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PATTERSON V. NEW YORK, 432 U. S. 197 - Volume 432 - 1977 - Full Text - US Supreme Court Center - USSC Cases - Nolo
US Supreme Court Center > Volume 432 > PATTERSON V. NEW YORK, 432 U. S. 197 (1977) > Full Text
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and STEWART, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. POWELL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 432 U. S. 216. REHNQUIST, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
Patterson was charged with second-degree murder. In New York, there are two elements of this crime: (1) "intent to cause the death of another person"; and (2) "caus[ing] the death of such person or of a third person." N.Y. Penal Law § 125.25 (McKinney 1975). [Footnote 1] Malice aforethought is not an element of the crime. In addition, the State permits a person accused of murder to raise an affirmative defense that he "acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse." [Footnote 2]
The jury found appellant guilty of murder. Judgment was entered on the verdict, and the Appellate Division affirmed. While appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was pending, this Court decided Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684 (1975), in which the Court declared Maine's murder statute unconstitutional. Under the Maine statute, a person accused of murder could rebut the statutory presumption that he committed
In 1895, the common law view was abandoned with respect to the insanity defense in federal prosecutions. Davis v. United States, 160 U. S. 469 (1895). This ruling had wide impact on the practice in the federal courts with respect to the burden of proving various affirmative defenses, and the prosecution
in a majority of jurisdictions in this country sooner or later came to shoulder the burden of proving the sanity of the accused and of disproving the facts constituting other affirmative defenses, including provocation. Davis was not a constitutional ruling, however, as Leland v. Oregon, supra, made clear. [Footnote 9]
In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358, 397 U. S. 364 (1970). Five years later, in Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684 (1975), the Court further announced that, under the Maine law of homicide, the burden could not constitutionally be placed on the defendant of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the killing had occurred in the heat of passion on sudden provocation. THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, concurring, expressed their understanding that the Mullaney decision did not call into question the ruling in Leland v. Oregon, supra, with respect to the proof of insanity.
We are unwilling to reconsider Leland and Rivera. But even if we were to hold that a State must prove sanity to convict once that fact is put in issue, it would not necessarily follow that a State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact, the existence or nonexistence of which it is willing to recognize as an exculpatory or mitigating circumstance affecting the degree of culpability or the severity of the punishment. Here, in revising its criminal code, New York provided the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance, a substantially expanded version of the older heat-of-passion concept; but it was willing to do so only if the facts making out the defense were established by the defendant with sufficient certainty. The State was itself unwilling to undertake to establish the absence of those facts beyond a reasonable doubt, perhaps fearing that proof would be too difficult and that too many persons deserving treatment as murderers would escape that punishment if the evidence need merely raise a reasonable doubt about the defendant's emotional state. It has been said that the new criminal code of New York contains some 25 affirmative defenses which exculpate or mitigate but which must be established by the defendant to be operative. [Footnote 10] The Due Process Clause, as we see it, does not
punish one as a murderer when it is as likely as not that he acted in the heat of passion or under severe emotional distress and when, if he did, he is guilty only of manslaughter. But this has always been the case in those jurisdictions adhering to the traditional rule. It is also very likely true that fewer convictions of murder would occur if New York were required to negative the affirmative defense at issue here. But in each instance of a murder conviction under the present law, New York will have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant has intentionally killed another person, an act which it is not disputed the State may constitutionally criminalize and punish. If the State nevertheless chooses to recognize a factor that mitigates the degree of criminality or punishment, we think the State may assure itself that the fact has been established with reasonable certainty. To recognize at all a mitigating circumstance does not require the State to prove its nonexistence in each case in which the fact is put in issue, if, in its judgment, this would be too cumbersome, too expensive, and too inaccurate. [Footnote 11]
Tot v. United States, 319 U. S. 463, 319 U. S. 469 (1943). See also Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. at 357 U. S. 523-525. Morrison v. California, 291 U. S. 82 (1934), also makes the point with sufficient clarity.
Long before Winship, the universal rule in this country was that the prosecution must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. At the same time, the long-accepted rule was that it was constitutionally permissible to provide that various affirmative defenses were to be proved by the defendant. This did not lead to such abuses or to such widespread redefinition of crime and reduction of the prosecution's burden that a new constitutional rule was required. [Footnote 12] This was not the problem to which Winship was addressed. Nor does the fact that a majority of the States have now assumed the burden of disproving affirmative defenses -- for whatever reasons -- mean that those States that strike a different balance are in violation of the Constitution. [Footnote 13]
It is urged that Mullaney v. Wilbur necessarily invalidates Patterson's conviction. In Mullaney, the charge was murder, [Footnote 14] which the Maine statute defined as the unlawful killing of a human being "with malice aforethought, either express or implied." The trial court instructed the jury that the words "malice aforethought" were most important because "malice
Mullaney's holding, it is argued, is that the State may not permit the blameworthiness of an act or the severity of punishment authorized for its commission to depend on the presence or absence of an identified fact without assuming the burden of proving the presence or absence of that fact, as the case may be, beyond a reasonable doubt. [Footnote 15] In our view,
It was unnecessary to go further in Mullaney. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court made it clear that malice aforethought, which was mentioned in the statutory definition of the crime, was not equivalent to premeditation, and that the presumption of malice traditionally arising in intentional homicide cases carried no factual meaning insofar as premeditation was concerned. Even so, a killing became murder in Maine when it resulted from a deliberate, cruel act committed by one person against another, "suddenly without any, or without a considerable, provocation." State v. Lafferty, supra at 665. Premeditation was not within the definition of murder; but
New York's present homicide laws had their genesis in lingering dissatisfaction with certain aspects of the common law framework that this Court confronted in Mullaney. Critics charged that the archaic language tended to obscure the factors
125.25(1)(a) (McKinney 1975). [Footnote 2/1] Under current New York law, [Footnote 2/2] those who kill intentionally are guilty of murder. But there is an affirmative defense left open to a defendant: if his act was committed "under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse," the crime is reduced to manslaughter. The supposed defects of a formulation like Maine's have been removed. Some of the rigid objectivity of the common law is relieved, since reasonableness is to be determined "from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation under the circumstances
But in one important respect, the New York drafters chose to parallel Maine's practice precisely, departing markedly from the ALI recommendation. Under the Model Penal Code, the prosecution must prove the absence of emotional disturbance beyond a reasonable doubt once the issue is properly raised. See ALI, Model Penal Code §§ 1.12, 210.3 (Proposed Official Draft 1962); id. § 1.13, Comment, pp. 108-118 (Tent; Draft No. 4, 1955). In New York, however, extreme emotional disturbance constitutes an affirmative defense, rather
397 U.S. at 397 U. S. 364. The only "facts" necessary to constitute a crime are said to be those that appear on the face of the statute as a part of the definition of the crime. [Footnote 2/3] Maine's statute was invalid, the Court reasons, because it "defined [murder] as the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought, either express or implied.'" Ante at 432 U. S. 212. "[M]alice," the Court reiterates, "in the sense of the absence of provocation, was part of the definition of that crime." Ante at 432 U. S. 216. Winship was violated only because this "fact" -- malice -- was "presumed" unless the defendant persuaded the jury otherwise by showing that he acted in the heat of passion. [Footnote 2/4] New York, in form presuming
This explanation of the Mullaney holding bears little resemblance
With all respect, this type of constitutional adjudication is indefensibly formalistic. A limited but significant check on possible abuses in the criminal law now becomes an exercise in arid formalities. What Winship and Mullaney had sought to teach about the limits a free society places on its procedures to safeguard the liberty of its citizens becomes a rather simplistic lesson in statutory draftsmanship. Nothing in the Court's opinion prevents a legislature from applying this new learning to many of the classical elements of the crimes it punishes. [Footnote 2/8] It would be preferable, if the Court has found
It is unnecessary for the Court to retreat to a formalistic test for applying Winship . Careful attention to the Mullaney decision reveals the principles that should control in this and like cases. Winship held that the prosecution must bear the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt "the existence of every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged.'" 397 U.S. at 397 U. S. 363, quoting Davis v. United States, 160 U. S. 469, 160 U. S. 493 (1895). In Mullaney, we concluded that heat of passion was one of the "facts" described in Winship -- that is, a
Implicit in these two inquiries are the principles that should govern this case. The Due Process Clause requires that the prosecutor bear the burden of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt only if the factor at issue makes a substantial difference in punishment and stigma. The requirement of course applies a fortiori if the factor makes the difference between guilt and innocence. But a substantial difference in punishment alone is not enough. It also must be shown that, in the Anglo-American legal tradition, [Footnote 2/10] the factor in question historically has held that level of importance. [Footnote 2/11] If either branch
The Court beats its retreat from Winship apparently because of a concern that otherwise the federal judiciary will intrude
The Winship/Mullaney test identifies those factors of such importance, historically, in determining punishment and stigma that the Constitution forbids shifting to the defendant the burden of persuasion when such a factor is at issue. Winship and Mullaney specify only the procedure that is required when a State elects to use such a factor as part of its substantive criminal law. They do not say that the State must elect to use it. For example, where a State has chosen to retain the traditional distinction between murder and manslaughter, as have New York and Maine, the burden of persuasion must remain on the prosecution with respect to the distinguishing factor, in view of its decisive historical importance. But nothing in Mullaney or Winship precludes a State from abolishing the distinction between murder and manslaughter and treating all unjustifiable homicide as murder. [Footnote 2/13] In this significant
Moreover, it is unlikely that more than a few factors -- although important ones -- for which a shift in the burden of persuasion seriously would be considered will come within the Mullaney holding. With some exceptions, then, the State has the authority "to recognize a factor that mitigates the degree of criminality or punishment" without having "to prove its nonexistence in each case in which the fact is put in issue." Ante at 432 U. S. 209. New ameliorative affirmative defenses, [Footnote 2/14] about
Furthermore, as we indicated in Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 421 U. S. 701-702, n. 28, even as to those factors upon which the prosecution must bear the burden of persuasion, the State retains an important procedural device to avoid jury confusion and prevent the prosecution from being unduly hampered. The State normally may shift to the defendant the burden of production, [Footnote 2/16] that is, the burden of going forward with sufficient
evidence "to justify [a reasonable] doubt upon the issue." [Footnote 2/17] ALI, Model Penal Code § 1.13, Comment, p. 110 (Tent.Draft No. 4, 1955). If the defendant's evidence does not cross this threshold, the issue -- be it malice, extreme emotional disturbance, self-defense, or whatever -- will not be submitted to the jury. [Footnote 2/18] See Sansone v. United States, 380 U. S. 343, 380 U. S. 349 (1965); Stevenson v. United States, 162 U. S. 313, 162 U. S. 314-316 (1896). Ever since this Court's decision in Davis v. United States, 160 U. S. 469 (1895), federal prosecutors have borne the burden of persuasion with respect to factors like insanity, self-defense, and malice or provocation, once the defendant has carried this burden of production. See, e.g., Blake v. United States, 407 F.2d 908, 910-911 (CA5 1969) (en banc) (insanity); Frank v. United States, 42 F.2d 623, 629 (CA9 1930) (self-defense); United States v. Alexander, 152 U.S.App.D.C. 371, 389-395, 471 F.2d 923, 941-947, cert. denied sub nom. Murdock v. United States, 409 U.S. 1044 (1972) (provocation). I know of no indication that this
Although the Court never says so explicitly, its new standards appear to be designed for application to the language of a criminal statute on its face, regardless of how the state court construes the statute. The Court, in explaining Mullaney, persistently states that, in Maine, malice "was part of the definition of that crime [murder]," ante at 432 U. S. 216, even though the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, construing its own statute, had ruled squarely to the contrary. See n. 4, supra. In the usual case, it is well established that an authoritative construction by the State's highest court "puts [appropriate] words in the statute as definitely as if it had been so amended by the legislature." Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507, 333 U. S. 514 (1948). See Mullaney, supra at 421 U. S. 690-691; Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U. S. 312, 272 U. S. 316-317 (1926); Murdock v. Memphis, 20 Wall. 590, 87 U. S. 635 (1875). Why an apparent exception should be engrafted on that doctrine today goes unexplained.
I have no doubt that the Court would find some way to strike down a formalistically correct statute as egregious as the one hypothesized in n. 8, supra. Cf. Morissette v. United States, 342 U. S. 246, 342 U. S. 250-263 (1952). But today's ruling suggests no principled basis for concluding that such a statute falls outside the "obvious" constitutional limits the Court invokes.
A number of commentators have suggested that the Constitution permits the States some latitude in adjusting the burden of persuasion with respect to new ameliorative affirmative defenses that result from legislative compromise, but not with respect to other factors. See, e.g., W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra, n. 11, at 49; 1 National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, Working Papers 119 (1970); ALI, Model Penal Code § 1.13, Comment, p. 113 (Tent.Draft No. 4, 1955) (quoted, ante at 432 U. S. 209 n. 11); Note, 51 Wash.L.Rev. 953, 964 (1976); Osenbaugh, supra, n. 13, at 459-467. Cf. Fletcher, supra, n. 13, at 928-929.
There are outer limits on shifting the burden of production to a defendant, limits articulated in a long line of cases in this Court passing on the validity of presumptions. Most important are the "rational connection" requirement of Mobile, J. & K. C. R. Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U. S. 35, 219 U. S. 43 (1910), and Bailey v. Alabama, supra at 219 U. S. 238-239, and also the "comparative convenience" criterion of Morrison v. California, 291 U. S. 82 (1934). See also e.g., Tot v. United States, supra at 319 U. S. 467-468; Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, 357 U. S. 523-524 (1958); Leary v. United States, 395 U. S. 6, 395 U. S. 33-34 (1969); Barnes v. United States, 412 U. S. 837, 412 U. S. 843 (1973). Caution is appropriate, however, in generalizing about the application of any of these cases to a given procedural device, since the term "presumption" covers a broad range of procedural mechanisms having significantly different consequences for the defendant. See McCormick, n. 11, supra at 802-806; Evans v. State, 28 Md.App. 640, 675-678, 349 A.2d 300, 324-325 (1975).
C. McCormick, Evidence § 307, pp. 638-639, and n. 2 (1st ed.1954). Cf. Fletcher, supra, n. 13, at 930.
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