Source: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_cha_chapter1_rule6_sectionb
Timestamp: 2019-10-23 14:40:09
Document Index: 621313401

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 137', '§ 305', '§ 638', '§ 643', '§ 29', '§ 513', '§ 50', '§ 136', '§ 113', '§ 1922', '§ 115', '§ 109', '§ 282', '§ 285', '§ 626', '§ 91', '§ 90', '§ 304', '§ 148', '§ 50', '§ 115', '§ 31', '§ 117', '§ 116', '§ 119', '§ 144', '§ 258', '§ 82', '§ 53']

Article 50(3) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I provides: “The presence within the civilian population of individuals who do not come within the definition of civilians does not deprive the population of its civilian character.”
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Geneva, 8 June 1977, Article 50(3). Article 50 was adopted by consensus. CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VI, CDDH/SR.41, 26 May 1977, p. 161.
Article 25(3) of the draft Additional Protocol II submitted by the ICRC to the CDDH provided: “The presence, within the civilian population, of individuals who do not fall within the definition of civilians does not deprive the population of its civilian character.”
This draft provision was adopted by consensus in Committee III of the CDDH.
Paragraph 6 of the 1991 Memorandum of Understanding on the Application of IHL between Croatia and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia requires that hostilities be conducted in accordance with Article 50(3) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I.
Paragraph 2.5 of the 1992 Agreement on the Application of IHL between the Parties to the Conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina requires that hostilities be conducted in accordance with Article 50(3) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I.
Argentina’s Law of War Manual (1989) states: “The presence within the civilian population of individuals who do not come within the definition of civilians does not deprive the population of its civilian character.”
Kenya’s LOAC Manual (1997) states: “The presence within the civilian population of individual combatants does not deprive the population of its civilian character and of the protection accorded to it.”
Sierra Leone’s Instructor Manual (2007) states: “The presence within the civilian population of individuals who do not come within the definition of civilians does not deprive the population of its non-combatant character.”
Spain’s LOAC Manual (1996) states: “The civilian population does not lose its civilian character by the fact that persons who are not civilians are present among the civilian population.”
Spain’s LOAC Manual (2007) states: “The presence within the civilian population of individuals who do not come within the definition of civilians does not deprive the population of its civilian character.”
The presence of individual combatants, for example among gatherings of people, has sometimes entailed a belligerent considering himself entitled to launch an attack on the gathering, with particularly serious consequences. It is therefore laid down in Article 50 [of the 1977 Additional Protocol I] that the presence of individual combatants within the civilian population may not deprive this population of its civilian character and thus its protection.
Sweden, International Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict, with reference to the Swedish Total Defence System, Swedish Ministry of Defence, January 1991, Section 3.2.1.5, pp. 42–43.
Ukraine’s IHL Manual (2004) states: “The presence within the civilian population of individuals who do not come within the definition of civilians does not deprive the population of its civilian character and of its protection under international humanitarian law.”
Under Ireland’s Geneva Conventions Act (1962), as amended in 1998, any “minor breach” of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, including violations of Article 50(3), is a punishable offence.
[T]he abovementioned persons, among others, were arrested in their place of residence or work, in hors de combat situation, and thus are legally qualified as civilians. Contrary to the argument made by the Defense, the Court emphasizes that “civilian” means predominantly civilian, as established by the ICTY: “A population may be considered as civilian even if certain non-civilians are present; it must simply be predominantly civilian” Kordić and Čerkez case, Judgement, 26 February 2001, para. 180]. Indeed, even the presence of those involved in the conflict does not deprive [a] population of [its] civilian nature. Civilian includes those who were members of a resistance movement and former combatants but who are no longer taking part in hostilities.
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Lučić case, Judgment, 19 September 2007, pp. 65–66.
In the Kaing case before the ECCC, the accused was charged, both individually and as a superior, with, inter alia, various crimes against humanity and grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. In its judgment in 2010, the Trial Chamber considered the character of the civilian population in relation to the chapeau requirements for crimes against humanity. The Trial Chamber stated:
305. The jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals has stressed that this population must be “predominantly civilian” and “the primary object of the attack.” This does not imply that the population shall be comprised only of civilians. The presence within the civilian population of individuals who do not come within the definition of civilians does not deprive the population of its civilian character. The civilian status of the victims, the number of civilians, and the proportion of civilians within a population are factors relevant to the determination of whether the requirement that an attack be directed against a “civilian population” is fulfilled.
306. For the purposes of this chapeau requirement, the ad hoc Tribunal jurisprudence has evaluated situations in which civilians and soldiers co-exist within the same geographical area subjected to an attack, and where victims of alleged crimes against humanity comprise both civilians and military personnel. The ICTY Appeals Chamber has noted that when discussing “whether a population is civilian based on the proportion of civilians and combatants within it, that is, [where] the status of the population has yet to be determined or may be changing due to the flow of civilians and military personnel”, it is inevitable in wartime conditions that combatants may become intermingled with the civilian population. However, “provided that these are not regular units with fairly large numbers, this does not in any way change the civilian character of a population.” [ICTY, Galić case, Judgement on Appeal, § 137].
ECCC, Kaing case, Judgment, 26 July 2010, §§ 305–306.
In its decision on the confirmation of charges in the Mbarushimana case in 2011, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I stated: “[P]ursuant to article 50(3) of the AP I [1977 Additional Protocol I], the presence within the civilian population of individuals who do not fit within the definition of civilians does not deprive the entire population of its civilian character.”
(footnotes in original omitted) The charges against Mr Mbarushimana related to alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity. The Pre-Trial Chamber did not confirm the charges.
In its judgment in the Tadić case in 1997, the ICTY Trial Chamber stated: “It is clear that the targeted population [of a crime against humanity] must be of predominantly civilian nature. The presence of certain non-civilians in their midst does not change the character of the population.”
ICTY, Tadić case, Judgment, 7 May 1997, § 638; see also § 643 and Mrkšić case, Review of the Indictment, 3 April 1996, § 29.
Even if it can be proved that the Muslim population of Ahmici was not entirely civilian but comprised some armed elements, still no justification would exist for widespread and indiscriminate attacks against civilians. Indeed, even in a situation of full-scale armed conflict, certain fundamental norms still serve to unambiguously outlaw such conduct, such as rules pertaining to proportionality.
ICTY, Kupreškić case, Judgment, 14 January 2000, § 513.
In its judgment in the Galić case in 2003, the ICTY Trial Chamber stated: “The presence of individual combatants within the population does not change its civilian character.”
In its judgment in 2006, the ICTY Appeals Chamber clarified the position with regard to the presence of combatants within a civilian population:
The civilian population comprises all persons who are civilians and the presence within the civilian population of individuals who do not come within the definition of civilians does not deprive the population of its civilian character. Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, § 50]
ICTY, Galić case, Judgment on Appeal, 30 November 2006, §§ 136–137.
In its judgment in the Blaškić case in 2004, the ICTY Appeals Chamber considered that “the presence within a population of members of resistance groups, or former combatants, who have laid down their arms, does not alter its civilian characteristic”. The Trial Chamber was correct in this regard.”
ICTY, Blaškić case, Judgment on Appeal, 29 July 2004, § 113.
The Appeals Chamber further stated:
The Trial Chamber also stated that the “presence of soldiers within an intentionally targeted civilian population does not alter the civilian nature of that population”. The ICRC Commentary on this point states:
…in wartime conditions it is inevitable that individuals belonging to the category of combatants become intermingled with the civilian population, for example, soldiers on leave visiting their families. However, provided that these are not regular units with fairly large numbers, this does not in any way change the civilian character of a population. [ICRC Commentary, Additional Protocol I, p. 612, § 1922]
ICTY, Blaškić case, Judgment on Appeal, 29 July 2004, § 115.
The term “civilian” refers to persons not taking part in hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds detention or any other cause. It is a principle of customary international law that these persons are protected in armed conflicts. The presence within a population of members of resistance groups or former combatants who have laid down their arms does not alter its civilian character. A population is considered a “civilian population” if it is predominantly civilian in nature. It is not necessary to demonstrate that the victims are linked to any particular side of the armed conflict. The Appeals Chamber has recently emphasised [Blaškić Appeal Judgement, § 109] that “there is an absolute prohibition on the targeting of civilians in customary international law.”
In the Martić case, the accused, who had held various leadership positions in the so-called “Serbian Autonomous District (SAO) Krajina” and the “Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK)”, was convicted of, inter alia, murder and torture as violations of the laws and customs of war and as crimes against humanity. In its judgment in the case in 2008, the ICTY Appeals Chamber considered whether the requirement of Article 5 of the 1993 ICTY Statute that the attack be directed against a civilian population meant that all victims of each crime must have civilian status, particularly persons hors de combat. The Appeals Chamber stated:
304. … [P]rovisions of the [1993 ICTY] Statute must be interpreted according to the “natural and ordinary meaning in the context in which they occur” [Tadić case, Judgement on Appeal, §§ 282–283 and § 285], taking into account their object and purpose. Article 5 of the Statute reads, in part:
The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for the following crimes when committed in armed conflict, whether international or internal in character, and directed against any civilian population […]
305. When dealing with the expression “directed against any civilian population”, the Tribunal has interpreted it as requiring “that the acts be undertaken on a widespread or systematic basis” [Tadić case, Judgement, § 626]. The Appeals Chamber has indeed clarified that
[t]he expression ‘directed against’ is an expression which ‘specifies that in the context of a crime against humanity the civilian population is the primary object of the attack.’ In order to determine whether the attack may be said to have been so directed, the Trial Chamber will consider, inter alia, the means and method used in the course of the attack, the status of the victims, their number, the discriminatory nature of the attack, the nature of the crimes committed in its course, the resistance to the assailants at the time and the extent to which the attacking force may be said to have complied or attempted to comply with the precautionary requirements of the laws of war. To the extent that the alleged crimes against humanity were committed in the course of an armed conflict, the laws of war provide a benchmark against which the Chamber may assess the nature of the attack and the legality of the acts committed in its midst. [Kunarac case, Judgement on Appeal, § 91]
Thus, on the face of it, the requirement that the acts of an accused must be part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population does not necessarily imply that the criminal acts within this attack must be committed against civilians only. The chapeau rather requires a showing that an attack was primarily directed against a civilian population, rather than “against a limited and randomly selected number of individuals.” [Kunarac case, Judgement on Appeal, § 90]
306. Relevant interpretative sources tend to show that the drafters of the Statute did not in fact intend to exclude persons hors de combat from the purview of victims under Article 5. In its discussion of crimes against humanity, the Report of the Secretary-General recommending the establishment of the Tribunal expressly referred to Common Article 3. Moreover, in its report, the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 referred to Common Article 3 and noted as well that article 4 of Additional Protocol II addressed “fundamental guarantees” and included in the protected group “all persons who do not take a direct part or who have ceased to take part in hostilities.”
307. Indeed, in the cases cited by the parties to support their interpretations of the meaning of “civilian” referenced above, the issue at stake was whether a population as a whole could be regarded as “civilian”, while single individuals in its midst – the exact number depending on the circumstances – could still be combatants without modifying the status of the population as a whole. These statements were made by the Appeals Chamber in the context of illustrating the scope of the “well-established jurisprudence regarding the chapeau element of ‘civilian population’.” Thus, the authorities cited by the Trial Chamber in order to exclude persons hors de combat from the victims of crimes against humanity (as opposed to the category of persons who may be object of the attack according to the chapeau of Article 5) are misleading. There is nothing in the text of Article 5 of the Statute, or previous authorities of the Appeals Chamber that requires that individual victims of crimes against humanity be civilians.
308. The Appeals Chamber notes that this approach has been followed by the Tribunal, albeit implicitly, in a number of cases. Nothing for instance suggests that in the Krstić case, the Trial Chamber or the Appeals Chamber required a distinction between the categories of victims – civilian and persons hors de combat according to international humanitarian law – in order to reach a finding on extermination as a crime against humanity. The other final judgements related to the Srebrenica massacre adhered to the same line of reasoning. A similar conclusion follows from an analysis of the more recent Brđanin Appeal Judgement. It should be noted that, in these and other cases, the Tribunal has generally discussed victims of crimes against humanity simply as “persons”, “people”, or “individuals” targeted during a widespread and systematic attack against the civilian population, without attempting to establish whether single victims were “civilians” in the sense of international humanitarian law. The relevance of the “civilian population”, however, of course remained for the purpose of the chapeau requirement.
309. The Appeals Chamber is satisfied that this approach reflects customary international law. The Nuremberg Charter and Allied Control Council Law No. 10 identified crimes against humanity of murder, extermination, enslavement, and deportation as crimes being committed against “any civilian population”, but subsequent practice established that the status of a victim of a crime against humanity was not restricted to “civilians”. This practice includes the High Command Case before the United States Military Tribunal, cases of the Supreme Court in the British Occupied zone, and the French cases of Barbie and Touvier.
310. Further, the Appeals Chamber notes that while post-World War II case-law generally considered war crimes and crimes against humanity together, when military tribunals did distinguish between them, they did so not on the basis of the status of their victims, but on the element of scale or organisation involved in crimes against humanity:
It is not the isolated crime by a private German individual which is condemned, nor is it the isolated crime perpetrated by the German Reich through its officers against a private individual. It is significant that the enactment employs the words “against any civilian population” instead of “against any civilian individual.” The provision is directed against offenses and inhumane acts and persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds systematically organized and conducted by or with the approval of government.
311. In light of the above, the Appeals Chamber finds that the interpretation of the Statute according to which persons hors de combat fall within the purview of Article 5 of the Statute as victims is consistent with the status of applicable customary international law.
313. Under Article 5 of the Statute, a person hors de combat may thus be the victim of an act amounting to a crime against humanity, provided that all other necessary conditions are met, in particular that the act in question is part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population. Further, the Appeals Chamber is satisfied that the commission of crimes under Article 5 of the Statute against persons hors de combat attracted individual criminal responsibility under customary international law at the time of the commission of the offences. Therefore, the principle of nullum crimen sine lege is not violated.
ICTY, Martić case, Judgment on Appeal, 8 October 2008, §§ 304–311 and 313.
In the Milutinović case, the accused were charged with violations of the laws or customs of war and crimes against humanity as members of a joint criminal enterprise to, amongst other things, modify the ethnic balance in Kosovo to ensure Serbian control of the province through a campaign of terror and violence directed at the Kosovo Albanian population. In its judgment in 2009, the Trial Chamber considered the civilian character of a population in the context of the chapeau requirement for the prosecution of crimes against humanity that an attack must be directed against a civilian population. The Trial Chamber stated:
Although there is no numerical rule clearly denoting the point at which a population loses its civilian character, the Chamber considers that the requirement that the population under attack be “predominantly civilian” provides a standard against which the facts of a particular case may be judged.
ICTY, Milutinović case, Judgment, 26 February 2009, § 148.
In the Mrkšić case, two of the three accused, officers in the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA), were convicted of, inter alia, torture as a violation of the laws or customs of war. In its judgment in the case in 2009, the ICTY Appeals Chamber considered the chapeau requirements for crimes against humanity, specifically whether persons hors de combat could be individual victims of crimes against humanity. It stated:
31. … [T]he fact that a population under the chapeau of Article 5 of the [1993 ICTY] Statute must be “civilian” does not imply that such population shall only be comprised of civilians. The status of the victims will thus also be relevant to determining whether the population against which the attack is directed is civilian. In Kordić and Čerkez, the Appeals Chamber stated:
The civilian population comprises all persons who are civilians and the presence within the civilian population of individuals who do not come within the definition of civilians does not deprive the population of its civilian character. [Kordić and Čerkez case, Judgement on Appeal, § 50]
In Blaškić, the Appeals Chamber, relying on the ICRC Commentary to Article 50 of [the 1977] Additional Protocol I, held that “in order to determine whether the presence of soldiers within a civilian population deprives the population of its civilian character, the number of soldiers, as well as whether they are on leave, must be examined”. [Blaškić case, Judgement on Appeal, § 115]
ICTY, Mrkšić case, Judgment on Appeal, 5 May 2009, §§ 31–32.
In order for a population to be considered “civilian”, it must be predominately civilian in nature; the presence of certain non-civilians in their midst does not change the character of the population. In determining whether the presence of soldiers within a civilian population deprives it of its civilian character, the Chamber must examine, among other factors, the number of soldiers as well as their status. The presence of members of resistance armed groups or former combatants who have laid down their arms, within a civilian population, does not alter its civilian nature.
SCSL, Fofana and Kondewa case, Judgment, 2 August 2007, § 117.
In its judgment in 2008, the Appeals Chamber considered the definition of the civilian population in relation to the chapeau requirements of crimes against humanity, stating:
258. The Trial Chamber stated that “civilian population” must be interpreted broadly. It includes “all those persons who are not members of the armed forces or otherwise recognised as combatants.” [Fofana and Kondewa case, Judgement, § 116] It also stated that the population must be predominantly civilian in nature and that the presence of certain non-civilians in their midst does not change the character of the population. It further stated that the use of the word “population” does not mean that the entire population of the geographical entity in which the attack is taking place must have been the subject of that attack. The Trial Chamber finally stated that:
the targeting of a select group of civilians – for example, the targeted killing of a number of political opponents – cannot satisfy the requirements of Article 2. It would therefore be sufficient to show that enough individuals were targeted in the course of the attack, or that they were targeted in such a way as to satisfy the Chamber that the attack was in fact directed against a civilian ‘population’, rather than against a limited and randomly selected number of individuals. [Fofana and Kondewa case, Judgement, § 119]
259. Article 50 of [the 1977] Additional Protocol I provides:
… The presence within the civilian population of individuals who do not come within the definition of civilians does not deprive the population of its civilian character.
The Appeals Chamber considers that Article 50(1) of the Additional Protocol I is a useful tool in determining a “civilian population.” The Appeals Chamber agrees with the view expressed in several judgments of international tribunals that “the presence within a population of members of resistance groups, or former combatants, who have laid down their arms, does not alter its civilian characteristic” and “[t]he civilian population comprises all persons who are civilians and the presence within the civilian population of individuals who do not come within the definition of civilians does not deprive the population of its civilian character.” [ICTY, Galić case, Judgement on Appeal, § 144] In line with this principle, the Appeals Chamber takes the view that the presence of rebels or juntas within the victims does not deprive the population of its civilian character.
SCSL, Fofana and Kondewa case, Judgment on Appeal, 28 May 2008, §§ 258–259 and 264.
In the Sesay case before the SCSL, the accused Sesay and Kallon, senior commanders in the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), Junta and Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC)/RUF forces, and the accused Gbao, senior commander in the RUF and AFRC/RUF forces, were each charged with eight counts of crimes against humanity, eight counts of war crimes, and two counts of other serious violations of international humanitarian law. In its judgment in the case in 2009, the Trial Chamber, in considering whether a civilian population could include persons hors de combat for the purposes of the chapeau requirement for crimes against humanity, stated:
82. The Chamber is satisfied that customary international law, determined by reference to the laws of armed conflict, has established that the civilian population includes all of those persons who are not members of the armed forces or otherwise recognised as combatants. A person who is hors de combat does not prima facie fall within this definition. However, the Chamber concurs with the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Martic case that where a person hors de combat is the victim of an act which objectively forms part of a broader attack directed against a civilian population, this act may amount to a crime against humanity. Thus, persons hors de combat may form part of the civilian population for the purpose of crimes against humanity, provided that the remaining general requirements of Article 2 [of the 2002 Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone] are satisfied in respect of the particular incident.
83. In order for a population to be considered “civilian”, it must be predominantly civilian in nature; the presence of certain non-civilians in their midst does not change the character of the population. In determining whether the presence of soldiers within a civilian population deprives it of its civilian character, the Chamber must examine, among other factors, the number of soldiers as well as their status. The presence of members of resistance armed groups or former combatants who have laid down their arms, within a civilian population, does not alter its civilian nature.
SCSL, Sesay case, Judgment, 2 March 2009, §§ 82–83.
To fulfil its task of disseminating IHL, the ICRC has delegates around the world teaching armed and security forces that: “The presence within the civilian population of individuals other than civilian persons does not deprive the population of its civilian character.”
Frédéric de Mulinen, Handbook on the Law of War for Armed Forces, ICRC, Geneva, 1987, § 53.
In a press release issued in 1983 concerning the conflict in Lebanon, the ICRC stated: “The presence of armed elements among the civilian population does not justify the indiscriminate shelling of women, children and old people.”
ICRC, Press Release No. 1474, Fighting in Tripoli: Appeal from the ICRC, Geneva, 4 November 1983.