Source: http://www.ihlresearch.org/amw/manual/category/section-d-attacks/section-d-general-rules
Timestamp: 2013-06-19 07:58:44
Document Index: 562733222

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art. 51', 'Art. 52', 'Art. 32', 'Art. 51', 'Art. 52', 'Art. 32', 'Art. 30', 'Art. 51', 'Art. 51', 'Art. 51', 'Art. 51', 'Art. 51', 'Art. 51', 'Art. 51', 'Art. 48', 'Art. 51', 'Art. 51', 'Art. 57', 'Art. 51', 'Art. 57', 'Art. 57', 'Art. 8', 'Art. 40', 'Art. 23', 'Art. 40', 'Art. 23', 'Art. 41', 'Art. 23', 'Art. 41', 'Art. 8', 'Art 8', 'Art. 12', 'Art. 41', 'Art. 23', 'Art. 41', 'Art. 8', 'Art. 8', 'Art. 12']

AMW Manual » D: General Rules
D: General Rules	Rule 10
Civilians who directly participate in hostilities lose their immunity from attack for such time as they so participate (see Section F). Although they have no combatant rights, they may be directly attacked like combatants. Yet, once they become hors de combat they are subject to — and benefit from — the application of Rule 15 (b). Categories: D: General Rules	Tags: Rule 11
Attacks directed against civilians or civilian objects are prohibited.
[Commentary] This Rule is based on the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration,[205] reaffirmed in the first sentence of Art. 51 (2) of AP/I[206] and in Art. 52 (1) of AP/I.[207]
It is necessary to distinguish between two modes of attacks against civilians or civilian objects, which are equally prohibited: (i) Rule 11 addresses the issue of attacks directed against civilians or civilian objects; (ii) Rule 13 deals with an “indiscriminate attack”, which is not directed against a specific person or object. Such an attack strikes lawful targets without distinction from civilians or civilian objects.
Directing attacks against civilians or civilian objects is prohibited regardless of the purpose. Nor is it important whether the attack is successful.
In time of armed conflict, attacks against civilians or civilian objects may result from a weapons system’s malfunction. For the purposes of Rule 11, this will not qualify as “attacks directed against civilians or civilian objects”. Thus, for example, if a guided missile loses its homing capability, i.e. “goes ballistic”, this will not qualify as an attack prohibited under Rule 11.
The prohibition of Rule 11 cannot eliminate cases of human error in targeting. The issue of mistake of fact is particularly relevant in case of criminal legal proceedings against the person. See Art. 32 (1) of the Rome Statute of the ICC.[208]
For the purpose of Rule 11, a civilian is any person who is not a combatant. However, a civilian loses protection against direct attack if, and for such time as, he directly participates in hostilities (see Section F).
Civilian objects, as defined in Rule 1 (j), are all objects that are not military objectives as defined in Rule 1 (y). The protection does not apply to civilian objects that have become military objectives through location, purpose or use (see Rule 22 (b)−(d)).
Rule 11 applies also in non-international armed conflict.
Second operative paragraph of the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration: “That the only legitimate object which States should endeavour to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy.”
First sentence of Art. 51 (2) of AP/I: “The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack.”
Art. 52 (1) of AP/I: “Civilian objects shall not be the object of attack or of reprisals. Civilian objects are all objects which are not military objectives as defined in paragraph 2.”
Art. 32 (1) of the Rome Statute of the ICC: “A mistake of fact shall be a ground for excluding criminal responsibility only if it negates the mental element required by the crime.” Art. 30 of the Rome Statute of the ICC further deals with this “mental element”. Categories: D: General Rules	Tags: Rule 12
Categories: D: General Rules	Tags: Rule 13
(a) Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited.
[Commentary] (b) Indiscriminate attacks are those that cannot be or are not directed against lawful targets (as defined in Rule 10 (b)) or the effects of which cannot be limited as required by the law of international armed conflict, and which therefore are of a nature to strike lawful targets and civilians or civilian objects without distinction.
[Commentary] (c)	Attacks must not treat as a single lawful target a number of clearly separated and distinct lawful targets located in a city, town, village or area containing a similar concentration of civilians or civilian objects.
[Commentary] This Rule is based on Art. 51 (4) of AP/I.[212]
Whether an attack is indiscriminate is typically a case-specific determination. Relevant factors include, but are not limited to indications of the attacker’s indifference; the nature of the weapons employed; and the location and density of civilians or civilian objects relative to military objectives.
Rule 13 (a) applies also in non-international armed conflict.
Art. 51 (4) of AP/I: “Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. Indiscriminate attacks are: (a) those which are not directed at a specific military objective; (b) those which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed at a specific military objective; or (c) those which employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited as required by this Protocol; and consequently, in each such case, are of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction.”
See also the first sentence of subpara. 2 of Para. 5.3.2 of NWP: “The principle of distinction, combined with the principle of military necessity, prohibits indiscriminate attacks.”
This Rule is based on Art. 51 (4) of AP/I.
Indiscriminate attacks may result from either the employment of indiscriminate methods (tactics) or means (weapons) of warfare. On the latter, see also Rule 5 (a).
Indiscriminate attacks, just like attacks directed against civilians or civilian objects (see Rule 11) need to be distinguished from instances of a weapons system’s malfunction or from human error. As long as a weapon was originally aimed at a lawful target, the fact that it or its weapons system malfunctions (e.g., when a missile “goes ballistic) and as a result hits civilians or civilian objects, does not alter the fact that it was “directed” against a lawful target. See also paragraph 4 and paragraph 5 of the Commentary on Rule 11.
If enemy defences or countermeasures deflect a weapon (not otherwise indiscriminate) from its intended target, causing it to strike civilians or civilian objects, the attack will not be deemed indiscriminate (on this ground).
Even when target identification and weapons guidance systems are used, an attack may become indiscriminate due to inclement weather conditions or similar reasons. Attacks at night may likewise not be possible to execute with sufficient discrimination using available equipment and weapons.
The question of whether the effects of an attack against a target in proximity of civilians or civilians objects is indiscriminate, may depend on such factors as the nature of the target, choice of weapons and meteorological conditions. For an example, see the 2007 judgment of the ICTY Trial Chamber in the Martic case. The Tribunal held that firing non-guided rockets with cluster munitions at a densely populated civilian area, from a distance of approximately 50 kilometers, constituted an indiscriminate attack.[213]
An aircraft that releases a weapon over an area in which civilians or civilian objects are likely to be present, without regard for where it will hit, will have conducted an indiscriminate attack. This includes an aircraft which chooses to jettison weapons prior to returning to base. However, in extreme circumstances, it is permissible to release the weapons over a sparsely populated area with a few scattered farms or cottages.
Attacks using missiles and other projectiles fired from beyond visual range (“over the horizon”, see Commentary on Rule 7 pertaining to “beyond visual range weapons systems”) are not as such indiscriminate when their employment permits distinguishing military objectives and combatants from civilians and civilian objects. This may be done through sensors on the weapon itself, or through external guidance, for instance from the aircraft. Indeed, the technological systems used to identify a target and prosecute such attacks can be far more reliable than the naked eye.
An operation must qualify as an “attack” (see Rule 1 (e)) before being prohibited as “indiscriminate”. For instance, a psychological operation directed against the civilian population which does not cause death/injury to civilians, or destruction/damage of civilian objects does not violate the law of international armed conflict (provided that it is not intended to terrorize civilians, see Rule 18). On this issue in particular, see Rule 21.
Rule 13 (b) applies also in non-international armed conflict.
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milan Martic, Case No. IT-95-11-T, Judgment by the Trial Chamber of 12 June 2007, at paras. 462–463.
This Rule is based on Art. 51 (5) (a) of AP/I.[214] It is also found in other treaties and in military manuals such as in NWP[215] and in the UK Manual.[216]
Rule 13 (c) is derived from the acute need to cope with the problem of “target area” bombing that arose in WWII. The text seriously limits the possibilities in which clusters of military objectives may be attacked as if they were a single lawful target. On the other hand, it does not deny the possibility that a number of lawful targets, which are not clearly separated and distinct, may be treated as a single lawful target.
As the experience of WWII demonstrated, recourse to “target area” bombing may cause devastation on an unprecedented scale because of the location of lawful targets — which are not clearly separated and distinct — within a city, or other residential area. However, it must be borne in mind that, under the current law of international armed conflict, all attacks are subject to the principle of proportionality (see Rule 14) and the requirement to take feasible precautions in attack (see Section G). Hence, the expected collateral damage to civilians and civilian objects must not be excessive compared to the anticipated military advantage.
As in other instances when the attacker is facing the risk of a breach of the principle of proportionality, the availability of precision guided weapons may facilitate striking lawful targets in a manner that will avoid — or, in any event, minimize — the expected collateral damage to civilians or civilian objects (see Rule 8).
Rule 13 (c) applies also in non-international armed conflict.
Art. 51 (5) of AP/I: “Among others, the following types of attacks are to be considered as in¬discriminate: (a) an attack by bombardment by any methods or means which treats as a single military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct military objectives located in a city, town, village or other area containing a similar concentration of civilians or civilian objects; and (b) an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”
Second subpara. of Para. 5.3.2 of NWP: “attacks that employ a method or means of combat that cannot be directed at a specific military objective (e.g., declaring an entire city a single military objective and attacking it by bombardment when there are actually several distinct military objectives throughout the city that could be targeted separately)”.
Para. 5.23.2 of the UK Manual: “The following are examples of indiscriminate attacks: (a) an attack by bombardment by any methods or means which treats as a single military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct military objectives located in a city, town, village or other area containing a similar concentration of civilians or civilian objects; …”
Categories: D: General Rules	Tags: Rule 14
An attack that may be expected to cause collateral damage which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated is prohibited.
[Commentary] This Rule is based on Art. 51 (5) (b) of AP/I,[217] and is often referred to as the principle of proportionality.
“Collateral damage” does not include inconvenience, irritation, stress, fear or other intangible conditions caused to the civilian population. It is limited to death/injury to civilians, or to damage/destruction of objects. For the definition of collateral damage, see Rule 1 (l).
In the context of air or missile combat operations, it is often unavoidable that civilians or civilian objects will be harmed during attacks on lawful targets, especially in circumstances in which military objectives are located in proximity to civilians or civilian objects, or when civilians are located within a military objective. In such cases, the attack may proceed so long as the principle of proportionality and the requirements of Section G are complied with. If an attack would not be possible without excessive collateral damage to civilians or civilian objects being expected, as compared to the anticipated military advantage, the attack is prohibited despite being directed against a lawful target. For the definition of “military advantage”, see Rule 1 (w).
The members of the Group of Experts could not agree as to what extent (if at all) indirect (“reverberating”) effects of attacks have to be factored into the proportionality calculation. In any event, there is no dispute that indirect effects cannot be taken into account if they are too remote or cannot be reasonably foreseen. The Group of Experts could identify no conclusive State practice that settles the issue of indirect effects of attacks. The key to the application of Rule 14 lies in the terms “expected” and “anticipated.” The principle of proportionality is not dealing with hindsight. What counts is not hindsight, but foresight (see paragraph 4 of the Commentary on Rule 1 (q) and paragraph 4 of the Commentary on Rule 12 (a)). Foresight includes taking feasible precautions (see Section G) and assessing the likely consequences of the attack that is being planned, bearing in mind the anticipated military advantage. The consequences that actually flow from an attack come into play in the course of an ex post facto evaluation of whether the attacker ought reasonably to have expected the resulting collateral damage. But the issue is expectations and not results (see also paragraph 8 of the Commentary on Rule 12 (b) with regard to hindsight in case of doubt).
The standard is objective in that expectations must be reasonable. If the attacker expected, in light of reliable information available at the time, that the collateral damage to civilians or civilians would be excessive relative to the anticipated military advantage, the principle of proportionality will have been violated. “Expected” collateral damage and “anticipated” military advantage, for these purposes, mean that that outcome is probable, i.e. more likely than not. Both terms assume a good-faith assessment by the commander planning or approving the attack, or the combatant executing it. They are “judged in the light of the information reasonably available” at the time.[218] Moreover, it must be acknowledged that mistakes occur due to the “fog of war” or when it turns out reality did not match expectations, perhaps due to faulty intelligence. An attack does not violate the principle of proportionality unless such mistakes were unreasonable in the circumstances. See Section G on feasible precautions in attacks.
The term “excessive” is often misinterpreted. It is not a matter of counting civilian casualties and comparing them to the number of enemy combatants that have been put out of action. It applies when there is a significant imbalance between the military advantage anticipated, on the one hand, and the expected collateral damage to civilians and civilian objects, on the other.
The fact that collateral damage is extensive does not necessarily render it excessive. The concept of excessiveness is not an absolute one. Excessiveness is always measured in light of the military advantage that the attacker anticipates to attain through the attack. If the military advantage anticipated is marginal, the collateral damage expected need not be substantial in order to be excessive. Conversely, extensive collateral damage may be legally justified by the military value of the target struck, because of the high military advantage anticipated by the attack.[219]
The term “concrete and direct” refers to military advantage that is clearly identifiable and, in many cases, quantifiable.[220] Of course, not always is the military advantage easy to establish and anticipate. On the other hand, it is clear that for the military advantage to be concrete and direct, it cannot be based merely on hope or speculation.
The term “military advantage” must not be too narrowly construed, for instance by restriction to ground gained or weakening the enemy armed forces (see paragraph 3 of the Commentary on Rule 1 (w)). This is especially true in aerial warfare. An attack can for instance be an element in a ruse (see Section Q, in particular Rule 116 (a)). The security of the attacking forces is also a component of military advantage,[221] as would be general disruption of command and control communications. On the other hand, the term “military advantage” must not be interpreted too broadly: it is limited to impact on the enemy’s military tactical or operational level. Thus, for instance, even if striking military objectives weakens the morale of the enemy civilian population (see Rule 18), this effect is not in itself a relevant “military advantage” for the purpose of Rule 14.
It is generally accepted as a matter of customary international law that “the military advantage anticipated from an attack is intended to refer to the advantage anticipated from the attack considered as a whole and not from isolated or particular parts of the attack”[222] , a standard adopted in the Rome Statute of the ICC.[223] This means that it is necessary to consider the military operation in its entirety and not merely the military advantage immediately accruing from the attack at the time that it is conducted. For instance, an attack on a bridge to deny the enemy the capability to cross a river may seemingly be of low military advantage if the enemy is actually not using that bridge. However, if the purpose of the attack on the bridge is to block avenues of retreat which the commander knows will be taken once he launches his planned offensive, the military advantage of destroying the bridge will be high. On this issue, see also paragraph 6 of the Commentary on Rule 1 (w), paragraph 7 of the Commentary on Rule 1 (y) and paragraph 3 of the Commentary on Rule 33.
Aerial attacks are often conducted by multiple military aircraft, in which case it would be improper to consider the impact of each single sortie in isolation. It is rather necessary to assess the overall mission. To consider military advantage in light of the “attack as a whole” has also other aspects. One example could be a contemplated series of attacks against a number of bridges across the same river when they are in proximity to each other. Although the first attack on one of these bridges might appear to yield only a limited military advantage, considering that the enemy can still use the remaining bridges, the military advantage will become apparent once subsequent attacks against the other bridges take place.
“An attack considered as a whole” ought not to be confused with the entire armed conflict, but could refer to a large air campaign. For example, a series of air attacks may be directed against military objectives in one zone — in anticipation of a military operation in another — as a ruse to deceive the enemy regarding the actual location of the intended operations (see Rule 116 (a)). Although the expected collateral damage to civilians or civilian objects resulting from the attacks might be excessive if viewed solely from the perspective of the advantage gained from individual target destruction, it must instead be considered in terms of the ruse’s value relative to the military operations elsewhere.
Opinions in the Group of Experts were divided as to whether civilians who are physically within a military objective (e.g., civilian employees working in a munitions factory) count for the purposes of the application of the principle of proportionality. Three views were expressed. Some experts were of the opinion that such civilians do not count because they have chosen to be there and have thereby voluntarily assumed the risk of an attack by the enemy. The majority of the Group of Experts felt that the principle of proportionality applies to such civilians as in all other cases. However, some experts — while belonging to that majority — pointed out that the application of the principle of proportionality will not make a material difference when the target is a high-value asset (such as a munitions factory), referring to the fact that extensive casualties do not necessarily amount to excessive collateral damage.
The principle of proportionality applies throughout all stages of an attack, from planning to execution. Anyone with the ability and authority to suspend, abort or cancel an attack, must do so once he reaches the conclusion that the expected collateral damage would be excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage. For instance, a pilot who has the target in view and unexpectedly observes civilians in the target area — who were not supposed to be there, based on the information provided to him during the briefing preceding the attack — must assess the collateral damage expected to befall them and cancel the attack if he concludes that the principle of proportionality will be violated. See Rule 32 (b) and Rule 35 (c).
National or policy requirements to seek approval of a specified level of command whenever collateral damage reaches a predetermined level are not a substitute for the application of the principle of proportionality in accordance with the law of international armed conflict. A decision by higher echelons to approve a planned attack will not render lawful an attack which violates Rule 14.
Rule 14 applies also in non-international armed conflict.
Para. 5.20.4. of the UK Manual. See also the UK statement of understanding made on ratification of AP/I: “Military commanders and others re-sponsible for planning, deciding upon, or executing attacks necessarily have to reach decisions on the basis of their assessment of the information from all sources which is reasonably available to them at the relevant time.”
Para. 1980 of the the ICRC Commentary on AP/I, in connection with Art. 51 of AP/I, disagrees with this view: “The idea has also been put forward that even if they are very high, civilian losses and damages may be justified if the military advantage at stake is of great importance. This idea is contrary to the fundamental rules of the Protocol; in particular it conflicts with Art. 48 (Basic rule) and with paragraphs 1 and 2 of the present Art. 51. The Protocol does not provide any justification for attacks which cause extensive civilian losses and damages. Incidental losses and damages should never be extensive.” The ICRC interpretation of Art. 51 of AP/I is not, however, found to be customary law.
Para. 2209 of the ICRC Commentary, in connection with to Art. 57 (2) (b) of AP/I states that the expression “concrete and direct military advantage” “was intended to show that the advantage concerned should be substantial and relatively close, and that advantages which are hardly perceptible and those which would only appear in the long term should be disregarded.”
The term “military advantage” involves a variety of considerations, including the security of attacking forces, see declarations made by Australia and New Zealand upon ratification of AP/I : “In relation to paragraph 5 (b) of Art. 51 and to paragraph. 2 (a) (iii) of Art. 57, [it is our understanding] that … the term “military advantage” involves a variety of considerations, including the security of attacking forces. …”
The UK has given the following understanding to Art. 57 of AP/I: “In the view of the United Kingdom, the military advantage anticipated from an attack is intended to refer to the advantage anticipated from the attack considered as a whole and not only from isolated or particular parts of the attack.” Similar understandings have also been given by, for example, Australia, Canada, Germany and The Netherlands.
Art. 8 (2) (b) (iv) of the Rome Statute of the ICC, see fn. 84.
Categories: D: General Rules	Tags: Rule 15
(a) It is prohibited to order that there shall be no survivors in combat operations, to threaten an adversary therewith, or to conduct hostilities on that basis.
[Commentary] (b) Persons who are hors de combat – either because they have clearly expressed an intention to surrender or as a result of sickness, wounds or shipwreck – must not be attacked, provided that they abstain from any hostile act and no attempt is made to evade capture.
[Commentary] This Rule is based on Art. 40 of AP/I.[224] See also Art. 23 (d) of the 1907 Hague Regulations.[225]
There was some debate in the Group of Experts as to whether it was necessary to have Rule 15 (a) in the Manual, considering that the subject of denial of quarter is also covered in Rule 126 in the context of surrender. The majority of the Group of Experts felt, however, that the issue of denial of quarter — and what is equally important, the threat thereof — is wider in scope and must therefore also be incorporated in Section D.
The emphasis in Rule 15 (a) is on the fact that a policy of “taking no any prisoners” is entirely inadmissible, and it cannot be threatened, even in advance of any fighting and, therefore, before the issue of surrender becomes relevant.
Persons who surrender or give themselves up for capture no longer pose a threat to the enemy (see Section S, in particular paragraph 3 of the Commentary on Rule 126). It is unlawful to kill or injure such persons regardless of whether they are combatants or civilians taking a direct part in hostilities.
Rule 15 (a) applies also in non-international armed conflict. Art. 40 of AP/I (“Quarter”): “It is prohibited to order that there shall be no survivors, to threaten an adversary therewith or to conduct hostilities on this basis.”
Art. 23 of the 1907 Hague Regulations: “In addition to the prohibitions provided by special Conventions, it is especially forbidden: … (d) To declare that no quarter will be given.”
This Rule is derived from Art. 41 of AP/I.[226] See also Art. 23 (c) of the 1907 Hague Regulations.[227]
For the specific context of air or missile operations, there are two categories of persons hors de combat: (i) those who have clearly expressed an intention to surrender; (ii) those who are incapacitated. The latter category falls into three subsets: sick; wounded; and shipwrecked.
Upon due consideration, the majority of the Group of Experts decided not to retain the separate category of Art. 41 (a) of AP/I, i.e. persons “in the power of an adverse Party”, in view of the fact that such category is irrelevant in aerial warfare.
Although, as a term of art, the expression “hors de combat” is reserved for combatants, for the purposes of Rule 15 (b), it covers incapacitation of both combatants and civilians who have directly participated in hostilities. Combatants (or civilians directly participating in hostilities) must communicate clearly their intention to surrender before becoming immune from attack. If a combatant (or a civilian directly participating in hostilities) does not indicate an intention to surrender in a way that the enemy can perceive and understand, this person is still liable to be attacked. For example, the crew of an attacking aircraft conducting a beyond-visual-range attack may be unaware that the forces they are attacking wish to surrender. As long as the lack of knowledge is reasonable in the circumstances, the attack may lawfully be conducted because the desire to surrender has not been effectively communicated to the aircrews (or other forces which could pass that information to the crew in adequate time).
In aerial warfare, it is often problematic to assess whether a person is hors de combat. When a person is in an aircraft in the air, his aircraft is not immune from attack and the person would have to suffer the consequences of an attack as long as the aircraft has not effectively communicated its intention to surrender (see Section S), although he may actually be wounded. When a person is lying on the ground, it is often difficult to determine from the air whether this is due to incapacitating injuries or because he is taking cover from aerial attack. Thus, it is essential to emphasize that the protection extends only to those who are hors de combat from the perspective of the reasonable attacker.
In the context of aerial warfare, it is possible to communicate an intention to surrender without actually being captured, for instance when a combatant on the ground surrenders to an aircraft (see dissenting view in the next paragraph). The protection against attack commences as soon as the intention to surrender has been clearly communicated to the enemy, for instance by throwing away one’s weapons and raising one’s arms. The display of a white flag by ground troops, which means a request to parley, is in practice also frequently used as a means of communicating an intention to surrender.
Opinions were sharply divided among the members of the Group of Experts as to whether it is possible for personnel on the ground or on board of ships to validly surrender to an aircraft that is not able to accept the surrender by taking prisoners. There were two views. Some members of the Group of Experts were of the opinion that it is irrelevant whether the aircraft can itself capture prisoners: those manifesting an intent to surrender may not be attacked. By contrast, other members of the Group of Experts insisted that an attack need not be aborted merely because someone on the ground is raising his hands or waving a white flag, since this could easily lead to misuse. All members of the Group of Experts agreed, however, that if a large unit surrenders collectively and ground forces can be summoned to take care of the surrendering enemy soldiers, they cannot be attacked. As to surrender, see Section S. The Group of Experts agreed that those who manifest the intention to surrender must do so in good faith. If ground forces of a Belligerent Party repeatedly raise their hands in order to avoid attack from enemy military aircraft knowing that the military aircraft has no possibility to take prisoners, and continue to fight again when the aircraft has left, this could amount to perfidy (see Section Q, in particular Rule 114 (e)). Furthermore, such personnel cannot expect that similar behaviour on future occasions will be taken seriously as a genuine offer of surrender.
A person may be incapacitated (hors de combat) by wounds or sickness. The incapacitation does not have to be caused by the conflict. The concept includes persons who have suffered stroke, heart attack or food poisoning, and even mothers who are delivering babies.
The notion of incapacitation is contingent on the combatant (or the civilian taking direct part in hostilities) (i) not continuing to commit any act of hostility; and (ii) not trying to escape.[228] Incapacitation ought not to be confused with lack of capability for defense. For instance, during an aerial attack, enemy forces may have no defensive means of warfare within range of the attacking aircraft. This does not render them hors de combat. If they wish to be exempt from attack, they must validly communicate an intention to surrender.
The terms “wounded”, “sick” and “shipwrecked” are defined in Art. 8 of AP/I. “Wounded” and “sick” are military or civilian persons in need of medical care and who refrain from all acts of hostility.[229] “Shipwrecked” are military or civilian persons in a perilous situation at sea or on any other waters following a misfortune and who refrain from all acts of hostility. Under Art 8 (b) of AP/I the concept is expanded to include persons, who are in peril at sea or in other waters (including lakes).[230] The term “shipwreck” means shipwreck from any cause and includes forced landings at sea by or from aircraft (first paragraph of Art. 12 of GC/II).[231]
A person descending by parachute from an aircraft in distress is assimilated to persons hors de combat and must not be made the object of attack during his descent. Upon landing in a territory controlled by the enemy, the person who descended in distress must be given an opportunity to surrender (for details, see Section T, in particular Rule 132).
Rule 15 (b) applies also in non-international armed conflict.
Art. 41 of AP/I ‘(“Safeguard of an enemy hors de combat”): “(1) A person who is recognized or who, in the circumstances, should be recognized to be hors de combat shall not be made the object of attack. (2) A person is hors de combat if: (a) he is in the power of an adverse Party; (b) he clearly expresses an intention to surrender; or (c) he has been rendered unconscious or is otherwise incapacitated by wounds or sickness, and therefore is incapable of defending himself.”
Art. 23 of the 1907 Hague Regulations: “In addition to the prohibitions provided by special Conventions, it is especially forbidden: … (c) To kill or wound an enemy who, having laid down his arms, or having no longer means of defence, has surrendered at discretion.”
Para. 1610 of the ICRC Commentary on AP/I, in connection with Art. 41 (2) of AP/I: “In accordance with this paragraph, a person is considered to be rendered ‘hors de combat’ either if he is “in the power” of an adverse Party, or if he wishes to surrender, or if he is incapacitated. This status continues as long as the person does not commit any act of hostility and does not try to escape.”
Art. 8 (a) of AP/I: “‘Wounded’ and ‘sick’ mean persons, whether military or civilian, who, because of trauma, disease or other physical or mental disorder or disability, are in need of medical assistance or care and who refrain from any act of hostility. These terms also cover maternity cases, new-born babies and other persons who may be in need of immediate medical assistance or care, such as the infirm or expectant mothers, and who refrain from any act of hostility.”
Art. 8 (b) of AP/I: “‘Shipwrecked’ means persons, whether military or civilian, who are in peril at sea or in other waters as a result of misfortune affecting them or the vessel or aircraft carrying them and who refrain from any act of hostility. These persons, provided that they continue to refrain from any act of hostility, shall continue to be considered shipwrecked during their rescue until they acquire another status under the Conventions or this Protocol.”
First paragraph of Art. 12 of GC/II: “Members of the armed forces and other persons mentioned in the following Article, who are at sea and who are wounded, sick or shipwrecked, shall be respected and protected in all circumstances, it being understood that the term “shipwreck” means shipwreck from any cause and includes forced landings at sea by or from aircraft.”
Categories: D: General Rules	Tags: direct participation in hostilties, hors de combat	Rule 16
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