Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/938/630/294144/
Timestamp: 2020-02-29 08:03:55
Document Index: 255357371

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2671', '§ 2680', '§ 2601', '§ 2605', '§ 2680', '§ 2680', '§ 2680', '§ 2680', '§ 2605', '§ 2601', '§ 2601', '§ 2606', '§ 2606', '§ 2605', '§ 2601', '§ 2605', '§ 2680', '§ 1346', '§ 2603', '§ 2607', '§ 2610', '§ 2605', '§ 6901', '§ 9601', '§ 6928', '§ 6973', '§ 9604']

Willie Mae Lockett, George R. Jackson, Thelma Y. Jackson,nathaniel Johnson, Sylvester Mcqueen, Dorothy L. Mcqueen,linnon Nixon, Edith Nixon, Ada Partlow, Luther Wiggins, Iral. Wilson, Kevin L. Carter, Joanne Davis, Cynthia Davis,ronald Davis, Henry Dillard, Lucy Bell Dillard, Albertnicholson, Annie J. Torry, and Charles White, Plaintiffs-appellants, v. United States of America, Defendant-appellee, 938 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1991) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Sixth Circuit › 1991 › Willie Mae Lockett, George R. Jackson, Thelma Y. Jackson,nathaniel Johnson, Sylvester Mcqueen, Dorot...
Willie Mae Lockett, George R. Jackson, Thelma Y. Jackson,nathaniel Johnson, Sylvester Mcqueen, Dorothy L. Mcqueen,linnon Nixon, Edith Nixon, Ada Partlow, Luther Wiggins, Iral. Wilson, Kevin L. Carter, Joanne Davis, Cynthia Davis,ronald Davis, Henry Dillard, Lucy Bell Dillard, Albertnicholson, Annie J. Torry, and Charles White, Plaintiffs-appellants, v. United States of America, Defendant-appellee, 938 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1991)
US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit - 938 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1991) Argued March 13, 1991. Decided July 3, 1991
Before RYAN, Circuit Judge, and EDWARDS and WELLFORD* , Senior Circuit Judges.
This is an appeal from the dismissal of an action brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2671, et seq., alleging negligence by the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") in its handling of a scrap yard site contaminated with polychlorinated biphenyls ("PCBs" or "PCB"). The district court granted the government's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the suit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a), the discretionary function exception to the FTCA. Lockett v. United States, 714 F. Supp. 848 (E.D. Mich. 1989). Plaintiffs appeal, claiming the discretionary function exception is not available to the government on the facts of this case. We disagree, and affirm the district court's judgment of dismissal.
Plaintiffs are twenty people who lived near a scrap yard used by Carter Industrial, Inc. in Detroit, Michigan. Carter was engaged in scrap reclamation, and had stockpiled a number of old electrical transformers on its property. Dielectric fluid within such transformers often contains high concentrations of PCBs, which are carcinogenic chemicals subject to federal regulation pursuant to the Toxic Substances Control Act ("TSCA"), 15 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq. See 15 U.S.C. § 2605(e).
In March of 1989, the government moved for summary judgment, in part, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a), which shields the government from liability under FTCA for the conduct of its agents in exercising certain discretionary functions. The district court determined that the discretionary function exception to FTCA was indeed applicable on the facts of this case and, therefore, the court was without jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiffs' claims. The court said:
714 F. Supp. at 851-52.
We review dismissals on the basis of summary judgment de novo. Burkart v. Post-Browning, Inc., 859 F.2d 1245, 1249 (6th Cir. 1988). Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), our duty is to determine whether, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiffs, there is a genuine issue as to any material fact precluding the government from a judgment as a matter of law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510-11, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986).
28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). Interpretations of this "discretionary function" exception by the Supreme Court have not been entirely consistent,1 but the Court's most recent decision on section 2680(a) is helpfully clarifying and provides a workable means of applying it. Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 108 S. Ct. 1954, 100 L. Ed. 2d 531 (1988).
The district court denied the government's subsequent 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)-inspired motion to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court then granted certiorari to determine "whether the discretionary function exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act ... bars a suit based on the Government's licensing of an oral polio vaccine and on its subsequent approval of the release of a specific lot of that vaccine to the public." Id. at 533, 108 S. Ct. at 1957. The Court held, "the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the discretionary function exception required the dismissal of petitioners' claims respecting the licensing of Orimune and the release of a particular vaccine lot." Id. at 548, 108 S. Ct. at 1965.
In so ruling, the Supreme Court set forth a two-pronged test to be applied to FTCA cases in which the government asserts a 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) defense:
Id. at 536-37, 108 S. Ct. at 1958-59 (citations omitted).
Plaintiffs argue that in March 1981, when the EPA became aware that the MDNR inspector found an oil puddle on the Carter site that contained PCBs at 560 ppm, that the agency had a mandatory duty to warn plaintiffs of the situation, to inspect further, and to clean up the site. The agency had a duty to do so again in July 1984, when the MDNR inspector's PCB readings on and near the Carter site were 31, 167, 131, and 2,340 ppm. Plaintiffs base this argument on the claim that TSCA, specifically 15 U.S.C. § 2605(e), and the regulations promulgated thereunder, see Polychlorinated Biphenyls, 40 C.F.R. Sec. 761.1, et seq. (1990), which preempt state regulatory authority, dictate a specific, mandatory, and nondiscretionary response by the EPA, such as public warning or cleanup, when it learns that any part of a site contains PCBs in excess of 50 ppm. Plaintiffs find additional support for their argument in an EPA statement made in the Preamble to Polychlorinated Biphenyls Spill Cleanup Policy, 52 Fed.Reg. 10,688 (1987) [hereinafter Spill Cleanup] (citing Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs) Manufacturing, Processing, Distribution in Commerce and Use Prohibitions; Use in Electrical Equipment, 47 Fed.Reg. 37,342 (1982) [hereinafter Use in Electrical Equipment], and documents issued by the regional EPA office for the State of Michigan.
15 U.S.C. § 2601(b). Further, the Act reads:
15 U.S.C. § 2601(c). 15 U.S.C. § 2606(a) provides the EPA "may" file a civil suit to seize imminently hazardous chemicals or otherwise seek relief therefrom. Such relief "may" include:
15 U.S.C. § 2606(b) (2).2
In addition to these general criteria, TSCA specifically authorizes regulation of PCBs. See 15 U.S.C. § 2605(e). Congress added this provision to TSCA because of its concern for the significant health and environmental dangers associated with PCBs.3
Initially, the PCB regulations, which apply to manufacturers, processors, distributors, and users of materials containing PCBs, used 500 ppm as a regulatory benchmark. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. Sec. 761.10(e) (1978). In 1979, the EPA lowered the 500 ppm minimum to 50 ppm, see Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs) Manufacturing, Processing, Distribution in Commerce, and Use Prohibitions, 44 Fed.Reg. 31,514, 31,516 (1979), as a means of generally defining when the PCB regulations applied. See 40 C.F.R. Sec. 761.1(b) (1979). In 1984, as part of its response to Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 636 F.2d 1267, 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1980), which held that substantial evidence did not support the EPA's decision to limit the application of its PCB regulations to materials with concentrations of 50 ppm or higher, the EPA narrowed its reference to 50 ppm as a means of categorizing certain disposal and storage procedures. See Toxic Substances Control Act; Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs) Manufacturing, Processing, Distribution in Commerce and Use Prohibitions; Response to Individual and Class Petitions for Exemptions, 49 Fed.Reg. 28,154, 28,189 (1984) (as codified at 40 C.F.R. Sec. 761.1(b) (1985)). Since 1979, the EPA has imposed record keeping and reporting requirements upon PCB handlers. See 40 C.F.R. Secs. 761.180-761.193 (1990). In 1987, the EPA also promulgated detailed regulations outlining cleanup procedures for spills releasing PCBs in excess of 50 ppm. See Spill Cleanup, 52 Fed.Reg. 10,688 (as codified at 40 C.F.R. Secs. 761.120-761.135 (1988)).4
An October 23, 1985, "Region V PCB Cleanup and Disposal Policy Draft Order" plaintiffs cite "establishes Region V policy under [TSCA] ... with respect to cleanup and disposal activities ... when conducted by either [EPA,] ... Region V, or by private parties pursuant to agreement with [EPA]...." The Draft Order poignantly states that " [a]ll improperly disposed PCBs shall be cleaned up." The Draft Order then sets a cleanup goal of 2.5 ppm, or 1 ppm if the site is a "high contact area," for soil at sites cleaned up, and it directs disposal of the removed materials pursuant to the PCB regulations. The Draft Order states that " [t]he Regional Administrator is responsible for assuring this policy is implemented."
As noted, TSCA was enacted with the Congressional intent that the EPA be permitted to "carry out this chapter in a reasonable and prudent manner and ... consider the environmental, economic, and social impact of any action" it takes or intends to take. See 15 U.S.C. § 2601(c). The fact that Congress set PCBs apart by specifically authorizing their regulation in 15 U.S.C. § 2605(e) does not, contrary to plaintiffs' assertion, mandate the conclusion that the regional EPA employees undertook duties with regard to PCB cleanup beyond those outlined in TSCA or the EPA's regulations.
The EPA statement plaintiffs cite in an effort to support their argument that the EPA was committed to cleanup all PCB spills within forty-eight hours is misleading. The EPA was referring to a final rule promulgated in 1982 as 40 C.F.R. Sec. 761.30(a) (1) (iii) (1983) regarding a condition on the authorized use of non-totally enclosed PCB activities. See 40 C.F.R. Sec. 761.30(a) (1) (x) (1990). This provision, rather than committing the EPA to engage in an immediate cleanup of every site where exposure to PCB levels of more than 50 ppm is discovered, simply instructs those using electrical transformers containing dielectric fluids with PCBs as authorized in the regulations to engage in cleanup efforts within forty-eight hours of a spill or leak or be subject to a possible EPA citation. See Use in Electrical Equipment, 47 Fed.Reg. at 37,353-54.
The Manual and the Draft Order, which were not promulgated as EPA regulations, likewise do not mandate a specific EPA response to evidence like that presented to the EPA in 1981 and 1984. Plaintiffs have not alleged that the 1981 and 1984 MDNR inspections were flawed or that the EPA could not rely on the evidence derived therefrom in making its decision. The Manual's inspection procedures, therefore, are of little assistance in this case. The Draft Order's instruction that " [a]ll improperly disposed PCBs shall be cleaned up" does not provide the specific and mandatory response plaintiffs now demand of the EPA.
Therefore, we conclude that the statutory and regulatory scheme relevant to the EPA's conduct in this case granted the regional EPA employees discretion to formulate a response to evidence of PCB contamination at a particular spill site within their jurisdiction.7 C.
Having concluded that TSCA and the regulations promulgated thereunder accord regional EPA employees discretion to determine an appropriate response to evidence of a PCB spill, we must determine whether that discretion, as exercised with regard to the discovery of PCB levels at the Carter site in 1981 and 1984 was the kind Congress intended would be shielded from liability under the TSCA. See Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536-37, 108 S. Ct. at 1958-59. That is, we must decide "if the action challenged in the case involves the permissible exercise of policy judgment." Id. at 537, 108 S. Ct. at 1959.
Congress intended that the discretionary function exception would " 'prevent judicial "second-guessing" of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the medium of an action in tort.' " Id. at 536-37, 108 S. Ct. at 1959 (quoting United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 814, 104 S. Ct. 2755, 2764, 81 L. Ed. 2d 660 (1984)). The government is immune from damages resulting from an alleged negligent failure to act if the inaction challenged is an exercise of that kind of discretion. See Graves v. United States, 872 F.2d 133, 137 (6th Cir. 1989) (citing Myslakowski v. United States, 806 F.2d 94, 97 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 948, 107 S. Ct. 1608, 94 L. Ed. 2d 793 (1987)); Dube v. Pittsburgh Corning, 870 F.2d 790, 796 (1st Cir. 1989); In re Ohio River Disaster Litigation, 862 F.2d 1237 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S. Ct. 59, 107 L. Ed. 2d 27 (1989).
Based on our reading of the statutory and regulatory scheme governing the EPA's duties toward PCB spills, and because of the nature of the decisions the EPA made in 1981, 1984, and between 1984 and 1986 regarding the Carter site, we hold that the discretionary function exception of 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) bars plaintiffs' suit against the government in this case.
Our holding comports with the post-Berkovitz decision of the District of Columbia Circuit in Wells v. United States, 851 F.2d 1471 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029, 109 S. Ct. 836, 102 L. Ed. 2d 969 (1989), an environmental contamination case, in which the EPA's alleged negligence in failing to take immediate cleanup measures was held to be nonactionable since " [the Administrator's] decision to order further study was based on economic, social and political policy considerations [within the discretionary function exception], and not solely on scientific considerations as plaintiffs claim." Id. at 1478.11
The legal question before this Court is whether this suit could be brought under the FTCA, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), which generally authorizes suits against the United States "for injury or loss of property or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government ..." The EPA contends its conduct falls within an exception to the TSCA, and hence is barred.1 Specifically, the EPA asserts that protecting a populated neighborhood from the pollution at Carter Industrials was a "matter of choice" for the agency.2 The EPA argues that it made this choice on the basis of social, economic and policy judgments and is shielded from liability by the discretionary function exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act.3 The district court granted this motion, and then this court has upheld the decision. I disagree.
Compare Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 35, 73 S. Ct. 956, 967, 97 L. Ed. 1427 (1953), in which the Supreme Court held that the discretionary function exception barred FTCA claims arising from the explosion of ammonium nitrate fertilizer being produced and distributed as part of the United States' post-World War II efforts to aid devastated areas in Europe, and United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 821, 104 S. Ct. 2755, 2768, 81 L. Ed. 2d 660 (1984), in which the Court held that the government was immune from liability under FTCA in separate actions for personal and property damage allegedly stemming from the Federal Aviation Administration's negligent failure to inspect the design of two aircraft before certifying their airworthiness under the discretionary function exception, with Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 69, 76 S. Ct. 122, 126, 100 L. Ed. 48 (1955), in which the Court held that the government could face FTCA liability for damages sustained as the result of the Coast Guard's alleged negligent maintenance of a lighthouse, and Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 108 S. Ct. 1954, 100 L. Ed. 2d 531 (1988), discussed above. These cases support one jurist's lament that the law regarding the discretionary function exception looks more like a patchwork quilt than a seamless web. Blessing v. United States, 447 F. Supp. 1160, 1167 (E.D. Pa. 1978), as quoted in Dube v. Pittsburgh Corning, 870 F.2d 790, 796 (1st Cir. 1989)
Additional provisions worth noting include 15 U.S.C. §§ 2603 and 2605, which require the Administrator of EPA to test and categorize chemical substances and issue regulations as to those found hazardous. 15 U.S.C. § 2607 requires chemical manufacturers to comply with EPA's reporting requirements. 15 U.S.C. § 2610 permits the EPA to inspect sites as necessary to enforce TSCA and regulations promulgated thereunder
For a concise discussion of the legislative history of 15 U.S.C. § 2605(e), see Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 636 F.2d 1267, 1271-72 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
The EPA's current PCB spill cleanup policy, which applies only to spills occurring after May 4, 1987, see 40 C.F.R. Sec. 761.120(a) (1990), is to evaluate the adequacy of cleanup efforts by the party who caused the contamination on the basis of site-specific considerations, see 40 C.F.R. Secs. 761.120(b) and (c), timeliness of the reporting; 40 C.F.R. Sec. 761.125(a) (1), disposal method used; 40 C.F.R. Sec. 761.125(a) (2), and success at meeting EPA's numerical cleanup goals for the type of spill involved. See 40 C.F.R. Secs. 761.125(b) and (c). It is worth noting that even with this precise policy, the EPA views its enforcement obligations as discretionary:
In addition to the TSCA statutory and regulatory scheme, we have reviewed the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 6901, et seq., and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. § 9601, et seq., to determine whether a specific type of EPA response was required under the facts of this case. TSCA, RCRA, and CERCLA collectively encompass the comprehensive scheme authorizing federal control over hazardous materials
RCRA grants the EPA discretionary authority, upon receiving evidence of a statutory or regulatory violation, to determine if a handler of solid wastes has violated federal disposal procedures and/or poses a risk to the public. The EPA is then permitted to determine the appropriate response to a violator. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6928(a) (1), 6934(a), and 6973(a). Only if the EPA determines that an imminent hazard exists is it now required to notify local government agencies of the hazard. See 42 U.S.C. § 6973(c).
Through Executive Order No. 12316, the President delegated to the EPA the authority CERCLA gave him in 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a) (1) to remove hazardous waste and to protect public health and/or the environment in a manner consistent with the "national contingency plan." See 46 Fed.Reg. 42,237 (1981). The national contingency plan may be found at National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 40 C.F.R. Sec. 300.1, et seq. (1990). Nothing in CERCLA or the regulations promulgated thereunder affects our assessment of the EPA's authorized discretion in this case.
Our holding is also consistent with two noteworthy pre-Berkovitz decisions involving the EPA. In Cisco v. United States, 768 F.2d 788 (7th Cir. 1985), neighbors to a residential landfill sued the government under FTCA for exposure to tetrachlorodibenzo-paradioxin, alleging that the EPA was negligent in failing to warn them about the toxin. In Bacon v. United States, 810 F.2d 827 (8th Cir. 1987), road repairmen working for the Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") sued the government under FTCA for their exposure to dioxins, alleging that HUD and the EPA, which had conducted dioxin tests in the area near the workers' exposure, negligently failed to warn them of any hazard. Both cases resulted in dismissals based on the discretionary function exception. Cisco, 768 F.2d at 790; Bacon, 810 F.2d at 830
The Supreme Court set forth these principles to guide the determination of whether the government's actions were a "matter of choice." Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531 at 536, 108 S. Ct. 1954 at 1958. (1988)
In examining the nature of the challenged conduct, a court must first consider whether the action is a matter of choice for the acting employee. This inquiry is mandated by the language of the exception; conduct cannot be discretionary unless it involves an element of judgment or choice. See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 34, 73 S. Ct. 956, 967, 97 L. Ed. 1427 (1953) (stating that the exception protects "the discretion of the executive or the administrator to act according to one's judgment of the best court"). Thus, the discretionary function exception will not apply when a federal, statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course of action for an employee to follow.
" [A]ssuming the challenged conduct involves an element of judgment, a court must determine whether the judgment is of the kind that the discretionary exception was designed to shield. The basis for the discretionary function exception was Congress' desire to "prevent judicial 'second-guessing' of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic and political policy through the medium of tort ..."
Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536-537, 108 S. Ct. 1954, 1959, 100 L. Ed. 2d 531 (1988).
This court's determination of this issue is not supported by the record. For example, this court states that an EPA officer, Daniel Patulski "determined that an enforcement action was not warranted in 1981 or 1984," a direct quotation from the lower court's decision in Lockett v. United States, 714 F. Supp. 848, 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989). Nonetheless, Patulski did not become an EPA officer until 1985, and has no recollection of a 1981 EPA determination on Carter Industrials. Nor does any other EPA officer recall such a decision. See Affidavit of Daniel E. Patulski; Deposition of Ralph Dollhopf, EPA on-scene Coordinator
See generally Graves v. U.S., 872 F.2d 133 (6th Cir. 1989) ("Discretionary decisions are not simply any decision that a government agency or employee makes.")