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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 187', '§ 190', '§ 664', '§ 12022', '§ 4', '§ 17', '§ 15', '§ 4', '§ 17', '§ 15', '§ 29']

People v. Sandoval (1992) :: :: Supreme Court of California Decisions :: California Case Law :: California Law :: US Law :: Justia
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People v. Sandoval (1992)
[No. S004765. Crim. No. 26405. Dec 14, 1992.]
Defendant was convicted by a jury in the Los Angeles County Superior Court of four counts of first degree murder (Pen. Code, [4 Cal. 4th 168] § 187) fn. 1 with a multiple-murder special-circumstance finding (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)), and one count of attempted murder (§§ 664/187). The jury also found that defendant personally used a firearm in the commission of each offense (§ 12022.5).
Susie Martinez testified that she drove Adela and the others to Belvedere Park on October 14, 1984. She walked around the park with Anthony Aceves until they were called back to the car. When they arrived at the car, she saw Carlos Tostado fighting with someone. The fight stopped, and she noticed defendant standing next to a brown Monte Carlo arguing or talking with Anthony. Gilbert was nearby. Defendant pulled out a gun and shot Gilbert and Anthony in the head. After Gilbert fell to the ground, defendant shot him again. Susie did not see Gilbert or Anthony with any weapons, nor did she them make any aggressive gestures. [4 Cal. 4th 169]
On October 15 or 16, 1984, defendant asked Verduzco to keep a beige and brown Monte Carlo in his garage because he was in some kind of trouble. [4 Cal. 4th 170] Verduzco agreed. Defendant left the car in Verduzco's garage and drove off with Eugene Valenzuela in a 1969 black Chevrolet Impala.
Betty Phipps sold a 1968 Chevrolet Caprice to defendant in October 1984. The car was not in running condition; defendant told her he was going to fix it up. On October 7, 1984, a black 1968 Chevrolet Caprice was stolen from the Los Angeles zoo. The stolen 1968 Chevrolet Caprice was stopped at the [4 Cal. 4th 171] United States-Mexico border at Tecate on December 15, 1984, while Salvador Rubio, a member of the Arizona Marivilla gang, was driving it. The license plate and vehicle identification numbers that were on the car did not belong to the car. One of the documents found in the glove compartment was a "pink slip" or ownership certificate with the name of Betty Phipps on the back.
Ralph Ortega testified that he went to a ranch in Tecate, Mexico with defendant and several other people on October 24, 1984. Ortega went back to Los Angeles and returned to Tecate with his wife and children on October 30, 1984. Defendant was still there. The next evening, October 31, Halloween, defendant and some others took Ortega's son trick-or-treating. [4 Cal. 4th 172]
The statutory requirements for joinder were met here because both incidents involved the same class of crimes-murder. [1] Since the requirements for joinder were satisfied, defendant can predicate error only on a clear showing of potential prejudice. (People v. Johnson (1988) 47 Cal. 3d 576, 587 [253 Cal. Rptr. 710, 764 P.2d 1087].) "The burden is on the party seeking severance to clearly establish that there is a substantial danger of prejudice requiring that the charges be separately tried." (People v. Bean (1988) 46 Cal. 3d 919, 938 [251 Cal. Rptr. 467, 760 P.2d 996].)
"The determination of prejudice is necessarily dependent on the particular circumstances of each individual case, but certain criteria have emerged to provide guidance in ruling upon and reviewing a motion to sever trial." (Frank v. Superior Court (1989) 48 Cal. 3d 632, 639 [257 Cal. Rptr. 550, 770 P.2d 1119].) Refusal to sever may be an abuse of discretion where: (1) evidence on the crimes to be jointly tried would not be cross-admissible in separate trials; (2) certain of the charges are unusually likely to inflame the jury against the defendant; (3) a "weak" case has been joined with a "strong" case, or with another "weak" case, so that the "spillover" effect of aggregate [4 Cal. 4th 173] evidence on several charges might well alter the outcome of some or all of the charges; and (4) any one of the charges carries the death penalty or joinder of them turns the matter into a capital case. (Ibid.; see also Williams v. Superior Court (1984) 36 Cal. 3d 441, 453 [204 Cal. Rptr. 700, 683 P.2d 699].)
[2] Defendant bases his argument for prejudice primarily on the absence of cross-admissibility of the two sets of offenses. He argues that the trial court's reasoning did not establish that the evidence of the two separate incidents would have been admissible in its entirety had there been separate trials. According to defendant, all it established was that there would have been some minor evidentiary crossover as to the two incidents. However, even if defendant is correct on this point, it is now clear that cross-admissibility is not the sine qua non of joint trials. (People v. Mason (1991) 52 Cal. 3d 909, 934 [277 Cal. Rptr. 166, 802 P.2d 950]; Frank v. Superior Court, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 641; People v. Poggi (1988) 45 Cal. 3d 306, 321 [246 Cal. Rptr. 886, 753 P.2d 1082].) "While we have held that cross-admissibility ordinarily dispels any inference of prejudice, we have never held that the absence of cross-admissibility, by itself, sufficed to demonstrate prejudice." (People v. Mason, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 934.) "That the evidence would otherwise be inadmissible may be considered as a factor suggesting possible prejudice, but countervailing considerations that are not present when evidence of uncharged offenses is offered must be weighed in ruling on a severance motion. The burden is on the defendant therefore to persuade the court that these countervailing considerations are outweighed by a substantial danger of undue prejudice." (People v. Bean, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 939.)
Defendant also made passing reference to the fact that he had separate defenses that would be prejudiced because he desired to testify as to one [4 Cal. 4th 174] incident but not the other. Although we have not addressed this theory of prejudice, it has been considered by federal courts. The federal courts have ruled that severance is not mandatory every time a defendant wishes to testify to one charge but not to another. " 'If that were the law, a court would be divested of all control over the matter of severance and the choice would be entrusted to the defendant.' " (U.S. v. Archer (7th Cir. 1988) 843 F.2d 1019, 1022.) The need for severance does not arise in federal courts " 'until the defendant makes a convincing showing that he has both important testimony to give concerning one count and strong need to refrain from testifying on the other.' " (Ibid.; quoting Baker v. United States (D.C. Cir. (1968) 401 F.2d 958, 977 [131 App.D.C. 7]; see also United States v. Valentine (10th Cir. 1983) 706 F.2d 282, 291.) Federal courts have required the defendant to present enough information to satisfy the court that the claim of prejudice is genuine and to enable it to weigh the considerations of economy and expedient judicial administration against the defendant's interest in having a free choice with respect to testifying. (United States v. Valentine, supra, 706 F.2d at p. 291.)
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in permitting the prosecutor to systematically exercise his peremptory challenges to excuse from the jury those prospective jurors who had expressed some scruples about imposition of the death penalty. Defendant acknowledges that we have addressed this contention on numerous occasions and have found no constitutional infirmity in permitting peremptory challenges by both sides on the basis of [4 Cal. 4th 175] specific juror attitudes on the death penalty. (See, e.g., People v. Caro (1988) 46 Cal. 3d 1035, 1061 [251 Cal. Rptr. 757, 761 P.2d 680]; People v. Belmontes (1988) 45 Cal. 3d 744, 799 [248 Cal. Rptr. 126, 755 P.2d 310].) Accordingly, we reject defendant's contention.
Defendant argues that evidence of gang membership was found to be prejudicial and irrelevant in People v. Cardenas (1982) 31 Cal. 3d 897 [184 Cal. Rptr. 165, 647 P.2d 569] and People v. Perez (1981) 114 Cal. App. 3d 470 [170 Cal. Rptr. 619]. However, here, unlike Cardenas and Perez, the evidence was far more relevant. In Cardenas the prosecution introduced evidence of gang membership to prove bias of defense witnesses, but bias had already been established by other testimony. We held that the admission of gang membership evidence was an abuse of discretion under Evidence Code section 352 because the evidence was of minimal probative value, cumulative, and extremely prejudicial. In Perez, the evidence of gang membership had no relevance to any issue at trial. In this case, the court did not err in the admission of gang affiliation. [4 Cal. 4th 176]
[6] A criminal defendant has a right to present evidence of third party culpability if it is capable of raising a reasonable doubt about his own guilt. This rule does "not require that any evidence, however remote, must be admitted to show a third party's possible culpability. ... [E]vidence of mere motive or opportunity to commit the crime in another person, without more, will not suffice to raise a reasonable doubt about a defendant's guilt: there must be direct or circumstantial evidence linking the third person to the actual perpetration of the crime." (People v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal. 3d 826, 833 [226 Cal. Rptr. 112, 718 P.2d 99].)
The present case is similar to People v. Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal. 3d 983, 1017-1018 [254 Cal. Rptr. 586, 766 P.2d 1], where the defense sought to [4 Cal. 4th 177] introduce evidence concerning the victim's association with "Hell's Angel-type people" and drug dealers in order to prove that someone other than the defendant committed the crime. We affirmed the trial court's ruling that the evidence was inadmissible. It did not identify a possible suspect other than the defendant or link any third person to commission of the crime, or even establish an actual motive rather than a possible or potential motive.
Defendant's reliance on Crane v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 683 [90 L. Ed. 2d 636, 106 S. Ct. 2142] is misplaced. That case bears no similarity to the facts of the present case. Crane involved the exclusion of testimony regarding the circumstances surrounding the taking of the defendant's confession. The Supreme Court held that the ruling had denied the defendant a fair opportunity to present a defense.
[8] Defendant contends that the trial court erred in ruling that his prior conviction for assault with intent to commit murder would be admissible for impeachment purposes. We do not agree. The court followed the analysis set forth in People v. Castro (1985) 38 Cal. 3d 301 [211 Cal. Rptr. 719, 696 P.2d 111], interpreting article I, section 28, subdivision (f) of the California Constitution, which was enacted as part of Proposition 8 in 1982. It properly concluded that defendant's reliance on pre-Castro cases was not determinative and that defendant's conviction for assault with intent to commit murder involved moral turpitude. (People v. Olmedo (1985) 167 Cal. App. 3d 1085, 1097-1098 [213 Cal. Rptr. 742].) The court then exercised its discretion under Evidence Code section 352, concluding that the probative value outweighed the prejudicial effect. The court noted that it could not assess the [4 Cal. 4th 178] impact of the prior conviction on defendant's testimony because no offer of proof as to that testimony had been made. Contrary to defendant's contention, the court did not state that an offer of proof was required and, indeed, noted that California law did not then require an offer of proof. fn. 3 Because of the similarity of the prior to one of the charged crimes, the court offered to sanitize the prior by allowing reference to the conviction only as a prior felony conviction. It did not abuse its discretion in doing so. (See People v. Massey (1987) 192 Cal. App. 3d 819, 825 [237 Cal. Rptr. 734].)
Before the defense rested its case, defense counsel told the court that defendant wished to testify about the Belvedere Park incident on October 14, 1984, but that he did not wish to testify about the Wells murders on October 31, 1984. Counsel asked the court to limit any cross-examination of defendant to the Belvedere Park charges. Counsel indicated that defendant would testify on the issue of self-defense but gave no further details as an offer of proof. Defense counsel argued that the two incidents were entirely separate and that the direct and cross-examination could therefore be limited to the Belvedere Park charges. The prosecution disagreed, asserting that there was evidentiary spillover regarding defendant's efforts to hide the beige and brown Monte Carlo in Verduzco's garage and Ray Wells's apparent knowledge of the transaction. The trial court refused to make a ruling in advance of defendant's actual testimony, stating "whether a defendant can effectively limit the cross-examination depends upon the direct examination and may not be known until he testifies. The law is that a defendant cannot artificially limit the cross-examination and direct examination." [4 Cal. 4th 179]
Defendant has failed to show that the court's ruling was erroneous. None of the authorities cited is directly on point, and none would have required the ruling sought here. Indeed, there is authority supportive of the trial court's action. (See People v. Keenan (1988) 46 Cal. 3d 478, 410-513 [250 Cal. Rptr. 550, 758 P.2d 1081]; People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal. 3d 883, 912-913 [245 Cal. Rptr. 336, 751 P.2d 395].) The court acted well within its discretion.
During closing argument the prosecutor referred to the doctor's admission that he had testified differently in other cases about the distinction between alcohol and PCP intoxication. Based on the admission the prosecutor stated that the doctor "is a liar." [4 Cal. 4th 180]
[11] Defendant contends that the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct in so questioning the doctor and in calling him a liar during closing argument. Although defendant objected to the questions on cross-examination, he raised no objection during argument to the prosecutor's use of the term "liar." Defendant has thus waived the latter point since any harm caused by this characterization could have been cured by a timely objection and an admonition. (People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal. 3d 1, 27 [164 Cal. Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468].)
In any event, there was no prosecutorial misconduct. The prosecutor was entitled to question the doctor's testimonial consistency and possible bias. (People v. Meneley (1972) 29 Cal. App. 3d 41, 60 [105 Cal. Rptr. 432].) Referring to testimony as "lies" is an acceptable practice so long as the prosecutor argues inferences based on the evidence and not on the prosecutor's personal belief. (People v. Edelbacher, supra, 47 Cal. 3d 983, 1030.) Closing argument may be vigorous and may include opprobrious epithets when they are reasonably warranted by the evidence. In this case, the prosecutor's argument was based on the evidence and amounted to nothing more than vigorous yet fair argument. (Ibid.)
Defendant's reliance on People v. McGreen (1980) 107 Cal. App. 3d 504 [166 Cal. Rptr. 360] (overruled on other grounds in People v. Wolcott (1983) 34 Cal. 3d 92 [192 Cal. Rptr. 748, 665 P.2d 520]) is misplaced. In McGreen, the prosecutor attempted to discredit the expert witness by showing that he had received B and C grades in graduate school and that the witness's membership in certain scientific societies was a sham. The trial court eventually foreclosed further cross-examination on these grounds. The prosecutor nevertheless persisted in the line of questioning and additionally asserted that the witness's testimony had been stricken in another case because it was "patently unbelievable." When asked for authority to support the admission of such evidence of the witness's "unbelievability," the prosecutor admitted he had none. Additionally, during argument the prosecutor suggested there had been an ethics investigation of the witness and characterized the witness as an habitual liar who prostituted his credentials for $50 an hour. (Id. at pp. 514-517.)
In no way was the cross-examination in this case comparable to that in McGreen. Here, the prosecutor elicited testimony tending to show bias by questioning the witness about his contrary testimony in previous cases and his interest in helping the defense. Such cross-examination was proper. (See People v. Rich (1988) 45 Cal. 3d 1036, 1088 [248 Cal. Rptr. 510, 755 P.2d 960].) [4 Cal. 4th 181]
[12] Defendant contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct by repeatedly suggesting that defense counsel had colluded with Ortega in the fabrication of Ortega's alibi testimony. In our view, the record, as described above, does not support the assertion. Moreover, defendant has waived the point by failing to object and request a timely admonition. (People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 27.) [4 Cal. 4th 182]
On cross-examination the prosecutor asked Ortega whether he (the prosecutor) had made the alleged threat in response to a question asked by [4 Cal. 4th 183] defense counsel. When Ortega answered yes, the prosecutor asked if defense counsel had said "Well, how do you guys like what happened in there today?" Defense counsel objected and denied making the statement. The objection was overruled. Ortega responded that he had heard defense counsel say only, "What's up?"
[18] "A prosecutor may vigorously argue his case, marshalling the facts and arguing inferences to be drawn therefrom. (People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal. 3d 572, 580 [189 Cal. Rptr. 855, 659 P.2d 1144].) We have held he may not express a personal belief in defendant's guilt, in part because of the danger that jurors may assume there is other evidence at his command on which he bases this conclusion. (People v. Bain (1971) 5 Cal. 3d 839, 848 [97 Cal. Rptr. 684, 489 P.2d 564].) We have also held it improper for the prosecutor to imply that defense counsel has fabricated evidence or otherwise to portray defense counsel as the villain in the case. It is not necessary to find that such implication impinges upon defendant's constitutional right to counsel. (Compare People v. Turner (1983) 145 Cal. App. 3d 658, 674 [193 Cal. Rptr. 614].) Instead it is sufficient to note that defendant's conviction should rest on the evidence, not on derelictions of his counsel. (People v. Perry (1972) 7 Cal. 3d 756, 790 [103 Cal. Rptr. 161, 499 P.2d 129]; Bain, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 847.) Casting uncalled for aspersions on defense [4 Cal. 4th 184] counsel directs attention to largely irrelevant matters and does not constitute comment on the evidence or argument as to inferences to be drawn therefrom." (People v. Thompson (1988) 45 Cal. 3d 86, 112 [246 Cal. Rptr. 245, 753 P.2d 37].)
[20] Defendant further charges that the prosecutor committed misconduct by referring to defendant's failure to testify at trial. The prosecutor argued that he forestalled defense testimony by preemptively proving that [4 Cal. 4th 185] defendant did not need glasses at the time of the Belvedere Park offenses: "I should not have proved to you earlier in the trial that he didn't need glasses at the time in the park, because then you would have heard, 'Well, I was in the park, and you can see all the witnesses say I didn't have any glasses on. And I saw one guy go do my friend in with a knife. And another one came to me, and I thought he was going to do me in. I ran over to help my friend and shot him, and I shot him twice. I saw the other one. I couldn't see good who was doing what to me, so I shot him. And the other one coming at me, I shot him, too, because I just couldn't see good.' That's what you would have heard." A defense objection under Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609 [14 L. Ed. 2d 106, 85 S. Ct. 1229] (Griffin) was sustained, and the court admonished the jury to disregard the prosecutor's comments to the extent they reflected on the defendant's not testifying. The prosecutor referred to the glasses again in his rebuttal, stating: "And I argued in my opening argument the fact that you would hear or you would have heard, had we given them a little rope to hang themselves, also you would have heard, 'Well, I couldn't see. I didn't have my glasses on, so therefore that's why I shot this person and I had to shoot this person.' " The defense objection was overruled.
In a supplemental brief, defendant argues that the instruction on reasonable doubt, CALJIC No. 2.90, is constitutionally flawed, citing Cage v. [4 Cal. 4th 186] Louisiana (1990) 498 U.S. 39 [112 L. Ed. 2d 339, 111 S. Ct. 328]. Similar challenges to CALJIC No. 2.90 were raised and rejected in People v. Jennings (1991) 53 Cal. 3d 334, 385-386 [279 Cal. Rptr. 780, 807 P.2d 1009] and People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal. 4th 1183, 1234-1235 [14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 702, 842 P.2d 1]. As we noted in Jennings and Johnson, despite use of the term "moral certainty" in CALJIC No. 2.90, the instruction does not suffer from the flaws condemned in Cage v. Louisiana, supra, 498 U.S. 39.
Defendant also cites Justice Mosk's criticism of CALJIC No. 2.90 in his concurring opinion in People v. Brigham (1979) 25 Cal. 3d 283, 292-316 [157 Cal. Rptr. 905, 599 P.2d 100]. Recognizing that CALJIC No. 2.90 is a verbatim copy of section 1096, Justice Mosk urged the Legislature to redraft the definition of reasonable doubt in section 1096 to make it intelligible to modern juries. The Legislature has not responded. As Justice Mosk recognized, such changes must come from the Legislature.
Ernest Leos testified that on March 17, 1979, he and his son were in their driveway when Jesse Trujillo's car stopped in front of the driveway. Leos's son, Ernest, Jr., went over to the car and was shot while talking to someone in the car. Defendant was convicted of assault with intent to commit murder for this shooting. [4 Cal. 4th 187]
Edward Dominguez had known defendant since 1976, when he opened his liquor store in the neighborhood. Defendant was always a gentleman and, on one occasion, prevented a fight in the store. [4 Cal. 4th 188]
We find no error. First, we have already concluded that the evidence of defendant's gang membership was properly admitted at the guilt phase. Second, the prosecutor was entitled to attempt to negate the evidence in mitigation to the effect that the Arizona Marivilla was now simply a peaceful neighborhood association. (People v. Thompson, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 124.) [23] It is well established that the prosecution may inquire of a defense reputation witness whether he has heard of acts or conduct by the defendant inconsistent with the witness's testimony so long as the People have a good faith belief that the acts or conduct about which they wish to inquire actually [4 Cal. 4th 189] took place. (People v. Siripongs (1988) 45 Cal. 3d 548, 578 [247 Cal. Rptr. 729, 754 P.2d 1306].)
Defendant acknowledges that we have rejected attacks on the instruction given. (See, e.g., People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal. 3d 730, 777-779 [230 Cal. Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113]; People v. Lucky (1988) 45 Cal. 3d 259, 301-302 [247 Cal. Rptr. 1, 753 P.2d 1052].) As we noted in People v. Lucky, supra, at page 302, mere chronological age should not of itself be deemed either aggravating or mitigating: "In our view, the word 'age' in statutory sentencing factor (i) is used as a metonym for any age-related matter suggested by the evidence or by common experience or morality that might reasonably inform the choice of penalty. Accordingly, either counsel may argue any such age-related inference in every case." (Ibid.)
The court did not err in rejecting defendant's proposed special instruction, since it stated that inferences relating to defendant's age could be considered only as a mitigating factor. Nor was there any impropriety in the prosecutor's argument. The prosecutor's argument that defendant was old enough to know better, thus making it aggravating, is an age-related inference that has been found permissible in a number of cases. (See People v. Bonin (1988) 46 Cal. 3d 659, 704-705, fn. 6 [250 Cal. Rptr. 687, 758 P.2d 1217]; People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal. 3d 432, 456-457 [250 Cal. Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135].)
Defendant urges us to reexamine our construction of the age factor in People v. Lucky, supra, 45 Cal. 3d 259 and succeeding cases, arguing that the unfettered discretion regarding how the factor is to be considered renders it unconstitutional under the principles of Gregg v. Georgia (1976) 428 U.S. 153 [49 L. Ed. 2d 859, 96 S. Ct. 2909] and Maynard v. Cartwright (1988) 486 [4 Cal. 4th 190] U.S. 356 [100 L. Ed. 2d 372, 108 S. Ct. 1853]. We rejected a similar argument in People v. Babbitt (1988) 45 Cal. 3d 660, 716 [248 Cal. Rptr. 69, 755 P.2d 253] and are not persuaded that we should reexamine that reasoning. (See also People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal. 3d 787, 844 [1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 696, 819 P.2d 436].)
[25] Defendant contends that the prosecutor violated Booth v. Maryland (1987) 482 U.S. 496 [96 L. Ed. 2d 440, 107 S. Ct. 2529] and South Carolina v. Gathers (1989) 490 U.S. 805 [104 L. Ed. 2d 876, 109 S. Ct. 2207] by urging the jury to consider characteristics of the victims and the loss suffered by the victims' families. The allegedly objectionable references were made in response to defense counsel's argument that the jury should consider defendant's difficult childhood, including the fact that he had to become the man of the house at the age of eight, as illustrated by a photograph of defendant at his father's funeral. fn. 4
"Think about it. They are funerals. Every time you look at this funeral photograph produced by the defense you think of their funerals. You think of their families. And you are called upon to impose death in cases like this when it's so aggravated. How many people must he kill?" [4 Cal. 4th 191]
During the pendency of this appeal, both Booth v. Maryland, supra, 482 U.S. 496 and South Carolina v. Gathers, supra, 490 U.S. 805, were largely overruled. In Payne v. Tennessee (1991) 501 U.S. ___ [115 L. Ed. 2d 720, 111 S. Ct. 2597], the United States Supreme Court held that the use of victim impact evidence does not offend the Eighth Amendment guaranty of an individualized penalty assessment in a capital trial. We have since held that the injury inflicted by the defendant-including evidence about the victim and the impact of the crime on the victim's family-is one of the circumstances of the crime, evidence of which is admissible under section 190.3, factor (a). (People v. Edwards, supra, 54 Cal. 3d 787, 833-836; People v. Fierro (1991) 1 Cal. 4th 173, 234-235 [3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 426, 821 P.2d 1302].)
The prosecutor's remarks were permissible under the principles set forth in Payne v. Tennessee, supra, 501 U.S. ___ [115 L. Ed. 2d 720, 111 S. Ct. 2597] and People v. Edwards, supra, 54 Cal. 3d 787. Accordingly, defendant's claim must be rejected.
"And in facing you again and thinking about that and thinking about how hard your job is, how difficult your job is, in reality you could sit, play God [4 Cal. 4th 192] to an individual. ... [¶] In some sense, I really don't know which is worse, execution or the gas chamber or that kind of life in prison. But you have that power alone. Any one of you can stop the execution alone. You have that power. I have never held that awesome power of holding a person's life in my hands. You have that power. You alone. [¶] You also have that responsibility that you are going to carry for the very rest of your life whether you push that button or not. And the bottom line is it's revenge. Because society to you because you are society, you want to extract revenge. Or is it bad enough to stop it and let this man live out his life in prison? ... [¶] I have come to grasp it now. I looked at you in the eye and you can look back at me. Doesn't change anything. Nothing will bring back Anthony Aceves and Gilbert Martinez and the two Wells. Nothing. Won't change. Bottom line is revenge. Just pure and simple. Vengeance.
"Mr. Applebaum says don't play God. Let every person be in subjection to the governing authorities for there is no authority except from God and those [4 Cal. 4th 193] which are established by God. Therefore, he who resists authority has opposed the ordinance of God, and they who have opposed will receive condemnations upon themselves for rulers are not a cause of fear for good behavior, but for evil. Do you want to have no fear or authority? Do what is good and you will have praise for the same for it is a minister of God to you for good. But if you do what is evil, be afraid for it does not bear the sword for nothing for it is a minister of God an Avenger who brings wrath upon one who practices evil. [¶] You are not playing God. You are doing what God says. This might be the only opportunity to wake him up. God will destroy the body to save the soul. Make him get himself right. ... [¶] ... Let him have the opportunity to get his soul right. That's the only way to get his attention. You are not playing God. God ordains authority."
The People seek to justify the argument as having been appropriate rebuttal to defense counsel's argument. While the question is close, we are of the opinion that the prosecutor's argument crossed the line of permissible argument and rebuttal. There are situations in which the prosecutor has been allowed to make comments in rebuttal that would otherwise be improper, when such comments are fairly responsive to the argument of defense counsel. (See People v. McDaniel (1976) 16 Cal. 3d 156, 177 [127 Cal. Rptr. 467, 545 P.2d 843] and People v. Hill (1967) 66 Cal. 2d 536, 560 [58 Cal. Rptr. 340, 426 P.2d 908]; see also United States v. Robinson (1988) 485 U.S. 25, 31-34 [99 L. Ed. 2d 23, 30-33, 108 S. Ct. 864].) This, however, is not such a situation.
Here, the prosecutor paraphrased a passage of the Bible that is commonly understood as providing justification for the imposition of the death penalty. Such argument is improper. "The closing statements of counsel should relate to the law and the facts of the case as each side interprets them." (People v. Hawthorne, ante, 43, at p. 60 [14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 133, 841 P.2d 118].) Though not expressly identified as such, the passage was unmistakably biblical in style and readily recognizable by persons schooled in the Christian religion. The prosecutor "may state matters not in evidence that are common knowledge, or are illustrations drawn from common experience, history, or literature." (People v. Love (1961) 56 Cal. 2d 720, 730 [16 Cal. Rptr. 777, 366 P.2d 33].) He may not, however, invoke higher or other law as a consideration in the jury's sentencing determination. (Jones v. Kemp (N.D.Ga. 1989) 706 F. Supp. 1534, 1559; Commonwealth v. Chambers (1991) 528 Pa. 558 [599 A.2d 630, 644].) The argument here was clearly improper by exhorting the jury to consider factors outside section 190.3 in making its penalty determination. [4 Cal. 4th 194]
[27] Penalty determinations are to be based on the evidence presented by the parties and the legal instructions given by the court. Reference by either party to religious doctrine, commandments or biblical passages tending to undermine that principle is improper. We recognize that the defense must be allowed some latitude in its presentation of mitigating evidence. Nevertheless, we do not understand that latitude to include exhortation of religious canons as a factor weighing against the death penalty. If the defense were to present such argument, it would be subject to objection by the prosecution and possible like-kind argument in rebuttal. (See United States v. Robinson, supra, 485 U.S. at pp. 31-34 [99 L.Ed.2d at pp. 30-33].) What is objectionable is reliance on religious authority as supporting or opposing the death penalty. The penalty determination is to be made by reliance on the legal instructions given by the court, not by recourse to extraneous authority. (Jones v. Kemp, supra, 706 F. Supp. 1534, 1559.) We do not mean to rule out all reference to religion or religious figures so long as the reference does not purport to be a religious law or commandment.
[26b] Though we have found that the argument in this case constituted misconduct, we do not find that it requires reversal of the penalty judgment. The jurors deliberated for four days before indicating that they were split six to six on two counts and five to seven on the other two. After further deliberations the next day, they returned verdicts of life without possibility of parole on three of the counts and death on only one of the counts. Under these circumstances, we find no reasonable possibility that the jury would have reached more favorable verdicts had the misconduct not occurred. (See People v. Brown, supra, 46 Cal. 3d 432, 448-449.) The result is the same under the federal Chapman test (Chapman v. California (1968) 386 U.S. 18 [17 L. Ed. 2d 705, 87 S. Ct. 824, 24 A.L.R.3d 1065]).
The jury retired for its penalty deliberations at 1:10 p.m. on Thursday, March 12, 1987, and deliberated until 2:45 p.m. Deliberations continued at 8:05 a.m. on Friday morning until the court recessed the jury at 11:45 a.m. to allow counsel time to submit argument on the appropriate response to a question submitted by the jury. The jury had been given separate verdict forms for each victim and it asked whether it could find that different penalties are applicable to different counts. On Monday morning, March 16, 1987, the court responded to the jury's question by stating, "you should reach a verdict as to each count if you can." At 8:50 a.m. the jury resumed [4 Cal. 4th 195] deliberations and continued until court was adjourned at 1:30 p.m. Deliberations continued on Tuesday, March 17, for an hour and a half. After deliberating two and a half more hours the next morning, March 18, the jury sent the court a note stating, "We cannot reach a verdict. How do you proceed from this point on, and what would you like us to do?" The court called the jury out and asked the foreman whether there was "any reasonable possibility, and I emphasize the word 'possible' that the jury can arrive at a verdict as to any count given further deliberations, the rereading of any testimony or the answering of any question that I can answer?" The foreman answered, "No. We have discussed that possibility, and we don't believe that we can reach a verdict." The court then asked for the jury division on each count and was told that it was six to six on count 1, six to six on count 2 five to seven on count 3, and five to seven on count 4. The court then polled each juror as to "whether you think there is a reasonable possibility with further deliberations you can arrive at a verdict as to any of the counts," and each juror replied, "No."
[28] "The determination whether there is reasonable probability of agreement rests in the discretion of the trial court. (People v. Miller (1990) 50 Cal. 3d 954, 993 [269 Cal. Rptr. 492, 790 P.2d 1289]; People v. Sheldon (1989) 48 Cal. 3d 935, 959 [258 Cal. Rptr. 242, 771 P.2d 1330]; People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal. 3d 730, 775 [230 Cal. Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113]; People v. Rojas (1975) 15 Cal. 3d 540, 546 [125 Cal. Rptr. 357, 542 P.2d 229, 92 A.L.R.3d 1127]; People v. Carter (1968) 68 Cal. 2d 810, 817 [69 Cal. Rptr. 297, 442 P.2d 353].) The court must exercise its power, however, [4 Cal. 4th 196] without coercion of the jury, so as to avoid displacing the jury's independent judgment 'in favor of considerations of compromise and expediency.' (People v. Carter, supra, 68 Cal.2d at p. 817.)" (People v. Breaux (1991) 1 Cal. 4th 281, 319 [3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 81, 821 P.2d 585].) The question of coercion is necessarily dependent on the facts and circumstances of each case. (Ibid.)
[29] Defendant argues that the length of time the jury had been deliberating demonstrates that the jury had given careful consideration to the evidence and that a mistrial would have been warranted. (Compare People v. Rich, supra, 45 Cal. 3d 1036, 1117 [court declined to declare mistrial on penalty after jury declared itself unable to reach verdict following only one hour of deliberation].) Defendant also cites the virtually even split and the jurors' individual statements against the usefulness of further deliberations as indicating that the court should have declared a mistrial. None of these factors, however, removed the court's discretion to require further deliberations. The jury had deliberated a similar amount of time in People v. Breaux, supra, 1 Cal. 4th 281, 317-320, when it was asked to continue even though all of the jurors were negative on the prospects of a verdict. In People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal. 3d 730, 774-777, we found no abuse of discretion in requiring the jury to continue deliberating after it declared itself unable to reach a verdict following 18 days of deliberation.
Nothing in the record suggests that the jury was coerced in any way. The court made no statements that could be interpreted as exerting pressure on any juror. The court viewed the jury as a responsible group that took its duty seriously. The court was not unreasonable in concluding that, in light of the [4 Cal. 4th 197] fact that the trial itself had taken some five months, the jury should put in a little more time than the fourteen and one-quarter hours it had deliberated up to that point. The record shows no abuse of discretion.
A defendant who kills more than one person may be convicted and punished for each murder. (People v. Andrews (1989) 49 Cal. 3d 200, 225 [260 Cal. Rptr. 583, 776 P.2d 285]; People v. Ramos (1982) 30 Cal. 3d 553, 587 [180 Cal. Rptr. 266, 639 P.2d 908].) Separate penalty verdicts have been returned in other capital cases. The defendant in People v. Bittaker (1989) 48 Cal. 3d 1046 [259 Cal. Rptr. 630, 774 P.2d 659] was convicted of first degree murder of five victims and was given separate death verdicts as to each murder victim. (Id. at pp. 1106, 1110, fn. 34.) Likewise, the defendant in People v. Mattson (1990) 50 Cal. 3d 826 [268 Cal. Rptr. 802, 789 P.2d 983], who was convicted of the first degree murder of two girls, was given a separate verdict of death as to each murder victim. (Id. at p. 838.) We are not persuaded that there is any impropriety in requiring the jury to return a separate penalty verdict for each capital murder count.
We rejected a similar challenge to this language in People v. Breaux, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pages 315-316. There, as in this case, the language in [4 Cal. 4th 198] question was preceded by instructions that provide: "The weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors does not mean a mere mechanical counting of factors on each side of an imaginary scale, or the arbitrary assignment of weights to any of them. You are free to assign whatever moral or sympathetic value you deem appropriate to each and all of the various factors you are permitted to consider. In weighing the various ... factors you determine under the relevant evidence which penalty is justified and appropriate by considering the totality of aggravating factors with the totality of the mitigating factors." The instructions given, in our view, were sufficient to inform the jury that it could return a death verdict only if the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances.
"I want to respond to some of the things argued by [defense counsel]. He told you that it's absurd to talk about life and death, that the law is absurd, that you are playing God, that it's revenge. [4 Cal. 4th 199]
At this point, defense counsel objected and asked to approach the bench, but met with summary denial. [4 Cal. 4th 200]
"It is of course misconduct for a prosecutor to invoke purported religious law in support of the imposition of the penalty of death." (People v. Hill (1992) 3 Cal. 4th 959, 1016 [13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 475, 839 P.2d 984] (conc. opn. of Mosk, J.); accord, People v. Wrest (1992) 3 Cal. 4th 1088, 1107 [13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 511, 839 P.2d 1020].)
"Argument of this sort by a representative of the government offends California statutes and judicial decisions, which establish the positive, secular law of this state as the rule governing the choice between life and death (see People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal. 4th 408, 483-484 [6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 822, 827 P.2d 388] (conc. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.)). It also violates the United States and California Constitutions-including their respective clauses concerning establishment of religion (U.S. Const., Amend. I; Cal. Const., art. I, § 4), cruel and unusual punishments (U.S. Const., Amend. VIII; Cal. Const., art. I, § 17), and due process of law (U.S. Const., Amend. XIV; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15)." (People v. Hill, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 1016-1017 (conc. opn. of Mosk, J.); see also People v. Wrest, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 1107 [holding that "such an argument tends to diminish the jury's sense of responsibility for its verdict and to imply that another, higher law should be applied in capital cases, displacing the law in the court's instructions"].)
"It is well settled that religion may not play a role in the sentencing process." (Jones v. Kemp (N.D.Ga. 1989) 706 F. Supp. 1534, 1559; accord, People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal. 4th 408, 485 [6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 822, 827 P.2d 388] (conc. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.); see People v. Wrest, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 1107.)
Indeed, the "use ... of an extrajudicial code ... cannot be reconciled with the Eighth Amendment's requirement that any decision to impose death [4 Cal. 4th 201] must be the result of discretion which is carefully and narrowly channelled and circumscribed by the secular law of the jurisdiction." (Jones v. Kemp, supra, 706 F.Supp. at p. 1559; accord, People v. Mincey, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 485 (conc. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.); see People v. Wrest, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 1107.)
It is also misconduct for a prosecutor to seek to "minimize the jury's sense of responsibility for determining the appropriateness of death." (Caldwell v. Mississippi (1985) 472 U.S. 320, 341 [86 L. Ed. 2d 231, 247, 105 S. Ct. 2633]; accord, People v. Wrest, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 1107.) "[U]nder the Eighth Amendment 'the qualitative difference of death from all other punishments requires a correspondingly greater degree of scrutiny of the capital sentencing determination.' " (Caldwell v. Mississippi, supra, at p. 329 [86 L.Ed.2d at p. 239], quoting California v. Ramos (1983) 463 U.S. 992, 998-999 [77 L. Ed. 2d 1171, 1178-1179, 103 S. Ct. 3446].) The assumption underlying Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is that "a capital sentencing jury recognizes the gravity of its task and proceeds with the appropriate awareness of its 'truly awesome responsibility.' " (Caldwell v. Mississippi, supra, at p. 341 [86 L.Ed.2d at p. 247].) This premise is threatened when a representative of the government attempts to undermine the jurors' proper attitude and approach.
It hardly needs mention that "[a] prosecutor is held to a standard higher than that imposed on other attorneys because of the unique function he or she performs in representing the interests, and in exercising the sovereign power, of the State." (People v. Espinoza (1992) 3 Cal. 4th 806, 820 [12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 682, 838 P.2d 204].) fn. 1
On the very face of the record, prosecutorial misconduct is manifest. [4 Cal. 4th 202]
Further, the "purpose of punishment" that the prosecutor called on the jury to serve was assertedly religious as well. He exhorted the jurors to destroy defendant's corruptible body in order to save his immortal soul. fn. 2 [4 Cal. 4th 203]
As noted, the prosecutor stated: "The defense wants to make [the penalty determination] burdensome for you. [']Each and everyone [sic] of you from here on must live with that decision. Push that button over there. You must live with that decision for the rest of your life.['] [¶] Well, if it wasn't you called upon to carry out the will of the people of the State of California, [4 Cal. 4th 204] would have been another jury, because that's our system. That's how the law is affected in this state. [¶] Don't once think that you have to feel burdened and depressed because I voted for death. You are doing what the law says if it's substantial, the aggravation substantially outweighs the mitigation. Don't listen to this lawyer talk."
It is the general rule for error under California law that reversal requires prejudice (People v. Gordon (1990) 50 Cal. 3d 1223, 1253 [270 Cal. Rptr. 451, 792 P.2d 251]) and prejudice in turn requires a reasonable possibility of an effect on the outcome when, as here, penalty in a capital trial is involved (People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal. 3d 432, 446-448 [250 Cal. Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135]).
Similarly, it is the general rule for error under the United States Constitution that reversal requires prejudice and prejudice in turn is presumed unless the government shows that the failing was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (See, e.g., Rose v. Clark (1986) 478 U.S. 570, 576-579 [92 L. Ed. 2d 460, 469-471, 106 S. Ct. 3101].)
The prosecutor's attempt to minimize the jury's responsibility cannot be deemed unsuccessful. "A capital sentencing jury is made up of individuals placed in a very unfamiliar situation and called on to make a very difficult and uncomfortable choice. They are confronted with evidence and argument on the issue of whether another should die, and they are asked to decide that [4 Cal. 4th 205] issue on behalf of the community. Moreover, they are given only partial guidance as to how their judgment should be exercised, leaving them with substantial discretion." (Caldwell v. Mississippi, supra, 472 U.S. at p. 333 [86 L.Ed.2d at p. 242].) Comments like those of the prosecutor in this case offered the jurors an easy way to avoid a hard choice-in fact, an especially hard choice, to judge from the relatively close balance of aggravation and mitigation at the penalty phase and the labored progress of the deliberations thereafter.
FN 1. All statutory references hereafter are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
FN 2. Bender, who is a car buff, first told police it was a Chevrolet Impala. He determined it was a Chevrolet Caprice after examining a book of cars. The only difference between an Impala and a Caprice was that the Caprice had chrome strips. He remembered the car because it was in excellent shape.
FN 3. We have since held that testimony by the defendant is a prerequisite to appellate review. (People v. Collins (1986) 42 Cal. 3d 378, 383 [228 Cal. Rptr. 899, 722 P.2d 173].) The ruling here preceded our holding in Collins, which was to be applied prospectively only.
FN 4. Defendant's mother testified that defendant was six or seven when his father died. The prosecutor, however, referred to defendant as having been eight at the time of his father's death.
FN 1. Because the issue is not raised in this case, I do not attempt to define "religious" misconduct by defense counsel. Certainly, the task would require some delicacy. For example, the provisions of the United States and California Constitutions that constrain the prosecution in this regard-including the clauses concerning establishment of religion (U.S. Const., Amend. I; Cal. Const., art. I, § 4), cruel and unusual punishments (U.S. Const., Amend. VIII; Cal. Const., art. I, § 17), and due process of law (U.S. Const., Amend. XIV; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15)-are generally inapplicable to the defense. (But see Cal. Const., art. I, § 29 ["In a criminal case, the people of the State of California have the right to due process of law ...."].) I leave this labor to another day. The majority should do so as well. They purport to distinguish between permissible references to "religion" and impermissible references to "religious law." Their "rule" may be suitable for sophists to debate in rhetorical exercises. It is altogether too vague for the bench and bar to apply in criminal trials.
FN 2. In accord with above analysis is Commonwealth v. Chambers (1991) 528 Pa. 558 [599 A.2d 630]. There, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered a claim of prosecutorial misconduct based on comments that "Karl Chambers has taken a life" and "As the Bible says, 'and the murderer shall be put to death.' " It found the point meritorious. Its reasoning was as follows.
FN 3. In accord on this point as well is Commonwealth v. Chambers, supra, 528 Pa. 558 [599 A.2d 630]. As noted, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in that case held meritorious a claim of prosecutorial misconduct based on the comments that "Karl Chambers has taken a life" and "As the Bible says, 'and the murderer shall be put to death.' " (See fn. 2, ante.) "Because the prosecutor's argument in favor of the death penalty reached outside of the evidence of the case and the law of this Commonwealth," concluded the court, "we are not convinced that the penalty was not the product of passion, prejudice or an arbitrary factor and, therefore, pursuant to our Death Penalty Statute, we must vacate the sentence of death ...." (528 Pa. at p. 587 [599 A.2d at p. 644].)