Source: https://casetext.com/brief/1d45feb6-marc-a-nicometi-appellant-respondentvthe-vineyards-of-fredonia-llc-et-al-respondents-appellants-et-al-defendants-scott-pfohl-et-al-third-party-plaintiffs-v-western-new-york-plumbing-ellicott-plumbing-and-remodeling-co-inc-third-party-respond-14
Timestamp: 2020-07-15 02:29:51
Document Index: 45227595

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 500', '§240', '§240', '§ 500', '§240', '§240', '§240', '§240', '§240', '§240', '§ 240', '§240', '§240', '§240', '§240', '§240', '§240', '§240', '§240', '§ 240', '§240']

To be Argued by: SIM R. SHAPIRO, ESQ. (Time Requested: 15 Minutes) APL-2013-00280 Appellate Division Docket No. CA 12-01962 Erie County Clerk’s Index Nos. 2008-3306 and 2008-3306-TP3 Court of Appeals of the State of New York MARC A. NICOMETI, Plaintiff-Appellant-Respondent, – against – THE VINEYARDS OF FREDONIA, LLC, WINTER-PFOHL, INC., Defendants-Respondents-Appellants, THOMAS WHITNEY and SCOTT PFOHL, Defendants. ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– SCOTT PFOHL, Third-Party Plaintiff, WINTER-PFOHL, INC., Third-Party Plaintiff-Respondent-Appellant, – against – WESTERN NEW YORK PLUMBING-ELLICOTT PLUMBING AND REMODELING CO., INC., Third-Party Defendant-Respondent-Appellant. REPLY BRIEF FOR THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT-APPELLANT Of Counsel: Sim R. Shapiro, Esq. Michael V. McLaughlin, Esq. BAXTER SMITH & SHAPIRO, P.C. Attorneys for Third-Party Defendant-Respondent-Appellant 182 Dwyer Street West Seneca, New York 14224 Tel.: (716) 854-6140 Fax: (716) 854-6540 July 29, 2014 i TABLE OF CONTENTS Page(s) TABLE OF CONTENTS………………………………………………….. i TABLE OF CITATIONS………………………………………………….. ii STATEMENT PURSUANT TO 22 NYCRR§ 500.1(f)…………………... 1 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT…………………………………………... 2 ARGUMENT………………………………………………………………. 3 I. A PLAINTIFF WHO IS INJURED WHILE UTILIZING STILTS CANNOT SUPPORT A LABOR LAW §240(1) CLAIM IN THE ABSENCE OF PROOF THAT THE STILTS FAILED, BROKE, COLLAPSED OR WERE DEFECTIVE ………………………………………………. 3 II. IF IT IS DETERMINED THAT LABOR LAW §240(1) APPLIES, THERE IS STILL A TRIABLE ISSUE OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF WAS THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HIS INJURIES……………………………………………… 8 CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………….. 10 ii TABLE OF CITATIONS Page(s) Andrews v. Ryan Homes, Inc., 27 A.D.3d 1197, 812 N.Y.S.2d 729 (4th Dep’t 2006) ……………... 8 Cahill v. Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority, 4 N.Y.3d 35, 823 N.E.2d 439, 790 N.Y.S.2d 74 (2004) …………… 9 Garcia v. Mt. Airy Estates, Inc., 2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 50615(U) (Sup. Ct. Richmond Co. 2012) …….. 6 Gatto v. Clifton Park Senior Living, 90 A.D.2d 1387, 935 N.Y.S.2d 366 (3d Dep’t 2011) ……………… 7 Gonzalez v. Majestic Fine Custom Home, 2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 31466(U) (Sup. Ct. Queens Co. 2012) ……….. 6 McNabb v. Oot Bros., Inc., 64 A.D.3d 1237, 882 N.Y.S.2d 792 (4th Dep’t 2009) …………….. 5, 6 Melber v. 6333 Main St., Inc., 91 N.Y.2d 759, 698 N.E.2d 933, 676 N.Y.S.2d 104 (1998) ………. 3, 4, 5 Russell v. Widewaters South Bay Road Assoc., LLP, 289 A.D.2d 1025, 735 N.Y.S.2d 900 (4th Dep’t 2001) …………… 5 Thome v. Benchmark Main Transit Assocs., LLC, 86 A.D.3d 938, 927 N.Y.S.2d 260 (4th Dep’t 2011) ……………… 8 Weininger v. Hagedorn & Co., 91 N.Y.2d 958, 695 N.E.2d 709, 672 N.Y.S.2d 840 (1998) ………. 8 1 STATEMENT PURSUANT TO 22 NYCRR § 500.1(f) WNY Plumbing is not the parent company or subsidiary of any other company or corporation, nor is it affiliated with any other company or corporation. 1 1 WNY Plumbing inadvertently failed to include this statement in its initial brief. 2 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT This Brief is submitted on behalf of the Third-Party Defendant-Respondent- Appellant, Western New York Plumbing-Ellicott Plumbing and Remodeling Co., Inc. (“WNY Plumbing”) in reply to Plaintiff-Appellant-Respondents’ Reply Brief and in further support of its own brief. The facts of this matter were addressed in WNY Plumbing’s initial brief and are incorporated by reference. To the extent set forth herein, it is respectfully requested that this Court reverse the decision of the Appellate Division Fourth Department. 3 ARGUMENT POINT I A PLAINTIFF WHO IS INJURED WHILE UTILIZING STILTS CANNOT SUPPORT A LABOR LAW §240(1) CLAIM IN THE ABSENCE OF PROOF THAT THE STILTS FAILED, BROKE, COLLAPSED OR WERE DEFECTIVE The plaintiff-appellant-respondent, Marc A. Nicometi, (hereinafter “plaintiff” or “Nicometi”), in his reply brief, continues to assert that there are inherent differences between mobile stilts and stationary ladders and scaffolds. In doing so, he has relied on cases inapposite to the case at bar. As discussed at length in WNY Plumbing’s initial Brief, Melber v. 6333 Main Street, 91 N.Y.2d 759, 698 N.E.2d 933, 676 N.Y.S.2d 104 (1998) and the later cases that specifically discussed incidents involving stilts — not ladders or scaffolding — must guide this Court’s decision in this case. The fact that the plaintiff, in Section I of his Argument contained in his Reply brief, primarily relies upon cases that did not involve stilts at all, further shows his purposeful attempt to avoid the controlling New York cases on the issue presented in the case at bar. There are at least five cases that specifically address incidents due to slipping or tripping while utilizing stilts that have consistently held that, where the 4 stilts did not fail and were not defective, such incidents are not covered by Labor Law §240(1). As addressed in WNY Plumbing’s initial brief, the controlling case regarding tripping or slipping while utilizing stilts is this Court’s decision in Melber v. 6333 Main Street, 91 N.Y.2d 759, 698 N.E.2d 933, 676 N.Y.S.2d 104 (1998), where the plaintiff, while using stilts, tripped on an electrical conduit and fell. Therein, this Court ruled: But here, as was the case in Ross, injury resulted from a separate hazard – electrical conduit protruding from the floor. Even if the stilts failed to avoid that pitfall, “plaintiff’s injuries allegedly flowed from a deficiency in the device that was ‘wholly unrelated to the hazard which brought about its need in the first instance’” and did not interfere with or increase the danger of injury in the performance of his elevation-related task (Ross v. Curtis- Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 N.Y.2d, at 501, supra, quoting Ross v. Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 180 A.D.2d 385, 394 [Mercure, J., dissenting in part]). Thus, plaintiff must look elsewhere for his remedy. Melber, 91 N.Y.2d at 763-764 (emphasis added). This Court went on to explain why such a case does not come within the purview of Labor Law §240(1): To be sure, conduit protruding from an unfinished floor – like a trough filled with hot oil – is a hazard in the workplace against which employees should be protected. However, neither the trough nor the conduit is a risk that can be avoided by proper placement or utilization of one of the devices listed in Labor Law §240(1). The protective equipment envisioned by the statue is simply 5 not designed to avert the hazard plaintiff encountered here. Id. at 763. This reasoning in Melber was followed by the Appellate Division, Fourth Department in both Russell v. Widewaters S. Bay Rd. Assocs., LLP, 289 A.D.2d 1025, 735 N.Y.S.2d 900 (4th Dep’t 2001), and McNabb v. Oot Bros., Inc., 64 A.D.3d 1237, 882 N.Y.S.2d 792 (4th Dep’t 2009), which are analogous to the instant case in that in both of those cases the plaintiff, while working on stilts, tripped and fell. In Russell, the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, held: Supreme Court properly granted that part of third-party defendant’s cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law §240(1) claim. Plaintiff Dean Russell, a subcontractor, tripped over an electrical cord while working on stilts and, in doing so, “did not encounter a hazard contemplated by the statute” (Melber v. 6333 Main St., 91 N.Y.2d 759, 761). Russell, 289 A.D.2d at 1025. Similarly, in McNabb, plaintiff was working on stilts when he tripped over an electrical cord, causing him to fall and sustain personal injuries. The Appellate Division, Fourth Department, held: Contrary to the contention of plaintiff on his cross appeal, the court properly dismissed the Labor Law §240(1) claim against all defendants because the accident does not fall within the purview of that statute (see Melber v. 6333 Main St., 91 N.Y.2d 759, 763-764 [1998]; 6 Russell v. Widewaters S. Bay Rd. Assoc., 289 A.D.2d 1025 [2001]). McNabb, 64 A.D.3d at 1239. The same understanding of Melber was also relied upon to dismiss Labor Law § 240(1) claims in two more recent Supreme Court decisions, Garcia v. Mt. Airy Estates, Inc., 2012 NY Slip Op 50615(U) (Sup. Ct. Richmond Co. 2012), and Gonzalez v. Majestic Fine Custom Home, 2012 NY Slip Op 31466U (Sup. Ct. Queens Co. 2012), copies of which were supplied to this Court by The Vineyards of Fredonia, LLC with its initial brief. These five cases clearly and consistently show that, in the absence of the stilts breaking, failing or otherwise being defective, a Labor Law §240(1) claim cannot stand, even where a stilt-wearing plaintiff falls and is injured when tripping or slipping on a floor-level hazard. Mr. Nicometi would have this Court ignore the relevant case law, arguing that somehow stilts are treated differently than other protective devices. See appellant-respondent’s reply brief, pp. 2-3. This argument missed the point, however. WNY Plumbing does not contend that injuries which occur when a plaintiff is utilizing stilts can never be subject to a Labor Law §240(1) claim or is somehow subjected to different rules. Rather, such a claim, like any other claim pursuant Labor Law §240(1), can only be supported when there is 7 some defect in the stilts. This explanation is conveniently ignored by the plaintiff- appellant-respondent. Indeed, a similar scenario was addressed in Gatto v. Clifton Park Senior Living, LLC, 90 A.D.2d 1387, 935 N.Y.S.2d 366 (3d Dep’t 2011) where the plaintiff had been using stilts to tape a nine-foot ceiling when one of the bolts on one stilt broke, which caused the stilt to collapse. 90 A.D.2d at 1387. The Appellate Division, Third Department, in affirming the trial court’s decision granting partial summary judgment regarding plaintiff’s Labor Law §240(1) claim, stated that “[p]laintiff established a prima facie violation of the statute as a matter of law because the stilt collapsed, thereby failing to perform its function of supporting him.” Id. (emphasis added). The determinative factor in Gatto was the failure of one of the bolts which caused the stilt to collapse, not the fact that plaintiff fell while wearing stilts. Once again, this rule of law has been ignored by the plaintiff. In the instant case, the stilts utilized by Mr. Nicometi did not collapse or fail. No bolt or strap broke, no metal support bent and the stilts were not otherwise defective. Therefore, the clear and consistent holdings in the above-cited cases should be applied and WNY Plumbing respectfully submits that this Court should determine that Mr. Nicometi’s incident is not covered by Labor Law §240(1). 8 POINT II EVEN IF IT IS DETERMINED THAT LABOR LAW §240(1) APPLIES, THERE IS STILL A TRIABLE ISSUE OF FACT AS TO WHETHER PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT-RESPONDENT WAS THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HIS INJURIES While the Appellate Division, Fourth Department found that Labor Law §240(1) applies to this matter, it also found that there was a question of fact as to whether the plaintiff’s own conduct — in using stilts to walk on a known icy surface — was the sole proximate cause of his accident. As discussed in WNY Plumbing’s initial brief, where “a reasonable jury could [conclude] that a plaintiff’s actions were the sole proximate cause of his injuries,” liability cannot be decided as a matter of law, but must be submitted to the jury. Weininger v. Hagedorn & Co., 91 N.Y.2d 958, 960, 695 N.E.2d 709, 672 N.Y.S.2d 840 (1998). Moreover, where a defendant has offered admissible evidence that a worker was injured while engaged in an activity that he or she had been expressly warned against, there is, at least, an issue of fact as to whether the plaintiff was a recalcitrant worker and, if so, whether such actions were the sole proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. See, e.g. Andrews v. Ryan Homes, Inc., 27 A.D.3d 1197, 1198, 812 N.Y.S.2d 729 (4th Dep’t 2006); Thome v. Benchmark Main Transit Assocs., LLC, 86 A.D.3d 938, 939-940, 927 N.Y.S.2d 260 (4th Dep’t 2011). 9 Here, there are clearly issues of fact as to whether the plaintiff’s actions were the “sole proximate cause” of his injury. Plaintiff’s own testimony established that he was aware of the presence of the ice and the danger it presented. [R. 151-52, 281-90]. Plaintiff also testified that he had spoken to his supervisor with regard to the safety concerns raised by the ice. [R. 157-58, 290]. Notably, Mr. Nicometi’s supervisor, Mr. Hilliker, testified that he told all three of his installers, including Mr. Nicometi, “do not insulate that area [where the ice was present].” [R. 589] (emphasis added). Thus, there are facts in the Record which establish that Mr. Nicometi chose to disregard a known condition that he himself identified. More significantly, there was testimony that he ignored an explicit directive from his supervisor by working in the area of the alleged incident. This is clearly relevant to whether the plaintiff’s disregarding of such a directive would make him a recalcitrant worker whose conduct was the sole proximate cause of the incident. See e.g. Cahill v. Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority, 4 N.Y.3d 35, 823 N.E.2d 439, 790 N.Y.S.2d 74 (2004). As such, the jury must be allowed to determine whether Mr. Nicometi’s own conduct while using the stilts was the “sole proximate cause” of his fall. CONCLUSION F or all the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse that portion of the Appellate Division, Fourth Department's decision affirming that Labor Law §240(1) applied to the plaintiff. In order to be awarded summary judgment on liability under § 240(1) of the New York Labor Law, a plaintiff must show that there was a defect in the safety device provided or that the absence of another safety device was a proximate cause of the accident. The plaintiff herein has failed to do so. Mr. Nicometi admitted that there was no defect in the stilts that he was using. Rather, the alleged accident was caused by his slipping on ice. Simply put, ice is not a risk that these devices are intended to protect against. As such, Labor Law §240(1) is inapplicable to the accident in question. Additionally, whether Mr. Nicometi's actions were the sole proximate cause of this incident is a triable issue of fact that should be submitted to a jury. DATED: July 29,2014 Respectfully submitted, BAXTER SMITH & SHAPIRO, P.C. By: --------~~~~--------- a lro . McLaughlin .10