Source: http://www.rishabhdara.com/sc/view.php?case=4131
Timestamp: 2020-07-12 22:19:43
Document Index: 642466671

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art. 19', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 166', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 226', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 226', 'Art. 226', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 132', 'Art. 19', 'Art.\n19', 'Art. 166', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 1', 'Art. 19']

STATE OF BIHAR versus K. K. MISRA & ORS
1971 AIR 1667	1970 SCR (3) 181
STATE OF BIHAR V. K. K. MISRA & ORS [1969] RD-SC 315 (29 October 1969)
29/10/1969 SHAH, J.C.
CITATION: 1971 AIR 1667	1970 SCR (3) 181
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act 5 of 1898), ss.	144 (6) Validity-Whether violates sub-cls. (b), (c) and (d) of cl. (1) of Art. 19 of the Constitution of India 1950.
Sub-section (6) of s. 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that no order under s, 144 shall remain in force for more than two months from the making thereof, unless, in cases of danger to human life, health or safety, or a likelihood of a riot or an affray, the State Government, by notification in the Official Gazette otherwise directs.	The City Magistrate of Jamshedpur passed orders under s. 144(1) against	the respondents which were later extended by	the State Government of Bihar in exercise of its powers under s.
144(6).	-In a writ petition filed by the respondents	the High Court of Patna struck down the second part of sub-s.(6) of s. 144 as being violative of sub-cls. (b), (c) and (d) of cl. (1)	of Art. 19	of the	Constitution.	The State appealed and contended that the only operative orders	were those made by	the Magistrate and the Government merely extended those	orders. Further, since the order of	the Government got merged in the orders of the Magistrate,	the extended order was open to review under sub-s. (4) of s. 144 and the same was also revisable under s. 435 read with s.
439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
HELD : Per Shelat, Vaidialingam, Hedge and Ray, JJ.-(i)	The Magistrate's order is no doubt the basic order. But after the process in the first five sub-sections of	s. 144 is completed he becomes functus officio. The decision that the circumstances mentioned in sub-s. (6) of s. 144 Criminal Procedure Code	continue to exist and	the original order should be continued is that of the Government.	It is not a case of the	Government order getting merged in	the Magistrate's order. Rather the Magistrate's order	is adopted by the Government as its own order. [194 A-C] The order of	the Government is made in the name of	the Governor ,and signed by a Secretary to the Government.	It is published in the Official Gazette. It is thus clearly an executive act of the Government coming within Art. 166 of the Constitution. If the direction given under s. 144(6) is intended to merely keep alive a judicial	order,	the legislature would have entrusted that function to a judicial authority as has been done in the case of an order under s.
144(1). [194 E-F] Section	144(4)	says in clearest possible terms that	the Magistrate may rescind or alter any order made	under that section	by himself or any magistrate subordinate to him or by a predecessor in office. It is not possible to bring within the scope of this section the order made by the State Government. for if it was so intended it would have	been mentioned in the section. [194 G] From a plain reading of s. 144(6) it is clear that the power conferred on the Government is an independent executive power, not expected to be exercised judicially.	It is	open to be exercised arbitrarily. The direc- 182 tions given in the exercise of that power need not be of a temporary nature. The ambit of that power is very large and is uncontrolled. [195 B] (ii) The fact	that the Legislature is expected to keep a check on governmental actions does not absolve this Court's responsibility. The	fundamental rights constitute a protective shield to the citizen as against State actions and the Court cannot desert its duty on the assumption	that the other organs of	the State would safeguard	the fundamental right of the citizens. [195 C-D] (iii)	In order to be a reasonable restriction within the meaning of Art. 19 of the constitution the same must not be arbitrary or excessive and the procedure and the manner of its imposition must also be fair and just. Any	restriction which is opposed to the fundamental principles	of liberty and justice cannot be considered reasonable. One of the im- portant	tests	to find out	whether	a restriction	is reasonable is to see whether the aggrieved party has a right of representation against the restriction	imposed	or proposed to be imposed. Further the courts have to	see whether it is in excess of the requirement or imposed in an arbitrary manner.
Although the object of a restriction may be beyond reproach and may -very well attract the protection of sub-Arts.	1 to 6 or Art. 19, if the State fails to	provide sufficient safeguards against its misuse the operative -sections	will be rendered invalid. [196 C-F] Since	section	144(6)	gives	the power to	impose	the restrictions contemplated by it to the executive Government and not to a judicial authority and there is no right of representation,	appeal or revision given to ,the aggrieved party against an order which may not be of	a temporary nature, it must be held that the said impugned provision is violative of Art. 19 (1) (b) (c) and (d) and is not saved by Arts. 19(3) (4) or (5). [196 G] Babulal	Parate	v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. [1961] 3 S.C.R. 423, ,referred to.
State of Madras v. V. G. Rao, [1952] S.C.R. 597; Dr. Khare V. State of Delhi, [1950] S.C.R. 519; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Baldeo Prasad [1961] 1 S.C.R. 970 and Virendra v.
State of Punjab, [1958] S.C.R. 308, applied.
Per Shah, J. (dissenting). Sub-s. (6) of s. 144 does	not authorise the	,State Government to make the order of	the Magistrate permanent.	It ,cannot direct it	to continue after apprehension of	danger or emergency ceases.	The validity of a	statute conferring power is not open to challenge on the plea that the power may possibly be abused by the authority in which it is vested.
The order duration of which is extended by declaration of the State is and continues to remain that of the Magistrate.
The 'source of the authority of the order is	derived	not from the State Government, but from the Magistrate.	It cannot be said that the order of the Magistrate gets merged with that of the Government when its duration is extended.
Although no provision is made in the Code for	a judicial review of the State Government's order under s. 144(6),	the said order does not depend on the subjective satisfaction of the Government	and is capable of being challenged in a petition under	Art. 226 of the Constitution'	Further	the Magistrate who passed the original order may in considera- tion of the materials placed before him under s. 144(4) rescind	or alter the State Government's order. In	the exercise of his judicial functions 183 the Magistrate	is independent of the	Government and	not subordinate to it. The principle applies even in the case of an Executive Magistrate who under the scheme of separation of powers may be responsible to the executive authorities.
The above remedies being available the provision in s.
144(6) cannot be held to be unreasonable on the mere ground that there is no express provision in the Code for redress against the, State Government's order.	Reasonableness of a statutory provision cannot 'be determined by the application of set formulas : it must be determined on a review of	the procedural and substantive provisions of the statute keeping in mind the nature of the right intended to be infringed, underlying purpose of the restriction contemplated to be imposed, gravity of the evil intended to	be remedied thereby, object intended to be achieved by the imposition of restriction, and other relevant circumstances. [185 D, G 188 B-D] Case-law referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 21 of 1966.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated January 22, 1962 of the Patna High Court in Misc.	Judicial Case	No. 757 of 1961.
M. K. Ramamurthi, for the respondents.
B. Sen and S. P. Nayar, for intervener No. 1.
L. M. Singhvi and S. P. Nayar, for intervener No. 2.
The Judgment of J. M. SHELAT,	C. A.	VAIDIALINGAM, K. S.
HEGDE and A. N. RAY, JJ. was delivered by HEGDE, J., SHAH, J. delivered a dissenting Opinion.
Shah, J.-The High Court of Patna has declared	the second part of sub-s. (6) of s. 144 of the Code	of Criminal Procedure ultra vires.	Sub-Section (6) reads "No order under this section shall remain in force for more than two months from the making thereof;	unless, in cases of danger to human life, health or safety, or a likelihood of a riot or an affray, the State Government, by notification in	the	Official Gazette, otherwise directs." In the view of the High Court, an order made by the State Government extending the duration of an order under s.	144 imposes	an unreasonable restriction	on the	fundamental freedom	of the citizens, because the order of the State Government is not subject to judicial scrutiny and the	Code provides no machinery for applying	for an order	of rescission or alteration of -the order.
Section	144 is enacted to provide for making temporary orders	in urgent cases of nuisance or	apprehended danger, where imme- 184 diate prevention or speedy remedy is desirable.	It provides that when a Magistrate competent in that behalf is of	the opinion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding under the section, and immediate prevention or speedy remedy is desirable, the Magistrate may make an order	in writing against any person or the public generally when	frequenting or visiting a particular place, if he considers that	his direction is	likely	to prevent or	tends	to prevent obstruction, annoyance or injury, or risk of	obstruction, annoyance or injury, to any person lawfully employed, or danger to human life, health or safety, or a disturbance of the public tranquility, or a riot, or an affray. The order must state the material facts of the case and it must be served in the manner provided by s. 134 and may direct a person	to abstain from a certain act or to make certain order with certain property in his possession or under	his management. In cases of emergency or in cases where	the circumstances do not	admit of service in due	time of a notice	upon the person against whom the order is directed, it may be passed ex parte. The order remains in force	for not more than two months, unless the State Government, in cases of danger to human life, health or safety, or a likelihood of a riot or an affray otherwise directs.	The order may be rescinded or altered by a Magistrate on his own motion or on the application of any person aggrieved if	the order is passed by himself or by any Magistrate	subordinate to him	or by his predecessor in office. In deciding	the application made to him the	Magistrate must give	an opportunity of appearing before him either in person or by pleader	and showing cause against the order.' and if	the Magistrate rejects the application wholly or in part, he shall record in writing his reasons for so doing.
This Court in Babulal Parate v. State of Maharashtra	and Ors.(1)	held that s. 144 is intended to secure	the public weal by preventing disorders, obstructions and	annoyances.
The powers conferred by it are exercisable by a Magistrate who acts judicially and the restraints permitted by it	are of a temporary nature 'and may be imposed	only in an emergency. The Court further held that the	restrictions which the section authorises are not	beyond	the limits prescribed by	cls. (2) and (3) of Art. 19 of the	Con- stitution, for	the prevention of such activities -as	are contemplated by the section is in public interest	and therefore no,	less in the interest of public	order.	The Court observed that the wide power under the section may be exercised only in an emergency and for	preventing obstruction, annoyance, or injury etc. as specified therein and those factors necessarily condition the exercise of the power and, therefore,	the power is	not unlimited	or untrammelled, and that the section cannot be	struck	down simply on the ground (1) [1961]3 S.C.R. 423.
185 that the Magistrate	might possibly	abuse	his power.
Challenge to the validity of s. 144 in its entirety	was negatived in Babulal Parate's case(1).	The Court however did not consider the validity of the power vested in	the State executive to extend the duration of the order beyond two months, apparently because no argument was advanced at the Bar in that behalf.
Power conferred upon a Magistrate to make an order under S.
144(1)	is subject to the jurisdiction of the	High Court under ss. 435	& 439 of the Code of	Criminal Procedure.
Again an order under sub-s. (4) refusing to rescind or alter any order under the section, may be rectified by the	High Court.	The Magistrate may pass an order in the conditions prescribed in sub-s. (1) and not otherwise. The order	does not remain in force for a period longer than	two months, unless	the State Government, in cases of danger to human life, health or safety, or a likelihood of a	riot or an -affray, directs otherwise. The power to "otherwise direct" involves authority to extend the duration of the Magisterial order for the ,duration of the danger or emergency.	Sub- section (6) however does not authorise the State to make the order of the	Magistrate permanent.	The State must in "otherwise" directing take into consideration, whether it is a case of danger to human life, health or safety, or of a likelihood of	a riot or an affray in respect of which an order has been made by the Magistrate, and whether it is necessary to extend the period beyond two months and then to direct	that the order shall remain in force for a period longer than two months, but not after apprehension of danger or emergency ceases.
It was	submitted that in the	absence on any statutory restriction on	the exercise of the power, the State	may abuse the power and continue it in force either	permanently or for a period longer than the apprehension of danger or emergency justifies. But the validity of	a statute conferring power is not open to challenge on the plea	that the power may possibly be abused by the authority in which it is vested., The order, duration of which is extended by declaration of the State,, is and continues to remain the order of	the Magistrate. The source of the authority of the order is derived	not from the	State	Government, but from	the Magistrate. The direction of the State Government	only extends	its duration.	The Code, it is true,	provides no machinery for	subjecting the direction by the	State	Gov- ernment to a judicial scrutiny.	The direction under sub-s.
(6) does not depend upon the subjective satisfaction of	the Government. On appropriate grounds the direction may be challenged in a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution.
Again sub-s. (4) of s. 144 clearly authorises a Magistrate either on his own motion or on the application of any person aggrieved, to rescind (1) [1961] 3 S.C.R. 423.
6Sup.CI/70-13 186 or alter any order made under the section. The order is passed	by the Magistrate, and, the source of its authority lies in the exercise	of the	judicial function of	the Magistrate even after its duration is extended by the State Government. Therefore under sub-s. (4) notwithstanding that the State Government has made a direction extending	the duration of the order beyond two months, the Magistrate would,	in my	judgment, be	competent, on	a judicial consideration of the materials placed before him, to rescind or alter the order. It was submitted	that a Magistrate exercising power under sub-ss. (1) & (4) of S. 144 of	the Code of Criminal Procedure is an authority subordinate to the State Government, and he cannot rescind or alter an order made by the State Government. That argument proceeds upon a misconception of the true nature of the division of powers under our Constitution.	Since the ultimate liability for maintaining law and order lies upon the	State,	the Legislature has provided that the order, if it is to remain in operation for a period exceeding two months, should	have the imprimatur of the State Government.	But on that account the Magistrate does got become an authority subordinate to the State Government.	The State Government is the head of the executive and exercises no authority over the judicial functions of the Magistrates.	A Magistrate is	independent of the State Government and he is entitled, notwithstanding the declaration made	by the	State	Government, if the circumstances justify, to rescind or alter the order.
Under the scheme of division of the executive and judicial functions, it is true that power to make an order under s.
144 is generally vested in Executive Magistrates who are in some matters responsible to the executive authorities.	But even under the scheme of separation of judicial-	and executive powers the function of the Magistrates exercising power under s. 144 remains judicial. To assume in deciding a constitutional issue, that in the	prevailing administrative set-up, an Executive Magistrate invested with power under s. 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure	may not, on extrajudicial considerations, rescind a direction of the State Government is to overlook the distinction between abuse of power and noninvolvement of power. If in a given case, the order is matte on extra-judicial considerations it is, it is liable to be set aside by recourse to	appropriate remedy.	The power to amend or alter the order after its duration is extended by the State Government cannot in my judgment be denied to the Magistrate merely because he is an Executive Magistrate.
In adjudging the reasonableness of the restrictions imposed by the exercise of power on the fundamental rights of	the citizens, absence of a provision for judicial review and of machinery forobtaining an order recalling or amending	the order made in exercise of that power have to be given	due weight : Virendra v. The 187 State of Punjab and Anr. (1) But as already pointed out	the State Government has to make an order not on any subjective satisfaction.	The order is	liable	to rescission	or alteration under sub-s. (4). Validity of an order made by a Magistrate is open to challenge on -appropriate ground	even after it is extended	by the direction of	the State Government in a proceeding before the High Court, for	the jurisdiction of the High Courts to examine the validity of the order of the Magistrate is not affected by the extension of the	duration of the order by the direction of	the executive. Again under sub-s. (4) of s. 144 a proceeding for withdrawal or modification of the order may be initiated even after the State has by direction extended its duration.
I am unable to hold that the order of the Magistrate	gets merged	into the direction of the State Government when	its duration is extended.	In terms, sub-s. (6) provides	that the order made by a Magistrate shall not remain in force for more than two months from the making thereof, unless in	the classes	of cases specified the State Government otherwise directs. Therefore, even after the period is	extended by the direction of the State Government the order continues to remain the order of the Magistrate. The declaration made by the State Government only removes the temporaly limit on its operation prescribed by sub-s. (6).
In State of Madras v. V. -G.	Row(2), Patanjali Sastri, C.J., observed	that in considering the reasonableness of laws imposing restrictions on fundamental rights, the	test of reasonableness, wherever prescribed, should be applied to each individual statute impugned and no abstract standard or general	pattern of reasonableness can be laid down as applicable to all cases.
Exercise of power under section 144 is intended to ensure the maintenance of law and order, and for that purpose	the section authorises the Magistrate, exercising judicial power of the State, on being satisfied on sufficient grounds,	and where it is necessary that immediate prevention or speedy remedy is desirable, to make an appropriate order. Normally an order made by a Magistrate under sub-s. (1) of S.	144 remains	in force so long as it serves its purpose, but	not longer than two months.	In case the danger or emergency or apprehension thereof is deep rooted, the State Government is competent by direction to extend the duration of the order.
The duty of maintaining law and order ordinarily lies on the executive, but	since the making of an order under S.	144 involves serious infringement of the rights of the citizens, exercise of, the power is conditioned by	a judicial evaluation of	the circumstances which necessitate	it.
Whether the order remains operative for its normal duration, or is extended by direction of the- execu- (1) [1958] S.C.R. 308.
188 tive, the Magisterial	verdict lends	sustenance to	it.
Apprehension that the	executive may abuse the power to extend	the duration will not, in my judgment,	justify	the Court in holding that the extension shifts the source of authority of	the order, or	vitiates the	Magisterial evaluation. I	cannot accept the abstract standard	that every statute in the execution of which fundamental rights of citizens may be infringed will be adjudged unreasonable, if within its	framework the	statute does	not provide machinery for	judicial scrutiny or for rescission of	the action	taken.	Nor can I accept the plea that	-absence of machinery in the Code for approaching the High Court	for redress against the direction of the State, and absence of express	provision for moving the State for rescission or alteration of the	duration constitute a test	of unreasonableness. Reasonableness of a statutory provision cannot be determined by the application of a set formula: it must be determined on a review of	the procedural	and substantive provisions of the statute keeping in mind	the nature	of the right intended to be infringed, underlying purpose	of the restriction contemplated to be imposed, gravity of the evil intended to be remedied thereby, object intended to be achieved by the imposition of	restriction, and other relevant circumstances.
In my view, the appeal must be allowed and the order passed by the High Court set aside.
Hegde, J.-In a proceeding under Art. 226 of the Constitution initiated by the respondents the High Court of Patna struck down the second part of sub-s. (6) of s. 144, Criminal Procedure Code as being violative of sub-cls. (b), (c)	and (d) of cl. (1) of Art. 19 of the Constitution.	The State of Bihar after obtaining a certificate from the	High Court under Art. 132(1) of the Constitution has brought	this appeal.
The respondents are not represented-in this Court.	This Court by its	order dated April 7,	1969 appointed	Mr.
Ramamurthi, a	senior Advocate of this Court as an amicus curiae	to assist the Court at the hearing of	the appeal.
The Union of India has intervened and it was	represented before	us by Mr. B. Sen. As the question involved in	this case directly concerns a legislation by the central legislature, notice to Attorney General was also given	and the Attorney General was represented by Dr. Singhvi.
The only question that arises for decision in this appeal is whether	the second part of sub-s. (6) of s. 144, Criminal Procedure Code namely the words "unless, in cases of danger to human life, health or safety, or a likelihood of a	riot or any affray, the (State Government) by notification in the Official Gazette, otherwise directs" are liable to be struck down as being violative of any of the clauses in Art. 19 (1 ) of the Constitution.
189 The facts leading to the present proceedings are as follows It appears that there was dispute between two	sections of workers in the Tata Workers Union, Jamshedpur. In	that connection Shri K. N. Mishra, City Magistrate, Jamshedpur passed an order against respondent Verma under sub-s. (1) of s. 144, Criminal Procedure Code on May 21,1961.	He followed up that order by another order against respondents, K. K.
Mishra,	Sadhu Singh, P. C. Joshi and M. N. Govende on	June 20, 1961. Thereafter the State Government of Bihar passed an order under sub-s, (6) of s.144, Criminal Procedure	Code and notified the same in the Bihar Official Gazette on	July 18, 1961. It is the validity of this notification that is in issue in this case.	That notification reads "NOTIFICATION The 18th July, 1961.
No. 8255 C Whereas the following orders	have been made under the provision of section	144, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (V of 1898) by Shri	K. N.	Mishra, City	Magistrate, Jamshedpur
1. TO Shri R. L. Verma, Jamshedpur.
Whereas it has been made to appear to me	that the President,	Tata	Workers' Union, Jamshedpur, has informed you regarding	the adoption of the resolution of ratification of no-confidence motion against you in the General Body meeting of T.W. Union on 17th May 1961, and you received the letter on 18th May, 1961 and still you have not refrained	from attending	the Office of Tata Workers' Union, situated.	at K. Road, Jamshedpur, and I am satisfied	that your going to the office of Tata Workers' Union, may lead to a serious breach of the peace, the prevention of which is immediately necessary.
I, K. N. Mishra, City Magistrate,	Jamshedpur, specially	empowered under section	144, Criminal	Procedure Code, therefore, hereby restrain	you from going to the office of	the Tata Workers, Union, situated at K. Road, Bistupur,	Jamshedpur, for a period of 60 (sixty) days, with effect from today. You are also called upon to show cause by 25th	May, 1961,at 6-30 a.m. as to why this order under section 144, Criminal Procedure Code, should not be made absolute against you.
190 Given under my hand and seal of	the Court, this the 21st day of May 1961.
Sd. K. N. Mishra City Magistrate Jamshedpur 21-5-1961.
2. To (1) Shri Kamla Kant Mishra, (2) Shri Sadhu Singh (3)	Shri P. C. Joshi and (4) Shri M. N.
Govende, all of Tata Workers' Union.
Whereas the officer in charge of Bistupur P.S.
has submitted a report that there is serious apprehension of breach of peace in respect of the Tata Workers' Union Office and the	same still continues.
And whereas I am satisfied that a serious apprehension of breach of peace still exists due to rivalry between two rival groups of the Tata Workers' Union and the same	(breach of peace) cannot otherwise be prevented unless these four members of the O.P. are prohibited from entering into the office and compound of the Tata Workers' Union at 'K' Road Bistupur, for _a further period of 30 (thirty) days, I.
K. N. Mishra, City Magistrate,	Jamshedpur, specially	empowered under section	144, Criminal	Procedure Code do hereby prohibit Shri Kamla Kant Mishra, Shri Sadhu Singh, Shri P. C. Joshi and Shri M. N. Govende from entering into the office and compound of	the.
Tata Workers' Union situated at 'K' Road, Bistupur, for a further period of 30 (thirty) days with effect from today, the 20th	June 1961, and also call upon you to show cause why this order under section 144, Criminal Procedure	Code, should not be made absolute against you--Cause, if any be on	29th June, 1961, 'at 6-30 a.m.
Given under my hand and the seal of the Court this 20th day of June, 1961.
Sd. K. N. Mishra, City Magistrate, Jamshedpur, 20-6-1961.
And whereas the above orders expire on	the 19th July, 1961, and whereas the Governor of Bihar is satisfied that the conditions which rendered	these orders necessary	still exist and that there is apprehension that they	may continue	to exist for a longer time and	that it is necessary that these orders should be "tended for 191 a	further period beyond the present date of their expiry in the interest of the safety of the life	of the inhabitants of the town of Jamshedpur and in order to avoid the risk of riotor affray.
Now, therefore,	in exercise of	the powers conferred	by sub-section (6) of	the Section 144 of the said Code, the Governor of Bihar is pleased to direct that the above orders	will continue	to remain in force for a period of four months, with effect from the date	of- publication of this notification in the Bihar Gazette,	unless previously withdrawn by a notification in the said Gazette.
By Order of the Governor,of Bihar, M. Sinha, Deputy Secretary to Government." At this stage we may mention that the validity of the orders made by the City Magistrate, Jamshedpur on May 21, 1961	and June 20, 1961 was not challenged in the present proceedings.
Nor was the validity of any portion of s. 144,	other	than mentioned earlier was assailed.	The validity of parts of s.
144 other than that impugned in the present proceedings	has been upheld by this Court in Babulal Parate v. State of Maharashtra and Ors.
In order to consider the validity of the impugned part of s.
144 Criminal Procedure Code, it is necessary to have before us the entire section.	That section reads thus :
"(1) In	cases where, in the opinion of a District	Magistrate, a	Chief	Presidency Magistrate, Sub-Divisional Magistrate, or of any other Magistrate (not being a magistrate of the third class) specially empowered by the (State Government) or the Chief Presidency Magistrate or the District Magistrate to	act under this section (there is sufficient ground for proceeding	under this section	and) immediate	prevention or	speedy	remedy	is desirable, such Magistrate may, by a written order stating the material facts of the	case and served in the manner provided by section 134, direct any	person to abstain from a certain act or to take	certain order	with certain property in his possession or under his management, if -such Magistrate considers that such direction is likely to prevent, or tends to prevent, obstruction annoyance or injury, or risk of obstruction, annoyance or injury to any person lawfully employed, or danger to human life, health or safety, or a disturbance of the public tranquillity, or a riot, or an affray, (1) [1961] 3 S.C.R. 423.
192 (2) An	order under this section may, in cases of	emergency or in cases where	the circumstances do not admit of the serving in due time of a notice upon the person against whom the	order is directed, be	passed, ex- parte.
(3) An	order under this section may be directed to a particular individual, or to the public generally when frequenting or visiting a particular place.
(4) Any	Magistrate may, (either on his	own motion or on the application of	any person aggrieved) rescind, or alter any	order	made under this section by himself or	any Magistrate subordinate to him, or by his	pre- decessor in office.
(5) Where such an application is received, the Magistrate shall afford to the applicant an early opportunity of appearing before	him either in person or by pleader	and showing case against the order; and it the Magistrate rejects the application wholly or in part, he shall record in writing his reasons for so doing.
(6) No order under this section shall remain in force	for more than two months from	the making thereof, unless, in cases of danger to human life, health or safety, or 'a likelihood of a riot or an affray, the (State Government) by notification	in the	Official Gazette, otherwise directs." It may be noted that orders under sub-ss. (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5) of s. 144	can only be passed by superior Magistrates.
This Court in	Babulal Parate's case(1) sustained	the validity of an order made by a Magistrate under s. 144(1) because of the various safeguards provided in the section.
It may be seen that an order made by a Magistrate under s.
144(1), Criminal Procedure Code is open to be revised on the basis of any representation made by the aggrieved party	and is also revisable by the High Court.	An analysis of	the section shows that an order -under that provision is subject to the following safeguards :
(1) It	has to be made by	a superior Magistrate;
(2) While making the order the Magistrate has to act judicially;
(3) The	order	will be in operation for a short period -an order of a temporary nature;
(4) An	opportunity is given, to	the aggrieved party of showing cause against	that order;
(5) Reasons have to be recorded by	the Magistrate for rejecting an application under s, 144(4) and (1) [1961] 3 S.C.R. 423 193 (6) The	order	of the	Magistrate being a judicial	order,	it can	be challenged	in revision	before the High Court under s.	435 read with s. 439, Criminal Procedure Code.
It was urged by Mr. Ramamurthi that whereas the	legislature had provided adequate safeguards in respect of orders	made by Magistrates, it has failed to provide for any safeguard in respect of orders made by the State Government under	the second	part of sub-s. (6) of s. 144,	Criminal Procedure Code; before making an order under that provision, the State Government is	not required	to make any inquiry;	no opportunity is given to the aggrieved party to	show cause against	the order; the order made by the State Government need not be of a temporary nature and the order of the State Government is	neither	appealable nor revisable. Hence according to him the restriction imposed on the	fundamental rights	guaranteed to the	respondents under	Art.
19(1)(b)(c)'(d)	viz., to assemble peaceably without -arms, to form associations or unions and to	move about freely throughout India, is an unreasonable restriction.
The State has not been consistent in its stand.	Before	the High Court, in its grounds of appeal filed as well as in the initial stage	of the arguments of Mr. Goburdan learned counsel	for the State of Bihar and Dr. Singhvi, the stand taken was that the order made by the State Government is on -administrative	order	and as such is not amenable to	any judicial review. But	after some discussion and after obviously realising the untenability of their	contention, they drastically changed their stand and contended that	the only operative orders are those made by the Magistrate,	the Government merely extended the duration of those orders; the order of the Government got merged in the orders of	the Magistrate; the extended order is open to review under	sub- s. (4) of s. 144, Criminal Procedure Code and the same is revisable under s. 435 read with S. 439, Criminal Procedure Code.
We shall now proceed to consider whether there is any basis for the new line of argument advanced in this	Court.	We have earlier seen the scheme of S. 144, Criminal Procedure Code.	Its first sub-section	empowers the	appropriate Magistrate to	make any order	contemplated therein.	The second	sub-section confers power on the Magistrate to	pass the ex-parte order under certain circumstances. The third sub-section sets out the person against whom the order	made by the 'Magistrate can be directed. The fourth	sub-section provides for the review of the order by the Magistrate	who made the order or his successor in office or by his superior either suo moto or on the representation made by	the aggrieved party. The	fifth	sub-section lays down	the procedure to be adopted by the concerned Magistrate to	deal with the repre- 194 sentation received. The first part of the sixth sub-section fixes the period during which the order made by a Magistrate would be in operation.	Once the process set but above comes to an	end the Magistrate has no	further function.
Thereafter it	is clear he becomes	functus	officio in relation to the order made by him. The power conferred on the Government under	the second part of the	sixth	sub- section	is an	independent power. Before issuing	any direction under that sub-section, the	Government has to examine	afresh whether the danger to human life, health or safety or a likelihood of a riot or an affray continues	and if it	continues how long the original order made by	the Magistrate should 'be kept alive. It is true that the basic order is the Magistrate's order but the decision that	the circumstances mentioned in sub-s. (6) of s. 144, Criminal Procedure Code	continue to exist and	the original order should	be continued for a certain	period	of time or indefinitely is that of the Government.	It is not a case of the Government	order getting merged in the	Magistrate's order.	It is rather the converse. The Magistrate's order is adopted by the Government as its own order. Once	the Government notifies its direction. the	responsibility for the continuance of the original order is that of	the Government. It may be noted that the direction given by	the Government has to be notified in the Official Gazette.	We have earlier seen that the order with which we are concerned in this case was made in the name of the Governor and signed by a Secretary to the Government.	That is the usual procedure adopted in issuing directions under	s. 144(6).
From all these, it is clear that the direction in question is an executive act of the State Government coming within Art. 166 of the ConstitutiON. If the direction given under s. 144(6) is intended to merely keep alive a judicial order, the legislature would have entrusted that function to a judicial authority as has been done in the case of an order under s. 144(1), Criminal Procedure Code. Further it is least likely that the legislature would have prescribed that such a direction should be notified in the Official Gazette.
It we bear in mind our legislative practice, it is difficult to accept the contention that the legislature had conferred upon the Magistrate power to review the directions given by the Government. Section 144(4) says in clearest possible terms that the Magistrate may rescind or alter any order made under that section by himself or any magistrate	sub- ordinate to him or by a predecessor in office.	It is	not possible to bring within the-scope of this section the order made by the State Government.	If the legislature intended to bring within the scope of	this sub-section direction (which really means order) given by the State Government, it would have stated so particularly when it	specifically referred to the order made by the Magistrate's	predecessor in office or that made by a subordinate Magistrate.	The scheme of the section. the language employed therein and our legislative practice militate	against the new line of defence adopted 195 on behalf of the State of Bihar, Union of India and	the Attorney General in this Court.
From a plain reading of S. 144(6), Criminal Procedure Code, it is clear that the power conferred on the State Government is an independent power and it is an executive power. It is not expected to be exercised judicially. It is open to be exercised arbitrarily.	The directions given in the exercise of that power need not be of a temporary nature. The ambit of that power is very large and it is uncontrolled.
Dr. Singhvi at one stage urged that the only check on	the exercise of that power by the Government is the searching scrutiny of	governmental actions expected	from	our legislators. We shall assume as Dr. Singhvi wants us to do that de executive actions of the Government are constantly being watched by the legislators. But that does not absolve this Court's responsibility. To quote the	felicitous expressions of one of the illustrious former Chief Justices of this Court (Sri Patanjali Sastri) in State of Madras v.
Y. G.	Row(1) that as regards the fundamental	rights,	the Constitution has assigned to this Court the	role of a Sentinel on the quivive. Proceeding further	the learned Chief Justice observed in that case that "while this Court naturally attaches great weight to the legislative judgment, it cannot desert its own duty to determine	finally	the constitutionality of an impugned statute".	It will be neither	fair nor just to this Court or to our	Constitution or even to our representatives, if this Court	deserts	its duty on the assumption that the other organs of the State would safeguard the fundamental rights of the citizens. Dr.
Singhvi's contention ignores	the very character of	the fundamental rights, the basic principles underlying them and the safeguards carefully erected by our Constitution against the legislative encroachment of the fundamental rights of citizens. Further it is based on an over simplification of the concept of the rule -of the majority in a parliamentary democracy. It overlooks the fact that these safeguards	are primarily intended to protect the rights of the minority.
Dr. Singhvi's contention also overlooks the fact that	the fundamental rights constitute a protective shield to	the citizens as against State actions. Therefore there is no point in saying that the legislators would see	that those rights are not impugned.
The real question for decision is	whether impugned restriction is	a reasonable	restriction. Unless	that restriction can be considered as a reasonable	restriction, it does not get the protection of Sub-Arts. (3), (4) and (5) of Art. 19, which means that restriction is violative of Art. 19 (1 ) (b) (c) and (d).
(1) [1952] S.C.R, 597.
196 As observed in Dr. Khare v. State	of Delhi(1),	and reiterated in	V. G. Rao's case (2 ) that in	considering reasonableness of laws imposing restrictions on	fundamental rights	both substantive and procedural aspects of the	law should be examined from the point of view of reasonableness and the test of reasonableness wherever prescribed should be applied to each individual statute impugned and no abstract standard or general pattern of reasonableness can be	laid down as applicable to all cases. It is not possible to for- mulate	an effective test which would enable the court to pronounce any	particular restriction to be reasonable or unreasonable per se. All the attendant circumstances	must be taken into consideration and one cannot dissociate	the actual contents of the restrictions from the manner of their imposition or the mode of putting them into practice.	In other words in order to be a reasonable restriction,	the same -must not be arbitrary or excessive and the procedure and the manner of imposition of the restriction must also be fair and just. Any restriction which is opposed to	the fundamental principles	of liberty and	justice cannot be considered reasonable.
One of the important tests to find out whether a restriction is reasonable is to see whether the aggrieved party has a right of representation against the restriction imposed or proposed to be imposed. No person can be deprived of	his liberty without being afforded an opportunity to be heard in defence	and that opportunity must be	adequate, fair	and reasonable. Further the courts have to see	whether	the restriction is in excess of the requirement or whether it is imposed in an arbitrary manner.
Although the object of a restriction may be beyond reproach and may very well attract the protection of Sub-Arts. 1 to 6 of Art. 19, if the statute fails to	provide sufficient safeguards against its misuse the operative sections will be rendered invalid-see The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Baldeo Prasad(3). A	restriction imposed under s. 3(1) of	the Punjab	Special	Powers Act, 1956 was struck down by	this Court in Virendra v. State of Punjab(4) on the ground	that the Act did not provide for any time for the operation of an order made thereunder	nor for a representation by	the aggrieved party.
Now adverting to the restriction impugned in this case,	the power to impose the same is conferred on the executive Government and not to any judicial authority.	There is no provision to make representation by the aggrieved party against the direction given by the Government; no appeal or revision is provided against that direction and the order made need -not be of temporary nature.	Hence we agree	with the High Court that impugned provision is (1) [1950] S.C.R 519.
(3) [1961] 1 S.C.R. 970.
(4) [1958] S.C.R. 308, 197 violative of Art. 1 9 (1) (b) (c) and (d) and is not saved by Art. 19(3), (4) or (5).
ORDER In accordance with the opinion of the majority the appeal is dismissed.