Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/878/501/166695/
Timestamp: 2019-06-25 09:31:08
Document Index: 489716020

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 818', '§ 819', 'art 41', 'art 41', 'art 3', '§ 819']

Richard N. White, Appellant v. Secretary of the Army, 878 F.2d 501 (D.C. Cir. 1989) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › D.C. Circuit › 1989 › Richard N. White, Appellant v. Secretary of the Army
Richard N. White, Appellant v. Secretary of the Army, 878 F.2d 501 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit - 878 F.2d 501 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
Argued Jan. 27, 1989. Decided July 7, 1989
Premature separation from the Army can be accomplished either by court martial or through administrative discharge proceedings. A member of the service can be separated by means of a bad conduct or dishonorable discharge only by a court martial. Articles 18 and 19, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §§ 818, 819 (1983). While a regular court martial may issue either of these discharges, a special court martial entirely lacks the power to issue a dishonorable discharge, and it may issue a bad conduct discharge only if a court reporter is present during the proceedings. Article 19, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 819.4
Administrative proceedings for premature separation can result in honorable, general,5 or undesirable discharges.6 32 C.F.R. Part 41, App. A.; Wood v. Secretary of Defense, 496 F. Supp. 192, 193 n. 1 (D.D.C. 1980). Under the Army's regulations, an individual separated for such shortcomings as inaptitude, defective attitudes, apathy, and inability to expend effort constructively will receive an honorable or a general discharge. A.R. 635-200, paragraphs 13-5b, 13-31b. Only an individual discharged for such offenses as "frequent incidents of a discreditable nature with civil or military authorities," an "established pattern of shirking," "sexual perversion," or "drug abuse" may be administratively given an undesirable discharge. A.R. 635-200, paragraphs 13-5a., 13-31a.
A discharge characterized as anything other than honorable carries with it both a serious stigma in the form of injury to reputation and loss of employment opportunities, Bland v. Connally, 293 F.2d 852, 858 (D.C. Cir. 1961), and it may also involve loss of entitlement to federal and state veterans benefits. See Roelofs v. Secretary of the Air Force, 628 F.2d 594, 603 and n. 12 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (Bazelon, J., concurring). On this basis, the Army has by regulation provided for numerous procedural protections with respect to both court martial and administrative discharge proceedings. Of particular relevance to this case are the safeguards that apply in the administrative process: they include notice, a hearing before a board of officers, the right to counsel, the opportunity to present witnesses and to cross examine adverse witnesses, and the opportunity to testify if the service member so chooses. A.R. 635-200, paragraphs 13-12 through 13-25, 32 C.F.R. Part 41, App. A, Part 3.
The function of the District Court in this case was to determine whether the decision of the BCMR was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law, Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 303, 103 S. Ct. 2362, 2367, 76 L. Ed. 2d 586 (1983); Wolfe v. Marsh, 835 F.2d 354, 358-59 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 109 S. Ct. 366, 102 L. Ed. 2d 355 (1988), and it lacked the power to overturn the review board's decision on any other basis. It is with that standard of review in mind that we consider the District Court's decision.
It is not disputed that the special court martial proceeding alone could not have resulted in appellant's discharge: the court martial had no power to direct the issuance of a dishonorable discharge under any circumstances, and it could have imposed a bad conduct discharge only if a court reporter was present at its proceedings. Article 19, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 819. However, in his instruction instituting the court martial to try appellant for his latest AWOL, the commander had specified "No reporter authorized," so that the option of a bad conduct discharge was likewise unavailable.
The answer is supplied by our decision in Giles v. Secretary of the Army, 627 F.2d 554 (D.C. Cir. 1980). That case involved an Army challenge to a decision by the District Court granting blanket upgrades to former enlisted men who had received general discharges on the unlawful basis of compelled urinalysis tests. The Army agreed that the compelled tests were unlawful, but it maintained that soldiers seeking upgrades should be required to apply to the DRB, which could then examine their personnel files to determine whether there existed any other reason justifying a general rather than an honorable discharge.
That line of argument entirely lacks merit and must squarely be rejected. By parallel reasoning, the Court would uphold the conviction of an accused with a long criminal record who pleads guilty to a crime based on erroneous legal advice, or otherwise in substantial violation of the standards for the entry of pleas of guilty, provided for by Rule 11, Fed. R. Crim. P., on the basis that, if he were released, he would inevitably commit another crime for which he would receive the same sentence or worse. That obviously is not the law.
The Secretary argues that the BCMR's conclusions are "virtually inescapable."9 But the truly inescapable fact is that appellant could not have been discharged as a result of the proceeding initiated by the Army. Only protracted speculation encompassing proceedings not begun, charges not brought, and offenses not yet committed can render appellant's undesirable discharge "inescapable." It would be difficult to find a more speculative conclusion. Even the Secretary's proper claim to the deference to be accorded by the courts to the BCMR's decision, see Heisig v. United States, 719 F.2d 1153, 1156 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cannot save so anomalous a result.
A prior action filed in 1983 resulted in a dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. White v. Secretary of the Army, 629 F. Supp. 64 (D.D.C. 1984)
See Carter v. United States, 213 Ct. Cl. 727 (1977)