Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/713/1441/149681/
Timestamp: 2019-11-18 08:19:22
Document Index: 304996204

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 101', '§ 811', '§ 801', '§ 94', '§ 816', '§ 815', '§ 818', '§ 816', '§ 816', '§ 801', '§ 184']

San Diego Regional Employment and Training Consortium(retc), Petitioner, v. U.S. Department of Labor, Respondent,bruce Lee Caukin, et al., Real Party in Interest, 713 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1983) :: Justia
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San Diego Regional Employment and Training Consortium(retc), Petitioner, v. U.S. Department of Labor, Respondent,bruce Lee Caukin, et al., Real Party in Interest, 713 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1983)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 713 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1983) Argued and Submitted May 6, 1983. Decided Aug. 25, 1983
RETC has been a prime sponsor within the meaning of §§ 101 and 102 of CETA and has been receiving funding to operate programs under the Act and its amendments. RETC is a consortium of eligible local governmental applicants, the City of San Diego and the County of San Diego, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 811(a) (3). Chula Vista was a subgrantee and recipient of CETA funds through the County of San Diego and RETC, to operate public service employment programs.
From the outset, CETA has attempted to decentralize the planning and administration of its employment programs, subject to federal supervision. Prime sponsors are responsible to supervise their subgrantees, just as the federal government is responsible to supervise the prime sponsors. That duty to supervise, as well as the power to do so, stems directly from the CETA program structure. CETA's enabling statute, 29 U.S.C. §§ 801, et seq., and the regulations promulgated thereunder, 29 C.F.R. §§ 94, et seq., (1982), make clear that the prime sponsor is given the major responsibility to ensure that employment programs are operated properly and effectively. In accepting CETA funds for distribution, a prime sponsor "must also accept the supervisory role envisioned by the Act" and "must police and enforce those regulations and ensure that the program within its geographic area runs smoothly and according to law." Commonwealth of Kentucky, Dept. of Human Resources v. Donovan, 704 F.2d 288, 293-94 (6th Cir. 1983).
The CETA statute authorizes the Secretary to terminate financial assistance in whole or in part, and to order sanctions and corrective actions as appropriate, when the Secretary concludes that a recipient is failing to comply with any provision of the chapter or that a recipient has not taken appropriate action against its subgrantees. 29 U.S.C. § 816(d) (1). Such sanctions and corrective actions were available to the Secretary even before the 1978 amendments to CETA. The original 1973 statute provided that the Secretary should not provide financial assistance to a prime sponsor unless the prime sponsor certified that "it would comply with all provisions of the chapter." 29 U.S.C. § 815(b) (2) (emphasis added). Further, the 1973 Act authorized the Secretary to revoke a prime sponsor's plan and to terminate funding for specific acts or omissions, including "otherwise materially failing to carry out the purposes and provisions of this chapter." 29 U.S.C. § 818(d) (4), amended by 29 U.S.C. § 816(c), (d).
RETC argues that its breach, uncontested in the findings of fact, cannot be considered material, but offers in support simply its conclusion that a violation of a single CETA participant's due process rights cannot be considered material within a national CETA program. RETC's argument does not attempt to counter the Secretary's findings of fact, and those findings shall be considered conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. The Secretary's decision to order RETC to provide Caukin with a civil service hearing is reasonable and supported by the evidence and findings presented and uncontested, as well as by the statutory scheme. Congress intended that the Secretary should exercise his own independent judgment in determining prime sponsor compliance with the law, and placed on him the duty to ensure that federal funds are expended in accordance and compliance with the requirements of federal law. H.Rep. No. 93-659, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1973 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 2935, 2942. Accord, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Balance of State, Prime Sponsor v. U.S. Dept. of Labor, 683 F.2d 568 (1st Cir. 1982) (CETA prime sponsor's joint and several liability for its subgrantee's violation upheld, based both on statutory scheme and prime sponsor's ability to provide immediate relief to the participant-complainant); and Milwaukee County v. Peters, 682 F.2d 609 (7th Cir. 1982) (prime sponsor's joint and several liability upheld as consonant with the legislative scheme and policy).
RETC does not claim lack of notice of the underlying violation, Chula Vista's denial of a civil service hearing to Caukin. RETC contends that it was without notice of the remedy that was to follow that violation. Despite its participation at every step of Caukin's administrative and judicial appeal, RETC now complains that it is entitled to a separate hearing on the issue of the appropriateness of the Secretary's conditional sanctions. In a recent case, this court has rejected the argument that a recipient of CETA funds is entitled to a separate hearing on sanctions. City of Oakland v. Donovan, 703 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1983). There the court concluded that the CETA statute's notice and hearing requirement, 29 U.S.C. § 816(d) (Supp. II 1978),3 is intended to "prevent the imposition of sanctions without a hearing on the underlying violation." City of Oakland v. Donovan, 703 F.2d at 1108.4
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 801, et seq., repealed by Act of Oct. 13, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-300, Title I, § 184(a) (1), (2), 96 Stat. 1357, 1358