Source: http://ca.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20110802_0003803.CCA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2016-10-21 11:40:25
Document Index: 637736222

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 4', '§ 4', '§1', '§ 4', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 2255']

| United States of America v. Haejoong Lee
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT,v.HAEJOONG LEE DEFENDANT/PETITIONER.
Petitioner argues that his prior conviction should not have been considered in calculating his criminal history because it was part of the same offense as the one at issue in the underlying federal action. Mot. at 5. According to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a), "the term 'prior sentence' means any sentence previously imposed upon adjudication of guilt ... for conduct not part of the instant offense." U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a) (emphasis added). "Conduct that is part of the instant offense means conduct that is relevant conduct to the instant offense under the provisions of §1B1.3." U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 n.1. According to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2), conduct is considered to be relevant conduct to the instant offense if it constitutes part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan. Mot. at 5, citing U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2).
Petitioner argues that his state court conviction was part of the same course of conduct as the underlying federal crime. Mot. at 6. An offense is considered to be part of the same course of conduct as a subsequent offense if the two offenses "are sufficiently connected or related to each other as to warrant the conclusion that they are part of a single episode, spree, or ongoing series of offenses. Factors that are appropriate to the determination of whether offenses are sufficiently connected or related to each other to be considered as part of the same course of conduct include the degree of similarity of the offenses, the regularity (repetitions) of the offenses, and the time interval between the offenses." Mot. at 6, citing U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, n.(B). Petitioner claims that the two offenses are sufficiently connected because they both involve the same offense (bank fraud) and were only separated by a few months. Id. Therefore, he argues that the state case should be deemed to be part of the underlying action for sentencing purposes. Id.
Alternatively, petitioner claims that the conduct for which he was convicted in state court was part of the same common scheme as the underlying federal crime. Mot. at 5. "For two ... offenses to constitute part of a common scheme or plan, they must be substantially connected to each other by at least one common factor, such as common victims, common accomplices, common purpose, or similar modus operandi." Mot. at 5, citing U.S.S.G. § 1.B1.3, n.9(A). Petitioner argues that his conduct in both cases involved common accomplices and a common purpose; therefore, it should be considered part of the same common scheme as the offense underlying his federal sentence. Mot. at 6. As such, it should be considered to be part of the same crime for sentencing purposes. Id.
Petitioner contends that his counsel's inability to argue the appropriate criminal history level passes the first prong of the Strickland test because it fell below reasonable attorney conduct. Id. Petitioner further alleges that he requested for his counsel to file an appeal to his criminal history determination; however, his attorney never did. Id., citing Add. #3 Petitioner claims that the failure of his counsel to file an appeal also falls below reasonable attorney conduct. Id. at 8, citing Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 477 (2000).
Petitioner further contends that his counsel's actions prejudiced him, and therefore satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test. Mot. at 8. Petitioner was sentenced to 48 months for the underlying federal crime, nine months less than the sentencing range for Offense Level 24, Criminal Category II. Sent. Tr. At 22.*fn1 Petitioner acknowledges that the sentence is also three months less than the sentencing range for Offense Level 24, Criminal Category I. Mot. at 9.*fn2 Petitioner contends than because he was given a shorter sentence that the incorrectly proposed range for Criminal Category II, he would have received an even shorter sentence if the Criminal Category had been properly decided. Id.
Petitioner further asserts that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Id. Section 2255 states that a petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing "unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is not entitled to relief." 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Further, an evidentiary hearing is "usually required if the motion states a claim based on matters outside of the record." Mot. at 11, citing United States v. Burrows, 872 F.2d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 1989). Petitioner argues that an evidentiary hearing is needed because counsel's reasons for not filing an appeal to the petitioner's sentencing are not found in the record. Id.*fn3
The government contends that petitioner's § 2255 claim fails because petitioner has not shown that his counsel's performance was deficient, nor has he demonstrated any prejudice. Opp. at 8. First, the government argues that defense counsel's failure to challenge the petitioner's criminal history category did not constitute deficient conduct because it could be reasonably argued that the categorization was correct. Id. At 11.
The government argues that petitioner's state crime is distinguishable from his federal crime. Id. The properties at issue in each case were different. Id. The properties were purchased under different names. Id. The state crime took place months after the federal crime and did not involve the same banks or victims. Id. The government argues, that in light of these differentiating facts, it would be reasonable for defense counsel to conclude that the state case was not relevant conduct. Id. Therefore, the government asserts that petitioner does not overcome the high burden needed to demonstrate that counsel acted deficiently. Id. at 12.
Moreover, the government contends that defense counsel did in fact argue that defendant's prior state conviction should be taken into consideration during sentencing. Opp. at 12. At defendant's sentencing, defense counsel pointed out that the sentencing recommendation letter was wrong to conclude that defendant was a recidivist. Id. Defense counsel also argued that the state case could have been tried as part of the federal case. Id. The government contends that although neither of these arguments were explicit challenges to petitioner's criminal history calculation, they make the same point, i.e., that the criminal conduct in both cases should be viewed as a whole. Id. The government argues that defense counsel's overall performance was more than sufficient. Id. In fact, the government alleges that defense counsel's argument at sentencing regarding defendant's prior state conviction resulted in defendant receiving a lower sentence that the Court was initially inclined to give. Id.
Second, the government argues that the defendant cannot establish that his counsel's performance caused him any prejudice. Id. The government contends that the consideration of the two actions as a single offense would raise the total loss amount used to calculate the total offense level by $1 million. Id. at 13. As a result, the total offense level would be raised from 24 to 26. Id. The sentencing guidelines recommend 63-78 months for a total offense level of 26 and a criminal history of I.*fn4 Id. The government contends that because the defense counsel's failure to argue that the two cases are part of the same offense potentially saved petitioner from a significantly higher sentence, his performance was not prejudicial. Id.
Petitioner disputes this contention, and argues that although the entire dollar amount of the state fraud for which he was convicted of was over $1 million, his participation in the state action was confined to a loss of $312,000. Reply and Opp. at
3. According to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 Application Note 2, "because a count may be worded broadly and include the conduct of many participants over a period of time, the scope of the criminal activity jointly undertaken by the defendant ... is not necessarily the same as the scope of the entire conspiracy, and hence relevant conduct is not necessarily the same for every participant." U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 n. 2. Therefore, petitioner argues, because the addition of his state conduct would not raise the amount of loss by $1 million, but rather by $312,000, his total offense level would remain 24. Reply and Opp. at 3. As such, the recommended sentencing range would be 51-63 months.
The Ninth Circuit has held that it is ineffective assistance of counsel for an attorney to refuse to file a notice of appeal when their client tells them to, even if the appeal is harmful to their client. United States v. Sandoval-Lopez, 409 F.3d 1193, 1197 (9th Cir. 2005). When such a claim is raised, the Ninth Circuit holds that the district court can (1) hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the allegation is true (and if so, vacate and re-enter judgment, allowing appeal to go forward) or (2) if the government does not object, vacate and re-enter the judgment without a hearing and allow the appeal to proceed, without determining the truth of the defendant's claim. Id. at 1198. The government objects and believes an evidentiary hearing, with defense counsel in attendance, should be held. Opp. at 16. Petitioner states that he wishes to waive his right to an evidentiary hearing because he believes it will not be able to be held before he has served his full sentence. Reply and Opp. at 1-2.
The Court finds that an evidentiary hearing is necessary to determine the validity of petitioner's claim with respect to the alleged failure of his attorney to file an appeal. The Court does not read petitioner's request to waive the hearing as a waiver of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim on this theory. Therefore, absent such a waiver an evidentiary hearing is required.
The Court finds that the defendant was not prejudiced by his attorney's failure to argue that his criminal history category was incorrectly determined. The Court specifically stated when deciding petitioner's sentence that it took into account the fact that the two cases could have been tried as one federal case. Further, petitioner acknowledges that the sentence he received is three months less than the recommended sentence in the sentencing guidelines for the offense level and criminal history that he claims should have been used. Jeffery v. U.S, 2010 WL 4942522, *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov, 24, 2010) (holding that there was no prejudice under Strickland when movant's sentence was already below the guidelines, and would not have been lower if the sentencing error would have been corrected). Therefore, defendant was not prejudiced by his attorney's failure to argue that his state crime should be considered part of the same offense as his federal crime. As such, counsel's actions do not pass the Strickland test. Moreover, it is not clear that the petitioner's counsel's error falls below reasonable attorney conduct.
For the reasons set forth above the Court DENIES petitioner's motion for habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to the extent that it is based on the theory that his attorney failed to argue that his prior state action should be considered part of the underlying federal case for sentencing purposes. The Court sets an evidentiary hearing to be held at noon on August 29, 2011, to determine the validity of petitioner's claim that his attorney ignored his request to appeal from the Court's sentence.