Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/563/421/concurrence.html
Timestamp: 2017-06-22 12:16:48
Document Index: 511685507

Matched Legal Cases: ['§204', '§205', '§502', '§204', '§204', '§502']

CIGNA Corp. v. Amara et al. (Concurrence by Justice Scalia) :: 563 U.S. 421 (2011) :: Justia US Supreme Court Center Log In
› CIGNA Corp. v. Amara et al.
CIGNA Corp. v. Amara et al. 563 U.S. 421 (2011)
a “ ‘carefully crafted and detailed enforcement scheme.’ ” Brief for Petitioners 2. And there is no discussion whatsoever of contract reformation or surcharge in the briefs of the parties or even amici.[Footnote 1]
demonstrate—by blatant dictum, if necessary—that, by George, plan members misled by an SPD will be compensated. That they will normally be compensated is not in doubt. As the opinion for the Court notes, ante, at 10, the Second Circuit has interpreted ERISA as permitting the invalidation of plan amendments not preceded by proper notice, by reason of §204(h), which reads:
be surcharged is, as the opinion for the Court notes, the “actual harm” suffered by an employee, ante, at 22—that is, harm stemming from reliance on the SPD or the lost opportunity to contest or react to the switch. Cf. 3 A. Scott & W. Fratcher, Law of Trusts §205, pp. 237–243 (4th ed. 1988). A remedy relating only to that harm would of course be far different from what the District Court imposed.[Footnote 3]
I agree with the Court that an SPD is not part of
or beneficiary may not recover for misrepresentations in an SPD under §502(a)(1)(B). Because this is the only question properly presented for our review, and the only question briefed and argued before us, I concur only in the judgment.
Footnote 1 “[P]lan reformation” makes an appearance in one sentence of one footnote of the Government’s brief, see Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 30, n. 9. This cameo hardly qualifies as “discussion.”
Footnote 2 The District Court found that §204(h) was unhelpful because CIGNA had provided a valid notice of its decision to freeze benefits under the old plan. If the new plan were invalidated because of a defective §204(h) notice, the freeze would return to force, and respondents would be worse off. Respondents might (and likely should) have argued that the notice for the freeze was itself void, but they “argued none of these things,” and the District Court declined to “make these arguments now on [their] behalf.” 559 F. Supp. 2d 192, 208 (Conn. 2008).
Footnote 3 It is also not obvious that the relief sought in this case would constitute an equitable surcharge allowable under Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 508 U. S. 248 (1993). Cf. Knieriem v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 434 F. 3d 1058, 1063–1064 (CA8 2006). This question, however, like the Court’s entire discussion of §502(a)(3), is best left for a case in which the issue is raised and briefed. Download PDF