Source: http://www.juricaf.org/arret/CONSEILDELEUROPE-COUREUROPEENNEDESDROITSDELHOMME-19790301-820978
Timestamp: 2017-01-21 06:57:41+00:00
Document Index: 222057617

Matched Legal Cases: ['arrêt ', "l'article 6", "l'article 6", "l'article 6", "l'article 8", "l'article 8", "l'article 27", "l'article 6", "l'article 6", "l'article 183", "l'article 6", "l'article 27", "l'article 6", "l'article 6", "l'article 27", "l'article 6", "l'article 6"]

SUTTER c. SUISSE
Page d'accueil > Résultats de la recherche SUTTER c. SUISSE
Type d'affaire : DecisionType de recours : Partiellement irrecevableNumérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 8209/78Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1979-03-01;8209.78 Analyses : (Art. 14) DISCRIMINATION, (Art. 34) VICTIME, (Art. 6-1) ACCES A UN TRIBUNAL, (Art. 6-1) PROCES EQUITABLEParties : Demandeurs : SUTTERDéfendeurs : SUISSETexte : APPLICATION/REQUETE NÂ° 8209/7 8 Peter SUTTER v/SWITZERLAND Peter SUTTER c/SUISS E DECISION of 1 March 1979 on the admissibility of the application DÃCISION du 1- mars 1979 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªt e
Article 6, paragraph 1 of the Convention : a . Independence of Swiss military divisional tribunals and military Court o f cassation . The fact that the judges are appointed for three years by the Government is of little consequence . However, it is essential that they should enjoy a certain stability and that in the performance of their duties, they should not be subject to any authority . "Equality of arms" before the military Court of Cassation and opportunit y .b given to the senior judge of the tribunal which has delivered the judgment which is challenged, to present a report to the Court of cassation . In the present case the applicant was able to reply to the arguments which were developed. Article 8 of the Convention : If the obligation for part-time soldiers to have their hair cut short car by considered an interference with the right to respect for private life, such interference can be regarded as necessary for the protection of health
paragraphe 1,.Article6, de la Convention : a . IndÃ©pendance des tribunaux militaires suisses de division et du tribunal militaire de cassation . Peu importe que les juges soient nommÃ©s pour trois ans par le Gouvernement ; l'essentiel est qu'ils jouissent d'une certaine stabilitÃ© et que, dans l'exercice de leurs fonctions, ils ne soient soumis Ã aucune autoritÃ© . Â« EgalitÃ© des armes Â» devant le tribunal militaire de cassation et possibilitÃ© .b offerte au prÃ©sident du tribunal qui a rendu le jugement attaquÃ© de prÃ©senter un rapport Ã l'intention du tribunal de cassation . En l'espÃ©ce, il n'a Ã©tÃ© dÃ©veloppÃ© aucune argumentation Ã laquelle le requÃ©rant n Ã¢urait pu rÃ©pliquer .
Article 8 de la Convention : Si l'obligation laite Ã des soldats de milice de porter les cheveux courts constitue une ingÃ©rence dans l'exercice de leur droit au respect de la vie privÃ©e, cette ingÃ©rence peut Ã©tre considÃ©rÃ©e comme nÃ©cessaire Ã la protection de la santÃ© .
Ifnglish : see p. 171 )
Les faits de la cause peuvent se rÃ©sumer comme suit : Le requÃ©rant est un ressortissant suisse nÃ© en 1949 . Etudiant, il rÃ©side Ã BÃ¢le . II est reprÃ©sentÃ© devant la Commission par M . L . Minelli . Lors de cours de rÃ©pÃ©tition (Wiederholungskurs) tenus en 1974 et 1975, il avait dÃ©j9 Ã©tÃ© condamnÃ© Ã cinq et sept jours d'arrÃ¨ts de rigueur pour avoir refusÃ© de se conformer au chiffre 203bis du RÃ©glement de service, relatif Ã la coupe de cheveux . Peu avant le dÃ©but du cours de rÃ©pÃ©tition de 1976, il reÃ§ut de son commandant d'unitÃ© une lettre recommandÃ©e lui enjoignant de se prÃ©senter Ã ce cours avec une coupe de cheveux rÃ©glementaire . Le requÃ©rant se prÃ©senta toutefois le 28 aoÃ»t 1976 avec une chevelure plus longue que celle autorisÃ©e et repoussa l'ordre verbal de son commandant de batterie de se la faire couper . Le 16 mai 1977, le Tribunal de Division 5 condamna le requÃ©rant Ã une peine de dix jours d'emprisonnement pour insubordination (article 61 al . 1 du code pÃ©nal militaire) et inobservation d'un rÃ©glement larticle 72 al . 1 du mÃ©me code) . Le dÃ©fenseur choisi par le requÃ©rant, L . Minelli, avait vainement demandÃ© au tribunal qu'il se dÃ©clare incompÃ©tent, les tribunaux militaires en gÃ©nÃ©ral n'Ã©tant pas Â« indÃ©pendants et impartiaux Â» au sens de l'article 6 de la Convention ; il avait aussi sollicitÃ© en vain une enquÃ©te complÃ©mentaire relative Ã l'inutilitÃ© voire au caractÃ¨re abusif des dispositions rÃ©glementaires relatives Ã la coupe de cheveux . Le requÃ©rant se pourvut alors, dans les dÃ©lais, devant le Tribunal militaire de cassation . Son recours, adressÃ© au grand juge, fut transmis Ã l'auditeur en chef qui conclut au rejet . Il fut effectivement rejetÃ© le 21 octobre 1977, au terme d'une procÃ©dure Ã©crite . L'arrÃªt du Tribunal militaire de cassation ne fut pas lu en sÃ©ance publique . Il fut communiquÃ© au requÃ©rant le 24 janvier 1978 .
GRIEFS Ainsi qu'il l'avait fait devant le Tribunal militaire de cassation, le requÃ©rant invoque la violation des articles 6 et 8 de la Convention . 1 . II soutient en premier lieu que les tribunaux militaires ne sont pas indÃ©pendants et impartiaux au sens de l'article 6, paragraphe 1 . II fait valoir Ã - 167-
cet Ã©gard que les juges des tribunaux de Division, .qui continuent Ã servir dans leurs corps respectifs, sont nommÃ©s par le Conseil FÃ©dÃ©ral sur proposition de l'auditeur en chef ; en outre, le grand juge, prÃ©sident du Tribunal de Division, avait Ã©tÃ© dÃ©signÃ© en l'espÃ¨ce par l'auditeur en chef . - , 2 . II se plaint encore de ce que la procÃ©dure devant le Tribunal militaire de cassation ail un caractÃ©re Ã©crit et non public, en sorte que l'exigence de publicitÃ© de l'article 6, paragraphe 1 serait mÃ©connue . Il se plaint Ã©galement de ce que, en application du droit procÃ©dural en vigueur, l'arrÃªt de ce tribunal n'ait pas Ã©tÃ© lu en audience publique mais simplement communiquÃ© aux parties . 3 . Le requÃ©rant allÃ©gue encore une violation du principe de l'Ã©galitÃ© des armes en ce que le grand juge, prÃ©sident du Tribunal de Division, transmet Ã l'auditeur en chef Â« le recours len cassation) et le dossier, accompagnÃ© de son rapport sur les faits attaquÃ©s Â» (article 189 al . 3, du code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale militaire) sans que ce rapport soit communiquÃ© au recourant . 4 . Le requÃ©rant soutient enfin que les dispositions rÃ©glementaires relatives Ã la coupe de cheveux interdisent au citoyen suisse, durant trente ans, de se coiffer selon ses dÃ©sirs . Cela constituerait une ingÃ©rence injustifiÃ©e dans le droit au respect de la vie privÃ©e .
EN DROI T 1 . Le requ5rant se plaint du rÃ¨glement relatif Ã la coupe de cheveux et invoque Ã cet Ã©gard l'article 8 de la Convention, qui garantit notamment le droit au respect de la vie privÃ©e . II a, en effet, encouru une sanction pÃ©nale pour avoir constammen t refusÃ© de se conformer au chiffre 203bis du RÃ©glement de service qui dispose, en substance, que les cheveux doivent Ãªtre propres et soignÃ©s et coupÃ©s de maniÃ©re Ã ne pas toucher le col . Sans doute l'application de cette rÃ©gle peut-elle Bter au requÃ©rant, appelÃ© chaque annÃ©e 9 faire une pÃ©riode de service militaire, la possibilitÃ© de se coiffer selon son propre choix et porter atteinte Ã un mode d'expression de sa personnalitÃ© . Dans la mesure oÃ¹ l'application' du chiffre 203bis du RÃ©glement de service peut Ãªtre effectivement considÃ©rÃ©e comme constitutive d'une ingÃ©rence dans le droit du requÃ©rant au respect de sa vie privÃ©e, la Commission considÃ©re toutefois que cette ingÃ©rence Ã©tait justifiÃ©e au regard du paragraphe 2 de l'article 8 . ApprouvÃ©e par le Conseil FÃ©dÃ©ral, auquel le lÃ©gislateur a dÃ©lÃ©guÃ© le pouvoir d'Ã©dicter le RÃ©glement de service, celle disposition peut en effet Ãªtre raisonnablement considÃ©rÃ©e comme une mesure nÃ©cessaire Ã la protection' de la santÃ©, pour des raisons d'hygiÃ¨ne et d e
prÃ©vention d'accident semblables Ã celle qui sont invoquÃ©es dans les collectivitÃ©s importantes et les professions prÃ©sentant au mÃªme titre un risque particulier d'accidents du travail . Il s'ensuit que, sous cet angle, la requÃªte est manifestement mal fondÃ©e au sens de l'article 27, paragraphe 2 .
2 . Le requÃ©rant allÃ©gue, par ailleurs, que ni le Tribunal de Division ni le Tribunal militaire de cassation ne constituent des tribunaux indÃ©pendants et impartiaux au sens de l'article 6, paragraphe 1, de la Convention . InculpÃ© d'infraction au code pÃ©nal militaire, punissable de peines d'emprisonnement, le requÃ©rant Ã©tait sans nul doute accusÃ© d'une infraction pÃ©nale en sorte que le Tribunal de Division appelÃ© Ã statuer sur le bien-fondÃ© de cette accusation, devait offrir toutes les garanties de l'article 6, paragraphe 1, et notamment Ãªtre Â« indÃ©pendant et impartial Â» . Le requÃ©rant n'indique pas de quelle maniÃ©re le tribunal aurait pu faillir Ã son obligation d'impartialitÃ© ; en revanche, il soutient que cette juridiction n'Ã©tait pas indÃ©pendante, en raison du mode de dÃ©signation des juges et d . elurindÃ©pacehriqu Le Tribunal de Division est composÃ© d'un grand juge, officier de la justice militaire, entourÃ© de six juges assesseurs, soit trois officiers et trois sous-officiers ou soldats . Ces juges sont nommÃ©s pour trois ans par le Conseil FÃ©dÃ©ral, c'est-A-dire le Gouvernement . Cette procÃ©dure de nomination ne saurait, en elle-m@me, affecter l'indÃ©pendance du tribunal . L'indÃ©pendance d'un juge n'implique pas nÃ©cessairement en effet qu'il soit nommÃ© Ã vie Icf . dÃ©cision sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªte NÂ° 6859/74 c/Belgique, Rec . 3 p . 139 - solution implicite) ni qu'il soit inamovible en droit (Cour Eur . D .H ., ArrÃªt Engel du 8 juin 1976, par . 681, c'est-Ã©-dire qu'il ne puisse recevoir de nouvelle affectation sans son consentement . Ce qui est essentiel, c'est qu'il jouisse d'une certaine stabilitÃ©, fOt-ce pour une pÃ©riode dÃ©terminÃ©e, et qu'il ne soit soumis, dans l'exercice de ses fonctions de juge, Ã aucune autoritÃ© . Or, rien n'indique que les juges ainsi nommÃ©s puissent Ã«tre rÃ©voquÃ©s . Par ailleurs, mÃªme si, en tant que militaires, ils sont soumis Ã l'autoritÃ© de leurs supÃ©rieurs hiÃ©rarchiques dans leurs corps respectifs, lorsqu'ils siÃ©gent comme juges, ces officiers et soldats n'ont de compte Ã rendre Ã personne en ce qui concerne leur maniÃ¨re d'administrer la Justice . Garantie en termes gÃ©nÃ©raux par l'article 183 ter de la Loi du 12 avril 1907 sur l'organisation militaire de la ConfÃ©dÃ©ration, leur indÃ©pendance se trouve encore protÃ©gÃ©e par le secret du dÃ©libÃ©rÃ© . Il est vrai que, dans la prÃ©sente affaire, le grand juge a Ã©tÃ© dÃ©signÃ© par l'auditeur en chef qui exerce par ailleurs Ã l'Ã©gard de cet officier de la justice militaire un pouvoir hiÃ©rarchique . Il s'agissait toutefois uniquement de rem-
placer le grand juge titulairÃ©, qui avait dÃ©jA traitÃ© le dossier du requÃ©rant Ã un autre titre, par son supplÃ©ant, rÃ©guliÃ©rement affectÃ© au -mÃªme Tribunal de Division par le Conseil FÃ©dÃ©ral . Rien ne permet en consÃ©quence de douter que le Tribunal de Divisio n n'aurait pas constituÃ© en l'espÃ¨ce un tribunal indÃ©pendant et impartial au sens de l'article 6, paragraphe 1 . Le mÃªme raisonnement s'applique au Tribunal militaire de cassation , dont les membres sont Ã©galement nommÃ©s pour trois ans par le Conseil FÃ©dÃ©ral . Il s'ensuit que le requÃ©te est, Ã .cet Ã©gard, manifestement mal fondÃ©e au sens de l'article 27, paragraphe 2, de la Convention . Le requÃ©rant se plaint encore de la procÃ©dure .3 devant le Tribunal militaire de cassation, qui placerait l'accusÃ© dans une position dÃ©favorable . Il indique Ã cet Ã©gard que le grand juge, qui reÃ§oit le recours, a la facultÃ© d'y joindre un rapport sur les faits attaquÃ©s Ã l'attention de l'auditeur en chef du tribunal . II dÃ©nonce, par ailleurs, le fait que l'auditeur en chef puisse dÃ©poser devant le tribunal des conclusions non communiquÃ©es au recourant . Il allÃ©gue Ã cet Ã©gard la violation de l'article 6, paragraphe 1, de la . Convention . Cette disposition, qui s'applique Ã©galement aux Tribunaux de cassatio n lorsque l'Etat s'est dotÃ© de juridictions de cette nature ICour Eur . D .H ., ArrÃªt Delcou rt du 17 janvier 1970, par . 25), garantit le droit Ã un procÃ©s Ã©quitable 1 et renfermele principe de l'a Ã©galitÃ© des armes Â» . dÃ¨s lors lieu de vÃ©rifier si, par le jeu des articles 189, paragraphe 3,~ -Iya et 190 du code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale militaire, tels qu'ils ont Ã©tÃ© appliquÃ©s en l'espÃ©ce, le requÃ©rant a pu Ã¨tre placÃ© - dans une position dÃ©favorable . La Commission n'estime pas nÃ©cessaire d'examiner en I'espÃ©ce si le grand juge peut Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ©, Ã un titre quelconque, comme une partie Ã la procÃ©dure de cassation ni de dÃ©terminer dans quelle mesure l'auditeur en chef doit Ã©tre considÃ©rÃ© comme l'adve rs aire de l'accusÃ© lorsqu'il conclut au rejet du pou rv oi . Il suffit de constater que ni le premier juge ni l'auditeur en chef n'ont dÃ©veloppÃ© devant le Tribunat militaire de cassation la moindre argumentation Ã - laquellÃ© lÃ¨ requÃ©rant n'aurait pu rÃ©pliquer ; qu'ils se sont . bornÃ©s Ã conclure d'un mot au rejet du recours . Se rÃ©fÃ©rant Ã son abondante jurisprudence concernant des affaires analogues ( notamment : Rappon sur les atfaires Ofner et Hopfinger, Ann . VI p . 705 ; DÃ©cisions sur requÃªtes NÂ° 1135/61 c/Autriche, Ann . VI p . 195, et NÂ° 1035/61 c/RÃ©publique FÃ©dÃ©rale d'Allemagne, Ann . VI p . 181), la Commission ne peut, dans ces circonstances, distinguer aucune apparence de violation du principe de l' Â« Ã©galitÃ© des armes Â» garanti par l'article 6, paragraphe 1 .
Il s'ensuit que cet aspect de la requÃ©te est manifestement mal fondÃ© au sens de l'article 27, paragraphe 2 . Le requÃ©rant se plaint, enfin, de l'absence de toute procÃ©dure oral e .4 devant le Tribunal militaire de cassation ainsi que du dÃ©faut d'un prononcÃ© public des arrÃ©ts de cette juridiction . Il allÃ©gue Ã cet Ã©gard la violation de l'article 6, paragraphe 1, de la Convention . La Commission constate que ces griefs, s'agissant notamment du prononcÃ© du jugement, soulÃ©vent des questions dÃ©licates relatives Ã la nature des procÃ©dures de cassation ainsi qu'A la portÃ©e de l'exigence de publicitÃ© inscrite Ã l'article 6, paragraphe 1 . Elle estime nÃ©cessaire de pousser plus avant son examen de la recevabilitÃ© de ces derniers griefs sans pour autant retarder sa dÃ©cision relative aux griefs Ã©noncÃ©s sous 1 Ã 3 ci-avant n
1 . AJOURNE l'examen de la requÃ©te, dans la mesure oÃ¹ elle vise l'absence de procÃ©dure orale et le dÃ©faut de prononcÃ© public des arrÃªts du Tribunal militaire de cassation ; 2 . DÃCLARE LA RE O UETE IRRECEVABLE pour le surplus .
THE FACT S The facts of the case may be summarised as follows : The applicant, a Swiss national born in 1949, is a student and resides in Basle . He is represented before the Commission by Mr L . Minelli . During refresher courses (Wiederholungskurse) held in 1974 and 1975, he had earlier been sentenced to five and seven days' close arrest respectively for refusing to comply with paragraph 203bis of the service regulations relating to haircuts . Shortly before the beginning of the refresher course in 1976, he received a registered letter trom his unit commander instructing him to report for the course with a statutory haircut . Nevertheless the applicant reported for duty on 28 August 1976, with his hair longer than authorised and refused a verbal order from his battery commander to have it cut .
On 16 May 1977, Divisional Tribunal No . 5 sentenced the applicant to 10 days' imprisonment for insubordination (Section 61 (1) of the Military Penal Code) and failure to comply with a regulation (Section 72 (1) of the aforesaid Code) . Mr L . Mihelli, the defence counsel chosen by ihe applicant unsuccessfully requested the tribunal to declare itself incompetent, on the grounds that military tribunals in general were not "independent and impartial" within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention . He also applied unsÃ»ccessfully for a supplementary enquiry into the futility or indeed abusive nature of the statutory provisions relating to haircuts . The applicant then appealed, within the prescribed time, to the military Court of Cassation . His appeal, addressed to the senior judge Igrand juge), was transmitted to the senior military prosecutor (auditeur en chef) who recommended that it should be dismissed . It was in fact dismissed on 21 October 1977, after written proceedings . The judgment of the military . Court of Cassation was not read out at a public hearing . It was communicated to the applicant on 24 January 1978 .
COMPLAINT S The applicant alleges a violation of Articles 6 and 8 of the Convenlion as he had done earlier before the military Court of Cassation . 1 . He submits in the first place that military tribunals are not independent and impartial within the meaning of Article 6 (1) . He points out in that connection that the judges of divisional tribunals, who continue to serve in their respective units, are appointed by the Federal Council on a proposal from the senior military prosecutor . Furthermore, the senior judge, president of the Divisional Tribunal, had been appointed in the case in point by-the senior military prosecutor . He further complains .2 that the proceedings before the military Court o f Cassation are in writing and not public, so that the publicity required by Article 6 (1) is allegedly not given . He also complains that, under the procedural law in force, this tribunal's judgment was not read out at a public hearing but merely transmitted to the parties . 3 . The applicant further alleges a, violation of the principle of equality of arms in that the senior judge, President of the Divisional Tribunal, transmits to the senior military prosecutor"the appeal (to the Court of Cassation) and the file, together with his report on the facts in dispute" (Section 189 131 of the Code of Military Penal Procedure) without sending the report to the applicant . 4 . The applicant submits lastly that the statutory provisions relating to haircuts prohibit a Swiss national from having his hair cut according to his - 172 -
tastes for 30 years . That is allegedly an unwarranted interference in the right to respect for private life .
THE LAW 1 . The applicant complains of the regulations on haircuts and in that connection he invoked Article 8 of the Convention which guarantees inter alia the right to respect for private life . Actually he received a penal sanction for constantly refusing to comply with paragraph 203bis of the service regulations which prescribes, in essence, that hair must be clean, well looked after and cut so as not to touch the collar . Undoubtedly the application of that rule might make it impossible for the applicant, who is required to undergo a period of military service each year, to have his hair cut according to his own tastes and thus adversely affect the way in which he expresses his personality . Insofar as the application of paragraph 203bis of the service regulations may indeed be regarded as constituting an interference in the applicant's right to respect for his private life, the Commission considers however, that this interference was justified in the light of Article 8, paragraph 2 . This provision was approved by the Federal Council, to which legislation has delegated the authority to lay down service regulations, and it can indeed be reasonably regarded as a measure necessary for the protection of health, for hygienic reasons and for the prevention of accidents, similar to that invoked in large groups and professions presenting a similar specific risk of industrial accidents . It follows that, in this respect, the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph 2 . 2 . The applicant also alleges that neither the Divisional Tribunal nor the military Court of Cassation are independent and impartial tribunals within the meaning of Article 6, paragraph 1 of the Convention . The applicant was charged with an offence under the Military Penal Code, punishable by imprisonment, and therefore he was undoubtedly accused of a criminal offence, so that the Divisional Tribunal, called upon to rule on the merits of the accusation, had to offer all guarantees under Article 6, paragraph 1, and, in particular, be "independent and impartial" . The applicant does not say in what way the court might have failed in its duty to be impartial ; on the other hand he submits that it was not independent because of the manner in which the judges are appointed and their hierarchical dependence .
The Divisional Tribunal is composed of a senior judge (grand juge), a military law officer, assisted by 6 assessors, i .e . officers and 3 NCOs or other ranks . These judges are appointed by the Federal Council, i .e . the Government, for 3 years . This nomination procedure could not itself affect the tribunal's dependence . Actually, a judge's independence does not necessarily imply that he should be appointed for life (cf . Decision as to the admissibility of Application No . 6859/74 against Belgium, Collection of Decisions No . 3, p . 139 - Implicit solution) or that he should be irremovable in law (European Court of Human Rights, Engel Judgment of 8 June 1976, paragraph 68 ) , i .e . that he cannot be given other duties without his consent . But it is essential that he should enjoy a certain stability, if only for a specific period, and that he should not be subject to any authority in the performance of his duties as a judge . There is nothing to indicate that judges appointed in this way can be dismissed from office . Furthermore, even if as servicemen they are subject to the authority of their hierarchical superiors in their respective units, when they sit as judges, these officers and soldiers are not answerable to anyone about the way in which they administer justice . Their independence is guaranteed in general terms by Article 183ter .of the Act of 12 April 1907 on the military organisation of the Confederation, and is further protected by the secrecy of deliberations . , , Admittedly, in this case, the senior judge was appointed by the senior military prosecutor who,is also the hiefarchical superior of this military law officer . Nevertheless, all that had to be done was to replace the senior judge, who-had already dealt with the applicant!s file in another capacity, by his substitute who had been attached to the same Divisional Tribunal by the Federal Council in accordance with statutory regulations . There is no reason-to doubt that the Divisional Tribunal was, in the case in point, an independent and impa rt ial tribunal within the meaning of A rt icle 6, paragraph 1 . . â¢ The same reasoning applies to the military Court of cassation whose
members are also appointed for 3 years by the Federal Council . It follows that in this respect, the application is manifestly ill-founded 1 within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph 2 of the Convention . 3 . The applicant fu rt her complains of the procÃ¨edings before the milita ry Cou rt of Cassation which allegedly placed him in an unfavourable position . He states in this connection that the senior judge who receives the appeal has the power to attach to it a repo rt on the facts in dispÃ»te for the attention of the senior milita ry prosecutor and the cou rt . He also complains of the fact that thesenior milita ry prosecutor canpresent conclusions to the cou rt which are not transmitted to the applicant . In this connection he alleges a violation of Article 6, paragraph .1of the Convention .
This provision, which also applies to Courts of Cassation when the State has instituted courts of that type (European Court of Human Rights, Delcourt Judgment, 17 January 1979, paragraph 251, guarantees the right to a fair trial and embodies the principle of "equality of arms" . Therefore it has to be established whether the applicant could have been placed in an unfavourable position because of the application of Sections 189 (3) and 190 of the Code of Military Penal Procedure as they were applied in this case . The Commission does not consider it necessary in this case to examine whether the senior judge can be regarded, in any capacity, as a party to the appeal proceedings or to determine to what extent the senior military prosecutor must be regarded as the accused's opponent when he concluded that the appeal should be dismissed . Suffice it to say that neither the first judge nor the senior military prosecutor presented any arguments before the military Court of Cassation to which the applicant was unable to reply ; they merely stated that the appeal should be dismissed . In the light of its abundant jurisprudence concerning similar cases le .g . : report of the Ofner and Hopfinger cases, Yearbook VI, page 704 ; Decisions concerning Applications No . 1135/61 against Austria, Yearbook VI, page 194 and No . 1035/61 against the Federal Republic of Germany, Yearbook VI, page 1601, the Commission is unable in these circumstances to distinguish any apparent violation of the principle of "equality of arms" guaranteed by Article 6 . paragraph 1 . It follows that this aspect of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 . paragraph 2 . 4 Lastly, the applicant complains of the absence of any oral proceedings before the military Court of Cassation and the fact that this Court's judgements are not pronounced in public . He alleges a violation of Article 6, paragraph 1 of the Convention in this connection . The Commission finds that these complaints, which mainly concer n the pronouncement of judgment, raise delicate questions concerning the nature of appeals' proceedings and the scope of the requirement for publicity embodied in Article 6, paragraph 1 . It considers it necessary to pursue its examination as to the admissibility of these latter complaints further, without deferring its decision as to the complaints set out under 1 to 3 above n
ADJOURNS the examination of the application insofar as it concerns the absence of oral proceedings and the lack of a public pronouncement of the judgments of the milita ry Court of Cassation ;
2 . DECLARES INADMISSIBLE THE REMAINDER OF THE APPLICATION . - 175 -Origine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Commission (plénière)Date de la décision : 01/03/1979Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page