Source: http://www.calattorneysfees.com/cases_special_fee_shifting_statutes/
Timestamp: 2018-09-21 19:30:23
Document Index: 96762053

Matched Legal Cases: ['§3662', '§ 1021', '§ 1038', '§ 928', '§ 1021', '§ 1021', '§3730', '§ 2']

CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY'S FEES : Cases: Special Fee Shifting Statutes
Posted at 07:57 PM in Cases: Prevailing Party, Cases: Special Fee Shifting Statutes | Permalink | Comments (0)
SLAPP, Special Fee Shifting Statute: Defendants Obtaining Dismissal of Civil Harassment Petition Entitled To Fee Recovery, But Trial Court Correctly Ruled Defendants Not Entitled To SLAPP Relief Such That Other Fee Work Could Not Be Recovered
Both Sides Appealed, But Trial Court’s Fee Recovery Orders Were Affirmed.
In Geiser v. Kuhns, Case No. B279738 (2d Dist., Div. 5 Aug. 30, 2018) (unpublished), defendants were awarded $40,000 in attorney’s fees based on defeating plaintiff’s civil harassment action but were denied additional fees based on the defense SLAPP motions because the lower court indicated the SLAPP motion would have been denied. The defense sought $84,150 in fees (inclusive of a 1.5 multiplier) under SLAPP, but the lower court determined only a portion of fees were recoverable by the defense based the civil harassment “win.” The lower court found that the reduction in claimed fees was appropriate based on excessive hourly rates and unsuccessful negotiation/SLAPP work.
Both sides appealed, with no change in result.
Plaintiff tried to argue that defendants were not the prevailing party because his civil harassment petition was a “catalyst” to certain responses by the defendants. However, the evidence showed that the lower court could conclude that defendants voluntarily did certain actions with no causal link to plaintiff’s lawsuit precipitating the responsive activities. Defendants were the prevailing parties, and the trial court’s fee calculations were not an abuse of discretion.
Defendants wanted more fees in their cross-appeal based on the theory they should have had their SLAPP motion granted. Nope, only a private matter was involved (over a dissenting justice’s opinion) such that the fee results remained unchanged.
Posted at 07:30 PM in Cases: SLAPP, Cases: Special Fee Shifting Statutes | Permalink | Comments (0)
Posted at 03:11 PM in Cases: Prevailing Party, Cases: Special Fee Shifting Statutes | Permalink | Comments (0)
Posted at 03:09 PM in Cases: Allocation, Cases: Landlord/Tenant, Cases: Special Fee Shifting Statutes | Permalink | Comments (0)
Special Fee Shifting Statute: SCOTUS Decides That Mandatory Victims Restitution Act Of 1996 Does Not Allow For Reimbursement Of Legal, Accounting, And Consulting Fees Related To Private Investigations Of Alleged “Fraudsters” In Non-Criminal Proceedin
$5 Million In Legal, Accounting, And Consulting Fees Relating To Private Fraud Investigation In Bankruptcy Proceedings Not Recoverable Under The Act.
In Lagos v. United States, No. 16-1519 (U.S. Sup. Ct. May 29, 2018), petitioner was convicted of using a company he controlled to defraud a lender of tens of millions of dollars. After the scheme came to light and petitioner’s company went bankrupt, the lender conducted a private investigation of the alleged fraud in petitioner’s company’s bankruptcy proceeding, spending nearly $5 million in legal, accounting, and consulting fees related to the fraud investigation. After petitioner pleaded guilty to federal wire fraud charges, the district judge ordered him to pay about $5 million in restitution to the lender under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. §3662A(b)(4). The Fifth Circuit affirmed, but SCOTUS reversed.
The U.S. Supreme Court, in an opinion delivered by Justice Breyer, determined that the Act was limited to government or criminal proceedings, not encompassing private, civil or bankruptcy investigations. Beyond that, the statute lists three types of reimbursable expenses to the victim—lost income; child care expenses; and transportation expenses—which does not encompass the broader expenses awarded by the district judge. The fact that the victim shares the results of its private investigation with the Government did not translate the expenses into those types which are reimbursable under the Act.
Posted at 06:31 PM in Cases: Special Fee Shifting Statutes | Permalink | Comments (0)
Special Fee Shifting Statute: Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Awarding $95,000 in Attorney’s Fees To Plaintiff Under CCP 1021.4, Discretionary Fee-Shifting Provision Where Civil Cases Involves Defendant’s Felony Offense(s).
Plaintiff Requested $1.3 Million In Fees, But Trial Court Found Lack Of Success Required Steep Discount And No 1.75 Positive Multiplier Justified Where Case Was Not Novel/Was Not That Difficult.
Defendant was found liable on several (4) tort counts for sexually abusing his niece when she was between 8-10 (the plaintiff). Before trial, the defense stipulated to the four felony offenses, but plaintiff sought over $12 million in damages for various counts not proven. Instead, the jury awarded plaintiff $90,000 in compensatory damages and a $300,000 punitive damages award which was reversed and remanded on appeal just as far as the punitive award. Plaintiff then moved for $1.3 million in fees (which apparently included a 1.75 positive multiplier), opposed by the defense when suggesting only $10,000 was reasonable in nature. Plaintiff moved under CCP § 1021.4, which is fee-shifting statutes allowing the court discretion to award reasonable fees to a plaintiff where damages are based on felony offense(s). The trial judge awarded only $95,000 in fees, prompting an appeal by plaintiff.
The fee award was affirmed as no abuse of discretion in B.C. v. Cottone, Case No. G051967 (4th Dist., Div. 3 May 24, 2018) (unpublished), authored by Justice Aronson (Acting Presiding Justice Moore partially dissented because she would have kept the punitive award also intact).
In doing so, the appellate court relied on (1) the lack of success, given the disparity in damages requested and damages awarded as well as the fact the defense stipulated to the four felony offenses resulting in a verdict as compared to numerous other unsuccessful counts; and (2) plaintiff failure to apportion fees between successful and unsuccessful claims, even though her counsel never showed it was impossible or impractical to do so. With respect to plaintiff’s multiplier request, the record did show that the lower court ignored the fact the case was taken on contingency and, additionally, the appellate court agreed with the lower’s court observation that the case was not novel or that difficult.
Posted at 02:59 PM in Cases: Special Fee Shifting Statutes | Permalink | Comments (0)
Settlement, Special Fee Shifting Statute: Ten-Day Settlement Offer Under IDEA Not Specifying Whether School District Would Pay Disabled Student’s Pre-Offer Attorney’s Fees And Costs Justified Parent In Rejecting Offer
Result Is That Matter Is Remanded So Post-Offer Reasonable Fees Can Be Awarded; Both Majority and Concurring Opinions Suggest School Districts Need To Make Their Offers Clear In Nature.
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) is a boutique practice involving a federal statute under which parents and school districts can resolve disputes over a disabled/special-needs child’s educational placement and schooling needs. IDEA also has a fee-shifting provision which allows the prevailing party parent to recoup reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, given that the parent is usually the person prosecuting a matter on behalf of his/her child. The school district can extend a settlement offer to the parent at least ten days before the dispute reaches an administrative hearing (known as the “ten-day offer”). The ten-day offer allows a school district to limit its exposure to fees by limiting a parent’s eligibility for fees to those accrued before the time of the ten-day offer. If the parent rejects the ten-day offer, the parent may only receive post-offer fees if the administrative hearing leads to more favorable relief than that expressed in the offer or the parent was substantially justified in rejecting the offer.
These ten-day offer principles fully were in play in Rena C. v. Colonial School Dist., No. 17-1161 (3d Cir. May 14, 2018) (published as precedential).
What happened in Rena C. was that the school district extended a 10-day offer in this form: “This offer is also being made in order to further limit the School District’s possible prevailing party attorney fee attorney liability. The School District offers to pay private school tuition and transportation for Parent’s unilateral placement at Delaware Valley Friends School.”
Rena C. (the parent) rejected the offer but moved to later recover $70,000 in IDEA fees before the district court, after the parent failed to “beat” the ten-day offer based on the result in the administrative hearing, as later interpretations by the district judge and circuit court of appeals confirmed. The district judge, however, only awarded parent $7,438 in pre-offer fees because she did not receive more favorable relief at the administrative level and she was not substantially justified in rejecting the offer.
Parent appealed to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals (based in Philadelphia), and obtained a 3-0 reversal so that she could seek post-offer fees too—with the majority opinion authored by Circuit Judge Fisher and a concurring opinion authored by Circuit Judge Greenaway, Jr.
Lots of arguments were raised by parent, some of which did not resonate and some of which did.
Although disturbed by the terseness of the ten-day offer, the Third Circuit found that the “tuition” offer did include the cost of one-on-one instruction and “stay-put” rights at the private school, meaning the offer was valid and parent did not receive more favorable relief before the administrative law officer. Nonetheless, and in an important holding, the circuit court found parent was substantially justified in rejecting the ten-day offer because the absence of language dealing with attorney’s fees in the offer provided justification for rejection. In doing so, it agreed with reasoning from the D.D.C. and did not adopt the rationale from a Fifth Circuit decision.
In his concurring opinion, Circuit Judge Greenway, Jr. had two main points to make: (1) school districts need to extend offers with more clarity than the one in the case before the circuit court, especially defining exactly what “tuition” means and making clear whether fees and costs are encompassed; and (2) parties in IDEA disputes should communicate more effectively regarding ten-day offers so as to facilitate clarification and possibilities of reaching a resolution based on those post-offer discussions.
BLOG OBSERVATION—Co-contributor Mike attended Rutgers-Camden School of Law which is across the Delaware River and nearby Philadelphia, the base of the Third Circuit. He externed his third year for Circuit Judge (now deceased) Arlin M. Adams, who on two occasions was on the short list of putative SCOTUS candidates. Mike remembers him as a very smart, sincere, interactive jurist who he recalls very fondly.
Posted at 07:20 PM in Cases: Settlement, Cases: Special Fee Shifting Statutes | Permalink | Comments (0)
Deadlines, Special Fee Shifting Statutes: Although Timely Filed, Motion For Defense Costs Under CCP § 1038 Properly Awarded To Defendant California Highway Patrol Winning Summary Judgment Motion
Section 1038 Deadlines Are Not Jurisdictional In Nature.
Code of Civil Procedure section 1038 allows an award of defense costs to a public entity that prevails on a frivolous lawsuit by means of a dispositive motion (such as a motion for summary judgment) if the public entity so moves “before the discharge of the jury or entry of judgment.”
In Gregg v. California Highway Patrol, Case No. E066241 (4th Dist., Div. 2 May 11, 2018) (unpublished), defendant California Highway Patrol “defensed” plaintiff’s personal injury negligence suit, arising from a traffic break, through a summary judgment motion resulting in an entry of judgment. After entry of the judgment, defendant moved for recovery of defense costs, which plaintiff opposed on the basis it was untimely filed. The trial court granted the motion and entered a separate costs judgment.
Plaintiff appealed, principally arguing the motion was untimely. The appellate court agreed, but affirmed nonetheless.
Defendant tried to convince the 4/2 DCA panel that the motion was timely because the determination was not made until after entry of the later costs judgment. That argument was unsuccessful, because the original judgment disposed of all legal issues except for the later fixing of costs such that the first judgment was the one that mattered for deadline purposes.
However, plaintiff was unable to overturn the defense costs award because the appellate court, while noting the incongruent timing issue (given that no one knows how a dispositive motion will turn out such that a contemporaneous motion before a merits determination seems odd timed from a pragmatic perspective), held that the section 1038 deadline was not jurisdictional in nature and that a costs motion could be entertained in the absence of prejudice. No prejudice was shown in this situation, leading to an affirmance on appeal.
Posted at 09:12 PM in Cases: Deadlines, Cases: Special Fee Shifting Statutes | Permalink | Comments (0)
Posted at 10:12 PM in Cases: Special Fee Shifting Statutes | Permalink | Comments (0)
Special Fee Shifting Statutes: Baker Botts’ Bankruptcy Rationale Did Not Apply To Compensation Of Fee-Application And Fee-Litigation Work Under The Longshore And Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act
$52,340 Fee Award Recommendations By Appellate Commissioner Are Adopted.
When it comes to awarding fees for appellate work, the Ninth Circuit refers the matters to the Appellate Commissioner under Ninth Circuit Rule 39-1.9. These Commissioners develop an expertise in resolving fee-application and fee-litigation work.
In Vortex Marine Construction v. Grimm, No. 15-72258 (9th Cir. Dec. 22, 2017) (published), the Commissioner recommended that Mr. Grimm be awarded $52,340 for successful appellate work and subsequent “fees on fees” work in a Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA) case. The other side argued that this type of work was not compensable based on the reasoning in Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC, 135 S.Ct. 2158, 2168 (2015) [reviewed in our June 19, 2015 post]. The problem here was that Baker Botts arose under the Bankruptcy Code now allowing for compensation of such work, unlike LHWCA’s specialized fee-shifting statute, 33 U.S.C. § 928(a), which does allow compensation for time spent establishing the entitlement to and amount of recoverable attorney’s fees.
Posted at 04:51 PM in Cases: Special Fee Shifting Statutes | Permalink | Comments (0)
Posted at 03:08 PM in Cases: Costs, Cases: Discovery, Cases: Private Attorney General (CCP 1021.5), Cases: Special Fee Shifting Statutes | Permalink | Comments (0)
Posted at 02:56 PM in Cases: Costs, Cases: Discovery, Cases: Private Attorney General (CCP 1021.5), Cases: Special Fee Shifting Statutes | Permalink | Comments (0)
However, Fee Multiplier Not Allowed Under Section 996.4 And Plaintiffs Did Well To Cross-Appeal Given That Costs To Prosecute 996.4 Recovery Not Allowable Under 996.4, But Was Allowable Under CCP § 1021.5.
This next case counsels that a protective cross-appeal can be a true salvation. It was for the successful plaintiffs in Hosac v. County of Los Angeles, Case Nos. B267998 et al. (2d Dist., Div. 2 Oct. 10, 2017) (unpublished).
What happened here is that two public employee police officers got caught up in a breach of contract action involving L.A. County. They sought defense and indemnification from the government, to no avail, but were eventually dismissed from the breach of contract action. Employees then sought recoupment of their fees and costs under Government Code section 996.4, which does allow recapture for public employees acting within their chain of command. The trial judge awarded them $473,510.75 for their strict recoupment claim, which included a multiplier on lodestar fees of $323,662.75. The lower court also awarded them $394,250-plus for fees/costs in prosecution efforts in obtaining fees, although denying the employees’ efforts to obtain them under the private attorney general statute also. County appealed, and employees protectively cross-appealed. Employees did well to cross-appeal.
The Court of Appeal determined that section 996.4 only allows recovery of fees actually incurred, such that the multiplier amount could not be allowed but only the $323,662.75 lodestar amount. As far as the secondary 996.4 award, the appellate court agreed there was no statutory basis for such an award under 996.4 but did determine the employees were entitled to it under CCP § 1021.5 based on their cross-appeal—after all, they vindicated an important right to follow the chain of command and should not be denied fees on that basis. So, in the end, employees ended up with $736,097.98 as the total fees/costs award—not bad, not bad.
Posted at 04:50 PM in Cases: Private Attorney General (CCP 1021.5), Cases: Special Fee Shifting Statutes | Permalink | Comments (0)
Merits Win Not Required, Agreeing With Two Other Decisions As Far As Breadth Of False Claims Act Prevailing Party Definitional Scope.
Dr. Ralph's Pills. Library of Congress.
In Amphastar Pharmaceutical Inc. v. Aventis Pharma SA, Nos. 14-56382/15-56204 (9th Cir. May 11, 2017) (published), the defense won a federal False Claims Act (FCA) qui tam suit based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but the district judge would not award it requested attorney’s fees under the federal fee-shifting provision contained at 31 U.S.C. §3730(d)(4) as a prevailing party because no merits adjudication was involved. Handing plaintiff a bitter pill, the Ninth Circuit reversed the fee denial, finding that a “lack of subject matter jurisdiction” victory did qualify as a prevailing party win under the independent grant language of the FCA fee-shifting provision, agreeing with the same conclusion reached by the Tenth Circuit and E.D. Pa. federal court in two other decisions.
Posted at 04:41 PM in Cases: Prevailing Party, Cases: Special Fee Shifting Statutes | Permalink | Comments (0)
In Irvine Unified School Dist. v. K.G., No. 14-56457 (9th Cir. April 13, 2017) (published), the Ninth Circuit, in a split decision, decided that it was unlikely that a student in an Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) case should be entitled to fees for litigation after high school graduation, when the student had received all of the statutory benefits under IDEA and never faced even a nominal risk that those benefits would be taken away, although remanding to make sure proper allocations were made in the fee award. Circuit Judge Callahan sharply dissented, finding post-graduation fees were in order to promote the objectives of IDEA.
Posted at 05:22 PM in Cases: Special Fee Shifting Statutes | Permalink | Comments (0)
Although not a California case, USA v. Lagos, No. 16-20146 (5th Cir. Mar. 23, 2017 revised) (published) was interesting for purposes of illustrating that significant attorney's fees and related costs can be awarded as part of restitution entered in criminal cases. Lagos involved a nearly $16 million restitution award in a federal criminal proceeding against the defendant and in favor of General Electric Capital Corp. (GECC), the victim-lender in wire fraud counts, resulting in an eventual guilty plea by defendant to six counts in the criminal case. The restitution encompassed legal, expert, and consulting fees incurred by GECC primarily in a related bankruptcy case involving fraud proceedings. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, because such an award in its view was allowable under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1343, 1344, disagreeing with a more narrow view of the statute by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.
Posted at 10:01 PM in Cases: Bankruptcy Efforts, Cases: Special Fee Shifting Statutes | Permalink | Comments (0)