Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/220/308/78733/
Timestamp: 2020-04-01 09:44:53
Document Index: 224534153

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1291', '§ 1292', '§ 1291', '§ 48', '§ 1292', '§ 3653', '§ 3673']

Laurie W. Tomlinson, Director of Internal Revenue for the State of Florida, Appellant, v. Sidney Poller and James G. Pace, Appellees, 220 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1955) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Fifth Circuit › 1955 › Laurie W. Tomlinson, Director of Internal Revenue for the State of Florida, Appellant, v. Sidney Pol...
Laurie W. Tomlinson, Director of Internal Revenue for the State of Florida, Appellant, v. Sidney Poller and James G. Pace, Appellees, 220 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1955)
US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit - 220 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1955) March 25, 1955
The question here presented is whether the District Court for the Southern District of Florida erred in entering an order requiring the Director of Internal Revenue for the State of Florida to accept a bond in lieu of a recorded lien against appellees, which bond was conditioned entirely differently from the bond prescribed by statute and normally used by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, in his discretion, and directing that the tax lien be cancelled from the records of Dade County, Florida, pending the prosecution of a suit by appellees to enjoin the collection of a social security tax which they had returned; and there is the further threshold question whether such an order is a "final decision" of the District Court under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291, or is such "an interlocutory order" under § 1292, as gives this court jurisdiction on appeal.1
The substance of appellees' contention is that, no matter how erroneous may have been the order of the trial court striking the lien from the records of Dade County and requiring the Director to accept what really amounted only to a supersedeas bond rather than a payment bond as is alone authorized by the Statute, the order was not a final judgment and thus it is not appealable. We are not aided overmuch by the briefs of the parties in connection with this particular question, but we do find two Supreme Court decisions that we think require us to reject this contention.3 These cases construe the term "final decision" as meaning something different than "final judgments which terminate an action". They construe it in a manner that includes decisions that fall in "that small class which finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated." Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Indus. Corp., supra, 337 U.S. at page 546, 69 S. Ct. at page 1225.
Not only can the lien of the United States for taxes be lifted only as provided by the statute,7 but also the form of the bond is also prescribed and the court erred additionally in directing that a bond be accepted by the Director which completely failed to conform to the statutory requirement that the bond be "conditioned upon the payment of the amount assessed". The bond authorized by the court's order was conditioned "if the said principal shall successfully contest said assessment in the United States District Court or in the Tax Court of the United States, or shall pay said obligation * * *." It is too apparent for argument that this bond utterly failed to meet the essential requirements of the statute.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1291:
"The courts of appeal shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States, the District Court for the Territory of Alaska, the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam, and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court. As amended Oct. 31, 1951, c. 655, § 48, 65 Stat. 726." 28 U.S.C.A. § 1292:
"(1) Interlocutory orders of the district courts of the United States, the District Court for the Territory of Alaska, the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam, and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, or of the judges thereof, granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modifying injunctions, except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court; * * *."
Falsone v. United States, 5 Cir., 205 F.2d 734, 737, certiorari denied 346 U.S. 864, 74 S. Ct. 103, 98 L. Ed. 375
Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana Del Caribe, 339 U.S. 684, 70 S. Ct. 861, 94 L. Ed. 1206; Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S. Ct. 1221, 1225, 93 L. Ed. 1528
26 U.S.C.A. § 3653: "Prohibition of suits to restrain assessment or collection
"(a) Tax. Except as provided in sections 272(a), 871(a) and 1012(a), no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court."
For a discussion of the principles involved see In re State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U.S. 575, 613-614, 23 L. Ed. 663; for decisions of this court see Steinhagen Rice Milling Co. v. Scofield, 5 Cir., 87 F.2d 804 and Beeland Wholesale Co. v. Davis, 5 Cir., 88 F.2d 447, certiorari denied 300 U.S. 680, 57 S. Ct. 672, 81 L. Ed. 884
26 U.S.C.A. § 3673: "Release of lien
"Subject to such regulations as the Commissioner, with the approval of the Secretary, may prescribe, the collector charged with an assessment in respect of any tax, may issue a certificate of release of the lien if —
"(b) Bond accepted. There is furnished to the collector and accepted by him a bond that is conditioned upon the payment of the amount assessed, together with all interest in respect thereof, within the time prescribed by law (including any extension of such time), and that is in accordance with such requirements relating to terms, conditions, and form of the bond and sureties thereon, as may be specified in the regulations.
"(26 U.S.C. 1946 ed., Sec. 3673.)"
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 6 Cir., 107 F.2d 311, certiorari denied 310 U.S. 630, 60 S. Ct. 978, 84 L. Ed. 1400