Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/860/508/465607/
Timestamp: 2020-07-13 09:23:05
Document Index: 143131583

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1962', '§ 2', '§ 371', '§ 7201', '§ 3577', '§ 1962', '§ 1962']

United States of America, Appellee, v. Lee Alexander, Defendant-appellant, 860 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1988) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Second Circuit › 1988 › United States of America, Appellee, v. Lee Alexander, Defendant-appellant
United States of America, Appellee, v. Lee Alexander, Defendant-appellant, 860 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1988)
US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit - 860 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1988) Argued Sept. 6, 1988. Decided Oct. 17, 1988
Defendant Lee Alexander appeals from a judgment entered in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, Thomas J. McAvoy, Judge, following Alexander's plea of guilty to one count of participating in the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity, in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1982) (but see Part II.C. below) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1982) (count 2); one count of conspiracy to defraud the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982) (count 3); and one count of income tax evasion, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (1982) (count 39). Alexander was sentenced to prison terms of 10 years on the RICO count, five years on the conspiracy count, and five years on the tax evasion count, all terms to run concurrently, and was ordered to pay partial restitution of $100,000 and special assessments totaling $150. On appeal, he urges that his sentence be vacated and the matter remanded for resentencing before another judge on the grounds that (1) he was denied adequate time to prepare his response to the government's sentencing position, and (2) the minutes of the grand jury that indicted him were improperly made public. Although we are troubled by the public disclosure of the grand jury minutes, we find no basis for vacation of the sentence, and we therefore affirm the judgment.
Alexander served as mayor of the City of Syracuse, New York ("City"), from 1970 to 1986. In July 1987, a special grand jury returned a 40-count indictment against him and one Kenyon Bajus, alleging, inter alia, that during his terms as mayor, Alexander had engaged in widespread illegal activities, including demanding and receiving more than $1.4 million worth of bearer bonds, gold and silver coins, and cash, as kickbacks on City-related contracts with architects, attorneys, and insurance agencies. In January 1988, after pretrial motions and discovery, Alexander entered into a written plea agreement pursuant to which he, inter alia, agreed to plead guilty to counts 2, 3, and 39 of the indictment and "admit [ted] that if the case had gone to trial the Government would have produced evidence sufficient to allow a finder of facts to conclude that the Government had proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the facts set forth in [those counts]." In the plea agreement, Alexander expressly admitted that he had "received kickbacks generated as a result of his conduct of the affairs of the City of Syracuse," that he had "attempted to conceal his activity through a cover-up scheme," and that he had "willfully attempted to evade the payment of taxes during the calendar year 1985." For its part of the plea bargain, the government agreed to move for dismissal of the other charges and agreed that concurrent terms of incarceration of not more than 10 years, and fines totaling not more than $100,000, would constitute an appropriate sentence.
On February 10, the government moved ex parte for an order pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) (3) (C) (i) allowing it to "disclose those matters occurring before the Special Grand Jury empanelled on November 7, 1985, which are, in the opinion of the United States Attorney, relevant to the court's sentencing determination." On the same day, the court granted the motion, stating that the government "may hereafter disclose, for the purposes of sentencing," all grand jury matters referred to in the motion.
It is clear that a defendant in a criminal case is entitled to due process in all phases of the prosecution, including sentencing. See, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 69 S. Ct. 1079, 93 L. Ed. 1337 (1949); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 68 S. Ct. 1252, 92 L. Ed. 1690 (1948). Due process requires that the defendant not be sentenced on the basis of materially false information, id. at 741, 68 S. Ct. at 1255, and he is thus entitled to an effective opportunity to respond to the sentencing position advanced by the government, see, e.g., United States v. Romano, 825 F.2d 725, 728 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v. Lee, 818 F.2d 1052, 1056 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 108 S. Ct. 350, 98 L. Ed. 2d 376 (1987), including an opportunity to review and comment upon the presentence report prepared by the probation office of the court, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.
It is also beyond dispute that the sentencing court has discretion with regard to the scheduling of the sentencing proceedings. See United States v. Bernstein, 417 F.2d 641, 643 (2d Cir. 1969); United States v. Costello, 760 F.2d 1123, 1129 (11th Cir. 1985). We will not vacate a sentence on the ground that the court has denied a continuance of the sentencing date unless the defendant shows that the denial was arbitrary and that it substantially impaired his opportunity to secure a fair sentence. Alexander has not made such a showing.
To the extent pertinent here, Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) (2), which sets forth the "General Rule of Secrecy" of grand jury matters, states that, "except as otherwise provided for in these rules," a government attorney "shall not disclose matters occurring before the grand jury." A knowing violation of this restriction "may be punished as a contempt of court." Id.
One exception provided by the Rule is that disclosure may be made "when so directed by a court preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding." Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) (3) (C) (i). For purposes of sentencing, which of course is part of a judicial proceeding, the court is virtually unfettered with respect to the information it may consider. See, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. at 246-50, 69 S. Ct. at 1082-85; United States v. Romano, 825 F.2d at 728; 18 U.S.C.A. Sec. 3661 (West 1985) (18 U.S.C. § 3577 (1982), renumbered as Sec. 3661, see Pub. L. No. 98-473, Sec. 212(a) (1), 98 Stat. 1987 (1984), effective Nov. 1, 1987, see Pub. L. No. 99-217, Sec. 4, 99 Stat. 1728 (1985)). Thus, the court may appropriately authorize the government to disclose to it grand jury materials for its use in considering what sentence to impose. In the present case, the government's desire to reveal to the court grand jury materials suggesting crimes by Alexander other than those to which he pleaded guilty or showing that certain of Alexander's coconspirators had given the government substantial cooperation that should be taken into account with respect to their sentences, provided ample reason for the court to direct disclosure of the grand jury materials to the court.
Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 218-19, 99 S. Ct. 1667, 1672-73, 60 L. Ed. 2d 156 (1979) ("Douglas Oil ") (footnotes omitted). Given these concerns, disclosure is warranted only when the need for it outweighs society's interest in secrecy.
The weighing of the competing concerns should be a closely focused inquiry. The mere fact that disclosure to one person for a stated purpose may be warranted does not mean that wholesale disclosure should be permitted to the public at large. A party moving for a relaxation of the normal rule of secrecy should structure its request to cover only material that is needed. The court should require that the showing of need be made " 'with particularity' so that 'the secrecy of the proceedings [may] be lifted discretely and limitedly.' " Id. at 221, 99 S. Ct. at 1674 (quoting United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 683, 78 S. Ct. 983, 987, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1077 (1958)); see Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) (3) (C) ("If the court orders disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury, the disclosure shall be made in such manner, at such time, and under such conditions as the court may direct.").
The present record could not by any stretch of the imagination justify a conclusion that the interests in secrecy were outweighed by a need for public filing. While certain of the Douglas Oil factors would appear to have dwindled in significance, others retained their importance. Thus, while there was no longer any risk here of grand jury tampering and perhaps little risk of witnesses fearing retribution, the court should have considered "not only the immediate effects upon [this] particular grand jury, but also the possible effect upon the functioning of future grand juries." Douglas Oil, 441 U.S. at 222, 99 S. Ct. at 1674. If grand jury proceedings may be made public for no stated reason at all, public confidence in grand jury secrecy cannot help but be eroded, and prospective witnesses will undoubtedly be more hesitant to come forward to testify.
We are not persuaded by the government's argument that unlimited public disclosure was permissible on the theory that the government is entitled to disclose grand jury materials in open court during sentencing proceedings even without court authorization. We reject the government's premise. Rule 6 confers no such privilege; nor are we aware of any need for the government to place grand jury materials in the open record in connection with such proceedings. With respect to sentencing, as contrasted with determinations of the defendant's guilt, there is no requirement that the court consider only evidence adduced in open court. See, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. at 250-51, 69 S. Ct. at 1084-85. Thus, we see no reason why the government cannot state its sentencing position in open court in terms that do not reveal matters that occurred before the grand jury, furnishing the supporting grand jury material to the court in a sealed filing. This would parallel the treatment given to presentence reports prepared by the federal probation office. Such reports are used by the court in sentencing; but they are not part of the public record, and they are unavailable to persons other than the court, the parties, and the probation office, except on a showing of compelling need. See generally United States v. Charmer Industries, 711 F.2d 1164 (2d Cir. 1983); Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c). Similar treatment of grand jury materials would reflect an appropriate balancing of the limited need for disclosure and the societal interest in grand jury secrecy.
Finally we note one clerical matter not adverted to by the parties. The indictment included two RICO counts; count 1 charged Alexander with a RICO conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), and count 2 charged a substantive RICO offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1982). The plea agreement, however, in recounting the charges set forth in the indictment, reversed these two sections. Thus, the agreement recited that Alexander's alleged conspiratorial activities (count 1) violated the substantive section, Sec. 1962(c), and that Alexander's participation in a RICO enterprise (count 2) violated the conspiracy section, Sec. 1962(d).
Alexander's plea and the judgment of conviction followed the recital set forth in the plea agreement rather than the terms of the indictment. Since the plea agreement and other parts of the record make it clear that Alexander intended to plead guilty to count 2 and nowhere indicated a willingness to plead guilty to RICO conspiracy, and since the conspiracy count of the indictment has been dismissed, the references to Sec. 1962(d) in the agreement and the judgment appear to be clerical errors that may be corrected at any time, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 36. Our affirmance of the judgment does not foreclose such a correction.