Source: http://openjurist.org/485/f3d/736/riel-v-city-of-bradford
Timestamp: 2013-12-11 10:12:34
Document Index: 718970483

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 178', '§ 178', '§ 178', '§ 178', '§ 178', '§ 178', '§ 178', '§ 178', '§ 178', '§ 178', '§ 178', '§ 178', '§ 178', '§ 178', '§ 125', '§ 125', '§ 125', '§ 125', '§ 125', '§ 125', '§ 125', '§ 125', '§ 1331', '§ 1291', '§ 178']

485 F3d 736 Riel v. City of Bradford | OpenJurist
485 F. 3d 736 - Riel v. City of Bradford	Home485 f3d 736 riel v. city of bradford
485 F3d 736 Riel v. City of Bradford 485 F.3d 736
Thomas RIEL; Diane Thompson; Fred Pysher, Appellantsv.CITY OF BRADFORD.
No. 05-4425.
Filed: May 3, 2007.
Philip B. Friedman, Ambrose, Friedman & Weichler, Erie, PA, Witold J. Walczak (Argued), American Civil Liberties Union, Pittsburgh, PA, for Appellants.
Richard A. Lanzillo (Argued), Knox, McLaughlin, Gornall & Sennett, Erie, PA, for Appellee.
Before: FISHER and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges, and BUCKWALTER,* District Judge.
The Appellants are home and business owners who were issued criminal citations by the City of Bradford, Pennsylvania ("City" or "Bradford") for displaying commercial and noncommercial signs on their private property without first obtaining a permit. They argue that the City's sign ordinances, which have now been amended, violate the First Amendment because they are impermissibly content-based, overbroad, vague, and allow too much time to process permit requests. The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania held that the ordinances, as amended, are in fact content-neutral and permissible under the First Amendment based in part on our holding in Rappa v. New Castle County, 18 F.3d 1043 (3d Cir.1994). For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the holding of the District Court.
Appellants Thomas Riel, Diane Thompson, and Fred Pysher are residents of the City of Bradford. The properties at issue are Riel's residence, and Thompson's and Pysher's commercial establishments in downtown Bradford. In March 2004, the City issued more than ten citations to the Appellants for displaying signs on their private property without first receiving approval and a permit from the Historical Architecture Review Board ("HARB"), as required by section 125-15(E) of the Bradford Code. Riel's and Thompson's signs were handmade cardboard and plywood signs containing criticisms of City officials. Some of the signs included: "How unethical is Mayor Henry?", "Can CEO Corignani work an honest 8 hours?", "Stop the City Hall Puppet Show, Mayor Henry", and "Fire Chief Wild Bill McCormack, Resign!". Pysher, on the other hand, was cited for a commercial sign advertising his realty business.
On March 24, 2004, the Appellants filed this action challenging the constitutionality of Bradford Code Chapter 125, section 125-15(E), which regulates signs in Bradford's historic district, and Chapter 178, which regulates signs in all of Bradford. Consent orders entered on March 24, 2004, and June 9, 2004, stayed enforcement of the challenged provisions. On May 14, 2004, and July 13, 2004, the City amended the two ordinances. The parties then filed cross-motions for summary judgment disputing the facial validity of the new laws.
A. Chapter 178
The first provision that the Appellants challenge is Chapter 178 of the City of Bradford Code, which applies to any outdoor sign or display within the City that can be seen by the general public. It makes it illegal for "any person to erect, repair, alter, relocate or maintain within the City of Bradford any sign" without first obtaining a permit from the Building Inspector, paying a $20 annual permit fee, and filing with the Building Inspector a $10,000 bond or liability insurance policy. Bradford, Pa., Code § 178-3 (2003). In order to obtain a permit, an applicant must disclose personal information, and provide descriptions of the location where the sign will be displayed and of the sign itself, including drawings and specification plans. Id. § 178-4.
The standard governing approval is contained in section 178-6, which directs the Building Inspector to
examine such plans and specifications and other data and the premises upon which it is proposed to erect the sign or other advertising structure, and if it shall appear that the proposed structure is in compliance with all the requirements of this chapter and all other laws and ordinances of the City of Bradford, he shall then issue the erection permit.
Id. § 178-6. Although the original ordinance did not limit the amount of time in which such decisions could be made, the amended rule requires the Building Inspector to act within thirty days of receiving the application. See id.
The ordinance also contains many provisions regulating a sign's appearance and placement. For example, there are size limits that vary depending on location of the sign. There is no size limit for ground signs, which are defined as "any sign supported by uprights or braces placed upon the ground and not attached to any building." Id. § 178-2. Wall signs may be up to 500 square feet in area, roof signs 300 square feet, and temporary signs 100 square feet. Id. §§ 178-24(B), 178-25(B), 178-27(A).
In addition, the ordinance requires that signs comply with Bradford's electrical code. Id. § 178-5. It also prohibits signs that are unsafe, id. § 178-10, that obstruct doors, windows, or fire escapes, id. § 178-17, or that pose a traffic hazard, id. § 178-18. And it regulates the construction, placement, and erection of different types of signs. Id. §§ 178-23 — 178-30.1 All approved signs must "have painted in a conspicuous place thereon, in letters not less than one inch in height, the date of erection [and] the permit number." Id. § 178-11. The ordinance characterizes permits as "mere licenses revocable at any time by the Building Officer." Id. § 178-9.
Finally, Chapter 178 provides a series of exemptions from the permit, fee, and bond requirements. Id. § 178-15. They include temporary signs, identification signs, signs related to the activities being conducted on the property where they are located, traffic and municipal signs, and noncommercial signs placed on private property by the owner or occupant.2 Id. These exemptions are the main focus of the Appellants' constitutional attack on the ordinance.
Each violation of Chapter 178 is punishable by a fine not exceeding $300 and a prison sentence not exceeding ninety days. Each day the sign is displayed constitutes a separate violation. Id. § 178-34.
B. Chapter 125
The other ordinance challenged by the Appellants is Chapter 125 of the Bradford Code, which delineates the City's historic districts and sets rules and procedures to "protect the distinctive historical character of these districts." Bradford, Pa., Code § 125-1 (2001). Specifically, the Appellants challenge the constitutionality of section 125-15(E), which regulates signs and awnings within historic districts.
When this case was filed, section 125-15(E) prohibited all signs in the historic districts "except for advertising informing the public of a service, business, occupation or profession[] carried on, in or about the property on which such sign or permanent external advertising is displayed." Id. § 125-15(E). Such signs could only be displayed after obtaining a permit from the HARB. Id. The Board's decisions were based on whether the sign was in "conformity [with] exterior material composition, exterior structural design, external appearance and size with similar advertising or information media used in the architectural period of the district." Id.
On May 14, 2004, Bradford amended section 125-15(E) in response to the filing of the Appellants' lawsuit. Now, "noncommercial" and "temporary" (those displayed less than sixty days) signs smaller than twelve square feet are allowed without a permit. Bradford, Pa., Code §§ 125-15(E)(3) & (E)(4) (2004). Residents wishing to display noncommercial signs larger than that must obtain a permit from the HARB. Id. § 125-15(E)(2). All non-temporary commercial signs, regardless of size, must have a permit. Id. § 125-15(E)(1).
The May 14 amendments also imposed time limits on the permit application process. Section 125-10(D) requires the HARB to issue a recommendation to the City Council on a permit application "no later than 30 days after [its next] meeting." Id. § 125-10(D). The City Council must then act on the application "at the council meeting immediately succeeding the receipt of the recommendation from HARB." Id. If the City Council fails to act within this time period, the HARB recommendation is "deemed approved by the council." Id.
A subsequent amendment to Chapter 125, passed on July 13, 2004, slightly altered the standards governing the HARB's decisions. It provided that the review must be "[i]n accordance with the Resource Inventory of building architectural styles of the Bradford Historic District." Id. § 125-15(E)(2). This Inventory lists buildings in the historic district by address, and gives their architectural style, construction material, roof type, building height, and construction date, as well as a brief narrative description of the building. In addition to consulting this Inventory, the HARB's decision about whether or not to issue a permit must be based on "conformity in exterior material composition, exterior structural design, external appearance and size of similar advertising or information media used in the architectural period of the district." Id.
The penalties for violating section 125-15 were untouched by the amendments. The first violation is punished by a fine between $25 and $1000, and possible imprisonment for up to ninety days. Id. § 125-18. The second violation carries a minimum $100 penalty, and subsequent violations carry a minimum $500 penalty, all with the same maximum fines and prison sentence as the first violation. Id. Each day that a sign is displayed after a violation notice is issued is considered a separate offense. Id.
On August 31, 2005, the District Court entered an order denying the Appellants' motion for summary judgment, and granting the City's motion. Riel v. City of Bradford, No. Civ. A. 04-90, 2005 WL 2106554, *1 (W.D.Pa. Aug. 31, 2005). The Court determined that the challenged ordinances were not content-based and thus not subject to strict scrutiny. Id. at *20. It also believed that they were not overbroad because they did not ban signs, but merely required permits. Id. at *9. Finally, the District Court determined that the standards governing permit approval were not unduly vague, and that the review period was not too great because of the many factors City officials had to consider. Id. at *23.
This appeal followed. The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
As we explained in Rappa v. New Castle County, "[e]ver since the Supreme Court invalidated an ordinance that prohibited all picketing near a school except for peaceful labor picketing on the basis that `the ordinance . . . describe[d] impermissible picketing not in terms of time, place, and manner, but in terms of subject matter,' the first step in First Amendment analysis has been to determine whether a statute is content-neutral or content-based." 18 F.3d at 1053 (quoting Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 33 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972)). This determination is vital because it dictates how we will analyze the ordinance at issue. If the ordinance is content-based, "then the [government] is required `to show that the regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.'" Id. (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321, 108 S.Ct. 1157, 99 L.Ed.2d 333 (1988)). If, on the other hand, we determine that the statute is content-neutral in that it "merely restricts the total quantity of speech by regulating the time, the place or the manner in which one can speak, a very different test applies." Id. In such cases, "the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech, provided [1] the restrictions `are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, [2] that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and [3] that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.'" Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989) (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293, 104 S.Ct. 3065, 82 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984)).
Here, the parties disagree over which framework we should use to analyze the exceptions embodied in the sign ordinances, which the Appellants challenge as impermissibly content-based.3 The Appellants argue that because some of the exceptions distinguish between speech on the basis of its content, we should employ the strict scrutiny test for content-based regulations. The City, on the other hand, contends that under our decision in Rappa the proper framework is that of a contentneutral time, place, and manner restriction.
This disagreement reflects the fact that determining whether a statute is content-based or content-neutral has not been entirely straightforward. On their face, Chapters 178 and 125 of the Bradford Code seem to distinguish between certain speech on the basis of its content. Chapter 178, for example, exempts from its permitting requirement signs that identify the name and profession of an owner or occupant of a building, signs that are cut into the masonry and contain identifying information about the building or its date of construction, and noncommercial signs not exceeding twelve square feet. Bradford, Pa., Code § 178-15 (2004). As we explained in Rappa, this law "indisputably distinguishes between, and allows the posting of certain signs based on the subject matter the sign conveys . . . . Under a literal understanding of `content-based,' that fact makes the statute content-based." 18 F.3d at 1054. But we went on in Rappa to set forth a more nuanced understanding of what makes a statute content-based for the purpose of First Amendment analysis.
Rappa involved a First Amendment challenge to a set of sign ordinances similar to the ones in the present case. It is important not just because of this similarity, but because it is the only case in which we have spoken on the issue since the Supreme Court's major ruling on point in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 2882, 69 L.Ed.2d 800 (1981). In Rappa, a politician who had lost his party's primary for Delaware's seat in the House of Representatives brought suit challenging the statutes and ordinances that had prevented him from advertising his candidacy. Specifically, the challenge involved two provisions: Subchapters I and II of Delaware Code Chapter 11. Subchapter I prohibited all signs in the right-of-way and within twenty-five feet of the right-of-way of any state highway. However, just as with the permitting scheme in the instant case, this general provision was limited by several exceptions. These exceptions included "direction or warning signs and official signs or notices," "signs advertising the sale or lease of the real property on which they are located," "signs advertising activities conducted on the real property" on which they are located, "beautification/landscape planting sponsorship signs," "danger and precautionary signs that relate to the premises," and "signs announcing a town, village, or city and advertising itself or its local industries." Id. at 1051-52. Subchapter II was Delaware's response to the federal Highway Beautification Act and applied to advertising within 660 feet of a right-of-way. Like Subchapter I, it contained a general prohibition on outdoor advertising in the regulated area along with a series of exceptions. Among other things, it excepted "direction and other official signs and notices," "signs, displays and devices advertising the sale or lease of the real property on which they are located," and "signs, displays and devices advertising activities conducted on the real property upon which they are located." Id. at 1052-53.
In reviewing the constitutionality of Delaware's statutory scheme, we first turned to the Supreme Court's splintered decision in Metromedia. There, the Court addressed an ordinance that generally prohibited "outdoor