Source: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/267/505
Timestamp: 2015-01-31 13:39:17
Document Index: 475798087

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1215', '§ 10138', '§ 10496', '§ 10138', '§ 1304', '§ 5368', '§ 5760', '§ 10184']

267 U.S. 505 (45 S.Ct. 417, 69 L.Ed. 761)
[HTML] Mr. Meyer Kraushaar, of New York City, for plaintiff in error.
This is a direct writ of error under section 238 of the Judicial Code (Comp. St. § 1215) to a conviction in the District Court of John F. Steele on an information in the District Court for unlawfully, willfully, and knowingly possessing a quantity of intoxicating liquor in violation of the National Prohibition Act (Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1923, § 10138 1/4 et seq.). The prosecution grew out of the seizure of whisky and gin upon a search warrant at 611 West Forty-Sixth street, New York City, the validity of which we have had occasion to examine in the case just preceding. The question here is as to the competency of the evidence of seizure under the search warrant which we there found sufficient. In addition to the grounds urged in the last case, the validity of seizure is attacked because the search warrant was issued to a general prohibition agent, when under section 6 of title 11 of the Espionage Act of June 15, 1917 (
40 Stat. 217, 228, c. 30 Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp 1919, § 10496 1/4 f), such a warrant must be issued 'to a civil officer of the United States duly authorized to enforce or assist in enforcing any law thereof.'
But, even if this were not so, we do not think the objection well taken. We think that the expression 'civil officer of the United States duly authorized to enforce or assist in enforcing any law thereof,' as used in the Espionage Act, does not mean an officer in the constitutional sense, that Congress in incorporating the provision in section 26, title 2, of the National Prohibition Act (Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1923, § 10138 1/2 mm) did not so construe it, and had no intention thus to limit persons authorized to receive and serve search warrants. It is quite true that the words 'officer of the United States,' when employed in the statutes of the United States, is to be taken usually to have the limited constitutional meaning. Burnap v. United States, 252 U. S. 512, 40 S. Ct. 374, 64 L. Ed. 692; United States v. Mouat, 124 U. S. 303, 8 S. Ct. 505, 31 L. Ed. 463; United States v. Smith, 124 U. S. 525, 8 S. Ct. 595, 31 L. Ed. 534. But we find that this court, in consideration of the context, has sometimes given it an enlarged meaning, and has found it to include others than those appointed by the President, heads of departments, and courts. United States v Hendee, 124 U. S. 309, 8 S. Ct. 507, 31 L. Ed. 465. The emphasis of the words of description in the Espionage Act is really on the limitations that the person designated shall be a civil and not a military agent of the government, and shall be one 'duly authorized to enforce or assist in enforcing any law of the United States.' It is not to be supposed that Congress wished to exclude from those empowered to receive and execute search warrants persons usually called officers who are in their duties most widely employed to enforce or assist in enforcing laws. Thus deputy marshals of the United States are appointed by the United States marshal under whom they serve (section 780, Revised Statutes Comp. St. § 1304), and he and his deputies have in each state the same power in executing the laws of the United States as the sheriffs and their deputies in such state in executing the laws thereof. The deputy marshal is not in the constitutional sense an officer of the United States, and yet marshals, and deputy marshals are the persons chiefly charged with the enforcement of the peace of the United States, as that is embraced in the enforcement of federal law. In re Neagle, 135 U. S. 1, 68, 69, 10 S. Ct. 658, 34 L. Ed. 55. A deputy marshal is engaged in serving all sorts of writs, and is called upon to exercise great responsibility and discretion in the service of some of them, in dealing with the person and property of individuals and in the preservation of their constitutional rights. The same thing may be said of deputy collectors of customs. Under section 2630 (Comp. St. § 5368), a collector of customs, with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, may employ within his district such number of proper persons, as deputy collectors of customs as he shall deem necessary, and such deputies are declared to be officers of the customs, and the collector may exercise his powers and perform his duties by deputy. And one of the chief functions of the collector of customs and of the deputy collectors is the seizure of goods which have not paid a tax, as seen by chapter 10 of title 34 of the Revised Statutes (sections 3058-3094 Comp. St. §§ 5760-5794). Deputy collectors of internal revenue are to be appointed by the collector of internal revenue. Section 3148, R. S. He may appoint as many as he thinks proper. Each deputy is to have the like authority which by law is vested in the collector himself, and distraint and seizure in the assessment and collection of taxes are authorized by chapter 2, title 35.
Again, in section 6 of the act supplemental to the National Prohibition Act (
42 Stat. 223 Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1923, § 10184a), it is provided that any officer, agent or employee of the United States engaged in the enforcement of this act or the National Prohibition Act, or any other law of the United States, who shall search any private dwelling as defined in the National Prohibition Act, without a warrant directing such search, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.