Source: http://openjurist.org/552/f2d/596/williams-v-phil-rich-fan-manufacturing-co-inc
Timestamp: 2017-01-23 10:58:56
Document Index: 710702057

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1981', '§ 1292', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 2000', '§ 4', '§ 2000']

552 F2d 596 Williams v. Phil Rich Fan Manufacturing Co Inc | OpenJurist
552 F. 2d 596 - Williams v. Phil Rich Fan Manufacturing Co Inc HomeFederal Reporter, Second Series 552 F.2d.
552 F2d 596 Williams v. Phil Rich Fan Manufacturing Co Inc 552 F.2d 596
14 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1601, 14 Empl. Prac.Dec. P 7562Helen WILLIAMS, Individually and on behalf of all otherssimilarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees,v.PHIL RICH FAN MANUFACTURING CO., INC., Defendant-Appellant.
No. 76-2959.
On this appeal we deal with a single narrow issue: whether the no-tolling rule of Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 95 S.Ct. 1716, 44 L.Ed.2d 295 (1975), as to actions arising under Title 42, U.S.C. § 1981, by reason of the filing of a Title VII complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), applies retroactively to cases pending at the time of that decision. We permitted an appeal under Title 28, U.S.C. § 1292(b) from the district court's denial of summary judgment in order to consider the question. We hold that the no-tolling rule applies retroactively and reverse the district court.
The question of the retroactivity of Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., supra, has been addressed in various other federal courts outside the Fifth Circuit and a majority of those courts have applied Johnson retroactively. See, e. g., Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257 (4 Cir. 1976); Greene v. Carter Carburetor Co., 532 F.2d 125 (8 Cir. 1976); Flores v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 12 FEP 149 (S.D.N.Y.1976). But the Fifth Circuit is in a different position from courts in our sister circuits because of our prior decisions. We have held6 that the running of the statute of limitations against a plaintiff's § 1981 claim is tolled during the pendency of administrative action of the EEOC on a related Title VII claim. See Boudreaux v. Baton Rouge Marine Contracting Co., 437 F.2d 1011 (5 Cir. 1971); Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 495 F.2d 398 (5 Cir. 1974); Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp., 498 F.2d 641 (5 Cir. 1974). For this reason plaintiffs in this circuit were led to expect a tolling of the statute, which was not the case in those courts where the prior rulings were contra. We view the distinction as requiring that we analyze the position.
In Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 92 S.Ct. 349, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971), the Supreme Court summarized the criteria to be considered in determining whether a judicial decision should be given retroactive application. In Chevron Oil, the Court stated:In our cases dealing with the nonretroactivity question, we have generally considered three separate factors. First, the decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied, see e. g., Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., supra, 392 U.S. (481), at 496, 88 S.Ct. (2224), at 2233 (20 L.Ed.2d 1231), or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed, see, e. g., Allen v. State Board of Elections, supra, 393 U.S. (544), at 572, 89 S.Ct. (817), at 835 (, 22 L.Ed.2d 1). Second, it has been stressed that "we must * * * weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation." Linkletter v. Walker, supra, 381 U.S. (618), at 629, 85 S.Ct. (1731), at 1738 (14 L.Ed.2d 601). Finally, we have weighed the inequity imposed by retroactive application, for "(w)here a decision of this Court could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding the 'injustice or hardship' by a holding of nonretroactivity." Cipriano v. City of Houma, supra, 395 U.S. (701), at 706, 89 S.Ct. (1897), at 1900 (23 L.Ed.2d 647).
Id. at 106-107, 92 S.Ct. at 355, 30 L.Ed.2d at 306. As for the first criterion, Johnson overrules past precedent, at least in this circuit. Starting with Boudreaux, supra, we have followed the rule that a filing of a complaint with the EEOC tolled the running of the applicable statute of limitations as to the § 1981 action. In Guerra, supra, this Court was presented with an untimely EEOC filing but one which was accepted by the EEOC:
421 U.S. at 465-466, 95 S.Ct. at 1722, 44 L.Ed.2d at 304-305.
Within ninety days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred as required by U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) prior to the 1972 amendment changing the period to one hundred eighty days. Pub.L. 92-261, § 4, Mar. 24, 1972, 86 Stat. 104. The plaintiff conceded below that the Title VII claim should be dismissed for lack of timeliness
The trial court noted and relied upon Bush v. Wood Bros. Transfer, Inc., 398 F.Supp. 1030, (S.D.Texas, 1975), in which case Judge Seals ruled that Johnson should not be given retroactive effect
After the trial court's denial, on October 6, 1976, of a Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment citing our holding in Dupree v. Hutchins Bros., 521 F.2d 236 (5 Cir. 1975), discussed in the text infra, and also pointing out that following Dupree, in Fair v. General Food Corporation, Civil Action No. 74-H-1694 (S.D.Tex.1975), Judge Seals reversed the stand he had taken in Bush v. Wood Bros. Transfer, Inc. (n. 4 supra ) and applied Johnson retroactively. The trial court's May 6, 1976 Order adhered to its earlier decision on retroactivity and held that Dupree did not override its holding, stating:
It was also the district where all and each of the Title VII venue conditions, Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) were met.
Johnson, supra, 421 U.S. at 467, 95 S.Ct. at 1723, 44 L.Ed.2d at 305, n. 4.