Source: http://stopforeclosurefraud.com/category/featured/
Timestamp: 2018-09-20 18:28:14
Document Index: 374983950

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 1652', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 501', '§ 1692', '§ 1692']

Posted in featured, STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD4 Comments
In this appeal, the borrower contends the trial court erred by sustaining defendants’ demurrer as to all of his causes of action attacking the nonjudicial foreclosure. We conclude that, although the borrower’s allegations are somewhat confusing and may contain contradictions, he nonetheless has stated a wrongful 2
foreclosure claim under the lenient standards applied to demurrers. We conclude that a borrower may challenge the securitized trust’s chain of ownership by alleging the attempts to transfer the deed of trust to the securitized trust (which was formed under New York law) occurred after the trust’s closing date. Transfers that violate the terms of the trust instrument are void under New York trust law, and borrowers have standing to challenge void assignments of their loans even though they are not a party to, or a third party beneficiary of, the assignment agreement.
Posted in featured, STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD8 Comments
GILBERTO SALDIVAR, SANDRA
CANALES SALDIVAR,
Debtor(s). JUDGE ISGUR
GILBERTO T SALDIVAR, et al
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., et al
As a threshold matter, the Court must first address Chase and Deutsche Bank’s assertion that
the Saldivars lack standing to challenge the validity of the assignment of their mortgage to the Trust.
A. Under New York Trust Law, is an ultra vires act void or merely voidable?
A third party generally lacks standing to challenge the validity of an assignment. Bank of
American Nat’l Assoc. v. Bassman FBT, L.L.C., et al. 981 N.E.2d 1, 7 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012). A
borrower may however raise a defense to an assignment, if that defense renders the assignment void.
N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 7-2.4.The Bassman court holds that despite the plain
language of § 7-2.4, under various circumstances a trustee’s ultra vires acts are voidable and not
void. Bassman, 981 N.E.2d. at 9. The Bassman court cites New York cases that hold that
beneficiaries of a trust can ratify a trustee’s ultra vires acts. See Gregan v. Buchanan, et al, 37
N.Y.S. 83, 85 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1896); see also Hine v. Huntington, et al. 103 N.Y.S. 535, 540 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1907); Birnbaum v. Birnbaum, et al., 503 N.Y.S.2d 451 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986). The
Bassman court holds that the ability to ratify a trustee’s ultra vires act is equivalent to finding that a
trustee’s ultra vires act is merely voidable and not void.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1652, this Court has the duty to apply New York law in accordance with
the controlling decision of the highest state court. Royal Bank of Canada v. Trentham Corp., 665
F.2d 515, 516 (5th Cir. 1981). While the Court finds no applicable New York Court of Appeals
decision, a recent New York Supreme Court decision is factually similar to the case before the Court.
See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Erobobo, et al., 2013 WL 1831799 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. April 29, 2013). In
Erobobo, defendants argued that plaintiff (a REMIC trust) was not the owner of the note because
plaintiff obtained the note and mortgage after the trust had closed in violation of the terms of the PSA
governing the trust, rendering plaintiff’s acquisition of the note void. Id. at *2. The Erobobo court
held that under § 7-2.4, any conveyance in contravention of the PSA is void; this meant that
acceptance of the note and mortgage by the trustee after the date the trust closed rendered the transfer
void. Id. at 8.
Based on the Erobobo decision and the plain language of N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law
§ 7-2.4, the Court finds that under New York law, assignment of the Saldivars’ Note after the start up
day is void ab initio. As such, none of the Saldivars’ claims will be dismissed for lack of standing.
The Court expresses no view on the effect of any subsequent ratification, if any. It is sufficient that a
claim has been stated.
Posted in featured, STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD7 Comments
Posted in featured, STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD2 Comments
FNIS also challenges Plaintiff’s claim against it for violation of the Florida
for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. FDUTPA’s purpose is to
protect the consuming public and legitimate business enterprises from unlawful and
deceptive acts. Fla. Stat. § 501.202(2). A claim for damages under FDUTPA has three
elements: (1) a deceptive act or unfair practice; (2) causation; and (3) actual damages.
Virgilio v. Ryland Group, Inc., 680 F.3d 1329, 1338 n.25 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting
Rollins, Inc. v. Butland, 951 So. 2d 860, 869 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)). A practice is
unfair under FDUTPA if it “offends established public policy” or is “immoral, unethical,
oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers. PNR, Inc. v. Beacon
Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 842 So. 2d 773, 777 (Fla. 2003). Here, Plaintiff alleges that
Defendants, including FNIS, violated FDUTPA by using fake identities and manufactured
documents to deprive her of her homestead through foreclosure of a debt that was not in
default3 prior to inception of the foreclosure cases. (Dkt. 2, ¶¶ 16-19.) The First
Amended Complaint alleges that FNIS’s business of preparing forged documents using
fictitious identities was an unfair and deceptive practice. (Id.) Plaintiff identifies FNIS
and the other LPS Defendants as being directly or vicariously liable for the alleged
fraudulent acts that caused her to lose her homestead. (Id. at ¶¶ 11-42.) Plaintiff’s
allegations are sufficient to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal motion. She must be
afforded the opportunity to prove the allegations through the discovery process.
FNIS further argues that Plaintiff fails to state a clam under the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) because FNIS was neither owed any part of the loan
the principal purpose of which is the enforcement of security interests. The Eleventh
Circuit has recently clarified that mortgage foreclosure can be debt collection under the
FDCPA. Reese v. Ellis, Painter, Ratterree & Adams, LLP, 678 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir.
2012); Birster v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc., 2012 WL 2913786 (11th Cir. Jul. 18,
2012). Plaintiff alleges that FNIS and its alter egos, the LPS Defendants, fabricated
(Dkt. 2, ¶¶16, 18(a), 18(d)(1, 4-7), footnote 3.) She alleges that Goebel oversees a section
of individuals who produce thousands of sworn affidavits a day for filing in state and
federal litigation brought by FNF clients and several boilerplate documents used in the
foreclosure of Plaintiff’s home. (Id. at ¶ 16.) Furthermore, under 15 U.S.C. § 1692f, “[a]
debt collector may not use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect
any debt. Subparagraph (6) of that section specifically prohibits taking or threatening to
take any nonjudicial action to effect dispossession or disablement of property if there is
no present right to possession of the property claimed as collateral through an enforceable
security interest. Consequently, this Court must find that Plaintiff’s allegations present a
question of fact as to whether FNIS’s activities violated the FDCPA, and she must be
[ipaper docId=102470017 access_key=key-rhpnsoc3vdnkk2ohl7q height=600 width=600 /]
Posted in featured, STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD1 Comment
WALLACE vs. WAMU, WELLS, LSR | 6th Cir.Ct. of Appeals- Law Firm faces liability under the FDCPA for misrepresenting the foreclosing bank’s “holder” status
15 U.S.C. § 1692e states in relevant part:
Posted in featured, STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD0 Comments
Posted in featured, STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD9 Comments
Posted in featured, STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD33 Comments
4,038,032 spam blocked by Akismet