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How to Remove a Federal Judge1
Welcome to Scribd, the world's digital library. Read, publish, and share books and documents. See moreDownloadStandard viewFull view of .Save to My LibraryLook up keyword or sectionLike thisShare on social networks2Activity×Share to your social networks.TweetEmbedTable Of Contentsintroductioni. modern misconceptionsA. Impeachment and RemovalB. A Case of Mistaken ConflationC. The Beguiling Role of Judicial Independenceii. the meaning of tenure “during good behaviour”A. Good-Behavior Tenure: An OverviewB. Good Evidence About Good Behavior1. From Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century England2. From Colonial America3. From Independent AmericaC. The Relation of Impeachment and Good Behavior1. Originally Unrelated Means of Removal2. A New, Nonexclusive Means of Judging Good BehaviorD. The Constitution’s CreationE. The Constitution’s Early Years and Beyondiii. judging misbehavior in the ordinary courtsA. Removal as a Consequence of a Criminal ConvictionB. Civil Forfeiture of an OfficeC. Judicial Disciplinary ProceedingsD. Defining Misbehaviorconclusion0 of .Results for: No results containing your search query{{& result_text }}
P. 1How to Remove a Federal Judge1How to Remove a Federal Judge1Ratings: (0)|Views: 86
|Likes: 1Published by Gemini Research REMOVE JUDGES, FEDERAL ,PER LAWREMOVE JUDGES, FEDERAL ,PER LAWMore info:Categories:Business/LawPublished by: Gemini Research on Apr 12, 2013Copyright:Attribution Non-commercialAvailability:Read on Scribd mobile: iPhone, iPad and Android.download as PDF, TXT or read online from ScribdFlag for inappropriate content|Add to collectionSee moreSee lesshttp://www.scribd.com/doc/135655659/How-to-Remove-a-Federal-Judge107/15/2013pdftextoriginal (2)
_10-16-06_ FINAL
saikrishna prakash and steveN D. smith
How To Remove a Federal Judge
Most everyone assumes that impeachment is the only means of removingfederal judges and that the Constitution’s grant of good-behavior tenure is an implicit referenceto impeachment. This Article challenges that conventional wisdom. Using evidence from England, the colonies, and the revolutionary state constitutions, the Article demonstrates that atthe Founding, good-behavior tenure and impeachment had only the most tenuous of relationships. Good-behavior tenure was forfeitable upon a judicial finding of misbehavior.There would have to be a trial, the hearing of witnesses, and the introduction of evidence, withmisbehavior proved by the party seeking to oust the tenured individual. Contrary to what many might suppose, judges were not the only ones who could be granted good-behavior tenure. Anything that might be held—land, licenses, employment, etc.—could be granted during goodbehavior, and private parties could grant good-behavior tenure to other private individuals.Impeachment, by contrast, referred to a criminal procedure conducted in the legislature thatcould lead to an array of criminal sanctions. In England and in the colonies, impeachment wasnever seen as a means of judging whether someone with good-behavior tenure had forfeited her tenure by reason of misbehavior. Whether a landholder, employee, or government officer withgood-behavior tenure had misbehaved would be determined in the ordinary courts of law.Moreover, the vast majority of state constitutions did not equate good-behavior tenure withimpeachment either. To the contrary, many distinguished them explicitly. Taken together, thesepropositions devastate the conventional conflation of good-behavior tenure with impeachment.More importantly, they indicate that the original Constitution did not render impeachment theonly possible means of removing federal judges with good-behavior tenure. Given the longtradition of adjudicating misbehavior in the ordinary courts, Congress may enact necessary andproper legislation permitting the removal of federal judges upon a finding of misbehavior in theordinary courts of law.
Saikrishna Prakash is Herzog Research Professor of Law, University of SanDiego. Steven D. Smith is Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego. Theauthors are grateful for the valuable comments and criticisms offered by Larry Alexander,Hasmik Badalian, Laurie Claus, Mike Rappaport, Martin Redish, and participants at theUniversity of San Diego and Cornell Law School faculty workshops. The authors also thank Ana Arboleda for her research assistance.
PRAKASH FORMATTED
_08-27-06 10/17/2006
modern misconceptions
Impeachment and Removal 79
A Case of Mistaken Conflation 82
The Beguiling Role of Judicial Independence 87
the meaning of tenure “during good behaviour”
Good-Behavior Tenure: An Overview 89
Good Evidence About Good Behavior 92
From Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century England 92
From Colonial America 102
From Independent America 105
The Relation of Impeachment and Good Behavior 109
Originally Unrelated Means of Removal 110
A New, Nonexclusive Means of Judging Good Behavior 114
The Constitution’s Creation 118
The Constitution’s Early Years and Beyond 122
judging misbehavior in the ordinary courts
Removal as a Consequence of a Criminal Conviction 129
Civil Forfeiture of an Office 130
Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings 132
Defining Misbehavior 134
116:72 2006
It is a virtually unquestioned assumption among constitutional law cognoscenti that impeachment is the only means of removing a federal judge.But why? The constitutional text does not expressly say as much. The text doesnot even connect the provision for judicial tenure “during good Behaviour”
toimpeachment.
In fact, these provisions are found in entirely different Articles,suggesting that they stand independent of each other. Why, then, do so many regard it as axiomatic that impeachment is the exclusive method of removing a federal judge?Perhaps the standard assumption derives from something deeply embedded in the constitutional text or structure. Though the text does notexpressly say that judges may be removed only through impeachment, maybe a more careful reading reveals a hidden connection. For example, given that theoriginal Constitution explicitly mentions removal only in the impeachmentprovisions,
scholars might infer that impeachment must be the exclusivemeans of removing judges.
Others might suppose that tenure “during goodBehaviour” is actually synonymous with “removable only via impeachment.”For instance, Professor Martin Redish has argued that “the good-behavior language must be construed as nothing more than a cross-reference to theavailability of impeachment.”
Finally, at least one scholar has suggested thatbecause only judges have good-behavior tenure, the Constitution might be bestread as making it
difficult to impeach federal judges than other officers.
Another justification for the standard assumption might be history. Neither impeachment nor good-behavior tenure originated with the Constitution. If 1.
. art. III, § 1 (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall holdtheir Offices during good Behaviour . . . .”). For consistency’s sake, we will use “behavior”rather than “behaviour” in the text, but preserve the latter spelling when found inquotations.
. art. I, § 2, cl. 5;
art. I, § 3, cls. 6-7;
art. II, § 4.
See id . art. I, § 3, cl. 7 (declaring that judgment cannot extend beyond removal anddisqualification);
art. II, § 4 (stating that officers convicted shall be removed).
Sam J. Ervin, Jr.,
Separation of Powers: Judicial Independence
, 35 L
AW & C
ONTEMP
.108, 117 (1970) (arguing that impeachment was intended to be the exclusive means of removal because it is the only mechanism mentioned); Merrill E. Otis,
A Proposed Tribunal: Is It Constitutional?
, 7 U.
ITY L.
R EV . 3, 38-41 (1938) (same).
Martin H. Redish,
Judicial Discipline, Judicial Independence, and the Constitution: A Textualand Structural Analysis
, 72 S.
R EV .
673, 692 (1999).
Suzanna Sherry,
Judicial Independence: Playing Politics with the Constitution
, 14 G
R EV . 795, 798 (1998) (suggesting that the grant of good-behavior tenure means that thereare good textualist reasons to limit impeachment to extreme cases of judicial misconduct).
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