Source: http://www.ussc.gov/guidelines/2015-guidelines-manual/archive/2007-2r11
Timestamp: 2016-07-25 04:15:38
Document Index: 774502450

Matched Legal Cases: ['§2', '§8', '§8', '§3', '§3', '§8', '§4']

2007 2r1_1 | United States Sentencing Commission
2007 2r1_1
2007 Federal Sentencing GuidelinesCHAPTER 2 - PART R - ANTITRUST OFFENSES §2R1.1. Bid-Rigging, Price-Fixing or Market-Allocation Agreements
(1) If the conduct involved participation in an agreement to
submit non-competitive bids, increase by 1 level.
For purposes of this guideline, the volume of commerce
attributable to an individual participant in a conspiracy is the
volume of commerce done by him or his principal in goods or
services that were affected by the violation. When multiple
counts or conspiracies are involved, the volume of commerce
should be treated cumulatively to determine a single, combined
§8C2.4 (Base Fine), use 20 percent of the volume of affected
(2) When applying §8C2.6 (Minimum and Maximum Multipliers),
neither the minimum nor maximum multiplier shall be less than
the greater of (A) the volume of commerce done by the
organization in the goods or services that were affected by the
violation, or (B) the largest contract on which the organization
submitted a complementary bid in connection with the bid-rigging
Position of Trust or Use of Special Skill), and 3C1.1
(Obstructing or Impeding the Administration of Justice) may be
relevant in determining the seriousness of the defendant’s
offense. For example, if a sales manager organizes or leads the
price-fixing activity of five or more participants, the 4-level
increase at §3B1.1(a) should be applied to reflect the
defendant’s aggravated role in the offense. For purposes of
applying §3B1.2, an individual defendant should be considered for
a mitigating role adjustment only if he were responsible in some
minor way for his firm’s participation in the conspiracy.
defendant’s participation in the offense, the defendant’s role,
and the degree to which the defendant personally profited from
the offense (including salary, bonuses, and career enhancement). If the court concludes that the defendant lacks the ability to
pay the guideline fine, it should impose community service in
lieu of a portion of the fine. The community service should be
equally as burdensome as a fine. 3. The fine for an organization is determined by applying Chapter
consider both the gain to the organization from the offense and
the loss caused by the organization. It is estimated that the
average gain from price-fixing is 10 percent of the selling
price. The loss from price-fixing exceeds the gain because,
among other things, injury is inflicted upon consumers who are
unable or for other reasons do not buy the product at the higher
prices. Because the loss from price-fixing exceeds the gain,
subsection (d)(1) provides that 20 percent of the volume of
affected commerce is to be used in lieu of the pecuniary loss
under §8C2.4(a)(3). The purpose for specifying a percent of the
volume of commerce is to avoid the time and expense that would be
required for the court to determine the actual gain or loss. In
cases in which the actual monopoly overcharge appears to be
either substantially more or substantially less than 10 percent,
this factor should be considered in setting the fine within the
guideline fine range.
contributed to harm that possibly was quite substantial. The
court should consider sentences near the top of the guideline
range in such cases.
7. In the case of a defendant with previous antitrust
convictions, a sentence at the maximum of the applicable
guideline range, or an upward departure, may be warranted. See §4A1.3 (Adequacy of Criminal History Category).
Background: These guidelines apply to violations of the
antitrust laws. Although they are not unlawful in all countries,
there is near universal agreement that restrictive agreements
among competitors, such as horizontal price-fixing (including
bid-rigging) and horizontal market-allocation, can cause serious
economic harm. There is no consensus, however, about the
harmfulness of other types of antitrust offenses, which
furthermore are rarely prosecuted and may involve unsettled
issues of law. Consequently, only one guideline, which deals
with horizontal agreements in restraint of trade, has been
promulgated. The agreements among competitors covered by this section are
almost invariably covert conspiracies that are intended to, and
serve no purpose other than to, restrict output and raise prices,
and that are so plainly anticompetitive that they have been
recognized as illegal per se, i.e., without any inquiry in
individual cases as to their actual competitive effect.Under the guidelines, prison terms for these offenders should be
require some period of confinement in the great majority of cases
that are prosecuted, including all bid-rigging cases. The court
will have the discretion to impose considerably longer sentences
within the guideline ranges. Adjustments from Chapter Three,
Part E (Acceptance of Responsibility) and, in rare instances,
important in order to ensure that the sanction is in fact
punitive and that there is an incentive to desist from a
violation once it has begun. The offense levels are not based
directly on the damage caused or profit made by the defendant
because damages are difficult and time consuming to establish. The volume of commerce is an acceptable and more readily
measurable substitute. The limited empirical data available as
to pre-guidelines practice showed that fines increased with the
volume of commerce and the term of imprisonment probably did as
well.The Commission believes that the volume of commerce is liable to
be an understated measure of seriousness in some bid-rigging
cases. For this reason, and consistent with pre-guidelines
practice, the Commission has specified a 1-level increase for
bid-rigging. Substantial fines are an essential part of the sentence. For an
individual, the guideline fine range is from one to five percent
of the volume of commerce, but not less than $20,000. For an
organization, the guideline fine range is determined under
Chapter Eight (Sentencing of Organizations), but pursuant to
subsection (d)(2), the minimum multiplier is at least 0.75. This
multiplier, which requires a minimum fine of 15 percent of the
volume of commerce for the least serious case, was selected to
provide an effective deterrent to antitrust offenses. At the
same time, this minimum multiplier maintains incentives for
desired organizational behavior. Because the Department of
Justice has a well-established amnesty program for organizations
that self-report antitrust offenses, no lower minimum multiplier
is needed as an incentive for self-reporting. A minimum
multiplier of at least 0.75 ensures that fines imposed in
antitrust cases will exceed the average monopoly overcharge. The Commission believes that most antitrust defendants have the
resources and earning capacity to pay the fines called for by
this guideline, at least over time on an installment basis. Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987. Amended effective
November 1, 1991 (see Appendix C, amendments 377 and 422);
2004 (see Appendix C, amendment 674); November 1, 2005 (see Appendix C, amendment 678). USSC HelpLine