Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/250/146/615329/
Timestamp: 2019-06-25 08:36:36
Document Index: 742096331

Matched Legal Cases: ['§1983', '§1983', '§ 1915', '§1997', '§ 1915', '§ 1997', '§1997', '§ 1997', '§ 1983', '§1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1997', '§ 1915', '§ 1997', '§ 1997', '§ 1997', '§ 1983', '§1997', '§ 1915', '§1997', '§ 1983', '§1915']

Julio F. Giano, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Glenn Goord, Commissioner, Department of Correctional Services, Donald Selsky, Director, Special Housing Programs, Frank Irvin, Superintendent, Wende Correctional Facility, Roy Henneberg, Deputy Superintendent of Security, Jeffrey Skinner, Captain, Wende Correctional Facility, Walter Shannon, Lieutenant, Wende Correctional Facility, James Burke, Sergeant, Wende Correctional Facility, Timothy Jeziorski, Sergeant, Wende Correctional Facility, Thomas Lamb, Michael Bishop, Gary Keohane, E. Mcevoy, Howard Brennan, John Barbera, John Doe, Correctional Officers, Wende Correctional Facility, Defendants Appellees, 250 F.3d 146 (2d Cir. 2001) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Second Circuit › 2001 › Julio F. Giano, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Glenn Goord, Commissioner, Department of Correctional Servic...
Julio F. Giano, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Glenn Goord, Commissioner, Department of Correctional Services, Donald Selsky, Director, Special Housing Programs, Frank Irvin, Superintendent, Wende Correctional Facility, Roy Henneberg, Deputy Superintendent of Security, Jeffrey Skinner, Captain, Wende Correctional Facility, Walter Shannon, Lieutenant, Wende Correctional Facility, James Burke, Sergeant, Wende Correctional Facility, Timothy Jeziorski, Sergeant, Wende Correctional Facility, Thomas Lamb, Michael Bishop, Gary Keohane, E. Mcevoy, Howard Brennan, John Barbera, John Doe, Correctional Officers, Wende Correctional Facility, Defendants Appellees, 250 F.3d 146 (2d Cir. 2001)
US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit - 250 F.3d 146 (2d Cir. 2001)
Originally submitted January 4, 2000Final submission October 27, 2000Decided May 16, 2001
Plaintiff-appellant Julio F. Giano appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of New York (Charles A. Siragusa, Judge) that, inter alia, dismissed without prejudice plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. §1983 regarding allegations of retaliation and faulty prison drug-testing procedures, and dismissed with prejudice plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. §1983 claims regarding allegations that Giano was deprived of privacy rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution as applied to the States under the Fourteenth Amendment, and due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Giano v. Goord, 9 F. Supp. 2d 235 (W.D.N.Y. 1998). We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Before Giano could cause his complaint to be served, the district court, sua sponte, dismissed it in its entirety pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (2) (B) (ii) and 42 U.S.C. §1997e(a). See Giano, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 239. The district court dismissed counts one, six, seven, eight, and nine with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (2) (B) (ii) for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See Giano, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 240-42. The district court dismissed the remainder of Giano's complaint-- counts two, three, four, five, and ten-- without prejudice because the court found that Giano had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). See Giano, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 239-40. Giano appealed.
A supplemental brief addressing these issues was filed on Giano's behalf on September 14, 2000. On October 27, 2000, the Attorney General responded by letter brief. Giano asserts that the district court should not have dismissed the counts that were dismissed with prejudice without affording him notice and an opportunity to be heard. He argues with respect to the counts dismissed without prejudice that the §1997(e) (a) exhaustion requirement applies only to complaints made "with respect to prison conditions" and not to his claims of individualized acts of retaliation. He contends in the alternative that he should have been excused from exhausting his administrative remedies because attempting to do so would have been futile.
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c), a court must dismiss a prisoner's § 1983 "action brought with respect to prison conditions... if the court is satisfied that the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief." Similarly, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e) (2), a court must dismiss "at any time" a complaint filed in forma pauperis "if the court determines that... the action or appeal -- (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." We review a district court's sua sponte dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e de novo. See Liner v. Goord, 196 F.3d 132, 134 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and § 1997e dismissals are subject to de novo review).
We hold that counts two, three, four, and five are not claims brought "with respect to prison conditions" and thus are not subject to this section's exhaustion requirement. " [P]rison conditions" is not defined in § 1997e(a), but several of our recent cases have addressed the meaning of the term. We have held that the term "prison conditions" encompasses "those aspects of prison life affecting the entire prison population" but does not include "individualized retaliatory actions against an inmate." Lawrence, 238 F.3d at 185 (extending holding in Nussle, 224 F.3d at 101, that the term "prison conditions" does not include particularized instances of excessive force directed at an inmate). Because counts two, three, four, and five allege individualized retaliatory actions against Giano, they are not subject to § 1997e(a)'s exhaustion requirement. Thus, the district court erred in dismissing those counts.
In contrast, count ten challenges the general procedure, applicable to all inmates, of "obtaining, processing, storing and testing urine samples at Wende Correctional Facility." This general procedure is an "aspect [] of prison life affecting the entire prison population." Lawrence, 238 F.3d at 185. Count ten therefore does challenge a "prison condition," and administrative remedies must be exhausted before Giano can bring an action asserting this § 1983 violation.
Count ten was properly dismissed, then, unless Giano in fact exhausted his available administrative remedies. The district court found that the grievance procedures that addressed the subject matter of Giano's complaint were available to him, Giano, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 239-40, and Giano has given us no reason to question that finding. Indeed, Giano does not deny that he failed to exhaust his remedies. Instead, he argues that pursuing the remedies available to him would have been "futile"1 because his claims were not being investigated. Although §1997e(a) "clearly does not require a prisoner to exhaust administrative remedies that do not address the subject matter of his complaint," Snider v. Melindez, 199 F.3d 108, 113 n.2 (2d Cir. 1999), the alleged ineffectiveness of the administrative remedies that are available does not absolve a prisoner of his obligation to exhaust such remedies when Congress has specifically mandated that he do so. See Nussle, 224 F.3d at 99 (explaining that the PLRA was amended specifically to eliminate "'effectiveness' of administrative remedies [as] a precondition to the exhaustion requirement"); Alexander v. Hawk, 159 F.3d 1321, 1325-26 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that "the courts cannot simply waive [the exhaustion] requirements where they determine they are futile or inadequate").2 Giano must grieve his complaints about the conditions under which drug tests are performed at Wende before he can bring an action with respect to them in federal court. The district court therefore correctly dismissed count ten without prejudice.
We have held that the screening process provided for in § 1915A "does not require that process be served or that the plaintiff be provided an opportunity to respond before dismissal." Carr v. Dvorin, 171 F.3d 115, 116 (2d Cir. 1999). We have noted, however, in the context of a district court's sua sponte dismissal on the merits under 42 U.S.C. §1997e(c) of a prisoner's § 1983 claim, that " [u]nless it is unmistakably clear that the court lacks jurisdiction, or that the complaint lacks merit or is otherwise defective, we believe it is bad practice for a district court to dismiss without affording a plaintiff the opportunity to be heard in opposition." Melindez, 199 F.3d at 113. We see no reason not to apply the Melindez reasoning to a dismissal pursuant to 28U.S.C. §1915 in the particular circumstances of the case at bar. Because we are returning this case to the district court in any event with respect to counts two, three, four, and five, it is the better course for the court to give Giano the opportunity to oppose the dismissal of counts one, six, seven, eight, and nine before ruling that they do not state a claim upon which relief may be granted.