Source: https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-non-judicialisation-of-war-german-constitutional-court-judgment-on-rescue-operation-pegasus-in-libya-of-23-september-2015-part-2/?pfstyle=wp
Timestamp: 2020-07-09 18:52:56
Document Index: 121894673

Matched Legal Cases: ['art 2', 'Art. 67', 'Art. 87', 'Art. 24', 'Art. 24', 'Art. 87', 'Art. 59']

The (Non-)Judicialisation of War: German Constitutional Court Judgment on Rescue Operation Pegasus in Libya of 23 September 2015 (Part 2) – EJIL: Talk!
Paulina Starski says
Just to add some thoughts on Anne Peters’ excellent and comprehensive analysis of the Federal Constitutional Court’s recent judgment on “Rescue Operation Pegasus”:
1. By clarifying that the government is not obliged to seek an ex post approval for completed armed operations which were ordered by the government in view of an “imminent threat” the Court stressed the self-responsibility of the “Bundestag” as the main legislative body. The parliament is free to direct questions to the government, to pass resolutions on governmental conduct or in extreme cases even to express its lack of confidence in the chancellor thereby bringing the whole government to fall (Art. 67 GG). It will, however, only be able to exercise its control instruments effectively if it is well informed in the aftermath of external missions. This makes the “parliamentary entitlement” to information that the Federal Constitutional Court underlines (para. 102) so crucial. Unfortunately, it did not have to examine whether the government fulfilled its obligation to inform in the case at hand (para. 119 et seq.). I expect that the issue of information will likely become the essential object of future disputes between parliament and government in light of emergency operations.
2. And two sidenotes on the “parliamentarization” of the deployment of armed forces in the German constitutional setting:
First of all, it is important to pay attention to the peculiarities of the German constitutional debate: It has been disputed for years whether, and if so, on which constitutional basis forces of the German Federal Army could be deployed outside of German territory at all. The Basic Law’s ambiguousness in that regard obviously roots in history and Germany’s role as aggressor in two world wars. Art. 87a(1) GG allows the establishment of an army only for purposes of defence, its para. 2 limits an employment of armed forces beyond that to cases expressly permitted by the constitution. However, Art. 24(2) GG allows the federation to enter into systems of mutual collective security like the NATO or the United Nations. The Federal Constitutional Court made clear in its “Out of Area” Judgment (BVerfGE 90, 286) that Art. 24 (2) not only legitimizes membership in but also military operations outside German territory within such collective security systems. Art. 87a(1) does not exclude this option. Being highly political in nature accession treaties to systems of mutual collective security have to be approved by the legislative bodies according to Art. 59(2) GG. However, NATO operations have departed in the course of time from its original objective – namely the establishment of a collective self-defence mechanism – and extended to peace enforcement in a broader sense. Unsurprisingly, it became questionable whether the initial approval of NATO’s founding treaty by the German parliament covered the participation of German armed forces in such extended activities or whether the North Atlantic Treaty was actually amended and required a new parliamentary approval. Since doubts remained the Federal Constitutional Court came up with a compromise: It regarded the dynamic evolvement of NATO as covered by its founding treaty and its initial approval by the German legislative bodies. This led to a shift of competences from parliament to government. The Court counterbalanced this shift by establishing the requirement to seek prior parliamentary approval before specific deployment decisions. The notion of the "Bundeswehr" as “army of the parliament” (“Parlamentsheer”) was hence a strategic move to compensate the lack of parliamentary participation in the dynamic development within collective security systems. The constellation at hand is different, since the evacuation in Libya was merely a unilateral operation outside of international security systems. But still it is crucial to keep in mind that the process of “parliamentarization” of the deployment of armed forces in Germany started with a changed self-conception of organizations like NATO and an increased engagement of Germany within UN mandated peace missions.
Joachim Sanden says
The second topic we have to analyse is if the German judgment gives now the robust mandate for further military rescue missions, the German Armed Forces need. The long-lasting discussion on the legitimacy of such activities (see Eric Yong Joong Lee, Military rescue operation for the hostages taken by Somali pirates: Was the Korean navy's "daybreak in the Gulf of Aden" legitimate? Journal of East Asia and International Law 5 (2012), 37 – 60; Natalino Ronzitti, Rescuing nationals abroad through military coercion and intervention on grounds of humanity, Dordrecht: Nijhoff 1985) can now refer to another central judgement of a national constitutional court, clearing the way. However, some questions are remaining: In the Pegasus case, different from the famous historical case of rescuing British paras in 1944, the activity was coined to save (among others) German citizens (civilians). In Nafura/East Libya, two transport airplanes of the German Airforce rescued 2011 almost 132 persons, among others 22 German nationals. In so far, the situation was the same like in the first rescue operation, the German Armed Forces implemented in 1997 in Tirana (Operation Libelle). Can the German Army feel free to join in or to start such a rescue action if no Germans are in the group of endangered persons or maybe none? What is the correct solution if it is not clear which nationality the endangered persons do have? Is it sufficient to support this rescue operation in furtherance of German national security interests? The FCC did not tackle the question. We should see this in the context of “multilateral composite military capabilities”, where a lead country needs the support of an allied partner country (EU, NATO etc.) to act (e.g. transport aircraft capacity or air surveillance). As it is stressed in the so-called Rühe report of the German Parliament (Unterrichtung durch die Kommission zur Überprüfung und Sicherung der Parlamentsrechte bei der Mandatierung von Auslandseinsätzen der Bundeswehr − Abschlussbericht der Kommission, Printed Matter 18/5000 of 16.06.2015) that today this capability is one of the essential circumstances to understand modern defence. Integration into the alliance (Grundsatz der Bündnisintegration) is of eminent relevance (see Robert A. P. Glawe, Quo vadis, Bündnispartner Deutschland?, NVwZ 2011, 1051, 1052).