Source: http://tx.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20190405_0000191.WTX.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2020-06-07 04:16:30
Document Index: 164564125

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 636', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 2', '§ 3582', '§ 3582', '§ 3582', '§ 2255', '§ 3585', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 3585', '§ 3585', '§ 2255', '§ 2241', '§ 2255', '§ 2241', '§ 2255', '§ 2241']

FindACase™ | Munguia v. United States
JESUS ROEL MUNGUIA
HONORABLE ROBERT LEE YEAKEL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Before the Court are Jesus Roel Munguia's Motion to Vacate (Dkt. No. 471), the Government's Response (Dkt. No. 505); and Munguia's Supplements to his Motion to Vacate (Dkt. Nos. 472 & 504). The undersigned submits this Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 1 of Appendix C of the Local Court Rules.
On February 1, 2011, Munguia was charged with (1) conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine (actual) and 100 kilograms or more of a mixture and substance containing a detectible amount of marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 and 846, and (2) two counts of possession with intent to distribute 5 grams or more of methamphetamine (actual) in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841, and aiding and abetting in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2. On April 14, 2011, pursuant to a plea agreement, Munguia pled guilty to the two counts of possession with the intent to distribute methamphetamine and aiding and abetting. Based upon his criminal history and relevant conduct, Munguia's advisory guideline range was 151 to 188 months with a statutory maximum of 40 years. On August 11, 2011, the District Court sentenced Munguia to a 151 months of imprisonment, followed by a four-year term of supervised release on each count to run concurrently. Dkt. No. 335. Munguia filed a direct appeal which was dismissed by the Fifth Circuit. Dkt. No. 364. On April 8, 2015, the District Court granted Munguia's Motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582 from 151 to 130 months based on amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines. Dkt No. 385.
On March 23, 2018, Munguia filed another motion for reduction of sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582 claiming that he was not given any jail credit from February 22, 2011, through June 8, 2011. Dkt. No. 466. On March 27, 2018, the District Court dismissed the motion finding that “Defendant's motion is an unauthorized motion over which this court does not have jurisdiction.” Dkt. No. 467. Munguia appealed the District Court's ruling but the appeal was dismissed for want of prosecution. Dkt. No. 473. On April 23, 2018, Munguia filed another motion for reduction of sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582 arguing that his sentence should be reduced because his base offense level was increased by two points based on his previous misdemeanor conviction for making a terroristic threat, which he argued is not a crime of violence under Sessions v. Dimaya, - U.S -, 138 S.Ct. 1204 (2018). The District Court also dismissed this motion finding that it did not have jurisdiction to rule on the motion since it did not fall within the limited circumstances under the statute for modifying a sentence. Dkt No. 470. The District Court also noted that even if it had jurisdiction the motion would be denied because “Dimaya has absolutely no effect on the calculation of Defendant's criminal history score.” Id. at p. 2 n.1.
A few days later, Munguia filed the instant Motion to Vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing once again that he was denied 120 days of jail credit for time spent in jail between February 22, 2011, through June 8, 2011, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3585. Munguia also argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to argue at sentencing and on appeal that (1) he was entitled to 120 days of credit toward his sentence and (2) that his previous conviction for making a terroristic threat was not a crime of violence and thus should not have been used to increase his base offense level. Munguia also argues that his attorney was ineffective because he coerced him into signing the waiver of his appeal rights and he did not realize he was waiving his right to appeal his sentence on non-frivolous grounds. Munguia requests that this Court grant him a 120 days of jail credit towards his sentence.
Under § 2255, four general grounds exist upon which a defendant may move to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence: (1) the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States; (2) the District Court was without jurisdiction to impose the sentence; (3) the sentence imposed was in excess of the maximum authorized by law; and (4) the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack. 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The nature of a collateral challenge under § 2255 is extremely limited: “A defendant can challenge his conviction after is it presumed final only on issues of constitutional or jurisdictional magnitude . . . and may not raise an issue for the first time on collateral review without showing both ‘cause' for his procedural default, and ‘actual prejudice' resulting from the error.” United States v. Shaid, 937 F.2d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 1991). If the error is not of constitutional or jurisdictional magnitude, the movant must show that the error could not have been raised on direct appeal and would, if condoned, “result in a complete miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Smith, 32 F.3d 194, 196 (5th Cir. 1994). A defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel gives rise to a constitutional issue and is cognizable pursuant to § 2255. United States v. Walker, 68 F.3d 931, 934 (5th Cir. 1996).
A. 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b)
Munguia argues once again that he was denied 120 days of jail credit for time spent in jail between February 22, 2011, through June 8, 2011, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b). Munguia is not contesting the legality or validity of his sentence, but rather is arguing that he should have received additional credit for time served in jail. “Such claims are not cognizable in § 2255 proceedings but must be addressed as habeas petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.” United States v. Gabor, 905 F.2d 76, 77-78 (5th Cir. 1990). This is because “a motion for credit of time calls for the computation of the service of a legally rendered sentence and is not directed toward the sentence itself so as to be cognizable only under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.” Id. (quoting Soyka v. Alldredge, 481 F.2d 303, 305 (3rd Cir. 1973). Thus, any claims regarding the application of sentencing credit to federal sentences must be brought in a motion under § 2241. Id. at 77-78; Vasquez v. United States, 2006 WL 1663762 at * 2 (S.D. Tex. June 13, 2006) (dismissing claim seeking credit against his sentence for time served since it was not cognizable under § 2255). That claim must be pursued in the district in which Munguia is incarcerated. Lee v. Wetzel, 244 F.3d 370, 373 (5th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he district of incarceration is the only district that has jurisdiction to entertain a defendant's § 2241 petition.”). Because Munguia is incarcerated at USP Coleman II in Summerville, Florida, only the Middle District of Florida would have jurisdiction to entertain this time credit claim.[1] Munguia's jail credit claim should therefore be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a petitioner must show that his counsel&#39;s performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Counsel&#39;s performance is deficient if it falls below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. A court&#39;s review of counsel&#39;s performance must be highly deferential, with a strong presumption that the performance was reasonable. Id. at 689; Little v. Johnson, 162 F.3d 855, 860 (5th Cir. 1998). A court will not find ineffective assistance of counsel merely because it disagrees with counsel&#39;s trial strategy. Crane v. Johnson, 178 F.3d 309, 312 (5th Cir. 1999). Moreover, &ldquo;[a] fair assessment of attorney performance requires every effort to be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight.&rdquo; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. To demonstrate the prejudice prong, a petitioner must show &ldquo;a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different but for counsel&#39;s unprofessional errors.&rdquo; Crane, 178 F.3d at 312. &ldquo;A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.&rdquo; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. ...