Source: http://www.copyhype.com/2011/04/oh-tenenbaum/
Timestamp: 2020-05-28 19:05:11
Document Index: 316804456

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 504', '§ 501', '§ 107', '§ 506', '§ 504', '§ 501', '§ 107', '§ 506']

The film Erin Brockovich portrays the tale of a single mother without a formal legal education who launched a successful fight against a large utility company alleged to be contaminating groundwater and sickening the local population, leading to the largest settlement paid in a direct action lawsuit in US history. 1According to Wikipedia.
Don’t get me wrong, $675,000 is a lot of money, and Tenenbaum was one of the unlucky quarter of 1/10 of one percent of illegal filesharers to be sued by the record labels between 2003 and 2008, 2This is a back-of-the-envelope calculation, derived from InternetWorldStats number of US internet users in 2005, Interpret’s percentage of internet users who have downloaded illegally, and record label court filings indicating the number of named defendants contacted during the litigation campaign. and of those, one of only 2 out of 18,000 defendants to have gotten a jury award of statutory damages against him.
On July 9, 2010, Judge Gertner reduced the jury’s award of $675,000 to $67,500 on constitutional grounds in Sony BMG Music Entertainment v. Tenenbaum. 3721 F.Supp.2d 85 (D. Mass). This is in contrast to the reduction of the jury award in the Jammie Thomas case, which was made under the common law procedure of remittitur 4Capitol Records v. Thomas-Rasset, 680 F.Supp.2d 1045 (D. Minn 2010). — and, in fact, Judge Gertner relied in part on the fact that the plaintiffs in Thomas-Rasset had rejected the remitted award to support her conclusion that the constitutional question in Tenenbaum could not be avoided. 5As Gertner observed, it is a generally accepted principle that courts should “avoid confronting constitutional questions when they can reasonably rest their holdings on other grounds.”
[wpaudio url=”http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/files/audio/10-1883.mp3″ text=”Oral arguments – Sony BMG Music Entertainment v. Tenenbaum” dl=”0″]
Judge Gertner concluded that the damages were unconstitutional using the analysis from BMW of North America v. Gore. 6517 US 559 (1996). There, the Supreme Court set out three guideposts for determining whether an award of punitive damages runs afoul of the Due Process Clause: (1) “the degree of reprehensibility of” the defendant’s acts, (2) “the disparity between the harm or potential harm suffered by [the plaintiff and the] punitive damages award”, and (3) “the difference between this remedy and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.”
The record labels and government disagree with Gertner’s choice of standard. They argue that the damages should be analyzed under the more deferential standard of St. Louis v. Williams 7251 US 63 (1919). because, unlike the punitive damages involved in Gore, statutory damages are set by law. The Court in Williams was tasked with determining whether a penalty set by statute violated the Due Process Clause. It concluded that governments “possess a wide latitude of discretion” in setting statutory penalties, and the limitations of the Due Process Clause only come into play when a penalty is “so severe and oppressive as to be wholly disproportioned to the offense and obviously unreasonable.”
What’s more, the issue of whether the award is unreasonable or unfair has to be viewed in light of the fact that it is roughly half the average of every jury award of statutory damages in P2P infringement cases that reached a jury verdict. 8Tenenbaum’s liability of $675,000 for 30 songs comes out to $22,500/song. The award in Jammie Thomas’s first civil trial was $9,250/song, in her second $80,000/song, and in the third trial, which concerned the amount of damages only, the jury awarded $62,500/song. All four juries that considered these cases, seeing the evidence with their own eyes and hearing the testimony for themselves, and weighing the amount of damages to award in light of the circumstances, have found it appropriate to hold P2P infringers liable for an average of $43,662.50 a song. The argument is essentially that each and every jury has acted unreasonably and unfairly.
But if the meaning of the statute is plain on its face, there is typically no need for further interpretation. 9US v. Ron Pair Enterprises, 489 US 235 (1989). Presumably, Congress intended the law to mean what it wrote it to say.
And I think the language of the statutory damage provision of the Copyright Act is quite clear. Statutory damages apply to any “infringer of copyright.” 1017 USC § 504(a). An “infringer of copyright” is “anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner.” (Emphasis added). 1117 USC § 501(a). In contrast, other provisions expressly take commercial use into consideration: for example, fair use (“In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include—(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes”) 1217 USC § 107. and criminal copyright infringement (“Any person who willfully infringes a copyright shall be punished as provided under section 2319 of title 18, if the infringement was committed—(A) for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain”). 1317 USC § 506(a). There’s simply nothing in the language of the Copyright Act that supports a commercial/noncommercial distinction for awards of statutory damages.
Tenenbaum’s second argument asserts that the Supreme Court declared the current statutory damages provision unconstitutional in Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television. 14523 US 340 (1998). It’s a creative argument, and one Feltner himself made after his case was remanded from the Supreme Court. 15Columbia Pictures v. Krypton Broadcasting, 259 F.3d 1186, 1192-93 (9th Cir. 2001). The 9th Circuit rejected this argument as unpersuasive, a position “contrary to the express language of the Supreme Court’s decision” and one based on a failed understanding of the holding in that case. Nevertheless, Tenenbaum hopes to convince the First Circuit that the 9th Circuit was mistaken.
1. ↑ According to Wikipedia.
2. ↑ This is a back-of-the-envelope calculation, derived from InternetWorldStats number of US internet users in 2005, Interpret’s percentage of internet users who have downloaded illegally, and record label court filings indicating the number of named defendants contacted during the litigation campaign.
3. ↑ 721 F.Supp.2d 85 (D. Mass).
4. ↑ Capitol Records v. Thomas-Rasset, 680 F.Supp.2d 1045 (D. Minn 2010).
5. ↑ As Gertner observed, it is a generally accepted principle that courts should “avoid confronting constitutional questions when they can reasonably rest their holdings on other grounds.”
6. ↑ 517 US 559 (1996).
7. ↑ 251 US 63 (1919).
8. ↑ Tenenbaum’s liability of $675,000 for 30 songs comes out to $22,500/song. The award in Jammie Thomas’s first civil trial was $9,250/song, in her second $80,000/song, and in the third trial, which concerned the amount of damages only, the jury awarded $62,500/song.
9. ↑ US v. Ron Pair Enterprises, 489 US 235 (1989).
10. ↑ 17 USC § 504(a).
11. ↑ 17 USC § 501(a).
12. ↑ 17 USC § 107.
13. ↑ 17 USC § 506(a).
14. ↑ 523 US 340 (1998).
15. ↑ Columbia Pictures v. Krypton Broadcasting, 259 F.3d 1186, 1192-93 (9th Cir. 2001).
I’m very surprised you didn’t listen to the words of Whitney Harper as well, nor comment on them:
Harper’s case presented a different issue than Tenenbaum’s.
Harper’s case involved her attempted use of the “innocent infringer” defense, which ultimately failed before the appellate court and the Supreme Court (cert. denied).
Tenenbaum’s case could not be more different. He admitted infringement, both downloading and uploading. He admitted wilfullness. He admitted having engaged in his actions over a course of many years, with his activities embracing far, far, far more than just the few works selected by the plaintiffs for purposes of filing their lawsuit. During the course of the trial he continued to engage in activities directly contrary to the orders of the court.
Yes, his case could not be more different.
I was more concerned with what she has actually said as a result of the litigation against her. Her case is similar from the statutory damages claim that gives her a $30,000 lien against her name for infringement.
I’m glad to see people begin to realize that the litigation issue seems to be coming to an end in copyright, no matter how that comes to be.
Bear in mind, the statutory damages and the jury issue do need to be resolved in some capacity. We have had quite a number of years of filesharing. There’s plenty of evidence to say that artists have not been harmed by the unbundling of CDs. There’s no justifiable reason to try to sue someone for half a million dollars when they didn’t have it in the first place.
Although Tenenbaum had a chaotic defense, it is quite dubious to say ” The argument is essentially that each and every jury has acted unreasonably and unfairly,” if the instructions merely tell the jurors to pick a number between $750 and $22,750.
With the statutory damages set by Congress, the incentive to criminalize filesharing has increased tremendously. 2008 was the year of the RIAA suing the world. Obviously, there’s much better ways to make the world go round than the cases of Tenenbaum, Thomas, and Harper.
“The argument is essentially that each and every jury has acted unreasonably and unfairly,” if the instructions merely tell the jurors to pick a number between $750 and $22,750 [per infringement].”
“With the statutory damages set by Congress, the incentive to criminalize filesharing has increased tremendously. 2008 was the year of the RIAA suing the world. [They tried to sue people for infringements until the courts used the same defenses that the mass infringement cases are hinged on. Obviously, there’s much better ways to make the world go round than the [strong arm of copyright being used against alleged infringers. Using the litigation side of copyright for] cases [such as] Tenenbaum, Thomas, and Harper,[ aren’t going to make people spend money for music. There need to be better ways than court cases to show the way.]
To Jay’s post of 4/24/2011 at 10:06 PM:
I am aware of no movement within Congress to extend the criminal provisions specified in Title 17. They are tightly constrained in scope, and none of the various proposals within Congress over the past several years have suggested an extension of what comprises criminal activity under Title 17.
Quite frankly, I am much more concerned with the possibility that Congress and the states might make a move to rely upon their inherent power to tax against P2P transfers, much like what several states are attempting to do with respect to sales using the internet.
This site purports to examine the economic impact of federal and state legislation. It seems to me that activities such as “inactivity” and file transfers would be an interesting subject to examine and present in an article here.
The last paragraph was included by mistake. It was meant to be included in a post on an entirely different site. My apologies to Mr. Hart.
Is there not at least two copyright bills that seem to be effectively going in the wrong direction? Namely COICA seems to be targeted at “rogue sites” by making the AG more prevalent.
Then there is the fashion copyright bill that is ill advised to become law. What’s truly egregious is the very fact that the main supporter of the bill, “infringed” on a minor competitor.
For the former, I have yet to see Rep. Issa or Leahy have any proof that these are needed. They say they want to fight piracy, but a look at who is supporting them tells a very different story.
Regarding the latter, Johanna Blakely does well in discussing the limits of copyright in fashion
As Mr. S correctly pointed out, the proposed COICA wouldn’t extend what comprises criminal infringement under Title 17 — it adds duties for third-party service providers engaged in business with websites already subject to forfeiture proceedings for existing violations of the criminal provisions of the Copyright Act.
The Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act only provides for civil, not criminal, enforcement. (And though the protection under the Act shares some similarities with copyright law and would be found in Title 17, it is not an amendment to the Copyright Act.)
You really shouldn’t link to that PFF piece, you are above the dishonest, low-blow tactics of Tom Sydnor. I read and respect your views though I differ in opinion about 50% of the time, linking to hacks like him makes me question your motives. The Sydnors of the world do nothing to advance rational debate, only drag it down to hysteria and half-truths.
That’s fine if you don’t agree with me all the time and I respect that, but those are the words of Whitney Harper. I have no idea who Tom Snyder is.
Jay – That comment was directed toward Terry, not you. I have no problem with you linking to something Whitney Harper said, but I do have an issue with Terry linking to the now defunct Progress and Freedom Foundation’s attack-dog (Tom Sydnor).
I apologize as well. I had thought your comment was a direct reply to mine, which seemed to confuse me. Reading, I did come across the PFF link and was a little confused.
I liked your footnote to Erin Brokovitch.
It seems that issue has been taken concerning the link to the PFF. In so doing the “message” is being deprecated solely on the basis of the person who presented the “message”.
I am quite pleased that you have chosen to ignore the “message/messenger” distinction.
The arguments before the appeals court were quite interesting, including the “argument” by a representative of the EFF.
Frankly, as appeals arguments go the only ones that addressed the issues ON APPEAL were those presented by the USG and the Plaintiffs/Respondents. I must admit confusion regarding the argument on Mr. Tenenbaum’s behalf that the jury instruction should have mentioned only a “floor”, and not a “ceiling”. The same can be said of the “commercial/non-commercial” distinction since the statute draws no such distinction. In all candor, I have always considered the fundamental issues at stake here being: (1) The role of the jury vis a vis that of the presiding judge, and (2) the deferrence to be extended by the judiciary to Congress in the balance it has chosen to strike.
I have concerns regarding some of the substantive provisions contained within Title 17, but I have much graver concerns relating to (1) and (2) above.