Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/20356728/Honduras-Constitutional-Law-Issues
Timestamp: 2018-07-16 00:07:57
Document Index: 277355484

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art. 184', 'Art. 323', 'Art. 51', 'Art. 184', 'Art. 313', 'Art. 278', 'Art. 323', 'Art. 328', 'Art. 336', 'Art. 333']

Honduras: Constitutional Law Issues | Honduras | Supreme Courts
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Description: Describes errors in arguing that Honduras had a constitutional continuation and not a military coup. The National Congress, directed by Mr. Roberto Micheletti Bain, elected the 15 members of the c...
Describes errors in arguing that Honduras had a constitutional continuation and not a military coup. The National Congress, directed by Mr. Roberto Micheletti Bain, elected the 15 members of the current Supreme Court in January of this year, 2009, from a list of attorneys presented by Mr. Micheletti to the Congress. On June 29th, 2009, the National Congress of Honduras interpreted president Zelaya’s disapproval, as removal of president Zelaya. The Congress then elected Mr. Micheletti, its president, as the president of Honduras based on a subjective absolute absence of President Zelaya, while President Zelaya’s absence was not absolute. It was, instead, forced and temporary, as he was violently taken out of his office and expatriated by the Army, a day before. The National Congress also had a letter of resignation by President Zelaya under consideration. The letter was signed three days before the coup. This resignation consequently would drop charges and close President Zelaya’s case. These National Congress actions were taken after a Congressional Decree dated Monday 29, 2009, at 12:45 AM - a day after President Zelaya was removed violently from his office and expatriated by the Army on Sunday June 28th at 5:30 AM. The Supreme Court failed to address the original Executive Orders of President José Manuel Zelaya Rosales and allowed the Honduran lower Court of Letters and the Contentious Administrative to deal with the constitutional matter beyond the competence of this Court. The Supreme Court of Honduras played a passive and facilitative roll in such a high priority and serious case.
ERRORS ON THE REPORT TO U.S.
CONGRESS: “Honduras: Constitutional Law Issues”
By José María Rodríguez González U.S. Foreign Policy International Analyst September 2009
Honduras: Constitutional Law Issues Errors on Report LL File No. 2009-002965 Page 2 of 10
September 2009 SERIOUS ERRORS ON: REPORT FOR CONGRESS August 2009 (The Law library of Congress Directorate of Legal Research for Foreign, Comparative, and International Law LL File No. 2009-002965)
The National Congress, directed by Mr. Roberto Micheletti Bain, elected the 15 members of the current Supreme Court in January of this year, 2009, from a list of attorneys presented by Mr. Micheletti to the Congress. On June 29th, 2009, the National Congress of Honduras interpreted president Zelaya’s disapproval, as removal of president Zelaya. The Congress then elected Mr. Micheletti, its president, as the president of Honduras based on a subjective absolute absence of President Zelaya, while President Zelaya’s absence was not absolute. It was, instead, forced and temporary, as he was violently taken out of his office and expatriated by the Army, a day before. The National Congress also had a letter of resignation by President Zelaya under consideration. The letter was signed three days before the coup. This resignation consequently would drop charges and close President Zelaya’s case. These National Congress actions were taken after a Congressional Decree dated Monday 29, 2009, at 12:45 AM - a day after President Zelaya was removed violently from his office and expatriated by the Army on Sunday June 28th at 5:30 AM. The Supreme Court failed to address the original Executive Orders of President José Manuel Zelaya Rosales and allowed the Honduran lower Court of Letters and the Contentious Administrative to deal with the constitutional matter beyond the competence of this Court. The Supreme Court of Honduras played a passive and facilitative roll in such a high priority and serious case.
Honduras: Constitutional Law Issues Errors on Report LL File No. 2009-002965 Page 3 of 10
If the case against President Zelaya’s was built in the lower Court of Letters of the Contentious Administrative it is an unequivocally fact that this court has no jurisdiction over constitutional matters, unconstitutionality or any violation of the Constitution. Constitutional matters are exclusively handled by the Supreme Court of Honduras. (Honduras Constitution Art. 184 1 , also here below)
Art. 323, section 2 stays that the Supreme Court has the power to “hear cases against the highest officers of the State and the Deputies.” This is the exclusive duty of the Supreme Court, never a function of a lower court. This provision in the Constitution is ignored by the Honduran Supreme Court. In addition to the Supreme Court overlooking its duties, the decrees focus of the ousting of President Zelaya - Executive Orders 2 # PCM-005-2009, PCM-019-2009, PCM-0202009 and PCM-027-2009, would be a matter of unconstitutionality revision due to the fact that these decrees represent a challenge to Art. 51 of the Constitution, which states “Regarding elections acts and procedures will be a Supreme Electoral Tribunal, autonomous and independent, with jurisdictional entity, with jurisdiction and competence in all the Republic, whose organization and function will be established by this Constitution and the law, which will stay equally related matters of other electoral organisms.” Art. 184 stays “Laws can be declared unconstitutional by reason of form or content. It competes original and exclusively to the Supreme Court of Justice the knowledge and resolution of the matter, and must pronounce it with the requisites of definite sentences.” To determine if President Zelaya’s decrees are unconstitutional is the sole province of the Honduran Supreme Court of Justice and not any other Court and definite not a lower Court, given the President’s highest authority and the high legal level of his decrees.
All references to Honduras Constitution are taken from the updated or amended CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA DE HONDURAS. Available online, at: http://www.gobernacion.gob.hn/descargas/leyes/CONSTITUCION%20DE%20LA%20REPUBLICA.pdf The Constitution was originally published officially in LA GACETA, Jan. 20, 1982.
Called Executive Decrees in Honduras. PCM-005-2009 was never published in LA GACETA, as required. PCM-019-2009 nullifies PCM-005-2009. The centerpiece document is PCM-020-2009, here attached. PCM-027-2009
follows up for execution of PCM-020-2009.
Honduras: Constitutional Law Issues Errors on Report LL File No. 2009-002965 Page 4 of 10
The U.S. Report for Congress, LL File No. 2009-002965, implies that by Honduran Constitution Art. 313, section 2 the Honduran Supreme Court has the provision, but in the case of President Manuel Zelaya the Supreme Court was not complying with its obligations and its negligence allowed the lower Court of Letters of the Contentious Administrative to build a case without hearings 3 , with subjective and a-priori sentences, and with improper filing of documents, not even published in the Official Journal “La
Gaceta,” as required.
According to the Constitution of the Republic of Honduras, the Supreme Court violated its provision, its obligations and did not proceed according to the Constitution in the matter of its original and exclusive competence.
No, it did not. The military is defined only by Army and Armed Forces in the Constitution of Honduras. Title V, Chapter X, Arts. 272 through 293 clearly state it. The term Public Force, as it is in many other countries, is reserved for the Police. The Police are trained with familiarity in criminal law, while military training is focused on war expertise. The law enforcement has been naturally and traditionally done by the providence of the police, not the military. As a matter of fact Honduran police normally attends to all Court enforcement needs. There is not a Honduras constitutional exception on this rule. More conclusively, there was no other army that the military had the need to confront. The bottom line for this Supreme Court, or any other military coup facilitator, was that no military coup could be done without the military, because of, precisely, the overwhelming war force that makes a military coup successful. The complicity of the Supreme Court in the military coup extends to not punishing the violations to the Constitution, the Criminal Code and the peace of the country inflicted by the military and their agents in the government:
These assertions can be corroborated by examining original Honduran courts documents compiled on a powerpoint presentation available on line at the military coup’s government site: http://www.poderjudicial.gob.hn/NR/rdonlyres/FB12D38C-64BE-433A-A6481D416F57623A/2464/CasoJoséManuelZelayaRosales3.pps
Honduras: Constitutional Law Issues Errors on Report LL File No. 2009-002965 Page 5 of 10
a. Violation of Constitution Art. 278. - The orders given by the President of the Republic to the Armed Forces, through their Chief, must be followed and executed. [The Army is under the Executive as the Police is under the Judicial branches of power]. b. Penal Code 4 Title XII, Chapter I, Art. 323. - Whoever offends the President of the Republic in his physical integrity or in his freedom will be punished by eight to twelve years in prison. c. Penal Code Chapter II, Art. 328.- Who delinquents against the form of government will be sanctioned with prison from six to twelve years, and who executes actions directly aim to obtain by force, or outside of the legal venues, some of the following objectives: 1) To replace the republican, democratic and representative Govern by any other form of govern. [An elected President was replaced, after violent action and obscure Congress dealings, by a non-elected President]. d. Penal Code Chapter VI, Art. 336. – Criminals of rebellion are who use arms to topple a govern established legally or to change or to stop in all or in part the constitutional regiment in existence in which refers to formation, functioning or renovation of public powers. e. Penal Code Art. 333. – It applies the punishment of reclusion from three (3) to five (5) years and fine from fifty thousand (L. 50,000.00) to hundred thousand (L. 100,000.00) to the official or public employee that: 3) Makes victim of humiliation or illegal pressures to the people trusted in their custody; 4) Does not process or resolve within legal terms an Habeas Corpus petition or protection or any other means to obstaculizing its processing; and 5) Order, execute or allow the expatriation of a Honduran citizen.
Did the Honduran National Congress properly approve the Articles of Impeachment of the President as provided for by the Honduran Constitution?
No, it didn’t. Because until June 26, 2009, Honduras Congress called only for an extraordinary session with the single agenda issue of electing the Congressional Commission, the first ever to investigate President Zelaya’s conduct. This commission reported a day after the military Coup (Monday June 29 at 12:20 AM. Military Coup happened on Sunday June 28th, 2009, at 5:30 AM). The Commission’s report did not present any article leading to President Zelaya’s impeachment, only some consideration points.
All references to Criminal Law are taken from Honduras Penal Code, Decree 144-83, available on line at: http://www.congreso.gob.hn/Codigos/DECRETO%20144-83.pdf
Honduras: Constitutional Law Issues Errors on Report LL File No. 2009-002965 Page 6 of 10
It is not feasible that in less than three days, mostly during a weekend, a Congressional Commission could gather enough information about President Zelaya from different governmental offices, Congress members and the Executive Branch, as well as to classify this data, evaluate it, analyze it, reach conclusions and write a report. There was not enough time for an “extensive” investigation, but rather only time for cursory notes. And without such an extensive investigation on such a serious issue, the Congress did not have enough information to properly approve any impeachment against the President. Congress claimed on Monday June 29th, 2009, at 12:37 AM to be in possession of a letter of resignation signed by the President four days earlier, coincidentally written in similar content as the considerations of the Congressional Commission. Why would the President have signed a letter of resignation and then not present it to the Supreme Court to avoid an order of arrest against him? A President who signs a letter of resignation is not a president who wants to be re-elected; all charges against him should have been dropped and his case closed. The consequent Congressional Decree5 had no articles of impeachment, only six general and subjective considerations. It jumps to an article disapproving the President and then to the next removing him from office, with the ill intention that Congress can interpret disapproval as removal. The military coup idea that the Honduras Congress has the right to remove the President if it only disapproves of him. The Congressional Commission’s improvised report and the mysterious Presidential resignation letter are the only two documents the National Congress has to show for the designation of its president Roberto Micheletti as president of Honduras. This designation would have never taken place if President Zelaya was not violently removed from his office and forced into expatriation and absence by the military coup a day before.
No. The Supreme Court could not follow up by holding a proper, constitutionally mandate trial of the President, because President Manuel Zelaya was violently removed from his office by the military coup that forced him to be absent as a result of his expatriation on June 28th, 2009, and without the Supreme Court ordering the immediate return of President Manuel Zelaya to stand trial, then the Honduran Supreme Court did not follow up by holding a proper, constitutionally mandated trial of the President.
Congressional Commission’s report and Letter of Resignation are not available. Congressional Decree is attached here.
Honduras: Constitutional Law Issues Errors on Report LL File No. 2009-002965 Page 7 of 10
No, it wasn’t. The previous four answers to the questions in the Report illustrate that the available sources used in the Report were insufficient. They missed the correlation of the facts, ignored Honduran law issues that were relevant to the case and did not show any awareness that the judicial and legislative branches of power were relentlessly seeking to criminalize President Zelaya.
The Honduran Congress and Supreme Court blamed President Zelaya for being the provocateur and the divisive one, but why the Supreme Court and Congress fall in a destructive spray to show who is must stubborn? This only brings Honduras to its knees, and everyone loses. It is time to stop it, to let President Zelaya finish his legal term. It was a mistake on the part of the Honduran Supreme Court to use the force in this matter, instead of trusting fully the rule of law. If the President would cheat with the Yes and No ballots then the world will be with Honduras for a just cause, but Army violence and dirty judicial play only damage Honduras. As demonstrated above, the removal of President Zelaya was not legal, it was not in accordance with Honduran constitutional and statutory law. Let us fully respect and trust the rule of law, and let democracy win. It is important to note that the military coup’s purpose is to dispose forever of a duly President elected by the people of Honduras, José Manuel Zelaya Rosales. The November 29th, 2009, elections seals, perpetuates, fulfill and completes fully the goal of the military coup. Therefore, elections as the last thrust of the military coup should be declared null immediately and defined without any effect. This military coup uses the “law” as a shield to prevail, claiming to defend democracy in Honduras. If these forced elections are not stopped, democracies themselves would be legitimizing and legally accepting the aim and completion of the military coup.
José María Rodríguez González U.S. Foreign Policy International Analyst September 2009
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