Source: http://www.aoc.state.nc.us/www/public/coa/opinions/2004/030629-1.htm
Timestamp: 2013-05-21 06:53:44
Document Index: 404658649

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 7']

In re J.A.O., (03-629) 09/07/2004
IN THE MATTER OF: J.A.O.
NO. COA03-629
Termination of Parental Rights--neglect--abandonment--remote chance of adoption
The trial court abused its discretion by terminating respondent mother's parental rights to
her sixteen-year-old son based on neglect and abandonment under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) and
(7), because: (1) it cannot be in the minor child's best interest to terminate respondent's parental
rights and thereby render the child a legal orphan; (2) it is highly unlikely that a child of this age
and physical and mental condition would be a candidate for adoption, much less selected by an
adoptive family; and (3) the remote chance of adoption does not justify the momentous step of
terminating respondent's parental rights.
Appeal by respondent from order entered 11 December 2002 by
Judge Peter L. Roda in Buncombe County District Court. Heard in
the Court of Appeals 26 February 2004.
John Adams, Esq., for petitioner-appellee Buncombe County
Michael Tousey and Judy Rudolph for guardian ad litem-
Mary Exum Schaefer for respondent-appellant.
Respondent appeals the trial court order terminating her
parental rights to her sixteen-year-old son, Jeff. (See footnote 1) For the
reasons discussed herein, we reverse.
The facts and procedural history pertinent to the instant
appeal are as follows: On 15 May 2002, Buncombe County Department
of Social Services (DSS) filed a petition to terminate
respondent's parental rights (the petition) to her minor son,Jeff. The petition alleged that sufficient grounds existed to
terminate respondent's parental rights pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 7B-1111(a)(1) (2003) and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(7) (2003). On 21 October 2002, the trial court conducted a hearing on the
petition. After hearing testimony and receiving evidence from the
parties, the trial court determined that sufficient grounds existed
to terminate respondent's parental rights pursuant to N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1) (2003) and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(7)
(2003). The trial court also determined that it was in Jeff's best
interest to terminate respondent's parental rights. Accordingly,
in an order entered 11 December 2002, the trial court terminated
respondent's parental rights to Jeff. Respondent appeals.
The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the trial court
erred in terminating respondent's parental rights. Because we
conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in terminating
respondent's parental rights, we reverse the trial court's order.
In the instant case, the trial court concluded at the
adjudicatory stage that sufficient grounds existed to terminate
respondent's parental rights based on neglect and abandonment
pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1) and (7). At the
dispositional stage, respondent argued that it was in Jeff's best
interest not to terminate respondent's parental rights because (i)
respondent had taken sufficient steps to correct the problems that
led to the grounds for termination, and (ii) adoption of Jeff was
highly unlikely. The trial court nevertheless concluded that it
was in Jeff's best interest to terminate respondent's parentalrights. We disagree. Termination of parental rights involves a two-stage process. In re Blackburn, 142 N.C. App. 607, 610, 543 S.E.2d 906, 908
(2001). At the adjudicatory stage, the petitioner has the burden
of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that at least one
of the statutory grounds listed in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111
exists. In re Anderson, 151 N.C. App. 94, 97, 564 S.E.2d 599, 602
(2002). If the trial court determines that grounds for
termination exist, it proceeds to the dispositional stage, and must
consider whether terminating parental rights is in the best
interests of the child. Id. at 98, 564 S.E.2d at 602. [This
Court] review[s] the trial court's decision to terminate parental
rights for abuse of discretion. Id. Evidence heard or introduced throughout the adjudicatory
stage, as well as any additional evidence, may be considered during
the dispositional stage. Blackburn, 142 N.C. App. at 613, 543
S.E.2d at 910. [E]ither party may offer relevant evidence as to
the child's best interests. In re Pierce, 356 N.C. 68, 76, 565
occurred before or after . . . the filing of the petition for
termination of parental rights. Id. at 76, 565 S.E.2d at 86-87. In the instant case, respondent's evidence tended to show that
respondent had made reasonable progress to correct the conditions
that led to the petition to terminate her parental rights. Although respondent admitted to stopping visits with Jeff in 1999,she explained that she stopped visiting Jeff because he had been
transferred to Cumberland Hospital in Virginia, more than six hours
away from respondent's residence. Debbie Ensley (Ensley), the
social worker in charge of Jeff's case, testified that respondent
had frequently visited Jeff prior to 1997. Ensley further
testified that respondent was asked by DSS to suspend her
visitations with Jeff in 1997 because of an increase in Jeff's
violent behavior. Respondent complied with DSS's request, and
remained an active part of the treatment team at that point. Respondent continued visitations with Jeff until 1999, when Jeff
was transferred to Park Ridge Hospital and subsequently Cumberland
Hospital. Respondent testified that when Ensley notified her of Jeff's
transfer to Cumberland Hospital, Ensley told me that he was going
-- they were going to send him up to Virginia, that I couldn't see
him. Respondent testified that she was told in 1997 that her
visits with Jeff were making him worse. Respondent testified
that she did not visit Jeff in Virginia because she did not have a
vehicle or other transportation to Virginia, and she didn't want
[Jeff] to have to suffer like he did[.] Respondent testified that
she nevertheless remained in frequent contact with the Mashburns,
Jeff's foster parents. Respondent also testified that she had
written Jeff letters after he had been subsequently transferred to
a hospital in Florida, but that the letters were never delivered. Respondent further testified that she now owns a vehicle, has had
stable employment since 1999, and lives in a rented efficiency
apartment. Two witnesses testified to respondent's love and carefor Jeff and her efforts to reunite with her son. Betty, (See footnote 2) respondent's sister, testified that respondent is a loving mother
and is currently looking for a larger apartment, hoping she'll get
[Jeff] back. Brenda McPherson (McPherson), a life-long friend
of respondent, testified that respondent is a very good mother,
[a] very loving and caring mother who has always showed a lot of
concern [for Jeff]. McPherson testified that she has had
experience helping sexually abused and hyperactive children as a
member of Angel Group, a support group, and would be willing to
help respondent and Jeff. Respondent also testified that she has
a support system of family and friends as well as a pediatrician
that will help me in any way with Jeff.
Dee Shelton (Shelton), Jeff's guardian ad litem, also argued
that it was in Jeff's best interest not to terminate respondent's
parental rights. In a 16 October 2002 report to the trial court,
Shelton made the following observations and conclusions:
The facts of this case may show that
[respondent] has had and would continue to
have difficulties parenting [Jeff] and it is
not likely that [respondent] would be able to
adequately provide the constant medical and
mental health care that [Jeff] currently needs
or will need in the future. [Respondent] is
remorseful that she was unable to attend to
her child's needs in the proper manner and
that her ex-husband may have disciplined
[Jeff] harshly.
[Respondent] and foster mother both informed
this GAL that the professionals involved over
the years have not been in agreement as to
diagnosis or cause of [Jeff's] problems. The
current therapist believes that [Jeff's]
problems exist due to his mental state and notenvironment. The Department of Social
Services petition fixes the blame for [Jeff's]
situation on his mother. This GAL has been
unable to establish an opinion of who or what
is to blame for the very sad state this child
is in. However, his parent has not been
allowed to be a part of his life for several
years. During that time, a number of caring
professionals have made gallant efforts to
meet [Jeff's] needs, without noticeable
This GAL cannot understand the need to
terminate the rights of [respondent] when it
is unlikely that another parent or family will
be sought to come forward for this child. The
one family who are familiar with [Jeff] and
profess and show love for him do not consider
adoption of this child as they recognize their
limitations. . . .
This GAL does not believe that terminating the
rights of [respondent] at this time,
ultimately leaving [Jeff] an orphan, would be
in the best interest of [Jeff]. While it may
be difficult to reintroduce his mother into
his life, he has so few people to show concern
for him personally, it should be considered
with the assistance of a therapist. [Respondent] may provide a valuable asset to
his future when he no longer has a whole team
of professional people looking after his
needs. At the dispositional stage, Shelton reiterated her concerns
regarding the termination of respondent's parental rights. At the
close of the disposition hearing, counsel for the guardian ad litem
Again, this is a pretty unique situation. I
don't know that this has happened in the
entire time I've been a guardian ad litem or
attorney advocate, but we do not believe that
it would be in the best interest to terminate
the rights [to] this young man. I think we'd
be making him a legal orphan to no good
advantage. He is 14 years old (See footnote 3) and over 200pounds, and as you can see by this assessment
of him, he is quite violent. Judge, [Jeff's
current physicians] think they're going to be
able to put him in a Level 3 placement. That's just not going to happen. A Level 4
placement [in North Carolina] says they can't
handle him. So I don't know what's going to
happen and where this youngster's going to go,
but I just don't see that adoption -- the
guardian does not see that adoption is
something that's really in [Jeff's] best
interest and in any way is going to assist him
and will, indeed, cut him off from any family
that he might have. . . . I think the bottom
line is that the guardian just does not
believe this would be in the best interest of
[Jeff] to terminate his parental rights, based
on -- the parental rights of his mother.
After reviewing the evidence presented at the adjudicatory and
dispositional stages, we conclude that the trial court abused its
discretion in determining that it was in Jeff's best interest to
terminate respondent's parental rights. One of the underlying
principles guiding the trial court in the dispositional stage is
the recognition of the necessity for any child to have a permanent
plan of care at the earliest possible age, while at the same time
recognizing the need to protect all children from the unnecessary
severance of a relationship with biological parents or legal
guardians. Blackburn, 142 N.C. App. at 612, 543 S.E.2d at 910. As our Supreme Court noted in In re Montgomery , the legislature
has properly recognized that in certain situations, even where the
grounds for termination could be legally established, the best
interests of the child indicate that the family unit should not be
dissolved. Id. at 613, 543 S.E.2d at 910 (citing In re
Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 107, 316 S.E.2d 246, 251 (1984)). Because we have determined that it cannot be in Jeff's best
interest to terminate respondent's parental rights and thereby
render Jeff a legal orphan, we conclude that the instant case
presents the situation contemplated by our legislature and
recognized by the Court in Montgomery.
As detailed above, Jeff is a troubled teenager with a
woefully insufficient support system. He has been placed in foster
care since the age of eighteen months and has been shuffled through
nineteen treatment centers over the last fourteen years. Respondent, Jeff's biological mother, is the only family member
connected to and interested in Jeff. His biological father was not
present at the termination proceeding and could not be located
through judicial summons. Although Jeff's foster family have shown
support and care for him, they are unwilling to adopt him and
undertake the important responsibilities associated with caring for
an individual who possesses significant and life-long debilitating
behaviors. Jeff has a history of being verbally and physically
aggressive and threatening, and he has been diagnosed with bipolar
disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, pervasive
developmental disorder, borderline intellectual functioning, non-
insulin dependent diabetes mellitus, and hypertension. As the
guardian ad litem argued at trial, it is highly unlikely that a
child of Jeff's age and physical and mental condition would be a
candidate for adoption, much less selected by an adoptive family.
We recognize that, as the trial court noted, a small
possibility of Jeff's adoption nevertheless remains. However, we
are unconvinced that the remote chance of adoption in this casejustifies the momentous step of terminating respondent's parental
rights. Thus, after balancing the minimal possibilities of
adoptive placement against the stabilizing influence, and the sense
of identity, that some continuing legal relationship with natural
relatives may ultimately bring, we must conclude that termination
would only cast [Jeff] further adrift. In re A.B.E., 564 A.2d
751, 757 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Therefore, we hold that the trial court
abused its discretion by terminating respondent's parental rights
to Jeff. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order and
remand the case for further proceedings. Reversed and remanded.
Footnote: 1 For the purposes of this opinion, we will refer to the
minor child by the pseudonym Jeff. Footnote: 2 For the purposes of this opinion, we will refer to
respondent's sister by the name Betty.Footnote: 3 At the time of the termination hearing, Jeff was fourteen
years old. However, as discussed supra, Jeff is currentlysixteen years old.