Source: https://jnslp.wordpress.com/2011/10/
Timestamp: 2018-08-17 11:29:14
Document Index: 93049622

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2339', '§ 2339', '§ 2339', '§ 1189', '§ 2339', '§ 2339', '§ 2423']

October | 2011 | Robert Chesney's National Security Law Listserv Archive
nationalsecuritylaw Bostan v. Obama (D.D.C. Oct. 12, 2011) (GTMO habeas denial)
Judge Walton has released the unclassified version of another opinion from October 12, 2011 (joining Hussein v. Obama) in which he denies habeas relief to a GTMO detainee. The opinion in Bostan v. Obama is here.
nationalsecuritylaw al-Hajj v. Obama (agreed dismissal of GTMO habeas petition)
* al-Hajj v. Obama (D.D.C. Oct. 28, 2011)
Judge Lamberth has granted a joint motion by Sharqawi Abdu ali Al-Hajj (ISN 1457) and the government to dismiss al-Hajj’s habeas petition, without prejudice. The one-page order is here.
nationalsecuritylaw Hussein v. Obama (D.D.C. Oct. 12, 2011) (habeas denied)
Another Guantanamo habeas denial has been made public (the opinion was just released, but the decision was rendered two weeks ago). It involves petitioners Abdul Qader Ahmed Hussein, a citizen of Yemen. I’ve posted a short summary, with the key excerpts here. The opinion itself is here.
nationalsecuritylaw United States v. Ahmed (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2011) (denying motion to dismiss indictment)
* United States v. Ahmed (SDNY Oct. 21, 2011) (denying motion to dismiss indictment)
Mohamed Ibrahim Ahmed is an Eritrean citizen (and resident of Sweden) who was arrested in Nigeria and later brought to the United States. He is charged with conspiring to provide, and actually providing, material support to al Shabaab (in the form of money as well as by providing himself to the group as personnel), and also with conspiring to obtain, and actually obtaining, military-type training from al Shabaab. He moved to dismiss these charges on the ground that the United States may not assert jurisdiction over him consistent with the 5th Amendment. Last week, Judge Castel denied the motion. Here is the relevant section of the opinion:
The Second Circuit expounded on the principles that govern the extraterritorial application of a federal criminal statue in United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56 (2d Cir.2003). It suffices to note that a presumption against extraterritoriality may be overcome by the clear expression of the intent of lawmakers. Id. at 86. Both the material support and the military-type training statutes explicitly grant extraterritorial jurisdiction, as follows: extraterritorial jurisdiction may be exercised when the "offender is brought into … the United States …." 18 U .S.C. §§ 2339B(d)(1)(C) & 2339D(b)(3). There is no dispute that the defendant was involuntarily brought into the United States after the offense conduct. Indeed, the indictment alleges that the defendant "will be first brought to and arrested" in this district. (Indictment ¶ 7, 11, 13, 17.) This alone is a sufficient statutory predicate for jurisdiction.
The defendant urges that the assertion of "brought into" jurisdiction in this case would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because there is not otherwise a sufficient nexus with the United States. (Def’s Mem. Supp. Motion to Dismiss 11-13.) In support he relies upon the Second Circuit’s agreement with the formulation of the Ninth Circuit that "[i]n order to apply extraterritorially a federal criminal statute to a defendant consistently with due process, there must be a sufficient nexus between the defendant and the United States, so that such application would not be arbitrary or fundamentally unfair." United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d at 111 (quoting United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 24849 (9th Cir.1990)). Elsewhere in Yousef, the Court recognized that the nexus could be to the interests of the United States. Id. at 112 (offense conduct may not be "so unrelated to American interests as to render their prosecution in the United States arbitrary or fundamentally unfair").
For both the material support and military-type training offenses, the extrajurisdictional grant is set forth in the same statute that defines the elements of the offense. The elements of both statutes require that the organization have been designated by the Secretary of State as a "foreign terrorist organization." 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339B(a)(1) & (g)(6); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339D(a) & (c)(4). One of the required elements for the designation by the Secretary of State is the finding that "the terrorist activity or terrorism of the organization threatens the security of United States nationals or the national security of the United States." 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1)(C). Further, under the two statutes "the person must have knowledge that the organization is a designated terrorist organization …, that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorist activity …, or that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorism …." 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339B(a)(1) & 2339D(a). Taken together, the designation and knowledge requirements ensure that there is a nexus to American interests so as to render the prosecution neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.
Finally, the two statutes also confer jurisdiction where "the offense occurs in or affects interstate or foreign commerce …." 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339B(d)(1)(E) & 2339D(b)(5). The indictment also alleges that the offenses occurred in and affected interstate and foreign commerce. (Indictment ¶¶ 7, 11, 13, 17.) The defendant asserts that the government will be unable to prove any impact on interstate commerce or foreign commerce. (Def’s Mem. 8-11.) Specifically, he asserts that foreign commerce requires commerce between the United States and a foreign country and not between two or more foreign countries. (Def’s Mem. 10); see United States v. Weingarten, 632 F.3d 60, 70-71 (2d Cir.2011) (construing "travel[ ] in foreign commerce," as used in 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b)). First, the "brought into" provision provides a sufficient statutory basis for jurisdiction. Second, whether the government can adequately prove an effect on interstate and foreign commerce should not be resolved prior to trial as long as the indictment itself is sufficient on its face.
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