Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/894/449/306690/
Timestamp: 2019-11-19 03:08:48
Document Index: 375755822

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2000', '§ 2000', '§ 2000', '§ 2000', '§ 2000', '§ 2000']

Gary L. Palmer v. Marion S. Barry, Jr., Mayor, et al., Appellants, 894 F.2d 449 (D.C. Cir. 1990) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › D.C. Circuit › 1990 › Gary L. Palmer v. Marion S. Barry, Jr., Mayor, et al., Appellants
Gary L. Palmer v. Marion S. Barry, Jr., Mayor, et al., Appellants, 894 F.2d 449 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit - 894 F.2d 449 (D.C. Cir. 1990) Argued Nov. 21, 1989. Decided Jan. 30, 1990
This case arises under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982) ("Title VII"). The appellee, Gary L. Palmer, a former Battalion Chief with the District of Columbia Fire Department ("Fire Department"), claims that the appellants, several high-ranking officials of the District of Columbia (the "District"), unlawfully discriminated against him from 1982 through his retirement in August of 1985, by failing to promote him to the rank of Deputy Fire Chief. In pursuit of this claim, Palmer first filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") on December 9, 1985; he then filed a complaint in the District Court on May 14, 1987.
After a two-day trial, the District Court found that the District had discriminated against Palmer, and awarded him back pay and interest for the period from 1982 through his retirement. In reaching this result, however, the trial judge appeared to find that the District's discriminatory treatment of Palmer ceased after mid-1984. If so, then--as the District argues on appeal--Palmer may have filed his EEOC charge outside of the time limit required by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1982).1
In the late seventies, Mayor Barry issued an order to make the Communications Division a separate Fire Department Division. In August of 1982 then acting Fire Chief Coleman, along with Palmer and one other person, planned to implement that order. Their plan called for the creation of a new position of Deputy Chief to head the upgraded Communications Division. Coleman told Palmer that he would recommend that Palmer be promoted from Director of the Communications Division and Battalion Chief to the newly created Deputy Chief position. According to the parties' stipulations, " [d]espite promises, beginning in May 1982 that he would promote Palmer to the rank of Deputy, Chief Coleman never did so even though Coleman believed that Palmer was performing the Director's job in an exemplary fashion." Appendix ("A.") 15. Palmer served as the Director of the Communications Division from 1980 until his retirement on August 30, 1985. Through nearly that whole period, he also held the rank of Battalion Chief.
On December 9, 1985, Palmer filed a discrimination complaint with the EEOC. The EEOC then referred the complaint to the District of Columbia Office of Human Rights ("OHR") on December 17, 1985.2 See Record Document No. 40, Exhibit 3. After both the OHR and the EEOC reviewed his complaint, the EEOC sent Palmer a Notice of Right to Sue on February 19, 1987. See Record Document No. 8, at 91. Palmer filed suit in the District Court within ninety days thereafter (on May 14, 1987), as required by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1982). In his complaint, Palmer alleged that the Fire Department had discriminated against him on the basis of his race in refusing to promote him to Deputy Chief from May of 1982 to the date of his retirement, August 30, 1985.
Following the District Court's issuance of the decision in Palmer I, the defendants filed a post-trial motion for modification of judgment. The defendants argued that if, as found in Palmer I, the discrimination against Palmer ceased in mid-1984, then Palmer's EEOC complaint, filed in early December of 1985, was untimely under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1982).
The District Court rejected the appellants' argument on timeliness. First, the trial court suggested that Palmer's complaint was not untimely because, even though he had not shown that discriminatory behavior occurred within the 300-day time limit under Title VII, he did prove "earlier related incidents of ... discrimination." See Palmer v. Barry, Civ.Action No. 87-1304, slip op. at 1-2, 1988 WL 129829 (D.D.C. Nov. 18, 1988) ("Palmer II "), reprinted in A. 69-70 (citing McKenzie v. Sawyer, 684 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). "Furthermore," the court continued, "while this court found that defendants have adduced evidence of nondiscriminatory reasons for their failure to promote [Palmer] after mid-1984, the court did not find that [Palmer's] allegations of discrimination after mid-1984 were unconnected with his allegations of discrimination before that time." Id. at 2, reprinted in A. 70. In its final comment on this argument, the trial court repeated its conclusion from Palmer I that the appellee had made out a prima facie case that someone "caused" Chief Coleman to "keep [Palmer] out of the new position until he retired so that the position could be given to his black successor." Id. (quoting Palmer I, slip op. at 3, reprinted in A. 63). After rejecting several of the District's other contentions relating to Palmer I, the District Court denied the motion for modification.
On appeal, the District raises the same issue of timeliness that it raised before the District Court in its post-trial motion. Since--according to the District's reading of Palmer I--the District stopped discriminating against Palmer in mid-1984, the EEOC complaint he filed on December 9, 1985, was untimely. The District argues that in order for Palmer to receive relief under Title VII, he must show that some actual discrimination took place within 300 days prior to December 9, 1985, even under a "continuing violation" theory of liability. Moreover, the District complains that the District Court failed to complete the full Title VII analysis called for by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973), and Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207 (1981). More specifically, the District argues that, although Palmer concededly made out his prima facie case that the District discriminated against him in denying him a promotion, Palmer's prima facie case was refuted with regard to the period between mid-1984 and Palmer's retirement in August of 1985. Since the District Court never found any pretext in the reasons offered by the District for not promoting Palmer after mid-1984, the District contends that there was no discrimination against Palmer within 300 days prior to the date on which Palmer filed his complaint. See Brief for Appellants at 10-14.
It is possible that the trial court intended to find that the District had a "mixed motive" for not promoting Palmer after mid-1984. However, such a finding would require an application of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, --- U.S. ----, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 104 L. Ed. 2d 268 (1989). Alternatively, the trial court may have believed that only the effects of the District's earlier discriminatory treatment of Palmer remained after mid-1984. But on this theory--absent some reason to toll the statute--the complaint was filed outside Title VII's filing period. It is well settled that "effects" alone are not sufficient to defeat a time bar, even under a "continuing violations" theory of liability. See Milton v. Weinberger, 645 F.2d 1070 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United Air Lines v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 97 S. Ct. 1885, 52 L. Ed. 2d 571 (1977).
On remand, the District Court must make specific findings as to whether the District discriminated against Palmer after mid-1984, applying the principles of either Burdine and McDonnell Douglas or Price Waterhouse. If there was such discrimination, then it would appear that Palmer's complaint was timely filed.3 If the complaint was not timely filed, then the trial court must determine whether an application of the "discovery rule" might toll the limitations period.4 See Wislocki-Goin v. Mears, 831 F.2d 1374, 1380-81 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 936, 108 S. Ct. 1113, 99 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1988) (discovery rule available for Title VII claim); Tucker v. United Parcel Service, 657 F.2d 724, 726 (5th Cir. 1981) (same); see also Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 818 n. 22, 100 S. Ct. 2486, 2493 n. 22, 65 L. Ed. 2d 532 (1980) (reserving judgment on availability of discovery rule). If the appellee requests the trial court to consider the applicability of a discovery rule, then the court must also consider whether Palmer is free to raise the issue at this juncture in the litigation (not having raised it during the initial trial).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1982).
The Supreme Court has established that in the interplay of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) and (e), a party must ordinarily (i.e., unless the statute is tolled) file with the EEOC no later than 240 days after the last act of discrimination occurred, unless the local 706 agency relinquishes its jurisdiction over the claim prior to the lapse of the 300-day period. See Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 814 n. 16, 100 S. Ct. 2486, 2491 n. 16, 65 L. Ed. 2d 532 (1980)