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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 9', '§ 11', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 11', '§ 9', '§ 15', '§ 15', '§ 12', '§ 7', '§ 15', '§ 15', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 10', '§ 10', '§ 11']

OKLAHOMA PRESS PUBLISHING CO. V. WALLING, 327 U. S. 186 - Volume 327 - 1946 - Full Text - US Supreme Court Center - USSC Cases - Nolo
US Supreme Court Center > Volume 327 > OKLAHOMA PRESS PUBLISHING CO. V. WALLING, 327 U. S. 186 (1946) > Full Text
(a) The Fifth Amendment affords no protection by virtue of the self-incrimination provision, whether for the corporation or for its officers. P. 327 U. S. 208.
No. 61. Upon application of the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor, a district court issued an order directing that he be given access to certain documents and records of a newspaper publishing corporation, pursuant to §§ 9 and 11(a) of the Fair Labor Standards Act. 7 Wage Hour Rep. 656. The circuit court of appeals affirmed. 147 F. 2d 658. This Court granted certiorari. 325 U.S. 845. Affirmed, p. 327 U. S. 218.
These cases bring for decision important questions concerning the Administrator's right to judicial enforcement of subpoenas duces tecum issued by him in the course of investigations conducted pursuant to § 11(a) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 52 Stat. 1060. His claim is founded directly upon § 9, which incorporates the enforcement provisions of §§ 9 and 10 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 717. [Footnote 1] The subpoenas sought the production of specified records to determine whether petitioners were violating the Fair Labor Standards Act, including records relating to coverage. Petitioners, newspaper publishing corporations, maintain that the Act is not applicable to them, for constitutional and other reasons, and insist that the question of coverage must be adjudicated before the subpoenas may be enforced.
In No. 61, involving the Oklahoma Press Publishing Company, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has rejected this view, holding that the Administrator was entitled to enforcement upon showing of "probable cause," which it found had been made. 147 F.2d 658. Accordingly it affirmed the District Court's order directing that the Administrator be given access to the records and documents specified. [Footnote 2]
In No. 63, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit likewise rejected the company's position, one judge dissenting on the ground that probable cause had not been shown. 148 F.2d 57. It accordingly reversed the District Court's order of dismissal in the proceeding to show cause, which in effect denied enforcement for want of a showing of coverage. Application of Walling, 49 F.Supp. 659. [Footnote 3] The
(148 F.2d 60), and relied upon Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U. S. 501, as being persuasive that this could not be done. Regarding the subpoena as containing no unreasonable demand, it conceived the return and affidavits filed by the company, together with the Administrator's allegations of coverage, [Footnote 4] as a showing sufficient to require enforcement. Hence, it directed that the District Court's discretion be exercised with that effect.
and decisions from other circuits, [Footnote 5] certiorari was granted in both cases. 325 U.S. 845.
The issues have taken wide range. They are substantially the same in the two causes, except in one respect to be noted. [Footnote 6] In addition to an argument from Congress' intent, reliance falls upon various constitutional provisions, including the First, Fourth and Fifth Amendments, as well as the limited reach of the commerce clause, to show that the Administrator's conduct and the relief he seeks are forbidden.
without merit. Associated Press v. Labor Board, 301 U. S. 103, and Associated Press v. United States, 326 U. S. 1; Mabee v. White Plains Pub. Co., 327 U. S. 178. [Footnote 7] If Congress can remove obstructions to commerce by requiring publishers to bargain collectively with employees and refrain from interfering with their rights of self-organization, matters closely related to eliminating low wages and long hours, Congress likewise may strike directly at those evils when they adversely affect commerce. United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 312 U. S. 116-117. The Amendment does not forbid this or other regulation which ends in no restraint upon expression or in any other evil outlawed by its terms and purposes. [Footnote 8]
Petitioners' narrower argument, of allegedly invalid classification, [Footnote 9] arises from the statutory exemptions and may be shortly dismissed. The intimation that the Act falls by reason of the exclusion of seamen, farm workers and others by § 13(a) is hardly more than a suggestion, and is dismissed accordingly. Cf. Buck v. Bell, 274 U. S. 200, 274 U. S. 208. The contention drawn from the exemption of employees of small newspapers by § 13(a)(8) deserves only slightly more attention. [Footnote 10] It seems to be two-fold,
that the amendment forbids Congress to "regulate the press by classifying it" at all and in any event that it cannot use volume of circulation or size as a factor in the classification. [Footnote 11]
Reliance upon Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, to support these claims is misplaced. There the state statute singled out newspapers for special taxation and was held in effect to graduate the tax in accordance with volume of circulation. Here there was no singling out of the press for treatment different from that accorded other business in general. Rather the Act's purpose was to place publishers of newspapers upon the same plane with other businesses and the exemption for small newspapers had the same object. 83 Cong.Rec. 7445. Nothing in the Grosjean case forbids Congress to exempt some publishers because of size from either a tax or a regulation which would be valid if applied to all.
Amendment and related issues concerning Congress' intent. It is claimed that enforcement would permit the Administrator to conduct general fishing expeditions into petitioners' books, records and papers, in order to secure evidence that they have violated the Act, without a prior charge or complaint and simply to secure information upon which to base one, all allegedly in violation of the Amendment's search and seizure provisions. Supporting this is an argument that Congress did not intend such use to be made of the delegated power, which rests in part upon asserted constitutional implications, but primarily upon the reports of legislative committees, particularly in the House of Representatives, made in passing upon appropriations for years subsequent to the Act's effective date. [Footnote 12]
The short answer to the Fourth Amendment objections is that the records in these cases present no question of actual search and seizure, but raise only the question whether orders of court for the production of specified records have been validly made; and no sufficient showing appears to justify setting them aside. [Footnote 13] No officer or other person has sought to enter petitioners' premises against their will, to search them, or to seize or examine their books, records or papers without their assent, otherwise than pursuant to orders of court authorized by law and made after adequate opportunity to present objections, which in fact were made. [Footnote 14] Nor has any objection been taken to the breadth of the subpoenas or to any other specific defect which would invalidate them. [Footnote 15]
Petitioners' plea that the Fourth Amendment places them so far above the law that they are beyond the reach of congressional and judicial power as those powers have been exerted here only raises the ghost of controversy long since settled adversely to their claim. [Footnote 16] They have advanced no claim founded on the Fifth Amendment's somewhat related guaranty against self-incrimination, whether or not for the sufficient reason, among others, that this privilege gives no protection to corporations or their officers against the production of corporate records pursuant to lawful judicial order, which is all these cases involve. [Footnote 17]
The cited authorities would be sufficient to dispose of the Fourth Amendment argument, and more recent decisions confirm their ruling. [Footnote 18] Petitioners, however, are insistent, in their contrary views, both upon the constitutional phases and in their asserted bearing upon the intention of Congress. While we think those views reflect a confusion not justified by the actual state of the decisions, the confusion has acquired some currency, as the
divided state of opinion among the circuits shows. [Footnote 19] Since the matter is of some importance, in order to remove any possible basis for like misunderstanding in the future, we give more detailed consideration to the views advanced and to the authorities than would otherwise be necessary.
There are two difficulties with petitioners' theory concerning the intent of Congress. One is that the argument from the so-called legislative history flies in the face of the powers expressly granted to the Administrator and the courts by §§ 9 and 11(a), so flatly that to accept petitioners' view would largely nullify them. [Footnote 20] Furthermore, the excerpted history from the later appropriation matters does not give the full story, and, when that is considered, the claimed interpretation is not made out, regardless of its retrospective aspect. [Footnote 21] Moreover, the
statute's language leaves no room to doubt that Congress intended to authorize just what the Administrator did and sought to have the courts do. [Footnote 22]
"enter and inspect such places and such records (and make such transcriptions thereof), question such employees, and investigate such facts, conditions, practices, or matters as he may deem appropriate to determine whether any person has violated any provision of this Act, or which may aid in the enforcement of the provisions of this Act. [Footnote 23]"
given in aid of this investigation and, in case of disobedience, the District Courts are called upon to enforce the subpoena through their contempt powers, [Footnote 24] without express condition requiring showing of coverage. [Footnote 25]
In view of these provisions, with which the Administrator's action was in exact compliance, this case presents an instance of "the most explicit language" [Footnote 26] which leaves no room for questioning Congress' intent. The very purpose of the subpoena and of the order, as of the authorized investigation, is to discover and procure evidence, not to prove a pending charge or complaint, but upon which to make one if, in the Administrator's judgment, the facts thus discovered should justify doing so.
Accordingly, if §§ 9 and 11(a) are not to be construed as authorizing enforcement of the orders, it must be, as petitioners say, because this construction would make them so dubious constitutionally as to compel resort to an interpretation which saves, rather than to one which destroys or is likely to do so. The Court has adopted this course at least once in this type of case. [Footnote 27] But, if the same course is followed here, the judgments must be reversed with the effect of cutting squarely into the power of Congress. For to deny the validity of the orders would be in effect to deny not only Congress' power to enact the provisions sustaining them, but also its authority to delegate effective power to investigate violations of its own laws, if not perhaps also its own power to make such investigations.
The primary source of misconception concerning the Fourth Amendment's function lies perhaps in the identification of cases involving so-called "figurative" or "constructive" search with cases of actual search and seizure. [Footnote 28] Only in this analogical sense can any question related to search and seizure be thought to arise in situations which, like the present ones, involve only the validity of authorized judicial orders.
instances of resistance to excess of governmental authority. [Footnote 29]
The matter of requiring the production of books and records to secure evidence is not as one-sided, in this kind of situation, as the most extreme expressions of either emphasis would indicate. With some obvious exceptions, there has always been a real problem of balancing the public interest against private security. The cases for protection of the opposing interests are stated as clearly as anywhere, perhaps, in the summations, quoted in the margin, [Footnote 30] of two former members of this Court, each of
The confusion, obscuring the basic distinction between actual and so-called "constructive" search has been accentuated where the records and papers sought are of corporate character, as in these cases. Historically, private corporations have been subject to broad visitorial power, both in England and in this country. And it long has been established that Congress may exercise wide investigative power over them, analogous to the visitorial power of the incorporating state, [Footnote 31] when their activities take place within or affect interstate commerce. [Footnote 32] Correspondingly,
it has been settled that corporations are not entitled to all of the constitutional protections which private individuals have in these and related matters. As has been noted, they are not at all within the privilege against self-incrimination, although this Court more than once has said that the privilege runs very closely with the Fourth Amendment's search and seizure provisions. [Footnote 33] It is also settled that an officer of the company cannot refuse to produce its records in his possession upon the plea that they either will incriminate him or may incriminate it. [Footnote 34] And, although the Fourth Amendment has been
held applicable to corporations [Footnote 35] notwithstanding their exclusion from the privilege against self-incrimination, the same leading case of Wilson v. United States, 221 U. S. 361, distinguishing the earlier quite different one of Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, [Footnote 36] held the process not invalid under the Fourth Amendment, although it broadly required the production of copies of letters and telegrams
221 U.S. at 221 U. S. 368, 221 U. S. 375.
The Wilson case has set the pattern of later decisions and has been followed without qualification of its ruling. [Footnote 37] Contrary suggestions or implications may be explained as dicta; [Footnote 38] or by virtue of the presence of an actual illegal search and seizure, the effects of which the Government sought later to overcome by applying the more liberal doctrine
devolved in relation to "constructive search"; [Footnote 39] or by the scope of the subpoena in calling for documents so broadly or indefinitely that it was thought to approach in this respect the character of a general warrant or writ of assistance, odious in both English and American history. [Footnote 40] But no case has been cited or found in which,
upon similar facts, the Wilson doctrine has not been followed. Nor in any has Congress been adjudged to have exceeded its authority, with the single exception of Boyd v. United States, supra, which differed from both the Wilson case and the present ones in providing a drastically incriminating method of enforcement [Footnote 41] which was applied to the production of partners' business records. Whatever limits there may be to congressional power to provide for the production of corporate or other business records, therefore, they are not to be found, in view of the course of prior decisions, in any such absolute or universal immunity as petitioners seek.
as in the case of a warrant, that a specific charge or complaint of violation of law be pending or that the order be made pursuant to one. It is enough that the investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose, within the power of Congress to command. This has been ruled most often perhaps in relation to grand jury investigations, [Footnote 42] but also frequently in respect to general or statistical investigations authorized by Congress. [Footnote 43] The requirement of "probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation" literally applicable in the case of a warrant is satisfied, in that of an order for production, by the court's determination that the investigation is authorized by Congress, is for a purpose Congress can order, and the documents sought are relevant to the inquiry. [Footnote 44] Beyond this, the requirement of reasonableness, including particularity in "describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized," also literally applicable to warrants, comes down to specification of the documents to be produced adequate, but not excessive, for the purposes of the relevant inquiry. Necessarily, as has been said, this cannot be reduced to formula, for relevancy and adequacy or excess in the breadth of the subpoena are matters variable in relation to the nature, purposes and scope of the inquiry. [Footnote 45]
were corporations. The only records or documents sought were corporate ones. No possible element of self-incrimination was therefore presented, or in fact claimed. All the records sought were relevant to the authorized inquiry, [Footnote 46] the purpose of which was to determine two issues, whether petitioners were subject to the Act and, if so, whether they were violating it. These were subjects of investigation authorized by § 11(a), the latter expressly, the former by necessary implication. [Footnote 47] It is not to be doubted that Congress could authorize investigation of these matters. In all these respects, [Footnote 48] the specifications
More recent confirmation of those rulings may be found in Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, supra, and Myers v. Bethlehem Corp., 303 U. S. 41. It is true that these cases involved different statutes substantially and procedurally. But, notwithstanding the possible influence of the doctrine of governmental immunity to suit in the Endicott Johnson case, it would be anomalous to hold that, under the Walsh-Healy Act, 49 Stat. 2036, the District Court was not authorized to decide the question of coverage or, on the basis of its adverse decision, to deny enforcement to the Secretary's subpoena seeking relevant evidence on that question, because Congress had committed its initial determination to him; and at the same time to rule that Congress could not confer the same power upon the Administrator with reference to violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act. [Footnote 49] The question at issue is not in either case the nature of the legal obligation violation of which the evidence is sought to show. It is rather whether evidence relevant to the violation, whatever the obligation's character, can be drawn forth by the exercise of the subpoena power.
the futility, expensiveness and vexatious character of the hearing to itself. [Footnote 50] This Court held that the District Court was without jurisdiction to enjoin the hearing. Regarding as appropriate the procedure before the Board and as adequate the provisions for judicial review of its action, including its determination of coverage, the Court sustained the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board, and of the Court of Appeals upon review, to determine that question, with others committed to their judgment, in the statutory proceeding for determining whether violations of the Act exist. The opinion referred to the Board's subpoena power, also to its authority to apply to a District Court for enforcement, and stated that, "to such an application, appropriate defense may be made." But the decision's necessary effect was to rule that it was not "an appropriate defense" that coverage had not been determined prior to the hearing or, it would seem necessarily to follow, prior to the Board's preliminary investigation of violation. If this is true in the case of the Board, it would seem to be equally true in that of the Administrator. [Footnote 51]
The showing in No. 61 was clearly sufficient to constitute "probable cause" in this sense under conceptions of coverage prevailing at the time of the hearing, [Footnote 52] whether
In No. 63, the showing was less extensive, and it is doubtful that it would constitute "probable cause" of coverage as that term was used in the decisions from the Tenth and Eighth Circuits. [Footnote 53] The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit did not so label it, but held the showing sufficient.
Congress has made no requirements in terms of any showing of "probable cause", [Footnote 54] and, in view of what has already been said, any possible constitutional requirement
The result therefore sustains the Administrator's position that his investigative function, in searching out violations with a view to securing enforcement of the Act, is essentially the same as the grand jury's, or the court's in issuing other pretrial orders for the discovery of evidence, [Footnote 55] and is governed by the same limitations. These are that he shall not act arbitrarily or in excess of his statutory authority, but this does not mean that his inquiry must be "limited . . . by . . . forecasts of the probable result of the investigation. . . ." Blair v. United States, 250 U. S. 273, 250 U. S. 282; cf. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43. Nor is the judicial function either abused or abased, as has been suggested, [Footnote 56] by leaving to it the determination of the
important questions which the Administrator's position concedes the courts may decide. [Footnote 57]
Petitioner stress that enforcement will subject them to inconvenience, expense and harassment. That argument is answered fully by what was said in Myers v. Bethlehem Corp. [Footnote 58] There is no harassment when the subpoena is issued and enforced according to law. The Administrator is authorized to enter and inspect, but the Act makes his right to do so subject in all cases to judicial supervision. Persons from whom he seeks relevant information are not required to submit to his demand, if in any respect it is unreasonable or overreaches the authority Congress has given. To it they may make "appropriate defense" surrounded by every safeguard of judicial restraint. In view of these safeguards, the expressed fears of unwarranted intrusions upon personal liberty are effective only to recall Mr. Justice Cardozo's reply to the same exaggerated forebodings in Jones v. Securities & Exchange Commission: "Historians may find hyperbole in the sanguinary simile." [Footnote 59]
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43; Wilson v. United States, 221 U. S. 361; Essgee Co. v. United States, 262 U. S. 151; United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U. S. 707, 321 U. S. 726; cf. United States v. White, 322 U. S. 694.
Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U. S. 501; Myers v. Bethlehem Corp., 303 U. S. 41, discussed infra, 327 U. S. at notes 49-51
The sparse legislative history bearing on the question contains nothing to the contrary. The bills originally introduced did not incorporate §§ 9 and 10 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, but contained substantially similar provisions. S. 2475, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., § 15, 81 Cong.Rec. 4961; H.R.7200, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., § 15, 81 Cong.Rec. 4998. The House Committee on Labor reported of this section (then § 12) that it "contains the usual administrative provisions authorizing the Board to conduct investigations, subpoena witnesses, and compel testimony." H.Rep.No.1452, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 18, also page 10. The Senate Committee used the same language. Sen.Rep.No.884, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 8. The House bill having been recommitted to the Committee, 82 Cong.Rec. 1834, 1835, it drafted the subpoena section (then § 7) into essentially its present form. See H.R.Rep.No.2182, 75th Cong., 2d Sess., 3. 11. The only substantially difference was that the subpoena power was given for the purpose of any "hearing," but not for the purpose of any "investigation." However, § 15(b) of the bills introduced in both houses, supra, granted the subpoena power "for the purpose of any investigation or any other proceeding under this Act. . . ." And compare § 15(a). The difference was remedied by the Senate and House conferees; for out of conference came § 9 as it is now written. 83 Cong.Rec. 9160; 83 Cong.Rec. 9248, 9254. See also Cudahy Packing Co. v. Holland, 315 U. S. 357, 315 U. S. 362, note 3.
See Federal Trade Commission v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U. S. 298, 264 U. S. 305-306, in which Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the Court, said:
"Anyone who respects the spirit as well as the letter of the Fourth Amendment would be loath to believe that Congress intended to authorize one of its subordinate agencies to sweep all our traditions into the fire (Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154 U. S. 447, 154 U. S. 479), and to direct fishing expeditions into private papers on the possibility that they may disclose evidence of crime. We do not discuss the question whether it could do so if it tried, as nothing short of the most explicit language would induce as to attribute to congress that intent."
See also note 40 Cf. Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616; Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S; Harriman v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 211 U. S. 407.
"In other words, the subpoena is equivalent to a search and seizure and to be constitutional it must be a reasonable exercise of the power." Lasson, Development of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 137, citing Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154 U. S. 447; Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 201 U. S. 76. Cf. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. at 116 U. S. 634-635 U.S. (as to which see also notes 33 and | 33 and S. 186fn36|>36):
See, in addition to the better known accounts of writs of assistance cited in Goldman v. United States, dissenting opinion, 316 U.S. at 316 U. S. 139, note 5, Lasson, Development of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution (1937).
Mr. Justice Cardozo, with whom joined the present CHIEF JUSTICE and Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Jones v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 298 U. S. 1, 298 U. S. 32-33. See also Handler, Constitutionality of Investigations of the Federal Trade Commission (1928) 28 Col.L.Rev. 708, 905, particularly at 933 ff.
On the other hand, the case for protected privacy was put by Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting, in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 277 U. S. 478-479:
Wilson v. United States, 221 U. S. 361, 221 U. S. 382; Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 201 U. S. 74-75; The Fourth and Fifth Amendments and the Visitorial Power of Congress over State Corporations, Note (1930) 30 Col.L.Rev. 103.
Ibid.; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154 U. S. 447; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U. S. 25; Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 221 U. S. 612; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U. S. 194; United States v. Louisville & N. R.R., 236 U. S. 318; Smith v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 245 U. S. 33; United States v. New York Central R.R., 272 U. S. 457; cf., however, Harrison v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 211 U. S. 407; Federal Trade Commission v. Claire Furnace Co., 274 U. S. 160. And see Handler, Constitutionality of Investigations by the Federal Trade Commission (1928) 28 Col.L.Rev. 708, 903.
The power is not limited to inquiring concerning matters which Congress may regulate otherwise than by requiring the production of information, at any rate when it is made to appear that some phase of the activity is in commerce or affects it. See United States v. New York Central R.R., 272 U. S. 457, 272 U. S. 464, and authorities cited; Federal Trade Commission v. Claire Furnace Co., 274 U. S. 160. Nor must the "jurisdictional" line be drawn in such cases before the information is called for. Cf. Myers v. Bethlehem Corp., 303 U. S. 41; Handler, op. cit. supra, at 918 ff., and authorities cited.
In the leading case of Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 116 U. S. 630, Mr. Justice Bradley, speaking for the Court in relation to the compelled production of "a man's own testimony, or of his private papers [specifically, a business invoice] to be used as evidence to convict him of crime, or to forfeit his goods," said in a much quoted statement: "In this regard, the fourth and fifth amendments run almost into each other." The opinion, quoting at length from Lord Camden's discussion in the historic case of Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials, 1029, relies strongly in this phase upon his conjunction of the right to freedom from search and seizure "where the law forceth evidence out of the owner's custody by process" and the privilege against self-incrimination. 116 U.S. at 116 U. S. 629. Cf. also the statement of Mr. Justice Brandeis quoted supra, note 30
Wilson v. United States, 221 U. S. 361; Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U. S. 25.
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385; Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154 U. S. 447, 448 ff. See also Consolidated Rendering Co. v. Vermont, 207 U. S. 541.
See notes 31 32 40 Thus far, Congress has not seen fit to leave to administrative officials authority to enforce subpoenas. The pattern adopted in §§ 9 and 10 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, of referring enforcement to the courts, has become accepted, whether by virtue of reflections of the opinion in Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154 U. S. 447, or for other reasons. The extent to which the pattern has been adopted is summarized, partially at least, in Handler, op. cit. supra, at 925 ff.
See, for example, Essgee Co. v. United States, 262 U. S. 151.
E.g., in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385, government officers, after arresting corporate officials at their homes, "without a shadow of authority went to the office of their company and made a clean sweep of all the books, papers and documents found there," taking them to the district attorney's office, where they were photographed. After an order of court to return the originals, but impounding the copies, subpoenas to produce the originals were enforced by an order, the refusal to obey which was held a contempt. The Court's strong language in reversing this decision undoubtedly was called forth by the Government's effort, not to say subterfuge, thus to avoid the effects of its initial wrong. Cf. Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383; Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298.
Thus, the aggravating circumstance in Federal Trade Commission v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U. S. 298, cf. note 27 seems to have been the Commission's claim of "an unlimited right of access to the respondents' papers with reference to the possible existence of practices in violation of section 5." 264 U.S. at 264 U. S. 305. The Court said:
P. 264 U. S. 306. (Emphasis added.) Cf. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, supra, note 39
However in Wheeler v. United States, 226 U. S. 478, where no element of actual search and seizure was present, a subpoena was enforced which called for copies of all letters and telegrams, all cash books, ledgers, journals and other account books of the corporation covering a period of fifteen months; cf. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154 U. S. 447. And in Brown v. United States, 276 U. S. 134, the subpoena called for all letters, telegrams or copies thereof passing between a national trade association and its members, including their officers and agents, over a period of two and one-half years, with reference to eighteen different items. The Court, by Mr. Justice Sutherland, said:
"The subpoena . . . specifies a reasonable period of time, and with reasonable particularity the subjects to which the documents called for relate. The question is ruled not by Hale v. Henkel, but by Consolidated Rendering Co. v. Vermont, 207 U. S. 541, 207 U. S. 553-554, and Wheeler v. United States,"
With reference to the breadth of the subpoena or order for production in the scope of what is called for, in addition to the authorities cited in this note and note 45 see Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U. S. 322; United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U. S. 707; Handler, op. cit. supra, at 913 ff.
E.g., Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43; Wilson v. United States, 221 U. S. 361, 221 U. S. 372.
Smith v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 245 U. S. 33; Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 221 U. S. 612; cf. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U. S. 194; Harriman v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 211 U. S. 407, 211 U. S. 419. And see Handler, op. cit. supra, 918 ff.
303 U.S. at 303 U. S. 50.
It is true that, in the Myers situation, the Board's determination is quasi-judicial, is given finality as to the facts if there is evidence to sustain its findings, National Labor Relations Act, § 10(e), (49 Stat. 454), and is expressly made exclusive, ibid., § 10(a), whereas, in the situations now presented, the Administrator's investigation is only preliminary to instituting proceedings in court, and thus has none of the finality or quasi-judicial character given to the Board's determination. But, as the Court noted, the Board also had preliminary investigative authority, incidental to preparation for the hearing, to which its subpoena power applies, National Labor Relations Act, § 11 (49 Stat. 455, 456); and, as we have said, if the courts are forbidden to determine coverage prior to the Board's quasi-judicial proceeding for deciding that question, it would seem necessarily to follow that they are forbidden also to decide it prior to the Board's preliminary investigation to determine whether the proceeding shall be instituted.
The bill of discovery in equity would seem to furnish an instance. Cf. Sinclair Refining Co. v. Jenkins Petroleum Co., 289 U. S. 689, 289 U. S. 696-697. See also the provisions for pretrial examination and the taking of depositions. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 26(b), 30(d), 45; Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Burger, 27 F.Supp. 556; Bloomer v. Sirian Lamp Co., 4 F.R.D. 167; Lewis v. United Air Lines Transport Corp., 27 F.Supp. 946, 947. The power of Congress itself to call for information presents a related illustration. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135, 273 U. S. 156-158.
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