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Timestamp: 2017-05-24 23:53:08
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| TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION LOCAL 234 v. TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION
TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION LOCAL 234 v. TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION
THE EXECUTIVE BOARD OF TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION OF PHILADELPHIA, LOCAL 234; THOMAS CASEY; JOSEPH COCCIO; BRIAN POLLITT; KARL TURNER; ROBERT O'CONNOR; ABE TISDALE; WILLIE BECKTON; CHARLES CLANCY; ROBERT D'ALFONSO; MEMBERS OF TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION OF PHILADELPHIA, LOCAL 234, PLAINTIFFSV.TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO; NELLIE (JEAN) ALEXANDER, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS PRESIDENT OF TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION, LOCAL 234, DEFENDANTS.
"The very essence of democratic government consists in the absolute
sovereignty of the majority. . . ."*fn1 When Alexis de Tocqueville wrote
these words in the middle of the nineteenth century, there were, of
course, no labor unions. De Tocqueville was relating his perceptive
observations of American society in general, and the methodology by which
Americans selected their government in particular. But the thoughts which
he expressed convey an important principle for the issue at stake in this
case, that the winner of a democratically held election controls the body
politic; indeed, the elected majority makes the decisions, subject only to
the constraints of an overriding constitution. This is the foundation
under which our Congress operates, under which our state legislatures
operate, and for the reasons stated in this opinion, under which this
Court finds that Transport Workers Union ("TWU") Local 234 ("Local 234")
must operate: to adhere to "the absolute sovereignty of the majority."
Internal disputes of Local 234 are not a stranger to this Court. The
most recent decision, Transport Workers Union of Philadelphia, Local 234
v. Transport Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, 131 F. Supp.2d 659, 661
(E.D.Pa. 2001) (Bechtle, J.)), imposed a trusteeship on this local after
TWU levied charges against Local 234 Executive Board members for
financial malpractice, subversion of union democracy, and discord among
the Board members. Id. at 661. One of Judge Bechtle's reasons for doing
so was that "a preliminary injunction enforcing the trusteeship is
necessary to restore democratic procedures." Id. at 667. The trusteeship
remained in effect from early 2001 until the election of new officers
took place in July 2002. Executive Board of Local 234 v. Transport
Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, C.A. No. 02-6633, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15471, at *4 (E.D.Pa. Aug. 9, 2002).
On July 19, 2002, an election was held for Local 234 officers and its
Board ("Board"). (Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 9).*fn2 As a result of
the election, fourteen Local 234 members were elected to positions on the
Board. Id. ¶ 10. These fourteen members ran on two opposing
electoral slates, including nine members, the individual Plaintiffs, who
ran as part of the "Jeffrey Brooks Unity Team," and five members who ran
on the "Alexander slate," named after Local President and Defendant, Jean
(Nellie) Alexander ("Alexander"). Id. ¶ 11. The election resulted in
a "split Board" for the first time in Local 234's history. Id.
Previously, competing electoral slates had always won all seats on the
Board. Id.
On July 25, 2002, the Board convened its first meeting with all members
present, and Alexander presiding. Id. ¶ 23. After discussion and
debate, the Board passed the following three motions: (1) to hire a
professional accountant to inspect and audit the books and records of the
Local's finances; (2) to retain a law firm as legal counsel to the
Local; and (3) to hire five union members as full time staff in
accordance with the Local's collective bargaining agreement with SEPTA.
Id.; Pl.'s Ex. 3. The Board also voted temporarily to refrain from hiring
any business agents pending the completion of a review of the Local's
finances. (Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 23). All of these motions passed by a vote
of nine to five, with Alexander and her fellow slate members voting
against all the motions. Id. ¶ 24.
That same day, Alexander sent a letter to TWU President Sonny Hall
requesting a presidential interpretation of the scope of her powers as
the Local 234 President under the TWU Constitution. Id. ¶ 25; Pl.'s
Ex. 4. She claimed that she had "the power, to the exclusion of the
Executive Board, to designate the Local's attorneys, accountants and
appointed Business Agents" based on "the implied powers given to the
President" by Article XVI § 1 of the TWU Constitution, (Pl.'s Compl.
¶ 25; Pl.'s Ex. 4), which provides:
The President shall preside at all meetings of
the Local Union, the Local Executive Board and
Joint Executive Committee. He/she shall sign all
orders of the Financial Secretary-Treasurer
authorized by the Local Executive Board and shall
countersign all checks issued by the Financial
Secretary-Treasurer against the accounts of the
Local Union on authorization of the Local Executive
Board. He/she shall enforce the provisions of this
Constitution. He/she shall appoint all committees
not otherwise provided for. He/she shall perform
such other duties as the Local Union, or the Local
Executive Board may assign to him/her; and except
as to powers and duties specifically conferred on
him/her by the Constitution, he/she shall adhere
to all decisions and directions of, and be subject
to, the Local Executive Board. He/she shall be, ex
officio, a delegate to Convention of the International
Union and of all organizations to which the Local
is affiliated. He/she shall be responsible for the
proper conduct of the affairs of the Local union,
and the compliance by his/her fellow officers with
their obligations under the International Constitution
and the Local by-laws. He/she shall be chairman of
the Local's Committee on Political Education.
(Pl.'s Ex. 1).
Alexander also published a letter in an edition of TWU Local 234 and
Move, the Local's official publication, in which she attacked
the Board for the motions it passed on July 25 and threatened to file
disciplinary charges against the Board members who voted for the
motions. (Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 27; Pl.'s Ex. 13).
On the very next day, July 26, 2002, President Hall rendered an
interpretation of the TWU Constitution which upheld the local president's
responsibility "for the proper conduct of the affairs of the Local
Union." (Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 31; Pl.'s Ex. 5). He wrote that that
responsibility was "inextricably bound up" with a local president's
exclusive power to hire and fire staff members:
Article XVI, Section 1., places on the Local
President the responsibility "for the proper
conduct of the affairs of the Local Union." It
is inconceivable to me that a Local President
could even begin to carry out this responsibility
without the power to select staff and professionals
whom the President felt he/she could trust to provide
the necessary assistance in a reliable manner. The
responsibility for "the proper conduct of the affairs
of the Local Union" is thus inextricably bound up
with the power to hire and fire staff professionals.
The Executive Board of the Local cannot usurp the
power in question without invading a responsibility
specifically assigned by the Constitution to the
Local President. Any attempt by an Executive Board,
on its own and contrary to the wishes to the President,
to exercise the power to hire and fire thus violates
the T.W.U. Constitution.
(Pl.'s Ex. 5).
Following the filing of the Complaint in this action, Plaintiffs
appealed President Hall's interpretation to the International Executive
Council ("IEC"), as permitted by the TWU Constitution, Article V §
1. (Pl.'s Ex. 1). On October 30, 2002, the IEC issued a decision
affirming President Hall's interpretation, but clarified that the Board
could review decisions made by the Local President and may disapprove
certain decisions based on an undefined "reasonableness standard." (Pl.'s
Ex. 6). This letter reflects Defendants' position against the Plaintiffs'
Motion for Preliminary Injunction and states in pertinent part as
Your appeal from the interpretation of the
T.W.U. Constitution by President Hall (dated
July 26, 2002) was placed before the International
Executive Council on October 22, 2002. Prior
to consideration of the matter by the entire
Council, President Hall told the Council that
his interpretation should not be taken to stand
for more than what it explicitly stated, namely,
that the decisions to hire and fire staff, and
to retain outside professional help, must
originate with the President, and that the
Executive Board had no right to usurp this
Presidential authority by initiating decisions
on who to hire and who to retain without reference
to the decisions made by the President. He said
that this interpretation should not be taken to
mean that the Executive Board had no role whatever
in reviewing these kinds of decisions by the
President, or that in appropriate cases the
Executive Board could not be justified in voting
to disapprove, for instance, a particular
arrangement reached between the President and
an outside lawyer or accountant, provided its
justification for the rejection was reasonable.
The letter continues, that a motion to affirm the constitutional
interpretation made by President Hill in his letter of July 26 was
The Complaint in this case, filed on August 6, 2002, was accompanied by
for Preliminary Injunction. At a scheduling conference with
counsel, all parties agreed that an internal union appeal was still
pending, and the Court was requested to withhold scheduling a hearing
until the internal union appeal mechanism had been exhausted. As noted
above, that appeal was decided on October 30, 2002, and shortly
thereafter, the Plaintiffs filed a renewed Motion and supplemental
memorandum which was answered by the Defendants.
An evidentiary hearing was held on December 11, 2002. At the hearing,
the Plaintiffs presented testimony from Thomas R. Casey, the duly elected
Recording Secretary of Local 234, and a number of documents. The
Defendants introduced exhibits but did not present any testimony.
Plaintiffs have agreed that their Motion will be limited to Count I of
the Complaint, which alleges that President Hall's interpretation of
Article XVI § 1 of the TWU Constitution, giving the Local President
the power to hire and fire legal counsel, professional consultants, and
other staff without approval from the Board, violates the TWU
Constitution and Local 234 By-laws.*fn3 Plaintiffs assert that President
Hall's interpretation directly contradicts provisions of the TWU
Constitution establishing Executive Board supremacy in the administration
of daily affairs of Local 234, is patently unreasonable, not entitled to
judicial deference, and that TWU has violated section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185 et seq. (Pl.'s
Compl. ¶¶ 47-48).
Plaintiffs request that TWU be enjoined from giving force or effect to
President Hall's July 26, 2002 constitutional interpretation of
presidential powers and otherwise interfering with the internal affairs of
Local 234; that TWU and Alexander give full force and effect to the
motions passed at the Executive Board's July 25, 2002 meeting; and that
Alexander be enjoined from filing disciplinary charges against
Plaintiffs. (Pl.'s Mot. for Preliminary Injunctive Relief).
As noted above, Recording Secretary Casey testified at the Preliminary
Injunction hearing. The Court found him credible in all respects. Mr.
Casey detailed the debilitating effect that the bickering between the
local factions has had on union affairs. The Local President, Defendant
Alexander, has generally refused to honor the Executive Board's request
for meetings, and there is a general shutdown of most union business.
Although the parties did agree to what was referred to as a "cease-fire"
reflected in a letter dated August 15, 2002, (Pl.'s Ex. 25), the internal
operations of the union have been stymied by the dispute, with the Local
President having the general backing of the international union's
internal power to interpret the constitution, which it has done so as to
deny the Local Executive Board any control over the operation of the
In ruling on a motion for a preliminary injunction, the Court must
consider the following four factors: (1) the likelihood that the moving
party will prevail on the merits; (2) the extent to which the moving party
is irreparably harmed; (3) the extent to which the non-moving party will
suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is issued; and (4) the public
interest. AT&T Co. v. Winback and Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421,
1427 (3d Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1103, 115 S.Ct. 1838, 131
L.Ed.2d 757 (1995)). Issuing a preliminary injunction is an
"`extraordinary remedy' and should be restricted to `limited
circumstances.'" Moscony v. Quaker Farms, LP, C.A. No. 00-2285, 2000 WL
1801853, at *1 (E.D.Pa. Dec. 8, 2000)) (quoting Instant Air Freight Co.
v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 800 (3d Cir. 1989)). A district
court should endeavor to balance these four factors to determine whether
an injunction should issue. See BP Chemical Ltd. v. Formosa Chemical
& Fibre Corp., 229 F.3d 254, 263 (3d Cir. 2000). All four factors
must weigh in favor of granting the preliminary injunction. See Pappan
Enter., Inc. v. Hardee's Food Sys., Inc., 143 F.3d 800, 803 (3d Cir.
1998). The moving party clearly bears the burden to prove that all
elements required for a preliminary injunction are met. See Adams v.
Freedom Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475, 486 (3d Cir. 2000).
The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, as this is
a dispute involving a labor organization according to
29 U.S.C. § 185(c). Venue is appropriate under 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)
and 29 U.S.C. § 412 because duly authorized officers or agents of the
subject labor organization are engaged in representing or acting for
employee members within this District, and the alleged violation is
occurring in this District.
III. Summary of Issues
Plaintiffs argue that President Hall's interpretation of the TWU
Constitution is "patently unreasonable" and not worthy of the deference
courts normally afford an official interpretation of a union
constitution. (Pl.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. 6-7). They assert that his
enumeration of presidential powers as "inextricably bound up" with a
general grant of responsibility directly contradicts the language of
Article XVI § 1, which, in describing the duties of the Local
President, provides that "except as to powers and duties specifically
conferred on him/her by the Constitution, he/she shall adhere to all
decisions and directions of, and be subject to, the Local Executive
Board." Id. at 7. Plaintiffs assert that the Local President is
subordinate to and must follow the directions and instructions of the
Board. Id. To support this, they cite Article XII § 2 of the TWU
Constitution, which provides that between meetings of the local union
membership, "the Local Executive Board shall have the authority to
administer the affairs of the Local Union." Id. They also quote from
Local 234's By-laws that "all decisions and rules shall be made by the
Executive Board." Id. However, this provision comes under Article IV,
which only refers to the "Relationship Between the Executive Board and
the Joint Executive Committee." (Pl.'s Ex. 2).
Plaintiffs assert that neither the TWU Constitution nor Local 234's
By-laws "specifically confer" upon the Local President the power to
retain legal counsel, hire and fire professional consultants, or hire and
fire business agents, but that President Hall's interpretation gives the
Local President this exclusive authority, an unreasonable departure from
the explicit language of the TWU Constitution limiting the Local
President's powers to those specifically conferred on him or her, and
giving all other power to the Board (Pl.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. Id. at 9).
They argue that President Hall used the "responsible for" language in
Article XVI § 1 as a source of implied presidential power, but this
language is specifically omitted from Local 234's By-laws, which are the
same as Article XVI § 1 except for this omission. Id. at 9-13; Pl.'s
Ex. 1, 2.
Plaintiffs refer to a decision of the TWU International Committee on
("ICA"), upholding a decision by the Executive Board of a Dallas,
Texas local union removing the local president from office for subverting
the Executive Board. (Pl.s' Mem. Supp. Mot. 14). They claim this decision
is directly at odds with President Hall's interpretation. Id.; Pl.'s Ex.
Defendants principally rely on the well-established judicial reticence
to enter into labor union internal disputes. They also rely on the
language of Article XVI § 1, which states that the "Local President
shall be responsible for the proper conduct of the affairs of the Local
Union." (Def.'s Mem. Opp. Mot. 6). They point out that there is no
constitutional provision expressly giving either the Local President or
the Board the power to retain counsel, hire accountants, or employ
staff. Id. However, they acknowledge, except as to powers specifically
conferred on the President by the TWU Constitution, the Local President
must adhere to the decisions and directions of the Board. Id.
Defendants contend that Local 234 Presidents historically have
exercised the power to originate employment decisions. Id. at 7-8. They
assert that the silence of past Boards in response to past Presidents
appointing or firing business agents indicates a tacit acknowledgment that
"the power to initiate staffing decisions resides with the Local
President." Id. at 8. They further claim that Plaintiffs have offered no
evidence that past Boards have ever exercised the unreviewable ...