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Nlrb Vs Allis Chalmers Mfg Co - Citation 101599 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Save as PDF Add a Tag Add a Note Semantics Visualize Nlrb Vs. Allis-chalmers Mfg. Co. - Court Judgment	LegalCrystal Citationlegalcrystal.com/101599CourtUS Supreme CourtDecided OnJun-12-1967Case Number388 U.S. 175AppellantNlrbRespondentAllis-chalmers Mfg. Co.Excerpt:
nlrb v. allis-chalmers mfg. co. - 388 u.s. 175 (1967)
lawful economic strikes were called at two of respondent allis chalmers' plants in accordance with duly authorized union procedures by the locals of the union representing the employees. some union members crossed picket lines and worked during the strikes. after the strikes were over, the locals brought proceedings against these members, imposed fines of $20 to $100, and sued..... Judgment:
1. The history of legislative action surrounding § 8(b)(1)(A)'s prohibition of union activity to "restrain or coerce" employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by § 7 justifies the conclusion, in light of the imprecision of the words "restrain or coerce," and the repeated refrain throughout the debates that Congress did not propose limitations on the internal affairs of unions, that Congress did not intend § 8(b)(1)(A) to prohibit the imposition of reasonable fines on full union members who decline to honor an authorized strike or to prohibit attempts to collect such fines. Pp.
388 U. S. 178
2. Since Allis-Chalmers offered no evidence that the fined employees enjoyed other than full union membership, the contrary will not be presumed. The question of the applicability of the statute to employees whose membership was limited to the obligation to pay monthly dues is not presented here. Pp.
388 U. S. 196
The question here is whether a union which threatened and imposed fines, and brought suit for their collection, against members who crossed the union's picket line and went to work during an authorized strike against their employer committed the unfair labor practice under § 8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act of engaging in conduct "to restrain or coerce" employees in the exercise of their right guaranteed by § 7 to "refrain from" concerted activities. [
Allis-Chalmers filed unfair labor practice charges against the locals alleging violation of § 8(b)(1)(A). [
It is highly unrealistic to regard § 8(b)(1), and particularly its words "restrain or coerce," as precisely and unambiguously covering the union conduct involved in this case. On its face, court enforcement of fines imposed on members for violation of membership obligations is no more conduct to "restrain or coerce" satisfaction of such obligations than court enforcement of penalties imposed on citizens for violation of their obligations as citizens to pay income taxes or court awards of damages against a contracting party for nonperformance of a contractual obligation voluntarily undertaken. But even if the inherent imprecision of the words "restrain or coerce" may be overlooked, recourse to legislative history to determine the sense in which Congress used the words is not foreclosed. We have only this Term again admonished that labor legislation is peculiarly the product of legislative compromise of strongly held views,
Local 1976, Carpenters' Union v. Labor Board,
357 U. S. 99
-100, and that legislative history may not be disregarded merely because it is arguable that a provision may unambiguously embrace conduct called in question.
National Woodwork Mfrs Assn. v. NLRB,
-620. Indeed, we have applied that principle to the construction of 8(b)(1)(A) itself in holding that the section must be construed in light of the fact that it
Labor Board v. Drivers Local Union,
362 U. S. 274
362 U. S. 292
. Thus, only the union may contract the employee's terms and conditions of employment, [
] and provisions for processing his grievances; the union may even bargain away his right to strike during the contract term [
] and his right to refuse to cross a lawful picket line. [
] The employee may disagree with many of the union decisions, but is bound by them. "The majority-rule concept is today unquestionably at the center of our federal labor policy." [
. For the same reason, Congress, in the 1959 Landrum-Griffin amendments, 73 Stat. 519, enacted a code of fairness to assure democratic conduct of union affairs by provisions guaranteeing free speech and assembly, equal rights to vote in elections, to attend meetings, and to participate in the deliberations and voting upon the business conducted at the meetings.
Integral to this federal labor policy has been the power in the chosen union to protect against erosion its status under that policy through reasonable discipline of members who violate rules and regulations governing membership. [
] That power is particularly vital when the members engage in strikes. The economic strike against the employer is the ultimate weapon in labor's arsenal for achieving agreement upon its terms, and "[t]he power to fine or expel strikebreakers is essential if the union is to be an effective bargaining agent. . . ." [
] Provisions in
union constitutions and bylaws for fines and expulsion of recalcitrants, including strikebreakers, are therefore commonplace, and were commonplace at the time of the Taft-Hartley amendments. [
In addition, the judicial view current at the time § 8(b)(1)(A) was passed was that provisions defining punishable conduct and the procedures for trial and appeal constituted part of the contract between member and union, and that "The courts' role is but to enforce the contract." [
Machinists v. Gonzales,
356 U. S. 618
, we recognized that "[t]his contractual conception of the relation between a member and his union widely prevails in this country. . . ." Although state courts were reluctant to intervene in internal union affairs, a body of law establishing standards of fairness in the enforcement of union discipline grew up around this contract
See Parks v. Electrical Workers,
314 F.2d 886, 902-903. [
To say that Congress meant in 1947 by the § 7 amendments and § 8(b)(1)(A) to strip unions of the power to fine members for strikebreaking, however lawful the strike vote and however fair the disciplinary procedures and penalty, is to say that Congress preceded the Landrum-Griffin amendments with an even more pervasive regulation of the internal affairs of unions. It is also to attribute to Congress an intent at war with the understanding of the union-membership relation which has been at the heart of its effort "to fashion a coherent labor policy" and which has been a predicate underlying action by this Court and the state courts. More importantly, it is to say that Congress limited unions in the powers necessary to the discharge of their role as exclusive statutory bargaining agents by impairing the usefulness of labor's cherished strike weapon. It is no answer that the proviso to 8(b)(1)(A) preserves to the union the power to expel the offending member. Where the union is strong, and membership therefore valuable, to require expulsion of the member visits a far more severe penalty upon the member than a reasonable fine. Where the union is weak, and membership therefore of little value, the union, faced with further depletion of its ranks, may have no real choice except to condone the member's disobedience. [
"The committee did not desire to limit the labor organization with respect to either its selection of membership or expulsion therefrom. But the committee did wish to protect the employee in his job if unreasonably expelled or denied membership. The tests provided by the amendment are based upon facts readily ascertainable, and
the employer to inquire into the internal affairs of the union.
The pending measure does not propose any limitation with respect to the internal affairs of unions.
They still will be able to fire any members they wish to fire,
and they still will be able to try any of their members.
All that they will not be able to do, after the enactment of this bill, is this: if they fire a member for some reason other than nonpayment of dues, they cannot make his employer discharge him from his job and throw him out of work. That is the only result of the provision under discussion. [
at 50, I Leg.Hist. 456. Senator Ball proposed § 8(b)(1)(A) as an amendment to the Senate bill, and stated,
93 Cong.Rec. 4016, II Leg.Hist. 1018. Senator Ball gave numerous examples of the kind of union conduct the amendment was to cover. Each one related to union conduct during organizational campaigns. [
Senator Ball reiterated this purpose several times thereafter, [
] including remarks added after passage of the amendment. [
] The consistent thrust of his arguments was the necessity of controlling union conduct in organizational campaigns. Indeed, when Senator Holland introduced the proviso eliminating from the reach of 8(b)(1)(A) "the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership . . . ," Senator Ball replied,
"I merely wish to state to the Senate that the amendment offered by the Senator from Florida is perfectly agreeable to me.
It was never the intention of the sponsors of the pending amendment to interfere with the internal affairs or organization of unions.
"That modification is designed to make it clear that we are not trying to interfere with the internal affairs of a union which is already organized. All we are trying to cover is the coercive and restraining acts of the union in its effort to organize unorganized employees. [
to protect employees in their freedom to decide whether or not they desire to join labor organizations, to prevent them from being restrained or coerced. [
Senator Taft also initially confined his comments on the amendment to examples of organizational tactics. [
] However, in debate with Senator Pepper, he suggested a broader but still limited application:
"If there is anything clear in the development of labor union history in the past 10 years, it is that more and more labor union employees have come to be subject to the orders of labor union leaders. The bill provides for the right to protest against
arbitrary powers which have been exercised by some of the labor union leaders.
"I think it is fair to say that, in the case of many of the unions, the employee has a good deal more of an opportunity to select his employer than he has to select his labor union leader. [
"The Congress has gone much further in protecting the rights of minority stockholders in corporations than it has in protecting the rights of members of unions.
in this bill, we do not tell the unions how they shall vote or how they shall conduct their affairs. . . .
(Emphasis supplied.) Senator Pepper attempted twice to clarify the effect of the amendment on internal affairs, but Senator Taft answered only that the amendment applied to nonunion men as well. [
It was one week after this debate between Senator Taft and Senator Pepper that § 8(b)(1)(A) was adopted by the Senate as an amendment to the bill. There was no further reference in the debates to the applicability of the section to internal union affairs, by Senator Taft or anyone else, despite the repeated statements by Senator Ball that it bore no relationship to the conduct of such affairs. At one point, Senator Saltonstall asked Senator Taft to provide examples of the kind of union conduct covered by the section. Senator Taft responded with examples of threats of bodily harm, economic coercion, and mass picketing in organizational campaigns and coercion which prevented employees not involved in a labor dispute from going to work. [
] But any inference
It is true that there are references in the Senate debate on § 8(b)(1)(A) to an intent to impose the same prohibitions on unions that applied to employers as regards restraint and coercion of employees in their exercise of § 7 rights. [
] However apposite this parallel might be when applied to organizational tactics, it clearly is inapplicable
to the relationship of a union member to his own union. Union membership allows the member a part in choosing the very course of action to which he refuses to adhere, but he has, of course, no role in employer conduct, and nonunion employees have no voice in the affairs of the union. [
Cogent support for an interpretation of the body of 8(b)(1) as not reaching the imposition of fines and attempts at court enforcement is the proviso to § 8(b)(1). It states that nothing in the section shall "impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein. . . ." Senator Holland offered the proviso during debate, and Senator Ball immediately accepted it, stating that it was not the intent of the sponsors in any way to regulate the internal affairs of unions. [
] At the very least, it can be said that the proviso preserves the rights of unions to impose fines, as a lesser penalty than
expulsion, and to impose fines which carry the explicit or implicit threat of expulsion for nonpayment. Therefore, under the proviso, the rule in the UAW constitution governing fines is valid, and the fines themselves and expulsion for nonpayment would not be an unfair labor practice. Assuming that the proviso cannot also be read to authorize court enforcement of fines, a question we need not reach, [
] the fact remains that to interpret the body of § 8(b)(1) to apply to the imposition and collection of fines would be to impute to Congress a concern with the permissible
of enforcement of union fines and to attribute to Congress a narrow and discrete interest in banning court enforcement of such fines. Yet there is not one word in the legislative history evidencing any such congressional concern. And, as we have pointed out, a distinction between court enforcement and expulsion would have been anomalous for several reasons. First, Congress was operating within the context of the "contract theory" of the union-member relationship which widely prevailed at that time. The efficacy of a contract is precisely its legal enforceability. A lawsuit is, and has been, the ordinary way by which performance of private money obligations is compelled. Second, as we have noted, such a distinction would visit upon the member of a strong union a potentially more severe punishment than court enforcement of fines, while impairing the bargaining facility of the weak union by requiring it either to condone misconduct or deplete its ranks.
There may be concern that court enforcement may permit the collection of unreasonably large fines. [
even were there evidence that Congress shared this concern, [
]this would not justify reading the Act also to bar court enforcement of reasonable fines. [
The 1959 Landrum-Griffin amendments, thought to be the first comprehensive regulation by Congress of the conduct of internal union affairs, [
] also negate the reach
362 U. S. 291
-292. In 1959, Congress did seek to protect union members in their relationship to the union by adopting measures to insure the provision of democratic processes in the conduct of union affairs and procedural due process to members subjected to discipline. Even then, some Senators emphasized that,
union leadership. The 1959 amendments are addressed to that concern. The kind of regulation of internal union affairs which Senator Taft said protected stockholders of a corporation, and made necessary a "right of protest against arbitrary powers which have been exercised by some of the labor union leaders," [
] is embodied in the 1959 Act. The requirements of adherence to democratic principles, fair procedures and freedom of speech apply to the election of union officials and extend into all aspects of union affairs. [
] In the present case, the procedures followed for calling the strikes and disciplining the recalcitrant members fully comported with these requirements, and were in every way fair and democratic. Whether § 8(b)(1)(A) proscribes arbitrary imposition of fines, or punishment for disobedience of a fiat of a union leader, are matters not presented by this case, and upon which we express no view.
358 F.2d at 660. But the relevant inquiry here is not what motivated a member's full membership, but whether the Taft-Hartley amendments prohibited disciplinary measures against a full member who crossed his union's picket line. It is clear that the fined employees involved herein enjoyed full union membership. Each executed the pledge of allegiance to the UAW constitution and took the oath of full membership. Moreover, the record of the Milwaukee County Court case against Benjamin Natzke discloses that two disciplined employees testified that they had fully participated in the proceedings leading to the strike. They attended the meetings at which the secret strike vote and the renewed strike vote were taken. It was upon this and similar evidence that the Milwaukee County Court found that Natzke "had, by his actions, become a member of the union for all purposes. . . ." Allis-Chalmers offered no evidence in this proceeding that any of the fined employees enjoyed other than full union membership. We will not presume the contrary.
Cf. Machinists v. Street,
367 U. S. 774
] Indeed, it
is and has been Allis-Chalmers' position that the Taft-Hartley prohibitions apply whatever the nature of the membership. Whether those prohibitions would apply if the locals had imposed fines on members whose membership was, in fact, limited to the obligation of paying monthly dues is a question not before us, and upon which we intimate no view. [
"(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7:
That this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein. . . ."
Two locals were involved, Local 248 at the West Allis plant, and Local 401 at the La Crosse plant. Although Allis-Chalmers' charges of unfair labor practices mentioned threats of fines as well as imposition of fines, the only proof that fines were specifically threatened during a strike consisted of a letter to strike-breaking West Allis members of Local 248 in 1959. As to the 1962 strike at West Allis and both the 1959 and 1962 strikes at La Crosse, mention of fines first occurred after the strikes were over. The threat of court enforcement of the fines was first made in 1960 in letters sent to fined members of Local 248 who had not paid their fines; the letter informed them of the outcome of a Wisconsin Supreme Court opinion holding fines enforceable,
UAW, Local 756 v. Woychik,
5 Wis.2d 528, 93 N.W.2d 336 (1958). Local 401's test suit was brought after the 1962 strike.
See J. I. Case Co. v. Labor Board,
Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. Labor Board,
321 U. S. 678
ILGWU v. Labor Board,
See Mastro Plastics Corp. v. Labor Board,
See Labor Board v. Rockaway News Co.,
Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 Harv.L.Rev. 1049 (1951); Philip Taft, The Structure and Government of Labor Unions 117-180 (1954); Taylor, The Role of Unions in a Democratic Society, Selected Readings on Government Regulation of Internal Union Affairs Affecting the Rights of Members, prepared for the Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare 17 (Committee Print, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 1958) (hereafter Selected Readings); Kerr, Unions and Union Leaders of Their Own Choosing, Selected Readings,
at 106, 109.
7, at 1049.
It is suggested that, while such provisions for fines and expulsion were a common element of union constitutions at the time of the enactment of § 8(b)(1), such background loses its cogency here, because such provisions did not explicitly call for court enforcement. However the potentiality of resort to courts for enforcement is implicit in any binding obligation. Surely it cannot be said that the absence of a "court enforceability" clause in a contract of sale implies that the parties do not foresee resort to the courts as a possible means of enforcement. It is also suggested that court enforcement of fines is "a rather recent innovation." Yet such enforcement was known as early as 1867.
Master Stevedores' Assn. v. Walsh,
2 Daly 1 (N.Y.).
Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43 Harv.L.Rev. 993 (1930); Note, Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associations, 76 Harv.L.Rev. 983 (1963); Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of 1959, 58 Mich.L.Rev. 819, 835-836 (1960).
Summers, Disciplinary Powers of Unions, 3 Ind.Lab.Rel.Rev. 483:
93 Cong.Rec. 4435-4436, II Leg.Hist. 1205-1206. The following statement of Senator Taft had no reference to the conduct of a union
a member who crossed the union's picket line, but referred to union conduct in preventing employees not in the bargaining unit from going to work -- "mass picketing, which absolutely prevents all the office force from going into the office of a plant."
"[i]ts application to
may have a slightly different implication, but it seems to me perfectly clear that, from the point of view of the
the two cases are parallel."
statement of Justice Stone in
South Carolina Hwy. Dept. v. Barnwell Bros.,
303 U. S. 184
"Underlying the stated rule has been the thought, often expressed in judicial opinion, that,
In 1958, in
356 U. S. 620
Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of 1959, 58 Mich.L.Rev. 819, 852:
Machinists v. Street,
we held that employees who were members of a union under a union security agreement authorized by the Railway Labor Act, had a right to relief against a union using their dues payments for political purposes. We said, at
373 U. S. 742
Not before us is the question of the extent to which union action for enforcement of disciplinary penalties is preempted by federal labor law.
Compare Machinists v. Gonzales,
Plumbers' Union v. Borden,
even though expulsion to enforce it would be a clear and serious brand of "coercion" imposed in derogation of those § 7 rights. Such restraint and coercion Congress permitted by adding the proviso to § 8(b)(1)(A). Thus, neither the majority nor the dissent in this case questions the validity of the union rule against its members' crossing picket lines during a properly called strike, or the propriety of expulsion to enforce the rule. Section 8(b)(1)(A), therefore, does not bar
restraint and coercion by a union to prevent the exercise by its members of their § 7 rights. "Coercive" union rules are enforceable at least by expulsion.
"make the prohibition contained in section 8(b)(1) apply to coercive acts of unions against employees who did not wish to join
or did not care to participate in a strike or picket line.
failure to participate; it is essential that weak unions have the choice between expulsion and court-enforced fines, simply because the latter are more effective, in the sense of being more punitive. Though the entire mood of Congress in 1947 was to curtail the power of unions, as it had previously curtailed the power of employers, in order to equalize the power of the two, the Court is unwilling to believe that Congress intended to impair "the usefulness of labor's cherished strike weapon." [
] I cannot agree with this conclusion, or subscribe to the Court's unarticulated premise that the Court has power to add a new weapon to the union's economic arsenal whenever the Court believes that the union needs that weapon. That is a job for Congress, not this Court.
intra-union means. [
] As the Court recognizes, expulsion for nonpayment of a fine may, especially in the case of a strong union, be more severe than judicial collection of the fine. But, if the union membership has little value and if the fine is great, then court enforcement of the fine may be more effective punishment, and that is precisely why the Court desires to provide weak unions with this alternative to expulsion, an alternative which is similar to a criminal court's power to imprison defendants who fail to pay fines.
In this case, each strikebreaking employee was fined from $20 to $100, and the union initiated a "test case" in state court to collect the fines. In notifying the employees of the charges against them, however, the union warned them that each day they crossed the picket line and went to work might be considered a separate offense punishable by a fine of $100. In several of the cases, the strikes lasted for many months. Thus, although the union here imposed minimal fines for the purpose of its "test case," it is not too difficult to imagine a case where the fines will be so large that the threat of their imposition will absolutely restrain employees from going to work during a strike. Although an employee might be willing to work even if it meant the loss of union membership, he would have to be well paid indeed to work at the risk that he would have to pay his union $100 a day for each day worked. Of course, as the Court suggests, he might be able to defeat the union's attempt at judicial enforcement of the fine by showing it was "unreasonable" or that he was not a "full member" of the union, but few employees would have the courage or the financial means to be willing to take that risk.
The Court disposes of this tremendous practical difference between court-enforced and union-enforced fines by suggesting that Congress was not concerned with "the permissible means of enforcement of union fines," and that court-enforcement of fines is a necessary consequence of the "contract theory" of the union-member relationship. And then the Court cautions that its holding may only apply to court enforcement of "reasonable fines." Apparently the Court believes that these considerations somehow bring reasonable court-enforced fines within the ambit of "internal union affairs." There is no basis either historically or logically for this conclusion or the considerations upon which it is based. First, the Court says that disciplinary fines were commonplace at the time the Taft-Hartley Act was passed, and thus Congress could not have meant to prohibit these "traditional internal union discipline" measures without saying so. Yet there is not one word in the authorities cited by the Court that indicates that court enforcement of fines was commonplace or traditional in 1947, and, to the contrary, until recently, unions rarely resorted to court enforcement of union fines. [
] Second, Congress' unfamiliarity in 1947 with this recent innovation and consequent failure to make any distinction between union-enforced and court-enforced fines cannot support the conclusion that Congress was unconcerned with the "means" a union uses to enforce its fines. Congress was expressly concerned with enacting "rules of the game" for unions to abide by. 93 Cong.Rec. 4436, II Leg.Hist. 1206. As noted by the Labor Board the year after § (b)(1)(A)
was passed, "[i]n that Section Congress was aiming at means, not at ends."
Perry Norvell Co.,
80 N.L.R.B. 225, 239. At the very least, Congress intended to preclude a union's use of certain means to collect fines. It is clear, as the Court recognizes, that Congress, in enacting § 8(b)(2), was concerned with insulating an employee's job from his union membership. If the union here had attempted to enforce the payment of the fines by persuading the employer to discharge the nonpaying employees or to withhold the fines from their wages, it would have clearly been guilty of an unfair labor practice under § 8(b)(2). [
] If the union here, operating under a union shop contract, had applied the employees' dues to the satisfaction of the fines and then charged them extra dues, that, under Board decisions, would have been a violation of § 8(b)(1)(A), since it would have jeopardized the employees' jobs. [
] Yet here, the union has resorted to equally effective outside assistance to enforce the payment of its fines, and the Court holds that within the ambit of "internal union discipline." I have already pointed to the impact that $100 per day court-enforced fines may have on an employee's job -- they would totally discourage him from working at all -- and I fail to see how court enforcement of union fines is any more "internal" than employer enforcement. The undeniable fact is that the union resorts to outside help when it is not strong enough to enforce obedience internally. And even if the union does not resort to outside help, but uses threats of physical violence by its officers or other members to compel payment of its fines,
Finally, the Court attempts to justify court-enforcement of fines by comparing it to judicial enforcement of the provisions of an ordinary commercial contract -- a comparison which, according to the Court's own authority, is simply "a legal fabrication." [
] The contractual theory of union membership, at least until recently, was a fiction used by the courts to justify judicial intervention in union affairs to protect employees, not to help unions. I cannot believe that Congress intended the effectiveness of § 8(b)(1)(A) to be impaired by such a fiction, [
] or that it was content to rely on the state courts' use of this fiction to protect members from union coercion. [
] Particularly is that so where the "contract" between the union and the employee is the involuntary
The repeated refrain of the debates on § 8(b)(1)(A) was actually that it was aimed to secure "equality . . . between employers and employees." [
] Over and over
again, Senator Taft and others emphasized that, if a union indulges in conduct that would be an unfair labor practice on the part of an employer, it too should be guilty of an unfair labor practice. [
] Although the Court deems "this parallel . . . clearly . . . inapplicable to the relationship of a union member to his own union," it is clear that the sponsors of § 8(b)(1)(A) did not think so. Several times, Senator Pepper tried to persuade Senator Taft that there was a difference between an employee's relation to his employer and his relation to his union. On each occasion, Senator Taft replied, "I cannot see any difference." 93 Cong.Rec. 4022, II Leg.Hist. 1026, 1027. When Senator Pepper asked whether the words "restrain or coerce" might have a different application to unions than to employers, Senator Taft replied:
"The Board has been defining those words for 12 years, ever since it [the Act] came into existence. Its application to labor organizations may have a slightly different implication, but it seems to me perfectly clear that, from the point of view of the employee, the two cases are parallel. . . . If there is anything clear in the development of labor union history in the past 10 years, it is that more and more
have come to be subject to the orders of labor union leaders. The bill provides for the right of protest against arbitrary powers which have been exercised by some of the labor union leaders. Certainly it seems to me that, if we are willing to accept the principle that employees are entitled to the same protection against labor union leaders as against employers, then I can see no reasonable objection to the amendment. . . ."
"I think it is fair to say that, in the case of many of the unions, the employee has a good deal more of an opportunity to select his employer than he has to select his labor union leader, and even if he has that opportunity . . . , the man who is elected may have been voted against by various of the employees who did not desire to have that particular man elected as the union leader. In such cases, the very fact that they did vote against that man is often used later by the union as a means of coercing such employees, and,
in some cases, the union expels them from the union or subjects them to treatment which interferes with their rights as American citizens.
93 Cong.Rec. 4023, II Leg.Hist. 1028. (Emphasis added.) And finally, when Senator Pepper charged that the "amendment is an effort to protect the workers against their own leaders," Senator Taft did not deny it. [
] He clearly stated that the bill was designed to warn unions "that they do not have the right to interfere with or coerce employees, either
or those outside their union." 93 Cong.Rec. 4025, II Leg.Hist. 1032. (Emphasis added.)
by unions against nonmember employees. But to say that § 8(b)(1)(A) covers
coercive organizational tactics, which the Court comes very close to doing, is to ignore much of the legislative history. It is clear that § 8(b)(1)(A) was intended to protect union as well as nonunion employees from coercive tactics of unions, and such protection would hardly be provided if the section applied only to organizational tactics. Also, it is clear that Congress was much more concerned with nonviolent economic coercion than with threats of physical violence. As Senator Ball, who introduced the section, put it: "But we are less concerned here with actual acts of violence than we are with threats. . . ." [
] And Senator Taft noted: "There are plenty of methods of coercion short of actual physical violence." [
] Examples were given of cases where unions threatened to double the dues of employees who waited until later to join. [
] It is difficult to see how fining a member is less coercive than doubling his dues, or how the one is "within the ambit of internal union affairs" and the other is not. After the bill was passed, in commenting on some of the abuses it was designed to correct, Senator Wiley said there are
"instances in which unions . . . have imposed fines upon their members up to $20,000 because they crossed picket lines -- dared to go to the place of employment. [
Twice during the debate, Senator Taft emphatically stated that the section guarantees employees who wished to work during a strike the right to do so. [
] Though on neither occasion did he expressly
limit his examples to organizational strikes, the Court reads them as having such a limited reference. [
] Once again, the Court utilizes ambiguous, extemporaneous legislative comments to circumvent the unambiguous language of a carefully drafted statute. Congress certainly knew how to limit expressly the applicability of the section to organizational coercion if it intended to do so. [
"Apparently it is not intended by the sponsors of the amendment to affect
at least that part of the internal administration
which has to do with the admission or the expulsion of members, [
Senator Ball replied, "It was never the intention of the sponsors of the pending amendment to interfere with the internal affairs or organization of unions." [
] From this statement by Senator Ball accepting the proviso, the Court unjustifiably implies an intent to broaden it. First, there is no reason to suppose that Senator Ball was referring to any "part" of internal affairs other than that to which Senator Holland had referred. Second, the sponsors of the section repeatedly announced that it would protect union members from their leaders, and that protection would be impossible if the section did not to some extent interfere with the internal affairs of unions. As Senator Wiley said,
"None of these provisions interferes
with union affairs,
except to the extent necessary to protect the individual rights of employees.
-- that the section may protect union members from "arbitrary" action of union leaders. However, it is difficult to understand how the arbitrariness or nonarbitrariness of a fine determines whether it is within the scope of "internal union affairs." [
"is to say that Congress preceded the Landrum-Griffin amendments with an even more pervasive regulation of the internal affairs of unions. [
for all employees, including the ones involved here, to pay dues and fees to the union. But § 8(a)(3) and § 8(b)(2) make it clear that "Congress intended to prevent utilization of union security agreements for any purpose other than to compel payment of union dues and fees."
Radio Officers' Union v. Labor Board,
347 U. S. 41
. If the union uses the union security clause to compel employees to pay dues, characterizes such employees as members, and then uses such membership as a basis for imposing court-enforced fines upon those employees unwilling to participate in a union strike, then the union security clause is being used for a purpose other than "to compel payment of union dues and fees." It is being used to coerce employees to join in union activity in violation of § 8(b)(2).
The National Labor Relations Act, as originally passed and amended from time to time, is the work product of draftsmen skilled by long experience in labor affairs. These draftsmen thoroughly understood labor legislation terminology, especially the oft-used words "restrain or coerce." Sections 7 and 8 together bespeak a strong purpose of Congress to leave workers wholly free to determine in what concerted labor activities they will engage or decline to engage. This freedom of workers to go their own way in this field, completely unhampered by pressures of employers or unions, is and always has been a basic purpose of the labor legislation now under consideration. In my judgment, it ill behooves this Court to strike so diligently to defeat this unequivocally declared purpose of Congress merely because the Court believes that too much freedom of choice for workers will impair the effective power of unions.
386 U. S. 203
(dissenting opinion). A court-enforced fine is certainly coercive, certainly affects the employee's job, and certainly is not a traditional method of internal union discipline. When applied by a union to an employee who has joined it as a condition of obtaining employment in a union shop, it defeats the provisions of the Act designed to prevent union security clauses
Comment, 115 U.Pa.L.Rev. 47 (1966); 80 Harv.L.Rev. 683 (1967).
These authorities are cited at
9 of the Court's opinion. One of them notes that the union's "discipline power has its own practical limitations" simply because the union's ultimate sanction at that time was limited to expulsion. Summers, Disciplinary Powers of Unions, 3 Ind.Lab.Rel.Rev. 483, 487 (1950). That practical limitation is today removed by the Court's holding.
See, e.g., NLRB v. Bell Aircraft Corp.,
206 F.2d 235 (collective bargaining agreement between employer and union provided that employer could not promote employee who had disciplinary charges pending against him by union).
See, e.g., Associated Home Builders of Greater Green Bay,
145 N.L.R.B. 1775,
352 F.2d 745.
Although the Court states that Congress was operating within the context of the "contract theory," I have been unable to find any reference to this theory in the legislative history, even by the opponents to curtailing union power. When Senator Pepper suggested that the section should not apply to union members because they elect their own leaders, Senator Taft rejected that premise as a frequent fiction.
388 U. S. 210
93 Cong.Rec. 4021, II Leg.Hist. 1025.
93 Cong.Rec. 4432-4436, II Leg.Hist. 1199-1207.
statement by Senator Taft quoted in
25 of the Court's opinion.
§ 8(b)(4)(b)
The NLRB has itself recognized that a union "fine is, by nature, coercive." In
Local 138, Operating Engineers,
148 N.L.R.B. 679, and
H. B. Roberts, Business Manager of Local 925, Operating Engineers,
148 N.L.R.B. 674,
121 U.S.App.D.C. 297, 350 F.2d 427, the Board held § 8(b)(1)(A) prohibited a union from fining members who violated an internal union rule against filing charges with the NLRB. The Board concluded that
Local 138,
148 N.L.R.B. at 682. In the present case, the Board distinguished
on the ground that the union rules involved there were "beyond the competence of the union to enforce," and were "not the legitimate concern of a union." 149 N.L.R.B. 67, 69. My Brother WHITE seems to take a similar position in resting his concurrence on the Court's holding that the union rule against crossing a picket line is "valid." But neither Congress' aim in § 8(b)(1)(A) of proscribing certain means used to accomplish legitimate ends nor the Court's view that Congress intended no interference with internal union affairs would allow the application of the section to depend on the Board's or this Court's views of whether a particular internal union rule is "valid" or not.