Source: http://cl.bna.com/cl/19980429/962567.htm
Timestamp: 2017-05-25 01:24:26
Document Index: 450471991

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1997', '§ 1988', '§ 1997', '§ 1988', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1997', '§ 1997', '§ 1997', '§ 1997', '§ 3006', '§ 1997', '§ 107', '§ 107', '§ 3626', '§ 3', '§ 1997', '§ 1997', '§ 1997', '§ 1983', '§ 1997', '§ 1997', '§ 802', '§ 1997', '§ 1997', 'art, 461', '§ 3626', '§ 1997', '§ 523', '§ 1915', '§ 1346', '§ 3624', '§ 3626', '§ 1997', '§ 1997', '§ 1997', '§ 1997']

Everett Hadix, et al.
(96-2567/2568);
Mary Glover, et al.
(96-2586/2588; 97-1218/1272),
Perry M. Johnson, Director, et al.,
Nos. 96-2567/2568/2586/2588;97-1218/1272
Nos. 77-71229; 80-73581--John Feikens, District Judge.
Argued: December 11, 1997
Decided and Filed: April 17, 1998
ARGUED: Leo H. Friedman, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, CORRECTIONS DIVISION,
Lansing, Michigan, for Appellants. Deborah A. LaBelle,
LAW OFFICES OF DEBORAH LABELLE, Ann Arbor,
Michigan, Jeffrey D. Dillman, Ann Arbor, Michigan, for
Appellees. ON BRIEF: Leo H. Friedman, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, CORRECTIONS DIVISION,
Michigan, Michael Barnhart, Detroit, Michigan, for
Appellees. KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which SUHRHEINRICH, J., joined. JONES, J. (p. 29), delivered a
KENNEDY, Circuit Judge. These four appeals primarily concern attorney fees in the Michigan prison reform litigation
which has been the subject of numerous appeals to our Court
for decision. We have consolidated the appeals for decision. One of these appeals, No. 97-1218, is moot because the order
challenged in that case has expired by its terms. The three
other appeals present overlapping issues surrounding the
propriety of three awards of attorney fees for work performed
primarily during the period of January 1, 1996 through June
30, 1996. The major issue before us is whether the attorney fee
limitation of section 803(d) of the Prison Litigation Reform
Act ("PLRA" or the "Act"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d) applies to work performed after the PLRA's enactment date of April 26,
1996 in a case filed before the enactment date. Section
803(d), among other things, places a cap on the hourly rate
attorneys may be awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 in civil
rights litigation brought by prisoners. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(d)(3). Recently, in a separate Glover appeal, we held that section 1997e(d) does not apply to work performed prior
to the PLRA's enactment. Glover v. Johnson, ___ F.3d ___ (6th Cir. 1998). For reasons fully explained below, we
conclude that section 1997e(d) is likewise inapplicable to
post-enactment work. Neither the language of the statute nor
the legislative history permits us to conclude that Congress
intended to differentiate between pre-enactment and post-
enactment services. In Glover, defendants also argue for reversal of the fee awards because plaintiffs were not prevailing parties within
the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 in three appellate matters. As explained below, we uphold the awards as to two of the
three matters and reverse as to the third because the work was
not compensable compliance monitoring and plaintiffs did not
prevail on appeal or on their petition for certiorari. On cross-
appeal, the Glover plaintiffs argue that the District Court abused its discretion in declining to increase the hourly rate of
a paralegal from the rate last approved by the court. We shall
reject this contention as without merit.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE LITIGATION
A. Glover v. Johnson
In 1977, a now-certified class of female inmates
incarcerated in the Michigan prison system, filed an action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in which they alleged violations
of certain constitutional rights surrounding the conditions of
their confinement. The District Court found that the Glover
plaintiffs had been denied the same vocational and
educational opportunities provided to male inmates, in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that the female inmates had been
unconstitutionally denied meaningful access to the courts. Glover v. Johnson, 478 F. Supp. 1075 (E.D. Mich. 1979) ("Glover I"). After extensive negotiations, the District Court entered an order specifying remedial actions to be undertaken
by the defendants to remedy the constitutional violations
found and retained jurisdiction until substantial compliance
with the remedial order is achieved. Glover v. Johnson, 510 F. Supp. 1019 (E.D. Mich. 1981) ("Glover II"). Neither of these orders were appealed by defendants. On November 12, 1985, the parties stipulated to an order of
the District Court, which awarded plaintiffs attorney fees,
including fees for monitoring defendants' compliance with
the District Court's orders, and established a system providing
for plaintiffs' submission of fees and costs on a semi-annual
basis and for the lodging of defendants' objections thereto. This 1985 Order, which plaintiffs contend establishes their
entitlement to monitoring fees, has never been appealed. It
provides in relevant part:IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs are entitled to
attorney fees and that requests for such fees shall be
submitted to opposing counsel every six months. Defendants will have twenty-eight days in which to
contest the amount of the fee request.
Thus, since 1985, the parties have followed this procedure
and plaintiffs' attorneys have been paid attorney fees at the
prevailing market rate, which has increased over the years, to
the current rate of $150.00 per hour. In a Memorandum
Opinion and Order dated November 27, 1989 (the "1989
Order"), the District Court interpreted its 1985 Order as
authorizing attorney fees for monitoring compliance with the
court's orders in this case in addition to non-monitoring legal
work, and as having decided the prevailing party issue. It also
held that the prevailing party issue will not be re-decided with
each petition for fees, and that the court is therefore not
required to await the completion of an appeal before determining whether plaintiffs are prevailing parties on
otherwise compensable work. Defendants appealed the 1989
Order, and this Court affirmed the District Court's holdings. Glover v. Johnson, 934 F.2d 703 (6th Cir. 1989) ("Glover III"). B. Hadix v. Johnson
In 1980, a class of male prisoners incarcerated in the State
Prison of Southern Michigan, Central Complex ("SPSM-
CC"), brought a class action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
alleging violations of their rights under the First, Eighth,
Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. The
parties entered into a comprehensive consent decree, which
was approved by and made an order of the District Court on
April 4, 1985. The detailed 33-page consent decree addresses
sanitation, health care, fire safety, overcrowding, volunteers,
access to courts, food service, management, operations and
mail at SPSM-CC and called for the submission of more
detailed remedial plans to carry out a number of the consent
decree mandates. Overall, the consent decree was intended to "assure the constitutionality" of the conditions of confinement
at SPSM-CC. The Court retained jurisdiction to enforce the
terms of the consent decree until compliance is achieved. Plaintiffs' attorneys have responsibility for monitoring
defendants' compliance with the decree, which continues to
this day. On November 19, 1987, the District Court entered an order
awarding fees and costs to plaintiffs' attorneys for compliance
monitoring. Plaintiffs construe this order as establishing their
entitlement to post-judgment monitoring fees. Under the
terms of this order, defendants have the right to review and
make objections to plaintiffs' fee requests. In the absence of
agreement, the District Court will resolve the fee dispute.
II. PROCEEDINGS BELOW In Glover and Hadix, each class of plaintiffs filed a fee petition for work performed from January 1, 1996 through June 30, 1996 pursuant to established procedure. Appeal
Nos. 96-2586/2588 and 96-2567/2568. The Glover plaintiffs filed a second fee petition that covered all outstanding fees
and costs related to work on two appeals. Appeal No. 97-
1272. Defendants objected on several grounds to all three
petitions. The District Court rejected all but one of the
objections in three separate orders. Defendants argued that the attorney fee limitation of the
PLRA should be applied to the fee petitions in appeal nos. 96-
2586/2588 and 96-2567/2568. In nearly identical opinions,
the District Court held the fee provision inapplicable to fees
earned before enactment of the PLRA but applied it to those
earned thereafter. Defendants also objected to fees for work on all appellate
matters in the Glover fee petitions in appeal nos. 96- 2586/2588 and 97-1272, which included work on three
appeals, because plaintiffs had not prevailed in these matters. The first involves Case No. 94-1617, a 1996 appeal regarding
defendants' obligation to provide legal assistance to plaintiffs
for parental rights matters. This case has been decided
against plaintiffs and the Supreme Court has denied their
petition for certiorari. Glover v. Johnson, 75 F.3d 264 (6th Cir.) ("Glover IV"), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 67 (1996) (hereinafter referred to as the "parental rights appeal" ). The
second involves appeal nos. 95-1903/95-2037/95-2120/96-
1155, consolidated appeals regarding a Compliance
Committee established by the District Court (hereinafter
referred to as the "Compliance Committee appeals"). These
appeals were voluntarily dismissed by stipulation of the
parties in March, 1996 upon dissolution of the Committee by
the District Court. The third involves appeal no. 95-1521, an
appeal regarding the District Court's denial of defendants'
motion to terminate the District Court's supervisory
jurisdiction because substantial compliance with the Remedial
Plan had been achieved (hereinafter referred to as the
"termination appeal"). We recently vacated this judgment,
retained jurisdiction and remanded the matter to the District Court for a new determination of whether a disparity now
exists between female and male inmates in educational and
vocational opportunities in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and whether female
inmates are presently being denied access to the courts in
violation of the First Amendment. Glover v. Johnson, ___ F.3d ___ (6th Cir. 1998) ("Glover V"). In rejecting this challenge, the District Court concluded that
plaintiffs were deemed prevailing parties in the 1985 Order,
that plaintiffs are not required to establish prevailing party
status each time fees are sought but instead need only
establish that the legal work was reasonably related to
ensuring compliance with the District Court's orders. The
District Court went on to conclude that the legal work at issue
in all three appeals was related to monitoring compliance with
the Remedial Plan and consequent court orders. The District Court also rejected defendants' objection that
the award in No. 96-2586/2588 was otherwise unreasonable
as conclusory and unsubstantiated. Finally, the District Court
declined to increase the rate of payment for a paralegal to the
prevailing market rate because she had been approved at an
established lower rate. Defendants and plaintiffs filed timely
notices of appeal and cross-appeal.See footnote 1
A. Statutory Background The Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134,
110 Stat. 1321-66 (1996), was signed into law by President
Clinton on April 26, 1996.See footnote 2 The PLRA, which comprises 10 sections, significantly affects prison litigation by amending
several provisions of the United States Code.See footnote 3 The Act was intended to curtail what was perceived to be the over
involvement of federal courts in managing state prison
systems pursuant to remedial orders and consent decrees such
as those involved in Glover and Hadix.See footnote 4 The second purpose of the Act was to stem the tide of frivolous prisoner suits.See footnote 5 Today we focus on section 802, which serves the first purpose
identified above by limiting judicial remedies in prison
condition litigation, and section 803, which serves the second
statutory purpose enumerated above by amending the Civil
Rights Of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997, et
seq. ("CRIPA"). Section 803(d) of the PLRA includes the provision
governing the award of attorney fees in prisoner civil rights
litigation. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d). It provides in relevant part: § 1997e. Suits by prisoners
(d) Attorney's fees (1) In any action brought by a prisoner who is confined
to any jail, prison, or other correctional facility, in which
attorney's fees are authorized under section 2 of the
Revised Statutes of the United States (42 U.S.C. 1988),
such fees shall not be awarded, except to the extent that
(A) the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in proving an actual violation of the plaintiff's rights
protected by a statute pursuant to which a fee may be
awarded under section 2 of the Revised Statutes; and
(B)(i) the amount of the fee is proportionately
related to the court ordered relief for the violation; or (ii) the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in
enforcing the relief ordered for the violation.
(3) No award of attorney's fees in an action described
in paragraph (1) shall be based on an hourly rate greater
than 150 percent of the hourly rate established under
section 3006A of title 18, United States Code, for
payment of court-appointed counsel.
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1), (3). In the Eastern District of
Michigan, $75 per hour is the maximum amount a court-
appointed attorney may be reimbursed pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3006A(d)(1). The established rate of pay for plaintiffs'
attorneys in both cases has been $150 per hour since at least
1993. Capping attorney fees at $112.50 (which represents
150% of the $75 maximum) would reduce plaintiffs'
attorneys' hourly rate by 25%. Whether or not we apply the
fee provision to the attorney fee petitions at issue in these
pending cases turns on matters of statutory construction and
1. Landgraf v. USI Film Products, Inc. The analytical framework to be used when determining
whether to apply a newly-enacted law to pending cases, or
whether such application is impermissible because it would
have retroactive effect is set forth by the Supreme Court in
Landgraf v. USI Film Products, Inc., 511 U.S. 244 (1994). In step one of the Landgraf analysis, a court determines whether Congress clearly defined the temporal reach of a new law. Id. at 257-63, 280. Where Congressional intent is clear, it is
controlling. Id. at 264. If Congressional intent is ambiguous, a court must proceed with step two, an analysis of
retroactivity. The long-standing presumption against retroactive
legislation does not arise every time a statute is applied to a
pending case or when its application would upset settled
expectations. Id. at 269 Rather, a statute operates retroactively when it "attaches new legal consequences to events completed before enactment" or "impair[s] rights a
party possessed when he acted." Id. at 269, 280. The determination of retroactivity is made after assessing "the
nature and extent of the change in the law and the degree of
connection between the operation of the new rule and a
relevant past event." Id. at 270. Judicial inquiries should be guided by "familiar considerations of fair notice, reasonable
reliance, and settled expectations." Id. Retroactive legislation will not be applied in absence of manifestly clear
Congressional intent. Id. at 280. 2. Glover V In Glover V, supra, we analyzed the attorney fee limitation under Landgraf in the context of a petition for fees for work completed before enactment of the PLRA but awarded after
enactment. Under step one, we held that Congress had not
explicitly prescribed the temporal reach of the provision. Slip
Op. at pp. 40-41. In so doing, we rejected the Fourth Circuit's
view that the plain language of the statute providing that fees
"shall not be awarded" except as provided, evinces clear
congressional intent that all post-enactment fee awards,
including those compensating for pre-enactment work, must
comply with section 803(d). Id. at 41 (declining to follow Alexander v. Boyd, 113 F.3d 1373 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 880 (1998)). Under step two of Landgraf, we held that application of section 803(d) to a pending fee
motion which sought compensation for work completed prior
to enactment would be impermissibly retroactive because it
would "attach[] significant new legal burdens to the
completed work . . . [and impair] rights acquired under pre-
existing law." Id. at 43. We thus concluded that Congress did not intend the statute to be applied retroactively. We
expressly limited our holding to work completed prior to
enactment. Id. at 44. Now that we are squarely presented with the issue of post-enactment work in a pending case, we
believe that our earlier conclusion regarding retroactivity
controls the application of the very same statutory language
to post-enactment fees. Under Landgraf, the Court is to determine the temporal reach Congress intends a new statute to have in the absence
of clear congressional intent. In Hadix, we determined that the attorney fee provision of section 803(d), as applied to a
fee petition for pre-enactment work, would be impermissibly
retroactive. From this conclusion, it followed that the historic
presumption against retroactive legislation arose to bar
retroactive application of the statute. The presumption is
invoked to interpret new statutory language overall, and we
do not believe that the resulting statutory interpretation can be
limited to specific circumstances. That certain applications of
the statute might be permissible does alter the statutory
construction unless it can be said that Congress possessed
different intentions with respect to different applications. In this case, a court would have to find that Congress relied
upon the same statutory language to convey an intent that the
temporal reach of the statute is dependent upon the timing of
the work, i.e., that it intended the fee provision to apply in
pending cases for post-enactment fees but did not intend the
provision to apply in pending cases for pre-enactment fees. We do not believe the statutory language is capable of such a
sophisticated construction; either the fee provision applies in
pending cases or not. Our interpretation of section 1997e(d)
in Glover V controls our interpretation of that section here. We therefore hold that the fee limitation is inapplicable to the
fee petitions before us, which include work performed both
prior to and after the enactment date. While the Glover court did not rely upon the recent decision in Lindh v. Murphy, 117 S. Ct. 2059 (1997), that decision supports our conclusion regarding retroactivity. As
in Lindh, we have the negative inference that section 803(d) is inapplicable to pending cases arising from the fact that
Congress made section 802 expressly applicable to pending
cases but did not do the same with section 803. We believe
that under Lindh, the artificial distinction between pre- enactment and post-enactment work breaks down. In
addition, in Wright v. Morris, 111 F.3d 414, 418 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 263 (1997), we held that the plain language of the exhaustion requirement of section 803(d), 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(a), evinced Congress' intent that it not be
applied to pending cases. Thus, Wright provides additional support for concluding that Congress did not intend to apply
the fee provision to pending cases because the attorney fee
provision, also part of section 803(d), contains very similar
temporal language to that of the exhaustion requirement. 3. Lindh v. Murphy In Lindh, the Supreme Court was presented with the question of whether a provision of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub. L. No.
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996), which amended the federal
habeas statute, applied to an application for habeas corpus
pending at the time the new statute was enacted. The Court
held that because one section of the AEDPA explicitly
applied to pending cases and the other relevant section did
not, this evinced clear congressional intent that the latter
would not apply to pending cases. Lindh v. Murphy, supra, 117 S. Ct. at 2063. The majority opinion appears to say that
when general rules of statutory construction are employed to
determine a new statute's temporal reach -- the first step of
the Landgraf analysis -- and a court determines that Congress intended purely prospective application, i.e., no application to
pending cases, then the court need not apply the judicial
default rules employed in the second step of the Landgraf analysis because there is no risk of retroactive effect. Id. at 2062-63 ("Although Landgraf's default rules would deny application when a retroactive effect would otherwise result,
other construction rules may apply to remove even the
possibility of retroactivity . . . ."). In its approach, "[t]he Court relies on one canon of
statutory interpretation, expressio unius est esclusio alterius, to the exclusion of all others." Id. at 2068 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). "The Court's opinion rests almost entirely on the
negative inference that can be drawn from the fact that Congress expressly made Chapter 154, pertaining to capital
cases, applicable to pending cases, but did not make the same
express provision in regards to Chapter 153." Id. "Chapter 153" refers to sections 2242 and 2253-2255 of Chapter 153 of
Title 28 of the United States Code, which are amended by
sections 101-106 of the AEDPA. "Chapter 154" was created
by section 107 of the AEDPA and refers to new sections
2261-2266 of Title 28. Congress chose to make Chapter 154
explicitly applicable to pending cases. See Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 107(c),
110 Stat. 1214, 1226 (1996) ("EFFECTIVE DATE. --
Chapter 154 of title 28 . . . shall apply to cases pending on or
after the date of enactment of this Act.") Congress did not
say anything about the effective date of Chapter 153. The
Court read section 107(c), which made Chapter 154 explicitly
applicable to pending cases, as "indicating implicitly that the
amendments to chapter 153 were assumed and meant to apply
to the general run of habeas cases only when those cases had
been filed after the date of the Act." Lindh v. Murphy, supra, 117 S. Ct. at 2063. The Court distinguished procedural amendments, which it
recognized would most likely be applied to pending cases. Id. (citing Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 275)See footnote 6. The Court also suggested that had the legislative history of the two chapters been
different, it might have reached a different result. Id. at 2064. Though the two chapters began in separate bills in separate houses, they were brought together in the same bill before
section 107(c) was added. "The insertion of § 107(c) with its
different treatments of the two chapters thus illustrates the
familiar rule that negative implications raised by disparate
provisions are strongest when the portions of a statute treated
differently had already been joined together and were being
considered simultaneously when the language raising the
implication was inserted." Id. at 2065 (citing Field v. Mans, 116 S. Ct. 437, 446 (1995) ("The more apparently deliberate
the contrast, the stronger the inference, as applied, for
example to contrasting statutory sections originally enacted
simultaneously in relevant respects.")). 4. Legislative History of the PLRA Section 802 of the PLRA contains a provision similar to
that found in chapter 154 of the AEDPA making the section
applicable to pending cases.See footnote 7 On the other hand, section 803 of the PLRA does not contain an effective date, just like
chapter 153 of the AEDPA. The legislative history of
sections 802 and 803 of the PLRA is slightly different than
that of Chapters 153 and 154 of the AEDPA. The PLRA
represents the culmination of efforts to reform two areas of
prison litigation. First, the reformers desired to deter federal
courts from so closely managing state prison systems in the
context of supervising compliance with judicial decrees
mandating remedies for unconstitutional prison conditions in
litigation that has, in states such as Michigan, spanned
decades. Second, the reformers sought to deter the "torrent"
of frivolous civil rights lawsuits filed by prisoners. Congress first proposed reform legislation in Titles II and
III of the Violent Criminal Incarceration Act of 1995. H.R.
667, 104th Cong. (1995). Title II -- entitled Stop Turning Out Prisoners or STOP -- addressed the "judicial remedies"
concern. "The purpose of the STOP Act is to keep our
Federal courts from taking over State prisons." 141 Cong.
Rec. S2648-02, S2649 (daily ed. Feb. 14, 1995) (statement of
Sen. Hutchison)See footnote 8
. The STOP Act is the forerunner to section 802; both limit judicial remedies in prison condition litigation
by amending 18 U.S.C. § 3626. Since, like section 802, the
STOP Act was directed at ongoing litigation, it was made
expressly applicable to pending cases. Significantly, the
STOP Act included a limitation on attorney fees, which like
the rest of the STOP provisions, was applicable to pending
cases. Title III of H.R. 667 amended CRIPA and addressed
the "frivolous lawsuit" concern. Title III is the forerunner to
PLRA section 803; both intend to deter frivolous prisoner
suits by amending CRIPA. Title III's CRIPA amendments
were not given an effective date and, significantly, did not
contain a limitation on attorney fees. As it made its way through the legislative process, the
provision limiting attorney fees was moved from the STOP
Act to the CRIPA amendments in a bill introduced by Senator
Abraham of Michigan. S. 1275, 104th Cong. (1995). S. 1275
continued to expressly apply the STOP Act to pending cases
and to refrain from providing an effective date for the CRIPA
amendments. Thus, the attorney fee limitation was moved
from a section of the statute that was expressly applicable to
pending cases to a section that did not contain an effective
date. None of the measures in the CRIPA amendments
directed at stemming frivolous lawsuits included an effective
date. See S. 1275, 104th Cong. §§ 3-4 (1995). S. 1275
contains no reference to H.R. 667 nor any explanation of why
the attorney fee limitation was moved from the STOP Act to
the CRIPA amendments. Additional and extensive CRIPA amendments were
proposed in S. 866, a bill focused exclusively on stemming
frivolous lawsuits. S. 866, 104th Cong. (1996). The
provisions of S. 866 went on to become sections 803, 804,
805, 806 and 809 of the PLRA. S. 866 did not contain the
STOP Act or any limitation on attorney fees. The sponsors of
S. 866 subsequently introduced S. 1279, which incorporated
the STOP Act of S. 1275 and the CRIPA amendments of S.
866. The STOP Act was made expressly applicable to
pending cases and the CRIPA amendments were not. S. 1279
placed the attorney fee limitation in the CRIPA amendments,
which is where it would remain through passage of the PLRA. In the instant case then, "the language raising the
implication" was not inserted after the STOP and CRIPA amendments had been joined in one bill as was the case in
Lindh. Lindh v. Murphy, supra, 117 S. Ct. at 2065. We believe that any negative inference drawn from Congress'
decision to move the attorney fee provision from STOP to
CRIPA is weaker than the inference drawn in Lindh. Nonetheless, the identical negative inference that was drawn
in Lindh can be drawn when sections 802 and 803 are compared. Furthermore, nothing in the PLRA's legislative
history suggests that Congress intended section 803 to apply
to pending cases. In fact, we believe that the legislative
history suggests otherwise. As discussed above, the STOP
Act arose to address the perceived excesses of the federal
judiciary in pending litigation such as the instant cases and was logically made expressly applicable to pending cases. In
contrast, the CRIPA amendments are forward looking as they
are aimed at curtailing the filing of frivolous lawsuits. We have found nothing to suggest that the CRIPA amendments
were aimed at pending litigation. This interpretation is also
consistent with Wright v. Morris, supra, which held the exhaustion requirement of section 803(d) inapplicable to
pending cases. 5. Wright v. Morris PLRA section 803(d) governs the bringing of civil rights
lawsuits by prisoners. Entitled "Suits by Prisoners", the
section comprehensively amends section 7 of CRIPA, 42
U.S.C. § 1997e, which was formerly entitled "Exhaustion of
Remedies." In addition to the attorney fee limitation, section
803(d) requires the exhaustion of administrative remedies
before a prisoner may bring an action under section 1983. 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(a).See footnote 9
In Wright v. Morris, supra, this Court recently held that the plain language of the statute provides
that this exhaustion requirement does not apply to pending
cases. § 1997e. Suits by prisoners (a) Applicability of administrative remedies No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under . . . [42 U.S.C. § 1983] by a prisoner
confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility
until such administrative remedies as are available are
exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (emphasis supplied). Issued prior to
Lindh, we declined to conclude that section 803 of the PLRA was inapplicable to pending cases based solely on the
negative inference drawn from the fact that section 802 is
expressly applicable to pending cases. Wright, 111 F.3d at 418. Instead, we relied upon the statutory text alone: "[T]he
text of the new requirement plainly states that 'no action shall be brought' without exhaustion of administrative remedies." Id. We reasoned further:
Thus, it is likely that had Congress intended the new
requirement to pertain to pending cases it would have
employed the same language as it used in § 802(b)(1) to
make that intent clear. This strengthens our conclusion
that the text of the PLRA indicates that the new
administrative exhaustion requirement applies only to
cases filed after the Act's passage.
Id. Even though we declined to rely solely upon the negative inference, we found the fact that section 802 contains a
provision expressly applying it to pending cases to be
significant. Our interpretation of section 1997e(a) and reliance upon the
negative inference that arises when section 803 is read
together with section 802 is equally applicable when
analyzing the attorney fee limitation. Section 1997e(d)
admonishes that "fees shall not be awarded" in any way
inconsistent with the rest of the subsection. This language is
not meaningfully distinguishable from the temporal language
of section 1997e(a), emphasized above, which provides that
no action "shall be brought" prior to exhausting remedies and
which we've interpreted as applying prospectively only. C. Conclusion
In sum, our interpretation of section 803(d), 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(d), under Landgraf in Glover V controls our interpretation of that same section here. Because application
of the attorney fee provision would have an impermissible
retroactive effect in a pending case involving a petition of
attorney fees for pre-enactment work, section 803(d) cannot
be applied to pending cases regardless of when the underlying
legal work is performed. Further, the fact that Congress chose
to move the attorney fee provision from a section of the
PLRA made expressly applicable to pending cases to a
section without an effective date raises a negative inference under Lindh that Congress intended that the fee provision apply only to cases filed after enactment of the PLRA. Finally, under Wright, the plain language of section 803(d), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d), is prospective. For all of these reasons,
we hold that the attorney fee provision of the PLRA is
inapplicable to cases brought before the statute was enacted
whether the underlying work was performed before or after
the enactment date of the statute. IV. THE PREVAILING PARTY STANDARD IN POST- JUDGMENT INSTITUTIONAL REFORM
We next turn to whether plaintiffs are prevailing parties in
these various appeals. A. The Law In The Sixth Circuit 1. Glover v. Johnson (Glover III) In Glover III, this Court rejected the same "prevailing party" argument that is advanced by defendants here. We
held that "plaintiffs may rely on the trial court's 1985 order to
establish that they are prevailing parties and, pursuant to that
order, plaintiffs have succeeded on a significant issue." Glover III, supra, 934 F.2d at 716. We also held that moving for contempt to compel compliance with earlier District Court
orders is a compensable post-judgment monitoring activity. Id. at 715-16. (citing Northcross v. Board of Education of Memphis City Schools, 611 F.2d 624, 637 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911 (1980)). In so holding, we rejected defendants' argument that prevailing party status was
dependent upon the outcome of their appeal of the District
Court's contempt findings. Id. We also upheld the award despite reversing the District Court in part because it
interpreted its remedial order beyond the order's express
terms in two areas. Id. at 712 (vocational training), 713 (work pass program). Thus, when plaintiffs seek fees for
compliance monitoring, plaintiffs are not required to again establish prevailing party status, nor is the award dependent
upon the outcome of an appeal. 2. Northcross v. Board of Education of Memphis City Schools Defendants rely heavily, if not exclusively, on our
statement in Northcross in their argument that plaintiffs are not entitled to fees unless they prevail on each post-judgment
dispute. There we stated, "[t]he [1977] hearings [which
involved plaintiffs' work defending a desegration plan from
attack] were collateral to and distinct from the desegregation
suit itself, which had been finally terminated in 1974, so had
the plaintiffs failed to prevail on the merits the district court
would have been justified in denying fees altogether." Northcross, 611 F.2d. We believe that this reliance is misplaced for several reasons. First, because the Northcross plaintiffs prevailed in defending the remedy and because the
Court held that plaintiffs are prevailing parties, this statement
is dicta. Second, defending a remedy from collateral attack is
indistinguishable from affirmatively moving for contempt to
enforce compliance with the remedy because both activities
share the same purpose of protecting court-ordered relief. See
Jenkins v. State of Missouri, 127 F.3d 709, 717 (8th Cir. 1997) (compliance monitoring, enforcement of the remedy,
and defense of the remedy are generally viewed as "necessary
adjuncts to the initial litigation" and compensable). Finally,
the Northcross dicta relied upon by defendants is inconsistent with Glover III, which held that compliance monitoring is compensable regardless of the degree of success or the
outcome of appeals. Glover III does not however definitively answer how courts should handle the prevailing party issue when unsuccessful
legal work for which fees are requested does not relate to
compliance monitoring or otherwise protecting a remedy
previously affirmed or not appealed. In such cases, we elect
to follow the approach outlined recently by the Eight Circuit. In an ongoing school desegregation case involving the
Kansas City School District, the Eighth Circuit had occasion
to examine the prevailing party issue when the Supreme Court
struck down the use of certain remedial measures employed
in the court-approved desegregation plan. Jenkins v. State of Missouri, supra. Because the Supreme Court's decision did not affect the district court's underlying holding that the State
of Missouri had committed constitutional violations and was
obligated to remedy those violations, the court found that the
decision did not "retroactively take away the Jenkins class's
status as a prevailing party." Id., 127 F.3d at 714 (discussing Balark v. City of Chicago, 81 F.3d 658, 665 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that prospective termination of a 10-year-old consent
decree pursuant to Rule 60(b) -- as opposed to reversal on
direct appeal -- did not deprive plaintiffs of prevailing party
status, which they enjoyed for 10 years). The Eighth Circuit
treated the prevailing party question as a "threshold" issue
and went on to examine "whether fees should be awarded for
matters on which the plaintiff lost." Id. at 716. The Jenkins court applied the paradigm of Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983), a case involving a civil rights plaintiff who had prevailed on some but not all issues, to the
prevailing party issue surrounding post-judgment fees in
institutional reform cases. Id. (citing Assoc. for Retarded Citizens v. Schafer, 83 F.3d 1008, 1010-12, (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 482 (1996)). The test asks first whether the issues in the post-judgment litigation are "inextricably
intertwined with those on which the plaintiff prevailed in the
underlying suit or whether they are distinct." Id. at 717. Compliance monitoring, enforcement of the remedy, and
defense of the remedy are generally viewed as "necessary
adjuncts to the initial litigation" and compensable. Id. Other activities, such as efforts to expand the scope of the original
relief obtained, may amount to the assertion of distinct new
claims that cannot rest upon the prevailing party
determination in the underlying case. Id. When the issues are intertwined, plaintiffs are entitled to fees, i.e., they maintain
their prevailing party status. Id. at 718. If on the other hand, the issues are distinct, plaintiffs are entitled to fees only if
they prevail on the separate issue. Id. at 717 (discussing Arvinger v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 31 F.3d 196, 202 (4th Cir. 1994) and Schafer, supra, which denied prevailing party status on strength of underlying litigation
under these circumstances). In applying this analysis to the
facts before it, the Jenkins court concluded that the issues that went up to the Supreme Court were related to the issues on
which the Jenkins class prevailed as the plaintiffs were placed
in the position of defending the scope of the district court's
remedial authority. Id. at 719.See footnote 10
B. Application of The Glover III/Jenkins Standard 1. The Compliance Committee Appeals In yet another Glover appeal, appeal no. 96-1852, defendants raised the identical prevailing party issue with
respect to the same Compliance Committee fees at issue here,
albeit for a different time period. In our recently-issued
decision, we held that plaintiffs were prevailing parties in
these appeals by virtue of defendants' voluntary dismissal and
that the work was otherwise compensable as post-judgment
compliance monitoring. Glover V, supra, at 46. We therefore reject this portion of defendants' challenge. 2. The Termination Appeal
The analysis of the termination appeal fee award is
controlled by Glover III. Defendants do not argue that the work was unrelated to ensuring compliance with court orders
or that the work was unrelated to the underlying issues on
which plaintiffs prevailed. As the District Court found: "[T]he relief sought amounted to a complete termination of the Remedial Plan. Work provided by plaintiffs' counsel on
this issue was critically related to monitoring compliance with
the judgment."See footnote 11
Rather, defendants argue that the prevailing party issue cannot be decided without awaiting the outcome
of appeal no. 95-1521. As explained above, this argument
was made and rejected once before. Glover III, 934 F.2d at 715-16. Additionally, we vacated the judgment denying the motion
to terminate in appeal no. 95-1521, and, in lieu of assessing
whether substantial compliance has been achieved, we
retained jurisdiction and remanded the matter to the District
Court for a new determination of whether a disparity now
violation of the First Amendment. Glover V, supra, pp. 26- 28. Given this outcome, we hold that plaintiffs have
prevailed in appeal no. 95-1521. We further hold that this
work qualifies as compensable post-judgment compliance
monitoring because plaintiffs sought to protect the remedy
ordered by the District Court for the equal protection
violations and access to court violations it found so many
3. The Parental Rights Appeal The remaining issue concerns the fees related to the
parental rights appeal and petition for certiorari. This appeal
originated when plaintiffs filed a motion for injunctive relief
to compel compliance with the District Court's orders
regarding court access. Glover v. Johnson, 850 F. Supp. 592 (E.D. Mich. 1994). Plaintiffs were prompted by defendants'
notice of decision to reduce funding for Prison Legal Services
("PLS"), the agency which provides legal assistance to female
inmates, and to wholly eliminate PLS' provision of legal
assistance on parental rights matters. The District Court
interpreted its earlier orders on court access as having ordered
the indefinite continuation of defendants' contract with PLS,
which since 1978 had required PLS to provide assistance in
the area of parental rights, and held defendants in contempt of
those earlier orders. Id. at 594. The District Court also concluded that the elimination of legal assistance in the area
of parental rights would violate plaintiffs' newly-enunciated
constitutional right to legal assistance in parental rights
matters. Id. at 595-601. The district court proceedings were broader than those on
appeal. What is relevant for our purposes here is not what
happened below, but instead the issues litigated on appeal. Appeal no. 96-1617 was limited to whether defendants were
required by court order or by the Constitution to provide
plaintiff inmates with legal assistance in parental rights
matters. Plaintiffs lost on both issues. Glover IV, supra, 75 F.3d 264. In reversing, we first held that the court had abused its
discretion in holding defendants in contempt because we
found no order requiring the funding of legal assistance in any
particular area of law. In the absence of a violated order, the
contempt finding could not be sustained. Id. at 267. Next, we held that defendants are not constitutionally required to
provide plaintiffs legal assistance in parental rights matters. Id. at 269. The Supreme Court denied plaintiffs' petition for certiorari. 117 S. Ct. 67 (1996). In awarding fees for appellate work on this matter, the
District Court acknowledged this Court's conclusion that
defendants had provided legal services for parental rights
matters without the support of a direct order but nevertheless
concluded that the "work done by plaintiff contesting the termination of services was a post-judgment monitoring
activity and is therefore compensable." We disagree with this
conclusion. Given the lack of any remedial order, plaintiffs'
counsel's efforts might best be characterized as a failed
offensive attempt to expand the remedy. In such
circumstances courts are less inclined to award fees. See, e.g., Ustrak v. Fairman, 851 F.2d 983, 990 (7th Cir. 1988). Plaintiffs' attorneys' efforts do not qualify as post-judgment
compliance monitoring and plaintiffs cannot rely upon their
status as prevailing parties in the underlying litigation. We
therefore reverse this portion of the challenged awards given
plaintiffs' lack of success in appeal no. 96-1617 and in the
petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court. C. Conclusion Defendants' challenges to the award of fees for work on the
Compliance Committee appeals and on the termination appeal
are rejected because the work is compensable compliance
monitoring and because plaintiffs prevailed. Defendants'
challenge to the award of fees for the unsuccessful work on
the parental rights appeal and petition for certiorari is
sustained because this claim went beyond the underlying
litigation and plaintiffs did not prevail.
V. OTHER ISSUES ARISING IN GLOVER A. The District Court's Denial of Defendants' Objections To The Award As Unreasonable Was
Not Clearly Erroneous Defendants objected to 47.4 hours in plaintiffs' fee petition
as "frivolous" and "unnecessary"; 48.7 hours as "excessive"
and "inappropriate"; and 18.9 hours as "non-Glover" related. The District Court found that "defendants' broad objections
and conclusory allegations" were an insufficient basis for
denying these fees. On appeal, defendants make absolutely no effort to add
specificity to their objections or to otherwise substantiate their claims. Defendants argue that plaintiffs have filed
"unnecessary" and "frivolous" pleadings without identifying those pleadings for this Court or explaining why any such pleadings were unnecessary or frivolous. Defendants'
argument that certain fees were "non-Glover related" is just
a rehashing of their "prevailing party" argument, which we
have rejected on numerous occasions. The District Court was
not clearly erroneous in rejecting defendants' objections as an
insufficient basis to deny fees which have been carefully
documented by plaintiffs' counsel. B. Whether the District Court Erred in Refusing to Approve An Award of Fees For Paralegals At The
Prevailing Market Rate Despite finding that $80 was well within the prevailing
market rate for paralegals, the District Court refused to
approve that rate because the rate established for paralegals in
its order 1990 was $45 per hour. We conclude that the
District Court did not abuse its discretion in so refusing. Plaintiffs could have submitted a petition for a higher rate
before or while the services were being rendered if a higher
rate was necessary.
C. Appeal No. 97-1218 The last appeal, No. 97-1218, involves a challenge to the District Court's order of January 31, 1997 enjoining
defendants from eliminating funding for provision of legal
services to women prisoners at current levels. The order
terminated by its own terms upon a decision in appeal No. 96-
1931, which was pending at the time of the court's ruling. Thus, the issues raised in appeal no. 97-1218 became moot
upon entry of our opinion in Glover V, supra, which decided, among others, appeal no. 96-1931.
VI. CONCLUSION We dismiss appeal no. 97-1218 as moot. In appeal nos. 96- 2567/2568, 96-2586/2588 and 97-1272, we affirm in part, reverse in part and remand the cases to the District Court for
a recalculation of the fee awards in a manner consistent with
NATHANIEL R. JONES, Circuit Judge, concurring. I
generally concur in the majority's well drafted opinion. However, I write separately to express my disagreement with
the majority's reversal of the district court's award of
attorney's fees for work in the parental rights appeal, No. 96-
1617, and the subsequent petition for certiorari to the
Supreme Court. Although the plaintiffs were not ultimately
successful in the appeal, I feel that this work, along with all of
the other work plaintiffs' counsel performed in this case, was
compensable post-judgment compliance monitoring and
related to the underlying equal protection and access to court
claims upon which plaintiffs prevailed in their original action. I would therefore affirm all of the fee awards in this case. FOOTNOTES
Plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration of the constitutional challenges they made to the PLRA's fee provision in Glover, No. 96- 2586/2588, which the court denied. Plaintiffs timely appealed the denial
of its motion. Because we decide that the PLRA fee provision is
inapplicable to this case, we need not and do not reach plaintiffs'
constitutional arguments.Footnote: 2
The Act is found in Title VIII of the omnibus appropriations bill for fiscal year 1996 for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the
Judiciary, and Related Agencies.Footnote: 3
The Act amends the following: 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (Section 802 - Appropriate Remedies For Prison Conditions); 42 U.S.C. § 1997 (Section
803 - Amendments To Civil Rights Of Institutionalized Persons Act); 11
U.S.C. § 523(a) (Section 804 - Proceedings In Forma Pauperis); 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915 (Section 804 - Proceedings In Forma Pauperis); 23 U.S.C.
§ 1346(b) (Section 806 - Federal Tort Claims); and 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)
(Section 809 - Earned Release Credit or Good Time Credit Revocation). The Act also adds provisions, including new sections 1915A (Section 805
- Judicial Screening) and 1932 (Section 809 - Earned Release Credit or
Good Time Credit Revocation) to title 28 of the United States Code.Footnote: 4
See, e.g., 141 Cong. Rec. S14316 (daily ed., Sept. 26, 1995) (statement of Sen. Abraham) ("The legislation I am introducing today [S. 1275] will
return sanity and State control to our prison systems by limiting judicial
remedies in prison cases [such as those in the State of Michigan] . . . .");
141 Cong. Rec. S14414 (daily ed., Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Dole) ("These guidelines will work to restrain liberal federal judges who
see violations on [sic] constitutional rights in every prisoner complaint
who have used these complaints to micromanage state and local
prisons."). Footnote: 5
See, e.g., 141 Cong. Rec. S14316 (daily ed., Sept. 26, 1995) (statement of Sen. Abraham) (in addition to problems with "massive judicial
interventions in state prison systems, we also have [the problem of]
frivolous inmate litigation); 141 Cong. Rec. S14414 (daily ed., Sept. 27,
1995) (statement of Sen. Dole) (legislation introduced, S. 1279, will
address the "alarming number of frivolous lawsuits" filed by prisoners).Footnote: 6
In Landgraf, the Court considered without deciding whether attorney fee provisions are procedural or whether they affect substantive rights. Compare Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 277 ("[a]ttorney's fee determinations are 'collateral to the main cause of action'") (citations omitted), with
Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 292 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("holding a person liable for attorney's fees affects a 'substantive right'"). In Glover V, we rejected the argument that attorney fee provisions can never result in
retroactive effect because they may be procedural in nature or are
collateral to the main cause of action. Glover V, supra, at 43. "[L]aws regulating litigation conduct [including attorney fee provisions] often
impact the substantive rights of the parties as well. . . [and must be
scrutinized under the Supreme Court's retroactivity analysis]. Id.Footnote: 7
Section 802(b)(1) provides that section 802(a), which amends 18 U.S.C. § 3626, "shall apply with respect to all prospective relief whether
such relief was originally granted or approved before, on, or after the date
of the enactment of this title."Footnote: 8
Senator Hutchison of Texas introduced S. 400 in the Senate, which was identical to Title II of H.R. 667.Footnote: 9
Under section 803(d), a court may sua sponte dismiss a civil rights action filed by a prisoner, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c); a prisoner may not bring
an action for emotional injury without a showing of physical injury, id. § 1997e(e); courts are instructed to conduct hearings by phone to the extent
practicable, id. § 1997e(f); and civil rights defendants may waive their right to reply to a complaint without prejudice, id. § 1997e(g). Footnote: 10
The Jenkins court went on to examine the reasonableness of the fee award and reduced the fee amount by 50% to reflect plaintiffs' limited
success. Id. at 718-20. We express no opinion on this portion of the decision.Footnote: 11
The District Court had ruled in an earlier opinion of May 30, 1996, that a decision on fees related to work on No. 95-1521 would be stayed
pending the outcome of the appeal. However, the District Court must
have reconsidered the issue because it granted both fee petitions involved
here, which included fees for work in No. 95-1521.