Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/787/375/197368/
Timestamp: 2019-10-19 20:02:19
Document Index: 533453413

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2113', '§ 3579', '§ 4205', '§ 3500', '§ 3500', '§ 2113']

United States of America, Appellee, v. Lawrence A. Wilson, Appellant.united States of America, Appellee, v. Henry Francis Enriquez, Appellant, 787 F.2d 375 (8th Cir. 1986) :: Justia
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United States of America, Appellee, v. Lawrence A. Wilson, Appellant.united States of America, Appellee, v. Henry Francis Enriquez, Appellant, 787 F.2d 375 (8th Cir. 1986)
US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit - 787 F.2d 375 (8th Cir. 1986) Submitted Oct. 14, 1985. Decided March 25, 1986
Lawrence Wilson and Henry Enriquez were convicted in separate trials before the same district judge1 of taking by force and violence, from the presence of Barbara Ann Dontrich, a manager at the State Bank of DeSoto, money belonging to the Bank, and with forcing Mrs. Dontrich to accompany them against her will, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (d), (e) (1982 & Supp. II 1984).2 In their separate appeals, which are here consolidated, the appellants raise numerous evidentiary and procedural issues which they contend require reversal of their convictions. Principal among these are the following: Wilson contends that the district court erroneously failed to suppress his post-arrest statements which he argues were involuntary. Enriquez contends first, that his fifty-year sentence is grossly disproportionate to the severity of his offense, and second, that the trial court erroneously failed to suppress identification evidence that was the product of an impermissible suggestive photo-identification procedure. We affirm the conviction of both Wilson and Enriquez.
The evidence presented in the two trials varied in only minor details. We will refer to these differences insofar as they are material to the issues discussed. The incident involved in this case began at approximately 10:00 p.m. on August 18, 1983. John and Barbara Dontrich were at home with their two children, aged eight and eleven years. While preparing for bed, John Dontrich answered a loud knocking at the door. A man shouted that he had a special delivery letter. Mr. Dontrich looked through a window in the door, and saw two men on the porch, one masked and attempting to hide. The second man was unmasked and Mr. Dontrich testified that he could see his face and outline. Tr. II-97 [E].3 Mr. Dontrich testified also that he saw a car located partially in the driveway and the road in front of his home. As Mr. Dontrich ran back toward his bedroom he heard the sound of his door being broken in and the men entering the house.
The intruders held the Dontrich family hostage in their home for the entire night. During this time Mr. and Mrs. Dontrich testified, the unmasked intruder did all the talking and appeared to be in control. Tr. II-115 [E]. The intruders brandished a device which they described, and which the Dontrichs took to be, a bomb. The device actually was four railroad fuses taped together with a battery and a timing device to look like a bomb. The intruders were armed with a shotgun and either an automatic pistol or a MAC 10, a .45 automatic weapon.4 Tr. II-109, 110 [E]. The intruders told the Dontrichs that there were other members of their group outside, and that all the Dontrichs' neighbors were under similar assault. The unmasked intruder laughed when Mrs. Dontrich asked why they were being terrorized.
Before they left the house the intruder directed Mrs. Dontrich to tie her daughter's hands, and to tie her son to a chair in the bedroom. He instructed them that he would leave the "bomb" in the house and detonate it by remote control if he or his waiting accomplices had any reason to believe the police had been called. Tr. II-127 [E]. Mrs. Dontrich said goodbye to her husband and children and left.
Enriquez was convicted and sentenced to fifty years imprisonment and ordered to pay $5600 in restitution under the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, 18 U.S.C. § 3579 (1982). Wilson was sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment and ordered to pay $5600 in restitution under the Act.
Magistrate Noce conducted a pre-trial hearing to determine whether to suppress Wilson's statements and concluded that the record does not support Wilson's assertion that he was threatened or coerced into making his statements. United States v. Wilson, No. 84-60Cr(1), slip op. at 5 (E.D. Mo. May 14, 1984). The Magistrate found that Wilson was properly advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), that he at no time requested an attorney, and that he knowingly and voluntarily waived these rights. Id. The Magistrate also found that no threats or promises were made to coerce Wilson to confess, and that the police complied with Wilson's request that they notify his employer and his girl friend of his whereabouts. Id. at 6. The district court, on the basis of these findings, denied Wilson's motion for suppression. Wilson urges us to conclude that this decision was erroneous.
The voluntariness of a confession is a legal inquiry subject to plenary review by the appellate courts. Miller v. Fenton, --- U.S. ----, 106 S. Ct. 445, 452, 88 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1985). In determining whether a confession was voluntary we must examine the entire record for evidence that the statement was given under such circumstances which would indicate that the defendant was coerced or his will overborne. Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 742, 86 S. Ct. 1761, 1764, 16 L. Ed. 2d 895 (1966); see also Rachlin v. United States, 723 F.2d 1373, 1377 (8th Cir. 1983). In this analysis the court employs a flexible totality of the circumstances approach, considering the specific interrogation tactics employed, the details of the interrogation, and the characteristics of the accused. Rachlin, 723 F.2d at 1377. This flexible standard allows for judicial determination of voluntariness "in myriad situations without being hampered by rigid and potentially artificial restraints." United States v. Grant, 622 F.2d 308, 316-17 (8th Cir. 1980).
After careful consideration of the circumstances, we conclude that Wilson's statements were voluntary. First, he was informed of his rights and does not dispute that he knowingly waived them. Second, Wilson is a mentally competent adult with a high school education. He served in the United States Army for twenty-two years and was honorably discharged. There is no evidence in the record to indicate that he was unusually susceptible to pressure. Third, in determining that the agent made no promise of lenience, Magistrate Noce resolved the credibility dispute in the government's favor and the record does not show that this was erroneous. Fourth, the short interrogation sessions, the fact that Wilson was in no physical discomfort at the time of interrogation,5 and the fact that the agents notified those who Wilson requested to be notified of his whereabouts, all indicate that the circumstances of the interrogation were not unduly oppressive. Finally, viewing the circumstances as a whole, we do not believe that, as a result of being told that his first confession implicated him in state crimes, Wilson's will was overborne and his confession coerced. Cf. Compare Johnson v. Hall, 605 F.2d 577, 582 (1st Cir. 1979) (the fact that agents confronted defendant with incriminating evidence does not amount to coercion). We therefore hold that the statements were voluntary and properly admitted into evidence.
An appellate court reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, accepting all reasonable inferences that logically arise from this evidence. United States v. Nabors, 762 F.2d 642, 652 (8th Cir. 1985); Durns v. United States, 562 F.2d 542, 545-46 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 959, 98 S. Ct. 490, 54 L. Ed. 2d 319 (1977). The evidence need not "exclude every other hypothesis except that of guilt [so long as it is] sufficient to convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty." United States v. Shahane, 517 F.2d 1173, 1177 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 893, 96 S. Ct. 191, 46 L. Ed. 2d 124 (1975).
The district court has broad discretion over motions for continuance. We will not reverse the denial of such a motion unless there is a clear abuse of the district court's discretion. United States v. Reeves, 730 F.2d 1189, 1193 (8th Cir. 1984). In denying the motions for continuance, the district court found that Wilson would have sufficient opportunity during the trial to assess the new identification evidence and prepare an appropriate response. Tr. I-5 [W].7 The court found that the other evidence disclosed did not involve matters which necessitated a delay for further investigation. Id.
The Supreme Court has recognized that the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution proscribes as cruel and unusual, punishment that is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offense. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 n. 17, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 3010 n. 17, 77 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1983); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667, 97 S. Ct. 1401, 1410, 51 L. Ed. 2d 711 (1977). This ruling does not, however, authorize courts to indiscriminately reassess sentences authorized by the legislature and administered by the trial court. The Court specifically noted that "in view of the substantial deference that must be accorded legislatures and sentencing courts, a reviewing court rarely will be required to engage in extended analysis to determine that a sentence is not constitutionally disproportionate." Solem 463 U.S. at 290 n. 16, 103 S. Ct. at 3009 n. 16. See also United States v. Rosandich, 729 F.2d 1512, 1512 (8th Cir. 1984) (a sentence generally is not subject to review unless it exceeds statutory limits, violates constitutional or procedural requirements, or shows that the district court manifestly or grossly abused its discretion.) The standard imposed is a high one. As the Court indicated in Solem, "outside of the context of capital punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences [will be] exceedingly rare." Solem, 463 U.S. at 289, 103 S. Ct. at 3009. See generally Jeffries & Stephan, Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of Proof in the Criminal Law, 88 Yale L.J. 1325, 1379 (1979) ("only in the extreme case of a penalty so grossly disproportionate and excessive as to defy rational judgment could the punishment be found cruel and unusual * * *.")
The Supreme Court in Solem articulated a three step analysis by which to conduct sentence proportionality review. These objective factors, while not exclusive, provide guidelines for our analysis. The three factors are: (1) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (2) comparison of sentences imposed in the same jurisdiction; and (3) comparison of sentences imposed on criminals in other jurisdictions. Solem, 463 U.S. at 290-291, 103 S. Ct. at 3010. We take these factors in turn.
In considering the third factor, we accept appellant's designation of all federal courts as "other jurisdictions." The defendant provides a list of section 2113(e) sentences in other United States district courts for the years 1979 to 1982, inclusive. Focusing only on those in which no homicide was committed, we encounter fifteen cases, in five of which the sentence imposed exceeded forty years. In three of these cases the court imposed a forty-five year sentence. Further, our research reveals two additional post 1982 cases. In one, a forty-year sentence was imposed. United States v. Moore, 710 F.2d 270 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 997, 104 S. Ct. 497, 78 L. Ed. 2d 690 (1983). In the other, a fifty-year sentence was upheld on appeal for a section 2113(e) violation. United States v. Whitley, 759 F.2d 327 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 106 S. Ct. 196, 88 L. Ed. 2d 164 (1985). We are amply cognizant of the fact that mere recitation of the numbers involved in sentences imposed on the basis of disparate facts is a superficial and perhaps largely inadequate way in which to analyze the disproportionality of a sentence. However, in the absence of specific details on the factors giving rise to these sentences, this inquiry remains a useful tool for fixing the range of sentences for a particular offense. The fifty-year term involved here is not so grossly disproportionate to other sentences under the same subsection as to be unconstitutional.
The appellant stresses his previously clean criminal record. While the absence of prior criminal convictions is a factor which the sentencing court may, in its discretion, consider, the fact that appellant was making his first appearance before the court does not carry the weight for which he argues. The deliberate and premeditated nature of the offense, the strong potential for violence involved, and the wanton invasion of the victim's home, weigh heavily against any lenience which may attach to Enriquez's status as a first offender. We also note that the Board of Probation and Parole's report does not bind the sentencing court's determination of the appropriate sentence. See e.g., United States v. Roberts, 676 F.2d 1185, 1187, 1189 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 855, 103 S. Ct. 122, 74 L. Ed. 2d 106 (1982) (sentence not invalid because court did not emphasize salient factors in presentence investigation report). Thus the fact that the court imposed a sentence in excess of the one calculated on the basis of the report, without more, is not evidence of an abuse of discretion.
Enriquez argues that the significantly lighter sentences imposed on Wright and Wilson indicate that his sentence was disproportionate. This argument is without merit. One accomplice cooperated with law enforcement authorities and was not charged with this offense. Enriquez has no legitimate claim to similar treatment. The other, as we discussed above, played a less prominent role in the robbery. It is within the sentencing judge's discretion to impose disparate sentences on co-defendants. See, e.g., United States v. Chiago, 699 F.2d 1012 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 854, 104 S. Ct. 171, 78 L. Ed. 2d 154; United States v. Castillo-Roman, 774 F.2d 1280, 1284 (5th Cir. 1985). Enriquez was apparently the central character in the kidnapping and robbery. The court could, in its discretion, determine that he was deserving of a more severe sentence.
Finally, Solem recognizes eligibility for parole as a relevant factor in determining whether a sentence is disproportionate. Enriquez, under 18 U.S.C. § 4205(a) (1982), will be eligible for parole consideration after serving ten years of his sentence. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the term of fifty years imposed on Enriquez was not grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offense.
An identification procedure may violate due process where, under the circumstances, the procedure creates a "very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification." Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198, 93 S. Ct. 375, 381, 34 L. Ed. 2d 401 (1972) (citing, Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384, 88 S. Ct. 967, 971, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1247 (1968)) .
Further, even had we concluded that the photo-identification procedure was unnecessarily suggestive, we would not suppress the witnesses' testimony as to the photographic identification unless it lacked a sufficient basis for reliability. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114, 97 S. Ct. 2243, 2253, 53 L. Ed. 2d 140 (1977); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199, 93 S. Ct. at 382. In evaluating the reliability of identification testimony, we will weigh such key factors as the witness' opportunity to view the criminal, the witness' degree of attention, the accuracy of prior descriptions, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the confrontation. Neil, 409 U.S. at 199, 93 S. Ct. at 382; Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 114, 97 S. Ct. at 2253.
In addition, all three witnesses selected Enriquez's photograph without hesitation as similar to the man who committed the robbery.12 The record shows that Mr. and Mrs. Dontrich identified a third person as resembling the man who invaded their home. They both, however, declined to identify him as the robber in a subsequent lineup. At trial, they testified that their selection was intended to indicate the person in that photo-display closest in appearance to the unmasked intruder, not as an absolute identification of that person as the intruder. Tr. II-167, 168; Tr. III-74, 75 [E].
Finally, even weighing the fact that more than four months had passed before these witnesses identified Enriquez, we still conclude that the identification testimony had a sufficient basis for reliability and was therefore admissible. We do not believe that under all the circumstances of this case there was "a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification." Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 116, 97 S. Ct. at 2254. Short of this point, the evidence is for the jury to weigh. Id.
The sixth amendment guarantees a defendant's right to fully and adequately cross-examine the witnesses against him. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315, 94 S. Ct. 1105, 1109, 39 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1974). In ensuring that a defendant has an opportunity for meaningful cross-examination, courts permit wide latitude in the scope of cross-examination of government witnesses about matters relevant to credibility or bias. See United States v. Mansaw, 714 F.2d 785, 789 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 964, 104 S. Ct. 403, 78 L. Ed. 2d 343 (1983). The trial court, however, retains the discretion to limit cross-examination beyond that necessary to satisfy the sixth amendment. United States v. Siegel, 587 F.2d 721, 727 (5th Cir. 1979); see also United States v. McLernon, 746 F.2d 1098, 1116 (6th Cir. 1984) (the court has broad discretion to limit cumulative harassing or irrelevant questioning). In determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in limiting appellant's cross-examination of Wright, we focus on the nexus between the information sought and the purpose of the cross-examination, the relevancy of the information, and the availability of other opportunities to elicit the information. See, Mansaw, 714 F.2d at 788-89.
Enriquez asserts that the trial court improperly limited the scope of cross-examination when it denied him the opportunity to inquire of Wright whether his girl friend's mother owned a Camaro. He argued that this inquiry was relevant to the case because it was known that Wright had previously used his girl friend's car in another robbery. He also stated that Wright's girl friend's mother owned a Camaro. He maintained that Mr. Dontrich had stated that he thought the car he saw in his driveway during the robbery was a Camaro or a Firebird.13 Enriquez sought to establish that Wright could have used his girl friend's mother's car in the State Bank of DeSoto robbery and then falsely implicated Enriquez in order to protect them. Thus, he argued, the inquiry was relevant to motive. The district court sustained the objection to this line of inquiry because the linkage which Enriquez's counsel sought to establish involved too many circumstances that would require explanation and had minimal probative value. Tr. II-6 [E].
We agree with the district court's assessment that the linkage which Enriquez's counsel sought to establish was hazy at best. Further, he had sufficient opportunity to pursue Wright's motive and bias in other cross-examination. For example, counsel questioned Wright on whether his girl friend owned a Camaro or a Firebird. He also explored the fact that Wright's plea agreement protected no one other than himself and intimated in closing argument that Wright was lying to protect close friends. Tr. II-26 [E]. He therefore suffered no violation of his sixth amendment right due to this restriction of cross-examination.
Enriquez next contends that the trial court erred in refusing to order the government to turn over, pursuant to the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1982), a report prepared by FBI agent Ramey. The report was prepared subsequent to appellant's arrest and allegedly contained statements given to Ramey by appellant's wife, Pam Enriquez, and his mother-in-law, Jeanne Perry.
The district judge ruled that the statements in the report were not the statements of a witness because neither Pam Enriquez nor Jeanne Perry had been called as a witness for the government. On appeal Enriquez argues that the statements were producible because they were Ramey's statements and were clearly within the 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e) (1982) definition of "statement."15
Appellant's analysis fails whether we regard the statements as agent Ramey's or as the statements of Jeanne Perry and Pam Enriquez.16 If, in fact, he believes the report contained Ramey's statements, he must demonstrate that these statements "relate to the subject matter as to which the witness has testified." Id. Sec. 3500(b). See, e.g., United States v. Gaston, 608 F.2d 607, 611 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Nickell, 552 F.2d 684, 687-88 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 904, 98 S. Ct. 2233, 56 L. Ed. 2d 402 (1978).
Appellant also contends that Pam Enriquez and Jeanne Perry's statements as to his whereabouts on the date of the robbery "would be necessarily favorable evidence", Brief for Appellant at 37, which must be disclosed under Brady v. Maryland, 73 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963). This argument is decidedly without merit since appellant called Pam Enriquez as a witness and she testified extensively in his favor concerning his whereabouts around the date of the robbery. The government is under no obligation to disclose to the defendant that which he already knows. See United States v. Young, 618 F.2d 1281, 1287 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 844, 101 S. Ct. 126, 66 L. Ed. 2d 52 (1980); United States v. Steffen, 641 F.2d 591, 594 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 943, 101 S. Ct. 3091, 69 L. Ed. 2d 959 (1981). Appellant's mother-in-law likewise was available to him as a witness.
Enriquez's remaining arguments need not detain us long. First, we reject his argument that the district court improperly admitted into evidence a photograph showing Enriquez in military camouflage dress and carrying a rifle. He argues that the photograph was irrelevant to any issue in the case or, alternatively, that if relevant it should be excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. The trial judge has broad discretion in determining the relevance of a given item of evidence. United States v. Williams, 545 F.2d 47, 50 (8th Cir. 1976). The photograph was admitted into evidence after Wright was cross-examined regarding a survivalist training camp which Enriquez operated. The trial court concluded that the information tended to confirm the relationship between Enriquez, Wright, and other individuals named throughout the trial. We do not believe that the photograph was so unfairly prejudicial as to render its admission an abuse of discretion.
Finally, we reject Enriquez's argument that the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial on the basis of the prosecution's closing argument in which he referred to his opponent as a "magician" performing "sleight of hand" in defense of his client. Tr. VI-60, 61 [E]. The district court has broad discretion in controlling closing arguments. United States v. Lavallie, 666 F.2d 1218, 1222 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v. Bohr, 581 F.2d 1294, 1301 (8th Cir.) cert. denied, 439 U.S. 958, 99 S. Ct. 361, 58 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1978). The statement, while perhaps over zealous, was not so prejudicial or inflammatory as to affect the jury's ability to fairly decide the case and thus deprive Enriquez of his right to a fair trial. See United States v. Robinson, 539 F.2d 1181, 1185 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1101, 97 S. Ct. 1124, 51 L. Ed. 2d 550 (1977). We therefore affirm the district court's denial of appellant's motion for mistrial.
18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (d), (e) provide:
Throughout this opinion " [E]" will designate transcript from the Enriquez trial and " [W]" will designate transcript from the Wilson trial
This is one point on which the testimony in both cases differed. Wilson testified that Enriquez carried a MAC 10, a .45 automatic weapon, when he entered the Dontrich home. Tr. 4-106 [W]. Wright testified that Enriquez carried an automatic pistol. Tr. 1-56 [E]. John Dontrich testified also to seeing a pistol. Tr. II-109, 110 [E]
While Wilson contends that he suffered "excruciating pain" in his side during the night, he does not state that these pains continued during his interrogation session the following afternoon. Tr. IV-108 [W]
Bob Blackwell was a student in Enriquez's karate class and a member of his survival training group. He also operated a locksmith business in which Henry Enriquez served as an apprentice. Tr. V-4 [E]
The Court indicated that trial would be recessed early on that day so that appellant's counsel could further evaluate the evidence. Tr. I-5 [W]
Appellant brings to our attention a number of convictions under various other subsections of section 2113. 18 U.S.C. Section 2113(a) carries a maximum penalty of twenty years and a $5000 fine. Subsections (b) and (c) carry maximum penalties of ten years and a $5,000 fine. Subsection (d) carries a maximum penalty of twenty-five years and a $10,000 fine. By focusing on convictions which involve these subsections of section 2113, and which do not include a subsection (e) violation, the appellant targets cases which have legislatively imposed lower sentences. While each subsection of Sec. 2113 states a separate offense, convictions under multiple subsections merge for sentencing purposes. Bryan v. United States, 721 F.2d 572, 575 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1038, 104 S. Ct. 1315, 79 L. Ed. 2d 711 (1984). Because appellants' conviction includes a Sec. 2113(e) offense, that subsection places an outer limit on the penalty which may be imposed. We therefore exclude from our analysis cases not involving a subsection 2113(e) violation
Wright testified that Enriquez planned the robbery. Tr. I-14 [W]. Both John and Barbara Dontrich testified that he issued the orders and did all the talking inside the home. Tr. II-104 [E]; Tr. III-29 [E]
The appellant brings Martinez v. Turner, 461 F.2d 261 (10th Cir. 1972) to our attention. In that case the Tenth Circuit examined a photo-spread in which only one of five individuals, other than the suspect, looked Mexican. The victims had identified their assailant as Mexican and the only other individual meeting that description was noticeably taller and slighter in build than the defendant. Under those circumstances, the court concluded that the absence of other Mexicans was a suggestive factor. Id. at 264. Our case is distinguishable from Martinez because the persons in the photo-spread had general physical characteristics compatible with Enriquez's appearance
We also conclude that the record does not support Enriquez's contention that the method in which the photographs were presented was unnecessarily suggestive. He provides no support for this contention. The record shows that the photographs were simultaneously displayed. Further, the witnesses separately viewed the photographs and had no opportunity to discuss their perceptions before making a decision. Finally, there is no evidence that they were pressured or led toward a particular selection. We therefore reject this contention. United States v. Thompson, 730 F.2d 82 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 105 S. Ct. 443, 83 L. Ed. 2d 369 (1984).
Barbara Dontrich stated, when she selected Enriquez's photo from the display, that she was not sure if she remembered him from the robbery, or from his having been to the bank previously to change a lock. Tr. III-84 [E]. This information, to the extent that it bore on the soundness of her identification, was fully presented to the jury
Wilson stated in his confession that he used a brown 1982 Buick Electra in the robbery, a fairly large car. The record reveals that John Dontrich stated that he thought he saw a smaller car. Tr. II-150 [E]; 11-171 [W]
Enriquez subsequently took the stand and testified to the above alleged transaction. The prosecution did not call Wright to rebut Enriquez's assertion. In his closing argument, Enriquez's counsel stressed this failed drug transaction as Wright's motive for false testimony. Tr. VI-37, 38 [E]