Source: http://rationalrights.com/page/4/
Timestamp: 2018-09-20 11:45:42
Document Index: 534996310

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art. 18', 'Art. 18', 'Art. 18', 'Art. 18', 'Art. 18', 'Art. 18', 'Art. 18', 'Art. 18', '§ 653', 'Art. 18']

Rational Rights - Page 4 of 10 - A rational review of the rights of creators
Final Form TPP Released
November 5, 2015 2:52 pm , 1 Comment , rationality
The final form of the Trans-Pacific Partnership or TPP trade agreement has been released and as expected it comes down hard on infringers and piracy.
Art. 18.2: Objectives
While many of the provisions mirror the current law in the United States, there are some expressions of artist rights that are affirming, such as:
Art. 18.60: Right of Distribution
Each Party shall provide to authors, performers and producers of phonograms the exclusive right to authorize or prohibit the making available to the public of the original and copies of their works, performances and phonograms through sale or other transfer of ownership.
With respect to penalties, the United States model appears largely intact.
Art. 18.74-3. Each Party shall provide that, in civil judicial proceedings, its judicial authorities have the authority at least to order the infringer to pay the right holder damages adequate to compensate for the injury the right holder has suffered because of an infringement of that person’s intellectual property right by an infringer who knowingly, or with reasonable grounds to know, engaged in infringing activity.
Art. 18.74-6. (a) & (b) provide for statutory damages sufficient to deter others (Ref. Art. 18.74-8) and punitive damages will be added, together with costs and fees under Art. 18.74-17.
One point of note is with respect to criminal penalties under Art. 18.77 – The TPP provides for imprisonment of infringers for not only commercial piracy but for anything determined to have “a substantial prejudicial impact.”
Art. 18.77 Criminal Penalties
Including criminal penalties for (b) significant acts, not carried out for commercial advantage or financial gain, that have a substantial prejudicial impact on the interests of the copyright or related rights holder in relation to the marketplace.
What may constitute a “a substantial prejudicial impact” under the TPP is not defined, but in California, this number has already been established to be the distribution of as few as 10 copies through means such as BitTorrent. Cal. Pen. Code § 653aa
Another issue of note is the imposition of penalties for “aiding and abetting.” This would be expected to extend liability for development of tools and means for piracy, such as web pages, software and possibly even discussion forums which expressly promote piracy.
Art. 18.77 -5
With respect to the offences for which this Article requires a Party to provide for criminal procedures and penalties, each Party shall ensure that criminal liability for aiding and abetting is available under its law.
The full text may be found at the USTR web site.
Maverick Eye Data Analysis “Sees Through” Dynamic IPs
October 27, 2015 3:16 am , Leave a Comment , Art Schopenhauer
In a recent case filed on behalf of Glacier Films for infringement of the film American Heist, it is revealed BitTorrent monitor Maverick Eye has developed a system to “see through” dynamically assigned IP addresses allowing the tracking of infringing activity by a single infringer through multiple IP assignments.
Posted in: BitTorrent, Copyright Infringement Cases , Tagged: bittorrent, copyright, Copyright Infringement Case
Courts Affirm And Return to BitTorrent Joinder
October 24, 2015 5:17 pm , Leave a Comment , rationality
Cobbler Nevada v. Does, 1:15-cv-05283 (N.D. Ill., Oct. 23, 2015)
In Bit Torrent litigation courts are affirming and returning to joinder, or the combining of many defendants into a single case as the proper and most efficient means to permit both plaintiffs and defendants to participate in the judicial process.
Joined cases generally allow the more efficient and economical management of claims. Individual cases may cost $5,000 or more each to prepare and file. When a case is against a single party, all those costs may then be borne by a single defendant. When multiple defendants are joined, the costs are spread out among the several defendants and no one party bears the full costs of a single case.
Many jurisdictions began to deny joinder or place restrictions on joinder when courts were faced with allegations of abuse. But investigations are finding such claims of abuse are often unsupported or overblown. In one case after the court ordered severance, defendants then complained that individual Doe cases were even “more nefarious.” Voltage Pictures, LLC v. Revitch, 6:14-cv-00301-AA, (Jan. 23, 2015.) Faced with defendants that first complained that joinder was improper and then argued that single party cases were unfair, and even demanding joinder, courts realized the real complaint of most defendants has nothing to do with joinder, but simply that defendants do not want to be caught.
As has been realized, arguments against joinder by defendants were a short-sighted effort to drive up costs for plaintiffs. Defendants forgot that when found liable they must then pay those costs. As a result, many defendants, and the courts, are returning to joined cases.
As per the opinion of Judge Coleman:
Looking to both the plain language of Rule 20 and the substantial body of persuasive authority in this district, this Court finds that Rule 20(a)(1) does not require a single transaction, direct transactions, or temporal overlap. Accordingly, multiple defendants need not participate in the swarm at the same time in order to be properly joined.
Here, Cobbler alleges that each defendant used BitTorrent to participate in a BitTorrent swarm and to download and upload identical pieces of the same copyrighted work within the span of less than one month. These allegations are adequate to establish that the defendants acted as part of the same series of transactions or occurrences. Furthermore, the purpose of judicial efficiency is best served by the continued joinder of the parties at this stage of the litigation.
Other jurisdictions following this trend include Washington (Dallas Buyers Club, LLC v. Does, 14-cv-1684 (W.D. WA., October 31, 2014)) and Oregon (Survivor Productions, Inc. v. Popcorn Time Users, 3:15-cv-01587-AA, (D. Or. Sept. 15, 2015))
The full text of the Judge Coleman opinion:
October 16, 2015 3:06 pm , Leave a Comment , rationality
Re: Authors Guild v. Google, Inc.,13-4829, 2nd Cir. , Oct. 16, 2015
In a case that likely has one more stop along the way, the Second Circuit has issued its opinion in Authors Guild v. Google that relates to the Google Books project and the considerations of Fair Use.
Google has made digital copies of tens of millions of books, including Plaintiffs’, that were submitted to it for that purpose by major libraries. Google has scanned the digital copies and established a publicly available search function. An Internet user can use this function to search without charge to determine whether the book contains a specified word or term and also see “snippets” of text containing the searched-for terms. In addition, Google has allowed the participating libraries to download and retain digital copies of the books they submit, under agreements which commit the libraries not to use their digital copies in violation of the copyright laws.
In a simplistic view: Google has put millions of books online. But it is important to understand some key facts in this case, which include:
The Google Books search function also allows the user a limited viewing of text. In addition to telling the number of times the word or term selected by the searcher appears in the book, the search function will display a maximum of three “snippets” containing it. A snippet is a horizontal segment comprising ordinarily an eighth of a page.
Google also disables snippet view entirely for types of books for which a single snippet is likely to satisfy the searcher’s present need for the book, such as dictionaries, cookbooks, and books of short poems. Finally, since 2005, Google will exclude any book altogether from snippet view at the request of the rights holder by the submission of an online form.
While it is true that Google has placed millions of copyrighted books online, it does not allow the viewers to read them, only to find out whether or not they might want to read them. As was critical in this case:
Google’s program does not, at this time and on the record before us, expose Plaintiffs to an unreasonable risk of loss of copyright value …
So the simplistic view is that Google is allowed to put millions of books online, but the proper understanding is that Google has created the world’s most effective card catalog to allow people to search and find books they may want to read, without making the books themselves available to read online.
After pages of tortured analysis of facts and factors, it all comes down to:
The ultimate goal of copyright is to expand public knowledge and understanding, which copyright seeks to achieve by giving potential creators exclusive control over copying of their works, thus giving them a financial incentive to create informative, intellectually enriching works for public consumption. . . .
There will be the inevitable confusion as many books on the Google Books project are available online in complete form, but it needs to be understood that the copyrights in those books have expired or been waived by the authors, thus they are properly free to the public.
For the full text: Authors Guild v. Google, 13-4829
Evasion of service caused an infringer $10,000
October 13, 2015 8:28 am , Leave a Comment , The Writer
In Dallas Buyers Club, LLC v. Vladamir Ivashentsev [Case No.: 3: 15-cv-00220-AC], the Court found Vladamir Ivashentsev willfully infringed the copyrights of Dallas Buyers Club, LLC (“DBC”). Mr. Ivashentsev willfully attempted to evade service and refused to participate in court proceedings with notice. He was properly served by publication.
Also, the Court awarded statutory damages in the sum of $10,000 in favor of DBC. The award was intended to compensate DBC as well as to provide proper notice and deterrence to others.
Further, the Court enjoined Mr. Ivashentsev from infringing DBC’s copyrights in the motion picture “Dallas Buyers Club”, including without limitation using the internet to reproduce, distribute or copy the movie. He was also directed to destroy all unauthorized copies of DBC’s motion pictures and to delete all software used to make or distribute those copies or exchange unlicensed content using the BitTorrent protocol. Similarly, he was enjoined from using BitTorrent or the Internet for the copying or downloading of unlicensed copyrighted content.
DBC was also awarded reasonable costs and fees pursuant to FRCP 54.
Deleting Files Costs $200,000 In Sanctions And Adverse Inference
May 23, 2015 4:39 pm , Leave a Comment , rationality
Destroying evidence is always bad. Getting caught is often assured, and even worse. In the case of Clear-View Technologies v. Rasnick, et al., in the Northern District of California the severity and expanse of duties to preserve evidence have been further clarified. One thing the court makes clear, sometimes the only thing worse than a smoking gun, is a missing gun that has been thrown away leaving only traces of smoke.
As the court starts off:
Deployment of “Crap Cleaner” software—with a motion to compel pending. Lost media with relevant documents. False certification that document production was complete. Failure to take any steps to preserve or collect relevant documents for two years after discussing this very suit. Any one of these transgressions by Defendants … and their prior counsel might justify sanctions. Taken together, there can be no doubt.
Preservation of evidence is a duty, and it does not start when suit is filed.
“The duty to preserve evidence begins when litigation is ‘pending or reasonably foreseeable.’ Thus, ‘[s]poliation refers to the destruction or material alteration of evidence or to the failure to preserve property for another’s use as evidence in pending or reasonably foreseeable litigation.’ This is an objective standard, asking not whether the party in fact reasonably foresaw litigation, but whether a reasonable party in the same factual circumstances would have reasonably foreseen litigation.”
This does not mean evidence must be preserved when a party learns about a suit or when a party is served with a complaint, it means the evidence must be preserved from the time when a reasonable person thinks they might be sued. The proverbial, “I’ll see you in court!” can result in a duty to preserve and further deletion may result in sanctions. (Or as the Court quotes, in this case, the statement “[K]eep it up and you’ll find [yourself] in court[.] Call Clyde again and I sue[.] Mark my words.”) The standard is not subjective. This is an objective standard. Even if a party is not aware of their duty, ignorance is not an excuse.
But this case had it all. Laptops and cell phones were “lost.” Emails were deleted. Documents were not produced. And likely most damming element, parties installed and ran software called CCleaner or “Crap Cleaner” which was specifically designed to delete data in a manner that it could not be recovered. Having software that is designed to hide evidence might be suspect in and of itself, evidence of its use is something courts cannot overlook.
The result of this cover up was the court ruling:
Defendants and their prior counsel therefore are jointly and severally liable for the following fees, which the court finds reasonable in light of the extraordinary effort required to uncover this widespread abuse: … $212,320.
But even more significant than the money to be paid, was the court’s ruling on further sanctions.
All this warrants the adverse instruction that the unproduced material may be deemed to support [Plaintiff’s] contentions. The court orders the jury be instructed as follows:
Defendants have failed to prevent the destruction and loss of relevant evidence for [Plaintiff’s] use in this litigation. This is known as the “spoliation of evidence.”
I instruct you, as a matter of law, that Defendants failed to preserve evidence after its duty to preserve arose. This failure resulted from its failure to perform its discovery obligations.
You also may presume that [Plaintiff] has met its burden of proving the following two elements by a preponderance of the evidence: first, that relevant evidence was destroyed after the duty to preserve arose. Evidence is relevant if it would have clarified a fact at issue in the trial and otherwise would naturally have been introduced into evidence. And second, the lost evidence was favorable to [Plaintiff].
The result: everything missing or deleted, no matter how innocent it might be, is presumed to be favorable to plaintiff.
The full text of the opinion: Clear-View Technologies v. Rasnick, et al., 13-cv-02744 (N.D. Cal. May 13, 2015.)