Source: https://www.calattorneysfees.com/2014/10/index.html
Timestamp: 2019-01-24 12:24:42
Document Index: 571967932

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1021', '§ 1021', '§ 1021', '§ 1920', '§ 1021', '§ 1021']

CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY'S FEES : October 2014
Judge Harold Kahn Reads The Riot Act.
If ever a case demonstrates why settlements of class actions and fee awards to class counsel are subject to court oversight and scrutiny, this is it. Lofton v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Case No. A136626 (1/3 October 22, 2014) (certified for publication).
Two separate class actions were brought by home mortgage consultants against Wells Fargo Home Mortgage seeking damages for unpaid wages: a class of 600 suing in Los Angeles, and a larger class of thousands suing in San Francisco. Contrary to what often happens, the two cases were, for the most part, neither coordinated or consolidated, proceeding instead on different tracks. However, a comprehensive settlement agreement of both matters was reached before the same mediator on the same day.
Counsel for the larger class of thousands (class counsel) then moved for approval of $6,333,333 in attorney fees and costs, explaining that the parties reached a “settlement for the class of $19,000,000 and a settlement of the individual ILG lawsuits of $6,000,000.” It was further represented that “ILG clients would recover from the richer per capita fund secured by ILG for its individual clients and opt out of the $19 million class settlement.” (Note: the ILG fund of $6,000,000 was “richer” per capita because the ILG clients were much fewer in number than the larger class).
However, as the matter unfolded, none of the 600 ILG clients opted out of the class settlement. It appeared to the trial court that this fact had not been made clear, that the participation of the 600 ILG clients in the overall settlement would dilute the class settlement, and that most of the $6,000,000 earmarked for the 600 clients would in fact go to their attorneys as fees.
When the trial court started to grasp what had happened, San Francisco Superior Court Judge Harold Kahn explained that he was deeply troubled by the situation. The judge’s extraordinary language is perhaps the most remarkable part of the opinion. The Court of Appeal repeated the judge’s comments, and so do we:
“I believe that I am obligated to completely take another look at this settlement. What appears to me based on the record is there has been egregious misconduct and bad faith on the part of ILG. And I say that recognizing those are serious words. [¶] I am troubled by what appears to be either turning a blind eye to or participation in that egregious misconduct by class counsel who was paid over $6 million, and a distinguished law firm that represents one of the great banking institutions of this country. [¶] The motion to intervene, though, seeks to intervene to represent just the interests of the ILG clients. And that may be appropriate but I am taking a look at the entire settlement. I believe that there is good cause to think that the entire class, not just the ILG clients, have been badly disserved. There is going to be extensive work on the part of all of us to get to the bottom of this. And if there is, as I believe there will be found, serious misconduct, it will be remedied.”
The Court of Appeal affirmed the TRO, holding that “the trial court presiding over the class action properly enjoined ILG from distributing or taking action to distribute the proceeds of its settlement to itself. The court presiding over the class action had concurrent exclusive jurisdiction to consider the propriety of the settlement of class member claims, even for those class members represented by ILG on class or related claims.”
And, for purposes of California Attorney’s Fees, the Court of Appeal also held, “the trial court had a duty to ensure the fees claimed by ILG were reasonable in light of the overall result ILG achieved.”
NOTE: A separate issue in the appeal, whether the trial court relied on inadmissible evidence subject to a mediation privilege, is the subject of a blog post today on California Mediation and Arbitration.
Posted at 03:54 PM in Cases: Class Actions, Cases: Settlement | Permalink | Comments (0)
Posted at 12:17 PM in Cases: Settlement, Cases: SLAPP | Permalink | Comments (0)
Coastal Environmental Rights Foundation, Inc. v. City of San Diego, Case Nos. D060230 (4th Dist., Div. 1 Oct. 16, 2014) (unpublished)
Here, a CEQA petitioner finally forged a settlement with the City of San Diego over issuing a permit for the 2010 La Jolla Cove Fireworks Show without performing an environmental review. Under the settlement, City did agree to do a review for special events and discretionary park use permits on a project-by-project basis. For our purposes, the stipulated settlement—approved by the appellate court—included a fee award of $250,000 to the petitioner.
"Say the French, 'See Paris and die!'
Make your home at La Jolla and Live, say I."
La Jolla visitor. Source: The Journal of San Diego History.
Marriage of Hogan, Case No. B248740 (2d Dist., Div. 1 Oct. 16, 2014) (unpublished)
This was a receiver case in which a receiver was appointed to manage/list three apartment buildings of family law dissolution litigants locked in acrimonious proceedings. The litigants challenged the receiver's/his personnel's hourly rates, but did not present proof to show they objected to the general receivership order allowing compensation at usual hourly billable rates or that the work expended was unreasonable. They also argued that the receiver could not obtain costs after his resignation because no costs memorandum was filed. The problem with this argument is that the receiver's final report and account and right to compensation is governed by CRC, rule 3.1184, which allows for compensation upon a review of the final report—with no costs memo requirement being applicable (the general rule for obtaining costs in normal civil litigation under CCP section 1032).
Posted at 12:01 PM in Cases: Private Attorney General (CCP 1021.5), Cases: Receivers | Permalink | Comments (0)
$602,211.23 Fee Request Pared Down By Lower Court and Sustained.
Living Rivers Council v. State Water Resources Control Bd., Case No. A138723 (1st Dist., Div. 5 Oct. 15, 2014) (unpublished) has a nice discussion of the private attorney fee recovery elements under CCP § 1021.5 and also demonstrates how a carefully framed lower court fee award will be affirmed under the abuse of discretion review standard.
In this one, a nonprofit dedicated to maintaining the Napa River succeeded on one of three CEQA claims against the Water Resources Control Board, requiring the Board to consider groundwater delineations as a mitigation measure for purposes of formulating a policy to maintain main instream flows to protect fisheries. The nonprofit moved for private attorney general fees, asking for $602,211.23. The lower court awarded $445,000, based on the following “math”: (1) the correct lodestar for fees on fees work was $45,000 and the lodestar for merits work was $324,120; (2) a reduction of $57,450 was warranted on the merits work because nonprofit only partially succeeded; and (3) the adjusted lodestar would be augmented by a 1.5 positive multiplier based on the contingent risk taken by nonprofit attorneys who were only paid $70,000 before taking the rest on contingency.
The appellate court affirmed the lower court’s fee award.
Nonprofit was the prevailing party even if it was the court that came up with the groundwater delineations which led to the lower court grant of mandate, with nonprofit winning on a significant issue and with the nonprofit’s petition leading to the ultimate “relook at” ruling. Because CEQA benefits were vindicated, the “significant nonpecuniary benefit on the public” 1021.5 element was satisfied—the ruling required more review that looking at a “minute blemish.” There was no need for prelitigation settlement negotiations (although there were settlement talks) because the matter was not a catalyst case.
With respect to the amount of the award, the lower court correctly allowed hourly rates ranging from $140-$625, and it was no error to award a positive multiplier based on the contingency risk taken on by nonprofit’s attorneys.
The Board then made the public fisc argument—taxpayers should not have to pay private attorneys’ compensation. However, although this can be considered, it cannot be the basis for a rejection of 1021.5 fee requests altogether. The lower court felt the benefit from the case required an award on the “public dime.” (Horsford v. Bd. of Trustees of Cal. State Univ., 132 Cal.App.4th 369, 400 (2005); Rogel v. Lynwood Redevelopment Agency, 194 Cal.App.4th 1319, 1331-1332 (2011).)
Posted at 09:14 AM in Cases: Private Attorney General (CCP 1021.5) | Permalink | Comments (0)
Minors: Trial Court Had Discretion To Reallocate Minor’s Fees To Be Paid By Superior Court, Rather Than Mother
Equitable Estoppel Supported Affirming What Happened in Unique Facts Involving a False Claims Act Wrinkle.
Family Code section 3153 directs that counsel’s fees for a minor are to be paid either by the parties or by the county when it comes to compensating counsel appointed to represent a minor child. (In re Marriage of Lisi, 39 Cal.App.4th 1573, 1576 (1995).) So, does the trial court have discretion to reallocate fees during the course of the family law proceeding even if it impairs the father’s claim in a separate qui tam proceeding?
You betcha, said the Fifth District in a decision involving convoluted facts, Smith v. Karabinus, Case No, F068796 (5th Dist. Oct. 9, 2014) (unpublished).
A lower court initially specified that mother, not the superior court, should pay fees for appointed minor’s counsel. However, the appointed attorney billed the superior court, which paid rather than mother. Father, learning of the error, filed a False Claims Act case against counsel on behalf of California. Counsel filed a motion to correct the fee order to make it payable by superior court, a request that was granted after father intervened in the family law proceedings because such an order might undermine an element of his False Claims Act lawsuit.
The fee modification order was affirmed based on the Family Code statutory scheme that had no provision constituting a ban on reconsideration or modification of prior orders based on changed circumstances. Beyond that, equitable estoppel was at play, because a court clerk had led counsel to believe that the fees order would be revised to show payment would come from the superior court.
Posted at 03:38 PM in Cases: Minors | Permalink | Comments (0)
It Did Satisfy Labor Code Section 218.5 Entitlement Statute, Notwithstanding Lower Court Believing It Was A Breach Of Contract Matter.
In Brunoehler v. Amstem Corp., Case No. B252545 (2d Dist., Div. 5 Oct. 10, 2014) (unpublished), a plaintiff obtained a hefty $537,657.49 judgment against former employer for unpaid salary and other benefits. However, the lower court denied his request for attorney’s fees under Labor Code section 218.5 because it felt this was not a wage/hour case but only a breach of contract matter.
The fee refusal was reversed on appeal. Plaintiff’s claims for unpaid salary and waiting time penalties certainly fell within the section 218.5 entitlement for fees when it came to wage/hour type matters. His general prayer for fees and costs was also sufficient to meet 218.5 requirements. Reversed, with fees to be awarded on remand.
Posted at 10:00 AM in Cases: Employment | Permalink | Comments (0)
Formal Opinion 468 Is The Opinion In This Area.
On October 8, 2014, the American Bar Association issued Formal Opinion 468, entitled “Facilitating the Sale of a Law Practice.” Among other things, it states that firms cannot bill for transitioning work in a sale of the law practice. Although this cannot be done post facto, there is language in the Formal Opinion which should guide lawyers on how to “recapture” such efforts: “The compensation, if any, to the selling lawyer or law firm for time spent on transitioning matters should be a matter of negotiation between the seller and the buyer in determining the consideration for the sale.”
Here is a link to ABA Formal Opinion 468.
$102,900 CCP § 1021.5 Award Affirmed in Favor of Police Union Association.
On September 17, 2014, we posted on Indio Police Command Unit Assn. v. City of Indio, Case No. G050051, a Fourth District, Division 3 decision affirming a $102,900 CCP § 1021.5 award in favor of a police union association. This opinion discussed, among other things, the public interest and financial burden elements of section 1021.5 in union representative context. We can now report that the decision was certified for publication on October 9, 2014.
Posted at 09:43 AM in Cases: Private Attorney General (CCP 1021.5) | Permalink | Comments (0)
1.25 Multiplier Allowed, Lack of Specific Challenges Did Not Lead to Major Reductions, and Prior SLAPP Awards Were Not Dispositive.
If you have followed our blog, you known there is a mandatory fee-shifting statute in favor of SLAPP defendant winners. In Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez, Case Nos. B243205/B246602 (2d Dist., Div. 5 Oct. 9, 2014) (published), two SLAPP defendant winners won over $162,000 in fees against plaintiff (which included a 1.25 multiplier).
Plaintiff’s appeal did not get any further reduction, with defendants getting further fees on remand for prevailing on appeal.
Plaintiff complained about “block billing,” but the billing submissions were sufficient to allow for a reasoned award. Plaintiff then argued that a counsel declaration on time spent, even with after-the-fact estimates, did not suffice, but this is simply contrary to California law allowing for an attorney declaration to be good enough. (City of Colton v. Singletary, 206 Cal.App.4th 751, 785 (2012).) Plaintiff protested loudly about the excessive nature of the fees, but its generalized arguments on “too high” did not suffice because specific challenges were not raised at the trial court stage. (Premier Medical Mgt. Systems, Inc. v. CIGA, 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564 (2008).) Plaintiff next argued that this particular SLAPP award was way off the charts given a comparison to fee awards in other SLAPP cases. However, this argument was rejected because each fee application stands and falls on its own unique set of facts. The multiplier was just fine based on a contingent factor, with excessive underlying fees not among the factors to be considered in determining if a positive enhancement was in order.
Posted at 09:40 AM in Cases: Multipliers, Cases: SLAPP, Cases: Substantiation of Reasonableness of Fees | Permalink | Comments (0)
Posted at 10:37 AM in Cases: Nonsignatories | Permalink | Comments (0)
Posted at 09:49 AM in Cases: Prevailing Party | Permalink | Comments (0)
However, Spending On Outside Counsel Went Down 2% Worldwide.
HBR Consulting, a legal business operations and technology consultancy, recently has issued its 2014 Corporate Law Department survey of 292 in-house legal departments (many of which are Fortune 500 companies).
The results show that, for 2012-2013 on a worldwide basis, legal spending was up 2% with respect to in-house legal departments, accounted for by a 5% increase in in-house salaries and operating expenses. However, spending for outside counsel under the same parameters went down by 2%. The median total legal spending by companies responding was $29.7 million (worldwide) and $26 million (U.S.).
Videotape Deposition Copies, E-Discovery Expenses, and Interpreter Expenses Discussed.
U.S. District Judge Lucy Koh, in Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., Case No. 11-CV-01846-LHK (N.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2014, Doc. 3193), ruled on Apple’s request for an award of “routine” costs—although the request was substantial—in the patent infringement litigation against Samsung involving smartphones and tablets. Eventually, Apple prevailed by obtaining a close to $1 billion jury verdict, which was largely sustained by the district judge and has been appealed. After refusing to defer a costs ruling pending appeal and rejecting the argument that Apple did not prevail, District Judge Koh did provide insightful rulings on costs requests by Apple, eventually reducing an amended costs request of $5.887 million down to $1.87 million (hardly “chump” change) for costs items under 28 U.S.C. § 1920(2), (4), (6):
1. Videotaped Deposition and Transcript Costs: N.D. Cal. judges have struggled over whether a successful litigant gets both a videotape depo/one stenographic transcript cost or only one of them. The issue here was Apple’s claim for an expedited additional deposition transcript cost. District Judge Koh decided that the costs of a videotape depo plus one transcript was okay, but nixed cost recovery for an additional expedited transcript.
2. Hearing Transcripts: She granted recovery of one hearing transcript on claims construction and summary judgment motion hearings, but denied recovery on more mundane appearances.
3. Trial Transcripts: She found recovery absolutely proper, even for trial daily transcripts.
4. Copy Costs for “Blowbacks”: District Judge Koh found these were proper as long as Apple could relate the costs to actual discovery against Samsung, denying mere convenience costs for Apple’s counsel.
5. Demonstrative Devices Used At Trial: If used at trial, just fine, but not just to aid counsel in trial preparation.
6. Trial Graphics and Demonstrative Aids: Okay, as long as invoices demonstrated they were truly “trial graphics.”
7. E-Discovery: These were fine as long as they narrowly related to costs to produce documents to the other side, with many internal firm processing expenses not allowed.
8. Shared Interpreters: Apple and Samsung agreed to split shared interpreter expenses, and District Judge Koh did not allow recovery because Apple did not show that the shared agreement was not a settlement on the issue rather than a reserved cost. She did not allow Apple’s costs for a “check” interpreter to make sure that the designated interpreter was getting it right. Costs for deposition interpreters were found to be proper.
Click here to see copy of Judge Koh’s order.
Posted at 03:35 PM in Cases: Costs, News | Permalink | Comments (0)
SLAPP: Independent Contractor Attorney Not Entitled To Recoup SLAPP Fees Where Pleading Captions And Emails Showed He Was A Member Of Recovering SLAPP Defendant Law Firm
Tax Characterization as Independent Contractor Was Not Dispositive Under Trope Prohibition.
Well, given that this is in our Mission Statement on this blog, we love the beginning of the next case: “This case illustrates that “[a]ll too often attorney fees become the tail that wags the dog in litigation.” (Deane Gardenhome Assn. v. Denktas (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1399.)” Amen, but us co-contributors do litigate fee issues, so we have known that for some time and this reality inspired our blog several years ago.
Ellis Law Group, LLP v. Nevada City Sugar Loaf Properties, LLC, Case No. C072820 (3d Dist. Oct. 3, 2014) (published) involved a trial court order awarding a defendant law firm $14,553.50 for successfully “SLAPPing” a plaintiff suit. The fees were awarded to an attorney claiming to be an “independent contractor” of the firm, a ground credited by the trial court in granting the award and rejecting the Trope prohibition argument made by the SLAPP losing plaintiff.
This one got reversed on appeal.
The problem was that the pleading captions and emails belied that the attorney was simply an independent contractor; rather, he was represented as a member of the winning SLAPP defendant law firm. The appellate court found that the “independent contractor” designation was not dispositive, especially given that tax characterizations are not binding in many, many litigation contexts.
Posted at 11:25 AM in Cases: SLAPP | Permalink | Comments (0)
Arbitration: Policy Against Certain Fee Splitting Arrangements Does Not Justify Judicial Review Of Arbitration Award Enforcing Oral Fee Splitting Arrangement
Arbitrator Did Not Exceed His Powers By Enforcing Oral Fee Splitting Arrangement
Attorneys Cohen and Sheinkopf had an oral agreement to split client fees: 75% to Cohen, 25% to Sheinkopf. After the two attorneys went their separate ways, they arbitrated a fee dispute in which the arbitrator enforced their oral fee splitting agreement, resulting in an award that the trial court confirmed as a judgment. Sheinkopf appealed, arguing that because the arbitrator’s enforcement of an oral fee splitting arrangement violated Rule of Professional Conduct 2-200, and was contrary to public policy, the arbitrator had exceeded his powers. Cohen v. Sheinkopf, Case No. B252301 (2/3 Oct. 2, 2014) (Edmon, Kitching, Aldrich) (unpublished).
Some courts have indeed stated an arbitrator exceeds his or her powers by issuing an award violating “an explicit legislative expression of public policy.” But apparently not all public policies are equal. Here, the Court of Appeal viewed the dispute among attorneys as more of a private matter, with the public policy served by the prohibition against fee splitting not justifying judicial review of the arbitration award.
Sheinkopf’s argument that the trial court erred by concluding she waived the right to litigate a statute of limitations issue also made no headway, because she submitted the limitations issue to the arbitrator without objection.
However, Sheinkopf was successful in getting a modification of the judgment, because the trial court’s judgment simply failed to include an amount for $6,312 that the arbitrator had awarded to her – and she also received prejudgment interest on that omitted amount.
This post also appears today on California Mediation and Arbitration.
Posted at 04:08 PM in Cases: Arbitration | Permalink | Comments (0)
Posted at 03:07 PM in Cases: Bankruptcy Efforts, Cases: Cases Under Review | Permalink | Comments (0)
Private Attorney General: Class Representative Who Did Not Catalyze DUI Blood Draw Refunds Before Suit Filed Not Entitled To CCP § 1021.5 Fee Recovery
County Actually Voluntarily Made Refunds; Class Rep’s Getting Refunds To 11 “Overlooked” Persons Did Not Constitute Substantial Class Of Persons.
Puck. 1907. Library of Congress.
Kuklenski v. County of Ventura, Case No. B251956 (2d Dist., Div. 6 Oct. 1, 2014) (unpublished) involved a situation where a certain person who never sued brought a claim resulting in the County of Ventura offering refunds to persons who apparently were impermissibly charged for DUI blood draws, with the refunds also encompassing interest and removal of negative credit derogs for not paying the charges. Later, a class representative (a different individual) did sue, but the County gave him a refund (with interest) and then refunded 11 “overlooked” individuals brought to County’s attention through the class representative’s efforts. Eventually, the suit was dismissed, bringing an appeal on the merits and a challenge to the lower court’s refusal to award class representative fees under CCP § 1021.5.
The merits and fee determinations were affirmed on appeal.
With respect to the fees, the class representative was not the catalyst for the County’s refund decision—that was brought about by the actions of the initial individual who never brought suit. (The County gave the refunds despite denying a formal tort claim, with class representative not bringing a tort claim—something he should have done.) Although the class representative did provide a benefit for the 11 “overlooked” individuals, the trial and appellate courts determined this was not a substantial enough class of individuals to justify private attorney general fees.
Posted at 04:07 PM in Cases: Private Attorney General (CCP 1021.5) | Permalink | Comments (0)
Class Action: Reviewing Court Sustains Class Action Settlement Against LegalZoom
Settlement Valued at $6.8 Million; $2.2 Million in Fees Approved.
In Webster v. LegalZoom.com, Inc., Case No. B240129 (2d Dist., Div. 1 Oct. 1, 2014) (unpublished), the Second District sustained a lower court approval of a class action settlement against LegalZoom where the settlement value was pegged at $6.8 million. Class counsel did a smart thing: they requested legal fees of $2.2 million, even though the lodestar plus costs was around $3.4 million. This voluntary reduction lead to a lower court approval of the $2.2 million fee request, with the appellate court rebuffing challenges by certain objectors and sustaining the settlement (including the fee award).
BLOG UNDERVIEW—The author of this 3-0 opinion was L.A. Superior Court Judge Wiley, who co-contributors Marc and Mike have appeared before. He was sitting in Complex and is on temporary assignment in the 2/1 DCA.
Posted at 02:20 PM in Cases: Class Actions | Permalink | Comments (0)