Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/684/721/40703/
Timestamp: 2019-09-20 03:21:36
Document Index: 357478696

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 303', '§ 301', '§ 767', '§ 185']

Local 472 of the United Association of Journeymen Andapprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefittingindustry of the United States Andcanada, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Georgia Power Company, et al., Defendants-appellees, 684 F.2d 721 (11th Cir. 1982) :: Justia
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Local 472 of the United Association of Journeymen Andapprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefittingindustry of the United States Andcanada, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Georgia Power Company, et al., Defendants-appellees, 684 F.2d 721 (11th Cir. 1982)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit - 684 F.2d 721 (11th Cir. 1982)
The complaint in our case alleges that the defendants induced a breach of the international constitution and conspired together to interfere with property rights created by the constitution.1 United Association of Journeymen v. Local 334, United Association of Journeymen, 452 U.S. 615, 101 S. Ct. 2546, 69 L. Ed. 2d 280 (1981), settles the question of jurisdiction. Therein, the Supreme Court held that union constitutions are "contracts" within the meaning of section 301(a) of the Labor-Management Relations Act.2 Since Local 472's suit is based on property rights allegedly created by the constitution of its International, it is clear that the District Court had subject matter jurisdiction. It is also clear that principles of federal law govern breach of contract suits brought under § 301. United Association of Journeymen, 452 U.S. at 627, 101 S. Ct. at 2553; Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238, 248-49, 82 S. Ct. 1318, 1324-1325, 8 L. Ed. 2d 462 (1962); Teamsters Local v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 102-04, 82 S. Ct. 571, 576-577, 7 L. Ed. 2d 593 (1962); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457, 77 S. Ct. 912, 918, 1 L. Ed. 2d 972 (1957).
However, while Local 472's complaint alleges a breach of the constitution, the local's theory of recovery is one of tortious interference with contractual or business relations. The local maintains that this cause of action is grounded on state law, not federal law. We disagree. "(T)he substantive law to apply in suits under § 301(a) is federal law, which courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor laws." Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 456, 77 S. Ct. at 917. The Supreme Court has consistently cautioned that, since the " 'subject matter (of § 301) is peculiarly one that calls for uniform law,' " Lucas Flour, 369 U.S. at 103, 82 S. Ct. at 576 (quoting Pennsylvania R. Co. v. PSC, 250 U.S. 566, 569, 40 S. Ct. 36, 37, 64 L. Ed. 1142 (1919)), to read § 301 narrowly " 'would undercut the Act and defeat its policy.' " Atkinson, 370 U.S. at 249, 82 S. Ct. at 1325 (quoting Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 456, 77 S. Ct. at 917). In this case, the local's action for tortious interference is based on the contractual relations which exist between the local and its International. The contract rights of the parties are governed by federal law. To hold that a tort action based on property rights allegedly created by the contract is governed by state law would be contrary to Supreme Court holdings and would defy reason. The national interest in a uniform body of labor relations law requires that the plaintiff's claim be judged by principles of federal law, not state law. See Wilkes-Barre Publishing Co. v. Newspaper Guild, 647 F.2d 372 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 102 S. Ct. 1003, 71 L. Ed. 2d 295 (1982); contra Loss v. Blankenship, 673 F.2d 942 (7th Cir. 1982). We agree with the reasoning of the Third Circuit in Wilkes-Barre:
647 F.2d at 381 (footnote and citations omitted). Cf. Mobile Mechanical Contractors Association v. Carlough, 664 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 102 S. Ct. 1490, 71 L. Ed. 2d 691 (1982) (under § 303 of the Labor-Management Relations Act, state action based on tortious interference with a lawful business is preempted); California State Council of Carpenters v. Associated General Contractors, Inc., 648 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, --- U.S. ----, 102 S. Ct. 998, 71 L. Ed. 2d 292 (1982) ("(s)tate remedies for non-violent business-related torts ... are preempted"); Ramsey v. Signal Delivery Service, Inc., 631 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1980) (state tort claims for emotional distress are preempted). We hold that the local's claim of tortious interference must be governed by federal common law. In determining the rights and liabilities of the parties under the local's legal theory, we may, of course, resort to "state law, if compatible with the purpose of § 301.... Any state law applied, however, will be absorbed as federal law and will not be an independent source of private rights." Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 457, 77 S. Ct. at 918.
In examining a claim of tortious interference, a court must examine the nature of the alleged culpable actions. Liability cannot be predicated on actions which are "justified" or "privileged." See, e.g., Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Martin Co., 240 Ga. 662, 242 S.E.2d 135 (1978); Nager v. Lad 'N Dad Slacks, 148 Ga.App. 401, 251 S.E.2d 330 (1978); Annot., 26 A.L.R.2d 1227 (1952); Annot., 9 A.L.R.2d 228 (1950). The concept of privilege involves a balancing process. Taking into consideration the nature of the conduct, the relationship between the parties, and the interest sought to be advanced by the "interferor" and to be protected by the complaining party, the court must determine whether societal interests in protecting the interferor's actions outweigh the particular property interest at stake. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 767 (1979); Carpenter, Interference with Contract Relations, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 728, 745 (1928).
Although the United Association and its representatives are named as co-conspirators with the other defendants, Section 301(b) precludes assessment of damages against individual union members. 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (1976); Atkinson, 370 U.S. at 249, 82 S. Ct. at 1325. Thus, under the Labor-Management Relations Act, defendants Blair and Ward are insulated from liability for money damages