Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/97896/united-states-vs-ruzicka
Timestamp: 2017-07-22 20:00:07
Document Index: 88291816

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 601', '§ 8', '§ 8']

United States Vs Ruzicka - Citation 97896 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Save as PDF Add a Tag Add a Note Semantics Visualize United States Vs. Ruzicka - Court Judgment	LegalCrystal Citationlegalcrystal.com/97896CourtUS Supreme CourtDecided OnDec-16-1946Case Number329 U.S. 287AppellantUnited StatesRespondentRuzickaExcerpt:.....that the demand was based upon faulty inspection of their accounts and improper tests of their milk and milk products.
they cannot assert this defense in an enforcement proceeding under § 8a(6), but are left to the administrative remedy specifically provided by § 8c(15).
, differentiated. pp. 290-296.
in a suit by the government under § 8a(6) of the agricultural marketing agreement act of 1937 against certain handlers of milk to enforce their obligation to make payments into a producer-settlement fund, the district court gave judgment for the government. the circuit court of appeals reversed. 152 f.2d 167. this court granted certiorari. 327 u.s. 776.
329 u. s. 296
United States v. Ruzicka - 329 U.S. 287 (1946)
We brought this case here, 327 U.S. 776, because it raises questions of importance in the administration of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937. 50 Stat. 246, 7 U.S.C. § 601
The general scheme of the Act and its operation have been before us in a series of cases.
. Our immediate concern is with the provisions of the Act that distribute enforcing authority between the courts and the Secretary of Agriculture. These become relevant to the enforcement of Milk Order No. 41, an "Order Regulating the Handling of Milk in the Chicago, Illinois, Marketing Area," and more particularly the portion of that elaborate Order which defines the rights and obligations of "handlers" of milk. Section 941.1(5). The Order was issued under the powers delegated to the Secretary of Agriculture to effectuate the purposes of the Act. Section 8c of the Act.
The sections of the statute directly relevant to our problem are set out in the margin. [
] Briefly, the district courts
of the United States are "vested with jurisdiction specifically to enforce" orders issued pursuant to the Act. [
] The Act authorizes a handler to challenge before the Secretary of Agriculture his order "or any obligation imposed in connection therewith" as "not in accordance with law," and to ask to have it modified or to be exempted from it. When the order is so challenged, the determination of the Secretary of Agriculture, after hearing, is final, but only "if in accordance with law." Section 8c(15)(A). To test whether such ruling is "in accordance with law," the handler may bring the Secretary's action for review before the appropriate district court. Section 8c(15)(B). But the very subsection, (15), which gives the handler access to the Secretary of Agriculture for administrative relief and opportunity for judicial review of his determination provides that the pendency of the proceedings before
interests of the entire industry need not be disturbed in order to do justice to an individual case. [
We are dealing here solely with the rights of handlers. This is not
. In that case, it was concluded that, since Congress had provided no administrative remedy for a producer to review the legality of an order against him, presumably the courts were not closed to him. But, by § 8c(15), Congress has made precisely such provisions for handlers. As to them the procedural scheme is complete.
The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act is one of many enactments by which Congress in regulating economic enterprise has divided the duty of enforcement between courts and administrative agencies. But there is the greatest variety in the manner in which Congress has distributed this responsibility. Those who are entitled to speak tell us that the development of the natural sciences has often suffered from premature generalization. Certainly the recent growth of administrative law counsels against generalizations regarding what is compendiously called judicial review of administrative action. And so we deem it desirable, in a case like this, to hug the shore of the precise problem before us in relation to the provisions of the particular Act immediately relevant. One general observation, may, however, be permitted. Both courts and administrative bodies are law-enforcing agencies, utilized by Congress as such. In construing the enforcement provisions of legislation like the Marketing Act, it is important to remember that courts and administrative agencies are collaborative "instrumentalities of justice," and not business rivals.
See United States v. Morgan,
And so we are not called upon to decide what powers inhere in a court of equity, exercising due judicial discretion, even in a suit such as was here brought by the United States for the enforcement of an order under § 8a. We say this because it appears that at a stage in the proceedings
in the district court a motion for a stay, pending disposition of the petition by the Ruzickas before the Secretary of Agriculture, was made by the respondents. With the court's leave, this motion was subsequently withdrawn. The power of the district court to have acted on it is therefore not before us.
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