Source: http://jaapl.org/content/41/4/578
Timestamp: 2019-10-16 16:49:40
Document Index: 221914097

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 17', '§ 17', '§ 17', '§ 17', '§ 17', '§ 17', '§ 17', '§ 17', '§ 17', '§ 17']

Continued Civil Commitment of Insanity Acquittees | Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law
Continued Civil Commitment of Insanity Acquittees
Monifa S. Seawell and Phillip J. Resnick
Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law Online December 2013, 41 (4) 578-581;
Monifa S. Seawell
Differential Procedures Used for Continuing the Civil Commitment of Insanity Acquittees Have a Rational Basis, Compared with Those for Civil Committees
In State v. Long, 19 A.3d 1242 (Conn. 2011), the Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed an order for the continued commitment of a defendant found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect, ruling that his equal protection challenge to Connecticut General Statute § 17a-593(c) (2011) was precluded under the doctrine of res judicata and that there is a rational basis for the differential treatment of civilly committed insanity acquittees.
Calvin Long had a history of schizophrenia and delusions that others were making homosexual advances toward him. He acted violently in response to those delusions. After striking a person in the head with a hammer (second-degree assault) he was found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect in 1986, and the trial court ordered his commitment to the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review Board (PSRB) for up to five years, the maximum sentence he could have received had he been found guilty. Connecticut's PSRB is a quasi-judicial body consisting of a layperson and experts in mental health, law, victims' rights, and probation and parole.
Before the expiration of his five-year commitment term, the state petitioned for Mr. Long's continued commitment pursuant to statute. Under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 17a-593c, if there is reasonable cause to believe that the acquittee is psychiatrically or developmentally disabled (mental retardation) and that his discharge would represent a danger to himself or others, the state can petition for continued commitment. The trial court granted the state's motion and continued Mr. Long's commitment for another three years. The state successfully petitioned the court on three additional occasions to continue Mr. Long's commitment.
In March 2001, after the state again petitioned for his continued commitment, Mr. Long filed a motion to dismiss. He argued that since he had reached his maximum term of recommitment, further recommitment under § 17a-593c was unconstitutional in treating him differently from civilly committed individuals. The trial court ruled in his favor, holding that committed acquittees belong to a constitutionally protected class and that strict scrutiny is therefore the proper standard to use in reviewing the constitutionality of § 17a-593c. Under a strict scrutiny test, § 17a-593c was deemed unconstitutional. The court opined that, as an insanity acquittee, Mr. Long was not afforded periodic judicial review of his status, which was a violation of his due process rights. The court further held that there was no rational basis for the disparate treatment of committed insanity acquittees and civilly committed inmates under the current system. The state appealed the decision to the Connecticut Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court of Connecticut held that Mr. Long's equal protection rights had not been violated. It reasoned that rational basis was the proper level of scrutiny and that there was a rational basis for the legislature's differential treatment of insanity acquittees and inmates subject to civil commitment, given that the risk of erroneous commitment is far less for an insanity acquittee. The court held that the PSRB's oversight of the recommitment of insanity acquittees was appropriate because the board is familiar with all acquittees and is in a better position to make decisions about their ongoing commitment.
In analyzing Mr. Long's due process claims, the court reviewed the existing procedural protections that were already in place for insanity acquittees facing recommitment, including the right to review all documents, the right to be present at hearings and to have representation by counsel, and the right to an independent review by a psychiatrist or psychologist. Acquittees additionally had the right to apply directly to the court for discharge every six months; however, Mr. Long had not invoked this right on the five prior occasions that the state had petitioned for his commitment.
The case was remanded to the trial court, which then granted the state's petition for continued commitment for another three years. Mr. Long appealed the ruling.
He then filed a second motion for dismissal. He conceded that he was seriously and persistently mentally ill and unlikely to improve. He had been in the jurisdiction of the PSRB for close to 22 years. During that time, he had committed about 15 assaults and had kissed and fondled female hospital staff members. However, he argued that, as an insanity acquittee who was unlikely to improve, he was likely to be held in the custody of the PSRB for the rest of his life. Mr. Long reasoned that had he been a civil committee, he most likely would have been transitioned into the community, rather than continued in the hospital.
Mr. Long argued that these differences in the treatment of similar classes of committed persons resulted in an as-applied violation of his equal protection rights. He asserted that intermediate scrutiny, not rational-basis review, was the appropriate level of scrutiny for his equal protection claim. Insanity acquittees, he reasoned, face stricter substantive standards than do civilly committed inmates. Although these differences may be constitutionally sound before the acquittee serves a commitment term equivalent to the maximum sentence he would have received if found guilty, they are not constitutional if applied after the acquittee has been committed for a period equivalent to the maximum prison term.
The trial court denied Mr. Long's second motion to dismiss, stating that there was clear and convincing evidence that he was mentally ill and a danger to others. The court further stated that Mr. Long had been unable to demonstrate how the statute, which the court had previously held as facially constitutional, was unconstitutional as applied to him.
On subsequent appeal to the Supreme Court of Connecticut, Mr. Long argued that a different level of scrutiny, intermediate, should be applied in reviewing the constitutionality of the commitment scheme. He also challenged whether it was a violation of his equal protection rights to commit him under the PSRB's jurisdiction rather than under the civil commitment system, arguing that under the board's jurisdiction, the prognosis of all acquittees is worse than that of civil committees. Thus, Mr. Long raised four questions to the supreme court. Was continued commitment under the jurisdiction of the PSRB, rather than under the civil commitment system, a violation of his equal protection rights? Was intermediate scrutiny the appropriate level for his equal protection claim? If rational-basis review was the appropriate standard of scrutiny, was there evidence of a change in conditions since § 17a-593c was enacted that now made § 17a-593c unconstitutional? Was § 17a-593c facially unconstitutional?
The Supreme Court of Connecticut held unanimously that there is a rational basis for the differential treatment of civil committees and committed insanity acquittees, and as such, Mr. Long's equal protection rights were not violated by committing him under the PSRB's jurisdiction; the proper level of scrutiny for his equal protection claim was rational-basis review; and the doctrine of res judicata precluded Mr. Long's facial challenge of § 17a-593c.
The court acknowledged that the legislature had imposed different mandates for overseeing the commitment of civil committees and committed insanity acquittees. However, this difference was viewed as rational, given that the PSRB's focal concern was the protection of society from dangerous insanity acquittees. The court additionally reviewed its ruling on Mr. Long's first motion, in which it had identified legitimate reasons for the disparate treatment of insanity acquittees.
The court further held that since Mr. Long had conceded on his first claim that rational-basis review was the proper level of scrutiny for his equal protection claim, under the doctrine of res judicata, he could not raise further action on this same claim or proceed with his facial challenge of the statute. Res judicata (the matter judged) means that once an issue has been decided, it may not be relitigated in subsequent proceedings.
This case touches on several important questions raised in the landmark cases of Jones v. United States (463 U.S. 354 (1983)), Vitek v. Jones (445 U.S 480 (1980)), and Addington v. Texas (441 U.S. 418 (1979)).
In Jones v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that since commitment occurs only after the insanity acquittee proves a defendant's criminal act was the product of mental illness, then there is diminished concern for error. Similarly in Long, the Connecticut Supreme Court reasoned that since the acquittee himself initiated the commitment process by offering an insanity defense and proving that mental illness led to his crime, there was a diminished concern for error. The Supreme Court of Connecticut stated that to be adjudicated not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect, a defendant had to prove that he had committed his criminal act as a result of mental illness, which eliminated the risk that he was being committed for mere idiosyncratic behavior.
In Vitek v. Jones, the U.S. Supreme Court held that due process requires a hearing and other procedural safeguards to transfer a prisoner to a psychiatric facility. In Long, the Supreme Court of Connecticut highlighted the existing procedural safeguards that were in place, many of which were similar to those outlined in Vitek, such as the right to review all documents (Long), the right to adequate notice (Vitek), and the right to representation by counsel (Long and Vitek). However unlike in Vitek, where there was a finding of a right to an adversary hearing before an independent decision maker, the Supreme Court of Connecticut held that a hearing before the Psychiatric Security Review Board was constitutionally sound. The idea was that the public must be protected from dangerous insanity acquittees, and the board was in the best position to provide that security. The Supreme Court of Connecticut acknowledged that this was in contrast to the treatment of civil committees. In the latter, the legislature had given physicians authority to form opinions about the patients and inform the probate court whether a less restrictive placement is available.
In Addington v. Texas, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a clear and convincing evidence standard, with the state having the burden of proof, is the constitutional minimum required by the Fourteenth Amendment in a civil commitment proceeding. The Addington Court reasoned that a lower standard jeopardizes individual liberty interest, while a higher standard is too restrictive to the state and poses a barrier to psychiatric treatment. In the hearing on his first motion to dismiss, Long referenced State v. Metz, 645 A.2d 965 (Conn. 1994), which interpreted Connecticut statue § 17–593c as requiring a burden of proof similar to that in Addington: clear and convincing evidence of mental illness and dangerousness to extend the commitment of an insanity acquittee.
The Long decision is in keeping with the public's intense and sometimes unreasonable fear that insanity acquittees will commit further violent crimes. Although the recidivism rate for insanity acquittees is substantially lower than that for released prisoners, the public appears to have taken a zero-tolerance stance. There is almost an implicit contract that in exchange for the NGRI finding, no further criminal conduct will be accepted.
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Monifa S. Seawell, Phillip J. Resnick
Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law Online Dec 2013, 41 (4) 578-581;