Source: http://masscases.com/cases/land/17/17lcr784.html
Timestamp: 2017-07-25 02:56:22
Document Index: 47112171

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 459', '§ 27', '§ 5', '§ 27', '§ 5', '§ 459', '§ 27', '§ 27', '§ 5', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6']

MISC 08-382185 December 28, 2009
On August 11, 2009, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendant Blasch Del Mar, LLC opposed the motion on September 28, 2009, and field a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. The motions were argued on October 23, 2009, and are the matters presently before the court.
1. Defendant Blasch Del Mar, LLC (Defendant Blasch) is the owner of a parcel of real property, known as and numbered 1440 Chequessett Neck Road in Wellfleet (Property).
2. The Property was first defined in or about 1952.
3. The Property contains approximately 2.95 acres of land.
4. At some point a dwelling structure was constructed on the Property.
5. At the time the Property was created and the original structure was built, there were no zoning bylaws in effect in the Town of Wellfleet.
6. In or about 1985, pursuant to a building permit, the original structure on the Property was demolished and a single-family structure was constructed (Prior House).
7. The Prior House contained 1,940 square feet of living area.
8. The Property is located in the National Seashore Park zoning district of the Town of Wellfleet Zoning By-laws. In the National Seashore Park district a single-family dwelling is allowed as of right.
9. The National Seashore Park district requires a minimum lot area of 3 acres.
10. The Prior House and lot met all the dimensional and setback requirements of the Town of Wellfleet Zoning By-laws except for minimum lot area.
11. Prior to March 4, 2008, Defendant Blasch applied for a building permit to demolish the Prior House and construct a new single-family dwelling on the Property (New House).
12. The proposed New House will continue to meet all the dimensional requirements of the Zoning By-laws.
13. The New House will be located in the same area as the Prior House; a promontory strip of land away from the tree cover to the north and overlooking Herring Pond to the east and Cape Cod Bay to the west.
14. The New House will have a larger footprint than the Prior House.
15. The New House will contain 5,848 square feet of living area.
16. The New House will be more than twice the height of the Prior House.
17. On March 4, 2008, the Building Inspector of the Town of Wellfleet granted the building permit to Defendant Blasch. Plaintiff appealed from the grant to the Town of Wellfleet Zoning Board of Appeals. On July 7, 2008, the Board of Appeals upheld the grant. The Plaintiff appealed to this court.
18. On or about June 2, 2008, prior to the Board of Appealss decision, the Defendant Blasch caused the Prior House to be demolished.
19. Plaintiff, the United States of America, is the owner of a vast area of real property, known as the Cape Cod National Seashore (CCNS), consisting of approximately 44,000 acres of land located along the shoreline of outer Cape Cod.
20. CCNS abuts the Property to the north, south, and east.
21. The CCNS property to the south of the Property contains a barrier beach, commonly known as the Gut.
22. The CCNS property in the vicinity contains beaches.
Summary judgment is granted where there are no issues of material fact and when the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Mass. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Cmty. Natl Bank v. Dawes, 369 Mass. 550 , 553 (1976); Cassesso v. Commr of Corr., 390 Mass. 419 , 422 (1983). The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating affirmatively the absence of a triable issue, and its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Pederson v. Time, Inc., 404 Mass. 14 , 16-17 (1989). In viewing the record before it, the court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Donaldson v. Farrakhan, 436 Mass. 94 , 96 (2002). In the instant matter, there are no genuine issues of material fact, within the meaning of Mass. R. Civ. P. 56(c), and, therefore, this case is proper for summary judgment.
[a]ny person aggrieved by a decision of the board of appeals or any special permit granting authority  may appeal to the land court department  by bringing an action within twenty days after the decision has been filed in the office of the city or town clerk.
In order to demonstrate such injury, plaintiff must assert a plausible claim of a definite violation of a private right, a private property interest, or a private legal interest. Harvard Square Defense Fund v. Planning Bd. of Cambridge, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 491 , 493 (1989) (and cases cited); accord Standerwick v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Andover, 64 Mass. App. Ct. 337 , 340 (2005) (and cases cited). [P]laintiff must establishby direct facts and not by speculative personal opinionthat his injury is special and different from the concerns of the rest of the community. Barvenik, 33 Mass. App. Ct. at 132. The facts alleged must be sufficient for a reasonable person to conclude that the claimed injury likely will flow from the boards action. Butler v. City of Waltham, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 435 , 441 (2005); accord Marashlian v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Newburyport, 421 Mass. 719 , 724 (1996); Monks v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Plymouth, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 685 , 688 (1994). Conjecture, personal opinion, and hypothesis, are not sufficient to substantiate standing. Butler, 63 Mass. App. Ct. at 441. Moreover, a general civic interest in the enforcement of zoning laws  is not enough to confer standing. Amherst Growth Study Comm., Inc. v. Bd. of Appeals of Amherst, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 826 , 826-27 (1973); accord Harvard Square Def. Fund, Inc., 27 Mass. App. Ct. at 495-96; Chongris v. Bd. of Appeals of Andover, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 999 , 999 (1984).
In the present case, it is undisputed that Plaintiff is an abutter to the Property and, thus, is presumed to have standing. However, Defendant Blasch has raised a challenge to the Plaintiffs standing. In support of this challenge, Defendant argues that Plaintiff either cannot support its alleged injuries with specific facts or cannot demonstrate that a supported injury is within the protection of the Town of Wellfleet Zoning By-laws.
Specifically, Defendant Blasch points out that Plaintiff alleges adverse impact to the directive of the Cape Cod National Seashore as defined by its enabling act, 16 U.S.C. § 459b-6 (2009), and as defined by the regulations establishing standards of approval of municipal zoning ordinances and bylaws in the CCNS, 36 C.F.R. § 27.3 (2008). Defendant argues that this injury is not an interest protected by the Zoning By-laws. The purpose of the National Seashore Park zoning district is [t]o provide for those residential and commercial uses that do not conflict with the regulations governing the activities of the National Seashore Park and are not incompatible with the character of the park, including the preservation of natural and scenic areas, as well as providing of certain recreational and leisure time activities for users of the park. Town of Wellfleet Zoning By-laws, § 5.3 (2008). In other words, the purpose of the district is to provide for certain uses permitted by the CCNS, pursuant to 36 C.F.R. § 27.3. This language, however, does not mean that the specific purposes of the CCNS are recognized and protected by the Zoning By-laws.
Moreover, § 5.3 of the Zoning By-laws is implicitly consistent with the purposes of the CCNS. The Cape Cod National Seashore is a designated National Park, comprising approximately 44,000 acres of land along the shoreline of outer Cape Cod, administered by the National Park Service, which service is a federal agency within the Department of the Interior of the Federal Government. CCNS was created in 1961 by the U.S. Congress [i]n order that the seashore shall be permanently preserved in its present state , including the flora and fauna, physiographic conditions, and historic sites and structures. 16 U.S.C. §§ 459b-6(b)(1) (2009). While the primary purpose of the CCNS is to prevent further development of the seashore, Congress recognized the interests of the residents located within this newly designated area. Rather than make comprehensive takings of all the land within the CCNS, Congress permitted developed property to remain, as long as the municipality in which it was located enacted a zoning bylaw and amendments that met with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior. In 1962, the Secretary issued regulations which established standards for the approval of zoning ordinances and bylaws. These regulations defined a Seashore District, which contains the Property. 36 C.F.R. § 27.3(a). The purposes of this district are to protect the scenic, scientific and cultural values of the area, preserve the undeveloped areas in a natural condition, and maintain the distinctive Cape Cod character of existing residential structures. 36 C.F.R. § 27.3(b). Therefore, the Plaintiff, by and through the Secretary of the Interior, had opportunity to consider § 5.3 of the Zoning By-Laws and, by not disapproving of the amendment, found that the provision was consistent with the purposes of the CCNS.
Defendant Blasch points out also that Plaintiff appears to allege injury to interests protected by the Wellfleet Conservation Commission. Defendant argues that these interests are clearly separate and distinct from the Zoning By-laws and not specifically protected therein. Moreover, Defendant argues that the Plaintiff is unable to produce any facts to support this allegation.
Plaintiff alleges also that the New House will cause surface instability and disruption of eolian transport of sand, which could cause harm to the Plaintiffs property to the north, south, and east as well as the Plaintiffs beaches in the vicinity, including the so-called Gut. Defendant counters that this allegation is purely speculative. In support of this argument, Defendant Blasch produces an Affidavit of Stanley M. Humphries, a coastal geologist. Mr. Humphries studied the Property and the surrounding area, including first-hand observation and soil samples. Upon considering the topography, soil consistency, vegetation, and wind patterns of the area, Mr. Humphries concludes that in his opinion, the New House will not cause a measurable geological impact on the Plaintiffs property.
Lastly, Defendant Blasch points out that Plaintiff alleges that the New House will cause harm to the scenery of the area. While a purpose of the National Seashore Park zoning district is the preservation of natural and scenic areas, Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot demonstrate particular injury. I agree. Accordingly, I find that Defendant Blasch has effectively rebutted the Plaintiffs presumption of standing.
Plaintiff has failed to produce any facts which tend to show any injury which would result if the New House were completed. Plaintiff stresses that it is a federal entity, mandated and funded to protect the public interest in natural and scenic values of the area. Unfortunately, the statutory purpose of a government entity is not sufficient to confer standing in the zoning context. See Harvard Square Def. Fund, Inc., 27 Mass. App. Ct. at 495-96; Chongris, 17 Mass. App. Ct. at 999; Amherst Growth Study Comm., Inc., 1 Mass. App. Ct. at 826-27. Plaintiff has not produced any specific facts which tend to show that the New House is a threat to cause damage to the CCNS property in the vicinity resulting from surface instability or disruption of eolian transport of sand.
In addition, Plaintiff characterizes the New House as manorial in design, including a turret, which design contrasts sharply with the natural terrain that surrounds the Property. Plaintiff contends that the height and volume of the New House render it highly visible from the Plaintiffs property; as compared to the Prior House, the New House will have a larger footprint, over three times the living area, and stand over twice as tall. However, Plaintiff does not demonstrate how the CCNS property in the vicinity is harmed by the alleged impact of the New House on the scenery of the area, or how such impact is particular to the Plaintiff. The New House will be visible from CCNS property farther than that portion directly abutting the Property as well as other property in the Town of Wellfleet.
Lastly, Plaintiff appears to argue that a government agency has standing in the Commonwealth to bring a zoning action on behalf of the public interest. I find this to be a wholly unsupported theory. Therefore, Plaintiff has not met its burden of demonstrating a particularized injury resulting from the zoning relief granted. Accordingly, I rule that the Plaintiff lacks standing to bring this action. Nonetheless, even if the Plaintiff had standing to bring this action, its claim fails on the merits.
Decision of the Board of Appeals
It follows, therefore, that the court may overturn the board's decision only if the decision is based on a legally untenable ground or is unreasonable, whimsical, capricious or arbitrary. Britton v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Gloucester, 59 Mass. App. Ct. 68 , 72 (2003); accord MacGibbon v. Bd. of Appeals of Duxbury, 356 Mass. 635 , 639 (1970); ACW Realty Mgmt., Inc., 40 Mass. App. Ct. at 246. Moreover, where the courts findings of fact support any rational basis for the municipal boards decision, that decision must stand. MacGibbon, 356 Mass. at 639; Davis v. Zoning Bd. of Chatham, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 349 , 356 (2001); ACW Realty Mgmt., Inc., 40 Mass. App. Ct. at 246.
In the present case, Plaintiff argues that the Board of Appeals is required to render a finding concerning whether the New House will be substantially more detrimental than the existing, nonconforming structure to the neighborhood and, therefore, the Decision should be annulled. General Laws chapter 40A, § 6 provides, in relevant part:
[A] zoning ordinance or by-law shall not apply to structures or uses lawfully in existence or lawfully begun  before the first publication of notice of the public hearing on such ordinance or by-law required by section five, but shall apply to any change or substantial extension of such use  after the first notice of said public hearing, to any reconstruction, extension or structural change of such structure and to any alteration of a structure begun after the first notice of said public hearing to provide for its use for a substantially different purpose or for the same purpose in a substantially different manner or to a substantially greater extent except where alteration, reconstruction, extension or structural change to a single or two-family residential structure does not increase the nonconforming nature of said structure.
Section 6 prescribes the minimum of tolerance that must be accorded to nonconforming uses, existing buildings and structure, and the existing use of any building or structure, and reserves to the municipality maximum control of such nonconformities. Inspector of Bldgs. of Burlington v. Murphy, 320 Mass. 207 , 209 (1946) (citations omitted) (and cases cited). In other words, § 6 establishes a floor for protection of nonconformities, and municipalities retain a continuing right to regulate or forbid changes in nonconforming uses [or structures]. Blasco v. Bd. of Appeals of Winchendon, 31 Mass. App. Ct. 32 , 39 (1991); see e.g. Chilson v. Zoning Bd. of Appeal of Attleboro, 344 Mass. 406 , 412-13 (1962); Inspector of Bldgs. of Burlington, 320 Mass. at 209-210.
Under § 6, a preexisting, nonconforming single- or two-family residential structure may be reconstructed if the reconstruction does not increase the existing nonconformities. However, a zoning ordinance or bylaw may specifically authorize such reconstruction.
Section 6.1.5.2 of the Town of Wellfleet Zoning By-laws provides, in relevant part:
Conforming single and two-family residential structures located on non-conforming lots may be altered if:
a. the structure after the alteration will continue to conform .
Section 2.1 of the Zoning By-laws defines structure as: Anything constructed or erected, the use of which requires location on the ground or attachment to something located on the ground . This section also defines lot, in relevant part, as: Parcel of land occupied or intended to be occupied by one Principal Building or Principal Use and its accessory buildings .
Section 6.1.5.2 of the Wellfleet Zoning By-laws clearly provides more liberal protections of nonconforming structures than required by G.L. c. 40A, § 6, which the town is authorized to do. It is undisputed that the Property and the New House fall under this provision of the Zoning By-laws.
Plaintiff argues also that § 6.1.5.2 of the Zoning By-laws is inconsistent with G.L. c. 40A, § 6, and therefore, is invalid. I disagree. While it is true that a provision of a zoning ordinance or bylaw may not conflict with a statute, as discussed previously, § 6 establishes only the minimum tolerance of nonconforming structures and uses and reserves to the municipality the right to provide more liberal protection. A zoning ordinance or bylaw may provide specific authority for the reconstruction of a single- or two-family residential structure. Section 6.1.5.2 of the Zoning By-laws does just that.
Plaintiff argues further that § 6.1.5.2 invalidly distinguishes between a nonconforming structure and a nonconforming lot. Plaintiff continues that the reconstruction of the previous house constituted a change to the nonconformity, because the structure and lot are considered together. Plaintiff concludes, therefore, that the Board of Appeals was required to render a finding concerning whether the New House will be substantially more detrimental than the existing, nonconforming structure to the neighborhood. Again, I disagree. Plaintiff relies on Bransford v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Edgartown for the proposition that, as applied in G.L. c. 40A, § 6, the phrase nonconforming structure means both nonconforming structure and nonconforming lot. 444 Mass. 852 (2005). In the context of that section, the two concepts are intertwined and they should not be distinguished. Id. at 861. However, this interpretation does not bind municipal bylaws and there is nothing prohibiting the town of Wellfleet from providing greater protections to nonconforming lots in this manner.
Lastly, Plaintiff makes the confusing argument that § 6.1.5.2 of the Zoning By-laws does not apply to authorize the New House, because Defendant Blasch voluntarily razed the Prior House and, therefore, is no longer protected by § 6 to construct the New House. On March 4, 2008, the Building Inspector of the Town of Wellfleet granted a building permit to Defendant Blasch for the demolition of the Prior House and the construction of the New House. Defendant Blasch demolished the Prior House on June 2, 2008. The demolition of the Prior House occurred only after and pursuant to the grant of a valid building permit.
For the foregoing reasons, this court concludes that Plaintiff lacks standing to bring this action. Defendant effectively rebutted the Plaintiffs presumption of standing by providing facts that Plaintiff cannot support its alleged injuries with specific facts or demonstrate that a supported injury is within the protection of the Town of Wellfleet Zoning By-laws. In response, Plaintiff did not convince the court that the directive of the Cape Cod National Seashore or the interests of the Wellfleet Conservation Commissioner are interests protected by the Zoning By-laws. Moreover, Plaintiff failed to produce specific facts which tend to show that the New House is a threat to cause damage to the Cape Cod National Seashore property in the vicinity resulting from surface instability or disruption of eolian transport of sand, or demonstrate how the property in the vicinity is harmed by the alleged impact of the New House on the scenery of the area or how such impact is particular to the Plaintiff. In accordance with the foregoing, the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby DENIED, and the Defendant Blaschs Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is ALLOWED.