Source: http://pa.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20100707_0000875.MPA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2017-09-25 20:47:33
Document Index: 287796399

Matched Legal Cases: ['§1519', '§1519', '§371', '§1519', '§1503', '§1519', '§1519', '§1512', '§1519', '§1519', '§1519', '§1519', '§1519']

JASON HAYES, DEFENDANT.
Presently before the Court are various motions by Defendant Jason Hayes, including a motion to dismiss for failure to allege the essential elements of 18 U.S.C. §1519 (Doc. 67), a motion to dismiss because §1519 is unconstitutionally vague (Doc. 69), a motion for a bill of particulars (Doc. 61), a motion to compel disclosure of misconduct evidence (Doc. 57), a motion for disclosure pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 807 (Doc. 59), a motion for Brady material (Doc. 63), a motion for discovery and inspection (Doc. 65), a motion for early disclosure of Jencks material (Doc. 71), a motion to preserve and produce notes, reports and evidence (Doc. 93), a motion to preserve and produce tapes of law enforcement interviews (Doc. 104), a motion for notice pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b) (Doc. 98), a motion for leave to file additional pretrial motions (Doc. 102), and a motion for individual voir dire and additional peremptory challenges (Doc. 106.)*fn1 For the reasons discussed below, Defendant's motions will be granted in part and denied in part.
On December 10, 2009, the Grand Jury charged Defendant Hayes with one count of conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. §371 and one count of falsification of records under 18 U.S.C. §1519. The Indictment ("Indict.") alleges the following:
Other provisions, such as [§1503], have been narrowly interpreted by courts, including the Supreme Court in [Aguilar] to apply only to situations where the obstruction [is] closely tied to a pending judicial proceeding... the current laws regarding destruction of evidence are full of ambiguities and technical limitations that should be corrected. This provision is meant to accomplish those ends. Section 1519 is meant to apply broadly to any acts to destroy or fabricate physical evidence so long as they are done with intent to obstruct, impede or influence the investigation or proper administration of any matter, and such matter is within the jurisdiction of an agency of the United States, or such acts done either in relation to or in contemplation of such a matter or investigation... It also extends to acts done in contemplation of such federal matters, so that the timing of the act in relation to the beginning of the matter or investigation is also not a bar to prosecution. The intent of the provision is simple; people should not be destroying, altering, or falsifying documents to obstruct any government function. S. Rep. No. 146, 107th Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15 (2002) (emphasis added). The Government's argument is defeated by this very Senate Report. As the report makes clear, the defendant must have intended to affect the future investigation or contemplate that such a future investigation or proceeding may occur. Id. While the Senate did intend §1519 to be expansive and broaden the scope of previous obstruction statutes, the nexus requirement does not frustrate this purpose. Like §1519, §1512(b)(2), interpreted through Arthur Anderson, was intended to apply to federal proceedings that had not yet occurred or were not yet pending. 544 U.S. at 707-08. Despite this broad intent, the Court still required the nexus and the foreseeability of the proceeding. Id. at 708. Likewise, Congress' own words in §1519 "or in... contemplation of" indicate that this nexus requirement exists in §1519.
Furthermore, as several courts have pointed out, §1519 contains a scienter requirement which mitigates any vagueness that remains in the statute. Fumo, 628 F.Supp.2d at 598; Russell, 639 F.Supp.2d at 240 (noting that §1519's use of the mens rea "knowingly" creates a necessary consciousness of wrongdoing that "eliminates any statutory vagueness concerns). §1519 was sufficient to put these officers on notice ...