Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/1053863/US-Supreme-Court-01-595
Timestamp: 2018-08-15 16:03:32
Document Index: 633707816

Matched Legal Cases: ['art 8', 'art 36', 'art 44', 'art 30', 'arts 29', 'art, 10']

US Supreme Court: 01-595 | Alford Plea | Plea
US Supreme Court: 01-595
UNITED STATES, Petitioner :
No. 01-595
ANGELA RUIZ.
THEODORE B. OLSON, ESQ., Solicitor General, Department of
Justice, Washington, D.C.; on behalf of the
STEVEN F. HUBACHEK, ESQ., San Diego, California; on behalf
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THEODORE B. OLSON, ESQ.
On behalf of the Petitioner STEVEN F. HUBACHEK, ESQ.
On behalf of the Petitioner 52
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(11:01 a.m.)
CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST: We'll hear -- we'll
hear argument next in No. 01-595, the United States
against Ruiz.
ORAL ARGUMENT OF THEODORE B. OLSON
MR. OLSON: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and
The Ninth Circuit has created a new
constitutional rule for guilty pleas that is neither
required by the Constitution nor warranted by this Court's
previous decisions. Its inevitable effect would be to
complicate and expose to collateral attack confessions of
guilt which -- which account for approximately 95 percent
of all convictions in the Federal system and to stifle the
market for plea bargains, which this Court has described
as an essential component of the administration of
The Ninth Circuit held that an accused cannot
enter a valid guilty plea unless he is first given all
evidence in the prosecutor's possession which would have a
reasonable probability of discouraging him from pleading
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The Ninth Circuit's rule, new rule, is not a
logical extension of the Brady -- Brady v. Maryland, which
is premised on concern over the constitutional fairness of
criminal trials. Brady and its progeny require disclosure
only when necessary to ensure a fair trial.
Brady itself, the Court was explicit to point out that it
-- that decision was premised on the avoidance of an
unfair trial to the accused. The subsequent cases, which
have expanded upon or interpreted or explained Brady, have
been even more specific with respect to the limitations on
the scope of Brady.
In U.S. v. Agurs, the Court said the prosecutor
will not have violated his constitutional duty unless his
omission is of sufficient significance to result in the
denial of a fair trial.
Something similar was said in U.S. v. Bagley.
Brady's purpose is not to displace the adversary system as
the primary means by which truth is uncovered. If it did
not deprive a defendant of a fair trial, there is no
constitutional violation.
QUESTION: Can we get to your main argument
about Brady, that is, Brady in all its aspects is a trial
right, not a pretrial right, in view of the plea agreement
in this case, which represents that you have already
turned over the prime Brady material and the only question
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is the impeaching material?
MR. OLSON: Yes, Justice Ginsburg. The
agreement to which Justice Ginsburg is referring is set
out -- the two paragraphs of that agreement --
QUESTION: MR. OLSON: 45a and 46a of the petition for cert.
Yes, and I also have it on -- on
page 12 of the joint appendix.
QUESTION: MR. OLSON: the --
QUESTION: MR. OLSON: -- the petition.
It's -- it's on page 14a of the
What -- what --
Page 12 of the joint appendix. It's
petition -- of the appendix to the petition for
QUESTION: It's the Government's representation
that any information establishing the factual innocence of
the defendant known to the prosecutor has been turned over
to the defendant. And so my question is, isn't that, at
You do have the
least in this case, a moot issue?
question about the impeaching material.
MR. OLSON: The answer to that, Justice
Ginsburg, is that both in the Sanchez decision and in this
case, the Ruiz decision, the Ninth Circuit went further
and made it clear that it was applying the rule that it
applied in this case to all exculpatory material which, if
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known to the defendant, might cause the defendant not to
plead guilty. Now, the undertaking that was made in the
particular proposed agreement here went a little bit
further in the direction of the defendant, which often
happens. Prosecutors frequently will decide, for one
reason or another, to give exculpatory information of some
sort to a defendant. But the Ninth Circuit went further
than that and made it clear that the rule that it was
enunciating applied to all exculpatory material, including
impeachment material, and that is the rule that's going to
be applicable in the Ninth Circuit.
So, even if this Court determined to limit its
decision to the -- the narrower scope, as articulated in
the second paragraph of that proposed agreement, we'd be
back here next year because it's quite clear what the
Ninth Circuit intends to do with its rule.
QUESTION: QUESTION: I -- I don't --
The statement referred to on page
14a, the Government represents -- that -- that was not
pursuant to any court order, I take it, the Government
turning that over?
MR. OLSON: No, it was not, Mr. Chief Justice.
This was a -- simply a -- a draft agreement which was, in
fact, prepared in response -- as a result of and in
response to the earlier Sanchez decision, which -- which
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the Ninth Circuit had articulated. the prosecutor --
This was an effort by
I was -- I was going to ask why --
It wouldn't have
why is that second paragraph there? occurred to me to --
MR. OLSON:
It's -- it's not in the record,
Justice Scalia, but it's my understanding that it's
something that is -- is developed particularly to deal
with the Sanchez case which the Ninth Circuit had already
decided, and the presumption that the Ninth -- the Ninth
Circuit's Sanchez decision went so far and not as far as
the -- that that covered the impeachment material, but not
other exculpatory material in the reverse.
So, however inartful this is, it was not in
response, Mr. Chief Justice, to a court order or any other
legal requirement, nor does it purport to articulate what
the law is. It purports to undertake what the prosecutor
voluntarily was willing to do with respect to this
particular form of plea --
QUESTION: country --
MR. OLSON: QUESTION: MR. OLSON: No.
-- or just --
This is -- this was developed just
Has this been used throughout the
in the San Diego -- the Southern District of California,
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although other versions in other places, but there's no
standard national form for plea agreements.
QUESTION: I -- I know what you'd like is that
we reach the question of this impeachment material and say
there is no such right in a -- in a plea agreement
context. But how would I even get there? They only get
an appeal here if there's a violation of law.
heard of a violation of law consisting of a judge refusing
And then assuming that there is some violation
of law in his refusal to depart, which I thought was
discretionary, how could he possibly depart? important to you. And this is
Because I don't see at the moment how
it would ever be a justification to depart, that a
defendant has entered into this program. I mean, I can't
find anything in the guidelines where it says "you can
depart for a reason such as," and then fill in the content
of the program to get a two-level departure.
So, how -- how do we get to your issue and what
do I do about those two things which seem tremendous
MR. OLSON: The Ninth Circuit -- let me answer
the jurisdictional point first.
perceived that it had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C.
3742(a)(1).
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 or the --
QUESTION: MR. OLSON:
That's violation of law.
A -- that the sentence was imposed
QUESTION: would ask them.
Yes, in violation of law.
I'd say, what law?
And -- and that the Ninth Circuit
perceived that the district court felt that it was barred
by law from departing --
QUESTION: There isn't much I can find in this
record that says that.
MR. OLSON: And -- and that the Ninth Circuit
felt that because this was a constitutional right that the
defendant was -- had that was being withheld from the
defendant because of the -- of the circumstances of this
case, that the -- the district court erroneously presumed
that it was prevented from going in a -- in a direction
that the Ninth Circuit felt that it could go.
And I think that then ties in with your second
-- your second question with respect to the sentencing
guidelines and section 5K2. The -- the court felt -- the
Ninth Circuit felt -- and it's not very clear, but -- and
-- and the Government is not objecting to the -- the way
the Ninth Circuit exercised jurisdiction at this point and
is not opposing the court's decision with respect to
jurisdiction at this point.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 things.
The Ninth Circuit felt that under section 5K2 of
the sentencing guidelines, this would be a -- mitigate --
the -- the entry into the so-called fast track program was
a mitigating circumstance of a kind or a degree not
adequately taken into account by the guidelines in
formulating the guidelines. sentence different --
QUESTION: Those are supposed to be individual
It should result in a
I mean, in other words --
MR. OLSON: QUESTION: Well, but -- yes.
-- I -- I see -- normally you could
We'll get to
say, okay, the Government doesn't oppose it. the main issue.
But these look like tremendous
jurisdictional blocks to me.
MR. OLSON: It -- it -- I think the answer to
that latter point with respect to the individual
consideration is covered by the fact that this particular
program, under the circumstances of this district, are --
they may be -- it may be frequently occurring, but it's
individualistic in the sense that entering into this
program alleviates a substantial amount of work and -- and
provides a substantial benefit to the prosecutor in that
district without which the prosecutor may not be able to
enforce the law on all of the responsibilities of the law.
This is one of the most busy districts of the
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United States because of the tremendous number of
narcotics crimes coming in across the border, multiplied
in a sense by the number of immigration violations that
take place. So that this was an individualized
circumstance in that district.
Now, one could quibble about the appropriateness
of that, but that's how the Ninth Circuit perceived it.
It perceived that it had jurisdiction on that basis, and
we're not objecting to it.
It seems clear that not only, therefore, that
not -- that this right is not required by or implicit
within Brady, but that the language of the Court's
decisions interpreting Brady make it clear that Brady is
not supposed to go that far, that it only has to do with
the rights at -- at trial.
Furthermore, the solution that the Ninth Circuit
proposed with respect to this is both overly broad and
underly inclusive. If the Court was concerned, as it said
it was and as the respondent contends it should be, with
the potential of innocent persons pleading guilty, the
test itself, which is set out in the court's -- the -- the
Ninth Circuit's opinion on page -- I think it's 15a of the
appendix to the petition for certiorari. About midway
through the page, the court says, the evidence is material
under the test announced in this case if there is a
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reasonable probability that but for the failure to
disclose the Brady material, the defendant would have
refused to plead and would have gone to trial.
In other words, the test is not couched in terms
of the potential innocence of the defendant or the risk
that a defendant was -- was innocent. It's couched in
terms of the tactical decision a defendant might make with
respect to whether or not to go trial.
QUESTION: He should know what the house odds
are before he -- before he rolls the dice by pleading
MR. OLSON: QUESTION: Precisely. In fact --
Which is sort of a different concept
from -- from what Brady was about.
MR. OLSON: Exactly, Justice Scalia. In fact,
this Court has frequently said that -- that there are lots
of risks involved in the -- in the defense of a case, a
criminal case, and -- and there are risks and benefits and
burdens and evaluations that must be taken into
QUESTION: What is the Government's obligation
with respect to advising the defendant or the court that
the elements of an offense have -- have been committed? -- in all these hypotheticals, the cocaine supposedly --
there was supposed to be cocaine.
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It's really talcum
powder or something, and the Government knows that. -- is this all taken care by rule 11 or --
MR. OLSON: several ways.
Well, I think it's taken care of in
If the -- the Constitution gives the
defendant a right to trial or a right to confront
witnesses, a right to counsel, reasonably competent,
informed counsel. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure require a relatively exhaustive
procedure where the court makes sure that the guilty plea
is voluntary and intelligent and that the elements of the
crime, of course, are involved in whether or not --
QUESTION: Well, does the Government have to
have a good faith belief that an offense has been
committed? Is there -- is there some standard that binds
the prosecution?
MR. OLSON: The standard -- the standards for
prosecutors in the United States -- for the United States
are set forth in the -- the U.S. Attorneys Manual. It
requires prosecutors not to bring a case unless they
believe in good faith that there is a reasonable basis for
the case that's being brought, in fact a reasonable basis
for believing that there could be a conviction based upon
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. That's not a
constitutional standard, Justice Kennedy.
The constitutional standard is set forth in the
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-- this Court's decisions with respect to the right to
counsel, the right to trial, the right to intelligent
information with respect to that.
Rule 11, which is a -- which is a joint product
of the courts and the -- and the legislature, sets out
elaborate procedures pursuant to which a Federal judge
will inquire with respect to the basis for the plea,
explain the rights that the defendant has violated, and
specifically requires the Federal court to find that
there's a factual basis for the plea.
Now, so that what I was saying was that is the
remedy, the so-called remedy, that the Ninth Circuit has
come up -- is -- is under-inclusive to the extent that if
it's concerned about -- it's over-inclusive to the extent
that it's concerned about innocent people pleading guilty
because it doesn't go to the -- the factual innocent. It
goes to the tactical decisions, the rolling of the dice,
with respect to what are the chances of winning or losing
QUESTION: Is this true, Mr. Solicitor General,
that the rolling of the dice concept can apply to an
innocent defendant as well? Supposing the -- the
defendant and his lawyer know there are three eyewitnesses
who were going to identify him. They also know he wasn't
there, but there was somebody there who looks a lot like
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And so they've got a choice of either taking the
chance of getting acquitted, in the face of that evidence
and based on their own denial -- he doesn't have an alibi
-- and if he gets convicted, he has a very long sentence.
And he gets an offer of a plea bargain, a very short
sentence. I don't suppose there's anything unethical
about the lawyer trying to figure out what the odds are.
MR. OLSON: Well, no, there's nothing unethical
In fact, rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure give fairly elaborate rights of discovery to the
defendant's counsel. And at that plea agreement, the
judge will inquire with respect to whether there's a
factual basis for the plea agreement.
In fact, the judge in this case specifically
addressed that question to the defendant, asked the
defendant is it, indeed, true -- asked the defendant and
then the counsel interceded and said, yes, she was
bringing in her car 60 -- 60 pounds of marijuana. And
then the judge turned to the defendant and said, is that
true? And the defendant said, yes, I knew that it was --
QUESTION: What is the lawyer -- what kind of
Hypothetically we have an
advice is the lawyer to give?
innocent client who has a very severe risk of being
convicted, and the lawyer would tell him there's going to
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be a plea colloquy here, and if you don't acknowledge
this, the plea bargain will go down the drain. Now, I
guess he shouldn't tell him what -- I don't know exactly
what the lawyer is supposed to do there.
MR. OLSON: either. Well, I don't -- I'm not sure
It would all depend upon the circumstance.
is -- there is a possibility that this Court's recognized
in the Alford decision a possibility of making a plea
which is -- which is not incompatible with a defendant's
assertion of innocence. But I think that in most cases
the defendant is the one who will know more than anyone,
the prosecutor or anyone else, whether the defendant is
QUESTION: Right, but I'm assuming a case in
which the defendant knows he's not guilty, and
nevertheless, there's a risk that, because the odds are so
heavy if you get convicted, you go away for 20 years. If
you have a 16-month plea bargain, you may want to not take
MR. OLSON: Stevens. Well, I understand that, Justice
That may happen in a particular case.
Court said in Bagley that Brady's primary purpose is not
to -- Brady's purpose is not to displace the adversary
system as the primary means by which truth is -- as the
primary means by which truth is uncovered.
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that the answer to your question is that this system, no
system is perfect or ever will be perfect, but we do have
a panoply of constitutional rights. defendant be adequately counseled. We insist that the
We insist that the
judge through rule -- through rule 16 --
QUESTION: So that in effect you're saying there
may be a hypothetical situation out there, but we've got
millions of cases. Also, we've got to balance the two,
one against the other.
MR. OLSON: Absolutely. And I must -- I must
say that with respect to -- we're not talking about that
case here. We're talking about a blanket rule which would
apply in 57 -- you know, 57,000-some guilty pleas in the
Federal system every year.
QUESTION: Well, the McMann and Brady cases too
said that a defendant may have to make some hard choices.
MR. OLSON: QUESTION: The Court said that explicitly.
Well, if we're talking about
balancing and basic fairness, I guess their argument would
be with 57,000 cases going -- that's 85 percent or 90
percent of all people plead guilty. drug crimes. Most of those are
When the prosecutor sits there with a drug
crime, he says, you plead guilty to a telephone count,
it's 8 months, or I bring you to a mandatory minimum
charge in trial and it's a minimum of 5 years.
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those circumstances, the person is quite tempted to plead
guilty irrespective of the facts. balances. And therefore, it
As you were saying, it balances the system and
it makes it somewhat more fair in that mine run situation
to understand what are the chances of being convicted if I
do go to trial.
MR. OLSON: QUESTION: Well --
That would be the argument, I think,
the other way in terms of fundamental fairness.
MR. OLSON: And I would answer that in two ways.
In the first place, I think the Chief Justice answered it
by referring to the Brady v. United States case.
QUESTION: So, you'd have to say that you're
But in taking --
right, that that isn't what Brady said.
taking into account the reality of the criminal justice
system, where 85 percent of the people plead guilty, and
the prosecutor is armed with this tremendous don't plead
guilty or else sentencing system, that this creates a kind
of basic balance that -- in terms of fairness -- I'm
trying to get the argument out.
MR. OLSON: I understand, Justice Breyer, I
And there's a certain --
But if that is -- if that
understand what you're saying. there's a certain logic to it.
was the case, then the Ninth Circuit's rule is under-
inclusive because if the defendant really wants to know
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what the best chances are, rather than the exculpatory
material or the impeachment material, what he is going to
want to know is the inculpatory material. And you made
the point about the other -- other prosecutions that are
being held over the defendant's head. He's going to want
to know what -- well, what evidence do they have on the
greater offense that they're about to charge me with,
because I'm going to take my chances now and plead to this
lesser included offense.
So, if the Ninth Circuit wanted to accomplish
what you're talking about as the thrust of your question,
it would have gone -- and I suspect that it will --
QUESTION: Well, you -- you wouldn't want it to
You -- you
go further, would -- would you, General Olson?
would not want us to adopt a rule that encourages -- that
enables innocent people to more intelligently plead guilty
when they're innocent?
MR. OLSON: QUESTION: No. I'm not --
I mean, it seems to me we should do
everything to discourage people who are innocent from
pleading guilty.
MR. OLSON: QUESTION: I -- I --
What kind of a legal system is this
where we're going to design our rules to encourage guilty
people to plead -- or innocent people to plead guilty?
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MR. OLSON: This Court -- this Court has said
that it's perfectly appropriate in the adversarial system
for the prosecutor to find legitimate ways to encourage
guilty defendants to plead guilty.
Now, we -- you're absolutely right. QUESTION: It's --
We're worrying here about innocent
people, and we're trying to encourage them to plead guilty
so that -- if they know everything about what the
Government has. I mean, there's something wrong with a
legal system that -- that --
MR. OLSON: QUESTION: MR. OLSON: QUESTION: MR. OLSON: But there's --
-- is even contemplating such --
-- Justice Scalia --
-- such action, it seems to me.
-- nothing in this case that
We have a guilty defendant
involves that issue at all.
who has acknowledged under oath -- I think it was under
oath. Usually it is, in the Federal court systems -- that
So, you are faced with the
this person was guilty.
possibility of drafting a rule -- or the Ninth Circuit
drafted a rule for a hypothetical situation not involving
the case before it, which was over-inclusive because it
includes the vast number of people that are indeed guilty,
and under-inclusive because it doesn't provide a remedy --
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the best remedy which we would definitely not encourage,
but I would suggest would be the next step, possibly from
the same circuit, with respect to giving additional
And it would be inconsistent not only with that,
but it would be inconsistent with what this Court has said
over and over again with respect to the value of competent
counsel, the fact that certain chances have to be taken,
that a defendant is not entitled to set aside a plea
because he may have misconstrued the weight or balance of
the prosecution's case, or there may have been mistakes of
law. In one -- in -- in Brady v. the United States, in
fact, it was a misconstruction of whether or not the
defendant would -- could be -- could be put to death if
the defendant went to trial. So, this Court has
recognized that there are those balances in the system.
But what the -- what we urge upon the Court is
that there are so many protections, including the
discovery right, the fairly exhaustive --
QUESTION: The discovery right would cover --
you did say there were some things that a defendant
perhaps would not know, and one of them you mentioned in
your -- in your brief is if you rob a bank and you don't
know whether it's FDIC insured. That kind of information.
How would that -- how would that come out pretrial?
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That would -- that would come out
through rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which is set out in the appendix, I think 3a to
5a, of our brief on the merits. The defendant is given
pretrial considerable discovery rights to find out those
sorts of things, and if the defendant is not sure and,
after consultation with his counsel, wishes to go to
trial, there's -- the Brady rights do kick in at an
appropriate time to allow the defendant to prepare for
What I'm saying is that -- that the combination
of the constitutional rights to trial and -- and
confrontation, the constitutional rights to counsel, the
-- the statutory rights to discovery, the statutory
obligations on a judge to make sure there's a factual
basis for the guilty plea, the obligations -- and we have
to assume under -- as this Court suggested in the
Mezzanatto case, a -- a good faith behavior by our public
officials that a prosecutor is not going to withhold
evidence in -- on -- where it knows that the -- this is an
innocent defendant. Those are ample assurances,
especially in the context, as this Court has said over and
over again, that the best person to know whether there's a
factual basis for a plea of guilty is the defendant
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I will say one more thing that is -- that seems
to me important with respect to the -- this -- the posture
in which this case comes. If this Court were to determine
that there is a constitutional right -- and we think that
neither this Court's decisions nor the Constitution would
lead the Court to that conclusion -- the constitutional
right could be waived. The Ninth Circuit said that a
defendant cannot, even if the defendant wanted to, plead
guilty. Knowing that the defendant was guilty, the
defendant could not waive the right.
Now, that has several implications. It -- it
creates problems for the criminal justice system.
Brady -- the Brady right that the Ninth Circuit would
engraft on the system here would force prosecutors to
develop cases and use resources at the defendant's
initiative, on the defendant's time table. It creates --
turns Brady -- the right, from a fair trial right into a
fair trial preparation right.
With respect to certain types of cases, it would
compromise conspiracy cases, racketeering cases, organized
crime drug cases, white collar cases where there may be
substantial warehouses full of documents. In other words,
many prosecutors won't be preparing their case for
determining what witnesses they're going to use until
they're ready to go to trial.
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Once they -- if they had to
disclose this information on the defendant's time table,
which the defendant -- if this rule were adopted by this
Court, the first thing a defendant would do is offer --
say, "I'm thinking about pleading guilty. everything in your files."
Now, a prosecutor in complicated cases is not going
to want to do that and -- and will refuse to engage in
that process or will -- once -- once it does so, there's
no more incentive for the -- for the prosecutor to enter
into the plea bargaining process. So, it could be
damaging to the benefits of the defendants over and over
again that's received the benefits of the plea bargaining
system, which this Court has sanctioned and encouraged.
QUESTION: reserve time. I don't want to cut into your -- your
If you prevail in this
case, what happens? of relief?
Does she get a longer supervised time
Or is there anything that's still live in this
case as to this defendant?
MR. OLSON: QUESTION: anyway?
MR. OLSON: -- she -- I don't -- I don't know
The --she -- she --
Or has she served the full time
whether she's served the entire -- the sentence that was
given to her was 18 months in incarceration and a 3-month
-- a 3-year --
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 moot?
-- probationary period. I think
that that would continue to go on.
That was at the very
low range, low end of the guideline sentence.
QUESTION: at stake here?
MR. OLSON: Yes, I believe so, Justice Kennedy,
So there is still some -- something
but I'm not sure, 100 percent sure, factually I know the
If I may reserve the balance of my time.
QUESTION: Very well, General Olson.
Mr. Hubachek, we'll hear from you.
ORAL ARGUMENT OF STEVEN F. HUBACHEK
MR. HUBACHEK: please the Court:
The Due Process Clause requires the disclosure
of materials --
QUESTION: Before you get going, is the case
Is there something left on the 3-year probation
MR. HUBACHEK: QUESTION: Yes, there is, Justice O'Connor.
Now, the -- the disclosure of
MR. HUBACHEK:
material exculpatory information is essential to ensure
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the accuracy of criminal convictions.
And Ake indicates
there's a societal and individual interest in the accuracy
of such convictions that's paramount.
The system that we have now, as has been
discussed already this morning funnels cases into plea
negotiations, and the -- the Court has said that's not a
bad thing, but it -- still, it funnels everybody, the
guilty and the innocent, into the same sort of result.
Innocent people are provided the same substantial and
legitimate incentives to plead guilty as guilty people
And if I could return to Justice --
QUESTION: No. I -- I object to that. I -- I
don't think our system ever encourages or, indeed, even
permits an innocent person to plead guilty. Our rules
require the judge to -- to interrogate the person pleading
guilty to make sure that, indeed, the person is guilty.
There is nothing in our system that encourages or even
allows an innocent person to -- to plead guilty. And I
would be horrified if -- if there were something like
MR. HUBACHEK: Well, Justice Scalia, the -- the
system does not -- first of all, I guess the first
protection would be a rule 11 type factual basis. not required in every case. That's
In fact, the Fifth Circuit
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cases that the Solicitor General relies upon, both of
those were nolo or Alford type pleas. So, there was no
factual basis provided at all in those cases.
who don't know whether they're innocent or guilty -- they
don't have to provide a factual basis that's -- that's
incorrect or false.
QUESTION: How many individuals don't know
whether they're innocent or guilty?
MR. HUBACHEK: I've --
QUESTION: it -- it is rare. I'm sure there may be rare cases, but
I'm sure that it's not
Your Honor, there are some.
tremendously common, but the important thing is -- is that
individuals who are innocent do receive the same
incentives to plead guilty. And I've cited some cases
from various State courts at pages 10 to 11 of the brief
where individuals pled guilty where substantial material
exculpatory evidence existed, several cases like Justice
Stevens' hypothetical involving identification testimony
where an individual was charged with an offense and was
told that there had been an identification made by what
appeared to be an otherwise unimpeachable witness --
QUESTION: down to? So -- so that's what your case comes
You want us to facilitate the pleading of guilty
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by innocent people.
You -- you want us to set up a system
that will make -- will make that a more intelligent
decision so that we can put in jail a lot of people who
plead guilty even though they're innocent because it's a
good deal for them.
MR. HUBACHEK: all. I --
QUESTION: I thought that's what you're saying.
No, Your Honor, not -- not at
I don't know what other -- for the guilty person, you're
not worried about it. You're -- you're asserting the
rights of the innocent.
MR. HUBACHEK: Right. It's the innocent person
who needs to receive this --
QUESTION: Who needs to be able to plead guilty
so he'll -- he'll serve a sentence that he doesn't
MR. HUBACHEK: Well, Your Honor, the fact that
The rule that I'm asking for
that happens exists already.
is to provide material exculpatory information to
individuals who are not guilty which will, when they are
able to --
QUESTION: But your client is guilty, and I
don't understand why what we're talking about is some
hypothetical. You have to establish your client's right
and the argument is, if the case is going to go to trial,
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you're entitled, before the trial starts, to get this
stuff, but you're not entitled to get it in the beginning
of the case. And you are representing a guilty client and
asserting that right on behalf of your guilty client.
MR. HUBACHEK: Well, Justice Ginsburg, the --
the posture of the case, as has been discussed, is that
there -- this is a sentencing issue where there's a
request for a departure based upon the -- this fast track
program. Ms. Ruiz didn't participate in the fast track
program because she objected to the term of the plea
agreement which required her to surrender her rights under
the -- the Brady decision.
QUESTION: nonetheless.
QUESTION: She said she's guilty.
But she -- she pled guilty
MR. HUBACHEK: QUESTION:
And she didn't enter an Alford plea.
No, Justice Souter, she did not.
But the -- the way that the case was presented to the
Ninth Circuit was that she had a constitutional right to
this information, if it existed. I mean, there are
situations where the -- the marijuana, for instance, in
this case is concealed. It's unlikely that an individual
who's merely a courier would ever have actual access to
it. There is a recent spate of cases in Dallas where the
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drugs that were seized turned out not to be drugs.
QUESTION: That's all true, but this is --
you're asking for a really major change in the system.
mean, what the Government says -- and maybe it would be a
better system, but the Government says, once we go down
this path, here's what's going to happen. right to me.
The prosecutors, who are very busy -- very busy
-- and have a little time with the witnesses and they go
in and start talking about a plea, will now not be able to
do that. They'll have to look into their witnesses, get
And they sound
all the evidence together, get the impeachment stuff, give
it to the defendant, and 80 percent of them or maybe only
30 percent will say, the hell with this. trial. I'm not going to do it. We'll go to
We'll go to trial.
And under the present system, particularly in
drug offenses, what that means for many, many, many
people, guilty and innocent -- let's say guilty -- they're
going to go away for very long times. And therefore,
we're transforming this system into something like a
European system where you can't take guilty pleas, and
it'd be somewhere in the middle. That's a major change.
And, anyway, the Constitution doesn't requirement --
require it and it would work out the worse, they say, for
a lot of defendants.
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Well, first of all, Justice
Breyer, the -- this system has been in place in the
Southern District of California, which has this enormous
caseload and all these drug cases, for the past year. term --
QUESTION: Have they been giving all the
evidence, the impeachment evidence and so forth?
MR. HUBACHEK: Right. The term that -- that Ms.
Ruiz objected to has been removed from the plea agreement.
It's been going on for a year. apace.
QUESTION: The same way?
The same way, Your Honor. The --
The pleas are proceeding
But let's -- let's go back perhaps to
Justice Ginsburg's question, that you say you're here on
behalf of innocent people who want to plead guilty. But
your own client admitted that she was -- had 50 or 60
pounds of marijuana. Surely, you've got to argue for a
rule that favors something like that who is not an
MR. HUBACHEK: Well, the rule that I'm proposing
would, indeed, benefit both non-innocent and innocent
individuals. But that's the case with every
QUESTION: Well, wouldn't it be better to just
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say we don't accept guilty pleas from innocent people?
MR. HUBACHEK: Well, the -- I don't think that
any judge or any prosecutor wants to accept guilty pleas
from innocent people.
QUESTION: rule. And indeed may not do so. That's the
You -- you won't accept a guilty plea from someone
who's innocent.
MR. HUBACHEK: Well, the protections that are in
For -- for
place don't fully account for innocence.
example, even in a rule 11 decision -- in a rule 11 plea,
if you ask someone, did you sell the drugs or did you, you
know, shoot the person, that doesn't say anything about
whether or not there's entrapment. It doesn't say
anything at all about whether or not there's self-defense.
If a defendant pleads guilty in ignorance of that kind of
information, then in fact an innocent person could plead
guilty. In Alford pleas or nolo pleas, there's no factual
basis provided at all. QUESTION:
The person doesn't understand that there's a -- this
person doesn't have a lawyer who tells him, you know, if
you shot the person in self-defense, of course, you're not
guilty. Is -- is that the hypothetical you're positing,
somebody who has such poor legal advice and he doesn't
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know there's a right of self-defense?
MR. HUBACHEK: The -- the concern here, Justice
Scalia, is not evidence that the lawyer has access to and
simply misadvises the client. I understand that you have
to take the risk in many situations.
about is evidence that would support such a defense, an
entrapment defense, or a self-defense defense that's not
available to counsel but is in the possession of -- of the
QUESTION: Well, it would certainly be in
I mean, it -- it's
possession of the defendant.
impossible for him not to know whether he was acting in
self-defense. The -- the only possible reason for -- for
giving him, this innocent person, this information is to
enable him to make an intelligent judgment to plead guilty
even though he's innocent. And I don't think we're -- I
don't think we're supposed to encourage that.
I mean, we would have contradictory policies.
Other provisions of our laws make it very clear that we
are not to accept guilty pleas from innocent people, and
you want to adopt a system that will enable innocent
people more intelligently to plead guilty.
MR. HUBACHEK: Well, perhaps -- what I'm saying
is -- is that if information that supports the self-
defense theory that is not in the possession of the
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defense but is in the possession of the prosecution, if
that evidence is turned over, that will make it more
likely that the innocent person will go to trial --
QUESTION: QUESTION: Okay. Let's --
Is there -- is there any precedent
outside the Ninth Circuit that says Brady is an immediate
turnover right and not a preparation for trial right?
MR. HUBACHEK: Yes, there is. The Second
Circuit has adopted this rule since 1988, and again, while
the Solicitor General has come forward and indicated there
are numerous potential down sides to this type of
constitutional rule, the bottom line is -- is it --
QUESTION: material as well?
MR. HUBACHEK: QUESTION: Yes, Your Honor.
The Second Circuit has for impeaching
Let me go back to a variant of
It seems to me that your
Justice Scalia's question.
strongest argument is the argument that does focus on the
-- the supposedly innocent defendant. And -- and the
argument that I think is strongest with respect to that
category is the argument that those who enter Alford pleas
obviously are not doing so because they want to plead
guilty, despite their protest of innocence, they're doing
it because they think they face such terrible odds that,
in fact, it's better for them to collapse at the beginning
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And if these people are presented
with exculpatory, including impeachment evidence, they are
less likely to do just what Justice Scalia says we, after
all, as a system don't want them to do.
My question is, do you have any indication that
there is such a rash of unintelligent Alford pleas going
on that we should modify the entire system to respond to
this risk of Alford pleas that, in fact, would not be
entered if the disclosure that you ask for were given?
MR. HUBACHEK: I don't have an -- an empirical
study that shows how many such guilty pleas are entered.
I've cited on pages 10 to 11 of the respondent's brief a
number of cases in which there are potentially innocent
people who have pled guilty, individuals who didn't know,
for instance, that a witness saw the tire blow out on the
car before the car crossed over the median, indicating
that that person -- that the tire blowout, not the
person's driving was responsible for the accident.
Another case, the Gibson case, where the
prosecutor was actually told by the main identification
witness that she was changing her story, and that wasn't
turned over to the defense.
In the Lee case, a situation where the
individual was charged with an offense and told that there
was an identification, and it turns out that the -- the
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witness misidentified him and that then the -- the witness
was later shown, before a preliminary hearing, a picture
of the defendant. this risk exists.
And if I could, I think that the -- one of the
problems I guess in getting across the point is that I
think the Solicitor General has misstated the import of
the Ninth Circuit's test. The Ninth Circuit's test is not
So, there are cases out there in which
solely a -- you know, we want to give you all the cards so
you can make a better strategic choice. The -- the test
is derived from the Court's decision in Hill v. Lockhart,
and Hill v. Lockhart's test says would the defendant have
gone to trial if, in fact, he had received the proper
advice. But then it says that --
QUESTION: Well, but even -- even if you're
going to imply -- if -- if that's going to be your
standard, it seems to me that the Solicitor General has
got a point when he says if the Ninth Circuit test is
going to be applied and applied with your gloss, it can't
stop where it is now. It's going to have to go the
further step and, in effect, require disclosure of all the
inculpatory evidence. MR. HUBACHEK: What's your response to that?
My response to that is -- is that
we're asking for a right based on Brady, and Brady doesn't
provide for --
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Oh, but Brady -- I mean, Brady
ultimately comes down to a judgment about materiality, and
-- and materiality in the sense of -- of the kind of
evidence that disturbs confidence in the verdict is a
judgment that can only be made in the context of the
entire evidence of the case. are made after the fact. Brady judgments ultimately
And I don't see why that -- that
very fact if we're -- if Brady is going, ultimately, to be
our standard here, doesn't imply just what the Solicitor
General argued.
Before we can tell that there has been a
violation of the rule that you propose, a court would have
to know -- and indeed, before that, a defendant presumably
would have to know -- the -- the entire evidentiary world
of that case. And that means you've got to know a lot
more than impeachment evidence or even exculpatory
evidence. You've got to know what the inculpatory
So, it seems to me that what you're arguing
for, even with your gloss and even starting with Brady, is
essentially a global disclosure rule.
MR. HUBACHEK: Well, I'd respectfully disagree.
I think that the Hill v. Lockhart test, when specifically
the Hill case was discussing when defense counsel fails to
-- to find material exculpatory evidence, that the Ninth
Circuit test would apply at that point, but that that test
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will ultimately devolve into what effect this evidence
would have at trial. QUESTION: So --
Hill -- Hill was an ineffective
assistance of counsel case, wasn't it?
MR. HUBACHEK: QUESTION: That's correct, Your Honor.
So, we're not talking about any
obligation of the prosecutor in Hill.
MR. HUBACHEK: No. I understand. But -- but
Hill talked about ineffective assistance of counsel in the
context of the failure to locate material exculpatory
evidence, essentially the same facts that -- that could
conceivably result in the withdrawal of the guilty plea.
QUESTION: Yes, but the relationship between a
defendant's attorney and the prosecutor on the other side
are by no means the same.
MR. HUBACHEK: I agree. And Brady certainly
Brady in trial
doesn't suggest that they're the same.
requires that the prosecutor turn over the evidence but
not to tell the defense lawyer how to use it. Well, we're
positing that the same sort of obligation should exist at
the pretrial stage. The prosecutor has to turn over the
information but not go any further and provide advice as
to how it should be used.
QUESTION: It's so odd that it comes to us in a
case where there's no suggestion that we're dealing here
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with an innocent defendant.
We're -- we're told nothing
about what's out there that would affect this case, are
MR. HUBACHEK: I -- I understand that this is a
case where there's a guilty plea and we're not making an
argument that she -- that Ms. Ruiz should be permitted to
withdraw her guilty plea. However, if the Court adopts a
rule that the Ninth Circuit and the Second Circuit's
approach is incorrect, then defendants will not receive
exculpatory evidence before they plead guilty and
situations such as arose in the various --
QUESTION: Well, I -- I assume there is, as the
Solicitor General suggests, some pretrial discovery right
that a defense counsel has.
MR. HUBACHEK: Well, there's some pretrial
discovery right, but it's not extensive and oftentimes it
doesn't cover the types of information that has led to
potential miscarriages of justice, as I set out in the
QUESTION: And in fact, the -- the relevant
discovery rule actually prohibits, as I read it, discovery
of some material that you say this rule would cover.
MR. HUBACHEK: the --
QUESTION: Statements of witnesses, for example.
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For instance, the --
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 correct. your --
Which is -- which is a troubling
concept because one of the things we're sort of trying to
do here is balance the system-wide benefit of an -- a fast
track program, on the one hand, with the occasional case
where there's a risk of injustice that -- that concerns
you. And it's that very balance that, it would seem to
me, must have motivated the draftsman of rule 16 and the
enactment of the Jencks Act that have developed some
rather elaborate rules as to just what rights you do have
before you plead guilty, and you're, in effect, saying
well, we should go beyond those as a matter of judicial
MR. HUBACHEK: Well, the rule that we're
proposing would not supplant all of those rules. a narrow range --
It would add to them, and that's it.
There's -- there's a limited right of discovery under the
Federal rules, and you are urging an expansion of that
right essentially.
MR. HUBACHEK: It -- it would expand it. That's
However, it would expand it in only a narrow
fashion because the information that we would -- that the
defense would be entitled to would be limited by the
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notion of materiality.
Much of the debate in Agurs and
Bagley was whether or not a more broad rule should be
adopted, but ultimately the -- the Court settled on the
materiality standard.
QUESTION: What we're doing is -- is you're
asking us to open up the plea bargaining process and
piecemeal to bring in a constitutional rule that would
affect one aspect of it. Now, it's -- it's hard for me to
accept that, at least without knowing more about what are
the proposals around in the bar and elsewhere as to how
that process should be regularized. Are there rules
suggestions, rules change suggestions, statutory
suggestions? Where does this constitutional rule coming
in, in a sense, out of -- from somewhere suddenly affect
this -- the whole process? reading something?
MR. HUBACHEK: I -- I can't direct you, Justice
Can I get a grasp of that by
Breyer, to any particular rule change proposals that are
Our argument is based upon the notion that
everyone agrees that the defendant is entitled to -- to
material exculpatory evidence at trial under the Fifth
Amendment and also that the -- that the Sixth Amendment
requires defense counsel to find material exculpatory
evidence to use at trial.
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Now, the -- the Sixth Amendment also requires
counsel to locate material exculpatory evidence before the
decision to make a plea is -- is made. And the reason
that is is so that it will be a plea that's worthy of
confidence. And that's -- ultimately the standard under
Brady is -- is essentially the same as under Strickland.
We want a -- a proceeding that's reliable.
Under the current state of the law, if defense
counsel fails to find a piece of material exculpatory
evidence, that guilty plea is then, therefore, going to be
unreliable. But if the same piece of -- of material
exculpatory evidence is unavailable to counsel, but in the
possession of the prosecution, that conviction is
considered to be reliable even if the defendant doesn't
get the benefit of it.
So, what we're proposing is -- is that there is
a complementary action of -- of both the Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights pre plea and during the trial and that if
there is going to be an overlap in the Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights it's got to be at -- where the interest
that those rights protect is at its highest, and that is,
protecting the innocent from pleading guilty.
QUESTION: Under the fast track program, does
the defendant have to waive rule 16 rights?
MR. HUBACHEK: The -- under the fast track
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program, the defendant can't file any motions at all, but
the -- what happens is -- is that there is a pre-
indictment offer that's made and the pre-indictment offer
is usually accompanied by discovery in the form of -- in a
case like Ms. Ruiz's, the reports of the initial
inspectors and then the special agent who comes in and
does the interrogation and does the -- sort of a summary
of the other individuals' information.
QUESTION: So, those are available even under
the fast track program.
MR. HUBACHEK: is provided.
QUESTION: Suppose you're right on your
I'd just like you to spend 1
That's correct. That information
constitutional argument.
minute addressing what I do not see how we get around the
simple fact that you have a client and your client is
saying that, as a matter of law, the judge had to depart.
And not only am I unaware of any law that says the judge
has to depart, but in this case, I can't even find a
provision that would allow him to depart.
And -- and I -- they've said, oh, well, he was
under a mistake of law. So, I've read the three sentences
quoted for that proposition, and I certainly don't see any
mistake of law there. He says, the court has read and
considered the -- the documents, blah, blah, blah, and
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I've decided this is -- the court feels that this is not a
proper case for departure. So?
And in another part of the record, he says -- he
says, if you didn't sign an agreement, you have to live
with the consequence.
MR. HUBACHEK: I -- I agree, Justice Breyer,
that there's no rule that you can say that a district
court is compelled to depart in any case. The -- the
district court judge, when asked to depart because Ms.
Ruiz was being denied the fast track benefit because she
refused to agree to what she thought was an
unconstitutional provision -- the district court's only
response was -- is that was acceptance and offer. The --
and the interpretation of that is -- is the district
thought it didn't have discretion to depart unless the
Government was agreeing --
QUESTION: That's really not what he said. I
mean, he just said you're not going to get advantage of
this because you didn't sign it.
QUESTION: He said it's just not proper. I
mean, I wish he'd give us language that -- that would
indicate that he thought he couldn't depart, even if he
wanted to. He just said it's not, in his view, a proper
case, but that's -- you know, that's fully consistent with
his discretion.
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The -- the district court's
comment related to whether or not -- he said to counsel
that there was offer and acceptance and -- and that's it.
QUESTION: What's bothering me is this, that you
could say, okay, let's just hold everything in abeyance,
get to the issue. If we do that, why wouldn't this case
stand for the proposition that courts of appeals have
absolute authority to review every instance in which a
trial judge refuses to depart? In which case there will
be tens of thousands of such instances every year going
right up to the court of appeals for review of the
question whether he should have departed. major change in the law, I think. Now, that's a
And how -- how could I
avoid that change and yet get to the issue?
MR. HUBACHEK: Well, the Solicitor General
hasn't been framing the questions related solely to the
discovery issues, the Brady issue and the waiver issue.
So, I don't think that the Court would be ruling on the
propriety of the -- of the Ninth Circuit's analysis --
QUESTION: Mr. Hubachek. Your -- your answer is an easy one,
Our -- our opinions are very clear that in
cases where we say nothing about jurisdiction, there is no
holding on jurisdiction.
MR. HUBACHEK: That's -- that's what I was --
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Justice.
QUESTION: If we simply didn't -- if we -- if we
simply didn't discuss the jurisdictional point, our -- our
decision would stand for nothing. But it's not very
responsible to do that where it's very clear where there's
that there's no jurisdiction. serious obstacle.
MR. HUBACHEK: improvidently granted. Well, perhaps cert was -- was
I mean, the -- Mr. Solicitor
That's -- that's the more
General has come up and said that the -- the Government is
not challenging the -- the Ninth Circuit's ruling.
QUESTION: Did you argue in the Ninth Circuit
that there was jurisdiction?
MR. HUBACHEK: QUESTION: Yes.
Then I take it you certainly don't
take a different position here.
MR. HUBACHEK: No, certainly not, Mr. Chief
QUESTION: dismiss the writ.
But our remedy would not be to
Our remedy would be to vacate the
judgment of the court of appeals if the court of appeals
did not have jurisdiction.
QUESTION: You don't want that.
MR. HUBACHEK: (Laughter.)
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With respect to the -- the --
with respect to the Fifth and Sixth Amendment claim that
we've made, the Second Circuit has also found a different
theory under which the -- the Court could find a Brady
violation, and they've indicated that the failure to turn
over Brady information is essentially otherwise
impermissible conduct under the Brady v. United States
case. So, Mr. Chief Justice brought up Brady v. United
States, and I think that the Ninth Circuit's analogy to
Hill v. Lockhart and the Miller v. Angliker impermissible
conduct approach has both addressed the concern that
United States v. Brady would preclude.
QUESTION: But -- but, you know, to say we'll
just call it impermissible conduct because we want to get
it done isn't very satisfactory. why it's impermissible.
MR. HUBACHEK: Right. And our -- our point is
I mean, you have to say
-- is that it's impermissible because the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments together protect the innocent from conviction.
When the Fifth Amendment right to receive the information
-- excuse me. When the Sixth Amendment right to have
counsel find this information attaches, then the Fifth
Amendment right to have the Government turn it over should
also attach because the same source of unreliability would
be present if, in fact, the defendant were to make the
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decision to plead guilty without receiving material
exculpatory information.
QUESTION: But in order to make that argument,
as I understand it, you have to make an unreliability
argument divorced from a materiality argument. agree?
MR. HUBACHEK: No. No, I don't because there is
a materiality requirement in Hill v. Lockhart.
QUESTION: How do we judge that materiality at
-- I mean, in Hill and Lockhart, when -- when you're
dealing with counsel, you can at least say, well, if -- if
they had been aware -- regardless of how the case would
have turned out, there's a way in which it makes sense to
say that if they had been aware of this kind of evidence,
they would have said we're going to trial. roll the dice.
When you're dealing with -- with essentially a
-- a Brady rule, you're not dealing with a will they roll
the dice or will they not kind of question; you're dealing
ultimately with the question of what was its effect on the
-- the soundness of the verdict, the soundness of a
result. And the only way you can make that judgment is to
know everything that would be in the case.
that's easy in a Brady situation because you're looking
back. Here you can't look back.
48 Alderson Reporting Company 1111 14th Street, N.W. Suite 400 1-800-FOR-DEPO Washington, DC 20005
So, it seems to me that you've either got to
come up with an entirely new materiality or prejudice
standard, and the -- and the effectiveness of counsel
cases don't seem to me quite on point there. Or you've
got to dispense with a materiality standard entirely and
say anything that would have had any tendency to exculpate
or to impeach in a way favorable to the defendant, if
denied, supports in effect a -- a claim for relief, which
is a nonmateriality standard.
MR. HUBACHEK: Well, Justice Souter, on page 16
of our brief, we have a block quote from Hill v. Lockhart,
and I really think that the test that was discussed in
Hill v. Lockhart covers the -- the concerns that Your
Honor is mentioning today. And ultimately Hill v.
Lockhart concludes by saying that in -- in the case of
counsel failing to discover material exculpatory
information, which is essentially the same type of problem
that we're talking about here, it says that ultimately the
assessment will depend in large part on a prediction
whether the evidence likely would have changed the outcome
Now, I certainly agree that it will be a more
difficult assessment to make without there actually having
been a trial, but we're asking that Your Honors adopt a
rule in which you would be -- the courts would undertake
49 Alderson Reporting Company 1111 14th Street, N.W. Suite 400 1-800-FOR-DEPO Washington, DC 20005
exactly the same analysis that Hill v. Lockhart already
requires in the context of defense counsel failing to find
a piece of exculpatory information. at all asking that this analysis --
QUESTION: But that is a different -- I mean, it
And -- so, we're not
necessarily is a different standard from the Brady
standard of materiality which we have now. MR. HUBACHEK: Is it not?
Well, the Brady standard for
materiality, as was explained in Kyles, derives from
Strickland. Hill v. Lockhart also derives its materiality
So, I think it's --
standard from Strickland. QUESTION:
Well, let's go back to my question.
They -- they may have a common ancestry, but in fact they
are not identical tests because they are applied in
circumstances that are by definition very different.
MR. HUBACHEK: Well, I -- I think that it's an
easier application post trial, but it's still the same
test that -- that's -- that we're being asked to apply in
the plea situation because Hill v. Lockhart says, look, if
counsel doesn't find the key piece of evidence and you
plead guilty, then we're going to go back and look and
see, well, what would have happened at a trial if you had
that key piece of evidence. If there's a reasonable
chance you would prevail at trial --
QUESTION: And in -- and in order to do that
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intelligently, we've got to know what the trial would have
included, won't we? And that either means, number one,
that the disclosure has got to go to, in effect, the
inculpatory evidence, or it means at the minimum, number
two, that the State has an opportunity to come in and say,
we'll tell you what the inculpatory evidence would have
been. This is what we would have put in, and judged in
this context, it's not material.
One way or the other, either -- either the
necessary implication of your test or the -- the
implication that the State would have a right to respond
to it, it seems implies that in order to apply your rule
before trial, a -- a court, reviewing one of your claims,
would have to make a judgment about the -- the
significance of the evidence in the context of -- of an
entire trial, a whole evidentiary record that can be --
that can -- can be anticipated.
MR. HUBACHEK: And that's the same approach that
But a prosecutor in making the
Hill v. Lockhart requires. determination --
Except in Hill it's easier because we
know that trial decisions are -- are often made without
knowing what the result would be. They are decisions to
go ahead and have a shot at defending the case, and that's
a different -- that's a different standard from Brady
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MR. HUBACHEK: QUESTION: Hill is a plea case.
Thank you, Mr. Hubachek.
General Olson, you have 4 minutes remaining.
REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF THEODORE B. OLSON
MR. OLSON: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
What the respondent is proposing and what the
Ninth Circuit adopted is an unworkable and undesirable
rule to solve a nonexistent problem. by the facts of this case. And it's illustrated
The footnote or the -- the
pages in the respondent's brief cite some cases in which
theoretically it might be that some driver who crossed the
line earlier might create a problem, but that is not this
case. And there's no empirical evidence or any other
evidence in the record that would show that there's a
significant problem here. QUESTION: The --
Mr. Olson, would you address again
I mean, if -- if in fact
the jurisdictional problem here?
the district court judge had discretion about what
sentence to impose and could have -- and did exercise that
discretion, do we have to be concerned about --
MR. OLSON: I think that is not an easy
situation, but I think that the Ninth Circuit believed
that however inartfully the district court expressed it or
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incompletely the district court expressed it, that the --
that the district court was saying it didn't feel that it
had the capacity or the ability under the law to depart,
that it didn't have the discretion to do so. the Ninth Circuit decided. Ninth Circuit --
QUESTION: I guess this is not a proper case
I wouldn't put it that way,
We argued otherwise to the
could mean that, I suppose. but it could --
It could mean that.
Ninth Circuit -- Circuit perceived it.
QUESTION: I'd even attempt not to say anything
about it, so long as I was not certain that there was no
MR. OLSON: We -- we believe that we -- after
looking at it carefully, we've decided that the Ninth
Circuit probably was right under the circumstances,
although you could argue it the other way, and that this
-- this is an issue that is presented clearly with respect
to the -- the legal standard that's been adopted to the --
by the Ninth Circuit and which is in play today.
The -- the respondent says, well, pleas are
proceeding apace in California notwithstanding -- or in
the Ninth Circuit, notwithstanding the decision in this
case. There is no evidence in the record to suggest that
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this hasn't created a problem, and in fact, I'm informed
that there are cases that have not been brought and cases
that have been dismissed because of a concern about
complying with the rule in this case, because once that's
done, those cases are -- are potentially over with. the fact is there's no evidence either way.
Justice Breyer, you raised some questions about
whether we would be constitutionalizing a rule which would
change Jencks and change the discovery rules. There --
there -- on page 26 of the Government's brief, we talked
about the fact that there have been efforts to change and
accelerate the discovery requirements and that those have
been soundly rejected for the very reasons we've been
talking about here. And the Jencks standard is what it is
because there's very much concern over the safety of
witnesses when those statements are produced earlier in
the case. And that's -- Congress has made that decision
quite consciously that those statements don't have to be
produced until the witness is actually called in trial for
Let me finish by saying that with respect to
Hill v. Lockhart, that's a case involving a requirement
that a defendant have, under the Sixth Amendment,
competent counsel within the range of -- of competence
expected for counsel in criminal cases.
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That's a Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.
not a -- a constitutional right to effective assistance of
the prosecution in deciding whether to plead guilty or
What we have in this case is a rule which is not
required, which -- which would cause considerable
problems. It would undermine the plea bargaining system,
which is important to the administration of criminal
justice in this country, and affect the finality of guilty
pleas, which is an important consideration as well.
CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST: Olson.
(Whereupon, at 12:02 p.m., the case in the
Thank you, General
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armed 18:17 arose 39:11 around 41:10 43:15 articulate 7:16 articulated 6:13 7:1 aside 21:9 asked 15:16,17 44:9 50:18 asking 28:18 30:3 36:24 41:6 49:24 50:4 aspect 41:8 aspects 4:22 asserting 28:10 29:4 assertion 16:10 assessment 49:19,23 assistance 38:4,9 55:1,2 assume 22:17 39:12 assuming 8:10 16:14 assurances 22:21 attach 47:24 attaches 47:22 attack 3:15 attempt 53:12 attorney 38:14 Attorneys 13:18 authority 45:9 available 33:8 43:9 avoid 45:15 avoidance 4:7 aware 48:12,14 away 16:17 30:19 a.m 1:12 3:2 B B 1:14 2:3,8 3:7 52:5 back 6:15 31:14 34:16 48:25,25 50:12 50:21 bad 26:7 Bagley 4:16 16:22 41:2 balance 17:8 18:19 21:10 25:10 40:5 40:8 balances 18:3,3 21:16 balancing 17:19 bank 21:23 bar 41:10 bargain 15:5 16:2,18 bargaining 24:10,12 41:6 55:7 bargains 3:18 barred 9:7 based 13:22 15:3 29:8 36:24 41:20 basic 17:19 18:19 basis 11:8 13:20,21 14:7,10 15:14 22:16,24 26:24 27:3,5 32:19 before 1:11 12:10,10 20:23 25:19 29:1 35:16 36:2 37:11,13 39:10 40:12 42:2 51:13 beginning 29:2 34:25 behalf 1:15,17 2:4,6,9 3:8 25:14 29:4
1111 14th Street, N.W. Suite 400 1-800-FOR-DEPO Washington, DC 20005
31:16 52:6 behavior 22:18 being 9:13 13:21 15:24 18:5 19:5 44:10 50:18 belief 13:13 believe 13:20 25:7 53:15 believed 52:24 believing 13:22 benefit 10:22 31:22 40:5 42:15 44:10 benefits 12:18 24:11,12 best 19:1 21:1 22:23 better 30:5 31:25 34:25 36:10 between 38:13 beyond 13:23 40:13 binds 13:14 bit 6:3 blah 43:25,25,25 blanket 17:12 block 49:11 blocks 8:21 10:14 blow 35:15 blowout 35:17 border 11:2 both 5:22 11:17 27:1 31:22 42:17 47:11 bothering 45:5 bottom 34:12 Brady 4:2,2,4,6,9,11,22,22,25 11:12 11:13,13 12:2,14 17:15 18:12,14 21:12 22:8 23:13,13,17 29:12 34:6 36:24,24 37:1,1,6,8,19 38:16,17 42:6 45:18 47:4,6,7,8,12 48:18,24 50:6,8 51:25 Brady's 4:17 16:22,23 Breyer 18:21 31:2 41:18 44:6 54:7 brief 21:23 22:4 27:17 35:12 39:19 49:11 52:12 54:10 bring 13:19 17:24 41:7 bringing 15:19 broad 11:17 41:2 brought 13:21 47:8 54:2 burdens 12:19 busy 10:25 30:8,8 C C 2:1 3:1 California 1:17 7:25 31:3 53:23 call 47:14 called 54:19 came 1:10 capacity 53:3 car 15:19 35:16,16 cards 36:9 care 13:2,3 carefully 53:16 case 4:24 5:19,23,25 7:9 9:15 11:25 12:17,18 13:19,21 15:15 16:14,21
17:12 18:12,24 20:16,23 21:11 22:18 23:3,23 24:16,18 25:19 26:25 27:24 28:25 29:3,6,19,23 31:23 35:19,19,23 37:6,15,23 38:4,25 39:2 39:5 40:6 43:5,19 44:2,8,24 45:7,10 47:8 48:12,23 49:15 51:24 52:2,11 52:15 53:7,25 54:4,17,22 55:5,13,14 caseload 31:4 cases 4:8 16:10 17:8,15,20 23:15,19 23:20,20,21,21 24:6 26:5 27:1,3,11 27:16,19 29:25 31:4 35:13 36:3 45:23 49:4 52:12 54:2,2,5,25 category 34:21 cause 6:1 55:6 cert 5:5 46:8 certain 18:22,23 21:8 23:19 53:13 certainly 33:10 38:16 43:23 46:15,17 49:22 certiorari 5:14 11:23 challenging 46:11 chance 15:2 16:19 50:24 chances 14:18 18:5 19:1,8 21:8 change 30:3,22 41:12,18 45:14,15 54:9,9,11 changed 49:20 changing 35:21 charge 17:25 19:7 charged 27:21 35:24 Chief 3:3,9 6:22 7:15 18:11 25:15 46:17 47:8 52:7 55:11 choice 15:1 36:10 choices 17:16 circuit 3:11,21 5:23 6:7,11,16 7:1,9 8:22,23 9:6,11,17,21,23 10:1 11:7 11:16 14:12 19:10 20:21 21:3 23:7 23:13 26:25 29:20 34:6,9,13 36:18 37:25 39:8 46:12 47:3 52:9,24 53:5 53:6,11,11,17,21,24 Circuit's 4:1 7:11 11:22 18:24 36:8,8 39:8 45:20 46:11 47:9 circumstance 10:4 11:5 16:6 circumstances 9:14 10:18 18:1 50:15 53:17 cite 52:12 cited 27:16 35:12 claim 47:2 49:8 claims 51:13 Clause 25:17 clear 5:24 6:8,15 9:21 11:10,13 33:19 45:22 46:5 clearly 53:19 client 15:24 28:22 29:3,4 31:17 33:4 43:16,16 client's 28:24 cocaine 12:24,25 collapse 34:25 collar 23:21
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