Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/958/379/371803/
Timestamp: 2019-10-23 03:19:11
Document Index: 150739326

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 6', '§ 3742', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Dennis Andrew Larson, Defendant-appellant, 958 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1992) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Ninth Circuit › 1992 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Dennis Andrew Larson, Defendant-appellant
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Dennis Andrew Larson, Defendant-appellant, 958 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1992)
US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 958 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1992) Submitted March 9, 1992. *Decided March 19, 1992
* Kathryn Barber, Larson's fiancé and a codefendant, brought an adversarial proceeding against Bruno Sabatier during the course of her bankruptcy filed in the United States Bankruptcy Court, District of Nevada. On June 6, 1988, Barber was awarded judgment against Sabatier in the amount of $13,800 (including interest and costs). In October of 1988, Barber lawfully obtained a Writ of Execution to confiscate and sell property owned by Sabatier in Nevada. The property was purchased by Barber and Larson for $10.
The presentence report noted the art was valued by Sabatier at $338,600. Larson's sentence was calculated utilizing a base level upward adjustment of seven, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b) (1) (H), because the loss to the victim was between $200,000 and $500,000.1 Larson disputed the presentence report's valuation of the misappropriated art pieces.
The government argues Larson cannot challenge his sentence because the district court could have properly imposed an identical sentence to the one received, using the alternative ground used in sentencing Barber. The government has not argued prior to appeal that Larson could have been sentenced pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2, as was Barber. We will not consider this argument because it was raised for the first time on appeal. See Winebrenner v. United States, 924 F.2d 851, 856 n. 7 (9th Cir. 1991).
* Ordinarily, we review the district court's factual findings for clear error and interpretations of the guidelines de novo. United States v. Helmy, Nos. 89-10659 and 89-10662, slip op. 589, 601 (9th Cir. Jan. 21, 1992). Larson argues, however, that before we can apply a deferential standard of review, the factual findings must be supported by a "proper foundation." This argument is merely a reiteration of the requirement that the facts not be clearly erroneous. See United States v. Fine, 946 F.2d 650, 652 (9th Cir. 1991) (a district court's factual determination is clearly erroneous if it is "without foundation"); United States v. Aichele, 941 F.2d 761, 767 (9th Cir. 1991) (same). Despite Larson's argument to the contrary, we review the district court's factual determinations for clear error.
To utilize a fact in sentencing, the government bears the burden of convincing the district judge, United States v. Howard, 894 F.2d 1085, 1090 (9th Cir. 1990), "by a preponderance of the evidence that the fact in question exists." United States v. Restrepo, 946 F.2d 654, 661 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (quotation omitted). " [T]he preponderance of the evidence standard is a meaningful one" that requires more than a mere weighing of the quantum of evidence produced. Id.
Any fact relied on by the district court in sentencing must have "sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy." U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a). A challenge to information used during sentencing must show the information to be "(1) false or unreliable, and (2) demonstrably made the basis for the sentence." United States v. Carvajal, 905 F.2d 1292, 1296 (9th Cir. 1990) (quotation omitted) (emphasis added in Carvajal) .
In reviewing the imposition of a sentence under the Guidelines, we "shall give due regard to the opportunity of the district court to judge the credibility of the witnesses...." 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (1988); see also United States v. Barbosa, 906 F.2d 1366, 1370 (9th Cir. 1990).
Sabatier testified at Barber's trial. Because his credibility was in issue at that time, the district judge had the opportunity to evaluate the truthfulness of his testimony. When the district judge was questioned during sentencing regarding the credibility of Sabatier, he responded that he gave Sabatier's testimony " [a] good deal more [credibility] than I gave to [Larson]."
The base level of six, U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(a), was also increased by two points pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b) (2) (A) for more than minimal planning
Barber was also sentenced to twenty-four months in custody. However, her sentence included an upward enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2 (Obstruction of Justice), instead of an enhancement pursuant to § 2F1.1(b) (1)