Source: http://securities.stanford.edu/1004/MCK99/01020.htm
Timestamp: 2013-05-21 19:36:09
Document Index: 160164989

Matched Legal Cases: ['§10', '§11', '§14', '§78', '§10', '§11', '§11', '§10', '§11', '§10', '§11', '§ 10', '§11', '§11', '§11', '§ 11', '§10', '§ 10', '§14', '§14', '§14', '§ 14', '§ 77', '§21', '§27', '§14', '§10', '§ 14', '§14', '§ 14']

99cv20743 Aronson v McKesson HBOC - 10/15/99 NYS Pension Fund Group Subset Lead Pltf Reply
Gerald J. Rodos
M. Richard Komins
Telephone: (215) 963-0600
Stephen R. Basser (Cal. No. 121590)
600 West Broadway, Suite 1700
Telephone: (619) 230-0800
Rochelle Feder Hansen
Attorneys for the New York State Pension Fund Group
and Proposed Co-Lead Counsel for the Class
ANDREW ARONSON on behalf of himself
McKESSON HBOC, INC., MARK A. PULIDO,
and CHARLES W. McCALL,
x :::::::::::x
No. C-99-20743-RMW
This Document Relates To: All
COURTROOM: Honorable
NEW YORK STATE PENSION FUND GROUP'S
IN REPLY TO THE OPPOSITION OF OTHER
MOVANTS SEEKING APPOINTMENT
AS LEAD PLAINTIFF FOR SUBSETS OF THE CLASS
I. The PSLRA Requires That The NYS Pension
Fund Group, The Movant Wth The Largest
Financial Interest In The Relief Sought
By The Class, Be Appointed Lead Plaintiff Of
The Entire Litigation
II. There Is No Cognizable Basis For Fragmentation
Of This Litigation
A. The Attempt Of The McKesson HBOC Lead Plaintiff Group
To "Reinvent" Itself To Fit The Circumstances Cannot Be
B. The McKesson HBOC Group's Recalculation Of
The NYS Pension Fund Group's Losses Is Incorrect
C. Other Movants Seeking To Represent "Carve Outs" Have Not
Demonstrated Any Supportable Basis For Their Motions
D. There Is No Impediment To The NYS Pension Fund Group
Serving As Lead Plaintiff Because Its Members Are
Governmental Pension Funds
E. The State Pension Fund Group's Motion To Be Appointed
Co-Lead Plaintiff Must Be Rejected
The New York State Common Retirement Fund (the "CRF"), Florida State Board of
Administration ("FSBA"), Anchorage Police & Fire Retirement System ("AP&RS"), and Public School
Teachers' Pension and Retirement Fund of Chicago ("Chicago Teachers' Fund"), (collectively the "NYS
Pension Fund Group") respectfully submit this reply memorandum to the opposition of certain movants
who seek to be appointed lead plaintiff for subsets of the class in this litigation.
The criterion for the appointment of lead plaintiff set forth in the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act (the "PSLRA") is clear and unequivocal. The NYS Pension Fund Group with losses that
exceed $246 million1 undeniably has the "largest financial interest in the relief sought by the class."
Therefore, under the PSLRA, it should be appointed Lead Plaintiff.
Unable to overcome the plain language of the statute, other lead plaintiff movants ("Other
Movants") argue for carving out separate subclasses which, they assert require separate lead plaintiffs
and lead counsel or simply adding themselves as additional lead plaintiffs. Essentially, they search for
anything different that could form the basis for a claim that they should be appointed as a lead plaintiff
and their lawyers as lead counsel. For example, one Other Movant, which originally moved for
appointment as lead plaintiff for the entire litigation, now says that it only seeks to represent a subclass
of persons with claims for violations of §10(b) with respect to open market purchases of McKesson
HBOC, Inc. ("McKesson HBOC"). Certain of the Other Movants seek a subclass of persons who
exchanged their HBO & Company ("HBOC") shares for McKesson HBOC shares in the Merger only
with respect to their claim for violation of §11 of the Securities Act.2 Others seek a subclass of persons
with a claim for violation of §14(a) of the Exchange Act. Another seeks a subclass of persons who
exchanged shares of Access Health, Inc. ("Access") in a merger with HBOC effected in December 1998.
And yet another seeks a subclass of persons who exchanged shares of US Servis, Inc. ("Servis"),
IMNET Systems, Inc. ("IMNET") and Access in mergers with HBOC effected between September and
December 1998.3 Another seeks a subclass of options purchasers. Finally, another seeks a subclass of
short sellers of HBOC.
Notwithstanding the explicit requirement of the PSLRA that the presumption that the movant
with the largest financial interest in the relief sought, i.e. the NYS Pension Fund Group, is the most
adequate plaintiff and should be appointed lead plaintiff may be overcome "only upon proof" that that
plaintiff will not fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class, 15 U.S.C. §78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(II)
(emphasis added)4, none is offered. At most, some Other Movants conjure up speculative potential
conflicts. That is not sufficient.
All of the arguments are unavailing. Any case can be artificially divided into innumerable
categories based on the time the security was purchased, the type of security purchased, and the specific
securities claim asserted. However, such a result would render the PSLRA and its lead plaintiff
provisions a nullity, and would lead to a litigation of monumental inefficiency. Congress insisted on
a unified leadership for securities class actions, requiring client-directed litigation and preferring
institutions to assume the lead plaintiff role. The NYS Pension Fund Group fits precisely the role
Congress created in the PSLRA. Having joined together, and selected the two firms they believe will
best represent the Class. See, Declaration of Horace Schow, II, General Counsel of FSBA and
Declaration of Randolph F. Treece, Counsel to the Comptroller of the State of New York, sole trustee
of the CRF, attached as Exhibits B and C respectively to the Declaration of Robert A. Hoffman filed
herewith ("Hoffman Decl."). The NYS Pension Fund Group is ready, willing and able to assert all
claims on behalf of all purchasers or acquirors of the securities at issue. The Other Movants' desire for
numerous lead plaintiffs, with multiple lead counsel proceeding on their own, would stand the PSLRA
The PSLRA sets forth very specific criteria for choosing lead plaintiffs and approving their
selection of counsel for the Class. In part, the purpose of these provisions was to streamline the process:
the movant with the largest financial loss, who also satisfies the requirements of Rule 23, is
presumptively the lead plaintiff, unless a very particular showing of conflict or inadequacy is made. No
such showing can be made here.
If the Court were to entertain the Other Movants' arguments, contrary to the intent of Congress
in passing the PSLRA, then in every case plaintiffs, knowing that they did not have the "largest financial
loss," would manufacture some niche, subclass or purported conflict and thereby undermine the simple
criterion mandated by the PSLRA for the selection of lead plaintiffs, in effect letting the tail wag the
dog. Indeed, the lengths to which Other Movants have gone here demonstrates why Congress sought
to avoid satellite litigation over the lead plaintiff issues.
I. The PSLRA Requires That The NYS Pension Fund Group, The
Movant With The Largest Financial Interest In The Relief Sought
By The Class, Be Appointed Lead Plaintiff Of The Entire Litigation.
As demonstrated in the NYS Pension Fund Group's Opening Memorandum, Opposition
Memorandum, and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Reply to the Opposition of Other Movants
Seeking Appointment as Lead Plaintiff For the Entire Litigation, filed concurrently herewith, it
unequivocally has the largest financial interest in the litigation and otherwise satisfies the requirements
of the PSLRA. Thus, the plain language of the statute dictates that it should be appointed Lead Plaintiff
and its choice of counsel should be approved.
Notwithstanding the fact that the NYS Pension Fund Group has the largest financial interest in
this litigation, counsel for various Other Movants have attempted to carve out some niche, no matter
how small, unfounded or unnecessary, offering a litany of groundless arguments as to why their clients
should be appointed lead plaintiff for the "subset" they have identified. As demonstrated at length in
the NYS Pension Fund Group's Opposition Memorandum, their arguments are counter to controlling
precedent or are based on a distortion of the cases in which some courts have appointed co-lead plaintiffs
or co-counsel to prosecute a class action under the PSLRA. See Id. at 12-25.
Several cases were cited in opposition memoranda submitted by Other Movants as purported
authority for the proposition that separate representation for certain "niche" groups is required that were
not addressed by the NYS Pension Fund Group in its Opposition Memorandum. Thus, for example, the
McKesson HBOC Lead Plaintiff Group cites to In re Alcatel Alsthom Sec. Litig., MDL No. 1263
(E.D.Tex. June 14, 1999) and Spiegel v. Physicians Computer Network, Inc., No. 2:98-CV-981 (MTB)
(D.N.J. May 28, 1999), see opposition memorandum at 5; and the Rappaport Group in its "Omnibus
Opposition" at 12 cites to Mark v. Fleming Cos., Inc., Case No. CIV-96-506-M, Orders (W.D. Okla.
Mar. 26, 1997) and Harbour Court LPI v. Nanophase Tech. Corp., et al. No. 98 C 7447, Memorandum
Opinion and Order (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 1999). In fact, none of these cases support an argument for
separate representation in this litigation.
In Alcatel, separate lead plaintiffs and lead counsel for open market purchasers of Alcatel
American Depository Shares (ADS) and former DSC shareholders who acquired ADSs pursuant to the
merger of DSC and Alcatel were in fact appointed. However, the group seeking to represent the former
DSC shareholders did not seek to represent the open market purchasers of ADS. As the Court noted,
the Alcatel Plaintiffs Group's motion was unopposed. Alcatel, Memorandum Opinion and Order at 2.
(Hoffman Decl. Ex. 6.) Had the court not appointed a separate lead plaintiff and counsel, the open
market purchasers of ADS would not have had any representation.
Spiegel involved three types of claims: (i) §10(b) claims on behalf of all persons who acquired
PCN common stock during the class period; (ii) §§11 and 12(a)(2) claims on behalf of all persons who
acquired PCN common stock in the company's May 1996 public offering and; (iii) §§11 and 12(a)(2)
claims on behalf of all persons who acquired PCN common stock in exchange for shares of Wismer-Martin, Inc. in a merger (the "Wismer-Martin Merger Claims"). The court appointed State of Wisconsin
Investment Board ("SWIB") Lead Plaintiff to represent everyone in the Class with a §10(b) claim and
all persons with §§11 and 12(a)(2) claims who acquired PCN common stock in the company's May
1996 public offering.5 As part of the lead plaintiff structure, SWIB agreed not to challenge the
appointment of another plaintiff, John F. Perez, as lead plaintiff with respect to the Wismer-Martin
Merger Claims which SWIB did not personally possess. Mr. Perez was thereafter appointed by the court
as Lead Plaintiff solely with respect to prosecuting those claims.
In Fleming, the lead plaintiff appointed for the stockholders did not wish to represent the
noteholders; and, similarly, the lead plaintiff appointed for the noteholders did not wish to represent the
stockholders. The Order cited is the court's refusal to grant defendants' motion to have only one lead
plaintiff for both groups. The court properly refused to force a plaintiff to represent a constituency when
it did not wish to do so.
Finally, in Nanophase, the lead plaintiff appointed for the Securities Act claims had filed a
complaint dated June 4, 1998 and a Corrected Consolidated Class Action Complaint dated November
24, 1998 only alleging claims for violation of the Securities Act. Its motion to be appointed lead
plaintiff, dated August 3, 1998, was made only pursuant to the provisions of the Securities Act. By the
time the Harbour Court plaintiffs filed their complaint on November 20, 1998, which only alleged
violations of the Exchange Act, there was a significant record that the Securities Act lead plaintiffs had
no interest in representing the Exchange Act claims. See, e.g., Lax v. First Merchants Acceptance Corp,
1997 WL 461036 at *7 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 11, 1997) (the fact that a group did not assert all claims raised
a question of whether that group could adequately represent the interests of persons who had asserted
other claims).
In marked contrast to each of these cases, the NYS Pension Fund Group has standing to, and
intends to assert all viable claims against all possible defendants. There is no reason to fragment this
action and appoint separate lead plaintiffs. All of the purchasers or acquirors of the securities at issue
have the same overriding interest in demonstrating the falsity of the financial statements that form the
linchpin in this litigation.
The positions of these Other Movants is, in reality, predicated on nothing more than an ipse dixit,
i.e., their assertion that each identified subset "requires" separate representation. Having made that
unsupported assertion, each of these Other Movants argues that it has the largest financial interest in the
niche it has carved out and, therefore, should be designated lead plaintiff. These contentions are wrong
as a matter of law and as a matter of fact. Moreover, the lengths to which some of these Other Movants
have gone to "support" their contentions would replace the "professional plaintiffs," which Congress
sought to eliminate by enacting the PSLRA, with an equally, if not more repugnant, approach to
jockeying for position -- that of "sheer opportunism" that runs counter to both the letter and the spirit
of the PSLRA.
II. There Is No Cognizable Basis For Fragmentation Of This Litigation.
A. The Attempt Of The McKesson HBOC Lead Plaintiff Group To "Reinvent"
Itself To Fit The Circumstances Cannot Be Countenanced.
The McKesson HBOC Lead Plaintiff Group moved to be appointed lead plaintiff for the entire
litigation based on the assertion that it possessed the largest financial interest, as required by the PSLRA.
See Notice of Motion and Opening Memorandum of The McKesson HBOC Lead Plaintiff Group. As
long as this movant believed it could satisfy the requirements of the PSLRA and be appointed lead
plaintiff for the entire litigation, it saw no "conflict" in having one lead plaintiff appointed. After the
opportunity to review the motions filed, which demonstrated that it did not have the largest financial
interest in the litigation and, thus, would not be appointed, this movant, "reinvented" itself as the
champion of a subclass that purportedly must have separate representation. See. McKesson HBOC Lead
Plaintiff Opposition Memorandum at 1.6 As demonstrated in the New York State Pension Fund Group's
Opposition Memorandum, this movant's newly discovered "conflict" between open market purchasers
of McKesson HBOC, i.e. §10 (b) claimants and exchange persons , i.e., §11 claimants, has often been
considered by the courts and regularly rejected.
More eggregious than the assertion of this meritless claim is the impunity with which this
movant has attempted to become "a horse of another color." The underlying facts relating to the claims
in this litigation have not changed; the type and amount of securities and claimed losses represented by
this movant have not changed. The only thing that has changed is that the McKesson HBOC Lead
Plaintiff Group now knows that it cannot succeed in its attempt to be appointed lead plaintiff for the
entire litigation and, thus, "conflicts," which did not exist on June 28, 1999 when it filed its motion, have
suddenly emerged.7 This tactic is anathema to the letter and spirit of the PSLRA. It cannot be
countenanced.8
Finally, it should be noted that, as a matter of fact, the New York State Pension Fund Group's
financial interest in the "subset" this movant now seeks to represent is far greater than this Other
Movant's. The McKesson HBOC Lead Plaintiff Group, which now seeks to represent only open market
purchasers of McKesson HBOC stock after the date of the Merger with respect to the § 10(b) claim,
asserts that it has $37 million in losses. The NYS Pension Fund Group, however, has more than $90
million in losses from its open market purchases.9
The NYS Pension Fund Group's Losses Is Incorrect.
The McKesson HBOC Group has submitted a declaration by John B. Torkelsen recalculating
losses claimed by certain lead plaintiff applicants. Based upon these recalculations, the McKesson
HBOC Group argues that it has the largest losses of any open market purchasers of McKesson HBOC
stock after the Merger and should, therefore, be appointed lead plaintiff only for that portion of the
class.10 Specifically, Torkelsen contends that the NYS Pension Fund Group, among other groups
including NYC, improperly calculated its losses on HBOC shares exchanged in the Merger and that one
of the funds in the NYS Pension Fund Group, the CRF, improperly calculated its losses on McKesson
shares purchased on the open market by using the wrong purchase price. Torkelsen contends, based on
his recalculations, that the CRF's losses should be lowered from approximately $64 million to
approximately $14 million and that the losses of another member of the NYS Pension Fund Group, the
FSBA, should be reduced by about $80 million. Torkelsen's conclusions are wrong as a matter of law
with respect to the NYS Pension Fund Group's HBOC shares converted into McKesson HBOC shares
in the Merger and wrong as a matter of fact with respect to its open market purchases.
Completely ignoring the statutory language of §11 of the Securities Act, Torkelsen claims that
for HBOC shares converted to McKesson HBOC shares in the Merger, the correct measure of damages
is the difference between the price at which the HBOC shares were purchased prior to the Merger and
their value at the time suit was brought.11 Based on this assumption, he estimates that losses of the CRF
and FSBA on HBOC shares exchanged should be reduced by $20 million and $80 respectively.
But Torkelsen's premise is incorrect as a matter of law. The §11 claim in this case does not arise
from open market purchases of HBOC shares; rather, it arises from the merger transaction where those
shares were converted into McKesson HBOC shares on January 13, 1999. It is settled that a merger
where shares of an acquired company are exchanged for new securities is a "sale" for purposes of §11
liability. 7547 Corp. v. Parker & Parsley Dev. Partners, L.P., 38 F.3d 211, 223 (5th Cir. 1994);
Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 591 n.11 (5th Cir. 1974); Feit v. Leasco Data Processing
Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp 544, 586 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). Thus, the amount "paid" by shareholders of the
acquired company is the price at the time of the transaction giving rise to the cause of action, not the
price when the shares used to "purchase" the new shares were first acquired. Feit, supra; Freedman v.
Value Health, Inc., Civil Action No. 3:95-CV-2038 (JCH) (D. Conn. Feb. 18, 1999) (unpublished
opinion attached to the Hoffman Declaration as Exhibit A) at 5-6. In Freedman, on this exact issue, the
court stated: "[T]he question of whether or not the value of the stock used to acquire stock of another
company in a merger is artificially inflated is irrelevant to the damages calculus under § 11. Recovery
is based on the market price of the shares used as currency in the merger, not on their intrinsic value."
Id. at 6. Torkelsen's recalculation of losses on the CRF's and FSBA's HBOC shares exchanged in the
Merger must therefore be rejected entirely. On January 13, 1999, the CRF and FSBA exchanged their
HBOC shares to purchase McKesson HBOC shares at a price of $83.9375 per share. Thus, the
calculation of losses for these converted shares set forth in the NYS Pension Fund Group's moving
papers is correct.
With respect to the McKesson shares listed by NYS in its Local Rule 3-7(c) Statement12 as
purchased on January 13, 1999, Mr. Torkelsen is correct that these shares were in fact purchased before
the merger, and not, as previously understood by the NYS Pension Fund Group, after the merger.13 He
is incorrect, however, in his estimate that this error overstated CRF's losses by $29 million. Rather, the
error resulted in an overstatement of losses by just $8 million. Mr. Torkelsen assumes that the CRF's
§10(b) damages for these shares were computed simply by multiplying the number of shares by the
amount the purchase price of $83.9375 exceeds the true value of those shares, or about $35. In fact, in
computing Section 10(b) damages on these shares, assuming these shares had been purchased after the
Merger, the loss on these shares was offset by gains from sales of McKesson HBOC after the Merger.
Also, the number of shares, 597,900, was reduced by the 429,000 shares sold after the Merger. This
significantly reduced the damages claimed for these shares. Because, however, these shares were
purchased before the Merger, and the sales were actually of shares purchased before the Merger, no
offset is required under the first-in-first-out method of calculating losses. Thus, elimination of the net
§ 10(b) damages claimed for the 597,900 shares only reduces the losses of the CRF by $7,919,116 to
$56,254,275 and the losses of the NYS Pension Fund Group as a whole to $246,011,412. Exhibit G to
the Hoffman Declaration shows the calculation of the CRF damages based upon the incorrect
assumption of 597,900 McKesson HBOC purchased on the open market on January 13, 1999 and a
corrected calculation showing damages based upon the fact that the 597,900 shares were purchased prior
Demonstrated Any Supportable Basis For Their Motions.
As demonstrated in the NYS Pension Fund Group's Opposition Memorandum and herein, there
is no legal basis for granting the motions of any of the Other Movants whose motions were and remain
motions for appointment as lead plaintiff for purported subclasses. The law, which demonstrates that
these motions are meritless and the distortions of the cases cited by these Other Movants in "support"
of their contentions, to the extent not discussed herein at pp. 4-5, is set forth in the NYS Pension Fund
Group's Opposition Memorandum. Rather than burden the Court with a restatement of this analysis,
the Court is respectfully referred to the NYS Pension Fund Group's Opposition Memorandum pp. 12-25.
Again, it must be noted that, in addition to the fact that the assertions of these Other Movants that
separate representation is required to solely represent the interests of these "carved out" niches are not
supported as a matter of law; as a matter of fact, the NYS Pension Fund Group has standing to bring all
viable claims against all possible defendants and its financial interest in the various "carved out"
positions dwarfs those of these Other Movants. Thus, for example, while the HBOC Securities Act
Group claims losses of approximately $513,000; the NYS Pension Fund Group's "exchange" claim
losses are approximately $152,161,182. See Declaration of Rochelle Feder Hansen in Support of the
New York State Pension Fund Group's Opposition Memorandum dated October 7, 1999, Ex. G
("Hansen Decl.").
Similarly, the contention by the Rappaport Group and the McKesseon Proxy Group that the
§14(a) claimants require separate representation14 has been specifically and resoundingly rejected by the
courts, including by the court in In re Reliance Acceptance Group, Inc., 1998 WL 388260 (W.D. Tex.
June 29, 1998), a decision rendered one year after the Supreme Court's decision in Amchem Prods. v.
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997) upon which the Other Movants so heavily rely.15
Again, as a matter of fact, notwithstanding the protestations of these movants that, unless a
separate lead plaintiff which seeks to solely represent the interests of the §14(a) claim is appointed, the
claim will not be vigorously or properly prosecuted, the financial interest of either or both of these
movants collectively in the §14 (a) claim is dwarfed by that of the NYS Pension Fund Group. The total
number of shares that these two groups represent is 132,534. In marked contrast, the New York State
Pension Fund Group represents more than 400,000 shares with a § 14 (a) claim.16
The Uhl Access Plaintiffs' Group have also failed to demonstrate that they should be appointed
lead plaintiff for the niche they would carve out either as a matter of law or fact. As demonstrated in
the NYS Pension Fund Group's Opposition Memorandum at 21-22, the claim of this group, though
couched in terms relating to the merger of Access and HBOC, in fact is dependent on its members
having exchanged their HBOC shares in the Merger. Their interests are precisley aligned with all others
who exchanged their HBOC shares in the Merger. In its Opposition Memorandum, the Access Group
predicates its "conflict" argument on the purported conflict between the Exchange Act and Securities
Act claimants. See Access Group Opposition Memorandum at 7-8. As already discussed, this argument
has repeatedly been rejected by the courts. Finally, as a matter of fact, the NYS Pension Fund Group,
which exchanged 165,200 shares of Access for HBOC, see Hansen Decl. Ex. G, has a far greater interest
in protecting the claims of these persons than the Access Group which exchanged only 3,800 Access
shares.17
Finally, the last Other Movant that submitted "opposition" papers, Senvest, seeking to represent
short sellers of HBOC, does not even attempt to justify its appointment. It rests on the bald assertion
that separate representation is required to "litigate issues that are unique to HBOC short sellers."
Senvest Opposition Memorandum at 3. There is no hint of what these "unique issues" are, much less
the requisite proof to establish that the NYS Pension Fund Group is not an adequate representative. As
set forth in the NYS Pension Fund Group's Opposition Memorandum, this purported group is, in fact,
subsumed within the group of all purchasers of HBOC common stock during the relevant period. This
motion also must be denied.18
D. There Is No Impediment To The NYS Pension Fund Group Serving As
Lead Plaintiff Because Its Members Are Governmental Pension Funds.
The McKesson Nationwide Group raises the specter of a conflict based on the fact that the
members of the NYS Pension Fund Group are governmental pension funds. McKesson Nationwide
Opposition Memorandum at 4-5. However, this movant merely speculates and offers no proof that
public pension funds may be subject to unique defenses based upon their alleged sophistication, which
purportedly is based upon their access to corporate management. This argument, while having no basis
in fact, has also been regularly rejected by the courts. See, e.g., Chan v. OrthoLogic Corp., No. CIV 96-1514 PHX RCB, slip op. at 11-12 (D. Ariz. Dec. 19, 1996) ("[s]ophisticated investors are as entitled to
rely on the fraud-on-the-market theory as anyone else," citing Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d
497, 506 (9th Cir. 1992) (Hansen Decl. Ex. I)); Modell v. Eliot Sav. Bank, 139 F.R.D. 17, 22 (D. Mass.
1991) (one's "status as a sophisticated investor renders him neither devoid of the protection of the
securities law nor immune to injury by misrepresentation"); Rubinstein v. Collins, 162 F.R.D. 534 (S.D.
Tex. 1995); Kirby v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 303 (D. Mass. 1987). This Co