Source: http://tn.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20171003_0000588.WTN.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2017-11-18 08:05:55
Document Index: 144491795

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 841', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 924', '§ 922', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 2255', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255']

FLOYD HARRIS, Movant,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. Crim. No. 06-10040-JDT
Before the Court is a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 filed by the Movant, Floyd Harris. For the reasons stated below, the Court DENIES Harris's § 2255 motion.
On June 26, 2006, a federal grand jury returned a one-count indictment charging Harris with possession of “crack” cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a). (No. 06-10040, Crim. ECF No. 1.) Harris entered a guilty plea on November 27, 2006. (Id., Crim. ECF Nos. 19 & 20.) At a hearing on February 26, 2007, the Court sentenced Harris to a 188-month term of imprisonment, to be followed by four years of supervised release. (Id., Crim. ECF No. 24.) Judgment was entered on February 27, 2007. (Id., Crim. ECF No. 25.) The Sixth Circuit affirmed on appeal. United States v. Harris, 260 F. App'x 869 (6th Cir. 2008).
Harris subsequently filed a motion to reduce his sentence based on Amendment 706 to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. (No. 06-10040, Crim. ECF No. 34.) The Court denied that motion on August 4, 2008. (No. 06-10040, Crim. ECF No. 37.) Harris then filed a second motion to reduce sentence based on the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (Aug. 3, 2010). (No. 06-10040, Crim. ECF No. 39.) The Court denied that motion as well. (Id., Crim. ECF No. 41.)
On August 19, 2016, Harris filed the present pro se § 2255 motion, contending that his sentence is constitutionally invalid under the decision in Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015). (ECF No. 1.) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a),
The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), requires a fifteen-year sentence for a felon who is convicted of unlawfully possessing a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and who has three prior convictions “for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both.” Id., § 924(e)(1). The ACCA defines “violent felony” as “any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” that (1) “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another, ” (2) “is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, ” or (3) “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” Id., § 924(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). The last part of that definition is commonly referred to as the “residual clause.” In Johnson, the Supreme Court held the ACCA's residual clause was unconstitutionally vague and that increasing a defendant's sentence under the clause was, therefore, a denial of due process. 135 S.Ct. at 2563. The Supreme Court later held the decision in Johnson was retroactive and thus applicable to cases on collateral review. Welch v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 1257 (2016).
Harris was sentenced not under the ACCA but under the career offender provision of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. The career offender guideline provides that a defendant who is convicted of “a felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense” qualifies for an increased sentence if he “has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.” § 4B1.1(a). At the time Harris was sentenced, the definition of “violent felony” in the career offender guideline contained a residual clause that was identical to the residual clause in the ACCA. § 4B1.2(a)(2) (2006).[1] Harris thus argues that his sentence is invalid because the residual clause in the career offender guideline is also unconstitutionally vague.
Harris's argument is foreclosed by the decision in Beckles v. United States, 137 S.Ct. 886, 892-95 (2017), in which the Supreme Court held “that the advisory Sentencing Guidelines are not subject to a vagueness challenge under the Due Process Clause and that § 4B1.2(a)'s residual clause is not void for vagueness.” 137 S.Ct. at 895. Harris was sentenced under the advisory guidelines, after the decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). Therefore, his 188-month sentence is valid.
Even if the decision in Johnson were applicable to the sentencing guidelines, Harris's § 2255 motion is without substantive merit. The Presentence Report in this case demonstrates the prior convictions that qualified Harris as a career offender were controlled substance offenses. The residual clause was part of the definition of a “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) and had no effect on the definition of a “controlled substance offense” in § 4B1.2(b). Thus, Harris would still qualify as a career offender even under the decision in Johnson.
Harris's § 2255 motion, together with the files and record in this case, “conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b); see also Rule 4(b), § 2255 Rules. A response from the United States is not necessary. Accordingly, the § 2255 motion is DENIED.