Source: http://www.howtocrackanut.com/blog/2013/10/neutrality-of-ownership-is-not.html
Timestamp: 2017-02-25 09:08:03
Document Index: 419657361

Matched Legal Cases: ['CJEU ', 'CJEU ', 'CJEU ', 'CJEU ', 'art 101', 'art 101', 'Art 5']

Neutrality of ownership is not unconditional: CJEU sets red lines for privatisation prohibitions (C-105/12 to C-107/12) — How to Crack a Nut
In Essent, the CJEU was concerned with the compatibility with EU law of an absolute privatisation ban. More specifically, it had to analyse a Dutch rule whereby shares in companies that operate distribution networks of electricity and gas can be transferred only within the circle of public authorities, ie cannot be privatised (for a comment, see here). Advocate General Jaaskinen had considered the absolute ban on privatisation compatible with both Article 345 TFEU and Article 63 TFEU on free movement of capital (see his Opinion, not available in English, here). The CJEU has reached the same conclusions.
In my view, one of the most interesting legal points of the Essent Judgment is that Article 345 TFEU does not write Member States a blank check when they regulate their property systems or, put othewise, that the principle of neutrality of ownership enshrined in that provision is not unconditional. Hence, the reasoning of the CJEU should be seen as an exercise to draw some red lines that Member States cannot overstep when designing their property systems and that, fundamentally, boil down to full compliance with the rules on free movement of capital.
29 Article 345 TFEU is an expression of the principle of the neutrality of the Treaties in relation to the rules in Member States governing the system of property ownership.30 In that regard, it is apparent from the Court’s case-law that the Treaties do not preclude, as a general rule, either the nationalisation of undertakings (see, to that effect, Case 6/64 Costa [1964] ECR 585, at 598) or their privatisation (see, to that effect, Case C‑244/11 Commission v Greece [2012] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 17).31 It follows that Member States may legitimately pursue an objective of establishing or maintaining a body of rules relating to the public ownership of certain undertakings.32 […] the prohibition of privatisation, within the meaning of the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings, allows, in essence, the transfer of shares held in a distribution system operator only to the authorities and to legal persons owned, directly or indirectly, by those authorities, since any transfer which has the result that the shares become the property of persons other than such authorities and legal persons is prohibited.33 It follows that the prohibition of privatisation precludes ownership by any private individual of shares in an electricity or gas distribution system operator active in the Netherlands. Its objective is therefore to maintain a body of rules relating to public ownership in respect of those operators.34 Such a prohibition falls within the scope of Article 345 TFEU. […]36 However, Article 345 TFEU does not mean that rules governing the system of property ownership current in the Member States are not subject to the fundamental rules of the FEU Treaty, which rules include, inter alia, the prohibition of discrimination, freedom of establishment and the free movement of capital (see, to that effect, Case 182/83 Fearon [1984] ECR 3677, paragraph 7; Case C‑302/97 Konle [1999] ECR I‑3099, paragraph 38; Case C‑452/01 Ospelt and Schlössle Weissenberg [2003] ECR I‑9743, paragraph 24; Case C‑171/08 Commission v Portugal [2010] ECR I‑6817, paragraph 64; Case C‑271/09 Commission v Poland [2011] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 44; and Commission v Greece, paragraph 16).37 Consequently, the fact that the Kingdom of the Netherlands has established, in the sector of electricity or gas distribution system operators active in its territory, a body of rules relating to public ownership covered by Article 345 TFEU does not mean that that Member State is free to disregard, in that sector, the rules relating to the free movement of capital (see, by analogy, Commission v Poland, paragraph 44 and the case‑law cited).38 Accordingly, the prohibition of privatisation falls within the scope of Article 63 TFEU and must be examined in the light of that article […] (C-105/12 ti C-107/12 at paras 29-38, emphasis added).
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