Source: https://casetext.com/case/nfe-international-ltd-v-resource-corporation
Timestamp: 2018-12-17 00:44:14
Document Index: 621501113

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1382', '§ 1121', '§ 1338', '§ 1332', '§ 1121', '§ 1338', '§ 1058', '§ 1065', '§ 1115', '§ 1058', '§ 1065', '§ 1115', '§ 1114', '§ 1065', '§ 1115', '§ 1115']

NFE International, Ltd. v. General Resource Corp, 558 F. Supp. 1137 | Casetext
NFE International, Ltd. v. General Resource Corp.
558 F. Supp. 1137 (N.D. Ill. 1983)
United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern DivisionFeb 25, 1983
ROBB CONTAINER CORP. v. SHO-ME CO.
…Wesley-Jensen Division of Schering Corp. v. Bausch Lomb, Inc., 698 F.2d 862, 864 (7th Cir. 1982). Our…
…In determining whether likelihood of confusion exists, courts typically consider such factors as the degree…
No. 82 C 5638
Basil P. Mann, Nate F. Scarpelli, Merriam, Marshall Bicknell, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff.
Steven Gilford, Catherine T. Crowley, Donald V. Jernberg, Isham, Lincoln Beal, Chicago, Ill., for defendant.
Plaintiff NEE International ("NFE") sued General Resource Corporation ("General Resource") for trademark infringement, unfair competition and dilution. Jurisdiction is asserted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1382, 15 U.S.C. § 1121, and 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (a). Presently pending before the Court is NFE's motion for a preliminary injunction against General Resource. For reasons set forth below, NFE's motion is granted.
28 U.S.C. § 1332 provides in pertinent part that
15 U.S.C. § 1121 states that:
According to 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (a)
NFE has been manufacturing industrial particle collectors, which are used to collect or convey particles of various sizes, for over ten years. Starting in or about 1970, NFE began to use HI-VAC as a trademark for its industrial pneumatic particle collectors and conveyors. NFE registered the trademark HI-VAC in the United States Patent and Trademark Office on May 28, 1974. Counsel for NFE subsequently filed Section 8 and 15 affidavits in an effort to satisfy various provisions of the Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1058 and 15 U.S.C. § 1065. On May 28, 1980, the Patent and Trademark Office accepted these affidavits, thus granting NFE the rights under the above sections of the Act and establishing NFE's exclusive right to use the mark under 15 U.S.C. § 1115. In its complaint, NFE alleges that it has spent substantial funds to advertise and promote its products under the HI-VAC mark, and that the mark HI-VAC has become well known as a badge of origin of its products.
15 U.S.C. § 1058 provides in pertinent part that
15 U.S.C. § 1065 provides in pertinent part that
the right of the registrant to use such registered mark in commerce for the goods or services on or in connection with which such registered mark has been in continuous use for five consecutive years subsequent to the date of such registration and is still in use in commerce, shall be incontestable . . . .
According to 15 U.S.C. § 1115, unless certain defenses or defects are established
Wesley-Jessen Division of Schering Corp. v. Bausch Lomb, Inc., 698 F.2d 862 at 864 (7th Cir. 1983); Helene Curtis Industries v. Church Dwight Co., 560 F.2d 1325, 1330 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1070, 98 S.Ct. 1252, 55 L.Ed.2d 772 (1978). We shall therefore consider in turn each of the above factors.
[1, 2] Under Federal Trademark Law, the test for liability for infringement is whether the infringer's "use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive. . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1). Thus, we must consider whether General Resource's use of the mark is likely to cause confusion in deciding whether NFE is likely to succeed on the merits. A number of factors must be analyzed in determining likelihood of confusion:
the degree of similarity between the marks in appearance and suggestion; the similarity of the products for which the name is used; the area and manner of current use; the degree of care likely to be exercised by consumers; the strength of the complainant's mark; actual confusion; and an intent on the part of the alleged infringer to palm off his products as those of another.
Helene Curtis industries v. Church Dwight Co., 560 F.2d 1325, 1880 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1078, 98 S.Ct. 1252, 55 L.Ed.2d 772 (1978), citing Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. VEB Carl Zeiss Jena, 438 F.2d 686, 705 (2 Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 905, 91 S.Ct. 2205, 29 L.Ed.2d 680 (1971). Examination of the marks in question indicates their similar appearance: HI-VAC and HIGH-VAC are spelled similarly, although HI-VAC uses different script and colors. HIGH-VAC, moreover, is used only in connection with the words "Super Jet." When pronounced, however, the two marks are identical. Similarity in the sound of trademarks enters into a consideration of likelihood of confusion. Grotrian, Heifferich, Schulz, T. Steinweg Nach F. v. Steinway Sons, 523 F.2d 1331, 1340 (2d Cir. 1975).
[3-7] The strength of NFE's mark is weak, according to General Resource, because it is merely a descriptive term for the words "high vacuum." General Resource also asserts that NFE's mark, in an infringement action, would be susceptible to the defense of fair use. But as NFE points out, a plaintiff who demonstrates that his trademark is uncontestable under § 1065 of the Lanham Act establishes conclusively his exclusive right to use the trademark under § 1115. Union Carbide v. Ever-Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 877 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830, 97 S.Ct. 91, 50 L.Ed.2d 94 (1976). Once it has been established that a mark is uncontestable, it is presumed that the mark is non-descriptive or has acquired secondary meaning. Id. NFE's exclusive right to use the mark under § 1115 has been established, thus precluding an argument by General Resource that the mark is merely descriptive. From the evidence submitted by the parties, it is unclear if there have in fact been instances of actual confusion between the parties products. There was, at best, one instance of confusion between NFE's product and the product of another maker containing a HI-VAC label. But evidence of actual confusion is not required in order to prove a likelihood of confusion for purposes of a preliminary injunction. Ideal Industries, Inc. v. Gardner Bender, Inc., 612 F.2d 1018, 1024 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 924, 100 S.Ct. 8016, 65 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1980). Evidence of actual confusion, however, is entitled to substantial weight. Tisch Hotels, Inc. v. Americana Inn, Inc., 350 F.2d 609, 612 (7th Cir. 1965). The evidence in the present case is sufficient to show that confusion between NFE's products and other manufacturers' products is likely.
General Resource has not addressed the issue of the uncontestability of NFE's mark.
Finally, we must examine whether there is intent on the part of General Resource to palm off their products as those of NFE. General Resource argues that it has used the term HIGH-VAC since 1968, well before NFE began using the mark HI-VAC. While NFE claims that it provided notice to General Resource that it was infringing NFE's mark, General Resource insists that use of its mark does not constitute infringement. We are not prepared to find, based on the evidence before us, that General Resource intentionally palmed off their products as those of NFE. Nevertheless, a consideration of the aforementioned factors indicates that NFE has demonstrated likelihood of confusion between their products and those of General Resource. Thus, NFE has proven that its infringement suit is likely to succeed on the merits.
In addition to deciding whether NFE is likely to succeed on the merits, we must also decide whether NFE is likely to have an adequate remedy at law or will be irreparably harmed without an injunction. General Resource states that NFE has not lost any sales, maintains that the parties products do not compete, and that confusion is not likely. But in trademark infringement cases, irreparable harm is readily found because of the victim's inability to control the nature and quality of the infringer's goods. NFE's loss of control over its reputation justifies a finding of irreparable harm even if it has lost no sales. Wesley-Jessen Division of Schering Corp. v. Bausch Lomb, Inc., 698 F.2d 862 at 867 (7th Cir. 1983).