Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/94122/supreme-lodge-knights-pythias-vs-meyer
Timestamp: 2017-04-30 00:18:56
Document Index: 583486048

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1', '§ 237', '§ 1', '§ 905', '§ 5043', '§ 709', '§ 237']

Supreme Lodge Knights of Pythias Vs Meyer - Citation 94122 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Save as PDF Add a Tag Add a Note Semantics Visualize Supreme Lodge, Knights of Pythias Vs. Meyer - Court Judgment	LegalCrystal Citationlegalcrystal.com/94122CourtUS Supreme CourtDecided OnApr-28-1924Case Number265 U.S. 30AppellantSupreme Lodge, Knights of PythiasRespondentMeyerExcerpt:.....to recover the amount of the insurance, and judgment was rendered in his favor. on appeal to the state supreme court, the judgment was affirmed on the authority of the decision of the same court on a former appeal.
after the insurance policy had gone into effect, the supreme lodge, by an amendment, increased the dues from $5.70 per month to $26.30 per month. prior to the effective date of the new rates, the assured had paid all dues assessed under the old rates. after such date, he refused to pay at the new rates upon the ground, among others, that, in disregard of a state statute, the society was not operating under a representative form of government when the rates were increased; but he regularly and duly tendered payment at the old rates.
section 4..... Judgment:
Supreme Lodge, Knights of Pythias v. Meyer - 265 U.S. 30 (1924)
1. While proceedings in the federal courts are not within the terms of Art. IV, § 1, of the Constitution, they nevertheless must be accorded the same full faith and credit by state courts as would be required in respect of the judicial proceedings of another state. P.
2. Where statutes of two states, couched in the same terms, receive different constructions by the courts of their respective localities, the constructions become parts of the respective statutes, which are to be treated accordingly as different laws. P.
265 U. S. 34
(a) The meaning attributed by the Nebraska Supreme Court to the Nebraska statute must be accepted by this Court, on review, as though it had been specifically expressed in the statute. P.
(b) A decree of the federal court in Indiana holding that the order had a "representative form of government" within the meaning of a similar statute of that state was not binding in the Nebraska litigation, because the two issues -- the meaning of the Nebraska statute and the meaning of the Indiana statute -- were not the same. P.
4. Under Jud.Code § 237, as amended by the Act of September 6, 1916, certiorari, and not error, is the remedy to review a state decision on a right claimed under a federal statute or authority where the validity of the statute or authority itself is not in question. P.
265 U. S. 36
"That said corporation shall have a constitution, and shall have power to amend the same at pleasure:
Under the settled rule of this Court, declared so frequently and uniformly as to have become axiomatic, we must accept this decision of the highest court of the state fixing the meaning of the state legislation, as though such meaning had been specifically expressed therein.
Green v. Lessee of Neal,
-300. And we follow
the state construction even though it may not agree with our own opinion.
18 Wall. 71,
85 U. S. 82
Tioga R. Co. v. Blossburg & Corning R. Co.,
. No question is raised as to the necessity for compliance with the provisions of the state statute, but the defense pleaded and relied upon is that the matter was concluded by a decree of the federal district court of Indiana, affirmed by the circuit court of appeals,
Holt v. Supreme Lodge Knights of Pythias,
235 F. 885, establishing the validity and enforceability of the increased rates; that such decree was binding, as
upon Meyer, the plaintiff, and that the court below, in declining to so consider it, denied full faith and credit to the judicial proceedings of another state, in contravention of Article IV, § 1, of the Constitution of the United States, and of § 905, Revised Statutes.
While the judicial proceedings of the federal courts are not within the terms of the constitutional provision, such proceedings nevertheless must be accorded the same full faith and credit by state courts as would be required in respect of the judicial proceedings of another state.
176 U. S. 644
. It appears from the record in the
case, which was in evidence and is in the record here, that the court expressly found that the society was, during its entire existence, operating under a representative form of government. We assume, for present purposes, that the plaintiff is bound by that decree, but the question -- and the vital question -- still remains, is the issue the same? We are of the opinion that it is not the same, and that the plea of
The principal place of business of the order was in Indiana, and the question presented in the
case, which was brought in Indiana, evidently was whether
there was a representative form of government within the meaning of the statute of that state, § 5043; 2 Burns' Indiana Stats.1914, p. 882, since the federal statute made no requirement on the subject, and the finding, unless to satisfy the Indiana law, would have been meaningless. The question of compliance with the statute of Nebraska or those of other states was not involved. The Indiana statute is reproduced in the margin,
and, as will be seen, differs from the Nebraska statute in that the former specifically defines what shall constitute a representative form of government, while the latter does not. But if we assume for the moment that the two statutes are alike, nevertheless our determination must be the same. It was within the competency of the federal court to construe the Indiana statute in one way, and it was equally within the competency of the Nebraska Supreme Court to construe the Nebraska statute in an opposite way; and, since the construction becomes part of the statute and is to be read as though in its text in the one case as in the other, the result is that they are, in effect, not the same, but different
Page 265 U. S. 35
statutes. In
Shelby v. Guy, supra; May v. Tenney,
148 U. S. 60
148 U. S. 64
. It follows that there is not identity of issue in the two cases, since, so far as this Court is concerned, the statutes which determine it are of exactly opposite import. In principle, it is the same as though the Indiana statute, which controlled the question decided in the first suit, had been superseded by a later Indiana enactment to the contrary effect, and a second suit, arising under and controlled by the later enactment, was brought involving the same question. The intervention of the new and antagonistic statute in either case furnishes a new basis for the litigation, and the issue is no longer the same.
Memphis City Bank v. Tennessee,
161 U. S. 186
161 U. S. 192
Erskine v. Steele County,
87 F. 630, 636;
98 F. 215, 220.
Prior decisions of this Court are pressed upon our attention, of which
, are examples. They are not in point. Neither the effect of state statutes imposing conditions like the one here under review nor the question in respect of identity of issue upon which the plea of
in the present case turns was involved or considered.
Under § 709 Revised Statutes, Judicial Code § 237, this case would be properly here upon writ of error,
Pittsburg, etc., Ry. Co. v. Long Island Loan & Trust Co.,
172 U. S. 508
Hancock National Bank v. Farnum, supra; Embry v. Palmer, supra;
but, as amended by the Act of September 6, 1916, c. 448, 39 Stat. 726, the remedy is by certiorari. We therefore dismiss the writ of error, grant the petition for certiorari,
Yazoo & M. v. R. Co. v. Clarksdale,
257 U. S. 15
-16, and, for the reasons given above, affirm the judgment of the state supreme court.
". . . Each association shall shall have a lodge system with ritualistic form of work and a representative form of government. Any association having a supreme governing or legislative body and subordinate lodges or branches by whatever name known, into which members shall be elected, initiated and admitted in accordance with its constitution, laws, rules, regulations, and prescribed ritualistic ceremonies, which subordinate lodges or branches shall be required by such association to hold regular or stated meetings at least once in each month, shall be deemed to be operating under the lodge system. Any association shall be deemed to have a representative form of government when it shall provide in its constitution and laws for a supreme legislative or governing body, composed of representatives elected either by the members or by delegates elected by the members through a delegate convention system, together with such other members as may be prescribed by its constitution and laws:
that the elective representatives shall constitute a majority in number and have not less than a majority of the votes, nor less than the votes required to amend its constitution and laws. . . ."
The defense was that, by a duly adopted rule, or law, the Supreme Lodge had increased the monthly rates for
Act of June 29, 1894, c. 119, 28 Stat. 96, 97. Under this federal charter, it might amend its statutes or bylaws, and the change of rates was effective unless prohibited by statute as to Nebraska members. The obligation of the contract between the lodge and the assured presents a question of federal law.
. This is plain under the last-cited case, which reviewed and reversed the judgment of the Texas court denying the validity of the bylaw here questioned.
The court below held that, under c. 47, General Laws of Nebraska 1897, the action of the Supreme Lodge in undertaking to increase rates was without effect because the association did not have a "representative form of government." And this makes it necessary to inquire whether that act is fairly susceptible of the construction adopted by the state court. Generally this Court accepts the construction of a local statute approved by the state court of last resort, but the rule does not apply where this is fanciful and amounts to a mere subterfuge.
Vandalia Railroad v. South Bend,
Superior Water Co. v. Superior,
263 U. S. 125
263 U. S. 136
In the circumstances, I think we should refuse to accept a ruling so obviously contrary to reason, treat it as a mere subterfuge, and hold that, under
Knights of Pythias v. Mims, supra,
the rates were properly increased, and, by failing to pay them, the assured surrendered all rights under the policy.