Source: http://courts.mrsc.org/supreme/089wn2d/089wn2d0023.htm
Timestamp: 2019-01-19 02:11:29
Document Index: 78087643

Matched Legal Cases: ['art. 4', 'art. 4', 'art. 4', 'art. 4', 'art. 4', 'art. 4', 'art. 4', 'art. 4', 'art. 4']

89 Wn.2d 23, STRENGE v. CLARKE
CITE: 89 Wn.2d 23, 569 P.2d 60
CAUSE NUMBER: 43813
CASE TITLE: Linda Strenge, Petitioner, v. Harold D. Clarke,
[1] Courts of Limited Jurisdiction - Jurisdiction - Concurrent Jurisdiction - In General. The constitution authorizes the legislature to grant concurrent jurisdiction to justice courts in the same class of cases as the superior court as long as that jurisdiction does not "trench upon" the jurisdiction of the superior courts within the prohibition of Const. art. 4, 10 (amendment 28).
[2] Consumer Protection - Action for Damages - Penalty - Nature. The penalty imposable under RCW 19.86.090 for a violation under the Consumer Protection Act is a civil penalty.
[3] Statutes - Construction - Meaning of Words - Ordinary Meaning. Words used in a statute are to be given their ordinary meaning unless a contrary intent appears.
[4] Consumer Protection - Action for Damages - Jurisdiction. An action for damages under the Consumer Protection Act (RCW 19.86.090) can be brought in either justice court or superior court.
[5] Statutes - Construction - Legislative Intent - In General. The primary objective in construing legislation is to determine and give effect to the intent of the legislature. The language of the act as a whole is interpreted in terms of its general object and purpose and, if susceptible to more than one construction, given that construction which will carry out its objective.
NAMES OF CONCURRING OR DISSENTING JUDGES: Dolliver, J., concurs in the result only; Wright, C.J., and Brachtenbach and Horowitz, JJ., dissent by separate opinion; Hicks, J., did not participate in the disposition of this case.
NATURE OF ACTION: A collection agency sought a judgment in justice court for an amount due. The debtor alleged violations of the Consumer Protection Act and counterclaimed for treble damages. District Court: The Spokane County District Court, No. 56728, Kathryn A. Mautz, J., on March 4, 1975, found that the agency had violated the Collection Agency Act and entered a judgment permitting recovery of the debt only. The court refused to enforce the penalty provisions of the Consumer Protection Act on the grounds of a lack of jurisdiction.
Superior Court: Certiorari to review the district court's denial of jurisdiction was issued by the Superior Court for Spokane County, No. 223486, Donald N. Olson, J., on March 24, 1975. On May 9, 1975, Harold D. Clarke, J., denied a motion to quash the writ but declined to rule on the merits.
Supreme Court: In an extraordinary review of the Superior Court action, the Supreme Court holds that a justice court and a superior court have concurrent jurisdiction over an action for damages under the Consumer Protection Act, and REVERSES the Superior Court and Justice Court.
COUNSEL: JERRY T. DYRESON of SPOKANE COUNTY LEGAL SERVICES, for petitioner.
MAJORITY OPINION: The sole issue in this case is whether justice district courts have jurisdiction to entertain and try damage claims arising under the Consumer Protection Act, RCW 19.86.
"[T]he commission by a licensee or an employee of a licensee of an act or practice prohibited by RCW 19.16.250 are declared to be unfair acts or practices or unfair methods of competition in the conduct of trade or commerce for the purpose of the application of the Consumer Protection Act found in chapter 19.86 RCW.
«1» RCW 19.16.250 provides, in part:
«2» RCW 19.16.450 provides:
During the trial it developed that respondent had indeed violated certain provisions of the Collection Agency Act, RCW 19.16.250(14), (18), 1 by attempting to collect court costs, services fees and attorney's fees before they were reduced to judgment. The district court (justice court) awarded respondent judgment for the unpaid balance of $39.15. But, acting pursuant to RCW 19.16.450 2 the court properly refused to award respondent any sum for court costs, collection costs, attorney's fees, or other costs, or interest. On the other hand, the court declined to entertain petitioner's counterclaim under RCW 19.86, claiming lack of jurisdiction over claims under the Consumer Protection Act.
We reverse the justice court and hold that it has jurisdiction over claims brought under the Consumer Protection Act for the following reasons: (1) the legislature has, pursuant to the Washington State Constitution, conferred justice courts with jurisdiction over proceedings of this nature (I.E., an action for a penalty not exceeding one thousand dollars); (2) the language of RCW 19.86.090 allows complainants under the act to bring their suits either in justice court OR in superior court; and (3) such a result is both in the public interest and consistent with the spirit and the purpose of the Consumer Protection Act.
«3» Const. art. 4, 6 (amendment 28) provides:
"The superior court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases in equity and in all cases at law which involve the title or possession of real property . . . and in all other cases in which the demand or the value of the property in controversy amounts to one thousand dollars, or a lesser sum in excess of the jurisdiction granted to justices of the peace and other inferior courts . . . and for such special cases and proceedings as are not otherwise provided for. The superior court shall also have original jurisdiction in all cases and of all proceedings in which jurisdiction shall not have been by law vested exclusively in some other court . . .
[1] First, article 4, section 6 (amendment 28) 3 invests the superior court with original and general jurisdiction in all cases and in all proceedings in which jurisdiction is not EXCLUSIVELY VESTED BY LAW in some other court or forum. DILLENBURG v. MAXWELL, 70 Wn.2d 331, 351-52, 413 P.2d 940 (1966). Similarly, justice court jurisdiction is provided for in the state constitution. However, the power to determine the extent of justice court jurisdiction is lodged in the legislature which is authorized to prescribe the jurisdiction of justice courts provided such jurisdiction does not "trench upon" the jurisdiction of the superior court. Const. art. 4, 10 (amendment 28).«4» That limitation has been interpreted to mean that the investing of original jurisdiction in the superior courts does not prevent the legislature from giving CONCURRENT jurisdiction to justice courts in the same class of cases.
«4» Const. art. 4, 10 (amendment 28) provides:
"The legislature shall determine the number of justices of the peace to be elected and shall prescribe by law the powers, duties and jurisdiction of justices of the peace: PROVIDED, That such jurisdiction granted by the legislature shall not trench upon the jurisdiction of superior or other courts of record . . . JUSTICES OF THE PEACE SHALL HAVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION IN CASES WHERE THE DEMAND OR VALUE OF THE PROPERTY IN CONTROVERSY IS LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED DOLLARS OR SUCH GREATER SUM, NOT TO EXCEED ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS, AS SHALL BE PRESCRIBED BY THE LEGISLATURE." (Italics ours.)
"THE LANGUAGE OF THE CONSTITUTION IS NOT THAT THE SUPERIOR COURTS SHALL HAVE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION, but it gives to the superior courts universal original jurisdiction,
LEAVING THE LEGISLATURE TO CARVE OUT FROM THAT JURISDICTION THE JURISDICTION OF THE JUSTICES OF THE PEACE, and any other inferior courts that may be created.
" Any person who is injured in his business or property by a violation of RCW 19.86.020 . . . MAY BRING A CIVIL ACTION IN THE SUPERIOR COURT . . . and the court may in its discretion, increase the award of damages to an amount not to exceed three times the actual damages sustained:
PROVIDED, That SUCH INCREASED DAMAGE AWARD for violation of RCW 19.86.020 may not exceed one thousand dollars.
(Italics ours.) Consequently, the issue thus becomes whether the statutory words "may bring an action in the superior court" reflect a legislative intent that an action for this type of civil penalty must be brought EXCLUSIVELY in superior court or whether the jurisdiction is CONCURRENT with that of the justice courts under Const. art. 4, 6 and 10 and RCW 3.66.020(3).
[3, 4] We are convinced the expression denotes CONCURRENT jurisdiction. Words in a statute must be given their usual and ordinary meaning unless a contrary intent appears. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE v. HOPPE, 82 Wn.2d 549, 552, 512 P.2d 1094 (1973). The ordinary meaning of the word "may" conveys the idea of choice or discretion. STATE EX REL. BECK v. CARTER, 2 Wn. App. 974, 977, 471 P.2d 127 (1970). While there appears to be no serious dispute over such a construction of the word "may," it has been suggested that the phrase "MAY bring a civil action in the superior court" as used in RCW 19.86.090 denies petitioner a choice of bringing a suit in either the justice courts or the superior court. "May," it is urged, merely indicates that a private litigant is under no compulsion to sue at all. We do not agree with that oversimplified view. The mere existence of a statute which creates a civil remedy NEVER COMPELS or REQUIRES a private person to bring suit. A prospective litigant may ALWAYS choose whether to pursue a civil action, regardless of the legislature's use of the word "may." The word "may," as used in the Consumer Protection Act, cannot be said to have no more meaning than merely to inform a potential claimant of that which he already knows, I.E., that he is not forced to sue. Rather, common sense tells us the word "may" permits the plaintiff to make a choice of forums either justice court or superior court.
The legislative scheme to allow claimants, under the Consumer Protection Act, to commence suit in either justice or superior court is further evidenced by limitation of the amount of the civil penalty to $1,000, the constitutional and statutory jurisdictional maximum for justice courts. Const. art. 4, 6, 10 (amendment 28); RCW 3.66.020(3).
The purpose of the Consumer Protection Act is "to complement the body of federal law governing . . . unfair, deceptive, and fraudulent acts or practices in order to protect the public and foster fair and honest competition. . . . To this end this act SHALL be liberally construed that its beneficial purposes may be served." RCW 19.86.920. (Italics ours.) The use of the word "shall" indicates that a liberal construction of the act is required.
We have recently indicated the necessity of interpreting RCW 19.86.090 liberally. In HOCKLEY v. HARGITT, 82 Wn.2d 337, 510 P.2d 1123 (1973), Justice Brachtenbach, speaking for a unanimous court, emphasized both the State's public policy of liberally construing the Consumer Protection Act as well as the inadequacy of remedies available to consumers. We have not been alone in recognizing the necessity for broader private consumer remedies. SEE: Report of the National Institute for Consumer Justice, REDRESS OF CONSUMER GRIEVANCES, 13; Staff Studies Prepared for the National Institute for Consumer Justice on Small Claims Courts, 13; Comment, THE SMALL CLAIMS COURT IN THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, 10 Gonz. L. Rev. 683 (1975); Note, CONSUMER PROTECTION IN FLORIDA, 23 Fla. L. Rev. 528, 533 (1971); Comment, TRANSLATING SYMPATHY FOR DECEIVED CONSUMERS INTO EFFECTIVE PROGRAMS FOR PROTECTION, 114 Pa. L. Rev. 395, 437 (1966); CF. Rice, REMEDIES, ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES AND THE DUALITY OF CONSUMER TRANSACTION PROBLEMS, 48 Boston U. L. Rev. 559, 569 (1968); Eovaldi & Gestrin, JUSTICE FOR CONSUMERS: THE MECHANISMS OF REDRESS, 66 Nw. U.L. Rev. 281 (1971); Comment, CONSUMER LEGISLATION AND THE POOR, 76 Yale L.J. 745, 764 (1967).
CONCURRING JUDGES: Rosellini, Hamilton, and Utter, JJ., concur.
DISSENTING OPINION: I dissent. The majority has ignored many fundamental principles of law to reach their result.
" Any person who is injured in his business or property by a violation of RCW 19.86.020, 19.86.030, 19.86.040, 19.86.050, or 19.86.060, or any person so injured because he refuses to accede to a proposal for an arrangement which, if consummated, would be in violation of RCW 19.86.030, 19.86.040, 19.86.050, or 19.86.060, may bring a civil action in the superior court to enjoin further violations, to recover the actual damages sustained by him, or both, together with the costs of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee, and the court may in its discretion, increase the award of damages to an amount not to exceed three times the actual damages sustained: PROVIDED, That such increased damage award for violation of RCW 19.86.020 may not exceed one thousand dollars. For the purpose of this section "person" shall include the counties, municipalities, and all political subdivisions of this state.
Whenever the state of Washington is injured by reason of a violation of RCW 19.86.030, 19.86.040, 19.86.050, or 19.86.060, it may sue therefor in the superior court to recover the actual damages sustained by it and to recover the costs of the suit including a reasonable attorney's fee.
Jurisdiction for superior courts and justice courts both originate from the constitution. Const. art. 4, 6, 10 (amendment 28). The difference between those two courts is that the former is a court of general jurisdiction in which jurisdiction exists unless specifically excluded. Const. art. 4, 6 (amendment 28) provides in part:
" The superior court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases in equity and in all cases at law . . . and in all criminal cases amounting to felony, and in all cases of misdemeanor not otherwise provided for by law; . . . and for such special cases and proceedings as are not otherwise provided for. The superior court shall also have original jurisdiction in all cases and of all proceedings in which jurisdiction shall not have been by law vested exclusively in some other court; . . .
Justice courts (district courts), on the other hand, are courts of limited jurisdiction. In fact, jurisdiction for that court must be presumed not to exist except by a specific legislative grant. Const. art. 4, 10 (amendment 28) states: "The legislature shall . . . prescribe by law the powers, duties and jurisdiction of justices of the peace . . ." RCW 3.66.010 gives justice courts "all the necessary powers which are possessed by courts of record in this state . . ." but only for the purpose of carrying out rights of action arising from RCW 3.30 through 3.74. It is also stated in RCW 3.66.010 that
"all laws of a general nature shall apply to such justice court as far as the same may be applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions of chapters 3.30 through 3.74 RCW.
" The justice court shall have jurisdiction and cognizance of the following civil actions and proceedings:
(9) Of all other actions and proceedings of which jurisdiction is SPECIALLY CONFERRED by statute, . . .
"trench upon the jurisdiction of superior or other courts of record, except that justices of the peace may be made police justices of incorporated cities and towns.
" Any person who is injured in his business or property . . . may bring a civil action in the SUPERIOR COURT to enjoin further violations, to recover the actual damages sustained by him, or both . . .
(Italics mine.) This statutory provision is plain upon its face. Any statute which is clear and unambiguous does not admit of construction. STATE v. HOUCK, 32 Wn.2d 681, 203 P.2d 693 (1949); SHELTON HOTEL CO. v. BATES, 4 Wn.2d 498, 104 P.2d 478 (1940); STATE v. SPINO, 61 Wn.2d 246, 377 P.2d 868 (1963). In other words, there is no need to search for the legislature's intent based on rules of statutory construction because the legislature's intent has been clearly spelled out by the use of the words "superior court" in RCW 19.86.090. However, since this issue is the focus of this litigation, I shall discuss several rules of statutory construction which are applicable.
The majority also argues that since RCW 19.86.090 imposes a civil penalty, justice courts have concurrent jurisdiction by virtue of RCW 3.66.020(3). The majority overlooks the fact that treble damages for unfair competition is a purely statutory remedy, which would not exist but for the statute. The statute here created the remedy and provided for the forum wherein the remedy might be enforced. The statement in STATE v. WOMACK, 82 Wn.2d 382, 386, 510 P.2d 1133 (1973) is applicable here:
" In a statutory proceeding, the jurisdiction and authority of the courts are prescribed by legislative enactment, and the court does not have any power that cannot be inferred from a broad interpretation thereof.
IN RE PARSONS, 76 Wn.2d 437, 457 P.2d 544 (1969); PASSMORE v. PASSMORE, 57 Wn.2d 762, 359 P.2d 811 (1961); ARNESON v. ARNESON, 38 Wn.2d 99, 227 P.2d 1016 (1951).
CONCURRING JUDGES: Brachtenbach and Horowitz, JJ., concur with Wright, C.J.