Source: http://dc.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.19830801_0000152.DDC.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2017-01-18 01:34:01
Document Index: 341384938

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 8', '§ 956', '§ 1541', '§ 793', '§ 1331', '§ 401', '§ 413']

| SANCHEZ-ESPINOZA v. REAGAN
JAVIER SANCHEZ-ESPINOZA, resident of the village of San Francisco de Guajinquilapa, Department of Chinadega, Republic of Nicaragua, MYRNA CUNNINGHAM, resident of Puerto Cabezas, Department of Zelaya, Republic of Nicaragua, BRENDA ROCHA, resident of the village of Bonanza, Department of Zelaya, Republic of Nicaragua, MARIA ESPINAL-MONDRAGON (VIUDA DE GUEVARA), individually and as personal representative of Victorino Guevara-Centeno, resident of the village of San Francisco de Guajiniquilapa Department of Chinandega, Republic of Nicaragua, VICTORINO HERNANDEZ-AGUILERA, resident of the village of San Francisco de Guajiniquilapa, Department of Chinandega, Republlic of Nicaragua, JOSE SANTOS-BARRERA, individually and as personal representative of Evilio Baquedano Barrera, resident of the village of San Francisco de Guajiniquilapa, Department of Chinandega, Republic of Necaragua, ELIA MARIA ESPINOZA (VIUDA DE MONCADA), individually and as personal representative of Ramon Aristides Moncada, resident of the village of San Francisco de Guajiniquilapa Department of Chinandega, Republic of Nicaragua, ROSEANGELA RESQUITA GROSJEAN, individually and as personal representative of Dr. Pierre Grosjean, resident of Paris, France, MARIA RIGAT-PFLAUM, individually and as personal representative of Dr. Albrecht Pflaum, resident of Berlin, Germany, ULLRICH PFLAUM, individually and as personal respresentative of Dr. Albrecht Pflaum, resident of Frankfurt, Germany, MARIA BUSTILLO DE BLANDON, individually and as personal representative of Ricardo, Leonardo, Gregorio, Juan Angeles, Nicolas and Antonio Blandon, resident of La Fragua, Department of Neuva Segovia, Republic of Nicaragua, CONCEPCION LOPEZ-TORRES, resident of Octal, Department of Nueva Segovia, Republic of Nicaragua, RONALD V. DELLUMS, in his capacity as member of the United States House of Representatives, 2136 Rayburn House Office Building, Washington WILLIAM CLAY, in his capacity as a member of the United States House of Representatives, 2470 Rayburn House Office Building, Washington D.C. 20515, GEORGE CROCKETT, in his capacity as a member of the United States House of Representatives, 1531 Longworth House Office Building, Washington, D.C. 10515, JOHN CONYERS, in his capacity as a member of the United States House of Representatives, 2313 Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, D.C. 20515, MELVYN DYMALLY, in his capacity as a member of the United States House of Representatives, 1717 Longworth House Office Building, Washington, D.C. 20515, WALTER FAUNTROY, in his capacity as a member of the United States House of Representatives, 2135 Rayburn House Office Building, Washington D.C. 20515, MICKEY LELAND, in his capacity as a member of the United States House of Representatives, Rayburn Office Building, Washington, D.C. 20505, GEORGE MILLER, III, in his capacity as a member of the United States House of Representatives, 419 Cannon House Office Building, Washington, D.C. 20505, PARREN J. MITCHELL, in his capacity as a member of the United States House of Representatives, 2367 Rayburn House Bldg., Washington, D.C. 20215, MAJOR OWENS, in his capacity as a member of the United States House of Representatives, 114 Cannon House Office Building, Washington, D.C. 20515 GUS SAVAGE, in his capacity as a member of the United States House of Representatives, 1121 Longworth House Office Building, Washington, D.C. 20515, THEODORE S. WEISS, in his capacity as a member of the United States House of Representatives, 132 Cannon House Office Building, Washington, D.C. 20515, ELEANOR GINSBERG, ex rel. State of Florida 9500 Southwest 60th Court, Miami, Florida, 33156, and LARRY O'TOOLE, ex rel." State of Florida, 15625 Southwest 102nd Place, Miami, Florida, 33157, Plaintiffs,
RONALD WILSON REAGAN, individually and in his official capacity as President of the United States, WILLIAM CASEY, individually and in his official capacity as Director of Central Intelligence, ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR., GEORGE P. SHULTZ, individually and in his official capacity as United States Secretary of State, THOMAS O. ENDERS, individually, VERNON WALTERS, individually and in his official capacity as United States Ambassador-at-Large, CASPAR WEINBERGER, individually and in his official capacity as United States Secretary of Defense, NESTOR SANCHEZ, individually and in his official capacity as United States Assistant Secretary of Defense, JOHN D. NEGROPONTE, individually and in his official capacity as United States Ambassador to Honduras, MAX VARGAS, individually, ALPHA 66 Inc., a Florida corporation, BAY OF PIGS VETERANS ASSOCIATION, Brigade 2506, Inc., and JOHN DOE AND RICHARD ROE, as yet unidentified officers or agents employed by the United States, Defendants
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER Before the Court is the motion of the federal defendants, pursuant to Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to dismiss this action in its entirety, or, in the alternative, to dismiss it as against the federal defendants. As grounds therefor they assert, inter alia, that (1) subject matter jurisdiction is lacking due to the presence of a political question, (2) plaintiffs do not have standing, (3) plaintiffs have failed to state a cause of action under any of the theories alleged in the complaint, (4) personal jurisdiction is lacking over several of the federal defendants, (5) venue is improper in the District of Columbia, and (6) the federal defendants enjoy absolute immunity from suits of this type. Plaintiffs have opposed. There has been extensive briefing of all the issues presented. Because we find that (1) this case involves significant factual and policy questions for which there are no judicially discoverable and manageable standards, and (2) resolution of plaintiff's claims would seriously impinge on the powers of the Legislative and Executive branches to establish and carry out foreign policy, as well as provide for national security, we conclude that this lawsuit is not justiciable. As a result, defendants' motion to dismiss this case in its entirety will be granted. I. BACKGROUND As presently drafted,
the complaint lists twenty-six plaintiffs, to wit, (1) twelve non-resident aliens, citizens of Nicaragua, (2) twelve members of the United States House of Representatives, and (3) two residents of the state of Florida who sue on behalf of that state. The named defendants can similarly be broken down into three groups, namely (1) nine present or former officials of the Executive Branch, including President Ronald Reagan,
(2) three non-federal defendants (one individual and two unincorporated associations located in Florida), and (3) an unspecified number of, as yet, unidentified officers or agents employed by the United States. The complaint is styled in eight causes of action which, for our purposes, can be grouped together into three broad categories of claims for relief. First, the Nicaraguan plaintiffs seek damages for injuries allegedly caused by U.S.-sponsored terrorist raids against various towns and villages in Nicaragua. They allege that paramilitary activities have been, and continue to be, financed and carried out by the U.S. government, its agents and employees, against the people of Nicaragua, in an attempt to overthrow their national government. Plaintiffs maintain that the U.S.-sponsored raids violate fundamental human rights established under international law and the U.S. Constitution. These plaintiffs also seek an injunction prohibiting further U.S. military involvement in Nicaragua. The Congressional plaintiffs present a second category of claims. They allege that the activities described above constitute acts of war which have not been authorized by Congress. These plaintiffs claim violations of their authority to declare war under Article I, § 8, cl. 11, of the Constitution, and laws promulgated thereunder, such as the so-called "neutrality laws," 18 U.S.C. §§ 956 et seq., and the War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-48. In short, they sue to stop an alleged undeclared war waged by the federal defendants against the people and government of Nicaragua. The Congressional plaintiffs also allege a violation of the Boland Amendment to the 1983 Department of Defense Appropriations Act, P.L. 97-337, § 793 (1982), which prohibits the Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA") and the Department of Defense from using any of the funds provided in the Act for military activities aimed at overthrowing the government of Nicaragua. The Congressmen seek declaratory and injunctive relief. Finally, the Florida plaintiffs seek to enjoin the alleged operation of U.S.-sponsored paramilitary training camps located in Florida, inasmuch as they constitute a nuisance under Florida law. Plaintiffs Eleanor Ginsberg and Larry O'Toole, residents of Dade County, Florida, sue on behalf of the state of Florida, to close those camps. Plaintiffs rely on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (federal question), 1350 (alien tort claims), 1361 (mandamus), 2201 and 2202 (declaratory judgments), and the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, see United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 16 L. Ed. 2d 218, 86 S. Ct. 1130 (1966), as grounds for establishing subject matter jurisdiction in this Court.
II. DISCUSSION This lawsuit is another cog in the wheel of controversy currently surrounding U.S. government involvement in Central America, particularly in Nicaragua, Honduras and El Salvador. The federal defendants strenuously argue that adjudication of plaintiffs' claims would impermissibly interfere with the constitutional powers of the Executive and Legislative branches of our government to conduct foreign affairs and attend to national security concerns. As a result, they argue, this case presents a non-justiciable political question. We agree. The political question doctrine insures that the judiciary exhibits appropriate concern for the separation of powers under our tri-parttite system of government. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165-66, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663, 82 S. Ct. 691 (1962); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15, 33 L. Ed. 2d 154, 92 S. Ct. 2318 (1972); see INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 77 L. Ed. 2d 317, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 51 U.S.L.W. 4907 (1983). To determine whether the resolution of a matter violates separation of powers principles, thereby making it a non-justiciable political question, we must apply the factors outlined by the Supreme Court in Baker: Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question. 369 U.S. at 217; see Consumer Energy, Etc. v. F.E.R.C., 218 U.S. App. D.C. 34, 673 F.2d 425, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1982), aff'd., 463 U.S. 1216, 103 S. Ct. 3556, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1402, 1413, 51 U.S.L.W. 3929 (1983). In the present context, we are mindful that "matters intimately related to foreign policy and national security are rarely proper subjects for judicial intervention," Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292, 69 L. Ed. 2d 640, 101 S. Ct. 2766 (1981), inasmuch as they are "so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference." Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589, 96 L. Ed. 586, 72 S. Ct. 512 (1952), quoted in Agee, 453 U.S. at 292. That is not to say, however, that every exercise of foreign policy power is unreviewable. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 96 L. Ed. 1153, 72 S. Ct. 863 (1952) (President Truman had no authority to seize the nation's steel mills in the face of a nationwide strike, even though he asserted the exigencies of the Korean Conflict); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 69 L. Ed. 2d 918, 101 S. Ct. 2972 (1981) (President Carter had authority under certain statutes to "suspend" individual damage claims against Iran as part of bargain to secure release of U.S. hostages). Rather, a court must take special care, when confronted with a challenge to the validity of U.S. foreign policy initiatives, to give appropriate deference to the decisions of the political branches, who are constitutionally empowered to conduct foreign relations and provide for national security. With these principles in mind, we proceed to analyze the instant lawsuit. A. Claims of the Congressional Plaintiffs As previously noted, twelve members of Congress sue for declaratory and injunctive relief alleging that the President, through his officers and appointees, has violated the neutrality laws, the War Powers Resolution, the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq.), especially the Hughes-Ryan Amendment (50 U.S.C. § 413, which requires certain reports to be made to Congress about U.S. intelligence activities), and the Boland Amendment, by carrying on an undeclared war against the Nicaraguan government. They argue that judicial relief is necessary because the President has ignored significant statutory restrictions on his power to engage in hostilities directed against foreign nations. In other words, the Congressional plaintiffs maintain that the judiciary must act to control Executive abuses of power in this case because Congress has done all it can, namely, pass legislation. For several reasons, we decline plaintiffs' invitation to delineate Presidential foreign policy power regarding Central America. First, this Court lacks judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving the dispute presented. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 217, Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893, 898 (D.D.C. 1982), appeal docketed, No. 82-2461 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (action by Congressmen to enjoin provision of military aid to El Salvador declared non-justiciable due to lack of discoverable standards to determine whether or not U.S. military personnel were engaged in hostilities). In Crockett, as here, the questions presented require judicial inquiry into sensitive military matters. Moreover, the covert activities of CIA operatives in Nicaragua and Honduras are perforce even less judicially discoverable than the level of participation by U.S. military personnel in hostilities in El Salvador. See Halkin v. Helms, 223 U.S. App. D.C. 254, 690 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1982). A second reason for finding this matter non-justiciable is the impossibility of our undertaking independent resolution without expressing a lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government. President Reagan has stated on numerous occasions, to the Congress and to the public at large, that he is not violating the spirit or letter of the Boland Amendment, or any other statutes, in Nicaragua. By all media accounts, members of both Houses of Congress strenuously disagree with the President's assertion. Were this Court to decide, on a necessarily incomplete evidentiary record, that President Reagan either is mistaken, or is shielding the truth, one or both of the coordinate branches would be justifiably offended. At this stage, therefore, it is up to Congress and the President to try to resolve their differences and jointly set a course for U.S. involvement in Central America. Finally, there is a real danger of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question. As previously noted, the Executive urges that his actions are legal and necessary to national security. Congress, especially the House of Representatives,
is currently considering the validity of the President's position. Congressional debate is ongoing, and the result will be some legislative pronouncement as to the proper role, if any, of U.S. military and CIA officials in Nicaragua. Judicial resolution of the Congressional plaintiffs' claims unnecessarily might provide yet a third view on U.S. activities in Central America. Such an occurrence would, undoubtedly, rattle the delicate diplomatic balance that is required in the foreign affairs arena. See Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1312 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936, 40 L. Ed. 2d 286, 94 S. Ct. 1935 (1974). It is, therefore, prudent for us to decline to adjudicate plaintiffs' claims at this time.
B. Claims of the Nicaraguan Plaintiffs The twelve non-resident alien plaintiffs, citizens and residents of Nicaragua, cast their claims for relief in the form of a combined international law and constitutional tort action. Much of the complaint is devoted to detailed descriptions of the atrocities allegedly committed against plaintiffs by U.S.-sponsored terrorist forces in Nicaragua. Plaintiffs assert that their rights to monetary and equitable relief arise under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution, as well as numerous treaties, United Nations Resolutions, and declarations of international human rights.
Notwithstanding the gravity and legal complexity of plaintiffs' claims, we find that, for the same reasons expressed in the previous section, those claims are not justiciable. In order to adjudicate the tort claims of the Nicaraguan plaintiffs, we would have to determine the precise nature and extent of the U.S. government's involvement in the affairs of several Central American nations, namely, Honduras, Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Nicaragua. See complaint at PP 40, 42, 46, 48-53, 73, 76. As pointed out above, judicial resolution of this matter is not proper at this time because it involves a nonjusticiable political question. See also Eminente v. Johnson, 124 U.S. App. D.C. 56, 361 F.2d 73 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 929, 17 L. Ed. 2d 211, 87 S. Ct. 287 (1966) (nonresident alien's damage claims against President Johnson due to destruction of property in Vietnam as a result of American military actions in Southeast Asia, dismissed as a non-justiciable controversy).
This Court simply does not have the resources and expertise required to oversee U.S. military affairs in Central America. C. Claims of the Florida Plaintiffs Two residents of the Dade County, Florida sue in the name of the state to abate a nuisance allegedly caused by the operation of paramilitary training camps in their county of residence. Their claims arise under Florida law and do not have an independent basis of federal subject matter jurisdiction. Rather, plaintiffs rely on the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction as enunciated in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 16 L. Ed. 2d 218, 86 S. Ct. 1130 (1966). Since we dismiss the federal causes of action, the state law claims of the Florida plaintiffs have no federal jurisdictional hook. Thus, this action must be dismissed in its entirety as against all defendants. III. CONCLUSION The instant action is replete with insurmountable obstacles to justiciability; not the least of which is the current debate and consideration of the issues presented here by both the Executive and Congress. We, therefore, must refrain from affording plaintiffs a day in court in view of our constitutional duty to respect the separation of powers. Accordingly, it is, this 1st day of August, 1983 ORDERED that defendants' motion to dismiss be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED; and it is FURTHER ORDERED that this action be, and the same hereby is, DISMISSED in its entirety as against all defendants. Our website includes the main text of the court's opinion but does not include the