Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/320/472/615630/
Timestamp: 2019-10-23 16:40:42
Document Index: 461321795

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 242', '§ 1252', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3']

Efrain Modesto Calle-vujiles, Petitioner v. John Ashcroft, Attorney General of the United States, Respondent, 320 F.3d 472 (3d Cir. 2003) :: Justia
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Efrain Modesto Calle-vujiles, Petitioner v. John Ashcroft, Attorney General of the United States, Respondent, 320 F.3d 472 (3d Cir. 2003)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit - 320 F.3d 472 (3d Cir. 2003) Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) February 4, 2003
Filed March 5, 2003
The Petitioner, a citizen of Ecuador, illegally entered the United States without inspection in 1990. The INS took him into custody in 1991, interviewed him, and on his release, the INS issued the Petitioner an Order to Show Cause ("OSC"). The OSC stated that the Petitioner would be required to appear before an Immigration Judge "on the date and time to be set" in order to "show why [he] should not be deported." Addendum at 2. There is some disagreement about whether the Petitioner was informed of the OSC's contents in Spanish, the only language he understands. The Petitioner changed his place of residence between the time he was issued the OSC and the time that the Hearing Notice was sent to his address of record. The Petitioner failed to appear at the scheduled hearing and was ordered deported to Ecuador, in absentia, pursuant to the now-repealed INA § 242(b). 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1988).
As the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit observed in Luis v. I.N.S., 196 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 1999), "the decision of the BIA whether to invoke its sua sponte authority is committed to its unfettered discretion. Therefore, the very nature of the claim renders it not subject to judicial review." Id. at 40. Similarly, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held in Ekimian v. I.N.S., 303 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2002), that it "lack [ed] jurisdiction to review a BIA decision not to reopen the proceeding sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. § 3.2(a)." Id. at 1154. Finally, in Anin v. Reno, 188 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 1999), the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that "§ 3.2(a) gives the BIA non-reviewable discretion to dismiss [a petitioner's] claim." Id. at 1279.
The view that decisions not to sua sponte reopen or reconsider are non-reviewable is based on Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 105 S. Ct. 1649, 84 L. Ed. 2d 714 (1985). That was a case in which a group of death row inmates demanded that the FDA enforce provisions of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, so as to prohibit the "misuse" of certain drugs in executing inmates by lethal injection. It held that courts have no jurisdiction to review matters "committed" to the agency's discretion, including matters where the governing "statute is drawn so that a court would have no meaningful standard of review against which to judge the agency's exercise of discretion." Id. at 830.
Although we are mindful that there is a strong presumption that Congress intends judicial review of administrative action, Chmakov v. Blackman, 266 F.3d 210 (3d Cir. 2001), we reject the Petitioner's arguments. The lesson of Heckler v. Chaney is that "review is not available in those rare circumstances where the relevant statute is so drafted that a court would have no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency's exercise of discretion." M.B. v. Quarantillo, 301 F.3d 109, 112 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal quotations omitted). Here, the regulation providing for reopening or reconsidering a case sua sponte offers no standard governing the agency's exercise of discretion. As the court in Anin noted:
[8 C.F.R. § 3.2(a) (1999)] reposes very broad discretion in the BIA "to reopen or reconsider" any motion it has rendered at any time or, on the other hand, " [to] deny a motion to reopen." Id. The discretion accorded in this provision is so wide that "even if the party moving has made out a prima facie case for relief," the BIA can deny a motion to reopen a deportation order. Id. No language in the provision requires the BIA to reopen a deportation proceeding under any set of particular circumstances. Instead, the provision merely provides the BIA the discretion to reopen immigration proceedings as it sees fit. Federal circuit courts consistently have interpreted the provision in this way. They have read 8 C.F.R. § 3.2(a) to give the BIA the discretion to reopen immigration proceedings in situations where federal courts lack the legal authority to mandate reopening.... In short, the provision gives the BIA non-reviewable discretion to dismiss Anin's claim.