Source: http://info.sfcriminallawspecialist.com/bid/92875/S-e-n-t-e-n-c-i-n-g-P-a-r-t-n-e-r-s-M-A-R-C-H-2-0-1-5-PART-I
Timestamp: 2017-04-25 20:29:38
Document Index: 517032000

Matched Legal Cases: ['§2255', '§2255', '§2', '§893', '§782', '§2', '§782', '§2', '§2', '§2', '§851', '§2', '§2']

S e n t e n c i n g P a r t n e r s - M A R C H - 2 0 1 5 (PART I) Blog
S e n t e n c i n g P a r t n e r s - M A R C H - 2 0 1 5 (PART I) Posted by
Chris Morales on Wed, May 27, 2015 @ 07:00 AM
Under the facts of this case, the court found “that the facts in [the defendant’s] case - namely, the vacatur of his state convictions in light of Annie Dookhan’s involvement in those cases - are sufficiently exceptional such that his claim is cognizable under §2255. Our holding is narrow. We need not and do not address the cognizability of a claim . . . that the sentencing court legally erred in applying the Guidelines.” Finally, the court observed that it was “aware of no Court of Appeals case taking a contrary position.” See Purvis v. United States, 662 F.3d 939 (7th Cir. 2011); Stewart v. United States, 646 F.3d 856 (11th Cir. 2011); United States v. Pettiford, 612 F.3d 270 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Doe, 239 F.3d 473 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v. LaValle, 175 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Cox, 83 F.3d 336 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Nichols, 30 F.3d 35 (5th Cir. 1994). “Accordingly, we join our sister circuits and hold that claims such as [the defendant’s] are cognizable under the fourth prong of §2255(a).”
Case Summaries Offense Conduct(Chapter 2)
United States v. Iovino2015 WL 405583 (2nd Cir. 2015)
United States v. Sarabia-Martinez2015 WL 736009 (5th Cir. 2015)
Florida conviction for trafficking methamphetamine (14 grams or more) not categorically “drug trafficking offense” The defendant pled guilty to illegal reentry. His sentence was enhanced sixteen levels, pursuant to §2L1.2, based on a previous “drugtrafficking offense” conviction. The district court based the enhancement solely on information in the PSR and sentenced the defendant to 50 months. On appeal, the defendant argued it was plain error to treat his prior “Trafficking in Methamphetamine 14 Grams or More” (Florida Stat. Ann. §893.135(1)(f)) conviction as a “drug trafficking offense.” The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that because the Florida statute classified mere possession as drug trafficking, it was defined more broadly than defined in the sentencing guidelines, and “[u]nder the categorical approach, application of the ‘drug trafficking offense’ enhancement would therefore be improper.” See United States v. Garza-Lopez, 410 F.3d 268 (5th Cir. 2005) and United States v. Lopez-Salas, 513 F.3d 174, 178-79 (5th Cir. 2008). A “conviction under the Florida drug trafficking statute does not categorically constitute a drug trafficking conviction for purposes of the sentencing guidelines. We further hold the district court plainly erred by relying on the PSR in applying the sentence enhancement. Because the error affected [the defendant’s] substantial rights, we vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing.”
United States v. Garcia-Perez2015 WL 753759 (5th Cir. 2015)
The defendant was brought to the United States as an infant in 1969. In 1996, he pled nocontest to manslaughter under Florida Statute §782.07 and was deported. He re-entered theUnited States several times. In 2013, he pled guilty to being an alien unlawfully present in the United States after deportation following an aggravated felony. The PSR recommended a 16- level enhancement under §2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii), based on the Florida manslaughter conviction being a “crime of violence.” Over the defendant’s objection, the district court adopted the PSR and sentenced him to 87 months, the top of the guideline range, noting that it was tempted to depart upwards, but did not do so. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed: “Because §782.07(1) neither has an element of force nor punishes only generic contemporary manslaughter, it is not a crime of violence for purposes of §2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). It was thus error to enhance [the defendant’s] offense level by 16 levels on the basis of his manslaughter conviction. Had the 16- level ‘crime of violence’ enhancement not been erroneously applied, [the defendant] would have been subject to, at most, an 8-level ‘aggravated felony’ enhancement under §2L1.2(b)(1)(C). All else being equal, the smaller enhancement would produce a total offense level of 13, which . . . would result in a Guideline range of 30 to 37 months. This range is 50 to 57 months less than the 87-month prison sentence imposed. We VACATE the judgment of sentence and REMAND for resentencing.”
United States v. Jones2015 WL 727969 (1st Cir. 2015)
Two-level §2D1.1(b)(12) stash house enhancement was justified DEA agents observed a drug dealer (“CW”) meeting the defendant at an apartment before CW sold crack cocaine to a confidential informant. The surveillance team saw the defendant’s coconspirator, Murphy, enter and leave the apartment on several occasions. Later, Murphy again met with CW, who then sold crack to an undercover police officer. CW was detained and found in possession of 63 grams of crack cocaine. At this point, CW began cooperating with the DEA. On three occasions, CW contacted the defendant by text message to set up controlled buys, resulting in two sales by Murphy and one sale by the defendant himself. The agents eventually searched the apartment and recovered over 600 grams of crack cocaine and nearly 500 grams of powdered cocaine. The defendant pled guilty to five counts of drugrelated offenses in exchange for the government’s withdrawal of a sentenceenhancing information under 21 U.S.C. §851. The PSR recommended a two-level enhancement for maintaining the apartment as a stash house, under §2D1.1(b)(12). The district court adopted the PSR and sentenced the defendant to 135 months. On appeal, the First Circuit explained that the “stash house enhancement applies when a defendant knowingly maintains a premises for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance” and that courts are to consider, among other things, “whether the defendant held a possessory interest in (e.g., owned or rented) the premises” and “the extent to which the defendant controlled access to, or activities at, the premises.” Further, “for the enhancement to apply, drug distribution need not be the sole reason that a defendant maintains the premises.” The court noted that the evidence showed that the defendant did not own or rent the apartment, did not receive mail there, did not use the address on any official forms, and did not contract for any of the utilities. On the other hand, the evidence showed that the defendant had ready access to the apartment, had gotten a key from the tenant, had given a duplicate key to Murphy, from time to time spent the night there, kept clothes and a toothbrush there, and elt free to come and go as he pleased. Based on these facts, the court affirmed the enhancement, holding that “[t]here was ample evidence that the defendant exercised dominion and control over the apartment. He had a key, came and went at will, and slept there whenever he pleased. He - and no one else - kept clothes and toiletries there. In addition, he controlled the activities that took place at the apartment (by, for example, furnishing a key to his coconspirator) and ensured that the premises would remain available by delivering rent payments.”
United States v. Ferdman2015 WL 619629 (10th Cir. 2015)
The defendant and three co-conspirators illicitly obtained the account information ofnumerous Sprint corporate customers and used that information to purchase phones by impersonating the corporate account representatives. The defendant charged the price of the phones to the corporate accounts, and then sold at least some of the phones to one of his coconspirators for online resale. He pled guilty to (a) conspiracy to transport in interstate commerce fraudulently obtained goods valued at $5,000 or more, and (b) conspiracy to use unauthorized access devices to obtain goods valued at $1,000 or more. The district court imposed a sentence of 15 months and ordered the defendant to pay Sprint $48,715.59 in restitution, under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (“MVRA”). The court calculated this amount based on what Sprint referred to as the “retail unsubsidized price” of 86 cell phones the defendant fraudulently procured, plus Sprint’s shipping and investigative costs. As support for this amount, the government offered an unverified two-page letter, prepared by Sprint’s regional manager of investigations, purporting to list the amount of losses Sprint sustained. On appeal, the defendant asserted that in awarding Sprint criminal restitution, the district court abused its discretion by basing the “value” of Sprint’s cell phones on their “retail unsubsidized price,” absent any evidence that his fraud diverted sales from Sprint, thereby affecting its profits. The Tenth Circuit explained that “in a case where a merchant claims its actual loss encompasses petail sales, the MVRA imposes on theGovernment the task of producing some evidence that the defendant’s theft in fact caused the victim to lose retail sales.” In addition, “[u]nlike loss under the Guidelines, the MVRA requires proof of actual loss and does not allow alternative metrics, such as intended loss.” Here, the government presented a mere claim that but for the defendant’s theft, Sprint may have made additional sales. “The Government must present at least some evidence . . . from which the court could reasonably infer lost sales. And . . . unless the Government can show the defendant’s crime depleted the stock of a particular fungible or readily replaceable good like a cell phone, at a time when the victim might otherwise have been able to sell that good to a willing buyer, something akin to replacement or wholesale cost clearly appears the more accurate measure of actual loss. Of course, because the MVRA’s controlling metric is actual loss, the Government still must satisfy its burden to prove the amount of the victim’s cost.” Finally, the unverified letter from Sprint was insufficient to support the estimated expenses Sprint incurred in investigating the fraud. “The record contains no actual proof, not even an affidavit, of what those expenses were. That those expenses for the most part appear reasonable is not enough to satisfy the evidentiary dictates of the MVRA. The likelihood that certain facts exist to confirm Sprint’s estimates, no matter how probable, does not relieve the Government of its burden, after proper objection, to establish their actuality.” The restitution order was vacated and remanded.
United States v. Burgos-Figueroa2015 WL 627170 (1st Cir. 2015)
United States v. Rogers2015 WL 452862 (7th Cir. 2015) §2B3.1(b)(5) enhancement for carjacking was proper