Source: http://www.juricaf.org/arret/CONSEILDELEUROPE-COUREUROPEENNEDESDROITSDELHOMME-19820716-923581
Timestamp: 2016-12-03 03:01:04+00:00
Document Index: 286732575

Matched Legal Cases: ['arrêt ', "l'article 285", "l'article 5", "l'article 5", "l'article 5", "l'article 27", "l'article 10", "l'article 6", "l'article 10", "l'article 14", "l'article 27", "l'article 6"]

Type d'affaire : DecisionType de recours : Partiellement irrecevable ; partiellement recevableNumérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 9235/81Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1982-07-16;9235.81 Analyses : (Art. 34) RECOURS, (Art. 34) VICTIME, (Art. 6-1) DELAI RAISONNABLEParties : Demandeurs : X.Défendeurs : REPUBLIQUE FEDERALE D'ALLEMAGNETexte : APPLICATION/REQUETE NÂ° 9235/8 I X . v/the FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY X . c/REPUBLIQUE FÃ.DÃRALE D'ALLEMGAN E DECISION of 16 July 1982 on the admissibility of the application DÃCISION du 16 juillet 1982 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªt e
Artlcle 6, paragraph I, of the Conventlon : There is no lack of fairness on the part of a civil court in refusing to take evidence on facts at issue (which are moreover clearly contradicted by historic facts of common knowledge), the assertiorr of which is as such defamatory. Artfcle 10 of the Convention : Prohibiting an individual to displav pamphlet s describing the historical fact of the assassination of millions of jews by the nazi regime as a lie. is a measure necessary in a democratic society for the protectiorr of the reputation of others .
Artlcle 6, paragraphe I, de la Convention : /l n'est pas inÃ©quitable, de la part d'un juge civil. de refuser d'autoriser la preuve de faits (d'ailleurs contraire Ã une vÃ©ritÃ© historique notoire) dont l'affirmation comme telle est diffamatoire. Article I O de la Convention : L'interdiction faite Ã une personne de propager une publication qualifrant de mensonge le fait historique de /'assassinat de millions de juifs par le rÃ©gime nazi est une mesure nÃ©cessaire dans une sociÃ©tÃ© dÃ©mocratique d la protection de la rÃ©putation d'autrui .
(jranÃ§ais : voir p . 199)
The applicant is a German citizen born in 1930 who is living in Mainz . He is represented by Mrs U . His complaints concern civil proceedings as a result of which he was forbidden to displav pamphlets alleging that the assassination of millions of jews during the pÃ©riod of the Third Reich was a zionistic swindle or lie . - 194 -
In 1975 the applicant had fixed on a notice board, which he had put up at his garden fence for the purpose of displaying certain right wing publications, a number of pamphlets which described the killing of six million jews as a mere invention, an unacceptable lie and a zionistic swindle . A neighbour of jewish origin born in 1950 whose grandfather had died in the concentration camp of Auschwitz felt defamed by these pamphlets and, after having successfully applied for an interlocutory injunction, he brought a civil action against the applicant by which he sought the discontinuance of the latter's behaviour . The Regional Court of Mainz decided on . . . April 1977 that the action was well-founded under Sections 1004 and 823 (2) of the Civil Code, read in conjunction with Section 185 of the Penal Code . It considered it as established that the applicant, a notorious member of a right wing political organisation, was responsible for the display of the pamphlets . Although these were not aimed at the plaintiff personally or at his grandfather, they had to be considered as defamatory of all jews persecuted or killed during the period of the Third Reich and their surviving relatives . As the plaintiff could understand the pamphlets as saying that the fate of his grandfather was a zionistic swindle or lie, he was entitled to bring a claim of defamation against the applicant . It was proven bv numerous documents bevond any doubt that millions of jews had in fact died as a consequence of force applied by the National Socialist authorities . The plaintiff could therefore demand that the applicant should not niake the incriminated statements . The applicant was accordingly forbidden to repeat these statements under threat of enforcement measures (fine up to DM 500,000 .- or detention up to six weeks in each case of culpable contravention) . The applicant's appeal from this judgment was allowed by the Koblenz Court of Appeal which in its judgment of . . . May 1978 considered that the plaintiff had no locus standi . The pamphlets were not addressed to him either personally or as a member of the insultable group of jews as defined in the case law of the Federal Court of Justice . They did not defame jews as such, but only people who hold certain opinions on the persecution of jews during the period of the Third Reich . In view of the fundamental importance of the matter, the Court of Appeal decided however to grant leave to appeal to the Federal Court of Justice . The plaintiff made use of his possibility and the Federal Court of Justice in fact allowed his appeal by a decision of . . . September 1979 . The .court first observed that nobody who denies the historical fact of the assassination of jews during the period of the Third Reich can invoke his freedont of expression under Article 5, paragraph I of the Basic Law, because this freedom does not include a right to make wrong statements . The killing of millions of jews was established by documentary evidence beyond any doubt . The applicant's argument that the pamphlets at issue were only criticising exaggerated estimations o( the number of assassinated jews was rejected . The pamphlet s
clearly described the very fact of the assassination of millions of jews as a lie and thus denied the inhuman destiny which jews had had to suffer merelv because of their ethical origin . This was not objective criticism of historiography short of insult to any person . It rather constituted a disrespect for the person of all those who are marked bv the persecution of jews during the period ot the Third Reich . The Federal Court's case law in criminal matters had established broad principles when dealing with defamation of jews : Because of the particulÃ¢r historical context each person belonging to this group mav feel defamed by an attack against the group as such, irrespective of whether he has personnaly suffered from persecution during the period of the ,Third Reich, or whether he has lived during that time . The plaintifP, if born earlier, would have been struck by the raciallegistation of NÃ¼rnberg and therefore belonged to this group . Any attempt to justify, extenuate or deny the destinv of jews during the period of the Third Reich therefore affected him personallv and he was entitled to claim to be defamed bv such statements . The Federal Court of Justice therefore restored the judgment of first instance . The applicant then filed a constitutiÃ´nal complaint invoking in particular his freedom of expression under Article 5, paragraph 1 of the Basic Law . However, on . . . March 1980 a three judge panel of the Federal Constitutional Court rejected his constitutional complaint as inadmissible . It considered that the Federal Court ot' Justice had rightlv come to the conclusion that the incriminated statements were untrue . They therefore did not enjoy the protection ot' Article 5, paragraph I . The decision was served on the applicant on . . . March 1980 . Following the above judgment bv the Federal Court of Justice crimina l proceedings were institutÃ©d against the applicant on a charge of incitement to hatred (Volksverhetzung, Section 130 of the Penal Code) . He was convicted and given a one year prison sentence .
Complaint c The applicant now invokes his rights under Articles 2 . 3 . S . 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 . 14 and 17 of the Convention . He alleges in particular that the court decisions taken in his case amount to a suppression of truth for political purposes . He invokes certain publications (including i .a . Heinz Roth . Der makaberste Betrug aller Zeiten . Odenhausen 1974, Arthur Butz . der Jahrhundert-Betrug, and Zilhelm StÃ¯glich, Der Auschwitz-Mythos, TÃ¼bingen 1979) as evidence of scientific research denving the assertions of the official historiographv . Their rejection without any taking of evidence in his opinion shows that the judges were not independent and impartial, and that herWas denied the guarantees of a fair hearing . - 196 -
THE LA W The applicant submits various complaints in relation to civil proceedings 1. as a result of which he was forbidden to repeat statements in which the assassination of millions of jews during the period of the Third Reich was described as a lie . These statements were considered as untrue and defamatory of jews in general . including the plaintiff, a person of jewish origin born in 1950 whose grandfather had died in the concentration camp of Auschwitz . It was clarified bv the Federal Court of Justice that the prohibition was limited to assertions denving the assassination of millions of jews as such, and that it did not cover criticism directed against an allegedly exaggerated extimation of the nuntber of jews which had been killed . The applicant himself had admitted in the course of the proceedings that this number might have been around two million . 2 . The applicant's subsequent criminal conviction for incitement to hatred which was apparently based on the same facts cannot be examined by the Commission because the applicant has failed to show that he has exhausted the domestic remedies in this respect (cf . Article 26 of the Convention) . This part of the application must accordingly be rejected under Article 27, paragraph 3, of the Convention . 3 . As regards the above civil proceedings . the applicant also has not exhausted the domestic remedies with regard to all complaints which he now submits to the Comniission . The Commission must accordingly limit its examination ot'the case to a consideration under Article 10 of the Convention where the applicant has clearlv exhausted the remedies by basing his constitutional complaint on an alleged violation of his freedom of expression, and a consideration under Article 6, paragraph 1, of the Convention insofar as he alleges a violation of his right to a fair hearing . A similar complaint may be considered as having been implied in his above constitutional complaint .
4 . Article 10 . paragraph 1, of the Convention guarantees everyone's right to freedom of expression, including freedom to hold opinions and to impart information and ideas without interference by public authority . There can be no doubt that the applicant's freedom of expression has been interfered with by his being restricted from fixing pamphlets with a certain content on a notice board . According to paragraph 2 of the Article, the exercise of this freedo m mav however be subjected to certain restrictions if they are prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society for certain specific purposes, including the protection of the reputation of others . The restriction applied in the present case was clearly covered by the applicable legal provisions existing in the Federal Republic of Germany as interpreted by the case law of the courts . This case law had for a long tim e - 197 -
been based on the principle that jews are insultable as a group and that each member of the jewish community can claim to be defamed by statements insulting the jews as such . AlthoÃ»gh this principle was further clariFied in the present case by affirming the ius standi even of a person of jewish origin born after the War, there can be no doubt that the measure affecting the applicant was "prescribed bv law" within the meaning of Article 10, paragraph 2 . The Conimission also finds that it was neither arbitrary nor unreasonable to consider the pamphlets displayed by the applicant as a defamatory attack against the jewish community and against each individual member of this communitv . Bv describing the historical fact of the assassination of millions of jews, a fact which was even admitted by the applicant himself, as a lie and a zionistic swindle, the pamphlets in question not only gave a distorted picture of the relevant historical facts but also contained an attack on the reputation ot all those who were described as liers or swindlers, or at least as persons profiting from or interested in such lies or swindles . The Commission considers that the courts rightly identified this as the underlying tendency of the pamphlets in question . Their restriction was therefore not only covered by a legitimate purpose recognised by the Convention (namely the protection of thÃ© reputation of others), but could also be considered Ã¢s neces'sarv in a democratic societv . Such a society rests on the principles of tolerahce and broadmindedness which the pamphlets in question clearlv failed to observe . The protection of these principles may be especiallv indicated vis-Ã -vis groups which have historically suffered from discrimination . The fact that collective protection against defantation is limited to certain specific groups including jews is based on objective considerations and does not involve any element of, discrimination contrary to Article 14 of the Convention . The applicant's complaint of a violation of his right to freedom of expression is therefore ntanifestlv ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph 2, of the Convention . Insofar as the applicant complains that the courts failed to take int o .5 account anv evidence on the historical facts at issue, the Commission finds no appearance of a violation of the principles of a fair hearing in the present case . It has already been stated that the restriction imposed on the applicant was limited to assertions denying the historical fact of the assassination of millions of jews as such . This historical fact is not only common knowledge established beyond any doubt by overwhelming evidence of all kind, it was even admitted by the applicant himself . His attempt to justify his pamphlets as merely criticising exaggerated estimations of the numbers is contradicted by the contents of the pamphlets themselves . The Federal Court of Justice furthermore dealt in explicit detail with this aspect of the matter and clarified that objective criticism of historiographv, including the assessment of th e
numbers of assassinated jews, was legally permitted . The facts of the applicant's case, however, did not involve anv .necessity to take evidence in this respect because it was the denial of the historical fact as such which was considered as defamatorv . Unlike the offence of slander (Ã¼ble Nachrede, Section 186 of the Penal Code) the offence of defamation (Section 185 of the Penal Code) does not consist in the assertion of certain facts whose truth may be proved or disproved, it constitutes a value judgment expressed in injuring form which as such is not susceptible to be disproved bv evidence of truth . As the applicant's case concerned a civil proceeding in which the above provision of the Penal Code was only applied by analogy (in combination with Sections 1004 and 823 of the Civil Coce), it was also subject to the principles of civil proceedings including the principle that the court is bound bv the plaintiff's claim . The plaintiff in the present case, however, had not alleged that the pamphlets displayed by the applicant were slanderous because based on wrong statements of fact, he only submitted that their tendency was defamatory against jews including himself, and that was the onlv issue before the courts . The courts therefore were not called upon to investigate whether or not the statements in question were true, but only whether they were defamatory . The Contmission therePore finds no appearance of a violation of the principles of a fair hearing as required by Article 6, paragraph 1 . of the Convention . This part of the application is therefore also manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected under Article 27, paragraph 2 . of the Convention . For these reasons the Commissio n
(TRADUCTION) EN FAI T Le requÃ©rant est un ressortissant allemand nÃ© en 1930 et habitant Mayence. Il est reprÃ©sentÃ© par Mme U . Ses griefs concernent une procÃ©dure civile qui a eu pour effet de lui interdire d'exposer des brochures allÃ©guant que l'assassinat de millions de Juifs sous le 3Â° Reich Ã©tait un mensonge ou une escroquerie sioniste . En 1975, le requÃ©rant . qui avait accrochÃ© $ la clÃ´ture de son jardin un tableau d'affichage de publications de droite, y avait apposÃ© diverses brochures qualifiant le massacre de six millions de Juifs de pure invention, d e
mensonge inacceptable et d'escroquerie sioniste . Un voisin d'origine juive, nÃ© en 1950 et dont le grand-pÃ¨re Ã©tait mort dans le camp de concentration d'Auschwitz, s'estima diffamÃ© par ces brochures : aprÃ¨s avoir obtenu du juge une ordonnance provisoire, il intenta une action civile contre le requÃ©rant pour mettre fin Ã ces agissements . . . avril 1977, le tribunal rÃ©gional . de Mayence jugea la demand e .Le fondÃ©e, en vertu des articles 1004 et 823 (2) du Code civil, lus en liaison avec l'article 285 du Code pÃ©nal . Il estima Ã©tabli que le requÃ©rant . membre notoire d'une organisation politique de droite, Ã©tait responsable de l'affichage des brochures . Certes, ces textes ne visaient personnellement ni le plaignant ni son grand-pÃ¨re . mais devaient Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ©s comme diffamatoires Ã l'Ã©gard de tous les Juifs persÃ©cutÃ©s ou tuÃ©s sous le troisiÃ¨me Reich, et Ã l'Ã©gard de leurs parents survivants . Le plaignant qui, pouvait interprÃ©ter les brochures comme qualifiant de mensonge ou d'escroquerie sioniste le sort de son grand-pÃ¨re, avait une action en diffamation contre le requÃ©rant . Nombre de documents incontestables ont prouvÃ© qu'en fait des millions de Juifs sont morts par suite de la contrainte exercÃ©e par les autoritÃ©s national-socialistes . Le plaignant pouvait donc exiger que le requÃ©rant s'abstienne de faire les dÃ©clarations incriminÃ©es . Le requÃ©rant se vit en consÃ©quence interdire de rÃ©pÃ©ter ces dÃ©clarations sous peine de mesures de coercition(amende de 500000 DM maximum ou emprisonnement pouvant aller jusqu'Ã six semaines dans chaque cas de contravention intentionnelle) . La cour d'appel de Coblence admit l'appel du requÃ©rant, en estimant , dans son arrÃªt du . . . mai 1978, que le plaignant n'avait pas qualitÃ© pour agir . Les brochures ne s'adressaient pas Ã lui, ni personnellement ni en tant que membre du groupe de Juifs susceptibles d'Ãªtre outragÃ©s, selon la dÃ©finition donnÃ©e par la jurisprudence de la Cour fÃ©dÃ©rale de justice . Les brochures ne diffamaient pas les Juifs en tant que tels, mais seulement les personnes professant certaines opinions sur la persÃ©cution des Juifs sous le 3" Reich . Vu l'importance de l'affaire, la cour d'appel dÃ©cida cependant d'octroyer l'autorisation d'interjeter appel devant la Cour fÃ©dÃ©rale de justice . Le plaignant fit usage de cette possibilitÃ© et la Cour fÃ©dÃ©rale fit droit Ã son appel dans son arrÃªt du . . . septembre 1979 . La Cour fit remarquer en premier lieu que quiconque nie le fait historique de l'assassinat des Juifs sous le 3Â° Reich ne peut invoquer la libertÃ© d'expression reconnue par l'article 5, paragraphe 1 de la Loi fondamentale, car cette libertÃ© n'inclut pas le droit de formuler des dÃ©clarations erronÃ©es . Le massacre de millions de Juifs a Ã©tÃ© Ã©tabli par des documents incontestables . La Cour a rejetÃ© l'argument du requÃ©rant selon lequel les brochures en question ne faisaient que critiquer les estimations exagÃ©rÃ©es du nombre de Juifs assassinÃ©s . En effet, les brochures qualifiaient clairement de mensonge le fait mÃªme de l'assassinat de millions de Juifs et niaient en consÃ©quence le sort inhumain que des Juifs ont dÃ» subir simplement en raison de leur origine ethnique . II ne s'agissait pas lÃ d'une critiqu e
objective d'historiographe dÃ©nuÃ©e d'intention insultante pour quiconque . Cela constituait au contraire un manque de respect pour la personne de toutes les victimes juives des persÃ©cutions du 3Â° Reich . Or . la jurisprudence pÃ©nale de la Cour fÃ©dÃ©rale a posÃ© de grands principes en matiÃ¨re de diffamation des Juifs : en raison du contexte historique particulier, toute personne appartenant Ã ce groupe ethnique peut s'estimer diffamÃ©e par une attaque portÃ©e contre le groupe en tant que tel, indÃ©pendamment du point de savoir si elle a personnellement souffert du 3' Reich ou vÃ©cu pendant cette pÃ©riode . Si le plaignant Ã©tait nÃ© plus tÃ´t, il serait tombÃ© sous le coup de la lÃ©gislation raciale de Nuremberg ; il appartient donc bien Ã ce groupe . Toute tentative faite pour justifier, attÃ©nuer ou nier le sort des Juifs sous le 3Â° Reich l'affecte donc personnellement et il est en droit de se ptÃ©tendre diffamÃ© par ce genre de dÃ©clarations . La Cour fÃ©dÃ©rale a donc rÃ©tabli le jugement rendu en premiÃ¨re instance . Le requÃ©rant a alors formÃ© un pourvoi constitutionnel en invoquant notamment la libertÃ© d'expression que lui garantit l'article 5 paragraphe 1 de la Loi fondamentale . Cependant, le . . . mars 1980, une chambre contposÃ©e de trois juges de la Cour constitutionnelle fÃ©dÃ©rale a rejetÃ© le pourvoi pour irrecevabilitÃ© . Elle a estimÃ© que la Cour fÃ©dÃ©rale de justice avait Ã juste titre conclu Ã l'inexactitude des dÃ©clarations incriminÃ©es qui ne bÃ©nÃ©ficiaient donc pas de la protection de l'article 5, paragraphe 1 . La dÃ©cision fut signifiÃ©e au requÃ©rant le . . . mars 1980 . A la suite de l'arrÃªt de la Cour fÃ©dÃ©rale de justice, des poursuites pÃ©nales furent engagÃ©es contre le requÃ©rant pour incitation Ã la haine raciale (Volksverhetzung, article 130, du Code pÃ©nal) . L'intÃ©ressÃ© fut reconnu coupable et condamnÃ© Ã un an de prison ferme . GRIEFS Le requÃ©rant invoque les droits que lui garantissent les articles 2, 3, 5, 6 . 7, 8, 9 . 10, 14 et 17 de la Convention . Il allÃ¨gue notamment que les dÃ©cisions judiciaires prises Ã son endroit Ã©quivalent Ã supprimer la vÃ©ritÃ© pour des raisons politiques . Il renvoie Ã certaines publications (notamment celles de Heinz Roth, Der makaberste Betrug aller Zeiten, Odenhausen 1974, d'Arthur Butz, Der Jahrhundert-Betrug et de Wilhelm StÃ¼glich, des Auschwitz-Mythos . TÃ¼bingen 1979) comme preuves de travaux scientifiques niant les assertions de l'historiographie officielle . Les rejeter sans enquÃªte montre, selon lui, que les magistrats n'Ã©taient pas indÃ©pendants et impartiaux et lui ont refusÃ© les garanties d'un procÃ¨s Ã©quitable . EN DROI T 1 . Le requÃ©rant formule divers griefs concernant la procÃ©dure civile qui a abouti Ã lui interdire de rÃ©itÃ©rer les dÃ©clarations qualifiant de mensonge l'assassinat de millions de Juifs sous le 3' Reich . Ces dÃ©clarations furen t
considÃ©rÃ©es comme inexactes et diffamatoires Ã l'endroit des Juifs en gÃ©nÃ©ral, et notamment du plaignant, d'o ri gine juive, nÃ© en 1950 et dont le grand-pÃ¨re Ã©tait mort dans le camp de concentration d'Auschwitz . La Cour fÃ©dÃ©rale de justice prÃ©cisa que l'interdiction se limitait aux affirmations niant en tant que tel l'assassinat de millions de Juifs et ne conce rn ait . pas les cri tiques po rtÃ©es contre une estimation prÃ©tendÃ»ment exagÃ©rÃ©e du nombre de Juifs massacrÃ©s . Le requÃ©rant lui-mÃªme a admis au cours de la procÃ©dure que ce nombre pouvait avoisiner deux millions . 2 . La Commission ne peut pas examiner la condamnation pÃ©nale ultÃ© rieure du re quÃ©rant pour incitation Ã la haine raciale et fondÃ©e appa re mment sur les mÃªmes faits, car le requÃ©rant n'a pas montrÃ© qu'il avait Ã©puisÃ© Ã cet Ã©gard les voies de recours internes (cf. article 26 de lÃ Convention) . La requÃªte doit donc, sur ce point ; Ãªtre rejetÃ©e conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 27, paragraphe 3 de la Convention . 3 . Quant Ã la procÃ©dure civile prÃ©citÃ©e, le requÃ©rant n'a pas non plus Ã©puisÃ©les recours internes sur tous les griefs qu'il formule maintenant devant la Commission . Celle-ci doit donc se borner, en l'espÃ¨ce, Ã examiner, d'une part les griefs tirÃ©s de l'article 10 de la Convention, pour lesquels le requÃ©rant a manifestement Ã©puisÃ© les recours intemes en fondant son pourv oi constitutionnel sur une violation allÃ©guÃ©e de sa libertÃ© d'expression et, d'autre pe rt , les griefs tirÃ©s de l'article 6, paragraphe 1, de la Convention, dans la mesure oÃ¹ il allÃ¨gue une violation de son droitd'Ãªtre entendu ; on peut en effet estimer que ce grief Ã©tait implicitement soulevÃ© dans le pÃ´urvoi constitutionnel du requÃ©rant . 4 . L'article 10, paragraphe 1, de la Convention garantit Ã toute pers onne le droit Ã la libertÃ© d'expression, notamment la libert Ã© d'opinion et celle de recevoir ou de communiquer des informations ou des idÃ©es sans qu'il puisse y avoir ingÃ©rence d'autoritÃ©s publiques . Il ne fait aucun doute qu'il y eu ingÃ©rence dans la libertÃ© d'expre ssion du requÃ©rant, puisqu'on lui a interdit d'afficher des brochures prÃ©sentant un certain contenu . Selon le paragraphe 2 de l'article, l'exercice de cette libertÃ© peut Ãªtre soumis Ã certaines restrictions Ã condition qu'elles soient prÃ©vues par la loi et nÃ©cessaires dans une sociÃ©tÃ© dÃ©mocratique Ã certains objectifs prÃ©cis, notamment la protection de la rÃ©putation d'autrui . ., _ La restriction imposÃ©e en l'espÃ¨ce relevait manifestement des dispositions lÃ©gales applicables en RÃ©publique FÃ©dÃ©rale d'Allemagne, telles qu'interprÃ©tÃ©es par la jurisprudence des t ri bunaux allemands . Cette ju ri sprudence se fonde depuis longtemps sur le principe que les Juifs sont, en tant que groupe, susceptibles d'Ãªtre outragÃ©s et que chaque membre de la communautÃ© juive peut se prÃ©tendre diffamÃ© par des dÃ©clarations insultant les Juifs en gÃ©nÃ©ral . Bien que ce p ri ncipe ait Ã©tÃ© encore prÃ©cisÃ© en l'espÃ¨ce par l'affirmation qu e
mÃªme un Juif nÃ© aprÃ¨s la guerre a qualitÃ© pour agir, il ne saurait faire de doute que la mesure affectant le requÃ©rant Ã©tait .prÃ©vue par la loi ., au sens de l'article 10, paragraphe 2. La Commission estime Ã©galement qu'il n'Ã©tait ni arbitraire ni dÃ©raisonnable de considÃ©rer les brochures exposÃ©es par le requÃ©rant comme une attaque diffamatoire dirigÃ©e contre la communautÃ© juive en gÃ©nÃ©ral et chacun de ses membres en particulier . En qualifiant de mensonge et d'escroquerie sioniste le fait historique de l'assassinat de millions de Juifs - fait reconnu par le requÃ©rant lui-mÃªme - les brochures en question ont non seulement donnÃ© une image dÃ©formÃ©e de faits historiques, mais Ã©galement terni la rÃ©putation de tous ceux qu'elles qualifiaient de menteurs et d'escrocs, ou du ntoins de personne intÃ©ressÃ©e Ã ces mensonges ou escroqueries ou en tirant profit . Selon la Commission, c'est Ã bon droit que les tribunaux ont vu lÃ l'esprit des brochures en question . La restriction imposÃ©e rÃ©pondait non seulement Ã un objectif lÃ©gitime reconnu par la Convention (protection de la rÃ©putation d'autrui), mais pouvait Ã©galement Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ©e comme nÃ©cessaire dans une sociÃ©tÃ© dÃ©mocratique . Pareille sociÃ©tÃ© repose en effet sur les principes de tolÃ©rance et de largeur d'esprit qui faisaient manifestement dÃ©faut aux brochures en question . Il est tout particuliÃ¨rement indiquÃ© de sauvegarder ces principes Ã l'Ã©gard de groupes qui ont historiquement souffert de discrimination . Le fait de limiter Ã certains groupes prÃ©cis, aux Juifs notamment, la protection collective contre la diffamation s'appuie sur des considÃ©rations objectives et n'implique aucun Ã©lÃ©ment de discrimination contraire Ã l'article 14 de la Convention . Le grief du requÃ©rant relatif Ã une violation de son droit Ã la libertÃ© d'expression est donc manifestement mal fondÃ©, au sens de l'article 27, paragraphe 2, de la Convention . 5. Dand la mesure oÃ¹ le requÃ©rant se plaint de ce que les tribunaux n'ont pas tenu compte des Ã©lÃ©ments de preuve fournis sur les faits historiques litigieux, la Commission ne constate en l'espÃ¨ce aucune apparence de violation des principes de procÃ¨s Ã©quitable . En effet, la Commission a dÃ©jÃ indiquÃ© que la restriction imposÃ©e au requÃ©rant se limitait aux assertions niant en tant que tel le fait historique de l'assassinat de millions de Juifs . Or, ce fait historique est non seulement un fait notoire, Ã©tabli avec certitude par des preuves Ã©crasantes de tous genres, mais a mÃªme Ã©tÃ© reconnu par le reqÃ»Ã©rant lui-mÃªme . Les tentatives faites par l'intÃ©ressÃ© pour se justifier en disant que les brochures se bomaient Ã critiquer les estimations exagÃ©rÃ©es des chiffres sont en contradiction avec le contenu des brochures elle-mÃªmes . La Cour fÃ©dÃ©rale de justice a expressÃ©ment traitÃ© en dÃ©tails de cet aspect de la question et prÃ©cisÃ© que la loi autorise Ã critiquer objectivement l'historiographie, notamment l'Ã©valuation du nombre de Juifs assassinÃ©s . Cependant, les faits de la cause n'obligeaient nullement Ã recueil-
lir des preuves Ã cet Ã©gard puisque c'est la nÃ©gation comme telle du fait historique qui Ã©tait considÃ©rÃ©e comme diffamatoire . A la diffÃ©rence de l'infraction de calomnie (Ã¼ble Nachrede, article 186 du Code pÃ©nal), la diffamation (article 185 du Code pÃ©nal) ne consiste pas Ã affirmer certains faits dont la vÃ©ritÃ© peut Ãªtre ou non prouvÃ©e ; elle constitue un jugement de valeur exprimÃ© sous une fornte injurieuse et qu'il n'est pas possible de rÃ©fiiter par la preuve contraire . Comme il s'agissait en l'espÃ¨ce d'une action civile dans laquelle la disposition susdite du Code pÃ©nal n'Ã©tait appliquÃ©e que par analogie (en conjonction avec les articles 1004 et 823 du Code civil) c'Ã©taient les principes de la procÃ©dure civile qui Ã©taient applicables, notamment celui selon lequel le tribunal doit s'en tenir aux termes de la demande . Or, en l'espÃ¨ce, le demandeur n'a pas allÃ©guÃ© que les brochures exposÃ©es par le requÃ©rant fussent calomnieuses parce que fondÃ©es sur des constats erronÃ©s . Il s'est bornÃ© Ã faire valoir que l'ensemble Ã©tait diffamatoire Ã l'Ã©gard des Juifs en gÃ©nÃ©ral et de luimÃªme en particulier et ce fut la seule question litigieuse portÃ©e devant les tribunaux . Ceux-ci n'Ã©taient donc pas appelÃ©s Ã rechercher si les constatations en question Ã©taient ou non exactes, mais seulement si elles avaient un caractÃ¨re diffamatoire .
La Commission ne constate donc aucune apparence de violation des principes de procÃ¨s Ã©quitable dont l'article 6 . paragraphe 1, de la Convention exige le respect . En consÃ©quence, la requÃªte est, sur ce point Ã©galement, nianifestement nial fondÃ©e et doit Ãªtre rejelÃ©e conformÃ©ment Ã I'a rt icle 27, paragraphe 2, de la Convention . Par ces motifs, la Commissio n
-2oq-Origine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Commission (plénière)Date de la décision : 16/07/1982Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page