Source: https://openjurist.org/440/f2d/226
Timestamp: 2017-11-21 10:27:06
Document Index: 237938416

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 174', '§ 174', '§ 174', '§ 4705', '§ 4705', '§ 287', '§ 286', '§ 288', '§ 249', '§ 4705', '§ 285', '§ 285', '§ 286', '§ 287', '§ 290', '§ 290', '§ 290']

440 F2d 226 Burgess v. United States | OpenJurist
440 F. 2d 226 - Burgess v. United States
440 F2d 226 Burgess v. United States
440 F.2d 226
Cleveland BURGESS, Appellant,
Mr. Steven R. Rivkin, Washington, D. C. (appointed by this Court) for appellant.
Mr. Robert C. Crimmins, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Messrs. Thomas A. Flannery, U. S. Atty., and John A. Terry, Asst. U. S. Atty., were on the brief, for appellee. Mr. Julius A. Johnson, and Miss Carol Garfiel, Asst. U. S. Atty., at the time the record was filed, also entered appearances for appellee.
Appellant was indicted and convicted on six counts charging violations of the narcotic laws. The first three counts grew out of three phases of a transaction involving heroin alleged to have been engaged in by appellant on March 22, 1967: (1) the sale, barter, exchange, and giving away of the drug not in pursuance of a written order;1 (2) its purchase, sale, dispensing, and distribution not in or from the original stamped package;2 and (3) facilitating its concealment and sale after its knowing importation into the United States contrary to law.3 The three additional counts charged the same violations involving transactions in heroin on March 24, 1967. Upon conviction as charged appellant was sentenced to five years on each of the violations of Section 4705(a) and Section 174, and one to three years for each violation of Section 4704(a), all sentences to run concurrently. This appeal followed.
The principal evidence was that of a federal narcotics agent, Collins, who testified that on each of the two dates appellant sold him 100 capsules of heroin without a written order form and with no tax stamps affixed to the capsules or to any package containing them. According to the officer, each sale was witnessed by a Government informer, Daniel Cole (Cox).4 The foregoing was the substance of his direct testimony.
* A principal contention of appellant on appeal is that the convictions on the two counts charging facilitating the concealment of heroin knowingly imported contrary to law, 21 U.S.C. § 174, must be reversed because the court instructed the jury, as permitted by that section of the statute, as follows:
Whether judged by the more-likely-than-not standard applied in Leary v. United States, [395 U.S. 6, 89 S.Ct. 1532, 23 L.Ed.2d 57 (1969)], or by the more exacting reasonable-doubt standard normally applicable in criminal cases, § 174 is valid insofar as it permits a jury to infer that heroin possessed in this country is a smuggled drug. If the jury relied on the § 174 instruction, it was entitled to do so.
As to the additional contention that the instruction, with its statuory authority, coerces the accused to testify and thereby to expose himself to further prosecutions, due to the need to explain "possession to the satisfaction of the jury," the Supreme Court held in Turner that as the inference from possession was sound the court's instruction on the inference "did not place impermissible pressure upon him to testify in his own defense." Id. at 418, 90 S.Ct. at 653, citing Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 178, 185, 45 S.Ct. 470, 69 L.Ed. 904 (1925). Appellant was not required to acknowledge possession. And if he was not in a position to deny it, the pressure on him to attempt to justify having the heroin, with possibly incriminatory results, arose from an inference which the Court in Turner held was permissible, not from compulsion prohibited by the Fifth Amendment.5
Turner v. United States, supra, 396 U.S. at 421-422, 90 S.Ct. at 655.6
This leaves for consideration appellant's challenge of the convictions on the two counts charging violation of 26 U.S.C. § 4705(a), requiring transfers of heroin to be made pursuant to an official order form, on the ground that if he were fully and literally to comply with this and other statutory provisions, he would be required to incriminate himself in violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege.7 We cannot agree. The Court in Minor v. United States, 396 U.S. 87, 90 S.Ct. 284, 24 L.Ed.2d 283 (1969), decided since appellant's brief was filed with us, held against this attack on the statute. For reasons therein elaborated the Court held that "the seller faces no risk of incrimination by reason of § 4705(a) since there will be and can be no order form involved" when a seller deals with buyers who have failed to register or cannot register because dealings in the drug are illicit. Id. at 97, 90 S.Ct. at 289. As in Minor's case, since it is clear appellant's customer was not a registered buyer, the possibility of incrimination was purely hypothetical, leaving for appellant, if he is to achieve full and literal compliance with Section 4705(a), only one alternative — not to sell.
A. The rule authorizing the inference referred to is applicable, in the language of the Supreme Court, when "a party has it peculiarly within his power to produce witnesses whose testimony would elucidate the transaction" and fails to do so. Graves v. United States, 150 U.S. 118, 121, 14 S.Ct. 40, 41, 37 L.Ed. 1021 (1893);8 see Stewart v. United States, 135 U.S.App.D.C. 274, 418 F.2d 1110 (1969); Wynn v. United States, 130 U.S.App.D.C. 60, 397 F.2d 621 (1967).
The Government counters that appellant waived any right he might have had to the instruction when he twice refused the trial court's offer to reopen the case for a hearing to determine the informer's peculiar availability. As I read the record, however, the offer to reopen went no further than to tender to defense counsel an opportunity to seek the informer by subpoena, based on the circumstance that the prosecution had supplied counsel with an address where several weeks before trial the informer might have been located. Counsel declined the offer, coming as it did after he had closed the defense.9
The Government also contends that the instruction was properly denied because the informer's testimony would have been merely cumulative. See Brown v. United States, 134 U.S.App. D.C. 269, 270-271 n.2, 414 F.2d 1165, 1166-1167 n.2 (1969); Morton v. United States, 79 U.S.App.D.C. 329, 332 n.11, 147 F.2d 28, 31 n.11, cert. denied, 324 U.S. 875, 65 S.Ct. 1015, 89 L.Ed. 1428 (1945); 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 287 (3d ed. 1940). The informer's testimony would have been cumulative in such a case as this only if we assume, contrary to the very rule under consideration, that the informer's testimony would have been favorable to the Government. Aside from this the informer's testimony could hardly have been cumulative; according to Collins the informer was present during both transactions. He was a natural witness for the Government and clearly was in a position to elucidate the transactions.
The Court had no occasion in Graves to refer to the difference between an instruction of the court and independent comment by counsel. It is of some interest also that the Supreme Court has never cited Graves in connection with a missing witness rule. Notwithstanding the development of the rule in this and other courts in reliance upon Graves, the Supreme Court in that case did not deprive trial courts of considerable latitude in applying the rule, guided by the importance of the possible witness to a fair elucidation of the facts as well as by a rational interpretation of when a party has the power to produce him. Not every absent but producible witness who can be held to have some knowledge of the facts need by reason of Graves be made the subject of the "presumption."10
The Court did not go so far as to say, however, that it must assume Reed's testimony would have been adverse to the Government, but only that it would not have been helpful, which quite likely is often all that can be assumed. The majority opinion in our Richards case, supra, in commenting upon one of the instructions there considered, also supports the view that not every witness whose testimony might in some sense elucidate the transaction can be inferred to be unfavorable when he is not called by the party to whom he is peculiarly available; and the dissenting opinion in Richards is not inconsistent with this position. See 2 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 286-87 (3d ed. 1940) & § 288 (Supp. 1964); McCormick, Evidence § 249 (1954); Brown v. United States, supra, and cases there cited, including Morton v. United States, supra, and Pennewell v. United States, 122 U.S.App.D.C. 332, 353 F.2d 870 (1965).
When the court is asked to give the instruction, then, a judgment is to be reached as to whether from all the circumstances an inference of unfavorable testimony from an absent witness is a natural and reasonable one. In reaching its decision the court will have in mind that it is not ruling upon an offer of evidence. The missing witness instruction is not evidence, but is concerned with the absence of evidence. While the context in which the question arises may clothe the missing witness with significance, there is the danger that the instruction permitting an adverse inference may add a fictitious weight to one side or another of the case. When thus an instruction is sought which in a sense creates evidence from the absence of evidence, the court is entitled to reserve to itself the right to reach a judgment as wisely as can be done in all the circumstances,11 even when the general guidelines based upon Graves are found to be supported by the evidence.12
[W]e have outlawed both comment21 and instruction22 as to absent witnesses where either of these conditions [peculiarly within a party's power to produce and testimony that would elucidate the transaction] was lacking.
Pennewell v. United States, supra note 19, 122 U.S.App.D.C. at 333, 353 F.2d at 871.
Billeci v. United States, supra note 19, 87 U.S.App.D.C. [274] at 278-279, 184 F.2d [394] at 398-399; McGuire v. United States, supra note 19, 84 U.S. App.D.C. [64] at 65-66, 171 F.2d [136] at 137-138; Egan v. United States, supra note 19, 52 App.D.C. [384] at 396, 287 F. [958] at 969-970.
Compare our similar suggestion in Wynn v. United States, supra note 43, 130 U.S.App.D.C. at 64-65, 397 F.2d at 625-626. This case, however, was tried before Wynn was decided.
26 U.S.C. § 4705(a)
The appellant and the Government are in disagreement as to the informer's name
We are likewise unable to accept the claim that the instruction amounts to a comment upon the accused's failure to testify, Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965), and therefore discourages his exercise of the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination,cf. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed. 2d 138 (1968). See United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 70-71, 85 S.Ct. 754, 13 L.Ed.2d 658 (1965); United States v. Turner, 404 F.2d 782, 784-785 (3d Cir. 1968), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, Turner v. United States, supra.
It should be noted that the Government's proof, independently of the statutory inference, was designed to show that appellant sold heroin without the appropriate stamps, whereas the inference complained of, according toTurner, can be sustained only as it relates to the purchase by appellant of the drugs without stamps, and could not authorize an inference of illegal sale. 396 U.S. at 421, 90 S.Ct. 642. But Turner also recognized that "when a jury returns a guilty verdict on an indictment charging several acts in the conjunctive, as Turner's indictment did, the verdict stands if the evidence is sufficient with respect to any one of the acts charged." 396 U.S. at 420, 90 S.Ct. at 654.
Appellant argues that, apart from the unconstitutionality of Section 4705(a) when considered alone, that section when considered with Section 4704(a), relating to the tax stamps, forms part of a comprehensive regulatory scheme which is violative of his privilege against self-incrimination because of the requirement of registration and taxation for activities prohibited by federal and state laws. We find nothing in the fact that Section 4705 (a) is part of a statutory scheme with Section 4704(a) which raises any question with respect to the Fifth Amendment privilege which we have not discussed
The passage inGraves often relied upon reads:
TheGraves language is in terms of a "presumption," whereas the rule as it has developed, in this respect departing from Graves, is now generally expressed as authorizing a permissible inference. Moreover, Graves had reference to a situation where the presumption was adverse to the defense. The present rule operates as well in favor of the defense.
Since the factual situations will vary from case to case it seems impossible, however much one would wish to be more helpful, to try to prescribe a definite guideline. The problem is one which must be left in large part to the sound judgment of the trial judge
In light of the decision I reach, I need not discuss the situation where it might be necessary for the party to explain to the trial judge why the witness is not called, assuming the witness was peculiarly within the party's power to produce and would elucidate the transaction
I join unreservedly in Parts I, II and III of Judge FAHY'S learned opinion. I agree, too, with the result reached in Part IV, and with much of the supporting reasoning; more specifically, I share three of the main Part IV conclusions unqualifiedly. Assuming his amenability to a subpoena, the uncalled informer, as a special agent for the Government in the criminal transactions alleged, was, I think, "peculiarly" available to the Government within the purview of the missing witness rule.1 Moreover, the informer's testimony, it seems clear, would not have been merely cumulative.2 And in consequence of the informer's recent relationship with the Government, it would appear that the right to invoke the rule was not waived by defense counsel's refusal to attempt production of the informer as his own witness.3
* The missing witness rule, where applicable, enables an inference that exerts impeaching though not probative force.4 "The nonproduction of evidence," said Dean Wigmore, "that would naturally have been produced by an honest and therefore fearless claimant permits the inference that its tenor is unfavorable to the party's cause."5 This is because "[t]he failure to bring before the tribunal some circumstance, document, or witness, when either the party himself or his opponent claims that the facts would thereby be elucidated, serves to indicate, as the most natural inference, that the party fears to do so, and this fear is some evidence that the circumstance or document or witness, if brought, would have exposed facts unfavorable to the party."6 By the same token, "the inference is based, not on the bare fact that a particular person is not produced as a witness, but on his nonproduction when it would be natural for him to produce the witness if the facts known by him had been favorable."7
It must follow, from this rationale of the rule, that the test for its application is the naturalness, under all circumstances, of an unfavorable inference from a party's nonproduction of the witness. I certainly agree with Judge Fahy that the missing witness doctrine is not "a rule of broad or rigid application whenever an adversary fails to call a witness peculiarly within his power to produce who might have some knowledge of the facts involved."8 That is evident from judicial holdings that the doctrine does not apply where the witness is unimportant,9 or is biased against the noncalling party,10 or his testimony would be cumulative or inferior to testimony already utilized,11 or the testimony would be privileged.12 The principle reconciling these decisions is that an unfavorable inference cannot be justified unless it can be said with reasonable assurance that it would have been natural for a party to have called the absent witness but for some apprehension about his testimony. And "the party affected by the inference may of course explain it away by showing circumstances which otherwise account for his failure to produce the witness."13
I agree, too, that the trial judge has a supervisory role in missing witness cases. As in instances of other sought-after inferences, it is the court's function to determine whether a jury could appropriately deduce from the underlying circumstances the adverse fact sought to be inferred, leaving it for the jury to say whether the inference actually ought to be drawn in the particular case.14 The noncalling party's explanation suffices, and the missing witness rule is properly rejected, where the trial judge is "satisfied that the circumstances thus offered would, in ordinary logic and experience, furnish a plausible reason for nonproduction."15 But the judge's discretion has its normal limitations and, in my view, it cannot redeem a refusal to abide by the missing witness rule where its preconditions are plainly met and the failure to call the witness is unexplained or inadequately explained — in sum, it cannot shield an exclusion of an inference which under governing rules a party was rightfully entitled to utilize.
In the litigation at bar, as certainly in a great many instances of missing witnesses, there might have been reasons why the absent witness was not called. Here, as on other occasions, those reasons, if revealed to the court, conceivably might have dispelled any notion that the failure to call was an implied admission of weakness in the party's case.16 Where there are such reasons, and they are produced and satisfy the trial judge on plausibleness, the judge should decline a request for a missing witness instruction, and should also forbid adverse comment to the jury on the absence of the witness.17
In the case before us, however, the Government did not justify its failure to call the informer.18 Since only Collins, of the four narcotics agents, was an eyewitness to the drug transactions for which appellant was on trial, it seems natural enough to infer that the Government would have called the informer but for a feeling that his testimony would leave something to be desired. He was the one witness who could have corroborated Collins' testimony directly. No interest in maintaining the secrecy of his name or supposed address was manifested; the Government made both available to appellant. These circumstances, it seems to me, were sufficient to lay an ample predicate for appellant's invocation of the missing witness rule. When a party neglects an acceptable showing as to why he did not call the witness, his opponent, I believe, cannot be deprived of the benefits of the rule by mere assumption that the noncalling party may have had reasons sufficient to negate an adverse inference.
While I believe that appellant was entitled to the normal benefits of the missing witness rule, I nonetheless concur in affirmance of his conviction. The office of the rule is narrow, its scope is limited; it permits only an inference that the testimony of the uncalled witness would have been unfavorable to the noncalling party.19 As to any matter to which the absent witness could have testified, the inference may diminish the value of the noncalling party's evidence, and may add strength to his opponent's evidence, but that is its maximum effect.20 "The inference does not affect indefinitely the merits of a whole cause, * * * but affects specifically and only the evidence in question."21 Moreover, the inference does not substitute for proof; its reach is not equivalent to independent evidence of any fact otherwise unproved.22
Here the Government's case, though partly circumstantial, was strong. There was Collins' direct testimony as to the alleged transactions, supported indirectly but firmly by the testimony of two other agents. There was also the testimony of each of the four agents contradicting appellant's alibi. An unfavorable inference from the informer's absence conceivably might have reduced the impact of the Government's proof that there was illegal drug trafficking on the occasions in question, but it could not have generated affirmative evidence that they did not occur.23 Such an inference might also have diluted the testimony that appellant was the trafficker, and at the same time might have aided the alibi, but hardly in decisive fashion. For in preference to the testimony of three alibi witnesses that appellant was not the offender, the jury accepted the testimony of four narcotics agents that he was; the jury accepted, too, the testimony of one of the agents that appellant twice peddled narcotics. With so much direct evidence to select from, the role of an inference would scarcely have loomed large. And with the jury fully cognizant of the informer's collaboration with the agents in implicating appellant, it is problematical that it would have drawn an inference that the informer's testimony would have disfavored the Government.
These, it seems to me, are the probabilities; and a decision as to whether judicial error engendered prejudice requiring reversal is necessarily an appraisal of the probabilities. The argument that prejudice flowed from the trial court's refusal of the requested comment and instruction on the informer's absence thus leaves me unpersuaded. Viewed realistically and balanced, the probabilities, in my judgment, do not favor appellant sufficiently to warrant reversal.24
This conclusion draws support from United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 593, 68 S.Ct. 222, 92 L.Ed. 210 (1948), where the facts were similar to those here, and from Stewart v. United States, 135 U.S.App.D.C. 274, 278-279, 418 F. 2d 1110, 1114-1115 (1969), where the problem was posed but ultimately dropped out of the case. See also Brown v. United States, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 269, 271 n. 3, 414 F.2d 1165, 1167 n. 3 (1969); United States v. Jackson, 257 F.2d 41 43-44 (3d Cir. 1958). As Judge Fahy explains (supra p. 232), Richards v. United States, 107 U.S.App.D.C. 197, 275 F.2d 655, cert. denied, 363 U.S. 815, 80 S.Ct. 1253, 4 L.Ed.2d 1155 (1960), presented a different situation.
Aside from Agent Collins, the informer was the only eyewitness to the activities charged to appellant. By the same token, the Government's case beyond Collins' testimony was entirely circumstantial. Thus the informer was in excellent position to "elucidate the transaction,"e. g., Graves v. United States, 150 U.S. 118, 121, 14 S.Ct. 40, 37 L.Ed. 1021 (1893), by either confirming or disputing Collins' version, as no other witness for the Government apparently could.
I agree fully with Judge Fahy that a party bears no duty to his opponent to call a witness whose relationship to the latter forecasts uncertain and possibly damaging testimony. See,e. g., Mammoth Oil Co. v. United States, 275 U.S. 13, 52, 48 S.Ct. 1, 72 L.Ed. 137 (1927).
With the discussion in textinfra at notes 5-7, compare the discussion in text infra at notes 19-22.
2 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 285 at 162 (3d ed. 1940) (emphasis in original omitted). That we have accepted as the theory sustaining the missing witness rule. Stewart v. United States,supra note 1, 135 U.S.App.D.C. at 279, 418 F.2d at 1115 (supplemental opinion).
2 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 285 at 162 (3d ed. 1940). See also Graves v. United States,supra note 2, 150 U.S. at 120-121, 14 S.Ct. 40, 37 L.Ed. 1021. Compare Clifton v. United States, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 242, 247, 11 L.Ed. 957 (1846).
2 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 286 at 166 (3d ed. 1940)
Brown v. United States,supra note 1, 134 U.S.App.D.C. at 270-271 n. 2, 414 F.2d at 1166-1167 n. 2; Morton v. United States, supra note 8, 79 U.S.App. D.C. at 332 n. 11, 147 F.2d at 31 n. 11, quoting 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 287 at 168-169 (3d ed. 1940).
Jarrell v. State, 251 Ala. 50, 36 So.2d 336, 341 (1948) (failure to call witness who had already testified for prosecution); Sterling v. McKendrick, 134 So. 2d 655, 658 (La.App.1961) (failure to call adversary); State v. De Paola, 5 N.J. 1, 73 A.2d 564, 574 (1950) (failure to call wife, who was hostile)
Brown v. United States,supra note 1, 134 U.S.App.D.C. at 270-271 n. 2, 414 F.2d at 1166-1167 n. 2; Morton v. United States, supra note 8, 79 U.S. App.D.C. at 332 n. 11, 147 F.2d at 31 n. 11; Cote v. Palmer, 127 Conn. 321, 16 A.2d 595, 600 (1940) (failure to call eight-year-old child).
Graves v. United States,supra note 2, 150 U.S. at 121, 14 S.Ct. 40, 37 L.Ed. 1021 (failure to call wife); Hopkins v. State, 11 Okl.Cr. 385, 146 P. 917 (1915) (failure to call codefendant).
2 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 290 at 178 (emphasis in original omitted). See also Stewart v. United States,supra note 1, 135 U.S.App.D.C. at 279-280, 418 F.2d at 1115-1116 (supplemental opinion).
See In re Dunbier's Estate, 170 Neb. 541, 103 N.W.2d 797, 804 (1960); Lantini v. Daniels, R.I., 247 A.2d 298, 302 (1968); National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Eddings, 188 Tenn. 512, 221 S.W.2d 695, 697-698 (1949)
2 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 290 at 178
Compare Stewart v. United States,supra note 1, 135 U.S.App.D.C. at 279-280, 418 F.2d at 1115-1116 (supplemental opinion).
Government trial counsel did allude to a feeling that the informer's testimony was cumulative and that harm might be-fall him, but neither of these points was accepted by the trial judge as a basis for his ruling
E. g., Graves v. United States, supra note 2, 150 U.S. at 121, 14 S.Ct. 40, 37 L.Ed. 1021; Wynn v. United States, 130 U.S.App.D.C. 60, 64-65, 397 F.2d 621, 625-626 (1967).
In re Dunbier's Estate,supra note 14, 170 Neb. at 549-550, 103 N.W.2d at 804; National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Eddings, supra note 14, 221 S.W.2d at 698-699.
2 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 290 at 179 (3d ed. 1940)
United States v. Roberson, 233 F.2d 517, 519-520 (5th Cir. 1956); Gafford v. Trans-Texas Airways, 299 F.2d 60, 63 (6th Cir. 1962); National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Eddings,supra note 14, 221 S.W.2d at 698-699. See also Annot., 70 A.L.R. 1326 (1931).
That is because the defense offered no independent evidence challenging the drug transactions, as distinguished from the identity of the trafficker. See textsupra at note 22.
Compare Brown v. United States,supra note 1, 134 U.S.App.D.C. at 272, 414 F.2d at 1168; Pennewell v. United States, 122 U.S.App.D.C. 332, 333, 353 F.2d 870, 871 (1965). See also Gass v. United States, 135 U.S.App.D.C. 11, 19, 416 F.2d 767, 775 (1969).