Source: http://ussc.blogspot.com/2008/
Timestamp: 2017-06-28 08:46:35
Document Index: 607167981

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 841', '§ 802', '§ 841', '§7201', '§ 301', '§301', '§301', '§316']

U.S. Supreme Court Blog: 2008
The Supreme Court held that Fed. R.Crim. P. 32(h), which requires a sentencing court to give the parties advance notice that it is contemplating a departure from the Guidelines, does not require the court to give notice of a contemplated variance from a recommended Guideline range.The Court explained that Rule 32(h) was premised on protecting a defendant’s expectation that his sentence would be within the applicable Guideline range. This expectation did not survive Booker, and the parties therefore did not have the kind of "expectancy" that required notice. Further, the Rule itself referred to "departures" not "variances."The Court added that district judges should consider granting a continuance of the sentencing when a party has a legitimate basis for claiming that it was illegitimately surprised by a contemplated variance.
Rather than issuing the summons required by Virginia law, police arrested Moore for the misdemeanor of driving on a suspended license. A search incident to the arrest yielded crack cocaine, for which Moore was charged and tried. The trial court declined to suppress the evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds. The Virginia Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that the search violated the Fourth Amendment because the arresting officers should have issued a citation under state law, and the Fourth Amendment does not permit search incident to citation. In a unanimous decision written by Justice Scalia, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that police did not violate the Fourth Amendment when they made an arrest that was based on probable cause but prohibited by state law, or when they performed a search incident to the arrest. A unanimous Supreme Court found no historical support for the notion that the Founders intended to incorporate statutes into the Fourth Amendment; neither the common law nor statutes of the Founding era support the defendant’s contention. Where history does not provide a conclusive answer, the Court analyzes a search or seizure in light of traditional reasonableness standards "by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests." Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U. S. 295, 300 (1999); see Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U. S. 927, 931 (1995). Applying that methodology, the Court has previously held that when an officer has probable cause to believe a person committed even a minor crime, the arrest is constitutionally reasonable. Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U. S. 318 (2001). A State’s choice of a more restrictive search-and-seizure policy does not render less restrictive ones unreasonable, and hence unconstitutional. While States are free to require their officers to engage in nuanced determinations of the need for arrest as a matter of their own law, the Fourth Amendment should reflect administrable bright-line rules. Incorporating state arrest rules into the Constitution would make Fourth Amendment protections as complex as the underlying state law, and variable from place to place and time to time. The Court sustained the search, as well as the arrest. Having arrested Moore, the officers were also entitled to search him, as in any other search incident to arrest, to ensure their safety and to safeguard evidence. Only Justice Ginsburg, who filed a separate concurrence, saw historical support for the defendant’s view, but even she was persuaded that Atwater governs the outcome here.
4/23/2008 08:11:00 AM
ACCA imposes a special mandatory 15-year prison term upon felons who unlawfully possess a firearm and who have three or more prior convictions for certain drug crimes or "violent felonies." Begay had 12 prior convictions for driving while intoxicated in violation of New Mexico law. The district court applied three of these convictions as a predicate for an enhanced ACCA sentence. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that felony DUI under New Mexico law is not a "violent felony" for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act. The Court held that the determinative question is not how the defendant may have committed the prior crimes, but rather how the statute defines it. Even if DUI involves conduct that presents serious risk of physical injury to another, it is too unlike the example crimes enumerated in ACCA – burglary, arson, extortion, and crimes involving explosives– to be included under the residual clause of ACCA. Moreover, DUI differs in an important respect from the example crimes, in that it does not involve purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct that is the centerpiece of the example crimes. Justice Scalia’s concurrence highlights that the analytical framework of this decision differs from the Court’s expansively inclusive residual clause analysis last term in James v. United States, 550 U.S. ___ (2007) (holding attempted burglary a violent felony under ACCA’s residual clause), from which he had dissented.
The federal Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), doubles the mandatory minimum sentence for certain federal drug crimes if the defendant was previously convicted of a "felony drug offense." Burgess pled guilty to a federal crack charge carrying 10-year mandatory minimum sentence, but that mandatory minimum sentence was doubled to 20 years based on a prior South Carolina misdemeanor drug conviction that carried a maximum sentence of two years. Burgess argued that "felony drug offense" has two components: it must be a felony and it must carry a sentence of in excess of one year; since South Carolina classified his prior offense as a misdemeanor, it could not qualify despite the maximum potential punishment of two years. The Supreme Court rejected this contention, holding instead that the federal statutory definition controls, and that 21 U.S.C. § 802(44) is the exclusive definition of the term "felony drug offense" in § 841(b)(1)(A); under that definition, a state drug offense punishable by more than one year qualifies as a felony drug offense, even if the state law classifies the offense as a misdemeanor.
Baze v. Rees: Lethal Injection Cocktail Constitutional
In a fractured opinion, a plurality of the Court held that the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution does not prohibit the most common method of lethal injection, involving a three-drug cocktail, sodium thiopental, pancuronium bromide, and potassium chloride. Although the final tally of concurrences provided a 7-2 vote, there was no opinion that spoke for five or more justices. The Court’s plurality adopted as a standard for assessing the validity of an execution method whether it poses a "substantial risk of serious harm." It rejected the death row inmate’s proposal that the standard be "unnecessary risk of pain and suffering."
Medellin v. Texas: States' Rights Trump International Law
In the Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), I.C.J. No. 128 Judgment of Mar. 31, 2004), the International Court of Justice determined that 51 named Mexican nationals, including petitioner, were entitled to receive review and reconsideration of their convictions and sentences through the judicial process in the United States without regard for procedural defaults. Petitioner filed a state habeas case challenging his capital conviction, claiming he was not informed of his Vienna Convention right to notify the Mexican consulate. Medellin had not timely raised and preserved the claim in state court so it was procedurally defaulted. While the applicability of Avena to Texas courts was pending in the U.S. Supreme Court, President George W. Bush determined that the United States would comply with its international obligation to give effect to the judgment by giving those 51 individuals review and reconsideration in the state courts. As a result, the Supreme Court case was deemed moot. Medellin filed another habeas petition in state court, relying on both Avena and the President’s decree. In response, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that the President’s determination exceeded his powers, and it refused to give effect to the Avena judgment or the President’s determination. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of the habeas petition, holding that neither an International Court of Justice case, nor a memorandum issued by the President of the United States constitutes directly enforceable federal law that preempts state limitations on the filing of successive habeas petitions.
Allen Snyder, a black man, was convicted and sentenced to death by an all-white jury in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, for the fatal stabbing of his wife’s male companion. Prior to trial, the prosecutor reported to the media that this was his “O.J. Simpson case.” At trial, the prosecutor peremptorily struck all five African-Americans who had survived cause challenges and then, over objection, urged the resulting all-white jury to impose death because this case was like the O.J. Simpson case, where the defendant “got away with it.” On initial review, a majority of the Louisiana Supreme Court ignored probative evidence of discriminatory intent, including the prosecutor’s O.J. Simpson remarks and argument, and denied Mr. Snyder’s Batson claims by a 5-2 vote. The U.S. Supreme Court then directed the Louisiana court to reconsider Mr. Snyder’s Batson claims in light of Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005). See Snyder v. Louisiana, 545 U.S. 1137 (2005). On remand, a bare majority adhered to its prior holding, once again disregarding substantial evidence establishing discriminatory intent, including the prosecutor’s references to the O.J. Simpson case, the totality of strikes against African-American jurors, and evidence showing a pattern of practice of race-based peremptory challenges by the prosecutor’s office. In addition, the majority imposed a new and higher burden on Mr. Snyder, asserting that Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333 (2006), permitted reversal only if “a reasonable factfinder [would] necessarily conclude the prosecutor lied” about the reasons for his strikes. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, relying entirely on one Batson violation, never mentioning the O.J. Simpson race card played by the prosecutor. Writing for a 7-2 majority, Justice Alito reiterated the three-part process for ruling on a Batson objection, then refined the test by adding a clear-error standard of appellate review, and then explained how that review applies in this case. Important principles result from this decision. The three-part test remains: (1) defendant must make a prima facie owing that a peremptory strike was race-based; (2) if so, the prosecutor must a offer race-neutral reason for the challenge; (3) and, in light of these submissions, the trial court must determine if there was purposeful discrimination. The Court clarified that the standard of appellate review of the trial court’s ruling is “clearly erroneous,” but the Court also made clear that an appealing defendant wins if he can show just one race-based challenge that should have been upheld under Batson. In determining if the challenge should be sustained, a trial judge considers the demeanor and credibility of the prosecutor, and an appellate court looks to the record to determine if the prosecutor’s excuse is supported. Here, the reasons given–the jurorwas a student teacher who could not miss class for the week of trial, and he acted nervous during questioning–were not supported by the record. The judge’s law clerk had called the prospective juror’s college dean, who said the student teaching could be satisfied even if he missed one week while serving on the jury. The record revealed that the judge made no finding on the nervousness concern. And the record revealed that the prosecutor did not strike other prospective jurors who are white, even though they expressed similar concerns about missing work due to jury service. Having found the prosecutor’s proffered excuses to be implausible, in light of the record, the Court held that equates to purposeful discrimination under Batson. Finally, the Court noted that it does not apply to Batson appeals the causation rule applicable in many other instances that once discriminatory intent is shown, the burden shifts to the defending party to show that the factor was not determinative. In this case, in particular, remand for examination of causation could not be “profitably” explored more than a decade later. As a result, the Court reversed the judgment with no opportunity for further appellate review by the state court.
Boulware was charged with criminal tax evasion and filing a false income tax return for diverting funds from a closely held corporation, of which he was the president, founder, and controlling shareholder. One element of tax evasion under 26 U. S. C. §7201 is “the existence of a tax deficiency.” Sansone v. United States, 380 U. S. 343. To support his argument that the government could not establish the tax deficiency required to convict him, Boulware sought to introduce evidence that the corporation had no earnings and profits in the relevant taxable years, so he in effect received distributions of property that were returns of capital, up to his basis in his stock, which are not taxable. See 26 U. S. C. §§ 301 and 316(a). Under §301(a), unless the Internal Revenue Code requires otherwise, a “distribution of property” “made by a corporation to a shareholder with respect to its stock shall be treated in the manner provided in [§301(c)].” Section 301(c) provides that the portion of the distribution that is a “dividend,” as defined by §316(a), must be included in the recipient’s gross income; and the portion that is not a dividend is, depending on the shareholder’s basis for his stock, either a nontaxable return of capital or a taxable capital gain. Section 316(a) defines “dividend” as a “distribution” out of “earnings and profits.” The District Court granted the government’s in limine motion to bar evidence supporting Boulware’s return-of-capital theory, relying on Ninth Circuit’s precedent holding that a diversion of funds in a criminal tax evasion case may be deemed a return of capital only if the taxpayer or corporation demonstrates that the distributions were intended to be such a return. The court later found Boulware’s proffer of evidence insufficient and declined to instruct the jury on his theory. Affirming his conviction, the Ninth Circuit held that Boulware’s proffer was properly rejected because he offered no proof that the amounts diverted were intended as a return of capital when they were made. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a distributee accused of criminal tax evasion may claim return-of-capital treatment without producing evidence that, when the distribution occurred, either he or the corporation intended a return of capital.
Virginia v. Moore - Search OK Following Arrest Vio...
Begay v. United States: DUI not a Violent Felony u...
Baze v. Rees: Lethal Injection Cocktail Constituti...
Medellin v. Texas: States' Rights Trump Internatio...
Boulware v. United States - Return of Capital Defe...