Source: http://www.williamgoren.com/blog/tag/fair-housing-act/
Timestamp: 2017-10-22 13:59:42
Document Index: 750605518

Matched Legal Cases: ['§1988', '§1988', '§1988', '§1988', '§1981', '§1988', '§3604', '§3617', '§3617', '§3617', '§1988', '§3604', '§3617', '§ 3604', '§ 3604', '§ 3604', '§ 3604', '§ 3604', '§3604', '§ 3604']

fair housing act | Understanding the ADA
Fair Housing Act, Emotional Support Animals, and Service Dogs: Noncompliance Can Cost You Big Time
August 9, 2017 By William Goren Leave a Comment
I was giving serious consideration to blogging on Stragapede v. City of Evanston, Illinois. After all, it isn’t very far from where I grew up, and I have all kinds of family connections to Northwestern University. So, I spent a lot of time in Evanston, including attending many a Northwestern University athletic event. However, Robin Shea just published an excellent write up of the case, and so I will leave it for her to analyze. It is definitely worth a read and can be found here. That left me with having to blog about something else. Ultimately, I decided to blog about a HUD conciliation agreement under the Fair Housing Act between an individual, the Fair Housing Advocates of Northern California and Schultz Investment Company et. al. Basically, the Respondents ran into problems with respect to emotional support animals/service dogs. Instead of taking it to trial, Respondents entered into a conciliation agreement. I thought it might be worthwhile to go over the terms. The blog entry is divided into terms of the conciliation agreement and takeaways. Since the structure of the blog entry is such and the length is so short, I’m figuring everyone is going to read the whole thing.
Highlights of the Conciliation Agreement
The agreement extends for three years.
A total of $71,000 was paid out to two different plaintiffs.
Within 90 days, the Respondents have to create and implement a reasonable accommodation and modification policy consistent with the Joint Statements of HUD and the Department of Justice on Reasonable Accommodations under the Fair Housing Act and Reasonable Modifications under the Fair Housing Act. That statement can be found here. What is curious is that the joint statement, from my read anyway, does not deal with emotional support animals and service dogs at all. Rather, it just deals with general obligations under the ADA and the Fair Housing Act. There is a document from the Housing and Urban Development Department talking about emotional support animal and service dogs that can be found here, and it is surprising that it doesn’t get a mention in the conciliation agreement.
The policy the defendant comes up with has to explicitly acknowledge and advise employees, tenants, and prospective tenants that an emotional support or companion animal qualifies as a reasonable accommodation under the Fair Housing Act.
Reasonable accommodation and reasonable modification requests must be consistently recorded and responded to in a timely manner.
Documentation of requests for reasonable accommodations or modifications will show whether medical verification was necessary or whether the disability was obvious and apparent as well as indicate when the defendant provided a written response to each request.
The policy also will say that reasonable accommodation and modification request can be made orally or in writing and that Respondents have to give appropriate consideration to requests even where the requester does not use the designated form.
The policy will make clear that verification of disability may come from a doctor or other medical professional such as a therapist, physician’s assistant, or nurse, or from a counselor, social worker, peer support group, a non-medical service agency, or a reliable third-party (emphasis added), who is in a position to know about the individual’s disability.
To request an accommodation or modification, the policy will make clear that an individual does not need to mention the Fair Housing Act or use the phrase “reasonable accommodation,” or “reasonable modification.” That is, MAGIC words are not required.
Leases must be redone within 90 days to reflect ¶ ¶ 1-8 above.
Within 90 calendar days, Respondents have to create and implement a form complying with the Fair Housing Act and make that form readily available to all applicants and current and future tenants. That form must be available at all leasing offices, included in application packets, and a copy provided to new tenants along with a copy of the executed lease.
Requests for reasonable accommodations and reasonable modification can be made verbally and the form is not required. However, there needs to be a written record of every request for reasonable accommodations or reasonable modifications.
Respondents agreed to track all requests for reasonable accommodations and/or reasonable modifications in an Excel spreadsheet and furnish that sheet to HUD on annual basis.
Receptionists, all front office staff, property managers, maintenance personnel, staff participating in making decisions on reasonable accommodations and/or reasonable modifications, and all other staff members interacting with tenants and/or applicants have to attend training sessions on fair housing lasting at least three hours at yearly intervals for two years. The first training session to occur within 90 days and the second one to occur by September 30, 2018. If the training is done by someone other than HUD, HUD will have to approve that training.
Respondents have to post HUD’s assistance animal poster at all leasing offices and at all trash/recycling areas. If the posters are removed or vandalized, Respondents have to promptly replace the posters with clean copies.
Respondents have to display the HUD fair housing poster in all leasing offices.
Within 30 days of the effective date of the agreement, Respondents have to inform all of their agents and employees responsible for compliance with the conciliation agreement the terms of the agreement and provide a person with a copy of the agreement.
Respondents agreed to submit to monitoring by HUD.
It is really curious why the HUD publication on service animals and assistance animal for people with disabilities in housing and HUD-funded programs does not get a mention. Even so, that is something you definitely want to look at.
Magic words are not required!!!!!!!!!!!
Reasonable accommodations and reasonable modifications under the Fair Housing Act encompass different meanings. Even so, for an attorney familiar with the ADA, that shouldn’t present a problem whatsoever since the term reasonable modifications under title III of the ADA, would encompass both Fair Housing Act terms.
While the Fair Housing Act does allow you to get documentation to determine whether the tenant has a disability, §I8 of this conciliation agreement casts a pretty broad net, much further than the ADA, as to the type of provider that can document the disability.
While Respondents did not admit liability, they did pay out $71,000 not to mention what they paid their attorneys in defending the case to this point.
I find it curious that the conciliation agreement mandates an Excel spreadsheet as one would think that there would be all kinds of possibilities that could be used with respect to dealing with the data associated with reasonable accommodation requests. Regardless, documentation is critical.
Interactive process!!
Did I say MAGIC words not required?
Training is always important.
Filed Under: ADA, Fair Housing Act, Title III Tagged With: ADA, conciliation agreement, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Department of Justice, DOJ, emotional support animal, fair housing act, fair housing advocates of northern California v. Schultz investment company, HUD, Illinois, interactive process, joint statement of DOJ and HUD on reasonable accommodations under the fair housing act and reasonable modifications under the fair housing act, leases, magic words, policies and procedures, reasonable accommodation, reasonable modification, Service animal, service animals and assistance animal for people with disabilities in housing and HUD-funded programs, Stragapede v. City of Evanston, title III
April 11, 2017 By William Goren 2 Comments
Back in January 2015, you will find this blog entry talking about the survivability of ADA claims and Fair Housing Act (FHA) claims. That case was appealed, and the Third Circuit issued a precedential (published), decision on March 31, 2017. So, here goes. As is usual, the blog is divided into categories and they are: facts (there was very little discussion of the facts in the original blog entry); court’s reasoning with respect to the survival cause of action; court’s reasoning with respect to failure to accommodate; court’s reasoning with respect to interference; and takeaways. Of course, the reader is free to read any or all of the sections.
Two residents of the condominium, Walters and Kromenhoek, suffered from disabilities and each had emotional support animal prescribed for them. Both of them obtained a dog thereby violating the no dogs rule of the condominium Association. That rule prohibited dogs and farm animals subject to a fine specified by the Board of Directors. The rule had no exceptions and the Association had no policy regarding assistance animals, including emotional support animals. The Board of Directors of the Association had the authority to enforce those rules and regulations. Both plaintiffs attempted to request accommodations for an emotional support animal by filing paperwork with the Association’s office manager, which included a doctor’s letter prescribing the emotional support animal and a dog certification. The certification stated that the dog was prescribed and deemed necessary to assist each of the individuals, and that property managers and landlords were required to make reasonable accommodations under the FHA. The Association took no action at that time.
Having dogs in the condominium got some of the residents very upset. One of the residents, a Talkington, wrote about it on his blog about the community. In October 2011, he wrote on the blog that Walters had a dog and claimed to have papers to allow her to have it. He also wrote that he had asked the office manager whether she had Walters paperwork in their files and whether monetary fines had been assessed but had not received an answer. In response to that blog post, another resident, a Felice, posted the first of many inflammatory comments on Talkington’s blog. He wrote that dog owners might be happier in another community rather than be ostracized at this condominium, which would be another fine and progressive fines after that. Walters responded saying that she was required to defend herself not as a violator of any laws but as a person with the disability. She also said that she was mortified that her personal business had been laid out over the Internet without her permission or forewarning. That drew a response from Felice saying that someone who needed an emotional support dog might go off his or her gourd without the dog at his or her side or have a violent reaction. Also, he thought that he might or might not need protection and that the law allowing her to have dogs was a bad law. He also said that Walters has a pet and should be fined. What followed was a flurry of emails among the Board and the plaintiffs.
The board did not grant an accommodation to either of the requesting individuals. Instead, the board voted to fine both individuals for violating the no dogs rule. The fine was $50 per day and put in abeyance pending legal advice. Even after that, both Felice and Talkington continued to lambaste both plaintiffs. In November 2011, Felice wrote that if you couldn’t remove the guilty, you could certainly ostracize them. In December 2011, Talkington wrote a blog post naming and labeling the plaintiffs as known violators and their emotional support animals as illegal neighborhood puppy dogs. Talkington also reported that a neighbor heard one dog barking and Talkington added sarcastically that trained service dogs are specifically trained to not bark unless the owner is in imminent danger. Further, maybe one of the pupps pooped in the owner’s unit and was warning the owner to watch out. Talkington continued saying that such certifications are issued without verifying either the animal’s credentials or the purported disability. He later said that the ridiculous puppy dog diplomas from the puppy mills are out of line and that diploma mills accept stress as a disability without any doctor confirmation. This was echoed by Felice in belligerent terms. Later that winter, Talkington wrote on his blog that the condominium association should go on the offensive and lawyer up to pursue an action against owners who are noncompliant with the policy on service dogs. Felice then described both of the plaintiffs as miscreants, ungracious, selfish, spoiled, brats willing to flaunt the illegal dogs in everyone’s face. Talkington piled on by saying that the two individuals were playground bullies attempting to hang onto their puppies and wrote that it was time for the Association to go on the offensive and file suit in a court of law to force the issue.
All this finally came to a close once a new president of the board came into place. In March 2012, both plaintiffs submitted to the new president of the board a formal request for accommodation and the board granted the request and waived the accrued fines. Even so, Walters and Kromenhoek filed suit.
Before moving further, a few points are worth noting. First, the original suit at the District Court level included ADA claims against the Board, which the District Court referenced in its decision. However, between that decision and the Circuit Court decision, plaintiffs conceded the ADA claims (the court doesn’t say why, but perhaps it is due to the fact that the FHA and the ADA do not deal with assistance animals in the same way; the FHA is far broader). Second, while the case was pending in the District Court, Walters committed suicide. So, as mentioned in the original blog entry, the District Court held that Walters claim did not survive and denied Kromenhoek’s claim on the merits. Third, the original president of the board, Harcourt, and Felice also died during the pendency of the litigation. Finally, the lawsuits had reasonable accommodation claims and interference claims under the FHA as their cause of action.
Court’s Reasoning Regarding Survival of Cause of Action
The appellate court reversed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment against Walters executrix. It also, on the merits of the summary judgment motions, reversed in part and vacated in part. In doing that, it reasoned as follows:
The FHA is silent as to survival of claims.
42 U.S.C. §1988(a) provides that where certain federal laws are deficient, the federal courts may apply common-law as modified and changed by the constitutions and statutes of the State provided that the state law is consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.
42 U.S.C. §1988(a) on its face only applies to certain statutes bound within three titles of the revised statutes, namely titles 13, 24, and 70. The FHA was enacted almost a century after those statutes and was never codified in title 13, 24, or 70. Therefore, 42 U.S.C. §1988(a) by its plain meaning does not apply to the FHA.
Legislative history of that provision shows that §1988(a) has always applied to designated statutes only and not to any statute that could be labeled a civil rights law.
1988(a) was intended to do nothing more than explain the source of law applicable in actions brought to enforce the substantive provisions of that act, which later became 42 U.S.C. §§1981-83.
Since 1874, Congress had never amended, save for editorial changes, the phrase, “this title [the judiciary], and of title ‘civil rights,’ and of title’crimes.’” Therefore, §1988(a) only applies to those laws codified within those three titles of the revised statutes of 1874, which does not include the FHA.
The Supreme Court has in general rejected linkage between the reconstruction era civil rights acts and other federal statutes by emphasizing the independence of the remedial scheme established by the reconstruction era acts.
Since the FHA is a federal statute, whether a claim survives the death of a party is a question of federal law.
Since Congress has not provided statutory guidance, resolution of the survival issue depends upon federal common law.
One area where courts consistently apply a uniform rule federal common law is when it comes to survival of federal claims, including such laws as: Vaccine Act; ERISA; Forfeiture Claims; Freedom Of Information Act; False Claims Act; ADEA; Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act Of 1959; and Truth In Lending Act.
When it comes to FHA claims surviving the death of a party, a uniform federal common law rule is appropriate to fulfill the overall purposes of the statute as the federal interests at stake to provide fair housing throughout the United States warrants displacement of state law on the narrow issue of survival of claims.
Since federal courts do not have the creative power vested in Congress, the court elected to follow the weight of authority saying that under federal common law rule, remedial claims survive but not penal ones.
The FHA is certainly remedial and was intended by Congress to have broad remedial intent.
Court’s Reasoning with Respect to Failure to Accommodate
Discrimination under the FHA includes, per 42 U.S.C. §3604(f)(2), a refusal to make reasonable accommodations and rules, policies, practices, or services, when those accommodations are necessary to afford an individual equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.
To determine whether an accommodation is reasonable, the court looks to whether the requested accommodation was reasonable and necessary to afford a person with a disability (the FHA uses the term handicapped), an equal opportunity to use and enjoy housing.
A reasonable accommodation under the FHA includes the use of an emotional support animal in a person’s own home despite the existence of a rule, policy or law prohibiting such an animal.
A refusal to provide a reasonable accommodation under the FHA may be either actual or constructive.
An undue delay in granting a reasonable accommodation may amount to a refusal.
A refusal occurs when the resident with a disability is first denied a reasonable accommodation regardless of the remedies granted in subsequent proceedings. For a housing provider’s action to be deemed a refusal under the FHA, that provider must first have a prior opportunity to accommodate. That is, the provider has to have an idea of the accommodation sought by the plaintiff prior to the provider incurring liability for refusing it.
Material issues of fact exist with respect to whether Cowpet’s action constituted a refusal. In particular, it isn’t clear from a series of emails whether the plaintiffs were asking the Board to not review their paperwork or whether they were just asking the board to respect the privacy of their medical information. If it was just a matter of respecting the privacy of information, then the Board would have had an opportunity to accommodate.
Material issues of fact also exists with respect to whether the original Cowpet Board President, Harcourt, actually reviewed the paperwork on file in the Association’s office as the office manager and the Board treasurer had opposite memories of what happened.
Court’s Reasoning with Respect to Interference
The FHA, 42 U.S.C. §3617, makes it unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his having exercise or enjoyed any right granted or protected by the FHA.
For an interference claim, a substantive violation of the FHA is not required, and a claim can arise before or after the plaintiff requires housing.
To prove interference, plaintiff has to show: 1) the plaintiff exercise or enjoyed any right granted or protected under the FHA; 2) the defendant’s conduct constituted interference; and 3) a causal connection existed between the exercise or enjoyment of the right and the defendant’s conduct.
Interference is not defined by either the FHA or its implementing regulations. Accordingly, the word must be understood by its ordinary meaning.
The court relied on cases from the Ninth Circuit saying that interference for purposes of §3617, means the act of meddling in or hampering an activity or process. Also, that interference is broadly applied to reach all practices having the effect of interfering with the exercise of rights under federal fair housing laws.
Interference under §3617 may (emphasis mine) consist of harassment if it is sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to create a hostile environment.
Such a view is consistent with the Department of Housing and Urban Development, as after oral argument, the Department of Housing and Urban Development issued a regulation allowing hostile environment harassment claims because of handicap. In particular, that regulation provides that harassment can be written, verbal, or other conduct and does not require any physical contact. Further, a single incident of harassment because of handicap constitute a discriminatory housing practice if that incident is sufficiently severe to create a hostile environment.
Harassment intruding upon the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home is considered particularly invasive.
Material issues of disputed fact exist with respect to the interference claims. In particular, if the plaintiff barred the Association from reviewing the accommodation request, then no interference occurred. However, if there was not such a ban, then the Association did interfere with the rights by failing to review the request for reasonable accommodation of their disabilities.
Genuine issues of material fact exist over the inferences that can be reasonably drawn from Felice’s blog posts. That is, a reasonable jury could find that Felice’s harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to interfere with the plaintiff’s fair housing rights. They could also find that there was a causal connection that the harassing conduct was the result of the plaintiff’s exercise of their FHA rights.
Genuine issues of material fact also exists as to whether Talkington interfered with the plaintiff’s fair housing rights when he wrote on his blog all the things that he did. In particular, a reasonable jury could find that his conduct constituted harassment sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to interfere with the plaintiff’s fair housing rights. They also could reasonably find a causal connection between his conduct and the exercise of the plaintiffs fair housing rights.
The ADA has a far narrower treatment of dogs than the federal housing act. The ADA is focused on recognition and response, as discussed in this blog entry, and not on emotional support. The FHA also allows other animals besides dogs.
Certification of service dogs is a real problem due to the certification mills. The ADA and the FHA differ here with the FHA going further than the ADA when it allows the owner to take reasonable steps to verify the need for an emotional support animal.
If a person exercises his rights and that results in social media blowback, that blowback may be interference under the FHA.
Interference includes hostile environment, but that is not the only thing it includes. The dictionary definition of interference is far broader than just hostile environment.
Training training training. Also, have a policy for dealing with the situation of when a resident request a service dog or an emotional support animal.
If you are going to fine someone for having a dog, get legal advice first before doing so. I can only begin to imagine the total costs of legal fees incurred by the defendant here and that is before any fee shifting.
One wonders if either plaintiff could have had a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
People with mental health conditions (such as generalized anxiety disorder, depression, etc.), face the real deal that goes beyond just stress. Often times, that can be managed with medication or without, but regardless, a different kettle of fish than stress.
No reason why the discussion about whether FHA claims survive and the discussion about interference would not equally apply to the ADA since the law’s remedial purposes are similar and the interference statutory provisions are virtually identical.
The ADA case law on interference is very scarce, and this case could be of great help, especially to plaintiff’s, when it comes to assessing whether interference claims exist.
Interference causation is quite broad. The question is whether there was an exercise of rights followed by an adverse reaction to that exercise.
Filed Under: ADA, Federal Cases, Proposed Federal Regulations, Title III Tagged With: 42 U.S.C. §1988, 42 U.S.C. §3604, 42 U.S.C. §3617, ADA, causation, condominium, condominium Association, condominium Association board, Cowpet Bay West condominium Association, emotional support animal, fair housing act, fair housing rights, genuine dispute of material fact, hostile environment, interference, Revock v. Cowpet Bay West Condominium Association, service dog certification, Service dogs, Third Circuit, title III, Walters v. Cowpet Bay West condominium Association
You Can Find ADA Concepts Almost Anywhere: the Intersection of the Fair Housing Act and the ADA
March 7, 2016 By William Goren Leave a Comment
Before we get started on this week’s blog entry, a couple of other matters to note. First, if you have not already checked it out, the Employment Law blog carnival from last month is worth a read. The Employment Law blog carnival comes out once a month from a different blogger and for those in employment law, it should be mandatory reading every month. There are some great bloggers from both the plaintiff and defense perspectives talking about employment law (including yours truly, though I do not consider myself an employment lawyer exclusively nor do I consider myself plaintiff or defense). Second, there is scarcely an area of the law that the ADA does not bump into, and I will be talking about that at a brown bag webinar being put on by the ABA next week. For those in the Atlanta area, I will essentially be repeating that presentation at the March GPSolo section luncheon.
Today’s case comes from my home Circuit, the 11th. It is actually a Fair Housing Act case, but one with ADA concepts within it. As is my usual practice, I have divided the blog entry into categories: facts; court’s reasoning (subdividing the reasoning into each of the counts alleged by the plaintiffs); and takeaways. The reader is free to focus on any or all of the categories.
Dyan and Karl Hunt have lived in the Reflections apartment complex in West Palm Beach, Florida since November 2006. At the time of the events in question, the property was owned and managed by Aimco (defendant). Karl, who was 21 years old at the time of the events, is a person with Down syndrome with an intellectual disability that causes him to act like a child of seven. On August 13, 2012, the Hunts received from the defendant a notice of required notice to vacate informing them that their 12 month lease was due to expire on November 19, 2012. The notice specifically invited them to renew their lease and mentioned that the defendant would gladly discuss flexible renewal options. On August 30, 2012, Dyan discovered that her son was being used as a maintenance person by the Reflections (the name of the apartment complex), staff and had been cleaning the bathroom for the complex’s clubhouse. The son appeared very upset. Dyan believed that the apartment community manager had chastised her son for stealing toilet paper. Later that day, Dyan called Ms. Jackson who informed her that her son had drawn on a map of the property and when asked what he was doing, had informed her that he was going to sacrifice her and another Reflections employee and then trap all the residents in their apartments and put the property on fire. Dyan advised Ms. Jackson that her son was describing an episode of a Japanese anime television series he watched and did not mean any harm. Ms. Jackson warned her that words like that should not come out in a joking manner. She also told her that the Reflections office staff had called their corporate office because they did not feel safe working at the office and that their legal department was now involved. The next morning, Ms. Jackson and Palm Beach County Sheriff Deputy Josh Kushel appeared at their apartment and asked to speak with the son. The deputy warned the son that if he went in or around the community clubhouse or the office, he would be arrested. 15 minutes after the police left, the mother called Ms. Jackson crying and saying that she and her son were very sorry, and she was looking at finding him a place/organization that would have him for the day while she is at work to avoid any more situations. Corporate ignored her explanation of her son’s activities and motivations and failed to consider her request for a reasonable accommodation. That same day, the defendant decided not to renew her lease based upon their attorney’s instructions. Ms. Jackson posted on their door a seven-day notice of noncompliance with opportunity to cure stating that Dyan had violated the terms of her lease due to her son’s actions. On September 12, 2012, Ms. Jackson posted on their door a notice of nonrenewal, which stated that they would have to be out of their apartment on or before November 19, 2012, the date the current lease expired. In reliance on that, she packed up the apartment and sold some furniture and personal property. She also prepared several background checks for rental applications and hired a rental agent to assist her with the move. Her son became afraid of the police and terrified to leave the apartment, believing he would be arrested, after the warning from the deputy. On October 12, 2012, they filed a complaint with the Palm Beach County Office of Equal Opportunity. On November 29, 2012 before they vacated their apartment, a new management company took over ownership and operation of the apartment complex and, after investigation, determined that the son was not a threat and allowed them to remain in their apartment. Even so, Dyan went ahead and filed a complaint alleging that the defendant violated the Fair Housing Act by denying or making a dwelling unavailable for rental in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1) and by discriminating in terms and conditions of housing in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2). An amended and second amended complaint further alleged that the defendant unlawfully failed to reasonably accommodate her son’s disability in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3). The District Court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss and the plaintiff appealed to the 11th Circuit.
In holding that the plaintiff had alleged sufficient facts to state a claim on each of their counts pled in their complaint, the court reasoned as follows:
Making Unavailable or Denying a Rental
In the 11th Circuit, there has not been a case expressly setting forth the elements of a claim alleging making unavailable or denying a rental. Nevertheless, through the court’s reasoning we can divine what the elements of such a claim may now be. First, there must be an adverse action. Second, there must be causation. That is, was the adverse action taken because of a disability. Third, the defendant must have knowledge of the disability. Fourth, the plaintiff were willing and qualified to continue renting the apartment. Finally, the apartment was made unavailable.
Court said that each of these elements were satisfied by the facts alleged. In particular, the plaintiffs pled: the son had Down syndrome, an intellectual disability causing him to act like a seven-year-old child and have difficulty making himself understood; the defendants had actual knowledge that the son had an intellectual disability since he had obvious behavioral characteristics and could be observed behaving like a seven-year-old child by for example listening to children’s music, such as Disney sing-alongs, and Pokémon songs on his headphones in the public areas of the complex; the defendant treated the son differently solely because of his disability and did not want him residing at the apartment complex even though the mother described to Ms. Jackson how the son’s disability could cause misunderstandings, discussions ignored by Ms. Jackson by her continuing the eviction process; they were willing and qualified to continue renting the apartment. After all, they had lived in the apartment complex for almost 6 years before receiving the notice of nonrenewal. They had also prior to the incident received notice that the defendants would gladly discuss flexible renewal options or renew the lease for 12 months; and they prepared for eviction by packing up their apartment, selling the furniture and housewares, and paying for background checks and a rental agent to assist them in finding another apartment. The court also noted that there was no indication in the complaint or its attached exhibits that the defendant ever reconsidered that decision or gave the plaintiff permission to remain in the apartment. Instead, the defendant made the apartment unavailable to them throughout its ownership and operation of the complex with the apartment only becoming available to them again because the complex was sold and the new owners permitted them to remain.
Just because the plaintiff were able to remain in their apartment that does not alter the prior discriminatory conduct.
The Fair Housing Act protects renters not only from eviction, but also from discriminatory actions leading to eviction but for an intervening cause.
Discriminating in the Terms, Conditions or Privileges of a Rental
Sufficient facts were alleged to support this claim. In particular, the plaintiff pled: defendant mistreated the son by yelling at him, making him do maintenance work around the complex, and barring him from the community rooms and office; forced the son to clean bathrooms and collect garbage; and he was prohibited from entering the community room, the full area, and the office. Accordingly, sufficient facts were alleged to show that the defendant placed conditions on the son that were not imposed on other residents and restricted access to facilities in the complex that were open to other residents.
The argument that the defendant cannot be liable because the police and not them instructed the son to stay out of the community room does not fly because a private entity may not use the police as a front for discrimination. Further, it was an employee of the defendant that called the police and accompanied the police to the apartment. Finally, the son was discouraged from using common areas at the apartment complex because the defendant escalated the situation to a law-enforcement matter.
The direct threat argument per 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(9) is not an argument that will work at the motion to dismiss stage since it is an affirmative defense.
The elements of a prima facie case under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3) are: 1) the plaintiff is a person with a disability within the meaning of the Fair Housing Act or is a person associated with that individual; 2) the plaintiff requested a reasonable accommodation for the disability; 3) the requested accommodation was necessary to afford the plaintiff an opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling; and 4) the defendant refused to make the accommodation.
While the 11th Circuit has yet to determine precisely what form the request for reasonable accommodation must take, it did note that U.S. Court of Appeals have used various formulations with respect to what constitutes a reasonable accommodation request under title I of the ADA, which, as readers of this blog know, has reasonable accommodation requirements for employees with disabilities. In the Third Circuit, what matters is not formulations about the manner of the request, but that the employer has notice of the employee’s disability and wishes to be accommodated. In the 10th Circuit, a plaintiff need not use magic words to express a request for accommodation. That is, a plaintiff can be said to have made a request for accommodation when the defendant has enough information to know of both the disability and the desire for an accommodation.
The 11th Circuit opts to follow the 3rd Circuit and says that circumstances must be at least sufficient to cause a reasonable housing provider to make appropriate inquiries about the possible need for an accommodation.
By alleging that the mother communicated she was attempting to make arrangements for the express purpose of avoiding future conflict as a result of her son’s disability, the court concludes that there was sufficient facts showing that she sought an accommodation in the form of an exception to the defendant’s apparent policy or practices of not renewing the leases of tenant who make threats.
The requested accommodation was necessary to eliminate the possibility that her son would make perceived threats or engage in other behaviors that frighten or disturb the staff of the apartment complex. Therefore, it was necessary to afford the plaintiff’s an opportunity to continue to use and enjoy the apartment, but such an accommodation was refused. Further, the defendant disregarded the mother’s plea that her son was not a direct threat and ignored her attempt to suggest alternative short of eviction.
In the 11th circuit, we now have a good idea as to what a prima facie case is for making unavailable or denying a rental under 42 U.S.C. §3604(f)(1).
Since the Fair Housing act, uses the term “because,” rather than “on the basis of,” causation under the Fair Housing Act, at least in the 11th Circuit if not everywhere, is sole cause.
The court’s statement that a private entity may not use the police as a front for discrimination has wide-ranging application outside of this context. It isn’t unusual for places of public accommodations to call the police to kick out a person with a disability from a place of public accommodation as we have seen in this blog entry. This particular statement means that where a place of public accommodation wrongfully kicks out a person with a disability from the place of public accommodation and the police supports that decision, the place of public accommodation will not be shielded from liability.
Wherever a statute contain the term “reasonable accommodation,” it is entirely possible that a court will look to title I of the ADA to help determine what it means. Same arguably goes for, “direct threat.”
The question not answered is once the Corporation turned it over to legal, why didn’t legal go through the direct threat analysis as seen in the ADA (of course, we don’t know if this actually occurred, but from the facts of the case, it would seem that it did not), for example? After all, when the new owner came in, a determination was made that the son was not a threat, which makes you wonder if he ever would’ve been a direct threat in the first place with a thorough investigation.
The court’s discussion about what it takes for a reasonable accommodation request to be made also has implications beyond the Fair Housing Act. Since the court is relying on title I of the ADA cases, it is a fair assumption that when it comes to reasonable accommodation request from employees, the court will adopt the same standard. While the court doesn’t use the term magic words, in my opinion, the formulation they do use amounts to the same thing.
Filed Under: ADA, Federal Cases Tagged With: 11th circuit, 42 U.S.C. § 3604, ADA, conditions or privileges of a rental, discriminating in the terms, failure to reasonably accommodate, fair housing act, Fair housing act Causation, Hunt v. Aimco Properties, magic words, making unavailable or denying a rental, prima facie, reasonable accommodation, title I
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