Source: http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/558/08-351/opinion.html
Timestamp: 2014-08-21 22:01:57
Document Index: 184543793

Matched Legal Cases: ['§1', '§570', '§570', '§150', '§1979', '§1983', '§1', '§2', '§2106']

Alvarez v. Smith :: 558 U.S. ___ (2009) :: Justia US Supreme Court Center Justia.comFind a LawyerLegal AnswersLawMore ▾Justia BlogVerdictLaw Blog DirectoryLegal FormsUS Law US Supreme Court Cases Federal Cases US Constitution US Code Federal RegulationsFederal DocketsState CasesState Codes & StatutesTrademarksPatentsCompany Legal ProfilesMarketing ServicesSign InSearchJustia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 558 › Alvarez v. Smith › Opinion
Sign up for Justia's FREE Newsletters: Daily Opinion Summaries by Court (covering the U.S. Supreme Court, all Federal Appellate Courts, and the 50 State Supreme Courts), and Weekly Opinion Summaries by Practice Area. Subscribe NowAlvarez v. Smith558 U.S. ___ (2009)Annotate this CaseOpinionPDFSyllabus
NO. 08-351ANITA ALVAREZ, COOK COUNTY STATE’S
SMITH et al.on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the seventh circuit[December 8, 2009] Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari in this case to determine whether Illinois law provides a sufficiently speedy opportunity for an individual, whose car or cash police have seized without a warrant, to contest the lawfulness of the seizure. See U. S. Const., Amdt. 14, §1; United States v. Von Neumann, 474 U. S. 242 (1986); United States v. $8,850, 461 U. S. 555 (1983). At the time of oral argument, however, we learned that the underlying property disputes have all ended. The State has returned all the cars that it seized, and the individual property owners have either forfeited any relevant cash or have accepted as final the State’s return of some of it. We consequently find the case moot, and we therefore vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to that court with instructions to dismiss. United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U. S. 36, 39 (1950); see also E. Gressman, K. Geller, S. Shapiro, T. Bishop, & E. Hartnett, Supreme Court Practice 941–942 (9th ed. 2007).I
Illinois law provides for forfeiture of movable personal property (including cars and cash) used “to facilitate” a drug crime. Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 720, §570/505(a)(6) (West 2008). It permits a police officer to seize that property without a warrant where (1) the officer has “probable cause to believe” the property was so used and (2) a “warrantless seizure … would be reasonable” in the circumstances. §570/505(b). When an officer has seized property without a warrant, the relevant law enforcement agency must notify the State’s Attorney within 52 days of the seizure; the State’s Attorney must notify the property owner of any impending forfeiture within a further 45 days; and, if the owner wishes to contest forfeiture, the State’s Attorney must begin judicial forfeiture proceedings within yet a further 45 days. See ch. 725, §§150/5–150/6. Thus, the statute gives the State up to 142 days, nearly five months, to begin judicial forfeiture proceedings—during which time the statute permits the State to keep the car or cash within its possession. On November 22, 2006, six individuals (the respondents or “plaintiffs”) brought this federal civil rights action against defendants the city of Chicago, the Superintendent of the Chicago Police Department, and the Cook County State’s Attorney (the petitioner here, whom we shall call the “State’s Attorney”). See Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983. Three of the individuals, Chermane Smith, Edmanuel Perez, and Tyhesha Brunston, said that earlier in 2006 the police had, upon their arrests, seized their cars without a warrant. See Complaint ¶25, App. 34a (Smith, seizure on Jan. 19, 2006); id., ¶26, at 34a (Perez, seizure on Mar. 8, 2006); id., ¶27, at 34a (Brunston, seizure on Apr. 8, 2006); Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification ¶8, at 39a. The other three plaintiffs, Michelle Waldo, Kirk Yunker, and Tony Williams, said that earlier in 2006 police had, upon their arrests, seized their cash without a warrant. See Complaint ¶28, at 34a–35a (Waldo, seizure on Jan. 20, 2006); id., ¶29, at 35a (Yunker, seizure on Sept. 26, 2006); id., ¶30, at 35a (Williams, seizure in July 2006); Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification ¶8, at 39a. The plaintiffs added that the police department still had custody of their property. See Complaint ¶¶24–30, at 34a–35a. They claimed that the failure of the State to provide a speedy postseizure hearing violated the federal Due Process Clause. See U. S. Const., Amdt. 14, §1. And they asked the court (1) to certify the case as a class action, (2) to declare that they had a due process right to a prompt postseizure probable-cause hearing, (3) to declare that the hearing must take place within 10 days of any seizure, and (4) to enjoin the defendants’ current practice of keeping the property in custody for a longer time without a judicial determination of probable cause. See Complaint ¶36, App. 36a.
On February 23, 2009, we granted certiorari to review the Seventh Circuit’s “due process” determination. The Court of Appeals then recalled its mandate. The parties filed briefs in this Court. We then recognized that
the case might be moot, and we asked the parties to address the question of mootness at the forthcoming oral argument.
At oral argument counsel for both sides confirmed that there was no longer any dispute about ownership or possession of the relevant property. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 5 (State’s Attorney); id., at 56–57 (plaintiffs). The State had returned the cars to plaintiffs Smith, Perez, and Brunston. See id., at 5. Two of the plaintiffs had “defaulted,” apparently conceding that the State could keep the cash. Ibid. And the final plaintiff and the State’s Attorney agreed that the plaintiff could keep some, but not all, of the cash at issue. Id., at 5, 56–57. As counsel for the State’s Attorney told us, “[T]hose cases are over.” Id., at 5.II
The Constitution permits this Court to decide legal questions only in the context of actual “Cases” or “Controversies.” U. S. Const., Art. III, §2. An “ ‘actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.’ ” Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U. S. 395, 401 (1975) (quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452, 459, n. 10 (1974)). In this case there is no longer any actual controversy between the parties about ownership or possession of the underlying property. The State’s Attorney argues that there is a continuing controversy over damages. We concede that the plaintiffs filed a motion in the District Court seeking damages. But the plaintiffs filed their motion after the Seventh Circuit issued its opinion. And, after this Court granted certiorari, the Court of Appeals recalled its mandate, taking the case away from the District Court before the District Court could respond to the motion. Thus, we have before us a complaint that seeks only declaratory and injunctive relief, not damages.
The parties, of course, continue to dispute the lawfulness of the State’s hearing procedures. But that dispute is no longer embedded in any actual controversy about the plaintiffs’ particular legal rights. Rather, it is an abstract dispute about the law, unlikely to affect these plaintiffs any more than it affects other Illinois citizens. And a dispute solely about the meaning of a law, abstracted from any concrete actual or threatened harm, falls outside the scope of the constitutional words “Cases” and “Controversies.” See, e.g.,Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U. S. 472, 477 (1990); North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U. S. 244, 246 (1971) (per curiam);Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, 241 (1937); Mills v. Green, 159 U. S. 651, 653 (1895).
We can find no special circumstance here that might warrant our continuing to hear the case. We have sometimes heard attacks on practices that no longer directly affect the attacking party, but are “capable of repetition” while “evading review.” See, e.g.,Federal Election Comm’n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U. S. 449, 462 (2007); Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 515 (1911). Yet here, unlike those cases, nothing suggests that the individual plaintiffs will likely again prove subject to the State’s seizure procedures. See Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U. S. 95, 109 (1983) (“[T]he capable-of-repetition doctrine applies only in exceptional situations, and generally only where the named plaintiff can make a reasonable showing that he will again be subjected to the alleged illegality”); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S. 312, 318–319 (1974) (per curiam). And in any event, since those who are directly affected by the forfeiture practices might bring damages actions, the practices do not “evade review.” See Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U. S. 1, 8–9 (1978) (damages claim saves case from mootness). Consequently, the case is moot. See, e.g.,Preiser, supra, at 403–404; Mills, supra, at 658.III
It is less easy to say whether we should order the judgment below vacated. The statute that enables us to vacate a lower court judgment when a case becomes moot is flexible, allowing a court to “direct the entry of such appropriate judgment, decree, or order, or require such further proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances.” 28 U. S. C. §2106; see also U. S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U. S. 18, 21 (1994). Applying this statute, we normally do vacate the lower court judgment in a moot case because doing so “clears the path for future relitigation of the issues between the parties,” preserving “the rights of all parties,” while prejudicing none “by a decision which … was only preliminary.” Munsingwear, 340 U. S., at 40. In Bancorp, however, we described circumstances where we would not do so. We said that, “[w]here mootness results from settlement” rather than “ ‘happenstance,’ ” the “losing party has voluntarily forfeited his legal remedy … [and] thereby surrender[ed] his claim to the equitable remedy of vacatur.” 513 U. S., at 25. The plaintiffs, pointing out that the State’s Attorney agreed to return all three cars and some of the cash, claim that, with respect to at least four of the plaintiffs, this case falls within Bancorp’s “settlement” exception.
In our view, however, this case more closely resembles mootness through “happenstance” than through “settlement”—at least the kind of settlement that the Court considered in Bancorp.Bancorp focused upon a bankruptcy-related dispute that involved a legal question whether a bankruptcy court could lawfully confirm a debtor’s Chapter 11 reorganization plan if the plan relied upon what the debtor said was a special exception (called the “new value exception”) to ordinary creditor priority rules. Id., at 19–20. The parties contested that legal issue in the Bankruptcy Court; they contested it in an appeal of the Bankruptcy Court’s order to the Federal District Court; they contested it in a further appeal to the Court of Appeals; and eventually they contested it in this Court. Id., at 20. While the case was pending here, the parties settled their differences in the Bankruptcy Court (the court where the case originated)—including their differences on this particular contested legal point. Ibid. They agreed upon a reorganization plan, which they said would constitute a settlement that mooted the federal case. Ibid. Recognizing that the reorganization plan that the Bankruptcy Judge confirmed in the case amounted to a settlement that mooted the case, this Court did not vacate the lower court’s judgment. The Court’s reason for leaving the lower court’s judgment in place was that mootness was not a result of “the vagaries of circumstance.” Id., at 25. Rather the party seeking review had “caused the mootness by voluntary action.” Id., at 24 (emphasis added). By virtue of the settlement, that party had “voluntarily forfeited his legal remedy by the ordinary processes of appeal or certiorari.” Id., at 25. Hence, compared to mootness caused by “happenstance,” considerations of “equity” and “fairness” tilted against vacatur. Id., at 25–26.
We consequently conclude that we should follow our ordinary practice, thereby “clear[ing] the path for future relitigation of the issues.” Munsingwear, 340 U. S., at 40. Thus, nothing in this opinion prevents the plaintiffs from bringing a claim for damages based on the conduct alleged in their complaint. Id., at 37–40. We therefore vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to that court with instructions to dismiss.It is so ordered.