Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/297/617/505505/
Timestamp: 2019-09-15 16:18:38
Document Index: 81645976

Matched Legal Cases: ['art, 474', '§ 5', '§ 5', 'art, 74', 'art, 74', 'art, 474']

Robert St. Pierre, Petitioner-appellant, v. Jonathan R. Walls, Warden, Menard Correctional Center, Respondent-appellee, 297 F.3d 617 (7th Cir. 2002) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Seventh Circuit › 2002 › Robert St. Pierre, Petitioner-appellant, v. Jonathan R. Walls, Warden, Menard Correctional Center, R...
Robert St. Pierre, Petitioner-appellant, v. Jonathan R. Walls, Warden, Menard Correctional Center, Respondent-appellee, 297 F.3d 617 (7th Cir. 2002)
US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit - 297 F.3d 617 (7th Cir. 2002)
Rehearing Denied August 29, 2002
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED Prentice H. Marshall, Jr., Scott L. Warner (argued), Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, Chicago, IL, for petitioner-appellant.
Robert St. Pierre committed two brutal murders for hire in 1982. St. Pierre was tried and convicted of the murders in Illinois state court in 1983. On direct appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial based on the admission of an improperly obtained confession. People v. St. Pierre, 122 Ill. 2d 95, 118 Ill.Dec. 606, 522 N.E.2d 61 (1988). On remand, St. Pierre accepted responsibility and pled guilty to the two murders in 1989, rather than face another trial. St. Pierre then exhausted his state post-conviction remedies, People v. St. Pierre, 146 Ill. 2d 494, 167 Ill.Dec. 1029, 588 N.E.2d 1159 (1992), and sought federal habeas relief. The district court dismissed the petition for writ of habeas corpus finding five of the seven claims had been procedurally defaulted and the other two lacked merit. St. Pierre appealed, and we reversed the dismissal of six of the seven claims, concluding they were not procedurally defaulted. St. Pierre v. Cowan, 217 F.3d 939 (7th Cir. 2000). On remand, the district court granted the petition in part, as to the sentencing phase, but denied it in all other respects. United States ex rel. St. Pierre v. Cowan, 2001 WL 1001164 (N.D. Ill. Aug.27, 2001). St. Pierre now appeals the partial denial of the petition, arguing that his counsel was ineffective at the pleading stage and that his guilty plea was not made knowingly and voluntarily. The State of Illinois decided not to cross-appeal the partial grant of the petition for the sentencing phase; thus, regardless of the outcome of this appeal, St. Pierre will receive a new sentencing hearing.1 For the following reasons, we affirm the denial of the remainder of the petition for writ of habeas corpus.
Following the expert testimony, Judge Neville made it clear that he ordered the examination based on the unusual circumstances of the case, and "there was no general indication of any specific abnormality on the part of Mr. St. Pierre that required me to ask for an examination." Judge Neville observed that St. Pierre had meaningfully participated in the proceedings and his defense. The judge questioned St. Pierre on the issue of whether he was pleading guilty simply to return to Menard and avoid any further stay at the Cook County Jail. (St. Pierre was more than merely displeased with the conditions at Cook County; he apparently had a boyfriend at Cook County who was moved to Menard, so St. Pierre also sought to be moved back to Menard for the duration of proceedings.) St. Pierre stated, "I am pleading voluntarily." When pressed on the issue again, St. Pierre replied: " [T]o enter a plea of not guilty, okay, when in fact I did commit the crime would be tantamount to trying to get away with murder, and that's not my intention." During the discussion St. Pierre's counsel stated that he did not recommend the plea, and that he was still uncomfortable with his client's decision, but conceded that it was St. Pierre's "wish to proceed as he stated." 1. Acceptance of the Guilty Plea
In late 1995, the private attorneys working pro bono filed for habeas relief in federal district court. The attorneys subpoenaed a number of documents relating to St. Pierre's childhood, which, according to them, show a troubled childhood and psychological problems. In early 1996, St. Pierre, pro se, filed a motion to dismiss the habeas petition and waive further federal review. According to his attorneys, St. Pierre asked them to withdraw the motion two days later. The district court issued a decision dismissing the petition on the merits, finding that St. Pierre had procedurally defaulted on five of the seven claims for habeas relief. This court reversed the finding of procedural default and remanded the case. St. Pierre v. Cowan, 217 F.3d 939 (7th Cir. 2000).
The district court found that based on the evidence St. Pierre was fit at the time of trial and that the guilty plea was properly taken. The court concluded that counsel's services were not deficient in the pleading stage. " [N]ot open to question was St. Pierre's knowing and voluntary desire to plead guilty." United States ex rel. St. Pierre, 2001 WL 1001164 at *11. When it came to the penalty phase, the district court indicated that counsel had a "greater obligation to discover and evaluate potential evidence of mitigation." Id. *12-13. The court found that because counsel did not subpoena St. Pierre's childhood records, counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient in the penalty phase of the proceedings. " [W]e cannot say with any confidence that St. Pierre's possible bipolar [disorder] would not have changed the Judge's decision to impose capital punishment." Id. at *14.
St. Pierre petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, and our review is a narrow deferential review for constitutional error, not an archaeological digging expedition to be conducted twenty years after the crime occurred and after numerous courts have reviewed the issues and facts first-hand. See, e.g., Foster v. Schomig, 223 F.3d 626, 634 & n. 4 (7th Cir. 2000) ("Given the context of the actual hearing, and not based on what the witnesses could or could not recall thirteen years later, not calling Dr. Rossiter was entirely reasonable.") (emphasis added); Jones v. Page, 76 F.3d 831, 839 (7th Cir. 1996); Milone v. Camp, 22 F.3d 693, 698-99 (7th Cir. 1994) ("Federal courts can grant habeas relief only when there is a violation of federal statutory or constitutional law"). The factual findings of both the state court and district courts are reviewed deferentially, including the numerous findings relating to competency. We review the district court's factual findings under the clearly erroneous standard and legal conclusions de novo.17 E.g., Kavanagh v. Berge, 73 F.3d 733, 735 (7th Cir. 1996). We presume the factual conclusions of the state courts correct if they were "made after a hearing on the merits and are fairly supported by the record," unless substantially demonstrated otherwise. Id.; Rodriguez v. Peters, 63 F.3d 546, 554 (7th Cir. 1995); Montgomery v. Greer, 956 F.2d 677, 680 (7th Cir. 1992).
The Sixth Amendment challenge to the effectiveness of St. Pierre's counsel is governed by the deferential standard announced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-98, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). St. Pierre has the burden of proving that: "counsel's performance was deficient"; and "the deficient performance prejudiced the defense". Id. at 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052. In considering the first element, the Supreme Court has instructed courts not to engage in "the distorting effects of hindsight," and to "evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time." Id. at 688-91, 104 S. Ct. 2052. In addition, courts must "indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Id.; Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 382, 106 S. Ct. 2574, 91 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1986). In order to demonstrate the prejudice element, the defendant must "show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052.
Although St. Pierre was not tried, the Strickland test still applies to counsel's conduct during the pleading stage. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57, 106 S. Ct. 366, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1985); Jones, 76 F.3d at 840. In the context of guilty pleas, challenged on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel, the first part of the Strickland analysis is the same; however, the prejudice requirement is altered, requiring the defendant to establish: "but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Hill, 474 U.S. at 58-59, 106 S. Ct. 366 (emphasis added). Yet, a lawyer need not advise his client of "every defense or argument or tactic that while theoretically possible is hopeless as a practical matter." Evans v. Meyer, 742 F.2d 371, 374 (7th Cir. 1984) (emphasis added). Just because there is no "bona fide defense to the charge" does not mean that counsel need manufacture one. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656-57 n. 19, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 80 L. Ed. 2d 657 (1984).
Even if Barasa had not discussed an insanity defense with St. Pierre, that does not mean his performance was deficient. Counsel is not required to discuss every possible defense with the defendant, especially one not suggested by any evidence.18 See Evans, 742 F.2d at 374. St. Pierre decided to plead guilty, against the advice of his attorney, and after a finding of competency. At the time St. Pierre pled guilty, there were multiple psychiatric reports available regarding his competency. Dr. Stipes testified pursuant to court order, the Associated Mental Health Services report prepared by Dr. Braun, from the first trial, was available and later used in the mitigation hearing, and the reports of Dr. Stephen R. Cann and psychologist Judy A. Condis were appended to the PSR. All of these reports, in addition to the personal observations by Barasa and Judge Neville, gave no indication of any psychological problems with St. Pierre at the time of the plea. Also, Barasa spoke with the attorneys from the first trial, who gave no indication that St. Pierre was mentally unfit at the time of the crime or first trial. Avoiding "the distorting effects of hindsight" and viewing this situation "from counsel's perspective at the time," we conclude counsel's conduct was proper under the circumstances because there were no indications of mental instability at the time St. Pierre pled guilty. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. 2052.
Moreover, St. Pierre cannot demonstrate prejudice based on his second and third arguments. In affidavits supporting his habeas petition, St. Pierre now claims that had he known about the possibility of an insanity defense he would not have pled guilty. However, the question is not what St. Pierre would do now, but what he would have done at the time had he known. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694-96, 104 S. Ct. 2052; Hill, 474 U.S. at 58-59, 106 S. Ct. 366. St. Pierre insisted on pleading guilty, despite Barasa's repeated and numerous attempts to dissuade him. Even more telling is the motion filed by Barasa to withdraw St. Pierre's guilty plea. St. Pierre interrupted the proceedings immediately after Barasa stated his intent, unequivocally stating that the motion to withdraw the plea was being filed against his wishes.20 No matter what Barasa said or did St. Pierre intended to take responsibility for his crimes and plead guilty. Thus, St. Pierre cannot show "but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Hill, 474 U.S. at 58-59, 106 S. Ct. 366 (emphasis added).
Next we discuss whether counsel's failure to investigate and obtain eight reports from St. Pierre's childhood constitutes ineffective assistance. We begin by noting that counsel only "has a duty to make reasonable investigations." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (emphasis added); Earl v. Israel, 765 F.2d 91, 93 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that "if it is reasonable in the circumstances not to conduct a particular investigation, the lawyer's failure to do so will not establish ineffective representation."). Figuring importantly in this assessment is the influence of the defendant's words and demeanor, and information supplied by the defendant. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-92, 104 S. Ct. 2052.
By all accounts, St. Pierre understood and actively participated in the court proceedings and his defense. Counsel spoke with St. Pierre numerous times and learned about St. Pierre's troubled childhood and background, but St. Pierre mentioned nothing about a history of mental problems. In addition, all the available medical expert evaluations concluded St. Pierre was competent to stand trial and plead guilty.21 Under the circumstances it was certainly reasonable for counsel not to conduct any further investigation into St. Pierre's childhood regarding mental competence at this stage in the proceedings. See Jones, 76 F.3d at 841-45; United States ex rel. Rivera v. Franzen, 794 F.2d 314, 316-17 (7th Cir. 1986) (noting defense attorneys have no general Sixth Amendment duty "to explore their clients' mental capacity in every case"); Earl, 765 F.2d at 93; Wright v. Walls, 288 F.3d 937, 947 (7th Cir. 2002) ("An attorney's investigation need not be unlimited in scope or unerring in execution, but merely reasonable.").
More importantly, it was St. Pierre himself who precluded counsel from even putting on a defense. Counsel cannot be considered ineffective when a competent defendant makes the informed choice not to put on a defense and instead plead guilty to the charges. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-92, 104 S. Ct. 2052 ("Counsel's actions are usually based, quite properly, on informed strategic choices made by the defendant and on information supplied by the defendant.") (emphasis added); Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794-95, 107 S. Ct. 3114, 97 L. Ed. 2d 638 (1987) ("`And when a defendant has given counsel reason to believe that pursuing certain investigations would be fruitless or even harmful, counsel's failure to pursue those investigations may not later be challenged as unreasonable.'") (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S. Ct. 2052); Davis v. Greer, 13 F.3d 1134, 1139 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that a defendant's informed choice of strategy, precluding counsel from putting on a particular defense, cannot later constitute the basis of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim); United States v. Weaver, 882 F.2d 1128, 1140 (7th Cir. 1989). St. Pierre's decision also precluded Barasa from having the time to develop facts favorable to St. Pierre. Barasa first appeared on behalf of St. Pierre May 19, 1988, and less than two months later St. Pierre voluntarily pled guilty on August 8, 1988. Counsel's performance was not ineffective by failing to obtain the additional reports because St. Pierre's strategic decision to plead guilty prevented further investigation by counsel.
St. Pierre attempts to parlay the district court's determination that counsel's performance was ineffective at the penalty phase into a finding that counsel's performance during the pleading phase was likewise incompetent. The two findings do create an apparent inconsistency. Cf. Bracy v. Schomig, 286 F.3d 406, 419-26 (7th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (Posner, J., concurring and dissenting). The inconsistency is primarily explained by the differing performance standards between trial and death penalty mitigation hearings. See id. at 412, 415 (majority opinion) (stating "death is different"). See also Jonathan P. Tomes, Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don't: The Use of Mitigation Experts in Death Penalty Litigation, 24 AM. J. CRIM. L. 359 (1997) (appropriately titled). In Strickland, the Supreme Court applied the same standard to a trial and a separate penalty hearing. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 684-87, 104 S. Ct. 2052 ("The same principle applies to a capital sentencing proceeding"). In later cases, the Court has continued to apply the same standard to determine ineffectiveness of counsel at both trial and sentencing proceedings. See, e.g., Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 184-87, 106 S. Ct. 2464, 91 L. Ed. 2d 144 (1986); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390-98, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 146 L. Ed. 2d 389 (2000) (reaffirming the Court's adherence to, and continued application of, the Strickland standard).
Nevertheless, this circuit has held defense counsel to a higher standard at the sentencing phase where death is a possible sentence. See, e.g., Kubat v. Thieret, 867 F.2d 351, 369 (7th Cir. 1989) (" [W]e hold that defense counsel must make a significant effort, based on reasonable investigation and logical argument, to ably present the defendant's fate to the jury and to focus the attention of the jury on any mitigating factors."). Even this inconsistency is potentially explained by the fact that nearly anything is admissible in mitigation, regardless of whether it would be admissible at trial. See 720 ILCS § 5/9-1(e) (West 2000) ("Any information relevant to any additional aggravating factors or any mitigating factors indicated in subsection (c) may be presented by the State or defendant regardless of its admissibility under the rules governing the admission of evidence at criminal trials."); People v. Jones, 94 Ill. 2d 275, 68 Ill.Dec. 903, 447 N.E.2d 161, 165-67 (1982) (quoting the 1979 version, which would have applied at St. Pierre's hearing, which is exactly the same standard as the current statutory version). While a defendant's mental state at the time of the crime might not rise to the level of a defense to the crime, it can be relevant in a mitigation hearing. See 720 ILCS § 5/9-1(c) (1) (West 2000) (" [T]he murder was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, although not such as to constitute a defense to prosecution"). Hence, the availability of additional evidence increases counsel's duty to investigate, within reasonable limits. See Stewart v. Gramley, 74 F.3d 132, 135-37 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Presumably the lawyer is not required to investigate the defendant's past with the thoroughness of a biographer.").
Of course, the availability and admissibility of practically any evidence is a double-edged sword. If counsel introduces mitigating evidence the prosecution can rebut with other evidence, which may turn out to be substantially more damaging. See Darden, 477 U.S. at 185-86, 106 S. Ct. 2464; Foster, 223 F.3d at 631-39 ("As we have noted before in cases like this one, there is a strong possibility that the defendant's mitigation evidence might turn out to be aggravating."); Emerson v. Gramley, 91 F.3d 898, 906-07 (7th Cir. 1996) ("The narratives that defense counsel and their `mitigation specialists' present often contain material that the jury is likely to consider aggravating rather than mitigating."). Because of the increased investigative burden, St. Pierre's counsel could be found to have been deficient for not uncovering mitigating evidence of childhood mental illness at the penalty phase, but not be deficient for failing to present the same evidence during the pleading phase.25
Just about all of the cases relied upon by the district court found counsel's performance deficient in the penalty phase because counsel failed to present any evidence in mitigation. See Kubat, 867 F.2d at 368 (finding defense counsel's performance deficient by contacting only two of the known fifteen character witnesses before trial and calling none to testify in mitigation, relying instead on a plea for mercy); Emerson, 91 F.3d at 907 (affirming the grant of habeas as to the sentencing phase because "no evidence whatsoever in mitigation, or even argument, was presented."); Brewer v. Aiken, 935 F.2d 850, 856-58 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding that counsel's failure to investigate and present any mitigating evidence at the sentencing phase prejudiced the defense); Antwine v. Delo, 54 F.3d 1357, 1365-68 (8th Cir. 1995) (upholding the conviction but finding counsel ineffective at the sentencing phase for failing to present evidence of defendant's mental illness and presenting only a plea for mercy); see also Patrasso v. Nelson, 121 F.3d 297, 303-05 (7th Cir. 1997). In contrast, St. Pierre's counsel presented significant evidence in mitigation, including three live witnesses (Monte Williams, Fr. Smyth, and St. Pierre), testimony by stipulation (Raymond Chodorowski), and the Associated Mental Health Services report. These witnesses provided substantially all of the same evidence regarding St. Pierre's childhood experiences that St. Pierre now asserts is in the reports and would have made the difference if it was investigated and introduced. See Darden, 477 U.S. at 185-87, 106 S. Ct. 2464 (finding counsel's decision not to introduce a psychiatric report and instead rely on a plea of mercy was reasonable); Foster, 223 F.3d at 631-39 (holding that counsel's performance was not ineffective for deciding not to call an expert to testify about defendant's mental state because it might do more harm than good); Stewart, 74 F.3d at 135-37 (finding attorney's failure to fully investigate defendant's history of drug use or potential brain damage was not ineffective assistance of counsel because the additional evidence would not have made a difference).
Simply because there is additional evidence of a rough life, deprived childhood, or mental instability does not necessarily make it less likely the death sentence will be imposed. Historical facts that show a defendant has a condition or proclivity toward violence are often aggravating, not redeeming or mitigating factors. See Stewart, 74 F.3d at 134 ("And since it obviously is not the theory of capital punishment that murderers are compelled to murder by their past and therefore should not be punished, it cannot be right that anything brought out at a death-penalty hearing is certain or even likely to help the defendant to save his life."); Brewer, 935 F.2d at 860-61 (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (noting that " [t]rying to persuade the jury that the accused is mentally ill is worse than no defense at all."). Judge Neville, after considering mitigating evidence similar to that which St. Pierre now proffers and the brutality and nature of the crimes, concluded the death penalty was the appropriate sentence.
Counsel for St. Pierre wanted to put on a defense at trial, and even sought to withdraw the guilty plea. It was St. Pierre who made the decision to plead guilty to the charges. Several psychologists, the judge, and counsel all agreed that he was competent to do so. Based on all the available evidence at the time of the plea and the Strickland standard, it is impossible to say that counsel's performance was deficient. In fact, counsel's overall performance at the pleading stage, considering his client's attitude and intent, was commendable. See Balfour v. Haws, 892 F.2d 556, 562-63 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting that for specific allegations of ineffective assistance courts must "weigh the overall quality of representation provided to the defendant" and not individual shortcomings). The district court's conclusion, finding counsel's performance did not fall below objective standards of reasonableness, was correct.
St. Pierre's argument that his plea was not knowing or voluntary directly relates to the prior discussion of counsel's performance because St. Pierre argues that counsel failed to advise and provide him with information making his plea involuntary. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 56-59, 106 S. Ct. 366 (applying the Strickland analysis when a defendant challenges the voluntariness of a plea based on inadequate advice of counsel); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770-72, 90 S. Ct. 1441, 25 L. Ed. 2d 763 (1970) (holding counsel's advice regarding evidence and potential success at trial versus a guilty plea is judged "not on whether a court would retrospectively consider counsel's advice to be right or wrong, but on whether that advice was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases."). However, St. Pierre's burden is even more onerous in this analysis for four reasons. First, counsel advised St. Pierre not to plead guilty and urged St. Pierre to go to trial. Second, counsel told St. Pierre about two possible defenses, one being insanity and the other being the admissibility of St. Pierre's statements. Third, St. Pierre was found competent to plead and clearly actively participated in the proceedings. Finally, we deal with a guilty plea by a defendant who is, without a doubt, guilty of the crime; and "the concern that unfair procedures may have resulted in the conviction of an innocent defendant is only rarely raised by a petition to set aside a guilty plea." Hill, 474 U.S. at 58, 106 S. Ct. 366 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
A guilty plea is properly accepted if it is made voluntarily and intelligently. E.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-44, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969). Voluntariness is determined by "considering all of the relevant circumstances surrounding" the guilty plea. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 749, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 25 L. Ed. 2d 747 (1970). During the process of accepting the plea the defendant must be made aware of the consequences of a guilty plea, however, he need not be made aware of every possible consequence. See Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242-44, 89 S. Ct. 1709; Brady, 397 U.S. at 748, 90 S. Ct. 1463; United States v. Jordan, 870 F.2d 1310, 1316 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Lumpkins, 845 F.2d 1444, 1450 (7th Cir. 1988); United States ex rel. Salisbury v. Blackburn, 792 F.2d 498, 499-501 (5th Cir. 1986).
St. Pierre does not argue that the judge improperly advised him of all the consequences of his guilty plea. St. Pierre cannot and does not challenge his competency to enter the plea because Judge Neville held a hearing on the issue of competence before accepting the guilty plea and the state judge's finding of competency is entitled to deference.26 See Montgomery, 956 F.2d at 680 (holding the state court's finding of competency is a factual one which we presume correct); Balfour, 892 F.2d at 560; cf. 725 ILCS 5/104-10 (providing the statutory presumption of fitness of a defendant to stand trial, plead, or be sentenced). See also Gosier v. Welborn, 175 F.3d 504, 507 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting involuntariness of a plea is often a derivative argument of competency).
Rather, St. Pierre asserts that his plea was neither knowing nor voluntary because he did not have the eight records from his childhood — later uncovered by private habeas counsel — and he did not know of the availability of an insanity plea. However, lawyers need not inform their clients of every possible defense, argument, or tactic, especially one not suggested by any evidence at the time. Evans, 742 F.2d at 374-75. Moreover, "` [i]t is well settled that a voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty made by an accused person, who has been advised by competent counsel, may not be collaterally attacked.'" Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621, 118 S. Ct. 1604, 140 L. Ed. 2d 828 (1998) (quoting Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508, 104 S. Ct. 2543, 81 L. Ed. 2d 437 (1984)).
St. Pierre was advised not to plead guilty, and about the possibility of using insanity as a defense. He flatly rejected the option of going to trial, and according to Judge Neville he did so knowingly and voluntarily. St. Pierre was found competent, and as the judge noted, appeared to meaningfully participate in his defense. Additionally, counsel noted that St. Pierre understood the charges and clearly wanted to plead guilty. Today St. Pierre says he wouldn't have pled guilty. However, hindsight is expressly prohibited in our analysis. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 56-59, 106 S. Ct. 366; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-91, 104 S. Ct. 2052. All the facts show that he understood the decision he was making and voluntarily made it because he wanted to accept responsibility for his crimes. There is no evidence indicating that the plea was not knowing and voluntary.
The majority's opinion affirming the district court's Solomonic decision to deny Robert St. Pierre's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, insofar as it related to his conviction (and to grant the petition insofar as it related to his death sentence) does the best that can be done with the facts surrounding the quality of the legal assistance St. Pierre received from his attorney throughout the proceedings. Unfortunately, in my opinion it is not enough to warrant the affirmance of the denial of the petition with respect to St. Pierre's guilty plea. As has been the case throughout the legal proceedings in St. Pierre's case, see, e.g., St. Pierre v. Cowan, 217 F.3d 939 (7th Cir. 2000), St. Pierre's mental illness — its nature, its severity, its effect on his crime, its effect on his ability to assist in his own defense, and its impact on his sentence — is a central problem. In a case where mental illness is or may be present, we must set aside our normal assumptions about human behavior and rationality of decisionmaking, and instead consider what occurred in light of the effects of any illness on the defendant's actions. When one does so in St. Pierre's case, I believe we are left with no choice but to grant the petition in its entirety.
The majority has also recounted most of the pertinent details about St. Pierre's retrial, which took place in 1988 before Circuit Judge Richard Neville, but it is here that I believe additional information helps to throw light on the problem before us. Judge Neville appointed Robert Barasa to represent St. Pierre. The majority characterizes Barasa as a "seasoned" trial attorney and former Cook County Public Defender, but neglects to mention that, no matter how seasoned an attorney Barasa was for ordinary criminal cases, he had never before had primary responsibility for a capital case. It is telling in that regard that the Report of the Governor's Commission on Capital Punishment, April 2002,1 includes among its recommendations several pertaining to the qualifications for counsel in capital cases, including an endorsement of new rules from the Illinois Supreme Court that creates a specialized Capital Litigation Trial Bar (membership in which requires prior experience as lead or co-counsel in at least two murder prosecutions) and further requires that lead counsel in all capital cases be a member of that bar. See Ill. S. Ct. Rules 416(d), 714(b). My point here is certainly not that these rules are retroactive; it is only that thoughtful people throughout the State of Illinois, including the members of the state Supreme Court and the members of the Governor's Commission, have recognized the importance of prior experience for defense counsel in capital cases. Someone like Barasa who lacks such experience is thus a novice to the capital area, no matter how much he has done elsewhere.
St. Pierre's original petition for a writ of habeas corpus was filed prior to the passage of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), and thus this appeal is governed by the standards applied prior to AEDPA's enactment. St. Pierre v. Cowan, 217 F.3d at 940. Although, as the majority emphasizes, our review of facts found by the state courts is deferential, we review issues of law de novo, including the critical questions whether he received ineffective assistance of counsel during his guilty plea proceedings and the adequacy of that plea. Cabello v. United States, 188 F.3d 871 (7th Cir. 1999). Here, of course, the state court never had the chance to make any findings of fact on the underlying issue of St. Pierre's mental illness because of the way Barasa was handling the proceedings. In any event, it is the Sixth Amendment issue (as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment) that is properly before us. That question, as the majority notes, is governed by the Supreme Court's decision in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).
Under Strickland, St. Pierre has the burden of showing both that his counsel's performance fell below the minimum level that the Constitution tolerates and that he was prejudiced by the inadequate performance. In the context of a guilty plea, this means that he must prove that the assistance he received leading up to the plea fell below the constitutional minimum and that he would not have entered the plea had he been adequately represented. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56, 106 S. Ct. 366, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1985). The majority finds St. Pierre's case insufficient, largely because it has assumed that St. Pierre was in fact competent to participate actively in the court proceedings that led to his guilty plea. It finds significant the fact that St. Pierre himself never mentioned his mental health problems. But there is a troubling circularity to this logic: a mentally ill person may not have the capacity to self-diagnose a problem of mental illness; he may be operating within a delusional system; he may believe himself to be some kind of superman; and so on. No one would expect a blind person to give a vivid description of a painting she is near, nor would one expect a person with a severe hearing impairment to discuss knowledgeably the performance on a particular evening of the cello section of the Chicago Symphony Orchestra. Everything St. Pierre did and said in the trial proceedings leading up to, and following, his guilty plea, is suspect because of the compelling evidence of mental illness that post-conviction counsel have uncovered. What we must consider is whether Barasa's failure to find the same information amounted to inadequate performance, and then, if so, whether that inadequate performance prejudiced St. Pierre.
St. Pierre's current lawyers point to Barasa's failure to conduct even a rudimentary background investigation of his client as one of his primary errors. As the Fifth Circuit put it in a case decided under the pre-AEDPA standards, " [w]here counsel (1) makes some exploration of the insanity defense but fails to take an obvious and readily available investigatory step which would have made the defense viable, (2) does not produce reasonable tactical reasons for not pursuing further investigation, and (3) raises no other plausible defense, courts may find ineffective assistance of counsel." Profitt v. Waldron, 831 F.2d 1245, 1248 (5th Cir. 1987). (This court later observed that Profitt's conclusion, as something developed under pre-AEDPA standards, did not apply in the post-AEDPA context, because the Supreme Court has never had occasion to consider this issue. See Long v. Krenke, 138 F.3d 1160, 1164 (7th Cir. 1998). As St. Pierre's case is governed by pre-AEDPA law, however, the constraint that the Long court found does not apply here.) In my opinion, the record overwhelmingly shows that Barasa's performance was constitutionally insufficient during the course of the proceedings that led to St. Pierre's guilty plea, as well as in the proceedings before the trial court after the guilty plea. He admitted at the first sanity hearing that he was unprepared and unaware of what it took to put into play a serious sanity defense. By the time of the second hearing, which Judge Neville conscientiously offered, Barasa was still grossly unprepared. He had not issued so much as a single subpoena to find out what St. Pierre's mental health history really was. He chose to rely on the "ridiculous" Williams as his only witness — and we have no reason to second-guess Judge Neville's impression of Williams's testimony. The utter failure to look into pertinent information cannot be accepted as a strategic choice. The Supreme Court noted in Strickland itself that "strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation." 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S. Ct. 2052. Here, the issue of St. Pierre's mental functioning had been called into question by the trial court judge himself; it is hard to imagine a better clue to defense counsel that this is a topic he too ought to exert at least some effort to explore.
Before a writ can be granted on the basis of a Sixth Amendment violation, it is of course also necessary to consider the question of prejudice. In my opinion, St. Pierre has also demonstrated this. First, had his bipolar disorder come to light before Judge Neville (whose own decisions were certainly hampered by Barasa's failure to develop the record properly), it is possible Judge Neville might have appointed a guardian to act for St. Pierre, rather than permitting him to make his own decisions. Such a guardian might have thought St. Pierre ought to have a full trial, rather than pleading guilty. Even if St. Pierre had remained in charge and had pleaded guilty, it is also quite likely that the evidence of the bipolar disorder that was eventually developed (and never considered by the state trial court because of the procedural mix-ups that have plagued this case) would have influenced the court's decision on the penalty phase. These cases are fact-specific, and for that reason I am not persuaded that the Eighth Circuit's decision in Antwine v. Delo, 54 F.3d 1357 (8th Cir. 1995), based on a situation with many similarities to St. Pierre's, is dispositive on the prejudice question. The (probable) severity of each man's disorder, the knowledge counsel had of the probable existence of mental abnormalities, the effect the disorder may have had on the commission of the offense, the effect it was having on the defendant's ability to assist in his own defense, and many other factors are different in the two cases. In any event, Antwine had insisted that he was interested only in the kind of defense that would produce an acquittal, whereas St. Pierre might also have benefitted at the penalty phase.
The district court in St. Pierre's federal habeas corpus proceedings also concluded that Barasa's failures were irrelevant because "under Illinois law, St. Pierre's sanity at the time of the crime was not an essential element of the crime." While correct as far as it goes — sanity at the time was an affirmative defense, as codified by Section 6-2(a) of the Criminal Code of 1961 — the ultimate conclusion of no prejudice is mistaken. In 1982, when St. Pierre committed this crime, the law pertaining to insanity defenses was as follows: the defendant had the initial burden of introducing evidence on the question of sanity; if he did so, the defendant was no longer presumed to be sane, and the state had the burden of proving sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. See People v. Hollins, 136 Ill.App.3d 1, 90 Ill.Dec. 770, 482 N.E.2d 1053, 1055 (1985). Although by 1988 Illinois had changed that rule, and now imposes the burden on the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she was not guilty by reason of insanity, see Pub. Act 83-288, Ill.Rev.Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 6-2(e); People v. Hickman, 143 Ill.App.3d 195, 97 Ill.Dec. 382, 492 N.E.2d 1041 (1986), St. Pierre was plainly entitled to have the 1982 version of the law applied to his case. As the Illinois courts themselves have recognized, to do otherwise would amount to an ex post facto application of the new statute. People v. Ramsey, 192 Ill. 2d 154, 248 Ill.Dec. 882, 735 N.E.2d 533, 535 (2000). In the end, therefore, it does not matter whether St. Pierre's sanity was formally an "essential element" of the case or an affirmative defense. What does matter is the fact that the state would have borne the burden of proving his sanity beyond a reasonable doubt, had Barasa properly raised the defense. This in turn shows once again that Barasa's shortcomings were prejudicial to St. Pierre at the guilt phase of his case.
According to his deposition Barasa had murder trial experience and had prepared an insanity defense before. These qualifications are relevant because the only issue remaining in this case is counsel's pre-trial (pleading stage) conduct.
The dissent makes Judge Neville's decision to hold a competency hearing a lynchpin of its argument that St. Pierre's mental health problems manifested themselves clearly and Barasa was on notice. However, Judge Neville specifically noted that "it should be made clear in the record that there was no general indication of any specific abnormality on the part of Mr. St. Pierre that required me to ask for an examination." (emphasis added).
Dr. Stipes, as Barasa noted in his deposition, was an independent "qualified health professional." (emphasis added).
Dr. Stipes had examined St. Pierre three other times before, dating back to 1981. Dr. Stipes stated that he interviewed St. Pierre for one hour and reviewed the "previous material." In his 1981 report Dr. Stipes noted reviewing the defendant's previous history "available from the old reports." Among the "old reports" were undoubtedly the reports of Dr. Stephen R. Cann, Judy A. Condis and the Associated Mental Health Services, all of which discuss St. Pierre's childhood psychology reports and examinations See infra note 11.
Barasa also stated in his deposition that he "nose [d] around" at Maryville, attempting to find any other potential witnesses or mitigating evidence
The dissent claims the issues of mental health and bipolar disorder were "never considered by the state trial court". However, St. Pierre's mental health was the sole focus of the post-conviction proceeding outlined above. A guardian was appointed, more experts were called, and still the judge concluded that St. Pierre was fit to waive any further appeals.
As we noted in the prior appeal,St. Pierre v. Cowan, 217 F.3d 939, 940 (7th Cir. 2000), St. Pierre's habeas petition was filed before the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. Hence, the pre-AEDPA standards (which are still deferential) apply to this case. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 335-36, 117 S. Ct. 2059, 138 L. Ed. 2d 481 (1997); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 402-03, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 146 L. Ed. 2d 389 (2000) (plurality opinion) (majority for Part II by O'Connor, J.). If, after receiving a new sentencing hearing, St. Pierre again files a habeas petition, AEDPA's substantially more strict standards will apply. See Lindh, 521 U.S. at 335-36, 117 S. Ct. 2059.
The dissent has clearly engaged in using the "distorting effects of hindsight", beginning with the very first paragraph where the dissent assumes the existence of "St. Pierre's mental illness". The dissent claims St. Pierre's behavior was erratic. The claimed instances of erratic behavior began well after St. Pierre pled guilty, in the post-conviction proceedings where he attempted to waive his appeals. As noted, it appears that St. Pierre always wished to waive his appeals, while his attorneys attempted to convince him otherwise (or simply acted in a manner inconsistent with his wishes), creating the appearance of erratic behavior. However, St. Pierre's conduct at the time he pled guilty, his conduct in the prior trial, and every psychological report prepared up to the time he pled guilty, indicated he was participating fully in his own defense and could make rational, reasoned decisions.
The dissent suggests that a guardian should have been appointed for St. Pierre. Once again, we point out there was no evidence at the time St. Pierre pled guilty and still there exists little evidence — demonstrating St. Pierre could not make rational and voluntary decisions. The dissent selectively cites a few isolated facts claiming Barasa should have declared St. Pierre incompetent. St. Pierre's desire to leave Cook County Jail is explained by his realization that the evidence clearly showed he committed a brutal crime — which St. Pierre does not dispute — and was going to prison, the only real questions were how soon and where. The dissent's suggestion that any defendant who acts in an erratic manner must have a guardian appointed and a multiple expert competency hearing held would put our criminal justice system at the mercy of defendants who could feign mental illness — something St. Pierre is no stranger to doing — and require justice not be based on law, but on the ever evolving and changing practice of psychiatry, where experts infinitely disagree See supra note 11 and infra note 26.
The dissent focuses on a few favorable facts, failing to mention not only St. Pierre's own conduct — which the dissent claims we overemphasize — but that more than four psychological reports all concluded St. Pierre was competent before he pled guilty. With this mountain of evidence against a finding of incompetency, Barasa cannot be faulted for failing to launch a full-scale expedition into the exploration of St. Pierre's mental workings in the short time between his appointment and St. Pierre's guilty plea.
In order for the documents to be used by the expert they must first be admissible or the expert's testimony will lack foundation See Pecoraro v. Walls, 286 F.3d 439, 446 (7th Cir. 2002) ("But the facts must somehow be gotten into the record for expert testimony premised on them to be admissible."). Many of the documents are appended to St. Pierre's motion have been copied so many times that they are unreadable.
The defense and the dissent claim St. Pierre suffers from bipolar disorder. Bipolar disorder cannot be diagnosed with physiological tests, instead the diagnosis is made by a psychologist or psychiatrist on the basis of observation of a number of possible symptoms and family history See NAT'L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, PUBLICATION NO. 01-3679, BIPOLAR DISORDER 6-7 (2002). Though the disorder can develop during childhood, many people do not develop the disorder until late adulthood. Id. at 2. Sometimes the disorder is misdiagnosed as schizophrenia. Id. at 5. Hence, reasonable experts could disagree as to a particular diagnosis, its overall effect on a particular person, and when it began. See infra note 15. Moreover, because it is so judgment and observationally based, it would be extremely difficult for a psychiatrist examining a person today to positively conclude that a person suffered from the disorder twenty years prior. Part of St. Pierre's argument is predicated on the assumption that the past diagnoses were incorrect. However, that simplistic assertion does not account for the passage of time; assuming St. Pierre is right doesn't mean that the diagnosis based on the medical science twenty years ago was wrong. Since the findings of fact were made twenty years ago and are entitled to deference, we should judge the medical findings based on a twenty-year-old standard, not one of today. Cf. Eddmonds v. Peters, 93 F.3d 1307, 1321 n. 3 (7th Cir. 1996). Of course, all of this argumentation is an attempt to induce this court to disregard the Strickland standards and launch our own fact-finding expedition into mental health issues which the defense experts disagree on today.
Bipolar disorder (a.k.a. manic-depressive illness) is a brain disorder which affects a person's mood See NIMH, PUB. NO. 01-3679, BIPOLAR DISORDER at 2-3. A person suffering from bipolar disorder will typically have feelings of extreme highs and lows (extreme in relation to normal highs and lows of life experienced every day by people). Id. Applicable here, would be the symptoms of restlessness, extreme irritability, distractibility, poor judgement, aggressive behavior and drug abuse. Id. at 4. 20-21. Over time the symptoms tend to worsen, unless treated. Id. at 9. Thus, St. Pierre should be even more manic today than he was twenty years ago. However, based on his pro se filings in federal court, St. Pierre comes off as articulate and rational when describing his current situation. As acknowledged by defense expert Dr. Kelly, a person with bipolar disorder can still be capable of rational decision making. Id. at 5-6, 20-21.
The dissent makes a second assumption that seems fatal to its own argument, that St. Pierre's claimed mental illness was so severe as to prevent rational decision making. And the dissent, throughout its opinion, seems to confuse the evidence of a mental illness and the evidence of a mental illness which impairs rational decision making. The two are clearly distinguishable. St. Pierre's supposed mental illness might have an effect on a judge or jury during a mitigation hearing, but only a severe, debilitating mental illness could make St. Pierre incompetent if proved to a judge or jury. Moreover, only two of the new expert reports prepared by defense counsel support the dissent's assumption, while yet another defense expert found St. Pierre's mental illness did not interfere with his ability to make rational decisions. See infra note 26. (Not to mention the nine other reports or examinations, all of which concluded that St. Pierre was able to make rational and voluntary decisions. See supra notes 11, 22-24 and infra note 26.)
That means, despite the fact that St. Pierre's mental health had received consideration in the earlier state court proceedings, that it was never evaluated in the light of the full record we now have before us.