Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/98178/frazier-vs-united-states
Timestamp: 2018-02-20 21:59:48
Document Index: 695165872

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 11', '§ 2553', '§ 11', '§ 2', '§ 819', '§ 30', '§ 11']

Frazier Vs United States - Citation 98178 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Frazier Vs. United States - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/98178
Case Number 335 U.S. 497
frazier v. united states - 335 u.s. 497 (1948) u.s. supreme court frazier v. united states, 335 u.s. 497 (1948) frazier v. united states no. 44 argued october 15, 1948 decided december 20, 1948 335 u.s. 497 certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit syllabus 1. petitioner was convicted in a federal court in the district of columbia for violating the harrison narcotics act. in the circumstances of this case, he was not denied the trial "by an impartial jury" guaranteed by the sixth amendment, although the jury was composed entirely of employees of the federal government and one of them and the wife of another were employees of the treasury department, but not of its bureau.....
Frazier v. United States - 335 U.S. 497 (1948)
U.S. Supreme Court Frazier v. United States, 335 U.S. 497 (1948)
1. Petitioner was convicted in a federal court in the District of Columbia for violating the Harrison Narcotics Act. In the circumstances of this case, he was not denied the trial "by an impartial jury" guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, although the jury was composed entirely of employees of the Federal Government and one of them and the wife of another were employees of the Treasury Department, but not of its Bureau of Narcotics, which administers and enforces the federal narcotics statutes. Pp. 335 U. S. 498 -514.
2. A motion to strike the entire panel for alleged irregularities in the method of its selection, which was not made until after an entire morning had been consumed in uncompleted efforts to select a jury and which was supported solely by counsel's unsworn statements, without any proof or offer of proof, was without merit. Pp. 335 U. S. 503 -504.
Held: his objection to the resulting jury on the ground that it consisted entirely of government employees was not justified. Pp. 335 U. S. 504 -512.
4. In view of the D.C.Code (1940) § 11-1420, which removed (with specified exceptions) the previously existing disqualification of government employees for jury service in the District of Columbia in criminal and other cases to which the Government is a party, the mere fact of government employment is insufficient to disqualify a juror who is otherwise qualified. United States v. Wood, 299 U. S. 123 . Pp. 335 U. S. 508 -512.
was being selected, petitioner's challenge to these two jurors in a motion for a new trial was rightly overruled. Pp. 335 U. S. 512 -514.
Petitioner was convicted in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia of violating the Harrison Narcotics Act, 26 U.S.C. § 2553. The jury was composed entirely of employees of the Federal Government, and one of them and the wife of another were employees of the Treasury Department, but not of its Bureau of Narcotics, which administers and enforces the federal narcotics statutes. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. 82 U.S.App.D.C. 332, 163 F.2d 817. This Court granted certiorari. 333 U.S. 873. Affirmed, p. 335 U. S. 514 .
Petitioner's primary complaint is that he has been denied the trial "by an impartial jury" which the Sixth Amendment guarantees. He was convicted of violating the Harrison Narcotics Act [ Footnote 1 ] by a jury composed entirely of employees of the Federal Government. One juror,
Moore, and the wife of another, Root, were employed in the office of the Secretary of the Treasury, who is charged by law with responsibility for administering and enforcing the federal narcotics statutes. [ Footnote 2 ] As against objections based on these facts and other matters, the Court of Appeals affirmed petitioner's conviction and sentence. 82 U.S.App.D.C. 332, 163 F.2d 817. He has sought relief here by application for certiorari limited to the issues relating to the jury's selection and composition. To review the determination made of them by the Court of Appeals, we granted certiorari. 333 U.S. 873.
Petitioner's objections comprehend an attack upon the entire panel of prospective jurors, made during the course of voir dire examination, in an effort to have the panel stricken; a challenge to the jury as finally constituted, after petitioner had exhausted his ten peremptory challenges, voir dire examination had been completed, and the twelve jurors who tried the case had been qualified; and, either separately or in conjunction with his other objections, [ Footnote 3 ] a claim of reversible error on account of the
eight unchallenged Government employees to join the four like ones originally called in composing the twelve who made up the jury as finally chosen. [ Footnote 4 ]
The Process of selection was interrupted shortly before noon, when petitioner still had two unused peremptory challenges, by a shortage of veniremen. Anticipating that others would be available later in the day, the court adjourned until 2:30 p.m. On its reconvening, additional prospective jurors were available. But petitioner then moved for the first time to strike the entire panel for alleged irregularity in the method used for selecting it, asserted to have been discovered by counsel through "a little investigation" during the noon recess. The court denied the motion, with leave to renew the objection in a motion for a new trial if petitioner should be convicted. [ Footnote 5 ] The material part of the colloquy relating to these proceedings and disclosing the grounds for the motion and its denial is set forth in the margin. [ Footnote 6 ]
Petitioner then exercised his two remaining peremptory challenges, after which he inquired of the twelve jurors then impaneled how many were employed by the Government. When all indicated they were, petitioner challenged the jury as impaneled for cause. The challenge and the court's ruling in denial of it appear below. [ Footnote 7 ] Although counsel sought to intermingle with this challenge
the one previously made to the panel, [ Footnote 8 ] the two are distinct attacks, and must be treated separately.
I. The method of selecting the panel. -- Apart from the objection that this challenge came too late, cf. Agnew v. United States, 165 U. S. 36 , it is without merit. It consists exclusively of counsel's statements, unsworn and unsupported by any proof or offer of proof. The Government did not explicitly deny those statements. But it was under no necessity to do so. The burden was upon the petitioner, as moving party, "to introduce, or to offer, distinct evidence in support of the motion." Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S. 60 , 315 U. S. 87 . See also Smith v. Mississippi, 162 U. S. 592 ; Tarrance v. Florida, 188 U. S. 519 ; Martin v. Texas, 200 U. S. 316 ; cf. Brownfield v. South Carolina, 189 U. S. 426 .
remaining number, from which it was said jurors were picked, "consisted mostly of Government employees and housewives, and unemployed." Counsel then urged that this furnished basis for applying the decision in Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U. S. 217 , as not affording "a proper cross-section."
brought in a Federal Court, prosecuted by a Federal prosecutor, and the case is presented by Federal agents. [ Footnote 9 ]"
Given ten arbitrary choices among twenty-two prospective jurors not disqualified for cause, of whom thirteen were Government employees and nine privately engaged, he knowingly, of his own right, rejected nine of the latter and, with knowledge or the full opportunity to secure it, accepted without challenge all but one of the former. It would seem that, ordinarily, one anxious to secure a jury representative of both private and public employment in a community like Washington, [ Footnote 10 ] and particularly to avoid overweighting the jury with Government employees, well might have found a more effective way of utilizing his peremptory challenges to achieve those objectives.
The right of peremptory challenge is given, of course, to be exercised in the party's sole discretion, and was so exercised here. We do not question petitioner's privilege to utilize his peremptory challenges as he did. But the right is given in aid of the party's interest to secure a fair and impartial jury, not for creating ground to claim partiality which, but for its exercise, would not exist. [ Footnote 11 ]
Here, petitioner was given a fairly and lawfully selected panel. From it, all disqualified for cause were excused. The fully qualified jurors remaining were fairly evenly distributed among persons publicly and privately employed. For reasons entirely his own, petitioner chose to eliminate the latter and retain the former. This was a deliberate choice, not an uninformed one. We need draw no conclusion concerning whether or not it was made for the purpose of creating the basis now asserted for objecting to the jury's composition. [ Footnote 12 ] Rather, we must take it as having been made exactly for the purpose for which the right was given -- namely, to afford petitioner an opportunity beyond the minimum requirements of fair selection to express an arbitrary preference among jurors properly selected and fully qualified to sit in judgment on his case. Cf. note 11 Any other view would convict him of abusing his privilege. This we are unwilling to do.
By the same token, we are not willing to join in repudiating the consequences of his own selection. We take petitioner at his word as expressed by his repeated choices. The fact that he exercised his peremptory challenges as he did, so frequently and consistently to eliminate privately employed jurors and retain only Government employees, hardly can be said to give cause for him to claim overweighting of the jury with Government employees. There was no defect of the panel in this respect. Nor is there any claim or basis for one that the prosecution utilized its peremptory challenges to bring about a jury constituted only of them. It would be going very far to say that, in the circumstances shown by this record, petitioner was deprived, either in law or in fact, of an impartial jury, or indeed of one fairly representative of the community. If deprivation there was, even in the latter sense, [ Footnote 13 ] it was the result of his own choice, not of imperfection in the choices tendered him by law or in the procedures of selection afforded.
"Chance has resulted in this jury panel of twelve being composed of Government employees, but the jury list from which they by chance were selected is a mixture of Government employees and private employees. [ Footnote 14 ]"
the community. [ Footnote 15 ] There is, under such circumstances, no right to any particular composition or group representation on the jury. [ Footnote 16 ]
Finally, in this phase of the case, United States v. Wood, 299 U. S. 123 , goes far toward precluding petitioner's objection. That decision sustained the Act of Congress of August 22, 1935, now D.C.Code 1940, § 11-1420, removing (with specified exceptions) the disqualification of Government employees previously existing in the District of Columbia for jury service in criminal and other cases to which the Government was a party. The disqualification had arisen in 1908 by virtue of the decision, made on common law grounds, in Crawford v. United States, 212 U. S. 183 .
Owing to the large and increasing proportion of Government to private employees in the District, the effect of the Crawford decision had been, by 1935, to create difficulties in securing properly qualified jurors. To meet this situation, the 1935 statute was adopted. [ Footnote 17 ] It continued
The Wood case was a criminal prosecution for theft from a private corporation. Three of the jurors were federal employees, challenged for cause on that ground. In sustaining the conviction and the statute, the Court first held that Congress had not "undertaken to preclude the ascertainment of actual bias," and that the question in issue was limited to "implied bias, a bias attributable in law to the prospective juror regardless of actual partiality." 299 U.S. at 299 U. S. 133 -134. As to this, the Court said of the statute,
Id. 299 U.S. at 299 U. S. 148 -149. By way of sustaining the legislative judgment, the Court added on its own account:
The Court was not confronted in the Wood case with the exact situation we have here -- namely, that all of the jurors finally selected were Government employees. But the purport of the decision was that the mere fact of Government employment, without more, would be insufficient under the statute's mandate to disqualify a juror. Implicit in this was the conception that, insofar as that fact alone is or may be effective, Government employees and persons privately engaged were put upon the same basis without any limitation, explicit or implied, upon the number who might be selected as jurors from either group. [ Footnote 18 ] The effect of these rulings, we think, was to make Government employees subject, as are all other persons and in the same manner, to challenge for "actual bias," [ Footnote 19 ] and, under all ordinary circumstances, only to such challenge. In that view, absent any basis for such challenge, we do not see how a right to challenge the panel as a
The opinion in the Wood case, however, was very careful to stress more than once that the Sixth Amendment prescribes no specific tests for determining impartiality. 299 U.S. at 299 U. S. 133 . It afforded further assurances, beyond those given by Art. III, § 2, par. 3, relating to trial by jury, in respect to speed, publicity, impartiality, etc. Id. at 299 U. S. 142 . But it did not require in these respects "the particular forms and procedure used at common law." 299 U.S. at 299 U. S. 143 . The opinion emphasized especially that
Pp. 299 U. S. 145 -146.
III. The challenges to Jurors Moore and Root. -- Considered as independent and individual challenges for "actual bias," [ Footnote 20 ] the objections to these jurors come too late. Moore was a Treasury messenger. Root's wife was a Treasury employee. Petitioner's counsel knew of the employment of Root's wife, and that Moore was a federal employee. He did not inquire where Moore was employed, but could have known his employment's exact nature. [ Footnote 21 ] It does not appear that either Moore or Root's wife was connected with the Bureau of Narcotics, or had any duty even remotely relating to its functions or those of the Secretary in relation to them. [ Footnote 22 ]
governmental activity to the matters involved in the prosecution, or otherwise, he had actual bias, and, if he had, to disqualify him. [ Footnote 23 ]"
Petitioner challenged neither Moore nor Root for "actual bias," though afforded the fullest opportunity legally and factually for doing so. After accepting them before trial, he could not challenge them successfully in a motion for a new trial. Queen v. Hepburn, 7 Cranch 290, 11 U. S. 297 ; Raub v. Carpenter, 187 U. S. 159 ; cf. United States v. Gale, 109 U. S. 65 . See Kohl v. Lehlback, 160 U. S. 293 , 160 U. S. 299 -302. Whether or not employment in the Treasury outside the Narcotics Bureau would constitute ground for challenge for "actual bias," [ Footnote 24 ] such employment in the connections disclosed here affecting Moore and Root was not so obvious a disqualification or so inherently prejudicial as a matter of law, in the absence of any challenge to them before trial, as to require the court, of its own motion or on petitioner's suggestion afterward, to set the verdict aside and grant a new trial.
as a whole. Apart from the fact that the two sorts of challenge are distinct, and are therefore to be dealt with separately, the challenge to the composition of the jury, as made to the trial court and as ruled upon by it, made no special reference to either Moore or Root, or the particular bases for objection now raised to them. [ Footnote 25 ] Those references, so far as is shown by the record, first appeared in the assignments of error made by petitioner in the Court of Appeals. They therefore came too late, even if they could be considered as forming part of the challenge to the jury's composition or as adding anything of weight to that challenge.
The right is in the nature of a statutory privilege, variable in the number of challenges allowed, which may be withheld altogether without impairing the constitutional guaranties of "an impartial jury" and a fair trial. Stilson v. United States, 250 U. S. 583 , 250 U. S. 586 , quoted in United States v. Wood, 299 U. S. 123 , 299 U. S. 145 .
Except in cases of treason and other capital offenses, no right to peremptory challenges existed in federal criminal trials until the Act of June 8, 1872, 17 Stat. 282, Rev.Stat. § 819, unless a rule of the particular federal court made applicable a provision of state law allowing peremptory challenges in noncapital cases. Act of April 30, 1790, § 30, 1 Stat. 112, 119; United States v. Randall, Fed.Cas. No. 16,118; United States v. Cottingham, Fed.Cas., No. 14,872; United States v. McPherson, Fed.Cas., No. 15,703; United States v. Krouse, Fed.Cas., No. 15,544. (However, the right of peremptory challenge in capital cases, which existed at common law, has been spoken of as "one of the most important of the rights secured to the accused." Pointer v. United States, 151 U. S. 396 , 151 U. S. 408 ; see also Lewis v. United States, 146 U. S. 370 , 146 U. S. 376 ).
Ruthenberg v. United States, 245 U. S. 480 ; Thomas v. Texas, 212 U. S. 278 , 212 U. S. 282 ; Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313 , 100 U. S. 322 -323; Higgins v. United States, 81 U.S.App.D.C. 371-372, 160 F.2d 222-223; see Fay v. New York, 332 U. S. 261 , 332 U. S. 284 -285; Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U. S. 217 , 328 U. S. 220 ; cf. Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398 , 325 U. S. 403 -404.
See United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. at 299 U. S. 132 -133, quoting from the opinion of the Court of Appeals, 65 App.D.C. 330, 332, 83 F.2d 587, 589. See also House Rep. 1421, Sen.Rep. 1297, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.; 79 Cong.Rec. 13,401, relating to the bill which became the Act of Congress of August 22, 1935, now D.C.Code 1940, § 11-1420. The Government's brief in the Wood case, relying upon figures assembled from various official sources, indicated that, of the probable 353,949 persons otherwise available for jury service in the District of Columbia as of 1935, some 156,874, or 44.3 percent, were disqualified to serve either by virtue of exemption or by the mere fact of employment by or receipt of benefits from the Government, under the ruling in the Crawford case.
The phrase "actual bias" is used in this opinion as it was in the Wood case. The Wood opinion stated: "The bias of a prospective juror may be actual or implied; that is, it may be bias in fact, or bias conclusively presumed as matter of law." 299 U.S. at 299 U. S. 133 . It later pointed out that
299 U.S. at 299 U. S. 134 -135. As appears from the portion of the opinion quoted in the text infra at note 23 the Court regarded "actual bias" or challenge "to the favor" as including not only prejudice in the subjective sense, but also such as might be thought implicitly to arise
299 U.S. at 299 U. S. 133 -134.
299 U.S. at 299 U. S. 140 . It is at least highly doubtful that an employment having no more relationship to the particular governmental activity involved in the prosecution than did that of Moore in this case, cf. note 2 or that of Root's wife, would give ground for challenge for "actual bias," although coming under the same ultimate departmental supervision, even though if timely called to the court's attention the circumstance might afford basis for the court, in an excess of caution, to excuse the venireman.
This amiable concession in some jurisdictions might produce no distortion of the composition of the panel; but it is certain to do just that in the District of Columbia because of the dual standard and dubious method of jury compensation. The nongovernment juror receives $4 per day, [ Footnote 2/1 ] which, under present conditions, is inadequate to be compensatory to nearly every gainfully employed
juror. But the government employee is not paid specially; instead, he is given leave from his government work with full pay while serving on the jury. [ Footnote 2/2 ] The latter class are thus induced to jury service by protection against any financial loss, while the former are subjected to considerable disadvantage.
This condition makes it obvious that, if jury service is put on virtually a voluntary basis and qualified persons are allowed to decline jury service at their own option, the panel will become loaded with government employees. If this undue concentration of such jurors were accomplished by any device which excluded nongovernment jurors, it unquestionably would be condemned not only by reason of, but even without resort to the doctrine that prevailed in, Ballard v. United States, 329 U. S. 187 ; Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U. S. 217 , and Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S. 60 .
The disadvantage of defendant as to talesmen from government ranks is more apparent, but not more more prejudicial, than with talesmen from other walks of life. Whatever reason he may have had for excusing such a one, the price he would probably have had to pay for using his challenge was to have one government employee take another's place. The Government could vacate the seat of a nongovernment talesman with no such unwelcome results. The short of the thing is: in no case where the court has intervened to use its supervisory power to revise federal jury systems has there been any result so consistently and inevitably prejudicial to one of the litigants as here, under our noses. Ballard v. United States, 329 U. S. 187 ; Thiel v. Southern Pacific, 328 U. S. 217 ; Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S. 60 . And in cases where a strong minority of the Court has wanted to go so far as to upset a state jury system as offensive to fundamental consideration of justice spelled out from the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, there has been no such brazen unfairness in actual practice. Moore v. New York, 333 U. S. 565 ; Fay v. New York, 332 U. S. 261 .
The precedent of United States v. Wood, 299 U. S. 123 , on which the Court leans heavily, is a weak crutch. That decision held only that the absolute disqualification of any federal employee, which had been declared in Crawford v. United States, 212 U. S. 183 , could constitutionally be removed by the Congress. In the case the Court was considering, only three out of the twelve were, by chance, government beneficiaries, and the Court was not confronted with such a systematic distortion of the jury as was at work here. It held that, individually, they were not subject to challenge for cause -- that is, they were not excusable by the court merely because they were government employees. But to hold that one or a few government employees may sit by chance is no precedent for holding that they may fill all of the chairs by a system of retiring everyone else. Furthermore, that opinion emphasized that the prosecution in that case was for larceny from a private corporation. That was not an offense against the Federal Government as such, except as it has responsibility for prosecuting crimes in the District that, in the state, would be a matter of no federal concern or even jurisdiction. But the prosecution before us is not for an offense of a private aspect; it is an offense against no one except federal government policy, and the Secretary of the Treasury, in whose own office one of these jurors was employed, has exclusive and nationwide responsibility for enforcement of the law involved.