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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2516', '§ 2515', '§ 2518', '§ 2516', '§ 510', '§ 2516', '§ 2516', '§ 2515', '§ 2518', '§ 2518', '§ 2510', '§ 2516', '§ 2515', '§ 2518', '§ 2518', '§ 2518', '§ 3731', '§ 2516', '§ 2515', '§ 2516', '§ 509', '§ 510', '§ 2516', '§ 2518', '§ 2518', '§ 2518', '§ 2516', '§ 2516', '§ 2516', '§ 2518', '§ 2518', '§ 2518', '§ 2518', '§ 2511', '§ 2520', '§ 2516', '§ 2515', '§ 2511', '§ 2511', '§ 2516', '§ 2518', '§ 2518', '§ 2518', '§ 2518', '§ 2518', '§ 2518', '§ 2518', '§ 2518', '§ 2518']

United States Vs Giordano - Citation 103529 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
United States Vs. Giordano - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/103529
Case Number 416 U.S. 505
Respondent Giordano
united states v. giordano - 416 u.s. 505 (1974) u.s. supreme court united states v. giordano, 416 u.s. 505 (1974) united states v. giordano no. 72-1057 argued january 8, 1974 decided may 13, 1974 416 u.s. 505 certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fourth circuit syllabus title iii of the omnibus crime control and safe streets act of 1968 provides in 18 u.s.c. § 2516(1) that "the attorney general, or any assistant attorney general specially designated by the attorney general, may authorize an application to a federal judge . . . for . . . an order authorizing or approving the interception of wire or oral communications" by federal investigative agencies seeking evidence of certain.....
United States v. Giordano - 416 U.S. 505 (1974)
U.S. Supreme Court United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974)
by federal investigative agencies seeking evidence of certain designated offenses; and further provides that the contents of intercepted communications, or evidence derived therefrom, may not be received in evidence at a trial if the disclosure of the information would violate Title III, 18 U.S.C. § 2515, and may be suppressed on the ground, inter alia, that the communication was "unlawfully intercepted," 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a)(i). In this case, an application purportedly authorized by a specially designated Assistant Attorney General for an order permitting the wiretap of the telephone of respondent Giordano, a narcotics offense suspect, was submitted to the Chief Judge of the District Court, who then issued an interception order and later an extension order based on a similar application, but also including information obtained from the previously authorized interception and extending the authority to conversations of additional named individuals calling to or from Giordano's telephone. The interception was terminated when Giordano and the other respondents were arrested and charged with narcotics violations. During suppression hearings, it developed that the wiretap applications had not, in fact, been authorized by a specially designated Assistant Attorney General, but that the initial application was authorized by the Attorney General's Executive Assistant and the extension application had been approved by the Attorney General himself. The District Court sustained the motions to suppress on the ground that the Justice Department officer approving each application had been misidentified in the applications and intercept orders. The Court of Appeals affirmed, but on the ground that the initial authorization violated § 2516(1), thereby requiring suppression of the wiretap
1. Congress did not intend the power to authorize wiretap applications to be exercised by any individuals other than the Attorney General or an Assistant Attorney General specially designated by him. Pp. 416 U. S. 512 -523.
(a) Notwithstanding 28 U.S.C. § 510, which authorizes the Attorney General to delegate any of his functions to any other officer, employee, or agency of the Justice Department, § 2516(1), fairly read, was intended to limit the power to authorize wiretap applications to the Attorney General himself and to any Assistant Attorney General he might designate. Pp. 416 U. S. 512 -514.
(b) This interpretation of § 2516(1) is strongly supported by the purpose of the Act effectively to prohibit all interceptions of oral and wire communications except those specifically provided for, and by its legislative history. Pp. 416 U. S. 514 -523.
2. Primary or derivative evidence secured by wire interceptions pursuant to a court order issued in response to an application which was, in fact, not authorized by the Attorney General or a specially designated Assistant Attorney General must be suppressed under § 2515 upon a motion properly made under § 2518(10)(a), and hence the evidence obtained from the interceptions pursuant to the initial court order was properly suppressed. Pp. 416 U. S. 524 -529.
(a) Under § 2518(10)(a)(i) the words "unlawfully intercepted" are not limited to constitutional violations, but the statute was intended to require suppression where there is a failure to satisfy any of those statutory requirements that directly and substantially implement the congressional intention to limit the use of intercept procedures to those situations clearly calling for the employment of this extraordinary investigative device. Pp. 416 U. S. 524 -528.
(b) Since Congress intended to condition the use of intercept procedures upon the judgment of a senior Justice Department official that the situation is one of those warranting their use, thus precluding resort to wiretapping in various situations where investigative personnel would otherwise seek intercept authority from the court and the court would very likely authorize its use, it is evident that the provision for pre-application approval was intended to play a central role in the statutory scheme and that suppression must follow when it is shown that this statutory requirement has been ignored. Pp. 416 U. S. 528 -529.
3. Communications intercepted pursuant to the extension order were inadmissible, since they were evidence derived from the communications invalidly intercepted pursuant to the initial order. Pp. 416 U. S. 529 -533.
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in Parts I, II, and III of which all Members joined, and in Part IV of which DOUGLAS, BRENNAN, STEWART, and MARSHALL, JJ., joined. DOUGLAS, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which BRENNAN, STEWART, and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 416 U. S. 580 . POWELL, J., filed an opinion concurring in Parts I, II, and III of the Court's opinion and dissenting from Part IV, in which BURGER, C.J., and BLACKMUN and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined, post, p. 416 U. S. 548 .
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 211-225, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520, prescribes the procedure for securing judicial authority to intercept wire communications in the investigation of specified serious offenses. The Court must here determine whether the Government sufficiently complied with the required application procedures in this case and whether, if not, evidence obtained as a result of such surveillance, under a court order based on the applications, is admissible at the criminal trial of those whose conversations were overheard. In particular, we must decide whether the provision of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2516(1) [ Footnote 1 ] conferring power on that "Attorney General, or any Assistant Attorney General specially designated by the Attorney General" to "authorize an application to a Federal judge . . . for . . . an order authorizing or approving the interception of wire or oral communications" by federal investigative agencies seeking evidence of certain designated offenses permits the Attorney General's Executive Assistant to validly authorize a wiretap application to be made. We conclude that Congress did not intend the power to authorize wiretap applications to be exercised by any individuals other than the Attorney General or an Assistant Attorney General specially designated by him, and that primary or derivative evidence secured by wire interceptions pursuant to a court order issued in response to an application which was, in fact, not authorized by one of the statutorily designated officials must be suppressed under 18 U.S.C. § 2515 upon a motion properly made under 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
In the course of an initial investigation of suspected narcotics dealings on the part of respondent Giordano, it developed that Giordano himself sold narcotics to an undercover agent on October 5, 1970, and also told an informant to call a specified number when interested in transacting narcotics business. Based on this and other information, Francis Brocato, an Assistant United States Attorney, on October 16, 1970, submitted an application to the Chief Judge of the District of Maryland for an order permitting interception of the communications of Giordano, and of others as yet unknown, to or from Giordano's telephone. The application recited that
Suppression hearings followed pretrial notification by the Government, see § 2518(9), that it intended to use in evidence the results of the court-authorized interceptions of communications on Giordano's telephone. It developed at the hearings that the applications for interception authority presented to the District Court had inaccurately described the official who had authorized the applications, and that neither the initial application for the October 16 order nor the application for the
The District Court sustained the motions to suppress on the ground that the officer in the Justice Department
approving each application had been misidentified in the applications and intercept orders, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(1)(a) and (4)(d), United States v. Focarile, 340 F.Supp. 1033, 1060 (Md.1972). On the Government's pretrial appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 3731, the Court of Appeals affirmed on the different ground that the authorization of the October 16 wiretap application by the Attorney General's Executive Assistant violated § 2516(1) of the statute and struck at "the very heart" of Title III, thereby requiring suppression of the wiretap and derivative evidence under §§ 2515 and 2518(10)(a)(i) and (ii). [ Footnote 2 ] 469 F.2d 522, 531 (CA4 1972). We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict with decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit [ Footnote 3 ]
The United States contends that the authorization of intercept applications by the Attorney General's Executive Assistant was not inconsistent with the statute, and that, even if it were, there being no constitutional violation, the wiretap and derivative evidence should not have been ordered suppressed. We disagree with both contentions. [ Footnote 4 ]
Turning first to whether the statute permits the authorization of wiretap applications by the Attorney General's Executive Assistant, we begin with the language
of § 2516(1), which provides that "[t]he Attorney General, or any Assistant Attorney General specially designated by the Attorney General, may authorize" an application for intercept authority. Plainly enough, the Executive Assistant is neither the Attorney General nor a specially designated Assistant Attorney General; but the United States argues that 28 U.S.C. § 509, [ Footnote 5 ] deriving from the Reorganization Acts of 1949 and 1950, vests all functions of the Department of Justice, with some exceptions, in the Attorney General, and that Congress characteristically assigns newly created duties to the Attorney General, rather than to the Department of Justice, thus making essential the provision for delegation appearing in 28 U.S.C. § 510:
The purpose of the legislation, which was passed in 1968, was effectively to prohibit, on the pain of criminal and civil penalties, [ Footnote 6 ] all interceptions of oral and wire communications except those specifically provided for in the Act, most notably those interceptions permitted to law enforcement officers when authorized by court order in connection with the investigation of the serious crimes listed in § 2516. Judicial wiretap orders must be preceded by applications containing prescribed information, § 2518(1). The judge must make certain findings before authorizing interceptions, including the existence of probable cause, § 2518(3). The orders themselves
The Act is not as clear, in some respects, as it might be, but it is at once apparent that it not only limits the crimes for which intercept authority may be obtained, but also imposes important preconditions to obtaining any intercept authority at all. Congress legislated in considerable detail in providing for applications and orders authorizing wiretapping, and evinced the clear intent to make doubly sure that the statutory authority be used with restraint and only where the circumstances warrant the surreptitious interception of wire and oral communications. These procedures were not to be routinely employed as the initial step in criminal investigation. Rather, the applicant must state and the court must find that normal investigative procedures have been tried and failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous. §§ 2518(1)(c) and (3)(c). The Act plainly calls for the prior, informed judgment of enforcement officers desiring court approval for intercept authority, and investigative personnel may not themselves ask a judge for authority to wiretap or eavesdrop. The mature judgment of a particular,
S. 1495 was not enacted, but its provision limiting those who could approve applications for court orders survived, and was included in almost identical form in later legislative proposals, including the bill that became Title III of the Act now before us. [ Footnote 7 ] In the course of
"Professor BLAKEY. If I am not mistaken, the present procedure is before any wiretapping or electronic equipment is used now, it is generally approved at that level anyway, Mr. Chairman, and I would not want this equipment used without high level responsible officials passing on it. It may very well be that, in some number of cases there will not be time to get the Attorney General to approve it. I think we are going to have just [ sic ] to let those cases go, and that, if this equipment is to be used, it ought to be approved by the highest level in the
Hearings on Anti-Crime Program before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 1379 (1967). [ Footnote 8 ]
S.Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 96-97 (1968). This report is particularly significant in that it not only recognizes that the authority to apply for court orders is to be narrowly confined, but also declares that it is to be limited to those responsive to the political process, a category to which the Executive Assistant to the Attorney General obviously does not belong. [ Footnote 9 ]
The Senate passed H.R. 5037, with the amendments tracking the provisions of S. 917, on May 23, 1968, as the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street Act of 1968, 114 Cong.Rec. 14798 and 14889. During the proceedings leading to the passage of the bill, emphasis was again placed on § 2516. That the Attorney General had the exclusive authority to approve or provide for the approval of wiretap applications was reiterated, and it was made clear that, as the bill was drafted, no United States Attorney would have or could be given the authority to apply for an intercept order without the advance approval of a senior officer in the Department. [ Footnote 10 ]
The Government insists that, because § 2516(2) provides for a wider dispersal of authority among state officers to approve wiretap applications and leaves the matter of delegation up to state law, [ Footnote 11 ] it is inappropriate
to confine the authority so narrowly on the federal level. But it is apparent that Congress desired to centralize and limit this authority where it was feasible to do so, a desire easily implemented in the federal establishment by confining the authority to approve wiretap applications to the Attorney General or a designated Assistant Attorney General. To us, it appears wholly at odds with the scheme and history of the Act to construe § 2516(1) to permit the Attorney General to delegate his authority at will, whether it be to his Executive Assistant or to any officer in the Department other than an Assistant Attorney General. [ Footnote 12 ]
"(iii) the interception was not made in conformity with the order of authorization or approval. [ Footnote 13 ]"
The Court of Appeals held that the communications the Government desired to offer in evidence had been "unlawfully intercepted" within the meaning of paragraph (i), because the October application had been approved by the Executive Assistant to the Attorney General, rather than by the Attorney General himself or a designated Assistant Attorney General. [ Footnote 14 ] We have already determined that delegation to the Executive Assistant was indeed contrary to the statute; but the Government contends that approval by the wrong official is a statutory violation only and that paragraph (i) must be construed to reach constitutional, but not statutory, violations. [ Footnote 15 ] The argument is a straightforward one based on the structure of § 2518(10)(a). On the one hand, the unlawful interceptions referred to in paragraph
The position gains some support from the fact that predecessor bills specified a fourth ground for suppression -- the lack of probable cause -- which was omitted in subsequent bills, apparently on the ground that it was not needed because official interceptions without probable cause would be unlawful within the meaning of paragraph (i). [ Footnote 16 ] Arguably, the inference is that, since
The argument of the United States has substance, and it does appear that paragraphs (ii) and (iii) must be deemed to provide suppression for failure to observe some statutory requirements that would not render interceptions unlawful under paragraph (i). But it does not necessarily follow, and we cannot believe, that no statutory infringements whatsoever are also unlawful interceptions within the meaning of paragraph (i). The words "unlawfully intercepted" are themselves not limited to constitutional violations, and we think Congress intended to require suppression where there is failure to satisfy any of those statutory requirements that directly and substantially implement the congressional intention to limit the use of intercept procedures to those situations clearly calling for the employment of this extraordinary investigative device. We have already determined that Congress intended not only to limit resort to wiretapping to certain crimes and situations where probable cause is present, but also to condition the use of intercept procedures upon the judgment of a senior official in the Department of Justice that the situation is one of those warranting their use. It is
"should serve to guarantee that the standards of the new chapter will sharply curtail the unlawful interception of wire and oral communications. [ Footnote 17 ]"
Moreover, it would not extend existing search
and seizure law for Congress to provide for the suppression of evidence obtained in violation of explicit statutory prohibitions. Nardone v. United States, 302 U. S. 379 (1937); Nardone v. United States, 308 U. S. 338 (1939). [ Footnote 18 ]
Even though suppression of the wire communications intercepted under the October 16, 1970, order is required, the Government nevertheless contends that communications
In its November 6 application, the Government sought authority to intercept the conversations of not only Giordano, who alone was expressly named in the initial application and order, but of nine other named persons who were alleged to be involved with Giordano in narcotics violations. Based on the attached affidavit, it was alleged that there was probable cause to believe that
It is apparent from the foregoing that the communications intercepted pursuant to the extension order were
Second, an extension order could validly be granted only upon an application complying with subsection (1) of § 2518. Subsection (1)(e) requires that the fact of prior applications and orders be revealed, and (1)(f) directs that the application set out either the results obtained under the prior order or an explanation for the absence of such results. Plainly, the function of § 2518(1)(f) is to permit the court realistically to appraise the probability that relevant conversations will be overheard in the future. If, during the initial period, no communications of the kind that had been anticipated had been overheard, the Act requires an adequate explanation for the failure before the necessary findings can be made as a predicate to an extension order. But here there were results, and they were set out in great detail. Had they been omitted, no extension order at all could have been granted; but with them, there were sufficient facts to warrant the trial court's finding, in accordance with § 2518(3)(b), of probable cause to believe that wire communications concerning the offenses involved "will
It is urged in dissent that the information obtained from the illegal October 16 interception order may be ignored, and that the remaining evidence submitted in the extension application was sufficient to support the extension order. But whether or not the application, without the facts obtained from monitoring Giordano's telephone, would independently support original wiretap authority, the Act itself forbids extensions of prior authorizations without consideration of the results meanwhile obtained. Obviously, those results were presented, considered, and relied on in this case. Moreover, as previously noted, the Government itself had stated that the wire interception was an indispensable factor in its investigation, and that ordinary surveillance alone would have been insufficient. In our view, the results of the conversations overheard under the initial order were essential, both in fact and in law, to any extension of the intercept authority. Accordingly, communications intercepted under the extension order are derivative evidence and must be suppressed. [ Footnote 19 ] The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
[For concurring opinion of MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, see post, p. 416 U. S. 580 .]
(iii) such person knows, or has reason to know
(2)(a)(i) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for an operator of a switchboard, or an officer, employee, or agent of any communication common carrier, whose facilities are used in the transmission of a wire communication, to intercept, disclose, or use that communication in the normal course of his employment while engaged in any activity which is a necessary incident to the rendition
(c) any offense which is punishable under the following sections of this title: section 201 (bribery of public officials and witnesses), section 224 (bribery in sporting contests), subsection (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), or (i) of section 844 (unlawful use of explosives), section 1084 (transmission of wagering information), section 1503 (influencing or injuring an officer, juror, or witness generally), section 1510 (obstruction of criminal investigations), section 1511 (obstruction of
(g) any conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing offenses.(2) The principal prosecuting attorney of any State, or the principal prosecuting attorney of any political subdivision thereof, if such attorney is authorized by a statute of that State to make application to a State court judge of competent jurisdiction for an order authorizing or approving the interception of wire or oral communications, may apply to such judge for, and such judge may grant in conformity with section 2518 of this chapter
(b) a full and complete statement of the facts and circumstances relied upon by the applicant, to justify his belief that an order should be issued, including (i) details as to the particular offense that has been, is being, or is about to be committed, (ii) a particular description of the nature and location of the facilities from which or the place where the communication is to be intercepted, (iii) a particular description of the type of communications
(3) Upon such application the judge may enter an ex parte order, as requested or as modified, authorizing or approving interception of wire or oral communications
(e) the period of time during which such interception is authorized, including a statement as to whether
(5) No order entered under this section may authorize or approve the interception of any wire or oral communication for any period longer than is necessary to achieve the objective of the authorization, nor, in any event, longer than thirty days. Extensions of an order may be granted, but only upon application for an extension made in accordance with subsection (1) of this section and the court making the findings required by subsection (3) of this section. The period of extension shall be no longer than the authorizing judge deems necessary to achieve the purposes for which it was granted, and in no event for longer than thirty days. Every order and extension thereof shall contain a provision that the authorization to intercept shall be executed as soon as practicable, shall be conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of communications not otherwise subject to interception under this chapter, and must terminate upon attainment of the authorized objective, or, in any event, in thirty days.
may intercept such wire or oral communication if an application for an order approving the interception is made in accordance with this section within forty-eight hours after the interception has occurred, or begins to occur. In the absence of an order, such interception shall immediately terminate when the communication sought is obtained or when the application for the order is denied, whichever is earlier. In the event such application for approval is denied, or in any other case where the interception is terminated without an order having been issued, the contents of any wire or oral communication intercepted shall be treated as having been obtained
(9) The contents of any intercepted wire or oral communication or evidence derived therefrom shall not be received in evidence or otherwise disclosed in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in a Federal or State court unless each party, not less than ten days before the trial, hearing, or proceeding, has been furnished with a copy of the court order, and accompanying application, under which the interception was authorized or approved. This ten-day period may be waived by the judge if he finds that it was not possible to furnish the party with
(b) In addition to any other right to appeal, the United States shall have the right to appeal from an order granting a motion to suppress made under paragraph (a) of this subsection, or the denial of an application for an order of approval, if the United States attorney shall certify to the judge or other official granting such motion or denying such application that the appeal
This and other relevant provisions of the statute are contained in the Appendix to this opinion, post, p. 416 U. S. 534 .
Because of our disposition of this case, we do not reach the grounds relied upon by the District Court. The issue resolved in the District Court, however, is the subject of the companion case, United States v. Chavez, post, p. 416 U. S. 562 .
Criminal sanctions were provided in 18 U.S.C. § 2511, and a civil damages remedy was created b § 2520. See Appendix to this opinion, post, p. 416 U. S. 534 .
114 Cong.Rec. 14469. During the same debate, Senator Long read from a report of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Committee on Federal Legislation, Committee on Civil Rights, "Proposed Legislation on Wiretapping and Eavesdropping after Berger v. New York and Katz v. United States, " which commented on the application provisions of Title III in the following manner:
" Who May Apply"
We also deem it clear that the authority must be exercised before the application is presented to a federal judge. The suggestion that it is acceptable practice under § 2516(1) for the Attorney General's Executive Assistant to approve wiretap applications in the Attorney General's absence if the Attorney General subsequently, after a court order has issued, ratifies the giving of approval in the particular instance, either directly or by personally approving the submission of a further application for an extension order, as in this case, is wide of the mark. As the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit noted in the panel decision in United States v. Robinson, 468 F.2d at 193, the Attorney General's
"Section 2515 of the new chapter imposes an evidentiary sanction to compel compliance with the other prohibitions of the chapter. . . . The provision must, of course, be read in light of section 2518(10)(a) discussed below, which defines the class entitled to make a motion to suppress. It largely reflects existing law. It applies to suppress evidence directly ( Nardone v. United States, 302 U. S. 379 (1937)), or indirectly obtained in violation of the chapter. ( Nardone v. United States, 308 U. S. 338 (1939).) There is, however, no intention to change the attenuation rule. . . . Nor generally to press the scope of the suppression role beyond present search and seizure law. . . . But it does apply across the board in both Federal and State proceeding[s]. . . . And it is not limited to criminal proceedings. Such a suppression rule is necessary and proper to protect privacy. . . . The provision thus forms an integral part of the system of limitations designed to protect privacy. Along with the criminal and civil remedies, it should serve to guarantee that the standards of the new chapter will sharply curtail the unlawful interception of wire and oral communications."
and § 2515 ties the propriety of suppression of evidence to the impropriety of its "disclosure," to hold that statutory violations committed in the Justice Department's internal approval and submission procedures with respect to wiretap applications preclude disclosure in court would be to attribute to Congress an intent to impose substantial criminal penalties for "every defect in processing applications." Brief for United States 38. Apart from the fact that a majority of the Court in United States v. Chavez, post, p. 416 U. S. 562 , has concluded that not every defect will warrant suppression, it is evident that § 2511 does not impose criminal liability unless disclosure is "willful" and unless the information was known to have been obtained in violation of § 2511(1). Clearly, the circumstances under which suppression of evidence would be required are not necessarily the same as those under which a criminal violation of Title III would be found.
I agree with the majority that the authorization by the Executive Assistant to the Attorney General of the application for the October 16 interception order contravened 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) and that the statutory remedy is suppression of all evidence derived from interceptions made under that order. I therefore join Parts I, II, and III of the opinion of the Court. For the reasons stated below, however, I dissent from the Court's conclusion, stated in 416 U. S. that evidence
obtained under the two "pen register" [ Footnote 2/1 ] extension orders and under the November 6 extension of the interception order must also be suppressed.
The authorization for use of the pen register device was extended by orders dated October 22 and November
The Government contends that, putting aside all evidence derived from the invalid original wiretap order, the independent and untainted evidence submitted to the District Court constituted probable cause for issuance of both pen register extension orders and the wiretap extension order, and, in the latter case, also satisfied the additional requirements imposed by 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3). [ Footnote 2/2 ] Preoccupied with the larger issues in the case, the District Court summarily dismissed this contention insofar as it related to the pen register extension orders:
With respect to the wiretap extension, neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals addressed the Government's contention that communications intercepted under the extension were not derivatively tainted by the improper authorization defect in the original wiretap order, and neither court made any finding on this contention. The District Court simply found the wiretap extension order invalid on a different ground applicable both to the extension and to the original order. Specifically, the court concluded that the original wiretap order was unlawful because the application for it misidentified the approving officer and therefore failed to comply strictly with the provisions of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(1)(a) and (4)(d). The misidentification problem occurred in the application for the original wiretap order and in the application for the wiretap extension. The District Court held the extension order invalid on that basis alone, and ordered the evidence obtained pursuant thereto suppressed for that reason. [ Footnote 2/3 ] The Court of
Today we affirm the suppression of evidence obtained under the original wiretap order for the same reason adopted by the Court of Appeals -- the defect of improper authorization. As noted above, this defect did not occur in the application for the wiretap extension order. Today we also hold that misidentification of the approving authority does not render inadmissible evidence obtained pursuant to a resulting interception order. United States v. Chavez, post, p. 416 U. S. 562 . This decision removes the sole basis advanced by the District Court for suppressing the telephone conversations intercepted under the wiretap extension order, and requires us to consider whether that evidence should be suppressed by reason of the improper authorization of the application for the original order. In doing so, it is important to note that we are the first court to consider this aspect of the case.
The majority holds that the invalidity of the original wiretap order requires suppression of all evidence
Because a pen register device is not subject to the provisions of Title III, the permissibility of its use by law enforcement authorities depends entirely on compliance
with the constitutional requirements of the Fourth Amendment. [ Footnote 2/4 ] In this case, the Government secured a court order, the equivalent for this purpose of a search warrant, for each of the two extensions of its authorization to use a pen register. The District Court seemed to assume that, because these extension orders were based in part on tainted evidence, information obtained pursuant thereto must necessarily be suppressed under the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. 340 F.Supp. at 1041. That is not the law.
The District Court relied on Nardone v. United States, 308 U. S. 338 (1939). In that decision, the Court held that a statutory prohibition of unlawfully obtained evidence encompassed derivative evidence as well. But the Court also reaffirmed that the connection between unlawful activity and evidence offered at trial may become "so attenuated as to dissipate the taint," id. at 308 U. S. 341 , and that facts improperly obtained may nevertheless be proved if knowledge of them is based on an independent source. Ibid. In its constitutional aspect, the principle is illustrated by Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471 (1963). It is, in essence, that the derivative taint of illegal activity does not extend to the ends of the earth, but only until it is dissipated by an intervening event. Of course, the presence of an independent source would always suffice.
The independent source rule has as much vitality in the context of a search warrant as in any other. Thus, for example, unlawfully discovered facts may serve as the basis for a valid search warrant if knowledge of them
is obtained from an independent and lawful source. See, e.g., Anderson v. United States, 344 F.2d 792 (CA10 1965). The obvious and well established corollary is that the inclusion in an affidavit of indisputably tainted allegations does not necessarily render the resulting warrant invalid. The ultimate inquiry on a motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a warrant is not whether the underlying affidavit contained allegations based on illegally obtained evidence, but whether, putting aside all tainted allegations, the independent and lawful information stated in the affidavit suffices to show probable cause. James v. United States, 135 U.S.App.D.C. 314, 315, 418 F.2d 1150, 1151 (1969); United States v. Sterling, 369 F.2d 799, 802 (CA3 1966); United States v. Tarrant, 460 F.2d 701, 703-704 (CA5 1972); United States v. Koonce, 485 F.2d 374, 379 (CA8 1973); Nowell v. Cupp, 427 F.2d 36, 38 (CA9 1970); Chin Kay v. United States, 311 F.2d 317, 321 (CA9 1962). [ Footnote 2/5 ] Judge
Id. at 82. I know of no precedent holding to the contrary. [ Footnote 2/6 ]
The application of this principle to the pen register extension orders is clear beyond doubt. The original pen register order was based on a showing of probable
"[Section 2515] largely reflects existing law. It applies to suppress evidence directly ( Nardone v. United States, 302 U. S. 379 (1937)) or indirectly obtained in violation of the chapter. ( Nardone v. United States, 308 U. S. 338 (1939).) There is, however, no intention to change the attenuation rule. See Nardone v. United States, 127 F.2d 521 (2d)! cert. denied, 316 U.S. 698 (1942); Wong Sun
S.Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 96. Thus, although the validity of a wiretap order depends on the satisfaction of certain statutory conditions in addition to the constitutional requirement of probable cause, the principle developed in 416 U. S. The question is not whether the application for that order relied in part on communications intercepted under the invalid original order but whether, putting aside that tainted evidence, the independent and lawful information stated in the supporting affidavit suffices to show both probable cause and satisfaction of the various additional requirements of Title III. [ Footnote 2/7 ] United States v.
The application for the wiretap extension order was supported by the affidavit of a group supervisor from the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. The same officer had sworn to one of two affidavits submitted in support of the application for the original wiretap order. The other had been filed by a narcotics agent acting under his supervision and stated facts within their joint knowledge. In the affidavit for the extension order, the supervisor swore that he had reviewed both of the earlier affidavits, and he "reassert[ed] the facts, details and conclusions contained in those affidavits." App. 66. Those allegations not only established probable cause to believe that Giordano was engaged in the illegal sale and distribution of narcotics on a fairly substantial scale, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a), they also satisfied the additional statutory criteria for issuance of an intercept order. They showed, for example, that Giordano had made numerous telephone calls to numbers listed to well known narcotics violators, and hence that there was probable cause to believe that communications concerning the illegal drug traffic were taking place on Giordano's telephone line. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(3)(b) and (d). The affidavits also established the inadequacy of alternative investigative means, and demonstrated that, without a wiretap of Giordano's telephone, the narcotics agents would be unable to discover his source of supply or method of distribution. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c). All this was shown on the basis of wholly untainted evidence incorporated and reaffirmed in the affidavit supporting
The affidavit also provided additional untainted information to support the application for the extension order. It set forth, for example, the circumstances of Giordano's sale of $3,800 worth of heroin to an undercover agent on the day following issuance of the original wiretap order. Moreover, it recounted in great detail highly suspicious conduct observed by federal agents keeping Giordano under physical surveillance. [ Footnote 2/8 ] Like the allegations incorporated by reference from the earlier affidavits, this additional untainted information was relevant both to the constitutional requirement of probable cause and to the various statutory criteria for issuance of an intercept order. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3).
The majority seems to believe that this principle, while fully applicable to original wiretap orders, is wholly inapplicable to extension orders. This, at least, is the most reasonable construction of the majority's discussion of §§ 2518(1)(e) and (f). Ante at 416 U. S. 532 -533. Those provisions require that an application for an extension order include "a full and complete statement of the facts concerning all previous applications" and "a statement setting forth the results thus far obtained from the interception. . . ." According to the majority, the fact that law enforcement authorities complied with §§ 2518(1)(e) and (f) by including in the application for the extension order information regarding the earlier wiretap necessarily and automatically rendered the extension order invalid, regardless of whether the independent and untainted information in the application for the extension satisfied the requirements of the Fourth Amendment and § 2518(3).
The detailed information lawfully obtained through surveillance and undercover work was aptly summarized in Ĺš 77 of the affidavit supporting the extension order: