Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/699/839/231845/
Timestamp: 2019-11-19 20:25:20
Document Index: 630927465

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1341', '§ 1962', '§ 1962', '§ 3651', '§ 3651', 'art, 18', '§ 1962']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Joan L. Lynch, Defendant-appellant, 699 F.2d 839 (7th Cir. 1983) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Seventh Circuit › 1983 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Joan L. Lynch, Defendant-appellant
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Joan L. Lynch, Defendant-appellant, 699 F.2d 839 (7th Cir. 1983)
US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit - 699 F.2d 839 (7th Cir. 1983) Argued June 2, 1982. Decided Sept. 3, 1982. *Opinion Jan. 28, 1983
The defendant, Joan Lynch, appeals her conviction on nine counts of mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1341 and one count of conspiracy to commit racketeering under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d).1 Underlying these charges was her participation with her husband, Ronald Lynch, now deceased, Joseph Armato, James Woodlock, and Jimmie Smith in a scheme to bypass administrative procedures at the Cook County Board of Appeals ["the Board" ] in order to obtain reductions in Cook County property tax assessments for clients of the R.M. Lynch Company. The defendant and her husband, before his death, owned the company, which was in the business of representing property owners appealing real estate tax assessments before the Board.
The defendant first argues that the evidence presented at trial, even taken in the light most favorable to the government, Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S. Ct. 457, 469, 86 L. Ed. 680 (1942), does not show her knowledge of the scheme or her participation in it. Despite the defendant's contentions, substantial evidence supported the jury's conclusion.
The defendant was also convicted on one count under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). The jury found that, with others at the R.M. Lynch Company, the defendant engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity by committing multiple acts of bribery and mail fraud.3 The government alleged Board employees Jimmie Smith, James Woodlock, and Thomas Lavin received bribes from the Company.
This instruction, following Instruction 5.11, Federal Jury Instructions of the Seventh Circuit (1980), plainly told the jury that the defendant must be a "willing" participant in the conspiracy and that her participation must be proved exclusively from her own acts and statements. Since the instruction forbade the jury from reaching that conclusion by considering factors other than the defendant's statements or actions, it duplicated the defendant's proposed instruction. The district court need not give cumulative or repetitious instructions simply because the defendant prefers the language in one instruction over the language in another. United States v. Allegretti, 340 F.2d 254, 259 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 911, 85 S. Ct. 1531, 14 L. Ed. 2d 433 (1965).
The defendant next argues that by introducing her past tax returns and other financial records and by referring to her wealth in closing argument over her objection, the government placed irrelevant and seriously prejudicial evidence before the jury. Defendant argues on appeal that the district court abused its discretion under Fed.R.Evid. 403 in allowing its admission. See United States v. Stahl, 616 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1980).
The financial records at issue were relevant to rebut these assertions. "When a party opens up a subject, even though it may not be strictly relevant to the case, he cannot complain on appeal if the opposing party introduces evidence on the same subject." United States v. Bolin, 514 F.2d 554, 558 (7th Cir. 1975). Moreover, the fact that the defendant only raised the issue during opening statement and in a few questions during cross-examination, does not make the evidence irrelevant. The defendant can hardly create a suspicion in the jury's mind and then argue that, because the point was made subtly, the government may not respond. Nor does the fact that much of the defendant's wealth was contained in yet uncollected accounts receivable establish that the records were irrelevant. That fact pertains only to the weight of the evidence rather than its relevancy.
Finally, the defendant contests the amount of restitution imposed as a condition of probation. After conviction, the district court placed the defendant on five-year probation with the condition that she repay Cook County $100,000 as restitution for the losses the County sustained from the scheme. The defendant argues that the County was not an "aggrieved party" under 18 U.S.C. § 3651. In pertinent part, that statute provides:
Finally, the defendant argues that the district court abused its discretion, see United States v. Davies, 683 F.2d 1052 (7th Cir. 1982), in arriving at the $100,000 restitution figure. Any amount to be paid in restitution must be obtained by accurate computation and cannot exceed the amount of loss actually caused. United States v. Hoffman, 415 F.2d 14, 21-22 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 958, 90 S. Ct. 431, 24 L. Ed. 2d 423 (1969). The government originally sought $367,000 in restitution for fees the company collected in the scheme. The government derived that figure from calculations based on the amount of fraudulent assessments the R.M. Lynch Company obtained from 1975 through 1979. The government asserted that nearly all assessments the company obtained were fraudulently processed. On the basis of the R.M. Lynch Company's standard fee, which was a percentage of the tax reduction obtained, the government estimated the County lost $1.4 million in revenue and the defendant collected more than $367,333 in fees.
Despite the defendant's argument to the contrary, the restitution award is adequately supported in the record. The statutory measure of damages is the amount of loss an aggrieved party actually suffered. 18 U.S.C. § 3651. Here, the government showed the County lost over $1.4 million in property tax revenues. The defendant does not challenge that contention. The defendant contends only that the base figures in the government's calculations were misleading because most of the company's fees were actually uncollected. Though uncollected, the fees nevertheless indicated that R.M. Lynch Company had fraudulently obtained a property tax reduction and the County had lost those revenues.5 The fact that the company never profited from its efforts in these cases is irrelevant, for the measure of restitution damages is "based ... on the loss to the victim of the fraud," not the benefit to the perpetrator of the fraud. Davies, 683 F.2d at 1055. Thus, the district court did not err in calculating the amount of restitution.
The defendant contends the government failed in its proof because, she argues, even if the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to show her knowledge and participation in the conspiracy after her husband's death--when she assumed a far more active role in operating the R.M. Lynch Company--the government failed to prove her knowledge and participation in the scheme before her husband died. This argument ignores the well-settled principle in conspiracy law that a conspirator is liable for all overt actions of other conspirators intended to advance the scheme. This includes actions which occur before the conspirator joins the conspiracy. United States v. Read, 658 F.2d 1225 (7th Cir. 1981). Thus, even if the government had only shown the defendant's participation after her husband's death the prosecution would have satisfied its burden. However, as mentioned, the evidence presented at trial was stronger. It established the defendant's knowledge and participation in the scheme both before and after her husband's death
In pertinent part, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and (d) provide:
Having twice rejected similar arguments challenging this instruction, we need not elaborate further on the instruction here. United States v. Gabriel, 597 F.2d 95, 100 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v. Prewitt, 553 F.2d 1082, 1087 (7th Cir. 1977). We note only that the evidence the government presented at trial and the defendant's arguments in response, clearly justified giving the instruction