Source: http://ca.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20100707_0001034.SCA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2016-12-08 18:08:39
Document Index: 82818960

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1915', '§ 1983', '§ 1915', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915']

| Ramirez v. Giurbino
GUSTAVO RAMIREZ, CDCR #K-93380, PLAINTIFF,v.GEORGE GIURBINO, ET AL., DEFENDANTS.
ORDER: (1) GRANTING MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS, IMPOSING NO INITIAL PARTIAL FILING FEE AND GARNISHING $350.00 BALANCE FROM INMATES'S TRUST ACCOUNT; and (2) DISMISSING ACTION WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b) & 1915A(b) [Doc. No. 2]
Gustavo Ramirez ("Plaintiff"), a state prisoner currently incarcerated at Calipatria State Prison located in Calipatria, California, and proceeding pro se, has submitted a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983. In addition, Plaintiff has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis ("IFP") pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [Doc. No. 2].
1. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claims
In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that his due process rights were violated when he was validated as a prison gang member. "The requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty and property." Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). State statutes and prison regulations may grant prisoners liberty interests sufficient to invoke due process protections. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-27 (1976). However, the Supreme Court has significantly limited the instances in which due process can be invoked. Pursuant to Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483 (1995), a prisoner can show a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment only if he alleges a change in confinement that imposes an "atypical and significant hardship . . . in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Id. at 484 (citations omitted); Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 827-28 (9th Cir. 1997).
In this case, Plaintiff has failed to establish a liberty interest protected by the Constitution because he has not alleged, as he must under Sandin, facts related to the conditions or consequences of the alleged gang affiliation which show "the type of atypical, significant deprivation [that] might conceivably create a liberty interest." Id. at 486. Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts from which the Court could find there were atypical and significant hardships imposed upon him as a result of the Defendants' actions. Plaintiff must allege "a dramatic departure from the basic conditions" of his confinement that would give rise to a liberty interest before he can claim a violation of due process. Id. at 485; see also Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 1996), amended by 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998). He has not; therefore the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to allege a liberty interest, and thus, has failed to state a due process claim. See May, 109 F.3d at 565; Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 466; Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486.
However, even if Plaintiff were able to allege facts sufficient to show that he had a liberty interest in remaining free from validation as a gang member, his due process claims could remain subject to sua sponte dismissal. Based on a liberal reading of Plaintiff's Complaint, it appears as though Plaintiff has based his due process claims on the allegations that Defendants failed to provide him with due process required by Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-70 (1974).*fn1 However, the Ninth Circuit has held that Wolff's protections are inapplicable to gang validation proceedings because they are not disciplinary convictions, but instead are related to prison security. See Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir. 2003). Specifically, the Ninth Circuit found that a due process claim based on prison officials' validation of an inmate as a member of a prison gang was subject only to the "some evidence" standard of Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985), noting that "California's policy of assigning suspected gang affiliates to the SHU is not a disciplinary measure, but an administrative strategy designed to preserve order in the prison and protect the safety of all inmates." Id. at 1287 (citing Munoz v. Rowland, 104 F.3d 1096, 1098 (9th Cir. 1997)).
Therefore, the Court dismisses Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment due process claims on the grounds that he has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 2. Eleventh Amendment
In addition, Plaintiff names the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation ("CDCR") as a Defendant in this matter. The State of California, and the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, as an agency of the State of California, are not "persons" subject to suit and are instead, entitled to absolute immunity from monetary damages actions under the Eleventh Amendment. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 53-54 (1996); Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984); see also Hale v. State of Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1398-99 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that a state department of corrections is not a "person" within the meaning of § 1983). In order to state a claim under § 1983, Plaintiff must identify a "person" who, acting under color of state law, deprived him of a right guaranteed under the Constitution or a federal statute. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Therefore, Plaintiff's claims for monetary damages against the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and the State of California are dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).
Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and for seeking monetary damages against an immune Defendant pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b) & 1915A(b). See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; Resnick, 213 F.3d at 446, n.1.
4. Plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and for seeking monetary relief against immune defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b). However, Plaintiff is GRANTED forty five (45) days leave from the date this Order is "Filed" in which to file a First Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading noted above. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint must be complete in itself without reference to the superseded pleading. See S.D. Cal. Civ. L. R. 15.1. Defendants not named and all claims not re-alleged in the Amended Complaint will be deemed to have been waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Further, if Plaintiff's Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, it may be dismissed without further leave to amend and may hereafter be counted as a "strike" under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177-79 (9th Cir. 1996).