Source: http://www.chanrobles.com/usa/us_supremecourt/419/544/case.php
Timestamp: 2019-09-21 01:04:36
Document Index: 421449282

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 8', '§ 1154', '§ 1154', '§ 1151', '§ 1154', '§ 1161', '§ 1154', '§ 8']

UNITED STATES V. MAZURIE, 419 U. S. 544 (1975) - US SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON-LINE
US Supreme Court Decisions On-Line> Volume 419 > UNITED STATES V. MAZURIE, 419 U. S. 544 (1975)
Subscribe to Cases that cite 419 U. S. 544
2. Congress has the authority under Art. I, § 8, of the Constitution to regulate the distribution of alcoholic beverages by establishments such as respondents' bar. Such authority is adequate, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The respondents were convicted of introducing spirituous beverages into Indian country, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1154. [Footnote 1] The Court of Appeals for the Tenth chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Wind River Reservation was established by treaty in 1868. Located in a rather arid portion of central Wyoming, at least some of its 2,300,000 acres have been described by Mr. Justice Cardozo as "fair and fertile," Shoshone Tribe v. United States, 299 U. S. 476, 299 U. S. 486 (1937). It straddles the Wind River, with its remarkable canyon, and lies in a mile-high basin at the foot of the Wind River Mountains, whose rugged, glaciated peaks and ridges form a portion of the Continental Divide. [Footnote 2] The reservation is occupied by the Shoshone and Arapahoe Tribes. Although these tribes were once "ancestral foes," ibid., they are today jointly known as the Wind River Tribes. As a result of various patents, substantial tracts of non-Indian-held land are scattered within the reservation's boundaries. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Before 1953, federal law generally prohibited the introduction of alcoholic beverages into "Indian country." 18 U.S.C. § 1154(a). "Indian country" was defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1151 to include non-Indian-held lands "within the limits of any Indian reservation." [Footnote 3] In 1949, the term was given a narrower meaning, insofar as relevant to the liquor prohibition, so as to exclude both fee-patented lands within "non-Indian communities".and rights-of-way through reservations.Act of May 24, 1949, 63 Stat. 94, 18 U.S.C. § 1154(c), supra, n 1. The quoted term is not defined, a fact which creates problems with which we shall shortly deal. In 1953, Congress passed local option legislation allowing Indian tribes, with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, to regulate the introduction of liquor into Indian country, so long as state law was not violated.Act of Aug. 15, 1953, 67 Stat. 586, 18 U.S.C. § 1161. [Footnote 4] The Wind River Tribes responded to this option by adopting an ordinance which permitted chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The case was tried to the District Court without a jury. Since most of the factual issues were disposed of by stipulations, [Footnote 7] the testimony at trial primarily dealt with chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
487 F.2d 18.
It is well established that vagueness challenges to statutes which do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in the light of the facts of the case at hand. United States v. National Dairy Products Corp., 372 U. S. 29 (1963). In determining whether § 1154(c) is unconstitutionally vague as to respondents, we must therefore first consider the evidence as to the location of the Blue Bull. [Footnote 9] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Other evidence bearing on whether the Blue Bull was located in a non-Indian community was Martin Mazurie's testimony that the bar served both Indians and non-Indians, and that: "We are kind of out there by ourselves, you know." App. 70. A transcript of the hearing on chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
We think that the foregoing evidence was sufficient to justify the District Court's implied conclusion that Fort Washakie and its surrounding settlements did not compose a non-Indian community. We do not read the opinion of the Court of Appeals as reaching a conclusion contrary to that which we have just stated. That court instead based its decision on the proposition that such proof did not go far enough, a view generated by its opinion of the requirements this statute must meet in order to avoid the vice of vagueness. The Court of Appeals was looking for proof beyond a reasonable doubt of precisely defined concepts of "Indian" and "community." We gather that it expected persons treated as "Indians" in the housing and school surveys to be proved to satisfy a specific statutory definition. Similarly, it apparently expected that proof concerning the "community" should have conformed to some specific statutory definition, presumably one keyed to a geographical area with precise boundaries. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Court of Appeals expressed doubt that "the Government has the power to regulate a business on the land it granted in fee without restrictions." 487 F.2d 18. Because that court went on to hold that, even if Congress did possess such power, it could not be delegated to an Indian tribe, that court did not find it necessary to chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Article I, § 8, of the Constitution gives Congress power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." This Court has repeatedly held that this clause affords Congress the power to prohibit or regulate the sale of alcoholic beverages to tribal Indians, wherever situated, and to prohibit or regulate the introduction of alcoholic beverages into Indian country. [Footnote 11] 70 U. S. 417-418 (1866); United States v. Forty-three Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U. S. 188, 93 U. S. 194-195 (1876); Ex parte Webb, 225 U. S. 663, 225 U. S. 683-684 (1912); Perrin v. United States, 232 U. S. 478, 232 U. S. 482 (1914); Johnson v. Gearlds, 234 U. S. 422, 234 U. S. 438-439 (1914); United States v. Nice,@ 241 U. S. 591, 241 U. S. 597 (1916).
Perrin v. United States, supra, demonstrates the controlling principle. It dealt with the sale of intoxicating beverages within premises owned by non-Indians, on privately held land in an organized non-Indian municipality. The land originally had been included in the Yankton Sioux Indian Reservation, but had been ceded to the United States. The cession agreement, as ratified and confirmed by Congress, specified that alcoholic beverages would never be sold on the ceded land. The land chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
We hold that neither the Constitution nor our previous cases leave any room for doubt that Congress possesses chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
487 F.2d 19.
This Court has recognized limits on the authority of Congress to delegate its legislative power. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 (1935). Those limitations are, however, less stringent in cases where the entity chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
exercising the delegated authority itself possesses independent authority over the subject matter. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 299 U. S. 319-322 (1936). Thus, it is an important aspect of this case that Indian tribes are unique aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory, 31 U. S. 557 (1832); they are "a separate people" possessing "the power of regulating their internal and social relations . . . ," United States v. Kagama, 118 U. S. 375, 118 U. S. 381-382 (1886); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n,@ 411 U. S. 164, 411 U. S. 173 (1973).
The fact that the Mazuries could not become members of the tribe, and therefore could not participate in the tribal government, does not alter our conclusion. This claim, that, because respondents are non-Indians Congress chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Id. at 358 U. S. 223 (citations omitted). chanroblesvirtualawlibrary