Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/565/699/285508/
Timestamp: 2019-07-19 21:19:08
Document Index: 232433254

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 552', '§ 552', '§ 552', '§ 552', '§ 552', '§ 3']

Morton H. Halperin v. Department of State et al., Appellants, 565 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir. 1977) :: Justia
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Morton H. Halperin v. Department of State et al., Appellants, 565 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit - 565 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
Argued Oct. 21, 1976. Decided Aug. 16, 1977
Appellee in this Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) case seeks to compel disclosure of deleted portions of the transcript of a so-called "background" press conference held by former Secretary of State Kissinger on December 3, 1974. Appellants assert that the disputed material was properly classified pursuant to an Executive order, and therefore is exempt from mandatory disclosure under FOIA. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1) (Supp. IV 1974). It is further contended that any disclosure, mandatory or discretionary, would be highly undesirable, since official attribution of the deleted passages to the former Secretary would adversely affect the negotiating position of the United States in the strategic arms limitations talks (SALT) with the Soviet Union.
Informed that the State Department would not comply completely with his FOIA request, appellee first pursued the administrative appeal to which he was entitled under 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (6) (A). In a letter dated April 9, 1975, Carol Laise, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, announced that the Department's Council on Classification Policy had decided to sustain the partial denial of appellee's FOIA request. Tracking closely the language employed by Mr. Vest, the Assistant Secretary's letter explained that "(w)e have examined the passages deleted . . . and have concluded that their release in a form directly attributed to the Secretary of State could damage the national security."
5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1) (Supp. IV 1974).5 The Conference Committee Report on the 1974 FOIA amendments, S.Rep. No. 93-1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12, reprinted in (1974) U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 6267, 6290, indicates that by the addition of clause (B), Congress intended to require proper classification "pursuant to both procedural and substantive criteria contained" in the relevant Executive order. There being no further Presidential action on the subject following adoption of the 1974 amendments, the governing Executive order remains No. 11652, issued by President Nixon in March, 1972. 37 Fed.Reg. 5209 (1972). That order sets forth standards describing the material which may be classified and the appropriate level of secrecy to be assigned to particular information. The three available classification categories afford varying degrees of protection from authorized disclosure depending upon the classified material's significance to national security. In addition, Executive Order 11652 establishes procedures to be followed in classifying and declassifying information. Also included are rules regulating storage of and access to classified material. We list below those features of the Executive Order which bear on the present controversy.
(a) t the time of origination, each document or other material containing classified information shall be marked with its assigned security classification and whether it is subject to or exempt from the General Declassification Schedule.
Nevertheless, we hesitate to order the release of material that would allegedly do grave damage to the national security without judicial scrutiny of the merits of that allegation. The responsibility of the courts to exercise some discretion in extreme circumstances is suggested by dicta in First Amendment cases involving prior restraint: "No one would question but that (when a nation is at war) a government might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops." Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716, 51 S. Ct. 625, 631, 75 L. Ed. 1357 (1931). See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 726, 91 S. Ct. 2140, 29 L. Ed. 2d 822 (1971),13 (Brennan, J., concurring), 730 (Stewart, J., concurring). Although the facts of this case are distinguishable from cases involving prior restraint of the publication of materials already in the hands of the would-be publisher, the underlying rationale of these dicta a basic notion of national self-preservation seems to apply in the circumstances before us.14
Prior to the 1974 FOIA amendments, the first exemption covered matters that were "specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy." Even before Congressional addition of the "properly classified" language in 1974, this court had decided, in Schaffer v. Kissinger, 164 U.S.App.D.C. 282, 505 F.2d 389 (1974), that agencies withholding documents in reliance on the (b) (1) exemption must demonstrate to the court that those documents were "properly classified pursuant to executive order." Id. at 391
Mr. George Vest, the State Department official who classified the relevant portions of the transcript, indicated when deposed that in classifying the deletions he did not consult the Executive Order or any other document and that he had never heard the phrase "could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the national security" prior to the deposition and that "it is not a phrase that has special meaning." (Vest deposition, p. 16). Furthermore, Mr. Vest indicated that he was not aware of the change made in the definition of confidential between the old Executive Order and the new Executive Order. (Vest deposition, p. 19). While Mr. Vest's affidavit is entitled to substantial weight and while he undoubtedly acted in good faith in making his determinations, nevertheless, the classifications were not made in accordance with the procedural and substantive criteria expressed in the Executive Order and hence cannot provide the basis for the (b) (1) exemption as claimed. Defendant's post hoc justifications do not negate the fact that the deletions were not classified in accordance with the Executive Order.
One would have thought that, in view of the deliberate and extensive, not to say daring, use it has made of that institution in the recent past, the Department would have been peculiarly alert to the searching out of all possible legal ramifications bearing on the security of the disclosures made at such conferences. Appellee, by virtue of his persistence, has at least benefited the nation by making the Department aware of the laws it must observe if these adventures are to be continued. It would thus appear that appellee has, irrespective of the outcome of the proceedings on remand, "substantially prevailed" within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (4) (E) (Supp. IV 1974) relating to assessment against the United States of litigation expense, thereby fulfilling one of the conditions for the invocation of possible disciplinary proceedings under 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (4) (F) (Supp. IV 1974)
Soucie v. David, 145 U.S.App.D.C. 144, 448 F.2d 1067, 1077 (1971); accord, Tax Analysts & Advocates v. IRS, 505 F.2d 350, 355 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Getman v. NLRB, 164 U.S.App.D.C. 243, 450 F.2d 670, 678 (1971). See generally Rose v. Department of the Air Force, 495 F.2d 261, 269 (2d Cir. 1974), aff'd, 425 U.S. 352, 96 S. Ct. 1592, 48 L. Ed. 2d 11 (1976); K. Davis, Administrative Law of the Seventies § 3 A. 6 (1976); Project: Government Information and the Rights of Citizens, 73 Mich. L. Rev. 971, 1150-56 (1975)
Although Near involved a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute that imposed a prior restraint, the Executive Branch in the Pentagon Papers Case had to rely, as it does here, on its inherent power to restrict the distribution of sensitive information. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 720, 91 S. Ct. 2140, 29 L. Ed. 2d 822 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring)
Cf. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 282, 62 S. Ct. 196, 203, 86 L. Ed. 192 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting): "Free speech is not so absolute or irrational a conception as to imply paralysis of the means for effective protection of all the freedoms secured by the Bill of Rights."
We note in particular that the procedural infractions in this case included the release of the information in question in statements by former Secretary Kissinger to reporters without security clearances. As the District Court noted in its memorandum opinion, Halperin v. Dep't of State, No. 75-674 (D.D.C., May 27, 1976), this circumstance calls into question both the government's claim of serious adverse consequences and the potential effectiveness of continuing to withhold the information. See United States v. Washington Post Co., 144 U.S.App.D.C. 326, 446 F.2d 1327, 1329, on petition for rehearing, 1331, 1332 aff'd, 403 U.S. 713, 91 S. Ct. 2140, 29 L. Ed. 2d 822 (1971)