Source: https://openjurist.org/979/f2d/146/united-states-v-cruz-ventura
Timestamp: 2019-12-14 12:57:37
Document Index: 174343714

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1324', '§ 1324', '§ 1325', '§ 924', '§ 4', '§ 5', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 2']

979 F2d 146 United States v. Cruz-Ventura | OpenJurist
979 F. 2d 146 - United States v. Cruz-Ventura
979 F2d 146 United States v. Cruz-Ventura
979 F.2d 146
Emiliano CRUZ-VENTURA, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 91-50720.
Submitted June 1, 1992*.
Emiliano Cruz-Ventura (Cruz) appeals the sentence imposed by the district court after he pleaded guilty to one count of transporting illegal aliens in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(B). The district court added two points to Cruz's offense level on account of a previous conviction related to alien smuggling. It then imposed a sentence that departed upward from the guidelines range by 12 months. We vacate and remand for resentencing.
Cruz pleaded guilty to one count of transporting undocumented aliens in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(B). His presentence report indicated a total offense level of 11 and a criminal history category of IV (four). His offense level was increased from a base level of 9 to a total of 11 to account for his prior conviction for a related offense. Cruz's Guideline sentencing range was 18 to 24 months. The district court, however, departed upward and sentenced him to 36 months. The court based its upward departure on a number of factors that it felt were inadequately considered by the Guidelines.
We review the district court's decision to depart from the Guidelines under a tripartite test established in United States v. Lira-Barraza, 941 F.2d 745, 746-47 (9th Cir.1991) (en banc). First, the district court's determination that an "unusual circumstance" not adequately considered by the Guidelines permits departure is subject to de novo review. Id. at 746. Second, the district court's factual findings supporting the existence of an identified circumstance permitting departure are reviewed for clear error. Id. at 746-47. Finally, the extent of the departure is reviewed to determine whether it is "reasonable" in light of the standards and policies incorporated in the Sentencing Reform Act and the Guidelines. Id. at 751.
A. Prior Related Offense
The presentence report recommended that Cruz's offense level be enhanced by two points because he had previously been convicted of aiding and abetting illegal entry. 8 U.S.C. § 1325. Section 2L1.1(b)(2) requires the court to enhance the base offense level by two points "[i]f the defendant previously has been convicted of smuggling, transporting, or harboring an unlawful alien, or a related offense...."
We have yet to decide whether a conviction for aiding and abetting illegal entry may be considered a prior related offense within the purview of section 2L1.1(b)(2). The Fifth Circuit has squarely determined that a "prior conviction of aiding and abetting the entry of an illegal alien is within the scope of the 'related offenses' contemplated by [section 2L1.1(b)(2).]" United States v. Reyes-Ruiz, 868 F.2d 698, 703 (5th Cir.1989), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Bachynsky, 934 F.2d 1349 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 402, 116 L.Ed.2d 351 (1991). That court declared that "[i]t is difficult to imagine a situation in which aiding the entry of an illegal alien does not involve some aspect of smuggling, transporting, or harboring that person." Id. at 702 (footnote omitted).
Next, Cruz argues that the Supreme Court's decision in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990), which mandates a "categorical analysis" of offenses for purposes of some statutory sentencing enhancements, puts his aiding and abetting conviction outside the scope of a "related offense." In Taylor, the Court held that the sentencing court must generally look to the statutory definition of an offense only, rather than to the actual facts supporting the defendant's prior conviction when it applies 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (armed career criminal). Id. at 602, 110 S.Ct. at 2160. We have applied the same rule to the career offender enhancement under the Guidelines, which is based upon convictions for prior offenses. See United States v. Becker, 919 F.2d 568, 570 (9th Cir.1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 1118, 113 L.Ed.2d 226 (1991).1 Section 2L1.1(b)(2) refers to convictions of other offenses, as does the guideline section which was at issue in Becker. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. That militates for a categorical approach, as does Becker's reasoning. Id. We adopt that approach for section 2L1.1 purposes.
In this case, it appears that Cruz's prior conviction resulted from his arrest as a passenger in a vehicle containing illegal aliens, conduct eminently similar to his present transportation conviction. That, however, is beside the point. The statutory definition of aiding and abetting illegal entry encompasses a broader range of activity. Cruz argues that a defendant may be convicted of aiding and abetting illegal entry by merely directing an illegal alien to the border. He cites United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 751, 112 L.Ed.2d 771 (1991), for this broad reading. Aguilar, however, found that evidence that the defendant supplied an illegal alien with false immigration documents, coached the alien to lie to immigration authorities, and accompanied the alien through the checkpoint was sufficient to sustain a conviction under section 1324. See Aguilar, 883 F.2d at 681-84. Moreover, an aider and abetter is a person who knowingly and intentionally helps another to commit a crime. See, e.g., Manual of Model Jury Instructions for the Ninth Circuit § 5.01 (1992). Nonetheless, Cruz contends, if one ignores the actual facts underlying the prior conviction, the generic, statutory offense itself does not qualify as a related offense. We disagree. Even if relatively minor activities, like accompanying someone to the border for the purpose of helping him enter the United States illegally, are not the same as smuggling, they are certainly related to that offense. Even categorically speaking, both acts have the same purpose--enabling the unlawful entry of an alien into this country. Thus, while Cruz's prior offense may not have been a brother to the present one, it was at least a first cousin.
On balance, therefore, we are persuaded by the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in Reyes-Ruiz. Helping aliens enter this country illegally fits hand in glove with actually bringing them in or hiding them once they are here. Cruz has demonstrated a pattern of disregard for the immigration laws; section 2L1.1(b)(2) was adopted to allow the court to consider his sort of recidivism. The district court properly enhanced Cruz's offense level under section 2L1.1(b)(2).
1. Access to Handgun
Moreover, when summing up the reasons for the sentence the judge made no specific reference to the gun. Thus, we conclude that "on the record as a whole ... the error [if any] did not affect the district court's selection of the sentence imposed." Williams v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1112, 1121, 117 L.Ed.2d 341 (1992).
2. Inadequacy of Criminal History
The district court stated that among the matters it considered in deciding to depart upward was "the inadequacy of [Cruz's] criminal history category of--of 4." Cruz argues that the court improperly considered prior contacts with law enforcement which did not result in an arrest. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 ("[A] prior arrest record itself shall not be considered [a ground for departure.]").
A sentencing court may depart upward from the defendant's guideline range "[i]f reliable information indicates that the criminal history category does not adequately reflect the seriousness of the defendant's past criminal conduct or the likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes...." U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3. However, "an upward departure based on the inadequacy of a defendant's criminal history category is proper only in those limited circumstances where the defendant's criminal record is 'significantly more serious' than that of other defendants in the same category." United States v. Streit, 962 F.2d 894, 903 (9th Cir.1992).
The district court considered the fact that three bench warrants had been issued in different, unresolved state court matters; that Cruz had two convictions that were not factored into his criminal history calculation; and that Cruz had in the past given authorities ten aliases, nine dates of birth, and four social security numbers. All are permissible grounds for upward departure under section 4A1.3. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a) (prior sentences not used in computing the criminal history category); U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(d) (criminal matters pending in other tribunals when offense is committed); U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(e) (prior similar adult conduct not resulting in a criminal conviction); United States v. Montenegro-Rojo, 908 F.2d 425, 428 (9th Cir.1990) (defendant's use of fictitious names is a permissible basis for upward departure); see also United States v. Hernandez-Vasquez, 884 F.2d 1314 (9th Cir.1989) (defendant's use of aliases is proper ground for departure). Thus, departure on this ground was proper.
3. Application Note 8 to Section 2L1.1
The district court had the authority to depart upward under application note 8 to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1 because of Cruz's dangerous treatment of the aliens. United States v. Hernandez-Rodriguez, 975 F.2d 622, 625-26 (9th Cir.1992). The record does not support Cruz's claim that the court increased his offense level by two points for each alien in his care. The court did not err in departing on this ground.
The district court departed upward by 12 months which is half again the maximum sentence in Cruz's guideline range. While the degree of departure does not appear excessive on its face and may be reasonable, the district court did not adequately state its reasons for the amount of the departure on the record. The court's decision "should include a reasoned explanation of the extent of the departure founded on the structure, standards and policies of the Act and Guidelines." Lira-Barraza, 941 F.2d at 751. See also Montenegro-Rojo, 908 F.2d at 431. We could attempt to discern which of the various combinations of upward adjustment of offense characteristics and criminal history led the district court to impose this particular increase. That, however, would be mere speculation on our part and would not assure that sentencing was, in fact, carried out in a proper fashion. Even when the circumstances relied upon for departure are proper, if the reasons given for the extent of the departure are inadequate, we remand for resentencing so that the degree of the departure can be adequately explained. United States v. Faulkner, 952 F.2d 1066, 1071 (9th Cir.1991) (citing United States v. Cervantes-Lucatero, 889 F.2d 916, 919 (9th Cir.1989)).
We have used a different approach where prior similar misconduct, rather than a prior offense, was under consideration. See United States v. Leake, 908 F.2d 550, 554 (9th Cir.1990); United States v. Cota-Guerrero, 907 F.2d 87, 89 n. 4 (9th Cir.1990)
We agree that under the facts of this case, where the gun was in a jacket pocket and there was no evidence of ownership or possession, any such finding would be very problematic. See United States v. Kelso, 942 F.2d 680, 682 (9th Cir.1991); see also Delgado v. United States, 327 F.2d 641, 642 (9th Cir.1964) (evidence of possession of marijuana found in a nightstand at the foot of co-defendants' bed was insufficient to convict either co-defendant because it was "pure speculation" as to which defendant had possession)