Source: http://sc.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20161103_0003013.DSC.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2017-08-24 01:10:29
Document Index: 203743856

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 851', '§4', '§ 16', '§ 4']

Karlos Gibson, Defendant.
On June 30, 2016, Defendant filed a pro se motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his sentence in light of Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. __, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015) and Welch v. United States, 578 U.S. __, 136 S.Ct. 1257 (2016). ECF No. 98.[1] The Government filed a motion for summary judgment and a memorandum in support/response in opposition to Defendant's § 2255 motion. ECF No. 104. On September 15, 2016, Defendant filed a reply. ECF No. 107.
On February 16, 2011, Defendant was indicted for Conspiracy to Possess with Intent to Distribute cocaine base and cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), and 841(b)(1)(B), and possession with intent to distribute cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841 (b)(1)(A). ECF No. 2. On March 23, 2011, the Government filed an Information pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851, notifying Defendant that he was subject to increased penalties based on two prior convictions for felony drug offenses. ECF No. 35.
On May 18, 2011, Defendant entered into a written plea agreement to plead guilty to count 1 of the indictment, conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine and more than 280 grams of “crack” cocaine. ECF No. 46. The same day, Defendant appeared before this court and pled guilty as above. ECF No. 49.
A Pre-Sentence Report (PSR) concluded Defendant had at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense, and therefore was classified as a career offender pursuant to U.S.S.G. §4B1.1(b). ECF No. 64. Defendant's predicate offenses were possession with intent to distribute marijuana and criminal domestic violence of a high and aggravated nature (“CDVHAN”). Id. Defendant's guideline range as a career offender was 262-327 months.
Defendant filed an objection to the PSR, arguing that his CDVHAN conviction did not count as a predicate offense for career offender purposes. ECF No. 56-3. Defendant also filed a sentencing memorandum, providing further support for the argument made in the objection. ECF No. 57. The Government replied, arguing that the CDVHAN did qualify as a crime of violence for career offender purposes. ECF No. 58.
On August 17, 2011, Defendant appeared for sentencing. ECF No. 59. Defendant's objection to the use of CDVHAN as a career offender predicate was overruled, but a defense motion for downward departure based on overrepresentation of criminal history was granted. The court sentenced Defendant outside the applicable career offender range to the statutory mandatory minimum 240 months imprisonment, with ten years of supervised release to follow. ECF No. 60. On August 3, 2015, an Amended Judgment was entered, reducing Defendant's sentence to 204 months. ECF No. 82.
In order for Defendant to be entitled to relief, the newly recognized right established in Johnson must be applicable not only to the ACCA, but to the career offender portion of the Sentencing Guidelines, which, at the time of Defendant's sentencing, contained a residual clause in its definition of “crime of violence.”[2] That residual clause, similar to the one in the ACCA, explained that “any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense” may be used as a predicate offense for career offender purposes. 18 U.S.C. § 16 (b); U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 (2008).
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;In this case it is not necessary to decide whether the residual clause in the career offender guideline was invalidated by Johnson, and therefore unnecessary to await the Supreme Court&#39;s decision in Beckles. Similarly, the court need not determine at this time whether CDVHAN is a “crime of violence” under the career offender force clause. While Defendant was categorized as a career offender in the PSR, Defendant's motion for a downward departure was granted and he was ...