Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/419/1364/33495/
Timestamp: 2020-06-06 11:09:49
Document Index: 763811248

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2255', '§ 2312', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255']

Herbert Boyd Hayes, Jr., Appellant, v. United States of America, Appellee, 419 F.2d 1364 (10th Cir. 1970) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Tenth Circuit › 1970 › Herbert Boyd Hayes, Jr., Appellant, v. United States of America, Appellee
Herbert Boyd Hayes, Jr., Appellant, v. United States of America, Appellee, 419 F.2d 1364 (10th Cir. 1970)
US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit - 419 F.2d 1364 (10th Cir. 1970) December 30, 1969
Rehearing Denied January 26, 1970
Appellant petitioned the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma for relief under Title 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and his motion to vacate sentence was denied after an evidentiary hearing. Appellant seeks to set aside a four-year sentence he is serving which was imposed after a jury convicted him on a one-count information charging interstate transportation of a stolen vehicle in violation of Title 18 U.S.C. § 2312. Appellant's motion to vacate is grounded upon alleged violations of his constitutional rights which he contends tainted the evidence presented against him at his trial.
In summary, appellant specifically contends: 1) he was illegally arrested and jailed by the Lawton City Police; 2) the car he was driving at the time of his arrest was illegally searched by the police; 3) the unconstitutional search produced the car's serial number and license tag number which was used to determine that the car was stolen; 4) that such information was used by an agent of the F.B.I. to induce him into making incriminating statements which were used against him at his trial; 5) the F. B.I. agent violated Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by interrogating him while he was in the city jail and prior to taking him before a United States Commissioner; 6) his testimony at his preliminary hearing before the United States Commissioner was illegally obtained because he was not warned at that time that his testimony could be used against him at trial; 7) his testimony at the hearing was induced by the fact that he felt he had to respond to the testimony of an F.B.I. agent who had previously interrogated Hayes. Lastly, he additionally contends here that the trial court on the § 2255 hearing erred in refusing to permit him to fully develop the facts surrounding each violation of the Constitution and the laws of the United States, all of which were related to evidence or testimony introduced at his criminal trial.
At trial, Hayes did not take the witness stand. The admissions made to the F.B.I. agent were introduced, and objection was made to them based upon a failure to give the Miranda warnings. The court forthwith held an evidentiary hearing outside the jury's presence in which the F.B.I. agent but not Hayes testified. The admissions were subsequently allowed into evidence and Hayes' admissions at the preliminary hearing were also introduced at trial. Ultimately, the jury convicted Hayes. He did not perfect a direct appeal of his conviction. Instead appellant thereafter filed a pro se motion in the court below under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 alleging 1) Miranda violations, and 2) an unnecessary delay in taking appellant before the Commissioner in violation of Rule 5(a), F.R.Crim.P. The court denied a hearing on the Miranda question since such a hearing had been held during the criminal trial and the court had ruled there had been no Miranda violation. A hearing on the Rule 5 complaint was ordered and counsel was appointed for Hayes. Thereafter his § 2255 motion to vacate was amended to include illegal search, illegal seizure, illegal working agreement between the Lawton police and the F.B.I., and interrogating Hayes before he was taken before a United States Commissioner.
Appellant first urges that his arrest was illegal and unconstitutional because the Lawton police detectives lacked sufficient probable cause to make the arrest. However, the validity of the arrest, without more, is not grounds for collateral attack in a proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.1 This rule, well established in our cases, is not abrogated by the recent case of Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 89 S. Ct. 1068, 22 L. Ed. 2d 227 (1969) because that case dealt with a § 2255 attack upon an illegal search which produced evidence which was used to convict Kaufman. The holding is very clear in dealing only with a search and seizure, and the basic foundation of the case is that the illegal search resulted in evidence used to convict the petitioner.2
It was not improper for the F. B.I. agent to interview Hayes while he was in state custody and before he was arrested on a federal warrant. "It is only when officers take advantage of an `unnecessary delay' to obtain a confession or incriminating statements that there is a violation of Rule 5(a)."5 Appellant attempted to show that such were the circumstances of his case by arguing to the trial court that there was an illegal working agreement between the Lawton Police and the F.B.I. The trial court could not find any evidence of an arrangement whereby the Lawton Police would illegally hold a party until the F.B.I. could "get the goods" on him. We agree that whatever coordination and cooperation there was between the law enforcement agencies was proper, and that there was no unnecessary delay as contemplated by Rule 5(a).6
In connection with the statements which Hayes made at the preliminary hearing, he contends that he was induced and required to testify at the hearing in order to defend against the testimony of the F.B.I. agent who interrogated Hayes. In other words, the admission at the hearing was the tainted fruit of the prior admission at the interrogation which in turn was tainted by the alleged illegal search and Rule 5(a) violations. Beyond the fact that the syllogism breaks down because we hold that there was neither an illegal search nor a 5(a) violation, appellant's contention fails for another reason. He did not raise this point in his § 2255 motion to vacate, and thus the trial court did not decide the point.
In conclusion, appellant argues that the trial court on the § 2255 motion erred in refusing to permit him to more fully develop the facts surrounding each alleged violation of his constitutional rights. We have read the record which discloses considerable latitude by the trial judge in taking evidence. There was no undue restriction.
Cf. Rogers v. United States, 369 F.2d 944 (10th Cir. 1966).