Source: http://t.openjurist.org/231/us/631/alexander-pennington-v-united-states
Timestamp: 2018-02-24 23:58:55
Document Index: 616245904

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 15', '§ 1262', '§ 1262', '§ 1262', '§ 15', '§ 1262', '§ 1262', '§ 145']

231 US 631 Alexander Pennington v. United States | OpenJurist
231 U.S. 631 - Alexander Pennington v. United States
231 US 631 Alexander Pennington v. United States
34 S.Ct. 269
58 L.Ed. 410
ALEXANDER C. M. PENNINGTON, Appt.,
By the judgment appealed from the court below dismissed the petition in which recovery was sought by the appellant, of a stated sum charged to be due him because of the extra per diem ration for each five years' service allowed by the act of July 5, 1838, § 15, 5 Stat. at L. 258, chap. 162, and the 10 per centum increase of yearly pay given for each term of five years' service by Rev. Stat. § 1262, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 896. To develop the questions to be decided, we chronologically arrange the facts alleged and somewhat abbreviate their statement, omitting nothing, however, relevant to the issues.
'During the entire period of his service as second lieutenant, first lieutenant, and captain aforesaid, the practice of the War Department and of the accounting officers of the Treasury Department was not to count service as a cadet in the United States Military Academy in reckoning the term of five years of service for purposes of the additional ration provided by the act of July 5, 1838, or for longevity increase of pay under § 1262 of the Revised Statutes (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 896).' The following averments were then made:
'It was decided by the Supreme Court of the United States on the 27th day of October, 1884, in the case of United States v. Morton, 112 U. S. p. 3, 28 L. ed. 613, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1, and on the 11th day of March, 1889, in the case of United States v. Watson, 130 U. S. p. 80, 32 L. ed. 852, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 430, that officers of the United States Army were entitled, in computing their rations under said act of July 5, 1838, and in computing their longevity pay under § 1262 of the Revised Statutes (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 896), to be credited with their service as cadets in the United States Military Academy.
Notwithstanding said decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, the Second Comptroller of the Treasury, on June 20, 1890, decided that he would not allow any claim for additional rations under § 15 of the act of July 5, 1838, aforesaid, and for increase of longevity pay under § 1262 of the Revised Statutes on account of any service not theretofore admitted as forming a proper subject of credit by the previous practice of the Treasury Department as aforesaid.'
It was alleged that on the 4th day of March, 1907, 'a provision of law was passed by Congress as a portion of the annual sundry civil appropriation bill (34 Stat. at L. 1356, chap. 2918, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 58),' which provision was quoted in full in the petition. It was further alleged:
'Your petiuoner respectiully represents that by said provision of statute, there was granted to your petitioner a right to be paid additional rations under said act of 1838, and additional longevity pay under said § 1262 of the Revised Statutes (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 896), for the reason that the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States and of the court of claims of the United States, aforesaid, held that such rations and longevity pay were due in a similar case, and such decisions should have been followed by said accounting officers notwithstanding the former settlement or adjudication by one of their predecessors as aforesaid. The refusal of the accounting officers of the Treasury aforesaid to state a balance in favor of your petitioner on account of the former settlement aforesaid deprived your petitioner of a right granted under said act of Congress, for which there is no remedy except by action in this court.'
'Back pay and bounty: For payment of amounts for arrears of pay of two and three year volunteers, for bounty to volunteers and their widows and legal heirs, for bounty under the act of July twenty-eighth, eighteen hundred and sixty-six [14 Stat. at L. 322, chap. 296], and for amounts for commutation of rations to prisoners of war in rebel states, and to soldiers on furlough, that may be certified to be due by the accounting officers of the Treasury during the fiscal year nineteen hundred and eight, $200,000: Provided, That in all cases hereafter so certified the said accounting officers shall, in stating balances, follow the decisions of the United States Supreme Court or of the court of claims of the United States after the time for appeal has expired, if no appeal be taken, without regard to former settlements or adjudications by their predecessors.'
'1. That the above proviso in the act of March 4, 1907, is an acknowledgment of the indebtedness of the United States to all persons whose claims are therein described. and, as a new promise, takes their claims out of the operation of the statute of limitations.
'2. That upon the refusal of the accounting officers to allow a claim as directed by this proviso, an action may be maintained upon the claim in the court of claims because it is a claim 'founded upon . . . any law of Congress' (Judicial Code, § 145, ¶1st [36 Stat. at L. 1136, chap. 231, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1981].'
The arguments advanced to sustain the proposition make it clear that such is its scope. For instance, it is insisted that 'Congress has by the proviso enacted that in all cases' 'the administrative rule of res judicata shall not prevail against a judicial decision,' and that the purpose of the provision was to remove the bar of all statutes of limitations as to every case to which the enactment relates. The extreme result of the proposition is thus made apparent. That its assertion is not academic becomes obvious when it is observed that maintaining it is essential to meet the requirements of the case, since without the asserted doctrine of new promise and the contention as to the removal of the bar of statutes of limitation the claim sued on would not be justiciable, and could be barred by limitations.
In other words, the only avenue of approach for the proposition is through a gateway created by wrenching the provision asunder. We are of opinion that this may not be done. (White v. United States, 191 U. S. 545, 48 L. ed. 295, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 171; Georgia R. & Bkg. Co. v. Smith, 128 U. S. 174, 181, 32 L. ed. 377, 380, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 47. But it is insisted that the words following the word 'provided' do not technically amount to a proviso, and therefore the clause must be divided into two independent parts, consisting the one of that portion which goes before the word 'provided,' and the other, that portion which follows it. And when this is done the argument is that the word 'all' in the latter portion renders it necessary to give to that portion the far-reaching significance claimed. Conceding for argument's sake that the latter part of the provision, that is, the portion which follows the word 'provided,' may not be technically a proviso, nevertheless the fact that the two provisions are united in enactment is one and the same clause, giving no intrinsic manifestation of a legislative purpose to separate them, causes the concession to be without influence in determining the proper construction of the provision. It is, however, urged that at the time of the enactment of the clause there were pending before Congress various bills concerning the action of the executive departments in failing to apply the rulings of this court as to longevity pay, and therefore the provision must have been intended to remedy the evil by the adoption of a general provision accomplishing the results here claimed. The premise, if conceded, serves to refute, instead of to sustain, the proposition based on it, for if it be that the purpose of Congress was to unsettle the entire past administrative action as to all claims against the government, and to confuse the entire administration for the future, it cannot be conceived that such a radical intent would have been expressed in such an obscure and uncertain manner. And this leads us finally to examine the contention that, as in modern practice it has become common to adopt independent legislation on appropriation bills by what is called a 'rider,' therefore the provision here involved should be treated as having that character, and be accordingly independently interpreted as claimed. But whatever be the new habit, it can in no respect serve to relieve the judiciary, when called upon to consider a statute, of the old duty of correctly interpreting it. Indeed, the very suggestion of the practice of 'riders' admonishes that things may not be so associated as one for the purpose of securing the enactment of legislation upon the theory that they are one, and when enacted be disassociated for the purpose of judicial construction so as to cause them to be wholly independent one of the other.