Source: http://openjurist.org/969/f2d/494/united-states-v-j-piasecki
Timestamp: 2014-09-21 14:12:58
Document Index: 69902446

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3161', '§ 1961', '§ 501', '§ 439', '§ 1955', '§ 3161', '§ 3161', '§ 3161', '§ 3161']

969 F2d 494 United States v. J Piasecki | OpenJurist
969 F. 2d 494 - United States v. J Piasecki	Home969 f2d 494 united states v. j piasecki
969 F2d 494 United States v. J Piasecki 969 F.2d 494
140 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2999, 122 Lab.Cas. P 10,332
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,v.Harry J. PIASECKI, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 91-2798.
Argued Feb. 20, 1992.Decided July 30, 1992.
Joseph C. Wyderko, argued, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Criminal Div., Washington, D.C., for plaintiff-appellee.
Hawk P.C. Kautz, argued, Merrillville, Ind., for defendant-appellant.
Harry J. Piasecki was convicted of one count of union racketeering, two counts of embezzlement of union funds, and one count of falsification of union records. Piasecki argues that these convictions should be reversed because the trial, which took place 341 days after his initial appearance before the court, failed to comply with the time limits set forth in the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161. Alternatively, Piasecki argues the trial judge erred in failing to rule on his motion to dismiss based on statute of limitations and pre-indictment delay. We affirm.
On April 10, 1990, an indictment was filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division. The indictment, in twenty-five counts, charged twelve defendants with a variety of acts including charges resulting from unlawful involvement in a large-scale bingo operation and with unlawful union activities. Count 1 jointly charged Piasecki and codefendants General "Jack" Parton, Phillip Cyprian, and Ezell Cooper for engaging in racketeering acts in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 et seq. This RICO count alleged that Piasecki and the codefendants had conducted the affairs of the United Steelworkers Union of America through a pattern of racketeering activity consisting of the embezzlement of union assets and the operation of an illegal gambling business. Moreover, the RICO count alleged twelve predicate racketeering acts, some of which incorporated other counts of the indictment.
In addition to the RICO count, Piasecki and Parton were jointly charged in Counts 2 and 11 with embezzling union funds in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 501(c) and in Count 14 with falsifying union records, 29 U.S.C. § 439(c). Cyprian, Cooper, and nine codefendants were charged in Count 15 with conducting an illegal gambling business in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1955. Moreover, Cyprian and Cooper were both charged under various other counts.
Piasecki made his initial appearance for these charges on May 30, 1990. After several reassignments of the case, on June 25, 1990, Chief Judge Sharp sua sponte entered a continuance under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(B)(ii). In this order Chief Judge Sharp found it "apparent that this case will involve intense media coverage, extensive documentary evidence as well as complex issues and multiple parties which will require a series of protracted proceedings." And, he further determined that because the case was both unusual and complex, "the ends of justice served by extending the time for trial in this case beyond the statutory deadline that would otherwise apply outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial." Then on July 20, 1990, during a status conference Chief Judge Sharp asked defense counsel if anyone objected to this "ends of justice" order under the Speedy Trial Act, and he asked that any such objections be put in writing within a week. Neither Piasecki nor any of the codefendants filed any written objections to the "ends of justice" order.
Up to this point Chief Judge Sharp had retained jurisdiction for all counts against all defendants. This began to change on July 31, 1990. On this date, upon motion of Parton and four other codefendants, Chief Judge Sharp severed Count 1, the RICO count, from Counts 2 through 25. Chief Judge Sharp assigned the RICO count to Judge Moody and retained jurisdiction of the remaining counts.
On October 3, 1990, Cooper entered a guilty plea, leaving Piasecki, Parton, and Cyprian to be tried on Count 1 in front of Judge Moody. So at this point Piasecki and Parton were before Chief Judge Sharp for Counts 2, 11, and 14, and they were before Judge Moody, along with Cyprian, for Count 1; whereas, Cyprian was before Judge Moody for Count 1, and before Chief Judge Sharp on numerous other counts. All this changed on December 24, 1990, when Chief Judge Sharp issued an order severing Counts 2, 11, and 14 as they applied to Piasecki and Parton. Chief Judge Sharp then assigned these severed counts to Judge Moody, meaning that Chief Judge Sharp had reassigned to Judge Moody all counts pertaining to Piasecki and Parton. Chief Judge Sharp had retained, however, jurisdiction over several counts naming Cyprian. As such, after December 24, 1990, Piasecki, Parton, and Cyprian were joined as codefendants before Judge Moody under Count 1 of the indictment, and Piasecki and Parton were joined before Judge Moody on Counts 2, 11, and 14.
On January 7, 1991, Chief Judge Sharp began a trial on the counts to which he had retained jurisdiction. Cyprian was a party to this trial which ended on February 7, 1991.
On February 14, 1991, Cyprian moved to dismiss Count 1 as it applied to him on grounds of double jeopardy, and Cyprian's counsel moved to withdraw. On March 1, 1991, Judge Moody held a pretrial conference with respect to Counts 1, 2, 11, and 14, and he set a trial date of May 6, 1991. After a discussion of Cyprian's motion to dismiss Count 1 and his counsel's motion to withdraw, Parton advised Judge Moody that his motion for severance would require additional action to determine whether Parton, Cyprian, and Piasecki should be tried together. Judge Moody directed Parton to file a renewed motion for severance. Afterward, Judge Moody asked whether the parties were planning to file any additional motions, and Piasecki's counsel indicated that this was a possibility. Judge Moody then set a deadline of March 15, 1991, for the filing of additional pretrial motions.
Parton filed a renewed motion for severance on March 7, 1991, and the government filed a response on March 8, 1991. On March 15, 1991, Parton filed a reply to the government's response. Then on April 26, 1991, Judge Moody denied Parton's motion for severance from Piasecki but granted Parton's motion for severance from Cyprian.
In the meantime, on March 15, 1991, Piasecki and Parton filed a joint motion to dismiss the indictment based on the Speedy Trial Act. The government filed a response on March 21, 1991. Then, on May 2, 1991, Judge Moody denied this motion to dismiss on two grounds. First, he concluded that the ends of justice continuance on June 25, 1990, applied to Parton and Piasecki even after they were entirely severed from the proceedings before Chief Judge Sharp on December 24, 1990. Second, he concluded, in the alternative, even if the ends of justice continuance had ceased to be applicable on December 24, 1990, there was sufficient excludable time before the trial date on May 6, 1991, to alleviate any Speedy Trial Act problems.
The Speedy Trial Act generally requires that a trial in a criminal case commence within seventy days of the filing of the indictment or from the date of the defendant's initial appearance, whichever occurs later. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). The Act, however, provides for periods of excludable delay. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)-(9). One period of excludable delay provided for in the Act is delay resulting from a judge-ordered continuance based on findings that "the ends of justice" served by the delay outweigh the defendant's and public's interest in a speedy trial. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A). A court may grant such a continuance on its own motion, the government's motion, or defendant's motion. Id. Section 3161(h)(8)(B) contains a nonexclusive list of factors that the judge must consider in deciding whet