Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/718/1484/416627/
Timestamp: 2019-08-22 09:49:28
Document Index: 713573690

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2', '§ 1951', '§ 3161', '§ 1341', '§ 2', '§ 1951', '§ 3282']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Jimmie Harold Primrose, Defendant-appellant, 718 F.2d 1484 (10th Cir. 1983) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Tenth Circuit › 1983 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Jimmie Harold Primrose, Defendant-appellant
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Jimmie Harold Primrose, Defendant-appellant, 718 F.2d 1484 (10th Cir. 1983)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit - 718 F.2d 1484 (10th Cir. 1983)
Jimmie Harold Primrose was indicted on thirty-eight counts of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1341 (1976), and three counts of extortion, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1976), in connection with an alleged scheme to defraud the citizens of Murray County, Oklahoma. A jury convicted him of thirteen counts of mail fraud. On appeal, he asserts that: (1) the trial court erred in not dismissing the indictment for unnecessary delay in bringing him to trial; (2) the voir dire of jurors was inadequate; (3) the Government failed to prove a use of the mails for the purpose of executing a scheme to defraud; (4) the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of crimes not charged in the indictment; (5) the prosecutor's references to other county commissioners were improper and prejudicial; (6) the prosecutor improperly cross-examined defense witnesses; and (7) certain remarks the prosecutor made during closing argument constituted improper vouching for witnesses. For the reasons set out below, we affirm.
In setting forth the circumstances giving rise to this appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. United States v. Petersen, 611 F.2d 1313, 1317 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 905, 100 S. Ct. 2985, 64 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1980). Primrose was elected county commissioner for district 3 of Murray County in 1969, and was re-elected for successive terms. In Oklahoma, counties are divided into three districts, and each district is represented by an elected commissioner. One witness described county commissioners as the "managers" and "operators" of the county. Rec., supp. vol. I, at 155. Among other things, they are responsible for maintaining county roads and bridges, a duty that includes authority to make purchases of supplies and equipment.
The three other vendors gave similar testimony. Bill Klutts, a co-owner of Okie Equipment Co., sold supplies and equipment to counties from 1977 to 1979. He testified that " [i]n most all cases there was a ten percent kickback built right into your price of supplies, tin horns, and lumber, grader blades." Id. at 308. He identified purchase orders, invoices, and warrants relating to seven transactions he had had with Primrose. These transactions constituted Counts 1-7 of the indictment. He testified that he had paid Primrose at least a ten percent kickback on each transaction and that the transaction described in Count 2 "was probably a split order." Id. at 318-19. He said that his invoices had been mailed to Murray County and that Murray County had mailed him warrants in payment.
T.L. ("Tommy") Craft, the owner of T.L. Craft Materials, Inc., sold bridge lumber and grader blades to Primrose's district. He testified to seven transactions, corresponding to Counts 28-34, on which he had paid Primrose ten percent kickbacks.3 He also testified that he had paid Primrose kickbacks on twelve other transactions that were not listed in the indictment4 and " [m]ight have split one or two with him back there." Id. at 378. Craft stated that his company's invoices had been mailed to the county and the county had mailed its warrants to him.
Primrose was indicted November 19, 1981, on thirty counts of mail fraud and one count of extortion. On December 31 the Government gave Notice of Dismissal of the indictment. The trial court granted the Government leave to dismiss on January 4, 1982, the date the case was originally scheduled to go to trial. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 48(a). Three days later a second indictment was returned against Primrose, charging him with thirty-eight counts of mail fraud and three counts of extortion. Primrose was arraigned and trial was set for March 1. Primrose moved to dismiss the second indictment under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(b) on the ground of unnecessary delay. Primrose appeals the district court's denial of this motion. He does not, however, allege any violation of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1976), of the speedy trial clause of the Sixth Amendment, or of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
The rule is applicable only to post-arrest situations. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789 n. 8, 97 S. Ct. 2044, 2048 n. 8, 52 L. Ed. 2d 752 (1977); United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 319, 92 S. Ct. 455, 462, 30 L. Ed. 2d 468 (1971); United States v. McManaman, 606 F.2d 919, 922 n. 5 (10th Cir. 1979). Because Primrose was not arrested prior to indictment, Rule 48(b) is inapplicable.
We have considered virtually identical arguments in United States v. Whitt, 718 F.2d 1494, (10th Cir. 1983), filed this date. In Whitt, as in this case, the trial judge asked general questions regarding the potential jurors' exposure to publicity, and then questioned individual jurors about their ability to be fair and impartial despite what they had heard or read. Based on the authorities and the analysis set forth in Whitt, we conclude that the voir dire here was adequate and did not constitute reversible error.
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976) (emphasis added). Primrose argues that, even assuming the Government showed mailings and the existence of a scheme to defraud, the mailings alleged were insufficiently related to the purported scheme to sustain his convictions. The question before us, then, is whether the county's mailings of warrants to Klutts, and Craft's mailings of invoices to the county, were for the purpose of executing a scheme to defraud.6
"The federal mail fraud statute does not purport to reach all frauds, but only those limited instances in which the use of the mails is a part of the execution of the fraud." Kann v. United States, 323 U.S. 88, 95, 65 S. Ct. 148, 151, 89 L. Ed. 88 (1944). However, " [i]t is not necessary that the scheme contemplate the use of the mails as an essential element." Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8, 74 S. Ct. 358, 362, 98 L. Ed. 435 (1954).
United States v. Bottom, 638 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1981), involved a scheme strikingly similar to that in the instant case. The defendant commissioners raised the same argument Primrose does here, but the court rejected it:
"Concerning the next issue as to the sufficiency of the evidence to prove mail fraud, the defendants argue that the scheme was complete once they received their money from Baldwin, which occurred up-front before Baldwin submitted his invoices to the county, before the county submitted checks to Baldwin, and before the commissioners initialed copies of the checks; and that if the scheme was complete, then the mailings were not sufficient to bring the transactions within the scope of the mail fraud statute. The defendants rely on United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 94 S. Ct. 645, 38 L. Ed. 2d 603 (1974).
In United States v. Boyd, 606 F.2d 792 (8th Cir. 1979), the defendant, a director of two projects receiving federal grants, demanded that a consultant kick back a portion of his consulting fees. The mailings involved were grant requests sent by Boyd and by a state agency on behalf of his organizations. The court stated:
Id. at 794. Here, the mailings of invoices and warrants ensured that the vendors got paid, which was an essential part of the scheme. See also United States v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026, 1029-30 (4th Cir.) (mailings of notice to proceed, payment, and bill relating to fraudulently obtained demolition contract), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 830, 919, 101 S. Ct. 98, 317, 66 L. Ed. 2d 35, 146 (1980); United States v. Diggs, 613 F.2d 988, 998-99 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (mailing of congressional employees' paychecks, out of which defendant was paid kickbacks), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 982, 100 S. Ct. 2961, 64 L. Ed. 2d 838 (1980). We conclude that the mailings at issue here are sufficient to bring the scheme within the mail fraud statute.
In this case, some invoices submitted by Craft included an affidavit of noncollusion, which is required by state law to be attached to all invoices in excess of $1,000. These mailings served the further purpose of preventing discovery of the scheme. In United States v. Sampson, 371 U.S. 75, 83 S. Ct. 173, 9 L. Ed. 2d 136 (1962), the indictment alleged a scheme in which the defendants "purported to be able to help businessmen obtain loans or sell out their businesses." 371 U.S. at 77, 83 S. Ct. at 174. After the victims submitted their applications accompanied by application fees, the defendants allegedly mailed them "the accepted application together with a form letter ... 'for the purpose of lulling said victims by representing that their applications had been accepted and that the defendants would therefore perform for said victims the valuable services which the defendants had falsely and fraudulently represented that they would perform.' " Id. at 78, 83 S. Ct. at 174 (quoting indictment). The district court dismissed the indictment, reasoning, on the authority of Kann, 323 U.S. 88, 65 S. Ct. 148, 89 L. Ed. 88, and Parr v. United States, 363 U.S. 370, 80 S. Ct. 1171, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1277 (1960), that no offense was charged because the mailings were after the defendants received their money and hence could not have been for the purpose of executing the scheme. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that subsequent mailings for the purpose of convincing the victims of the scheme that they had not been defrauded are " 'for the purpose of executing' a scheme within the meaning of the mail fraud statute." Id. 371 U.S. at 81, 83 S. Ct. at 176. See also U.S. v. Curry, 681 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1982); Sparrow v. United States, 402 F.2d 826, 829 (10th Cir. 1968) ("lulling" letter). The vendors' false affidavits in this case helped to conceal Primrose's kickback scheme.
Primrose cites United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 94 S. Ct. 645, 38 L. Ed. 2d 603 (1974), Kann, 323 U.S. 88, 65 S. Ct. 148, 89 L. Ed. 88, and United States v. Wolf, 561 F.2d 1376 (10th Cir. 1977), in support of his argument that mailings after a defendant receives the fruits of a fraud are not for the purpose of executing the fraud. "Kann and Maze hold merely that under the facts of those cases the fraudulent schemes had ended before the mailings occurred. If the scheme continues, mailings made after receipt of the money can clearly support conviction." U.S. v. Knight, 607 F.2d 1172, 1175 (5th Cir. 1979). Wolf is similarly distinguishable.
Finally, Primrose analogizes the mailings of invoices and warrants in this case to the mailings involved in Parr v. United States, 363 U.S. 370, 80 S. Ct. 1171, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1277 (1960). Parr concerned the misappropriation of a school district's funds by members of the school board, its secretary, its attorney, and certain bank officers. The mailings related to the assessment and collection of taxes, duties assigned to the school board by the state constitution and statutes. In the absence of any showing "that the taxes assessed and collected were excessive, 'padded' or in any way illegal," id. at 387, 80 S. Ct. at 1181, the Court concluded:
" [I]t cannot be said that mailings made or caused to be made under the imperative command of duty imposed by state law are criminal under the federal mail fraud statute, even though some of those who are so required to do the mailing for the District plan to steal, when or after received, some indefinite part of its moneys."
Id. at 391, 80 S. Ct. at 1183. Primrose likens his situation to that in Parr:
A trial court has broad discretion to determine whether the probative value of evidence outweighs the risk of prejudice. See Fed.R.Evid. 403;7 see also United States v. Franklin, 704 F.2d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir. 1983). Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides:
United States v. Scott, 668 F.2d 384, 387 (8th Cir. 1981); see also United States v. Adcock, 558 F.2d 397 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 921, 98 S. Ct. 395, 54 L. Ed. 2d 277 (1977).
We find these cases persuasive. The indictment here alleged the existence of a scheme for a period before the overt acts charged. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Primrose's other dealings. See United States v. Lea, 618 F.2d 426, 431-32 (7th Cir.) (testimony that defendant solicited kickbacks from broker not in indictment), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 823, 101 S. Ct. 82, 66 L. Ed. 2d 25 (1980); United States v. Reece, 614 F.2d 1259, 1262 (10th Cir. 1980) (evidence of defendants' kickback scheme with meat broker admissible in mail fraud trial for two similar schemes); United States v. Walton, 552 F.2d 1354, 1365 (10th Cir.) (evidence of sixth check in prosecution for interstate transportation of five stolen checks), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 959, 97 S. Ct. 2685, 53 L. Ed. 2d 277 (1977); but see United States v. O'Connor, 580 F.2d 38, 42 (2d Cir. 1978) (error to admit evidence that defendant meat inspector took bribes at three plants not charged in indictment).
The three other references occurred during the prosecutor's cross-examination of defense witnesses. Clarence Knight, who had testified to Primrose's good reputation in the community for being an honest, law-abiding citizen, was asked about Frazier's and Lance's reputations. The court sustained defense counsel's objections when the prosecutor asked whether their reputations had changed recently. Otis Saunders also testified to Primrose's good reputation. During cross-examination, he said that his company also did business with Lance and Frazier and that they both had good reputations. Finally, Bobby Riddle, who had said that Primrose had a good reputation, was asked if his company did business with the other commissioners and what their reputations were. This time the court sustained defense counsel's objection and that line of questioning was stopped. From our examination of the record, we are convinced that any error was harmless. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a).
The prosecutor asked each witness to speculate on what Primrose's community reputation would be if people knew he was guilty of taking kickbacks. In United States v. Polsinelli, 649 F.2d 793 (10th Cir. 1981), we held it improper for the Government to ask such questions because they are based on the assumption that the defendant is guilty of the very crimes for which he is being tried. See also U.S. v. Candelaria-Gonzales, 547 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1977). In this case, however, no objection was made below to the questioning now raised as error. Accordingly, we may reverse on this ground only if it constitutes plain error affecting substantial rights. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). In making this determination we must assess whether the verdict was substantially swayed by the error. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765, 66 S. Ct. 1239, 1248, 90 L. Ed. 1557 (1946); United States v. Baez, 703 F.2d 453, 455-56 (10th Cir. 1983). In view of the abundant evidence of guilt in the record as a whole, we conclude that reversal is not required.
Primrose asserts that the prosecutor vouched for the Government's witnesses in his closing argument. This court has repeatedly condemned personalized vouching for the integrity of government witnesses. See, e.g., United States v. Beckman, 662 F.2d 661, 662 (10th Cir. 1981); United States v. Carleo, 576 F.2d 846, 851-52 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 850, 99 S. Ct. 153, 58 L. Ed. 2d 152 (1978); United States v. Ludwig, 508 F.2d 140, 143 (10th Cir. 1974); United States v. Martinez, 487 F.2d 973, 977 (10th Cir. 1973). Attorneys may not express their personal beliefs concerning the evidence or the witnesses. United States v. Grapp, 653 F.2d 189, 195 (5th Cir. 1981).
Rec., vol. I, at 1-2. Counts 2-7 incorporated the allegations contained in Count 1 except for the date, warrant number, and amount described in paragraph 4, listing instead six other warrants addressed to Okie Equipment Co. Counts 8-34 incorporated allegations contained in the first three paragraphs of Count 1, then charged that Primrose on or about specified dates, "for the purpose of executing the aforesaid scheme to defraud, and attempting to do so, did cause" Independent Industries, Inc. (Counts 8-23), Machinery Parts and Service Co. (Counts 24-27), and T.L. Craft Road & Bridge Material (Counts 28-34) "to place in an authorized mail depository to be sent and delivered by the U.S. Postal Service to Murray County" envelopes containing specified invoices for specified amounts "which caused the issuance" of specified county warrants, all in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1341 (1976). Rec., vol. I, at 3-4. Counts 35-38 alleged that Primrose entered into lease-purchase agreements with E.L. Irwin for which he received kickbacks. Counts 39-41 charged Primrose with violations of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1976).
Because he had not done business with Primrose after 1976, Wilson's testimony only concerned offenses which could not be prosecuted because of the five-year statute of limitations. See 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1976). The trial judge admitted the testimony with a cautionary instruction that it was only to be considered to show the existence of a plan or scheme. See Fed.R.Evid. 404(b)