Source: https://connecticut.lexroll.com/barton-v-waterbury-company-03786-crb-05-98-03-6-3-1999/
Timestamp: 2020-01-19 04:37:21
Document Index: 510582111

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 31', '§ 31', '§31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31']

BARTON v. WATERBURY COMPANY, 03786 CRB-05-98-03 (6-3-1999) | LexRoll (CT)
BARTON v. WATERBURY COMPANY, 03786 CRB-05-98-03 (6-3-1999)
LexRoll.com > LexRoll (CT) > Connecticut Workers Compensation Commission Opinions > BARTON v. WATERBURY COMPANY, 03786 CRB-05-98-03 (6-3-1999)
VIRGINIA BARTON v. WATERBURY COMPANY EMPLOYER and GAB BUSINESS SERVICES INSURER RESPONDENTS-APPELLEES COMPENSATION REVIEW BOARD
CASE NO. 03786 CRB-05-98-03 CLAIM NO. 500015126Workers’ Compensation Commission
The respondents were represented by Dominick Statue, Esq., Montstream May, L.L.P., Salmon Brook Corporate Park.
The claimant has petitioned for review from the March 3, 1998 Finding and Award of the Commissioner acting for the Fifth District. She argues on appeal that the trier erred by dismissing her claim for permanent partial disability, and by refusing to authorize payment of medical bills from Gaylord Hospital and seven of the doctors who treated the claimant. We affirm the trial commissioners decision.
When this board reviews a decision by a trial commissioner, we are not retrying the case. Fair v. People’s Savings Bank,207 Conn. 535, 539 (1988). Instead, we are examining that decision to ensure that the trier of fact has not committed legal error of any kind. As the fact-finder, he is entitled to weigh the credibility of the evidence, including medical reports and the testimony of all witnesses. Pallotto v. Blakeslee Prestress,Inc., 3651 CRB-3-97-7 (July 17, 1998); Jusiewicz v. RelianceAutomotive, 3140 CRB-6-95-8 (Jan. 24, 1997). When we review his findings, we can change them only if they contain facts found without any supporting evidence, or if they fail to include material and undisputed facts. Webb v. Pfizer, Inc., 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 69, 70-71, 1859 CRB-5-93-9 (May 12, 1995). Conclusions of law must also stand unless they result from an incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts, or from an inference illegally or unreasonably drawn from them.Fair, supra; Webb, supra, 71.
First, we observe that the trial commissioner was not required to find in accordance with Dr. Hale’s report instead of Dr. Rubinstein’s, simply because Dr. Hale performed an examination under § 31-294f.[1] Although a commissioner’s examination can reasonably be expected to provide the trier of fact with strong guidance; Iannotti v. Amphenol/Spectra-Strip,13 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 319, 321, 1829 CRB-3-93-9 (April 25, 1995), affirmed, 40 Conn. App. 918 (1996) (per curiam); he is not bound to rely on it. As long as the trier gives some indication as to why he does not find the § 31-294f
examiner’s report persuasive, he is entitled to rely on the opinion of a different doctor. Gillis v. White Oak Corp., 49 Conn. App. 630, 637 (1998); Nieves v. SCM Company,3317 CRB-6-96-4 (July 9, 1997).
The trial commissioner explained in ¶ H of his conclusions that he did not adopt Dr. Hale’s report because Dr. Rubinstein had the benefit of a more complete history of the claimant’s symptoms. Dr. Hale explicitly acknowledged this gap, and his opinion draws only a tenuous connection between the claimant’s injury and her current symptoms. Claimant’s Exhibit R. We can hardly fault the trier for choosing to adhere to the diagnosis of Dr. Rubinstein rather than the less vehement opinion of Dr. Hale. It was thus reasonable for him to conclude that the claimant’s compensable injury caused neither a traumatic brain injury nor permanent partial disability to her right eye. Nieves,
The claimant also objects to the trial commissioner’s refusal to authorize certain doctors as treating physicians under §31-294d. Although § 31-294d(b) allows a claimant to choose her own treating physician, this language refers only to the initial selection of a physician following an injury. See Zeringv. UTC/Pratt Whitney, 3321 CRB-6-96-4 (Aug. 8, 1997). Subsequent changes of physician must be authorized by the trier pursuant to § 31-294d(c), who has considerable discretion to grant or deny such changes. Dichello v. Holgrath Corp., 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 441, 445, 2249 CRB-5-94-12 (Sept. 5, 1996), affirmed, 49 Conn. App. 339 (1998).
Here, the trier declined to authorize the treatment of Dr. Pulaski after January 9, 1995. That is the date Dr. Lesser, to whom Dr. Pulaski had referred the claimant, stated that she could return to work. Dr. Lesser did not refer the claimant back to Dr. Pulaski; instead, she took it upon herself to visit him again. Once an authorized treater refers a patient to another doctor, he is not automatically entitled to continue his own treatment. SeeBesitko v. McDonald’s Restaurant,12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 111, 113, 1415 CRB-8-92-5 (Feb. 28, 1994). The trial commissioner must decide whether such treatment should be authorized. Id; see also Dichello, supra.
The trier’s findings adopt the position embodied in the reports of Drs. Lesser and Rubinstein, i.e., that the claimant’s problems are more psychological than physical, and are unrelated to her compensable injury. See ¶ G, Findings. It is consistent with that viewpoint that he would deem medically unnecessary the treatment sought by the claimant after Dr. Lesser issued his report releasing her to return to work. See Greiger v.Leake Nelson, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 17, 19, 890 CRB-4-89-6 (Jan. 10, 1991) (finding that claimant went to doctor on his own did not, by itself, justify failure to authorize treatment). Further, as Dr. Pulaski’s care beyond January 9, 1995 was deemed unauthorized, his referrals to other doctors after that date did not constitute valid referrals under § 31-294d.McGowan v. Waterbury Farrell,14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 319, 321, 1964 CRB-1-94-2 (Sept. 15, 1995), affirmed, 43 Conn. App. 917 (1996). As there is evidence to support the trier’s decision on this issue, we must uphold his findings.
[1] See Barton v. Waterbury Company,16 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 216, 3428 CRB-5-96-9 (June 6, 1997), in which this board affirmed the trial commissioner’s order that Dr. Hale perform a commissioner’s examination, and Dr. Rubinstein’s report be treated as an independent medical examination.