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Airports Auth. v. Citizens for Noise Abatement - 501 U.S. 252 (1991) :: Justia US Supreme Court Center
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Airports Auth. v. Citizens for Noise Abatement - 501 U.S. 252 (1991)
Case	U.S. Supreme CourtAirports Auth. v. Citizens for Noise Abatement, 501 U.S. 252 (1991)Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v.Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc.No. 90-906Argued April 19, 1991Decided June 17, 1991501 U.S. 252Syllabus
An Act of Congress (hereinafter the Transfer Act) authorized the transfer of operating control of Washington National Airport (National) and Dulles International Airport (Dulles) from the federal Department of Transportation to petitioner Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority (MWAA), which was created by a compact between Virginia and the District of Columbia. Both airports are located in the Virginia suburbs of the District. Dulles is larger than National, and lies in a rural area miles from the Capitol. National is a much busier airport, due to the convenience of its location at the center of the metropolitan area, but its flight paths over densely populated areas have generated concern among residents about safety, noise, and pollution. Because of congressional concern that surrender of federal control of the airports might result in the transfer of a significant amount of traffic from National to Dulles, the Transfer Act authorizes the MWAA's Board of Directors to create a Board of Review (Board). The Board is to be composed of nine congressmen who serve on committees having jurisdiction over transportation issues, and who are to act "in their individual capacities." The Board is vested with a variety of powers, including the authority to veto decisions made by MWAA's directors. After the directors adopted bylaws providing for the Board, and Virginia and the District amended their legislation to give MWAA powers to establish the Board, the directors appointed the Board's nine members from lists submitted by Congress. The directors then adopted a Master Plan providing for extensive new facilities at National, and the Board voted not to disapprove that Plan. Subsequently, respondents -- individuals living along National flight paths and Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc. (CAAN), whose members include persons living along such paths, and whose purposes include the reduction of National operations and associated noise, safety, and air pollution problems -- brought this action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the Board's veto power is unconstitutional. Although ruling that respondents had standing to maintain the action, the District Court granted summary judgment for petitioners. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding, inter alia, that Congress' delegation of the Page 501 U. S. 253 veto power to the Board violated the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers.
(a) Petitioners argue incorrectly that this case does not raise any separation-of-powers issue because the Board is a state creation that neither exercises federal power nor acts as an agent of Congress. An examination of the Board's origin and structure reveals an entity created at the initiative of Congress, the powers of which Congress has mandated in detail, the purpose of which is to protect an acknowledged federal interest in the efficient operation of airports vital to the smooth conduct of Government and congressional business, and membership in which is controlled by Congress and restricted to Members charged with authority over air transportation. Such an entity necessarily exercises sufficient federal powers as an agent of Congress to mandate separation of powers scrutiny. Any other conclusion would permit Congress to evade the Constitution's "carefully crafted" constraints, INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919, 462 U. S. 959, simply by delegating primary responsibility for execution of national policy to the States, subject to the veto power of Members of Congress acting "in their individual capacities." Cf. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U. S. 714, 478 U. S. 755 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment). Nor is there merit to petitioners' contention that the Board should nevertheless be immune from scrutiny for constitutional defects because it was created in the course of Congress' exercise of its power to dispose of federal property under Article IV, § 3, cl. 2. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U. S. 203, 483 U. S. 212, distinguished. Pp. 501 U. S. 265-271. Page 501 U. S. 254
STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BLACKMUN, O'CONNOR, SCALIA, KENNEDY, and SOUTER, JJ., joined. WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and MARSHALL, J., joined, post, p. 501 U. S. 277. Page 501 U. S. 255
A few years after National opened, the Truman Administration proposed that a federal corporation be formed to operate the airport. See Congressional Research Service, Federal Ownership of National and Dulles Airports: Background, Pro-Con Analysis, and Outlook 4 (1985) (CRS Report), reprinted in Hearings before the Subcommittee on Page 501 U. S. 256 Governmental Efficiency and the District of Columbia of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 404 (1985). The proposal was endorsed by the Hoover Commission in 1949, but never adopted by Congress. Instead, when Congress authorized construction of a second major airport to serve the Washington area, it again provided for federal ownership and operation. 64 Stat. 770. Dulles International Airport (Dulles) was opened in 1962 under the direct control of the FAA. See CRS Report 1-2.
Throughout its history, National has been the subject of controversy. Its location at the center of the Metropolitan area is a great convenience for air travelers, but flight paths over densely populated areas have generated concern among local residents about safety, noise, and pollution. Those living Page 501 U. S. 257 closest to the airport have provided the strongest support for proposals to close National or to transfer some of its operations to Dulles. See CRS Report 3.
The Commission recommended that the proposed authority be created by a congressionally approved compact between Virginia and the District, and that its Board of Directors be composed of 11 members serving staggered 6-year terms, with five members to be appointed by the Governor of Virginia, three by the Mayor of the District, two by the Governor of Maryland, and one by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate. See App. 17. Emphasizing the importance of a "nonpolitical, independent authority," the Commission recommended that members of the board "should not hold elective or appointive political office." Ibid. To allay concerns that local interests would not be adequately represented, the Commission recommended a requirement that all Page 501 U. S. 258 board members except the Presidential appointee reside in the Washington metropolitan area. Ibid.
Substitute bills were therefore drafted to provide for the establishment of a review board with veto power over major actions of MWAA's Board of Directors. Under two of the proposals, the board of review would clearly have acted as an agent of the Congress. After Congress received an opinion from the Department of Justice that a veto of MWAA action by such a board of review "would plainly be legislative action that must conform to the requirements of Article 1, § 7 of the Constitution," [Footnote 4] the Senate adopted a version of the review Page 501 U. S. 259 board that required Members of Congress to serve in their individual capacities as representatives of users of the airports. See 132 Cong.Rec. 28372-28375, 28504, 28521-28525 (1986). The provision was further amended in the House, id. at 32127-32144, and the Senate concurred, id. at 32483. Ultimately, § 2456(f) of the Transfer Act as enacted defined the composition and powers of the Board of Review in much greater detail than the Board of Directors. Compare 49 U.S.C. App. § 2456(f) with § 2456(e).
Subparagraph (1) of § 2456(f) specifies that the Board of Review "shall consist" of nine Members of the Congress, eight of whom serve on committees with jurisdiction over transportation issues and none of whom may be a Member from Maryland, Virginia, or the District of Columbia. [Footnote 5] Subparagraph Page 501 U. S. 260 4(B) details the actions that must be submitted to the Board of Review for approval, which include adoption of a budget, authorization of bonds, promulgation of regulations, endorsement of a master plan, and appointment of the chief executive officer of the Authority. [Footnote 6] Subparagraph 4(D) explains that disapproval by the Board will prevent submitted actions from taking effect. [Footnote 7] Other significant provisions of the Act include paragraph 5, which authorizes the Board of Review to require Authority directors to consider any action relating to the airports; [Footnote 8] subsection (g), which requires that any action changing the hours of operation at either National or Dulles be taken by regulation, and therefore be subject to veto by the Board of Review; [Footnote 9] and Page 501 U. S. 261 subsection (h), which contains a provision disabling MWAA's Board of Directors from performing any action subject to the veto power if a court should hold that the Board of Review provisions of the Act are invalid. [Footnote 10]
In November, 1988, Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., and two individuals who reside under flight Page 501 U. S. 262 paths of aircraft departing from and arriving at National (collectively CAAN) brought this action. CAAN sought a declaration that the Board of Review's power to veto actions of MWAA's Board of Directors is unconstitutional, and an injunction against any action by the Board of Review, as well as any action by the Board of Directors that is subject to Board of Review approval. Id. at 10. The complaint alleged that most of the members of CAAN live under flight paths to and from National, and that CAAN's primary purpose is to develop and implement a transportation policy for the Washington area that would include balanced service among its three major airports, thus reducing the operations at National and alleviating noise, safety, and air pollution problems associated with such operations. Id. at 4. The complaint named MWAA and its Board of Review as defendants. Id. at 5.
The District Court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. 718 F.Supp. 974 (DC 1989). As a preliminary matter, however, the court held that plaintiffs had standing to maintain the action for two reasons: [Footnote 11] first, because the master plan will facilitate increased activity at National that is harmful to plaintiffs, and second, because the composition of the Board of Review diminishes the influence of CAAN on airport user issues, since local congressmen and senators are ineligible for service on the Board. Id. at 980-982. On the merits, the District Court concluded that there was no violation of the doctrine of separation of powers, because the members of the Board of Review acted in their individual capacities as representatives of airport users, and therefore the Board was not an agent of Congress. Id. at 985. Moreover, the Board's powers were derived from the legislation enacted by Virginia and the District, as implemented by MWAA's bylaws, rather than from the Transfer Page 501 U. S. 263 Act. Id. at 986. "In short, because Congress exercises no federal power under the Act, it cannot overstep its constitutionally designated bounds." Ibid.
Because of the importance of the constitutional question, we granted MWAA's petition for certiorari. 498 U.S. 1045-1046 (1991). Although the United States intervened in the Court of Appeals to support the constitutionality of the Transfer Act, see 28 U.S.C. § 2403(a), the United States did not join in MWAA's petition for certiorari. As a respondent in this Court pursuant to this Court's Rule 12.4, the United Page 501 U. S. 264 States has again taken the position that the Transfer Act is constitutional. [Footnote 12]
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 422 U. S. 501 (1975). If we accept that the master plan's provisions will result in increased noise, pollution, and danger of accidents, Page 501 U. S. 265 this "personal injury" to respondents is "fairly traceable" to the Board of Review's veto power, because knowledge that the master plan was subject to the veto power undoubtedly influenced MWAA's Board of Directors when it drew up the plan. Because invalidation of the veto power will prevent the enactment of the master plan, see 49 U.S.C. App. § 2456(h), the relief respondents have requested is likely to redress their alleged injury. Moreover, the harm respondents have alleged is not confined to the consequences of a possible increase in the level of activity at National. The harm also includes the creation of an impediment to a reduction in that activity. See App. 8. The Board of Review was created by Congress as a mechanism to preserve operations at National at their present level, or at a higher level if possible. See supra at 501 U. S. 258. The Board of Review and the Master Plan, which even petitioners acknowledge is, at a minimum, "noise-neutral," Brief for Petitioners 37-38, therefore injure CAAN by making it more difficult for CAAN to reduce noise and activity at National. [Footnote 13]
Petitioners argue that this case does not raise any separation of powers issue, because the Board of Review neither exercises federal power nor acts as an agent of Congress. Examining the origin and structure of the Board, we conclude that petitioners are incorrect. Page 501 U. S. 266
Control over National and Dulles was originally in federal hands, and was transferred to MWAA only subject to the condition that the States create the Board of Review. Congress placed such significance on the Board that it required that the Board's invalidation prevent the Airports Authority from taking any action that would have