Source: http://openjurist.org/597/f2d/201
Timestamp: 2013-05-23 19:35:51
Document Index: 86456196

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 708', '§ 103', '§ 103', '§ 171', '§ 171', '§ 161', '§ 103', '§ 171', '§ 103']

597 F2d 201 Sidewinder Marine Inc v. Starbuck Kustom Boats and Products Inc | OpenJurist
597 F. 2d 201 - Sidewinder Marine Inc v. Starbuck Kustom Boats and Products Inc	Home597 f2d 201 sidewinder marine inc v. starbuck kustom boats and products inc
597 F2d 201 Sidewinder Marine Inc v. Starbuck Kustom Boats and Products Inc 597 F.2d 201
202 U.S.P.Q. 356
SIDEWINDER MARINE, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant,v.STARBUCK KUSTOM BOATS AND PRODUCTS, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
Argued March 13, 1978.Decided April 9, 1979.
This is a patent infringement action in which the question of infringement has been mooted by a holding in the trial court that the subject patent was invalid and therefore incapable of being infringed. The court's opinion is reported at 418 F.Supp. 224 (D.Col.). Plaintiff Sidewinder Marine, Inc. ("Sidewinder"), seeks reversal of the holding of invalidity and remand for trial on the issue of infringement.
Because of this sudden, extensive copying activity, Sidewinder which had filed for patent protection through Baker and Plecia only After the Chicago show sought to expedite consideration of its application in the Patent Office by means of a "petition to make special." The company thus took on the burden of submitting a copy of all references "deemed most clearly related to the subject matter" of the claim. Manual of Patent Examining Procedure, § 708.02 (VII)(d) (3d ed. 1961). As noted, the subject patent was granted under this procedure on November 3, 1970. The six references cited by the Patent Examiner bore no close resemblance to plaintiff's design, and only a boat called the Nova "somewhat resembled" the Super Sidewinder in side-view, as pointed out by the court below. 418 F.Supp. at 226.
The trial court further noted the division among the circuits on the application of the nonobviousness test in the area of design patents. 418 F.Supp. at 228. The Ninth Circuit in Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 444 F.2d 295, 9 Cir., adopted the view of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in In re Laverne, 356 F.2d 1003, 1006, 53 C.C.P.A. 1158, that under § 103 it is only necessary "to determine obviousness to the ordinary intelligent man." The Second, Third and District of Columbia Circuits disagree and require that nonobviousness be measured from the perspective of a designer having ordinary skill in the art. Id. at 228, and cases cited. The trial court agreed with the latter position.
After reviewing the prior art references the court found that the Sidewinder design failed to meet the nonobviousness condition of § 103 because, whichever standard were applied, the differences between the Sidewinder and prior art are such that the design as a whole would have been obvious within the meaning of that section. 418 F.Supp. at 230-31.
It is true that the burden on an alleged infringer to rebut the presumption of validity is heavy. The defendant must introduce "clear and convincing" evidence in this regard, E. g., Moore v. Shultz, 491 F.2d 294, 298 (10th Cir.), and "every reasonable doubt should be resolved against him," Mumm v. Jacob E. Decker & Sons, 301 U.S. 168, 171, 57 S.Ct. 675, 676, 81 L.Ed. 983. See also Radio Corp. of America v. Radio Engineering Laboratories, Inc., 293 U.S. 1, 7-8, 55 S.Ct. 928, 79 L.Ed. 163; Eimco Corp. v. Peterson Filters and Engineering Co., 406 F.2d 431, 434 (10th Cir.), Cert. denied,395 U.S. 963, 89 S.Ct. 2105, 23 L.Ed.2d 749; King-Seely Thermos Co. v. Refrigerated Dispensers, Inc., 354 F.2d 533 (10th Cir.). The rationale for this strong presumption is the expertise of the Patent Office in determining when the conditions for patentability have been satisfied. Neff Instrument Corp. v. Cohu Electronics, Inc., 298 F.2d 82, 86 (9th Cir.). See Mumm,supra.
Nevertheless, the presumption flowing from issuance is rebuttable. When it is shown that a patent has issued "without consideration of prior art not submitted to the Patent Office, the basis for the presumption vanishes, and the presumption is significantly weakened." Johns-Manville Corp. v. Cement Asbestos Products Co., 428 F.2d 1381, 1382 (5th Cir.). See also Norwood v. Ehrenreich Photo-Optical Industries, Inc., 529 F.2d 3, 9 (9th Cir.); Hadco Products, Inc. v. Walter Kidde & Co., 462 F.2d 1265, 1272 n. 33 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1023, 93 S.Ct. 464, 34 L.Ed.2d 315; Deep Welding, Inc. v. Sciaky Bros., Inc., 417 F.2d 1227, 1234 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1037, 90 S.Ct. 1354, 25 L.Ed.2d 648. When the Patent Office has failed to take into account prior art which would be relevant to a patentability determination, it cannot be said that that agency has fully brought its expertise to bear on the task at hand, and the statutory presumption is diminished or dissipated altogether. See Deep Welding, supra; Lorenz v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 305 F.2d 102, 105 and nn. 6-7 (2d Cir.).
Plaintiff also points to the previous adjudication of validity in Sidewinder Marine, Inc. v. Burns, supra, as strong evidence of validity in this case. There is, of course, no question here concerning Res judicata or collateral estoppel on the validity issue, since defendant Starbuck was not a party to the Burns case. See Boutell v. Volk, 449 F.2d 673, 677-78 (10th Cir.). Rather, plaintiff relies on the outcome of the California litigation for supposedly strong, if non-binding, precedential effect. See Radio Corp. of America v. Radio Engineering Laboratories, Inc., supra, 293 U.S. at 8, 55 S.Ct. 928 hereto.
It is variously stated that a prior adjudication of patent validity is entitled to "comity," Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 391 F.Supp. 780, 785 (N.D.Ill.), aff'd 537 F.2d 896 (7th Cir.), "great weight," Barr Rubber Products Co. v. Sun Rubber Co., 425 F.2d 1114, 1120 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 878, 91 S.Ct. 118, 27 L.Ed.2d 115, and "respectful consideration," Safe Flight Instrument Corp. v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp., 482 F.2d 1086, 1090 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1113, 94 S.Ct. 843, 38 L.Ed.2d 740. The cases also speak in terms of a "high presumption of validity" created by a prior adjudication favorable to the patentee. See, e. g., General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 489 F.2d 1105, 1116 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932, 94 S.Ct. 2643, 41 L.Ed.2d 235.7
Still, such a prior adjudication of validity "does not, absent estoppel running against the parties to the prior litigations, supplant the primary duty of a court to dispose of cases according to the law and the facts of the particular case before it," Safe Flight Instrument Corp. v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp., supra, 482 F.2d at 1090. In a case like this, where relevant prior art was not before the court rendering the earlier adjudication of validity, that decision has little precedential value. See Phillips Electronic and Pharmaceutical Industries Corp. v. Thermal and Electronics Industries, Inc., 450 F.2d 1164, 1176 (3d Cir.); Deep Welding, Inc. v. Sciaky Bros., Inc., supra, 417 F.2d at 1234. Although the court in the Burns case had before it some automobile designs, it is apparent that that court did not consider at least two important prior art automobiles the DuPont amphibious car and the Cycolac demonstration vehicle which were presented by the defendant in this case. (Appellant's Opening Brief, 17; see Defendant's Exhibits I3 and Q3). And as developed further below, the Cycolac vehicle is particularly pertinent to the subject design. (See note 11, Infra ).
Plaintiff Sidewinder next contends that the trial court erred in assessing the obviousness issue according to how an "ordinary designer" would view it rather than from the perspective of the "ordinary intelligent man." The importance of this distinction to plaintiff is that under the "ordinary designer" standard, the trial court found that previously-existing automobile designs may properly be taken into account as developments in an analogous field which a boat designer could reasonably be expected to be aware of, and we accept that finding. Under the "ordinary intelligent man" standard, the trial court felt that only prior boat designs would be relevant. See 418 F.Supp. at 229-30. While the trial court applied both tests and found the Sidewinder design obvious even under the "ordinary intelligent man" standard preferred by plaintiff,8 we have considerable doubt as to the result under that standard alone. Since the result might be different under the two standards, we feel that we should determine which standard applies and then proceed on that basis.
As written, and as interpreted in cases dealing with utility patents, the statutory non-obviousness requirement focuses not on some hypothetical "ordinary" person, or layman, but on one "reasonably skilled" in the applicable art. Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 229, 96 S.Ct. 1393, 47 L.Ed.2d 692. There is disagreement among the Circuits, however, when the non-obviousness requirement is carried over as it must be according to 35 U.S.C. § 171 into the design patent area. As noted, the Ninth Circuit in Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., supra, 444 F.2d at 299, applied the level of knowledge of an "ordinary intelligent man" as the standard by which obviousness or non-obviousness of a design should be determined, following the lead of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, which had said concerning obviousness in In re Laverne, 356 F.2d 1003, 1006, 53 C.C.P.A. 1158:
On the other hand, the Second, Third, Sixth, Eighth, and District of Columbia Circuits have phrased their standard for design obviousness in terms of the "worker of ordinary skill in the art" or the "ordinary designer," though those courts recognize that novelty and ornamentality distinct requirements of design patentability contained in 35 U.S.C. § 171 are to be assessed from the viewpoint of the "ordinary observer." See Clark Equipment Co. v. Keller, 570 F.2d 778, 799 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 99 S.Ct. 96, 58 L.Ed.2d 118; Schnadig Corp. v. Gaines Manufacturing Co., 494 F.2d 383, 389 (6th Cir.); Fields v. Schuyler, 153 U.S.App.D.C. 229, 472 F.2d 1304, 1306, cert. denied, 411 U.S. 987, 93 S.Ct. 2270, 36 L.Ed.2d 965; Hadco Products, Inc. v. Walter Kidde & Co., 462 F.2d 1265, 1272 (3d Cir.); G. B. Lewis Co. v. Gould Products, Inc., 436 F.2d 1176, 1178 (2d Cir.). See also 2 Walker, Patents, § 161 at 757.
We are persuaded that the proper standard is that of the "ordinary designer" in the field in question. Not only does this standard hew more closely to the statutory wording in § 103, but, as pointed out in Fields v. Schuyler, supra at 1306, it serves as a "more objective reference point" concerning obviousness than the "ordinary observer" standard.9 If the latter standard were adopted, as again pointed out in Fields, commercial success of the design among the mass of "ordinary" consumers would be a "virtually conclusive determinant" of non-obviousness, rather than the secondary consideration it is supposed to be under the rule of Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17, 86 S.Ct. 684, 15 L.Ed.2d 545.10
Although the ultimate test of patent validity is one of law, resolution of the obviousness issue necessarily entails several basic factual inquiries. Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 280, 96 S.Ct. 1532, 47 L.Ed.2d 784. Those inquiries were outlined in Graham v. John Deere Co.,supra, 383 U.S. at 17, 86 S.Ct. at 694, as follows:
We do not feel that explicit findings in the exact terms of the Graham criteria are required, "(s)o long as it is clear that the court has grappled with the problems presented," and its findings are "sufficient to provide (us) with a clear understanding of the . . . court's reasons so as to present an adequate review." Price v. Lake Sales Supply R. M., Inc., 510 F.2d 388, 391 (10th Cir.). See also Tanks, Inc. v. Reiter Industries, Inc.,545 F.2d 1276 (10th Cir.). We believe that the trial judge's findings in his opinion in this case do afford an adequate basis for us to see that the Graham inquiries were considered and substantially answered. See 418 F.Supp. at 229-31.
We feel that the record as a whole supports the trial court's findings on obviousness, applying the standards of an ordinary designer in the sport and pleasure boat field. It is true that the prior boat art cited by defendant and discussed by its president at trial11 seems to argue obviousness of the Sidewinder patent by breaking down the design combination into its various known components, and that this is an impermissible basis for claiming obviousness. See In re Jennings, 182 F.2d 207, 208, 37 C.C.P.A. 1023. And as plaintiff points out and the trial court recognized, 418 F.Supp. at 225, the Super Sidewinder design did enjoy notable commercial success and favorable publicity, and was apparently widely copied.
Nevertheless, there are other factors which, with the entire record, persuade us that the findings on obviousness were not clearly erroneous. There is first the offsetting factor of contemporaneous independent development of designs similar to the Super Sidewinder design, I. e., the Glastron boat (Defendant's Exhibit S) and the Avenger Too speed boat (Defendant's Exhibit N3, Appendix C). Moreover, in addition to the prior art in boat designs, which alone is not overly persuasive, there were automobile designs introduced by defendant at trial, and cited by the trial court's findings, 418 F.Supp. at 230-31, which sufficiently support the findings on obviousness. These include notably the DuPont amphibious car (Defendant's Exhibit I 3) and the Cycolac Research Vehicle, (Defendant's Exhibit Q3).12 Indeed the latter design is one with which a striking illustration was made at trial by defendant, by tracing the Cycolac design and superimposing it over the Super Sidewinder sideview. (See Figure 2 in Appendix A-1 and Appendix B-2 hereto). The Cycolac vehicle displays a windshield which is almost "continuously arcuate," and the car has an overall appearance of considerable similarity to the upper portion of the Super Sidewinder.13
Although defendant at trial seriously questioned the jurisdiction of the district court on the basis of the "complexity and confusion surrounding the chain of title in the subject patent," resulting from Sidewinder's bankruptcy in the early 1970s, the district court concluded that it did in fact have jurisdiction because of certain orders entered in the separate bankruptcy proceeding. 418 F.Supp. at 227. Defendant does not raise this jurisdictional point in the appeal, and we are in any case satisfied with the district court's resolution of the question. See Pl.Ex. 81
The district court also held that the design was not "original" and therefore failed to meet one of the requirements for a design patent contained in 35 U.S.C. § 171. 418 F.Supp. at 231. Because of our disposition on obviousness grounds, we need not consider the holding on originality
There is especially strong language along this line in Cold Metal Process Co. v. Republic Street Corp., 233 F.2d 828, 837 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 891, 77 S.Ct. 128, 1 L.Ed.2d 86: "The prior decisions holding these patents valid should be followed unless the court is convinced of 'a very palpable error in law or fact.' " The Cold Metal court was quoting from Penfield v. C. & A. Potts & Co., 126 F. 475, 478 (6th Cir.), and study of that case reveals that the Sixth Circuit, in originating the "very palpable error" language, was concerned with the principle of Stare decisis, i. e., where the same court had previously upheld the patent in question. See Pachmayr Gun Works, Inc. v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., 502 F.2d 802, 805 (9th Cir.). This Circuit has not before been faced with the Sidewinder patent, and so the Cold Metal-Penfield language is not apposite here
The trial judge stated that he believed that the "ordinary designer" test is the better approach, but that since neither the Supreme Court nor this court has ruled upon which test should be applied, he had analyzed the prior art references under both standards of non-obviousness. 418 F.Supp. at 229
We feel that the plaintiff's reliance on Smith v. Whitman Saddle Co., 148 U.S. 674, 680, 13 S.Ct. 768, 37 L.Ed. 606, and Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 528, 20 L.Ed. 731 is misplaced. Gorham Co. v. White did apply the test of substantial similarity in the eye of an ordinary observer, but only in deciding the question of infringement of the patented design
It is true that in Smith v. Whitman Saddle Co., 148 U.S. 674, 679-80, 13 S.Ct. 768, 37 L.Ed. 606 (1893), in discussing patentability generally the Court referred to the test of identity of design as being that of sameness of appearance to the eye of an ordinary observer, citing Gorham Manufacturing Co. v. White, inter alia. However, we do not feel that this statement is controlling here since it was made long before the enactment of § 103 on obviousness with its standard of "a person having ordinary skill in the art . . ." and long before the clear reference in Graham v. John Deere Co. to "the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art . . ." in applying the 1952 statute. 383 U.S. at 17, 86 S.Ct. at 694.
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