Source: http://il.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20190905_0001350.SIL.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-11-20 20:13:25
Document Index: 479221339

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2241', '§ 922', '§ 924', '§ 922', '§ 922', '§ 2255']

Petitioner Danyahle L. Mosley, an inmate in the Bureau of Prisons, filed a Petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1). Mosley is currently incarcerated at Hazelton USP in Bruceton Mills, West Virginia, serving a 180-month sentence after pleading guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).[1] United States v. Mosley, 13-cr-30026-NJR-1, Doc. 42 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 7, 2013). His sentence was enhanced pursuant to the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), based on three prior Illinois felony convictions: a 2001 residential burglary pursuant to 720 ILCS 5/19-3 (1985), a 2004 residential burglary pursuant to 720 ILCS 5/19-3 (2001), and a 2008 robbery pursuant to 720 ILCS 5/18-1(a) (1999).
Mosley now invokes Mathis v. United States, - U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 2243 (2016), to challenge his ACCA enhancement based on these prior convictions and argue that he is entitled to be resentenced without said enhancement. Specifically, Mosley argues that the Illinois residential burglary statute criminalizes broader behavior than the generic federal definition of “burglary” because it potentially criminalizes the entry or remainder into “mobile home[s], trailer[s], or other living quarters” that may not be buildings or structures under the generic definition. (Doc. 1, pp. 4- 7). Mosley also makes brief mention of his prior robbery conviction (Doc. 1, p. 3; Doc. 17, p. 1), but does not further develop his argument regarding the robbery statute. Ultimately, Mosley argues that these convictions were improperly considered to be violent felonies under the ACCA and can no longer support his enhanced sentence in light of Mathis.
Respondent opposes issuance of the writ on multiple grounds. In an argument Respondent acknowledges is inconsistent with the current law of the Seventh Circuit, Respondent contends that inmates who have previously sought post-conviction relief under Section 2255 may not use Section 2255(e)'s savings clause to challenge his or her sentence via a Section 2241 petition. (Doc. 13, pp. 4-15). Respondent also argues that Mosley's failure to raise a similar argument on direct appeal bars his petition under the procedural default rule. (Id. at pp. 16-18). Respondent asserts that Mosley has affirmatively waived his right to collaterally attack his sentence via Sections 2255 and 2241 in his plea agreement (Id. at pp. 18-20), and also argues that even if the Court reaches the merits of Mosley's Petition, his Petition must fail because his prior Illinois residential burglary and robbery convictions were properly considered predicate violent felonies under the ACCA. (Id. at pp. 20-23).
Mosley filed a reply in support of his Petition. (Doc. 17).
On April 15, 2013, Mosley pleaded guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). United States v. Mosley, No. 13-cr-30026-NJR-1, Doc. 21 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 15, 2013). Mosley entered into a written Plea Agreement, in which he agreed that he was properly considered an Armed Career Criminal under the ACCA based on his criminal history, which explicitly included his prior Illinois robbery and residential burglary convictions, and would potentially be subject to a sentence of 15 years to life imprisonment. Id. at pp. 4-7. Mosley also agreed that he:
knowingly and voluntarily waive[d] his right to contest any aspect of his conviction and sentence that could be contested under Title 18 or Title 28 [of the United States Code], or under any other provision of federal law, except that if the sentence imposed is in excess of the Sentencing Guidelines as determined by the Court (or any applicable statutory minimum, whichever is greater), the Defendant reserves the right to appeal the reasonableness of the sentence.
Id. at pp. 7-8.[2]
Mosley's Presentence Report (“PSR”) determined that his prior criminal history, including his Illinois robbery and residential burglary convictions, qualified him for the ACCA enhancement and set his minimum term of imprisonment at 15 years (180 months) pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 942(e). Id. at Doc. 38, p. 17. Mosley did not object to the findings in the PSR, id. at Doc. 39, and was ultimately sentenced to 180 months imprisonment. Id. at Doc. 42.
Mosley did not file a direct appeal. After being sentenced, he filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 relying on Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015), to argue that his Illinois robbery conviction could not be considered a crime of violence under the ACCA. Mosley v. United States, No. 16-cv-0206-NJR, Doc. 1 (S.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 2016). This motion was denied on the merits. Id. at Doc. 9. Mosley did not appeal the denial of his Section 2255 petition, but he did seek authorization to file a second Section 2255 petition from the Seventh Circuit using the same theory he puts forth in the instant Petition. That request was summarily denied. Id. at Doc. 16, pp. 1-2.
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Aside from the direct appeal process, a prisoner who has been convicted in federal court is generally limited to challenging his conviction and sentence by bringing a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. &sect; 2255 in the court which sentenced him. A Section 2255 motion is ordinarily the &ldquo;exclusive means for a federal prisoner to attack his conviction.&rdquo; Kramer v. Olson, 347 F.3d 214, 217 (7th Cir. 2003). And, a prisoner is generally limited to only one challenge of his conviction and sentence under Section 2255. A prisoner may not file a “second or successive” Section 2255 motion unless a panel of the appropriate court of appeals certifies that such motion contains either (1) newly discovered evidence “sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found ...