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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 7', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 67', '§ 4', '§ 623', '§ 623', '§ 4', '§ 623', '§ 623', '§ 2000', 'art, 435', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 623', '§ 4', '§ 626', '§ 16', '§ 7', '§ 626', '§ 16', '§ 16', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 4', '§ 623', '§ 260', '§ 11', '§ 7']

Trans World Airlines Inc Vs Thurston - Citation 106007 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Trans World Airlines, Inc. Vs. Thurston - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/106007
Case Number 469 U.S. 111
Appellant Trans World Airlines, Inc.
Respondent Thurston
trans world airlines, inc. v. thurston - 469 u.s. 111 (1985) u.s. supreme court trans world airlines, inc. v. thurston, 469 u.s. 111 (1985) trans world airlines, inc. v. thurston no. 83-997 argued october 9, 1984 decided january 8, 1985 * 469 u.s. 111 certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the second circuit syllabus the age discrimination in employment act (adea) was amended in 1978 to prohibit the mandatory retirement of a protected employee because of his age. concerned that its retirement policy, at least as it applied to flight engineers, violated the adea, petitioner trans world airlines (twa) adopted a plan permitting any employee in "flight engineer status" at age 60 to continue working in.....
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston - 469 U.S. 111 (1985)
U.S. Supreme Court Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 (1985)
Decided January 8, 1985 *
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) was amended in 1978 to prohibit the mandatory retirement of a protected employee because of his age. Concerned that its retirement policy, at least as it applied to flight engineers, violated the ADEA, petitioner Trans World Airlines (TWA) adopted a plan permitting any employee in "flight engineer status" at age 60 to continue working in that capacity. The plan, however, does not give 60-year-old captains (pilots) the right automatically to begin training as flight engineers. Instead, a captain may remain with the airline only if he has been able to obtain "flight engineer status" through the bidding procedures outlined in the collective bargaining agreement between TWA and petitioner Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA). These procedures require a captain, prior to his 60th birthday, to submit a "standing bid" for the position of flight engineer. When a vacancy occurs, it is assigned to the most senior captain with a standing bid. If no vacancy occurs prior to his 60th birthday, or if he lacks sufficient seniority to bid successfully for those vacancies that do occur, the captain is retired. Under the collective bargaining agreement, a captain displaced for any reason besides age need not resort to the bidding procedure. For example, a captain who is medically disabled or whose position is eliminated due to reduced manpower may displace automatically, or "bump," a less senior flight engineer. Respondent former TWA captains (hereafter respondents) were retired upon reaching age 60. Each was denied an opportunity to "bump" a less senior flight engineer. Two of them were forced to retire before TWA adopted its new plan and thus were denied an opportunity to become flight engineers through the bidding procedures. The third filed a standing bid for the position of flight engineer but no vacancies occurred prior to his 60th birthday, and he too was forced to retire. Respondents filed an action against TWA and ALPA in Federal District Court, claiming that TWA's transfer policy violated § 4(a)(1) of the ADEA -- which proscribes differential treatment of older workers "with respect to . . . [a] privileg[e] of employment" -- because, while it allowed captains displaced for reasons
other than age to "bump" less senior flight engineers, it did not allow the same "privilege of employment" to captains compelled to vacate their positions upon reaching age 60. The District Court entered summary judgment in favor of TWA and ALPA, holding that respondents had failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination under the test set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792 , and that the affirmative defenses provided by § 4(f)(1) -- an employer may take "any action otherwise prohibited" where age is a "bona fide occupational qualification [BFOQ]" -- and § 4(f)(2) -- it is not unlawful for an employer to adopt a "bona fide seniority system" -- of the ADEA justified TWA's transfer policy. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the McDonnell Douglas test was inapposite because respondents had adduced direct proof of age discrimination; that TWA was required by § 4(a)(1) to afford 60-year-old captains the same "privilege of employment," i.e., "bumping" less senior flight engineers, allowed captains disqualified for reasons other than age; that the affirmative defenses of the ADEA did not justify TWA's discriminatory transfer policy; and that TWA was liable for "liquidated" or double damages under § 7(b) of the ADEA, because its violation of the ADEA was "willful" within the meaning of that section.
1. TWA's transfer policy denies 60-year-old captains a "privilege of employment" on the basis of age in violation of § 4(a)(1) of the ADEA. Captains disqualified because of age are not afforded the same "bumping" privilege as captains disqualified for reasons other than age, but instead must resort to the bidding procedures. While the ADEA does not require TWA to grant transfer privileges to disqualified captains, nevertheless, if it does grant some disqualified captains the "privilege" of "bumping" less senior flight engineers, it may not deny the opportunity to others because of their age. The McDonnell Douglas test is inapplicable where the plaintiff presents direct evidence of discrimination. Here, there is direct evidence that the transfer method available to a captain depends on his age. Since it allows captains disqualified for any reason other than age to "bump" less senior flight engineers, TWA's transfer policy is discriminatory on its face. Pp. 469 U. S. 120 -122.
2. The affirmative defenses provided by §§ 4(f)(1) and (2) do not support the argument that TWA's discriminatory transfer policy is justified. The BFOQ defense is meritless because age is not a BFOQ for the position of flight engineer. Nor can TWA's policy be viewed as part of a bona fide seniority system. A system that includes this discriminatory transfer policy permits the forced retirement of captains on the basis of age. Pp. 469 U. S. 122 -125.
3. TWA's violation of the ADEA was not willful within the meaning of § 7(b), and therefore respondents are not entitled to "liquidated" or double damages. A violation is "willful" within the meaning of § 7(b) if the employer knew its conduct was prohibited by the ADEA or showed a "reckless disregard" for whether it was prohibited, but not if the employer simply knew of the potential applicability of the ADEA or that ADEA was "in the picture." The latter broad standard would result in an award of double damages in almost every case. TWA certainly did not "know" that its conduct violated the ADEA. Nor can it fairly be said that the TWA adopted its transfer policy in "reckless disregard" of the ADEA's requirements. The record makes clear that TWA officials acted reasonably and in good faith in attempting to determine whether their policy would violate the ADEA. Pp. 469 U. S. 125 -130.
TWA has approximately 3,000 employees who fill the three cockpit positions on most of its flights. [ Footnote 1 ] The "captain" is the pilot and controls the aircraft. He is responsible for all phases of its operation. The "first officer" is the copilot and assists the captain. The "flight engineer" usually monitors a side-facing instrument panel. He does not operate the flight controls unless the captain and the first officer become incapacitated.
In 1977, TWA and the Airline Pilots Association (ALPA) entered into a collective bargaining agreement, under which every employee in a cockpit position was required to retire when he reached the age of 60. This provision for mandatory retirement was lawful under the ADEA, as part of a "bona fide seniority system." See United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U. S. 192 (1977). On April 6, 1978, however, the Act was amended to prohibit the mandatory retirement of a protected individual because of his age. [ Footnote 2 ] TWA officials
became concerned that the company's retirement policy, at least as it applied to flight engineers, violated the amended ADEA. [ Footnote 3 ]
On July 19, 1978, TWA announced that the amended ADEA prohibited the forced retirement of flight engineers at age 60. The company thus proposed a new policy, under which employees in all three cockpit positions, upon reaching age 60, would be allowed to continue working as flight engineers. TWA stated that it would not implement its new policy until it "had the benefit of [ALPA's] views." [ Footnote 4 ] ALPA's views were not long in coming. The Union contended that the collective bargaining agreement prohibited the employment of a flight engineer after his 60th birthday, and that the proposed change was not required by the recently amended ADEA.
Despite opposition from the Union, TWA adopted a modified version of its proposal. [ Footnote 5 ] Under this plan, any employee in "flight engineer status" at age 60 is entitled to continue
working in that capacity. The new plan, unlike the initial proposal, does not give 60-year-old captains [ Footnote 6 ] the right automatically to begin training as flight engineers. Instead, a captain may remain with the airline only if he has been able to obtain "flight engineer status" through the bidding procedures outlined in the collective bargaining agreement. These procedures require a captain, prior to his 60th birthday, to submit a "standing bid" for the position of flight engineer. When a vacancy occurs, it is assigned to the most senior captain with a standing bid. If no vacancy occurs prior to his 60th birthday, or if he lacks sufficient seniority to bid successfully for those vacancies that do occur, the captain is retired. [ Footnote 7 ]
Under the collective bargaining agreement, a captain displaced for any reason besides age need not resort to the bidding procedures. For example, a captain unable to maintain the requisite first-class medical certificate, see 14 CFR § 67.13 (1984), may displace automatically, or "bump," a less senior flight engineer. [ Footnote 8 ] The medically disabled captain's ability to bump does not depend upon the availability of a vacancy. [ Footnote 9 ] Similarly, a captain whose position is eliminated due to reduced manpower needs can "bump" a less senior
flight engineer. [ Footnote 10 ] Even if a captain is found to be incompetent to serve in that capacity, he is not discharged, [ Footnote 11 ] but is allowed to transfer to a position as flight engineer without resort to the bidding procedures. [ Footnote 12 ]
Thurston, Clark, and Parkhill filed this action against TWA and ALPA in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. They argued that the company's transfer policy violated ADEA § 4(a)(1), 81 Stat. 603,
29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). The airline allowed captains displaced for reasons other than age to "bump" less senior flight engineers. Captains compelled to vacate their positions upon reaching age 60, they claimed, should be afforded this same "privilege of employment." The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission intervened on behalf of 10 other age-disqualified captains who had been discharged as a result of their inability to displace less senior flight engineers. [ Footnote 13 ]
The District Court entered a summary judgment in favor of defendants TWA and ALPA. Air Line Pilots Assn. v. Trans World Air Lines, 547 F.Supp. 1221 (1982). The court held that the plaintiffs had failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination under the test set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792 (1973). None could show that at the time of his transfer request a vacancy existed for the position of flight engineer. See id. at 411 U. S. 802 . Furthermore, the court found that two affirmative defenses justified the company's transfer policy. 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(f)(1) and (f)(2). The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the District Court's judgment. 713 F.2d 940 (1983). It found the McDonnell Douglas formula inapposite because the plaintiffs had adduced direct proof of age discrimination. Captains
disqualified for reasons other than age were allowed to "bump" less senior flight engineers. Therefore, the company was required by ADEA § 4(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1), to afford 60-year-old captains this same "privilege of employment." The Court of Appeals also held that the affirmative defenses of the ADEA did not justify the company's discriminatory transfer policy. [ Footnote 14 ] 713 F.2d at 949-951. TWA was held liable for "liquidated" or double damages because its violation of the ADEA was found to be "willful." According to the court, an employer's conduct is "willful" if it "knows or shows reckless disregard for the matter of whether it conduct is prohibited by the ADEA." Id. at 956. Because "TWA was clearly aware of the 1978 ADEA amendments," the Court of Appeals found the respondents entitled to double damages. Id. at 956-957.
The ADEA "broadly prohibits arbitrary discrimination in the workplace based on age." Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S. 575 , 434 U. S. 577 (1978). Section 4(a)(1) of the Act proscribes differential treatment of older workers "with respect to . . . [a] privileg[e] of employment." 29 U.S.C. § 623(a). Under TWA's transfer policy, 60-year-old captains are denied a "privilege of employment" on the basis of age. Captains who become disqualified from serving in that position for reasons other than age automatically are able to displace less senior flight engineers. Captains disqualified because of age are not afforded this same "bumping" privilege. Instead, they are forced to resort to the bidding procedures set forth in the collective bargaining agreement. If there is no vacancy prior to a bidding captain's 60th birthday, he must retire. [ Footnote 15 ]
The Act does not require TWA to grant transfer privileges to disqualified captains. Nevertheless, if TWA does grant
Id. at 467 U. S. 75 . This interpretation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq., applies with equal force in the context of age discrimination, for the substantive provisions of the ADEA "were derived in haec verba from Title VII." Lorillard v. Pons, supra, at 434 U. S. 584 . [ Footnote 16 ]
TWA contends that the respondents failed to make out a prima facie case of age discrimination under McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U. S. 792 (1973), because at the time they were retired, no flight engineer vacancies existed. This argument fails, for the McDonnell Douglas test is inapplicable where the plaintiff presents direct evidence of discrimination. See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324 , 431 U. S. 358 , n. 44 (1977). The shifting burdens of proof set forth in McDonnell Douglas are designed to assure that the "plaintiff [has] his day in court despite the unavailability of direct evidence." Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1014 (CA1 1979). In this case there is direct evidence that the method of transfer available to a disqualified captain depends upon his age. Since it allows captains who become disqualified for any reason other than age to "bump" less senior flight engineers, TWA's transfer policy is discriminatory on its face. Cf. Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U. S. 702 (1978) (employer's policy requiring
TWA's discriminatory transfer policy is not permissible under § 4(f)(1) because age is not a BFOQ for the "particular" position of flight engineer. It is necessary to recognize that the airline has two age-based policies: (i) captains are not allowed to serve in that capacity after reaching the age of 60; and (ii) age-disqualified captains are not given the transfer privileges afforded captains disqualified for other reasons.
The first policy, which precludes individuals from serving as captains, is not challenged by respondents. [ Footnote 17 ] The second practice does not operate to exclude protected individuals from the position of captain; rather it prevents qualified 60-year-olds from working as flight engineers. Thus, it is the "particular" job of flight engineer from which the respondents were excluded by the discriminatory transfer policy. Because age under 60 is not a BFOQ for the position of flight engineer, [ Footnote 18 ] the age-based discrimination at issue in this case cannot be justified by § 4(f)(1).
TWA nevertheless contends that its BFOQ argument is supported by the legislative history of the amendments to the ADEA. In 1978, Congress amended ADEA § 4(f)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2), to prohibit the involuntary retirement of protected individuals on the basis of age. Some Members of Congress were concerned that this amendment might be construed as limiting the employer's ability to terminate workers subject to a valid BFOQ. The Senate proposed an amendment to § 4(f)(1) providing that an employer could establish a mandatory retirement age where age is a BFOQ. S.Rep. No. 95-493, pp. 11, 24 (1977). In the Conference Committee, however, the proposed amendment was withdrawn because "the [Senate] conferees agreed that . . . [it] neither added to nor worked any change upon present law." H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 95-950, p. 7 (1978). The House Committee Report also indicated that an individual could be compelled to retire from a position for which age was a BFOQ. H.R.Rep. No. 95-527, pt. 1, p. 12 (1977).
In summary, TWA's transfer policy discriminates against protected individuals on the basis of age, and thereby violates the Act. The two statutory defenses raised by petitioners do not support the argument that this discrimination is justified. The BFOQ defense is meritless because age is not a bona fide occupational qualification for the position of flight engineer, the job from which the respondents were excluded. Nor can TWA's policy be viewed as part of a bona
Section 7(b) of the ADEA, 81 Stat. 604, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b), provides that the rights created by the Act are to be "enforced in accordance with the powers, remedies, and procedures" of the Fair Labor Standards Act. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. at 434 U. S. 579 . But the remedial provisions of the two statutes are not identical. Congress declined to incorporate into the ADEA several FLSA sections. Moreover, § 16(b) of the FLSA, which makes the award of liquidated damages mandatory, is significantly qualified in ADEA § 7(b) by a proviso that a prevailing plaintiff is entitled to double damages "only in cases of willful violations." 29 U.S.C. § 626(b). In this case, the Court of Appeals held that TWA's violation of the ADEA was "willful," and that the respondents therefore were entitled to double damages. 713 F.2d at 957. We granted certiorari to review this holding.
The legislative history of the ADEA indicates that Congress intended for liquidated damages to be punitive in nature. The original bill proposed by the administration incorporated § 16(a) of the FLSA, which imposes criminal liability for a willful violation. See 113 Cong.Rec. 2199 (1967). Senator Javits found "certain serious defects" in the administration bill. He stated that "difficult problems of proof . . . would arise under a criminal provision," and that the employer's invocation of the Fifth Amendment might impede investigation, conciliation, and enforcement. Id. at 7076. Therefore, he proposed that "the [FLSA's] criminal penalty in cases of willful violation . . . [be] eliminated and a double damage liability substituted." Ibid. Senator Javits argued that his proposed amendment would "furnish an effective deterrent to willful violations [of the ADEA]," ibid.,
This Court has recognized that in enacting the ADEA, "Congress exhibited . . . a detailed knowledge of the FLSA provisions and their judicial interpretation. . . . " Lorillard v. Pons, supra, at 434 U. S. 581 . The manner in which FLSA § 16(a) has been interpreted therefore is relevant. In general, courts have found that an employer is subject to criminal penalties under the FLSA when he
Nabob Oil Co. v. United States, 190 F.2d 478, 479 (CA10), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 876 (1951); see also Darby v. United States, 132 F.2d 928 (CA5 1943). [ Footnote 19 ] This standard is substantially in accord with the interpretation of "willful" adopted by the Court of Appeals in interpreting the liquidated damages provision of the ADEA. The court below stated that a violation of the Act was "willful" if "the employer . . . knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by the ADEA." 713 F.2d at 956. Given the legislative history of the liquidated damages provision, we think the "reckless disregard" standard is reasonable.
The definition of "willful" adopted by the above cited courts is consistent with the manner in which this Court has interpreted the term in other criminal and civil statutes. In United States v. Murdock, 290 U. S. 389 (1933), the defendant was prosecuted under the Revenue Acts of 1926 and 1928, which made it a misdemeanor for a person "willfully" to
fail to pay the required tax. The Murdock Court stated that conduct was "willful" within the meaning of this criminal statute if it was "marked by careless disregard [for] whether or not one has the right so to act." Id. at 290 U. S. 395 . In United States v. Illinois Central R. Co., 303 U. S. 239 (1938), the Court applied the Murdock definition of "willful" in a civil case. There, the defendant's failure to unload a cattle car was "willful," because it showed a disregard for the governing statute and an indifference to its requirements. 303 U.S. at 303 U. S. 242 -243. [ Footnote 20 ]
We are unpersuaded by respondents' argument that a violation of the Act is "willful" if the employer simply knew of the potential applicability of the ADEA. Even if the "in
the picture" standard were appropriate for the statute of limitations, the same standard should not govern a provision dealing with liquidated damages. [ Footnote 21 ] More importantly, the broad standard proposed by the respondents would result in an award of double damages in almost every case. As employers are required to post ADEA notices, it would be virtually impossible for an employer to show that he was unaware of the Act and its potential applicability. Both the legislative history and the structure of the statute show that Congress intended a two-tiered liability scheme. We decline to interpret the liquidated damages provision of ADEA § 7(b) in a manner that frustrates this intent. [ Footnote 22 ]
As noted above, the Court of Appeals stated that a violation is "willful" if "the employer either knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by the ADEA." 713 F.2d at 956. Although we
There simply is no evidence that TWA acted in "reckless disregard" of the requirements of the ADEA. The airline had obligations under the collective bargaining agreement with the Airline Pilots Association. In an attempt to bring its retirement policy into compliance with the ADEA, while at the same time observing the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, TWA sought legal advice and consulted with the Union. Despite opposition from the Union, a plan was adopted that permitted cockpit employees to work as "flight engineers" after reaching age 60. Apparently TWA officials and the airline's attorneys failed to focus specifically on the effect of each aspect of the new retirement policy for cockpit personnel. It is reasonable to believe that the parties involved, in focusing on the larger overall problem, simply overlooked the challenged aspect of the new plan. [ Footnote 23 ] We conclude that TWA's violation of the Act was not willful within the meaning of § 7(b), and that respondents therefore are not entitled to liquidated damages.
The Court of Appeals also found that ALPA had violated ADEA § 4(c), 29 U.S.C. § 623(c), which prohibits unions from causing or attempting to cause an employer to engage in unlawful discrimination. The court found, however, that ALPA was not liable for damages. It held that the ADEA does not permit the recovery of monetary damages, including backpay, against a labor organization. It noted that the ADEA incorporates the remedial scheme of the Fair Labor Standards Act, which does not allow actions against unions to recover damages. 713 F.2d at 957.
Both the individual respondents and the EEOC argue that the issue of union liability is properly before the Court. But the respondents failed to file a cross-petition raising this question. A prevailing party may advance any ground in support of a judgment in his favor. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 , 397 U. S. 475 , n. 6 (1970). An argument that would modify the judgment, however, cannot be presented unless a cross-petition has been filed. FEA v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 126 U. S. 548 , 126 U. S. 560 , n. 11 (1976). In this case, the judgment of the Court of Appeals would be modified by the arguments advanced by the EEOC and the individual plaintiffs, as they are contending that the Union should be liable to them for monetary damages.
The Court interpreted the FLSA, as originally enacted, as allowing the recovery of liquidated damages any time that there was a violation of the Act. See Overnight Motor Transportation Co. v. Missel, 316 U. S. 572 (1942). In response to its dissatisfaction with that harsh interpretation of the provision, Congress enacted the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S. 575 , 434 U. S. 581 -582, n. 8 (1978). Section 11 of the PPA, 29 U.S.C. § 260, provides the employer with a defense to a mandatory award of liquidated damages when it can show good faith and reasonable grounds for believing it was not in violation of the FLSA. Section 7(b) of the ADEA does not incorporate § 11 of the PPA, contra, Hays v. Republic Steel Corp., 531 F.2d 1307 (CA5 1976). Nevertheless, we think that the same concerns are reflected in the proviso to § 7(b) of the ADEA.
713 F.2d at 957.