Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/143/157/562640/
Timestamp: 2019-10-13 22:26:02
Document Index: 760161958

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3', '§ 1105', '§ 309', '§ 309', '§ 1158', '§ 1101', '§ 1101', '§ 1158', '§ 1101', '§ 1253', '§ 1182', '§ 1182', '§ 1182', '§ 1253']

Aravinthan Balasubramanrim, Petitioner, v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Respondent, 143 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 1998) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Third Circuit › 1998 › Aravinthan Balasubramanrim, Petitioner, v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Respondent
Aravinthan Balasubramanrim, Petitioner, v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Respondent, 143 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 1998)
US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit - 143 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 1998) Argued March 10, 1998. Decided May 1, 1998
The Board had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.1(b), 3.1(c) and 236.7 (1997). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1105a, as amended by the transitional changes in judicial review set forth in § 309(c) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009. On August 6, 1997, Balasubramanrim filed a timely petition for review as required by § 309(c).
Whether an asylum applicant has demonstrated a well-founded fear of persecution is a factual determination reviewed under the substantial evidence standard. Chang v. INS, 119 F.3d 1055, 1060 (3d Cir. 1997). We will uphold the agency's findings of fact to the extent they are "supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole." INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481, 112 S. Ct. 812, 815, 117 L. Ed. 2d 38 (1992) (citing 8 U.S.C.s 1105a(a) (4)). Likewise, adverse credibility determinations are reviewed for substantial evidence. Hartooni v. INS, 21 F.3d 336, 340 (9th Cir. 1994); Cordero-Trejo v. INS, 40 F.3d 482, 487 (1st Cir. 1994).
Under the asylum statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1994), if the Attorney General determines that an alien is a refugee within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (42) (A) (1994), the Attorney General has the discretion of granting the alien asylum. A refugee is defined as:
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (42) (A).8 Thus, Balasubramanrim has the burden to show that he qualifies as a refugee because he was persecuted in the past or has a "well-founded fear" of future persecution on the ground of, inter alia, political opinion, which is the basis of his appeal.
Where the immigration judge makes a credibility determination, the Board can independently assess that determination and make de novo findings on credibility. See Damaize-Job v. INS, 787 F.2d 1332, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986) ("The Board has the power to review the record de novo and make its own findings of fact, including credibility determinations."). In this case, the Board conducted such an assessment and found Balasubramanrim not credible. As noted, we review the Board's adverse credibility determination for substantial evidence. Hartooni, 21 F.3d at 340. "The Board's findings ... must ... be set aside when the record before a Court of Appeals clearly precludes the Board's decision from being justified by a fair estimate of the worth of the testimony of witnesses or its informed judgment on matters within its special competence or both." Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 490, 71 S. Ct. 456, 466, 95 L. Ed. 456 (1951). Though we defer to reasonable inferences drawn by the Board from conflicting evidence, "deference is not due where findings and conclusions are based on inferences or presumptions that are not reasonably grounded in the record, viewed as a whole." Cordero-Trejo, 40 F.3d at 487 (citations omitted).
The Board should give specific reasons for its determination that a witness is not credible. Mosa v. Rogers, 89 F.3d 601, 604 (9th Cir. 1996). We must "evaluate those reasons to determine whether they are valid grounds upon which to base a finding that the applicant is not credible." Id. (citations omitted). The reasons must bear a legitimate nexus to the finding. Id. (citations omitted).
Our recent case, Marincas v. Lewis, 92 F.3d 195 (3d Cir. 1996), is instructive. In Marincas, we found the asylum procedure afforded stowaways inadequate because there was no translator and no mechanism to ensure accurate recording of their statements to assure a fair review process. Id. at 204. Balasubramanrim, unlike the stowaways in Marincas, received a full adversarial hearing before an immigration judge and had the assistance of an attorney at that hearing. But in carefully scrutinizing Balasubramanrim's initial statements at the airport, the Board treated that interview like an initial application for asylum. Furthermore, the airport statement procedure here suffers from some of the same defects as did the stowaway proceedings invalidated in Marincas. Balasubramanrim did not have a translator at the airport interview. Nor do we have any confidence that the interview was accurately recorded. At least in Marincas the stowaways were informed that they were being afforded the opportunity to present their claim for asylum and were questioned specifically as to their past persecution or well-founded fear of future persecution. No such notice was provided in this case.
That there were some inconsistencies between the airport statement and Balasubramanrim's testimony before the immigration judge is not sufficient, standing alone, to support the Board's finding that Balasubramanrim was not credible. See Aguilera-Cota v. INS, 914 F.2d 1375, 1382 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding that inconsistencies between an applicant's written asylum application and his testimony at the asylum hearing are not enough, standing alone, to serve as a basis for finding a lack of credibility). We find that the Board's credibility determination was not reasonable because the airport interview alone in this case does not serve as a "valid ground [ ] upon which to base a finding that an asylum applicant is not credible." Id. (citations omitted).
Balasubramanrim applied for asylum and withholding of deportation. As noted, under 8 U.S.C. § 1158, if the Attorney General determines that an alien is a refugee within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (42) (A), then the Attorney General has the discretion to grant the alien asylum. A refugee is eligible for asylum if he was persecuted in the past or has a "well-founded fear" of future persecution on the ground of, inter alia, political opinion, which is the basis of Balasubramanrim's appeal.10 Id. In addition, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) requires withholding of deportation of an alien "if the Attorney General determines that such alien's life or freedom would be threatened on account of ... political opinion." Eligibility for withholding of deportation involves a stricter standard ("clear probability") than eligibility for asylum. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 430-31, 107 S. Ct. 1207, 1212-13, 94 L. Ed. 2d 434 (1987). The well-founded fear standard has a subjective and an objective component. Id. at 430-31, 107 S. Ct. at 1212-13. The alien must show that "he has a subjective fear of persecution that is supported by objective evidence that persecution is a reasonable possibility." Chang, 119 F.3d at 1066. When documentary evidence is lacking, as in the instant case, the applicant's credible, persuasive, and specific testimony may suffice. Aguilera-Cota v. INS, 914 F.2d 1375, 1378 (9th Cir. 1990).
The Immigration Judge found Balasubramanrim excludable because he had no valid immigration visa, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a) (7) (A) (i) (I) (1994); was a nonimmigrant without a valid passport, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (7) (B) (i) (I); and had no valid nonimmigrant visa or border crossing card, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (7) (B) (i) (II). Balasubramanrim does not appeal these findings
In addition, Balasubramanrim applied for withholding of deportation. Section 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1994), requires withholding of deportation of an alien "if the Attorney General determines that such alien's life or freedom would be threatened in such country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." Eligibility for withholding of deportation under section 243(h) of the INA involves a stricter standard ("clear probability") than eligibility for asylum. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 430-31, 107 S. Ct. 1207, 1212-13, 94 L. Ed. 2d 434 (1987)
The persecution may be on account of a political opinion the applicant actually holds or on account of one the foreign government has imputed to him. Sangha v. INS, 103 F.3d 1482, 1489 (9th Cir. 1997). See also Cruz-Diaz v. INS, 86 F.3d 330, 332 (4th Cir. 1996) (rejecting applicant's asylum claim because "the evidence does not compel the conclusion that Cruz-Diaz will be subjected to persecution or other harm based on actual or imputed political opinion"); Singh v. Ilchert, 63 F.3d 1501, 1509 (9th Cir. 1995) (relying on evidence that the applicant was tortured because he was suspected of being a Sikh separatist); Ravindran v. INS, 976 F.2d 754, 760 (1st Cir. 1992) (citation omitted) ("An imputed political opinion, whether correctly or incorrectly attributed, may constitute a reason for political persecution within the meaning of the Act."); Rajaratnam v. Moyer, 832 F. Supp. 1219, 1223 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (finding eligibility for asylum based on evidence that applicant was persecuted because the authorities suspected him of being a member of the Liberation Tigers)