Source: https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/woods-v-young-31075
Timestamp: 2020-08-12 06:53:49
Document Index: 657532505

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 356', '§ 356', '§ 356', '§ 1858', '§ 340', '§ 340', '§ 12', '§ 340']

Woods v. Young - 53 Cal.3d 315 S005969 - Thu, 04/04/1991 | California Supreme Court Resources
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Citation 53 Cal.3d 315
Woods v. Young (1991) 53 Cal.3d 315 , 279 Cal.Rptr. 613; 807 P.2d 455
Hassard, Bonnington, Rogers & Huber, David E. Willett, Musick, Peeler & Garrett, James F. Ludlam, Charles E. Forbes, Horvitz, Levy & Amerian, [53 Cal.3d 319] S. Thomas Todd and Frederic D. Cohen as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents.
[1] In enacting MICRA in 1975, the Legislature "attempted to reduce the cost and increase the efficiency of medical malpractice litigation by revising a number of legal rules applicable to such litigation." (American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hospital (1984) 36 Cal.3d 359, 363-364 [53 Cal.3d 320] [204 Cal.Rptr. 671, 683 P.2d 670, 41 A.L.R.4th 233].) The MICRA revision added to the Code of Civil Procedure three provisions that are relevant to a resolution of the issue presented here: Code of Civil Procedure section 364, subdivisions (a) and (d), and section 365.fn. 2 (All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.)
[2] Section 364, subdivision (a) (hereafter section 364(a)) requires that, before filing a medical malpractice action, a plaintiff give the defendant at least 90 days' notice of intent to sue. The purpose of this 90-day waiting period is to decrease the number of medical malpractice actions filed by establishing a procedure that encourages the parties to negotiate "outside the structure and atmosphere of the formal litigation process." (Jenkins & Schweinfurth, California's Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act: An Equal Protection Challenge (1979) 52 So.Cal.L.Rev. 829, 963, fn. omitted; see Grimm v. Thayer (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 866, 871 [233 Cal.Rptr. 687]; Gilbertson v. Osman (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 308, 317 [229 Cal.Rptr. 627].)
Unless the giving of the 90-day notice tolls or extends the statute of limitations, sections 364(a) and 365 pose a dilemma for the plaintiff's attorney who serves the notice within the last 90 days of the 1-year limitations period. In that situation, the attorney must either comply with section 364(a)'s proscription against commencing the action during that statute's 90-day waiting period, thereby forfeiting the client's cause of action, or the attorney must file the lawsuit during the statutory 90-day waiting period, thereby "triggering" section 365's provision of possible disciplinary action by the State Bar. In the absence of tolling or extension, a plaintiff's attorney wishing to protect the client's rights without risking disciplinary [53 Cal.3d 321] proceedings would have to serve the 90-day notice within 9 months of the plaintiff's discovery of the injury. This would, in effect, shorten the statutory limitations period from one year to nine months.
All of the Courts of Appeal that have attempted to resolve the difficulties presented by the MICRA provisions discussed above have resorted to the non-MICRA tolling provision of section 356. That provision states that when "the commencement of an action is stayed by ... statutory prohibition," the time of the statutory prohibition "is not part of the time limited for the commencement of the action." The Courts of Appeal have [53 Cal.3d 322] concluded that section 364(a)'s 90-day waiting period is a "statutory prohibition" within the meaning of section 356, thus resulting in a 90-day tolling of the 1-year limitations period regardless of when the notice of intent to sue is given. They have disagreed, however, whether the 90-day extension provided by section 364(d) is in addition to, or is included within, the 90-day tolling attributable to section 356, as the following cases illustrate.
In Gomez v. Valley View Sanitorium (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 507 [151 Cal.Rptr. 97], the court, relying on section 356, concluded that the giving of the 90-day notice of intent to sue required by section 364(a) tolls the 1-year statute of limitations for a period of 90 days, and that, in addition, when the notice is served within 90 days of the expiration of the statute, section 364(d) operates to lengthen the statute by a period of between 1 day and 90 days.
Therefore, under Gomez v. Valley View Sanitorium, supra, 87 Cal.App.3d 507, the 90-day tolling resulting from the application of section 356 and the 90-day extension flowing from section 364(d) are consecutive, so that the time for bringing suit does not expire until up to 180 days after service of the 90-day notice required by section 364(a). Thus, under Gomez, the statute of limitations period can be extended for a period ranging from 90 days to 180 days, depending on when a plaintiff gives section 364(a)'s 90-day notice of intent to sue. At least two cases have followed Gomez. (Paxton v. Chapman General Hospital, Inc. (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 110, 115 [230 Cal.Rptr. 355]; Estrella v. Brandt (9th Cir. 1982) 682 F.2d 814, 818-819.)
But in Braham v. Sorenson (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 367 [174 Cal.Rptr. 39], another Court of Appeal adopted a different view. In Braham, the court focused on the express language in section 364(d) providing that its 90-day extension must be measured from the date of service of section 364(a)'s 90-day notice of intent to sue. The court concluded that this [53 Cal.3d 323] language precluded adding the two 90- day provisions. (119 Cal.App.3d at p. 372.)
The Braham court reasoned that section 364(d)'s extension of 90 days was concurrent with, and consequently subsumed by, the 90-day tolling that results from applying section 356's "statutory prohibition" provision to section 364(a)'s 90-day notice requirement. As interpreted by Braham, the application of sections 356, 364(a), and 364(d) results in all cases in changing the one-year limitations period into a total of one year and ninety days, but not more than that. (Braham v. Sorenson, supra, 119 Cal.App.3d at pp. 372-373.) Among the cases that have followed the Braham decision are Grimm v. Thayer, supra, 188 Cal.App.3d 866, 870; Gilbertson v. Osman, supra, 185 Cal.App.3d 308, 317; Hilburger v. Madsen (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 45, 52 [222 Cal.Rptr. 713]; and Banfield v. Sierra View Local Dist. Hospital (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 444, 459-460 [177 Cal.Rptr. 290].
[3] In construing statutes, we must determine and effectuate legislative intent. (People v. Woodhead (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1002, 1007 [239 Cal.Rptr. 656, 741 P.2d 154]; People ex rel. Younger v. Superior Court (1976) 16 Cal.3d 30, 40 [127 Cal.Rptr. 122, 544 P.2d 1322].) To ascertain intent, we look first to the words of the statutes. (Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1386-1387 [241 Cal.Rptr. 67, 743 P.2d 1323]; People v. Woodhead, supra, at p. 1007.) "Words must be construed in context, and statutes must be harmonized, both internally and with each other, to the extent possible." (California Mfrs. Assn. v. Public Utilities Com. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 836, 844 [157 Cal.Rptr. 676, 598 P.2d 836].) Interpretations that lead to absurd results or render words surplusage are to be avoided. (Ibid.)
[4a] To apply section 356's tolling provision to section 364, as the Courts of Appeal have done, extends the 1-year statute of limitations for either a period ranging from 90 to 180 days, as expressed in Gomez v. Valley View Sanitorium, supra, 87 Cal.App.3d 507, or for 90 days only, but not more than that, as held in Braham v. Sorenson, supra, 119 Cal.App.3d 367.
The Gomez court's construction, under which the section 364(d) extension commences only after the section 356 tolling is concluded, cannot be [53 Cal.3d 324] reconciled with the language of section 364(d) stating that the 90-day extension is measured "from the service of the notice" that a plaintiff must give under section 364(a).
The Braham court's construction, on the other hand, is faithful to the language of section 364(d), but at the cost of rendering it substantively meaningless. Under the reasoning of Braham, the section 364(d) extension and the section 356 tolling are both "triggered" by the same act (service of the notice of intent to sue). Beginning at the same time, the two 90-day periods run in tandem and expire together. In other words, the section 364(d) extension is wholly subsumed within, and thus redundant of, the 90-day tolling attributable to sections 364(a) and 356. [5] Because this conclusion deprives section 364(d) of any meaning, it violates the rule that every provision of a statute is assumed to have meaning and to perform a useful function. (White v. County of Sacramento (1982) 31 Cal.3d 676, 681 [183 Cal.Rptr. 520, 646 P.2d 191]; J. R. Norton Co. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1979) 26 Cal.3d 1, 36 [160 Cal.Rptr. 710, 603 P.2d 1306].)
[4b] The anomalies created by applying the tolling provision of section 356 to section 364 suggest that when the Legislature enacted MICRA it did not intend section 356, a non-MICRA provision, to apply to section 364, a MICRA statute. This conclusion is supported by the presence of section 365 in MICRA's statutory scheme. Section 365 states that a medical malpractice plaintiff's failure to comply with the 90-day notice requirement of section 364(a) does not invalidate court proceedings and is not jurisdictional, although failure to comply may subject the plaintiff's attorney to State Bar disciplinary proceedings. Therefore, as noted in Toigo v. Hayashida (1980) 103 Cal.App.3d 267, 268- 269 [162 Cal.Rptr. 874], section 365 does not legally prevent a plaintiff from commencing a medical malpractice action during the mandatory 90-day waiting period set forth in section 364(a). (Compare, e.g., Cal. Cigarette Concessions v. City of L. A. (1960) 53 Cal.2d 865, 868 [3 Cal.Rptr. 675, 350 P.2d 715] [§ 356 held to toll the statute of limitations during the pendency of a claim for refund of municipal business license taxes when the presentation of a claim to the city was a prerequisite to bringing court action]; Eistrat v. Cekada (1958) 50 Cal.2d 289, 291-292 [324 P.2d 881] [§ 356 held applicable to a restraining order in a bankruptcy proceeding that prevented the plaintiff from commencing an action].)
Our conclusion that section 356 does not apply to section 364 is also supported by the rule of statutory construction that a later, more specific statute controls over an earlier, general statute. Sections 364 and 365 were enacted in 1975 as part of MICRA, "an interrelated legislative scheme enacted to deal specifically with all medical malpractice claims." ( Young v. [53 Cal.3d 325] Haines (1986) 41 Cal.3d 883, 894 [226 Cal.Rptr. 547, 718 P.2d 909].) Section 356, a non-MICRA provision, was enacted in 1872 (13A West's Ann. Code Civ. Proc. (1982 ed.) § 356, p. 594), and applies to tolling and to statutory prohibitions in general. [6] As we said in People v. Tanner (1979) 24 Cal.3d 514, 521 [156 Cal.Rptr. 450, 596 P.2d 328]: "A specific provision relating to a particular subject will govern a general provision, even though the general provision standing alone would be broad enough to include the subject to which the specific provision relates."
Moreover, this interpretation resolves the dilemma, discussed earlier, that sections 364(a) and 365 pose for a plaintiff's attorney who serves the 90-day notice of intent to sue required by section 364(a) in the last 90 days of the 1-year [53 Cal.3d 326] limitations period. Our construction of section 364 as tolling, rather than merely extending, the statute of limitations, permits the plaintiff to commence the action after the 90-day "waiting" period has elapsed and before the limitations period has expired.fn. 3 The plaintiff who gives the 90-day notice before the last 90 days of the 1-year limitations period can still bring the lawsuit after the 90-day period has elapsed because in that situation the 1-year statute of limitations will not have expired at the end of the 90-day waiting period.
We recognize that to grant additional time to a plaintiff who serves the notice of intent to sue required by section 364(a) in the last 90 days of the limitations period, but not to a plaintiff who more promptly gives such notice, appears to reward the dilatory plaintiff. But the Legislature drew this distinction when it enacted MICRA. Through section 364(d), the Legislature extended the statute of limitations "[i]f the notice is served within 90 days of the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations ...." Presumably the Legislature's reason for imposing this restriction was that plaintiffs who serve the notice before the final 90 days of the limitations period will still have time to file their actions after the 90-day waiting period is concluded, and so they do not need an extension. (See Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. City of Los Angeles (1990) 50 Cal.3d 402, 412 [267 Cal.Rptr. 589, 787 P.2d 996].) In matters of statutory construction, we may not ignore restrictions the Legislature has inserted. (§ 1858.) If the relief afforded by section 364(d) is to be provided also to plaintiffs who serve the section 364(a) notice [53 Cal.3d 327] before the last 90 days of the 1-year limitations period, it must be the Legislature that provides it.
Also without merit is plaintiff's assertion that the legislative classifications are not rationally related to the legislative objective. [7] The "rational basis" standard, rather than the "compelling state interest" test, applies to legislative classifications among personal injury plaintiffs. (Young v. Haines, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 899; American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hospital, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 373, fn. 12.) As noted earlier, the Legislature sought to decrease the number of medical malpractice actions filed by providing for a period of negotiation before commencement of the [53 Cal.3d 328] lawsuit. Allowing additional time if the 90-day notice to sue is not given until the last 90 days of the statute of limitations directly relates to this legislative objective by providing time for negotiation without barring the plaintiff's claim. (See Fein v. Permanente Medical Group (1985) 38 Cal.3d 137, 161-164 [211 Cal.Rptr. 368, 695 P.2d 665]; Roa v. Lodi Medical Group, Inc. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 920, 930-933 [211 Cal.Rptr. 77, 695 P.2d 164]; Barme v. Wood (1984) 37 Cal.3d 174, 181-182 [207 Cal.Rptr. 816, 689 P.2d 446]; American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hospital, supra, 36 Cal.3d at pp. 370-374.)
In response to interrogatories, plaintiff stated that she learned of the alleged misdiagnosis upon admission to County-USC on June 6, 1983. Thus, that would have been the date on which plaintiff discovered her injury and the statute of limitations would have commenced running. (§ 340.5.) Hospital records, however, showed that Brotman discharged plaintiff on June 29, 1983, and that she was admitted on that same day to County-USC, where she remained until her discharge on July 25, 1983. Because of plaintiff's admission in her interrogatory response that she first learned of the misdiagnosis upon her admission to County-USC, the discrepancy between the date she said to be her admission date and hospital records showing a later date of admission suggests that the date given by [53 Cal.3d 329] plaintiff may have been in error. In any event, as the Court of Appeal in this case concluded, "the date of such advice could not have been later than July 25, 1983, the date of [plaintiff's] discharge from County-USC." For purposes of this decision, therefore, we will accept July 25, 1983-the latest possible date of plaintiff's discovery of the alleged malpractice-as the date on which the one-year statute of limitations started to run. (§ 340.5.)
[8a] If the construction of the relevant statutes that we have adopted were applied retroactively to the facts of this case, plaintiff's action would be barred by the statute of limitations. Because she served the notice of intent to sue before the last 90 days of the limitations period, plaintiff would not be entitled to the benefit of the tolling provided by section 364(d). Her complaint, filed one year and three weeks after discovery of her cause of action, would be untimely. [53 Cal.3d 330]
[9] Unlike statutory enactments, judicial decisions, particularly those in tort cases, are generally applied retroactively. (Newman v. Emerson Radio Corp. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 973, 978, 981-982 [258 Cal.Rptr. 592, 772 P.2d 1059].) But considerations of fairness and public policy may require that a decision be given only prospective application. (Id. at pp. 983-984; see Estate of Propst (1990) 50 Cal.3d 448, 463 [268 Cal.Rptr. 114, 788 P.2d 628]; Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Companies (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287, 305 [250 Cal.Rptr. 116, 758 P.2d 58]; Peterson v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 147, 152 [181 Cal.Rptr. 784, 642 P.2d 1305].) Particular considerations relevant to the retroactivity determination include the reasonableness of the parties' reliance on the former rule, the nature of the change as substantive or procedural, retroactivity's effect on the administration of justice, and the purposes to be served by the new rule. (Newman v. Emerson Radio Corp., supra, at pp. 983-992; Peterson v. Superior Court, supra, at p. 152; Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand (1971) 6 Cal.3d 176, 193 [98 Cal.Rptr. 837, 491 P.2d 421].)
Limiting the retroactivity of our decision is also indicated by the nature of the change effected by the new rule. The change is procedural, affecting only the calculation of the limitations period. Prospective application will not remove any substantive defense to which defendants would otherwise be entitled. Retroactive application of the change, on the other hand, would bar plaintiffs' actions regardless of their merits. [10] Retroactive application of an unforeseeable procedural change is disfavored when such application would deprive a litigant of "any remedy whatsoever." (Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson (1971) 404 U.S. 97, 108 [30 L.Ed.2d 296, 306, 92 S.Ct. 349]; Newman v. Emerson Radio Corp., supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 990-991.)
[8c] Concern for the administration of justice further supports prospective application. Medical malpractice is one of the more common tort [53 Cal.3d 331] actions; therefore, we anticipate that many pending cases will be affected by our decision. Justice is not served by barring so many actions that reasonably appeared timely when filed. (Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Companies, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 305; Li v. Yellow Cab Co. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 804, 829 [119 Cal.Rptr. 858, 532 P.2d 1226, 78 A.L.R.3d 393].)
I concur reluctantly in the majority's holding that the 90-day tolling of the statute of limitations applies only to those who file the notice required by subdivision (a) of section 364 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter section 364(a))fn. 1 within the last 90 days of the 1-year limitations period set forth in section 340.5. The consequence of this ruling is to allow the dilatory malpractice plaintiff an additional 90 days to file a malpractice action-i.e., [53 Cal.3d 332] 1 year plus 90 days-while limiting the diligent plaintiff to 9 months or less from the date the notice period expires-i.e., 1 year minus 90 days. It is difficult to believe that the Legislature deliberately intended such an inexplicable result.
Nevertheless, there seems to be no other way out of the dilemma posed by the language of section 364, subdivision (d), which requires an attorney to [53 Cal.3d 333] either sacrifice a client's cause of action to the bar of the statute of limitations or face disciplinary proceedings before the State Bar. If the statute were applied literally, as is pointed out in Gomez v. Valley View Sanitorium (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 507, 510 [151 Cal.Rptr. 97], subdivision (d) of section 364 would "self- destruct." The choice, then, appears to be between applying the statute as written, which would not accomplish the Legislature's goal, or, as the majority have done, in effect rewriting it. The latter course is obviously unsatisfactory, but I reluctantly conclude that in this instance it may be the best way to resolve the anomalies caused by the contradictory and ineffectual statutory scheme.
­FN *. Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, assigned by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.
­FN 1. Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5 provides for a limitations period in medical malpractice cases of three years after the injury or one year after the plaintiff's discovery of the injury, whichever occurs first. The three-year limitations period is not in issue here.
­FN 2. Section 364, subdivision (a) provides: "No action based upon the health care provider's professional negligence may be commenced unless the defendant has been given at least 90 days' prior notice of the intention to commence the action."
­FN 3. A plaintiff who serves the notice of intent to sue on the last day of the limitations period has one day after the ninety-day waiting period to file the complaint. Tolling may be analogized to a clock that is stopped and then restarted. Whatever period of time that remained when the clock is stopped is available when the clock is restarted, that is, when the tolling period has ended. Because the law does not divide time periods into increments of less than one day (see, e.g., §§ 12, 1013) and because tolling takes effect immediately, the day of service of the notice is not part of "the time for the commencement of the action." (§ 340.5.)
­FN 4. Statements in the following cases inconsistent with this holding are disapproved: Grimm v. Thayer, supra, 188 Cal.App.3d 866; Paxton v. Chapman General Hospital, Inc., supra, 186 Cal.App.3d 110; Gilbertson v. Osman, supra, 185 Cal.App.3d 308; Hilburger v. Madsen, supra, 177 Cal.App.3d 45; Banfield v. Sierra View Local Dist. Hospital, supra, 124 Cal.App.3d 444; Braham v. Sorenson, supra, 119 Cal.App.3d 367; and Gomez v. Valley View Sanitorium, supra, 87 Cal.App.3d 507.
­FN 5. Plaintiff did not file her complaint within one year of any of the possible dates (June 6, June 29, and July 25, 1983) of discovery of the injury. Nor did she serve the 90-day notice of intent to sue within the last 90 days of the 1-year limitations period regardless of which date is considered the date of discovery. Each of these possible dates leads to the same result.
­FN 6. Because the Courts of Appeal were divided on this issue, a plaintiff could not reasonably rely on the interpretation under which the time for bringing suit after discovery of the injury could exceed one year and ninety days. This interpretation, first advanced in Gomez v. Valley View Sanitorium, supra, 87 Cal.App.3d 507, was vigorously disputed by other appellate decisions.
­FN 7. Making the holding effective as soon as our decision becomes final would reduce the limitations period for those plaintiffs who served the notice of intent to sue before the final 90 days of the 1-year limitations period but have not yet filed suit. To provide a reasonable period within which such parties may commence their actions, we have determined that the effective date should be 90 days after the decision becomes final.
­FN 1. All statutory references in this opinion are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
­FN 2. Section 365 provides, "Failure to comply with this chapter [which includes section 364] shall not invalidate any proceedings of any court of this state, nor shall it affect the jurisdiction of the court to render a judgment therein. However, failure to comply with such provisions by any attorney at law shall be grounds for professional discipline and the State Bar of California shall investigate and take appropriate action in any such cases brought to its attention."
Petition for review after the Court of Appeal reversed a summary judgment in a civil action. This case is concerned with the effect of the 90 day notice requirement for actions for medical malpractice on the statute of limitations. (Code Civ. Proc., sections 356, 364, 365.)
Thu, 04/04/1991 53 Cal.3d 315 S005969 Review - Civil Appeal closed; remittitur issued
BRODEHL v. BECKER (S007720)
OKITA v. BEATTY (S009408)
ROBINSON v. KAISER FOUNDATION HOSPTIALS (S016243)
BENOV v. S.C. (SHABAN) (S018705)
1 Harris, Hiawatha (Respondent)
Represented by Donna Hulbert
2 Trotter, Alvin T. (Respondent)
Represented by Roy D. Goldstein
Herzfield & Rubin
3 Brotman Medical Center (Respondent)
4 Woods, Varetta (Appellant)
Horvitz Levy & Amerian
15760 Ventura Blvd., 18th
7 Young, William (Respondent)
Apr 4 1991 Opinion: Affirmed
Jun 7 1988 Petition for review filed
By Resp Harris
Jun 9 1988 Joinder to petition filed
Respondent Brotman Medical Center
Jun 20 1988 Answer to petition for review filed
Jul 25 1988 Petition for review granted (civil case)
Votes: Mosk, Arguelles, Eagleson & Kaufman JJ. Broussard, J., did not participate.
Aug 24 1988 Opening brief on the merits filed
Respondent Trotter
Oct 7 1988 Received document entitled:
Request to file Late Resp's brief & Request to rely on Hiawatha Harris brief filed in Ca.
Oct 11 1988 Filed document entitled:
Motion to be Relieved from Default for Failure to filed Appellant's brief on the merits
Oct 12 1988 Received letter from:
Frederic Cohen dated 10-11-88 for Perm to file AC Brf for Cal Medical Assn supporting Respondents
Oct 13 1988 Notice of Intent to Rely on CA Brief (Opening Bf)
By Def-Resp Hiawatha Harris, Md.
Oct 13 1988 Application for Extension of Time filed
Joinder by Pltf-App & Deft-Resp for Ext of time to filed Resp's brief & App's reply brief
Oct 14 1988 Extension of time granted
Aplt's brief on merits Due 11-14-88
Oct 14 1988 Extension of time denied
Resp Brotman Med Center Having Failed to file Opening Brf on merits, its Appln for Ext of time to file reply Brf Is denied
Oct 14 1988 Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted
For Cal Med Assn (Cma) Brf Due 11-14-88. Ans Due 12-5-88
Nov 1 1988 Motion to strike filing (non-AA)
Appellant's motion to strike brief of respondent Trotter & dismiss review as to Trotter
Nov 3 1988 Motion filed (non-AA)
Request of appellant to keep CA opinion permanently published.
Nov 7 1988 Filed document entitled:
Oppo of Resp Trotter to motion to strike brief and Dismiss Review
Nov 14 1988 Answer brief on the merits filed
by appellant Woods
Nov 14 1988 Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:
Filed by Attorney for Cal. Med. Assoc., Cal. Assoc of Hosp. and Health Systems and Cal. Dental Assoc.
Nov 30 1988 Request Denied
The request for an order directing that Court of Appeal opinion in this cause remain published is denied.
For Cal Trial Lawyers. A/C brief Due 12-9-88. Ans Due 12-23-88
Dec 2 1988 Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
Dec 5 1988 Response to Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:
Brothman Medical Center
Dec 8 1988 Motion to strike filing (non-AA)
Motion to strike reply brief & renewed motion to dismiss review as to respondent Alvin Trotter, Md
Dec 8 1988 Motion to strike filing (in non-AA case)
Motion by appellant to strike reply brief.
Dec 9 1988 Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:
Oppositon to motion to strike reply brief
Dec 14 1988 Received letter from:
From Herzfeld & Rubin requesting Citation be Added to Oppo to motion filed 12-13-88
Tues., 1/8/91, 9 A.M. - LA
Dec 7 1990 Letter sent to:
Counsel requesting letter briefs Due: 12-21-90 Re issue whether Decision Holding Statute Limitations Is not Tolled by the Giving of the Notice of Intention to Commence the Action should be Applied Prospectively or Retroactively. Counsel should be Prepared to Address issue At Oral Argument.
Dec 18 1990 Letter sent to:
Atty Wasserwald - time to file Suppl Ltr brief extended to 12-26-90 for all parties
Dec 19 1990 Letter sent to:
Aty Goldstein Re $200 appearance fee not paid by Client Trotter & to Remit Check Promptly.
Dec 20 1990 Request Denied
Motion to dismiss & to strike opening & reply brief denied. Broussard, J. did not participate.
Filing fee as requested from Mr. Goldstein
Apr 4 1991 Opinion filed: Judgment affirmed in full
Defendants are awarded their costs on appeal. Majority Opinion by Kennard, J. -- joined by Lucas C.J., Panelli, Arabian, Baxter & Daniel J. Kremer (P.J. 4/1, assigned) JJ. Concurring Opinion by Mosk, J. Concurring Opinion by Baxter, J.
May 6 1991 Remittitur Issued
Douglas Fee (Shield & Smith)
Frederic D. Cohen (Horvitz Levy & Amerian)
Donna Hulbert (Kirtland & Packard)
Roy D. Goldstein (Herzfield & Rubin)
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