Source: http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/published/COMMENT_DECISION/32158-10.htm
Timestamp: 2013-05-18 21:29:41
Document Index: 140093024

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 851', '§451', '§ 368', '§ 451', '§ 701', '§ 851']

1. The PSA offered by PG&E and the Commission staff is unreasonable and not in the public interest unless it is modified as provided in the Modified Settlement Agreement (MSA) in Appendix C.
2. On November 8, 2000, PG&E filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California against the five commissioners in their official capacity (the "Rate Recovery Litigation"). PG&E's complaint alleged that the Commission violated federal law by not allowing PG&E to collect in rates its costs of procuring wholesale energy. The Commission denied PG&E's allegations.
3. On January 4, 2001, in D.01-01-004, and on March 26, 2001, in D.01-03-082 the Commission raised retail rates for PG&E's electric customers and has not reduced those rates since. 4. On April 6, 2001, PG&E filed for protection under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, and has been operating under Bankruptcy Court supervision and protection since that date.
5. On September 20, 2001, PG&E and PG&E Corporation, as co-proponents, proposed a plan of reorganization for PG&E in its Chapter 11 proceeding. That plan provided for the disaggregation of PG&E's historic businesses into four companies, three of which would be regulated by the FERC rather than this Commission, as a means of raising the money necessary to pay all valid creditor claims in full and exit Chapter 11.
6. On October 5, 2001 the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California entered a judgement settling claims by Southern California Edison (SCE) against the Commission, which maintained then existing rates in effect and utilized revenues exceeding costs of supplying electric service to pay Edison's energy crisis obligations. This judgement was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit on September 23, 2002, in Southern California Edison v. Lynch, 307 F. 3d 794. State law issues involved in the settlement were resolved by the California Supreme Court on August 26, 2003 in Southern California Edison v. Peevey, 31 Cal. 4th 781.
7. Pursuant to the settlement SCE has paid its energy crisis-related debts and has received investment grade credit ratings from Fitch, Moody's and Standard and Poor.
8. On August 30, 2002, the Commission and the Official Creditors Committee filed a joint amended plan of reorganization for PG&E.
9. PG&E and the Commission have vigorously opposed and litigated against the plans proposed by each other.
10. Bankruptcy confirmation hearings on the competing plans of reorganization started on November 18, 2002, and were ongoing on March 11, 2003, when the Bankruptcy Court entered an order staying further confirmation and related proceedings for sixty days to facilitate a mandatory settlement process under the supervision of Bankruptcy Court Judge Randall Newsome. The stay was later extended to June 20, 2003. 11. On July 25, 2002 in PG&E's federal district court case against the Commission, U.S. District Judge Vaughan Walker denied the Commission's motion to dismiss and denied PG&E's and the Commission's motions for summary judgment. In the course of his ruling denying the motions, Judge Walker held that the federal filed rate doctrine applies to purchases of energy at market based rates, but he found that there were numerous factual disputes and he set the matter for trial. The federal district court case has been stayed by the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit pending the appeal by the Commission of the District Court's denial of a motion to dismiss.
12. On July 8, 2003 PG&E Corporation's unregulated subsidiary PG&E National Energy Group filed for bankruptcy protection and PG&E has abandoned its investment in NEG.
13. In the PG&E's federal district court case and other proceedings, PG&E claims to be entitled to recover from ratepayers $11.8 billion of unrecovered costs of utility service. The Commission disputes this claim.
14. PG&E also claims to be entitled to retain $2.5 billion in wholesale power generation revenues collected from retail ratepayers for September 2000 through January 2001. The Commission disputes these claims.
15. In the ATCP, ORA claims that $434 million of costs of procuring power through the California Power Exchange should be disallowed as imprudently incurred. PG&E disputes ORA's claim.
16. On June 19, 2003, certain of the Commission's staff and PG&E announced that they had reached agreement on a proposed settlement that would resolve the competing plans of reorganization in the Bankruptcy Court, PG&E's case against the Commission in the U.S. District Court, and various pending Commission proceedings, all as set forth in the PSA.
17. There are substantial litigation risks to PG&E, the Commission, and ORA, and corresponding risks to ratepayers, in going to hearings on all issues and it is reasonable to approve a settlement that appropriately balances those risks.
18. PG&E has asserted claims, which total approximately $11.8 billion, and the ratepayer costs of the settlement ($6.8 billion), are about 60% of those claims, excluding litigation costs of PG&E and PG&E Corporation. In addition there are direct, positive benefits ratepayers will obtain. Those benefits include immediate rate reductions; the ability of the Commission to regulate PG&E on an integrated, cost-of-service basis; and environmental betterments. The ratepayer dollar settlement is fair and reasonable when compared to the claims PG&E would waive and release.
19. It is in the public interest that PG&E emerge from bankruptcy promptly.
20. To emerge from bankruptcy PG&E should pay its creditors. All allowed claims should be paid in full. The dollar amount of the settlement, $6.8 billion, will achieve that result and is a reasonable compromise of the differences between PG&E and the Commission staff. The headroom revenue for 2001, 2002 and 2003 is part of the total revenue package which we find reasonable and in the public interest.
21. If this MSA is implemented, the initial revenue reduction in 2004 resulting from the settlement is projected to be approximately $230 million.
22. Paragraph 6 of the PSA is unreasonable and not in the public interest, because it requires the Commission not to restrict PG&E from paying dividends or repurchasing common stock, regardless of the circumstances, evidence or merit of any challenges to PG&E's dividend practices.
23. The motives, independence, and professional competence of the governmental representatives in the negotiations are beyond dispute. The ratepayers had adequate representation in the post-settlement process that resulted in the MSA.
24. The MSA will result in a feasible plan to permit PG&E to emerge from bankruptcy.
25. The MSA is fair, just and reasonable and in the public interest. First, it adopts the regulatory asset and the cash allowances of the PSA, and therefore will pay creditors in full, improving PG&E's credit metrics. Second, the MSA calls for the amortization of the regulatory asset "mortgage style" over nine years. Third, it offers the State significant environmental benefits. Fourth, it provides for reduction of the regulatory asset by any refunds obtained from energy suppliers. Finally, it contains PG&E's commitment not to unilaterally disaggregate for the life of the plan.
26. On September 9, 2003, the ALJ encouraged the parties to resolve their differences with respect to the Land Conservation Commitment in Paragraph 17 and Appendix E to the PSA.
27. On September 25, 2003, PG&E, California Resources Agency, ORA, Association of California Water Agencies, California Farm Bureau Federation, California Hydropower Reform Coalition, Regional Council of Rural Counties, State Water Resources Control Board, Tuolumne Utility District, U.S. Department of Agriculture-Forest Service and non-parties California Forestry Association, California Wilderness Coalition, Central Valley Regional Water Control Board, Mountain Meadows Conservancy, Natural Resources Defense Council, Northern California Council Federation of Fly Fishers, The Pacific Forest Trust, Inc., Planning and Conservation League, Sierra Club California, Sierra Foothills Audobon Society, Sierra Nevada Alliance, Trust for Public Land and U.S. Department of Interior-Bureau of Land Management presented to the Commission a Stipulation Resolving Issues Regarding The Land Conservation Commitment (the "Land Commitment Stipulation") that implements Paragraph 17 and Appendix E of the PSA and constitutes an enforceable contract among those parties.
28. The Land Conservation Commitment Stipulation is reasonable in light of the whole record, consistent with law, and in the public interest.
29. Under the LCC, no lands will be transferred or encumbered unless PG&E first applies for and obtains approval from the Commission pursuant to § 851.
30. It is in the public interest for PG&E to provide $30 million for environmental enhancements benefiting ratepayers in its urban areas in addition to the $70 million of environmental enhancements, which PG&E has provided in the PSA (¶ 17) for rural areas.
31. It is in the public interest for PG&E to provide $30 million for clean energy technology.
32. TURN's proposal to use a securitized financing supported by a dedicated rate component cannot feasibly be done without express enabling legislation. To wait for legislation would entail unreasonable delay in resolving PG&E's Chapter 11 proceeding.
1. The PSA offered by PG&E and the Commission staff is unreasonable and not in the public interest unless it is modified as provided in the Modified Settlement Agreement (MSA) in Appendix C. 2. When entering into the settlement agreements or contracts, the Commission may not act inconsistent with state law. 3. The Commission must strike the phrase "notwithstanding any contrary state law" in Paragraphs 21 and 32 of the PSA that provide that the Parties agree that the settlement agreement, the settlement plan and any court orders are intended to be binding and enforceable under federal law notwithstanding any contrary state law, because we can only enter into a settlement if it is consistent with state law. 4. In light of the constitutional requirement that the Commission actively supervise and regulate public utility rates and the statutory requirements under the §§451, 454, 728 that the Commission ensure that the public utilities' rates are just and reasonable, the Commission must retain its authority to set just and reasonable rates during the term of the MSA .
5. The Commission cannot be powerless to protect PG&E's ratepayers from unjust and unreasonable rates or practices during the term of the MSA. 6. The government may not contract away its right to exercise the police power in the future.
7. Entering into the Modified Settlement Agreement (MSA) is fully consistent with the Commission's exercise of its ratemaking authority, because it is of limited duration (four (4) years); because the regulatory asset provision is a reasonable and a necessary part of the settlement, and because the Commission will continue to decide the overall retail electric rates for PG&E's customers in pending and future proceedings.
9. Paragraph 2.g.'s commitment that the Commission will act to facilitate and maintain the investment grade credit ratings does not guarantee such a credit rating when there are other causes, besides the Commission's actions (e.g., PG&E's imprudent conduct resulting in a disallowance), which are responsible for any threats to PG&E's investment grade credit rating.
10. Paragraph 3..b.'s limitation on the Commission's ability to change PG&E's authorized rate of return based on PG&E's credit rating is not unreasonable so long as the Commission can prevent any negative influence from PG&E Corp. that would adversely affect PG&E.
11. The Bankruptcy Court has jurisdiction over the plan of reorganization and over the parties to enforce the settlement agreement, settlement plan and the Court's own confirmation order, as well as jurisdiction over the implementation of the bankruptcy plan, but only for the four (4) year duration of the regulatory asset amortization.
12. AB 6X made § 368(a) inapplicable to the utilities' unrecovered costs, and it is clear that the Commission's authority to allow PG&E to recover the balance in its TCBA is not limited by AB 1890. 13. The Commission and ratepayers had adequate representation in the settlement process, including the post-settlement proceedings in this OII, in order to arrive at the MSA. 14. TURN's proposed securitization financing cannot be achieved without legislation. 15. The MSA (the "Settlement Agreement" in Appendix C of this order) is not contrary to state law and is fair, just and reasonable and in the public interest; therefore, it should be approved and adopted.
16. The rulings of the presiding Administrative Law Judge are affirmed.
17. The Commission has inherent authority under the California Constitution and Public Utilities Code §§ 451 and 701 to enter into and execute a settlement agreement.
18. The Commission has authority under Public Utilities Code § 701 and Rule 51 to approve the Land Conservation Commitment (LCC) Stipulation.
19. Under the LCC, the Commission retains its existing authority under § 851 to approve or disapprove of any proposed disposition or encumbrance of PG&E's property.
20. Should PG&E agree to the Modified Settlement Agreement and the Bankrutcy Court approve it as part of the settlement plan, the Modified Settlement Agreement will be binding upon future Commissions. ORDER
1. The Proposed Settlement Agreement offered by PG&E and the Commission staff is modified by substituting a Regulatory Asset in an amount of 1.2 billion dollars ($1,200,000,000.00) grossed up for taxes and amortized on a straight line basis over four (4) years; by adding a reference to "PG&E" in Paragraph 2.g.; by adding a proviso to Paragraph 3.b. relating to the holding company's affect on credit rating; by deleting Paragraph 6 ("Dividend Payments and Stock Repurchases"); by deleting the phrase "notwithstanding any contrary state law" in Paragraphs 21 and 32; by adding $30 million of environmental benefits for PG&E's urban ratepayers, and adding $15 million to assure adequate planning and funding of clean energy technology; as set forth in Appendixes B and C.
PROPOSED REGULATORY ASSET REVENUE REQUIREMENT
AND CREDIT RATIOS
RED-LINED MODIFIED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
This Modified Settlement Agreement ("Agreement") is made and entered into by Pacific Gas and Electric Company ("PG&E"), PG&E Corporation (the "Parent" or "PG&E Corporation") (PG&E and PG&E Corporation are collectively referred to as the "PG&E Proponents"), and the Public Utilities Commission of the State of California, as of ___________, 2003 (each of which is individually referred to as a "Party," and collectively as the "Parties")
F. On January 4, 2001, and on March 26, 2001,m the CPUC raised PG&E's retail rates by an average of 4 cents per kilowatt hour, making them among the highest in the United States. PG&E has collected billions of dollars in revenues above its costs of providing service since that time.
F.G. The Parties desire to settle their differences with respect to the competing plans of reorganization and the other matters specified herein, and to jointly support a plan of reorganization for PG&E (the "Settlement Plan"), all as set forth more specifically below. G.H. In the exercise of its police and regulatory powers, the Commission is entering into this Agreement and shall adopt such decisions and orders as necessary to implement and carry out the provisions of this Agreement, including but not limited to, establishing Retail Electric Rates to provide for payment in full of the Securities and the Regulatory Asset (each as defined below) in accordance with their respective terms.
(6) Among other things, as part of this Agreement, PG&E will release claims against the Commission that would have been retained by PG&E or its Parent under the PG&E Plan. In lieu of those claims and the value that PG&E's shareholders would have received from the transactions provided for under the PG&E Plan, PG&E's shareholders will receive value over fournine years through this Agreement, the Settlement Plan and the Confirmation Order (as defined below), including amortization of the Regulatory Asset as provided for herein.
(7) The Commission acknowledges and agrees that the benefit of this Agreement to PG&E's shareholders requires that the Commission provide timely and full recovery of PG&E's reasonable costs of providing utility service, including return of and return on investment in utility plant and recovery of operating expenses, including power procurement costs, over the full nine-year amortization period of the Regulatory Asset. The Commission intends to provide PG&E with the opportunity to recover all of its prudently incurred costs as well as a return of and return on its investment in utility plant. The Commission also intends that any operational mandate it imposes that requires PG&E to expend funds or incur costs, including demand reduction or energy conservation programs, include a timely rate recovery mechanism for the reasonable costs of such mandate. (8) PG&E acknowledges and agrees that the benefit of this agreement to ratepayers and the public requires that PG&E's management conduct itself at all times in a prudent, open and transparent, fully responsive to the requirements of the Commission as respects rates and service and accounting therefore, disclosing conflicts and risks when known and avoiding them where possible. Agreement
p. "Company Credit Rating" means a long-term issuer credit rating from S&P and an issuer rating from Moody's for PG&E the utility, separate from PG&E Corp..
c. c. PG&E shall fund PG&E Environmental Enhancement Corporation with $70 million in Cash to cover administrative expenses and the costs of environmental enhancements to the Watershed Lands and Carizzo Plains, provided that no such enhancement may at any time interfere with PG&E's hydroelectric operations, maintenance or capital improvements. The funds will be paid in equal installments over ten years on the Effective Date and on January 2 of each year thereafter. The Commission shall authorize PG&E to recover these payments in retail rates without further review.
CLEAN MODIFIED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
F. On January 4, 2001 and on March 26, 2001 the CPUC raised PG&E's retail rates by an average of 4 cents per kilowatt hour, making them among the highest in the United State. PG&E has collected billions of dollars in revenues above its cost of providing service since that time.
G. The Parties desire to settle their differences with respect to the competing plans of reorganization and the other matters specified herein, and to jointly support a plan of reorganization for PG&E (the "Settlement Plan"), all as set forth more specifically below. H. In the exercise of its police and regulatory powers, the Commission is entering into this Agreement and shall adopt such decisions and orders as necessary to implement and carry out the provisions of this Agreement, including but not limited to, establishing Retail Electric Rates to provide for payment in full of the Securities and the Regulatory Asset (each as defined below) in accordance with their respective terms.
(6) Among other things, as part of this Agreement, PG&E will release claims against the Commission that would have been retained by PG&E or its Parent under the PG&E Plan. In lieu of those claims and the value that PG&E's shareholders would have received from the transactions provided for under the PG&E Plan, PG&E's shareholders will receive value over four years through this Agreement, the Settlement Plan and the Confirmation Order (as defined below), including amortization of the Regulatory Asset as provided for herein.
(9) The Commission acknowledges and agrees that the benefit of this Agreement to PG&E's shareholders requires that the Commission provide timely and full recovery of PG&E's reasonable costs of providing utility service, including return of and return on investment in utility plant and recovery of operating expenses, including power procurement costs, over the full nine-year amortization period of the Regulatory Asset. The Commission intends to provide PG&E with the opportunity to recover all of its prudently incurred costs as well as a return of and return on its investment in utility plant. The Commission also intends that any operational mandate it imposes that requires PG&E to expend funds or incur costs, including demand reduction or energy conservation programs, include a timely rate recovery mechanism for the reasonable costs of such mandate.
(10) PG&E acknowledges and agrees that the benefit of this agreement to ratepayers and the public requires that PG&E's management conduct itself at all times in a p[rudent, open and transparent manner, fully responsive to the requirements of the Commission as respects rates and service and accounting therefore, disclosing conflicts and risks when known and avoiding them where possible.
p. "Company Credit Rating" means a long-term issuer credit rating from S&P and an issuer rating from Moody's for PG&E the utility, separate fro PG&E Corp.
2. Regulatory Asset. The Commission shall establish a regulatory asset of One Billion Two Hundred Million Dollars ($1,200,000,000.00) as a new, separate and additional part of PG&E's rate base (the "Regulatory Asset"). a. The Regulatory Asset shall be amortized in PG&E's Retail Electric Rates on a "straight line" basis over four years starting on January 1, 2004. . b. The Regulatory Asset shall earn PG&E's authorized return on equity ("ROE") on the equity component of PG&E's capital structure as set in PG&E's annual cost of capital proceedings, provided that the ROE on the Regulatory Asset shall be no less than 11.22 percent per year for the life of the Regulatory Asset and that, once the equity component of PG&E's capital structure reaches 52 percent, the authorized equity component for the Regulatory Asset shall be no less than 52 percent for the life of the Regulatory Asset. c. The Commission will use its usual methodology for tax-effecting the ROE component for purposes of setting PG&E's revenue requirements associated with the unamortized portion of the Regulatory Asset. The Commission will apply the same method of tax-effecting to the scheduled amortization of the Regulatory Asset. The Commission shall authorize PG&E to establish a Tax Tracking Account to be used as follows: In the event that it is finally determined that PG&E is required to pay income taxes on the Regulatory Asset any earlier than the Regulatory Asset is amortized pursuant to Paragraph 2a, PG&E shall record in the Tax Tracking Account the difference between (1) the taxes incurred on account of the Regulatory Asset plus any interest imposed by the federal or state taxing authorities with respect to such earlier recognition of taxable income and (2) the taxes that would have been incurred on account of the Regulatory Asset had it been subject to tax as it was amortized pursuant to Paragraph 2a. The Tax Tracking Account shall earn PG&E's authorized rate of return in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph 2b. PG&E shall amortize the Tax Tracking Account in Retail Electric rates over the greater of the remaining life of the Regulatory Asset or five years.
f. The Commission agrees that PG&E should receive the benefit of this Agreement over the entire life of the Regulatory Asset. To ensure this, the Commission agrees that the URG Rate Base for PG&E already established by the Commission in D.02-04-016 shall be deemed just and reasonable and not subject to modification, adjustment or reduction, except as necessary to reflect capital expenditures and any change in authorized depreciation. (This shall not preclude the Commission from determining the reasonableness of any capital expenditures made on URG after the Effective Date.) The Commission further agrees that it shall not in any way reduce or impair the value of the Regulatory Asset or the URG Rate Base by taking the Regulatory Asset or the URG Rate Base, their amortization or earnings into account when setting other revenue requirements and resulting rates for PG&E. Nor shall the Commission take this Agreement or the Regulatory Asset into account in establishing PG&E's authorized ROE or capital structure. g. The Commission and PG&E recognize that the establishment, maintenance and improvement of Investment Grade Company Credit Ratings is vital for PG&E to be able to continue to provide safe and reliable service to its customers. The Commission and PG&E further recognize that the establishment, maintenance and improvement of PG&E's Investment Grade Company Credit Ratings directly benefits PG&E's ratepayers by reducing PG&E's immediate and future borrowing costs, which, in turn, will allow PG&E to finance its operations and make capital expenditures on its distribution, transmission, and generation assets at lower cost to its ratepayers. In furtherance of these objectives, the Commission and PG&E agree to act to facilitate and maintain Investment Grade Company Credit Ratings for PG&E.
b. The Commission shall set PG&E's capital structure and authorized ROE in PG&E's annual cost of capital proceedings in its usual manner; provided that, from January 1, 2004 until either S&P confers on PG&E a Company Credit Rating of at least "A-" or Moody's confers on PG&E a Company Credit Rating of at least "A3," the authorized ROE shall be no less than 11.22 percent per year and the authorized equity ratio for ratemaking purposes shall be no less than 52 percent, except for a transition period as provided below. The Commission recognizes that, at the Effective Date, PG&E's capital structure will likely not contain 52 percent equity. Accordingly, for 2004 and 2005, the authorized equity ratio shall equal the Forecast Average Equity Ratio, but in no event shall it be less than 48.6 percent. PG&E agrees not to pay any dividend on common stock before July 1, 2004. Provided, that if the Commission receives information that PG&E's relationship with PG&E Corporation is any manner preventing it from receiving the referenced credit ratings, the Commission may take such actions including deconsolidation or divestiture necessary to address the drag on credit ratings.
c. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to create a rate freeze or rate cap for PG&E's electric or gas business.
6. [REJECTED/DELETED] 7. DWR Contracts. If the Commission desires it, PG&E agrees to accept an assignment of or to assume legal and financial responsibility for the DWR Contracts, provided that (a) PG&E's Company Credit Rating, after giving effect to such assignment or assumption, shall be no less than "A" from S&P and "A2" from Moody's; (b) the Commission shall first have made a finding that, for purposes of assignment or assumption, the DWR Contracts to be assigned or assumed are just and reasonable; and (c) the Commission shall have acted to ensure that PG&E will receive full and timely recovery in its Retail Electric Rates of all costs of such DWR Contracts over their life without further review. The Commission agrees not to require PG&E to assume or accept an assignment of legal or financial responsibility for the DWR Contracts unless conditions (a), (b) and (c) are all met. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to limit the discretion of the Commission to review the prudence of PG&E's administration and dispatch of the DWR Contracts, consistent with applicable law.
b. In addition to withdrawing its pending applications at FERC, PG&E and PG&E Corporation agree that neither they nor any of their affiliates or subsidiaries will make any filing under Sections 4, 5 or 7 of the Natural Gas Act to transfer ownership of or ratemaking jurisdiction over PG&E's intrastate natural gas pipeline and storage facilities, and to keep such natural gas pipeline and storage facilities subject to the regulation of the Commission. In addition, PG&E and PG&E Corporation agree that the Commission has jurisdiction under existing Public Utilities Code section 851 to review and approve any proposal by PG&E to dispose of property necessary or useful in the performance of PG&E's duties to the public.
15. Fees and Expenses. As of the Confirmation Date, and pursuant to the Settlement Plan and the Confirmation Order, PG&E shall reimburse PG&E Corporation and the Commission for all of their respective professional fees and expenses incurred in connection with the Chapter 11 Case (such fees and expenses of the Commission to include those of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, UBS Warburg LLC and Chanin Capital Partners), without the need for any application under Section 330 or 503(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. If it is determined by court order that such an application is required for all or any part of such fees and expenses, then the Parties shall support such application in a written pleading to be filed with the Court and such fees and expenses shall be allowed and treated as an Administrative Expense Claim under the Settlement Plan in the amount approved by the Court. The Commission shall authorize PG&E to recover the amounts so paid or reimbursed to the Commission in retail rates over a reasonable period of time, not to exceed four years. PG&E shall not recover any portion of the amounts so paid or reimbursed to PG&E Corporation in retail rates directly or indirectly16. Conditions Precedent to Effective Date. Among other conditions to be contained in the Settlement Plan, the following shall be conditions precedent to the Effective Date:
PG&E shall fund PG&E Environmental Enhancement Corporation with $100 million in Cash: $70 million in Cash to cover administrative expenses and the costs of environmental enhancements to the Watershed Lands and Carizzo Plains, provided that no such enhancement may at any time interfere with PG&E's hydroelectric operations, maintenance or capital improvements; and $30 million of which will be dedicated to the Environmental Opportunity for Urban Youth Program. The funds will be paid in equal installments over ten years on the Effective Date and on January 2 of each year thereafter. The Commission shall authorize PG&E to recover these payments in retail rates without further review.
22. Enforcement. The Parties agree that the Court shall retain jurisdiction over the Parties for all purposes relating to enforcement of this Agreement, the Settlement Plan and the Confirmation Order, but only for the duration of the regulatory asset amortization period.
I certify that I have by mail, and by electronic mail to the parties to which an electronic mail address has been provided, this day served a true copy of the original attached Commissioner Wood's Proposed Alternate Decision Opinion modifying the proposed settlement agreement of Pacific Gas & Electric Company, PG&E Corporation and the Commission staff and approving the settlement agreement as modified on all parties of record in this proceeding or their attorneys of record.
Dated December 4, 2003, at San Francisco, California.
/s/ SUSIE TOY
Susie Toy