Source: http://va.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20190329_0000302.EVA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2020-08-13 15:02:14
Document Index: 265007577

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 924', '§ 2255', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 2255']

MONTA TERRY GIBBS, Defendant.
Monta Terry Gibbs, a federal inmate proceeding with counsel, filed this 28 U.S.C. § 2255 Motion ("§ 2255 Motion," ECF No. 47) arguing that his firearm conviction and sentence are invalid under Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015).[1] The Government filed a Motion to Dismiss the § 2255 Motion contending that it is barred by the relevant statute of limitations. (ECF No. 49.) As discussed below, while the Government correctly asserts that the § 2255 Motion is untimely, the Court also finds that Gibbs's Johnson claim lacks merit.
On June 2, 2009, Gibbs was charged with: conspiracy to interfere with commerce by threats and violence (Count One); interference with commerce by threats and violence ("Hobbs Act robbery") by robbing Paul Terry Boyles (Count Two); brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, to wit, the crime charged in Count Two (Count Three); and, possession of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon (Count Four). (Indictment 1-2, ECF No. 1.)
On September 8, 2009, pursuant to a Plea Agreement, Gibbs pled guilty to Counts One and Three and the Government agreed to dismiss the remaining charges. (ECF No. 23, at 1, 5.) On December 11, 2009, the Court sentenced Gibbs to 60 months of imprisonment on Count One and 84 months on Count Three to be served consecutively to Count One. (ECF No. 31, at 2.)
On June 23, 2016, Gibbs filed his initial § 2255 Motion. (ECF No. 44.) Thereafter, the Government moved to dismiss, arguing that the § 2255 Motion is barred by the relevant statute of limitations.
A. Gibbs's § 2255 Motion is Untimely
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1), Gibbs was required to file any 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion within one year after his conviction became final. Accordingly, absent a belated commencement of the limitation period, Gibbs's § 2255 Motion is untimely. Gibbs contends that he is entitled to a belated commencement of the limitation period under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3).
Section 2255(f)(3) provides that a petitioner may bring a claim within a year of the date of which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court. "[T]o obtain the benefit of the limitations period stated in § 2255(f)(3), [Gibbs] must show: (1) that the Supreme Court recognized a new right; (2) that the right 'has been ... made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review'; and (3) that he filed his motion within one year of the date on which the Supreme Court recognized the right." United States v. Mathur, 685 F.3d 396, 398 (4th Cir. 2012) (alteration in original).
The "right" asserted here is the right recognized in Johnson. In Johnson, the Supreme Court held "that imposing an increased sentence under the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act [("ACCA")] violates the Constitution's guarantee of due process." 135 S.Ct. 2563.[2] The Johnson Court concluded that the way the residual clause of the ACCA, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), defined "violent felony" was unconstitutionally vague because the clause encompassed "conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another." Id. at 2557-58. Subsequently, in Welch v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 1257, 1268 (2016), the Supreme Court held that "Johnson announced a substantive rule of law that has retroactive effect in cases on collateral review." Id. at 1268.
Gibbs asserts that his conviction is unlawful in light of Johnson, and in doing so, he argues that Johnson restarted the one-year limitation period pursuant to § 2255(f)(3).[3] For a petitioner to satisfy section 2255(f)(3), the Supreme Court itself must be the judicial body to establish the right in question. See Doddv. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 357 (2005). "[I]f the existence of a right remains an open question as a matter of Supreme Court precedent, then the Supreme Court has not 'recognized' that right." United States v. Brown, 868 F.3d 297, 301 (4th Cir. 2017) (citations omitted).
Gibbs was convicted of using, carrying and brandishing a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence, to wit, the Hobbs Act robbery of Paul Terry Boyles, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).[4] Gibbs's argument-that the residual clause of § 924(c) is unconstitutionally vague-simply was not a right announced in Johnson. Rather, the Supreme Court's holding in Johnson only addressed the residual clause of ACCA. As the Fourth Circuit has observed, although "the Supreme Court held unconstitutionally vague the [residual clause in ACCA], ... the [Supreme] Court had no occasion to review ... the residual clause [of § 924(c)]." United States v. Fuertes, 805 F.3d 485, 499 n.5 (4th Cir. 2015). Thus, Gibbs's contention that § 924(c)'s residual clause is unconstitutionally vague was not a right announced by the Supreme Court in Johnson. See United States v. Cook, No. 1:11-CR-188, 2019 WL 921448, at *3 (E.D. Va. Feb. 25, 2019) ("[T]he question of [Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S.Ct. 1204 (2018)] and Johnson's effect on Section 924(c)(3)(B) is not yet settled.")[5] Thus, the Government correctly asserts that Gibbs's § 2255 Motion is untimely and barred from review here. Accordingly, the Government's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 49) will be granted.
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;B. Gibbs's ...