Source: http://www.ratical.org/ratville/CAH/USAPAanalyze.html
Timestamp: 2016-02-09 09:38:58
Document Index: 305753769

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 802', '§ 2331', '§ 411', '§\n1182', '§ 411', '§\n1182', '§ 224', '§ 224', '§ 213', '§\n3103', '§\n2705', '§ 215', '§\n1801', '§ 215', '§\n1862', '§ 215', '§\n1862', '§\n1862', '§ 215', '§ 1801', '§ 215', '§\n1862', '§\n1862', '§ 215', '§ 215', '§\n1862', '§ 215', '§\n1863', '§\n3127', '§\n3127', '§ 216', '§\n3127', '§ 216', '§\n3123', '§\n3122', '§ 216', '§\n3123', '§ 216', '§\n3123', '§\n1804', '§ 218', '§\n1804', '§ 203', '§\n401', '§\n203', '§ 203', '§\n2517', '§ 203', '§\n1227', '§ 411', '§\n1182', '§ 411', '§\n1182', '§ 411', '§\n1182', '§\n1189', '§\n1189', '§\n1182', '§\n1189', '§ 411', '§\n1182', '§\n1182', '§\n1182', '§\n1182', '§ 411', '§\n1182', '§\n1182', '§\n1182', '§ 411', '§ 412', '§\n1226', '§ 412', '§\n1226', '§\n1531']

The USA PATRIOT Act: What's So Patriotic About Trampling on the Bill of Rights? by Nancy Chang, November 2001
What's So Patriotic About Trampling on the Bill of Rights? [1]
by Nancy Chang, Senior Litigation Attorney
THE USA PATRIOT ACT CONFERS VAST AND UNCHECKED POWERS TO
Tolling the Death-Knell on Privacy
Enhanced Surveillance Powers
Access to Records in International Investigations
Allowing Law Enforcement Agencies to Evade the Fourth Amendment's Probable Cause Requirement
Sharing of Sensitive Criminal and Foreign Intelligence Information
Stripping Immigrants of Constitutional Protections
Expanding The Class of Immigrants Subject to Removal
Detention at the Attorney General's Decree
The Political Implications of the USA PATRIOT Act for Immigrants
WILL THE JUDICIARY REIN IN THE EXECUTIVE AND UPHOLD THE BILL OF RIGHTS?
Just six weeks after the September 11 terrorist attacks on the
World Trade Center and the Pentagon, a jittery Congress --
exiled from its anthrax-contaminated
offices and confronted with
warnings that more terrorist assaults were soon to
come -- capitulated to the Bush Administration's demands for a new
arsenal of anti-terrorism weapons. Over vigorous objections
from civil liberties organizations on both ends of the political
spectrum, Congress overwhelmingly approved the Uniting and
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act, better known by its
acronym, the USA PATRIOT
Act. [2] The House
vote was 356-to-66, and the Senate vote was 98-to-1. Along the
way, the Republican House leadership, in a raw display of force,
jettisoned an anti-terrorism bill that the House Judiciary
Committee had unanimously approved and that would have addressed
a number of civil liberties concerns. [3] The hastily-drafted, complex, and
far-reaching legislation spans 342 pages. Yet it was passed with
virtually no public hearing or debate, and it was accompanied by
neither a conference nor a committee report. On October 26, the
Act was signed into law by a triumphant President George W.
Bush. [4]
I. THE USA PATRIOT ACT CONFERS VAST AND UNCHECKED POWERS TO
Although a number of its provisions are not controversial, the
nevertheless stands out as radical in its
design. To an unprecedented degree, the Act sacrifices our
political freedoms in the name of national security and upsets
the democratic values that define our nation by consolidating
vast new powers in the executive branch of government. The Act
enhances the executive's ability to conduct surveillance and
gather intelligence, places an array of new tools at the
disposal of the prosecution, including new crimes, enhanced
penalties, and longer statutes of limitations, and grants the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) the authority to
detain immigrants suspected of terrorism for lengthy, and in
some cases indefinite, periods of time. And at the same time
that the Act inflates the powers of the executive, it insulates
the exercise of these powers from meaningful judicial and
It remains to be seen how the executive will wield its new
authority. However, if the two months that have elapsed since
September 11 serve as a guide, we should brace ourselves for a
flagrant disregard of the rule of law by those charged with its
enforcement. Already, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has
admitted to detaining more than 1,100 immigrants, not one of
whom has been charged with committing a terrorist act and only a
handful of whom are being held as material witnesses to the
September 11 hijackings. [5] Many in this
group appear to have been held for extended time periods under
an extraordinary interim regulation announced by Attorney
General John Ashcroft on September 17 and published in Federal
Register on September 20. [6] This
regulation sets aside the strictures of due process by
permitting the INS to detain aliens without charge for 48 hours
or an uncapped "additional reasonable period of time" in the
event of an "emergency or other extraordinary circumstance."
Also, many in this group are being held without bond under the
pretext of unrelated criminal charges or minor immigration
violations, in a modern-day form of preventive detention.
Chillingly, the Attorney General's response to the passage of
was not a pledge to use his new powers
responsibly and guard against their abuse, but instead was a vow
to step up his detention efforts. Conflating immigrant status
with terrorist status, he declared: "Let the terrorists among us
be warned, if you overstay your visas even by one day, we will
arrest you." [7]
Furthermore, the Administration has made no secret of its hope
that the judiciary will accede to its broad reading of the USA PATRIOT Act
just as pliantly as Congress acceded to its broad
legislative agenda. In a letter sent to key Senators while
Congress was considering this legislation, Assistant Attorney
General Daniel J. Bryant, of DOJ's Office of Legislative
Affairs, openly advocated for a suspension of the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement in the government's
investigation of foreign national security threats. [8] The Bryant letter brazenly declares:
As Commander-in-Chief, the President must be able to use
whatever means necessary to prevent attacks upon the United
States; this power, by implication, includes the authority
to collect information necessary to its effective exercise. . .
The government's interest has changed from merely conducting
foreign intelligence surveillance to counter intelligence
operations by other nations, to one of preventing terrorist
attacks against American citizens and property within the
continental United States itself. The courts have observed that
even the use of deadly force is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment if used in self-defense or to protect others. . .
Here, for Fourth Amendment purposes, the right to self-defense
is not that of an individual, but that of the nation and its
citizens. . . If the government's heightened interest in
self-defense justifies the use of deadly force, then it
certainly would also justify warrantless
searches. [9]
II. SUSPENSION OF CIVIL LIBERTIES
The Administration's blatant power grab, coupled with the wide
array of anti-terrorism tools that the USA PATRIOT Act puts at
its disposal, portends a wholesale suspension of civil liberties
that will reach far beyond those who are involved in terrorist
activities. First, the Act places our First
Amendment rights to
freedom of speech and political association in jeopardy by
creating a broad new crime of "domestic terrorism," and by
denying entry to non-citizens on the basis of ideology. Second,
the Act will reduce our already lowered expectations of privacy
Amendment by granting the government enhanced
surveillance powers. Third, non-citizens will see a further
erosion of their due process rights as they are placed in
mandatory detention and removed from the United States under the
Act. Political activists who are critical of our government or
who maintain ties with international political movements, in
addition to immigrants, are likely to bear the brunt of these
attacks on our civil liberties.
A. Silencing Political Dissent
Section 802 of the USA PATRIOT Act creates a federal crime of
"domestic terrorism" that broadly extends to "acts dangerous to
human life that are a violation of the criminal laws" if they
"appear to be intended...to influence the policy of a government
by intimidation or coercion," and if they "occur primarily
States." [10] Because this crime is
couched in such vague and expansive terms, it may well be read
by federal law enforcement agencies as licensing the
investigation and surveillance of political activists and
organizations based on their opposition to government policies.
It also may be read by prosecutors as licensing the
criminalization of legitimate political dissent. Vigorous
protest activities, by their very nature, could be construed as
acts that "appear to be intended...to influence the policy of a
government by intimidation or coercion." Further, clashes
between demonstrators and police officers and acts of civil
disobedience -- even those that do not result in injuries and are
entirely non-violent -- could be construed as "dangerous to human
life" and in "violation of the criminal laws." Environmental
activists, anti-globalization activists, and anti-abortion
activists who use direct action to further their political
agendas are particularly vulnerable to prosecution as "domestic
In addition, political activists and the organizations with
which they associate may unwittingly find themselves the subject
of unwanted government attention in the form of surveillance and
other intelligence-gathering operations. The manner in which the
government implements the Act must be carefully monitored to
ascertain whether activists and organizations are being targeted
selectively for surveillance and prosecution based on their
opposition to government policies. The First
tolerate viewpoint-based discrimination. [11]
Furthermore, Section 411 of the Act poses an ideological test
for entry into the United States that takes into consideration
core political speech. Representatives of a political or social
group "whose public endorsement of acts of terrorist activity
the Secretary of State has determined undermines United States
efforts to reduce or eliminate terrorist activities" can no
longer gain entry into the United States. [12] Entry is also barred to non-citizens
who have used their "position of prominence within any country
to endorse or espouse terrorist activity," if the Secretary of
State determines that their speech "undermines United States
efforts to reduce or eliminate terrorist activities." [13]
PATRIOT Act [14] launches a
three-pronged assault on our privacy. First, the Act grants the
executive branch unprecedented, and largely unchecked,
surveillance powers, including the enhanced ability to track
email and Internet usage, conduct sneak-and-peek searches,
obtain sensitive personal records, monitor financial
transactions, and conduct nationwide roving wiretaps. Second,
the Act permits law enforcement agencies to circumvent the
Amendment's requirement of probable cause when conducting
wiretaps and searches that have, as "a significant purpose," the
gathering of foreign intelligence. Third, the Act allows for the
sharing of information between criminal and intelligence
operations and thereby opens the door to a resurgence of
domestic spying by the Central Intelligence Agency.
By and large, Congress granted the Administration its
longstanding wish list of enhanced surveillance tools, coupled
with the ability to use these tools with only minimal judicial
and Congressional oversight. In its rush to pass an
anti-terrorism bill, Congress failed to exact in exchange a
showing that these highly intrusive new tools are actually
needed to combat terrorism and that the Administration can be
trusted not to abuse them.
The recent decision in
v. United States [15] serves as a pointed reminder that
once a Fourth
Amendment protection has been eroded, the
resulting loss to our privacy is likely to be permanent. In
Kyllo, the Supreme Court concluded that the use of an advanced
thermal detection device that allowed the police to detect heat
emanating from marijuana plants growing inside the defendant's
home constituted a "search" for the purposes of the Fourth
Amendment and was presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.
The Court placed great weight on the fact that the device was
new, "not in general public use," and had been used to "explore
details of a private home that would previously have been
unknowable without physical intrusion." [16] Implicit in the Court's holding is
the principle that once a technology is in general public use
and its capabilities are known, a reasonable expectation of
privacy under the Fourth Amendment may no longer attach.
Several of the Act's enhanced surveillance tools, and the civil
liberties concerns they raise, are examined below.
Section 213 of the Act
authorizes federal agents to conduct "sneak and peek searches,"
or covert searches of a person's home or office that are
conducted without notifying the person of the execution of the
search warrant until after the search has been completed.
Section 213 authorizes delayed notice of the execution of a
search warrant upon a showing of "reasonable cause to believe
that providing immediate notification... may have an adverse
result." [17] Section 213 also
authorizes the delay of notice of the execution of a warrant to
conduct a seizure of items where the court finds a "reasonable
necessity" for the seizure.
contravenes the "common law 'knock and announce'
principle," which forms an essential part of the Fourth
Amendment's reasonableness inquiry. [18] When notice of a search is delayed,
one is foreclosed from pointing out deficiencies in the warrant
to the officer executing it, and from monitoring whether the
search is being conducted in accordance with the warrant. In
addition, Section 213, by authorizing delayed notice of the
execution of a warrant to conduct a seizure of items,
contravenes Rule 41(d) of the Federal
which requires that, "The officer taking property
under the warrant shall give to the person from whom or from
whose premises the property was taken a copy of the warrant and
a receipt for the property taken or shall leave the copy and
receipt at the place from which the property was taken."
Under Section 213,
notice may be delayed for a "reasonable
period." Already, DOJ has staked out its position that a
"reasonable period" can be considerably longer than the seven
days authorized by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in
United States v. Villegas, [19] and by the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals in United States v. Freitas. [20] DOJ states in its Field Guidance
on New Authorities (Redacted) Enacted in the 2001 Anti-Terrorism
Legislation [21] that "[a]nalogy to other
statutes suggest [sic] that the period of delay could be
substantial if circumstances warrant," and cites in support of
this proposition a case that found a 90-day delay in providing
notice of a wiretap warrant to constitute "a reasonable time."
Notably, Section 213 is not limited to terrorism investigations,
but extends to all criminal investigations, and is not scheduled
b. Access to Records in International Investigations
Section 215 [22] is one of several
provisions in the USA PATRIOT Act
that relaxes the requirements,
and extends the reach, of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act of 1978 (FISA). [23] Under
Section 215, the Director of the FBI or a designee as low in
rank as an Assistant Special Agent in Charge may apply for a
court order requiring the production of "any tangible things
(including books, records, papers, documents, and other items)"
upon his written statement that these items are being sought for
an investigation "to protect against international terrorism or
clandestine intelligence activities." [24] A judge presented with an application
under Section 215 is required to enter an order if he "finds
that the application meets the requirements of this
section." [25]
Notably absent from Section 215
is the restriction in the FISA
provision it amends that had required the government to specify
in its application for a court order that "there are specific
and articulable facts giving reason to believe that the person
to whom the records pertain is a foreign power or an agent of a
foreign power." [26] Now, under Section 215,
the FBI may obtain sensitive personal records by simply
certifying that they are sought for an investigation "to protect
activities." The FBI need not suspect the person whose records
are being sought of any wrongdoing. Furthermore, the class of
persons whose records are obtainable under Section 215 is no
longer limited to foreign powers and their agents, but may
include United States citizens and lawful permanent residents,
or "United States persons" in the parlance of the
FISA. [27] While Section 215 bars
investigations of United States persons "solely upon the basis
of activities protected by the first amendment to the
Constitution," it does nothing to bar investigations based on
other activities that tie them, no matter how loosely, to an
international terrorism investigation. [28]
The FISA provision that was amended by Section 215 had been
limited in scope to "records" in the possession of "a common
carrier, public accommodation facility, physical storage
facility, or vehicle rental facility." [29] Section 215 extends beyond "records"
to "tangible things" and is no longer limited in terms of the
entities from whom the production of tangible things can be
required. [30] A Congressional oversight
provision will require the Attorney General to submit
semi-annual reports on its activities under Section
215. [31] Section 215 is scheduled to expire on
Under Section 216
of the Act, courts are required to order the
installation of a pen register and a trap and trace
device [31] to track both telephone
and Internet "dialing, routing, addressing and signaling
information" [32] anywhere within the
United States when a government attorney has certified that the
information to be obtained is "relevant to an ongoing
criminal investigation." [33] Section 216
states that orders issued under its authority cannot permit
the tracking of the "contents of any wire or electronic
communications." However, in the case of email messages and
Internet usage, the Act does not address the complex question of
where the line should be drawn between "dialing, routing,
addressing and signaling information" and "content." Unlike
telephone communications, where the provision of dialing
information does not run the risk of revealing
content, [35] email messages move
together in packets that include both address and content
information. Also, the question of whether a list of web sites
and web pages that have been visited constitutes "dialing,
routing, addressing and signaling information" or "content" has
By providing no guidance on this question, Section 216 gives the
government wide latitude to decide what constitutes "content."
Of special concern is the fact that Section 216 authorizes the
government to install its new Carnivore or DCS1000 system, a
formidable tracking device that is capable of intercepting all
forms of Internet activity, including email messages, web page
activity, and Internet telephone communications. [36] Once installed on an Internet Service
Provider (ISP), Carnivore devours all of the
communications flowing through the ISP's network -- not just those
of the target of surveillance but those of all users -- and not
just tracking information but content as well. The FBI claims
that through the use of filters, Carnivore "limits the messages
viewable by human eyes to those which are strictly included
within the court order." [37] However,
neither the accuracy of Carnivore's filtering system, nor the
infallibility of its human programers, has been demonstrated.
While Section 216 requires the government to maintain a record
when it utilizes Carnivore, this record need not be provided to
the court until 30 days after the termination of the order,
including any extensions of time. [38] Section 216 is not scheduled to
2. Allowing Law Enforcement Agencies to Evade the Fourth
Amendment's Probable Cause Requirement
Perhaps the most radical provision of the USA PATRIOT Act is
which amends FISA's wiretap and physical search
provisions. Under FISA, court orders permitting the executive to
conduct surreptitious foreign intelligence wiretaps and physical
searches may be obtained without the showing of probable cause
required for wiretaps and physical searches in criminal
investigations. Until the enactment of the Act, orders issued
under FISA's lax standards were restricted to situations where
the gathering of foreign intelligence information was "the
purpose" of the surveillance. [39]
Under Section 218,
however, orders may be issued under FISA's
lax standards where the primary purpose of the surveillance is
criminal investigation, and the gathering of foreign
intelligence information constitutes only "a significant
purpose"of the surveillance. [40] As a
result, Section 218 allows law enforcement agencies conducting a
criminal investigation to circumvent the Fourth
whenever they are able to claim that the gathering of foreign
intelligence constitutes "a significant purpose." In
doing so, Section 218 gives the FBI a green light to resume
domestic spying on government "enemies" -- a program that reached
an ugly apex under J. Edgar Hoover's directorship.
In the seminal case of
States v. United States District Court for the Eastern
(Keith), [41] the Supreme Court
rejected President Richard Nixon's ambitious bid for the
unchecked executive power to conduct warrantless wiretaps when
investigating national security threats posed by domestic
groups with no foreign ties. The Court recognized that national
security cases reflect "a convergence of First
Amendment values not present in cases of 'ordinary'
crime." [42] With respect to the First
Amendment, the Court wisely observed that "[o]fficial
surveillance, whether its purpose be criminal investigation or
ongoing intelligence gathering, risks infringement of
constitutionally protected privacy of speech" because of "the
inherent vagueness of the domestic security concept... and the
temptation to utilize such surveillances to oversee political
dissent." [43]
With respect to the Fourth
Amendment, the Court acknowledged the
constitutional basis for the President's domestic security role,
but refused to exempt the President from the Fourth Amendment's
warrant requirement. [44] The Court
explained that the oversight function assumed by the judiciary
in its review of applications for warrants "accords with our
basic constitutional doctrine that individual freedoms will best
be preserved through a separation of powers and division of
functions among the different branches and levels of
Government." [45]
Notably, the Keith Court declined to examine "the scope
of the President's surveillance power with respect to the
activities of foreign powers, within or without this
country." [46] To fill the vacuum left
in the wake of the Keith decision, in 1978 Congress
enacted FISA, which is premised on the assumption that Fourth
Amendment safeguards are not as critical in foreign intelligence
investigations as they are in criminal investigations. The
Supreme Court has yet to rule on FISA's constitutionality.
However, both the Fourth and Ninth Circuits have cautioned that
applying FISA's lax standards to criminal investigations raises
serious Fourth Amendment concerns. In United States v. Truong
Dinh Hung, the Fourth Circuit held that "the executive
should be excused from securing a warrant only when the
surveillance is conducted 'primarily' for foreign
intelligence reasons," because "once surveillance becomes
primarily a criminal investigation, the courts are
entirely competent to make the usual probable cause
determination, and because, importantly, individual privacy
interests come to the fore and government foreign policy
concerns recede when the government is primarily attempting to
form the basis for a criminal prosecution." [47] In a similar vein, the Ninth Circuit
held in United States v. Johnson that "the investigation
of criminal activity cannot be the primary purpose of [FISA]
surveillance" and that "[FISA] is not to be used as an end-run
around the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of warrantless
searches." [48]
The constitutionality of Section 218
is in considerable doubt.
The extremist position staked out by DOJ in the Bryant Letter,
which argues that "[i]f the government's heightened interest in
certainly would also justify warrantless searches," would
undermine the separation of powers doctrine. [49] Until the Supreme Court weighs in on
this matter, the government will find itself in a quandary each
time it seeks to prosecute a criminal defendant based on
evidence that, although properly obtained under the lesser
showing required by Section 218, does not meet the probable
cause showing required by the Fourth
Amendment. Should the
government decide to base prosecutions on such evidence, it will
run the risk that the evidence will be suppressed under the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. [50] Section 218 is scheduled to expire on
3. Sharing of Sensitive Criminal and Foreign Intelligence
USA PATRIOT Act authorizes the disclosure,
without judicial supervision, of certain criminal and foreign
intelligence information to officials of the FBI, CIA, and INS,
as well as other federal agencies, where receipt of the
information will "assist the official... in the performance of
his official duties." [51] Section
203(a) permits the disclosure of matters occurring before a
grand jury -- a category that is as boundless in scope as the
powers of a grand jury to subpoena records and
witnesses. [52] Section 203(b) permits
the disclosure of recordings of intercepted telephone and
Internet conversations. [53] And Section
203(d) permits the disclosure of foreign intelligence obtained
as part of a criminal investigation. [54]
While some additional sharing of information between agencies is
undoubtedly appropriate given the nature of the terrorist
threats we face, the Act fails to protect us from the dangers
posed to our political freedoms and our privacy when sensitive
personal information is widely shared without court supervision.
A cautionary tale can be found in the 1976 report of the
Senate's Church
Committee, which revealed that the FBI and CIA
had spied on thousands of law-abiding citizens, from civil
rights workers to anti-Vietnam War protestors, who had been
targeted solely because they were believed to harbor politically
dissident views. [55] Section 203(a) is not
scheduled to expire. Subsections (b) and (d) of Section 203,
however, are scheduled to expire.
deprives immigrants of their due process and
Amendment rights through two mechanisms that operate in
tandem. First, Section 411 vastly expands the class of
immigrants who are subject to removal on terrorism grounds
through its broad definitions of the terms "terrorist activity,"
"engage in terrorist activity," and "terrorist organization."
Second, Section 412
vastly expands the authority of the Attorney
General to place immigrants he suspects are engaged in terrorist
activities in detention while their removal proceedings are
1. Expanding The Class of Immigrants Subject to Removal
vastly expands the class of immigrants that can be
removed on terrorism grounds. [56] The term
"terrorist activity" is commonly understood to be limited to
pre-meditated and politically-motivated violence targeted
against a civilian population. [57] Section
411, however, stretches the term beyond recognition to encompass
any crime that involves the use of a "weapon or dangerous device
(other than for mere personal monetary gain)." [58] Under this broad definition, an
immigrant who grabs a knife or makeshift weapon in the midst of
a heat-of-the-moment altercation or in committing a crime of
passion may be subject to removal as a "terrorist."
The term "engage in terrorist activity" has also been expanded
to include soliciting funds for, soliciting membership for, and
providing material support to, a "terrorist organization," even
when that organization has legitimate political and humanitarian
ends and the non-citizen seeks only to support these lawful
ends. [59] In such situations,
would permit guilt to be imposed solely on the basis
of political associations protected by the First
Amendment. [60]
To complicate matters further, the term "terrorist organization"
is no longer limited to organizations that have been officially
designated as terrorist and that therefore have had their
designations published in the Federal Register for all to
see. [61] Instead, Section 411 now includes as
"terrorist organizations" groups that have never been designated
as terrorist if they fall under the loose criterion of "two or
more individuals, whether organized or not," which engage in
specified terrorist activities. [62] In situations where a non-citizen has
solicited funds for, solicited membership for, or provided
material support to, an undesignated "terrorist organization,"
Section 411 saddles him with the difficult, if not impossible,
burden of "demonstrat[ing] that he did not know, and should not
reasonably have known, that the act would further the
organization's terrorist activity." [63] Furthermore, while Section 411
prohibits the removal of a non-citizen on the grounds that he
material support to, a designated "terrorist organization" at a
time when the organization was not designated as a "terrorist
organization," Section 411 does not prohibit the removal of a
non-citizen on the grounds that he solicited funds for,
solicited membership for, or provided material support to, an
undesignated "terrorist organization" prior to the enactment of
the Act. [64]
At the same time that Section 411
vastly expands the class of
immigrants who are removable on terrorist grounds, Section 412
vastly inflates the Attorney General's power to detain
immigrants who are suspected of falling into that
class. [65] Upon no more than the
Attorney General's unreviewed certification that he has
"reasonable grounds to believe" that a non-citizen is engaged in
terrorist activities or other activities that threaten the
national security, a non-citizen can be detained for as long as
seven days without being charged with either a criminal or
immigration violation. [66] This low
level of suspicion falls far short of a finding of probable
cause, and appears even to fall short of the "reasonable and
articulable suspicion" that supports a brief investigatory stop
Amendment. [67]
If the non-citizen is charged with an immigration violation, he
is subject to mandatory detention and is ineligible for release
until he is removed, or until the Attorney General determines
that he should no longer be certified as a terrorist. [68] While the immigration proceedings are
pending, the Attorney General is required to review his
certification once every six months. [69] However, Section 412
the Attorney General either to inform the non-citizen of the
evidence on which the certification is based, or to provide the
non-citizen with an opportunity to contest that evidence at an
Immigration Judge hearing or other administrative review
procedure. Instead, Section 412 limits the non-citizen's ability
to seek review of the certification to a habeas corpus
proceeding filed in federal district court, appeals from which
must be filed in the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia. [70] Since habeas proceedings
are civil rather than criminal in nature, the government has no
obligation under the Sixth
Amendment to provide non-citizens
with free counsel in such proceedings. [71]
Even where a non-citizen who is found removable is deemed
eligible for asylum or other relief from removal, Section 412
does not permit his release. [72] Further, in
the event that the non-citizen is found removable, but removal
is "unlikely in the reasonably foreseeable future" -- most likely
because no other country will accept him -- he may be detained for
additional periods of six months "if the release of the alien
will threaten the national security of the United States or the
safety of the community or any person." [73] Only habeas review of such a
determination is available under Section 412. [74]
The Due Process Clause "applies to all 'persons' within the
United States, including aliens, whether their presence is
lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent." [75] Yet, Section 412
exposes immigrants
to extended, and, in some cases, indefinite, detention on the
sole authority of the Attorney General's untested certification
that he has "reasonable grounds to believe" that a non-citizen
is engaged in terrorist activities. It remains to be seen what
evidentiary safeguards, if any, the Attorney General will build
into his regulations implementing Section 412. It also remains
to be seen how rigorous federal court habeas reviews of such
certifications will be and to what extent the courts will demand
that the Attorney General base his certification on objective
evidence. Nevertheless, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that
the Act will deprive non-citizens of their liberty without due
process of law. [76]
3. The Political Implications of the USA PATRIOT Act for
In short, immigrants who engage in political activities in
connection with any organization that has ever violated the law
risk being certified as terrorists, placed in mandatory
detention, and removed, whether on a technical immigration
violation or on terrorism grounds. Immigrants cannot protect
themselves from such risks by simply avoiding association with
organizations that have been designated as "terrorist
organizations" because the Act broadens that term to include
undesignated groups. Nor can immigrants protect themselves from
such risks by limiting themselves to activities that are
Amendment, such as soliciting membership
for, soliciting funds for, and providing material support to, a
"terrorist organization" towards the goal of furthering the
organization's lawful ends, because the Act broadens the term
"engage in terrorist activity" to include these activities.
Ironically, in the post-USA PATRIOT Act world, immigrants who
are intent on avoiding such risks should refrain from any
associations with organizations that could potentially be deemed
terrorist, even if their association is strictly confined to
activities that further the humanitarian and peace-oriented
goals of the organization, such as training members of such a
organization on how to present international human rights claims
to the United Nations, representing such an organization in
peace negotiations, and donating humanitarian aid to such an
III. WILL THE JUDICIARY REIN IN THE EXECUTIVE AND UPHOLD THE
Our commitment to the Bill of Rights and to the democratic
values that define this nation has been put to the test by the
events of September 11. Already, Congress and the Administration
have demonstrated their eagerness to sacrifice civil liberties
in hopes of gaining an added measure of security. The task of
upholding the Bill of Rights -- or acquiescing in its
surrender -- will soon fall to the judiciary, as lawsuits testing
the constitutionality of the USA PATRIOT Act wind their way
In what we have come to regard as some of the most shameful
episodes in our history, the judiciary has consistently bowed to
the wishes of the political branches of government in times of
crisis by finding the state interest in national security to be
paramount to all competing interests. During World War I, the
Supreme Court upheld the conviction of socialist Eugene Debs for
expressing his opposition to World War I, refusing to recognize
his non-violent, anti-war advocacy as speech protected by the
Amendment. [77] More recently, following
the bombing of Pearl Harbor during World War II, the Supreme
Court upheld an Executive Order mandating the internment of more
than 100,000 Japanese-Americans and Japanese immigrants based
solely on their ancestry, refusing to recognize their preventive
detention as a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. [78]
The extent to which the judiciary will defer to the
Administration's views on the troubling First
Amendment issues presented by the USA PATRIOT Act, will tolerate
ethnic and ideological profiling by the Administration as it
implements the Act, and will allow the due process rights of
immigrants in detention to be eroded remains to be seen.
Certainly, the more anxious the times become, the more likely
the judiciary will be to side with the Administration -- at least
where judges are convinced that the measures are vital to the
national security, are not motivated by discriminatory intent,
and tread as lightly as possible upon civil liberties. The
recent words of Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, who
so often figures as the swing vote on pivotal decisions, do not
hold out hope for a vigorous defense of our political freedoms
by the judiciary. Following a visit to Ground Zero, where the
World Trade Centers once stood, the Justice bleakly predicted,
"We're likely to experience more restrictions on personal
freedom than has ever been the case in this country." [79]
This article is an excerpt from the forthcoming book, Silencing Political Dissent: How Post-September 11 Antiterrorism Measures Threaten Our Civil Liberties, by Nancy Chang, which will be available from Seven Stories Press in March 2002. This article is available as a free eBook on the Seven Stories Press website, http://www.sevenstories.com/book/index.cfm/GCOI/58322100208840
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56. Local, multiple-format copies available on ratical at:
http://www.ratical.org/ratville/CAH/index.html#HR3162
Adam Clymer, "Antiterrorism
Bill Passes; U.S. Gets Expanded Powers," The New York Times, Oct. 26, 2001, at A1; Robin Toner and Neil A. Lewis, "House
Passes Terrorism Bill Much Like Senate's, but With 5-Year Limit," The New York Times, Oct. 13, 2001, at B6; Jonathan Krim,
"Anti-Terror
Push Stirs Fears for Liberties; Rights Groups Unite To Seek Safeguards," The Washington Post, Sept. 18, 2001, at A17; Mary Leonard, "Civil Liberties," The Boston Globe, Sept. 21, 2001, at A13. Adam Clymer, "Bush
Quickly Signs Measure Aiding Antiterrorism Effort,"
The New York Times, Oct. 27, 2001, at B5. Amy Goldstein, et al., "A
Deliberate Strategy of Disruption, Massive, Secretive Detention Effort Aimed Mainly
at Preventing More Terror ," Washington Post, Nov. 4, 2001, at A1. See 66 Federal Register 48334-35 (Sept. 20, 2001). Congress denied the Attorney General's request for the codification of this interim regulation in the USA PATRIOT Act and limited to seven days the time aliens suspected of terrorist activity can be detained without charge. Although the interim regulation would appear to be in tension with the Act, it has not yet been rescinded.
This interim regulation appears to have been drafted with the holding of County of Riverside
v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991), in mind. In County of Riverside, the Supreme Court considered the Fourth
rights of individuals who had been arrested without a warrant and placed in detention. The Court ruled that after such an arrestee has been held in detention for 48 hours, the burden shifts to the government to show a bona fide emergency or an extraordinary circumstance for failing to provide the arrestee with a judicial probable cause determination. In marked contrast to the arrestees in County of Riverside, all of whom were arrested based on a probable cause finding by the arresting officer, the interim regulation has been drafted to support the detention of any non-citizen in this country, even when a basis for suspecting him of a criminal or immigration violation is entirely lacking. Dan Eggen, "Tough Anti-Terror Campaign Pledged -- Ashcroft Tells Mayors He Will Use NewLaw to Fullest Extent,"
Washington Post, Oct. 26, 2001, at A1. This undated letter was sent to Senators Bob Graham, Orrin Hatch, Patrick Leahy, and Richard Shelby. A copy of this letter is on file with the author. Bryant Letter at p. 9 (emphasis added). USA PATRIOT Act
§ 802, amending 18 U.S.C. § 2331. See R.A.V.
v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). USA PATRIOT Act § 411(a), amending 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(IV)(bb). USA PATRIOT Act § 411(a), amending 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(VI). Out of concern for the dangers that the USA
PATRIOT Act's enhanced surveillance procedures pose to our privacy, and
over the strong objections of the Administration, Congress has scheduled
some -- though not all -- of these procedures to sunset, or expire, on December 31, 2005. See USA PATRIOT Act § 224(a). However, Congress has exempted from the operation of any sunset clause: (1) foreign intelligence
investigations that began before the sunset date, and (2) offenses that
began or occurred before the sunset date. See USA PATRIOT Act § 224(b). 121
S. Ct. 2038, 2046 (2001). Id. USA PATRIOT Act § 213, amending 18 U.S.C. §
3103a. The definition of the term "adverse result" in Section 213 is borrowed from a statute establishing the standards under which the government may provide delayed
notice when it searches stored email and other wire and electronic
communications -- searches that are not nearly as intrusive as physical
searches of one's home or office. The term is defined in 18 U.S.C. §
2705(a)(2) as: "(A) endangering the life or physical safety of an
individual; (B) flight from prosecution; (C) destruction of or tampering
with evidence; (D) intimidation of potential witnesses; or (E) otherwise seriously jeopardizing an investigation or unduly delaying a trial." Wilson
v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 929 (1995). 899 F.2d 1324, 1337 (2d Cir. 1990). 800 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir. 1986). See http://cryptome.org/doj-at-guide.htm
http://www.epic.org/privacy/terrorism/DOJ_guidance.pdf.
USA PATRIOT Act § 215, amending 50 U.S.C.
1862 and 1863. 50 U.S.C. §
1801 et seq. USA PATRIOT Act § 215, amending 50 U.S.C. §
1862(a)(1). USA PATRIOT Act § 215, amending 50 U.S.C. §
1862(c)(1). See 18 U.S.C. §
1862(b)(2)(B), prior to its amendment by USA PATRIOT Act § 215. FISA defines the term "United States persons" to include United States citizens and lawful permanent residents. See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(i). USA PATRIOT Act § 215, amending 50 U.S.C. §
1862(a)(1). See 50 U.S.C. §
1862(a), prior to its amendment by USA PATRIOT Act § 215. USA PATRIOT Act § 215, amending 50 U.S.C. §
1862. USA PATRIOT Act § 215, amending 50 U.S.C. §
1863. Pen registers record telephone numbers of outgoing calls. See 18 U.S.C. §
3127(3). Trap and trace devices record telephone numbers from which incoming calls originate. See 18 U.S.C. §
3127(4). USA PATRIOT Act § 216(c)(3) amending 18 U.S.C. §
3127(4) (emphasis added). USA PATRIOT Act § 216(b) amending 18 U.S.C. §
3123(a). In the case of orders for pen registers and trap and
trace devices, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 demands only "a
certification by the applicant that the information likely to be obtained is
relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation." 18 U.S.C. §§
3122(b)(2). See also Smith
v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). However, providing telephone dialing
information does not reveal the contents of telephone communications. USA PATRIOT Act § 216(b) amending 18 U.S.C. §
3123(a)(3)(A). Internet and Data Interception Capabilities Developed by the FBI, Statement of Dr. Donald M. Kerr, Assistant Director, Laboratory Division, July 24, 2000. http://www.tiaonline.org/standards/CALEA_JEM/CJEM727-126.pdf
USA PATRIOT Act § 216(b) amending 18 U.S.C. §
3123(b)(3).
50 U.S.C. §§
1804(a)(7)(B) and 1823(a)(7)(B)
USA PATRIOT Act § 218, amending 50 U.S.C. §§
1804(a)(7)(B) and 1823(a)(7)(B) (emphasis added).
407 U.S. 297 (1972).
407 U.S. at 313.
407 U.S. at 317.
407 U.S. at 309 (emphasis added).
United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 915 (4th Cir. 1980) (emphasis added). United States v. Johnson, 952 F.2d 565, 572 (9th Cir. 1992). See supra Note 8 and the accompanying text. The exclusionary rule is
a judicially created rule that bars prosecutors from using incriminating evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment to prove guilt. See, e.g.,
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). USA PATRIOT Act § 203(a), (b),
and (d). The information that may be shared must involve either "foreign intelligence or counterintelligence," as that term is defined in the National Security Act of 1947, at 50 U.S.C. §
401a, or "foreign intelligence information," as that term is defined in Section 203(a)(1), (b)(2)(C), and (d)(2).
USA PATRIOT Act §
203(a), amending Rule 6(e)(3)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
USA PATRIOT Act § 203(b), amending 18 U.S.C. §
2517(6).
USA PATRIOT Act §§ 203(d) and 905(a).
with Respect to Intelligence Activities,
Activities and the Rights of Americans, Final Report of the Senate Select
Activities, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1976). Under the Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA), non-citizens who have or are engaged
in "terrorist activities" or activities that threaten the national
security are subject to removal from the United States. See 8 U.S.C. §
1227(a)(4)(A) and (B).
Since 1983, the United States government has defined
the term "terrorism," "for statistical and analytical purposes," as the
"premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant
targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to
influence an audience." See
Terrorism 2000, United States Department of State, Introduction
(April 2001). USA PATRIOT Act § 411(a), amending 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(V)(b).
USA PATRIOT Act § 411(a), amending 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(IV)(bb) and (cc), (V)(bb) and (cc), and (VI)(cc) and (dd).
The Supreme Court has described guilt by association
as "alien to the traditions of a free society and the First
Amendment itself."
NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 932 (1982). See also
408 U.S. 169, 186 (1972).
USA PATRIOT Act § 411(a) amended 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(I) to include as a "terrorist organization" any
foreign organization so designated by the Secretary of State under 8 U.S.C. §
1189, a provision that was introduced in the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. As of October 5, 2001, 26
organizations had been designated as foreign terrorist organizations under 8 U.S.C. §
1189. See 66 Federal Register 51088-90 (Oct. 5, 2001). In order to qualify as a designated "foreign terrorist organization" under 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(I), the Secretary of State must find that "(A) the organization
is a foreign organization; (B) the organization engages in terrorist activity; and
(C) the terrorist activity of the organization threatens the security of United
States nationals or the national security of the United States." See 8 U.S.C. §
1189(a)(1)(A)-(C).
In addition, USA PATRIOT Act § 411(a) amended 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(II) to include as a "terrorist organization" any domestic or foreign organization so designated by the Secretary of State in consultation with or upon the
request of the Attorney General under Section 411.
On December 5, 2001, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the
Attorney General, designated 39 groups as Terrorist Exclusion List
organizations under this provision. See
66 Federal Register 63619-63620
(Dec. 7, 2001). In order to qualify as a designated "terrorist organization"
under 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(II), a "finding" must be made that the organization engages in one or more of the "terrorist activities" described in 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(I)-(III). These activities consist of: (1) "commit[ting] or incit[ing] to commit, under circumstances indicating an intention to cause death or serious bodily injury, a terrorist activity;" (2) "prepar[ing] or plan[ning] a terrorist activity;" and (3) "gather[ing] information on potential targets for terrorist activity." See 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(I)-(III). USA PATRIOT Act § 411(a), amending 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III). In order to qualify as an undesignated "terrorist
organization" under 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III), "a group of two or more individuals, whether organized or
not," must engage in one or more of the "terrorist activities" described in 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(I)-(III). See supra Note 59.
1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(IV)(cc), (V)(cc), and (VI)(dd).
USA PATRIOT Act § 411(c)(3)(A) and (B). USA PATRIOT Act § 412(a), adding 8 U.S.C. §
1226A(a).
USA PATRIOT Act § 412(a), adding 8 U.S.C. §
1226A(a)(3) and (5).
392 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968).
1226A(a)(2).
1226A(a)(7).
1226A(b)(1) and (2)(A)(iii) and (iv).
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
1226A(a)(6).
1226A(b)(1).
See Zadvydas
v. Davis, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 2500 (2001).
While the USA PATRIOT Act does not explicitly authorize the
use of secret evidence in immigration proceedings, its provisions are certain to
encourage its use. Since 1996, the INA has explicitly provided for the use of such
evidence in removal proceedings before the Alien Terrorist Removal Court. See 8 U.S.C. §
1531 et seq. In addition, the INS has long taken the position that it is authorized to use secret evidence in bond proceedings. See, e.g., Al Najjar v. Reno, 97 F.Supp.2d 1329 (S.D.Fl. 2000); Kiareldeen v. Reno, 71 F.Supp.2d 402 (D.N.J. 1999).
See Debs.
v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
See Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Linda Greenhouse,
New York Visit, O'Connor Foresees Limits on Freedom," The New York Times, Sept. 29, 2001, at B5.
Copyright © 2001 Nancy Clark