Source: http://www.chanrobles.com/usa/us_supremecourt/258/13/case.php
Timestamp: 2017-12-11 13:34:29
Document Index: 529205994

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 4679', '§ 465', '§ 465', '§ 465', '§ 465', '§ 7']

Plaintiff in error, herein called the Telegraph Company, brought this proceeding to condemn an easement upon the right of way of defendant in error, herein called the Railroad Company, in exercise of a right conferred by a Kentucky statute of 1898 (Ky. St. § 4679c). [Footnote 1] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
It was intimated, however, that "an award chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
of damages" might "meet the case," but that it might be that another telegraph line could not be so placed as not to substantially obstruct the use by the Railroad Company of its right of way for some railroad purpose. The court therefore concluded that the verdict of the jury and the judgment entered thereon must be set aside and the case remanded for new trial upon the question of amount of compensation and for such further hearing and decision upon the question of the forbidden interference in specific places as the opinion indicated might be open. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 249 F.3d 5. As we construe the decision, there was a reversal not only on the question of damages, but on the question of the interference by the easement petitioned for with the use by the railroad of its right of way. And hence there might be brought into consideration a conflict between the uses, the resolution of which would determine for or against the right of the Telegraph Company under the law of 1898.
On March 14, 1916, the legislature of the state repealed the Act of March 1898. [Footnote 2] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The court denied the motion to dismiss the petition, deciding that the repealing act, taken in connection with Ky.St. § 465, [Footnote 3] was not intended to affect pending cases, and that, if so intended it, the repealing act, was void under the constitution of the state, which precludes interference with judicial proceedings, the courts having the "exclusive right to determine the law of existing cases."
The ruling was contrary to that subsequently made by the circuit court of appeals, the latter court holding, reversing the district court's action in refusing to dissolve the injunction that had been granted against the Railroad Company in a suit brought for that purpose, that, within the meaning of § 465, the Telegraph Company had not acquired any vested right when the repealing act was passed, and that therefore that act terminated the right of eminent domain conferred upon it, the Telegraph chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Company, by the law of 1898. A petition for rehearing was denied. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 268 F. 4, 13. [Footnote 4]
The assignments of error of the Telegraph Company are in effect repetition of its contentions in the district court [and we may say of its contentions in the circuit court of appeals] and are all based on the asserted immutability of the judgment of the district court, the effect of the award of damages, and the payment of the latter into court. The contentions repel almost immediately upon their utterance. To yield to them would practically take away the virtue of an appeal, give it right and procedure, but accord it only partial effect. The present case illustrates this. The circuit court of appeals reversed the judgment of the district court in favor of the Telegraph Company not only because of errors in amount of the award, but because of errors in the judgment chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
of conditions essential to a grant of the easement. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 249 F.3d 5. There was something more, therefore, to be inquired into upon the return of the case to the district court than the amount of compensation to be paid, as we have pointed out.
The Telegraph Company insists that § 465 of the Kentucky statutes precludes the application of the Act of March 14, 1916, to the case, and such was the original view. We cannot accede to it. We agree with the circuit court of appeals that no right had accrued or claim arisen under the judgment of the district court within the meaning of § 465. Besides, as also pointed out by the circuit court of appeals, the Act of March 14, 1916, is general and absolute. It takes away the power to condemn the right of way of a railroad company by telegraph companies, and it does not save proceedings commenced before its applicable date. Such reservation is usual, if intended (Railroad Co. v. Grant, 98 U. S. 398), and is illustrated by Pannell v. Louisville Tobacco Warehouse Co., 113 Ky. 630.
Of the effect of a reversal on appeal of a judgment and award in a condemnation proceeding and a repealing act, Treacy v. Elizabethtown, Lexington & Big Sandy Railroad Co., 85 Ky. 270, is of pertinent reference. It is there held that, if a judgment in condemnation proceedings be reversed on appeal (the conditions requisite to legal condemnation of the land not having been established), the case upon reversal stands upon the petition or application alone, and the proceedings being thus in fieri, the law under which they were instituted could be repealed, and if repealed, the subsequent proceedings must be under the new law. The principle was announced to sustain the repeal of the charter of a railroad company under which upon the rendition of the verdict assessing damages for chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The same comment is applicable to § 7 of the Act of 1898, which provides that telegraph companies, upon the payment of the award, may enter upon the land they seek to condemn. The Telegraph Company in the present case was not put to exercise the privilege. It had possession having received it under the contract with the Railroad Company. The contract having expired, the Telegraph Company was put to confirm the possession chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The injunction suit was brought to restrain the Railroad Company from disturbing the Telegraph Company's occupancy of the right of way of the Railroad Company pending this proceeding. The injunction was granted February 7, 1913, 201 F.9d 6. The order granting it was affirmed by the circuit court of appeals. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 207 F. 1.