Source: https://casetext.com/case/naas-v-stolman
Timestamp: 2020-08-13 02:22:23
Document Index: 590453470

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1692', '§ 1331', '§ 1692', '§ 1367', '§ 1291', '§ 1692', '§ 340']

Naas v. Stolman, 130 F.3d 892 | Casetext Search + Citator
Naas v. Stolman
Simard v. LVNV Funding, LLC
Generally, if a plaintiff's FDCPA claim arises from a debt collection suit filed in state or municipal court,…
The district court concluded that the FDCPA's one-year statute of limitations began to run on the date that…
Full title:RICHARD E. NAAS; JANET NAAS, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. MARC D. STOLMAN…
Date published: Dec 9, 1997
130 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 1997)
holding that, where the alleged FDCPA violation is the filing of a lawsuit, "the statute of limitations beg[ins] to run on the filing of the complaint"
Summary of this case from Thorpe v. Ertz
No. 96-16789
Argued and Submitted October 9, 1997 — San Francisco, California.
Maxim N. Bach, Oroville, California, for the plaintiffs-appellants.
Mark E. Ellis and Gregory W. McCracken, Murphy, Pearson, Bradley Feeney, Sacramento, California, for defendants-appellees Marc D. Stolman and National Business Factors.
Charles A. Tweedy, Parshall Tweedy, Gold River, California, for defendant-appellee David L. Adrian.
D.C. No. CV-95-01258-EJG.
Before: Procter Hug, Jr., Chief Judge, J. Clifford Wallace and Cynthia Holcomb Hall, Circuit Judges.
Richard and Janet Naas sued National Business Factors, Inc. and its attorneys, Adrian and Stolman, (collectively NBF) for violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (Act), 15 U.S.C. § 1692a-1692o, and for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d), and 28 U.S.C. § 1367, and dismissed the Naases' complaint without leave to amend, and dismissed the action. The Naases timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm and hold that the Naases' action is barred by the statute of limitations.
This action arises from a state court debt collection suit brought against the Naases by NBF. NBF filed suit in California Municipal Court on March 10, 1993, to recover $625.16 for unpaid hospital bills. NBF obtained a judgement which the Appellate Department of the California Superior Court affirmed on January 12, 1996. The Naases filed their action in federal district court on July 11, 1995, alleging that NBF's collection suit violated the Act and caused intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court entered a stay, pending resolution of the state court case, and subsequently dismissed the action.
We must determine whether the district court's review was barred by the statute of limitations. We review rulings on statutes of limitations de novo. Torres v. City of Santa Ana, 108 F.3d 224, 226 (9th Cir. 1997). 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d) states that actions to enforce liability for violations of the Act may be brought "within one year from the date on which the violation occurs."
We have never determined at which point the statute of limitations begins to run when the alleged violation of the Act is the filing of a lawsuit. Similarly, other circuit courts have apparently not been called upon to answer the question. It has, however, been ruled on by two district courts. Prade v. Kelly, 941 F. Supp. 596, 599-600 (N.D. W. Va. 1996); Blakemore v. Pekay, 895 F. Supp. 972, 982-83 (N.D. Ill. 1995). In Prade, the court held that the violation occurred and the statute of limitations started to run on either the day the complaint was filed or the day it was served, but deciding between the two alternatives was unnecessary in that case. Prade, 941 F. Supp. at 600. Blakemore is more precise, holding that the statute of limitations began to run from the day garnishment proceedings were initiated. Blakemore, 895 F. Supp. at 982-83.
[1] The Naases argue unpersuasively that the statute of limitations should run from the day of decision by the Appellate Department of the Superior Court. The alleged violation of the Act was not a reviewing court judgment, but the bringing of the suit itself. If the Naases were correct and the violation did not occur until the Appellate Department judgment, then their federal action would have been premature, as it was brought six months before that judgment. We hold that the statute of limitations began to run on the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court.
[2] This result is consistent with other circuit courts' interpretations of the Act in which they have held in the analogous nonfiling situation that the Act's statute of limitations begins to run when a harassing collection letter is mailed. Maloy v. Phillips, 64 F.3d 607, 608 (11th Cir. 1995); Mattson v. U.S. West Communications, 967 F.2d 259, 261 (8th Cir. 1992).
These courts reasoned that the purpose of the Act is to regulate the actions of debt collectors; because the mailing date was the debt collector's "last opportunity to comply with the [Act], . . . the mailing of the letters, therefore, triggered section 1692k(d)." Mattson, 967 F.2d at 261; see Maloy, 64 F.3d at 608. In addition, "the date of mailing is a date which may be `fixed by objective and visible standards,' one which is easy to determine, ascertainable by both parties, and may be easily applied." Mattson, 967 F.2d at 261; see Maloy, 64 F.3d at 608.
[3] These considerations apply equally to this case. Filing a complaint is the debt collector's last opportunity to comply with the Act, and the filing date is easily ascertainable.
[4] We also affirm the district court's ruling that the state intentional infliction of emotional distress claim is also barred by the one-year statute of limitations. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 340(3); Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp., 4 Cal.App.4th 857, 889 (1992). In addition, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend, as the Naases' potential amended claim would still be barred by the statute of limitations.
holding that the statute of limitations begins to run on the date the complaint was filed, not when it was served, because "[f]iling a complaint is the debt collector's last opportunity to comply with the Act"
Summary of this case from Means v. Intelligent Buisness Solutions, Ltd.
holding that "the statute of limitations [begins] to run on the filing of the complaint"
Summary of this case from Adams v. Law Office of Keith S. Shindler, Ltd.
holding statute of limitations began to run upon filing of state court complaint because that was "the debt collector's last opportunity to comply with" the Act
holding that a FDCPA claim was barred by the one-year statute of limitations because "the statute of limitations began to run on the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court"
Summary of this case from Ross v. Gordon Weinberg, P.C.
holding district court properly denied plaintiff leave to amend, where amended claims would have been barred by statute of limitations
Summary of this case from Yarber v. County of Santa Clara Probation Department
holding that statute of limitations runs from the time of the purported violation
holding the statute of limitations began to run on debtor's FDCPA claim on the date debt collector filed its complaint in state court
Summary of this case from Zenon v. Palisades Collection, LLC
holding that the statute of limitations on an FDCPA claim based on the filing of a lawsuit beings to run "on the filing of the complaint"
Summary of this case from Taylor v. Quall
holding that where the violation of the FCPA was the filing of a lawsuit, the statute of limitations begins to run on the date of filing
Summary of this case from Sierra v. Garbus
finding that the statute of limitations begins to run on the date a lawsuit is filed
concluding that time begins to run on the date that the lawsuit is filed
Summary of this case from Terech v. First Resolution Mgmt. Corp.
rejecting assertion that the statute of limitations should run from the day of the reviewing court's judgment instead of the day the suit was brought
Summary of this case from Gajewski v. Ocwen Loan Serv.
rejecting argument that violation of FDCPA occurred on day of decision by appellate state court in review of trial court debt collection suit, and holding that violation occurs with the initial filing of the debt collection complaint
Summary of this case from Young v. Thieblot Ryan, P.A.
In Naas, a panel of this court suggested that an FDCPA “violation occurs” when the debt collection action is filed. 130 F.3d at 893.
Summary of this case from Lyons v. Michael & Assocs.
stating that the FDCPA's statute of limitations begins to run when the debt-collection suit is filed rather than when the trial court issues its judgment
discussing the Mattson test
Summary of this case from Michaels v. NCO Fin. Sys.
In Naas v. Stolman, 130 F.3d 892 (9 Cir. 1997), for example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court's dismissal of a claim with prejudice based on the applicable statute of limitations.
Summary of this case from Trotter v. Hawaii
In Naas, the Ninth Circuit stated that the court had "never determined at which point the statute of limitations begins to run" under the FDCPA, wholly undermining the purported strength of the court's earlier ruling in Fox.
Summary of this case from Busby v. Bank of Am., N.A.
In Naas v. Stolman, 130 F.3d 892, 893 (9th Cir. 1997), the Ninth Circuit explicitly held that "the statute of limitations began to run on the filing of the complaint."
Summary of this case from Smith v. New Falls Corp.
In Naas, the plaintiffs alleged that defendants violated the FDCPA by filing a lawsuit to recover unpaid hospital bills.
In Naas v. Stolman, 130 F.3d 892, 893 (9th Cir. 1997), the Ninth Circuit held that the statute of limitations in an FDCPA action begins to run on the filing of the complaint when the alleged violation is "the bringing of the lawsuit itself.
Summary of this case from Sosa v. Utah Loan Servicing, LLC
Summary of this case from Redman v. Francis David Corp.