Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/alaska/supreme-court/1986/s-477-1.html
Timestamp: 2020-07-10 10:05:02
Document Index: 477704838

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2008', '§ 26', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983']

Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage :: 1986 :: Alaska Supreme Court Decisions :: Alaska Case Law :: Alaska Law :: US Law :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Alaska Case Law › Alaska Supreme Court Decisions › 1986 › Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage
Penny A. HAZEN, Appellant, and Cross-Appellee, v. MUNICIPALITY OF ANCHORAGE, Richard Stevens, William L. Casto, Tim Kasper, Michael Grimes, and Allen Bailey, Appellees, and Cross-Appellants.
*457 Walter Share, Anchorage, for appellant/cross-appellee.
*458 OPINION
Following the arrest, Officer Stevens prepared a report charging Hazen with assignation for prostitution. On June 27, 1977, Bailey moved to dismiss the criminal charges against Hazen. At the dismissal *459 hearing Hazen's attorneys requested that the arrest tape be preserved or that she be given a copy of the tape as Hazen was contemplating a civil suit. Bailey then advised the court that the tape would be preserved. Immediately after that statement, a male voice whispered, "[W]ait `til you hear what is on the tape now." This remark was not audible in the open courtroom but was picked up by a microphone.[1] The remark came from the prosecutor's table. Seated at the prosecutor's table at the hearing were Bailey and an Assistant District Attorney who was not involved in the case.
During discovery, Hazen's civil attorneys[2] requested and received the arrest tape. They found the tape to be generally inaudible. Hazen then listened to the arrest tape with Saville and Tatter, her attorneys in the prior criminal proceedings. They concluded that it was not as clear as it had been when they had originally listened to it and that it had been altered. Thereafter, Hazen and her civil attorneys listened to the tape of the June 27, 1977 dismissal hearing, and heard the whispered comment, "[W]ait `til you hear what is on the tape now."
The superior court also directed a verdict in favor of all defendants as to Hazen's claims for violation of civil rights arising from the alleged false arrest and malicious *460 prosecution. The court stated that the establishment order holding that there was probable cause was a complete defense to these claims.[3] The trial then continued with the remaining claims of violation of civil rights from the alteration of the arrest tape against the municipality and Bailey.
DISCUSSION I. Discovery Sanctions.
Since the customer lists have no bearing on the issue of probable cause, we *461 hold that the superior court abused its discretion in dismissing Hazen's false arrest and malicious prosecution claims and in instructing the jury that the officers had probable cause for the arrest. Hazen is therefore entitled to a new trial on the false arrest and malicious prosecution claims against the police officers and the municipality.[3a] We further hold that Hazen's customer lists are not relevant to the subject matter of Hazen's remaining claims for relief, and are therefore not discoverable under Alaska R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1).
We recognize that the discovery rules are to be broadly construed and that relevance for purposes of discovery is broader than for purposes of trial.[4] However, even under this broad concept of relevance the information sought still must be relevant to the subject matter of the action. 8 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2008 at 42 (1970); 4 J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice § 26.56[1] (2d ed. 1984).
The subject matter of these actions, therefore, concerns specifically what happened between Hazen and the police officers on the night of March 22, 1977. Information concerning the general activities at The Body Shop is irrelevant to this case and is therefore not discoverable.[5]
The jury found Bailey and the municipality not liable on claims that they altered the arrest tape in order to impede Hazen's civil action. Hazen argues that the establishment order holding that there was probable cause was prejudicial error, affecting the jury's deliberations as to whether the tape was altered with the intent to impede her civil litigation.[6] We agree and hold that the verdicts must be *462 vacated and Hazen given a new trial on these claims.
[it] would have to be deemed to establish that the tape was altered, that it was altered favorably to the Municipality, and that it was done by somebody that had it in his or her custody. But the somebody consists of a number of people, and there is no evidence to show which one of them accomplished the alteration. It's just like shooting into the dark.[7]
*463 Hazen argues that the superior court should not have directed a verdict because there was evidence that all the police officers had access to the arrest tape and that they were all aware of a possible civil suit. She also argues that the jury could have chosen to disbelieve the testimony of some, none, or all of the officers that they did not alter the tape.
The superior court fashioned an implied cause of action under the Alaska Constitution for deliberate violations of due process arising from Hazen's allegations that the arrest tape had been altered. The court held that this cause of action was available against the municipality because there was no common-law cause of action for these allegations and the municipality could not be sued under § 1983 because no "custom or policy" had been shown. The court held that the constitutional cause of action was not available against Bailey because Hazen could obtain a complete remedy against him under § 1983.[8]
We hold that Hazen has a common-law cause of action in tort for intentional interference with prospective civil action by spoilation of evidence.[9] Since Hazen can obtain a complete remedy under this cause of action we need not decide whether a cause of action should be implied under the Alaska Constitution for these allegations. See State v. Haley, 687 P.2d 305, 318 (Alaska 1984).
In recognizing this "new tort" we find persuasive the reasoning in Smith v. Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles, 151 Cal. App. 3d 491, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1984). In Smith, plaintiff's car had collided with a van. Immediately after the accident, the van was towed to a dealer for repairs. The dealer made an agreement with plaintiff's counsel to maintain certain parts of the van pending further investigation. The dealer thereafter destroyed, lost or transferred these parts, making it impossible for plaintiff's experts to test them. Plaintiff sued the dealer. Id., 198 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
The California Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's dismissal of the complaint, recognizing a new tort for intentional spoilation of evidence. The court pointed out that "new and nameless torts are being recognized constantly" and that the "common thread woven into all torts is the idea *464 of unreasonable interference with the interests of others." Id. at 832 (citation and emphasis omitted). The court analogized to the tort of intentional interference with prospective business advantage and stated that a prospective civil action in a product liability case is a valuable "probable expectancy" that the Court "must protect from the kind of interference alleged herein." Id. at 836, 837.
On remand Hazen therefore has the following causes of action available to her: (1) common-law claims for false arrest against the four police officers and the municipality, (2) common-law claims for malicious prosecution against the four police officers and the municipality, and (3) common-law claims for intentional interference with prospective civil action by spoilation of evidence (the arrest tape) against the municipality and Bailey.[10]
The superior court instructed the jury that if the defendants proved that if Hazen's attorneys had used reasonable diligence they would have discovered the alteration of the arrest tape prior to April 22, 1980, then defendants were not liable on the tape alteration claims. The court based this instruction on the "discovery rule" that the two-year statute of limitations[11] did not begin to run until the aggrieved party discovered or reasonably should have discovered the facts that gave that party a cause of action. Since the tape alteration claims were filed on April 21, 1982, the statute of limitations would bar the cause of action if Hazen should have discovered the altered tape more than two years prior to that date.
We conclude that the nature of Hazen's problems in discovering her injury warranted giving the discovery rule instruction in this case. There was no reason for Hazen to have suspected that the arrest tape had been altered. At the dismissal hearing, after Hazen requested a copy of the arrest tape or an assurance that it would be preserved, *465 Bailey stated on the record that the tape would be preserved. The instruction properly placed before the jury the question of whether Hazen's failure to discover the injury prior to April 22, 1980 was justified.
The same policy reasons to not allow punitive damages against municipalities exist, however, irrespective of the conduct alleged. An award of punitive damages against a municipality will only "punish" the innocent taxpayers, the group which is supposed to benefit from the public example set by a punitive damages award. See, City of Newport v. Facts Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 267, 101 S. Ct. 2748, 2759-60, 69 L. Ed. 2d 616, 632 (1981); Fisher v. City of Miami, 172 So. 2d 455, 457 (Fla. 1965). Further, since a municipality can have no malice independent of the malice of its officials, damages awarded in order to punish are not sensibly assessed against the municipality itself. Newport, 453 U.S. at 267, 101 S. Ct. at 2759-60, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 632.
It is also unclear whether an award of punitive damages would have any substantial deterrent effect. It is unlikely that individual officials would have to or be able to pay sizable punitive damage awards assessed against a municipality. Further, as one court stated, protection against future misconduct can be obtained without resorting *466 to punitive damage awards which the public will have to foot:
We therefore hold that in the absence of statutory authorization punitive damages are not available against a municipality, irrespective of the nature of the conduct involved.[12]
[1] All court proceedings in Alaska are recorded.
[2] Saville and Tatter, Hazen's attorneys in the criminal proceedings against her, did not represent Hazen in the prosecution of her civil claim.
[3] The court also directed a verdict against Hazen on the negligent hire claim for relief. This ruling is not at issue on appeal.
[3a] The superior court also directed a verdict against Hazen's civil rights claims arising out of the arrest on the grounds that probable cause was a complete defense to these charges and that the discovery sanction established probable cause. Since the sanction was erroneous, this would ordinarily mean that the claims could be maintained on retrial. At oral argument in conjunction with this appeal, however, Hazen's counsel conceded that all claims on retrial would be brought under state law. We need not determine whether a cause of action should be implied under the Alaska Constitution for these alleged civil rights violations because Hazen has common law causes of actions for false arrest and malicious prosecution that provide her a complete remedy for the alleged violations. See State v. Haley, 687 P.2d 305, 318 (Alaska 1984).
[4] Alaska R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1) provides that it is not a ground for objection that the information sought in discovery will be inadmissible at trial "if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."
[5] Such information would be relevant if Hazen's reputation were involved here. Hazen is not bringing a defamation cause of action, however, and Hazen's attorney stated at oral argument before this court that Hazen would not seek damages for injury to reputation and loss of business.
[6] Since no special interrogatories were used, it is uncertain whether the jury found the defendants not liable on these grounds or on the grounds that Hazen should have discovered the tape alteration before April 22, 1980.
[7] The superior court refused to direct a verdict for the municipality because there was evidence which could establish that the tape was at all times in the custody of the municipality's agents and employees, and that it was altered by one of those agents or employees. The court also determined not to direct a verdict for Bailey, stating that the evidence, viewed most favorably to Hazen, could lead to the inference that Bailey had altered the tape. The key additional evidence against Bailey that did not exist against the police officers was apparently the whispered comment made from the prosecutor's table at the dismissal hearing. From this evidence an inference could be drawn that Bailey knew about the alteration of the tape and had something to do with it.
[8] Hazen's counsel conceded at oral argument that no federal claims would be brought on remand.
[9] Although this issue was neither briefed nor discussed at oral argument, we will decide it in order to facilitate the proceedings on remand.
[10] Defendants argued on cross-appeal that punitive damages could not be recovered under the tape alteration claims in the absence of any showing of compensatory damages. At trial Hazen could not show compensatory damages because such damages would have been based on the theory that the tape alteration made it more difficult and expensive to prove her claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution. These other claims, however, had already been dismissed by the superior court.
[11] AS 09.10.070 provides that actions must be brought in two years for
[12] The municipality also argues that it may not be held liable for the tape alteration under a theory of respondeat superior without a showing of an official custom or policy pursuant to which the alteration occurred. This contention is without merit. The cases the municipality cites concern § 1983 and are not apposite here. The "official custom or policy" requirement is based explicitly on the language and legislative history of § 1983. See Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 2036, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611, 636 (1978).