Source: http://ca.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20140319_0000269.SCA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2017-07-23 04:48:19
Document Index: 535993448

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1915', '§ 1914', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1983', '§ 1915']

| Marquez v. Scott
Marquez v. Scott
JUAN CARDENA MARQUEZ, BOP #63465208, Plaintiff,v.U.S. IMMIGRATION AGENT SCOTT, Defendant.
ORDER: (1) GRANTING MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS [ECF Doc. No. 2] (2) DENYING MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL [ECF Doc. No. 3] AND (3) DIRECTING U.S. MARSHAL TO EFFECT SERVICE OF SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(3) AND 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)
Juan Cardena Marquez ("Plaintiff"), a federal prisoner currently incarcerated at the United States Penitentiary in Lompoc, California, has submitted a civil action which the Court liberally construes to arise pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), insofar as it contains allegations of "physical assault[]" on the part of a federal agent at the time of Plaintiff's arrest near the U.S./Mexican border in January 2012. See Compl. (ECF Doc. No. 1) at 1-3.
Plaintiff has not prepaid the $350 filing fee mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); instead, he has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis ("IFP") pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF Doc. No. 2), along with a Motion to Appoint Counsel (ECF Doc. No. 3).
In support of his IFP application, Plaintiff has submitted a prison certificate certified by a trust account counselor at USP Lompoc as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D. CAL. CIVLR 3.2. Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119. The Court has reviewed Plaintiff's trust account certificate verifying his account history and available balances. Plaintiff's certificate indicates he has average monthly deposits of $34.66, and an available balance of $30.17 in his trust account at the time of filing. Based on this information, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF Doc. No. 2) and assesses an initial partial filing fee of $6.93 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
However, the Warden of USP Lompoc, or his designee, shall collect this initial fee only if sufficient funds in Plaintiff's account are available at the time this Order is executed pursuant to the directions set forth below. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that "[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee."); Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a "safety-valve" preventing dismissal of a prisoner's IFP case based solely on a "failure to pay... due to the lack of funds available to him when payment is ordered."). The remaining balance of the $350 total owed in this case shall be collected and forwarded to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL (ECF Doc. No. 3)
Plaintiff also requests appointment of counsel because his claim is "meritorious, " and he has been "unable to find an attorney willing to represent [him] on terms that [he] can afford." See Pl.'s Mot. for Appoint. Counsel (ECF Doc. No. 3) at 1.
Nonetheless, "[t]here is no constitutional right to appointed counsel in a § 1983 action." Rand v. Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Storseth v. Spellman, 654 F.2d 1349, 1353 (9th Cir. 1981)); see also Hedges v. Resolution Trust Corp. (In re Hedges), 32 F.3d 1360, 1363 (9th Cir. 1994) ("[T]here is no absolute right to counsel in civil proceedings.") (citation omitted). Federal courts do not have the authority "to make coercive appointments of counsel." Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 310 (1989); see also United States v. $292, 888.04 in U.S. Currency, 54 F.3d 564, 569 (9th Cir. 1995).
Districts courts have discretion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), to "request" that an attorney represent indigent civil litigants upon a showing of "exceptional circumstances." See Agyeman v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 390 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004); Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525. However, a finding of exceptional circumstances requires "an evaluation of the likelihood of the plaintiff's success on the merits and an evaluation of the plaintiff's ability to articulate his claims in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.'" Agyeman, 390 F.3d at ...