Source: https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/_layouts/ntsb.recsearch/Recommendation.aspx?Rec=A-95-029
Timestamp: 2019-12-13 15:11:40
Document Index: 355990385

Matched Legal Cases: ['ARTS 121', 'ARTS 121', 'arts 121', 'arts 121', 'arts 23', 'art 135']

Safety Recommendation A-95-029
Synopsis: ON 9/8/94, A USAIR BOEING 737-300, FLIGHT 427, WAS ON A SCHEDULED PASSENGER FLIGHT FROM CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, TO PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA. DURING THE APPROACH TO LANDING, THE AIRPLANE SUDDENLY ROLLED TO THE LEFT & PITCHED NOSE DOWN UNTIL IT REACHED A NEARLY VERTICAL ATTITUDE & STRUCK THE GROUND NEAR ALIQUIPPA, PENNSYLVANIA. THE AIRPLANE WAS DESTROYED: THE 5 CREWMEMBERS & 127 PASSENGERS WERE FATALLY INJURED. THE BOARD'S INVESTIGATION OF THIS ACCIDENT IS CONTINUING, & THE PROBABLE CAUSES HAVE NOT BEEN DETERMINED. AND OTHERS, ON 3/3/91, A UNITED AIRLINES BOEING 737-291, FLIGHT 585, WAS ON A SCHEDULED PASSENGER FLIGHT FROM DENVER TO COLORADO SPRINGS, COLORADO. ON 10/7/1993, A BRITISH AIRWAYS BOEING 747-436 EXPERIENCED A NOSE-DOWN PITCHING MOMENT IMMEDIATELY AFTER DEPARTURE FROM LONDON HEATHROW AIRPORT.
Recommendation: THE NTSB RECOMMENDS THAT THE MANUFACTURERS OF AIRPLANES OPERATED UNDER PARTS 121, 125, OR 135: ESTABLISH, FOR ALL NEWLY MANUFACTURED AIRPLANES THAT WILL BE OPERATED UNDER 14 CFR PARTS 121, 125, OR 135 (10 SEATS OR LARGER), A MINIMUM STANDARD FOR RECORDING FLIGHT DATA RECORDER PARMETERS IN ACCORDANCE WITH "PROPOSED FDR ENHANCEMENTS FOR NEWLY MANUFACTURED AIRPLANES."
Issue Date: 3/9/1995
Date Closed: 1/23/2002
Addressee(s) and Addressee Status: ATR (Avions de Transport Regional) (Closed--No Longer Applicable)
Beechcraft (formerly Hawker Beechcraft) (Closed--No Longer Applicable)
Boeing Company (Closed--No Longer Applicable)
Bombardier, Inc. (Closed--No Longer Applicable)
British Aerospace (BAE Systems) (Closed--No Longer Applicable)
Cessna Aircraft Company (Closed--No Longer Applicable)
Construcciones Aeronauticas SA (CASA) (Closed--No Longer Applicable)
Dassault Aviation (Closed--No Longer Applicable)
Deutsche Aerospace AG (Closed--No Longer Applicable)
Embraer (Empressa Brasileira de Aeronautica, S.A.) (Closed--No Longer Applicable)
European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company (Closed--No Longer Applicable)
Fairchild Dornier Aircraft (Closed--No Longer Applicable)
Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation (Closed--No Longer Applicable)
Israel Aircraft Industries Ltd. (Closed--No Longer Applicable)
Jetstream Aircraft Ltd. (Closed--No Longer Applicable)
Lockheed Martin (Closed--No Longer Applicable)
McDonnell Douglas Corporation (Closed--No Longer Applicable)
Saab Automobile AB (Closed--No Longer Applicable)
To: McDonnell Douglas Corporation
From: McDonnell Douglas Corporation
Date: 4/10/1995
To: Saab Automobile AB
Response: The Safety Board is aware that since this recommendation was issued, the Federal Aviation Administration has revised Title 14 CFR Parts 121.344 and 121.344a to require, after August 19, 2002, all newly manufactured transport category aircraft to have FDR systems that meet this recommendation, and major manufacturers are now producing airplanes that meet or exceed this requirement. As a result of these regulations, the need for this recommendation has been overcome by events. Consequently, Safety Recommendation A-95-29 is now classified "Closed--No Longer Applicable."
To: Cessna Aircraft Company
To: Construcciones Aeronauticas SA (CASA)
To: Jetstream Aircraft Ltd.
To: Beechcraft (formerly Hawker Beechcraft)
To: Dassault Aviation
To: European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company
To: ATR (Avions de Transport Regional)
From: ATR (Avions de Transport Regional)
Date: 3/28/1995
To: Israel Aircraft Industries Ltd.
To: Embraer (Empressa Brasileira de Aeronautica, S.A.)
To: Deutsche Aerospace AG
To: Lockheed Martin
To: Fairchild Dornier Aircraft
Response: Thank you for the February 27, 2002, letter from Mr. Jack Morgan, Vice President, Aviation Safety and Airworthiness. Mr. Morgan's letter was responding to a January 23, 2002, letter from the National Transportation Safety Board classifying Safety Recommendation A-95-29 "Closed-No Longer Applicable." This recommendation, issued to Fairchild Aircraft on March 9, 1995, concerned minimum standards for flight data recorders (FDRs). In our January letter, the Safety Board noted that since this recommendation had been issued, the Federal Aviation Administration had revised Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Parts 121.344 and 121.344a to require, after August 19, 2002, all newly manufactured transport category aircraft to have FDR systems that meet this recommendation, and major manufacturers are now producing airplanes that meet or exceed this requirement. Consequently, the status of "Closed-No Longer Applicable" was assigned. Mr. Morgan noted in his letter that, contrary to the statement in the Safety Board's January 23, 2002, letter that we had not received any correspondence from Fairchild regarding this recommendation, Mr. Carl Albert, former President, Chairman, and Chief Executive Officer, of Fairchild Aircraft, had replied to the Safety Board on March 30, 1995. Mr. Morgan further noted that Mr. James Hall, former Chairman of the Safety Board, had responded to Mr. Albert on June 23, 1995. Mr. Morgan supplied copies of these letters. The Safety Board apologizes for having overlooked this correspondence and appreciates Mr. Morgan bringing this to our attention. Thank you for Fairchild Dornier's prompt response and for your commitment to transportation safety.
From: Fairchild Dornier Aircraft
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 03/15/2002 8:25:00 AM MC# 2020290. I believe that there must have been an error in the NTSB process for reviewing responses to Safety Recommendations. Fairchild Aircraft Incorporated did respond to NTSB Safety Recommendation A-95-29, in the form of a three-page comment letter, dated March 30, 1995, from Mr. Carl A. Albert, Chairman, Chief Executive Officer and President. In addition, Mr. Albert received a response tohis comment letter from Mr. Jim Hall, Chairman of the NTSB, dated June 23, 1995. Copies of both letters are attached for your convenience. Just for your information, Fairchild Dornier did not exist in 1995; therefore they could not have provided a response to the above referenced NTSB Safety Recommendation.
Response: The FAA has indicated that it agrees with the intent of the Board's recommendations and will work with the Board, manufacturers, and operators to develop the most aggressive possible FDR upgrade schedule. Your comments and concerns, including concerns relating to the costs of weight penalty and inspections and maintenance will be useful to the FAA during the development of this schedule. Further, the FAA has urged industry not to wait for an FAA mandate and to start working immediately to meet the intent of the Board's recommendations.
Date: 3/30/1995
Response: Currently, the FDR installed in the Metro 23 (Fairchild's current production SA227 aircraft) is a Loral Data Systems, model number F1000 S703-1000-000, Digital Flight Data Recorder, with the capability of recording twenty-one parameters. The Loral F1000 FDR records the parameters required by Title 14 of the CFR Parts 23.1459, 91.609, and 135.152. It does not meet the proposed requirements set forth in Attachment A or B of the Recommendation. After reviewing all available information related to the recommendation including recent accident reports of part 135 operators, Fairchild has determined that safety benefits derived from the implementation of the recommendation could not be identified and that significant economic detriment would be caused. In addition, compliance with the NTSB's proposed number of parameters would require the addition of a Flight Data Acquisition Unit with significant economic impact.
To: British Aerospace (BAE Systems)