Source: http://web.openjurist.org/120/f3d/120/martyszenko-v-safeway-inc
Timestamp: 2018-02-24 14:19:48
Document Index: 36100907

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2612', '§ 2612', '§ 2612', '§ 825', '§ 2611', '§ 2601']

120 F3d 120 Martyszenko v. Safeway Inc | OpenJurist
120 F. 3d 120 - Martyszenko v. Safeway Inc
120 F3d 120 Martyszenko v. Safeway Inc
120 F.3d 120
133 Lab.Cas. P 33,554, 3 Wage & Hour Cas.2d
(BNA) 1793
Vivian MARTYSZENKO, Plaintiff-Appellant,
SAFEWAY, INC., a Delaware Corporation; Dennis Davis,
No. 97-1010.
Dr. Sullivan evaluated Kyle on August 14. He reported:[Kyle] is not expressing any issues that he has been sexually abused or had any sexual contact. The family reports that his behavior at home is essentially normal with no behavior problems. He had no behavior problems at school last year.
In relevant part, the FMLA entitles an eligible employee to twelve workweeks' leave per year to care for a child with a serious health condition. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C). This leave generally may be unpaid. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(c). An employer violates the FMLA if it denies the employee leave or reinstatement following the leave. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2612(a), 2614(a), 2615(a)(1).
The district court interpreted these regulations as requiring incapacity. It is difficult to fault this assessment. In construing regulations of the Secretary, we were recently reminded that "[where] Congress has not 'directly spoken to the precise question at issue,' we must sustain the Secretary's approach so long as it is 'based on a permissible construction of the statute.' " Auer v. Robbins, --- U.S. ----, ----, 117 S.Ct. 905, 909, 137 L.Ed.2d 79 (1997) (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2781-82, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984)).
Martyszenko argues that incapacity is not required to trigger the FMLA. She contends that even if incapacity is required, Kyle's three consultations with Dr. Sullivan qualify as a period of incapacity. We find no error in the district court's interpretation. In addition to the standards set forth in the regulations, the legislative history of the FMLA supports the district court's construction. The Act was designed to permit a parent to tend to her child where the child is "unable to participate in school or in his or her regular daily activities." S.Rep. No. 103-3, at 28 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 30; H.R.Rep. No. 103-8, pt. 1; see also 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(a)(2)(I). The Act was "not intended to cover short-term conditions for which treatment and recovery are very brief." S.Rep. No. 103-3, at 28.
Uniformly, courts applying the FMLA expressly or impliedly have required a showing of incapacity. See Hodgens v. General Dynamics Corp., 963 F.Supp. 102, 106 (D.R.I. 1997) (holding no FMLA breach where employee's "condition did not prevent him from performing his job"); Boyce v. New York City Mission Soc'y, 963 F.Supp. 290, 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (recognizing the requirement of incapacity; holding plaintiff's shortness of breath and chest pains failed to meet the FMLA standard); Rhoads v. FDIC, 956 F.Supp. 1239, 1255 (D.Md.1997) (denying employer's summary judgment motion where the plaintiff's "well documented chronic health condition" caused "episodic periods of incapacity"); Kaylor v. Fannin Reg'l Hosp., 946 F.Supp. 988, 997-98 (N.D.Ga.1996) (finding plaintiff's back injury to be a "serious health condition" because it "incapacitated [him] for three weeks"); George v. Associated Stationers, 932 F.Supp. 1012, 1015-16 (N.D.Ohio 1996) (finding a "serious health condition" where the plaintiff's communicable chicken pox prevented him from working for over three days); Hott v. VDO Yazaki Corp., 922 F.Supp. 1114, 1128 (W.D.Va.1996) (noting incapacity requirement and granting employer summary judgment where condition would last ten days but where "the plaintiff was able to perform the functions of her position"); Gudenkauf v. Stauffer Communications, Inc., 922 F.Supp. 465, 474-76 (D.Kan.1996) (holding employer's refusal to grant leave did not violate the FMLA where the employee failed to prove that her condition "kept her from performing the functions of her job"); Bauer v. Dayton-Walther Corp., 910 F.Supp. 306, 310-11 (E.D.Ky.1996) (finding no FMLA violation upon no showing of requisite incapacity period); Brannon v. OshKosh B'Gosh, Inc., 897 F.Supp. 1028, 1036-37 (M.D.Tenn.1995) (holding employee's condition did not require FMLA leave because she was not " 'incapacitated' for more than three calendar days," but employee's daughter's fever qualified because it kept her from day care); Seidle v. Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co., 871 F.Supp. 238, 243 (E.D.Pa.1994) (requiring employee to demonstrate her child underwent "a period of incapacity requiring absence from his day care center for more than three days").
Although periodic examinations may constitute treatment, by the FMLA's express terms such treatment must be "continuing" to require extended leave. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(11)(B). That is, consistent with the aim of the statute to permit reasonable leave "for eligible medical reasons ... and for compelling family reasons," 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(4) (emphasis added), examinations and evaluations concerning serious health conditions will implicate the FMLA only to the extent their importance, duration and frequency require absence from work.