Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/99073/berra-vs-united-states
Timestamp: 2017-05-01 04:16:14
Document Index: 666030040

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 145', '§ 3616', '§ 145', '§ 3616', '§ 3616', '§ 145', '§ 3616', '§ 145', '§ 3616', '§ 3616', '§ 3616', '§ 145', '§ 3616', '§ 145', '§ 145', '§ 3616', '§ 145', '§ 7201', '§ 7207', '§ 3616', '§ 1035', '§ 565', '§ 145', '§ 3616', '§ 3616', '§ 3616', '§ 3616', '§ 145', '§ 145', '§ 145', '§ 7201', '§ 7206']

Berra Vs United States - Citation 99073 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Save as PDF Add a Tag Add a Note Semantics Visualize Berra Vs. United States - Court Judgment	LegalCrystal Citationlegalcrystal.com/99073CourtUS Supreme CourtDecided OnApr-30-1956Case Number351 U.S. 131AppellantBerraRespondentUnited StatesExcerpt:
berra v. united states - 351 u.s. 131 (1956)
petitioner was indicted for wilfully attempting to evade federal income taxes by filing with the collector "false and fraudulent" tax returns in violation of 26 u.s.c. (1952 ed.) § 145(b). this, it is here assumed, is also a violation of 26 u.s.c. (1952 ed.) § 3616(a), the penalty for the violation of which is lesser than for a violation of § 145(b). petitioner was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment greater than the maximum possible had..... Judgment:
it was not error for the trial judge to refuse to give to the jury an instruction requested by petitioner that a verdict of guilty of the "lesser crime" under § 3616(a) would be permissible. Pp.
351 U. S. 132
(a) It is here assumed,
that § 3616(a) is applicable to income tax returns. P.
351 U. S. 133
(b) The contention that, since there was no difference in the proof required to establish violations of §§ 145(b) and 3616(a), the indictment must be taken as charging violations of both sections, and that, under Rule 31(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the jury should have been permitted to make the choice between the two crimes, cannot be sustained. Pp.
(c) Rule 31(c) was not intended to change the jury's traditional function of deciding only the issues of fact, and taking the law as given by the court. P.
(d) Whether § 3616(a), rather than § 145(b), should apply was not for the jury to determine. Pp.
Petitioner was charged, in a three-count indictment, with wilfully attempting to evade federal income taxes for 1951, 1952, and 1953 by filing with the Collector "false and fraudulent" tax returns, "in violation of Section 145(b), Title 26, United States Code." [
] That section of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, 53 Stat. 63, provided:
At the close of the trial judge's charge to the jury, petitioner asked that the jury be instructed with respect to each count that a verdict of guilty of the "lesser crime" under § 3616(a) would be permissible. [
] No motions
The Court of Appeals, in affirming the conviction, held that § 3616(a) did not apply to income tax returns, and that any instruction relating to that section would therefore have been irrelevant under the evidence in this case. [
] Both parties agree, however, that § 3616(a) was applicable to income tax returns, and we shall assume,
the correctness of that interpretation of the statute.
offense "necessarily included in the offense charged." [
] In a case where some of the elements of the crime charged themselves constitute a lesser crime, the defendant, if the evidence justified it, would no doubt be entitled to an instruction which would permit a finding of guilt of the lesser offense.
. But this is not such a case. For here, the method of evasion charged was the filing of a false return, and it is apparent that the facts necessary to prove that petitioner "willfully" attempted to evade taxes by filing a false return, § 145(b), were identical with those required to prove that he delivered a false return with "intent" to evade taxes, § 3616(a). In this instance. §§ 145(b) and 3616(a) covered precisely the same ground. [
The role of the jury in a federal criminal case is to decide only the issues of fact, taking the law as given by the court.
156 U. S. 102
. Certainly Rule 31(c) was never intended to change this traditional function of the jury. [
] Here, whether
§ 145(b) or § 3616(a) be deemed to govern, the factual issues to be submitted to the jury were the same; the instruction requested by petitioner would not have added any other such issue for the jury's determination. [
] When the jury resolved those issues against petitioner, its function was exhausted, since there is here no statutory provision giving to the jury the right to determine the punishment to be imposed after the determination of guilt. [
] Whatever other questions might have been raised as to the validity of petitioner's conviction and sentence, because of the assumed overlapping of §§ 145(b) and 3616(a), were questions of law for the court. No such questions are presented here.
This case arises under the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. The sections involved have been changed in the 1954 Code;
§§ 7201, 7207, 68a Stat. 851, 853.
In so holding, the Court of Appeals followed its earlier decision in
218 F.2d 97.
§ 7207 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, under which the willful filing of a false return no longer requires the element of an "intent to defeat or evade" taxes, as was so under the former § 3616(a).
The Notes of the Advisory Committee state that Rule 31(c) "is a restatement of existing law." The preceding "lesser offense" statutes were Act of June 1, 1872, 17 Stat. 196, 198; R.S. § 1035; 18 U.S.C. § 565.
Cf. Stevenson v. United States, supra,
162 U. S. 315
162 U. S. 322
156 U. S. 103
Ekberg v. United States,
167 F.2d 380, 385.
Cf. Andres v. United States,
"any person who willfully attempts
to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this chapter . . . shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both, together with the costs of prosecution."
] The offense charged in the indictment, filing a fraudulent return, could be held to be proscribed by § 145(b) because of the phrase "in any manner." But certainly it falls squarely within the specific language of 26 U.S.C. § 3616(a), which provides that any person who
"Delivers or discloses to the collector or deputy any false or
account, or statement, with intent to defeat or evade the . . . assessment intended to be made . . . shall be fined not exceeding $1,000, or be imprisoned not exceeding one year, or both at the discretion of the court, with costs of prosecution."
] At an appropriate time, the petitioner asked the trial judge to charge the jury that, if the allegations of the indictment had been proven, they should find the petitioner guilty of a misdemeanor under § 3616(a). Although § 3616(a) unambiguously makes the conduct charged a misdemeanor punishable by no more than one year in prison, the trial judge apparently felt that he was compelled to treat the offense as a felony because of the statement in the indictment that the conduct charged
was "In violation of Section 145(b). . . ." [
] The judge not only refused the requested instruction, but, after the jury returned a verdict of guilty, he sentenced petitioner to serve four years in prison on each of the three counts, the sentences to run concurrently.
Regardless of whether it was error to refuse the requested instruction, the record raises a serious question as to whether the four-year sentence on each count was lawfully imposed. The Court's opinion takes the position that no proper challenges to the sentence under the felony statute were raised below, and hence that "[n]o such questions are presented here." [
] In my judgment, the requested instruction was adequate to call the trial judge's attention to petitioner's contention that the offense charged was not a felony, but a misdemeanor. But even if the question should have been raised again when the judge announced the sentence, "[p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court." Fed.Rules Crim.Proc. 52(b).
See also Wiborg v. United States,
. Since I think petitioner is right in saying the offense charged was only a misdemeanor,
The Government admits here, and the Court assumes, that filing a false and fraudulent income tax return is both a misdemeanor under § 3616(a) and a felony under § 145(b). The Government argues that the action of the trial judge must be upheld because "the Government may choose to invoke either applicable law," and "the prosecution may be for a felony even though the Government could have elected to prosecute for a misdemeanor." Election by the Government, of course, means election by a prosecuting attorney or the Attorney General. [
] I object to any such interpretation of §§ 145 and 3616. I think we should construe these sections so as not to place control over the liberty of citizens in the unreviewable discretion of one individual -- a result which seems to me to be wholly incompatible with our system of justice. Since Congress has specifically made the conduct charged in the indictment a misdemeanor, I would not permit prosecution for a felony under the broad language of § 145(b). Criminal statutes, which forfeit life, liberty, or property should be construed narrowly, not broadly.
So far as I know, this Court has never approved the argument the Government makes here. It certainly did not do so in
United States v. Beacon Brass Co.,
344 U. S. 45
A basic principle of our criminal law is that the Government only prosecutes people for crimes under statutes passed by Congress which fairly and clearly define the conduct made criminal and the punishment which can be administered. [
] This basic principle is flouted if either of these statutes can be selected as the controlling law at the whim of the prosecuting attorney or the Attorney General.
A congressional delegation of such vast power to the prosecuting department would raise serious constitutional questions. Of course, it is true that, under our system, Congress may vest the judge and jury with broad power to say how much punishment shall be imposed for a particular offense. But it is quite different to vest such powers in a prosecuting attorney. A judge and jury act under procedural rules carefully prescribed to protect the liberty of the individual. Their judgments and verdicts are reached after a public trial in which a defendant has the right to be represented by an attorney. No such protections are thrown around decisions by a prosecuting attorney. Substitution of the prosecutor's caprice for the adjudicatory process is an action I am not willing to attribute to Congress in the absence of clear command. Our system of justice rests on the conception of impersonality in the criminal law. This great protection to freedom is lost if the Government is right in its contention here.
346 U. S. 306
Internal Revenue Code of 1939, 53 Stat. 63.
§ 7201, Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 68 A Stat. 851.
Internal Revenue Code of 1939, 53 Stat. 440.
§§ 7206(1), 7207, Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
But see Williams v. United States,
; Fed.Rules Crim.Proc. 7(c), which provides in part that:
See, e.g., International Harvester Co. of America v. Kentucky,