Source: http://nj.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.19930331_0041203.C03.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2017-06-23 14:02:28
Document Index: 711759664

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2254', '§ 2253', '§ 1291', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2', '§ 2']

| Hakeem v. Beyer
ALI ABDUL-HABIB HAKEEM A/K/A THOMAS WOOTENv.HOWARD L. BEYER; ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY HOWARD L. BEYER, SUPERINTENDENT, AND ROBERT J. DEL TUFO, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, APPELLANTS IN NO. 91-5848 ALI ABDUL-HABIB HAKEEM, APPELLANT IN NO. 91-5884
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. (D.C. Civil Action No. 90-02243).
Appellants Howard Beyer, the Superintendent of Trenton State Prison, and Robert Del Tufo, the Attorney General of New Jersey, appeal an order of the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey granting Ali Abdul-Habib Hakeem's (Hakeem)*fn1 petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court based its order on a holding that a fourteen and one-half month delay in bringing Hakeem to trial it found attributable to the negligence of the state violated the Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Hakeem cross-appeals rulings of the district court rejecting the other grounds he asserted as a basis for habeas relief.
The district court had jurisdiction over Hakeem's petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 1977). We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 2253 (West 1971) and 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291 (West Supp. 1992).
We will affirm the district court on the issues that are the subject of Hakeem's cross-appeal and, therefore, deny Hakeem appellate relief on that cross-appeal docketed at our No. 91-5884. Except for the double jeopardy issue Hakeem raises on his cross-appeal, we do so essentially for the reasons set forth in the district court's opinion. See Hakeem v. Beyer, 774 F. Supp. 276 (D.N.J. 1991).*fn2 On the double jeopardy issue, we set forth our reasoning, which differs somewhat from that of the district court, in Part III of this opinion infra.
On the state's appeal at No. 91-5848, we will vacate the district court's order granting Hakeem a writ of habeas corpus on his claim that the state violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial and remand the case to it for an evidentiary hearing on the cause of the delay. With respect to the cause of the delay we hold that the district court properly disregarded the presumption of correctness that attaches to a finding of fact of a state court under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) because the state court's finding was not fairly supported by the record as required by § 2254(d)(8). In situations where a state court's finding of fact is not fairly supported by the record, Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 313, 9 L. Ed. 2d 770, 83 S. Ct. 745 (1963), requires the district court to hold a hearing to resolve those material facts that are in dispute. The district court failed to do this with respect to the cause of the delay, a material fact that is genuinely in dispute on the state record in this case. Accordingly we will remand for an evidentiary hearing on the cause of the delay. Resolution of the speedy trial issue also requires a balancing of the factors set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101, 92 S. Ct. 2182 (1972), based on appropriate findings of fact and that balancing is a matter for the district court in the first instance. On the record before us, however, we disagree with the district court's decision on which side of the balance some of the factors should be placed and also, to some extent, with the weight it afforded to those factors that go on Hakeem's side. Specifically, we agree with the district court that a fourteen and one-half month delay triggers a Barker inquiry. We also agree with the district court that Hakeem has demonstrated no cognizable prejudice beyond that which is inherent in the fourteen and one-half month delay in bringing him to trial, but we disagree with the district court's Conclusion that this delay of itself places the factor of prejudice on Hakeem's side of the balance. We also hold, in partial disagreement with the district court, that Hakeem's assertion of his right to a speedy trial weighs only slightly in his favor.
On March 7, 1984, Hakeem entered a plea of not guilty to all charges. By a letter dated April 5, 1984 and addressed only to "Honorable Sir," Hakeem complained of excessive bail and that he had not yet been afforded discovery. The letter was forwarded to a state court Judge who acknowledged the letter on April 12 and informed Hakeem by form letter that the court was "forwarding a copy to your attorney with instructions to see you immediately and take any required action." Joint Appendix (App.) at 244.
On January 7, 1985, the New Jersey Superior Court heard and denied a motion to suppress evidence the state had obtained during Hakeem's arrest. State v. Wooten, No. 604-2-84 (N.J. Super. Ct. Jan. 7, 1985). On January 14, 1985, the Superior Court held a hearing pursuant to State v. Sands, 76 N.J. 127, 386 A.2d 378 (N.J. 1978), at which it was determined that all of Hakeem's prior convictions would be admissible for impeachment purposes if he chose to testify at trial. On January 16, 1985, the Superior Court held a Wade*fn3 hearing and determined that the state's out-of-court identifications of Hakeem would be admissible.
Hakeem appealed his sentences asserting nine issues. The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, affirmed the convictions in an unpublished per curiam opinion. State v. Wooten, No. A-3657-84T4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 30, 1988) (per curiam). Hakeem filed a petition for certification nunc pro tunc to the New Jersey Supreme Court. It was denied on February 21, 1989. He then sought post-conviction relief from the New Jersey Superior Court based on his belief that his sentences violated the Fifth and Eighth Amendments. The Superior Court dismissed his petition without prejudice. State v. Wooten, No. 609-2-84 (N.J. Super. Ct. Dec. 8, 1989).
On June 11, 1990, Hakeem filed a pro se habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey alleging seven grounds for relief. Hakeem v. Beyer, 774 F. Supp. at 282-83. The district court held, inter alia, that Hakeem was not denied effective assistance of counsel, the identification testimony used at trial was admissible and the state did not engage in prosecutorial misconduct in refusing to furnish Hakeem's counsel with a copy of the possibly exculpatory transcript. Id. at 286-87, 290. The district court did, however, conclude that Hakeem was denied his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. Id. at 296. It ordered Hakeem discharged from custody but immediately stayed that order pending the outcome of this appeal. Id. at 299. Thereafter, on December 23, 1991, this Court denied Hakeem's motion to vacate the stay.
Hakeem's double jeopardy issue presents a question of law subject to plenary review. See United States v. Garcia, 919 F.2d 881, 885 (3d Cir. 1990); Daniel v. Warden, 794 F.2d 880, 883 (3d Cir. 1986). The district court's determination that Hakeem has established a violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial is reviewed de novo. Burkett v. Fulcomer, 951 F.2d 1431, 1437-38 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 120 L. Ed. 2d 921, 112 S. Ct. 3055 (1992). Where an evidentiary hearing is not mandatory, the district court has discretion to determine whether a habeas corpus petitioner is entitled to a hearing and its determination is reviewable for abuse of discretion. Reese v. Fulcomer, 946 F.2d 247, 256 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 118 L. Ed. 2d 396, 112 S. Ct. 1679 (1992). Because the district court never conducted an evidentiary hearing, we also exercise de novo review over the factual inferences the district court drew from the record. Zettlemoyer v. Fulcomer, 923 F.2d 284, 291 n.5 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 116 L. Ed. 2d 232, 112 S. Ct. 280 (1991).
The district court concluded that Hakeem's dual convictions and consecutive sentences for first degree armed robbery under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:15-1 (West 1982) and possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:39-4 (West Supp. 1992) did not place him twice in jeopardy because the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court determined that the state legislature intended to formulate two specific crimes and punishments. The district court therefore held that the United States Supreme Court's test for double jeopardy announced in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 76 L. Ed. 306, 52 S. Ct. 180 (1932), did not apply. See Hakeem, 774 F. Supp. at 285 (citing Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368-69, 74 L. Ed. 2d 535, 103 S. Ct. 673 (1983) (state legislature may proscribe separate punishments for single act)). The district court did not consider the problem that a dual conviction creates when one crime is a lesser included component of the other. See Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 109 L. Ed. 2d 548, 110 S. Ct. 2084 (1990); Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 65 L. Ed. 2d 228, 100 S. Ct. 2260 (1980). Though the appellate division, in considering Hakeem's direct appeal, held that possession of a weapon is a separate offense from assault, it did not decide whether the legislature intended possession of a weapon to be an offense separate from armed first degree robbery. On this point, other cases decided by the Appellate Division leave New Jersey law unclear. See State v. Jones, 213 N.J. Super. 562, 517 A.2d 1219 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1986) (holding two sentences permissible). But see State v. Porter, 210 N.J. Super. 383, 510 A.2d 49 (N.J. Super App. Div.) (conviction for weapon possession merged with first degree armed robbery conviction), cert. denied, 523 A.2d 191 (N.J. 1986).
The state court's rejection, without Discussion, of Hakeem's double jeopardy attacks on his dual convictions for robbery and possession does not by itself conclusively establish a legislative intent that would avoid Blockburger. If it did, Blockburger analysis would seldom be necessary on federal habeas because state affirmance of a dual conviction could bring our double jeopardy inquiry to an end. Nevertheless, in Hakeem's case, we are satisfied that his dual convictions survive Blockburger analysis because the two crimes have different elements. See Vitale, 447 U.S. at 416 ("If 'each statute requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not,' the offenses are not the same under the Blockburger test.") (quoting Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166, 53 L. Ed. 2d 187, 97 S. Ct. 2221 (1977) (emphasis omitted)). New Jersey's possession statute requires proof that a defendant intended to use the weapon unlawfully.*fn4 Its first degree robbery statute requires mere possession of a weapon at the time the offense is committed without any proof that the actor intended to use or exhibit it.*fn5 Consequently, Hakeem ...