Source: http://www.sdbar.org/Federal/2008/2008dsd017.htm
Timestamp: 2013-05-21 13:49:06
Document Index: 241770475

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 1973', '§ 1973', 'art, 461', '§ 1973', '§ 1997', '§ 1973', 'art,\n461', '§ 1988', '§ 1821', '§ 1920', '§ 1821', '§ 1920']

Cottier v. City of Martin, 2008 DSD 17
CITY OF MARTIN; Todd Alexander; Rod Anderson; Scott Larson; Don Moore; Brad Otte; and Molly Risse, in their official capacities as members of Martin City Council; and Janet Speidel, in her official capacity as Finance Officer of City of Martin,
[2008 DSD 17]
CIV 02-5021
ON MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND EXPENSES
ACLU Foundation, Atlanta, GA
[¶1]	Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney Fees and Expenses, doc. 424.
Plaintiffs request fees and costs for services performed from March 2002 through March 2007. For
the following reasons, the Motion is granted in part and denied in part. BACKGROUND
[¶2]	This case involves a voting-rights challenge to the City of Martin's city council wards. Plaintiffs, all of whom are Native American, filed suit in 2002. In the original complaint filed under
28 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiffs claimed that Defendants violated their constitutional rights by adopting
Ordinance 121 which created voting wards of unequal populations as part of a redistricting plan. Plaintiffs sought a preliminary and permanent injunction prohibiting Defendants from further use of
the redistricting plan created by Ordinance 121. Defendants subsequently adopted Ordinance 122
which appeared to equally redistribute the population. After a trial on May 24, 2002, the Court (1)
concluded that Plaintiffs' claim was moot because of the adoption of Ordinance 122. An Order
denying the injunction and dismissing the Complaint was filed on May 29, 2002. Plaintiffs timely filed
a motion to amend or alter the judgment and to file a supplemental complaint. The proposed
supplemental complaint alleged that Ordinance 122 unconstitutionally configured the City wards in
a manner that intentionally and effectively diluted the voting strength of Native Americans and kept
Indian-preferred aldermen candidates from being elected, all in violation of Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973, and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution. On September 4, 2002, the Court granted Plaintiffs' motion to amend the
judgment and file the supplemental complaint.
[¶3]	After an 11-day court trial in June 2004, the Court entered judgment in favor of Defendants
in March 2005. Plaintiffs appealed. The Eighth Circuit affirmed with respect to Plaintiffs'
constitutional claims but reversed and remanded the Voting Rights Act claim. See Cottier v. City of
Martin, 445 F3d1113 (8th Cir. 2006). [¶4]	On remand, the Court held that the City's wards violate the Voting Rights Act by diluting the
Native American vote and ordered Defendants to propose a remedy. See Cottier v. City of Martin,
466 F.Supp.2d 1175 (D.S.D. 2006). Defendants failed to propose a remedy, arguing that no
workable remedy existed. On February 9, 2007, the Court adopted one of Plaintiffs' proposed
remediation plans and entered judgment in Plaintiffs' favor. See Cottier v. City of Martin, 475
F.Supp.2d 932 (D.S.D. 2007). DISCUSSION
[¶5]	The Court's analysis begins with 42 U.S.C. § 1973l(e). Under section 1973l(e) of the Voting
Rights Act, "[i]n any action or proceeding to enforce the voting guarantees of the fourteenth or
fifteenth amendment, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, . . . a reasonable
attorney's fee, reasonable expert fees, and other reasonable litigation expenses as part of the costs." (2) A.	Prevailing Party Status
[¶6]	Defendants concede that Plaintiffs are prevailing parties on the Voting Rights Act claim, but
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot be deemed prevailing parties "during the first portion of this
case involving the original Complaint alleging malapportionment." Defendants ask the Court to deny
recovery of fees and expenses for time spent working on the original Complaint in this case. The
Court rejects that request. As the Supreme Court stated in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424
Many civil rights cases will present only a single claim. In other cases the plaintiff's
claims for relief will involve a common core of facts or will be based on related legal
theories. Much of counsel's time will be devoted generally to the litigation as a whole,
making it difficult to divide the hours expended on a claim-by-claim basis. Such a
lawsuit cannot be viewed as a series of discrete claims. Instead the district court
should focus on the significance of the overall relief obtained by the plaintiff in
relation to the hours reasonably expended on the litigation.
Where a plaintiff has obtained excellent results, his attorney should recover a
fully compensatory fee. Normally this will encompass all hours reasonably expended
on the litigation, and indeed in some cases of exceptional success an enhanced award
may be justified. In these circumstances the fee award should not be reduced simply
because the plaintiff failed to prevail on every contention raised in the lawsuit. See
Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 8 E.P.D. ¶ 9444, at 5049 (CD Cal.1974). Litigants
in good faith may raise alternative legal grounds for a desired outcome, and the
court's rejection of or failure to reach certain grounds is not a sufficient reason for
reducing a fee. The result is what matters.
Id. at 435. The goals of Plaintiffs' original Complaint and Plaintiffs' Supplemental Complaint were the same: to have an equitable election system for the City Council in Martin, South Dakota. The
original pleadings focused on the deficiencies of Ordinance 121 and its failure to create equal voting
districts by population. After Plaintiffs filed suit, Defendants corrected this inequality by enacting
Ordinance 122. The Supplemental Complaint alleges that Ordinance 122 dilutes the voting strength
of Native Americans by fragmenting Indian voters into three wards. The claims in both Complaints
involve a common core of facts. The remedial plan proposed by Plaintiffs and adopted by the Court,
doc. 415, is an excellent result for Plaintiffs. The plan gives Native Americans in Martin a strong
chance to elect one member of the Martin City Council in each election cycle. Accordingly, Plaintiffs
are entitled to recover fees for work performed since the beginning of this litigation.
B.	Expert Witness Fees
[¶7]	Defendants assert that Plaintiffs' expert witness fees are not recoverable. On July 27, 2006,
Congress adopted the Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006 ("VRARA"). Section 6 of VRARA amended 42
U.S.C. § 1973l(e) by granting courts discretion to award "reasonable expert fees" to the prevailing
party in a Voting Rights Act case. Plaintiffs incurred the expert witness fees in this case before
Section 6 took effect, and Defendants argue that Section 6 cannot apply retroactively.
[¶8]	Judge Schreier addressed this issue in an unpublished decision in Bone Shirt v. Hazeltine, Civ.
No. 01-3032 (D.S.D. Apr. 5, 2007), where she held that Section 6 of VRARA should not be applied
retroactively and that the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover expert witness fees incurred before
adoption of VRARA. This Court agrees with Judge Schreier's analysis and reasoning in the Bone
Shirt decision and will apply it to the present case. Denying recovery of expert witness fees incurred
prior to enactment of VRARA is consistent with the Supreme Court's holding in Martin v. Hadix,
527 U.S. 343 (1999) (refusing to apply 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(3) limits on attorney fees to legal work
performed prior to effective date of the statute). Pursuant to the traditional presumption against
retroactivity, Plaintiffs cannot recover expert witness fees under Section 6 of VRARA. Accordingly,
expert witness fees will be deducted from the expenses awarded to Plaintiffs. [¶9]	Plaintiffs' tally of expert witness fees is attached to their reply brief as Exhibit A. The total
requested is $45,740.56. Exhibit A includes the June 27, 2003 expense for the exit poll but does not
include the expert witness fees paid to Defendants' expert, Mr. Weber. The expense for the exit poll
in the amount of $5,013.67 will be awarded to Plaintiffs. Judge Schreier's Memorandum Opinion
issued on March 22, 2005 discusses how the poll was conducted, including how Plaintiffs' expert
hired Indian and non-Indian polltakers from the local college and personally trained them regarding
the proper procedures for conducting a poll. (Doc. 371 at p. 31.) The Eighth Circuit ruled that the
exit poll results supported Plaintiffs' vote dilution claim. See Cottier, 445 F3dat 1120. The cost
to conduct the exit poll is a compensable litigation expense. On the other hand, the fees paid to
Defendants' expert witness are not recoverable. Plaintiffs paid Mr. Weber $3,897.56 on August 26,
2003 and $1,304.53 on November 6, 2003, for a total of $5,202.08. Despite being paid to
Defendants' expert, these are expert witness fees which were not recoverable under § 1973l(e) at the
time they were incurred, and thus they cannot be awarded to Plaintiffs. As a result of these changes
to Plaintiffs' tally of expert witness fees, the Court determines that expert witness fees in the amount
of $45,928.97 will be deducted from Plaintiffs' request for expenses.
C.	Calculation of Attorney Fees and Costs
[¶10]	The starting point for determining an award of attorney fees is "the number of hours
reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate." Hensley v. Eckerhart,
461 U.S. at 433. A court should consider twelve factors:
reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the "undesirability" of the case; (11) the
Id. at 430 n.3 (citing Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, 488 F.2d 714,717-719 (5th Cir. 1974)).
These factors were taken into account in arriving at the appropriate hourly rates and hours expended
in this case, with the exception of factors (4) and (7) as they do not appear to be applicable.
1.	Reasonable Hourly Rates
[¶11]	In this litigation, Plaintiffs were represented by three lawyers and the hourly rates requested
vary from lawyer to lawyer. The Court has reviewed the credentials of Plaintiffs' lawyers. Lead
counsel for Plaintiffs is Bryan Sells. Mr. Sells graduated from Harvard College and Columbia Law
School. Prior to working with the ACLU, he was a law clerk for Judge Myron H. Thompson, United
States District Judge for the Middle District of Alabama. Over the course of his career, Mr. Sells has
specialized in voting rights litigation and has served as lead counsel or co-counsel in the United States
Supreme Court and various federal and state courts. Mr. Sells has spoken on Indian voting rights and
has given testimony before the National Commission on the Voting Rights Act regarding the state
of Indian voting rights in South Dakota. His affidavit represents that his hourly rate is $225. [¶12]	Mr. McDonald's affidavit indicates that he is currently the director of the Voting Rights
Project of the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, Inc. He graduated from Columbia
University and the University of Virginia Law School, and he has practiced law for more than 35
years both in private practice and as an employee of the ACLU. His affidavit lists numerous Voting
Rights Act cases in which he acted as counsel. Mr. McDonald also has been a faculty member at the
University of North Carolina Law School at Chapel Hill. He wrote a book on voting rights and other
books on the rights of racial minorities. He has written chapters, articles and reviews on voting
rights, as well as a manual on voting rights litigation. On a number of occasions, Mr. McDonald
testified about voting rights issues before Congress. His hourly rate is $400 and he was awarded fees
at this rate by Judge Schreier in the Bone Shirt case, as well as in a South Carolina case.
[¶13]	Mr. Duffy is local counsel for Plaintiffs. Although Mr. Duffy's affidavit does not reveal
experience with voting rights issues, he has had a distinguished career in law for over twenty years. He earned the distinction of South Dakota Trial Lawyer of the Year in 2006. Duffy charges an hourly
rate of $250. [¶14]	Defendants first argue that the attorney fees for work done in prior years should not be based
on the lawyers' current hourly rates. Defendants suggest using Mr. Sells' 2003 hourly rate of $185
and Mr. Duffy's 2003 hourly rate of $150. In advocating the use of historic rates, Defendants fail
to consider the delay in payment and the lost use of income. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274,
283-84 (1989) (recognizing that, under fee-shifting provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1988, "compensation
received several years after the services were rendered . . . is not equivalent to the same dollar amount
received reasonably promptly as the legal services are performed, as would normally be the case with
private billings"); Standley v. Chilhowee R-IV Sch. Dist., 5 F3d319, 325 (8th Cir. 1993) (district
court abused its discretion in reducing hourly rate from the current rate to the rate charged by counsel
at the time the services were performed without taking the delay factor into account). The historic
rates suggested by Defendants fail to compensate the lawyers for the delay in payment, but the current
rates charged by Mr. Sells and Mr. Duffy appear to overcompensate them somewhat for the work
they performed some time ago. The Court will therefore reduce the rates for Sells and Duffy to $200
per hour- - which is approximately the "midpoint" between the two rates the record establishes they
charged in 2003 and those charged in 2007. [¶15]	Defendants suggest a $225 hourly rate for Mr. McDonald, arguing that it is a reasonable in-state rate for someone with Mr. McDonald's experience. Plaintiffs have produced evidence that they
were unable to find members of the local bar who would represent them. In addition, Duffy said in
his affidavit that he would not have been willing to represent Plaintiffs without the resources and
assistance of the ACLU. The cost, complexity and undesirability of this voting rights case forced
Plaintiffs to look beyond the South Dakota bar for their attorneys. Mr. McDonald's experience with
voting rights issues appears to be unmatched. As a result, the $400 hourly rate charged by Mr.
McDonald is appropriate even though it is more than our normal local rate. See Bone Shirt, 2006
WL 1788307 (D.S.D. 2006) (Judge Schreier found Mr. McDonald's $400 rate reasonable). [¶16]	Paralegals Katie O'Connor and Heidi Lunsford have billable rates of $75 and $45 per hour,
respectively. Defendants do not object to these rates and the Court finds that they are reasonable hourly rates for the work done by the paralegals. 2.	Reasonable Hours Expended
[¶17]	Plaintiffs seek compensation for a total of 2,446.61 hours of work. Mr. Duffy billed 418.8
hours, but Plaintiffs have withdrawn a request for 8.35 hours of Mr. Duffy's time, resulting in a total
of 410.45 billable hours for him. Mr. McDonald and Mr. Sells billed 268.1 and 1,616.03 hours,
respectively. Ms. Lunsford billed 11.5 hours and Ms. O'Connor billed 132.18 hours. Defendants
make numerous objections to the billings, and Plaintiffs have addressed each objection. The Court
has also conducted an independent review of the hours for which compensation is sought in order to
determine if any time should be excluded. [¶18]	"A court may reduce attorney hours, and consequently fees, for inefficiency or duplication of
services in cases where more than one attorney is used." A.J. by L.B. v. Kierst, 56 F3d849, 864 (8th
Cir. 1995). The only billings that the Court finds duplicative are Mr. McDonald's 8 hours on April
25, 2003 for attending the deposition of Mr. Weber, and Mr. Sells' 7.25 hours on April 23 and 24
for attending the depositions of Mr. McCool, Mr. Cooper and Mr. Cole. According to Plaintiffs'
argument and evidence, Mr. Sells took the deposition of Mr. Weber, Defendants' expert, and Mr.
McDonald defended the other three depositions of Plaintiffs' experts. The Court agrees it was
reasonable to divide up the work this way under the circumstances of this case, but the lawyers will
be compensated only for the time on depositions they personally conducted or defended. Mr.
McDonald's fees will be reduced by $3,200, and Mr. Sells' by $1,450. [¶19]	Considering all of the relevant factors, all other billed hours were necessary to secure relief
in this case. As a result, the Court will calculate and award fees in the following amounts: Attorney/Paralegal
Sells	1,608.78
Sales Tax(6%)
3.	Costs and Expenses
[¶20]	Section 1973l(e) of the Voting Rights Act permits the Court to award reasonable litigation
expenses to prevailing parties. In their motion, Plaintiffs sought a total of $105,147.34 in expenses.
Mr. Sells' affidavit includes an itemized list of those expenses. He states that the list is based on his
organization's contemporaneous business records. In their reply brief, Plaintiffs withdrew a few
mistaken requests for: 1) $694 for a transcript of Dr. Zax's deposition; 2) $311 for witness fees and
mileage paid to Pearl Cottier and Rebecca Three Stars; and 3) $284.25 mileage fee paid to Brett
Healey on July 7, 2004. The Court will also deduct $45,928.97 in expert witness fees. With these
deductions, Plaintiffs expenses are $57,929.12. Defendants argue that many of the expenses are not
recoverable and object to many other expenses for lack of necessity and documentation. Plaintiffs'
reply to Defendants' objections contains additional documentation for and explanations of expenses
questioned by Defendants. [¶21]	The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that many of Defendants' objections result from confusion
over what is recoverable under the witness-fee statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1821, or the cost statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1920, with what is recoverable under the fee-shifting statute. The fee-shifting statute allows
this Court to assess "litigation expenses" that may not otherwise be claimed under § 1821 or § 1920
under the rubric of attorney fees rather than costs. Such expenses have been described by the Eighth
Circuit as "out-of-pocket expenses of the kind normally charged to clients by attorneys." Pinkham
v. Camex, Inc., 84 F3d292, 294-95 (8th Cir. 1996) (long distance, fax, messenger and express mail
charges were reasonable out-of-pocket expenses of kind normally charged to clients by attorneys, and
thus should have been included as part of reasonable attorney fee award to prevailing party in
copyright case).
[¶22]	The Court is persuaded that most of the expenses requested by Plaintiffs are reimbursable. Unfortunately, the law in the Eighth Circuit does not allow a prevailing party to recover money spent
on computer assisted legal research. See Standley v. Chilhowee, 5 F3dat 325. The Court does not
agree with Standley's holding because computerized research significantly reduces the time spent on
research. Computerized research charges are often included in reimbursed expenses, especially where
the billing is on a time basis, as it reduces billable hours charged by lawyers for conducting research. Nonetheless, Standley is controlling and this Court cannot allow the $263.70 paid for Lexis Nexis
research on June 17, 2002, June 11, 2003 and July 12, 2004. The Court also will deduct as normal
office overhead the postage ($271.94), office supplies ($73.12) and internet access ($128.52)
expenses listed on pages 6 to 7 of Defendants' Objections (doc. 436), for a total of $473.58. See
Emery v. Hunt, 272 F3d1042, 1048 (8th Cir. 2001) ("Plaintiffs are not entitled to reimbursement
for expenses that are part of normal office overhead in the community.") With these deductions for
computerized research and overhead expenses, Plaintiffs' litigation expenses are $57,191.84. [¶23]	A few other expenses will be excluded because they are not normally charged to a client. These are laundry expenses billed in May 2003 and July 2004 ($19.87), drinks in December 2002
($7.00 only because the other half of the $14.00 was billed to another case), and drinks in February 2003 ($8.25). With the exclusion of these expenses, the Court finds that Plaintiffs are entitled to
recover expenses in the amount of $57,156.72. Accordingly,
[¶24]	IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney Fees and Expenses, doc. 424, is granted
in part and denied in part. Plaintiffs are awarded $549,416 in fees and $57,156.72 in expenses. Footnotes:
1. Judge Karen Schreier presided over the case until her recusal on July 30, 2007. The case was
reassigned to this Court on August 3, 2007. 2. The language allowing an award of expert fees was added by amendment on July 27, 2006.