Source: http://la.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20170512_0001718.LA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2017-08-17 21:28:07
Document Index: 748762081

Matched Legal Cases: ['art, 15', 'art, 15', 'art. 578', 'art. 579', 'art. 579', 'art. 579']

CHAKA STEWART
Following his appearances for status hearings and pre-trial matters, defendant received notice-proof of which is in the record-to appear on May 17, 2012. At some point before this date, however, defendant was arrested on federal charges, and thus did not appear as scheduled on May 17, 2012. On that date, a minute entry reflects that defense counsel did appear and announce that defendant was detained in federal custody. The matter was continued, and the minute entry also shows that the state indicated its intent to secure defendant's presence for the next scheduled court date.
On July 23, 2013, one year after its first motion, the state filed a second motion and order for writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum-this time directed to the specific penitentiary in Arkansas where defendant was serving a federal sentence. Still, defendant's absence from court persisted. After several more continuances, the trial court issued an alias capias for defendant in February 2014; and at a bond forfeiture hearing on April 30, 2014, counsel for the surety appeared and advised that defendant was in federal custody in Arkansas, and provided a certificate of incarceration. The matter was continued, and on July 25, 2014, defendant filed a motion to quash all charges on speedy trial grounds, which the trial court granted.
The court of appeal reversed the quashal, because even though the state knew that defendant was in federal custody, the two-year limitations period within which it had to bring him to trial was interrupted by defendant's initial failure to appear and did not begin to run anew until the surety filed the certificate of defendant's incarceration in Arkansas on April 30, 2014. Thus, the court of appeal found that the state had two years from that date, i.e., until April 30, 2016, to bring defendant to trial. State v. Stewart, 15-0135 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/9/15), 176 So.3d 465;[1] State v. Stewart, 15-0136 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/16/15).
Here, the record indicates that the state had notice of defendant's custodial location by July 23, 2013--when it filed its motion and order for writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum directed to the specific penitentiary in Arkansas where defendant was in federal custody. Before this date, though the record suggests the state had some indication of defendant's general whereabouts, i.e., according to defense counsel's advisement, he was "in federal custody, " the state would have had to take affirmative steps to discern defendant's specific location.
As we explained in Romar, the state has no affirmative duty to locate an absent defendant. Rather, it was incumbent upon defendant to provide the state with notice of his location to trigger commencement of a new limitations period under La.C.Cr.P. art. 578. See Romar, 07-2140, pp. 7-8, 985 So.2d at 727 ("The burden . . . falls not on the state to show that defendant had placed himself outside of its control . . . but on defendant and his sureties to avoid the consequences of his failure to appear. . . [O]ne of those consequences, since 1984, is the interruption of the time limits placed on trial."). Because the record does not show that the state had notice of defendant's custodial location before July 23, 2013, when it filed a writ specifically directed to the Arkansas penitentiary, the trial court erred in granting the motions to quash filed on July 25, 2014.
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Unlike the court of appeal, we find it immaterial whether the more specific notice requirements of La.C.Cr.P. art. 579(C) were met, because Subpart C did not go into effect until August 1, 2013, after commencement of the prosecution in this case. Given that Subpart C imposes new substantive obligations on a defendant, and because those obligations impact a defendant&#39;s constitutional right to a speedy trial, it does not apply retroactively. This is consistent with the Court&#39;s prior decision that La.C.Cr.P. art. 579(A)(3) could not be retroactively applied. See State v. Groth, 85-1528 (La. 1986), 483 So.2d 596, 599; see also State v. Kraft, 86-0155 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1987), 501 So.2d 313, 315 ("Moreover, since [La.C.Cr.P. art. 579(A)(3)] provides for an additional method for interruption of the prescriptive period, it bears upon a defendant's right to a speedy trial. Thus, [it] should not be given retroactive application in light of the constitutional safeguard of the right to a speedy trial."). Though we maintain that the state has no duty to take affirmative steps to locate an absent defendant, we also note that in circumstances such as these, in which the state has become aware (whether by its own efforts or otherwise) of an absent defendant's location, that awareness is ...