Source: https://www.inversecondemnation.com/inversecondemnation/2010/05/index.html
Timestamp: 2020-07-06 03:22:35
Document Index: 466549452

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 23', 'art. 2', '§ 22', '§ 16', '§ 33601', '§ 33670', '§ 9', '§ 32', '§ 9', '§ 532', '§ 101', '§ 830', '§ 120', '§ 120', '§ 120', '§ 120', '§ 1983']

inversecondemnation.com: May 2010 posts
Reminder: June 1 NY Court Of Appeals Oral Agument In Columbia "Blight" Case
A reminder: on Tuesday, June 1, 2010 at 2:00 p.m. ET, we will be live blogging the oral arguments in Kaur v. New York State Urban Development Corp.
In that case, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division (First Department) struck down the attempted taking of land north of Columbia University in New York City because of the record reflected overwhelming private benefit and lack of "blight." The agency appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals webcasts oral arguments, so we will be able to follow along and live blog the event. Joining me will be eminent domain scholar and property owners' advocate Tim Sandefur, and my Damon Key colleague and fellow condemnation law attorney Mark Murakami. Sign up here for email notification, then on Tuesday, follow along and join in the discussion.
Posted on May 28, 2010 in ▪ Appellate law, ▪ Development agreements, ▪ Due process, ▪ Eminent Domain | Condemnation, ▪ Property rights, ▪ Public Use | Kelo | Permalink
Arkansas Supreme Court: Pipeline Taking Not A Private Use
In Smith v. Ark. Midstream Gas Servs, No 09-1186 (May 27, 2010), the Arkansas Supreme Court concluded that a taking for a natural gas pipeline by a private, for-profit utility company was not a violation of the state constitution's public use clause.
Arkansas law delegates the power of eminent domain to certain pipeline companies and deems them to be "common carriers" --
All pipeline companies operating in this state are given the right of eminent domain and are declared to be common carriers, except pipelines operated for conveying natural gas for public utility service.
Ark. Code Ann. § 23-15-101. The public use clause in the Arkansas Constitution isn't that much different than similar provisions in other constitutions:
The right of property is before and higher than any constitutional sanction; and private property shall not be taken, appropriated or damaged for public use, without just compensation thereof.
Ark. Const. art. 2, § 22. The Smiths argued that the taking of a 60 foot right of way over their land for the natural gas pipeline was a private, not public, use because the pipeline is for use by less than the public, and the public at large is not able to ship materials through the pipeline. Slip op. at 6. The court rejected the argument because as a common carrier, the pipeline company is required by law to allow public access to the pipeline, even if the public does not actually use the pipeline. It is the right of the public to use the pipeline that makes the taking public, not the present actual use. Slip op. at 7 ("Again, the character of a taking, whether public or private, is determined by the extent of the right to use it, and not the extent to which that right is exercised.") (citing Ozark Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania Anthracite Co., 134 S.W. 534 (1911)).
The court also rejected the property owner's argument that the statutory delegation is unconstitutionally vague. Because the statute does not guide the property owner's conduct, the owner has no standing to challenge the statute. A statute is void for vagueness if it does not provide a discernible standard to which a person may conform their conduct. Since the delegation statute does not require the property owner to do (or not do) anything, he could not challenge the law.
Posted on May 28, 2010 in ▪ Eminent Domain | Condemnation, ▪ Property rights, ▪ Public Use | Kelo | Permalink
How Remedying Blight "Pays For Itself"
Here's a case, issued yesterday by a California Court of Appeal, that is not directly about the use of eminent domain for redevelopment purposes to remedy "blight," but is nonetheless worth reviewing since it shows how redevelopment supposedly "pays for itself" (in the words of a court) through tax increment financing:
Under the [California Redevelopment Law (Cal. Const. art. XVI § 16], redevelopment is financed through tax increment financing. In essence, a redevelopment agency, which is not empowered to tax, but which is empowered to acquire debt through loans or the sale of bonds (§ 33601), finances a redevelopment project through borrowing. When the redevelopment results in increased property values in the redevelopment area, the tax attributable to the increase in value -- the tax increment -- is distributed by the taxing authority to a special fund of the redevelopment agency, to pay the principal of and interest on its debt. (§ 33670, subd. (b).) "'This way, the redevelopment project in effect pays for itself.' [Citations.])" (City of Dinuba v. County of Tulare, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 865-866; Community Development Com'n of City of Oxnard v. County of Ventura (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1475-1476.)
Glendale Redevelopment Agency v. County of Los Angeles, No. B212718 slip op. at 3-4 (May 25, 2010). Couple tax increment financing with California's notoriously loose standards for defining "blight," and you can see why there is little disincentive to designating property as blighted. For additional background and commentary, see A Tiff Over TIF In Northern California and In Pursuit of the Free Lunch on Professor Kanner's blog.
Update: some additional thoughts on counties vs redevelopment agencies in Grab redevelopment cash from Cal Watchdog.
The dispute in the Glendale case involved whether the redevelopment agency was permitted to submit a revised request to the County for its share of the tax increment. The court held the statute permitted the redevelopment agency to amend its request after the annual deadline in order to correct an error in the original request, even though the statute did not expressly permit the County to accept it after the deadline.
Posted on May 26, 2010 in ▪ Eminent Domain | Condemnation, ▪ Land use law | Permalink
Another Brief Seeking Reconsideration Of HAWSCT's Kuilima/Turtle Bay Supplemental EIS Opinion
Here's the latest development in the reconsideration process in the Turtle Bay/Kuilima EIS case, Unite Here! Local 5 v. City and County of Honolulu, No. 28602 (Apr. 8, 2010).
As we noted earlier, Kuilima Resort Company filed a motion asking the Hawaii Supreme Court to reconsider or clarify its opinion in the case. Recently, a motion for leave to file an amicus brief in support of Kuilima's motion for reconsideration was filed by the Land Use Research Foundation of Hawaii and a whole bunch of others (too numerous to list, but read the brief if you need to know who they are).
Movants seek to file an amicus curiae brief to apprise the Court of important legal issues and public interests at stake in this precedent-setting case of first impression including, but are not limited to, how:
1. The Court Opinion, unless reconsidered or clarified, has created new regulatory requirements and policies and/or substituted its judgment for the existing land use process and decisions made by the legislature and relevant government agencies.
2. The Court Opinion will, and is already, affecting other projects in the State, subjecting uncompleted projects to a cloud of uncertainty and time limitations and other new requirements not known to exist until the Decision.
3. The Court Opinion, unless reconsidered or clarified, has already had and will continue to have far-reaching and a negative impact on the development of market and affordable housing, the visitor industry, the construction industry, lenders, and on Hawaii's economy as a whole.
Motion at 2-3.
Posted on May 21, 2010 in ▪ Appellate law, ▪ Environmental law, ▪ Land use law, ▪ Shoreline | CZMA, ▪ Vested rights | Permalink
We're "Activists!" Who Knew?
According to the Daily Reporter (Wisconsin), that is. If it's on the internet, it must be true, right?
Activists want U.S. Supreme Court to rule on eminent domain case summarizes the background in City of Milwaukee Post No. 2874 Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States v. Redevelopment Agency of the City of Milwaukee, No. 09-1204 (cert. petition filed Apr. 2, 2010):
National organizations that focus on eminent domain law are urging the U.S. Supreme Court to rule on a lawsuit over the vacant property at 27th Street and Wisconsin Avenue in Milwaukee.
The Redevelopment Authority of the City of Milwaukee acquired the property in 2001 from Maharishi Vedic University Inc. by declaring the land blighted. The authority paid $140,000 to the university and $300,000 to the City of Milwaukee Veterans of Foreign Wars Post No. 2874, which held a long-term lease for space in a vacant hotel on the site.
We we filed an amicus brief on behalf of the National Association of Home Builders and the Wisconsin Building Association in support of the VFW's cert petition. The Institute for Justice (the people that represented Mrs. Kelo) also filed an amicus brief, available here.
The issue in the case is the constitutionality of the "undivided fee" rule. The Wisconsin Supreme Court applied the rule to prohibit the jury from hearing evidence regarding the value of the VFW's long-term low rent lease. The court concluded that the VFW's lease could not be valued separately because the fee simple interest was condemned, and that the VFW was not entitled to any compensation for its leasehold interest.
The case is getting nationwide attention because it is an example of a legal dispute that has come up in other U.S. lawsuits, said Dana Berliner, senior attorney for the Institute for Justice, an Arlington, Va.-based law firm that takes on cases that affect eminent domain law. In the Milwaukee case, the VFW stands to get no compensation for its lease, based on a 2009 Wisconsin Supreme Court ruling.
"This situation showed so clearly the results of the rule that the Wisconsin Supreme Court applied," Berliner said. "The result was so extreme."
The origin of the case dates to 1961, when the VFW, which owned the site, agreed to sell it to Towne Metropolitan Inc., Milwaukee, to develop a hotel. In exchange for the land, the VFW received a 99-year lease to use space in the building as a VFW hall. In 2003, the VFW had 67 years left on its lease with the option to extend the lease another 99 years.
"It is completely impossible that just compensation for a 50-year or 60-year lease is zero," Berliner said.
The core question is whether governments, when using eminent domain, base their payments to the owner on the value of the land acquired or the value of the assets lost, such as the VFW’s long-term lease.
More about the case and the issue here. Thanks to the folks at California Eminent Domain Report for the heads up.
Posted on May 20, 2010 in ▪ Appellate law, ▪ Eminent Domain | Condemnation, ▪ Land use law, ▪ Property rights | Permalink
Posted on May 19, 2010 in ▪ Appellate law, ▪ Eminent Domain | Condemnation, ▪ Land use law, ▪ Regulatory takings | Permalink | 0 Comments
Final (Final) Briefs In Hawaii Beach Taking Case: Is "Future" Accretion A Present Property Interest?
A couple of days ago, we posted "Final Briefs In Hawaii Beach Takings Case: Is 'Future' Accretion A Present Property Interest?" with what we thought was a complete set of the merits and amicus briefs filed in Maunalua Bay Beach Ohana 28 v. State of Hawaii, No. 28175 (cert. application filed Apr. 22, 2010).
Turns out we missed one set, the amicus brief of Hawaii's Thousand Friends which urges the Hawaii Supreme Court not to accept the application for a writ of certiorari filed by the property owners, and the property owners' brief responding to HTF's brief.
HTF's amicus brief (May 13, 2010)
Property owners' response to HTF's brief (May 18, 2010)
[Our usual disclosure: we filed an amicus brief in the Intermediate Court of Appeals supporting the property owners, and recently filed an amicus brief in the Supreme Court].
Unless there is another amicus party of whom we are not aware, or the Hawaii Supreme Court orders further briefing from the parties, these should be the final briefs in the case.
Posted on May 18, 2010 in ▪ Appellate law, ▪ Environmental law, ▪ Inverse condemnation, ▪ Land use law, ▪ Property rights, ▪ Regulatory takings, ▪ Shoreline | CZMA, ▪ Vested rights, ▪ Water rights | Public trust | Permalink
Georgia SCT: Lack Of Prosecution Time Limit Applies To Condemnees
The first line of this opinion issued today by the Georgia Supreme Court got us all excited:
The trial court dismissed this condemnation case for lack of prosecution pursuant to OCGA § 9-2-60 (b).
Windsor f/k/a Bank v. City of Atlanta, No. S10A0102 (May 17, 2010). Was it a case where a condemnor sat on its rights? Started to take property then did nothing? Alas, it was not quite as dramatic.
The city needed a 29-foot subsurface easement to address a substandard sewer line. The city offered $180 for the easement but Windsor declined, at which point the city instituted a "declaration of taking" action and put $400 into court as the estimated compensation. The trial court vested title in the city. Slip op. at 3.
Windsor challenged the taking, including with its claims a challenge to the constitutionality of the declaration of taking procedure. The issues were briefed and evidence presented, but the trial court denied Windsor's motion to annul the taking. The Georgia Supreme Court declined interlocutory review, and left the case with the trial court.
"For the next five years, nothing happened in the case, aside from the occasional filing of a notice of a leave of absence by one of the attorneys." Slip op. at 4. After Windsor filed a motion to have the case placed on the trial court's calendar, the court dismissed under Georgia's code section which provides "[a]ny action or other proceeding filed in any of the courts of this state in which no written order is taken for a period of five years shall automatically stand dismissed with costs to be taxed against the party plaintiff."
The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed, holding this is a "bright line rule." Slip op. at 5. Certain trial court orders will reset the five-year clock, but in this case, Windsor did not argue the trial court had entered such an order.
It appears to us that the Supreme Court's ruling turned on Georgia's process for property owner challenges to declaration of taking condemnations. In order to contest the taking under Georgia law, Windsor was required to file a notice of appeal with the trial court, at which point it became a "plaintiff," it appears, for purposes of the five year prosecution statute:
OCGA § 32-3-14. We can't quite square this with the court's conclusion that Windsor could not avail itself of a code provision that allows a "plaintiff" to reboot:
When an action is dismissed under this Code section, if the plaintiff recommences the action within six months following the dismissal then the renewed action shall stand upon the same footing, as to limitation, with the original action.
OCGA § 9-2-60(c). The court concluded "the property owner in a condemnation case is neither the plaintiff nor a counter-claimant and so cannot take advantage of the renewal provisions." Slip op. at 6. If someone has a way to address our dissonance, comment away.
Posted on May 18, 2010 in ▪ Eminent Domain | Condemnation | Permalink | 0 Comments
Final Briefs In In Hawaii Beach Taking Case: Is "Future" Accretion A Present Property Interest?
Here are the latest filings in Maunalua Bay Beach Ohana 28 v. State of Hawaii, No. 28175 (cert. application filed Apr. 22, 2010). In that case, the property owners are asking the Hawaii Supreme Court to review the decision of the Intermediate Court of Appeals in Maunalua Bay Beach Ohana 28 v. State of Hawaii, 122 Haw. 34, 222 P.3d 441 (Haw. Ct. App. 2009), which held that "Act 73" (codifed here and here) was a taking. [Disclosure: we filed an amicus brief in the ICA supporting the property owners, and recently filed an amicus brief in the Supreme Court - see below].
In Act 73, the legislature declared that title to shoreline land naturally accreted cannot be registered by anyone except the State, and that only the State could quiet title to accreted land. The ICA held that the Act was a taking of accreted land which existed in 2003 when the Act was adopted, but that it was not a taking of what the ICA called "future accretions."
The court held that because "future" accretion might never happen, the State could acquire it without first paying compensation. Maunalua Bay, 122 Haw. at 53, 222 P.3d at 460. The ICA accepted the State’s argument that Act 73 did not affect a taking of future accretion, because the right is simply a contingent future interest. The ICA concluded,"any claims that Plaintiff may have to future accretions are purely speculative, and other courts have held that a riparian owner has no vested right to future accretions." Id.
On April 26, 2010, the State filed its own application for writ of certiorari which asked the Supreme Court to review and reverse the ICA's conclusion that Act 73 was a taking of pre-2003 accreted lands, and last week filed its opposition to the property owner's application.
So here's the state of the briefing so far:
The littoral property owners' application for a writ of certiorari (April 22, 2010)
State of Hawaii's opposition (May 10, 2010)
Pacific Legal Foundation's brief amicus curiae (May 13, 2010)
State of Hawaii's application for writ of certiorari (Apr. 26, 2010)
Property owners' opposition to State's application for cert (May 11, 2010)
Next up: a decision by the court on whether to accept or reject either (or both) of the cert applications. Stay tuned.
Posted on May 17, 2010 in ▪ Appellate law, ▪ Due process, ▪ Environmental law, ▪ Inverse condemnation, ▪ Land use law, ▪ Property rights, ▪ Regulatory takings, ▪ Shoreline | CZMA, ▪ Vested rights, ▪ Water rights | Public trust | Permalink
Briefs And Live Blog Of June 1 New York Court Of Appeals Oral Argument In Kaur v. NY State Urban Dev Corp. (Columbia "Blight" Case)
On June 1, 2010, starting at 2:00 p.m. ET, the New York Court of Appeals will hear oral arguments in Kaur v. New York State Urban Development Corp. In that case, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division (First Department) struck down the attempted taking of land north of Columbia University in New York City because of the record reflected overwhelming private benefit and lack of "blight." We analyzed the Appellate Division's opinion here.
The Court of Appeals webcasts oral arguments, so we will be able to follow along and live blog the event. Joining me will be eminent domain scholar and property owners' advocate Tim Sandefur, and my Damon Key colleague and fellow condemnation law attorney Mark Murakami.
Sign up below for email notification. Then on the day of the argument follow along and join in the discussion.
&lt;p&gt;&amp;amp;lt;p&amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;amp;lt;p&amp;amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;lt;p&amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;lt;p&amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;lt;p&amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;lt;p&amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;lt;a href=&amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;quot;http://www.coveritlive.com/mobile.php/option=com_mobile/task=viewaltcast/altcast_code=8d1b4a3fb2&amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;quot; &amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;gt;N.Y. Ct. of Appeals Oral Arguments in Kaur v. NY State Urban Dev (Columbia Eminent Domain)&amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;lt;/a&amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;lt;/p&amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;lt;/p&amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;lt;/p&amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;lt;/p&amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;amp;lt;/p&amp;amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;lt;/p&amp;amp;gt;&lt;/p&gt;
Posted on May 17, 2010 in ▪ Appellate law, ▪ Eminent Domain | Condemnation, ▪ Land use law, ▪ Property rights, ▪ Public Use | Kelo | Permalink | 0 Comments
Missouri Court Of Appeals: Good Faith Negotiation Statute Requires Appraisal Using "Generally Accepted Appraisal Practices"
After Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005), many state and local governments adopted measures designed to limit exercises of the power of eminent domain. Some jurisdictions went for substantive limits. For example, Nebraska adopted a statute prohibiting takings that are "primarily" for economic development. Other jurisdictions took the procedural route, and adopted procedural limits on the exercise of the eminent domain power.
Missouri is one of the latter jurisdictions. It adopted Missouri Rev. Stat. § 532.256 which requires a condemor to engage in "good faith negotiations" before filing an eminent domain action:
(1) It has properly and timely given all notices to owners required by this chapter;
(2) Its offer under section 523.253 was no lower than the amount reflected in an appraisal performed by a state-licensed or state-certified appraiser for the condemning authority, provided an appraisal is given to the owner pursuant to subsection 2 of section 523.253 or, in other cases, the offer is no lower than the amount provided in the basis for its determination of the value of the property as provided to the owner under subsection 2 of section 523.253;
(3) The owner has been given an opportunity to obtain his or her own appraisal from a state-licensed or state-certified appraiser of his or her choice; and
(4) Where applicable, it has considered an alternate location suggested by the owner under section 523.265.
If the court does not find that good faith negotiations have occurred, the court shall dismiss the condemnation petition, without prejudice, and shall order the condemning authority to reimburse the owner for his or her actual reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred with respect to the condemnation proceeding which has been dismissed.
In Planned Industrial Expansion Authority of Kansas City v. Ivanhoe Neighborhood Council, No. WD70655 (Apr. 27, 2010), the Missouri Court of Appeals (Western District) held that pursuant to subsection (2) (which incorporates by reference section 523.253), a court must invalidate a taking if the condemnor hasn't made a good faith offer. A "good faith offer" means that it must be supported by an appraisal by a state licensed or certified appraiser, "using generally accepted appraisal practices." The issue in the case wa whether the Expansion Authority's appraisal was valid under these standards.
The trial court determined "the appraisal fell short of a good faith appraisal" because it did not find the appraiser's testimony credible. Slip op. at 11. On appeal, the Expansion Authority argued that sections 532-256 and 532-253 did not give the trial court the power to question the credibility of the appraiser, but that it must accept the appraiser's direct testimony that he used a generally accepted appraisal practice. The court of appeals rejected the argument:
The Expansion Authority argues that the 2006 amendments to chapter 523 do not affect a condemning authority's requirement to negotiate in good faith. We disagree. The legislature enacted the 2006 amendments to chapter 523 in response to Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005), which held that it did not violate the United States Constitution when private property was taken and given to another private entity for public development purposes even when the property was not located in a blighted area. Dale A. Whitman, Eminent Domain Reform in Missouri: A Legislative Memoir, 71 Mo. L. Rev. 721, 723 (Summer 2006). Thus, the legislature‟s aim was to strengthen the rights of landowners in eminent domain actions. Id. The precise language at issue here—the requirement that any appraisal be conducted using generally accepted appraisal practices—was inserted "to prevent condemnors from providing the landowner with slipshod or incompetent appraisals." Id. at 749.
Thus, section 523.253 gave landowners the added protections that an appraisal (or an explanation with supporting financial data) be included in the condemning party's good faith offer and that any appraisal be made using generally accepted appraisal practices.
Slip op. at 12-13 (footnote omitted). In short, a trial court is not required to take an appraiser's claim that his method is generally accepted at "face value." Slip op. at 15.
While the court held that the post-Kelo amendments permit a trial court to measure the credibility of an appraiser to determine whether she used generally accepted appraisal practices, "[w]e stress that section 523.253 does not contemplate a full determination of the fair market value of the subject property at the initial hearing." Slip op. at 14. It looks like the court is contemplating a procedure similar to the typical voir dire examination of expert witnesses to determine they are qualified.
Finally, the court awarded attorneys' fees, holding that the term "owner" in section 532.256 includes the owner and holder of a note secured by a deed of trust upon the property because the note is "property" subject to condemnation. Slip op. at 15-16. The court also awarded attorneys' fees incurred in the appeal, and remanded the case to the trial court for a determination of the award.
Posted on May 16, 2010 in ▪ Eminent Domain | Condemnation, ▪ Property rights | Permalink | 0 Comments
This just in: the Ninth Circuit has issued an opinion in Adam Bros. Farming, Inc. v. County of Santa Barbara, No. 09-55315 (May 14, 2010).
Adam Bros. Farming, Inc. and Iceberg Holdings, L.L.C. (collectively "Adam Bros.") appeal from the district court’s dismissal of their joint complaint. Adam Bros. sued the County of Santa Barbara and several of its employees (collectively "the county") in federal court, alleging that the county had, through a false wetland delineation, temporarily taken its land without providing just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The district court granted the county’s motion to dismiss and concluded that Adam Bros.’s claim was not ripe because Adam Bros. failed to demonstrate that it had sought and was denied just compensation under state law. Because we conclude that Adam Bros.’s claim is barred by the application of res judicata, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
More to follow after a chance to digest the opinion.
Posted on May 14, 2010 in ▪ Appellate law, ▪ Inverse condemnation, ▪ Land use law, ▪ Property rights, ▪ Regulatory takings, ▪ Williamson County | Ripeness | Permalink | 0 Comments
Florida Court Of Appeal: State Must Pay When It Destroys Healthy Orange Trees
When the state purposely destroys healthy citrus trees as part of a program to address citrus canker, it must pay the owners of the trees just compensation.
In Dep't of Agriculture & Consumer Services v. Borgoff, No. 4D08-4474 (May 12, 2010), the Florida District Court of Appeal (Fourth District) affirmed an $11 million class action jury verdict ordering the Department of Agriculture to pay for the more than 100,000 non-commercial trees it cut down and destroyed in Broward County. The Department's eradication program destroyed any citrus tree within 1,900 feet of any tree found with citrus canker. The court concluded this was a taking:
Cutting down and destroying healthy noncommercial trees of private citizens could hardly be more definitively a taking. Government has regulatory power for the very purpose of safeguarding the rights of citizens, not for destroying them.
Slip op. at 6 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). The court first concluded that it would not disturb the jury's determination that healthy citrus trees "are not harmful or destructive, even though found within 1,900 feet of a tree having citrus canker." Slip op. at 3. The Department asserted that its scientific evidence was more convincing, but court held that it was the function of the jury to choose which side's evidence should be accepted. Because"[t]here is evidence in the record that the healthy trees taken under the [eradication program] had continued to produce the fruit, the juice, the shade, the pleasing aromas, the agreeable vistas — all the virtues for which their owners carefully planted and tended them," slip op. at 3, the appeals court would not override the jury's conclusion.
The court also rejected the Department's argument that healthy trees exposed to citrus canker were valueless because they were a nuisance, and will eventually develop canker. "It is apparent from the history of this case that [the Department] destroyed these privately owned healthy trees not because they were really 'imminently dangerous' to anybody but instead to benefit the citrus industry in Florida." Slip op. at 4 (citation omitted). Nuisance is reserved for things that cause imminent "inconvenience or damage" to the public, and the court rejected the Department's claim that the healthy trees were a danger:
If trees are destroyed not to prevent harm but instead to benefit an industry, it is difficult to understand how [the Department] can argue on appeal that the trees legally constituted a nuisance without any value.
Slip op. at 4. The court also rejected the Department's claim that multi-factored takings tests are applicable instead of a per se physical invasion rule. See slip op. at 5-6. Calling the multi-factored test "recondite," (the opinion does not cite Penn Central, but what else could it be referring to?), the court held:
Under any possible meaning, if government cuts down and burns private property having value, then government has taken it. And if government has
taken it, government must pay for it.
Lastly, the court bluntly rejected the Department's claim that the Florida legislature replaced the common law claim for inverse condemnation for destruction of citrus trees with a statutory claim. Slip op. at 6 ("Like most of the arguments of [the Department] in this dispute, it seems to have been made without regard to history, positive law or precedent.").
More about the decision from the Miami Herald: Court upholds $11M citrus canker payout, but Florida vows to appeal. It looks like we have not seen the last of this issue.
Posted on May 13, 2010 in ▪ Agriculture, ▪ Inverse condemnation, ▪ Land use law, ▪ Regulatory takings | Permalink | 0 Comments
Petition To Watch: Is A Littoral Owner Trespassing When The Shoreline Erodes?
SCOTUSblog has listed Sharp v. United States, No. 09-820 as a "petition to watch" for the Court's conference today.
May 17, 2010 Update: cert. denied.
In that case, the property owners are asking the U.S. Supreme Court to review the Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. Milner, 583 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir. 2009), which held that a littoral owner was liable for trespass in waters held by the federal government for the benefit of the Lummi Nation, and for violation of the Rivers and Harbors Act for maintaining a "shore defense structure." The structure was built on private fast (dry) land, but the shoreline eventually eroded up to it.
In the opinion, detailed in this post, the Ninth Circuit held that "both the tideland owner and the upland owner have a right to an ambulatory boundary, and each has a vested right in the potential gains that accrue from the movement of the boundary line." Slip op. at 14477. The shoreline defense structure may have been legal when it was built, according to the court, but it became illegal when it impeded natural erosion.
We detailed the cert petition here.
Here are the petition, BIO of the Lummi Nation, the U.S. government's BIO, and the amicus briefs:
Lummi Nation's Brief in Opposition
Federal Government's Brief in Opposition
Brief Amicus Curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation and the Washington State Farm Bureau
Brief Amicus Curiae of the Bay Planning Coalition and the California Building Industry Association
Posted on May 13, 2010 in ▪ Appellate law, ▪ Environmental law, ▪ Inverse condemnation, ▪ Land use law, ▪ Property rights, ▪ Regulatory takings, ▪ Shoreline | CZMA, ▪ Vested rights, ▪ Water rights | Public trust | Permalink
Ely On "Stevens, Kagan and Property Rights"
Vanderbilt lawprof James Ely (if you haven't read his book The Guardian of Every Other Right: A Constitutional History of Property Rights (1998), you really should) writes on the topic du jour, the nomination of SG Elena Kagan to the Supreme Court in Stevens, Kagan and property rights.
Most of the article focuses on Justice Stevens' record in property cases:
Hopefully Elena Kagan, Mr. Obama's nominee to replace Justice Stevens, holds a more balanced view of the importance of property rights in the American constitutional order. As in many other fields of law, however, Ms. Kagan's record with respect to property rights is a blank slate. It certainly would be appropriate for senators at Ms. Kagan's confirmation hearing to ask about her thoughts on this subject.
Will they, and more importantly, will she respond with anything more than a the claim that judges are "umpires?"
Posted on May 12, 2010 in ▪ Eminent Domain | Condemnation, ▪ Property rights, ▪ Public Use | Kelo, ▪ Regulatory takings | Permalink | 0 Comments
Yale Law Journal: Eminent Domain Due Process
A new article worth reading: Eminent Domain Due Process, 119 Yale L. J. 1280 (2010) by D. Zachary Hudson. Here's the abstract:
This Note analyzes the apparent disconnect between eminent domain doctrine and due process doctrine. Following Kelo, numerous states have reformed their eminent domain laws in an effort to ensure that the takings power is not abused. Whatever one makes of these legislative reforms, at an absolute minimum, the Due Process Clause should guarantee that landowners receive notice and an opportunity for some sort of judicial determination of the legality of the taking before the land is actually taken. After cataloging existing eminent domain laws, this Note traces the evolution of these laws over time in both the legislatures and the courts. In parallel, this Note analyzes the evolving circumstances driving the judicial perception of eminent domain. Examining these facts, the Note explains why courts have failed to rein in the eminent domain power with procedural protections. After establishing the appropriateness of applying modern due process principles to eminent domain actions, the focus of the inquiry shifts to what procedural due process demands. This colloquy explains what process is due, what the content and form of that process should be, and the likely effects of recognizing due process rights in the eminent domain context.
The article cites one of my home jurisdictions (Hawaii) as taking a "middle course" by providing "some process" before the taking:
Several other states require notice by statute prior to allowing the exercise of eminent domain authority, but do not specifically afford any form of precondemnation judicial process. Under Hawaii law, for example, a taking can be accomplished by a simple filing with the court, but the condemnor must also provide notice to the owner of the property it seeks to condemn. There is no specific judicial proceeding provided for under this statute, but by ensuring notice to the property owner, the statute at least gives the individual the opportunity to attempt to insert herself in the process by seeking an injunction or pursuing some other equitable remedy.
119 Yale L. J. at 1289 (citing Haw. Rev. Stat. § 101-28 (2006)).
Thanks to my colleague Dwight Merriam for the heads up on this article.
Posted on May 12, 2010 in ▪ Due process, ▪ Eminent Domain | Condemnation, ▪ Property rights | Permalink
Cal Ct App: You Knew The Property Was Damaged When You Bought It
In a partially-published* opinion in Ridgewater Associates, LLC v. Dublin San Ramon Services District, No. A124661 (Apr. 11, 2010), the California Court of Appeals (First District) held that a property owner did not muster sufficient proof to support its claim for inverse condemnation against a neighboring sewage treatment facility. Ridgewater claimed that water from the facility intruded on its property.
The appeals court first rejected the trial court's conclusion that Ridgewater lacked standing because it was seeking relief for damages that occurred prior to its purchase of the property. The court held that by asserting it has been forced to pump intruding water off of its land, Ridgewater was asserting a claim for damages occurring during its ownership, and not for damages incurred before. Slip op. at 6 ("Ridgewater claims that rising water in the loading dock must be pumped to and over the paved surfaces on Ridgewater's property, erodes the pavement and requires additional maintenance and repairs.").
Even though Ridgewater had standing, the appeals court concluded that it did not prove it was damaged by the water intrusion. "Ridgewater was aware when it purchased the property that it was affected by '[c]ertain water table and water intrusion conditions' and the price it paid was reduced to take those conditions into account." Slip op. at 6. Someone who purchases land knowing it is subject to such conditions "cannot claim to be the victim of a governmental taking." Slip op. at 7. The court published this portion of the opinion.
In the unpublished portion, the court rejected Ridgewater's nuisance claim. The government is immune from liability for "injuries caused by the plan, design or construction of a public improvement that is built in conformance with the plan or design and is reasonably approved by a public body." Slip op. at 7 (citing Cal. Gov't Code § 830.6). The court concluded "[t]here is no reason to conclude the plans for the [sewage facilities] were not approved by the District's governing body and constructed in accordance with that approval." Slip op. at 10.
*For those of you not aware of the California courts' unusual publication practices, find out more here.
Posted on May 11, 2010 in ▪ Inverse condemnation | Permalink
New York Appellate Division: Condemnation Must Proceed Under Eminent Domain Statutes, Not Highway Law
In County of Cortland v. Miller, No 507725 (Mar. 24, 2010), the New York Appellate Division (Third Department) held that when the county legislature authorized the condemnation of property for a road culvert pursuant to New York's Eminent Domain Procedure Law, the county highway department must condemn the property pursuant to the EDPL, and not the Highway Law.
Here, the County Legislature's resolution in August 2008 authorized the acquisition pursuant to the EDPL. Rather than adhering to the method for the taking directed in the resolution (i.e., the EDPL), petitioner instead attempted to use a procedure under a different statute (i.e., Highway Law § 120). This alone is reason enough to dismiss the petition. In addition, Highway Law § 120 is inconsistent with the EDPL in significant aspects relevant in this proceeding, including hearing requirements (see EDPL 201) and who determines compensation (see EDPL 501 [B]). Those aspects of Highway Law § 120 no longer govern a taking in this state and it was error to utilize procedures from Highway Law § 120 that were at odds with the EDPL.
Posted on May 10, 2010 in ▪ Eminent Domain | Condemnation | Permalink | 0 Comments
"Our decision today recognizes that snow and snowplowing are facts of life in Vermont, and we do not find a cause of action when defendant has done nothing more than protect public safety by plowing the roads that it has an ongoing legal duty to plow."
Ondovchick Family Ltd. P'ship v. Agency of Transportation, No 2009-182, at ¶ 22 (Apr. 30, 2010).
There you have it: one of those decisions where its really not productive to dig deeper, or to try and reconcile it with other cases. You know the kind of decision we're talking about, the kind where the opinion begins with "The widow Plaintiff..." and that you don't need to read much further to know the result the opinion is going to reach, or why.
Oh, we could try and analyze the Vermont Supreme Court's opinion in Ondovchick more closely. But that might be a fruitless exercise.
Like how the court rejected an inverse condemnation theory which alleged that as a result of road-widening project, plowed snow and water runoff entered the plaintiff's property and damaged a building (before the project moved the road closer to the building, thrown snow was not a problem). The theory failed, the court held, because the invasion of the property by the thrown snow was "temporary," citing of all things, Loretto v. Teleprompter Mannattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1983) (Slip op. at ¶ 12), but not even mentioning First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987), the decision confirming that temporary takings require compensation. See slip op. at ¶¶ 16-18.
Or that the court cited Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005) for the just plain weird proposition that "[i]nverse condemnation claims are reserved for instances in which the state should have entered into eminent domain proceedings initially." Slip op. at ¶ 21. "This is not such an instance," the Vermont court concluded, because, "Defendant did not have an obligation to use its powers of eminent domain to take all of the land that might at some point be hit by snow throw and water runoff." (If anyone cares, Lingle stands for nothing of the sort, holding instead that when a police power regulation has the same effect as an exercise of the eminent domain power, the protections of the Takings Clause are triggered. Courts don't need to inquire whether the government had an obligation to condemn the property instead of regulating it.)
The court also rejected the property owner's trespass theory. The agency's conduct was privileged, the court held, because it has discretion to determine how to remove snow off of Vermont's roads, "even if the chosen method causes some incursion upon or incidental damage to landowner’s property." Slip op. at ¶ 12.
In sum, Vermont has snow.
Lots of it, and it must be plowed. Get over it, landowners.
Posted on May 8, 2010 in ▪ Inverse condemnation, ▪ Land use law | Permalink | 0 Comments
More About The "Undivided Fee Rule" Cert Petition
A couple of links following up on our recent post about City of Milwaukee Post No. 2874 Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States v. Redevelopment Agency of the City of Milwaukee, No. 09-1204 (cert. petition filed Apr. 2, 2010).
That's the case in which the Supreme Court is being asked to review a decision by the Wisconsin Supreme Court (768 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2009)) applying the "undivided fee" rule to conclude that a valuable long-term $1 per year lease was worthless as a matter of law. The VFW was prohibited by the trial court from introducing any evidence of value since under the undivided fee rule, the jury could only determine the value of the fictional fee simple interest. The sharply divided Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed. [Disclosure: we filed an amicus brief, noted below.]
The cert petition is here. The amicus brief we filed for National Association of Home Builders and the Wisconsin Builders Association is here. The Institute for Justice's amicus brief is posted here.
Lawprof Ilya Somin details the amicus brief he filed in the case, and the comments include a spirited debate on the workings and wisdom of the undivided fee rule (via the Volokh Conspiracy).
The Eminent Domain Law Blog provides more information on the case here.
Posted on May 8, 2010 in ▪ Appellate law, ▪ Due process, ▪ Eminent Domain | Condemnation, ▪ Land use law, ▪ Property rights | Permalink | 0 Comments
Links From WMA Presentation - Regulatory Takings, Rent Control, And Guggenheim
Yesterday, I had the pleasure of speaking to members of the Western Manufactured Housing Communities Association about some of the legal issues facing their businesses, and property owners in general. Here are the links I mentioned:
Guggenheim v. City of Goleta, 582 F.3d 996 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc review ordered Mar. 12, 2010). This is the very important case regarding the city's mobile home rent control ordinance, which the Ninth Circuit panel concluded worked a facial taking of property under Penn Central. We have the briefs which have been filed for en banc review, and will be posting them in the upcoming days. Most definitely a case to watch.
Professor Richard Epstein's short article about Guggenheim, Takings Law Made Hard.
RS Radford's rejoinder to Professor Epstein, Takings victories made harder.
A recent opinion from the California Court of Appeal in another rent control regulatory takings case, MHC Financing Ltd. P'ship v. City of Santee, No. D053345 (Mar. 15, 2010). The case illustrates well the procedural hurdles the courts have erected when property owners bring regulatory takings claims.
Another recent decision in the same vein, this time from the federal courts: Knutson v. City of Fargo, No. 08-1894 (Apr. 12, 2010).
Posted on May 7, 2010 in ▪ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 | Civil Rights, ▪ Due process, ▪ Eminent Domain | Condemnation, ▪ Inverse condemnation, ▪ Land use law, ▪ Property rights, ▪ Regulatory takings, ▪ Seminars, ▪ Williamson County | Ripeness | Permalink
Home Builders' Amicus Brief In SCOTUS Eminent Domain Case: Is Wisconsin's Application Of The Undivided Fee Rule Unconstitutional?
Today, on behalf of the National Association of Home Builders and the Wisconsin Building Association, we filed this brief amici curiae in City of Milwaukee Post No. 2874 Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States v. Redevelopment Agency of the City of Milwaukee, No. 09-1204 (cert. petition filed Apr. 2, 2010).
The brief argues that the "undivided fee rule," as applied by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, violates the Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation Clause because it requires that the value of a leasehold interest which would be worth over $1 million if condemned separately be valued at zero. Most eminent domain attorneys know about the infamous undivided fee rule (aka as the "unit rule" in some jurisdictions), a legal fiction which requires a trial court to calculate valuation of property as if a single owner possessed everything, even when it is held by more than one interest. Under the rule, the condemnor is not required to compensate each separate interest in the property, but treats the property as if it had one owner.
For example, if a condemned building is being leased to tenants, compensation is measured by the value of the undivided fee simple absolute value of the building, not the aggregate value of the building and the leases. The building owner and the tenants must divide up the condemnation award by contract. In many if not most cases, the rule is uncontroversial. But in a few cases its rigid application works very unusual and unfair results.
In City of Milwaukee Post No. 2874 Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States v. Redevelopment Agency of the City of Milwaukee, 768 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2009), a sharply divided Wisconsin Supreme Court applied the rule to conclude first that a tenant who owned an admittedly valuable long term lease ($1 rent per year, plus goodies) was not entitled to any compensation because the value of the building was zero.We deconstructed the opinion in this post: Wisconsin Supreme Court: The Whole Is Lesser Than The Sum Of Its Parts.
The petition points out the split of authority in the lower courts on the applicability of the undivided fee rule. Some twenty states (Hawaii included) apply the rule regardless of the circumstances. Seven other jurisdictions never apply the rule. Still others (eight states and several federal courts) apply the rule, but are willing to deviate from it when its application would deny just compensation. A split of authority is one of the surest tickets to Supreme Court review. To add to this case's chances, the Court has appeared to be interested in the question of just compensation recently. During the oral arguments in Kelo v. City of New London, for example, two Justices asked counsel about it, even though just compensation was not at issue in that case.
The petition sums up the basic issue, and the equities:
The question is whether valuation by this fictional technique satisfies the 5th and 14th Amendments’ guarantee that those whose property is commandeered for public use will receive just compensation, usually defined as fair market value. The result below speaks eloquently. The Veterans of Foreign Wars received $0 as compensation for a long-term lease, a lease that the majority opinion had to concede had value, even though application of the undivided fee rule forbade the VFW from presenting any evidence as to that value or receiving any compensation from the Redevelopment Authority for its taking.
Petition at 4-5. Our amici brief argues:
The "undivided fee" rule – a rule of convenience under which a court will not value a leasehold interest separately if it is condemned along with the fee simple estate – cannot override the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of just compensation when property is taken.
A uniform standard is sorely lacking and the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s rigid application of the undivided fee rule resulted in the literal evaporation of what was acknowledged by all parties to be a valuable property interest. The Private Property and Just Compensation Clauses require more.
Leaseholds are"property" protected from uncompensated takings by the Fifth Amendment, and if the VFW’s lease alone had been condemned, there would be no question it would be entitled to compensation and to have a jury determine the lease’s value. See, e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 380 (1945) ("The right to occupy, for a day, a month, a year, or a series of years, in and of itself and without reference to the actual use, needs, or collateral arrangements of the occupier, has a value."). The Wisconsin court’s application of the undivided fee rule to value that lease at zero as a matter of law simply because the fee simple interest was also being acquired – and to prohibit the VFW from presenting evidence of the lease’s actual value to the jury – ignored its status as Fifth Amendment property, entitled to recognition independent of the fee simple interest, and separate valuation.
This Court should grant the writ of certiorari to review the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s conclusion that in eminent domain law, somehow the whole can be lesser than the sum of its parts.
Br. at 4-5 (emphasis original). More to follow if and when a brief in opposition is filed.
Posted on May 5, 2010 in ▪ Appellate law, ▪ Due process, ▪ Eminent Domain | Condemnation, ▪ Property rights | Permalink | 0 Comments
"Takings International" Panel Report
My ABA State & Local Government Law colleague Andy Gowder has posted on his blog Grounded, a report and summary of the recent Miami panel discussion of Takings International: A Comparative Perspective on Land Use Regulations and Compensation Rights (Mar. 2010; $95 regular price; $75 for SLG members).
Takings International is a comparative study of how 13 jurisdictions worldwide treat what we in the U.S. call "regulatory takings." Visit this page for the Table of Contents and a pdf of Chapter I (scroll to the bottom of the page). Our book review is here.
I concur with Andy's assessment that it was a fascinating and informative session (and I disclaim any bias resulting from the fact I served as moderator).
The panelists highlighted the issues discussed in the book, and Andy reports:
Professor Alterman began her remarks by pointing out that though no other country comes close to the United States in the amount of litigation, academic writing and public media generated on the issue of takings, it does not have the broadest compensation rights. In fact, the US is generally in the middle of the pack, with Poland, Germany, Sweden, Israel, and the Netherlands offering significantly more to the landowner in compensation for taking of property by the government, with the Netherlands, interestingly, having the highest rate of compensation.
Read the entirety of Andy's report here.
Along with me and Professor Alterman, the panel included Professor Russell Brown (University of Alberta) and Professor Bryan Schwartz (University of Manitoba) who gave details and criticisms of Canada's approach, Professor David Callies (University of Hawaii) discussing the Asia and Pacific approaches, and Professor Tom Roberts (Wake Forest University) comparing our homegrown system.
Professor Brown has promised a blog post with further thoughts upon his return home. We will link to it when it goes up. Update: here's a link to Professor Brown's post on the Faculty Blog (U. Alberta). See also Professor Brown's comment to this post, which I have copied here:
Thanks for this post. In fact, I blogged (very quickly) the Takings International session later that same day. See http://ualbertalaw.typepad.com/faculty/2010/04/takings-international.html
As you will see, it prompted an exchange. The commentator is the co-editor of a leading Canadian text on Government Liability, to which I contribute the chapter on "Takings".
I would like to do something more substantial, but am scrambling to get some stuff done before heading out of the country again in 2 weeks.
Love your blog, by the way. And thanks, Andy, for a great post. The one little correction I'd make is that the international law obligations are applicable as such, and not by virtue of Canada's membership in the OAS, which is just one of the sources of those various obligations.
PS - think kindly of me - it has snowed 6" here since I got back from Miami.
Posted on May 3, 2010 in ▪ Articles and publications, ▪ Inverse condemnation, ▪ Land use law, ▪ Property rights, ▪ Regulatory takings | Permalink | 0 Comments