Source: http://www.williamgoren.com/blog/tag/levorsen-v-octapharma-plasma-inc/
Timestamp: 2019-09-22 13:12:54
Document Index: 310373081

Matched Legal Cases: ['§504', '§504', '§504', '§504', '§504', '§504', '§504', '§504', '§ 12181', '§ 12181', '§ 12181', '§ 12181', '§ 504', '§ 12181', '§ 504', '§ 12181', '§12181', '§12181', '§ 12181', '§ 12181', '§ 12181', '§ 35', '§ 12181', '§ 36', '§ 35', '§ 36', '§ 12181']

Levorsen v. Octapharma Plasma Inc.
Court System Accessibility Best Practices Checklist
October 25, 2018 by William Goren 1 Comment
As readers of this blog know, I don’t usually blog more than once a week. However, I had a moment and a real cool idea already in the can so to speak, so here goes.
At least once a month, I get a call from someone around the country talking about how the court system is inaccessible. Usually, it is coming from a Family Court, but not exclusively so. Also, whether this State is red or blue doesn’t matter. I am proud to say that the State of Georgia has been busy working on these issues, and I have been doing what I can to help in a variety of ways, including, for example, volunteering to come up with a courtroom accessibility best practices checklist. I thought the readers of this blog would really appreciate it if I modified that list for our blog.
The following is a nonexclusive list of considerations for ensuring persons with disabilities have meaningful access per the ADA and §504 of the Rehabilitation Act (the latter may apply if federal funding is involved). Also, the list is not not exhaustive, and is also not a substitute for obtaining knowledgeable legal counsel on ADA matters as all of this can get really complicated as we know.
Make sure judges and administrative staff receive quality training from ADA knowledgeable individuals. I have often wondered just who is providing the training when it comes to ADA compliance across all ADA titles. Typically, when there is an ADA dispute and it settles, training is a required part of the settlement. If the training is good, I don’t understand why these things keep happening. Training should also be regular. Further, you need to have an ADA/§504 knowledgeable person/attorney to help out with the complicated questions that arise.
Have an ADA/§504 coordinator and an ADA/§504 grievance procedure. If the Rehabilitation Act applies, you need to have this if you have more than 15 employees. If only the ADA applies, you need to have it if you have more than 50 employees. Regardless, having both is excellent preventive law.
Don’t be afraid to get help from knowledgeable ADA counsel as ADA and §504 are extremely complicated. Also, don’t be afraid to bring in outside experts or ask for briefing. Check your State for the judicial rules in this area. For example, Georgia allows a court to bring in an outside expert to help sort things out providing all the parties are on notice as to why the expert is being brought in and what the expert will do. Your State may have similar rules.
The interactive process is critical. Remember, one size does not fit all. The ADA focuses on an individualized analysis.
Judges and all personnel should know the definition of a disability as amended by the ADA Amendments Act. The bottom line is that after the amendments it’s going to be really difficult to find that a person does not have a disability.
Make sure judges and all personnel are familiar with the federal regulations on service dogs and effective communication. With respect to service dogs, keep in mind, that it is entirely possible that your State laws on service dogs fall below the standard set by the DOJ in their final implementing title II and title III ADA regulations. With respect to effective communication, I really like this guidance, which we discussed in this blog entry. I realize that the guidance is not applicable to the court system, but it is so good that it should be useful in this context.
With respect to effective communication pertaining to court access, remember primary consideration must be given to the individual’s preferred mode of communicating because courts are public entities.
Make sure all requests for modifications are handled timely and with respect. If requesting documentation, make sure that documentation is narrowly focused and not excessive.
Don’t charge a person with a disability for any accommodations/modifications.
Read Silva v. Baptist Health South, Florida, 856 F.3d 824 (11th 2017). I have not blogged on this case. That said, I did co-counsel with an attorney here in Atlanta on an effective communication case involving a doctor and a hospital that did not provide an ASL interpreter for culturally deaf, Deaf, individuals. This case is a real game changer for the culturally deaf. It says that effective communication does not occur under the Rehabilitation Act if the communication hinders the culturally deaf individual’s understanding of what is being said. Silva took place in the medical context, but its reasoning easily transfers to the legal arena.
Remember reasonable accommodations/modifications are whatever gets the person with disability to the same starting line as a person without a disability. Reasonable accommodations/modifications must be done unless there is an undue burden or a fundamental alteration, both of which, as we know, are terms of art and are very difficult standards to meet.
Perform a self-evaluation plan. This plan should have been completed in 1992. If not done already, get one done.
Develop a transition plan to resolve issues arising from the self-evaluation plan.
Make sure people are aware of how to request accommodations.
Is the court’s website meaningfully accessible per the ADA (WCAG 2.0 AA is the gold standard), for persons with disabilities. Pay particular attention to screen readers, voice dictation, and captioning of audio. Also, keep in mind that a website may be accessible for voice dictation users but not for screen readers and vice a versa.
Establish specific flexible procedures to address reasonable accommodation/modification request and to meet recurring accessibility needs. That is, do have procedures, but make sure they are flexible enough to deal with every situation being entirely different.
Your State may have a judicial handbook for courtroom accessibility. Georgia has one, and it is excellent.
For a resource, you can always look at this blog. I really love its search engine and use it all the time.
Next week, I explore once again just what is a service establishment. Without spoiling everything, let me say there is now a clear-cut Circuit Court split on the issue. In the meantime, you might want to review this blog entry.
Filed Under: General Tagged With: §504, §504 grievance procedure, ADA, ADA coordinator §504 coordinator, ADA grievance procedure, ADAAA, courtroom accessibility, deaf, effective communication, fundamental alteration, individualized analysis, interactive process, judicial handbook, Levorsen v. Octapharma Plasma Inc., policies and procedures, reasonable accommodation, reasonable modifications, rehabilitation act, self-evaluation plan, Service dogs, Silva v. Baptist health South Florida, title II, title II final implementing regulation, title III, title III final implementing regulation, training, transition plan, undue burden, WCAG 2 .0 AA, Website
Just What Is a Sales Establishment Anyway per Title III of the ADA?
August 22, 2016 by William Goren 4 Comments
In a recent blog entry, I discussed a 10th Circuit opinion that talked about just what is a service establishment. This blog entry talks about a similar issue, which is just what is a sales establishment? The case of the day essentially adopts the dissenting view of Judge Holmes in Levorsen, the case referenced above. As such, it makes you wonder whether there is not a split in the Circuits with respect to just what does it mean for a place of public accommodation to exist. I realize the issues are not exactly the same, since one involves sales establishments and the other involves service establishments. However, the applicable analysis is identical but with completely different outcomes. Therefore, one has to wonder whether the defendant in Levorsen have now increased its chances for an en banc rehearing and/or appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Today’s case is Magee v. Coca-Cola Refreshments USA, Inc., a published Fifth Circuit decision. As is usual, my blog is divided into categories: facts; court’s reasoning; and takeaways. The reader is free to focus on any or all of the categories.
Coca-Cola’s glass-front vending machines are self-service, fully automated machines dispensing bottles and cans of Coca-Cola sodas, as well as juices, energy drinks, and waters. They have been around since 2000 and are equipped with many different features including: the ability to accept payment from smart phones and other near field communication devices; wireless Internet capabilities; credit and debit card processing; motion sensing technology; and onboard computer systems. Even so, the vending machines lack any meaningful accommodation for use by the blind. In particular, the machines use an alphanumeric keypad. Such a keypad does not contain a tactile indicator differentiating between letters and numbers, but yet the users have to identify and input selecting codes of the beverage they wish to purchase. Of course, a blind user (the plaintiff suffers from macular degeneration and is considered legally blind), can’t do that since the selecting codes are printed in place below each beverage inside the machine and are visible to the machine’s glass front. It is also possible that the vending machines could be made accessible to the blind by doing any of several different things including: retrofitting the machine with an audio interface system and a tactile alphanumeric keypad; developing a smart phone application capable of displaying a non-visual representation of the contents and corresponding prices for the vending machine; or imprinting a nonvisually displayed toll-free hotline that the visually impaired person to call for assistance in purchasing a beverage. The plaintiff encountered the vending machines at East Jefferson General Hospital in Metairie, Louisiana, and at a bus station in New Orleans, Louisiana. He has regularly used both of those places and reasonably expects to use those places in the future. The plaintiff’s filed suit against Coca-Cola Refreshments alleging that they were violating title III of the ADA by not having a sales establishment accessible to him. He did not sue the bus station or the hospital.
In rejecting plaintiff’s claim that a sales establishment was present, the court reasoned as follows:
42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(E) states that a place of public accommodation includes, “a bakery, grocery store, clothing store, hardware store, shopping center, or other sales or rental establishment.”
Two principles are critical for assessing whether the vending machine is a sales establishment. The first is noscitur a sociis, which means a word is known by the company it keeps. Second, ejusdem generis, which means when a general word or phrase follows a list of the specific, the general word or phrase will be interpreted to include only items of the same class as those listed.
The relevant portion of the statute uses the term “sales establishment,” following a list of retailers occupying physical stores.
The Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have recognized that every term listed in 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) is a physical place open to public access. That is, they are actual, physical places where goods or services are open to the public, and places where the public get those goods or services. The court does note a split among the Circuits on this point as the First, Second, and Seventh Circuits have interpreted the term, “public accommodation” to extend beyond physical places.
Although the term “establishment,” could possibly be read to include a vending machine, a vending machine is not like any of the listed examples in the applicable statute.
A look at various dictionaries reveals that an establishment would not include a vending machine. The dictionaries consistently talk about places of business or residence with furnishings and staff when it comes to establishments.
The United States Supreme Court, in a Fair Labor Standards Act case, has recognized that the term “establishment,” is normally used in business and in government as meaning a distinct physical place of business.
Legislative history also backs up the use of noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis. In particular, a House Report said that although not expressly mentioned, bookstores, video stores, stationery stores, pet stores, computer stores, and other stores offering merchandise for sale or rent are included as retail sales establishments. Another House Report notes that the category including a bakery, grocery store, clothing store, hardware store, shopping center, or other sales or retail establishment is only a representative sample and that other retail or wholesale establishments selling or renting items include such things as: a bookstore; videotape rental store; or pet store, all of which are physical places and actual stores.
The Department of Justice has noted that the category sales or rental establishments includes many facilities other than those specifically listed such as: video stores; carpet showrooms; and athletic equipment stores. Again, all of which are actual stores.
Holding otherwise leads to an absurd result, though the Fifth Circuit didn’t say it quite that way. For example, the Department of Justice has said that a building with five or more sales or retail establishments is a shopping center or mall. Accordingly, if the plaintiff’s theory is correct, that would mean that any building containing five vending machines would qualify as a shopping center or mall, which is clearly not the intent of the various drafters. That Department of Justice guidance also refers to counters and large windows and check out aisles as special features for sales or rental establishments, which are clearly not applicable to vending machines.
All of this is not to say that vending machines are not subject to various requirements under the ADA by virtue of their being located in a hospital or a bus station as both of those places are undoubtedly places of public accommodation per 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F) and 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(G).
For the reasons stated by the court, it is curious why the bus station and the hospital were not sued instead of Coca-Cola Refreshments. If the vending machines are still in the hospital and the bus station, it would make sense for the plaintiff to immediately go after the hospital and the bus station.
With respect to the hospital, since they take federal funds, the plaintiff will also have the option, assuming the vending machines are still there, of suing the hospital under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. It would also make sense to investigate whether the bus station takes federal funds. If the Rehabilitation Act is applicable, that opens up the possibility of damages, though that would involve meeting a high standard, in addition to attorneys fees and injunctive relief.
One wonders why it was not argued that the vending machines were an establishment serving food or drink per 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(B), but even there, you would have to get around the “establishment,” language for the vending machines to come within coverage of that clause. For that, you might argue for adoption of the majority decision in Levorsen, which basically says the key is the adjective and not the noun. That is, an establishment is simply a place carrying out a service or in this case, a sale.
The court also specifically references the split among the Circuits with respect to whether a place of public accommodation extends beyond physical spaces.
As mentioned above, we now have two United States Court of Appeals cases discussing places of public accommodations reaching diametrically opposite conclusions, albeit discussing different categories. One wonders if that doesn’t set up a Circuit court split or at a minimum, as mentioned above, increase the chances of an en banc hearing in Levorsen.
Common sense says to me that this would be a very difficult case to win on appeal, assuming the United States Supreme Court would take the case in the first place, since vending machines are involved and it involves a logical stretch from the statutory language. It is also worth noting that there was no dissent in Magee. That said, as mentioned above, this case does, to my mind, increases the possibility of a rehearing en banc in Levorsen or if that does not happen, an appeal to the United States Supreme Court on a Circuit court split theory.
Filed Under: ADA, Federal Cases, Final Federal Regulations, Guidances, Title III Tagged With: § 504, 10th circuit, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(B), 42 U.S.C. §12181(7)(F), 42 U.S.C. §12181(7)(G), A.H. Phillips, ADA, bus station, deliberate indifference, East Jefferson General Hospital, Establishment, Fifth Circuit, Inc., Inc. v. Walling, Levorsen v. Octapharma Plasma Inc., Liese v. Indian River County Hospital District, Magee v. Coca-Cola refreshments USA, place of public accommodation, rehabilitation act, rental establishment, sales establishment, service establishment, title III, vending machines
Just What Is a Service Establishment Anyway?
July 18, 2016 by William Goren 2 Comments
Just what is a service establishment under title III of the ADA? A published case from the 10th Circuit that came down on July 12, 2016, Levorsen v. Octapharma Plasma, Inc., deals with this question. As is usual, the blog entry is divided into categories: facts, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F); majority reasoning; reasoning of dissent; and takeaways. The reader is free to focus on any or all of the categories.
Plaintiff suffers from various psychiatric disorders, including borderline schizophrenia. For years, he had donated plasma in exchange for money in an effort to supplement his limited income. In May 2013, he attempted to do that at a Salt Lake City branch of Octapharma Plasma, Inc. (hereafter, defendant). The defendant operates in multiple places. At these places, the defendant collects donors’ plasma using a process called plasmapheresis. During that process, it draws and mechanically processes the donor’s blood, separating and reserving the plasma before returning the red blood cells to the donor. It pays it donors for this plasma, then sells it to pharmaceutical companies. When an employee of the defendant learned that the plaintiff suffers from borderline schizophrenia, the employee became concerned that he might have a schizophrenic episode while donating and dislodge the collecting needle, possibly injuring himself or someone else. The employee then advised the plaintiff that he was ineligible to donate plasma. Even though the plaintiff provided the defendant with a signed form from his psychiatrist, who both indicated that he was medically suitable to donate plasma twice a week, the defendant maintained its refusal to allow him to donate. He then brought suit under title III of the ADA. The defendant defended on the grounds that it was not a service establishment under 42 U.S.C. 12181(7)(F), and therefore, it was not subject to coverage under the ADA.
42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F)
42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F) states that one of the places of public accommodations includes:
“a laundromat, dry-cleaner, bank, barber shop, beauty shop, travel service, shoe repair service, funeral parlor, gas station, office of an accountant or lawyer, pharmacy, insurance office, professional office of a health care provider, hospital, or other service establishment.” (Emphasis mine).
Majority Reasoning (Moritz, Briscoe)
In reversing and remanding the decision of the District Court, which held that the defendant was not operating a service establishment, the majority, in an opinion by Judge Moritz, reasoned as follows:
The court cited to the definition of a service establishment noted in II above;
The examples listed for service establishment are not exclusive but instead are illustrative;
Courts must construe the section liberally to afford individuals with disabilities access to the same establishments available to those without disabilities;
Turning to Webster’s third new international dictionary, the court said that the dictionary defines a service as “conduct or performance that assists or benefits someone or something,” or “useful labor that does not produce a tangible commodity.” Therefore, a service establishment is a place or business of a public or private institution that, by its conduct or performance, is assisting or benefiting someone or something or providing useful labor without producing a tangible good for a customer or client. In other words, a service establishment is an establishment that provides a service;
Giving the term “service establishment,” its ordinary meaning does not result in an ambiguity nor does it result in an irrational one. Rather, it results in a broad definition entirely consistent with the aim of title III to afford individuals with disabilities access to the same establishments available to those without disabilities;
Even if giving the term “service establishment,” its ordinary meaning resulted in the definition that was ambiguous or irrational, employing the canons of statutory interpretation, ejusdem generis and noscitur a sociis (which would lead to the conclusion that only places providing compensation to customers should be considered a service establishment), doesn’t help anything because another rule of statutory interpretation argues against reading a direction of compensation requirement into the statute when it doesn’t appear. To decide otherwise, only serves to manufacture ambiguity when none exists;
Even assuming ambiguity does exist, legislative history supports the decision to refrain from concluding that an entity is a service establishment only if it is similar to the enumerated examples in the section. More specifically, a House Report explained that a person alleging discrimination does not have to prove that the entity being charged with discrimination is similar to the examples listed in the definition, but only has to show that the entity falls within the overall category. Further, Congress changed the language in this section from “other similar service establishment,” to “other service establishment,” presumably to make clear that a particular business need not be similar to the examples in order to constitute a service establishment (a presumption consistent with legislative history);
The defendant is a place of business that assists or benefits those who wish to provide plasma for medical use, whether it be for altruistic reasons or pecuniary gain, by supplying the trained personnel and medical equipment necessary to accomplish that goal. While the defendant may ultimately produce a tangible good for pharmaceutical companies in the form of plasma, it doesn’t produce a tangible good for individuals like the plaintiff seeking the use of plasma procurement services. Rather, the defendant simply assists those individuals in accomplishing their goal of providing plasma;
The argument that finding the defendant is running a service establishment contradicts regulations from the FDA doesn’t wash because this decision is not a decision on the merits, but rather one holding that it is subject to title III of the ADA in the first place.
Reasoning of the Dissent (Holmes)
The District Court correctly ruled that service establishments offer certain services in exchange for monetary compensation i.e. a fee;
Every establishment listed in the section shares certain unifying traits by: 1) offering the public a service in the form of: a) expertise (eg. barbers, beautician, shoe repair craftsman, drycleaner, funeral parlors, lawyer, accountant, insurance offices, pharmacists, healthcare providers, and hospitals); or b) specialized equipment (eg. laundromats and gas station); 2) for use in achieving some desired end in exchange for monetary compensation;
Plasma donation center do not receive a fee from members of the public in exchange for any services they provide;
To the extent that plasma donation centers provide services to the public, they do not do so for the public’s use in achieving the desired end. Rather, they provide them for the plasma centers use in achieving a desired end-collecting plasma for sale to pharmaceutical companies. Therefore, plasma donation centers are fundamentally unlike service establishments listed in the section and should not be deemed to fall within the scope of that section;
Since the statute is clear, legislative intent should not be looked at;
The meaning of statutory language depends upon context and using the applicable canons of statutory construction (see below). Therefore, it doesn’t make sense to break out the terms “service,” and “establishment,” in the way the majority did in order to come up with a definition of the term, “service establishment;”
It was proper to apply to statutory canons of construction, as the lower court did, to reach the proper result. The first, ejusdem generis, means that when a general term follows a specific one, the general should be understood as a reference to subjects akin to the one with specific enumeration. The second, noscitur a sociis, means that a word is known by the company it keeps;
Canons of statutory construction are aids in construing statutory language itself and not a tool to be relied upon only in the face of ambiguity;
Saying that there is no need to resort to legislative history if the literal language of the statute controls, is not the same thing as giving a court the right to ignore canons of statutory construction;
The fact that legislation has a remedial purpose does not give the judiciary license in interpreting a provision to disregard entirely the plain meaning of the word used by Congress;
The Department of Justice has made it clear that the statutorily enumerated examples are representative and illustrative of what constitutes a service establishment i.e. the examples possess qualities common to all service establishments;
From looking at the categories in the section, it is more appropriate and natural to think of service establishments as providing a service rather than a good even though the delivery of the goods may be incidental to the furnishing of the service. Accordingly, service establishments under this section offer services to the public in exchange for a fee, i.e. monetary compensation;
Every establishment listed in the section provides the public a service in the form of expertise or specialized equipment. Further, the list of services are intended for the public’s use in achieving a desired end, such as a haircut, clean clothes, legal advice etc.;
Using the principles of statutory construction, the term “service establishment,” is a statutory term with a distinct meaning from the dictionary definitions of its component words;
Utilizing the statutory canons of constructions leads to the conclusion that for a place of public accommodation to be a service establishment, the entity must offer the public a service in the form of expertise or specialized equipment for use in achieving some desired end of the public in exchange for compensation. The plasma centers do not meet this definition because they do not receive a fee from members of the public in exchange for any services that they furnish. Instead, they give members of the public a fee for tendering to them the commodity in the form of plasma or for performing a service of donating plasma;
Unlike the service establishments found in the section, the defendant did not receive money from the plaintiff in exchange for services, but rather it paid the plaintiff instead;
Plasma centers do not provide services for the public’s use in achieving the desired end, rather they provide them for the plasma centers use in achieving the desired end. Every service establishment listed in the section offers members of the public a service for use in achieving an end desired by them and not an end desired by the service establishment;
The statute contemplates the service establishment provide the service to the public in exchange for a fee that it receives, but it does not contemplate that a member of the public will receive from the service establishment both the service and the fee. That is, under this section, the fee cannot be the desired end the public is seeking to achieve from the plasma donation center because the statute contemplates that the service establishment receive the fee in exchange for providing the desired end;
Plasma donation centers resemble manufacturers much more than they do the kind of entities customarily providing services to the public under this section. That is, they manufacture a product, plasma. That product is derived from a raw commodity, whole blood, given by donors in exchange for a fee. Thus, plasma donation centers are more like paper mills, a manufacturer, than the other typical business providing services to the public under this section. Further, federal statutes clearly regard plasma donation centers as manufacturers as does the Food and Drug Administration. So, plasma centers may be manufacturers, but they are not service establishments.
This case is the first of its kind at the Circuit Court level. Both opinions have their strengths and weaknesses, and as a result, I would certainly expect the Circuits to eventually split on this question. Will the Supreme Court take the case before a split in the Circuits presents itself? They don’t usually do that, but it does happen on occasion. Which way would the Supreme Court go? If Justice Scalia was on the Court, there is little doubt in my mind that the dissenting view would prevail. However, he is no longer on the Court, and we have an election coming up. So, it is impossible to predict which way this case will ultimately go. Considering the dissent and how it is written, one wonders whether four Justices would even agree to hear the case as I could see this case being an even split. That is, a reasoning based on canons of statutory construction will, in my opinion, have a great deal of appeal to many Justices on the Supreme Court. That said, perhaps four would agree to hear the case and gamble on what the next Justice would do. Such a gamble would be a huge one because a case turning on interpretation of a statute with statutory canons of construction/legislative history being the critical factors does not fit neatly into a liberal-conservative dynamic.
Since canons of statutory construction have a great deal of appeal to jurists, one wonders if the 10th circuit will not grant a rehearing en banc, assuming one is sought.
How this case ultimately resolves itself depends upon whether legislative history combined with the statutory construction that you don’t read words into a statute that are not there prevails or whether the two canons of statutory construction that are the underpinning of the dissent prevails. It could go either way.
If the case goes forward, direct threat will be a factor. However, the Department of Justice regulations for title II and title III (28 C.F.R. § § 35.139, 208 respectively), unlike the EEOC regulations, do not include threat to self as one of the possibilities.
The manufacturing part of the dissenting opinion leads one to wonder if the dissent isn’t essentially claiming that the plasma centers are a commercial facility per 42 U.S.C. § 12181(2) . Commercial facilities are subject to new construction and alteration requirements but they are not subject to the auxiliary aids and nondiscrimination provisions (see here at discussion of 28 C.F.R. § 36.104).
Interestingly enough, under either the majority or dissenting opinion, software as a service, which I discuss here, would be a service establishment.
Filed Under: ADA, Final Federal Regulations, Title III Tagged With: 10th circuit, 28 C.F.R. § 35.139, 28 C.F.R. § 36.208, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F), ADA, canons of statutory construction, commercial facilities, direct threat, ejusdem generis, Levorsen v. Octapharma Plasma Inc., noscitur a sociis, plasma donation, plasma donation center, service establishment, Software as a service, title III