Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/739/885/453941/
Timestamp: 2019-06-17 21:04:29
Document Index: 218892262

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2', '§ 841', '§ 952', '§ 960', '§ 963', '§ 2', '§ 2']

United States of America v. Leon, Pablo, Appellant in No. 83-5208case, William, Appellant in No. 83-5209pugh, David Mark, Appellant in No. 83-5210tomlinson, Clemente Roberto, Roberto Clemento Tomlinson,appellant in No. 83-5212, 739 F.2d 885 (3d Cir. 1984) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Third Circuit › 1984 › United States of America v. Leon, Pablo, Appellant in No. 83-5208case, William, Appellant in No. 83-...
United States of America v. Leon, Pablo, Appellant in No. 83-5208case, William, Appellant in No. 83-5209pugh, David Mark, Appellant in No. 83-5210tomlinson, Clemente Roberto, Roberto Clemento Tomlinson,appellant in No. 83-5212, 739 F.2d 885 (3d Cir. 1984)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit - 739 F.2d 885 (3d Cir. 1984)
Argued April 9, 1984. Decided July 12, 1984
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support the convictions of Pugh and Tomlinson, we are mindful of the Supreme Court's decision in Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S. Ct. 457, 469, 86 L. Ed. 680 (1942). In Glasser, the Court stated:
Id. (citation omitted). Recently, the Court reaffirmed this holding. In Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 17, 98 S. Ct. 2141, 2150, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1978), the Court stated:
Id. (citations omitted). Moreover, " [t]he evidence does not need to be inconsistent with every conclusion save that of guilt if it does establish a case from which the jury can find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Allard, 240 F.2d 840, 841 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 939, 77 S. Ct. 814, 1 L. Ed. 2d 761 (1957). See also United States v. Cooper, 567 F.2d 252, 253 (3d Cir. 1977) (recognizing the Glasser and Allard standards). Finally, when examining the sufficiency of the evidence, the court reviews the totality of the circumstances. See Government of the Virgin Islands v. Greene, 708 F.2d 113, 115 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S. Ct. 1004, 79 L. Ed. 2d 236 (1984); United States v. Blasco, 702 F.2d 1315, 1332 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S. Ct. 275, 78 L. Ed. 2d 256 (1984). Because we are unconvinced that the "prosecution's failure [was] clear"12 and because the evidence does establish a case from which the jury could find these four defendants guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,13 we are unwilling to disturb the district court's final orders.
Initially, we recognize that the evidence against Tomlinson was not as strong as that offered against some of his convicted co-defendants. Tomlinson contends that he was convicted solely because of his presence at the Edison Rest Area 24 hours prior to his arrest. Although we agree with Tomlinson's contention that presence alone is insufficient, see DeSimone, 660 F.2d at 537, the totality of the circumstances viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, Glasser, 315 U.S. at 80, 62 S. Ct. at 469, demonstrates more than mere presence at the scene of a crime. First, the crime scene in this case is hardly an ordinary one into which an innocent person might wander. The South Amboy dock area is situated in a secluded area, one well suited to off-loading contraband. The arrest was made in the early morning hours after the unloading operation, consisting of people walking between the "Saetta" and the truck carrying large objects on their shoulders, had been carried out under cover of darkness "with a lot of activity" (T. 1895) for approximately one and one-half hours. Tomlinson was found just yards from where the unloading had taken place and a short distance from where a great deal of the marijuana was located. While even this proximity alone might be insufficient as showing mere acquiescence and not participation, but cf. United States v. Castro, 723 F.2d 1527, 1534-35 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v. Blasco, 702 F.2d 1315, 1331-32 (11th Cir. 1983), critically Tomlinson was observed also at the Edison Rest Area, on the night before the unloading of the contraband, in the vicinity of the tractor-trailer identified in one of the anonymous telephone calls and of Pablo Leon, who was apprehended the next night at the George Washington Bridge as the driver of the tractor-trailer containing the marijuana. Although there may be innocent explanations consistent with these facts, we think that a reasonable jury could infer from these circumstances that Tomlinson was not present for some innocuous reason, but was involved in the conspiracy to import, possess, and distribute marijuana and was guilty of the substantive offenses as well. See 18 U.S.C. § 2(a).19 Accordingly, we will affirm the district court's decisions to deny Tomlinson's motions for acquittal and for a new trial.
The appeals of two other co-defendants, United States v. Angel Roman, No. 83-5211, and United States v. Francisco Novaton, No. 83-5213, have been dismissed. A total of 27 persons were charged in the indictment with (a) conspiring to knowingly and intentionally possess, with intent to distribute, as well as (b) possession with intent to distribute, approximately 35 tons of marijuana, a Schedule I controlled substance, contrary to 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1) & (b) (6), 21 U.S.C. § 952(a), 21 U.S.C. § 960(a) (1) & (b) (2), 21 U.S.C. § 963, and 18 U.S.C. § 2
Krisza testified that the small area was " [m]aybe five feet by six feet or something; five feet by seven feet" (T. 1091)
See Burks v. United States, supra, 437 U.S. at 17, 98 S. Ct. at 2150
Defendant Pugh places a great deal of reliance on United States v. DeSimone, 660 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1027, 102 S. Ct. 1732, 72 L. Ed. 2d 149 (1982). Since its decision in DeSimone, the Fifth Circuit has been split into the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits. The Eleventh Circuit has consistently refused to read DeSimone as broadly as Pugh would have us read that case. See, e.g., United States v. Castro, 723 F.2d 1527, 1534-35 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v. Blasco, 702 F.2d 1315, 1331-32 (11th Cir. 1983)
Title 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) provides:
First, the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 72 L. Ed. 2d 752 (1982), is dispositive of Leon's contention that the search of the tractor-trailer he was driving constituted an illegal search and seizure. Second, we find that the district court's decision to admit two airline tickets of Mr. Case for travel from Miami to Newark in March 1980 did not constitute an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Long, 574 F.2d 761, 767 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 985, 99 S. Ct. 577, 58 L. Ed. 2d 657 (1978). Third, we reject Case's contention that the district court should have granted a mistrial in light of Coyle's statement that he feared for his life when he boarded the "Saetta." The district judge has considerable discretion in determining whether to grant a mistrial. See United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 485-86, 91 S. Ct. 547, 557-58, 27 L. Ed. 2d 543 (1971). We do not think the district judge abused his discretion by denying defendant's motion. Fourth, we reject defendants' contention that an offhand comment by Trooper Coyle to the jury was grounds for a mistrial. Although a private communication between a witness and a juror is presumptively prejudicial in a criminal case, Remmer v. United States, 350 U.S. 377, 379, 76 S. Ct. 425, 426, 100 L. Ed. 435 (1956), when the record rebuts the presumption of prejudice a mistrial need not be granted. United States v. Hines, 696 F.2d 722, 731 (10th Cir. 1982). Although the communication was unfortunate, our review of the record convinces us that the witness' innocuous statement that "I always wanted to be a teacher" was not prejudicial (T. 1917). Moreover, the district court's refusal to permit cross-examination of Coyle on his remark was not an abuse of discretion. United States ex rel. Abdus-Sabur v. Cuyler, 653 F.2d 828, 833 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1088, 102 S. Ct. 650, 70 L. Ed. 2d 625 (1981). Fifth, we reject defendants' contention that the district court erred by refusing to charge "Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus." The court's charge on the credibility of witnesses adequately covered the evidence in this record (T. 2662). See United States v. Weinstein, 452 F.2d 704, 713-14 (2d Cir. 1971). Sixth, we affirm the district court's decision to admit the unsolicited statements of Case and Pugh because the statements did not violate the Supreme Court's directive in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1965). See supra note 15