Source: http://fsmsupremecourt.org/WebSite/fsm/decisions/vol7/7fsm152_161.htm
Timestamp: 2017-09-25 06:09:47
Document Index: 263979699

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 18', '§ 26', '§ 21', '§ 18', '§ 18', '§ 13', '§ 17']

7 FSM Intrm. 152-161
IN THE MATTER OF HANS WILIANDER,
1995 Candidate for Congress of the
MAX MALLARME, National Election Director,
JOHN R. PETEWON,
APPEAL CASE NO. C1-1995
Elections; Equity ) Laches, Estoppel and Waiver
Where no action, or words, or silence of the National Election Director prior to the appellant's initial petition misled the appellant into untimely filing his petition after certification it does not give rise to an estoppel. The Director's later failure to raise the issue of untimeliness until his denial of the petition was appealed to the Supreme Court does not give rise to an estoppel. Wiliander v. Mallarme, 7 FSM Intrm. 152, 157-58 (App. 1995).
This appeal arises out of the rejection by election officials of 169 absentee ballots cast in the
[7 FSM Intrm. 155]
The parties agreed upon what would constitute the record on appeal, and an accelerated briefing
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"Acceptability of a Vote" Time Frame
The appellant's petition was filed with the Director pursuant to section 902, and is not a petition for a recount. "Any other petition [not for recount] challenging the acceptability of a vote or votes must be filed prior to certification of the results of the election or within 1 week of the election, whichever occurs first." Id. No petition was filed within one week of the election.
Id. § 18(1) (to be codified at 9 F.S.M.C. 705(1)). The Code requires that this examination process to
[7 FSM Intrm. 157]
The appellant argues that the petition of March 21st should be allowed as timely on a theory of equitable estoppel, that is, because the Director did not inform the appellant of the March 20th certification, and did not in his written decision, or in his letter of March 22nd, reject the petition on the grounds that it was untimely, the Director is now estopped from making that argument.
In finding untimeliness, we first consider whether the appellant filed before certification. He did not. We next consider whether the Director, who did not inform the appellant of certification, caused
[7 FSM Intrm. 158]
Timeliness of the Director's Decision
We expressed concern during oral argument concerning the validity (timeliness) of the Director's decision. We need not resolve the matter now, but outline the problem as we see it. After a petition challenging the acceptability of a vote or votes is filed, the winning candidate has one week to respond,9 and the Director then has ten days to decide whether to approve the petition. Pub. L. No. 8-97, § 26 (8th Cong., 3d Reg. Sess. 1994) (to be codified at 9 F.S.M.C. 902).
The appellant's only argument on the merits is that absentee ballots should not have been rejected on the ground that the signature on the affidavit did not correspond with the signature on the voter's request for an absentee ballot. The appellant contends that since the word "signature" is mentioned in only one other place in the Election Code, the section concerning voter registration, that the only signature that the affidavit signature can be compared with to determine if it corresponds is the voter's signature on the voter registration form. He further contends that the statute does not require a signature on the request for an absentee ballot. In his petition to the Director and in his brief before us the appellant's argument emphasized that under Chuukese custom a family head may sign legal documents for family members.12 For that proposition he relied on O'Sonis v. Truk, 3 FSM Intrm. 516 (Truk S. Ct. Tr. 1988). At oral argument he contended that this was only one example of why the signature on the request should not be relied upon, and emphasized his point that comparison with the request signature was unauthorized by statute.13 It is on this ground that he requests the court to order the election certification vacated and the improperly rejected ballots counted and the new results certified.
One of the Director's duties is "to implement rules and regulations for absentee ballots." Id.
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We do not find persuasive the appellant's argument concerning an alleged custom whereby a family head may sign a family member's absentee ballot request. The Truk State Court trial division's holding in O'Sonis merely allows one spouse to "prosecute or defend a civil action in which one or both spouses may be a party." O'Sonis, 3 FSM Intrm. at 518. Even if, as a general proposition, in Chuukese society the head of the household is responsible for taking care of the family's legal matters, such as signing legal documents, that holding in a state court trial case cannot extend to personal political rights created solely by national law. Since the right to vote is personal ) one person's vote cannot be cast by another ) one person's request to vote absentee cannot be made by another. Therefore, like other cases involving transactions or behavior that are distinctly non-customary and nonlocal, local custom is inapplicable. See, e.g., Wito Clan v. United Church of Christ, 6 FSM Intrm. 129, 132 (discussion of application of custom to legal problems), reh'g denied, 6 FSM Intrm. 291 (App.
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3. This is despite the President's emergency election regulations requiring Pohnpei and Chuuk to finish counting the ballots in the national election within four days. Emergency Regulations to Implement Provisions of the National Election Code pt. 2.10 (tabulation to be finished in no more than four days unless good cause shown and National Election Director approval) (Feb. 21, 1995).
4. The Code requires certification by the National Election Director "[u]pon completion of the counting and tabulation of election results by the national election commissioners." Pub. L. No. 8-97, § 21 (8th Cong., 3d Reg. Sess. 1994) (to be codified at 9 F.S.M.C. 810). The three-day delay in certifying the election result is unexplained.
5. The Director, correctly we believe, treated the appellant's March 21st and 23rd notices as an appeal from the Commissioner's appointee's March 16 rejection of the ballots. Decision of National Election Director at 3 n.2 (Apr. 13, 1995).
6. In case the statement is found to be insufficient or in case the signatures do not correspond, or in case the voter has not complied with the requirements of section 704 of this title or is not a duly qualified elector or the ballot envelope is open or has been opened and resealed, the ballot envelope shall not be opened and the national election commissioner or his appointee shall mark across its face `Rejected,' giving the reason therefor, and shall preserve the same in the manner provided by law.
Pub. L. No. 8-97, § 18(2) (8th Cong., 3d Reg. Sess. 1994) (to be codified at 9 F.S.M.C. 705(2)).
7. Other than inviting the court, during oral argument, to examine the other 80 rejected ballots to check the accuracy of the reasons given for rejection, the appellant does not contend that the 80 were rejected improperly. The ballots were not made a part of the record.
8. This is consistent with the provision that absentee ballots received after close of polls on Election Day are neither examined nor counted. Pub. L. No. 8-97, § 18(3) (8th Cong., 3d Reg. Sess. 1994) (to be codified at 9 F.S.M.C. 705(3)).
9. The law is unclear, but it seems likely that the Director, in certifying the election also has t he duty to notify all the candidates of the certification. The Director is the party most able to assure the smooth running of the process.
10. We cannot presently see a circumstance under which the Director would have jurisdiction after these 17 days, but the future may present one.
11. Once again we note that a candidate must be vigilant in exercising his right to appeal.
12. There is no evidence, however, that a family head did actually sign an absentee ballot request for a family member.
13. This change of tack may have been influenced by his assertion that not until the Director's affidavit of April 27th was there any indication that 89 instead of 169 ballots were rejected for noncorresponding signatures, but see Decision of National Election Director at 1-2 (Apr. 13, 1995) (mentioning three other reasons for rejection), and appellant's contention that the phrase "lack of proper execution" may also refer to signatures because a document is "executed" when it is signed.
14. The Emergency Regulations were promulgated on February 21, 1995, two weeks before Election Day. Registered voters may request an absentee ballots up to 120 days before the election, Pub. L. No. 5-70, § 13(2) (5th Cong., 3d Spec. Sess. 1988) (to be codified at 9 F.S.M.C. 703(2)), and absentee ballots may be cast during the 30 days before Election Day, Pub. L. No. 8-97, § 17(1) (8th Cong., 3d Reg. Sess. 1994) (to be codified at 9 F.S.M.C. 704(1)). While the election officials are to be commended for addressing potential problems, an earlier start may have been advisable.
15. The only time the Election Code allows assistance to be given an absentee voter is when a voter is a confined person "who by reason of physical disability is unable to mark his ballot." 9 F.S.M.C. 702.