Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/160/1078/533971/
Timestamp: 2019-08-22 18:09:18
Document Index: 335622984

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 841', '§ 922', '§ 924', '§ 841', '§ 924', '§ 846', 'art, 545', '§ 922', '§ 922', '§ 922', '§ 2', '§ 1', '§ 3', '§ 841', '§ 1002', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 846', '§ 846', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 846', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 851']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Darnell L. Walker (96-3073); William A. Mckinley (96-3938),defendants-appellants, 160 F.3d 1078 (6th Cir. 1998) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Sixth Circuit › 1998 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Darnell L. Walker (96-3073); William A. Mckinley (9...
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Darnell L. Walker (96-3073); William A. Mckinley (96-3938),defendants-appellants, 160 F.3d 1078 (6th Cir. 1998)
US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit - 160 F.3d 1078 (6th Cir. 1998)
Argued July 30, 1998. Decided Nov. 19, 1998
Walker was also charged with one count of possessing cocaine base with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1), (b) (1) (B); two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g), 924(a) (2); and one count of using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug-trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1). McKinley was charged with an additional count of possessing cocaine base with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1), 842(b) (1) (B).
Walker and McKinley proceeded to trial and, in September 1994, were convicted on all counts. Walker's conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1), however, was dismissed prior to sentencing, following the Supreme Court's decision in Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 116 S. Ct. 501, 133 L. Ed. 2d 472 (1995). Both defendants filed timely appeals.
McKinley's attorney added that "Judge White [had] addressed [him] off the bench and off the record, and at that time just indicated that the juror had made that statement to him." The attorney had not thought "anything of it at the time because ... [he] was present [in the elevator], there was no conversation; but in light of the fact of the rest of that particular juror's attitudes and demeanors in the case, ... [he now] believe [d] that those culmination of facts have caused her to rule against [his] client or otherwise have a predisposition towards conviction."
It is a " 'basic requirement of due process' " that a "defendant in a criminal case receive 'a fair trial by a panel of impartial, "indifferent" jurors.' " Rigsby, 45 F.3d at 122 (quoting Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722, 81 S. Ct. 1639, 6 L. Ed. 2d 751 (1961)). The landmark case on the topic of jury taint is Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 74 S. Ct. 450, 98 L. Ed. 654 (1954), where the Court "affirmed that juries in criminal cases must be free of outside influences and announced the procedure to be followed when a party alleges that a jury has been subjected to such influences," Rigsby, 45 F.3d at 122-23, namely, the holding of a hearing " 'with all interested parties,' " rather than ex parte resolution of the problem by the judge, id. (quoting Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229-30, 74 S. Ct. 450).
United States v. Rugiero, 20 F.3d 1387, 1390 (6th Cir. 1994) (citations and footnotes omitted). In Rugiero, we emphasized that it is the defendant's obligation to "prove [ ] ... actual bias ... on the part of the jury ..., [or to demonstrate] 'actual prejudice.' " Id. at 1391. And the rule established in United States v. Rigsby is that " [w]hen there is a credible allegation of extraneous influences, the court must investigate sufficiently to assure itself that constitutional rights of the criminal defendant have not been violated." 45 F.3d 120, 124-25 (6th Cir. 1995) (emphasis added). But a district court is not obligated to conduct a hearing on every allegation of jury taint, because "not all communications with jurors warrant a hearing for a determination of potential bias." Rigsby, 45 F.3d at 124. And a defendant who waits until appeal to request a hearing bears a heavy burden, since the defendant has thereby effectively deprived this court of any basis for concluding that a hearing would be necessary, and asks us to presume that the district court would not have acceded to such a request, and would have done so for erroneous reasons. See United States v. Griffith, 17 F.3d 865, 880 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. Walton, 908 F.2d 1289, 1296-97 (6th Cir. 1990); cf. United States v. Walker, 1 F.3d 423, 430-31 (6th Cir. 1993).
The essential elements of conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 846 are (1) an agreement by two or more persons to violate the drug laws, and (2) knowledge of, intention to join, and participation in the conspiracy on the part of each conspirator. See United States v. Elder, 90 F.3d 1110, 1120 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, ----, 117 S. Ct. 529, 993, 136 L. Ed. 2d 415, 873 (1996). As we have on many occasions explained, we review a defendant's claim of insufficient evidence by evaluating the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, and by drawing all inferences and resolving all credibility disputes in the government's favor. See United States v. Riffe, 28 F.3d 565, 567 (6th Cir. 1994). Our task is simply "to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.; see Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979).
For at least two decades, it was the rule in this court and elsewhere that "the government is not required to accept the defendant's offer to stipulate that he is a convicted felon in lieu of presenting evidence of defendant's prior felony convictions." United States v. Yannott, 42 F.3d 999, 1007 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing United States v. Burkhart, 545 F.2d 14, 15 (6th Cir. 1976)). All that was changed last year, however, when the Supreme Court held that a district court abuses its discretion when it refuses a defendant's offer to stipulate as to a prior offense in a firearm felon-in-possession case, if the prior conviction raises the risk of improper considerations by the jury, and if the only rationale for admitting the offense is to prove that the defendant meets the relevant criterion of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1). See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 647. In Old Chief, the defendant had previously been convicted of assault causing serious bodily injury. He offered to stipulate to that fact but the prosecution refused, and the district court allowed the prosecution to introduce the order of judgment and commitment for Old Chief's prior conviction. Old Chief was ultimately convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1). Id.
In reversing the conviction, the Supreme Court observed that convicting a felon of unlawful possession of a firearm merely because the prior conviction established a tendency to disobey the law would be an impermissible basis for the verdict. Id. 117 S. Ct. at 650. Next, the Court opined that a court's probative-value/unfair-prejudice calculation should be informed by the available alternatives. If an equally probative, but less unfairly prejudicial, item of evidence is available, then it should be substituted. Id. at 652. The evidence at issue in Old Chief had a clear risk of unfair prejudice, and the alternative--a stipulation that the defendant had been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year's imprisonment--would have been equally probative in terms of proving the elements of the crime charged. Although the prosecution has a general right to "tell its story" and, within limits, introduce the type of evidence it sees fit, that right has "virtually no application when the point at issue is a defendant's legal status, dependent on some judgment rendered wholly independently of the concrete events of later criminal behavior charged against him." Id. at 654-55. Further, such a stipulation would mitigate the danger of unfair prejudice. Id. at 653.
Clearly, under Old Chief, the court's decision to admit DeCarlo's testimony rather than accept Walker's stipulation was error. The question is whether it was harmless. See United States v. Daniel, 134 F.3d 1259, 1262-63 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 119 S. Ct. 83, 142 L. Ed. 2d 65, 1998 WL 221491 (1998). " [I]t is well settled that an error which is not of constitutional dimension is harmless 'unless it is more probable than not that the error materially affected the verdict.' " Id. at 1262 (quoting United States v. Fountain, 2 F.3d 656, 668 (6th Cir. 1993)). When the other evidence of guilt, apart from the evidence admitted in violation of Rule 403, is overwhelming, the Rule 403 error is rendered harmless. See Thomas, 49 F.3d at 259.2.
"In order to convict under § 922(g) (1), the Government must prove the following three elements: ' "(1) that the defendant had a previous felony conviction, (2) that the defendant possessed a firearm, and (3) that the firearm had traveled in or affected interstate commerce." ' " United States v. Kincaide, 145 F.3d 771, 782 (6th Cir. 1998) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In this appeal, Walker takes the position that the evidence with respect to one felon-in-possession count was otherwise very weak, specifically with respect to the possession element of the charge, and that therefore, the alleged Old Chief violation was not harmless. Walker does not specifically acknowledge that there were two felon-in-possession counts, but his argument is directed solely at the evidence offered with respect to the offense alleged to have occurred on May 21, 1993. We therefore presume, for the sake of this issue at least, that he concedes that the evidence with respect to the April 30, 1993, offense was overwhelming.
One officer, John Kelty, testified at trial that while some officers chased Walker, he and another officer approached the car from the driver's side. As Kelty stood next to the officer he was with, he observed the officer "remove [ ] [a] handgun from the front seat of the white Buick." Kelty testified that the handgun "was right on the front seat, in plain view"; apparently, however, Kelty himself did not see it, and was simply told this by his fellow officer. Kelty also testified that the front seat was a bench-style seat with no divider in the middle. Kelty identified government exhibit 5/21-3 as "the handgun [his fellow officer] removed from the white Buick."
Walker's sister told a completely different story. She testified that she saw the officer "holding [a gun] inside of the car," but that she "didn't see where it came from," and she "guess [ed]" that " [h]e had it with him." As her testimony developed, however, it became clear that the gun she was referring to was not the same gun the police found. She claimed that the gun the police officer had been holding was " [s]omething like an AK," "you know, like a long machine gun or something, one of them kind of guns," "a policeman's gun." And she claimed that one police officer got in the car with her, and drove her "around the block" while he "talk [ed] on the radio"; she estimates that this episode lasted "like [an] hour and a half." The officer then "ask [ed] [her] did Darnell have any drugs or any guns or anything," to which she answered no. She further testified that she did not see Walker with any guns that day, but that when she was finally allowed out of the car, "they went to search the car [and] he found a gun in the car." She claimed that the seats were separate, and that the gun was found in an armrest between the two seats. She also testified that she did not bring any guns into the car that day, and that any gun that was found did not belong to her. Finally, she testified that the car belonged to Walker's girlfriend, not to Walker.
McKinley argues now that his trial attorney had a conflict of interest that rendered his representation ineffective, taking the position that his attorney in effect jointly represented McKinley and Robinson. Whether the facts in a particular case give rise to a conflict of interest is a mixed question of fact and law that we review de novo. See United States v. Hopkins, 43 F.3d 1116, 1119 (6th Cir. 1995).
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), the Court established a two-part test for assessing ineffective-assistance claims. The first prong of this test--the showing of deficient performance--is an objective one: "When a convicted defendant complains of the ineffectiveness of counsel's assistance, the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 687-88, 104 S. Ct. 2052. The Court pointed to "certain basic duties" inherent in the representation of a criminal defendant, among them a "duty of loyalty" to the client, from which derive "the overarching duty to advocate the defendant's cause and the more particular duties to consult with the defendant on important decisions and to keep the defendant informed of important developments in the course of the prosecution." Id.
The Strickland Court then turned to a consideration of the second, "prejudice" prong of its test, noting that even professionally unreasonable errors do "not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error [s] had no effect on the judgment." Id. at 691, 104 S. Ct. 2052. Except in certain limited circumstances, "ineffectiveness claims alleging a deficiency in attorney performance are subject to a general requirement that the defendant affirmatively prove prejudice." Id. at 693, 104 S. Ct. 2052. But one of those circumstances is that claimed by Walker to exist here: when a defendant can "demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance," Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348, 100 S. Ct. 1708, 64 L. Ed. 2d 333 (1980), he "need not demonstrate prejudice in order to obtain relief," id. at 349-50, 100 S. Ct. 1708; see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692, 104 S. Ct. 2052.
Following trial, a presentence report was prepared for McKinley setting forth the various transactions for which there was evidence that McKinley was involved, either by directly selling the cocaine or crack himself, or by having it sold from his house by his codefendants. Those amounts totaled 87.4 grams of crack. In addition, the PSR noted a March 1993 incident in which $75,695 was seized in Pennsylvania from a hidden compartment in a car linked to McKinley. And the PSR stated, somewhat conclusorily, that "information supplied by informants and information from other investigations" resulted in an estimate that the conspirators "distributed over 150 kilograms of cocaine in the Youngstown area, from 1989 to 1993." The PSR then set forth a base offense level of 34 pursuant to U.S.S.G. §§ 2D1.1, 1B1.3, based on an estimate that " [t]he total quantity of drugs possessed and distributed during the course of this conspiracy is 173.8 grams of cocaine base and 25.2 grams of cocaine, which is equivalent to a marijuana weight of 3481.04 kilograms." Four levels were added because " [a]ccording to investigative information provided by the Government, the defendant's role is viewed as that of a leader, considering his degree of participation"; no specific factual underpinnings for this conclusion were provided.
The government bears a " 'burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the amount of drugs for which a defendant is accountable.' " United States v. Charles, 138 F.3d 257, 267 (6th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). A coconspirator is responsible, for sentencing purposes, for the amount of drugs that the government proves by a preponderance were the result of " 'reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the' conspiracy." United States v. Gaitan-Acevedo, 148 F.3d 577, 593 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a) (1) (B)). We review for clear error the district court's finding as to the quantity of drugs attributed to a defendant. See Charles, 138 F.3d at 267. As a general rule, a court's determination is not clearly erroneous if it is "supported by competent evidence in the record." Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
McKinley next argues that the district court erred in finding him responsible for any amount of cocaine base, or crack, as opposed to cocaine. He bases this argument on the alleged failure of the government expert to "positively identify the existence" of either baking soda or sodium bicarbonate, as required by the guidelines' definition of crack, in the samples provided by law enforcement officers. Therefore, he concludes, the cocaine under consideration was not crack. See generally United States v. Valenzuela, 150 F.3d 664, 667 (7th Cir. 1998). The government disagrees with McKinley's characterization of the evidence, and points to testimony of the expert that supports the determination that the substance in question was crack.
United States v. Cullens, 67 F.3d 123, 124 (6th Cir. 1995).
McKinley's final sentencing challenge is that the district court clearly erred in finding that McKinley was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of the conspiracy, and therefore increasing his offense level by two, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c). " 'A district court's determination regarding a defendant's role in the offense is reversible only if clearly erroneous.' " United States v. Washington, 127 F.3d 510, 515 (6th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S. Ct. 2348, 141 L. Ed. 2d 2718 (1998).
The government points to various items of evidence that it contends support the district court's determination. Our careful review of the evidence, however, makes clear that the government has greatly exaggerated the state of the record, as well as the significance of the testimony it cites. Further, the government implicitly exaggerates the extent of the case-law support for its position. None of the four cases it has relied on give it any aid; either the cases are inapposite, addressing the sentencing court's findings regarding the number of people involved in the conspiracy, Elder, 90 F.3d at 1110; United States v. Ghazaleh, 58 F.3d 240 (6th Cir. 1995), or they involve leadership activity by defendants that is far in excess of what even the government believes the evidence showed here, see United States v. Schultz,, 14 F.3d 1093 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. Perkins, 994 F.2d 1184 (6th Cir. 1993).
Walker received a statutorily mandated sentence of life imprisonment, based on the district court's conclusion that he had committed an offense involving more than 50 grams of cocaine base at a time when he had two prior final felony drug-offense convictions. " [T]he Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 [, 100 Stat. 3207, 21 U.S.C. § 841 et seq.,] and subsequent legislation established a regime of extremely high penalties for the possession and distribution of so-called 'crack' cocaine." United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 478, 116 S. Ct. 1480, 134 L. Ed. 2d 687 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting). "ADAA § 1002 created a new drug penalty classification for large-scale offenses involving certain narcotics, such as ... trafficking in more than one kilogram of heroin. For first-time offenders in these high-volume narcotics crimes, Congress authorized sentences of 10 years to life imprisonment." Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 401, 111 S. Ct. 840, 112 L. Ed. 2d 919 (1991). And, 21 U.S.C. § 841 mandates a term of life in prison without parole for a defendant convicted of committing a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) involving more than 50 grams of crack cocaine after two prior felony convictions for drug offenses have become final.
Section 841(a) makes it unlawful "to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance." 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1). Section 846 criminalizes a conspiracy "to commit any offense defined in this subchapter [,] ... subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy." 21 U.S.C. § 846. Walker was convicted of engaging in a conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 846, the object of which was the commission of a violation of section 841(a) (1), thus making him subject to the penalty provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b).
We first consider whether Walker's April 9, 1993, sale is properly treated as having been made after "two ... prior convictions for a felony drug offense have become final," 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1) (A) (iii), since at the time Walker had pleaded guilty to both prior drug offenses but had been sentenced only on one.
" [T]he meaning of the phrase 'have become final' in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1) (B) [i]s a question of federal law rather than state law." United States v. Cisneros, 112 F.3d 1272, 1280 (5th Cir. 1997). The statute itself contains no definition of the term "final," see United States v. Howard, 115 F.3d 1151, 1158 (4th Cir. 1997), and we therefore turn to the relevant case law. We find it well-settled that a prior conviction is "final" within the meaning of section 841(b) when the time for taking a direct appeal from the judgment of conviction has expired. See id.; United States v. Brazel, 102 F.3d 1120, 1163 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, ----, 118 S. Ct. 78, 79, 139 L. Ed. 2d 37 (1997), and cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S. Ct. 720, 139 L. Ed. 2d 659 (1998); cf. United States v. Hughes, 924 F.2d 1354, 1359 (6th Cir. 1991).
Walker's argument would require that we give unwarranted legal significance to the date of each overt act. But Walker was not charged with four discrete violations of the drug laws, one for each sale. He was charged with a single, ongoing conspiracy. He committed the conspiracy every day over the life of the agreement, and the timing of each separate overt act is not controlling. We conclude, therefore, that Walker committed a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 at a time that he had two prior final convictions. We also conclude that the violation involved more than 50 grams of cocaine base. Therefore, the district court properly applied the statutory sentence mandated by 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1) (A).
What we have said above effectively answers Walker's contention that a conspiracy conviction involving multiple sales that together total more than 50 grams does not constitute "a violation" within the meaning of the statute. We disagree because, as we have said, a conspiracy is a single violation of the drug laws, and the fact that this particular conspiracy was characterized by separate transactions is a fact of no legal significance. We note, too, that Walker's reliance on our decision in United States v. Winston, 37 F.3d 235 (6th Cir. 1994), is misplaced because of important factual distinctions.
Following his conviction, Winston was sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1) (A). As an initial matter, this court held as follows:
We conclude that not only does Winston not aid Walker, it in fact compels a result unfavorable to him. The Winston court made clear that a conspiracy involving more than 50 grams would have been "a violation" within the meaning of section 841(b) (1); further, it did not suggest that there was any barrier to aggregating the separate overt acts of the conspiracy to reach a total of 50 grams. See United States v. Pruitt, 156 F.3d 638, 643 (6th Cir. 1998). And unlike in Winston, there is no dispute here regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to show that the conspiracy involved a total of more than 50 grams. The Winston court held that the sole barrier to sentencing under section 841(b) (1) was that the particular conspiracy charged and proven involved less than 50 grams. Implicit in this reasoning is the counterfactual: if the conspiracy had involved 50 or more grams, the enhanced sentence would have been appropriate. In the course of his membership in this conspiracy, Walker was directly responsible for selling more than 50 grams, and the statutory life sentence was therefore necessarily imposed.
The district court further found that " [t]he plea hearing transcript reveals that the court inquired as to whether Walker read and understood the plea form before he signed it. Walker unequivocally stated ... that Morley went over the plea form with him and that he understood the elements of the charge."
It is well-established that " [o]nce the government establishes the fact of a prior conviction based upon a guilty plea, the defendant must prove the invalidity of the conviction by a preponderance of the evidence." United States v. Barlow, 17 F.3d 85, 89 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 32-34, 113 S. Ct. 517, 525, 121 L. Ed. 2d 391 (1992)); see 21 U.S.C. § 851(c) (2). Thus, the district court's conclusion that a plea is voluntary is to some degree a factual finding, subject to review for clear error. See Barlow, 17 F.3d at 89; Dorrough v. United States, 385 F.2d 887, 893 (5th Cir. 1967); see also United States v. Mims, 928 F.2d 310, 311 (9th Cir. 1991). Obviously, however, the ultimate question whether a plea was voluntary requires a legal conclusion, one "reached by applying legal rules to facts." United States v. Wildes, 910 F.2d 1484, 1486 (7th Cir. 1990). Our review of this ultimate question is, therefore, de novo. See United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343,1352 (11th Cir. 1993); see also Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d 1448, 1454 (9th Cir. 1995).
There is no requirement that in order to rely on a defendant's answers in a guilty-plea colloquy to conclude that the defendant pleaded guilty knowingly and voluntarily, those answers must be lengthy and all-encompassing; a straightforward and simple "Yes, your Honor" is sufficient to bind a defendant to its consequences. Cf. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74, 97 S. Ct. 1621, 52 L. Ed. 2d 136 (1977). The defendant simply has not presented sufficient evidence to prove by a preponderance that his plea was other than knowing and voluntarily; he cannot overcome his affirmations at the plea hearing that his counsel had informed him of the elements of the crime, and that he understood his rights. While it is true that the state court proceedings did not set forth a factual basis for the plea, that is not constitutionally required; further, the plea form that Walker affirmed he understood recited the elements. Walker has not presented anything to lead this court to believe that a factual basis was actually lacking; there is no reason to suspect, that is, that he was not pleading guilty for any reason other than that he actually was guilty.