Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/104339/california-vs-united-states
Timestamp: 2020-01-17 21:30:03
Document Index: 409519872

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 8', '§ 9', '§ 946', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 617', '§ 8', '§ 231', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 5', '§ 423', '§ 9', '§ 485', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 5', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 9', '§ 14', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 10', '§ 373', '§ 7']

California Vs United States - Citation 104339 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
California Vs. United States - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/104339
Decided On Jul-03-1978
Case Number 438 U.S. 645
california v. united states - 438 u.s. 645 (1978) u.s. supreme court california v. united states, 438 u.s. 645 (1978) california v. united states no. 77-285 argued march 28, 1978 decided july 3, 1978 438 u.s. 645 certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit syllabus the united states bureau of reclamation applied to the california state water resources control board for a permit to appropriate water that would be impounded by the new melones dam, a unit of the california central valley project. congress specifically directed that the dam be constructed and operated pursuant to the reclamation act of 1902, which established a program for federal construction and operation of reclamation.....
California v. United States - 438 U.S. 645 (1978)
U.S. Supreme Court California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978)
point to a contrary conclusion in Ivanhoe Irrigation District v. McCracken, 357 U. S. 275 , City of Fresno v. California, 372 U. S. 627 , and Arizona v. California, 373 U. S. 546 , from imposing conditions in this case that are not inconsistent with congressional directives authorizing the project in question, those dicta are disavowed. Pp. 438 U. S. 653 -679.
2. Whether the conditions imposed by the Board in this case are inconsistent with congressional directives as to the New Melones Dam and issues involving the consistency of the conditions remain to be resolved. P. 438 U. S. 679 .
REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and STEWART, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 438 U. S. 679 .
dam across City Creek near the present site of the Mormon Temple and diverted sufficient water to saturate some 5 acres of exceedingly dry land. Before the day was over, they had planted potatoes to preserve the seed. [ Footnote 1 ]"
During the subsequent half-century, irrigation expanded throughout the arid States of the West, supported usually by private enterprise or the local community. [ Footnote 2 ] By the turn of the century, however, most of the land which could be profitably irrigated by such small-scale projects had been put to use. Pressure mounted on the Federal Government to provide the funding for the massive projects that would be needed to complete the reclamation, culminating in the Reclamation Act of 1902. [ Footnote 3 ]
plant products that require mild winters and long growing seasons. Citrus fruits, the less hardy deciduous fruits, fresh vegetables in winter -- these are their most important contributions at present. Rainless summers make possible the inexpensive drying of fruits, which puts into the market prunes, raisins, dried peaches, and apricots. In its present relation to American economy in general, the primary technical problem of agriculture in the Pacific Coast States is to make increasingly more effective use of the mild winters and the long growing season in the face of the great obstacle presented by the rainless summers. To overcome that obstacle, supplementary irrigation is necessary. Hence the key position of water in Pacific Coast agriculture. [ Footnote 4 ]"
" [N]othing in this Act shall be construed as affecting or intended to affect or to in any way interfere with the laws of any State or Territory relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation, or any vested right acquired thereunder, and the Secretary of the Interior, in carrying out the provisions of this Act, shall proceed in conformity with such laws, and nothing herein shall in any way affect any right of any State or of the Federal Government or of any landowner, appropriator, or user of water in, to, or from any interstate stream or the waters thereof: Provided, that the
Perhaps because of the cooperative nature of the legislation, and the fact that Congress, in the Act, merely authorized the expenditure of funds in States whose citizens were generally anxious to have them expended, there has not been a great deal of litigation involving the meaning of its language. Indeed, so far as we can tell, the first case to come to this Court involving the Act at all was Ickes v. Fox, 300 U. S. 82 (1937), and the first case to require construction of § 8 of the Act was United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., supra, decided nearly half a century after the enactment of the 1902 statute. [ Footnote 5 ]
The New Melones Dam, which this litigation concerns, is part of the California Central Valley Project, the largest reclamation project yet authorized under the 1902 Act. [ Footnote 6 ] The Dam, which will impound 2.4 million acre-feet of water of California's Stanislaus River, has the multiple purposes of flood control, irrigation, municipal use, industrial use, power, recreation, water quality control, and the protection of fish and wildlife. The waters of the Stanislaus River that will be impounded behind the New Melones Dam arise and flow solely in California.
The United States Bureau of Reclamation, as it has with every other federal reclamation project, applied for a permit from the appropriate state agency, here the California State Water Resources Control Board, to appropriate the water that would be impounded by the Dam and later used for reclamation. [ Footnote 7 ] After lengthy hearings, the State Board found that unappropriated water was available for the New Melones Dam during certain times of the year. Although it therefore approved the Bureau's applications, the State Board attached 25 conditions to the permit. California State Water Resources Control Board, Decision 1422 (Apr. 14, 1973). The most important conditions prohibit full impoundment until the Bureau is able to show firm commitments, or at least a specific plan, for the use of the water. [ Footnote 8 ] The State Board
and judicial decisions. Even in this early stage of the development of Western water law, before many of the Western States had been admitted to the Union, Congress deferred to the growing local law. Thus, in Broder v. Water Co., 101 U. S. 274 (1879), the Court observed that local appropriation rights were "rights which the government had, by its conduct, recognized and encouraged, and was bound to protect." Id. at 101 U. S. 276 .
E. Mead, Irrigation Institutions 372 (1903). [ Footnote 9 ] Such commentators were not without some support from language
"In the argument on the demurrer, counsel for plaintiff endeavored to show that Congress had expressly imposed the common law on all this territory prior to its formation into States. . . . But when the States of Kansas and Colorado were admitted into the Union, they were admitted with the full powers of local sovereignty which belonged to other States, Pollard v. Hagan, [3 How. 212]; Shively v. Bowlby, [152 U.S. l]; Hardin v. Shedd, 190 U. S. 508 , 190 U. S. 519 ; and Colorado, by its legislation, has recognized the right of appropriating the flowing waters to the purposes of irrigation."
Id. at 206 U. S. 92 and 206 U. S. 95 . And see United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrig. Co., 174 U. S. 690 , 174 U. S. 702 -703, and 174 U. S. 709 (1899).
§ 9, 14 Stat. 253. The Mining Act of 1866 was not itself a grant of water rights pursuant to federal law. Instead, as this Court observed, the Act was " a voluntary recognition of a preexisting right of possession, constituting a valid claim to its continued use.'" United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrig. Co., supra at 174 U. S. 705 . Congress intended
"to recognize as valid the customary law with respect to the use of water which had grown up among the occupants of the public land under the peculiar necessities of their condition. [ Footnote 10 ]"
Basey v. Gallagher, 20 Wall. 670, 87 U. S. 684 (1875). See Broder v. Water Co., supra at 101 U. S. 276 ; Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U. S. 453 , 98 U. S. 459 -461 (1879). [ Footnote 11 ]
"by [the homesteader's] conducting water upon the same, within the period of three years [after filing a declaration to do so], Provided however that the right to the use of water by the person so conducting the same . . . shall not exceed the amount of water actually appropriated, and necessarily used for the purpose of irrigation and reclamation: and all surplus water over and above such actual appropriation and use, together with the water of all lakes, rivers and other sources of water supply upon the public lands and not navigable, shall remain and be held free for the appropriation and use of the public for irrigation, mining and manufacturing purposes subject to existing rights. "
Ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377 (emphasis added). This Court has had an opportunity to construe the 1877 Desert Land Act before. In California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U. S. 142 (1935), Mr. Justice Sutherland [ Footnote 12 ] explained that, through this language, Congress
"effected a severance of all waters upon the public domain, not theretofore appropriated, from the land itself." Id. at 295 U. S. 158 . The nonnavigable waters thereby severed were "reserved for the use of the public under the laws of the states and territories." Id. at 295 U. S. 162 . Congress' purpose was not to federalize the prior appropriation doctrine already evolving under local law. Quite the opposite:
"What we hold is that, following the act of 1877, if not before, all non-navigable waters then a part of the public domain became publici juris, subject to the plenary control of the designated states, including those since created out of the territories named, with the right in each to determine for itself to what extent the rule of appropriation or the common law rule in respect of riparian rights should obtain. For since 'Congress cannot enforce either rule upon any state,' Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 46 , 206 U. S. 94 , the full power of choice must remain with the state. The Desert Land Act does not bind or purport to bind the states to any policy. It simply recognizes and gives sanction, insofar as the United States and its future grantees are concerned, to the state and local doctrine of appropriation, and seeks to remove what otherwise might be an impediment to its full and successful operation. See Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U. S. 419 , 259 U. S. 465 ."
Id. at 295 U. S. 163 -164. See also Gutierres v. Albuquerque Land Irrig. Co., 188 U. S. 545 , 188 U. S. 552 -553 (1903); Ickes v. Fox, 300 U. S. 82 , 300 U. S. 95 (1937); Brush v. Commissioner, 300 U. S. 352 , 300 U. S. 367 (1937).
Unfortunately, this language, which had been hastily drafted and passed, had the practical effect of reserving all of the public lands in the West from settlement. [ Footnote 13 ] As a result, "there came a perfect storm of indignation from the people of the West, which resulted in the prompt repeal of the extraordinary [1888] provision." 29 Cong.Rec.1955 (1897) (statement of Cong. McRae). In the Act of Aug. 30, 1890, 26 Stat. 391, Congress repealed the 1888 provision except insofar as it reserved reservoir sites. Then, in the Act of Mar. 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 1101, as amended, 43 U.S.C. § 946, Congress provided for rights-of-way across the public lands to be used by "any canal or ditch company formed for the purpose of irrigation." The apparent purpose of the 1890 and 1891 Acts was to reserve reservoir sites from settlement, but to open them for use in reclamation projects. [ Footnote 14 ] As before, Congress expressly indicated
that the reclamation would be controlled by state water law: [ Footnote 15 ]
"[T]he right of way through the public lads and reservations of the United States is hereby granted . . . for the purpose of irrigation . . . to the extent of the ground occupied by the water of the reservoir and of the canal and its laterals . . . ; Provided, That . . . the privilege herein granted shall not be construed to interfere with the control of water for irrigation and other purposes under authority of the respective States or Territories. "
The final provision of the 1897 Act was proposed as a floor amendment by Representative, later Speaker, Cannon to expressly preserve States' control over reclamation within their borders. It was clearly the opinion of a majority of the Congressmen who spoke on the bill, however, that such an amendment was unnecessary except out of an excess of caution. [ Footnote 16 ] According to Congressman Lacey, Chairman of the House Committee on Public Lands and a principal sponsor of the
174 U.S. at 174 U. S. 702 -703. The Court noted that there are two limitations to the State's exclusive control of its streams -- reserved rights "so far at least as may be necessary for the beneficial uses of the government property," id. at 174 U. S. 703 , and the navigation servitude. The Court, however, was careful to emphasize with respect to these limitations on the States' power that, except where the reserved rights or navigation servitude of the United States are invoked, the State has total authority over its internal waters.
Id. at 174 U. S. 709 .
Id. at 206 U. S. 92 . But federal legislation could not "override state laws in respect to the general subject of reclamation." Ibid. "[E]ach State has full jurisdiction over the lands within its borders, including the beds of streams and other waters." Id. at 206 U. S. 93 . With respect to the question that had been presented in Rio Grande Dam & Irrig. Co., the Court reaffirmed that each State
206 U.S. at 206 U. S. 94 .
It is against this background that Congress passed the Reclamation Act of 1902. With the help of the 1891 and 1897 Acts, private and state reclamation projects had gone far toward reclaiming the arid lands, [ Footnote 17 ] but massive projects were now needed to complete the goal and these were beyond the means of private companies and the States. In 1900, therefore, all of the major political parties endorsed federal funding of reclamation projects. While the Democratic Party's platform specified none of the attributes of a federal program other than to recommend that it be "intelligent,"
K. Porter & D. Johnson, National Party Platforms 115 (2d ed.1961), the Republicans specifically recommended that the reclamation program "reserv[e] control of the distribution of water for irrigation to the respective States and territories." Id. at 123. In his first message to Congress after assuming the Presidency, Theodore Roosevelt continued the cry for national funding of reclamation, and again recommended that state law control the distribution of water. [ Footnote 18 ]
As a result of the public demand for federal reclamation funding, a bill was introduced into the 57th Congress to use the money from the sale of public lands in the Western States to build reclamation projects in those same States. The projects would be built on federal land, and the actual construction and operation of the projects would be in the hands of the Secretary of the Interior. But the Act clearly provided that state water law would control in the appropriation and later distribution of the water. As originally introduced, § 8 of the Reclamation Act provided: [ Footnote 19 ]
"the Secretary of the Interior would proceed to make the appropriation of the necessary water by giving the notice and complying with the forms of law of the State or Territory in which the works were located. "
"Mr. MONDELL. The bill provides explicitly that even an appropriation of water can not be made except under State law. "
35 Cong.Rec. 6687 (1902) (emphasis added). [ Footnote 20 ]
the same State would be governed by different laws, and would frequently conflict. [ Footnote 21 ]
Id. at 6679. [ Footnote 22 ]
several decisions recognized the right of the State to regulate and control the use of water within its borders." Ibid. (Cong. Mondell). According to the House Report "Section 8 recognizes State control over waters of nonnavigable streams such as are used in irrigation." H.R.Rep. No. 794, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., 6 (1902) (emphasis added). [ Footnote 23 ]
For almost half a century, this congressionally mandated division between federal and state authority worked smoothly. No project was constructed without the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, and the United States, through this official, preserved its authority to determine how federal funds should be expended. But state laws relating to water rights were observed in accordance with the congressional directive contained in § 8 of the Act of 1902. In 1958, however, the first of two cases was decided by this Court in which private landowners or municipal corporations contended that state water law had the effect of overriding specific congressional directives to the Secretary of the Interior as to the operation of federal reclamation projects. In Ivanhoe Irrigation District v. McCracken, 357 U. S. 275 , the Supreme Court of California decided that
357 U.S. at 357 U. S. 291 -292. Five years later, in City of Fresno v. California, 372 U. S. 627 (1963), this Court affirmed a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit holding that § 8 did not require the Secretary of the Interior to ignore explicit congressional provisions preferring irrigation use over domestic and municipal use. [ Footnote 24 ]
Petitioners do not ask us to overrule these holdings, nor are we presently inclined to do so. [ Footnote 25 ] Petitioners instead ask us to hold that a State may impose any condition on the "control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water" through a federal reclamation project that is not inconsistent with clear congressional directives respecting the project. Petitioners concede, and the Government relies upon, dicta in our cases that may point to a contrary conclusion. Thus, in Ivanhoe, the Court went beyond the actual facts of that case and stated:
357 U.S. at 357 U. S. 291 -92. Like dictum was repeated in City of Fresno, supra at 372 U. S. 630 , and in this Court's opinion in Arizona v. California, 373 U. S. 546 (1963), where the Court also said:
"The argument that § 8 of the Reclamation Act requires the United States in the delivery of water to follow priorities laid down by state law has already been disposed of by this Court in Ivanhoe Irrig. Dist. v. McCracken, . . . and reaffirmed in City of Fresno v. California. . . . Since § 8 of the Reclamation Act did not subject the Secretary to state law in disposing of water in [ Ivanhoe ], we cannot, consistently with Ivanhoe, hold that the Secretary must be bound by state law in disposing of water under the Project Act."
Id. at 373 U. S. 586 -587.
While we are not convinced that the above language is diametrically inconsistent with the position of petitioners, [ Footnote 26 ] or that it squarely supports the United States, it undoubtedly goes further than was necessary to decide the cases presented to the Court. Ivanhoe and City of Fresno involved conflicts between § 8, requiring the Secretary to follow state law as to water rights, and other provisions of Reclamation Acts that placed specific limitations on how the water was to be distributed. Here the United States contends that it may ignore state law even if no explicit congressional directive conflicts with the conditions imposed by the California State Water Control Board. [ Footnote 27 ]
In Arizona v. California, the States had asked the Court to rule that state law would control in the distribution of water from the Boulder Canyon Project, a massive multistate reclamation project on the Colorado River. [ Footnote 28 ] After reviewing the legislative history of the Boulder Canyon Project Act, 43 U.S.C. § 617 et seq., the Court concluded that, because of the unique size and multistate scope of the Project, Congress did not intend the States to interfere with the Secretary's power to determine with whom and on what terms water contracts would be made. [ Footnote 29 ] While the Court, in rejecting the States' claim, repeated the language from Ivanhoe and City of Fresno as to the scope of § 8, there was no need for it to reaffirm such language except as it related to the singular legislative history of the Boulder Canyon Project Act.
" The Reclamation Act recognizes the interests and rights of the States in the utilization and control of their water resources, and requires the Bureau, in carrying out provisions of the Act, to proceed in conformity with State water laws. Since the construction of a reservoir and the subsequent storage and release of water for beneficial purposes normally entails stream regulation, it is necessary to reach an understanding with the States regarding
Id. § 231.5.1 (1957) (emphasis added). With respect to the Central Valley Project, the Bureau advised Congress that " [r]eclamation law . . . recognizes State water law and rights thereunder,'" and that "Bureau filings on water are subject to State approval." 95 Cong.Rec. A961 (1949). [ Footnote 30 ]
Id. at 295 U. S. 42 -43. Ten years later, in its final decision in Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U. S. 589 (1945), the Court elaborated on its original observation:
Id. at 325 U. S. 613 -615.
the choice of uses it will serve." [ Footnote 31 ] Brief for United States 89. While later Congresses have indeed issued new directives to the Secretary, they have consistently reaffirmed that the Secretary should follow state law in all respects not directly inconsistent with these directives. The Flood Control Act of 1944, 58 Stat. 888, for example, which first authorized the New Melones Dam, provides that it is the
" confirms the rights to the use of water . . . as established by local law and the decisions of the courts. In short, it proposes no new system, but sanctions, regulates, and confirms a system to which the people are devotedly attached. "
California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U. S. 142 , 295 U. S. 155 (1935)
"The pioneer settlers on the arid public domain chose their homes along streams from which they could themselves divert the water to reclaim their holdings. Such opportunities are practically gone. There remain, however, vast areas of public land which can be made available for homestead settlement, but only by reservoirs and main-line canals impracticable for private enterprise. These irrigation works should be built by the National Government. The lands reclaimed by them should be reserved by the Government for actual settlers, and the cost of construction should, so far as possible, be repaid by the land reclaimed. The distribution of the water, the division of the streams among irrigators, should be left to the settlers themselves in conformity with State laws and without interference with those laws or with vested rights. "
372 U.S. at 372 U. S. 630 -631.
Id. at 372 U. S. 630 . Because no provision of California law was actually inconsistent with the exercise by the United States of its power of eminent domain, this statement was dictum. It also might have been apparent from examination of the congressional authorization of the Central Valley Project that Congress intended the Secretary to have the power to condemn any necessary water rights. We disavow this dictum, however, to the extent that it implies that state law does not control even where not inconsistent with such expressions of congressional intent.
As discussed earlier in n 21, it is at least arguable that Congress did not intend to override state water law when it was inconsistent with congressional objectives such as the 160-acre limitation, but intended instead to enforce those objectives simply by the Secretary's refusal to approve a project which could not be built or operated in accordance with them. This intent, however, is not clear, and Congress may have specifically amended § 8 to provide that state law could not override congressional directives with respect to a reclamation project. See n 19, supra. Ivanhoe and City of Fresno read the legislative history of the 1902 Act as evidencing Congress' intent that specific congressional directives which were contrary to state law regulating distribution of water would override that law. Even were this aspect of Ivanhoe res nova, we believe it to be the preferable reading of the Act.
Even though concluding that the power of the States was so limited, the Court went on to note that the Project Act "plainly allows the States to do things not inconsistent with the Project Act or with federal control of the river." 373 U.S. at 373 U. S. 588 .
A remarkably similar history of administrative construction and advice to Congress was given weight in United State v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. at 339 U. S. 735 -736. Considerable weight must be accorded to these interpretations of the Reclamation Act by the agency charged with its operation. See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1 (1965); Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379 (1971); General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U. S. 125 (1976).
Straightaway, however, and with obvious reluctance, it is conceded in a footnote that § 8 does not really go so far and that Congress, after all, "did not intend to relinquish total control of the actual distribution of the reclamation water to the States." Ante at 438 U. S. 668 n. 21. Where following state law would be inconsistent with other provisions of the Reclamation Act or with congressional directives to the Secretary contained in other statutes, § 8 and local law must give way. [ Footnote 2/1 ] Otherwise, however, it is insisted that, by virtue of § 8, state policy must govern federal projects. The next section of the majority opinion is devoted to defending this conclusion and to explaining why it refuses to follow our prior cases construing § 8 much more narrowly than the present temporal majority finds acceptable.
Four of the five major cases bearing on the construction of § 8 have arisen out of the Central Valley Reclamation Project, a massively expensive reclamation undertaking which aimed at redistributing the water in California's Central Valley, which the State was unable to finance and which the Federal Government eventually undertook. [ Footnote 2/2 ] The salient features of the project, which need not be repeated, have been outlined in the Court's cases. United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U. S. 725 (1950); Ivanhoe Irrigation District v. McCracken, 357 U. S. 275 (1958); Dugan v. Rank, 372 U. S. 609 (1963); and City of Fresno v. California, 372 U. S. 627 (1963). One of the project's principal components is the Friant Dam, which interrupted the flow of the upper San Joaquin River, the impounded waters being distributed to irrigate lands not theretofore served by San Joaquin water. To supply the needs of the lower river basin, water was imported from the Sacramento River Valley to the north. The difficulty was that Sacramento water was delivered to the San Joaquin some 60 miles below the Friant Dam. The riparian owners and others along this section of the river, the flow of which would, at the very least, be severely diminished, naturally sought their remedy.
The next case before this Court involving the Central Valley Project was Ivanhoe, supra. That case arose out of proceedings in the state courts, required by federal statute, to confirm contracts for the use of water entered into between state irrigation districts and a state water agency, on the one hand, and the United States, on the other. The contracts contained provisions against the use of project water on tracts in excess of 160 acres, a provision specified by § 5 of the Reclamation Act of 1902 and substantially reenacted in the Omnibus Adjustment Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 650, as amended, 70 Stat. 524, 43 U.S.C. § 423e. [ Footnote 2/3 ] They also contained the
40-year payout provisions provided for in § 9 of the Reclamation Project Act of 1939, 53 Stat. 1193, as amended, 72 Stat. 542, 43 U.S.C. § 485h. The California Supreme Court refused to confirm the contracts, because it construed § 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902 as requiring the contracts to conform to state law and because the 160-acre limitation and the payout provisions were, for separate reasons, contrary to the law of California. This judgment rested in part on the theory that the water rights acquired by the United States were, by virtue of § 8, subject to the normal trust obligations to water users that were imposed by state law, and that were inconsistent with the proposed contract provisions. [ Footnote 2/4 ] As described by the Attorney General of California, who represented the state water districts in this Court, the California Supreme Court reasoned that the water rights needed to perform the contracts
Brief for Appellants in Ivanhoe Irrigation District v. McCracken, O.T. 1957, Nos. 122-125, p. 21. [ Footnote 2/5 ]
357 U.S. at 357 U. S. 291 . The Court also rejected the argument that § 8 required the Secretary to follow state law that was inconsistent with § 5. As the Court understood § 8,
357 U.S. at 357 U. S. 291 . (Emphasis added.) The United States would be obliged to pay for any water rights which were vested under state law and which it took, "[b]ut the acquisition of water rights must not be confused with the operation of federal projects." Ibid. (Emphasis added.) The Court could find nothing in § 8 that "compels the United States to deliver water on conditions imposed by the State," 357 U.S. at 357 U. S. 292 (emphasis added), and quoted with approval from Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U. S. 589 , 325 U. S. 615 (1945):
Like Gerlach, the Dugan and Fresno cases involved the consequences of the Friant Dam on those dependent on the first 60 miles of the San Joaquin downstream from the project. These cases arose from the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit entered in a suit brought by water right claimants below the Friant Dam, including the city of Fresno, for an injunction to prevent the storing and diverting of water at the Dam until a satisfactory remedy for the deprivation of their rights had been achieved. State v. Rank, 293 F.2d 340 (1961). The defendants were local officials of the United States Reclamation Bureau, a number of irrigation and utility districts, and later the United States itself. The District Court overruled the claim that the suit was an unconsented suit against the United States and ordered that the injunction issue unless the Government effected a "physical solution" adequate to satisfy plaintiffs' water rights, which it held the United States was obligated to respect. The Court of Appeals dismissed the United States from the action and then inquired whether the suit against the officials and the districts was also a suit against the United States. This depended, in the first instance, on whether these officers were acting within their statutory and constitutional authority. If they were not, the suit could go forward. Plaintiffs contended, among other things, that Congress had not conferred any right to condemn water rights along this stretch of the river, and that, in any event, plaintiffs had rights under California's "county of origin" and "watershed of origin" statutes that were not subject to condemnation under state law, and hence, pursuant to § 8, were not seizable by the United States. [ Footnote 2/6 ]
372 U.S. at 372 U. S. 619 . Furthermore, the Court noted:
Id. at 372 U. S. 622 -623.
subject to condemnation under § 8 and state law. [ Footnote 2/7 ] Opinions of the Attorney General of California were submitted in support of this claim. Brief for Petitioner in City of Fresno v. California, O.T. 1962, No. 51, pp. 148-150. [ Footnote 2/8 ] These claims were essentially those of a riparian owner to the maintenance of the flow of the San Joaquin River. Fresno also claimed, however, that, under the "county of origin" and "watershed of origin" statutes, it had a prior right to Friant Dam water in an amount necessary to satisfy its needs, and that project water could not be delivered beyond the limits prescribed by these statutes until the city's needs were met. [ Footnote 2/9 ] Section 8, it was argued, required the United States to respect the city's rights under these statutes. The city also claimed a statutory priority for municipal uses, as well as the right to purchase project water for less than the price Bureau officials proposed to charge.
372 U.S. at 372 U. S. 630 . Nor did § 8 require
372 U.S. at 372 U. S. 629 -630. The more limited role of § 8 "is to leave to state law the definition of the property interests, if any, for which compensation must be made." 372 U.S. at 372 U. S. 630 . The Court went on to say that, in any event, the California watershed and county statutes did not give Fresno the priority claimed and that the claims with respect to a municipal priority and to a lower water price were contrary to § 9 of the Reclamation Project Act of 1939. [ Footnote 2/10 ]
Fresno was decided on April 15, 1963, having been argued on January 7 of that year. The opinion and judgment in Arizona v. California, 373 U. S. 546 , were announced on June 3, 1963, the case having been argued for the second time in November, 1962. In Arizona, the Special Master had concluded that, in choosing between users within each State and in settling the terms of his contracts with them, the Secretary was required to follow state law by virtue of §§ 14 and 18 of the Project Act and by reason of § 8 of the Reclamation Act. The Court expressly disagreed, relying on Ivanhoe and Fresno and saying with respect to § 8:
"As we read § 8, it merely requires the United States to comply with state law when, in the construction and operation of a reclamation project, it becomes necessary for it to acquire water rights or vested interests therein. But the acquisition of water rights must not be confused with the operation of federal projects. As the Court said in Nebraska v. Wyoming, [325 U.S.] at 325 U. S. 615 : 'We do not suggest that, where Congress has provided a system of regulation for federal projects, it must give way before an inconsistent state system.' . . . We read nothing in § 8 that compels the United States to deliver water on conditions imposed by the State."
"[357 U.S. at] at 357 U. S. 291 -292."
373 U.S. at 373 U. S. 586 -587.
Even less explicable is the majority's insistence on reaching out to overturn the holding of this Court in Fresno, which reflected the decision in Dugan and was, in turn, grounded on a similar approach in Ivanhoe, that state law may not restrict the power of the United States to condemn water rights. The issue was squarely presented and decided in both Dugan and Fresno. In both cases, it was claimed -- and State Attorney General's opinions supported the claim -- that some of the rights at issue were not condemnable under state law, and that § 8 therefore forbade their taking by the Federal Government. In both cases, the claim was rejected by this Court, just as it was in the Court of Appeals. Without briefing and argument, the majority now discards these holdings in a footnote. See ante at 438 U. S. 671 -672, n. 24.
Furthermore, § 10 of the Reclamation Act, now 43 U.S.C. § 373, authorizes the Secretary to perform any and all acts necessary to carry out the Act. As the Court said in United States v. Buffalo Pitts Co., 234 U. S. 228 , 234 U. S. 233 (1914),
And in Henkel v. United States, 237 U. S. 43 , 237 U. S. 50 (1915), the Court, referring to §§ 7 and 10, said:
" Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. 367 , 91 U. S. 371 -372, 91 U. S. 374 . It makes no difference whether the property 'sought to be condemned is held . . . in trust instead of in fee.' United States v. Carmack, 329 U. S. 230 , 329 U. S. 239 . The beneficiaries may press their claims to compensation."
The usual rule in this Court is that, when two independent reasons are given to support a judgment, "the ruling on neither is obiter, but each is the judgment of the court, and of equal validity with the other." Union Pacific R. Co. v. Mason City & Fort Dodge R. Co., 199 U. S. 160 , 199 U. S. 166 (1905); United States v. Title Ins. Co., 265 U. S. 472 , 265 U. S. 486 (1924). See also Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U. S. 535 , 337 U. S. 537 (1949); Massachusetts v. United States, 333 U. S. 611 , 333 U. S. 623 (1948).