Source: https://www.flra.gov/decisions/v49/49-082.html
Timestamp: 2016-12-05 14:29:35
Document Index: 251926016

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 5596', '§ 7701', '§ 7701', '§ 7701', '§ 7701', '§ 7701', '§ 7701', '§ 7701', 'art: 1']

49:0858(82)AR - - HHS, SSA, Baltimore, MD and AFGE, Local 1923 - - 1994 FLRAdec AR - - v49 p858 | FLRA
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The decision of the Authority follows: 49 FLRA No. 82 FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY WASHINGTON, D.C. _____ U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION BALTIMORE, MARYLAND (Agency) and AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES LOCAL 1923 (Union) 0-AR-2535 _____ DECISION April 29, 1994 _____ Before Chairman McKee and Members Talkin and
Union's exceptions. The Arbitrator denied the Union attorney's request for attorney fees in
connection with a grievance. The Arbitrator found that the parties had agreed
to the amount of attorney fees in a settlement agreement. The Arbitrator also
held that, even in the absence of the settlement agreement, an award of
attorney fees was not warranted under the Back Pay Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 5596. For the following reasons, we conclude that the Union's
exceptions fail to establish that the award is deficient and we will deny the
exceptions. II. Background and Arbitrator's Award Prior to the arbitration in this case, the Union had filed a grievance
asserting that certain Agency employees were entitled to overtime pay and night
pay differentials for work performed at their homes since 1982. The grievance
was not resolved and was submitted to arbitration before Arbitrator Joseph M.
Stone. Arbitrator Stone issued an award in April 1989, granting in part and
denying in part the grievance. Both parties filed exceptions to Arbitrator
Stone's award with the Authority. On October 31, 1990, in U.S. Department of Health and Human
Federation of Government Employees, Local 1923, 37 FLRA 1469
(1990) (SSA), the Authority found that the award was deficient, modified
part of the award, and vacated that part of the award in which Arbitrator Stone
denied backpay for overtime for answering telephone calls at home. The
Authority directed the parties to make the determinations as to which employees
were entitled to compensation and the amount of compensation to which they were
entitled for answering telephone calls at home. The Authority stated that
"[a]ppropriate means for making these determinations would include mutual
agreement of the parties, resubmission to [Arbitrator Stone], or submission to
arbitration before another arbitrator." Id. at 1479-80 (citation
omitted). On November 19, 1990, the Union's attorney, Irving Becker,
submitted a request for attorney fees to Arbitrator Stone for work performed in
SSA from February 23, 1988, through November 19, 1990. The
parties resolved the issue of attorney fees in a settlement agreement on
March 25, 1991, in which the Agency agreed to pay the Union's attorney
$25,000 in attorney fees and the attorney "agreed to accept the $25,000 'in
full settlement and satisfaction of all attorneys fees in connection with
[SSA].'" Award at 4 (quoting Settlement Agreement As To Attorney
Fees at 2).(*) In March 1993, after a final agreement was reached on the amount of
compensation for the grievants in the SSA case, the Union's attorney
submitted a request for additional attorney fees for his services in the
negotiation of the grievants' compensation. The Union's attorney "requested
$4,584 in fees for 25 hours of work performed from 1988 through 1992" and
"$18,581.25 in fees for work performed from 1991 through March of 1993."
Id. The Agency denied this request and the matter was submitted to
arbitration. During the arbitration proceeding, the Union's attorney also
requested an additional amount of attorney fees for preparing for the
arbitration. The Arbitrator framed the issue at arbitration as: Whether claimant is entitled to attorney fees beyond the amount
specified in a signed settlement agreement dated March 25,
1991. Id. at 1. The Union's attorney contended before the Arbitrator that "the
settlement agreement [did] not preclude him from obtaining fees for work that
was not a part of the original fee application submitted to Arbitrator Stone."
Id. at 5. The Arbitrator noted that the Union's attorney claimed
"for the first time in his response brief, that the fees he requested were for
work he performed on behalf of three separate classes of claimants." Id.
at 7. The Arbitrator stated that the three classes of claimants were the
original grievants in SSA, employees who filed claims after the decision
in SSA, and supervisors who were not claimants in SSA. The Agency asserted before the Arbitrator that the settlement agreement
precluded the Union's attorney from receiving any additional attorney fees and
that the Union's attorney was not entitled to additional fees under the Back
Pay Act because he did not perform legal work. Rather, the Agency contended,
the work performed by the attorney was administrative. The Agency also
contended that attorney fees were not appropriate for the negotiations over the
amount of backpay due the grievants because the negotiations did not constitute
litigation and, therefore, the grievants were not prevailing parties. The
Agency maintained that the attorney fee request did not meet any of the other
requirements for an award of attorney fees under the Back Pay Act, including
the requirements for a showing that the fees would be in the interest of
justice and that the amount requested was reasonable. The Arbitrator examined the settlement agreement and noted that the
agreement provided that the payment of $25,000 in attorney fees was "in 'full
settlement' of 'all attorney's fees in connection with' the aforementioned
arbitration case [in SSA]." Id. at 10 (quoting Settlement
Agreement As To Attorney Fees at 2). The Arbitrator stated: This language is quite broad. There is no reservation of [Mr.
Becker's] right to make a subsequent fee request. In order for Mr. Becker's
claim to go forward, therefore, he has to argue that these fees were, in
effect, for a new case. In his rebuttal comments, Mr. Becker clearly adopts
this view by arguing without significant reference to the prior arbitration
case. Id. at 11. The Arbitrator noted that the case before him had a different case
number and involved "claims for fees by Mr. Becker for work done on behalf
of the original grievants [in the case before Arbitrator Stone in SSA],
other grievants who filed after the first case, and some non-bargaining unit
employees." Id. The Arbitrator stated: The fact remains, however, that this matter principally derives
itself from the original arbitration case and the subsequent FLRA decision.
Both that case and the FLRA decision are referenced in the March 25, 1991
agreement. The FLRA decision, furthermore, specifically directed the parties to
either negotiate over the back pay for the grievants or [] submit the matter to
arbitration. This is much like an appellate court that returns a matter to a
trial court for further deliberation. That is not a new proceeding. In
addition, the work that Mr. Becker performed and is claiming fees for directly
related to his negotiations on behalf of these grievants and the subsequent
filing of a request for arbitration in accordance with that FLRA decision. The
"connection" between the matter before me and the aforementioned arbitration
case is a direct one. Based on this, I believe that Mr. Becker already has
agreed to the amount of fees he would receive in this matter. Id. at 11-12. With regard to the arguments concerning entitlement of the Union's
attorney to attorney fees under the Back Pay Act, the Arbitrator stated that
even if the settlement agreement did not cover the fees requested by the
Union's attorney, he had "trouble with at least two (2) elements that need to
be established for attorney's fees payments under the Back Pay Act." Id.
The Arbitrator noted that the criteria for awarding attorney fees are set forth
in 5 U.S.C. § 7701(g). He found that the first criterion had
been met and that the attorney had an attorney-client relationship with the
Union. However, the Arbitrator found that the Union had not established that it
was a prevailing party in the negotiations that followed the decision in
SSA. Rather, he found that the parties had merely negotiated concerning
what type of information was needed in order for a claim for backpay pursuant
to the decision in SSA to be considered. The Arbitrator stated that
"this concept of prevailing party involves instances in which one side has been
successful in a 'litigation.' Mr. Becker appears to be extending this theory to
negotiation situations." Id. at 13. The Arbitrator found that there
was nothing "adversarial with respect to the specific claims[,]" and he
concluded that "these facts do not support a finding that the grievants were
prevailing parties as defined above." Id. at 14. The Arbitrator also found that, even if the amount of attorney fees
were not limited by the settlement agreement, an award of attorney fees would
not be in the interest of justice. He rejected, "for lack of testimony or
persuasive evidence[,]" the argument of the Union's attorney that "the
circumstances supported a finding that fees should be awarded in the interest
of justice because 'some of the [A]gency officials' did not appear to accept
and work with existing statutory and regulatory requirements." Id.
at 15. The Arbitrator found that the interest of justice standard applied
in instances in which an agency engaged in gross misconduct and "Mr. Becker did
not provide sufficient evidence to establish this." Id. The Arbitrator made the following rulings and denied the attorney fee
request: 1. Mr. Becker signed a[n] Attorney's Fee Agreement on March 25,
1991, that would pay him all of his fees and was a full settlement in
connection with the arbitration case. 2. That arbitration case and the subsequent FLRA decision directly
spawned the additional work performed by Mr. Becker on behalf of the
grievants. 3. Even if this were a separate case not governed by the
March 25th agreement, Mr. Becker failed to establish that he was the
'prevailing party' or that the interest of justice' would be served by awarding
him fees. Id. at 16. III. Positions of the Parties A. The Union The Union contends that the award is contrary to provisions of the Back
Pay Act and rules and regulations pertaining to the awarding of attorney fees.
In particular, the Union contends that the Arbitrator erred by finding that:
(1) the Union was not a prevailing party in the matter of negotiating a
backpay settlement pursuant to SSA; and (2) an award of backpay
would not be in the interest of justice. The Union asserts that attorney fees
can be awarded even in instances, such as this, in which the Union prevailed on
behalf of grievants through a settlement instead of litigation. The Union
maintains that the requirement that attorney fees be in the interest of justice
was met because the Agency knew or should have known that it would not prevail
in its efforts to reduce the amount of backpay that was due to claimants
pursuant to SSA. With respect to the Arbitrator's enforcement of the settlement
agreement, the Union contends that the Arbitrator based his award on nonfacts
and that the award is not based on the evidence. The Union maintains that the
Arbitrator misunderstood the Authority's decision in SSA and that he
erroneously regarded that decision as a remand, rather than a final decision.
The Union asserts that the award is based on a nonfact because "[t]here is no
evidence whatsoever that the fees referred to in the Settlement Agreement of
March 25, 1991, dealt with fees which would be incurred in the future."
Exceptions at 12. The Union maintains that "there is no basis whatsoever
for the Arbitrator to speculate, or conjecture that the purpose of the
Agreement of March 25, [1991], was to forever bar the Applicant to file
for fees for work performed subsequent to November 21, 1990." Id.
at 13. The Union also maintains that the award is incomplete because the
Arbitrator did not address the claim for attorney fees for representing
employees who were not parties to the original grievance in SSA. B. The Agency The Agency asserts that the Arbitrator properly interpreted the plain
language of the settlement agreement to conclude that the Union's attorney had
agreed with the Agency to accept $25,000 in settlement of all attorney fees in
connection with SSA. The Agency maintains that the Union's attorney was
aware of what he agreed to and that he signed the agreement voluntarily. The
Agency contends that the Union is merely disagreeing with the Arbitrator's
interpretation and application of the settlement agreement. The Agency further contends that the Arbitrator correctly found that
the Union was not a prevailing party and that an award of attorney fees was not
in the interest of justice. The Agency maintains that the Union has failed to
establish that the negotiation of the backpay settlement arising out of
SSA constituted litigation in which the Union was a prevailing party.
Finally, the Agency contends that the award is complete and that the Arbitrator
did address the Union's claims for attorney fees in connection with the backpay
claims of employees who were not among the original grievants in
SSA. IV. Analysis and Conclusions When exceptions are filed to arbitration awards resolving requests for
the arbitrator has complied with applicable statutory standards. See
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Chicago Region and National Treasury
Employees Union Chapter 242, 45 FLRA 437, 453 (1992). When the exceptions
concern the standards established under 5 U.S.C. § 7701(g), the
Authority applies the decisions of the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB)
and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Id. In this case, the issue before the Arbitrator concerned whether
the Union's attorney was entitled to additional fees beyond those specified in
the settlement agreement of March 25, 1991. In cases similar to this, the
MSPB, the Federal Circuit, and another court of appeals have recognized that
parties to a dispute for which attorney fees may be awarded can agree as to the
appropriate amount of such fees. In such cases, the party requesting fees can
effectively waive its claims to attorney fees beyond the amount agreed upon.
See Paderick v. Office of Personnel Management, 54 MSPR 456
(1992), citing Greco v. Department of the Army, 852 F.2d 558,
560-61 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (Greco) and Wakefield v. Matthews,
852 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1988). In Greco, the court found, based on
the language in a settlement agreement covering attorney fees, that the
agreement was applicable to all aspects of the underlying case, including
compliance. With respect to the argument that the settlement agreement should
not be interpreted to extend to future proceedings arising from the case, the
court stated: While it may be true that the parties could not have foreseen the
protracted compliance proceeding which developed, it is clear that the parties'
intent was to end their dispute. Final resolution of the case could only be
achieved upon petitioner's restoration, as far as practicable, to the status
quo ante. In our view it would be unreasonable to read the agreement in a
manner so narrow as to defeat the intent of the parties. Greco, 852 F.2d at 561. In this case, the Arbitrator interpreted the parties' settlement
agreement and concluded, based on the plain language of the agreement, that the
parties intended for the Union's attorney to receive $25,000 to cover all
attorney fees in connection with SSA. The Arbitrator further concluded
that the work for which additional attorney fees were claimed was work
performed in connection with SSA. Consequently, we find that the
Arbitrator was enforcing the provisions of a settlement agreement on attorney
fees in a manner that was consistent with the procedures used by MSPB and
Federal courts in the above cases. In its exceptions, the Union does not claim that the Arbitrator's
interpretation of the settlement agreement is erroneous, but rather that the
award is based on a nonfact and is incomplete. We will find an award deficient
under the Statute because it is based on a nonfact if the central fact
underlying the award is clearly erroneous, but for which the arbitrator would
have reached a different result. U.S. Small Business Administration,
Washington, D.C. and American Federation of Government Employees, Local
2532, 42 FLRA 890, 899 (1991) (SBA). However, the Union has not
demonstrated that the Arbitrator made any factual errors in reaching his
conclusion that the settlement agreement limited the amount of attorney fees to
$25,000. Instead, the Union is merely disagreeing with the Arbitrator's
conclusion in that regard. In similar circumstances, we have determined that
where "disputed conclusions by the [a]rbitrator are not facts, the [u]nion has
failed to demonstrate that the award is deficient because it is based on
nonfacts." SBA, 42 FLRA at 899. See also American
Federation of Government Employees, Local 2921 and U.S. Department of Defense,
Army and Air Force Exchange Service, Dallas, Texas, 47 FLRA 446, 452
(1993) (exception constituted mere disagreement with an arbitrator's
interpretation of the parties' agreement and did not demonstrate that an award
was based on a nonfact). Consequently, the Union has failed to demonstrate that
the award is deficient because it is based on a nonfact. Rather, we find that the Union's exceptions that the Arbitrator erred
in his findings concerning the effect of the settlement agreement and that the
award is incomplete constitute a contention that the award fails to draw its
essence from the parties' agreement. To demonstrate that an award is deficient
on this ground, a party must show that the award: (1) cannot in any rational
way be derived from the agreement; (2) is so unfounded in reason and fact, and
an infidelity to the obligation of the arbitrator; (3) evidences a manifest
interpretation of the agreement. See U.S. Department of the Army, Red
River Army Depot, Texarkana, Texas and National Association of Government
Employees, Local R14-52, 46 FLRA 1292, 1294 (1993). As noted above, the Arbitrator found that: (1) the settlement agreement
provided that the Union's attorney agreed to accept the amount of $25,000 in
full satisfaction of all attorney fees claimed; and (2) the additional fees
claimed for work performed in the negotiations over specific backpay for each
claimant, including those claimants who were not original grievants in
SSA, were covered by the agreement. The Union has not shown that the
Arbitrator's conclusions and interpretation of the settlement agreement are
irrational, implausible, or unconnected to the wording and purpose of the
agreement. Consequently, the Union has not established that the award fails to
draw its essence from the agreement and we will deny this exception. With respect to the Union's other exceptions, we note that the basis on
which the Arbitrator resolved the attorney fee request was the settlement
agreement. As additional alternative grounds for his award denying the attorney
fee request, the Arbitrator set forth his opinion that, in the absence of the
settlement agreement as a basis for denying the request, he would also have
denied the request on the grounds that the Union was not a prevailing party and
that the additional attorney fees would not be in the interest of justice under
the standards of 5 U.S.C. § 7701(g)(1). However, inasmuch as the
parties had agreed that attorney fees were warranted and had fixed the amount
of attorney fees in the settlement agreement, it was not necessary for the
Arbitrator to examine the requirements of 5 U.S.C. § 7701(g)(1)
in order to render an award resolving the specific issue before him. His
interpretation and application of the settlement agreement provided a
sufficient basis for the award in these circumstances. Consequently, it is not
necessary for us to discuss the Union's allegations that the award is contrary
to law and regulations. See Greco, 852 F.2d at 561
("Because we decide this case on the basis of the settlement agreement, we do
not reach the merits of petitioner's 5 U.S.C. § 7701(g)
claim."). Accordingly, we do not address the Union's contentions regarding
5 U.S.C. § 7701(g) or the Arbitrator's conclusions with respect
to the application of 5 U.S.C. § 7701(g) in this case. V. Decision The Union's exceptions are denied. APPENDIX The "Settlement Agreement As To Attorney Fees" provides, in relevant
part: 1. The Agency agrees to pay the Attorney the sum of Twenty-five
thousand dollars ($25,000) in full settlement and satisfaction of all attorneys
fees in connection with [U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,
Government Employees, Local 1923, 37 FLRA 1469 (1990)]. 2. The Attorney agrees to accept the payment of the sum of
Twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) in full settlement and satisfaction of
attorneys fees in connection with [U.S. Department of Health and Human
(1990)]. 3. The Attorney agrees to withdraw the Attorney Fee Application
hereinabove identified in consideration of the premises (sic), and the parties
agree to terminate arbitration proceedings on the attorney fees applied for by
the Attorney. 4. The parties agree that the amount of attorneys fees agreed to
herein is the result of a negotiated settlement of the above fee application
and is not to be construed as a precedent with respect to the amount of
attorneys fees the attorney bills to the Department of Health and Human
Services and Social Security Administration in other cases or whether any other
case would warrant the payment of attorney fees. 5. The Agency agrees to process the payment of the attorneys fees set
out herein in [an] expedited manner and further agrees to make payment to the
Attorney as soon as reasonabl[y] possible. 6. The Union concurs in this Agreement in its
entirety. Opposition, Attachment 1. FOOTNOTES: (If blank, the decision does not
have footnotes.) */ Relevant portions of the settlement
agreement are set forth in the Appendix to this decision. Federal Labor Relations Authority