Source: http://www.williamgoren.com/blog/tag/otherwise-qualified/
Timestamp: 2020-01-29 05:41:55
Document Index: 110803876

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 12101', '§1983', '§1983', '§1630', '§1983', '§1630', '§504', '§504', '§504', '§504', '§504', '§504']

otherwise qualified
Hostile Work Environment Issues and Demotion as a Reasonable Accommodation
November 18, 2019 by William Goren Leave a Comment
Next week is Thanksgiving week. My daughter has that entire week off. So, I am not sure about a blog entry for next week.
I have a whole bunch of cases in my pile that I can blog on. When I was going through them this morning, I ultimately decided to blog on a couple of cases dealing with hostile work environment and the ADA. I have blogged on hostile work environment and the ADA before, here. At the time I previously blogged on it, it wasn’t entirely clear whether hostile environment claims applied to the ADA at all. Now, it is becoming increasingly clear that hostile work environment claims do apply to the ADA. Most recently, the Tenth and Seventh Circuits have held as much. Considering the Seventh Circuit has not been particularly friendly to persons with disabilities, that holding is particularly significant. The Seventh Circuit case, which is published, also raises the question of whether hostile work environment claims can ever be split into two and whether a demotion can ever be a reasonable accommodation. As usual, the blog entry is divided into categories and they are: Mestas v. Town of Evansville, Wyoming; Ford v. Marion County Sheriff’s Office, which is then divided into subcategories of: basic facts taken directly from opinion; issues presented and holdings; court’s reasoning viability of hostile work environment claims; court’s reasoning severability of hostile work environment claim; court’s reasoning demotion as a reasonable accommodation; and thoughts/takeaways. Of course, the reader is free to focus on any or all of the categories.
Mestas v. Town of Evansville, Wyoming
In this particular case, the Tenth Circuit in an unpublished opinion, basically held that hostile work environment does apply to ADA claims, though it didn’t explicitly say so. Also, worthwhile noting is the court said that for retaliation claims a plaintiff does not have to show he or she suffers from an actual disability. Rather, plaintiff only has to show he or she had a reasonable good faith belief he or she had a disability. In this particular case, the court said plaintiff brought forth enough facts create a question of fact for a jury with respect to retaliation and hostile work environment.
Ford v. Marion County Sheriff’s Office
Basic Facts Taken Directly from Opinion:
Plaintiff Brigid Ford worked as a deputy in the Marion County Sheriff’s Office until her hand was seriously injured in a car accident while on duty. After assigning Ford to light duty for about a year, the Sheriff’s Office told Ford that she must either transfer to a permanent position with a cut in pay or be terminated. After some back and forth, Ford accepted a civilian job as a jail visitation clerk. In the following years, Ford alleges, she suffered disability- 2 No. 18-3217 based harassment by co-workers, refusals to accommodate her scheduling needs, and several discriminatory promotion denials. Ford sued the Sheriff’s Office for discriminatory employment practices in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. The district court granted summary judgment on most of Ford’s claims. Two claims were tried to a jury, which rendered a verdict for the defense.
Issues Presented and Holdings:
Is a hostile work environment actionable under the ADA? (Yes)
Can a hostile work environment claim ever be separated by the court into two different hostile work environment claims? (Yes)
Can a demotion be a reasonable accommodation? (Yes)
Court’s Reasoning Viability of Hostile Work Environment Claims
Every Circuit to consider the question of whether a hostile work environment claim exists under the ADA has held it does.
Congress wrote the ADA using the language of title VII, and title VII recognizes hostile work environment claims.
Five Circuits have held that hostile work environment claims are permitted under the ADA (Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth). Further, the First, Third, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits have assumed without deciding that such claims are possible.
Court’s Reasoning Severability of Hostile Work Environment Claims
Hostile work environment claims can be severed after looking at three factors: a significant gap between alleged incidents of discriminatory harassment; a change in managers; and intervening action by the employer.
With respect to time, no magic number exists. Rather, the question is whether the series of allegations describe continuous conduct rather than isolated incidents. In this particular case, there was a gap of 18 months between the two series of disability harassment.
With respect to a change in manager, while routine personnel actions are not sufficient to break up hostile work environment claims, a change in supervisor, which happened here, is.
With respect to intervening action, prompt and appropriate corrective action reasonably likely to prevent harassment from occurring beats employer liability for coworker harassment. In this case, the alleged first set of harassers were removed permanently. Accordingly, such removal brought an end to the unlawful employment practice at issue. Also, incidental rotation of coworkers not calculated to address the harassment does not sever the hostile work environment claims. Rather, it has to be a transfer amounting to intervening action by the employer in order to close out a distinct unlawful employment practice before the hostile work environment claim can be severed. Permanent removal of supervisors qualifies in either situation.
Demotion as a Reasonable Accommodation
A demotion can be a reasonable accommodation when the employer cannot accommodate the employee with the disability in his or her current or prior jobs or in an equivalent position.
The ADA does require an employer to offer an employee a vacant position that more closely matches his or her previous job.
The EEOC’s interpretive guidance said that an employer may reassign an individual to a lower graded position if there are no vacant equivalent position that the individual was qualified to do with or without reasonable accommodations.
The 10th Circuit has said and the court in this case agrees, that the employer should first consider a lateral move to positions regarded as equivalent before demoting an employee.
For a plaintiff to prevail on the question of whether the employer did not consider first a lateral move to positions that were equivalent, the plaintiff has to come forward with evidence that a more equivalent position for which he or she would qualify was vacant at the relevant time, which the plaintiff did not do in this case.
In the Seventh Circuit, a problem in the interactive process is not actionable in and of itself because the ADA looks at ends and not means.
Takeaway/Thoughts
It’s becoming really clear that a hostile work environment claim is a viable claim under the ADA providing traditional hostile work environment principles are met.
For purposes of proof at trial as well as for purposes of statute of limitations, attorneys want to keep in mind that circumstances exist as to when hostile work environment claims can be severed into separate hostile work environment claims.
The three factors to consider when deciding whether hostile work environment claim can be severed do appear to stand on their own. However, if Ford is any guide, a court will look to all three of the factors even if one of them might be the deciding factor.
A demotion under certain circumstances can be a reasonable accommodation. While the burden is on the plaintiff to show that a more equivalent position that he or she was qualified for was vacant at the relevant time, as a matter of preventive law, it makes sense for the employer to assist the employee in helping to determine whether any such vacant positions exist (see also this blog entry discussing mandatory reassignment). An employer that leaves it entirely open to the plaintiff to figure out whether there are equivalent vacant positions would leave themselves open to a claim that a more equivalent position was not really considered by the employer. If you’re the employer, why bother to take such a chance. Also, by providing assistance to find equivalent positions, you probably lessen the chance of litigation to begin with, and you certainly lessen the chance of successful litigation by the plaintiff.
As we have mentioned before, such as here, the Circuits are all over the place with respect to whether violation of the interactive process is actionable in and of itself. Very much depends upon the jurisdiction.
Filed Under: General Tagged With: ADA, ADA attorney, ADA compliance, ADA compliance attorney, ADA compliance expert witness, ADA consultant, ADA consulting, ADA consulting expert, ADA litigation consulting, change in managers, demotion, eleventh circuit, Ford v. Marion County Sherrif's Office, Hostile work environment, interactive process, intervening factor, lateral, lateral move, Mandatory reassignment, Mestas v. Town of evansville Wyoming, otherwise qualified, qualified, reasonable accommodation, severability of hostile work environment claim, significant gap, Tenth circuit, title I, title VII, transfer
Lewis v. Union City Yet Again
August 26, 2019 by William Goren 1 Comment
Today’s blog entry is a case that I have blogged on before twice, here and here. On August 15, 2019, the 11th Circuit came down with its second decision on this case, here. Since I have blogged on it before twice, there isn’t any need to cover the facts except through the court’s reasoning. The prior appeal to the 11th Circuit just discussed the civil rights aspect of the case and not the ADA. This appeal to the 11th Circuit discussed the ADA and revisited the civil rights claims. It also looked at municipal liability under §1983, which the court threw out. I don’t see a need to discuss the municipal liability section under §1983. Finally, there was a concurring and dissenting opinion. The concurrence agrees with dismissing the municipal liability claim and would have thrown out the ADA and civil rights claims as well. As usual, the blog entry it divided into categories and they are: court’s reasoning actual disability and regarded as; court’s reasoning qualified individual; court’s reasoning direct threat; court’s reasoning racial and gender discrimination claims; and takeaways. The reader is free to focus on any or all of the categories.
Court’s Reasoning Actual Disability and Regarded As
While plaintiff certainly had a physical or mental impairment with respect to her heart condition, she simply didn’t bring forth enough evidence to permit a conclusion that the physical impairment substantially limited a major life activity. For example, she testified that she had periodic shortness of breath, and her doctor testified that it could limit her ability to sleep. However, no evidence existed as to the severity, frequency, and duration of the episodes with respect to shortness of breath. Further, there wasn’t any evidence discussing the extent of plaintiff’s ability to sleep that could lead a reasonable jury to conclude she was substantially limited in a major life activity.
The ADA allows for a cause of action where the an employer regards an employee as having a disability.
Plenty of evidence existed to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether plaintiff’s employer regarded her as having a disability. In particular: 1) Assistant Chief Brown in his June 17 letter referred to her chronic conditions and instructed her to complete FMLA paperwork thereby suggesting that he believed plaintiff had a medical condition warranting medical leave; 2) on July 1, Assistant Chief Brown prohibited plaintiff from returning to work until everything was cleared up with her doctor. He also said that her Dr.’s letter essentially made it impossible for her to work or be at work and concluded that she could not return until her doctor released her for duty. That email again referred to the possibility of plaintiff taking leave under FMLA; 3) the department’s own stated reason for putting plaintiff on leave, i.e. a fear for her safety in view of her heart condition, demonstrate the department’s belief that plaintiff’s medical condition set her apart from other police officers.
Looking to an EEOC guidance, an employer engages in prohibited conduct regarding a person as having a disability where it takes adverse action because it fears the consequences of an employee’s medical condition.
Court’s Reasoning Qualified Individual
A qualified individual under title I of the ADA is a person who with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that he or she holds or desires.
Essential functions of the job are evaluated on a case-by-case basis after examining a number of factors. Courts do consider the employer’s judgment of whether a particular function is essential and may even cut the employer more slack when the employer is a Police Department. Courts also consider the EEOC seven factors as well.
The employer’s judgment as to what are the essential functions of the job is not by itself conclusive.
The city’s written job description for the position of detective nowhere mentions it is necessary for a detective either to carry or to be exposed to OC spray or a Taser shock. In fact, there is no such mention of any of that in an entire paragraph listing various physical demands of the job.
The work environment section states that a detective has to be willing to carry a firearm on and off the job and be mentally and physically capable of using deadly force if justified. However, it contains no reference to OC spray or Taser.
Plaintiff offered evidence that detectives previously were permitted the choice of what nonlethal weapon or weapons to carry. Further, neither party disputed that Taser International does not require trainee to receive a shock in order to become certified in Taser use.
Plaintiff clearly presented enough evidence to show that a jury would be justified in concluding that receiving a Taser shock or direct exposure to OC spray was not an essential function of her job. As a result, that means plaintiff was a qualified individual.
In a footnote, the court said that ample evidence existed that plaintiff could withstand indirect exposure to OC spray that would allow her to work inside the Police Department building if that option have been made available to her.
Court’s Reasoning Direct Threat
Plaintiff produced sufficient evidence that she is not a direct threat.
Direct threat means a significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodations. See 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(r).
Direct threat, as we have discussed previously here, has to be based on a reasonable medical judgment relying on the most current medical knowledge and/or the best available objective evidence. It also must be based upon an expressly individualized assessment of the individual’s present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job after considering, among other things, the imminence of the risk and severity of the harm. For this, the court specifically cited to Chevron USA Inc. v. Echazabal, which we discussed here and in numerous other blog entries as well.
The definition of direct threat requires an analysis of the individual’s ability to perform safely the essential functions of the job.
Court’s Reasoning Racial and Gender Discrimination Claims
Previously, the 11th Circuit sitting en banc concluded that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination under McDonnell Douglas because her comparators were not similarly situated in all material respects. Thus, that particular aspect of the ruling is binding on this panel.
Even without similarly situated comparators, plaintiff can still get by summary judgment if he or she presents circumstantial evidence creating a triable issue concerning the employer’s discriminatory intent. After all, not every employee can produce a similarly situated comparator. Further, a proper comparator may not exist in every workplace. Therefore, a plaintiff always gets by summary judgment if he or she can present a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence that allows a jury to infer intentional discrimination.
A convincing mosaic can be demonstrated in a variety of ways, including: 1) suspicious timing, ambiguous statements and other bits and pieces from which an inference of discriminatory intent might be drawn; 2) systematically better treatment of similarly situated employees; and 3) the employer’s justification is pretextual.
Plaintiff presented a mosaic of circumstantial evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact as set forth in the paragraphs that follow below.
Union City initiated plaintiff’s indefinite administrative leave on June 17 and informed her on July 1 that she would not be permitted to return to work until she was medically cleared. Yet a week later, and despite plaintiff’s request to return to work and the police chief’s explicit denial of that request, Union City terminated her for being absent without leave.
Union City gave plaintiff no warning that if she exercised the option to use her accrued leave instead of being on non-pay status, she would be terminated upon taking that option.
Union City gave her no notice she had to file FMLA paperwork by any specific date nor did the department’s written FMLA policy provide any such deadline.
At no time was plaintiff told she would be terminated if her doctor failed to contact the department on the very first day the doctor returned from vacation.
There is also plenty of evidence that Union City’s stated reason for firing plaintiff were pretextual as discussed in the following paragraphs.
Plaintiff can show pretext in any of the following ways: 1) casting sufficient doubt on the defendant’s proffered discriminatory reason so as to permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude the employer’s reasons were not what actually motivated its conduct; 2) showing that the employer’s articulated reason is false and that the false reason led to the discrimination; or 3) establishing that the employer failed to clearly articulate and follow its formal policies.
One of the reasons offered by Union City was that her medical condition was permanent. However, evidence exists suggesting the department believed either that plaintiff was faking her medical condition or that her condition was not sufficiently serious to prevent her from working as a detective. In fact, the initial letter placing plaintiff on leave stressed that she had been cleared for full duty without restrictions after a heart attack and emphasized that the letter disclosing her chronic condition came as a surprise.
Plaintiff’s doctor testified that the Assistant Chief made clear to plaintiff’s doctor in a telephone conversation that he thought her letter was more a product of plaintiff’s influence than her unbiased medical judgment. In fact, the Assistant Chief at his deposition testified that he doubted plaintiff’s doctor truthfulness more generally.
Two of Union City’s police chief’s letters could reasonably be construed as indicating that plaintiff’s doctor would ultimately clear plaintiff for duty and that the medical condition, in the department’s view would not permanently prevent plaintiff from doing her job as a detective.
Plenty of evidence exists that the argument that plaintiff did not timely submit her paperwork was just a pretext.
Evidence existed permitting the conclusion that two Caucasian officers in a similar situation to plaintiff were treated differently. However, the white officers were treated more favorably than the plaintiff because they were given extended periods of time to attempt to demonstrate their physical ability they needed, but plaintiff was fired without warning.
A reasonable jury could find that Union City did not consistently exercise its authority in placing physically unfit officers on administrative leave and that Union City did not comply with its own policies.
One Caucasian officer was offered a transfer to a position not requiring him to continue taking the fitness test that he failed while plaintiff was fired without notice after 21 days of administrative leave and was offered no such alternative assignment before termination.
Union City had a history of working with others with a heart condition to allow them to receive a milder version of Taser training with respect to officers with heart conditions but that option was never offered to the plaintiff.
A Union City Lieutenant testified that the department treated women differently than men with regards to the cases assigned to them.
Plaintiff by her termination undoubtedly suffered an adverse action i.e. a change in the terms of her employment.
A regarded as cause of action does not require a substantial limitation on a major life activity. Thanks to the amendments to the ADA, it only requires the employer regard the person as having a physical or mental impairment.
The employer’s judgment as to what the essential functions of the job is not the be-all and end-all of things.
Keep your written job descriptions current.
Antidiscrimination policies for dealing with people with disabilities are always a good idea. Also, make sure those policies are implemented without favoritism and in a consistent manner. Keep in mind, when it come to the ADA, consistently doing an individualized analysis is where you need to go.
I’ve seen many folks get hung up on direct threat because they don’t read Chevron v. Echazabal. Remember, direct threat has to be based on a reasonable medical judgment relying on the most current medical knowledge and or the best available objective evidence. It also needs to be based upon an individualized assessment as well. I have also seen lots of entities make a mistake by not doing the individualized assessment.
This isn’t the first time we have seen convincing mosaic. We saw it here. What is interesting in this case, is that the 11th Circuit says that convincing mosaic is a fallback were no comparators exist. In the Seventh Circuit, as we discussed previously, convincing mosaic is another way to deal with McDonnell-Douglas regardless of whether the proof is indirect or direct.
Insisting on a full return to work is always a bad idea. We discussed that issue here.
Remember, otherwise qualified/qualified is a question of whether the individual can do the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodations.
Convincing mosaic is a fairly new idea. It will be interesting to follow what happens from here on out. Expect the United States Supreme Court to deal with it eventually.
The 11th Circuit nicely lays out what is needed to show it convincing mosaic and what is necessary to show pretext.
Filed Under: General Tagged With: §1983, 29 C.F.R. §1630.2, Actual disability, ADA, chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, convincing mosaic, direct threat, EEOC seven factor test, employer judgment, essential functions, essential functions of the job, fitness for duty, FMLA, genuine issue of fact, genuine issue of material fact, indirect exposure, Job descriptions, Lewis v. city of Union City Georgia, McDonnell Douglas, McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. green, OC spray, Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises Inc., otherwise qualified, powers v. USF Holland Inc., pretext, pretextual, qualified, reasonable accommodations, Regarded as, school board of Nassau County Florida v. Arline, Taser, title I, title VII, will return to work, With or without reasonable accommodations
Obesity as a Disability and the Case of a Legislator with a Disability Unable to do His Job
August 1, 2019 by William Goren Leave a Comment
Today’s blog entry is a two-for-one. First off, with respect to being late this week, my daughter started her second year of high school today. So, this week was her last week of summer break, and as you can imagine, things were pretty hectic around here. But, we are now back to the school routine.
Turning to the blog entry of the day, as mentioned above, it is a two-for-one. First, the blog will explore the issue of whether obesity is a disability. We will explore a very interesting case from the State of Washington. Second, what happens if you have a legislator with a disability who can’t get to the same starting line as a legislator without a disability due to another legislator refusing to accommodate him. What title of the ADA does that legislator turn to. As usual, the blog entry is divided into categories and they are: background with respect to whether obesity is a disability; Taylor facts; Washington Supreme Court’s reasoning that obesity is always a disability under Washington law; Taylor takeaways; what’s going on in Wisconsin? Introduction; and let’s break this down. Of course, the reader is free to focus on any or all of the categories.
Background with Respect to Whether Obesity Is a Disability
In Taylor v. Burlington Northern Rail Holdings, Inc., The Washington Supreme Court received a certification request from the Ninth Circuit with respect to whether under Washington law obesity was a disability. People who follow the ADA know whether obesity is a disability under the ADA is complicated. The courts aren’t unanimous on it. However, the majority view in a big way is for obesity to be a disability under the ADA, there must be an underlying physical or mental impairment. Absent an underlying physical or mental impairment, a person with obesity is not a person with a disability under the ADA. This case raises a very important point that States often have their own antidiscrimination laws. Those laws may look at things very differently from the ADA.
Taylor Facts
In 2007, Taylor received a conditional offer of employment as an electronic technician from the defendant. The offer was contingent on a physical exam and a medical history questionnaire. The physical exam found that Taylor met the minimum physical demands of the essential functions of an electronic technician. However, the medical exam found that Taylor’s height was 5’6” and weighed 256 pounds resulting in a BMI of 41.3. Since a BMI over 40 is considered severely or morbidly obese, the defendant treated that as a trigger for further screening in the employment process. As a result, his results were referred to defendant’s chief medical officer who told Taylor that they were unable to determine whether he was medically qualified for the job due to significant health and safety risks associated with extreme obesity and uncertain status of knees and back. The defendant offered to reconsider if Taylor paid for expensive medical testing, including a sleep study, bloodwork, and an exercise tolerance test. The defendant also told Taylor that it was company policy to not hire anyone having a BMI over 35 and that if he could not afford the testing, his only option was to lose 10% of his weight and keep it off for six months. Taylor could not afford the testing because he was unemployed and did not have medical insurance or VA benefits. So, he filed suit in Washington State court and the suit was removed to federal court. At the federal court level, the judge relied on the majority rule with respect to obesity and found that Taylor was not a person with a disability under the ADA because he could not show that the obesity was caused by a physiological condition or disorder or that the defendant perceived the plaintiff’s obesity as having such a cause. On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit stated that whether obesity was a disability under Washington State law was unresolved and certified the question to the Washington Supreme Court. The Washington Supreme Court accepted that certification.
Washington Supreme Court’s Reasoning That Obesity Is Always a Disability under Washington Law
Washington law makes it an unfair practice for an employer to refuse to hire any person because of the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification.
Washington law defines a disability as a sensory, mental, or physical impairment that: 1) is medically cognizable or diagnosable; or 2) exists as a record or history; or 3) is perceived to exist whether or not it exists in fact.
Under Washington law, a disability can be temporary or permanent, common or uncommon, mitigated or unmitigated and can exist regardless of whether it limits the ability to work generally or at a particular job, or limits any other activity.
What is an impairment under Washington law is either of the following: 1) any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more the following body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory, including speech organ, cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine; or 2) any mental, developmental, traumatic, or psychological disorder, including but not limited to cognitive limitation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.
The debate is over whether obesity is a physiological disorder or condition under Washington law.
The Washington Human Rights Commission has said that a person is considered disabled by a sensory, mental, or physical condition if he or she was discriminated against because of the condition and the condition is abnormal.
In a prior case, the Washington Supreme Court has said that an employee is disabled if they have a sensory, mental, or physical a abnormality and such abnormality has a substantially limiting effect upon the individual’s ability to perform his or her job.
In response to previous opinions of the Washington Supreme Court, the Washington legislature in amending Washington law expressly found that the Washington Law against Discrimination affords residents of Washington protections independent of those afforded by the ADA and that those protections existed for many years prior to the advent of the ADA. In making those changes the legislature chose to define disability very broadly including explaining that impairment includes but is not limited to any physiological disorder or condition affecting one or more body systems.
In a case such as this, all plaintiff need to show is the employer perceived the employee as having an impairment.
The medical community recognizes obesity as a primary disease. The medical evidence shows that obesity is always an impairment because it is a physiological disorder or condition affecting one or more body systems.
Obesity qualifies as an impairment that is physiological because it involves the organic process and phenomena of an organism-the excessive accumulation of fat cells.
The medical community recognizes obesity as a disorder.
Just because obesity is often diagnosed by measuring weight doesn’t mean that it is not a physiological disorder affecting body systems.
Overwhelming consensus in the medical community is that obesity is a disease in and of itself.
Obesity satisfies the AMA criteria for labeling something a disease. That recognition of obesity as a disease is supportive of the conclusion obesity is a physiological disorder under the Washington statute.
While the Washington statute does not define disorder, Webster’s does. A disorder under Webster’s is a derangement of function and an abnormal physical or mental condition. A disease fits within that definition.
While the Washington legislature did not provide a definition of “condition,” the Washington Human Rights Commission did. According to Washington Human Rights Commission a condition is a sensory, mental, or physical disability if it is an abnormality and is a reason why the person having the condition did not get or keep the job in question. The Human Rights Commission definition of “condition,” has to be given great weight since the Human Rights Commission is responsible for administering the Washington law against discrimination. The Washington Court of Appeals has previously adopted the Human Rights Commission view of what a condition is.
While the Human Rights Commission doesn’t define the word abnormal, the medical evidence shows obesity is an abnormal condition. The AMA has stated that obesity is a disease involving abnormal energy balance and abnormal endothelial function resulting in metabolic abnormalities even after weight loss.
The medical evidence also shows that obesity itself affects one or more body systems including neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organ, respiratory, including speech organ, cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine. In particular, Amicus brief described in detail just how obesity itself affects the cardiovascular or circular system, the musculoskeletal system, the lymphatic system, and the endocrine system.
The court had trouble understanding how finding obesity is a disability would produce more psychological harm than is already caused by companies freely and openly refusing to hire people because of their obesity. Obesity after all leads to social, economic, and psychological problems as a result of prejudice, discrimination, poor body image, and low self-esteem. Oftentimes, obese people are underemployed or unemployed.
Washington Law against Discrimination must view the definition of impairment broadly in order to effectuate the purposes of that law.
Washington Law against Discrimination is broader than the ADA and offers its own independent protection to Washingtonians.
When it comes to disability discrimination, the ADA isn’t the end-all and be-all, though it is in Georgia. It is not unusual for States to have their own antidiscrimination laws when it comes to people with disabilities. Those laws may extend coverage to employers of less than 15 or more. Those laws also may define disability very very differently. Finally, those laws may have different remedies associated with them. Accordingly, the ADA is only one thing to look at. You have to look at state law as well.
Washington Law Against Discrimination defines disability very differently from the ADA. While impairment under Washington law, judging from the case, appears to resemble the ADA, the other part of the definition of a disability is quite a bit different as it talks about whether the mental or physical impairment or sensory impairment is medically cognizable or diagnosable. That makes things considerably broader than the ADA in its scope of coverage.
Did I mention that I am not an attorney licensed in Washington. When it comes to state antidiscrimination laws affecting people with disabilities, always be sure to find an attorney who can interpret that state law for you. Generally, that means an attorney licensed in the applicable State.
Will you now see a movement by the legislators in Washington to change the definition of disability under the Washington Law against Discrimination to something more similar to the ADA. As mentioned above, “impairment,” in Washington law is quite similar to the ADA. It is the disability part that is considerably different. I don’t know what the answer to this question is, but it wouldn’t surprise me if you see an effort to amend the Washington Law against Discrimination to match the ADA.
Two problems with this case are that the Washington Supreme Court doesn’t really define what obesity is. It just assumes obesity is a BMI over 40. Also, the Washington Supreme Court says that obesity is always a disability and that it never depends. The decision that obesity is always a disability and never depends is what drove Justice Yu to dissent. His view is that obesity should not be a per se rule but should be based upon an individualized inquiry as such an approach fits better with how disability discrimination statutes, such as the ADA, generally work.
Those who are followers of Chevron deference matters, can see that the Washington Supreme Court essentially adopted that approach with respect to how the Human Rights Commission defined various terms. Note, that the Human Rights Commission had specific authority from the legislature to implement the Washington Law Against Discrimination.
What’s going on in Wisconsin?: Introduction
In Wisconsin, there is a legislator who uses a wheelchair. The story can be found here. Basically, the legislator is a Democrat who uses a wheelchair and a personal attendant is necessary many times. There are time because of his health and the lack of an ability to find a personal attendant that it makes sense for him to be able to dial in or use videoconferencing to attend some of his obligations. The chair is a Republican and is refusing to allow that accommodation and insists upon the legislator being personally there. I have seen the article pop up in several different places on the Internet. What is interesting, is that the article never seem to take into account title II of the ADA. Some of the articles that I have read said that if the legislator was an employee, then title I applies, but since he is a legislator all bets are off.
One of the things I have consistently seen over the years, is ADA knowledge is quite high among attorneys practicing in title I of the ADA. On the plaintiff side, you will find attorneys who litigate on behalf of plaintiffs with respect to employment discrimination claims involving persons with disability. The defense bar responding to those lawsuits is generally quite knowledgeable and not afraid to retain people, such as myself, who are knowledgeable if requisite knowledge is lacking. The defense bar also gets involved in counseling employers on disability discrimination matters. However, once you move into title II and title III of the ADA, the knowledge base among attorneys goes way down. What is wild about this situation is that title I and title II are involved at the same time. It is rare you see that. In fact, I have only seen it once; many years ago, when I consulted on such a case.
With respect to title I, assuredly the Democratic legislator is being paid for his efforts. Who is the entity paying him? It is probably the State of Wisconsin. Surely, the State of Wisconsin or whatever entity is paying him has more than 15 employees. So, the entity that is paying him has independent ADA obligations to ensure that one of their employees receives reasonable accommodations for his or her disability. As we have mentioned too many times to count, under title I of the ADA, accommodations must be made unless an undue hardship is involved. Undue hardship can either be financial or logistical. As we have also mentioned previously, financial hardship is very difficult to show as you look to the overall governmental resources and not to the budget item. For undue hardship in the logistical sense, readers of the blog know to think in terms of fundamental alteration. I don’t see how either applies to the case of the Democratic lawmaker seeking the ability to dial in or to videoconference. Of course, you have the question of whether the Democratic legislator is a qualified person with a disability. I don’t see how that is an issue here. Clearly, the Democratic lawmaker has a disability. By virtue of being elected, he has the requisite skill, experience, etc. to be a legislator. The question then becomes can he do the job with or without reasonable accommodations. He has recommended accommodations and has been turned down. So, whoever is employing the Democratic legislator has a problem on their hands with respect to the actions of the Republican chair. At a minimum, an interactive process should ensue to see if everyone can get to a win-win. Of course, I’m assuming that legislators and Wisconsin are employees in the first place and not independent contractors. If by some chance legislators in Wisconsin are actually independent contractors, I don’t see how that is possible but even so…, Then the Democratic legislator would still have claims under title II of the ADA and §504.
It doesn’t end there. With respect to title II, there may be a claim there as well. After all, a public entity is involved. We are also talking about accessing the programs, services, and activities of a public entity, i.e. legislative proceedings. Under title II of the ADA, reasonable accommodations have to be made unless you are dealing with an undue hardship or a fundamental alteration. As we have discussed previously many times, undue hardship and undue burden mean the same thing. Fundamental alteration is essentially logistical undue hardship. For the reasons mentioned above, I don’t see how either undue burden or fundamental alteration work as a defense in this situation. Again, you have the question of whether the Democratic legislator is a qualified person with a disability. Whether a person is a qualified person with a disability under title II of the ADA has a different definition than in title I of the ADA. Again, the Democratic legislator gets by this hurdle rather easily. He is, as mentioned above, a person with a disability. As for being qualified, he also meets the essential eligibility requirements of the program, activity, or services as well, i.e. he is qualified to be a state legislator and to participate in all legislative proceedings with or without reasonable accommodations. So, bottom line, the Democratic legislator has both a title I claim and a title II claim against the entity paying both him and the chair. With respect to title I, it is entirely possible that the S grin tate of Wisconsin may be able to claim sovereign immunity per Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett. However, the state of Wisconsin is going to have a much harder time claiming sovereign immunity with respect to our Democratic legislator’s title II claim as we are talking about legislative activities. See this blog entry. Also, since federal funds are undoubtedly involved as well, our Democratic legislator probably has a §504 claim as well. In many jurisdictions, receipt of federal funds waves sovereign immunity under §504.
In short, the chair and the entity paying the chair and the Democratic legislator need to get together to engage in the interactive process so that the Democratic legislator can do his job with or without reasonable accommodations. Failure to do that could very well lead to title I, title II, and §504 claims. In addition, such a lawsuit would be horrible publicity. Finally, from the little facts we do know, such a lawsuit would have a high probability of success thereby forcing the state of Wisconsin to pay attorney fees for themselves as well as for the Democratic legislator. Finally, if the Democratic legislator were to be retaliated against for bringing the lawsuit, that would result in additional claims. The retaliation claims would then relate back to both title I and to title II as well as to §504. In that situation, whether damages would be allowed in the ADA claims, would depend upon the particular title of the ADA involved. That is, no damages for retaliation under title I per this blog entry, but damages upon a showing of the deliberate indifference (see this blog entry for discussion of deliberate indifference), for violating title II.
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