Source: http://www.wifcon.com/pd6_301c.htm
Timestamp: 2020-06-06 14:39:02
Document Index: 509936313

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2304', '§ 2304', '§ 2304', '§ 2304', '§ 6', '§ 2304', '§ 6', '§ 3301', '§ 3304', '§ 3304', '§ 21', '§ 21', '§ 2304', '§ 2304', '§ 2304', '§ 6', '§ 2304', '§ 2304', '§ 6']

FAR 6.301c: Lack of Advance Planning
ASC also argues that the award, on a sole-source basis, of a bridge contract to BAH was improper. The protester argues that the urgency of the requirement that resulted in the sole-source award to BAH was the result of a lack of adequate advance planning. See Protest (Dec. 16, 2015) at 9-10; ASC’s Comments (Jan. 27, 2016) at 16. ASC further contends that the delay between the authorization of the J&A and execution of the bridge contract undermines the agency’s position that there were urgent and compelling circumstances justifying the use of noncompetitive acquisition procedures, and the agency otherwise failed to reasonably demonstrate that BAH was the only contractor that could satisfy the government’s requirements. See Supp. Protest (Jan. 27, 2015) at 12-13; ASC’s Supp. Comments (Feb. 12, 2016) at 4-8. For the reasons that follow, we find no basis to sustain ASC’s protest challenging the Navy’s award of the sole-source bridge contract to BAH.
The Competition in Contracting Act, 10 U.S.C. § 2304(c)(2), permits an agency to use other than competitive procedures in acquiring goods or services where the agency’s requirement is of such an unusual and compelling urgency that the government would be seriously injured unless the agency is permitted to limit the number of sources from which it solicits proposals. Although the Competition in Contracting Act requires that agencies solicit offers from as many potential sources as is practicable when using the unusual and compelling urgency exception to limit competition, 10 U.S.C. § 2304(e), an agency nonetheless may limit a procurement to the only firm it reasonably believes can properly perform the work in the time available. Camden Shipping Corp., B-406171, B-406323, Feb. 27, 2012, 2012 CPD ¶ 76 at 6; McGregor Mfg. Corp., B‑285341, Aug. 18, 2000, 2000 CPD ¶ 151 at 6.
When using noncompetitive procedures pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 2304(c)(2), such as here, agencies are required to execute a written J&A with sufficient facts and rationale to support the use of the cited authority. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 2304(f)(1)(A), (b); FAR §§ 6.302-2(c)(1), (d)(3), 6.303, 6.304. Noncompetitive procedures may not justify a noncompetitive award on the basis of urgency where the agency’s requirements have become urgent as a result of a lack of advanced planning. 10 U.S.C. § 2304(f)(4)(A); FAR § 6.301(c)(1); eAlliant, LLC, B-407332.4, B‑407332.7, Dec. 23, 2014, 2015 CPD ¶ 58 at 5. While an agency may not justify a noncompetitive award on the basis of urgency where the agency’s requirements have become urgent as a result of a lack of advanced planning, such planning need not be entirely error-free or successful. eAlliant, LLC, supra; Pegasus Global Strategic Solutions, LLC, B‑400422.3, Mar. 24, 2009, 2009 CPD ¶ 73 at 9.
In this regard, we have found that an immediate need for services that arises as a result of an agency’s implementation of corrective action in response to a protest does not generally constitute a lack of advanced planning. See eAlliant, LLC, supra, at 8; Systems Integration & Mgmt., Inc., B‑402785.2, Aug. 10, 2010, 2010 CPD ¶ 207 at 3; Chapman Law Firm Co., LPA, B‑296847, Sept. 28, 2005, 2005 CPD ¶ 175 at 3. Our review of an agency’s decision to conduct a noncompetitive procurement focuses on the adequacy of the rationale and conclusions set forth in the J&A; where the J&A sets forth a reasonable justification for the agency’s actions, we will not object to the award. Camden Shipping Corp., supra.
ASC first contends that any need for a sole-source bridge contract arising from the Navy’s decision to terminate ASC’s task order, cancel the RFP, and resolicit the agency’s requirements was the result of the agency’s lack of adequate advance planning. Specifically, the protester contends that the agency failed to adequately determine its requirements and associated evaluation criteria, and points to the Navy’s apparently unsuccessful attempt to remedy the concerns with the cost realism evaluation criteria in amendment No. 3 to the RFP. See Protest (Dec. 16, 2015) at 10; ASC’s Comments (Jan. 27, 2016) at 16. The protester relies on our recent decision in XTec, Inc., B-410778.3, Oct. 1, 2015, 2015 CPD ¶ 292, in support of its argument that the Navy here engaged in a lack of adequate advanced planning by cancelling the RFP based on inadequate solicitation requirements. We find, however, that the facts here are readily distinguishable from the facts presented in XTec, and the record otherwise does not show a lack of advanced planning by the Navy.
In XTec, our Office found that an agency had a reasonable basis to cancel a solicitation where it determined, after multiple rounds of awards, protests, and corrective action, that the solicitation failed to contain adequately detailed information regarding various contract performance requirements. XTec, Inc., supra, at 9-10. We sustained XTec’s protest challenging the cancellation of the solicitation, and the award of a sole-source bridge contract extension for the incumbent, because the record showed that the procuring agency was aware of, and had documented the need for, more detailed solicitation requirements for nearly four years. Id. at 10-12. Thus, our Office’s decision sustaining the protest was based on the procuring agency’s failure to adequately plan how it would address the flaws with the solicitation that had been known by the agency for years.
In stark contrast to the facts in XTec, the record here demonstrates that the Navy proactively sought to address concerns with the RFP’s cost realism evaluation criteria through issuance of amendment No. 3. To the extent the Navy’s efforts in this regard introduced new problems associated with the agency’s cost realism methodology, and were ultimately unsuccessful, that is not the applicable legal standard. eAlliant, LLC, supra; Pegasus Global Strategic Solutions, LLC, supra. Thus, the circumstances in XTec, where the procuring agency passively ignored potential defects in the solicitation for almost four years, are materially different than the circumstances here.
ASC also challenges the urgent and compelling justification for the sole-source bridge contract award to BAH. The protester first contends that the urgency basis for the award, which was predicated on preventing a lapse in contract support when BAH’s incumbent task order ended on December 1, is undermined by the fact that the bridge contract was not fully executed by both parties until December 29. See ASC’s Supp. Comments (Feb. 12, 2016) at 4-7. ASC further alleges that the delay in awarding the bridge contract undermines the Navy’s position that BAH was the only contractor capable of performing without a significant material impact on the agency’s mission. See id. at 7-9. We find that neither argument provides a basis on which to sustain the protest. (American Systems Corporation B-412501.2, B-412501.3: Mar 18, 2016) (pdf)
XTec first asserts that cancellation of RFQ No. 858797 was improper since the RFQs “broadly worded requirements” were sufficient in scope to cover all of the more detailed requirements GSA now asserts must be included in the solicitation. Protest at 8-14.
A contracting agency need only have a reasonable basis to support a decision to cancel an RFQ. Progressive Servs. Corp., B-404183, B-404251.2, Jan. 11, 2011, 2011 CPD ¶ 18 at 2. A reasonable basis to cancel exists when, for example, an agency determines that a solicitation does not accurately reflect its needs. MedVet Dev. LLC, B-406530, June 18, 2012, 2012 CPD ¶ 196 at 2-3.
The agency responds that, early in 2015, it was “made aware by its customer agencies” that the solicitation “insufficiently captured various agencies’ requirements.” Agency Legal Memorandum, July 27, 2015, at 8. More specifically, the agency maintains that the solicitation failed to contain detailed requirements regarding the SIP interface between the customer agencies’ systems and the USAccess system; failed to reflect sufficient requirements regarding customer-owned hardware; and identified a performance period that was too short. Id. at 8-10; AR, Tab 10, Contracting Officer’s Cancellation Memo, May 6, 2015, at 2. Although not reflected in the contracting officer’s cancellation memo, the agency’s response to this protest also asserts that the solicitation should reflect a requirement for “derived credentials,” which was “being developed” at the time of cancellation. Agency Legal Memorandum, July 27, 2015, at 10.
Here, based on our review of the entire record, we cannot conclude that the agency’s decision to cancel the solicitation was unreasonable. That is, we cannot conclude that the solicitation’s “high level” requirements were, in fact, adequate to meet the government’s needs. Accordingly, we reject XTec’s assertion that cancellation of the solicitation was unreasonable.
[Agency’s failure to engage in reasonable and adequate advance planning.]
Alternatively, XTec asserts that cancellation of the solicitation was caused by the agency’s failure to engage in reasonable and adequate advance planning. We agree.
The Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (CICA) generally requires that agencies engage in “full and open competition” when conducting government procurements. 41 U.S.C. § 3301(a). While there are specific exceptions to this general requirement, under no circumstances may noncompetitive procedures be used due to a lack of advance planning by contracting officials. 41 U.S.C. § 3304(e)(5); New Breed Leasing Corp., B‑274201, B-274202, Nov. 26, 1996, 96-2 CPD ¶ 202 at 6; TeQcom, Inc., B‑224664, Dec. 22, 1986, 86-2 CPD ¶ 700. Our Office has recognized that, while the requirement for advance planning does not mean that such planning must be completely error‑free, see, e.g., Sprint Communications Co., L.P., B-262003.2, Jan. 25, 1996, 96-1 CPD ¶ 24, as with all agency procurement actions, the advance planning required by CICA must be reasonable. In considering this statutory requirement, we have noted that contracting officials have a duty to promote competition. Precision Logistics, Inc., B-271429, July 18, 1996, 96-2 CPD ¶ 24 at 5; National Aerospace Group, Inc., B‑282843, Aug. 30, 1999, 99‑2 CPD ¶ 43. That is, contracting officials must act affirmatively to obtain and safeguard competition; they cannot take a passive approach and remain in a sole-source situation when they could reasonably take steps to enhance competition. HEROS, Inc., B-292043, June 9, 2003, 2003 CPD ¶ 111 at 7.
Here, as discussed above, the agency asserts that it was required to cancel the solicitation due to the solicitation’s failure to adequately address various requirements of the customer agencies, including the SIP interface requirements; agency-owned hardware; training of agency personnel; and the length of the performance period. See Agency Legal Memorandum, July 27, 2015, at 8-10; AR, Tab 10, Contracting Officer’s Cancellation Memorandum, May 6, 2015, at 2. In responding to XTec’s protest, the agency asserts that it had no reason to know of these solicitation omissions until its customer agencies began expressing their concerns early in 2015. Id.
Contrary to the agency’s assertions, the record establishes that the agency knew in 2011--when it justified, and defended, its prior award of a sole-source task order to HPES--that the USAccess system was “built around a proprietary set of technologies that combine databases and middleware”; that customer agencies had “invested heavily” in hardware for light credentialing configurations; and that “[m]ost of the USAccess customers have slightly different requirements for interface with their internal systems,” each of which had required a “custom interface.” Protest, exh. 1, Contracting Officer’s Statement, Sept. 8, 2011, at 3-4. In short, the agency’s 2011 justification for not competing the logical follow-on task order awarded to HPES expressly referenced the very concerns on which it now relies to support its decision to cancel RFQ No. 858797. Notwithstanding the agency’s 2011 documented recognition of the need for detailed requirements, the agency published RFQ No. 858797 with only “high level” requirements, received and evaluated quotations on that basis, and twice selected XTec for award--asserting that it only reasonably knew that the requirements were inadequate early in 2015. On the record here, we reject the agency’s assertion that it did not know of the necessity for more detailed requirements until earlier this year.
Even if we were to conclude that the agency did not previously know of the customer agencies’ need for more detailed requirements, we reject the argument that such lack of knowledge was reasonable. As noted above, pursuant to CICA’s requirements for advance planning, contracting officials have an affirmative obligation to promote competition and may not take a passive approach to remaining in a sole-source situation when they could reasonably take steps to enhance competition. HEROS, Inc., supra. Here, the [HSPD-12 Managed Services Office] MSO program manager acknowledged at the GAO hearing that GSA had “a very robust communication mechanism with our agency customers,” but, nonetheless, that the customer agencies “felt like the things they were concerned about . . . had not ended up in the RFQ.” Tr. at 34, 36. In this context, the MSO program manager acknowledged that “GSA should have reached out more strenuously to the agency customers to ask them for further detail.” Id. Similarly, the HCA testified that: “we . . . had some leadership turnover in the last three years. . . [a]nd . . .the leadership down to the program folks had not had experience in these kinds of transitions and programs and just had not adequately thought it through or planned for it.” Tr. at 501. On this record, we sustain XTec’s protest based on the agency’s failure to engage in reasonable advance planning.
Extension of HPES’s Task Order
XTec also protests that the extension of HPES’s sole-source task order similarly flowed from the agency’s failure to engage in advance planning, and further asserts that the extension was illegal in that the agency provided no justification for that action until nearly two months after it had taken place. For the reasons discussed above, we agree that the agency’s extension of the task order was caused by its failure to engage in reasonable advance planning, and sustain the protest.
We further view the agency’s failure to either execute or publish the LSJ for nearly two months after the action was taken to be contrary to the requirements of CICA, under which such justification must generally be executed prior to the action being taken, and notice of the action must be published within 14 days. 41 U.S.C. §§ 3304(e), (f). Here, there can be no dispute that the agency failed to comply with these requirements. Nonetheless, in light of our decision sustaining the protest for failure to engage in reasonable advance planning, and our recommendations below, we do not further address this matter.
Since we do not question the reasonableness of the agency’s determination that RFQ No. 858797 failed to adequately address the government’s requirements, and there is no dispute that the government has an ongoing need for the HSPD-12 services, we do not recommend that the cancelled solicitation be reinstated or that HPES’s ongoing performance of the sole-source task order be terminated. We do recommend that the agency make expeditious efforts to prepare the new solicitation and conduct a competition thereunder. Further, based on the agency’s extension of the HPES task order for up to two years, we recommend that GSA reimburse XTec for the proposal preparation costs it incurred in responding to the solicitation that GSA now concludes was fatally flawed. See The Jones/Hill Joint Venture, B‑286194.4 et al., Dec. 5, 2001, 2001 CPD ¶ 194 at 22; COBRO Corp., B‑287578.2, Oct. 15, 2001, 2001 CPD ¶ 181 at 9. Finally, we recommend that the protester be reimbursed the reasonable costs of filing and pursuing its protest, including reasonable attorneys’ fees. 4 C.F.R. § 21.8(d)(1). The protester’s certified claim for costs, detailing the time spent and costs incurred, must be submitted to the agency within 60 days of receiving this decision. 4 C.F.R. § 21.8(f)(1). (XTec, Inc. B-410778.3: Oct 1, 2015) (pdf)
Trison contends that the Army's decision to limit the competition to existing MATOC holders is inconsistent with its proposed corrective action, which caused our Office to dismiss Trison's prior protest as academic. Protest at 5. The protester argues that the goals of the protest system are circumvented where the agency does not promptly implement its promised corrective action. Id. at 5--7. In this respect, the protester suggests that (although it states that it does not allege that the Army acted in bad faith) the agency's actions are a "mere pre-text and not rationally related to the agency's own stated corrective action." Comments at 4. Finally, Trison challenges the urgency of the agency's needs, complaining that the agency waited 12 days to decide how to procure the requirement after terminating EEC's contract and canceling the IFB, and argues that the urgency associated with the agency's requirements are the result of poor procurement planning. Id. at 7.
The agency responds that resoliciting under a new IFB (as the agency originally contemplated) would "endanger the Agency's ability to assure that the work could be completed within the necessary time limits." Contracting Officer's Statement, Sept. 4, 2009, at 2. Specifically, the agency states that a wide variety of operations and activities are being transferred to APG under base realignments and closures (BRAC) and that the renovations are necessary to prepare a building that houses the APG's data center, a mission critical facility for the entire APG installation. Id. In this regard, the agency expects an influx of personnel and a four-fold expansion of the capacity of existing systems in the building and states that the construction services (which would take at least 270 days) must be completed by June 2010 to allow for occupancy in August. Id.
Following the July 17 dismissal of Trison's prior protest, agency officials met on July 21 to consider how to satisfy the agency's urgent requirements; among the acquisition methods considered were whether to resolicit under a new IFB or to conduct a limited competition among MATOC holders. The agency concluded that, if it resolicited under a new IFB, award would likely not be made until mid-October, which the agency believed would likely not leave sufficient time for completion of the renovation services by June. The Army decided that it would conduct a limited competition among MATOC holders to satisfy its requirements. Id. at 2--3.
The record provides no basis to conclude that the agency acted unreasonably in deciding to restrict the resolicitation of the renovation services to MATOC holders to satisfy the agency's urgent requirements. Although Trison complains that the agency waited 12 days to decide how to reprocure the requirement after taking corrective action in response to the prior protest, the protester does not assert that the agency lacks an urgent basis for the completion of these renovation services by June 2010, nor show that the agency's urgent requirement could be timely satisfied by issuing a new IFB. Given that the agency reasonably found that resoliciting these requirements under a new IFB would not timely satisfy its urgent requirements, we have no basis to object to the agency's decision not to issue a new IFB.
Also, we are not persuaded by Trison's arguments that the agency's urgent requirements were created by the agency's taking 12 days after announcing that it would initiate corrective action to decide how to obtain these services or from the errors made in drafting the prior IFB. Although the prior IFB was ambiguous with respect to the price evaluation of certain contract line items, this alone does not establish that the agency's urgent requirements were the result of a lack of advanced procurement planning. See, e.g., New Breed Leasing Corp., B-274201, B-274202, Nov. 26, 1996, 96-2 CPD para. 202 at 6; Sprint Commc'ns Co., LP, B-262003.2, Jan. 25, 1996, 96-1 CPD para. 24 at 9 (an agency's obligation to engage in reasonable advance planning prior to conducting procurements does not constitute a requirement that procurement planning be perfect or completely error-free). We also think that taking 12 days to determine an appropriate acquisition approach was unobjectionable.
Finally, the record does not support Trison's allegation that the cancellation of the IFB and decision to conduct a limited competition among MATOC holders was a "mere pretext" to avoid resoliciting Trison. As noted above, the record shows that the Army reasonably found that resoliciting under a new IFB likely would not meet the agency's urgent requirements. Trison's arguments that the agency's actions are a "mere pretext" are based upon no more than inference and supposition, upon which our Office will not attribute unfair or prejudicial motives to procurement officials. See Shinwha Elecs., B-290603 et al., Sept. 3, 2002, 2002 CPD para. 154 at 5 n. 6. (Trison Construction, Inc., B-401537.2, November 9, 2009) (pdf)
Under CICA, 41 U.S.C. sect. 253(a)(1)(A), contracting officers have a duty to promote and provide for competition and to provide the most advantageous contract for the government. In their role of promoting and providing for competition, contracting officials must act affirmatively to obtain and safeguard competition; they cannot take a passive approach and remain in a noncompetitive position where they could reasonably take steps to enhance competition. VSE Corp., Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., B-290452.3 et al., May 23, 2005, 2005 CPD para. 103 at 8; HEROS, Inc., B-292043, June 9, 2003, 2003 CPD para. 111 at 7; National Aerospace Group, Inc., B-282843, Aug. 30, 1999, 99-2 CPD para. 43 at 8. See also S. Rep. No. 98-50, at 18 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2174, 2191 (stating that CICA requires agencies to “make an affirmative effort to obtain effective competition”). CICA further provides that under no circumstance may noncompetitive procedures be used due to a lack of advance planning by contracting officials. 41 U.S.C. sect. 253(f)(5)(A); Signals & Sys., Inc., B-288107, Sept. 21, 2001, 2001 CPD para. 168 at 9. Although the requirement for advance planning is not a requirement that such planning be successful or error-free, see Abbott Prods., Inc., B-231131, Aug. 8, 1988, 88-2 CPD para. 119, at 8, the advance planning must be reasonable. Signals & Sys., Inc., supra, at 13. Here, we conclude that the agency has failed to comply with the CICA mandate for reasonable advance planning. With regard to the feasibility of alternatives to a sole-source award, the agency principally focuses on the difficulties associated with either acquiring a new software system, or having another firm perform the required services without license rights to the RGII software. The agency also asserts that its advance planning efforts have been reasonable in that it has taken steps to avoid expansion of its reliance on RGII. In this regard, the agency notes, for example, that it has been considering using a program developed by another agency office, the Bureau of European Affairs, to meet its needs here, instead of contracting with RGII for the development of additional proprietary software. Agency’s Response to GAO Questions, supra, at 4. While, as discussed above, it is reasonable to conclude that, given the restrictive nature of the agency’s current licensing agreement with RGII, only RGII can now meet its needs, the agency’s arguments simply do not address the issue of whether the agency’s acquisition planning--in the face of those restrictions--was reasonable, given the requirement that the agency make an affirmative effort to obtain competition. The agency has produced no record of any steps that it has taken to end its reliance on the services of the incumbent to maintain the existing software systems; in fact, this latest proposed sole-source award has a potential term of 5 years. It is possible, for example, that the agency could purchase additional rights to the proprietary software in order to promote competition, see Environmental Tectonics Corp., B‑248611, Sept. 8, 1992, 92-2 CPD para. 160 at 5, rights that the government relinquished nearly 6 years ago. In this regard, the protester asserts that in 2004 RGII offered the agency a source code license to multiple copies of Monument for less than $1.2 million, and that at the time RGII stated that the value of Monument was less than $1 million. Protest, Tab E, Letter from Protester to Agency, Aug. 7, 2006, at 2. Further, the agency acknowledges that the “value of the software may in fact now be quite limited.” Agency’s Response to GAO Questions, supra, at 3. Under the circumstances here--where the agency ceded substantial rights in the software created by RGII under the development contract, and where there is no indication that the agency has explored the possibility of acquiring additional rights from RGII--we think that, to satisfy its obligation to engage in reasonable advance planning and to promote competition, the agency was required to consider whether the costs associated with a purchase of additional license rights, or some other alternative, outweigh the anticipated benefits of competition. See HEROS, Inc., supra, at 7, 10. (eFedBudget Corporation, B-298627, November 15, 2006) (pdf)
While we do not question the agency's need for a transition period (even though the record does not clearly establish that this period is required to take as much as 4 months), we agree with VSE that the agency's predicament of not being able to complete a transition period in the event of an award to a firm other than EG&G was caused by the agency's failure to consider meeting its requirement for these bridge services with any firm other than EG&G. In this regard, the record evidences that the agency was aware from the start of 2004, and increasingly certain as the year passed, that the RFP might well be canceled; that EG&G's latest contract extension would expire on April 1, 2005; that a follow-on contract would require a transition period; and that there were other capable contractors, such as VSE and Johnson Controls, which had competed during the agency's protracted competitive procurement, that might be interested in the agency's interim requirements. Yet the agency did not take any steps to avoid having to negotiate exclusively with EG&G to satisfy its requirements. Under the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (CICA), 41 U.S.C. 253(a)(1)(A), contracting officers have a duty to promote and provide for competition and to provide the most advantageous contract for the government. In doing so, contracting officials must act affirmatively to obtain and safeguard competition; they cannot take a passive approach and remain in a noncompetitive position where they could reasonably take steps to enhance competition. See Signal & Sys., Inc. , B-288107, Sept. 21, 2001, 2001 CPD 168 at 14-15. Thus, 41 U.S.C. 253(f)(5)(A) provides that under no circumstance may noncompetitive procedures be used due to a lack of advanced planning by contracting officials. Signal & Sys., Inc. , supra , at 9. Although the requirement for advanced planning is not a requirement that such planning be successful or error-free, see Abbott Products, Inc. , B-231131, Aug. 8, 1988, 88-2 CPD 119, the advanced planning must be reasonable. Signal & Sys., Inc. , supra , at 13. Also, even where the agency has a basis to conduct a noncompetitive procurement, it is still required to request offers from as many potential sources as is practicable under the circumstances. 41 U.S.C. 253(e); Signal & Sys., Inc. , supra , at 8-9. As described above, even though the agency was increasingly aware many months in advance that the on-going competitive solicitation for these services might well be cancelled, the only alternative considered by the agency was the sole-source extension of EG&G's contract. If the agency had earlier planned to compete for these interim services, as required, a transition period between EG&G's existing contract and the bridge contract could have been accommodated, given that there were more than 4 months between when the RFP was actually cancelled and when EG&G's contract expired. In this regard, the record evidences that the agency could easily have decided earlier to cancel the RFP, given that virtually all of the reasons for the cancellation were apparent months earlier. Thus, we find that the circumstance of not having sufficient time to complete a transition period was created by the CBP's failure to engage in reasonable advanced procurement planning. See Techno-Sciences, Inc. , B-257686, B-257686.2, Oct. 31, 1994, 94-2 CPD 164 at 9, 11 (agency needs to account for reasonable phase-in periods to achieve adequate advance procurement planning). The situation here is exacerbated by the fact that EG&G's incumbent contract expired in May 2001 and has been extended on a sole-source basis for the past 4 years. Moreover, while the base period for the protested sole source contract extension is only for 6 months, the record evidences that the agency anticipates that the full 18 months will be needed before the new contractor selected under the anticipated competitive procurement can start contract performance. See Draft J&A. In sum, we do not think that the agency could sit idly by in the face of the circumstances present here and not consider obtaining more competition for its sole-source requirements. (VSE Corporation; Johnson Controls World Services, Inc., B-290452.3; B-290452.4; B-290452.5, May 23, 2005) (pdf)
In enacting CICA, Congress explained: “Effective competition is predicated on advance procurement planning and an understanding of the marketplace.” S. Rep. No. 50, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2191. The Senate Report also quoted with approval the following testimony regarding the need for advance planning:
Opportunities for obtaining or improving competition have often been lost because of untimely, faulty, or the total lack of advance procurement planning. Noncompetitive procurement or inadequate competition also has resulted many times from the failure to develop specifications . . . . By requiring effective competition, Congress will serve notice on the agencies that they will need to do more than the minimum to comply with the statute. S. Rep. No. 50, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2192. Finally, in interpreting this statutory requirement, our Office has noted that contracting officials have a duty to promote and provide for competition and to obtain the most advantageous contract for the government. Precision Logistics, Inc., B-271429, July 18, 1996, 96-2 CPD ¶ 24 at 5; National Aerospace Group, Inc., B‑282843, Aug. 30, 1999, 99-2 CPD ¶ 43. In other words, contracting officials must act affirmatively to obtain and safeguard competition; they cannot take a passive approach and remain in a sole-source situation when they could reasonably take steps to enhance competition. Here, the Army's actions over the past several years fail to comply with CICA's statutory mandate for reasonable advance planning.
(HEROS, Inc., B-292043, June 9, 2003) (pdf)
American Systems Corporation B-412501.2, B-412501.3: Mar 18, 2016 (pdf) XTec, Inc. B-410778.3: Oct 1, 2015 (pdf)
Trison Construction, Inc., B-401537.2, November 9, 2009 (pdf) Major Contracting Services, Inc., B-401472, September 14, 2009 (pdf)
eFedBudget Corporation, B-298627, November 15, 2006 (pdf)
VSE Corporation; Johnson Controls World Services, Inc., B-290452.3; B-290452.4; B-290452.5, May 23, 2005 (pdf)
The sole-source procurement in this case is governed by 10 U.S.C. § 2304, which states in relevant part:
The head of an agency may use procedures other than competitive procedures only when --
(2) the agency’s need for the property or services is of such an unusual and compelling urgency that the United States would be seriously injured unless the agency is permitted to limit the number of sources from which it solicits bids or proposals . . . .
10 U.S.C. § 2304(c). The agency may not justify a sole-source award by reason of its own “lack of advance planning.” 10 U.S.C. § 2304(f)(4)(A). The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) has incorporated these principles in FAR 6.302–1(c). 48 C.F.R. § 6.302-1(c).
As in other bid protests, a sole-source procurement decision may be set aside if: “(1) the sole-source award lacked a rational basis; or (2) the sole-source procurement procedure involved a violation of a statute, regulation, or procedure.” Emery Worldwide Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 264 F.3d 1071, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing Impresa, 238 F.3d at 1332). Under the first ground, “[t]he test for reviewing courts is to determine whether the contracting agency provided a coherent and reasonable explanation of its exercise of discretion.” Id. at 1085-86 (citations omitted). Under the second ground, the court examines the sole-source procurement for violations of law or regulation, in the absence of which the protestor would have had a substantial chance of receiving an award under either a competitive bidding process (where the sole-source procedure was made irrational by the violations), under the sole-source procedure or in some other fashion. Id. at 1086 (citations omitted); see also KSD, Inc. v. United States, 72 Fed. Cl. 236, 255 (2006).
In this case, defendant all but admits that the BIA failed to plan adequately for the transition of the procurement here and, in particular, for the use of the sole-source contract in question. The decisional law strongly suggests that this was an inappropriate use of the sole-source regulations. See Innovation Dev. Enters. of Am. v. United States, 108 Fed. Cl. 711, 727 (2013); L-3 Comm’s v. United States, 85 Fed. Cl. 667, 674 (2009); WorldWide Language Res., Inc., 2005 CPD ¶ 206 (Comp. Gen. Nov. 14, 2005); see also Filtration Dev. Co., LLC v. United States, 60 Fed. Cl. 371 (2004). While the court understands that the planning in this regard cannot be perfect or even error-free, see Infrastructure Def. Techs. v. United States, 81 Fed. Cl. 375, 298 (2008), it is obvious here that the agency failed to perform any real advanced planning, beyond having the prior contract awardee perform the work and invoking the sole-source procurement rules in Chenega’s favor. See Reilly’s Wholesale Produce, 73 Fed. Cl. at 715. Waiting until the last minute does not absolve the BIA of its obligations in this regard – a different view would turn the sole-source rules on their head. Accordingly, the court believes that plaintiff has demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits. (Cherokee Nation Technologies, LLC v. U S and Chenega Federal Systems, LLC, No. 14-371C, June 23, 2014) (pdf)
A. Army Delays
"[T]here is a presumption . . . that government [procurement] officials act in good faith." Galen Med. Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 369 F.3d 1324, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing Am-Pro Protective Agency, Inc. v. United States, 281 F.3d 1234, 1239 (Fed. Cir. 2002)) (emphasis removed). EOTech does not allege that the Army proceeded in bad faith and intentionally created an urgent and compelling need for CCOs. However, EOTech alleges that "the 'urgent' circumstances in which the Army finds itself are of its own making.” Pl.’s Mot. at 14. The court agrees that, in hindsight, the Army participated to some extent in the delay of a competitive procurement of CCOs which would have replenished its dwindling stocks of optical rifle sights. However, the court believes that the Army’s actions were justified under the circumstances, and that the record does not show a lack of advance planning on the part of the Army.
As plaintiff points out, a lack of advance planning cannot justify a sole source award. See 10 U.S.C. § 2304(f)(4)(A) (formerly codified at § 2304(f)(5)(A)); 48 C.F.R. § 6.301(c)(1) (2007). In the court’s view, however, the Army has made exhaustive attempts to procure CCOs through competitive procedures, but the acquisition schedules envisioned by these planning activities have consistently been forced to yield to unforeseen increases in demand and unanticipated delays, not the least of which has been caused by litigation over the award of the new contract. The court examines the sequence of events that led to this sole source procurement.
The record shows that the competitive award of the old contract to Aimpoint on March 16, 2006 was intended to fulfill the Army’s need for M68 CCOs. AR at 29, 32. The original quantity ordered under that contract was 163,000 units. Id. at 32. The need for M68 CCOs greatly exceeded projections, and deliveries were requested at an accelerated pace. Id. at 29 (showing an increase from [ ] units per month to [ ] units per month). In February 2007, less than a year into the old contract, the Army began work on a competitive procurement for the next generation of CCOs. Id. at 28.
In May 2007, the Army acted to prevent a predicted shortfall of CCOs, and justified the first bridge contract to Aimpoint for 93,226 M68 CCOs. AR at 22, 32. The contract modification was signed in July 2007. Id. at 32. The new contract’s solicitation was issued in August 2007, with a closing date in September 2007. Id. at 28. Due to problems with the scheduling of bid sample testing, anticipated award was delayed from November 2007 to March 2008. Id. Then, the anticipated award date of the new contract was pushed back by two bid protests, one at GAO, and the other one in this court. See supra. The Army reasonably chose to await the outcome of the second protest before resorting to noncompetitive measures, because shipments under the first modification of the old contract continued through June 2008, and during the summer of 2008 supplies appeared to be adequate to fulfill the Army’s needs through [ ]. AR at 27, 29. On August 15, 2008, this court enjoined the Army from proceeding to award the new contract to Aimpoint based on a flawed competitive range determination, and required retesting of EOTech’s bid sample before award of the new contract could be made under the solicitation.
There is nothing in the retesting of EOTech’s bid sample that suggests a lack of advance planning on the Army’s part. It appears to the court that the months following August 2008 have been consumed by retesting procedures, occurring on a reasonable schedule. Some of the delays in that schedule can be attributed to the Army, others to EOTech. The record shows that award of the new contract has been significantly delayed, despite adequate advance planning by the Army, and reserve supplies of the M68 CCOs are running out. The court does not find that the Army violated any statute or regulation in its advance planning for the competitive procurement of additional CCOs, a process which began in February 2007 and which has not yet reached it goal. See Infrastructure Def. Techs., LLC v. United States, 81 Fed. Cl. 375, 398 (2008) (“[I]t is well settled that[] procurement planning ‘need not be entirely error-free or even actually successful. All that is required is that the planning actions be reasonable.’” (citing Cubic Def. Sys., Inc. v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 239, 258 (1999))). Thus, plaintiff’s first ground for invalidating this sole source procurement, lack of advance planning, fails. (L-3 Communications Eotech, Inc., v. U. S. and Aimpoint, Inc., No. 08-871C, Filed February 18, 2009) (pdf)
L-3 Communications Eotech, Inc., v. U. S. and Aimpoint, Inc., No. 08-871C, Filed February 18, 2009 (pdf) Cherokee Nation Technologies, LLC v. U S and Chenega Federal Systems, LLC, No. 14-371C, June 23, 2014 (pdf)