Source: http://docplayer.net/3093766-Domestic-open-market-operations-during-2014.html
Timestamp: 2018-10-19 09:19:15
Document Index: 789201538

Matched Legal Cases: ['art 1', 'art 1', 'art 2', 'art 2', 'art 3', 'art 4', 'art 3', 'art 5', 'art 4', 'art 5', 'art 6', 'art 7', 'art 6', 'art 7', 'art 8', 'art 8', 'art 9', 'art 1', 'art 9', 'art 1', 'art 11', 'art 11', 'art 12', 'art 12', 'art 13', 'art 13', 'art 14', 'art 14', 'art 15', 'art 15']

DOMESTIC OPEN MARKET OPERATIONS DURING PDF
DOMESTIC OPEN MARKET OPERATIONS DURING 2014
Download "DOMESTIC OPEN MARKET OPERATIONS DURING 2014"
1 DOMESTIC OPEN MARKET OPERATIONS DURING 214 A Report Prepared for the Federal Open Market Committee by the Markets Group of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York APRIL 215
2 This report, presented to the Federal Open Market Committee by Simon Potter, Executive Vice President, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and Manager of the System Open Market Account, describes domestic open market operations of the Federal Reserve System for the calendar year 214. Suraj Prasanna and Tal Shoer were primarily responsible for preparation of the report. Overview...1 Domestic Open Market Operations...3 Permanent Operations...3 Treasury Securities Operations...3 Agency MBS Operations...8 Agency Debt Operations...12 Temporary Operations...12 Balance Sheet Effects of Federal Reserve Operations SOMA Domestic Securities Holdings...15 Portfolio Size and Composition...15 Composition of Treasury Holdings...17 Composition of Agency MBS Holdings...17 Composition of Agency Debt Holdings...18 Portfolio Risk Measures...19 Factors Affecting the Supply of Reserves...2 Reserve Balances...2 Autonomous Factors...21 Other Federal Reserve Operations and Standing Facilities...22 Financial Results...23 SOMA Income...23 Federal Reserve Remittances...23 SOMA Unrealized Gains and Losses...23 Projections for the SOMA Portfolio and Net Income...24 Baseline and Alternative Projections...24 Projection Uncertainty...26 Money Market Analysis and Policy Implementation Tools...29 Money Market Developments...29 The Federal Funds Market...29 FR 242 Report of Selected Money Market Rates...3 Planning for Monetary Policy Normalization Policy Normalization Principles and Plans...31 Readying Tools for Interest Rate Control during Normalization...32 Conclusion...39 Appendixes...41 Appendix 1: Authorization for Domestic Open Market Operations...41 Appendix 2: Guidelines for the Conduct of System Open Market Operations in Federal Agency Issues...42 Appendix 3: Domestic Policy Directives Issued to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York...43 Appendix 4: Resolutions Authorizing Overnigh and Term Reverse Repo Operations...46 Appendix 5: Federal Reserve Bank of New York Counterparties for Domestic Open Market Operations...48 Appendix 6: Federal Reserve Reference Webpages...5 Appendix 7: Selected Research on LSAPs
3 1 Overview The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) continued to provide monetary policy accommodation in 214 to support a stronger economic recovery in a context of price stability. The Committee maintained the target for the federal funds rate in a range of to ¼ percent, and provided forward guidance on the federal funds rate that evolved as the economic outlook improved through the year. Further, it continued to adjust the size and composition of the Federal Reserve s balance sheet by purchasing additional Treasury securities and agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS), although it slowed the pace of its purchases and eventually ended them in October. Lastly, it continued to reinvest principal payments from Treasury securities at auction and to reinvest principal payments from agency MBS and debt in agency MBS. These monetary policy actions were intended to put downward pressure on longer-term interest rates, support mortgage markets, and help foster more accommodative financial conditions in order to advance the FOMC s goals of maximum employment and stable prices. The FOMC issued directives to the Open Market Desk (hereafter referred to as the Desk ) at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to implement these policies. 1 The FOMC s directives to expand the balance sheet resulted in the Desk making cumulative additional purchases of $45 billion in longer-term securities in 214, including $25 billion in Treasury securities and $2 billion in agency MBS. These purchases brought the System Open Market Account s (SOMA) domestic portfolio to a level of nearly $4.3 trillion. 2 Although the size of the portfolio grew substantially over the year, the overall composition of the portfolio did not change significantly, with approximately 6 percent of its holdings in Treasury securities and 4 percent in agency MBS. The Desk monitored market conditions closely while undertaking these actions, and available indicators suggested little adverse impact on market functioning from the Desk s activity. Interest rates declined over the year, leading the SOMA domestic securities portfolio s unrealized loss position at the end of 213 to shift to an unrealized gain by the end of 214. These unrealized gains or losses have no effect on net income or Federal Reserve remittances to the U.S. Department of the Treasury unless assets are actually sold. As in recent years, in 214 the large size of the SOMA portfolio resulted in historically elevated levels of the Federal Reserve s income and remittances to the U.S. Treasury. A projection exercise using publicly available data suggests that the SOMA portfolio s net income will decline as the FOMC eventually normalizes the stance of monetary policy, but will remain above the average level seen prior to the financial crisis. The scenario s baseline projections further show that the portfolio will not reach its steady-state size until late 22. Bank reserves, which are liabilities on the Federal Reserve s balance sheet, also grew to historically elevated levels primarily as a result of large-scale asset purchases. Reserves are created in the process of conducting asset purchases. However, reserve balances did not increase to the same extent as SOMA assets in 214 largely because of changes in the composition of liabilities attributable to the Federal Reserve s testing of tools that might be used when the FOMC elects to tighten monetary policy. The federal funds rate remained within the FOMC s specified target range without the need for the Desk to conduct temporary open market operations to manage the supply of reserves. The federal funds rate remains well connected to other money market rates and is of ongoing importance for the transmission of monetary policy. The Federal Reserve began a data collection initiative in 214 to facilitate monetary policy implementation by monitoring conditions in money markets more comprehensively. The data gathered,
4 2 issued in the Report of Selected Money Market Rates, provide new and detailed insight into unsecured money markets. The New York Fed expects to use this data source to calculate the federal funds effective rate and to publish a new overnight bank funding rate in the coming year. Lastly, the Federal Reserve devoted considerable attention to readying operational tools that could assist in the execution of monetary policy during normalization. These tools, including overnight and term reverse repurchase agreements (reverse repos, or RRPs) and term deposits, may be used to supplement interest on excess reserves as a means of managing the federal funds rate and other money market rates at levels consistent with the FOMC s macroeconomic objectives. Tests of these tools saw significant participation from eligible counterparties, with the aggregate amount of accepted offers across the exercises peaking at $568 billion in early December. Such exercises are a matter of prudent planning, and have no implications for the timing or pace of eventual policy normalization. This report begins with a review of the permanent open market operations undertaken in 214 to adjust the size and composition of the Federal Reserve s balance sheet as directed by the FOMC. It then describes the evolution of the SOMA portfolio since the start of the third large-scale asset purchase (LSAP3) program in 212, identifies the factors affecting the Federal Reserve s consolidated balance sheet, and reports the current and projected income from the SOMA portfolio. Lastly, it reviews the state of the federal funds market and the Desk s testing of operational tools described above. Appendixes 1 through 4 provide the full text of the authorizations, directives, and resolutions guiding the Desk s activity. Appendix 5 provides background detail on Desk counterparties. Appendix 6 provides links to webpages where source material for Federal Reserve related content and underlying data for the charts in this report can be found. Finally, Appendix 7 presents suggested readings on the financial and economic effects of largescale asset purchases.
5 3 Domestic Open Market Operations The FOMC directed the Desk to purchase Treasury securities and agency MBS as part of the LSAP3 program. It also instructed the Desk to continue reinvesting maturing securities. The Desk s purchases of securities under the program were intended to put downward pressure on longer-term interest rates, support mortgage markets, and make broader financial conditions more accommodative. The ultimate goal was to promote a stronger economic recovery and to help ensure that unemployment and inflation, over time, would be consistent with the Federal Reserve s dual mandate (see Box 1). The FOMC also directed the Desk to undertake open market operations as necessary to maintain conditions in reserve markets such that the federal funds rate traded in a range of to ¼ percent, and authorized it to conduct reverse repurchase agreements for the purpose of operational readiness testing. Chart 1 SOMA Treasury Purchases under LSAP3 Billions of U.S. dollars Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Note: Figures are monthly. Permanent Operations Permanent open market operations consist of outright purchases of Treasury securities and agency MBS, and were conducted by the Desk in 214 as part of LSAP3. The monthly pace of purchases was adjusted at each meeting by the FOMC based on its review of incoming information on economic and financial developments, including the outlook for the labor market. TREASURY SECURITIES OPERATIONS Through October 214, the FOMC directed the Desk to purchase Treasury assets at a monthly rate that decreased over time as a result of the Committee s ongoing review of the economic outlook at its regular meetings (Chart 1). For six consecutive meetings beginning in December 213, the FOMC voted to reduce the pace of Treasury purchases in $5 billion increments. In September, the Committee judged that sufficient progress in the labor market had been made to conclude the program at the end of October with a final $1 billion reduction. Throughout 214, the Committee also directed the Desk to roll over maturing Treasury securities into new issues at auction, such that the total amount of Treasuries on the balance sheet would not materially decline. In total, the Desk purchased $25 billion in additional Treasury securities during 214. Adding this amount to the $54 billion purchased in 213 brought the total size of large-scale Treasury purchases under LSAP3 to $79 billion. Purchases were distributed across pre-established maturity sectors for nominal Treasury securities and Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS) (Table 1). The allocations resulted in a weighted average duration of 9.8 years for 214 purchases. The Desk also rolled over $464 million in maturing Treasury securities.
6 4 Box 1 The Economic Rationale for Asset Purchases Several theories have been advanced about the channels through which asset purchases can affect financial conditions. One prevalent theory centers on a portfolio balance channel. In this view, the Federal Reserve s sizable purchases of longer-term securities reduce the current and expected future stock of securities and therefore the risk that would otherwise be held in private investors portfolios. As a result, the purchases compress risk premiums (that is, the compensation that investors demand for bearing risk), which puts downward pressure on long-term interest rates. While Treasury securities, agency debt, and agency MBS are free of credit risk, they bear duration risk, the chance that interest rates may change over time, which in turn affects the value of those bonds. By purchasing large amounts of relatively long-duration securities, the Federal Reserve reduces the amount of this risk that must be borne by the market. Since Treasury rates serve as the basis for other borrowing costs, lower term premiums on Treasury securities may also reduce broader private sector borrowing costs relative to the levels that otherwise would have prevailed. In addition to removing duration risk from the market, the Federal Reserve s purchases of agency MBS remove prepayment risk associated with the uncertain timing of principal cash flows, given that mortgage holders may refinance (and thus prepay) their mortgages at any time. In particular, declining interest rates often result in greater prepayments, as homeowners respond to the economic incentive to refinance their mortgages at lower interest rates. Similarly, rising interest rates often result in decreasing prepayments, as homeowners are less likely to refinance. The Federal Reserve s absorption of prepayment risk from the market may also have a secondary effect of dampening risk related to interest rate volatility by reducing the need for agency MBS investors to hedge their positions, a behavior that can exacerbate large interest rate moves. By removing such risks from the market, purchases of agency MBS contribute to downward pressure on longer-term interest rates, and all else equal, lower MBS rates, helping to reduce primary mortgage rates and encourage greater demand for housing. LSAPs may also work through other channels. Some research suggests that asset purchases can provide a signal about the FOMC s overall stance of monetary policy and thus reinforce other FOMC communications that shape market partici pants expectations about the future path of the federal funds rate. In addition, under certain circumstances, asset purchases can help improve market functioning and liquidity by boosting confidence that the central bank is willing to act aggressively through a consistent and significant market presence. Additional analysis of the financial and economic effects of large-scale asset purchases can be found in the studies cited in Appendix 7. Table 1 Maturity Distribution of Treasury Operations in 214 Par Amount Purchased (Billions of U.S. Dollars) Percentage of Total Purchases Nominal Coupon Securities by Maturity Range 4 4¾ years ¾ 5¾ years ¾ 7 years years years years TIPS 7 3 Total 25 1 Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Note: Figures may not sum to totals because of rounding.
7 5 The Desk did not sell any Treasury securities in 214, and has not done so since the conclusion of the Maturity Extension Program (MEP) in December 212. Operation Results The Desk conducted 148 operations in the secondary market, with an average operation size of about $1.7 billion. Consistent with the intent to focus on longer-maturity securities, more than half of new purchases were in the seven- to ten-year and twenty- to thirty-year maturity sectors. The competitiveness of propositions in Treasury operations was robust over 214. One proxy measure of competitiveness is the ratio of offers from participants to the amount of securities actually purchased by the Desk. 3 This ratio averaged 4.8 in 214, meaning that for every dollar of securities the Desk purchased, $4.8 dollars of securities were offered for sale. For comparison, the ratio was a slightly less competitive 3.1 in 213 (Chart 2). The offer-to-cover ratio rose over the course of the year, because counterparties did not materially reduce the dollar value of the offers they submitted as the pace of purchases declined. Instead, counterparties bidding behavior in aggregate remained relatively static until very late in the program, when many adjusted offer amounts. The coverage ratio for purchases in the ten- to twenty-year maturity sector rose significantly over the year to become the highest for all sectors, although it was likely highly variable given the relatively small size of purchases in this sector. The offer-to-cover ratio was lowest in the seven- to ten-year sector, where operations were the largest. Operational Approach The Desk conducted all open market purchases according to operating policies that were released in December 212, immediately following the FOMC s announcement that purchases of longer-term Treasury securities would continue following the conclusion of the MEP. These policies were periodically revised to provide updates to operational details, such as the number of operations each month by maturity sector. The FAQs accompanying the policies specified the maturity distribution, expected average duration, and other details of new purchases. Toward the end of each month, the Desk also released a tentative schedule of operations for the following month. Chart 2 Coverage of SOMA Treasury Purchase Operations under LSAP3 Ratio month moving average, all sectors 213 Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 1- to 2-year offer-to-cover ratio 7- to 1-year offer-to-cover ratio 214 Beginning in May, the Desk reduced the number of operations per month and the size of each operation at several points. This consolidation increased efficiency by combining multiple small operations within the same maturity sector. The sectors and proportion of securities purchased in each sector remained constant each month, thereby avoiding large swings in the weighted average maturity of new purchases. Purchase operations were conducted through FedTrade, the New York Fed s proprietary trading system. Counterparties participating in an operation were allowed to submit multiple offers across the range of eligible securities in a multi-price auction. An announcement was posted prior to each operation noting the maturity bin, the securities eligible, and a range for the dollar amount of expected awards. Results, including the amount selected for each security, were generally posted well within three minutes of the close of the auction window on the New York Fed s public website; participating counterparties received their own award notifications simultaneously. At the end of each month, the Desk released the weighted average accepted price, the highest accepted price, and the percentage of propositions filled at the highest accepted price for each security at every operation during that month. 4 The Desk judged the attractiveness of offers to determine which would be accepted based on their proximity to prevailing market
8 6 Table 2 SOMA Purchase Limits for Individual Treasury Securities Maximum Purchase Amount per Security in Operation Is Lesser of: SOMA Security Ownership prior to Operation as a Percentage of Outstanding Issuance (A) (B) 3 N/A 35% of outstanding less SOMA holdings % of outstanding 5% of outstanding less SOMA holdings % of outstanding 6% of outstanding less SOMA holdings % of outstanding 7% of outstanding less SOMA holdings More than 7 Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Not eligible for purchase prices near the close of the auction, as well as on the Desk s own evaluation of theoretical value using a yield curve model. The selection criteria had the effect of tilting purchases toward securities that the Desk perceived to be undervalued by market participants, such as certain off-the-run securities. Off-the-run securities those issued prior to the most recent Treasury auction for a given maturity sector often trade at a discount relative to the most recently issued, or on-the-run, securities because they are somewhat less liquid. These characteristics tend to render them more attractive from a relative value perspective. To avoid disruptions in market liquidity and excessive concentration in its holdings, the Desk placed a number of constraints on the security selection process, as it had done in past programs. First, the Desk excluded certain securities if it judged that purchasing them might adversely affect market functioning. Specifically, it refrained from purchasing securities that traded with heightened scarcity value (that is, securities that traded special ) in the repurchase agreement (repo) market, those that were the cheapest to deliver into Treasury futures contracts, Treasury STRIPS (Separate Trading of Registered Interest and Principal Securities), and securities in the when-issued market that had yet to be formally issued. At the start of each operation, the Desk announced specific issues to be excluded from the eligible basket of CUSIPs. 5 Second, the Desk maintained limitations on the amount of any individual security that it could own. In accordance with this framework, aggregate holdings of any individual Treasury security were capped at 7 percent of that security s outstanding supply, and restrictions were phased in once SOMA holdings reached 3 percent of total supply (Table 2). These limits became more binding as the proportion of aged securities the Desk purchased increased throughout the program. At the end of LSAP3, the SOMA portfolio held the maximum limit of 7 percent of outstanding supply in seventeen securities, up from thirteen at the maximum in Desk counterparties in Treasury operations were primary dealers and, through July 214, Treasury Operations Counterparty (TOC) participants. The TOC program, announced in February 213, was a one-year pilot project designed to explore ways of broadening access to open market operations and to determine the extent to which firms beyond the primary dealer community could augment the New York Fed s operational capacity and resiliency in its monetary policy operations. Under the program, four counterparties were selected to participate in Treasury outright operations. All four firms participated in at least one operation, and their offered amounts were consistent with their relative size. Rollovers The FOMC directed the Desk to reinvest the proceeds from Treasury securities that matured over the year at auction. However, for operational efficiency, proceeds were only reinvested on days in which the total amount of maturities exceeded $2 million; when maturities fell short of this sum, the securities were allowed to mature without reinvestment. In line with existing practices, maturing Treasury securities were reinvested in new Treasury securities issued on the day the funds
9 7 were received, and were allocated in proportion to the issue size of all qualifying new securities. Given that the Desk had sold most securities that would have matured in 214 during the MEP, rollovers were sporadic over the year. In aggregate, the Desk reinvested $464 million of Treasury securities in 214 across five separate issue dates, including the acquisition of nearly $5 million in floating rate notes (see Box 2). In contrast, the Desk allowed $1 million of securities to mature from the portfolio without reinvestment on dates when maturities did not exceed the minimum threshold. Securities Lending Securities lending operations provide a secondary and temporary source of securities to the financing market to promote the smooth clearing of Treasury and agency securities. Lending of SOMA s securities, especially those in which SOMA has a significant market share, may help to mitigate periods of scarcity or elevated fails. In 214, securities held in the SOMA portfolio were lent to primary dealers based on competitive bidding in auctions conducted over FedTrade. Primary dealers bid on a fee that would be economically equivalent to a spread between the general collateral repo rate and the rate at which they are willing to borrow the security. The minimum bid was 5 basis points, all loans were for an overnight term, and the amount of each security that could be lent was limited. Dealers borrowing securities pledged other Treasury securities to the New York Fed, plus margin, as collateral for the securities loan. Primary dealers borrowed an average of $12 billion in par value of securities per day in 214, somewhat lower than the daily average of $15 billion in 213 (Chart 3). Despite bouts of heightened market fails on several occasions during the year, daily securities lending volumes exhibited less variability than in prior years. Box 2 Floating Rate Notes In January 214, the Department of the Treasury began to issue floating rate notes (FRNs). The Treasury s stated goal in developing this product was to complement its existing suite of securities and to help achieve its objective of financing the government at the lowest cost over time. Interest on FRNs is accrued and paid quarterly, with the rate referencing the most recent thirteen-week Treasury bill auction rate. To date, the Treasury has only issued FRNs with a two-year maturity, and auctions for new FRNs occur quarterly. a Bids for the security at auction are expressed in terms of a discount margin, which is the fixed spread to the underlying index rate paid by Treasury for the remaining life of the security. On January 13, the Desk released a statement noting that it would treat FRNs in a similar manner to other Treasury securities in its rollover operations, securities lending program, and repo and reverse repo operations. Because of their short duration, FRNs were not included in outright LSAP3 purchases. On May 21, the Desk began to accept FRNs as collateral in its securities lending and repo operations, and noted that it expected its first reinvestments in FRNs to occur on July 31, 214. Once such securities were held by the SOMA, FRNs would be available for borrowing in the daily securities lending program and could be pledged in reverse repo operations. In July, the Desk purchased nearly $5 million in FRNs during its normal reinvestments of maturing Treasury principal. A portion of these FRN holdings were lent out in regular securities lending operations at several points through the year. a See and -the-floating-rate-note-treasury-security.html Market Functioning By the end of the year, SOMA held approximately 2 percent of all marketable Treasury securities, with those holdings concentrated in longer-maturity sectors. These purchases do not appear to have had an adverse impact on market functioning. While some isolated bursts of volatility occurred, they were not related to purchase operations, and most major indicators of market liquidity in cash Treasury markets, including bid-ask spreads, quote sizes, and trading volumes, generally remained within historical ranges. 7 As the pace of SOMA purchases declined to zero, there were some signs of increased spreads between on-the-run and off-the-run securities, perhaps related in part to the declining volume of Fed purchases. Although market liquidity was normal, fails to deliver in certain on-the-run benchmark Treasury securities rose throughout 214 as many market participants placed positions anticipating that interest rates would rise from very low levels (Chart 4). 8 In June, the par value of fails to deliver in Treasury securities reached its highest level since the introduction in May 29 of a punitive charge on counterparties failing to deliver securities; on-the-run securities accounted for a significant portion of these fails. 9 As noted earlier, the Desk rarely purchased
10 8 Chart 3 SOMA Securities Lending in Treasuries Chart 5 SOMA Agency MBS Purchases under LSAP3 Billions of U.S. dollars Securities lending, daily average 212 DTCC fails to deliver, daily average Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of New York; The Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation. Note: Figures are monthly. Billions of U.S. dollars Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Note: Figures are monthly. Reinvestments from agency debt Reinvestments from agency MBS Additional purchases Chart 4 U.S. Treasury Yields Percent year 1-year 214 AGENCY MBS OPERATIONS In addition to authorizing the Desk s Treasury security purchases, the FOMC directed the Desk to purchase MBS guaranteed by the three government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs): Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae. For six consecutive meetings beginning in December 213, the FOMC voted to reduce the pace of agency MBS purchases in $5 billion increments. In September, the Committee judged that sufficient progress in the labor market had been made to conclude the program at the end of October with a final $5 billion reduction. Throughout the year, the Desk was also directed to continue to reinvest principal payments from agency debt and agency MBS in agency MBS (Chart 5). Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Note: Figures are daily. on-the-run securities in its purchase operations, and the limited amount of rollovers of maturing Treasury securities in the SOMA meant fewer new on-the-runs were acquired through reinvestments. Many market participants suggested that had the SOMA held such securities in its portfolio, it could have alleviated market stress by lending them out. Indeed, volumes in the securities lending program did not increase in tandem with the rise in fails to deliver in 214. In total, the Desk completed $2 billion in additional purchases in 214. Adding this amount to the $623 billion purchased in 212 and 213 brings the total size of large-scale agency MBS purchases under the open-ended program to $823 billion. The Desk did not sell any agency MBS securities outright in 214 for policy implementation, but did engage in temporary sales through dollar roll transactions, discussed further below. 1 Operation Results The Desk conducted agency MBS purchase operations on most trading days in 214 for a total purchase amount of $42 billion. This
11 9 figure comprises $2 billion in additional purchases and $22 billion from reinvestments of principal payments. For comparison, in 213, total purchases including reinvestments totaled $783 billion. Within the GSE-guaranteed MBS universe, purchases took place in the to-be-announced (TBA) market and were concentrated in thirty-year securities, because these make up the majority of coupon issuance. 11 The remainder consisted of fifteen-year Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac securities (Table 3). The fifteen-year securities, which are strongly related to refinancing activity, accounted for 1 percent of the Desk s purchases down 6 percentage points from their 213 share. This decline mirrors the decrease in new issuance of fifteen-year securities in the market, which declined as a share of all issuance from 18 percent in 213 to 12 percent in For each agency issuer and maturity term, agency MBS can be grouped by the coupon rate that they pay. Typically, issuers minimize costs and maximize expected returns by issuing coupons closest to the primary mortgage rate minus a spread (which incorporates compensation for servicing the mortgage). Newly issued thirty-year securities were concentrated in 3.5 and 4. percent coupons in 214, reflecting an average 1 basis points spread from the primary mortgage rate. Production coupon rates edged lower during 214 alongside the steady decline in longer-term interest rates (Chart 6). Consistent with the drop in refinancing activity noted above, pay-downs of SOMA agency MBS principal and the resultant purchases required to reinvest those proceeds declined from $273 billion in 213 to $24 billion in 214 (Chart 7). 13 The decline in SOMA MBS principal pay-downs occurred despite the larger overall size of the MBS portfolio. An additional $16 billion in purchases were executed in 214 reinvestment cycles to reinvest maturing agency debt in agency MBS. Operational Approach The Desk conducted all open market purchases according to operating policies that were released in September 212 and periodically updated thereafter. The operating policies specified how the Desk Table 3 Distribution of Agency MBS Operations in 214 Term SOMA Purchases (Billions of U.S. Dollars) Issuance (Billions of U.S. Dollars) SOMA Purchases as a Share of Issuance (Percent) 3-year year Agency Fannie Mae Freddie Mac Ginnie Mae Coupon 2.5% % % % % Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of New York; embs. Notes: Figures may be rounded. Issuance figures represent gross issuance of fixed-rate agency MBS in 214.
12 1 Chart 6 SOMA Purchases of Agency MBS by Coupon Chart 7 SOMA Agency MBS Principal Payments and Primary Mortgage Rate Percent % 3.% 3.5% 4.% 4.5% Billions of U.S. dollars Percent Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Note: Figures are monthly and consist of thirty-year agency MBS purchases only Principal payments on SOMA agency MBS Primary mortgage rate 213 Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of New York; Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation. Note: Figures are monthly would execute operations. Additionally, the Desk released statements following each FOMC meeting in 214 noting the new pace at which it was directed to purchase. Each Friday afternoon, the Desk released a tentative weekly schedule of new purchase operations; on the eighth business day of each month, it announced a tentative amount for the following month s reinvestments. 14 Further, the Desk released information on trades that took place in the prior month, including price, trade amount, agency, coupon, term, and settlement date. The distribution of agency MBS purchases by coupon and issuing agency was intended to reflect origination patterns. Thus, purchases were targeted toward newly produced coupons in thirty- and fifteen-year securities issued by the three GSEs in the TBA market. These securities are closely linked to new primary issuance and accordingly tied to primary mortgage rates. After April 214, the Desk decreased the number of operations per month and increased the amount purchased per operation. While the reduction in monthly purchase amounts was one factor leading to fewer and larger operations over time, the notable change seen after April was due to the Desk s shift in trading platforms. In that month, the Desk began to execute an increasing share of its purchase operations on the FedTrade platform, phasing out its use of the commercial TradeWeb platform for these transactions by June. This shift represented a major enhancement to the Desk s operational approach (see Box 3). Since the Desk transacted in the TBA market, purchases were scheduled to settle meaning a security was delivered to the Federal Reserve up to three months following the trade date. In certain cases, agency MBS securities could become relatively scarce in the market, and the Desk had the option to conduct dollar roll transactions to facilitate settlement. 15 A dollar roll sale is a transaction that involves the sale of agency MBS for delivery in one month with the simultaneous agreement to purchase substantially similar securities in the following month. Dollar roll sales helped the Desk ease market stress by allowing dealers more time to obtain securities in the TBA market that were required to settle transactions, in exchange for a market price that compensated the Federal Reserve. Dollar roll transactions represented only 2 percent of the Desk s expected agency MBS settlements in 214, down from 5 percent in 213 a decline that suggests minimal stress in agency MBS markets (Chart 8). 16 The Desk required counterparties to post a margin on the unsettled trade amount, given that up to three months may have passed before a trade was settled. The margin was calculated on a daily
13 11 Box 3 Executing Agency MBS Operations on FedTrade Prior to April 214, all agency MBS operations were conducted on the commercial TradeWeb platform. These operations were conducted with a rotating subset of four primary dealers the maximum number of dealers Tradeweb allowed to ensure adequate competition. The executed price of the trade was only transparent to the winning dealer whose offer to sell the agency MBS was accepted by the Desk. The Desk released both a weekly summary of the amount it purchased by product and a monthly summary of the amount it purchased by product and price. In early April, the Desk began executing outright purchases of agency MBS over its proprietary FedTrade platform the same platform used in several other Desk operations. The switch to FedTrade, which was completed by early June, fulfilled three objectives: 1) it minimized operational risk by eliminating the reliance on a third-party software provider and by reducing manual processes, 2) it improved efficiency and competitiveness by permitting transactions with a larger number of counterparties and all at the same time, and 3) it increased transparency around the Desk s mortgage operations through the advance announcement of operation details and the prompt release of results. FedTrade operations were conducted using multiple-price auctions, meaning that each offer at or lower than the stop-out rate was transacted at the actual offer rate a practice similar to that used in the Desk s Treasury operations. All primary dealers that transact in agency MBS were expected to participate meaningfully, and each dealer was allowed to submit up to ten offers on each security included in the operation. The competitiveness of each dealer s offers was assessed by their proximity to prevailing market prices at the auction close. basis, and served to protect the New York Fed from counterparty credit risk exposure arising from unsettled MBS trades. There was no change in this policy from the prior year. Agency MBS operations were conducted with primary dealers that transact in this market. Additionally, in August 214, the Desk announced the Mortgage Operations Counterparty (MOC) pilot program, which was modeled after the recently concluded TOC Chart 8 SOMA Dollar Roll Sales Billions of U.S. dollars Total 213 Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Note: Figures are monthly by settlement month. Share of expected settlements 214 Percent 25 program. The FRBNY s intent in conducting this pilot program was to explore ways to broaden access to MBS open market operations and to determine the extent to which firms beyond the Primary Dealer community could augment the Desk s operational capacity and resiliency in its monetary policy operations. Three counterparties were announced in November, and they began participating in outright purchase operations in mid-december. 17 Market Functioning Having risen notably in 213, yields on agency MBS securities declined modestly over the course of 214. Further, spreads to Treasury securities of similar duration, adjusted for the value of the prepayment option, narrowed during the year most sharply for the Fannie Mae 3.5 percent coupon. The price appreciation of agency MBS relative to Treasuries has been attributed to subdued origination trends, low interest rate volatility, and the substantial volume of Federal Reserve purchases during the year (Chart 9). Against this backdrop of declining origination, Desk purchases accounted for 5 percent of gross issuance of eligible securities for the year as a whole (Chart 1). This ratio was higher in the first quarter of the year when gross issuance was relatively low and purchase amounts were relatively larger. It declined sharply in the second quarter when seasonal factors and lower interest rates boosted gross issuance and the pace of Desk purchases declined. At the end of the
14 12 Chart 9 Thirty-Year Agency MBS Current Coupon Yields Percent 4 3 Freddie Mac Chart 1 SOMA Agency MBS Purchases as a Share of Gross Fixed-Rate Issuance Percent Fannie Mae Source: Bloomberg L.P Note: Figures are weekly. Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of New York; embs. Note: Figures are monthly. year, when only reinvestment activity was occurring, Desk purchases accounted for approximately 2 percent of gross issuance. Major indicators of liquidity in agency MBS markets, including trading volumes and average trade sizes, increased modestly over the course of the year; however, they remained at the lower end of the range seen over the past several years. Purchase operations were affected by the bout of market volatility and liquidity impairment that took place on October 15, when interest rates declined sharply without an apparent catalyst. On that day, the operation was extended by ten minutes, from 9:45 a.m. to 9:55 a.m., because of low levels of participation up to that point. After allowing counterparties additional time to enter offers, the operation closed with adequate offers to cover the purchase amount fully. Settlements of agency MBS purchases generally went smoothly throughout the year, as evidenced by the limited amount of dollar rolls undertaken by the Desk. The implied financing rate on dollar roll transactions for production coupon securities, which is a measure of the availability of a particular cohort of TBA securities relative to demand for those securities, was near zero for much of the year a sign of limited scarcity. In private markets, fails to deliver in agency MBS securities were near multiyear lows as well. AGENCY DEBT OPERATIONS In 214, the Desk did not purchase or sell any direct obligations of the housing-related GSEs. About $19 billion of agency debt holdings matured in 214, and proceeds were reinvested in agency MBS throughout the year. Agency debt securities in the SOMA portfolio are offered for loan in the SOMA securities lending program. As in the case of Treasury securities, an auction is held each day to determine the fee for lending specific securities. The minimum bid rate is 5 basis points. On average, primary dealers borrowed less than $1 billion of agency debt securities per day in 214 a level consistent with the low levels seen in prior years. Loans of agency debt are collateralized with Treasury securities. Temporary Operations Temporary open market operations, including repo (RP) and reverse repo (RRP) operations, are typically used to manage the supply of reserves, and thus influence the federal funds market. Since December 28, the FOMC has directed the Desk to maintain conditions in the market for reserve balances such that the federal funds rate trades in a range of to ¼ percent. The Desk has not
15 13 needed to conduct any temporary open market operations since that time to fulfill its monetary policy directives. Prior to the financial crisis of 28-9, the Federal Reserve maintained a modest structural deficit in the level of reserve balances supplied to the federal funds market, such that small changes in the supply of reserves significantly changed the market-clearing price. The Desk would undertake temporary open market operations to make such adjustments to the supply of reserves, and thus maintain the federal funds effective rate (FFER) at its target. 18 Since the financial crisis, the monetary policy framework has changed in several ways. Instead of adopting a single-point target, the FOMC has employed a target range of between and ¼ percent for the federal funds rate. Actions undertaken since the crisis have elevated the level of reserve balances and eliminated the structural deficit, with the excess supply of reserves putting downward pressure on rates. The payment of interest on excess reserves (IOER), set at ¼ percent, has provided a countervailing upward pull on rates. In tandem, these factors maintained the FFER within the target range without the need for any temporary open market operations. The Desk still maintains its operational capacity to conduct RP operations, and has periodically tested this capability in recent years. In 214, more extensive testing was conducted in overnight and term RRP operations as part of the Desk s operational readiness exercises. Peak usage occurred over year-end, with a combined amount of $397 billion awarded on December 31, but for most of the year, usage was below $2 billion. A more detailed review of these exercises is provided in this report s discussion of planning for normalization.
17 15 Balance Sheet Effects of Federal Reserve Operations The asset purchase program completed in 214 was one of several portfolio-oriented programs that the Federal Reserve has undertaken since 28 to provide additional monetary policy accommodation once U.S. short-term interest rates reached the zero lower bound (Box 4). Together, these programs have had a profound effect on the Federal Reserve s balance sheet, including shifts in the size and composition of the SOMA s domestic securities portfolio and in the composition of Federal Reserve liabilities associated with those assets. As a result of these changes, the portfolio has contributed to outsized increases in the Federal Reserve s income and remittances to the Treasury. A projection exercise, summarized below, illustrates how the size of the portfolio and the net income associated with it are expected to decline from their currently elevated levels as the FOMC eventually normalizes the stance and conduct of monetary policy. Chart 11 Composition of SOMA Domestic Securities Holdings Billions of U.S. dollars 4,5 4, 3,5 3, 2,5 2, 1,5 1, Agency debt 212 Agency MBS Treasury securities 213 Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Note: Figures are weekly averages of daily figures and include unsettled holdings. 214 SOMA Domestic Securities Holdings Since 28, the composition of the SOMA s domestic securities holdings has shifted significantly from an all-treasury portfolio with a relatively short average maturity. By the end of 214, the portfolio had become much larger, with a longer maturity profile and a sizable allocation to agency MBS securities. The portfolio roughly quadrupled in size from its pre-crisis level to $4.26 trillion at the end of 214, and it continued to serve as a source of monetary policy accommodation. The following discussion reviews changes in the portfolio that took place in 214, as well as changes that began with the start of LSAP3 in September 212. PORTFOLIO SIZE AND COMPOSITION Domestic securities holdings of the System Open Market Account (SOMA) grew by $45 billion in 214 through additional asset purchases under LSAP3. Over the entire course of LSAP3, the SOMA s domestic securities holdings grew by $1.61 trillion, a 38 percent increase (Chart 11). 19 During the same period, the size of the SOMA relative to U.S. nominal GDP increased to about 24 percent from approximately 16 percent. Although the size of the portfolio grew substantially during LSAP3, the overall composition of the portfolio did not change
18 16 Box 4 Timeline of Asset Purchase Programs Since late 28, the FOMC has undertaken three large-scale asset purchase (LSAP) programs and a Treasury security maturity extension program (MEP), and has used reinvestment policies to preserve or augment the accommodative effects of its large securities portfolio. The first LSAP program, announced in November 28, focused on purchases of direct obligations of housingrelated GSEs and GSE-backed MBS in order to support housing markets and foster improved conditions in financial markets more generally. In March 29, the FOMC substantially expanded the size of the program and added Treasury securities to it. A total of $1,25 billion of agency MBS, $172 billion of agency debt, and $3 bil lion of longer-term Treasury securities were purchased under LSAP1 before the program s completion in March 21. To promote a faster pace of economic recovery and to help ensure that inflation, over time, would be at levels consistent with the FOMC s mandate, a second LSAP program ran from November 21 to June 211. During this time, the Federal Reserve purchased $6 billion of longer-term Treasury securities. In September 211, the FOMC announced a maturity extension program, which ultimately ran from October 211 through December 212. The MEP raised the average maturity of the SOMA s portfolio of Treasury securities without increasing its total size. It did so through sales and redemptions of $667 billion in shorter-term securities and purchases of an equivalent par amount of longer-term securities. In September 212, the FOMC initiated a third LSAP program, which ran concurrently with the MEP through the end of the year. At the start of LSAP3, the Federal Reserve purchased agency MBS, then added outright Treasury securities purchases in January 213 after the MEP concluded. Unlike the parameters of prior purchase programs, the length and total purchase amount under LSAP3 were open-ended, with the FOMC announcing at each meeting a monthly pace of purchases based on progress toward a substantial improvement in the labor market outlook in a context of price stability, and an assessment of the likely efficacy and costs of the purchases. Through December 213, the FOMC purchased agency MBS at a pace of $4 billion per month and longer-term Treasury securities at a pace of $45 billion per month. Over 214, the monthly purchase pace was reduced in measured steps. At the completion of LSAP3 in October 214, a total of $823 billion in agency MBS and $79 billion in Treasury securities had been purchased under the program (see chart below). The FOMC has also used reinvestment policies as a portfolio-related tool for monetary policy implementation. Agency MBS and agency debt holdings acquired during LSAP1 were initially allowed to run off through maturities or prepayments, thus reducing the size of the SOMA portfolio. In August 21, however, to maintain its level of monetary accommodation, the FOMC announced it would keep constant its holdings of securities at existing levels by reinvesting principal payments from agency debt and agency MBS in longer-term Treasury securities. Another shift occurred in October 211, at the start of the MEP, when the FOMC specified that agency MBS and agency debt reinvestments should instead be directed to agency MBS reinvestment activity that continues today. Aside from a period of redemptions during the last six months of the MEP, the FOMC has also continued its long-standing practice of rolling over its holdings of Treasury securities as they mature. SOMA Domestic Securities Holdings Billions of U.S. dollars 5, 4, 3, LSAP1 LSAP2 MEP LSAP3 Start of LSAP3 for agency MBS 2, 1, Reinvest agency debt and MBS in Treasuries Reinvest agency debt and MBS in agency MBS Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Note: Figures are weekly averages of daily figures and include unsettled holdings.
19 17 Chart 12 Maturity Distribution of SOMA Treasury Holdings Percent Less than 3 years 3 6 years 6 1 years 1 3 years TIPS Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Note: Figures are as of year-end. a Less than 1 percent of holdings in 214 are floating rate notes (FRNs) FRNs a significantly as it had during previous asset purchase programs. As a share of the total SOMA portfolio, agency MBS holdings constituted just under 41 percent, Treasury holdings 58 percent, and agency debt just under 1 percent. These proportions are similar to those at the end of 213, and reflect a small increase in the share of agency MBS since the start of LSAP3. COMPOSITION OF TREASURY HOLDINGS Over the course of LSAP3, the Treasury portion of the SOMA portfolio increased by $79 billion to $2.46 trillion, primarily because of additional asset purchases. In late 212, just prior to the start of Treasury purchases, the portfolio was near its peak duration of 8. years, reflecting the impact of the MEP. The duration of the Treasury portfolio then slowly declined to 7.6 at end-213 and 7.4 at end-214 as the aging of extant portfolio holdings outweighed the addition of new LSAP3 purchases. For example, although the majority of additional purchases were of securities with six or more years to maturity, the percentage of securities in the SOMA with fewer than six years remaining to maturity increased to 54 percent from 38 percent over the program (Chart 12). Although the portfolio continues to age, there will not be a significant amount of Treasury holdings maturing from it until early 216. Chart 13 SOMA Treasury Holdings as a Share of Outstanding Treasury Supply Percent Less than 3 years 3 6 years 6 1 years 1 3 years TIPS Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of New York; U.S. Treasury Department FRNs a Note: Figures are as of year-end. a SOMA held less than 1 percent of the outstanding supply of floating rate notes (FRNs) in 214. As of the end of 214, the SOMA portfolio held about 2 percent of the outstanding supply of marketable Treasury securities. 2 It owned a larger proportion of the longer-term securities outstanding. For example, it held 45 percent of Treasuries with ten to thirty years remaining until maturity a share essentially unchanged since the end of 213 and 8 percentage points higher than just prior to the start of LSAP3 (Chart 13). COMPOSITION OF AGENCY MBS HOLDINGS During LSAP3, the agency MBS portion of the SOMA portfolio increased by $863 billion to $1.76 trillion. At the end of 214, 51 percent of the settled agency MBS portfolio was held in MBS guaranteed by Fannie Mae, 29 percent in MBS guaranteed by Freddie Mac, and 2 percent in MBS guaranteed by Ginnie Mae. Eighty-eight percent of the portfolio was held in thirty-year MBS and the remaining 12 percent in fifteen-year MBS. The shares of Ginnie Mae and fifteen-year MBS in SOMA increased during LSAP3, as allocations were adjusted in line with the relative availability of securities for settlement (Chart 14). At the end of 214, just over half of the portfolio was in 3. and 3.5 percent coupons similar to the proportion of the portfolio
20 18 Chart 14 Distribution of SOMA Agency MBS Holdings Issuer Fannie Mae Freddie Mac Ginnie Mae Term a 3-year 15-year Coupon 2.5% 3.% 3.5% 4.% 4.5% Vintage Pre Percent Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Notes: Figures are as of December 31, 214. Holdings total $1,737 billion and consist of settled holdings only. a Less than 1 percent of holdings are ten- and twenty-year agency MBS, which may be delivered into fifteen- and thirty-year TBA contracts, respectively. Chart 15 Coupon Distribution of SOMA Agency MBS Holdings Percent Coupon (%) Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Note: Figures are as of August 31, 212, and December 31, 214. a Less than 1 percent of holdings in 214 are 6. percent coupons. b Less than 1 percent of holdings in 212 and 214 are 6.5 percent coupons a b average coupon of the agency MBS in the portfolio decreased over the LSAP3 period to 3.6 percent at the end of 214, from 4.2 percent in September 212. The Federal Reserve s ownership of the outstanding stock of fixed-rate agency MBS available in the market rose to 34 percent from 3 percent at the end of 213, and from 19 percent at the start of LSAP3. Ownership was more concentrated in certain sectors that have been the focus of more recent purchases. For example, at the end of 214, the SOMA held 51 percent of outstanding thirty-year, 213- and 214-vintage, 3. and 4. percent coupon agency MBS. The SOMA portfolio also held lower coupons and newer loans, on average, than the broader market. For example, the weightedaverage coupon of securities held in the SOMA was 3.6 percent, compared with the 3.9 percent average coupon in the broader market. The weighted average loan age of SOMA securities was twenty-seven months, compared with thirty-eight months for the broader market. 21 in 4. and 4.5 percent coupons at the start of LSAP3 (Chart 15). The older, higher coupon securities held at the start of LSAP3 were acquired in past asset purchase programs, when longer-term interest rates were significantly higher. Accordingly, the weighted COMPOSITION OF AGENCY DEBT HOLDINGS At the end of 214, the SOMA held a total face value of $39 billion of agency debt securities, acquired during the Federal Reserve s
DOMESTIC OPEN MARKET OPERATIONS DURING 2011
DOMESTIC OPEN MARKET OPERATIONS DURING 2011 A Report Prepared for the Federal Open Market Committee by the Markets Group of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York March 2012 DOMESTIC OPEN MARKET OPERATIONS
DOMESTIC OPEN MARKET OPERATIONS DURING 2001
DOMESTIC OPEN MARKET OPERATIONS DURING 21 A Report Prepared for the Federal Open Market Committee by the Markets Group of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York February 22 DOMESTIC OPEN MARKET OPERATIONS
Impact of the Federal Reserve s Quantitative Easing Programs on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
Federal Housing Finance Agency Office of Inspector General Impact of the Federal Reserve s Quantitative Easing Programs on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Evaluation Report EVL-2015-002 October 23, 2014 Impact