Source: http://openjurist.org/print/33859
Timestamp: 2015-07-04 05:28:51
Document Index: 283374012

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 2113', '§ 924', '§ 922', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924']

508 US 129 Deal v. United States
508 US 129 Deal v. United States 508 U.S. 129
113 S.Ct. 1993
124 L.Ed.2d 44
Thomas Lee DEAL, Petitoner,v.UNITED STATES.
On the basis of his use of a gun in committing six bank robberies on different dates, petitioner Deal was convicted, in a single proceeding, of six counts of carrying and using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). Section 924(c)(1) prescribes a 5-year prison term for the first such conviction (in addition to the punishment provided for the crime of violence) and requires a 20-year sentence "[i]n the case of [a] second or subsequent conviction under this subsection." The District Court sentenced Deal to 5 years imprisonment on the first § 924(c)(1) count and to 20 years on each of the five other counts, the terms to run consecutively. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held: Deal's second through sixth convictions in a single proceeding arose "[i]n the case of his second or subsequent conviction" within the meaning of § 924(c)(1). There is no merit to his contention that the language of § 924(c)(1) is facially ambiguous and should therefore be construed in his favor under the rule of lenity. In context, "conviction" unambiguously refers to the finding of guilt that necessarily precedes the entry of a final judgment of conviction. If it referred, as Deal contends, to "judgment of conviction," which by definition includes both the adjudication of guilt and the sentence, the provision would be incoherent, prescribing that a sentence which has already been imposed shall be 5 or 20 years longer than it was. Deal's reading would have the strange consequence of giving a prosecutor unreviewable discretion either to impose or to waive the enhanced sentence by opting to charge and try a defendant either in separate prosecutions or under a single multicount indictment. The provision also cannot be read to impose an enhanced sentence only for an offense committed after a previous sentence has become final. While lower courts have held that statutes providing enhancement for "subsequent offenses" apply only when a second offense has been committed after conviction for the first, those decisions depend on the fact that it cannot legally be known that an "offense" has been committed until there has been a conviction. The present statute does not use the term "offense," and so does not require a criminal act after the first conviction; it merely requires a conviction after the first conviction. Nor is the rule of lenity called for on grounds that the total length of Deal's sentence (105 years) is "glaringly unjust." Under any conceivable reading of § 924(c)(1), some criminals convicted of six armed bank robberies would receive a sentence of that length. It is not "glaringly unjust" to refuse to give Deal a lesser sentence merely because he escaped apprehension and conviction until the sixth crime had been committed. Pp. ____.
Between January and April 1990, petitioner committed six bank robberies on six different dates in the Houston, Texas area. In each robbery, he used a gun. Petitioner was convicted of six counts of bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a) and (d), six counts of carrying and using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), and one count of being a felon in possession of firearms, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Title 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) provides:
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas sentenced petitioner to 5 years imprisonment on the first § 924(c)(1) count and to 20 years on each of the other five § 924(c)(1) counts, the terms to run consecutively. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentence. 954 F.2d 262 (1992). We granted certiorari on the question whether petitioner's second through sixth convictions under § 924(c)(1) in this single proceeding arose "[i]n the case of his second or subsequent conviction" within the meaning of § 924(c)(1). 506 U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 53, 121 L.Ed.2d 22 (1992).
It is certainly correct that the word "conviction" can mean either the finding of guilt or the entry of a final judgment on that finding. The word has many other meanings as well, including "[a]ct of convincing of error, or of compelling the admission of a truth"; "[s]tate of being convinced; esp., state of being convicted of sin, or by one's conscience"; "[a] strong persuasion or belief; as, to live up to one's convictions; an intensity of thorough conviction. " Webster's New International Dictionary 584 (2d ed. 1950). But of course susceptibility of all of these meanings does not render the word "conviction," whenever it is used, ambiguous; all but one of the meanings is ordinarily eliminated by context. There is not the slightest doubt, for example, that § 924(c)(1), which deals with punishment in this world rather than the next, does not use "conviction" to mean the state of being convicted of sin. Petitioner's contention overlooks, we think, this fundamental principle of statutory construction (and, indeed, of language itself) that the meaning of a word cannot be determined in isolation, but must be drawn from the context in which it is used. See King v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 502 U.S. ----, ----, 112 S.Ct. 570, 574, 116 L.Ed.2d 578 (1991); Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809, 109 S.Ct. 1500, 1504, 103 L.Ed.2d 891 (1989); United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 828, 104 S.Ct. 2769, 2773, 81 L.Ed.2d 680 (1984).
Petitioner contends that this absurd result is avoided by the "[i]n the case of" language at the beginning of the provision. He maintains that a case is the "case of [a defendant's] second or subsequent" entry of judgment of conviction even before the court has entered that judgment of conviction and even before the court has imposed the sentence that is the prerequisite to the entry of judgment of conviction. We think not. If "conviction" meant "entry of judgment of conviction," a "case" would surely not be the "case of his second or subsequent conviction" until that judgment of conviction was entered, by which time a lower sentence than that which § 924(c)(1) requires would already have been imposed. And more fundamentally still, petitioner's contention displays once again the regrettable penchant for construing words in isolation. The word "case" can assuredly refer to a legal proceeding, and if the phrase "in the case of" is followed by a name, such as "Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803)" that is the apparent meaning. When followed by an act or event, however, "in the case of" normally means "in the event of"—and we think that is its meaning here.
The sentence of § 924(c)(1) that immediately follows the one at issue here confirms our reading of the term "conviction." That sentence provides: "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court shall not place on probation or suspend the sentence of any person convicted of a violation of this subsection." That provision, like the one before us in this case, is obviously meant to control the terms of a sentence yet to be imposed. But if we give the term "convicted" a meaning similar to what petitioner contends is meant by "conviction"—as connoting, that is, the entry of judgment, which includes sentence—we once again confront a situation in which the prescription of the terms of a sentence cannot be effective until it is too late, i.e., until after the sentence has already been pronounced.1
We are also confirmed in our conclusion by the recognition that petitioner's reading would give a prosecutor unreviewable discretion either to impose or to waive the enhanced sentencing provisions of § 924(c)(1) by opting to charge and try the defendant either in separate prosecutions or under a multicount indictment. Although the present prosecution would not have permitted enhanced sentencing, if the same charges had been divided into six separate prosecutions for the six separate bank robberies, enhanced sentencing would clearly have been required. We are not disposed to give the statute a meaning that produces such strange consequences.2
The dissent contends that § 924(c)(1) must be read to impose the enhanced sentence only for an offense committed after a previous sentence has become final. Though this interpretation was not mentioned in petitioner's briefs, and was put forward only as a fall-back position in petitioner's oral argument, see Tr. Oral Arg. 4, the dissent thinks it so "obvious," "post, at 2001, that our rejection of it constitutes a triumph of "texturalism" over "common sense," post, at 2004, and the result of an elaborate exerc