Source: https://www.chanrobles.com/usa/us_supremecourt/372/29/case.php
Timestamp: 2020-06-02 08:37:47
Document Index: 348816238

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3', '§ 13', '§ 3', '§ 1', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 2', '§ 3', '§ 13']

UNITED STATES V. NATIONAL DAIRY PRODUCTS CORP., 372 U. S. 29 (1963)
US Supreme Court Decisions On-Line> Volume 372 > UNITED STATES V. NATIONAL DAIRY PRODUCTS CORP., 372 U. S. 29 (1963)
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This case involves the question whether § 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13a, making it a crime to sell goods at "unreasonably low prices for the purpose of destroying competition or eliminating a competitor," is unconstitutionally vague and indefinite as applied to sales made below cost with such purpose. National Dairy and Raymond J. Wise, a vice-president and director, upon being charged, inter alia, with violating § 3 by making sales below cost for the purpose of destroying competition, moved for dismissal of the Robinson-Patman chanrobles.com-red
The indictment charged violations of both the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, and the Robinson-Patman Act in Kansas City and in six local markets in the adjacent area. [Footnote 1] The Robinson-Patman counts charged National chanrobles.com-red
National Dairy and Wise urge that § 3 is to be tested solely "on its face," rather than as applied to the conduct charged in the indictment, i.e., sales below cost for the purpose of destroying competition. The Government, on the other hand, places greater emphasis on the latter, contending that, whether or not there is doubt as to the validity of the statute in all of its possible applications, chanrobles.com-red
Void for vagueness simply means that criminal responsibility should not attach where one could not reasonably chanrobles.com-red
The history of § 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act indicates that selling below cost, unless mitigated by some acceptable business exigency, was intended to be prohibited by the words "unreasonably low prices." That sales below cost without a justifying business reason may come within the proscriptions of the Sherman Act has long been established. See e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1 (1911). Further, when the Clayton Act was enacted in 1914 to strengthen the Sherman Act, Congress passed § 2 to cover price discrimination by large companies which compete by lowering prices, "oftentimes below the cost of production . . . chanrobles.com-red
Whether "below cost" refers to "direct" or "fully distributed" cost or some other level of cost computation cannot be decided in the abstract. There is nothing in the record on this point, and it may well be that the issue chanrobles.com-red
United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81 (1921), on which much reliance is placed, is inapposite here. In Cohen, the Act proscribed "any unjust or unreasonable rate or charge." The charge in the indictment was in the exact language of the statute, and, in specifying the conduct covered by the charge, the indictment did chanrobles.com-red
This opinion is not to be construed, however, as holding that every sale below cost constitutes a violation of § 3. Such sales are not condemned when made in furtherance of a legitimate commercial objective, such as the chanrobles.com-red
The statute here involved makes it a crime to sell "goods at unreasonably low prices for the purpose of destroying competition or eliminating a competitor." 15 U.S.C. § 13a. In United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81 (1921), this Court held unconstitutional and void for vagueness a statute which made it a crime "for any person willfully . . . to make any unjust or unreasonable rate or charge" in dealing in or with any necessaries. The rule established by that case has been often followed, [Footnote 2/1] is in my judgment sound, and should control this case. Accordingly, chanrobles.com-red