Source: http://www.juricaf.org/arret/CONSEILDELEUROPE-COUREUROPEENNEDESDROITSDELHOMME-19770711-760176-780677
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Document Index: 317257677

Matched Legal Cases: ['arrêt ', 'art 2', 'art 3', '§ 6', "l'article 27", "l'article 28", "l'article 9", "l'article 9", "l'article 9", "l'article 10", "l'article 9", "l'article 9", "l'article 9", "l'article 9", "l'article 9", "l'article 1", "l'article 1", "l'article 11", "l'article 11", "l'article 11", "l'article 64", "l'article 11", "l'article 11", "l'article 11", "l'article 11", "l'article 11", "l'article 13", "l'article 9", "l'article 10", "l'article 11", "l'article 13", "l'article 11", "l'article 11", "l'article 11", "l'article 11", "l'article 11", '§ 5', "l'article 9", "l'article 9", "l'article 10", "l'article 11", "l'article 13", "l'article 11", "l'article 11"]

YOUNG et JAMES c. ROYAUME-UNI
Page d'accueil > Résultats de la recherche YOUNG et JAMES c. ROYAUME-UNI
Type d'affaire : DecisionType de recours : Struck out of the listNumérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 7601/76;7806/77Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1977-07-11;7601.76 Analyses : (Art. 14) DISCRIMINATION, (Art. 9-1) LIBERTE DE RELIGIONParties : Demandeurs : YOUNG et JAMESDéfendeurs : ROYAUME-UNITexte : APPLICATION/REOUETE NÂ° 7601/7 6 I .M . YOUNG and N .H . JAMES v/the UNITED KINGDO M I .M . YOUNG et N .H . JAMES c/ROYAUME-UN I
DECISION of 11 July 1977 on the admissibility of the application DÃCISION du 11 juillet 1977 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃ©te
Article 11 of the Convention : Does this provision guaranree the righr not to join a rrade-union ? Application declared admissible .
Article 11 de la Convention : Cette disposition garantit-elle un droit de ne pas s'affilier B un syndicat ? RequÃªte dÃ©clarÃ©e recevable.
Ifrancais : voirp . 146 1
THE FACTS The facts of the case may be summarised as,follow
s Both applicants are citizens of the United Kingdom The first applicant wa s born in 1953 and is presently residing in Surrey . The second applicant was born in 1928 and now resides in Havant . They are represented by Mr Mitchell-Heggs of the law firm Boodington and Yturbe in Paris, acting under powers-of-attorney dated 14 July 1976 .
With regard to the first applicant, Mr Young From the statements and documents submitted by the applicants lawyer it appears that the first applicant commenced employment with British Rail on 2 October 1972 where he worked until he received his dismissal notice on 27 May 1976, effective as of 26 June 197 6 In August 1975 notices were published on each floor of the premises known as Southern House where the applicant was working at the time which drew the attention of staff to a change in their contracts of employment as a result of an agreement between the management and trade unions, dated July 1975 . The notice stated that as from 1 August 1975 membership of a recognised trade union was to be a condition of employment for the staff covered by the said agreement
In September 1975 the applicant had a meeting with his immediate super'visor who was also a representative of the Transport and Salaried Staff Association . `t_,â¢,Ai this meeting the applicant was told that "closed shop" agreements had been mÃ de`between British Rail and the three railway unions : i .e . The National Union ',~ofRailwaymen (N .U .R .) ; The Transport and Salaried Staff Association (T .S .S .A . :The Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen IA .SL .E .F ).1 . and -`s!i Under the agreement the applicant was required to join the T .S .S .A . with -_'â¢an option of joining the N .U .R . The applicant was informed that he could obtain ;r,,Â± --; .Ãezemption from this requirement if he genuinely objected on grounds of religiou s A belie( to being a member of any trade union whatsoever or on any reasonable ground to being a member of a particular trade union . He was also informed that z` .ifhewished to make a claim for exemption then a written application would have to-be submitted by 17 October 1975 . :~-. On 19 September a further notice was published on each floor of the -^~'`~. . ~prÃ©mises stating that it had been agreed that the acceptance of exemption on Y'4~~"-"arÃ©ligious giounds would apply only to those religious dominations which specifically i ::,â¢ : :. . -, proscribed members from joining a trade union . The notice further stated that ,-_ Ã§ontinuingexemption only on religious grounds depended upon the passin g through Parliament of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Amendment) Bill --~` Ã©na Ã¯hÃ¢t-employees would be advised further on this point . .. i
cÃ´rdingly on 17 October 1975 the applicant submitted a written claim for .~~exÃ©mption n_d o1301A_prils197,6 he received a letter from British Rail for exemptio n
â¢Union and Labour Relations (Amendment) by Section I(e) repealed the words of the Dloyee the right to claim exemption "on any )er,of a particular trade union" . Thenceforth e exempted from a condition of employment iuld befounded only on grounds of religiou s tiori ^ongrounds of religious belief to being a idhe object on any grounds to being a member rthÃ©less ; he did object for a number of other i,and the reasons stated in his written claim for m be suinmarisedas follows
AJJJJ a . Money from thetiL i~U~ idn' FÃ»nd is usÃ©dto produce a monthly news7a
papeÃ§ which-.is grossly~politically biased in fÃ¢vour of the Labour Party and the WIll -. . Ã¢pplicant had not received sufficient assurances that the Fund was not used for other political purposes . Furthermore, the applicant did not subscribe to the political views of the T .S .S .A . and did not wish to give financial support to their â¢Y,'~ propagation . â
5~'-' . ..: ;- . .
127 ;~_~.i~r . .
b . By seeking to enforce a"closed shop" the T .SS .A . showed itself intolerant of the expression of individual freedom . c By forcing large pay awards, T .S .S .A . increases inflation and therefore instead of increasing real wealth, it reduces it . d . T .S .S .A . supports nationalisation of industry per se whereas the applicant believes that nationalised industries are economic white elephants . In general, the applicant is in favour of private enterprise . e . The applicant disagreed with the increased control which the T .S .S .A . now has over "hiring and firing" of employees which results from the "closed shop" agreemen t f The applicant objected to the fact that in order to be a full-time official of T .S .S .A . he would have to furnish details of his past work in the Labour and Trade Union movements . g . Should TS .S .A . decide to go on strike, the applicant would be obliged to withdraw his labour along with his colleagues ; the applicant felt that such collective withdrawal of labour in a key service industry is collective blackmail on the country as a whole, and he did not wish to participate in such action or still further to be forced to do so . On 5 May 1976 the applicant's claim for exemption was considered by an "Appeal Body" consisting of a representative of British Rail, a representative of the T .S .S .A . and a representative of the National Union of Railwaymen . By letter of 27 May 1976 British Rail informed the applicant that his claim for exemption was disallowed and gave him one month's notice of dismissal to which his Contract of Employment entitled him, expiring on 26 June 1976 . The applicant also submitted thewritten opinion of John Hall, D .F .C ., Uueen's Counsel and Barrister-at-Law . The Counsel expressed the opinion that whereas the applicant has the right to apply to the Industrial Tribunal to allege that he was unfairly dismissed by British Rail, such an application would be bound to fail . The effective date of termination of the applicant's employment was 5 April 1976 at which time the relevant legislation regarding dismissal was to be found in Schedule I, Part 2, of the 1974 Act, as amended by the 1976 Act, which came into force on 25 March 1976, Paragraph 4 (1), which provided "in every employment to which this paragraph applies, every employee shall have the right not to be unfairly dismissed by his employer, and the remedy of an employee so dismissed for breach of that right shall be by way of complaint to an Industrial Tribunal under Part 3 of this Schedule and not otherwise" . Paragraph 6 (5) of the 1976 Act provides : dismissal of an employee by an employer shall be regarded as fair for the purposes of this Schedule if (a) it is the practice in accordance with a Union Membership Agreement for all employees of that employer or all employees of the same class as the dismissed employee to belong to a specified independent trade union, or to one of a number ot specifie d
_.~`â¢ihdependent trade unions ; unless the employee genuinely objects on the grounds "o.freligious belief to being a member of any trade whatsoever . . . in which case - : the : dismissal shall be regarded as unfair" . -`,The Counsel came to the conclusion that any appeal by the applicant xâ¢'IA,Ã©gainst a decision of the Industrial Tribunal would be equally bound to fail . In his .,'opinion the applicant had, therefore, in effect no remedy under English law i n esbÃ©ct of his dismissal, and in these circumstances, and in this sense, it could - - Ã§cÃ»ratelÃ¿ and properly be stated that any domestic remedies open to the applicant :â¢_~=, .
had,been exhausted .
'~%Witharegard to the second applicant, Mr Jame s -' .'â¢Ã¯'----. .On 27 March 1974 the applicant was employed by British Rail as a leading . - â¢-a .,xs . "" .railwayman Ihe had already been employed by British Rail for two periods of sorriÃ© yearsl .
~7T~Some time in July/August 1975 a similar notice as mentioned above was cp Ã´lished inihe premises where the applicant was employed drawing the attentio n VÃ´f tÃ©fftitoÂ°`change in their contractsas a result of an agreement between the ~~~ ;~â¢-. .J . . , manement andtrade unions dated July 1975 . As already set out above the .a g
hotÃce stated that as from 1 August 1975 membership of a recognised trade union wasto be a condition of employment for the staff covered by agreements listed in 'thÃ©'notic e . -.
.' As far as existing em ployees ,were.. concerned, the notice stated that agree. ent on the dÃ«tailÃ©d rrangementsâ¢=tobe applied, including the provision fo r claiming exemption from mÃ©mbership .of a trade union had been concluded only .and"Conciliation staff covered by the Machinery in respect of a Railway Salaried~ Negotiation dated 28 May 1956.."~`= . â¢ ~ The applicant falling into~â¢â¢thÃ©category of conciliation staff was therefore allegedly bound by the new cQndition of employment .
On 16 October 1975 the~ap'plicant had a meeting with his immediate superior
$,Y i Q and a representatrve of the IoÃ©a1 3 N .Ã .R .Branch . At this meeting he learnt that he was obliged to join the N!U .R~Ã¢ a result of the unilateral change in his contract 3K . . of employment and that no=otheÃ¿ -,union membership was open to him . The applicant told his superior and t-Ã©,N .U .R . representative that he was willing to . wâ¢ r ._ .. .
join the N .U .R . However tFiÃ©=appliÃ§ant's final decision was put into abeyance f~) ; '
pending clarification from--the=N~ :U'.Ras to the computation of his salary . The b :. applicant was particuÃarl ytcÃ´ncÃ© rned that although he was working the same i: . -_ . . r hours as a colleag~e ~,t~e~e~appearedâ¢tobe a difference in their respective wages . Before :actuallÃ¿ 8pplying for membership to the N .U .R . the applicant wished to seethe outcome of the pay query by his colleague as he wanted to see how the N .U .R . dealuwith a problem of one of its members . As the N .U .R . replied to the pplicant's colleague's que ry that his pay had been correctly calculated withou t N ;â¢stating :on what basis they had arrived at this conclusion, it failed, in the opinion
. . ~ .: :_
of the applicant, to carry out its duties, i .e . an examination in detail and a full explanation of the conclusions reached .
In a letter dated 18 December 1975 the applicant refused to join the union as the management or the union had failed to reply to his own query over his hours of work . On 23 February 1976 the applicant received a dismissal notice which state d that by reason of his non-compliance with the terms of the agreement on Trade Unions' Membership, dated July 1975, his services would no longer be required as from 5 April 1976 . On 8 April 1976 the applicant submitted a claim to the Industrial Tribunal claiming unfair dismissal . On 18 June 1976 the applicant appeared before the Industrial Tribunal who reserved their decision . On about 6 July 1976 the applicant received a copy of the Tribunal's decision stating that his claim was rejected . The grounds for the tribunal's finding indicated that the applicant, when raising objections to joining the union, did at no time apply for exemption in accordance with the exemption procedure set out in the Agreement . It was further said that as the applicant had clearly refused to join the appropriate union in accordance with the Union membership agreement the applicant's claim had to be considered under Paragraph 6 151 of the 1976 Act . As the applicant at no time had said that his grounds for refusal were religious it had to follow that the law required the tribunal to find that the dismissal was fair . The applicant further submitted that he did not object in principle the trade unions and, indeed, previously had been a member of the N .U .R . and was willing to acquiesce to the request of his manager and the N .U .R . representative to take up membership . He was, however, not yet convinced that doing so would be an advantage to him He further believed that an individual should have freedom of choice to join or not to join a trade union no matter what his personal reasons for such a choice may be . Complaints Both applicants now complain that the United Kingdom enforced the aforesaid provisions of the Parliamentary Act and so far failed to amend this Act, in order to enable British subjects to exercise their freedom of thought, conscience, expression and association with others and failed to provide adequate remedies for wrongful dismissal in particular with regard to British subjects who lose their employment through abstaining from joining one of the trade unions recommended by the employers . They further complain that in a situation as the present application wherein the applicants have no genuine objection based on religious belief but rather have a genuine objection based on reasonable grounds and, or, alternatively, based o n
_13p_
the .grounds of exercising his freedom of expression and association as provided -- : by Arts . 9, 10 and 11 of the Convention, such enforcement is tantamount to a -violation of the aforesaid Convention and, in particular, against the spirit expressed inM Arts : 9, 10, 11 and 13 . Ã¯ - PROCEEDINGS - .~F1, . On 11 December 1976 the Commission decided that notice of the application shÃ´uÃd~-tiegiven to the Government of the United Kingdom which should be -,.askÃ¨d,to submit to the Commission their observations in wriong on its admissibility . - The Government submitted such observations on 22 March 1977 and the applicants' lawyer replied on 14 June 1977 .
SUBMISSION OF THE PARTIES i A. j- -â¢[h+,
:Respondent Government obse rv ations .
r1, $eckgroun d
1-. 1, .Domestic Law and Practice 1945-77 _- , -The respondent Government stated that during the period from 1945 to .--1971 ; .`the legislation in force in England and Wales contained nothing about closed shop agreemÃ©nts or arrangements . Such agreements or arrangement s --Â°werÃ© , however, wides pÃ© d-pciic`uÃaily in certain industries and others of long standing Recenn~t research~hÃ¢sssÃ¯iggested that possibly more than 40% of the total number of British T,rade Ãni istswork in closed sh op of one sort and another (in the 1960s, 40%1 . In pursuanÃ§Ã© Ã´fthe agreements and arrangements which as widely recognised could also have advantages, particularly in contributing to strong and orderly bargainirng-Ã¢riangements and helping to reduce the risks of disputes between unions-andâ¢bÃ«fpvÃ©Ãªn groups of workers and thus contribute to the protection of theirrin ierests, industrial or managerial action to force nonmembers to join or facedism sÃ¢l occurred from time to time . As termination of acontractâ¢,of employment prior to the enactment of the r 'a Indus tnal Relations Act 197.1 ;-wa ssnot'gubject toany special statutory restriction lapart from the Contracts of EmpÃÃ´yrriÃ©nt Act 1963 providing for a statutory minimum period of noticel tiÃ¹t~fÃ¼r~aFiÃ© most part governed by common law an employee could be lawfullÃ¿~dismissed ; on due notice being given regardless of whether the dismissal was orwÃ¢s,noGfor reasons assodiated with non-membership of the union,in a Ã©los~ed sRÃ´p Ifwrongfully dismissed without notice, an em.-. pÃbyÃ©Ã© s rediÃ«dÃ¿ was merely to sue for the balance of the wages which would have,been payable during a valid notice period .
s, .~ . The Industrial Relations Act 1971 changed the position radically by creating -_~- new statutory restrictions on an employer's right to dismiss an employee and, at the same time, giving individual employees a statutory right not to belong to a
._..' . .
trade union . In principle all employees were given the right not to be "unfairly dismissed" even if due contractual notice was given . Industrial Tribunals to which employees could complain if allegedly unfairly dismissed could order the employer to pay compensation to the employee or re-engage him if he could not satisfy the tribunal that one or more of the specified grounds for dismissal existed (conduct, capability, redundancy, etc) and that it was reasonable in the circumstances to treat that ground as a reason for dismissal . . Although, by giving individual employees a statutory right not to belong to a trade union, the Act of 1971 thereby made closed shop agreements unenforceable, the Act also contained provision s a . allowing employers and unions to enter into "agency shops" agreements which could make it a condition of employment either to belong to one of the unions in question or make an appropriate contribution to the union funds . Empioyees with conscientious objections to belonging or contributing to the union were allowed to pay an equivalent sum to charity ; b . allowing the establishment of approved closed shops in certain narrowly defined circumstances . In these cases conscientious objectors were only allowed to contribute to charity instead of joining the union . The Act of 1971 was repealed by the Trade Union and Labour Relation Act 1974 which, in the context of the closed shop, sought broadly to return to the position existing before 1971 : thus the right not to belong to a trade union and the consequent restriction on the establishment of closed shops were removed . In addition, the Act provided (paragraph 6 (5), schedule 1) that in general dismissal for not being a member or refusing to remain a member of a union where a "union membership agreement" IUMAI as it is described in the Act was in force was only to be regarded unfair if "the employee genuinely objected on grounds of religious belief to being a member of any trade union whatsoever or on any reasonable gounds to being a member of any pa rt icular trade union (the words underlined were included by Parliament as a result of an amendment against the wishes of the Government) . The Trade Union and Labour Relations (Amendment) Act 1976 removed the "any reasonable grounds" exception, leaving only the exception in respect of religious belief . In the Government's opinion, under the Acts of 1974 and 1976, the employees were no less well protected now than they were before 1971 and, since the creation of the right not to be unfairly dismissed went beyond the United Kingdom's obligation under the Convention, the restriction of that right in specified circumstances could not constitute a breach of existing obligations . The Government concluded this review of domestic law and practice by stating that it might be noted that in practice closed shops also existed in certain industries in several member States of the Council of Europe .
1 .2 As to the employment and dismissal of the applicants the Government submitted that they had no official knowledge of these matters . But it was understood that the British Rail Board's closed shop agreement was brought into operation at the end of 1975 as a revival of a dormant agreement dating from 1970 . The Board was subsequently faced with a small number of employees who refused to joint any of the trade unions specified in the agreement . During the summer of 1976 most of thisgroup were dismissed . Some appealed to industrial tribunals and several were held to have been unfairly dismissed because lunlike Messrs . Young and James) and contrary to British Rail's views, they were found to have genuine religious objections to trade union membership .
2 . The position of the respondent Governmen t The Government then set out their position vis-8-vis the British Rail . Under the provisions of the Transport Act 1962, the British Railways Board was constituted as a public authority . The Board was not part of the Government ot the United Kingdom, but rather a separate statutory corporation . It had the task of running the railways although Section 27 of the Act confered on a Minister of the Government certain powers in relation to the Board's work and Section 28 required the Minister's consent before the Board might exercise certain powers . In the matters of personal management, relationships with the trade unions and the conditions of employment, the Board was autonomous . Both the decisions to employ the two applicants and to conclude the Union Membership Agreement of 1975 were those of the Board, as well as the decision to dismiss them . The Government submitted that on the question whether or not there should be a closed shop in a particular place of work, their policy was one of neutrality . The one new legislative provision which was introduced by the Act of 1974 and modified by the Act ot 1976 lon closed shop agreements in relation to unfair dismissalsl was considered necessary in order to define the way in which the unfair dismissal provisions were to apply in the case of a person dismissed for failure to join or remain a member of a union in pursuance of a closed shop agreement . Before the Commission, the position of a respondent government in respect of statutory corporations or other public bodies had been considered in a number of cases . The Commission had twice leftopen the question of the responsibility of the Government of the United Kingdom for the BBC (Collection of Decisions 29, p . 89 ; Yearbook 14, pp . 538 and 549) . Similarly, the position of the Irish Government in regard to the Irish Electricity Supply Board had been left open 114Yearbook 198 at 2181 . In considering application No . 2413/65, the Commission had reached the conclusion that the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany was not responsible for the acts of German press, radio and television companies IColl . of Dec . 23 p . 7) . The European Court of Human Rightshad had occasion to consider the position o f
the Swedish Government and the Swedish Railways in the Swedish Engine Drivers' Union Case . The Court had found that : "Article 11 is accordingly binding upon the 'State as employer', whether the latter's relations with its employees are governed by public or private law" (judgment of 6 February 1976, page 10) . In the Government's opinion, the relationship between them and British Rail was different from that between the Swedish Government and Swedish State Railways . Moreover, the relationship between British Rail and its employees was different from that between the Swedish State Railways and its employees . In the United Kingdom, the State was not the employer of railwaymen and there was no equivalent of the National Collective Bargaining Office . The Government submitted that for the foregoing reasons the application should be rejected as being incompatible with the Convention rarione personae .
3 . Admissibility of the complaint under A rtic% 9 The Government then turned to the applicÃ¢nt's statement that "The United Kingdom enforced . . . . . provisions of the Parliamentary Act and so far failed to amend this Act in order to enable British subjects to exercise their freedom of thought, conscience . . . . ." . In the Government's opinion the application did not make clear in what way the applicants considered that their freedom of thought and conscience had been violated . They held that they had not intervened or imposed restrictions in this regard and that this matter of dismissal was not directly connected with the applicants' freedom of thought or conscience . They were free under the Convention in force in the United Kingdom to hold (and to express) the opinion that the closed shop should be made illegal or subject to greater restrictions than now existed . Read in its context land in particular with Articles 10 and 11), Article 9 protected religious and other beliefs based on thought and conscience . Such other beliefs included agnosticism and atheism . Beliefs which were not so based were not protected by Article 9, although their expression was protected by Article 10 . In other words, they were not "beliefs" within the meaning of Article 9, but rather opinions, etc . "Conscience" and "belief/conviction" .outside the area of religious belief was difficult to define . Guidance as to the common understanding of the member states in regard to Article 9 might be derived from Resolution 337 adopted in 1967 by the Consultative Assembly, concerning the Rights of Conscientious Objection . Basic Principle No . 1 was worded as follows "Persons liable to conscription for military service who, for reasons of conscience or profound conviction arising from religious, ethical, moral, humanitarian, philosophical or similar motives, refuse to perform armed service shall enjoy a personal right to be released from the obligation to perform such service" . (Collected Texts, page 907 . 1
- 13y1 -
That wording indicated that a"conscientious" objection could not be taken to exist in a case where the objection arose from political , economic or similar motives . â¢ In the light of the foregoing arguments, the Government submitted that on `+Ã¢ Ã¼Ã»e construction of Article 9 "belief" meant an opinion akin to but not YcÃ´nss,s~tisg .of a religion ; hence manifesting such a belief involved something of the_natitre of religious worship, teaching, practice and observance . Even if the ~ mission were to take the view that the terms "belief" and "manifesting his eÃiÃ©f" _ shoUld be given a wider meaning, it could not possibly be so wide that the "---â¢ u.., ~ was required to refrain from stopping a person doing anything he wanted State regardlessâ¢of the objections of others, on the basis of that person's claim to be ? manifesting a belief ; still less that the State was required to take positive actio n -=-Cd;ensÃ¼rÃ©sucli a person such a freedom . For the above reasons, the applicants objection to joining a trade union would not appear to be based on the sort of Ã®eligiqÃ»s or other similar belief protected by Article 9 . Nor, even if it were held by thÃ¨ Commission that the applicants' views constituted a belief, did the Unite d - ~- ;KÃ¯rigdom's legislation directly prevent them from manifesting it (see Section 1 . 1
The respondent Government submitted that, for the above reasons the pplicÃ¢tion was manifestly ill-founded on the facts or in the alternative was compÃ¢tible-with the Convention because their respective beliefs are not ones 'otected by :Article9 ;: 4. A_ dmissibrlirylo/ thÃ©xo mp int under Article 10 the applicants had failed to produce any Dm of expression and that complaint shoul d
under Article 1 1 then stated that the applicants had complaine d
ed the (Trade Union and Labour Relations 3r failed to amend this Act in order to enable freedom of . . . . association with others . . ." ;
ezact way in which the applicants considered with otheis has been violated was not mad e If'the applicants were comptaining that they had been dismissed by British â¢~"~~_:~8. .Roil, the complaint should be considered incompatible with the provisions of the ~.'Â°~~',LonvÃ©Ã¼tion as the right not to be dismissed was not protected by it . : j;,_ .
The respondent Government then turned to the statement of one of the applicant s "that an individual should have freedom to choose to ioin or not to ioin a trade union no matter what his personal reasons tor such a choice may be" . They submitted that if the applicants were complaining that Article 11 (1) provided not only the right to join a trade union but also the right not to join a trade union, they would like to state the following : 5 .2 As to the effect of the legislation on the applicants it was held that the legislation concerned did not provide any statutory mechanism to enable a union to secure a closed shop agreement from an employer, but rather provided rules about fair and unfair dismissal in circumstances where such an agreement had been concluded and was being implemented . In the Government's opinion the applicants' complaint stemmed directly from their dismissal by British Rail and the terms of their contracts, indirectly from the Union Membership Agreement and less directly still from the legislation . 5 .3 The respondent Government then described at length the negotiating history of Article 11 in the light of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 10 December 1948 and the early drafts of what became the European Convention . The Government stated that, although in early drafts a reference to a right not to join trade unions was included, the final draft did not mention this right anymore as it was considered inopportune to introduce such right in view of the difficulties the "closed shop" system introduced in some countries could cause . As the Governments when signing the CÃ´nvention had agreÃ©dto an Article 11 which deliberately did not refer to a right not to join trade unions, the Government of the United Kingdom, if they had thought differently when signing and ratifying the Convention, could and would have made a reservation as permitted by Article 64 . 5 .4 The Government also mentioned the similar approach adopted in drafting the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as a proposal to add the sentence "No one may be compelled to join an association" was . not accepted . IUN document A/2929 of 1 July 1955 .) In reliance upon that approach they had ratified the Covenant without making a reservation in this respect, while the instrument of ratification was deposited on 20 May 1976, i .e . after the entry into force of the Act of 1976 . 5 .5 The Government then stated that no ideological, textual and contextual interpretation allowed a different view . If any ambiguity in the wording of Article 11 (1) would exist, it would suffice to refer to the preparatory work of the Convention in this respect . They further held that it did not follow that because Article 11 111 protected the right to join trade unions it also protected the right not to join as the express protection of a positive right did not imply protection of the negative or "converse" right .
- 1 36 -
- 5 :6 The Government then referred to the ILO Conventions 87 and 98, as well as to the Social Cha rt er, as the Commission and the European Court of Human Rights had both found it appropriate to consider Article 11 together with these instruments In the Government's opinion no right not to join a trade organisation or a trade union was mentioned in these instruments . 57 ThÃ©y finally submitted that the issue under consideration had not been the ~'â¢sÃ»pject bf anyfinding by the European Court of Human Rights . It was however a ~.~rlÃ«vant factor in the case that in more than one case the Court had held mor e ~gÃ©nÃ©rally that Article 11 did not secure any pa rt icular treatment o( trade unions, ~ -=__'or`.their members, by the State ( Swedish Engine-Drivers Union case) and, in 1_ -- -`paiucular, that the implementation of governmental policies designed to restrict -_ = the number of trade unions in a particular sector did not amount to an infringement of the freedom to join a union INational Union of Belgian Police and - - -: Swedish Engine-Drivers' Union case) . fT 3
58â¢Asregards the applicants' complaint that they had a right protected by Anicle 11 not to join a trade union and that legislation in force in the United _~`~'~7~â¢King"dom violated this right the Government submitted that for the reasons give n Ã¢tibvÃ© Article 11 was not intended to and did not now protect any right not to join a, trade union . Article 11 imposed a duty on the State to protect the right to ~ . . "lo~and form rrade unions : Employers and employees might legitimately take ih e râ¢:.u " wew~hÃ¢~~he_p~ro,tection of the workers in a particular indust ry or employment reuiredâ¢that Ã¢ll^workÃ©rs - should j oin a union The State was entitled to enable them without risk of b Ã§~'.Sof+the law, to act accordingly . There was nothing in Artlcle 11 ( 1) which gaVÃ©Ta ;iight to anindividual not to associate with others or not to join a trade union ~Ã©itheiat all or if he did not consider it necessary for the protection of his interests'1t ' shduld therefore be assumed that the Convention did not recognise the right Ã´f Ã¢n Findividual to twart that which his fellow-employees sâ¢ , consideredna n to be necessary,fqr~the protection of their interests, that was to say, the maintece of_a 100 % _hlÃ´h m embership . It was not relevant to this issue whether 100% membersip ;;wÃ¢s necessa ry for this purposes the State was en. titled to take steps which}recognised the belief of employers and employees tha t Turning to the -recÃ¨nt~ legislation enacted in the United Kingdom, the Government emphasisÃ©d`ÃÃ¯atiit concerned the right not to be unfairly dismissed . This right had been sÃ¹piiriposed upon existing law regarding dismissal . In other words, a particulardisrÃ¯mi~fat. lhe present time might not breach an employee's . .~c ~: , . common law rights, (ore xam ple because the employer gave due noUCe in accordance with terms o.f the,Ã§o ractof employment, but yet constituted an "unfair ~`â¢di'smissalwitHintfiÃ© meaning of the recent legislation . Where a case of "unfai r dismissal" arose, the employee was given certain statutory rights . The right not to bÃ© unfairly dismissed was not one of those rights which were protected by the Convention . Viewed in this light, the rights given to employees by the recen t JÃ©gislation could be regarded as something of a "bonus" for the employee over and above his riahts as orotected bv the Convention and as protected by the law 1". {
in force in England and Wales regarding the termination of contracts of employment . The "bonus" introduced into the law in force in the United Kingdom was subject to an exception in the case of termination of employment arising out of the refusal of the employee to join a trade union (other than on religious grounds) . The grant of this "bonus" subject to the above limitation could, in the Government's view, not be considered to be a violation of the Convention by reason of the existence of the qualification . In so far as the applicants complained about an infringement of their freedom of association, the Government held that in the light of the foregoing the application was manifestly ill-founded on the facts and that as to the alleged infringement of the freedom not to join a trade union, the application was incompatible with the Convention because the right was not one of those protected by the Convention . 6 The Government lastly submitted that as neither a violation of the Articles 9, 10 and 11 had been shown, nor the right not to be dismissed was guaranteed by the Convention the applicants' complaint under Article 13 that the United Kingdom had failed to provide adequate remedies for wrongful dismissal was bound to fail . In summarising their conclusions the Government requested the Commission to declare the application to be incompatible with the Convention ratione personae and, in the alternative, in so far as the applicants complained of a violation of - Article 9, the application was manifestly ill-founded or incompatible with the Convention ratione materiae and so inadmissible ;
- Article 10, the application was manifestly ill-founde d - Article 11, the application was manifestly ill-founded or incompatible with the Convention ratione materiae ; - Article 13, no issue could arise . B . The applicants' obse rvations The applicants in their written observations of 14 June 1977 first submitted that the question which was raised by the present application should be examined in the context of the whole Convention and above all in the light of the rights and freedoms of the individual which the Convention seeked to identify and made plain to all . In this context they stated that those who framed the Convention intended that the citizen should be free to work at any lawful trade or calling he pleased, which he was capable of performing, without being subjected to any requirement which was incompatible with the spirit of the Convention as the price for being allowed to do his work . The position of the Government on the other hand, was that, while it acknowledged the right of the citizens of the United Kingdom to freedom of person, thought, conscience, assembly and association, it would no t
-13g-
intervene to prÃ´tect those citizens from being compelled, as the price of pursuing their trade or calling, to enter into an association with others, even though that association might be hostile to their most deeply held opinions, their conscience or their beliefs . After these general remarks the applicants dealt in more detail with the points ai issue . They stated that as under the present laws of the United Kingdom the closed shop was permitted (and indeed encouraged) this concept was incompatible with the rights to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, freedom ot expression and freedom of association specified in Arts . 9 10 and 11 of the Convention . In the applicants' opinion the freedom guaranteed by Art . 11 should involve freedom not to associate with others . If there was no freedom to decline to associate, there could not be freedom to associate . An individual might wish to associate with others for an almost infinite variety of reasons, but an individual who was forced into an association with others against his will was unlikely to share the aims or beliefs of those with whom he had been compelled to associate . If he did not share their aims or beliefs he had not merely been deprived of his freedom not to associate with others . The very fact of association might do violence to his own freedom of thought or conscience . The fact of association might also inhibit or stifle his freedom of expression . A trade union was an association within the meaning of that word in Art . 11 of the Convention . The applicants submitted that if an individual was compelled by the existence of a closed shop to join a trade union contrary to his own thought, conscience or belief, his rights under Articles 9, 10 and 11 of the Convention were thereby violated . The applicants furfher submitted that it would clearly be contrary to the Convention if an Act of Parliament were to provide that every employed person should join a trade union . In their view the Government appeared tacitly to acknowledge that this would be so when they pointed out that the Act of 1976 did not make Union Membership Agreements compulsory . If the law provided no protection against dismissal for refusal to join a union, then, whenever an employer and a trade union combined to impose a closed shop, the individual employee who did not wish to join the union would nevertheless in all probability be compelled to do so for tear of being dismissed if he did not . Thus, the consequence of the failure of the Government to make the closed shop illegal was to render it possible for an employer and a trade union to impose upon citizens of the United Kingdom a limitation on their freedom which it would be contrary to the Convention for the Government to impose by Act of Parliament . As to the Government's interpretation of Art . 11 in the light of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the applicants held that this was inconsistent with the Recital to the Convention which referred to that Declaration . They could no t
accept that the negotiating history of Art . 11 as set out by the Government could frustrate in one way or another the true construction of the terms of the Convention . In dealing with the background of the present case, the applicants agreed to the Government's submissions that prior to 1971 the rights and liabilities of the parties to a contract of employment under English law were for the most part governed only by common law . They also referred to and quoted from the Report of a Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Association published in 1968 which, in general, was sympathetic to the trade union point of view and which suggested that the closed shop should not be prohibited as, inter alia, that prohibition could not be made effeciive . Therefore, according to the said Commission, redress should be given to an employee who, for one reason or another, lost his job because of the introduction of the closed shop . The applicants then set out the situation when the Industrial Relations Act 1971 was introduced, the consequences of the enforcement of the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974 which repealed the 1971 Act, and the amendments brought about by the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Amendment) Act 1976 . In summarising these submissions, the applicants held that, prior to the 1971 Act an employer could terminate a contract of employment by notice for any reason, including the employee's insistence upon joining a union or his refusal to do so . While the 1971 Act was in force, it would, in general, have constituted an unfair dismissal to terminate an employee's employment on either of these grounds . Now, it would constitute an unfair dismissal to terminate an employment on the ground that the employee had joined or wished to join a union, but a "fair" dismissal to terminate an employment for refusing to join a union, except on grounds of religious belief . Further, as was pointed out by Leading Counsel in his Opinion on exhaustion of domestic remedies, the ordinary courts of the land were no longer available in the case of actions for unfair dismissa l The applicants stressed that in these circumstances they did not accept the Government's contention that employees dismissed for refusing union membership "were no less well protected now than they were before 1971" . Nor did they accept the argument that since the creation of the right not to be unfairly dismissed went beyond the obligations of the Government under the Convention the restriction of that right could not constitute a breach of existing obligations . The applicants submitted that they did not complain herein of any restriction of the right not to be unfairly dismissed but of breaches by the Government of the United Kingdom of Ans . 9, 10 and 11 of the Convention With regard to the Government's statement that in practice closed shops also existed in certain industries in several member States of the Council of Europe the applicants stated that, even if this was the case, it did not justify the breaches of the Convention alleged in their application . Further, in numerous member States of the Council of Europe the closed shop was unlawful
--` .Asto the Government's submission that the application was incompatible with the Convention ratione personae, the applicants challenged this contention upon two grounds . In the first place they said that, having regard to the nature of the legislation under which the British Railways Board carried out its functions , -and having regard to the nature and degree of the powers of direction, control and supervision exercised by the responsible Minister over the activities of the Board ; the adoption by British . Rail of a closed shop policy was an act for which theÂ°GÃ´vernment of the United Kingdom was answerable . Further, and secondly, theystated that in so far as the domestic law of the United Kingdom permitted them to be dismissed for refusal to join a trade union and failed to provide either of the applicants with an adequate remedy against such dismissal the Government was liable under the Convention by reason of the fact that the domestic law of the United Kingdom did not protect rights and freedoms guaranteed by the ConvÃ©ntion that the applicants' rights had been infringed, and that the domestic "'-1awo1 the United Kingdom did not provide an adequate remedy . i As tÃ´ the nature and extent of the control exercised over the Board by the responsi6le Minister under the provisions of the 1962 . 1968 and 1974 Acts, the _ . . :applicants were of the opinion that there could be no doubt that the Minister ha d tRenecessary powers under the legislation to have prevented the adoption of the closed shop, if he had chosen to do so . They stated that they did not accept that the Board was autonomous in the matters of personnel management, relationships with,the trade unions or conditions of employment . If the decision to conclude ;heUnion Membership Agreement of July 1975 was that of the Board, then the ~a r. Â±
applicantssserted thatjhaving regÃ¢rd'to the relationship between the responsible Mi~ Ã©r Ã¢nd the Boa d as lai-d down,by statute, the responsible Minister had to be taken to haveÃ¢approved Ã´radopted such decision . Further the applicants contended that, havingBrÃ©gÃ¢rd7 Ão . theConvention, the Government was not . entitled to adopt a poliÃ§yzdf~~rieÃ¼trality on the question whether or not there ~~. . _ should be a closed Ã¢hop i-nva~-particular place of work . The applicants noted the Government's contention -that?iewas up to the parties in each case (the trade union and the employerÃ io`=f :dec'idÃ©';whether or nota closed shop should be established and observed thaitZhis_cÃ´ntention involved the proposition that in such a case the terms of an=indi ÃdÃ»al employee's contract of employment were p not ~P a matter to be decided - bynÃ«gotiation between him and the employer but were a matter to be decided6bÃ©tween .his employer or prospective employer and a ~: third party, without neÃ§eÃslly3r e~fÃ©r:ring the matter to the employee concerned . The applicants th'en~sÃ©iÂ°Ã´Ã»t4thÃ© respective powers and functions of the responsible Minister n'the oar":inmore-detail by referring to specific provisions of the-1962â1968. .a . 19Z4Acts, in~order toshow the ministerial responsibility for the .~w.` .,,, and . , .i .
ailwaÃ¿s Board contrary to the Government's submission that the Board was Ã¢utonomous, independent of State responsibility . . ~'
-~, :â¢~ ' Accordingly, the applicants pointed out that, having regard to the very extensive and detailed powers of direction and control exercised by the Minister -~ --,1now the Secretary of State) over the Railways Board, the decision lif such it was) of
the Railways Board to enter into a closed shop agreement with the trade unions concerned was an act for which the Government of the United Kingdom had to accept responsibility . The applicants further submitted that the objection of the Government 2rione personae should be rejected also upon the ground that the Government owed a duty to the applicants to protect the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention, and that the domestic law of the United Kingdom did not and does not protect such rights and freedoms in that it permitted the British Railways Board to establish a closed shop, permitted the Board to dismiss the applicants on the ground of their refusal to join a trade union and failed to provide any or any adequate remedy or redress . As to the admissibility of the complaint under A rt s 9-1 1 The applicants added some further submissions to that which they had already stated above in this respect . They maintained that it was recognised that every individual should be free to associate and that they had already advanced reason why such a freedom should include a freedom not to associate . If an individual was compelled, by fear of losing his job, to join an association of which he disapproved, some loss of freedom, ihough and conscience, and of expression . was inevitable . The applicants averred that their freedom of association had been violated by the fact of being faced with an unacceptable choice between joining a union and losing their jobs . They did not complain, except in this context, of infringement of a "right not to be dismissed" . The applicants drew attention to the statements of the Government that it was for the employer and the trade union or unions representing employees to decide whether to adopt a closed shop and that the employee's contract should have allowed for the possibility of such action before the legislation had an impact upon an individual employee .ln their opinion the first of these statements underlined the employee's loss of personal freedom of choice . With regard to the second of these statements, when the applicants joined Btitish Rail their contracts did not insist upon the closed shop . The terms of their contrects were purportedly varied, without consulting them, by agreement between British Rail and the unions . As to the Government's observations concerning the negotiating history of Art . 11 . the applicants submitted that it was clear from the history set out therein that the provision about the freedom not to associate was omitted from the Convention for reasons which might be broadly described as "political" in character and was probably unnecessary . They stressed that freedom to associate should include freedom not to associate and referred in this respect to the Commission's case-law (Application No . 4072/69) . As to paragraph 5 .8 of the Government's observations, the applicants noted that, in contrast to references earlier in the Government's observations to "employers and trade unions" the references here were to "employers and employees", The applicants presumed that when the Government referred to employers and employees legitimately taking the view that the protection of the workers required that all workers should join a union, and to fellow employee s
who considered it to be necessary for thÃ© protection of their interests to maintain a 100% union membership, the Government intended to refer to a majority of employees and fellow employees . In the applicants' opinion the argument appeared to be that if a majority of employees considered that something should be done then they should have their way . This could not be right, it having their way involved, as the applicants claimed it did, infringing the fundamental rights of others . The Government also claimed that the right given to employees by recent legislation not to be unfairly dismissed was "something of a bonus" . The applicants however submitted that this "bonus" was irrelevant to and did not excuse or palliate the diminution of individual rights brought about by the 1974 and 1976 Acts . The applicants finally stated that the concern of the Convention on Human Rights was with individual freedom, while the closed shop constituted a diminution of individual freedom and conferred great power on the employer and greater power still on the union . The price paid for these powers was the diminution in the freedom of the individual employee . In the submission of the applicants, to face them with the choice of joining a trade union or giving up their employment constituted a violation of their rights as individual human beings and they requested the Commission to so declare .
THE LA W The applicants have originally complained that the United Kingdom enforced the legislation complained of and so far failed to amend it, in order to enable British subjects to exercise their freedom of thought, conscience, expression and association with others, and failed to provide adequate remedies for wrongful dismissal in particular with regard to British subjects who lose their employment through abstaining from joining one of the trade unions recommended by the employers . They further complained that in a situation as the present one where the applicants have no genuine objection based on religious belief but rather have a genuine objection based on reasonable grounds or, alternatively, based on the grounds of exercising their freedom of expression and association as provided by Articles 9, 10 and 11 of the Convention, such enforcement was tantamount to a violation of the Convention and, in particular, against the spirit of the aforesaid Articles . The Commission first observes that the applicants, in their original complaints, asserted that the respondent Government had violated the rights and freedoms at issue vis-A-vis British subjects . However, since the Convention does not provide for applications in the form of an actio popularns, the Commission, while accepting that the issues raised in the present application affect a number of persons, is considering it only insofar as the applicants themselves are concerned
The Government of the United Kingdom have submitted that the application is incompatible with the provision of the Convention ratione personae . They maintained that the British Railways Board which was responsible for the dismissal of the applicants was an autonomous body and did not involve any State responsibility . The Commission notes that the Government, in their observations, pointed out that under the provision of the Transport Act 1962 the British Railways Board was constituted as a public authority and had the task of running the railways although certain powers were conferred on the Minister of the Government . Whatever the division of rights and duties between the Board and the respective Minister may be, in the Commission's opinion, there can be no doubt that the Government of the United Kingdom is responsible for their public authorities and thus for the acts of the British Railways Board . As the British Railways Board employed and dismissed both applicants, these acts must be considered as acts by the "State as employer" . In this respect the Commission refers to the Court's finding in the Swedish Engine Drivers' Union case where it stated that the Convention nowhere makes an express distinction between the functions of a Contracting State as holder of public power and its responsibilities as employer . IPara . 37 of the Judgment of 6 February 1976, Publication of the European Court of Human Rights, Series A, No . 20, at p . 14 .1 In this opinion, the same argumentation is applicable mutatls mutandis in the present case . It follows that the acts of the British Railways Board of which the applicants complain engage the responsibility of the United Kingdom under the Convention . The application cannot, therefore, be rejected as being incompatible with the provisions of the Convention . In the alternative, the Government contended that insofar as the application alleged violations of Articles 9 . 10, 11 and 13, it was inadmissible on several other grounds . In the Government's opinion, the applicants' objection to joining a trade union would not appear to be based on the sort of religious or other similar belief protected by Article 9 nor, even if it were held by the Commission that the applicants' views constituted a beliet, did the United Kingdom's legislation directly prevent them from manifesting it . The applicants' complaint under Article 9, was, therefore, incompatible with the Convention, or in the alternative, manifestly ill-founded . Furthermore, as the applicants had failed to produce any evidence of a violation of their freedom of expression the Government have submitted that the complaint under Article 10 should be considered as manifestlv ill-founded . Also the applicants' complaint under Art . 11 that the legislation concerned interfered with their freedom of association and their freedom not to join a trade union would, in the Government's submission be bound to fail, as the first part of this complaint was manifestly ill-founded on the facts and the second incompatibl e
with the Convention because this right was not protected by it . The Government finally stated that as no violation of any of the Articles invoked by the applicants had been shown, no issue could arise under Article 13 . The applicants, however, maintained that the application was admissible for the various reasons indicated in their original submissions . In the Commission's opinion it is now sufficiently clear that the interpretation of Art . 11 of the Convention, in particular whether it protects also the right not to join a trade union, appears to be the main issue in the case . This issue has been raised in earlier cases which did not, however, on the facts presented in those cases, call for a decision by the Commission squarely on that point Isee, inter alia, Application No . 4072-69, Yearbook 13, p . 708) . In the present case the issue is clearly before the Commission and both parties have advanced various arguments for and against such an interpretation . Article 27 121 in requiring the Commission to declare inadmissible any application from an individual, a non-governmental organisation or group of individuals which it considers to be manifestly ill-founded, does not permit the Commission at the stage of admissibility to reject a complaint which cannot so be described Isee, for example, decisions on the admissibility of Applications No . 5100 to 5102/71, 5354/72, 5370/72, Five Soldiers v . the Netherlands, Yearbook 15, pp . 508, 556 with further references, and Times Newspapars Ltd . et al v . United Kingdom, DR 2/90,97 . 1 In the present case the Commission has carried out a preliminary examination of the information and arguments submitted by the parties . The Commission finds that these raise substantial issues of interpretation and application of the Convention, in particular of Article 11, which are of such complexity that their determination should depend upon an examination of their merits . For these reasons, the Commissio n DECLARES ADMISSIBLE and retains the application, without in any way prejudging the merits of the case .
(TRADUCTION) EN FAIT Les faits de la cause peuvent se rÃ©sumer comme sui t Les deux requÃ©rants sont des ressortissants du Royaume-Uni . Le premier, nÃ© en 1953, est actuellement domiciliÃ© dans le Surrey . Le second, nÃ© en 1928, est actuellement domiciliÃ© Ã© Havant . Ils sont reprÃ©sentÃ©s par M . Mitchell-Heggs, du cabinet juridique Boodington et Yturbe Ã Paris, agissant en vertu d'une procuration datÃ©e du 14 juillet 1976 . Pour ce qui est du premier requÃ©rant, M . Youn g Des dÃ©clarations et documents prÃ©sentÃ©s par le reprÃ©sentant des requÃ©rants il ressort que le premier d'entre eux a Ã©tÃ© embauchÃ© par les Chemins de fer britanniques le 2 octobre 1972 et a travaillÃ© pour cet employeur jusqu'Ã ce que son licenciement lui soit notifiÃ©, le 27 mai 1976, avec effet au 26 juin de la mÃ©me annÃ©e . En aoÃ»t 1975, fut affichÃ©e Ã chaque Ã©tage du bÃ¢timent dit "Southern House", oÃ¹ le requÃ©rant travaillait Ã l'Ã©poque, une note attirant l'attention du personnel sur une modification intervenue dans les contrats de travail Ã la suite d'un accord conclu en juillet 1975 entre la direction et les syndicats . La note indiquait qu'Ã dater du 1 - aoÃ¹t 1975, l'appartenance Ã un syndicat reconnu ferait partie des conditions requises pour l'emploi du personnel auquel s'appliquait ledit accord . En septembre 1975, le requÃ©rant rencontra son supÃ©rieur hiÃ©rarchique direct qui Ã©tait par ailleurs dÃ©lÃ©guÃ© de l'Association du personnel des transports (Transport and Salaried Staff Association) . A cette occasion, le requÃ©rant apprit que des accords instaurant un monopole d'embauche syndical I"closed shop") avaient Ã©tÃ© conclus entre les Chemins de fer britanniques et les trois syndicats de cheminots, Ã savoir l'Union nationale des cheminots INational Union of Railwaymen - NUR) ; l'Association des personnels des transports (Transport and Salaried Staff Association - TSSA) ; et l'Association des mÃ©caniciens et chauffeurs de locomotive IAssociated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen - ASLEF) . Aux termes de l'accord, le requÃ©rant Ã©tait tenu d'adhÃ©rer Ã la TSSA ou, Ã son choix, Ã la NUR . Il fut informÃ© qu'il pouvait Ãªtre dispensÃ© de cette obligation s'il avait des objections spÃ©ciales d'ordre religieux Ã l'appartenance syndicale en gÃ©nÃ©ral ou s'il avait des raisons spÃ©ciales de refuser d'appartenir Ã un syndicat dÃ©terminÃ© . On lui indiqua Ã©galement que s'il souhaitait obtenir cette dispense il devrait en faire la demande par Ã©crit avant le 17 octobre 1975 . Le 19 septembre, une autre note fut affichÃ©e Ã chaque Ã©tage du bÃ¢timent, prÃ©cisant qu'il avait Ã©tÃ© convenu que les dispenses pour des motifs d'ordre religieux ne seraient accordÃ©es qu'Ã ceux Ã qui leur confession interdisait spÃ©cifiquement d'adhÃ©rer Ã un syndicat . La note indiquait de plus que la prolongation ,
pour des motifs religieux uniquemÃ©nt, dÃ©pendait de l'adoption par le Parlement du projet d'amendement Ã la Loi sur les syndicats et les relations du travail et que le personnel serait informÃ© en temps utile . En consÃ©quence, le 17 octobre 1975 le requÃ©rant dÃ©posa une demande Ã©crite de dispense et le 30 avril 1976 les Chemins de fer britanniques l'informaient ; par lettre que sa requÃªte serait examinÃ©e le 5 mai 1976 . -,- La Loi portant amendement Ã la Loi sur les syndicats et les relations du travail entra en vigueur le 25 mars 1976 . L'alinÃ©a lel de son arlicle 1â¢ r annulait les _ dispositions de la loi de 1974 donnant Ã un salariÃ© le droit de demander Â« pou r tout motif raisonnable Â» Ã Ãªtre dispensÃ© de l'obligation d'adhÃ©rer Ã un syndicat donnÃ© . . DorÃ©navant toute demande d'un salariÃ© dÃ©jÃ embauchÃ© dÃ©sireux d'Ã©tre '!A`~=Â°dÃ©gagÃ© dÃ© l'obligation de s'affilier Ã©'un syndicat pour garder son emploi ne ; .. pÃ´uvait plus s'appuyer que sur des motifs d'ordre religieux . 1 . .r._~c-T+. j â¢--" `i" e requÃ©rant n'avait pas d'objection d'ordre religieux Ã© adhÃ©rer Ã vn syndica ~ il . n'avait pas non plus d'objection particuliÃ©re Ã l'Ã©gard de tel ou tel syndicat . tToutefois, - pour plusieurs autres raisons, il se refusait Ã adhÃ©rer A un syndicat, quel .qu'il soit, et les motifs exposÃ©s dans sa demande Ã© crite du 17 octobre 1975 peuvent Ãªtre rÃ©sumÃ©s comme suit :
a . L'argent du principal Fonds syndical sert Ã financer une publication mensuelle qui n'est qu'un organe de propagande en faveur du Parti travailliste et le s uffisantes que le fonds n'Ã©tait pas utilisÃ© Ã requÃ©rant n' a pas reÃ§u d'assu~ranc :p`Ãus'lÃ© requÃ©rant ne partage pas les opinions politiques 1 d'autres finsipoÃitiques . .,D,Ã© de la TrSSA et ne shÃ¢itÃ©TÃ´Ã¢s_contribuer Ã en financer la diffusion . tn. monopole d'embauche, la TSSA montre :lÃ«-. .libertÃ© individuelle . ientÃ¢tions de salaire, la TSSA aggrave l'inflaIle au lieu de l'augmenter . ment favorable Ã la nationalisation des indusiÃ©re les industries nationalisÃ©es comme des 3-aÃ©nÃ©rale il est favorable Ã la libre entreprise . _ mainmisÃ¨ croissante de la TSSA sur le te de l'accord de monopole d'embauch e
/ . Le requÃ©rant n'acceptÃ¨a`s'~obligÃ¢tlon :dans laquelle il serait, pour deve;dÃ©lÃ©guÃ© Ã plein temps TSSA, de donner des dÃ©tails sur ses activitÃ©s nir, sÃ©es au sein des mouvements travailliste et syndicaliste . pÃ¢ g Si'la TSSA dÃ©cidait de (aire grÃ¨ve, le requÃ©rant serait contraint de cesser le travail en mÃªme temps que ses collÃ©gues ; il estime qu'une telle interruption = gÃ©nÃ©rale du travail dans un service-clef Ã©quivaut Ã un chantage collectif sur l e
pays tout entier et il ne souhaite pas participer Ã une telle action, surtout pas sous la contrainte . Le 5 mai 1976, la demande de dispense du requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© examinÃ©e par une Â« Commission de recours Â» composÃ©e d'un reprÃ©sentant des Chemins de fer britanniques, d'un reprÃ©sentant de la TSSA et d'un reprÃ©sentant de la NUR . Par lettre du 27 mai 1976, les Chemins de fer britanniques informaient le requÃ©rant que sa demande de dispense n'Ã©tait pas acceptÃ©e et lui signifiaient son licenciement Ã l'expiration, le 26 juin 1976, du dÃ©lai de prÃ©avis d'un mois auquel son contrat lui donnait droit . Le requÃ©rant a Ã©galement soumis une consultation de John Hall, O .C . et avocat . Celui-ci estimait que, si le requÃ©rant avait effectivement le droit de faire valoir auprÃ¨s du Tribunal du travail qu'il avait Ã©tÃ© injustement licenciÃ© par les Chemins de fer britanniques, ce recours resterait sans effet . La cessation effective d'emploi du requÃ©rant Ã©tait intervenue le 5 avril 1976, date Ã laquelle les dispositions applicables au licenciement Ã©taient celles de la 2â¢ partie de l'Annexe I, Ã la loi de 1974, modifiÃ©e par la loi de 1976, entrÃ©e en vigueur le 25 mars 1976, dont le paragraphe 4 111 prÃ©voit que a dans tout emploi tombant sour le coup du prÃ©sent paragraphe, tout salariÃ© a le droit de ne pas Ãªtre injustement licenciÃ© par son employeur et le recours d'un employÃ© licenciÃ© en violation de ce droit consiste Ã saisir un tribunal du travail en application de la troisiÃ¨me partie de la prÃ©sente annexe et uniquement dans ces limites rr . Le paragraphe 6 (5) de la loi de 1976 dispose que le licenciement d'un salariÃ© par un employeur est considÃ©rÃ© comme justifiÃ© aux fins de la prÃ©sente annexe si lal conformÃ©ment Ã un accord en matiÃ©re d'affiliation syndicale IUnion Membership agreement), la pratique est que tous les salariÃ©s de cet employeur ou tous les salariÃ©s de la mÃªme catÃ©gorie que le salariÃ© licenciÃ© appartiennent Ã un syndicat indÃ©pendant dÃ©terminÃ© ou Ã l'un de ces syndicats si plusieurs sont spÃ©cifiÃ©s ; Ã moins que le salariÃ© ne soit sincÃ©rement opposÃ©, pour des raisons de croyance religieuse, Ã l'affiliation Ã un syndicat quel qu'il soit, . . auquel cas le licenciement sera considÃ©rÃ© comme injustifiÃ© r r L'avocat est parvenu Ã la conclusion que tout recours du requÃ©rant contre une dÃ©cision du tribunal du travail serait Ã©galement vouÃ© Ã l'Ã©chec . A son avis le requÃ©rant n'avait donc en pratique aucun recours en droit anglais contre son licenciement et, dans ces conditions et dans ce sens, l'on Ã©tait fondÃ© Ã dire que toutes les voies de recours ouvertes au requÃ©rant avaient Ã©tÃ© Ã©puisÃ©es .
Pour ce qui est du deuxiÃ©me requÃ©rant, M . James : A la date du 27 mars 1974, le requÃ©rant Ã©tait employÃ© par les Chemins de fer britanniques en qualitÃ© de chef d'Ã©quipe (il avait dÃ©jÃ Ã©tÃ© employÃ© par les Chemins de fer britanniques Ã deux reprises pendant plusieurs annÃ©esl . Vers juillet/aoÃ»t 1975, une note analogue Ã celle mentionnÃ©e plus haut fut affichÃ©e sur le lieu de travail du requÃ©rant afin d'attirer l'attention du personnel su r
une modification apportÃ©e aux contrats de travail Ã la suite d'un accord intervenu en juillet 1975 entre la direction et les syndicats . Comme on l'a dÃ©jÃ dit plus haut, la note indiquait qu'Ã© dater du 1â¢ 1 ao0t 1975, l'affiliation Ã un syndicat reconnu devenait une condition d'emploi du personnel auquel s'appliquait les accords Ã©numÃ©rÃ©s dans la note . Pour ce qui Ã©tait du personnel dÃ©jB en poste, la note indiquait qu'un accord sur le dÃ©tail des arrangements, y compris les dispositions relatives aux demandes de dispense d'affiliation Ã un syndicat, n'avait Ã©tÃ© conclu que pour une catÃ©gorie de personnel IRailway Salaried and Conciliation Staff) visÃ©e par la nÃ©gociation du 28 mai 1956 . Le requÃ©rant relevant de cette catÃ©gorie de personnel Ã©tait donc censÃ© tomber sous le coup des nouvelles dispositions en matiÃ©re d'emploi . '" LÃ© 16 octobre 1975, le requÃ©rant rencontra son supÃ©rieur hiÃ©rarchique immÃ©diatainsi qu'un dÃ©lÃ©guÃ© de la section locale de la NUR . II apprit Ã cette occasion qÃ»'il'Ã©tait obligÃ© d'adhÃ©rer Ã la NUR Ã la suite d'une modification unilatÃ©rale de son contrat et qu'il n'avait pas le choix d'autres syndicats . Le requÃ©rant indiqua Ã son supÃ©rieur et au dÃ©lÃ©guÃ© de la NUR qu'il avait l'intention d'adhÃ©rer Ã ce syndicat . Sa dÃ©cision dÃ©finitive restait toutefois en suspens dans l'attente d'une mise au point de la NUR quant au calcul de son salaire . Le requÃ©rant Ã©tait particuliÃ©rement prÃ©occupÃ© par le fait que, bien qu'il travaillÃ¢t le mÃ©me nombre dheures qu'un de ses collÃ©gues, il semblait que leurs salaires respectifs n'Ã©taient pas Ã©gaux . ;Avant de demander officiellement son inscription Ã la NUR le requÃ©rant souhaitait attendre de-cÃ´nnÃ¢PÃrÃ©lÃ¢'rÃ©ponse faite Ã son collÃ©gue sur cette question de salaire car il dÃ©sir Ã© it '--v4ii-comment la NUR traitait les problÃ©mes de ses adhÃ©rents . Lorsque laÃR rÃ©pÃ´nditau collÃ©gue du requÃ©rant que son salaire avait Ã©tÃ© calculÃ© correctem, enty sÃ¢ns prÃ©ciser les bases sur lesquelles on Ã©tait parvenu Ã cette conclusion ;~lÃ©~r, quÃ©rant-estima que ce syndicat avait manquÃ© Ã ~.. son devoir de procÃ©der,-Ã , un examen dÃ©taillÃ© et de donner une explication complÃ©te de ses conclÃ»sioris : :. .. ._ embre 1975, le requÃ©rant refusa d'adhÃ©rer n'ayant rÃ©pondu Ã sa propre demande d e
~ieqdÃ©rant reÃ§ut un avis de licenciement indiquant que pectÃ© les termes de l'accord de juillet 1975 sur l'affiliane seraient plus requis Ã compter du 5 avril 1976 . Le 8 avril 1976, le requÃ©rant porta plainte auprÃ©s du Tribunal du travail pour licenciement injustifiÃ© . Le 18 juin 1976, le requÃ©rant comparut devant le Tribunal du travail, qu i
rÃ©serva sa dÃ©cision .
Vers le 6 juillet 1976, le requÃ©rant reÃ§ut copie du jugement du tribunal le dÃ©boutant de sa demande . Les attendus du jugement indiquaient que le requÃ©rant, tout en soulevant des objections Ã l'affiliation au syndicat, n'avait Ã aucun moment demandÃ© Ã en Ãªtre dispensÃ© conformÃ©ment Ã la procÃ©dure prÃ©vue par l'Accord Par ailleurs, le requÃ©rant ayant clairement refusÃ© d'adhÃ©rer au syndical comme prÃ©vu par l'accord sur l'affiliation syndicale, sa plainte devait Ãªtre examinÃ©e Ã la lumiÃ©re du paragraphe 6 (5) de la loi de 1976 . Etant donnÃ© que le requÃ©rant n'avait Ã aucun moment indiquÃ© que les raisons de son refus Ã©taient d'ordre religieux, il s'ensuivait que le tribunal Ã©tait tenu, aux termes de la loi, de conclure qu'il ne s'agissait pas d'un licenciement arbitrair e Le requÃ©rant a fait valoir encore qu'il n'avait pas d'objection de principe contre les syndicats, qu'il avait d'ailleurs prÃ©cÃ©demment appartenu Ã la NUR et qu'il Ã©tait disposÃ© Ã s'y affilier Ã nouveau Ã la demande de son supÃ©rieur et du dÃ©lÃ©guÃ© de ce syndicat . Il n'Ã©tait toutefois pas encore persuadÃ© que cela serait Ã son avantage . Il estimait de plus que chacun devrait pouvoir en toute libertÃ© dÃ©cider d'adhÃ©rer ou non Ã un syndicat, quelles que soient les raisons personnelles de ce choix .
Griefs Les deux requÃ©rants font valoir que le Royaume-Uni applique les dispositions susmentionnÃ©es de la loi, qu'il ne les a pas jusqu'ici modifiÃ©es de maniÃ©re 9 permettre aux citoyens britanniques d'exercer leur droit Ã la libertÃ© de pensÃ©e et de conscience, d'expression et d'association, et n'a pas prÃ©vu de moyens de recours adÃ©quats en cas de licenciement arbitraire, notamment pour les citoyens britanniques qui perdent leur emploi pour avoir omis d'adhÃ©rer Ã l'un des syndicats recommandÃ©s par leur employeur . Ils font de plus valoir que dans une situation telle que celle qui fait l'objet de la prÃ©sente requÃ©te, oÃ¹ les requÃ©rants n'ont pas d'objection spÃ©cialement fondÃ©e sur des motifs religieux, mais plutÃ´t une objection sÃ©rieuse reposant sur des motifs raisonnables ou sur la volontÃ© d'exercer le droit Ã la libertÃ© d'expression et d'association prÃ©vue aux articles 9, 10 et 11 de la Convention, l'application de la loi en quesuon Ã©quivaut Ã une violation de la Convention et se trouve, notamment, en contradiction avec l'esprit des articles 9, 10, 11 et 13 .
PROCÃDUR E Le 11 dÃ©cembre 1976, la Commission dÃ©cida de communiquer la requÃªte au Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni et d'inviter celui-ci Ã soumettre Ã la Commission ses observations Ã©crites sur la recevabilitÃ© de ladite requÃªte . Le Gouvernement a fait parvenir ses observations le 22 mars 1977 et le reprÃ©sentant des requÃ©rants y a rÃ©pondu le 14 juin 1977 .
ARGUMENTATION DES PARTIE S Observations du Gouvernement dÃ©fendeu r 1
Historiqu e
1 1 : Droit et pratique internes de 1945 Ã 197 7 Le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur a indiquÃ© que dans la pÃ©riode de 1945 Ã 1971, la lÃ©gislation en vigueur en Angleterre et au Pays de Galles ne contenait aucun e : disposition relative Ã d'Ã©ventuels accords sur le monopole syndical d'embauche 1'â¢clÃ´sed shop") . De tels accords Ã©taient toutefois courants dans certains secteurs, particÃ»liÃ©rement dans les industries anciennes . Une Ã©tude rÃ©cente donne Ã penser que probablement plus de 40 % des syndiquÃ©s britanniques travaillent dans l e _ .Ã¢adre ;d ;accords de ce type (40 % dans les annÃ©es 60) . Ces accords, du fait qu'ils ~Ã©taient largement reconnus, pouvaient Ã©galement prÃ©senter des avantages notam" â¢ : mÃ©nt~enrenforÃ§ant .la position des syndicats dans les nÃ©gociations et en contrir bÃ»ant~@ rÃ©duirÃ©reles risquÃ©sde conflits entre syndicats et entre groupes de travail_'- leÃ»is ; protÃ©geÃ¢nt ainsi aÃ» mieux les intÃ©r@ts de ces derniers . Mais leur application donnait parfois lieu Ã des interventions des syndicats ou de la direction pour coniraindre les non-syndiquÃ©s Ã adhÃ©rer sous peine d'@tre licenciÃ©s . Etant donnÃ© qu'avant l'entrÃ©e en vigueur de la Loi de 1971 sur les relation s = du travail, la,rupture,d'un contrat de travail ne faisait l'objet d'aucune restriction dÃ¢ns lesd textÃ«s ~ I excÃ©puontr,de la Loi de 1963 sur les contrats de travail prÃ©voyant un prÃ©avis mihimumlImÃ¢is Ã©tait pour l'essentiel rÃ©gie par le droit coumlier Icommon law ;un empÃiiÃ¿ "pouvait @tre licenciÃ© lÃ©galement Ã condition que les dÃ©laie soient PesetÃst~=que les, motifs du licenciement soient ou non liÃ©s au refus d'appartenir au!,syndiÃ§at dÃ©tenant le monopole d'embauche . Le seul recours pour un employÃ© arbiirÃ¢irÃ©meni licenciÃ© sans prÃ©avis Ã©tait de poursuivre ~ â¬: 1lem leur pour obten i aÃ¨~paiement du salaire qui lui aurait Ã©tÃ© d0 pendant le
La Loi de 1971 sur lÃ©srÃ©lÃ¢tions-du travail a modifiÃ© radicalement la situation en imposant de nouvelles~rÃ©sÃ¯rictons au droit de l'employeur de licencier un employÃ© et en donnant sir_riultÃ¢ Ã«mÃ©ni a ce dernier le droit de ne pas appartenir Ã un syndicat . En principe, tousuÃes .ÃªmployÃ©s jouissaient ainsi du droit de ne pas Ã«tre tr arbitrairement licenciÃ©s, ;_,mÃ©Ã¢vec le prÃ©avis requis . Les tribunaux du ~,^.,,, . .. . travail auxquels les emplqy_Ã©slpouvaienC avoir recours s'ils estimaient leur licencie. ment injustifiÃ© pouva ient :ordonn erÃ I;employeur de dÃ©dommager l'employÃ© ou de le,,.rÃ©embaucher, A .moinsYdÃ© pÃ´tÃ¯voir prouver au tribunal l'existence dâ¢un ou de plÃ»sieurs des motifs de licenciement admis (conduite, compÃ©tence, double emploi, -etc .) et convaincre celui-ci que ces motifs, en l'occurrence, justifiaient raisonnablement un licenciement .
Bien que, en donnant Ã tout employÃ© te droit de ne pas appartenir Ã un syndicat, la Loi de 1971 rendit inapplicables les accords sur le monopole syndical d'embauche, elle contenait Ã©galement des dispositions : a permettant aux employeurs et aux syndicats de conclure des accords dits Â« agency shops Â», aux termes desquels l'appartenance Ã l'un des syndicats en question ou la contribution Ã son financement pouvait Ãªtre une condition d'embauche . Les employÃ©s objectant, pour des motifs de conscience, Ã l'appartenance Ã un syndicat ou au paiement de la cotisation Ã©taient autorisÃ©s Ã verser une somme Ã©quivalente Ã des oeuvres de bienfaisance ; b . autorisant Ã conclure des accords instaurant un monopole d'embauche dans des conditions bien dÃ©finies . Dans ces cas les objecteurs de conscience n'Ã©taient autorisÃ©s qu'Ã verser des contributions Ã des muvres de bienfaisance . La Loi de 1971 a Ã©tÃ© abrogÃ©e par la Loi de 1974 sur les syndicats et les relations du travail qui, pour ce qui est du monopole syndical d'embauche tendait Ã revenir Ã la situation antÃ©rieure Ã 1971 : c'est ainsi que le droit de ne pas appartenir Ã un syndicat et les restrictions qui en dÃ©coulaient pour l'instauration de monopoles d'embauche ont Ã©tÃ© supprimÃ©s . La loi disposait en outre IÂ§ 6 151, Annexe 1) que d'une maniÃ¨re gÃ©nÃ©rale le licenciement pour non-appartenance ou refus de continuer Ã appartenir Ã un syndicat lorsqu'un accord Ã cet effet la Union Membership agreement sl Ã©tait en vigueur ne pouvait Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ© comme arbitraire que si Â« l'employÃ© avait de vÃ©ritables objections, pour des raisons de convictions religieuses, contre l'appartenance Ã un syndicat quel qu'il soit ou avait des objections raisonnables contre l'affiliation Ã tel ou tel syndicat Â» (les mots soulignÃ©s ont Ã©tÃ© ajoutÃ©s par le Parlement Ã la suite d'un amendement contraire aux vmux du Gouvernementl . La Loi de 1976 portant amendement Ã la Loi sur les syndicats et les relations du travail supprima l'exception prÃ©vue pour des motifs Â« raisonnables Â», laissant uniquement celle touchant les convictions religieuses . Aux yeux du Gouvernement, les salariÃ©s ne sont pas moins bien protÃ©gÃ©s par les lois de 1974 et 1976 qu'ils ne l'Ã©taient avant 1971 et, puisque l'instauration du droit de ne pas Ãªtre injustement licenciÃ© va au-delA des obligations que la Convention implique pour le RoyaumeUni, la restriction de ce droit dans des conditions bien dÃ©finies ne peut constituer une violation desdites obligations . Le Gouvernement conclut cette prÃ©sentation du droit et de la pratique internes en rappelant que le monopole syndical d'embauche existe, pour certaines industries, dans plusieurs Etats membres du Conseil de l'Europe .
1 .2 Pour ce qui est de l'embauche et du licenciement des requÃ©rants, le Gouvernement a fait valoir qu'il n'avait pas eu officiellement connaissance de ces affaires . Mais, qu'Ã ce qu'il savait, l'Office (Board) des Chemins de fer britanniques avait appliquÃ© l'accord sur le monopole syndical d'embauche Ã la fin de 1975, remettant ainsi en vigueur un accord restÃ© en sommeil depuis 1970 . L'Office s'Ã©tait alors trouvÃ© en face d'un petit nombre d'employÃ©s qui refusaient d'adhÃ©rer Ã l'un ou Ã l'autre de s
syndicats spÃ©cifiÃ©s dans l'accord . Au cours de l'Ã©tÃ© 1976, la plupart de ces personnes turent licenciÃ©es . Certaines eurent recours Ã des tribunaux du travail, qui considÃ©rÃ©rent dans plusieurs cas que ces licenciements Ã©taient injustifiÃ©s car, lÃ© la diffÃ©rence de MM . Young et James) et contrairement Ã l'opinion des Chemins de fer britanniques, on estima qu'ils avaient de sÃ©rieuses objections d'ordre religieux Ã l'adhÃ©sion Ã un syndicat .
2 . Position du Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur Le Gouvernement a ensuite exposÃ© sa position par rapport aux Chemins de fer britanniques . ConformÃ©ment Ã la Loi sur les transports de 1962, les Chemins de fer Britanniques assurent un service public . L'Office ne fait pas partie du Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni ; il s'agit plutÃ´t d'un organisme distinct, responsable de l'exploitation du rÃ©seau ferrÃ©, bien que l'article 27 de la loi confÃ©re Ã un ministre du Gouvernement certains pouvoirs touchant l'activitÃ© de l'Office et que l'article 28 soumette l'exercice de certains pouvoirs de l'Office Ã l'autorisation du ministre . Pour ce qui concerne la gestion du personnel, les relations avec les syndicats et les conditions d'embauche, l'Office est autonome . La dÃ©cision d'embaucher les deux requÃ©rants et celle de conclure l'accord (Union membership agreementl de 1975 ont toutes deux Ã©tÃ© prises par l'Office, tout comme celle de les licencier . Le Gouvernement a indiquÃ© que sur la question de savoir s'il devait ou non y avoir un monopole d'embauche dans tel ou tel endroit il avait optÃ© pour une politique de neutralitÃ© . L'unique disposition nouvelle introduite par la loi de 1974 et modifiÃ©e par celle de 1976 Isur les accords pour le monopole d'embauche en liaison avec les licenciements arbitraires) rÃ©pondait Ã la nÃ©cessitÃ© de dÃ©finir la maniÃ©re dont les dispositions relatives aux licenciements arbitraires devraient Ãªtre appliquÃ©es dans le cas d'une personne licenciÃ©e pour refus d'adhÃ©rer Ã un syndicat ou de maintenir son adhÃ©sion Ã la suite d'un accord instaurant un monopole d'embauche . La Commission s'est dÃ©jÃ© penchÃ©e Ã plusieurs reprises sur la question de la position d'un gouvernement dÃ©fendeur face Ã des organismes publics . La Commission a par deux fois laissÃ© indÃ©cise la question de la responsabilitÃ© du Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni pour la BBC IRecueil de dÃ©cisions 29, p . 89 : Annuaire 14, pp . 539-549) . La Commission ne s'est pas non plus prononcÃ©e sur la position du Gouvernement irlandais face Ã la Compagnie irlandaise d'Ã©lectricitÃ© (Irish Electricity Supply Board) (Annuaire 14, pp . 199 Ã 219) . En examinant la requÃªte NÂ° 2413/65, la Commission est parvenue Ã la conclusion que le Gouvernement de la RÃ©publique FÃ©dÃ©rale d'Allemagne n'Ã©tait pas responsable des actes des sociÃ©tÃ©s allemandes de presse, de radio et de tÃ©lÃ©vision (Recueil de dÃ©cisions 23, p . 7) . La Cour europÃ©enne des Droits de l'Homme a eu l'occasion d'examiner les responsabilitÃ©s respectives du Gouvernement suÃ©dois et des Chemins de fer suÃ©dois dans l'Affaire des conducteurs de locomotive . La Cour a conclu qu e Â« L'article 11 s'impose par consÃ©quent Ã l' 'Etat employeur', que les relations de ce dernier avec ses employÃ©s obÃ©issent au droit public ou au droit privÃ© Â» farrÃ¨t du 6 fÃ©vrier 1976 , p . 10) . - 153 -
Le Gouvernement estime qu'il n'a pas avec les Chemins de ter britanniques les mÃ©mes liens que ceux qui existent entre le Gouvernement suÃ©dois et les Chemins de fer nationaux suÃ©dois . De plus, la relation entre les Chemins de fer britanniques et leurs employÃ©s est diffÃ©rente de celle des Chemins de fer nationaux suÃ©dois avec les leurs . Au Royaume-Uni, l'Etat n'est pas l'employeur des cheminots et il n'existe pas d'Ã©quivalent de l'Office national pour les nÃ©gociations col lectives . Le Gouvernement a fait valoir que pour les raisons ci-dessus la requÃ¨te devait Ãªtre rejetÃ©e pour incompatibilitÃ© avec la Convention ratione personae .
RecevabilitÃ© du grief fondÃ© sur l'article 9
Le Gouvernement passe ensuite Ã l'examen de la dÃ©claration des requÃ©rants affirmant que Â« le Royaume-Uni applique les dispositions . . . de la loi et qu'il ne les a pas jusqu'ici modifiÃ©es de maniÃ©re Ã permettre aux citoyens britanniques d'exercer leur droit Ã la libertÃ© de pensÃ©e, de conscience . . . rr . De l'avis du Gouvernement, la requÃªte ne fait pas clairement apparaPtre en quoi les requÃ©rants estiment que leur libertÃ© de pensÃ©e et de conscience n'a pas Ã©tÃ© respectÃ©e . Le Gouvernement maintient qu'il n'y a eu de sa part ni intervention ni restriction Ã cet Ã©gard et que la question du licenciement n'a pas de lien direct avec la libertÃ© de pensÃ©e ou de conscience des requÃ©rants . Ceux-ci sont libres, aux termes de la Convention, qui est appliquÃ©e au Royaume-Uni, d'avoir (et d'exprimerl l'opinion que le monopole syndical d'embauche devrait Ãªtre interdit par la loi ou soumis Ã des restrictions plus sÃ©vÃ©res que ce n'est le cas actuellement . Lu dans son contexte (et notamment en liaison avec les articles 10 et 111 , l'article 9 protÃ¨ge les convictions religieuses ou autres fondÃ©es sur la pensÃ©e et la conscience . Ces derniÃ¨res incluent l'agnosticisme et l'athÃ©isme . Les conclusions ne reposant pas sur ces bases ne sont pas protÃ©gÃ©es par l'article 9, bien que leur expression soit protÃ©gÃ©e par l'article 10 . En d'autres termes, il ne s'agit plus alors de Â« convictions u, au sens de l'article 9 , mais plutÃ´t d'opinions, etc . Â« La conscience n et les a convictions n (beliefs) ne relevant pas du domaine des convictions religieuses sont difficiles Ã dÃ©finir . La RÃ©solution 337 relative au droit Ã l'objection de conscience, adoptÃ©e par l'AssemblÃ©e Consultative en 1967, donne une indication de l'interprÃ©tation de l'article 9 commune aux Etats membres . Le principe de base NÂ° 1 est rÃ©digÃ© comme sui t Â« Les personnes astreintes au service militaire qui, pour des motifs de conscience ou en raison d'une conviction profonde d'ordre religieux, Ã©thique, moral, humanitaire, philosophique ou autre de mÃªme nature, refusent d'accomplir le service armÃ©, doivent avoir un droit subjectif Ã Ãªtre dispensÃ©es de ce service . Â» (Recueil de textes, p . 907 ) Il ressort de ce texte que l'on ne saurait considÃ©rer au'il existe une obiection a de conscience n dans le cas oÃ¹ l'obiection tient Ã des motifs Dolitioues . Ã©conomiques ou d'ordre analoaue .
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S'appuyant sur les .arguments ci-dessus, le Gouvernement a fait valoir que dans une interprÃ©tation correcte de l'article 9, le terme Â« conviction n dÃ©signe une opinion de nature voisine d'une opinion religieuse .mais ne constituant pas une croyance religieuse ; et la manifestation d'une telle conviction implique quelque chose de nature comparable Ã u culte, Ã l'enseignement, aux pratiques et Ã l'accomplissement des rites . MÃªme si la Cor :mmission devait estimer qu'il convient de donner un sens plus large aux mots Â« conviction Â» et Â« manifester sa conviction Â», ce sens ne pourrait Ãªtre Ã©largi au point que l'Etat soit tenu de s'abstenir d'empÃªcher une personne de faire tout ce qu'elle veut en dÃ©pit des objections des autres pour la raison que cette personne prÃ©tendrait manifester ainsi une conviction ; el moins encore aÃ¼ point que l'Eta4 soit tenu de prendre des mesures pour assurer Ã cette personne une telle libertÃ© . II ne semble donc pas que l'objection des requÃ©rants Ã l'adhÃ©sion Ã un syndicat repose sur le type de convictions religieuses ou analogues protÃ©gÃ©es par l'article 9 . MÃªme si la Commission devait estimer que les opinions des requÃ©rants Ã©quivalent Ã une conviction, la lÃ©gislation du Royaume-Uni n'a pas dirÃ©Ã©fernent empÃ©chÃ© ceux-ci de manifester ces opinions Ivoir 4 1 1 ci-dessusl . Le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur soutient que pour les raisons ci-dessus la requÃªte est manifestement mal fondÃ©e en fait ou, alternativement, incompatible avec la Convention, les convictions respectives des requÃ©rants ne faisant pas partie de celles que protÃ¨ge l'article 9 .
4 . RecevabilitÃ© du grief fondÃ© sur l'article 1 0 De l'avis du Gouvernement, les requÃ©rants n'ont apportÃ© aucune preuve d'une violation de leur libertÃ© d'expression et ce arief doit donc Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ© comme manifestement mal fondÃ© . 5 . RecevabilitÃ© du grief fondÃ© sur l'article 1 1 5 .1 Le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeurrappelle ensuite que les requÃ©rants s'Ã©taient plaints que : Â« Le Royaume-Uni applique les dispositions susmentionnÃ©es de la loi, qu'il ne les a pas jusqu'ici modifiÃ©es de maniÃ©re Ã permettre aux citoyens britanniques d'exercer leur droit Ã la libertÃ© . . . d'associalion Â» et qu'ils ont invoquÃ© l'article 11 de la Convention .
Du point de vue du Gouvernement, la requÃªte ne fait pas apparaÃ®tre clairement en quoi les requÃ©rants estiment qu'il a Ã©tÃ© portÃ© atteinte Ã leur libertÃ© d'association . Si les requÃ©rants se plaignent .d'avoir Ã©tÃ© licenciÃ©s par les Chemins de fer britanniques, ce grief doit Ã©tre considÃ©rÃ© comme incompatible avec les dispositions de la Convention, puisque celle-ci ne garantit pas le drolt de ne pas Ã©tre licenciÃ© .
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Le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur se rÃ©fÃ©re ensuite Ã la dÃ©claration de l'un des requÃ©rants selon laquelle : Â« chacun doit pouvoir en toute libertÃ© dÃ©cider d'adhÃ©rer ou non Ã un syndicat quelles que soient les raisons personnelles de ce choix Â» . Le Gouvernement, pour le cas oÃ¹ les requÃ©rants prÃ©tendraient que l'article 11 111 prÃ©voit non seulement le droit d'adhÃ©rer Ã un syndical mais aussi celui de ne pas y adhÃ©rer, ferait observer ce qui suit : 5 .2 Pour ce qui est des effets de la lÃ©gislation sur les requÃ©rants, celle-ci ne fournit pas un mÃ©canisme permettant Ã un syndicat d'obtenir d'un employeur un accord instaurant le monopole d'embauche, mais comporte plutBt des rÃ¨gles relatives au licenciement justifiÃ© ou non dans les cas oÃ¹ un tel accord existe et est appliquÃ© . De l'avis du Gouvernement, le grief des requÃ©rants dÃ©rive directement de leur licenciement par les Chemins de fer britanniques et des termes de leurs contrats, indirectement de l'Accord sur l'affiliation syndicale et moins directement encore de la lÃ©gislation . 5 3 Le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur a ensuite retracÃ© longuement l'historique des nÃ©gociations concernant l'article 11, Ã la lumiÃ©re de la DÃ©claration universelle des Droits de l'Homme du 10 dÃ©cembre 1948, et dÃ©crit les premiers projets de ce qui devait devenir la Convention europÃ©enne . Il a fait observer que, bien que les premiers projets fissent mention du droit de ne pas adhÃ©rer Ã un syndicat, celui-ci n'apparaissait plus dans le texte final car on avait estimÃ© inopportun de l'y inclure, considÃ©rant les difficultÃ©s que pourrait entrainer le systÃ©me du monopole syndical d'embauche ("closed shop") adoptÃ© par certains pays . Etant donnÃ© que les gouvernements ont, en signant la Convention, acceptÃ© un article 11 dans lequel on avait dÃ©libÃ©rÃ©ment Ã©vitÃ© de mentionner le droit de ne pas se syndiquer, le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni, s'il avait eu un point de vue diffÃ©rent lorsqu'il a signÃ© et ratifiÃ© la Convention, aurait pu formuler une rÃ©serve comme l'y autorise l'article 64 et n'aurait pas manquÃ© de le faire . 5 .4 Le Gouvernement a par ailleurs rappelÃ© qu'une optique analogue avait prÃ©valu lors de la rÃ©daction du Pacte des Nations Unies sur les droits civils et politiques, puisque la proposition d'ajouter une phrase prÃ©cisant que nul ne pouvait Ãªtre contraint Ã adhÃ©rer Ã une association n'a pas Ã©tÃ© acceptÃ©e (Document UN A /2929 du 1^ 1 juillet 19551 . C'est dans cette optique que le Gouvernement a ratifiÃ© le Pacte sans formuler de rÃ©serve Ã cet Ã©gard, alors que l'instrument de ratification a Ã©tÃ© dÃ©posÃ© le 20 mai 1976, c'est-Ã -dire aprÃ©s l'entrÃ©e en vigueur de la Loi de 1976 . 5 .5 Le Gouvernement a fait ensuite valoir qu'aucune interprÃ©tation idÃ©ologique, textuelle et contextuelle ne permettait des conclusions diffÃ©rentes . Si le libellÃ© de l'article 11 111 laissait subsister la moindre ambiguÃ¯tÃ©, il suffirait de se rÃ©fÃ©rer aux travaux prÃ©paratoires de la Convention sur ce point .
. En outre, du fait que l'article 11 (1) protÃ©ge le droit d'adhÃ©rer Ã un syndicat il ne s'ensuit pas qu'il protÃ©ge Ã©galement celui de ne pas y adhÃ©rer car la protection explicite d'un droit positif n'implique pas la protection du droit nÃ©gatif ou Â« inverse Â» .
5 .6 Le Gouvernement se rÃ©fÃ©re Ã© galement aux Conventions 87 et 98 de l'o .I .T . ~_- ainsi qu'A la Charte sociale, car la Commission et la Cour europÃ©ennes des Droits de l'Homme ont toutes deux estimÃ© devoir considÃ©rer l'article 11 en liaison avec ces instruments . De l'avis du Gouvernement, ces instruments ne font pas mention d'un droit de ne pas adhÃ©rer Ã une organisation professionnelle ou syndicale . 5 .7 II est vrai que la Cour europÃ©enne des Droits de l'Homme n'a jamais statuÃ© sur ce point . Mais il n'est pas inopportun de rappeler qu'Ã plusieurs reprises la Cour a considÃ©rÃ© de maniÃ©re plus gÃ©nÃ©rale que l'article 11 n'assurait pas au x
-`,Ã¯syndicais ou Ã leurs membres un traitement prÃ©cis de la part de l'Etat (Affaire du
. -,nr . 1. -_~-,Syndicat suÃ©dois des conducteurs de locomotives) et plus particuliÃ©rement que la mise en ~uvre de politiques gouvernementales tendant Ã restreindre le nombre ss-=?`-â¢'-'~dÃ©s syndicÃ¢ts dans un secteur donnA ne po rtait pas atteinte Ã la libertÃ© syndicale
IAffÃ¢ires du Syndicat national de la police belge et du Syndicat suÃ©dois des conducteurs de locomotives) . "58 Pour ce qui est du grief des requÃ©rant selon lequel l'a rt icle 11 leur garantit le droii de ne pas se syndiquer et selon lequel la lÃ©gislation en vigueur au RoyaumeUni porte atteinte Ã ce droit, le Gouvernement a fait valoir que, pour les raisons donnÃ©es ci-dessus, l'article 11 ne vise pas et n'assure pas la protection d'un ~,. --~qÃ¼elconque droit de nepa5 ra dhÃ©rer Ã un syndicat . L'article 11 fait Ã l'Etat obligation de protÃ©ger leioitrdeyconstituer des syndicats et d'y adhÃ©rer . Employeurs et employÃ©s peÃ»vent_ÃÃ©gitimement estimer que la protection des travailleurs dans un secteur our-Ã»n`-feÃ¼_donnÃ© exige que tous ces travailleurs adhÃ©rent Ã un syndicat . L'Etat a le tl rrit _deÃ§leur permettre d'agir en consÃ©quence sans risquer d'enfreindre la loi . Rien~dansl:article 11 (1) ne donne le droit Ã un particulier d e ~-.:--_Â°- : ne pas s'associer Ã d'autres-ou .de ne pas adhÃ©rer Ã un syndicat, que ce soit pa r principe ou parce quÃ©il,nÃ©Ã¯t'estime pas nÃ©cessaire Ã la protection de ses intÃ©rÃ©ts . Il faut donc en dÃ©dÃ¹i7e-Ã¼ e~ la Convention ne reconnaÃ®t pas le droit pour un particulier de faire obstaclÃ© -Ã§e que ses collÃ©gues considÃ¨rent comme nÃ©cessaire Ã la protection de leurs_ intr Ãª ts, en l'occurrence le maintien d'une pa rt icipation syndicale Ã 100 % . La~qÃ»Ã©stion de savoir si cette participation Ã 100 % est nÃ©cessaire Ã cette :fin"est .sansrapport avec le point qui nous occupe ; l'Etat est en droit de prendre desâ¢mÃ«sÃ»res tenant compte du fait que les employeurs et les employÃ©s sont convÃ¢incÃ¹s de .cette nÃ©cessitÃ© .
DuantÃ lalÃ©gi Ã¢tiÃ´n~Ã©cemment entrÃ©e en vigueur au Royaume-Uni, le - :`~~ ~G6uvernement a soulignÃ© qu'elle concernait le droit de ne pas Ã¨tre arbitrairemen t - licenciÃ© . Ce droit a Ã©tÃ© en quelque sorte superposÃ© Ã une lÃ©gislation prÃ©existante . En d'autres termes, un licenciement donnÃ© intervenant Ã l'heure actuelle peut ne pas Atre contraire aux droits de l'employÃ© en droit coutumier Icommon law), parce que, par exemple, l'employeur aura donnÃ© le prÃ©avis prÃ©vu par le contrat d e
travail, et constituer nÃ©anmoins un Â« licenciement arbitraire Â», au sens de la nouvelle lÃ©gislation . Lorsqu'un cas de Â« licenciement arbitraire Â» se prÃ©sente, la loi donne Ã l'employÃ© certains droits . Celui de ne pas Ã©tre injustement licenciÃ© ne fait pas partie de ceux que garantit la Convention Vu sous cet angle, les droits donnÃ©s aux employÃ©s par la nouvelle lÃ©gislation peuvent Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ©s comme une sorte de a bonus Â», allant au-delÃ© des droits protÃ©gÃ©s par la Convention et par le droit appliquÃ© en Angleterre et au Pays de Galles en matiÃ¨re de rupture des contrats de travail . Ce Â« bonus Â» introduit dans la lÃ©gislation en vigueur au Royaume-Uni peut faire l'objet d'une exception dans le cas oÃ¹ il est mis fin Ã un contrat Ã la suite du refus de l'employÃ© d'adhÃ©rer Ã un syndicat Ipour des motifs autres que religieux) . L'octroi de ce e bonus n, assorti de la limitation ci-dessus, ne peut, de l'avis du Gouvernement, Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ© comme une violation de la Convention du fait de l'existence de cette limitation . Dans la mesure oÃ¹ les requÃ©rants se plaignent d'une violation de leur libertÃ© d'association, le Gouvernement estime qu'Ã la lumiÃ©re de ce qui prÃ©cÃ©de la requÃ©te est manifestement mal fondÃ©e et, dans la mesure oÃ¹ ils allÃ¨guent une violation de la libertÃ© de ne pas adhÃ©rer Ã un syndicat, la requÃªte est incompatible avec la Convention, puisque ce droit ne figure pas au nombre de ceux que protÃ©ge ladite Convention . 6 Le Gouvernement a fait valoir enfin que, aucune preuve d'une violation des articles 9, 10 et 11 n'ayant Ã©tÃ© rapportÃ©e et le droit de ne pas Ãªtre licenciÃ© n'Ã©tant pas garanti par la Convention, le grief des requÃ©rants tirÃ© de l'article 13, selon lequel le Royaume-Uni n'a pas mis Ã leur disposition les recours adÃ©quats contre un licenciement arbitraire, ne peut Ã©tre retenu . RÃ©sumant ses conclusions, le Gouvernement demande Ã la Commission de dÃ©clarer que la requÃ©te est incompatible avec la Convention ratione personae et que, par ailleurs, dans la mesure oÃ¹ les requÃ©rants se plaignent d'une violation - de l'article 9, la requÃ©te est manifestement mal fondÃ©e ou incompatible ratione materiae avec la Convention, et donc irrecevable ;
- de l'article 10, la requÃªte est manifestement mal fondÃ© e - de l'article 11, la requÃªte est manifestement mal fondÃ©e ou incompatible ratione materiae avec la Convention ; - de l'article 13, aucun problÃ©me ne se pose sous l'angle de cet articl e B . Observations des requÃ©rant s Dans leurs observations Ã©crites datÃ©es du 14 juin 1977, les requÃ©rants ont fait valoir tout d'abord que la question soulevÃ©e par la prÃ©sente requÃªte devait Ãªtre examinÃ©e dans le contexte de la Convention prise dans son ensemble et surtout au regard des droits et libertÃ©s de l'individu que ladite Convention tend Ã dÃ©finir et Ã rendre Ã©vidents aux yeux de tous .
Ils estiment, Ã ce propros, que,j'intention de ceux qui ont conÃ§u la Convention Ã©tait que tout citoyenfOt libre de se livrer Ã toute activitÃ© professionnelle licite de son choix, Ã condition d'en avoir la capacitÃ©, sans Ã¨tre soumis, pour Ã¨tre autorisÃ© Ã faire ce" travail, 8des conditions incompatibles avec l'esprit de la Convention . La position du Gouvernement, par contre, est que, lout en reconnaissant aux citoyens du Royaume-Uni la libertÃ© de leur personne, la libertÃ© de pensÃ©e, de conscience, de rÃ©union et d'association, il n'interviendrait pas pour empÃªcher ces mÃªmes citoyens d'Ãªtre contraints, pour pouvoir poursuivre leurs activitÃ©s professionnelles, Ã se joindre Ã une association, mÃªme dans le cas oÃ¹ celle-ci irait Ã l'opposÃ© de leurs convictions les plus profondes, de leur conscience ou de leurs croyances . AprÃ¨s ces observations de caractÃ©re gÃ©nÃ©ral, les requÃ©rants ont traitÃ© plu s en dÃ©tail les diffÃ©rents points en litige . Ils ont fait valoir que si, dans l'actuelle lÃ©gislation du Royaume-Uni, le monopole syndical d'embÃ¢uche("closed shop") Ã©tait autorisÃ© let mÃªme encouragÃ©), ce principe Ã©tiit incompatible .avec le droit Ã la libertÃ© de pensÃ©e, de conscience et de religion, Ã la libertÃ© d'expression et Ã la libertÃ© d'association mentionnÃ©es aux articles 9, 10 et 11 de la Convention . De l'avis des requÃ©rants, la libertÃ© garantie parl'article 11 doit comprendre la libertÃ© de ne pas s'associer Ã d'autres personnes . S'il n'y a pas de libertÃ© de refuser l'association, il ne peut y avoir non plus de libertÃ© d'association . Un individu peut souhaiter s'associeYA d'autres pour une infinitÃ© de raisons, mais il est peu probable qu'une p&sonne contrainte Ã s'associer Ã d'autres contre sa volontÃ© partage les objectifs ou les convictions de ceux Ã qui elle aura dÃ¹ se joindre . Si elle ne partage pas leurs objectifs ou convictions, elle est non seulement privÃ©e de sa libertÃ© de ne pas s'associer Ã d'autres, mais lÃ© fait mÃªme de cette association risque de faire violence Ã sa libertÃ© de pensÃ©e ou de conscience . Cette association peut aussi entraver ou Ã©touffer sa libertÃ© d'expression . Or un syndicat est une association au sens donnÃ© Ã ce mot Ã l'article 11 de la Convention . Les requÃ©rants ont fail valoir que si une personne Ã©tait contrainte par l'existence d'un monopole d'embauche Ã adhÃ©rer Ã un syndicat contre sa propre pensÃ©e, conscience ou conviction, les droits que lui garantissent les articles 9, 10 et 11 de la Convention se trouvent ainsi violÃ©s . Les requÃ©rants ont fait valoir, de plus, qu'il serait Ã l'Ã©vidence contraire Ã la Convention qu'une loi dispose que tout salariÃ© doit appartenir Ã un syndicat . A leur avis, le Gouvernement lui-mÃªme semble l'avoir tacitement reconnu en faisant observer que la loi de 1976 ne rend pas obligatoires les accords sur l'affiliation syndicale . Si la loi ne prÃ©voit pas de protection contre le licenciement pour refus d'adhÃ©re r Ã un syndicat, chaque fois qu'un employeur et un syndical s'entendront pour imposer un monopole d'embauche, l'employÃ© qui ne souhaite pas Ã¨tre syndiquÃ© sera, selon toute probabilitÃ©, obligÃ© de le .devenir de crainte d'Ãªtre licenciÃ© . Le fait que le Gouvernement n'a pas interdit le monopole syndical d'embauche a donc pour consÃ©quence de permettre Ã un employeur et Ã un syndicat d'imposer Ã des citoyen s
du Royaume-Uni une limitation de leurs libertÃ©s pour laquelle le Gouvernement se trouverait en opposition avec la Convention s'il l'imposait par la voie lÃ©gislative . Quant Ã l'interprÃ©tation que le Gouvernement donne de l'article 11 Ã la lumiÃ¨re de la DÃ©claration universelle des Droits de l'Homme, les requÃ©rants estiment qu'elle n'est pas conforme au PrÃ©ambule de la Convention, qui se rÃ©fÃ©re Ã cette DÃ©claralion . Ils voient mal en quoi l'histoire de nÃ©gociations de l'article 11, telle qu'elle est prÃ©sentÃ©e par le Gouvernement, pourrait en quoi que ce soit influer sur l'interprÃ©tation correcte des termes de la Convention . En traitant des origines de la prÃ©sente affaire, les requÃ©rants ont indiquÃ© que, comme le Gouvernement l'a exposÃ©, il est vrai qu'avant 1971 les droits et responsabilitÃ©s des parties Ã un contrat de travail Ã©taient pour l'essentiel rÃ©gis uniquement par le droit coutumier Icommon lawl . Ils ont Ã©galement citÃ© le rapport d'une Commission royale sur les syndicats et les associations d'employeurs, publiÃ© en 1968, qui Ã©tait d'une maniÃ©re gÃ©nÃ©rale assez favorable au point de vue des syndicats et conseillait de ne pas interdire la pratique du monopole d'embauche considÃ©rant, entre autres, qu'il ne serait pas possible de faire respecter cette interdiclion . Cette commission estimait qu'en consÃ©quence il fallait accorder rÃ©paration Ã l'employÃ© qui pour une raison ou une autre perdait son travail Ã la suite de l'instauration d'un monopole d'embauch e Les requÃ©rants ont ensuite dÃ©crit la situation au moment de l'entrÃ©e en vigueur de la Loi de 1971 sur les relations industrielles IIndustrial Relations Actl, ainsi que les consÃ©quences de l'application de la loi de 1974 (Trade Union and Labour Relations Actl abrogeant celle de 1971, et les modifications apportÃ©es par la loi de 1976 (Trade Union and Labour Relations IAmendmentl Act) . RÃ©sumant leur argumentation, les requÃ©rants ont maintenu qu'avant la loi de 1971, un employeur pouvait mettre fin Ã un contrat de travail pour n'importe quelle raison, y compris la dÃ©cision de l'employÃ© d'adhÃ©rer Ã un syndicat ou son refus de le faire . Tant que la loi de 1971 Ã©tait en vigueur, un licenciement pour l'un de ces motifs aurait Ã©tÃ© considÃ©rÃ© comme injustifiÃ© . Actuellement, il serait considÃ©rÃ© comme injustifiÃ© de mettre fin Ã un contrat de travail pour la raison que l'employÃ© a adhÃ©rÃ© ou souhaitait adhÃ©rÃ©r Ã un syndicat, mais il ne serait par contre pas "injustifiÃ©" de licencier un employÃ© refusant d'adhÃ©rer Ã un syndicat, sauf pour des motifs d'ordre religieux . De plus, comme l'avocat principal fait observer dans son opinion sur l'Ã©puisement des recours internes, il n'est plus possible de recourir aux tribunaux ordinaires en tentant une action pour licenciement arbitraire . Les requÃ©rants ont soulignÃ© que dans ces conditlons ils ne peuvent souscrire Ã l'affirmation du Gouvernement selon laquelle les employÃ©s licenciÃ©s pour refus de se syndiquer Â« ne sont pas moins bien protÃ©gÃ©s Ã l'heure actuelle qu'ils ne l'Ã©taient avant 1971 Â» . Ils rejettent aussi l'idÃ©e que, puisque lareconnaissance d'un droit Ã ne pas Ã©tre injustement licenciÃ© va au-delÃ des obligations du Gouvernement aux termes de la Convention, la limitation de ce droit ne peut constituer une violation des obligations existantes . Les requÃ©rants ont soulignÃ© qu'ils n'allÃ©guaien t
oas ici une limitation du droit de ne pas Ã©tre injustement licenciÃ©, mais la violation par le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni des articles 9, 10 et 11 de la Convention . Quant Ã l'araument par leauel le Gouvernement fait valoir que le monopole syndical d'embauche existe Ã©galement, en pratique, dans certaines industries de plusieurs Etats membres du Conseil de l'Europe, les requÃ©rants maintiennent que mÃªme si tel est le cas cela ne justifie pas les violations de la Convention dont Ils font Ã©tat dans leur requÃªte . De plus, dans de nombreux Etats membres du Conseil de l'Europe, la pratique du monopole d'embauche est illÃ©gale . Les requÃ©rants contestent pour deux raisons que la requÃ©te soit, comme l'a affirmÃ© le Gouvernement, incompatible ratione personae avec la Convention Tout d'abord, compte tenu de la nature de la lÃ©gislation rÃ©gissant les activitÃ©s de l'Office et considÃ©rant la nature et le degrÃ© des pouvoirs de direction, de contrÃ´le et de supervision exercÃ©s par le ministre responsable des activitÃ©s de l'Office, l'adoption par les Chemins de fer britanniques d'une politique favorable au monopole syndical d'embauche est un acte qui engage la responsabilitÃ© du Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni . Ils font valoir en second lieu que dans la mesure oÃ¹ la lÃ©gislation interne du Royaume-Uni a permis qu'ils soient licenciÃ©s pour avoir refusÃ© d'adhÃ©rer Ã un syndicat, sans mettre Ã leur disposition un recours adÃ©quat contre ce licenciement, le Gouvernement est responsable aux termes de la Convention pour la raison que le droit interne du Royaume-Uni ne protÃ¨ge pas les droits et libertÃ©s garantis par la Convention, que les droits des requÃ©rants n'ont pas Ã©tÃ© respectÃ©s et que le droit interne du Royaume-Uni ne fournit pas de recours adÃ©quat . Quant Ã la nature et Ã la portÃ©e du contrÃ´le exercÃ© sur l'Office par le Ministre responsable en vertu des lois de 1962, 1968' et 1974, les requÃ©rants estiment qu'il ne faisait pas de doute que le Ministre eÃ»t Ã©galement les pouvoirs nÃ©cessaires pour empÃªcher l'instauration du monopole d'embauche s'il avait dÃ©cidÃ© de le faire . Il n'est pas exact, aux yeux des requÃ©rants, que l'Office soit autonome pour ce qui concerne la gestion du personnel, les relations avec les syndicats ou les conditions d'embauche . Si la dÃ©cision de conclure l'Accord sur l'affiliation syndicale de juillet 1975 a Ã©tÃ© prise par l'Office, les requÃ©rants affirment que, compte tenu de la situation de celui-ci par rapport au Ministre responsable, telle que la dÃ©finit la loi, il faut considÃ©rer que le Ministre compÃ©tent a approuvÃ© ou fait sienne cette dÃ©cision . Les requÃ©rants affirment par ailleurs qu'eu Ã©gard Ã la Convention, le Gouvernement n'est pas en droit d'adopter une politique de neutralitÃ© sur la question de savoir s'il devait ou non y avoir un monopole syndical d'embauche 1"closed shop") dans telle ou telle entreprise . Les requÃ©rants ont notÃ© l'affirmation du Gouvernement selon laquelle "c'Ã©tait aux parties Isyndicat et employeur) qu'il revenait de dÃ©cider s'il convenait ou non d'instaurer un monopole d'embauche et font observer que ce point de vue implique qu'en pareil cas les termes du contrat d'un employÃ© ne dÃ©pendent pas d'une nÃ©gociation entre celui-ci et l'employeur mais sont laissÃ©s Ã la dÃ©cision de l'employeur ou du futur employeur et d'une tierce partie sans que l'intÃ©ressÃ© soit nÃ©cessairement consultÃ© .
Les requÃ©rants ont ensuite exposÃ© de maniÃ©re plus dÃ©taillÃ©e les fonctions et pouvoirs respectifs du Ministre compÃ©tent et de l'Office, en se rÃ©fÃ©rant aux dispositions pertinentes des lois de 1962, 1968 et 1974, afin de montrer que le Ministre Ã©tait largement responsable des activitÃ©s de l'Office, contrairement aux affirmations du Gouvernement prÃ©sentant l'Office comme un organe Ã©chappant Ã la responsabilitÃ© de l'Etat . En consÃ©quence, les requÃ©rants font observer que, vu les pouvoirs de direction et de contrÃ´le trÃ©s larges et dÃ©taillÃ©s que le Ministre lactuellement un SecrÃ©taire d'Etat) exerce sur l'Office, la dÃ©cision Is'd s'agit bien d'une dÃ©cisionl de cet organe de conclure avec les syndicats intÃ©ressÃ©s un accord sur le monopole Ã©tait un acte dont le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni doit accepter la responsabilitÃ© . Les requÃ©rants ont fait valoir, de plus, que l'objection du Gouvernement ratione personae doit Ã©tre rejetÃ©e pour la raison supplÃ©mentaire que le Gouvernement a le devoir Ã l'Ã©gard des requÃ©rants de protÃ©ger les droits et libertÃ©s garantis par la Convention et que le droit interne du Royaume-Uni ne protÃ©geait pas Ã l'Ã©poque et ne protÃ¨ge pas ces droits et libertÃ©s, en ce sens qu'il a permis aux Chemins de fer britanniques d'Ã©tablir un monopole d'embauche et de licencier les requÃ©rants parce qu'ils avaient refusÃ© de se syndiquer, sans leur fournir de voies de recours ou de rÃ©parations adÃ©quates .
Quant Ã la recevabilitÃ© du grief fondÃ© sur les articles 9-1 1 Sur ce sujet, les requÃ©rants ont ajoutÃ© quelques observations complÃ©mentaires Ã celles dÃ©jÃ prÃ©sentÃ©es plus haut . Ils ont rÃ©affirmÃ© qu'il Ã©tait reconnu que toute personne devait Ã¨tre libre de s'associer Ã d'autres et qu'ils avaient dÃ©jÃ donnÃ© les raisons pour lesquelles cette libertÃ© devait impliquer celle de ne pas se joindre Ã une association . Si une personne est contrainte, de peur de perdre son emploi, Ã adhÃ©rer Ã une association qu'elle dÃ©sapprouve, il s'ensuit inÃ©vitablement une certaine atteinte Ã sa libertÃ© de pensÃ©e, de conscience et d'expression . Les requÃ©rants affirment que leur libertÃ© d'association a Ã©tÃ© violÃ©e par le fait qu'ils ont Ã©tÃ© placÃ©s devant un choix inacceptable entre l'adhÃ©sion Ã un syndicat et la perte de leur emploi . Ils ne se plaignent pas, sauf dans ce sens, d'une atteinte au "droit de ne pas Ãªtre licenciÃ©" . Ils attirent l'attention sur la dÃ©claration du Gouvernement affirmant que c'est Ã l'employeur et au(x) syndicatlsl reprÃ©sentant les employÃ©s qu'il revient de dÃ©cider d'instaurer ou non un monopole d'embauche ("closed shop"I et que le contrat de travail devait prÃ©voir cette possibilitÃ© avant le stade de l'application de la loi . A leur avis, la premiÃ©re de ces dÃ©clarations montre bien que l'employÃ© a perdu sa libenÃ© de choix personnel . Quant Ã la seconde de ces dÃ©clarations, lorsque les requÃ©rants ont Ã©tÃ© embauchÃ©s par les Chemins de fer britanniques leur contrat ne spÃ©cifiait pas la nÃ©cessitÃ© du monopole d'embauche . Les termes de leur contrat ont Ã©tÃ© - leur a-t-on dit - modifiÃ©s, sans qu'ils aient Ã©tÃ© consultÃ©s, par accord entre les Chemins de fer britanniques et les syndicats . Ouant aux observations du Gouvernement Ã propos de l'historique des nÃ©gociations pour la rÃ©dactlon de l'article 11, les requÃ©rants font valoir qu'i l
ressort clairement de cet exposÃ© que la disposition relative Ã la libertÃ© de ne pas s'associer Ã d'autres personnes avait Ã©tÃ© omise de la Convention pour des raisons que l'on pourrait qualifier de "politiques'", au sens large, et qu'elle Ã©tait probablement superflue . Ils ont soulignÃ© que la libertÃ© de s'associer devait inclure celle de ne pas le faire et se sont rÃ©fÃ©rÃ©s'Ã cet Ã©gard Ã la jurisprudence de la Commission IrequÃ©te NÂ° 4072/69) . Quant au Â§ 5 .8 des observations du Gouvernement, les requÃ©rants ont notÃ© que celui-ci s'y rÃ©fÃ©re aux Â« employeurs et employÃ©s Â» alors que dans les observations prÃ©cÃ©dentes il parlait des a employeurs et syndicats Â» . Les requÃ©rants supposent que lorsque le Gouvernement dit que les employeurs et les employÃ©s sont parfaitement en droit de considÃ©rer que la protection des travailleurs nÃ©cessite que ceux-ci soient tous syndiquÃ©s et parle de Â« collÃ©gues n estimant nÃ©cessaire Ã la protection de leurs intÃ©rÃ©ts de maintenir une participation syndicale Ã 100%, le Gouvernement veut parler d'une majoritÃ© desdits employÃ©s et collÃ©gues . II a donc semblÃ© aux requÃ©rants que l'argument Ã© tait le suivant : si une majoritÃ© des employÃ©s estiment telle ou telle action nÃ©cessaire, ils doivent pouvoir agir Ã leur guise . Ce qui ne peut Ã¨tre juste si cela entraÃ®ne - comme l'allÃ©guent les requÃ© rants - une atteinte aux droits fondamentaux d'autres personnes Le Gouvernement a prÃ©tendu par ailleurs que le droit de ne pas Ãªtre arbitrairement licenciÃ©, que la nouvelle lÃ©gislation a donnÃ© aux employÃ©s, Ã©tait Â« une sorte de bonus rr . Les requÃ©rants maintiennent que ce a bonus Â» est sans rapport avec la restriction des droits individuels entrainÃ©e par les lois de 1974 et de 1975 et n'excuse ni ne compense cette restriction . Les requÃ©rants ont fait observer enfin que la Convention des Droits de l'Homme se prÃ©occupe de la libertÃ© individuelle, alors que le monopole d'embauche entraine une limitation de cette libertÃ© et donne un grand pouvoir Ã l'employeur et un pouvoir plus grand encore aux syndicats . Ce pouvoir est acquis au prix d'une rÃ©duction de la libertÃ© personnelle des employÃ©s . Les requÃ©rants ont maintenu que le fait de les contraindre Ã choisir entre l'adhÃ©sion Ã un syndicat ou la perte de leur emploi constituait une violation des droits de la personne humaine et ils ont demandÃ© Ã la Commission de dÃ©clarer qu'il en Ã© tait bien ainsi .
EN DROI T Les requÃ©rants se sont plaints initialement que le Royaume-Uni appliquait la lÃ©gislation incriminÃ©e et ne l'avait pas jusqu'ici modifiÃ©e de maniÃ©re Ã permettre aux citoyens britanniques d'exercer leur droit Ã la libertÃ© de pensÃ©e, de conscience, d'expression et d'association, et n'avait pas prÃ©vu de voie de recours adÃ©quate en cas de licenciement arbitraire, particuliÃ©rement pour les citoyens britanniques qui perdent leur emploi du fait de leur refus d'adhÃ©rer Ã l'un des syndicats recommandÃ©s par les employeurs . Ils se sont plaints en outre que dans une situation-telle que la leur, alors qu'ils n'ont pas d'objection pour des motifs d'ordre spÃ©cifiquement religieux, mais plutÃ´t une objection sÃ©rieuse pour des motifs raisonnables ou pour le motif qu'il s
entendent exercer la libertÃ© d'expression et d'association garantie par les articles 9, 10 et 11 de la Convention, l'application d'une telle lÃ©gislation constituait une violation de la Convention et Ã©tait, notamment, contraire Ã l'esprit desdits articles . La Commission observe tout d'abord que les requÃ©rants, dans leurs griefs initiaux, ont soutenu que le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur avait portÃ© atteinte aux droits et libertÃ©s en question pour ce qui est des citoyens britanniques . Toutefois, Ã©tant donnÃ© que la Convention ne prÃ©voit pas de requÃªte sous forme d'actio popularis, la Commission, tout en Ã©tant consciente que les points soulevÃ©s dans la prÃ©sente requÃªte concernent de nombreuses personnes, ne prend celle-ci en considÃ©ration que dans la mesure oÃ¹ les requÃ©rants eux-mÃªmes se trouvent visÃ©s . Le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni a soutenu que la requÃ©teÃ©tait incompatible ratione personae avec les dispositions de la Convention . Il a fait valoir que l'Office des Chemins de fer britanniques responsable du licenciement des requÃ©rants Ã©tait un organe autonome dont les dÃ©cisions n'engageaient pas la responsabilitÃ© de l'Etat . La Commission relÃ¨ve que le Gouvernement a indiquÃ© dans ses observations qu'aux termes de la Loi de 1962 sur les transports, l'Office Ã©tait une entreprise publique chargÃ©e de l'exploitation du rÃ©seau ferrÃ©, encore que certains pouvoirs soient confiÃ©s Ã un Ministre du Gouvernement . Quelle que soit la rÃ©partition des droits et des devoirs entre l'Office et le Ministre compÃ©tent, la Commission estime qu'il ne fait pas de doute que le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni est responsable de ses services publics et donc des actes de l'Office des Chemins de fer britanniques . L'Office a embauchÃ©, puis licenciÃ© les deux requÃ©rants et ces actes doivent Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ©s comme des actes de Â« l'Etat employeur Â» . La Commission renvoie Ã ce propos Ã la conclusion de la Cour dans l'Affaire du Syndicat suÃ©dois des conducteurs de locomotives, oÃ¹ il est dit que la Convention ne fait nulle part de distinction expresse entre les attributions de puissance publique des Etats Contractants et leurs responsabilitÃ©s d'employeurs 14 37 de l'arrÃªt du 6 fÃ©vrier 1976, Publications de la Cour europÃ©enne des Droits de l'Homme, sÃ©rie A NÂ° 20 p 14) . De l'avis de la Commission, la mÃªme argumentation est applicable en l'espÃ¨ce, mutatis murandis. Il s'ensuit que les actes de l'Office des Chemins de fer britanniques incriminÃ©s par les requÃ©rants engagent la responsabilitÃ© du Royaume-Uni aux termes de la Convention . La requÃ¨te ne peut donc Ãªtre rejetÃ©e pour incompatibilitÃ© avec les dispositions de la Convention . Le Gouvernement a fait valoir Ã titre subsidiaire que dans la mesure oÃ¹ la requÃªte allÃ©guait des violations des articles 9, 10, 11 et 13, elle Ã©tait irrecevable pour divers autres motifs . De l'avis du Gouvernement, l'objection des requÃ©rants Ã l'adhÃ©sion Ã un syndicat n'apparaissait pas comme fondÃ©e sur les convictions religieuses ou d'autres convictions analogues protÃ©gAes par l'article 9 et, mÃªme s i
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la Commission devait considÃ©rer que les opinions des requÃ©rants constituaient une conviction, la lÃ©gislation du Royaume-Uni ne les avait pas directement empÃ©chÃ©s de manifester celle-ci . Les griefs des requÃ©rants sur le terrain de l'article 9 seraient donc soit incompatibles avec la Convention, soit manifestement mal fondÃ©s . De plus, le Gouvernement soutient que, puisque les requÃ©rants n'ont pas apportÃ© la preuve d'une violation de leur libertÃ© d'expression, le grief fondÃ© sur l'article 10 devrait Atre considÃ©rÃ© comme manifestement mal fondÃ© . De mÃªme le grief des requÃ©rants tirÃ© de l'article 11, grief selon lequel la lÃ©gislation en question oorterait atteinte Ã leur libertÃ© d'association et Ã leur libertÃ© de ne pas adhÃ©rer Ã un syndicat, ne saurait Ã¨tre retenu, de l'avis du Gouvernement, puisque la premiÃ©re partie en est manifestement mal fondÃ©e en fait et la seconde incompatible avec la Convention, qui ne protÃ©ge pas ce droit . Le Gouvernement a conclu que puisqu'aucune violation de l'un des articles invoquÃ©s par les requÃ©rants n'avait Ã©tÃ© dÃ©montrÃ©e, il n'y avait pas lieu de faire intervenir l'article 13 . Les requÃ©rants ont maintenu, toutefois, que la requÃªte Ã©tait recevable pour les diverses raisons indiquÃ©es dans leur argumentation initiale . De l'avis de la Commission, il est dÃ©sormais suffisamment clair que le litige porte essentiellement sur l'interprÃ©tation de l'article 11 de la Convention, notamment sur le point de savoir si celui-ci protÃ¨ge aussi le droit de ne pas adhÃ©rer Ã un syndicat . Cette question a dÃ©jÃ Ã©tÃ© soulevÃ©e dans des affaires antÃ©rieures sans toutefois que les faits exigent que la Commission se prononce spÃ©cifiquement sur ce point Ivoir, entre autres, la requÃªte NÂ° 4072/69, Annuaire NÂ° 13 page 709) . La question est, en l'espÃ¨ce, clairement posÃ©e devant la Commission et les deux parties ont avancÃ© divers arguments pour et contre cette interprÃ©tation . L'article 27 121, qui dispose que la Commission dÃ©clare irrecevable toute requÃ¨te Ã©manant d'un particulier, d'une organisation non gouvernementale o ud'ngropeaticulsq'emanifst lodÃ©e,n'autrise pas ladite Commission, au stade de la recevabilitÃ©, Ã rejeter une requÃ¨te qui ne peut Ãªtre ainsi qualifiÃ©e Ivoir, par exemple, les dÃ©cisions sur la recevabilitÃ© des requÃªtes Nos . 5100 Ã 5102/71, 5354/72, 5370/72, Cinq militaires contre les PaysBas, Annuaire 15, pp . 509 Ã 557 et rÃ©fÃ©rences, et Times Newspapers Ltd . et autres contre Royaume-Uni, D .R . 2 p . 90, 97) . Ayant procÃ©dÃ© Ã un examen prÃ©liminaire des exposÃ©s en fait et en droi t prÃ©sentÃ©s par les parties, la Commission considÃ¨re que ceux-ci soulÃ©vent, quant Ã l'interprÃ©tation et Ã l'application de la Convention, notamment de l'article 11, des questions importantes et d'une complexitÃ© telle qu'il ne saurait Ãªtre statuÃ© Ã leur sujet qu'aprÃ©s un examen au fond . Par ces motifs, la Commissio n
DÃCLARE RECEVABLE et retient la requÃ¨te, tout moyen de fond rÃ©servÃ© .
- 165-Origine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Commission (plénière)Date de la décision : 11/07/1977Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page