Source: https://oconnorlibrary.org/supreme-court/hathorn-v-lovorn-1981
Timestamp: 2020-07-12 10:38:15
Document Index: 320926830

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 19731', '§ 1973', '§ 12', '§ 1973', '§ 5', '§ 12', '§ 5', '§ 12', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 4', '§ 15', '§ 1973', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 68', '§ 5']

Hathorn v. Lovorn - Supreme Court Opinions | Sandra Day O'Connor Institute Digital Library
Supreme Court Opinions > Hathorn v. Lovorn
Joining O'Connor opinion: Justice BLACKMUN Justice BRENNAN Chief Justice BURGER Justice MARSHALL Justice STEVENS Justice WHITE
Citation: 457 U.S. 255 Docket: 81–451 Audio: Listen to this case's oral arguments at Oyez
The boards of trustees of all municipal separate school districts, either with or without added territory, shall consist of five (5) members, each to be chosen for a term of five (5) years, but so chosen that the term of office of one (1) member shall expire each year.... [I]n any county in which a municipal separate school district embraces the entire county in which Highways 14 and 15 intersect, one (1) trustee shall be elected from each supervisors district.
In 1975, five Winston County voters filed an action in the Chancery Court of Winston County, [ Footnote 3 ] seeking to enforce the neglected 1964 state statute. [ Footnote 4 ] These plaintiffs, respondents here, named numerous Louisville and Winston County officials as defendants. The Chancery Court dismissed respondents' complaint, holding that the statute violated Mississippi's constitutional bar against local legislation. The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed, striking only the specific reference to Highways 14 and 15 and upholding the remaining requirement that, "in any county in which a municipal separate school district embraces the entire county," each supervisors district must elect one trustee. Lovorn v. Hathorn, 365 So.2d 947 (1979) (en banc). The court then "remanded to the chancery court for further proceedings not inconsistent with [its] opinion." Id. at 952.
[i]f no candidate receives a majority of the vote cast at any of said elections.. a runoff election shall be held... between the two candidates receiving the highest vote [in the first election].
Failing to obtain an election from the Chancery Court, respondents once again appealed to the Mississippi Supreme Court. That court observed that its "prior decision, which the United States Supreme Court declined to reverse or alter in any respect, became and is the law of the case." Carter v. Luke, 399 So.2d 1356, 1358 (1981). The court explained that, because the prior decision upheld a statute referring to the statute requiring runoffs, and because both parties had agreed during oral argument to abide by the runoff procedure, the Chancery Court properly enforced the law requiring runoffs and improperly conditioned the election on compliance with the Voting Rights Act. Accordingly, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the portion of the Chancery Court's decree referring to the Voting Rights Act and "remanded with directions for the lower court to call and require the holding of an election." Ibid. We granted certiorari to decide whether the Mississippi Supreme Court properly ordered the election without insuring compliance with federal law. 454 U.S. 1122 (1981). [ Footnote 8 ]
[w]e have jurisdiction to consider all of the substantial federal questions determined in the earlier stages of [state proceedings],... and our right to reexamine such questions is not affected by a ruling that the first decision of the state court became the law of the case....
Reece v. Georgia, 350 U. S. 85, 350 U. S. 87 (1955). See also Davis v. O'Hara, 266 U. S. 314, 266 U. S. 321 (1924); United States v. Denver & Rio Grande R. Co., 191 U. S. 84, 191 U. S. 93 (1903). Because we cannot review a state court judgment until it is final, [ Footnote 9 ] a contrary rule would insulate interlocutory state court rulings on important federal questions from our consideration.
Respondents also argue that the Mississippi Supreme Court pretermitted consideration of the Voting Rights Act because petitioners' reliance upon the issue in a petition for rehearing was untimely. We have recognized that the failure to comply with a state procedural rule may constitute an independent and adequate state ground barring our review of a federal question. [ Footnote 12 ] Our decisions, however, stress that a state procedural ground is not "adequate" unless the procedural rule is "strictly or regularly followed." Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U. S. 146, 378 U. S. 149 (1964). State courts may not avoid deciding federal issues by invoking procedural rules that they do not apply evenhandedly to all similar claims. Even if we construe the Mississippi Supreme Court's denial of petitioners' petition for rehearing as the silent application of a procedural bar, we cannot conclude that the state court consistently relies upon this rule.
One particular decision by the Mississippi Supreme Court, decided only last year, demonstrates that the court does not consistently preclude consideration of issues raised for the first time on rehearing. In Quinn v. Brannin, 404 So.2d 1018 (1981), the court held that part of a criminal statute violated the State Constitution's prohibition against local legislation. Striking the offensive language, the court approved the rest of the statute and affirmed the underlying conviction. The defendant then petitioned for rehearing, pointing out that the affidavit against him did not allege a crime under the reformed statute. The court agreed with this contention, granted the petition in part, and reversed the conviction, all without mentioning the rule against consideration of new issues on rehearing. The striking similarity between Quinn and this case, both involving issues that the parties could have foreseen but that arose with urgency only after the court upheld part of a challenged statute, persuades us that the Mississippi Supreme Court is not "strictly or regularly" following a procedural rule precluding review of issues raised for the first time in a petition for rehearing. The denial of rehearing in this case, although not appearing sufficiently final to permit our immediate review, must have rested either upon a substantive rejection of petitioners' federal claim or upon a procedural rule that the state court applies only irregularly. [ Footnote 15 ] Thus, there are no independent and adequate state grounds barring our review of the federal issue.
Respondents do not dispute that the change in election procedures ordered by the Mississippi courts is subject to preclearance under § 5. [ Footnote 16 ] They urge, however, that the Voting Rights Act deprives state courts of the power even to decide whether § 5 applies to a proposed change in voting procedures. [ Footnote 17 ] Under their analysis of the Act, a state court asked to implement a change in the State's voting laws could not inquire whether the change was subject to § 5. Even if the change plainly fell within § 5, the court would have to ignore that circumstance and enter a decree violating federal law. Both the language and purposes of the Voting Rights Act refute this notion.
an explicit statutory directive, [an] unmistakable implication from legislative history, or... a clear incompatibility between state court jurisdiction and federal interests
will rebut the presumption. Ibid. Most important for our purposes, even a finding of exclusive federal jurisdiction over claims arising under a federal statute usually "will not prevent a state court from deciding a federal question collaterally." Id. at 453 U. S. 483, n.12. [ Footnote 18 ]
[n]o court other than the District Court for the District of Columbia... shall have jurisdiction to issue any declaratory judgment pursuant to... section 5....
79 Stat. 445, 42 U.S.C. § 19731(b). We have already held, however, that this provision governs only declaratory judgments approving proposed changes in voting procedure. Other courts may decide the distinct question of whether a proposed change is subject to the Act. See Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544, 393 U. S. 557 -560 (1969); McDaniel v. Sanchez, 452 U. S. 130 (1981).
[a]ny action under this section shall be heard and determined by a court of three judges in accordance with the provisions of section 2284 of title 28 of the United States Code,
79 Stat. 439, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c, while § 12(f) declares that "[t]he district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction of proceedings instituted pursuant to this section." 79 Stat. 444, 42 U.S.C. § 1973j(f). [ Footnote 19 ] It is possible that these sections grant the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over "action[s] under" § 5 or "proceedings instituted pursuant" to § 12. [ Footnote 20 ] We need not resolve that question in this case, however, because respondents' state suit fell within neither of these categories. Instead, respondents' initial suit was an action to compel compliance with a forgotten state law. [ Footnote 21 ] Nothing in § 5 or § 12 negates the presumption that, at least when the issue arises collaterally, state courts may decide whether a proposed change in election procedure requires preclearance under § 5.
The policies of the Act support the same result. [ Footnote 22 ] The Voting Rights Act "implemented Congress' firm intention to rid the country of racial discrimination in voting." Allen v. State Board of Elections, supra, at 393 U. S. 548. Fearing that covered jurisdictions would exercise their ingenuity to devise new and subtle forms of discrimination, Congress prohibited those jurisdictions from implementing any change in voting procedure without obtaining preclearance under § 5. Granting state courts the power to decide, as a collateral matter, whether § 5 applies to contemplated changes in election procedures will help insure compliance with the preclearance scheme. [ Footnote 23 ] Approval of this limited jurisdiction also avoids placing state courts in the uncomfortable position of ordering voting changes that they suspect, but cannot determine, should be precleared under § 5. Accordingly, we hold that the Mississippi courts had the power to decide whether § 5 applied to the change sought by respondents.
If the Mississippi courts had the power to make this determination, then it is clear that they also had the duty to do so. "State courts, like federal courts, have a constitutional obligation... to uphold federal law." Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 428 U. S. 494, n. 35 (1976) (citing Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 14 U. S. 341 -344 (1816)). Section 5 declares that, whenever a covered jurisdiction shall
enact or seek to administer any... standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1964,
see n 1, supra, it must obtain either preclearance from the Attorney General or a declaratory judgment from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Our opinions repeatedly note that failure to follow either of these routes renders the change unenforceable. See, e.g., Dougherty County Board of Education v. White, 439 U. S. 32, 439 U. S. 46 (1978); United States v. Board of Supervisors, 429 U. S. 642, 429 U. S. 645 (1977) (per curiam). When a party to a state proceeding asserts that § 5 renders the contemplated relief unenforceable, therefore, the state court must examine the claim and refrain from ordering relief that would violate federal law. [ Footnote 24 ]
Our holding mandates reversal of the lower court judgment. Under our analysis, the change in election procedure is subject to § 5, see n 16, supra, and the Mississippi courts may not further implement that change until the parties comply with § 5. At this time, however, we need not decide whether petitioners are entitled to any additional relief. The United States has initiated a federal suit challenging the change at issue here, see n 8, supra, and we agree with the Solicitor General that the District Court entertaining that suit should address the problem of relief in the first instance. As we noted in Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379, 400 U. S. 395 -397 (1971), a local district court is in a better position than this Court to fashion relief, because the district court "is more familiar with the nuances of the local situation" and has the opportunity to hear evidence. Id. at 400 U. S. 397. In this case, the District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi will be better able to decide whether a special election is necessary, whether a more moderate form of interim relief will satisfy § 5, [ Footnote 25 ] or whether new elections are so imminent that special relief is inappropriate. We hold only that the Mississippi courts must withhold further implementation of the disputed change in election procedures until the parties demonstrate compliance with § 5. Accordingly, the judgment of the Mississippi Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Whenever a [covered] State or political subdivision... shall enact or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1964,... such State or subdivision may institute an action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for a declaratory judgment that such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2) of this title, and unless and until the court enters such judgment no person shall be denied the right to vote for failure to comply with such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure: Provided, That such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure may be enforced without such proceeding if the qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure has been submitted by the chief legal officer or other appropriate official of such State or subdivision to the Attorney General and the Attorney General has not interposed an objection within sixty days after such submission, or upon good cause shown, to facilitate an expedited approval within sixty days after such submission, the Attorney General has affirmatively indicated that such objection will not be made....
The legislature shall not pass local, private, or special laws in any of the following enumerated cases, but such matters shall be provided for only by general laws, viz.: * * * *" (p ) Providing for the management or support of any private or common school, incorporating the same, or granting such school any privileges.
As we have explained on numerous occasions, covered jurisdictions may satisfy § 5 by submitting proposed changes to the Attorney General. If the Attorney General objects to the proposal, the jurisdiction may either request reconsideration or seek a declaratory judgment from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. A covered jurisdiction, of course, also may seek a declaratory judgment in the first instance, omitting submission to the Attorney General. See generally Blanding v. DuBose, 454 U. S. 393 (1982); Allen v. State Board of Election, 393 U. S. 544, 393 U. S. 548 -550 (1969).
would have been impossible to have submitted to the Attorney General for approval until this Court had set up the mechanics of the election, for until that was done, the Attorney General would not have the data necessary to either approve or disapprove.
Nor, of course, does our previous denial of petitioners' petition for a writ of certiorari preclude us from examining questions decided during the first state appeal. It is "well-settled... that denial of certiorari imparts no implication or inference concerning the Court's view of the merits." Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U. S. 363, 409 U. S. 366, n. 1 (1973).
the State court exerted its jurisdiction in such a way that the case could have been brought here had the questions been raised prior to the original disposition.
Mississippi plainly is one of the jurisdictions covered by the statute. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 383 U. S. 318 (1966); 30 Fed.Reg. 9897 (1965). The Louisville School District Board of Trustees, like all political entities within the State, accordingly must comply with § 5's strictures. See Dougherty County Board of Education v. White, 439 U. S. 32, 439 U. S. 46 (1978); United States v. Board of Commissioners of Sheffield, 435 U. S. 110 (1978). It is immaterial that the change sought by respondents derives from a statute that predates the Voting Rights Act, because § 5 comes into play whenever a covered jurisdiction departs from an election procedure that was " in fact in force or effect'... on November 1, 1964." Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379, 400 U. S. 395 (1971) (emphasis in original).
Finally, the presence of a court decree does not exempt the contested change from § 5. We held only last Term that § 5 applies to any change "reflecting the policy choices of the elected representatives of the people," even if a judicial decree constrains those choices. McDaniel v. Sanchez, 452 U. S. 130, 452 U. S. 153 (1981). Although McDaniel involved a reapportionment plan drafted pursuant to a federal court's order, its interpretation of § 5 is equally instructive here. When state or local officials comply with a court order to enforce a state statute, there is no doubt that their actions "reflec[t] the policy choices of... elected representatives." Indeed, if § 5 did not encompass this situation, covered jurisdictions easily could evade the statute by declining to implement new state statutes until ordered to do so by state courts. Cf. McDaniel v. Sanchez, supra, at 452 U. S. 151 (noting that "if covered jurisdictions could avoid the normal preclearance procedure by awaiting litigation challenging a refusal to redistrict after a census is completed, [§ 5] might have the unintended effect of actually encouraging delay in making obviously needed changes in district boundaries"). In light of McDaniel, we conclude that a state court decree directing compliance with a state election statute contemplates "administ[ration]" of the state statute within the meaning of § 5.
We frequently permit state courts to decide "collaterally" issues that would be reserved for the federal courts if the cause of action arose directly under federal law. For example, the state courts may decide a variety of questions involving the federal patent laws. American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U. S. 257 (1916); New Marshall Engine Co. v. Marshall Engine Co., 223 U. S. 473 (1912); Pratt v. Paris Gas Light & Coke Co., 168 U. S. 255 (1897). Similarly, although state courts lack jurisdiction to entertain suits brought pursuant to § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15, they often decide issues concerning the federal antitrust laws in other contexts. See, e.g., California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U. S. 97 (1980); Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 U. S. 70 (1902), quoted with approval in Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Mullins, 455 U. S. 72, 455 U. S. 81 -82, n. 7 (1982). See generally Note, Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts in Private Civil Actions, 70 Harv.L.Rev. 509, 510-511 (1957).
Section 12(d) authorizes preventive relief against persons "engaged or... about to engage in any act or practice prohibited by" designated sections of the Voting Rights Act. 79 Stat. 444, 42 U.S.C. § 1973j(d).
We find little force in respondents' claim that, if the state courts possess jurisdiction to decide § 5 issues arising in disputes between private parties, they will frustrate the Attorney General's enforcement of the Act by interpreting the preclearance requirement conservatively. The Attorney General is not bound by the resolution of § 5 issues in cases to which he was not a party. City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U. S. 358, 422 U. S. 373 -374, n. 6 (1975). Common notions of collateral estoppel suggest that the state proceedings similarly would not bind other interested persons who did not participate in them. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 68 (Tent. Draft No. 4, Apr. 15, 1977). Persons dissatisfied with a state court's collateral resolution of a § 5 issue in proceedings involving other parties, therefore, are likely to be able to litigate the issue anew in federal court.