Source: https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid%3AUSC-prelim-title11-chapter3-subchapter2&saved=%7CZ3JhbnVsZWlkOlVTQy1wcmVsaW0tdGl0bGUxMS1zZWN0aW9uMzI4%7C%7C%7C0%7Cfalse%7Cprelim&edition=prelim
Timestamp: 2020-07-13 06:18:17
Document Index: 52224247

Matched Legal Cases: ['§429', '§207', '§501', '§2', '§4', '§257', '§207', '§207', '§323', '§324', '§208', '§325', '§430', '§209', '§107', '§4', '§48', '§4', '§4', '§430', '§430', '§201', '§257', '§257', '§210', '§328', '§431', '§1206', '§329', '§432', '§257', '§432', '§432', '§330', '§433', '§211', '§117', '§224', '§232', '§407', '§1104', '§1104', '§232', '§1104', '§407', '§415', '§407', '§224', '§117', '§211', '§257', '§211', '§433', '§433', '§434', '§434', '§331', '§232', '§2', '§1104', '§3001']

[USC02] 11 USC CHAPTER 3, SUBCHAPTER II: OFFICERS
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11 USC CHAPTER 3, SUBCHAPTER II: OFFICERS
From Title 11—BANKRUPTCYCHAPTER 3—CASE ADMINISTRATION
1984—Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 98–353 substituted "the case" for "a case" after "an examiner in".
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b)(1), a person selected under section 701, 702, 703, 1104, 1163, 1183, 1202, or 1302 of this title to serve as trustee in a case under this title qualifies if before seven days after such selection, and before beginning official duties, such person has filed with the court a bond in favor of the United States conditioned on the faithful performance of such official duties.
(d) A proceeding on a trustee's bond may not be commenced after two years after the date on which such trustee was discharged.
(Pub. L. 95–598, Nov. 6, 1978, 92 Stat. 2562; Pub. L. 98–353, title III, §429, July 10, 1984, 98 Stat. 369; Pub. L. 99–554, title II, §§207, 257(d), Oct. 27, 1986, 100 Stat. 3098, 3114; Pub. L. 103–394, title V, §501(d)(3), Oct. 22, 1994, 108 Stat. 4143; Pub. L. 111–16, §2(2), May 7, 2009, 123 Stat. 1607; Pub. L. 116–54, §4(a)(3), Aug. 23, 2019, 133 Stat. 1085.)
Section 322(a) is modified to include a trustee serving in a railroad reorganization under subchapter IV of chapter 11.
A trustee qualifies in a case by filing, within five days after selection, a bond in favor of the United States, conditioned on the faithful performance of his official duties. This section is derived from the Bankruptcy Act section 50b [section 78(b) of former title 11]. The court is required to determine the amount of the bond and the sufficiency of the surety on the bond. Subsection (c), derived from Bankruptcy Act section 50i [section 78(i) of former title 11], relieves the trustee from personal liability and from liability on his bond for any penalty or forfeiture incurred by the debtor. Subsection (d), derived from section 50m [section 78(m) of former title 11], fixes a two-year statute of limitations on any action on a trustee's bond. Finally, subsection (e) dispenses with the bonding requirement for the United States trustee.
2019—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 116–54 inserted "1183," after "1163,".
2009—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 111–16 substituted "seven days" for "five days".
1994—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 103–394 substituted "1202, or 1302" for "1302, or 1202".
1986—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 99–554, §257(d), inserted reference to section 1202 of this title.
Pub. L. 99–554, §207(1), substituted "Except as provided in subsection (b)(1), a person" for "A person".
Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 99–554, §207(2), amended subsec. (b) generally, adding par. (1), designating existing provisions as par. (2), substituting "The United States trustee" for "The court", "(A) the amount" for "(1) the amount", and "(B) the sufficiency" for "(2) the sufficiency".
1984—Subsec. (b)(1). Pub. L. 98–353 inserted "required to be".
Effective date and applicability of amendment by section 207 of Pub. L. 99–554 dependent upon the judicial district involved, see section 302(d), (e) of Pub. L. 99–554, set out as a note under section 581 of Title 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure.
§323. Role and capacity of trustee
Subsection (a) of this section makes the trustee the representative of the estate. Subsection (b) grants the trustee the capacity to sue and to be sued. If the debtor remains in possession in a chapter 11 case, section 1107 gives the debtor in possession these rights of the trustee: the debtor in possession becomes the representative of the estate, and may sue and be sued. The same applies in a chapter 13 case.
§324. Removal of trustee or examiner
(Pub. L. 95–598, Nov. 6, 1978, 92 Stat. 2562; Pub. L. 99–554, title II, §208, Oct. 27, 1986, 100 Stat. 3098.)
1986—Pub. L. 99–554 amended section generally, designating existing provisions as subsec. (a), substituting "a trustee, other than the United States trustee, or an examiner" for "a trustee or an examiner", and adding subsec. (b).
§325. Effect of vacancy
(a) In a case under chapter 7 or 11, other than a case under subchapter V of chapter 11, the court may allow reasonable compensation under section 330 of this title of the trustee for the trustee's services, payable after the trustee renders such services, not to exceed 25 percent on the first $5,000 or less, 10 percent on any amount in excess of $5,000 but not in excess of $50,000, 5 percent on any amount in excess of $50,000 but not in excess of $1,000,000, and reasonable compensation not to exceed 3 percent of such moneys in excess of $1,000,000, upon all moneys disbursed or turned over in the case by the trustee to parties in interest, excluding the debtor, but including holders of secured claims.
(b) In a case under subchapter V of chapter 11 or chapter 12 or 13 of this title, the court may not allow compensation for services or reimbursement of expenses of the United States trustee or of a standing trustee appointed under section 586(b) of title 28, but may allow reasonable compensation under section 330 of this title of a trustee appointed under section 1202(a) or 1302(a) of this title for the trustee's services, payable after the trustee renders such services, not to exceed five percent upon all payments under the plan.
(Pub. L. 95–598, Nov. 6, 1978, 92 Stat. 2562; Pub. L. 98–353, title III, §430(a), (b), July 10, 1984, 98 Stat. 369; Pub. L. 99–554, title II, §209, Oct. 27, 1986, 100 Stat. 3098; Pub. L. 103–394, title I, §107, Oct. 22, 1994, 108 Stat. 4111; Pub. L. 116–54, §4(a)(4), Aug. 23, 2019, 133 Stat. 1085.)
Subsection (b) of this section entitles an operating trustee to a reasonable fee, without any limitation based on the maximum provided for a liquidating trustee as in current law, Bankruptcy Act §48c(2) [section 76(c)(2) of former title 11].
Subsection (d) [enacted as (c)] provides a limitation not found in current law. Even if more than one trustee serves in the case, the maximum fee payable to all trustees does not change. For example, if an interim trustee is appointed and an elected trustee replaces him, the combined total of the fees payable to the interim trustee and the permanent trustee may not exceed the amount specified in this section. Under current law, very often a receiver receives a full fee and a subsequent trustee also receives a full fee. The resultant "double-dipping", especially in cases in which the receiver and the trustee are the same individual, is detrimental to the interests of creditors, by needlessly increasing the cost of administering bankruptcy estates.
2019—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 116–54, §4(a)(4)(A), inserted ", other than a case under subchapter V of chapter 11" after "7 or 11".
Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 116–54, §4(a)(4)(B), inserted "subchapter V of chapter 11 or" after "In a case under".
1994—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 103–394 substituted "25 percent on the first $5,000 or less, 10 percent on any amount in excess of $5,000 but not in excess of $50,000, 5 percent on any amount in excess of $50,000 but not in excess of $1,000,000, and reasonable compensation not to exceed 3 percent of such moneys in excess of $1,000,000" for "fifteen percent on the first $1,000 or less, six percent on any amount in excess of $1,000 but not in excess of $3,000, and three percent on any amount in excess of $3,000".
1986—Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 99–554 amended subsec. (b) generally, substituting "under chapter 12 or 13 of this title" for "under chapter 13 of this title", "expenses of the United States trustee or of a standing trustee appointed under section 586(b) of title 28" for "expenses of a standing trustee appointed under section 1302(d) of this title", and "under section 1202(a) or 1302(a) of this title" for "under section 1302(a) of this title".
1984—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 98–353, §430(a), substituted "and three percent on any amount in excess of $3000" for "three percent on any amount in excess of $3,000 but not in excess of $20,000, two percent on any amount in excess of $20,000 but not in excess of $50,000, and one percent on any amount in excess of $50,000".
Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 98–353, §430(b), amended subsec. (d) generally. Prior to amendment, subsec. (d) read as follows: "The court may deny allowance of compensation for services and reimbursement of expenses of the trustee if the trustee—
"(1) failed to make diligent inquiry into facts that would permit denial of allowance under section 328(c) of this title; or
"(2) with knowledge of such facts, employed a professional person under section 327 of this title."
Until the amendments made by subtitle A (§§201 to 231) of title II of Pub. L. 99–554 become effective in a district and apply to a case, for purposes of such case any reference in subsec. (b) of this section—
1986—Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 99–554, §257(e)(1), which directed the insertion of ", 1202," after "section 721," was executed by making the insertion after "section 721" to reflect the probable intent of Congress.
Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 99–554, §257(e)(2), which directed the insertion of ", 12," after "section 7," was executed by making the insertion after "chapter 7" to reflect the probable intent of Congress.
Pub. L. 99–554, §210, inserted "or the United States trustee" after "another creditor".
1984—Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 98–353 substituted "In a case under chapter 7 or 11 of this title, a person is not disqualified for employment under this section solely because of such person's employment by or representation of a creditor, unless there is objection by another creditor, in which case the court shall disapprove such employment if there is an actual conflict of interest." for "In a case under chapter 7 or 11 of this title, a person is not disqualified for employment under this section solely because of such person's employment by or representation of a creditor, but may not, while employed by the trustee, represent, in connection with the case, a creditor."
§328. Limitation on compensation of professional persons
(a) The trustee, or a committee appointed under section 1102 of this title, with the court's approval, may employ or authorize the employment of a professional person under section 327 or 1103 of this title, as the case may be, on any reasonable terms and conditions of employment, including on a retainer, on an hourly basis, on a fixed or percentage fee basis, or on a contingent fee basis. Notwithstanding such terms and conditions, the court may allow compensation different from the compensation provided under such terms and conditions after the conclusion of such employment, if such terms and conditions prove to have been improvident in light of developments not capable of being anticipated at the time of the fixing of such terms and conditions.
(c) Except as provided in section 327(c), 327(e), or 1107(b) of this title, the court may deny allowance of compensation for services and reimbursement of expenses of a professional person employed under section 327 or 1103 of this title if, at any time during such professional person's employment under section 327 or 1103 of this title, such professional person is not a disinterested person, or represents or holds an interest adverse to the interest of the estate with respect to the matter on which such professional person is employed.
(Pub. L. 95–598, Nov. 6, 1978, 92 Stat. 2563; Pub. L. 98–353, title III, §431, July 10, 1984, 98 Stat. 370; Pub. L. 109–8, title XII, §1206, Apr. 20, 2005, 119 Stat. 194.)
This section, which is parallel to section 326, fixes the maximum compensation allowable to a professional person employed under section 327. It authorizes the trustee, with the court's approval, to employ professional persons on any reasonable terms, including on a retainer, on an hourly or on a contingent fee basis. Subsection (a) further permits the court to allow compensation different from the compensation provided under the trustee's agreement if the prior agreement proves to have been improvident in light of development unanticipatable at the time of the agreement. The court's power includes the power to increase as well as decrease the agreed upon compensation. This provision is permissive, not mandatory, and should not be used by the court if to do so would violate the code of ethics of the professional involved.
Subsection (b) limits a trustee that has been authorized to serve as his own counsel to only one fee for each service. The purpose of permitting the trustee to serve as his own counsel is to reduce costs. It is not included to provide the trustee with a bonus by permitting him to receive two fees for the same service or to avoid the maxima fixed in section 326. Thus, this subsection requires the court to differentiate between the trustee's services as trustee, and his services as trustee's counsel, and to fix compensation accordingly. Services that a trustee normally performs for an estate without assistance of counsel are to be compensated under the limits fixed in section 326. Only services that he performs that are normally performed by trustee's counsel may be compensated under the maxima imposed by this section.
2005—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 109–8 inserted "on a fixed or percentage fee basis," after "hourly basis,".
1984—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 98–353 substituted "not capable of being anticipated" for "unanticipatable".
§329. Debtor's transactions with attorneys
(Pub. L. 95–598, Nov. 6, 1978, 92 Stat. 2564; Pub. L. 98–353, title III, §432, July 10, 1984, 98 Stat. 370; Pub. L. 99–554, title II, §257(c), Oct. 27, 1986, 100 Stat. 3114.)
This section, derived in large part from current Bankruptcy Act section 60d [section 96(d) of former title 11], requires the debtor's attorney to file with the court a statement of the compensation paid or agreed to be paid to the attorney for services in contemplation of and in connection with the case, and the source of the compensation. Payments to a debtor's attorney provide serious potential for evasion of creditor protection provisions of the bankruptcy laws, and serious potential for overreaching by the debtor's attorney, and should be subject to careful scrutiny.
The Bankruptcy Commission recommended a provision similar to this that would have also permitted an examination of the debtor's transactions with insiders. S. 236, 94th Cong., 1st sess., sec. 4–311(b) (1975). Its exclusion here is to permit it to be dealt with by the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. It is not intended that the provision be deleted entirely, only that the flexibility of the rules is more appropriate for such evidentiary matters.
1984—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 98–353, §432(a), substituted "or" for "and" after "in contemplation of".
Subsec. (b)(1). Pub. L. 98–353, §432(b), substituted "estate" for "trustee".
§330. Compensation of officers
(a)(1) After notice to the parties in interest and the United States Trustee and a hearing, and subject to sections 326, 328, and 329, the court may award to a trustee, a consumer privacy ombudsman appointed under section 332, an examiner, an ombudsman appointed under section 333, or a professional person employed under section 327 or 1103—
to pay $15 to trustees serving in cases after such trustees' services are rendered. Beginning 1 year after the date of the enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, such $15 shall be paid in addition to the amount paid under paragraph (1).
(Pub. L. 95–598, Nov. 6, 1978, 92 Stat. 2564; Pub. L. 98–353, title III, §§433, 434, July 10, 1984, 98 Stat. 370; Pub. L. 99–554, title II, §§211, 257(f), Oct. 27, 1986, 100 Stat. 3099, 3114; Pub. L. 103–394, title I, §117, title II, §224(b), Oct. 22, 1994, 108 Stat. 4119, 4130; Pub. L. 109–8, title II, §232(b), title IV, §§407, 415, title XI, §1104(b), Apr. 20, 2005, 119 Stat. 74, 106, 107, 192.)
Section 330(a) contains the standard of compensation adopted in H.R. 8200 as passed by the House rather than the contrary standard contained in the Senate amendment. Attorneys' fees in bankruptcy cases can be quite large and should be closely examined by the court. However bankruptcy legal services are entitled to command the same competency of counsel as other cases. In that light, the policy of this section is to compensate attorneys and other professionals serving in a case under title 11 at the same rate as the attorney or other professional would be compensated for performing comparable services other than in a case under title 11. Contrary language in the Senate report accompanying S. 2266 is rejected, and Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Brock, 405 F.2d 429, 432 (5th Cir. 1968) is overruled. Notions of economy of the estate in fixing fees are outdated and have no place in a bankruptcy code.
Section 330(b) of the Senate amendment is deleted as unnecessary, as the limitations contained therein are covered by section 328(c) of H.R. 8200 as passed by the House and contained in the House amendment.
Section 330(b) of H.R. 8200 as passed by the House is retained by the House amendment as section 330(c) [section 15330].
Section 330 authorizes the court to award compensation for services and reimbursement of expenses of officers of the estate, and other professionals. The compensation is to be reasonable, for economy in administration is the basic objective. Compensation is to be for actual necessary services, based on the time spent, the nature, the extent and the value of the services rendered, and the cost of comparable services in nonbankruptcy cases. There are the criteria that have been applied by the courts as analytic aids in defining "reasonable" compensation.
The reference to "the cost of comparable services" in a nonbankruptcy case is not intended as a change of existing law. In a bankruptcy case fees are not a matter for private agreement. There is inherent a "public interest" that "must be considered in awarding fees," Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Brock, 405 F.2d 429, 432 (C.A.5, 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969). An allowance is the result of a balance struck between moderation in the interest of the estate and its security holders and the need to be "generous enough to encourage" lawyers and others to render the necessary and exacting services that bankruptcy cases often require. In re Yale Express System, Inc., 366 F.Supp. 1376, 1381 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). The rates for similar kinds of services in private employment is one element, among others, in that balance. Compensation in private employment noted in subsection (a) is a point of reference, not a controlling determinant of what shall be allowed in bankruptcy cases.
One of the major reforms in 1938, especially for reorganization cases, was centralized control over fees in the bankruptcy courts. See Brown v. Gerdes, 321 U.S. 178, 182–184 (1944); Leiman v. Guttman, 336 U.S. 1, 4–9 (1949). It was intended to guard against a recurrence of "the many sordid chapters" in "the history of fees in corporate reorganizations." Dickinson Industrial Site, Inc. v. Cowan, 309 U.S. 382, 388 (1940). In the years since then the bankruptcy bar has flourished and prospered, and persons of merit and quality have not eschewed public service in bankruptcy cases merely because bankruptcy courts, in the interest of economy in administration, have not allowed them compensation that may be earned in the private economy of business or the professions. There is no reason to believe that, in generations to come, their successors will be less persuaded by the need to serve in the public interest because of stronger allures of private gain elsewhere.
The last sentence of subsection (a) provides that in the case of a public company—defined in section 1101(3)—the court shall refer, after a hearing, all applications to the Securities and Exchange Commission for a report, which shall be advisory only. In Chapter X cases in which the Commission has appeared, it generally filed reports on fee applications. Usually, courts have accorded the SEC's views substantial weight, as representing the opinion of a disinterested agency skilled and experienced in reorganization affairs. The last sentence intends for the advisory assistance of the Commission to be sought only in case of a public company in reorganization under chapter 11.
Subsection (b) reenacts section 249 of Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act ([former] 11 U.S.C. 649). It is a codification of equitable principles designed to prevent fiduciaries in the case from engaging in the specified transactions since they are in a position to gain inside information or to shape or influence the course of the reorganization. Wolf v. Weinstein, 372 U.S. 633 (1963). The statutory bar of compensation and reimbursement is based on the principle that such transactions involve conflicts of interest. Private gain undoubtedly prompts the purchase or sale of claims or stock interests, while the fiduciary's obligation is to render loyal and disinterested service which his position of trust has imposed upon him. Subsection (b) extends to a trustee, his attorney, committees and their attorneys, or any other persons "acting in the case in a representative or fiduciary capacity." It bars compensation to any of the foregoing, who after assuming to act in such capacity has purchased or sold, directly or indirectly, claims against, or stock in the debtor. The bar is absolute. It makes no difference whether the transaction brought a gain or loss, or neither, and the court is not authorized to approve a purchase or sale, before or after the transaction. The exception is for an acquisition or transfer "otherwise" than by a voluntary purchase or sale, such as an acquisition by bequest. See Otis & Co. v. Insurance Bldg. Corp., 110 F.2d 333, 335 (C.A.1, 1940).
Section 330 authorizes compensation for services and reimbursement of expenses of officers of the estate. It also prescribes the standards on which the amount of compensation is to be determined. As noted above, the compensation allowable under this section is subject to the maxima set out in sections 326, 328, and 329. The compensation is to be reasonable, for actual necessary services rendered, based on the time, the nature, the extent, and the value of the services rendered, and on the cost of comparable services other than in a case under the bankruptcy code. The effect of the last provision is to overrule In re Beverly Crest Convalescent Hospital, Inc., 548 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1976, as amended 1977), which set an arbitrary limit on fees payable based on the amount of a district judge's salary, and other, similar cases that require fees to be determined based on notions of conservation of the estate and economy of administration. If that case were allowed to stand, attorneys that could earn much higher incomes in other fields would leave the bankruptcy arena. Bankruptcy specialists, who enable the system to operate smoothly, efficiently, and expeditiously, would be driven elsewhere, and the bankruptcy field would be occupied by those who could not find other work and those who practice bankruptcy law only occasionally almost as a public service. Bankruptcy fees that are lower than fees in other areas of the legal profession may operate properly when the attorneys appearing in bankruptcy cases do so intermittently, because a low fee in a small segment of a practice can be absorbed by other work. Bankruptcy specialists, however, if required to accept fees in all of their cases that are consistently lower than fees they could receive elsewhere, will not remain in the bankruptcy field.
This subsection provides for reimbursement of actual, necessary expenses. It further provides for compensation of paraprofessionals employed by professional persons employed by the estate of the debtor. The provision is included to reduce the cost of administering bankruptcy cases. In nonbankruptcy areas, attorneys are able to charge for a paraprofessional's time on an hourly basis, and not include it in overhead. If a similar practice does not pertain in bankruptcy cases then the attorney will be less inclined to use paraprofessionals even where the work involved could easily be handled by an attorney's assistant, at much lower cost to the estate. This provision is designed to encourage attorneys to use paraprofessional assistance where possible, and to insure that the estate, not the attorney, will bear the cost, to the benefit of both the estate and the attorneys involved.
2005—Subsec. (a)(1). Pub. L. 109–8, §1104(b)(1), inserted "an ombudsman appointed under section 333, or" before "a professional person" in introductory provisions.
Pub. L. 109–8, §232(b), inserted "a consumer privacy ombudsman appointed under section 332," before "an examiner" in introductory provisions.
Subsec. (a)(1)(A). Pub. L. 109–8, §1104(b)(2), inserted "ombudsman," before "professional person".
Subsec. (a)(3). Pub. L. 109–8, §407(1), in introductory provisions, substituted "In" for "(A) In" and inserted "to an examiner, trustee under chapter 11, or professional person" after "awarded".
Subsec. (a)(3)(E), (F). Pub. L. 109–8, §415, added subpar. (E) and redesignated former subpar. (E) as (F).
Subsec. (a)(7). Pub. L. 109–8, §407(2), added par. (7).
1994—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 103–394, §224(b), amended subsec. (a) generally. Prior to amendment, subsec. (a) read as follows: "After notice to any parties in interest and to the United States trustee and a hearing, and subject to sections 326, 328, and 329 of this title, the court may award to a trustee, to an examiner, to a professional person employed under section 327 or 1103 of this title, or to the debtor's attorney—
"(2) reimbursement for actual, necessary expenses."
Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 103–394, §117, designated existing provisions as par. (1) and added par. (2).
1986—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 99–554, §211(1), inserted "to any parties in interest and to the United States trustee" after "notice".
Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 99–554, §257(f), inserted reference to chapter 12.
Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 99–554, §211(2), added subsec. (d).
1984—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 98–353, §433(1), struck out "to any parties in interest and to the United States trustee" after "After notice".
Subsec. (a)(1). Pub. L. 98–353, §433(2), substituted "nature, the extent, and the value of such services, the time spent on such services" for "time, the nature, the extent, and the value of such services".
Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 98–353, §434(a), substituted "$45" for "$20".
Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 98–353, §434(b), added subsec. (c).
Effective date and applicability of amendment by section 211 of Pub. L. 99–554 dependent upon the judicial district involved, see section 302(d), (e) of Pub. L. 99–554, set out as a note under section 581 of Title 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure.
§331. Interim compensation
(Pub. L. 95–598, Nov. 6, 1978, 92 Stat. 2564.)
Section 331 permits trustees and professional persons to apply to the court not more than once every 120 days for interim compensation and reimbursement payments. The court may permit more frequent applications if the circumstances warrant, such as in very large cases where the legal work is extensive and merits more frequent payments. The court is authorized to allow and order disbursement to the applicant of compensation and reimbursement that is otherwise allowable under section 330. The only effect of this section is to remove any doubt that officers of the estate may apply for, and the court may approve, compensation and reimbursement during the case, instead of being required to wait until the end of the case, which in some instances, may be years. The practice of interim compensation is followed in some courts today, but has been subject to some question. This section explicitly authorizes it.
This section will apply to professionals such as auctioneers and appraisers only if they are not paid on a per job basis.
(Added Pub. L. 109–8, title II, §232(a), Apr. 20, 2005, 119 Stat. 73; amended Pub. L. 111–16, §2(3), May 7, 2009, 123 Stat. 1607.)
2009—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 111–16 substituted "7 days" for "5 days".
(Added Pub. L. 109–8, title XI, §1104(a)(1), Apr. 20, 2005, 119 Stat. 191.)
The Older Americans Act of 1965, referred to in subsecs. (a)(2)(B), (C) and (c)(2), is Pub. L. 89–73, July 14, 1965, 79 Stat. 218, as amended, which is classified generally to chapter 35 (§3001 et seq.) of Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 3001 of Title 42 and Tables.