Source: http://openjurist.org/664/f2d/423/grand-jury-proceedings-hermann-grand-jury-proceedings-vannier
Timestamp: 2017-04-29 20:31:55
Document Index: 32531741

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1826', '§ 2515', '§ 3504', '§ 3504', '§ 3504', '§ 3504', '§ 3504', '§ 3504']

664 F2d 423 Grand Jury Proceedings Hermann Grand Jury Proceedings Vannier | OpenJurist
664 F. 2d 423 - Grand Jury Proceedings Hermann Grand Jury Proceedings Vannier HomeFederal Reporter, Second Series 664 F.2d.
664 F2d 423 Grand Jury Proceedings Hermann Grand Jury Proceedings Vannier 664 F.2d 423
9 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1314
In re GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS.Appeal of Mitchell HERMANN, Witness.In re GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS.Appeal of Francine VANNIER.
Nos. 81-5602, 81-5636.
I. Adequacy of the Government's Responses
A. Response to Hermann's Motion
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a) the district court may confine a recalcitrant grand jury witness if the witness' refusal to testify is without "just cause." However, 18 U.S.C. § 2515 provides a defense to a contempt charge; a grand jury witness may decline to answer questions derived from illegal interception of the witness' communications. In short, a showing that the interrogation would be based upon the illegal interception of the witness' communications constitutes a showing of "just cause" that precludes a finding of contempt. Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 47-50, 92 S.Ct. 2357, 2360-62, 33 L.Ed.2d 179 (1972).
Section 3504 provides a mechanism by which a potential witness may try to demonstrate that the questions posed were derived from illegal electronic surveillance. "(U)pon a claim ... that evidence is inadmissible because it is the primary product of (illegal interception) ..., the opponent of the claim shall affirm or deny the occurrence of the alleged" illegal surveillance. 18 U.S.C. § 3504 (1976). In this circuit the adequacy of the government's denial of illegal electronic surveillance is dependent upon the specificity of the witness' allegation of illegality. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 643 F.2d 226, 229 (5th Cir. 1981); Brummitt v. United States, 613 F.2d 62, 65 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 907, 100 S.Ct. 2990, 64 L.Ed.2d 856 (1980); United States v. Stevens, 510 F.2d 1101, 1105 (5th Cir. 1975). Hermann does not argue, and indeed could not argue, that the government's response to his first § 3504 motion was inadequate. A record search by all potentially interested federal agencies which revealed no electronic surveillance of the movant or his attorney is a valid denial. In light of this prior all agency inquiry and response, we hold that the government's response to Hermann's second § 3504 motion was sufficient as an update of its first June 16, 1980 response. Were the government's second response the sole reply ever made to a claim by Hermann of illegal interception, we could not pronounce it sufficient.
Hermann has also alleged that the government's failure to deny that the questions were the product of illegal electronic surveillance by cooperating state agencies justified his refusal to testify. We are not prepared to require the federal government to extend the scope of its inquiry and its required affirmance or denial to state agencies.11 Moreover, the government's direct and unequivocal denial that any of its questions were derived from any illegal surveillance-state or federal-is a sufficient answer to Hermann's claim. In re Harris, 383 F.Supp. 1036, 1039-40 (N.D.Cal.1974).
B. Response to Vannier's Motion
As we observed above, the standard for determining the sufficiency of the government's denial of electronic surveillance varies with the degree of specificity of the allegations raised in a § 3504 motion to compel disclosure. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 643 F.2d 226, 229 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Brummitt, 613 F.2d 62, 65 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 907, 100 S.Ct. 2990, 64 L.Ed.2d 856 (1980); United States v. Stevens, 510 F.2d 1101, 1105 (5th Cir. 1975). Furthermore, this court has stated that
a "mere assertion" of unlawful surveillance is enough to trigger the government's obligation to affirm or deny. However, such an "assertion" must be, at a minimum, a positive statement that unlawful surveillance has taken place. A generalized motion based on the possibility of such surveillance ... is not a "claim" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 3504(a)(1).
United States v. Tucker, 526 F.2d 279, 282 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 958, 96 S.Ct. 1738, 48 L.Ed.2d 203 (1976) (emphasis added). In Tucker we held that the movants' allegation that "the Government may have conducted illegal electronic surveillance" of them or their attorneys was insufficient to state a § 3504 claim and therefore required no response from the government. As in Tucker, we hold here that Mrs. Vannier has failed to state a "claim" of illegal electronic surveillance and that the government, therefore, had no obligation to respond.
The scope of the marital privilege has never been construed, even at common law, as absolute. Wigmore, supra. And as it is in derogation of the public's "right to every man's evidence", United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331, 70 S.Ct. 724 (730), 94 L.Ed. 884 (1950), it is not to be "expansively construed."
Subject to sharp criticism for its basis in outdated notions which regarded the woman as a chattel and denied her a separate legal existence, the privilege against adverse spousal testimony has had a checkered history.1 Recently the United States Supreme Court modified the privilege "so that the witness spouse alone has a privilege to refuse to testify adversely" and "may be neither compelled to nor foreclosed from testifying." Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 53, 100 S.Ct. 906, 914, 63 L.Ed.2d 186 (1980). See also Fed.R.Evid. 501 (applicable to grand juries under Fed.R.Evid. 1101(d)). As an unwilling witness, Mrs. Vannier may not be compelled to testify if in fact the testimony would be adverse to her husband's interest. Thus the issue becomes whether Mrs. Vannier's answers to the questions posed2 would tend to incriminate her husband.
In Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159, 71 S.Ct. 223, 95 L.Ed. 170 (1950), a case involving the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the Supreme Court noted that the danger of incrimination must not be viewed narrowly. Such a danger may exist, said the Court, even if the answer to a question would not by itself support a conviction. It suffices if the "(a) nswers to the questions asked by the grand jury would have furnished a link in the chain of evidence needed in a prosecution of the petitioner." Id. at 161, 71 S.Ct. at 224. In Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 71 S.Ct. 814, 95 L.Ed. 1118 (1951), the Supreme Court further elaborated on the standard governing incriminating statements:
Id. at 486, 71 S.Ct. at 818 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Therefore a claim of incrimination must be upheld unless it is perfectly clear that the answers to the questions could not possibly incriminate. Id. at 488, 71 S.Ct. at 819. The setting in which the questions here were asked-a grand jury investigation of, inter alia, a conspiracy charge3 involving Vannier's husband-becomes crucial to a proper resolution of a claim of privilege against self-incrimination and against adverse spousal testimony.
With this setting in mind, it becomes clear that the questions posed to Mrs. Vannier were not "innocuous," as the government contends and the majority agrees, but contain potential for providing a link in a chain of evidence which might be used to convict Mr. Vannier. Under the law of conspiracy, the acts of one co-conspirator in furtherance of the unlawful agreement are admissible against all, even in the absence of the other's approval of these overt acts. United States v. Netterville, 553 F.2d 903, 912 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009, 98 S.Ct. 719, 54 L.Ed.2d 752 (1978). The overt act itself need not be criminal if it is in furtherance of the unlawful agreement, United States v. Enstam, 622 F.2d 857, 867 (5th Cir. 1980), and it may occur before or after the others join the conspiracy. United States v. Netterville, 573 F.2d at 912. If, for example, Mrs. Vannier were to testify that she moved from California to Pinellas County, Florida with her husband in 1975, and the government proves that the purpose of the move was to engage in, as a field service member of the Church of Scientology, any of the alleged unlawful activities recited in footnote 1, this overt act would provide evidence admissible against Mr. Vannier as an alleged co-conspirator. Likewise, an affirmative answer by Mrs. Vannier that she infiltrated the election campaign of Gabriel Cazares would prove an act attributable to Mr. Vannier. This brief discussion suffices to show that, given the scope of the grand jury's investigation into activities of members and employees of the Church of Scientology, it is not perfectly clear that the answers to the questions could not possibly incriminate Mr. Vannier. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. at 488, 71 S.Ct. at 819.
We do not comment upon the federal government's obligation where it is shown that a federal agency exercised considerable dominion and control over a state agency's resources in pursuing a federal investigation. See generally In re Harris, 383 F.Supp. 1036, 1039 (N.D.Cal.1974). We do not find such circumstances present here
See generally Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 43-50, 100 S.Ct. 906, 909-12, 63 L.Ed.2d 186 (1980)