Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/972/1129/177763/
Timestamp: 2019-12-14 05:03:59
Document Index: 310283659

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 271', '§ 1988', '§ 1983', '§ 1988', '§ 1988', '§ 1988', 'art, 461']

Lanric Hyland, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Roy L. Wonder, Supervising Judge, Juvenile Court,individually and in His Official Capacity, et Alia;superior Court for the City and County of San Francisco;dennis Sweeney; Fred Jordan; San Francisco Juvenileprobation Commission; Diane Laplante; City and County Ofsan Francisco, Defendants-appellees,andstephen La Plante, Defendant, 972 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir. 1992) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Ninth Circuit › 1992 › Lanric Hyland, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Roy L. Wonder, Supervising Judge, Juvenile Court,individually...
Lanric Hyland, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Roy L. Wonder, Supervising Judge, Juvenile Court,individually and in His Official Capacity, et Alia;superior Court for the City and County of San Francisco;dennis Sweeney; Fred Jordan; San Francisco Juvenileprobation Commission; Diane Laplante; City and County Ofsan Francisco, Defendants-appellees,andstephen La Plante, Defendant, 972 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir. 1992)
US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 972 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir. 1992) Argued and Submitted Jan. 16, 1992. Decided Aug. 21, 1992
Hyland alleges that, following his termination, Sweeney told a newspaper reporter " [J]ust ask Hyland why he can't be a peace officer in the State of California." Hyland also alleges that Sweeney threatened to take various measures designed to prevent Hyland from working in the juvenile justice system again. Hyland does not, however, contend that Sweeney actually carried through on these threats. Sweeney and La Plante also wrote letters to the Governor of California withdrawing their support for Hyland's pardon application. Hyland alleges that Sweeney followed-up with a phone call to the Governor in March 1989, demanding that Hyland's pardon be denied because Hyland allegedly had unethically released to the public confidential information from juvenile court files. Hyland's pardon was denied in May 1989.
After briefing and oral argument, the district court dismissed Hyland's federal action for failure to state a claim, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6). Specifically, the district court ruled that the complaint failed to articulate either a property or liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. The district court also found that the speech was not protected by the First Amendment, citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 103 S. Ct. 1684, 75 L. Ed. 2d 708 (1983). The district court then dismissed Hyland's state law claims, without prejudice, for lack of jurisdiction.
We review de novo the district court's dismissal of Hyland's complaint for failure to state a claim. Thomas v. Carpenter, 881 F.2d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1028, 110 S. Ct. 1475, 108 L. Ed. 2d 612 (1990). The dismissal cannot be affirmed " 'unless it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts that could be proved.' " Id. (quoting Sanders v. Kennedy, 794 F.2d 478, 481 (9th Cir. 1986)). All material allegations of the complaint are taken as true and are construed in the light most favorable to Hyland. Id.
Whether Hyland's speech is protected by the First Amendment and is a matter of "public concern" is a question of constitutional law we review de novo. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 148 n. 7, 103 S. Ct. at 1691 n. 7; Roth v. Veteran's Admin., 856 F.2d 1401, 1405 (9th Cir. 1988). Whether Hyland's termination impinged upon a protected property or liberty interest is likewise a question of constitutional law that we accord de novo review. See Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-78, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 2705-10, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1972); Carreras v. City of Anaheim, 768 F.2d 1039, 1042 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1985).
The right of public employees to speak on matters of public concern, acknowledged in cases like Connick v. Myers is an outgrowth of the constitutional tenet that public officials may not deny or deprive a person of a governmental benefit or privilege on a basis that infringes her or his freedom of speech. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597, 92 S. Ct. 2694, 2698, 33 L. Ed. 2d 570 (1972) ("For at least a quarter-century, this Court has made clear that ... [government] may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests--especially, his interest in freedom of speech."); see also Connick, 461 U.S. at 144, 103 S. Ct. at 1688 (" 'the denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege' " can violate the First Amendment) (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404, 83 S. Ct. 1790, 1794, 10 L. Ed. 2d 965 (1963)); Havekost v. United States Dep't of the Navy, 925 F.2d 316, 318 (9th Cir. 1991) (recognizing the "broad principle that the government may not deny a person a valuable benefit on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests") (quotation omitted).
The cases thus recognize a variety of public benefits, in addition to public employment, which cannot be denied solely because of the recipient's exercise of constitutional rights. See, e.g., Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, ----, 110 S. Ct. 2729, 2736, 111 L. Ed. 2d 52 (1990) (promotion or transfer in a government job); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 n. 6, 89 S. Ct. 1322, 1327 n. 6, 22 L. Ed. 2d 600 (1969) (welfare benefits); Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404-05, 83 S. Ct. at 1794-95 (unemployment benefits); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526, 78 S. Ct. 1332, 1342, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1460 (1958) (tax exemptions); Thomas, 881 F.2d at 829-30 (loss of certain job responsibilities).
We have specifically recognized that the rule of Perry v. Sindermann and Connick v. Myers applies beyond the employment context. In Havekost v. United States Dep't of the Navy, the Navy permitted Havekost to enter the military base and earn tips as a bagger at the commissary. Havekost had no employment contract with the Navy, only "a revocable grant of permission to work for customer tips." 925 F.2d at 317. After Havekost protested the head of the commissary's efforts to regulate baggers, the Navy revoked her permission to enter the base and work. The Ninth Circuit found the Connick analysis applicable "even though Havekost was not an employee." Id. at 318; see also Soranno's Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989) (suspension of petroleum bulk use plant permits violates First Amendment if made in retaliation for speech); Bullfrog Films, Inc. v. Wick, 847 F.2d 502, 511 (9th Cir. 1988) (exemptions from import duties); Bernasconi v. Tempe Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 3, 548 F.2d 857, 860 (9th Cir.) (unwanted transfer constitutes loss of a "valuable governmental benefit"), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825, 98 S. Ct. 72, 54 L. Ed. 2d 82 (1977).
The Supreme Court has instructed that the type of sanction imposed to discourage the exercise of First Amendment rights "need not be particularly great in order to find that rights have been violated." Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 359 n. 13, 96 S. Ct. 2673, 2683 n. 13, 49 L. Ed. 2d 547 (1976). A person's rights are unconstitutionally infringed "both where the government fines a person a penny for being a Republican and where it withholds the grant of a penny for the same reason." Id.; see also Rutan, 497 U.S. at ---- n. 8, 110 S. Ct. at 2737-38 n. 8 (" [T]he First Amendment ... already protects state employees not only from patronage dismissals but even an act of retaliation as trivial as failing to hold a birthday party for a public employee ... when intended to punish her for exercising her free speech rights.") (quotation omitted). The injury to position or privilege necessary to activate the First Amendment thus need not rise to the level of lost employment. Retaliatory actions with less momentous consequences, such as loss of a volunteer position, are equally egregious in the eyes of the Constitution because a person is being punished for engaging in protected speech.
The Second Circuit has held that the First Amendment can protect against the loss of a volunteer position. In Janusaitis v. Middlebury Volunteer Fire Dep't, 607 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1979), the court held that the dismissal of a volunteer firefighter for complaining about low morale and inadequate training and discipline can violate the First Amendment. Id. at 25.1
Perry, 408 U.S. at 597, 92 S. Ct. at 2697 (citation and quotation omitted); see also Rutan, 497 U.S. at ----, 110 S. Ct. at 2735-36 (following Perry, the Court "find [s] the assertion here that the employee petitioners had no legal entitlement to promotion, transfer, or recall beside the point"); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 383-84, 107 S. Ct. 2891, 2896, 97 L. Ed. 2d 315 (1987) ("Even though McPherson was merely a probationary employee, and even if she could have been discharged for any reason or for no reason at all, she may nonetheless be entitled to reinstatement if she was discharged for exercising her constitutional right to freedom of expression."); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 283-84, 97 S. Ct. 568, 574, 50 L. Ed. 2d 471 (1977) ("Even though he could have been discharged for no reason whatever, and had no constitutional right to a hearing prior to the decision not to rehire him ..., he may nonetheless establish a claim to [relief] if the decision not to rehire him was made by reason of his exercise of constitutionally protected First Amendment freedoms."); McKinley v. City of Eloy, 705 F.2d 1110, 1116 (9th Cir. 1983); accord Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-06, 87 S. Ct. 675, 685, 17 L. Ed. 2d 629 (1967) (" [T]he theory that public employment which may be denied altogether may be subjected to any conditions, regardless of how unreasonable, has been uniformly rejected.").
In Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 88 S. Ct. 1731, 20 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1968), the Supreme Court formulated the "public concern" test in an effort to find a compromise between the rights of public employees to free speech and of the government to regulate its workplace. "The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees." Id. at 568, 88 S. Ct. at 1734-35. Under Pickering, a dismissal from employment or other loss of a governmental benefit as a consequence of speech does not run afoul of the First Amendment unless the speech addresses a matter of public concern. Id. at 572-74, 88 S. Ct. at 1736-38; see also Connick, 461 U.S. at 146, 103 S. Ct. at 1689. Correspondingly, speech focused solely on internal policy and personnel grievances does not implicate the First Amendment.
Connick, 461 U.S. at 146-47, 103 S. Ct. at 1690 (citation omitted).
Determining whether speech involves a matter of public concern entails an inquiry into the "content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record." Id. at 147-48, 103 S. Ct. at 1690 (footnote omitted); see also Anderson v. Central Point Sch. Dist. No. 6, 746 F.2d 505, 507 (9th Cir. 1984). If some part of the communication addresses an issue of public concern, the First Amendment's protections are triggered even though other aspects of the communication do not qualify as a public concern. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 149, 103 S. Ct. at 1691. Some inaccuracy in the content of the speech must be tolerated. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 570-72, 88 S. Ct. at 1735-37.
Similarly, in Allen v. Scribner, 812 F.2d 426 (9th Cir.), amended, 828 F.2d 1445 (9th Cir. 1987), we held that speech criticizing the "competency of [the Mediterranean Fruit Fly Eradication] Project Management as well as the efficient performance of project duties" constituted a matter of public concern. Indeed, we observed that " [s]uch allegations are arguably the most fundamental sort of first amendment expression, given the first amendment's role in facilitating self-government." Id.; see also McKinley, 705 F.2d at 1114 (speech addressed to "the competency of the police force is surely a matter of great public concern," as is speech revealing "the interrelationship between city management and its employees," "discipline and morale in the work place," and "an agency's efficient performance of its duties") (quotations omitted); Janusaitis, 607 F.2d at 18 (volunteer firefighter's report charging low morale and inadequate training and discipline of firefighters is a matter of public concern).
The context in which the memorandum was drafted and circulated belies the defendants' suggestion that Hyland's speech concerned only an internal personnel dispute. Taking the alleged facts in the light most favorable to Hyland, Hyland's speech was not the by-product of a personal employment dispute. The memorandum did not concern Hyland's dissatisfaction with his own position or on-the-job treatment. See Roth, 856 F.2d at 1406. Hyland had no personal occupational stake in the dismissal of La Plante. Nor was Hyland's purpose simply "to gather ammunition for another round of controversy with [his] supervisors." Connick, 461 U.S. at 148, 103 S. Ct. at 1690. Hyland's memorandum addressed more than a "work place grievance"--Hyland spoke "in order to bring wrongdoing to light ... [not] merely to further some purely private interest." Havekost, 925 F.2d at 318; cf. Connick, 461 U.S. at 148, 103 S. Ct. at 1691 (questionnaire not a matter of public concern because, "if released to the public, [it] would convey no information at all other than the fact that a single employee is upset with the status quo").
While Hyland's memorandum did involve an end-run of his superior, that alone does not suffice to transform the memorandum into a personnel dispute. Pickering's letter to the newspaper was no less a matter of public concern simply because it involved going over the Board of Education and appealing directly to voters. 391 U.S. at 566-69, 88 S. Ct. at 1733-35; see also Roth, 856 F.2d at 1404 (criticism "outside the [ ] ranks" remains a matter of public concern). To hold otherwise would deter employees from bringing problems and abuses in a governmental office to the attention of the authorities charged with oversight of that office. Some of the most important public employee speech--exposing governmental corruption, wrongdoing, or incompetence--would be left outside the First Amendment's aegis.
The defendants further contend that the staleness of the information contained in the memorandum warrants denying it First Amendment protection. We reject this argument. Admittedly, at the time Hyland's memorandum circulated, troubles at Juvenile Hall had already been exposed to the public by the California Youth Authority. The defendants do not suggest, however, that the detailed discussion of these problems contained in the Hyland memorandum and the identification of La Plante as the root cause of these troubles was already a matter of public record. Furthermore, general public awareness of an issue does not make all further investigation and in-depth discussion of the matter redundant, superfluous, or devoid of public interest. See Givhan v. Western Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 411-16, 99 S. Ct. 693, 694-97, 58 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1979) (teacher's complaints about race discrimination at school are a matter of public concern, even though school's discriminatory practices had already been exposed when school became the subject of a federal court's desegregation order).
Givhan, 439 U.S. at 415-16, 99 S. Ct. at 696-97; see also Rankin, 483 U.S. at 386-87 n. 11, 107 S. Ct. at 2899 n. 11 ("The private nature of the statement does not ... vitiate the status of the statement as addressing a matter of public concern."); Connick, 461 U.S. at 149, 103 S. Ct. at 1691 (item on questionnaire circulated only to colleagues still qualifies as a matter of public concern).
Our conclusion that Hyland adequately alleged the loss of a valuable governmental benefit or privilege in retaliation for his speech on an issue of public concern does not end the constitutional inquiry. Hyland's discharge could still survive First Amendment scrutiny if the defendants show that Hyland's speech so severely damaged office harmony and working relationships that the government's interest in promoting an effective workplace outweighs Hyland's First Amendment rights. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388, 107 S. Ct. at 2899 ("Because McPherson's statement addressed a matter of public concern, ... we [must] balance McPherson's interest in making her statement against 'the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.' ") (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568, 88 S. Ct. at 1734-35); Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S. Ct. at 1692 ("The ... balance requires full consideration of the government's interest in the effective and efficient fulfillment of its responsibilities to the public."); see also McKinley, 705 F.2d at 1115.2
Application of this balancing test entails a factual inquiry into such matters as whether the speech (i) impairs discipline or control by superiors, (ii) disrupts co-worker relations, (iii) erodes a close working relationship premised on personal loyalty and confidentiality, (iv) interferes with the speaker's performance of her or his duties, or (v) obstructs the routine operation of the office. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388, 107 S. Ct. at 2899; Connick, 461 U.S. at 151-52, 103 S. Ct. at 1692-93; Roth, 856 F.2d at 1407; Bernasconi, 548 F.2d at 861-62. The "manner, time, and place" in which the speech occurred also constitute relevant considerations. Connick, 461 U.S. at 152, 103 S. Ct. at 1693.
The nature of the government's burden to show disruption, moreover, varies with the content of the speech. Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S. Ct. at 1692. The more tightly the First Amendment embraces the speech the more vigorous a showing of disruption must be made. Id. at 150, 152, 103 S. Ct. at 1692, 1693 ("We caution that a stronger showing may be necessary if the employee's speech more substantially involved matters of public concern."); Roth, 856 F.2d at 1407; Allen, 812 F.2d at 432; see also Bernasconi, 548 F.2d at 862 (" [T]he plaintiff's right to speak ought to be protected in consonance with the first amendment's primary concerns.") (quotation omitted). Furthermore, "actual, material and substantial disruption must be demonstrated." Roth, 856 F.2d at 1407; see also Allen, 812 F.2d at 432 (disruption must be "real, [and] not imagined.") (quoting McKinley, 705 F.2d at 1115). Mere allegations of interference with a working relationship cannot "serve as a pretext for stifling legitimate speech or penalizing public employees for expressing unpopular views." McKinley, 705 F.2d at 1115; see also Allen, 812 F.2d at 432.
Board of Regents, 408 U.S. at 577, 92 S. Ct. at 2709. The Supreme Court went on to outline the possible sources of such property interests:
Second, even assuming that Sweeney did expressly promise that Hyland's volunteer service could be terminated when, and only when, Hyland received a pardon, that promise was void as contrary to law. Hyland's property interest must be defined consistently with California law. Guy v. Mohave County, 701 F.2d 73, 75 (9th Cir. 1982). Under California law, the terms and conditions of government service are regulated by statute, not by contract. Williams v. Los Angeles City Dep't of Water & Power, 130 Cal. App. 3d 677, 181 Cal. Rptr. 868, 870 (1982); see also Cal.Welf. & Inst.Code § 271 (county civil service laws define tenure of probation department officials and employees). Temporary, non-civil service employees have no property interest in continued employment, according to California law. Williams, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 871.
We have held that promises of continued employment made in direct contravention of applicable law are insufficient to create a claim of entitlement for purposes of the Due Process Clause. In Bollow v. Federal Reserve Bank, 650 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 948, 102 S. Ct. 1449, 71 L. Ed. 2d 662 (1982), we ruled that a promise of employment security made by a bank officer did not create an enforceable property interest because the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 established the at-will status of employees. Id. at 1099. We declared the promise void and concluded that " [a] void contract is clearly insufficient to support a claim of entitlement to government employment." Id.; see also Davis v. Oregon State Univ., 591 F.2d 493, 496 (9th Cir. 1978) (promise of tenure insufficient to create property interest in continued employment because inconsistent with University's written regulations governing the grant of tenure).
The Fourteenth Amendment's protection against deprivations of liberty encompasses the right of persons " 'to engage in any of the common occupations of life.' " Board of Regents, 408 U.S. at 572, 92 S. Ct. at 2707 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S. Ct. 625, 626, 67 L. Ed. 1042 (1923)); see also Bollow, 650 F.2d at 1100 ("The liberty protected by the due process clause of the fifth and fourteenth amendments encompasses an individual's freedom to work and earn a living.") If, in the course of dismissing an employee, the government takes steps or makes charges that so severely stigmatize the employee that she cannot avail herself of other employment opportunities, a claim for deprivation of liberty will stand. Board of Regents, 408 U.S. at 573-74, 92 S. Ct. at 2707-08; Bollow, 650 F.2d at 1101 ("To implicate constitutional liberty interests ... the reasons for dismissal must be sufficiently serious to 'stigmatize' or otherwise burden the individual so that he is not able to take advantage of other employment opportunities.").
The stigma imposed must be severe and genuinely debilitating before the discharge can rise to a level of constitutional concern. In other words, the stigma must "seriously damage [ ] a person's reputation or significantly foreclose [ ] his freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities." Bollow, 650 F.2d at 1101 (quotation omitted).
Stretten v. Wadsworth Veterans Hosp., 537 F.2d 361, 366 (9th Cir. 1976); cf. Gray v. Union County Intermediate Educ. Dist., 520 F.2d 803, 806 (9th Cir. 1975) (suggestion that employee has difficulty getting along does not deprive individual of liberty because it does not "import serious character defects"). Sweeney and La Plante's charges are unlikely to result in the permanent exclusion or protracted interruption of gainful employment for Hyland. See Roth, 856 F.2d at 1411. At most, the charges may make Hyland somewhat less attractive to future employers. This is not enough to implicate the Due Process Clause. Board of Regents, 408 U.S. at 574 n. 13, 92 S. Ct. at 2707 n. 13; see also Roley v. Pierce County Fire Protection Dist. No. 4, 869 F.2d 491, 495-96 (9th Cir. 1989). The federal Constitution is not concerned with every insult hurled in the heat of an employment dispute. Moreover, while not dispositive, the fact that Hyland almost immediately secured a new position is relevant to our assessment of the severity of the defendants' charges against Hyland. Id.
Additionally, the protections of the Due Process Clause do not attach to false or damaging accusations alone. The Supreme Court has held that the criticism must be accompanied by the loss or alteration of a right or status recognized by state law before the Due Process Clause is implicated. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 708-09, 96 S. Ct. 1155, 1164, 47 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1976) (defamation unaccompanied by any tangible loss of a right "vouchsafed ... by the State" does not deprive an individual of a protected liberty interest); see also Vanelli v. Reynolds Sch. Dist. No. 7, 667 F.2d 773, 777-78 (9th Cir. 1982). Under California law, Hyland has no protected property interest in or legal entitlement to his volunteer position. The loss of his volunteer job thus did not deprive him of a right otherwise protected by state law. " [T]he interest in reputation alone which [Hyland] seeks to vindicate" does not state a claim for loss of liberty cognizable under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Paul, 424 U.S. at 711, 96 S. Ct. at 1165.
Second, Sweeney's and La Plante's statements to the Governor were not publicly disclosed, according to the allegations of the complaint. See Finkelstein v. Bergna, 924 F.2d 1449, 1452 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S. Ct. 75, 116 L. Ed. 2d 49 (1991).
Third, the grant of a pardon is a discretionary act. Hyland has no right or entitlement to the pardon under state law. As noted earlier, calumny unaccompanied by the loss or alteration of a right or status recognized by state law does not constitute a deprivation of liberty, within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Id.; see also Paul, 424 U.S. at 711, 712, 96 S. Ct. at 1165, 1166.
Both Hyland and the defendants seek an award of attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. This court is authorized to award attorney's fees to the prevailing party for the prosecution of an appeal in an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 42 U.S.C. § 1988; see Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 883 F.2d 739, 742-43 (9th Cir. 1989). We deny Hyland's request for fees, however, because any determination of Hyland's status as a "prevailing party" would be premature at this stage. Richardson v. Penfold, 900 F.2d 116, 118-19 (7th Cir. 1990); see also Mantolete v. Bolger, 791 F.2d 784, 786 (9th Cir. 1986).
The defendants' request for attorney's fees is also denied. Civil rights defendants, unlike plaintiffs, may obtain attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 only "upon a finding that the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith." Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421, 98 S. Ct. 694, 700, 54 L. Ed. 2d 648 (1978) (standard for awarding fees to defendants in Title VII action); see also Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14, 101 S. Ct. 173, 178, 66 L. Ed. 2d 163 (1980) (adopting Christiansburg standard for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1988); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 n. 2, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 1937 n. 2, 76 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1983); Miller v. Los Angeles County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 617, 619-20 (9th Cir. 1987). Neither Hyland's First Amendment nor his Fourteenth Amendment claim is frivolous or unreasonable.
The Supreme Court and our court have distinguished between charges that challenge an individual's good name, reputation, honor and integrity and charges of incompetence or inability to get along with coworkers. The former infringe the liberty interest while the latter do not. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1972); Bollow v. Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 650 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 948, 102 S. Ct. 1449, 71 L. Ed. 2d 662 (1982); Stretten v. Wadsworth Veterans Hospital, 537 F.2d 361 (9th Cir. 1976); Gray v. Union County Intermediate Education District, 520 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1975); Jablon v. Trustees of California State Colleges, 482 F.2d 997 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1163, 94 S. Ct. 926, 39 L. Ed. 2d 116 (1974).
In Roth, Wisconsin State University-Oshkosh did not rehire Roth and did not give any reasons for its decision. The Court held that there was "no suggestion whatever that [Roth's] 'good name, reputation, honor, or integrity' [were] at stake." Roth, 408 U.S. at 573, 92 S. Ct. at 2707 (quoting Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437, 91 S. Ct. 507, 510, 27 L. Ed. 2d 515 (1971)).
I concur in the result because Hyland's complaint as currently framed is deficient. First, Hyland has not alleged that he suffered the loss of some right or interest protected by state law as required by Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 96 S. Ct. 1155, 47 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1976). Second, Hyland has not alleged that the defendants' actions caused the termination of his employment with the National Center on Institutions and Alternatives. Finally, Hyland has not alleged that the defendants' actions caused the Governor to deny his pardon or that their statements to the Governor were publicly disclosed. Of course, if given leave by the district court, Hyland is not precluded from amending his complaint to cure these deficiencies.
The discharge decision could also be sustained if the defendants proved by a preponderance of the evidence that they would have released Hyland regardless of his speech. See, e.g., Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287, 97 S. Ct. at 576. The defendants, however, do not make such an argument here
This dismissal is without prejudice. If granted leave by the district court, Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), Hyland might well be able to amend the complaint to state the loss of an interest sufficient to activate the protections of the Due Process Clause