Source: http://mi.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20190807_0002733.EMI.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-10-21 20:04:54
Document Index: 55079165

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 1367', '§ 1367', '§ 1367', '§ 1367', '§ 1367', '§ 1367', '§ 1367', '§ 1367']

FindACase™ | Zawada v. Hogan
Zawada v. Hogan
ARTUR ZAWADA, Plaintiff,
OFFICER PATRICK HOGAN, et al., Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING WITHOUT PREJUDICE PLAINTIFF'S STATE LAW CLAIMS
Plaintiff Artur Zawada filed a complaint against Hamburg Township and several Hamburg Township police officers related to his arrest by Defendants on December 19, 2017. He asserts federal claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 against the individual defendants and the municipality. He also brings several state tort claims against the individual defendants for gross negligence (Count I), assault, battery, false arrest and trespass (Count II), and intentional inflection of emotional distress (Count III).
Since Plaintiff's federal and state law claims arise out of the same incident and share common operative facts, the court is permitted to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367. However, because exercising supplemental jurisdiction over these claims would not promote judicial economy, the convenience of the parties, fairness, or comity, the court will dismiss the state law claims without prejudice.
A federal court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over each claim in an action that shares a common nucleus of operative facts with a claim that invokes the court's original jurisdiction. See Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 245 (2007) (citing United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966)). The federal court need not, however, exercise its authority to invoke supplemental jurisdiction in every case in which it is possible to do so. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726. Supplemental jurisdiction may be denied if “it appears that the state issues substantially predominate” or “the likelihood of jury confusion in treating divergent legal theories of relief . . . would justify separating state and federal claims for trial.” Id. at 726-27.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, federal courts have broad discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction “over state-law claims that are ‘so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they may form part of the same case or controversy.'” Gamel v. City of Cincinnati, 625 F.3d 949, 951 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)). The court considers several factors when exercising this discretion, “including the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.'” Id. (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988)). If these considerations are not present, “a federal court should hesitate to exercise jurisdiction over state claims.” Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726.
Under § 1367(c), the court has the discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if:
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Subsections two and four are relevant to the present action.
A. Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2)
A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to § 1367(c)(2) if “the [state] claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2). Where “the state issues substantially predominate, whether in terms of proof, of the scope of the issues raised, or of the comprehensiveness of the remedy sought, the ...