Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/4th/16/696.html
Timestamp: 2019-06-16 14:33:46
Document Index: 569456953

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 16', '§ 102', '§ 85', '§ 631', '§ 631', '§ 583']

Cohill v. Nationwide Auto Service (1993) :: :: California Court of Appeal Decisions :: California Case Law :: California Law :: US Law :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › California Case Law › Cal. App. 4th › Volume 16 › Cohill v. Nationwide Auto Service (1993)
Cohill v. Nationwide Auto Service (1993)
[No. B065502. Second Dist., Div. Seven. June 15, 1993.]
Jones, Mahoney & Brayton, Paul M. Mahoney, Richard A. Soll, Saxon, Alt, Dean, Mason, Brewer & Kincannon, Williams, Berges & Sanford and Thomas C. Sanford for Defendants and Respondents. [16 Cal. App. 4th 698]
Two days later, on December 4, 1991, appellant's counsel also wrote to the superior court. He stated: "The order ... sets the matter for a non-jury [16 Cal. App. 4th 699] trial. This is incorrect as early in this matter, the defendants requested a jury trial. Should the defendant now wish to withdraw their request for a jury trial, the plaintiff would request the jury. [¶] It is respectfully requested that ... the matter be set for jury trial." Copies of this letter were mailed to respondents.
A civil litigant has "an inviolate right" to a jury trial, a right insured by the California Constitution. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 16.)
[1] "The right to trial by jury is a basic and fundamental part of our system of jurisprudence. ... As such, it should be zealously guarded by the courts. ... In case of doubt therefore, the issue should be resolved in favor of preserving a litigant's right to trial by jury." (Byram v. Superior Court (1977) 74 Cal. App. 3d 648, 654 [141 Cal. Rptr. 604], internal citations omitted.) [16 Cal. App. 4th 700]
[2] Code of Civil Procedure fn. 4 section 631 fn. 5 specifies the ways a jury trial may be waived. Those specified ways are exclusive. (Cooks v. Superior Court (1990) 224 Cal. App. 3d 723, 727 [274 Cal. Rptr. 113].) There "can be no waiver by implication." (7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Trial, § 102, p. 100.) And "[n]o waiver results from going to trial after the erroneous denial of a jury, if the party makes a proper objection." (Id. at p. 101.) Denial of the right to a jury trial is reversible error. (Robinson v. Puls (1946) 28 Cal. 2d 664, 667 [171 P.2d 430]; Cooks v. Superior Court, supra, 224 Cal. App. 3d 723, 727; DeCastro v. Rowe (1963) 223 Cal. App. 2d 547, 563 [36 Cal. Rptr. 53]; 7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, Trial, § 85, p. 86.)
Prior to a 1941 amendment of section 631 "where one party set the case for trial and demanded a jury, but the adverse party relying on such demand, neither demanded a jury himself nor deposited jury fees, such adversary [16 Cal. App. 4th 701] party upon the waiver of a jury by the demanding party, was deemed to have lost his right to a jury trial. [Citations.] The 1941 amendment ... eliminated such a harsh rule. Its purpose and philosophy was to permit a party to rely on another party's demand and deposit of fees." (DeCastro v. Rowe, supra, 223 Cal. App. 2d 547, 561.) The "purpose and philosophy" of this ameliorative amendment is now reflected by subdivisions (b), (c), and (d). (See fn. 5.)
[3] Credit Union argues that appellant waived jury "[b]y failing to announce that a jury is required, at the time the cause is first set for trial, if it is set upon notice. ..." (§ 631, subd. (a)(4).) Credit Union is mistaken.
On November 21, 1991, and again on December 26, 1991, the court gave notice the trial was set for February 10, 1992. Nationwide, by its December 2d letter-70 days prior to the February 10, 1992, trial date-timely "announced that a jury is required" (§ 631, subd. (a)(4)). Appellant was permitted "to rely on [Nationwide's] demand ...." (DeCastro v. Rowe, supra, 223 Cal.App.2d at p. 561.) Moreover, appellant by his own December 4th letter made explicit his request for a jury trial. We conclude that appellant did not waive his right to a jury trial by means of section 631, subdivision (a)(4).
We need not consider appellant's additional remedies under section 631, subdivision (b). [16 Cal. App. 4th 702]
The judgment is reversed. The superior court is directed to give the matter priority and set the case for trial at the earliest possible date. (See Moran v. Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal. 3d 229, 242 [197 Cal. Rptr. 546, 673 P.2d 216].) The five-year statutory period (§ 583.310) is tolled until the new trial date.
FN 1. The minute order was mailed to all parties.
FN 2. We reject Credit Union's assertion that this letter and appellant's December 4, 1991, letter are not properly part of the record on appeal because not "filed or lodged" with the clerk of the superior court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.5.) Appellant properly designated both letters in his "Notice to Prepare Clerk's Transcript." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5(a).) That each letter is stamped "Copy supplied by Applt." is neither unusual nor disqualifying. The clerk misplaced or lost at least 10 other documents in the instant case, requested copies from defendants/respondents (who had designated them as part of the record on appeal), was not provided copies, and executed certificates regarding missing documents.
FN 3. The court had set the matter for a four-day nonjury trial.
FN 4. Statutory references, unless otherwise noted, are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
FN 5. The section reads:
FN 6. This silent, uncommunicated "choice" did not effect a section 631 waiver under subdivision (a)(1) or (2) or (3). Nor was it an "announcement" within the meaning of section 631, subdivision (b).
FN 7. This holding makes it unnecessary to consider other contentions by appellant.