Source: http://habeascorpusblog.typepad.com/habeas_corpus_blog/legal-insufficiency/
Timestamp: 2017-03-24 12:04:28
Document Index: 747863441

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2241', '§ 2254', '§ 2241', '§ 2241', '§ 2254', '§ 2241']

Habeas Corpus Blog: Legal Insufficiency Habeas Corpus Blog
* While I do not expect many potential witness murders to read this post, take note: it doesn't work. Even without Drabik as a witness, a jury found Hoffler guilty on the drug charges and the court sentenced him to a 17 to 34 year term. A jury convicted Hoffler of Drabik’s murder, but the NY appellate court reversed because of what can only described as a rookie mistake. When the jury venire was sworn prior to voir dire, it was given the oath required of an empaneled petit jury, not the prospective juror oath.The appellate court found that, because this "structural" error infected the entire trial proceeding, there could be no harmless error. The court remanded for a new trial.
* The Circuit dove deep to explain this conclusion, engaging in a lengthy discussion going all the way back to Blackstone and the common law preference for void rather than voidable judgments to promote “the law’s longstanding opposition to retrying an acquitted defendant.” I'm almost certainly nitpicking, but query whether that preference is relevant to the retrial of a convicted defendant. To be clear, I think the Circuit found the least contorted way out of the legal pickle presented here. But resort to Blackstone for the answer to this question? To go back even further, the Circuit doth protest too much. Harmless Error Resurrected
Indeed, the Circuits are split on this issue. According to the Second Circuit’s count, the Third, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have found it to be a constitutional requirement, while the First, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have adopted, as a prudential rule, mandatory appellate review of sufficiency challenges prior to retrial. The Second Circuit declined to answer the question.* Instead, the Circuit held that, even if sufficiency review prior to retrial was a constitutional requirement, the failure to review Hoffler’s sufficiency claim was “necessarily” harmless because Hoffler’s claim was meritless.** * Why not weigh in on the issue here? My guess is that at least one panel member believed that would have involved overruling Wallach, something the Second Circuit can only do en banc.
** At this point you have to ask: why didn't the NY Appellate Division reject Hoffler's sufficiency claim in the first instance? It's as close to a zero-risk ruling as you can get. The standard is so high for a defendant that there is almost no chance of reversal. And while answering only the minimum to dispose of a case is a great rule, all of this Burks precedent suggesting that this is an exception to that rule has been out there for a long time. The closest the Circuit came to criticizing the Appellate Division is that sufficiency review was warranted, “at a minimum, as a matter of prudent policy.” I can only conclude that the state court did not think through the ramifications of its omission. The Circuit did what the state appellate court should have done. Of course the trial evidence against Hoffler was sufficient: Hoffler had a “strong motive” and ample means to murder Drabik. After a thorough review of the evidence, the Circuit held that “the totality of these circumstances” allowed a reasonable jury to infer that Hoffler solicited Drabek’s murder, and then aided in its commission, in order to silence Drabik prior to Hoffler’s drug trial.
Coda I cannot finish this post without noting the procedural rulings, which also involve some clever strategic thinking on the part of New York here. Hoffler initially raised his habeas claims in a § 2241 petition. A little brother to the usual § 2254 petition, § 2241s are appropriate in limited circumstances and, as the district court noted:
“whether a petition for a pretrial writ of habeas corpus is properly brought pursuant to § 2241 or § 2254 has never been squarely addressed by the Second Circuit.” Importantly, the district court concluded that § 2241 was the appropriate vehicle for Hoffler’s petition and, as a result, the state court decision did not get AEDPA deference. Yet New York did not appeal that issue to the Circuit.
Posted at 06:56 PM in AEDPA, Double Jeopardy, Legal Insufficiency | Permalink
Issue one, on the other hand, is pretty interesting. Do you judge sufficiency on the State's theory presented at trial or can you judge sufficiency on any old theory that the State throws at the court on habeas review (because that's what happened)? That is an extension of the principle the Supreme Court established in Richter, namely that the Supreme Court can conceivably consider almost any ground in determining whether the state court's decision was reasonable. But does that concept apply when the State attempts to change their whole theory of the case in federal court? That seems particularly nuts to me, but it could be the direction in which habeas is going. Of course, the State's argument would be more compelling if there actually was a theory on which to support the conviction in that case. But I don't think that there was. Posted at 06:17 AM in Legal Insufficiency, Other Blogs, Second Circuit, Supreme Court | Permalink
Two notes. First, in the recent COA grant in Reily v. Ercole, petitioner has yet to file a notice of appeal. It's now gone beyond the 30 days. Docket sheet says that the decision and judgment were sent to petitioner and petitioner appears to be held in same facility as the one listed on docket sheet. But this is not the first time in the history of this blog where a COA was granted in a pro se case, the decision was sent to the right facility, but no notice of appeal was filed. It suggests a couple of possibilities: (1) pro se inmate never received decision even though it was sent to right place; (2) pro se inmate received decision and did not know that, after a COA grant, he was required to file a notice of appeal; or (3) pro se inmate didn't care to go further in the litigation. Obviously, I think (3) is not what's happening. I think (1) is most likely. But it could be (2). In any event, I think the best way to handle these situations would be for the DJ to assign counsel before granting a COA. Notice won't be an issue, counsel should know what the next step would be after a COA grant, and, if petitioner doesn't want to continue, counsel would be in the best position to learn that.
Second note: petitioner's counsel in Garbutt v. Conway has filed a motion to expand the COA. I am keeping a close eye on this case since it is a depraved indifference case raising one of the procedural questions that comes up in many of those types of cases. The previous COA grant was on the issue of whether a habeas court can address a procedurally defaulted depraved indifference claim on the ground that a manifest injustice would occur if the claim was not addressed. In the motion to expand the COA, petitioner is seeking to include the issue of whether the state court's finding the claim was unpreserved represented an "adequate" state law ground for affirming the conviction. I hope that the motion is granted. This pops up in many of these depraved indifference cases. It's usually pretty fact specfic, but it would be nice to see the Second Circuit provide some guidance on this issue.
Posted at 07:55 AM in Legal Insufficiency, Second Circuit | Permalink