Source: https://causeofactionelements.blogspot.com/2015/08/civil-barratry-suit-against-lawyers-law.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed:+Coatx+(COA.TX)
Timestamp: 2019-08-21 11:29:31
Document Index: 412901382

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 54', '§ 54', '§ 54', '§ 54', '§ 54', '§ 54', '§ 54', '§ 82', '§ 82', '§ 82', '§ 17', '§ 17', '§ 17', '§ 17', '§ 17', '§ 17', '§ 82', '§ 82', '§ 82', '§ 82', '§ 82', '§ 82', '§ 82', '§ 82', '§ 82', '§ 82', '§ 82', '§ 82', '§ 82', '§ 82', '§ 82', '§ 82', '§ 82', '§ 82', '§ 82', '§ 82']

COA.TX: Neese v Lyon: Civil Barratry: Dallas Court of Appeals addresses multiple complex legal issues in clients' suit against attorneys seeking to void attorney fee agreement based on illegal solicitation after pipeline explosion
In their fourth issue, the Clients urge that the trial court erred by summarily dismissing their fiduciary-duty claims. Appellees obtained summary judgment by arguing that an essential element of these claims was that appellees derived an "improper benefit" from their conduct, and that, as a matter of law, an agreed-upon and earned fee is not an improper benefit.[8]
"The elements of a breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim are: (1) a fiduciary relationship existed between the plaintiff and defendant; (2) the defendant breached its fiduciary duty to the plaintiff; and (3) the defendant's breach resulted in injury to the plaintiff or benefit to the defendant." Anderton v. Cawley, 378 S.W.3d 38, 51 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2012, no pet.). An attorney owes his client a fiduciary duty as a matter of law, but the attorney-client relationship must first exist before a fiduciary duty arises. See Kiger v. Balestri, 376 S.W.3d 287, 290 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2012, pet. denied).
In the attorney-client context, a fiduciary-duty claim focuses on whether the attorney's conduct involved his or her integrity and fidelity, and whether the attorney obtained an improper benefit from representing the client. Gibson v. Ellis, 126 S.W.3d 324, 330 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, no pet.). An attorney thus commits a fiduciary breach when he or she benefits improperly from the attorney-client relationship by, among other things, subordinating his or her client's interests to his or her own, retaining the client's funds, engaging in self-dealing, improperly using client confidences, failing to disclose conflicts of interest, or making misrepresentations to achieve those ends. Id. An attorney also owes a client a duty to inform the client of matters material to and within the scope of the representation. Joe v. Two Thirty Nine Joint Venture, 145 S.W.3d 150, 159-60 (Tex. 2004); see also Hernandez v. Sovereign Cherokee Nation Tejas, 343 S.W.3d 162, 175 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2011, pet. denied) (attorney's duty to make a full and accurate confession of all fiduciary activities, transactions, profits, and mistakes).
Our first step is to identify which element of the claim appellees attacked. Near the beginning of the relevant section of their motion, appellees stated, "To raise even the possibility of fee forfeiture, Plaintiffs must first show a breach of fiduciary duty. . . . They cannot. Their fiduciary duty claim fails because Defendants did not receive an improper benefit." The remainder of their argument focused on whether their fee was an improper benefit. We conclude that appellees attacked only the third element, which requires a plaintiff to show either (i) damages to himself or (ii) a benefit to the defendant. We therefore do not address the merits of the second element, which is the element of breach.
The question then is whether appellees conclusively negated the third element of the Clients' fiduciary-duty claims. In this regard, the Clients argue that they are entitled to pursue the remedy of fee forfeiture for appellees' fiduciary breaches under Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. 1999).[9] In Burrow, the plaintiffs sued their former attorneys for breach of fiduciary duty and other causes of action. Id. at 232. Factually, the plaintiffs alleged, among other things, that the defendant attorneys had improperly solicited their business through a "lay intermediary." Id. The supreme court held that fee forfeiture was a potential remedy for breach of fiduciary duty, even in the absence of any actual damages to the clients. Id. at 240.
Given the posture of the case, we must accept as true the Clients' claims that (i) appellees breached their fiduciary duties by failing to disclose that they had obtained the right to represent the Clients through a deceptive barratry scheme and (ii) appellees benefited from their fiduciary breaches by collecting their fees in the underlying case. If these allegations are true, then under Burrow the Clients may be entitled to recover some or all of those fees through fee forfeiture. We thus conclude that appellees did not conclusively negate the third element of the Clients' fiduciary-duty claims.
Appellees argue that they did not receive an improper benefit because they earned the fees and because the Clients do not complain about the quality of the legal services or the results obtained in the underlying case. For support, they rely on cases holding that legal fees received for negligently rendered legal services, without more, are not an improper benefit that transforms a negligence claim into a fiduciary-duty claim. See Reneker v. Offill, No. 3:08-CV-1394-D, 2009 WL 804134, at *10 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2009); Vara v. Williams, No. 03-10-00861-CV, 2013 WL 1315035, at *4 n.4 (Tex. App.-Austin Mar. 28, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.). This case, however, is distinguishable from Reneker and Vara because the Clients' fiduciary-duty claims are not founded on negligently provided legal services, but rather on appellees' alleged failure to disclose their own alleged prior misconduct.
The trial court erred by granting summary judgment on the Clients' fiduciary-duty claims. We resolve the Clients' fourth issue in their favor.
In their fifth issue, the Clients urge that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment on their fraud claims. Appellees asserted two grounds for summary judgment on those claims: (i) the Clients ratified the alleged fraud and (ii) the Clients have no recoverable damages.[10]
On appeal, the Clients address only the second ground for summary judgment. Because the Clients do not address an independent ground for summary judgment on their fraud claims, we must affirm the judgment as to those claims. Adams v. First Nat'l Bank of Bells/Savoy, 154 S.W.3d 859, 875 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.) ("[A] reviewing court will affirm the summary judgment as to a particular claim if an appellant does not present argument challenging all grounds on which the summary judgment could have been granted."). We therefore reject the Clients' fifth issue.
The Clients pleaded an "[a]lternative claim for rescission," alleging that they were entitled to rescind the contingency-fee agreements as a remedy for appellees' wrongful conduct such as breach of fiduciary duty, barratry, and fraud. Specifically, they sought the return of all the fees and expenses appellees received, plus the Clients' attorneys' fees incurred in prosecuting their suit against appellees. Appellees argued that rescission is unavailable to one who retains the benefits of the contract to be rescinded. In their sixth issue, the Clients argue, as they did in their summary-judgment response, that the trial court can, as part of a restitution remedy, determine the value of appellees' services that appellees will retain for providing those services to the Clients. We agree.
"Rescission" is a common shorthand for the composite remedy of rescission and restitution. Cruz v. Andrews Restoration, Inc., 364 S.W.3d 817, 825 (Tex. 2012). Rescission is an equitable remedy that operates to extinguish a contract that is legally valid, but must be set aside because of fraud, mistake, or some other reason to avoid unjust enrichment. Gentry v. Squires Constr., Inc., 188 S.W.3d 396, 410 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.).
In Cruz, the Texas Supreme Court relied heavily on the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment in explaining the law of rescission. 364 S.W.3d at 825-27. The court held that rescission is "generally limited to cases in which counter-restitution by the claimant will restore the defendant to the status quo ante." Id. at 826 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 54(3)). The court also held that a defendant's wrongdoing may factor into whether it should bear an uncompensated loss in situations in which the claimant cannot restore the defendant to the status quo ante, but a defendant's wrongdoing does not excuse the claimant from counter-restitution when counter-restitution is feasible. Id.(citing RESTATEMENT § 54(3)(b) & cmt. c). Finally, incorporating Restatementprinciples into its interpretation of the rescission remedy available under the DTPA, the court held that a DTPA claimant does not have to make restitution or a tender of restitution to the defendant before seeking the remedy "as long as the affirmative relief to the consumer can be reduced by (or made subject to) the consumer's reciprocal obligation of restitution." Id. at 827 (citing RESTATEMENT § 54(5)); see also Morton v. Nguyen, 412 S.W.3d 506, 511 (Tex. 2013) (incorporating RESTATEMENT § 54(5) into rescission remedies available under the Property Code); RESTATEMENT § 54 cmt. g ("Rescission is not forfeiture. . . .").
Based on Cruz and Morton's reliance on § 54(5), we conclude that Texas's common law of rescission does not require a claimant to make restitution or a tender of restitution as a prerequisite to relief as long as any affirmative relief to the claimant can be reduced by or made subject to the claimant's reciprocal obligation of restitution.
Appellees urge that rescission is unavailable because the Clients are retaining the settlement funds they recovered in the underlying case, making restoration of the status quo ante impossible. The Clients respond that appellees misunderstand the rescission requirement that the claimant not retain the benefits of the transaction. According to the Clients, if they are retaining any benefits for purposes of rescission analysis, those benefits are appellees' services, not the settlement proceeds the Clients have received. We agree with the Clients. For rescission, the claimant generally must return the defendant to the status quo ante. See Cruz, 364 S.W.3d at 826. We find no authority that a claimant in the Clients' position must return benefits it received from third parties not before the court as a prerequisite for rescission.
The Clients argue that they are excused from restoring benefits to appellees because the Clients' inability to restore them was caused by appellees' own wrongdoing. They alternatively argue that the trial court can effect an equitable restoration of benefits in conjunction with an award of rescission, if the court finds that appellees' services had value.
We conclude that, under Cruz and the Restatement, a rescission claimant must either (i) make counter-restitution of benefits to the defendant or (ii) show that the defendant's wrongdoing is such that the claimant's inability to make counter-restitution should be excused. See id. (citing RESTATEMENT § 54(3)(b) & cmt. c). The Cruz court further held that a claimant can make counter-restitution for services received by deducting the value of the services from the ultimate rescission award.Id. at 827 (rescission DTPA award was erroneous because there was no deduction for the value the claimant received under the contracts).
On traditional summary judgment, then, appellees had to conclusively prove that the Clients could not make counter-restitution of benefits received from appellees and that appellees' wrongdoing was not sufficient to excuse counter-restitution. Because they did not attempt to prove these matters, appellees did not carry either burden. The trial court thus erred by granting summary judgment that the Clients are not entitled to a rescission remedy, and we resolve the Clients' sixth issue in their favor.
In their seventh issue, the Clients argue that the trial court erred by summarily dismissing their money-had-and-received claims.
1. Timeliness of appellees' "supplement"
The Clients added their money-had-and-received claims by amending their pleadings seven days before the summary-judgment hearing. Appellees addressed these new claims in a "supplement" filed five days before the hearing. The Clients filed a special exception and response in which they complained that they had not received twenty-one days' notice of the hearing as to appellees' supplement. The special exception was discussed at the hearing, and the trial court said that it would hear the supplement. It granted summary judgment on the money-had-and-received claims along with the rest of the Clients' claims.
The Clients argue that this summary judgment was improper because appellees' summary-judgment motion did not address the Clients' money-had-and-received claims and because appellees addressed those claims only in a supplement filed within twenty-one days of the hearing. The Clients preserved their complaint about the timeliness of the supplement via their special exception. See Luna v. Estate of Rodriguez, 906 S.W.2d 576, 582 (Tex. App.-Austin 1995, no writ) (nonmovant must object to hearing of summary-judgment motion on less than twenty-one days' notice). But on appeal, the Clients present no argument or authorities that the trial court erred by implicitly overruling their special exception or that they were harmed by the ruling. We thus reject the Clients' inadequate-notice argument. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i) (requiring argument, supported by authorities and record citations); see also In re Estate of Snow, No. 12-11-00055-CV, 2012 WL 3793273, at *2-3 (Tex. App.-Tyler Aug. 30, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (affirming trial court's decision to shorten notice of summary-judgment hearing, in part because nonmovants failed to show they were harmed by the ruling).
The Clients also argue that the trial court erred on the merits. Appellees obtained summary judgment on the Clients' money-had-and-received claims by arguing that the claim is not viable when a contract covers the transaction in question. The Clients argue that their claims are viable because the barratrous fee agreements were void as against public policy.
We disagree with the Clients' position. The law treats void and voidable instruments differently. When a party seeks to recover money paid under a void instrument, its remedy is not rescission, but a recovery in quantum valebant for money had and received. Country Cupboard, Inc. v. Texstar Corp., 570 S.W.2d 70, 74 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.). If the instrument is voidable rather than void, the party must sue for rescission and cannot sue for money had and received. Id.Barratrous contracts were considered void before the adoption of § 82.065(b). SeePelton v. McClaren Rubber Co., 120 S.W.2d 516, 517 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1938, writ ref'd) (claim-collector's contract secured by personal solicitation in violation of criminal statute was "void and unenforceable"). But when it adopted § 82.065(b) in 1989, the legislature plainly declared that barratrous contingency-fee agreements were voidable, and it changed any contrary common-law rule. See City of Galveston v. State, 217 S.W.3d 466, 473 (Tex. 2007) ("The Legislature, of course, may change the common law. . . ."). Accordingly, the Clients' allegations, taken as true, show only that the fee agreements were voidable, not void, and do not support a cause of action for money had and received.
For support, the Clients rely on Quintero v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 709 S.W.2d 225 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.). That case is distinguishable. InQuintero, the court held that an aggregate settlement agreement violating the disciplinary rules was void and unenforceable. 709 S.W.2d at 229-30. But there is no indication in Quintero that the legislature had adopted a statute declaring aggregate settlement agreements to be voidable, as opposed to void. Here, a statute declares barratrous contingency-fee agreements to be voidable, and we must implement the legislature's intent. Because the barratry alleged by the Clients would make the fee agreements voidable, not void, their claims for money had and received fail as a matter of law.
We therefore reject the Clients' seventh issue.
In their eighth issue, the Clients argue that the trial court erred by summarily dismissing their unjust-enrichment claims because the fee agreements are allegedly void as against public policy. But, as we have just held, original § 82.065(b) makes barratrous fee agreements voidable rather than void. We thus reject the Clients' eighth issue on appeal.
G. Legal malpractice
In their ninth issue, the Clients argue that the trial court erroneously dismissed their malpractice claims. Appellees argued that (i) the Clients judicially admitted in a prior summary-judgment response that they had no malpractice claim, and (ii) the Clients had no recoverable damages. On appeal, the Clients address only the second ground. Because the Clients do not address an independent ground for summary judgment on their malpractice claims, we must affirm the judgment as to that claim.See Adams, 154 S.W.3d at 875.
H. Conspiracy and accounting
In their tenth issue, the Clients argue that the trial court erroneously dismissed their civil-conspiracy claims. In their twelfth issue, they argue the trial court erroneously denied their request for an accounting. Appellees argued that the Clients had no viable tort claims to support a derivative conspiracy claim or an accounting remedy. Because we reverse the summary judgment as to barratry and breach of fiduciary duty, we also reverse the summary judgment as to civil conspiracy. See Porter v. Sw. Christian Coll., 428 S.W.3d 377, 384 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2014, no pet.) (reversing summary judgment on civil conspiracy under similar circumstances). And because we reverse the summary judgment as to barratry and rescission, we reverse the summary judgment as to the Clients' request for an accounting. See Cruz, 364 S.W.3d at 825 (rescission requires "a mutual restoration and accounting" (emphasis added)).
I. Deceptive Trade Practices Act
In their eleventh issue, Carl "Stacey" Neese, James Neese, David Neese, Jennifer Hughes, and Mitzi Renfroe (the "DTPA appellants") argue that the trial court erred by dismissing their claims under the DTPA.[11] See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a)(1), (3) (West 2011).
Appellees sought dismissal of these claims because: (i) the Clients had no damages, and (ii) the transactions in question involved consideration exceeding $500,000, making the DTPA inapplicable under § 17.49(g). On appeal, appellees attempt to assert additional grounds supporting summary judgment on the DTPA claims, but we cannot consider those new arguments. See McConnell v. Southside Indep. Sch. Dist., 858 S.W.2d 337, 341 (Tex. 1993) ("A motion [for summary judgment] must stand or fall on the grounds expressly presented in the motion.").
The DTPA appellants argue that appellees did not conclusively prove that the DTPA appellants have no recoverable DTPA damages. We agree. The DTPA appellants pleaded for mental-anguish damages, which are potentially recoverable under the DTPA. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b)(1) (authorizing recovery of mental-anguish damages if the defendant's conduct was committed knowingly);Carpenter v. De La Cruz, No. 04-11-00285-CV, 2012 WL 3025842, at *3 (Tex. App.-San Antonio July 25, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (affirming award of mental-anguish damages under the DTPA). On their traditional motion for summary judgment, appellees bore the burden of conclusively negating the existence of damages. SeeShaun T. Mian Corp. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 237 S.W.3d 851, 868 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, pet. denied) (stating that movant's "burden on a traditional motion for summary judgment is to negate an essential element of [claimant's] cause of action as a matter of law"). Appellees did not carry that burden. Summary judgment thus cannot be sustained on appellees' no-damages ground.
The DTPA appellants also argue that appellees did not conclusively prove the DTPA exception for transactions involving "total consideration by the consumer of more than $500,000." See BUS. & COM. § 17.49(g) (West Supp. 2014). Appellees based this ground on averments in the fifth amended petition that appellees received millions of dollars in attorneys' fees based on the transactions. But in the Clients' sixth amended petition—their live pleading at the time of the summary-judgment hearing—appellant Hooper and the minor children of James Robert Neese dropped their DTPA claims, and the remaining appellants specifically averred that "[t]he total consideration paid by each of the DTPA Plaintiffs for the representation was less than $500,000." The text of § 17.49(g) supports the DTPA appellants' argument that the $500,000 cap must be applied on an individual-consumer basis. We conclude that appellees did not conclusively prove the § 17.49(g) exception and that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment on the DTPA claims.
J. Suspension and disbarment
In their thirteenth and final issue, the Clients challenge the trial court's dismissal of their request for an order suspending or revoking appellee Lyon's law license pursuant to Texas Government Code § 82.062. Appellees argued that § 82.062 does not create a private cause of action. We agree with appellees.
Section 82.062 provides in pertinent part:
Any attorney who is guilty of barratry, any fraudulent or dishonorable conduct, or malpractice may be suspended from practice, or the attorney's license may be revoked, by a district court of the county in which the attorney resides or in which the act complained of occurred.
TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 82.062 (West 2013). We find no cases holding that § 82.062 authorizes a private citizen to sue an attorney in district court for license suspension or revocation. Cf. Merritt v. Davis, 331 S.W.3d 857, 862-63 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2011, pet. denied) (rejecting for inadequate briefing appellant's request that court of appeals disbar appellee).
The Clients contend that they did not assert § 82.062 as a cause of action but rather raised it so that the court could consider suspension or disbarment as proper responses to Lyon's misconduct. But they invoked § 82.062 in their live pleading under the general heading "Causes of Action" and requested that the trial court suspend or disbar Lyon under that statute.
Suspension and disbarment proceedings are generally undertaken by the Texas Commission for Lawyer Discipline. See, e.g., Bitter v. Comm'n for Lawyer Discipline,No. 02-12-00197-CV, 2014 WL 1999315 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth May 15, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.); Long v. Comm'n for Lawyer Discipline, No. 14-11-00059-CV, 2012 WL 5333654 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 30, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.). Although § 82.062 states that district courts may suspend or disbar attorneys for various kinds of malfeasance, it does not state who has the right to seek such relief from the courts.
Our sister court has held that an individual attorney may not sue to have another attorney disbarred. That power rests solely with the state bar. State ex rel. Chandler v. Dancer, 391 S.W.2d 504, 505 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Since Chandler was decided, other courts of appeals have recognized the state bar's authority in this area. See McGregor v. Clawson, 506 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1974, no writ) (by adopting State Bar Act, the legislature intended "to provide for a full and comprehensive set of laws to cover completely the practice of law, and regulation of and disciplining of lawyers"); see also Bradt v. State Bar of Tex., 905 S.W.2d 756, 759 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, no writ)(holding that private individual could not bring a claim to remove a judge's name from the roll of attorneys); Galindo v. State, 535 S.W.2d 923, 925 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, no writ) ("When misconduct on the part of an attorney is alleged to have occurred, the Grievance Committee [of the state bar] has the task to conduct an investigation."). We conclude that there is no private cause of action for suspension or disbarment.
We reject the Clients' thirteenth issue on appeal.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court's judgment as to the following claims and remedies: barratry under the original version of Texas Government Code § 82.065, breach of fiduciary duty, rescission, civil conspiracy, DTPA violations, and an accounting. We affirm the remainder of the trial court's judgment, and we remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
In accordance with this Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part.
We REVERSE that portion of the trial court's judgment granting summary judgment as to appellants Carl "Stacey" Neese, Individually and as Next Friend of L.N., C.N., L.N., and C.N., James Neese, David Neese, Jennifer Hughes, Mitzi Renfroe, and Irl Hooper's claims for barratry under the original version of Texas Government Code § 82.065, breach of fiduciary duty, rescission, civil conspiracy, and an accounting. We also REVERSE that portion of the trial court's judgment granting summary judgment as to appellants Carl "Stacey" Neese, Individually, James Neese, David Neese, Jennifer Hughes, and Mitzi Renfroe's claims for DTPA violations. In all other respects, we AFFIRM the trial court's judgment. We REMAND this cause to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.
[1] The Honorable Kerry P. FitzGerald, Retired Justice, was a member of the panel at the time this case was submitted, but he retired from the Court on December 31, 2014, and did not participate in the issuance of this opinion. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.1(a), (b).
[2] We will sometimes refer to appellant Carl "Stacey" Neese in this opinion simply as "Neese." We will use full names when referring to other individual members of the Neese family.
[3] The legislature amended § 82.0651 in 2013, but those amendments have no effect on this case.
[4] Although the court cited the version of § 82.065(b) in effect from 2011 to 2013, 401 S.W.3d at 671,the court's statement of the facts makes it appear that any barratry must have occurred in or before 2010, so the original version of § 82.065(b) should have applied. The 2011 amendments to § 82.065(b), however, merely expanded that provision's scope to encompass all contracts for legal services, rather than only contingency-fee contracts, and so those amendments did not affect the court's analysis.
[5] The other decisions about § 82.065 that we have found—most of which involve the statute of frauds found in § 82.065(a) rather than § 82.065(b)—are not instructive. See Cobb v. Stern, Miller & Higdon, 305 S.W.3d 36, 43 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (client successfully rescinded barratrous contract under § 82.065(b) a month after signing it, thereby negating client's personal-jurisdiction contacts with Texas); see also Tillery & Tillery v. Zurich Ins. Co., 54 S.W.3d 356, 359 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2001, pet. denied) (client successfully rescinded contingent-fee contract that did not satisfy § 82.065(a)); Sanes v. Clark, 25 S.W.3d 800, 804-05 (Tex. App.-Waco 2000, pet. denied)(client successfully rescinded contingent-fee contract that did not satisfy § 82.065(a)); Enochs v. Brown, 872 S.W.2d 312, 316-19 (Tex. App.-Austin 1994, no writ) (client could not rescind fully performed contingent-fee contract that did not fully satisfy § 82.065(a)), disapproved in part on other grounds by Roberts v. Williamson, 111 S.W.3d 113, 120 (Tex. 2003).
[6] As previously noted, a voidable contract is one that is valid and enforceable unless and until a party entitled to avoid it, for reasons such as fraud, mistake, or lack of mental capacity, takes steps to disaffirm it. See Cole, 2015 WL 3485269, at *2; see also Part III.D, infra, for additional discussion of rescission and restitution.
[7] But performance with full knowledge of the facts making an agreement voidable can demonstrate ratification of a voidable agreement under some circumstances. We discuss ratification in Part III.C,infra.
[8] In the part of their summary-judgment motion addressing the Clients' fiduciary-duty claims, appellees included a footnote in which they said, "Mr. Heidelberg is an investigator, not a lawyer. He was not a fiduciary, and Plaintiffs' claim that he breached a fiduciary duty is groundless." Appellees do not repeat this assertion in their appellate brief. We conclude that this footnote, which is devoid of citation to proof, was not sufficient to raise an independent ground for summary judgment on Heidelberg's behalf, and we express no opinion about whether Heidelberg was a fiduciary to the Clients. For purposes of this appeal, we assume that he was.
[9] The Clients also observe that appellees did not address whether appellees breached their duty of full disclosure by not disclosing their alleged prior fraud on the Clients. That point, however, addresses the breach element, which appellees did not attack. We accordingly do not discuss the Clients' argument on the breach element.
[10] Appellees ask us to hold that the Clients have waived their fifth, ninth, and eleventh issues because the Clients often cite the evidence attached to their response to appellees' first amended summary-judgment motion rather than the evidence attached to their response to appellees' second amended summary-judgment motion. But the Clients attached essentially the same evidence, including identical affidavits, to both responses, and the Clients' citations to the earlier response have not unduly hampered our ability to find the corresponding evidence attached to the later response. We thus reject appellees' argument that the Clients have waived their issues through deficient briefing.
[11] Appellant Hooper and the minor children of James Robert Neese did not assert a DTPA claim in the live petition.
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