Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/97764/hill-vs-florida
Timestamp: 2017-12-15 22:00:23
Document Index: 253614798

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 6', '§ 4', '§ 6', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 14', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 9', '§ 8', '§ 10']

Hill Vs Florida - Citation 97764 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Hill Vs. Florida - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/97764
Case Number 325 U.S. 538
hill v. florida - 325 u.s. 538 (1945) u.s. supreme court hill v. florida, 325 u.s. 538 (1945) hill v. florida no. 11 argued april 4, 5, 1945 decided june 11, 1945 325 u.s. 538 certiorari to the supreme court of florida syllabus 1. section 4 of a statute of florida (laws of 1943, c. 21968) provides that no person shall be licensed as a "business agent" of a labor union who has not been a citizen of the united states for more than 10 years, who has been convicted of a felony, or who is not a person of good moral character. section 6 requires every labor union operating in the state to file an annual report disclosing its name, the location of its principal offices, and the names and addresses of its officers, and to pay an.....
Hill v. Florida - 325 U.S. 538 (1945)
U.S. Supreme Court Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945)
Held: that §§ 4 and 6 of the Florida statute, as so applied, are invalid as in conflict with the National Labor Relations Act. P. 325 U. S. 541 .
2. As here applied, § 4 of the Florida statute circumscribes the "full freedom" of choice of collective bargaining agents which is secured to employees by the National Labor Relations Act. P. 325 U. S. 541 .
3. The requirement of reports and the exaction of a $1.00 annual fee in § 6 does not, in and of itself, conflict with the National Labor Relations Act; it is the sanction here imposed -- injunction against the labor union functioning as such -- which is inconsistent with the federally protected process of collective bargaining. P. 325 U. S. 543 .
Certiorari, 324 U.S. 832, to review the affirmance of a decree granting injunctions against a labor union and its business agent until they shall have complied with the requirements of a state statute the validity of which they challenged.
The only question we find it necessary to decide in this case is whether a Florida statute [ Footnote 1 ] regulating labor union activities has been applied to these petitioners in a manner which brings it into irreconcilable conflict with the collective bargaining regulations of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449. That Federal Act, we decided in Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Board, 315 U. S. 740 , did not wholly foreclose state power to regulate labor union activities. Certain conduct, such as mass picketing, threats, violence, and related actions, we held were not governed by the Wagner Act, and, hence, Wisconsin was free to regulate them. We carefully pointed out, however, that, had the state order under consideration, "affected the status of the employees, or . . . caused a forfeiture of collective bargaining rights, a distinctly different question would arise." That question, which we so distinctly reserved in the Wisconsin case, has now arisen in this case.
The Attorney General of Florida filed a bill for injunction against the petitioner union and its business agent, Hill, in a state court. He sought to restrain both of them
from functioning as such until they had complied with the Florida statute. The basis for the relief sought against Hill was that he had, for a pecuniary reward, acted as a business agent in violation of § 4; the basis for the relief sought against the union was that it had operated without obtaining a state license, as required by § 6. § 4, which was invoked against Hill, provides that no on shall be licensed as a "business agent" of a labor union who has not been a citizen of the United States for more than 10 years, who has been convicted of a felony, or who is not a person of good moral character. Application for a license as a "business agent" must be accompanied by a $1.00 fee and a statement signed by officers of the union setting forth the agent's authority. The statute then provides that the application be held for 30 days to permit the filing of objections to the issuance of a license. A Board composed of the Governor, the Secretary of State, and the Superintendent of Education then passes on the application, and, if it finds the applicant measures up to the standards of the act, as it sees them, it authorizes the license to be issued, to "expire on December 31 of the year for which issued, unless sooner surrendered, suspended, or revoked." Section 2(2) defines "business agent" as "any person . . . who shall, for a pecuniary or financial consideration, act or attempt to act" for a union "in soliciting or receiving from any employer any right or privilege for employees . . . " or "in the issuance of membership, or authorization cards, work permits, or any other evidence of rights granted or claimed in, or by, a labor organization. . . ." Section 6, which the Attorney General invoked against the union, requires every labor union "operating" in the state to file a written report with the Secretary of State, disclosing its name, the location of its offices, and the names and addresses of its officers. Section 14 makes it a misdemeanor for "any person or labor organization" to violate the statute.
Section 4 of the Florida act circumscribes the "full freedom" of choice which Congress said employees should possess. It does this by requiring a "business agent" to prove to the satisfaction of a Florida Board that he measures up to standards set by the Florida as one who, among other things, performs the exact function of a collective bargaining representative. To the extent that § 4 limits a union's choice of such an "agent" or bargaining representative, it substitutes Florida's judgment for the workers' judgment.
Thus, the "full freedom" of employees in collective bargaining which Congress envisioned as essential to protect the free flow of commerce among the states would be, by the Florida statute, shrunk to a greatly limited freedom. No elaboration seems required to demonstrate that Section 4, as applied here, "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52 , 312 U. S. 67 ; Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U. S. 148 ; Napier v. Atlantic, Coast Line R. Co., 272 U. S. 605 . It is not amiss, however, to call attention to the fact that operation of this very section has already interfered with the collective bargaining process. An employer before the Labor Board defended its refusal to bargain with a duly selected representative of workers on the ground that the representative had not secured a Florida license as a business agent. In the Matter of Eppinger & Russell Co., 56 N.L.R.B. 1259. The Board properly rejected the employer's contention, holding that Congress did not intend to subject the "full freedom" of employees to the eroding process of "varied and perhaps conflicting provisions of state enactments." Cf. Labor Board v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U. S. 111 .
Since the Labor Board has held that an employer must bargain with a properly selected union agent despite his failure to secure a Florida license, it is argued that the state law does not interfere with the collective bargaining process. But here, this agent has been enjoined, and, if the Florida law is valid, he could be found guilty of a contempt for doing that which the act of Congress permits him to do. Furthermore, he could, under § 14 of the state law, be convicted of a misdemeanor and subjected to fine and imprisonment. The collective bargaining which Congress has authorized contemplates two parties free to bargain, and cannot thus be frustrated by state legislation. We hold that § 4 of the Florida Act is repugnant to the National Labor Relations Act.
Section 6, as here applied, stands no better. The requirement as to the filing of information and the payment of a $1.00 annual fee does not, in and of itself, conflict with the Federal Act. But, for failure to comply, this union has been enjoined from functioning as a labor union. It could not, without violating the injunction and also subjecting itself to the possibility of criminal punishment, even attempt to bargain to settle a controversy or a strike. It is the sanction here imposed, and not the duty to report, which brings about a situation inconsistent with the federally protected process of collective bargaining. Cf. Western Union Co. v. Massachusetts, 125 U. S. 530 , 125 U. S. 553 -554; Kansas City Southern R. Co. v. Kaw Valley Drainage District, 233 U. S. 75 , 233 U. S. 78 ; St. Louis S.W. R. Co. v. Arkansas, 235 U. S. 350 , 235 U. S. 368 . This is true because, if the union or its representatives acted as bargaining agents without making the required reports, presumably they would be liable both to punishment for contempt of court and to conviction under the misdemeanor section of the act. Such an obstacle to collective bargaining cannot be created consistently with the Federal Act.
Nor can it be argued that our decision in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516 , forecloses such result. In that case, we did not have, as here, to deal with such a direct impediment to the free exercise of the federally established right to collective bargaining.
Our holding is that the National Labor Relations Act and §§ 4 and 6 of the Florida Act, as here applied, cannot "move freely within the orbit of their respective purposes without infringing upon one another." Union Brokerage Co. v. Jensen, 322 U. S. 202 , 322 U. S. 207 . [ Footnote 2 ] Accordingly, the case
The National Labor Relations Act applies only to activities which affect interstate commerce. Labor Board v. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U. S. 1 , 301 U. S. 29 -30. The original bill for an injunction prayed that this union might be restrained from functioning as a union in connection with employees of the St. Johns River Shipbuilding Co. of Jacksonville, Florida, which company has been held by the Labor Board to be engaged in interstate commerce and subject to the Federal Act. Matter of St. Johns River Shipbuilding Co., 52 N.L.R.B. 12; 52 N.L.R.B. 958; 55 N.L.R.B. 1451; 59 N.L.R.B. No. 83; 60 N.L.R.B. No. 55. The case was submitted on the pleadings, which assume that interstate commerce questions were involved. The Supreme Court of Florida so treated the case in holding that there was no constitutionally prohibited conflict between the Florida and Federal Acts.
This, of course, does not mean that labor unions or their officers are immune in other respects from the exercise of the state's police power to punish fraud, violence, or other forms of misconduct, either because of the commerce clause or the National Labor Relations Act. It is familiar ground that the commerce clause does not itself preclude a state from regulating those matters which, not being themselves interstate commerce, nevertheless affect the commerce, California v. Thompson, 313 U. S. 109 , 313 U. S. 113 -114, 313 U. S. 116 , and cases cited; Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 , 317 U. S. 360 , and cases cited, and that the state's authority is curtailed only as Congress may by law prescribe in the exercise of the commerce power. United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100 , 312 U. S. 119 , and cases cited. I can find nothing in
the National Labor Relations Act or its legislative history to suggest a Congressional purpose to withdraw the punishment of fraud or violence, or the violation of any state law otherwise valid, from the state's power merely because the state might subject the business agent of a labor union who violates its law to imprisonment, which would prevent his functioning as a bargaining agent for employees under the National Labor Relations Act. Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Board, 315 U. S. 740 , 315 U. S. 748 . See S.Rep. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.; H.Rep. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
For the same reasons, the National Labor Relations Act does not preclude a state from requiring a labor union, or its officers and agents, as such, to procure licenses or make reports or perform other duties which do not materially obstruct the exercise of rights conferred by the National Labor Relations Act or other federal legislation. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516 , 323 U. S. 542 . But it is quite another matter to say that a state may fix standards or qualifications for labor unions and their officers and agents which would preclude any of them from being chosen, and from functioning as bargaining agents under § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act. The right conferred on employees to bargain collectively through a representative of their own choosing is the foundation of the National Labor Relations Act. Without that right, or if it were restricted by state action, the Act as drawn would have little scope for operation. The fact that the National Labor Relations Act imposes sanctions on the employer alone does not mean that it did not, by § 7, confer the right on employees, as against others as well as the employer, to make an uninhibited choice of their bargaining agents. Cf. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U. S. 219 . Section 7 confers the right of choice generally on employees, and not merely as against the employer.
I dissent from so much of the opinion as holds that § 6 of the Florida statute, as applied, is invalid because it conflicts with the National Labor Relations Act. The requirement of filing by a labor organization of the information prescribed by § 6, accompanied by a filing fee of $1.00, is, as the opinion of the Court recognizes, not incompatible with the National Labor Relations Act, since it in no substantial way hinders or interferes with the performance of the union's functions under that Act. Thomas v. Collins, supra, 323 U. S. 542 ; cf. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. R. Comm'n, 297 U. S. 471 , 297 U. S. 478 ; see Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 282 U. S. 133 ; Western Distributing Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 285 U. S. 119 ; Dayton Power & Light Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 292 U. S. 290 ; Natural Gas Co. v. Slattery, 302 U. S. 300 , 302 U. S. 306 .
Notwithstanding the conflict between the commerce clause or the federal statute and the local regulation which was found in Western Union Co. v. Massachusetts, 125 U. S. 530 , 125 U. S. 554 , and St. Louis S.W. R. Co. v. Arkansas, 235 U. S. 350 , 235 U. S. 368 , I can find no logical or persuasive legal ground or practical reason for saying that Congress, by the enactment of the National Labor Relations Act, intended to preclude the state from exercising to the utmost extent its sovereign power to enforce the lawful demands of § 6 of the Florida Act. There is no more occasion for implying such a Congressional purpose where the union is prevented from functioning, by punishment or injunction, for a violation of a valid state law than for saying that Congress, by the National Labor Relations Act, intended to forbid the states to arrest and imprison a labor leader for the violation of any other valid state law because that would prevent his or the union's functioning under the National Labor Relations Act. The question is wholly one of state power. Here, the state power is not restricted by the commerce clause standing alone, nor, so far as I can see, by any Congressional intention expressed
in the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act. Union Brokerage Company v. Jensen, 322 U. S. 202 , 322 U. S. 206 .
It was settled early in our constitutional history that the mere fact that Congress has power to regulate commerce among the several States does not exclude State legislation in the exercise of the police power, even though it may affect such commerce, where the subject matter does not demand a nationwide rule. Willson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 245; Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299, 53 U. S. 319 . The States, in short, may speak on matters even in the general domain of commerce so long as Congress is silent. But, when Congress has spoken, although not as fully as the Constitution authorizes -- that is, when a federal enactment falls short of the Congressional power to legislate touching commerce -- the States may still speak where Congress is still silent. The real question is: has Congress spoken so as to silence the States? The same regard for the harmonious balance of our federal system, whereby the States may protect local interests despite the dormant Commerce Clause, allows State legislation for the protection of local interests so
Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 How. 227, 63 U. S. 243 .
In a great variety of cases, the Court has applied the accommodation formulated in Sinnot v. Davenport, supra, and either reasserted or reinforced that policy. The emphasis has been on recognizing that both the State law and the federal statute must be allowed to prevail if they may prevail together -- that is, if they do not, as a
Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Haber, 169 U. S. 613 , 169 U. S. 623 .
Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S. 137 , 187 U. S. 148 , 187 U. S. 153 .
Savage v. Jones, 225 U. S. 501 , 225 U. S. 533 .
Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Harris, 234 U. S. 412 , 234 U. S. 418 -419.
Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 245 U. S. 493 , 245 U. S. 510 .
Atchison, T. & S.F. R. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 283 U. S. 380 , 283 U. S. 392 -393.
Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U. S. 346 , 289 U. S. 350 .
"The power conferred upon the Congress is such that, when exerted, it excludes and supersedes state legislation in respect of the same matter. But Congress may so circumscribe its regulation as to leave a part of the subject open to state action. Atlantic Coast Line v. Georgia, 234 U. S. 280 , 234 U. S. 290 . Cf. Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line, 272 U. S. 605 . The purpose exclusively to regulate need not be specifically declared. New York Cent. R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U. S. 147 . But ordinarily such intention will not be implied unless, when fairly interpreted, the federal measure is plainly inconsistent with state regulation of the same matter."
Gilvary v. Cuyahoga Valley R. Co., 292 U. S. 57 , 292 U. S. 60 .
Townsend v. Yeomans, 301 U. S. 441 , 301 U. S. 454 .
Kelly v. Washington, 302 U. S. 1 , 302 U. S. 10 .
Since the bulk of federal regulatory legislation has, until recently, been concerned with the great interstate utilities, the cases dealing with the relation of State to federal legislation in this field shed most light on the question before us. Moreover, these present situations least favorable to tolerance for State legislation. The
The range and particularity of federal legislation regulating railroads, expressed in a long series of enactments, have given rise to most of the cases in which State action has been found in conflict with federal action. Once Congress established a uniform federal rule concerning liability for freight loss or damage in place of the variegated rules of the several States, State policy "differently conceived" had to yield. Charleston & W.C. R. Co. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U. S. 597 , 237 U. S. 604 . The comprehensive control over railroad rates, progressively exercised by Congress, necessarily displaced much prior State law. And so, the permissive power of States to deal with aspects of transportation in the absence of federal law ceased when State action ran counter to the specific requirements of the Hepburn Act, 34 Stat. 5 4. Southern R. Co. v. Reid, 222 U. S. 424 ; Chicago, R.I. & P. R. Co. v. Hardwick Farmers' Elevator Co., 226 U. S. 426 . State regulation of the hours of railroad employees could not survive a Congressional policy as to hours of service. Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Washington, 222 U. S. 370 . Explicitness by Congress relating to the equipping of freight cars with safety appliances superseded a State law dealing differently with such safety requirements. Southern R. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 236 U. S. 439 . When Congress saw fit to define in the Federal Employees Liability Act a carrier's responsibility for the death or injury of its employees, a State could not assert a different basis of responsibility. New York Cent. R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U. S. 147 . Uniform standards set by the Interstate Commerce Commission for the equipment of locomotives preclude different requirements for such equipment by the States. Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line, 272 U. S. 605 . But merely because regulatory power is
possessed by a federal agency does not displace State regulation if no federal standards are set. See Welch Co. v. New Hampshire, 306 U. S. 79 ; Eichholz v. Public Service Comm'n, 306 U. S. 268 . That, even in this technical field, a State is not denied the exercise of its police power beyond what is practically required by the actual use of federal power is illustrated by the limited application given to Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 250 U. S. 566 , in Terminal Assn. v. Trainmen, 318 U. S. 1 .
Even where the enforcement of a State statute carries international implications, and thus deals with sensitive concerns peculiarly within the direction of federal authority, this Court only recently was slow to strike down an exercise of the State police power. When, in Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52 , the United States strongly urged upon us that a Pennsylvania system of alien registration, established in 1939, had been superseded by the Federal Alien Registration Act of 1940, we did not displace the State law cavalierly, on the basis of loose inference and dogmatic assertion, but examined with painstaking care the particular requirements of Pennsylvania in order to ascertain whether, in their practical operation, they ran counter to the scheme as conceived by Congress and impinged upon its administration. A detailed examination of the long course of federal legislation affecting aliens, of which the Act of 1940 was the latest in a series, led the Court to conclude that Congress
had "provided a standard for alien registration in a single integrated and all-embracing system . . . through one uniform national registration system" to which Pennsylvania had to subordinate its local policy. 312 U. S. 312 U.S. 52, 312 U. S. 74 . Even this conclusion evoked a weighty dissent, and one cannot read the Court's opinion without an awareness that the case presented a close question. Shortly after this decision, we unanimously made it clear that Hines v. Davidowitz was not intended to relax the requirement of practical and effective conflict between a State law and a federal enactment before a State police measure can be nullified, and that the international bearing of the circumstances made persuasive the finding of conflict in that case. What was said about Hines v. Davidowitz in Allen-Bradley Local v. Board, 315 U. S. 740 , 315 U. S. 749 , is precisely relevant here:
"In the Hines case, a federal system of alien registration was held to supersede a state system of registration. But there, we were dealing with a problem which had an impact on the general field of foreign relations. The delicacy of the issues which were posed alone raised grave questions as to the propriety of allowing a state system of regulation to function alongside of a federal system. In that field, any 'concurrent state power that may exist is restricted to the narrowest of limits.' p. 312 U. S. 68 . Therefore, we were more ready to conclude that a federal act in a field that touched international relations superseded state regulation than we were in those cases where a State was exercising its historic powers over such traditionally local matters as public safety and order, and the use of streets and highways. Maurer v. Hamilton, [309 U.S. 598], supra, and cases cited. Here, we are dealing with the latter type of problem. We will not lightly infer that Congress, by the mere passage of a federal Act, has impaired the traditional sovereignty of the several States in that regard. "
By legislation known as House Bill No. 142, Florida, in 1943, undertook to regulate labor unions and their officers. Laws of Florida, 1943, Ch. 21968, p. 565. That Act prohibits any person from acting as a "business agent" for any "labor organization" without having obtained a license. § 9(6). In order to obtain such a license, for a fee of one dollar, a person must file with the Secretary of State an application, under oath, accompanied by a statement showing the applicant's authority to act as business agent, vouched for by the president and secretary of the labor organization. To permit the filing of objections to granting the license, the application must be held on file for thirty days. Thereafter, the application, with all relevant
The Court reaches this conclusion rather summarily, as though the conflict between the Wagner Act and the Bradford Act is too obvious for argument. Considering the fact that this case involves what so often has
Section 1. To that end § 8, the heart of the Act, enumerated conduct by employers which the National Labor Relations Board was established to prevent. § 10. It is an accurate summary of the Wagner Act to say that it aimed to equalize bargaining power between industrial employees and their employers by putting federal law behind the employees' right of association. The whole plan or scheme of the Wagner Act was to enable employees to bargain on a fair basis, freed from "restraint or coercion
by their employer" through the protection given by the federal government. Labor Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp, 301 U. S. 1 , 301 U. S. 33 .
If Congress tomorrow chose to subject labor organizations and their officers to regulations similar to those dealt
If the Wagner Act has left Florida free to deal with these matters, Florida may not only legislate, but also provide for enforcement of its legislation. In other words, if Florida may call for reports and require business agents to apply for licenses, of course Florida may provide appropriate sanctions for such regulations. If a union may properly be required to file a report and does not do so, and therefore is prohibited from pursuing its industrial activities until it does file such a report, the State is not interfering with whatever rights the union may have