Source: http://www.groklaw.net/articlebasic.php?story=20110729130407266
Timestamp: 2017-01-20 19:55:59
Document Index: 684872418

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 102', '§ 101', '§ 101', 'art=10', '§ 102', '§ 102', '§ 103', '§ 102', '§ 101', '§ 102', '§ 101', '§ 102', '§ 101', '§ 101', '§ 101', '§102']

Groklaw - Oracle v. Google - Breaking News - Oracle and Google Agree On Time Of Day
Oracle v. Google - Breaking News - Oracle and Google Agree On Time Of Day
Saturday, July 30 2011 @ 10:55 AM EDT
Actually, we're not absolutely sure they do agree on the time of day, but if it were to occur, it would be a first in this case. Congress and the debt ceiling is no more contentious than these two parties.
That probably overstates the contentiousness a bit because there is evidence that the parties are actually trying to work together. Take for instance their Joint Submission in Response to Order Regarding Rule 706 Experts. [PDF] The parties truly seem to be trying to comply with the court's directive to identify and
“recommend two qualified economists or other experts to testify under FRE 706
concerning whether or not the claims tried to the jury, if infringed, constitute the basis for demand for Android.”
The problem they are running into is that the court directed them to find experts within the Northern District of California. While they have identified at least eight experts, they all are either unavailable, have a conflict with respect to one of the parties, or are deemed unsuitable by at least one party.
Judge Alsup has issued a new Order re Search for Rule 706 Experts [PDF], in which he removes the requirement that they come from the judicial district. But Judge Alsup has given the parties only until Wednesday, August 3, to either jointly or individually submit the names of potential experts. If the parties are unable to jointly agree, the judge will name the experts from the names or, if no names or an insufficient number of names are submitted, the judge will conduct his own search, and that will likely delay the trial.
Before we go on, here are all the filings:
233 - Filed & Entered: 07/25/2011
Docket Text: Minute Entry: Motion Hearing held on 7/21/2011 before
William Alsup (Date Filed: 7/25/2011) re [171] MOTION To Exclude Expert
Opinions and Testimony (Daubert) filed by Google Inc. Motion taken under
submission. (Court Reporter Sahar Bartlett.) (dt, COURT STAFF) (Date
Filed: 7/25/2011)
234 - Filed & Entered: 07/26/2011
Docket Text: RESPONSE to re [195] Order JOINT SUBMISSION REGARDING RULE
706 EXPERTS by Google Inc.. (Van Nest, Robert) (Filed on 7/26/2011)
235 - Filed & Entered: 07/26/2011
Docket Text: RESPONSE TO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE by Google Inc. DECLARATION
OF ROBERT VAN NEST RE RULE 706 EXPERTS. (Van Nest, Robert) (Filed on
236 - Filed & Entered: 07/27/2011
Docket Text: ORDER RE SEARCH FOR RULE 706 EXPERTS re [234] Response (
Non Motion ) filed by Google Inc., [235] Response to Order to Show Cause
filed by Google Inc.. Signed by Judge Alsup on July 27, 2011. (whalc1,
COURT STAFF) (Filed on 7/27/2011)
237 - Filed & Entered: 07/27/2011
Docket Text: STIPULATION and [Proposed] Order Regarding Exchange of
Expert Demonstrative Exhibits by Oracle America, Inc.. (Muino, Daniel)
(Filed on 7/27/2011)
238 - Filed & Entered: 07/27/2011
Docket Text: STIPULATED ORDER REGARDING EXCHANGE OF EXPERT DEMONSTRATIVE
EXHIBITS re [237] Stipulation filed by Oracle America, Inc.. Signed by
Judge Alsup on July 27, 2011. (whalc1, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 7/27/2011)
239 - Filed & Entered: 07/27/2011
Docket Text: NOTICE RE SUBPOENAS FOR TRIAL WITNESSES. Signed by Judge
Alsup on July 27, 2011. (whalc1, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 7/27/2011)
240 - Filed & Entered: 07/27/2011
Docket Text: RESPONSE (re [214] Amended MOTION for Leave to File
Supplement Invalidity Contentions ) filed by Oracle America, Inc..
(Attachments: # (1) - Declaration Declaration of Marc Peters in Support of
Oracle's Opposition to Google's Motion for Leave to Amend Invalidity
Contentions)(Peters, Marc) (Filed on 7/27/2011)
241 - Filed & Entered: 07/27/2011
Docket Text: Administrative Motion to File Under Seal Portions of the
Parties' Joint Letter filed by Oracle America, Inc.. (Holtzman, Steven)
242 - Filed & Entered: 07/27/2011
Docket Text: Letter from Robert A. Van Nest re July 21 Hearing. (Van
Nest, Robert) (Filed on 7/27/2011)
243 - Filed & Entered: 07/28/2011
Docket Text: Declaration of Matthias A. Kamber in Support of [241]
Administrative Motion to File Under Seal Portions of the Parties' Joint
Letter filed byGoogle Inc.. (Related document(s)[241]) (Kamber,
Matthias) (Filed on 7/28/2011)
244 - Filed & Entered: 07/28/2011
Docket Text: Proposed Order re [241] Administrative Motion to File Under
Seal Portions of the Parties' Joint Letter by Google Inc.. (Kamber,
245 - Filed & Entered: 07/28/2011
Docket Text: ORDER Setting Hearing re Parties' 7/27/2011 Joint Discovery
Letter. Discovery Hearing set for 8/1/2011 09:30 AM in Courtroom 2, 4th
Floor, Oakland before Magistrate Judge Donna M. Ryu. Signed by
Magistrate Judge Donna M. Ryu on 07/28/2011. (dmrlc1, COURT STAFF)
(Filed on 7/28/2011)
246 - Filed & Entered: 07/28/2011
Docket Text: STIPULATION and Proposed Order to Extend Fact Discovery
Cut-Off and Due Dates for Expert Reports by Oracle America, Inc..
(Muino, Daniel) (Filed on 7/28/2011)
247 - Filed & Entered: 07/28/2011
Docket Text: Letter from Robert Van Nest re Leave to File Two Short
Motions. (Van Nest, Robert) (Filed on 7/28/2011)
248 - Filed & Entered: 07/29/2011
Docket Text: RESPONSE to re [247] Letter by Oracle America, Inc..
(Norton, William) (Filed on 7/29/2011)
Judge Alsup also made clear that he would not approve Google's request to limit the nature of the testimony these experts provide to an advisory nature to the court. Rather, these experts will be expected to testify at trial. The judge's impatience with both parties seeped through when he added: "This assistance will be particularly useful because
both sides have taken such extreme and unreasonable positions regarding damages in this action."
Next up, Oracle is opposing Google's request to supplement its invalidity contention. Oracle filed this opposition statement.
Basically, Oracle is saying it is unfair for Google to amend its invalidity contentions so late in the game. On the other hand, when Oracle has been dragging its feet in narrowing the claims to be asserted at trial, exactly what is Google supposed to do? In fact, Google did exactly what Oracle admits it suggested:
On June 7, counsel for
Oracle told counsel for Google that the parties were not likely to reach a compromise and that
Google should proceed to file a motion to amend its invalidity contentions.
But it goes deeper than that. What seems to be lost in all of this is a serious search for the truth as to all relevant prior art and whether the patents truly are valid. Avoiding that certainly doesn't seem to be in the public interest. We would hope that the court allows Google's motion. However, absent Google's response and taking Oracle's arguments at face value, the Oracle opposition certainly gives the court a good deal to consider.
The magistrate has set a hearing for Monday, August 1, on the discovery disputes between the parties. We should get some indication of whether one or both parties have been as cooperative as they claim to be.
The parties have agreed that discovery should be extended, including extending the deadline for depositions until the end of August. Judge Alsup still has to rule on this stipulation.
Finally, there is the dispute between the parties as to whether Oracle breached the protective order in submitting some documents to the court during the Daubert hearing that were marked as confidential by Google. They each tell a different story. The letters to the court are included below.
Joint Submission in Response to Order Regarding Rule 706 Experts
JOINT SUBMISSION IN RESPONSE
TO ORDER REGARDING RULE 706
The parties have followed the Court’s instructions that they try to “agree on two qualified
candidates in this district and jointly call them to make sure they would be available and have no
conflicts,” and “recommend two qualified economists or other experts to testify under FRE 706
concerning whether or not the claims tried to the jury, if infringed, constitute the basis for demand
for Android.” First, both parties sifted through a large number of experts that they thought might
be good candidates. Each party independently found that many experts had to be excluded for
reasons of conflicts, as a result of which both parties expanded their searches outside the Northern
District of California. Second, the parties exchanged names of several experts who survived this
process, after which they jointly reached out to those experts to assess availability and conflicts.
Having now concluded the vetting process, the parties regret to inform the Court that they
do not yet have agreed experts who fulfill the Court’s criteria. All experts vetted by the parties
are either (1) unavailable (e.g., Candidate A), (2) not located in the District (e.g., Candidate A,
Candidate B, Candidate C, Candidate D, and Candidate E), or (3) have actual or apparent
conflicts that one party or the other believes would prevent them from being an appropriate court-appointed
expert (e.g., Candidate C (previously approached Oracle in connection with this
litigation), Candidate B (recently adverse to Oracle, and employment issue with consulting firm
retained by Oracle in this case), Candidate D (investor in Google, has written on Android, and has
stated positions on software patents generally), Candidate E (contacts with Google and past
payment by Google), Candidate F (contacts with Sun Microsystems), and Candidate G
(represented Google in two previous cases)). Google objects to one additional potential expert
proposed by Oracle, Candidate H, on the ground that he is a technical (computer science) rather
than a marketing expert. The parties will separately submit the names of the candidates to avoid
putting them and the parties’ comments about them in the public spotlight.
The parties are willing to continue working together in an effort to satisfy the Court’s
request for recommendations, but would need more time to do so. In light of the results to date
and the Court’s July 22, 2011 Order on the Daubert motion, however, the parties would
appreciate further direction from the Court as to whether it wishes the parties to attempt further
efforts to agree on candidates who meet the Court’s criteria.
With respect to the Court’s statement that the parties may submit declarations showing
cause why such appointments would (or would not) be advisable, and describing the assignments
counsel would prefer be given to the experts, Google is submitting a declaration herewith. Oracle
is not submitting a declaration, but notes that it disagrees with Google’s position as to the
advisability of a marketing expert as compared to a technical expert on the issue of whether the
claims to be tried to the jury constitute the basis for demand for Android.
By: /s/ Steven Holtzman
By: /s/ Robert Van Nest
Order re Search for Rule 706 Experts
ORDER RE SEARCH
FOR RULE 706 EXPERTS
On July 5, 2011, the parties were requested to jointly submit the names and resumes of
candidates to serve as Rule 706 experts by July 26 (Dkt. No. 195). When the deadline arrived, the
parties instead “inform[ed] the Court that they do not yet have agreed experts who fulfill the
Court’s criteria.” The parties “are willing to continue working together in an effort to satisfy the
Court’s request for recommendations,” but seek “further direction” (Dkt. No. 234). Because the
July 5 request has proven problematic, it is modified as follows.
First, the candidates need not be drawn from this district as originally requested. Second,
if the parties are unable to agree on jointly proposed candidates, then each party may separately
submit its own candidates. The names and resumes of these candidates may be filed under seal.
Third, any and all candidates must be submitted by AUGUST 3, 2011. If no candidates are
submitted by that date, then the Court will independently search for candidates, and the parties
will still be required to pay the costs of the expert(s) chosen from that pool pursuant to
FRE 706(b). Such a search likely would portend delay of the trial date, because any expert will
need time to be brought up to speed on the facts of the case after being appointed.
Regarding the declaration filed by Google Inc., the suggestion that the role of any
Rule 706 expert be limited “to confidentially advising the Court, rather than testifying before the
jury” will not be taken (Dkt. No. 235 at 2). As stated in the July 5 order, the search is for an
expert “to testify before the jury at trial under FRE 706 and not [to serve] as a confidential
advisor to the judge” (Dkt. No. 195). Far from complicating the jury’s decision on damages, as
Google argues, the testimony of a Rule 706 expert would assist the jury by providing a neutral
explanation and viewpoint. See Monolithic Power Sys., Inc. v. O2 Micro Int’l Ltd.,
558 F.3d 1341, 1346–48 (Fed. Cir. 2009). This assistance will be particularly useful because
both sides have taken such extreme and unreasonable positions regarding damages in this action.
Oracle's Opposition to Google's Amended Motion for Leave to Supplement Invalidity Contentions
AMENDED MOTION FOR LEAVE
TO SUPPLEMENT INVALIDITY
Hearing Date: August 18, 2011
The middle of expert discovery is the wrong time for Google to swap out most of its
invalidity theories and trade them for different ones. Google’s own motion demonstrates that
Google inexplicably delayed between four and six months to seek leave to add most of its “new”
invalidity theories. This is the exact opposite of diligence, and is enough to end the “good cause”
inquiry. Google’s stalling tactics have caused significant prejudice to Oracle’s trial planning by
leaving open the question as to what Google’s invalidity case is going to be. The parties are
supposed to be narrowing the case, not expanding it right in the middle of expert discovery,
which will be well under way by the time the Court hears this motion. The Patent Local Rules
exist to ensure patent cases are litigated in a fair and orderly fashion. They are intended to have
bite—parties must show good cause to change patent theories mid-stream. Google must show
that it was diligent in requesting leave to amend from the Court and that its actions have not
prejudiced Oracle. Google fails on both counts.
Google served its initial Invalidity Contentions on January 18, 2011, which included
thirty-five §§ 102 and 103 charts, §§ 101, 112, and 251 defenses, and a twenty-two page table of
500+ additional references, for which Google did not provide any detailed contentions in the form
of prior art charts as required by Patent L.R. 3-3. Declaration of Marc Peters in Support of
Oracle’s Opposition to Google’s Motion for Leave To Amend Invalidity Contentions (“Peters
Decl.”) at ¶ 1. Next, Google requested reexaminations of the patents in February and March
2011. Although Google asserted many new prior art references in the reexamination requests, it
did not then seek to include them in this case. (Id. at ¶ 2.)
Not until May 6, 2011, did Google identify any particular references that it desired to add
to its Invalidity Contentions, and then, only by name. (Id. at ¶ 5.) On May 16, Google provided
formal proposed Supplemental Invalidity Contentions, which included twenty-one new or revised
prior art charts and extensive additions to its § 101 and 112 defenses. (Id.) Google’s May 6 letter
and May 16 charts did not, however, include theories based on Krakowiak or Vyssotsky (new ’104
chart A-10) or JavaOS (still no chart), or some revisions to earlier charts (revised charts A-2 and
A-3). For those new theories, Oracle had to wait until June 15 to learn about JavaOS and July 8
for the rest. (Id. at ¶ 5, 12, 14.)
On May 23, 2011, the Court accepted the agreed-upon portion of the parties’ plan to limit
issues for trial. (ECF No. 147.) On June 1, in view of Google’s then-asserted-and-proposed
invalidity defenses (which did not include theories based on Krakowiak, Vyssotsky, JavaOS,
Wahbe/JLS, and Roskind/Roskind), Oracle selected its fifty patent claims. On June 7, counsel for
Google should proceed to file a motion to amend its invalidity contentions. (Id. at ¶ 8.) On June
11, Google demanded that Oracle prepare its portion of a joint motion to be filed with Magistrate
Judge Ryu. Oracle did so. On June 15, Google announced that it would file a précis with the
Court instead. (Id. at ¶¶ 10-11.)
Also on June 15, 2011, Google identified invalidity defenses for each patent claim by the
names of the references only—no additional Patent L.R. 3-3 charts were provided. Some of the
identified invalidity theories were completely new to Oracle and not included in any thenprovided
chart: Krakowiak and Vyssotsky for the ’104, Vyssotsky for the ’702, Wahbe/JLS for the
’447, and Roskind/Roskind for the ’476. (Id. at ¶ 12.) Gong for the ’447 and ’476 had been
named but not charted in Google’s May 16 disclosure. In all, a majority of Google’s selected
invalidity grounds were new defenses that Google had not disclosed in January 2011. Also,
Google also purported to “reserve” the right to assert alternate defenses in the event the Court
denied Google’s anticipated motion to supplement its Invalidity Contentions, so the total number
of asserted defenses selected exceeded the six permitted by the Court. (Id.) Two days later,
Google filed its précis asking for permission to file this motion on June 17, 2011.
Astonishingly, even though the Court granted Google leave to file this motion on June 21,
2011, Google waited more than two weeks to file it—until July 8, 2011. And there were many
problems with the invalidity theories that Google sought to advance. Google’s July 8 motion
sought leave to add Vyssotsky (revised chart B-4), Wahbe/JLS, Roskind/Roskind, Gong, among
other invalidity theories. Three hours before filing, Google sent an email purporting to send a
“complete set of Google’s invalidity claim charts.” Later that day, Oracle pointed out that there
were differences between Google’s May 16 and July 8 chart disclosures: the May 16 set did not
include charts for Wahbe/JLS, Roskind/Roskind, or Gong. Google acknowledged that its May 16
version of the B-4 chart did not include Vyssotsky. On July 10, Oracle pointed out that Google
had not provided a chart for the Griffin/JLS invalidity theory. (Id. at ¶ 14.)
What followed was a quick series of retractions. (Id.) On July 13, Google withdrew its
Griffin/JLS invalidity theory. Shortly thereafter, Google withdrew its Wahbe/JLS,
Roskind/Roskind, and Gong invalidity theories. (Because Google admitted in its July 8 motion
that Gong was not prior art, this may have been wise.) Shortly before midnight on July 13,
Google filed an amended motion that dropped Vyssotsky from its proposed revised chart B-4.
In sum, in the time between May 6 and July 13, Google advanced forty-two new invalidity
theories based on prior art combinations and withdrew twenty-five of the new theories and most
of the January ones, leaving Oracle still to guess as to what Google’s invalidity case will look like
at trial. Oracle has been whipsawed since the end of May. Google’s behavior is a flagrant
violation of the Patent Local Rules and the values they codify.
III. GOOGLE HAS NOT SHOWN GOOD CAUSE TO AMEND UNDER
PATENT L.R. 3-6
The Patent Local Rules “exist to further the goal of full, timely discovery and provide all
parties with adequate notice and information with which to litigate their cases . . . .” IXYS Corp.
v. Advanced Power Tech., Inc., No. C 02-03942 MHP, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10934, at *8 (N.D.
Cal. June 16, 2004). Failure to adhere to the deadlines established by the rules can be very
disruptive, which is why “[a]mendment of . . . the Invalidity Contentions may be made only by
order of the Court upon a timely showing of good cause.” Patent L.R. 3-6. “[T]he ‘good cause’
inquiry first considers whether the moving party was diligent in amending its contentions and
then considers prejudice to the non-moving party should the motion to amend be granted.” West
v. Jewelry Innovations, Inc., No. C 07-1812 JF (HRL), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84928, at *4 (N.D.
Cal. Oct. 8, 2008). Google has not shown that it was diligent in amending its contentions.
To be diligent, a party must seek to amend its contentions promptly after discovering the
new information. O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Monolithic Power Sys., Inc., 467 F.3d 1355, 1366-67
(Fed. Cir. 2006). A delay of a few months shows a lack of diligence. See id. at 1367 (holding
that party waiting three months to move to amend was not diligent); Iovate Health Scis., Inc. v.
Bio-Engineered Supplements & Nutrition, Inc., No. 9:07-CV-46 (E.D. Tex. June 7, 2008) (Peters
Decl. Ex. 4) (denying motion for leave to amend invalidity contentions where defendant moved
three months after discovering the prior art and less than a month before the close of fact
Google has the burden of establishing its diligence. O2 Micro, 467 F.3d at 1366. Merely
asserting that it made “diligent inquiries” does not meet this burden. West, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 84928, at *10. If Google “fails to establish diligence, the ‘good cause’ inquiry should
end.” Id., at *11 (citation omitted); O2 Micro, 467 F.3d at 1368 (“Having concluded that the
district court could properly conclude that O2 Micro did not act diligently in moving to amend its
infringement contentions, we see no need to consider the question of prejudice to MPS.”).
A. The Court Should Reject Charts A-9 & A-12 Because Google Could
Have Asserted These Invalidity Theories Earlier Had It Been Diligent
Google identified the Rau article in its January 18 Invalidity Contentions, but did not then
apply it against the ’104 patent. In fact, Google stated that Rau was among the references that
were “not the most pertinent” and “unnecessarily duplicative.” (Peters Decl. Ex. 5 at 24, 43.)
Google may have changed its mind, but that does not show diligence. See Brilliant Instruments,
Inc. v. GuideTech, Inc., No. C 09-5517 CW, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48865, at *4-6 (N.D. Cal.
Apr. 29, 2011) (denying defendants’ motion for leave to add new prior art because defendant did
not investigate it promptly after discovering it).
What excuse does Google give for adding Rau at this late date? Google says that Rau
only became important after the Court construed the terms “resolve” and “intermediate form
(object) code.” But Google learned Oracle’s proposed definitions in February 2011 (ECF No. 91
at 7-8), and the Court adopted Oracle’s proposals almost verbatim. Google could have foreseen
the Court’s claim construction and should have analyzed the Rau article in light of Oracle’s
proposed definitions, not just its own. See Nike, Inc. v. Adidas Am. Inc., 479 F. Supp. 2d 664, 669
(E.D. Tex. 2007) (“The court concludes that this definition was not so different from the parties’
proposal as to warrant amended infringement contentions based on the claim construction.”).
Google is using this Court’s claim construction as an excuse to add a theory that it could have
presented in February. Oracle assumed Google was telling the truth in January when it said Rau
was “unnecessarily duplicative.” Oracle relied on Google’s representation, and it would prejudice
Oracle to allow Google to assert Rau now when it could have done so months ago.
B. The Court Should Reject Chart A-10 Because Google Could Have
Asserted These Invalidity Theories Earlier Had It Been Diligent
The Court should reject Google’s attempt to add an obviousness combination based on
Tafvelin in view of “Multics dynamic linking as described in Daley, Krakowiak, and/or
Vyssotsky.” Supplementation is improper where “there is no showing that the publication prior
art references were difficult to locate and no showing that any diligence was exercised in
discovering them.” Sunpower Corp. Sys. v. Sunlink Corp., No. C-08-2807 SBA (EMC), 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85425, at *9 (N.D. Cal. June 12, 2009).
Tafvelin, Daley, Krakowiak, and Vyssotsky are not obscure or hard to find. On the
contrary, Google could have found all of these references by using its own online database,
Google Scholar, where Google has indexed them for searching.1 Indeed, searching for the term
“Multics” on Google Scholar brings up Daley as the sixth hit and Vyssotsky as the tenth hit. See
http://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&q=multics. A diligent search would have led Google
right to the publications in enough time for disclosure in January. Google’s counsel’s declaration
fails to explain why Google could not have found these four references earlier. (ECF No. 214-1
at 1-2.) The Court is left to wonder why Google made a point of saying “[m]any of these older
prior art documents were not indexed or easily searchable” (Id. at ¶ 10) when the references in
question had been indexed, by Google no less. And as Google did not find Krakowiak and
Vyssotsky until the last minute, what would be the harm to leave them out? Google has not shown
they are significant in any way. Google’s motion should be denied.
1See http://scholar.google.com/scholar?start=10&q=Tafvelin+&hl=en&as_sdt=0,5;
http://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&q=multics;
http://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&q=Krakowiak+multics (last visited July 26, 2011).
C. The Court Should Reject The JavaOS Defense Because Google Has
Not Satisfied The Patent Local Rules
The JavaOS part of Google’s motion is premature, at best. Google is asking the Court for
permission to reserve a future on-sale bar contention based on Sun’s JavaOS product. Google has
not provided invalidity charts to explain such a contention. Because Google has not complied
with Patent L.R. 3-3(c), this Court should deny Google’s request for “the ability to further
supplement its contentions with invalidity charts based on JavaOS” at some day in the indefinite
future. (ECF No. 214 at 7.) If there ever comes a time when Google can adequately describe
how some version of JavaOS allegedly contained each and every patent claim limitation and was
on sale more than one year before the application date, then that is the time that the Court should
consider whether Google was diligent in advancing this theory. That time has not come.
The supposed discovery issues surrounding JavaOS are a red herring. Oracle produced
JavaOS code in May, as Google concedes. (Id.) That production includes JavaOS source code
that predated the ’702 patent by more than a year. If Google disputes that, it could have filed a
motion with Magistrate Judge Ryu.
Some context on the origin of the JavaOS issue may be helpful to the Court. Oracle
identified JavaOS 1.0 (mistakenly, as it turns out) as an embodiment of the ’702 patent in its
December 2, 2010 infringement contentions. If this were enough to raise an on-sale bar issue,
Google could have included it in its January invalidity contentions, informed by the public
announcement of JavaOS 1.0. (ECF No. 214-1 Ex. L.) But it did not. After Google waited until
June 15, 2011 to contend there was a JavaOS on-sale bar, Oracle discovered the mistake in its
contentions. The source code that implements the ’702 invention was first put into the thenunreleased
JavaOS 1.1 product in May 1997 (and not into the JavaOS 1.0 product). The May 20,
1997 JavaOS 1.1 release notes plainly identify the mclass technology as a “New Feature”: “New
Java ‘linker’ that combines multiple .class files into one .mclass file. New ROMizer – rewrite to
be more modular, Handles new .mclass files.” (Peters Decl. Ex. 6 at 33, emphasis added.) Google
has received these materials in discovery and stubbornly refuses to believe them. Notably,
Google could have asked at the deposition of one inventor of the ’702 patent about when the
invention was conceived and reduced to practice—but failed to do so. Google has not sought to
depose the second inventor.
Oracle has since notified Google that Oracle would not be relying on JavaOS 1.0 as an
embodiment of the ’702 patent for any reason, because it was not in fact an embodiment. (ECF
No. 214-1 Ex. M.) Google argues that this was an attempt to amend Oracle’s infringement
contentions without leave. Not so. The Patent Local Rules only say that if a patent owner wishes
to reserve the right to rely on its own product as being an embodiment, it must make certain
disclosures. Oracle, discovering the mistake, has relinquished its rights with respect to the
mistaken version. It is up to Google to prove that the invention was on sale more than a year
before the patent filing date by clear and convincing evidence, and this it will not be able to do,
because it is not true. If the Court wishes to grant Google’s motion without a proper claim chart,
Oracle asks that it be allowed to amend its infringement contentions to drop JavaOS 1.0 from its
contentions, for formality’s sake if no other.
D. The Court Should Reject Charts E-9, E-10 and E-11 Because Google
Could Have Asserted These Invalidity Theories Earlier Had It Been
The Court should reject Charts E-9, E-10, and E-11, because Google waited almost six
months to seek leave to add these obviousness theories to the case. The charts disclose
combinations of Magnusson with Wakeling, Lewis, or Deutsch. In January, 2011, Google
asserted all four references as anticipatory references and provided charts, but did not provide
obviousness charts based on combinations of these references, even though it certainly could
have. After Oracle pointed out in an interrogatory response how Google’s anticipation arguments
were defective, Google abandoned them and now seeks to use the references for obviousness.
Google has not shown good cause to allow this change in legal theories. All Google can
argue is lack of prejudice, but good cause is much more than that. Google had all this art in
January—why not make an obviousness contention then? On this point, Google’s motion and
declaration are silent. The truth is that Google developed these new theories only after Oracle
demonstrated that Google’s anticipation arguments would fail. But Invalidity Contentions are not
supposed to be reply briefs. Allowing Google to respond to Oracle’s validity arguments would
lead to the “shifting sands” approach that the Patent Local Rules expressly aim to eliminate.
Atmel Corp. v. Info. Storage Devices, Inc., No. C 95-198 FMS, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17564, at
*7 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 1998). Google must “put all [its] cards on the table up front” and stick to
them. CBS Interactive, Inc. v. Etilize, Inc., 257 F.R.D. 195, 201 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (quotation
In place of a true diligence showing, Google argues that Oracle has been on notice of
Google’s reservation of rights to combine these § 102 references. This is very weak tea. In its
initial Invalidity Contentions, Google stated:
To the extent that any one of the previously discussed anticipatory references is
found not to anticipate one or more Asserted Claims, various references described
herein and/or the knowledge and skill of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the
time of the invention, in combination with any one of the anticipatory references,
render the claim invalid as obvious.
(ECF No. 214-1 Ex. N at 9.) But Google’s Invalidity Contentions included not only the charted
§ 102 and § 103 art, but also a twenty-two page table of 500+ uncharted references. Google
purported to “reserve” the right to combine the § 102 art with any of the hundreds of identified
references. This ploy cannot serve to put Oracle on notice of all the thousands of potential
combinations, let alone the particular three that Google wishes to assert now. Google’s cases
(IXYS and Stanford v. Roche) are distinguishable because Oracle was not effectively put on notice
of Google’s new obviousness combinations, unlike the parties in those cases.
E. The Court Should Reject the Reexamination References Because
Google Did Not Diligently Move to Add Them to the Case
The Court should not allow Google to add new prior art references and theories that it
used to request reexamination of the asserted patents for one simple reason: Google intentionally
delayed seeking to add them to the litigation. Google concedes in its opening brief that it had
prepared claim charts for these references in February and March. (ECF No. 214 at 8.) And yet
it sat on its hands until July before filing this motion. Perhaps this is why Google does not even
describe the “good cause” for adding these references—it only argues lack of prejudice. (ECF
No. 214 at 8.) Google does not explain or justify the choices it made.
One factor that courts consider whether a party has shown good cause is “whether the
request to amend is motivated by gamesmanship.” West, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84928, at *4.
That may well be the case here. Since March, Google has requested that the Court stay the
litigation in favor of the reexaminations at every opportunity. Perhaps Google thought that its
chances of obtaining a stay would be improved if it were not also simultaneously seeking to
expand the scope of its invalidity case. One thing that is known for certain is the story of charts
D-5 and D-6. In April, Google requested a second reexamination of the ’520 patent based on
charts D-5 and D-6. In June, the examiner concluded that Google’s D-5 and D-6 charts did not
raise a substantial new question of patentability, and denied the request. (Peters Decl. at ¶ 3.) In
July, Google made those charts part of this motion. So after Google’s new theories were shut out
of the reexamination, Google filed a motion to include them in the litigation. Not only does this
suggest gamesmanship, but the examiner’s action is also evidence that these references are not as
important as the others. West, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84928, at *4 n.5 (holding that “the
relevance of the newly-discovered prior art” is relevant to the good-cause inquiry). Because
Google delayed moving to amend with respect to the reexamination references and has not
adequately explained the delay, there is a “lack of diligence and therefore a lack of ‘good cause.’”
O2 Micro, 467 F.3d at 1368.
F. The Court Should Reject § 101/§ 102 Printed Matter Defense Because
Google Could Have Asserted The Invalidity Theory Earlier Had It
Been Diligent
The Court should reject Google’s attempt to add a new § 101 / § 102 printed matter
defense against the “computer-readable medium” (and similarly worded) claims of the ’720, ’447,
and ’476 patents, because there is no reason Google could not have asserted it before. In January
2011, Google merely contended that all of the asserted claims reflected abstract ideas and so were
not patentable as governed by 35 U.S.C. § 101” and that the “computer-readable medium” (and
similarly worded) claims were invalid under § 101 because they cover “signals per se.” (Peters
Decl. Ex. 5 at 17-18.) It did not identify any defense under the printed matter doctrine. Google
claims that it “has since learned that courts conduct what is in effect the same analysis under both
§ 101 and §102” (ECF No. 214 at 8), and seeks to add a new “printed matter” invalidity theory in
addition to its “signals-per-se” theory. But the printed matter doctrine has been in existence since
the 1930s, In re Russell, 48 F.2d 668, 669 (C.C.P.A. 1931), so Google has no legitimate excuse
for failing to assert it earlier. Also, the most recent significant printed matter decision binding on
this court, King Pharms. Inc. v. Eon Labs, Inc., 616 F.3d 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2010), issued on August
2, 2010, well before Google served its January Invalidity Contentions. The declaration of
Google’s counsel fails to explain why Google could not have conducted the legal research to
develop a “printed matter” theory in January 2011 to join its “signals-per-se” theory.
IV. GRANTING GOOGLE’S MOTION WOULD PREJUDICE ORACLE
Google’s supplementations at this late stage in the case would prejudice Oracle. Although
Google states that Oracle’s counsel conceded there would be no prejudice in late May 2011, that
discussion was based on an expectation of a prompt resolution. (Peters Decl. at ¶¶ 6-7.) Google’s
stalling in June and July has changed things substantially for the worse for Oracle since then.
By unilaterally deciding to bring this matter to the overburdened Court rather than the
assigned Magistrate Judge, by delaying filing a précis requesting permission to file this motion,
and by further delaying filing the motion once it received the Court’s permission, Google ensured
the parties’ dispute would be resolved in August rather than May. This motion could have been
heard promptly by Magistrate Judge Ryu; instead, the motion ended up on the regular 35-day
motion calendar. Google’s inexplicable two-week delay in filing its motion after receiving leave
pushed out the hearing even more. Thus the resolution of Google’s motion, which could have
occurred in June, will not happen until on or after August 18, well into expert discovery. This is
highly prejudicial—Oracle should not be required to work through expert discovery and prepare
its case based on guesswork as to what is in and what is out.
Google has not established diligence in seeking to amend its Invalidity Contentions. Its
delay in filing this motion has heightened the prejudice to Oracle if the Court were to allow the
supplementations. Google has not established good cause to amend at this time, under these
circumstances. Therefore, this Court should deny Google’s motion for leave to amend its Invalidity Contentions 10
Google's Letter to the Court Seeking to Protect Privileged Documents Disclosed by Oracle
[Keker and Van Nest logo]
Google seeks leave to file two short motions requesting that the Court redact portions of the record for the Daubert motion the Court heard and ruled upon last week. The relevant passages appear at page 3, lines 24 - 27 of the July 22, 2011 Order, and at the following locations in the hearing transcript: page 23, linel7 - page 24, line 7; page 39, line 24 - page 42, line 16; and page 45, lines 11-16. These motions and the requested orders are necessary because these passages reflect Oracle's improper use of a document that Google subsequently determined was an inadvertently-produced privileged document, subject to the attorney-client privilege.
This situation would not have arisen but for Oracle's violation of the protective order in this matter. The inadvertently-produced document was marked "HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL -- ATTORNEY'S EYES ONLY" and paragraph 5.2(b) of the protective order specifically states
that "[p]arties shall give the other parties notice if they reasonably expect a deposition, hearing or other proceeding to include Protected Material[.]" (Docket No. 66 at 7:1-4].
Oracle provided no such notice prior to the hearing. Instead, it appeared at the hearing bearing a binder of excerpts from various documents that were not part of its filed opposition and not part of the record, including many that Google had designated "Confidential" or "Attorney's Eyes Only." With regard to the document at issue, that wholesale violation of the protective order had particularly serious consequences, because it meant that Google did not have the opportunity to determine that the underlying document was privileged and to rectify the inadvertent production before Oracle published the contents of the document in open court. Before the July 21, 2011 hearing, that document had not featured in this litigation - it had not been the subject of correspondence between the parties, marked as a deposition exhibit, nor used as an exhibit in any court filing, and therefore Google only learned of its production at the hearing.
Moreover, Oracle's misleading presentation disguised issues that would have been clear from the face of the document itself. Although Oracle implied that it was quoting from an email that had actually been sent, the document that Oracle quoted was in fact an incomplete draft of a privileged email message. The unfinished nature of the email is clear because the "addressee" field is blank and the email itself ends in an incomplete sentence. The document is indisputably privileged, because the final version of the document, which appears on Google's privilege log, was sent to, among others, Google's in-house attorneys, and was also prominently marked "Attorney Work Product." The fact that the document was stored on Google's systems in an incomplete draft form explains its inadvertent production - given the volume and speed of
production in this case, Google has been forced to rely on electronic screening mechanisms, which in part use sender and addressee information, as well as privilege-related key words, to identify potentially privileged documents.
Google investigated the cited document immediately after the hearing, and promptly informed Oracle of the privileged nature of the document, requesting that the provisions of the Stipulated Protective Order relating to inadvertently produced privileged documents be followed. Google also requested that Oracle stipulate to the relief Google now seeks leave to request. Despite the fact that Oracle has itself retroactively asserted privilege over hundreds of inadvertently produced privileged document in this matter - requests that Google has honored without question — Oracle has refused to stipulate to the requests.
As stated in the Stipulated Protective Order, "[ijnadvertent production is itself no waiver of privilege." (Docket No. 66 at 18:16-17.) Because Google was not the party who put the content of its privileged document in the record, and because Oracle's violation of the protective order deprived Google of the opportunity to prevent Oracle from doing so, Google now respectfully requests the opportunity to file the motions necessary to preserve its privilege, consisting of a noticed motion to redact a hearing transcript pursuant to General Order 59, and an administrative motion to seal a portion of the Court's July 22, 2011 Order pursuant to Civil Local Rules 7-11 and 79-5.
Oracle's Response to the Google Letter
[Boies, Schiller, & Flexner LLP logo]
Oracle responds to the précis submitted by Google on July 28, 2011. (Dkt. No. 247.)
At the July 21, 2011, hearing on Google’s Daubert motion, Oracle referred to a draft email
written by Tim Lindholm, a current Google engineer and former Sun employee. The Court
read portions of the Lindholm document into the record and quoted it on page 3 of its Order. At
the hearing the Court informed Google counsel that, at trial, “you are going to be on the losing
end of this document.” (7/21/2007 Tr. at 41:5-6.)
Google now seeks leave to file a motion to strike all mention of the Lindholm document
from the Court’s Daubert hearing transcript and Daubert Order. Google now says the document
is privileged and confidential, and that its disclosure was the result of Oracle’s supposed failure
to comply with the Protective Order. As the record already establishes that the document is
neither privileged nor confidential, and Oracle complied directly with all orders of the Court, the
Court should deny Google’s précis and hold that no privilege applies to the Lindholm document.
Google – not Oracle – has the burden of proving that the document is privileged. See
U.S. v. Richey, 632 F.3d 559, 566 (9th Cir. 2011). The Protective Order prohibits Oracle from
presenting the information in the document to the Court to determine the privilege claim.
(Protective Order ¶ 13 (Dkt. No. 66).) If the Court allows Google to file a motion, Oracle
requests that the Court allow Oracle to cite the contents of the already disclosed document in its
opposition. But on the evidence already known to the Court, Google’s privilege claim fails.
First, Google claims the Lindholm document is work product “prepared as a result of
direction from counsel in anticipation of litigation,” an assertion that is contradicted by the
document on its face.
Second, as Google well knows, it cannot shield non-privileged facts from disclosure by
including them in communications to its attorneys. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383,
395–96 (1981); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947); U.S. v. ChevronTexaco Corp., 241
F.Supp.2d 1065, 1075 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (“The mere fact that outside counsel was copied with the
e-mail will not shield communications not made for the purpose of securing legal advice.”)
Third, Google’s claim of inadvertent disclosure is not credible. Google produced
versions of the Lindholm document more than nine times. Each time, Google designated the
document “Highly Confidential – Attorneys Eyes Only.” As the designation must reflect a good
faith belief that the document contains sensitive information, Google’s confidentiality
designation shows pre-disclosure review of each such version – not inadvertent disclosure.
Fourth, contrary to Google’s assertion, the Daubert hearing was not the first hearing at
which the Lindholm document was discussed. Earlier that day, at a discovery hearing, Magistrate
Judge Ryu asked Oracle’s counsel to identify documents showing the need for Mr. Lindholm’s
deposition. In response, Oracle’s counsel referred to the Lindholm document. At the discovery
hearing and at the Daubert hearing, Google counsel demonstrated that they were already familiar
with the document, discussed its substance with the Court, and made no claim of privilege.
Only after these events, in which Google’s counsel twice argued the substance of the
Lindholm document, twice failed to persuade the Court, and was told in no uncertain terms that
the Lindholm document could be a serious blow to its case, did Google reverse course and claim
privilege. That was too late. Luna Gaming-San Diego, LLC v. Dorsey & Whitney, LLP, 2010
WL 275083 (S.D. Cal. Jan 13, 2010).
Indeed, to the extent that the arguments in Google’s précis reflect its approach to
privilege in general, the legitimacy of its entire privilege log is thrown into doubt.
Google also asserts that Oracle breached Paragraph 5(b) of the Protective Order by
supposedly failing to inform Google that Oracle expected the Daubert hearing to include
material that Google had designated as confidential. That is untrue. At the outset of the Daubert
hearing, Oracle gave Google a copy of the materials it intended to use, disclosed that they
included documents that Google had designated as confidential, and stated that Oracle did not
intend to discuss their contents. In response, the Court flatly rejected the contention that the
documents were confidential at all, stating, “You say whatever you want. If Google has a memo
in their file saying, we are about to willfully infringe, there is no way I’m going to keep that
secret from the public or the investing public.” (7/21/2011 Tr. 19:9-12.) Not a single Google
attorney objected, not one raised any argument in protest. To the contrary, Google’s counsel
then disclosed – with no warning at all – the testimony of Jonathan Schwartz, which Google had
agreed to treat as Highly Confidential. Ultimately, Google’s selective and inaccurate invocation
of the Protective Order is a mere distraction, and lends no support to its request that evidence of
its misconduct be scrubbed from the public record of this case.
Oracle thus requests that the Court either (1) deny the précis and hold the Lindholm
document is not privileged, or (2) direct Google to show cause justifying its claims that the
Lindholm document is privileged and confidential and should be removed from the record.
/s/ Fred Norton