Source: http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/628/1208/59207/
Timestamp: 2013-12-11 02:29:43
Document Index: 792076475

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2000', '§ 2000', '§ 1291', '§ 2000', '§ 713', '§ 713']

628 F.2d 1208: Theodore S. Cooper, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Griffin B. Bell, et al., Defendant-appellee :: US Court of Appeals Cases :: Justia
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628 F.2d 1208: Theodore S. Cooper, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Griffin B. Bell, et al., Defendant-appelleeUnited States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. - 628 F.2d 1208
Argued and Submitted Feb. 6, 1980.Decided Aug. 21, 1980.Rehearing Denied Oct. 17, 1980
Eva S. Halbreich, Asst. U.S. Atty., Los Angeles, Cal., for defendant-appellee.
Before KENNEDY, FLETCHER, and POOLE, Circuit Judges.
Appellant Cooper, an employee of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), filed a complaint against the United States Attorney General alleging that he had been discriminated against in violation of section 717 of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1976). Jurisdiction in the district court was based on 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-16(c) and (d) (1976). The district court judge, concluding that Cooper had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, dismissed for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted. We have jurisdiction to review under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976). We reverse the district court and remand for further proceedings.
Cooper, a white male, was employed at the Los Angeles office of DEA as an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) coordinator. He was responsible for preparing and assisting in the implementation of EEO plans in the Western Region of DEA, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1976) and 5 C.F.R. § 713.201 et seq. (1976).1
On February 19, 1976, Cooper filed a grievance with DEA. He complained that his attempts to implement an EEO program had been met with suspicion and hostility and that Van Diver, the DEA Regional Director, and Azzam, the Deputy Regional Director, were intentionally frustrating the EEO program by subjecting Cooper to personal threats and other verbal abuse. He described an incident in which his attempt to deliver an EEO plan to Van Diver led to a heated shouting match culminating in Cooper's being pursued and threatened by Azzam. Acting on Cooper's grievance, DEA instructed Van Diver and Azzam to support the EEO program and suspended Cooper for one day for his part in the incident. Cooper did not appeal the suspension.
On July 8, 1976, Cooper sent a letter of resignation to the agency's EEO Director, Rogers. The letter expressed Cooper's dissatisfaction with the disposition of his grievance and with the general lack of support for the EEO program.
Almost a year later, on May 31, 1977, Cooper, through an attorney, wrote to Rogers asserting that his letter of resignation had actually been an employment discrimination charge and asking Rogers to accept it for administrative consideration. Rogers replied that he could not accept the charge because Cooper had not brought it to the attention of an EEO counselor within thirty days of the alleged discriminatory conduct, as required by 5 C.F.R. § 713.214 (1976). Cooper subsequently met with an EEO counselor, but the matter could not be informally resolved.
Cooper then filed an employment discrimination complaint in federal district court, alleging as discrimination the interference and harassment he had previously described in his grievance and in his letter of resignation, and the refusal to grant him a promised transfer. In addition, Cooper alleged that Holder, an employee in DEA's personnel office, had told Cooper that a white male could not file an employment discrimination charge.
The government responded with a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6), and 12(c), on the ground that Cooper had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The judge granted the motion and dismissed the complaint. Cooper appeals from the dismissal.
We treat the government's motion under rules 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6), and 12(c) as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Accordingly, our review is limited to determining whether within the context of his complaint Cooper could have proved any set of facts entitling him to relief. Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 1980).2