Source: http://www.juricaf.org/arret/CONSEILDELEUROPE-COUREUROPEENNEDESDROITSDELHOMME-19760520-575972
Timestamp: 2017-01-17 09:25:36+00:00
Document Index: 214314886

Matched Legal Cases: ['arrêt ', "l'article 3", "l'article 6", "l'article 26", "l'article 26", "l'article 26", "l'article 27"]

Type d'affaire : DecisionType de recours : Partiellement irrecevableNumérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 5759/72Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1976-05-20;5759.72 Analyses : (Art. 11) LIBERTE DE REUNION ET D'ASSOCIATION, (Art. 11-1) FONDER ET S'AFFILIER A DES SYNDICATS, (Art. 11-1) INTERET DES MEMBRESParties : Demandeurs : X.Défendeurs : AUTRICHETexte : APPLICATION/REQUETE NÂ° 5759/72 X . v/AUSTRIA X . c/AUTRICH E DECISION OF 20 May 1976 on the admissibility of the application DECISION du 20 mai 1976 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªte
Articte 26 of the Convention : Period of six months : a) When there is no remedy, the period begins from the date of the decision complained against. b) /n the case of judgment detivered in open court in the presence of the applicant's lawyer, the period starts to run from the date of delivery if the applicant would understand from the spoken judgment that he was not in receipt of a remedy for his grievance. Article 26 de la Convention : DÃ©lai de six mois :
a) Lorsqu'il n'existe pas de voie de recours, le dÃ©lai se compte Ã partir de la dÃ©cision critiquÃ©e. b) S'agissant d'un arrÃªt prononcÃ© en audience publique en prÃ©sence de l'avocat du requÃ©rant, le dÃ©lai court Ã partir du prononcÃ© si celui-ci permet au requÃ©rant de constater qu'il n'a pas Ã©tÃ© remÃ©diÃ© Ã la situation contestÃ©e. I franÃ§ais : voir p. 171
At the end of a trial which lasted five days, the applicant was sentenced in May 1971 by the Regional Court of Graz to two years in prison on 33 counts of fraud . The applicant filed an appeal and, at the same time, a plea of nullity (Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde) with the Supreme Court . In his plea of nullity the applicant alleged that the transcript of the trial was incomplete in that it did not mention that the defence had complained about the lack of sufficient time for preparation . He also alleged that the court had refused to hear certain witnesses and experts and that the decision contained both contradictions and errors of law . The Supreme Court rejected the plea of nullity in anuary 1972 in a decision given in open court, in the presence of the applicant's counse % The applicant reiterated his complaints before the Commission . He also complained that the court has subjected him to an exhausting hearing on five consecutive days from morning to evening in spite of his bad state of health which the court was aware of.
THE LAW ( Extract ) The applicant has Ifirstl complained that the conduct of the trial in his case by the Graz Regional Court amounted to an inhuman or degrading treatment, and that the trial was unfair, in particular because he was not given adequate opportunity to defend himself, and because witnesses of the defence allegedly were not summoned or heard under the same conditions as witnesses of the prosecution . It is true that Article 3 of the Convention prohibits inhuman or degrading treatment, and that Article 6 affords an accused certain procedural guarantees in the determination of any criminal charge against him, including the right to a fair and public hearing (Article 6(1 ) 1, the right to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defence (Article 6 (3) (b)) and the right to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him (Article 6 (3) (d) .
However, the Commission is not required to decide whether or not the facts alleged by the applicant disclose any appearance of a violation of these provisions, as Article 26 of the Convention provides that the Commission "may only deal with the matter . . . within a period of six months from the date on which the final decision was taken" . (a) Insofar as elements of the trial proceedings of which the applicant now complains, such as e .g . the conduct of the trial in a very concentrated form during five consecutive days in spite of the applicant's bad state of health, were not subject to appeal under Austrian law, the relevant procedural rulings (prozessleitende VerfÃ¼gungenl of the court's president must be regarded as the final domestic decisions . Now, the Commission states that these trial proceedings terminated on . . . May 1971, whereas the present application was submitted to the Commission only on 31 August 1972, that is more than six months after that date . (b) Insofar as the applicant complains of elements in the trial proceedings which were covered by the plea of nullity (e .g . the refusal to hear certain witnesses and experts, cf . . . .), the final domestic decision under Article 26 of the Convention is the Supreme Court's decision of . . . January 1972 given in the applicant's case . Since this decision was immediately known to his counsel, acting for him ; since it necessarily showed that elements in the trial proceedings, dealt with by the Supreme Court and regarded by the applicant as contrary to the Convention, had not been corrected or remedied ; and since the motivation of the Supreme Court decision, given to the applicant's counsel on . . March 1972, was therefore not essential to the filing of his application with the Commission, though, of course, material to its full presentation at a later stage, there is nothing to show that the applicarit was prevented from raising his complaints to the Commission in this respect immediately after the pronunciation of the Supreme Court's decision on . . . January 1972 . However, the present application was only brought on 31 August 1972, that is more than six months after that date . (c) Finally, insofar as the applicant could be regarded as complaining, in addition, of the conduct of its proceedings by the Supreme Court itself, it is again to be observed that these proceedings terminated in effect on . . . January 1972, hence more than six months before the filing of the present application . It follows that all the applicant's complaints relating to the conduct of certain criminal proceedings have been brought out of time, having regard to the provisions o f
Article 26 of the Convention . Furthermore, an examination of the case does not disclose the existence of any special circumstances which might have interrupted or suspended the running of the six months' period provided for in that Article . It follows that this pa rt of the application must be rejected under Article 27, paragraph (3) of the Convention . RÃ©sumÃ© des faits pertinents A/'issue d'un procÃ©s qui dura 5 jours, le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© condamnÃ© en mai 1971 par le tribunal rÃ©gional de Graz Ã 2 ans de rÃ©clusion pour escroquerie commise Ã© 33 reprises . Le requÃ©rant a interjetÃ© appel et, simultanÃ©ment, s'est pourvu en cassation (Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde) euprÃ©s de la Cour suprÃ©me . A l'appui de son pourvoi, le requÃ©rant allÃ©guait que le compte-rendu d'audience, incomplet, ne mentionnait pas que la dÃ©lense s'Ã©tait plainte de n'avoir pas disposÃ© d'un temps de prÃ©paration sul/isant . // e//Ã©guait en outre que le tribunal avait refusÃ© d'entendre certains tÃ©moins et experts et que le jugement contenait des contradictions et des erreurs de droit . La Cour SuprÃ©me rejeta le pourvoi au cours d'une audience publique, tenue en janvier 1971, Ã laquelle assistait le conseil du requÃ©rant .
Le requÃ©rant rÃ©itÃ©re ses griefs devant la Commission . ll se plaint en outre que le tribunal lui ait imposÃ© un procÃ©s Ã©puisant durant 5 jours du matin au soir en dÃ©pit de son mauvais Ã©tat de santÃ©, que le tribunal connaissait . (TRADUCTION) EN DROIT IExtrait l Le requÃ©rant se plaint len premier lieul que la conduite de son procÃ©s par le tribunal rÃ©gional de Graz a constituÃ© un traitement inhumain ou dÃ©gradant et que ce procÃ¨s n'a pas Ã©tÃ© Ã©quitable, en particulier, parce que la dÃ©fense n'a pu Ãªtre assurÃ©e convenablement et que, selon le requÃ©rant, des tÃ©moins de la dÃ©fense n'ont pas Ã©tÃ© convoquÃ©s ni entendus dans les mÃªmes conditions que les tÃ©moins de l'accusation . Il est vrai que l'article 3 de la Convention interdit les traitements inhumains ou dÃ©gradants et que l'article 6 accorde Ã l'accusÃ© certaines garanties de procÃ©dure dans la dÃ©termination des charges qui pÃ¨sent contre lui, y compris le droit Ã un procÃ©s Ã©quitable et public ( a rt icle 6, paragraphe 1), le droit au temps et aux facilitÃ©s nÃ©cessaires Ã la prÃ©paration de sa dÃ©fense la rt icle 6, paragraphe 3 ( b) et le droit d'interroger ou faire interroger les tÃ©moins 9 charge et obtenir la convocation et l'interrogation des tÃ©moins Ã dÃ©charge dans les mÃ©mes conditions que les tÃ©moins Ã charge (article 6, paragraphe 31d1 .
Toutefois, la Commission n'est pas appelÃ©e Ã dÃ©cider si les faits allÃ©guÃ©s par le requÃ©rant rÃ©vÃ©lent l'apparence d'une violation de ces dispositions . En effet, aux termes de l'article 26 de la Convention, "la Commission ne peut Ãªtre saisie que . . . dans le dÃ©lai de six mois, Ã partir de la date de la dÃ©cision interne dÃ©finitivÃ©" . (a) Dans la mesure oÃ¹ le requÃ©rant se plaint de circonstances du procÃ©s qui ne peuvent faire l'objet d'un recours en droit autrichien - comme par exemple, la conduite du procÃ©s durant 5 jours d'une maniÃ¨re trÃ©s condensÃ©e, malgrÃ© la mauvaise santÃ© du requÃ©rant - ce sont les ordonnances du prÃ©sident du tribunal relatives Ã l'organi . sation de la procÃ©dure (Prozessleitende VerfÃ¼gungenl qui doivent Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ©e s
comme les dÃ©cisions internes dÃ©finitives . Or, la Commission constate que le procÃ©s a pris fin le . . . mai 1971, alors que la prÃ©sente requÃªte n'a Ã©tÃ© introduite devant la Commission que le 31 aoÃ»t 1972, soit plus de six mois plus tard . (b) Dans la mesure oÃ¹ le requÃ©rant se plaint de circonstances du procÃ©s qui ont Ã©tÃ© contestÃ©es dans son pourvoi en cassation (p . ex . le refus d'entendre certains tÃ©moins et experts, cf . . .), la dÃ©cision interne dÃ©finitive, au sens de l'article 26 de la Convention, est l'arr8t de la Cour SuprÃ©me rendu le . . . janvier 1972 dans la cause du requÃ©rant . Or le conseil du requÃ©rant, reprÃ©sentant ce dernier, a eu immÃ©diatement connaissance de cet arrÃ©t, dont il ressortait nÃ©cessairement qu'il n'avait pas Ã©tÃ© remÃ©diÃ© aux circonstances du procÃ©s soumises Ã l'apprÃ©ciation de la Cour SuprÃ©me et en quoi le requÃ©rant voit une violation de la Convention ; les motrfs de l'arrÃ©t de la Cour SuprÃªme, notifiÃ©s au conseil du requÃ©rant le . . . mars 1972, n'Ã©taient pas indispensables Ã l'introduction de la requÃªte devant la Commission, encore qu'ils aient pu Ãªtre utiles, bien sÃ»r, au dÃ©veloppement de la requÃªte Ã un stade ultÃ©rieur . Il dÃ©coule de ce qui pnlcÃ©de que rien ne permet de penser que le requÃ©rant fut empÃ©chÃ© de faire valoir devant la Commission ses griefs Ã ce sujet immÃ©diatement aprÃ¨s le prononcÃ© de l'arrÃªt de la Cour SuprÃ©me du . . . janvier 1972 . Pourtant, la prÃ©sente requÃ©te n'a Ã©tÃ© introduite que le 31 aoÃ¹t 1972, soit plus de six mois plus tard .
(c) Enfin, dans la mesure oÃ¹ le requÃ©rant parait se plaindre, en outre, de la conduite de son affaire par la Cour SuprÃªme elle-mÃªme, on observera derechef que cette procÃ©dure a pris fin le . . . janvier 1972, soit plus de six mois avant l'introduction de la prÃ©sente requÃ©te . Il s'ensuit que tous les griefs du requÃ©rant relatifs Ã certaines procÃ©dures pÃ©nales sont tardifs, vu l'article 26 de la Convention . De plus, l'examen de l'affaire ne permet de discerner aucune circonstance de nature Ã interrompre ou Ã suspendre le cours du dÃ©lai de six mois prÃ©vu dans cette disposition . Cette partie de la requÃªte doit donc Ã¨tre rejetÃ©e en application de l'article 27, paragraphe 3, de la Convention .
- 18 -Origine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Commission (plénière)Date de la décision : 20/05/1976Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page