Source: http://openjurist.org/145/f3d/771
Timestamp: 2013-05-18 20:48:01
Document Index: 330324956

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 2', '§ 841', '§ 2', '§ 841', '§ 2', '§ 922', '§ 922', '§ 2518', '§ 2518', '§ 2518', '§ 2518', '§ 2518', '§ 841', '§ 922', '§ 922', '§ 922', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2255']

145 F3d 771 United States v. Kincaide R | OpenJurist
145 F. 3d 771 - United States v. Kincaide R	Home145 f3d 771 united states v. kincaide r
145 F3d 771 United States v. Kincaide R 145 F.3d 771
49 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 655
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,v.Willie KINCAIDE (96-1771), Christian R. Key (96-1915), KeithElbert Riley (96-1772), Defendants-Appellants.
Nos. 96-1771, 96-1772 and 96-1915.
Argued March 19, 1998.Decided May 21, 1998.Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc Denied in No. 96-1915 July 20, 1998.
Melvin Houston (argued and briefed), Detroit, MI, Willie Kincaide, Leavenworth, KS, for Defendant-Appellant Willie Kincaide.
Keith M. Nathanson (argued and briefed), Nathanson & Nathanson, Farmington Hills, MI, Keith Elbert Riley, Detroit, MI, for Defendant-Appellant Keith Elbert Riley.
Kevin M. Schad (argued and briefed), Schad, Buda, Lucia & Cook, Cincinnati, OH, Christian R. Key (briefed), Otisville, KY, for Defendant-Appellant Christian R. Key.
David Debold (argued and briefed), Amy B. Hartmann, Office of the U.S. Attorney, Detroit, MI, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Defendants Willie Kincaide, Christian Key, and Keith Riley were convicted on various counts of a nine-count indictment that a grand jury returned against thirteen alleged participants in a drug distribution ring. Count one of the indictment charged Kincaide, Key, and Riley under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846 with conspiring to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute heroin, cocaine, and cocaine base from July 1, 1994 through December 14, 1994. Count two charged Kincaide with possession of heroin with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and aiding and abetting under 18 U.S.C. § 2. Count five charged Key under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) with possessing seven kilograms of cocaine with the intent to distribute and under 18 U.S.C. § 2 with aiding and abetting. Count six charged Key and Riley with the possession of heroin with the intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and aiding and abetting under 18 U.S.C. § 2. Count Eight charged Key and Riley under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) as felons in possession of firearms. Finally, count nine charged Kincaide with possessing a firearm while he was a fugitive from justice, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(2). After a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, defendants were convicted of various offenses. Each defendant alleges that the District Court committed errors that require reversal of his convictions, and defendants Key and Riley also contest the validity of their sentences. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the convictions and sentences of each of the defendants.
Kuhl, knowing that a search warrant for the East Larned apartment had already been obtained, summoned a search team. At approximately 10:30 a.m., a team of law enforcement agents conducted a warrant-based search of the apartment. Along with defendant Key, the search team found the following evidence: eighty-eight packets of heroin; powder cocaine; a bag full of ammunition; a loaded Smith & Wesson .357 revolver adjacent to the couch; a 9 millimeter semi-automatic pistol in plain view on the floor of the kitchen; a loaded .22 caliber rifle in a living room closet; a loaded .380 handgun in a bedroom closet; thousands of dollars in cash; chemicals used to cut heroin; surgical masks and gloves; packaging envelopes; and a triple beam scale. Meanwhile, Agent Kuhl noticed what appeared to be a secret compartment on the exterior of the GMC Jimmy's undercarriage below the driver's seat. The FBI impounded the vehicle, and an inventory search revealed approximately seven kilograms of powdered cocaine in the secret compartment.
All three defendants argue that the District Court committed error when it admitted tape recordings of telephone conversations that the Government intercepted pursuant to judicial authorization under 18 U.S.C. § 2518. They argue that the manner in which the tape recordings were sealed did not comply with the requirements set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(a). In addition, defendant Key argues that the District Court abused its discretion by failing to consider the merits of his pretrial motion to suppress these tapes, thereby denying him the opportunity to raise several challenges to the wiretap recordings. We review the decision to admit tape recordings or composite tapes at trial for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Scarborough, 43 F.3d 1021, 1024 (6th Cir.1994).
Defendants' claim that the procedures the Government employed to seal the tapes did not comply with the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(a) is without merit.1 Law enforcement agents placed the individual tapes in evidence envelopes that were sealed, dated, and initialed at the end of each day. At the end of the investigation these envelopes were then sealed in a box, which was sealed in a cabinet pursuant to a court order. Defendants argue that the tapes should have been sealed in the presence of the authorizing judge. "[N]othing in the language of § 2518(8)(a) ... requires the presence of the judge as the sealing of the recordings takes place." United States v. Abraham, 541 F.2d 624, 627 (6th Cir.1976). The statute only requires that the tapes be made available to the judge, and that they be sealed according to his directions. The tapes in this case were sealed in accordance with the judge's orders, and we conclude that the sealing of the tapes in this case complied with § 2518(8)(a).
On appeal defendant Key argues that the District Court's refusal to entertain his untimely motion to suppress the wiretap evidence prevented him from raising several challenges to the evidence. We are precluded from reaching the merits of these challenges on appeal. In United States v. Obiukwu, 17 F.3d 816 (6th Cir.1994), we explained that "Rule 12(f) [of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure] provides that failure to make a pre-trial motion before the motion cut-off date set by the court 'shall constitute waiver' of the motion, unless the court, 'for cause shown ... grant[s] relief from the waiver.' " Id. at 819 (omission and second alteration in the original). The District Court explicitly refused to grant relief in this case, and defendant has waived his right to raise on appeal the issues contained in his untimely motion to suppress.
Defendant Key asserts on appeal that the District Court compromised his rights by refusing to allow him extra time to file a motion to suppress the wiretap evidence when the District Court knew that the Key had been having trouble gaining access to a law library. We have held on several occasions that "the state does not have to provide access to a law library to defendants in criminal trials who wish to represent themselves." United States v. Smith, 907 F.2d 42, 45 (6th Cir.1990); see also United States v. Sammons, 918 F.2d 592, 602 (6th Cir.1990) (explaining that offer of court appointed counsel satisfies constitutional obligation to provide legal assistance). Defendant Key knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel, and the Court was not required to provide him with access to a law library. In this case, the District Court went out of its way to ensure that Key had adequate access to a law library to research his pretrial motions, and Key is not exempt from the rule that an untimely motion to suppress fails to preserve for appeal any issues contained therein. We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in its handling of the wiretap evidence.
With respect to the apartment search, the District Court first ruled that "defendant cannot establish standing to challenge the validity of the search warrant" because he argued that he did not reside in the apartment that was searched. The court, however, also ruled on the merits of defendant Key's challenge, holding that the search warrant was supported by probable cause.2 The District Court also denied Key's motion with respect to the car search, finding that the law enforcement agents had probable cause to conduct a preforfeiture inventory search of the vehicle, and that the search was also valid under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.
In considering a district court's denial of a motion to suppress, we review its conclusions of law and application of the law to the facts, such as its finding of probable cause, de novo. See, e.g., United States v. Pasquarille, 20 F.3d 682, 685 (6th Cir.1994). We must affirm the lower court's denial of a motion to suppress "if the district court's conclusion can be justified for any reason." Id.
We believe that defendant Key had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the East Larned apartment and, therefore, had standing to contest its search. See Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990). Turning to the merits of Key's challenge, we affirm the District Court's conclusion that the warrant authorizing the search was supported by probable cause. A United States Magistrate Judge issued the search warrant for the apartment based on the eighteen-page affidavit of Special Agent Lintner. The Supreme Court explained in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), "that after-the-fact scrutiny by courts of the sufficiency of an affidavit should not take the form of de novo review." Because "the possession of a warrant by officers conducting an arrest or search greatly reduces the perception of unlawful or intrusive police conduct," reviewing courts should pay great deference to a magistrate's determination of probable cause. Id. Therefore, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that an issuing magistrate's determination "should be upheld so long as the magistrate had a 'substantial basis for ... conclud[ing]' that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing." Id. (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960)) (alteration and omission in the original). The affidavit in this case reported that intercepted telephone calls and surveillance indicated that defendants conducted a portion of their drug trafficking activities from the East Larned apartment. It provided the magistrate with a substantial basis for concluding that the search of that apartment would uncover evidence of narcotics trafficking. Therefore, we affirm the District Court's denial of Key's motion to suppress evidence seized from that apartment.
Defendant Key's argument that the District Court should have suppressed the evidence seized from his car is also without merit. It is well established that "police may search an automobile and the containers within it where they have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is contained." California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580, 111 S.Ct. 1982, 114 L.Ed.2d 619 (1991); accord Pasquarille, 20 F.3d at 690; United States v. Mans, 999 F.2d 966, 969 (6th Cir.1993). If police officers have probable cause, they may conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle, "even after it has been impounded and is in police custody." Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259, 261, 102 S.Ct. 3079, 73 L.Ed.2d 750 (1982).
On appeal, defendant Kincaide challenges the District Court's refusal to require the Government to respond to a set of interrogatories that he had served on the prosecution. We review the District Court's order on a discovery motion in a criminal case for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Phillip, 948 F.2d 241, 250 (6th Cir.1991). The District Court was clearly within the bounds of its discretion when it denied defendant Kincaide's request for discovery. Kincaide filed this request for discovery after the cut-off date for pretrial motions, and the interrogatories sought information on the history of slavery in the United States, an issue that was not relevant to this case. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Kincaide's request for discovery.
Defendants Riley and Key assert that they were denied a fair trial because they were tried together with Defendant Kincaide. Both defendants Riley and Key submitted pre-trial motions for separate trials and argue on appeal the District Court erred in its decision to deny them. We review the District Court's decision for plain error because Riley and Key failed to renew their motions at the close of evidence.3 See United States v. Anderson, 89 F.3d 1306, 1312 (6th Cir.1996). Under the plain error analysis, we will only "correct a plain forfeited error affecting substantial rights if the error 'seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.' " United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160, 56 S.Ct. 391, 80 L.Ed. 555 (1936)).
Persons indicted together ordinarily should be tried together because "there is almost always common evidence against the joined defendants that allows for the economy of a single trial." United States v. Phibbs, 999 F.2d 1053, 1067 (6th Cir.1993). Therefore, "when defendants properly have been joined ..., a district court should grant a severance under Rule 14 [of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure] only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence." Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993).
Because defendant Key chose not to make a motion for a mistrial, we review the District Court's failure to grant a mistrial for plain error. See United States v. Cunningham, 804 F.2d 58, 63-64 (6th Cir.1986). "As a general rule, a cautionary instruction advising the jury not to allow a disruptive co-defendant's behavior to [have an] impact [on] the decision regarding the other defendants affords sufficient protection against undue prejudice." United States v. Koskela, 86 F.3d 122, 125 (8th Cir.1996). The court's instruction to the jury sufficed to cure any prejudice that might have occurred as a result of defendant Kincaide's conduct. Moreover, a defendant has a "valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal." Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689, 69 S.Ct. 834, 93 L.Ed. 974 (1949); accord Harpster v. Ohio, 128 F.3d 322 (6th Cir.1997), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 1044, 140 L.Ed.2d 109 (1998). Therefore, in a case where a defendant does not move for a mistrial but one is granted, double jeopardy bars the retrial of the defendant unless the court granting the mistrial had manifest necessity. The Supreme Court has interpreted this standard to "require a 'high degree' [of necessity] before concluding that a mistrial is appropriate." Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 506, 98 S.Ct. 824, 54 L.Ed.2d 717 (1978). We find no error in the District Court's failure to order a mistrial.
E. Sufficiency of the Evidence Supporting Riley's Conspiracy
Defendant Riley challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction on count one of the indictment, which charged him under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846 with conspiring to distribute controlled substances and to possess controlled substances with the intent to distribute. Under Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), we review Riley's challenge to determine "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." To prove guilt on the drug conspiracy charge, the Government bore the burden of proving "the existence of an agreement to violate the drug laws and that each conspirator knew of, intended to join, and participated in the conspiracy." United States v. Lee, 991 F.2d 343, 348 (6th Cir.1993). "Moreover, once the existence of a conspiracy has been proven, only slight evidence is necessary to implicate a defendant." Id.
We review this challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence with the standard of review outlined in the previous section. In order to convict under § 922(g)(1), the Government must prove the following three elements: " '(1) that the defendant had a previous felony conviction, (2) that the defendant possessed a firearm, and (3) that the firearm had traveled in or affected interstate commerce.' " United States v. Moreno, 933 F.2d 362, 372 n. 1 (6th Cir.1991) (quoting United States v. Petitjean, 883 F.2d 1341, 1347 (7th Cir.1989)). Defendant Key challenges only the sufficiency of the evidence that he possessed a firearm. Evidence of constructive possession suffices to satisfy the requirement under § 922(g)(1) of proof that a defendant possessed a firearm. Moreno, 933 F.2d at 373. "Constructive possession exists when a person does not have actual possession but instead knowingly has the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion and control over an object, either directly or through others." United States v. Craven, 478 F.2d 1329, 1333 (6th Cir.1973). Proof that "the person has dominion over the premises where the firearm is located" is sufficient to establish constructive possession. United States v. Clemis, 11 F.3d 597, 601 (6th Cir.1993) (per curiam); accord United States v. Snyder, 913 F.2d 300, 304 (6th Cir.1990).
In Old Chief, a defendant charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) unsuccessfully attempted to stipulate to his status as a convicted felon and objected at trial when the Government introduced the order of judgment and conviction that disclosed the nature of his prior felony. The Ninth Circuit affirmed his conviction, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied the defendant's attempt to exclude evidence of the name and nature of his prior offense under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.4 The Court held that whenthe prior conviction is for an offense likely to support conviction on some improper ground, the only reasonable conclusion was that the risk of unfair prejudice did substantially outweigh the discounted probative value of the record of conviction, and it was an abuse of discretion to admit the record when an admission was available.
117 S.Ct. at 655. In a footnote, the Court explained that "there may be ... other means of proof besides a formal admission on the record that, with a proper objection, will obligate a district court to exclude evidence of the name of the offense." Id. at 655 n. 10 (emphasis added). Thus, the district court's abuse of discretion was its denial of the defendant's attempts to stipulate only to his status as a felon and to exclude evidence of the nature of his prior conviction from the record.
Defendant Kincaide argues on appeal that the District Court erroneously admitted evidence concerning violent and deceptive conduct by himself and other members of his drug distribution organization. He argues that this evidence was not relevant to his role in the conspiracy and should have been excluded under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Because Kincaide did not voice these objections at trial, we review the admission of this evidence for plain error. See, e.g., United States v. Leal, 75 F.3d 219, 224 (6th Cir.1996).
Under Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Courts have regularly upheld the relevancy of evidence of violent acts that exemplify the conspiracy's pattern of conduct. See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 10 F.3d 1374, 1413 (9th Cir.1993); United States v. Patterson, 819 F.2d 1495, 1505 (9th Cir.1987); United States v. Meester, 762 F.2d 867, 874-75 (11th Cir.1985). The use of fraudulent identification also is relevant evidence of a conspiracy's methods of operations. See United States v. Wilson, 11 F.3d 346, 353 (2d Cir.1993) (finding false identification relevant and admissible as evidence of means used to conduct conspiracy). In the instant case, the evidence of violent and fraudulent conduct was relevant the Government's proof of count one of the indictment, which alleged that Kincaide and other members of the conspiracy "would and did obtain false and identification and fraudulent vehicle registrations to avoid detection by law enforcement," and that "various members of this conspiracy ... would enforce the goals of the conspiracy through threats of violence and intimidation."
This evidence was admissible under Rule 403, which allows relevant evidence to be "excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." The contested evidence had great probative value; it showed the means Kincaide used to manage his drug distribution organization. This evidence did portray Kincaide in a negative light, but this does not make it impermissibly prejudicial. "Unfair prejudice does not mean the damage to a defendant's case that results from the legitimate probative force of the evidence; rather it refers to evidence which tends to suggest decision on an improper basis." United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 567 (6th Cir.1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, this evidence tended to prove Kincaide's guilt of conspiracy as it was charged in the indictment but did not suggest an improper basis for conviction. Therefore, we find no error in the admission of this evidence.
1. Defendant Key's Sentence
Defendant Key argues that the District Court incorrectly enhanced his sentence by two levels under USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1) for the possession of a firearm during a drug distribution offense. He asserts that there was insufficient evidence to prove the required nexus between the weapons found in the East Larned apartment and the drug offenses charged in this case. We review the District Court's finding that an enhancement was warranted under § 2D1.1 for clear error. United States v. Elder, 90 F.3d 1110, 1133 (6th Cir.1996).
USSG § 2D1.1, comment. (n.3). In the present case, there was overwhelming evidence that the weapons and defendant Key were present in the apartment in connection with the drug offenses, and we affirm the two-level enhancement under § 2D1.1.
When a defendant fails to object to an error at sentencing, he forfeits his right to raise that error on appeal. See, e.g., United States v. Dobish, 102 F.3d 760, 762 (6th Cir.1996) (per curiam); United States v. Tosca, 18 F.3d 1352, 1355 (6th Cir.1994). By failing to object to the PSR's calculation of the amount of drugs for which he was accountable, defendant has failed to preserve that issue for appeal.I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Unless the record on appeal is adequate to assess the merits of the defendants' allegations, we will not address an ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first time on direct appeal. E.g., United States v. Tucker, 90 F.3d 1135, 1143 (6th Cir.1996); United States v. Snow, 48 F.3d 198 (6th Cir.1995). " 'Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are best brought by a defendant in a post-conviction proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 so that the parties can develop an adequate record on the issue.' " United States v. Seymour, 38 F.3d 261, 263 (6th Cir.1994) (quoting United States v. Daniel, 956 F.2d 540, 543 (6th Cir.1992)).
The record before us is insufficient to allow us to assess the merits of defendant Riley's assertions of error. In particular, the claim that his counsel erred by deciding not to respond to the District Court's overtures for a motion seeking a mistrial could benefit from a more complete record. When the record "is insufficient to show whether the alleged wrongful acts could be considered sound trial strategy," we will not review the defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims for the first time on direct appeal. Snow, 48 F.3d at 199.
First, the defendant must show that his counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.
466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. We have elaborated on these burdens, explaining that "the threshold issue is not whether [defendant's] attorney was inadequate; rather it is whether he was so manifestly ineffective that defeat was snatched from the hands of probable victory." United States v. Morrow, 977 F.2d 222, 229 (6th Cir.1992) (en banc).
The District Court reasoned in the alternative that if probable cause were absent, then the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule under United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), would provide an a third basis for denying Key's motion to suppress evidence from the apartment
FED.R.CRIM.P. 52(b) provides that "[p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court."
In pertinent part, Rule 403 authorizes the exclusion of relevant evidence "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury." FED.R.EVID. 403
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