Source: https://www.floridabar.org/the-florida-bar-journal/rule-or-no-rule-an-examination-of-recent-unadopted-rule-challenge-decisions/
Timestamp: 2019-01-24 04:51:38
Document Index: 437070370

Matched Legal Cases: ['§120', '§120', '§120', '§120', '§120', '§120', '§335']

Rule or No Rule? An Examination of Recent Unadopted Rule Challenge Decisions – The Florida Bar
September/October 2018 Gregory L. Pitt, Jr. Administrative Law
As noted above, unadopted rule challenges provide parties with a method of opposing agency statements alleged to be unpromulgated rules.11 reviewing the final orders from such cases, legal practitioners are provided with guidelines from which to work when initiating or defending similar actions. The following recent DOAH decisions are instructive in their examination and application of the principles discussed above.
“[It] is determined that both [the Manual and Advisory] are agency statements of general applicability that implement, interpret, and prescribe law or policy, and that they impose conditions, require compliance, and have the effect of law. Accordingly, it is concluded that [the Manual and Advisory] are rules, as that term is defined in []120.52 (16).”18
“Section 335.199 is susceptible to multiple reasonable interpretations that result in different outcomes, and, thus, is ambiguous….[T]he statute can reasonably be read to apply only to work program projects; to projects that entail both work program projects and non-work program projects; and also to projects that arise in the context of connection permit applications where [r]espondent — which has sole control over the placement of median barriers and the location of median openings — decides to close existing median openings or create new median openings to maintain required traffic and safety standards.”27
After noting that the respondent “ultimately determined that []335.199 should be read as imposing the 180-day statutory notice requirement only on [r]espondent’s ‘work program’ projects,”29 the court held that the handbook language was an unadopted rule due to its generally applicability and interpretation of the aforementioned statute.30
The issue of general applicability, however, is slightly more nuanced. In Williams, agency statements that applied to all used motor vehicles coming into Florida from foreign countries for which certificates of title were sought were found to be generally applicable because they applied uniformly to a class of persons or activities over which the department exercised authority. Similarly, in Ocala Herlong, the challenged handbook language was held to be generally applicable since the department’s districts statewide were uniformly required to adhere to its requirements. In American Residential Development, the court found that the statements contained in the RFA were not generally applicable due to the discretion afforded the agency in applying and evaluating its provisions. However, in explaining its reasoning, the court also stated, “[The challenged statements in the RFA] are specific to the solicitation process for affordable rental housing tax credits in a small geographic area. They have no applicability other than to the specific persons who submit an application in response to [the RFA].”31 This indicates that, in addition to its finding of agency discretion, which alone was sufficient to negate general applicability under Schluter, the court considered the size of the affected class, the size of the geographic area, and the prospective application of the challenged statementsin reaching its determination. Though not included among the general statutory and judicial guidelines discussed above, Florida caselaw has indicated that such considerations may negate general applicability under limited circumstances. Specifically, in State, Department of Commerce, Division of Labor v. Matthews Corp., 358 So. 2d 256, 258 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), general applicability was found lacking in agency statements that applied to a single party, in a single geographic location, for a single project. In reaching its decision, the court cited the “temporal [and] geographical limitations” of the challenged agency statements as evidence that they were not generally applicable.32 However, later caselaw appears to limit the aforementioned decision to its particular facts.33 Therefore, while a detailed examination of this issue is beyond the scope of this article, it is sufficient for our purposes to recognize that these factors may affect a court’s general applicability determination under circumstances similar to those described in the aforementioned case.
1 Fla. Stat. §120.54(2018).
2 These requirements are beyond the scope of this article. For our purposes, it is only necessary to recognize that such requirements exist.
3 Fla. Stat. §120.52(20) (2018).
4 Fla. Stat. §120.52(16) (2018).
6 Jenkins v. State, 855 So. 2d 1219, 1225 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003).
7 See Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Schluter, 705 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).
8 Fla. Stat. §120.56(4)(a) (2018).
10 Fla. Stat. §120.56(4)(e) (2018).
11 Fla. Stat. §120.56(4) (2018).
12 Williams, Case No. 16-6127RU at 18.
19 Numerous statements in the RFA were challenged as unadopted rules. However, it is sufficient for the purposes of this article to consider the challenge as being applicable to the RFA in its entirety.
20 American Residential Development, Case Nos. 16-6610RU and 16-6611RU at 4.
22 Id. at 42 (citation omitted).
23 Ocala Herlong, Case No. 17-3348RU at 6.
24 C.S./C.S./S.B. 1842 created Fla. Stat. §335.199. The statutory language at issue states in pertinent part: “Whenever the Department of Transportation proposes any project on the State Highway System which will divide a state highway, erect median barriers modifying currently available vehicle turning movements, or have the effect of closing or modifying an existing access to an abutting property owner, the department shall notify all affected property owners, municipalities, and counties at least 180 days before the design of the project is finalized.”
25 Id. at 8 (alteration in original).
27 Id. at 48 (citation omitted).
31 Am. Residential Dev., LLC v. Fla. Hous. Fin. Corp., Case Nos. 16-6610RU and 16-6611RU at 42 (DOAH Jan. 18, 2017).
32 State, Dep’t of Commerce, Div. of Labor v. Matthews Corp., 358 So. 2d 256, 258 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
33 See Balsam v. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs., 452 So. 2d 976, 978 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).