Source: http://openjurist.org/109/f3d/1185
Timestamp: 2014-10-21 02:31:58
Document Index: 317520010

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 440', '§ 306', '§ 106', '§ 1105', '§ 1251', '§ 435', '§ 1255', '§ 802', '§ 792', '§ 2151', '§ 2381', '§ 451', '§ 1', '§ 1185', '§ 1328', '§ 241', '§ 241', '§ 1253', '§ 208', '§ 212', '§ 1182', '§ 241', '§ 241', '§ 241', '§ 241', '§ 241', '§ 212', '§ 241', '§ 212', '§ 241', '§ 212', '§ 241', '§ 241', '§ 212']

109 F3d 1185 Yang v. Immigration and Naturalization Service Terrazas-Garcia | OpenJurist
109 F. 3d 1185 - Yang v. Immigration and Naturalization Service Terrazas-Garcia	Home109 f3d 1185 yang v. immigration and naturalization service terrazas-garcia
109 F3d 1185 Yang v. Immigration and Naturalization Service Terrazas-Garcia 109 F.3d 1185
Ter YANG, also known as Ricky Yang, Petitioner,v.IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, Respondent.Elizardo TERRAZAS-GARCIA, Petitioner,v.IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, Respondent.Dimitrios KATSOULIS, Petitioner,v.IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, Respondent.Jelica BICANIN, also known as Jelica Murati, Petitioner,v.IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, Respondent.Nos. 94-3071, 95-3665, 96-1824 and 96-2044.United States Court of Appeals,Seventh Circuit.
Argued Jan. 24, 1997.Decided March 18, 1997.Rehearing and Suggestion forRehearing En BancDenied in Nos. 95-3665, 96-1824,96-2044May 14, 1997.*
David D. Cook, Monroe, WI, for Ter Yang.
Janet Reno, U.S. Attorney General, Washington, DC, Samuel Der-Yeghiayan, Immigration & Naturalization Service, Chicago, IL, James B. Burns, Office of the United States Attorney, Chicago, IL, Richard M. Evans, Kristal Marlow (argued), Robert Kendall, Jr., David M. McConnell, Michelle Gluck, Department of Justice, Civil Division, Immigration Litigation, David J. Kline, Department of Justice, Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, for Immigration and Naturalization Service in No. 94-3071.
Javier H. Rubinstein, Mayer, Brown & Platt, Chicago, Il, Lisa Scott, Mark S. Davidson, Davidson & Scott, Chicago, IL, for Elizardo Terrazas-Garcia.
Janet Reno, U.S. Attorney General, Washington, DC, Tom Schroeder, Immigration & Naturalization Service, Chicago, IL, Richard M. Evans, William J. Howard, David M. McConnell, Stephen W. Funk, Marion E. Guyton, Quynh Vu, Department of Justice, Civil Division, Immigration Litigation, Kristal Marlow, F. Franklin Amanat (argued), Department of Justice, Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, for Immigration and Naturalization Service in No. 95-3665.
Javier H. Rubinstein, Mayer, Brown & Platt, Chicago, IL, Scott D. Pollock, Pollock & Associates, Chicago, IL, for Dimitrios Katsoulis.
David V. Bernal, Department of Justice, Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Samuel Der-Yeghiayan, Immigration & Naturalization Service, Chicago, IL, F. Franklin Amanat (argued), Papu Sandhu, Department of Justice, Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, for Immigration and Naturalization Service in No. 96-1824.
Javier H. Rubinstein (argued), Mayer, Brown & Platt, Chicago, IL, Stanley J. Horn, Horn & Villasuso, Chicago, IL, for Jelica Bicanin.
Samuel Der-Yeghiayan, Immigration & Naturalization Service, Chicago, IL, Joan E. Smiley, Stephen W. Funk, F. Franklin Amanat (argued), Frank W. Hunger, Asst. Attorney General, Quynh Vu, Department of Justice, Civil Division, Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, for Immigration and Naturalization Service in No. 96-2044.
These deportation cases pose questions about the meaning and constitutionality of parts of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub.L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (Apr. 24, 1996), and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRA), Division C of Pub.L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (Sept. 30, 1996). The IIRA rewrote the rules for both deportation (renamed "removal") and judicial review, but most of its rules apply only to proceedings commenced on or after April 1, 1997. See INS v. Yueh-Shaio Yang, --- U.S. ----, ---- n. 1, 117 S.Ct. 350, 352 n. 1, 136 L.Ed.2d 288 (1996); Lalani v. Perryman, 105 F.3d 334, 335-37 (7th Cir.1997). For earlier proceedings the former law, as modified by the AEDPA, applies. Under this body of law, a final order of deportation is reviewable in the court of appeals, but with an exception created by § 440(a) of the AEDPA (as amended by § 306(d) of the IIRA), amending § 106(a)(10) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(10):
Section 241 is codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1251. The pertinent portions of this law, including an amendment made by § 435(a) of the AEDPA, read:
(a) Any alien (including an alien crewman) in the United States shall, upon the order of the Attorney General, be deported if the alien is within one or more of the following classes of deportable aliens: ...
(A) General crimes.
(i) Crimes of moral turpitude. Any alien who--
(I) is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years (or 10 years in the case of an alien provided lawful permanent resident status under section 245(i) [8 U.S.C. § 1255(i) ] ) after the date of entry, and
(ii) Multiple criminal convictions. Any alien who at any time after entry is convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude, not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct, regardless of whether confined therefor and regardless of whether the convictions were in a single trial, is deportable.
(iv) Waiver authorized. Clauses (i), (ii), and (iii) shall not apply in the case of an alien with respect to a criminal conviction if the alien subsequent to the criminal conviction has been granted a full and unconditional pardon by the President of the United States or by the Governor of any of the several States.
(i) Conviction. Any alien who at any time after entry has been convicted of a violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. § 802)), other than a single offense involving possession for one's own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana, is deportable.
(ii) Drug abusers and addicts. Any alien who is, or at any time after entry has been, a drug abuser or addict is deportable.
(C) Certain firearm offenses. Any alien who at any time after entry is convicted under any law of purchasing, selling, offering for sale, exchanging, using, owning, possessing, or carrying, or of attempting or conspiring to purchase, sell, offer for sale, exchange, use, own, possess, or carry, any weapon, part, or accessory which is a firearm or destructive device (as defined in section 921(a) of title 18, United States Code) in violation of any law is deportable.
(D) Miscellaneous crimes. Any alien who at any time has been convicted (the judgment on such conviction becoming final) of, or has been so convicted of a conspiracy or attempt to violate--
(i) any offense under chapter 37 [18 U.S.C. § 792 et seq.] (relating to espionage), chapter 105 [18 U.S.C. § 2151 et seq.] (relating to sabotage), or chapter 115 [18 U.S.C. § 2381 et seq.] (relating to treason and sedition) of title 18, United States Code, for which a term of imprisonment of five or more years may be imposed;
(ii) any offense under section 871 or 960 of title 18, United States Code;
(iii) a violation of any provision of the Military Selective Service Act (50 U.S.C.App. § 451 et seq.) or the Trading With the Enemy Act (50 U.S.C.App. § 1 et seq.); or
(iv) a violation of section 215 or 278 of this Act [8 U.S.C. § 1185 or § 1328],
We must decide whether, and if so how, these rules apply to four aliens who have been ordered deported following the commission of crimes.
* Ter Yang came to the United States as a refugee with his family in 1980, when he was five years old. This Hmong family was in flight from chaos and persecution in Laos. Alas, arrival in the New World did not end its troubles. Ter Yang took up with a gang and began a life of crime. Two of his crimes led to convictions. (1) Members of the gang broke into a pawn shop and stole 23 pistols, apparently for use in gang activities. Yang pleaded guilty to being a party to the crime of burglary and was sentenced to an indeterminate term of not more than 10 years' imprisonment. (2) The Yang family's garage became a depot for the gang's loot. A search of this garage turned up stolen items, including a gun burgled from a second pawn shop. Yang was convicted of concealing stolen firearms and was sentenced to five years' probation; this crime, a Class D felony in Wisconsin, had a maximum punishment of five years' imprisonment. The immigration judge ordered Yang deported under § 241(a)(2)(A)(ii), because both offenses are "crimes involving moral turpitude, not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct", and under § 241(a)(2)(C), because concealing the pilfered gun equates to "possessing" a firearm. The judge also concluded that Yang is ineligible for asylum because the theft of weapons is a "particularly serious crime" (see 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2); 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(c)) and is ineligible for discretionary relief under § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c), because there is no ground of exclusion comparable to the § 241(a)(2)(C) ground of deportation. See Leal-Rodriguez v. INS, 990 F.2d 939, 949 (7th Cir.1993). Having contested deportation under § 241(a)(2)(A)(ii) before the immigration judge, Yang dropped that contention on appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals. Although he renewed his argument that the burglary was not a "particularly serious crime," the BIA disagreed. The Board also held Yang ineligible for other relief, for essentially the reasons the immigration judge gave. In this court Yang argues that he is entitled to apply for asylum because the burglary was not a "particularly serious crime"; that he is not deportable under § 241(a)(2)(C) because concealing a firearm does not imply possessing it; and that even if he is deportable under both § 241(a)(2)(A)(ii) and § 241(a)(2)(C) he is entitled to seek discretionary relief under § 212(c).
Elizardo Terrazas-Garcia entered the United States from Mexico in 1962, when he was 16, as a lawful permanent resident. He has six children, all of whom are U.S. citizens. Between 1980 and 1988 (perhaps 1990), Terrazas-Garcia was a full-time drug dealer. His convictions for possession of cocaine and distribution of heroin led to a deportation order based on § 241(a)(2)(A)(iii), the aggravated-felony provision. Terrazas-Garcia concedes that he is deportable under this section but wants to remain in the United States. For this he needs a favorable exercise of discretion under § 212(c). The immigration judge and then the BIA held that Terrazas-Garcia does not deserve this boon. In this court Terrazas-Garcia argues that the Board abused its discretion because it did not fully discuss evidence that he has been rehabilitated since 1990, and that his long residence before he took up crime, and large family, are "unusual or outstanding equities" justifying relief from deportation.
Dimitrios Katsoulis came to the United States from Greece in 1972, when he was 10. His criminal record began in 1987 with a conviction for burglary of an automobile. He was sentenced to probation, which did not work. In 1988 he pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana and was again given a non-custodial sentence. In 1991 he pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine, with intent to distribute that drug, and to distribution of heroin on a separate occasion. These convictions led to a term of three years' probation, and again no confinement. Continued involvement with drugs led supervisory officials to threaten revocation of the probation, but nothing happened. In January 1993 Katsoulis pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine and was sentenced to three years' incarceration. He served less than a year, but the INS got wind of his troubles with the law and commenced deportation proceedings. The immigration judge and BIA found him deportable under § 241(a)(2)(B)(i), the controlled-substance provision, and denied his request for relief under § 212(c). In this court Katsoulis argues that the Board abused its discretion because it did not fully discuss evidence that he has been rehabilitated and that he has close ties to his family, which he submits are "unusual or outstanding equities" justifying relief from deportation.
Jelica Bicanin entered the United States from Yugoslavia as a visitor in 1981, when she was 34, and acquired permanent resident status in 1983 following her marriage to a U.S. citizen. In 1991 she pleaded nolo contendere to a cocaine offense and served eight months' imprisonment plus a term in a halfway house. She was ordered deported under both § 241(a)(2)(A)(iii) (aggravated felony) and § 241(a)(2)(B)(i) (controlled-substance violation). Bicanin's application for relief under § 212(c) was denied by both the immigration judge and the BIA, which did not find the equities in her favor sufficient: "[R]espondent has been convicted for shoplifting [in addition to the drug crime]. We also note that the respondent did not become a lawful permanent resident of the United States until she was well into her adult years ... and has substantial family ties to the former Republic of Yugoslavia, where her husband, three of her four children, mother, and six of her eight sib