Source: https://askalawyer.com/employment-law-case-law-hoffman-plastic-compounds-inc-v-national-labor-relations-board-supreme-court-of-united-states/
Timestamp: 2020-05-26 19:43:10
Document Index: 354134867

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 8', '§ 1101', '§ 8', '§ 101', '§ 1324', '§ 1324', '§ 1324', '§ 1324', '§ 1324', '§ 1324', '§ 1324', '§ 1324', '§ 1324', '§ 1324', '§ 1546', '§ 103', '§ 158', '§ 1324', '§ 1546', '§ 1324', '§ 1621', '§ 1324', '§ 158', '§ 1324', '§ 1324', '§ 1324', '§ 274']

Employment Law Case Law HOFFMAN PLASTIC COMPOUNDS, INC. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD – Supreme Court of United States | Ask A Lawyer
Three years later, in January 1992, respondent Board found that Hoffman unlawfully selected four employees, including Castro, for layoff “in order to rid itself of known union supporters” in violation of § 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).[1] 306 N. L. R. B. 100. To remedy this violation, the Board ordered that Hoffman (1) cease and desist from further violations of the NLRA, (2) post a detailed notice to its employees regarding the remedial order, and (3) offer reinstatement and backpay to the four affected employees. Id., at 107-108. Hoffman entered into a stipulation with the Board’s General Counsel and agreed to abide by the Board’s order.
“We are unable to conclude that Congress intended to compel employers to retain persons in their employ regardless of their unlawful conduct,—to invest those who go on strike with an immunity from discharge for acts of trespass or violence against the employer’s property, which they would not have enjoyed had they remained at work.” 306 U. S., at 255.
Our decision in Sure-Tan followed this line of cases and set aside an award closely analogous to the award challenged here. There we confronted for the first time a potential conflict between the NLRA and federal immigration policy, as then expressed in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 66 Stat. 163, as amended, 8 U. S. C. § 1101 et seq. Two companies had unlawfully reported alien-employees to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in retaliation for union activity. Rather than face INS sanction, the employees voluntarily departed to Mexico. The Board investigated and found the companies acted in violation of §§ 8(a)(1) and (3) of the NLRA. The Board’s ensuing order directed the companies to reinstate the affected workers and pay them six months’ backpay.
The Southern S. S. Co. line of cases established that where the Board’s chosen remedy trenches upon a federal statute or policy outside the Board’s competence to administer, the Board’s remedy may be required to yield. Whether or not this was the situation at the time of Sure-Tan, it is precisely the situation today. In 1986, two years after Sure-Tan, Congress enacted IRCA, a comprehensive scheme prohibiting the employment of illegal aliens in the United States. § 101(a)(1), 100 Stat. 3360, 8 U. S. C. § 1324a. As we have previously noted, IRCA “forcefully” made combating the employment of illegal aliens central to “[t]he policy of immigration law.” INS v. National Center for Immigrants’ Rights, Inc., 502 U. S. 183, 194, and n. 8 (1991). It did so by establishing an extensive “employment verification system,” § 1324a(a)(1), designed to deny employment to aliens who (a) are not lawfully present in the United States, or (b) are not lawfully authorized to work in the United States, § 1324a(h)(3).[3] This verification system is critical to the IRCA regime. To enforce it, IRCA mandates that employers verify the identity and eligibility of all new hires by examining specified documents before they begin work. § 1324a(b). If an alien applicant is unable to present the required documentation, the unauthorized alien cannot be hired. § 1324a(a)(1).
Similarly, if an employer unknowingly hires an unauthorized alien, or if the alien becomes unauthorized while employed, the employer is compelled to discharge the worker upon discovery of the worker’s undocumented status. § 1324a(a)(2). Employers who violate IRCA are punished by civil fines, § 1324a(e)(4)(A), and may be subject to criminal prosecution, § 1324a(f)(1). IRCA also makes it a crime for an unauthorized alien to subvert the employer verification system by tendering fraudulent documents. § 1324c(a). It thus prohibits aliens from using or attempting to use “any forged, counterfeit, altered, or falsely made document” or “any document lawfully issued to or with respect to a person other than the possessor” for purposes of obtaining employment in the United States. §§ 1324c(a)(1)-(3). Aliens who use or attempt to use such documents are subject to fines and criminal prosecution. 18 U. S. C. § 1546(b). There is no dispute that Castro’s use of false documents to obtain employment with Hoffman violated these provisions.
Indeed, awarding backpay in a case like this not only trivializes the immigration laws, it also condones and encourages future violations. The Board admits that had the INS detained Castro, or had Castro obeyed the law and departed to Mexico, Castro would have lost his right to backpay. See Brief for Respondent 7-8 (citing A. P. R. A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group, Inc., 320 N. L. R. B., at 416). Cf. INS v. National Center for Immigrants’ Rights, Inc., 502 U. S., at 196, n. 11 (“[U]ndocumented aliens taken into custody are not entitled to work”) (construing 8 CFR § 103.6(a) (1991)). Castro thus qualifies for the Board’s award only by remaining inside the United States illegally. See, e. g., A. P. R. A. Fuel Buyers Group, 134 F. 3d, at 62, n. 4 (Jacobs, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Considering that NLRB proceedings can span a whole decade, this is no small inducement to prolong illegal presence in the country”). Similarly, Castro cannot mitigate damages, a duty our cases require, see Sure- Tan, 467 U. S., at 901 (citing Seven-Up Bottling, 344 U. S., at 346; Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U. S. 177, 198 (1941)), without triggering new IRCA violations, either by tendering false documents to employers or by finding employers willing to ignore IRCA and hire illegal workers. The Board here has failed to even consider this tension. See 326 N. L. R. B., at 1063, n. 10 (finding that Castro adequately mitigated damages through interim work with no mention of ALJ findings that Castro secured interim work with false documents).[5]
Lack of authority to award backpay does not mean that the employer gets off scot-free. The Board here has already imposed other significant sanctions against Hoffman—sanctions Hoffman does not challenge. See supra, at 140. These include orders that Hoffman cease and desist its violations of the NLRA, and that it conspicuously post a notice to employees setting forth their rights under the NLRA and detailing its prior unfair practices. 306N. L. R. B., at 100-101. Hoffman will be subject to contempt proceedings should it fail to comply with these orders. NLRB v. Warren Co., 350 U. S. 107, 112-113 (1955) (Congress gave the Board civil contempt power to enforce compliance with the Board’s orders). We have deemed such “traditional remedies” sufficient to effectuate national labor policy regardless of whether the “spur and catalyst” of backpay accompanies them. Sure-Tan, 467 U. S., at 904. See also id., at 904, n. 13 (“This threat of contempt sanctions . . . provides a significant deterrent against future violations of the [NLRA]”). As we concluded in Sure-Tan, “in light of the practical workings of the immigration laws,” any “perceived deficienc[y] in the NLRA’s existing remedial arsenal” must be “addressed by congressional action,” not the courts. Id., at 904. In light of IRCA, this statement is even truer today.[6]
The Court does not deny that the employer in this case dismissed an employee for trying to organize a union—a crude and obvious violation of the labor laws. See 29 U. S. C. § 158(a)(3) (1994 ed.); NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U. S. 393, 398 (1983). And it cannot deny that the Board has especially broad discretion in choosing an appropriate remedy for addressing such violations. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U. S. 575, 612, n. 32 (1969) (Board “draws on a fund of knowledge and expertise all its own, and its choice of remedy must therefore be given special respect by reviewing courts”). Nor can it deny that in such circumstances backpay awards serve critically important remedial purposes. NLRB v. J. H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 396 U. S. 258, 263 (1969). Those purposes involve more than victim compensation; they also include deterrence, i. e., discouraging employers from violating the Nation’s labor laws. See ante, at 152 (recognizing the deterrent purposes of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)); Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U. S. 883, 904, n. 13 (1984) (same).
Without the possibility of the deterrence that backpay provides, the Board can impose only future-oriented obligations upon law-violating employers—for it has no other weapons in its remedial arsenal. Ante, at 152. And in the absence of the backpay weapon, employers could conclude that they can violate the labor laws at least once with impunity. See A. P. R. A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group, Inc., 320 N. L. R. B. 408, 415, n. 38 (1995) (without potential backpay order employer might simply discharge employees who show interest in a union “secure in the knowledge” that only penalties were requirements “to cease and desist and post a notice”); cf. Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U. S. 168, 185 (1973); cf. also EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U. S. 279, 296, n. 11 (2002) (backpay award provides important incentive to report illegal employer conduct); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 417-418 (1975) (“It is the reasonably certain prospect of a backpay award” that leads employers to “shun practices of dubious legality”). Hence the backpay remedy is necessary; it helps make labor law enforcement credible; it makes clear that violating the labor laws will not pay.
Where in the immigration laws can the Court find a “policy” that might warrant taking from the Board this critically important remedial power? Certainly not in any statutory language. The immigration statutes say that an employer may not knowingly employ an illegal alien, that an alien may not submit false documents, and that the employer must verify documentation. See 8 U. S. C. §§ 1324a(a)(1), 1324a(b); 18 U. S. C. § 1546(b)(1). They provide specific penalties, including criminal penalties, for violations. Ibid.; 8 U. S. C. §§ 1324a(e)(4), 1324a(f)(1). But the statutes’ language itself does not explicitly state how a violation is to effect the enforcement of other laws, such as the labor laws. What is to happen, for example, when an employer hires, or an alien works, in violation of these provisions? Must the alien forfeit all pay earned? May the employer ignore the labor laws? More to the point, may the employer violate those laws with impunity, at least once—secure in the knowledge that the Board cannot assess a monetary penalty? The immigration statutes’ language simply does not say.
To deny the Board the power to award backpay, however, might very well increase the strength of this magnetic force. That denial lowers the cost to the employer of an initial labor law violation (provided, of course, that the only victims are illegal aliens). It thereby increases the employer’s incentive to find and to hire illegal-alien employees. Were the Board forbidden to assess backpay against a knowing employer—a circumstance not before us today, see 237 F. 3d 639, 648 (CADC 2001)—this perverse economic incentive, which runs directly contrary to the immigration statute’s basic objective, would be obvious and serious. But even if limited to cases where the employer did not know of the employee’s status, the incentive may prove significant—for, as the Board has told us, the Court’s rule offers employers immunity in borderline cases, thereby encouraging them to take risks, i. e., to hire with a wink and a nod those potentially unlawful aliens whose unlawful employment (given the Court’s views) ultimately will lower the costs of labor law violations. See Brief for Respondent 30-32; Tr. of Oral Arg. 41, 47; cf. also General Accounting Office, Garment Industry: Efforts to Address the Prevalence and Conditions of Sweatshops 8 (GAO/ HEHS-95-29, Nov. 1994) (noting a higher incidence of labor violations in areas with large populations of undocumented aliens). The Court has recognized these considerations in stating that the labor laws must apply to illegal aliens in order to ensure that “there will be no advantage under the NLRA in preferring illegal aliens” and therefore there will be “fewer incentives for aliens themselves to enter.” SureTan, supra, at 893-894. The Court today accomplishes the precise opposite.
Neither does precedent help the Court. Indeed, in ABF Freight System, Inc. v. NLRB, 510 U. S. 317 (1994), this Court upheld an award of backpay to an unlawfully discharged employee guilty of a serious crime, namely, perjury committed during the Board’s enforcement proceedings. Id., at 323. See also id., at 326-331 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment while stressing seriousness of misconduct). The Court unanimously held that the Board retained “broad discretion” to remedy the labor law violation through a backpay award, while leaving enforcement of the criminal law to ordinary perjury-related civil and criminal penalties. See id., at 325; see also 18 U. S. C. § 1621 (criminal penalties for perjury).
The Court, trying to distinguish ABF Freight, says that the Court there left open “whether the Board could award backpay to an employee who engaged in `serious misconduct’ unrelated to internal Board proceedings.” Ante, at 146. But the Court does not explain why (assuming misconduct of equivalent seriousness) lack of a relationship to Board proceedings matters, nor why the Board should have to do more than take that misconduct into account—as it did here. 326 N. L. R. B. 1060, 1060-1062 (1998) (thoroughly discussing relevance of immigration policies); see also A. P. R. A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group, Inc., 320 N. L. R. B., at 412-414 (same). The Court adds that the Board order in ABF Freight “did not implicate federal statutes or policies administered by other federal agencies.” Ante, at 146. But it does not explain why this matters when, as here, the Attorney General, whose Department—through the Immigration and Naturalization Service—administers the immigration statutes, supports the Board’s order. Nor does it explain why the perjury statute at issue in ABF Freight was not a “statute . . . administered by” another “agenc[y].” See 510 U. S., at 329 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (noting Department of Justice officials’ responsibility for prosecuting perjury).
The Court concludes that the employee misconduct at issue in ABF Freight, “though serious, was not at all analogous to misconduct that renders an underlying employment relationship illegal.” Ante, at 146. But this conclusion rests upon an implicit assumption—the assumption that the immigration laws’ ban on employment is not compatible with a backpay award. And that assumption, as I have tried to explain, is not justified. See supra, at 155-157.
At the same time, the two earlier cases upon which the Court relies, NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U. S. 240 (1939), and Southern S. S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U. S. 31, 47 (1942), offer little support for its conclusion. The Court correctly characterizes both cases as ones in which this Court set aside the Board’s remedy (more specifically, reinstatement). Ante, at 142-144. But the Court does not focus upon the underlying circumstances—which in those cases were very different from the circumstances present here. In both earlier cases, the employer had committed an independent unfair labor practice—in the one by creating a company union, Fansteel, supra, at 250, in the other by refusing to recognize the employees’ elected representative, Southern S. S. Co., supra, at 32-36, 48-49. In both cases, the employees had responded with unlawful acts of their own—a sit-in and a mutiny. Fansteel, supra, at 252; Southern S. S. Co., supra, at 48. And in both cases, the Court held that the employees’ own unlawful conduct provided the employer with “good cause” for discharge, severing any connection to the earlier unfair labor practice that might otherwise have justified reinstatement and backpay. Fansteel, supra, at 254-259; Southern S. S. Co., supra, at 47-49.
Neither can the remaining two features—unlawfully earned wages and criminal fraud—prove determinative, for they tell us only a small portion of the relevant story. After all, the same backpay award that compensates an employee in the circumstances the Court describes also requires an employer who has violated the labor laws to make a meaningful monetary payment. Considered from this equally important perspective, the award simply requires that employer to pay an employee whom the employer believed could lawfully have worked in the United States, (1) for years of work that he would have performed, (2) for a portion of the wages that he would have earned, and (3) for a job that the employee would have held—had that employer not unlawfully dismissed the employee for union organizing. In ignoring these latter features of the award, the Court undermines the public policies that underlie the Nation’s labor laws.
Of course, the Court believes it is necessary to do so in order to vindicate what it sees as conflicting immigration law policies. I have explained why I believe the latter policies do not conflict. See supra, at 155-157. But even were I wrong, the law requires the Court to respect the Board’s conclusion, rather than to substitute its own independent view of the matter for that of the Board. The Board reached its conclusion after carefully considering both labor law and immigration law. 326 N. L. R. B., at 1060-1062; see A. P. R. A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group, Inc., supra, at 412-414. In doing so the Board has acted “with a discriminating awareness of the consequences of its action” on the immigration laws. Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U. S. 156, 174 (1962). The Attorney General, charged with immigration law enforcement, has told us that the Board is right. See 8 U. S. C. § 1324a(e) (Immigration and Naturalization Service placed within the Department of Justice, under authority of Attorney General who is charged with responsibility for immigration law enforcement); cf. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U. S. 218, 258-259, n. 6 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Solicitor General’s statements represent agency’s position); Jean v. Nelson, 472 U. S. 846, 856, and n. 3 (1985) (agency’s position with respect to its regulation during litigation “arrives with some authority”). And the Board’s position is, at the least, a reasonable one. Consequently, it is lawful. Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842-843 (1984) (requiring courts to uphold reasonable agency position).
[1] Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA prohibits discrimination “in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.” 49 Stat. 452, as added, 61 Stat. 140, 29 U. S. C. § 158(a)(3).
[2] For an alien to be “authorized” to work in the United States, he or she must possess “a valid social security account number card,” § 1324a(b)(C)(i), or “other documentation evidencing authorization of employment in the United States which the Attorney General finds, by regulation, to be acceptable for purposes of this section,” § 1324a(b)(C)(ii). See also § 1324a(h)(3)(B) (defining “unauthorized alien” as any alien “[not] authorized to be so employed by this chapter or by the Attorney General”). Regulations implementing these provisions are set forth at 8 CFR § 274a (2001).
[4] When questioned at oral argument about the tension between affirmative mitigation duties under the NLRA and explicit prohibitions against employment of illegal aliens in IRCA, the Government candidly stated: “[T]he board has not examined this issue in detail.”Tr. of Oral Arg. 32. Justice Breyer says that we should nonetheless defer to the Government’sview that the Board’s remedy is entirely consistent with IRCA. Post, at 161 (dissenting opinion).But such deference would be contrary to Southern S. S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U. S. 31, 40-46 (1942), where the Government told us that the Board’s remedy was entirely consistent with the federal maritime laws,and NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U. S. 513, 529-532 (1984), where the Government told us that the Board’s remedy was entirely consistent with the Bankruptcy Code, and Sure-Tan, 467 U. S., at 892-894, 902-905, where the Government told us that the Board’s remedy was entirely consistent with the INA. See alsoCarpenters v. NLRB, 357 U. S. 93, 108-110 (1958) (rejecting Government position that we should defer to the Board’s interpretation of the Interstate Commerce Act). We did not defer to the Government’s position in any of these cases, and there iseven less basis for doing so here since IRCA—unlike the maritime statutes,the bankruptcy Code, or the INA—not only speaks directly to matters of employment but expressly criminalizes the only employment relationship at issue in this case.
m8tech	2017-03-09T15:08:45+00:00