Source: https://www.docketalarm.com/cases/Virginia_Eastern_District_Court/2--19-cv-00463/In_re_Peanut_Farmers_Antitrust_Litigation/148/
Timestamp: 2020-07-16 16:42:03
Document Index: 33803383

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 15', '§ 1', '§ 1331', '§ 15', '§ 15', '§ 1391']

In re Peanut Farmers Antitrust Litigation, 2:19-cv-00463, No. 148 (E.D.Va. May. 27, 2020)
Case 2:19-cv-00463-RAJ-LRL Document 148 Filed 05/27/20 Page 1 of 44 PageID# 1520
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
`Norfolk Division
`IN RE PEANUT FARMERS
`Case No. 2:19-cv-00463-RAJ-LRL
`SECOND AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
`AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
`Case 2:19-cv-00463-RAJ-LRL Document 148 Filed 05/27/20 Page 2 of 44 PageID# 1521
`NATURE OF ACTION .................................................................................................... 1
`JURISDICTION AND VENUE ....................................................................................... 3
`PARTIES .......................................................................................................................... 5
`Plaintiffs ................................................................................................................ 5
`Defendants ............................................................................................................ 6
`AGENTS AND CO-CONSPIRATORS ........................................................................... 7
`TRADE AND COMMERCE ............................................................................................ 8
`FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS ........................................................................................... 9
`Background on the Peanut Production Industry ................................................... 9
`Peanut Production in the United States. .................................................... 9
`Federal Peanut Policy and the Farm Bills. .............................................. 10
`Contract Marketing Under the Current Peanut Policy. ........................... 11
`Peanuts Are a Commodity. ..................................................................... 12
`The United States Peanut Production Market is a National
`Market Worth Over a Billion Dollars Annually. .................................... 12
`The Structure and Characteristics of the Peanut Shelling Market
`Render the Conspiracy Economically Plausible. ................................................ 12
`The Peanut Market is Characterized by Inelastic Demand. .................... 12
`There Are No Significant Substitutes for Peanuts. ................................. 12
`The Peanut Shelling Industry is Highly Concentrated and
`Has Experienced High Consolidation. .................................................... 13
`The Peanut Shelling Industry is Characterized by a Lack of
`Pricing Transparency and Asymmetric Access to Key
`Market Information. ................................................................................ 14
`The Peanut Shelling Industry Relies on Market Data
`Provided Voluntarily and Confidentially by Shellers. ............................ 15
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`The Peanut Shelling Industry and Golden Peanut’s Parent
`Company Have Previously Been Investigated by the
`Government for Collusive Action. .......................................................... 16
`Defendants Had Numerous Opportunities to Collude. ........................... 17
`There Are High Barriers to Entry in the Peanut Shelling
`Market. .................................................................................................... 22
`Despite Significant Market Changes, the Prices of Raw, Harvested
`Runner Peanuts Paid to Farmers Have Remained Low and Notably
`Stagnant Since 2014. ........................................................................................... 23
`Birdsong and Golden Peanut Conspired With One Another to
`Manipulate USDA Data and Depress Prices Paid to Peanut
`Farmers. .............................................................................................................. 27
`VII. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS ............................................................................... 30
`VIII. ANTITRUST INJURY ................................................................................................... 32
`IX.
`ACTIVE CONCEALMENT ........................................................................................... 33
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`Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves individually and on behalf of a plaintiff
`class (the “Class”) consisting of Peanut farmers in the United States who sold raw, harvested
`Runner Peanuts to Peanut shelling companies from at least January 1, 2014 through the present
`(the “Class Period”). Plaintiffs bring this action for treble damages under the antitrust laws of the
`United States against Defendants, and demand a trial by jury.
`NATURE OF ACTION
`Peanut shelling companies (or shellers) play a vital role in the peanut production
`process. The majority of Peanut crops are processed in some manner prior to reaching customers.
`Once Peanut farmers harvest their crops, approximately 90% of the Peanuts are usually moved to
`a buying point and sold to a shelling plant. Inside the shelling plant, the Peanuts are processed and
`packaged into sacks for shipment or storage. The Peanut shellers are responsible for marketing
`and selling the shelled product to food companies or other manufacturers.
`As used in this Complaint, “Peanut” or “Peanuts” refers to all peanuts that are raw
`and harvested and ready to be sold to shellers. “Peanuts” includes all four of the major types of
`peanuts: runner, Spanish, Valencia, and Virginia.
`As used in this Complaint, “Runner,” “Runners,” or “Runner Peanuts” refers to
`the runner type of peanuts that are raw and harvested and ready to be sold to shellers.
`Defendants Birdsong Corporation (“Birdsong”) and Golden Peanut Company, LLC
`(“Golden Peanut”) are the two largest players in the shelling industry in the United States and
`together hold 80-90% of the total Peanut shelling market share. Defendant Olam Peanut Shelling
`Company, Inc., f/k/a McCleskey Mills, Inc. (“Olam” and together with Birdsong and Golden
`Peanut, “Defendants”) is the third largest participant in the United States Peanut shelling industry
`and holds at least 10% of the total Peanut Shelling market share.
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`Since January 2014, the prices paid by shellers to Peanut farmers for Runners have
`remained remarkably flat and unchanged, despite significant supply disruptions such as Hurricane
`Michael, a Category 5 hurricane that hit a significant amount of Peanut crops in the Florida
`panhandle/southern Georgia and Alabama area in 2018.
`From 2011 to 2013, the Peanut industry experienced drastic weather-related price
`changes that made it difficult for Defendants and McCleskey Mills (now known as Olam) to
`manage risk and plan for production. Upon information and belief, and as alleged in this
`Complaint, Defendants and McCleskey Mills thereafter conspired and colluded with one another
`to stabilize and depress Runner prices. Among other things, during the relevant time period,
`Defendants over-reported Peanut and Runner inventory numbers to the USDA to create the false
`impression of an oversupplied market. Defendants capitalized on the perceived oversupply to offer
`artificially low Runner prices to farmers. Defendants also under-reported Peanut and Runner
`prices to the USDA to further suppress prices and keep them low and less volatile.
`In addition, Defendants offered nearly identical shelling contracts, often within the
`same day of one another, limiting the negotiating power and pricing options for farmers. Upon
`information and belief, these contracts are released following National Peanut Buying Points
`Association conferences, which are sponsored and attended by Golden Peanut, Birdsong, and
`Olam.
`The Peanut shelling industry is particularly susceptible to a conspiracy due to a lack
`of pricing transparency. Unlike other agricultural commodities, there is no futures market for
`Peanuts. Rather, Peanut prices are set through private contracting between shellers and farmers,
`although farmers rarely have negotiating power over contractual terms. As the dominant players
`in this industry, Defendants dictate the prices offered to Plaintiffs and Class members.
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`Defendants’ shelling facilities and the buying points they control through various
`contractual arrangements are scattered throughout key United States Peanut production regions
`and located in close proximity to one another, providing prime opportunities for collusion.
`Defendants are heavily involved in the industry’s top trade associations through which they discuss
`and share exclusive market information.
`Defendants’ wrongful and anticompetitive actions had the intended purpose and
`effect of artificially fixing, depressing, maintaining, and stabilizing the price of Runners to
`Plaintiffs and Class members in the United States.
`The effect of Defendants’ conspiracy has been devastating to many farmers. Unlike
`prior to the conspiracy, there are no longer good price years to balance out the now-common bad
`years of Runner prices. This has led numerous farmers to borrow from generations of equity built
`up in their land, relying on that equity to pay themselves and keep their farms running. The
`consequence is smaller farmers being run out of business as they use up the remaining equity in
`their farms.
`As a result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, Plaintiffs and the other members of
`the Class were artificially underpaid for Runners during the Class Period. Such prices were below
`the amount Plaintiffs and the Class would have been paid if the price for Runners had been
`determined by a competitive market. Thus, Plaintiffs and Class members were directly injured by
`Defendants’ conduct.
`Plaintiffs bring this action under Sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C.
`§§ 15 and 26), to recover treble damages and the costs of this suit, including reasonable attorneys’
`fees, against Defendants for the injuries sustain by Plaintiffs and the members of the Class by
`Case 2:19-cv-00463-RAJ-LRL Document 148 Filed 05/27/20 Page 7 of 44 PageID# 1526
`virtue of Defendants’ violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, and to enjoin
`further violations.
`This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337, and Sections 4 and 16
`of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15(a) and 26.
`Venue is appropriate in this District under Sections 4, 12, and 16 of the Clayton
`Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 22, and 26 and 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), (c), and (d), because one or more
`Defendants resided or transacted business in this District, is licensed to do business or is doing
`business in this District, and because a substantial portion of the affected interstate commerce
`described herein was carried out in this District.
`This Court has personal jurisdiction over each Defendant because, inter alia, each
`Defendant: (a) transacted business throughout the United States, including in this District; (b)
`purchased substantial quantities of Runners and sold the shelled product throughout the United
`States, including in this District; and/or (c) engaged in an antitrust conspiracy that was directed at
`and had a direct, foreseeable, and intended effect of causing injury to the business or property of
`persons residing in, located in, or doing business throughout the United States, including in this
`The activities of the Defendants and their co-conspirators, as described herein, were
`within the flow of, were intended to, and did have direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable
`effects on the interstate commerce of the United States.
`No other forum would be more convenient for the parties and witnesses to litigate
`this case.
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`Plaintiff D&M Farms is a Florida partnership that sold Runners to Defendants
`during the Class Period and suffered antitrust injury as a result of the violations alleged in this
`Complaint.
`Plaintiff Mark Hasty is a resident of Florida and citizen of the United States. Mr.
`Hasty is a Peanut farmer who sold Runners to Defendants during the Class Period and suffered
`antitrust injury as a result of the violations alleged in this Complaint.
`Plaintiff Dustin Land is a resident of Florida and citizen of the United States. Mr.
`Land is a Peanut farmer who sold Runners to Defendants during the Class Period and suffered
`Plaintiff Rocky Creek Peanut Farms, LLC is an Alabama limited liability
`company that sold Runners to one or more Defendants during the Class Period and suffered
`Plaintiff Daniel Howell is a resident of Alabama and citizen of the United States.
`Mr. Howell was a Peanut farmer who sold Runners to one or more Defendants during the Class
`Period and suffered antitrust injury as a result of the violations alleged in this Complaint.
`Plaintiff L&K Farms Group, LLC is a Florida limited liability company that sold
`Runners to one or more Defendants during the Class Period and suffered antitrust injury as a
`result of the violations alleged in this Complaint.
`Plaintiff Lonnie Gilbert is a resident of Florida and citizen of the United States.
`Mr. Gilbert is a Peanut farmer who sold Runners to one or more Defendants during the Class
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`Defendant Birdsong Corporation is a Virginia corporation headquartered in
`Suffolk, Virginia. Birdsong purchases Runners directly from farmers, and then cleans, shells, and
`sizes the Runners to sell to food manufacturers. Birdsong operates six shelling plants throughout
`Virginia, Georgia, and Texas. Birdsong also operates eighty-five buying points throughout
`Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas,
`Oklahoma, and Texas.
`Defendant Golden Peanut Company, LLC is a Georgia limited liability company
`headquartered in Alpharetta, Georgia and registered to conduct business in Virginia. Golden
`Peanut is a leading Peanuts and tree nuts sheller with shelling plants in Georgia, Texas, and
`internationally. Golden Peanut also maintains more than 100 buying points. Golden Peanut is a
`wholly-owned subsidiary of Archer Daniels Midland Company (“ADM”), a public corporation
`and one of the world’s largest agricultural processors and food ingredient providers. As discussed
`further below, ADM has a history of price-fixing, and paid $100 million (the largest fine ever at
`the time in 1996) for a global conspiracy to eliminate competition in the food and feed additive
`industries.
`Defendant Olam Peanut Shelling Company, Inc. is a Georgia corporation
`headquartered in Fresno, California. Olam is the third largest Peanut sheller in the United States
`with shelling plants in Georgia and Alabama. Olam also maintains roughly two dozen buying
`points. Olam is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Olam International Limited (“OIL”), a leading agri-
`business operating in 60 countries and headquartered and listed in Singapore. On December 5,
`2014 OIL announced that it had signed a purchase agreement to acquire a 100% interest in
`McCleskey Mills, Inc. for $176 million, the third largest peanut sheller headquartered in
`Smithville, Georgia which maintained a 12% market share at the time. On June 9, 2016 OIL
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`announced that it acquired a 100% interest in Brooks Peanut Company, LLC for $85 million, the
`sixth largest peanut sheller in the United States at the time based in Samson, Alabama. On
`December 27, 2018, Brooks Peanut Company, LLC and McCleskey Mills, Inc. were merged, and
`the corporate name was changed to Olam Peanut Shelling Company, Inc. Olam is liable for its
`own actions during the Class Period and also for the acts of McCleskey Mills, Inc. and Brooks
`Peanut Company, LLC, its predecessor companies.
`“Defendant” or “Defendants” as used herein includes, in addition to those named
`specifically above, all of the named Defendants’ predecessors, including peanut shelling
`companies that merged with or were acquired by the named Defendants and each named
`Defendant’s wholly-owned or controlled subsidiaries or affiliates that purchased Runners in
`interstate commerce, directly or through its wholly-owned or controlled affiliates, from peanut
`farmers in the United States during the Class Period.
`To the extent that subsidiaries and divisions within each Defendant’s corporate
`family purchased Runners from Peanut farmers, these subsidiaries played a material role in the
`conspiracy alleged in this Complaint because Defendants wished to ensure that the prices paid for
`such Runners would not undercut the artificially depressed pricing that was the aim and intended
`result of Defendants’ coordinated and collusive behavior as alleged herein. Thus, all such entities
`within the corporate family were active, knowing participants in the conspiracy alleged herein, and
`their conduct in purchasing and pricing with regard to Plaintiffs and members of the Plaintiff Class
`for Runners was known to and approved by their respective corporate parent named as a Defendant
`in this Complaint.
`IV. AGENTS AND CO-CONSPIRATORS
`Various other persons, firms, and corporations not named as defendants have
`participated as co-conspirators with Defendants and have performed acts and made statements in
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`furtherance of the conspiracy. The Defendants are jointly and severally liable for the acts of their
`co-conspirators whether or not named as defendants in this Complaint.
`32. Whenever reference is made to any act of any corporation, the allegation means
`that the corporation engaged in the act by or through its officers, directors, agents, employees, or
`representatives while they were actively engaged in the management, direction, control, or
`transaction of the corporation’s business or affairs.
`Each of the Defendants named herein acted as the agent or joint-venturer of or for
`the other Defendants with respect to the acts, violations, and common course of conduct alleged
`Defendants are also liable for acts done in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy by
`companies they acquired through mergers and acquisitions.
`TRADE AND COMMERCE
`During the Class Period, each Defendant, directly or through its subsidiaries or
`other affiliates, purchased Runners and sold the shelled product in the United States in a continuous
`and uninterrupted flow of interstate commerce and foreign commerce, including through and into
`this judicial district.
`During the Class Period, Defendants collectively controlled a majority of the
`market for Peanut shelling in the United States.
`By reason of the unlawful activities hereinafter alleged, Defendants substantially
`affected interstate trade and commerce throughout the United States and caused antitrust injury to
`Plaintiffs and members of the Class.
`Case 2:19-cv-00463-RAJ-LRL Document 148 Filed 05/27/20 Page 12 of 44 PageID# 1531
`Background on the Peanut Production Industry
`Peanut Production in the United States.
`There are four major types of Peanuts grown in the United States: Runner, Spanish,
`Valencia, and Virginia. The type of Peanut grown is region-specific: Runners are grown
`throughout the country, but especially in Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Texas, and Oklahoma;
`Spanish Peanuts are primarily grown in Oklahoma and Texas; Valencia Peanuts are primarily
`grown in New Mexico; and Virginia Peanuts are primarily grown in Virginia, North Carolina, and
`South Carolina. The Runner type is the primary commercial Peanut raised, and makes up
`approximately 80% of the United States’ planted acreage. As a result, this Complaint focuses on
`Runner Peanuts, although Defendants’ conspiracy may also involve the other Peanut types;
`Defendants are just as active in purchasing Spanish and Virginia Peanuts as they are with runner
`Peanuts. Plaintiffs’ investigation continues.
`Peanut production in the United States is concentrated in the Southeast (Alabama,
`Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, South Carolina), the Southwest (New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas),
`and the Mid-Atlantic (Virginia and North Carolina).
`Peanuts are produced either on irrigated land or dry land. Irrigated Peanuts, also
`known as premium Peanuts, are less risky crops than dry-land Peanuts because the yield is more
`certain, whereas dry-land Peanuts are more susceptible to drought conditions. As reported in 2016,
`however, only 25% of United States Peanut acreage is irrigated due to limited land with water
`available for irrigation. For example, southern Georgia and northern Florida have a higher
`percentage of irrigated Peanuts due to a large aquifer in the region.
`The growing cycle of the Peanut, from planting to harvesting, takes approximately
`four to five months. The crops are planted after the last frost of the year, usually in April or May.
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`When Peanuts are ready for harvest during the fall, farmers pull the plants out of the ground to dry
`and collect the nuts. Once that is completed, the Peanuts are ready to be delivered to buying points
`and sold to shellers.
`Buying points typically are either independent entities who contract exclusively
`with one sheller, or are owned by a sheller. Buying points act on a sheller’s behalf to facilitate
`transactions with farmers, but buying points do not take title to the Peanuts and have no pricing
`authority; instead, buying points simply convey to farmers Peanut prices set by shellers. Farmers
`deliver their Peanuts to buying points where the Peanuts are cleaned, graded, and delivered to
`shelling plants. The Peanuts must be delivered to buying points immediately after harvest to
`prevent the Peanuts from rotting.
`As noted above, shellers play a vital role in the peanut production process. Peanut
`shelling involves breaking the outer hull or shell of Peanuts and removing the kernels.
`Approximately 90% of harvested Peanuts are sold to shellers to be processed and packaged for
`food companies or other manufacturers, such as Hershey Co., Mars, Inc., and Jif.
`Federal Peanut Policy and the Farm Bills.
`Peanut farmers face higher than normal farming risks and have limited information
`with regard to price discovery because there is no futures market. In addition, there are the typical
`agricultural risks that affect the success of a Peanut crop harvest, with weather (such as floods or
`droughts) being the primary risk factor. Other risks include pests, new technology, machinery
`efficiency, and the availability, quality, and efficacy of inputs.
`The federal government has provided some risk management and funding options
`for Peanut farmers. From the 1930s to 2002, the Peanut industry operated under a system of
`marketing quotas that controlled domestic supplies and prices. In 2002, Congress eliminated the
`quota system under the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act (the “2002 Farm Bill”) such that
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`farm policy for Peanuts followed essentially the same structure as other covered commodities—
`fundamentally changing the Peanut industry to become more market-oriented. The 2002 Farm
`Bill provided a marketing loan rate of $355 per ton for all Peanuts, creating more competition
`among farmers without restricting the supply by favoring just the quota holders.
`In 2014, Congress enacted the Agricultural Act of 2014 (the “2014 Farm Bill”),
`which introduced additional modifications to Peanut payment programs and governs the majority
`of current Peanut policy.1 Under the current policy, there are three types of financial support for
`Peanut farmers. At a general level, the current policy offers loans guaranteed by the farmer’s crop
`so that the government can repossess Peanuts as repayment if the farmer is unable to sell all of it.
`The current loan rate for Peanuts, including Runners, is approximately $355 per ton, which has
`remained the same since the 2002 policy. This loan program essentially provides a price floor
`because the government takes ownership of the crop if prices drop below the statutory loan rate.
`Contract Marketing Under the Current Peanut Policy.
`After implementation of the 2002 Farm Bill, private contracting became the
`standard for Peanut transactions between farmers and shellers. Option contracts are the most
`commonly used type of contracts. Shellers use option contracts to manage risk and hedge against
`poor crop years, by obtaining an exclusive option in advance to purchase Peanuts from farmers for
`a specific type and amount. Shellers pay an option price above the government loan rate for the
`right to purchase Peanuts, and farmers can pocket that premium. In theory, option contracts may
`differ among shellers with regard to payment specifications, such as when payment is received,
`how many tons are farmed, the right to purchase additional Peanuts, and shrink and storage options.
`1 In 2018, Congress enacted another Farm Bill, but the 2018 Farm Bill for the most part left
`critical Peanut provisions in place and did not significantly impact federal peanut policy.
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`In practice, however, the contracts tend to be similar for each transaction, as farmers merely receive
`pre-printed forms to complete and sign.
`Peanuts Are a Commodity.
`48. Within each type (such as Runners), Peanuts are commodity products with little to
`no product differentiation among growers, as recognized by the USDA and the Agricultural
`Marketing Resources Center. After harvesting, Runners from different farmers are co-mingled
`and stored together at buying point warehouses; there is no need to separate Runners based on the
`grower.
`The United States Peanut Production Market is a National Market Worth
`Over a Billion Dollars Annually.
`Peanuts are the twelfth most valuable cash crop grown in the United States, with a
`farm value averaging $1.1 to $1.4 billion U.S. dollars annually.
`The Structure and Characteristics of the Peanut Shelling Market Render the
`Conspiracy Economically Plausible.
`The Peanut Market is Characterized by Inelastic Demand.
`Consumer demand for peanuts and peanut products is relatively unaffected by price
`because peanuts are historically considered to be an inexpensive good, even when prices fluctuate,
`comprising a small share of consumers’ budgets. This inelasticity is a critical long-running factor
`that influences Peanut output such that even small changes in supply can result in large price
`fluctuations.
`There Are No Significant Substitutes for Peanuts.
`There are no significant substitutes for Peanuts. Although there are potential
`substitute products, such as soybeans, sunflower seeds, almonds, cashews, or other tree nuts, the
`characteristics of those products lack the unique characteristics of peanuts. Peanuts are distinctive
`in that they can be both consumed and processed into other foods, from peanut butter to candies.
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`Peanuts also have more protein than any other nut, making peanuts a unique source of nutrition.
`Peanuts are an inexpensive protein upon which many consumers in the U.S. rely. Moreover,
`Peanuts can be processed for industrial uses, such as paints, plastics, and fuel.
`The Peanut Shelling Industry is Highly Concentrated and Has Experienced
`High Consolidation.
`The concentration of shellers has significantly increased over the past fifty years as
`non-farm sectors of the industry consolidated to promote higher efficiency. The USDA reported
`in 2016 that Peanut farmers operate in a thin market with a very small number of shellers,
`sometimes facing no options at all because there is only one potential buyer available for their
`region. In 1970, there were 92 active shelling companies, a stark contrast from the two very large
`and roughly one dozen other small shellers that exist today. At least five of these smaller shellers
`are family or farmer-owned businesses that are limited to a single processing facility. Another two
`of these shellers, Severn Peanut Company and Southern Peanut Company, operate their own food
`production labels and shell primarily, if not exclusively, for their own food labels.
`There are currently only two major shellers, Defendants Birdsong and Golden
`Peanuts. Between 2000 and 2003, Defendants controlled approximately 73% of all Peanuts
`purchased for shelling and two-thirds of all buying points. Currently, Defendants Birdsong and
`Golden Peanut together control 80-90% of the United States Peanut shelling market. Defendant
`Olam is the third largest participant in the United States Peanut shelling industry and controls at
`least 10% of the United States Peanut shelling market.
`There have been several acquisitions by major companies and industry players in
`the past five years. Since the 1950s, Defendant Golden Peanut (previously known as Gold Kist
`Peanuts) has acquired various shelling plants and peanut mills. In 1992, Golden Peanut purchased
`Dothan Oil Mill (also known as Domco), one of the key shelling companies at the time. In 2015,
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`Golden Peanut acquired Clint Williams Company (also known as Texoma Peanut Company) after
`Clint Williams filed for bankruptcy. The bankruptcy threatened to cripple the Peanut industry in
`Texas, Oklahoma, Arkansas, and Mississippi until the USDA paid out affected farmers for their
`lost Peanuts.
`As mentioned above, in 2014, Defendant Olam’s ultimate parent company OIL
`announced it would acquire McCleskey Mills, Inc., the third largest peanut sheller in the United
`States at the time and in 2016, OIL acquired Brooks Peanut Company, the sixth largest Peanut
`sheller in the United States at the time. On December 27, 2018, Brooks Peanut Company, LLC
`and McCleskey Mills, Inc. were merged, and the corporate name was changed to Olam Peanut
`Shelling Company, Inc. These recent acquisitions have strengthened Olam’s position as the third
`largest Peanut sheller in the U.S., with a market share of at least 10%.
`The Peanut Shelling Industry is Characterized by a Lack of Pricing
`Transparency and Asymmetric Access to Key Market Information.
`Because there is no futures market or public exchange for buying and selling
`Peanuts, price discovery is difficult. The use of private contracts in the industry means there is no
`true market price.
`Large shellers hold an advantage over individual farmers because the shellers have
`easier access to resources and market information. A 20