Source: http://ca.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20130320_0000365.SCA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2017-04-27 13:21:19
Document Index: 646808654

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1983', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1983']

| Darryl Lee Dunsmore, Cdcr #Ad-6237 v. State of California; John Doe
Darryl Lee Dunsmore, Cdcr #Ad-6237 v. State of California; John Doe
DARRYL LEE DUNSMORE, CDCR #AD-6237, PLAINTIFF,v.STATE OF CALIFORNIA; JOHN DOE, AND DIRECTOR OF FINANCE; RICHARD ROE, AGENCY OR AGENCIES; JOHN DOE #2, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, DEFENDANTS.
ORDER: (1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS, IMPOSING NO PARTIAL FILING FEE AND GARNISHING $350 BALANCE FROM PRISONER'S TRUST ACCOUNT PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (2) DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR FAILING TO [ECF No. 7]; STATE A CLAIM AND AS FRIVOLOUS PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b)
Plaintiff, Darryl Lee Dunsmore, a state prisoner currently incarcerated at the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility ("RJD") located in San Diego, California, and proceeding in pro se, initially filed a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on August 6, 2012. (ECF No. 1). In addition, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis ("IFP") pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). (ECF No. 2). However, because Plaintiff failed to a certified copy of his prison trust account statement, as required pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), the Court denied Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed IFP and dismissed the action. (ECF No. 3). Plaintiff was given forty-five (45) days to file a new Motion to Proceed IFP, with a trust account statement, in order to reopen the action. (Id.) Although untimely, on March 6, 2013, this Court permitted Plaintiff to file a First Amended Complaint ("FAC"), along with a certified copy of his inmate trust account statement. (ECF Nos. 5, 7). The Court will now liberally construe Plaintiff's inmate trust account statement to be a pending Motion to Proceed IFP.
The Court finds that Plaintiff has no available funds from which to pay filing fees at this time. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that "[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee."); Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a "safety-valve" preventing dismissal of a prisoner's IFP case based solely on a "failure to pay ... due to the lack of funds available to him when payment is ordered."). Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed IFP [ECF No. 7] and assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). However, the entire $350 balance of the filing fees mandated shall be collected and forwarded to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
While far from clear, it appears that Plaintiff is claiming that the PLRA is unconstitutional, including the provision that requires garnishment of the civil filing fee from prisoners. (See FAC at 20.) Plaintiff argues that his right to equal protection has been violated and "it is unconstitutional to require a fee for that which the Constitution declares to be a free exercise of a right." (Id.) "The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State shall 'deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,' which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike." City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 472 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).
Equal protection claims arise when a charge is made that similarly situated individuals are treated differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. See San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1972). In order to state a § 1983 claim based on a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff must show that similarly situated individuals were intentionally treated differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. See Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000).
However, the Ninth Circuit has specifically held that the "PLRA filing fee provisions satisfy rational basis scrutiny and thus do not violate an indigent prisoner's constitutional right to equal protection of the laws." Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 849-50 (9th Cir. 2002). Thus, Plaintiff is unable to ...