Source: https://ebenchbook.org/colorado/statutes/1-45-111-5-duties-of-the-secretary-of-state-enforcement-sanctions/
Timestamp: 2019-03-18 21:37:41
Document Index: 359784920

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 6', '§ 4', '§ 1', '§ 6', '§ 7', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 9', '§ 1', '§ 10', '§ 1', '§ 13', '§ 1', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13']

eBenchBook | Colorado | 1-45-111.5. Duties of the secretary of state - enforcement - sanctions
1-45-111.5. Duties of the secretary of state – enforcement – sanctions
The secretary of state is responsible for issuing rules necessary to enforce and administer any provision of this article. Pursuant to procedural requirements created by both statute and the state constitution, an individual may contest the rules promulgated by the secretary of state. Administrative law judges may also sanction fines and other penalties on parties who fail to abide by this article.
Litigation involving any challenges or enforcement must abide by the regulations provided in this statute, including procedural requirements for subpoenas and judicial standard of review.
(1) The secretary of state shall promulgate such rules, in accordance with article 45 of title 24, C.R.S., as may be necessary to enforce and administer any provision of this article.
(1.5) (a) Any person who believes that a violation of either the secretary of state’s rules concerning campaign and political finance or this article 45 has occurred may file a written complaint with the secretary of state not later than one hundred eighty days after the date of the occurrence of the alleged violation. The complaint is subject to all applicable procedures specified in
section 9 (2) of article XXVIII of the state constitution. The person filing the complaint must serve the complaint on the respondent by certified mail, return receipt requested, on the same day the person files the complaint with the secretary of sate. The person filing the complaint must state factual allegations of a violation. For purposes of this section and section 9 (2) of article XXVIII of the state constitution, “complaint” means a signed document that alleges a violation of article XXVIII of the state constitution or of this article 45.
(b) Any person who commits a violation of either the secretary of state’s rules concerning campaign and political finance or this article that is not specifically listed in section 9 (2)(a) of article XXVIII of the state constitution shall be subject to any of the sanctions specified in section 10 of article XXVIII of the state constitution or in this section.
(c) In addition to any other penalty authorized by article XXVIII of the state constitution or this article, an administrative law judge may impose a civil penalty of fifty dollars per day for each day that a report, statement, or other document required to be filed under this article that is not specifically listed in article XXVIII of the state constitution is not filed by the close of business on the day due. Any person who fails to file three or more successive committee registration reports or reports concerning contributions, expenditures, or donations in accordance with the requirements of section 1-45-107.5 shall be subject to a civil penalty of up to five hundred dollars for each day that a report, statement, or other document required to be filed by an independent expenditure committee is not filed by the close of business on the day due. Any person who knowingly and intentionally fails to file three or more reports due under section 1-45-107.5 shall be subject to a civil penalty of up to one thousand dollars per day for each day that the report, statement, or other document is not filed by the close of business on the day due.
Imposition of any penalty under this paragraph (c) shall be subject to all applicable requirements specified in section 10 of article XXVIII of the state constitution governing the imposition of penalties.
(d) In connection with a complaint brought to enforce any requirement of article XXVIII of the state constitution or this article, an administrative law judge may order disclosure of the source and amount of any undisclosed donations or expenditures.
(e) In connection with any action brought to enforce any provision of article XXVIII of the state constitution or this article, the membership lists of a labor organization or, in the case of a publicly held corporation, a list of the shareholders of the corporation, shall not be disclosed by
means of discovery or by any other manner.
(f) Any person who is fined up to one thousand dollars per day for a knowing and intentional failure to file under paragraph (c) of this subsection (1.5) shall, if the person has shareholders or members, notify such shareholders or members of the penalty and the adjudicated violations on its publicly accessible website in a prominent manner for not less than one hundred eighty days after the final adjudication. A copy of this notice, with the website address used, shall be filed with the secretary of state and shall be a public record.
(g) The secretary of state has, as a matter of right, the right to intervene in any action pending before the office of administrative courts or the court of appeals that is brought to enforce the provisions of article XXVIII of the state constitution or this article.
(2) A party in any action brought to enforce the provisions of article XXVIII of the state constitution or of this article 45 is entitled to the recovery of the party’s reasonable attorney fees and costs from any attorney or party who has brought or defended the action, either in whole or in part, upon a determination by the office of administrative courts that the action, or any part thereof, lacked substantial justification or that the action, or any part thereof, was commenced for delay or harassment or if it finds that an attorney or party unnecessarily expanded the proceeding by other improper conduct, including abuses of discovery procedures available under the Colorado rules of civil procedure. Notwithstanding any other provision of this subsection (2),no attorney fees may be awarded under this subsection (2) unless the court or administrative law judge, as applicable, has first considered and issues written findings regarding the provisions of section 13-17-102 (5) and (6). Either party in an action in which the office of administrative courts awarded attorney fees and costs may apply to a district court to convert an award of attorney fees and costs into a district court judgment. Promptly upon the conversion of the award of attorney fees and costs into a district court judgment, the clerk of the district court shall mail notice of the filing of the judgment to the judgment debtor at the address given and shall make a note of the mailing in the docket. The notice must include the name and post-office address of the judgment creditor and the judgment creditor’s lawyer, if any, in this state. In addition, the judgment creditor may mail a notice of the filing of the judgement to the judgment debtor and may file proof of mailing with the clerk. Lack of mailing notice of filing by the clerk shall not affect the enforcement proceedings if proof of mailing by the judgement creditor has been filed. For purposes of this subsection (2), “lacked substantial justification” means substantially frivolous, substantially groundless, or substantially vexatious.
(3) Upon a determination by the office of administrative courts that an issue committee failed to file a report required pursuant to section 1-45-108, the administrative law judge shall direct the issue committee to file any such report within ten days containing all required disclosure of any previously unreported contributions or expenditures and may, in addition to any other penalty, impose a penalty not to exceed twenty dollars for each contribution received and expenditure made by the issue committee that was not timely reported.
(4) (a) Upon failure of a witness or party to comply with an administrative subpoena issued in relation to an alleged campaign finance violation pursuant to article XXVIII of the state constitution or this article, the party that requested the administrative subpoena or the issuing agency may petition the district court ex parte with a copy of the petition sent to the subpoenaed witness or party and the administrative law judge by regular mail, for an order directing the witness or party to comply with the administrative subpoena.
(b) If the petition required by paragraph (a) of this subsection (4) shows to the district court’s satisfaction that the administrative subpoena was properly served pursuant to rule 4 of the Colorado rules of civil procedure, the district court shall order the subpoenaed witness or party
to appear before the district court and show cause why the witness or party should not be ordered to comply with the administrative subpoena. A copy of the petition and the court order shall be served, pursuant to rule 5 of the Colorado rules of civil procedure, on the witness or party at
least fifteen days before the date designated for the witness or party to appear before the district court.
(c) At a show cause hearing ordered by the district court pursuant to paragraph (b) of this subsection (4), the court shall review the administrative subpoena and any evidence presented by the parties to determine compliance with the Colorado rules of civil procedure. The subpoenaed witness or party shall bear the burden of showing good cause as to why he or she should not be ordered to comply with the administrative subpoena.
(d) If the court determines that the subpoenaed witness or party is required to comply with the
administrative subpoena:(I) The district court shall order compliance forthwith and may impose remedial and punitive fines, including attorneys’ fees and costs, for the witness’s or party’s failure to comply with the administrative subpoena; and (II) The administrative law judge shall schedule a hearing on the complaint to occur on a day after the occurrence of the required deposition and such other discovery as may be warranted due to such deposition.
(e) If the subpoenaed witness or party fails to appear at the show cause hearing, the district court may issue a bench warrant for the arrest of the subpoenaed witness or party and may impose other sanctions pursuant to the Colorado rules of civil procedure.(5) Not later than December 1, 2016, the secretary of state shall create and post on the secretary’s official website a campaign finance training course that offers sufficient content to satisfy the training requirements for administrative law judges that is required by section
24-30-1003 (6), C.R.S.
Source: L. 2003: Entire section added, p. 2160, § 6, effective June 3. L. 2005: (2) amended, p.852, § 4, effective June 1. L. 2008: (1.5) added and (2) amended, p. 349, § 1, effective April 10.L. 2010: (1.5)(c), (1.5)(d), (1.5)(e), and (1.5)(f) added, (SB 10-203), ch. 269, p. 1236, § 6,
effective May 25; (3) added, (HB 10-1370), ch. 270, p. 1242, § 7, effective January 1, 2011. L. 2011: (4)added, (HB 11-1117), ch. 35, p. 97, § 1, effective March 21. L. 2016: (5) added, (SB 16-106), ch. 290, p. 1175, § 1, effective August 10; (HB 18-1047).
Cross references: (1) For the legislative declaration in the 2010 act adding subsections (1.5)(c), (1.5)(d), (1.5)(e), and (1.5)(f), see section 1 of chapter 269, Session Laws of Colorado 2010.(2) For the legislative declaration in the 2010 act adding subsection (3), see section 1 of
chapter 270, Session Laws of Colorado 2010.
Holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by entering preliminary injunction against secretary of state enjoining implementation of administrative rule defining “member” for purposes of constitutional provisions governing small donor committees. Proposed rule would force labor and other covered organizations to get written permission before using an individual’s dues or contributions to fund political campaigns. Plaintiffs demonstrated reasonable probability of success on the merits in challenging secretary’s authority to enact proposed rule. Secretary’s “definition” of term “member” in proposed rule is much more than an effort to define term. It can be read effectively to add, modify, and conflict with constitutional provision by imposing new condition not found in text of article XXVIII. Secretary’s stated purpose in enacting proposed rule not furthered by “definition” contained in proposed rule. Proposed rule does not further secretary’s stated goal of achieving transparency of political contributions. Sanger v. Dennis, 148 P.3d 404 (Colo. App. 2006).
Holding that the plaintiffs demonstrated reasonable probability of success on the merits in alleging that administrative rule promulgated by secretary of state violated their constitutional rights to freedom of association as applied to them. Secretary’s immediate enforcement of administrative rule forcing labor and other covered organizations to get written permission before using an individual’s dues or contributions to fund political campaigns would have effectively prevented plaintiffs from exercising their first amendment rights in general election. Administrative rule was not narrowly tailored. Rationale justifying administrative rule was based upon speculation there would be dissenters, thereby impermissibly penalizing constitutional rights of the many for the speculative rights of the few. Accordingly, district court did not abuse its discretion by entering preliminary injunction against implementation of administrative rule. Sanger v. Dennis, 148 P.3d 404 (Colo. App. 2006).
Holding that the adoption of Rule 9.3 of the Colorado secretary of state’s rules concerning campaign and political finance requiring the name of the candidate unambiguously referred to in the electioneering communication to be included in the electioneering report, was within the rulemaking authority of the secretary of state under § 9(1)(b) of article XXVIII of the state constitution and subsection (1) of this section. Colo. Citizens for Ethics in Gov’t v. Comm. for the Am. Dream, 187 P.3d 1207 (Colo. App. 2008).
Holding that the ALJ had jurisdiction to impose penalty for violation of Rule 9.3 and did not err by imposing a $1,000 penalty on political committee. Section (2)(a) of article XXVIII of the state constitution grants an ALJ authority to conduct hearings on alleged violations of the article and the “Fair Campaign Practices Act” and to impose penalties if a violation has occurred. Rule 9.3 is necessary to implement former § 1-45-109 (5), and, under § 10(2)(a) of article XXVIII of the state constitution, sanctions can be imposed for violations of § 1-45-109. Colo. Citizens for Ethics in Gov’t v. Comm. for the Am. Dream, 187 P.3d 1207 (Colo. App. 2008).
Holding that the ALJ did not err in determining that membership contribution claim was groundless and in awarding attorney fees against litigant. ALJ did not misinterpret subsection (2) by rejecting litigant’s defense based on voluntary dismissal of its membership contributions claim under § 13-17-102 (5). Although § 1-45-111.5 (2) contains the same operative language and definitions as § 13-17-102 (4), at the time of the action, the FCPA did not incorporate § 13-17-102 (5) and contained no exception for dismissal of a groundless claim prior to hearing. Moreover, although § 13-17-102 applies to any civil action commenced or appealed in any court of record, “court of record” does not include administrative courts. Finally, the record showed that the ALJ considered litigant’s arguments about the efforts it made after the filing of the action to reduce or dismiss claims it found to be invalid. Colo. Citizens for Ethics in Gov’t v. Comm. for the Am. Dream, 187 P.3d 1207 (Colo. App. 2008).
Holding that given that identical terms “substantially frivolous, substantially groundless, or substantially vexatious” are found in this section and in § 13-17-102, case law construing that section may be examined for guidance in construing terms used in this section. Colo. Ethics Watch v. Senate Major. Fund, 275 P.3d 674 (Colo. App. 2010), aff’d on other grounds, 2012 CO 12, 269 P.3d 1248.
Holding that the claim is frivolous if its proponents can present no rational argument based on the evidence or the law to support it. A claim is vexatious if it is brought or maintained in bad faith to annoy or harass another. Colo. Ethics Watch v. Senate Major. Fund, 275 P.3d 674 (Colo. App. 2010), aff’d on other grounds, 2012 CO 12, 269 P.3d 1248.
1.Administrative law judge
2.Attorney fees and costs
Holding that a lobbyist, who was the respondent in a campaign finance violation proceeding under the Fair Campaign Practices Act (FCPA), and who sought to enforce an ALJ’s award of attorney fees, failed to preserve for appeal her argument that phrase “the person filing the complaint” in constitutional provision allowing an ALJ’s order in a FCPA action to be enforced by the Secretary of State or “in a private action by the person filing the complaint” referred to the person seeking to enforce the ALJ order, rather than the person alleging the FCPA violation, where argument was raised for the first time at oral argument on appeal from the dismissal of lobbyist’s petition to enforce the ALJ’s order. McGihon v. Cave, App.2016, 2016 WL 2957205.
Holding that a lobbyist’s appeal from the dismissal, for lack of jurisdiction, of her petition to enforce an ALJ’s order awarding her attorney fees in campaign finance violation proceeding brought against her under the Fair Campaign Practices Act (FCPA) was not wholly frivolous and groundless, and thus complainant in the underlying FCPA action and complainant’s attorney were not entitled to appellate attorney fees; matter was one of first impression involving construction of statutory and constitutional provisions, and lobbyist acted in good faith in attempting to find a means of enforcing her undisputed fee award. McGihon v. Cave, App.2016, 2016 WL 2957205.
Holding that an administrative law judge (ALJ) did not abuse his discretion when it found that membership contribution violation claim asserted by citizens group against political committee under the Campaign and Political Finance Amendment to the Colorado Constitution and the Fair Campaign Practices Act (FCPA) was groundless, and thus that political committee was entitled to attorney fees under the FCPA; citizens group claimed that political committee was not home builders association’s sponsored committee and thus that association’s contributions to the committee violated $500 contribution limit under the Amendment, or, alternatively, that political committee had violated FCPA rule by not reporting association members who had contributed more than $20 in dues during a reporting period, but citizens group had no evidence supporting the claim prior to filing its complaint and claim was based on group’s belief that its allegations might be true. Colorado Citizens for Ethics in Government v. Committee for American Dream, App.2008, 187 P.3d 1207.
Holding that voluntary dismissal by citizens group of claim that political committee had violated membership contribution limits of Campaign and Political Finance Amendment to the Colorado Constitution and Fair Campaign Practices Act (FCPA) was not a defense to committee’s claim for attorney fees when administrative law judge (ALJ) found the claim groundless; applicable version of FCPA attorney fees statute providing for fees if a claim was groundless contained no exception for the dismissal of a claim prior to hearing, and courts of record subject to dismissal prior to hearing defense to a claim for attorney fees did not include administrative courts. Colorado Citizens for Ethics in Government v. Committee for American Dream, App.2008, 187 P.3d 1207.
Holding that the constitutional provision allowing an ALJ’s order in a campaign finance violation proceeding under the Fair Campaign Practices Act (FCPA) to be enforced by the Secretary of State or “in a private action by the person filing the complaint” did not allow lobbyist who was the respondent in such a proceeding, and who was awarded attorney fees on the ground that the claims against her were substantially groundless, frivolous, and vexatious, to enforce the ALJ’s order by private action; plain language of the Constitutional provision created a non-reciprocal enforcement right in favor of the complainant, and only the legislature or the people had the power to correct that result. McGihon v. Cave, App.2016, 2016 WL 2957205.
Holding that a lobbyist, who was the respondent in a campaign finance violation proceeding under the Fair Campaign Practices Act (FCPA), and who sought to enforce an ALJ’s award to her of attorney fees, failed to preserve for appeal her argument that plain language interpretation of statute authorizing the attorney fee award and constitutional provision governing enforcement of ALJ orders in FCPA actions, under which a complainant but not a respondent could enforce an attorney fee award, violated her rights to substantive due process and equal protection, where lobbyist raised the arguments for the first time on appeal. McGihon v. Cave, App.2016, 2016 WL 2957205.
Holding that the statute authorizing an award of attorney fees in actions brought under the state constitutional provision governing campaign and political finance does not apply to costs on appeal. Campaign Integrity Watchdog v. Coloradans for a Better Future, App.2016, 2016 WL 1385200, certiorari granted 2016 WL 4822062, reversed 2018 WL 577031.
Holding that the provision of Fair Campaign Practices Act (FCPA) regarding reasonable attorney fees and costs does not apply to costs on appeal. Campaign Integrity Watchdog v. Coloradans for a Better Future, App.2016, 378 P.3d 852, as modified.
Holding that a claim is “frivolous,” so as to permit attorney fees to be imposed as sanction in a civil action, if its proponent can present no rational argument based on the evidence or the law to support it. Colorado Ethics Watch v. Senate Majority Fund, LLC, App.2010, 275 P.3d 674, certiorari granted 2010 WL 4851462, affirmed 269 P.3d 1248.
Holding that a watchdog group did not lack substantial justification, so as to permit ALJ to impose attorney fees and costs on group as sanctions, for filing complaint with secretary of state alleging that certain political advertisements constituted express advocacy and were therefore subject to regulation under amendment to State Constitution regulating independent expenditures for the purpose of expressly advocating election or defeat of a candidate for office. Colorado Ethics Watch v. Senate Majority Fund, LLC, App.2010, 275 P.3d 674, certiorari granted 2010 WL 4851462, affirmed 269 P.3d 1248.
4. Definition for Issue committee
6. Definition for Small donor committee
7. Definition for Independent expenditure
8. Definition for Electioneering communication
9. Definition for Independent expenditure committee
11. Definition for Title
Case Name: Johnson v. Griffin
Citation: 240 P.3d 404 (Colo. App. 2009)
Case URL: https://www.ravellaw.com/opinions/0c000549706f8574b24efe3e0457f1b3
Case Summary: Holding that section of constitutional article governing sanctions for violation of disclosure requirements, which provided for a penalty of $50 per day for each day that information was not filed as required, determined the amount to fine county commissioner candidate for failure to disclose contributor employment information, where candidate was not otherwise required to return contributions.
Case Name: Lambert v. Ritter Inaugural Comm.
Citation: 218 P.3d 1115 (Colo. App. 2009)
Case URL: https://casetext.com/case/lambert-v-ritter-inaugural-committee-inc
Case Summary: Holding that limitations period in which plaintiff had to allege campaign finance law violation began to run from date that gubernatorial inaugural committee allegedly made the $350 campaign contribution.