Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/417/340/190322/
Timestamp: 2019-07-21 19:31:29
Document Index: 745167935

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 4744', '§ 4744', '§ 4744', '§ 4744', '§ 4744', '§ 4744', '§ 4744', '§ 4744', '§ 4742', '§ 4742', '§ 4751', '§ 4742']

Efrain Santos, Petitioner-appellant, v. United States of America, Respondent-appellee, 417 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1969) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Seventh Circuit › 1969 › Efrain Santos, Petitioner-appellant, v. United States of America, Respondent-appellee
Efrain Santos, Petitioner-appellant, v. United States of America, Respondent-appellee, 417 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1969)
US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit - 417 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1969)
It appears clear that Leary requires a reversal of Santos' conviction under § 4744(a) (1).3 In Leary, the Supreme Court reversed the petitioner's conviction under 26 U.S.C.A. § 4744(a) (2) holding that the "petitioner's invocation of the privilege [against self-incrimination] was proper and * * * should have provided a full defense" to the count alleging a violation of § 4744 (a) (2). The necessary implication of Leary is that the substantive violations under § 4744(a) (1) in the instant case can not be sustained. No reasonable grounds exist for distinguishing between a conviction premised on § 4744(a) (1) and a conviction obtained under § 4744 (a) (2). Both provisions of § 4744 share identical constitutional infirmities and are equally subject to the privilege against self-incrimination, as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. These provisions of § 4744, when viewed within the context of the comprehensive statutory scheme of the Marihuana Tax Act,4 expose a person to a "real and appreciable" risk of self-incrimination, within the rationale of Leary v. United States, supra, Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 88 S. Ct. 697, 19 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968), Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62, 88 S. Ct. 709, 19 L. Ed. 2d 906 (1968), and Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 88 S. Ct. 722, 19 L. Ed. 2d 923 (1968).
When considered in conjunction with other interrelated sections of the Marihuana Tax Act, the net legal effect of § 4742(a) is to place the criminal transferor in the position of being statutorily required to provide the government with information "which would surely prove a significant `link in the chain' of evidence tending to establish his guilt." Marchetti v. United States, supra 390 U.S. at 48, 88 S. Ct. at 703. This is true since the order form mandate of § 4742 (a) compels the criminal transferor to require the transferee to obtain an order form and to identify him not only as a transferor of marihuana but as a transferor who has not registered and paid the occupational tax required by §§ 4751-4753. This interplay of the sections exposes the criminal transferor to a real hazard of self-incrimination since such information becomes readily available to investigative authorities.
We see no legally significant reason for distinguishing between the Marchetti type statutory scheme, in which the defendant is required to personally incriminate himself, and the more subtle statutory scheme, as is found in the instant case, where the law requires the defendant to compel another to divulge equally incriminating information. Both statutory schemes confront the defendant with a real and substantial risk of incrimination. The privilege against self-incrimination provides a complete defense to prosecution for failure to comply with either incriminating scheme. There is a "right not to be criminally liable for one's previous failure to obey a statute which required an incriminatory act." Leary v. United States, supra, 395 U.S. at 28, 89 S. Ct. at 1544.
In the recent case of United States v. Buie, 2 Cir., 407 F.2d 905 (1969), the Second Circuit was faced with resolving the identical issue of whether the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination can be invoked by a defendant-transferor as a defense to a conviction for transferring marihuana without the written order form required by § 4742(a). On the authority of its decision in United States v. Minor, 2 Cir., 398 F.2d 511 (1968)6 , the Buie court affirmed the defendant-transferor's conviction and concluded that under the statutory scheme of the Marihuana Tax Act the defendant did not personally reveal his own identity and thereby incriminate himself. In substance, the court held that "the privilege against self-incrimination is personal" and is not violated so long as the defendant-transferor does not have to personally provide the incriminatory information.
On the authority of Grosso v. United States, supra, 390 U.S. at 70-72, 88 S. Ct. 709, we are constrained to hold that the appellant did not knowingly waive his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination by failing to raise this defense at trial or upon appeal. It would be anomalous and contravene the precepts of fairness to hold otherwise for at the time of the appellant's trial and appeal the decisions in Leary, Marchetti, Grosso and Haynes had not been handed down. It is axiomatic that "unless the defendant is fully aware of a constitutional right, he cannot effectively waive it." United States v. Rosenson, D.C.E. D.La., 291 F. Supp. 874, 878 (1968). See also Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439-440, 83 S. Ct. 822, 9 L. Ed. 2d 837 (1963), Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461 (1938), and United States ex rel. O'Connor v. State of New Jersey, 3 Cir., 405 F.2d 632, 634 (1969). Under the circumstances of the instant case, there is no reason to believe Santos knowingly waived a constitutional right which evolved subsequent to his trial and appeal.7 Defendants should not be required to anticipate favorable Supreme Court rulings "or compelled to make the futile gesture of raising the privilege at trial to preserve their rights in the event of * * * [a favorable forthcoming] decision." United States v. Manfredonia, 2 Cir., 391 F.2d 229, 230 (1968).
Our holding is premised upon the reasoning of the foregoing Supreme Court decisions which were handed down after the appellant's conviction became final. Obviously, our decision in this matter assumes that these recent cases should be given retroactive effect. While we are fully aware of the present conflict in the circuits with respect to the resolution of the issue of retroactivity8 , we are persuaded by the reasoning and the result reached in United States v. Miller, 4 Cir., 406 F.2d 1100 (1969). The import of the Fourth Circuit holding is that these cases are entitled to retroactive application under the guidelines set forth in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297, 87 S. Ct. 1967, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1199 (1967).
In Leary, supra 395 U.S. at 14-15, 89 S. Ct. at 1536-1537, the Supreme Court aptly summarizes the statutory scheme of the Marihuana Tax Act:
The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in Minor v. United States, 395 U.S. 932, 89 S. Ct. 2000, 23 L. Ed. 2d 447 (June 2, 1969)
The Leary opinion also requires that the constitutional question be raised in timely fashion. By timeliness, we understand the Court to be referring to the doctrine that an issue must first be presented to the district court before it can be argued on appeal. In the present case, in view of the fact that Marchetti and its companion cases as well as Leary were decided after petitioner's conviction became final on appeal, we are of the opinion that the presentation of these unwaived constitutional questions to the district court in the petition to vacate and set aside the conviction was timely and that the issues are now properly before us for decision.
In the case of Graham v. United States, 6 Cir., 407 F.2d 1313, March 10, 1969, the Sixth Circuit in a per curiam opinion held that Marchetti and Grosso were not to be applied retroactively to a conviction which became final prior to the date of these decisions.
For a careful analysis of Leary and Covington see 38 U.S.L.W. 3052-53 (July 29, 1969).