Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/448/136/case.html
Timestamp: 2018-05-24 07:44:48
Document Index: 447830765

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 40641', '§ 40', '§ 40', 'Art. 1', '§ 8', '§ 405']

White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, (full text) :: 448 U.S. 136 (1980) :: Justia US Supreme Court Center
Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 448 › White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker › Case
In 1971 respondents [Footnote 4] sought to impose on Pinetop the two state taxes at issue here. The first, a motor carrier license tax, is assessed on "[e]very common motor carrier of property and every contract motor carrier of property." Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 40641(A)(1) (Supp. 1979). Pinetop is a "contract motor carrier of property," since it is engaged in "the transportation by motor vehicle of property, for compensation, on any public highway." § 40-601(A)(1) (1974). The motor carrier license tax amounts to 2.5% of the carrier's gross receipts. § 40-641(A)(1) (Supp. 1979). The second tax at issue is an excise or use fuel tax designed "[f]or the
Although "[g]eneralizations on this subject have become . . . treacherous," Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U. S. 145, 411 U. S. 148 (1973), our decisions establish several basic principles with respect to the boundaries between state regulatory authority and tribal self-government. Long ago, the Court departed from Mr. Chief Justice Marshall's view that "the laws of [a State] can have no force" within reservation boundaries, Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 31 U. S. 561 (1832). [Footnote 9] See Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U. S. 463, 425 U. S. 481-483
(1976); New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326 U. S. 498 (1946); Utah & Northern R. Co. v. Fisher, 116 U. S. 28 (1885). At the same time, we have recognized that he Indian tribes retain "attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory." United States v. Mazurie, 419 U. S. 544, 419 U. S. 557 (1975). See also United States v. Wheeler, 435 U. S. 313, 435 U. S. 323 (1978); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U. S. 49, 436 U. S. 55-56 (1978). As a result, there is no rigid rule by which to resolve the question whether a particular state law may be applied to an Indian reservation or to tribal members. The status of the tribes has been described as "an anomalous one and of complex character,'" for, despite their partial assimilation into American culture, the tribes have retained
Congress has broad power to regulate tribal affairs under the Indian Commerce Clause, Art. 1, § 8, cl 3. See United States v. Wheeler, supra at 435 U. S. 322-323. This congressional authority and the "semi-independent position" of Indian tribes have given rise to two independent but related barriers to the assertion of state regulatory authority over tribal reservations and members. First, the exercise of such authority may be preempted by federal law. See, e.g., Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U. S. 685 (1965); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, supra. Second, it may unlawfully infringe "on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them." Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217, 358 U. S. 220 (1959). See also Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U. S. 463, 439 U. S. 502 (1979); Fisher
v. District Court, 424 U. S. 382 (1976) (per curiam); Kennerly v. District Court of Montana, 400 U. S. 423 (1971). The two barriers are independent because either, standing alone, can be a sufficient basis for holding state law inapplicable to activity undertaken on the reservation or by tribal members. They are related, however, in two important ways. The right of tribal self-government is ultimately dependent on and subject to the broad power of Congress. Even so, traditional notions of Indian self-government are so deeply engrained in our jurisprudence that they have provided an important "backdrop," McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, supra at 411 U. S. 172, against which vague or ambiguous federal enactments must always be measured.
The unique historical origins of tribal sovereignty make it generally unhelpful to apply to federal enactments regulating Indian tribes those standards of preemption that have emerged in other areas of the law. Tribal reservations are not States, and the differences in the form and nature of their sovereignty make it treacherous to import to one notions of preemption that are properly applied to the other. The tradition of Indian sovereignty over the reservation and tribal members must inform the determination whether the exercise of state authority has been preempted by operation of federal law. Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, supra at 425 U. S. 475. As we have repeatedly recognized, this tradition is reflected and encouraged in a number of congressional enactments demonstrating a firm federal policy of promoting tribal self-sufficiency and economic development. [Footnote 10] Ambiguities in federal
When on-reservation conduct involving only Indians is at issue, state law is generally inapplicable, for the State's regulatory interest is likely to be minimal, and the federal interest in encouraging tribal self-government is at its strongest. See Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, supra at 425 U. S. 480-481; McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n. More difficult questions arise where, as here, a State asserts authority over the conduct of non-Indians engaging in activity on the reservation. In such cases, we have examined the language of the relevant federal treaties and statutes in terms of both the broad
With these principles in mind, we turn to the respondents' claim that they may, consistent with federal law, impose the contested motor vehicle license and use fuel taxes on the logging and hauling operations of petitioner Pinetop. At the outset, we observe that the Federal Government's regulation of the harvesting of Indian timber is comprehensive. That regulation takes the form of Acts of Congress, detailed regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior, and day-to-day supervision by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Under 25 U.S.C. §§ 405-407, the Secretary of the Interior is granted broad authority over the sale of timber on the reservation. [Footnote 12]
In these circumstances, we agree with petitioners that the federal regulatory scheme is so pervasive as to preclude the additional burdens sought to be imposed in this case. Respondents seek to apply their motor vehicle license and use fuel taxes on Pinetop for operations that are conducted solely on Bureau and tribal roads within the reservation. [Footnote 14] There is no room for these taxes in the comprehensive federal regulatory scheme. In a variety of ways, the assessment of state taxes would obstruct federal policies. And equally important, respondents have been unable to identify any regulatory function or service performed by the State that would justify
to the contrary. That is simply not the law. In a number of cases we have held that state authority over non-Indians acting on tribal reservations is preempted, even though Congress has offered no explicit statement on the subject. See Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U. S. 685 (1965); Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217 (1958); Kennerly v. District Court of Montana, 400 U. S. 423 (1971). The Court has repeatedly emphasized that there is a significant geographical component to tribal sovereignty, a component which remains highly relevant to the preemption inquiry; though the reservation boundary is not absolute, it remains an important factor to weigh in determining whether state authority has exceeded the permissible limits. "The cases in this Court have consistently guarded the authority of Indian governments over their reservations.'" United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. at 419 U. S. 558, quoting Williams v. Lee, supra, at 358 U. S. 223. Moreover, it is undisputed that the economic burden of the asserted taxes will ultimately fall on the Tribe. [Footnote 15] Where, as here, the Federal Government has undertaken comprehensive regulation of the harvesting and sale of tribal timber, where a number of the policies underlying the federal regulatory scheme are threatened by the taxes respondents seek to impose, and where respondents are unable to justify the taxes except in terms of a generalized interest in raising revenue, we believe that the proposed exercise of state authority is impermissible. [Footnote 16]
Id. at 380 U. S. 691. The present case, we conclude,
Between November 1971 and May 1976, Pinetop paid under protest use fuel taxes of $19,114.59 and motor carrier license taxes of $14,701.42. The Arizona Court of Appeals determined that the latter assessment improperly denied Pinetop a 60% credit to which it was entitled under state law. [Footnote 2/1] After allowance for that credit, the total amount of the disputed taxes for the 4 1/2-year period is reduced to about $25,000 or $5,000-$6,000 per year.
Although Pinetop represents that its use of the Arizona state highways within the reservation is extremely limited, it does not dispute its tax liability for such use. On the other hand, in this Court, the State expressly conceded that its assessments were improper under state law to the extent that they applied to operations on either private logging roads [Footnote 2/3]
or tribal roads. [Footnote 2/4] If it is conceded that the State may tax Pinetop's use of public roads maintained by the State and may not tax the use of tribal or private roads, the question that arises is whether the public roads maintained by the
Bureau of Indian Affairs are more akin to the former or to the latter. It appears that the BIA roads are like the state highways, insofar as they are open to use by the general public. [Footnote 2/5] On the other hand, it also appears that they were constructed
Even assuming, however, that the state courts would uphold the imposition of taxes based on the use of BIA roads, despite their similarities to private and tribal roads, I would not find those taxes to be preempted by federal law. In Warren Trading Post v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U. S. 685, the Court held that state taxation of a non-Indian doing business with a tribe on the reservation was preempted because the taxes threatened to "disturb and disarrange" a pervasive scheme of federal regulation, and because there was no governmental interest on the State's part in imposing such a burden. See Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, post at 448 U. S. 168 (STEWART, J., dissenting). In this case, we may assume, arguendo, that the second factor relied