Source: https://www.denizdefense.com/blog/2014/12/13-arrested-on-san-dui-counts-at-2-overnight-checkpoints-in-encinitas-and-san-diego/
Timestamp: 2020-06-03 10:54:19
Document Index: 446446208

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 817', '§ 21', '§ 2400', '§ 26600', '§ 2806', '§ 2805', '§ 2814', '§ 5341', '§ 49']

13 Arrested on San DUI Counts at 2 Overnight Checkpoints in Encinitas and San Diego | The Law Offices of Mark Deniz APLC
13 Arrested on San DUI Counts at 2 Overnight Checkpoints in Encinitas and San Diego
Home » Firm News » 13 Arrested on San DUI Counts at 2 Overnight Checkpoints in Encinitas and San Diego
Monday is a big “holiday party” day because its proximity to christmas. In the next few days people are holding holidays parties of the office, the local watering hole, etc. I know we used to meet before christmas at the yardhouse. Police know this as well and there will be checkpoints and saturation patrols around the county. Be safe and do not tempt fate. Hope the holidays are faring well for you.
Law enforcement officers arrested 13 suspected drunken drivers around two separate overnight checkpoints in downtown San Diego and the Cardiff-by-the-Sea area of Encinitas.
The bulk of the arrests were made in the vicinity of First Avenue and Beech Street in San Diego. In addition to the 11 suspected drunken drivers busted there between 11 p.m. Saturday and 3 a.m., officers impounded 14 vehicles, San Diego Police Officer Mark McCullough said.
Two suspected drunken drivers were arrested between 8 p.m. Saturday and 2:30 a.m. at a checkpoint on South Coast Highway near Chesterfield Drive, sheriff’s Sgt. Joe Tomaiko said. Deputies also cited eight motorists for license violations and other offenses, he said.
Here is the sentinel case regarding checkpoints:
Ingersoll v. Palmer (1987)
That same month, the Burlingame Police Department (the Department) set up the first sobriety checkpoint program to operate in California, [43 Cal. 3d 1326] following the guidelines set forth in the Attorney General’s opinion. fn. 1 The Burlingame checkpoint was expected to serve as a model for others. We therefore examine the Burlingame checkpoint as illustrative of checkpoint operation procedures.
The checkpoint operation was supervised by a commander under whom two sergeants served. One sergeant supervised a team of traffic control and screening officers, and the second sergeant supervised the field sobriety test teams. Two traffic control officers, with support staff, set up the checkpoint and selected every fifth car for screening. There were one to four screening officers who contacted the motorists. Nonsworn reserve personnel were available for recording information and timing each contact. One to four officers, each with a nonsworn reserve assistant, were on duty to administer the field sobriety tests. There was also a booking officer, an officer to operate an intoxilizer, one for photographing and one alternate. There were also nonsworn personnel available for interpreting, transportation and booking assistance. All the officers chosen for checkpoint duty had a good record of “driving under the influence” (DUI) detection and arrest, all had recent refresher training on recognizing the symptoms of drug and alcohol use, and all had special training in checkpoint procedures, including conducting a simulated checkpoint. All officers on duty at the checkpoint were in full uniform. [43 Cal. 3d 1327]
[1] Petitioners contend the validity of a sobriety checkpoint stop must be determined by the standard set forth in In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal. 3d 888 [148 Cal.Rptr. 366, 582 P.2d 957], requiring an individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. If the primary purpose of the stop here were to detect crime [43 Cal. 3d 1328] or gather evidence of crime, we would agree with the contention that an individualized suspicion of wrongdoing is required. But, as we shall explain, the primary purpose of the stop here was not to discover evidence of crime or to make arrests of drunk drivers but to promote public safety by deterring intoxicated persons from driving on the public streets and highways. We therefore conclude the propriety of the sobriety checkpoint stops involved here is to be determined not by the standard pertinent to traditional criminal investigative stops, but rather by the standard applicable to investigative detentions and inspections conducted as part of a regulatory scheme in furtherance of an administrative purpose. (See People v. Hyde (1974) 12 Cal. 3d 158, 165-166, 173 [115 Cal.Rptr. 358, 524 P.2d 830].)
In upholding airport screening searches, a majority of this court in Hyde applied the administrative search rationale. (12 Cal. 3d at p. 165 et seq.) The concurring minority, reaching the same result, preferred a more generic balancing test of reasonableness. (12 Cal. 3d at p. 172 et seq.) But, verbal formulations aside, both the majority and the concurring minority in Hyde relied upon essentially the same principles and factors.
The majority noted: “Like all searches subject to the Fourth Amendment, an administrative screening must be measured against the constitutional mandate of reasonableness. In the case of administrative searches, however, ‘there can be no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search entails.’ (Camara v. Municipal Court (1967) supra, 387 U.S. 523, 536-537 [18 L.Ed.2d 930, 940, 87 S.Ct. 1727].) It is ironic, therefore, that by adopting the administrative search doctrine to evaluate the validity of airport screening procedures we must undertake a similar process of balancing to that which would have followed from a reliance upon Terry [v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1 (20 L.Ed.2d 889, 88 S.Ct. 1868)].” (People v. Hyde, supra, 12 Cal. 3d 158, 166, italics added.) The concurring minority reasoned: “It is now settled … that there is no fixed standard of reasonableness that applies to all types of governmental action which is subject to the mandates of the Fourth Amendment. Where, as here, we deal with a type of official conduct that (1) has objectives qualitatively different from those of the conventional search and seizure in the criminal context and (2) cannot feasibly be subjected to regulation through the traditional probable cause standard of justification, we may assess the reasonableness of the particular type of search and seizure by examining and balancing the governmental interest justifying the search and the invasion which the search entails. [Citations.]” (Id., conc. opn. at p. 173. Italics added, fns. and original italics omitted.) We perceive no real inconsistency in the two analyses. They both employed a balancing test for reasonableness. [43 Cal. 3d 1329]
California constitutional principles are based on the same considerations, i.e., balancing the governmental interests served against the intrusiveness of the detention. (See People v. Hyde, supra, 12 Cal. 3d 158, 166, also conc. opn. at pp. 172-173.) With respect to a seizure for conventional investigation of criminal activity, standards similar to federal standards have been articulated. [3] “[I]n order to justify an investigative stop or detention the circumstances known or apparent to the officer must include specific and articulable facts causing him to suspect that (1) some activity relating to crime has taken place or is occurring or about to occur, and (2) the person he intends to stop or detain is involved in that activity. Not only must he subjectively entertain such a suspicion, but it must be objectively reasonable for him to do so: the facts must be such as would cause any reasonable police officer in a like position, drawing when appropriate on his training and experience (People v. Superior Court (Kiefer) [1970] 3 Cal. 3d [807,] at p. 827 [91 Cal.Rptr. 729, 478 P.2d 449]), to suspect the same criminal activity and the same involvement by the person in question.” (In re Tony C., supra, 21 Cal. 3d 888, 893, fn. omitted.)
But Tony C. itself further pointed out that, for purposes of analysis under the Fourth Amendment and under California constitutional law, “[a] more fruitful approach focuses on the purpose of the intrusion itself. If the individual is stopped or detained because the officer suspects he may be personally involved in some criminal activity, his Fourth Amendment rights are [43 Cal. 3d 1330]implicated and he is entitled to the safeguards of the rules set forth above. But similar safeguards are not required if the officer acts for other proper reasons.” (In re Tony C., supra, 21 Cal. 3d 888, at p. 895, italics added.) Thus, the court in Tony C., like the United States Supreme Court in Brown, supra, 443 U.S. 47, expressly recognized that individualized suspicion that the contactee is involved in criminal activity is not required in certain types of police-citizen contacts.
“Nevertheless,” we stated, “we do find support under the Fourth Amendment for the pre-departure screening of prospective passengers in the series of United States Supreme Court decisions relating to administrative searches. (United States v. Biswell (1972) 406 U.S. 311 [32 L.Ed.2d 87, 92 S.Ct. 1593]; Wyman v. James (1971) 400 U.S. 309 [27 L.Ed.2d 408, 91 S.Ct. 381]; Colonnade Corp. v. United States (1970) 397 U.S. 72 [25 L.Ed.2d 60, 90 S.Ct. 774]; See v. City of Seattle (1967) 387 U.S. 541 [18 L.Ed.2d 943, 87 S.Ct. 1737]; Camara v. Municipal Court (1967) 387 U.S. 523 [18 L.Ed.2d 930, 87 S.Ct. 1727]; see also United States v. Davis (9th Cir. 1973) 482 F.2d 893; United States v. Schafer (9th Cir. 1972) 461 F.2d 856; Downing v. Kunzig (6th Cir. 1972) 454 F.2d 1230 [15 A.L.R.Fed. 926].) [4a] These cases recognize that ‘searches conducted as part of a general regulatory scheme in furtherance of an administrative purpose, rather than as part of a criminal investigation to secure evidence of crime, may be permissible under the Fourth Amendment though not supported by a showing of probable cause directed to a particular place or person to be searched.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Hyde, supra, 12 Cal. 3d 158, 165.)
We pointed out that the purpose of the airport search is not to ferret out contraband or preserve for trial evidence of criminal activity, although the mechanics of the search itself take the form of a search to detect criminal [43 Cal. 3d 1331] activity (carrying weapons or explosives aboard an aircraft). Rather, we characterized the search as “a central phase of a comprehensive regulatory program designed to insure that dangerous weapons will not be carried onto an airplane and to deter potential hijackers from attempting to board. [Citations.]” (People v. Hyde, supra, 12 Cal. 3d 158, 166.) In the reasonableness analysis under the Fourth Amendment, we found the governmental interest substantial, the intrusion minimal, and the method effective for its purpose (in fact, we found in that case that there was no other effective means of achieving the purpose). We pointed out it was possible for a traveler to avoid the intrusion by either checking his or her hand luggage or foregoing air travel and opting for alternate means of transportation. Finally, we pointed out that airport searches were singularly unsuited to the warrant procedure because of the extremely high volume of air passenger traffic, rendering it impractical if not impossible to issue a warrant for any individual passenger. In addition, the consequences of not having a warrant were found mitigated by (1) neutral application of the screening process to all air passengers, minimizing the discretion of the officials in the field, and (2) limiting the intrusiveness of the search to those actions strictly necessary to disclose the presence of weapons or explosives.
The three concurring justices in Hyde agreed that the airport screening procedures were constitutionally permissible but questioned whether the airport search could properly be labelled an “administrative search” like the building inspection in Camara v. Municipal Court (1967) 387 U.S. 523 [18 L.Ed.2d 930, 87 S.Ct. 1727]. In the view of the concurring justices in Hyde, supra, 12 Cal. 3d 158, the Fourth Amendment considerations should simply be evaluated pursuant to a balancing test of reasonableness, consisting of an assessment of the governmental interest justifying the search and the intrusiveness entailed in the search. The concurring minority had no difficulty in concluding the governmental interest was compelling and the intrusion resulting from the search was minimal. Thus, the airport searches were concluded to be reasonable. No warrant was required because compliance with the warrant procedure, as the majority had also pointed out, would completely frustrate the legitimate governmental purpose.
[5] The sobriety checkpoint presents a compelling parallel to the airport screening search. While the label “administrative search” is open to some criticism in application to either the airport search or the sobriety checkpoint stop, both, although they operate mechanically as a search or inspection for the violation of law, actually serve a primary and overriding regulatory purpose of promoting public safety. Their primary purpose is to prevent and deter conduct injurious to persons and property; they are not conventional criminal searches and seizures. The fact that sobriety checkpoint stops will lead to the detection of some individuals involved in [43 Cal. 3d 1332] criminal conduct does not alter the fundamental regulatory character of the screening procedure. (See People v. Hyde, supra, 12 Cal. 3d 158, at p. 166; see also New York v. Burger (1987) 482 U.S. ___, ___ [96 L.Ed.2d 601, 622-623, 107 S.Ct. 2636, 2651].)
Some industries are so heavily regulated that government inspections are held constitutionally permissible, without notice, warrant, or individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. (Donovan v. Dewey (1981) 452 U.S. 594 [69 L.Ed.2d 262, 101 S.Ct. 2534] [mines]; United States v. Biswell (1972) 406 U.S. 311 [32 L.Ed.2d 87, 92 S.Ct. 1593] [firearms]; Colonnade Corp. v. United States (1970) 397 U.S. 72 [25 L.Ed.2d 60, 90 S.Ct. 774] [liquor].) Business owners in the heavily regulated industries are presumed to know [43 Cal. 3d 1333] that they are subject to the periodic inspections which are specified by and regularly carried out pursuant to enabling legislation.
Regulatory inspections and stops have also been permitted under decisions of the United States Supreme Court and the California courts in the absence of an individualized suspicion of wrongdoing in border patrol checkpoint inspections (United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, supra, 428 U.S. 543), agricultural inspection checkpoints (People v. Dickinson (1980) 104 Cal. App. 3d 505 [163 Cal.Rptr. 575]), vehicle mechanical inspection checkpoints (People v. De La Torre (1967) 257 Cal. App. 2d 162 [64 Cal.Rptr. 804]), and license and registration inspection checkpoints (People v. Washburn (1968) 265 Cal. App. 2d 665 [71 Cal.Rptr. 577]).
The need to provide an assurance of legitimacy of the search/seizure required a warrant in the building inspection context, but that need was served alternatively in the checkpoint operation by the visible manifestations [43 Cal. 3d 1334] of authorization in the form of signs announcing the roadblock, official insignia and vehicles, and fully uniformed personnel. Another purpose of the warrant requirement in Camara was to prevent hindsight from coloring the evaluation of the reasonableness of a search or seizure. In the checkpoint operation, however, “The reasonableness of checkpoint stops … turns on factors such as the location and method of operation of the checkpoint, factors that are not susceptible to the distortion of hindsight, and therefore will be open to post-stop review notwithstanding the absence of a warrant. Another purpose for a warrant requirement is to substitute the judgment of the magistrate for that of the searching or seizing officer. [Citation.] But the need for this is reduced when the decision to ‘seize’ is not entirely in the hands of the officer in the field, and deference is to be given to the administrative decisions of higher ranking officials.” (United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, supra, 428 U.S. 543, 565-566 [49 L.Ed.2d 1116, 1133].)
The intimation that neutrally operated checkpoint stops are permissible was reiterated in dictum in Delaware v. Prouse, supra, 440 U.S. 648. In that case, a single patrol officer decided to make a roving stop for the purpose of a license or registration “spot check,” but he had no information or reasonable suspicion either that the driver was unlicensed or that the vehicle was improperly registered. The Supreme Court held that such a random roving stop made without a reasonable suspicion of law violation was contrary to the Fourth Amendment. However, the court was careful to state that “This holding does not preclude the State of Delaware or other States from developing methods for spot checks that involve less intrusion or that do not involve the unconstrained exercise of discretion. Questioning of all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops is one possible alternative.” (Id., at p. 663, fn. omitted [ 59 L.Ed.2d at pp. 673-674].) This dictum was not mere rhetoric, [43 Cal. 3d 1335] however. It is analytically consistent with the court’s holdings in other cases. Standardless and unconstrained discretion on the part of government officers is what the court sought to circumscribe in the regulatory inspection and stop cases. (Almeida-Sanchez v. United States (1973) 413 U.S. 266, 270 [37 L.Ed.2d 596, 601, 93 S.Ct. 2535]; Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, 387 U.S. 523, 532-533 [18 L.Ed.2d 930, 937-938].) [4b] Accordingly, such stops and inspections for regulatory purposes may be permitted if undertaken pursuant to predetermined specified neutral criteria (Delaware v. Prouse, supra, 440 U.S. 648, 662 [59 L.Ed.2d 660, 673]) such as the criteria articulated for a checkpoint stop (United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, supra, 428 U.S. 543, 553-554, 556-564 [49 L.Ed.2d 1116, 1126, 1127-1132]).
[6] Petitioners argue the sobriety checkpoint stop we examine here is a criminal investigation roadblock, subject not only to Tony C., supra, 21 Cal. 3d 888, but barred by the Fourth Amendment under this court’s decision in People v. Gale (1956) 46 Cal. 2d 253 [294 P.2d 13]. (See also Wirin v. Horrall (1948) 85 Cal. App. 2d 497 [193 P.2d 470].) In Gale, sheriff’s officers stopped and searched cars at a roadblock explicitly for the purpose of “‘[curb]ing the juvenile problem and also check for, well, anything that we might find, anything that looked suspicious.'” (People v. Gale, supra, 46 Cal. 2d 253, 255.) We do not agree.
A sobriety checkpoint program operated by the Arizona Highway Patrol is assertedly designed “to develop a public perception of the high risk of [43 Cal. 3d 1337] apprehension of drinking drivers,” and the program abstract for the Maryland sobriety checkpoint project stated it was intended to function as a general deterrent to drinking drivers by instilling the perception that there was an increased likelihood of detection and arrest. An integral aspect of the Maryland program was publicity, to attain maximum public awareness and voluntary compliance with DUI laws.
Petitioners argue in their discussion of the balancing test that roadblocks are not effective for apprehending DUI violators, and point out that the CHP experience showed that roving patrols were over twice as effective as roadblocks per work hour in producing drunk driving arrests, and that the Burlingame checkpoint in fact resulted in no arrests. The absence of arrests, however, is both explained by and affords substantial support for the conclusion that increasing drunk driving arrests — i.e., conducting investigations for the purpose of gathering evidence of criminal activity — is not the primary purpose of sobriety checkpoints. An absence of arrests does not indicate a sobriety checkpoint is a futile exercise. It more likely indicates that the existence of the checkpoint program has succeeded in inducing voluntary compliance with the law, thus fulfilling the program’s primary objective of keeping automobiles operated by impaired drivers off the roads. Drunk driving is not merely a crime, it is a serious public safety problem. A vehicle driven by an intoxicated person is as much a road hazard as a [43 Cal. 3d 1338] vehicle with defective brakes or a defective steering mechanism. Sobriety checkpoints serve to keep such hazardous instrumentalities off the road in the first instance. If checkpoints perform a significant deterrent function, it follows that drunk driving arrests would decrease in areas of checkpoint operation.
Deterring drunk driving and identifying and removing drunk drivers from the roadways undeniably serves a highly important governmental interest. As we noted in Burg v. Municipal Court (1983) 35 Cal. 3d 257, at page 262 [198 Cal.Rptr. 145, 673 P.2d 732], “The drunk driver cuts a wide swath of death, pain, grief, and untold physical and emotional injury across the roads of California and the nation. The monstrous proportions of the problem have often been lamented in graphic terms by this court and the United States Supreme Court. [Citations.] … [I]n the years 1976 to 1980 there were many more injuries to California residents in alcohol-related traffic accidents than were suffered by the entire Union Army during the Civil War, and more were killed than in the bloodiest year of the Vietnam [43 Cal. 3d 1339] War. [Citations.] Given this setting, our observation that ‘[d]runken drivers are extremely dangerous people’ [citation] seems almost to understate the horrific risk posed by those who drink and drive.” Stopping the carnage wrought on California highways by drunk drivers is a concern the importance of which is difficult to overestimate.
Nevertheless, there are indications of the effectiveness of the roadblocks even in the absence of statistical evidence. For example, the Maryland court in Little v. State (1984) 300 Md. 485 [479 A.2d 903, 913], noted certain evidence in that record that on the night of the checkpoint operation many people who had been drinking asked a sober companion to drive instead, that calls for taxi service by drunk individuals increased, and that certain groups anticipating consumption of alcohol at social events chartered vehicles instead of driving. “The prospect of being stopped at a roadblock thus convinced some intoxicated individuals to find alternate means of transportation.” [43 Cal. 3d 1340] (Little v. State, supra, 479 A.2d 903, 913.) Similar results were observed in connection with the Burlingame checkpoint in the instant case, and at oral argument counsel for petitioners conceded the likely deterrent effect of the sobriety checkpoints involved here.
Justice Feldman, in a concurring opinion in State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Ct. of State (1983) 136 Ariz. 1 [663 P.2d 992], observed that “The governmental interest sought to be protected by the roadblocks is greater than merely detecting and apprehending drunk drivers. Given the carnage on our highways, there is a unique societal interest in enforcing compliance with the law by deterring driving while under the influence of alcohol or other drugs. [¶] … [T]he state cannot satisfy this interest by traditional [43 Cal. 3d 1341] methods which satisfy the Terry test. The traditional system has left us far short of achieving the law’s objective. … It is only fortuitous that an officer happens to be in a position to see a drunk entering the freeway on the off-ramp [sic] before that drunk happens to kill some innocent person. … [¶] … [It is] obvious that traditional law enforcement methods, involving the arrest by roving officers of only those whom they can stop upon a founded suspicion of drunk driving, fall short of satisfying society’s compelling interest in enforcing compliance with the laws prohibiting drunk driving.” (Id., 663 P.2d 992 at pp. 998-999, conc. opn. Feldman, J.)
The decision to establish a sobriety checkpoint, the selection of the site and the procedures for the checkpoint operation should be made and established by supervisory law enforcement personnel, and not by an officer in [43 Cal. 3d 1342] the field. This requirement is important to reduce the potential for arbitrary and capricious enforcement. (See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, supra, 428 U.S. at p. 559 [49 L.Ed.2d at p. 1129].)
Primary consideration must be given to maintaining safety for motorists and officers. Proper lighting, warning signs and signals, and clearly identifiable official vehicles and personnel are necessary to minimize the risk of [43 Cal. 3d 1343] danger to motorists and police. (Cf. Jones v. State (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1984) 459 So.2d 1068, 1079.) The checkpoint should be operated only when traffic volume allows the operation to be conducted safely. Screening procedures may at times be altered consistent with traffic volume, such that, for example, every car might be stopped when traffic is light, but if traffic began to back up, a different neutral formula might be applied, such as every fifth or tenth car, or operations might be temporarily suspended until traffic volume permitted resumption of safe checkpoint operation.
One state court has found a sobriety checkpoint unconstitutional largely because it was not at a permanent location. (State v. Olgaard (S.D. 1976) 248 N.W.2d 392.) A decision of the Ninth Circuit also held that a border patrol stop at a temporary checkpoint was unlawful. (United States v. Maxwell (9th Cir. 1977) 565 F.2d 596.) We believe, however, that the temporary nature of sobriety checkpoints does not affect their constitutionality. The Olgaard court’s concern with lack of permanency was solely based on its worry about surprise and lack of publicity in connection with the checkpoint. Although it is not precisely clear from the record in Olgaard, it is inferrable from the circumstances that the Olgaard checkpoint was set up on a surprise basis. The checkpoint was operated by only four officers utilizing nothing but the red flashing lights on several patrol cars. They stopped all traffic in both directions. No lights or signs were used that would have given advance notice of the checkpoint. There was no advance publicity about the checkpoint. The checkpoint plainly also lacked sufficient indicia of legitimacy in terms of staffing strength. In addition, there was no showing who made the decision to set up the checkpoint, or how the [43 Cal. 3d 1344] location was selected. Thus the Olgaard court appears to have acted with propriety in holding the checkpoint unlawful.
With respect to the Burlingame checkpoint, the lighting, signing, substantial uniformed police presence, official vehicles, etc., provided advance notice to the motorist sufficient to ward off surprise and fright. In fact, sufficient advance notice was provided so a motorist could choose to avoid the checkpoint altogether. The objective and subjective intrusion into [43 Cal. 3d 1345] Fourth Amendment rights was no greater than that resulting from a permanent checkpoint. The checkpoints at issue here were reasonable as to location.
Publicity also serves to establish the legitimacy of sobriety checkpoints in the minds of motorists. Although the court in Jones v. State, supra, 459 So.2d 1068, found that advance publicity was not constitutionally mandated for all sobriety roadblocks, nevertheless the court offered the observation, consistent with finding reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment, that [43 Cal. 3d 1347]“‘[A]dvance publication of the date of an intended roadblock, even without announcing its precise location, would have the virtue of reducing surprise, fear, and inconvenience.’ [Citation.]” (Id., at p. 1080.)
[8b] Petitioners cite no persuasive authority for the proposition that police officers may not enforce the Vehicle Code in any manner not specifically provided for by statute. Citing People v. One 1960 Cadillac Coupe (1964) 62 Cal. 2d 92, 95-96 [41 Cal.Rptr. 290, 396 P.2d 706], they claim that the general police power only permits detention on reasonable suspicion when a motorist is engaged in wrongdoing unless there is statutory authority for other police action. The cited case is inapposite; it merely applies [43 Cal. 3d 1348]familiar principles as to the circumstances necessary to justify a detention, and establishes that the exclusionary rule applies in a civil action for forfeiture of a car believed to be involved in drug trafficking.
Petitioners also cite People v. McGaughran (1979) 25 Cal. 3d 577, 583-584 [159 Cal.Rptr. 191, 601 P.2d 207] (warrant checks during traffic stops); People v. Superior Court (Simon) (1972) 7 Cal. 3d 186, 199-200 [101 Cal.Rptr 837, 496 P.2d 1205] (search incident to arrest for violations for which accused would not be booked) and People v. Franklin (1968) 261 Cal. App. 2d 703, 707 [68 Cal.Rptr. 231] (scope of statutes allowing stops for vehicle safety and registration inspection) for the proposition that the Vehicle Code is comprehensive and controls methods of enforcement of its provisions. None of these cases, however, establishes that unless a method of law enforcement is specifically authorized in the Vehicle Code, it is prohibited. Rather, these cases interpret the limits on officers’ authority which have been expressly established by statute.
For similar reasons, petitioners’ position is not aided by their citation to People v. Welsch (1984) 151 Cal. App. 3d 1038 [199 Cal.Rptr. 87] (warrantless arrest for hit and run outside officer’s presence not authorized by statute); People v. Horvath (1982) 127 Cal. App. 3d 398 [179 Cal.Rptr. 577] (neither Pen. Code nor Pub. Util. Code authorized arrest of pilot who flew while intoxicated outside officer’s presence); or People v. Aldapa (1971) 17 Cal. App. 3d 184 [94 Cal.Rptr. 579] (arrest outside jurisdiction not authorized by former Pen. Code, § 817). In each case, the officer breached a statutory limitation on his authority; none of these decisions holds that methods of law enforcement not specifically authorized are prohibited.
[9b] With respect to the second point, it is true that the Vehicle Code generally preempts the field of traffic regulation vis-a-vis local ordinances. [43 Cal. 3d 1349] (See Veh. Code, § 21.) fn. 7 We have observed that unless the Legislature so provides, a city has no authority over traffic control. (See Rumford v. City of Berkeley (1982) 31 Cal. 3d 545, 550 [183 Cal.Rptr. 73, 645 P.2d 124] [city has no authority to erect traffic barriers not qualifying as traffic control devices under Veh. Code].) While this rule of preemption might conceivably prevent municipalities from establishing permanent drunk driving roadblocks that might in effect regulate traffic, it does not affect the statutory authority of the CHP and local police to enforce the Vehicle Code and other laws with checkpoints at more temporary locations. (See, e.g., Veh. Code, § 2400; Gov. Code, §§ 26600, 26601.)
[10b] Petitioners’ arguments as to their third point, again go far beyond the authority they cite. Petitioners point out examples in which the Legislature has permitted police to stop or inspect cars. The Vehicle Code authorizes police officers to require motorists to stop and submit their vehicles for safety inspections upon reasonable cause to believe that the vehicle is in violation of the code. (Veh. Code, § 2806.) CHP and law enforcement officers “whose primary responsibility is to conduct vehicle theft investigations” may make warrantless inspections for vehicle registration. (Veh. Code, § 2805.) The CHP is authorized to run mechanical inspection stations. (Veh. Code, § 2814.) And the Legislature has provided for agricultural inspection stations at state borders. (Food & Agr. Code, § 5341 et seq.) But it does not follow that because the Legislature has specifically authorized these inspections, no other inspections are permissible under the general police power. Indeed, it may be more reasonable to assume the Legislature would not feel obliged to enact specific legislation authorizing conduct it deemed to be constitutional and appropriate within the scope of existing police power. Legislative silence is an unreliable indicator of legislative intent in the absence of other indicia. We can rarely determine from the failure of the Legislature to pass a particular bill what the intent of the Legislature is with respect to existing law. fn. 8 “As evidences of legislative intent they [unpassed bills] have little value.” (Sacramento Newspaper Guild v. Sacramento County Bd. of Suprs. (1968) 263 Cal. App. 2d 41, 58 [69 Cal.Rptr. 480]; see Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson (1982) 30 Cal. 3d 721, 735, fn. 7 [180 Cal.Rptr. 496, 640 P.2d 115, 30 A.L.R.4th 1161]; Miles v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1977) 67 Cal. App. 3d 243, 248, fn. 4 [136 Cal.Rptr. [43 Cal. 3d 1350] 508]; see also United States v. Wise (1962) 370 U.S. 405, 411 [8 L.Ed.2d 590, 594-595, 82 S.Ct. 1354]; Gregory v. City of San Juan Capistrano (1983) 142 Cal. App. 3d 72, 84 [191 Cal.Rptr. 47]; cf. 2A Sutherland, Statutory Construction (4th ed. 1984) § 49.10, pp. 407-408.)
In Hyde, we permitted predeparture screening of airline passengers, without individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. Our theory was that the screening was a central part of a general regulatory scheme in furtherance of an [43 Cal. 3d 1351] administrative purpose, not an effort to seize contraband or evidence of crime. (People v. Hyde, supra, 12 Cal. 3d at p. 166.)
Hyde does not bring the drunk driving roadblock into the administrative search doctrine. First of all, the Vehicle Code provisions prohibiting drunk driving are not a “regulatory scheme.” In Hyde, we used federal cases approving warrantless inspection of the firearms and liquor industry as examples of pervasively regulated activities in which a warrantless inspection was permissible. (People v. Hyde, supra, 12 Cal. 3d 158, 165, citing United States v. Biswell (1972) 406 U.S. 311 [32 L.Ed.2d 87, 92 S.Ct. 1593]; Colonnade Corp. v. United States (1970) 397 U.S. 72 [25 L.Ed.2d 60, 90 S.Ct. 774].) The rationale of those cases is that a person engaging in the pervasively regulated industry is on notice that he has a limited expectation of privacy because the regulations provide for effective inspection. (United States v. Biswell, supra, 406 U.S. 311, 316 [32 L.Ed.2d 87, 92], see also Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc. (1978) 436 U.S. 307, 313 [56 L.Ed.2d 305, 311-312, 98 S.Ct. 1816].) No such “regulatory scheme” puts California drivers on notice that they are subject to detention without reasonable suspicion to determine whether they are driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Drivers do not “impliedly consent” to being inspected for alcohol on their breath.
A drunk driving roadblock also differs from the usual administrative or regulatory inspection because there is no “regulatory” agency to enforce the drunk driving prohibitions other than the police and the criminal courts. fn. 2 The clear purpose of these laws is not to regulate, but to detect and punish criminal drunk driving. Nothing distinguishes this crime from any other serious one. [43 Cal. 3d 1352]
The majority suggest that as long as the purpose of a drunk driving roadblock is to deter rather than detect crime, the roadblock is “regulatory.” But we certainly did not hold in Hyde, supra, 12 Cal. 3d 158, as the majority suggest, that if the purpose of a detention is to deter rather than detect crime, it may be justified as an administrative search. Criminal law enforcement encompasses both detection and deterrence. If we allowed detentions without individualized suspicion to deter crime, we would allow preventive detentions in high crime areas. But we do not allow such practices. (See People v. Loewen (1983) 35 Cal. 3d 117, 124 [196 Cal.Rptr. 846, 672 P.2d 436].) What distinguishes the permissible administrative inspection from other searches is not that they are only intended to deter, but that they carry out an administrative scheme that is not part of the penal system. There is no such administrative scheme here. In fact, the majority would permit roadblocks carried out without uniform regulation, without statewide oversight, in a Balkanized system varying from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
To call a drunk driving roadblock an administrative inspection ignores its true purpose — apprehension of drunk drivers. The fact is that the apparatus of the law enforcement system is moved to the scene of the roadblock — with breathalyzers ready to take evidence for introduction at a criminal trial, police officers ready to arrest offenders, and police vans ready to take suspects away. If we call the Burlingame roadblock an administrative inspection, then a detention to investigate any crime could be deemed an administrative inspection. The Constitution cannot, and should not, be stretched so far. [43 Cal. 3d 1353]
The propriety of an administrative search is judged under a balancing test in which the invasion of individual liberty is weighed against the necessity for the invasion and its effectiveness in achieving the state’s goal. (See Camara v. Municipal Court (1967) 387 U.S. 523, 536-537 [18 L.Ed.2d 930, 940, 87 S.Ct. 1727]; People v. Hyde, supra, 12 Cal. 3d 158, 166.) Even assuming that the analogy to administrative searches is proper, and that we should abandon individualized suspicion in favor of a balancing test, I would conclude that roadblocks are neither necessary nor effective enough to warrant the intrusion on the individual that they cause.
We all agree that the government has a profound interest in deterring and punishing drunk driving. We have recently lamented the “… horrific risk posed [to public safety] by those who drink and drive.” (Burg v. Municipal Court (1983) 35 Cal. 3d 257, 262 [198 Cal.Rptr. 145, 673 P.2d 732].) Yet the necessity for and effectiveness of drunk driving roadblocks remains to be demonstrated. And the intrusion is far from minimal.
The majority suggest that roadblocks are necessary because existing enforcement techniques have not eradicated the problem of drunk driving. If this were a proper consideration, the Fourth Amendment would have little meaning. Existing enforcement techniques have not eradicated the scourge of crime in our society, yet no one would seriously propose that the Constitution therefore permits the police to make unprecedented invasions of personal liberty. If we allow mass detentions through the means of roadblocks merely because the police claim that they may be more effective and [43 Cal. 3d 1354] helpful to law enforcement, we have gone a long way towards abandoning the protection of the Fourth Amendment.
We also must weigh the intrusion of the roadblock on the individual. There can be no question of the reasonableness of the motorist’s expectation of privacy. Though the expectation of privacy in the automobile is not as great as in the home, it is clear from Almeida-Sanchez, supra, 413 U.S. 266, [43 Cal. 3d 1355] and Delaware v. Prouse, supra, 440 U.S. 648, that motorists do retain a reasonable expectation of considerable privacy in the automobile. The invasiveness of a drunk driving roadblock is far greater than the invasion that the high court has characterized as minimal in the immigration checkpoint. (See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, supra, 448 U.S. 543, 559 [49 L.Ed.2d 1116, 1129].) In the immigration checkpoint, the immigration agent’s primary purpose is not to make arrests. But at a drunk driving roadblock, officers stop individuals with the purpose of determining if they are then committing the crime of drunk driving — a crime now involving considerable public stigma, to say nothing of the substantial criminal penalties that now result from a drunk driving conviction. The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly distinguished the minimal invasion of the administrative inspection from the necessarily hostile, threatening, and frightening intrusion of an investigation for crime. (See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, 387 U.S. 523 at pp. 530, 537 [18 L.Ed.2d 930 at pp. 936, 940].) Moreover, the detention at a drunk driving roadblock is necessarily experienced as personally intrusive, since unlike in the license inspection or immigration checkpoint, the officer’s object is to inspect the interior of the vehicle for evidence of crime and to examine the present mental and physical condition of the driver to determine if he or she should be arrested.
The pervasiveness of the invasion also must be considered. Take one example. The New York City police used 100 officers to operate a series of drunk driving roadblocks from May 27 to June 26, 1983. The police stopped 184,828 cars. There were 222 arrests for drunk driving. (N.Y. Times (June 27, 1983) at p. B1, col. 2, described in Grossman, Sobriety Checkpoints: Roadblocks to Fourth Amendment Protections, supra, 12 Am. J. Crim. L. 123, 157.) fn. 5 During a one-month period, 184,606 people who [43 Cal. 3d 1356] turned out to be innocent were detained by the police. For every arrest there were 831 innocent drivers whose privacy was infringed. We certainly would be concerned about the propriety of detaining the same number of citizens on our streets for “inspection” for drug abuse or other crimes. It is one thing to invade personal privacy in order to apprehend dangerous criminals, but when the purported object is deterrence, such mass detentions are a very high price to pay when the effectiveness of such detentions is questionable at best.