Source: http://www.google.com/patents/US7353396?dq=6,073,142
Timestamp: 2015-08-29 19:39:09
Document Index: 482579459

Matched Legal Cases: ['Application No. 60', 'Application No. 60', 'Application No. 60', 'Application No. 60', 'Application No. 60', 'Application No. 60', 'Application No. 60', 'Application No. 60', 'Application No. 60', 'Application No. 60', 'Application No. 60', 'Application No. 60', 'Application No. 60', 'Application No. 60', 'Application No. 60', 'Application No. 60', 'Application No. 60', 'Application No. 60', 'Application No. 60', 'Application No. 60', 'Application No. 60', 'Application No. 60', 'Application No. 60', 'Application No. 60', 'Application No. 60', 'Application No. 60', 'Application No. 60', 'Application No. 60', 'application No. 60', 'Application No. 60', 'Application No. 60', 'Application No. 60', 'Application No. 60', 'Application No. 60', 'Application No. 60', 'Application No. 60', 'Application No. 60', 'Application No. 60', 'Application No. 60', 'Application No. 60']

Patent US7353396 - Physical access control - Google PatentsSearch Images Maps Play YouTube News Gmail Drive More »Sign inAdvanced Patent SearchPatentsA system and method are disclosed for controlling physical access through a digital certificate validation process that works with standard certificate formats and that enables a certifying authority (CA) to prove the validity status of each certificate C at any time interval (e.g., every day, hour,...http://www.google.com/patents/US7353396?utm_source=gb-gplus-sharePatent US7353396 - Physical access controlAdvanced Patent SearchPublication numberUS7353396 B2Publication typeGrantApplication numberUS 10/409,638Publication dateApr 1, 2008Filing dateApr 8, 2003Priority dateOct 2, 1995Fee statusPaidAlso published asUS20040049675Publication number10409638, 409638, US 7353396 B2, US 7353396B2, US-B2-7353396, US7353396 B2, US7353396B2InventorsSilvio Micali, David Engberg, Phil Libin, Leo Reyzin, Alex SinelnikovOriginal AssigneeCorestreet, Ltd.Export CitationBiBTeX, EndNote, RefManPatent Citations (101), Non-Patent Citations (100), Referenced by (45), Classifications (32), Legal Events (6) External Links: USPTO, USPTO Assignment, EspacenetPhysical access control
US 7353396 B2Abstract
A system and method are disclosed for controlling physical access through a digital certificate validation process that works with standard certificate formats and that enables a certifying authority (CA) to prove the validity status of each certificate C at any time interval (e.g., every day, hour, or minute) starting with C's issue date, D1. C's time granularity may be specified within the certificate itself, unless it is the same for all certificates. For example, all certificates may have a one-day granularity with each certificate expires 365 days after issuance. Given certain initial inputs provided by the CA, a one-way hash function is utilized to compute values of a specified byte size that are included on the digital certificate and to compute other values that are kept secret and used in the validation process.
1. A method for an entity A to control the access of at least one user U to at least one disconnected door D having means to determine the current time, comprising the steps of:
for each time interval d of a sequence of dates, having A produce a digital signature SIGUDd, indicating that user U can access door D during time interval d;
causing a card of the user U to receive SIGUDd during time interval d for presentation to door D in order to pass through D;
having U present the card with SIGUDd to door D; and
having D open after verifying that (i) SIGUDd indeed is a digital signature of A indicating that U can access door D at time interval d, and (ii) that the current time is indeed within time interval d, wherein the door D stores, on the card of the user, information corresponding to an access attempt of a different user.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein D has a card reader coupled with an electromechanical lock, and wherein U presents SIGUDd to D by having his card read by D's card reader.
3. The method of claim 1, wherein A causes SIGUDd to be received by U during time interval d by posting SIGUDd into a database accessible by U.
4. The method of claim 1, wherein SIGUDd is a public-key signature, and wherein D stores the public-key of A.
receiving the information stored on the card at a database disconnected from the door D.
6. The method of claim 1, wherein D also verifies identity information about U.
7. The method of claim 5, wherein the identity information about U includes at least one of: a PIN and the answer to a challenge of D.
8. A method for controlling the access to at least one disconnected door, comprising:
for each time interval of a sequence of dates, causing an entity to produce a digital signature, wherein the digital signature indicates that at least one user can access the disconnected door during the time interval;
causing a card of a first user to receive the digital signature during the time interval for presentation to the disconnected door in order to pass through the disconnected door; and
after the first user presents the card with the digital signature to the disconnected door, causing the disconnected door to open after verifying that: (i) the digital signature is a digital signature of the entity indicating that the first user can access the disconnected door at the time interval, and (ii) that a current time is within the time interval, wherein the disconnected door stores, on the card of the first user, information that corresponds to a second user different from the first user.
9. The method of claim 8, wherein the disconnected door has a card reader coupled with an electromechanical lock, and wherein the first user presents the digital signature to the disconnected door by having the card of the first user read by the card reader.
10. The method of claim 8, wherein the entity causes the digital signature to be received by the first user during the time interval by posting the digital signature into a database accessible by the first user.
11. The method of claim 8, wherein the digital signature is a public-key signature, and wherein the disconnected door stores the public-key of the entity.
receiving the information stored on the card at a database disconnected from the door.
13. The method of claim 8, wherein the disconnected door also verifies identity information about the first user.
14. The method of claim 13, wherein the identity information about the first user includes at least one of: a PIN and the answer to a challenge of the disconnected door. Description
The present application is based on: U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/370,867, filed Apr. 8, 2002, entitled SCALABLE CERTIFICATE VALIDATION AND SIMPLIFIED PKI MANAGEMENT; U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/372,951, filed Apr. 16, 2002, entitled CLOCK-LESS DEVICE VALIDATION; U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/373,218, filed Apr. 17, 2002, entitled TECHNIQUES FOR TRAVERSING HASH SEQUENCES; U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/374,861, filed Apr. 23, 2002, entitled PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROL; U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/420,795, filed Oct. 23, 2002, entitled SECURE PHYSICAL ACCESS; U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/421,197, filed Oct. 25, 2002, entitled REAL TIME CREDENTIALS OVER OCSP; U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/421,756, filed Oct. 28, 2002, entitled REAL TIME CREDENTIALS; U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/422,416, filed Oct. 30, 2002, entitled PROTECTING MOBILE COMPUTING RESOURCES; U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/427,504, filed Nov. 19, 2002, entitled PRIVATE KEY SECURE PHYSICAL ACCESS OR REAL TIME CREDENTIALS (RTCs) IN KERBEROS-LIKE SETTINGS; U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/443,407, filed Jan. 29, 2003, entitled THREE-FACTOR AUTHENTICATION WITH REAL-TIME VALIDATION; and U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/446,149, filed Feb. 10, 2003, entitled RTC PHYSICAL ACCESS WITH LOWER-END CARDS; the teachings of all of which are incorporated herein by reference.
The present application is a continuation in part of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 10/103,541, filed Mar. 20, 2002, entitled SCALABLE CERTIFICATE VALIDATION AND SIMPLIFIED MANAGEMENT, (pending), the teachings of which are incorporated herein by reference, which itself is a continuation in part of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 09/915,180, filed Jul. 25, 2001, now U.S. Pat. No. 6,766,450 entitled CERTIFICATE REVOCATION SYSTEM, (pending), and which is a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 09/483,125, filed Jan. 14, 2000, now U.S. Pat. No. 6,292,893, which is a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 09/356,745, filed Jul. 19, 1999, now abandoned, which is a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 08/823,354, filed Mar. 24, 1997, (now U.S. Pat. No. 5,960,083), which is a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 08/559,533, filed Nov. 16, 1995, (now U.S. Pat. No. 5,666,416), which is based on U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 60/006,038, filed Oct. 24, 1995. U.S. patent application Ser. No. 10/103,541 is also a continuation in part of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 08/992,897, filed Dec. 18, 1997, now U.S. Pat. No. 6,487,658 which is based on U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/033,415, filed Dec. 18, 1996, and which is a continuation in part of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 08/715,712, filed Sep. 19, 1996, entitled CERTIFICATE REVOCATION SYSTEM, (abandoned), which is based on U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/004,796, filed Oct. 2, 1995, entitled CERTIFICATE REVOCATION SYSTEM. U.S. patent application Ser. No. 08/992,897 is also a continuation in part of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 08/729,619, filed Oct. 11, 1996, entitled TREE-BASED CERTIFICATE REVOCATION SYSTEM, (now U.S. Pat. No. 6,097,811), which is based on U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/006,143, filed Nov. 2, 1995, entitled TREE BASED CERTIFICATE REVOCATION SYSTEM. U.S. patent application Ser. No. 08/992,897 is also a continuation in part of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 08/804,868, filed Feb. 24, 1997, entitled TREE-BASED CERTIFICATE REVOCATION SYSTEM, (abandoned), which is a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 08/741,601, filed Nov. 1, 1996, entitled TREE-BASED CERTIFICATE REVOCATION SYSTEM, (abandoned), which is based on U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/006,143, filed Nov. 2, 1995, entitled TREE-BASED CERTIFICATE REVOCATION SYSTEM. U.S. patent application Ser. No. 08/992,897, is also a continuation in part of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 08/872,900, filed Jun. 11, 1997, entitled WITNESS BASED CERTIFICATE REVOCATION SYSTEM, (abandoned), which is a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 08/746,007, filed Nov. 5, 1996, entitled CERTIFICATE REVOCATION SYSTEM, (now U.S. Pat. No. 5,793,868), which is based on U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/025,128, filed Aug. 29, 1996, entitled CERTIFICATE REVOCATION SYSTEM. U.S. patent application Ser. No. 08/992,897 is also based on U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/035,119, filed Feb. 3, 1997, entitled CERTIFICATE REVOCATION SYSTEM, and is also a continuation in part of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 08/906,464, filed Aug. 5, 1997, entitled WITNESS BASED CERTIFICATE REVOCATION SYSTEM, (abandoned), which is a continuation in part of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 08/763,536, filed Dec. 9, 1996, entitled WITNESS BASED CERTIFICATE REVOCATION SYSTEM, (now U.S. Pat. No. 5,717,758), which is based on U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/024,786, filed Sep. 10, 1996, entitled WITNESS BASED CERTIFICATE REVOCATION SYSTEM, and is based on U.S. patent application Ser. No. 08/636,854, filed Apr. 23, 1996, (now U.S. Pat. No. 5,604,804), and is also based on U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/025,128, filed, Aug. 29, 1996, entitled CERTIFICATE REVOCATION SYSTEM. U.S. patent application Ser. No. 08/992,897 is also a continuation in part of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 08/756,720, filed Nov. 26, 1996, entitled SEGMENTED CERTIFICATE REVOCATION LISTS, (abandoned), which is based on U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/025,128, filed Aug. 29, 1996, entitled CERTIFICATE REVOCATION SYSTEM, and is also based on U.S. Pat. No. 08/715,712, filed Sep. 19, 1996, entitled CERTIFICATE REVOCATION SYSTEM, (abandoned), and is also based on U.S. patent application Ser. No. 08/559,533, filed Nov. 16, 1995, (now U.S. Pat. No. 5,666,416). U.S. patent application Ser. No. 08/992,897 is also a continuation in part of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 08/752,223, filed Nov. 19, 1996, entitled CERTIFICATE ISSUE LISTS, (now U.S. Pat. No. 5,717,757), which is based on U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/025,128, filed Aug. 29, 1996, entitled CERTIFICATE REVOCATION SYSTEM, and is also a continuation in part of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 08/804,869, filed Feb. 24, 1997, entitled TREE-BASED CERTIFICATE REVOCATION SYSTEM, (abandoned), which is a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 08/741,601, filed Nov. 1, 1996, entitled TREE-BASED CERTIFICATE REVOCATION SYSTEM, (abandoned), which is based on U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/006,143, filed Nov. 2, 1995, entitled TREE-BASED CERTIFICATE REVOCATION SYSTEM. U.S. patent application Ser. No. 08/992,897, is also a continuation in part of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 08/823,354, filed Mar. 24, 1997, entitled CERTIFICATE REVOCATION SYSTEM, (now U.S. Pat. No. 5,960,083), which is a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 08/559,533, filed Nov. 16, 1995, entitled CERTIFICATE REVOCATION SYSTEM, (now U.S. Pat. No. 5,666,416), which is based on U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/006,038, filed Oct. 24, 1995, entitled ENHANCED CERTIFICATE REVOCATION SYSTEM. U.S. patent application Ser. No. 10/103,541 is also based on U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/277,244, filed Mar. 20, 2001, and U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/300,621, filed Jun. 25, 2001, and U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/344,245, filed Dec. 27, 2001. All of the above are incorporated herein by reference.
The present application is also a continuation in part of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 09/915,180, filed Jun. 25, 2001, entitled CERTIFICATE REVOCATION SYSTEM, (pending), the teachings of which are incorporated herein by reference, which itself is a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 09/483,125, filed Jan. 14, 2000, (pending), which is a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 09/356,745, filed Jul. 19, 1999, (abandoned), which is a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 08/823,354, filed Mar. 24, 1997, (now U.S. Pat. No. 5,960,083), which is a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 08/559,533, filed Nov. 16, 1995, (now U.S. Pat. No. 5,666,416), which is based on U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/006,038, filed Oct. 24, 1995, abandoned. The teachings of all of the above are incorporated herein by reference.
The present application is also a continuation in part of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 10/395,017, filed Mar. 21, 2003, entitled EFFICIENT CERTIFICATE REVOCATION, (pending), the teachings of which are incorporated herein by reference, which itself is a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 10/244,695 filed Sep. 16, 2002 (pending), which is a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 08/992,897 filed Dec. 18, 1997, (now U.S. Pat. No. 6,487,658), which is based on U.S. provisional patent application No. 60/033,415, filed Dec. 18, 1996, and which is a continuation in part of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 08/715,712, filed Sep. 19, 1996, entitled CERTIFICATION REVOCATION SYSTEM, Abandoned, which is based on U.S. Patent Application No. 60/004,796, Oct. 2, 1995, entitled CERTIFICATE REVOCATION SYSTEM, and which is also a continuation in part of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 08/729,619, filed Oct. 10, 1996, entitled TREE-BASED CERTIFICATE REVOCATION SYSTEM, (now U.S. Pat. No. 6,097,811), which is based on U.S. Patent Application No. 60/006,143, filed Nov. 2, 1995, entitled Tree Based CERTIFICATE REVOCATION SYSTEM, and which is also a continuation in part of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 08/804,868, filed Feb. 24, 1997, entitled Tree-Based CERTIFICATE REVOCATION SYSTEM, Abandoned, which is a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 08/741,601, filed Nov. 1, 1996, entitled TREE-BASED CERTIFICATE REVOCATION SYSTEM, Abandoned, which is based on U.S. Patent Application No. 60/006,143, filed Nov. 2, 1995, entitled TREE-BASED CERTIFICATE REVOCATION SYSTEM, and which is also a continuation in part of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 08/872,900, filed Jun. 11, 1997, entitled WITNESS BASED CERTIFICATE REVOCATION SYSTEM, Abandoned, which is a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 08/746,007 filed Nov. 5, 1996, entitled CERTIFICATE REVOCATION SYSTEM, (Now U.S. Pat. No. 5,793,868), which is based on U.S. Patent Application No. 60/025,128, filed Aug. 29, 1996, entitled CERTIFICATE REVOCATION SYSTEM, and which is also based on U.S. Patent Application No. 60/035,119, filed Feb. 3, 1997, entitled CERTIFICATE REVOCATION SYSTEM, and which is also a continuation in part of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 08/906,464, filed Aug. 5, 1997, entitled WITNESS BASED CERTIFICATE REVOCATION SYSTEM, Abandoned, which is a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 08/763,536 filed Dec. 9, 1996, entitled WITNESS BASED CERTIFICATE REVOCATION SYSTEM, (now U.S. Pat. No. 5,717,758), which is based on U.S. Patent Application No. 60/024,786, filed Sep. 10, 1996, entitled WITNESS BASED CERTIFICATE REVOCATION SYSTEM, and is also based on U.S. patent application Ser. No. 08/636,854, filed Apr. 23, 1997, (now U.S. Pat. No. 5,604,804), and U.S. Patent Application No. 60/025,128, filed Aug. 29, 1996, entitled CERTIFICATE REVOCATION SYSTEM, and which is also a continuation in part of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 08/756,720, filed Nov. 26, 1996, entitled SEGMENTED CERTIFICATE REVOCATION LISTS, Abandoned, which is based on U.S. Patent Application No. 60/025,128, filed Aug. 29, 1996, entitled CERTIFICATE REVOCATION SYSTEM, and also based on U.S. patent application Ser. No. 08/715,712, filed Sep. 19, 1996, entitled CERTIFICATE REVOCATION SYSTEM, Abandoned, and is also based on U.S. patent application Ser. No. 08/559,533, filed Nov. 16, 1995, (now U.S. Pat. No. 5,666,416), and which is also a continuation in part of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 08/752,223, filed Nov. 19, 1996, entitled CERTIFICATE ISSUE LISTS, (now U.S. Pat. No. 5,717,757), which is based on U.S. Patent Application No. 60/025,128, filed Aug. 29, 1996, entitled, CERTIFICATE REVOCATION SYSTEM, and is also a continuation in part of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 08/804,869, filed Feb. 24, 1997, entitled TREE-BASED CERTIFICATE REVOCATION SYSTEM, Abandoned, which is a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 08/741,601, filed Nov. 1, 1996, entitled TREE-BASED CERTIFICATE REVOCATION SYSTEM, Abandoned, which is based on U.S. Patent Application No. 60/006,143, filed Nov. 2, 1995, entitled TREE-BASED CERTIFICATE REVOCATION SYSTEM, and which is also a continuation in part of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 08/823,354 filed Mar. 24, 1997, entitled CERTIFICATE REVOCATION SYSTEM, (now U.S. Pat. No. 5,960,083) which is a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 08/559,533, filed Nov. 16, 1995, entitled CERTIFICATE REVOCATION SYSTEM, (Now U.S. Pat. No. 5,666,416), which is based on U.S. Patent Application No. 60/006,038, filed Oct. 24, 1995, entitled CERTIFICATE REVOCATION SYSTEM. The teachings of all of the above are incorporated herein by reference.
The present invention relates to the field of digital certificates and more particularly to the field of digital certificate validation for controlling physical access.
In essence, a digital certificate (C) consists of a certifying authority's (CA's) digital signature securely binding together several quantities: SN, a serial number unique to the certificate, PK, the public key of the user, U, the user's identifier, D1, the issue date, D2, the expiration date, and additional fields. In symbols, C=SIGCA(SN, PK, U, D1, D2, . . . ).
It is widely recognized that digital certificates provide the best form of Internet and other access authentication. However, they are also difficult to manage. Certificates may expire after one year (i.e., D2−D2=1 year), but they may be revoked prior to their expiration; for instance, because their holders leave their companies or assume different duties within them. Thus, each transaction enabled by a given digital certificate needs a suitable proof of the current validity of that certificate, and that proof often needs to be archived as protection against future claims.
Unfortunately, traditional technologies for proving the validity of issued certificates do not scale well. At tomorrow's volume of digital certificates, today's validity proofs will be either too hard to obtain in a secure way, or too long and thus too costly to transmit (especially in a wireless setting). Certificate validation is universally recognized as a crucial problem. Unless efficiently solved, it will severely limit the growth and the usefulness of PKIs.
CRLs have not found much favor; for fear that they may become unmanageably long. (A fear that has been only marginally lessened by more recent CRL-partition techniques.) A few years ago, the National Institute of Standards and Technology tasked the MITRE Corporation to study the organization and cost of a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for the federal government. (See Public Key Infrastructure, Final Report; MITRE Corporation; National Institute of Standard and Technology, 1994). This study concluded that CRLs constitute by far the largest entry in the Federal PKI's cost list.
Controlling physical access includes reviewing real time credentials, where the real time credentials include a first part that is fixed and a second part that is modified on a periodic basis, where the second part provides a proof that the real time credentials are current, verifying validity of the real time credentials by performing an operation on the second part and comparing the result to the first part, and allowing physical access only if the real time credentials are verified as valid. The first part may be digitally signed by an authority. The authority may provide the second part or the second part may be provided by an entity other than the authority. The real time credentials may be provided on a smart card. A user may obtain the second part of the real time credentials at a first location. The user may be allowed access to a second location different and separate from the first location. At least a portion of the first part of the real time credentials may represent a one-way hash applied plurality of times to a portion of the second portion of the real time credentials. The plurality of times may correspond to an amount of time elapsed since the first part of the real time credentials were issued. Controlling physical access may include controlling access through a door.
FIG. 1 is a schematic illustration of how the CA sends to a Directory individual certificate revocation status information CRSi about each of its issued, but not-yet expired certificates C1 . . . Ck, according to one embodiment of the invention;
FIG. 2 is a schematic illustration of the sequence of transactions in a trivial OCSP environment;
FIG. 3 is a schematic illustration a major “network bottleneck” in a server causing considerable congestion and delays;
FIG. 4 is a schematic illustration showing how OCSP has difficulties in servicing certificate validity requests originating from different security domains;
FIG. 5 is a schematic illustration showing the servicing of certificate validity requests originating from different security domains according to one embodiment of the invention;
FIG. 6 is a schematic illustration of the RTC System according to one embodiment of the invention;
FIG. 7 is a schematic illustration showing how RTC-over-OCSP would be deployed in a cross-CA environment according to one embodiment of the invention;
FIG. 8 is a schematic illustration of the system operation according to one embodiment of the invention;
FIG. 9 is a schematic illustration of a stolen computer timeline.
Ensuring that only authorized individuals access protected areas is crucially important (e.g., at an airport, a military installation, office building etc.). Protected areas may be defined by physical doors (in particular doors through which a human may enter, or doors of a container, or safe, or vehicle, etc.) and walls, or may be virtually defined in other ways. For instance, a protected area may consist of an area entering which causes a detector to signal intrusion (and possibly send a signal or sound an alarm if authorization is not provided). In an airport, often entering the gate area through an exit lane will trigger such a signal, even though no doors or walls have been violated. Notice also that throughout this application, doors should be construed to include all other types of access access-control devices implementable with a traditional or more modern type of a key. In particular, key mechanisms used to start engines (so that our invention becomes a novel way to ensure that only currently authorized users may start a plane, a truck, or otherwise access other valuables).
Having established the generality of our context, in the sequel for concreteness, but without loss of generality intended, we shall refer to a “door” as the means of controlling access or establishing the perimeter and to “entering” as the means of accessing an area which one wishes to protect.
Smart doors provide such access control. At the simplest level, a smart door may be equipped with a key pad, through which a user enters his/her PIN or password. The key pad has an attached memory or elementary processor in which a list of valid PINs/passwords are stored, so that it can be checked whether the currently entered one belongs to the list. If so, the door opens, else it remains lock. Such elementary access control mechanism offers minimum security. In particular a terminated employee may no longer be authorized to go trough that door; yet, if he still remembers his own PIN, he would have no trouble to open such an elementary smart door. Therefore, it would be necessary to “deprogram” the PIN of terminated employees. Such a procedure, however, may be very cumbersome and costly: an airport facility may have hundreds of doors, and dispatching a special team of workers to go out and deprogram all of such doors whenever an employee leaves or is terminated may be too impractical. More security is certainly needed, without incurring excessive costs and sacrificing convenience.
Of course, rather than (solely) relying on traditional keys or simple key pads, a more modern smart door may work (in alternative or in conjunction) with cards—such as smart cards and mag-strip cards—or contactless devices. But this enhanced set of tools does notper se guarantee the security, convenience and low-cost of the access-control system. These crucially depend on how such tools are used in the overall security architecture.
Ideally, a smart door should identify the person entering and verify that he is currently authorized to do so. Of the two tasks, the first is perhaps easier. Identification may be performed in a variety of ways: in particular:
1. using PINs and passwords, that can be entered at a key pad associated to the door; 2. using biometrics, that can be entered by users via special readers associated with the door; 3. using traditional signatures, provided by the user via a special pad associated to the door; 4. using a smart cards or contactless cards (e.g., sending a PIN to the door via a special reader/receiver) 5. using a digital certificate—e.g., one stored in a smart card, contactless card or a wireless device, that can “communicate to the door” via a card reader or other receiver. We believe that digital certificates are particularly attractive for use within the inventive system, and thus we wish to elaborate a little further on some ways to use them with smart doors which we envision incorporating within the inventive system. For concreteness, but without loss of generality intended, we will refer to the device in possession of a person wishing access as a “card.” The card may store a digital certificate and the corresponding secret key(s). Upon proper command from the cardholder (performed, for example, by punching a secret code on a key pad on the card), the card would transmit the digital certificate to the door mechanism and perform an identification protocol (e.g., decrypt a random challenge) by using the corresponding secret key. Preferably, the digital certificate, and particularly its corresponding secret key(s), should be protected within a secure-hardware portion of the card/device.
In some cases, one wishes to have anonymous yet secure access control. In this case, identification needs not be performed, but authorization still needs to be performed. In most cases, however, identification in some form is mandated: thus we can assume that identification can or has already been performed (e.g, by any one of the 5 methods described above). Either way: how can authorization be performed? Even if the door knows for certain that it is dealing with John Doe, how can the door make sure that John Doe is currently authorized to enter now? Traditionally, a smart door consults a database of currently (e.g., on a given day/date) authorized users to verify that so indeed is the individual requesting access. But this requires that the smart door to be connected to the distant database. Moreover, this is not ordinary network connection: it must be a secure network connection. In fact, not only one must use cryptographically protected communication to prevent an impostor from impersonating the database to the door, but must also prevent an enemy to cut the wire connecting the door to the database, else once disconnected a door must choose from equally bad options: (a) always open or (b) always remain closed. But a secure network connection easily dwarfs the cost of the electromechanical component of the door lock: a top of the line component may cost $1,000 while the secure network connection may cost $4,000 (more if a wire must securely connect large distance, such at an airport. Moreover, even after spending such $4,000, is there such a thing as a secure network connection in a public place such as an airport? Notice that providing a smart door with a wireless connection to a distant database is not a viable alternative either. First of all, long range wireless transmitters and receivers are expensive. Second, in certain facilities, wireless bandwidth can be severely restricted (to avoid possible interference with other instrumentation) or banned altogether for such uses. Third, wireless communication can be easily jammed, so as to effectively disconnect the door from the database (thus forcing it to opt for two equally bad decisions). Fourth, if the door belongs to a container in the middle of the Atlantic, most probably it cannot wireless talk to any database on the shore.
It is thus one aspect of the invention to provide low-cost, convenient and secure disconnected smart doors, that is low-cost, convenient and secure smart doors having no connection (whether wired or wireless) to any database or authority.
In a preferred embodiment, the present invention relies on digital signatures, and preferably on 20-byte technology. Digital signatures (such as RSA) are used to prove that a given message M originates from a given user U. To this end U produces a pair of matching keys: a verification key PK and a signature key SK. Digital signatures are produced via SK, and verified via the matching key PK. A user U should keep his own SK secret (so that only U can sign on U's behalf). Digital signatures work because PK does not “betray” the matching key SK, that is, knowledge of PK does not give an enemy any practical advantage in computing SK. Therefore, a user U should make his own PK as public as possible (so that every one can verify U's signatures). For this reason PK is preferably called the public key. We shall denote by SIGU(M) U's digital signature of the message M. Digital signature is intended to include private-key signatures, in which case signed and verifier may share a common secret key.
Alphanumeric strings called certificates enable digital signatures by guaranteeing that a given key PK is indeed the public key of a user U. A Certifying Authority (CA) generates and issues a certificate to a user, once assured of the user's identity. Thus the certificate proves to everyone that the CA has verified the holder's identity, and possibly other attributes. (E.g., if a company acts as its own CA and issues certificates for its own employees, a certificate may prove the extent to which its holder is authorized to bind his/her employer.) Certificates expire after a specified amount of time, typically one year in the case of public CAs. In essence, a digital certificate C consists of a CA's digital signature securely binding together several quantities: SN, a serial number unique to the certificate, PK, the public key of the user, U, the user's name, D1, the issue date, D2, the expiration date, and additional data. In symbols, C=SIGCA(SN,PK,U,D1,D2 . . . ).
A certificate may also encompass the case where PK is an encryption key. In this case U may prove his identity to a verifier V by sending V the certificate C, by having V encrypt a random challenge (String) R with key PK, and then ask U to send back the decryption. If the user responds with R, then V is ensured that he is dealing with U, because only U should know the decryption key matching PK.
The preferred embodiment of the present invention provides a much better solution for access control. Specifically, if the card contains a digital certificate according to the present invention, then authorization can be performed much cheaper. Instead of consulting the central database about the validity of every digital certificate, the door would simply need to obtain the 20-byte validity proof according to the present invention that verifies the current validity of the card.
Let now A be an authority (i.e., entity) controlling a set of smart doors and U a user to whom access to a given door should be granted for a given period of time.
Each user possesses a card (in the general sense discussed before).
Each smart door has an associated card reader (in the general sense capable of communicating or at least receiving information from a user card), coupled with an electromechanical lock in the case of a really physical (rather than virtual) door. Preferably each door also has a unique identifier (and knows its own identifier). The door has a card reader and a non-easily tamperable clock and a computing device possessing A's public key PKA and capable of verifying A's signatures.
The authority decides which users can go through which doors in a given time interval. (For instance, without loss of generality intended, we may assume that each interval of time of interest consists of a day.) To this end, A may use her own private database DB 1, storing all permissions, that is who is authorized to go through which door at a given (or any foreseeable future day). Presumably, A protects this database, else an enemy could alter the permissions stored there to his advantage. However, A computes from DB a public database PDB as follows. For each user U having permission to go through door D at day d, A computes a digital signature SUDd indicating that indeed this is the case. For instance A computes SUDd=SIGA(U,D,d). Notice that only A can compute these digital signatures, while all having A's public key PKA can verify them. These signatures are unforgeable by someone not knowing A's secret key SKA, nor can they modified in any manner (e.g., by transforming U′ permission into permission for an unauthorized user U′) without making them invalid. Thus A can timely compute and send (eg, at the beginning od a day) these signatures to a repository PR without much worry. A repository is a place that can be accessed by users. For instance a server located at the employee entrance of a large facility (such as an employee entrance at an airport). Because A's signatures are unforgeable, the connection between A and PR needs not be secure. It suffices that A succeeds to transfers its signatures to PR within a reasonable time.
When employee U arrives at work on day d at the facility (eg, through a point of entrance in which PR is located) he can connect his card with PR (eg, he inserts his card in a card reader/writer connected with or remotely communicating with PR). By doing this he picks up on his card SIGUDd, the dital signature indicating that that day he is authorized to go through door D. This requires that the point of entrance, rather than hundreds of doors, be connected with A, and this connection needs not be secure either. In reality, D needs not to indicate a single door. For instance, it can indicate a set of doors (eg, baggage handling doors) and the signature of A indicates that U can go through each door indicated by D. Alternatively, a plurality of doors, D1, . . . , Dn, can be indicated one by one, and the fact that U can go that day through each one of hem can be indicated by more than one signature of A. For example SIGUD1d . . . SIGUDnd. In which case, all such signatures are transferred to U's card.
Assume now that during day d U walks around the facility and reaches a door D for which he has granted permission. Therefore, his card now stores SIGUDd. Then U may insert his card C into a card reader at door D. The processor associated with the door then verifies that the SIGUDd indeed is valid using A's public key. Then verifies that the current day is indeed d using its own clock. If both items are true, then door D opens. Notice that the door can check that the cardholder is indeed by performing identification in a variety of ways. In particular, U may also required to enter his PIN on a key pad associated with the door. (Notice that, differently than before, a dismissed employee cannot enter door D even if he remembered his own PIN. In fact the door in this example would need both the PIN and the correct signature for the current day. However, after U has been fired, A no longer produces signatures SIGUDd for any subsequent day d, therefore U cannot provide the door with such a signature. Nor can he forge such a signature of A. Therefore he cannot “convince” door D to open on any day after being fired.) Alternatively, the card can transfer SIGUDd to D's card reader only if U inputs the right PIN on a key pad on the back of C, and the repository PR may download SIGUDd onto card C, only after the card proves that indeed it is U's card. Alternatively, U may represent an identifier for card, C, belonging to U, and when inserted in the card reader, the card indeed proves—eg, by means of a cryptographic protocol, that indeed it is card C. Alternatively, end preferably, U's card carries a certificate for U, and after the proper PIN is entered, the card proves the identity of U by decrypting a random challenge of the door. In this case, it is preferable that SIGUDd indicates that U has permission to go through door D by indicating that U's certificate carries that permission for his owner. For instance, SIGUDd=SIGuDd, where u is an identifier for U's certificate, such as the serial number (and issuer) of U's certificate.
In all these ways, it should be appreciated that the door is “disconnected” from A. The door only (possibly identifies U and) checks that the U has permission of entering via an internal computation and utilizing A's public key and its own internal clock. The system therefore, not only is very secure, but also very economical.
This validity or authorization proof can be provided in a number of different ways. The following are just examples of how this can be done.
The card owner may “pick up” the validity proof at the appropriate time. For example, in a work environment, each person may pick up the current validity proof when reporting to work. In many work places (particularly those sensitive to security, such as airports), employees sign in when reporting to work. This “sign in” may include obtaining the 20-byte validity, SIGUDd, and storing it on the card.value and storing it on the card. The card may obtain the value via a wired or a wireless connection.
The card may obtain the validity proof via a wireless network, such the pager network, for example. At the appropriate time, if the card is authorized for access, a 20-byte value is sent to it. Note that the bandwidth requirements are minimal: the authorization value is shorter than a typical message transmitted by the pager network. At the appropriate time, if the card is authorized for access, SIGUDd is sent to it.
The door may obtain the validity proof similarly via a wired or a wireless network, for every card that it expects to encounter, in advance.
The door may obtain the validity proof for a card on demand, when the card starts interacting with it.
Note that none of the above methods require any sort of secure connection between the door and a central server. This is so because the validity proof is self-authenticating, so that even if the door receives it from an untrusted source and/or via an insecure connection, it can still ascertain its correctness. The fact that these methods require no connection at all for the door provides a much better means for access control in large and/or remote areas, areas with multiple doors and mobile areas, such as airplanes' or trucks' doors.
Note also that throughout this application, door and protected areas should be construed to include all other types of access points that could be protected with a traditional or more modern type of key. In particular, key mechanism that used to start engines (so that only currently authorized employees may start a plane, a truck, or other engine).
Those skilled in the art can realize that the 20-byte validity proof is a special, restricted type of a digital signature scheme, and while it offers unique benefits, such as compactness and efficiency, many other benefits can be derived by practicing the invention with more general digital signature schemes, possibly without validation technology. The components of the preferred embodiment of the present invention are: (1) A door mechanism capable of verifying digital signatures, coupled with means of opening the door upon successful verification; (2) An authority component, providing a digital signature signifying that authorization for entering through the door has been granted for a given time period; (3) A card or other wired/wireless device component capable of receiving a digital signature and presenting it. The authorization of access may be accomplished by any of the following sequences of steps:
(1) The authority component causes the card to receive the authorizing signature; (2) The card receives and stores the authorizing signature; (3) The card presents the authorizing signature to the door, which verifies it and opens if and only if the authorizing signature is valid Sequence 2:
(1) The card presents itself to the door requesting authorization for access; (2) The door requests the authorizing signature; (3) The authority component causes the door to receive the authorizing signature; (4) The door verifies the authorizing signature and opens if and only if it is valid. Sequence 3:
(1) The card requests the authorizing signature from the authority component (2) The authority component transmits the authorizing signature to the card; (3) The card receives and stores the authorizing signature; (4) The card presents the authorizing signature to the door, which verifies it and opens if and only if the authorizing signature is valid. Sequence 4:
(1) The door receives in advance (either at its own request or not) authorizing signatures for a plurality of cards it is expected to encounter from the authority component; (2) The card presents itself to the door requesting authorization for access; (3) The door verifies the card's authorizing signature and opens if an only if it is valid. These sequences are only some of the multitude of examples. In addition, these sequences may be combined. For example, the door may receive part of the information/authorization (e.g., the 20-byte value), while the card may receive another part (e.g., the digital certificate). They may also be separated in time: the card may receive part of the information/authorization (e.g., the digital certificate) at first, and then receive other parts (e.g., the 20-byte value for each hour) later.
Moreover, the authorizing digital signatures may be tied to the long-term certificate of the cardholder. For example, the card may contain a long-term certificate valid for each year, and the authority component may issue daily signatures verifying that the certificate is still valid o