Source: https://nclej.org/chapter-6-7
Timestamp: 2020-07-09 09:36:39
Document Index: 800097837

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1291', '§ 1407', '§ 1291', '§ 1292', '§ 1292', '§ 1913', '§ 1254']

6.7 Appellate Practice - National Center for Law and Economic Justice
The basic rule is that “[t]he courts of appeals . . . shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts ….”3 The Supreme Court interprets this “to mean that an appeal ordinarily will not lie until after final judgment has been entered in a case.”4 This final judgment rule provides that “a decision is not final, ordinarily, unless it ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.”5 In practice, whether a judgment is indeed final is not always intuitive and should be researched. For example, the Supreme Court has ruled that a judgment is final even though a request for attorney fees is still pending.6 When a matter remains pending despite the entry of a judgment, research the finality issue carefully and quickly.
In the vast majority of cases, the appellant did not prevail below and has standing to challenge that adverse decision. However, the Supreme Court has concluded that prevailing parties may, under certain circumstances, possess the “personal stake” needed for Article III standing to appeal.7 In Camreta v. Greene, the Supreme Court recently held that a state social worker had standing to challenge a lower court decision that his interviewing a minor without a warrant, exigent circumstance or parental consent violated the Constitution, but they were immune because the law was insufficiently clear to put them on notice of the illegality of their conduct.8 The constitutional decision, if unchallenged, would require the social workers in the future either to modify their practice or to risk liability, thereby establishing a prospective stake in the outcome of the appeal.
After the notice of appeal and the docketing fee are received by the clerk of the court of appeals, the clerk usually issues a standard order directing the parties to take certain actions within set time frames. Without an order stating otherwise, however, counsel for the appellant will have fourteen days to order a transcript of relevant court proceedings from the court reporter (or to certify that no transcript will be ordered).43 The details of how to proceed from that point on are either in an order issued from the court of appeals’ clerk’s office, or in the local circuit rules that supplement the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and that describe the somewhat different procedures between the circuits. Although Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 31(a)(1) sets out the timing of the filing of the briefs, the court clerks usually issue orders establishing the briefing schedule. In an effort to avoid the oft-endless round of requests for extensions, the Second Circuit has implemented a novel procedure whereby the appellant and the appellee each choose the date for filing their briefs within a 91-day window,44 but the court has made clear that, under that system, extensions will only rarely be granted and the appellant’s failure to file on time may well result in dismissal of the appeal.45 Furthermore, while the federal rules set out the standards for determining whether oral argument will be held,46 the appellate courts take different practical approaches to the issue. The First Circuit suggests that counsel include a statement in the brief regarding their position on the need for oral argument,47 while the Second Circuit, which presumes that there will be oral argument, notifies counsel if it tentatively decides not to hold oral argument and provides an opportunity to explain why it should be held.48
To obtain a stay or injunction pending appeal, a party must normally first move for that relief in the district court, but, when that is “impracticable,” the motion may be made originally in the court of appeals.50 The Supreme Court has recently held that that the standard is the same as for a preliminary injunction, and and noted that the “first two factors of the traditional standard are the most critical.”51 Opposing a stay (in either court) can make the difference between immediate relief for the plaintiffs and a one- to two-year wait while the appeal winds its way through the system and the lower court proceeds to the merits. If the stay is granted, however, consideration should be given to moving for an expedited appeal, which would speed up the appellate process, at least through the point of oral argument. Similarly, although obtaining an injunction pending appeal is particularly difficult, combining it with a motion for an expedited appeal is probably a good tactic because the court may be willing to take that action in lieu of the more extreme one of issuing an injunction pending appeal.52
2.See, e.g., In re O’Brien, 312 F.3d 1135, 1137 (9th Cir. 2002) (dismissal of appeal because brief and excerpts of record failed to comply with federal and circuit rules).
3.28 U.S.C. § 1291.
4.Cunningham v. Hamilton County, Ohio, 527 U.S. 198, 203 (1999) (citations omitted).
5.Id. at 204 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
6.Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co.,486 U.S. 196, 199-202 (1988).
7.Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2028-30 (2011).
8.Id. at 2031-32.
9.Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 742-43 (1976).
10.In Gelboim v. Bank of America Corporation, 135 S. Ct. 897 (2015), the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff whose case has been consolidated for multidistrict litigation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 may appeal the dismissal of the case under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 within 30 days rather than waiting until the completion of the multidistrict litigation consolidation.
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).
12.See, e.g., Gardner v. Westinghouse Broad. Co., 437 U.S. 478, 480 (1978).
13.28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
15.Swint v. Chambers County Comm’r, 514 U.S. 35, 47 (1995).
16.Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f).
17.See In re Delta Air Lines, 310 F.3d 953, 959 (6th Cir. 2002) (reviewing and summarizing decisions from several other circuits on the appropriate standard), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 904 (2003); In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 289 F. 3d 98, 102-04 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (same).
18.Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f).
19.Swint, 514 U.S. at 42. See also Mohawk Industries v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100 (2009) (orders to disclose documents asserted to be protected by the attorney-client privilege do not qualify for immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine);Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225 (2007) (order denying Westfall Act certification and substitution); Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345 (2006) (Federal Tort Claims Act’s judgment bar); Cunningham v. Hamilton Co., 527 U.S. 198 (1999) (sanctions against attorney for failing to comply with discovery order); Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 878-79 (1994) (refusal to enforce settlement agreement); Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 143-44 (1993) (Eleventh Amendment immunity); Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 530-31 (1988) (forum non conveniens dismissal); Richardson-Merrill Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424 (1985) (attorney disqualification).
20.Fed. R. App. P. 38. See, e.g., Ingle v. Circuit City, 408 F.3d 592, 595-96 (9th Cir. 2005).
21.While most appellate courts regularly invite judges from other appellate courts and from the district courts to sit by designation on their panels, the D.C. Circuit currently uses only its own appeals court judges. This kind of information can be useful in gauging the odds of a sympathetic panel.
22.A good source of information about federal appellate judges is the Almanac of the Federal Judiciary (published by Aspen), a two-volume looseleaf volume updated at least twice a year; it has basic biographical information and anonymous evaluations by lawyers of judges’ perceived strengths, weaknesses, and political predispositions. Volume 2 describes the appellate judges.
23.Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1). Form 1 attached to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure is a “Notice of Appeal to a Court of Appeals from a Judgment or Order of a District Court.” See Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(5).
24.Id. 3(c)(1)(A).
25.Under the prior version of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c)(1), the Supreme Court held that naming one plaintiff as an appellant, followed by “et al.,” was not sufficient to designate the unspecified plaintiffs as appellants. Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 317-18 (1988). The rule was then liberalized to eliminate this trap for the unwary. See, e.g., Garcia v. Walsh, 20 F.3d 608, 609 (5th Cir. 1994).
26.Fed. R. App. P. 3(a)(1), (d)(1), (e). As a matter of courtesy, however, appellants’ counsel also should serve the notice of appeal on the other parties. See, e.g., Handbook of Practice and Internal Procedures § III.B.I. at 13 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 1, 2009) [hereinafter D.C. Circuit Handbook].
27.See, e.g., Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007) (courts cannot make equitable exceptions); Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58-59 (1982); see also Fed. R. App. P. 3(a)(2) .
28.Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A).
30.Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B). The rules regarding judgments are almost metaphysical. According to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(7), a judgment is considered to be “entered” when there has been compliance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 58, which requires the judgment to be “set forth on a separate document.” Only then is the judgment “effective.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 58; see Shalala v. Schaeffer, 509 U.S. 292, 302-03 (1993). Adding to the complexity is that the real date on which the judgment is considered entered is “the date of entry of a civil judgment on the clerk’s docket,” which may not be shown on the docket sheet. Houston v. Greiner, 174 F.3d 287, 289 (2d Cir. 1999). Using the date file-stamped on the judgment as beginning the time to appeal is the safest approach.
31.Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(2).
32. Id. 4(a)(4)(B)(i).
33.Id. 4(a)(3).
34.Id. 4(a)(5)(A).
35.See, e.g., Allied Steel v. City of Abilene, 909 F.2d 139, 142 (5th Cir. 1990).
38.See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1913 (note), 1917; U.S. Courts, Court of Appeals Miscellaneous Fee Schedule (Dec. 1, 2013).
39.Id. 24(a)(1). The necessary information for the accompanying declaration appears in Form 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. See id. 24(a)(1)(A).
40.Id. 24(a)(2).
41.Id. 24(a)(5).
42.Id. 24(a)(3).
43.Id. 10(b)(1).
44.Second Circuit Local Rule 31.2(a)(1).
45.See RLI Insurance Company v. JDJ Marine, Incorporated, 716 F.3d 41, 43-44 (2d Cir. 2013).
46.The panel of three judges must unanimously agree that the appeal is frivolous, that the dispositive issues “have been authoritatively decided,” or that the facts and arguments have been presented such that “the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument.” Id. 34(a)(2).
47.First Circuit Local Rule 34(a).
48.Second Circuit Local Rule 34(d)(1).
49.Note, however, that the rules now generally require briefs to be in at least 14-point type. Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(5)(A). Also, since the limit for a principal brief is only 30 pages, it will invariably be preferable to employ the alternative method of counting the words (up to 14,000 for a principal brief) and certifying compliance with that limit. Id. 32(a)(7)(B)(i),(C). Practitioners should also check the local rules.
50.Id. 8(a)(1), (2). The rule is somewhat illogical in requiring the appellant first to seek emergency relief pending appeal in the district court. If the district court grants a stay, it is effectively contradicting the rationale of its own previous decision to issue an injunction. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. DeBuono, 175 F.3d 227, 235 (2d Cir. 1999) (in reversing preliminary injunction which had been stayed by the district court, court of appeals states that “grant of a stay of a preliminary injunction pending appeal will almost always be logically inconsistent with a prior finding of irreparable harm”). The request for an injunction pending appeal from the district court is also almost certainly an exercise in futility because of that court’s denial of the request for an injunction on the merits. Nevertheless the effort should be made in order to satisfy the terms of the rule.
51.Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009). The Court also made it clear that satisfaction of these first two factors, the likelihood of success and irreparable harm, requires more than just a better than negligible chance of success and more than just the possibility of irreparable harm. Id.; see also, e.g., Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987) (listing the four factors for a stay pending appeal). Rule 8(a)(1), Circuit Rules of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (standard for both a stay and an injunction pending appeal).
52.In some instances the statute under which a case is brought specifies the circumstances in which the appeal may be expedited. See, e.g., D.C. Circuit Rule 47.2(a). Otherwise, the standard often is the traditional “good cause”; see, e.g., Rule 27-12, Circuit Rules of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Rule 27.5, Circuit Rules of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, may be more demanding, such as in requiring “irreparable injury” and in that the decision under review be “subject to substantial challenge.” D.C. Circuit Handbook, supra note 423, § VIII.B, at 33.
53.The Fourth Circuit, for instance, discourages motions for summary disposition and considers them only after briefing is completed. Rule 27(f), Circuit Rules of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. But see, e.g., D.C. Circuit Rule 27(g)(1) (requiring the motion to be filed within forty-five days of docketing); D.C. Circuit Handbook, supra note 423, § VIII.I at 36 (“Parties are encouraged to file such motions where a sound basis exists for summary disposition.”); see also, e.g., Rule 27.4, Third Circuit Local Appellate Rules (must “alleg[e] that no substantial question is presented”).
54.See, e.g., Taxpayers Watchdog Inc. v. Stanley, 819 F.2d 294, 297 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
55.See, e.g., Indianapolis Power & Light Co. v. Surface Transp. Bd., No. 02-1056, 2002 WL 1349542 (D.C. Cir. June 19, 2002).
56.Fed. R. App. P. 40(a)(2).
57.See, e.g., Second Circuit Local Rule 40.1(d).
58.Fed. R. App. P. 40(a)(4).
59.Id. 35(a). Although extremely rare, a hearing en banc may also be requested before the appeal to the panel is heard. Id. 35(c).
60.Id. 35(a).
61.Indeed, a vote will not even be taken unless at least one judge calls for it. Id. 35(f). If rehearing en banc is granted, the appeal will be heard by the entire circuit court, except in the Ninth Circuit, which employs a limited en banc court of eleven judges (with a full en banc at least theoretically possible). Ninth Circuit Rule 35-3.
62.Fed. R. App. P. 40(a)(1), 35(c).
63.Id. 35(b)(2), (3), 40(b).
64.Id. 35(e), 40(a)(3).
65.28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
66.Sup. Ct. R. 13.1, 13.3.
67.Id., Rule 15.1, 15.3.
68.Id., Rule 15.4.