Source: https://el.b-ok.org/book/960192/1a2e34
Timestamp: 2019-12-06 20:50:34
Document Index: 242218663

Matched Legal Cases: ['art. 1', 'art. 8', 'art. 1', 'art. 1', 'art. 13', 'art. 4', 'art. 25']

Political Violence and the International Community: Developments in International Law and Policy | Kirsti Samuels | download
Κύρια Political Violence and the International Community: Developments in International Law and Policy
Are civil conflicts and coups d'etat matters of international concern, or questions of national interest only? How can the increasingly common practice of condemnation and intervention by the United Nations and individual States into situations of extreme political violence be understood? Will civil conflict one day be considered illegal under international law, in the same way as international war? Offering a penetrating analysis that unpacks the relationships between political violence, international policy and international law, and explores international practice in more than 30 civil conflicts, this book challenges many assumptions we hold about the dividing line between domestic and international affairs, whether democracy is an international norm, and how long the international community is prepared to sit on the sidelines and allow ruthless political violence to determine political leadership in nations. This book fills an important void and captures the complexities and tensions inherent in an area where practice has moved faster than theory, and pragmatism clashes with idealism.
Εκδότης: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers
ISBN 10: 1571053743
ISBN 13: 9781571053749
POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND THE
DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL
M A RT I N U S N I J H O F F P U B L I S H E R S
Cover photo by Kirsti Samuels, Somalia, March 2006.
Political violence and the international community : developments in
international law and policy / Kirsti Samuels.
ISBN 978-1-57105-374-9
1. Intervention (International law) 2. War (International law)
3. Sovereignty. 4. Political violence. 5. Coups d’état.
6. Humanitarian assistance. 7. United Nations. Security Council.
KZ6368.S26 2007
341.5’84—dc22
Copyright (c) 2007 Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands.
All rights reserved. No part of this public may be reproduced, translated,
prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy
items for internal or personal use is granted by Brill provided that the
appropriate fees are paid directly to the Copyright Clearance Center,
222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are
About the Author . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
List of Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
Chapter 1: Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
A. A Shifting Understanding of Sovereignty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
B. International Norms, Law, and Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
C. Civil Conflict and Coup d’État Under International Law . . . . 12
1. Civil Conflict and Coup d’État Defined . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2. Intervention Prohibited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3. Self-Determination and Secession. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4. Humanitarian Laws in Armed Conflict. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5. Coup d’État. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
D. Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Chapter 2: Methodological Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
A. An Appropriate Customary Law Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1. Legal Methodology and the Emergence of
Human Rights Customary Law Norms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2. Elements of the Customary Law Context . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
a. Whose Practice Is Relevant? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
b. Condemnation Followed by Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
c. Verbal Acts and Physical Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
d. A Question of Consent?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
e. Inconsistent Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3. International Law and Non-State Actors . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
B. The Normative Impact of Security Council Practice . . . . . . . 41
1. The Relevance of Resolutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
a. Textual Interpretation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
b. When Are Resolutions Binding? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Non-Chapter VII Resolutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
ii. Resolutions Addressed at Parties vs.
U.N. Members . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
iii. Non-State Actors?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2. The Security Council and Customary Law . . . . . . . . . . . 49
a. The Approach of the Court and Commentators. . . . 49
The International Court of Justice . . . . . . . . . . . 49
ii. The View of Commentators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
iv • Political Violence and the International Community
b. Evidence of Practice and Opinio Juris of States . . . . . 52
The Practice of an International
Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
ii. Analogy with the General Assembly? . . . . . . . . . 54
iii. Authority of the Council . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
iv. Seriousness and Binding Nature of
Resolutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
v. Decision-Making Body . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
vi. Consequential Practice of States
Under Resolutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
c. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Quasi-Legislative Impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
a. Quasi-Judicial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
b. Explicit Quasi-Legislative Determinations . . . . . . . . . 63
c. Implicit Quasi-Legislative Prohibitions? . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Ad Hoc Policy or Binding Prohibitions? . . . . . . . 65
ii. Council Sanctions and Illegality . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
d. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Shaping International Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
a. Crystallizing the Opinion of the International
Community. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
b. Shaping the Practice of States. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
Chapter 3: The Security Council Response to Extreme
Political Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
A. The Legal Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
1. Pacific Settlement of Disputes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
2. Intervention Under Chapter VII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3. Peace-Keeping Forces. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
B. The Practice of the Council . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
1. Rejecting Violence to Resolve Political Disputes . . . . . . 79
a. Overview of the Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
The Balkans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
ii. Kosovo. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
iii. Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. . . . . . 88
iv. Other Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
v. Contrary Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
vi. Rejecting Violent Breach of a Cease-Fire or
Peace Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
b. Ad Hoc Response to a Threat to International
Peace and Security or Binding Principle? . . . . . . . . 107
c. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
Rejecting Political Violence Against a Democratically
Elected Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
a. Overview of the Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
b. Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
An Obligation to Resolve Conflicts Peacefully? . . . . . . 124
a. Overview of the Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
b. Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
Rejecting Violence Against Civilians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
Chapter 4: The Response of States and Regional Organizations . . . 141
A. Sierra Leone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
1. Prohibition on Violence Against a Democratically
Elected Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
a. Condemnation of the Coup and Calls for the
Junta to Step Down . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
b. Sanctions Against the Rebels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
c. Forceful Intervention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
2. Prohibition on Recourse to Violence to Resolve
Political Disputes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
3. Prohibition on Violence Against Civilians . . . . . . . . . . 153
4. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
B. Côte D’Ivoire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
Elected Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
Political Disputes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
3. Prohibition on the Breach of a Peace or Cease-Fire
Agreement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
4. Prohibition on Violence Against Civilians . . . . . . . . . . 164
5. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
C. Liberia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
Elected Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
2. Prohibition on Violence Against Civilians . . . . . . . . . . 173
3. Prohibition on Recourse to Violence to Resolve
Political Disputes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
4. Prohibition on the Breach of a Peace or Cease-Fire
Agreement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
5. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
D. The A.U. and ECOWAS Security Treaties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
1. Prohibition on Violence to Resolve Political
Disputes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
vi • Political Violence and the International Community
Prohibition on Violence Against Civilians . . . . . . . . . . 185
Prohibition on Violence Against a Democratically
Elected Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
4. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
Chapter 5: The Nature and Impact of the Emerging Norms . . . . . . 191
A. The Domestic Nature of Civil Conflicts? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
B. Prohibition on Political Violence Against a Democratic
Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
1. The Impact of the Norm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
C. Prohibition on Violence to Gain Political Power? . . . . . . . . 204
1. A Broad Support. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
D. Realpolitik and Normative Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
1. Implied Exceptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
2. Ethical and Political Rationales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
Appendix 1: Security Council Practice in Civil Conflicts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
Appendix 2: Table of Security Council Interventions and Consent . . . . . . . 381
Appendix 3: Rationale for Non-Intevention in Conflicts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 391
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 399
Table of Security Council Resolutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 421
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 435
Dr. Kirsti Samuels is the Senior Programme Manager of the ConstitutionBuilding Processes program at International IDEA, an inter-governmental
organization that supports sustainable democracy worldwide. In 2006, she
worked in Somalia and Kenya as the lead legal consultant to UNDP on a
constitution-building process for Somalia and with the interim government
for Somalia and later the Constitutional Commission in developing and
implementing an inclusive and participatory process.
Dr. Samuels has consulted to the World Bank on Rule of Law reform
in post-conflict countries and the Clinton Global Initiative on state-building
policy and civil conflict. During 2003–2005, she headed the state-building
program at the International Peace Academy, focusing on the challenges
faced and the lessons learned from previous state-building experiences. She
has taught Law at University College Oxford (2000–2002), clerked on the
Australian constitutional court and final court of appeal for the Hon.
Justice Michael McHugh (1998–1999), and worked with the Australian
Delegation to UNESCO in Paris, on the Underwater Cultural Heritage Treaty
Negotiation and the campaign for Director General (2000).
Dr. Samuels holds a Law Degree and Science Degree from the University of Sydney, and a Masters in Laws and a Doctorate from Oxford University.
Recent publications include: RULE OF LAW REFORM IN POST-CONFLICT
COUNTRIES: OPERATIONAL INITIATIVES AND LESSONS LEARNED (World Bank
Social Development Papers Series, Oct. 2006); Post-Conflict Peace-Building
and Constitution-Making, 6(2) CHICAGO JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(Winter 2006); CONSTITUTION BUILDING PROCESSES AND DEMOCRATIZATION: A DISCUSSION OF TWELVE CASE STUDIES (International IDEA,
2006); CONSTITUTIONAL ENGINEERING AFTER CONFLICT: THE CONSEQUENCES OF GOVERNANCE CHOICES IN POST-CONFLICT CONSTITUTIONS (IPA,
2006); Sustainability and Peace-Building: A Key Challenge,” 15(6) JOURNAL OF
DEVELOPMENT IN PRACTICE (Nov. 2005); State-Building and the Political
Transition after Conflict, PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW ANNUAL CONFERENCE (2005).
I am infinitely grateful to Professor Sir Frank Berman QC, advisor
and friend, for his challenging and insightful supervision of the Dphil
thesis that developed into this book. For friendship beyond the call of
duty and dedicated reading and discussion of drafts, I gratefully thank
Drew Evans. Thanks to my sister, Saffron, for extraordinarily patient
proof-reading, and to my father, Dr. Rob Samuels, whose intellectual
curiosity and vitality inspired me to start the doctoral work, and whose
trust and patient reading sustained me to its completion.
Thank you to Magdalen College and its members that were my home
and my Oxford family during the years of writing the thesis. I am grateful for financial support through a Senior Mackinnon Scholarship and a
Herbert Warren Benefaction from Magdalen, and to the Sir Robert
Menzies Memorial Trust for a Scholarship in Law.
Finally, I want to thank my mentor and friend Justice Michael
McHugh of the Australian High Court, whose intellectual rigor and
integrity, and lifelong dedication to justice, will always remain an inspiration and example to me.
Armed Forces Ruling Council (Sierra Leone)
Liberations United for Reconciliation and Democracy
U.N. Mission in Côte d’Ivoire
Patriotic Movement of Côte d’Ivoire
U.N. Assistance Mission for Rwanda
U.N. Mission in Sierra Leone
U.N. Angola Verification Mission
Uniao Nacional Para a Independencia Total de
Angola (United Front for the Total Liberation of
U.N. Mission in Liberia
U.N. Observer Mission in Sierra Leone
U.N. Operation in Somalia
U.N. Protection Force in Croatia
U.N. Transitional Administration in East Timor
Political violence within a state can take the form of a range of violent struggles aiming to capture or retain political power in a state,
including civil conflict, coup d’état, terrorist actions, as well as riots or
violent demonstrations and the violent repression of such movements.
While questions surrounding terrorism and the protection of political
speech and other human rights have been widely debated and form an
important aspect of international legal and policy discourse, the
response of the international community1 to civil conflicts and coups
d’état has not been subject to systematic analysis in the international
law or policy arena.2 However, violence in the domestic context, particularly civil war and coup d’état, is proving itself to be a particularly
intractable and complex issue currently facing the international community. Civil war has become the dominant type of war in number3 and
1 I use the term “international community” as a shorthand to encapsulate a variety of different actors on the international plane that are relevant to a discussion of
emerging international norms: states, regional organizations, and U.N. bodies, particularly the General Assembly, the Security Council, and the Secretary-General.
2 The study of civil conflict has largely focused on the legality of intervention in
civil war by third parties (see, e.g., Richard Falk, Introduction, in 1 THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF CIVIL WAR 1 (Richard Falk ed., 1971); LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN
WORLD (John Norton Moore ed., 1974); or CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND THE USE OF FORCE (2000)) and the application of humanitarian laws of war (see,
e.g., LINDSAY MOIR, THE LAW OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT (2002)). One exception to this trend is HEATHER A. WILSON, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF
FORCE BY NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS (1988), which considered the legality of the use of force by rebels in wars of national liberation and concluded that
despite a trend toward the extension of the authority to use force to national liberation movements, the resort to force in such wars “remained a matter of self-help
beyond the purview of international law” (Id. at 28). Another is Ruth Wedgwood, The
Use of Force in Civil Disputes, 26 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 239 (1996), which suggests, albeit
in an introductory and tentative manner, that contemporary international practice
implies that the prohibition on the use of force “may be extended to bar large-scale
military force in pursuit of domestic political objectives” (Id. at 239).
3 E.g., Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, Sudan, Rwanda,
Burundi, Western Sahara, Colombia, East Timor, Sri Lanka, Kashmir, Nepal, West
Papua, Laos, Afghanistan, the Former Yugoslavia, Kosovo, and Chechnya represent a
few of the more prominent. Evan Luard, Civil Conflicts in Modern International Relations,
in THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF CIVIL WARS 7 (Evan Luard ed., 1972), contrasts seven international conflicts with at least 34 civil wars during 1945–70. The vast
2 • Political Violence and the International Community
severity.4 It has caused humanitarian devastation on a vast scale, as well
as serious disruption of regional and international peace and security. 5
The purpose of this work is to collate and analyze a broad range of
international community practice with respect to civil conflicts and coups
d’état and to investigate how this practice, which has undergone substantial change in the last 15 years, is shaping international law and policy. “International policy” is used to describe norms that have widespread
acceptance within the international community from a moral or rational
perspective, whereas “international law,” in particular customary law, is
used to describe those norms that satisfy the formal requirements for the
emergence of international legal norms within the legal discourse.
Since the end of World War II and particularly in the last decade,
states, regional organizations, and the United Nations have become
increasingly involved in situations of civil conflicts and coups d’état. They
condemn them, call on parties to cease fighting and to resolve their disputes by peaceful means, and frequently impose sanctions or intervene
forcefully. The international community has also formulated a series of
rationales for its actions, ranging from rejecting violence against civilians
to rejecting the use of force against democratic governments.
For many years, such responses to civil conflicts and coups d’état
took place in the Cold War context, and they were largely governed by
geopolitical ideology and superpower motives rather than international
majority of the 30 wars in Africa since 1970 have been civil wars. See The SecretaryGeneral, Report of the Secretary-General into the Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of
Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa, delivered to the Security Council, U.N.
Doc. A/52/871, S/1998/318 (Apr. 16, 1998), available at http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/
geninfo/afrec/sgreport/index.html. Of the 11 U.N. peace-keeping operations established between 1992 and 1995, 82 percent dealt with internal conflicts. See The
Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization:
Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, U.N. Doc. A/50/60*, S/1995/1* (Jan. 25, 1995).
4 These wars have been frequently characterized by intense and deliberate assault
of the civilian population, ruthless terror tactics, tribal or ethnic conflict, massive violations of human rights, and often a complete or partial breakdown of the state concerned. According to the Fund for Peace, more civilians have died from internal wars
than from inter-state wars and terrorism combined, and civilian fatalities have grown
to represent 90 percent of war-related deaths in the 1990s as compared to 5 percent
at the turn of the century. FUND FOR PEACE, CONFLICT PREVENTION AND RECOVERY
PROGRAM (2000).
5 Consider, e.g., the impact of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Kosovo,
Rwanda, Somalia, Sierra Leone, or Afghanistan.
policy or legal norms. Security Council involvement was sporadic—the
Council generally only intervened once the parties had come to accept
the need for a negotiated peace agreement.
However, since the end of the Cold War, the international community, and particularly the Council, has begun intervening frequently
and consistently in such conflicts. These interventions are not easily
explicable on the basis of geopolitical ideology and strategic interests.
A large amount of new practice is accumulating, which raises the question of how international policy and legal norms are being shaped by
this practice. This introduction reviews the existing international law
and policy that addresses civil conflict and coup d’etat before turning
to the recent practice.
A SHIFTING UNDERSTANDING OF SOVEREIGNTY
The context for the discussion undertaken includes a broad shift in
the approach of the international community to matters of state sovereignty. The content of the concept of sovereignty provides the basis for
interpretation of the scope of obligations of states and the international
community, as well as of the rights of the international community vis-àvis states, and a number of matters that used to be considered to fall
within the exclusive jurisdiction, or sovereignty, of a state—including
human rights, humanitarian intervention, and civil conflicts—are
increasingly viewed as matters of international concern. For instance, a
number of U.N. Secretaries-General have emphasized that sovereignty
cannot be ascribed a meaning that shelters states from their responsibilities when serious human rights abuses are taking place. Most recently,
Kofi Annan asserted, “State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being
redefined—not least by the forces of globalization and international cooperation. States are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples, and not vice versa.”6 This statement takes up and
expands on a statement by Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar: “It
is now increasingly felt that the principle of non-interference with the
essential domestic jurisdiction of States cannot be regarded as a protective barrier behind which human rights could be massively or systematically violated with impunity.”7 And, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-
Kofi Annan, Two Concepts of Sovereignty, ECONOMIST, Sept. 18, 1999, at 49.
The Secretary-General, Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the
Organization, at 10–11, U.N. Doc. A/46/1 (Sept. 16, 1991).
4 • Political Violence and the International Community
Ghali has said: “The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty, however,
has passed; its theory was never matched by reality.”8
The extensive and heated debate surrounding humanitarian intervention is another example of this trend.9 The reformulation of that
debate by the International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty as a question of the responsibility of states to protect their
people10 has resulted in a watershed decision by the General Assembly to
adopt the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war
crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. They stated that
they “accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it” and
went on to hold that they were prepared to take collective action through
the Security Council under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, “should
peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly
8 The Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and
Peace-Keeping, U.N. Doc. A/47/277, S/24111, ¶ 17 (June 17, 1992). See also American
Society of International Law, The End of Sovereignty?, 88 PROC. ANN. MEETING OF ASIL
(1995); Annan, supra note 6; Nico Schrijver, The Changing Nature of State Sovereignty, 70
BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 65 (1999). The debate continues, however. See Derek Bowett, The
Interrelation of Theories of Intervention and Self-Defense, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE
MODERN WORLD, supra note 2, at 38; INTERVENTION IN WORLD POLITICS (Hedley
Bull ed., 1984); W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary
International Law, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 866 (1990); Louis Henkin, The Mythology of
Sovereignty, 21 PROC. ANN. CONF. OF CAN. COUNCIL INT’L L. 5 (1992); American
(1995); Thomas F. Franck, Multiple Tiers of Sovereignty: The Future of International
Governance, 88 PROC. ANN. MEETING OF ASIL 51 (1994); MORTIMER SELLERS, THE
NEW WORLD ORDER: SOVEREIGNTY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES (1996); NEIL MACCORMICK, QUESTIONING SOVEREIGNTY: LAW,
STATE, AND NATION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMONWEALTH (1999).
9 See, e.g., Wolfgang Friedmann, Intervention, Civil War and the Role of International
Law, 59 PROC. ANN. MEETING OF ASIL 67 (1965); Tom J. Farer, Intervention in Civil
Wars: A Modest Proposal, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 266 (1967); John Norton Moore, Toward
an Applied Theory for the Regulation of Intervention, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 1, supra note 2; LORI F. DAMROSCH, ENFORCING RESTRAINT: COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS (1993); Anthony Chukwuka Ofodile,
The Legality of ECOWAS Intervention in Liberia, 32 COLUM. J. TRANSNT’L L. 381 (1994);
JAMES MAYALL, THE NEW INTERVENTIONISM 1991–1994: UNITED NATIONS EXPERIENCE IN CAMBODIA, FORMER YUGOSLAVIA AND SOMALIA (1996); THEODOR
MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY LAW (1989);
Lois E. Fielding, Taking the Next Step in the Development of New Human Rights: The
Emerging Right of Humanitarian Assistance to Restore Democracy, 5 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L
L. 329 (1995); FERNANDO R. TESÓN, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY
INTO LAW AND MORALITY (2d ed. 1997); SIMON CHESTERMAN, JUST WAR OR JUST
PEACE?: HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2001).
10 INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY,
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 2.24 (2001).
failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing and crimes against humanity.”11
The way civil conflicts are perceived has also undergone dramatic
change. The basic legal framework for the analysis of conflict remains the
division of wars into civil and international,12 and the most common legal
formulation considers that civil conflicts are matters within the domestic
jurisdiction of states.13 However, it is widely accepted that subject matters
are not irrevocably fixed within this reserved domain14 and that such
jurisdiction may be controlled and limited by international duties
through treaty or custom or whenever a matter requires enforcement in
relation to another state.15 The practice of the international community
reviewed in this book suggests that such conflicts are increasingly recognized as matters that are appropriate for international scrutiny and
involvement.16 Moreover, the Council has maintained that many civil con11
2005 World Summit Outcome: Final Document, U.N. Doc. A/60/L.1 (Sept. 20,
12 Civil wars involve conflicts primarily fought between factions internal to a sovereign state, and international wars, conflicts between two or more sovereign states.
Richard Falk, Preface, in 1 THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF CIVIL WAR, supra note 2, at
xi. See also Rosalyn Higgins, Internal War and International Law, in 3 THE FUTURE OF
THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER: CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 81, 85 (Cyril E. Black
and Richard A. Falk eds., 1969), pointing out that identification of a conflict as civil
or international is “essential to the correct application of the relevant legal norms” but
also that is it often difficult to appraise a conflict as simply internal.
13 Domestic matters are considered to be matters “where the jurisdiction of the
state is not bound by international law.” IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW (5th ed. 1998). See the discussion of the traditional approach
in FALK, supra note 2, at 11–16; GRAY, supra note 2, at 51.
14 BROWNLIE, supra note 13, at 293; ROSALYN HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS
58–130, esp. 63 (1963); MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW (4th ed. 1997).
The notion that domestic jurisdiction is relative is also expounded in Nationality
Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco (French Zone) on November 8, 1921, Advisory
Opinion, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 4 (Feb. 7) [hereinafter Nationality Decrees Case].
15 BROWNLIE, supra note 13, at 293; Satvinder Juss, Nationality Law, Sovereignty, and
the Doctrine of Exclusive Domestic Jurisdiction, 9 FLA. J. INT’L L. 219, 228–29 (1994). This
view of domestic jurisdiction finds support in the Nationality Decrees Case, 1923 P.C.I.J.
(ser. B) No. 4, at 24, and is consistent with the exemption for Chapter VII enforcement measures.
16 NIGEL D. WHITE, KEEPING THE PEACE: THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY (2d ed. 1997), quoting Report of the
Conference held at San Francisco by the Rt Hon Frazer, NZ Dept. of External Affairs
Publication, No. 11, 28, argued that Article 2(7) should be read to permit intervention
where it is “proper in the interests of peace and justice, and in the preservation of
human rights to interfere in the internal affairs of Member states.” Cf. D.R. Gilmour, The
6 • Political Violence and the International Community
flicts represent a threat to international peace and security. Goodrich et
al. point out that any situation that amounts to a threat to international
peace and security is “patently a matter of international concern.”17 Falk’s
predicted “growth of a community willingness to remove internal wars
from the sanctuary of ‘domestic jurisdiction’”18 has crystallized in the
actual practice of states and the international community. The extent to
which international law and policy has developed to reflect such changes
is investigated in greater detail in Chapter 5.
INTERNATIONAL NORMS, LAW, AND POLICY
The term “international policy” is used to describe norms that have
widespread acceptance within the international community from a moral
or rational perspective, whereas international law, and, in particular, customary law, is used to describe those norms that satisfy the formal
requirements for the emergence of international legal norms within the
In essence, this book considers international law to be a sub-system
of international politics, whereby, since both are in a state of continual
evolution, as new issues arise in international politics, so international
policy is formulated and international law is slowly crystallized, and each
reinforces the other. The real importance of international law may not
be so much in its coercive power, since it is weak, but rather in the normative standards it sets, which play a role in shaping international politics and policy. These, like international law, are supported through
normative influence and moral and diplomatic pressure.
The emergence and relevance of international law is a highly contested area of analysis both within international relations discourse and
within legal jurisprudence. Commentators influenced by realpolitik conclude that only power and interest shape international norms, and any
compliance with international law by states is merely a coincidence of
Meaning of Intervene Within Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter, 16 INT’L & COMP. L.Q.
330, 349 (1967), who maintains that it excludes anything internal.
17 LELAND M. GOODRICH ET AL., CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS 292 (3d ed. 1969). See Lois E. Fielding, Taking a Closer
Look at Threats to Peace: The Power of the Security Council to Address Humanitarian Crises, 73
U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 551 (1996). White agrees: “[A]ny finding under Article 39,
whether or not combined with enforcement measures, is sufficient to internationalise
the situation and to escape the grasp of Article 2(7).” WHITE, supra note 16, at 56.
Richard Falk, Janus Tormented: The International Law of Internal Law, in INTER-
NATIONAL ASPECTS OF CIVIL STRIFE 185, 208 (James Rosenau ed., 1964).
interests. Because international law does not have enforcement capability and is largely based on consent, it has little relevance in an international order dominated by power.19 However, others argue that
international law does impact on the conduct of states and moreover
plays a symbolic and standard-setting role in the international sphere.20
The chasm between these positions is exacerbated by widely divergent jurisprudential approaches to international law. Legal positivism,
the most conservative approach to international law, focuses on legal
rules with little interest in the political considerations and practical realities.21 The feature “which characterizes all, or at least all traditional,
Positivistic theories is that these are not concerned with values and
ideals”22 and hence divorce law from morality or values. Natural law theories, in contrast, see moral values as inextricably linked to policy choices
and consider it possible to arrive at commonly agreed norms based on
moral reasoning.23 Renewed natural law theories have moved beyond
reliance entirely on morality or natural law and seek to integrate an analytical approach to the identification of laws while still taking into
19 For a discussion of the Realist school and why it considers international law to
be of little relevance to international politics, see Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern
International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT’L L.
338 (1989); ROBERT O. KEOHANE, NEOREALISM AND ITS CRITICS 7 (1986); Francis
A. Boyle, The Irrelevance of International Law: The Schism Between International Law and
International Politics, 10 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 198 (1980); Robert G. Gilpin, The Richness
of the Tradition of Political Realism, 38 INT’L ORG. 290 (1984). Keohane highlighted
three assumptions: that states are the key units of action; that they seek power, either
as an end in itself or as a means to other ends; and that they behave in ways that are
essentially rational. KEOHANE, supra, at 6.
20 For an introduction to aspects of the debate from the international law perspective, see MARTIN DIXON AND ROBERT MCCORQUODALE, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON INTERNATIONAL LAW ch. 3 (3d ed. 2000); INTERNATIONAL LAW, CASES AND
MATERIALS ch. 1 (Louis Henkin and Wolfgang Friedmann eds., 1980); IAN BROWNLIE, THE RULE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (1998); MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI,
FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA (1989).
21 Colin Warbrick, The Theory of International Law: Is There an English Contribution?,
in THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN
MEMORY OF MICHAEL AKEHURST 49, 61 (Vaughan Lowe and Colin Warbrick eds.,
1994); for an alternative approach, see PHILIP ALLOTT ET AL., THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN INTRODUCTION (1991).
22 G.J.H. VAN HOOF, RETHINKING THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 34
23 Colin Warbrick, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law: An Assessment, 11
EUR. J. INT’L L. 621, 627 (2000). See Stephen Hall, The Persistent Spectre: Natural Law,
International Order and the Limits of Legal Positivism, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 269 (2001), for
a discussion of the ongoing role of natural law in international law.
8 • Political Violence and the International Community
account the role values can play in shaping the law.24 Finnis, for instance,
argues that the aim is not to “minimise the range and determinacy of
positive law or the general sufficiency of positive sources as solvents of
legal problems,” but rather to show that the act of stating a legal rule “is
an act which can and should be guided by ‘moral’ principles and rules;
and that those moral norms are a matter of objective reasonableness, not
whim, convention, or mere ‘decision.’”25 Thus, the aim of the natural law
tradition becomes to “determine what the requirements of practical reasonableness really are, so as to afford a rational basis for the activities of
legislators, judges, and citizens.”26
In contrast, the policy and sociological approaches to international
law seek to replace “the fictitious legalism of traditional jurisprudence
with a conception nearer to the realities of the law.”27 They reject the certainty and clarity of the analytical approach, which they perceive as misleading and simplistic, since it does not reflect the complexity of reality,
which includes power, economic rationales, and other influences on state
conduct.28 A common theme in many of the approaches is the recognition that international behavior arises from complex interactions
between rules and political, social, and cultural factors.29
24 See esp. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980); see M.D.A.
FREEMAN, LLOYD’S INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 132 (7th ed. 2001).
FINNIS, supra note 24, at 290.
Id. See also RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 245 (1998). Dworkin’s approach
rejects the positivist separation between law and morals and argues that law constitutes
rules and “non-rule standards”—moral and political standards—on which courts can
draw in order to reach a decision in hard cases.
27 Hans Morgenthau, Positivism, Functionalism, and International Law, in THE
NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 159, 172 (Gerry Simpson ed., 2001).
28 See e.g. Myres S. McDougal, International Law, Power and Policy: A Contemporary
Conception, 82 RECUEIL DES COURS 133 (1953); MYRES S. MCDOUGAL AND W.
MICHAEL REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW ESSAYS: A SUPPLEMENT TO INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE (1981); Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A.
Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113 (1999). For an
interesting review of some of these theories, see MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER
AND THE POWER OF RULES: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 125 (1999); and Morgenthau, supra note 27, at 172.
ORIOL CASANOVAS, UNITY AND PLURALISM IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
85 (2001); OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
27–28 (1991).
Some commentators argue that such emphasis on social reality
undermines the ability of law to provide certainty and predictability and
results in law acting as apology for power dynamics.30 Indeed, some
within this school side with those international relations scholars who discount international law and maintain that states comply with norms only
because of self-interest and not out of “a sense of moral or legal obligation.”31 However, others consider that the policy approach can ground
international law in reality, while at the same time maintaining its normative value. Higgins adopts a “law as process” approach that she argues
“encourages interpretation and choice that is more compatible with values we seek to promote and objectives we seek to achieve.”32 In her analysis, formulating law is not a mechanistic process but a rational one, which
involves choices between options, taking into account the political and
social context to make decisions that best reflect community interests
and promote common values. International law, in her analysis, is composed of norms that states believe to be necessary to guide their relations
with one another.33
This book considers that both international law and international
politics are relevant to the shaping of perceived reality. In the practice of
international law and international relations, it is difficult to disentangle
law from politics and power. Consider, for instance, how political and ideological perspective affected the degree to which the international intervention in Iraq was considered legal. As Scott aptly observes, “Power is
not a consideration distinct from international law. It appears that the
idea of international law is an important form of power in international
politics.”34 Even from a legal perspective, Higgins points out that there is
a close relationship between law and politics:
Policy considerations, although they differ from “rules,” are an
integral part of that decision making process which we call international law; the assessment of so-called extralegal considerations
is part of legal process, just as is reference to the accumulation of
See, e.g., VAN HOOF, supra note 22, at 26.
Goldsmith and Posner, supra note 28, at 1114.
ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
HOW WE USE IT 10 (1994).
Id. at 18, 95, 8–9.
Shirley V. Scott, International Law as Ideology: Theorizing the Relationship Between
International Law and International Politics, 5 EUR. J. INT’L L. 313 (1994).
10 • Political Violence and the International Community
past decisions and current norms. . . . There is no avoiding the
essential relationship between law and politics.35
On the question of how to deal with a field of international law where
practice no longer accords with traditional norms, this book is sympathetic
to the view put forward by scholars such as Reisman, Franck, and Falk that
international law must sufficiently mirror international reality to be able to
influence and shape it. The conservative view has been to uphold the validity of the extant norms and discount inconsistent practice.36
However, increasingly, commentators support an approach that
emphasizes the importance of descriptive accuracy, where laws are
assumed to correspond to reality. Roberts argues:
Descriptive accuracy (which focuses on what the practice has
been) is valuable in justifying the content of international law
because laws should correspond to reality. Laws must bear some
relation to practice if they are to regulate conduct effectively,
because laws that set unrealistic standards are likely to be disobeyed and ultimately forgotten. This consideration particularly
applies to decentralized systems of law, such as international law,
where traditional enforcement mechanisms are unavailable or
underdeveloped. Descriptive accuracy is also essential to predictive power because a theory that accurately describes practice
enables more reliable predictions of future state behavior.37
Similarly, Reisman rejects the approach of those international experts
who “respond to the appearance of a discrepancy between existing and
emerging legal arrangements by heatedly rejecting the new,” without taking into account whether the traditional arrangements are appropriately
attaining their goal, particularly in contexts different from those they
35 Higgins, supra note 32, at 5, quoting her position in Rosalyn Higgins, Integration of
Authority and Control: Trends in the Literature of International Law and International
Relations, in TOWARD WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN DIGNITY 80 (W. Michael Reisman
and Burns Weston eds., 1976).
36 This approach is particularly prevalent with commentators who reject the emergence of new norms permitting humanitarian and pro-democratic intervention, and
any other exceptions to the prohibition on intervention, and the crystallization of
human rights customary law.
37 Elizabeth A. Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International
Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 757, 762 (2001).
were originally established to address.38 Franck also supports attempts to
reformulate the law to better reflect reality; otherwise “international law,
like law dealing with drug addiction, cannot hope to influence the situation so long as the law itself induces everyone to pretend that the problem does not exist.”39
Rules that are unenforced and do not represent the actual practice
of states should be carefully scrutinized. Falk argues: “A legal norm that
operates in such a climate of contradiction is bound to function as mere
rhetoric and to erode generally arguments urging for international
law.”40 “It is better explicitly to disregard particular rules of international
law that have become obsolete than to make the entire legal system
appear obsolete by disregard of rules in practice.”41 While rejecting the
natural law-influenced approach where certain rules, such as rules
against aggression and self-defense, have “higher normativity,”42 Higgins
maintains that the reason certain norms, such as the prohibition on torture, retain their status, despite breaches, is that the opinio juris in favor
of such norms is not withdrawn.43 But she also acknowledges that it is
only by looking “behind the legal rhetoric to the reality” that “a more
realistic legal order can be built.”44
In essence, it is important to move beyond a formalistic approach
that undermines the respect due to international law by rendering it an
academic and theoretical field irrelevant to the circumstances and events
in the real world. Such an approach hinders the development of principles that can guide the practice of the international community in relation to civil conflicts, as it masks the failure of the traditional rules. The
38 W. Michael Reisman, Editorial Comment: Assessing Claims to Revise the Laws of War,
97 AM. J. INT’L L. 82, 83 (2003).
39 Thomas M. Franck and Nigel Rodley, Legitimacy and Legal Rights of Revolutionary
Movements with Special Reference to the People’s Revolutionary Government of South Viet Nam,
in THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 723, 732 (Richard Falk ed., 1972).
FALK, supra note 2.
Falk, supra note 18, at 216.
Oscar Schachter, Entangled Treaty and Custom, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AT A
TIME OF PERPLEXITY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SHABTAI ROSENNE 717, 734 (Yoram
Dinstein ed., 1989).
HIGGINS, supra note 14, at 22.
Rosalyn Higgins, International Law and Civil Conflict, in THE INTERNATIONAL
REGULATION OF CIVIL WARS, supra note 3, at 169.
12 • Political Violence and the International Community
issue will be most difficult when real-world practice violates basic moral
principles, but, even then, when a so-called norm becomes no more than
empty rhetoric, its existence serves less to protect than to render complacent those who ought to be lobbying for a more effective law. It is vital
that international law evolve better to approximate real-world practice
and thereby reflect the changing perspective of the international community, providing guidance in the new situations that arise.
CIVIL CONFLICT AND COUP D’ÉTAT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
Despite the growing general perception that civil conflict is no
longer a matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of states, the conventional international legal approach to civil conflicts remains very limited.
This section provides an overview of what law and policy has developed
so far and sets the context for the remainder of the discussion.
Little has changed in the legal literature since Falk set out the scope
of international law with respect to civil conflict as being restricted to (1)
“a process for designating the degree of formal acknowledgment by third
states of the claims made on behalf of the anti-government faction”
(through the rules dealing with belligerency); (2) “a rhetoric for claiming and contesting various forms of external participation in internal
wars”; (3) “a system for regulating the scope of hostilities by the application of the rules of war”; and (4) “limited control over the outcome of
internal wars whenever the community consensus can be effectively
mobilized in support of one faction” (where such wars are deemed a
threat to international peace and security).45
The traditional position remains that civil conflict is largely beyond
the reach of international law and neither legal nor illegal.46 Accordingly,
there is no restriction on the use of violence to initiate a civil conflict,
whereas initiating an international conflict—the unilateral use of force
by states against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
other state—is outlawed, subject to the right of self-defense.47 Borrowing
Falk, supra note 18, at 194.
WILSON, supra note 2.
U.N. Charter Article 2, paragraph 4, provides: “All Members shall refrain in
with the Purposes of the United Nations.” The prohibition has also crystallized as a
general norm of international law, according to the decision in Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits, 1986 I.C.J. 14
(June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua, Merits]. The right to self-defense is preserved in
U.N. Charter Article 51.
terminology from the international war context, no jus ad bellum internum
norms prohibit civil conflict.48
As More points out,
[t]he normative standards for differentiating permissible from
impermissible resort to force have, like the other principal
strands in the international law of conflict management, largely
evolved in response to conventional warfare across national
boundaries. Thus, for the most part, they provide only minimal
guidance, if any, to normative judgment concerning conflicts
purely within national boundaries.49
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the view that civil conflicts were domestic
matters, there has been little discussion or analysis of the legality of civil
conflict under international law. In 1963, Lauterpacht stated without further discussion, “the Law of Nations does not treat civil war as illegal.”50
Similarly, Akehurst states: “There is no rule in international law against
civil wars. Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter prohibits the use or threat of
force in international relations only.51 It is possible that each side will
regard the other side as traitors from the point of view of municipal law,
but neither the insurgents nor the established authorities are guilty of
any breach of international law.”52 This line of thought is reflected in
Starke’s comment, “It is trite law that civil wars are not prohibited by any
international legal rules.”53 The assumption that there is no international
48 The terminology of “jus ad bellum internum,” “recourse to force,” and “recourse
to violence” in internal conflicts as used here must be distinguished from similar terminology and concepts used in international conflicts. In the international context,
jus ad bellum governs the legitimacy of direct use of force against the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of a state and possibly extends to indirect violence through support for subversive or terrorist armed activities within another state.
49 John Norton Moore, Introduction, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN
WORLD, supra note 2, at xiii, xiii.
50 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, DISPUTES, WAR AND NEUTRALITY
(Hersch Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1963). Note that later editions did not update the
volume of Oppenheim addressing this issue.
51 The San Francisco debates on the U.N. Charter do not discuss how to address
civil conflicts. These were apparently not considered to be a threat to international
peace and security at the time.
52 MICHAEL AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW
281–82 (6th ed. 1992).
JOSEPH G. STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW (10th ed. 1989),
14 • Political Violence and the International Community
law addressing recourse to force is also consistent with a general lack of
detailed discussion of the issue in many major texts.54 One exception to
this trend is a short but noteworthy article by Wedgwood that raised the
question of whether international law should extend jus ad bellum to “bar
large-scale military force in the pursuit of domestic political objectives,”
and concluded that irrespective of the many theoretical and moral difficulties arising from such a notion, “an international norm against use of
force in questions of ethnic secession is worthy of debate.”55
Civil Conflict and Coup d’État Defined
The terms “civil conflict” and “coup d’état” do not yet have an
accepted specialized meaning in international law. Civil conflict requires
more elaboration. Some commentators have used the term “civil wars,”
others refer to “internal wars,” “non-international wars,” “guerrilla wars,”
“revolutions,” “belligerencies,” “rebel wars,” or “wars of self-determination.” “Civil conflict” has been adopted here to refer to non-international
violent conflict involving a government and one or more non-state actors
that reaches a level of intensity of insurgency or belligerency.
Traditionally, international law dealt with civil wars according to their
level of intensity and the extent of territorial control by rebels. The terminology of “rebellion,” “insurgency,” and “belligerency” was initially
used to categorize different levels of civil strife for the purposes of international law. These constituted the basis of the original rules governing
intervention discussed in Section C.2.
The lowest intensity category of civil disruption, a rebellion, defined
as involving temporary or sporadic acts of violence, was the exclusive
domestic concern of the state against which it was fought. Insurgency fell
between rebellion and belligerency. It arose when it was not yet appropriate for third-party states to treat rebels as “having the full rights and
which also appears in the latter edition by Ivan Shearer; IVAN A. SHEARER, STARKE’S
INTERNATIONAL LAW 489 (11th ed. 1994).
54 See e.g. the reasoning in FALK, supra note 2, at 11; GRAY, supra note 2 (other
than in the context of self-determination); MOIR, supra note 2, at 1. Similarly, in the
report on law in civil conflicts, undertaken by the American Society of International
Law, the discussion focused on the right to intervene in civil conflicts and did not consider the legality of waging the conflict. LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN
WORLD, supra note 2, at 1.
Wedgwood, supra note 2, at 239, 251.
obligations of a belligerent, or to regard third states as subject to the
obligations of neutrality.”56 However, the conflict “may have such scope,
and be accompanied by a sufficient degree of organisation on the part of
the rebels, that they can no longer be treated as private individuals committing unlawful acts.”57 At a minimum, therefore, insurgency requires
rebel control over territory and “sufficient military might for the interests of foreign States to be affected.”58 Belligerency, the state of civil disorder closest to international war, arises, according to Lauterpacht, when
rebel forces occupy territory, have a measure of orderly administration,
observe the rules of warfare, and there is a practical necessity for thirdparty states to define their attitude to the war.59 Once a party is recognized as a belligerent, all the rules of international law with respect to
warfare apply to it.60
This terminology has been criticized for being self-referential and
discretionary, derived from practical necessity for a third-party state to
define its attitude to the rebels,61 and the practice of explicit recognition
of belligerency has largely fallen into disuse—although Oppenheim suggests that a recognition of belligerency in ways other than by formal declaration is permissible and not an infrequent occurrence.62 This division
of civil conflicts has been termed “more theoretical than real,” and not a
single recognition of belligerency has occurred since World War II.63
Nonetheless, for better or worse, important international law has been
written in the language of this terminology, so it is necessary to engage
56 ROBERT JENNINGS AND ARTHUR WATTS, OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW
165–66 (9th ed. 1992).
WILSON, supra note 2, at 24; FALK, supra note 2, at 11; Higgins, supra note 12.
OPPENHEIM, supra note 50, ¶ 76.
Id. at 249. See also JENNINGS AND WATTS, supra note 56, at 165, cross-referencing OPPENHEIM, supra note 50, paras. 55, 76, 76a; WILSON, supra note 2, at 24.
61 Franck and Rodley, supra note 39, at 724. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 67 (2001), calls the rules “rather confused and rudimentary.” See also FALK, supra
note 2, at 11, rejecting the view that an improper recognition would amount to an illegal interference in the affairs of a state.
OPPENHEIM, supra note 50, at 250–51.
WILSON, supra note 2, at 27.
16 • Political Violence and the International Community
The Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions essentially
adopted the standard of belligerency when it defined the conflicts that it
applies to as being non-international armed conflicts involving armed
forces of organized groups under responsible command and exercising
control over a part of the territory.64 However, the present discussion
adopts the terminology of “civil conflict” to include both belligerency
and insurgency, as there seems to be little distinction in the practice
between the response of the international community to one or the
other. This certainly implies a degree of violence greater than “merely
limited local unrest,”65 and the conflict must be of a sufficient scale and
degree of intensity to differentiate it from riots and sporadic violence.66
Nonetheless, the term “civil conflict” is not intended to incorporate
the somewhat dated and complex rules developed to deal with the legal
recognition of the existence of a state of “war” between nations, according to which civil war only occurs once recognition of belligerency is
made, which gives international recognition to the non-state party.67
The term “rebel” is used generically to refer to a non-governmental
party involved in civil conflict. The term is not intended to impart any
judgment, such as the notion that rebels “unjustly” take up arms, as de
Vattel uses the term.68
It should be noted that the line between strictly internal and international conflicts is becoming increasingly blurred. Civil wars often
evolve from strictly internal affairs to internationalized conflicts
directly or indirectly involving other states. Moreover, under international law, certain categories of conflicts are taking on quasi-interna-
64 See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Relating
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, art. 1, para. 1, 16
I.L.M. 1442 (1977) [hereinafter Additional Protocol II].
GRAY, supra note 2, at 58.
See discussion of different levels of conflict in WILSON, supra note 2, at 23; GRAY,
supra note 2, at 58.
67 See OPPENHEIM, supra note 50, at 209; William T. Burke, The Legal Regulation of
Minor International Coercion: A Framework of Inquiry, in THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 39, at 79, 80, emphasizing the confusion and complexity
of the terminology. INGRID DETTER, THE LAW OF WAR 3–25 (2d ed. 2000).
68 Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law, Originally
Printed in 1758, in THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 39, at
tional status.69 Wars of self-determination are one example of this
trend. Internal conflicts are another example where third-party states
have intervened.70 Certain separatist conflicts have also been recategorized as international through the recognition of breakaway territories as new states (as occurred in the break-up of Yugoslavia for
instance). This phenomenon of internationalization is an integral
aspect of the current investigation, and hence such wars are included
within the term “civil conflict.”
Civil conflicts encompass a wide spectrum of conflicts and involve
armed groups with different aims and approaches. Part of the complexity that confronts the analysis of such conflicts arises from the very diversity of contexts in which they occur.71 In addition, the nature of civil war
has changed dramatically over the last 50 years. Initially the post-World
War II literature dealing with rebels focused on armed forces that continued to fight once the state had admitted defeat (there was much discussion of German forces acting as rebels and of groups fighting outside
invading forces amounting to rebels).72 By the 1950s and 1960s,
however, the dominant type of civil war was the post-colonial war of
liberation, which raised issues of self-determination and anti-colonialism.73 The contemporary world arena, in contrast, is dominated by civil
wars with ethnic cleansing or religious aims—such as in Rwanda or the
former Yugoslavia—or wars with clear financial incentives for the rebels,
such as those in Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Sudan, or Colombia.
Finaly, for the purposes of this book, “coup d”état” is taken to mean
any attempt to overthrow a government by force. This definition does not
turn on whether injury or death results, since it is implicit that violence
would have been used if necessary.
69 ADAM ROBERTS AND RICHARD GUELFF, DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR
(3d ed., 2000).
70 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment of the Appeals
Chamber (July 15, 1999) [hereinafter Tadic, Judgment of the Appeals Chamber]: an
internal conflict may become international “if (i) another State intervenes in that conflict through its troops, or alternatively (ii) some of the participants in the internal
armed conflict act on behalf of that State.”
71 See a review of different contexts and different types of conflicts in FALK, supra
note 2, at 17–22. See the categorization of conflicts in 1969, Higgins, supra note 12, at
72 See, e.g., Iosee Trainin, Questions of Guerrilla Warfare in the Law of War, 40 AM. J.
INT’L L. 534 (1946); Lester Nurick and Roger W. Barrett, Legality of Guerrilla Forces
Under the Laws of War, 40 AM. J. INT’L L. 563 (1946).
E.g., WILSON, supra note 2.
18 • Political Violence and the International Community
Intervention Prohibited
As the one exception to the otherwise substantially under-developed
legal and policy discourse surrounding civil conflict, the law governing
intervention in civil conflict has received sustained attention. However,
the issue is far from settled. In theory, intervention by outside states into
civil conflicts is largely prohibited. This derives from the well-established
duty of states not to intervene or interfere74 in the internal affairs of
other states.75
In the words of Oppenheim’s International Law, “when there exists a
civil war and control of a State is divided between warring factions, any
form of interference or assistance (except probably of a humanitarian
character) to any party amounts to intervention contrary to international
law.”76 Assistance to rebels is also prohibited irrespective of the level of
conflict or the purpose of the war.77 The International Court of Justice in
Nicaragua rejected any exceptions to this rule based on the rebel’s aims
or political or moral values, although it did not address the case of assistance to liberation movements.78
The one area of contention is the degree to which consensual intervention is restricted. Though states may invite intervention while a civil
disturbance falls below the level of intensity of a civil conflict, some have
argued that when the conflict reaches the level of a civil conflict, thirdparty states may no longer intervene to assist the government, irrespective of consent.79
Both terms are used in the relevant General Assembly declarations.
See, e.g., Committee of Enquiry into Breaches of International Law, Report and
Findings of Committee of Enquiry into Breaches of International Law Relating to Intervention
in Spain, S/32 and S/34 SCOR (1936), 1.1 Supp 2 at 54–55, Security Council, Apr. 17,
1946, SCOR 1.1 N2, 167; Titus Komarnicki, L’Intervention en Droit International Moderne,
in REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 521 (1956) (Fr.); Tom J.
Farer, Harnessing Rogue Elephants: A Short Discussion on Foreign Intervention in Civil Strife,
82. HARV. L. REV. 511 (1969); Moore, supra note 9, at 1.
JENNINGS AND WATTS, supra note 56, at 438.
Higgins, supra note 12; CASSESE, supra note 61, at 66–69; Mary Ellen O’Connell,
Regulating the Use of Force in the 21st Century: The Continuing Importance of State Autonomy,
in POLITICS, VALUES AND FUNCTIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY
443, 448 (Jonathan I. Charney et al. eds., 1998).
Nicaragua, Merits, supra note 47, ¶ 209.
See, e.g., GRAY, supra note 2, at 51–52; WILSON, supra note 2, at 30–32; Bowett,
supra note 8, at 42; Institut De Droit International, Resolution, 56 ANNUAIRE DE L’INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 544, 546 (1975).
However, the practice has diverged starkly from all of the theoretical
prohibitions on intervention. Intervention in civil conflicts is widespread
and consistent. Falk goes so far as to consider the restatement of the general rule in General Assembly resolutions as a “hypocritical normative
assertion since it contradicts the attitudes and policies of many governments.”80 Higgins argues: “If one would look behind the legal rhetoric to
the reality . . . , it is clear that the law has to be restated.”81 Franck and
Rodley also call for such reformulation: “One advantage of legitimating
what is in any event happening—the general intervention of third States
in civil wars—is that it permits international law to regulate the nature
and scope of these interventions on the basis of reciprocal principles.”82
There has been much debate whether this extensive practice of intervention into civil conflict, which contradicts the traditional legal position
that such intervention is prohibited, supports the emergence of new
norms permitting intervention into such conflicts. However, the question
of whether this practice reflects a change in international policy with
respect to civil conflict, or in perception about the legality of civil conflict itself, has been largely overlooked.
As wars of self-determination have been accorded special status with
respect to the norms of jus in bello, there has been some suggestion that
such wars may constitute an exception to the prohibition on intervention
to assist rebel forces and even that international law may in fact develop
to authorize the use of force by national liberation movements.83
National liberation wars are “upgraded” to the equivalent of international wars through the 1977 Geneva Additional Protocol I, and the
International Court of Justice in Nicaragua deliberately kept open the
option of an exception to the prohibition on intervention when it
excluded such wars from its judgment prohibiting assistance to rebel
forces.84 Nonetheless, so far, no such exceptions have crystallized. As
FALK, supra note 2, at 7. See also Farer, supra note 9, at 516.
Higgins, supra note 44, at 183.
Franck and Rodley, supra note 39, at 732.
84 Nicaragua, Merits, supra note 47, ¶ 206. Note that Judge Schwebel rejected this
aspect of the majority judgment. Id., ¶¶ 179–80. But see Antonio Cassese, Le Droit
International Et La Question De L’assistance Aux Mouvements De Libération Nationale, 19
20 • Political Violence and the International Community
Wilson explained, even in such cases, the use of force “remained a matter of self-help beyond the purview of international law.”85
Even a civil conflict that seeks to achieve secession is not supported
under international law. The generally accepted position is that international law does not recognize a unilateral right to secession.86 The doctrine of uti possidetis, which provides that colonial boundaries will become
international boundaries at independence,87 seems to have played a role
in preventing the emergence of a right to secession via self-determination.88 However, once the new state is established, the principle of uti possidetis should give way to the principle of territorial integrity.89
It would appear that, as the Canadian Supreme Court held in the
Quebec Secession Case, international law leaves the question of secession to
be determined by the state.90 The Court did suggest that the right to
self-determination may ground a right to unilateral secession “when a
people is blocked from the meaningful exercise of its right to self-determination internally, it is entitled, as a last resort, to exercise it by secession.”91 However, the matter did not ultimately arise for resolution in
that case.92
REVUE BELGE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 307, 325 (1986); Bowett, supra note 8, at
43. See also JENNINGS AND WATTS, supra note 56, at 445–46, who limit the permissible
assistance to humanitarian or economic.
WILSON, supra note 2, at 28.
Reference Re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, para. 112 (Can.). James
Crawford, State Practice and International Law in Relation to Secession, 69 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L
L. 85 (1999).
87 See OAU Res. 16, para. 1 (1964) (Cairo), in which member states pledged to
respect each others’ colonial frontiers at the moment of decolonialization.
88 For instance, the Yugoslav Arbitration Commission maintained: “[I]t is well
established that, whatever the circumstances, the right to self-determination must not
involve changes to existing frontiers at the time of independence (uti possidetis juris)
except where the states concerned agree otherwise.” Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission
Opinion 2, 31 I.L.M. 1497 (1992).
89 Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso/Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554, 565 (Dec. 22). For a discussion of this doctrine, see PAUL R. HENSEL ET AL., THE COLONIAL LEGACY AND
BORDER STABILITY: UTI POSSIDETIS AND TERRITORIAL CLAIMS IN THE AMERICA
Reference Re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217.
Id., paras. 135, 138.
Id., para. 135. See also Crawford, supra note 86, paras. 10, 26, which maintains
One point to note is that the violent repression of self-determination
is likely to be governed by international law. Although this has not yet
been applied in practice, Bowett maintains that denial of self-determination is an international wrong,93 and, accordingly, forceful intervention
is permissible, at least where the Security Council or General Assembly
has confirmed the denial of the right to self-determination and has
authorized the intervention.94
Humanitarian Laws in Armed Conflict
Jus in bello norms, also known as humanitarian laws in armed conflict,
seek to regulate the actual use of force in conflicts without judging
whether the cause of war was legitimate. The protection, so far as possible, of civilians from violence is a cardinal aspect of humanitarian law.95
Humanitarian principles increasingly apply to civil conflicts. Initially only
Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions applied to non-international conflicts and, even then, only to situations recognized as “armed
conflicts.” The article prohibits “[v]iolence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture,” against
“[p]ersons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of
armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de
combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause.”
The Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions extends a
series of protections to conflicts involving self-determination against colonial or racist regimes,96 and the Additional Protocol II aims to apply to
that “international law does not confer any right to unilateral secession outside the
colonial context,” and points out that “[s]ince 1945 the international community has
been extremely reluctant to accept unilateral secession of parts of independent states,
in situations where the secession is opposed by the government of that state,” that, in
fact, since 1945, no such state has been admitted to the United Nations against the
wishes of the predecessor state, and there are many examples of attempted secession
that have failed. See also Commission of Jurists, Aaland Islands Situation, LEAGUE OF
NATIONS O. J., Spec. Supp. No. 3 (1920): “Positive International law does not recognise the right of national groups, as such, to separate themselves from the State of
which they form a part by the simple expression of a wish.”
Bowett, supra note 8, at 43.
See ROBERTS AND GUELFF, supra note 69, at 615–17; and Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court art. 8, U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.183/9 (July 17, 1998).
See Additional Protocol II, supra note 64, art. 1, para. 4.
22 • Political Violence and the International Community
all other armed conflicts involving armed forces of organized groups
under responsible command and exercising control over a part of the
territory.97 According to Additional Protocol II, “The civilian population
as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack.
Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited.”98
Jus in bello norms are increasingly being applied to all civil conflicts,
both through the creation of the International Criminal Tribunals for
the former Yugoslavia (ICTFY) and for Rwanda (ICTR),99 and following
the decision of the ICTFY in Tadic, which held that Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions was part of customary law and thus applicable to all
conflicts. In Tadic, the Court of Appeal also found that the grave breaches
provisions of the Geneva Conventions could apply in the conflict in the
former Yugoslavia, as a conflict could be internationalized if another state
intervenes through its troops or if participants in the conflict act on
behalf of another state.100
Traditionally, the question of regime change through coup d’état was
considered a matter for the state in question, not for the international
community. While democratic states have expressed a policy preference
for democratic states, there was little in international law to suggest that
regime change through coup d’état was a matter for international concern. However, a series of regional agreements in Africa and Latin America
have begun addressing the legitimacy of forceful regime change, at least
when the targeted government was “democratically elected.” The African
Union, for instance, adopted the Lomé Declaration on Unconstitutional
Changes of Government (2000), which rejected and condemned such
unconstitutional change of government, defined as military coup d’état
against a democratically elected government; intervention by mercenar97
See id., art. 1, para. 1.
See id., art. 13.
Note that while ICTFY provides for prosecution of the laws or customs of war,
in the case of ICTR, the statute appears to provide only for prosecution of violations
of Common Article 3 or of Additional Protocol II. See Statute of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda art. 4, available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/
law/itr.htm. It does, however, extend international criminality to such violations.
100 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 127
(Oct. 2, 1995); Tadic, Judgment of the Appeals Chamber, Case No. IT-94-1-A.
ies to replace a democratically elected government; replacement of
democratically elected governments by armed dissident groups and rebel
movements; or the refusal by an incumbent government to relinquish
power to the winning party after free, fair, and regular elections.101
The Economic Community of West African States, has also listed the
“overthrow or attempted overthrow of a democratically elected government” as enlivening the jurisdiction of its Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, which
permits intervention to “prevent, manage and resolve internal and interState conflicts,” and “maintain and consolidate peace, security and stability within the Community.”102 Such a principle is also supported by the
treaty regime of the Organization of American States, which specifically
supports the use of collective measures to restore democracy where it has
been overthrown unconstitutionally.103
The impact of these treaties on international policy and law with
respect to violent regime change is explored further in Chapter 4,
In this context, this book considers how the practice of the international community responding to certain forms of extreme political violence has influenced the international law and international policy
perspective. It reviews the accumulating practice of the international community rejecting and condemning civil conflict and coups d’état, which
101 Lomé Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional
Changes of Government (2000) AHG/Decl.5 (XXXVI), available at http://www.
africanreview.org/docs/govern/govchange.pdf.
102 ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, art. 25, Dec. 2001,
A/SP1/12/01, available at http://www.issafrica.org/AF/RegOrg/unity_to_union/
pdfs/ecowas/12ProtDemocGood.pdf.
103 Inter-American Democratic Charter, Sept. 11, 2001, OEA/Ser.G CP-1, available
at http://www.oas.org/OASpage/esp/Publicaciones/CartaDemocratica_spa.pdf; Organization of American States (OAS), The Santiago Commitment to Democracy and the
Renewal of the Inter-American System, G.A. 3d plen. sess. (June 4, 1991) OEA/
SerP/XXIO2; OAS, Representative Democracy, G.A. Res. 1080, 5th plen. sess., OAS
Doc. AG/RES. 1080 (XXI-O/91) (June 5, 1991); OAS, Inter-American Democratic
Charter, Resolution of San Jose Costa Rica, G.A. Res. 1838, 4th plen. sess., OAS Doc.
G/RES. 1838 (XXXI-O/01) (June 5, 2001). See, e.g., OAS Permanent Council
Emergency Meeting (Apr. 13, 2003), for the condemnation of the attempted coup in
Venezuela in April 2003.
24 • Political Violence and the International Community
up to now has not been systematically analyzed, and seeks to explore what
changes it evidences in international policy, and/or in the relationship
between political violence and international law. In this regard, it considers the emergence of possible norms of jus ad bellum internum104 under traditional customary law or international law more broadly.
The book begins with a discussion of methodology to set out the way
in which the practice will be approached. It then reviews and analyzes the
practice of the Security Council in the 32 civil conflict/coups d’état situations in which it had been involved through September 30, 2003, followed by three recent case studies providing an in-depth overview of the
response of the international community to such examples of extreme
political violence. The final chapter seeks to pull the practice together
through an analysis of how this practice reflects changing international
policy norms and emerging international law perspective.
104 This question is distinct from the question of whether a response by a state or
regional body is legal, which is concerned with whether new rules governing intervention into civil conflicts are emerging. That question has been extensively, albeit
inconclusively, debated, and there is no intention to reopen it here. See, e.g.,
Friedmann, supra note 9; Farer, supra note 9; Moore, supra note 9; DAMROSCH, supra
note 9; Ofodile, supra note 9; MAYALL, supra note 9; MERON, supra note 9; Fielding,
supra note 9; TESÓN, supra note 9; CHESTERMAN supra note 9.
A discussion of emerging international policy on civil conflict and
coup d’état can be based on a descriptive analysis of the practice, to determine whether certain policy positions are gaining widespread support and
becoming established. However, the discussion of customary law requires
a more extensive methodological framework, both with respect to what
broad approach is appropriate in the context of civil conflict and coup d’état, and also with respect to the role the Security Council plays in shaping
new international law. This role is markedly under-theorized—in contrast
to the widely debated General Assembly practice in customary law formation—but is central because of the remarkable scope of Council practice that has been accumulating in response to civil conflicts and coups
AN APPROPRIATE CUSTOMARY LAW METHODOLOGY
In formal terms, the formation of customary law requires evidence
of both opinio juris and material practice. However, the question of how
customary norms emerge and what is required to establish their existence is a long-standing controversial issue in international law. A search
for a methodological framework must take account of a number of
related issues, notably what and whose practice is relevant to customary
norm formation, the proper balance between opinio juris and practice,
the assessment of the practice, and the relative weight to be ascribed to
oral and physical conduct. In order to determine an appropriate
methodological framework for this book, it is useful to consider the
debate surrounding the emergence of human rights customary law
norms, which raises similar issues to the field under consideration.
Legal Methodology and the Emergence of Human Rights Customary
The International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) and the international
tribunals have repeatedly stated basic principles in relation to
customary law formation: there must be practice1 and opinio
1 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
Merits, 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua, Merits]: “[T]he shared view of
26 • Political Violence and the International Community
juris.2 However, the extent to which practice must be established and
systematically reviewed, and the extent to which both opinio juris and
practice must be separately established rather than implied, remain open
to debate. In the human rights context, the emphasis has been on the
dominance of opinio juris over inconsistent practice.3 However, the
reverse proposition, that where appropriate practice exists “it is not necessary to prove the existence of an opinio juris,” has also recently been
adopted by the Committee on the Formation of Customary Law.4
In the human rights context, the nature of the available practice
raised methodological questions regarding how to assess a proliferation
of conventions, General Assembly resolutions, and governmental statements subscribing to the norms, but little practical compliance or
enforcement. The value-laden nature of such norms squarely raised the
positivist-natural lawyer divide. The mainstream position in support of
the existence of such norms argues that the nature of human rights is
such that a broad category of practice must be considered, and that practice in favor and against each human right must be considered individually to determine whether that particular norm has crystallized into
custom.5 Schachter illustrates this approach. He rejects the “usual process
of customary law formation,” as “States do not usually make claims on
other States or protest violations that do not affect their nationals,”6 and
the Parties as to the content of what they regard as the rule is not enough. The Court
must satisfy itself that the existence of the rule in the opinio juris of States is confirmed
by practice.”
2 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J. 3, 44 (Feb. 20): acts must “be
such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice be
rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule requiring it.”
3 See THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY LAW 99 (1989). But see Bruno Simma and Philip Alston, The Sources of Human
Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L. 82, 96
(1989), who favor a strict approach to customary norm formation and reject undue
reliance on opinio juris.
4 International Law Association, Final Report of the Committee on Formation of Customary General International Law 742 (2000).
5 See, e.g., MERON, supra note 3; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 161 (1987); Oscar Schachter, International Law in
Theory and Practice, 178 RECUEIL DES COURS 13, 333 (1982), in favor of human rights
customary law norms.
6 Schachter, supra note 5. See Isabelle Gunning, Modernizing Customary International Law: The Challenge of Human Rights, 31 VA. J. INT’L L. 212 (1991).
Methodological Issues • 27
instead argues that in the human rights context greater emphasis can
validly be placed on General Assembly resolutions and multilateral
treaties. According to this approach, he concludes that a review of available practice—conventions, declarations, U.N. resolutions, the incorporation of human rights provisions into domestic laws and condemnation
by states of human rights violations by other states, as well as repeated
breaches of human rights norms—suggests that some, but not all, of the
norms in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights have crystallized
into custom.7 Charlesworth’s methodology is similar, in that she points
out that that modern custom does not accord with the traditional
rhetoric of custom.8
A variation on this approach emphasizes reliance on the role of the
moral value of human rights in assessing whether such norms exist.
Cassese considers that when it comes to proof of the emergence of norms
based on the dictates of public conscience, the requirement of practice
may be less stringent than in other cases, and the opinio juris may take on
a special prominence.9 Kirgis similarly suggests: “When issues of armed
force are involved, it may well be that the need for stability explains an
international decision maker’s primary reliance on normative words
rather than on a combination of words and consistent deeds.”10
Meron, interestingly, acknowledges that it is “to be expected that those
rights which are most crucial to the protection of human dignity and of
universally accepted values of humanity, and whose violation triggers broad
condemnation by the international community, will require a lesser
amount of confirmatory evidence.”11 However, he then goes on to assess
the question on the basis of a largely positivist approach.12 Nevertheless, he
7 Schachter, supra note 5, at 336. Richard B. Lillich, The Growing Importance of
Customary International Human Rights Law, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 9–10 (1996),
adopts a similar approach.
8 Hilary C.M. Charlesworth, Customary International Law and the Nicaragua Case, 11
AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L. 1 (1984–87).
ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 122 (2001).
10 Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., Custom on a Sliding Scale, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 146, 147
MERON, supra note 3, at 92.
12 For a criticism of Meron’s lack of radical revision, see Martti Koskenniemi, Book
Review, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1946 (1990) (reviewing THEODOR MERON, HUMAN
RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY LAW (1989)).
28 • Political Violence and the International Community
recognizes the relevance of statements and resolutions, pointing out that
“the repetition of the articulation and the assertion of certain norms in various resolutions and declarations and treaties play an important role” in
the formation of new customary norms of human rights.13
A more extreme position can be seen in the reasoning of scholars
who rely more directly on a Dworkinian approach. The influence of the
natural law school is particularly evident in Tesón’s recent analysis of
humanitarian intervention, where he argues that “moral philosophy is
necessarily part of the articulation of legal propositions.”14 Tesón points
out that any approach to customary law is permeated by values and is
inevitably purposive15 and therefore uses moral theory to assist the selection of relevant precedents.16 He rejects the traditional inductive
approach17 in favor of a claim-oriented approach,18 which, he argues,
takes better account of the exceptional and in extremis nature of humanitarian intervention.19
Koskenniemi similarly emphasizes that the nature of the rules is fundamental to their assessment. He writes:
[I]t is really our certainty that genocide or torture is illegal that
allows us to understand state behavior and to accept or reject its
legal message, not state behavior itself that allows us to understand that these practices are prohibited by law. It seems to me
that if we are uncertain of the latter fact, then there is really little in this world we can feel confident about.20
Higgins, on the other hand, rejects the natural law-influenced perspective of hierarchical normativity where certain rules, as those against
MERON, supra note 3, at 99.
FERNANDO R. TESÓN, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO
LAW AND MORALITY 6 (2d ed. 1997).
17 GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, THE INDUCTIVE APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL
LAW (1965).
18 Also favored by ANTHONY D’AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 18–20 (1971).
TESÓN, supra note 14, at 176.
Koskenniemi, supra note 12, at 1952.
Methodological Issues • 29
aggression and self-defense, have “higher normativity”21 than other international rules and require different compliance.22 She also rejects an
unduly positivistic, “law-as-rules” approach and instead argues for a “lawas-process” approach that “encourages interpretation and choice that is
more compatible with values we seek to promote and objectives we seek
to achieve.”23 Ultimately, she maintains that the reason certain norms,
such as the prohibition on torture, retain their status despite breaches is
that there remains strong opinio juris in their favor.24
Among those that deny the existence of customary human rights
norms, there are those who reject the assessment of the practice, while
agreeing that an inclusive approach is appropriate,25 and those who
reject all aspects of the methodology. Simma and Alston represent the
latter view, rejecting the entire approach, which they see as a way of bending the formal criteria of customary law “in order to reach a certain policy result.”26 Instead, they favor a strict approach to customary norm
formation, rejecting the reliance on opinio juris over state practice and
even reliance on practice, such as General Assembly resolutions and conventions.27 They suggest that human rights norms should be acknowledged as legally binding as “general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations” under Article 38 of the I.C.J. statute.28 However, their
21 Oscar Schachter, Entangled Treaty and Custom, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AT A
22 ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
HOW WE USE IT 20 (1994).
See, e.g., Arthur M. Weisburd, The Significance and Determination of Customary
International Human Rights Law, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 99, 135–36 (1996), which
questions the point of relying on evidence which parties flout and fail to enforce.
Simma and Alston, supra note 3, at 96.
Id. at 96. For examples of other authors that reject the emergence of human
rights customary law norms, see G.J.H. VAN HOOF, RETHINKING THE SOURCES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 107 (1983).
28 In their view, this would accommodate a process of “express articulation of principles in the first instance, ab initio or progressively being ‘accepted and recognised’
as binding and peremptory by the “international community of States as a whole.”
Simma and Alston, supra note 3, at 104. This approach also requires bending of the
formal requirements, as the original debates surrounding U.N. Charter Article 38,
paragraph 1(c) favor the view that this source of law was intended to refer to general
30 • Political Violence and the International Community
approach is out of step with that of the mainstream29 and the view of the
I.C.J.30
These divergent approaches present a spectrum of attitudes responding to the type of practice and opinio juris available in the human rights
context. The mainstream approach considers that a broad range of practice should be treated as relevant and that the emphasis on the type of
practice and the relevance of material practice and opinio juris must take
into account how states act in that particular context. It suggests that customary law methodology must be tailored to the context of the norms
investigated. To develop a methodology in this case, it is therefore essential to investigate how the civil conflict and coup d’état context will affect
the practice and opinio juris required to establish customary law.
Elements of the Customary Law Context
Whose Practice Is Relevant?
Generally, new customary law norms are manifested in the conduct
of states. In the case of permissive norms, the focus is on practice consistent with, and statements upholding, the positive obligation that
underlies them.31 In contrast, norms of prohibition are more difficult to
examine, as the primary practice is absence of action, in effect refraining
principles within the domestic rather than the international sphere. For instance,
Lord Phillimore specified that what was intended was laws accepted by “all civilized
nations in foro domestico.” Proces-Verbaux Du Comité Consultatif Des Juristes, 16
Juin/24 Juillet, 306, 335 (1920). See Lillich, supra note 7. For the alternative view, see,
e.g., Simma and Alston, supra note 3, at 104. In the environmental rights context, see
Daniel Bodansky, Customary (and Not So Customary) International Environmental Law, 3
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 105, 116–19 (1995), which also seeks to justify customary law as a new form of universal declaratory law.
See Lillich, supra note 7, at 12–13.
30 See esp. Nicaragua, Merits, supra note 1; and Advisory Opinion on the Legality
of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 8) [hereinafter Legality
of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons].
31 For instance, in Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116 (Dec. 18), the Court
considered the practice of states, which had asserted an extension of the fisheries limits, and preparatory documents to the third Conference on the Law of the Sea, which
included the principle of preferential rights for coastal states (para. 53). It also considered resolutions at conferences as showing “overwhelming support for the idea”
(para. 58) and noted that the practice of the North East Atlantic fisheries commissions
(of which the parties were members) had adopted the principle in question.
Methodological Issues • 31
The Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion shows that an absence of action
is difficult to interpret. In that case, certain states argued that the consistent practice of non-utilization of nuclear weapons since 1945 supported the existence of a customary international law prohibiting their
use.32 However, other states argued that the non-use was referable not to
emerging customary prohibition, but to the fact that circumstances that
might justify their use had not arisen.33 Ultimately this division of opinion led the Court to discount the importance of the practice.34
In the case of civil conflicts and coups d’état, cases of disagreements
that could have led to conflicts but were peacefully resolved are not easy
to locate and are unlikely to have attracted international community
interest. However, the response of the international community to the
cases in which recourse to force occurs can be identified. The question
that arises is whether the regular disapproval of certain types of conduct
expressed through condemnation or intervention amounts to a response
to the breach of a legal norm. While such an approach would not be
strictly orthodox, it is consistent with an aspect of the opinion of the
Court in Nicaragua, which emphasized that “ instances of State conduct
inconsistent with a given rule should generally have been treated as breaches of
that rule, not as indications of the recognition of a new rule.”35
Morgenthau points out that “a rule, be it legal, moral, or conventional, is valid when its violation is likely to be followed by an unfavorable
reaction, that is, a sanction against its violator.”36 Weisburd similarly
emphasizes: “What is crucial, however, to permit the characterization of
a norm as a rule of customary law, is that States refuse to acquiesce in a
breach of the norm, but on the contrary actively seek to reverse the
effects of the breach.”37 Schachter also highlights the importance of
assessing the intensity and depth of third-party condemnation of viola32
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 30, paras. 65–66.
Id., paras. 65–66.
Id., para. 67. It also considered the impact of General Assembly resolutions
affirming the illegality of nuclear weapons but held that as these were not binding,
and were not supported by all nuclear states, these were insufficient to establish the
requisite opinio juris. See paras. 68–69.
Nicaragua, Merits, supra note 1, para. 186 (emphasis added).
Hans Morgenthau, Positivism, Functionalism, and International Law, in THE
NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 159, 175 (Gerry Simpson ed., 2001).
Weisburd, supra note 25, at 103.
32 • Political Violence and the International Community
tion in determining the emergence of a norm.38 In practical terms, therefore, the customary law norm would be founded on the practice of the
international community in response to the recourse to force in civil conflicts and coups d’état, rather than on an assessment of the extent to
which states resolve their internal differences through political means, as
The question remains whether the disapproval is based on a policy
decision or is hardening into a legal prohibition. This turns on the issue of
intention. Was the statement intended to protest against the violation of
a legal obligation? To some extent, this can be determined through consideration of how the statement is formulated: whether it implies a legal
obligation and uses legal terminology, whether it is perceived as binding
by different actors, and how the international community responds to its
breach. A focus on intention is consistent with the emphasis on opinio juris
in customary law but also inherits similar difficulties, particularly, how to
balance what states actually believe with what they claim.39
Condemnation Followed by Sanctions
This book takes the view that instances in which non-injured parties
respond to a situation, by explicitly condemning the conduct and then
seeking to impose sanctions, constitute crucial practice. Such responses,
which appear to represent attempts at enforcement of a prohibition by
non-injured states, are unusual in the realm of international law.40 In fact,
He was discussing human rights norms. Schachter, supra note 5, at 335–36.
For a helpful disc