Source: http://www.chanrobles.com/usa/us_supremecourt/211/137/case.php
Timestamp: 2017-12-17 19:30:41
Document Index: 407430805

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 73', '§ 6', '§ 73', '§ 1216', '§ 30', '§ 1216', '§ 30', '§ 17', '§ 30', '§ 17']

HONOLULU RAPID TRANSIT CO. V. WILDER, 211 U. S. 137 (1908) - US SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON-LINE
US Supreme Court Decisions On-Line> Volume 211 > HONOLULU RAPID TRANSIT CO. V. WILDER, 211 U. S. 137 (1908)
HONOLULU RAPID TRANSIT CO. V. WILDER, 211 U. S. 137 (1908)
Subscribe to Cases that cite 211 U. S. 137
Honolulu Rapid Transit Co. v. Wilder, 211 U.S. 137 (1908)
A ratification of legislation between certain specified dates does not exclude legislation enacted on those dates. Taylor v. Browm, 147 U. S. 640.
The charter was granted by the Republic of Hawaii on July 7, 1898, the day on which Congress passed the resolution of annexation, and, doubts having been felt as to the right of the Hawaiian Legislature to grant a charter at that time (see 22 Op.Atty.Gen. 574; id., 627), the organic act declared that,
Act of April 30, 1900, c. 339, § 73, 31 Stat. 141, 154. It is contended that the effect of this section was to make the charter an act of Congress by adoption. In our opinion, this is a mistake. There is no doubt that local legislation under the authority of Congress previously granted is treated as emanating from its immediate, not from its remote, source in determining rights and liabilities. Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U. S. 349, 205 U. S. 353-354. See In re Moran, 203 U. S. 96, 203 U. S. 104. A general ratification like that of existing laws in § 6 would have no greater effect. We discover nothing in the words just quoted from § 73 to indicate that Congress had this particular franchise in view, or meant to adopt it and give it a superior source, or to do anything more than to supply the power that, by accident might have been wanting. See 53 U. S. 8; Murphy v. Utter, 186 U. S. 95, 186 U. S. 106. We need not pursue further this part of the objection to the tax except to remark that, in view of obvious purpose, it properly was admitted that July 7 was not excluded from the ratification by the word "between." See Taylor v. Brown,@ 147 U. S. 640. For it also was admitted at the argument before us that, if there was no exemption in the charter, the appellant had no case, and we are of opinion that there was none.
It is said that, when the charter was granted, real and personal property were assessed for taxation "separately as to each item thereof for its full cash value," with provisos deemed not to be material, Rev.Laws Hawaii, 1905, § 1216; that § 30 contemplates a taxation of this kind, and that a taxation of the franchise would be double taxation, and was excluded. It is true that one of the provisos in § 1216 taxes going concerns as wholes, but § 30 is thought to show a choice of the other method. It is contended that the charter, by fair implication, contracts against any other charges, especially in view of the ultimate division of the excess of income, after the payment of eight percent dividend. If the dividends do not exceed eight percent, the tax will fall wholly on the stockholders, contrary to the fair understanding of what the charter holds out. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The argument, of which we have given a summary outline, is far from establishing such a clear renunciation of the right to tax as the cases require. Metropolitan Street Ry. Co. v. New York state Board of Tax Commissioners, 199 U. S. 1. It appears to us very questionable whether the phrase "charges properly or necessarily connected with the maintenance and operation of the road" has any reference to taxes. It points in another direction. Taxes are left unmentioned in § 17, and the liability to them is assumed. The language of § 30 does not import the imposition of a tax that otherwise would be excluded. It takes the liability for granted, and relieves the company from the burden for a certain time. The drift of the section cannot be made clearer by lengthy restatement. It starts with exoneration, and merely saves the right to tax the portions completed by a proviso which, in this case, fulfils the proper function of that much-abused term. If any doubt were raised by § 17, which does not seem to us to be the case, it would be relieved by this further section of the same act. Nothing else seems to us to need mention in the present posture of the case.