Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/943/305/86339/
Timestamp: 2019-10-15 08:26:33
Document Index: 208236654

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1002', '§ 1002', '§ 1002', '§ 1954', '§ 3', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 186', '§ 1002', '§ 2510', '§ 2', '§ 3']

United States of America v. Joseph Cusumano, Appellant, 943 F.2d 305 (3d Cir. 1991) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Third Circuit › 1991 › United States of America v. Joseph Cusumano, Appellant
United States of America v. Joseph Cusumano, Appellant, 943 F.2d 305 (3d Cir. 1991)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit - 943 F.2d 305 (3d Cir. 1991) Argued May 14, 1991. Decided Aug. 28, 1991
This court has characterized this provision broadly to reach "all persons who exercise control, direct or indirect, authorized or unauthorized, over the fund." United States v. Palmeri, 630 F.2d 192, 199-200 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 967, 101 S. Ct. 1484, 67 L. Ed. 2d 616 (1981) (cited in United States v. Soures, 736 F.2d 87, 90 (3d Cir. 1984); United States v. Friedland, 660 F.2d 919, 925, 927 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 989, 102 S. Ct. 2268, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1283 (1982)).
Initially, we note that the question whether the Fund was a welfare benefit plan under ERISA was submitted to the jury without objection from Cusumano. In fact Cusumano delayed until oral argument in this court before raising this issue. Therefore, our power to grant relief is limited to circumstances in which the district court's instruction to the jury was plain error affecting substantial rights. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 30, 52(b). Given that the challenge to the construction of the statute goes to the existence vel non of criminal responsibility, we think that the error, if such it was, would affect Cusumano's due process rights and would constitute plain error. United States v. Piccolo, 835 F.2d 517, 519 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1032, 108 S. Ct. 2014, 100 L. Ed. 2d 602 (1988). We therefore turn to the merits of Cusumano's contention.
According to the language of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1), the Fund is a welfare benefit plan "to the extent" it was established or maintained for the purpose of providing any of the listed benefits. See Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367, 1371 n. 5 (11th Cir. 1982) (in dicta, "plan ... furnishing both benefits listed in ... § 1002(1) and benefits not listed ... is subject to ERISA to the extent the plan ... has as its purpose the providing of the enumerated benefits"). The Fund provided, in addition to other benefit plans, dental and life insurance plans for the benefit of the employees it served. Both of these fall within the benefits enumerated in § 1002(1), which Cusumano does not dispute. Therefore, to the extent that it provided both dental and life insurance benefits, the Fund was a "welfare benefit plan." To read the statute in any other way would be contrary to the plain meaning of its language. It follows from this conclusion that the fact that separate applications may have to be filed with different government agencies, and their separate approvals obtained, does not alter our analysis. Thus we reject Cusumano's construction. Given our conclusion, it is not suggested that the ultimate question was not for the jury. Therefore, the district court did not err in submitting the § 1954 counts to the jury.
Cusumano assigns two grounds of error in the district court's charge to the jury. It is suggested at the outset by both parties that we should review these objections only for plain error. The record is not entirely clear as to whether the objections were preserved. However, because of our conclusion, we will proceed to address the merits under the abuse of discretion standard as if the objections had been preserved. See United States v. Santos, 932 F.2d 244, 247 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v. Beros, 833 F.2d 455, 458 n. 3 (3d Cir. 1987).
Where the relevant statute lists alternative means of violation, " [t]he general rule is that when a jury returns a guilty verdict on an indictment charging several acts in the conjunctive ... the verdict stands if the evidence is sufficient with respect to any of the acts charged." Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 420, 90 S. Ct. 642, 654, 24 L. Ed. 2d 610 (1970). This rule obviously extends to a trial court's jury instructions in the disjunctive in the context of a conjunctively worded indictment. See United States v. Klein, 850 F.2d 404, 405-06 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 867, 109 S. Ct. 173, 102 L. Ed. 2d 143 (1988); United States v. Schiff, 801 F.2d 108, 114 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 945, 107 S. Ct. 1603, 94 L. Ed. 2d 789 (1987); United States v. Uzzolino, 651 F.2d 207, 210 n. 2 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 865, 102 S. Ct. 327, 70 L. Ed. 2d 166 (1981). Cusumano does not argue that the evidence was insufficient with respect to any of the acts charged. Therefore, the failure to charge in the conjunctive cannot be treated as an improper amendment of the indictment. We thus conclude that the district court's charge did not constitute an abuse of discretion.
Next, Cusumano argues that the district court should have given a specific unanimity instruction on the embezzlement counts under United States v. Beros, 833 F.2d 455 (3d Cir. 1987). He states that the district court gave merely a general unanimity instruction, but failed to specify to the jury that it must be unanimous in concluding that Cusumano committed one of the disjunctive acts. Thus he argues that the jury might have thought that it could convict as long as each of them believed he committed one of the listed offenses but without being unanimous as to any offense. His proposed point for charge illustrates his grievance. Cusumano proposed that, after charging as to the disjunctive list of offenses, the district court instruct the jury that "you are instructed that ... the jury must unanimously agree on one or more of these charged elements."
In Beros the government charged the defendant under a disjunctively worded statute, alleging that the defendant violated that statute by engaging in three separate and different acts. This court held that it was an abuse of discretion not to specifically instruct the jury that it had to be unanimous as to at least one of the three acts committed. Id. at 460-63. Here, the government did not allege different sets of facts, and the only possible confusion arose from the disjunctive nature of the charge under the statute. There is insufficient risk of confusion in such circumstances and the need for a specific unanimity instruction was not triggered. See United States v. Jackson, 879 F.2d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 1989). Therefore, the district court's charge did not constitute an abuse of discretion and a new trial is not warranted.5
We have previously stated that a construction of § 3D1.2 is a legal issue for our plenary review. See United States v. Riviere, 924 F.2d 1289, 1304 (3d Cir. 1991). However, in that case the issue was "whether offenses for which society is the victim are properly grouped together...." In contrast, Cusumano's particular objection requires us to decide whether his various offenses were part of one overall scheme, which we view as an "essentially factual" issue. On that basis, our review of the district court's determination that the offenses were not "ancillary" is governed by the clearly erroneous standard. See United States v. Ortiz, 878 F.2d 125, 126-27 (3d Cir. 1989).
Cusumano relies on various statements of the Sentencing Commission in the Guidelines. First, he points to an introductory policy statement in which the Commission described its approach to the question "whether to base sentences upon the actual conduct in which the defendant engaged regardless of the charges for which he was indicted or convicted ('real offense' sentencing), or upon the conduct that constitutes the elements of the offense for which the defendant was charged and of which he was convicted ('charge offense' sentencing)." U.S.S.G. Ch. 1, part A, 4(a) (discussed in United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1099 & n. 14 (3d Cir. 1990)). The Commission goes on to state that the process through which it created the Guidelines resulted in a compromise, one that was "close to a charge offense system" but that "contain [s] a significant number of real offense elements." Id. In contrast to Cusumano's contention, this discussion does not evidence the Commission's intent to adhere to a "real offense" system. Therefore, the district court was correct to apply the plain language of the specific Guidelines.
Cusumano also points to Guidelines § 1B1.2, a general application principle describing how a district court is to determine the applicable guidelines. That guideline directs the court to " [d]etermine the offense guideline section in Chapter Two (Offense Conduct) most applicable to the offense of conviction (i.e., the offense conduct charged in the count of the indictment or information of which the defendant was convicted)." Cusumano points to the words "most applicable" to support his view of the Guidelines.
Guidelines § 1B1.1 is of no help to Cusumano, however. That provision instructs a district court how to proceed in imposing a sentence. The first step, which is what is described in § 1B1.2, is to " [d]etermine the applicable offense guidelines section from Chapter Two." See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1(a). That is only the first step, however, in a complex procedure. For example, § 1B1.1(d) instructs the court, in the case of multiple counts, to determine the applicable offense guidelines section for each of the counts, and then to group the counts according to Part D of Chapter III, just as occurred in this case. Cusumano's reliance on a portion of the language of § 1B1.2 is therefore simplistic, and we reject it as without merit.
Guidelines § 3B1.1(c) directs a district court to increase the offense level by two levels " [i]f the defendant was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in any criminal activity other than [one involving five or more participants]."8 The district court in this case determined that "the defendant's posture here was not one of a mere suggestor of commission of the offense, but indeed consisted of his recruitment of accomplices, his participation in planning, organizing the offense." On that basis, the district court adjusted the offense level upward.
The district court found that Cusumano told the probation officer, upon questioning as to his financial resources, that stock which he owned was "essentially worthless." In fact, the court found that " [t]here was a very vigorous, ongoing, well-nigh concluded negotiation to sell the aforesaid for over a half million dollars, which of course, is not well-nigh worthless." The district court concluded that Cusumano's statement to the probation officer was "at the very best a half truth," and that he had engaged in "willful misleading of the Probation authorities." On that basis the court adjusted Cusumano's offense level upward pursuant to § 3C1.1. We read the district court to have implicitly concluded that the false information provided by Cusumano was "material."
Cusumano disputes that the information he provided was false. He asserts that the evidence shows that at the time of his statements to the probation officer the negotiations involving the sale of Cusumano's stock were preliminary. Our review of the district court's finding that Cusumano lied and willfully mislead the probation officer is governed by the clearly erroneous standard. See United States v. McDowell, 888 F.2d 285, 292 (3d Cir. 1989).
We have found no case that has directly held on the question whether materiality under § 3C1.1 is an issue of law or fact for the district court. To the extent courts have spoken to the issue, it appears that there may be some difference of opinion. Compare, e.g., United States v. Torres-Rodriguez, 930 F.2d 1375, 1389-90 (9th Cir. 1991) (review district court's finding of obstruction of justice, for false testimony as to material fact, for clear error) with United States v. Bakhtiari, 913 F.2d 1053, 1063 (2d Cir. 1990) (district court determination of obstruction of justice reviewed as factual finding except where question turns on interpretation of guideline term), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S. Ct. 1319, 113 L. Ed. 2d 252 (1991). The parties have not addressed the specific question of our standard of review of a materiality determination by the district court. We will assume without deciding that our standard of review is plenary, because even under this more rigorous standard the district court did not err.
Section 186(c), a provision of the Labor Management Relations Act, refers to, inter alia, pooled vacation, holiday and severance benefits. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (6) (1988). The effect of § 1002(1) (B) "is to include in the definition of 'welfare plan' those plans which provide holiday and severance benefits, and benefits which are similar (for example, benefits which are in substance severance benefits, although not so characterized)". 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-1(a) (3) (1990)
We note that Cusumano cites United States v. Dansker, 537 F.2d 40, 51 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038, 97 S. Ct. 732, 50 L. Ed. 2d 748 (1977), in the context of his argument under Beros. Dansker is inapplicable here for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is that this court has not reversed Cusumano's conviction on any count
Cusumano contends that the district court should have assigned a base offense level under Guidelines § 2E5.1(a) (2) relating to violations concerning employee welfare plans
The factors involved in a court's determination under this section include the following: (1) the exercise of decision-making authority; (2) the nature of participation in the commission of the offense; (3) the recruitment of accomplices; (4) the claimed right to a larger share of the fruits of the crime; (5) the degree of participation in planning and organizing the offense; (6) the nature and scope of the illegal activity; and (7) the degree of control and authority exercised over others. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, application note 3; United States v. Gonzalez, 918 F.2d 1129, 1138 n. 9 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S. Ct. 1015, 112 L. Ed. 2d 1097 (1991)