Source: https://arizona.lexroll.com/arizona-attorney-general-opinion-no-i17-004-r15-026/
Timestamp: 2018-11-17 04:48:21
Document Index: 642735061

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 41', '§ 41', '§ 39', '§ 39', '§ 39', '§ 39', '§ 8', '§ 39', '§ 39', '§ 39']

Arizona Attorney General Opinion No. I17-004 (R15-026) | LexRoll (AZ)
Arizona Attorney General Opinion No. I17-004 (R15-026)
LexRoll.com > LexRoll (AZ) > Arizona Attorney General Opinions > Arizona Attorney General Opinion No. I17-004 (R15-026)
Are messages sent and received via texting and social media sites by officers or public bodies that have a substantial nexus to the job public records, even if the employee uses a private cell phone or electronic device?1
This is a question of first impression in Arizona, as no Arizona appellate decision has addressed the applicability of the public records law to electronic messages on non-government electronic devices or messages on non-government social media accounts.2 Courts interpret statutes by looking first to the plain language of the law as the best indicator of the legislature’s intent. Premier Physicians Grp, PLLC v. Navarro, 240 Ariz. 193, 195 ¶ 9 (2016). When an ambiguity exists in a statute, courts “determine its meaning by considering secondary factors, such as the statute’s context, subject matter, historical background, effects and consequences, and spirit and purpose.” Id. “[G]enerally ‘the legislature does not include in statutes provisions which are redundant, void, inert, trivial, superfluous, or contradictory.’” Vega v. Morris, 184 Ariz. 461, 463 (1996).
The text of § 41-151.18 requires that the materials be “made or received by any governmental agencyin pursuance of law or in connection with the transaction of public business and preserved or appropriate for preservation by the agency” (emphasis added). Similarly, § 41-151.16(A) permits “[e]ach agency of this state” to maintain records using electronic media. The statutes’ plain language makes clear that when the Legislature expanded the scope of public records to include electronic records, it did so only with respect to agency-maintained systems. Concluding otherwise would require going beyond the language of the relevant statutes and would make the 2000 amendment to § 39-121.01(B) superfluous. For the same reason, the language “public records and other matters” in § 39-121 does not itself cover electronic communications. If “other matters” itself covered electronic communications, then the 2000 changes to § 39-121.01 would be superfluous. Moreover, the Arizona Supreme Court said long before the 2000 legislative amendments that the breadth of § 39-121.01 “obviate[ed] the need for any technical distinction between ‘public records’ or ‘other matters,’ insofar as the right to inspection by the public is concerned.” Carlson v. Pima Cty., 141 Ariz. 487, 490 (1984).
The Court’s language in Griffis that “the nature and purpose of a document determine whether it is a public record,” 215 Ariz. at 4 ¶10 (quoting Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Cmty. v. Rogers, 168 Ariz. 531, 538 (1991)), is not to the contrary. That language, like similarly broad language in other cases, was used in the context of limiting what documents on a government-issued electronic device or in the possession of an agency count as public records, not expanding it beyond those contours. Absent direction from the Legislature otherwise, it is improper to pull language out of its context in Griffislimiting the reach of the public records law in order to expand that statute’s application.
Second, public employees have a strong privacy interest in their personal electronic devices and social media accounts, which contain significant personal, private information. See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014) (noting special privacy concerns implicated by modern cell phones: “it is no exaggeration to say that many of the more than 90% of American adults who own a cell phone keep on their person a digital record of nearly every aspect of their lives—from the mundane to the intimate”; “a cell phone search would typically expose to the government far morethan the most exhaustive search of a house”); see also Ariz. Const. art. II, § 8, providing “broad protection” of “individual privacy.” Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe, 217 Ariz., 103, 112 (App. 2007). Classifying messages on personal electronic devices and social media accounts as public records would potentially expose the entire contents of employees’ personal electronic devices and social media accounts to agency access and perusal as part of the public records response process.
Third, officers and public bodies are under independent obligations to record their work and otherwise maintain records. See, e.g., A.R.S. § 39-121.01(B), (C) (Officers and public bodies are obliged to keep records that are “reasonably necessary or appropriate to maintain an accurate knowledge of their official activities.”). This record-keeping obligation precludes public officials from using private devices or accounts for the purpose of concealing official activities. While nothing herein should be read as encouraging the use of private electronic devices or social media accounts to conduct official activities, if such activity does occur it is the duty of the public official to record the activity in accordance with A.R.S. § 39-121.01.3 Government agents are presumed to meet this obligation. See, e.g., Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 909 (1997) (“Ordinarily, we presume that public officials have ‘properly discharged their official duties.’”) (quoting United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996)).
1. This opinion addresses only the specific request made, relating to electronic messages sent via “texting and social media sites,” and does not evaluate the applicability of the Arizona Public Records Law, A.R.S. § 39-121 et seq, to any other types of potential public records.
2. Courts in other states have recently issued opinions on public-records related disclosure questions in their own states, interpreting their own state statues and constitutional provisions in light of judicial precedent. E.g., Nissen v. Pierce Cty., 357 P.3d 45 (Wash. 2015); City of San Jose v. Superior Court, 389 P.3d 848 (Cal. 2017). While these opinions may identify many of the same conflicting policy issues identified herein, the policy choices reached in those opinions do not provide a basis for going beyond the plain language of the pertinent Arizona provisions in answering the question presented: what electronic systems the Arizona Legislature has determined can contain public records under Arizona law. This is especially true given that, as noted below, it would be improper for this opinion to supplant the legislature’s role as the arbiter of the policy balancing on this important question. Making private devices per se subject to government review should not be done without authorization in the law, flowing from a proper legislative balancing of constitutional and policy considerations.
3. The precise contours of this duty are not the subject of this Opinion and likely involve fact-intensive analyses.