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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 10', '§ 10', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 10', '§ 10', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 554', '§ 554', '§ 10', '§ 554', '§ 160', '§ 10', '§ 8', '§ 10', '§ 8', '§ 554', '§ 554', '§ 10', '§ 554', '§ 10', '§ 10', '§ 554', '§ 554', '§ 10', '§ 10', '§ 8', '§ 10', '§ 10', '§ 8', '§ 10', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 10', '§ 10', '§ 10', '§ 10', '§ 557', '§ 3105']

IT&T CORP. V. ELECTRICAL WORKERS, 419 U. S. 428 (1975) - US SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON-LINE
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Petitioner employer filed an unfair labor practice charge against respondent union under § 8(b)(4)(D) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization to induce employees to strike to force an employer to assign particular work to employees in a particular labor organization. Section 10(k) of the NLRA provides that, whenever a § 8(b)(4)(D) unfair labor practice charge is filed, the National Labor Relations Board shall hear and determine the dispute out of which such unfair labor practice arose, unless, within 10 days after notice that such charge has been filed, the parties submit evidence that they have adjusted the dispute, in which case or upon compliance with the Board's decision, such charge shall be dismissed. Pursuant to § 10(k), a hearing was held before a hearing officer, and subsequently the Board rendered a decision adverse to respondent, which then indicated it would not comply therewith. The Board's General Counsel thereafter issued a complaint on the unfair labor practice charge, and at a trial examiner's hearing, at which the General Counsel was represented by the same attorney who had been the hearing officer in the § 10(k) proceeding, the trial examiner concluded that respondent had violated § 8(b)(4)(D), and the Board issued a cease and desist order. The Court of Appeals, on respondent's petition to set aside the order, agreed that respondent had violated § 8(b)(4)(D), but refused to enforce the order, on the ground that, because the § 10(k) hearing officer had participated in both the § 10(k) and the § 8(b)(4)(D) proceedings, the Board had not complied with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In 1947, Congress responded to the labor unrest caused by jurisdictional disputes by adding § 8(b)(4)(D) to the National Labor Relations Act, which made it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization to induce the employees of any employer to strike in the hopes of forcing an employer to assign particular work to employees in a particular labor organization. [Footnote 1] In the belief chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
One year earlier, Congress had responded to the many expressed concerns for fairness and regularity in the administrative process summarized in Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U. S. 33, 339 U. S. 36-41 (1950), by enacting the Administrative Procedure Act (Act). [Footnote 3] Section 5 of that Act, now 5 U.S.C. § 554, establishes requirements governing certain agency proceedings that come within the Act's definition of "adjudication." We granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in this chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
case, 416 U.S. 981 (1974), to review its conclusion that 5 U.S.C. § 554 applied to a § 10(k) proceeding conducted by the Board, 486 F.2d 863 (1973). Another Court of Appeals had decided a short time earlier that such a Board proceeding was not subject to § 554, Bricklayers v. NLRB, 155 U.S.App.D.C. 47, 475 F.2d 1316 (1973). The case now before us arose out of a jurisdictional dispute between respondent Local 134 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) (hereafter respondent) and the Communications Workers of America (CWA) over whose members would perform certain telephone installation work in Cook County, Ill. Petitioner International Telephone & Telegraph Corp., which had a nationwide collective bargaining agreement with the CWA, had established a communications equipment and systems division to sell and install private telephone systems. [Footnote 4] In 1970, petitioner entered into a contract with the village of Elk Grove, Ill., for the installation and sale of a switching system and related telephone and circuitry work. Since employees of the Illinois Bell Telephone Co., who were members of respondent, had already run trunklines from the local operating telephone system to the Administrative Office of the village, petitioner's contract covered only the remaining two stages necessary to complete installation of the system. First the telephone cable had to be routed from the telephone room in the basement to the telephone instruments in particular rooms and offices by a process known as "pulling cable"; petitioner subcontracted this work to the C. A. Riley Electric Construction Co., chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
When CWA employees appeared at the jobsite on December 3, 1970, to begin their portion of the work, all of respondent's members left their jobs. [Footnote 6] That afternoon, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
29 U.S.C. § 160(k). Respondent was notified that a hearing would be conducted by a hearing officer [Footnote 8] upon the dispute alleged in chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
the charge, and the hearing was held on March 12, 15, and 17, 1971, with Stephen S. Schulson, an attorney in the regional office, presiding. All parties appeared at the hearing and were given full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to adduce evidence bearing on the issues. In accordance with NLRB regulations, the record was transmitted to the Board for decision without any recommendation from the hearing officer. [Footnote 9] The Board received briefs from petitioner, respondent, and the CWA, and concluded that employees represented by the CWA were entitled to perform the work in dispute. 191 N.L.R.B. 828 (1971). On August 30, 1971, respondent notified the Regional Director that it would not comply with the Board's § 10(k) determination. The Regional Director, on behalf of the Board's General Counsel, then issued a complaint upon the § 8(b)(4)(D) unfair labor practice charge that had been held in abeyance pending the attempt to resolve the dispute pursuant to the § 10(k) proceeding. At the hearing before a trial examiner, the General Counsel was represented by the same attorney who had presided over the compilation of testimony for chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Respondent filed a petition to review and set aside the Board's order in the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and the Board filed a cross-application for enforcement of its order. [Footnote 11] The Court of Appeals found respondent's conduct to be "the very activity § 8(b)(4)(D) was intended to prohibit," 486 F.2d 866, but refused to enforce the Board's order because it decided that the Board had not complied with the Act, 5 U.S.C. § 554. [Footnote 12] The court was under the impression that the chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
parties had "admitted that § 554 applies to § 10(k) hearings," 486 F.2d 867, and regarded the participation by Schulson in both proceedings as a violation of 5 U.S.C. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
486 F.2d 866-867. With that perspective, the Court of Appeals found the attorney's participation to be "plainly inconsistent with both the spirit and the letter of the Act." Id. at 868.
To determine whether § 554 governs proceedings conducted under § 10(k) of the National Labor Relations Act necessitates some understanding of both statutory provisions which, as noted above, were enacted within a year of each other. The Administrative Procedure Act was aptly described in Wong Yang Sung, supra, as "a new, basic and comprehensive regulation of procedures in many agencies," 339 U.S. at 339 U. S. 36. The Court there chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
National Union of Marine Cooks & Stewards (Irwin-Lyons Lumber Co.), 83 N.L.R.B. 341 (1949). [Footnote 13] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The question which we must decide here is whether the § 10(k) determination is an "adjudication" governed by the Act, 5 U.S.C. § 554. The Court of Appeals did not consider in any detail whether § 554 governs § 10(k) proceedings, since it was under the impression that the parties had conceded the general applicability of this chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
section to such hearings. 486 F.2d 867. Petitioner and the Board contend that the Court of Appeals was mistaken with respect to any such concession, and state that they argued both in their principal briefs and in their petitions for rehearing that 554 was not applicable. Respondent acknowledges that no such concession was made, [Footnote 14] and we therefore address the issue on its merits.
Section 554 applies "in every case of adjudication required by statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing," [Footnote 15] and 5 chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The relationship between the § 10(k) proceeding and the § 8(b)(4)(D) proceeding, however, is quite distinct from the relationship between the hearing before an administrative law judge and ultimate review of his findings and recommendations by the agency. The § 10(k) proceeding has a life of its own from the time that testimony is taken in the field by a hearing officer until the time the Board, with the record of the testimony before it but with no proposed findings or conclusions or recommendations from the hearing officer, reaches its own determination. The Board's attention in the § 10(k) proceeding is not directed to ascertaining whether there is substantial evidence to show that a union has engaged in forbidden conduct with a forbidden objective. Those inquiries are left for the § 8(b)(4)(D) proceeding. [Footnote 16] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Were we to adopt respondent's position that merely because a § 10(k) determination has a significant practical effect on the § 8(b)(4)(D) proceeding, it was therefore "agency process for the formulation" of the § 8(b)(4)(D) order, we might well sweep under the definition of that term numerous ancillary agency proceedings that are distinct from the adjudications on which they have an effect, and which the language of the Act does not appear to have been designed to reach. We therefore decline to adopt that position. We accordingly conclude that a § 10(k) determination is neither itself a final disposition under the definitional section of the Act nor is it "agency process for the formulation of an order" within the meaning of that section. Proceedings under chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
There is a suggestion in the opinion of the Court of Appeals that the Board's order should not be enforced even if the Act does not govern the § 10(k) proceeding, because the commingling of functions was "incompatible with the accepted norms for the proper administration of justice." 486 F.2d 863, 868. Cf. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U. S. 33 (1950). In the present case, however, attorney Schulson prosecuted the case for the General Counsel after he had presided at the § 10(k) proceeding. Even if it be assumed that his function at the § 10(k) proceeding was judicial in nature, it is hard to see how this sequence of events would present the danger of commingling which the Court of Appeals saw. The Court of Appeals may have confused "hearing officers" with "trial examiners" or "hearing examiners" (now "administrative law judges") who are ordinarily required to make recommended decisions, 5 U.S.C. § 557(b), and who must be appointed pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 3105. 486 F.2d 867 n. 3.