Source: https://guo.com.au/law/author/guocomau/
Timestamp: 2020-02-17 04:33:57
Document Index: 462904856

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art 1', 'art 7', 'art 7', 'art 7', 'art 7', 'art 7']

Min | Law
In Asaad v Minister for Home Affairs (No 2) [2019] FCAFC 214 the Full Court explained the interaction of estoppel and public law duties.
Care however must be taken to not interpret the Court’s observations as laying down a blanket rule that it will always be lawful for a Minister to revisit the exercise of a discretion. For example, when it is the re-exercise of the discretion in relation to the same set of facts, it may be that the subsequent exercise is unlawful as an abuse of process, or an exercise of the duty for an improper purpose, or otherwise invalid because of bad faith. Assad does not preclude these conclusions in the appropriate scenario.
abuse of processbad faithestoppelimproper purpose
20/11/2019 Min	Leave a comment
In DQQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 784 at [10], Colvin J said:
a submission by counsel appearing for the Minister that a decision under appeal is not attended with any doubt, or sufficient doubt or error must reflect the independent judgment of counsel after considering all of the materials in performance of counsel’s paramount duty to the Court. It is not to be based upon the lack of particularisation of grounds by an appellant who is appearing in person.
unrepresented applicant
11/11/2019 Min	Leave a comment
Mortimer J stated in CPE15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 591 at [60]:
The “reasonably foreseeable future” is something of an ambulatory period of time, but the use of reasonable foreseeability as the benchmark concept indicates that the assessment is intended to be one which can be made on the basis of probative material, without extending into guesswork. It is also intended to preclude predictions of the future that are so far removed in point of time from the life of the person concerned at the time the person is returned to her or his country of nationality as to bear insufficient connection to the reality of what that person may experience. The purpose of the “well-founded” aspect of the Art 1A test is, after all, to be an objective but realistic and accurate assessment of what risks a person may face in the practical “on the ground” circumstances she or he will be living in. Using “reasonably foreseeable” also carries with it a rejection of an assessment which becomes too remote from a person’s expected life circumstances. These are not matters which can be expressed sensibly with any more precision
09/07/2019 Min	Leave a comment
It is surprising how often people still think that complementary protection requires the identification of a motivation or reason for the feared harm. The proposition is plainly wrong.
In AON15 v Minister For Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 48 at [3], Besanko J said:
Furthermore, the appellant submitted that no Convention “nexus” is required to attract the operation of the complementary protection criterion. I accept both of these propositions.
Of course, this is different to reasoning along the lines of that since the asserted motivation for the harm is not believed (as opposed to not connected to some kind of Convention nexus), there is no real risk. This kind of reasoning is plainly permissible.
13/03/2019 Min	Leave a comment
In Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CPA16 [2019] FCAFC 40 the Full Court unanimously dismissed the Minister’s appeal, finding that on those facts, the Secretary’s breach of his obligation under s 473CB to provide all relevant documents to the IAA disabled the IAA from completing its review task. At [43]-[51] the Court rejected the Minister’s submission that the missing documents could not have made a difference to the outcome (applying SZMTA), essentially because the Minister’s submissions were ones as to the merits.
CPA16 follows EVS17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 20 in which the Full Court discussed the differences between the obligations of the Secretary under Part 7 (s 418) and Part 7AA (s 473CB). There, the Court rejected the proposition that cases such as WAGP were relevant to breaches of the obligation under Part 7AA. The effect of EVS17 and CPA16 is that a breach of the obligation under Part 7AA is more likely to be a jurisdictional error than of the equivalent obligation under Part 7, with the focus on the materiality of the withheld information and whether there is a possibility that the withheld information could have made a difference. This is in contrast to WAGP and SZOIN, which, if correct, appear to limit findings of jurisdictional error to something more than mere materiality (see eg SZOIN at [64]: ‘at least without something more’).
In Omar v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 279, Direction 75 was found not to be sufficient to overcome the defects defects identified in Direction 65 by BCR16.
whether a person is owed non-refoulement obligations is not the same as whether a person might be granted a protection visa: see [58], [76], and also Ali at [28]
whether a person is owed non-refoulement obligations and whether to comply with those questions is not the same as merely assessing the risk of harm, but instead also requires consideration of the significance of adhering to international law as ‘another reason’ to revoke a cancellation (notwithstanding s 197C, because s 197C/198 operate after a refusal to revoke a cancellation): see [65]-[66]
direction 65direction 75non-refoulement