Source: https://casetext.com/brief/1d45feb6-marc-a-nicometi-appellant-respondentvthe-vineyards-of-fredonia-llc-et-al-respondents-appellants-et-al-defendants-scott-pfohl-et-al-third-party-plaintiffs-v-western-new-york-plumbing-ellicott-plumbing-and-remodeling-co-inc-third-party-respond-11
Timestamp: 2020-08-10 05:57:19
Document Index: 619557507

Matched Legal Cases: ['§500', '§500', '§500', '§240', '§240', '§240', '§240', '§240', '§240', '§240', '§240', '§240', '§240', '§240', '§5602', '§240', '§240', '§240', '§240', '§240', '§240', '§240', '§ 240', '§240', '§240', '§240', '§240', '§240', '§240', '§240', '§240', '§240', '§240', '§240', '§240', '§240', '§240', '§240', '§240', '§240', '§240', '§ 240', '§240']

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To be Argued by: SIM R. SHAPIRO, ESQ. (Time Requested: 15 Minutes) Docket No. APL-2013-00280 Appellate Division Docket No. CA 12-01962 Erie County Clerk’s Index Nos. 2008-3306 and 2008-3306-TP3 Court of Appeals of the State of New York MARC A. NICOMETI, Plaintiff-Appellant-Respondent, – against – THE VINEYARDS OF FREDONIA, LLC, WINTER-PFOHL, INC., Defendants-Respondents-Appellants, THOMAS WHITNEY and SCOTT PFOHL, Defendants. ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– SCOTT PFOHL, Third-Party Plaintiff, WINTER-PFOHL, INC., Third-Party Plaintiff-Respondent-Appellant, – against – WESTERN NEW YORK PLUMBING-ELLICOTT PLUMBING AND REMODELING CO., INC., Third-Party Defendant-Respondent-Appellant. BRIEF FOR THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT- APPELLANT WESTERN NEW YORK PLUMBING Of Counsel: Sim R. Shapiro, Esq. Michael V. McLaughlin, Esq. BAXTER SMITH & SHAPIRO, P.C. Attorneys for Third-Party Defendant-Respondent-Appellant 182 Dwyer Street West Seneca, New York 14224 Tel.: (716) 854-6140 Fax: (716) 854-6540 May 29, 2014 i DISCLOSURE STATEMENT PURSUANT TO §500.1(F) OF THE RULES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS Pursuant to §500.1(f) of the Rules of the Court of Appeals, Western New York Plumbing-Ellicott Plumbing and Remodeling Co., Inc. states that no parents, subsidiaries or affiliates exist. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page(s) STATEMENT PURSUANT TO RULE §500.1(f)………………………… i TABLE OF CONTENTS………………………………………………….. ii TABLE OF CITATIONS………………………………………………….. iii QUESTIONS PRESENTED………………………………………………. v PRELIMINARY STATEMENT…………………………………………... 1 JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT…………………………………….…. 3 STATEMENT OF FACTS………………………………………………… 4 ARGUMENT………………………………………………………………. 7 I. LABOR LAW §240(1) DOES NOT APPLY TO THIS MATTER AS IT DOES NOT EXTEND TO PROTECTING A WORKER AGAINST THE HAZARD OF SLIPPING ON ICE, AS THAT IS NOT AN ELEVATION-RELATED RISK CONCLUSION……………………………………………… 7 II. IF IT IS DETERMINED THAT LABOR LAW §240(1) APPLIES, THERE IS STILL A TRIABLE ISSUE OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF WAS THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HIS INJURIES……………………………………………… 14 CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………….. 19 iii TABLE OF CITATIONS Page(s) Andrews v. Ryan Homes, Inc., 27 A.D.3d 1197, 812 N.Y.S.2d 729 (4th Dep’t 2006) …………… 15 Blake v. Neighborhood Hous. Services of New York City, Inc., 1 N.Y.3d 280, 803 N.E.2d 757, 771 N.Y.S.2d 484 (2003) ……… 14 Buckley v. J.A. Jones/GMO, 38 A.D.3d 461, 832 N.Y.S.2d 560 (1st Dep’t 2007) ……………. 17 Cohen v. Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center, 11 N.Y.3d 823, 897 N.E.2d 1059, 868 N.Y.S.2d 578 (2008) …… 8 Danielewicz v. Klewin Bldg. Co., Inc., 39 A.D.3d 1194, 834 N.Y.S.2d 813 (4th Dep’t 2007) …………… 17 Doan v. Aiken & McGlauklin, Inc., 217 A.D.2d 908, 629 N.Y.S.2d 921 (4th Dep’t 1995) …………… 18 Duda v. John W. Rouse Construction Corp., 32 N.Y.2d 405, 298 N.E.2d 667, 345 N.Y.S.2d 524 (1973) …….. 14 Gordon v. E. Ry. Supply Inc., 82 N.Y.2d 555, 626 N.E.2d 912, 606 N.Y.S.2d 127 (1993) ……… 15 Hamill v. Mutual of America Investment Corp., 79 A.D.3d 478, 913 N.Y.S.2d 62 (1st Dep’t 2010) ………………. 17 Kumar v. Stahlunt Assoc., 3 A.D.3d 330, 769 N.Y.S.2d 884 (1st Dep’t 2004) ………………. 17 Macutek v. Lansing, 226 A.D.2d 964, 640 N.Y.S.2d 693 (3d Dep’t 1996) …………….. 18 Matos v. Garden State Brick Face of Middle Village, Inc., 272 A.D.2d 70, 707 N.Y.S.2d 169 (1st Dep’t 2000) ……………… 12, 13, 18 iv McNabb v. Oot Bros., Inc., 64 A.D.3d 1237, 882 N.Y.S.2d 792 (4th Dep’t 2009) …………… 11, 12 Melber v. 6333 Main St., Inc., 91 N.Y.2d 759, 698 N.E.2d 933, 676 N.Y.S.2d 104 (1998) ……… 8, 9, 10 Narducci v. Manhasset Bay Assocs., 96 N.Y.2d 259, 750 N.E.2d 1085, 727 N.Y.S.2d 37 (2001) ……… 7, 8 Petrocelli v. Tishman Constr. Co., 19 A.D.3d 145, 797 N.Y.S.2d 12 (1st Dep’t 2005) ………………. 17 Rocovich v. Consolidated Edison Co., 78 N.Y.2d 509, 583 N.E.2d 932, 577 N.Y.S.2d 219 (1991) ……… 8 Ross v. Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 N.Y.2d 494, 618 N.E.2d 82, 601 N.Y.S.2d 49 (1993) ………… 7, 8 Russell v. Widewaters South Bay Road Assoc., LLP, 289 A.D.2d 1025, 735 N.Y.S.2d 900 (4th Dep’t 2001) …………… 11 Thome v. Benchmark Main Transit Assocs., LLC, 86 A.D.3d 938, 927 N.Y.S.2d 260 (4th Dep’t 2011) ……………… 15 Weininger v. Hagedorn & Co., 91 N.Y.2d 958, 695 N.E.2d 709, 672 N.Y.S.2d 840 (1998) ………. 14 v QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. Is Labor Law §240(1) applicable to the facts of this case where plaintiff slipped on ice and fell while wearing stilts, and did defendants fail to provide proper protection to plaintiff under these circumstances? 2. If Labor Law §240(1) is found to be applicable to the facts of this case, did defendants raise material questions of fact whether plaintiff was the sole proximate cause of his injury, whether defendants violated Labor Law §240(1) or whether such alleged violation was a proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury? 1 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT This Brief is submitted on behalf of the Third-Party Defendant-Respondent- Appellant, Western New York Plumbing-Ellicott Plumbing and Remodeling Co., Inc. (“WNY Plumbing”). This action was brought based upon personal injuries allegedly sustained by plaintiff-appellant-respondent, Marc A. Nicometi (“plaintiff” or “Nicometi”), when Mr. Nicometi slipped on an allegedly icy floor while wearing stilts at premises owned by The Vineyards of Fredonia, LLC. (“The Vineyards”). [R. 29-38, 48-54]. Plaintiff thereafter moved for partial summary judgment on liability under Labor Law §240(1). The defendants/third-party plaintiffs-respondents-Appellants, Scott Pfohl (“Pfohl”) and Winter-Pfohl, Inc. (“Winter-Pfohl”) cross-moved for summary judgment seeking to dismiss Plaintiff’s Labor Law §240(1) claim. WNY Plumbing opposed Mr. Nicometi’s motion. The Supreme Court, Erie County, (Hon. Timothy J. Drury, JSC) granted plaintiff’s motion and denied Winter-Pfohl’s cross-motion. [R. 15-17]. By Notice of Appeal dated June 22, 2012, WNY Plumbing appealed Justice Drury’s Order. [R. 3-6]. Both Winter-Pfohl and The Vineyards also appealed this Order. [R.7-14]. By Memorandum and Order entered June 14, 2013, the Appellate Division, Fourth Department modified the Order of the Supreme Court by denying plaintiff’s 2 motion. The Appellate Division, Fourth Department held that, while the Supreme Court properly concluded that Labor Law §240(1) applied to Mr. Nicometi’s claim because working on stilts is a gravity-related risk, there was a triable issue of fact as to whether Mr. Nicometi’s actions were the sole proximate cause of his injuries. [R. 5a-9a]. WNY Plumbing respectfully submits that the Appellate Division, Fourth Department erred in holding that the circumstances of Mr. Nicometi’s incident are covered by Labor Law §240(1). In the instant matter, the presence of ice on the floor where Mr. Nicometi was working was not the risk that brought about the need for the stilts in the first instance. Additionally, the accident was not the result of the type of hazard that comes within the purview of Labor Law §240(1). Rather, the accident resulted from the usual and ordinary dangers at a construction site, namely ice or slippery substances, to which the statutorily prescribed protections of Labor Law §240(1) do not extend. Further, there remain triable issues of fact regarding whether plaintiff’s conduct was the sole proximate cause of his injuries. The testimony of plaintiff’s supervisor, Raymond Hilliker, reveals that he specifically told plaintiff and his coworkers not to insulate in the area where the ice was present. Plaintiff failed to heed this direction and, therefore, caused his own injuries. 3 JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to CPLR §5602(b)(l). The Appellate Division, Fourth Department issued a non-final order, with two Justices dissenting, on a prior appeal in the action, finding that a question of law has arisen that ought to be reviewed by this Court, and therefore granted leave to appeal to this Court. 4 STATEMENT OF FACTS The Vineyards hired Winter-Pfohl as its general contractor to build ten buildings in Fredonia, New York, including the building where the incident that is the subject of this action is alleged to have occurred. [R. 49, 340]. Winter-Pfohl hired 84 Lumber to install insulation at the worksite. [R.405]. At the time of the incident, Marc A. Nicometi was working as an employee of 84 Lumber as an insulation installer at The Vineyards worksite. [R. 100, 115-16, 131]. Plaintiff and two co-workers, Collin Grzeskowiak and Russell Elsworth, were supervised by Ray Hilliker, a manager at 84 Lumber. [R. 100, 114-16, 131]. The plaintiff testified that on the day of the accident, he was using stilts to install insulation between the rafters in the ceiling. [R. 143-44, 165-66]. He stated that the stilts were adjusted so that the bottoms of his feet were approximately three to five feet above the floor. [R. 121]. They were made of some sort of metal and had a rubber foot-shaped place to strap a work boot into. [R. 167-75]. Mr. Nicometi had never used a ladder to install insulation and had only used a scaffold once before. [R. 179, 287-88]. He testified that stilts were the appropriate device for the project at The Vineyards and that he had all of the materials, tools and equipment he needed to do his job. [R. 182-83]. When asked about the stilts he was using, plaintiff testified that he was not aware of any defects: 5 Q. Were there any parts missing from [the stilts]? A. Not that I know of. Q. To your knowledge had they broken at all before you used them? A. Not to my knowledge. Q. To your knowledge were they in need of any repair or adjustment before you used the? A. No. [R. 196]. Mr. Nicometi testified that on the day of the accident, he saw some water and ice on the floor, and he had a conversation with his supervisor, Raymond Hilliker, as to where the water and ice had come from. [R.151-152]. Plaintiff believed that walking around using stilts on a floor with ice patches would be hazardous to his health and expressed his concern to Mr. Hilliker. [R. 281]. Plaintiff also heard Mr. Hilliker speak with a man he believed to be the General Contractor, telling him that there was ice on the floor and that he needed to do something about it. [R. 155-158]. Plaintiff heard the person he believed to be the General Contractor say that he would take care of it. [R. 158]. Mr. Hilliker testified that on the date of the incident he arrived at the work site before the plaintiff. Mr. Hilliker was not aware of any employees of any of the other contractors being present that morning inside the building where the 84 6 Lumber employees were working. [R. 289]. Mr. Hilliker saw that there was “a very small area” of ice on the floor in the building where they were working. [R. 587]. Mr. Hilliker stated that he directed all three of his installers, including plaintiff, “do not insulate that area.” [R. 589]. After he told his installers not to insulate that area, they agreed that they would not, stating, “[o]kay. We won’t.” [R.591]. Mr. Hilliker testified that he was present in the doorway of the room where the plaintiff was working and that he had begun to walk toward Mr. Nicometi to tell him, once again, to get out of the icy area. It was then that the Mr. Nicometi slipped and fell onto a bag of insulation. [R. 572-74, 591-92]. Mr. Nicometi testified that, as he swung a hammer-tacker, which is a cross between a hammer and a stapler that it used to inject a staple into the insulation, he stepped forward onto ice and slipped, falling onto a bag of insulation on the floor. [R. 71-72, 194]. Mr. Nicometi testified, “I slipped, my foot came out from underneath me.” [R. 194]. 7 ARGUMENT POINT I LABOR LAW §240(1) DOES NOT APPLY TO THIS MATTER AS IT DOES NOT EXTEND TO PROTECTING A WORKER AGAINST THE HAZARD OF SLIPPING ON ICE, AS THAT IS NOT AN ELEVATION-RELATED RISK As this Honorable Court is well aware, not every fall by every worker at a construction site triggers the statutory protections of Labor Law §240(1). Such liability depends upon the “existence of a hazard contemplated in section 240(1)” and upon “the failure to use, or the inadequacy of, a safety device of the kind enumerated therein.” Narducci v. Manhasset Bay Assocs., 96 N.Y.2d 259, 267, 750 N.E.2d 1085, 727 N.Y.S.2d 37 (2001) citing Ross v. Curtis-Palmer Hydro- Elec. Co., 81 N.Y.2d 494, 501, 618 N.E.2d 82, 601 N.Y.S.2d 49 (1993). In this case, the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that either of the requirements to support a prima fascia case under Labor Law §240(1) can be satisfied. “Labor Law §240(1) was designed to prevent those types of accidents in which the scaffold, hoist, stay, ladder or other protective device proved inadequate to shield the injured worker from harm directly flowing from the application of the force of gravity to an object or person.” Ross v. Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec., Co., 81 N.Y.2d 494, 501, 618 N.E.2d 82, 601 N.Y.S.2d 49 (1993) (emphasis in original). Additionally, there is no liability under Labor Law §240(1) if the 8 worker’s injury is caused by a hazard that was not contemplated by the State Legislature in enacting the statute. See Cohen v. Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center, 11 N.Y.3d 823, 825, 897 N.E.2d 1059, 868 N.Y.S.2d 578 (2008); Narducci, 96 N.Y.2d at 267 citing Rocovich v. Consolidated Edison Co., 78 N.Y.2d 509, 583 N.E.2d 932, 577 N.Y.S.2d 219 (1991). The Court of Appeals in Rocovich described a hazard encompassed by §240(1) of the Labor Law as one “related to the effects of gravity where protective devices are called for … because of a difference between the elevation level of the required work and a lower level.” Rocovich, 78 N.Y.2d at 514. These are the “elevation-related risks” that the State Legislature designated to receive the special protections afforded under Labor Law §240(1). Injuries from other types of hazards are not protected under the statute even if they are caused by the absence of a scaffold or other required safety device. See Ross, 81 N.Y.2d at 500 (“Labor Law § 240(1) was aimed only at elevation-related hazards and that, accordingly, injuries resulting from other types of hazards are not compensable under that statute even if proximately caused by the absence of an adequate scaffold or other required safety device.”) The controlling case regarding tripping or slipping while utilizing stilts is this Court’s decision in Melber v. 6333 Main Street, 91 N.Y.2d 759, 698 N.E.2d 9 933, 676 N.Y.S.2d 104 (1998), where the plaintiff, while using stilts, tripped on an electrical conduit and fell. Therein, this Court ruled: But here, as was the case in Ross, injury resulted from a separate hazard – electrical conduit protruding from the floor. Even if the stilts failed to avoid that pitfall, “plaintiff’s injuries allegedly flowed from a deficiency in the device that was ‘wholly unrelated to the hazard which brought about its need in the first instance’” and did not interfere with or increase the danger of injury in the performance of his elevation-related task (Ross v. Curtis- Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 N.Y.2d, at 501, supra, quoting Ross v. Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 180 A.D.2d 385, 394 [Mercure, J., dissenting in part]). Thus, plaintiff must look elsewhere for his remedy. Melber, 91 N.Y.2d at 763-764 (emphasis added). In Melber, not only did this Court decline to award summary judgment to the plaintiff, it dismissed the Labor Law §240(1) claim altogether: To be sure, conduit protruding from an unfinished floor – like a trough filled with hot oil – is a hazard in the workplace against which employees should be protected. However, neither the trough nor the conduit is a risk that can be avoided by proper placement or utilization of one of the devices listed in Labor Law §240(1). The protective equipment envisioned by the statue is simply not designed to avert the hazard plaintiff encountered here. Id. at 763. Indeed, in Melber, this Court noted that, “[h]ad [the stilts] failed while plaintiff was installing the metal studs in the top of the drywall – work requiring 10 the statute’s special protections – a different case would be presented.” Id. at 763- 764. However, the distinction to be made is not whether plaintiff was injured in the course of actually performing construction at an elevation, but whether the injury resulted from a hazard that is contemplated by the statute. There is no qualitative difference between the electrical conduit in Melber and the ice in the instant case. In each case, the risk — the electrical conduit or the ice — could not be “avoided by proper placement or utilization of one of the devices listed in Labor Law §240(1).” Melber, 91 N.Y.2d at 763. In both cases, the injury resulted from the hazard at ground level, not from any alleged failure of the stilts. Whether a person is on stilts or not, the risk posed by either an electrical conduit or ice is the same. To the extent that there is a condition that caused the incident, it was the ice, which is not the type of hazard contemplated by the statute. This Court’s decision in Melber was clear in this regard, and WNY Plumbing respectfully contends that the Appellate Division, Fourth Department erred when it effectively rejected this Court’s decision in Melber. Of critical importance is that neither here, nor in Melber, did plaintiff claim that his stilts failed (e.g., that they buckled, bent, broke, came apart, collapsed, etc.). Instead, Mr. Nicometi claimed that he slipped on ice, a condition, similar to the one in Melber, “wholly unrelated to the hazard [i.e., installing insulation at 11 ceiling level] which brought about [the] need [for the stilts] in the first instance.” Melber at 763-764. This reasoning in Melber was followed by the Appellate Division, Fourth Department in both Russell v. Widewaters S. Bay Rd. Assocs., LLP, 289 A.D.2d 1025, 735 N.Y.S.2d 900 (4th Dep’t 2001), and McNabb v. Oot Bros., Inc., 64 A.D.3d 1237, 882 N.Y.S.2d 792 (4th Dep’t 2009), which are analogous to the instant case in that in both of those cases the plaintiff, while working on stilts, tripped over an electrical cord. In Russell, the Appellate Division, Fourth Department held: Supreme Court properly granted that part of third-party defendant’s cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law §240(1) claim. Plaintiff Dean Russell, a subcontractor, tripped over an electrical cord while working on stilts and, in doing so, “did not encounter a hazard contemplated by the statute” (Melber v. 6333 Main St., 91 N.Y.2d 759, 761). Russell, 289 A.D.2d at 1025. Similarly, in McNabb, plaintiff was working on stilts when he tripped over an electrical cord, causing him to fall and sustain personal injuries. The Appellate Division, Fourth Department held: Contrary to the contention of plaintiff on his cross appeal, the court properly dismissed the Labor Law §240(1) claim against all defendants because the accident does not fall within the purview of that statute (see Melber v. 6333 Main St., 91 N.Y.2d 759, 763-764 [1998]; 12 Russell v. Widewaters S. Bay Rd. Assoc., 289 A.D.2d 1025 [2001]). McNabb, 64 A.D.3d at 1239. In the instant matter, the facts are undisputed that the plaintiff fell when he slipped on ice on the floor while wearing stilts. Mr. Nicometi did not fall off the stilts, nor did the stilts fail or malfunction. Mr. Nicometi testified that there was nothing wrong with his stilts and that he slipped and fell on an icy floor. [R. 194, 196]. There is no evidence in the Record, be it testimonial, documentary or through expert opinion that the stilts were defective or had anything wrong with them. Thus, not only was the plaintiff not exposed to any risk that any of the safety devices enumerated in Labor Law §240(1) would have protected against, the plaintiff has not pointed to any defect in the stilts altogether. It is respectfully submitted that the risk of slipping on ice, like encountering an electrical cord, a protruding conduit or a trough of hot oil, is not a risk that can be avoided by proper placement or utilization of one of the devices enumerated in Labor Law §240(1). The protective equipment enumerated in and envisioned by the statute is not designed to avert the hazard that plaintiff allegedly encountered, namely an icy floor. In his brief, plaintiff cites Matos v. Garden State Brick Face, 272 A.D.2d 70, 707 N.Y.S.2d 169 (1st Dep’t 2000), in support of his contention that Labor Law 13 §240(1) should apply to his case. In Matos, the Appellate Division, First Department read Melber as depending on the fact that the plaintiff was walking to retrieve a tool, rather than performing work at a height: Here, in distinction to Melber, where the plaintiff was injured in a fall from stilts as he walked down a hallway to retrieve a tool, plaintiff was injured in the course of actually performing construction at an elevation. 272 A.D.2d at 70-71. Respectfully, the Appellate Division, First Department misconstrued the holding of Melber in its holding. The dispositive factor is whether the injury resulted from a hazard that is contemplated by the statute. Accordingly, plaintiff’s reliance on Matos is misplaced. The Court of Appeals’ holding in Melber was clear, as evidenced by the later decisions of the Appellate Division, Fourth Department in Russell and McNabb. The only divergent decision — other than the instant case — is Matos. WNY Plumbing respectfully submits that this Court should apply the clear holding of Melber and determine that Mr. Nicometi’s incident is not covered by Labor Law §240(1). 14 POINT II IF IT IS DETERMINED THAT LABOR LAW §240(1) APPLIES, THERE IS STILL A TRIABLE ISSUE OF FACT AS TO WHETHER PLAINTIFF WAS THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HIS INJURIES There can be no liability under Labor Law §240(1) unless the injured party shows that the defendant violated §240(1) of the Labor Law and that such violation was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. See, e.g. Blake v. Neighborhood Hous. Serv. of New York City, Inc., 1 N.Y.3d 280, 289, 803 N.E.2d 757, 771 N.Y.S.2d 484 (2003). Labor Law §240(1) is violated when a contractor, owner or agent thereof does not provide “proper protection” to a plaintiff and that such failure caused the plaintiff’s injury. Id. at 289. Even assuming arguendo that there is a violation of Labor Law §240(1), a plaintiff must show that the violation was a “contributing cause of his fall.” Blake v. Neighborhood Hous. Serv. Of New York City, Inc., 1 N.Y.3d at 289. See also Duda v. John W. Rouse Constr. Corp., 32 N.Y.2d 405, 410, 298 N.E.2d 667, 345 N.Y.S.2d 524 (1973). Moreover, where “a reasonable jury could [conclude] that a plaintiff’s actions were the sole proximate cause of his injuries,” liability cannot be decided as a matter of law, but must be submitted to the jury. Weininger v. Hagedorn & Co., 91 N.Y.2d 958, 960, 695 N.E.2d 709, 672 N.Y.S.2d 840 (1998). Notably, where a defendant has offered admissible evidence that a worker was injured while engaged in an activity that he or she had been expressly warned against, there is, at least, an issue of fact as to 15 whether the plaintiff was a recalcitrant worker and, if so, whether such actions were the sole proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. See, e.g. Andrews v. Ryan Homes, Inc., 27 A.D.3d 1197, 1198, 812 N.Y.S.2d 729 (4th Dep’t 2006); Thome v. Benchmark Main Transit Assocs., LLC, 86 A.D.3d 938, 939-940, 927 N.Y.S.2d 260 (4th Dep’t 2011). While the Appellate Division, Fourth Department found that Labor Law §240(1) applies to this matter, it also found that there was a question of fact as to whether the plaintiff’s own conduct — in using stilts to walk on a known icy surface — was the sole proximate cause of his accident. See, e.g. Gordon v. E. Ry. Supply Inc., 82 N.Y.2d 555, 562, 626 N.E.2d 912, 606 N.Y.S.2d 127 (1993) (“plaintiff was working on a ladder and thus was subject to an ‘elevation-related risk.’ The ladder did not prevent plaintiff from falling; thus the “core” objective of section 240 (1) was not met. Accordingly, plaintiff is within the protection of the statute if his injury was proximately caused by the risk”); see also Andrews v. Ryan Homes, 27 A.D.3d 1197, 812 N.Y.S.2d 729 (4th Dep’t 2006). There are clearly issues of fact as to whether the plaintiff’s actions were the “sole proximate cause” of his injury. Notably, Mr. Nicometi’s supervisor, Mr. Hilliker, testified that he told all three of his installers, including Mr. Nicometi: “do not insulate that area.” [R. 589]. In addition, the plaintiff’s own testimony establishes that he was aware of the presence of the ice and the danger it presented. 16 [R. 151-52, 281-90]. Furthermore, the plaintiff testified that he had a discussion with his supervisor with regard to the safety concerns raised by the ice. [R. 157- 58, 290]. Thus, there are facts in the Record which establish that the Mr. Nicometi negligently chose to disregard a known danger that he himself identified, as well as the notice and instruction given by his supervisor, when he attempted to utilize the stilts he was provided to walk on the open and obvious patch of ice, causing himself to fall. The device that Mr. Nicometi used clearly was not defective as he has admitted that he fell when he slipped on ice. There was no failure or defect in the stilts. [R. 196]. As such, the jury must be allowed to determine whether Mr. Nicometi’s own conduct while using the stilts was the “sole proximate cause” of his fall. As there is testimony that the plaintiff was expressly instructed by his supervisor “do not insulate that area [where the ice was present]” [R. 589], plaintiff’s motion should not have been granted. Additionally, the plaintiff has given multiple and differing accounts of the happening of the accident. Notably, the plaintiff gave an account of the accident in his own handwriting to a treating healthcare provider that implies that he was not even installing insulation at the time of his accident, but rather that he was simply walking around. [R. 867]. He gave other accounts, which differ from his 17 deposition testimony, including informing another physician that he was carrying insulation rather than installing it at the time of his accident. [R. 868]. In a situation such as this, there are “questions of fact concerning the circumstances surrounding plaintiff’s accident,” and summary judgment should not be awarded. Buckley v. J.A. Jones/GMO, 38 A.D.3d 461, 832 N.Y.S.2d 560 (1st Dep’t 2007); see also Danielewicz v. Klewin Bldg. Co., Inc., 39 A.D.3d 1194, 1194-95, 834 N.Y.S.2d 813 (4th Dep’t 2007) (“plaintiff’s inconsistent accounts of the manner in which the accident occurred raise issues of fact whether the statute was violated and, if so, whether that violation was a proximate cause of the accident.”); Hamill v. Mutual of America Investment Corp., 79 A.D.3d 478, 479, 913 N.Y.S.2d 62 (1st Dep’t 2010) (“The conflict between these witnesses’ testimony and plaintiff’s testimony … presents a triable issue of fact whether plaintiff’s injury was attributable to defendant’s failure to provide adequate protective devices or was caused solely by plaintiff’s own conduct.”); Petrocelli v. Tishman Constr. Co., 19 A.D.3d 145, 145, 797 N.Y.S.2d 12 (1st Dep’t 2005) (“Conflicting evidence with respect to how plaintiff fell from the ladder presented a triable issue as to whether plaintiff’s injury was attributable to provide adequate protective devices or was solely attributable to plaintiff’s own conduct.”); Kumar v. Stahlunt Assoc., 3 A.D.3d 330, 769 N.Y.S.2d 884 (1st Dep’t 2004) (holding that 18 differing accounts of the manner in which plaintiff’s construction site accident occurred raised triable issues of fact). It is important to note that the discrepancy between plaintiff’s versions of what he was doing when he slipped on ice while wearing stilts would result in different outcomes based upon plaintiff’s own arguments. Plaintiff argues that the fact that he was installing insulation, rather than merely retrieving a tool, when he slipped should cause this Court to find Labor Law §240(1) applicable under the holding of Matos v. Garden State Brick Face, 272 A.D.2d 70, 707 N.Y.S.2d 169 (1st Dep’t 2000). However, if the plaintiff was merely walking around or carrying insulation, surely even plaintiff would agree that, under Matos, Labor Law §240(1) would not apply. Plaintiff’s description of the accident in the medical records that he was walking around and carrying insulation, and not installing it, raises important issues of fact that cannot be determined on the law and should, instead, be submitted to a jury. Because plaintiff himself has given differing account as to how the accident occurred, there are significant questions of fact with respect to the occurrence of the accident. Therefore, summary judgment is not appropriate in this case. See Doan v. Aiken & McGlauklin, Inc., 217 A.D.2d 908, 629 N.Y.S.2d 921 (4th Dep’t 1995); Macutek v. Lansing, 226 A.D.2d 964, 640 N.Y.S.2d 693 (3d Dep’t 1996). 19 CONCLUSION For all the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse that portion of the Appellate Division, Fourth Department’s Decision affirming that Labor Law §240(1) applied to the plaintiff. In order to be awarded summary judgment on liability under § 240(1) of the New York Labor Law, a plaintiff must show that there was a defect in the safety device provided or that the absence of another safety device was a proximate cause of the accident. The plaintiff herein has failed to do so. Mr. Nicometi admitted that there was no defect in the stilts that he was using. Rather, the accident was allegedly caused by his slipping on ice. Simply put, ice is not a risk that these devices are intended to protect against. As such, Labor Law §240(1) is inapplicable to accident in question. Additionally, whether Mr. Nicometi’s actions were the sole proximate cause of this incident is a triable issue of fact which should be submitted to a jury. DATED: May 29, 2014 Respectfully submitted, BAXTER SMITH & SHAPIRO, P.C. By: s/ Michael V. Mclaughlin Sim R. Shapiro Michael V. McLaughlin 182 Dwyer Street West Seneca, New York 14224 Tel.: (716) 854-6140 Fax: (716) 854-6540