Source: http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/345/229/case.html
Timestamp: 2013-12-13 15:39:16
Document Index: 375863252

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 10', '§ 19', '§ 10', '§ 10', '§ 10', '§ 8']

Heikkila v. Barber - 345 U.S. 229 (1953) :: Justia US Supreme Court Center
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Heikkila v. Barber - 345 U.S. 229 (1953)
Case	U.S. Supreme CourtHeikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229 (1953)Heikkila v. BarberNo. 426Argued February 5, 1953Decided March 16, 1953345 U.S. 229APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
Appellant's complaint seeking a "review of agency action" as well as injunctive and declaratory relief, was dismissed by a three-judge District Court. On direct appeal to this Court, affirmed, p. 345 U. S. 237. Page 345 U. S. 230
It is clear that, prior to the Administrative Procedure Act, habeas corpus was the only remedy by which deportation orders could be challenged in the courts. [Footnote 1] The courts have consistently rejected attempts to use injunctions, declaratory judgments, and other types of relief for this purpose. [Footnote 2] Accordingly, in asserting the availability Page 345 U. S. 231 of judicial review of the type sought here, appellant relies primarily on § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, [Footnote 3] conceding that the question has not yet been decided by this Court. The Government contends that, because Page 345 U. S. 232 § 19(a) of the Immigration Act of 1917 [Footnote 4] makes the decision of the Attorney General "final" the underlying statute precludes judicial review and comes within the first exception to § 10.
The spirit of these statements, together with the broadly remedial purposes of the Act, counsel a judicial attitude of hospitality towards the claim that § 10 greatly expanded the availability of judicial review. However such generalities are not dispositive of the issue here, else a balance would have to be struck between those in the Committee reports and material in the debates which indicates inconsistent legislative understandings as to how extensively Page 345 U. S. 233 § 10 changed the prior law on judicial review. [Footnote 7] No easy answer is found in our decisions on the subject. Each statute in question must be examined individually; its purpose and history as well as its text are to be considered in deciding whether the courts were intended to provide relief for those aggrieved by administrative action. Mere failure to provide for judicial intervention is not conclusive; neither is the presence of language which appears to bar it. [Footnote 8]
That the Attorney General's decisions are "final" does not settle the question. The appellant properly emphasizes the ambiguity in that term. Read alone, it might refer to the doctrine requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies before judicial process can be invoked. But "final," as used in immigration legislation, has a history, both in the statutes and in the decisions of this Court. It begins with § 8 of the Immigration Act of 1891, 26 Stat. 1084, which provided in part