Source: http://www.scribd.com/doc/71296824/Viacom-v-YouTube-YT-Post-Argument-Brief-10-3270
Timestamp: 2013-12-21 07:32:00
Document Index: 225133584

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 512', 'art 2', '§ 512', '§ 512', '§ 512', '§ 512']

P. 1Viacom v. YouTube - YT Post Argument Brief (10-3270)Viacom v. YouTube - YT Post Argument Brief (10-3270)Ratings: 0|Views: 1,406|Likes: 1Published by garethdicksonPost-argument brief of YouTube as ordered by the Second Circuit on the extent of the "storage" DMCA safe harbor and clarification of YT's "knowledge" theory could work in practice. Originally hosted on Justia http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/10-3270/496/0.pdfPost-argument brief of YouTube as ordered by the Second Circuit on the extent of the "storage" DMCA safe harbor and clarification of YT's "knowledge" theory could work in practice. Originally hosted on Justia http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/10-3270/496/0.pdfMore info: categoriesBusiness/Law, Court FilingsPublished by: garethdickson on Nov 02, 2011Copyright:Attribution Non-commercialAvailability:Read on Scribd mobile: iPhone, iPad and Android.Free download as PDF, TXT or read online for free from ScribdFlag for inappropriate content|Add to collectionSee MoreSee lesshttp://www.scribd.com/doc/71296824/Viacom-v-YouTube-YT-Post-Argument-Brief-10-327011/07/2011pdftextoriginal VIA ECF
November 1, 2011Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Esq.Clerk of Court, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit40 Foley SquareNew York, NY 10007Re:
Viacom International, Inc. et al. v. YouTube, Inc.et al.
, No. 10-3270 and
The Football Association Premier League Ltd. et al. v. YouTube, Inc. et al.
, No. 10-3342Argued Oct. 18, 2011 (Cabranes, Livingston, Miner)YouTube respectfully submits this letter brief in response to the Court’s October 25, 2011 Order.
Plaintiffs Have Not Made The Showing Required To Deprive YouTube Of The SafeHarbor Under The Red-Flag Knowledge Provision.
The Court has asked “whether and how the red-flag knowledge provision would apply under theDefendants’ ‘specific’ knowledge construction of § 512(c)(1)(A).”
The answer is straightforward: todisqualify a service provider from the safe harbor for a given instance of infringement, a plaintiff mustshow that the service provider (a) was actually aware of facts or circumstances (b) from which thatparticular infringement would have been apparent to a reasonable person, and (c) failed to expeditiouslyremove the infringing material of which it had such awareness. Summary judgment in this case wasappropriate because plaintiffs failed even to attempt to make the showing that the DMCA requires withrespect to any of their clips in suit.A plaintiff bears the burden of proving red-flag awareness.
If the plaintiff fails to come forwardwith sufficient evidence to establish a triable issue of fact, therefore, the service provider is entitled to
, CV-05-4753, slip op. at 8 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2008) (“it is [plaintiffs’]burden to show that [defendant] had actual knowledge of infringement within the meaning of section 512(c)”);
, 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1110 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (“
UMG II ”)(granting summary judgment where plaintiff “has not provided evidence establishing that [defendant] failed to act
51 Madison Avenue, 22nd Floor, New York, New York 10010-1601 |
: (212) 849-7100
(212) 849-7164andrewschapiro@quinnemanuel.com
-2-summary judgment on this element of the safe harbor
In assessing whether the plaintiff has met thatburden, the reviewing court must bear in mind that Congress deliberately crafted a “high bar for finding‘red flag’ knowledge.”
UMG II , 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1111. The test is whether facts and circumstancesof which the service provider was aware made the infringing nature of the activity “obvious.” H.R. Rep.105-551(Part 2), at 57-58 (July 22, 1998). The “common-sense result of this ‘red flag’ test is that[service providers] would not be required to make discriminating judgments about potential copyrightinfringement.”
Id . at 58; S. Rep. 105-190, at 49 (May 11, 1998). Instead, the infringing nature of thematerial must be “apparent from even ‘a brief and casual viewing.’”
, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1108;
3 NIMMER 12B.04[A][1] (“the flag must be brightly red indeed—and be waving blatantly inthe provider’s face”). In short, “if investigation of ‘facts and circumstances’ is required to identifymaterial as infringing, then those facts and circumstances are not ‘red flags.’”
UMG II , 665 F. Supp. 2dat 1108;
§ 512(m).
The fact that it may not be easy for a plaintiff to show red-flag knowledgethus is integral to the design and operation of section 512(c)—a statute that was specifically intended toprotect service providers against liability and to put the primary burden of policing online infringementon copyright holders.
Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC , 488 F.3d 1102, 1114 (9th Cir. 2007).
expeditiously whenever it had actual notice of infringement, whether from DMCA notices or other sources of information”);
, 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1109 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (grantingsummary judgment where plaintiff presented “no evidence from which to infer that Amazon was aware of, butchose to ignore, red flags”).
There is an important distinction in this regard between the “copyrighted work claimed to have been infringed”(
South Park ) and the “material is claimed to be infringing” (
a specific video clip). § 512(c)(3)(A)(ii),(iii). The awareness that the DMCA requires for red-flag knowledge is of particular
material , notparticular copyrighted works. A service provider’s awareness that a given work can be found somewhere on itsservice is not sufficient to create red-flag knowledge.
., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082,1084-85, 1093 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (letter telling eBay that “pirated copies” of the work “Manson” were on itsservice did not create red-flag knowledge because eBay “did not have actual or constructive knowledge thatparticular listings were being used by particular sellers to sell pirated copies of ‘Manson’”);
No. 10 Civ. 4135, 2011 WL 940056, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2011) (past takedownnotices insufficient to demonstrate red-flag knowledge that subsequent listings of same works were infringing).
Courts applying this test thus have recognized that even a description of material as “illegal” or “stolen” maynot be a red flag, because it “may be an attempt to increase [the] salacious appeal” of the material.
-3-This well established understanding of 512(c)(1)(A)(ii) in no way renders the actual-knowledgeprovision superfluous or eliminates a service provider’s obligation to respond to genuine “red flags.”Instead, the knowledge provision and the awareness provision establish alternative ways for a plaintiff toshow that a service provider was required—without receiving a takedown notice—to “expeditiously”remove “the material” that the plaintiff alleges was infringing (§ 512(c)(1)(A)(iii)). A service providermight have “actual knowledge” even in the absence of facts or circumstances from which thatinfringement would be apparent to an objective observer. Alternatively, a service provider, even if lacking subjective knowledge that the material was infringing, might have been aware of facts orcircumstances that, by any objective measure, made that infringement apparent. H.R. Rep. 105-551, at53; S. Rep. 105-190, at 44. The awareness provision thus prevents a service provider from claimingthat, because it did not actually believe the material was infringing, it had no duty to remove it, eventhough it was aware of facts that would have made the infringement obvious to a reasonable person.Every case to have addressed this issue has interpreted the red-flag provision in this way, andrejected plaintiffs’ efforts to deprive service providers of the safe harbor based on generalized awarenessthat unspecified (or even “rampant”) infringement is occurring on a service.
2011 WL5104616, at *12-14;
488 F.3d at 1113;
Wolk , 2011 WL 940056, at *5;
UMG II , 665 F.Supp. 2d at 1108;
, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1148;
, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1108. And for good reason.As we have explained (YouTube Br. 29-44), plaintiffs’ construction: (1) would subsume and rendersuperfluous the DMCA’s “actual knowledge” provision; (2) cannot be squared with the statute’sdirective that, upon obtaining the requisite knowledge or awareness, the provider expeditiously remove
F.3d at 1113;
Io Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc.,
586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1149 (N.D. Cal. 2008);
Capitol Records, Inc. v MP3tunes, LLC , No. 07 Civ. 9931, 2011 WL 5104616, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2011) (rejectingargument that “the terms ‘free,’ ‘mp3,’ or ‘file-sharing’ [are] tantamount to ‘red flag’ knowledge of infringement”). Nor is a general communication from the copyright owner sufficient. 17 U.S.C.§ 512(c)(3)(B)(i); H.R. Rep. 105-551, at 54 (“neither actual knowledge nor awareness of a ‘red flag’ may beimputed to a service provider based on information from a copyright owner or its agents that does not complywith the notification provisions of new subsection (c)(3)”).
Activity (3)FiltersAdd to collectionReviewAdd noteLikeEmbedShowingAllMost RecentReviewsAll NotesLikesYou've already reviewed this. Edit your review.Rating 0/5Post notePost reviewPost replyPost note and like1 hundred reads|about 2 years agojlinford liked this|about 2 years agoLoad more
Second Circuit Order for Further Argument in Viacom v. Yo...
Christian Louboutin SA et al. v. Yves Saint Laurent Ameri...
Association for Molecular Pathology et al. v. Myriad Gene...
Newspaper Licensing Agency & Ors. v Meltwater & Ors [2011...
The Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd & Ors v Meltwater Hold...
Private Career Training Institutions Agency v. Vancouver ...
Costco v. Omega, No. 08-1423, U.S. Sup. - Supreme Court p...
Viacom vs. YouTube - Viacom Brief (10-3270)