Source: http://www.chanrobles.com/usa/us_supremecourt/331/519/case.php
Timestamp: 2020-01-18 07:34:22
Document Index: 113069208

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 16', '§ 17', '§ 45', '§ 17', '§ 45', '§ 17', '§ 17', '§ 16', '§ 17', '§ 17', '§ 17', '§ 17', '§ 17', '§ 17', '§ 17', '§ 17', '§ 16', '§ 17', '§ 17', '§ 17', '§ 17', '§ 45', '§ 17']

The origin of this suit is to be found in an order issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission on May 16, 1922. Chicago Junction Case, 71 I.C.C. 631. See also Chicago Junction Case, 264 U. S. 258. The Commission there approved the purchase by the New York Central Railroad Co. (Central) of all the capital stock of the Chicago River & Indiana Railroad Co. (River Road); it also authorized the leasing to River Road of all the properties of the Chicago Junction Railway Co. (Junction) for 99 years and thereafter, at the lessee's option, in perpetuity. Among the properties in question were trackage and switching facilities at the Union Stock Yards, Chicago, Illinois, connecting with various trunk lines. Prior to the Commission order, the practice had been for the trunk line railroads to use their own power and crews to move their empty and loaded livestock cars over these tracks to and from the loading places in the Union Stock Yards. For the privilege of so moving their cars, the railroads were charged $1.00 per car, loaded or empty.
71 I.C.C. at 639. This condition is still in effect, the Commission's decision and order having been found to be valid and binding on all parties in a proceeding in the District Court in 1929. [Footnote 1]
The trunk line railroads have continued to use their own power and crews in moving their livestock cars over the trackage operated by River Road and have paid River Road the amount of $1.00 per car. But, on January 25, 1946, Central and River Road notified the railroads that, on and after February 1, 1946, the cars would be moved over this trackage by means of the power and crews of River Road, and that the handling charge would be $12.96 per outbound loaded car. Soon after this new practice went into effect, the trunk line railroads (appellees herein) brought this suit for preliminary and permanent injunctions under § 16(12) of the Interstate Commerce Act against Central, River Road, and Junction. They claimed that the new practice was in violation of the third condition of the 1922 Commission order. They accordingly sought to enjoin the defendants and "their respective officers, agents, representatives, servants, employees, and successors" from disobeying the order, especially the third condition thereof, and to force the defendants to permit them to move their cars with their own power and crews. The Commission was allowed to intervene as a party plaintiff; its intervening complaint also prayed for an chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
injunction against the alleged violation of the third condition by the defendants and their employees. [Footnote 2]
The District Court thereupon issued a preliminary injunction as requested. Central, River Road and Junction, and "their respective officers, agents, representatives, employees, and successors," were restrained from disobeying the 1922 Commission order and from violating the third condition of that order, and were commanded to permit the trunk line railroads to move their cars over the River Road line with their own power and crews. The court concluded as a matter of law that the facts relative to chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
the labor dispute between the Brotherhood and River Road were "irrelevant and immaterial." [Footnote 3]
Three days after the preliminary injunction became effective, the Brotherhood asked leave to file its special appearance for the purpose of moving to vacate the injunction and to dismiss the proceedings for failure to join the Brotherhood and its members as indispensable parties. This motion was denied. River Road then filed its answer to the original complaint, pointing out that the changed arrangement resulted from the labor dispute with the Brotherhood and contending that this new practice did not violate the 1922 Commission order. The Brotherhood thereafter filed its motion to intervene generally as a party defendant, alleging that the primary purpose of the suit was to nullify its agreement with River Road and to deprive the Brotherhood members of the work they were performing under that agreement, and that the Brotherhood members were therefore indispensable parties. The contention was made that the Brotherhood had an unconditional right to intervene by virtue of § 17(11) of the Interstate Commerce Act [Footnote 4] and Rule 24(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and 28 U.S.C. § 45a was later added in support of this contention. But the motion to intervene was denied by order, without opinion.
The District Court then allowed an appeal to this Court from its order denying intervention. The appellee railroads moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that such an order was not final, and hence was not appealable, the Brotherhood not being entitled to intervene as a chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Ordinarily, in the absence of an abuse of discretion, no appeal lies from an order denying leave to intervene where intervention is a permissive matter within the discretion of the court. United States v. California Canneries, 279 U. S. 553, 279 U. S. 556. [Footnote 5] The permissive nature of such intervention necessarily implies that, if intervention is denied, the applicant is not legally bound or prejudiced by any judgment that might be entered in the case. He is at liberty to assert and protect his interests in some more appropriate proceeding. Having no adverse effect upon the applicant, the order denying intervention accordingly falls below the level of appealability. But where a statute or the practical necessities grant the applicant an absolute right to intervene, the order denying intervention becomes appealable. Then it may fairly be said that the applicant is adversely affected by the denial, there being no other way in which he can better assert the particular interest which warrants intervention in this instance. And since he cannot appeal from any subsequent order or judgment in the proceeding unless he does intervene, the order denying intervention has the degree of definitiveness which supports an appeal therefrom. See Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co. v. United States, 312 U. S. 502, 312 U. S. 508.
Our jurisdiction to consider an appeal from an order denying intervention thus depends upon the nature of the applicant's right to intervene. If the right is absolute, the order is appealable, and we may judge it on its merits. But if the matter is one within the discretion of the trial chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Brotherhood claims that as a consequence of either of two federal statutes -- § 17(11) of the Interstate Commerce Act or 28 U.S.C. § 45a -- it has an absolute right to intervene within the meaning of Rule 24(a)(1). It also alleges that it possesses an absolute right within the contemplation of Rule 24(a)(2), the representation of its interest by existing parties being inadequate and the possibility that it may be bound by a judgment in the action being a real one. No claim to permissive intervention chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In our view, § 17(11) of the Interstate Commerce Act does give the Brotherhood an absolute right to intervene in the instant proceeding within the meaning of Rule 24(a)(1). As set forth in 54 Stat. 916, [Footnote 6] this portion of the Act reads:
Second. The right of intervention granted to such a representative by § 17(11) applies to a court proceeding under § 16(12) of the Act, the plain language of § 17(11) extending its reach to "any proceeding arising under this Act." chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
We cannot sanction such a construction of these words. It is true, of course, that § 17 is concerned primarily with the organization of the Commission and its subdivisions and with the administrative disposition of matters coming within that agency's jurisdiction. At least ten of the twelve paragraphs of § 17 deal with those matters. And, before § 17 was cast into its present form in 1940, all five of its paragraphs related exclusively to those matters. Congress rewrote the section when it enacted the Transportation Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 898, continuing and modifying previous provisions and consolidating and including matters which had formerly been scattered throughout the Act. [Footnote 7] At the same time, however, it was expressly recognized that certain paragraphs were being added which were entirely new -- paragraphs which went beyond purely administrative matters. Thus, the pertinent committee chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
reports stated [Footnote 8] that
And, as to paragraph (11), it was said [Footnote 9] that
That the heading of § 17 fails to refer to all the matters which the framers of that section wrote into the text is not an unusual fact. That heading is but a shorthand reference to the general subject matter involved. While accurately referring to the subjects of Commission procedure and organization, it neglects to reveal that § 17 also deals with judicial review of administrative orders, and with intervention by employee representatives. But headings and titles are not meant to take the place of the detailed provisions of the text. Nor are they necessarily designed to be a reference guide or a synopsis. Where the text is complicated and prolific, headings and titles can do no more than indicate the provisions in a most general manner; to attempt to refer to each specific provision would often be ungainly, as well as useless. As a result, matters in the text which deviate from those falling within the general pattern are frequently unreflected in the headings and titles. Factors of this type have led to the wise rule that the title of a statute and chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
the heading of a section cannot limit the plain meaning of the text. 6 U. S. 386; Cornell v. Coyne, 192 U. S. 418, 192 U. S. 430; Strathearn S.S. Co. v. Dillon,@ 252 U. S. 348, 252 U. S. 354. For interpretative purposes, they are of use only when they shed light on some ambiguous word or phrase. They are but tools available for the resolution of a doubt. But they cannot undo or limit that which the text makes plain.
Here, the meaning of § 17(11) is unmistakable on its face. There is a simple unambiguous reference to "any proceeding arising under this Act" or, as the House committee paraphrased it, [Footnote 10] to "any proceedings arising under part I." There is not a word which would warrant limiting this reference so as to allow intervention only in proceedings arising under § 17 or in proceedings before the Commission. The proceedings mentioned are those which arise under this Act, an Act under which both judicial and administrative proceedings may arise. [Footnote 11] The instant case is a ready illustration of a judicial proceeding arising under this Act; a suit of this nature is authorized solely by § 16(12) of the Act. [Footnote 12] Hence, it is a proceeding to which the right of intervention may attach by virtue of § 17(11).
Nor do we perceive any reason of statutory policy why the framers of § 17(11) should have wished to confine the right of intervention by employee representatives to proceedings chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Since all the conditions of § 17(11) have been satisfied in this case, the only question that remains is whether the Brotherhood is thereby accorded a permissive or an absolute right to intervene. The language of § 17(11) is in chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Some statutes speak of intervention "as of right." Thus, where suit is brought by or against the United States to enforce or set aside a Commission order, the Commission or the parties in interest to the proceeding before the Commission "may appear as parties thereto . . . as of right." 28 U.S.C. § 45a. In such a case, the right to intervene is absolute and unconditional. Sprunt & Son v. United States, 281 U. S. 249, 281 U. S. 255.
We thus conclude that § 17(11) gives the Brotherhood an absolute right to intervene in this proceeding, making it unnecessary to discuss whether, and to what extent, the chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
See also Ex parte Cutting, 94 U. S. 14; Credits Commutation Co. v. United States, 177 U. S. 311; Ex parte Leaf Tobacco Board of Trade, 222 U. S. 578; In re Engelhard, 231 U. S. 646; City of New York v. Consolidated Gas Co., 253 U. S. 219; New York City v. New York Telephone Co., 261 U. S. 312.