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Category Archives: Asset Distribution
December 21, 2011 · 1:24 am
Florida Case Law on Asset Distribution in Divorces and Alimony
Florida Case Law on Asset Distribution in Divorces
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Accrued benefits: “A former spouse is not entitled to receive benefits that accrue after
the dissolution of the parties’ marriage.” Rivero v. Rivero, 963 So. 2d 934, 937 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007). Section 61.075, Florida Statutes (2008), provides that in a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, the court shall
equally distribute the marital assets and liabilities between the parties. The statute defines “marital assets” as “assets acquired … during the marriage, individually b y either spouse or jointly by them.” This
encompasses assets that have been enhanced or appreciated in value “resulting either from the efforts of either party during the marriage or from the contribution to or expenditure thereon of marital funds or other
forms of marital assets, or both.” § 61.075(6)(a)1.a.–b., Fla. Stat. (2008). See also Boyett v. Boyett, 683 So. 2d 1140, 1141 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) (holding that it is not permissible for the former wife to benefit from the former husband’s labor after the divorce); Brown v. Minning, 757 So. 2d 628, 630 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (holding that “current law provides that a spouse should not receive benefits accrued after dissolution of the
parties’ marriage”). Section 61.075(7), Florida Statutes (2008), “provides that the date of
filing of the petition for dissolution is generally the latest date for identifying and classifying marital assets, but the court may value marital assets on a date that the court determines is just and equitable.” Leonardis v. Leonardis, 30 So. 3d 568, 571 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (citing § 61.075(6), Fla. Stat. (2006); Byers v. Byers, 910 So. 2d 336, 344 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)).
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RECENT ALIMONY, IMPUTED INCOME AND EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION CASES AND LAW IN FLORIDA
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Review of the trial court’s decision:
The appellate court will review a trial court’s equitable distribution of marital assets and
award of alimony for abuse of discretion. Lule v. Lule, 60 So. 3d 567,
569 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011); Rafanello v. Bode, 21 So. 3d 867, 869 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2009). By statute, a trial court must formulate a complete equitable
distribution: “In any contested dissolution action wherein a stipulation
and agreement has not been entered and filed, any distribution of marital
assets or marital liabilities shall be supported by factual findings in the
judgment or order based on competent substantial evidence with
reference to the factors enumerated in subsection (1).” § 61.075(3), Fla.
Stat. (2009) (emphasis added).
EFFECT OF STIPULATIONS OR AGREEMENT BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT:
A binding agreement to convey real property from the marital estate to one of the
parties requires a writing signed by the parties, or an explicit bilateral
stipulation on the record before a court reporter. See § 725.01, Fla. Stat. and Farrell v. Farrell, 661 So. 2d 1257, 1259 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995).
A joint stipulation must be “entered and filed” in accordance with section 61.075(3).
Imputed Income:
The standard of review of a court’s decision to impute income is whether it is supported by competent, substantial evidence. Mount v. Mount, 989 So. 2d 1208, 1209 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008). A court may impute income where a party is willfully earning less and the party has the capability to earn more by the use of his best efforts. Schram v. Schram, 932 So. 2d 245, 249 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). Zarycki-Weig v. Weig, 25 So. 3d 573, 575 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). In considering imputation of income, “the court must determine whether the subsequent unemployment resulted from the spouse’s pursuit of her own interests or through less than diligent and bona fide efforts to find employment paying income at a level equal to or better than that formerly received.”
“A trial court’s decision on whether to award permanent periodic alimony is subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review.” Hornyak v. Hornyak, 48 So. 3d 858, 861 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010); see Mondello v. Torres, 47 So. 3d 389, 396 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (noting that “the nature and amount of a n award of alimony is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court” (citation, internal quotation marks, and alteration omitted)); § 61.08(2), Fla. Stat. (2009).
In determining a proper award of alimony or maintenance, the court shall consider all relevant economic factors, including but not limited to:
(a) The standard of living established during the marriage.
(b) The duration of the marriage.
(c) The age and the physical and emotional condition of each
(d) The financial resources of each party, the nonmarital and the
marital assets and liabilities distributed to each.
(e) When applicable, the time necessary for either party to acquire
sufficient education or training to enable such party to find
appropriate employment.
(f) The contribution of each party to the marriage, including, but
not limited to, services rendered in homemaking, child care,
education, and career building of the other party.
(g) All sources of income available to either party.
THE NEEDS OF THE SPOUSE:
The needs of the spouse requesting the alimony and the ability of the other spouse to make alimony payments.
Leonardis v. Leonardis, 30 So. 3d 568, 570 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “The criteria to be used in establishing this need include the parties’ earning ability, age, health, education, the duration of the marriage, the standard of living enjoyed during its course, and the value of the parties’ estates.” Mallard v. Mallard, 771 So. 2d 1138, 1140 (Fla. 2000) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “The standard-of-living is not a super-factor” over the other considerations. Donoff v. Donoff, 940 So. 2d 1221, 1225 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006); see Pirino v. Pirino, 549 So. 2d 219, 220 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989) (“Indeed, it is the exceptional case when a couple’s resources and earnings prove sufficient to maintain two independent households in the same manner as the original household.”). “[T]he parties’ standard ofliving during the marriage is not a useful guide in awarding alimony where the parties lived beyond their means,” as in this case. Nichols v. Nichols, 907 So. 2d 620, 623 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see § 61.08(2)(a), Fla. Stat.“Clearly the husband cannot be required to maintain the wife’s standard of living when this maintenance stretches beyond his financial capacity.”
Pirino, 549 So. 2d at 220. Alimony is not intended “to fund the enjoyment of every little luxury enjoyed before divorce.” Levine v. Levine, 954 So. 2d 741, 743 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).
The court may consider any other factor necessary to do equity and justice between the parties. § 61.08(2), Fla. Stat.
In contrast to permanent periodic alimony, “[b]ridge-the-gap alimony is designed to ease the transition of a spouse from married to single life.” Hornyak, 48 So. 3d at 862. It “is most appropriately awarded in instances where the receiving spouse is already employed, possesses adequate employment skills, and requires no further rehabilitation other than a brief time to ease the transition to single life.” Cohen v. Cohen, 39 So. 3d 403, 406 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see Wofford v. Wofford, 20 So. 3d 470, 474 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (“Bridge-the-gap alimony serves to assist a spouse already capable of self-support during the transition from being married to being single.”
(citation, internal quotation marks, and alteration omitted)). “Where no rehabilitative plan is presented, a bridge-the-gap award must have a relatively brief durational limit.” Hornyak, 48 So. 3d 862; see Mills v. Mills, 948 So. 2d 885, 886 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (“Bridge-the-gap alimony is to assist a spouse with any legitimate, identifiable, short-term need.” (citation, internal quotation marks, and ellipsis omitted)). The Fifth District Court of Appeal en banc affirmed a twelve-month, bridge-the-gap alimony, where “the former wife ha[d] adequate employment skills and an exemplary employment record” as not being a n abuse of discretion. Engesser v. Engesser, 42 So. 3d 249, 252 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (en banc). A “[d]isparity in income alone does not justify an award of permanent periodic alimony” and that “[a]n award of permanent alimony is improper where the evidence does not reflect permanent inability on the part of the wife to become self-sustaining.” Rosecan v. Springer, 845 So. 2d 927, 929, 930 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
JEWELRY AS MARITAL ASSETS:
“Marital assets” include “[i]nterspousal gifts during the marriage.” § 61.075(6)(a)1.c., Fla. Stat. (2009); see Ruiz v. Ruiz, 548 So. 2d 699, 699- 700 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (reversing trial court for failing to treat the
uncontroverted purchase of jewelry with marital assets as marital property subject to equitable distribution and citing § 61.075 relating to interspousal gifts as declaratory of Florida law). “Under well-established
statutory and case law, an interspousal gift during the marriage is a marital asset.” Maddox v. Maddox, 750 So. 2d 693, 694 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000); cf. Gardner v. Gardner, 452 So. 2d 981, 983-84 (Fla. 5th DCA
1984) (“Separate property of a spouse includes assets of one spouse acquired from a source outside or unconnected with the marriage, such as by inheritance, property owned prior to marriage, or gifts from third
parties.”). Any gift of jewelry from Former Husband to Former Wife bought with marital assets remains a marital asset.
POST PETITION SPENDING: Post-petition spending is not always waste. See Bush v. Bush,
824 So. 2d 293, 294 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (recognizing error to include as part of the equitable distribution scheme a portion of stock options husband had depleted during dissolution proceedings to satisfy couple’s
financial obligations).
Posted by Edward J. Chandler, Esq. at 3:26 PM 0 comments
Florida Alimony Types:
Bridge-the-gap Alimony: May be awarded to assist a party by providing support to allow the party to make a transition from being married to being single. Bridge-the-gap alimony is designed to assist a party with legitimate identifiable short-term needs, and the length of an award may not exceed 2 years. An award of bridge-the-gap alimony terminates upon the death of either party or upon the remarriage of the party receiving alimony. An award of bridge-the-gap alimony shall not be modifiable in amount or duration.
Rehabilitative Alimony: Awarded to assist a party in establishing the capacity for self-support through either:
1. The redevelopment of previous skills or credentials; or
2. The acquisition of education, training, or work 113 experience necessary to develop appropriate employment skills or 114 credentials.
A final judgment or order of rehabilitative alimony must have findings of fact showing a “specific and defined rehabilitative plan.”
An award of rehabilitative alimony may be modified or terminated based upon a substantial change in circumstances, upon noncompliance with the rehabilitative plan, or upon completion of the rehabilitative plan.
Durational Alimony: Awarded when permanent periodic alimony is inappropriate. The purpose of durational alimony is to provide a party with economic assistance for a set period of time following a marriage of short or moderate duration.
An award of durational alimony terminates upon the death of either party or upon the remarriage of the party receiving alimony.
The amount of an award of durational alimony may be modified or terminated based upon a substantial change in circumstances.
The length of durational alimony may not be modified absent exceptional circumstances.
The length of durational alimony may not exceed the length of the marriage.
Permanent Alimony: Awarded to provide for the needs and necessities of life as they were established during the marriage of the parties for a party who lacks the financial ability to meet his or her needs and necessities of life following a dissolution of marriage.
Permanent alimony may be awarded following a marriage of long duration, following a marriage of moderate duration if such an award is appropriate upon consideration of the following factors:
An award of permanent alimony terminates upon the death of either party or upon the remarriage of the party receiving alimony.
An award may be modified or terminated based upon a substantial change in circumstances or upon the existence of a supportive relationship.
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