment; Sole Ownership Compared 18D Pleading, Proof, and Defense of Exclusive-Dealing Claims Pleading, Proof, and Defense of Exclusive-Dealing Claims ¶1820. Basic Test of Legality ¶1821. Prima Facie Exclusive-Dealing Case ¶1822. Proof of Defenses; Reasonable Justifications ¶1823. Standing, Injury, and Related Issues Chapter 19 Horizontal Agreements: An Introduction ¶1900. Overview 19A The Antitrust Concern with Horizontal Restraints ¶1901. Horizontal Restraints: Definitions, Use, General Assumptions ¶1902. Horizontal Agreements Receive Antitrust's Most Severe Scrutiny ¶1903. Administrability of Judicial Intervention Against Multilateral Activity 19B Identification of "Naked" and "Ancillary" Restraints ¶1904. Introduction ¶1905. Narrow Concept of “Ancillary” Restraint in Addyston Pipe Decision ¶1906. “Naked” Restraints Defined; Ancillary Restraints Distinguished ¶1907. Defenses Limited ¶1908. Factors Relevant to Determining Ancillarity 19C Horizontal Restraints: General Rules for Determining Legality ¶1909. Introduction ¶1910. Per Se Illegality for “Naked” Restraints ¶1911. Truncated Rule of Reason Inquiry ¶1912. Rule of Reason Treatment for Ancillary Horizontal Restraints ¶1913. Less Restrictive Alternatives ¶1914. Burden and Elements of Proof in Horizontal Restraints Cases Chapter 20 Horizontal Agreements Limiting Participants' Output ¶2000. Introduction; Preliminary Considerations ¶2001. Anticompetitive Horizontal Agreement Requires Exclusivity ¶2002. Basic Cartel Economics ¶2003. Development of Sherman Act Price-Fixing Law 20A Sellers' Joint Limitations on Price or Output ¶2004. Explicit, “Naked,” or Nearly Naked Horizontal Price-Fixing Agreement ¶2005. Price Fixing in Auction Markets: Bid-Rigging, Sale Rotation, Agreement Not to Bid ¶2006. Agreements Setting Market Share or Limiting Output ¶2007. Maximum Price Fixing ¶2008. Restraints in the Learned Professions or Markets Exhibiting Significant Information Asymmetries 20B Price Fixing by Buyers ¶2010. Introduction ¶2011. Buyers’ and Sellers’ Naked Cartels Equally Harmful ¶2012. Express Buyers’ Cartel Unlawful Per Se ¶2013. Buyers’ Agreements Allocating Suppliers, Territories, or Products ¶2014. Product Standardization Agreements Limiting Inputs ¶2015. Special Defenses to Buyer Price Fixing 20C Agreements Fixing Element of Price or Price Determination Process ¶2020. Introduction; Basic Classification Principles ¶2021. Basic Policy and Economics of Price-Affecting Agreements ¶2022. Agreements Expressly Fixing Price Element ¶2023. Agreements Pertaining to Advertising and Related Dissemination of Product Information ¶2024. Agreements to Post, or to Post and Adhere ¶2025. Agreements on Terms of Delivery; Agreed Basing-Point Pricing 20D Naked and "Nearly Naked" Market Divisions ¶2030. Properly Defined Naked Market Divisions Unlawful Per Se ¶2031. Naked Horizontal Market Division: Basic Economics ¶2032. Possible Justifications ¶2033. Distinguishing Horizontal from Vertical Market Divisions: Franchises and Noncompetition Agreements 20E Horizontal Agreements Concerning Rights in Intellectual Property ¶2040. Introduction ¶2041. Horizontal Price-fixing Provisions in Intellectual Property Licenses ¶2042. Quantity Limitations ¶2043. Cross-Licensing, Patent Pools, and Other Reciprocal Agreements Among Patentees ¶2044. Horizontal Market Divisions Involving Intellectual Property ¶2045. Joint Challenges ¶2046. Settlements Resolving Intellectual Property Disputes Chapter 21 Horizontal Agreements Facilitating Development, Production, or Distribution 21A Joint Ventures: Preliminary Issues ¶2100. Introduction ¶2101. Restraint-of-Trade Standard; Single-Firm Conduct Distinguished ¶2102. Price Impact Lacking or Only Positive; Pleading Requirement; Competitively Harmless Exchanges ¶2103. Significance and Nature of Joint Venture Power Inquiry ¶2104. Significance of Joint Venture Exclusivity 21B Joint Provision of Information and Learning ¶2110. Introduction ¶2111. Competitor Dissemination and Exchange of Price or Output Information: Benefits and Potential Harms ¶2112. Industrywide Collection and Dissemination of Price and Output Information ¶2113. Direct Competitor Exchange of Price and Related Information ¶2114. Competitor Provision or Exchange of Cost Information ¶2115. Joint Research, Development, or Other Acquisition of Information; Agreements Restraining Innovation 21C Joint Production and Control of Output or Distribution ¶2120. Overview 21C-1 Production Joint Ventures Generally ¶2121. Physical and Legal Attributes ¶2122. Structural Analysis Indicating Antitrust Concern ¶2123. Government Guidelines Pertaining to Joint Ventures 21C-2 Self-Limitations on Joint Venture Output or Competition Among Members ¶2130. Introduction; Restraint-of-Trade Standard Recalled ¶2131. Ancillary Output Limitations ¶2132. Market Creation; Joint Price Making ¶2133. Ancillary Maximum Price-Fixing Agreements ¶2134. Market Allocations Ancillary to Joint Production or Distribution; Noncompetition Covenants ¶2135. Joint Purchasing of Inputs, Excluding Advertising; Joint Litigation ¶2136. Standard Setting as Facilitator of Output Collusion ¶2137. Joint Arrangements for Sales and Distribution Chapter 22 Horizontal Agreements Excluding Rivals 2200a. Definitions; organization of this chapter. 2200b. Overview. 22A General Issues and Competitive Harms General Issues and Competitive Harms ¶2201. “Naked” and “Ancillary” Concerted Refusals ¶2202. Anticompetitive Concerted Refusals to Deal: Basic Economics ¶2203. Per Se Illegality for “Naked” Boycott or Concerted Refusal; “Nearly Naked” Refusals ¶2204. Exclusions Directed at Noncompetitors; Purely Vertical Agreements ¶2205. Conspiracy to Exclude or Eliminate Rival by Unfair Practices; Pick-Barth Doctrine 22B Joint Ventures' Expulsion or Refusal to Admit 22B-1 General and Pervasive Issues ¶2210. General Conclusions Summarized ¶2211. Ancillary Concerted Refusal Defined; Power Assessment ¶2212. Relevant “Exclusion” Defined; Exclusion from Market Unnecessary to Competitive Harm ¶2213. Venture Restraints on Members’ Activities Outside the Venture ¶2214. Closed or Limited Membership Venture’s Duty to Deal ¶2215. Unexplained or Arbitrary Refusals 22B-2 Joint Ventures Subject to Open Membership, Positive Network Externalities, or Significant Scale Economies ¶2220. Introduction; Definitions and Basic Competitive Concerns ¶2221. Open Membership Plus Power Creates Expanded Duty; Major Decisions ¶2222. Less Restrictive Alternatives to Open-Membership Venture Exclusion ¶2223. Defenses for Exclusion from Open-Membership Ventures ¶2224. Administration of Access Decrees 22C Joint Making and Enforcement of Product, Industry, or Professional Standards Joint Making and Enforcement of Product, Industry, or Professional Standards ¶2230. Introduction ¶2231. Competitive Threat of Exclusion by Standard Setting ¶2232. Minimum Conditions for Competitive Harm ¶2233. Standard Setting in Industries Subject to Significant Network Externalities ¶2234. Special Problems of Standing, Antitrust Injury, and Causation ¶2235. Identifying Unreasonable Standards; Less Restrictive Alternatives Part Four: Collateral Antitrust Provisions
Chapter 23 The Robinson-Patman Act 23A Introductory Issues ¶2300. Introduction ¶2301. “Secondary-Line” Injury Essentially Vertical ¶2302. The Robinson-Patman Act: A Brief Historical Overview 23B Technical and "Jurisdictional" Requirements Technical and “Jurisdictional” Requirements ¶2310. Introduction ¶2311. Identities and Relationships of the Parties; Remote Purchasers ¶2312. Nature of Qualifying Transactions: High- and Low-Priced “Sales” ¶2313. Reasonably Contemporaneous Transactions; Spot and Long-Term Contracts ¶2314. Sales of “Commodities” ¶2315. Goods of “Like Grade and Quality” ¶2316. Statutory Reach; Goods Bound for Foreign Markets 23C "Discrimination" in Price ¶2320. Meaning of Price “Discrimination” Under Robinson-Patman Act ¶2321. Discrimination in the Terms of Delivery ¶2322. “Indirect” Price Discriminations; Differential Credit Terms 23D Competitive Injury; Minimizing Conflict with General Antitrust Policy ¶2330. Introduction 23D-1 Robinson-Patman Act's Theory of Injury ¶2331. Statutory Requirement of Competitive Injury ¶2332. Proof of Primary-Line Injury ¶2333. Secondary-Line Injury ¶2334. More Remote Injuries: Third- and Fourth-Line; Customers of Predator or Disfavored Purchaser 23D-2 Competitive Injury: Avoiding Excessive Conflict Between Robinson-Patman and General Antitrust Goals ¶2340. Conflicts Between the Robinson-Patman Act and General Antitrust Goals ¶2341. Primary-Line Excesses Greatly Limited by Supreme Court’s Brooke Decision ¶2342. Secondary-Line Injury: Minimizing Conflict with General Antitrust Goals and Fidelity to Statutory Language and Legislative History 23E Defenses and Exemptions ¶2350. Introduction; Overview ¶2351. “Cost Justification” Defense; Quantity Discounts ¶2352. The “Meeting Competition” Defense ¶2353. Changing Conditions ¶2354. Specific Statutory and Nonstatutory Immunities 23F The Robinson-Patman Act's Collateral Liability Provisions ¶2360. Introduction ¶2361. Buyer Liability Under §2(f) and in Related Circumstances ¶2362. Brokerage Provisions of §2(c) ¶2363. Discrimination in the Provision of Promotional Services or Facilities Under §§2(d) and 2(e) ¶2364. Criminal Liability 23G Enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act ¶2370. Introduction; Public Enforcement ¶2371. Private Enforcement: Injury-in-Fact, Causation, and Damages ¶2372. Class Actions; Associational Standing as Alternative Chapter 24 State Antitrust Law: A Brief Introduction 24A State Antitrust Law in Our Federal System ¶2400. Introduction; Notice to the Reader ¶2401. Legitimacy of State Antitrust Law Based in History and Federalism ¶2402. Double Jeopardy, Res Judicata, and Federal and State Limitations on Multiple or Aggregated Recoveries ¶2403. Federal and Self-Imposed Limitations on Reach of State Antitrust Law 24B State Antitrust Law: Coverage and Limitations ¶2410. Introduction: State Law Coverage Typically Mimics Federal Law ¶2411. Exemptions, Immunities, and Other Limitations on State Antitrust Coverage ¶2412. The State Antitrust System of Remedies ¶2413. Measurement of Market Power ¶2414. Unilateral Exclusionary Conduct: Monopolization, Attempt, and Predatory Pricing ¶2415. State Antitrust Merger Policy ¶2416. Agreement and Intraenterprise Conspiracy ¶2417. Vertical Restraints and Agreements ¶2418. Horizontal Agreements and Noncompetition Agreements Involving Potential Rivals ¶2419. Price Discrimination and Related Practices Appendices
Statutory Appendix Appendix A Horizontal Merger Guidelines Appendix B Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations Appendix C Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property Appendix D Horizontal Merger Guidelines of the National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) (1993) Appendix E Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors Addendum District Court and Circuit Court Microsoft Opinions Login to mail or print a selection