Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/466/1021/424901/
Timestamp: 2020-01-27 18:12:40
Document Index: 678273622

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 4009', '§ 4009', '§ 4009', '§ 4009', '§ 4009', '§ 4009', '§ 1732', '§ 4009', '§ 1732', '§ 4009', '§ 4009']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Ed Lange, Doing Business As Sun West, Defendant-appellant(two Cases).united States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Commander Associates, Inc., Doing Business As Dsi,defendant-appellant, 466 F.2d 1021 (9th Cir. 1972) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Ninth Circuit › 1972 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Ed Lange, Doing Business As Sun West, Defendant-app...
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Ed Lange, Doing Business As Sun West, Defendant-appellant(two Cases).united States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Commander Associates, Inc., Doing Business As Dsi,defendant-appellant, 466 F.2d 1021 (9th Cir. 1972)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 466 F.2d 1021 (9th Cir. 1972) Sept. 5, 1972
The statute under which appellants were sued is 39 U.S.C. § 4009, "whereby any householder may insulate himself from advertisements that offer for sale 'matter which the addressee in his sole discretion believes to be erotically arousing or sexually provocative.' 39 U.S.C. § 4009(a) . . ." Rowan v. United States Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728, 730, 90 S. Ct. 1484, 1487, 25 L. Ed. 2d 736 (1970). An individual who has received material in the mail, which he believes to be objectionable, may initiate the process by notifying the Post Office that he wishes his name removed from the mailing lists of a specific mailer.
The Post Office then issues a prohibitory order, specifying the name and address of the complainant. The order directs the mailer and his agents or assigns to refrain from making "any further mailings to the designated addressees" and to "delete immediately the names of the designated addressees from all mailing lists owned or controlled" by them. The order also prohibits the sale, rental or exchange of mailing lists which include the complainant's name. The order takes effect thirty days after service upon the mailer. 39 U.S.C. § 4009(c).
If the Post Office learns that the mailer sent a second mailing to the designated addressee after the effective date of the order, the Department notifies the mailer and informs him that he has the right to request an administrative hearing on the matter. 39 U.S.C. § 4009(d). With or without a hearing, if the Post Office determines that a violation of the prohibitory order has occurred, it may request the Attorney General to seek judicial enforcement of the order. 39 U.S.C. § 4009(d). Finally, a third mailing in violation of the judicial decree may result in the exercise of the contempt power of the court. 39 U.S.C. § 4009(e).
Appellants' second constitutional contention is that the administrative procedures set up in Sec. 4009 violate due process. An identical argument was rejected by the Supreme Court in Rowan v. United States Post Office Dept., supra, 397 U.S. at 738-739, 90 S. Ct. 1484, where the Court held that the administrative procedures comport with the notice and fair hearing requirements of the Due Process Clause. The actions of the Post Office personnel are merely the predicate for full judicial consideration of the case. Chief Justice Burger, speaking for a court that was unanimous on this point, stated in Rowan:
"It is sufficient that all available defenses, such as proof that no mail was sent, may be presented to a competent tribunal before a contempt finding can be made. See Nickey v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 393, 396, [54 S. Ct. 743, 78 L. Ed. 1323] (1934)." 397 U.S. at 739, 90 S. Ct. at 1492.
We interpret this to mean that sufficent constitutional safeguards exist under Sec. 4009 because the mailer is entitled to a trial de novo on the factual issues. Rowan v. United States Post Office Dept., supra, 397 U.S. at 739, n. 6, 90 S. Ct. 1484; cf. Rowan v. United States Post Office Dept., 300 F. Supp. 1036, 1046 (C.D. Cal. 1969) (three judge court) (Hufstedler, J., specially concurring).
The business records exception requires that the particular record must have been "made in regular course of any business" and that it was "the regular course of such business to make such memorandum or record . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1732. In deciding whether these elements are present in the instant case, it is relevant to examine the "content and method of preparation of the document sought to be introduced." La Porte v. United States, supra, 300 F.2d at 880. See 1 Wigmore on Evidence (3d ed. 1940) Sec. 8a, pp. 248, 249.
The source of these records, then, are the complaining persons who acted on their own initiative to notify the Post Office. Such initiative was geared to a specific purpose, a demand that an agency of government perform a service which it is required by law to perform. 39 U.S.C. § 4009. These factors tend to insure that the person complaining did in fact receive the material.
We conclude that the district judges were correct in their findings that the entire administrative files are admissible as records prepared in the regular course of the Post Office's business, under 28 U.S.C. § 1732.
Taking first the summary judgments, it is important to note that the district judge was not reviewing the administrative orders merely to determine whether the Post Office had sufficient evidence to support its order; summary judgment is uniquely suited to that kind of limited review with a great deference accorded to such administrative determinations. 6 Moore's Federal Practice p 56.17, p. 2472; See, e.g., Fields v. Hannegan, 82 U.S.App.D.C. 234, 162 F.2d 17, 18 (1947) (action to enjoin enforcement of Postmaster General's order to cease using the mails for frandulent purposes). Rather, the jurisdiction of the district court in the instant cases extended, if necessary, to a trial de novo. Rowan v. Post Office Dept., supra, 397 U.S. at 739, n. 6, 90 S. Ct. 1484; Rowan v. United States Post Office Dept., supra, 300 F. Supp. at 1046 (Hufstedler, J., concurring). This distinction is important because the summary judgments here might well have met the first standard but do not meet the latter, as to two of the five counts against Sun West, Number One.
Under Sec. 4009, the government has the burden of proving that a mailing was sent to each complainant more than thirty days after the prohibitory order was served on the mailer. 39 U.S.C. § 4009(c) and (f). This grace period was evidently written into the statute by Congress in order to give the mailer an opportunity to work through the administrative task of deleting the complainant's name from mailing lists.
Some of the complainants asked that the names of their minor children under the age of nineteen also be deleted from the lists. 39 U.S.C. § 4009(g)
Hearsay in an affidavit supporting a motion for summary judgment is determined according to the same principles as an offer of proof at trial. See 6 Moore's Federal Practice p 56.22, pp. 2812, 2813