Source: http://www.debtorboards.com/index.php/topic,30068.msg292332.html?PHPSESSID=5j8hlmnm8uqj2ahifjtqcqhp80
Timestamp: 2018-02-21 23:20:38
Document Index: 309113195

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 227', '§ 227', '§ 64', '§ 227', '§ 227', '§ 227', '§ 227', '§ 64', '§ 227', '§ 227', '§ 64', '§ 227', '§ 227', '§ 227', '§ 64', '§ 227', '§1692', '§ 1692', '§1692', '§1692', '§ 1692', '§ 1692']

Possible tcpa case?
Topic: Possible tcpa case?
Author Topic: Possible tcpa case? (Read 2143 times)
Jackson0515
Re: Possible tcpa case?
« Reply #30 on: August 04, 2017 11:19:32 PM »
Quote from: aaabbb on August 04, 2017 10:11:02 PM
Section (c) of the TCPA states:
(1) Rulemaking proceeding required Within 120 days after December 20, 1991, the Commission shall initiate a rulemaking proceeding concerning the need to protect residential telephone subscribers’ privacy rights to avoid receiving telephone solicitations to which they object.
In other words, section (c) requires the FCC to establish regulations. These regulations are contained in 47 CFR 64.1200; The penalty for violating these regulations is spelled out in 47 USC 227(c)(5)(B).
47 CFR 64.1200 begins by restating the autodialer restriction:
(a) No person or entity may:
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (a)(2) of this section, initiate any telephone call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or is made with the prior express consent of the called party) using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice; (iii) To any telephone number assigned to a paging service, cellular telephone service, specialized mobile radio service, or other radio common carrier service, or any service for which the called party is charged for the call.
So, a single use of an autodialier without prior express consent violates the TCPA twice.
Charvat v NMP LLC is an example of a plaintiff who successfully sued under both sections (b)(3) and (c)(5); http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/10-3390/11a0248p-06-2011-08-30.html
Charvat v NMP LLC
Do you have the final decision of that case? The link your provided looks to be a decision on motions to dismiss some or part of the case by the defense. And from what I read, the judge decided to not comment or make ANY decision on whether or not the plaintiff could sue on both (B) and (C) of the TCPA.
« Last Edit: August 04, 2017 11:53:31 PM by Jackson0515 »
« Reply #31 on: August 05, 2017 12:14:27 AM »
Quote from: Jackson0515 on August 04, 2017 11:19:32 PM
Sorry. I didn't actually read the link I sent you
Here's a better one: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17898928251720630968&q=charvat+v.+nmp+llc&hl=en&as_sdt=806&as_vis=1
The more difficult question is whether Charvat may recover statutory damages under both the automated-call subsection of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b), and the do-not-call-list subsection, 47 U.S.C. § 227(c) (as implemented in 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d)). We look first to the statutory language. The fact that the statute includes separate provisions for statutory damages in subsections (b) and (c) suggests that a plaintiff could recover under both. See Reichenbach v. Chung Holdings, LLC, 159 Ohio App.3d 79, 823 N.E.2d 29, 32-34 (2004).[9] Subsection (b) permits "an action based on a violation of this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection," § 227(b)(3)(A) (emphases added),[10] and subsection (c) permits an action based on a "telephone call ... in 449*449 violation of the regulations prescribed under this subsection," § 227(c)(5) (emphasis added). Additionally, the two private-right-of-action provisions contain significant textual differences, indicating that they are distinct provisions to be treated independently. Subsection (c), which requires the maintenance of a do-not-call list, has a threshold requirement that a person "receive[] more than one telephone call within any 12-month period by or on behalf of the same entity." 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5). Subsection (c)'s private-right-of-action provision also includes an affirmative defense if "the defendant has established and implemented, with due care, reasonable practices and procedures to effectively prevent telephone solicitations in violation of the regulations prescribed under [subsection (c)]." Id. These provisions do not appear in the automated-call subsection, § 227(b)(3).
The two subsections, moreover, target different harms: Subsection (b) imposes greater restrictions on automated telephone calls and transmissions, which Congress found to be "more of a nuisance and a greater invasion of privacy than calls placed by `live' persons." S.Rep. No. 102-178, at 4-5, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1968, 1972. Subsection (c) and its accompanying regulations in 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d) impose minimum procedures for maintaining a do-not-call list that apply to all calls — live or automated — initiated for telemarketing purposes to residential telephone subscribers. By enacting separate private-right-of-action provisions, each including a statutory damages provision, Congress evidenced its intent that a person be able to recover for the telemarketer's failure to institute the minimum procedures for maintaining a do-not-call list as well as the additional harm of the call being automated.[11] Recovery of damages for the two separate provisions does not upset Congress's balance in setting damages "`fair to both the consumer and the telemarketer.'" See GVN Mich., 561 F.3d at 632 n. 8 (quoting 137 Cong. Rec. S16,204, S16,205 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of Sen. Hollings)).
We therefore conclude that a person may recover statutory damages of $1500 for a willful or knowing violation of the automated-call requirements, § 227(b)(3), and $1500 for a willful or knowing violation of the do-not-call-list requirements, § 227(c)(5) — even if both violations occurred in the same telephone call. Charvat alleges that Defendants willfully or knowingly violated subsection (b)'s automated-call requirements and subsection (c)'s do-not-call-list requirements in thirty-one of the telephone calls. Thus, Charvat's maximum damages for the thirty-one telephone calls that he alleges violated both sets of requirements total $93,000.
Finally, we note that Charvat alleges that he is entitled to statutory damages for the violations of the do-not-call-list regulations, 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d), pursuant to subsection (b)'s damages provision, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). R.20 (2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 52, 55, 67, 70). An action based on a telephone call that violates the do-not-call-list regulations, however, is provided for in subsection (c) of § 227. Technical and procedural standards specific to automated calls are included in § 227(d) and accompanying regulation 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(b), which do not provide a private right of action or a statutory-damages provision. 450*450 Charvat should have alleged damages for the do-not-call violations pursuant to § 227(c)(5) instead of (b)(3); on remand, the district court shall permit Charvat to amend his complaint for this technical, non-prejudicial pleading error. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2).
« Reply #32 on: August 05, 2017 12:54:29 PM »
You never said where you are located. Charvat was in Ohio, 6th Circuit. The decision won't be binding unless you live there. Charvat filed so many TCPA suits they almost gave him an office in the court house. He won some, lost some.
« Reply #33 on: August 05, 2017 02:22:57 PM »
Quote from: Bruno the JDB Killer on August 05, 2017 12:54:29 PM
I'm in lllinois. It's sill valuable case law even though in Ohio.
« Reply #34 on: August 05, 2017 03:00:50 PM »
It's not binding in the 7th where you are. You should check to see if there are similar decisions in your circuit. Also, unless you hit the 75K mark, you'll be in state court.
« Reply #35 on: August 05, 2017 07:16:47 PM »
TCPA provides federal jurisdiction. No $75,000 requirement needed.
Plenty of 1-2 call TCPA cases in federal court. Not that I would bring one.
« Reply #36 on: August 05, 2017 10:32:13 PM »
I read a case that said there would be no federal unless the amount was 75K. It was from his circuit. I'll see if I can find it. Something to do with the language of the TCPA which specified a remedy was state.
« Reply #37 on: August 06, 2017 03:30:58 AM »
Quote from: Bruno the JDB Killer on August 05, 2017 03:00:50 PM
It'll be binding in the 7th circuit once he pleads his case and wins (assuming his evidence is really as strong as he says it is). The plain text of the TCPA doesn't give a judge any wiggle room here. There are two separate and distinct private rights of action. Unless you are a lawyer filing a class action, there is no reason not to plead this way.
The Supreme Court decided this a few years ago. TCPA cases can be filed in federal court because it is a federal law.
https://www.pillsburylaw.com/images/content/3/9/v2/3916/CommunicationsLitigationAdvisoryMimsClassActionLawsuitsUndertheT.pdf
« Reply #38 on: September 13, 2017 01:07:41 PM »
The 7th circuit in Illinois is pretty consumer friendly, you shouldn't have a problem arguing 3k per call.
« Reply #39 on: September 15, 2017 07:44:45 PM »
Quote from: Bruno the JDB Killer on August 04, 2017 08:24:17 PM
Show us case law that supports the position that you violate when you fail to identify yourself when nobody answers the call.
A voicemail message is a “communication” within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. §§1692d(6) and 1692e. Foti v. NCO Financial Systems, 424 F.Supp.2d 643, 669 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Hosseinzadeh v. M.R.S. Associates, Inc., 387 F.Supp.2d 1104, 1112, 1118 (C.D.Cal. 2005); Joseph v. J. J. MacIntyre Cos., 281 F.Supp.2d 1156 (N.D.Cal. 2003); Stinson v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, 1:05cv1026, 2006 WL 1647134, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42266 (E.D. Va., June 12, 2006); Belin v. Litton Loan Servicing, LP, 8:06-cv-760-T-24 EAJ, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47953 (M.D.Fla., July 14, 2006); Knoll v. Allied Interstate, Inc., 502 F. Supp. 2d 943, 946 (D.Minn. 2007) (“a debt collector violates § 1692d(6) if the collector leaves an answering machine message and fails to disclose that the call is related to debt collection”); Knoll v. IntelliRisk Mgmt. Corp., Civil No. 06-1211 (PAM/JSM), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77467 (D.Minn., October 16, 2006) violations include: a. Failure to include the warning required by 15 U.S.C. §1692e(11) and, if the initial communication, failure to provide the §1692g notice within 5 days. b. Failure to identify the caller’s company.
A voice message which does not provide meaningful disclosure and the mini-Miranda violates §§ 1692d(6) and 1692e(11) of the FDCPA. Baker v. Allstate Financial Services, Inc., 554 F. Supp. 2d 945 - Dist. Court, Minnesota 2008; A debt collector violates §§ 1692d(6) and 1692e(11) by failing to provide meaningful disclosure of the debt collector’s identity in messages left on consumer’s voice mail. Costa v. National Action Financial Services, 634 F. Supp. 2d 1069 - Dist. Court, ED California 2007; A debt collector’s failure to identify themselves as a debt collector in voice-mail messages to a debtor violates the FDCPA as a matter of law. Masciarelli v. Richard J. Boudrea & Assocaites, LLC, 529 F. Supp.2d 183, 185 (D. Mass. 2007).
« Reply #40 on: September 15, 2017 11:04:46 PM »
The bottom line of the Foti ruling is that whatever it chooses to use as a method of contacting the alleged debtor is that it MUST comply with the law.
The collection industry turned itself inside out with this ruling but has chosen to ignore both statute and Foti. They could elect not to use the telephone, but they haven't. And with each and every telephone call they have elected to ignore both.
To them, being sued over this is the cost of doing business...and, given the number of times that the DON'T get sued, it appears as if it has been a profitable position to take.
« Reply #41 on: November 19, 2017 07:43:20 PM »
Got over taken by a new job the last few months. So this had to go on the back burner. Now that I have more free time. I want to move forward with this asap! So I will go for $3k per call. I would like to include FDCPA violations of failure to identify, and harassment into the case as well.
Obviously I will send out a demand letter prior to filing anything. If the CA doesn't pay or work something out, I want to file my case pro se.
This is all very new to me so it is a tad overwhelming. Advice? As I have never filed a lawsuit in my life.
« Reply #42 on: November 20, 2017 10:22:32 PM »
Quote from: Jackson0515 on November 19, 2017 07:43:20 PM
I want to file my case pro se.
Yes, hire a lawyer to do this for you if you are over whelmed now you will get steam rolled in court. Especially if they are really smart and have your entire case removed to Federal Court based on your claim of FDCPA violations.
« Reply #43 on: November 20, 2017 11:51:27 PM »
If OP is overwhelmed now, even a not-so-bright attorney will chew him up.
Not everybody is cut out for the litigation game, and it is the smart person that understands that...A who hires himself as a lawyer has a fool for a client, and the adage is often true. [i}Pro se[/i]ers often realize this point too late.
It takes preparation, concentration, logic, and good presentation skills to make a civil case stick, and especially in TCPA cases, where one has to educate the judge, the point is often proven.
It is a mistake to see the dollar signs before the court or the jury has awarded you the win. And it is even a bigger mistake to start spending the proceeds before the check has cleared the bank.
« Reply #44 on: November 21, 2017 06:13:31 PM »
Gonna send out a demand letter with a fully filed out complaint. If the my don’t pay or work something out I’m going to file the case myself. There will be an opportunity to settle the case before things start to happen. I will use not having an attorney as leverage to settle the case. If they don’t, I’ll let an attorney handle it.
Should this be filed in federal or state court?