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A PROPOSED DEVICE ATTACHMENT STATUTE FOR CONVERGED NETWORKS - PDF
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1 JOURNAL OF INFORMATION POLICY 1 (2011): A PROPOSED DEVICE ATTACHMENT STATUTE FOR CONVERGED NETWORKS BY SCOTT JORDAN * AND GWEN SHAFFER Interconnection of user-side devices and applications to networks has long been a contentious issue, compounded by the emergence of converged broadband networks. Doctors Jordan and Shaffer offer a unified draft statute to ensure users the right to connect devices and applications of their choice while ensuring providers the right to reasonable network management. Analyzing current attachment rules for telephony, cable, MVPDs, mobile services, and the Internet, they propose a single set of rules for operating in a converged broadband network environment. They acknowledge that there are difficult issues involved and try to apply a balancing of interests to resolve them. INTRODUCTION In the United States, a user s legal ability to attach and control a device to a network depends on whether the device is attached to a telephone, video device, cellular network, or the Internet. In telephone networks, for instance, Part 68 regulations provide strong assurance that users may attach and control non-harmful devices of their choice. 1 In multichannel video programming distributor (MVPD) networks, CableCARD regulations provide similar assurance. 2 The rules change when it comes to broadband access service. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) recently adopted an Open Internet Order meant to provide some assurance that fixed broadband Internet users may attach non-harmful devices of their choice. However, the regulations do not define harmful, nor do they clearly specify which functionality of user devices the service provider may control. 3 An entirely different set of rules applies to cellular networks. These regulations allow service providers to exercise great latitude over which devices a user attaches to the network, as well * Professor of Computer Science, University of California, Irvine. Jordan has served as an IEEE Congressional Fellow and on the FCC Open Internet Technical Advisory Committee. Postdoctoral Scholar, University of California, Irvine. 1 Federal Communications Commission, FCC : Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Service (Carterfone Order), Federal Communications Commission Reports 2nd Series 13 (1968), 420, accessed Sept. 26, 2011, 2 Federal Communications Commission, FCC : Implementation of Section 304 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Commercial Availability of Navigation Devices, Report and Order (CableCARD Order), Federal Communications Commission Record 13(21) (1998), 14775, accessed Sept. 26, 2011, 3 Federal Communications Commission, FCC : Preserving the Open Internet; Broadband Industry Practices, Report and Order (Open Internet Order), Federal Communications Commission Record 25(21) (2010), 17905, 14775, accessed Sept. 26, 2011, 394
2 VOL. 1 JOURNAL OF INFORMATION POLICY 395 as allowing them to control a wide range of functionalities of those devices. In the United States, users obtain nearly all of their wireless devices from their cellular provider. However, from the end-user perspective, the act of accessing a network is becoming increasingly similar, whether using a personal computer (PC), smartphone, or set-top box to do so. Vertical silo regulation of device attachment and control is incompatible with this evolving user view. Although vertical regulation is often criticized, recent actions taken by the FCC have maintained and even strengthened these artificial silos with respect to device attachment. The FCC s Open Internet Order continues to classify broadband Internet access as an information service, rather than as a more tightly regulated telecommunications service. As a result, even services and providers that directly compete with one another may be treated differently under current rules. This article explores the issues that must be resolved in order to create unified regulation of device attachment in converged communication networks. It is apparent that it is not sufficient to merely state an any device rule without substantial development of further statutes or regulations that detail what this means. The article posits that these issues include demarcation of the connection point between a provider s network and a user s network, delineation of reasonable network management of various user devices, subsidization of user devices, and content protection. Furthermore, it explains that reasonable network management in this context requires identification of not only which functions are reasonable but also in which devices. Thus issues of discrimination and harm also arise. For each such issue, this article also presents an example of statutory language that could be used to resolve the issue. The proposed statutes ensure users the right to connect devices of their choice while simultaneously ensuring network providers the right to maintain reasonable network management. It is consistent with current user and provider rights on telephone networks, and strengthens user rights on cable and satellite networks and on cellular networks. It can be applied to residential networks attached through cable and digital subscriber line (DSL) modems, Internet residential gateways, set-top boxes, and smartphones, and it addresses which protocols and devices should be controlled by users and which should be controlled by providers. The proposed statute eliminates separate device attachment rules for telephone, cable television, satellite television and cellular networks, and the Internet. THE CONVERGED ENVIRONMENT Convergence During the past 25 years, most telephone networks have greatly expanded their capacity by deploying fiber. The backbone infrastructure now converts analog signals to digital and carries them as Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP). With this extra capacity and capability, most telephone networks now offer not only telephone service, but also Internet and video access. DSL modems delivering broadband traffic use the Internet Protocol (IP) over the entire path, from source to
3 VOL. 1 JOURNAL OF INFORMATION POLICY 396 destination. In recent years, some telephone networks have also begun offering video service known as Internet Protocol Television (IPTV). One such network, AT&T s U-verse, is available to more than 23 million homes. 4 Verizon s FiOS, another IP-based network, claims more than 3 million subscribers. 5 Telephone networks are thus migrating toward an integrated IP architecture to support telephone calls, Internet access, and video. Most cable television networks have also deployed fiber and have transitioned from analog to digital transmission in the network backbone. Similarly, satellite networks have increased capacity by adding infrastructure and using more efficient transmission methods. Consequently, cable and satellite networks routinely offer not only video service, but also Internet access and telephone service. Industry analysts expect to see video transmission migrate to an IPTV architecture as well. Broadband traffic on cable networks, carried at the endpoints via cable modems, uses IP over the entire path from source to destination. Telephone service over cable networks uses a VoIP architecture. Cable and satellite networks are, ultimately, migrating toward an integrated IP architecture to support telephone calls, broadband access, and video. Cellular networks have similarly transitioned from analog to digital transmission, and now offer not only telephone service but also Internet access and often video programming. With the upgrade to fourth generation (4G) technology in the next few years, it is expected that carriers will migrate voice traffic onto a VoIP architecture. 6 When smartphones access the Internet, they already rely on an IP architecture. Finally, some cellular carriers now offer video services, Verizon s VCAST for example. Soon, this video content is also likely to be delivered over an IPTV architecture. Finally, the Internet was designed to offer data services such as file transfer and . However, with the increased popularity of gaming and voice and video chat applications, the Internet is now in the process of transitioning toward an architecture that can more efficiently support real-time applications such as telephone calls and video conferencing. Telephone, video, cellular networks, and the Internet are thus merging. Economic and regulatory forces have reinforced technology trends. A flurry of mergers between communications companies has brought together content providers, broadcasters, cable networks, local and long distance telephone networks, cellular networks, and Internet Service Providers (ISPs). Different portions of such converged networks use different access technologies, including telephone wiring, coaxial cable, fiber, and wireless transmission. Not only are the networks themselves converging, but the range of applications offered on each are also converging. Regardless of the physical medium, these networks use the standardized IP 4 AT&T, 2009 Annual Report: AT&T U-verse, 3, accessed June 16, 2011, 5 Karl Bode, Verizon: 3.1 Million FiOS Customers, Broadband DSLReports.com, July 27, 2009, accessed June 16, 2011, 6 Motorola, Beyond Mobile Broadband, accessed June 16, 2011,
4 VOL. 1 JOURNAL OF INFORMATION POLICY 397 protocol to support telephone service, streaming video, video conferencing, gaming, , web browsing, and file transfer. These converging communications networks are steadily progressing toward supporting a wide variety of heterogeneous devices. Today, a typical residential network may connect a modem, a wireless router, computers, printers, televisions, music systems, network attached storage, wireless adapters, and set-top boxes. Cell phone networks now enable smartphones, tablets, e-readers, and navigation devices to access the Internet. A wider variety of Internet-connected devices is expected, and the Internet of things is the subject of many studies. Communication transactions that previously required multiple gadgets making phone calls, listening to music, sending , browsing the web, watching video, and taking pictures may all now be performed on a single handheld device. Regulation of Common Devices Rules governing device attachment can greatly affect the development of a competitive market. This section briefly discusses three impacted devices: residential gateways, set-top boxes, and smartphones. Increasingly, homeowners are establishing residential gateways allowing them to connect a wide variety of devices to the Internet with connectivity provided by an ISP. However, an ISP sometimes mandates use of its own residential gateway, precluding users from attaching routers of their choice. In addition, the ISP maintains control over nearly all protocols used in the gateway, which may deprive subscribers of the use and control of certain applications. Cable and satellite television subscribers typically access these services through a set-top box. In some cases, the consumer must lease the box from the provider. In other cases, the consumer may elect to purchase a set-top box offered by a consumer electronics company. However, it may not provide access to all video content. The set-top box supplied by the video provider, on the other hand, may limit devices that a consumer connects to the network and use proprietary protocols to access certain information streams. As a result, this may disable the functionality of other userchosen devices, such as video navigation. Smartphones used on cellular networks present an even greater challenge to open networks. A cellular provider often exercises control over the devices used on its network through a combination of terms of service and device pricing. Because the provider reserves the right to control nearly all communication protocols on the device, it is not uncommon for providers to lock devices to their own networks and to cripple handset functionality. The focus of this article is on device attachment and control in converged networks. Convergence will rend vertical regulation of devices on each network infeasible, as users cease to distinguish between the types of networks to which they connect. If a user watches video on a mobile device using a cell phone network, would this service be regulated in the United States under Title II of the Communications Act as a communications service, under Title VI as a video service, or under Title I as a broadband service? If the user then walks inside a residence and switches to a Wi-Fi network,
5 VOL. 1 JOURNAL OF INFORMATION POLICY 398 does the service classification change? Increasingly, users will not view telephone service, video service, and broadband service as three distinct services. Users also expect to connect a wide variety of devices, and to use these devices without unreasonable interference from a network access provider. Increasingly, users are rejecting limitations on wireless devices when these same limitations are unacceptable in the context of their wired devices. For example, it is unthinkable that the Comcast or Cox cable companies would bar subscribers from using a particular PC. Yet AT&T and Verizon dictate which devices may access their wireless networks. Literature Review Substantial research literature highlights the need for a unified regulatory approach to converged networks in general. Nuechterlein and Weiser explain that the telecommunications market can t function effectively without a converged regulatory policy that treats like services alike, regardless of what physical infrastructure is used to provide them. 7 They urge policymakers to place heavy regulation on the layers of each network that encompass wholesale transmission services, and to analyze petitions for vertical integration by assessing the potential for that company to leverage its market power to the detriment of competitors at higher levels. In the absence of such a converged policy, Bar and Sandvig explain that vertical integration means that companies increasingly interact across regulatory boundaries, broadening the possibility that industry players will profit by exploiting price differences in similar markets. 8 They propose dropping current regulatory structures that approach regulation based on the physical conduit and who owns it, and conclude that a more appropriate telecommunications policy should focus on the software configuration that defines the architecture of each platform in this converged environment. Schejter argues that definitions should be developed at the highest normative level, with regulators then analyzing and determining how to apply them. 9 Despite fervent discussion of the challenges of convergence, minimal academic literature addresses device attachment and control in converged networks. Wu focuses on whether subscribers should be able to attach wireless devices of their choice, and argues for an extension of the FCC s Carterfone rules to wireless networks including prohibiting carriers from locking devices and allowing users to attach compatible and non-harmful devices. 10 To make this a reality, Wu proposes that the industry or the FCC define a basic air interface for wireless devices. He also argues for the application of net 7 Jonathan Nuechterlein and Philip Weiser, Digital Crossroads: American Telecommunications Policy in the Internet Age (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005). 8 Francois Bar and Christian Sandvig, U.S. Communications Policy after Convergence, Media, Culture & Society 30, no. 4 (2008): Amit Schejter, From All My Teachers I Have Grown Wise, and From My Students More than Anyone Else : What Lessons Can the US Learn from Broadband Policies in Europe? The International Communication Gazette 71, no. 5 (2009): Timothy Wu, Wireless Carterfone, International Journal of Communication 1 (2007):
6 VOL. 1 JOURNAL OF INFORMATION POLICY 399 neutrality to wireless networks, 11 and asserts that carriers should meter and charge for bandwidth usage rather than block particular applications. Wu advocates requiring wireless carriers to disclose practices such as locking phones, disabling protocols or applications, and limiting bandwidth. Finally, he recommends that carriers and equipment manufacturers work toward standardization of application development platforms. In response, Hahn, Litan, and Singer claim that attachment of devices and Quality-of-Service (QoS) are separate issues. 12 Having previously opposed net neutrality as a method to regulate QoS, 13 in this paper they contest many of Wu s proposals. First, they argue that there is sufficient wireless competition to avoid market failure and that innovation in wireless devices and applications is thriving. Next they argue that the results of an economic analysis show that the benefits of device subsidies, device exclusivity, and limits on devices and on applications outweigh the costs of each. Methodology The remainder of this article applies traditional policy analysis techniques, 14 with the goal of identifying the issues that must be resolved in order to create unified regulation of device attachment in converged communication networks. Table 1 below will be used throughout the article to identify and track these issues, which are listed in the left column. 11 Federal Communications Commission, FCC , Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities et al., Policy Statement (Internet Policy Statement), Federal Communications Commission Record 20(17) (2005), 14986, accessed Sept. 26, 2011, 12 Robert Hahn, Robert Litan, and Hal Singer, The Economics of Wireless Net Neutrality, Journal of Competition Law & Economics 3, no. 3 (2007): Robert Hahn and Robert Litan, The Myth of Network Neutrality and What We Should Do About It, International Journal of Communication 1 (2007): For an explanation of these methods, see Eugene Bardach, A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis (Washington: CQ Press, 2005).
7 VOL. 1 JOURNAL OF INFORMATION POLICY 400 Issue Demarcation point required Telephone Cable MVPD Satellite MVPD Cellular Fixed Internet access Mobile Internet access Yes Yes No No No No Yes Harm defined Yes No No Partially No Partially Yes Any device rule Yes Yes No No Yes No Yes Discrimination prohibited Yes Partially No Yes Yes No Yes Interconnect. No No No No No No Yes Subsidies No No No No No No Yes Gateway defined Control point defined Reasonable network management defined Content protection No Partially No No No No Yes Yes Partially No No No No Yes Yes No No No Partially Partially Yes No Partially Partially No No No Yes Proposed Statute Table 1: Comparison of Legal Approaches There is a great deal of latitude in how to resolve each issue. Each row of Table 1 shows whether each current type of vertical regulation addresses the corresponding issue. For issues that are addressed by regulation of one or more types of networks, this article asks if current regulations can be merged and extended to apply effectively to converged networks. For issues in which there is no current regulation, current regulations are mutually contradictory, or current regulations cannot be extended to apply effectively to converged networks, this article proposes statutory language based on fundamental user rights and provider rights. PRINCIPLES As previously noted, it will soon become impossible to maintain different and conflicting communications law provisions regarding device attachment as telephone, video, cellular networks, and the Internet converge. Sound policy must be grounded in principles. To guide development of a unified device attachment statute, this section proposes two sets of rights one that should apply to users of communications networks, and another that should apply to providers
8 VOL. 1 JOURNAL OF INFORMATION POLICY 401 of communications services. 15 While the principles detailed in this section do not negate the needs of industry stakeholders, they place equal emphasis on the rights of communications users. The following principles are modeled, either loosely or closely, on notions of Internet governance that exist in other contexts. The following user rights have been commonly recognized: U1: Users of communications services are entitled to choose a communications provider in a competitive marketplace. U2: Users of communications services are entitled to connect any legal device to a communications network, so long as that device does not cause harm to the network. U3: Users of communications services are entitled to run applications of their choice on their devices. U4: Users of communications services are entitled to transparency in terms of billing, traffic management, device restrictions, and all other aspects of their communications services. In 2005, in the early days of the net neutrality debate, the FCC issued a set of principles that it proposed should apply to consumers and providers of telecommunications for Internet access. 16 Right U1 is modeled on the FCC s right of consumers to competition among network providers, application and service providers, and content providers. However, the reference to application, service, and content providers is omitted since that is outside the scope of this article. Right U2 is modeled on the FCC s proposed right of consumers to connect their choice of legal devices that do not harm the network. Right U3 is modeled on the FCC's right of consumers to run applications and use services of their choice. Right U4 is modeled on transparency principles later proposed by the FCC and multiple stakeholders. The following communication provider rights have been commonly recognized: P1: Communication providers are entitled to charge for communications services provided to their subscribers. P2: Communication providers are entitled to the use of reasonable network management. P3: Communication providers are entitled to forbearance from regulations that are unnecessary for ensuring user rights. 15 While the focus of this article is exclusively on the relationship between devices and network carriers, the owners of operating systems as opposed to carriers are responsible for imposing some device restrictions. However, this study examines only actions taken by communications providers. Therefore this article does not address device restrictions imposed by operating systems or content providers. 16 Federal Communications Commission, FCC , Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities et al., Policy Statement (Internet Policy Statement).
9 VOL. 1 JOURNAL OF INFORMATION POLICY 402 Right P1 is an original statement, but it represents a basic tenet of capitalism; it is intended to make it clear that user rights are limited by the services purchased from their communication providers. Right P2 is modeled on FCC s net neutrality rules, which make all user rights subject to reasonable network management. 17 (Listing reasonable network management as a communication provider right is more straightforward than incorporating it into each user right.) Right P3 reflects a provision of communications law specifying the conditions under which communications regulations should be exempted; exemptions are granted when a marketplace is viewed as sufficiently competitive. RECLASSIFICATION The Challenge of Definitions for Converged Networks As the ultimate goal of this article is to craft a statute for device attachment in converged networks, the scope of converged networks must first be defined and delineated. The differing terms used within the context of various regulatory silos complicates this task, however. Title II of the Communications Act of 1934 applies to common carriers, defined recursively as any person engaged as a common carrier for hire in communications by wire or radio, excepting radio broadcasting. However, much of Title II concerns only providers of telecommunications service, defined as the offering of telecommunications for a fee directly to the public In turn, telecommunications is defined as the transmission, between or among points specified by the user, of information of the user s choosing, without change in the form or content of the information as sent and received. Services over telecommunication networks that are not classified as telecommunications services are often classified as information services, defined as the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information via telecommunications. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 placed telecommunications services, but not information services, under Title II of the 1934 Act. As a result, Part 68 regulations apply only to telecommunications services. In 2002, the FCC ruled that cable modem service is exclusively an information service, not a composite of telecommunications service and information service. 18 In 2005, the FCC similarly ruled that DSL modem service is solely an information service. 19 Both rulings are controversial. 17 Federal Communications Commission, FCC 09-93: Preserving the Open Internet; Broadband Industry Practices, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (Open Internet NPRM), Federal Communications Commission Record 24(16) (2009), 13064, accessed Sept. 26, 2011, 18 Federal Communications Commission, FCC 02-77: Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities et. al., Declaratory Ruling (Cable Modem Ruling), Federal Communications Commission Record 17(7) (2002), 4798, accessed Sept. 26, 2011, 19 Federal Communications Commission, FCC : Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities et. al., Report and Order (DSL Order), Federal Communications Commission Record 20(17) (2005), 14853, accessed Sept. 26, 2011,
10 VOL. 1 JOURNAL OF INFORMATION POLICY 403 Title VI of the Communications Act applies to multichannel video programming distributors, defined as a person such as, but not limited to, a cable operator, a multichannel multipoint distribution service, a direct broadcast satellite service, or a television receive-only satellite program distributor, who makes available for purchase by subscribers or customers, multiple channels of video programming. In turn, cable operator is defined as any person who provides cable service over a cable system and cable service is defined as one-way transmission to subscribers of video programming or other programming service Cable system is defined as a facility, consisting of a set of closed transmission paths and associated signal generation, reception, and control equipment that is designed to provide cable service Cellular service providers (formally called providers of commercial mobile services), are defined as any mobile service that is provided for profit and makes interconnected service available to the public Mobile service is defined as a radio communications service carried on between mobile stations and includes both one-way and two-way radio communication services Such providers are subject to only selected portions of Title II. Finally, in the Open Internet Order, broadband Internet access service is defined as a mass-market retail service by wire or radio that provides the capability to transmit data to and receive data from all or substantially all Internet endpoints excluding dial-up Internet access service, with further distinctions between fixed and mobile broadband Internet access service depending on whether it serves users primarily using stationary or mobile equipment. Clearly these multiple definitions will lose their meaning and application as networks converge. A definition of communications services is required that can be effectively applied to converged networks and that makes sense in current telephone networks, cable and satellite networks, cellular networks, and the Internet. Layered Internet Architecture Guidance for creating the required definitions can be provided by examining the architecture of each network. While telephone, cable, cellular networks, and the Internet claim distinct characteristics, each is based on the concept of a modular, layered architecture. Each network device, and the network as a whole, is abstractly composed of a number of vertical layers that provide specific functionalities. A designer of a particular module need only understand the functionality and the interface, not the detailed operation of other interoperating modules. Although designing a component in a modular fashion restricts the design space, the benefits typically outweigh the disadvantages. The OSI (Open Systems Interconnection) model, illustrated in Figure 1 below, is designed to enable various network facilities, each run by a distinct operator, to interconnect. But the design transcends a description that is purely technical or neutral. 20 In reality, layered architecture is a political-economic notion intended to boost competition within telecommunications markets, and has considerable implications for communications policy. 20 Jan van Cuilenburg and Pascal Verhoest, Free and Equal Access: In Search of Policy Models for Converging Communication Systems, Telecommunications Policy 22, no. 3 (1998):
11 VOL. 1 JOURNAL OF INFORMATION POLICY 404 Figure 1: OSI and Internet Layers Models As an example, two network users Alice and Bob may exchange s even if they use different programs. 21 The is generated through Alice s program on her computer (the source) at layer 7. Layer 7 hands the off to layer 6, which deals with the encoding of the , HTML for example. Layer 6 then hands the off to layer 5, which logs onto Bob s mailserver. Layer 4 breaks the into a sequence of packets, and hands them oneby-one to layer 3. Layer 3 determines the first router on the path from Alice to Bob. Layer 2 decides when each packet can be transmitted, and layer 1 transmits each packet bit-by-bit. When these bits are received by the first router, layer 1 on that router translates the received signal into bits and layer 2 puts the bits back together into a packet, allowing layer 3 to examine the packet header and determine the next router along the path. Subsequent routers act similarly. Finally, layers 1 through 4 on Bob s computer (the destination) assemble the received signal back together into the , layer 5 retrieves the from Bob s mailserver, and layers 6 and 7 display the in Bob s program. Statutory Definitions for Converged Networks Future statutory definitions should be based when possible on both network architecture and previous legal models. Layered regulatory models proposed in the literature have the potential benefit of effectively creating legal definitions that can be applied to converged networks and that are largely backwards-compatible with current legal models. 22 Using a layered model has two strengths. First, the layered model is actually used by engineers in the design of communication 21 For simplicity, it is assumed that the mail servers reside on the source and destination computers. 22 For example, see Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World (New York: Random House, 2001); Kevin D. Werbach, A Layered Model for Internet Policy, Journal of Telecommunications and High-Tech Law 1, no. 37 (2002): 37-67; Lawrence Solum and Minn Chung, The Layers Principle: Internet Architecture and the Law, University of San Diego Public Law Research Paper No. 55, accessed Sept. 26, 2011, Rick Whitt, A Horizontal Leap Forward: Formulating a New Communications Public Policy Framework Based on the Network Layers Model, Federal Communications Law Journal 56 (2004):
12 VOL. 1 JOURNAL OF INFORMATION POLICY 405 networks and devices. Second, the model can be applied to all four types of networks telephone, cable and satellite, cellular, and Internet and thus to converged networks as well. However, the proposals for layered regulatory models do not agree on which layers should be regulated in which manner. This article proposes that communication services can be defined as the lower layers of the network, and information services as the upper layers of the network. The first question is at which layer the delineation should be made. Although lower layer protocols differ based on the characteristics of the physical connection, converged networks will likely adopt similar protocols at the network layer (OSI layer 3) and above. This does not, however, necessarily indicate that the delineation between communication services and information services should be at the network layer. A further examination of network architecture can point the way. Routers and switches typically contain OSI layers 1-3, while end devices contain all layers. The oft-quoted (and oft-misquoted) Internet end-to-end principle can be interpreted as a suggestion that network functionality should be implemented in OSI layers 1-3 only if it cannot be implemented effectively in higher layers at endpoints. Network architecture thus hints that distinguishing between OSI layers 1-3 and 4-7 can be a powerful tool. Current legal models in the United States are based on the distinction between telecommunications services and information services. Telecommunications services entail the transmission, between or among points specified by the user, of information of the user s choosing, without change in the form or content of the information as sent and received. In terms of layers, this describes the functionality of OSI layers 1-3, which are concerned with transmission and routing of data. In contrast, information services entail the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information via telecommunications. In terms of layers, this describes the functionality of ISO layers 4-7, which are concerned with the creation and processing of data. Both the architectural and legal models thus suggest that differentiating between OSI layers 1-3 and layers 4-7 is a powerful tool. This distinction also creates a relevant economic interpretation. OSI layers 1-3 exhibit a high barrier to entry, while OSI layers 4-7 exhibit a low barrier to entry. The high barrier to entry of infrastructure required to construct the lower layers has resulted in a small number of providers offering service in any particular location. In contrast, the low barrier to entry of applications offered in higher layers has resulted in a competitive market with a large number of application providers. A pure delineation based on layers 1-3 versus 4-7 is too rigid. Allowance should be made for network management, addressed below. An example of a definition of communication services based on this layered model is: COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES The term Communications Services means all services (A) over a network that uses a public right-of-way; and (B) that reside at or below the network layer or are required to manage the network.
13 VOL. 1 JOURNAL OF INFORMATION POLICY 406 The proposed definition of communications services includes services that must be implemented in every portion of the network, including the access network, by including layer 1-3 functions: for example, routing, addressing, and QoS (if used). It also includes services in layers 4-7 that are required for managing the network, since only a subscriber s ISP can provide these functions. The immediate consequence of this approach, purely on technological grounds, is that the Internet clearly consists of both communications services and information services. The application of the term communications services to broadband Internet access service will thus surely imply some type of reclassification. This is intentional, as technological distinctions alone contradict the FCC s decision to classify Internet access solely as an information service. THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE A PROVIDER Implementation of the first user right, to choose a communications provider in a competitive marketplace, requires addressing how technological convergence is impacting the types of providers offering communications services, and how the role played by communications providers is evolving as a result of technological convergence. The first issue that arises is the need for a definition of what constitutes a user device. As discussed above, the variety of devices in various networks is growing, and it is sometimes less than clear whether some devices are the property of the user versus the provider, and whether a user device is for computing, communications, or both. Regulations for different types of networks define user devices with varying levels of specificity. AllVid proposals in particular are struggling with which devices are user property versus provider property. 23 However, Part 68 regulations for telephone networks provide perhaps the most general definition. Part 68 defines what it calls terminal equipment. This definition can be easily updated and generalized as follows. First, whereas Part 68 restricts user devices to those on customer premises, converged networks require inclusion of mobile devices. Second, whereas Part 68 is concerned only with devices used for telecommunications or information services, converged networks require inclusion of an updated set of services such as the definition of communications services given above. A possible revision of the Part 68 definition is: USER DEVICE The term User device means communications equipment located on customer premises or in the possession of the user at the end of a communications link, used to permit the stations involved to accomplish the provision of communications or information services. Such a definition, however, still relies on delineation between where a network provider s network ends and a user s network begins. The point at which the two networks interconnect is commonly referred to as the demarcation point. Determination of the demarcation point is an issue that must be 23 Federal Communications Commission, FCC 10-60: Video Device Competition et. al., Notice of Inquiry (AllVid NOI), Federal Communications Commission Record 25(5) (2010), 4275, accessed Sept. 26, 2011,
14 VOL. 1 JOURNAL OF INFORMATION POLICY 407 resolved to implement an any device rule. As illustrated in the first row of Table 1 above, the demarcation point is well-established in telephone networks, but not in other types of networks. Part 68 regulations require a standardized connection between the user s residential telephone wiring and the common carrier s telephone network. The demarcation point establishes the geographical point of the interconnection between the communication provider s network and customer premises wiring. Cable and satellite networks rely on the presence of a junction box and often a set-top box, but no formal demarcation point is defined. It remains unclear if the cable or satellite service provider facilities interconnect with the user s network at the junction box or the set-top box. Proposed AllVid regulations for MVPDs would seem to place the demarcation point on the user s side of the set-top box or adapter, thus placing the set-top box or adapter in the service provider s network. 24 Broadband Internet access also relies on the presence of a junction box and a modem or gateway, but again no formal demarcation point is defined other than that in the underlying telephone or cable network. It also remains unclear if the Internet service provider facilities interconnect with the user s network at the junction box or the modem or gateway, or at the underlying telephone or cable network demarcation point. In cellular networks the air interface essentially serves as a demarcation point, but regulations neglect to formally define a demarcation point and many cellular providers claim wireless devices are part of their network. A standardized demarcation point that can be applied to all of these networks is necessary. The Part 68 definition of a demarcation point can provide this definition by eliminating the current Part 68 restriction to wireline, replacing the older term telecommunications services with a new definition of communications services, and explicitly including both wired and wireless user terminal equipment. A possible revision of the Part 68 definition is: DEMARCATION POINT The term Demarcation point means the point of demarcation and/or interconnection between the communications facilities of a provider of communications, and wired or wireless user devices, or protective apparatus or wiring at a subscriber s premises. The requirement that telephone common carriers establish a demarcation point using a standardized interface has accomplished two feats. First, it denotes responsibility for the maintenance of physical facilities; users are responsible for all wiring on their side of the demarcation point. Second, when multiple communications providers compete to serve a residence, the presence of a demarcation point allows a simple way for a user to switch from one communications provider to another. If a similar approach is applied to all communications providers, then the right to choose a provider can be ensured. Part 68 regulations for telephone networks can again be used as a useful starting point. These regulations require a telecommunications service provider to create a demarcation point near where the wiring crosses a property line, and to place a standardized wire or jack at this demarcation point. This requirement can be easily updated and generalized as follows. First, as with the definition of user devices above, mobile devices must be included. Second, as above, the Part 68 restriction to wireline should be eliminated and an updated set of services such as the definition of communications 24 Ibid.
15 VOL. 1 JOURNAL OF INFORMATION POLICY 408 services given above should be included. Third, the interface at the demarcation point should be generalized. A possible revision of the Part 68 definition is: REQUIRED DEMARCATION POINT A communications provider shall establish a demarcation point at either the closest practicable point to where the wiring crosses a property line, the closest practicable point to where the wiring enters a multiunit building or buildings, or the point at which a communications link terminates at a user device. The reasonable and nondiscriminatory standard operating practices of the provider of communications services shall determine which shall apply. Facilities of communications providers at, or constituting, the demarcation point shall consist of an interface conforming to the technical criteria published by a recognized national or international standards body. The use of the property line for single unit buildings or the closest practicable point for multiunit buildings is used in Part 68. The inclusion of the point at which a communications link terminates at a user device can be used to address mobile devices, since the relevant property line is unclear. The requirement of a standardized interface rather than a wire or jack, with standardization to be determined by any recognized standards body, can be used to generalize the interface. This updated requirement for communications providers to use a standardized interface at the demarcation point can efficiently and effectively implement user right U1. This approach can be applied to telephone networks, for which Part 68 applies, but also to cable and satellite networks, wireless networks, and Internet access. THE RIGHT TO ATTACH DEVICES Implementation of the second user right, to connect any legal device to a communications network so long as that device does not cause harm to the network, requires addressing how technological convergence is impacting the types of devices that users routinely attach to communications networks, and which new types of services users are subscribing to as a result of technological convergence. As illustrated in the third row of Table 1, statutes and/or regulations implement some type of any device rule for telephone, cable, and fixed broadband Internet networks. In telephone networks this right is ensconced in Title II of the Communications Act and in Part 68. In cable MVPD networks, CableCARD provides a similar right, but proposed AllVid regulations would allow a provider to require the use of a proprietary adapter. Fixed broadband Internet access providers are required to allow users to attach non-harmful devices, but harm is not defined. Cellular and satellite providers are not subject to any requirements. Unification of these legal approaches and inclusion of mobile broadband Internet networks and cellular networks is required. There would seem to be three essential elements: a definition of a demarcation point, a definition of harm, and application of the rule. There are many pieces of current
16 VOL. 1 JOURNAL OF INFORMATION POLICY 409 law that can provide guidance, including Part 68 regulations and section 202 and 251 of the Communications Act. The following subsections discuss the issues involved and apply current law when possible. Defining Harm and Applying the Any Device Rule One issue that must be confronted here is the definition of harm. As illustrated in the second row of Table 1, harm is currently defined for telephone networks. Part 68 regulations describe harm in terms of electrical hazards, damage to equipment, or degradation of service. This definition is sufficient for wireline networks, but must be broadened to apply to wireless networks. One starting point is the definition of harmful interference in 47 C.F.R for radio frequency devices, which includes emissions that obstruct or degrade radio communications services. These definitions of harm and harmful interference can be combined to address both wireline and wireless devices. However, one other update is required. Both definitions rely on the term degradation. In both wireline and wireless networks, degradation of service can occur through reasonable traffic management, as discussed below. Thus an updated definition of harm should be restricted to unreasonable degradation. A possible merger of the Part 68 and 47 C.F.R definitions with such an updated definition is: HARM The term Harm means electrical hazards to the personnel of providers of communications, damage to the equipment of providers of communications, malfunction of the billing equipment of providers of communications, and unreasonable degradation of service to persons other than the user of the subject user device, his calling or called party. Unreasonable degradation includes harmful interference, defined as any emission, radiation or induction that seriously degrades, obstructs, or repeatedly interrupts a radio communication service. As with earlier proposed definitions, references to wireline have been removed, references to telecommunications have been replaced with communications, and references to terminal equipment have been replaced with user device. With harm defined, it is now possible to implement an any device rule. Although such rules currently exist in telephone, cable, and fixed broadband Internet networks, the implementation in fixed Internet access is under-developed and the implementation in cable MVPD networks is in flux. Fortunately, the implementation in telephone networks again provides a useful starting point. Part 68 states that users maintain the right to use any terminal equipment that does not harm the telephone network. The basic idea can be easily applied to all user devices, rather than just terminal equipment, and to all providers of communications services, rather than just to the public switched telephone network. A possible statement of this right is: ANY DEVICE User devices that do not cause harm may be directly connected to the facilities of the communications provider.
17 VOL. 1 JOURNAL OF INFORMATION POLICY 410 It remains to describe how user devices can be guaranteed not to cause harm. Part 68 gives users two options for ensuring that no harm is caused to telephone networks: to purchase devices that are certified not to cause harm or to insert protective circuitry between the device and the demarcation point. These options make sense for other types of networks, and thus this element of Part 68 regulation can also be applied broadly to all user devices by requiring that all user devices for communications services either be approved by an independent body that verifies conformance with standards that prevent harm, or be connected through protective circuitry. Common network devices currently meet this requirement since they almost invariably connect through standardized interfaces. An example of statutory language that implements this approach is: CERTIFICATION OF NO HARM User devices must be certified not to cause harm, or must connect through protective circuitry that is certified to prevent harm. Technical criteria published by a recognized national or international standards body are the presumptively valid technical criteria for the protection of the facilities of the communications provider from harms caused by the connection of user devices. These adaptations of Part 68 regulations acknowledge today s converged communications environment by updating the definition of harm to encompass both wireline and wireless networks. Similarly, the proposed statutory language expands recognized standardization bodies to include organizations associated with multiple platforms, as opposed to the existing code that refers exclusively to the certification body for telephone network devices. For instance, currently CableLabs must certify cable modems, while the Broadband Forum serves as the central organization for developing broadband packet networking specifications. The proposed legal approach thus combines the current device rights provided to telephone network users under Part 68, the new device rights of fixed broadband Internet access service users under the Open Internet Order, and current device rights of cable television users. Discrimination and Interconnection The proposed any device rule presented in the previous subsection should go a long way toward guaranteeing user right U2, the communications services user s right to connect any legal, nonharmful device to a communications network. However, the goal of any any device rule is often to ensure a competitive marketplace for devices, and merely allowing attachment does not suffice. The next two subsections tackle issues of potential discrimination through the offering of devices directly by a network provider. Section 202 of the Communications Act effectively deals with discrimination by common carriers. The inclusion of the phrase by any means or device in the section 202 prohibition on unjust or unreasonable discrimination served as a basis for the Carterfone decision, and thus the development of Part 68 regulations. 25 The section already applies to telecommunications services, including cellular voice service. However, as illustrated in the row in Table 1 above labeled Discrimination 25 Federal Communications Commission, FCC : Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Service (Carterfone Order), 420.
18 VOL. 1 JOURNAL OF INFORMATION POLICY 411 prohibited, it does not currently apply to mobile broadband Internet access service, and only selected elements have been applied to fixed broadband Internet access service and cable and satellite networks. Whether section 202 should apply to Internet access has been at the heart of the debate over net neutrality. The prohibition on unjust or unreasonable discrimination by device should apply to all providers of communications services, as defined above. Exceptions should be made for reasonable network management, and this provision can be subject to forbearance; both are addressed below. Application of section 202(a) to other types of networks merely requires replacing common carrier with provider of communications services: 26 DISCRIMINATION AND PREFERENCES It shall be unlawful for any provider of communications services to make any unjust or unreasonable discrimination in charges, practices, classifications, regulations, facilities, or services for or in connection with like communications service, directly or indirectly, by any means or device, or to make or give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person, class of persons, or locality, or to subject any particular person, class of persons, or locality to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage. Another issue that should be addressed in an any device rule is interconnection of devices. Increasingly, a user may connect a whole residential network to the Internet, rather than simply one or two devices. The issue is whether a user should have similar interconnection rights as providers. Unfortunately, there is not much guidance here. As illustrated in the row in Table 1 labeled Interconnection, this issue has not been addressed in a statute or regulation for any type of network. Nevertheless, there is some indication in current law of how this might be addressed. Section 251 of the Communications Act addresses interconnection between common carriers. In particular, section 251(c)(2) addresses interconnection between telecommunications carriers with local exchange carriers. It requires interconnection upon request and at a quality at least equal to that provided by the local exchange carrier to itself. This subsection can be applied to connection of user devices by requiring similar interconnection and quality to a subscriber network. An example of statutory language that implements this approach is: INTERCONNECTION A communications provider shall provide, for the facilities and equipment of any subscriber, interconnection with the communications provider s network (a) for communications services; (b) that is at least equal in quality to that provided by the communications provider to user devices provided to the subscriber; and (c) on rates, terms, and conditions that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory. A communications provider shall not require any communications or information service based on a subscriber s device. 26 An exception can be made for Title VI service, until such time as Title VI ceases to exist if and when the Communications Act is rewritten to accommodate converged networks. See for example Scott Jordan, A Layered Network Approach to Net Neutrality, International Journal of Communication 1 (2007):
19 VOL. 1 JOURNAL OF INFORMATION POLICY 412 This proposed language addresses all communications services rather than only those provided by telephone exchange service and exchange access. The 251(c)(2)(B) requirement for interconnection at any technically feasible point has been omitted, since the requirement for a standardized demarcation point adequately covers this. Together, these provisions ensure that devices supplied by a communications provider do not tilt the playing field in user devices and still support user right U2. The last sentence of the proposed interconnection statutory language prohibits communications providers from requiring a service on the basis of a subscriber s device. This provision is not present in section 251. However, such a prohibition is necessary to avoid an end-run around the previous provisions. For example, currently many cellular service providers require users to subscribe to a data plan if they use a smartphone; this provision would allow the user of a smartphone to subscribe to only a voice plan, if desired. Device and Service Plan Integration Finally, service plans are sometimes used to entice or require users to select particular devices. These subsidies may threaten a level playing field in devices. Consequently, there should be an additional provision directly addressing device subsidies. The key question is whether such subsidies entitle the communications provider to particular rights. Unfortunately, there is not much guidance here. As illustrated in the row in Table 1 labeled Subsidies, this issue has not been addressed in a statute or regulation for any type of network. Conflicting views on this issue arise because of integration between the device and services or content offered by the communications provider. The goals of CableCARD and AllVid can provide some guidance. Section 629 of the Communications Act gives the FCC authority to regulate navigation devices offered by MVPDs. This language directs the FCC to assure the commercial availability of converter boxes, interactive communications equipment, and other equipment used by consumers to access multichannel video programming from vendors not affiliated with any MVPD. The issue is not unique to MVPD networks. In cellular service contracts, providers commonly charge early termination fees, as well as lock handsets. Some value exists in these arrangements. However, in order to promote commercial availability of devices from vendors not affiliated with communications providers, regulations must limit the use of subsidies, early termination fees, locks, and other methods of integration between user devices and service plans. The following statutory language could be used to provide such safeguards: DEVICE SUBSIDIES (A) A communications provider or an affiliated equipment provider may supply a device to a subscriber through lease and/or purchase. If so, then (i) the communications provider shall offer communications and information services without requiring this device lease and/or purchase, and (ii) the communications provider s charge to a subscriber for such device shall be separately stated and not subsidized by charges for any service offered over the communications provider s network. (B) If a communications provider supplies a device through purchase, then (i) any subsidy shall be disclosed, and (ii) any early termination fee associated with the device shall be no greater than the device
20 VOL. 1 JOURNAL OF INFORMATION POLICY 413 subsidy, and shall decrease at least linearly over the life of the service contract. (C) A communications provider may charge a service initiation fee and/or an early termination fee associated with providing initial service to the subscriber, provided that any such early termination fee is no greater than the incremental cost of providing initial service minus the set-up fee. (D) When a communications provider supplies a subsidized device to a subscriber, it may restrict use of that device to its own network for the life of the service contract. Item (A)(ii) in this proposed language is adapted from section 629 of the Communications Act, but has been generalized to apply to all user devices and all communications providers. All other items in the provision are original. Item (A)(i) is required to ensure user right U2. Item (B)(i) for purchased devices mirrors the disclosure requirement (A)(ii) for leased devices. Items (B)(ii) and (C) place limits on early termination fees, based on a belief that there is no justification for these fees beyond ensuring a communication provider s right to recoup device subsidies and other service initiation costs. Item (D) allows a communications provider to lock a device, but only for the purposes of recouping a subsidy and for the life of the service contract. These provisions would ensure a competitive marketplace not just for set-top boxes, but for all communications devices. For instance, a cellular provider would have to allow a lower monthly rate for subscribers who bring their own devices. The combination of these provisions the application of section 202 and a portion of section 251 of the Communications Act, the broadening of Part 68 rules, and new language concerning the integration of devices and service plans can efficiently and effectively guarantee communications service users the right to connect legal non-harmful devices to a communications network. THE USER RIGHT TO RUN APPLICATIONS AND THE SERVICE PROVIDER RIGHT TO REASONABLE NETWORK MANAGEMENT The right of users to run applications of their choice on their devices (U3), the right of providers of communications services to charge for communications services provided to their subscribers (P1), and the right of communications service providers to use reasonable network management practices (P2) are often in tension with one another. Implementation of these rights requires addressing which parameters are necessary for a communications provider to control, and how these parameters can be established without violating the rights of users. Current Legal Approaches and Network Architecture The issue of network management was minimal in Part 68 regulations because telephone networks had little need to control terminal attachments. However, broadband Internet access providers must exercise significant control over some user devices, such as cable and DSL modems, in order to configure the service. Stating that users have the right to connect non-harmful devices and giving them the unfettered right of control over these devices undermines the ability of many providers to