Source: http://kpcraoindia.blogspot.com/2012/05/consttution-of-india-concept-of.html
Timestamp: 2018-11-18 02:31:27
Document Index: 239416107

Matched Legal Cases: ['Arts 200', 'art. 31', 'Art.3', 'Art.352', 'art.356', 'Art. 360', 'Art.352', 'Art. 356']

SELECT 100 LEGAL ARTICLES OF KPC RAO AND Dr PADMA: THE CONSTTUTION OF INDIA – CONCEPT OF FEDERALISM
THE CONSTTUTION OF INDIA – THE CONCEPT OF FEDERALISM
LLB., FCS., FICWA.,
Federalism is the theory or advocacy of federal principles for dividing powers between member units and common institutions. Unlike in a unitary state, sovereignty in federal political orders is non-centralized, often constitutionally, between at least two levels so that units at each level have final authority and can be self governing in some issue area. Citizens thus have political obligations to, or have their rights secured by, two authorities. The division of power between the member unit and center may vary, typically the center has powers regarding defense and foreign policy, but member units may also have international roles. The decision-making bodies of member units may also participate in central decision-making bodies. Much recent philosophical attention is spurred by renewed political interest in federalism, coupled with empirical findings concerning the requisite and legitimate basis for stability and trust among citizens in federal political orders. Philosophical contributions have addressed the dilemmas and opportunities facing Canada, Australia, Europe, Russia, Iraq, Nepal and Nigeria, to mention just a few areas where federal arrangements are seen as interesting solutions to accommodate differences among populations divided by ethnic or cultural cleavages yet seeking a common, often democratic, political order.[1]
A federal political order is here taken to be “the genus of political organization that is marked by the combination of shared rule and self-rule”[2]. Federalism is the theory or advocacy of such an order, including principles for dividing final authority between member units and the common institutions.
A federation is one species of such a federal order; other species are unions, confederations, leagues and decentralised unions—and hybrids such as the present European Union. A federation in this sense involves a territorial division of power between constituent units—sometimes called ‘provinces’, ‘cantons’, or confusingly ‘states’—and a common government. This division of power is typically entrenched in a constitution which neither a member unit nor the common government can alter unilaterally. The member unit and the common government both have direct effect on the citizenry—the common government operates “on the individual citizens composing the nation”—and the authorities of both are directly elected. In comparison, decentralized authority in unitary states can typically be revoked by the central legislature at will. Such entrenchments notwithstanding, some centralization often occurs owing to the constitutional interpretations by a federal level court in charge of settling conflicts regarding the scopes of final legislative and/or judicial authority.
In other words, Constitution of a country may be Unitary or Federal. Under Unitary Constitution powers are centralized in Central Government. In Federal Constitution the powers are distributed between the Centre and State. However, there is a division of powers between the Federal and the State Governments and both are independent in their own spheres.
There is a difference of opinion amongst the jurists about the nature of the Indian Constitution. One view is that it is a quasi-federal constitution and contains more unitary features than federal. The other view is that it is a federal constitution with a novel feature adopting itself to national emergencies. The view of the framers of the Constitution is that the Indian Constitution is a Federal Constitution. Dr. Ambedkar, the Chairmen of the Drafting Committee, observed thus, “I think it is agreed that our Constitution notwithstanding the many provisions which are contained in it whereby the Centre has been given powers to override the Provinces (States) nonetheless, is a Federal Constitution”.[3]
But some constitutional jurists hesitate to characterize the Indian Constitution as federal. It is, therefore, necessary to ascertain firstly, what federal constitution is and what are its essential characteristics and secondly, to examine whether our Constitution possesses those characteristics.
According to Prof. Wheare, “By the Federal Principles” means “is the method of dividing power so that the general and regional Governments are each within a sphere coordinate and independent. Both the federal and the Regional Government are co-ordinate and independent in their spheres and not subordinate to one another.
The American Constitution is universally regarded as an example of federal constitution. It establishes dual polity or dual form of Government. i.e the Federal and the State Governments. The powers of both the Central and the State Governments are divided and both are independent in their own spheres. The existence of co-ordinate authorities independent of each other is the gist of the federal principle.
Prof. Wheare, after giving the above definition as to what the federal principle is, himself proceeds to examine whether the American Constitution satisfies the above test. He observes “Are we to confine the forms to cases where the federal principal has been applied completely and without exception? It would not be sensible to do this. After all, the Constitution of the United States itself , as originally drawn up contained at least one exception to the federal principle in that the Senate was composed of representatives selected by the Legislatures of the State. Thus a part of the general Government of the United States was dependent to some extent upon a part of the regional Government. This exception to the federal principle was maintained in law until 1913. Yet the American Constitution from 1787-1913 was and must be called a “federal constitution” for the federal principle was predominant in it. Thus, the criterion is “Is the federal principle predominant in the Constitution? If so, that constitution may be called a “federal Constitution” If, on the other hand, there are so many modifications, in the application of the federal principle that it ceases to be of any significance, then the constitution cannot be termed as federal. This appears to be the most instructive and responsible way in which to use the term “federal constitution “. It seems essential to define federal principle rigidly, but to apply the term “federal constitution “ more widely. Thus Dr. Wheare accepts that exceptions are permissible provided federal principle is predominantly retained in the constitution.
Essentials or Features or Characteristics of Federalism or Federal Constitution:
1) Distribution of Powers
2) Supremacy of the Constitution
3) A Written Constitution
5) Authority of Courts; and
6) Dual Policy.
“Federalism’ means “distribution of powers of the State among different co-ordinate bodies (Controlled by the constitution)” The basis of such distribution is in view of national importance. The basis of such distribution of powers is that in matters of national importance in which a uniform policy is desirable in the interest of the units, authority is entrusted to the Union, and matters of local concern remain with the States.
2) Supremacy of Constitution
In a Federal State, Constitution is the supreme law of the land. The Government Machinery is in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. Prof. Wheare says “that those two institutions –the supreme constitution and the written constitution are then, essential institutions to a federal Government. The Supreme Constitution is essential if Government is to be federal; the written constitution is essential if federal Government is to work well.
To maintain supremacy and to achieve the goals, the Constitution must be in writing. A written Constitution is one which is written down in the form of document. Eg. American Constitution.
If the Constitution is rigid, it is very difficult to amend. A rigid Constitution is one, which requires a special, complex and more technical procedure for its amendment. With this rigidity, supremacy of the Constitution can be maintained.
5) Authority of courts
For the existence of a Federal system, Legal Supremacy is very essential. Any action by the Centre or State may abridge the provisions of the constitution or infringe the legal rights of individuals. In such situations, judiciary is the final authority to interpret the constitution to resolve (settle) such conflicts. This must be done by some independent and impartial authority above and beyond the ordinary bodies whether federal or State legislatures existing under the Constitution. The judiciary has, in a federal polity, the final power to interpret the Constitution and guard the entrenched provisions of the Constitution.
6) Dual Policy
In Federal constitution, there exists dual policy. The Union at the Centre and States at provinces are, endowed with sovereign powers.
Reasons for a federal order rather than separate states
Here is a list of reasons for a federal order rather than separate states.
1) Federations may foster peace, in the senses of preventing wars and preventing fears of war, in several ways. States can join a (con)federation to become jointly powerful enough to dissuade external aggressors, and/or to prevent aggressive and preemptive wars among themselves.
2) Federations can promote economic prosperity by removing internal barriers to trade, through economies of scale, by establishing and maintaining inter-member unit trade agreements, or by becoming a sufficiently large global player to affect international trade regimes.
3) Federal arrangements may protect individuals against political authorities by constraining state sovereignty, placing some powers with the center. By entrusting the center with authority to intervene in member units, the federal arrangements can protect minorities’ human rights against member unit authorities.
4) Federations can facilitate some objectives of sovereign states, such as credible commitments, certain kinds of coordination, and control over externalities, by transferring some powers to a common body. Since cooperation in some areas can ‘spill over’ and create demands for further coordination in other sectors, federations often exhibit creeping centralization.
5) Federal arrangements may enhance the political influence of formerly sovereign governments.
6) Federal political orders can be preferred as the appropriate form of nested organizations.
Constitutional Provisions which Support the Argument of the Federal Principle
Some scholars hesitate to characterize the Indian Constitution as truly federal because according to them in certain circumstances the Constitution empowers the Centre to interfere in the State matters and thus places the States in a subordinate position which violates the federal principle. They, therefore, use such expressions for it as ‘quasi-federal’, ‘unitary with federal features’ or ‘federal with unitary features’. In the opinion of Prof. Wheare: ‘The Constitution establishes a system of Government which is almost quasi-federal …. A unitary State with subsidiary federal features rather than a federal State with subsidiary unitary features’. Jennings has characterized it as a federation with a strong centralizing tendency.
Concept of Federalism- in the Indian Context
The provisions of the Constitution which support the argument of the federal principle are discussed below:
1) Appointment of governors
The Governors of the State are appointed by the President. This is however not a matter of much significance, for the Governor is only the constitutional head of the State who shall normally act on the advice of his Ministers. There are provisions in the Constitution under which the Governor is required to send certain State Laws for the assent of the President. The President has power to veto those State Laws e.g. Arts 200, 288(2) But whatever be the letter of the Constitution in practice there are not many examples where the President has vetoed the State laws. The only example has been the Kerala Education Bill. But here also the Centre obtained advisory opinion of the Supreme Court before sending it back to the State Legislature for suitable amendments in the light of the Court’s opinion.
2) Parliament’s power to legislate in the national interest
Under Article 249 Parliament is empowered to make laws with respect to every matter enumerated in the state list if Rajya Sabha passes a resolution by 2/3rd majority that it is necessary in the national interest. There cannot be any objection to this provision. First , no one will deny that if a subject in the State List assumes national character. Parliament should make a law on it. In normal course this cannot be done unless the Constitution is amended. But in this provision we have devised an expedient way by which without formally amending the Constitution, we can achieve the desired effect. Namely, the acquisition by the Centre of the power to administer and legislate upon a subject which has assumed national importance. Secondly, it should also be noted that this power is given to Parliament by the Council of States itself by passing a resolution supported by 2/3 majority of the members present. Thus, in effect by this device the Constitution is amended by the agreement of majority of the States. We, therefore, fail to understand how Article 249 places the State in subordinate position.
3) Parliament’s power to form new States and alter boundaries of existing States
The Parliament of India may form new States; it may increase or diminish the area of any state and it may alter the boundaries or name of any state (art. 31). The very existence of the State thus depends upon the sweetwill of the Union Government. The power conferred on Parliament to make territorial adjustment is better explained on the historical basis. The Government of India, for the first time, establish federal polity in India. It deliberately created the constituent units of the federation although they had no organic roots in the past. The framers of the Constitution were well aware of the peculiar conditions under which and the reasons for which the States were formed and their boundaries were defined and so they deliberately accepted the provisions in Article 3 with a view to meeting the possibility of the redistribution of the State territory after the integration of Indian States. The provisions in Art.3 take into account the fact that the Constitution contemplated readjustment of the territories of constituent States which might arise in future.
4) Emergency provisions
The Constitution envisages three types of emergencies:
i) Emergency caused by war or external aggression or armed rebellion (Art.352);
ii) Emergency caused by failure of constitutional machinery in states (art.356);
iii) Financial emergency (Art. 360).
When the proclamation of emergency is made under Art.352, the normal distribution of powers between the Centre and the States undergo a vital change. Parliament is empowered to make laws with respect to any matter enumerated in the State List. The Centre is empowered to give directions to any state as to manner in which the State’s executive power is to be exercised. Further the President may by order direct that all or any of the provisions of Arts. 278 to 279 relating to distribution of revenue between the Centre and State shall take effect with such exception or modifications, as he thinks fit. Under Art. 356, if the President is satisfied that Government of a State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution he can dismiss the state ministry and dissolve the Legislature and assume all the functions of the State. Thus the normal distribution of powers between the Centre and the States, which is the basic element of a federal constitution, is completely suspended. It is alleged that these provisions enable the Union Parliament to convert the Union into a unitary State which vitally affects the federal character of the Indian Constitution.
Do these provisions modify the federal character of the Indian Constitution? The correct view is that emergency provisions which come into operation only on the happening of the specific contingencies , do not modify or destroy the federal system. It is rather a merit of the Constitution that it visualizes the contingencies when the strict application of the federal principle might destroy the basic assumption on which our Constitution is built. The Constitution by adopting itself to a changed circumstance strengthens the Government in its endeavour to overcome the crisis. In an emergency the behaviour of each federal Constitution is very much different from that in peace time. Though the Constitution of the U.S.A., Australia and Canada do not expressly provide for enlargement of federal power during the periods of emergency, but during the two World Wars, the defence power of the Federal Government was given so extended interpretation by the Courts that these countries behaved more likely unitary than federal State. For the above reasons, we maintain that the Indian Constitution is federal in nature. Prof. Wheare has coined a phrase ‘quasi-federation ‘as applicable to India but he has nowhere defined that a ‘quasi-federation’ is. “It is not necessary to use such a vague term ‘quasi-federal ‘ to characterize it” The term ‘quasi-federal‘ is extremely vague as it does not denote how powerful the Centre is, how much deviation there is from the pure federal model’ or what kind of special position a particular quasi-federation occupies between a unitary State and a federation proper. The fundamental principle of federation is that the powers are distributed between the Centre and the States and that is done by the Constitution. That is what the Constitution does. The States do not depend upon the Centre, for, in normal times the Centre cannot intrude. It may be that the Centre has been assigned a larger role than the States but that by itself does not detract from the federal nature of the Constitution, for it is not the essence of federalism to say that only so much and more power, is to be given to the Centre.
Prof. Wheare appears to feel that the American Constitution is truly of federal type. He says ‘among examples of federal constitutions there may be mentioned those of the United States, Switzerland and Australia.’ It may, however, be clearly understood that the nature of federalism is more of historical growth based on a nation’s necessity. To accept the same pattern of federalism in all countries is well nigh impossible. With all respects to Prof. Wheare , we may tell him that federalism varies from place to place and from time to time depending on so many factors-historical, geographical, economical and political. So what is good for America is not necessarily good for India. The people of a country can take in only the required dosages, otherwise they may stunt or destroy their growth. Federalism is not like the set pattern of coats to wear. It is a clock of varying organized pattern befitting each wearer and helping him to the next and superior stages of federalism. India’s federalism is unique and good for itself. America’s federalism is not perfect as it is stated to be. It has got its own drawback. Indian constitution is sufficiently federal. It is not less federal than American federalism which on paper is of higher degree but in the actual practice the leaning is towards centralization of national interest. The term ‘quasi’ is a misnomer India is federal and America is more federal in the outline of the Constitution. In practice there is not much difference between the two.
It may be that we deviated in respect of certain matters from the strict federalism as operating in the U.S.A. or Switzerland, but the reasons are obvious. The Indian Constitution makers defined the Indian federal structure not with an eye on theoretical but on practical considerations in designing federalism. Under the impact of World wars, international crisis, scientific and technological progress and developments and the emergence of the ideal of social welfare State, the whole concept of federalism had been undergoing a change for sometime throughout the world. There are centralizing tendencies in evidence in every federation and whether it is in U.S.A. or in Australia, strong and powerful national governments have emerged in every federation. The framers of the Indian Constitution took note of these tendencies and kept in view the practical needs of the country designed on federal structure not on the footing that it should conform to some theoretical, definite or standard pattern, but on the basis that it should be able to subserve the need of the vast and diverse country like India. The Indian Constitution, therefore, constitutes a new bold experiment in the area of federalism.
In short it may concluded that the Constitution of India neither purely federal nor purely unitary but is a combination of both. It is a union of composite State of novel type. It enshrines the principle that in spite of federalism, the national interest ought to be paramount. Thus, the Indian Constitution is mainly federal with unique safeguards for enforcing national unity and growth.[4]
Since the ancient period, kingdoms or empires that have ruled over the Indian subcontinent have practiced federal policies because in all the internal affairs, the chieftain and his vassal state was left very much alone. This policy of non-intervention in local affairs was a practical necessity because natural diversities of the people of the subcontinent were so great that they could only be made a part of a single empire if no or very little effort was made to impose a common set of beliefs.
Seeds of cooperative federalism can be traced right from the Regulating Act of 1773 which set up a system whereby the British Government supervised (regulated) the work of the East India Company but did not take power for itself. The Government of India Act, 1919 provided for a federal India, however superficial, by envisaging a dual form of government called ‘dyarchy’. The Report of the Indian Statutory Commission of 1929 gave a federal solution by proposing to introduce ‘dyarchy’ at the centre and to advance from diarchy to fully responsible government in the provinces. The same was sought to be achieved by the Government of India Act, 1935. In 1937, after a great deal of confrontation, Provincial Autonomy commenced. From that point until the declaration of war in 1939, Lord Linlithgow tirelessly tried to get enough of the Princes to accede to launch the Federation. The Cabinet Mission of 1946 provided that Union of India should deal with Foreign Affairs, Defence and Communication and all subjects other than Union subjects and all residuary powers were to vest in the Provinces.
The Constituent Assembly members did a commendable job by envisaging a cooperative federalism set up because in the turbulent and bloody circumstances prevailing at that time and in the wake of India’s partition, it could have been very easy to swing towards at least a highly centralised federation, if not unitary, in place of a quasi federation, as the latter is much more difficult to work out, demanding a lot of ground work, time, draftsmanship as well as ‘vision’ which could foresee that only a cooperative federal set up could ensure that the needs of security, defence, urge for a welfare state and meeting the situation of economic crisis are catered to along with addressing the demands of the country’s constituent states, as a result of which India as a nation would last. Hence, even though federal character seemed to be a practical imperative by reason of India’s sheer size and diversity, yet this assumption should not be taken for granted.
In fact, the strong central bias in the constitution has been a boon to keep India together at the most crucial time of its birth when forces of communalism, separatism and linguism were rampant.
In State of Rajasthan v UOI,[5] , it was quoted that according to Granville Austin, the Constitution of India was perhaps the first constituent body to embrace from the start what A.H. Birch and others have called ‘cooperative federalism’. Chief Justice Beg called the Constitution ‘amphibian’, ....If then our Constitution creates a Central Government which is ‘amphibian’, in the sense that it can move either on the federal or on the unitary plane, according to the needs of the situation and circumstances of a case...”.
In S.R. Bommai v Union of India [6], the phrase ‘pragmatic federalism’ was used. In the words of Justice Ahmadi, “..It would thus seem that the Indian Constitution has, in it, not only features of a pragmatic federalism which, while distributing legislative powers and indicating the spheres of governmental powers of State and Central Governments, is overlaid by strong unitary features...”
In State of Haryana v State of Punjab[7], ‘semi federal’ was used. And in Shamsher Singh v State of Punjab [8], the Constitution was called ‘more unitary than federal’.
In the words of Chief Justice Beg in State of Rajasthan v Union of India[9], “.....A conspectus of the provisions of our Constitution will indicate that, whatever appearance of a federal structure our Constitution may have, its operations are certainly, judged both by the contents of power which a number of provisions carry with them and the use that has been made of them”.
The States Reorganisation Act, 1956 under Nehru, creating linguistic states, fulfilled a demand that was being made vociferously and was a victory of popular will. Five Zonal Councils were set up vide Part-III of the States Re-organisation Act, 1956 with the object, in Nehru’s own words, to “develop the habit of cooperative working”.
In 1966, the Santhanam Committee on Prevention of Corruption was the first to bring possession of unexplained disproportionate assets within the ambit of corruption and to enunciate that the abuse and misuse of power for self-aggrandisement by the political executive was to be blamed for the prevalence of corruption at all other levels. The setting up of vigilance departments presided over by a Chief Vigilance Officer in every Ministry and Public Sector Undertaking, and the constitution of the Chief Vigilance Commission in 1964 as a pivotal authority to monitor the progress of vigilance cases, are the direct outcome of its recommendations. The latter was accorded statutory status in 2003, consequent upon the judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vineet Narain v. Union of India[10] , through the Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003.
All this however could not stop the formation of new parties which were born outside the Parliament, based on ideology, like the DMK in Tamil Nadu, Telugu Desam in Andhra Pradesh and Communist Party in Bengal. Playing with the country’s inherent federal spirit can be a double edged weapon. The very policies of centralisation, politicisation and dictatorship that damaged the federal and democratic structure of the country, led to the rise of a strongly ideological party on the right i.e. the BJP and a mildly ideological combine on the Left.
In the meanwhile, the Rajmannar Committee Report came out in 1971 comprehensively reviewing centre-state relations. It recognised the urgent need to constitute a non-political advisory body under article 263 to keep inter-governmental relations under constant review. Since such a body would be free of politics, hence it would command greater respect and its advices would be more acceptable. The ISC should not be merely advisory but be ‘ordinarily binding’ on both the Centre and the States. No decision of national importance or which may affect one or more states should be taken by the Union Government except after consultation with the ISC. Every bill of national importance or which is likely to affect the state interests should, before its introduction in the Parliament, be referred to the ISC, and its views thereon should be submitted to Parliament at the time of introduction of the Bill. It is apparent that the Rajmannar Committee gave the most pro active recommendations.
It was due to Mrs Indira Gandhi’s misadventures that in Kesavananda Bharti v State of Kerala[11], 1973, the Courts evolved the ‘basic structure’ doctrine to save the Constitution from the misplaced establishment sovereignty of the Union Parliament. Chief Justice Sikri clearly stated that the federal character of the Constitution was a feature of the basic structure of the Constitution which was, hence, not open to whimsical amendments. And the Doctrine of Supremacy of the Constitution is part of basic structure i.e. neither of the three constitutionally separate organs of the State can leap outside the boundaries of its own constitutionally assigned sphere or orbit of authority into that of the other.
The amendments introduced in Article 356 by the 44th Amendment Act helped to mitigate the abuse of emergency provisions. By deleting the clauses which made the declaration and continuance of emergency by the President conclusive, it provided an opportunity for judicial review i.e. the Courts can now take a more active part in preventing a malafide exercise of power to impose President’s rule. Quoting Justice P.B. Sawant in S.R. Bommai v Union of India [12], “....The courts should not lightly decline to exercise judicial review when as a matter of common knowledge, the emergency has ceased to exist.....This amendment has been prompted not only by the abuse of the Proclamation of emergency arising out of war or external aggression, but even more, by the wholly unjustified Proclamation of emergency issued in 1975 to protect the personal position of the Prime Minister”
This declaration of emergency had another significant impact. It gave an opportunity to the nascent opposition, struggling for its birth, a burning political cause and a strongly shared grievance that enabled the leaders to sink their differences and to plan for the future. This led to the rise of the Janata Party, India’s first alternative to the Congress, which won in 1977 elections, marking a watershed in Indian politics. It is to be noted that the break up from single party rule across the country and the rise of regional parties happened simultaneously with the existing virtually single party rule of Congress. It was because of the federal structure that people could aspire for share in power.
In State of Rajasthan v Union of India[13] , States of Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab, Bihar, Himachal Pradesh and Orissa challenged the sufficiency of grounds of action by the governor under Article 356(1). Chief Justice Beg held that sufficiency or inadequacy of the grounds for declaration of emergency could not be gone into by the Court. Only if the grounds are disclosed to the public by the Union Government which revealed that a constitutionally or legally prohibited or extraneous or collateral purpose was sought to be achieved, only then the Court would look into it. Dissent was been expressed against this judgment in S.R. Bommai case which expanded the scope of judicial review.
Opposition Conclaves took place in different parts of the country to express views on centre-state relations. In response to the call of CM of Andhra Pradesh, N. T. Rama Rao, the first Opposition Conclave was held in Vijayawada in 1983. Fourteen non-Congress parties gathered to criticise the Centre for encroaching upon the powers of the states and the Centre was held responsible for all economic problems of the country. In 1984, Delhi Conclave was held. It was opined that the Union was only a mother organisation to coordinate the activities of various states, helping them to develop. It could not operate as an institution or treat the state governments as its branch offices. The states would soon become just puppets dancing to the Centre’s tune and unable to exist as viable territorial units. In the Srinagar Opposition Conclave, 10 non-Congress parties gathered. It was suggested that Governors must be appointed by the President on the basis of a panel forwarded by the State Governments concerned and Articles 200 and 201 should either be suitably amended or else deleted. It also said that it must be mandatory for the President to constitute ISC. And that the NDC and the Planning Commission should be given constitutional and statutory status with proper representation of states on these bodies. The last was the Calcutta Conclave participated by 18 non-Congress parties accusing Indira Gandhi of engaging in a conspiracy against the Opposition.
Opposition conclaves should be made a regular feature of our dynamic system. They symbolise a healthy and responsible federalism. They are a useful forum for getting to know the other side of the picture. Such conclaves must be held and thereafter be covered well by the media for the knowledge of the public. But the same requires a mature Opposition too. If the same is ensured, opposition conclaves can serve as a fantastic form of institutionalised criticism and pro activeness. It may even transform into a pseudo shadow cabinet system found in the UK.
In this background of simmering discontent among opposition ruled states, Mrs Gandhi constituted the Commission on Centre State Relations headed by Justice R. S. Sarkaria, a retired judge of the Supreme Court, in 1984 which submitted its voluminous report in 1988 to the Rajiv Gandhi Government recommending inter alia, a permanent Inter State Council as an independent forum for consultation with a mandate defined according to Article 263. It should deal with subjects other than socio-economic planning and development and have an advisory role only. Administratively, it should be called Inter Governmental Council.
Mrs Gandhi was assassinated in 1984. But Congress came to power again due to sympathy vote for her son Rajiv Gandhi. Steady deterioration of centre-state relations had come to head under Rajiv Gandhi. Meetings of the NDC became acrimonious.
Tensions were most acute over financial matters. Rajiv Gandhi further increased the control of the centre over plan funds to be spent in the States by bringing majority of the programs under centrally sponsored schemes to include everything like drinking water and supply of oil seeds. The State governments were slowly sidelined from all areas of development generating resentment among the latter. Such a tendency is found even today (Rural Health Mission, Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan etc.) and it shows lack of confidence in the states and discourages initiative from the states making them dependent on the Centre for basics. It does not augur well for progressive federalism. It is also an instance of the misuse of the grants under Article 275.
In D.C. Wadhwa v State of Bihar [14], the Court upheld the writ petitions challenging the constitutional validity of the practise of the Governor of Bihar of repeatedly promulgating the same ordinances without caring to get the Ordinances replaced by Acts of the legislature. To quote Justice Bhagwati, “The power to promulgate an ordinance is essentially power to be used to meet an extraordinary situation and it cannot be allowed to be ‘perverted to serve political ends’ ”
To control unprincipled defections induced by allurements of office, money and pressure, the Tenth Schedule was added by the Constitution (52nd Amendment) Act, 1985. But since the desired goal could not be achieved, law was further strengthened by the Constitution (Ninety First Amendment) Act, 2003. It deleted the provision which did not treat mass shifting of loyalty by one-third as defection.
Another important Chief Ministers’ conference was held on June 11, 1989 to forge a consensus on the statutory creation of PRIs.
With the economic liberalisation of the 1990s, State leaders came to demand partnership in the federal policy making processes that concern multilateral agreements with international organisations. This brought out into the open the economic and regional disparities making the same a matter of significant concern all the more for the federal government. At another level, inter-state competition of sorts came to mark the behaviour of state governments to attract FDI. Hence, economic liberalisation prompted a change in federal relations from inter governmental cooperation to inter jurisdictional competition among the states.
After the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi on May 21, 1991, there was serious concern as to whether India really was a viable entity and whether it could hold together in the face of fissiparous tendencies springing all over the country.
Cooperative in the Late 1980s
In 1989, Congress was replaced by a Minority Government called the National Front led by V. P. Singh. This marked the beginning of multi party system in India. In its election manifesto, the National Front argued for a serious commitment to, what it termed, “true federalism” by reversing the over centralisation brought about by the ruling party. A government by consensus was evolved. Two meetings of NDC were held. One was held on June 16, 1989 to endorse the approach to the 8th Five Year Plan. The other meeting was held on October 9, 1989, at which the government asked the members of the Planning Commission to make a presentation to the assembled CMs explaining the rationale for the allocations that had been made to each sector of the economy, and how the principal goals of the plan would be met.
In addition to revival of the NDC, the Inter State Council was set up as an apostle of federal comity on a permanent basis. It was created under Article 263, a general Article under which any number of such bodies can be appointed to deal with various matters. Its genesis is Section 135 of Government of India Act, 1935. The report of Joint Commitee of Indian Constitutional Reform contained the philosophy for the inclusion of an ISC.
The Council met on August 10th, 1990 on its creation. Thereafter, the first meeting was held after a gap of 6 years on October 15th, 1996. Since then, it has met sporadically. In these meetings, it has taken view of all 247 recommendations of Sarkaria Commission, 65 of which have not been accepted by the Council, nor by the administrative ministries of the departments concerned, while 179 recommendations have been implemented. Basically advisory and recommendatory, its main function is to inquire and advice upon inter – state disputes of non-legal nature. Hence it complements the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction under Article 131.
The Council is fully dominated by the executives of the two levels of government. There is no representation from, or role for, the legislature in deciding the agenda and issues to be discussed. Furthermore, the meetings of the Council are held in camera and while the questions discussed by the Council are decided by consensus, the decision of the PM is final.
Constitutionality of a policy is determined only by Articles 245 and 246. It does not make any difference if the matter is not taken to the Council. It is also to be noted that whereas Article 263 contemplates inquiry into, and advice upon, disputes between states, it does not bring within the scope of the Article disputes between the Union and a State.
The fact remains that in spite of the Council being a constitutional body and the Prime Minister being its Chairman, yet, the Council has been a non-factor in India’s federal relations. It is neither an analytical unit that provides short term or long term strategy nor is it a public policy making institution. It has met sporadically according to the changing political scenario. Moreover, it has no decision making authority.
Even then, the importance of a body like the ISC cannot be ignored because in the modern times, the problems of a nation have become so intertwined that they cannot be solved by a mere division of power by the Constitution as between the Federation and the States. An authority like the ISC is extremely important to assess the impact of national policies on states and coordinate their mutual policies, without surrendering their respective constitutional jurisdictions.
A standing body is definitely necessary to ensure follow up action and to ensure a holistic perspective which cannot be achieved through adhoc bodies and meetings alone.
In Dabur India Ltd v State of UP [15], the Supreme Court recommended that the Government should consider the feasibility of setting up a Council under Article 263 which would adjudicate and adjust the dues of the respective governments. Chief Justice Sabyachi Mukherjee stated that if a dispute is under two different central legislations, and under one, the state authorities can realise and impose the taxes on finding certain basis, and under the other, the same transaction may be open to imposition by Central Government authorities on a particular view, in such a situation, how and when the refund should be made of duty in respect of a transaction to one of the authorities, the state or the Centre to be adjusted, should be a subject matter of settlement by the Council to be set up u/a 263.
To revitalise the ISC, it was suggested that the ISC should strive for autonomy on the lines of the Election Commission and even its merger with NDC. As long as a mechanism remains advisory, it will be nothing more than an ornamental piece. That is the chief reason for the lack-lustre condition of the ISC and other such bodies. But if these bodies are properly worked, they can serve as the panacea to the rising fissiparous tendencies today.
Cooperative in the 1990s
The National Front coalition government of V.P. Singh fell. Chandrashekhar of Samajwadi Janta Party followed from 1990-91. And in the 1991 elections, P. V. Narsimha Rao was elected. The return of Congress and the five years rule from 1991 to 1995 under one party signified a desire among the people for stability, and the fact that federalism can survive only if the Centre itself is strong and competent. A Centre that is formed of parties that are incoherent in their plan of action will be a weak centre that cannot sustain a healthy cooperative structure. Hence simply having a multi party centre is not a guarantee that the same would strengthen federalism or that it would be better than single party rule at the Centre.
Narsimha Rao followed a conciliatory style of politics. He held all party meetings and used the National Integration Council to forge a consensus on communal issues and meetings of the CMs under the aegis of NDC and ISC to discuss specific thorny problems like urgent need to stop providing electricity virtually free of cost to agriculture. The NDC has immense untapped potential. Bringing the CMs together in national decision making will be extremely useful as it not only helps in strengthening cooperative federalism, but also makes the states understand the limitations and compulsions of the Centre as well as the limitations of other states.
In 1992, the 73rd and 74th Amendment Acts were passed making India the first statutorily defined three tier system of democracy. It was envisaged as a way to destroy paternalism of the centre. A brainchild of Ramakrishna Hegde, it was first implemented in Karnataka in June 1987. This measure in many ways formed the core of the federalist, decentralised form of democracy.
In 1996, the BJP Coalition was formed that lasted only two weeks as its vision was flawed. It was followed by the United Front Government under Deve Gowda from 1996-97 and then IK Gujral from 1997-98 of the Janata Dal.
In the landmark Nine Judge Bench decision S.R. Bommai v Union of India [16], it was held that ‘satisfaction’ of the President is not his personal whim or opinion but a legitimate inference drawn from the material placed before him, and the same is relevant for the Courts. The validity of the Proclamation under Article 356(1) was judicially reviewable to the extent of examining whether it was issued on the basis of any material at all or whether the material was relevant or whether the Proclamation was issued in the mala fide exercise of the power. And that although Article 74(2) bars judicial review so far as the advice given by Ministers is concerned, it does not bar the scrutiny of the material on the basis of which advice was given. Quoting Justice Sidhwa in Khaja Ahmed Tariq Rahim v Federation of Pakistan, “...Unless a violation of a provision of the Constitution was so grave that the Court could come to no other conclusion but that it alone directly led to the breakdown of the functional working of the Government, it would not constitute a valid ground”. Noting the observations in Sarkaria Commission Report, Article 356 provides the remedy when there has been actual breakdown of the constitutional machinery of the state. Hence, exercise of power under 356 must be limited to rectifying such a failure only. A wide literal construction of the Article will damage the fabric of the Constitution.
In 1996, a group of Chief Ministers and regional leaders met in Hyderabad to discuss what they considered to be a paradigm shift in federal relations in India. The slogan of their meeting was “Federation without a Centre” because they believed that with the formation of the United Front Government, the pattern of federal relations in India had undergone such a dramatic change where the Central government had been rendered superfluous.
BJP came to power again from 1998-2003. It created three new states in 2000 to recognise the demands around tribal identities. It is important to note that these new states have emerged very much within the fabric of India which is a “Union of States”, reinforcing that our federalism is alive and kicking. Indian federalism has also experimented with sub state regional development councils to satisfy regional, ethnic and tribal aspirations.
Inclusion of languages has been another mechanism of cooperative federalism. In 2003, Bodo, Dogri, Maithili and Santhali were included in the Eighth Schedule of the Constitution. The inclusion allows privileges like simultaneous translation facilities in Parliamentary proceedings, allocation of central government funding for development of the language and its literature and is an effective tool to include the periphery into the mainstream.
The National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (NCRWC) submitted its report in two volumes to the Government on 31st March, 2002. It recommended that there was a need to institutionalise the consultation process between the Centre and the states. It considered Article 263 as being in tune with the spirit of cooperative federalism and suggested that the ISC Order, 1990 may clearly specify in 4(b) of the order the subjects that would form part of the consultation in the ISC. Article 139A should be amended so as to provide that it can withdraw to itself cases even if they are pending in one Court where such questions as to legislative competence of Parliament or State Legislature are involved. Further, an Inter State Trade and Commerce Commission should be established.
Cooperative, Concomitant, Negotiatory and Opportunistic in the Last One Decade
The current trends emphasize cooperation and coordination, rather than demarcation of powers between different levels of government. The basic theme today is interdependence.
BJP lost heavily in the elections of 2003 due to its “Shining India Campaign” resulting in victory of the Congress with support from outside of the Left. It was a testing period for the Central Government as it had to play the balancing act very carefully. Soon after the Government was formed, it faced the threat of withdrawal from the DMK for not getting plum posts. And it had to face the wrath of the Left over the Indo-US Nuclear Deal, though successfully, when it had to prove its majority on the floor of the House. In 2008, the Congress came to power without outside support.
On 31st August, 2005, the President set up a Commission of Inquiry called the Second Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC) to prepare a detailed blueprint for revamping the public administration system under the Chairmanship of Shri Veerappa Moily.
On 22nd September 2006, the Supreme Court of India delivered a historic judgment, in Prakash Singh and Others v Union of India, laying down six practical directives to kick-start the police reform process. The most important directives of the Supreme Court are Directives 1 and 6 on setting up State Security Commissions and Police Complaints Authorities. The Manmohan Singh government had set up a Police Act Drafting Committee (PADC) to draft a new Model Police Act, commonly known as the Soli Sorabjee Committee in 2005-06. The committee's work and its model Act also provides a sound legislative guide for state governments to follow in forming their own Acts.
In Rameshwar Prasad v Union of India[17] , Chief Justice Sabharwal held that, “.....Undisputedly, the Governor is charged with the duty to preserve, protect and defend the Constitution and the laws, and has a concomitant duty and obligation not to permit the ‘canker’ of political defections to tear into the vitals of the Indian democracy..... After elections, every genuine attempt is to be made which helps in installation of a popular Government, whichever be the political party”.
On April 27, 2007, the Second Commission on Centre State Relations was set up with Chairperson Justice M. M. Punchhi, to look into the sea changes that have taken place in the polity and economy ever since the Sarkaria Commission looked into the issue of centre-state relations two decades ago. The Commission has been criticised for non inclusion of the major points in the Centre State relations such as the needed increase in the share of central taxes for the states, transfer of centrally sponsored schemes in the state subjects to the states and the alleviation of the problem of debt burden on the state. There has been an intrusion into the jurisdiction of the states as items (j) and (k) of the terms of reference have been mentioned along with the idea of setting up of a central law enforcing agency. These go against the basic issue viz. the law and order being a state subject.
On January 6, 2009, CMs conference was held in Delhi where the multi dimensional challenges from terrorism, Left-wing extremism and insurgency in the North–East were highlighted. The CMs conferences should not be an opportunity wasted. The pivotal point that determines the country’s security ultimately depends upon the citizens’ confidence in the state machinery .On June 29, 2009, CMs conference was held in Delhi with the participation of 29 CMs on the issues of rural development, drinking water and sanitation.
Though the dominant party today effectively is the Congress alone, yet there is hardly any possibility of an Indira Gandhi like confrontationist federalism to take shape because cooperative federalism today is the result of a complex interlay of multiple factors. It is no longer the old 2-tier kind of set up. Rather it has become not just 3 tiered but also multi layered within the 3 tiers, along with the interplay of independent external players envisaging newer opportunities for shared action. All this has added to the beauty and strength of our federal structure.
Challenges for 21st Century Federalism
The new challenges facing 21st Century federalism have further necessitated the pre existing need for cooperative federalism, thereby making its practice as a form of governance all the more indispensable. Technological advances have led to tremendous improvement in connectivity and accessibility, both, physical as well as electronic.
Environmental challenges of global nature like climate change do not recognise state frontiers. Pollution and conservation issues reflect the uncomfortable tension between decision making process of the governments at the centre-state –local levels. Public Trust Doctrine is a new doctrine of federalism evolved by the Supreme Court in MC Mehta v Kamal Nath[18] . It has established a direct link between the State and the public. To quote Justice Kuldip Singh, “The State is the trustee of all natural resources which are by nature meant for public use and enjoyment...and is under a legal duty to protect the natural resources. These resources meant for public use cannot be converted into private ownership”. Disaster Management transcends inter-state boundaries.
Globalisation has reinforced the need for concurrence between the geographical, climatic, environmental and technological diversities inter as well as intra states so that they may link with global processes for viable and sustainable development and growth. What is being experienced at the global level is also being felt at the local level. India is making strides in the global sphere and the local governments that promote shared partnership in development have come to be noticed today. Hence, whenever development programs or any other interests of states in matters relating to IT or investment by way of export, trade, exchange of projects etc are touched by international agreements, the well conceived demands of states should be met in order to promote truly cooperative, coordinative and multi dimensional centre state relations. This requires mutual trust and confidence.
Since the world has become a global village, the country’s internal security and political problems are open to external influence verging on intervention. For instance, the US Ambassador to India, Mulford, in 2006, overstepped his diplomatic role by writing directly to the Chief Minister of Assam offering assistance from the FBI to investigate a bomb attack in the state. Hence, under the garb of protecting human rights and on the plea that minorities are being tortured, big powers can intervene militarily which is against India’s interest.
The states today have acquired sufficient political weight of their own through a pluralised party system enabling individual states to embark onto bilateral negotiations with the union bypassing the institutionalised bodies of collective policy framing that have proved to be ineffective, thus lending a negotiatory character to our federalism.
However, the same must be taken with a pinch of salt because power sharing by states at the central level has not contributed towards reducing localism, parochialism and chauvinism of regionalists and sub-regional parties. Increase in bargaining capacity will serve to strengthen cooperative federalism only if the supposed drawbacks of centralism are mitigated through it.
The increasing voices of autonomy and separatism have vitiated the political and social fabric of the federal structure. States are increasingly harbouring feelings of deprivation and alienation and have begun viewing all problems from a narrow parochial outlook. Moreover, their approach is becoming violent confrontationist.
This not only weakens the nation politically and economically but also makes the land fertile for the growth of terrorism and insurgency.
The Indian Union has united its rich diversity of its humungous population serving as an example to the rest of the world. This is an asset to be built upon for the future. To override the fissiparous tendencies, only the legitimate grievances of the regions or states should be addressed as far as possible within the framework of the federal Constitution. More importantly, a strong sense of nationhood is necessary to maintain our territorial integrity and internal security, and this cannot be accomplished without cooperative federalism.
Terrorism, militancy, organised crimes, problem of internally displaced persons, refugees – all these require that the country as a whole comes together and the institutional bodies under state governments help the centre by collectively making available the necessary information and resources.
The need to come together today is not only the consequence of the new challenges facing the nation but that the same will serve as an antidote to prevent such challenges from recurring in future. Cooperative federalism alone strengthens the nation from within by enabling it to withstand adversities and challenges because of its inherent resilience and malleability.
India is a beautiful melting pot of diversity. The same needs to be valued and cherished. And there isn’t a better way to do so than by cooperative federalism. In the famous words of Nani Palkhivala – ‘Who Dies if India Lives and Who Lives if India Dies’..... People of several states sink or swim together, and that in the long run, prosperity and salvation are in innovation and not in division; mutuality and not conflict; co-operation and not competition.
[1] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP)
[2] Watts 1998, 120
[3] C.A.D.Vol. 4 p.133, see also C.A.D., Vol.5 pp 33-36.
[4] Jennings – some Characteristics of Indian Copnstitution, P. 55
[5] State of Rajasthan v UOI, 1977; AIR 1977 SC 1361
[6] S.R. Bommai v Union of India; (1994) 3 SCC 1: JT (1994) 2 SC 215
[7] State of Haryana v State of Punjab; 2002(1)SCALE238, (2002)2SCC507, [2002]1SCR227
[8] Sher Singh & Others v the State of Punjab; AIR 1983 SC 465
[9] State of Rajasthan v Union of India; AIR 1977 SC 1361
[10] Vineet Narain v. Union of India; AIR 1998 SC 889
[11] Kesavananda Bharti v State of Kerala; AIR 1973 SC 1461
[12] S.R. Bommai v Union of India; (1994) 3 SCC 1: JT (1994) 2 SC 215
[13] State of Rajasthan v Union of India; AIR 1977 SC 1361
[14] D.C. Wadhwa v State of Bihar; AIR 1987 SC 579
[15] Dabur India Ltd v State of UP; 1990 AIR 1814 1990 SCR (3) 294 1990 SCC (4) 113 JT 1990 (3) 109 1990 SCALE (2)29
[16] S.R. Bommai v Union of India; (1994) 3 SCC 1: JT (1994) 2 SC 215
[17] Rameshwar Prasad v Union of India; AIR 1990 SC 560
[18] MC Mehta v Kamal Nath; (1997) 1 SCC 388
Posted by kpcrao at 12:00:00 am
Labels: Characteristics of Federalism, Federal Constitution, federal political order, Federal Principle, federation, Supremacy of the Constitution, THE CONCEPT OF FEDERALISM