Source: https://casetext.com/case/united-states-v-southern-tanks-inc
Timestamp: 2020-01-23 12:30:26
Document Index: 132832429

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2', '§ 7604', '§ 7604', '§ 7402', '§ 7402', '§ 2', '§ 2']

United States v. Southern Tanks, Inc., 619 F.2d 54 | Casetext
United States v. Southern Tanks, Inc.
See Note, The Institutional Bad Faith Defense to the Enforcement of IRS Summons, 80 Columbia L.R. 621 (1980)…
U.S. v. Zygarowski
The First Circuit has noted that the requirement of a " de novo determination" only applies to the…
Full title:UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND ROBERT F. KELSO, JR., SPECIAL AGENT,…
Date published: Mar 21, 1980
619 F.2d 54 (10th Cir. 1980)
Argued and Submitted February 14, 1980.
Decided March 21, 1980. Rehearing Denied April 28, 1980.
William A. Whitledge, Atty., Tax Div., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C. (M. Carr Ferguson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Gilbert E. Andrews and Donald B. Susswein, Attys., Tax Div., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C.; Larry Patton, U.S. Atty., Oklahoma City, Okl., of counsel), for petitioners-appellees.
Ostensibly, the order of reference in this case was made pursuant to § 2(m) or Rule 31 which authorizes a magistrate to "Issue an attachment or order to enforce obedience to an Internal Revenue Service Summons to produce records or give testimony. 26 U.S.C. § 7604(b)." Appellants say, and probably correctly, that the underlying enforcement action in this case was not commenced under § 7604(b), but under either 26 U.S.C. § 7402(b) or 7604(a). Under appellants' theory, the absence of an explicit reference in the district court's local rules to enforcement proceedings under §§ 7402(b) and 7604(a) precludes a district judge from referring such matters to a magistrate for preliminary proceedings.
The interpretation of § 2(m) of Rule 31 offered by appellants is unreasonably narrow. We think it sufficiently clear, from even a casual reading, that the district court, in its local rules, fully intended to authorize magistrates to conduct whatever portions of IRS summons enforcement proceedings they could properly undertake. In any event, the district court's order of reference was definitely within the scope of the omnibus section (§ 2[n]) of Rule 31 which authorizes magistrates to perform any additional duty which is not inconsistent with the Constitution and the laws of the United States. While the form of the underlying proceedings may have certain similarity to past practices in the Western District of Oklahoma, the substance of these proceedings was well within permissible constitutional and statutory boundaries. See United States v. First National Bank of Rush Springs, 576 F.2d 852 (10th Cir. 1978); United States v. Jones, supra.
As a general rule, discovery is available in summons enforcement proceedings only in extraordinary situations. United States v. Fensterwald, 180 U.S.App.D.C. 86, 553 F.2d 231 (D.C. Cir. 1977); United States v. Wright Motor Co., 536 F.2d 1090 (5th Cir. 1976). Some courts have permitted very limited discovery in order to examine an agency's institutional posture with respect to possible criminal proceedings. See United States v. Genser, 582 F.2d 292 (3rd Cir. 1978) and 595 F.2d 146 (3rd Cir. 1979); United States v. Marine Midland Bank, 585 F.2d 36 (2nd Cir. 1978). Here however, we think the record furnishes ample indication of the ongoing civil tax determination purpose. Also, petitioners firmly denied that there had been a recommendation for prosecution made to the Department of Justice or that there was any intention to do so. This is sufficient to meet the tests of United States v. LaSalle National Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 98 S.Ct. 2357, 57 L.Ed.2d 221 (1978) and Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 91 S.Ct. 534, 27 L.Ed.2d 580 (1971).