Source: http://masscases.com/cases/app/86/86massappct601.html
Timestamp: 2017-04-23 11:51:23
Document Index: 255361541

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 28', '§ 6', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 28', '§ 5', '§ 9', '§ 1', '§ 38', '§ 28', '§ 6', '§ 28', '§ 28', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 28', '§ 28', '§ 28', '§ 38', '§ 28', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 21']

VAIDA vs. VAIDA, 86 Mass. App. Ct. 601
May 7, 2014 - November 6, 2014
Divorce and Separation, Child support, Attorney's fees. Parent and Child, Child support. Jurisdiction, Equitable. Probate Court, General equity power. In the circumstances of a complaint in equity seeking postminority support from the father for the parties' physically disabled twenty-three year old son, the Probate and Family Court judge properly granted summary judgment in favor of the father, where the son, due to his age, was categorically ineligible for support under G. L. c. 208, § 28; where the son did not meet any of the criteria under G. L. c. 215, § 6, for the court's use of equity jurisdiction to provide for postminority support, in that he was not an incapacitated person within the meaning of G. L. c. 190B, § 5-101(9), and could not be placed under a guardianship under G. L. c. 190B, § 5-306(b)(6); and where a settlement agreement and release executed by the parties in a separate civil suit precluded the claim. [606-609]
This court declined to award attorney's fees or costs where a complaint was not frivolous or brought for the sake of being litigious. [609-610]
1. Factual and procedural background. The parties were married in 1977, filed for divorce in 1993, and were divorced by a judgment of divorce nisi dated August 22, 1996, as amended September 24, 1996, and further amended December 2, 1996 (judgment of divorce). There are three children born of the marriage: Allison, Justin, and Evan. At the time of the divorce, Page 602 the children were sixteen, fourteen, and eight years old, respectively.
While the civil suit was pending, the divorce trial took place, and on August 22, 1998, the court entered a judgment of divorce. Pursuant to that judgment, the father and the mother were granted joint legal custody of Allison, who resided primarily with the father. The mother was granted sole legal and physical custody of both Evan and Justin. The divorce judgment also required the father to pay the mother alimony of $5,500 per month until either the father or the mother died or the mother remarried, as well as $5,500 per month in child support for Evan and Justin. The father's child support payments would be reduced by fifty percent after Justin's emancipation, and child support would be terminated after both sons were emancipated. The divorce judgment defined emancipated as the earliest of the following:
a child's attaining age 18 or his graduation from high school, whichever is first except that if a child is enrolled in college as a full-time student, emancipation shall not be deemed to have occurred until the age of 23 so long as the child so remains, so enrolled;
a child's ceasing to reside primarily with the mother;
The father was also ordered to maintain and pay for health insurance for the mother and each of the children as well as to pay Page 603 for all of the children's reasonable and necessary uninsured expenses.
On February 28, 1997, the mother, individually and as parent and next friend of Justin and Evan, settled the claims against the father for a total sum of $3.5 million, and also entered into a Settlement Agreement and Release with the father and his insurers. The settlement agreement and release contained a Release and Discharge provision and a General Release provision whereby the mother, on behalf of herself and as parent and next friend of Justin and Evan, released the father from any and all future claims of any kind on account of or growing out of the April 22, 1995, accident. [Note 1] The release and discharge also explicitly Page 604 stated that it would not operate as a release on any rights that the mother may have against the father from the divorce judgment. The mother received a lump sum of $225,000 from the settlement. She also received $64,666.84 for the benefit of Justin. For the benefit of Evan, $600,000 was paid into the Evan A. Vaida Irrevocable Trust (trust). An annuity was also purchased for Evan's benefit, which made periodic payments into the trust:
$7,500 payable quarterly for a period of 5 years until January 1, 2002;
Page 605 On February 6, 2011, Evan turned twenty-three years old, at which time he became emancipated as per the divorce judgment and G. L. c. 208, § 28. Evan has significant physical and medical needs as a partial quadriplegic confined to a wheelchair. However, Evan is not an incapacitated person as defined by G. L. c. 190B, § 5-101(9), inserted by St. 2008, c. 521, § 9, and has not been appointed a guardian or conservator. No other protective order was entered on Evan's behalf pursuant to art. V of the Massachusetts Uniform Probate Code (MUPC), G. L. c. 190B, §§ 1-101 et seq. Evan recently attended and graduated from Boston College.
The judge allowed the father's motion for summary judgment. From this judgment, the mother appeals, and the father requests Page 606 an award of attorney's fees and costs in accordance with G. L. c. 208, § 38.
2. Discussion. a. The mother's complaint for postminority support. The mother argues that G. L. c. 208, § 28, does not expressly prohibit an order allowing postminority child support for an emancipated child, and that the court can use its equity jurisdiction under G. L. c. 215, § 6, to allow such an order.
The statutory system governing child support in Massachusetts is a complete system, and there is no nonstatutory right to relief under the common law. Orlandella v. Orlandella, 370 Mass. 225 , 227 (1976). Therefore, we must look to G. L. c. 208, § 28, which addresses circumstances under which postminority child support is allowed. [Note 2] In essence, the statute allows for postminority child support up to the age of twenty-three, provided that the conditions outlined in the statute are met. Evan's circumstances met the requirements of the statute, and postminority child support was provided for Evan until he reached the age of twenty-three. Since Evan has reached the age of twenty-three, he no longer meets the requirements of the statute to allow for postminority child support, and is, therefore, categorically ineligible for support under G. L. c. 208, § 28.
The mother looks to the equity jurisdiction conferred upon the court under G. L. c. 215, § 6, as the basis for her argument that the court can order postminority support for Evan. Section 6 does allow the court powers of equity jurisdiction in certain circumstances, which are outlined in that statute. There are at least two cases where the court used this authority to order postminority support. See Feinberg v. Diamant, 378 Mass. 131 (1979); Eccleston v. Bankosky, 438 Mass. 428 (2003). In each of these cases the adult child had been placed under a guardianship as defined by the statute in effect at that time. The statutory scheme prior to 2009, under G. L. c. 201, §§ 6, 6A, and 6B, allowed for the appointment of a guardian for persons who were mentally ill, mentally Page 607 retarded, or persons unable to make or communicate informed decisions due to physical incapacity or illness (emphasis supplied). The 2009 adoption of the MUPC replaced the terms mentally ill, mentally retarded, and physical incapacity with the term incapacitated person and provided for a limited guardianship in addition to what has traditionally been a plenary guardianship. The MUPC defines incapacitated person as
an individual who for reasons other than advanced age or minority, has a clinically diagnosed condition that results in an inability to receive and evaluate information or make or communicate decisions to such an extent that the individual lacks the ability to meet essential requirements for physical health, safety, or self-care, even with appropriate technological assistance.
In Eccleston, the court allowed postminority support for a child who was under a guardianship because the child was under the age of twenty-three, could not domicile with either of her parents, was not financially independent from her guardian, and otherwise would have met the requirements for postminority support under G. L. c. 208, § 28, up to age twenty-three. 438 Mass. at 438. In Eccleston, the court used its equity powers to close an unintended gap in the comprehensive legislative scheme providing postminority support to children of disrupted families that is consistent with the Legislature's directive to construe child support statutes liberally to secure the welfare of children. Id. at 437.
A third case addresses the necessity for a guardianship before a court could use its equity jurisdiction to order postminority support for an adult child. Saia v. Saia, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 135 (2003). In Saia, the adult child was suffering from depression Page 608 and bulimia, but did not meet any of the requirements for postminority support under G. L. c. 208, § 28. Saia v. Saia, supra at 136. The court affirmed the rationale that postminority support could not be ordered because the adult child did not meet the requirements of G. L. c. 208, § 28, and had not been placed under a guardianship. Saia v. Saia, supra at 138.
While the court does have equity jurisdiction, it is limited to the provisions outlined in the statute, which do not address situations where the adult child is not an incapacitated person and has not been placed under a guardianship. The equity powers conferred by the Legislature on the Probate and Family Court are intended to enable that court to provide remedies to enforce existing obligations; they are not intended to empower the court to create new obligations. T.F. v. B.L., 442 Mass. 522 , 532 (2004). Evan does not meet the definition of an incapacitated person and cannot be placed under a guardianship for those reasons, and as such does not meet any of the criteria to open the door to the court's use of equity jurisdiction to provide for postminority child support.
The mother also claims that, assuming Evan did need to be placed under a guardianship to be eligible for postminority support, Page 609 the adoption of the MUPC in 2009 left an unintended gap in the legislative scheme for physically incapacitated persons to be appointed a guardian. However, review of the pre-2009 statute indicates that the statute allows for the appointment of a guardian in situations where a person, due to physical incapacity, is either unable to make or communicate informed decisions or properly care for his or her property. [Note 3] As already discussed, there are no facts to support the idea that Evan is not unable to make or communicate informed decisions or properly care for his own property, given that he is able to financially support himself through the trust funds and Social Security. Under either regulatory scheme, Evan does not meet the requirements for a guardianship.
The plaintiff's last claim is that this action is not barred by the release provision of the settlement agreement and release because it arises out of the divorce judgment. However, for the reasons described above, there are no remedies available under current law to permit an amendment to the divorce judgment. The only other avenue under which to pursue relief would be a tort action, which is expressly barred by the release provisions of the settlement agreement and release. There is no factual dispute to as to the terms of the settlement agreement and release, which is exhaustive and complete. The mother executed the settlement agreement and release as parent and next friend of Evan knowingly, voluntarily, and with the advice of counsel. Since there is no cause of action arising out of the divorce judgment and the claim thereby falls outside of the sole exception to the settlement agreement and release, the mother's claim is barred by the settlement agreement and release, and she is precluded from pursuing the requested relief.
b. The father's request for fees. The father requests attorney's fees and costs in accordance with G. L. c. 208, § 38. The matter appears to have been pursued in good faith. The unique facts of this case and the complexity of the issues underlying this matter amply substantiate that this complaint was not a frivolous claim, or a claim brought for the sake of being litigious and dragging a defendant into court. The father's request for fees is denied.
[Note 1] The release and discharge provision of the settlement agreement and release stated as follows: 1. Release and Discharge. In consideration of the payments called for herein, the Plaintiffs completely release and forever discharge the Defendant  of and from any and all past, present or future claims, demands, obligations, actions, causes of action, wrongful death claims, rights damages, costs, losses of services, expenses and compensation of any nature whatsoever, whether based on a tort, contract, or other theory of recovery, and whether for compensation or punitive damages, which the Plaintiffs now have, or which may hereafter accrue or otherwise be acquired, on account of, or in any way growing out of, an accident alleged to have occurred on or about April 22, 1995 at or near Truro, Massachusetts, which are the subject of the Complaint (and all related pleadings), including, without limitation, any and all known or unknown claims for bodily and personal injuries (including claims for loss of consortium and claims for negligent and/or intentional infliction of emotional distress) to the Plaintiffs, or any future wrongful death claim of Plaintiff's representative, which have resulted or may result from the alleged acts or omissions of the Defendant. This release, on the part of the Plaintiffs, shall be a fully binding and complete settlement between the Plaintiffs, the Defendant, and the Insurers .  Nothing contained in this Agreement, however, shall constitute or be construed in any way to operate as a release of any and all rights Plaintiffs may have against the Defendant arising out of a Judgment of Divorce entered by the Norfolk Probate and Family Court in the case of Nancy C. Vaida v. George A. Vaida, Docket No. 93D-1621-01, as same exists or as may be amended.
7. General Release. The Plaintiffs hereby acknowledge and agree that the Release set forth in paragraph 1 hereof is a general release relating to the alleged negligent acts and omissions of the Defendant as contained in Norfolk Superior Court Civil Action No. 95-02417, and they further expressly waive and assume the risk of any and all claims for damages which exist as of this date but of which the Plaintiffs do not know or suspect to exist, whether through ignorance, oversight, error, negligence, or otherwise, and which, if known, would materially affect Plaintiffs' decision to enter into, this Settlement Agreement. The Plaintiffs further agree that they have accepted payment of the sums specified herein as a complete compromise of matters involving disputed issues of law and fact and they assume the risk that the facts or laws may be otherwise than they believe. It is understood and agreed by the Parties that this settlement is a compromise of a doubtful and disputed claim, and the payments are not to be construed as an admission of liability on the part of the Defendant, by whom liability is expressly denied.  
[Note 2] The court may make appropriate orders of maintenance, support and education of any child who has attained age eighteen but who has not attained age twenty-one and who is domiciled in the home of a parent, and is principally dependent upon said parent for maintenance. The court may make appropriate orders of maintenance, support and education for any child who has attained age twenty-one but who has not attained age twenty-three, if such child is domiciled in the home of a parent, and is principally dependent upon said parent for maintenance due to the enrollment of such child in an educational program, excluding educational costs beyond an undergraduate degree. G. L. c. 208, § 28, inserted by St. 1991, c. 173, § 1. [Note 3] The probate court may, if it appears necessary or convenient, appoint guardians of minors, mentally ill persons, mentally retarded persons, persons unable to make or communicate informed decisions due to physical incapacity or illness, and spendthrifts and conservators of the property of persons by reason of mental weakness, mental retardation or physical incapacity unable to properly care for their property, who are inhabitants of or residents in the county or who reside out of the commonwealth and have estate within the county. G. L. c. 201, § 1 (repealed effective July 1, 2009, by St. 2008, c. 521, § 21). Home/Search Table of Cases by Citation