Source: https://openjurist.org/451/us/679/clayton-v-international-union-united-automobile-aerospace-and-agricultural-implement-workers-of-amer
Timestamp: 2019-06-19 06:03:14
Document Index: 733384640

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 301', '§ 185', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 185', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 101', '§ 411', '§ 101', '§ 173', '§ 101', '§ 411', '§ 301']

451 US 679 Clayton v. International Union United Automobile Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America Itt Gilfillan | OpenJurist
451 U.S. 679 - Clayton v. International Union United Automobile Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America Itt Gilfillan
451 US 679 Clayton v. International Union United Automobile Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America Itt Gilfillan
451 U.S. 679
101 S.Ct. 2088
68 L.Ed.2d 538
Clifford E. CLAYTON, Petitioner,
INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA, et al. ITT GILFILLAN, etc., Petitioner, v. Clifford E. CLAYTON.
An employee seeking a remedy for an alleged breach of the collective-bargaining agreement between his union and employer must attempt to exhaust any exclusive grievance and arbitration procedures established by that agreement before he may maintain a suit against his union or employer under § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 156, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652-653, 85 S.Ct. 614, 616, 13 L.Ed.2d 580 (1965); see Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 563, 96 S.Ct. 1048, 1055, 47 L.Ed.2d 231 (1976); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 184, 87 S.Ct. 903, 913, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967). The question presented by these cases is whether, and in what circumstances, an employee alleging that his union breached its duty of fair representation in processing his grievance, and that his employer breached the collective-bargaining agreement, must also attempt to exhaust the internal union appeals procedures established by his union's constitution before he may maintain his suit under § 301.
* After eight years in the employ of ITT Gilfillan, Clifford E. Clayton, a member of the United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW) and a shop steward of its Local 509, was dismissed for violating a plant rule prohibiting defined misbehavior. Pursuant to the mandatory grievance and arbitration procedure established by the collective-bargaining agreement between ITT and Local 509, Clayton asked his union representative to file a grievance on his behalf on the ground that his dismissal was not for just cause. The union investigated Clayton's charges, pursued his grievance through the third step of the grievance procedure, and made a timely request for arbitration.1 It then withdrew the request, choosing not to proceed to arbitration. Clayton was notified of the union's decision after the time for requesting arbitration had expired.2
Clayton did not file a timely internal appeal from his local's decision not to seek arbitration of his grievance.3 Instead, six months after the union's withdrawal of its request for arbitration, Clayton filed this action under § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), in the District Court for the Central District of California. He alleged that the union had breached its duty of fair representation by arbitrarily refusing to pursue his grievance past the third step of the grievance procedure, and that the employer had breached the collective-bargaining agreement by discharging him without just cause.4
The Courts of Appeals are divided over whether an employee should be required to exhaust internal union appeals procedures before bringing suit against a union or employer under § 301. Some hold that the employee's failure to exhaust internal union procedures may not be asserted as a defense by an employer.5 Others permit the defense to be asserted by an employer if the internal appeals procedures could result in reactivation of the grievance.6 With respect to a union, some courts hold that the employee's failure to exhaust is excused if union officials would be so hostile to an employee that he could not hope to obtain a fair hearing.7 Others would also excuse the employee's failure to exhaust if the substantive relief available through the internal procedures would be less than that available in his § 301 action.8
In Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 85 S.Ct. 614, 13 L.Ed.2d 580 (1965), we were asked to decide whether an employee alleging a violation of the collective-bargaining agreement between his union and employer must attempt to exhaust exclusive contractual grievance and arbitration procedures before bringing suit under § 301(a).9 In deciding that issue we looked to principles of federal common law. See Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457, 77 S.Ct. 912, 918, 1 L.Ed.2d 912 (1957). Two considerations influenced our decision to require exhaustion. First, Congress had "expressly approved contract grievance procedures as a preferred method for settling disputes and stabilizing the 'common law' of the plant." 379 U.S., at 653, 85 S.Ct., at 616.10 Second, a contrary rule, allowing an employee to bring suit under § 301 without attempting to exhaust the contractual grievance procedures, would "deprive employer and union of the ability to establish a uniform and exclusive method for orderly settlement of employee grievances." Ibid.11 The rule established by Republic Steel was thus intended to protect the integrity of the collective-bargaining process and to further that aspect of national labor policy that encourages private rather than judicial resolution of disputes arising over the interpretation and application of collective-bargaining agreements. See Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S., at 567, 570-571, 96 S.Ct., at 1057, 1059.
The contractual procedures we required the employee to exhaust in Republic Steel are significantly different from the procedures at issue here. In these cases, the Court is asked to require exhaustion of internal union procedures. These procedures are wholly a creation of the UAW Constitution. They were not bargained for by the employer and union and are nowhere mentioned in the collective-bargaining agreement that Clayton seeks to have judicially enforced.12 Nonetheless, Clayton's employer and union contend that exhaustion of the UAW procedures, like exhaustion of contractual grievance and arbitration procedures, will further national labor policy and should be required as a matter of federal common law. Their argument, in brief, is that an exhaustion requirement will enable unions to regulate their internal affairs without undue judicial interference and that it will also promote the broader goal of encouraging private resolution of disputes arising out of a collective-bargaining agreement.
We do not agree that the policy of forestalling judicial interference with internal union affairs is applicable to these cases.13 This policy has been strictly limited to disputes arising over internal union matters such as those involving the interpretation and application of a union constitution. As we stated in NLRB v. Marine Workers, 391 U.S. 418, 88 S.Ct. 1717, 20 L.Ed.2d 706 (1968), the policy of deferring judicial consideration of internal union matters does not extend to issues "in the public domain and beyond the internal affairs of the union." Id., at 426, n. 8.14 Here, Clayton's dispute against his union is based upon an alleged breach of the union's duty of fair representation. This allegation raises issues rooted in statutory policies extending far beyond internal union interests. See United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 66, and n. 2, 101 S.Ct. 1559, 1562, and n. 2, 67 L.Ed.2d 732 (STEWART, J., concurring); Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., supra, at 562, 96 S.Ct., at 1055; Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S., at 182, 87 S.Ct., at 912; Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 84 S.Ct. 363, 11 L.Ed.2d 370 (1964).
In his suit under § 301, Clayton seeks reinstatement from his employer and monetary relief from both his employer and his union.15 Although, the UAW Constitution does not indicate on its face what relief is available through the internal union appeals procedures,16 the parties have stipulated that the Public Review Board can award backpay in an appropriate case, Tr. 35-36, and the two decisions of the Public Review Board reprinted in the joint appendix both resulted in awards of backpay. App. 89-109. It is clear, then, that at least some monetary relief may be obtained through the internal appeals procedures.17
It is equally clear that the union can neither reinstate Clayton in his job, see n. 15, supra, nor reactivate his grievance. Article IX of the collective-bargaining agreement between Local 509 and ITT Gilfillan provides that the union may obtain arbitration of a grievance only if it gives "notice . . . to the Company in writing within fifteen (15) working days after the date of the Company's decision at Step 3 of the Grievance Procedure." By the time Clayton learned of his union's decision not to pursue the grievance to arbitration, this 15-day time limit had expired. See n. 2, supra. Accordingly, the union could not have demanded arbitration even if the internal appeal had shown Clayton's claim to be meritorious. The union was bound by its earlier decision not to pursue Clayton's grievance past the third stage of the grievance and arbitration procedure.18 For the reasons that follow, we conclude that these restrictions on the relief available through the internal UAW procedures render those procedures inadequate.19
Where internal union appeals procedures can result in either complete relief to an aggrieved employee or reactivation of his grievance, exhaustion would advance the national labor policy of encouraging private resolution of contractual labor disputes. In such cases, the internal union procedures are capable of fully resolving meritorious claims short of the judicial forum. Thus, if the employee received the full relief he requested through internal procedures, his § 301 action would become moot, and he would not be entitled to a judicial hearing. Similarly, if the employee obtained reactivation of his grievance through internal union procedures, the policies underlying Republic Steel would come into play,20 and the employee would be required to submit his claim to the collectively bargained dispute-resolution procedures.21 In either case, exhaustion of internal remedies could result in final resolution of the employee's contractual grievance through private rather than judicial avenues.
By contrast, where an aggrieved employee cannot obtain either the substantive relief he seeks or reactivation of his grievance, national labor policy would not be served by requiring exhaustion of internal remedies. In such cases, exhaustion would be a useless gesture: it would delay judicial consideration of the employee's § 301 action, but would not eliminate it.22 The employee would still be required to pursue judicial means to obtain the relief he seeks under § 301. Moreover, exhaustion would not lead to significant savings in judicial resources, because regardless of the outcome of the internal appeal, the employee would be required to prove de novo in his § 301 suit that the union breached its duty of fair representation and that the employer breached the collective-bargaining agreement.23 As we recently stated, one of the important federal policies underlying § 301, is the " 'relatively rapid disposition of labor disputes.' " United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S., at 63, 101 S.Ct., at 1564, quoting Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 707, 86 S.Ct. 1107, 1114, 16 L.Ed.2d 192 (1966). This policy is undermined by an exhaustion requirement unless the internal procedures are capable of either reactivating the employee's grievance or of redressing it.24
I join Justice REHNQUIST'S dissent, and write briefly to emphasize a rationale—suggested by an amicus curiae*—that is consistent both with national labor policy and the relevant precedents.
In my view, the asserted distinction in a tripartite case such as this one between contractual and internal union remedies, ante, at 687, is immaterial. The situation presented in this case is well within the doctrine underlying Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 85 S.Ct. 614, 13 L.Ed.2d 580 (1965), that employees must pursue all procedures established for determining whether a union will go forward with a grievance. Employees must pursue available procedures even if the collective-bargaining agreement contains time limits that appear on their face to bar revival of the grievance. As the Court noted in John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 556-557, 84 S.Ct. 909, 917, 11 L.Ed.2d 898 (1964), "[q]uestions concerning the procedural prerequisites to arbitration do not arise in a vacuum; they develop in the context of an actual dispute about the rights of the parties to the contract or those covered by it." Therefore, "it best accords with the usual purposes of an arbitration clause and with the policy behind federal labor law to regard procedural disagreements not as separate disputes but as aspects of the dispute which called the grievance procedures into play." Id., at 559, 84 S.Ct., at 919. Thus, the question whether such time limits should be waived in a particular case is itself an arbitrable matter.
The Court creates a three-prong test for determining when a district court should exercise its discretion and require exhaustion of intraunion remedies. Ante, at 689. Admittedly, a district court when exercising this discretion should carefully consider the first criterion referred to by the Court—whether union officials are so hostile to the employee that he could not obtain a fair hearing on his claim. Ibid. However, there is no question that this criterion does not come into play in this case. Ibid.
However, no prior case of this Court has held that exhaustion should not be required unless the internal union remedies can provide all the substantive relief requested or reactivation of the grievance. The principal difficulty with the Court's opinion lies in its framing of this second criterion which reflects much too narrow a view of the purposes of the exhaustion defense and the benefits which will likely result from requiring exhaustion in a case where a union has established a means for reviewing the manner in which it has represented an employee during a grievance. It is worth noting that neither NLRB v. Marine Workers, 391 U.S. 418, 88 S.Ct. 1717, 20 L.Ed.2d 706 (1968), on which the Court so heavily relies, nor any other case of this Court, supports the language used by the Court in the second prong of its test. In fact, Marine Workers simply states exhaustion should not be required "when the administrative remedies are inadequate." Id., at 426, n. 8, 88 S.Ct., at 1722, n. 8. Our focus therefore should be on the adequacies of the union remedies when viewed in the context of the underlying purpose of the exhaustion defense—which is to encourage private rather than judicial resolution of disputes.
The exhaustion of intraunion remedies, even where those remedies cannot provide reinstatement or reactivation of a grievance, does promote private resolution of labor disputes. Resort to the intraunion appeals procedures provides the union with its first opportunity to focus on the issue of fair representation—as opposed to the alleged breach of the collective-bargaining agreement. Resort to the union appeals procedures gives the union an opportunity to satisfy the employee that its decision not to pursue a grievance was correct. If successful on this score, litigation is averted. Where a union determines through its appeals procedures that it mishandled an employee's grievance, litigation may also be averted because at that point both the union and the employer have a strong incentive to pursue private resolution of the grievance. Even where a collective-bargaining agreement does not provide for reactivation of a grievance it is reasonable to assume that many employers, when confronted with both a determination by a union that it had breached its duty of fair representation and the immediate prospect of an employee commencing litigation, would seriously consider voluntarily reactivating the grievance procedure to avoid the additional burden and costs of litigation. Should litigation nonetheless occur, exhaustion may well have narrowed the factual and legal issues to be decided and thus result in a savings of judicial resources. A fact that should also not be discounted is that the conscientious handling by a union of an employee's intraunion appeal cannot help but enhance the union's prestige with its members. Cf. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 653, 85 S.Ct. 614, 616, 13 L.Ed.2d 580 (1965). Exhaustion promotes union democracy and self-government as well as the broader policy of non-interference with internal union affairs. A union's incentive to maintain internal procedures which provide substantial procedural protection and which can afford significant substantive relief will be greatly undermined if an employee can simply bypass the procedures at will.
An additional question which is also of great importance is whether a union should ever be found to have breached its duty of fair representation when a union member shuns an appeals procedure which is both mandated by the union constitution and established for the purpose of allowing the union to satisfy its duty of fair representation. It seems to me not at all unreasonable to say that a union should have the right to require its members to give it the first opportunity to correct its own mistakes. Responsible union self-government demands a fair opportunity to function. This is especially true in a situation such as here where exhaustion of the union remedies could eliminate the need to litigate altogether. Congress has recognized the importance of these values in § 101(a)(4) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 522, 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(4). This section provides in part:
Section 101(a)(4) reflects what I believe to be the reasonable compromise Congress reached when trying to balance two somewhat competing interests—furtherance of the national labor policy in favor of private resolution of disputes on the one hand and the desire not to unduly burden or "exhaust" an individual employee with time-consuming procedures on the other. It is fair to say that § 101(a)(4) represents Congress' judgment that limiting access to the courts for at least four months is not an unreasonable price to pay in exchange for the previously mentioned benefits exhaustion may provide.
Section 203(d) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 153, 29 U.S.C. § 173(d), provides that "[f]inal adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement."
This policy has its statutory roots in § 101(a)(4) of the Landrum-Griffin Act, 73 Stat. 522, 29 U.S.C § 411(a)(4), which is part of the subchapter of that Act entitled "Bill of Rights of Members of Labor Organizations." Section 101(a)(4) provides:
In addition, by reactivating the grievance, the union might be able to rectify the very wrong of which the employee complains—a breach of the duty of fair representation caused by the union's refusal to seek arbitration—and the employee would then be unable to satisfy the precondition to a § 301 suit against the employer.