Source: http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/552/213/169248/
Timestamp: 2017-09-20 07:42:52
Document Index: 125321240

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1704', '§ 1708', '§ 3006', '§ 3006', '§ 3006', '§ 3006', '§ 3006']

United States of America, Appellee, v. Margaret Sailer, Appellant, 552 F.2d 213 (8th Cir. 1977) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Eighth Circuit › 1977 › United States of America, Appellee, v. Margaret Sailer, Appellant
United States of America, Appellee, v. Margaret Sailer, Appellant, 552 F.2d 213 (8th Cir. 1977)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit - 552 F.2d 213 (8th Cir. 1977)
Submitted March 14, 1977. Decided March 17, 1977. Rehearing Denied April 13, 1977. Certiorari Denied June 6, 1977. See 97 S. Ct. 2687
Margaret Sailer appeals from her conviction of obtaining a post office box key by false pretenses, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1704, and stealing a letter from the box, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1708. Her sole contention on appeal is that the District Court1 erred in denying her petition for authorization to employ a handwriting expert at government expense, pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e) (1).
Appellant's claim that she was entitled to government payment for her expert's services is based on 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e) (1), which provides:
This Court has formulated the following standard for authorization of services under § 3006A(e) (1): "While a trial court need not authorize an expenditure under subdivision (e) for a mere 'fishing expedition', it should not withhold its authority when underlying facts reasonably suggest that further exploration may prove beneficial to the accused in the development of a defense to the charge." United States v. Schultz, 431 F.2d 907, 911 (8th Cir. 1970) (footnote omitted). Other courts have interpreted the statute in similar fashion consistent with its remedial purpose, placing indigent defendants on a footing closer to that of prosecutors, who have resources of the government at their disposal. United States v. Durant, 545 F.2d 823, 827 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Bass, 477 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Theriault, 440 F.2d 713, 715 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 984, 93 S. Ct. 2278, 36 L. Ed. 2d 960 (1973).
It should be noted that the application for authorization was completed late in the case. One seeking authorization for funds under § 3006A(e) (1) must meet a two pronged test: "(1) The accused must satisfy the court that financial inability prevents him from obtaining the services he requests; and (2) The accused must show need for such services to present an adequate defense." United States v. Schultz, supra, 431 F.2d at 908 (footnote omitted). Appellant did not show even a colorable ability to meet either prong of this test until she filed the documents on Friday, July 30, 1976. This was seventeen days before the trial date, and almost three months after appellant's counsel appeared in the case. Monday, August 2, thus became the earliest day when appellant could have looked for favorable action. The District Court entered its order on August 9. The expert was in fact finally retained on Thursday, August 12. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the time spent by the District Court in considering the motion affected appellant's expert's ability to form an opinion.
Given the tardiness of the application for authorization, the indication that the expert witness' unwillingness to testify regarding the post office box key application did not result from court delay, and the failure of appellant at any time to seek a continuance for purposes of trial preparation, we cannot say that the denial of authorization under § 3006A(e) (1) was prejudicial error.