Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/99016/baltimore-contractors-inc-vs-bodinger
Timestamp: 2017-03-23 19:27:37
Document Index: 574715935

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1292', '§ 1291', '§ 1292', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 1291', '§ 1291', '§ 1292', '§ 1292', '§ 129', '§ 274', '§ 129', '§ 129', '§ 1292', '§ 1292', '§ 3', '§ 7', '§ 129', '§ 7', '§ 24', '§ 47', '§ 31', '§ 1292', '§ 1291', '§ 1292', '§ 1291', '§ 1291', '§ 1292']

Baltimore Contractors Inc Vs Bodinger - Citation 99016 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Save as PDF Add a Tag Add a Note Semantics Visualize Baltimore Contractors, Inc. Vs. Bodinger - Court Judgment	LegalCrystal Citationlegalcrystal.com/99016CourtUS Supreme CourtDecided OnJan-10-1955Case Number348 U.S. 176AppellantBaltimore Contractors, Inc.RespondentBodingerExcerpt:.....to determination of the merits of the controversy. and this court has held that § 1292 makes all stay orders appealable that have the substantial effect of interlocutory injunction orders.
ettelson v. metropolitan
317 u. s. 188
Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger - 348 U.S. 176 (1955)
an appeal to a federal court of appeals could not be taken. Pp.
(a) The order denying a stay was not a "final decision" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291. P.
348 U. S. 179
(b) The order denying a stay was a step in controlling the litigation before the trial court, not the refusal of an interlocutory injunction within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(1). Pp.
Ettelson v. Metropolitan Ins. Co.,
Shanferoke Corp. v. Westchester Corp.,
348 U. S. 182
The petitioner moved for a stay of the action pursuant to § 3 of the United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 3, which authorizes a stay by a federal court when an issue is "referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration." The District Court refused the stay on the ground that the agreement between the parties did not constitute an agreement to arbitrate. The court apparently construed the quoted provision as limited to mathematical disputes. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 216 F.2d 192. On respondent's motion, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, citing
City of Morgantown v. Royal Ins. Co.,
In view of the conflict between the decision below and
Hudson Lumber Co. v. United States Plywood Corp.,
181 F.2d 929, we granted the petition, 347 U.S. 942. [
] Section 22 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 84, provided that appeals in civil actions could be taken to the circuit courts only from final decrees and judgments. [
] That requirement of finality has remained a part of our
law ever since, and now appears as § 1291 of the Judicial Code. [
The trial court's interpretation of the quoted contract clause and its order denying a stay could not be called a final decision under § 1291. It was as surely an interlocutory order as the District Court's order in
The provision for interlocutory appeals was first introduced in 1891, when the circuit courts of appeals were established as intermediate appellate courts. 26 Stat. 826. Section 7 of that Act allowed appeals from interlocutory orders in equity "granting or continuing" injunctions, but from those only. Additions to the class of appealable interlocutory orders were made from time to time until the enactment of § 1292 in its present form. [
No discussion of the underlying reasons for modifying the rule of finality appears in the legislative history, although the changes seem plainly to spring from a developing need to permit litigants to effectually challenge interlocutory orders of serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence. [
] When the pressure rises to a point that influences Congress, legislative remedies are enacted. The Congress is in a position to weigh the competing interests of the dockets of the trial and appellate courts, to consider the practicability of savings in time and expense, and to give proper weight to the effect on litigants. When countervailing considerations arise, interested parties and organizations become active in efforts to modify the appellate jurisdiction. [
] This Court, however, is not authorized to approve or declare judicial modification. It is the responsibility of all courts to see that no unauthorized extension or reduction of jurisdiction, direct or indirect, occurs in the federal system.
decisions disorganize practice by encouraging attempts to secure or oppose appeals, with a consequent waste of time and money. The
A series of decisions of this Court has developed the rationale for determining the appealability of such an interlocutory order as this under § 1292 and its predecessors. The appealability of routine interlocutory injunctive orders raised few questions.
See George v. Victor Talking Machine Co.,
293 U. S. 377
. There, the statute was clear. It was when stays of proceedings, in distinction to injunctions, were appealed that the issue of jurisdiction became sharp. In
national courts and between the powers of those courts when sitting as courts of law and when sitting as courts of equity.' Per Van Devanter, J., in
Griesa v. Mutual Life Ins. Co.,
165 F. 48, 50, 51."
] After the adoption of the one form of action by the Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. 2, we reiterated this ruling in a like case.
. We said a stay of the complaint until disposition of the fraud issue "is as effective . . . as an injunction. . . . The statute looks to the substantial effect of the order made."
The point was made in the
case that power to stay mere steps within the framework of the litigation before a court differs as to appealability from an injunction prohibiting proceedings in another court. This distinction was applied in
. There, the insurance company brought a suit for reformation of the contract. The insured counterclaimed, seeking to enforce the contract as written, and demanded a jury trial; the company moved to strike the demand; the court granted the motion and set the case for trial to the court without a jury. The insured appealed, and the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal. We affirmed, holding that the
rule did not apply; that, since this was an equitable proceeding with a counterclaim to enforce the policy, the decision to hear the reformation issue first without a jury was only a decision as to how to try the case, and therefore was not an interlocutory order in the nature of an injunction. To the argument that the importance of a jury trial justified
case controls here. [
] Whether the District Court was right or wrong in its ruling that the contract provision did not require arbitration proceedings, it was simply a ruling in the only suit pending, actual or fictional. It was a mere order, and not an injunction, as that word is understood through the
cases as a stay through equitable principles of a common law action. This present case is to be distinguished from the
Shanferoke
in the same way. There, in a common law action, a motion for an interlocutory injunction on an equitable defense was refused. The order was appealable under Judicial Code, § 129. This Court said:
"For the reasons stated in
, an order granting or denying a stay based on an equitable defense or cross-bill interposed in an action at law under § 274b . . . is appealable under § 129."
case was a suit for a declaratory judgment as to the meaning of certain contract provisions, with a prayer for incidental injunctive relief. Appeal was allowed by the Court of Appeals from the District Court order staying the trial pending resort to arbitration, as required by the contract.
This enlarged the English rule, for there, interlocutory appeals were allowed in equity, although not at common law. 1 Holdsworth's History of English Law 214; Crick, The Final Judgment as a Basis for Appeal, 41 Yale L.J. 539, 540-548, 551. Section 22 was rigorously enforced.
Rutherford v. Fisher,
6 Cranch 51. Fragmentary appeals were denounced.
The statutory limitation of appeals to final decisions,
judgments and decrees,
, has called for determinations of the characteristics of finality.
342 U. S. 6
Roberts v. District Court,
Cf. Bandini Petroleum Co. v. Superior Court,
326 U. S. 124
Montgomery Bldg. & Const. Trades Council v. Ledbetter Erection Co.,
Underwood, Appeals in the Federal Practice From Collateral Orders, 36 Va.L.Rev. 731.
The concept of finality does not require a judgment completely disposing of every matter or issue that arises in the litigation. Some collateral issues may become "so severed . . . as to permit an appeal."
, was a suit at common law to recover damages for breach of a contract containing an arbitration clause. A motion was made to stay the suit until arbitration. The motion was denied because the trial court thought the arbitration clause applicable only to New York litigation. This Court held that the order was interlocutory and was appealable under § 129 of the Judicial Code of 1911, the predecessor of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(1). The ruling followed
201 F.2d 439,
reversed on issues not pertinent here,
U.S. 427, was a suit for statutory damages. It allowed an appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292 to the Court of Appeals from a District Court interlocutory order refusing a stay sought pursuant to the United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 3. The
case was cited.
In 1895, § 7 was amended to permit an appeal from interlocutory orders refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve an injunction. 28 Stat. 666. A further amendment was made in 1900 to include certain orders in receiverships. 31 Stat. 660. This amendment had the effect of repealing the 1895 provision which was restored in § 129 of the Judicial Code of 1911. 36 Stat. 1087, 1134.
Frankfurter and Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court, 124-127. The amendment of 1925, 43 Stat. 937, made two changes: first, it embraced orders modifying or refusing to modify injunctions and expanded the number of orders in receiverships which were appealable. Second, it dropped the words "in equity" from the phrase "where, upon a hearing in equity in a district court," which had been employed since the initial enactment of § 7 in 1891. No change was intended by that omission.
Schoenamsgruber v. Hamburg American Line,
294 U. S. 457
, footnote 3. In 1927, provision was made for interlocutory appeals in patent cases which are final save for an accounting, 44 Stat. 1261. Interlocutory appeals in bankruptcy cases are covered by § 24 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 47.
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc., rule 54(b),
and see Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp.,
Statutory provisions for interlocutory appeals have been enacted in Great Britain.
the Judicature Act of 1925, Law Reports 1925(2), 15 and 16 Geo. V, c. 49, § 31; 19 Halsbury's Laws of England (2d ed.) 209.
Hart and Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System, Note on Rule 54(b) and Review of Interlocutory Orders, 1344; Proposals for Interlocutory Appeals, 58 Yale L.J. 1186.
Report of the Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Judicial Conference of the United States for Sept. 24-25, 1953, p. 27, Report of Committee on Enlargement of Scope of Appeals from Interlocutory Orders, with proposed amendment to § 1292. This was transmitted to Congress, 100 Cong.Rec. 1079 and 1168.
Cf. Schoenamsgruber v. Hamburg American Line,
, where a stay in admiralty for arbitration was held not appealable as an injunction, but only an order as to the course of trial.
Moore's Commentary on the U.S. Judicial Code 492.
I think the District Court's order denying a stay is appealable because it is (1) "final" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and (2) a refusal to grant an interlocutory injunction within the meaning of § 1292. As the Court admits, a collateral issue may be so severable and unrelated to central trial issues have a judgment on the collateral issue is considered "final" and appealable under § 1291, even though other important issues are left undecided. Given this common sense meaning, § 1291 authorizes the present appeal. For certainly, decision of whether a judicial, rather than an arbitration, tribunal shall hear and determine this accounting controversy is logically and practically severable from the factual and legal issues crucial to determination of the merits of the controversy. And this Court has held that § 1292 makes all stay orders appealable that have the substantial effect of interlocutory injunction orders.