Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/643/54/454143/
Timestamp: 2020-01-26 08:13:19
Document Index: 275551824

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 841', '§ 5010', '§ 5031', '§ 41', '§ 3146', '§ 846']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Luz-estella Alvarez-porras, Jose Garcia-perez, and Robertocolon-diaz, Defendants-appellants, 643 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1981) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Second Circuit › 1981 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Luz-estella Alvarez-porras, Jose Garcia-perez, and...
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Luz-estella Alvarez-porras, Jose Garcia-perez, and Robertocolon-diaz, Defendants-appellants, 643 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1981)
US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit - 643 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1981) Argued Sept. 24, 1980. Decided Feb. 10, 1981
Appellants were convicted after a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York before Judge Jacob Mishler. They were found guilty of conspiring to import and distribute substantial quantities of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) (1), 846, 952(a), 960(a) (1), and 963. Appellant Luz-Estella Alvarez-Porras was sentenced to three years' custody and a special parole term of ten years. Appellant Jose Garcia-Perez was sentenced to eight years' incarceration and a special parole term of life. Appellant Roberto Colon-Diaz was sentenced to incarceration under 18 U.S.C. § 5010(b), the Youth Corrections Act.
In challenging their convictions, each of the appellants in this case raises an issue distinct from the others' claims. First, appellant Alvarez-Porras argues that her codefendants' statements should not have been accepted as her own admissions under the conspiracy exception to the hearsay rule because the government failed to link her to their conspiracy by a fair preponderance of the independent evidence, as required by United States v. Geaney, 417 F.2d 1116 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1028, 90 S. Ct. 1276, 25 L. Ed. 2d 539 (1970), and its progeny. Second, appellant Colon-Diaz argues that, in determining his age for purposes of the juvenile offenders procedures in 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-42, the trial judge improperly considered an otherwise suppressible statement made after an illegal arrest. Third, appellant Garcia-Perez argues that the fruits of a search of his apartment should have been suppressed because the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents who conducted the search acted under the mistaken belief that a valid warrant, properly issued several hours later, had already been signed.1
A criminal defendant's out-of-court statements, ordinarily barred by the hearsay rule, are admissible against him as nonhearsay under Federal Rule of Evidence ("Rule") 801(d) (2) (A), which exempts from the hearsay rule any "statement ... offered against a party" as an admission. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 701, 94 S. Ct. 3090, 3104, 41 L. Ed. 2d 1039 (1974); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 172, 94 S. Ct. 988, 39 L. Ed. 2d 242 (1974). Similarly, Rule 801 defines a coconspirator's statements as nonhearsay if made "during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy." F.R.E. 801(d) (2) (E). See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 74-75, 62 S. Ct. 457, 86 L. Ed. 680 (1942). But such statements cannot be used to substantiate the underlying conspiracy, lest the prosecution be allowed to invoke an important hearsay exception by presenting only hearsay proof of the conspiracy itself. The government must first make "a sufficient showing, by independent evidence, of a conspiracy among one or more other defendants and the declarant," United States v. Nixon, supra, 418 U.S. at 701, 94 S. Ct. at 3104.
417 F.2d at 1120. This standard, the court noted, is lower than the standard of evidence sufficient to submit a charge of conspiracy to the jury. Id. at 1119-20; United States v. Ragland, 375 F.2d 471, 477 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 925, 88 S. Ct. 860, 19 L. Ed. 2d 987 (1968); United States v. Ross, 321 F.2d 61, 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 894, 84 S. Ct. 170, 11 L. Ed. 2d 123 (1963). Once the "threshold requirement for admissibility is satisfied by a showing of a likelihood of an illicit association between the declarant and the defendant," United States v. Ragland, supra, 375 F.2d at 477, the conspirators' statements are admissible and they "might tip the scale" in favor of the defendant's guilt, United States v. Geaney, supra, 417 F.2d at 1120. The principles laid out in Geaney have been adopted by subsequent cases following its lead. E. g., United States v. Cambindo Valencia, 609 F.2d 603, 631 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 940, 100 S. Ct. 2163, 64 L. Ed. 2d 795 (1980); United States v. DiPalermo, 606 F.2d 17, 21 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 915, 100 S. Ct. 1274 (1980); United States v. Lyles, 593 F.2d 182, 194 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 847, 100 S. Ct. 94, 62 L. Ed. 2d 61 (1980); United States v. DeFillipo, 590 F.2d 1228, 1236 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 920, 99 S. Ct. 2844, 61 L. Ed. 2d 288 (1979); United States v. Ziegler, 583 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1978).
Upon considering all of these facts and circumstances, we are convinced that Judge Mishler correctly found a sufficient link between the appellant and the conspiracy to admit otherwise excludable statements as the appellant's own admissions. Although the first three facts listed above might be as consistent with innocence as with guilt, they no longer appear innocuous when considered in light of the fourth and fifth facts, for "pieces of evidence must be viewed not in isolation but in conjunction." United States v. Geaney, supra, 417 F.2d at 1121. There can be little doubt about the significance of the two conversations related by the informant. Appellant's silence after Mesa-Valencia's inculpatory introduction constituted an adoptive admission under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d) (2) (B); United States v. Williams, 577 F.2d 188, 193-94 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 868, 99 S. Ct. 196, 58 L. Ed. 2d 179 (1978). And the appellant's assent to pick up a package with Mesa-Valencia, in light of the surroundings, can only have been in connection with a drug transaction. "Judges are not required to exhibit a naivete from which ordinary citizens are free." United States v. Stanchich, 550 F.2d 1294, 1300 (2d Cir. 1977). Given Alvarez-Porras' close relations with other members of the conspiracy, her presence and participation in incriminating conversations, and the coincidence of her itinerary with the travel needs of the drug ring, we are satisfied that the court below properly applied the Geaney standard.
In order to effectuate the commands of the Fourth Amendment, to deter police misconduct, and to safeguard the integrity of the judicial process, the Supreme Court has fashioned the exclusionary rule which makes inadmissible at trial any evidence derived from the violation of an individual's right to be free from illegal searches and seizures. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 40 S. Ct. 182, 64 L. Ed. 319 (1920). But the Court has cautioned that
Wong Sun v. United States, supra, 371 U.S. at 487-88, 83 S. Ct. at 417. In applying the exclusionary rule, a trial court must focus on the existence of "exploitation" of the "primary illegality." "(T)he primary issue (is) whether the unlawful police behavior bore a causal relationship to the acquisition of the challenged testimony." United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 469, 100 S. Ct. 1244, 1248, 63 L. Ed. 2d 537 (1980). "(O)f course, ... the question of causal connection in this setting, as in so many other questions with which the law concerns itself, is not to be determined solely through the sort of analysis which would be applicable in the physical sciences. The issue cannot be decided on the basis of causation in the legal sense alone, but necessarily includes other elements as well." United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 274, 98 S. Ct. 1054, 1059, 55 L. Ed. 2d 268 (1978).
Although "(t)he exclusionary prohibition extends as well to the indirect as the direct products of" constitutional invasions, Wong Sun v. United States, supra, 371 U.S. at 484, 83 S. Ct. at 416, the government still has the opportunity to refute "the premise that the challenged evidence is in some sense the product of illegal governmental activity," United States v. Crews, supra, 445 U.S. at 471, 100 S. Ct. at 1250. Even if "the challenged evidence was acquired by the police after some initial Fourth Amendment violation, ... the question before the court is whether the chain of causation proceeding from the unlawful conduct has become so attenuated or has been interrupted by some intervening circumstance so as to remove the 'taint' imposed upon that evidence by the original illegality." Id. (emphasis in original).
There are "three commonly advanced exceptions to the exclusionary rule the 'independent source,' 'inevitable discovery,' or 'attenuation' doctrines," id. at 470, 100 S. Ct. at 1249. E. g., United States v. Ceccolini, supra (attenuation); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 60 S. Ct. 266, 84 L. Ed. 307 (1939) (attenuation); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, supra, 251 U.S. at 392, 40 S. Ct. at 182 (independent source); United States ex rel. Owens v. Twomey, 508 F.2d 858, 865 (7th Cir. 1974) (inevitable discovery). But see Fitzpatrick v. New York, 414 U.S. 1050, 94 S. Ct. 554, 38 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1973) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (questioning inevitable discovery theory). Each of these exceptions rests, most basically, on the lack of a sufficiently close connection between the state's wrongdoing and the invasion of the defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy. Furthermore, despite the identification of discrete headings for the various exceptions, their applications and rationales overlap enough that we view them more as helpful guides than as rigid tests. In each case, we must weigh the extent of any illegality, the probative value of any legally obtained information, and the relationship between the two, always with the hope of vigorously enforcing the Fourth Amendment without imposing ineffective constraints on criminal investigations. As this court commented in United States v. Marchand, 564 F.2d 983, 994 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1015, 98 S. Ct. 732, 54 L. Ed. 2d 760 (1978):
The government and Garcia-Perez seem to agree on which of this circuit's cases are most directly on point; they disagree, of course, on how to interpret and apply the pertinent authority. These precedents are United States v. Marchand, supra; United States v. Jarvis, 560 F.2d 494 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 934, 98 S. Ct. 1511, 55 L. Ed. 2d 532 (1978); United States v. Galante, 547 F.2d 733 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 969, 97 S. Ct. 2930, 53 L. Ed. 2d 1066 (1977); United States v. Falley, 489 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Cole, 463 F.2d 163 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 942, 93 S. Ct. 238, 34 L. Ed. 2d 193 (1972). Although these decisions do not definitively dispose of this case, we are convinced that under the principles articulated in these and other Fourth Amendment cases, the items seized in Garcia-Perez' apartment need not be suppressed. Moreover, we reach this decision without embracing or rejecting the terms, "inevitable discovery" and "good faith," as exceptions to the exclusionary rule. In this complicated area, it is wiser to let the cases speak for themselves and to encourage careful analysis and argument than to endorse vague headings which add little to our understanding of the problems and which, because of their symbolic impact, may lead inadvertently to a weakening of the Fourth Amendment's protection. In various ways, the issues of causation and good faith will undoubtedly enter into the court's handling of the exclusionary rule. See, e. g., United States v. Ajlouny, 629 F.2d 830, 841 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Dien, 609 F.2d 1038, 1046 (2d Cir. 1979). But the law as it stands is flexible enough to accommodate the sound disposition of cases without "(t)he announcement of a radical change in the scope of the exclusionary rule (which) creates a host of interpretive problems." United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 849-50 & n.4 (5th Cir. 1980) (Rubin, J., concurring specially).
In both Falley and Cole, this court spoke about the causal connections, if any, between Fourth Amendment violations and the evidence ultimately used in convicting the defendants. We explained: "If the evidence produced by the investigation was simply the normal output of that investigation, then the investigative findings have not been tainted directly." United States v. Falley, supra, 489 F.2d at 41. "Conduct is not the legal cause of an event if the event would have occurred without it. Prosser, Torts § 41 at 239 (1971 ed.)." United States v. Cole, supra, 463 F.2d at 173. But these dicta, as pithy and quotable as they may be, should not be taken to decide issues not considered by those panels. As Chief Justice Marshall commented in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 5 L. Ed. 257 (1821):
Id. at 398 (referring to dicta appearing in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803)). The Cole and Falley decisions did not announce a general rule allowing the courts to inquire whether, despite any illegality, the government's evidence would have been discovered anyway. In both of those cases, the government conducted a legal investigation which was supported by sufficient legal grounds that the additional illegal grounds did not mandate reversal. In this case, the government had adequate legal grounds for searching Garcia-Perez' apartment, but the agents had not fully complied with the warrant requirement at the time of the search.
The opinion in United States v. Jarvis, supra, has similarly broad implications. There, the court invalidated a "John Doe" arrest warrant for failure to satisfy the particularity requirement, but nonetheless refused to suppress the defendant's photograph and palm print which were obtained after his arrest which occurred at the defendant's home following a forcible entry made without exigent circumstances. Despite the "serious question" raised by the arrest a question recently answered by the Supreme Court, see Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 65 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1980) the Second Circuit admitted the challenged evidence because
Despite the apparent breadth of the cases discussed above, we can decide this case without adding to the uncertainty they may have engendered, and we choose to do so. The danger in applying an expansive interpretation of Jarvis and Galante to this case is that they suggest, and Judge Mishler adopted below, a broad inevitable-discovery exception whenever a court is satisfied that any government illegality was not the but-for cause of the discovery of any incriminating evidence. In many cases, dictum about a general but-for exception based on the Supreme Court's phrase in Wong Sun v. United States, supra, 371 U.S. at 487, 83 S. Ct. at 417 will not change the result because the related, but separable, independent-source exception also applies. E. g., United States v. Cole, supra. But the difference between the doctrines is crucial. The independent-source exception requires a showing that, even if the constable blundered once, he has taken enough proper steps that his lawful investigation is not thereby invalidated. A broad but-for exception, on the other hand, encourages speculation on whether a blunderbuss constable might eventually have developed a lawful basis for his investigation. A judge would have to conjecture about what the police would have done, or might have done, or could conceivably have done, in deciding whether illegal conduct which led to incriminating evidence was the but-for cause of the seizure. And these determinations would have to be made retrospectively, after the inculpating evidence has been incorporated into the government's case, a time when the purposes of the Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary rule may seem least compelling and the need for a conviction may seem paramount. See United States v. Karathanos, 531 F.2d 26, 35-36 (2d Cir.) (Oakes, J., concurring), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 910, 96 S. Ct. 3221, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1217 (1976).
In advocating an exception dubbed "inevitable discovery," the government cites cases which purportedly illustrate a clear split among the circuit courts. Government's Brief at 21 n.10. The heading "inevitable discovery" is generally traced to the Seventh Circuit's decision in United States ex rel. Owens v. Twomey, supra, 508 F.2d at 865-66. See United States v. Crews, supra, 445 U.S. at 470 n.11, 100 S. Ct. at 1249. That doctrine was unnecessary to the Owens decision, however, and the same result could have been reached without relying on it.
In Owens, the defendant abducted two people whom he held captive for six to seven hours, part of which time was spent in one victim's car, part in the apartment the defendant shared with his common law wife. After the victims were released, one of them led the police back to the suspect's apartment which the police illegally searched and where the police illegally seized a photograph of the defendant and an address book revealing his companion's work address. At trial the defendant moved to suppress the victim's in-court identification as tainted by the photo and to suppress his companion's testimony because it was the direct result of the seizure of the address book. The first claim was ludicrous; the victim had spent over six hours, most of them face-to-face, with his abductor, and his in-court identification was not affected in the least by the photograph. The second claim, while slightly more troublesome, could easily have been decided as it was without an inevitable-discovery rule. There was a legal independent source for the authorities' knowledge of the companion's identity and for lawfully presenting her live testimony. Besides, even if her identity had been uncovered solely through illegal means, she was not a defendant in the case, a factor subsequently stressed by the Supreme Court in considering the admissibility of witness testimony arrived at by illegal means. See United States v. Ceccolini, supra, 435 U.S. at 275, 98 S. Ct. at 1059. Similarly, the other cases cited in the government's brief as "appear(ing) to accept the (inevitability) doctrine" can also be explained on the basis of the more firmly established exceptions to the exclusionary rule. United States v. Seohnlein, 423 F.2d 1051, 1053 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 913 (1970); Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 209 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 860, 84 S. Ct. 125, 11 L. Ed. 2d 86 (1963).
In a case factually similar to this one, United States v. Griffin, 502 F.2d 959 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1050, 95 S. Ct. 626, 42 L. Ed. 2d 645 (1974), the court refused to extend the exclusionary rule's exceptions to cover "police who believe they have probable cause to search ... without a warrant merely because they plan subsequently to get one." Id. at 961. There several officers were sent to "secure" that is, forcibly enter and occupy what they knew to be an empty apartment while awaiting a valid warrant which was ultimately issued. When the defendant arrived home, he was placed under arrest, and when the warrant arrived, a thorough search was conducted. In upholding the district court's suppression of the evidence seized, the Sixth Circuit wrote:
In Griffin, the purposes of the exclusionary rule were served by suppressing the evidence, lest the police be encouraged to execute warrants before they have been issued and before they have been properly presented to those persons at the scene of the intended search. On the facts of this case, by contrast, as supported by the district court's findings, the purposes of the exclusionary rule would not be served by suppressing the evidence uncovered in Garcia-Perez' apartment. We stress, however, that our decision rests not on a broad exception for inevitably discoverable material, but on the narrow showings made at the suppression hearing. As the Fifth Circuit has commented, "the relevant issue in each case is broader than a sterile 'but for' inquiry." Parker v. Estelle, 498 F.2d 625, 629 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963, 95 S. Ct. 1951, 44 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1975). Instead, the trial courts should consider the principles underlying the exclusionary rule, as discussed in Wong Sun v. United States, supra. It is a misuse of Wong Sun, which aims at analytical refinement, to read its discussion of exclusionary rule exceptions as if it were a legislative enactment expressing a few immutable terms which must be applied to all cases. The Wong Sun opinion elaborates on the underlying rationale of the exclusionary rule and instructs trial courts on how to apply the rule and its rationale to varying cases. With that mandate in mind, we now turn to the facts of this case.
As a general matter, we agree with the appellant that "(t)o allow officials to make an unlawful search and then repeat the search pursuant to a warrant would sanction the very misconduct the exclusionary rule was intended to proscribe." Garcia-Perez Brief at 12. Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 90 S. Ct. 1969, 26 L. Ed. 2d 409 (1970). But on the unusual facts in this case, suppressing the evidence seized would not serve the deterrent purposes of the exclusionary rule. United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 541-42, 95 S. Ct. 2313, 2319-20, 45 L. Ed. 2d 374 (1975); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 254 n.24, 89 S. Ct. 1030, 1036, 22 L. Ed. 2d 248 (1969); United States v. Ajlouny, supra, 629 F.2d at 840-41. We stress, however, that in cases such as this, the government must bear a heavy burden in showing that an otherwise inexcusable departure from the warrant requirement should be overlooked.
In arguing against all use of the evidence at the age hearing, the appellant invokes the Supreme Court's decisions in Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 74 S. Ct. 354, 98 L. Ed. 503 (1954), and Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 46 S. Ct. 4, 70 L. Ed. 145 (1925). But we do not find them applicable here. Those cases involved the use of facts illegally obtained to prove, at trial, the elements of the offense charged. The age hearing, by contrast, only determines which set of procedures will be used to prosecute the defendant for his crimes. The government appropriately refers the court to the many non-trial stages at which the exclusionary rule is not enforced. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 94 S. Ct. 613, 38 L. Ed. 2d 561 (1974) (grand jury); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 78 S. Ct. 1245, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1503 (1958) (preliminary hearings); United States v. Schipani, 435 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983, 91 S. Ct. 1198, 28 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1971) (sentencing); 18 U.S.C. § 3146(f) (bail hearings). Each of these steps is at least as important for the defendant as the age hearing, and probably more so, because the government must marshal evidence to substantiate the defendant's commission of the crime and his culpability. The age hearing does not raise these crucial issues; it turns on the objective fact of age.
In Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 97 S. Ct. 2319, 53 L. Ed. 2d 281 (1977), the Supreme Court held that states may constitutionally impose on defendants the burden of proving an affirmative defense. In that case, proof of extreme emotional disturbance could reduce a charge of second-degree murder to manslaughter. Cf. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S. Ct. 1881, 44 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1975) (states may not constitutionally shift to defendant the burden of disproving an element of the crime). In this case, evidence of age does not constitute an element of the crime or an affirmative defense. Therefore, even though age is pertinent to the treatment the defendant receives during prosecution and after a conviction, if any, the Constitution is not offended by requiring the defendant to come forward with credible evidence of his minority.
Appellants Alvarez-Porras and Garcia-Perez also challenge the imposition of special parole terms. In light of the Supreme Court's decision last year in Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 100 S. Ct. 2247, 65 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1980), the government concedes that this portion of the sentences should be vacated. We agree and therefore vacate the special parole terms imposed under 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 963. See also United States v. Grammatikos, 633 F.2d 1013, 1025 (2d Cir. 1980)