Source: http://www.rishabhdara.com/sc/view.php?case=8672
Timestamp: 2020-08-10 02:37:35
Document Index: 661766606

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art. 19', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 19', 'Art.\t19', 'Art.\n19', 'Art. 14', 'Art. 19', 'Art.\n19', 'Art.\n48', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 14', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 19', 'Art.\t14', 'Art. 14']

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF THECITY OF AHMEDABAD & ORS versus JAN MOHAMMED USMANBHAI & ANR
1986 AIR 1205	1986 SCR (2) 700 1986 SCC (3)	20	1986 SCALE (1)1180
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF THECITY OF AHMEDABAD & ORS V. JAN MOHAMMED USMANBHAI & ANR [1986] RD-SC 85 (17 April 1986)
CITATION: 1986 AIR 1205	1986 SCR (2) 700 1986 SCC (3)	20	1986 SCALE (1)1180
Bombay Provincial	Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 - S.
466(1)(D)(b) -	Standing Orders	issued directing closure of slaughter house	on seven specified days in a year - Whether violates fundamental right to carry on trade.
Section 466 (l)(D)(b) of the	Bombay	Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 confers on the Municipal Commissioner power to make standing orders, rules and bye- laws. One of such powers extends to fixation	of days and hours during which any market, slaughter house or stock-yard may be	kept open for use. The appellant-Corporation framed such bye-laws on 18th	July 1957 and	the same had	been sanctioned by the Government. A standing order was made by the Municipal Commissioner in the year 1956 fixing four days as holidays in a year on which the municipal slaughter house shall remain closed. By an amendment	to the said standing order effected	on 17th	September, 1965 three more holidays were added.
The respondent, a beef dealer, filed a writ petition challenging the	validity of the said	two standing orders directing the closure of slaughter houses on seven days as being violative of Arts. 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution alleging that the closure of the slaughter house adversely effected his trade; that the power to keep the municipal slaughter house	closed on any particular day in an area is vested in the Municipal Commissioner and such a power could only be	exercised by a standing order properly issued and promulgated by him; that under the earlier standing order of 1956 slaughter houses could be kept open for use on all days except on the four days viz. Janmashtami, Jain Samvatsari, 2nd Oct. (Mahatama Gandhi's Birthday)	and 12th February (Sharddha day of Mahatama Gandhi); that the resolution passed by the 701 Corporation on 18th January, 1965, adding three more days as the closure days of the slaughter houses viz. 30th January (Mahatama Gandhi's Nirwan Day), Mahabir Jayanti and	Ram Navami, was therefore, null and void; that the said standing orders put an unreasonable restriction on the petitioner's right to carry on his trade or business as a beef dealer and that restriction was not in the interest of	the general public but was based on extraneous considerations; that the standing orders single out the petitioner and other butchers like him, who slaughter only cattle and not sheep or goat, for hostile discrimination inasmuch as the standing orders effect only the butchers who slaughter cattle and not those who deal in meat of goat and sheep.
Allowing the petition, the High Court held that	the impugned standing orders were ultra vires being violative of Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.
The appellant-Corporation	appealed to	this Court, contending that	the restriction imposed by the two standing orders was a reasonable one and in the interests of	the general public.
HELD : 1. The closure of slaughter house on seven days specified in the two standing orders did not in any way put an unreasonable restriction	on the fundamental right guaranteed to the respondent under Art. 19(1)(g) of	the Constitution. [717 C] Hanif Quareshi & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors., [1959] S.C.R. 629, Minerva Mills Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 206, 257, Abdul Hakim Quraishi & Ors.
v. State of bihar & Ors., [1961] 2 S.C.R. 610 and Mohd.
Faruk v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors., [1970] 1 S.C.R.
156, referred to.
2. The Court must	in considering	the validity of the impugned law imposing prohibition on	the carrying on a business or a profession attempt an evaluation of its direct and immediate impact upon the fundamental rights of	the citizens affected thereby and	the larger public interest sought to be ensured in the light of the object sought to be 702 achieved, the necessity to restrict the citizens, freedom, the inherent pernicious nature of the act prohibited or its capacity or tendency to be harmful to the general public, the possibility	of achieving the object by imposing a less drastic	restraints, and in the absence of	exceptional situations such	as the	prevalence of a State of emergency, national or local or the necessity to maintain necessary supplies or the necessities to stop activities, inherently dangerous, the	existence of a	machinery to	satisfy	the administrative	authority that a case for imposing restriction is	made out or a	less drastic restriction may ensure the object intended to be achieved. [713 G-H; 714 A- C]
3. Clause	(6) of	Art. 19 protects a law which imposes in the	interest of general public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by sub-c1. (g) of c1.
(1) of Art. 19. It is left to the Court in case of a dispute to determine the reasonableness of the restriction imposed by the law. But the Court cannot proceed on a general notion of what is reasonable in the abstract or	even on a consideration of what is reasonable from the point of view of the	person or persons on	whom the restrictions	are imposed. The right conferred by sub-c1. (g) is expressed in general	language and	if there had	been no qualifying provision like	c1. (6)	the right so conferred would have been an	absolute one.	What the Court	has to do is to consider whether the restrictions imposed are reasonable in the interest of general public. [714 G-H; 715 A-B] State of Madras v. V.G. Row, [1952] S.C.R. 597, relied upon.
4. The expression "in the interest of general public" is of wide import comprehending public order, public health, public security, morals, economic welfare of the community and the objects mentioned in Part IV of the Constitution. No body can dispute a law providing for basic amenities; for the dignity of human labour as a social welfare measure in the interest of general public. [716 B-C]
5.1 The tests of	reasonableness have to be viewed in the context of the issues which faced the legislature. In the construction of such laws and in judging their validity, Courts must approach the problem from the point of view of 703 furthering the	social interest	which it is the purpose of the legislation	to promote. They are	not in these matters functioning in vacuo but as part of society which is trying, by the	enacted law to solve its problem and furthering the moral and material progress of the community as a whole.
[716 G-H; 717 A] Joti Prasad v. Union Territory of Delhi, [1961] S.C.R.
1601, relied upon.
5.2 Normally, the legislature is the best judge of what is good	for the community by whose sufferage it comes into existence. This	should be the proper approach of the Court.
But the ultimate responsibility for determining the validity of the	law must rest with the Court and the Court must not shirk that solemn duty	cast upon it by the Constitution.
[717 E-F]
5.3 In the instant case, it was, therefore, open to the Municipal Commissioner	to fix	days and hours at and during which any slaughter house should be kept open for use. If the Municipal Commissioner declares certain days as holidays for the	slaughter house in order to give facilities to the municipal staff working in the municipal slaughter house, no body could have any objection to such a standing order. The grievance of	the respondent	is that the Municipal Commissioner by standing orders had declared days concerning Mahatma Gandhi,	Lord Mahavir,	Sri Ram	and Lord Krishna as holidays. Mahatama Gandhi and Lord Mahavir were apostles of non-violence who lived and died for that cause. Mahatama Gandhi was venerated by the people of India as the Father of the Nation. Lord Mahabir preached and practised Ahimsa. Rama is considered by the people to be the embodiment of	all virtues. Krishna is known to	be the expounder of	the philosophy of the Geeta. Their birthdays are generally observed by the people not merely as days of festivity but also as days of abstinence from meat. One cannot, therefore, complain that these days are ill chosen as holidays. [715 E- H; 716 A-B]
6. When the validity of a law placing restriction on the exercise of a fundamental right in Art.	19(1)(g) is challenged, the	onus of proving to the satisfaction of the Court that the restriction is	reasonable lies upon	the State. If the law requires that an act which is inherently dangerous, noxious or injurious to the public interest, health or safety 704 or is likely to prove a nuisance to the community shall be done under a permit or a licence of an executive authority, it is not per se unreasonable	and no	person may claim a licence or a permit to do that act as of right. Where the law providing for grant of a	licence or permit confers a discretion upon	an administrative authority regulated by rules or principles, express or implied, and exerciseable in consonance with	the rules of natural	justice, it will be presumed to impose a reasonable restriction. Where, however, power is entrusted to	an administrative agency to grant or withhold a permit or licence in its uncontrolled discretion the law	ex facie infringes the fundamental right under Art.
19(1)(g). Imposition of restriction on the exercise of a fundamental right may be in the form of	control or prohibition. But when the exercise of a fundamental right is prohibited, the	burden of proving that a total ban on the exercise of the right alone may ensure the maintenance of the interest of general public lies heavily upon the State.
[713 C-G]
7. While Art. 14 forbids class legislation it does not forbid	reasonable classification for the	purposes of legislation. There is always a presumption in favour of constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is	upon him, who attacks it, to show	that there has been a clear violation of the constitutional principles. The Courts must presume	that the legislature understands and correctly appreciates the	needs of its own people, that its laws are directed against problems made	manifest by experience and that its discriminations are based on adequate grounds. The legislature is	free to	recognise degrees of harm and may confine its restrictions to those cases where the need is deemed to be the clearest, and finally, that	in order to sustain the presumption of constitutionality the Court may take into consideration matters of common knowledge, matters of common rapport, the	history of the times and may assume every state of facts which can be conceived to be existing at the time of legislation. [717 D-H; 718 A-B]
8. The butchers who slaughter cattle formed the well defined class based on their occupation. That classification is based on intelligible differentia and distinguishes them from those who kill goats and sheep and this differentiation has close connection with the object sought to be achieved by 705 the impugned Act, namely the preservation, protection and the improvement of livestock. The attainment of these objectives may	well necessitate that the slaughterers of cattle	should	be dealt with differently	than	the slaughterers of goats	and sheep. The standing orders, therefore, adopt a classification based on sound	and intelligible basis and can quite clearly stand the test.
[718 E-G]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1685 of 1970.
From the Judgment and Order dated 3rd March, 1970 of the Gujarat High Court in S.C.A. No. 102 of 1965.
S.T. Desai, T.U. Mehta, H.S. Parihar, Mrs. A.K. Verma, Joel Peres, D.N. Mishra and Vipin Chandra for	the Appellants.
G.A. Shah,	Girish Chandra, C.V. Subba Rao and	R.N.
T.U. Mehta and H.J. Zaveri for the Interveners.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by R.B. MISRA, J. Slaughter of cows and calves has been a sensitive issue	and it	has generated	violent	sentimental differences time and again between different sections of the people of this country. Part IV of the Constitution of India enshrines what	are called the Directive Principles of State Policy. These Directive Principles are not enforceable in a court of law	but are nevertheless	fundamental in	the governance of the country and are to be applied by States in making laws. Article 48 contained in Part IV provides :
"48.	The State shall endeavour	to organise agriculture and animal husbandry in	modern	and scientific lines and shall,	in particular,	take steps for preserving and improving the breeds, and prohibiting the slaughter, of cows and calves and other milch and draught cattle." It	appears that	pursuant to	Article	48 of	the Constitution several	States enacted laws for	the preservation 706 and prohibition	of the	slaughter of cows and	calves	and other milch and draught cattle. The State of Bihar enacted the 'Bihar Preservation and Improvement of Animals	Act, 1955' the U.P. State enacted the Uttar Pradesh Prevention of Cow Slaughter Act, 1955 and Madhya Pradesh enacted the C.P.
and Berar Animal Preservation Act, 1949,	hereinafter referred to as the Bihar, U.P. and	C.P. &	Berar	Acts respectively, for short. These	Acts put a total ban on the slaughter of all categories of animals or species of bovine cattle.	The constitutional validity	of these Acts	was challenged in Mohd. Hanif Quareshi & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors.,	[1959] S.C.R. 629, by those whose trade or business was affected, as being	violative of Arts. 14, 19(1)(g) and 25 of the Constitution. This Court held :
"The result is that we uphold and declare that the Bihar Act in so far as it prohibits the slaughter of cows of all ages and calves of cows and calves of buffaloes, male and female, is constitutionally valid and we hold that, in	so far as it totally prohibits the slaughter of she-buffaloes, breeding bulls and working bullocks (cattle and buffalo), without prescribing any test or requirement as to their age or usefulness, it infringes the rights of the petitioners under Art. 19(1)(g) and is to that extent void.
As regards the U.P. Act we uphold and declare, for reasons already	stated, that it	is constitutionally valid in so	far as it prohibits the slaughter	of cows of all ages and calves of cows, male and female, but we hold that in so far as it	purports to totally prohibit the slaughter of breeding bulls and working bullocks without prescribing any test or requirement as to their age or usefulness,	it offends against	Art.
19(1)(g) and is to that extent void.
As regards the Madhya Pradesh Act	we likewise declare that	it is constitutionally valid in so far as it prohibits the slaughter of cows of all ages and calves of cows, male and female, but that it is void in so far as it totally prohibits the 707 slaughter of	breeding bulls	and working bullocks without prescribing any test or requirement as to their age of usefulness.
We also hold that the Act is valid in so far as it regulates the	slaughter of other animals under certificates granted by the authorities mentioned therein." The Court	observed that these Acts were made by the States in discharge of	the obligation laid on them by Art.
48 of the Constitution.
Article 19(1)(g) confers a fundamental right upon a citizen to practise any profession, or to carry on	any occupation, trade or business.	Article 14 enjoins that the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the	equal protection of the laws within the territory of India. Article	13(2) provides that the State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any law made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void.
Dealing with Fundamental Rights as given	in Part III and the	Directive Principles as detailed in Part IV of the Constitution, the Constitution Bench in Minerva Mills Ltd. & Ors. v.	Union of India & Ors., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 206, 257, observed as follows :
"The significance of the perception that Parts III and IV together constitute the core of commitment to social revolution and they, together, are the conscience of	the Constitution is to be traced to a deep understanding of the scheme of the Indian Constitution.	Granville Austin's	observation brings out the true position that Parts III and IV are like two wheels	of a chariot, one no	less important than the other. You snap	one and	the other will lose its efficacy. They are like a twin formula for achieving the social revolution, which is the ideal which the visionary founders of the Constitution set before themselves. In other words, the Indian Constitution is founded on the bed-rock of the 708 balance between Parts III and IV. To give absolute primacy to one over	the other is to disturb the harmony of the Constitution. This	harmony and balance between fundamental rights and directive principles is	an essential feature of the basic structure of the Constitution.
This is not mere semantics. The edifice of	our Constitution	is built upon the concepts crystallised	in the Preamble. We	resolved to constitute ourselves	into a Socialist State which carried with	it the	obligation to secure to our people justice-social, economic and political. We, therefore, put Part	IV into our	Constitution containing directive principles of State policy which specify the socialistic goal to be achieved.
We promised to our people a democratic polity which carries	with it the obligation of securing to the people liberty of thought,	expression, belief, faith	and worship; equality of status and of opportunity and the assurance that the dignity of the individual will at all costs be preserved.
We, therefore, put Part III in our Constitution conferring those rights on	the people. Those rights are not an end in themselves but are the means to an end. The end is specified in Part IV.
Therefore, the rights conferred by Part III are subject to	reasonable restrictions and	the Constitution provides that enforcement of some of them may, in stated	uncommon circumstances, be suspended. But just as the rights conferred by Part III would be without a radar and a compass if they were not geared	to an	ideal, in the	same manner the attainment of the ideals	set out in Part IV would become a pretence for tyranny if the price to be paid for achieving that ideal is human freedoms. One of the faiths of our founding fathers was the purity of means. Indeed, under our law, even a decoit who has	committed a murder cannot be put to death in the exercise of right of self-defence after he has made good his escape. So great is the insistence of civilised laws on the purity of means. The	goals set out in Part IV have, therefore, to be achieved 709 without the abrogation of the means provided for by Part III. It is in this sense that Parts III and IV together constitute the core of	our Constitution and combine to	form its conscience.
Anything that destroys the balance between the two parts will ipso facto destroy an essential element of the basic structure of our Constitution." Attempts were, however, made from time	to time to circumvent the	judgment of this Court in Mohd. Hanif Quareshi's case (supra). After the judgment in that case the legislatures of the State of Bihar and U.P. passed Amendment Acts prescribing minimum age of animals to be slaughtered.
The Bihar Act prohibited slaughter of	a bull, bullock or shebuffalo unless the animal was of 25 years of age and was useless. Under	the U.P. Act slaughter of a bull or buffalo was permitted only if	it was	over 20 years of age and was permanently unfit. The Madhya	Pradesh Legislature passed a new Act, the M.P. Agricultural Cattle Preservation Act, 1959 under which slaughter of a bull, bullock or buffalo except on a certificate issued by the competent authority	was prohibited. A certificate could not be issued unless	the animal was of over 20 years' age and was unfit for work or breeding. These	Acts were again challenged in Abdul Hakim Quraeshi & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors., [1961] 2 S.C.R.
610. This Court took the view that the ban on the slaughter of bulls, bullocks and she-buffaloes below the age of 20 or 25 years was not a reasonable restriction in the interests of the general public and was void. It was on the basis that a bull,	bullock or buffalo did not remain useful after 15 years and whatever little use it may have then was greatly offset	by the economic disadvantages of	feeding	and maintaining unserviceable cattle. This	Court further	held that the additional condition	that the animal must, apart from being above 20 or 25 years of age, also be unfit was a further unreasonable restriction. Accordingly the relevant provisions in the Bihar, U.P. and Madhya Pradesh Acts were declared invalid.
The present case is apparently another attempt, though on a slightly different ground, to circumvent the judgment of this Court in Mohd. Hanif	Quareshi's case (supra). The writ giving rise to the present appeal sought to challenge two Standing Orders made by the Municipal Commissioner of the 710 Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad in exercise of his powers under s. 466(1)(D)(b) of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act 1949 directing that the Municipal ?laughter houses should be kept open	for use	on all days except on seven days mentioned in the two standing orders.
Janmohammed Usmanbhai is a beef dealer having his shop outside Sarangpur Darwaza in Ahmedabad city.	His case is that he gets his animals slaughtered at the slaughter house owned by the	Municipal Corporation. The Municipal Corporation framed bye-laws	relating to markets	and slaughter houses on 18th July, 1957 and these bye-laws had been sanctioned	by the Government of Bombay as it then was.
Section 466(1)(D)(b) of the Act confers on the Municipal Commissioner power to make standing orders consistent with the provisions of the Act and the rules and bye-laws. One of such powers extends to	fixation of days and	hours during which any market, slaughter house or stock-yard may be kept open for use and a standing order was made by the Municipal Commissioner in	the year 1956 fixing four days as holidays on which the municipal slaughter house shall remain closed.
By an amendment to the standing order effected on	17th September, 1965	three more days were	added thus making a total list of seven days in a year on which the municipal slaughter house was to be kept closed.
Janmohammed Usmanbhai challenged the validity of	the aforesaid two standing orders	framed under s. 466(1)(D)(b) of the	Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act,	1949 directing the closure of slaughter houses on	seven	days named in the standing orders being violative of Arts. 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution inasmuch as the closure of the slaughter house	adversely effected his trade	as animals could not be admitted in the slaughter house on those seven days specified in the standing orders and therefore he could not get the meat of those animals for his beef shop.
It appears	that at the time of the presentation of the writ petition the amended standing order adding three more days to the list of holidays in the slaughter house had not seen the light of the day. The Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad had, however, passed a resolution on 18th January, 1965 whereby three more days were added to the list of holidays for the slaughter house. The petitioner took up a 711 plea that the power to keep the municipal slaughter house closed on any particular day in an area vested in	the Municipal Commissioner	and such a power could only be exercised by	a standing order properly issued	and promulgated by the Municipal Commissioner. Under the earlier standing order	on 1956	made by the Municipal Commissioner municipal slaughter houses could be kept open for use on all days except on the following four days viz.	Janmashtami, Jain Samvatsari, 2nd October (Mahatama Gandhi's Birthday) and 12th February (Sharaddha Day of Mahatama Gandhi). The resolution passed by the Corporation on 18th January, 1965 declaring three additional holidays	for the slaughter houses, therefore, was null and void. During the pendency of the writ petition, however, a new standing order was made by the Municipal	Commissioner on 17th	September, 1965 in exercise of his powers	under s. 466(1)(D)(b) of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act adding three more days as the	closure days of the slaughter houses : 30th January (Mahatama Gandhi's Nirwan Day), Mahavir Jayanti and	Ram Navmi to the previous	list. Consequently respondent No. 1, the petitioner	in the writ	petition, applied for	the amendment of the writ	petition, which	was allowed by the Court on 12th August,	1969. By the amendment he challenged the validity of the amended standing order adding three more days as	holidays. The	result was that the respondent No. 1 challenged the constitutional validity of all the seven days declared as holidays in the slaughter houses.
The main ground of challenge was	that the impugned standing orders	put an unreasonable	restriction on	the petitioner's right to carry on his trade or business as a beef dealer and that restriction was not in the interests of the general public but was	based on other extraneous considerations. The other ground of attack was that	the standing orders single out the petitioner and other butchers like him who slaughter	only cattle and not sheep or goat, for hostile discrimination inasmuch as the standing orders effect only the butchers who slaughter cattle and not those who deal in meat of goat and sheep.
The High Court relying on Mohd.	Faruk v. State of Madhya Pradesh	& Ors.,	[1970] 1 S.C.R. 156 held that the impugned standing orders were ultra vires being violative of Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. In that case the bye-laws of the 712 Jabalpur Municipality permitted the slaughter	of various animals including bulls and bullocks. A licence had to be obtained for that purpose. The slaughter of	animals in places outside	the premises fixed by	the municipality was prohibited by s. 257(3) of the Act and the sale of meat, within the area of the Municipality,	of the	animals so slaughtered in	the premises not fixed by the municipality was also prohibited. Under the notification by which	the bye-laws were issued in 1948 bulls and bullocks could be slaughtered in the premises fixed for the purpose but by the notification dated 12th January, 1967 the confirmation of bye-laws in so far as they related to bulls and bullocks was cancelled. The	effect of that notification was to prohibit the slaughter of bulls and bullocks within the Municipality of Jabalpur. This cancellation	of the confirmation of bye- laws, it was urged, imposed a	direct restriction upon the fundamental right of the petitioner under Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. This Court laid down :
"The	impugned notification,	though	technically within the competence of the State	Government, directly infringes the fundamental right of	the petitioner guaranteed by Art. 19(1)(g), and may be upheld only if it be established that it seeks to impose reasonable restrictions in the interests of the general public and a less drastic restrictions will	not ensure the interest of	the general public." This Court further observed :
"The sentiments of a section of the people may be hurt by permitting slaughter of bulls and bullocks in premises maintained by a local authority. But a prohibition imposed	on the exercise of a fundamental right to carry on an occupation, trade or business will not be regarded as reasonable, if it is	imposed not in the interest of the general public, but merely to respect the susceptibilities and sentiments of a	section of the people whose way of life, belief or thought is not the same as that of the claimant." 713 The High Court, however, overruled the objection based on Art. 14 of the Constitution.
The appellants have now come to challenge the judgment and order of the High Court by certificate, and they contend that the restriction imposed by the two standing orders was a reasonable one and in the interests of the general public.
Before proceeding	to deal	with the points urged on behalf of the appellants it will be appropriate to refer to the well established principles in the construction of the constitutional	provisions. When the	validity of a	law placing restriction on the exercise of a fundamental right in Art. (19)(1)(g) is challenged, the onus of proving to the satisfaction of the Court that the restriction is reasonable lies upon the State. If the law requires that an act which is inherently dangerous, noxious or injurious to the public interest, health or safety or is likely to prove a nuisance to the	community shall	be done under a permit or a licence of an executive authority, it is not per se unreasonable and no person may claim a licence or a permit to do that act as of right. Where the law providing for grant of a licence or permit confers a discretion upon an administrative authority regulated by rules or	principles, express or implied, and exerciseable in consonance with the rules	of natural justice, it will be	presumed to impose a reasonable restriction. Where, however,	power is entrusted to an administrative agency to grant	or withhold a permit or licence in its uncontrolled discretion the law ex facie infringes the	fundamental right under Art. 19(1)(g).
Imposition of restriction on the exercise of a fundamental right may be in the form of control or prohibition. But when the exercise of a fundamental	right	is prohibited,	the burden of proving that	a total ban on the exercise of the right alone may ensure the maintenance of the interest of general	public	lies	heavily	upon the State. In	this background of	legal	position the	appellants have to establish that	the restriction put on the fundamental right of the	respondents to	carry on their trade or business in beef was a reasonable one. The Court must in considering the validity of the impugned law imposing	prohibition on	the carrying on of	a business or a profession	attempt an evaluation of its direct and	immediate impact upon	the fundamental rights of the citizens affected thereby and the 714 larger public interest sought to be ensured in the light of the object sought to be achieved, the necessity to restrict the citizen's freedom, the inherent pernicious nature of the act prohibited or its capacity or tendency to be harmful to the general public, the possibility of achieving the object by imposing a less drastic restraint, and in the absence of exceptional situations	such as the prevalence of a state of emergency, national or local,	or the necessity to maintain necessary supplies or	the necessity	to stop activities inherently dangerous,	the existence	of a machinery to satisfy	the administrative authority that	a case	for imposing restriction	is made out	or a less drastic restriction may ensure the object intended to be achieved.
In the light of the aforesaid principles the question for consideration is whether the closure of the slaughter house on seven days specified in the two standing orders puts a	reasonable restriction	on the	fundamental right of the petitioner	guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(g) of	the Constitution. Out of the seven days declared as closed days for the slaughter house three of the days are connected with Mahatma Gandhi,	that is, 2nd October	being his birthday, 12th February being his Sharaddha Day and the 30th January as his	Nirwan day, and out of the remaining	four days, Janmashtami relates to the birth day	of Lord Krishna, Ram Navami relates	to the birth day of Sri Ram, Mahabir Jayanti and Jain Samvatsari relate to Lord Mahabir, the exponent of Jainism. Normally the legislature is the best judge of what is good	for the community by	whose suffrage it comes into existence. This	should be the proper approach of the Court.
But the ultimate responsibility for determining the validity of the	law must rest with the court and the court must not shirk that solemn duty cast upon it by the Constitution.
Clause (6)	of Art. 19 protects a law which imposes in the interest of general public reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by sub-clause (g) of clause (1) of Art. 19. Obviously it is left to the court in case of	a dispute to determine the reasonableness of the restrictions imposed	by the	law. In determining	that question the court cannot proceed on	a general notion of what is reasonable in the	abstract or	even on a consideration of what is reasonable from the point of view of the	person or persons on	whom the restrictions	are imposed. The right conferred by sub-clause 715 (g) is	expressed in general language and if there had been no qualifying	provision like	clause	(6) the right so conferred would	have been an absolute	one. To the persons who have this right any restriction will be irksome and may well be	regarded by them as unreasonable. But the question cannot be decided on that basis. What the Court has to do is to consider whether the restrictions imposed are reasonable in the interest of general public. In the State of Madras v.
V.G. Row, [1952] S.C.R. 597 this Court laid down the test of reasonableness in the following terms :
"It is important in	this context to bear in mind that	the test of	reasonableness, whereever prescribed, should be applied to each individual statute impugned, and no abstract standard, or general pattern of reasonableness can be laid down as applicable	to all	cases. The nature of	the right	alleged to have been infringed,	the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the disproportion of	the imposition, the prevailing conditions at the time, should all enter into the judicial verdict." In the instant case it was open to the Municipal Commissioner to	fix days and hours at and during which any slaughter house should be kept open for use. If	the Municipal Commissioner declares certain days as holidays for the slaughter house in	order to give facilities to	the municipal staff working in the municipal slaughter house, no body could have any objection to such a standing order. The grievance of the petitioner-respondent	in the instant case is on the ground that the Municipal Commissioner by standing orders had declared days concerning Mahatma Gandhi,	Lord Mahavir, Sri Ram and Lord Krishna as holidays. Mahatma Gandhi and Lord Mahavir were apostles	of non-violence who lived and died for that cause. Mahatma Gandhi, venerated by the People of India as the Father of	the Nation was an apostle of non-violence. Mahavir preached and practised Ahimsa and even today has a large following in the State of Gujarat. Rama and Krishna are the beloved of the Hindu Pantheon and are worshiped by large sections of the people.
Rama is	considered by	them to	be the	embodiment of	all virtues and of everything that is good in 716 humanity. Krishna is known to	be the expounder of	the philosophy of the Geeta. Their birthdays are generally observed by the people	not merely as days of festivity but also as days of abstinence from meat. One cannot, therefore, complain that these days are ill chosen as holidays.
The expression 'in the interest of general public' is of wide	import comprehending public order, public health, public security, morals, economic welfare of the community and the	objects mentioned in part IV of the Constitution.
Nobody can dispute a law providing for basic amenities; for the dignity of human labour like provision for canteen, rest rooms, facilities for drinking	water, latrines and urinals etc. as	a social welfare measure in the interest of general public.	Likewise in respect of	legislations	and notifications concerning the wages, working conditions or the other amenities for the working class, the courts have adopted a liberal attitude and the interest of the workers has been protected notwithstanding the hardship that might be caused to the employers. It was, therefore, open to the Legislature or	the authority concerned, to ensure proper holidays for the Municipal staff working in the Municipal slaughter houses and provide certain closed days in	the year. Even according to the observations of the High Court nobody could have any	objection to the standing orders issued	by the Municipal Commissioner under section 466(1)(d)(b) if	Municipal slaughter houses were closed on certain days in order	to ensure proper holidays for	the municipal staff	working in the Municipal slaughter houses.
The only objection was	that the standing orders direct closure	of the slaughter houses on	Janamashtami,	Jain Samvatsari, 2nd	October (Mahatama Gandhi's birthday), 12th February (Sharaddha day of Mahatama Gandhi),	30th January (Mahatma Gandhi's Nirvan day), Mahavir Jayanti and	Ram Navami. These days were declared as	holidays under	the standing orders	for the Municipal Corporation slaughter houses.
The tests	of reasonableness have to be viewed in the context of the issues	which faced the legislature. In the construction of	such laws and in judging their validity, courts must approach the problem from the point of view of furthering the	social interest	which it is the purpose of the legislation	to promote. They are	not in these matters functioning in vacuo but as part of society which is trying, 717 by the enacted law, to solve its problems and furthering the moral and material progress of the community as a whole.
(See Joti Prasad v. Union Territory of Delhi, [1961] S.C.R.
1601) If the expression 'in the interest of general public' is of wide import comprising public order, public security and public morals, it	cannot be said	that the standing orders closing	the slaughter houses on seven days is not in the interest of general public.
In view of the aforesaid discussion we are not prepared to hold	that the closure of slaughter house on seven days specified in the two standing orders	in any	way put an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right guaranteed to the	petitioner-respondent under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.
This leads us to the second contention raised on behalf of the	respondent, which is	based on Art.	14 of	the Constitution. The High Court had repelled this contention for a valid reason with which we fully agree.
It is now well-established that while Art. 14 forbids class	legislation it does not	forbid	reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation and that in order to pass the test of permissible classification	two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (i) the classification must be founded on	an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group and (ii) such differentia must have rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. The classification, may be founded on different basis, namely, geographical, or according to objects or occupations or the like and what is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the	Act under consideration. There is always	a presumption	in favour of constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is	upon him, who attacks it, to show	that there has been a clear violation of the constitutional principles. The courts must presume	that the legislature	understands and correctly appreciates the	needs of its own people, that its laws are directed against problems made	manifest by experience and that its discriminations are based on adequate grounds. It must be	borne in mind that the legislature	is free to recognise 718 degrees of harm and may confine its restrictions to those cases where the need is deemed to be	the clearest,	and finally	that	in order to sustain	the presumption of constitutionality the court may take	into consideration matters of common knowledge, matters of common rapport, the history of the times and may	assume every state of facts which can be conceived	to be	existing at the time of legislation.
The objects sought to be	achieved by the impugned standing orders are	the preservation, protection	and improvement of	live-stock. Cows, bulls, bullocks and calves of cows	are no	doubt the most important cattle for	the agricultural economy of this country. Female buffaloes yield a large	quantity of milk and	are, therefore,	well looked after and do not need as much protection as cows yielding a small quantity	of milk	require. As draught	cattle	male buffaloes are not half as useful as bullocks. Sheep and goat give very little milk	compared to the cows and the female buffaloes, and	have practically no	utility	as draught animals. These	different categories	of animals being susceptible of	classification into separate groups on the basis of their usefulness to society, the butchers who kill each category of animals may also be placed	in distinct classes according to the effect produced on society by the carrying on of their respective occupations.	The butchers who slaughter cattle formed the well defined class based on their occupation. That classification is	based	on intelligible differentia and distinguishes them from those who kill goats and sheep and	this differentiation has a close connection with the object sought to be achieved by the impugned Act, namely the preservation, protection and the improvement	of our	livestock. The	attainment of these objectives may	well necessitate that the slaughterers of cattle	should	be dealt with differently	than	the slaughterers of	say, goats and sheep. The standing orders, therefore, in our view, adopt a classification based on sound and intelligible basis and can quite clearly stand the test laid down above.
It is accordingly allowed. The judgment and order of the High Court dated 3rd March, 1970 are set aside and the writ petition filed	by the	respondents before the	High Court stands dismissed with costs.