Source: http://openjurist.org/637/f2d/1267/lloyd-v-u-s-department-of-labor-abts
Timestamp: 2016-12-09 04:58:41
Document Index: 325110393

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 223', '§ 2273', '§ 250', '§ 2322', '§ 2273', '§ 90', '§ 2273', '§ 2322', '§ 2272', '§ 2273', '§ 2273', '§ 90', '§ 2273', '§ 2291', '§ 2291', '§ 2319', '§ 2319', '§ 2273', '§ 2273', '§ 2322', '§ 90', '§ 2322']

637 F2d 1267 Lloyd v. U S Department of Labor Abts | OpenJurist
637 F. 2d 1267 - Lloyd v. U S Department of Labor Abts HomeFederal Reporter, Second Series 637 F.2d.
637 F2d 1267 Lloyd v. U S Department of Labor Abts 637 F.2d 1267
2 ITRD 1201
Oralee D. LLOYD, Petitioner,v.U. S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Respondent.Elaine ABTS; Shirley Mitchell; Corine Howarter; Alice V.Smith; and Shirley A. Smith, Petitioners,v.U. S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Respondent.Keith R. KLEMME, Petitioner,v.U. S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Respondent.Valorie Anne REPKA, Petitioner,v.U. S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Respondent.King FOX, Clarence Domingo, Warren S. Short and RobertStevenson, on behalf of a group of Kaiser SteelCorporation Workers, Napa, California, Petitioners,v.UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Harold A. Bratt, Harry J.Gilman and Marvin Fooks, Respondents.
Nos. 76-3253, 76-3269, 76-3333, 76-3334 and 78-3357.
Submitted July 8, 1980.Decided Nov. 3, 1980.
These consolidated cases involve challenges to determinations by the Labor Department that certain workers are not eligible to apply for worker adjustment assistance under relevant provisions of the Trade Act of 1974. Petitions 76-3253, 76-3269, 76-3333, and 76-3334 were consolidated because they arise from a common factual setting or because they involve a common legal issue-namely, the application of the one-year eligibility restriction of § 223(b)(1) of the Trade Act, 19 U.S.C. § 2273(b)(1). Although it arises from a different factual setting, the Fox petition, No. 78-3357, was consolidated with the others because it shares this legal issue. In addition the Fox petition raises other questions. We have jurisdiction under § 250 of the Trade Act, 19 U.S.C. § 2322.
19 U.S.C. § 2273(b)(1). See also 29 C.F.R. § 90.16(e) (regulations repeating statutory provision).
In the cases at bar the basic facts are undisputed. In the Abts, Klemme, and Repka petitions the issue is the application of the one-year limit of 19 U.S.C. § 2273(b)(1). In the Lloyd petition, the one-year limit has also been raised, but there is first a threshold question whether Lloyd has yet been aggrieved by the Secretary's action. In the Fox petition, in addition to the one-year limit issue, questions are raised concerning the timeliness of the petition for review under 19 U.S.C. § 2322(a) and concerning the Secretary's choice of the "appropriate subdivision" under 19 U.S.C. § 2272(1) and (3).
It appears that all of the Motorola petitioners before the court worked at Mesa, although some may have worked in Phoenix. In any event, the stumbling block for their eligibility, except for petitioner Lloyd, is the December 8, 1974 initial cut off date for eligibility. The Secretary set up that date because it is one year prior to the date of the petition. See 19 U.S.C. § 2273(b)(1). Petitioners Abts, Mitchell, Howarter, A. Smith, and S. Smith (No. 76-3269) were laid off on November 23, 1974. Petitioner Klemme (No. 76-3333) was laid off on November 8, 1974. Petitioner Repka (No. 76-3334) was laid off sometime prior to December 8, 1974. Petitioner Lloyd (No. 76-3253) was not laid off but took a reduction in job and pay on March 15, 1975. Her petition raises different issues. We assume the other petitioners would have been eligible but for the Labor Department's application of the one-year rule.
B. The One-Year Rule
Under the Act the Secretary must specify the date on which the total or partial separations attributable to increased imports began or threatened to begin. 19 U.S.C. § 2273(a). This date is referred to by Department of Labor regulations as the "impact date," which is "the earliest date on which any part of the total or partial separations involving a significant number or proportion of workers began or threatened to begin." 29 C.F.R. § 90.16(d)(2).
But the statute further provides that, regardless of the actual impact date, no certification may apply to any worker whose last total or partial separation from the firm occurred more than one year before the date of the petition on which certification was granted. 19 U.S.C. § 2273(b)(1).
Once the group of workers is certified as eligible, each worker must apply individually and meet certain requirements. If Lloyd hereafter applies for benefits under 19 U.S.C. § 2291, she ultimately may be denied on the ground that she does not qualify because her individual job reduction does not meet the requirements for a partial separation. See 19 U.S.C. § 2291(1) (requirement of total or partial separation) and § 2319(6) (definition of partial separation). Lloyd states that her weekly salary was reduced from $168.80 to $151.60. This is a reduction to approximately 89.8% of her prior salary, but "partial separation" requires a reduction to 80% or less of one's prior salary. See 19 U.S.C. § 2319(6)(B).
The Secretary determined that competition from imports had contributed importantly to job losses at Napa, Vallejo, and Oakland, and so certified the workers at those three facilities as eligible to apply for assistance based on the January 5, 1978 petition (as expanded). But, pursuant to the one-year rule of 19 U.S.C. § 2273(b)(1), the Secretary set the beginning cut-off date for eligibility at one year prior to the petition date. Thus, Napa workers laid off prior to January 5, 1977 were not eligible for assistance. The Secretary's initial Napa determination appears at 43 Fed.Reg. 30930 (July 18, 1978). The petitioners before the court are such workers laid off at Napa before January 5, 1977.
The petitioners were excluded from the Napa eligibility determination by the operation of the one-year limit of 19 U.S.C. § 2273(b)(1). The dates of their total or partial separations were more than one year before the Napa petition for certification. The petitioners' first argument is a challenge to the Labor Department's application of the one-year limit. As we discussed above with regard to the Motorola petitions, this argument fails.
Under the workers' adjustment assistance provisions of the Trade Act, workers aggrieved by a final determination of the Secretary "may, within 60 days after notice of such determination, file a petition for review" in the appropriate circuit court of appeals. 19 U.S.C. § 2322(a). Failure to file the petition timely is jurisdictional. But administrative reconsideration tolls the time until the reconsideration is decided whence the 60-day period runs. See, e. g., Samuel B. Franklin & Co. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 290 F.2d 719, 725 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 889, 82 S.Ct. 142, 7 L.Ed.2d 88 (1961). See also 29 C.F.R. § 90.18(e) (negative determination regarding a reconsideration is a final determination for § 2322 review).