Source: http://nv.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20191021_0013751.DNV.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2020-01-23 08:35:19
Document Index: 768037693

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 2254', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983']

FindACase™ | Rowell v. Dzurenda
Rowell v. Dzurenda
LAMARR ROWELL, Plaintiff
JAMES E. DZURENDA, Defendant
Plaintiff, a formerly incarcerated person of the Nevada Department of Corrections (“NDOC”), has submitted a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Complaint”) and has filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis for prisoners, a motion for declaratory judgment and a motion for judicial action. (ECF Nos. 1, 1-1, 1-2, 6.) The Court denies the application to proceed in forma pauperis for prisoners (ECF No. 1) as moot because Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated. The Court now screens Plaintiff's Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and addresses the motions.
Federal courts must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which an incarcerated person seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See Id. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings, however, must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
II. SCREENING OF COMPLAINT[1]
In the Complaint, Plaintiff sues Defendant NDOC Director James E. Dzurenda for events that took place while Plaintiff was incarcerated at the Stewart Conservation Camp. (ECF No. 1-1 at 1.) Plaintiff alleges one count and seeks monetary damages and declaratory relief.[2] (Id. at 4, 9.)
The Complaint alleges the following. In March 2008, a state court sentenced Plaintiff to life in prison with parole eligibility after serving 10 years. (Id. at 4.) On December 14, 2017, the parole board granted Plaintiff parole, effective when eligible. (Id.) The NDOC offender management division timekeeper determined that Plaintiff's parole eligibility date (“PED”) was March 11, 2018. (Id.) The PED ended Plaintiff's 10-year minimum sentence and parole was effective on that date. (Id.) Both the grant of parole and its effective date were a protected liberty interest. (Id.) Even though Dzurenda lacked the statutory authority to hold Plaintiff in custody past March 11, 2018, Plaintiff remained in Dzurenda's custody until August 15, 2018. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges a Fourteenth Amendment due process violation. (Id.)
In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the Supreme Court held that “in order to recover damages for [an] allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.” Id. at 486-87. “A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been . . . invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.” Id. at 487. “Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” Id.
Plaintiff's claims implicate Heck because he is challenging the duration of his sentence. However, the Court finds that, despite the Heck bar, Plaintiff may bring this § 1983 claim because habeas relief is unavailable to Plaintiff because he is no longer incarcerated. See Nonnette v. Small, 316 F.3d 872, 875-77 (9th Cir. 2002). The Court will now address Plaintiff's due process claim.
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;In order to state a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim, a plaintiff must adequately allege that he was denied a specified liberty interest and that he was deprived of that liberty interest without the constitutionally required procedures. Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 219 (2011). In Nevada, state prisoners do not have a liberty interest in parole or parole eligibility. See Moor v. Palmer, 603 F.3d 658, 661-62 (9th Cir. 2010); Fernandez v. Nevada, No. 3:06-CV-00628-LRH-RAM, 2009 WL 700662, at *10 (D. Nev. Mar. 13, 2009); see NRS &sect; 213.10705 (stating that &ldquo;[t]he Legislature finds and declares that the release or continuation of a person on parole or probation is an act of grace of the State. No person has a right to parole or probation . . . and it is not intended that the establishment of standards relating thereto create any such right or interest in liberty or property or establish a basis for any cause of action against the State, its political subdivisions, agencies, boards, commissions, departments, officers or employees&rdquo;). The Supreme Court has held that, if state law does not create a liberty interest in parole, there can be no liberty interest after a grant of parole. See Jago v. Van Curen, ...