Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/104164/northeast-marine-terminal-co-inc-vs-caputo
Timestamp: 2018-12-16 20:41:59
Document Index: 683807737

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 902', '§ 902', '§ 903', '§ 901', 'art, 253', '§ 902', '§ 89']

Northeast Marine Terminal Co Inc Vs Caputo - Citation 104164 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Northeast Marine Terminal Co., Inc. Vs. Caputo - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/104164
Case Number 432 U.S. 249
Appellant Northeast Marine Terminal Co., Inc.
Respondent Caputo
northeast marine terminal co., inc. v. caputo - 432 u.s. 249 (1977) u.s. supreme court northeast marine terminal co., inc. v. caputo, 432 u.s. 249 (1977) northeast marine terminal co., inc. v. caputo no. 7644 argued april 18, 1977 decided june 17, 1977 * 432 u.s. 249 certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the second circuit syllabus in 1972 congress amended the longshoremen's and harbor workers' compensation act (act) to extend coverage to additional workers in an attempt to avoid anomalies inherent in a system that drew lines at the water's edge by allowing compensation under the act only to workers injured on the seaward side of a pier. the relevant sections, as so amended, broadened the.....
Northeast Marine Terminal Co., Inc. v. Caputo - 432 U.S. 249 (1977)
U.S. Supreme Court Northeast Marine Terminal Co., Inc. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249 (1977)
Decided June 17, 1977 *
were therefore "employees" within the meaning of § 902(3) at the time of their injuries. Pp. 432 U. S. 265 -279.
(a) Congress' intent to adapt the Act to modern cargo-handling techniques, such as containerization, which have moved much of the longshoreman's work off the vessel and onto land, clearly indicates that such tasks as stripping a container are included in the category of "longshoring operations" under § 902(3), and hence it is apparent that respondent Blundo, whose task was an integral part of the unloading process as altered by the advent of containers, was a statutory "employee" when he slipped on the ice. Pp. 432 U. S. 269 -271.
(b) Both the text of the 1972 amendments to the Act, which focuses primarily on occupations (longshoreman, harbor worker, etc.), and their legislative history, which shows that Congress wanted a system that did not depend on the fortuitous circumstance of whether the injury occurred on land or over water, demonstrate that Congress intended to provide continuous coverage to amphibious workers such as longshoremen, who, without the amendments, would be covered for only part of their activity, and that therefore the amendments were meant to cover such a person as respondent Caputo, who as a member of a regular stevedoring gang worked either on the pier or on the ship, and who, on the day of his injury in his job as a terminal laborer, could have been assigned to a number of tasks, including stripping containers, unloading barges, and loading trucks. Pp. 432 U. S. 271 -274.
(c) Respondents' coverage as "employees" under the Act cannot be defeated by the so-called "point of rest" theory, whereby longshoremen's "maritime employment" would be considered, in the case of unloading, to be taking cargo out of a vessel's hold, moving it away from the ship's side, and carrying it to its point of rest on a pier or in a terminal shed, since that theory appears nowhere in the Act, was never mentioned by Congress during the legislative process, does not comport with Congress' intent, and restricts coverage of a remedial Act designed to extend coverage. Pp. 432 U. S. 274 -279.
2. The injuries of both respondents occurred on a "situs" covered by the Act. Pp. 432 U. S. 279 -281.
(a) The truck that respondent Caputo was helping to load was parked inside the terminal area adjoining "navigable waters of the United States." P. 432 U. S. 279 .
even if it is assumed that the phrase "customarily used" in § 903(a) modifies all the preceding terms, rather than only the immediately preceding term "other adjoining area," he satisfied the test by working in an "adjoining . . . terminal . . . customarily used . . . for loading [and] unloading." Pp. 432 U. S. 279 -281.
In 1972, Congress amended the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA or Act), 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq., in substantial part to "extend [the Act's] coverage to protect additional workers." S.Rep. No. 91125, p. 1 (1972) (hereinafter S.Rep.). [ Footnote 1 ] In these consolidated cases, we must determine whether respondents Caputo and Blundo, injured while working on the New York City waterfront, are
"Compensation shall be payable . . . in respect of disability or death of an employee but only if the disability or death results from an injury occurring upon the navigable waters of the United. States ( including any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoining area customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing, or building a vessel ). . . ."
loaded onto or unloaded from vessels, barges, or containers. [ Footnote 2 ] Blundo was assigned his tasks at the beginning of each day, and, until he arrived at the terminal, he did not know whether he would be working on a ship or on shore. He was reassigned during the day if he completed the task to which he was assigned initially. App. 63-69, 112.
coverage requirements of the Act and the Benefits Review Board (BRB) affirmed. [ Footnote 3 ] Respondent Ralph Caputo was a member of a regular longshoring "gang" that worked for Pittston Stevedoring Co. [ Footnote 4 ] When his gang was not needed, Caputo went to the
On April 16, 1973, Caputo was hired by Northeast to work as a "terminal labor[er]." App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 76-444, p. 48a; App. 8, 14. A terminal laborer may be assigned to load and unload containers, lighters, [ Footnote 5 ] barges, and trucks. [ Footnote 6 ] Id. at 8; Brief for Petitioners in No. 76-444, p. 4. When he arrived at the terminal, Caputo was assigned, along with a checker and forklift driver, to help consignees' truckmen load their trucks with cargo that had been discharged from ships at Northeast's terminal. [ Footnote 7 ] Caputo was injured while rolling a dolly loaded with cheese into a consignee's truck. App. 27-40.
The Administrative Law Judge found that Caputo satisfied the requirements of the Act, and awarded him compensation. The BRB affirmed. [ Footnote 8 ]
decisions and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit consolidated the cases. After thorough consideration of the language, history, and purposes of the 1972 Amendments, the court held, one judge dissenting, that the injuries of both respondents were compensable under the LHWCA. [ Footnote 9 ] In view of the conflict over the coverage afforded by the 1972 Amendments, [ Footnote 10 ] we granted certiorari to consider.both cases. [ Footnote 11 ] 429 U, S. 998 (1976). We affirm.
to provide compensation for maritime workers injured on navigable waters through state compensation programs. In 1917, the Court, in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen , 244 U. S. 205 , held that the States were without power to extend a workmen's compensation remedy to longshoremen injured on the gangplank between a ship and a pier. The decision left longshoremen injured on the seaward side of a pier without a compensation remedy, while longshoremen injured on the pier were protected by state compensation Acts. State Industrial Comm'n v. Nordenholt Corp., 259 U. S. 263 (1922). Dissatisfied with the gap in coverage thus created, and recognizing that the amphibious nature of longshoremen's work made it desirable to have "one law to cover their whole employment, whether directly part of the process of loading or unloading a ship or not," Congress sought to authorize States to apply their compensation statutes to injuries seaward of the Jensen line. [ Footnote 12 ] Its attempts to allow such uniform state systems, however, were struck down as unlawful delegations of congressional power. Washington v. W. C. Dawson Co., 264 U. S. 219 (1924); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149 (1920). Finally, convinced that the only way to provide workmen's compensation for longshoremen and harborworkers
The Act was, in a sense, a typical workmen's compensation system, compensating an employee for injuries "arising out of and in the course of employment." [ Footnote 13 ] But it was designed simply to be a gap-filler -- to fill the void created by the inability of the States to remedy injuries on navigable waters. Thus, it provided coverage only for injuries occurring "upon the navigable waters of the United States" and permitted compensation awards only "if recovery . . . through workmen's compensation proceedings [could] not validly be provided by state law." [ Footnote 14 ]
Congress' initial apprehension of the difficulties inherent in the existence of two compensation systems for injuries sustained by amphibious workers proved to be well founded. The courts spent the next 45 years trying to ascertain the respective spheres of coverage of the state and federal systems. As two commentators described it, "the relationship between [LHWCA] and the otherwise applicable State Compensation Act [was] shrouded in impenetrable confusion." G. Gilmore & C. Black, Law of Admiralty 409 (2d ed.1975) (Gilmore). It is unnecessary to examine in detail the Court's efforts to dispel the confusion. [ Footnote 15 ] Suffice it to say that, while the Court permitted recovery under state remedies in particular situations seaward of the Jensen line, see, e.g., Davis v. Washington Labor Dept., 317 U. S. 249 (1942), the Court made it clear that federal coverage stopped at the water's edge. Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U. S. 212 (1969).
In Nacirema Operating Co., supra, the Court held that the Act did not cover longshoremen killed or injured on a pier while attaching cargo to ships' cranes for loading onto the ships, even though coverage might have existed had the men been hurled into the water by the accident, Marine Stevedoring Corp. v. Oosting, 238 F.Supp. 78 (ED Va.1965), aff'd, 398 F.2d 900 (CA4 1968) (en banc), [ Footnote 16 ] or been injured on the
Id. at 396 U. S. 223 -224. [ Footnote 17 ] In 1972, Congress moved the line.
The 1972 Amendments were the first significant effort to reform the 1927 Act and the judicial gloss that had been attached to it. The main concern of the 1972 Amendments was not with the scope of coverage, but with accommodating the desires of three interested groups: (1) shipowners who were discontented with the decisions allowing many maritime workers to use the doctrine of "seaworthiness" to recover full damages from shipowners regardless of fault; (2) employers of the longshoremen who, under another judicially created doctrine, could be required to indemnify shipowners and thereby lose the benefit of the intended exclusivity of the compensation remedy; and (3) workers who wanted to improve the benefit schedule deemed inadequate by all parties. [ Footnote 18 ] Congress sought to meet these desires by
S.Rep. 5. [ Footnote 19 ]
"It is apparent that, if the Federal benefit structure embodied in [the] Committee bill is enacted, there would be a substantial disparity in benefits payable to a permanently disabled longshoreman, depending on which side of the water's edge the accident occurred, if State laws are permitted to continue to apply to injuries occurring on land. It is also to be noted that, with the advent of modern cargo-handling techniques, such as containerization and the use of LASH-type vessels, more of the longshoreman's work is performed on land than heretofore. [ Footnote 20 ]"
"any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoining area customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing, or building a vessel. [ Footnote 21 ]"
by the Act. Previously, so long as a work-related injury occurred on navigable waters and the injured worker was not a member of a narrowly defined class, [ Footnote 22 ] the worker would be eligible for federal compensation provided that his or her employer had at least one employee engaged in maritime employment. It was not necessary that the injured employee be so employed. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. O'Rourke, 344 U. S. 334 , 344 U. S. 340 -342 (1953). But with the definition of "navigable waters" expanded by the 1972 Amendments to include such a large geographical area, it became necessary to describe affirmatively the class of workers Congress desired to compensate. It therefore added the requirement that the injured worker be "engaged in maritime employment," which it defined to include
33 U.S.C. § 902(3) (1970 ed., Supp. V). [ Footnote 23 ]
We turn first to the question whether Caputo and Blundo satisfied the "status" test -- that is, whether they were "engaged in maritime employment," and therefore "employees" at the time of their injuries. [ Footnote 24 ] The question is made difficult by the failure of Congress to define the relevant terms -- "maritime employment," "longshoremen," "longshoring operations" [ Footnote 25 ] -- in either the text of the Act or its legislative history. [ Footnote 26 ]
The closest Congress came to defining the key terms is the "typical example" of shoreward coverage provided in the Committee Reports. [ Footnote 27 ] The example clearly indicates an
intent to cover those workers involved in the essential elements of unloading a vessel -- taking cargo out of the hold, moving it away from the ship's side, and carrying it immediately to a storage or holding area. The example also makes it clear that persons who are on the situs but are not engaged in the overall process of loading and unloading vessels are not covered. Thus, employees such as truck drivers, whose responsibility on the waterfront is essentially to pick up or deliver cargo unloaded from or destined for maritime transportation are not covered. Also excluded are employees who perform purely clerical tasks and are not engaged in the handling of cargo. But while the example is useful for identifying the outer bounds of who is clearly excluded and who is clearly included, it does not speak to all situations. [ Footnote 28 ] In particular, it is silent on the question of coverage for those people, such as Caputo and Blundo, who are injured while on the situs, see 432 U. S. infra, and engaged in the handling of cargo as it moves between sea and land transportation after its immediate unloading. [ Footnote 29 ]
Nevertheless, we are not without guidance in resolving that question. The language of the 1972 Amendments is broad and suggests that we should take an expansive view of the extended coverage. Indeed, such a construction is appropriate for this remedial legislation. The Act "must be liberally construed in conformance with its purpose, and in a way which avoids harsh and incongruous results." Voris v. Eikel, 346 U. S. 328 , 346 U. S. 333 (1953). Consideration of the purposes behind the broadened coverage reveals a clear intent to reach persons such as Blundo and Caputo. [ Footnote 30 ]
much of the longshoreman's work off the vessel and onto land. S.Rep. 13; H.R.Rep. 10. Noted specifically was the impact of containerization. Unlike traditional break-bulk cargo handling, in which each item of cargo must be handled separately and stored individually in the hold of the ship as it waits in port, containerization permits the time-consuming work of stowage and unstowage to be performed on land in the absence of the vessel. The use of containerized ships has reduced the costly time the vessel must be in port and the amount of manpower required to get the cargo onto the vessel. [ Footnote 31 ] In effect, the operation of loading and unloading has been moved shoreward; the container is a modern substitute for the hold of the vessel. As Judge Friendly observed below,
Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35, 53 (CA2 1976). Congress' intent to adapt the LHWCA to modern cargo-handling techniques clearly indicates that these tasks, heretofore done on board ship, are included in the category of "longshoring operations." [ Footnote 32 ]
It is therefore apparent that respondent Blundo was a statutory "employee" when he slipped on the ice. His job was to check and mark items of cargo as they were unloaded from a container. His task is clearly an integral part of the unloading process as altered by the advent of containerization, and was intended to be reached by the Amendments. Indeed, the Committee Reports explicitly state: "[C]heckers, for example, who are directly involved in the loading or unloading functions are covered by the new amendment." S.Rep. 13; H.R.Rep. 11. We thus have no doubt that Blundo satisfied the status test. [ Footnote 33 ]
We need not decide, however, whether the congressional desire for uniformity supports the Director's view [ Footnote 34 ] and entitles
That Caputo is such a person is readily apparent. As a member of a regular stevedoring gang, he participated on either the pier or the ship in the stowage and unloading of cargo. On the day of his injury, he had been hired by petitioner Northeast as a terminal laborer. In that capacity, he could have been assigned to any one of a number of tasks necessary to the transfer of cargo between land and maritime transportation, including stuffing and stripping containers, loading and discharging lighters and barges, [ Footnote 35 ] and loading and unloading
trucks. App. 8. Not only did he have no idea when he set out in the morning which of these tasks he might be assigned, but, in fact, his assignment could have changed during the day. Thus, had Caputo avoided injury and completed loading the consignee's truck on the day of the accident, he then could have been assigned to unload a lighter. Id. at 24. Since it is clear that he would have been covered while unloading such a vessel, [ Footnote 36 ] to exclude him from the Act's coverage in the morning but include him in the afternoon would be to revitalize the shifting and fortuitous coverage that Congress intended to eliminate.
Petitioners and the NAS seek to avoid these results by proposing a so-called "point of rest" theory. [ Footnote 37 ] The term "point of rest" is claimed to be a term of art in the industry
Stockman v. John T. Clark & Son of Boston, Inc., 539 F.2d 264, 275 (1976). In addition, the theory fails to accommodate the intent to cover those longshoring operations that modern technology had moved onto the land. Coverage that stops at the point of rest excludes those engaged in loading and unloading the modern functional equivalents of the hold of the ship. As we have indicated, Congress clearly intended to cover such operations. [ Footnote 38 ]
The only support petitioners can find for their theory is the fact that it is consistent with the "typical example" given in the Committee Reports. See n 27, supra. But, as we have already indicated, supra at 432 U. S. 266 -267, the example is equally consistent with a broader view of coverage. Consistency with an illustrative example is clearly not enough to overcome the overwhelming evidence against the theory. [ Footnote 39 ]
In view of all this, it is not surprising that the "point of rest" limitation has been rejected by all but one of the Circuits that have considered it, [ Footnote 40 ] and by virtually all the commentators. [ Footnote 41 ]
First, we agree with the court below that it is not at all clear that the phrase "customarily used" was intended to modify more than the immediately preceding phrase "other areas." We note that the sponsor of the bill in the House, Representative Daniels, described this section as "expand[ing] the coverage which was limited to the ship in the present law, to the piers, wharves, and terminals." 118 Cong.Rec. 36381 (1972). There was little concern with respect to how these facilities were used. [ Footnote 42 ]
For discussion of the history, see Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U. S. 202 , 404 U. S. 204 -209 (1971); Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U. S. 212 , 396 U. S. 216 -224 (1969); Gilmore 417-423; 4 A. Larson, Law of Workmen's Compensation § 89 (1976); Note, Broadened Coverage Under the LHWCA, 33 La.L.Rev. 683 (1973).
404 U.S. at 404 U. S. 216 .
"Section 2(a) amends section 2(3) of the Act to define an 'employee' as any person engaged in maritime employment. The definition specifically includes any longshoreman or other person engaged in longshoreing [ sic ] operations, and any harborworker, including a ship repairman, shipbuilder and shipbreaker. It does not exclude other employees traditionally covered, but retains that part of 2(3) which excludes from the definition of 'employee' masters, crew members or persons engaged by the master to unload, load or repair vessels of less than eighteen tons net."
That the example is not exhaustive is clear. Some types of cargo, for example, are never brought to a "holding or storage area," but are placed directly on a truck or railroad car for immediate inland movement. See Brief for Petitioner in No. 76-454, p. 38 n. 46; Tr. of Oral Arg. 44. And, while all would agree that persons bringing such cargo directly from a ship to a truck are engaged in maritime employment, see infra at 432 U. S. 274 -275, the example does not mention such activity. In addition, while it is incontrovertible that workers engaged in the process of loading a ship and performing steps analogous to those mentioned in the example -- that is, moving cargo from storage and placing it immediately on the ship -- are covered, the fact is that the example also does not mention these steps. See also discussion, n 38, infra.
In addition, we reiterate that Caputo did not fall within the excluded category of employees "whose responsibility is only to pick up stored cargo for further trans-shipment." S.Rep. 13; H.R.Rep. 11. As we indicated supra at 432 U. S. 266 -267, that exclusion pertains to workers, such as the consignees' truck drivers Caputo was helping, whose presence at the pier or terminal is for the purpose of picking up cargo for further shipment by land transportation.