Source: http://www.lawweb.in/2016/07/how-to-appreciate-evidence-if-landlord.html
Timestamp: 2016-10-26 05:45:23
Document Index: 520319097

Matched Legal Cases: ['APPLICATION NO. 770', 'Application No. 770', 'Application No. 167', 'Application No. 770', 'Application No. 167', 'Application No. 770', 'Application No.1450', 'Application No. 167', 'Application No. 167', 'Application No. 770', 'Application No. 770']

Law Web: How to appreciate evidence if landlord is denying that tenant has sent rent by money order?
How to appreciate evidence if landlord is denying that tenant has sent rent by money order?
Similarly, in case of Kamlabai B. Kabade vs. Laxmibai J.
Jagtap and ors.2001(2) MH.L.J. 905, this Court has held that refusal of rent sent by
money order constitutes deemed acceptance of rent. In such asituation, there would be no cause of action either to issue notice orto institute a suit on the ground of default. 46] The failure to examine postman, in facts and circumstances of
the present, is by no means sufficient to upset the concurrent
findings that rents were indeed sent by money order and refused by
the respondent ­landlords. There are records of money order
dispatches over considerable period. The amounts dispatched and
the endorsement thereon are substantially clear. The deposition on
behalf of the applicants as well as respondent­landlords, does
substantially establish that consequent upon purchase of suit
premises by the respondent­landlords some time in the year 1992,
rents have been dispatched by the applicants by way of money
orders and same have been refused by the respondent­landlords. In
such circumstances, there is no question of ignoring all such
materials and relying upon a singular and bald assertion on the part
of the respondent­landlords that the rents dispatched by money
orders were never refused by them. Any conclusion that rents were
not refused, in the facts and circumstances of the present case,
would be contrary to the weight of evidence on record. The Appeal
Court, therefore, has exceeded its jurisdiction or in any case,
committed an error of law apparent on face of record. The failure to examine postman, in facts and circumstances ofthe present, is by no means sufficient to upset the concurrentfindings that rents were indeed sent by money order and refused by respondent­ landlords. N THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAYCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTIONCIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 770 OF 2013 Vasant Mahadeo Gujar .. Applicant vs.Baitulla Ismail Shaikh & anr. .. Respondents
Date of Pronouncing the Judgment : 04 August 2015Citation: 2016 (4) ALLMR 174
1] Rule and interim relief was granted in these Civil RevisionApplications by speaking order dated 4 February 2014. As againstthe same, the respondent­landlords preferred Special Leave Petitionsbefore the Apex Court, which were dismissed on 2 May 2014.However, the Apex Court requested this Court to dispose of the
pending Civil Revision Applications expeditiously. It is in thesecircumstances, that two Civil Revision Applications were taken upfor final disposal.2] The learned counsel for the parties requested that these twoCivil Revision Applications be disposed of by common judgment andorder. Even otherwise, the respondent­landlords in the two CivilRevision Applications are one and same. The tenants who haveinstituted these Civil Revision Applications occupy parts of the sameHouse No.86. The impugned orders proceed on basis of substantiallysimilar facts and reasoning. After certain stage, common evidencecame to be recorded in the two matters. For all these reasons, itwould indeed be appropriate if these two Civil Revision Applicationsare disposed of by this common judgment and order. 3] The Civil Revision Application No. 770 of 2013 is instituted byVasant M. Gujar (Gujar). This concern two rooms, together admeasuringabout 240 sq.ft. in House No. 86, Dr. Sabane Road,Mahabaleshwar (suit premises No.1), of which the respondents arethe landlords. The suit premises No.1 were let out by one Mr. Bhise, the previous owner since last several decades. The suit premises arebeing used by the tenant Gujar for residential purposes. 4] The Civil Revision Application No. 167 of 2014 has beeninstituted by Smt. Khatija Panhalkar and others (Panhalkar). Thisconcerns road facing premises ad­measuring about 40 sq.ft., againbeing part of House No. 86, Dr. Sabane Road, Mahabaleshwar (suitpremises No.2) of which, the very same respondents as in CivilRevision Application No. 770 of 2013 are landlords. The suitpremises No.2 are being used by the tenant Panhalkar for sale ofhandicrafts, Mahabaleshwar sticks etc. last several decades.5] At least two portions of House No.86 of which the suitpremises form a part, are in possession of the landlords. One of theportion is immediately adjacent to suit premises No.1 and the samewas used for residential purposes. The second is immediatelyadjacent to suit premises No.2 and is used by the landlords forcommercial purposes. There is reference to yet another portion/shedin the occupation of tenant Gujar. However, no proceedings areinitiated in respect of the said portion/shed and accordingly it is clarified that the present proceedings do not concern with suchportion/shed. 6] The landlords instituted Regular Civil Suit No. 137 of 2010(old Regular Civil Suit No. 241 of 2002) against the tenant Gujarseeking eviction from the suit premises No.1 on the grounds ofdefault in payment of rent, reasonable and bona fide requirementand that the premises are required for immediate purpose ofdemolition ordered by municipal authorities. These are groundscontemplated by Sections 15, 16(1)(g) and 16(1)(k) of theMaharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 (Rent Act).7] The landlords also instituted Regular Civil Suit No. 136 of2010 (old Regular Civil Suit No. 239 of 2002) against the tenantPanhalkar for eviction on the same grounds. There was however, anadditional ground that the tenant Panhalkar had without thelandlords' consent in writing erected upon the suit premises No.2 apermanent structure. This is a ground contemplated by Section16(1)(b) of the Rent Act. 8] The two suits were taken up for consideration together by theCivil Judge, Junior Division at Mahabaleshwar (Trial Court). Theexamination­in­chief was recorded separately in the two cases tobegin with. However, after some stage, at the request of the parties,common evidence was recorded. Even the cross­examination ofBaitulla Shaikh is common in both cases. The Trial Court, byjudgment and order dated 4 July 2011 decreed two suits on theground of reasonable and bona fide requirement as also on theground that the suit premises are required for immediate purpose ofdemolition ordered by the Municipal Authorities. However, decree ofeviction on other grounds was declined. 9] The tenants appealed to the District Court (Appeal Court).The landlords instituted cross­objections seeking decree of evictionon the remaining grounds as well. The Appeal Court by its judgmentand order dated 4 July 2013 has dismissed the tenants' appeal andallowed the landlords cross­objections. Hence, the present CivilRevision Applications, by the tenants. 10] In the suit against the tenant Gujar, it appears that thelandlords had raised the ground that the tenant Gujar had acquired
an alternate suitable accommodation in Namdeo CooperativeHousing Society. Under the Rent Act, the acquisition of alternatepremises is not a ground for eviction. The Trial Court is not clearwhether eviction was made on this ground. However, it does appearthat this aspect was taken into consideration by the Trial Court indealing with the issue of comparative hardship. The Appeal Courthas, however, not adverted to this aspect at all. 11] In the appeals, both the tenants had taken out applicationsunder Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure (1908)seeking leave to produce additional evidence. The Appeal Court, inmaking the impugned judgment and decree dated 4 July 2013, hasnot dealt with or disposed of the said applications. The argumentsbefore the Appeal Court had concluded on 15 January 2013 and theimpugned judgment and decree was made on 4 July 2013. 12] In the aforesaid circumstances, Mr. Talkute and Mr.Warunjikar,learned counsel for the tenants, in support of both the Civil RevisionApplications, have urged the following :(a) There is failure to exercise jurisdiction by not evenadverting to, much less deciding the applications under Order41 Rule 27 of the CPC;
(b) The delay of more than six months in pronouncing theimpugned judgment and decree, after the conclusion ofarguments is contrary to the provisions contained in Order 20Rule 1 of CPC, as interpreted by the Apex Court and this Courtin its several rulings, on the subject;(c) The Appeal Court has committed an error of law,apparent on face of record in interpreting Section 15 of theRent Act, in the manner it has. The interpretation is contraryto both, the text as well as the rulings of this Court on thesubject. This is a case where rents were regularly offered anddispatched by way of money orders. The rents were, however,refused by the landlords. In such circumstances, there is noobligation upon the tenants to comply with conditionsprescribed in Section 15(3) of the Rent Act. It is always opento a tenant to establish and prove that the tenant was alwaysready and willing to pay rent and therefore, there was nocause of action to even initiate proceedings for eviction underSection 15(1) of the Rent Act. Besides, a careful perusal of theimpugned orders would indicate that concurrently the twoCourts have accepted that there was no default in payment of
rents. There is, in any case, ample evidence on record toestablish that there was no default in payment of rent;(d) From the notice purporting to determine tenancy,pleadings as well as depositions, it is apparent that evictionwas applied for in order to demolish the suit premises and toerect thereupon a new building. The ground for eviction wastherefore, relatable to Section 16(1)(i) of the Rent Act and notto Section 16(1)(g) thereof. Accordingly, it was incumbent torecord satisfaction and secure compliances of the conditionsspecified in sub­sections (4),(5), (6) and (7) of Section 16 ofthe Rent Act before any decree under Section 16(1)(i) of theRent Act is made. There being no consideration whatsoever ofthe provisions in the sub­sections, the impugned judgmentand decrees are in excess of jurisdiction or in any case vitiatedby illegality or material irregularities; (e) There was a blatant suppression of material particularswith regard to several premises owned and occupied by thelandlords. Therefore, applying the principles laid down by thisCourt in case of Tarachand Hassaram Shamdasani Vs.
Durgashankar G. Shrof1, as well as other rulings, no decreeof eviction on the ground of reasonable and bona fiderequirement, could ever have been made. Even otherwise, thetwo Courts have neither applied the true and correct tests insuch matters nor has relevant evidence on record beenconsidered. Even the aspect of comparative hardship has notbeen adverted to independently;(f) There was no case made out for eviction under Section16(1)(k) of the Rent Act. There is material on record whichestablishes that the landlords were intentionally andmaliciously damaging the suit premises with the sole object ofinviting demolition notices. There is no satisfaction recordedthat the suit premises were required for 'immediate purpose ofdemolition'. In any case, the demolition notices, on basis ofwhich the suits came to be instituted did not relate to theentire suit premises. There is clear misinterpretation of theprovisions contained in Section 16(1)(k) of the Rent Act. (g) There is no case made out to evict the tenant Panhalkarunder Section 16(1)(b) of the Rent Act. The Trial Court had1 2004(Suppl) Bom.C.R.333
rightly declined the eviction on this ground. The finding of theAppeal Court is vitiated by clear perversity. The explanation toSection 16(1)(b) of the Rent Act has been completely ignored.(h) In general, for the aforesaid reasons, the learnedcounsel for the tenants submitted that the impugned judgmentand decrees are in excess of jurisdiction and in any case,vitiated by illegality and material irregularities. 13] Mr. P.B. Shah and Mr. A.V. Anturkar, learned counsel for thelandlords, separately advanced submissions in support of theimpugned judgments and decrees. They submitted that there areconcurrent findings recorded by the two Courts which are bornefrom the material on record. There is accordingly, no warrant tointerfere with the same in the exercise of limited revisionaljurisdiction. 14] The learned counsel for the landlords further submitted thaton the basis of evidence led by the tenants, it is apparent that therewere defaults in payment of rents. The tenants neither raised anydispute with regard to the standard rent nor did they avail theoption under Section 15(3) of the Rent Act. Accordingly, the Appeal
Court was right in directing eviction under Section 15 of the RentAct. 15] The learned counsel for the landlords further submitted that inthis case, Municipal Authorities had issued no less than four noticesfor demolition of House No.86, of which the suit premises were onlya part. The allegations of malice or mala fide were vaguely made andthe same was rightly rejected by the Appeal Court. Accordingly, theysubmitted that the ground as contemplated by Section 16(1)(k) ofthe Rent Act was clearly made out.16] As regards the ground of reasonable and bona fiderequirement, Mr. Anturkar, appearing for the landlords in CivilRevision Application No. 167 of 2014 conceded that the pleadingsdid make out a case under Section 16(1)(i) of the Rent Act andtherefore, no decree of eviction could be made without securingcompliances under sub­sections (4),(5),(6) & (7) of Section 16 ofthe Rent Act. However, Mr. Shah, learned counsel appearing in CivilRevision Application No. 770 of 2013 for the very same landlordsjoined issue and submitted that notwithstanding such pleadings, adecree of eviction on the grounds of reasonable and bona fide
requirement can always be made under Section 16(1)(g) of the RentAct. In this regard, Mr. Shah placed reliance upon the decision of theApex Court in case of Ramniklal P. Mehta vs. Indradaman A.Sheth2 and of this Court in case of Sharadchandra V. Chitnis Vs.Mrs. Neela Ashok Korde & anr.317] Finally, Mr. Anturkar submitted that the material on recordclearly bears out that the tenant Panhalkar had carried outconstruction of permanent nature and therefore, the decree underSection 16(1)(b) of the Rent Act, as made by the Appeal Court, wasin perfect order. 18] The learned counsel for both the parties made reference tocertain decisions of the Apex Court as well as this Court to whichreference shall be made in the course of this common judgment andorder.19] The rival contentions now fall for my determination.2 AIR 1964 SC 16763 2008(4) MAH.L.J. 873
Non consideration of the Applications under Order 41, Rule 27 ofthe CPC20] There is nothing in the record and at least none wasdemonstrated by the learned counsel appearing for the landlordsthat the tenants' applications under Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPCwere considered and disposed of by the Appeal Court at the stage ofmaking the impugned orders. This clearly, amounts to failure toexercise jurisdiction. 21] In case of Eastern Equipment & Sales Limited vs. ING YashKumar Khanna4, the Apex Court has observed thus:5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and afterconsidering the facts and circumstances of the present case, weare of the view that in order to decide the pending appeal inwhich the application under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code ofCivil Procedure was filed ought to have been taken by theappellate court along with the application for acceptance ofadditional evidence under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code ofCivil Procedure.6. In that view of the matter and without going into themerits as to whether the application under Order 41 Rule 27of the Code of Civil Procedure was rightly rejected by theappellate court as well as by the High Court, we set aside theorder of the High Court as well as of the appellate courtrejecting the application under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Codeof Civil Procedure and we direct that the appellate court shalldecide the pending appeal along with the application underOrder 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure on merits4 (2008) 12 Supreme Court Cases 739
within a period of three months from the date of supply of acopy of this order to the appellate court. The appeal is allowedto the extent indicated above. There will be no order as tocosts. 7. The view that we have expressed can be supported by adecision of this Court in Jaipur Development Authority v.Kailashwati Devi ­ (1997) (7) SCC 297.”22] Similarly, in case of Muzaffar Ali vs. Dasaram5, the ApexCourt remanded the matter for reconsideration of the SecondAppeal, where the second Appellate Court had failed to consider thereasons assigned by the first Appellate Court for rejection of anapplication under Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC. In paragraphs 3 and4, the Apex Court observed thus:3. It is true that the first appellate court, while decidingthe first appeal, had given reasons for rejection of the saidapplication but the ground for such rejection was, as notedhereinabove, not considered by the High Court. That being theposition, we set aside the judgment of the High Court anddirect it to decide the appeal afresh on merits and inaccordance with law along with the application under Order41 Rule 27 CPC and the reasons given by the first appellatecourt for its rejection.4. The High Court is now requested to decide the secondappeal along with the application under Order 41 Rule 27CPC on merits within a period of three months from the dateof supply of a copy of this order. While deciding the same, theHigh Court shall also consider the reasons for rejection of theapplication under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC given by theappellate court.5 (2009) 2 SCC 654
23] In the aforesaid circumstances, this would call for remand tothe Appeal Court. However, the suits in the present case wereinstituted in the year 2002. As discussed hereinafter, the tenantshave made out a case to upset the eviction orders upon othersubstantive grounds. Remand, in the circumstances, would onlyprolong the life of the litigation. Accordingly, no remand is orderedupon this ground. Delay of more than six months in making the impugned ordersdated 4 July 201324] The record reveals that oral arguments before the Trial Courtconcluded on 15 January 2013. Thereafter, Roznama reveals that thematters were adjourned at least on five to six occasions for 'reply'.The significance of such adjournments or for that matter 'reply' afterconclusion of final arguments in the appeal, is by no meansdiscernible. However, abruptly, on 4 July 2013, the impugned orderscame to be pronounced. There is no record of any reply as such,being filed by any of the parties on any of the adjourned dates. Ineffect, there is delay of over six months in making the impugnedorders, after the conclusion of the arguments. The record alsoindicates that all the parties had filed written notes of arguments onrecord.
25] The learned counsel for the tenants submitted that the delayconstitutes breach of principles laid down in the Order 20 Rule 1 ofthe CPC and the impugned orders deserve to be set aside on thegrounds of delay alone. On the other hand learned counsel for thelandlords submitted that this was the case where notes of writtenarguments had been filed before the Appeal Court and therefore, theimpugned orders are not vitiated on this score. 26] In the case of R.C. Sharma Vs. Union of India6, the ApexCourt made strong observations in the context of delay in delivery ofjudgment after conclusion of arguments. In the said case, the ApexCourt observed observed thus:Nevertheless an unreasonable delay between hearing ofarguments and delivery of judgment, unless explained byexceptional or extraordinary circumstances, is highlyundesirable even when written arguments are submitted. It isnot unlikely that some points which the litigant considersimportant may have escaped notice. But, what is moreimportant is that litigants must have complete confidence inthe results of litigation. This confidence tends to be shaken ifthere is excessive delay between hearing of arguments anddelivery of judgments. 27] In the case of Anil Rai vs. State of Bihar7, the Apex Courtagain made strong observations and went on to suggest that the6 1976(3) SCC 5747 (2001) 7 SCC 318
delay in delivery of judgments after the conclusion of arguments,might by itself, constitute a ground for setting aside such orders anda remand for re­hearing. The Division Bench of this Court in case ofof Debang R. Vora vs. Union of India8, in fact set aside the ordermade by CEGAT on the ground of delay alone and remanded thematter for fresh consideration. The Division Bench of this Court incase of Pradeep K.R. Sangodker Vs. State of Goa and The DistrictConsumer Dispute Rederssal Forum9, upon analysis of severalrulings on this subject, issued directions to judicial as well as quasijudicial authorities in the State of Goa to deliver judgments within aperiod of three months from the date of conclusion of arguments.The contention that written arguments were on record andtherefore, delay did not matter was rejected in case of R.C. Sharma(supra) by observing that it is not unlikely that such points whichthe litigant considers important may have escaped notice28] Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts andcircumstances of the present case, it shall have to be held that thedelay in pronouncement of the impugned order by the Appeal Courtis indeed inordinate and unexplained. However, as noted earlier, the8 2004 (2) Mh.L.J. 2089 Writ Petition No. 281 of 2006 decided on 24.08.2006 : (MANU/MH/1246/2006
learned counsel for the landlords do not seek a remand. There areother substantial grounds to upset the impugned orders. This is alsonot a case where any of the parties had moved this Courtcomplaining about the delay in pronouncement of the impugnedorder and applied for withdrawal of the case from the Bench orsought a fresh hearing. Upon cumulative consideration of all thesecircumstances, it would not be appropriate to set aside theimpugned judgments and decrees and remand the matter for freshconsideration on the ground of delay between conclusion ofarguments and pronouncement of judgment. Default in payment of rents (Section 15 of the Rent Act)29] The landlords, in their notice dated 4 February 2002 issuedunder Section 15 (2) of the Rent Act, alleged that the tenants havenot bothered to pay any rents to the landlords from the year 1992.Demand was made of arrears in an amount of Rs.3400/­ from thetenant Gujar. Similarly, notice dated 31 May 2002 was issued to thetenant Panhalkar quantifying arrears in an amount of Rs.2312/­.There are allegations/pleadings in the respective plaints are also tothe same effect. 30] The tenants' defence, both in their replies to the notices aswell as in written statement was that rents in respect of suitpremises were regularly sent to the landlords, inter alia, by means ofmoney orders. However, the same were refused, which refusal isevident from the postal records. In such circumstances, the tenantscontended that they have always been ready and willing to pay therents and therefore, in terms of Section 15(1) of the Rent Act, therearises no question of making any decree of eviction on the ground ofnon­payment of rent. As a matter of abundant caution, the tenantseven deposited the arrears / rents deposited before the Trial Court.However, it is common ground that such deposit is well beyond theperiod of ninety days from the date of service of summons in thesuit. 31] The Trial Court, upon appreciation of the material on record,in the form of both oral as well as documentary evidence recordedconclusion that there was no default on the part of the tenants inpayment of rents. No decree of eviction was, therefore, made by theTrial Court on this ground. The reasoning of the Trial Court iscontained in paragraph '13' of the judgment and decree dated 4 July2011 (in case of Vasant Gujar) and the same reads thus: 13] In this regard, I have perused Section 15 of theMaharashtra Rent Control Act. It gives three­fold protectionto tenant in clause (1), (2) and (3) respectively. As perSection 15(1) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, if thetenant pays or is ready and willing to pay the amount ofstandard rent and permitted increases then the landlord isnot entitle to recover the possession of tenanted premises. Inpresent case, admittedly, the rent of suit property is not paidto the plaintiffs but, we have to see whether the defendantwas and is ready and willing to pay rent ? In this respect, itis pertinent to note that, D.W.1 Mahesh had deposed that,since 9/1/1992 defendant is sending the rent to plaintiff bymoney order and plaintiff had refused the same. He has filedreceipts of money order, said are at Exh.257 to 296. I haveperused said money order receipts. On perusal of said receiptsit reveals that, receipts at Exh. 295 and 296 are accepted butthe plaintiff had refused other money orders of the rent.Therefore, in my opinion, if the plaintiff is refusing the rentand thereafter coming before the court on the ground ofdefault then he can not be allowed to do so and to takebenefit of his own wrong. It is clear that, the defendant hadsent the rent by money order but the plaintiff had refused it.Further, plaintiffs had not proved that, they had made thedemand of rent to the defendant and defendant refused topay the rent. On the contrary, as stated above, it is theplaintiff who had refused to accept the rent, therefore, in myopinion, the act of defendant of sending the rent to plaintiffby money order clearly shows that, the defendant was readyand willing to pay the rent of suit property. Further, duringthe pendency of suit the defendant had also deposited theamount of rent in the court which shows that, the defendantis ready and willing to pay the rent. Therefore, as defendantis ready and willing to pay the rent, in my opinion, clauseno.2 and 3 of Section 15 of the Maharashtra Rent ControlAct will not be applicable to the present case.”(emphasis supplied)32] The reasoning of the Trial Court in declining a decree ofeviction on the ground of default in payment of rents in case of the
tenant Panhalkar is almost identical to the aforesaid, except that thereasoning contained in paragraph 25 of the judgment and decreedated 4 July 2011.33] The Appeal Court has, however, reversed the Trial Court andmade a decree of eviction on the ground of default in payment ofrents. The reasoning of the Appeal Court, which is contained inparagraphs 31 to 34 of the impugned judgment and decree dated 4July 2013 (identical reasoning in the two cases), reads thus :31] It is the defence that the defendants had endeavouredto pay the arrears of rent by Money Order, but it was refusedby the landlords. According to D.W. 2 Ibrahim, the plaintiffas has refused to accept the amount of Money Order, theground under Section 15 of the Act is not open. Exhs.295 and296 are the receipts of Money Orders, having endorsement ofrefusal by the addressee. 32] The documentary evidence reveals that first time, thedefendant has deposited the amount of rent on 4­10­2004,then on 24th June 2005. He has time and again deposited therent, but one fact is clear that no rent was paid before 7­10­1992, though the plaintiffs have purchased the suit propertyon 9th January, 1992. For around nine months, thedefendant did not pay the rent, much less in time. He filed hiswritten statement on 21­11­2002 by alleging that entirearrears were paid. The statutory period of 90 days comes toan end on 9­12­2002. the defendant has been served withsuit summons on 9­9­2002. Thus, it was obligatory on hispart, especially when the plaintiffs are accusing him to bedefaulter, to deposit the entire arrears together with statutoryinterest. 33] It is the defence that the defendant has endeavoured topay rent through Demand Draft, but it was also refused. Onthis point, evidence of Vijay Kadam, the Manager ofMahabaleshwar Urban Cooperative Bank, is to be viewed.The said witness does not know, who applied for the DemandDraft and in favour of whom it was issued. Thus, Exh. 415 isjust a Challan for issuance of Demand Draft. No furtherdetails have been dispelled by his evidence. The defendant hasjust placed on record photo­copy of said Challan, which is notadmissible. Though assumed that the defendant has depositedthe arrears of rent, it is inclusive of 9% interest. Arrears of 13years rent comes to Rs.7450/­ and 9% interest comes toRs.4023/­ total Rs.11,473/­ has been deposited vide Exh.34on 2nd September, 2004. This is in contravention of Subsection(3) of Section 15 of the Act. 34] On going through the impugned Judgment, the learnedtrial Court has emphasised the factum of refusal, however,has failed to consider whether even after service of summons,the defendant has failed to deposit the arrears. All threeclauses of Section 15, are parallel to each other. The plaintiffshave purchased the suit premises in January, 1992. Sincethen, the defendants did not pay the rent to them, at least upto August, 1992. This material aspect of this matter is notaptly considered by the trial Court. What is material is thedate of demand and deposit of amount of rent. Even afterservice of Notice, dated 4­2­2002, amount was not paid.Thus, mere offering the amount does not work. Thus, theclaim of plaintiffs falls under Sub­section (3) of Section 15 ofthe Act and the defendants are guilty of non­compliancethereof.For these reasons, I endorse my finding against PointNo. 4 in the affirmative.”(emphasis supplied)34] In order to appreciate the reasoning of the Appeal Court,reference is necessary to the text of Section 15 of the Rent Act,which reads thus:
15. No ejectment ordinarily to be made if tenant paysor is ready and willing to pay standard rent andpermitted increases. ­ (1) A landlord shall not beentitled to the recovery of possession of any premises so longas the tenant pays, or is ready and willing to pay, the amountof the, standard rent and permitted increases, if any, andobserves and performs the other, conditions of the tenancy, inso far as they are consistent with the provisions of this Act.(2) No suit for recovery of possession shall beinstituted by a landlord against the tenant on the ground ofnon­payment of the standard rent or permitted increases due,until the expiration of ninety days next after notice in writingof the demand of the standard rent or permitted increases hasbeen served upon the tenant in the manner provided in section106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (IV of 1882).(3) No decree for eviction shall be passed by thecourt in any suit for recovery of possession on the ground ofarrears of standard rent and permitted increases if, within aperiod of ninety days from the date of service of the summonsof the suit, the tenant pays or tenders in court the standardrent and permitted increases then due together with simpleinterest on the amount of arrears at fifteen per cent perannum; and thereafter continues to pay or tenders in courtregularly such standard rent and permitted increases till thesuit is finally decided and also pays cost of the suit as directedby the court.(4) Pending the disposal of any suit, the court may, outof any amount paid or tendered by the tenant, pay to thelandlord such amount towards the payment of rent orpermitted increases due to him as the court thinks fit.35] Section 15(1) of the Rent Act, in terms provides that alandlord shall not be entitled to eviction of a tenant, so long as thetenant pays, or is ready and willing to pay, the amount of thestandard rent and permitted increases, if any, and observes andperforms the other conditions of the tenancy, in so far as they are
consistent with the provisions of this Act. Clause 15(3) of the RentAct, however, is a legislative injunction to the Courts from making adecree of eviction on the ground of default in payment of rent andpermitted increases, if , within a period of ninety days from the dateof service of summons in the suit, the tenant pays or tenders inCourt the standard rent and permitted increases then due togetherwith simple interest at the prescribed rates and thereafter, continuesto pay or tenders the same till the suit is finally decided and alsopays cost of the suit as directed by the Court.36] The Appeal Court has made a decree of eviction by merelyrecording that the applicants failed to comply with the provisions ofSection 15(3), in as much as arrears of rent, permitted increasestogether with interest, were not deposited in the Court within ninetydays from the date of service of summons in the suit. There is noconsideration whatsoever of the tenants' plea that the tenants hadpaid or in any case were ready and willing to pay rents andpermitted increases to the landlords, but it was the landlords whohad refused to accept the same. 37] From the scheme of Section 15 of the Rent Act, it is clear thatbenefit under Section 15(3) of the Rent Act can be availed of by atenant, even if such tenant is admittedly, in default. From the tenorof Section 15(3) of the Rent Act, it does appear that no Court canmake a decree of eviction on the grounds of default, where suchtenant deposits within ninety days, arrears of rent, permittedincreases and complies with other prescribed requirements. This,however, does not mean and imply that resort to benefit underSection 15(3) of the Rent Act is only mode available to a tenant toavoid a decree of eviction on the ground of default. The tenant, canalways establish that he has paid or was always ready and willing topay the rent and the permitted increases to the landlord and on suchbasis avoid a decree of eviction. In fact, Section 15(1) of the RentAct, in terms provides that a landlord shall not be entitled to adecree of eviction so long as the tenant pays or is ready and willingto pay the standard rent, permitted increases and observes otherterms and conditions of the tenancy, so far as they may consistentwith the provisions of the Rent Act. 38] The reasoning of the Appeal Court, in fact, constitutes an errorof law apparent on face of record. The Appeal Court does not appear
to have reversed the findings of the fact in the context of payment ordispatch of money orders by the tenants and their refusal by thelandlords. The Appeal Court, however, makes decree of eviction onthe ground of non­compliance with the provisions contained inSection 15(3) of the Rent Act. There is no consideration whatsoeverto the pleas of the tenants that rents were indeed tendered regularlyand punctually to the landlords, by means of money orders and thesame were refused by the landlords. The Appeal Court has held that'all three clauses of Section 15 are parallel to each other'. This is anerror of law apparent on face of record. Even where, there is nocompliance with the provisions contained in Section 15(3) of theRent Act, it is always open to a tenant to establish the factum ofpayment or the factum of readiness and willingness of payment ofrent. If such factum is indeed established, the landlords cannotsecure a decree of eviction on the ground of default in payment ofrents. This proposition which emerges upon the plain reading of theprovisions in Section 15 of the Rent Act, as also from the authoritieson the subject, has been ignored by the Appeal Court. The finding onthis aspect is therefore, vitiated by error of law apparent on face ofrecord. 39] In case of Suka Ishram Chaudhari vs. Jamnabai R.Gujarathi & ors.10, the tenant had sent the rent amount to thelandlord through money order, but the landlord refused to acceptthe same. Upon receipt of statutory notice under Section 12(2) ofthe Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Houses Rates Control, 1947Act (1947 Act), the tenant failed to avail the benefit under Section12(3)(a) of the 1947 Act and pay arrears and permitted increasedwithin one month from the date of receipt of notice. Accordingly, theissue arose as to whether a decree of eviction could be made as therewas no compliance with the conditions prescribed under Section12(3)(a) of the 1947 Act. The learned Single Judge of this Court(R.R. Bhole, J.) held that no decree of eviction would be made aslong as the tenant was ready and willing to pay the rent. Therelevant observations are contained in paragraphs 5, 6 and 7, whichreads thus:5. Section 12 of the Rent Act provides for ejectment of thetenant by the landlord. It is divided into four clauses. The firstclause prohibits a landlord from recovering possession of anypremises so long as tenant pays and is ready and willing topay the amount of the standard rent and permitted increases,if any, and observes and performs the other conditions of thetenancy in so far as they are consistent with the provisions ofthe Rent Act. Therefore, as long as the tenant is ready andwilling to pay and as long as he observes the conditions oftenancy, landlord cannot recover possession of the premises.The second clause directs the landlord to give a notice before a10 AIR 1972 Bom 27328/75::: Uploaded on - 04/08/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 31/07/2016 18:50:44 :::Bombay High CourtDSS cra-770-13 & 167-14suit on the ground of non­payment of rent is filed. A landlordunder this clause cannot file a suit until expiration of onemonth next after the notice of the demand of standard rent.The third clause deals with two kinds of arrears, Sub­clause(a) deals with a tenant who is in arrears for a period of sixmonths or more; sub­clause (b) deals with a tenant, who is inarrears for less than six months and sub­clause (c) providesthat if a tenant raises a dispute regarding the amount ofstandard rent or permitted increases he is allowed to raise thatdispute; and if the tenant makes the payment of which he isarrears within one month of the notice, then the landlordcannot recover possession of the premises. But if he does notraise any dispute and if he neglects to pay until expiration ofthe period of one month after the notice then the Court has noother alternative but to pass a decree for eviction. So far assub­clause (b) is concerned the tenant is asked to pay thearrears on the first date of the hearing of the suit or beforesuch other date as the Court may fix and if he continues to payrent regularly in Court, then no decree can be passed againsthim but if after notice and after filing of the suit he neitherpays the arrears on the first date of the hearing of the suit norbefore such other date as the Court may fix, then a decree foreviction shall have to be passed. We are not concerned with thefourth clause because that clause merely deals withdisbursement of the amount paid by the tenant in Court.6. Now, therefore, under Section 12 of the Rent Act thisCourt has to see whether the tenant was ready and willing topay rent; whether the landlord had given him necessarynotice; whether in this case, which is governed by Section12(3)(a), the tenant is in arrears of rent for a period of sixmonths or more and whether the tenant has neglected to makepayment of the same. We have seen that the respondent hadbeen refusing to accept rent sent to him by money orders. Thearrears of rent according to the notice given by the landlord isfor a period from 1­11­64 to 1­5­65. The question, in view ofthe fact that the tenant had sent rent by money orders and iswhether the tenant was still in arrears of rent. If the landlordhad accepted rent, the tenant would certainly not have been inarrears and there could not have been any cause of action for29/75::: Uploaded on - 04/08/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 31/07/2016 18:50:44 :::Bombay High CourtDSS cra-770-13 & 167-14the notice to be served by the landlord on the tenant. Becausethe landlord had been refusing to accept rent for the period forwhich he was said to be in arrears the cause of action arose. Inmy view the landlord cannot take advantage of his conduct innot accepting rent sent by the tenant and then give a noticesaying that the tenant is in arrears of rent for more than six months. The intention of the legislature when enacting Rent Act could not have been to protect the landlord who refuses toaccept rent and after six months turns round to say that thetenant is in arrears of rent for a period of six months or more.In my view, therefore the facts and circumstances of theinstant case show that the petitioner ­ tenant was ready andwilling to pay rent. The facts also show that the tenant wasnot in arrears of rent voluntarily. It is because of the conductof the landlord that he fell in arrears at all. If that is so, then,in my view, the view of the learned Assistant Judge in inferring that the petitioner can be evicted under Section 12(3)(a) ofthe Rent Act is erroneous. On the other hand the inference andthe legal effect of these proved facts is that the tenant cannotbe evicted because he was neither in arrears of rent nor can besaid to be not ready and willing to pay rent. 7. I am supported in this view of mine by a judgment ofChandachud J. while deciding Civil Revision Application No.1450 of 1961 on 16th April 1964. He had before him factssimilar to the facts of the instant case and he has taken thesame view as I am now taking. (emphasis supplied)40] In case of Abdul Gani Dinali Mom. V. Mohamed YusufMohamed Isak11, another learned Single Judge of this Court(Jahagirdar J.), disagreed with the view of Bhole, J. in Suka IshramChaudhari (supra). Therefore, a reference was made to the DivisionBench in case of Sitram Maruti Nagpure vs. Fakirchand P. Dhase12.11 80 BLR 64612 2008(1) Mh.LJ. 61030/75::: Uploaded on - 04/08/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 31/07/2016 18:50:44 :::Bombay High CourtDSS cra-770-13 & 167-14The Division Bench held that the view taken by Bhole, J. in case ofSuka Ishram Chaudhari (supra), is correct and the view taken bythe Jahagirdar, J., in case of Abdul Gani (supra) is overruled. Therelevant observations are contained in paragraphs 14, 15 and 16,which read thus:14. After having heard the learned Counsel for both sides inthe above and after perusal of all the aforesaid judgments, it isvery clear that Section 12 makes it abundantly clear that iftenant pays or ready or willing to pay standard rent orpermitted increases, then no ejectment will be made. To put itin other words, the landlord will be entitled to recoverpossession of the premises only if the tenant fails to pay thestandard rent and permitted increases. In fact the said Section12 clearly contemplates in a negative manner that no suit forrecovery of possession shall be instituted by the landlordunless the landlord satisfies that the tenant was not ready andwilling to tender and had not paid the standard rent andpermitted increases for over a period of six months and in theevent, the tenant was not ready and willing to tenderstandard rent and permitted increases, and that he has beenin arrears of over a period of six months, then the landlordhas to issue notice terminating the tenancy and demand thestandard rent and permitted increases within a month afterservice of the notice. Even Section 12(3)(a) makes it clear thatwhere the rent is payable by the month and there is no disputeregarding the amount of standard rent or permitted increases,if such rent or increases are in arrears for a period of sixmonths or more and the tenant neglects to make paymentthereof until the expiration of period of one month after thenotice as referred in Sub­section (2), the Court may pass adecree for eviction in any such suit for recovery of possession.By way of explanation, in the said section, it is provided thatin any case where there is dispute as to the amount ofstandard rent or permitted increases recoverable under thisAct the tenant shall be deemed to be ready and willing to paysuch amount if, before the expiry of the period of one monthafter notice referred to in Sub­section (2), he makes anapplication to the Court under Sub­section (3) of Section 11and thereafter pays or tenders the amount of rent orpermitted increases specified in the order made by the Court.To put it in other words, the explanation is with regard to theprocedure, when there is a dispute with regard to the standardrent. Where there is no dispute with regard to the standardrent, the tenant has to show that he was always ready andwilling to tender rent and he must not be in arrears for morethan six months and in the event, the tenant was in arrearsfor more than six months, the landlord has the right to servenotice of termination and demand rent and permittedincreases, and if the tenant does not pay the same within onemonth, in such a case, the landlord will be entitled for adecree of eviction.15. In view of the clear explanation of Section 12, if thetenant raises a dispute with regard to the standard rent andpermitted increases, he has to approach the Court within aperiod of one month from the notice of termination and makedeposit within a period of one month in the Court. On thecontrary, if there is no dispute, the tenant must show hisreadiness and willingness to pay rent and permitted increasesand must keep regularly tendering the same, even by moneyorder and no landlord can take advantage, neither by refusingto accept the same nor say that the tenant had not paid therent or tendered the rent. This fact has been rightly pointed out by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Priya Ghoshand Ors. v. Bajranglal Singhania and Anr . and it is held thatthe landlord will be easily able to trap the tenant by refusingto accept and turn round and to file a suit against the tenant.That is why, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has clearly observedthat the law has to be construed in a fair manner and it is notintended to trap the tenant into a situation so that thelandlord can evict the tenant.16. Under the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case,we are clearly of the view that the view taken by Bhole, J. iscorrect and the view taken by Jahagirdar, J. is over­ruled andthe same does not lay down the correct law. (emphasis supplied)41] The reasoning of the Appeal Court in the present case isdirectly contrary to the law laid down by Bhole, J., in case of SukaIshram Chaudhari (supra), which is held as the correct view by theDivision Bench in case of Sitaram Nagpure (supra).42] The learned counsel for the respondents, however, submittedthat there is no material on record in support of the applicants' pleathat rents were regularly and punctually sent to the landlord bymoney order and that the same were refused by the landlord. In thisregard, Mr. Anturkar, learned senior counsel appearing for therespondent­landlords in Civil Revision Application No. 167 of 2014,on the basis of the documents evidencing money orders attempted todemonstrate that there were certain unexplained gaps in thedespatch of money orders. Mr. Anturkar and Mr. Shah also submittedthat since the plea of refusal of money orders was denied by therespondent­landlords, the applicants had to examine the postman inorder to establish refusal. In absence of the evidence of postman,failure to accept the rents cannot be said to be proved and therefore,the Appeal Court justify in making the decree on the ground ofdefault in payment of making rents.43] It is not possible to accept the aforesaid contentions of thelearned counsel for the respondent­landlords. The Trial Court on thebasis of material on record, has recorded findings of fact that rentswere regularly and punctually sent by the applicants to therespondent­landlords through money orders and that the same wererefused by the respondent­landlords. In record of such finding, theTrial Court has adverted to the material on record in the form ofmoney order despatches, the endorsement made thereon as well asthe payment made thereby. The payments, relate not to some limitedperiod but to over a substantial length of time, i.e. from January1992 to February/May 2002. There is material on record, whichestablishes that the rents were paid and in any case, overconsiderable period of time, were being accepted on yearly basis.The Trial Court has also given due credence to the oral testimony,inter alia, the deposition and cross­examination of the respondentlandlords.On basis of all such materials, the findings of fact as toabsence of any default on the part of the applicants came to berecorded by the Trial Court. There is absolute no perversity in therecord of such findings. The Appeal Court has in fact, not evendisturbed such findings. The Appeal Court, has merely criticized theTrial Court for having 'emphasized the factum of refusal' but failed toconsider whether even after the service of summons the applicantshad failed to deposit arrears. Thus, the decree made by the AppealCourt, is not on the basis of any default on the part of the applicantsin making payment of rents, but rather the decree is made on theground of failure on the part of the applicants to deposit the arrearsof rent within ninety days from the receipt of summons in the suit.The Appeal Court in terms states that the decree is made, becausethe claim of respondents (plaintiffs) fall under sub­section (3) ofSection 15 of the Rent Act and 'the defendants are guilty of noncompliance thereof'. As noticed earlier, such reasoning is contrary toscheme of Section 15 of the Rent Act, as also the decisions in case ofSuka Ishram Chaudhari (supra) and Sitaram Nagpure (supra).44] The decision in case of Suka Ishram Chaudhari (supra) wasfollowed by the another learned Single Judge of this Court in case ofMadhukar Vaidya vs. Narayan H. Surve13. In the said case, it wasobserved thus:­7. …....... It would be relevant to point out that thisCourt in Suka Ishram's, case was fully conscious of the saidlegal position which is reiterated by the Apex Court inHarbanslal's case. This Court in Suka Ishram's case at page222 has referred to the broad principles that would cover thecases under Section 12(3)(a) of the Bombay Rent Act,nevertheless, in the facts of that case, which in my view are13 2000 (102(3)) BOMLR 276similar to the one in the present case, proceeded to hold thatthe tenant cannot be evicted under Section 12(3)(a) of theBombay Rent Act. As aforesaid, it cannot be said that therespondent­tenant was a wilful defaulter prior to the issuanceof the suit notice or had failed and neglected to pay the rentregularly. On the other hand, what appears from the record isthat the petitioner­landlord obviously wanted to create anevidence against the respondent­tenant to maintain the suitfor eviction on the ground of arrears of rent and thereforerefused to accept the money orders (Exhibits 36, 37 and 38)sent by the respondent. The Courts below have thereforerightly held that the petitioner­landlord had an obliquemotive in refusing to accept the money orders sent just beforethe issuance of the suit notice and if the petitioner hadaccepted the said money orders, in which case, there wouldhave been no cause of action for the petitioner to issue thesuit notice or to institute the suit on the ground of default.The Courts below have consistently held that the respondenthas not neglected to pay the rent, which was the prerequisitefor applying Section 12(3)(a) of the Bombay Rent Act. I amin full agreement with the concurrent finding of fact as wellas the conclusions reached by the Courts below.45] Similarly, in case of Kamlabai B. Kabade vs. Laxmibai J.Jagtap and ors.14, this Court has held that refusal of rent sent bymoney order constitutes deemed acceptance of rent. In such asituation, there would be no cause of action either to issue notice orto institute a suit on the ground of default. 46] The failure to examine postman, in facts and circumstances ofthe present, is by no means sufficient to upset the concurrentfindings that rents were indeed sent by money order and refused by14 2001(2) MH.L.J. 905the respondent­landlords. There are records of money orderdispatches over considerable period. The amounts dispatched andthe endorsement thereon are substantially clear. The deposition onbehalf of the applicants as well as respondent­landlords, doessubstantially establish that consequent upon purchase of suitpremises by the respondent­landlords some time in the year 1992,rents have been dispatched by the applicants by way of moneyorders and same have been refused by the respondent­landlords. Insuch circumstances, there is no question of ignoring all suchmaterials and relying upon a singular and bald assertion on the partof the respondent­landlords that the rents dispatched by moneyorders were never refused by them. Any conclusion that rents werenot refused, in the facts and circumstances of the present case,would be contrary to the weight of evidence on record. The AppealCourt, therefore, has exceeded its jurisdiction or in any case,committed an error of law apparent on face of record. Reasonable and Bona fide Requirement (Section 16(1)(g) of the Rent Act)47] In the notice preceding the institution of suits for eviction,inter alia, on the ground that the suit premises are required by the37/75::: Uploaded on - 04/08/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 31/07/2016 18:50:44 :::Bombay High CourtDSS cra-770-13 & 167-14respondent­landlord reasonably and bona fide for occupation byhimself or by any person for whose benefit the premises are held,the Applicants have set out the case that Baitulla Shaikh (plaintiffNo.1) has two sons Irfan B. Shaikh and Haroon B. Shaikh. That bothare aged 23 and 24 years respectively and are degree holders.Similarly, Shri. C.K. Aris, Hamid (plaintiff No.2), apart from the suitpremises, has no other premises in Mahabaleshwar. Therefore, it wasstated that the respondent­landlords proposed to demolish the suitpremises and in their place construct a building for residence aswell as hotel business. The necessary plan in this regard has alsobeen approved by the Municipal Authorities and in the open spaceappurtenant, pits have been dug and construction work commenced.The allegations in the plaint, are also to this identical effect.48] Section 16(1)(g) of the Rent Act entitles the landlord torecover possession of the tenanted premises, if the same arereasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for occupation byhimself or by any person for whose benefit the premises are held.Section 16(1)(i) further provides that where premises are reasonablyand bona fide required by the landlord for the immediate purpose ofdemolishing them and such demolition is to be made for the purpose38/75::: Uploaded on - 04/08/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 31/07/2016 18:50:44 :::Bombay High CourtDSS cra-770-13 & 167-14of erecting new building on the premises sought to be demolished,then subject to certain conditions set out in sub­sections (4),(5),(6)and (7) of Section 16 of the Rent Act, the Court may make a decreeof eviction.49] In the context of decree of eviction under Section 16(1)(i),sub­section (4) of Section 16 of the Rent Act provides that a Courtmay pass the decree only in respect of a part of the premises whichin its opinion is necessary to vacate for carrying out the work oferection of new building. Sub­section (5) of Section 16 of the RentAct renders unlawful, assignment of any decree of eviction obtainedon the grounds specified in Section 16(1)(i) of the Rent Act. Subsection (6) of the Section 16 provides that no decree of eviction ongrounds specified in Section 16(1)(i) of the Rent Act shall be made,unless the Court is satisfied that necessary funds for purpose of theerection of new building are available with the landlord, the plansand estimates of the new building have been properly prepared, thatthe new building contained residential tenements not less than thenumber of existing tenements which are sought to be demolished,the landlord has given the necessary undertakings prescribed underclause (d) of sub­clause (6) of Section 16 of the Rent Act. The39/75::: Uploaded on - 04/08/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 31/07/2016 18:50:44 :::Bombay High CourtDSS cra-770-13 & 167-14undertaking makes reference to the amendment and time schedulein which the erection of new building will commence and conclude.Sub­section (7) of Section 16 of the said provides that wherepossession of premises is recovered under Section 16(1)(i) of theRent Act and the premises are transferred by the landlord, or byoperation of law before the tenant or tenants are placed inoccupation, then such transfer shall be subject to the rights andinterests of such tenants. 50] Mr. Talkute relying upon the statements in notice dated 4February 2002, the plaint as also the deposition of the landlordssubmitted that the respondent­landlords intended to seek evictionunder Section 16(1)(i) and not Section 16(1)(g) of the Rent Act. Ifthis be so, Mr Talkute submitted that the conditions prescribed insub­sections (4) to (7) of Section 16 of the Rent Act had to becomplied with. In absence of any such compliance, no decree ofeviction would ever been made against the applicants. 51] In fact, Mr. Anturkar, learned senior counsel appearing for therespondent­landlords in Civil Revision Application No. 167 of 2014fairly conceded to the aforesaid position, in the light of the40/75::: Uploaded on - 04/08/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 31/07/2016 18:50:44 :::Bombay High CourtDSS cra-770-13 & 167-14averments in the legal notice, plaint and the deposition. However,Mr. Shah, who appears for the same respondent­landlords in CivilRevision Application No. 770 of 2013, submitted thatnotwithstanding the statements/averments in the notice, plaint anddeposition, a decree of eviction was perfectly competent underSection 16(1)(g) of the Rent Act. In this regard, Mr. Shah placedreliance upon the decision of the Apex Court in case of Ramniklal P.Mehta (supra) and Sharadchandra Chitnis (supra), whichaccording to him, have taken the view that where the possession ofthe tenanted premises is required reasonably and bona fide for thepersonal occupation of the landlord or members of the landlord'sfamily, eviction decree can be made despite the proposal being fordemolition of the suit premises and the erection of a new buildingthereon.52] The aforesaid issue does not call for any decision in the factsand circumstances of the present case. This is because, therespondent­landlords, in the present case, have not made out anycase for decree of eviction on the ground that the suit premises arereasonably and bona fide required by them or any persons for whosebenefit the premises are held by them.41/75::: Uploaded on - 04/08/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 31/07/2016 18:50:44 :::Bombay High CourtDSS cra-770-13 & 167-1453] In notice as well as suit seeking eviction upon the groundscontemplated by Section 16(1) (g) of the Rent Act, the respondentlandlordshave averred that the suit premises are required for thepurposes of residence as well as hotel business of the two sons IrfanB. Shaikh and Haroon B. Shaikh as well as as Shri. C.K. Aris Hamid(plaintiff No.2). The pleadings, are by no means clear andcategorical. However, in such matters, the pleadings, particularly inthe context of reasonable and bona fide requirement are requiring tobe liberally considered, as such the contentions of Mr. Talkute andMr.Warunjikar that the landlords' plea be rejected on grounds ofvagueness in the pleadings, cannot be accepted.54] However, the respondent­landlords, have not at all beencandid with the Court insofar as the pleadings are concerned. In thecourse of evidence, it has come on record that the respondentlandlordshave, besides the suit premises several other premises,which are being used by them for purposes of commerce as well asresidence. Some of the premises, may have been acquired post theinstitution of the suit including in particular, the premises acquiredby one of the sons of Baitullah Shaikh. Nevertheless, there were nodisclosures volunteered in the course of examination­in­chief. Even42/75::: Uploaded on - 04/08/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 31/07/2016 18:50:44 :::Bombay High CourtDSS cra-770-13 & 167-14if, the premises subsequently acquired are left out of consideration,there was a duty upon the respondent­landlords to fully andcandidly make disclosure about the premises in their occupation,both for the purposes of residence as well as commerce andthereafter to explain, howsoever briefly, the subsistence of the needin respect of suit premises. The respondent­landlords havecompletely failed in this aspect. Such non­disclosure is a relevantconsideration in the context of determining both the reasonability aswell as bona fides.55] The tenants have managed to bring on record the material inthe context of occupation and control of several premises by therespondent­landlords. Looking to the conduct of the respondentlandlords,there is no certainty as to whether the premises in respectof which the tenants have obtained and produced documents, areonly premises which are in the occupation of control of therespondent­landlords or whether there are some others as well.However, even on basis of the existing material on record, there wasno question of making any decree under Section 16(1) (g) of theRent Act.43/75::: Uploaded on - 04/08/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 31/07/2016 18:50:44 :::Bombay High CourtDSS cra-770-13 & 167-1456] There is record that the property in C.T.S. No. 137, 137/1,137/2 and 137/3 at Dr. Sabane Road, Mahabaleshwar, Satara is inthe occupation of the respondent­landlords. Upon the said property,the respondent­landlords, operate 'Hotel Blue Star'. Incidentally,Dr.Sabane Road, Mahabaleshwar, is the very road upon which thesuit premises are situated. In the plaint, there was no reference inrespect of this property. There are documents which establish thatthis property is in the occupation of the respondent­landlords. Thereare admissions in this regard as well. Mr. Shah contended thatfailure to disclose is not fatal, if it is established that a decree foreviction can be sustained even if disclosure were to be made. That isnot a situation in the present case. Apart from this property, thereare several other properties in the occupation or control of therespondent­landlords. The landlords have hotel business under thename and style of 'Hotel Blue Star'. There are other businesses likeSTD Booth, sale of handicrafts, Lucky Restaurant carried out by thelandlords at Mahabaleshwar itself. There was no disclosures inregard to the premises and the businesses. Such disclosures werenecessary, if the requirement of the suit premises is to be regarded asreasonable and bona fide. 44/75::: Uploaded on - 04/08/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 31/07/2016 18:50:44 :::Bombay High CourtDSS cra-770-13 & 167-1457] There is again, the property at School Mohalla in CTS No.252, Mahabaleshwar, Satara. The ownership of this property byShaikh Baitulla is not really in dispute. There is material in the formof documents as well as admissions. The belated explanation is thatthe property is ancestral property belonging to the joint family. Thisby itself, is no excuse for non­disclosure. There is again reference tothe property at CTS No. 399 near Nagarpalika Society. This propertyas also Municipal House No. 11 CTS No. 558 comprising six roomswith Toilet bathroom have nexus with the two sons of Mr. BaitullaShaikh. The belated explanations that one of the properties is in thename of Irfan's wife or that one of the properties has already beenrented out, again, afford no excuse for non­disclosure. Therespondent­landlords i.e., Baitulla Shaikh himself resides at 23/B,Nagarpalika Society since last several years, though the explanationis that the said property belongs to his mother­in­law. There is alsoreference to a flat in Pune, which, however, in the facts andcircumstances of the present case, is really irrelevant. Nevertheless,from the material on record, it is apparent that the landlords have intheir occupation several properties and carry on several businessesand these facts were suppressed by the landlords in their plaintsseeking eviction on the ground of reasonable and bona fide45/75::: Uploaded on - 04/08/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 31/07/2016 18:50:44 :::Bombay High CourtDSS cra-770-13 & 167-14requirement. The belated explanation that some of the properties aretaken on rent or rented, that some of the properties are not in thenames of the landlords or that some of the properties are joint familyproperties, hardly inspire any confidence. In any case, the reasons,do not apply to all the properties in regard to which, the materialhas been produced on record by the applicants. It was the duty ofthe landlords to have made disclosure in their pleadings andthereafter, offered explanation, howsoever brief, as to how despitethe occupation of all such properties, need in respect of the suitpremises subsists and is further bona fide and reasonable. Suchpleading or disclosure, would have enabled the applicants to meetthe case set out by the landlords. In absence of such disclosures onvital and relevant matters, no decree of eviction under Section 16(1)(g) of the Rent Act is sustainable.58] In case of Tarachand Hassaram Shamdasani (supra), thelearned Single Judge of this Court has held that it is obligatory forthe landlord to disclose in the pleadings and in his evidence that thefact that he owns other premises which were capable of beingutilized for the requirement pressed into service in the suit filedagainst the tenant and to further disclose and explain that in spite of46/75::: Uploaded on - 04/08/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 31/07/2016 18:50:44 :::Bombay High CourtDSS cra-770-13 & 167-14those acquisitions, ownership of other premises, the requirementwhich is pressed into service against the tenant would still survive. Itis only then the landlord would be entitled to invoke the ground ofreasonable and bona fide requirement and would succeed inestablishing that the need is indeed bona fide and reasonable. In thesaid case also, there were no disclosures and the material withregard to ownership of other premises came on record only duringthe course of cross­examination. This was possible because thetenants through their efforts managed to obtain information. ThisCourt, upset the concurrent findings as to bona fide and reasonablerequirement, where the landlord has suppressed such materialparticulars. The relevant observations are contained in paragraphs,7,8 and 9, extract of which reads thus:7. …................That building can be used for residence.These facts were indeed relevant for deciding the issue ofbonafide and reasonableness of the requirement of thePlaintiff, but were not disclosed either in the pleadings oratleast in the examination­in­chief when the Plaintiff enteredthe witness box. However, were elicited only during the crossexamination conducted by the Defendant­tenant. This waspossible only because all these details were within theknowledge of the Defendant­tenant. In spite of suchoverwhelming evidence on record, the Courts below haveproceeded to answer the issue of bonafide and reasonablerequirement in favour of the Respondent landlord. Thatcannot be countenanced, to say the least.8. To my mind, however, it is obligatory for the landlordto disclose in the pleadings and in his evidence the fact that47/75::: Uploaded on - 04/08/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 31/07/2016 18:50:44 :::Bombay High CourtDSS cra-770-13 & 167-14he owns other premises which were capable of being utilizedfor the requirement pressed into service in the suit filedagainst the tenant and to further disclose and explain thatinspite of those acquisitions and ownership of other premises,the requirement which is pressed into service against thetenant would still survive. It is only then the landlord wouldbe entitled to invoke this ground and would succeed inestablishing his need to be bonafide and reasonable.9. I have no hesitation in taking the view that in the factsituation of the present case the Plaintiffs has failed to pleadand also depose in his evidence (examination­in­chief) aboutthe ownership of other premises capable of being used for therequirement pressed into service in the subject suit. Besides,he has failed to disclose and explain that even the otherpremises were not sufficient to satisfy the requirement pressedinto service in the suit against the tenant. Only when thelandlord pleads and proves all these material facts that theCourt would be able to adjudicate fully, completely andeffectually as to whether the requirement pressed into serviceby the landlord in the suit so filed is bonafide and reasonable.As mentioned earlier, it is well settled that the landlord is notonly required to establish his need to be bonafide but also tobe reasonable. If the landlord fails to plead or establish eitherof this ingredient then the ground under Section 13(1)(g) ofthe Act for eviction is unavailable to the landlord. Inherent inthis test is that if the landlord has failed to disclose relevantmaterials in the pleading and in his evidence (examinationin­chief),dejure, the landlord has not approached the courtwith clean hands. In such a case, it will be the duty of thecourt to non­suit the landlord with regard to this ground. Itwill be useful to place reliance on the enunciation of the Apexcourt in the case of S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu's case (supra).The Apex Court has observed that duty is cast upon thePlaintiff to disclose all the facts, it is the duty of the Plaintiffto come to Court with true case and prove it by true evidence.The Apex Court has further observed that deliberate deceptionwith the desire of securing something by taking unfairadvantage of another, it is a deception in order to gain byanother's loss, it is a cheating intended to get an advantage.Further, in Paragraph 6 it has observed that, non disclosure48/75::: Uploaded on - 04/08/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 31/07/2016 18:50:44 :::Bombay High CourtDSS cra-770-13 & 167-14of all the material and relevant facts at the trial tantamountto playing fraud on the Court. A litigant, who approaches theCourt, is bound to produce all the documents executed by himwhich are relevant to the litigation. Withholding of any vitaldocument in this case information, in order to gainadvantage on the other side then he would be guilty of fraudon the Court as well as on the opposite party. Such a personcan be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation. Ifthis principle is to be applied to the facts of the present case, Ihave no manner of doubt that the Respondent­Landlord willhave to be non suited on this ground. Because, it is a case ofnon disclosure of material facts and information, therefore,one of approaching the Court with unclean hands. And asobserved by the Apex Court tantamount to playing fraud onthe court as well as the opposite side. In this case sheerlybecause the Petitioner tenant was vigilant enough, couldmuster the necessary information to confront the Respondentlandlord regarding his need being not bonafide andreasonable.(emphasis supplied)59] In case of Narendra Gulabrao Zade vs. ShiocharanGhashiram Gupta since deceased through Lrs. Smt. RadhabaiShivcharan Gupta & anr.15, in the context of the necessity ofdisclosure by the landlord, this Court has made followingobservations:9. The application as filed by the petitioner before theRent Controller does not contain a reference to other housebelonging to him and situated at Rajapeth i.e. within theMunicipal limits. The law requires the petitioner to prove hisbonafide need and for that to approach the Court of law withclean hands. The petitioner could have explained inadequacyor other lacunae in Rajapeth accommodation to justify hispreference of ground floor in occupation of the tenant. Hadthere been such a case and pleading, the respondent – tenant15 2011 (1) Mh.L.J. 83949/75::: Uploaded on - 04/08/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 31/07/2016 18:50:44 :::Bombay High CourtDSS cra-770-13 & 167-14would have then got an opportunity of cross examination andthen bonafides or otherwise of the need of the landlord could have been judicially appreciated. Unfortunately, such acourse of action is not possible here. The respondent – tenanthas through cross examination of the petitioner placed onrecord only the suppression of availability of other house atRajapeth with further fact that proceedings for eviction ofMohan Singh Thakur therefrom were actually initiated andlater on compromised when Mohan Singh Thakur agreed toincrease the rent. Thus, this material brought on record by thetenant is sufficient to substantiate that there is no bonafideneed of the landlord. Subsequent utilization of premisesvacated by Shri Mohan Singh Thakur for establishing abusiness again raises several questions and as this fact is noton record, the same cannot be considered here.10. The reliance upon the judgment delivered by me andreported in the case of Murlimanohar vs. PrabhaBhattacharya, (supra) in this situation is misconceived.There, the landlady and her sisters qualified gynecologistswere seeking eviction of tenant to start maternity home andhospital. The tenant was urging that they can have theircomplex and in that complex, the tenant also can beaccommodated. The evidence which has come on record therehas been appreciated and such insistence on the part of thetenant was found to be unjustified. This Court has found thatin such situation, the landlord is the best judge of his need.The judgment, therefore, has no application in present facts.The landlord can claim to be a best judge of his need after hefairly discloses all options available to him and shows somereason for choosing particular option i.e. premises. It is thiselection, effected by him after full knowledge andappreciation, which cannot be interfered with judicially.Here, the premises at Rajapeth were suppressed and hence itcannot be said that the landlord has judged his need bonafidein accordance with law. In this situation, I find that thepetitioner – landlord can initiate fresh proceedings inaccordance with law. (emphasis supplied)50/75::: Uploaded on - 04/08/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 31/07/2016 18:50:44 :::Bombay High CourtDSS cra-770-13 & 167-14 60] The two Courts have returned findings on the aspect ofreasonable and bona fide requirement in quite of perfunctorymanner. The two Courts, have permitted themselves to beparticularly influenced by the circumstances that the landlordBaitulla Shaikh resides in the house, which is owned by his motherin­law.Although, the same might have been a relevant factor, it is tobe noted that the need pleaded by Baitulla Shaikh for purposes ofresidence, was not his own, but rather the need pleaded was that ofhis two sons. In fact, the pleadings with regard to need for residenceare sketchy. Though, it is held that the pleadings in the matter ofreasonable and bona fide requirement have to be consideredliberally, there are really, in this case, no pleadings worth the namein the context of personal residential requirement of Baitulla Shaikh.Therefore, the Courts were clearly in error in laying undue emphasisupon the circumstances that the house in which the Baitulla Shaikhresides for number of years is in the name of his mother­in­law.There was no case pleaded by Baitulla Shaikh that he is put to anyinconvenience on this ground. In fact, Baitulla Shaikh chose tosuppress any details about the factum of his residence. 51/75::: Uploaded on - 04/08/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 31/07/2016 18:50:44 :::Bombay High CourtDSS cra-770-13 & 167-1461] The two Courts have further held that the landlord, is thefinal arbiter in the matter of his need and it is neither for the Courts,much less the tenant to dictate any terms. There can be no quarrelwith the proposition per se. However, the intention of the legislatureis surely not to vest in a landlord some sort of unfettered discretionin the matter. The Apex Court, in the case of M.M. Quasim Vs.Manohar Lal Sharma16, at paragraph 19, has observed thus: 19. ….........This approach betrays a woeful lack ofconsciousness relatable to circumstances leading to enactmentof Rent Acts in almost all States in the country. The timehonoured notion that the right of re­entry is unfettered andthat the owner landlord is the sole judge of his requirementhas been made to yield to the needs of the society which hadto enact the Rent Acts specifically devised to curb and fetterthe unrestricted right of re­entry and to pro comparativehardship vide that only on proving some enabling grounds setout in the Rent Act the landlord can re­enter. One suchground is of personal requirement of landlord. Whenexamining a case of personal requirement, if it is pointed outthat there is some vacant premises with the landlord which hecan conveniently occupy, the element of need in hisrequirement would be absent. To reject this aspect by sayingthat the landlord has an unfettered right to choose the premises is to negative the very raison de'etre of the Rent Act.Undoubtedly, if it is shown by the tenant that the landlordhas some other vacant premises in his possession, that byitself may not be sufficient to negative the landlord's claim butin such a situation the Court would expect the landlord toestablish that the premises which is vacant is not suitable forthe purpose of his occupation or for the purpose for which herequires the premises in respect of which the action iscommenced in the Court. It would, however, be a bald statement unsupported by the Rent Act to say that the16 (1981) 2 SCC 3652/75::: Uploaded on - 04/08/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 31/07/2016 18:50:44 :::Bombay High CourtDSS cra-770-13 & 167-14landlord has an unfettered right to choose whatever premiseshe wants and that too irrespective of the fact that he has somevacant premises in possession which he would not occupy andtry to seek to remove the tenant. This approach would put apremium on the landlord's greed to throw out tenants payinglower rent in the name of personal occupation and rent outthe premises in his possession at the market rate. To curb this very tendency the Rent Act was enacted and, therefore, it becomes the duty of the Court administering the Rent Act tobear in mind the object and intendment of the legislature inenacting the same. The Court must understand andappreciate the relationship between legal rules and one ofnecessities of life shelter and the way in which one part of thesociety exacts tribute from another for permission to inhabit aportion of the globe. In 'The Sociology of Law', edited by PatCarlen, the author examines the rent and rent legislation inEngland and Wales and observes as under:"The prevailing paradigms of neo­classical economics and empiricist political theory have determined the conceptual insularity of law and legal institutions, withthe result that they and other social events appear as random existences independent of their historical formation. The force of any theory comparative hardship of law must of course lie in its explanatory power, and this in turn depends on the wider image of social relations which produces it".(emphasis supplied)62] In Civil Revision Application No. 770 of 2013, the Courts haveheld against the applicant on the ground that the applicant hadacquired two rooms at Namdev Cooperative Housing Society andthat PW­4, one Mukund, had stated that permission for constructinga second floor can be granted by the Society. Apart from the53/75::: Uploaded on - 04/08/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 31/07/2016 18:50:44 :::Bombay High CourtDSS cra-770-13 & 167-14circumstance that the acquisition of alternate premises is no longerground under the Rent Act for eviction of a tenant, even if weproceed on the basis that such a circumstance can legitimately betaken into account in the matter of determination of comparativehardship, the material on record indicates that the suit premises atNamdeo Cooperative Housing Society are occupied by one of thetwo married sons of the applicant. Besides, the two rooms inNamdeo Cooperative Housing Society are not on ownership basisbut taken on rent from the municipality. The tenant Gujar hasfurther deposed that in the suit premises, which comprises tworooms ad­measuring 10 x 12 feet each, the said applicant residesalongwith his parents, two sons and two daughters. The twodaughters are married, but often visit the suit premises. One of thesons is married and has shifted to two room at Namdeo CooperativeHousing Society. All such relevant materials have been totallyignored by the two Courts. 63] The Trial Court, in the present case has considered the issue ofbona fide requirement and comparative hardship in a compositemanner rather than consider the two aspects separately. The TrialCourt, failed to appreciate that to begin with, it has to be determined54/75::: Uploaded on - 04/08/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 31/07/2016 18:50:44 :::Bombay High CourtDSS cra-770-13 & 167-14whether the landlords have made out a case that the suit premisesare required by them reasonably and bona fide. Upon record ofsatisfaction in this regard, the Trial Court should have then advertedto the predicates of Section 16(2) of the Rent Act, which mandatethat no decree of eviction shall be passed on the grounds specified inSection 16(1)(g) of the Rent Act, if the Court is satisfied that havingregard to all the circumstances of the case, including the questionwhether reasonable accommodation is acquired by landlord, greaterhardship would be caused by passing a decree than by refusing topass it. There is accordingly, clear failure to exercise jurisdictionunder Section 16(2) of the Rent Act, by confusing and mixing of twoissues of reasonable and bona fide requirement and comparativehardship into one. The entire reasoning of two Courts is that thelandlords are the best judges and the final arbiters in matters ofreasonable and bona fide requirement and further that since thetenant Gujar has two rooms in Namdev Cooperative Housing Society,the respondent­landlords will suffer greater hardship. The landlordsare hoteliers having Hotels like Blue Star and Lucky Restaurant atMahabaleshwar itself. The landlords and their family members areengaged in several businesses like STD Booth, sale of handicraftsetc.. One of the landlords has been the President of Municipal55/75::: Uploaded on - 04/08/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 31/07/2016 18:50:44 :::Bombay High CourtDSS cra-770-13 & 167-14Council of Mahabaleshwar. The record indicates that the familymembers of one of the landlords have served in Municipal Council insome capacities or the other. In contrast, the tenant Gujar, whoresides in suit premises No.1 , is engaged in sale of 'Panipuri' andother road side snacks. The tenant Panhalkar is engaged in sale ofhandicraft items through suit premises No.2 which ad­measurearound 40 sq.ft. Both the tenants have deposed that despite bestefforts, it is not possible for them to acquire other premises. Thereare several premises in the occupation of the landlords which thelandlords did not even bother to disclose in the plaints. In thesecircumstances, even if the issue of comparative hardship wasrequired to be decided, the same would have to be answered infavour of the tenants. In any case, by ignoring of such relevant andvital material on record, the Courts could not have answered suchissue in favour of the landlords. 64] This Court in case of BismilL Bee w/o. SK. Chand andKhajamiyan S/o. Sk. Chand Vs. anwar S.o. Mohd. Akhtar17, hasheld that the provisions of Section 16(2) of the Rent Act, cast astatutory duty upon the Court to make an enquiry to the extent ofneed of the landlord, even if such need is found to be reasonable and17 2010(1) ALL MR 88956/75::: Uploaded on - 04/08/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 31/07/2016 18:50:44 :::Bombay High CourtDSS cra-770-13 & 167-14bona fide. The right of the landlord to seek eviction on one hand andthe protection granted to the tenant on the ground of comparativehardship on the other hand, can be balanced by the Court by makingenquiry into the extent of need of landlord and even passing adecree for partial eviction from the suit premises, to meet the endsof justice. Such an exercise is required to be carried out by the Courtirrespective of the fact whether party demands it or not. If suchexercise is not carried out by the Court, then certainly it would resultnot only in failure to jurisdiction, but also failure to performstatutory and mandatory duty, resulting in failure of justice. Further,Section 16(2) of the Rent Act mandates that the Court is to have'regard to all circumstance of the case'. It further proceeds to state thatthis would include the question whether other reasonableaccommodation is available for the landlord or the tenant. In thiscontext, it is necessary, for the Court to be alive to the financialstatus of both the landlord as well as the tenant. The Court is alsoexpected to be alive to the situation regards scarcity ofaccommodation at a particular place. In the present case, the twoCourts have failed to undertake any such exercise and the impugnedorders consequently are unsustainable. 57/75::: Uploaded on - 04/08/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 31/07/2016 18:50:44 :::Bombay High CourtDSS cra-770-13 & 167-14The premises required for immediate purpose of demolitionordered by Municipal Authorities (Section 16(1)(k) of the RentAct)65] The Trial Court as well as the Appeal Court have upheld theplea for eviction on the ground contemplated by Section 16(1)(k) ofthe Rent Act. There is, however, variance in the reasoning adoptedby the Trial Court and Appeal Court. 66] Section 16(1)(k) of the Rent Act reads thus:16(1)(k) ­ that the premises are required for the immediatepurpose of demolition ordered by any municipal authority orother competent authority; 67] The Trial Court, as reflected in the judgment and decree dated4 July 2011, had framed the following issue in the context ofgrounds for eviction under Section 16(1)(k) of the Rent Act.(2) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for possession on theground that suit property is in dilapidated condition andordered to be demolished by the local authority as beingdangerous for human habitation ?68] From the manner in which the issue was cast by the TrialCourt as also the discussion in the judgments and decrees made bythe Trial Court and the Appeal Court, it is clear that both the Courtshave not even adverted to the aspect of as to whether the suit58/75::: Uploaded on - 04/08/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 31/07/2016 18:50:44 :::Bombay High CourtDSS cra-770-13 & 167-14premises were required for 'immediate purpose of demolition' ascontemplated by Section 16(1)(k) of the Rent Act. The italicisedexpression, is not without a purpose or a mere surplasage. Before,any decree of eviction can be made under Section 16(1)(k) of theRent Act, the Court has to satisfy itself that the suit premises arerequired for the 'immediate purpose of demolition'. In the absence ofeven the consideration of this aspect of immediacy, much less recordof any satisfaction in that regard, there is clear failure to exercisejurisdiction. This position is no longer res integra. 69] The Apex Court, in case of P.O.P.R. and Sons (P) Ltd. vs.Associates Publishers (Madras) Limited18, has held that theexpression 'immediate purpose' in Section 14(1)(b) of the TamilnaduBuildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 (Tamilnadu Act)relates to directness rather than speed, although the absence of thelatter negatives the former. This expression denotes connection andtimely action, but not instant action, yet delayed action is a sign ofremoteness of purpose. The expression must be understood asrequired in direct connection and timely purpose and not just somesecondary, remote or premature purpose. The legislative intent isthat the purpose should be immediate or direct and not mediate,18 (1991) 1 SCC 30159/75::: Uploaded on - 04/08/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 31/07/2016 18:50:44 :::Bombay High CourtDSS cra-770-13 & 167-14remote, not direct or secondary. The Apex Court, in the context ofSection 14(1)(b) of the Tamilnadu Act as also observed that theCourt does not normally sit in judgment over the appreciation ofevidence and findings of fact rendered by authorities empoweredunder a statute. However, if the authority has acted in excess of itsjurisdiction, asked itself wrong questions or misunderstood ormisapplied the law, failed to consider the relevant circumstances,allowed itself to be persuaded by irrelevant circumstances, then thefindings are liable to be reversed as perverse by a Court exercisingjudicial review. Any repository of power must act, in accordance withthe law and on basis of relevant evidence. The authorities must actby reason and justice, not by private opinion. 70] The learned Single Judge of this Court in case of Mrs. PiadadFernander vs. K.M. Ramesh and ors.19, in the context of provisionscontained in Section 13(1)(hhh) of the 1947 Act have held thatsatisfaction regards immediacy is not a mere formality. The Courtmust apply its mind to all facts and circumstances of the caseincluding the order of demolition and then come to the conclusionone way or the other. The earlier decision of this court in CivilRevision Application Nos. 1734 to 1748 of 1965 decided on 1419 AIR 1970 Bombay 37660/75::: Uploaded on - 04/08/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 31/07/2016 18:50:44 :::Bombay High CourtDSS cra-770-13 & 167-14August 1967 (Bom.) was referred to and relied upon to hold that theexpression 'immediate' must be given its due weight in the context.Mr. Justice Patel , in the decision rendered on 14 August 1967, hasobserved thus:“In my view, the word 'immediate' in the above clause hasbeen used by the legislature with some intent. If thelegislature wanted to provide that the landlords should beentitled to recover possession for the purpose of demolition ofthe property ordered by the Corporation there should havebeen no necessity of using the word 'immediate' and even themeaning it would have borne would be the same which Mr.Dhanuka wants me to give to the above clause. It must beremembered in this connection that between the issuing of thenotices by the Municipal Corporation for demolition of thepremises and the filing of a suit many things might interveneand though at one time the Corporation might have thoughtthat a building was in such a ruinous condition that it mustbe ordered to be demolished, the same state of affairs mightnot continue to exist after the lapse of a few years. The word'immediate' must be given its due effect in the context.” 71] This Court, again in the context of Section 13(1)(hhh) of the1947 Act, in case of M.L. Sonavane vs. C.G. Sonar20, has held thatbefore any order of eviction under Section 13(1)(hhh) of the 1947Act can be made, the Court must be satisfied upon two aspects. Itmust be satisfied that a decree for possession has to be passedagainst the a tenant and secondly, “premises are required for the20 1981 Bom.R.C. 12861/75::: Uploaded on - 04/08/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 31/07/2016 18:50:44 :::Bombay High CourtDSS cra-770-13 & 167-14immediate purposes of demolition”. Unless the Court is satisfied aboutthe existence of both these things, it would be difficult to see how aCourt can pass a decree for eviction against a tenant. Thesatisfaction must relate to the requirement of passing a decree forpossession against the tenant, and the immediate necessity ofdemolition. The satisfaction of the Court is not a substitute for thesatisfaction of the local authority. Nor is it that Court must itselfenquire that the premises are in such a ruinous condition that theyare required to be demolished. That satisfaction is relegated to thelocal authority. But, even apart from that satisfaction is still reservedfor the Court by the terms of the section, which deals with thatsatisfaction with regard to the passing of a decree for possessionagainst the tenant, and the immediate purpose of demolition. If theCourt is satisfied, on a consideration of the subsequent events thatthe premises are not required 'for the immediate purpose ofdemolition', then, notwithstanding the order passed upon a bona fideexercise of the power by the local authority, the Court may stillrefuse to pass a decree. 72] Finally, in case of Manohar P. Rajpal vs. Satara CityMunicipal Corporation, Satara and anr.21, which was relied upon21 AIR 1992 Bom.R.C. 22062/75::: Uploaded on - 04/08/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 31/07/2016 18:50:44 :::Bombay High CourtDSS cra-770-13 & 167-14by both the Trial Court as well as Appeal Court, this Court has heldthat it is open to the Rent Court, before making an order of evictionunder Section 13(1)(hhh) of 1947 Act to examine whether the ordermade by the local authority is based upon relevant considerationsand not irrelevant ones. Further, some enquiry is also warranted inthe context of expression 'immediate purpose' since the expression isnot a mere surplusage and the same has to be considered havingregard to various circumstances, including subsequent events.73] Now if the impugned judgments and decrees made by theTrial Court and the Appeal Court are perused, it is clear that there isno serious investigation as to whether the notice dated 23 January2002, upon which the landlords have founded their cause of actionto seek eviction under Section 16(1)(k) of the Rent Act was issuedon basis of relevant considerations and after eschewing irrelevantones. Further there is no discussion at all on the issue of 'immediatepurpose of demolition'. As held in case of M.L. Sonavane (supra), therecord of satisfaction on the aforesaid twin aspects is necessarybefore any eviction order can be made on basis of provisions parimateria to Section 16 (1)(k) of the Rent Act. Therefore, in theabsence of even adverting to the significant aspect of 'immediate 63/75::: Uploaded on - 04/08/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 31/07/2016 18:50:44 :::Bombay High CourtDSS cra-770-13 & 167-14purpose of demolition' , the impugned judgments and decrees cannotbe sustained.74] The notice dated 23 January 2002, which as noted earlier, wasfoundation of the institution of the suits by the landlords states thatinspection was carried out on 22 January 2002 and therein it wasrevealed that the eastern wall of House No. 86B is bloated and thereare cracks therein. Similarly, wooden rafters have decayed and theroof destabilized. This condition, poses danger to the personsresiding in the house as also passers by. The notice finally directs thelandlords to remove the dangerous part of the house and warns thatthe Municipal Authority will not be responsible for any untowardinstances, including loss and life or property. 75] In the context of the provisions contained in Section 16(1)(k)of the Rent Act as also the ruling in case of Manohar Rajpal(supra), the correct question to be posed would be whetherdemolition of the suit premises has indeed been ordered by theMunicipal Authorities and further, whether such orders are basedupon relevant considerations and not irrelevant ones. Some enquiry64/75::: Uploaded on - 04/08/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 31/07/2016 18:50:44 :::Bombay High CourtDSS cra-770-13 & 167-14is also warranted in the context of the expression 'immediate purpose'employed in Section 16(1)(k) of the Rent Act. Apart from thedecision of the Apex Court in case of P.O.P.R. & Sons (P) Ltd.(supra), this Court in case of M.L. Sonawane (supra), has held thatthe word 'immediate' is not a surplusage and the same must beconstrued having regard to the circumstances. 76] In the notice dated 23 January 2002, there is no reference tothe same being issued under Section 195 of the MaharashtraMunicipalities Act, 1965 (1965 Act), which is the law, which governsthe Municipal Authorities at Mahabaleshwar. This is significantbecause there is a statutory appeal against the notice under Section195 of the 1965 Act, which opportunity was denied to the tenants.Further, the notice is not directly in the context of suit premisesoccupied by the tenants, but rather pertains to certain portions ofHouse No.86B. The notice, does not require demolition of the entireHouse No.86B, but rather requires removal of portions thereof,including in particular eastern wall, rafters and roofing. On basis ofsuch notice, it is difficult to sustain an eviction order under Section16(1)(k) of the Rent Act, particularly where no satisfactionwhatsoever has been recorded by the two Courts on the aspect of65/75::: Uploaded on - 04/08/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 31/07/2016 18:50:44 :::Bombay High CourtDSS cra-770-13 & 167-14'immediate purpose of demolition', which satisfaction, was required tobe recorded, both in terms of the context of Section 16(1)(k) of theRent Act as also the decision of this Court in case of M.L. Sonavane(supra). 77] There is yet another significant aspect in the context of orderof eviction under Section 16(1)(k) of the Rent Act. On 6 August2002, the tenants lodged the complaint to the Municipal Authoritiesthat the landlord Baitulla Shaikh was deliberately indulging inweakening of the walls of the portion of House NO.86, in hispossession, with the objective of weakening the entire structure.Based upon such complaint, on 29 August 2002, an inspection washeld by the Municipal Authority. Upon finding some merit in thecomplaint of the tenants, the decision was taken to issue appropriatenotice to the landlords Baitulla Shaikh and C.K. Aris, Hamid.Pursuant to such decision, the Municipal Authority, by notice dated29 August 2002, notified the landlords that during inspection it wasrevealed that the landlords are illegally and unauthorisedlyweakening the walls of House No. 86 and that in future, if the wallcollapses and causes loss to the life and property of the tenants,then, it is the landlords, who will be entirely responsible for the66/75::: Uploaded on - 04/08/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 31/07/2016 18:50:44 :::Bombay High CourtDSS cra-770-13 & 167-14same. The documents like compliant of the tenants, inspectionreport as well as notice dated 29 August 2002 have been proved inthe course of evidence and have been marked as Exhibits 223, 224and 225. This vital material has been completely ignored by the twoCourts. Exclusion of relevant and vital material, is also a species ofperversity in the record of any finding of fact. The CourtCommissioner was also appointed and even the Report of the CourtCommissioner does not make out the case that the premises wererequired for immediate purpose of demolition. The evidence of theMunicipal Engineers as well as the Court Commissioner, at thehighest indicates that certain portions of House No.86 are in need ofrepairs. But the evidence does not make out any case that the suitpremises were required for the immediate purpose of demolition. Byvirtually ignoring such material, the two Courts have proceeded tomake a decree of eviction under Section 16(1)(k) of the Rent Act.This is an exercise in excess of jurisdiction. There is both illegality aswell as material irregularity in the record of findings of fact,inasmuch as the Courts have failed to ask itself correct question inthe context of 'immediate purpose' and further failed to considerrelevant circumstances, rather the two Courts have allowedthemselves to be persuaded by irrelevant circumstances.67/75::: Uploaded on - 04/08/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 31/07/2016 18:50:44 :::Bombay High CourtDSS cra-770-13 & 167-1478] The learned counsel for the landlords, however, attempted tomake reference to certain subsequent notices issued by theMunicipal Authority during pendency of proceedings. One suchnotice is dated 3 December 2005. Again, this notice makes noreference to the Section 195 of the 1965 Act. Copy of this notice wasmarked to Shri. Dastagir Dange and Shri. Sanjay Shinde, who werestated to be the complainants. There is no question of placing anyreliance of such notice dated 3 December 2005, because theMunicipal Authority, by subsequent communication dated 16December 2005 (Exhibit­299) informed the tenants that furtherenquiries were conducted in the context of complaint made byShri.Dattatray Deshmukh, which were the basis for issuance ofnotice dated 23 January 2002 and it was revealed that the complaintmade by Shri. Dattatray Deshmukh was false. There is record ofletter dated 14 November 2005 addressed by Shri. DattatrayDeshmukh stating that he had never made any complaint. Thecommunication dated 16 December 2005 has been marked (asExhibit­299) in the record. 68/75::: Uploaded on - 04/08/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 31/07/2016 18:50:45 :::Bombay High CourtDSS cra-770-13 & 167-1479] The learned counsel for the landlords also made reference tonotice dated 16 July 2009 (Exhibit­196). This is a notice whichmakes reference to Section 195 of the 1965 Act. As against thisnotice, the appeal has been instituted by the tenants and the same ispending consideration. That apart, even this notice directs thedemolition of eastern wall and states that the Municipal Authoritieswill not be responsible for loss of life or property. What needs to beemphasized is that even this notice dated 16 July 2009 does notrequire demolition of the suit premises, but only the eastern wall ofHouse No.86. Then again, this notice makes reference to the CourtCommissioner Report, without really considering the contents of saidReport.80] Upon cumulative consideration all the aforesaid circumstancesas well as law on the subject, the eviction under Section 16 (1)(k) ofthe Rent Act is unsustainable. The Courts have not even adverted to,much less recorded any satisfaction on the aspect of 'immediatepurpose of demolition'. This is an essential pre­requisite before anyeviction order can be made under Section 16(1)(k) of the Rent Act,as held by this Court in case of M.L. Sonavane (supra). Further, theCourts have not even adverted to the issue as to whether notice69/75::: Uploaded on - 04/08/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 31/07/2016 18:50:45 :::Bombay High CourtDSS cra-770-13 & 167-14dated 23 January 2002 as also the subsequent notices indeedrequired the demolition of the entire House No. 86 or for that matterthe entire suit premises. The Courts have also not eschewed theirrelevant considerations or taken into account relevantconsiderations. In particular, the Courts have totally ignored noticedated 29 August 2002 (Exhibit­155) issued by the MunicipalAuthority to the landlords in the context of deliberate damage to thewalls by the landlords, in order to prejudice the tenants. The noticedated 29 August 2002 issued by the Municipal Authority is backedby the documents at Exhibit­223 and 224 in the form of complaintsand notings in pursuance of inspection of House No. 86. The Courtshave also failed to take into consideration the communication dated16 December 2005 (Exhibit­299) which accepts that Shri. DattatrayDeshmukh upon whose complaint, the notice dated 23 January 2002was issued, had made no complaint at all in the matter. The CourtCommissioner's Report and evidence as also the MunicipalEngineer's evidence has not been adverted to by the two Courts inproper perspective. Therefore, applying the principles set out in caseof M.L. Sonavane (supra) and Manohar Rajpal (supra), it is notpossible to sustain eviction under Section 16(1)(k) of the Rent Act. 70/75::: Uploaded on - 04/08/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 31/07/2016 18:50:45 :::Bombay High CourtDSS cra-770-13 & 167-14Permanent construction without landlords' written consent(Section 16(1)(b) of the Rent Act)81] The landlords' had alleged that the tenant Panhalkar hascarried out a permanent construction on the suit premises No.2without landlords' written consent and therefore, the ground foreviction under Section 16(1)(b) of the Rent Act was made out, in sofar as the tenant Panhalkar is concerned. The Trial Court had in factheld that the ground under Section 16(1)(b) of the Rent Act was notmade out by the landlords and therefore, declined to make decree ofeviction under Section 16(1)(b) of the Rent Act. The Appeal Courthas, however, reversed the Trial Court by mainly relying upon theReport of the Commissioner at Exhibit­122, which, according to theAppeal Court, discloses that the tenant Panhalkar has erected a shedon the front side of suit premises No.2 by implanting iron pole incement and concrete. The finding of the Appeal Court is vitiated byperversity as well as non­application of mind. 82] In the plaint instituted against the tenant Panhalkar, theallegation is that the tenant Panhalkar, in front of suit premises No.2has erected that a shed on platform (Otta) and that erection of such 71/75::: Uploaded on - 04/08/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 31/07/2016 18:50:45 :::Bombay High CourtDSS cra-770-13 & 167-14shed constitutes a permanent construction as envisaged by Section16(1)(b) of the Rent Act.83] The material on record, as analysed by the Trial Court clearlyreveals that the suit premises No.2, which are adjacent to almostsimilar premises in the occupation of the landlords are used for thepurposes of sale of some handicrafts, Mahabaleshwar sticks etc.During the tourist season, all such shops, erects temporary structuresto cover the small space between the actual shop and the road.There is absolutely no element of any permanence in so far as theerection of such temporary shed/covering is concerned. Theexplanation to Section 16(1)(b), which has not even been advertedto by the Appeal Court provides that the expression 'permanentstructure' does not include the carrying out of any work with thepermission wherever necessary, of the Municipal Authority, forproviding a wooden partition, standing cooking platform in kitchen,door, lattice work or opening of a window necessary for ventilation,a fall ceiling, installation of air­conditioners, an exhaust outlet or asmoke­chimney. There must be an element of permanency in thestructure, because a temporary structure of the nature described in 72/75::: Uploaded on - 04/08/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 31/07/2016 18:50:45 :::Bombay High CourtDSS cra-770-13 & 167-14the evidence adduced by the tenants, is not within thecontemplation of Section 16(1)(b) of the Rent Act. 84] In the present case, upon small space between the suitpremises No.2 and the road a temporary shed is put up. This shed, issimilar to the sheds erected by other shops on the same street. Theshed is basically some sort of protection to the customers from therains. There is neither any element of permanency, nor any questionof intention to put up any permanent structure upon the suitpremises. In these circumstances, there was absolutely no warrantfor the Appeal Court to reverse the Trial Court and make a decreeunder Section 16(1)(b) of the Rent Act. Miscellaneous Applications in these Civil Revision Applications85] The tenants, by Civil Application Nos. 210 and 211 of 2015,have applied for leave to produce additional evidence in these CivilRevision Applications. Mainly, the tenants wish to bring on recordthe details with regard to further and other premises acquired by orin possession of the landlords and their children. This is in thecontext of challenge to decrees of eviction on the grounds ofreasonable and bona fide requirement. Since it is held that thelandlords were not entitled to any decrees upon such ground, thereis no necessity to permit any further material / evidence in thisregard. Accordingly, Civil Application Nos. 210 and 211 of 2015 aredisposed of.86] The landlords have taken out Civil Application Nos. 352 and353 of 2014 seeking mesne profits from the tenants. Since theeviction decrees are being set aside, there is no question of award ofany mesne profits. Accordingly, Civil Application Nos. 352 and 353of 2014 are also disposed of.Final Order87] For all the aforesaid reasons, Civil Revision ApplicationNos.770 of 2013 and 167 of 2014 are allowed and the impugnedjudgments and decrees dated 4 July 2011 and 4 July 2013 are setaside. Accordingly, Rule is made absolute in the two Civil RevisionApplications. 88] For the reasons set out in paragraph '85', Civil Application Nos.210 and 211 of 2015 taken out by the tenants seeking leave toproduce additional evidence on record are disposed of. 89] As the two Civil Revision Applications have been allowed andthe eviction decrees are set aside, Civil Application Nos. 352 and 353of 2014 seeking mesne profits from the tenants do not survive andare consequently disposed of.90] In the facts and circumstances as aforesaid, there shall be noorder as to costs.(M.S. SONAK, J.)
landlord-tenant dispute,