Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/99292/labor-board-vs-lion-oil-co
Timestamp: 2017-12-14 00:43:24
Document Index: 40182086

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 301']

Labor Board Vs Lion Oil Co - Citation 99292 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Labor Board Vs. Lion Oil Co. - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/99292
Case Number 352 U.S. 282
Respondent Lion Oil Co.
labor board v. lion oil co. - 352 u.s. 282 (1957) u.s. supreme court labor board v. lion oil co., 352 u.s. 282 (1957) national labor relations board v. lion oil co. no. 4 argued october 8, 1956 decided january 22, 1957 352 u.s. 282 certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eighth circuit syllabus section 8(d)(4) of the national labor relations act, as amended, provides that a party who desires to modify or terminate a collective bargaining contract must continue "in full force and effect, without resorting to strike or lock-out, all the terms and conditions of the existing contract for a period of sixty days after . . . notice is given or until the expiration date of such contract, whichever.....
Labor Board v. Lion Oil Co. - 352 U.S. 282 (1957)
U.S. Supreme Court Labor Board v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S. 282 (1957)
1. The notice and waiting requirements of § 8(d) were fully satisfied, the strike did not violate § 8(d)(4), and the strikers did not lose their status as employees entitled to the protection of the Act. Pp. 352 U. S. 283 -294.
(a) In expounding a statute, courts must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but must look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy. P. 352 U. S. 288 .
(b) A construction of a statute that would produce incongruous results is to be avoided. P. 352 U. S. 288 .
(c) The substitution of collective bargaining for economic warfare, and the protection of the right of employees to engage in concerted activities for their own benefit, were dual purposes of the Taft-Hartley Act, and a construction which serves neither of these aims is to be avoided. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. Labor Board, 350 U. S. 270 , 350 U. S. 284 . P. 352 U. S. 289 .
(d) "Expiration date" in § 8(d)(1) of the Act relates to the date when a contract is subject to modification, as well as the date when it would come to an end, and the same phrase in § 8(d)(4) must carry the same meaning. Pp. 352 U. S. 289 -290.
(e) This construction gives meaning to the congressional language which accords with the general purpose of the Act. Pp. 352 U. S. 290 -292.
(f) The fact that, on October 23, the contract became terminable upon further notice by either party is immaterial. The statutory notice requirement operates wholly independently of whatever notice requirement the parties have fixed for themselves. P. 352 U. S. 292 .
2. The strike was not in breach of the contract, and the strikers were not disentitled to relief in proceedings before the Labor Board. Labor Board v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U. S. 332 , distinguished. Pp. 352 U. S. 293 -294.
(a) Where there has been no express waiver of the right to strike, a waiver of the right during such a period is not to be inferred. P. 352 U. S. 293 .
(b) The two-phase provision for terminating the contract here involved does not mean that it was not within the contemplation of the parties that economic weapons might be used to support demands for modification before the notice to terminate was given. P. 352 U. S. 293 .
In this case, we are called upon again to interpret § 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. [ Footnote 1 ]
See Mastro Plastics Corp. v. Labor Board, 350 U. S. 270 . In particular, we are concerned with § 8(d)(4), which provides that a party who wishes to modify or terminate
We are told by the Solicitor General that the question is of major importance in the negotiation and administration of hundreds of collective bargaining agreements throughout the country; that there is a decided trend among unions and employers to execute contracts of longer duration than formerly, and to include provisions for reopening to negotiate changes during the contract term. [ Footnote 2 ] Because of the importance of the question, we granted certiorari, 350 U.S. 986, to review a decision of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit to the effect that § 8(d)(4) bans strikes to obtain modifications of a
On August 24, 1951, the union served written notice on the company of its desire to modify the contract. [ Footnote 3 ] Negotiations
cease; that the second notice required to bring about this termination not having been given, the strike violated § 8(d)(4), and the strikers therefore lost their status as employees entitled to the protection of the Act. [ Footnote 4 ]
"If the above words are read in complete isolation from their context in the Act, such an interpretation is possible. However, '[i]n expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.' United States v. Boisdore 's Heirs, 8 How. 113, 49 U. S. 122 ."
350 U.S. at 350 U. S. 285 . Moreover, in Mastro Plastics, we cautioned against accepting a construction that "would produce incongruous results." Id. at 350 U. S. 286 .
That § 8(d)(4) is susceptible of various interpretation is apparent when § 8(d) is read as a whole. Its ambiguity was recognized by the Joint Committee of Congress created by the very act of which § 8(d) was a part to study the operation of the federal labor laws. [ Footnote 5 ] Members of the National Labor Relations Board, the agency specially charged by Congress with effectuating the purposes of the national labor legislation, have expressed divergent views on the proper construction of § 8(d)(4); none of them has taken the position adopted
by the court below. [ Footnote 6 ] In the face of this ambiguity, it will not do simply to say Congress could have made itself clearer and automatically equate the phrase "expiration date" only with the date when a contract comes to an end.
We find our guide to the general context of the statute in Mastro Plastics. In that case, we recognized a "dual purpose" in the Taft-Hartley Act -- to substitute collective bargaining for economic warfare and to protect the right of employees to engage in concerted activities for their own benefit. 350 U.S. at 350 U. S. 284 . A construction which serves neither of these aims is to be avoided unless the words Congress has chosen clearly compel it. The restriction on employees' concerted activities which would result from the construction placed upon § 8(d)(4) by the Court of Appeals is obvious. [ Footnote 7 ] Too, we think it would discourage the development of long-term bargaining relationships. Unions would be wary of entering into long-term contracts with machinery for reopening them for modification from time to time if they thought the right to strike would be denied them for the entire term of such a contract, though they imposed no such limitations on themselves.
Our conclusion is buttressed by a provision of § 8(d) which was added by the Conference Committee. [ Footnote 8 ]
itself contemplates such bargaining. It would be anomalous for Congress to recognize such a duty and at the same time deprive the union of the strike threat which, together with "the occasional strike itself, is the force depended upon to facilitate arriving at satisfactory settlements." [ Footnote 9 ]
"Reading section 8(d) as a whole seems to lead to the conclusion that the act permits a strike, after a 60-day notice, in the middle of a contract which authorizes a reopening on wages. Use of the words 'or modify' and 'or modification' in the proviso, and use of 'or modification' in section 8(d)(1), and the statement in the final paragraph of the section that the parties are not required to agree to any modification effective before the contract may be reopened under its terms, all seem to contemplate the right of either party to insist on changes in the contract if they have so provided. The right of the union would be an empty one without the right to strike after a 60-day notice. [ Footnote 10 ] "
The contemporary legislative history manifests no real recognition of the problem before us. [ Footnote 11 ] A reading of the committee reports and the floor debates alone could well lead to the conclusion that both the sponsors and the opponents of the bill saw in § 8(d)(4) no more than a means for preventing "quickie" strikes by requiring a "cooling-off" period which would not in any circumstances exceed 60 days. [ Footnote 12 ] But the language used in the statute goes beyond this limited purpose. Significance must be given to the clause, "or until the expiration date of such contract, whichever occurs later." We believe our construction gives meaning to the congressional language which accords with the general purpose of the Act.
requirement operates wholly independently of whatever notice requirement the parties have fixed for themselves. [ Footnote 13 ] The situation here is not different, so far as the applicability of the statute is concerned, from that of a fixed-term contract with a clause providing for reopening at some specific time.
Nor can we accept respondents' alternative contention that, even apart from § 8(d), the strike was in breach of contract and the strikers were for that reason not entitled to relief at the hand of the Board. Respondents rely upon Labor Board v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U. S. 332 . In Sands, as in this case, the contract did not contain an express no-strike clause. Employees there refused in the course of the contract to continue work "in accordance with their contract." Id. at 306 U. S. 344 . The refusal occurred midway in a fixed-term contract which did not provide for modifications during its term. This Court sustained the propriety of the employer's action in discharging the employees. Here, the strike occurred at a time when the parties were bargaining over modifications after notice and in accordance with the terms of the contract. Where there has been no express waiver of the right to strike, [ Footnote 14 ] a waiver of the right during such a period is not to be inferred. We do not believe that the two-phase provision for terminating this contract means that it was not within the contemplation of the parties that
"No objection that has not been urged before the Board, its member, agent, or agency, shall be considered by the court, unless the failure or neglect to urge such objection shall be excused because of extraordinary circumstances. [ Footnote 2/1 ]"
employment relationship with the strikers and should on that account be subject to the consequences of its alleged unfair labor practices even if the strike was in violation of contract. Finally, it is for the Court of Appeals to judge whether the record as a whole supports the Board's findings of unfair labor practices. Universal Camera Corp. v. Labor Board, 340 U. S. 474 , 340 U. S. 491 .
Senator Taft's attention was directed solely to strikes at termination, and this statement was intended merely to emphasize the point made in the following sentence -- that, if notice is given less than sixty days prior to termination, the waiting period extends beyond the life of the contract. [ Footnote 2/2 ]
Mr. Murdock pointed out that the Senate Report on the Taft-Hartley bill stated, with respect to § 301, that a no-strike clause was something to be bargained for, S.Rep.No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 17-18, and he reasoned that it would not have said this "[i]f it had been intended to remove no-strike provisions from the realm of collective bargaining. . . ." This argument would have force against an interpretation which actually does remove such provisions from bargaining. Section 8(d), however, has no effect on whether unions may validly strike over non-bargaining matters. See Mastro Plastics Corp. v. Labor Board, 350 U. S. 270 . Nor does it render obsolete union pledges not to resort to bargaining strikes at reopening, if the present Board's interpretation is correct, or at any time after sixty days' notice, if the view of the former Board prevails. In any event, this statement from the Committee report on another section of the bill provides a flimsy basis for frustrating the oft-expressed legislative purpose of preventing "quickie" strikes.
This is the fourth time this Term that the Court has passed on questions which the court below never reached. See Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U. S. 1 ; [ Footnote 3/1 ] Thompson v. Coastal Oil Co., 352 U. S. 862 ; [ Footnote 3/2 ] Gibson v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 352 U. S. 874 . [ Footnote 3/3 ] I think this practice is an unfortunate one, depriving this Court, as it does, of the considered views of the lower courts. Its dangers are particularly apparent in the present case. As my brother FRANKFURTER points out, there is at least some question as to whether respondent ever raised its breach of contract defense before the National Labor Relations Board. And, on the merits, the question is an unusual one because of the atypical nature of this contract, and surely requires
This kind of original adjudication by this Court is not what litigants have a right to expect. Moreover, to decide questions which, as here, have not been raised in the petition for certiorari offends our own rules. [ Footnote 3/4 ] There will no doubt be cases where remand is not justified because the questions left open by the lower court are manifestly insubstantial. It seems to me that, in such instances, this Court should state that it is not remanding for that reason, instead of proceeding as a matter of course to decide the questions itself, either expressly or sub silentio. The latter procedure can only have a tendency to lead this Court, as here, to decide questions which it should not pass upon in the first instance, and, in my opinion, represents unsound judicial administration.