Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/99428/machinists-vs-gonzales
Timestamp: 2018-02-25 12:18:00
Document Index: 630420076

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 158', '§10', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§8', '§ 12', '§ 301', '§ 10', '§ 10', '§ 160', '§ 301', '§ 185', '§ 303']

Machinists Vs Gonzales - Citation 99428 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Machinists Vs. Gonzales - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/99428
Case Number 356 U.S. 617
machinists v. gonzales - 356 u.s. 617 (1958) u.s. supreme court machinists v. gonzales, 356 u.s. 617 (1958) machinists v. gonzales no. 31 argued december 12, 1957 decided may 26, 1958 356 u.s. 617 certiorari to the district court of appeal of california, first appellate district syllabus claiming to have been expelled from membership in an international union and its local union in violation of his rights under the constitutions and bylaws of the unions, a former union member sued in a california state court for restoration of his membership and for damages for his illegal expulsion. the court entered judgment ordering his reinstatement and awarding him damages for lost wages and physical and mental suffering. .....
Machinists v. Gonzales - 356 U.S. 617 (1958)
U.S. Supreme Court Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958)
Held: The National Labor Relations Act as amended, does not exclude this exercise of state power, and the judgment is affirmed. Pp. 356 U. S. 618 -623.
(a) The protection of union members in their contractual rights as members has not been undertaken by federal law, and state power to order reinstatement in a union is not precluded by the fact that the union's conduct may also involve an unfair labor practice and there is a remote possibility of conflict with enforcement of national policy by the National Labor Relations Board. Pp. 356 U. S. 618 -620.
(b) Likewise, a state court can award damages for breach of the contract by wrongful ouster, since, even if the Board could award back pay, it could not compensate for other injuries suffered by an ousted union member, and the danger of conflict with federal policy is no greater than from an order of reinstatement. Pp. 356 U. S. 620 -623.
for at least half a century. See Dingwall v. Amalgamated Assn. of Street R. Employees, 4 Cal.App. 565, 88 P. 597. Though an unincorporated association, a labor union is, for many purposes, given the rights and subjected to the obligations of a legal entity. See United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344 , 259 U. S. 383 -392; United States v. White, 322 U. S. 694 , 322 U. S. 701 -703.
That the power of California to afford the remedy of reinstatement for the wrongful expulsion of a union member has not been displaced by the Taft-Hartley Act is admitted by petitioners. Quite properly, they do not attack so much of the judgment as orders respondent's reinstatement. As Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U. S. 485 , could not avoid deciding, the Taft-Hartley Act undoubtedly carries implications of exclusive federal authority. Congress withdrew from the States much that had theretofore rested with them. But the other half of what was pronounced in Garner -- that the Act "leaves much to the states" -- is no less important. See 346 U.S. at 346 U. S. 488 . The statutory implications concerning what has been taken from the States and what has been left to them are of a Delphic nature, to be translated into concreteness by the process of litigating elucidation. See Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U. S. 468 , 348 U. S. 474 -477.
61 Stat. 141, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1). The present controversy is precisely one that gives legal efficacy under state law to the rules prescribed by a labor organization for "retention of membership therein." Thus, to preclude a state court from exerting its traditional jurisdiction to determine and enforce the rights of union membership would in many cases leave an unjustly ousted member without remedy for the restoration of his important union rights. Such a drastic result, on the remote possibility of some entanglement with the Board's enforcement of the national policy, would require a more compelling indication of congressional will than can be found in the interstices of the Taft-Hartley Act. See United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U. S. 656 .
remedy by an award of damages for loss of wages and suffering resulting from the breach of contract. No radiation of the Taft-Hartley Act requires us thus to mutilate the comprehensive relief of equity and reach such an incongruous adjustment of federal-state relations touching the regulation of labor. The National Labor Relations Board could not have given respondent the relief that California gave him according to its local law of contracts and damages. Although, if the unions' conduct constituted an unfair labor practice, the Board might possibly have been empowered to award back pay, in no event could it mulct in damages for mental or physical suffering. And the possibility of partial relief from the Board does not, in such a case as is here presented, deprive a party of available state remedies for all damages suffered. See International Union, United Automobile Workers v. Russell, post, p. 356 U. S. 634 .
By sustaining a state court damage award against a labor organization for conduct that was subject to an unfair labor practice proceeding under the Federal Act, this Court sanctions a duplication and conflict of remedies to which I cannot assent. Such a disposition is contrary to the unanimous decision of this Court in Garner v. Teamsters C. & H. Local Union, 346 U. S. 485 .
"Congress evidently considered that centralized administration of specially designed procedures was necessary to obtain uniform application of its substantive rules and to avoid these diversities and conflicts likely to result from a variety of local procedures and attitudes toward labor controversies. [ Footnote 1 ]"
"Further, even if we were to assume, with petitioners, that distinctly private rights were enforced by the state authorities, it does not follow that the state and federal authorities may supplement each other in cases of this type. The conflict lies in remedies, not rights. The same picketing may injure both public and private rights. But when two separate remedies are brought to bear on the same activity, a conflict is imminent. [ Footnote 2 ]"
The two subsequent opinions of this Court that have undertaken to restate the holding in Garner, one of them written by the author of today's majority opinion, confirm its prohibition against duplication of remedies. Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, 348 U. S. 468 , 348 U. S. 479 ; [ Footnote 3 ] United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U. S. 656 , 347 U. S. 663 , 347 U. S. 665 . [ Footnote 4 ] And if elucidating litigation was required to dispel the Delphic nature of that doctrine, the requisite concreteness has been adequately supplied. This Court has consistently turned back efforts to utilize state remedies for conduct subject to proceedings for relief under the Federal Act. District Lodge 34, Lodge 804, International
Assn. of Machinists v. L. P. Cavett Co., 355 U. S. 39 ; Local Union 429, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Farnsworth & Chambers Co., 353 U.S. 969; Retail Clerks International Assn. v. J. J. Newberry Co., 352 U.S. 987; Pocatello Building & Construction Trades Council v. C. H. Elle Constr. Co., 352 U.S. 884; Building Trades Council v. Kinard Constr. Co., 346 U.S. 933. With the exception of cases allowing the State to exercise its police power to punish or prevent violence, United A., A. & A.I.W. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 351 U. S. 266 ; Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U. S. 131 , the broad holding of Garner has never been impaired. Certainly United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., supra, did not have that effect. The Laburnum opinion carefully notes that the Federal Act excludes conflicting state procedures, and emphasizes that "Congress has neither provided nor suggested any substitute" [ Footnote 5 ] for the state relief there being sustained. [ Footnote 6 ]
The principles declared in Garner v. Teamsters C. & H. Local Union, supra, were not the product of imperfect consideration or untried hypothesis. They comprise the fundamental doctrines that have guided this Court's preemption decisions for over a century. When Congress, acting in a field of dominant federal interest as part of a comprehensive scheme of federal regulation, confers rights and creates remedies with respect to certain conduct, it has expressed its judgment on the desirable scope of regulation, and state action to supplement it is as "conflicting," offensive, and invalid as state action in derogation. E.g., Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U. S. 497 ; Missouri
P. R. Co. v. Porter, 273 U. S. 341 ; Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1, 18 U. S. 21 -23. This is as true of a state common law right of action as it is of state regulatory legislation. Texas & P. R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co. , 204 U. S. 426 . As recently as Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U. S. 1 , we had occasion to reemphasize the vitality of these preemption doctrines in a labor case where, due to NLRB inaction, the conduct involved was either subject to state regulation or it was wholly unregulated. We set aside a state court remedial order directed at activity that had been the subject of unfair labor practice charges with the Board, declaring that
"the [secession of jurisdiction] proviso to §10(a) is the exclusive means whereby States may be enabled to act concerning the matters which Congress has entrusted to the National Labor Relations Board. [ Footnote 7 ]"
That the foregoing principles of preemption apply to the type of dispute involved in this case cannot be doubted. Comment hardly need be made upon the comprehensive nature of the federal labor regulation in the Taft-Hartley Act. One of its declared purposes is "to protect the rights of individual employees in their relations with labor organizations whose activities affect commerce. . . ." [ Footnote 8 ] The Act deals with the very conduct involved in this case by declaring in § 8(b)(2) that it shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate in regard to hire or tenure of employment against an employee who has been denied union membership on some ground other than failure to tender periodic dues. [ Footnote 9 ] The evidence disclosed the probability of a § 8(b)(2) unfair labor practice in the union's refusal to
dispatch Gonzales from its hiring hall after his expulsion from membership and his inability thereafter to obtain employment. If a causal relation between the nondispatch and the refusal to hire is an essential element of § 8(b)(2), [ Footnote 10 ] there was ample evidence to satisfy that requirement. A few months after Gonzales' expulsion, the union signed a multiemployer collective bargaining agreement with a hiring hall provision. One witness testified that there was no material difference between hiring procedures before and after the date of that agreement. [ Footnote 11 ] There were other indications to the same effect. [ Footnote 12 ] In any event, since the uncontested facts disclose the probability of a § 8(b)(2) unfair labor practice, the existence of the same must for preemption purposes be assumed. As we said in Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, supra, 348 U.S. at 348 U. S. 478 , "The point is rather that the Board, and not the state court, is empowered to pass upon such issues in the first instance."
Assuming that the union conduct involved constituted a §8(b)(2) unfair labor practice, [ Footnote 13 ] the existence of a conflict of remedies in this case cannot be denied. Section 10(c) of the Act empowers the Board to redress such conduct by requiring the responsible party to reimburse the worker for the pay he has lost. Relying upon the identical conduct on which the Board would premise its back
pay award, [ Footnote 14 ] the state court has required of the union precisely what the Board would require that Gonzales be made whole for his lost wages. Such a duplication and conflict of remedies is the very thing this Court condemned in Garner.
for the employer discriminations that result from nonmembership. [ Footnote 15 ]
"The most frequent form of affirmative action required in cases of this type is specifically provided for, i.e., the reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as the circumstances dictate. No private right of action is contemplated. [ Footnote 16 ]"
There is nothing in the Taft-Hartley amendments that detracts in the slightest from this unequivocal declaration that private rights of action are not contemplated within the scheme of remedies Congress has chosen to prescribe in the regulation of labor relations. [ Footnote 17 ] It is consistent with every indication of legislative intent. As the Act originally passed the House, § 12 created a private right of action in favor of persons injured by certain unfair labor practices. [ Footnote 18 ] The Senate rejected that approach, and the Section was deleted by the Conference.
Special considerations prompted adoption of a Senate amendment creating an action for damages sustained from one unfair labor practice, the secondary boycott. [ Footnote 19 ]
Aside from the obvious argument that the express inclusion of one private action in the scheme of remedies provided by the Act indicates that Congress did not contemplate others, the content of § 301 furnishes another distinguishing feature. The right of action is federal in origin, assuring the uniformity of substantive law so essential to matters having an impact on national labor regulation. [ Footnote 20 ] The right of action that the majority sanctions here, on the other hands, is a creature of state law, and may be expected to vary in content and effect according to the locality in which it is asserted. Free to operate as what Senator Taft characterized "a tremendous deterrent" [ Footnote 21 ] to the unfair labor practice for which it gives compensation, this damage recovery constitutes a state-created and state-administered addition to the structure of national labor regulation that cannot claim even the virtue of uniformity.
The majority draws satisfaction from the fact that this was a suit for breach of contract, not an attempt to regulate or remedy union conduct designed to bring about an employer discrimination. But the presence or absence of preemption is a consequence of the effect of state action on the aims of federal legislation, not a game that is played with labels or an exercise in artful pleading. In a preemption case decided upon what now seem to be discarded principles, [ Footnote 22 ] the author of today's majority opinion declared:
Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, supra, at 348 U. S. 480 . I would adhere to the view of preemption expressed by that case and by Garner v. Teamsters C. & H. Local Union, supra, and reverse the judgment below.
346 U.S. at 346 U. S. 490 .
346 U.S. at 346 U. S. 498 -499.
And see Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U. S. 1 , 353 U. S. 6 :
347 U.S. at 347 U. S. 663 .
Speaking of the Laburnum case in Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, 348 U. S. 468 , 348 U. S. 477 , the Court stated that
353 U.S. at 353 U. S. 9 .
The new Act deleted the provision in § 10(a) that the Board's power to prevent unfair labor practices was "exclusive," but the Committee reports make abundantly clear that the deletion was only made to avoid conflict with the new provisions authorizing a federal court injunction against unfair labor practices (§§ 10(j) and (l), 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) and ( l )), and the provision making unions suable in the federal courts (§ 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185). H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 510, on H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 52. Amazon Cotton Mill Co. v. Textile Workers Union, 167 F.2d 183.
"By this provision [§ 303], the Act assures uniformity, otherwise lacking, in rights of recovery in the state courts. . . ." United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U. S. 656 , 347 U. S. 665 -666.
" United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U. S. 656 , was an action for damages based on violent conduct, which the state court found to be a common law tort. While assuming that an unfair labor practice under the Taft-Hartley Act was involved, this Court sustained the state judgment on the theory that there was no compensatory relief under the federal Act and no federal administrative relief with which the state remedy conflicted."
348 U.S. at 348 U. S. 477 .
Ante, p. 356 U. S. 621 .