Source: https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/morning/2003/20031104mr.html
Timestamp: 2018-10-18 11:46:04
Document Index: 404256631

Matched Legal Cases: ['art 21', 'art 21', 'art 21', 'art 21', 'art 21', 'art 21', 'art 21', 'art 21', 'art 21', 'art 21', 'art 21', 'art 21']

NRC: Morning Report for November 4, 2003
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Morning Report for November 4, 2003
Part 21 - 2003-0020-00 - Failure of Circuit Breaker Charging Motor
MR Number: H-2003-0029
Part 21 - 2003-0020-00
Westinghouse, a supplier of electrical components for nuclear power plants, reported a failure of a DHP-VR350, 1200A circuit breaker manufactured by Eaton Cutler-Hammer. Westinghouse commercially dedicated these breakers for Class 1E applications and supplied 16 of them for safety-related applications at Columbia Generating Station. During installation acceptance testing, one breaker charging motor failed to charge. The licensee inspected each breaker, found a loose screw associated with the position switch in seven of them, and tightened all loose screws.
Westinghouse states that the failure occurred because a screw on the position switch terminal became dislodged, disconnecting a wire. Westinghouse understands that the screw is typically removed and reinstalled during manufacturer testing. The dedication process did not include checking the tightness of all screws.
During installation testing, the breaker failed to close and latch on demand. Had the breaker been closed when the wire came loose, the breaker would have opened but would not have closed again. This condition would have been indicated. Because the condition existed on several breakers, a common mode failure could result from redundant breakers serving the same safety-related application. Westinghouse recommends that all users of these breakers verify the tightness of the position switch screws.
Westinghouse plans to issue a Nuclear Safety Advisory Letter (NSAL) to all PWR and BWR plants on this issue.
ML032510902 09/04/2003
Part 21 - 2003-0023-00 - Potential Failure of Overload Relay Heater Pack
CRANBERRRY TOWNSHIP, Pennsylvania
MR Number: H-2003-0030
Part 21 - 2003-0023-00
Framatome ANP, a supplier of electrical products for nuclear power plants, reported potential failure of a weld on Freedom Series Heater Packs intended for installation into Freedom Overload Relays. The weld joins the screw terminal to the heater coil. If the load is not running at the time of failure, the failure would not be indicated until the load is started. The load would not start in this condition but would draw excessive current, either tripping or damaging the load. If the load is running at the time of failure, the load would slow or stop, drawing excessive current with similar results.
Framatome ANP determined that the root cause of the problem was welding with worn electrodes during manufacture. Corrective actions by the manufacturer, Eaton Cutler-Hammer, include daily inspection or replacement of weld electrodes and destructive sample testing. Corrective actions by Framatome ANP include addressing weld integrity acceptance during dedication.
Framatome ANP recommends replacing heater pack numbers H2009B-3 through H2011B-3 and H2012B-3 through H2017B-3. Affected nuclear power plants are D.C. Cook, Vogtle and Beaver Valley.
ML032750756 09/30/2003
Part 21 - 2003-0024-00 - Safety Hazard of Certain Circuit Breaker Plug-in Stabs
MR Number: H-2003-0031
Part 21 - 2003-0024-00
Framatome ANP, a supplier of electrical products for nuclear power plants, reported a potential safety hazard involving Type W Vintage Unit plug-in stabs used in motor control centers. The manufacturer, Eaton Cutler-Hammer, issued a product advisory that plug-in stabs manufactured between October 1, 2000, and March 26, 2003, should not be removed from the motor control center with the structure bus energized. The spring clip (112B146H01) of the individual stabs fails to hold the stab finger in the stab housing. As a result, the stab finger remains plugged in the bus until the breaker cable connection forces the stab finger off the bus. The Eaton Cutler-Hammer evaluation determined that the clip does not conform with the tolerance specification of the intended design, specifically the top wings of the spring clip. A defective unit being extracted from a live bus may cause arcing, single phasing, or risk of personal injury, death, or property damage.
Framatome ANP determined that the defective plug-in stabs were supplied to the Point Beach nuclear power plant as safety-related components.
ML032870422 10/09/2003
Prairie Island 1, Prairie Island 2
Dockets: 05000282, 05000306
MR Number: 3-2003-0032
E-MAIL from Res. Insp.
Nuclear Management Company, LLC (NMC) announced the appointment of Mr. Craig G. Anderson as Senior Vice-President for Group Operations. In this position, Mr. Anderson, who is currently Vice-President of Operations with Entergy's Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO) plant, will oversee operations at Prairie Island and Duane Arnold, effective November 10, 2003. He will report to Mr. John Paul Cowan, NMC Executive Vice-President and Chief Nuclear Officer.
ML033080168 11/03/2003
PATRICK LOUDEN PLL (630) 829-9627
BRUCE BURGESS BLB (630) 829-9629
MR Number: 3-2003-0033
PATRICK LOUDEN (630) 829-9627
BRUCE BURGESS (630) 829-9629
COOPER NUCLEAR STATION RESTART FOLLOWING PLANT SHUTDOWN DUE TO FIRE (UPDATE)
MR Number: 4-2003-0013
On October 28, 2003, operators at Cooper Nuclear Station reduced power and then scrammed the reactor in response to a small fire on the cross-arm of a wood tower supporting the transmission lines from the main power transformer to the 345 kV switchyard. At the time of the shutdown, Emergency Diesel Generator 2 was out of service for planned maintenance.
The licensee determined that the fire was the result of a ground caused by the degradation of the cross-arm on the wood tower and moisture due to rain. Cooper Nuclear Station personnel repaired the damage caused by the fire, modified the switchyard to remove the wood tower, and completed the maintenance on Emergency Diesel Generator 2. In addition, the licensee performed maintenance and testing on nuclear instrumentation.
The plant was restarted on November 1, 2003, and connected to the electrical grid on November 2, 2003.
The Senior Resident Inspector responded to the site and monitored the licensee's response to the event. Followup inspection is continuing to review the licensee's root cause evaluation and corrective actions.
ML033080266 11/04/2003
KENNEDY, KRISS M R4 (817) 860-8144 KMK@nrc.gov
Part 21 - 2003-0021-00 - Potential Safety Hazard Involving Crane Emergency Drum Brake
MR Number: H-2003-0028
Part 21 - 2003-0021-00
On Friday, August 15, 2003 the Duane Arnold Energy Center (DAEC) notified Ederer that during routine testing of the X-SAM® Single Failure Proof Safety System on Ederer crane S/N F1475, the emergency drum brake would not set consistently. DAEC said the condition was being evaluated in accordance with their 10 CFR, Part 21 reporting procedure. DAEC also said they had re-adjusted the system so it was functioning correctly for use. Ederer reviewed the information provided by DAEC and sent a letter to them on Wednesday, August 20, 2003, which recommended the crane not be used for any safety-related or critical lifts until the X-SAM® Safety System has been thoroughly examined and verified to be in satisfactory operating condition.
This particular crane had been in service since 1983 and was the first instance where the system did not function correctly. Ederer's personnel traveled to DAEC Saturday, August 23, 2003 and examined and tested the system. It was determined that accumulated wear over the life of the assembly resulted in increased friction such that the cable would not slide freely and brake reaction setting force could no longer overcome the resistance of the cable. This resulted in the inconsistent operation of the emergency drum brake noted by DAEC.
Ederer requested DAEC send the old cable assembly back to Ederer for a more complete examination. If that examination provides any different results, the vendor will submit a supplemental report for Part 21 followup. In addition, Ederer has stated that if allowed to remain uncorrected, this condition constitutes a 'safety hazard' because, in the event of the failure of another component, the loss of the safety function could result in a significant reduction in the degree of protection provided by the crane safety system.
Ederer has taken the following corrective actions. They have promptly notified the other affected user (Point Beach) with the same type of system and advised them not to use their crane for any safety-related or critical lifts until the condition had been evaluated. Also, Ederer replaced the cable assembly and retested the system at DAEC. It should be noted that although the Point Beach system was functioning normally, Ederer went to site and replaced the cable assembly and retested the system. In addition, Ederer has set a recommended replacement life for this component to 10 years. This is based on 50% of the shortest known useful life of 20 years.
Nuclear plants using this equipment were identified and notified, and the components replaced. Duane Arnold and Point Beach were the only two nuclear plants, active or decommissioning/decommissioned, to have the type of brake cable affected. There have been no previous or similar conditions reported for this product. There was no adverse effect on plant safety or on the health and safety of the public as a result of this condition.
ML032580450 09/10/2003
Part 21 - 2003-0025-00 - Stability Option III Period Based Detection Algorithm Allowable Settings
License No: Various Notification:
MR Number: H-2003-0032
Reviewer: DOZIER, IRA (JERRY)
Part 21 - 2003-0025-00
GE Nuclear Energy provided information concerning a reportable condition on the stability of the Option III Period Based Detection Algorithm (PBDA) for the Oscillation Power Range Monitor installed at the affected Licensee plants listed below. The defect involves the specification of the allowable values for the adjustable period confirmation variables in the PBDA used in Stability Option III. The result of the defect is such that Safety Limit Minimum Critical Power Ratio protection might not be provided for all anticipated reactor instabilities. Additional information is available in ADAMS, Accession Number ML032870429.
ML032870429 10/04/2003