Source: https://ru.scribd.com/document/355155932/Barredo-v-Garcia
Timestamp: 2019-09-19 17:06:01
Document Index: 162040675

Matched Legal Cases: ['ART. 1089', 'ART. 1092', 'ART. 1093', 'ART 1902', 'ART. 1903', 'ART. 1904', 'ART. 100', 'ART. 101', 'ART. 102', 'ART. 103', 'ART. 365']

Barredo v Garcia | Negligence | Crimes
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FAUSTO BARREDO vs.
SEVERINO GARCIA and TIMOTEA ALMARIO
This case comes up from the Court of Appeals which held the petitioner herein, Fausto
Barredo, liable in damages for the death of Faustino Garcia caused by the negligence of Pedro
Fontanilla, a taxi driver employed by said Fausto Barredo.
At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936, on the road between Malabon and
Navotas, Province of Rizal, there was a head-on collision between a taxi of the Malate Taxicab
driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a carretela guided by Pedro Dimapalis. The carretela was
overturned, and one of its passengers, 16-year-old boy Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries from
which he died two days later. A criminal action was filed against Fontanilla in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, and he was convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one
year and one day to two years of prision correccional. The court in the criminal case granted
the petition that the right to bring a separate civil action be reserved. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the sentence of the lower court in the criminal case. Severino Garcia and Timotea
Almario, parents of the deceased on March 7, 1939, brought an action in the Court of First
Instance of Manila against Fausto Barredo as the sole proprietor of the Malate Taxicab and
employer of Pedro Fontanilla. On July 8, 1939, the Court of First Instance of Manila awarded
damages in favor of the plaintiffs for P2,000 plus legal interest from the date of the complaint.
This decision was modified by the Court of Appeals by reducing the damages to P1,000 with
legal interest from the time the action was instituted. It is undisputed that Fontanilla 's
negligence was the cause of the mishap, as he was driving on the wrong side of the road, and
at high speed. As to Barredo's responsibility, the Court of Appeals found:
... It is admitted that defendant is Fontanilla's employer. There is proof that he exercised
the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (See p. 22, appellant's
brief.) In fact it is shown he was careless in employing Fontanilla who had been caught
several times for violation of the Automobile Law and speeding (Exhibit A) violation
which appeared in the records of the Bureau of Public Works available to be public and
to himself. Therefore, he must indemnify plaintiffs under the provisions of article 1903 of
The main theory of the defense is that the liability of Fausto Barredo is governed by the
Revised Penal Code; hence, his liability is only subsidiary, and as there has been no civil
action against Pedro Fontanilla, the person criminally liable, Barredo cannot be held
responsible in the case. The petitioner's brief states on page 10:
... The Court of Appeals holds that the petitioner is being sued for his failure to exercise
all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Pedro
Fontanilla to prevent damages suffered by the respondents. In other words, The Court
of Appeals insists on applying in the case article 1903 of the Civil Code. Article 1903 of
the Civil Code is found in Chapter II, Title 16, Book IV of the Civil Code. This fact
makes said article to a civil liability arising from a crime as in the case at bar simply
because Chapter II of Title 16 of Book IV of the Civil Code, in the precise words of
article 1903 of the Civil Code itself, is applicable only to "those (obligations) arising from
wrongful or negligent acts or commission not punishable by law.
The gist of the decision of the Court of Appeals is expressed thus:
... We cannot agree to the defendant's contention. The liability sought to be imposed
upon him in this action is not a civil obligation arising from a felony or a misdemeanor
(the crime of Pedro Fontanilla,), but an obligation imposed in article 1903 of the Civil
Code by reason of his negligence in the selection or supervision of his servant or
The pivotal question in this case is whether the plaintiffs may bring this separate civil action
against Fausto Barredo, thus making him primarily and directly, responsible under article
1903 of the Civil Code as an employer of Pedro Fontanilla. The defendant maintains that
Fontanilla's negligence being punishable by the Penal Code, his (defendant's) liability as an
employer is only subsidiary, according to said Penal code, but Fontanilla has not been sued in
a civil action and his property has not been exhausted. To decide the main issue, we must cut
through the tangle that has, in the minds of many confused and jumbled
together delitos and cuasi delitos, or crimes under the Penal Code and fault or negligence
under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. This should be done, because justice may be lost
in a labyrinth, unless principles and remedies are distinctly envisaged. Fortunately, we are
aided in our inquiry by the luminous presentation of the perplexing subject by renown jurists
and we are likewise guided by the decisions of this Court in previous cases as well as by the
solemn clarity of the consideration in several sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain.
Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana " is a separate legal
institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely
apart and independent from delict or crime. Upon this principle and on the wording and spirit
article 1903 of the Civil Code, the primary and direct responsibility of employers may be safely
The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and Revised Penal Code are as follows:
ART. 1089 Obligations arise from law, from contracts and quasi-contracts, and from acts
and omissions which are unlawful or in which any kind of fault or negligence intervenes.
ART. 1092. Civil obligations arising from felonies or misdemeanors shall be governed by
the provisions of the Penal Code.
ART. 1093. Those which are derived from acts or omissions in which fault or negligence,
not punishable by law, intervenes shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter II, Title
XVI of this book.
ART 1902. Any person who by an act or omission causes damage to another by his
fault or negligence shall be liable for the damage so done.
ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next preceding article is enforcible, not only
for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another is
The father and in, case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for any
damages caused by the minor children who live with them.
Guardians are liable for damages done by minors or incapacitated persons subject to
their authority and living with them.
Owners or directors of an establishment or business are equally liable for any
damages caused by their employees while engaged in the branch of the service in
which employed, or on occasion of the performance of their duties.
The State is subject to the same liability when it acts through a special agent, but not if
the damage shall have been caused by the official upon whom properly devolved the
duty of doing the act performed, in which case the provisions of the next preceding
Finally, teachers or directors of arts trades are liable for any damages caused by
their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody.
The liability imposed by this article shall cease in case the persons mentioned therein
prove that they are exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the
ART. 1904. Any person who pays for damage caused by his employees may recover
from the latter what he may have paid.
ART. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. Every person criminally liable for a
felony is also civilly liable.
ART. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. The exemption from criminal
liability established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 of article 12 and in subdivision 4 of
article 11 of this Code does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be
enforced to the following rules:
First. In cases of subdivision, 1, 2 and 3 of article 12 the civil liability for acts committed
by any imbecile or insane person, and by a person under nine years of age, or by one
over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has acted without discernment shall
devolve upon those having such person under their legal authority or control, unless it
appears that there was no fault or negligence on their part.
Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his authority,
legal guardianship, or control, or if such person be insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or
minor shall respond with their own property, excepting property exempt from execution,
in accordance with the civil law.
Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of article 11, the person for whose benefit
the harm has been prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion to the benefit which they
may have received.
The courts shall determine, in their sound discretion, the proportionate amount for which each
one shall be liable.
When the respective shares can not be equitably determined, even approximately, or when the
liability also attaches to the Government, or to the majority of the inhabitants of the town, and,
in all events, whenever the damage has been caused with the consent of the authorities or
their agents, indemnification shall be made in the manner prescribed by special laws or
Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of article 12, the persons using violence or
causing the fear shall be primarily liable and secondarily, or, if there be no such persons, those
doing the act shall be liable, saving always to the latter that part of their property exempt from
ART. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavern keepers and proprietors
of establishment. In default of persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavern
keepers, and any other persons or corporation shall be civilly liable for crimes
committed in their establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances
or some general or special police regulation shall have been committed by them or their
Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods taken by robbery or
theft within their houses lodging therein, or the person, or for the payment of the value
thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself,
or the person representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall
furthermore have followed the directions which such innkeeper or his representative
may have given them with respect to the care of and vigilance over such goods. No
liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or intimidation against or
intimidation of persons unless committed by the innkeeper's employees.
ART. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The subsidiary liability
established in the next preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers,
persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by
their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their
ART. 365. Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, by reckless
imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a
grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the
penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which
would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its
medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the
penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed."
It will thus be seen that while the terms of articles 1902 of the Civil Code seem to be broad
enough to cover the driver's negligence in the instant case, nevertheless article 1093
limits cuasi-delitos to acts or omissions "not punishable by law." But inasmuch as article 365
of the Revised Penal Code punishes not only reckless but even simple imprudence or
negligence, the fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code has apparently been
crowded out. It is this overlapping that makes the "confusion worse confounded." However, a
closer study shows that such a concurrence of scope in regard to negligent acts does not
destroy the distinction between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for
cuasi-delitos or culpa extra-contractual.
The same negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime
under article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, or create an action for cuasi-delito or culpa
extra-contractual under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.
The individuality of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual looms clear and unmistakable. This
legal institution is of ancient lineage, one of its early ancestors being the Lex Aquilia in the
Roman Law. In fact, in Spanish legal terminology, this responsibility is often referred to as
culpa aquiliana. The Partidas also contributed to the genealogy of the present fault or
negligence under the Civil Code; for instance, Law 6, Title 15, of Partida 7, says: "Tenudo es
de fazer emienda, porque, como quier que el non fizo a sabiendas en dao al otro, pero
acaescio por su culpa."
The distinctive nature of cuasi-delitos survives in the Civil Code. According to article 1089, one
of the five sources of obligations is this legal institution of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-
contractual: "los actos . . . en que intervenga cualquier genero de culpa o negligencia." Then
article 1093 provides that this kind of obligation shall be governed by Chapter II of Title XVI of
Book IV, meaning articles 1902-0910. This portion of the Civil Code is exclusively devoted to
the legal institution of culpa aquiliana.
Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code and the culpa
aquiliana or cuasi-delito under the Civil Code are:
1. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are only of private concern.
2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act, while the Civil
Code, by means of indemnification, merely repairs the damage.
3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are punished only if there
is a penal law clearly covering them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which
"any king of fault or negligence intervenes." However, it should be noted that not all violations
of the penal law produce civil responsibility, such as begging in contravention of ordinances,
violation of the game laws, infraction of the rules of traffic when nobody is hurt. (See Colin and
Capitant, "Curso Elemental de Derecho Civil," Vol. 3, p. 728.)
Let us now ascertain what some jurists say on the separate existence of quasi-delicts and the
employer's primary and direct liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code.
Dorado Montero in his essay on "Responsibilidad" in the "Enciclopedia Juridica Espaola"
(Vol. XXVII, p. 414) says:
El concepto juridico de la responsabilidad civil abarca diversos aspectos y comprende a
diferentes personas. Asi, existe una responsabilidad civil propiamente dicha, que en
ningun casl lleva aparejada responsabilidad criminal alguna, y otra que es
consecuencia indeclinable de la penal que nace de todo delito o falta."
The juridical concept of civil responsibility has various aspects and comprises different
persons. Thus, there is a civil responsibility, properly speaking, which in no case carries
with it any criminal responsibility, and another which is a necessary consequence of the
penal liability as a result of every felony or misdemeanor."
Maura, an outstanding authority, was consulted on the following case: There had been a
collision between two trains belonging respectively to the Ferrocarril Cantabrico and the
Ferrocarril del Norte. An employee of the latter had been prosecuted in a criminal case, in
which the company had been made a party as subsidiarily responsible in civil damages. The
employee had been acquitted in the criminal case, and the employer, the Ferrocarril del Norte,
had also been exonerated. The question asked was whether the Ferrocarril Cantabrico could
still bring a civil action for damages against the Ferrocarril del Norte. Maura's opinion was in
the affirmative,
As things are, apropos of the reality pure and simple of the facts, it seems less tenable
that there should be res judicata with regard to the civil obligation for damages on
account of the losses caused by the collision of the trains. The title upon which the
action for reparation is based cannot be confused with the civil responsibilities born of a
crime, because there exists in the latter, whatever each nature, a culpa surrounded with
aggravating aspects which give rise to penal measures that are more or less severe.
The injury caused by a felony or misdemeanor upon civil rights requires restitutions,
reparations, or indemnifications which, like the penalty itself, affect public order; for this
reason, they are ordinarily entrusted to the office of the prosecuting attorney; and it is
clear that if by this means the losses and damages are repaired, the injured party no
longer desires to seek another relief; but this coincidence of effects does not eliminate
the peculiar nature of civil actions to ask for indemnity.
Such civil actions in the present case (without referring to contractual faults which are
not pertinent and belong to another scope) are derived, according to article 1902 of the
Civil Code, from every act or omission causing losses and damages in which culpa or
negligence intervenes. It is unimportant that such actions are every day filed before the
civil courts without the criminal courts interfering therewith. Articles 18 to 21 and 121 to
128 of the Penal Code, bearing in mind the spirit and the social and political purposes of
that Code, develop and regulate the matter of civil responsibilities arising from a crime,
separately from the regime under common law, of culpa which is known as aquiliana, in
accordance with legislative precedent of the Corpus Juris. It would be unwarranted to
make a detailed comparison between the former provisions and that regarding the
obligation to indemnify on account of civil culpa; but it is pertinent and necessary to
point out to one of such differences.
Articles 20 and 21 of the Penal Code, after distriburing in their own way the civil
responsibilities among those who, for different reasons, are guilty of felony or
misdemeanor, make such civil responsibilities applicable to enterprises and
establishments for which the guilty parties render service, but with subsidiary character,
that is to say, according to the wording of the Penal Code, in default of those who are
criminally responsible. In this regard, the Civil Code does not coincide because article
1903 says: "The obligation imposed by the next preceding article is demandable, not
only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another is
responsible." Among the persons enumerated are the subordinates and employees of
establishments or enterprises, either for acts during their service or on the occasion of
their functions. It is for this reason that it happens, and it is so observed in judicial
decisions, that the companies or enterprises, after taking part in the criminal cases
because of their subsidiary civil responsibility by reason of the crime, are sued and
sentenced directly and separately with regard to the obligation, before the civil courts.
Seeing that the title of this obligation is different, and the separation between punitive
justice and the civil courts being a true postulate of our judicial system, so that they
have different fundamental norms in different codes, as well as different modes of
procedure, and inasmuch as the Compaa del Ferrocarril Cantabrico has abstained
from taking part in the criminal case and has reserved the right to exercise its actions, it
seems undeniable that the action for indemnification for the losses and damages
caused to it by the collision was not sub judice before the Tribunal del Jurado, nor was it
the subject of a sentence, but it remained intact when the decision of March 21 was
rendered. Even if the verdict had not been that of acquittal, it has already been shown
that such action had been legitimately reserved till after the criminal prosecution; but
because of the declaration of the non-existence of the felony and the non-existence of
the responsibility arising from the crime, which was the sole subject matter upon which
the Tribunal del Jurado had jurisdiction, there is greater reason for the civil obligation ex
lege, and it becomes clearer that the action for its enforcement remain intact and is
not res judicata.
Laurent, a jurist who has written a monumental work on the French Civil Code, on which the
Spanish Civil Code is largely based and whose provisions on cuasi-delito or culpa extra-
contractual are similar to those of the Spanish Civil Code, says, referring to article 1384 of the
French Civil Code which corresponds to article 1903, Spanish Civil Code:
The action can be brought directly against the person responsible (for another), without
including the author of the act. The action against the principal is accessory in the sense
that it implies the existence of a prejudicial act committed by the employee, but it is not
subsidiary in the sense that it can not be instituted till after the judgment against the
author of the act or at least, that it is subsidiary to the principal action; the action for
responsibility (of the employer) is in itself a principal action. (Laurent, Principles of
French Civil Law, Spanish translation, Vol. 20, pp. 734-735.)
Question No. 1. Is the responsibility declared in article 1903 for the acts or omissions of
those persons for who one is responsible, subsidiary or principal? In order to answer
this question it is necessary to know, in the first place, on what the legal provision is
based. Is it true that there is a responsibility for the fault of another person? It seems so
at first sight; but such assertion would be contrary to justice and to the universal maxim
that all faults are personal, and that everyone is liable for those faults that can be
imputed to him. The responsibility in question is imposed on the occasion of a crime or
fault, but not because of the same, but because of the cuasi-delito, that is to say, the
imprudence or negligence of the father, guardian, proprietor or manager of the
establishment, of the teacher, etc. Whenever anyone of the persons enumerated in the
article referred to (minors, incapacitated persons, employees, apprentices) causes any
damage, the law presumes that the father, guardian, teacher, etc. have committed an
act of negligence in not preventing or avoiding the damage. It is this fault that is
condemned by the law. It is, therefore, only apparent that there is a responsibility for the
act of another; in reality the responsibility exacted is for one's own act. The idea that
such responsibility is subsidiary is, therefore, completely inadmissible.
That is to say, one is not responsible for the acts of others, because one is liable only
for his own faults, this being the doctrine of article 1902; but, by exception, one is liable
for the acts of those persons with whom there is a bond or tie which gives rise to the
responsibility. Is this responsibility direct or subsidiary? In the order of the penal law, the
Penal Code distinguishes between minors and incapacitated persons on the one hand,
and other persons on the other, declaring that the responsibility for the former is direct
(article 19), and for the latter, subsidiary (articles 20 and 21); but in the scheme of the
civil law, in the case of article 1903, the responsibility should be understood as direct,
according to the tenor of that articles, for precisely it imposes responsibility "for the acts
of those persons for whom one should be responsible."
Coming now to the sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain, that court has upheld the
principles above set forth: that a quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual is a separate and
distinct legal institution, independent from the civil responsibility arising from criminal liability,
and that an employer is, under article 1903 of the Civil Code, primarily and directly
responsible for the negligent acts of his employee.
It will be noted, as to the case just cited:
First. That the conductor was not sued in a civil case, either separately or with the street car
company. This is precisely what happens in the present case: the driver, Fontanilla, has not
been sued in a civil action, either alone or with his employer.
Second. That the conductor had been acquitted of grave criminal negligence, but the Supreme
Tribunal of Spain said that this did not exclude the co-existence of fault or negligence, which is
not qualified, on the part of the conductor, under article 1902 of the Civil Code. In the present
case, the taxi driver was found guilty of criminal negligence, so that if he had even sued for his
civil responsibility arising from the crime, he would have been held primarily liable for civil
damages, and Barredo would have been held subsidiarily liable for the same. But the plaintiffs
are directly suing Barredo, on his primary responsibility because of his own presumed
negligence which he did not overcome under article 1903. Thus, there were two liabilities
of Barredo: first, the subsidiary one because of the civil liability of the taxi driver arising from
the latter's criminal negligence; and, second, Barredo's primary liability as an employer under
article 1903. The plaintiffs were free to choose which course to take, and they preferred the
second remedy. In so doing, they were acting within their rights. It might be observed in
passing, that the plaintiff choose the more expeditious and effective method of relief, because
Fontanilla was either in prison, or had just been released, and besides, he was probably
without property which might be seized in enforcing any judgment against him for damages.
Third. That inasmuch as in the above sentence of October 21, 1910, the employer was held
liable civilly, notwithstanding the acquittal of the employee (the conductor) in a previous
criminal case, with greater reason should Barredo, the employer in the case at bar, be held
liable for damages in a civil suit filed against him because his taxi driver had been convicted.
The degree of negligence of the conductor in the Spanish case cited was less than that of the
taxi driver, Fontanilla, because the former was acquitted in the previous criminal case while the
latter was found guilty of criminal negligence and was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence
of one year and one day to two years of prision correccional.
(See also Sentence of February 19, 1902, which is similar to the one above quoted.)
Considering that the sentence, in question recognizes, in virtue of the facts which it
declares, in relation to the evidence in the case: (1) that the invoice issued by the
railroad company in favor of the plaintiff contemplated that the empty receptacles
referred to in the complaint should be returned to the consignors with wines and liquors;
(2) that when the said merchandise reached their destination, their delivery to the
consignee was refused by the station agent without justification and with fraudulent
intent, and (3) that the lack of delivery of these goods when they were demanded by the
plaintiff caused him losses and damages of considerable importance, as he was a
wholesale vendor of wines and liquors and he failed to realize the profits when he was
unable to fill the orders sent to him by the consignors of the receptacles:
Considering that upon this basis there is need of upholding the four assignments of
error, as the original complaint did not contain any cause of action arising from non-
fulfillment of a contract of transportation, because the action was not based on the delay
of the goods nor on any contractual relation between the parties litigant and, therefore,
article 371 of the Code of Commerce, on which the decision appealed from is based, is
not applicable; but it limits to asking for reparation for losses and damages produced on
the patrimony of the plaintiff on account of the unjustified and fraudulent refusal of the
carrier to deliver the goods consigned to the plaintiff as stated by the sentence, and the
carrier's responsibility is clearly laid down in article 1902 of the Civil Code which binds,
in virtue of the next article, the defendant company, because the latter is connected with
the person who caused the damage by relations of economic character and by
administrative hierarchy. (Emphasis supplied.)
The above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act may come under both the
Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent was unjustified
and fraudulent and therefore could have been the subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was
held to be also a proper subject of a civil action under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also
to be noted that it was the employer and not the employee who was being sued.
Let us now examine the cases previously decided by this Court.
In the leading case of Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil., 359, 362-365 [year
1907]), the trial court awarded damages to the plaintiff, a laborer of the defendant, because the
latter had negligently failed to repair a tramway in consequence of which the rails slid off while
iron was being transported, and caught the plaintiff whose leg was broken. This Court held:
It is contended by the defendant, as its first defense to the action that the necessary
conclusion from these collated laws is that the remedy for injuries through negligence
lies only in a criminal action in which the official criminally responsible must be made
primarily liable and his employer held only subsidiarily to him. According to this theory
the plaintiff should have procured the arrest of the representative of the company
accountable for not repairing the track, and on his prosecution a suitable fine should
have been imposed, payable primarily by him and secondarily by his employer.
This reasoning misconceived the plan of the Spanish codes upon this subject. Article
1093 of the Civil Code makes obligations arising from faults or negligence not punished
by the law, subject to the provisions of Chapter II of Title XVI. Section 1902 of that
chapter reads:
"A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is
fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.
"SEC. 1903. The obligation imposed by the preceeding article is demandable, not
only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom
they should be responsible.
"The father, and on his death or incapacity, the mother, is liable for the damages
caused by the minors who live with them.
"Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for the
damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the
latter may be employed or in the performance of their duties.
"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned
therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
avoid the damage."
As an answer to the argument urged in this particular action it may be sufficient to point
out that nowhere in our general statutes is the employer penalized for failure to provide
or maintain safe appliances for his workmen. His obligation therefore is one 'not
punished by the laws' and falls under civil rather than criminal jurisprudence. But the
answer may be a broader one. We should be reluctant, under any conditions, to adopt a
forced construction of these scientific codes, such as is proposed by the defendant, that
would rob some of these articles of effect, would shut out litigants against their will from
the civil courts, would make the assertion of their rights dependent upon the selection
for prosecution of the proper criminal offender, and render recovery doubtful by reason
of the strict rules of proof prevailing in criminal actions. Even if these articles had always
stood alone, such a construction would be unnecessary, but clear light is thrown upon
their meaning by the provisions of the Law of Criminal Procedure of Spain (Ley de
Enjuiciamiento Criminal), which, though never in actual force in these Islands, was
formerly given a suppletory or explanatory effect. Under article 111 of this law, both
classes of action, civil and criminal, might be prosecuted jointly or separately, but while
the penal action was pending the civil was suspended. According to article 112, the
penal action once started, the civil remedy should be sought therewith, unless it had
been waived by the party injured or been expressly reserved by him for civil
proceedings for the future. If the civil action alone was prosecuted, arising out of a crime
that could be enforced only on private complaint, the penal action thereunder should be
extinguished. These provisions are in harmony with those of articles 23 and 133 of our
Penal Code on the same subject.
An examination of this topic might be carried much further, but the citation of these
articles suffices to show that the civil liability was not intended to be merged in the
criminal nor even to be suspended thereby, except as expressly provided in the law.
Where an individual is civilly liable for a negligent act or omission, it is not required that
the injured party should seek out a third person criminally liable whose prosecution must
be a condition precedent to the enforcement of the civil right.
Under article 20 of the Penal Code the responsibility of an employer may be regarded
as subsidiary in respect of criminal actions against his employees only while they are in
process of prosecution, or in so far as they determine the existence of the criminal act
from which liability arises, and his obligation under the civil law and its enforcement in
the civil courts is not barred thereby unless by the election of the injured person.
Inasmuch as no criminal proceeding had been instituted, growing our of the accident in
question, the provisions of the Penal Code can not affect this action. This construction
renders it unnecessary to finally determine here whether this subsidiary civil liability in
penal actions has survived the laws that fully regulated it or has been abrogated by the
American civil and criminal procedure now in force in the Philippines.
The difficulty in construing the articles of the code above cited in this case appears from
the briefs before us to have arisen from the interpretation of the words of article 1093,
"fault or negligence not punished by law," as applied to the comprehensive definition of
offenses in articles 568 and 590 of the Penal Code. It has been shown that the liability
of an employer arising out of his relation to his employee who is the offender is not to be
regarded as derived from negligence punished by the law, within the meaning of articles
1902 and 1093. More than this, however, it cannot be said to fall within the class of acts
unpunished by the law, the consequence of which are regulated by articles 1902 and
1903 of the Civil Code. The acts to which these articles are applicable are understood to
be those not growing out of pre-existing duties of the parties to one another. But where
relations already formed give rise to duties, whether springing from contract or quasi
contract, then breaches of those duties are subject to articles 1101, 1103, and 1104 of
the same code. A typical application of this distinction may be found in the
consequences of a railway accident due to defective machinery supplied by the
employer. His liability to his employee would arise out of the contract of employment,
that to the passengers out of the contract for passage, while that to the injured
bystander would originate in the negligent act itself.
In Manzanares vs. Moreta, 38 Phil., 821 (year 1918), the mother of the 8 of 9-year-old child
Salvador Bona brought a civil action against Moreta to recover damages resulting from the
death of the child, who had been run over by an automobile driven and managed by the
defendant. The trial court rendered judgment requiring the defendant to pay the plaintiff the
sum of P1,000 as indemnity: This Court in affirming the judgment, said in part:
If it were true that the defendant, in coming from the southern part of Solana Street, had
to stop his auto before crossing Real Street, because he had met vehicles which were
going along the latter street or were coming from the opposite direction along Solana
Street, it is to be believed that, when he again started to run his auto across said Real
Street and to continue its way along Solana Street northward, he should have adjusted
the speed of the auto which he was operating until he had fully crossed Real Street and
had completely reached a clear way on Solana Street. But, as the child was run over by
the auto precisely at the entrance of Solana Street, this accident could not have
occurred if the auto had been running at a slow speed, aside from the fact that the
defendant, at the moment of crossing Real Street and entering Solana Street, in a
northward direction, could have seen the child in the act of crossing the latter street
from the sidewalk on the right to that on the left, and if the accident had occurred in
such a way that after the automobile had run over the body of the child, and the child's
body had already been stretched out on the ground, the automobile still moved along a
distance of about 2 meters, this circumstance shows the fact that the automobile
entered Solana Street from Real Street, at a high speed without the defendant having
blown the horn. If these precautions had been taken by the defendant, the deplorable
accident which caused the death of the child would not have occurred.
It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in a
criminal case because his negligence causing the death of the child was punishable by the
Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear instance of the same act of negligence being a proper
subject-matter either of a criminal action with its consequent civil liability arising from a crime or
of an entirely separate and independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of
the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate individually of a cuasi-delito or culpa
aquiliana under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a
negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal
case and for which, after such a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil liability
arising from his crime.
Years later (in 1930) this Court had another occasion to apply the same doctrine. In Bernal
and Enverso vs. House and Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., 54 Phil., 327, the parents
of the five-year-old child, Purificacion Bernal, brought a civil action to recover damages for the
child's death as a result of burns caused by the fault and negligence of the defendants. On the
evening of April 10, 1925, the Good Friday procession was held in Tacloban, Leyte. Fortunata
Enverso with her daughter Purificacion Bernal had come from another municipality to attend
the same. After the procession the mother and the daughter with two others were passing
along Gran Capitan Street in front of the offices of the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd.,
owned by defendants J. V. House, when an automobile appeared from the opposite direction.
The little girl, who was slightly ahead of the rest, was so frightened by the automobile that she
turned to run, but unfortunately she fell into the street gutter where hot water from the electric
plant was flowing. The child died that same night from the burns. The trial courts dismissed the
action because of the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs. But this Court held, on appeal,
that there was no contributory negligence, and allowed the parents P1,000 in damages from J.
V. House who at the time of the tragic occurrence was the holder of the franchise for the
electric plant. This Court said in part:
Although the trial judge made the findings of fact hereinbefore outlined, he nevertheless
was led to order the dismissal of the action because of the contributory negligence of
the plaintiffs. It is from this point that a majority of the court depart from the stand taken
by the trial judge. The mother and her child had a perfect right to be on the principal
street of Tacloban, Leyte, on the evening when the religious procession was held. There
was nothing abnormal in allowing the child to run along a few paces in advance of the
mother. No one could foresee the coincidence of an automobile appearing and of a
frightened child running and falling into a ditch filled with hot water. The doctrine
announced in the much debated case of Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co.
([1907]), 7 Phil., 359), still rule. Article 1902 of the Civil Code must again be enforced.
The contributory negligence of the child and her mother, if any, does not operate as a
bar to recovery, but in its strictest sense could only result in reduction of the damages.
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied article 1902 of the
Civil Code. It is thus that although J. V. House could have been criminally prosecuted for
reckless or simple negligence and not only punished but also made civilly liable because of his
criminal negligence, nevertheless this Court awarded damages in an independent civil action
for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code.
In Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes (30 Phil., 624 [year 1915), the action was for damages for the
death of the plaintiff's daughter alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the servant
in driving an automobile over the child. It appeared that the cause of the mishap was a defect
in the steering gear. The defendant Leynes had rented the automobile from the International
Garage of Manila, to be used by him in carrying passengers during the fiesta of Tuy, Batangas.
Leynes was ordered by the lower court to pay P1,000 as damages to the plaintiff. On appeal
this Court reversed the judgment as to Leynes on the ground that he had shown that the
exercised the care of a good father of a family, thus overcoming the presumption of negligence
under article 1903. This Court said:
As to selection, the defendant has clearly shown that he exercised the care and
diligence of a good father of a family. He obtained the machine from a reputable garage
and it was, so far as appeared, in good condition. The workmen were likewise selected
from a standard garage, were duly licensed by the Government in their particular
calling, and apparently thoroughly competent. The machine had been used but a few
hours when the accident occurred and it is clear from the evidence that the defendant
had no notice, either actual or constructive, of the defective condition of the steering
The legal aspect of the case was discussed by this Court thus:
Article 1903 of the Civil Code not only establishes liability in cases of negligence, but
also provides when the liability shall cease. It says:
ELEMENTS OF QUASI - DELICT
From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the
negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that
there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of
the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after the selection, or both; and (2)
that presumption is juris tantum(rebuttable presumption) and not juris et de jure
(conclusive presumption), and consequently, may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that
if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he
has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is
overcome and he is relieve from liability.
This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on his own negligence and
not on that of his servant.
The doctrine of the case just cited was followed by this Court in Cerf vs. Medel (33 Phil., 37
[year 1915]). In the latter case, the complaint alleged that the defendant's servant had so
negligently driven an automobile, which was operated by defendant as a public vehicle, that
said automobile struck and damaged the plaintiff's motorcycle. This Court, applying article
1903 and following the rule in Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes, said in part (p. 41) that:
The master is liable for the negligent acts of his servant where he is the owner or
director of a business or enterprise and the negligent acts are committed while the
servant is engaged in his master's employment as such owner.
Another case which followed the decision in Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes was Cuison vs.
Norton & Harrison Co., 55 Phil., 18 (year 1930). The latter case was an action for damages
brought by Cuison for the death of his seven-year-old son Moises. The little boy was on his
way to school with his sister Marciana. Some large pieces of lumber fell from a truck and
pinned the boy underneath, instantly killing him. Two youths, Telesforo Binoya and Francisco
Bautista, who were working for Ora, an employee of defendant Norton & Harrison Co., pleaded
guilty to the crime of homicide through reckless negligence and were sentenced accordingly.
This Court, applying articles 1902 and 1903, held:
The basis of civil law liability is not respondent superior but the relationship of pater
familias. This theory bases the liability of the master ultimately on his own negligence
and not on that of his servant. (Bahia vs.Litonjua and Leynes [1915], 30 Phil., 624;
Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co. [1918], 38 Phil., 768.)
In Walter A. Smith & Co. vs. Cadwallader Gibson Lumber Co., 55 Phil., 517 (year 1930) the
plaintiff brought an action for damages for the demolition of its wharf, which had been struck by
the steamer Helen C belonging to the defendant. This Court held (p. 526):
The evidence shows that Captain Lasa at the time the plaintiff's wharf collapsed was a
duly licensed captain, authorized to navigate and direct a vessel of any tonnage, and
that the appellee contracted his services because of his reputation as a captain,
according to F. C. Cadwallader. This being so, we are of the opinion that the
presumption of liability against the defendant has been overcome by the exercise of the
care and diligence of a good father of a family in selecting Captain Lasa, in accordance
with the doctrines laid down by this court in the cases cited above, and the defendant is
therefore absolved from all liability.
It is, therefore, seen that the defendant's theory about his secondary liability is negatived by
the six cases above set forth. He is, on the authority of these cases, primarily and directly
responsible in damages under article 1903, in relation to article 1902, of the Civil Code.
Let us now take up the Philippine decisions relied upon by the defendant. We study first, City
of Manila vs. Manila Electric Co., 52 Phil., 586 (year 1928). A collision between a truck of the
City of Manila and a street car of the Manila Electric Co. took place on June 8, 1925. The truck
was damaged in the amount of P1,788.27. Sixto Eustaquio, the motorman, was prosecuted for
the crime of damage to property and slight injuries through reckless imprudence. He was found
guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of P900, to indemnify the City of Manila for P1,788.27, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Unable to collect the indemnity from Eustaquio,
the City of Manila filed an action against the Manila Electric Company to obtain payment,
claiming that the defendant was subsidiarily liable. The main defense was that the defendant
had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. The lower court
rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. This Court held, in part, that this case was governed
by the Penal Code, saying:
With this preliminary point out of the way, there is no escaping the conclusion that the
provisions of the Penal Code govern. The Penal Code in easily understandable
language authorizes the determination of subsidiary liability. The Civil Code negatives
its application by providing that civil obligations arising from crimes or misdemeanors
shall be governed by the provisions of the Penal Code. The conviction of the motorman
was a misdemeanor falling under article 604 of the Penal Code. The act of the
motorman was not a wrongful or negligent act or omission not punishable by law.
Accordingly, the civil obligation connected up with the Penal Code and not with article
1903 of the Civil Code. In other words, the Penal Code affirms its jurisdiction while the
Civil Code negatives its jurisdiction. This is a case of criminal negligence out of which
civil liability arises and not a case of civil negligence.
Our deduction, therefore, is that the case relates to the Penal Code and not to the Civil
Code. Indeed, as pointed out by the trial judge, any different ruling would permit the
master to escape scot-free by simply alleging and proving that the master had exercised
all diligence in the selection and training of its servants to prevent the damage. That
would be a good defense to a strictly civil action, but might or might not be to a civil
action either as a part of or predicated on conviction for a crime or misdemeanor. (By
way of parenthesis, it may be said further that the statements here made are offered to
meet the argument advanced during our deliberations to the effect that article 0902 of
the Civil Code should be disregarded and codal articles 1093 and 1903 applied.)
It is not clear how the above case could support the defendant's proposition, because the
Court of Appeals based its decision in the present case on the defendant's primary
responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code and not on his subsidiary liability arising from
Fontanilla's criminal negligence. In other words, the case of City of Manila vs. Manila Electric
Co., supra, is predicated on an entirely different theory, which is the subsidiary liability of an
employer arising from a criminal act of his employee, whereas the foundation of the decision of
the Court of Appeals in the present case is the employer's primary liability under article 1903 of
the Civil Code. We have already seen that this is a proper and independent remedy.
Arambulo vs. Manila Electric Co. (55 Phil., 75), is another case invoked by the defendant. A
motorman in the employ of the Manila Electric Company had been convicted o homicide by
simple negligence and sentenced, among other things, to pay the heirs of the deceased the
sum of P1,000. An action was then brought to enforce the subsidiary liability of the defendant
as employer under the Penal Code. The defendant attempted to show that it had exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in selecting the motorman, and therefore claimed
exemption from civil liability. But this Court held:
In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and so hold, (1) that the
exemption from civil liability established in article 1903 of the Civil Code for all who have
acted with the diligence of a good father of a family, is not applicable to the subsidiary
civil liability provided in article 20 of the Penal Code.
The above case is also extraneous to the theory of the defendant in the instant case, because
the action there had for its purpose the enforcement of the defendant's subsidiary liability
under the Penal Code, while in the case at bar, the plaintiff's cause of action is based on the
defendant's primary and direct responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code. In fact, the
above case destroys the defendant's contention because that decision illustrates the principle
that the employer's primary responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code is different in
character from his subsidiary liability under the Penal Code.
In trying to apply the two cases just referred to, counsel for the defendant has failed to
recognize the distinction between civil liability arising from a crime, which is governed by the
Penal Code, and the responsibility for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code, and
has likewise failed to give the importance to the latter type of civil action.
The defendant-petitioner also cites Francisco vs. Onrubia (46 Phil., 327). That case need not
be set forth. Suffice it to say that the question involved was also civil liability arising from a
crime. Hence, it is as inapplicable as the two cases above discussed.
The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate individuality of cuasi-
delitos or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code. Specifically they show that there is a distinction
between civil liability arising from criminal negligence (governed by the Penal Code) and
responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that the
same negligent act may produce either a civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal
Code, or a separate responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the
Civil Code. Still more concretely, the authorities above cited render it inescapable to conclude
that the employer in this case the defendant-petitioner is primarily and directly liable
under article 1903 of the Civil Code.
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be sufficient to
dispose of this case. But inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that have been little
understood in the past, it might not be inappropriate to indicate their foundations.
negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or
negligence not punished by law, according to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code,
the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual life.
Death or injury to persons and damage to property through any degree of negligence even
the slightest would have to be indemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising
from a crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa
aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so
absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the
letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning of the
law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown
development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in
articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt
is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant
pay in damages. There are numerous cases of criminal negligence which can not be shown
beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases,
the defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910
of the Civil Code. Otherwise, there would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. Ubi
jus ibi remedium.
Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make defendant's liability effective, and that is, to
the plaintiff to follow a devious and cumbersome method of obtaining relief. True, there is such
a remedy under our laws, but there is also a more expeditious way, which is based on the
primary and direct responsibility of the defendant under article 1903 of the Civil Code. Our view
of the law is more likely to facilitate remedy for civil wrongs, because the procedure indicated
by the defendant is wasteful and productive of delay, it being a matter of common knowledge
that professional drivers of taxis and similar public conveyance usually do not have sufficient
means with which to pay damages. Why, then, should the plaintiff be required in all cases to go
through this roundabout, unnecessary, and probably useless procedure? In construing the
laws, courts have endeavored to shorten and facilitate the pathways of right and justice.
employees should be carefully chosen and supervised in order to avoid injury to the public. It is
the masters or employers who principally reap the profits resulting from the services of these
servants and employees. It is but right that they should guarantee the latter's careful conduct
for the personnel and patrimonial safety of others. As Theilhard has said, "they should
reproach themselves, at least, some for their weakness, others for their poor selection and all
for their negligence." And according to Manresa, "It is much more equitable and just that such
responsibility should fall upon the principal or director who could have chosen a careful and
prudent employee, and not upon the injured person who could not exercise such selection and
who used such employee because of his confidence in the principal or director." (Vol. 12, p.
622, 2nd Ed.) Many jurists also base this primary responsibility of the employer on the principle
of representation of the principal by the agent. Thus, Oyuelos says in the work already cited
(Vol. 7, p. 747) that before third persons the employer and employee "vienen a ser como una
sola personalidad, por refundicion de la del dependiente en la de quien le emplea y utiliza."
("become as one personality by the merging of the person of the employee in that of him who
employs and utilizes him.") All these observations acquire a peculiar force and significance
when it comes to motor accidents, and there is need of stressing and accentuating the
responsibility of owners of motor vehicles.
Code on this subject, which has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres
already discussed, and for lack of understanding of the character and efficacy of the action
for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to seek damages only by virtue of
the civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that there is another remedy, which is by
invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by our
laws, it has nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious and
effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we
are asked to help perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time we pointed out to
the harm done by such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility for fault or
negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we
caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that
its waters may no longer be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is
believed, make for the better safeguarding of private rights because it re-establishes an
depending on the issues, limitations and results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed
by the party wronged or his counsel, is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress.
In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be and is hereby
affirmed, with costs against the defendant-petitioner.
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