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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 121', '§ 121', '§ 121', '§ 121', '§ 121', '§ 374']

BROWN V. HARTLAGE, 456 U. S. 45 - Volume 456 - 1982 - Full Text - US Supreme Court Center - USSC Cases - Nolo
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BROWN V. HARTLAGE, 456 U. S. 45 (1982)
This case involves a challenge to an application of the Kentucky Corrupt Practices Act. The parties were opposing candidates in the 1979 general election for the office of Jefferson County Commissioner, "C" District. Petitioner, Carl Brown, was the challenger; respondent, Earl Hartlage, was the incumbent. [Footnote 1] On August 15, 1979, in the course of the campaign, Brown held a televised press conference together with Bill Creech, the "B" District candidate on the same party ticket. Brown charged his opponent with complicity in a form of fiscal abuse:
Id. at 2. [Footnote 2]
Id. at 5. In the November 6, 1979, election, Brown defeated Hartlage by 10,151 votes. [Footnote 3] Creech was defeated.
Ky.Rev.Stat. § 121.055 (1982). [Footnote 4]
The Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed. 618 S.W.2d 603. That court agreed with the Circuit Court that the salary of County Commissioners was fixed by law, [Footnote 5] and that Brown's statement was proscribed by § 121.055 as construed in Spark v. Boggs, supra. [Footnote 6] The Court of Appeals also held, however, that the trial court had erred in failing to order a new election. App. 34-35. It held that retraction of the offending
At the core of the First Amendment are certain basic conceptions about the manner in which political discussion in a representative democracy should proceed. As we noted in Mills v. Alabama, 384 U. S. 214, 384 U. S. 218-219 (1966):
Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U. S. 265, 401 U. S. 271-272 (1971) (citation omitted). The political candidate does not lose the protection of the First Amendment when he declares himself for public office. Quite to the contrary:
"The candidate, no less than any other person, has a First Amendment right to engage in the discussion of public issues and vigorously and tirelessly to advocate his own election and the election of other candidates. Indeed, it is of particular importance that candidates have the unfettered opportunity to make their views known so that the electorate may intelligently evaluate the candidates' personal qualities and their positions on vital public issues before choosing among them on election day. Mr. Justice Brandeis' observation that in our country 'public discussion is a political duty,' Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 274 U. S. 375 (1927) (concurring opinion), applies with special force to candidates for public office."
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 424 U. S. 52-53 (1976) (per curiam).
embodying the intention to make such an exchange. Although agreements to engage in illegal conduct undoubtedly possess some element of association, the State may ban such illegal agreements without trenching on any right of association protected by the First Amendment. The fact that such an agreement necessarily takes the form of words does not confer upon it, or upon the underlying conduct, the constitutional immunities that the First Amendment extends to speech. Finally, while a solicitation to enter into an agreement arguably crosses the sometimes hazy line distinguishing conduct from pure speech, such a solicitation, even though it may have an impact in the political arena, remains, in essence, an invitation to engage in an illegal exchange for private profit, and may properly be prohibited. See Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U. S. 489, 455 U. S. 496 (1982); Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U. S. 557, 447 U. S. 563-564 (1980); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U. S. 376, 413 U. S. 388 (1973).
It is thus plain that some kinds of promises made by a candidate to voters, and some kinds of promises elicited by voters from candidates, may be declared illegal without constitutional difficulty. But it is equally plain that there are constitutional limits on the State's power to prohibit candidates from making promises in the course of an election campaign. Some promises are universally acknowledged as legitimate, indeed, "indispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy," First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 435 U. S. 777 (1978); and the
Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359, 283 U. S. 369 (1931). Candidate commitments enhance the accountability of government officials to the people whom they represent, and assist the voters in predicting the effect
of their vote. The fact that some voters may find their self-interest reflected in a candidate's commitment does not place that commitment beyond the reach of the First Amendment. We have never insisted that the franchise be exercised without taint of individual benefit; indeed, our tradition of political pluralism is partly predicated on the expectation that voters will pursue their individual good through the political process, and that the summation of these individual pursuits will further the collective welfare. [Footnote 7] So long as the hoped-for personal benefit is to be achieved through the normal processes of government, and not through some private arrangement, it has always been, and remains, a reputable basis upon which to cast one's ballot.
In sum, Brown did not offer some private payment or donation in exchange for voter support; Brown's statement can only be construed as an expression of his intention to exercise public power in a manner that he believed might be acceptable to some class of citizens. If Brown's expressed intention had an individualized appeal to some taxpayers who felt themselves the likely beneficiaries of his form of fiscal restraint, that fact is of little constitutional significance. The benefits of most public policy changes accrue not only to the undifferentiated "public," but more directly to particular individuals or groups. Like a promise to lower taxes, to increase efficiency in government, or indeed to increase taxes in order to provide some group with a desired public benefit or public service, Brown's promise to reduce his salary cannot be deemed beyond the reach of the First Amendment, or considered as inviting the kind of corrupt arrangement the appearance of which a State may have a compelling interest in avoiding. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 424 U. S. 27.
Sparks v. Boggs, 339 S.W.2d 480 (1960), relied in part on the interest a State may have in ensuring that the willingness of some persons to serve in public office without remuneration does not make gratuitous service the sine qua non of plausible candidacy. [Footnote 8] The State might legitimately fear that such emphasis on free public service might result in persons of independent wealth, but less ability, being chosen over those who, though better qualified, could not afford to serve
at a reduced salary. But if § 121.055 was designed to further this interest, it chooses a means unacceptable under the First Amendment. [Footnote 9] In barring certain public statements with respect to this issue, the State ban runs directly contrary to the fundamental premises underlying the First Amendment as the guardian of our democracy. That Amendment embodies our trust in the free exchange of ideas as the means by which the people are to choose between good ideas and bad, and between candidates for political office. The State's fear that voters might make an ill-advised choice does not provide the State with a compelling justification for limiting speech. It is simply not the function of government to "select which issues are worth discussing or debating," Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92, 408 U. S. 96 (1972), in the course of a political campaign.
Amicus points out that § 121.055, as applied through Sparks v. Boggs, supra, bars promises to serve at a reduced salary only when the salary of the official has been "fixed by law," and where the promise cannot, therefore, be delivered. Of course, demonstrable falsehoods are not protected by the First Amendment in the same manner as truthful statements. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323, 418 U. S. 340 (1974). But
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254,
376 U. S. 271-272 (1964), quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 371 U. S. 433 (1963). Section 121.055, as applied in this case, has not afforded the requisite "breathing space."
The Commonwealth of Kentucky has provided that a candidate for public office forfeits his electoral victory if he errs in announcing that he will, if elected, serve at a reduced salary. As the Kentucky courts have made clear in this case, a candidate's liability under § 121.055 for such an error is absolute: his election victory must be voided even if the offending statement was made in good faith and was quickly repudiated. The chilling effect of such absolute accountability for factual misstatements in the course of political debate is incompatible with the atmosphere of free discussion contemplated by the First Amendment in the context of political campaigns. See Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U. S. 265 (1971); Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U. S. 295 (1971). Although the state interest in protecting the political process from distortions caused by untrue and inaccurate speech is somewhat different from the state interest in protecting individuals from defamatory falsehoods, the principles underlying the First Amendment remain paramount. Whenever compatible with the underlying interests at stake, under the regime of that Amendment, "we depend for . . . correction not on the conscience of judges and juries, but on the competition of other ideas." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra, at 418 U. S. 339-340. In a political campaign, a candidate's factual blunder is unlikely to escape the notice of, and correction by, the erring candidate's political opponent. The preferred First Amendment remedy of "more speech, not enforced silence," Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 274 U. S. 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), thus has special force. Cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra, at 418 U. S. 344. There has been no showing in this case that petitioner made the disputed statement other than in good faith and without knowledge of its falsity, or that he made the statement with reckless disregard as to whether it was false or not. Moreover, petitioner retracted
""An agreement by a candidate for office that, if chosen, he will discharge the duties of the office without compensation or for a lesser compensation than that provided by law, or will pay part of his salary into the public treasury, is illegal, whether made in good faith or not. The underlying principle . . . is that, when a candidate offers to discharge the duties of an elective office for less than the salary fixed by law, a salary which must be paid by taxation, he offers to reduce pro tanto the amount of taxes each individual taxpayer must pay, and thus makes an offer to the voter of pecuniary gain' [quoting 43 Am.Jur., Public Officers § 374, p. 159 (1942)]."
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