Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/100335/russell-vs-united-states
Timestamp: 2017-12-15 04:38:48
Document Index: 77174405

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 192', '§194', '§ 192', '§192', '§ 192', '§ 194', '§ 192', '§ 192', '§ 192', '§ 192', '§ 192', '§ 192', '§ 192', '§ 1870', '§ 192', '§ 192', '§ 192', '§ 192', '§ 192', '§ 102', '§ 1621', '§ 192', '§ 192', '§ 192', '§ 192', '§ 192', '§ 192', '§ 192', '§ 192', '§ 3266', '§ 3281', '§ 192', '§ 192', '§ 192']

Russell Vs United States - Citation 100335 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Russell Vs. United States - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/100335
Case Number 369 U.S. 749
Appellant Russell
russell v. united states - 369 u.s. 749 (1962) u.s. supreme court russell v. united states, 369 u.s. 749 (1962) russell v. united states no. 8 argued december 7, 1961 decided may 21, 1962 * 369 u.s. 749 certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit syllabus the petitioners in these six cases were convicted of violating 2 u.s.c. § 192, which makes it a misdemeanor for any person summoned to testify before a committee of congress to refuse to answer "any question pertinent to the question under inquiry." in each case, the indictment returned by the grand jury stated that the questions to which answers were refused "were pertinent to the question then under inquiry" by the.....
Russell v. United States - 369 U.S. 749 (1962)
U.S. Supreme Court Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749 (1962)
Decided May 21, 1962 *
Held: the grand jury indictment required by 2 U.S.C. §194 as a prerequisite to a prosecution for a violation of § 192 must state the question which was under inquiry at the time of the defendant's alleged default or refusal to answer, as found by the grand jury, and the judgment affirming the conviction of each of the petitioners is reversed. Pp. 369 U. S. 751 -772.
(a) The Congress which originally enacted, in 1857, the law which was a predecessor of 2 U.S.C. §192 was expressly aware that pertinency to the subject under inquiry was the basic preliminary question which the federal courts would have to decide in determining whether a violation of the statute had been alleged or proved. Pp. 369 U. S. 756 -758.
(b) Many decisions of this Court arising under 2 U.S.C. § 192 have recognized the crucial importance of determining the issue of pertinency, and the obvious first step in determining whether the questions asked were pertinent to the subject under inquiry is to ascertain what that subject was. Pp. 369 U. S. 758 -760.
(c) While convictions are no longer reversed because of minor and technical deficiencies which did not prejudice the accused, the substantial safeguards to those charged with serious crimes cannot be eradicated under the guise of technical departures from the rules. Pp. 369 U. S. 760 -763.
(d) Omission from the indictments here involved of statements of the subject under inquiry deprived the defendants of one of the significant protections which the guaranty of a grand jury indictment was intended to confer -- i.e., they failed adequately to apprise the defendants of what they must be prepared to meet. Pp. 369 U. S. 763 -768.
(e) These indictments were also insufficient to serve the corollary purpose of enabling the courts to decide whether the facts alleged were sufficient in law to support convictions. Pp. 369 U. S. 768 -769.
(f) The deficiencies in these indictments could not have been cured by bills of particulars, because under 2 U.S.C. § 194, only a grand jury may determine whether a person should be held to answer in a criminal trial for refusing to give testimony pertinent to a question under congressional committee inquiry, and the grand jury itself must necessarily determine what the question under inquiry was. Pp. 369 U. S. 769 -771.
In these six cases, we review judgments of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, [ Footnote 1 ] which affirmed convictions obtained in the District Court under 2 U.S.C. § 192. [ Footnote 2 ]
Each of the petitioners was convicted for refusing to answer certain questions when summoned before a congressional subcommittee. [ Footnote 3 ] The cases were separately briefed and argued here, and many issues were presented. We decide each case upon a single ground common to all, and we therefore reach no other questions.
In each case, the indictment returned by the grand jury failed to identify the subject under congressional subcommittee inquiry at the time the witness was interrogated. The indictments were practically identical in this respect, stating only that the questions to which answers were refused "were pertinent to the question then under inquiry" by the subcommittee. [ Footnote 4 ] In each case, a motion
was filed to quash the indictment before trial upon the ground that the indictment failed to state the subject under investigation at the time of the subcommittee's interrogation of the defendant. [ Footnote 5 ] In each case, the motion was denied. In each case, the issue thus raised was preserved on appeal, in the petition for writ of certiorari, and in brief and argument here.
Congress has expressly provided that no one can be prosecuted under 2 U.S.C. § 192 except upon indictment by a grand jury. [ Footnote 6 ] This Court has never decided whether
the indictment must identify the subject which was under inquiry at the time of the defendant's alleged default or refusal to answer. [ Footnote 7 ] For the reasons that follow, we hold
In enacting the criminal statute under which these petitioners were convicted, Congress invoked the aid of the federal judicial system in protecting itself against contumacious conduct. Watkins v. United States, 354 U. S. 178 , 354 U. S. 207 . The obvious consequence, as the Court has repeatedly emphasized, was to confer upon the federal courts the duty to accord a person prosecuted for this statutory offense every safeguard which the law accords in all other federal criminal cases. Sinclair v. United States, 279 U. S. 263 , 279 U. S. 296 -297; Watkins v. United States, supra, at 354 U. S. 208 ; Sacher v. United States, 356 U. S. 576 , 356 U. S. 577 ; Flaxer v. United States, 358 U. S. 147 , 358 U. S. 151 ; Deutch v. United States, 367 U. S. 456 , 367 U. S. 471 .
Recognizing this elementary concept, the Sinclair case established several propositions which provide a relevant starting point here. First, there can be criminality under the statute only if the question which the witness refused to answer pertained to a subject then under investigation by the congressional body which summoned him. "[A] witness rightfully may refuse to answer where . . . the questions asked are not pertinent to the matter under inquiry." Sinclair v. United States, supra, at 279 U. S. 292 . Secondly, because the defendant is presumed to be innocent, it is "incumbent upon the United States to plead and show that the question [he refused to answer] pertained to some matter under investigation." Id. at 279 U. S. 296 -297. Finally, Sinclair held that the question of pertinency
is one for determination by the court as a matter of law. Id. at 279 U. S. 298 .
In that case, the Court had before it an indictment which set out in specific and lengthy detail the subject under investigation by the Senate Committee which had summoned Sinclair. The Court was thereby enabled to make an enlightened and precise determination that the question he had refused to answer was pertinent to that subject. Id. at 279 U. S. 285 -289, 279 U. S. 296 -298.
That the making of such a determination would be a vital function of the federal judiciary in a prosecution brought under 2 U.S.C. § 192 was clearly foreseen by the Congress which originally enacted the law in 1857. [ Footnote 8 ] Congress not only provided that a person could be prosecuted only upon an indictment by a grand jury, but, as the record of the legislative debates shows, Congress was expressly aware that pertinency to the subject under inquiry was the basic preliminary question which the federal courts were going to have to decide in determining
These forecasts of the office which the federal courts would be called upon to perform under 2 U.S.C. § 192 have been amply borne out by the cases which have arisen under the statute. The crucial importance of determining the issue of pertinency is reflected in many cases which have come here since Sinclair, supra. Watkins v. United States, 354 U. S. 178 , 354 U. S. 208 ; Sacher v. United States, 356 U. S. 576 , 356 U. S. 577 ; Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U. S. 109 , 360 U. S. 123 -125; Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U. S. 399 , 365 U. S. 407 -409, 365 U. S. 413 ; Braden v. United States, 365 U. S. 431 , 365 U. S. 435 -436; Deutch v. United States, 367 U. S. 456 , 367 U. S. 467 -471. Our decisions have pointed out that the obvious first step in determining whether the questions asked were pertinent
to the subject under inquiry is to ascertain what that subject was. See, e.g., Deutch v. United States, supra, at 367 U. S. 469 . Identification of the subject under inquiry is also an essential preliminary to the determination of a host of other issues which typically arise in prosecutions under the statute. In Wilkinson v. United States, supra, for example, the Court pointed out that, in order properly to consider any of the many issues there presented, "the starting point must be to determine the subject matter of the subcommittee's inquiry." 365 U.S. at 365 U. S. 407 .
Where, as in the Sinclair case, the subject under inquiry has been identified in the indictment, this essential first step has presented no problem. Where, as in the more recent cases, the indictment has not identified the topic under inquiry, the Court has often found it difficult or impossible to ascertain what the subject was. The difficulty of such a determination in the absence of an allegation in the indictment is illustrated by Deutch v. United States, supra. In that case, the members of this Court were in sharp disagreement as to what the subject under subcommittee inquiry had been. Moreover, all of us disagreed with the District Court's theory, and the Court of Appeals had not even ventured a view on the question. 367 U.S. at 367 U. S. 467 . In Watkins v. United States, supra, the Court found it not merely difficult, but actually impossible, to determine what the topic under subcommittee inquiry had been at the time the petitioner had refused to answer the questions addressed to him.
354 U.S. at 354 U. S. 214 . [ Footnote 9 ]
to consider whether an offense under 2 U.S.C. § 192 is an "infamous crime," Duke v. United States, 301 U. S. 492 , since Congress has, from the beginning, explicitly conferred upon those prosecuted under the statute the protection which the Fifth Amendment confers by providing that no one can be prosecuted for this offense except upon an indictment by a grand jury. This specific guaranty, as well as the Fifth Amendment's Due Process, Clause, are therefore both brought to bear here. Of like relevance is the guaranty of the Sixth Amendment that, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; . . . "
The constitutional provision that a trial may be held in a serious federal criminal case only if a grand jury has first intervened reflects centuries of antecedent development of common law, going back to the Assize of Clarendon in 1166. [ Footnote 10 ]
Costello v. United States, 350 U. S. 359 , 350 U. S. 362 . See McClintock, Indictment by a Grand Jury, 26 Minn.L.Rev. 153; Orfield, Criminal Procedure from Arrest to Appeal, 137-140, 144-146.
17 Stat. 198. This legislation has now been repealed, but its substance is preserved in the more generalized provision of Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which states that "Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." [ Footnote 11 ]
Smith v. United States, 360 U. S. 1 , 360 U. S. 9 . "But," as the Smith opinion went on to point out,
" Cochran and Sayre v. United States, 157 U. S. 286 , 157 U. S. 290 ; Rosen v. United States, 161 U. S. 29 , 161 U. S. 34 ."
Hagner v. United States, 285 U. S. 427 , 285 U. S. 431 . See Potter v. United States, 155 U. S. 438 , 155 U. S. 445 ; Bartell v. United States, 227 U. S. 427 , 227 U. S. 431 ; Berger v. United States, 295 U. S. 78 , 295 U. S. 82 ; United States v. Debrow, 346 U. S. 374 , 346 U. S. 377 -378.
Without doubt, the second of these preliminary criteria was sufficiently met by the indictments in these cases. Since the indictments set out not only the times and places of the hearings at which the petitioners refused to testify, but also specified the precise questions which they then and there refused to answer, it can hardly be doubted that the petitioners would be fully protected from again being put in jeopardy for the same offense, particularly when it is remembered that they could rely upon other parts of the present record in the event that future proceedings should be taken against them. See McClintock, Indictment by a Grand Jury, 26 Minn.L.Rev. 153, 160; Bartell v. United States, 227 U. S. 427 , 227 U. S. 433 . The vice of these indictments, rather, is that they failed to satisfy the first essential criterion by which the sufficiency of an indictment is to be tested, i.e., that they failed to sufficiently apprise the defendant "of what he must be prepared to meet."
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542 , 92 U. S. 55 . An indictment not framed to apprise the defendant "with reasonable certainty, of the nature of the accusation against him . . . is defective, although it may follow the language of the statute." United States v. Simmons, 96 U. S. 360 , 96 U. S. 362 .
United States v. Carll, 105 U. S. 611 , 105 U. S. 612 .
United States v. Hess, 124 U. S. 483 , 124 U. S. 487 . See also Pettibone v. United States, 148 U. S. 197 , 148 U. S. 202 -204; Blitz v. United States, 153 U. S. 308 , 153 U. S. 315 ; Keck v. United States, 172 U. S. 434 , 172 U. S. 437 ; Morissette v. United States, 342 U. S. 246 , 342 U. S. 270 , n. 30. Cf. United States v. Petrillo, 332 U. S. 1 , 332 U. S. 10 -11. [ Footnote 12 ] That these basic principles of fundamental
fairness retain their full vitality under modern concepts of pleading, and specifically under Rule 7(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, is illustrated by many recent federal decisions. [ Footnote 13 ]
The vice which inheres in the failure of an indictment under 2 U.S.C. § 192 to identify the subject under inquiry is thus the violation of the basic principle "that the accused must be apprised by the indictment, with reasonable certainty, of the nature of the accusation against him,. . . ." United States v. Simmons, supra, 96 U. S. 362 . A cryptic form of indictment in cases of this kind requires the defendant to go to trial with the chief issue undefined. It enables his conviction to rest on one point, and the affirmance of the conviction to rest on another. It gives the prosecution free hand on appeal to fill in the gaps of proof by surmise or conjecture. The Court has had occasion before now to condemn just such a practice in a quite different factual setting. Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U. S. 196 , 333 U. S. 201 -202. And the unfairness and uncertainty which have characteristically infected criminal proceedings under this statute which were based upon indictments which failed to specify the subject under inquiry are illustrated by the cases in this Court we have already discussed. The same uncertainty and unfairness are underscored by the records of the cases now before us. A single example will suffice to illustrate the point.
Security Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee. At the beginning of the hearing in question, the Chairman and other subcommittee members made widely meandering statements purporting to identify the subject under inquiry. It was said that the hearings were "not . . . an attack upon the free press," that the investigation was of "such attempt as may be disclosed on the part of the Communist Party . . . to influence or to subvert the American press." It was also said that "[w]e are simply investigating communism wherever we find it." In dealing with a witness who testified shortly before Price, counsel for the subcommittee emphatically denied that it was the subcommittee's purpose "to investigate Communist infiltration of the press and other forms of communication." But, when Price was called to testify before the subcommittee, no one offered even to attempt to inform him of what subject the subcommittee did have under inquiry. At the trial, the Government took the position that the subject under inquiry had been Communist activities generally. The district judge before whom the case was tried found that "the questions put were pertinent to the matter under inquiry," without indicating what he thought the subject under inquiry was. The Court of Appeals, in affirming the conviction, likewise omitted to state what it thought the subject under inquiry had been. In this Court, the Government contends that the subject under inquiry at the time the petitioner was called to testify was "Communist activity in news media." [ Footnote 14 ]
was not told at the time what subject the subcommittee was investigating. The prior record of the subcommittee hearings, with which Price may or may not have been familiar, gave a completely confused and inconsistent account of what, if anything, that subject was. Price was put to trial and convicted upon an indictment which did not even purport to inform him in any way of the identity of the topic under subcommittee inquiry. At every stage in the ensuing criminal proceeding, Price was met with a different theory, or by no theory at all, as to what the topic had been. Far from informing Price of the nature of the accusation against him, the indictment instead left the prosecution free to roam at large -- to shift its theory of criminality so as to take advantage of each passing vicissitude of the trial and appeal. Yet Price could be guilty of no criminal offense unless the questions he refused to answer were in fact pertinent to a specific topic under subcommittee inquiry at the time he was interrogated. Sinclair v. United States, 279 U. S. 263 at 279 U. S. 292 .
It has long been recognized that there is an important corollary purpose to be served by the requirement that an indictment set out "the specific offence, coming under the general description," with which the defendant is charged. This purpose, as defined in United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542 , 92 U. S. 558 , is
"to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had. [ Footnote 15 ]"
here, in the light of the difficulties and uncertainties with which the federal trial and reviewing courts have had to deal in cases arising under 2 U.S.C. § 192, to which reference has already been made. See, e.g., Watkins v. United States, 354 U. S. 178 ; Deutch v. United States, 367 U. S. 456 . Viewed in this context, the rule is designed not alone for the protection of the defendant, but for the benefit of the prosecution, as well, by making it possible for courts called upon to pass on the validity of convictions under the statute to bring an enlightened judgment to that task. Cf. Watkins v. United States, supra.
It is argued that any deficiency in the indictments in these cases could have been cured by bills of particulars. [ Footnote 16 ]
But it is a settled rule that a bill of particulars cannot save an invalid indictment. See United States v. Norris, 281 U. S. 619 , 281 U. S. 622 ; United States v. Lattimore, 94 U.S.App.D.C. 268, 215 F.2d 847; Babb v. United States, 218 F.2d 538; Steiner v. United States, 229 F.2d 745; United States v. Dierker, 164 F.Supp. 304; 4 Anderson, Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure, § 1870. When Congress provided that no one could be prosecuted under 2 U.S.C. § 192 except upon an indictment, Congress made the basic decision that only a grand jury could determine whether a person should be held to answer in a criminal trial for refusing to give testimony pertinent to a question under congressional committee inquiry. A grand jury, in order to make that ultimate determination, must necessarily determine what the question under inquiry was. To allow the prosecutor, or the court, to make a subsequent guess as to what was in the minds of the grand jury at the time they returned the indictment would deprive the defendant of a basic protection which the guaranty of the intervention of a grand jury was designed to secure. For a defendant could then be convicted on the basis of facts not found by, and perhaps not even presented to, the grand jury which indicted him. See Orfield, Criminal Procedure from Arrest to Appeal 243.
This underlying principle is reflected by the settled rule in the federal courts that an indictment may not be amended except by resubmission to the grand jury unless the change is merely a matter of form. Ex parte Bain, 121 U. S. 1 ; United States v. Norris, 281 U. S. 619 ; Stirone v. United States, 361 U. S. 212 .
Ex parte Bain, supra, at 121 U. S. 10 , 121 U. S. 13 . We reaffirmed this rule only recently, pointing out that
Stirone v. United States, supra, at 361 U. S. 218 . [ Footnote 17 ]
For these reasons, we conclude that an indictment under 2 U.S.C. § 192 must state the question under congressional committee inquiry as found by the grand jury [ Footnote 18 ]
"The question must be pertinent to the subject matter, and that will have to be decided by the courts of justice on the indictment. [ Footnote 19 ]"
" I NTRODUCTION"
The question was presented but not reached in Sacher v. United States, 356 U. S. 576 , where the conviction was reversed on other grounds. The question was also raised in the petition for certiorari in Braden v. United States, 365 U. S. 431 , but was abandoned when the case was briefed and argued on the merits. Although the question was decided by the lower court in Barenblatt v. United States, 100 U.S.App.D.C. 13, 240 F.2d 875, it was not raised in this Court, 360 U. S. 360 U.S. 109.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has passed on the question, holding that the indictment need not set forth the subject under committee inquiry. See Barenblatt v. United States, 100 U.S.App.D.C. 13, 240 F.2d 875; Sacher v. United States, 102 U.S.App.D.C. 264, 252 F.2d 828. Indictments returned in that circuit, of course, reflect this rule. See cases cited in MR. JUSTICE HARLAN's dissenting opinion, post, p. 369 U. S. 782 , n. 2. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit sustained an indictment under 2 U.S.C. § 192 which did not set forth the subject under inquiry in United States v. Josephson, 165 F.2d 82. However, Josephson appears to have been substantially limited by the same court in United States v. Lamont, 236 F.2d 312, and indictments under 2 U.S.C. § 192 currently being returned in the Second Circuit do, in fact, set forth the subject under inquiry. See the unreported indictments in United States v. Yarus (D.C.S.D.N.Y.) No. C 152-239 (the opinion acquitting defendant Yarus is reported at 198 F.Supp. 425); United States v. Turoff (D.C.W.D.N.Y.) No. 7539-C (the opinion of the Court of Appeals reversing defendant Turoff's conviction is reported at 291 F.2d 864).
11 Stat. 155-156. The statute, now 2 U.S.C. §§ 192-194, was enacted to supplement the established contempt power of Congress itself. Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U. S. 125 , 294 U. S. 151 . The specific background of the statute's adoption is sketched in Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. at 354 U. S. 207 , n. 45. See Cong.Globe, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. 405. See also id. at 403-413, 426-433, 434-445. Except for a basic change in the immunity provisions in 1862, 12 Stat. 333, the legislation has continued substantially unchanged to the present time, with only a slight modification in language in R.S. §§ 102 and 104. The only other amendment in the substantive provisions was made in 1938, 52 Stat. 942, so as to make the statute applicable to joint committees. The provision requiring grand jury indictment has been amended twice since 1857. The original legislation provided for certification only to the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia. In 1936, an amendment was made to permit certification to any United States Attorney, 49 Stat. 2041. In 1938, the provision was amended to bring it into accord with the joint committee amendment of the substantive provisions of the law.
In the Watkins case, the Court's primary concern was not whether pertinency had had been proved at the criminal trial, but whether the petitioner had been apprised of the pertinency of the questions at the time he had been called upon to answer them. These two issues are, of course, quite different. See Deutch v. United States, 367 U.S. at 367 U. S. 467 -468. But identification of the subject under inquiry is essential to the determination of either issue. See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. at 360 U. S. 123 -125.
Rosen v. United States, 161 U. S. 29 , heavily relied upon in the dissenting opinion, is inapposite. In that case, the Court held that an indictment charging the mailing of obscene material did not need to specify the particular portions of the publication which were allegedly obscene. As pointed out in Bartell v. United States, 227 U. S. 427 , 227 U. S. 431 , the rule established in Rosen was always regarded as a "well recognized exception" to usual indictment rules, applicable only to "the pleading of printed or written matter which is alleged to be too obscene or indecent to be spread upon the records of the court." Under Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476 , 354 U. S. 488 -489, the issue dealt with in Rosen would presumably no longer arise.
See also Smith v. United States, 360 U. S. 1 , 360 U. S. 13 (dissenting opinion); Comment, 35 Mich.L.Rev. 456.
The federal perjury statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1621 makes it a crime for a person under oath willfully to state or subscribe to "any material matter which he does not believe to be true." The Government, pointing to the analogy between the perjury materiality requirement and the pertinency requirement in 2 U.S.C. § 192 recognized in Sinclair v. United States, 279 U. S. 263 , 279 U. S. 298 , contends that the present cases are controlled by Markham v. United States, 160 U. S. 319 , where the Court sustained a perjury indictment. But Markham is inapposite. The analogy between the perjury statute and 2 U.S.C. § 192, while persuasive for some purposes, is not persuasive here, for the determination of the subject under inquiry does not play the central role in a perjury prosecution which it plays under 2 U.S.C. § 192. But even were the analogy perfect, Markham would still not control, for it holds only that a perjury indictment need not set forth how and why the statements were allegedly material. The Court carefully pointed out that the indictment did, in fact, reveal the subject under inquiry stating that,
160 U.S. at 160 U. S. 325 -326. (Emphasis added.) This has been equally true of other perjury indictments sustained by the Court. See Hendricks v. United States, 223 U. S. 178 ; United States v. Debrow, 346 U. S. 374 (the indictment in Debrow is set forth in the opinion of the Court of Appeals, 203 F.2d 699, 702, n. 1).
See p. 369 U. S. 757 , supra.
"We are not singling out any newspaper and not investigating any newspaper or any group of newspapers. We are simply investigating communism wherever we find it, * and I think that, when this series
is one on which "no valid legislation" can be enacted. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168 , 103 U. S. 195 . Since the First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom . . . of the press," this present investigation was plainly unconstitutional. As we said in Watkins v. United States, 354 U. S. 178 , 354 U. S. 197 :
Under our system of government, I do not see how it is possible for Congress to pass a law saying whom a newspaper or news agency or magazine shall or shall not employ. If this power exists, it can reach the rightist, as well as the leftist, press, as United States v. Rumely, 345 U. S. 41 , shows. Whether it is used against the one or the other will depend on the mood of the day. Whenever it is used to ferret out the ideology of those collecting news or writing articles or editorials for the press, it is used unconstitutionally. The theory of our Free Society is that government must be neutral when it comes to the press -- whether it be rightist or leftist, orthodox or unorthodox. The theory is that, in a community where men's minds are free, all shades of opinion must be immune from governmental inquiry, lest we end with regimentation. Congress has no more authority in the field of the press than it does where the pulpit is involved. Since the editorials written and the news printed and the policies advocated by the press are none of the Government's
There is a dictum in United States v. Rumely, 345 U. S. 41 , 345 U. S. 43 , that the reach of the investigative power of Congress is measured by the "informing function of Congress," a phrase taken from Woodrow Wilson's Congressional Government (1885), p. 303. But the quotation from Wilson was mutilated, because the sentences which followed his statement that "[t]he informing function of Congress should be preferred even to its legislative function" were omitted from the Rumely opinion. Those omitted sentences make abundantly clear that Wilson was speaking
"A metropolitan newspaper in America today is more than a mirror to the happenings of the day. It is a moulder of public opinion; capable of leading crusades; capable of introducing new ideas; capable of propagating truth or propaganda as it wills. By its very nature, whether it would abdicate of not, a newspaper maintains a position of leadership and responsibility in this cold war that is vital to our national security. Other industries (atomic energy, defense, et cetera ) may be more vital, but this fact does not impair the vital role of our press."
By fastening upon indictment forms under § 192 its superficial luminosity requirement, the Court creates additional hazards to the successful prosecution of congressional contempt cases, which impair the informing procedures of the Congress by encouraging contumacy before its committees. It was only five years ago, in my dissenting opinion in Watkins, that I indicated the rule in that case might "well lead to trial of all contempt cases before the bar . . . " of the House of Congress affected. Watkins v. United States, supra, at p. 354 U. S. 225 . In that short period, the Court has now upset 10 convictions
under § 192. This continued frustration of the Congress in the use of the judicial process to punish those who are contemptuous of its committees indicates to me that the time may have come for Congress to revert to "its original practice of utilizing the coercive sanction of contempt proceedings at the bar of the House [affected]." Id. at 354 U. S. 206 . Perhaps some simplified method may be found to handle such matters without consuming too much of the time of the full House involved. True, a recalcitrant witness would have to be released at the date of adjournment, but at least contumacious conduct would then receive some punishment. The dignity of the legislative process deserves at least that much sanction.
The ground rules for testing the sufficiency of an indictment are twofold: (1) does the indictment adequately inform the defendant of the nature of the charge he will have to meet; (2) if the defendant is convicted, and later prosecuted again, will a court, under what has been charged, be able to determine the extent to which the defense of double jeopardy is available? United States v. Debrow, 346 U. S. 374 .
The rule was "designed to eliminate technicalities," and is "to be construed to secure simplicity in procedure." Debrow at 346 U. S. 376 .
An essential element of the offense established by 2 U.S.C. § 192, [ Footnote 2/1 ] is that the questions which the defendant refused to answer were "pertinent to the question under inquiry" before the inquiring congressional committee. Each of the indictments in these cases charged this element of the offense in the language of the statute, following the practice consistently employed since 1950 in the District of Columbia, where most of the § 192 cases have been brought. [ Footnote 2/2 ] The Court now holds, however, that,
The Court's holding is contrary to the uniform course of decisions in the lower federal courts. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, sitting first as a panel and later en banc, has upheld "pertinency" allegations which, like the present indictment, did not identify the particular subject being investigated. Barenblatt v. United States, 100 U.S.App.D.C. 13, 240 F.2d 875 (panel); Sacher v. United States, 102 U.S.App.D.C. 264, 252 F.2d 828 (en banc). [ Footnote 2/3 ] The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is of the same view. United States
v. Josephson, 165 F.2d 82; [ Footnote 2/4 ] United States v. Lamont, 236 F.2d 312. [ Footnote 2/5 ] And so, quite evidently, is the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Braden v. United States, 272 F.2d 653. [ Footnote 2/6 ] No Court of Appeals has held otherwise.
And nothing in this Court's more recent cases could possibly be taken as foreshadowing the decision made today. [ Footnote 2/7 ]
It is first argued that an allegation of "pertinency" in the statutory terms will not do, because that element is at "the very core of criminality" under § 192. This is said to follow from what "our cases have uniformly held." Ante, p. 369 U. S. 764 . I do not so understand the cases on which the Court relies. It will suffice to examine the three cases from which quotations have been culled. Ante, pp. 369 U. S. 765 -766.
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542 , involved an indictment under the Enforcement Act of 1870 (16 Stat. 140) making it a felony to conspire to prevent any person from exercising and enjoying "any right or privilege granted or secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Most of the counts were dismissed on the ground that they stated no federal offense whatever. The remainder were held inadequate from the standpoint of "apprisal," in that they simply alleged a conspiracy to prevent certain citizens from enjoying rights "granted and secured to them by the constitution and laws of the United States," such rights not being otherwise described or identified. Small wonder that these opaque allegations drew from the Court the comment
that the indictment "must descend to particulars." Id. at 369 U. S. 558 . Indeed, the Court observed:
"According to the view we take of these counts, the question is not whether it is enough, in general, to describe a statutory offence in the language of the statute, but whether the offence has here been described at all. "
Id. at 369 U. S. 557 . (Emphasis supplied.)
United States v. Simmons, 96 U. S. 360 , was concerned with an indictment involving illegal distilling. Revised Statutes § 3266 made it an offense to distill spirits on premises where vinegar "is" manufactured. One count of the indictment charged the defendant with causing equipment on premises where vinegar "was" manufactured to be used for distilling. This count was dismissed for its failure (1) to identify the person who had so used the equipment or to allege that his identity was unknown to the grand jurors; and (2) to allege that the distilling and manufacture of vinegar were coincidental, as required by the statute. [ Footnote 2/8 ] What is more significant from the standpoint of the present cases is that, in sustaining another count of the indictment charging the defendant with engaging in the business of distilling "with the intent to defraud the United States of the tax" on the spirits (R.S. § 3281), the Court held that it was not necessary to allege "the particular means by which the United States was to be defrauded of the tax." Id. at 96 U. S. 364 .
United States v. Carll, 105 U. S. 611 , held no more than that an indictment charging forgery was insufficient for failure to allege scienter, which, though not expressly required by the statute, the Court found to be a necessary element of the crime. Hence, a charge in the statutory language would not suffice. Section 192, of course, contains no such gap in its provisions. What the Court now requires of these indictments under § 192 involves not the supplying of a missing element of the crime, but the addition of the particulars of an element already clearly alleged.
To me, it seems quite clear that, even under these cases, decided long before Rule 7(c) came into being, the "pertinency" allegations of the present indictments would have been deemed sufficient. Other early cases indicate the same thing. See, e.g., 32 U. S. Mills, 7 Pet. 138, 32 U. S. 142 ; Evans v. United States, 153 U. S. 584 , 153 U. S. 587 ; [ Footnote 2/9 ] Markham v. United States, 160 U. S. 319 , 160 U. S. 325 ; [ Footnote 2/10 ] Bartell
v. United States, 227 U. S. 427 , 227 U. S. 433 -434. [ Footnote 2/11 ] I think there can be no doubt about the matter after Rule 7(c).
In United States v. Debrow, supra, the Court in reversing the dismissal of perjury indictments which had gone on the ground that they had not alleged the name or authority of the persons administering the oath, said (346 U.S. at 346 U. S. 376 -378):
The Court says that its holding is needed to prevent the Government from switching on appeal, to the prejudice of the defendants, to a different theory of pertinency from that on which the conviction may have rested. Ante, pp. 369 U. S. 766 -768. There are several good answers to this.
To the extent that this fear relates to the subject under investigation, the Government cannot, of course, travel outside the confines of the trial record, of which the defendant has full knowledge. If what is meant is that the Government may not modify on appeal its "trial" view of the "connective reasoning" ( supra, p. 369 U. S. 784 , note 6) relied on to establish the germaneness of the questions asked to the subject matter of the inquiry, surely it would be free to do so, this aspect of pertinency being simply a matter of law, Sinclair v. United States, 279 U. S. 263 , 279 U. S. 299 . Moreover the Court does not find these indictments deficient because they failed to allege the "connective reasoning."
Beyond these considerations, a defendant has ample means for protecting himself in this regard. By objecting at the committee hearing to the pertinency of any question asked him, he may "freeze" this issue, since the Government's case on this score must then stand or fall on the pertinency explanation given by the committee in response to such an objection. Deutch v. United States, 367 U. S. 456 , 367 U. S. 472 -473 (dissenting opinion); cf. Watkins v. United States, supra, at 354 U. S. 214 -215; Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U. S. 109 , 360 U. S. 123 -125. If he has failed to make a pertinency objection at the committee hearing, thereby leaving the issue "at large" for the trial ( Deutch, ibid. ), he may still seek a particularization through a bill of particulars. Cf. United States v. Kamin, 136 F.Supp. 791, 795 n. 4.
It should be noted that no pertinency objection was made by any of these petitioners at the committee hearings. Further, no motions for a bill of particulars were made in No. 12, Price, to which the Court especially addresses itself ( ante, pp. 369 U. S. 766 -768), or in No. 8, Russell, No. 10, Whitman, and No. 11, Liveright. In No. 9, Shelton, and No. 128, Gojack, such motions were made. However, no appeal was taken from the denial of the motion in Gojack, and in Shelton, the sufficiency of the particulars furnished by the Government was not questioned either by a motion for a further bill or on appeal.
Referring to certain language in the Cruikshank case, supra, the Court suggests that the present holding is supported by a further "important corollary purpose" which an indictment is intended to serve: to make "it possible for courts called upon to pass on the validity of convictions under the statute to bring an enlightened judgment to that task." Ante, pp. 369 U. S. 768 -769.
But whether or not the Government has established its case on "pertinency" is something that must be determined on the record made at the trial, not upon the allegations of the indictment. There is no such thing as a motion for summary judgment in a criminal case. While appellate courts might be spared some of the tedium of going through these § 192 records were the allegations of indictments to spell out the "pertinency" facts, the Court elsewhere in its opinion recognizes that the issue at hand can hardly be judged in terms of whether fuller indictments "would simplify the courts' task." Ante, p. 369 U. S. 760 .
the court has jurisdiction has been alleged. Cf. McClintock, Indictment by a Grand Jury, 26 Minn.L.Rev. 153, 159-160 (1942); Orfield, Criminal Procedure from Arrest to Appeal, 222-226, 227, n. 107. [ Footnote 2/12 ] Certainly the allegations of these indictments meet such requirements.
The final point made by the Court is perhaps the most novel of all. It is said that a statement of the subject under inquiry is necessary in the indictment in order to fend against the possibility that a defendant may be convicted on a theory of pertinency based upon a subject under investigation different from that which may have been found by the grand jury. An argument similar to this was rejected by this Court many years ago in Rosen v. United States, 161 U. S. 29 , 161 U. S. 34 , where an indictment charging the defendant with mailing obscene matter, only generally described, was upheld over strong dissent ( id. at 161 U. S. 45 -51) asserting that the accused was entitled to know the particular parts of the material which the grand jury had deemed obscene. [ Footnote 2/13 ]
This proposition is also certainly unsound on principle. In the last analysis, it would mean that a prosecutor could not safely introduce or advocate at a trial evidence or theories, however relevant to the crime charged in the indictment, which he had not presented to the grand jury. Such cases as Ex parte Bain, 121 U. S. 1 ; United States v.
Norris, 281 U. S. 619 , and Stirone v. United States, 361 U. S. 212 , lend no support to the Court's thesis. They held only that, consistently with the Fifth Amendment, a trial judge could not amend the indictment itself, either by striking or adding material language, or, amounting to the latter, by permitting a conviction on evidence or theories not fairly embraced in the charges made in the indictment. To allow this would in effect permit a defendant to be put to trial upon an indictment found not by a grand jury, but by a judge. [ Footnote 2/14 ]
to mind the trenchant observation made by Mr Justice Holmes many years ago in Paraiso v. United States, 207 U. S. 368 , 207 U. S. 372 :
On the merits, these convictions are, of course, squarely ruled against the petitioners by principles discussed in our recent decisions in the Barenblatt, Wilkinson, and Braden [ Footnote 2/15 ] cases, as was all but acknowledged at the bar.
This case evinces no purpose to depart from Josephson. The District Court, although dismissing the indictment on other grounds, quite evidently found the statutory "pertinency" allegation sufficient. 18 F.R.D. 27 at 30, 37. And, in affirming, the Court of Appeals, citing the Josephson case, among others, stated that "the result might well be different" had the authority of the investigating committee appeared in the indictment. 236 F.2d at 316 (note 6). (The committee in Lamont was a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Government Operations whose enabling legislation the court found did not authorize investigation of "subversive activities.") As regards the issue decided in the present cases, the following observations by Chief Judge Clark, who speaks with special authority in procedural matters, are significant ( id. at 317):
That case was concerned with the "connective reasoning" aspect of "pertinency," Watkins v. United States, 354 U. S. 178 , 354 U. S. 214 -215, rather than the "subject under inquiry" aspect; but it is not perceived how this can be thought to make a difference in principle.
This is not the first opportunity the Court has had to consider the matter. Ante, p. 369 U. S. 754 , note. 7.
The Court stated ( id. at 96 U. S. 362 ):
In that case, the Court spoke, doubtless by way of dictum, concerning the method of pleading "materiality" in a perjury indictment (an element akin to "pertinency" under § 192, Sinclair v. United States, 279 U. S. 263 , 279 U. S. 298 ):
160 U.S. at 160 U. S. 325 .
There, under an exception, prevailing in "obscenity" cases, to the then general rule that, in "documentary" crimes the contents of the document must be set forth in the indictment, the Court, in sustaining an indictment charging the unlawful mailing of an "indecent" letter, only generally described, said ( id. at 227 U. S. 433 -434):
The Court suggests that Bartell and Rosen v. United States ( infra, p. 369 U. S. 792 ) are inapposite because of the special rule of pleading applicable in "obscenity" cases. Ante, p. 369 U. S. 765 . However, considering that the "apprisal" requisite of an indictment arises from constitutional requirements, this factor far from lessening the weight of these two cases adds to their authority.
The other cases and commentaries referred to by the Court in Note 15 ante, pp. 369 U. S. 768 -769, indicate nothing different.
It seems clear that the Court proceeded on the premise that the "isolated excerpt" rule of Regina v. Hicklin, [1868] L.R. 3 Q.B. 360, recently rejected in Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476 , 354 U. S. 488 -489, in favor of the "whole book" rule, obtained, for the Court relied on United States v. Bennett, 24 Fed.Cas. p. 1093, 16 Blatchford 338, where the "excerpt" test was applied.