Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/749/1222/359639/
Timestamp: 2019-08-22 18:34:03
Document Index: 299625614

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2671', '§ 2680', '§ 1346', '§ 2680', '§ 2680', '§ 2680', '§ 2680', '§ 2680']

Gustof Charles Feyers and Gabrielle Feyers, Plaintiffs-appellees, v. United States of America, Defendant-appellant, 749 F.2d 1222 (6th Cir. 1984) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Sixth Circuit › 1984 › Gustof Charles Feyers and Gabrielle Feyers, Plaintiffs-appellees, v. United States of America, Defen...
Gustof Charles Feyers and Gabrielle Feyers, Plaintiffs-appellees, v. United States of America, Defendant-appellant, 749 F.2d 1222 (6th Cir. 1984)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit - 749 F.2d 1222 (6th Cir. 1984)
Argued Oct. 18, 1984. Decided Dec. 12, 1984
The United States appeals from a judgment rendered by the district court in favor of appellees Gustof and Gabrielle Feyers pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680, on appellees' claims alleging negligent inspection of, and failure to provide safety training in, the railyard where Gustof Feyers was injured. Since we conclude that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, we vacate the judgment of the district court and remand with instructions to dismiss.
The United States contends that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the case since the Federal Tort Claims Act's waiver of sovereign immunity does not apply to discretionary acts by government employees. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).4 The district court opinion indicates no ruling on whether the inspection by the government's employees or the failure to require safety training for railyard workers was a discretionary act depriving the district court of jurisdiction.
The United States can be sued only to the extent to which it has waived its sovereign immunity. United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 814, 96 S. Ct. 1971, 1976, 48 L. Ed. 2d 390 (1976). While the Federal Tort Claims Act, specifically 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b),5 generally waives that immunity, 28 U.S.C. § 2680 reserves immunity in specific instances. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) provides:
If a case falls within the statutory exceptions of 28 U.S.C. § 2680, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Colorado Flying Academy, Inc. v. United States, 724 F.2d 871, 875 (10th Cir. 1984); Miller v. United States, 710 F.2d 656, 662 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S. Ct. 352, 78 L. Ed. 2d 316 (1983); Carlyle v. U.S. Department of Army, 674 F.2d 554, 556 (6th Cir. 1982). The Feyers' claim that the United States was negligent in failing to provide safety training to the Chrysler workers essentially challenges the United States' delegation of safety responsibility to Chrysler. Therefore, the Feyers contend that the United States' decision to contract for Chrysler to provide safety programs for Chrysler employees did not constitute a discretionary function and that the United States, once having agreed to make inspections, was required to do so non-negligently.
Our resolution of this case follows the analysis of United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), --- U.S. ----, 104 S. Ct. 2755, 81 L. Ed. 2d 660 (1984), in which an airline and the owner of an aircraft brought an action challenging the Federal Aviation Administration's "spot check" system of compliance review, similar to the "spot review" included in the contract between the United States and Chrysler. The plaintiffs alleged, pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the government was negligent in issuing certificates for aircraft that did not comply with applicable safety regulations. The plaintiffs alleged, as do the Feyers regarding Chrysler's safety practices, that the government's inspection process was negligent in failing to inspect certain aspects of the aircraft design. The United States in both cases contends that the basic responsibility for complying with safety standards had been delegated to a private party, the aircraft manufacturers and Chrysler, and that the government, through "spot checks," simply monitored compliance. Id. at 2766-67.
Id. at 2768. Garbarino v. United States, 666 F.2d 1061, 1065 (6th Cir. 1981) ("... [T]he discretionary function exception also bars that portion of the claim based on the decision of the FAA to delegate inspection duties to an inspection department of the manufacturer"). See Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. United States, 742 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1984); Madison v. United States, 679 F.2d 736, 738-39 (8th Cir. 1982) (awarding of government contract to contractor and promulgation of safety manual are discretionary functions); Blaber v. United States, 332 F.2d 629, 631 (2d Cir. 1964) (delegation of safety responsibility to independent contractor is discretionary function); Maltais v. United States, 546 F. Supp. 96, 101 (N.D.N.Y.1982), aff'd, 729 F.2d 1442 (2d Cir. 1983) (government decision to delegate safety responsibility to contractor is a discretionary function despite government's retention of the right to inspect and stop work).
The United States' decisions to delegate safety responsibility to Chrysler, to conduct only "spot checks" of Chrysler's safety programs, and to not institute a safety training program for railyard workers are clearly the type of discretionary functions protected by 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). The evidence established that the United States' safety office was primarily responsible for the safety of government employees, that access to the plant by government inspectors to make "spot checks" was limited by the need for Chrysler security clearance, and that the United States' safety staff could not order Chrysler to change its safety practices. The government's safety director testified that safety decisions regarding specific areas of the plant were based on accident rates in those areas. The decision to rely on the "spot checks" or annual review along with accident rates to establish safety priorities is, in essence, a policy decision, involving the exercise of discretion. Although Chrysler was required to comply with the AMC Safety Manual AMC 385-100, that manual did not describe railroad safety procedures.7 Further, the decision to delegate responsibility for safety to Chrysler was based on a perception by government negotiators that Chrysler was a prudent contractor capable of implementing its own safety program.8 These facts establish that the acts cited in appellees' complaint constitute discretionary functions over which the district court lacked jurisdiction.
Feyers v. United States, 561 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Mich. 1983)
The Court in Varig Airlines reaffirmed its earlier interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) in Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 73 S. Ct. 956, 97 L. Ed. 1427 (1953)
Id. at 35-36, 73 S. Ct. at 968 (footnotes omitted). Varig Airlines, 104 S. Ct. at 2764.
While the discretionary function exception does not apply where mandatory guidelines or regulations are violated, Colorado Flying Academy, Inc., 724 F.2d at 875; Jayvee Brand, Inc. v. United States, 721 F.2d 385, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Hylin v. United States, 715 F.2d 1206, 1213 (7th Cir. 1983); Bergmann v. United States, 689 F.2d 789, 792 (8th Cir. 1982); Reminga v. United States, 631 F.2d 449, 456 (6th Cir. 1980), this rule is inapplicable in this case since neither the AMC Safety Manual AMC 385-100 nor any other provision of the contract required specific safety measures in the railyard. See Madison, 679 F.2d at 739-40 (failure by United States to require compliance with safety manual was not a discretionary act where the government knew of the safety violations and specific safety precautions were required by the safety manual incorporated by reference into the contract); Barron v. United States, 473 F. Supp. 1077, 1084 (D.Hawaii 1979), modified, 654 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1981) (failure to correct safety problems not discretionary where contractor disregarded significant safety requirements of the contract). Further, the contract provided that the provisions of the Manual would be applied as mandatory only "when mutually agreed upon by the parties." See supra, note 3
Similarly, in Varig Airlines, the Court noted that " [t]he FAA employees ... were specifically empowered to make policy judgments regarding the degree of confidence that might reasonably be placed in a given manufacturer." Id. at 2768