Source: http://www.familylore.co.uk/2012_05_01_archive.html
Timestamp: 2014-10-22 07:57:08
Document Index: 108546592

Matched Legal Cases: ['art 4', 'art 1', 'art 4', 'art 2', 'art 3', 'arts 1', 'EWCA ', 'EWCA ']

Family Lore: May 2012
The Facts: The parties met in 1985. In 1986 Mr Aspden purchased Outlaithe Farm, which comprised a farmhouse, a number of outbuildings, a derelict barn with planning permission for conversion to a dwelling and about 6 acres of land. The parties began cohabiting shortly after this, and there were two children of the relationship, both of whom are now grown up.
The parties separated in late 1995 or early 1996. Ms Elvy left Outlaithe Farm with the two children and went to live nearby. By a Transfer dated 21 January 2006 Mr Aspden transferred Outlaithe Barn (which included almost the whole of the land which had been comprised in Outlaithe Farm save for the farmhouse itself) to Ms Elvy. There was considerable dispute as to the circumstances of the transfer and the parties' intentions at that time (set out in detail at paragraphs 58 to 64), but essentially Mr Aspden maintained that there was a common intention that he should retain an interest in the barn. Ms Elvy denied that there was any such intention.
Following the transfer Mr Aspden remained living at the farmhouse until it was sold in January 2008. Mr Aspden received about £188,000 from the sale, after discharging creditors. Thereafter he lived in a static caravan situated (with Ms Elvy's consent) on part of the land within the curtilege of Outlaithe Barn.
Steps were taken to convert Outlaithe Barn into a dwelling-house. Mr Aspden made a substantial financial contribution to the cost of the conversion works but the extent of the contribution was disputed. Mr Aspden contended that the payments he made were pursuant to a common intention that the parties would marry and cohabit as a family, or a belief on his part that that was the position. Ms Elvy contended that there was never any common intention that they would marry or cohabit, and that the payments were gifts to her in recognition of her contributions to the family, and in respect of her interest in Outlaithe Farm.
Mr Aspden put his case on the basis of a constructive trust and/or proprietary estoppel. Ms Elvy contended that she was the absolute owner of Outlaithe Barn and denied that any proprietary estoppel arose.
The Decision: The case was heard by His Honour Judge Behrens, sitting as a Judge of the High Court in Leeds. After going through the facts in detail, he set out the relevant law at paragraphs 92 to 101 of his judgment. In particular, he referred to Stack v Dowden and Jones v Kernott, the recent authorities on the beneficial entitlement to a shared home. As he pointed out, both of these were joint names cases, but there are passages in the speeches which refer specifically to the situation where the legal title is vested in one person. In particular, in paragraphs 16 and 17 of the judgments of Lord Walker and Baroness Hale in Jones v Kernott they said:
16. …To the extent that we recognise that a "common intention" trust is of central importance to "joint names" as well as "single names" cases, we are going some way to meet that hope. Nevertheless it is important to point out that the starting point for analysis is different in the two situations. That is so even though it may be necessary to enquire into the varied circumstances and reasons why a house or flat has been acquired in a single name or in joint names…
17. The starting point is different because the claimant whose name is not on the proprietorship register has the burden of establishing some sort of implied trust, normally what is now termed a "common intention" constructive trust. The claimant whose name is on the register starts (in the absence of an express declaration of trust in different terms, and subject to what is said below about resulting trusts) with the presumption (or assumption) of a beneficial joint tenancy.
As to proprietary estoppel, Judge Behrens referred to the three elements identified by Lord Walker in Thorner v Major: a representation or assurance made to the claimant; reliance on it by the claimant; and detriment to the claimant in consequence of his (reasonable) reliance.
Judge Behrens then set out his findings, including the following:
1. That on the crucial issue of the parties' intentions at the time of the transfer, he preferred the evidence of Ms Elvy, and that therefore the transfer by Mr Aspden was and was intended to be an outright transfer of his legal and beneficial interest in the barn (paragraph 118).
2. That on the issue of the financial contribution to the cost of the conversion works, he preferred Mr Aspden's evidence, and found that his contribution was between £65,000 and £70,000 (paragraph 122).
3. That he could not accept that the proper inference was that the contributions were intended to be gifts (paragraph 124) - if that was the intention Mr Aspden would have left himself nowhere to live except the caravan.
4. The proper inference from the whole course of dealing was that there was a common intention that Mr Aspden should have some interest in the barn (paragraph 125).
5. That he valued Mr Aspden's interest at 25%, which he felt represented a fair return (paragraph 128).
6. That it was not necessary to consider in detail the claim based on proprietary estoppel, as in his view the result would be the same (paragraph 129).
7. That accordingly, the barn was held by Ms Elvy as to 75% for herself and 25% for Mr Aspden (paragraph 130).
The best Olympics you'll see this (or any other) year:
The best thing she's done yet (the only good thing she's done?):
Further to my post on Tuesday, here is a DfE video in which Professor Munro discusses the changes in the child protection system:
Once again Natasha and I bring you the top family law news stories from the last week in a short, easy-to-listen podcast.
Heard during the week. Still literally makes the hairs stand up on the back of my neck (despite the bad miming):
The Family Justice Review of course recommended the establishment of a single family court, with a single point of entry. That recommendation was accepted by the Government and, as ObiterJ of Law and Lawyers has explained, the recommendation is to be given effect by the Crime and Courts Bill.
You can find the draft Bill here, and explanatory notes here. I don't propose to go through the relevant provisions of the Bill in depth as many of them are quite tedious, but here are the main points:
Clause 17 inserts a new Part 4A into the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984, section 31A of which establishes the family court.
Schedule 10 sets out the detail. Part 1 adds further sections to Part 4A of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984. These include:
Section 31C, which essentially makes everyone who presently deals with family cases, from the Lord Chief Justice down to magistrates, into a judge of the family court.
Section 31D, which provides for the making of rules as to the composition of the family court and the distribution of business among judges of the court (certain 'lower' judges may be prohibited from conducting specified business).
Section 31E, which enables the family court to make any order that could be made by the High Court if the proceedings were in the High Court, or any order that could be made by the county court if the proceedings were there.
Section 31F, which bestows on the family court certain powers relating to hearings and orders that mirror existing powers contained in the County Courts Act 1984 and the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980.
Section 31I, which provides that the High Court may transfer proceedings pending in the family court to the High Court, where it considers it desirable to do so.
Section 31K, which deals with appeals.
Section 31L, which deals with the court's enforcement powers.
Part 2 of Schedule 10 makes amendments to other enactments arising out of the creation of the family court, principally to enable existing family legislation to apply to proceedings in the new family court.
Part 3 of Schedule 10 lists repeals and revocations to legislation in consequence of Parts 1 and 2 of the Schedule.
Finally, Schedule 11 makes amendments to legislation providing for the transfer of jurisdiction to the family court. As the notes state, principally these amendments reflect the fact that the county court and magistrates’ courts will no longer deal with family proceedings and to transfer their family jurisdiction to the new family court.
AT THE OFFICES of Messrs. Venal & Grabbit, Solicitors. Edgar Venal is sitting at his desk pondering how he might make certain assets belonging to a divorce client 'disappear' so that the client's wife will not get her hands on them, when the phone rings. It is his secretary Brunhilde. "A young woman has just come into reception. She says she has some information for you that you may find interesting. She says she must tell you in person." Says Brunhilde.
Edgar's interest is certainly piqued. He closes the file he is looking at and tells Brunhilde to show the woman in.
The woman is young. She is attractive, but is wearing a cheap coat. She speaks with a thick Russian accent. Edgar recognises her as Elena Brezhnev, au pair for Sir Basildon and Lady Virginia Wedlock. She tells him that she is no longer in their employ.
"Why did you leave?" Asks Edgar.
"I deed not leave," replies Elena, "Lady Vedlock deesmeesed me."
Edgar's interest piques a little more. "Oh," he says, "why was that?"
"She zinks zat I seeduced Sir Basildon, but eet ees not true - he tried to seeduce me!" Exclaims Elena.
Edgar's interest piques yet more. "I see," he says, "but what is this information you have for me?"
"Eet ees about Lady Vedlock." Replies Elena. "Zee other day she took zis coat from my vardrobe and left Vedlock House vearing eet. She voz up to sometheeng - maybe she ees seeing another man."
Edgar's interest reaches maximum pique. This could have possibilities. He thinks. "So vy - err, I mean why - are you telling me this?" He asks.
"I hate Lady Vedlock." Answers Elena. "She has made sure zat I vill never get another job een Eengland. I vill have to reeturn to Russia - how vould you like to live een Moscow?"
"Well, quite." Replies Edgar.
Edgar thanks Elena. When she has left he rings Piranha to tell him the news. As he puts the phone down there is a timid knock on his door. It is his trainee D’Arcy Downtrodden, who has finally issued the defamation claim against Matt O'Gridley.
"A-all w-we n-need t-to d-do now is find him and serve the claim on him, M-M-Mr Venal." Says D'Arcy. Edgar thinks that D'Arcy's stammer is getting worse. "Don't worry," he says, "I have an idea as to how we will do that."
D'Arcy looks relieved. Edgar dismisses him from the room and picks up his phone again.
This time he rings Police Inspector Gormless. The Inspector owes Edgar a favour, after Edgar represented him in his divorce, and made sure Mrs Gormless never found out the true value of his police pension. Edgar decides it is time to call in the favour. Gormless may not be the sharpest truncheon in the force, but Edgar thinks even he should be capable of locating Matt and serving the defamation claim upon him.
"In any proceedings in which any question with respect to the upbringing of a child arises, the court shall have regard to the general principle that any delay in determining the question is likely to prejudice the welfare of the child."
- Children Act 1989, s.1(2)
We are always being reminded these days of the need to reduce delay in proceedings concerning children. However, two cases reported on Family Law Week yesterday serve as reminders that there can be such a thing as too much haste. In both cases the court made s.8 orders without properly considering the evidence.
In S (A Child) [2012] EWCA Civ 617, a mother successfully appealed against an order for supervised contact that had been made without hearing from the Cafcass officers. The case concerned the father's application for contact with his three year old daughter. The court had made findings of violent conduct by the father against the mother and her 16-year-old son, and had directed a Cafcass report, which recommended supervised contact. As the court indicated it was likely to follow the recommendation, the mother consented to an interim contact order, and an addendum Cafcass report was ordered on the progress of the contact. A different Cafcass officer was appointed to prepare the addendum report and, having met the father in the course of her enquiries, she took a different view of the case and wrote to the judge expressing concerns about supervised contact commencing.
A directions hearing took place, and the mother submitted that the court should hear oral evidence from the Cafcass officers and adjudicate upon what should happen about contact and that until that had been done supervised contact should not proceed. The judge rejected this submission, on the basis that it would cause further delay, and ordered supervised contact to go ahead. The mother appealed.
In the Court of Appeal Lady Justice Black allowed the appeal. She said (at paragraph 34):
"I have very great sympathy with the judge, who had to decide what to do about a most unusual situation, knowing that if he were to accede to the mother's suggested course he would inevitably be delaying the start of contact for a father and daughter who had already not been in contact with each other for a very significant period of time. He would have been aware of the pressures on the court lists and on the time of the Cafcass officers. But I cannot accept that in the exceptional circumstances that he faced it was appropriate to proceed without the attendance of the officers to give oral evidence."
The case B (A Child) [2012] EWCA Civ 632 concerned residence applications by a mother and the maternal grandmother. At a hearing just a few days after the applications were made, the judge made directions for contact, and a residence order in favour of the mother. The grandmother appealed against the residence order, on the basis that it had been made without proper evidence or argument.
In the Court of Appeal Lord Justice Hughes found that the judge had not had the material on which to make the decision that she had (the only documents were the applications), and had heard no real argument about it at all (she had conducted the short hearing entirely by way of judicial question and advocates' answer). She had merely concluded early in the proceedings that it was inevitable that the child would need to live with the mother. Whilst Lord Justice Hughes agreed that this may turn out to be the case, he felt that "the judge in this case out of the best possible motives moved in the end too fast". Accordingly, the residence order was set aside.
In a consenting judgment, however, Lord Justice McFarlane took pains not to close the door to courts taking "a robust and interventionist role", particularly in the light of the pressure on the family courts:
"Where a court is satisfied that it has the material necessary to determine an issue, and after the court has conducted a fair process, albeit maybe a robust and pragmatic process, during which all parties, particularly those who may oppose the order that the court has in mind, have been heard, then there is nothing to prevent a court at an early stage in proceedings making a determination of the sort that was made in this case."
You guessed it: Natasha and I bring you the top family law news stories and cases from the last week, in a short, easy to listen podcast:
GRIM GRANGE. John Jaundiced has decided that the children Clint and Chantelle spend far too much time in front of their PlayStations, so he asks Prissy to take them for a walk in the countryside around the Grange. The request does not go down well, either with Prissy or the children, but John is adamant.
The three young people don their best Nike Air-head trainers and head off into the nearby woods. Soon, however, they are quite lost, as their mobile phones are unable to obtain a GPS signal.
They wander around for what must be minutes, before they are arrested by two burly security guards. Unbeknown to them, they have strayed into the grounds of Wedlock House, and tripped an intruder alert. The guards take the hapless wanderers to the House. They would normally be brought before Sir Basildon but he is still away on business, so they are brought before Lady Wedlock instead.
As Lady Wedlock descends the stairs to where Prissy is waiting in the Hallway with the children, Prissy thinks her Ladyship looks agitated about something, but Lady Wedlock soon gathers her composure.
Her Ladyship looks at the three youthful captives, pausing momentarily as she regards Prissy. "Where are you from?" She asks. Her tone suggests she already knows the answer.
"From Grim Grange, Your Ladyship." Replies Prissy, thinking that there is something strangely familiar about Lady Wedlock.
"I see, and how did you come to be in the grounds of Wedlock House?" Asks Lady Wedlock
"We were just out for a walk - we got lost." Says Prissy. She wonders whether she has seen Lady Wedlock somewhere previously.
Lady Wedlock turns to the guards. "I don't think we need detain these young people." She says. "Let them go." She swiftly disappears back up the stairs.
There's something about her. Thinks Prissy.
As the children are escorted from the house, there is a commotion behind them. Another security guard is manhandling a young woman out of a side entrance, and the woman is screaming at him in a language that Prissy does not understand.
What Prissy does not know is that the woman is the au pair Elena Brezhnev. She is also unaware that whilst her husband has been away, Lady Wedlock has found a love note from him to Elena, and has assumed that Elena has seduced him. Lady Wedlock has therefore dismissed Elena from her employ, before Sir Basildon has a chance to stop her.
... that in 1893 husbands had to put up with wives who hadn't finished the housework by the time they got home.
My thanks to ObiterJ of Law and Lawyers for reminding me today that the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (as it unfortunately now is) makes certain changes to the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 and the Civil Partnership Act 2004. Just to go into a little more detail, the changes are as follows:
Section 49 of LASPO begins by specifying that an order for maintenance pending suit under s.22 MCA may not require a party to pay to the other party any amount in respect of legal services for the purposes of the proceedings, and then inserts a new s.22ZA, enabling the court to make 'an order or orders requiring one party to the marriage to pay to the other (“the applicant”) an amount for the purpose of enabling the applicant to obtain legal services for the purposes of the proceedings' ('Orders for payment in respect of legal services'). Such orders may be made in proceedings for divorce, nullity of marriage or judicial separation and also in proceedings for financial relief in connection with proceedings for divorce, nullity of marriage or judicial separation.
Under sub-section (3), the court must not make an order unless it is satisfied that, without the amount, the applicant would not reasonably be able to obtain appropriate legal services for the purposes of the proceedings or any part of the proceedings, and for the purposes of subsection (3), the court must be satisfied, in particular, that—
(b) the applicant is unlikely to be able to obtain the services by granting a charge over any assets recovered in the proceedings (s.22ZA(4)).An order may be made to enable the applicant to obtain legal services of a specified description, including for a specified period or for the purposes of a specified part of the proceedings (s22ZA(5)), and may provide for payment of the amount by instalments (s.22ZA(6)).
S.22ZA(9) makes the obvious provision that, for the purposes of the assessment of costs in the proceedings, the applicant’s costs are to be treated as reduced by any amount paid to the applicant pursuant to an order under this section for the purposes of those proceedings.
S.22ZA(10) defines 'legal services', which include advice and assistance in the form of representation and any form of dispute resolution, including mediation.
Moving on, section 50 of LASPO inserts a new s.22ZB, which sets out the matters to which the court is to have regard in deciding how to exercise power under section 22ZA. These include the means and needs of both parties, the subject matter of the proceedings and, interestingly, whether the applicant has taken any steps to avoid the proceedings (for example by proposing mediation) and the applicant’s conduct in relation to the proceedings. They also include the effect of the order on the paying party and, for these purposes, the court must have regard, in particular, to whether the making or variation of the order is likely to—
(b) prevent the paying party from obtaining legal services for the purposes of the proceedings (s.22ZB(3).Section 51 of LASPO amends s.24A(1) MCA by adding orders under s.22ZA to the types of order that can 'trigger' the making of an order for sale of property under s.24A.
Finally, ss.52, 53 and 54 of LASPO make similar provisions as above in respect of civil partnerships, by making the appropriate amendments to the Civil Partnership Act 2004.
Something for the Weekend: Foo Fighters - Learn To Fly
A change of tempo this week. One of my favourite Foo Fighters songs, and one of their best videos:
Legal Aid Bill receives Royal Assent - Family Law Week, 1st May 2012
On Channel 4 News last night (I make no comment, as this is a subject upon which I have little current knowledge and no recent experience):
[Thanks to Jailhouselawyer for the link.]