Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/884/174/463902/
Timestamp: 2019-10-17 16:03:54
Document Index: 561284544

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 924', 'art, 779', '§ 960']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Ernest Michael Wilson, Defendant-appellant, 884 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1989) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Fifth Circuit › 1989 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Ernest Michael Wilson, Defendant-appellant
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Ernest Michael Wilson, Defendant-appellant, 884 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1989)
US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit - 884 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1989) Sept. 7, 1989
Defendant-appellant, Ernest Michael Wilson ("Wilson"), appeals from his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1), use or carrying of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense. We affirm Wilson's conviction and hold that (1) there was sufficient evidence to establish that Wilson carried a firearm "in relation to" a drug trafficking offense, and (2) the indictment fairly imports the essential elements of the charged offense.
Wilson was charged on a one count indictment of carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1).2 He was convicted in a trial by jury after presenting no evidence. Wilson appeals his conviction alleging that (1) there was insufficient evidence to establish that he carried a firearm "in relation to" a drug trafficking offense, and (2) the indictment was fatally defective for failure to allege a scienter element for either the substantive or predicate offense.
Wilson first contends that his conviction should be reversed because there was insufficient proof that he carried a firearm "in relation to" a drug trafficking offense.3 In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we look at the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and resolve all credibility inferences consistent with the jury's verdict. United States v. Hernandez-Palacios, 838 F.2d 1346, 1348 (5th Cir. 1988). The evidence is sufficient to support the jury's verdict if a rational trier-of-fact could have found the essential elements of the charged crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 313-14, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2786, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979).
Section 924(c), as originally drafted in 1982, made it an offense to "carr [y] a firearm unlawfully during the commission of a felony." 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2) (1982) (emphasis added). In 1984, Congress revamped Sec. 924(c) and substituted the phrase "during and in relation to." 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1984) (emphasis added). The revision was earmarked to clarify the existing elements of the offense and to:preclude [Sec. 924(c)'s] application in a situation where [a weapon's] presence played no part in the crime....
S.Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 314 n. 10 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 3182, 3492 n. 10. As the Ninth Circuit puts it, the "in relation to" language was calculated to avoid convictions for "inadvertently carrying a firearm in an unrelated crime." United States v. Ramos, 861 F.2d 228, 231 (9th Cir. 1988). Thus, under the current version of Sec. 924(c), the government is shouldered with the burden of establishing some relationship between the firearm Wilson possessed and the predicate drug trafficking offense.
We have previously upheld convictions under Sec. 924(c) where large numbers of firearms were readily available in strategic locations near large quantities of drugs and money--under what has come to be known as the "fortress theory." United States v. Robinson, 857 F.2d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1988) (residence contained seven firearms, ammunition, 444 gelatin capsules of cocaine, marijuana and thousands of dollars in cash and jewelry); see also United States v. Matra, 841 F.2d 837, 842-43 (8th Cir. 1988) (drug house included machine gun, three pistols, an assault rifle, a shotgun, ammunition, over $200,000 in cocaine and $10,000 in cash). In fortress type cases, the sheer volume of weapons and drugs makes reasonable the inference that the weapons involved were carried in relation to the predicate drug offense since they "increase [ ] the likelihood [the drug offense will] succeed." Robinson, 857 F.2d at 1010 (citing Matra, 841 F.2d at 843).
However, for cases that do not fit within the fortress analogy, something more than strategic proximity of drugs and firearms is necessary to honor Congress' concerns. In United States v. Raborn, 872 F.2d 589, 595 (5th Cir. 1989), we held that where a defendant actually carried a weapon during drug transactions, a jury could reasonably conclude that the weapon was carried in relation to, and for protection during, drug trafficking crimes. Similarly, in United States v. Coburn, 876 F.2d 372, 375 (5th Cir. 1989) we held that a jury could reasonably conclude that a shotgun, prominently displayed in the rear window of a pickup truck used to distribute marijuana, served as protection in relation to a drug trafficking offense.
Wilson's second contention alleges that his indictment was fatally defective because it failed to state the scienter requirement for either the substantive offense (18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1)) or the predicate offense (21 U.S.C. § 841(c) (1)). The indictment charged:
On or about August 7, 1987, in the Fort Worth Division of the Northern District of Texas, ERNEST MICHAEL WILSON, defendant, did use or carry a firearm to wit: a Browning High Power Model, ... during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, that is, a felony violation of federal law involving the possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Section 841(a) (1).
In order to address Wilson's contentions, we must determine the scienter required under Sec. 924(c) (1)--an issue of first impression for this court.4 At the outset we note that Sec. 924(c) (1) does not explicitly state the scienter required in formal terms such as "knowingly" or "willfully."5 Wilson contends that the scienter for Sec. 924(c) (1) is, therefore, provided by the default scienter of "willfully" under Sec. 924(a) (1) (D).6 However, Sec. 924(a) (1), by its terms, excludes subsection (c). Thus, Sec. 924(a) (1) lends no aid to our construction of the scienter element in Sec. 924(c) (1).
In United States v. Nelson, 733 F.2d 364, 370-71 (5th Cir. 1984), we held that under the former version of Sec. 924(c), the government must prove that a defendant "knowingly carried a firearm...." Our holding in Nelson was consistent with the general rule of construction that "knowledge of the facts constituting the offense [ ] is ordinarily implied" where a "statute does not expressly mention any mental element." United States v. Barber, 594 F.2d 1242, 1244 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 835, 100 S. Ct. 69, 62 L. Ed. 2d 46 (1979) (citing Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252, 72 S. Ct. 240, 244, 96 L. Ed. 288 (1951) ("wrongdoing must be conscious to be criminal")).
Having established the scienter requirement under Sec. 924(c), we turn to the merits of Wilson's contention that his indictment was fatally defective for failing to set out the requisite scienter for the substantive and predicate offenses. The Fifth and Sixth Amendments demand that a grand jury indictment set forth each essential element of an offense.8 Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763-65, 82 S. Ct. 1038, 1046-48, 8 L. Ed. 2d 240 (1962); United States v. Campos-Ascencio, 822 F.2d 506, 508 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v. Outler, 659 F.2d 1306, 1310 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 950, 102 S. Ct. 1453, 71 L. Ed. 2d 665 (1982).
An objection that an indictment fails to state an essential element of a crime may be raised at any time. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b) (2); Campos-Ascencio, 822 F.2d at 508 n. 1; United States v. Oberski, 734 F.2d 1034, 1035 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1113, 105 S. Ct. 797, 83 L. Ed. 2d 790 (1985). However, where, as here, "the defendant demonstrates no prejudice and waits for appeal to assert his challenge, an appellate court will read the indictment liberally." Campos-Ascencio, 822 F.2d at 508. Under such circumstances, an indictment will be sufficient "unless it is so defective that it does not, by any reasonable construction, charge an offense for which the defendant is convicted." United States v. Trollinger, 415 F.2d 527, 528 (5th Cir. 1969) (per curiam).
The test of the validity of an indictment is "not whether the indictment could have been framed in a more satisfactory manner, but whether it conforms to minimal constitutional standards." United States v. Webb, 747 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1226, 105 S. Ct. 1222, 84 L. Ed. 2d 362 (1985). While a statutory citation cannot, standing alone, meet this test, a citation to the statute "reinforce [s] other references within the indictment." Campos-Ascencio, 822 F.2d at 508; United States v. Varkonyi, 645 F.2d 453, 456 (5th Cir. 1981) (citation to statute in indictment "direct [s] the reader" to it). An indictment that tracks the words of a statute is not sufficient "unless those words of themselves fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty of ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offense intended to be punished." Gordon, 780 F.2d at 1171. However, "the law does not compel a ritual of words," and a recitation of the exact scienter ("knowing") is not required where the pleading "fairly imports" knowledge. United States v. Purvis, 580 F.2d 853, 857-58 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 914, 99 S. Ct. 1229, 59 L. Ed. 2d 463 (1979); United States v. Arteaga-Limones, 529 F.2d 1183, 1199-1200 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920, 97 S. Ct. 315, 50 L. Ed. 2d 286 (1976).
The indictment in Purvis fully tracked the statutory language (which language did not formally set out the requisite scienter of "intentionally"), and the indictment referred to the relevant statutory citation. Further, since the indictment only tracked the statute, the indictment did not explicitly set out the scienter element.9 The court ruled that the indictment was sufficient despite the absence of specific words of intent because " [t]aken as a whole, the facts set forth in the indictment here sufficiently allege intent...." Purvis, 580 F.2d at 857.
The present case is controlled by Purvis and Arteaga-Limones. The indictment here referred to both the predicate and substantive statutes. The scienter requirements for both statutes, while not present in the statutes,11 were relatively clear. The mens rea for both Sec. 924(c) (1) and the possession element of Sec. 841(a) (1) was the lowest possible mental state short of strict liability--knowledge of the facts constituting the offense--and the indictment, liberally read,12 "fairly imports" this marginal mental state. Therefore, we conclude that the indictment sets out the essential elements of the predicate and substantive offenses.
The predicate drug trafficking offense was 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1), possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute. Wilson, prior to his trial on Sec. 924(c), pleaded guilty in state court to aggravated possession of a controlled substance. However, the district court held that Wilson's guilty plea for the offense in state court was insufficient to establish all the elements of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute under Sec. 841(a) (1). Thus, the government was required to present additional evidence on the predicate drug trafficking offense
This court has previously held that the predicate offense in this case, possession with intent to distribute under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1), is a "drug trafficking offense" for purposes of Sec. 924(c). United States v. Robinson, 857 F.2d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1988)
In United States v. Coburn, 876 F.2d 372, 375 (5th Cir. 1989), we noted that the indictment in that case stated "lawfully, knowingly, and intentionally" as the mens rea under Sec. 924(c) (1). However, we were not called upon to consider the correctness of the scienter element in the indictment in that case
Section 924(a) (1) provides:
(a) (1) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (2) or (3) of this subsection, subsection (b), (c), or (f) of this section, or in section 929, whoever--
(B) knowingly violates subsection (a) (4), (a) (6), (f), or (k) of section 922;
18 U.S.C. § 924(a) (1).
The legislative history of the maiden version of Sec. 924(c) is concededly "sparse." Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 15, 98 S. Ct. 909, 914, 55 L. Ed. 2d 70 (1977). However, a later Congress' understanding of the legislative intent of an earlier Congress is entitled to deference. United States v. Stewart, 779 F.2d 538, 540 (9th Cir. 1985) (Kennedy, J.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 867, 108 S. Ct. 192, 98 L. Ed. 2d 144 (1987); Bobsee Corp. v. United States, 411 F.2d 231, 236-37 (5th Cir. 1969); see also N. Singer, 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction Secs. 49.11, 412-14 (rev. 4th ed. 1984) (" [a]lthough comments about an earlier act in a legislative report on a subsequent bill are not part of the legislative history of the earlier act ... they are entitled to consideration")
The Sixth Amendment requires that every criminal defendant "be informed of the nature and cause of an accusation." The inclusion of all essential elements generally fulfills the Sixth Amendment's demands if a defendant is fairly informed of what charge he must be prepared to meet and has sufficient facts to determine whether he may plead double jeopardy. United States v. Gordon, 780 F.2d 1165, 1169 (5th Cir. 1986). The Fifth Amendment guarantees a defendant prosecuted for an "infamous" or serious crime a grand jury indictment. United States v. Outler, 659 F.2d at 1310. Wilson focuses on the Fifth Amendment guarantee
(21 U.S.C. §§ 960(a) (1) & 952(a))
Wilson contends that the indictment failed to address one of the two mental states required for a Sec. 841(a) (1) violation--knowing possession with intent to distribute