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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. DON EUGENE SIEGELMAN RICHARD SCRUSHY | FindLaw
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. DON EUGENE SIEGELMAN RICHARD SCRUSHY
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. DON EUGENE SIEGELMAN, RICHARD SCRUSHY, Defendants–Appellants.
No. 07–13163 D.C. Docket No. 05–00119–CR–F–N
Decided: May 10, 2011
Before TJOFLAT, EDMONDSON, and HILL, Circuit Judges.
ON REMAND FROM THE UNITED STATES
This case is before us on remand from the Supreme Court of the United States for reconsideration in light of Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S.
Ct. 2896 (2010). The parties were ordered to re-brief the case; oral argument was heard.
Don Eugene Siegelman is the former Governor of Alabama. Richard Scrushy is the founder and former Chief Executive Officer of HealthSouth Corporation (“HealthSouth”), a major hospital corporation with operations throughout Alabama. The defendants were convicted of federal funds bribery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B), and five counts of honest services mail fraud and conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1346, and 18 U.S.C. § 371. Siegelman was also convicted of obstruction of justice, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3).
The bribery convictions were based on allegations that the defendants made and executed a corrupt agreement whereby Scrushy gave Siegelman $500,000 in exchange for Siegelman's appointing him to Alabama's Certificate of Need Review Board (the “CON” Board). The honest services mail fraud convictions were also based in part upon these bribery allegations, but two of the counts also alleged that Scrushy used the CON Board seat to obtain favorable treatment for HealthSouth's applications. The conspiracy count alleged that Scrushy and Siegleman conspired to violate the honest services statute. Siegelman's obstruction of justice conviction is based on allegations that he corruptly influenced another to create a series of sham check transactions to cover up a separate “pay-to-play” payment to him.1
But it has arrived in this court with the “sword and buckler” of a jury verdict. The yeoman's work of our judicial system is done by a single judge and a jury. Twelve ordinary citizens of Alabama were asked to sit through long days of often tedious and obscure testimony and pour over countless documents to decide what happened, and, having done so, to apply to these facts the law as the judge has explained it to them. And they do. Often at great personal sacrifice. Though the popular culture sometimes asserts otherwise, the virtue of our jury system is that it most often gets it right. This is the great achievement of our system of justice. The jury's verdict commands the respect of this court, and that verdict must be sustained if there is substantial evidence to support it. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942).
Furthermore, to the extent that the verdict rests upon the jury's evaluations of the credibility of individual witnesses, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from that testimony, we owe deference to those decisions. In our system, the jury decides what the facts are, by listening to the witnesses and making judgments about whom to believe. This they have done, and, though invited to do so,2 we shall not substitute our judgment for theirs.
This is not to say that the judgment below is inviolable. Having determined what the facts are, a jury applies the law as the judge instructs them. The defendants' lawyers assert that there were errors in those instructions. They also contend that the court committed other legal mistakes during the course of the trial. Our duty as an appellate court is to answer properly presented questions from the parties in the case as to whether the law was correctly interpreted by the district court. With this in mind, we have reviewed the claims of legal error in the proceedings below, and our opinion as to their merit follows. First, however, we recount the facts as the jury found them.3
Nick Bailey was one of Siegelman's closest associates and had worked on Siegelman's campaign for governor. Cline testified that “whatever [Bailey] told me that the Governor wanted was what the Governor said.” Cline also testified that “if the Governor wanted to get something done, then [Bailey] went ahead—blindly went ahead and did it.”
Martin also testified that Scrushy told him that HealthSouth could not make the payment to the lottery campaign, nor could he do it personally because “we [HealthSouth] had not supported that and that his wife, Leslie, was against the lottery, and it would just look bad if HealthSouth made a direct contribution to the lottery, so we needed to ask—he instructed me in particular to ask our investment banker, Bill McGahan, from [the Swiss bank] UBS, to make the contribution.”
Siegelman appointed Scrushy to the CON Board on July 26, 1999—one week after the date on the IHS check.7 Siegelman directed Bailey to contact the Board chair-designee to tell her that Siegelman wanted Scrushy to be vice-chair of the CON Board, and the Board so chose. Bailey testified that Siegelman made Scrushy vice-chair “[b]ecause [Scrushy] asked for it.” Scrushy stayed on the Board until January of 2001, at which time Siegelman appointed Thom Carman, HealthSouth's vice-president, to the remainder of Scrushy's term. Siegelman subsequently reappointed Carman to a full term. While Carman was on the Board, HealthSouth successfully applied for and received Certificates of Need for a mobile PET scanner and a rehabilitation hospital.
Darren Cline, the Foundation's fundraising director, testified that Siegelman gave him the IHS check and told him it was from Scrushy. Cline was concerned about the amount of the donation from one person, and Siegelman told him to hold the check. In November of 1999, however, at Siegelman's direction, Bailey retrieved the check and opened a new checking account in the Foundation's name at a Birmingham bank. Bailey made an initial deposit of $275,000—the $250,000 IHS check and a $25,000 check from another company. Cline was never told. On March 9, 2000, the Foundation borrowed, from the same Birmingham bank, $730,789.29 to repay the Alabama Democratic Party's debt in connection with the lottery initiative and Siegelman guaranteed the loan. At that time, the Foundation had over $447,000 in its checking account at the bank, $250,000 of which had come from the IHS check deposited in November of 1999. On March 13, 2000, $440,000 was debited from the account to pay down the Foundation's loan.
Lanny Young was a long-time business associate of Siegelman's who testified that he was part of a “pay-to-play” arrangement with Siegelman existing over many years. He testified that he would provide money, campaign contributions, and other benefits in return for official action, as needed, that benefitted Young's business interests. He testified that in January of 2000, Siegelman asked him for $9,200 to buy a motorcycle. The evidence was that Siegelman had already purchased the motorcycle. Young testified that he and Bailey worked out the details for the transaction.
By June of 2001, Siegelman was well aware of the federal-state investigation into the Foundation's finances and his dealings with Young. Bailey and Young each testified that, in an effort to cover up Young's $9,200 payment to Siegelman, Bailey gave Young a check for $10,503.39, on which he noted “repayment of loan [the $9,200] plus interest” in order to make it appear that he had borrowed the $9,200 from Young. Bailey also wrote a check to Siegelman for $2,973.35 with the notation “balance due on m/c” to provide a reason for his borrowing money from Young, which was to purchase the motorcycle from Siegelman. Bailey testified that he did not borrow the money to buy the motorcycle, but that Young's $9,200 had gone through him to Siegelman and “we used the motorcycle to cover it up.” Bailey testified that Siegelman was aware of and approved Bailey's writing of the $10,503.39 check to Young.
On appeal, Siegelman and Scrushy together allege nine errors in the trial proceedings. With respect to the bribery, conspiracy and honest services mail fraud counts against them, defendants assert that the court's instructions erroneously failed to require the jury to find a quid pro quo in order to convict; that, in any event, there was insufficient evidence of any quid pro quo; that the bribery counts were barred by the statute of limitations; and that the trial court erroneously admitted hearsay to prove these counts. Defendants also allege that there was juror misconduct requiring the grant of a new trial and that the procedures used to select their grand and petit juries violated the Jury Selection and Services Act of 1968 and the United States Constitution. Siegelman contends that there was insufficient evidence that he obstructed justice and that the district court abused its discretion in sentencing him by upwardly departing from the Sentencing Guidelines. We shall consider each of these allegations of error in turn.
1. Counts 3 and 4: Federal Funds Bribery.
The bribery statute under which defendants were convicted makes it a crime for a state official to corruptly agree to accept anything of value from another person “intending to be influenced” in that person's favor in an official action. 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B).
Siegelman and Scrushy's bribery convictions in this case were based upon the donation Scrushy gave to Siegelman's education lottery campaign.12 As such, the convictions impact the First Amendment's core values—protection of free political speech and the right to support issues of great public importance. It would be a particularly dangerous legal error from a civic point of view to instruct a jury that they may convict a defendant for his exercise of either of these constitutionally protected activities.13 In a political system that is based upon raising private contributions for campaigns for public office and for issue referenda, there is ample opportunity for that error to be committed.
The Supreme Court has guarded against this possibility by interpreting federal law to require more for conviction than merely proof of a campaign donation followed by an act favorable toward the donor. McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257 (1991). In reviewing a Hobbs Act prosecution for the federal crime of extortion under color of official right, the Court said:
To avoid this result, the Court made clear that only if “payments are made in return for an explicit promise or undertaking by the official to perform or not to perform an official act, are they criminal.” Id. at 273 (emphasis added). The Court quoted the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which had said that:
Id. (quoting United States v. Dozier, 672 F.2d 531, 537 (5 th Cir.1982)).
While the Supreme Court has not yet considered whether the federal funds bribery, conspiracy or honest services mail fraud statutes require a similar “explicit promise,” the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has observed that extortion and bribery are but “different sides of the same coin.” United States v. Allen, 10 F.3d 405, 411 (7 th Cir.1993).14
The district court in this case instructed the jury that they could not convict the defendants of bribery in this case unless “the defendant and the official agree that the official will take specific action in exchange for the thing of value.” (emphasis added). This instruction was fashioned by the court in direct response to defendants' request for a quid pro quo instruction, and was given in addition to the Eleventh Circuit's pattern jury instruction for § 666 bribery cases. So, even if a quid pro quo instruction was required, such an instruction was given.
Defendants, however, assert that this instruction was inadequate under McCormick. Defendants assert that the instruction failed to tell the jury that not only must they find that Siegelman and Scrushy agreed to a quid pro quo, the CON Board seat for the donation, but that this agreement had to be express. We disagree that McCormick requires such an instruction.
McCormick uses the word “explicit” when describing the sort of agreement that is required to convict a defendant for extorting campaign contributions. Explicit, however, does not mean express. Defendants argue that only “proof of actual conversations by defendants,” will do, suggesting in their brief that only express words of promise overheard by third parties or by means of electronic surveillance will do.
Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 258 (1992). The Court held that the instruction “satisfies the quid pro quo requirement of McCormick v. United States.” Id. at 268. The Court said that the “Government need only show that a public official has obtained a payment to which he was not entitled, knowing that the payment was made in return for official acts.” Id.
The instruction approved in Evans required that the acceptance of the campaign donation be in return for a specific official action—a quid pro quo.15 No generalized expectation of some future favorable action will do. The official must agree to take or forego some specific action in order for the doing of it to be criminal under § 666. In the absence of such an agreement on a specific action, even a close-in-time relationship between the donation and the act will not suffice.
But there is no requirement that this agreement be memorialized in a writing, or even, as defendants suggest, be overheard by a third party. Since the agreement is for some specific action or inaction, the agreement must be explicit, but there is no requirement that it be express. To hold otherwise, as Justice Kennedy noted in Evans, would allow defendants to escape criminal liability through “knowing winks and nods.” 504 U.S. at 274 (Kennedy, J. concurring). See also United States v. Blandford, 33 F.3d 685, 696 (6 th Cir.1994) (“Evans instructed that by ‘explicit’ McCormick did not mean express”); accord United States v. Giles, 246 F.3d 966, 972 (7 th Cir.2001); United States v. Tucker, 133 F.3d 1208, 1215 (9 th Cir.1998); United States v. Hairston, 46 F.3d 361, 365 (4 th Cir.1995).16
Furthermore, an explicit agreement may be “implied from [the official's] words and actions.” Evans, 504 U.S. at 274 (Kennedy, J., concurring). As Justice Kennedy explained:
Id. See also United States v. Massey, 89 F.3d 1433, 1439 (11 th Cir.1996) (holding that bribery conviction under general federal bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201, may be supported by “inferences drawn from relevant and competent circumstantial evidence”).
In this case, the jury was instructed that they could not convict the defendants of bribery unless they found that “the Defendant and official agree [d] that the official will take specific action in exchange for the thing of value.” This instruction required the jury to find an agreement to exchange a specific official action for a campaign contribution. Finding this fact would satisfy McCormick's requirement for an explicit agreement involving a quid pro quo. Therefore, even assuming a quid pro quo instruction is required to convict the defendants under § 666, we find no reversible error in the bribery instructions given by the district court.17 Furthermore, the evidence of a corrupt agreement between Siegelman and Scrushy to exchange the CON Board seat for a campaign donation was sufficient to permit a reasonable juror to find such a quid pro quo.
2. Counts 5, 6, 7, 8, 9: Honest Services Mail Fraud & Conspiracy
Counts 6, 7, 8 and 9 charge Siegelman and Scrushy with violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1346, which criminalize the use of the mails “to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services.” Count 5 charges the defendants with a conspiracy to commit these “honest services” offenses, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Both defendants were convicted of all these counts.
After the defendants were convicted, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to consider the reach of these honest services criminal statutes. In Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. _, 130 S.Ct. 2896 (2010), the Court held that Congress intended these statutes to reach only those schemes to defraud the public that are based upon allegations of bribery and/or kickbacks.18 After Skilling, therefore, prosecutions based upon any other theory—for example, self-dealing—are not permitted. The defendants contend that Skilling, and other errors, require that their honest services convictions be overturned.
A. Counts 6 and 7: The Bribery of Siegelman as Honest Services Fraud
Counts 6 and 7 charge that Scrushy's bribery of Siegelman deprived the public of the right to the defendant's honest services. Thus, there is no Skilling error here—a bribery (or kickback) scheme is required under Skilling and one was alleged.
Notwithstanding this fact, the defendants assert that their convictions on these counts must be reversed because the jury was not instructed that the government was required to prove a quid pro quo in order to convict them on a bribery theory of honest services fraud.19 We find no merit in this contention.
The honest services fraud alleged in Counts 6 and 7 of the indictment is predicated upon the same pay-to-play scheme that was alleged in the § 666 bribery counts—Counts 3 and 4.20 Without deciding whether a quid pro quo must be proved in an honest services bribery prosecution,21 we hold that any error in the honest services instructions as to Counts 6 and 7 was harmless. Since Counts 6 and 7 re-allege the pay-to-play scheme charged in Counts 3 and 4, the jury instructions as to all these counts may be read in tandem. On Counts 3 and 4, the jury was instructed that they could not convict Scrushy of bribing Siegelman unless they found that the defendants “agree[d] that the official will take specific action in exchange for the thing of value.” Having been instructed they must find a quid pro quo to convict of the bribery alleged in Counts 3 and 4, and having done so, any error in the honest services instructions as to Counts 6 and 7 was harmless. See Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 148–48. (1973) (jury instructions must be evaluated as a whole). Therefore, we shall affirm defendants' convictions on Counts 5, 6 and 7.22
B. Counts 8 and 9: Scrushy's Self–Dealing
Counts 8 and 9 allege a broader scheme than that alleged in Counts 6 and 7. These counts allege that Scrushy “would and did use his seat on the CON Board to attempt to affect the interests of HealthSouth and its competitors,” and that Scrushy “would and did offer things of value to another Board member to attempt to affect the interests of HealthSouth and its competitors.” 23 Although Scrushy was not on the Board when the alleged self-dealing occurred, the indictment charged that it was part of the scheme that Siegelman and Scrushy “orchestrated Scrushy's replacement on the Board by another person employed by HealthSouth.” The mailings charged in connection with these allegations were letters sent by the Board to HealthSouth, notifying it that it had been awarded Certificates of Need in connection with the rehabilitation hospital (Count 8) and the PET scanner (Count 9).
Although Counts 8 and 9 incorporate the bribery scheme, thus surviving Skilling, they allege a broader scheme of which, Siegelman argues, he was unaware and in which he did not participate. He contends that there was no evidence at trial to link him to Scrushy's self-dealing scheme. We agree.
Siegelman may be held criminally liable for Scrushy's conduct on the Board only if he was a knowing party to a scheme that included that conduct. United States v. Toney, 598 F.2d 1349, 1355 (5 th Cir.1979). It was the government's theory, argued at trial and in its brief on appeal, that not only did Siegelman know that Scrushy wanted the seat in order to self-deal on the CON Board, but that “it was certainly foreseeable to Siegelman that Scrushy would bribe another Board member to further HealthSouth's interests” since “[a]fter all, Scrushy paid Siegelman $500,000 to get HealthSouth a seat on the Board in the first place.” The problem for the government is that there was scant evidence at trial to support this position.
While on the Board, Carman employed another member of the Board, Tim Adams, to prepare the application for the PET scanner, paying him $8000 to do so.24 There was also testimony that Adams was paid another $3000 for “additional work he apparently had done on the PET scanner application” in return for his agreement to attend the CON Board meeting at which HealthSouth's application for a rehabilitation hospital in Phoenix City was considered. At the meeting, Carman recused himself from voting on the application. Adams attended, and although he abstained from voting, under the Board's rules, his abstention did not affect the quorum his presence established, thus permitting a vote to be taken. There was no opposition to the application and the Board unanimously approved the application.
The testimony in support of the government's allegation of a pay-to-play scheme whereby Scrushy paid Siegelman for a seat on the CON Board came principally from Bailey, Martin, Young, McGahan, and Skelton. Of these witnesses, only Skelton, HealthSouth's lawyer in charge of certificates of need, had any knowledge about Scrushy's subsequent alleged self-dealing while on the CON Board. Her testimony, however, did not mention Siegelman. Alva Lambert, the Executive Director of the CON Board during the relevant time and the other primary government witness in support of the allegations of Scrushy self-dealing, testified that the Siegelman CON Board was an “extremely well-balanced” Board, that CON Boards had never to his knowledge turned down an application for a PET scanner, and that he never saw Siegelman exert any influence or try to exert any influence whatsoever over a Board decision.
In view of this absolute lack of any evidence whatsoever from which the jury could infer that Siegelman knowingly agreed to or participated in a broader scheme that included Scrushy's alleged subsequent self-dealing while on the Board, we shall reverse Siegelman's convictions on Counts 8 and 9.
As to Scrushy's convictions on Counts 8 and 9, one thing is clear. After Skilling, his conviction cannot rest upon the self-dealing theory articulated in the indictment. The government, therefore, points to other allegations in Counts 8 and 9 that Scrushy bribed Tim Adams (a member of the CON Board) in order to obtain favorable CON Board action on the two HealthSouth applications. This post-Skilling theory of Scrushy's honest services fraud as to the Board remains viable. The issue on appeal, then, is whether the government sufficiently proved that Scrushy bribed Adams.25
The government's proof of these allegations was that Scrushy resigned from his seat on the CON Board in January of 2001 and that, the next day, Siegelman appointed Thom Carman, HealthSouth vice-president, to the remainder of the term.
Carman employed another member of the Board, Tim Adams, to prepare the application for the PET scanner, paying him $8000 for the work. There was testimony that Scrushy “was aware” of this. There was also testimony that Adams was paid another $3000 for “additional work he apparently had done on the PET scanner application” in return for his agreement to attend the CON Board meeting at which HealthSouth's application for a rehabilitation hospital in Phenix City was considered. Lori Skelton, a HealthSouth lawyer testified that Adams had never written a CON Board application and that his work was substandard. At the meeting during which the hospital application was considered, Adams attended but abstained from voting, as he had prepared the application. Under the rules, his abstention did not affect the quorum, thus permitting a vote to be taken. There was no opposition to the application and the Board unanimously approved the application.
Six months later the PET scanner application was also approved. At this meeting, Adam's presence was not necessary to the quorum, and he again abstained from voting. The application was unopposed and passed unanimously. Alva Lambert, the Executive Director of the board testified that the unopposed applications were routinely approved, and that both these applications were consistent with prior board actions. There was no evidence that Scrushy knew of any of these actions.
During closing, the government primarily argued the Siegelman/Scrushy pay-to-play conspiracy, but did say that:
[Scrushy's] own lawyer [Skelton] told you that Adams began to ask him for stuff, and they began to be concerned that he was trying to use his position. And they were concerned that he might harm their interests. So what did they do? Did they report him? No, because that's not why Scrushy was up here. He was trying to influence him. What did he do? He paid him, even though his lawyer told him you need to leave this guy alone; this isn't good.
The government also argued that, as a result of the CON Board seat, Scrushy was able “to start manipulating Tim Adams' activities, start courting him and bringing him down and engaging in agreements to give him money.”
We conclude that the evidence that Scrushy bribed Adams is insufficient to support Scrushy's conviction on these counts. The evidence at best shows only that Skelton hired Adams to prepare the scanner application, which he did, and for which he was paid. Scrushy was “aware” of this.
The government's case, even in Counts 8 and 9, was always primarily focused on the pay-to-play scheme between Scrushy and Siegelman. The vast majority of the allegations and testimony went to prove this scheme. The government always described the scheme alleged in Counts 8 and 9 as self-dealing, and its attempt now—post-Skilling—to emphasize the alleged bribery of Adams finds some, but not much, support in the proof. The evidence that Adams intended to alter his official actions as a result of the receipt of benefits from Scrushy is insufficient, and Scrushy's convictions on Counts 8 and 9 must be reversed.26
3. Count 17: Obstruction of Justice
Siegelman was charged with two counts of obstruction of justice.27 The indictment alleged and the government undertook to prove that eighteen months after the $9200 pay-to-play payment to Siegelman from Lanny Young, Siegelman and Bailey became aware of the federal-state corruption investigation and instigated a series of sham check transactions in an effort to cover up the payment. The coverup was designed to make it appear that Bailey had borrowed the $9200 from Young so that he could buy a motorcycle from Siegelman.
Count 16 alleged that Siegelman corruptly persuaded Bailey to write a check for $10,503 to Young with the notation “repayment of loan plus interest.” Count 17 alleged that Siegelman corruptly persuaded Bailey to write and give him a check for $2973.35 with the notation on it that it was the “balance due on m/c.”
Count 17 also alleged that Siegelman engaged in misleading Bailey's attorney with the intent to hinder or prevent the attorney's communication of information regarding these transactions to the FBI.
Bailey: I found out about the investigation that was going on with Lanny—could have involved others; we weren't sure at the time. I wanted to repay Lanny's $9200. I did it in the form of a check. Did a promissory note with Lanny to repay this $9200 plus interest, $10,503.
In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's verdict, we are required to “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and resolve all reasonable inferences and credibility evaluations in favor of the jury's verdict.” United States v. Robertson, 493 F.3d 1322, 1329 (11 th Cir.2007). The evidence needs not “be wholly inconsistent with every conclusion except that of guilt, provided that a reasonable trier of fact could find that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
A reasonable juror could have concluded that Siegelman persuaded Bailey (he asked and Bailey agreed) to take the final step in the coverup by giving him a $2793.35 check with the notation that it was final payment for the motorcycle. See United States v. Tocco, 135 F.3d 116, 126–27 (2d Cir.1998) (affirming jury inference of persuasion from defendant's strong influence over witness who was employee); United States v. Morrison, 98 F.3d 619, 629–30 (D.C.Cir.1996) (making a request sufficient persuasion). The testimony was that Siegelman knew and agreed that Bailey would disguise Young's payment to Siegelman as a loan to Bailey to buy the motorcycle by “paying back” Young with his own check. The evidence further showed that Siegelman accepted and cashed the $2973.35 check from Bailey with the notation that it was final payment for the motorcycle. Finally, the jury had heard testimony that Bailey always did what Siegelman asked him to do.
The jury's acquittal on Count 16 shows that it was not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that Siegelman instigated the coverup by directing Bailey to “pay back” Young with the initial $10,500 check. But, by the time Bailey wrote the check to Siegelman for $2793.35, just over four months later, as a final step in the coverup, the jury's conviction on Count 17 indicates that it concluded Siegelman not only knew what Bailey was doing to cover up Young's corrupt payment, but that he was directing the coverup by persuading Bailey to write the check to him.
This sort of split verdict is itself evidence that the jury considered the charges carefully and individually, addressed the strength of the evidence on each charge, and reached a reasoned conclusion. See United States v. Dominguez, 226 F.3d 1235, 1248 (11 th Cir.2000) (making these comments in the context of allegations of premature jury deliberations).
Siegelman's argument against the sufficiency of this evidence is the same he made against his convictions on virtually all the other counts—that the evidence in this case was not perfect, that it relied too heavily on circumstances and required the jury to draw inferences from those circumstances that might have been drawn differently by different jurors.
But this is far too academic a view of trial by jury. In the absence of a defendant's confession or observation of his wrongdoing by a third person, proof by circumstantial evidence and the fair inferences to be drawn therefrom is both necessary and permissible. Siegelman's contention throughout his brief that “there was no evidence” to support a particular inference too often means merely that there was no evidence other than Bailey or Young's testimony. While Siegelman may not approve that the testimony of co-conspirators was sufficient to support the jury's findings of fact, the jury was free to disregard or disbelieve it. They believed it.
With respect to the “misleading” prong of the statute, the evidence was more than sufficient to support the jury's finding that the delivery of the final check in the presence of the two lawyers and the use of the lawyers to “finalize” the sale of the motorcycle to Bailey was an attempt to “create witnesses as part of a cover-up and to use unwitting third parties or entities to deflect the efforts of law enforcement agents in discovering the truth,” United States v. Veal, 153 F.3d 1233, 1247 (11 th Cir.1998) (statute satisfied by “the possibility or likelihood that [the defendants'] false and misleading information would be transferred to federal authorities ․”). The jury was entitled to infer from the sham check transaction in Bailey's lawyer's presence that Siegelman intended to mislead the lawyer into believing that the transaction was legitimate, that Bailey had, indeed, purchased the motorcycle from him, and that the check was final payment. As the “unwitting third party,” the lawyer would be in a position factually to support the coverup since Siegelman clearly knew that there was a “possibility” that the federal investigators would come asking.28
Under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E), a court has the discretion to admit co-conspirator statements made during and in furtherance of the conspiracy. The court's admission of such statements is an abuse of its discretion to do so if the statements do not meet this legal standard. United States v. Magluta, 418 F.3d 1166 (11 th Cir.2005).
This court applies a liberal standard in determining whether a statement was in furtherance of a conspiracy. United States v. Santiago, 837 F.2d 1545, 1549 (11 th Cir.1988). “The statement need not be necessary to the conspiracy, but must only further the interests of the conspiracy in some way.” United States v. Miles, 290 F.3d 1341, 1351 (11 th Cir.2002). “[I]f the statement ‘could have been intended to affect future dealings between the parties,’ then the statement is in furtherance of a conspiracy.” United States v. Caraza, 843 F.2d 432, 436 (11 th Cir.1988) (quoting United States v. Patton, 594 F.2d 444, 447 (5 th Cir.1979)). Finally, “[s]tatements between conspirators which provide reassurance, serve to maintain trust and cohesiveness among them, or inform each other of the current status of the conspiracy further the ends of the conspiracy․” United States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238, 252 (3d Cir.1983). Even defendants concede that boasting or bragging is in furtherance of a conspiracy if the statements are directed at obtaining the confidence or allaying the suspicions of co-conspirators. Santiago, 837 F.2d at 1549.
Hanson's statement at the HealthSouth retreat furthered the conspiracy. We agree with the government that, given Martin's own involvement in the conspiracy (obtaining the IHS check), Hanson's bragging to him about purchasing the CON Board seat “with the help of” the IHS check informed Martin that their plan had worked and that Martin's involvement had helped. This alone is sufficient to permit its introduction under Ammar, 714 F.2d at 252. Additionally, however, the statement is easily seen to affect the co-conspirators' future dealings because Martin's assistance might be needed in connection with the second $250,000 donation and Hanson knew this. Thus, Hanson's statement easily meets the Caraza standard. 843 F.2d at 436 (approving statement admitted after several acts of conspiracy helping to ensure final acts). The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence.
Defendants filed a joint motion for a new trial under Fed.R.Crim.P. 33(a), alleging juror misconduct by way of both juror exposure to extraneous information as well as by improper juror deliberation and that each impropriety violated the Sixth Amendment and requires a new trial.29 After conducting two evidentiary hearings on this issue,30 the district court held that no substantial violation of the Sixth Amendment occurred that required a new trial. We review the denial of a motion for new trial based on alleged juror misconduct for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Venske, 296 F.3d 1284, 1290 (11 th Cir.2002).31 We will consider each of the claims of misconduct in turn.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the right to trial by an impartial jury. U.S. Const. amend. VI. To protect the right to an impartial jury, the Supreme Court has recognized that “[d]ue process means a jury capable and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before it, and a trial judge ever watchful to prevent prejudicial occurrences and to determine the effect of such occurrences when they happen.” Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982). The jury must determine guilt solely on the basis of the evidence presented at trial and the court's instructions as to the applicable law. Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472–73 (1965).
We presume, however, that the jury has been impartial. United States v. Winkle, 587 F.2d 705, 714 (5 th Cir.1979).32 A defendant who alleges denial of this right resulting from juror exposure to extraneous information has the burden of making a colorable showing that the exposure has, in fact, occurred. Id. See also United States v. Ayarza–Garcia, 819 F.2d 1043, 1051 (11 th Cir.1987). If the defendant does so, prejudice to the defendant is presumed and the burden shifts to the government to show “that the jurors' consideration of extrinsic evidence was harmless to the defendant.” Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954); United States v. Ronda, 455 F.3d 1273, 1299 (11 th Cir.2006).33
If the district court concludes the exposure to the extrinsic evidence was harmless to the defendant, on appeal, we review this conclusion for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 1296 n.33. In doing so, we look at all the circumstances and we consider: (1) the nature of the extrinsic evidence; (2) the manner in which it reached the jury; (3) the factual findings in the district court and the manner of the court's inquiry into the juror issues; and, (4) the strength of the government's case. Id. at 1299–1300.
Defendants attached several exhibits to their motion regarding juror misconduct, including news articles after the trial and copies of affidavits by Juror 5 and his wife and his wife's pastor. This material, especially the affidavit of Juror 5, suggested that, during the trial, some of the jurors may have seen information about the trial on the internet.
Finding that the defendants had made a colorable showing of extrinsic influence on the jury, the district court held a hearing to which all twelve jurors were summoned and told to bring with them any material related to outside information that they or any other juror considered during trial or deliberations. At the hearing, the court asked each juror a series of twelve questions designed to reveal the nature and extent of any extrinsic evidence to which the jurors were exposed.34 Each juror testified under oath in response to the twelve questions and follow-up questions.
We agree. In substantially similar circumstances, we affirmed a district court's decision that a new trial was not required in a case where the jury foreman went to the library and checked out a book entitled What You Need to Know for Jury Duty, and then exposed the jury to it. United States v. De La Vega, 913 F.2d 861, 869 (11 th Cir.1990). In that case, the foreperson read the book, implemented suggestions for jury procedures outlined in the book, brought the book to the jury room, and showed some other jurors a page in the book that outlined organizational steps for deliberation. Id. at 869–70. We held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that there was no reasonable possibility that the introduction of this extrinsic information prejudiced the defendants such that a new trial was required. Id. at 870–71.
During trial, the district court granted the government's motion to cure what the court had determined was mutiplicitous charging of the federal funds bribery counts by removing reference to Siegelman in Count 4 and to Scrushy in Count 3 of the Second Superseding Indictment.35 The district court provided the jury with a copy of the resulting redacted Second Superseding Indictment for its deliberations.
Furthermore, the jury was repeatedly instructed that the indictment was not evidence of guilt, and that it must decide the case solely on the evidence properly admitted during the trial. The jury is presumed to follow the district court's instructions. See United States v. Shenberg, 89 F.3d 1461, 1472 (11 th Cir.1996). Based upon the district court's investigation of this claim, its careful review of the nature, source and use of the extrinsic information in the context of the substantial evidence of defendants' guilt, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants a new trial for this reason.
Defendants rely upon purported emails allegedly exchanged between jurors during trial and deliberations. Documents said to be copies of such exchanges were mailed anonymously to the defense, to argue that there was both premature jury deliberation and deliberation by fewer than all the jurors in this case, and that this improper deliberation deprived the defendants of their Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury.
These allegations posed a very different problem for the district court from those suggesting that the jury had been subject to external influences. District courts are subject to very stringent limitations on their authority to question jurors about their deliberations, and to use one or more juror's testimony to impeach the verdict of all. In fact, for nearly a century, the Supreme Court has recognized a near-universal and firmly established common-law rule flatly prohibiting the use of juror testimony to impeach a verdict. Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 117 (1987); McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264 (1915).
The Court has repeatedly emphasized the important policy considerations that require the shielding of juries from public scrutiny of their deliberations. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970). “The essential feature of a jury obviously lies in the interposition between the accused and his accuser of the commonsense judgment of a group of laymen, and in the community participation and shared responsibility that results from that group's determination of guilt or innocence.” Id. Because our system of justice so prizes this unique and essential feature of our criminal justice system, it both anticipates and tolerates some level of imperfection in the system. United States v. D'Angelo, 598 F.2d 1002, 1004–05 & n.4 (5 th Cir.1979).36 As the Supreme Court has explained:
Tanner, 483 U.S. at 120–21 (internal citations omitted).
Permission to attack jury verdicts by postverdict interrogations of jurors would allow defendants to launch inquiries into jury conduct in the hope of discovering something that might invalidate the verdicts against them. “Jurors would be harassed and beset by the defeated party in an effort to secure from them evidence of facts which might establish misconduct sufficient to set aside a verdict.” Id. at 119–20 (quoting McDonald, 238 U.S. at 267–68)). Such events would result in “the destruction of all frankness and freedom of discussion” in the jury room. Id. And, as early as 1892, the Supreme Court expressed concern that such postverdict investigation would “induce tampering with individual jurors subsequent to the verdict.” Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 149 (1892). In a justice system that depends upon public confidence in the jury's verdict, such events are unacceptable.
By disallowing a juror to impeach the jury's verdict by testimony about their deliberations, the rule operates to protect jurors from postverdict investigation and to protect the verdict from endless attack.37
We have previously affirmed district courts that have denied motions for a new trial while declining to conduct investigations into jury deliberations. Cuthel, 903 F.2d at 1381. In Cuthel, we held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing despite evidence of premature deliberations by the jury and evidence of intrajury pressure to reach a verdict. Id. at 1383; see also United States v. Barshov, 733 F.2d 842, 852 (11 th Cir.1984) (duty to investigate arises only in the context of extrinsic influence); United McElroy by McElroy v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 894 F.2d 1504, 1511 (11 th Cir.1990) (denying defendant's requests to interview the jury members based on allegations of improper deliberations).
The district court said that it had serious reservations about the authenticity of these purported emails, but concluded that the law barred it from questioning the jurors about their deliberations, or about the emails purporting to suggest that the jurors deliberated improperly.38 Instead, it stated that “[e]ven if the Court were to assume arguendo the authenticity of these documents,” it would not find that the emails established that the jury either deliberated prematurely or without all its members in any significant measure.
We agree. Additionally, we note that the verdict in this case was split in that Siegelman was acquitted of many of the charges.39 Such a split verdict lends supports to a conclusion that the jury carefully weighed the evidence and reached a reasoned verdict free of undue influence and did not decide the case prematurely. United States v. Dominguez, 226 F.3d 1235, 1248 (11 th Cir.2000); Cuthel, 903 F.2d at 1383.
We conclude, therefore, that the district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding that the purported emails, assuming they are authentic, do not entitle defendants to a new trial. The district court applied the relevant factors to the email evidence, and was well within its discretion to conclude that they did not demonstrate premature deliberation or deliberation with fewer than all jury members sufficient to arise to a constitutional violation.40
A motion for recusal based upon the appearance of partiality must be timely
made when the facts upon which it relies are known. The untimeliness of such a motion is itself a basis upon which to deny it. Phillips v. Amoco Oil Co., 799 F.2d 1464, 1472 (11 th Cir.1986). The rule has been applied when the facts upon which the motion relies are public knowledge, even if the movant does not know them. See National Auto Brokers Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 572 F.2d 953, 957–59 (2d Cir.1978). The purpose of the rule is to “conserve judicial resources and prevent a litigant from waiting until an adverse decision has been handed down before moving to disqualify the judge.” Summers v. Singletary, 119 F.3d 917, 921 (11 th Cir.1997).
Federal criminal defendants have both a statutory and a constitutional right to a grand and a petit jury selected at random from a fair cross-section of their community. Juror Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861–1869 (the “JSSA”); U.S. Const. amend. VI. By its terms, the JSSA provides remedies for only a “substantial failure to comply” with its requirements for jury selection procedures that are random, objective, and that produce a jury that is a fair-cross section of the community. 28 U.S.C. § 1861 and 1867(d). Mere technical deviations from the JSSA's requirements do not violate the JSSA if they do not result in impermissible discrimination in the jury selection process. United States v. Gregory, 730 F.2d 692, 699 (11 th Cir.1984).
Before their trial, both Siegelman and Scrushy filed virtually identical motions, alleging that the Middle District of Alabama committed substantial violations of the JSSA in constructing its Qualified Jury Wheels in 2001 and 2005, and in the selection from those wheels of both their grand and petit juries. Defendants claimed that these violations resulted in their juries being not a fair-cross section of their community. Specifically, Scrushy and Siegelman challenged the Middle District's liberal deferral policy and its procedures for summoning previously deferred jurors, claiming that they resulted in juries that under-represented African–Americans. The district court denied these challenges. Defendants appeal this denial.
A panel of this court has upheld the jury selection procedures of the Middle District of Alabama in a case raising virtually the same claims as those asserted here. United States v. Carmichael, 560 F.3d 1270 (11 th Cir.2009). Carmichael held that the Middle District's jury selection procedures—including the liberal deferral policy and the procedures for summoning previously deferred jurors—did not substantially violate the JSSA. Id. at 1281. Additionally, Carmichael held that the Middle District's jury selection procedures did not result in the systematic under-representation of African–American jurors on the 2001 Qualified Jury Wheel or in the jury pools selected from that wheel. Id.
In his brief, which Siegelman adopted, Scrushy acknowledges the identity between the claims presented in Carmichael and his claims presented here, conceding that “[b]ut for the fact that only the petit jury which was drawn from the 2001 jury wheel was challenged there [and the petit jury was drawn from the 2005 wheel here], the issues presented overlap.” This is not surprising since the same expert who opined in Carmichael about alleged violations of the JSSA and the Constitution is relied upon here, using the same evidence in support of those claims. At the time defendants filed their pre-trial motion, however, Carmichael had not yet been decided. Now that it has, it disposes of their claims as to the 2001 jury wheel.
With respect to the 2005 wheel, the district court in this case held that defendants were not entitled to any relief because the challenged objectivity and randomness practices did not apply to that wheel. Additionally, the district court found that defendants had not shown the absolute racial disparity between the composition of his juries and the community at-large of over 10% that is required to establish a statutory or constitutional violation. See Carmichael, id.; see also United States v. Gresham, 63, Fl3d 1074, 1078–79 (11 th Cir.1995). We agree.
Siegelman contends that the district court's decision to grant an upward departure under U.S.S.G. §§ 2C1.1 cmt.n.5, 5K2.0 (2002) violated the First Amendment and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) because it was allegedly based on Siegelman's statements criticizing the prosecutors in and the prosecution of this case. If this were true, we might agree.41 It does not, however, accurately describe the district court's reasons for the upward departure.
The statute permits and the cases relied upon by the government uphold upward departures where the district court finds that there was pervasive corruption of a governmental function resulting in a loss of public confidence in state or local government. See U.S.S.G. §§ 2C1.1 cmt.n.5, 5K2.0; United States v. Shenberg, 89 F.3d 1461, 1476–77 (11 th Cir.1996); United States v. Reyes, 239 F.3d 722, 744–45 (5 th Cir.2001).
As to Siegelman, we affirm Counts 3, 5, 6, 7 and 17. We reverse as to Counts 8 and 9 and vacate the convictions on these counts.
As to Scrushy, we affirm as to Counts 4, 5, 6, and 7. We reverse the convictions on Counts 8 and 9. Scrushy's sentence as to Counts 8 and 9 is vacated.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED. All pending motions in this case are DENIED. Remanded for resentencing.
Eleventh question: During the time that you were serving as a juror did you view
or hear any extraneous information about either the law applicable to this case or any factual material relating to this case?
FN1. The obstruction of justice allegations involved conduct unrelated to the Siegelman–Scrushy bribery, mail fraud and conspiracy charges.. FN1. The obstruction of justice allegations involved conduct unrelated to the Siegelman–Scrushy bribery, mail fraud and conspiracy charges.
FN2. The defendants assert that this is a case in which we owe no deference to the jury's findings of fact, but we disagree.. FN2. The defendants assert that this is a case in which we owe no deference to the jury's findings of fact, but we disagree.
FN3. Where the jury need not have found a particular fact to be established in order to reach their verdict, we indicate who testified to that fact.. FN3. Where the jury need not have found a particular fact to be established in order to reach their verdict, we indicate who testified to that fact.
FN4. There was another personal guarantor, but each was individually liable.. FN4. There was another personal guarantor, but each was individually liable.
FN5. Three of the nine seats on the Board are reserved for health care industry providers.. FN5. Three of the nine seats on the Board are reserved for health care industry providers.
FN6. Bailey told the FBI that Scrushy gave the check to Siegelman in a meeting on July 14, 1999, but testified at trial that he did not remember exactly when the meeting was.. FN6. Bailey told the FBI that Scrushy gave the check to Siegelman in a meeting on July 14, 1999, but testified at trial that he did not remember exactly when the meeting was.
FN7. Seven other Board members were appointed that day.. FN7. Seven other Board members were appointed that day.
FN8. HealthSouth's political contributions coordinator testified that she did not know about the donation until she read about it in the newspaper. The Foundation's fundraising director testified that he was not present when Scrushy gave Siegelman either of the checks.. FN8. HealthSouth's political contributions coordinator testified that she did not know about the donation until she read about it in the newspaper. The Foundation's fundraising director testified that he was not present when Scrushy gave Siegelman either of the checks.
FN9. The superseding indictment replaced an earlier version of the indictment.. FN9. The superseding indictment replaced an earlier version of the indictment.
FN10. The federal funds bribery statute criminalizes the taking of a bribe by an official of a state agency that receives over $10,000 in federal funds annually. 18 U.S.C. § 666. Honest services mail fraud criminalizes the mailing of a letter in connection with a scheme to defraud a state agency of an official's honest services in the performance of his official duties. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1346. The conspiracy count charged the defendants with agreeing to violate the honest services statute. 18 U.S.C. § 371.. FN10. The federal funds bribery statute criminalizes the taking of a bribe by an official of a state agency that receives over $10,000 in federal funds annually. 18 U.S.C. § 666. Honest services mail fraud criminalizes the mailing of a letter in connection with a scheme to defraud a state agency of an official's honest services in the performance of his official duties. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1346. The conspiracy count charged the defendants with agreeing to violate the honest services statute. 18 U.S.C. § 371.
FN11. Siegelman and Scrushy were denied bond pending appeal, but a panel of this court subsequently released Siegelman pending resolution of this appeal.. FN11. Siegelman and Scrushy were denied bond pending appeal, but a panel of this court subsequently released Siegelman pending resolution of this appeal.
FN12. Although the conspiracy and mail fraud counts (Counts 5–9) alleged a broader scheme for Scrushy to self-deal once on the CON Board, they also incorporated the bribery scheme alleged in Counts 3 and 4.. FN12. Although the conspiracy and mail fraud counts (Counts 5–9) alleged a broader scheme for Scrushy to self-deal once on the CON Board, they also incorporated the bribery scheme alleged in Counts 3 and 4.
FN13. Arguably, the potential negative impact of these statutes on issue-advocacy campaigns is even more dangerous than it is to candidate-election campaigns. Issue-advocacy campaigns are a fundamental right in a free and democratic society and contributions to them do not financially benefit the individual politician in the same way that a candidate-election campaign contribution does. Defendants assert, and we do not know otherwise, that this is the first case to be based upon issue-advocacy campaign contributions.. FN13. Arguably, the potential negative impact of these statutes on issue-advocacy campaigns is even more dangerous than it is to candidate-election campaigns. Issue-advocacy campaigns are a fundamental right in a free and democratic society and contributions to them do not financially benefit the individual politician in the same way that a candidate-election campaign contribution does. Defendants assert, and we do not know otherwise, that this is the first case to be based upon issue-advocacy campaign contributions.
FN14. We acknowledge, as the defendants point out, that several district courts, in unpublished opinions, have extended the McCormick rationale to the bribery and honest service statutes. The government points to no contrary authority, relying instead on inapposite authority not involving campaign contributions.. FN14. We acknowledge, as the defendants point out, that several district courts, in unpublished opinions, have extended the McCormick rationale to the bribery and honest service statutes. The government points to no contrary authority, relying instead on inapposite authority not involving campaign contributions.
FN15. The Latin means “something for something,” Black's Law Dictionary 1282 (8 th ed.2004).. FN15. The Latin means “something for something,” Black's Law Dictionary 1282 (8 th ed.2004).
FN16. Nor is this court's prior holding in United States v. Davis, 30 F.3d 108 (11 th Cir.1994), to the contrary. In Davis, we acknowledged that, after McCormick, “an explicit promise by a public official to act or not act is an essential element of Hobbs Act extortion, and the defendant is entitled to a reasonably clear jury instruction to that effect.” Id. at 108. We reversed Davis' conviction not only because his jury did not receive a reasonably clear instruction, but because the court in that case “informed the jury that ‘a specific quid pro quo is not always necessary for a public official to be guilty of extortion.’ ” Id.. FN16. Nor is this court's prior holding in United States v. Davis, 30 F.3d 108 (11 th Cir.1994), to the contrary. In Davis, we acknowledged that, after McCormick, “an explicit promise by a public official to act or not act is an essential element of Hobbs Act extortion, and the defendant is entitled to a reasonably clear jury instruction to that effect.” Id. at 108. We reversed Davis' conviction not only because his jury did not receive a reasonably clear instruction, but because the court in that case “informed the jury that ‘a specific quid pro quo is not always necessary for a public official to be guilty of extortion.’ ” Id.
FN17. Skilling did not deal with federal funds bribery under § 666 at all and, so, does not affect our consideration of these counts of conviction.. FN17. Skilling did not deal with federal funds bribery under § 666 at all and, so, does not affect our consideration of these counts of conviction.
FN18. Deprivation of an intangible right to honest services was a lower court sanctioned theory of prosecution under the mail fraud statute— § 1341– at one time. In McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987), however, the Supreme Court held that the mail fraud statute reached only schemes to defraud another of tangible property. Congress responded almost immediately by enacting § 1346, which broadened mail fraud to reach schemes to defraud another of the intangible right to honest services. After twenty years of widely diverging theories as to what could be prosecuted as a deprivation of honest services, the Court in Skilling clarified that Congress intended to reenact only that portion of the pre-McNally case law that was aimed at bribery and kickback schemes. 130 S.Ct. at 2905.. FN18. Deprivation of an intangible right to honest services was a lower court sanctioned theory of prosecution under the mail fraud statute— § 1341– at one time. In McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987), however, the Supreme Court held that the mail fraud statute reached only schemes to defraud another of tangible property. Congress responded almost immediately by enacting § 1346, which broadened mail fraud to reach schemes to defraud another of the intangible right to honest services. After twenty years of widely diverging theories as to what could be prosecuted as a deprivation of honest services, the Court in Skilling clarified that Congress intended to reenact only that portion of the pre-McNally case law that was aimed at bribery and kickback schemes. 130 S.Ct. at 2905.
FN19. This is the same argument defendants asserted as to the § 666 bribery instructions.. FN19. This is the same argument defendants asserted as to the § 666 bribery instructions.
FN20. Count 6 charges mail fraud in connection with the mailing of a letter appointing Thom Carman as Scrushy's replacement on the CON Board. Count 7 charges a mailing in connection with Carman's reappointment to the Board.. FN20. Count 6 charges mail fraud in connection with the mailing of a letter appointing Thom Carman as Scrushy's replacement on the CON Board. Count 7 charges a mailing in connection with Carman's reappointment to the Board.
FN21. Skilling limited § 1346 to bribery and kickback schemes, holding that, in the absence of such narrowing, the statute would provide insufficient notice of what conduct is prohibited by it. The Court's rationale reminds us that even the narrowed honest services statute must provide constitutionally adequate notice of what conduct is prohibited.Since a campaign donation—unlike bags of cash delivered to the official himself—is protected First Amendment activity and, indeed, the normal course of politics in this country, due process requires that the potential campaign donor have notice of what sort of conduct is prohibited. Absent an explicit agreement to “buy an appointment” there is nothing inherently corrupt about a donation followed by an appointment. It is the corrupt agreement that transforms the exchange from a First Amendment protected campaign contribution and a subsequent appointment by a grateful governor into an unprotected crime.In McCormick, which interpreted the extortion under color of official right statute, the Court required such an agreement—a quid pro quo—in order to prove that the official and the campaign contributor corruptly agreed to a specific exchange. In so doing, the Court protected both the First and the Fifth Amendments by reading the statute to require an agreement to swap money for office, thereby putting both government officials and potential contributors on notice that such an agreement would subject them to prosecution.Although Skilling refers us to the pre-McNally bribery cases as examples of the fact patterns that would supply notice of what constitutes an honest services bribery violation, none of these cases was a campaign donation case. After Skilling, it may well be that the honest services fraud statute, like the extortion statute in McCormick, requires a quid pro quo in a campaign donation case. Thus seen, § 1346 would criminalize only the agreement to exchange a campaign donation for an appointment The official's duty to provide honest services, which includes the duty to exercise his appointment powers independently of the receipt of any campaign donation, would be violated only by an agreement to exchange an appointment for a campaign donation. Such an agreement would amount to the official's “selling” to the appointee the official's duty and authority to make appointments.. FN21. Skilling limited § 1346 to bribery and kickback schemes, holding that, in the absence of such narrowing, the statute would provide insufficient notice of what conduct is prohibited by it. The Court's rationale reminds us that even the narrowed honest services statute must provide constitutionally adequate notice of what conduct is prohibited.Since a campaign donation—unlike bags of cash delivered to the official himself—is protected First Amendment activity and, indeed, the normal course of politics in this country, due process requires that the potential campaign donor have notice of what sort of conduct is prohibited. Absent an explicit agreement to “buy an appointment” there is nothing inherently corrupt about a donation followed by an appointment. It is the corrupt agreement that transforms the exchange from a First Amendment protected campaign contribution and a subsequent appointment by a grateful governor into an unprotected crime.In McCormick, which interpreted the extortion under color of official right statute, the Court required such an agreement—a quid pro quo—in order to prove that the official and the campaign contributor corruptly agreed to a specific exchange. In so doing, the Court protected both the First and the Fifth Amendments by reading the statute to require an agreement to swap money for office, thereby putting both government officials and potential contributors on notice that such an agreement would subject them to prosecution.Although Skilling refers us to the pre-McNally bribery cases as examples of the fact patterns that would supply notice of what constitutes an honest services bribery violation, none of these cases was a campaign donation case. After Skilling, it may well be that the honest services fraud statute, like the extortion statute in McCormick, requires a quid pro quo in a campaign donation case. Thus seen, § 1346 would criminalize only the agreement to exchange a campaign donation for an appointment The official's duty to provide honest services, which includes the duty to exercise his appointment powers independently of the receipt of any campaign donation, would be violated only by an agreement to exchange an appointment for a campaign donation. Such an agreement would amount to the official's “selling” to the appointee the official's duty and authority to make appointments.
FN22. We held above that the evidence of a bribery scheme was sufficient to support the jury's verdict as to Counts 3 and 4, and, similarly, we hold it sufficient as to the same scheme alleged in Counts 5, 6, and 7.. FN22. We held above that the evidence of a bribery scheme was sufficient to support the jury's verdict as to Counts 3 and 4, and, similarly, we hold it sufficient as to the same scheme alleged in Counts 5, 6, and 7.
FN23. The government's initial brief on appeal states that, as to Counts 8 and 9, “the jury had to find that Scrushy and Siegelman intended to deprive the public of their right to honest services and intended to deceive the public, and that Siegelman intended to alter his official actions as a result of Scrushy's purported campaign contributions.” Red Brief, p. 53–54 (emphasis added). FN23. The government's initial brief on appeal states that, as to Counts 8 and 9, “the jury had to find that Scrushy and Siegelman intended to deprive the public of their right to honest services and intended to deceive the public, and that Siegelman intended to alter his official actions as a result of Scrushy's purported campaign contributions.” Red Brief, p. 53–54 (emphasis added)
FN24. There was testimony that Adams had never written a CON Board application, and that his work was substandard.. FN24. There was testimony that Adams had never written a CON Board application, and that his work was substandard.
FN25. Scrushy did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence as to Counts 8 and 9 in his initial brief on appeal. He did challenge the legal sufficiency of the charges. This challenge has now been vindicated by Skilling. In view of the fact that the government has now offered a bribery theory in support of the convictions on these counts, he is entitled to challenge that evidence this time around.. FN25. Scrushy did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence as to Counts 8 and 9 in his initial brief on appeal. He did challenge the legal sufficiency of the charges. This challenge has now been vindicated by Skilling. In view of the fact that the government has now offered a bribery theory in support of the convictions on these counts, he is entitled to challenge that evidence this time around.
FN26. The legal sufficiency of the jury instruction regarding the bribery of Adams is not discussed here because we find the evidence insufficient to support the jury's verdict. But we note that the Adams bribery could not benefit from the same spill over effect of the quid pro quo instruction given in the § 666 instructions, since it was a different bribery. Therefore, the honest services jury instruction would have to support Scrushy's convictions on these counts, and that instruction is deficient if a quid pro quo is required for conviction. The instruction required that “they intended to alter their official actions as a result of the receipt of campaign contributions or other benefits.” The instruction conveys the requirements for a quid - a campaign contribution—and a quo - an official action—but the “as a result of” language fails adequately to require the pro—the corrupt agreement to make a specific exchange.. FN26. The legal sufficiency of the jury instruction regarding the bribery of Adams is not discussed here because we find the evidence insufficient to support the jury's verdict. But we note that the Adams bribery could not benefit from the same spill over effect of the quid pro quo instruction given in the § 666 instructions, since it was a different bribery. Therefore, the honest services jury instruction would have to support Scrushy's convictions on these counts, and that instruction is deficient if a quid pro quo is required for conviction. The instruction required that “they intended to alter their official actions as a result of the receipt of campaign contributions or other benefits.” The instruction conveys the requirements for a quid - a campaign contribution—and a quo - an official action—but the “as a result of” language fails adequately to require the pro—the corrupt agreement to make a specific exchange.
FN27. Section 1512(b)(3) provides in pertinent part:Whoever knowingly uses intimidation, threatens, or corruptly persuades another person, or attempts to do so, or engages in misleading conduct toward another person, with intent to -․(3) hinder, delay, or prevent the communication to a law enforcement officer or judge of the United States of information relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense ․. FN27. Section 1512(b)(3) provides in pertinent part:Whoever knowingly uses intimidation, threatens, or corruptly persuades another person, or attempts to do so, or engages in misleading conduct toward another person, with intent to -․(3) hinder, delay, or prevent the communication to a law enforcement officer or judge of the United States of information relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense ․
FN28. Indeed, the “bill of sale” for the motorcycle, prepared by the attorneys, was introduced at this trial. Similarly, Bailey had also delivered the “loan re-payment” check for $10,503.39 to Young in the office of Young's lawyer.. FN28. Indeed, the “bill of sale” for the motorcycle, prepared by the attorneys, was introduced at this trial. Similarly, Bailey had also delivered the “loan re-payment” check for $10,503.39 to Young in the office of Young's lawyer.
FN29. Scrushy has moved this court to appoint a special master under Fed. R.App. R. 48 to investigate the matter. The request is denied.. FN29. Scrushy has moved this court to appoint a special master under Fed. R.App. R. 48 to investigate the matter. The request is denied.
FN30. In the first of these hearings, the court considered the affidavit of Juror 5 to determine whether it established sufficient reason to conduct further inquiry, concluding that it did.. FN30. In the first of these hearings, the court considered the affidavit of Juror 5 to determine whether it established sufficient reason to conduct further inquiry, concluding that it did.
FN31. Of course, the district court's findings of facts supporting its legal conclusion are reviewed only for clear error. United States v. Cuthel, 903 F.2d 1381, 1383 (11 th Cir.1990).. FN31. Of course, the district court's findings of facts supporting its legal conclusion are reviewed only for clear error. United States v. Cuthel, 903 F.2d 1381, 1383 (11 th Cir.1990).
FN32. All decisions of the Fifth Circuit prior to October 1, 1981, when this court was established, have been adopted as decisions of this court. Bonner v. Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11 th Cir.1981).. FN32. All decisions of the Fifth Circuit prior to October 1, 1981, when this court was established, have been adopted as decisions of this court. Bonner v. Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11 th Cir.1981).
FN33. Ronda recognized that there has been some inconsistency in our application of Remmer, but, as in Ronda, we decline to consider this issue because it has no bearing on the outcome. 455 F.3d at 1299 n.36.. FN33. Ronda recognized that there has been some inconsistency in our application of Remmer, but, as in Ronda, we decline to consider this issue because it has no bearing on the outcome. 455 F.3d at 1299 n.36.
FN34. These questions are attached as Exhibit “A” to this opinion.. FN34. These questions are attached as Exhibit “A” to this opinion.
FN35. The government had charged both in each count, thereby permitting each to be convicted twice for the same offense.. FN35. The government had charged both in each count, thereby permitting each to be convicted twice for the same offense.
FN36. For example, we permit logically inconsistent jury verdicts as to different counts, and even as to different co-defendants. We permit jury nullification. We do not inquire whether a verdict is the result of compromise, mistake or even carelessness.. FN36. For example, we permit logically inconsistent jury verdicts as to different counts, and even as to different co-defendants. We permit jury nullification. We do not inquire whether a verdict is the result of compromise, mistake or even carelessness.
FN37. The only exception to the rule is to permit the sort of examination of jurors conducted by the district court in this case to determine whether the jury considered extrinsic information to the defendant's prejudice, as discussed in the immediately preceding portion of this opinion. The district court found as a matter of fact that it had “no doubt whatsoever that the documents purporting to be juror emails on which the Defendants rely are wholly unrelated to any evidence of jury exposure to extraneous information or outside influence.” We conclude that this finding of fact is not clearly erroneous. In addition, we see no abuse of discretion in the way the district court dealt with the three other emails called to its attention after the evidentiary hearings.. FN37. The only exception to the rule is to permit the sort of examination of jurors conducted by the district court in this case to determine whether the jury considered extrinsic information to the defendant's prejudice, as discussed in the immediately preceding portion of this opinion. The district court found as a matter of fact that it had “no doubt whatsoever that the documents purporting to be juror emails on which the Defendants rely are wholly unrelated to any evidence of jury exposure to extraneous information or outside influence.” We conclude that this finding of fact is not clearly erroneous. In addition, we see no abuse of discretion in the way the district court dealt with the three other emails called to its attention after the evidentiary hearings.
FN38. Defendants urged the court to obtain information regarding the emails from the jurors' internet providers but provided the court with no legal authority in support of this “unusual and intrusive investigation of jurors.” In view of the law governing postverdict investigation of jurors, the court denied the request.. FN38. Defendants urged the court to obtain information regarding the emails from the jurors' internet providers but provided the court with no legal authority in support of this “unusual and intrusive investigation of jurors.” In view of the law governing postverdict investigation of jurors, the court denied the request.
FN39. Scrushy argues that because he was convicted on all counts against him, that the verdict was not split as to him. The law, however, is to the contrary. See United States v. Baker, 432 F.3d 1189, 1237 (11 th Cir.2005) (a split verdict is one in which the jury finds “guilt as to some defendants or charges but not as to others”).. FN39. Scrushy argues that because he was convicted on all counts against him, that the verdict was not split as to him. The law, however, is to the contrary. See United States v. Baker, 432 F.3d 1189, 1237 (11 th Cir.2005) (a split verdict is one in which the jury finds “guilt as to some defendants or charges but not as to others”).
FN40. Defendants moved just before oral argument for permission to file supplemental information regarding juror misconduct. At oral argument, the government represented to the court that its investigation into that misconduct did not involve the allegations of juror misconduct at issue in this appeal. For this reason, we shall deny the motion.. FN40. Defendants moved just before oral argument for permission to file supplemental information regarding juror misconduct. At oral argument, the government represented to the court that its investigation into that misconduct did not involve the allegations of juror misconduct at issue in this appeal. For this reason, we shall deny the motion.
FN41. The government argues persuasively that, even if there was error here, it was harmless as the departure did not affect Siegelman's ultimate sentence. As we need not, we do not reach this argument.. FN41. The government argues persuasively that, even if there was error here, it was harmless as the departure did not affect Siegelman's ultimate sentence. As we need not, we do not reach this argument.