Source: http://www.juricaf.org/arret/CONSEILDELEUROPE-COUREUROPEENNEDESDROITSDELHOMME-19790305-715175-715275
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SPORRONG &amp; LÖNNROTH c. SUEDE
Page d'accueil > Résultats de la recherche SPORRONG & LÖNNROTH c. SUEDE
Type d'affaire : DecisionType de recours : Partiellement irrecevableNumérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 7151/75;7152/75Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1979-03-05;7151.75 Analyses : (Art. 14) DISCRIMINATION, (Art. 34) VICTIME, (Art. 6-1) ACCES A UN TRIBUNAL, (Art. 6-1) PROCES EQUITABLEParties : Demandeurs : SPORRONG & LÖNNROTHDéfendeurs : SUEDETexte : APPLICATIONS/REOUE'TES Nw 7151/75 et 7152/75 Qolnedl)olntes) Estate of E . SPORRONG and I .M . LONNROTH v/SWEDE N
Hoirie E . SPORRONG et I .M . LONNROTH c/SUÃD E DECISION of 5 March 1979 on the admissibility of the applications DÃCISION du 5 mars 1979 sur la recevabilitÃ© des requÃªte s
Article 6, paragraph 1 of the Convention : Question whether a dispute concerns the determination of civil rights and obfigations must be decided by reference to the substantive content and effects of the right concerned . In the case in point : right to a decision on expropriation and right to compensation for threat of future expropriation accompanied by prohibition on construction. (Question joined to the merits of the case) . Article 26 of the Convention : Where an appfication concerns a continuing situation and where this state of affairs cannot be considered to be the result of a particular decision or event, the appfication cannot be rejected for nonobservance of the six months rule . Article 1, paragraph 1 of the First Protocof : In the course of expropriation proceedings and pending a decision on expropriation there ts no deprivation of possessions . Question whether a threat to expropriate, accompanied by a prohibition on construction, by its very duration constitutes an interference with the right to peaceful enjoyment of the applicant's possessions. Articfe 1, paragraph 2 of the First Protocof : Where it has been established that /egislation on the use of property is lawful and has a legitimate purpose, is it appropriate to examine whether the legislation goes beyond that /egitimate purpose or whether it is disproportionate to it ?
A rtfcle 6, paragraphe 1, de la Convention: La question de savoir si une contestation porte sur des droits et obligations de caractÃ¨re civil doit Atre tranchÃ©e par rÃ©fÃ©rence au contenu matÃ©rief du droit litigieux et Ã ses effets . En l'espÃ¨ce : droit Ã ce qu'une dÃ©cision soit prise en matiÃ©re d'expropriation et droit Ã¨ une indemnitÃ© pour menace d'expropriation avec interdiction de construire . IOuestion renvoyÃ©e Ã¨ l'examen du fond de l'affaire) .
Article 26 de la Convention : Lorsque la requÃªte a pour objet la durÃ©e d'une situation actuelle et que cette durÃ©e ne peut Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ©e comme la consÃ©quence d'une dÃ©cision ou d'un fait prÃ©cis, la requÃªte ne peut Ã©tre rejetÃ©e pour inobservation du dÃ©lai de six mois. Article 1, paragraphe 1, du Protocole additionnef : Pendant une procÃ©dure tendant Ã l'expropriation et tant que celle-ci n'a pas eu lieu, il n'y a pas privation de propriÃ©tÃ©. Une menace d'expropriation accompagnÃ©e d'une interdiction de construire, peut-elle, par sa durÃ©e, constituer une atteinte au droit au respect des biens ? Article 1, paragraphe 2, du Pro tocole additionnel : Lorsqu'une rÃ©glementation de l'usage des biens est lÃ©gale et a un but tÃ©gitime, y a-t-il lieu de rechercher encore si elle outrepasse son but ou lui est disproportionnÃ©e ?
I franÃ§ats : voir p . 25 l
The facts as they have been submitted by the applicants are apparantly not in dispute between the parties and may be summarised as follows : The first application (No . 7151/75) is lodged by the Estate of E . Sporrong, Deceased, Stockholm, which is an association of the heirs Mrs M . Sporrong, Mr C .O . Sporrong and Mrs B . Atmer, who reside in Stockholm and its environs . The applicant is the owner of a property in Stockholm called "Riddaren No . 8" . The second application (No . 7152/75) is lodged by Mrs I .M . Ldnnroth,who also resides in Stockholm and is the owner of three quarters of a property in Stockholm called "Barnhuset No . 6" .
Both applicants are represented in the proceedings before the Commission by Mr M . Hernmarck, who is a barrister practising in Stockholm . Particulars of the fi rst application The applicant states that on 31 July 1956 the Swedish Government granted the Municipality of Stockholm a zone expropriation permit in accordance with the Building Act (then Sect . 44) for urban redevelopment in Stockholm comprising 164 properties including the property owned by the applicant . The permit was valid as from the application for expropriation which was filed with the Government on 6 June 1955 . According to the plans, the intention was to demolish the applicant's building . In pursuance of the provisions of the Expropriation Act 1917 the Government fixed the timelimit for redemption (within which the Municipality should summon the owners to appear in court to settle their compensation and in default o f
which the permit would become void) at five years, although according to the applicants the established practice had been to fix such time limits at one year . The expropriation permit was also combined with a building ban issued by the Municipality in accordance with the Building Act specifying and strengthening the restrictions against building investment during the period of redemption . Subsequently at requests of the Municipality the Government repeatedly prolonged the validity of the redemption permit . In 1961 a three-year prolongation was granted and in 1964 a five-year prolongation . Finally, on 14 May 1971, the permit was prolonged by ten years (from the date of the request) until 31 July 1979 . The Municipality then presented modified plans lin May 1975) and according to these the use of the property concerned should not be altered and the existing building should be preserved . The applicant submits that there is no possibility of having .the expropriation permit reviewed and refers in this respect to an unsuccessful request made by the second applicant (cf . below) . Pa rticulars of the second applicatio n In this case the Swedish Government IMinistry for Physical Planning and Local Government) decided on 24 September 1971 to grant the Municipality of Stockholm the right of redemption concerning 129 properties including the property owned by the applicant . This permit was also valid as from the application for expropriation which was filed with the Government on 22 January 1968 . The Government ordered that applications for summons to appear in court should follow not later than 31 December 1979 . This permit was also combined with a building ban . According to the plans a parking house would be erected on the applicant's property . However, the works in the area were postponed and new plans wer e being considered . The applicant's property was in urgent need of repair and she lodged a request that her property be exempted from the redemption permit . The municipality replied that existing plans did not allow any exception . The Government (National Housing Boardl rejected the request on 20 February 1975 for the reason that the redemption permit could not be revoked without the direct consent of the Municipality .
The alleged position of the authorities and its consequences The applicants explain that the prolongations of the expropriation permits were made for several reasons . Initially the Municipality did not hav e
sufficient resources for realising the extensive restructuring which their application for expropriation in 1955 had foreseen . In 1962 a new city plan was adopted which included changed intentions of the Municipality owing to the development of motor traffic . In 1967 these plans were funher elaborated and since 1975 they are being revised because of new policies to limit motor car traffic in the city . The applicants submit that as a result of long-term expropriation permits they lose their security in possession-in pa rt icular their possibility of assessing the value of investments-by being held in suspense for 23 years and 12 years respectively as to whether, and if so, when, the expropriation will be followed up in court . They also lose their share in the development possibilities of the property . Instead the Municipality will benefit from the situation and maintain long-term expropriation permits since the rules for compensation fix the amount of compensation in proportionto the value of the property at the date of the granting of the zone expropriation permit . The applicants also submit that they lose their possibilities of participating in the urban development . Further, by the building bans they lose their possibilities of making use of the building rights given in the town plan, and building permits are combined with forced agreements limiting the future compensation . The applicants point out that the Parliament Ombudsman (J .o .l has criticised the long-term building bans and suggested that these should be combined with a right to compensation . The applicants also state that they lose their possibilities of selling the property on the normal free market terms . The applicants ihen submit that these restrictions have the result that the capital invested in the property cannot be made available for other purposes . They describe their legal position as being that their earlier ownership has beed transformed into a limited right to dispose of the property during an indefinite period of time . They finally submit that Swedish law provides them with no possibility of obtaining compensation either for the limitations of their ownership or for the economic consequences of long-term expropriation permits .
COMPLAINT S The applicants' complaints may be summarised as follows : Concerning civil proceedings They complain that 23 years and 12 years, respectively, will pass without a trial of their compensation claims . They submit that these periods . of time are unreasonable and contrary to Anicle 6 (1) of the Convention .
Concerning ownership They also complain that compensation has not been paid "promptly" in accordance with general principles of international law, which is contrary to Article 1 of the Protocol No . 1 to the Convention . They complain that the public expropriation powers have been misused to limit the rights inherent in ownership to a far greater extent than is necessary in order to effect the expropriation, which is contrary to Article 17 of the Convention . They also complain .that the "public interest", e .g . the original grounds for the expropriation, no longer applies and the continued use of the expropriation permit is a restriction of their rights for alien aims, which is contrary to Article 18 of the Convention . They complain that the consequences of the long-term expropriation permits deprive them of their right to peaceful enjoyment of their possessions, which is a further violation of Article 1 of Protocol No . 1 . They complain that through the forced agreements regarding the influence of building measures on the compensation, the Municipality has, without legal authority, exercised control of the claims, thereby dispossessing the individual of his property under other conditions than those provided by law and consequently in violation of Article 1 of Protocol No . 1 . In addition the first applicant complains that the prolongations of the expropriation permits were made without legal authority and therefore dispossessed it of its property under other conditions than those provided by law and consequently in violation of Article 1 of Protocol No . 1 .
Concerning compensation Both applicants then complain that the lack of compensation for loss of a great part of their right to dispose of the property is not in conformity with general principles of international law concerning "just compensation" and consequently a violation of Article 1 of the Protocol No . 1 .
Conceming alleged discriminatio n The applicants finally complain that in comparison with property owners who are not affected by long-term expropriation permits, they are subject to very far-reaching special treatment in violation of Article 14 of the Convention . .. . ... . . . . . . . . .
THE LAW 1 . The applicants complain of the effects on their ownership of properties caused by long-term expropriation permits accompanied by the prohibition of construction, which have by now been effective during a period totallin g
23 years in the first applicant's case and 12 years in the second applicant's case . The applicants have alleged violations ot Article 1 of Protocol No . 1 to the Convention taken either alone or in conjunction with Articles 14, 17 and 18 of the Convention . a . The respondent Government have submitted in the first place that the applicants have failed to observe the six months' time limit provided for in Artcile 26 of the Convention, since the last decisions regarding the prolongation of the expropriation permits were given on 14 May 1971 in the first applicant's case and on 24 September 1971 in the second applicant's case . The applicants have argued, on the other hand, that there is no final decision in their cases within the meaning of Article 26 of the Convention and that they have no power to demand such a decision to be taken . Article 26 of the Convention provides as follows
"The Commission may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted according to the generally recognised rules of international law, and within a period of six months from the date on which the final decision was taken" . The Commission notes that it is not in dispute between the parties that the applicants do not have any effective remedy at their disposal under Swedish law to bring an end to the state of affairs of which they are complaining . In these cicumstances, there cannot, in the Commission's view, be any final decision for the purposes of Article 26 connected with the exhaustion of domestic remedies . Consequently, the question arises whether the six months' period is applicable in the present cases . The Commission recalls that it has previously held that the six months' rule specified in Article 26 of the Convention "is justified by the wish of the High Contracting Parties to prevent the past judgments being constantly called into question" (cf . the De Becker Case, Yearbook 2, p . 215 at p . 244) . In that case it was also stated by the Commission, however, that this legitimate concern for order, stability and peace cannot be allowed to stand in the way of the consideration, by the Commission, of a continuing situation of which the applicant complains, insofar as this state of affairs is not a thing of the past but still exists without there being any domestic remedies available to the applicant libidl . It is true, on the other hand, that the Commission has recently held that, when there is no remedy, the period of the six months begins from the date of the decision complained of (cf . application No . 5759/72, X v/Austria, Decisions and Reports6, p . 15 .) .
In the opinion of the Commission, however, the latter finding can only apply to cases where the complaint is directed against a decision as such or another particular event and not where, as in the present cases, the grievance s
result more gradually with the passing of time from the accumulation of renewed delays of expropriation combined with prohibition on construction which affect the applicants as property owners . The state of affairs complained of by the present applicants is neither a thing of the past, nor was it created by the latest decisions referred to by the respondent Government or by any other particular decision or event .
The Commission concludes from the above considerations that the present applications cannot be rejected for non-compliance with the six months' rule referred to in Article 26 of the Convention . b . The applicants have submitted that, contrary to Article 1 of the Protocol, they have not been paid just and prompt compensation in accordance with the general principles of international law . The first applicant has stated, in addition, that the prolongations of the expropriation permits have been made without legal authority and that he has therefore been dispossessed of his property contrary to Article 1 of the Protocol . The applicants have furthermore contended that the existence during a protracted period of the unused expropriation permits and the accompanying prohibition on construction has caused inconvenience with regard to their properties to such a degree that they amount to an unjustified interference with their right to peaceful enjoyment of their possessions . In the applicants' view the permits and prohibition were in no way necessary either under Swedish law or under the Convention and they consider consequently that they contravene Articles 17 and 18 of the Convention . The respondent Government have stated, on the other hand, that expropriation permits and prohibition on construction do not affect the applicants' rights as property owners and that they, therefore, do not restrict the applicants' right to peaceful enjoyment of their possessions . This does in the Government's view hold true irrespective of the length of time during which an expropriation permit is maintained . Even if it were shown that the length of time during which an expropriation permit is in effect could be regarded as a limitation of the use of property, such a limitation must, in the submission of the Government, be considered as necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest as permitted by the second paragraph of Article 1 of the Protocol . It would seem to follow that the Government consider the applications to be incompatible with this Article . Moreover, in the opinion of the respondent Government, Articles 17 and 18 of the Convention have no bearing on the present case . Article 1 of the First Protocol to the Convention reads as follows "Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions . No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law .
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties . " The Commission observes in the first place that the question whether or not the applicants' properties will eventually be subjected to expropriation, depends on a decision to make use of the expropriation permits, a decision which will be taken by the Municipality of Stockholm in the future . Pending a decision of the Municipality to make use of the said permits, the applicants will remain the owners of the properties concerned . It is therefore clear that the applicants have not as yet been deprived of their possessions . It follows that there is no appearance of a violation of the rights set forth in the second sentence of the first paragraph of Article 1 of the Protocol . The Commission wil now turn to the question whether or not th e length of time during which the expropriation permits and the prohibition on construction have been in force without being used, can be considered as amounting to an interference with the applicants' right to peaceful enjoyment of their possessions as guaranteed by the first sentence of the first paragraph of Article 1 of the Protocol . Any such interference by way of a limitation on the use of the property question would then have to be considered by the Commission under the second paragraph of Article 1 of the Protocol and could only be justified on the conditions set out therein . In connection with such an examination the Commission might also have to consider Articles 17 and 18 of the Convention . The Commission observes that while the necessity for such legislation seems to be left to the discretion of the State, Article 1 appears to provide for a limited supervision of the enforcement measures as regards their lawfulness and purpose . Even where their lawfulness is beyohd doubt and the purpose at the outset appears legitimate, the question may Ã¢rise whether the prolonged existence of restrictions amounts to an interference which could become Ã»njustified as going beyond or being disproportionate to their legitimate purpose . However, the Commission considers that these questions thus arising under Article 1 of the Protocol No : 1 taken either alone or in conjunction with Articles 17 and 18 of the Convention are complex questions concerning the interpretation of the Convention, the determination of which should depend on an examination of the merits of the case . It follows that this part of the applications cannot be regarded as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 121 of the Convention and must therefore be declared admissible, no other ground for declaring them inadmssible having been established .
2 . The applicants have further complained that the matters of expropriation and compensation-and at the same time their civil rights-have not been determined within a reasonable time . They have stated that they have no admissible claim in the civil courts before the Municipality of Stockholm decides to make use of its expropriation permits . In their own view, however, they are entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time as prescribed by Article 6 (1) of the Convention ever since the time when the expropriation process began, namely, as from the dates when the expropriation permits were granted to the Municipality . The respondent Government have argued that Article 6 (1) of the Convention cannot be so interpreted as to require that the Municipality should decide within a reasonable time whether or not to expropriate the applicants' properties . They submit furthermore that the applicants' legal rights remain unaffected by the expropriation permits and that the building bans have to be tolerated although they may reduce the value of the properties concerned . In the submission of the Government, the applicants have consequently no basis for their claim for compensation . The Government state furthermore that, since there is no civil right in issue in the present cases, the applicants are not entitled to a hearing at the present stage . The first sentence of Article 6 (1) of the Convention reads as follows : "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of . any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law" . The first question is whether the complaint concerns a "civil right" within the meaning of this provision . The concept of "civil rights and obligations" cannot be interpreted solely by reference to the domestic law of the respondent State . It has constantly been held by the Commission, and also recently by the European Court of Human Rights (cf . K6nig Case, judgment of 28 June 1978, para . 88), that the notion of civil right is autonomous . This does on the other hand not mean that the legislation of the State concerned is without importance . Whether or not a right is to be regarded as a civil one within the meaning of Article 6 111 of the Convention must be determined by reference to the substantive content and effects of the right under the domestic law concerned . In the exercise of its supervisory functions, the Commission must also take account of the object and purpose of the Convention and of the national legal systems of other Contracting States (cf . the above-mentioned Kbnig Case judgment, para . 89) .
Whether, in the present cases, a civil right is, at all, in issue, depends on the claims raised by the applicants either by reason of the possible future
expropriation ot the applicants' properties or, for instance, by reason of any claims, such as claims for compensation, that the applicants may raise because of any possible unjustified interference with their right to peaceful enjoyment of their possessions under Article 1 of the Protocol No . 1 of the Convention . If one or more of the applicants' claims constitute a pretended civi l right within the meaning of this expression in the Convention it follows from Article 6 that the applicants are entitled to access to the courts for the purpose of having this civil right determined within a reasonable time . The Commission reralls that the right to access to the courts constitutes an element which is inherent in the right stated by Article 6 (1) of the Convention (cf . Eur . Court H .R ., judgment of 7 May 1974 in the Golder Case, Series A, Vol . 18, p . 18, para . 36) . However, having examined the information and arguments presented by the parties, the Commission considers that the questions whether the applicants' claims fall within the scope of the Convention, in particular of its Article 6 111 and, if so, whether or not there has been a violation of the Convention in the present cases are complex questions concerning the interpretation of the Convention, the determination of which should depend on an examination of the merits . It follows that this part of the applications must therefore be declared admissible . 3. The applicants have also complained that they are being discriminated against contrary to Article 14 of the Convention not only in relation to those who do not have their properties expropriated but also in relation to those who have their properties expropriated in a way which is acceptable under both Swedish law and the terms of the Convention .
The Government have stated that there is no appearance of a violation of Article 14 of the Convention in the present cases, since any distinction made between the applicants and other property owners against whom similar measures have not been taken is based on reasonable and objective grounds . Article 14 provides that the "enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status" .
The Commission has already accepted the applications as raising questions under various Articles securing substantive rights under the Convention . The allegations made by the applicants in the context of Article 1 4 _24_
of the Convention relate to the same facts and circumstances as those made in the context of the other Articles . Having regard to the interpretation which the European Court of Human Rights has given to its jurisdiction under Article 45 of the Convention (cf . De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp judgment of 18 June 1971, Series A, No . 12, pp . 29-30, paras . 49 and 51 ; Handyside judgment of 7 December 1976, Series A, No . 24, p . 20, para . 41) the Commission finds that the determination of the above question should not be made at the admissibility stage of the applications but should depend on an examination of their merits . For these reasons, the Commissio n DECLARES ADMISSIBLE and retains the applications, without in any way prejudging their merits .
(TRADUCTION) EN FAI T Les faits de la cause, tels qu'ils ont Ã©tÃ© exposÃ©s par les requÃ©rants et qui ne font apparemment l'objet d'aucune contestation entre les parties, peuvent se rÃ©sumer comme suit : La premiÃ©re requÃªte INÂ° 7151/75) a Ã©tÃ© prÃ©sentÃ©e par l'Hoirie E . Sporrong, Stockholm, formÃ©e de Mme M . Sporrong, M . C .-0 . Sporrong et Mme B . Atmer, qui rÃ©sident Ã Stockholm ou dans les environs . L'hoirie requÃ©rante est propriÃ©taire Ã Stockholm d'un immeuble sis Â« Riddaren NÂ° 8n . La deuxiÃ©me requÃªte INÂ° 7152/75) a Ã©tÃ© introduite par Mme I .M . LÃ´nnroth, qui rÃ©side Ã©galement Ã Stockholm oÃ¹ elle est propriÃ©taire pour les trois-quarts d'un immeuble sis Â« Barnhuset NÂ° 6x . L'une et l'autre requÃ©rantes sont reprÃ©sentÃ©es devant la Commission par M- M . Hernmarck, avocat Ã Stockholm . DÃ©tails de la premiÃ¨re requ8te La requÃ©rante dÃ©clare que, le 31 juillet 1956, le Gouvernement suÃ©dois a, conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 44 de la loi sur la construction, accordÃ© Ã la municipalitÃ© de Stockholm un permis d'exproprier pour la rÃ©novation urbaine de 164 immeubles, dont celui que possÃ©de l'hoirie requÃ©rante . Ce permis Ã©tait valable Ã partir de la demande d'expropriation, dÃ©posÃ©e auprÃ© s
du Gouvernement le 6 juin 1955 . Selon les plans, il Ã©tait prÃ©vu de dÃ©molir le bÃ©timent de la requÃ©rante . ConformÃ©ment aux dispositions de la loi de 1917 sur l'expropriation, le Gouvernement fixa ce dÃ©lai de rachat (pendant lequel la municipalitÃ© devait citer les propriÃ©taires Ã comparaitre devant le tribunal pour la fixation des indemnitÃ©s faute de quoi le permis serait nul et de nul effet . Les requÃ©rantes prÃ©tendent que l'usage est de fixer ce dÃ©lai Ã un-an . Le permis d'exproprier Ã©tait as orti d'une interdiction de construir e Ã©mise par la municipalitÃ© conformÃ©ment Ã la loi sur la construction, qui prÃ©cisait et renforÃ§ait les interdictions d'investir en construction pendant le dÃ©lai de rachat . Par la suite, Ã la demande de la municipalitÃ©, le Gouvernement prolongea Ã diverses reprises la validitÃ© de l'autorisation de rachat . En 1961 fut accordÃ©e une prolongation de trois ans et en 1964 une prolongation de cinq ans . Enfin, le 14 mai 1971, l'autorisation fut prorogÃ©e de dix ans lÃ partir de la date de la demande), soit jusqu'au 31 juillet 1979 . La municipalitÃ© prÃ©senta (en mai 1975) des plans modifiÃ©s selon lesquels l'usage des immeubles visÃ©s ne pouvait Ãªtre modifiÃ©, le bÃ¢timent existant devait Ã©tre conservÃ© . La requÃ©rante dÃ©clare n'avoir pas eu la possibilitÃ© de faire rÃ©viser le permis d'exproprier et se rÃ©fÃ©re Ã cet Ã©gard Ã une requÃªte infructuÃ©use prÃ©sentÃ©e par la deuxiÃ©me requÃ©rante (voir ci-dessous) .
DÃ©tails de la deuxiÃ¨me requÃªt e Dans ce cas, le Gouvernement suÃ©dois (le MinistÃ©re de l'amÃ©nagement du territoire et de l'administration locale) dÃ©cida, le 24 septembre 1971, d'accorder Ã la municipalitÃ© de Stockholm un droit de rachat portant sur 129 immeubles, dont celui que possÃ©de la requÃ©rante . Ce permis Ã©tait, lui aussi, valable Ã dater de la demande d'expropriation, dÃ©posÃ©e auprÃ¨s du Gouvernement le 22 janvier 1968 . Le Gouvernement dÃ©cida que les demandes de citations Ã comparaÃ®tre devant le tribunal devraient Ãªtre dÃ©posÃ©es avant le 31 dÃ©cembre 1979 . Ce permis Ã©tait, lui aussi, assorti d'une interdiction de construire . Selo n les plans, un silo Ã voitures devait Ãªtre Ã©rigÃ© sur l'emplacement de l'immeuble de la requÃ©rante . Toutefois, les travaux dans ce quartier ont Ã©tÃ© retardÃ©s et de nouveaux plans sont Ã l'Ã©tude . L'immeuble de la requÃ©rante ayant besoin de rÃ©parations urgentes, sa propriÃ©taire dÃ©posa une demande tendant 8 ce que son immeuble Ã©chappe Ã l'autorisation de rachat . La municipalitÃ© rÃ©pondit que les plans existants n'autorisaient aucune exception . Le Gouvernement (Commission nationale de l'habitat) rejeta la demande de la requÃ©rante le 20 fÃ©vrier 197 5
au motif que l'autorisation de rachat ne pouvait pas Ãªtre rÃ©voquÃ©e sans le consentement de la municipalitÃ© . L'a ttitude prÃ©tendument adoptÃ©e par les autoritÃ©s et ses consÃ©quence s Les requÃ©rantes expliquent que la validitÃ© des permis d'exproprier a Ã©tÃ© prorogÃ©e pour diverses raisons . A l'origine, la municipalitÃ© n'avait pas les crÃ©dits nÃ©cessaires pour exÃ©cuter les grands travaux de rÃ©novation que prÃ©voyait sa demande d'expropriation en 1955 . En 1962, un nouveau plan d'urbanisme a Ã©tÃ© adoptÃ© qui comportait des modifications apportÃ©es par la municipalitÃ© en raison du dÃ©veloppement de la circulation automobile . Ces plans ont Ã©tÃ© complÃ©tÃ©s en 1967 et sont en cours de rÃ©vision depuis 1975 du fait des nouvelles mesures tendant Ã restreindre la circulation automobile dans la ville . Les requÃ©rantes font valoir qu'en consÃ©quence des autorisations d'expropriation de longue durÃ©e, elles ont perdu toute sÃ©curitÃ© dans la propriÃ©tÃ© de leurs biens et notamment toute possibilitÃ© d'estimer leur valeur, du fait d'avoir Ã©tÃ© tenues en haleine pendant 23 et 12 ans, respectivement sans savoir si la procÃ©dure judiciaire d'expropriation serait engagÃ©e et, si oui, Ã quel moment . Elles ont Ã©galement perdu la possibilitÃ© de participer aux possibilitÃ©s de plus-value de leur propriÃ©tÃ© . En revanche, la municipalitÃ© va tirer profit de la situation et faire durer les permis d'exproprier car la rÃ©glementation prÃ©voit que l'indemnitÃ© sera proportionnelle Ã la valeur du bien Ã la date d'octroi de l'autorisation gÃ©nÃ©rale d'expropriation . Les requÃ©rantes prÃ©tendent aussi avoir perdu la possibilitÃ© de tirer parti du dÃ©veloppement urbain . Elles ont en outre, du fait des interdictions de construire, perdu toute possibilitÃ© d'utiliser les droits de construction rÃ©sultant du plan d'urbanisme ; d'ailleurs, les permis de construire sont assortis d'accords imposÃ©s limitant une indemnisation future . Les requÃ©rantes soulignent que l'ombudsman parlementaire a critiquÃ© la durÃ©e excessive des interdictions de construire et propose de leur adjoindre un droit Ã indemnisation . Les requÃ©rantes dÃ©clarent Ã©galement avoir perdu toute possibilitÃ© de vendre leur immeuble aux conditions normales du marchÃ© libre . Elles ajoutent que ces restrictions aboutissent Ã ce que le capital investi dans les immeubles n'est pas disponible Ã d'autres fins . Elles dÃ©crivent leur situation juridique comme Ã©tant la suivante : leur droit de propriÃ©tÃ© a Ã©tÃ© transformÃ© en un droit limitÃ©, pendant une pÃ©riode de temps indÃ©finie, de disposer de leurs biens . Elles allÃ©guent enfin que le droit suÃ©dois ne leur laisse aucune possibilitÃ© d'obtenir une indemnisation, ni pour les limitations apportÃ©es Ã leur droit de propriÃ©tÃ©, ni pour les consÃ©quences Ã©conomiques de la durÃ©e excessive des permis d'exproprier .
GRIEFS Les griefs des requÃ©rantes peuvent se rÃ©sumer comme suit ~ Quant Ã une procÃ©dure civile Elles se plaignent que 23 ans et 12 ans respectivement se sont Ã©coulÃ©s sans procÃ©dure judiciaire concernant une indemnisation . Ces dÃ©lais soni, d'aprÃ©s elles, dÃ©raisonnables et contraires Ã l'anicle 6, par . 1, de la Convention . Ouanr au droit de propriÃ©tÃ© Les requÃ©rantes se plaignent Ã©galement qu'elles n'aient pas Ã©tÃ© Â« promptement Â» indemnisÃ©es, conformÃ©ment aux principes gÃ©nÃ©raux du droit international, ce qui est contraire Ã l'article 1^' du Protocole additionnel Ã la Convention . Elles allÃ¨guent un abus du pouvoir d'expropriation en ce sens que les droits inhÃ©rents Ã leur propriÃ©tÃ© ont Ã©tÃ© limitÃ©s beaucoup plus qu'il n'est nÃ©cessaire pour mener Ã bien une expropriation, ce qui est coritraire Ã l'article 17 de la Convention . Elles font Ã©galement valoir que s l'utilitÃ© publique n, motif initial de l'expropriation, ne peut plus Ãªtre invoquÃ© et que le recours permanent au permis d'exproprier est une restriction Ã leurs droits Ã des fins Ã©trangÃ©res, ce qui est contraire Ã l'article 18 de la Convention . Les requÃ©rantes se plaignent aussi de ce que les effets de la durÃ©e excessive des permis d'exproprier les privent du droit au respect de leurs biens, ce qui constitue une autre violation de l'article 1 - du Protocole additionnel . Elles allÃ©guent enfin que, par les accords imposÃ©s concernant l'influence des rÃ©gles sur les constructions sur une Ã©ventuelle indemnisation, la municipalitÃ© a, sans base juridique, modÃ©rÃ© les crÃ©ances en indemnisation, dÃ©possÃ©dant ainsi le particulier de son bien dans des conditions autres qÃ»e celles que prÃ©voit la loi et, partant, en violation de l'article 1^ du Protocole additionnel . Au surplus, la premiÃ©re requÃ©rante se plaint que les prolongations des permis d'exproprier aient Ã©tÃ© faites sans base lÃ©gale, de sorte qu'elles a Ã©tÃ© dÃ©possÃ©dÃ©e de ses biens dans des conditions autres que celles prÃ©vues par la loi et, en consÃ©quence contrairement Ã l'article 1^ du Protocole additionnel .
Quant Ã l'indemnisation Les deux requÃ©rants allÃ©guent que l'absence d'indemnisation pour la pert e d'une grande pa rt ie de leur droit Ã disposer librement de leurs biens n'est pas conforme aux principes gÃ©nÃ©raux du droit international concernan t
Â« une juste indemnitÃ© Â» et qu'elle constitue donc une violation de l'article 1^' du Protocole additionnel . Quant 8 une prÃ©tendue discrimination Les requÃ©rantes se plaignent enfin que, par comparaison avec les propriÃ©taires d'immeubles non touchÃ©s par les permis d'exproprier Ã long terme, elles ont Ã©tÃ© soumises Ã un traitement spÃ©cial d'une portÃ©e considÃ©rable et contraire Ã l'article 14 de la Convention .
EN DROI T 1 . Les requÃ©rantes se plaignent des effets, sur leur droit de propriÃ©tÃ© de permis d'exproprier de longue durÃ©e assortis d'une interdiction de construire, permis en vigueur maintenant depuis 23 ans pour la premiÃ©re requÃ©rante et du 12 ans pour la seconde . Elles allÃ¨guent la violation de l'article 1â¢ 1 Protocole additionnel, considÃ©rÃ© soit isolÃ©ment soit en liaison avec les articles 14, 17 et 18 de la Convention . a . Le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur a fait valoir tout d'abord que les requÃ©rantes n'ont pas respectÃ© le dÃ©lai de six mois prÃ©vu Ã l'article 26 de la Convention, puisque les derniÃ¨res dÃ©cisions concernant la prolongation de la validitÃ© des permis d'exproprier datent du 14 mai 1971 pour la premiÃ¨re requÃ©rante et du 24 septembre 1971 pour la seconde . Les requÃ©rantes ont rÃ©pliquÃ© qu'il n'y a pas eu, en l'espÃ¨ce, de dÃ©cision dÃ©finitive, au sens de l'article 26 de la Convention, et qu'elles n'avaient pas la possibilitÃ© d'exiger une telle dÃ©cision . L'article 26 de la Convention stipule : s La Commission ne peut Ãªtre saisie qu'aprÃ©s l'Ã©puisement des voies de recours internes, tel qu'il est entendu selon les principes de droit international gÃ©nÃ©ralement reconnus et dans le dÃ©lai de six mois, Ã partir de la date de la dÃ©cision interne dÃ©finitive u . La Commission relÃ©ve qu'il n'est pas contestÃ© entre les parties que le droit suÃ©dois n'offre pas aux requÃ©rants un recours efficace pour mettre un terme Ã la situation incriminÃ©e . Elle estime que, dans ces conditions, il ne saurait y avoir de dÃ©cision dÃ©finitive, au sens de l'article 26, liÃ© Ã l'Ã©puisement des voies de recours internes . En consÃ©quence la question se pose de savoir si le dÃ©lai de six mois est applicable en l'espÃ©ce . La Commission rappelle avoir dÃ©clarÃ© antÃ©rieurement que la rÃ©gle des six mois prÃ©cisÃ©e Ã l'article 26 de la Convention e s'explique par le souci de s
Hautes Parties Contractantes d'empÃ©cher la constante remise en cause du passÃ©v . (Cf . l'affaire De Becker, Annuaire 2, p . 215, Ã la page 244) . Dans cette affaire toutefois la Commission a Ã©galement dÃ©clarÃ© que cette prÃ©occupation lÃ©gitime d'ordre, de stabilitÃ© et de paix ne saurait faire obstacle Ã l'examen, par la Commission d'une situation continue qu'incrimine le requÃ©rant, pour autant que cette situation ne relÃ¨ve point du passÃ© mais persiste sans qu'aucun recours interne ne s'offre au requÃ©rant . (/bidem) . Il est vrai que la Commission a rÃ©cemment dÃ©clarÃ©, par ailleurs, qu'en l'absence de voie de recours, le dÃ©lai de six mois court Ã partir de la date de la dÃ©cision incriminÃ©e (voir requÃªte NÂ° 5759/72, X . contre l'Autriche, DÃ©cisions et Rapports 6, p . 15) . La Commission estime toutefois que cette derniÃ©re conclusion ne saurait s'appliquer qu'aux affaires oÃ¹ la plainte est dirigÃ©e contre une dÃ©cision en tant que telle ou contre tout autre Ã©vAnement prÃ©cis et non pas, comme en l'espÃ©ce, lorsque les griefs rÃ©sultent progressivement, au fur et Ã mesure que le temps s'Ã©coule, de l'accumulation de rÃ©tards dans l'expropriation, assortis d'une interdiction de construire affectant les requÃ©rants en tant que piopriÃ©taires . La situation dont se plaignent les requÃ©rantes ne relÃ©ve pas du passÃ© et n'a pas Ã©tÃ© crÃ©Ã©e non plus par les derniÃ©res dÃ©cisions Ã©voquÃ©es par le Gouvernerrient dÃ©fendeur, ni par toute autre dÃ©cision ou Ã©vÃ©nement spÃ©cifique . Vu ce qui prÃ©cÃ©de, la Commission estime que les prÃ©sentes requÃªtes ne sauraient Etre rejetÃ©es pour inobservation du dÃ©lai de six mois prÃ©vu par l'article 26 de la Convention . b . Les requÃ©rants ont fait valoir que, contrairement Ã l'article 1â¢ 1 du Protocole, il ne leur a pas Ã©tÃ© versÃ© promptement une juste indemnitÃ©, conformÃ©ment aux principes gÃ©nÃ©raux du droit international . La premiÃ©re requÃ©rante a dÃ©clarÃ© en outre que, les prolongations des permis d'exproprier Ã©tant intervenues sans base lÃ©gale, elle a donc Ã©tÃ© dÃ©possÃ©dÃ©e de ses biens contrairement Ã l'article 1â¢ 1 .du Protocole . Les requÃ©rantes ont soutenu au surplus que l'existence, pendant une longue pÃ©riode, 'de permis d'exproprier inutilisÃ©s et les interdictions de construire qui les accompagnent, ont crÃ©Ã©, en ce qui concerne leurs biens, des inconvÃ©nients tels qu'ils Ã©quivalent Ã une atteinte injustifiÃ©e du droit au respect de leurs biens . Selon les requÃ©rantes, permis et interdictions n Ã©taient nÃ©cessaires ni au regard de la lÃ©gislation suÃ©doise, ni au regard de la ConventiÃ´n, . de sorte qu'il y a violation des articles 17 et 18 de la Convention .
Le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur soutient de son cÃ´tÃ© que permis n'affectent pas les droits de propriÃ©tÃ© des requÃ©rantes et qu'ils ne restreignent 'donc pas le droit des requÃ©rantes au respect de leurs biens . Ceci demeure vrai, selon le Gouvernement, indÃ©pendamment de la durÃ©e de validitÃ© du permis d'exproprier . Toutefois, s'il Ã©tait admis que la durÃ©e de validitÃ© du permis peut Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ©e comme une limitation . apportÃ©e Ã l'usage d u
bien, une telle limitation devrait, selon le Gouvernement, Ptre considÃ©rÃ©e comme nÃ©cessaire pour rÃ©glementer l'usage du bien dans l'intÃ©rÃ©t gÃ©nÃ©ral, comme l'autorise le paragraphe 2 de l'article 1 - du Protocole . Il semble en dÃ©couler que le Gouvernement estime les requÃªtes incompatibles avec cet article . En outre, selon le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur, les articles 17 et 18 de la Convention ne sont pas d'application en l'espÃ©ce . L'article 1 - du Protocole additionnel est ains! libellÃ© : u Toute personne physique ou morale a droit au respect de ses biens . Nul ne peut Ãªtre privÃ© de sa propriÃ©tÃ© que pour cause d'utilitÃ© publique et dans les conditions prÃ©vues par la loi et les principes gÃ©nÃ©raux du droit international . Les dispositions prÃ©cÃ©dentes ne portent pas atteinte au droit que possÃ©dent les Etats de mettre en vigueur les lois qu'ils jugent nÃ©cessaires pour rÃ©glementer l'usage des biens conformÃ©ment Ã l'intÃ©rÃ©t gÃ©nÃ©ral ou pour assurer le paiement des impÃ´ts ou d'autres contributions ou des amendes . Â» La Commission remarque en premier lieu que le point de savoir si les biens des requÃ©rantes seront finalement expropriÃ©s dÃ©pend d'une dÃ©cision de faire usage des permis d'exproprier, dÃ©cision que prendra ultÃ©rieurement la municipalitÃ© de Stockholm . Dans l'attente d'une dÃ©cision de la municipalitÃ© d'utiliser lesdits permis, les requÃ©rantes restent propriÃ©taires des biens en question . Il est donc Ã©vident qu'elles n'ont pas, jusqu'Ã© prÃ©sent, Ã©tÃ© privÃ©es de leurs biens . Il s'ensuit qu'il n'y a pas apparence d'une violation des droits Ã©noncÃ©s dans la deuxiÃ©me phrase du 1Â° paragraphe de l'article 1^ 1 du Protocole . La Commission en vient maintenant Ã la question de savoir si la durÃ©e pendant laquelle les permis d'exproprier et les interdictions de construire sont demeurÃ©s en vigueur sans Ã©tre utilisÃ©s peut Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ©e comme Ã©quivalent Ã une atteinte au droit des requÃ©rantes au respect de leurs biens, telle que le leur garantit l'article 1â¢ 1 du Protocole, paragraphe 1, premiÃ©re phrase . Toute atteinte rÃ©sultant d'une limitation Ã l'usage du bien en question devrait alors Ãªtre examinÃ©e par la Commission sous l'angle du deuxiÃ¨me paragraphe de l'article 1^ 1 du Protocole et ne pourrait Ãªtre justifiÃ©e que dans les conditions qui y sont prÃ©cisÃ©es . En liaison avec cet examen, la Commission pourrait Ã©galement avoir Ã prendre en considÃ©ration les articles 17 et 18 de la Convention . La Commission fait remarquer que si la nÃ©cessitÃ© de mettre en vigueur pareille lÃ©gislation semble Ãªtre laissÃ©e Ã la discrÃ©tion de l'Etat, l'article 1â¢ 1 prÃ©voit, semble-t-il, un contrÃ´le limitÃ© des mesures d'exÃ©cution pour ce qui concerne leur lÃ©galitÃ© et leur objet . MÃªme lorsque leur lÃ©galitÃ© ne fait aucun doute et que leur objet apparait d'emblÃ©e lÃ©gitime, la question peut se pose r
de savoir si la persistance de restrictions Ã©quivaut Ã une atteinte qui pourrait devenir injustifiÃ©e comme outrepassant l'objectif lÃ©gitime ou lui Ã©tant disproportionnÃ©e . La Commission estime toutefois que les questions qui se posent ainsi sur le terrain de l'article 1â¢ 1 du Protocole additionnel pris soit isolÃ©ment, soit en liaison avec les articles 17 et 18 de la Convention, sont des questions complexes touchant Ã l'interprÃ©tation de la Convention et nÃ©cessitant, pour en dÃ©cider, un examen du fond de l'affaire . Il s'ensuit que cette partie des requÃªtes ne saurait Ãªtre considArÃ©e comme manifestement mal fondÃ©e, au sens de l'article 27, par . .2, de la Convention, et doit donc Ãªtre dÃ©clarÃ©e recevable, aucun autre motif d'irrecevabilitÃ© n'ayant Ã©tÃ© Ã©tabli . 2 . Les requÃ©rantes se plaignent en outre que les questions d'expropriation et d'indemnisation - et donc en mÃªme temps leurs droits civils - n'ont pas Ã©tÃ© tranchÃ©es dans un dÃ©lai raisonnable . Elles ont dÃ©clarÃ© qu'aucun recours recevable devant le tribunaux civils ne s'offrait Ã elles tant que la municipalitÃ© de Stockholm n'a pas dÃ©cidÃ© de faire usage de ses permis d'exproprier . De leur point de vue toutefois, elles ont droit Ã ce que leur cause soit entendue Ã©quitablement et publiquement dans un dÃ©lai raisonnable, comme le prescrit l'article 6, par . 1, de la Convention et ce dÃ©s le dÃ©but du processus d'expropriation, c'est-B-dire Ã partir du moment oÃ¹ les permis d'exproprier ont Ã©tÃ© â¢ accordÃ©s Ã la municipalitÃ© . Le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur soutient que l'article 6, par . 1, de la Convention ne saurait Ãªtre intÃ©rprÃ©tÃ© de maniÃ¨re Ã exiger de la municipalitÃ© qu'elle dÃ©cide dans un dÃ©lai raisonnable d'exproprier ou non les requÃ©rantes . Il fait valoir en outre que les permis d'exproprier n'affectent pas les droits lÃ©gaux des requÃ©rantes et que les interdictions de construire doivent Ãªtre tolÃ©rÃ©es mÃªme si elles diminuent la valeur vÃ©nale des biens en question . Aussi le Gouvernement estime-t-il que les requÃ©rantes n'ont aucune base juridique pour asseoir leur demande d'indemnisation . Le Gouvernement affirme enfin qu'aucun droit civil n'Ã©tant en cause en l'espÃ¨ce, les requÃ©rantes n'ont pas droit Ã faire entendre leur cause au stade actuel de la procÃ©dure . La premiÃ¨re phrase de l'article 6, par . 1, de la Convention est ainsi libellÃ©e Â«7oute personne a droit Ã ce que sa cause soit entendue Ã©quitable-
ment, publiquement et dans un dÃ©lai raisonnable, par un tribunal indÃ©pendant et impartial, Ã©tabli par la loi . Â» La premiÃ¨re question est celle de savoir si le grief concerne un Â«droit civilÂ», au sens de cette disposition . La notion de adroits et obligations de caractÃ©re civilÂ» ne peut Ãªtre interprÃ©tÃ©e uniquement par rÃ©fÃ©rence au droi t
interne de l'Etat dÃ©fendeur . La Commission a constamment dÃ©clarÃ©, de mÃªme que rÃ©cemment la Cour europÃ©enne des Droits de l'Homme Icf . Affaire KÃ´nig, arrÃªt du 28 juin 1978, par . 88), que la notion de droit civil est une notion autonome, ce qui n'exclut pas, toutefois, que la lÃ©gislation de l'Etat concernÃ© doive Ãªtre prise en considÃ©ration . Pour savoir si un droit doit Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ© comme de caractÃ©re civil au sens de l'article 6, par . 1, de la Convention, il faut se rÃ©fÃ©rer au contenu matÃ©riel et aux effets que lui confÃ©re le droit interne de l'Etat en cause . Dans l'exercice de ses fonctions de contrÃ´le, la Commission doit Ã©galement tenir compte de l'objet et du but de la Convention et des systÃ©mes de droit interne des autres Etats contractants (cf . l'arrÃªt susmentionnÃ© dans l'affaire KÃ´nig, par . 89) . Le point de savoir si, en l'espÃ©ce, un droit civil est ou non en jeu, dÃ©pend des prÃ©tentions Ã©mises par les requÃ©rantes soit en raison de l'expropriation Ã©ventuelle portant sur leurs biens, soit en raison de toute demande d'indemnisation, par exemple, que les requÃ©rantes pourraient prÃ©senter pour atteinte Ã©ventuelle injustifiÃ©e au droit au respect de leurs biens, au sens de l'article 1â¢ 1 du Protocole additionnel . Si l'une ou plusieurs des prÃ©tentions Ã©levÃ©es par les requÃ©rantes constituent une prÃ©tention Ã un droit civil au sens que cette expression reÃ§oit dans la Convention, il dÃ©coule de l'article 6 que les requÃ©rantes ont un droit d'accÃ¨s aux tribunaux pour qu'il soit dÃ©cidÃ© de ce droit civil dans un dÃ©lai raisonnable . La Commission rappelle que le droit d'accÃ©s aux tribunaux constitue un Ã©lÃ©ment inhÃ©rent au droit Ã©noncÃ© par l'article 6, par . 1, de la Convention Icf . Cour europÃ©enne des Droits de l'Homme, arrÃªt du 7 mai 1974 rendu dans l'affaire Golder, sÃ©rie A, Vol . 18, p . 18, par . 36) . AprÃ¨s examen des informations et des arguments prÃ©sentÃ©s par les parties, la Commission estime toutefois que le point de savoir si les contestations Ã©levÃ©es par les requÃ©rantes relÃ©vent de la Convention, notamment de son article 6, par . 1 et, dans l'affirmative, s'il y a eu ou non violation de la Convention en l'occurrence, sont des questions complexes touchant Ã l'interprÃ©tation de la Convention et dont la rÃ©ponse appelle un examen du fond de l'affaire .
Il s'ensuit que cette partie des requÃ©tes doit Ã©tre dÃ©clarÃ©e recevable . 3 . Les requÃ©rantes se sont plaintes enfin, d'Ã©tre victimes d'une discrimination contraire 8 l'article 14 de la Convention, non seulement par rapport Ã ceux des propriÃ©taires qui n'ont pas Ã©tÃ© expropriÃ©s mais Ã©galement par rapport Ã ceux qui l'ont Ã©tÃ© d'une maniÃ©re acceptable, tant en droit suÃ©dois que selon les termes de la Convention . Le Gouvernement estime qu'il n'y a pas, en l'espÃ©ce, apparence de violation de l'article 14 de la Convention, puisqu'une Ã©ventuelle distinction faite entre les requÃ©rantes et d'autres propriÃ©taires contre lesquels des mesures de ce genre n'ont pas Ã©tÃ© prises se fonde sur des motifs objectifs et raisonnables .
L'article 14 stipule que Â« la jouissance des droits et libertÃ©s reconnus dans la prÃ©sente Convention doit Ãªtre assurÃ©e, sans distinction aucune, fondÃ©e notamment sur le sexe, la race, la couleur, la langue, la religion, les opinions politiques ou toutes autres opinions, l'origine nationale ou sociale, l'appartenance Ã une minoritÃ© nationale, la fortune, la naissance ou toute autre situation . Â» La Commission a dÃ©jÃ© reconnu les requÃ©tes recevables comme posant un problÃ©me au regard de diverses dispositions matÃ©rielles de la Convention . Les allÃ©gations des requÃ©rantes au regard de l'article 14 de la Convention concernent les mÃªmes faits et circonstances que les allÃ©gations formulÃ©es sous l'angle des autres articles . Vu l'interprÃ©tation que la Cour europÃ©enne des Droits de l'Homme a donnÃ© de la compÃ©tence que lui confÃ©re l'article 45 de la Convention (cf . arrÃªt De Wilde, Ooms et Versyp du 18 juin 1971, SÃ©rie A, NÂ° 12, pp . 29-30, par . 49 et 51 ; arrÃ¨t Handyside du 7 dÃ©cembre 1976, SÃ©rie A, NÂ° 24, p . 20, par . 41), la Commission estime que la question prÃ©citÃ©e ne saurait Ãªtre tranchÃ©e au stade de la recevabilitÃ© des requÃªtes mais qu'elle appelle un examen au fond .
Par ces motifs, la Commissio n DECLARE RECEVABLES et retient les requÃªtes, tout moyen de tond Ã©tant rÃ©servÃ© .
-34-Origine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Commission (plénière)Date de la décision : 05/03/1979Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page