Source: http://www.intellirights.com/cms2/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=37&Itemid=67&limitstart=16
Timestamp: 2017-06-29 09:13:25
Document Index: 773547237

Matched Legal Cases: ['§285', '§ 285', '§ 284', '§ 285', '§1920', '§ 285', '§102', '§ 102', '§282', '§ 282', '§271']

En Banc Federal Circuit Will Address Liability of Multiple Parties Who Perform Steps of Method Claim
The Federal Circuit on Apr. 20 agreed to address en banc the scope of infringement liability where multiple parties perform separate steps of a method claim (Akamai Technologies Inc. v. Limelight Networks Inc., Fed. Cir., No. 2009-1372, en banc order 4/20/11).
Taking up an issue that has become a point of contention among some judges recently, the court will examine the nettlesome problem posed where parties in combination perform the steps of a claimed method, but no single party performs every claimed step.
Akamai’s Interactive Method Patent Found Not Infringed.
CAFC Reverses Ruling That Beverage Can Patents Did Not Satisfy Written Description Requirement
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit on Apr. 1 reversed a summary judgment that patents related to ways of saving metal when seaming beverage can bodies and ends failed to meet the Patent Act’s written description requirement, Crown Packaging Technology Inc. v. Ball Metal Beverage Container Corp., Fed. Cir., No. 2010-1020, 4/1/11).
District Court Finds Patents Invalid on Written Description and Anticipation Grounds.
Judge Chin Rejects Google Book Settlement With Authors, Publishers
Judge Denny Chin of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York on Mar. 22 rejected a proposed agreement to settle class action copyright infringement suits against Google Inc. over its program to scan millions of books for online searching (Authors Guild v. Google Inc., S.D.N.Y., No. 05-CV-8136 (DC), 3/22/11).
As to the ultimate question of whether the proposed deal to settle suits brought against Google by authors and publishers is fair, adequate, and reasonable for purposes of Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “I conclude that it is not,” Chin wrote. He said that this settlement raises issues “more suited for Congress than this Court,” particularly because it “would release claims well beyond those contemplated by the pleadings,” and may even violate antitrust law, international law, and Section 201(e) of the Copyright Act.
After Google’s Copying, the Parties Reach a Settlement. Read more... Add new comment
The U.S. Senate on Mar. 8 passed the Patent Reform Act of 2011 by a vote of 95 to 5. Among other things, S. 23, entitled the “America Invents Act,” changes U.S. law from a system that affords patent protection to the first to invent to one that gives protection to the party who is first to file the application for the claimed invention.
The America Invents Act, if passed by the House of Representatives and signed into law by President Obama, would be the first comprehensive reform to the U.S. patent system in nearly 60 years.
Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), the bill’s sponsor, on Mar. 11 said in a statement that [t]hese reforms are a catalyst for creativity and for the jobs that go hand-in-hand with innovation. We are keeping faith with the constitutional imperative of encouraging innovation and invention.” On Mar. 8, House Judiciary Committee Chairman Lamar Smith (R-Tex.) hailed the Senate vote. “Today’s vote in the Senate is a victory for American innovators who create businesses, generate jobs and drive economic growth. The current patent system is outdated and is bogged down by frivulous suits and uncertainty regarding patent ownership. Patent reform unleashes American inventors and allows patent hulders to capitalize on their innovations and create new products and more jobs.”
Key Provisions of the Patent Reform Act of 2011.
Amends federal patent law to define the "effective filing date" of a claimed invention as the actual filing date of the patent or the application for patent containing a claim to the invention -- establishing a first-to-file system to replace the current first-to-invent system, except as specified. It also requires the effective filing date for a claimed invention in an application for reissue or reissued patent to be determined by deeming the claim to the invention to have been contained in the patent for which reissue was sought.
Establishes a 1-year grace period--a prior art exception--for inventors to file an application after certain disclosures of the claimed invention by the inventor or another who obtained the subject matter from the inventor. Also revises provisions concerning novelty and nonobvious subject matter.
Repeals provisions relating to inventions made abroad and statutory invention registration. Replaces interference proceedings with derivation proceedings by permitting a civil action by a patent owner against another patent owner claiming to have the same invention and who has an earlier effective filing date if the invention claimed by the earlier patent owner was derived from the inventor claimed in the patent owned by the person seeking relief. Such action must be filed within a specified 1-year period. Replaces the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences with the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (the Board).
Creates a damages determination procedure that requires the court or jury to consider only court-identified methodulogies and factors. It authorizes a court to treble the amount of damages found or assessed (inapplicable to specified royalties for provisional rights to inventions claimed in published applications). Allows any party to request that the trier of fact decide infringement and validity questions before the issues of damages and willful infringement are tried. Revises specified defenses and evidentiary requirements, including a bar on using an accused infringer's failure to obtain the advice of counsel to prove that any infringement was willful or induced.
Allows one who is not the patent owner to request to cancel as unpatentable one or more claims of patent by filing a petition with the USPTO to institute: (1) post-grant review on any ground that could be raised under specified provisions relating to invalidity of the patent or any claim, and (2) inter partes review (replaces inter partes reexamination procedures) on specified novelty and nonobvious subject matter grounds based on prior art consisting of patents and printed publications. Limits the filing of petitions for post-grant review to the 9-month period beginning after the grant of patent or issuance of a reissue patent. Requires any petition for inter partes review to be filed after the later of: (1) 9 months after the grant or reissue, or (2) the date of termination of a post-grant review.
Disallows both post-grant and inter partes review if the petitioner (or real party in interest or privy) has filed: (1) a related civil action, or (2) the petition more than 6 months after being served with a complaint alleging infringement. Prohibits the petitioner from asserting claims in certain proceedings before the USPTO and International Trade Commission (ITC) and in specified civil actions if such claims were raised or reasonably could have been raised in the respective reviews (in the case of post-grant review, prohibits only raised claims from ITC proceedings and civil actions) that resulted in a final Board decision. Prohibits the USPTO Director (Director) from authorizing: (1) inter partes review unless information in the petition and any response shows a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail on at least one of the challenged claims; or (2) post-grant review unless information in the petition, if not rebutted, would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable, or unless such petition raises a novel or unsettled legal question important to other patents or applications. Sets a deadline for the Director to make such determinations, which are deemed final and nonappealable. Requires the Director to prescribe related regulations.
Sets forth the Board's required composition and duties. Allows appeals to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) from specified Board decisions, including examinations, reexaminations, post-grant and inter partes reviews, and derivation proceedings.
Section 10 Establishes supplemental examinations to consider, reconsider, and correct information. Requires the Director to order reexamination if a substantial new question of patentability is raised by at least one item of information in the request.
Eliminates the requirement that CAFC judges must reside within 50 miles of the District of Culumbia. Section 12
Defines the term "micro entity" for both an assigned and unassigned application, including specifying for both that an entity qualifies as a small entity if it is so defined in regulations issued by the Director and has not been named on five or more previously filed patent applications.
Decreases the percentage of certain invention-related royalties and income that must be paid to the federal government and correspondingly increases the percentage that must be given to small business firms when a nonprofit organization has a funding agreement with the government for the operation of a government owned, contractor operated facility. (An existing provision defines the term "funding agreement" as a contract, grant, or cooperative agreement entered into between a federal agency and any contractor for the performance of experimental, developmental, or research work funded in whule or in part by the federal government.)
Section 15 Prohibits using failure to disclose best mode as a basis on which any claim of a patent may be canceled or held invalid or otherwise unenforceable.
Provides for the removal to a U.S. district court of legal actions invulving patents, plant variety protection, or copyrights, and for the remand of unrelated matters.
S. 23 was supported by an array of companies and associations that included Biotechnulogy Industry Organization, IBM, Exxon, General Electric, Caterpillar, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Microsoft, the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, and the Association of University Technulogy Managers.
S. 23 was opposed by a number of companies and groups, including Dell, Cisco, and the Generic Pharmaceutical Association.
ABB Inc. was represented by David L. Burgert of Porter & Hedges, Houston. Cooper Industries was represented by Robert J. McAughan Jr. of Locke Lord Bissell & Liddell, Houston. Add new comment
Centillion was represented by Victor M. Wigman of Blank Rome, Washington, D.C. Qwest was represented by Vincent J. Belusko of Morrison & Foerster, Los Angeles. Add new comment
Google Loses Award of §285 Attorneys’ Fees Since Plaintiff’s Patent Infringement Was Not Frivolous or Objectively Baseless
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Jan. 11 vacated an award of attorneys’ fees to Google Inc. pursuant to Section 285 of the Patent Act because it found that the infringement plaintiff’s suit, while unsuccessful, was not frivolous or objectively baseless (iLOR LLC v. Google Inc., Fed. Cir., No. 2010-1117, 1/11/11).
Finding that the district court clearly erred in ruling that this was an “exceptional” case warranting an awarding of attorneys’ fees under Section 285, the Federal Circuit said that this suit was not objectively baseless because the plaintiff here “could reasonably argue that its broad claim construction position was correct and that Google infringed its claims.”
Google Prevails on Infringement Question, Is Awarded Attorneys’ Fees.
In this suit, iLOR LLC charged that Google Inc.’s Google Notebook infringed its U.S. patent 7,206,839 relating to Internet functionality, which in Claim 26 requires “the toolbar being displayable based on a location of a cursor in relation to a hyperlink.”
At trial, Google argued that the “being displayable” limitation only covered methods where the toolbar was automatically displayed when a cursor was proximate to the hyperlink. However, iLOR read the claim to also cover an embodiment where a right-mouse click was required to display the toolbar.
The district court agreed with Google and construed the claim to mean that “the toolbar is ‘automatically displayed’ upon the placement of the cursor in proximity to a hyperlink with no further action on the part of a user.” It went on to grant a summary judgment of noninfringement and dismiss the suit with prejudice.
In an initial appeal, the Federal Circuit found no error in the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction, agreeing that the language of the claim and the specification suggested that the toolbar display was automatic and “based on the location of the cursor” in relation to the hyperlink. iLOR LLC v. Google Inc., 550 F.3d 1067 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Here, iLOR appealed the district court’s award to Google of $627,039 in attorneys’ fees and other costs for a total of $660,351.
Google Fails to Meet Brooks Furniture Test.
Under Patent Act Section 285, 35 U.S.C. § 285, a “court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney[s’] fees to the prevailing party.”
The Federal Circuit observed that Section 285 must be viewed in the context of Supreme Court authority recognizing that the right to bring and defend litigation implicates First Amendment rights and that bringing allegedly frivolous litigation can only be sanctioned if the lawsuit is “objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the merits.” Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries Inc., 508 U.S. 49 (1993). As to whether a case is “exceptional,” Judge Timothy B. Dyk said that the relevant standard under Brooks Furniture Manufacturing Inc. v. Dutailier International Inc., 393 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005), asks whether “there has been some material inappropriate conduct related to the matter in litigation, such as willful infringement, fraud or inequitable conduct in procuring the patent, misconduct during litigation, vexatious or unjustified litigation, conduct that violates Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, or like infractions.”
Dyk noted that Brooks Furniture relied on Professional Real Estate in holding that, absent misconduct during patent prosecution or litigation, sanctions may be imposed against a patent plaintiff “only if both (1) the litigation is brought in subjective bad faith, and (2) the litigation is objectively baseless.” Under the strict standard of Brooks Furniture, the plaintiff’s case must have no objective foundation, the plaintiff must actually know this, and both the objective and subjective prongs “must be established by clear and convincing evidence,” Dyk said, quoting Wedgetail Ltd. v. Huddleston Deluxe Inc., 576 F.3d 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Looking at whether the second prong was present here, Dyk explained that “[t]he objective baselessness standard for enhanced damages and attorneys’ fees against a non-prevailing plaintiff under Brooks Furniture is identical to the objective recklessness standard for enhanced damages and attorneys’ fees against an accused infringer for § 284 willful infringement actions under In re Seagate Technology LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc).”
Even though iLOR was ultimately unsuccessful in its patent infringement suit, “Google has not met its high burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that this suit was brought frivolously or that iLOR’s position on claim construction was objectively baseless, the Federal Circuit wrote. It said that the claim terms, specification, and prosecution history supported iLOR’s broad claim interpretation, which was ultimately found incorrect. “But simply being wrong about claim construction should not subject a party to sanctions where the construction is not objectively baseless,” Dyk stressed. He acknowledged that claim construction issues are often complex and “not always predictable.” Having found that Google failed the objective element of the two Brooks Furniture requirements, he said there was no need to look at the issue of subjective bad faith.
While the appellate court vacated the award of attorneys’ fees under § 285, it did find that the awarding Google costs for copying, court reporting, and transcripts was proper under 28 U.S.C §1920. The court then set aside the award of expert fees to Google under § 285, pointing out that that this case was not brought in bad faith.
The “exceptional” case finding was reversed, and the suit was remanded.
iLOR was represented by David E. Schmit of Frost Brown Todd, Cincinnati. Google was represented by Frank E. Scherkenbach of Fish & Richardson, Boston. Add new comment
Even Under Bilski, Claims Still Drawn to Patentable Subject Matter. On remand from the Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit said that “Bilski did not undermine our preemption analysis of Prometheus’s claims” but rejected the notion of the machine-or-transformation test as an “exclusive” test.
In re Grams Distinguished. Further, the court distinguished this case from In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1989), saying that the administering and determining steps are not “merely” data-gathering steps or “insignificant extra-solution activity,” but are part of treatment regimes for various diseases using thiopurine drugs. While noting that the final “wherein” clauses of the claims involve mental steps that are “not patent-eligible per se,” it stressed that “the claims are not simply to the mental steps.” Here, Lourie pointed out that “[a] subsequent mental step does not, by itself, negate the transformative nature of prior steps.”
Respondent MedioStream Inc. was represented by Byron W. Cooper of Goodwin Procter, Menlo Park, Calif. Add new comment
Supreme Court Will Hear Microsoft’s Appeal on the Evidentiary Standard Required to Defeat i4i’s Markup Language Patent
The U.S. Supreme Court on Nov. 29 agreed to hear Microsoft’s argument on appeal that the Federal Circuit erred by requiring clear and convincing evidence to defeat plaintiff i4i’s markup language patent even though the Patent and Trademark Office never reviewed an allegedly invalidating prior art software system before the patent issued (Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Limited Partnership, U.S., No. 10-290, 11/29/10).
While Microsoft directly stands to lose an infringement damages judgment of more than $290 million, also at stake in this case is whether the high court will decide to adjust the presumption of validity that patent holders have grown accustomed to under the Federal Circuit’s clear-and-convincing test that has been applied for 30 years.
Microsoft Petitions for Review of Federal Circuit Evidentiary Standard. In this case, i4i Limited Partnership and Infrastructures for Information Inc.(i4i) filed an infringement complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas against Microsoft Corp., alleging that the software giant violated their patent (5,787,449) covering a system and method for the “separate manipulation of the architecture and content of a document.”
As noted in an earlier Intellirights story, a jury verdict and court ruling went in favor of i4i, and the Federal Circuit affirmed a damages judgment of more than $290 million. i4i Limited Partnership v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
Microsoft filed a petition with the U.S. Supreme Court in August 2010, arguing that the Federal Circuit’s requirement of clear and convincing evidence for proving the ‘449 patent invalid was inappropriate in this case. The heart of Microsoft’s invalidity defense is the argument that the invention in the ‘449 patent was placed on sale more than a year before the application filing when a software called “S4” was sold to client SEMI—a violation of the on-sale bar at 35 U.S.C. §102(b). While at trial Microsoft pointed to statements that i4i officials made to investors and Canadian government officials about the relationship between S4 and the ‘449 patent, it was unable to provide the jury with conclusive proof because i4i had destroyed the S4 source code before filing this suit. Though Microsoft had sought a jury instruction that it only had to prove invalidity by a preponderance of the evidence, the district court ruled that Federal Circuit case law required proof of invalidity under a clear and convincing evidence standard.
In its petition, Microsoft seized upon language in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007), where the high court found it “appropriate to note” that the rationale for the presumption of patent validity presumption—that the PTO, in its expertise, has approved the claim—seems much diminished” here because the PTO never considered the S4 reference during prosecution of the ‘449 patent.
Microsoft’s petition argued as follows:
The Federal Circuit has repeatedly disregarded KSR’s invitation to reconsider its heightened evidentiary standard. Instead, it has clung to its pre-KSR caselaw and continued to apply the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard even to invalidity defenses based on prior-art evidence that the PTO never considered.…
The consequences of the Federal Circuit’s rigidity are dramatic, as this case—the largest patent infringement verdict ever to be affirmed on appeal— well illustrates. Respondents i4i Limited Partnership and Infrastructures for Information Inc. (collectively,“i4i”) alleged that certain versions of Microsoft’s word-processing software, Microsoft Word, infringed i4i’s patent. … At trial, Microsoft contended that i4i’s patent is invalid because the disclosed invention had been embodied in a software product sold in the United States more than a year before the patent application was filed, … , thus rendering the invention unpatentable under the “on-sale bar” of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). That prior-art software was never considered by the PTO during prosecution of the patent. … Yet because i4i had destroyed the source code for its early software before filing its action against Microsoft, i4i’s technical expert and counsel were able to stress to the jury repeatedly that Microsoft could not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the software embodied the patented invention. Ultimately, the jury concluded that Microsoft had failed to sustain this heightened standard of proof, and the district court subsequently entered a permanent injunction and a money judgment against Microsoft in excess of $290 million. … This case thus places in stark relief the distortive consequences of the Federal Circuit’s clear-and-convincing-evidence standard.
Microsoft’s view is supported by numerous amici, including 36 law, business and economics professors, who argued in their brief that “the Federal Circuit has steadfastly hewed to the uniform rule it created, even in circumstances in which that rule makes no sense.” That brief, submitted by Stanford University Law Professor Mark A. Lemley, noted that this high level of deference for every patent is unwarranted because the PTO is “subject to enormous information and budgetary constraints” and “bad patents routinely slip through.” Thus, the 36 professors asked the Supreme Court “to do what the Federal Circuit will not—apply a legal standard for the presumption of validity that reflects the modern patent system.”
However, i4i’s opposition brief argued that the Supreme Court should not take this case because Microsoft never raised this issue in seeking en banc review at the Federal Circuit. Further, it noted that “Congress is currently considering additional patent reforms that are closely related to the clear-and-convincing standard.”
The opposition brief of i4i continued:
In particular, pending legislation would establish a “post-grant review” process that would further expand the PTO’s ability to consider validity challenges. … These congressional efforts to reform patent law could be disrupted by a grant of certiorari, which would signal that the Court might upset the settled clear-and-convincing standard. Moreover, the fact that Congress continues to focus attention on measures related to that standard, while leaving §282 undisturbed, underscores that the Federal Circuit’s longstanding interpretation of that provision is correct and should not be altered by the courts.
However, in a Nov. 29 order, the U.S. Supreme Court granted Microsoft’s certiorari petition and agreed to address the following question:
The Patent Act provides that "[a] patent shall be presumed valid" and that "[t]he burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity." 35 U.S.C. § 282. The Federal Circuit held below that Microsoft was required to prove its defense of invalidity under 35 U.S.C. § l02(b) by "clear and convincing evidence," even though the prior art on which the invalidity defense rests was not considered by the Patent and Trademark Office prior to the issuance of the asserted patent. The question presented is: Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that Microsoft's invalidity defense must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.
Chief Justice John Roberts recused himself from this case.
Microsoft’s petition was submitted by Thomas G. Hungar of Gibson Dunn & Crutcher, Washington, D.C.
The i4i opposition brief was filed by Seth P. Waxman of Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr, Washington, D.C.
Microsoft’s petition is supported in the following briefs filed by amici:
Facebook Inc. & Netflix Inc.
Google Inc. & Verizon Communications Inc.
Yahoo Inc. Add new comment
Amicus Briefs in Support of Neither Party • Apotex Inc. • United States Patent & Trademark Office • Intellectual Property Owners Association • Federal Circuit Bar Association • American Intellectual Property Law Association • Biotechnology Industry Organization • American Bar Association • Boston Patent Law Association • Houston IP Law Association • San Diego IP Law Association • Kentucky IP Law Students • IP Law Association of Chicago • Washington State IP Law Association • Eli Lilly Patent Attorneys • SAP America Inc. • Acacia Research • Dolby Laboratories • Professor Hricik • Professor Mammen • Johnson & Johnson + Procter & Gamble • 22 Patent Law Firms • Verizon • ECore International • EISAI • Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America Add new comment
Finding No Likelihood of Confusion, Judge Denies Order to Block Sony’s Promotion of ‘The Illusionist’ Film That Is Set for Dec. 25 Release
A federal district court judge in California on Nov. 4 denied a request for a temporary restraining order to prohibit Sony Pictures from marketing its film “The Illusionist,” finding little likelihood that the public will confuse this film with one of the same name released in 2006 (Illusionist Distribution LLC v.Sony Pictures Classics Inc., C.D. Cal., No. CV 10-08062 DMG (MANx), 11/4/10).
Refusing to stop the marketing of Sony’s film that is set for a Christmas day release, the court said that the plaintiff’s “Illusionist” mark is “weak” and merely “generically describes a movie about an illusionist rather than Plaintiff’s product in particular.”
Fight Over ‘Illusionist’ Film Mark.
Plaintiff Illusionist Distribution LLC released its 2006 film called “The Illusionist” starring Ed Norton, Jessica Biel, and Paul Giamatti, which was nominated for an Academy Award. The plot centers on a stage magician named Eisenheim (played by Norton) who appears to possess extraordinary powers and falls in love with a duchess named Sophie (played by Biel). The climax of the film occurs when Eisenheim uses his superior skills as an illusionist to help Sophie flee a planned marriage to a crown prince, who is scheming to overthrow his aged father, the emperor.
“The Ilusionist” film set to be released by Sony Pictures Classics Inc. in December 2010 is an animated art movie based on a screenplay written in the 1950s by famed French mime, actor, and film director Jacques Tati. It is set in Scotland in the 1950s or 1960s, has virtually no dialogue or voiceovers, and involves a main character who is a struggling, aging magician whose life is transformed by a young girl who believes his tricks are real.
Illusionist Distribution brought this suit against Sony and others, charging that the film constitutes a false designation of origin, false designation of affiliation, and false or misleading representation of fact under the federal Lanham Act. Illusionist Distribution filed an ex parte application for a temporary restraining order against Sony’s promotion, marketing, distribution, and release of its picture.
Plaintiff’s Mark Is ‘Weak;’ Confusion Unlikely.
To prevail on a trademark infringement claim, a plaintiff must show that (1) it has a valid, protectable trademark; and (2) the defendant’s use of the mark is likely to cause, Judge Dolly M. Gee observed. As its “The Illusionist” mark is unregistered, Illusionist Distribution has a valid, protectable trademark only if its mark is sufficiently distinctive or has acquired a secondary meaning in the market, she explained. The company insisted that the mark had acquired secondary meaning as a “box office success,” citing $18 million in the theatrical release marketing and advertising in the United States, $11 million in DVD release marketing, and more than $88 million in gross receipts worldwide.
A “large expenditure of money,” however, “does not in itself create legally protectable rights,” Gee said, quoting Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A. Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2010). Other than these expenditures, she said, Illusionist Distribution provided no other evidence that its mark had acquired secondary meaning.
Gee went on to find that the two films were alike in name only and that there was no likelihood of confusion shown under the eight-factor test set forth in AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979): (1) the similarity of the marks; (2) the strength of the plaintiff’s mark; (3) the proximity or relatedness of the goods or services; (4) the defendant’s intent in selecting the mark; (5) evidence of actual confusion; (6) the marketing channels used; (7) the likelihood of expansion into other markets; and (8) the degree of care likely to be exercised by purchasers of the defendant’s product.
Notwithstanding that the marks at issue are identical, there is little likelihood of consumer confusion. Plaintiff’s mark is weak. It generically describes a movie about an illusionist rather than Plaintiff’s product in particular. As SPC points out, there are works galore with that title, including a film released in 1983, as well as at least 14 books published since 1952, 12 of which are still in print. … In addition, a wide variety of consumer products employ the term “illusionist” in some variation in their registered trademark. … More still, thousands of magicians perform under the description “illusionist.”
Although both products are movies about illusionists, they are so different that there is little chance that consumer confusion will ensue.…
Defendants’ film has always been called “The Illusionist” (or, in the original French, “L’Illusionniste”) and their choice of title has nothing to do with Plaintiff’s film. … There is no indication that Defendants intend to market their film to the same audience as Plaintiff’s. Defendants’ movie is geared toward animation aficionados and fans of independent art films. Plaintiff’s movie has been advertised as a mainstream, live-action “period piece” of interest to the general public. … Plaintiff presents no evidence of actual consumer confusion. In sum, the Sleekcraft factors weigh against a finding of likely consumer confusion between the two films. Plaintiff is thus unlikely to meet either of the prongs to establish trademark infringement.
‘A Strong First Amendment Defense.’
In addition to finding that Illusionist Distribution lacked a protectable mark and failed to show a likelihood of confusion, the court pointed to another ally for Sony—the First Amendment. It found that Sony has “a strong First Amendment defense” under the test articulated in Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989), which was adopted by the Ninth Circuit. This test reads the Lanham Act to apply to artistic works—particularly an artistic work’s title—“only where the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion outweighs the public interest in free expression,” Gee said, quoting E.S.S. Entertainment 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos Inc., 547 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2008). “An artistic work’s use of a trademark that otherwise would violate the Lanham Act is not actionable unless the use of the mark has no artistic relevance to the underlying work whatsoever, or, if it has some artistic relevance, unless it explicitly misleads as to the source or the content of the work,” she added, quoting E.S.S. Neither element applies here, Gee said, noting that “The Illusionist” is artistically relevant in describing the main character of the film and that the title does not explicitly mislead as to the source of the work. “Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim will likely fail on First Amendment grounds as well.”
Since the only basis for the unfair competition claim here is the allegation of trademark infringement, the court went on to conclude that Illusionist Distribution’s unfair competition claim “is also likely to fail.”
Finally, the court found that Illusionist Distribution was not entitled to injunctive relief based on the relevant factors: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a likelihood of irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) the balance of equities in its favor; and (4) injunctive relief being in the public interest.
Illusionist Distribution clearly failed on the first two elements, and the third factor favors the defendants because they “cannot simply release their film under a different name,” the court said. Here, Gee noted that “[t]he December 25, 2010 release date was specifically chosen in order to make Defendants’ picture eligible for year-end award consideration, including consideration for Academy Awards,” and that any delay would jeopardize the film’s chances for such an award.
As to the final injunctive relief factor, Gee concluded this way:
While the public has an interest in trademark enforcement, it has no interest in seeing the enforcement of unprotectable marks. The public has a substantial interest in preventing artistic expression from becoming stifled by overzealous intellectual property protection.
The ex parte application was denied.
Illusionist Distribution was represented by Behzad Nahai and Edward Wei of Nahai Law Group, Los Angeles. Sony was represented by Asheley G. Dean and Neil R. O'Hanlon of Hogan Lovells US LLP, Los Angeles, and by Dori Ann Hanswirth and Nathaniel S. Boyer of Hogan Lovells, New York.
Read the Illusionist Distribution LLC v. Sony Pictures Classics Inc. ruling. Add new comment
CAFC Rejects Lilly’s Bid to Clarify Law of Double Patenting En Banc in Case That Found Its Gemcitabine Cancer Treatment Invalid
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit on Nov. 1 refused to address the law of double patenting en banc in a case which found Eli Lilly’s patent claiming gemcitabine as a cancer treatment invalid based on an earlier patent that the company was issued for using gemcitabine to treat viral infections (Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. v. Eli Lilly and Co., Fed. Cir., No. 2010-1105, 11/1/10).
However, Judge Pauline Newman, joined by Chief Judge Randall R. Rader and Judges Alan D. Lourie and Richard Linn, dissented from the review denial, saying that “inconsistent precedent warrants clarification” en banc. “Until recently the law of double patenting was clear, but it has become distorted by divergent statements, leading to this flawed ruling,” Newman wrote.
Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. filed an Abbreviated New Drug Application with the Food and Drug Administration for marketing approval on a generic version of Gemzar® and certified that the ’614 and ’826 patents were invalid or not infringed.
Double Patenting Decision Upheld. As reported in a July Intellirights story, the Federal Circuit affirmed that ruling. Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 611 F.3d 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
In that decision, the panel relied on the decisions in Geneva Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, 349 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003), and Pfizer Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA Inc., 518 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Finding that precedent controlling, Judge Sharon Prost said that Geneva and Pfizer both found claims of a later patent invalid for obviousness-type double patenting where an earlier patent claimed a compound, disclosing its utility in the specification, and a later patent claimed a method of using the compound for a use described in the specification of the earlier patent. Quoting language from both cases, she observed that a “claim to a method of using a composition is not patentably distinct from an earlier claim to the identical composition in a patent disclosing the identical use.”
The panel decision rejected Lilly’s argument that, in Geneva and Pfizer, the specification of the earlier patent disclosed a single use for the claimed compound, which was an essential part of the patented invention and thus necessary to patentability. To Lilly, the double patenting analysis of those cases does not apply to the later ’826 patent claims reciting a method of using gemcitabine for cancer treatment because, though the specification of the earlier ’614 patent disclosed gemcitabine’s use in treating both viral infections and cancer, the antiviral use provided the essential utility necessary to the patentability of the ’614 patent.
Prost disputed the suggestion that Pfizer involved a single disclosed utility that was alone essential to the patentability of the claimed compound. Further, she stressed that “the analysis in the Pfizer decision shows that obviousness-type double patenting encompasses any use for a compound that is disclosed in the specification of an earlier patent claiming the compound and is later claimed as a method of using that compound.”
Prost explained:
Pfizer never implies that its reasoning depends in any way on the number of uses disclosed in the specification of the earlier patent. … Instead, its broad analysis reflects that the court considered the multiple uses for the compound that were discussed in the specification of the earlier patent. Indeed, the Pfizer decision ultimately invalidated claims in the later patent that were separately directed to these multiple uses, including inflammation, inflammation-associated disorders, and the specific inflammation-associated disorders of arthritis, pain, and fever.…
Dissenting Judges: Clarity on Double-Patenting Is Needed.
“The law of double patenting is contrary to the panel’s holding,” Newman argued in her dissenting opinion. Here, she quoted earlier circuit authority stating that the rule that “[d]ouble-patenting is altogether a matter of what is claimed.” General Foods Corp. v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle mbH, 972 F.2d 1272 (Fed. Cir. 1992). “This law was also fully established in our predecessor court,” Newman added, citing In re Vogel, 422 F.2d 438 (CCPA 1970).
The panel apparently was misdirected by an overly-broad statement in Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, 349 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Genevastated that “[o]ur predecessor court recognized that a claim to a method of using a composition is not patentably distinct from an earlier claim to the identical composition in a patent disclosing the identical use.” …
Extending Genevato cover the facts of this case does not further the policy of obviousness-type double patenting. “Obviousness-type double patenting is a judicially created doctrine intended to prevent improper timewise extension of the patent right by prohibiting the issuance of claims in a second patent which are not ‘patentably distinct’ from the claims of a first patent.” … The panel failed to explain how Lilly’s claims to the use of gemcitabine to treat cancer, discovered after gemcitabine’s antiviral use was disclosed in the original application, improperly extend the patent right to gemcitabine as a compound, let alone how these claims would “shock one’s sense of justice.” For purposes of this case, there is no dispute that Lilly would be entitled to a separate patent on the anticancer use if Lilly had not included the disclosure of anticancer use in the specification of the continuation-in-part filed the same day. Such disclosure does not “improperly extend” any patent.…
A change of law “in ways that negatively impact the patentability of important later-discovered uses” serves no public purpose in areas in which commercial development requires patent protection. Id.If the majority of the court now believes, as a matter of policy, that the law should be changed in this new direction, en banc treatment is particularly appropriate, for the court’s rule is that the earlier precedent prevails unless overruled en banc. A situation in which the court ignores this rule, and applies whatever law the panel prefers, is an indictment of the ability of this court to provide stable law in the areas entrusted to us.
Sun Pharmaceutical was represented by James F. Hurst of Winston & Strawn, Chicago. Lilly was represented by Charles E. Lipsey of Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, Reston, Va.
Matthew D. McGill of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Washington, D.C., represented amicus curiae Washington Legal Foundation. Leslie Morioka of White & Case, New York, represented amicus curiae Biotechnology Industry Organization. David W. Ogden of Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr, Washington, D.C., represented amicus curiae Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America. Elizabeth J. Holland of Kenyon & Kenyon, New York, represented amici curiae Teva Parenteral Medicines Inc. and Teva Pharmaceuticals USA Inc.
Read the Nov. 1 order denying en banc review in Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. v. Eli Lilly and Co. Add new comment
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