Source: http://kasai2012.hatenablog.com/?page=1484658669
Timestamp: 2017-04-25 08:32:20
Document Index: 570319993

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 28', '§ 14', '§ 14', '§ 14', '§ 14', '§ 14', '§ 14']

Hendrickson v. Hendrickson, 2000 ND 1, 603 N.W.2d 896Filed Jan. 3, 2000
v. Mark Hendrickson, Defendant and AppelleeNo. 990123Appeal from the District Court of Stark County, Southwest Judicial District, the Honorable Ronald L. Hilden, Judge.
William A. Herauf, Reichert & Herauf, P.C., P.O. Box K, Dickinson, N.D. 58602-8305, for defendant and appellee.Hendrickson v. Hendrickson
No. 990123Maring, Justice.[¶1] Diane and Mark Hendrickson's 1995 divorce and subsequent child custody and visitation dispute are the subject of two prior appeals to this court, Hendrickson v. Hendrickson, 553 N.W.2d 215 (N.D. 1996) [Hendrickson I] and Hendrickson v. Hendrickson, 1999 ND 37, 590 N.W.2d 220 [Hendrickson II]. Following this Court's remand in Hendrickson II, the trial court entered an order denying Diane's motion for change of venue, changing custody from Diane to Mark, denying Diane visitation with the children for a period of one year, and requiring Diane to participate in counseling with a therapist of Mark's choosing. Diane now appeals from this order. We affirm in part, reverse in part and remand for modification of the order.I.[¶2] Diane and Mark Hendrickson married in 1980 and purchased a home in Jamestown. Diane lived in Jamestown with their four children. Mark lived and worked in Dickinson, but lived with Diane and the children on weekends, holidays and vacations. The couple divorced in 1995. Diane received custody of the children and Mark was granted visitation. In the original decree, the trial court found the children were attached to their lives in Jamestown and had developed a warmer and more secure relationship with their mother than with their father, due substantially to the long-distance living arrangement. The trial court noted, "Mark and Diane effectively--even if not deliberately or knowingly--jointly decided in advance the issue of custody through the residential arrangements they voluntarily made." The trial court issued a visitation schedule allowing Mark visitation two weekends per month and at Christmas. We affirmed the child custody award in Hendrickson I, concluding that it was not clearly erroneous in light of the family's circumstances. 553 N.W.2d at 218.[¶3] On October 1, 1997, Mark filed a motion for change of custody asserting Diane was alienating the children from him. He filed the motion after disputes arose over visitation, which went unresolved despite the trial court's modification of the visitation order. Several months before Mark's motion of October 1, the trial court appointed Karen Mueller as guardian ad litem and directed her to evaluate the Hendrickson family. According to the report Mueller submitted, Diane believed herself completely blameless in the breakdown of her marriage and the ensuing child custody dispute. She considered herself the children's sole caregiver and asserted she was "unaware of any parenting skills Mark might possess." Diane admitted to Mueller that she hung up on Mark when he called and until he gave her $20,000 she would continue to do so. Mueller also reported on several occasions assistance from police officers was required to complete a visitation exchange; at one exchange, Diane's son-in-law verbally attacked Mueller, and at a second, one of the children obstinately dared her to "try to make me go." Mueller explained Mark's relationship with the children had been tenuous from the beginning because of his absence from the family home, and that Diane's alienating behavior was causing additional, harmful estrangement between Mark and the children. In an order dated December 9, 1997, the trial court awarded custody of the children to Stutsman County and ordered the family into therapy.[¶4] Stutsman County, however, declined to take custody of the Hendrickson children. On February 24, 1998, the trial court issued another order, in which the court stated, "[t]his is the most outrageous case that I have seen since I began law school twenty-five years ago." The court also stated:by deed and innuendo, Diane rewards the children's rejection of their father making this perhaps the worst case of alienation syndrome in the history of the United States . . . . Her statement on the stand that she has "tried and tried" to encourage visitation is patently ridiculous.[¶5] The court expressed a desire to send Diane to jail for her failure to comply with court orders, yet was concerned this would harm the children. Rather, the court ordered Mark's child support payments to be placed in escrow. The order also stated Mark should continue to have reasonable visitation, but did not grant Mark custody because the relationship between the children and their father had been so poisoned.[¶6] We reviewed that order upon Diane's appeal and Mark's cross-appeal in Hendrickson II. 1999 ND 37, 590 N.W.2d 220. We concluded the trial court erroneously ordered the child support to be placed in escrow as a sanction against Diane. Id. at ¶¶ 10-11. We noted as an alternative remedy, the court could find her in contempt and impose a jail sentence. Id. at ¶ 12. As to Mark's assertion the trial court should change custody, we explained "evidence of alienation or persistent frustration can be relevant factors" in a trial court's assessment of whether there has been a significant change of circumstances following an initial custody determination. Id. at ¶ 13. We then stated:we recognize methods other than a change of custody should be used initially to remedy a parent's misbehavior, . . . we also recognize that, after exhausting other remedies, a change in custody may be the only method to correct the damage of a particularly stubborn and defiant custodial parent. If the alternative remedies fail, the district court should consider a change of custody.Id. at ¶ 13.[¶7] Just before the Hendrickson II appeal, Mark filed another motion to change custody on April 9, 1998, with a supporting affidavit by the guardian ad litem, Karen Mueller. Following that motion, Diane demanded a change of judge. The case was then reassigned to Judge Allan Schmalenberger. Following our remand, Judge Schmalenberger informed the parties that if Mark's pending motion for change of custody were withdrawn, he could invalidate the demand for change of judge and reassign the case to Judge Hilden to carry out this Court's directions in Hendrickson II. Mark withdrew the motion, and on April 5, 1999, Judge Schmalenberger reassigned the case to Judge Hilden because "he is in the best position to understand the case and to carry out the directions of the North Dakota Supreme Court."[¶8] On April 26, 1999, Judge Hilden issued an order, first denying Diane's motion for change of venue and then turning to consideration of our remand. In its order, the court found Diane had frustrated visitation between Mark and the children and had attempted to alienate the children from their father. The court concluded there had been a significant change of circumstances following the original child custody determination. The court then stated:This Court has exhausted remedies available to correct Diane Hendrickson's misbehavior. Diane Hendrickson has proven to be a stubborn and defiant custodial parent and the only option yet available is to change custody. Moreover, I find that it is in the best interest of the children that custody be changed and, therefore, I grant immediate custody of the Hendrickson children to their father, Mark Hendrickson.In addition, the trial court ordered that Diane have no visitation for one year after the custody transfer and required her to submit to counseling with a counselor chosen by Mark. Diane appeals from this order.II.[¶9] Diane asserts the trial court abused its discretion when it denied her motion for a change of venue. We disagree. Under N.D.C.C. § 28-04-07(3), a trial court may change the place of trial "[w]hen the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice would be promoted by the change." A motion for change of venue on grounds of convenience of witnesses and furtherance of the ends of justice is addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the court. American State Bank of Dickinson v. Hoffelt, 236 N.W.2d 895, 898 (N.D. 1975). The applicant must produce facts affirmatively establishing a change of venue is warranted. Eckman v. Stutsman County, 1999 ND 151, ¶ 6, 598 N.W.2d 494. The trial court's decision will not be disturbed on appeal unless a clear abuse of discretion is shown. Id. at ¶ 7.[¶10] Diane asserts this case is similar to Whitehead v. Whitehead, in which we declared the denial of a motion for change of venue would be an abuse of discretion when both parties, their child, and all material witnesses lived outside the county where the action was then venued. 336 N.W.2d 363, 365-66 (N.D. 1983). We conclude the procedural posture in the two cases differs substantially. In Whitehead, the motion to change venue preceded determinative evidentiary hearings. Id. at 364. In this case, however, following the remand and reassignment to Judge Hilden, no additional evidentiary hearing was necessary for the trial court to comply with our decision in Hendrickson II. There simply are no witnesses to be inconvenienced by the location of the action. In addition, given the tortuous history of this case and the parties' continued conflict over their children, we believe the ends of justice will be best served by an expeditious resolution of this action. On the facts of this case, we determine continuing the current venue will serve that end. Thus, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Diane's motion for change of venue.III.[¶11] Diane contends the trial court's decision to change custody was clearly erroneous and should be reversed. We analyze this issue under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.6, which imposes limitations on post-judgment custody modifications. We conclude the trial court's order was supported by the evidence. We determine, however, the order should be modified to allow Diane supervised visitation.A.[¶12] Diane submits the trial court erroneously used a change of child custody as a contempt sanction. Further, Diane asserts Mark's withdrawal of the April 9, 1998, motion for change of custody left no such request pending, so that the trial court was without power to change custody. Diane also contends, even if such a motion was properly before the court, it could not order the change without first holding an evidentiary hearing. Diane misunderstands the trial court's order and the procedural stance of the action following our remand.[¶13] We first address Diane's contempt argument. The trial court's April 26, 1999, order does not find Diane in contempt. The order contains no indication the trial court used a change of custody as a contempt sanction.[¶14] Second, the withdrawal of Mark's April 9, 1998, motion for change of custody did not divest the trial court of jurisdiction to consider the custody issue on remand from this Court. The appeal in Hendrickson II included a cross-appeal by Mark asserting the court should have granted his motion for change of custody. Our remand encompassed that issue and allowed the trial court to reexamine its decision on child custody. When the case returned to the trial court on remand, the issue was properly before the court.[¶15] Third, the order appealed from in Hendrickson II was preceded by a full evidentiary hearing and submission of a guardian ad litem's report. Our decision in Hendrickson II clearly contemplated custody might be changed upon remand. 1999 ND 37, ¶ 13, 590 N.W.2d 220. On this record, no additional evidentiary hearing was required under the statute. N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.6(4).B.[¶16] Diane next argues the change of custody to Mark was clearly erroneous because it was unsupported by the evidence. We disagree. When a trial court entertains a motion to change custody of children of divorced spouses, the judge must determine two issues: whether or not there has been a significant change in circumstances since the original divorce decree and custody award and, if so, whether or not those changed circumstances compel or require a change in custody to foster the best interests of the child. Mosbrucker v. Mosbrucker, 1997 ND 72, ¶ 6, 562 N.W.2d 390. See also N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.6(6); Holtz v. Holtz, 1999 ND 105, ¶ 10, 595 N.W.2d 1 (statutory standard "essentially tracks the two-step approach previously used by this Court for deciding a change of custody case"). The party seeking modification bears the burden of showing a change of custody is required. Mosbrucker, at ¶ 6. A trial court's decision to modify custody is a finding of fact subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review. Id. at ¶ 5. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is induced by an erroneous view of the law, if there is no evidence to support it, or if it is clear to the reviewing court that a mistake has been made. Id.[¶17] In the order of April 26, 1999, the trial court expressly concluded both elements required for a change of custody existed: the circumstances significantly changed after the original child custody award and the changed circumstances required a change in custody in the best interests of the children. Supporting these conclusions were the trial court's findings that Diane frustrated both the original and subsequent visitation orders and attempted to alienate the children from their father. Specifically, the court noted Diane's removal of the children from the home at scheduled visitation times, her refusal to allow Mark to take the children for visitation, and her refusal to make visitation arrangements. Testimony from the record supports these findings, as does the guardian ad litem's report, which states Diane's alienating behavior was "indicative of an unhealthy parental figure." Further, the court noted Diane had numerous opportunities to change her behavior and failed to do so.[¶18] In Blotske v. Leidholm, we stated "frustration of visitation does not alone constitute a sufficient change in circumstances to warrant a change in custody," and a court should first resort to a more rigid visitation schedule, rather than change custody. 487 N.W.2d 607, 610 (N.D. 1992). However, we also explained visitation problems may justify a change in custody when a court finds such problems have worked against a child's best interests. Id. In addition, in Hendrickson II, we stated that, though other methods should be used initially to remedy misbehavior by a parent, "after exhausting other remedies, a change in custody may be the only method to correct the damage of a particularly stubborn and defiant custodial parent." 1999 ND 37, ¶ 13, 590 N.W.2d 220. Finally, we note the Legislature has expressly recognized frustration of visitation may require a change of custody. Under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.6(5), a trial court may not change custody within two years after the date of entry of a custody order. This time limit does not apply, however, if the trial court finds both that a modification is necessary to serve the best interest of the child and also that there has been a "persistent and willful denial or interference with visitation." N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.6(5)(a). The next subsection allows the trial court to modify custody before the two year period expires upon a finding that a change is necessary for the child's best interest and that the child's environment "may endanger the child's physical or emotional health or impair the child's emotional development." N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.6(5)(b). Thus the legislature considers persistent frustration of visitation and the emotional and physical endangerment of children to be in the same behavioral class and accords the same remedy.[¶19] While the trial court did not expressly find Diane's persistent frustration of visitation worked against the best interests of her children, we can discern the rationale for the court's conclusion from inference and deduction, so we need not remand for the court to clarify its finding. Holtz, 1999 ND 105, ¶ 18, 595 N.W.2d 1. The trial court's findings make it clear the children were deprived of contact with their father by Diane's withholding visitation rights. The right of the children to visitation is presumed to be in their best interests. Blotske, 487 N.W.2d at 610. Thus withholding contact with a loving parent works against the best interests of the children. The record enables us to clearly understand the trial court's basis for its conclusion of law. We conclude the trial court's decision to change custody to Mark after trying other remedies was not clearly erroneous.[¶20] In her reply brief, Diane asserts the trial court erred because it did not allow her to cross-examine the guardian ad litem regarding her report. We do not address issues raised for the first time in a reply brief because, under Rule 28(c), N.D.R.App.P., a reply brief must be confined to new matter raised in the appellee's brief.(1) Freidt v. Moseanko, 484 N.W.2d 861, 863 (N.D. 1992).C.[¶21] Though we conclude the change of custody was proper and we sympathize with the trial court's frustration, we do not believe Diane should be deprived of all visitation for one year. We have stated visitation between a non-custodial parent and a child is presumed to be in the child's best interests and that it is not merely a privilege of the non-custodial parent, but a right of the child. Blotske, 487 N.W.2d at 610. Thus, a court should only withhold visitation when it is "likely to endanger the child's physical or emotional health." Id. We explained this to the Hendricksons in Hendrickson II, speaking to the need for visitation between Mark and the children. 1999 ND 37, ¶ 7, 590 N.W.2d 220. We are no less committed to those principles now that the tables have turned. Denying a non-custodial parent visitation with a child is "an onerous restriction," such that "physical or emotional harm resulting from the visitation must be demonstrated in detail" before it is imposed. Johnson v. Schlotman, 502 N.W.2d 831, 835 (N.D. 1993). We believe continuing, supervised contact with Diane should be attempted before she is denied all visitation. At oral argument, Mark agreed supervised visitation would be an acceptable outcome. We, therefore, reverse that part of the trial court's order denying Diane visitation for one year and remand for modification to allow supervised visitation.IV.[¶22] Diane next asserts the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered her to see a counselor of Mark's choosing. A trial court abuses its discretion only when it acts in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable manner, or when its decision is not the product of a rational mental process leading to a reasoned determination. Krizan v. Krizan, 1998 ND 186, ¶ 13, 585 N.W.2d 576. We conclude the trial court's order was an abuse of discretion, because it left the choice of the counselor up to Mark.[¶23] In Johnson, we reviewed a trial court order requiring the parties' children to receive counseling to deal with problems arising from visitation. 502 N.W.2d at 835-36. There, the trial judge considered psychological treatment necessary for the children's welfare. Id. at 836. By approving of this order, we confirmed the trial court's authority to order a child to receive counseling if it is in a child's best interests. We determine the trial court may order counseling for a child's parent as well if it is in the child's best interests. This is especially important in the context of parental alienation because an alienating parent's unhealthy behavior, left untreated, may continue to impede a child's development of an emotional attachment to the other parent.[¶24] In this case, we conclude the trial court correctly determined Diane's behavior merited counseling. We also agree Diane's continual defiance of court orders suggests she should not be allowed to choose her own counselor, for fear she will frustrate the court's goals. We do not agree, however, the situation will be best served by allowing Diane's ex-husband to choose her counselor. We, therefore, direct the trial court to obtain from both parties a list of qualified counselors. The trial court should then choose Diane's counselor from among those named.V.[¶25] This Court recognizes the difficulty divorced spouses encounter when trying to resolve post-marital disputes regarding their children. We wish to emphasize, however, divorced parents may not use their children as pawns in their battles. Children benefit from healthy relationships with both parents; divorced parents must seek to facilitate such bonds. When a custodial parent deprives a child of the right to have contact with the non-custodial parent, the custodial parent may lose custody. We, therefore, affirm the trial court's order changing custody to Mark and denying Diane's motion for a change of venue. We reverse and remand for a modification of the order to allow Diane supervised visitation and for the trial court to choose Diane's counselor.[¶26] Mary Muehlen Maring
Gerald W. VandeWalle, C.J.[¶27] William W. McLees, D.J., sitting in place of Kapsner, J., disqualified.Footnote:1. We recently considered a party's right to cross-examine an investigator in an evidentiary hearing on a motion to change custody. Quarne v. Quarne 1999 ND 188, 601 N.W.2d 256. In Quarne, we held it was reversible error for a trial court, when making a custody decision, to rely on facts in an investigator's report without allowing the party to call and cross-examine the investigator. Id. at ¶ 6. Our refusal to consider the issue for procedural reasons in this case does not undermine our commitment to that holding.
2016年12月20日 子の引き渡し　連れ去りを生まぬようhttp://www.chunichi.co.jp/article/living/life/CK2016120702000005.html
2016年12月7日＜子どもに会いたい　別居後の面会交流＞（上）　妻拒絶でかなわぬ望みhttp://www.chunichi.co.jp/article/living/life/CK2016120802000001.html
2016年12月8日＜子どもに会いたい　別居後の面会交流＞（中）　不安抑えて「娘のため」http://www.chunichi.co.jp/article/living/life/CK2016120902000002.html
2016年12月9日＜子どもに会いたい　別居後の面会交流＞（下）　親の愛情を確認する機会こういうまともな記事が出るとうれしい。
この人たちには子どもを連れ去られて苦しんでいる親の存在が見えていないんだろうか。親子断絶防止法成立を訴えている人たちはDV被害者の存在をちゃんと認めてDV被害者に対する配慮をしているのに、親子断絶防止法に反対している人たちは子どもを連れ去られて苦しんでいる親を全てDV加害者扱いして侮蔑し罵倒を浴びせてくる。元妻に拒絶され、
社会からも拒絶される。自分が死ねば、遺産は全て子どものものになって同居親の自由になる。
自分が死ねば、母も長くはないと思う。自分と自分の母が死ねば、子どもの父方親族は消滅する。
元妻も子どもも家裁も社会も、誰一人自分が生きていることを望んでいない。皆、自分が死ねば笑いをこらえながら悔やみの言葉を述べるのだろう。それともギリギリまで養育費を搾り取って、もう絞り取れなくなってから死んで欲しいと思ってるのかな。でも、
大塚玲子 | ライター、編集者、ジャーナリスト 12/10(土) 10:31 http://bylines.news.yahoo.co.jp/otsukareiko/20161210-00065334/
大塚玲子 | ライター、編集者、ジャーナリスト 12/13(火) 6:30
大塚玲子 | ライター、編集者、ジャーナリスト 11/22(火) 15:00 http://bylines.news.yahoo.co.jp/otsukareiko/20161122-00064709/
大塚玲子 | ライター、編集者、ジャーナリスト 11/24(木) 15:30 http://bylines.news.yahoo.co.jp/otsukareiko/20161124-00064780/
大塚玲子 | ライター、編集者、ジャーナリスト 11/26(土) 7:00 http://bylines.news.yahoo.co.jp/otsukareiko/20161126-00064786/
認容・成立件数
認容・成立率
1383 70 1313 51.2% H14(2002)
1703 113 1590 53.5% H15(2003)
2025 150 1875 52.0% H16(2004)
2364 196 2168 53.5% H17(2005)
2604 239 2365 55.2% H18(2006)
2798 283 2515 53.8% H19(2007)
3180 316 2864 56.9% H20(2008)
3475 319 3156 57.7% H21(2009)
3786 412 3374 59.6% H22(2010)
4321 432 3889 61.7% H23(2011)
5133 565 4568 64.4% H24(2012)
5742 618 5124 65.0% 養育費・扶養料
H13(2001) 13141
8878 408 8470 67.6%
H14(2002) 14251
9632 486 9146 67.6%
H15(2003) 16953
11745 885 10860 69.3%
H16(2004) 16861
11879 1211 10668 70.5%
H17(2005) 15628
11367 1273 10094 72.7%
H18(2006) 15372
11136 1259 9877 72.4%
H19(2007) 14837
11090 1321 9769 74.7%
H20(2008) 15501
11687 1405 10282 75.4%
H21(2009) 17845
13534 1791 11743 75.8%
H22(2010) 18438
14111 1829 12282 76.5%
H23(2011) 17898
13870 2100 11770 77.5%
H24(2012) 18482
14417 2140 12277 78.0%
そもそも千田氏は「父母の離婚等の後における子と父母との継続的な関係の維持等に関する法律案」をちゃんと読んだのだろうか？ - 誰かの妄想・はてな版さんから拝借。
（目的）第一条　この法律は、父母の離婚等（未成年の子（以下単に「子」という。）を有する父母が離婚をすること又は子を有する父母が婚姻中に別居し、父母の一方が当該子を監護することができなくなることをいう。以下同じ。）の後においても子が父母と親子としての継続的な関係（以下単に「継続的な関係」という。）を持ち、その愛情を受けることが、子の健全な成長及び人格の形成のために重要であることに鑑み、父母の離婚等の後における子と父母との継続的な関係の維持等に関し、基本理念及びその実現を図るために必要な事項を定めること等により、父母の離婚等の後における子と父母との継続的な関係の維持等の促進を図り、もって子の利益に資することを目的とする。（基本理念）第二条　父母の離婚等の後においても子が父母と継続的な関係を持つことについては、児童の権利に関する条約第九条第三項の規定を踏まえ、それが原則として子の最善の利益に資するものであるとともに、父母がその実現についての責任を有するという基本的認識の下に、その実現が図られなければならない。（国及び地方公共団体の責務）第三条　国は、前条の基本理念（以下「基本理念」という。）にのっとり、父母の離婚等の後における子と父母との継続的な関係の維持等の促進に関する施策を策定し、及び実施する責務を有する。２　地方公共団体は、基本理念にのっとり、父母の離婚等の後における子と父母との継続的な関係の維持等の促進に関し、国との連携を図りつつ、その地域の状況に応じた施策を策定し、及び実施する責務を有する。（関係者相互の連携及び協力）第四条　国、地方公共団体、民間の団体その他の関係者は、基本理念の実現を図るため、相互に連携を図りながら協力するよう努めなければならない。（法制上の措置等）第五条　政府は、この法律の目的を達成するため、必要な法制上又は財政上の措置その他の措置を講ずるものとする。（離婚後の面会及びその他の交流等に関する取決め）第六条　子を有する父母は、離婚をするときは、基本理念にのっとり、子の利益を最も優先して考慮し、離婚後の父又は母と子との面会及びその他の交流並びに子の監護に要する費用の分担に関する書面による取決めを行うよう努めなければならない。２　国は、子を有する父母が早期かつ円滑に前項の取決めを行うことができるよう必要な支援を行うとともに、子を有する父母であって離婚しようとするものに対し、父母の離婚後においても子が父母と継続的な関係を持つことの重要性及び離婚した父母が子のために果たすべき役割に関する情報の提供を行うものする*2。３　地方公共団体は、子を有する父母が早期かつ円滑に第一項の取決めを行うことができるよう必要な支援を行うとともに、子を有する父母であって離婚しようとするものに対し、前項の情報の提供を行うよう努めなければならない。（面会及びその他の交流の定期的な実施等）第七条　父母の離婚等の後に子を監護する父又は母は、基本理念にのっとり、当該子を監護していない父又は母と当該子との面会及びその他の交流が子の最善の利益を考慮して定期的に行われ、親子としての緊密な関係が維持されることとなるようにするものとする。２　父母の離婚等の後に子を監護する父又は母は、当該子を監護していない父又は母と当該子との面会及びその他の交流が行われていないときは、基本理念にのっとり、当該面会及びその他の交流ができる限り早期に実現されるよう努めなければならない。３　国は、前二項の面会及びその他の交流の実施等に関し、子を有する父母に対し、その相談に応じ、必要な情報の提供、助言その他の援助を行うものとする。４　地方公共団体は、第一項及び第二項の面会及びその他の交流の実施等に関し、子を有する父母に対し、その相談に応じ、必要な情報の提供、助言その他の援助を行うよう努めなければならない。（子を有する父母に対する啓発活動等）第八条　国は、子を有する父母が婚姻中に子の監護をすべき者その他の子を監護について必要な事項に関する取決めを行うことなく別居することによって、子と父母の一方との継続的な関係を維持することができなくなるような事態が生じないよう、又は当該事態が早期に解消されるよう、子を有する父母に対し、必要な啓発活動を行うとともに、その相談に応じ、必要な情報の提供、助言その他の援助を行うものとする。２　地方公共団体は、前項の自体が生じないよう、又は当該事態が早期に解消されるよう、子を有する父母に対し、必要な啓発活動を行うとともに、その相談に応じ、必要な情報の提供、助言その他の援助を行うよう努めなければならない。（特別の配慮）第九条　前三条の規定の適用に当たっては、児童に対する虐待、配偶者に対する暴力その他の父又は母と子との面会及びその他の交流の実施により子の最前の利益に反するおそれを生じさせる事情がある場合には、子の最前の利益に反することとならないよう特別の配慮がなされなければならない。（人材の育成）第十条　国及び地方公共団体は、父母の離婚等の後における子と父母との継続的な関係の維持等の促進に寄与する人材の確保及び資質の向上のため、必要な研修その他の措置を講ずるよう努めなければならない。（調査研究の推進等）第十一条　国及び地方公共団体は、父又は母と子との面会及びその他の交流の実施状況等に関する調査及び研究を推進するとともに、その結果を踏まえて、父母の離婚等の後における子と父母との継続的な関係の維持等の促進に関する施策の在り方について検討するよう努めなければならない。（国の地方公共団体に対する援助）第十二条　国は、地方公共団体が行う父母の離婚等の後における子と父母との継続的な関係の維持等の促進に関する施策に関し、必要な助言、指導その他の援助をすることができる。附則（施行期日）第一条　この法律は、公布の日から施行する。ただし、第六条から第九条までの規定及び次条第二項の規定は、公布の日から起算して一年を超えない範囲内において政令で定める日から施行する。（検討）第二条　政府は、父母の離婚後においても父母が親権を共同して行うことができる制度の導入、父母の離婚等に伴う子の居所の指定の在り方並びに子と祖父母その他の親族との面会及びその他の交流の在り方について、速やかに検討を加え、必要があると認めるときは、その結果に基づいて所要の措置を講ずるものとする。２　政府は、前条ただし書に規定する規定の施行後二年を目途として、父又は母と子との面会及びその他の交流の実施状況、第八条の啓発活動の効果等を勘案し、父又は母と子との充実した面会及びその他の交流を実現するための制度及び体制の在り方について検討を加え、必要があると認めるときは、その結果に基づいて所要の措置を講ずるものとする。
連れ去られ当事者からすればこれでもかなりぬるい法律だけど、これすら離婚弁護士連中は全否定するってあり得ないよ。
離婚によって別々に暮らす父親と子どもが定期的に会う「面会交流」を認めるのを前提に母親が親権者となったのに、母親の言動が原因で子どもが面会に応じていないとして、福岡家裁が家事審判で親権者変更を求めた父親側の申し立てを認めたことが１７日、分かった。「母親を親権者とした前提が崩れている。母親の態度の変化を促し、円滑な面会交流の再開にこぎつけることが子の福祉にかなう」と判断した。４日付。
父親側の代理人を務めた清源（きよもと）万里子弁護士（中津市）は「面会交流の意義を重視した画期的な判断」と評価。虐待が判明するなどしなければ、母親が持つ親権が父親に移ることはほぼなく、面会交流を理由に親権者変更を認めたのは全国の家裁でも極めて珍しいという。
発端は関東に住んでいた３０代夫婦の離婚調停。双方が長男（現在は小学生）の親権を望んだ。母親は協議中に長男を連れて福岡県へ転居。最終的には、離れて暮らす父親と長男の面会交流を月１回実施するのを前提に、母親を親権者とすることで２０１１年７月に合意した。
もともと父親と長男の関係は良好だったが、面会交流は長男が拒否する態度をみせうまくいかなかった。父親側は「母親が拒絶するよう仕向けている」と１２年９月に親権者変更などを福岡家裁に申し立てていた。
家裁は家裁内のプレイルームで「試行的面会交流」を２回実施。長男は１回目は父親と２人で遊べたが、２回目は拒否。家裁は、長男が「（マジックミラーで）ママ見てたよ」といった母親の言動を受け、１回目の交流に強い罪悪感を抱き、母親に対する忠誠心を示すために父親に対する拒否感を強めたと推認するのが合理的と指摘。面会を実施できない主な原因は母親にあるとした。
その上で、家裁は親権を父親、監護権を母親へ分けるべきだと判断。「双方が長男の養育のために協力すべき枠組みを設定することが有益。子を葛藤状態から解放する必要がある」とも指摘した。 https://www.oita-press.co.jp/1010000000/2014/12/18/235615591
「面会交流は長男が拒否する態度をみせうまくいかなかった」「面会を実施できない主な原因は母親にあるとした」というのは、片親疎外そのもののケースに思える。
「母親に対する忠誠心を示すために父親に対する拒否感を強めたと推認するのが合理的」というのは、家裁が片親疎外について認めたということだろう。
まともな裁判官もいるんだな。
試行面会が2回も認められることさえ珍しい。