Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/185/236
Timestamp: 2015-11-28 05:51:14
Document Index: 557734244

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 828', '§ 574', '§ 583', '§ 2013', '§ 574', '§ 574', '§ 574', '§ 574']

UNITED STATES, , v. JOSEPH C. FINNELL. | US Law | LII / Legal Information Institute
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185 U.S. 236 (22 S.Ct. 633, 46 L.Ed. 890)
UNITED STATES, Appt., v. JOSEPH C. FINNELL.
Decided: April 21, 1902.
[HTML] Assistant Attorney General Pradt and Mr. Philip M. Ashford for appellant.
These views are justified by long practice in the Department, and upon that we may properly rest our affirmance of the judgment of the court of claims. It is found as a fact that the present appellee, in every account rendered by him since 1882, has charged for services similar to those set out in the account here in suit, and such accounts were uniformly allowed and paid up to June 30th, 1893. And on his account for the period from January 1st, 1892, to June 30th, 1894, he obtained judgment in the court of claims, which judgment was paid,no appeal having been prosecuted by the United States. Finnell v. United States, 32 Ct. Cl. 634. It thus appears that the government has for many years construed the statute of 1887 as meaning what we have said it may fairly be interpreted to mean, and has settled and closed the accounts of clerks upon the basis of such construction. If the construction thus acted upon by accounting officers for so many years should be overthrown, we apprehend that much confusion might arise. Of course, if the departmental construction of the statute in question were obviously or clearly wrong, it would be the duty of the court to so adjudge. United States v. Graham, 110 U. S. 219, 28 L. ed. 126, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 582; Wisconsin C. R. Co. v. United States, 164 U. S. 190, 41 L. ed. 399, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 45. But if there simply be doubt as to the soundness of that construction,and that is the utmost that can be asserted by the government,the action during many years of the Department charged with the execution of the statute should be respected, and not overruled except for cogent reasons. Edwards v. Darby, 12 Wheat. 206, 210, 6 L. ed. 603, 604; United States v. Philbrick, 120 U. S. 52, 59, 30 L. ed. 559, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 413; United States v. Johnston, 124 U. S. 236, 253, 31 L. ed. 389, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 446; United States v. Alabama G. S. R. Co. 142 U. S. 615, 621, 35 L. ed. 1134, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 306. Congress can enact such legislation as may be necessary to change the existing practice, if it deems that course conducive to the public interests.
By act of February 26, 1853 (10 Stat. at L. 161, chap. 80), Rev. Stat. § 828, the whole subject of fees was revised, and an attendance fee allowed to the clerk of $5 per day for his attendance on the court 'while actually in session.' By that act the words 'while actually in session' were first introduced into the law. It is evident that some change was contemplated by the use of these words. For some purposes, notably in admiralty and equity cases (Rev. Stat. §§ 574, 638), the court may be deemed to be sitting when a judge is present upon a rule day, or makes an order which can only be made by the court; but, as we shall show hereafter, no attendance was contemplated on these days,at least in the absence of the judge.
The words 'actually in session,' found in the act of 1853, are emphasized by the sundry civil appropriation act of March 3, 1887 (24 Stat. at L. 509, 541, chap. 362), wherein it is enacted as follows: That hereafter no part 'of any money appropriated shall be used in payment of a per diem compensation to any attorney, clerk, or marshal for attendance in court, except for days when the court is open opened by the judge for business, or business is actually transacted in court, and when they attend under §§ 583, 584, 671, 672, and 2013 of the Revised Statutes, which fact shall be certified in the approval of their accounts.' The special sections here mentioned and reproduced in full in the opinion of the court may be dismissed from consideration, as, with the exception of § 2013, since repealed, they relate to cases where there is no judge present at the opening of the term, when special authority is given to the clerk or marshal to adjourn the court from day to day until a judge is present. As no claim is made in the case under consideration for attendance under these sections, they are only important here as indicating the will of Congress that neither the clerk nor the marshal should have an unlimited discretion in opening the court in the absence of the judge, and requiring a special authority for that purpose. These sections undoubtedly contemplate a special exigency to prevent a lapse of the term, which might follow from the absence of the judge, and to allow the court to be adjourned for a limited number of days. In two of these sections (584 and 671) there is a provision that if the judge does not attend before the close of the fourth day, the court shall be adjourned until the next iegular term. We have already held in the case of United States v. Pitman, 147 U. S. 669, 37 L. ed. 324, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 425, that the officers are entitled to per diem fees for attendance under these sections, the same as if the judge were present and business were transacted.
We had supposed the law to be that no court could be in session without the presence of a judge, and that the sections above cited from the opinion of the court in this case (583, 584, 671, 672) allow an attendance to be charged, not because the court is actually in session, but to prevent a lapse of the term, when the officers are supposed to be present and in readiness should the judge appear. Bouvier says (Law Dict.) in giving a definition of the word 'court' and the different styles of court, 'that the one common and essential feature in all courts is a judge or judges,so essential, indeed, that they are even ealled the court, as distinguished from the accessory and subordinate officers.' So, too, in Bacon's Abridgment a court is defined as an incorporeal political being, which requires for its existence the presence of the judges.
There are, however, so many other answers to his claim under §§ 574 and 638, that no elaborate discussion of them is necessary. (1) These three sections574, 638, and 828are all taken from the Revised Statutes, and must be construed together, as if they constituted parts of one act, as they really do. Nothing is said about attendance in the first two of these sections, and all the orders are such as are usually made at chambers. Both sections provide upon their face that the proceedings therein authorized may be made at chambers, or in the clerk's office, and in vacation as well as in term; but in a separate and distinct section,828, providing for clerk's fees, his fees for attendance are limited to such as are earned while the court 'is actually in session.' Of course, if there be any conflict between these sections the later rules, but in addition to that it is inconceivable that Congress, while providing specially for attendance while the court is in actual session, should throw the door wide open in §§ 574 and 638 to a charge for attendance upon every day when the judge may happen to make an order, whether the court be actually in session or not. All that is meant by §§ 574 and 638 is a recognition of the old custom that courts of admiralty and equity are presumed to be always open for incidental purposes,a custom as old as the very existence of these courts. (2) The list of the orders actually made by the judge, for the entry of which the clerk claims attendance in this case, shows that none of them were in admiralty cases, and comparatively few in equity cases. The great bulk were in common-law cases. The claim under these sections was evidently an afterthought. (3) If these sections be construed as opening the door for an attendance fee each time an order was made, then they were clearly repealed by the act of 1887, under which the clerk has a right to compensation only when the court is opened by the judge for business, or business is actually transacted in court, and when they attend under certain sections, in which §§ 574 and 638 are not included.