Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/935/739/283402/
Timestamp: 2019-11-14 08:18:38
Document Index: 278901033

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 846', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 848', '§ 7201', '§ 841', '§ 848', '§ 7201', '§ 846', '§ 848', '§ 848', '§ 848', '§ 192']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Juan Leonardo Paulino (90-5090); Ada Fernandez, A/k/a Adapaulino (90-5094); Edward Chazulle (90-5091); Alex Vieyra(90-5092); Juan Carlos Paulino, A/k/a John Wilson, A/k/aedward Sanchez (90-5093), Defendants-appellants,gary Helton, Steve Pierre, Samuel Torres, Defendants, 935 F.2d 739 (6th Cir. 1991) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Sixth Circuit › 1991 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Juan Leonardo Paulino (90-5090); Ada Fernandez, A/k...
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Juan Leonardo Paulino (90-5090); Ada Fernandez, A/k/a Adapaulino (90-5094); Edward Chazulle (90-5091); Alex Vieyra(90-5092); Juan Carlos Paulino, A/k/a John Wilson, A/k/aedward Sanchez (90-5093), Defendants-appellants,gary Helton, Steve Pierre, Samuel Torres, Defendants, 935 F.2d 739 (6th Cir. 1991)
US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit - 935 F.2d 739 (6th Cir. 1991) Argued Feb. 14, 1991. Decided June 3, 1991
Defendants appeal their convictions on charges of conspiring to possess and distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and possessing with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1). Defendant Juan Leonardo Paulino also challenges his conviction for conducting a continuing criminal enterprise with respect to violations of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) (1) and 846, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848; and his conviction on two counts of evading taxes, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201.
On May 17, 1989, an indictment was returned charging Juan Leonardo Paulino, Ada Fernandez, Gary Helton, Edward Chazulle, Alex Vieyra, Steve Pierre, Carlos Paulino, and Samuel Torres with one count of conspiring to distribute cocaine between 1987 and March 9, 1989; Carlos Paulino and Torres with one count of possession with the intent to distribute 752 grams of cocaine on March 9, 1989; and Leonardo Paulino with conducting a continuing criminal enterprise with respect to violations of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) (1) and 846, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848. On August 2, 1989, a superseding indictment was returned. The superseding indictment was identical to the May 17, 1989, indictment as to the first three counts; and added two counts charging Leonardo Paulino with evading taxes in the amounts of $41,471 and $29,813 in the calendar years of 1987 and 1988, respectively, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201.
Defendants Vieyra and Carlos Paulino challenge the district court's denial of their motions to suppress the cocaine seized as a result of the stop and subsequent search of the cooler on March 9, 1989. Because Vieyra never raised the issue below, he has waived his right to appeal. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b) (3) & (f).1 We will therefore consider only Carlos Paulino's arguments. Carlos Paulino does not dispute the existence of the facts justifying a Terry stop. Rather, he contends that the stop was in fact an arrest, and that the government was therefore required to demonstrate probable cause, which ran only to the cooler and not to the automobile in question. The government counters that the search was justified as both a protective search and/or as a probable cause search.
It is well established that an officer may legally search for weapons if a reasonably prudent officer in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1883, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968); United States v. Kelly, 913 F.2d 261, 264 (6th Cir. 1990). In Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201 (1983), the Supreme Court held that these safety concerns, in the context of roadside encounters, justify the search of the passenger compartment of an automobile, limited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden, if the police officer possesses a reasonable belief based on specific and articuable facts that the suspect is dangerous and may gain immediate control of the weapons. Long, 463 U.S. at 1049, 103 S. Ct. at 3480.
In this case, we find that the officers acted reasonably in searching the cooler for weapons. First, the officers had prior information that Carlos Paulino carried an Uzi gun, and had reasonable suspicion to believe that the driver of the vehicle was in fact Carlos Paulino. See United States v. Hardnett, 804 F.2d 353, 356 (6th Cir. 1986) (informant's tip is sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1097, 107 S. Ct. 1318, 94 L. Ed. 2d 171 (1987). Second, the cooler was in the passenger area of the vehicle where the defendants had ready access to it and could have easily concealed a weapon. The number of officers on the scene, even when coupled with the fact that the cooler and the defendants were outside the vehicle, did not obviate the need for a protective search of the vehicle and its contents. Thus, we find that the search of the cooler was justified as a protective search under Long.
In the alternative, the government argues that the search at issue was justified as a probable cause search. A search of a vehicle for contraband as opposed to a weapon cannot be justified under Terry. See Long, 463 U.S. at 1049 n. 14, 103 S. Ct. at 3481 n. 14; United States v. Barrett, 890 F.2d 855, 862 (6th Cir. 1989). It is well settled, however, that a warrantless search of a vehicle lawfully stopped by the police does not violate the fourth amendment if the officers have probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S. Ct. 280, 69 L. Ed. 543 (1925); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 799, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2159, 72 L. Ed. 2d 572 (1982); United States v. Crotinger, 928 F.2d 203, (6th Cir., 1991). Furthermore, if probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, then that probable cause extends to every part of the vehicle and any containers that may conceal the object of the search. Ross, 456 U.S. at 824, 102 S. Ct. at 2172. Probable cause is determined not by the nature of the container in which the contraband is secreted, but by the object of the search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe it may be found.
Defendant relies on United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 97 S. Ct. 2476, 53 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1977), and Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 99 S. Ct. 2586, 61 L. Ed. 2d 235 (1979), in support of his argument that probable cause ran only to the cooler and not to the entire automobile. In those cases, the Supreme Court held that the moving vehicle exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to a footlocker and suitcase, respectively, which the police had probable cause to believe contained contraband prior to their being placed in the trunks of the automobiles. Concededly, the police in the instant case had prior knowledge that the cooler contained cocaine secreted in its lining. Unlike Chadwick and Sanders however, where the luggage was out of control of the defendants once they were inside the vehicle, here the cooler was in the defendants' control and out of sight of the agents from the time it was placed in the car until the vehicle was eventually pulled over. As found by the district court, the cocaine could have easily been removed from the cooler and concealed elsewhere in the car. For this reason, we believe that probable cause extended to the vehicle.
We find the instant case more akin to United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478, 105 S. Ct. 881, 83 L. Ed. 2d 890 (1985). In Johns, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the warrantless search of packages discovered in the back of a pickup truck on the basis of the automobile exception. In that case, United States customs agents observed two airplanes, which they had reason to believe were transporting marijuana, meet two pickup trucks in an isolated desert airstrip. Thereafter, they observed individuals covering packages in the back of the truck with a blanket. The packaging was similar to that which the officers knew to be used to enclose marijuana, and they smelled marijuana emanating from the package. The Johns Court distinguished Chadwick, commenting that in Chadwick there had been an immediate seizure of a closed footlocker from the trunk of an automobile and the police therefore had no probable cause to believe that the automobile, as contrasted with the footlocker, contained contraband. Johns, 469 U.S. at 482, 105 S. Ct. at 884.
In Johns, unlike the instant case, the agents were unaware of the fact that the packages contained marijuana until they approached the vehicle. However, the Supreme Court also found that they had reason to believe that marijuana might be contained elsewhere in the vehicle since the customs officers on the ground were unable to observe the airplanes after they were landed, and consequently did not see the packages loaded into the pickup truck. Id. 469 U.S. at 482, 105 S. Ct. at 884. Similarly, in the instant case, the cooler was out of the officers' view for several minutes, an adequate amount of time to remove the contraband from the cooler and hide it elsewhere in the vehicle. Thus, under the authority of Ross and Johns, we conclude that probable cause ran to the vehicle as well as the cooler.
All five defendants argue that the trial court committed reversible error in refusing to give a multiple conspiracy instruction. If only one conspiracy is alleged in the indictment and the evidence adduced at trial can reasonably be construed to support a finding of multiple conspiracies, the resulting variance between the indictment and the proof constitutes reversible error if the appellants can demonstrate prejudice. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 66 S. Ct. 1239, 90 L. Ed. 1557 (1946); United States v. Warner, 690 F.2d 545, 548 (6th Cir. 1982).
This court has stated that in determining whether the evidence showed single or multiple conspiracies it must be remembered that the essence of the crime of conspiracy is agreement; and that in order to prove a single conspiracy the government must show that each alleged member agreed to participate in what he knew to be a collective venture directed toward a common goal. Warner, 690 F.2d at 548-49 (citations and quotations omitted). On the other hand, the government is not required to prove an actual agreement among the various conspirators in order to establish a single conspiracy. Id. at 549. Further, in a "chain conspiracy" such as the one at issue here, it is enough that each member of the conspiracy realizes that he is participating in a joint enterprise, even if he does not know the identities of many of the participants. Id. See also United States v. Davenport, 808 F.2d 1212, 1215-16 (6th Cir. 1987).
The issue presented is one of first impression in this circuit. Several other circuits have held that for constitutional purposes, an indictment charging a CCE offense is sufficient if it articulates in statutory language the elements of the violation, and need not list the specific predicate offenses of the "continuing series of violations" element.3 United States v. Martell, 906 F.2d 555, 558 (11th Cir. 1990); United States v. Amend, 791 F.2d 1120, 1125 (4th Cir.) (indictment sufficient although not alleging five individuals with whom the defendant acted in concert), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 930, 107 S. Ct. 399, 93 L. Ed. 2d 353 (1986); United States v. Sterling, 742 F.2d 521, 526 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1099, 105 S. Ct. 2322, 85 L. Ed. 2d 840 (1985); Sperling v. United States, 692 F.2d 223, 226 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1131, 103 S. Ct. 3111, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1366 (1983); United States v. Johnson, 575 F.2d 1347, 1356 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 907, 99 S. Ct. 1213, 1214, 59 L. Ed. 2d 454 (1979). Three other circuits have held that an indictment was sufficient where the predicate offenses were alleged in other counts of the indictment. United States v. Staggs, 881 F.2d 1527, 1531 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S. Ct. 719, 107 L. Ed. 2d 739 (1990); United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706, 752 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 908, 109 S. Ct. 3221, 106 L. Ed. 2d 571 (1989); United States v. Becton, 751 F.2d 250, 256-57 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1018, 105 S. Ct. 3480, 87 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1985).
We agree with those circuits which have held that all that is required to satisfy defendant's fifth amendment right to be tried only upon offenses presented to a grand jury is evidence that the defendant committed three predicate offenses for a section 848 violation, regardless of whether such offenses were charged in counts in the indictment. The Supreme Court has held that an indictment is sufficient "if it, first, contains the elements of the offense charged and fairly informs a defendant of the charge against which he must defend, and, second, enables him to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense." Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S. Ct. 2887, 2907, 41 L. Ed. 2d 590 (1974). See also Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763-64, 82 S. Ct. 1038, 1046-47, 8 L. Ed. 2d 240 (1962); United States v. Gray, 790 F.2d 1290, 1296 (6th Cir. 1986); United States v. Piccolo, 723 F.2d 1234, 1238 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 970, 104 S. Ct. 2342, 80 L. Ed. 2d 817 (1984).4 An indictment is generally sufficient if it sets forth the words of the statute itself, as long as the statute itself adequately states all of the elements of the offense. Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117, 94 S. Ct. at 2907; Gray, 790 F.2d at 1298. Furthermore, a defendant is not entitled to a bill of particulars with respect to information which is available through other sources. Martell, 906 F.2d at 558.
unlawfully, willfully, knowingly and intentionally did engage in a Continuing Criminal Enterprise in that he did violate Title 21, United States Code, Sections 841(a) (1) and 846 which violations were part of a continuing series of violations of said statutes undertaken by Juan Leonardo Paulino in concert with at least five (5) other persons with respect to whom Juan Leonardo Paulino occupied a position of organizer, supervisor and manager....
Furthermore, as defendant acknowledged in his brief, the availability of a bill of particulars provides adequate protection for a defendant's sixth amendment right by providing him with a means of discovering the specific violations the government intends to use at trial. See United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374, 378, 74 S. Ct. 113, 115, 98 L. Ed. 92 (1953); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 66, 62 S. Ct. 457, 463, 86 L. Ed. 680 (1942). Here, although Leonardo Paulino sought a bill of particulars on the conspiracy charge, no similar request was made with respect to the CCE charge.
Defendant Leonardo Paulino next argues that the district court erred in instructing the jury that it had to find Leonardo Paulino guilty of Count I, the conspiracy count, as one of the "continuing series of violations" elements under the CCE charge in Count III of the indictment. Leonardo Paulino asserts that a section 846 conspiracy (21 U.S.C. § 846) cannot be the predicate act for a section 848 offense (21 U.S.C. § 848), since conspiracies are inchoate crimes, and section 848 requires proof of a substantive violation.
We have expressly held that a conspiracy under section 846 can be a predicate offense under section 848. United States v. Davis, 809 F.2d 1194, 1203 (6th Cir.) cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1007, 107 S. Ct. 3234, 97 L. Ed. 2d 740 (1987); United States v. Schuster, 769 F.2d 337, 345 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1021, 106 S. Ct. 1210, 89 L. Ed. 2d 322 (1986). Notwithstanding, we have also held that a defendant cannot be subjected to cumulative punishment for both a conspiracy violation under section 846 and a CCE violation under section 848, even if the conspiracy and CCE sentences run concurrently. United States v. English, 925 F.2d 154, 160 (6th Cir. 1991).5 Thus, defendant's conspiracy conviction under Count I of the indictment must be vacated in light of his CCE conviction under Count III. We REMAND this issue to the district court with instructions to vacate Leonardo Paulino's conspiracy conviction.
In conspiracy cases, the general rule is that persons jointly indicted should be tried together. This is especially true where the offenses charged may be established against all of the defendants by the same evidence resulting from the same series of acts. United States v. Hessling, 845 F.2d 617, 619 (6th Cir. 1988). Once the defendants have been properly joined under Rule 8(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a "strong showing of prejudice" is required to justify severance; and a district court's denial of a motion for severance under Fed. R. Crim. P. 14 is reversible only for an abuse of discretion. 845 F.2d at 619. To establish prejudice, a defendant must show that the jury is unable to separate and to treat distinctively evidence that is relevant to each particular defendant at trial. United States v. Moore, 917 F.2d 215, 220 (6th Cir. 1990) (citing United States v. Gallo, 763 F.2d 1504, 1525 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1017, 106 S. Ct. 1200, 89 L. Ed. 2d 314 (1986)), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S. Ct. 1590, 113 L. Ed. 2d 654 (1991). Even if the defendant establishes some potential jury confusion, this must be balanced against society's need for speedy and efficient trials. Moore, 917 F.2d at 220.
In Gallo, we stated that a prejudicial "spillover effect" warranting severance "turns in part on whether the numbers of conspiracies and conspirators involved were too great for the jury to give each defendant the separate and individual consideration of the evidence against him to which he was entitled." 763 F.2d at 1526 (quoting United States v. Toliver, 541 F.2d 958, 962 (2d Cir. 1976)); see also Moore, 917 F.2d at 220. Gallo held that a district court's refusal to grant a severance was not an abuse of discretion where there were seven indicted defendants, five of whom eventually went to trial, and there was no other showing of compelling prejudice. Similarly, in this case, five of the eight indicted defendants stood trial. Furthermore, the evidence in this case related to one conspiracy, not multiple conspiracies, and much of it was overlapping as to each defendant. As we noted in Moore, " [t]he presentation of evidence applicable to more than one defendant is simply a fact of life in multiple-defendant cases;" and "a defendant is not entitled to a severance simply because the evidence against a co-defendant is far more damaging than the evidence against him." Moore, 917 F.2d at 220 (citations omitted). We find no showing that quantity and complexity of the evidence was so overwhelming that the jury was unable to give each defendant the separate and individual consideration of the evidence to which he was entitled. Id. at 221.
Carlos Paulino claims that his association with his brother and co-defendant Leonardo Paulino led to jury confusion. However, Carlos Paulino has offered no compelling showing that prejudice resulted, and a jury must be presumed capable of sorting out the evidence and considering the case of each defendant separately. United States v. Thomas, 728 F.2d 313, 319 (6th Cir. 1984) (citation omitted). Carlos Paulino's complaint regarding closing argument on behalf of Leonardo Paulino is likewise without merit. Counsel for Leonardo Paulino did not state that "Juan Carlos was a part of [the conspiracy]." Rather, in attempting to demonstrate that fewer than five people were involved in an alleged organization, counsel for Leonardo merely stated, "You got Juan Carlos Paulino; according to Samuel he's in the organization." It is clear that counsel for Leonardo was arguing in the hypothetical. In any event, no objection was raised on behalf of Carlos at the time, and the issue is therefore waived on appeal. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b) (5) & (f).
Finally, we must examine Leonardo Paulino's contention that his joinder with co-defendant Chazulle prevented Chazulle from testifying on his behalf. Vague allegations, such as the one presented here, do not rise to the level of mandating separate trials. To justify a separate trial, a defendant is required to show that his co-defendant would be willing to testify on his behalf. This requires a showing that the co-defendant would not invoke his fifth amendment privilege, and that the testimony would be exculpatory. United States v. Whitley, 734 F.2d 1129, 1139 (6th Cir. 1984) (citing United States v. Goldfarb, 643 F.2d 422, 435 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 827, 102 S. Ct. 117, 118, 70 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1981)); see also United States v. Rocha, 916 F.2d 219, 232 (5th Cir. 1990), petition for cert. filed February 20, 1991; United States v. Studley, 892 F.2d 518, 525 (7th Cir. 1989). In his pleadings defendant Leonardo Paulino failed to make any such showing with respect to Chazulle, and has therefore failed to sustain his heavy burden. We therefore find that the trial court did not abuse discretion in this regard. See Whitley, 734 F.2d at 1139.
Both Fed.R.Evid. 1006 and "the established tradition" in this circuit and others allow the introduction of summary evidence to aid the jury in the examination of testimony or documents in evidence. See United States v. Scales, 594 F.2d 558 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 946, 99 S. Ct. 2168, 60 L. Ed. 2d 1049 (1979); and United States v. Campbell, 845 F.2d 1374 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908, 109 S. Ct. 259, 102 L. Ed. 2d 248 (1988). The summaries presented here are pedagogical devices "more akin to argument than evidence" since they organize the jury's examination of testimony and documents already admitted in evidence. Thus, strictly speaking, they do not fall within the purview of Rule 1006. See Gomez v. Great Lakes Steel Div., Nat'l Steel Corp., 803 F.2d 250, 257 (6th Cir. 1986). This court has indicated, however, that authority for such summaries exists under Fed.R.Evid. 611(a)7 . Scales, 594 F.2d at 563. Such a summary should be accompanied by a limiting instruction which informs the jury of the summary's purpose and that it does not constitute evidence. See United States v. Campbell, 845 F.2d 1374, 1381 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908, 109 S. Ct. 259, 102 L. Ed. 2d 248 (1988); Gomez, 803 F.2d at 257-58; United States v. Seelig, 622 F.2d 207, 214 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869, 101 S. Ct. 206, 66 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1980); Scales, 594 F.2d at 564. Even with such an instruction, a summary may still be considered too conclusory or inaccurate. Scales, 594 F.2d at 564. The admission of summaries is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Campbell, 845 F.2d at 1381; Gomez, 803 F.2d at 257; United States v. Collins, 596 F.2d 166, 169 (6th Cir. 1979).
Moreover, the defendants had an full opportunity to cross-examine the witness and thereby "alleviat [e] any danger of inaccuracy or unfair characterization." United States v. Mann, 884 F.2d 532, 539 (10th Cir. 1989); United States v. Possick, 849 F.2d 332, 340 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v. Lemire, 720 F.2d 1327, 1248 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1226, 104 S. Ct. 2678, 81 L. Ed. 2d 874 (1984). Finally, upon review of the record as a whole, we do not find the charts to be substantially inconsistent with the evidence adduced at trial. In sum, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the summary witness testimony.
Under Rule 404(b), evidence of "other crimes" is not admissible to prove the character of a person. See United States v. Ismail, 756 F.2d 1253, 1258 (6th Cir. 1985) ("The law is clear, of course, that evidence of past criminal activity is inadmissible to show criminal propensity"). It is admissible however to show "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident." Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). The Supreme Court has held that in determining whether evidence is admissible under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b), " [t]he threshold inquiry a Federal District Court must make before admitting similar acts evidence under Rule 404(b) is whether that evidence is probative of the material issue other than character." Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 686, 108 S. Ct. 1496, 1499, 99 L. Ed. 2d 771, (1988); United States v. Zelinka, 862 F.2d 92, 98 (6th Cir. 1988). Secondly, the court must determine "whether the danger of undue prejudice outweighs the probative value of the evidence in view of the availability of other means of proof and other factors appropriate for making decisions of this kind under Rule 403." Id. See also United States v. Acosta-Cazares, 878 F.2d 945, 948-49 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S. Ct. 255, 107 L. Ed. 2d 204 (1989).
Rule 404(b) "is actually a rule of inclusion rather than exclusion, since only one use is forbidden and several permissible uses of such evidence are identified." Acosta-Cazares, 878 F.2d at 948 (quoting United States v. Blankenship, 775 F.2d 735, 739 (6th Cir. 1985)). A district court's ruling under Rule 404(b) will be reversed only upon finding of an abuse of discretion. Acosta-Cazares, 878 F.2d at 948.
We find no abuse of discretion on the part of the district court. In addition to the testimony of Hughes, Torres identified Government's Exhibit # 24 as the weapon possessed during the course of the conspiracy by Carlos Paulino. Torres further testified that he had seen Leonardo Paulino carry a weapon on several occasions in connection with the drug enterprise. This court has on several occasions recognized that firearms and ammunition are tools of the drug trafficking trade and have been admitted in drug distribution cases as tools of the drug conspiracy. See United States v. Marino, 658 F.2d 1120, 1122-24 (6th Cir. 1981) (even though defendant was not charged with any firearms offense, evidence of firearms held relevant and admissible because it tended to prove intent to promote and protect the narcotics conspiracy); United States v. Williams, 704 F.2d 315, 322 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 991, 104 S. Ct. 481, 78 L. Ed. 2d 679 (1983); United States v. Arnott, 704 F.2d 322, 325-26 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 948, 104 S. Ct. 364, 78 L. Ed. 2d 325 (1983); United States v. Gahagan, 865 F.2d 1490, 1499 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 918, 109 S. Ct. 3242, 106 L. Ed. 2d 590 (1989).
The cases cited by defendant are distinguishable. In United States v. Zelinka, 862 F.2d 92, 99 (6th Cir. 1988), this court held that cocaine seized from a suspected drug dealer at the time of his arrest was inadmissible where the seizure occurred seventeen months after the conspiracy had ended and the government failed to explain how the evidence related to the conspiracy. In United States v. Daniels, 572 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1978), involving a prosecution for distribution and possession of heroin, the court held it was improper to admit evidence concerning defendant's possession of a sawed-off shotgun, since the shot-gun incident occurred subsequent to the alleged narcotics incident. In both of these cases, the evidence of "other crimes" related to a period subsequent to the conduct in question and was therefore not relevant to the charges in the indictment. Here, by contrast, the evidence adduced at trial indicated that the gun was used during the course and in furtherance of the narcotics conspiracy.
Next we consider Leonardo Paulino's objection to introduction of his prior drug dealing. Government witness Torres testified that Leonardo Paulino was street dealing drugs in early 1986 in Miami, and that later in 1986 Leonardo Paulino and Carlos Paulino were involved in a shootout over a cocaine transaction and moved to Kentucky to escape retribution. Those who moved with Leonardo Paulino to Kentucky included members of the conspiracy charged in the indictment--Chazulle and Carlos Paulino; as well as persons whose names appeared as recipients of wire transfers of drug proceeds over the course of the conspiracy--Corpa Perdoma and Mairena Suarez. We find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence since it was clearly admissible for the "legitimate purpose of showing the background and development of a conspiracy." United States v. Hitow, 889 F.2d 1573, 1578-79 (6th Cir. 1989) (quoting United States v. Passarella, 788 F.2d 377, 383 (6th Cir. 1986)).
A district court's finding as to the amount of drugs a defendant is to be held accountable for is a factual finding which must be accepted by this court unless clearly erroneous. United States v. Walton, 908 F.2d 1289, 1300-01 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S. Ct. 273, 112 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1990). In this case, there was ample evidence that the amount of cocaine exceeded five kilograms. The United States conservatively estimated that Torres' testimony alone established that he transported 3 3/4 kilograms and that Carlos transported 1 1/2 kilograms. At least 1/4 kilogram was qualified as attributable to Vieyra. Chazulle was caught with 1 1/2 kilograms. These quantities alone add up to more than five kilograms. Moreover, this figure does not include the cocaine muled by Hughes or Helton, or reflect trips taken by Vieyra, Carlos Paulino, and others for which no specific figure was given.
All that is required for enhancement under section 3B1.1 is the participation of at least two culpable individuals so that leadership of some criminal enterprise or organization, however minimal, can be claimed. United States v. Carroll, 893 F.2d 1502, 1505 (6th Cir. 1990). In determining whether a defendant qualifies for enhancement under section 3B1.1(c), facts that the court should consider include:
Commentary, Application Note Three, Sec. 3B1.1. Here the trial court, focusing on the "defendant's role in the offense," see United States v. Tetzlaff, 896 F.2d 1071 (9th Cir. 1990), relied on testimony indicating that Carlos assumed the role of manager in his brother's absence. "A finding that a defendant is functioning as an organizer or leader, however, does not necessarily mean that he is directly controlling other individuals." United States v. Johnson, 906 F.2d 1285, 1291-92 (8th Cir. 1990) (upholding district court's four-level upward adjustment to his base offense level for acting as an organizer).
There was evidence that Carlos Paulino directed the distribution of cocaine in Lexington during his brother's absence. It was also testified that he wired proceeds, rented an apartment, automobiles, and a mobile telephone in the names of other individuals on behalf of the conspiracy. While his status was not as elevated as that of his brother Leonardo, we nonetheless conclude that there was sufficient evidence from which the court could conclude that Carlos Paulino merited a two-point upward adjustment in his guidelines for his role in the offense. Thus, the district court's conclusion was not clearly erroneous. United States v. Medved, 905 F.2d 935, 943 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S. Ct. 997, 112 L. Ed. 2d 1080 (1991).
In addition, Vieyra was not in possession of the cooler or the cocaine at the time it was seized, nor did he assert any ownership interest in the cooler or the automobile. Thus, Vieyra had no expectation of privacy sufficient to confer standing upon him to challenge the search in question. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 100 S. Ct. 2556, 65 L. Ed. 2d 633 (1980)
To obtain a CCE conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 848, the government must prove: (1) a felony violation of the federal narcotics laws; (2) as part of a continuing series of violations; (3) in concert with five or more persons; (4) for whom the defendant is an organizer or supervisor; and (5) from which he derives substantial income. 21 U.S.C. § 848; United States v. English, 925 F.2d 154, 156 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Davis, 809 F.2d 1194, 1203 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1007, 107 S. Ct. 3234, 97 L. Ed. 2d 740 (1987). In construing the "continuing series of violations" element, the only one at issue here, we have held that proof of three or more drug violations is required. United States v. Sinito, 723 F.2d 1250, 1261 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 817, 105 S. Ct. 86, 83 L. Ed. 2d 33 (1984)
Defendant's reliance on United States v. Rivera, 837 F.2d 906 (10th Cir. 1988) (Rivera I) ; reh'g granted 847 F.2d 660 (10th Cir. 1988) (Rivera II) ; aff'd by an equally divided court, 874 F.2d 754 (10th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (Rivera III), is misplaced. In that case, an equally divided court affirmed the defendant's conviction, which rested upon the use of uncharged offenses as substantive evidence of the continuing series element of the CCE charge. Thus the original panel holding in Rivera I, that in the case of uncharged offenses, the words of the CCE statute alone are not sufficient to meet a defendant's fifth and sixth amendment concerns, is without precedent and is not binding on the trial court in that case. Rivera III, 874 F.2d at 755
Defendant's reliance on Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 82 S. Ct. 1038, 8 L. Ed. 2d 240 (1962), for the proposition that the failure to allege predicate offenses in the indictment was a violation of his fifth amendment right is inapposite. In that case the Supreme Court held that a prosecution involving 2 U.S.C. § 192, which prohibits the refusal to answer questions pertinent to a subject under inquiry by a congressional committee, pertinency to the subject under inquiry is "the very core of criminality." Russell, 369 U.S. at 764, 82 S. Ct. at 1047. Thus, in that case the allegation of the subject was necessary to the sufficiency of the indictment in order to define the chief issue. Id. at 766, 82 S. Ct. at 1048. Courts have distinguished Russell on this basis. See United States v. Staggs, 881 F.2d 1527, 1533 n. 8 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S. Ct. 719, 107 L. Ed. 2d 739 (1990); See United States v. Mobile Materials Inc., 871 F.2d 902, 910 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S. Ct. 837, 107 L. Ed. 2d 833 (1989); United States v. Perkins, 748 F.2d 1519, 1526 n. 11 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v. McClean, 528 F.2d 1250, 1257 (2d Cir. 1976)