Source: http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/458/50.html
Timestamp: 2017-02-24 01:55:12
Document Index: 788619650

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3', '§ 7', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 57']

NORTHERN PIPELINE CO. v. MARATHON PIPE LINE CO. | FindLaw
NORTHERN PIPELINE CO. v. MARATHON PIPE LINE CO., (1982)
This jurisdictional grant empowers bankruptcy courts to entertain a wide variety of cases involving claims that may affect the property of the estate once a petition has been filed under Title 11. Included within the bankruptcy courts' jurisdiction are suits to recover accounts, controversies involving exempt property, actions to avoid transfers and payments as preferences or fraudulent conveyances, and causes of action owned by the debtor at the time of the petition for bankruptcy. The bankruptcy courts can hear claims based on state law as well as those based on federal law. See 1 W. Collier, Bankruptcy § 3.01, pp. 3-47 to 3-48 (15th ed. 1982).
During this period they are empowered to exercise essentially all of the jurisdiction and powers discussed above. See 404, 405, 92 Stat. 2683-2685. See generally 1 Collier, supra, §§ 7.04-7.05, pp. 7-23 to 7-65. The procedure for taking appeals is similar to that provided after the transition period. See 405(c)(1), 92 Stat. 2685.
] Although the Act initially vests this jurisdiction in district courts, 28 U.S.C. 1471(a) (1976 ed., Supp. IV), it subsequently provides that "[t]he bankruptcy court for the district in which a case under title 11 is commenced shall exercise all of the jurisdiction conferred by this section on the district courts," 1471(c) (1976 ed., Supp. IV) (emphasis added). Thus the ultimate repository of the Act's broad jurisdictional grant is the bankruptcy courts. See 1 W. Collier, Bankruptcy § 3.01, pp. 3-37, 3-44 to 3-49 (15th ed. 1982).
clearly-erroneous standard, employed in old Bankruptcy Rule 810 for review of findings of fact made by a referee. See Brief for United States 41; Tr. of Oral Arg. 27. See also In re Rivers, 19 B. R. 438 (Bkrtcy. ED Tenn. 1982); 1 Collier, supra n. 3, § 3.03, p. 3-315.
] Appellants and JUSTICE WHITE's dissent also rely on the broad powers exercised by the bankruptcy referees immediately before the Bankruptcy Act of 1978. See post, at 98-103. But those particular adjunct functions, which represent the culmination of years of gradual expansion of the power and authority of the bankruptcy referee, see 1 Collier, supra n. 3, § 1.02, have never been explicitly endorsed by this Court. In Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323
(1932). It cannot be doubted that the new bankruptcy judges, unlike the referees, have jurisdiction far beyond that which can be even arguably characterized as merely incidental to the discharge in bankruptcy or a plan for reorganization. Second, the bankruptcy judges have broader powers than those exercised by the referees. See infra, at 84-86; H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, supra, at 12, and nn. 63-68. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the relationship between the district court and the bankruptcy court was changed under the 1978 Act. Before the Act, bankruptcy referees were "subordinate adjuncts of the district courts." Id., at 7. In contrast, the new bankruptcy courts are "independent of the United States district courts." Ibid.; 1 Collier supra n. 3, § 1.03, p. 1-9. Before the Act, bankruptcy referees were appointed and removable only by the district court. 11 U.S.C. 62 (repealed). And the district court retained control over the reference by his power to withdraw the case from the referee. Bkrtcy. Rule 102. Thus even at the trial stage, the parties had access to an independent judicial officer. Although Congress could still lower the salary of referees, they were not dependent on the political Branches of Government for their appointment. To paraphrase JUSTICE BLACKMUN's observation in Raddatz, supra, the primary "danger of a `threat' to the `independence' of the [adjunct came] from within, rather than without, the judicial department." 447 U.S., at 685
Second, the distinction between claims based on state law and those based on federal law disregards the real character of bankruptcy proceedings. The routine in ordinary bankruptcy cases now, as it was before 1978, is to stay actions against the bankrupt, collect the bankrupt's assets, require creditors to file claims or be forever barred, allow or disallow claims that are filed, adjudicate preferences and fraudulent transfers, and make pro rata distributions to creditors, who will be barred by the discharge from taking further actions against the bankrupt. The crucial point to be made is that in the ordinary bankruptcy proceeding the great bulk of creditor claims are claims that have accrued under state law prior to bankruptcy - claims for goods sold, wages, rent, utilities, and the like. "[T]he word debt as used by the Act is not confined to its technical common law meaning but . . . extends to liabilities arising out of breach of contract . . . to torts . . . and to taxes owing to the United States or state or local governments." 1 W. Collier, Bankruptcy § 1.14, p. 88 (14th ed. 1976). Every such claim must be filed and its validity is subject [458 U.S. 50, 97]
The bankruptcy judge possessed "complete jurisdiction of the proceedings." 1 W. Collier, Bankruptcy § 1.09, p. 65 (14th ed. 1976). The referee would initially hear and decide practically all matters arising in the proceedings, including the allowance and disallowance of the claims of creditors.
the orders of the referee are entitled to the same presumption of validity, conclusiveness and recognition in the court of bankruptcy or other courts." 1 W. Collier, Bankruptcy § 1.09, pp. 65-66 (14th ed. 1976).
] "The judicial act of allowance or disallowance is one, of course, that is performed by the referee where the proceedings have been generally referred." 3 W. Collier, Bankruptcy § 57.14, p. 229, n. 3 (14th ed. 1977).
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