Source: https://casetext.com/case/wilwording-v-swenson-6
Timestamp: 2020-02-28 15:18:10
Document Index: 111438947

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2255', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1343', '§ 1983', '§ 1343', '§ 1361', '§ 216', '§ 526', '§ 1983', '§ 2254', '§ 21']

Wilwording v. Swenson, 439 F.2d 1331 | Casetext
Petitioners were entitled to have their actions treated as claims for relief under the Civil Rights Acts, to…
The more serious question addresses itself, however, to whether or not counsel had the right to waive oral…
Full title:Alan Daniel WILWORDING, Appellant, v. Harold R. SWENSON, Warden,…
Date published: Mar 16, 1971
439 F.2d 1331 (8th Cir. 1971)
Nos. 20264, 20313 and 20421.
None of the petitioners is attacking the legality of his conviction or detention. Each petitioner has been convicted of substantial and serious crimes and has already collaterally tested the legality of his judgment of conviction. These current petitions do not seek release from custody but seek relief from alleged illegal restrictive confinement and present other complaints about treatment received from prison guards and employees and other conditions of confinement.
Case No. 20264 — Wilwording was convicted of first degree robbery in 1964 and sentenced to a term of 20 years.
It is alleged that each petitioner is in a maximum security section; that the facilities are inadequate in many ways and lack conveniences for hygiene, recreational, educational and religious practices, thus depriving the petitioners of the basic amenities of life guaranteed by the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. In addition, three of the petitioners allege physical mistreatment by prison employees and all contend that their conditions of confinement are more stringent and restrictive than is necessary for the maintenance of prison discipline and security.
Each petititioner has attempted to present these complaints to the Missouri courts, either by a petition for habeas corpus or by a proceeding under Rule 27.26 of the Missouri Supreme Court, V.A.M.R., which is analogous to a federal proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (Section 2255 provides a method of collateral attack upon a federal sentence where the petitioner claims the right to be released from custody upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or the laws of the United States). In all cases the petitioners' complaints were dismissed by the Missouri Supreme Court for failure to state grounds upon which relief could be granted. The Missouri Supreme Court in Goodman v. Swenson (No. 54872), considered the propriety of the use of state habeas corpus to test conditions of confinement in the Missouri penal system and dismissed without opinion the petition as failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, thus viewing the writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum as available only to release a prisoner from unlawful imprisonment. And the State's brief says that all petitioners seeking relief from alleged unconstitutional conditions of confinement by way of habeas corpus have been denied by the Missouri Supreme Court on the same ground of failure to state a claim.
While there is no uniformity of treatment among the circuits as to the precise scope of the habeas corpus writ, the courts have recognized the traditional scope of habeas corpus as extending basically to the legality of the confinement, but also have granted relief from certain conditions of confinement. The courts, moreover, have liberally construed the pro se complaints of inmates and have been inclined to grant some type of relief where proof of the conditions alleged would clearly indicate that relief is merited. Roberts v. Pegelow, 313 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1963). Roberts held that while the traditional function of the habeas corpus writ is to test legality of detention the court has a discretionary right to treat the complaint as one for injunctive relief.
The Annual Report of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts reveals that in 1970, state prisoners filed 11,812 petitions in the federal district courts. Of this number, 9063 were petitions for habeas corpus and 2749 were "other petitions". It seems reasonable to surmise that the bulk of these "other petitions" constituted complaints under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and, of course, we have no way of knowing how many of the habeas corpus petitions contained complaints more properly founded upon § 1983, but undoubtedly many of them did. This represented an increase of 350 per cent in all state prisoner filings over 1963. The "other petitions" filed represented an increase of almost 41 per cent over 1969, and an increase of 430 per cent since 1963.
In this circuit we have accepted jurisdiction on complaints denominated as habeas corpus, writs of mandamus, and petition for physical examination as petitions for injunctive relief under the Civil Rights Statutes, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) and (4) and viewed the cases brought therein as class actions within the scope of Rule 23, Fed.R.Civ.P. Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968). In an exhaustive opinion relating to prisoners' complaints about treatment amounting to cruel and unusual punishment in the Arkansas state prison system, Judge (now Mr. Justice) Blackmun approved the practice of treating prisoners' handwritten petitions, styled as petitions for habeas corpus and for writ of mandamus, as proceedings under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) and (4). Accord, Sharp v. Sigler, 408 F.2d 966 (8th Cir. 1968); cf. Cates v. Ciccone, 422 F.2d 926 (8th Cir. 1970). This practice has also received the approval of other circuits. See Smart v. Avery, 370 F.2d 788 (6th Cir. 1967); and see also Long v. Parker, 390 F.2d 816 (3d Cir. 1968), where the court treated the habeas corpus petition of a federal prisoner as a proceeding in the nature of mandamus under 28 U.S.C. § 1361.
Therefore, we think petitioners should respect Missouri rules of procedure and make an effort to fully present their claims for equitable relief to the Missouri courts by mandamus or prohibition for the claimed violations of §§ 216.445, 216.450, 222.020 R.S.Mo., V.A.M.S., or by way of an injunction seeking relief from alleged deprivation of constitutionally or otherwise legally protected rights. See § 526.030 R.S.Mo., V.A.M.S. To the extent that these petitions are not cognizable in habeas corpus under Cates v. Ciccone, supra, the District Court's decision is correct and the petitioners must look elsewhere for a forum. However, to the extent their complaints are cognizable in federal habeas corpus, which does include certain conditions of confinement or treatment, the rules and statutory procedures governing habeas corpus should be followed. We recognize that some conditions of confinement or treatment might properly be justiciable issues under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and under other federal statutes. However, in dealing with the present petitions as proceedings seeking equitable relief or injunctions under the habeas corpus writ, the federal courts should respect the congressional mandate of § 2254 of Title 28 U.S.C. requiring that the petitioner "exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the state, or that there is either an absence of available state corrective process or the existence of circumstances rendering such processes ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner."
Exhaustion requires the petitioner to raise the issue "by any available procedure" and comprehends an opinion of the highest state court on the merits of the precise issue involved, provided state procedures are available. See Kennedy v. Sigler, 397 F.2d 556 (8th Cir. 1968); State of Louisiana ex rel. Gwin v. Dees, 410 F.2d 321 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 918, 90 S.Ct. 241, 24 L.Ed.2d 196 (1969); and Thompson v. Peyton, 406 F.2d 473 (4th Cir. 1968). The denial by the Missouri Supreme Court of the habeas corpus petitions for failure to state a claim on which any relief can be granted does not exhaust all available state remedies. See Cox v. Nash, 226 F. Supp. 87 (W.D. Mo. 1964); Russell v. Swenson, 251 F. Supp. 196 (W.D.Mo. 1966).
The State of Missouri has statutory enactments respecting the operations and administrations of penal institutions. These provisions are certainly enforceable within the state court structure by some type of proceeding, either by mandamus, prohibition, injunction or other equitable proceeding. In addition, the state structure of government from the governor on down is responsive to the needs and aspirations of the citizens of the state and to the complaints of those who claim to be oppressed. Missouri, in fact, has one of the best post-conviction reviews set up by Supreme Court Rule 27.26 whereby a full hearing with counsel is provided (for release from confinement). And the State courts should be afforded the opportunity, within their own procedural rules, to pass upon complaints of unconstitutional treatment of state prisoners.
In closing we think it appropriate to note the suggestion of the Attorney General of Missouri that the State of Missouri has statutory provisions relating to penal discipline, prison administration and conditions of judicially imposed confinements. When these laws are violated the Attorney General suggests that a prisoner may bring a suit for injunction, a writ of prohibition, or mandamus or a declaratory judgment in the state courts seeking relief. We have no way of knowing whether such petitions would be successful in reaching the merits, but that is no reason why cases of this type should not be presented to the Missouri courts in an appropriately recognized proceeding. And we assume that the Missouri courts will be diligent in protecting prisoners' rights where a proper case is presented. See Miller v. Owsley, 422 S.W.2d 39 (Mo. 1967).
See footnotes 4 and 5. In addition Missouri Constitution, V.A.M.S., Article I, § 21 prohibits cruel and unusual punishment.