Source: http://www.chanrobles.com/usa/us_supremecourt/486/825/case.php
Timestamp: 2019-10-21 17:31:17
Document Index: 339782766

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 514', '§ 514', '§ 502', '§ 1132', '§ 502', '§ 1132', '§ 502', '§ 514', '§ 206', '§ 514', '§ 514', '§ 514', '§ 206', '§ 206', '§ 206', '§ 514', '§ 1056', '§ 1144', '§ 206', '§ 514', '§ 514', '§ 514', '§ 514', '§ 514', '§ 514', '§ 514', '§ 514', '§ 514', '§ 514', '§ 514', '§ 514', '§ 1144', '§ 1132', '§ 514', '§ 1144', '§ 514']

Respondent is a collection agency. It sought and obtained money judgments chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Because of conflicting decisions among the courts on the questions presented here, we granted certiorari. 483 U.S. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U. S. 85, 463 U. S. 96-97 (1983) (emphasis added). On several occasions since our decision in Shaw, we have reaffirmed this rule, concluding that state laws which make "reference to" ERISA plans are laws that "relate to" those plans within the meaning of § 514(a). See, e.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U. S. 41, 481 U. S. 47-48 (1987); 471 U. S. 739 (1985). In fact, we have virtually taken it for granted that state laws which are "specifically designed to affect employee benefit plans" are preempted under § 514(a). Cf. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, supra, at 481 U. S. 47-48; Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., supra,@ at 463 U. S. 98.
A more complex question is posed by the argument of petitioners, rejected by the Georgia Supreme Court, that the entire Georgia garnishment procedure is preempted by ERISA. We reserved decision on the issue in Franchise Tax Board of California v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern California, 463 U. S. 1, 463 U. S. 7, 463 U. S. 26, n. 30 (1983); the question, which is one of federal law, [Footnote 5] is a close chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Unfortunately, ERISA itself offers no express answer as to whether welfare benefit plan trustees must comply with garnishment orders like those respondent is seeking to enforce. In our view, however, certain ERISA provisions, and several aspects of the statute's structure, indicate that Congress did not intend to forbid the use of state law mechanisms of executing judgments against ERISA welfare benefit plans, even when those mechanisms prevent plan partici chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
At the outset, we consider the several types of civil suits that can be brought against ERISA welfare benefit plans. First, ERISA's § 502 provides that civil enforcement actions may be brought by particular persons against ERISA plans, to secure specified relief, including the recovery of plan benefits. Suits for benefits or to enforce a participant's rights under a plan may be brought in either federal or state court. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e). Section 502, which provides that a plan may "sue or be sued" as an entity in § 502 actions, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(d)(1), clearly contemplates the enforcement of money judgments against benefit plans, 29 U.S.C. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
ERISA does not provide an enforcement mechanism for collecting judgments won in either of these two types of actions. Thus, while § 502(d), the "sue and be sued" provision, contemplates execution of judgments won against plans in civil actions, it does not provide mechanisms to do so. Moreover, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
It is thus clear enough that money judgments against ERISA welfare benefit plans, based on state or federal law, won in state or federal court, must be collectible in some way; garnishment is one permissible method. In fact, while petitioners' brief argued that any garnishment of an ERISA plan was preempted, see Brief for Petitioners 14, under questioning at oral argument, petitioners conceded that garnishment is among the state law enforcement mechanisms that may used in certain types of cases involving ERISA welfare benefit plans. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 6-7. [Footnote 10] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The problem with this proposed interpretation of § 514(a) is that it has no basis whatsoever in the language of the statute. Section 514(a) preempts State laws "insofar as they . . . relate to . . . employee benefit plan[s]"; no distinction is made between plan funds generally and those funds due a particular participant at a particular time. As the amicus curiae chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
First, § 206(d)(1) expressly includes a distinction that the Solicitor General would have us read into § 514(a). Section 206(d)(1) bars the assignment or alienation of pension plan benefits, and thus prohibits the use of state enforcement mechanisms only insofar as they prevent those benefits from being paid to plan participants. As discussed above, § 514(a), by contrast, deals with state laws as they relate to plans. The Solicitor General asks us to read § 514(a) as protecting only benefits -- but not plans as a whole -- from state law attachment orders (recognizing the numerous problems that would arise if we were to conclude that welfare benefit plans could in no way be subjected to state law attachment). But by adopting § 206(d)(1), Congress demonstrated that it could, where it wished to, stay the operation of state law as it affects only benefits and not plans. The Solicitor General asks chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Ultimately, in examining §§ 206(d)(1) and 514(a), there is no ignoring the fact that, when Congress was adopting ERISA, it had before it a provision to bar the alienation or garnishment of ERISA plan benefits, and chose to impose that limitation only with respect to ERISA pension benefit plans, and not ERISA welfare benefit plans. In a comprehensive regulatory scheme like ERISA, such omissions are significant ones. Cf. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U. S. 134, 473 U. S. 147 (1985). Once Congress was sufficiently aware of the prospect that ERISA plan benefits could be attached and/or garnisheed -- as evidenced by its adoption of § 206(d)(1) -- Congress' decision to remain silent concerning the attachment or garnishment of ERISA welfare plan benefits "acknowledged and accepted the practice, rather than prohibiting it." @ 451 U. S. 516 (1981). We therefore conclude that Congress did not intend to preclude state law attachment of ERISA welfare plan benefits. [Footnote 12]
In support of his reading of § 514(a), the Solicitor General relies heavily on a 1984 amendment to ERISA, the Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub.L. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426. The 1984 Act included several changes in ERISA which Congress felt were necessary to guarantee that the Nation's private retirement-income system provided fair treatment for women. See S.Rep. No. 98-575, p. 1 (1984); H.R.Rep. No. 98-655, p. 1 (1984). Among the Act's provisions were amendments to ERISA which insured that the statute's antigarnishment and preemption provisions could not be used to block the enforcement of "qualified domestic relations orders" -- generally, court orders providing for child support and alimony payments by ERISA plan participants. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3) (1982 ed., Supp. IV); 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(7) (1982 ed., Supp. IV). While the primary focus of this portion of the 1984 Act was removing § 206(d)(1)'s antigarnishment protection from pension plan benefits when spouses sought enforcement of domestic support orders, Congress at the same time also amended § 514(a)'s preemption provision. It apparently adopted the latter amendments in response to lower court rulings that had interpreted § 514(a) to bar state law garnishment for the purpose of enforcing domestic relations orders. [Footnote 13] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Petitioners and the Solicitor General argue that the 1984 amendment to § 514(a) makes clear that the section, as originally enacted, generally preempts state attachment and garnishment procedures. Otherwise, they contend, there would have been no necessity to amend § 514(a) to save domestic relation orders from preemption. There is, however, another plausible construction of Congress' action in 1984, namely, that Congress thought that some courts had erroneously construed § 514(a) as preempting such orders. In this view, the 1984 amendment served the purpose of correcting the error, thus clarifying the original meaning of the section. [Footnote 14] Cf. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U. S. 568, 485 U. S. 585 (1988); 434 U. S. 218 (1977) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting.) Moreover, even if the Solicitor General is correct, and Congress in 1984 thought that § 514(a) as originally enacted preempted domestic relations orders directed at ERISA plans -- and other state law attachments and garnishments as well -- the opinion of this later Congress as to the meaning of a law enacted 10 years earlier does not control the issue. United Airlines, Inc. v. McMann, supra, at 434 U. S. 200, n. 7. "[T]he views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one." United States v. Price,@ 361 U. S. 304, 361 U. S. 313 (1960). [Footnote 15]
H.R.Rep. No. 98-655, pt. 1, supra, at 42. This statement does suggest that the House Committee in 1984 thought that § 514(a) foreclosed state law attachment orders akin to those at issue here. But again, these views -- absent an amendment to the original language of the section -- do not direct our resolution of this case. Instead, we must look at the language of ERISA and its structure, to determine the intent of the Congress that originally enacted the provision in question. "It is the intent of the Congress that enacted [the section] . . . that controls." Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 431 U. S. 354, n. 39 (1977). This inquiry supports our reading of § 514(a), which is the reading given it by every other court that has considered the issue in this context (save the Ninth Circuit in a decision that was vacated by this Court). chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Since that action, decisions from the Ninth Circuit have abandoned the position taken by the panel majority in Franchise Tax Board, and have adopted the interpretation of § 514(a) that Judge Tang expressed in dissent in that case, 679 F.2d 1310-1311. See, e.g., Misic v. Building Service Employees Health & Welfare Trust, 789 F.2d 1374, 1376-1377 (CA9 1986); Arizona Laborers, Teamsters, and Cement Masons, Local 395 Pension Trust Fund v. Nevarez, 661 F.Supp. 365, 368-370 (Ariz.1987).
We have said with repeated emphasis that the reach of § 514(a) is not limited to state laws specifically designed to affect employee benefit plans. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U. S. 41, 481 U. S. 45-46 (1987); Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U. S. 85, 463 U. S. 98 (1983). Further, the reach of § 514(a) is not limited to state laws that conflict with the substantive provisions of ERISA. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U. S. 724, 471 U. S. 739 (1985). On the contrary, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
This common-sense reading of the language of § 514(a) is confirmed by Congress' decision to exempt certain "domestic relations orders" from the preemptive reach of ERISA. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(7) (1982 ed., Supp. IV). As the majority acknowledges, this provision was intended to save from preemption certain garnishments designed to enforce domestic relations obligations. See ante at 486 U. S. 838. The majority chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In reaching its conclusion that Georgia's garnishment statutes are not preempted in the circumstances of this case, the Court relies on two principal arguments. First, the Court notes that Congress contemplated that ERISA benefit plans would be subject to suit under certain circumstances. The majority notes, correctly, that civil enforcement actions are maintainable pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132. The majority chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Further, it assumes the point in issue to say that the Court's conclusion is required by cases holding that a "sue-and-be-sued" clause creates a presumption of susceptibility to garnishment and other state law procedures for enforcing judgments. See ante at 486 U. S. 834, n. 9, citing Franchise Tax Board of California v. USPS, 467 U. S. 512 (1984), and FHA v. Burr, 309 U. S. 242 (1940). The "sue-and-be-sued" clause in each of those cases was a waiver of the sovereign immunity that otherwise would have protected certain federal agencies from legal process, including writs of garnishment. In that chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
First, the alternative construction adopted by the Court results in the total redundancy of § 514(b)(7), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(7) (1982 ed., Supp. IV). It is preferable, in my view, to tolerate the partial overlap rejected by the Court than to construe § 514(a) so as to render another section of the chanroblesvirtualawlibrary