Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/962/48/92437/
Timestamp: 2020-04-09 12:10:14
Document Index: 793994144

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 7101', '§ 7102', '§ 7103', '§ 7103', '§ 7106', '§ 7106', '§ 7117', '§ 7116', '§ 7102', '§ 7114', '§ 7117', '§ 7103']

Department of the Navy, Marine Corps Logistics Base, Albany,georgia, Petitioner, v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, Respondent,american Federation of Government Employees, Afl-cio, Intervenor.marine Corps Logistics Base, Barstow, California, Petitioner, v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, Respondent,american Federation of Government Employees, Afl-cio, Intervenor, 962 F.2d 48 (D.C. Cir. 1992) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › D.C. Circuit › 1992 › Department of the Navy, Marine Corps Logistics Base, Albany,georgia, Petitioner, v. Federal Labor Re...
Department of the Navy, Marine Corps Logistics Base, Albany,georgia, Petitioner, v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, Respondent,american Federation of Government Employees, Afl-cio, Intervenor.marine Corps Logistics Base, Barstow, California, Petitioner, v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, Respondent,american Federation of Government Employees, Afl-cio, Intervenor, 962 F.2d 48 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit - 962 F.2d 48 (D.C. Cir. 1992) Argued Feb. 24, 1992. Decided April 24, 1992
The Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7135 (1988) ("FSLMRS" or "Statute"), grants most federal employees the right to organize and bargain collectively. See id. §§ 7102, 7103(a) (2). It requires agencies to negotiate with the recognized bargaining representative of their employees regarding "conditions of employment," id. § 7103(a) (12), which are defined as "personnel policies, practices, and matters ... affecting working conditions," id. § 7103(a) (14). However, the Statute specifically excludes certain "management rights" from the duty to bargain. These include matters such as hiring decisions, the assignment of work and the establishment of performance standards. See id. § 7106(a) (2).
Although an agency is not required to bargain with respect to its management rights per se, it is required to negotiate about the "impact and implementation" of those rights--that is, the "procedures which management officials of the agency will observe in exercising" management rights and "appropriate arrangements for employees adversely affected by the exercise" of such rights. Id. § 7106(b) (2), (3); see also United States Dep't of the Air Force v. FLRA, 949 F.2d 475, 477 & n. 2 (D.C. Cir. 1991). The FSLMRS also requires agencies to consult with employee unions before implementing "any substantive change in conditions of employment proposed by the agency." 5 U.S.C. § 7117(d) (2) (A). An agency commits an unfair labor practice if it refuses to bargain over "impact and implementation" issues or fails to consult with the employees' representative over proposed changes in conditions of employment.1 Id. § 7116(a) (5).
Article 16 of the MLA governs the "detailing" of employees. It provides that an employee's duties may be changed in order to "meet [ ] temporary needs ... when necessary services cannot be obtained by other desirable or practical means"; the reassignment may be to a higher or lower grade level, or to a set of duties that has not yet been classified. See Albany, 39 F.L.R.A. at 1077 n. 1 (ALJ Decision) (reprinting Article 16). Article 16 also places limits upon the duration of a "detail" and addresses certain procedural matters relevant to the implementation of details, including how details must be documented, when details will result in temporary promotions, when competitive procedures must be used and how deductions of union dues will be handled for detailed employees. See id. Disputes arising from management decisions to detail employees are subject to the grievance procedure contained in Article 13 of the MLA. See id. at 1078.
We will defer to the Authority's interpretation of the FSLMRS so long as that interpretation is "reasonable and defensible." Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v. FLRA, 464 U.S. 89, 97, 104 S. Ct. 439, 444, 78 L. Ed. 2d 195 (1983). However, we are under no obligation to "rubber stamp" the Authority's actions; when they are "incompatible with either the terms or the purpose of the controlling statute, or ... conflict with prior FLRA precedent," we are obliged to intervene. AFGE, Local 32 v. FLRA, 853 F.2d 986, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Such is the case here.
The FLRA's present test for determining when a mandatory bargaining subject is "covered by" a collective bargaining agreement has its genesis in the Authority's 1985 decision in Internal Revenue Service, 17 F.L.R.A. 731 (1985). There, the Authority held that, under the FSLMRS, agencies have no duty to bargain over union-initiated proposals during the term of a collective bargaining agreement. See id. at 732. The affected union petitioned for review, and this court vacated the Authority's decision. National Treasury Employees Union v. FLRA, 810 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("NTEU"). Based upon the FSLMRS's policy of promoting collective bargaining and the "clear precedent in the private sector," we rejected the Authority's conclusion that agencies have no mid-term duty to bargain with respect to union-initiated proposals.3 Id. at 301.
The Internal Revenue Service petitioned for review of the Authority's decision in IRS II and sought initial hearing en banc, arguing that the Authority's analytical approach would wreak havoc in public sector labor relations by requiring agencies to engage in endless mid-term bargaining. This court denied the request for initial hearing en banc and dismissed the petition for review without prejudice. See FLRA v. Internal Revenue Serv., 838 F.2d 567 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en banc). Two judges of this court, concurring in the denial of initial hearing en banc, emphasized the limited nature of the mid-term duty to bargain recognized by the Authority in IRS II: "In reconsidering the issue of union-initiated midterm bargaining, the Authority adopted a position far short of requiring negotiations with respect to all mandatory subjects not specifically addressed in an existing collective bargaining agreement." Id. at 568 (Edwards, J., joined by Silberman, J., concurring).
It is well-established in this circuit that where an agency departs from its prior cases, it must offer a reasoned explanation for its change in view. See, e.g., AFGE, Local 32, 853 F.2d at 991; Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923, 91 S. Ct. 2229, 29 L. Ed. 2d 701 (1971). As we have pointedly stated, " [d]ivergence from agency precedent demands an explanation." Hall v. McLaughlin, 864 F.2d 868, 872 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
As explained in the preceding section, the Authority, in IRS II, adopted a two-part test for determining when an agency has a mid-term duty to bargain with employee unions. See 29 F.L.R.A. at 166. Under the IRS II approach, the agency must engage in mid-term negotiations over an otherwise bargainable matter raised by the union, except when: (1) the matter is covered by the parties' collective bargaining agreement; or (2) the union has "clearly and unmistakably" waived its right to bargain, either by express agreement (e.g., a zipper clause8 ), or through its bargaining history with the agency. Id. The test adopted by the Authority for determining the existence of the second type of waiver--waiver by bargaining history--is whether "the particular subject matter of the proposals offered during contract and mid-term negotiations is the same." Id. at 167 (emphasis added); see also note 4 supra.
The approach adopted by the Authority in IRS II is perfectly consistent with the FSLMRS, eminently reasonable and patently sensible. As the Authority noted, see 29 F.L.R.A. at 166, the IRS II approach is also consistent with private sector labor law, under which it is well-recognized that the parties to a collective bargaining agreement have no obligation to engage in mid-term negotiation over subjects covered by the agreement. See NLRB v. Jacobs Mfg. Co., 196 F.2d 680, 684 (2d Cir. 1952); see also Local Union No. 47, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 927 F.2d 635, 640 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ("Electrical Workers"); United Mine Workers of Am., Dist. 31 v. NLRB, 879 F.2d 939, 943-44 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("United Mine Workers"). Moreover, the IRS II approach is consistent with the Authority's own longstanding view that an agency incurs no bargaining obligation when it takes action pursuant to a contractual provision that authorizes the action in question. See, e.g., Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, Norfolk, Va., 9 F.L.R.A. 774, 777 (1982) ("Naval Amphibious Base") (finding no duty to bargain where agency, in implementing adverse action against two employees, followed procedures prescribed by negotiated agreement).
See also United Mine Workers, 879 F.2d at 944 (concluding that waiver standard not relevant where matter at issue was covered by contract); Mead Corp. v. NLRB, 697 F.2d 1013, 1020 (11th Cir. 1983) (finding "covered by" and "waiver" inquiries to be analytically distinct). Cf. Ador Corp., 150 N.L.R.B. 1658, 1660 (1965) (holding that where negotiated agreement dealt with subject, " [t]he parties had, in effect, bargained about" the matter). See generally ROBERT A. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW 458-63 (1976).
Indeed, the difference between the two concepts goes to the structural heart of labor law. When parties bargain about a subject and memorialize the results of their negotiation in a collective bargaining agreement, they create a set of enforceable rules--a new code of conduct for themselves--on that subject. Because of the fundamental policy of freedom of contract, the parties are generally free to agree to whatever specific rules they like, and in most circumstances it is beyond the competence of the Authority, the National Labor Relations Board or the courts to interfere with the parties' choice. Cf. H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 106-07, 90 S. Ct. 821, 825, 25 L. Ed. 2d 146 (1970). On the other hand, when a union waives its right to bargain about a particular matter, it surrenders the opportunity to create a set of contractual rules that bind the employer, and instead cedes full discretion to the employer on that matter. For that reason, the courts require "clear and unmistakable" evidence of waiver and have tended to construe waivers narrowly. See Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 708-09, 103 S. Ct. 1467, 1477-78, 75 L. Ed. 2d 387 (1983); NLRB v. Brown-Graves Lumber Co., 949 F.2d 194, 198 (6th Cir. 1991).
The Authority's approach is not only illogical but also impermissible, because it contravenes the policies of the FSLMRS. A primary purpose of the Statute is to promote collective bargaining and the negotiation of collective bargaining agreements. See 5 U.S.C. § 7102(2) (establishing right of employees "to engage in collective bargaining with respect to conditions of employment"); id. § 7114(a) (4) (requiring agency and union to "meet and negotiate in good faith for the purpose [ ] of arriving at a collective bargaining agreement"). Implicit in this statutory purpose is the need to provide the parties to such an agreement with stability and repose with respect to matters reduced to writing in the agreement. As the Authority itself recognized in Internal Revenue Service, 17 F.L.R.A. at 734, " [T]o the extent that the parties are required to adhere to the specific conditions of employment mutually established in their agreement during the life of such agreement, stability at the work place is thereby fostered."12
The Authority's "waiver" approach to the "covered by" inquiry subverts the statutory policies of contractual stability and repose by requiring essentially endless bargaining. At oral argument, the Authority's counsel candidly admitted that he could think of no circumstance in which the Marine Corps could "detail" an employee without being required to bargain. As such, it is clear that the Marine Corps' efforts at negotiating with the AFGE to reach a contractual agreement on "detailing" and the implementation of performance standards profited the agency nothing. Such a result creates a disincentive to engage in collective bargaining and undermines contractual repose, thereby contravening the policies of the FSLMRS. See id. at 736 (finding promotion of contractual repose necessary to avoid "discourag [ing] [parties] from engaging in the effort, as part of negotiation of their basic collective bargaining agreement, to foresee potential labor-management relations issues, and resolve those issues in as comprehensive a manner as practicable"). Cf. Dunham-Bush, Inc., 264 N.L.R.B. 1347, 1349 (1982) (" [T]he greater confidence the parties have that their agreements will be observed, the greater the incentive they will have to submit their disputes to the bargaining process.").
The third flaw in the Authority's "waiver" approach is that it is inconsistent with the principles of private sector labor law upon which the Authority purported to rely, and which the Authority advances in this court in defense of the results reached in Albany and Barstow.13 Under private sector law, the parties to a collective bargaining agreement may negotiate about many matters that would otherwise constitute "statutory rights"; if agreement is reached, the parties' collective bargaining agreement supplants the statute as the source of rights and obligations regarding such matters. See Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 705-07, 103 S. Ct. 1467, 1475-76, 75 L. Ed. 2d 387 (1983); Plumbers & Pipefitters Local Union No. 520 v. NLRB, 955 F.2d 744, 754 (D.C. Cir. 1992); American Freight Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 722 F.2d 828, 832 (D.C. Cir. 1983). In Albany and Barstow, the Authority paid lip service to this principle by holding that parties may negotiate contractual provisions that "cover" the union's statutory right to bargain over impact and implementation matters, such that the negotiated agreement will take the place of the statutory right with respect to those matters. But the Authority's waiver-based approach for determining when a subject is "covered by" a collective bargaining agreement makes that result virtually impossible to attain. As such, the Authority's approach runs counter to the very private sector principles that the Authority apparently intended to follow.
The Authority argues that its "waiver" approach is consistent with NLRB v. Jacobs Mfg. Co., 196 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1952), and other private sector precedents. But Jacobs Mfg. Co. and its progeny have never been read to require continuous bargaining with respect to matters addressed in a collective bargaining agreement. This court, other courts of appeals and the National Labor Relations Board ("Board") have rejected that notion time and time again. See, e.g., Electrical Workers, 927 F.2d at 640 ("The union may exercise its right to bargain about a particular subject by negotiating for a provision in the collective bargaining contract that fixes the parties' rights and forecloses further mandatory bargaining as to that subject."); International Union, UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175, 179-80, 183 & n. 30 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("Milwaukee Spring"); N L Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 536 F.2d 786, 790 (8th Cir. 1976); C & S Indus., Inc., 158 N.L.R.B. 454, 457 (1966).
Indeed, the Authority's narrow test for when a matter is "covered by" a negotiated agreement is patently inconsistent with private sector law. In C & S Industries, Inc., id. at 459, the Board held that a matter need not be specifically mentioned in a collective bargaining agreement in order to be "covered by" the agreement. There, the Board found that the subject of an incentive wage structure was "covered by" the parties' contract, reasoning that " [a]lthough the contract makes no specific mention of wage incentives, such incentives are inseparably bound up with and are thus plainly an aspect of the payment of wages, a subject expressly covered by the contract." Id.; see also Dunham-Bush, Inc., 264 N.L.R.B. at 1348 n. 4 (finding matter not specifically mentioned in negotiated agreement to be contained in agreement "by implication"). The Board's relatively expansive conception of when a matter is covered by a contract is consistent with this court's prior cases. For example, in United Mine Workers, 879 F.2d at 942-44, we affirmed a Board decision that an employer's right to subcontract work was "covered by" the applicable collective bargaining agreement (and therefore not subject to the duty to bargain when exercised), despite the fact that the relevant contractual provision far from addressed the full gamut of issues raised by the union. Rejecting the union's argument that waiver analysis was appropriate, we concluded that although the provisions of the contract may have left "many unresolved and difficult questions" regarding the employer's subcontracting rights, those questions were "properly resolved through the contractual grievance procedure" and not through an unfair labor practice case. Id. at 944.
To be sure, neither Article 16 nor Article 31 "specifically address [es] the full range of impact and implementation issues" that might conceivably arise, id. at 1133; but, as we have explained, such a standard is both unrealistic and impermissible. That the Authority embraced it merely demonstrates the depth of the confusion engendered by the Authority's flawed transformation of the two-part duty to bargain test adopted in IRS II into a one-part "clear and unmistakable waiver" inquiry.
Put another way, the MLA plainly authorized the Marine Corps to detail employees and establish performance criteria in the manner that it did. Consequently, the agency's actions did not effect a "change" in the employees' conditions of employment, and so no bargaining obligation arose. See 5 U.S.C. § 7117(d) (2) (A) (providing that agency's duty to consult arises only as to "any substantive change in conditions of employment proposed by the agency") (emphasis added); Naval Amphibious Base, 9 F.L.R.A. at 777 (finding no duty to bargain where agency followed procedures specified in contract in taking "adverse action" against employees). Cf. Milwaukee Spring, 765 F.2d at 183 n. 30 ("Obviously, if the Company had the contractual right to make the relocation decision, it had no duty to bargain before making that decision.").
As we noted in AFGE, Local 1923 v. FLRA, 819 F.2d 306, 308 (D.C. Cir. 1987), there is some tension between subsection (a) of section 7106, which reserves certain prerogatives to an agency's discretion, and subsection (b), which requires the agency to bargain with employee unions regarding the procedures it will follow in exercising its reserved discretion. By ascribing certain management rights to agencies, but tempering those rights through the requirement of impact and implementation bargaining, Congress sought to strike a compromise between the agency's need to manage itself efficiently and the employees' right to participate in the decisions that affect them. See Office of Personnel Management v. FLRA, 864 F.2d 165, 168 (D.C. Cir. 1988). That the balance struck by Congress is a delicate one--easily upset by a untoward shift of power to either party--is aptly demonstrated by the facts of this case
In Social Security Administration v. FLRA, 956 F.2d 1280, 1288-89 (4th Cir. 1992), the Fourth Circuit held, contrary to our decision in NTEU, that there is no mid-term duty to bargain over union-initiated proposals under the FSLMRS. Although we are, of course, bound by the result reached in NTEU, we note that the policy rationales upon which the Fourth Circuit relied in reaching the contrary result--the need for stability and predictability during the term of a collective bargaining agreement--are entirely consistent with, and furthered by, our holding today
See 5 U.S.C. § 7103(a) (12) ("the obligation [to bargain in good faith] ... does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or to make a concession"); cf. H.K. Porter Co., 397 U.S. at 106, 90 S. Ct. at 825 (" ' [T]he Board may not, either directly or indirectly, compel concessions or otherwise sit in judgment upon the substantive terms of collective bargaining agreements.' " (quoting NLRB v. American Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 404, 72 S. Ct. 824, 829, 96 L. Ed. 1027 (1952)))
See IRS II, 29 F.L.R.A. at 166 (describing Authority's approach as "consonant with case law in the private sector"); Brief for the Federal Labor Relations Authority at 33 (" [T]he Authority's standard is consistent with the private sector standard.")