Source: https://ilt.eff.org/Defamation__CDA_Cases.html
Timestamp: 2018-12-17 15:41:51
Document Index: 702278115

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 230', '§ 230', '§ 230', '§ 1125', '§ 230', '§ 230', '§ 230', '§ 230', '§ 230', '§ 230']

Courts across the country have upheld Section 230 immunity and its policy of regulatory forbearance in a variety of factual contexts.
Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003) (website operator immune for distributing email sent to listserv)
Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003) (Internet dating service provider was entitled to Section 230 immunity from liability stemming from third party’s submission of false profile);
Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 99 Cal. App. 4th 816 (2002) (eBay is entitled to immunity);
Kathleen R. v. City of Livermore, 87 Cal. App. 4th 684 (2001) (library not liable for providing access);
Universal Commc'ns Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413 (1st Cir. 2007) (message board not liable for users' messages);
Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc., 31 P.3d 37, 39 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (online bookseller providing forum for others to submit book reviews is “interactive computer service” provider (“ICS provider”));
Doe v. America Online, 783 So.2d 1010, 1013-1017 (Fl. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 208 (2000) (§ 230 immunizes America Online (“AOL”) for negligence);
Ben Ezra, Weinstein & Co. v. America Online, 206 F.3d 980, 984-985 (10th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 824 (2000) (no liability for posting of incorrect stock information);
Marczeski v. Law, 122 F.Supp.2d 315, 327 (D. Conn. 2000) (individual who created private “chat room” was ICS provider entitled to immunity);
Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 49-53 (D.D.C. 1998) (AOL has Section 230 immunity from liability for content of independent contractor’s news reports, despite agreement with contractor allowing AOL to modify or remove such content).
The dividing line in determining whether an entity is an "internet service provider" or an "internet content provider" hinges on editorial publisher function and when something is a statement being made by the information content provider. An emerging trend, though, has been noted in some recent 230 cases where courts have begun to develop an inducement model. In these cases, facilitating or inducing illegal behavior seems to be troubling for claiming 230 immunity.
In Fair Housing v. Roommates.com, 489 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2007), [hereinafter Roommates], in which the 9th Circuit held that the housing locator site, Roommates.com, was not immune under Section 230. Roommates was not a passive publisher of the content; rather, the site had developed questionnaires to elicit potentially discriminatory information from users. Although the court found that Roommates.com was immune in regard to open-ended questions that suggested no particular information to be provided by members, the court found that its search mechanism and e-mail notifications meant that it was neither a passive pass-through of information provided by others nor merely a facilitator of expression. "By categorizing, channeling and limiting the distribution of users' profiles, Roommates provides an additional layer of information that it is 'responsible' at least 'in part' for creating or developing." Id. at 17. The court therefore held that the site was an information content provider and not immune under the publisher provisions of the CDA.
Concurring in Roommates, Judge Ikuta disagreed with the majority's narrow interpretation of a content provider, writing, "Unless a website operator directly provides 'the essential published content,'... it is not an 'information content provider.'" Id. at 26. Judge Reinhardt argued in dissent that no immunity should attach at all because the user profiles had to be conceived as a whole, over which Roommates.com was exercising editorial control, and that therefore no part of the site deserved immunity.
The Ninth Circuit revised the Roommates decision en banc. Fair Housing v. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008). The Court clarified that "providing neutral tools to carry out what may be unlawful or illicit searches does not amount to 'development' for purposes of the immunity exception." Id. at 1169. Likewise, a "website operator who edits user-created content-such as by correcting spelling, removing obscenity or trimming for length-retains his immunity for any illegality in the user-created content, provided that the edits are unrelated to the illegality." Id.
Similarly, in NPS LLC v. StubHub, Inc., 25 Mass.L.Rptr. 478, 2009 WL 995483 (Mass. Super. Ct. Jan. 26, 2009), the court found StubHub to be an “information content provider” if it could be shown that they encouraged their users to violate ticket scalping laws. The court held that, “there is evidence in the record that StubHub materially contributed to the illegal ‘ticket scalping’ of its sellers. In effect the same evidence that is sufficient, if proven, to establish improper means is also sufficient to place StubHub outside the immunity provided by the CDA.” Id. at *14.
The Tenth Circuit, noting that the meaning of “development” is more than simply creation, broadens the definition of “information content provider” in F.T.C. v. Accusearch Inc., 570 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2009), and finds Accusearch responsible for the development of content as a result of their converting legally protected records from confidential material to publicly exposed information. In doing so, the court found “that a service provider is 'responsible' for the development of offensive content only if it in some way specifically encourages development of what is offensive about the content." Id. at 1199. The Court distinguished Ben Ezra, Weinstein & Co. v. America Online, 206 F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 2000), which held AOL not responsible for inaccurate stock information, because, although AOL solicited the stock information, "America Online had done nothing to encourage what made the content offensive." Id. at 1199-1200.
Alternatively, the Seventh Circuit in Chicago Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2008) [hereinafter Craigslist], mirrored part of the decision in Roommates, where the court found craigslist not responsible for the open-ended “Additional Comments” form on their website. Like Roommates, where the court found Defendant did not prompt or solicit any of the questionable material submitted by its users, the court in Craigslist also held that, “[n]othing] in the service craigslist offers induces anyone to post any particular listing or express a preference for discrimination; for example, craigslist does not offer a lower price to people who include discriminatory statements in their postings.” Id. at 671-672. From this, it appears that the point at which an "internet service provider” becomes an “internet content provider” is when the provider takes an active role in inducing their users to engage in illegal activity.
In Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250 (4th Cir. 2009), the Fourth Circuit distinguished Roommates, and found that the "structure and design of the website" was not sufficiently contributing to the content to transform Consumeraffairs.com into an information content provider.
"Nothing in [Section 230] shall be construed to limit or expand any law pertaining to intellectual property." Section 230(e)(2). No legislative history exists regarding subsection (e)(2).
This provision has led courts to hold that Section 230 immunity is not available for federal intellectual property claims. See Gucci Am., Inc. v. Hall & Assocs., 135 F. Supp. 2d 409, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that to immunize defendant from trademark claims would limit laws pertaining to intellectual property); Ford Motor Co. v. GreatDomains.com, Inc., No. 00-CV-71544-DT, 2001 WL 1176319, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 25, 2001) (holding that if defendant violated federal trademark laws Section 230 would not provide immunity); Parker v. Google, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 492, 502 n.8 (E.D. Pa. 2006) ("Google argues that it is immune from Lanham Act claims because of its § 230 immunity under the CDA. We agree with those courts that have rejected this argument based on § 230(c)(2)'s exception for intellectual property laws."); cf. Associated Bank-Corp. v. Earthlink, Inc., 2005 WL 2240952 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 13, 2005) (dismissing Lanham Act claim ("15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), Injury to Business Reputation") under Section 230).
Carafano, 339 F.3d 1119 (online matchmaking service is an ICS);
PatentWizard, Inc. v. Kinko’s, Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1071 (D.S.D. 2001) (photocopy shop not contested as ICS provider under § 230);
Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc., 31 P.3d 37, 39 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (online bookseller providing forum for others to submit book reviews is “interactive computer service” provider); Corbis v. Amazon.com, 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1118 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (same);
Gentry, 99 Cal. App. 4th at 931 n.7 (eBay an ICS);
Kathleen R., 87 Cal. App. 4th at 692-693 (public library protected by § 230);
Marczeski v. Law, 122 F. Supp. 2d 315, 327 (D. Conn. 2000) (organizer of chat room for discussion of dispute about plaintiff held to be ICS provider);
Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1031 (website and listserv operator held to be ICS provider and user);
Smith v. Intercosmos Media Group, Inc., 2002 WL 31844907 (E.D. La. 2002) (domain name registrar is an ICS provider).
D’Alonzo v. Truscello, No. 0274, 2006 Phila. Ct. Comm. Pl. LEXIS 244 (Phila. Ct. Comm. Pl. May 31, 2006), 2006 WL 1768091 (Pa. Com. Pl. 2006) (website was "interactive computer service," and not "internet content provider," within meaning section 230 immunity provision. )
Delfino v. Agilent Technologies, Inc., 52 Cal. Rptr. 3d 376, 145 Cal. App. 4th 790 (Cal. App. Ct. 2006) (employer that provided its employees with Internet access through employer's internal computer system was “provider or user of an interactive computer service” within meaning of section 230 immunity provision).
Application to Users of Interactive Computer Services
Zeran v. America Online, 129 F.3d 327, 330-31 (4th Cir. 1997) (in enacting § 230, Congress sought "to encourage service providers to self-regulate the dissemination of offensive material over their services" and to remove disincentives to self-regulation); see also Blumenthal v. Drudge, 922 F. Supp. 44, 52 (D.D.C. 1998) (§ 230 forbids the imposition of publisher liability on a service provider for the exercise of its editorial and self- regulatory functions); 141 Cong. Rec. H8460-01, H8470 (1995) (statement of Rep. Barton) (Congress enacted § 230 to give interactive service providers "a reasonable way to . . . help them self-regulate themselves without penalty of law").
As noted by the Ninth Circuit, a central purpose of Congress in enacting Section 230 “was to protect from liability service providers and users who take some affirmative steps to edit the material….” Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1031. Accordingly, Section 230 “precludes liability for exercising the usual prerogative of publishers … to edit the material published….” Id. "The exclusion of 'publisher' liability necessarily precludes liability for exercising the usual prerogative of publishers to choose among proffered material and to edit the material published while retaining its basic form and message." Id.
Numerous courts have agreed. See Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003) ("So long as a third party willingly provides the essential published content, the interactive service provider receives full immunity [under Section 230] regardless of the specific editing or selection process."); Ben Ezra, 206 F.3d at 985-986 (deleting of information did not transform ICS provider into “information content provider”); Schneider, 31 P.3d at 39-43 (website not liable despite right to edit posted matter); D'Alonzo v. Truscello, 2006 WL 176809, 2006 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS 244 (Phila. Ct. Common Pleas May 31, 2006) (not liable where ICS affirmatively gets content elsewhere);
Thus, minor alterations and categorizations do not remove the immunity. In Ramey v. Darkside Producs., Inc. 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10107, *19-20 (D.D.C. 2004) the Court followed Batzel and Carafano, and held that defendant's "minor alterations of that advertisement (printing its website address on every advertisement that it publishes on its website, placing a watermark on the photos used, and categorizing the advertisements by subject matter) do not constitute "creation or development" of the advertisement within the definition of "information content provider." To the contrary, "because Defendant did no more than select and make minor alterations to Crittenden's advertisement, it cannot, as a matter of law, be considered the content provider of the advertisement for purposes of § 230." Id., cf. MCW, Inc. v. badbusinessbureau.com, LLC, No. 3:02-CV-2727-G, 2004 WL 833595 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 19, 2004) (no immunity where allegation that defendant Rip-Off Report created "disparaging titles, headings, and editorial messages," and that editorial contributions contributed to and shaped content, holding that "actively encouraging and instructing a consumer to gather specific detailed information is an activity that goes substantially beyond the traditional publisher's editorial role."); Hy Cite Corp. v. badbusinessbureau.com, LLC, 418 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1148-49 (D. Ariz. 2005) (no immunity when plaintiff alleged "that wrongful content appears on the Rip-off Report website in editorial comments created by Defendants and titles to Rip-off Reports, which Defendants allegedly provide."); Whitney Information Network v. Xcentric Ventures, 199 Fed. Appx. 738 (11th Cir. Aug 1, 2006) (bare declaration on non-authorship insufficient to get 230 defense on summary judgment).
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