Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/174233343/Defence-Reform-Bill
Timestamp: 2016-12-03 10:27:31
Document Index: 459368523

Matched Legal Cases: ['art 1', 'art 1', 'art 2', 'art 6', 'art2', 'art 6', 'art2']

Defence Reform Bill | Military | Bill (Law)
BrowseInterestsBiography & MemoirBusiness & LeadershipFiction & LiteraturePolitics & EconomyHealth & WellnessSociety & CultureHappiness & Self-HelpMystery, Thriller & CrimeHistoryYoung AdultBrowse byBooksAudiobooksArticlesSheet MusicBrowse allUploadSign inJoinDefence Reform Bill: Public Bill Committee StageStandard Note: Last updated: Author: Section SN06732 4 October 2013 Claire Mills International Affairs and Defence
The intention of the Defence Reform Bill is to implement some of the proposals for reform that have been made in two recent White Papers: Better Defence Acquisition, Cm 8626 and Reserves in the Future Force 2020, Cm 8655. Specifically, the Bill establishes the arrangements for reforming Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S) and turning it into a Government-Owned, Contractor-Operated (GOCO) organisation. It creates a statutory framework for the governance of MOD single source contracts and makes several amendments to the regulations governing the Reserve Forces. Second reading of the Defence Reform Bill was held on 16 July 2013. The Public Bill Committee held four general sessions on the principles of Bill at the beginning of September 2013. Line-by-line consideration of the Bill is scheduled to begin on 8 October and the last scheduled date for committee hearings is 24 October 2013. Notice of amendments was given on 3 October 2013. This note looks at the discussion and amendments to the Bill made during the Public Bill Committee stage, and the wider debate on the Bill’s proposals, in particular the establishment of a Government-Owned, Contractor-Operated (GOCO) model for Defence Equipment and Support.
1 General Discussion 1.1 Establishing a GOCO The Need for a GOCO Conflicts of Interest, Foreign Control and Lack of Competition Safeguards on Performance Intellectual Property 1.2 Single Source Contract Regulations 1.3 The Reserves 2 Committee Amendments 2 2 2 6 10 11 12 13 15 1
Many of the witnesses who gave evidence in all four Committee sessions shared similar concerns over the creation of a GOCO. Namely: the motivation behind the proposals; conflicts of interest among the bidders, foreign ownership and the lack of competition within the GOCO bid process; assurances on intellectual property; and safeguards on performance by the GOCO contractor, including the MOD’s ability to act as an intelligent customer. The Need for a GOCO Primarily the question was asked why there needs to be a GOCO when the main challenges to defence acquisition (such as an overheated equipment plan) appear to have been largely addressed through the broader defence reform agenda, and that the outstanding issue of skills and competencies could equally be effectively managed within a reformed DE&S. At
If one looks at some of the drivers in terms of defence procurement and some of the problems that have been experienced historically, there has been overheating in the procurement programme. We are told that the books are balanced. That issue, to some extent, has been resolved. I know people still have questions with regard to that. There has been an issue about fractured relationships. We heard earlier this week about the Levene reforms and efforts being made to reform the types of relationships and decision making within the Department and with stakeholders. The key driving force behind the issue of the GoCo, as we see it, is about skills and competencies within the organisation to meet procurement needs. It has been a frustration on our side, but it cannot be beyond the wit of either man or woman that within the public sector we can have the skills and the competencies. What you need is an HR organisational framework that actually supports those competencies and skills within the organisation, because this function is different from a number of other civil service Departments that I have looked at. There is the issue of supporting specialisms, and the suggestion here is that what is needed is flexibilities—HR and reward flexibilities— to ensure that the appropriate skills and competencies are there. Surely we can achieve that in the public sector? 1
The Public and Commercial Services Union (PCS) also agreed with this view. In its written submission to the Committee it stated that it “believes that existing DE&S staff already have the vast majority of skills to deliver world-class procurement and that the risks of moving to a GOCO are too high... the work must remain in the civil service and [more must be done] to retain, recruit and incentivise DE&S staff... The perceived problems of recruitment and retention are symptoms of civil service pay restraint, which can be solved by removing the constraints on pay, terms and conditions”. 2 In oral evidence, Chris Dando, PCS Ministry of Defence Group President, also suggested that most of the problems in procurement “in our view are not caused within DE&S organisation; most of them are external to it... we believe that the DE&S plus discussions with the Treasury to loosed the Treasury cap on salaries is the right way to do it, rather than to put it out to the private sector where, really, the Government are going to have no control over salaries whatever”. 3 Mr Dando also observed that at present there is a great deal of uncertainty among employees about the future. Of particular concern is whether the TUPE regulations will protect them in a privatised environment, and what assurances are there that jobs will not be moved because a private company can do it cheaper elsewhere. 4 Calls were also made by both union representatives for a coherent set of terms and conditions to be established for all staff, both existing staff and new entrants, in order to avoid the creation of a two–tier work force. Garry Graham observed that “An approach that effectively allows for a two-tier work force within this type of knowledge-based organisation would be deeply damaging, in terms of flexibility and the ability to recruit and retain people”. 5
In contrast, Lord Hamilton, a former defence minister, expressed strong support for the GOCO proposal, staing the belief that “I have always taken the view that private contractors are much better at managing people and motivating them”. 7 In responding to these concerns Minister for Defence Equipment and Support, Philip Dunne, stated:
Bernard Gray: It is harder for it to compete. By the way, it is not employment law; it is the way that the GovernmentQ78 Mrs Moon: But if the Treasury does not loosen those strings, it is dead in the water. Bernard Gray: I would not go as far as saying that, but we do not know what we will get out of the other side yet. You are trying to get me to prejudge an experiment that has not yet been run. When I get to the end of the competition and come here to discuss it, we will see what we have in DE&S-plus, what we have in GoCo and which looks like the most viable contribution towards maintaining the acquisition and support of matériel for the armed forces. 9
It is very clear, given the economy that exists within the defence sector, that companies that are participants in the sector and suppliers to the MOD and others will also potentially be part of this. At the moment, our assumption is that in contracting for a GoCo—if that is the route that is finally taken—there will be either contractual requirements that prevent companies from bidding for contracts within themselves, or a set of rules put in place to ensure that the relationships are not inappropriate. At the moment, there is an open question as to how the operational aspects of the GoCo will be delivered. 14
Chris Dando: I think the biggest concerns are about conflicts of interest, and the extent to which it is possible to protect the knowledge that the DE&S organisation and its various constituent parts will have from spilling out into other activities. We have yet to be convinced that the Chinese walls that may need to continue through this organisation will be sufficient to protect that. I can understand that there will be some nervousness from people who already have a contractual relationship with DE&S about the details of their bids and their cost bases being known to a third party. I am not convinced that there is sufficient rigour or protection in the Bill to avoid that, because I am not sure how you would. Garry Graham: Concerns have been raised about the protection of intellectual property and the Bill’s provisions, and about conflicts of interest, particularly if contracts are already let to certain organisations that are bidding to be part of this. My experience of the regulatory environment elsewhere is that it is not just about people’s concerns; perceptions have a validity in and of themselves. They may not be able to prove them in a court of law or undertake litigation, but the very fact that there are perceptions or concerns about that is, I think, telling of itself. 15
One of the things that constrains the pool of companies able to do this for us is that we have already ruled out a lot of potential companies for conflict of interest reasons. It has been a very active process, and it has taken about four months to go through it in great detail with all those people. Prime defence contractors—the BAE Systems and Lockheeds of this world—unlike for the lead system integrator role, are barred from doing this. The conflict of interest of the people who are here is pretty small. It is related to a few extant contracts that were let some time ago. They have all accepted that they will not be able to come in and bid for any work that is being managed by the GoCo. 16
Ms Stuart: Yes. You said that you excluded defence contractors on that basis, but you will never be able to eliminate conflicts of interest completely. Could you say a bit about how you intend to manage those conflict of interest situations and whether there are situations that you could envisage where it would become unacceptable? You gave examples of where you do manage conflict of interest; in nuclear it is fairly well defined [...] Bernard Gray: Within the governor, we will have a permanent group looking at conflict of interest in the way that we do now. Effectively, if there was something that potentially gave rise to a conflict of interest, we would examine it on a case-by-case basis. We have already been through an exhaustive effort, in pre-qualifying everybody for this, to look through all the potential conflicts of interest. Inevitably you have to take it on a case-by-case basis, but we may well be in a situation where, if there was one, we would say that people have to accept that they are constrained from certain types of work with us. As it happens, neither Hill nor Bechtel do particularly large amounts of work for us at the moment, and that is therefore not a particularly big problem. But they are having to accept that this would be the predominant flavour of what they are doing for the UK Ministry of Defence. If a particular thing came up, we would look at it from the governor organisation, with the conflict of interest people and commercial people there, to say, "Okay, how do we resolve this?" Broadly speaking, by and large it will have to be resolved in favour of a Caesar’s wife judgment about the people running the GoCo. 17
The other concern that we have—I know others have expressed this as well—is that there does not appear to us to be a ready market in terms of a contract. There is not a large number of bidders out there. Certainly, Lord West and others have made the
remark that this is not a direction that the US is going in—it is going in a completely different direction, in terms of contractorisation. France and Germany are not going in this direction. A concern about the duration of a contract of that length and size is, ultimately, whether you become a hostage to the contract. Do you have the intelligent customer base to challenge it? If things are not going right, where is the moral hazard for the people who are actually running the contract, in terms of their ability to execute it? So there are a range of complex issues and, if you then add on to that issues of intellectual property and concerns or perceptions about conflict of interest, then it takes you into really difficult territory. 19
In the way that I think about the proposition and, as I said at the Defence Committee yesterday, I quite like the formulation, we are running a competition in the private sector, but we are also running a competition with the public sector, so the DE&S-plus model is very real and I invest a lot of time in trying to strengthen that proposition and to force it ahead to be as good as it possibly can be. I like the proposition that I can go to the private sector potential providers and say, “You need to try harder, because the public sector’s pushing really hard here.” I don’t know why I like this, but I quite like being able to go to the Treasury and the Cabinet Office and say,“You’ve got to be able to do better in terms of what we can do with the public sector work force here in order for the public sector to be competitive against the bid.” We have that double tension there, which I think is very helpful. Would I like more bidders? Yes, we would always like those, but there are constraints in this competition in that we are looking for a highly skilled organisation. You cannot just have anybody walking in. There are potentially four, five or six worldwide companies that are of a scale to do this, and we have hired one of them on our side of the bid. 20
I think that there would be a problem if we were talking about European contractors bidding for this business, but not if they are mainly American. I do not know who is involved at all, but the question of sensitivity over technology is much more of an American problem than it is anybody else’s. 22
In evidence to the Defence Select Committee Mr Gray attempted to clarify the MOD’s position on foreign ownership and its implications:
Sir Bob Russell: I deliberately picked my words carefully, so I will try and repeat them carefully. Is it the case that in terms of the UK’s plan to outsource procurement of military equipment to the private sector, it is likely that the contract will be won by a non-UK company? Bernard Gray: The GoCo competition that we are running at the moment is composed of two consortia, both of which contain an American and two British companies, as parent bidders, if you like. The company that runs this will be a UK limited company, but the parent shareholders of that would be, in both cases, partly American. So the short answer to that question is yes, I suppose. Sir Bob Russell: So we have one of the major military nations in the world, with its procurement with a significant stake held by foreign companies. Bernard Gray: Yes, but in the way that I described before, that already happens in some of the most sensitive areas. For example, AWE has two American shareholders and one British shareholder in that structure. Our nuclear weapons manufacturing, maintenance and development facility has a preponderance of US companies running that, for example-if you call it in that way. The reality of the situation is that AWEML is a UK-registered company and operates under similar constraints. Sir Bob Russell: But lots of companies are UK-registered; the question is about them being foreign-owned. Bernard Gray: I understand, and I am saying that we place constraints on-there is a boundary around-what that UK company, which houses all the information, finances and national security issues, can pass beyond its boundary. That operates today, both in the nuclear weapons field and in the GoCo in Aldermaston, and it also applies to other major contractors-as I have said, in the case of, for example, Lockheed Martin UK and Thales UK. 23
The government should lead the rest of the country by example when they are letting public sector contracts. It is therefore disappointing that two of the bidding consortiums have chequered histories. In the US, CH2M Hill paid an $18.5 million (£12.2m) fine for fraud on government contracts and Bechtel paid a $458m (£301m) fine for shoddy work - leading to a death - on a public contract. When the CH2M Hill fine was announced the US Department of Justice said: "This sort of systemic fraud is an appalling abuse of the trust we place in our contractors." Does the MoD now really wish to deal with such companies and run even more risk if the department is brought into disrepute. 24
US group Bechtel, meaning that it could end up handing out contracts to defence firms that it audits [...] Serco...is at the centre of the scandal that allegedly saw the taxpayer charged £50m to monitor non-existent electronic tags allocated to the dead and those who were back in custody [...] These two firms [Serco and Bechtel] are working together on a bid for DIO [the Defence Infrastructure Organisation] and are widely thought to be hot favourites. Should they win and Mr Hammond pursues his preferred plan for DE&S, that would mean one of Serco or Bechtel would be responsible for both agencies and more than half of the MOD’s entire budget. Even if the reality turned out to be that this is not a problem in practice, at the bare minimum the idea that a company [...] has that much control over national defence is distinctly unpalatable. Any decision that the company made would also be open to accusations of laziness through power or bias toward certain defence contractors, whether there any truth in those claims or not [...] In other words, defence reforms might be a good idea in theory, but in practice they look like a complete mess. 25
Suggestions have thus been made that Labour will seek to make a number of “tough amendments” to the Bill, focusing on conflicts of interest and concerns over foreign control. 26 Safeguards on Performance Leading on from the discussion over conflicts of interest and the lack of competition in the bid process, has been the broader debate over how the MOD can therefore safeguard the performance of the GOCO and provide an intelligent customer function to challenge it. As Chris Dando acknowledged “there is very clear evidence that those contractual relationships lead to complacency, and after all MOD is not very good at letting, managing and co-ordinating contracts, if that is why the Government are proposing to do what they are doing, it seems odd to us that we are going to have a super-contract to manage this”. 27 Along the same theme, Lord West also expressed concern over the private sector handling of other large contracts such as the NHS computer system, and the cost overruns that have been incurred stating that “private does not necessarily mean cheaper”. 28 In order to provide some reassurances on safeguarding performance, Bernard Gray made the following comments:
“Labour targets privatisation of defence body”, the Independent on Sunday, 8 September 2013 and “Audacious they may be, but defence reforms look a complete mess”, The Independent, 15 August 2013 “Labour targets privatisation of defence body”, the Independent on Sunday, 8 September 2013 Public Bill Committee: Defence Reform Bill, Fourth Sitting, 5 September 2013, Q.159 Public Bill Committee: Defence Reform Bill, Second Sitting, 3 September 2013, Q.30
earlier; using a large part of Ms Mason’s organisation, which sits at the centre of the Ministry of Defence and effectively offers a strategic, independent view of commercial activities; and the retention of some external advisers such as the engineering firm I mentioned earlier. Their job will be to oversee the performance of that contract. My contention is that it is easier in those circumstances to have a credible intelligent customer community that we can recruit, retain and make effective when we are talking about a few hundred people than it is at the level of thousands of people when we are trying to do it inside DE&S. 29
In the event that the GOCO fails to deliver Mr Gray confirmed “We have set it up in a way that allows us to be effectively able to take it back in-house very cleanly. We have looked at other examples and we have already engaged, as it were, an alternative provider to sit on the Government’s side of the fence. If we chose to take it back in-house and run it through the governor and the engineering firm we have hired [Jacobs Engineering] to assist the governor team, we could do that, and we could decide whether we wished to run a subsequent competition to replace the GOCO contractor in the long term or to reintegrate it in the Ministry of Defence”. Intellectual Property Assuring intellectual property within the GOCO structure was also raised as a concern by many, in particular the trade association ADS. In its written submission to the Committee ADS noted:
There is inadequate protection for suppliers’ IP and commercially sensitive information (Clauses 7 and 8). IP is critical to the success of the UK Defence Industry and the Bill must consider proper safeguards or risk a loss of business confidence [...] Elements within the consortia bidding for the GOCO contract will at times inevitably compete, both in the UK and abroad, with companies not bidding for the contract. The Bill must provide safeguards to ensure UK industry IP is protected. Sanctions should be put in place to deter IP infringement, deliberate or otherwise. Clauses 7 and 8 take rights away from the disclosing party or copyright owner without any right to objection and without compensation. 1.5. ADS has serious concerns about the proposed provisions in Clauses 7 and 8. We recommend that, in the case of copyright, the existing Crown user rights under the IPR DEFCONS should be preserved. [1] Clauses 7 & 8 should therefore be removed from the Bill. 30
A lack of sufficient safeguards may undermine MOD’s ability to be an intelligent customer. Industry trusts MOD and is willing to give it access to its IP and commercially sensitive information. Without stringent safeguards, that confidence will be lost and companies may become unwilling to share their information with MOD. The consequence would be a more transactional relationship between MOD and industry. Part 1 should provide stronger safeguards to protect suppliers’ IP and private and commercially sensitive information. A new clause should be introduced in Part 1 to
provide for a criminal offence of failure to protect, or prevent the unauthorised use of, suppliers’ protected information. 31
This issue of no legal protection for intellectual property in relation to the GOCO, when the Bill establishes such provision in part 2 in relation to single source contracts and the SSRO, was also raised by the Defence Select Committee. Giving evidence to that Committee, Bernard Gray set out the Government’s current thinking on this issue:
There is legal protection. At the moment it happens to be civil law rather than criminal law, so in the contract and the articles of association of GOCO... they have an obligation to protect any intellectual property that they are holding [...] in the articles of association and in the draft contract, it will be set out that in perpetuity they are not able to take that data and use it in some third party environment... Within the SSRO we are going to require the industry to declare a significantly greater amount of detailed information than they do to us today... therefore there has been pressure from industry to say “we need some increase in sanction against that”. 32
at the moment, we think that on our side the civil sanctions are pretty onerous and sufficient. But we accept that there is a difference between us in the two things, and it may well be that we turn around and say, "Evaluating all those things together, why don’t we have the criminal sanction apply to both sides, on top of the significant civil sanctions that exist?" We are thinking about that. 33
The Single Source Contract Regulations received significantly less attention within the Committee’s general sessions, in part due to the fact that the draft regulations, containing most of the detail, are yet to be published. However, several issues were raised in relation to the exemption of certain contracts from scrutiny and the impact additional regulation will have on companies. Paul Everitt of ADS commented:
In its written submission Prospect also questioned whether a move toward greater regulation of single source contracts would cause a behavioural change in employers. Specifically it suggested that “a possible result of the increased scrutiny of the pricing of contracts and company overheads by the SSRO may inadvertently cause job losses, as contractors trim budgets to comply with stricter transparency rules”. 35 Lord West also questioned whether independence of the new regulatory body could be assured.
The Bill has relatively few clauses that relate to Reserves, largely because we think that most of what needs to be done to the Reserves does not require legislation... we think that we have covered the things that require legislation, which is why we have put them in the Bill. We also recognise that there is an opportunity, in two years’ time, for the quinquennial defence Bill to make further changes if we have missed anything out, or if we think something needs to be adopted. That gives an adequate belt and braces. 36
In its written submission to the Committee the FSB also welcomed the proposals to compensate employers of Reservists. However, it went on to question whether £500 per month will be sufficient. It also suggested that, in addition, to financial compensation, greater assistance should be provided to employers in finding replacement staff. Specifically the FSB has suggested that the Bill should introduce measures to encourage SMEs to employ members of the reserve forces, and Regular personnel once they have completed their service. Their submission notes:
The FSB suggests that in certain sectors where particular skills are essential, there is a ‘central pool’ of labour that could fill vacancies for any employer. Secondly, there could be a far better way of ‘matching’ regulars (and possibly those Reservists) who wanted
to find a job, with employers who had vacancies – in essence an MOD-led ‘matching service’ which could operate online but also at Job Centre Plus branches, Armed Forces recruitment centres and Territorial Army centres. 38
Although not directly set out in the Bill, 39 concerns were also raised within the Committee on the broader issue of Reservist recruitment and in particular the ability to meet the targets required under Future Force 2020 (i.e. 30,000 Reservists, with a further 8,000 in training by 2020). Lord West questioned whether the Army will actually manage to recruit the number of Reserves that will be necessary and at the readiness level required particularly if the UK “got involved in some sort of enduring operation, it could be a real problem and we could have huge difficulty in getting and keeping the numbers we want to”. 40 With respect to SME employers of Reservists he also went on to comment
I am also very concerned about these ambitious programmes to have 30,000 Reservists. As I suggested in my note, the problem with Reservists is that in the old days, if you were a member of the Territorial Army, you went off at weekends—outside company time—and you asked the boss if you could possibly go to a camp on Salisbury plain for a fortnight in August, which is when the demands on his business were minimal anyway, so he was happy to let you go. Nowadays, you are away for a year. If you spend six months in Afghanistan with training and whatever, you are probably out of place for 12 months. That is a serious burden on any business. During the year, you have to be replaced by somebody else, who may turn out to be better; if he is worse, he has to be got rid of when you come back. It is a very different and difficult scenario, and I do not think that employers will be in any way as supportive as they have been of the Territorial Army in the past. 42
I am the senior responsible officer accountable to the Secretary of State for the delivery of Future Reserves 2020, and I am confident that we can effect the numbers and the capability required as part of the integrated force that the Air Chief Marshal has talked about. There are a number of initiatives to take forward the White Paper, which was published only in July, and to make sure that people—this comes back to your question, ma’am—understand the proposition for the individual and the employer, and the benefits. I am therefore confident that we can deliver plan A. Stephen Gilbert: So there is no Plan B?
This issue of cutting the size of the Regular Army and boosting the Reserves has been debated extensively, and both widely supported and criticised, since the announcements on Army 2020 were made in 2012. In recent weeks a number of Conservative backbenchers are reported to have written to the Secretary of State for Defence calling for the plan to be scrapped, suggesting that it was “clearly born of financial necessity and not strategic design” and would not deliver the expected cost savings. An article in The Daily Telegraph on 14 September 2013 went so far as to suggest that backbench opposition to the plan could affect the progress of the Defence Reform Bill, claiming that “a substantial revolt could see the Government risking an embarrassing defeat”. 44
Ibid, Q.129 “Tory MPs revolt over Army cuts”, The Daily Telegraph, 14 September 2013 http://www.politicshome.com/uk/article/85303/jim_murphy_conference_speech.html See “Abuse forces RAF uniform ban", The Guardian, 7 March 2008 and "Airmen told not uniforms in City", BBC News Online, 7 March 2008 Report of Inquiry into National Recognition of our Armed Forces. May 2008
Defence Reform Bill by ThinkDefence1.4K viewsEmbedDownloadDescriptionDefence Reform BillDefence Reform BillRead on Scribd mobile: iPhone, iPad and Android.Copyright: Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)Download as PDF, TXT or read online from ScribdFlag for inappropriate contentShow moreShow less
RelatedNew Microsoft Word Documentby shakira_khan_200814.2 Conclusions- Military Equipment (Post-conflict)by Aasif SaifiIB Defence.indigenisationby Cvr Lightings CalicutUntitledby api-33411753Australian Mortimer Review 2008by dairygoatJds 7 3 VandanaKumarby Devraj(2011) DoD Acquisition Reform: Something Old, Something Newby Jeffrey BradfordThe Canadian Forces Grievance Process - Making It Right for Those Who Serveby Cadet LibraryReport to the French Parliament regarding defence equipments exports in 2006by api-26808978NES 113 Part 6 Requirements for Mechanical Handling_Winches, Reels and Windlasses Category 2by JEORJE23_Part2_Chapter3_Sec2.pdfby Keane RazielStatus report concerning the Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defence Academies and Security Studies by Gigi Hungary Accelerator_draft v2.1_no Questionnaireby info3136The Angolan Defense Industry Market Attractivenessby Venkat KameshwarBroby mailme_vijuJP3_01.1_820201by Anonymous QYxbCS[eBook - Military] US Army FM 03-011 (03-100) Operations) Multi Service Tactics, Techniques, And Procedures for Nuclear, Biological, Anby one2muchMultiservice, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures2by Liviu LiviuNotice: Meetings:by Justia.comSAUDIARABIEN och SVERIGE - Militärt Samarbetsavtalby undermattanF35_QA_EN (1)by 404 System Error1-Keith Hartley.pdfby Mikhael DananApril COESGR Newsletterby James GarrettJP3_01.2_860401by Anonymous QYxbCSFull Motion Video for Defense Summitby PR.com 2Canteen Administration and Operation,Sampli Thesesby graceabuboDND-OPA - Press Release - Gazmin Signs Agreement With Italian Defense Minister - 6 February 2012by Kagawaran Ng Tanggulang PambansaDSA Feb-2012by AlvinMatabangSimilar to Defence Reform BillNew Microsoft Word Document14.2 Conclusions- Military Equipment (Post-conflict)IB Defence.indigenisationUntitledAustralian Mortimer Review 2008Jds 7 3 VandanaKumar(2011) DoD Acquisition ReformThe Canadian Forces Grievance Process - Making It Right for Those Who ServeReport to the French Parliament regarding defence equipments exports in 2006NES 113 Part 6 Requirements for Mechanical Handling_Winches, Reels and Windlasses Category 223_Part2_Chapter3_Sec2.pdfStatus report concerning the Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defence Academies and Security Studies Hungary Accelerator_draft v2.1_no QuestionnaireThe Angolan Defense Industry Market AttractivenessBroJP3_01.1_820201[eBook - Military] US Army FM 03-011 (03-100) Operations) Multi Service Tactics, Techniques, And Procedures for Nuclear, Biological, AnMultiservice, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures2NoticeSAUDIARABIEN och SVERIGE - Militärt SamarbetsavtalF35_QA_EN (1)1-Keith Hartley.pdfApril COESGR NewsletterJP3_01.2_860401Full Motion Video for Defense SummitCanteen Administration and Operation,Sampli ThesesDND-OPA - Press Release - Gazmin Signs Agreement With Italian Defense Minister - 6 February 2012DSA Feb-20122015 Index of US Military Strength FINALa104391.pdfDefence Reform Bill