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Ricky Eugene Kerr | Murderpedia, the encyclopedia of murderers
Ricky Eugene KERR
Elizabeth McDaniel, 57, and her son Gary Barbier, 42 (his landlords)
No. 35,965-04
Meyers, Price, Womack, and Holcomb., JJ. Johnson, J., filed a concurring opinion. Keller, P.j., filed a dissenting opinion to the order, joined by Keasler, J. Hervey, J.,
On March 1, 2000, applicant filed the instant third "writ" application with the convicting court which was transmitted to this Court under art. 11.071, § 5 to determine whether this is a subsequent writ barred by Section 5. We conclude that this is not a subsequent writ. It is, in fact, the first writ application that Mr. Kerr has filed which comports with the requirements of article 11.071 in that it "seeks relief from a judgment imposing a penalty of death." (8)
Ricky Lee Kerr has not yet had that one full and fair opportunity. The present application is the first document in which applicant's claims and contentions, if true, might merit "relief from a judgment imposing a penalty of death." Art. 11.071, § 1.
The purpose of a writ of habeas corpus is to obtain a speedy and effective adjudication of a person's right to liberation from illegal restraint. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977) ("the very purpose of the writ of habeas corpus [is] to safeguard a person's freedom from detention in violation of constitutional guarantees"); Ex parte Ramzy, 424 S.W.2d 220, 223 (Tex.1968) ("the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to obtain a speedy adjudication of a person's right to liberation from illegal restraint"); 39 Am Jur 2d, Habeas Corpus § 1 ("[t]he purpose of the writ of habeas corpus ... is not to determine the guilt or innocence of a prisoner; the primary, if not the only, object of the writ is to determine the legality of the restraint under which a person is held").
To constitute a document worthy of the title "writ application" filed pursuant to article 11.071, the writ must seek "relief from a judgment imposing a penalty of death." (14) A death penalty "writ" that does not challenge the validity of the underlying judgment and which, even if meritorious, would not result in immediate relief from his capital murder conviction or death sentence, is not an "initial application" for purposes of art. 11.071, § 5 which generally bars consideration of a subsequent writ after filing the "initial application." This same rule applies to non-capital writs filed under Article 11.07. See Ex parte Evans, 964 S.W.2d 643, 646-47 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (an "initial application" for a writ under art. 11.07 pertaining to a parole revocation hearing does not challenge the underlying conviction and thus does not bar a subsequent writ which does challenge the conviction). (15)
Similarly, trial courts who make the original appointment of habeas counsel under art. 11.071, § 2(c), have the authority to monitor the progress and timely filing of an initial application for a writ which qualifies as one which "seeks relief from a judgment imposing a penalty of death." (21) We are confident that Texas trial judges can identify and deal appropriately with any recalcitrant or dilatory habeas counsel.
In sum, we hold that the timely filed document submitted by applicant's original habeas counsel was not "a writ of habeas corpus in which the applicant seeks relief from a judgment imposing a penalty of death." Therefore, the application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by Mr. Kerr's present habeas counsel on August 6, 2000, is his initial writ for purposes of art. 11.071. We consider it timely filed as of today's date, issue the writ by operation of law pursuant to art. 11.071, § 6(a), and return the initial application and all associated materials to the trial court for further proceedings.
2. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 11.071, § 1.
8. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 11.071, § 1.
9. Tex. Const. Art. 1, § 12.
14. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 11.071, § 1.
In Ex parte Whiteside, 12 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000), this Court held that if an inmate files an initial writ application challenging his conviction, he is barred from having the merits of a second writ application (even one complaining of the parole revocation process which does not challenge the underlying conviction) considered unless he meets the special exceptions under art. 11.07, § 4. Neither the reasoning nor result in this case have any effect upon the reasoning or result in Whiteside since this is applicant's first writ application challenging his judgment. He is in the same position as the habeas applicant in Evans; he is not in the same position as the applicant in Whiteside.
18. See, e.g, Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 11.071, § 4A (c); Tex. Gov't Code § 82.061 ("[a]n attorney at law may be fined or imprisoned by any court for misbehavior or for contempt of court"); see also Guillory v. State, 557 S.W.2d 118, 120 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (appointed attorney who failed to timely file appellate brief could be held in contempt, reported to State Bar grievance committee, be removed from specific representation and prevented from receiving future ap pointments).
19. See, e.g, Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 11.071, § 4A(c).
21. See, e.g., Tex. Gov't Code § 82.061, supra; Talley v. State, 593 S.W.2d 702, 704 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (trial courts have authority to punish with contempt--or invoke other Guillory options-recalcitrant appointed attorneys who fail to timely file appellate briefs).
(4) (10) (11) (16) initial application, regardless of whether it attacks the conviction, triggers the §5 bar for all subsequent applications.
For these reasons, I conclude that the present application is indeed a subsequent application subject to §5. Because applicant fails to meet the enumerated exceptions, (17) this application should be barred. I respectfully dissent.
1. See Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 319, §§1 and 5.
3. See Article 11.071, §2(a) - (c).
5. Court's opinion at 3 (quoting Article 11.071, §1).
6. See Article 11.07, §1; Compare with Article 11.071, §1.
12. See Article 11.07, §4(a)(emphasis added) and Article 11.07, §5(a). Both provisions contain exceptions which are not relevant to the present discussion.