Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/4th/5/242.html
Timestamp: 2019-10-15 08:35:10
Document Index: 199197050

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 305', '§ 313', '§ 315', '§ 317', '§ 319', '§ 319', '§ 361', '§ 395', '§ 361', '§ 366', '§ 300', '§ 300', '§ 361', '§ 366', '§ 366', '§ 366', '§ 366', '§ 366', '§ 317', '§ 452', '§ 459', '§ 232', '§ 300']

Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (San Diego County Dept. of Social Services) (1993) :: :: Supreme Court of California Decisions :: California Case Law :: California Law :: US Law :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › California Case Law › Cal. 4th › Volume 5 › Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (San Diego County Dept. of Social Services) (1993)
Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (San Diego County Dept. of Social Services) (1993)
Llloyd M. Harmon, County Counsel, Susan Strom, Chief Deputy County Counsel, and Gary C. Seiser, Deputy County Counsel, for Respondent. [5 Cal. 4th 245]
A few days before the date set for the section 366.26 hearing, mother filed a petition for writ of mandate/prohibition seeking to have the Court of [5 Cal. 4th 246] Appeal order the trial court to vacate its order setting the section 366.26 hearing and to prohibit it from taking any further action to terminate mother's parental rights. Mother claimed that the statutory provisions violated due process because they allowed findings of detriment to be made by a preponderance of the evidence rather than by clear and convincing evidence. The Court of Appeal denied relief, and we granted review.
These revisions still fell short of the desired goal. As Justice Brauer observed in a concurring opinion in In re Micah S. (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d [5 Cal. 4th 247] 557, 564 [243 Cal. Rptr. 756], there were still lengthy delays, especially when adoption was selected as the permanent plan. Months, or even years, might pass before the separate termination proceeding would be completed in superior court: "The passage of five or more years from initial removal of the child from its home to ultimate resolution and repose [was] by no means unusual." (Id. at p. 565 (conc. opn. of Brauer, J.).)
A peace officer, probation officer, or social worker, who has reason to believe that a child falls within the definitions set forth in section 300 and is [5 Cal. 4th 248] in immediate danger as a result thereof, may remove the child from the home. (§§ 305, 306.) fn. 3 A petition to have such a child declared a dependent child must be filed within 48 hours excluding nonjudicial days. (§ 313; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1440(a).) A "detention hearing" must be held by the juvenile court no later than the next judicial day. (§ 315; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1440(d).) The parents are entitled to court-appointed counsel to represent them throughout the proceedings if they cannot afford counsel. (§ 317.) fn. 4 At the detention hearing the department of social services bears the burden of making a prima facie showing that the minor comes within section 300 and that there is a need for detention under specified conditions. (§ 319.) The court must make findings regarding whether reasonable efforts were made "to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the minor from his or her home" and, if the minor is to be detained, must order services "to be provided as soon as possible to reunify the minor and his or her family if appropriate." (§ 319.)
If the child is removed from the parents' custody, the court must make orders regarding reunification services. (§ 361.5.) The court must also notify the parents that their parental rights may be terminated if they do not reunify [5 Cal. 4th 249] within 12 months. (Ibid.; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1456(f).) fn. 5 The parents have the right to challenge both the jurisdictional and dispositional findings and orders on appeal. (§ 395.)
Thus, in order to terminate parental rights, the court need only make two findings: (1) that there is clear and convincing evidence that the minor will [5 Cal. 4th 250] be adopted; and (2) that there has been a previous determination that reunification services shall be terminated. According to the task force, "the critical decision regarding parental rights will be made at the dispositional or review hearing, that is, that the minor cannot be returned home and that reunification efforts should not be pursued. In such cases, the decision to terminate parental rights will be relatively automatic if the minor is going to be adopted." (Task Force Report, supra, p. 11.) The task force's intent was "to eliminate duplication between the regular review hearings and the termination hearing. Therefore, the decisions made at the review hearing regarding reunification are not subject to relitigation at the termination hearing. This hearing determines only the type of permanent home." (Task Force Report, supra, p. 12.)
[1a] Mother contends that the previously described statutory framework violates due process because it allows a parent's rights to be terminated based on a finding by a preponderance of the evidence that return of the child to parental custody would create a substantial risk of detriment to the child. She maintains that due process requires that the finding be made by clear and convincing evidence and relies on Santosky v. Kramer (1982) 455 U.S. 745 [71 L. Ed. 2d 599, 102 S. Ct. 1388] and In re Angelia P. (1981) 28 Cal. 3d 908 [171 Cal. Rptr. 2d 637, 632 P.2d 198] as support for that proposition. fn. 7 Similar claims have been made by parents in other cases, with varying results. The Court of Appeal in In re Heather B. (1992) 9 Cal. App. 4th 535 [11 Cal. Rptr. 891] aptly described Santosky as follows:
"In Santosky v. Kramer, supra, 455 U.S. 745, the United States Supreme Court considered New York's procedures for the termination of parental rights upon a determination that a child was 'permanently neglected.' Under New York law a child could be removed from parental custody upon a finding of neglect and the parental relationship could be severed upon a finding of permanent neglect. Permanent neglect would be shown by evidence that the child had been in state custody for a year or more, the state had made diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship, but the parents failed substantially and continuously or repeatedly to [5 Cal. 4th 251] maintain contact with the child or to plan for his or her future although physically and financially able to do so." (Id. at p. 748 [71 L.Ed.2d at p. 603].) These findings were to be proven by a ' "fair preponderance of the evidence." ' (Ibid.)
"Concerning the second factor, the risk of error in the chosen procedure, the court held that a New York permanent neglect proceeding is an adversary contest between the state and a child's natural parents, and that in such [5 Cal. 4th 252] circumstances the relevant question is whether a preponderance of the evidence standard fairly allocates the risk of an erroneous factfinding between these two parties. (Santosky v. Kramer, supra, 455 U.S. at p. 761 [71 L.Ed.2d at p. 612].) The court found that several aspects of the New York procedure combined to magnify the risk of an erroneous determination, including imprecise substantive standards which left determinations unusually open to subjective standards; the fact that the court possessed unusual discretion to underweigh probative evidence favoring the parent; the state's greater ability to assemble its case; the fact that the state had the power to shape the historical events that formed the basis for termination; and the lack of any 'double jeopardy' defense against repeated state termination efforts. (Id. at pp. 762-764 [71 L.Ed.2d at pp. 612-613].) The court concluded that increasing the burden of proof is one way to impress the fact finder with the importance of the decision and thereby reduce the chances of an erroneous determination. (Ibid.)
Our decision in In re Angelia P., supra, 28 Cal. 3d 908, preceded Santosky v. Kramer. In re Angelia P. dealt with a proceeding brought under Civil Code [5 Cal. 4th 253] section 232 to terminate parental rights for parental neglect. We rejected a claim that proof beyond a reasonable doubt rather than the legislatively prescribed clear and convincing evidence standard should be required for termination of parental rights under Civil Code section 232. We held that the clear and convincing evidence standard appropriately balanced the interests involved: "(1) the parent and child in a continuing familial relationship; (2) the parent in preserving the integrity and privacy of the family unit, free of state intervention and social stigma attached to either parent or child; (3) the child in a permanent, secure, stable, and loving environment; and (4) the state in protecting the child." (In re Angelia P., supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 919.)
[2] Turning to the current statutory scheme, section 366.26 cannot properly be understood except in the context of the entire dependency process of which it is part. Unlike the termination hearings evaluated in Santosky v. Kramer, supra, 455 U.S. 745, and In re Angelia P., supra, 28 Cal. 3d 908, the purpose of the section 366.26 hearing is not to accumulate further evidence of parental unfitness and danger to the child, but to begin the task of finding the child a permanent alternative family placement. fn. 8 By the time dependency proceedings have reached the stage of a section 366.26 hearing, there have been multiple specific findings of parental unfitness. [1b] Except for a temporary period, the grounds for initial removal of the child from parental custody have been established under a clear and convincing standard (see § 361, subd. (b)); in addition, there have been a series of hearings involving ongoing reunification efforts and, at each hearing, there was a statutory presumption that the child should be returned to the custody of the parent. (§§ 366.21, subds. (e), (f), 366.22, subd. (a).) Only if, over this entire period of time, the state continually has established that a return of custody to the parent would be detrimental to the child is the section 366.26 stage even reached.
[3] We therefore conclude that the three factors relied upon in Santosky v. Kramer, supra, 455 U.S. 745, to require an elevated standard of proof do not compel the use of that standard in this case under our statutory scheme. [5 Cal. 4th 254]
The second factor considered in Santosky v. Kramer, supra, 455 U.S. 745, was the risk of erroneous fact-finding. The New York scheme employed "imprecise substantive standards that leave determinations unusually open to the subjective values of the judge," thus allowing "unusual discretion to underweigh probative facts that might favor the parent." (Id. at p. 762 [71 L.Ed.2d at p. 612].) This risk is substantially diminished under our scheme, which emphasizes "preservation of the family whenever possible." (§ 300, subd. (j).) Nowhere in our scheme has the Legislature invited value judgments comparable to those described in Santosky. Indeed, our scheme requires: (1) a court finding that "there is a substantial risk of serious future [5 Cal. 4th 255] injury" to the minor in order to establish dependency (§ 300, subd. (a)); (2) a finding by clear and convincing evidence that there is "substantial danger to the physical health of the minor" in order to remove the child from parental custody (§ 361, subd. (b)(1)); and (3) repeated findings by a preponderance of the evidence that return "would create a substantial risk of detriment to the physical or emotional well-being of the minor" (§§ 366.21, subds. (e), (f), 366.22, subd. (a)).
The third factor considered in Santosky v. Kramer, supra, 455 U.S. 745, was the governmental interest supporting the procedure-the state's parens patriae interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of the child, and the state's fiscal and administrative interest in reducing the cost and burden of such proceedings. In contrast to Santosky v. Kramer, our dependency statutes endeavor to preserve the parent-child relationship and to reduce the risk of erroneous fact-finding in so many different ways that it would be fanciful to think that these state interests require what in most cases would be a sixth [5 Cal. 4th 256] inquiry into whether the severance of parental ties would be detrimental to the child. The number and quality of the judicial findings that are necessary preconditions to termination convey very powerfully to the fact finder the subjective certainty about parental unfitness and detriment required before the court may even consider ending the relationship between natural parent and child.
Lucas, C. J., Mosk, J., Arabian, J., Baxter, J., and George, J., concurred. [5 Cal. 4th 257]
Cynthia immediately challenged the juvenile court's ruling setting the case for a "selection and implementation" hearing, by filing a petition for a writ of mandate or prohibition in the Court of Appeal. Specifically, Cynthia asked the Court of Appeal to prohibit the trial court from terminating her parental rights with respect to her minor child, Sarah. Cynthia argued that the juvenile court's use of the lowest evidentiary standard-proof by a preponderance of the evidence-in making its finding of detriment at the 18-month status review hearing conflicted with decisions by this court and by the United States Supreme Court requiring that the dispositive finding necessary to terminate parental rights be made under a heightened "clear and convincing" evidentiary standard. (In re Angelia P. (1981) 28 Cal. 3d 908 [171 Cal. Rptr. 637, 623 P.2d 198][parental unfitness must be proved by clear and convincing evidence]; Santosky v. Kramer (1982) 455 U.S. 745, 759 [71 L. Ed. 2d 599, 610, 12 S. Ct. 1388] [same].) The Court of Appeal denied Cynthia writ relief. [5 Cal. 4th 258]
Under the new dependency statutes, the status of every child temporarily removed from parental custody must be judicially reviewed once every six months for a period of no more than eighteen months. (§§ 366, 366.21, 366.22.) If, at the 12-month status review hearing, there is no substantial probability the child will be returned to the parents within the next 6 months, or if at the 18-month status review hearing the child is not returned to the parents, the juvenile court must set the matter for a "selection and implementation" hearing under section 366.26 to develop a plan for permanent placement of the child, either in foster care, a guardianship, or adoption. (§§ 366.21, subd. (g), 366.22, subd. (a), 366.26.) For young children and those children for whom adoptive parents are available, adoption is usually the preferred placement because it offers the prospect of a secure permanent home. (See In re Heather B. (1992) 9 Cal. App. 4th 535, 558 [11 Cal. Rptr. 891].) To free a child for adoption, however, the juvenile court must first terminate the natural parents' rights in the child. (§ 366.26.) [5 Cal. 4th 259]
In In re Angelia P., supra, 28 Cal. 3d 908, this court considered the standard of proof necessary for terminating parental rights under Civil Code [5 Cal. 4th 260] section 232, fn. 2 which requires a showing of parental unfitness. We concluded that "clear and convincing" evidence of parental unfitness was most consistent with the statutory goal of providing the fullest opportunity for the parents to exercise their rights without impairment of the best interests of the child. (In re Angelia P., supra, at p. 919.) One year later, the United States Supreme Court considered the standard of proof used to terminate parental rights under the New York Family Court Act, and concluded that the due process clause of the federal Constitution required proof by clear and convincing evidence. (Santosky v. Kramer, supra, 455 U.S. at p. 770 [71 L.Ed.2d at pp. 617- 618].)
The determination whether a particular evidentiary standard that a state uses to terminate parental rights comports with the constitutional requirements of due process turns on a balancing of three factors that the United States Supreme Court articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) 424 U.S. 319, 335 [47 L. Ed. 2d 18, 33-34, 96 S. Ct. 893]. As subsequently reiterated by the high court, these factors are: "the private interests affected by the proceeding; the risk of error created by the State's chosen procedure; and the countervailing governmental interest supporting use of the challenged procedure." (Santosky v. Kramer, supra, 455 U.S. at p 754 [71 L.Ed.2d at pp. 606-607].)
In considering the first of these factors-the private interest at stake-the United States Supreme Court observed that the interest a parent has in the continued care, custody and control of his or her minor child is a "fundamental liberty interest," which is "commanding" and "far more precious than [5 Cal. 4th 261] any property right." (Santosky v. Kramer, supra, 455 U.S. at pp. 758-759 [71 L.Ed.2d at pp. 609-610], citing Stanley v. Illinois (1972) 405 U.S. 645, 651 [31 L. Ed. 2d 551, 558-559, 92 S. Ct. 1208], and Lassiter v. Department of Social Services (1981) 452 U.S. 18, 27 [68 L. Ed. 2d 640, 649-650, 101 S. Ct. 2153].) As the court explained, a state- initiated action to terminate parental rights, "seeks not merely to infringe" this fundamental liberty interest, "but to end it." (Santosky v. Kramer, supra, 455 U.S. at p. 759 [71 L.Ed.2d at p. 610].)
With respect to the state's fiscal concerns, the court explained in Santosky that an elevated standard of proof would not adversely affect that interest. Proof of parental unfitness by clear and convincing evidence, the court observed, is no more costly and does not create any more administrative burdens than proof by a preponderance of the evidence. (Santosky v. Kramer, supra, 455 U.S. at p. 767 [71 L.Ed.2d at pp. 615-616].) In addressing the state's parens patriae interest in the welfare of the child, the high court observed that the statutory scheme at issue in Santosky, the New York Family Court Act, sought to preserve natural family bonds whenever possible. (Santosky v. Kramer, supra, 455 U.S. at p. 767 [71 L.Ed.2d at pp. [5 Cal. 4th 262] 615-616].) Use of a "preponderance of the evidence" standard of proof to permanently sever parental rights, the court said, was not consistent with that statutory goal. (Ibid.)
But Cynthia, the child's mother, does not contend that due process compels an elevated standard of proof at the section 366.26 "selection and implementation" hearing. Rather, her argument is that a higher standard of proof by clear and convincing evidence must be applied to the dependency [5 Cal. 4th 263] court's final decision not to return a child to parental custody, either at the 12- or 18-month status review hearing. (§§ 366.21, subd. (e), 366.22, subd. (a).) The Task Force Report prepared for the California Senate calls this the "critical decision" in terminating parental rights under the California dependency statutes because it is the last substantive evaluation necessary to the juvenile court's termination of parental rights. (Task Force Report, supra, p. 11.) By ignoring the decision critical to terminating parental rights and instead focusing on a later phase of the dependency procedures-the section 366.26 "selection and implementation" hearing-the majority skews its evaluation of the three-factor test of Mathews v. Eldridge, supra, 424 U.S. at page 335 [47 L.Ed.2d at pages 33-34], to favor the lower standard of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. But use of that lower standard of proof does not withstand scrutiny when the test the high court established in Mathews v. Eldridge, supra, is applied to the critical decision in terminating parental rights under the California juvenile dependency scheme, as I shall explain.
Under the test that the United States Supreme Court established in Mathews v. Eldridge, supra, 424 U.S. at page 335 [47 L.Ed.2d at pages 33-34], to determine whether state procedures that work a deprivation comport with due process, the first factor to be considered is the private interest affected by the threatened deprivation. In an action initiated by the state to terminate parental rights, the private interest at stake is a parent's "fundamental" and "commanding" liberty interest in maintaining a parent-child relationship with the child. (Santosky v. Kramer, supra, 455 U.S. at pp. 758-759 [71 L.Ed.2d at pp. 609-610].) Irrespective of whether state proceedings to terminate parental rights are brought under the New York Family Court Act at issue in Santosky, under the California Civil Code provision this court considered in In re Angelia P., supra, 28 Cal. 3d 908, or under the California juvenile dependency statutes, the private interest at stake is just as "fundamental" and "commanding." Nor is the threatened deprivation any less permanent for the parents or for the child when, as here, the state initiates proceedings to terminate parental rights under California's juvenile dependency statutes. Thus, the private interest affected when parental rights are threatened in a juvenile court dependency action supports using the same standard of proof required to terminate parental rights under the New York and the California Civil Code procedures-proof by clear and convincing evidence.
I now turn to the second factor of the test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, supra, 424 U.S. at page 335 [47 L.Ed.2d at pages 33-34]: the risk that using [5 Cal. 4th 264] the "preponderance of the evidence" standard in the California juvenile dependency scheme may lead to an erroneous deprivation of parental rights. In Santosky v. Kramer, supra, 455 U.S. at page 761 [71 L.Ed.2d at pages 611- 612], the United States Supreme Court held that the prospect for an erroneous deprivation of parental rights based on proof by a preponderance of the evidence, the standard adopted by the New York Family Court Act, was "significant." In part, the high court's conclusion rested on the state's superior ability to assemble its case and the potential for cultural or class bias against the parents who, in most termination proceedings, are "poor, uneducated, or members of minority groups." (Id. at pp. 763-764 [71 L.Ed.2d at pp. 612-615].)
As the United States Supreme Court explained in Santosky v. Kramer, supra, 455 U.S. 745, increasing the burden of proof on the state at the critical phase of the proceedings to terminate parental rights " 'is one way to impress the factfinder with the importance of the decision' " and to thereby reduce the risk that parental rights will be erroneously extinguished. (Id. at pp. 764-765 [71 L.Ed.2d at p. 614], quoting Addington v. Texas (1979) 441 U.S. 418, 427 [60 L. Ed. 2d 323, 331-332, 99 S. Ct. 1804].) The rights at issue in any parental termination proceeding are just too important to take an unnecessary risk.
The third and final factor of the test articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge, supra, 424 U.S. at page 335 [47 L.Ed.2d at pages 33-34], is the government's interest in its chosen procedure. With respect to an action brought to terminate parental rights, the government has not only an interest in avoiding added fiscal and administrative burdens that an additional procedural requirement might entail, but also a parens patriae interest in the child's welfare. (See Santosky v. Kramer, supra, 455 U.S. at p. 754 [71 L.Ed.2d at pp. 606-607].) [5 Cal. 4th 265]
FN 2. Although the Task Force Report was published in January 1988, after the enactment of Senate Bill No. 243, the report states that it "documents the intent of the new laws." (Id., p. i.)
FN 3. Our review of the dependency process is limited to those cases in which the child is removed from the home since they are the only ones that carry the potential for termination of parental rights.
FN 4. Appointment of counsel previously had been a matter of juvenile court discretion. Senate Bill No. 243 made appointed counsel mandatory when out-of-home placement is involved. (§ 317, subd. (b).)
FN 5. Thus, to state, as does the dissent, that Sarah was "temporarily" removed from her mother's custody, may be misleading.
FN 6. The language differs slightly in section 366.21, subdivision (f). It reads "substantial risk or detriment" instead of "substantial risk of detriment," as stated in section 366.21, subdivision (e) and section 366.22, subdivision (a). The most logical explanation for the difference in language is that the word "or" is a typographical error; that "or" should have read "of."
FN 7. Requests for judicial notice have been filed by mother and amicus curiae on behalf of mother. (See Evid. Code, §§ 452, 459.) We grant mother's request for judicial notice of certain amended versions of Senate Bill No. 243, enacted as Statutes 1987, chapter 1485, and amicus curiae's request for judicial notice of the court record in In re Sarah D., S026737, a companion case. We deny amicus curiae's request for judicial notice of the Little Hoover Commission Report, Mending our Broken Children: Restructuring Foster Care in California, and the 1991-92 San Diego Grand Jury Report, entitled, Families in Crisis, Report No. 2, because these reports are irrelevant to the question of the constitutionality of the statutory scheme. (Evid. Code, § 459, subd. (a).)
FN 8. As previously mentioned, the termination proceeding in In re Angelia P., supra, 28 Cal. 3d 908, was pursuant to Civil Code section 232. A Civil Code section 232 proceeding to terminate parental rights is heard in the superior court as a new action in which the superior court must find by clear and convincing evidence the existence of statutorily specified grounds of parental fault. (Civ. Code, § 232, subd. (c).) The higher standard of proof is appropriate in light of the fact that this is a separate proceeding in which specific findings of fault or detriment are required. The present statutory scheme, by contrast, requires the juvenile court to conduct multiple hearings and findings of detriment before the section 366.26 stage is reached. Thus the Civil Code section 232 proceeding is not comparable to a proceeding pursuant to section 366.26 in which parental rights are terminated. The Civil Code section 232 proceeding bears more similarity to the New York proceeding at issue in Santosky v. Kramer, supra, 455 U.S. 745, than it does to the statutory scheme being evaluated in the present case.
FN 9. This analysis is adapted from a concurring opinion by Kline, J., in the Court of Appeal in In re Michaela C. *(Cal.App.).
FN 1. Further unlabeled statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FN 2. Civil Code section 232 sets out a procedure for declaring children free of the custody and control of one parent or both. In 1981 when this court decided In re Angelia P., supra, 28 Cal. 3d 908, section 232 governed all such proceedings, including those involving children who had been declared dependents of the juvenile court. (§ 300 et seq.)