Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/383/225/case.html
Timestamp: 2016-10-01 17:15:18
Document Index: 38355555

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 451', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8']

U.S. Supreme CourtAccardi v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 383 U.S. 225 (1966)Accardi v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co.No. 280Argued January 20, 1966Decided February 28, 1966383 U.S. 225CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Petitioners, who are World War II veterans and former employees of the Pennsylvania Railroad, brought this action claiming that their former employer denied them certain seniority rights guaranteed by § 8 of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940. [Footnote 1] Section 8(b)(B) of that Act provides that upon application by any former employee who has satisfactorily completed his military service, a private employer "shall restore" such honorably discharged serviceman to his former
Section 8(c) Page 383 U. S. 227 reemphasizes § 8(b)(B) by providing that any person so restored "shall be so restored without loss of seniority."
The amount of the separation allowances was determined, according to the language of the agreement, by Page 383 U. S. 228 the length of "compensated service" with the railroad. A month of "compensated service" was defined as any month in which the employee worked one or more days, and "a year of compensated service is 12 such months or major portion thereof." In computing petitioners' separation allowances, the railroad did not include the years spent in the armed forces as years of "compensated service." Petitioners claim this was error and contrary to § 8 of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940. Each petitioner received $1,242.60 less than he would have if given credit for the three or more years he spent in military service, and the parties have stipulated that, if petitioners are entitled to have the time in the service included in determining severance pay, judgment for this amount should be rendered for each of them. The District Court rendered judgment for petitioners. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding, contrary to the District Court, that the petitioners were not entitled to credit for their time in the service in computing the allowances because the allowances did not come within the concepts of "seniority, status, and pay." 341 F.2d 72.
The language of the 1940 Act clearly manifests a purpose and desire on the part of Congress to provide as nearly as possible that persons called to serve their country in the armed forces should, upon returning to work in civilian life, resume their old employment without any loss because of their service to their country. Section 8(b)(B) of the statute requires that private employers reinstate their former employees who are honorably discharged veterans "to [their former] position or to a position of like seniority, status, and pay," and § 8(c) provides that such a person "shall be so restored without loss of seniority." This means that, for the purpose of determining seniority the returning veteran is to be treated as though he has been continuously employed during the period spent in the armed forces. Fishgold v. Page 383 U. S. 229 Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U. S. 275, 328 U. S. 284-285. The continuing purpose of Congress in this matter was again shown in the Universal Military Training and Service Act, 62 Stat. 604, as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. § 451 et seq. (1964 ed.). Section 9(c)(2) of that Act provides:
At 328 U. S. 285. The term "seniority" is not to be limited by a narrow, technical definition, but must be given a meaning that is consonant with the intention of Congress as expressed in the 1940 Act. That intention was to preserve for the returning veterans the rights and benefits which would have automatically accrued to them had they remained in private employment rather than responding to Page 383 U. S. 230 the call of their country. In this case, there can be no doubt that the amounts of the severance payments were based primarily on the employees' length of service with the railroad. The railroad contends, however, that the allowances were not based on seniority, but on the actual total service rendered by the employee. This is hardly consistent with the bizarre results possible under the definition of "compensated service." As the Government [Footnote 2] points out, it is possible under the agreement for an employee to receive credit for a whole year of "compensated service" by working a mere seven days. There would be no distinction whatever between the man who worked one day a month for seven months and the man who worked 365 days in a year. The use of the label "compensated service" cannot obscure the fact that the real nature of these payments was compensation for loss of jobs. And the cost to an employee of losing his job is not measured by how much work he did in the past -- no matter how calculated -- but by the rights and benefits he forfeits by giving up his job. Among employees who worked at the same jobs in the same craft and class, the number and value of the rights and benefits increase in proportion to the amount of seniority, and it is only natural that those with the most seniority should receive the highest allowances, since they were giving up more rights and benefits than those with less seniority. The requirements of the 1940 Act are not satisfied by giving returning veterans seniority in some general abstract sense and then denying them the perquisites and benefits that flow from it. We think it clear that the amount of these allowances is just as much a perquisite of seniority as the more traditional benefits such as work preference and order of lay-off and recall. We hold that the failure to credit petitioners' "compensated service" time with the Page 383 U. S. 231 period spent in the armed services does not accord petitioners the right to be reinstated "without loss of seniority" guaranteed by §§ 8(b)(B) and (c).
The legislative history referred to in the Government's brief persuasively supports such a purpose. [Footnote 3] Page 383 U. S. 232
Since the Court of Appeals held that the provisions of § 8(b)(B) did not apply to separation allowances, it found it unnecessary to decide an alternative ground which the railroad contended should cause reversal. That contention was that, since the agreement between the railroad and the union was entered into more than one year after petitioners were restored to their employment, the Act has no application to any rights created by the agreement. This argument rested on that part of § 8(c) which provides that a veteran who is restored to employment "shall not be discharged from such position without cause within one year after such restoration." The District Court rejected the contention as having no merit. We agree with the District Court, and believe this contention to be so wholly without merit that the case need not be remanded to the Court of Appeals for its decision on the point. In Oakley v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 338 U. S. 278, 338 U. S. 284, we said:
"[T]he expiration of the year did not terminate the veteran's right to the seniority to which he was entitled by virtue of the Act's treatment of him as though he had remained continuously in his civilian employment; nor did it open the door to discrimination Page 383 U. S. 233 against him, as a veteran. . . . His seniority status . . . continues beyond the first year of his reemployment. . . ."