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0366b | Microsoft Sql Server | Databases
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Author: Version: Date File Name:
Roger French 1.27 2008-07-23 MS_SQL_ST_1.27
This document is the Security Target (ST) for the Common Criteria evaluation of the Database Engine of Microsoft SQL ServerTM 2005, Enterprise Edition (English), Version 9.00.3068.00 (TOE)
CC, ST, Common Criteria, SQL, Security Target
Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005, Security Target
Date 2005-10-25 2005-10-26 2005-10-29 2005-11-06 2005-11-13 2005-11-14 2005-11-15
Version 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.6
Author Roger French Roger French Roger French Roger French Roger French Roger French Roger French
Edit Initial Version First content for TOE description Content of DBMS-PP V.1.21 incorporated (without Rationale) Rationale incorporated, formatting First draft of the TOE summary specification added Updated the TOE description and added some information to the Rationale Reviewed the SFRs, performed the open operations, editing of the TOE Summary Specification Complete review for the first draft version Editorial changes Changes after Kick-Off Meeting with BSI Removed references to PP Editorial changes Editorial Changes Editorial Changes Editorial Changes Editorial Changes Editorial Changes Editorial Changes Changes after 1 OR Editorial Changes, Version for 2 review by the evaluator Editorial Changes Changed description of instances and changed SFR for the environment Changed FIA_ATD.1, FDP_ACF.1.3 Final version after evaluation Addressed comments of BSI Minor changes to Management function Minor changes regarding transmission of password Added statement in chapter 1.2 Minor changes to the rationale and chapter 5 Updated ST to be compliant to [PP] Minor editorial changes Using FDP_RIP.2 instead of FDP_RIP.1 Minor editorial changes Minor editorial changes Incorporated comments from EAL1 evaluation Updated default value for # of concurrent sessions
2005-11-21 2005-11-24 2005-12-19 2005-12-19 2005-12-21 2005-12-22 2005-12-23 2005-12-23 2005-12-27 2005-12-28 2006-01-03 2006-01-20 2006-01-20 2006-01-24 2006-01-25 2006-01-26 2006-01-30 2006-03-15 2006-03-20 2006-04-18 2006-05-22 2006-07-09 2006-07-12 2006-08-08 2006-08-15 2006-09-08 2006-09-11 2007-04-03 2007-05-15
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Roger French Roger French Roger French Roger French Roger French Roger French Roger French Roger French Roger French Roger French Roger French Roger French Roger French Roger French Roger French Roger French Roger French Roger French Roger French Roger French Roger French Roger French Roger French Roger French Roger French Roger French Roger French Roger French Roger French
2007-08-03 2007-08-30 2007-09-03 2007-10-22 2007-10-22 2008-02-12 2008-02-16 2008-02-20 2008-03-24 2008-07-22
1.17 1.18 1.19 1.2 1.21 1.22 1.23 1.25 1.26 1.27
Roger French Roger French Roger French Roger French Roger French Roger French Roger French Roger French Roger French Roger French
Minor updates Updated permissions of database roles Update final build number Minor update in SF.AU Minor update after evaluators comments Minor update after evaluators comments Minor update after evaluators comments Minor update after evaluators comments Minor update Final version
Security Target Page 4/90 This page intentionally left blank .Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005.
...............................5 Session Handling (SF...........................................................16 2........................................4 Conventions .....................3 CC Conformance ...............20 3.................................37 5...........................19 3..........................................................................................................................20 3.....................27 5..................................33 5.........................................27 5...3 Security Requirements for the Non-IT Environment ...................................24 4..............4 Logical Scope and Boundary of the TOE.......9 1......37 5......................... Security Target Page 5/90 Table of Contents Page 1 ST INTRODUCTION .............1 ST Identification ........................................1 Threat Agent Characterization ......................1......................................................AU) ..........................................1.....2 Assurance Measures ........1.....................6 Class FTA: TOE access .................................................................................28 5..............................................39 6.26 5 IT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS .......38 6 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION....3 Architecture of the TOE .....................10 1...............................................................1 TOE Security Functional Requirements.......................................1.............5 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF.........1.......1 Security Objectives for the TOE....................................................................................47 8 RATIONALE ..............2 Security Requirements for the IT Environment .....46 7 PROTECTION PROFILE (PP) CLAIMS ......................................................................................................................38 5...........................................................................................................................................................................................................1..............4 TOE Security Assurance Requirements .................8 1.......................................................4 Organizational Security Policies ................................39 6.............42 6..................................3 Threats.......................Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005..........................9 1..................................................................18 3...............................44 6..............1 Assets ...........................................................................SE)...................2....12 2.......................32 5...................1 Product Type......................................1 TOE Security Functions ......................48 ...................1 Security Management (SF............................................................................2 Class FDP: User Data Protection..........................................40 6.................................................................................40 6................................................................................................................................13 2.............AC) .....2 ST Overview .............................................1...........2 Physical Scope and Boundary of the TOE...................36 5....................................1 Class FAU: Security Audit .....................................2 Security Objectives for the Environment.........SM) ...........................................1.......23 4 SECURITY OBJECTIVES ........43 6..........................1 IT Environment (FIT) ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................2 Access Control (SF....................................................16 3 TOE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT ...........................................4 Security Audit (SF........................1...................................12 2...............................................4 Class FMT: Security Management .............................................................................................18 3..........................................I&A)................................................1........36 5...............3.....1..................................3 Class FIA: Identification and authentication ........................................24 4.......................................................3 Identification and Authentication (SF.........................................................................2 Assumptions ................11 2 TOE DESCRIPTION ...............................................................31 5................................
........................................................................2 Rationale for the Security Objectives for the Environment ........................85 9....................57 8.............................................................................................................2 Example of Ownership Chaining .................................7 Rationale for Explicit Requirements.........................................................6 Rationale for satisfying all Dependencies .........................1 How Permissions Are Checked in a Chain..........................85 9.........2 Concept of Ownership Chains .....................1 Definition for FIT_PPC_EXP.........................................................................................................................................87 9..71 8...8 TOE Summary Specification Rationale........................3........Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005............................88 9...........................................2..................4 Glossary and Abbreviations ................49 8...........................................................69 8.......4..................88 9..........................89 ...............................................................................................................................2.....1.........85 9......................82 8.....10 Rationale for PP Claims...................................................................5 Rationale for Strength of Function Claim ................................................84 9........................... Security Target Page 6/90 8......84 9...........4................69 8.................................3 Rationale for the TOE and environmental Security Requirements ........1 FIT_PPC_EXP (IT Environment Protection Profile Compliance) ........................................................1 Rationale for TOE Security Objectives ....................4 Rationale for Assurance Requirements ....9 Rationale for Assurance Measures................1 Glossary .......................................................................................................2 Abbreviations.82 9 APPENDIX.....1 Mutual support and internal consistency of security requirements.................................................69 8..................................................73 8...........................3 References..............78 8..84 9.................59 8....
..............................84 Figure 3: Component Levelling for FIT_PPC_EXP ...................................73 Table 21 – Rationale for Explicit Requirements .....50 Table 16 – Rationale for IT Environmental Objectives .........23 Table 4 .................Security Objectives for the TOE Environment..................................................................................................................Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005..........................................................................................................................57 Table 17 – Rationale for TOE Security Requirements ...............................................................39 Table 13 ........................................................................................................................................................................................................78 Table 25 – Rationale for TOE Summary Specification.........................79 List of Figures Page Figure 1: TOE.............................................................................71 Table 20 – Functional Requirements Dependencies for IT Environment............................Assignment of SFRs to Security Functions..................................................................................................................................................................37 Table 12 – Summary of Security Functions ...............86 ....................................................................Default Database Roles ...27 Table 7 ......................76 Table 23 ........................................28 Table 8 – Auditable Events for additional SFRs...IT Environment Security Functional Requirements.......................................................19 Table 2 ...84 Figure 4: Concept of Ownership Chaining ..........................................73 Table 22 – Rationale for Environmental Requirements.... Security Target Page 7/90 List of Tables Page Table 1 .............................................Auditable Events .............................................................................................................................................Security Objectives for the TOE..............21 Table 3 – Organizational Security Policies.............46 Table 14 – Summary of Security Objectives Rationale ................................................................................................................................................49 Table 15 – Rationale for TOE Security Objectives.........................13 Figure 2: Class Structure for FIT .......59 Table 18 – Rationale for Environment Requirements ..........26 Table 6 ..............Assumptions.........................................35 Table 11 ......77 Table 24 .........................................................................................................................................................................................................TOE Security Functional Requirements.......................................................................................34 Table 10 ......................Threats to the TOE......................................................................68 Table 19 – Functional Requirements Dependencies ...........24 Table 5 ............Important SFRs of the environment ...................................Assurance Measures ........................30 Table 9 – Default Server Roles .............................................................
The IT security functions provided by the TOE that meet the set of requirements (chapter 6. b) c) The structure and content of this ST comply with the requirements specified in the Common Criteria (CC). Annex C. a list of threats that the TOE is intended to counter. Security Target Page 8/90 1 ST Introduction This chapter presents security target (ST) identification information and an overview of the ST. and Part 3. TOE Summary Specification). and any known rules with which the TOE must comply (chapter 3. A set of security objectives and a set of security requirements to address the security problem (chapters 4 and 5. Part 1. .Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005. chapter 5. An ST contains the information technology (IT) security requirements of an identified Target of Evaluation (TOE) and specifies the functional and assurance security measures offered by that TOE to meet stated requirements. respectively). TOE Security Environment). Security Objectives and IT Security Requirements. An ST principally defines: a) A security problem expressed as a set of assumptions about the security aspects of the environment.
27 2008-07-23 Roger French.001 Windows Server 2003 Enterprise Edition (English) SP1 including MS05-042.2 U. MS05-039. Common Criteria. Security Target CC Identification: Evaluation Assurance Level: PP Conformance: Keywords: 1.S. 07.3068. The security functionality of the TOE comprises: • • • • • Security Management Access Control Identification and Authentication Security Audit Session Handling 1 This version includes the Service Pack 2 (SP2) and the Security Patch GDR 4 . Microsoft Corporation BSI-DSZ-CC-366 Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005.1. Enterprise Edition (English). ST.3. SQL Server is a Database Management System (DBMS). Government Protection Profile for Database Management Systems in Basic Robustness Environments. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation. ST Title: ST Version: Date: Author: Certification-ID TOE Identification: TOE Version: TOE Platform: Microsoft SQL Server 2005 Database Engine Common Criteria Evaluation Security Target 1. A patch that updates the Internet Protocol (IP) Security (IPSec) Policy Agent is available for Windows Server 2003 and Windows XP (KB 907865) as specified in [WIN_ST].00.06. August 2005 (also known as ISO 15408).1 ST Identification This chapter provides information needed to identify and control this ST and its Target of Evaluation (TOE). Version 2.2 ST Overview The TOE is the database engine of SQL Server 2005. Security Target Page 9/90 1.2006 CC.Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005. The TOE has been developed as the core of the DBMS to store data in a secure way. EAL4 augmented by ALC_FLR. Version 1. 9. MS05-027. SQL. and its related guidance documentation.
Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005. such as Service Broker.2. Hence. A more detailed description of the security functions can be found in chapter 6. provide services that are useful but are not central to the enforcement of security policies. . security evaluation is not directly applicable to those other products. Security Target Page 10/90 A summary of the TOE security functions can be found in chapter 2. Other related products of the SQL Server 2005 platform. 1. Please note that only the SQL Server 2005 database engine is addressed in this ST.3 CC Conformance The TOE is [CC_PART2] extended and [CC_PART3] conformant at the level of assurance EAL4 augmented by assurance requirement ALC_FLR. TOE Description. TOE Summary Specification.
1. Such requirements are termed ‘explicit requirements’ and are permitted if the CC does not offer suitable requirements to meet the authors’ needs. (iteration_number). FAU_GEN. Assignments that have been made are denoted by showing the value in square brackets.Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005.g. This ST also includes security requirements on the IT environment. Refinement of security requirements is denoted by bold text. Additionally bold and italics text is used to indicate where text from [PP] has been added or changed as denoted in each chapter of this document. Each of these operations is used in this ST. refinement. The assignment operation is used to assign a specific value to an unspecified parameter. Security Target Page 11/90 1. In this ST. Iteration is denoted by showing the iteration number in parenthesis following the component identifier. and iteration are defined in paragraph 148 of Part 1 of the CC. explicit requirements will be indicated with the “_EXP” following the component name.4 Conventions For this Security Target corresponding to [PP] the following conventions are used: The CC allows several operations to be performed on functional requirements. selection. National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) interpretations are used and are presented with the NIAP interpretation number as part of the requirement identifier (e.. such as the length of a password. The iteration operation is used when a component is repeated with varying operations. assignment. The CC paradigm also allows protection profile and security target authors to create their own requirements. Selections that have been made are denoted by italicized text. The selection operation is used to select one or more options provided by the CC in stating a requirement. .NIAP-0410 for Audit data generation). Explicit requirements must be identified and are required to use the CC class/family/component model in articulating the requirements. [Assignment_value]. The refinement operation is used to add detail to a requirement. Explicit Environmental requirements will be indicated with the “_(ENV)” following the component name. and thus further restricts a requirement.
Security Target Page 12/90 2 TOE Description This chapter provides context for the TOE evaluation by identifying the product type and describing the evaluated configuration. The TOE which is described in this ST is the database engine and therefore part of SQL Server 2005. native Web service support is built into SQL Server to ensure interoperability with other applications and platforms. 2. The chapter starts with a description of the product type before it introduces the physical scope. in which only one user may access the DBMS at a given time. the architecture and last but not least the logical scope of the TOE. In addition. transform. A DBMS may be a single-user system. including existing Oracle databases. Web-based reports. The main purpose of this chapter is to bind the TOE in physical and logical terms. paper-oriented reports and interactive. Notification Services: Notification capabilities for the development and deployment of applications that can deliver personalized. and to provide user accountability via audit of users’ actions. and load capabilities for data warehousing and enterprise-wide data integration Analysis Services: Online analytical processing (OLAP) capabilities for the analysis of large and complex datasets.Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005. Integration Services: Extract. SQL Server additionally includes the following tools which are not part of the TOE: • Replication Services: Data replication for distributed or mobile data processing applications and integration with heterogeneous systems. Identification and Authentication. enforce Discretionary Access Controls on objects under the control of the database management system based on user and/or role authorizations. Management tools: SQL Server includes integrated management tools for database management and tuning as well as tight integration with tools such as Microsoft Operations Manager (MOM) and Microsoft Systems Management Server (SMS). It provides a relational database engine providing mechanisms for Access Control.1 Product Type The product type of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) described in this ST is a database management system (DBMS) with the capability to limit TOE access to authorized users. managing. Security Audit and Session handling. • • • • • . or a multi-user system. in which many users may access the DBMS simultaneously. and delivering both traditional. A DBMS is a computerized repository that stores information and allows authorized users to retrieve and update that information. timely information updates to a variety of connected and mobile devices. Standard data access protocols drastically reduce the time it takes to integrate data in SQL Server with existing systems. Reporting Services: A comprehensive solution for creating.
transformation. All the additional tools as listed before interact with the TOE as a standard SQL client.2 Physical Scope and Boundary of the TOE The TOE is the database engine of the SQL Server 2005 and its related guidance documentation. The scope and boundary of the TOE will be described in the next chapter. and reporting that are tightly integrated with Microsoft Visual Studio to provide end-to-end application development capabilities. data extraction. data mining. Security Target Page 13/90 • Development tools: SQL Server offers integrated development tools for the database engine. Figure 1: TOE As seen in figure 1 the TOE internally comprises the following logical units: The Communication part is the interface for programs accessing the TOE. It processes Tabular Data Stream (TDS) . Every major subsystem in SQL Server ships with it's own object model and set of APIs to extend the data system in any direction that is unique to each business. OLAP. and loading (ETL). It is the interface between the TOE and clients performing requests. The TOE itself only comprises the database engine of the SQL Server 2005 platform which provides the security functionality as required by this ST.Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005. The following figure shows the TOE (including its internal structure) and its immediate environment. 2.
The memory pool is used to supply the TOE with its memory while it is executing. which is important for the Security Functions of the TOE (see chapter 2. The SQL-OS is a resource provider for all situations where the TOE uses functionality of the operating system. builds and caches a query plan. When the relational engine attempts to execute a T-SQL statement that accesses an object for the first time. optimizes the query request. Services of the Operating System are used to route the communication of remote clients with the TOE. compiles every statement. The Storage Engine is a resource provider. However other parts of the platform may be installed on the same machine if they are needed to support the operation or administration of the TOE. every other client would do. and synchronization —all running in user mode. which might be installed together with the TOE. put it into memory and return a pointer to the execution engine. it calls upon the storage engine to retrieve the object.4for more details) Other parts of the SQL Server 2005 Platform. The Relational Engine is the core of the database engine and is responsible for all security relevant decisions. Security Target Page 14/90 packets to identify the type of packet and translate the packet type into a specific request type. including scheduling. Clients comprising (local clients and remote clients) are used to interact with the TOE during administration and operation. SQL-OS especially contains functionality for Task Management and for Memory Management. the storage engine manages the physical resources for the TOE by using the Windows OS. To perform these tasks. The TOE is the central part of a complete DBMS platform. The TOE relies on functionality of the Windows 2003 Server Operating System and has the following hardware requirements: . The memory pool also provides resources for transaction logging and data buffers.g. Almost all data structures that use memory in the TOE are allocated in the memory pool. However these other parts will interact with the TOE in the same way. These resources comprise general functionality (e. checks permissions to determine if the statement can be executed by the user associated with the request. all (except for I/O) without calling the Windows Operating System. For Task Management the TOE provides an OS-like environment for threads. The relational engine establishes a user context. and executes the statement.Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005. syntactically checks every Transact SQL (T-SQL) statement. the memory management and scheduling features of the OS) as well as specific functionality of the OS. SQL-OS provides an abstraction layer over common OS functions and was designed to reduce the number of context switches within the TOE. All responses to user application requests return to the client through this part of the TOE. The immediate environment of the TOE comprises: The Windows 2003 Server Enterprise Edition Operating System. which realizes all Security Functions as described in this ST. The Memory Manager is responsible for the TOE memory pool. As the TOE is a software only TOE it lives as a process in the Operating System (OS) and uses the resources of the OS. which hosts the TOE.
1 gigabyte (GB) or more recommended Approximately 350 MB of available hard-disk space for the recommended installation Approximately 425 MB of additional available hard-disk space for SQL Server Books Online. SQL Server Mobile Books Online. and sample databases CD-ROM or DVD-ROM drive Super VGA (1. February 2007 SQL Server Guidance Addendum / Installation / Startup The website https://www.microsoft. .024x768) or higher-resolution video adapter and monitor Microsoft Mouse or compatible pointing device The following guidance documents and supportive information belong to the TOE: • • SQL Server Books Online. This website shall be visited before using the TOE.com/sql/commoncriteria/2005/sp2/default.Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005. 1-gigahertz (GHz) or faster processor recommended 512 megabytes (MB) of RAM or more.mspx provides the guidance documentation and contains additional information about the TOE and its evaluated configuration. Security Target Page 15/90 • • • • • • • 600-megahertz (MHz) Pentium III-compatible or faster processor.
The Memory Management functionality of the TOE ensures that any previous information in memory is made unavailable before the memory is used either by overwriting the memory explicitly with a certain pattern or by overwriting the memory • • • • • Note that the TOE as well as the environment provides a mechanism for identification and authentication. The machine the instances are running on is referenced as "server" or "DBMS-server". The TOE comprises one instance of SQL Server 2005. The Identification and Authentication2 function of the TOE is able to identify and authenticate users based on a Username/Password based mechanism. All clients which connect to the TOE are within the same enclave as the TOE which means that they are under the same management control and operate under the same security policy constraints. If more than one instance of SQL Server 2005 is installed on one machine these just represent multiple TOEs as there is no other interface between two instances of the TOE than the standard client interface In this way two or more instances of the TOE may only communicate through the standard client interface.4 Logical Scope and Boundary of the TOE SQL Server 2005 is able to run multiple instances of the database engine on one machine. The Management function allows authorized administrators to manage the behavior of the security functions of the TOE. Security Target Page 16/90 2. The Security Audit function of the TOE produces log files about all security relevant events. It further controls that only authorized administrators are able to manage the TOE. The Session Handling mechanism which limits the possibilities of users to establish sessions with the TOE and maintains a separate execution context for every operation. After installation one default instance exists. However the administrator is able to add more instances of SQL Server 2005 to the same machine. 2 . The TOE provides the following set of security functionality • The Access Control function of the TOE ensures that only authorized users are able to connect to the TOE and access user data stored in the TOE. Chapter 6 will describe this in more detail. Within this ST it is referenced either as "the TOE" or as "instance".Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005. 2.3 Architecture of the TOE The TOE which is described in this ST comprises one instance of the SQL-Server 2005 database engine but has the possibility to serve several clients simultaneously.
1.Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005. the SQL Server Profiler. Access to the complete functionality of the TOE is possible via a set of SQL-commands (see [TSQL]).g. which is part of the SQL Server Platform). The following functions are part of the environment: • The Audit Review and Audit Storage functionality has to be provided by the environment and provide the authorized administrators with the capability to review the security relevant events of the TOE. The environment has to ensure that the security functions of the TOE cannot be bypassed. The Access Control Mechanisms has to be provided by the environment for files stored in the environment The environment provides Identification and Authentication for users for the cases where this is required by the TOE (The environment AND the TOE provide mechanisms for user authentication. See chapter 6. This set of commands is available via: • • • Shared Memory Named Pipes TCP/IP . Security Target Page 17/90 completely with new information. The environment provides a cryptographic mechanisms for hashing of passwords The environment provides residual information protection for memory which is allocated to the TOE: • • • • • • All these functions are provided by the underlying Operating System (Windows 2003 Server Enterprise Edition) except Audit Review. for which an additional tool has to be used (e.3 for more details). The environment has to provide a mechanism for Domain Separation to separate the execution context of the TOE from other contexts and to provide the TOE with the capability to create separate contexts for different users.
Security Target Page 18/90 3 TOE Security Environment The security environment for the functions addressed by this specification includes threats. 3. User security attributes. as discussed below.Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005. This kind of data is also called metadata. Security Audit instructions and records . Transaction logs.1 Assets The TOE maintains two types of data which represent the assets: User Data and TSF Data. User-developed queries or procedures that the DBMS maintains for users. It especially includes: • • • • • The definitions of user databases and database objects Configuration parameters. security policies. The primary assets are the User Data which comprises the following: • • The user data stored in or as database objects. The secondary assets comprise the TSF data that the TOE maintains and uses for its own operation. and usage assumptions.
There are no general-purpose computing capabilities (e. administration and support of the DBMS.NO_EVIL A. The evaluation and certification of the underlying OS has been done on at least EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR. The underlying OS has been validated against an NSA sponsored OS PP of at least Basic Robustness. appropriately trained. and transmitted information. A.Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005.NO_GENERAL_PURPOSE Description Administrators are non-hostile. A. These assumptions have been taken from [PP] with only the changes indicated by bold italic text..Assumptions Assumption A.2.2 Assumptions The following table lists all the assumptions about the environment of the TOE.OS_PP_VALIDATED A.COMM The assumption A. compilers or user applications) available on DBMS servers. Security Target Page 19/90 3. other than those services necessary for the operation.PHYSICAL It is assumed that appropriate physical security is provided within the domain for the value of the IT assets protected by the TOE and the value of the stored.g. It is assumed that any communication path from and to the TOE is appropriately secured to avoid eavesdropping and manipulation. and follow all administrator guidance. processed.OS_PP_VALIDATED ensures that the following security functionality is provided by the environment: • • • • • • • • Identification and authentication of users Access Control for Files Domain Separation Non Bypassability of TOE Security Functions Cryptographic Functionality Residual Information Protection Audit Review and Audit Storage Time Stamps . Table 1 .
it appears that the only effect these may have is to lower the robustness requirements. A threat agent with low motivation and low expertise is just as unlikely to attempt to compromise a TOE as an attacker with low motivation and high expertise. however. Having said that.Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005. and available resources) that are valid for a given level of robustness. Given the same expertise and set of resources. The following discussion explores the impact of each of the threat agent factors on the ability of the TOE to protect itself (that is. the relationship between expertise and resources is somewhat more complicated. there are corresponding varieties of specific threat agents (that is. medium. the robustness of the TOE should increase as the motivation of the threat agents increases. because of the value of the resources processed by the TOE and the trustworthiness of the entities that can access the TOE. if resources include factors other than just raw processing power (money. in general. suppose an organization determines that. Unlike the motivation factor. Threat agents are typically characterized by a number of factors such as expertise. then expertise should be considered to be at the same “level” (low. For instance. That is. However. the motivation of those entities would be “medium”. This normally indicates that a medium robustness TOE . the motivation of threat agents should be considered a “high water mark”. because expertise in and of itself does not automatically procure resources.3 Threats 3. when assessing the robustness needed for a TOE. Therefore. In general. this is because the attacker with high expertise does not have the motivation to compromise the TOE even though they may have the expertise to do so. The motivation of the threat agent seems to be the primary factor of the three characteristics of threat agents outlined above. the threat agent is a key component of the formal threat statements in the ST. thus a basic robustness TOE should offer sufficient protection. Likewise. expertise. the threat agents will have different combinations of motivation.1 Threat Agent Characterization In addition to helping define the robustness appropriate for a given environment. for example) as the resources because money can be used to purchase expertise. Because each robustness level is associated with a variety of environments. available resources. high. an entity with no authorization to low value data none-the-less has low motivation to compromise the data. hacking into a bank to obtain money in order to obtain other resources). It may not make sense to distinguish between these two factors.3. it may be plausible that someone with high expertise can procure the requisite amount of resources by virtue of that expertise (for example. Expertise in some ways is different. Security Target Page 20/90 3. the robustness required of the TOE). the fully authorized user with access to highly valued data similarly has low motivation to attempt to compromise the data. an attacker with low motivation may not be as likely to attempt to compromise the TOE. for example). For example. the same can't be said for expertise. The same argument can be made for resources as well. and motivation. thus again a basic robustness TOE should be sufficient.
It should be clear from this discussion that there is no “cookbook” or mathematical answer to the question of how to specify exactly the level of motivation. However. ACCIDENTAL_ADMIN_ERROR Description An administrator may incorrectly install or configure the TOE resulting in ineffective security mechanisms. via the Internet or “hacker chat rooms”) introduces a problem when trying to define the expertise of. Table 2 . Security Target Page 21/90 would be required because the likelihood that those entities would attempt to compromise the TOE to get at those resources is in the “medium” range. Each organization wishing to procure a TOE must look at the threat factors applicable to their environment.Threats to the TOE Threat T. or resources available to. In this case. A threat agent’s expertise and/or resources that is “lower” than the threat agent’s motivation (e. a threat agent.MASQUERADE T.. However. These threats have been directly taken from [PP] with only the changes indicated by bold italic text. the amount of resources. discuss the issues raised in the previous paragraph. now suppose the organization determines that the entities (threat agents) that are the least trustworthy have no resources and are unsophisticated. an organization can look at combinations of these factors and obtain a good understanding of the likelihood of a successful attack being attempted against the TOE. The important general points we can make are: • • The motivation for the threat agent defines the upper bound with respect to the level of robustness required for the TOE. leading to flaws that T. even though those threat agents have medium motivation. A user or process may masquerade as another entity in order to gain unauthorized access to data or TOE resources Errors in requirements specification or design of the TOE may occur. and document their decision regarding likely threat agents in their environment. however). a threat agent with high motivation but little expertise and few resources) may lessen the robustness requirements for the TOE (see next point. the likelihood that they would be able to mount a successful attack on the TOE would be low. consult with appropriate accreditation authorities for input. and the degree of expertise for a threat agent so that the robustness level of TOEs facing those threat agents can be rigorously determined.POOR_DESIGN .g.Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005. The following table identifies the threats to the TOE. and so a basic robustness TOE may be sufficient to counter that threat. • For this Security Target the attack potential is considered to be low. The availability of attacks associated with high expertise and/or high availability of resources (for example.
leading to flaws that may be exploited by an attacker.UNIDENTIFIED_ACTIONS .RESIDUAL_DATA T. Failure of authorized administrators to identify and act upon unauthorized actions may occur.Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005. Security Target Page 22/90 Threat Description may be exploited by an attacker.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS T.POOR_TEST T. A malicious user or process may cause configuration data to be inappropriately accessed (viewed.TSF_COMPROMISE T. T. T. A user may gain unauthorized access to user data for which they are not authorized according to the TOE security policy. A user or process may gain unauthorized access to data through reallocation of TOE resources from one user or process to another. modified or deleted).POOR_IMPLEMENTATION Errors in implementation of the TOE design may occur. Lack of or insufficient tests to demonstrate that all TOE security functions operate correctly (including in a fielded TOE) may result in incorrect TOE behavior being discovered thereby causing potential security vulnerabilities.
This role shall be separate and distinct from other authorized users. These organizational security policies have been taken from [PP] without any changes.Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005. Security Target Page 23/90 3.4 Organizational Security Policies An organizational security policy is a set of rules. and procedures imposed by an organization to address its security needs. This chapter identifies the organizational security policies applicable to the TOE. The TOE shall provide an authorized administrators role for secure administration of the TOE. practices.ACCOUNTABILITY P.ROLES Description The authorized users of the TOE shall be held accountable for their actions within the TOE. Table 3 – Organizational Security Policies Policy P. .
The TOE will provide the capability to detect and create records of security relevant events associated with users. 4. The objectives have been directly taken from [PP] with only the changes indicated by bold italic text.ACCESS_HISTORY Description The TOE will store and retrieve information (to authorized users) related to previous attempts to establish a session.ADMIN_GUIDANCE O. Security Target Page 24/90 4 Security Objectives The purpose of the security objectives is to detail the planned response to a security problem or threat.AUDIT_GENERATION O.Security Objectives for the TOE Objective O.DOCUMENTED_DESIGN O. O. the CC identifies two categories of security objectives: • • Security objectives for the TOE. and Security objectives for the environment.CONFIGURATION_IDENTIFICATION O.1 Security Objectives for the TOE This chapter identifies and describes the security objectives of the TOE. The design of the TOE is adequately and accurately documented. Table 4 .Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005. The TOE will provide administrators with the necessary information for secure management. The TSF will maintain internal domains for separation of data and queries belonging to concurrent users. Threats can be directed against the TOE or the security environment or both therefore.INTERNAL_TOE_DOMAINS . The configuration of the TOE is fully identified in a manner that will allow implementation errors to be identified and corrected with the TOE being redistributed promptly.ADMIN_ROLE O. The TOE will provide authorized administrators roles to isolate administrative actions.
The TOE will provide mechanisms that control a user’s logical access to the TOE.MEDIATE O.TOE_ACCESS O.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION O. and restrict these functions and facilities from unauthorized use.PARTIAL_SELF_PROTECTION O. tampering. The TOE must protect user data accordance with its security policy. or unauthorized disclosure through its own interfaces. O. in O.MANAGE Description The TOE will provide all the functions and facilities necessary to support the authorized administrators in their management of the security of the TOE. Security Target Page 25/90 Objective O. The TSF will maintain a domain for its own execution that protects itself and its resources from external interference.Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005. The TOE will ensure that any information contained in a protected resource within its Scope of Control is not released when the resource is reallocated.I&A . The TOE will provide a mechanism for identification and authentication of users. The TOE will undergo some vulnerability analysis to demonstrate that the design and implementation of the TOE does not contain any flaws which can be exploited in the intended environment for the TOE and that the TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by attackers possessing a low attack potential.PARTIAL_FUNCTIONAL_TEST The TOE will undergo some security functional testing that demonstrates the TSF satisfies some of its security functional requirements.VULNERABILITY_ANALYSIS O.
There will be no general-purpose computing capabilities (e. The objectives for the environment have been directly taken from [PP] with only the changes indicated by bold italic text. OE. appropriately trained and follow all administrator guidance.. compilers or user applications) available on DBMS servers.COMM . Table 5 . administration and support of the DBMS.2 Security Objectives for the Environment The security objectives for the TOE Environment are defined in the following table.Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005. Security Target Page 26/90 4.NO_GENERAL_ PURPOSE OE. The underlying OS has been validated against an NSA sponsored OS PP of at least Basic Robustness. other than those services necessary for the operation. Any communication path from and to the TOE will be appropriately secured to avoid eavesdropping and manipulation. processed. OE. The evaluation and certification of the underlying OS has to be done on at least EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.2.NO_EVIL Description Sites using the TOE shall ensure that authorized administrators are non-hostile.g.Security Objectives for the TOE Environment Objective OE. and transmitted information.OS_PP_VALIDATED OE.PHYSICAL Physical security will be provided within the domain for the value of the IT assets protected by the TOE and the value of the stored.
. 5.2 FAU_SEL.2 User attribute definition User authentication before any action Multiple authentication mechanisms User identification before any action Class FMT: Security Management FMT_MOF.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements The TOE satisfies the SFRs delineated in the following table. Security Target Page 27/90 5 IT Security Requirements This chapter defines the IT security requirements that shall be satisfied by the TOE or its environment: The CC divides TOE security requirements into two categories: • Security functional requirements (SFRs) (such as.1-NIAP-0407 FDP_RIP. Table 6 .1 Management of security functions behaviour Management of security attributes Static attribute initialization Management of TSF data . identification and authentication.TOE Security Functional Requirements Class FAU: Security Audit FAU_GEN.1 FMT_MSA_EXP.1 FDP_ACF. • These requirements are discussed separately within the following subchapters.1-NIAP-0410 FAU_GEN_EXP. configuration management.1-NIAP-0407 FAU_STG_EXP. and vulnerability assessment).4 Audit data generation User and/or group identity association Selective audit Administrable Prevention of audit data loss Class FDP: User Data Protection FDP_ACC. and user data protection) that the TOE and the supporting evidence need to satisfy to meet the security objectives of the TOE. Security assurance requirements (SARs) that provide grounds for confidence that the TOE and its supporting IT environment meet its security objectives (e.2 Subset access control Security attribute based access control Full Residual Information Protection Class FIA: Identification and Authentication FIA_ATD. testing.5 FIA_UID.3 FMT_MTD. The rest of this chapter contains a description of each component and any related dependencies.2 FIA_UAU.1 FMT_MSA.Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005. security management.1 FIA_UAU.g.
and b) For each audit event type.1 FTA_TAH_EXP.1-NIAP-0410 Refinement: The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events: a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions.4. based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in the ST.1). Security Target Page 28/90 FMT_REV. those often used by authorized administrators4 to circumvent access control policies).1. c) [Start-up and shutdown of the DBMS. and the outcome (success or failure) of the event.1 Basic limitation on multiple concurrent sessions TOE access history TOE session establishment 5. subject identity (if applicable).Auditable Events 3 4 Number of table changed by ST writer.1.1 Class FAU: Security Audit Audit data generation (FAU_GEN. FAU_GEN. type of event.1-NIAP-0410) FAU_GEN. and e) [events as specified in Table 8]]. Note that in the context of this Security Target the term „Authorized Administrator“ refers either to the „sysadmin“ (sa) or any other user who has the permission to perform the administration activity based on the DAC policy (see also chapter 9. d) Use of special permissions (e.1 Revocation (user attributes) Revocation (subject.1 TSF domain separation Internal TSF consistency Class FTA: TOE access FTA_MCS.1(2) FMT_SMF.1 FPT_TRC_EXP.. Table 7 .1(1) FMT_REV.2-NIAP-0410 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information: a) Date and time of the event.1 FTA_TSE. . [information specified in column three of Table 7 and 8 below]. b) All auditable events for the minimum level of audit listed in Table 73. object attributes) Specification of management functions Security roles Class FPT: Protection of the TSF FPT_SEP_EXP.Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005.1.g.1 FMT_SMR.
See also chapter 8. Use of the functions management Identity of the member of authorized administrators performing these functions.1-NIAP-0407 Successful requests to The identity of the subject perform an operation on an performing the operation. Unsuccessful revocation of Identity of individual security attributes.Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005. .1 FMT_MSA_EXP. None Additional Audit Record Content The identity of the authorized administrator that made the change to the audit configuration. None None None None None None - FDP_RIP.1 5 There is no audit event related to FPT_TRC_EXP.1 FMT_REV. FMT_REV.1-NIAP-0407 Auditable Event(s) None None All modifications to the audit configuration that occur while the audit collection functions are operating.2 FAU_SEL. attempting to revoke security attributes.1 - Rejection of a new session based on the limitation of multiple concurrent sessions.1(1) Unsuccessful revocation of Identity of individual security attributes. attempting to revoke security attributes.8 for further information.1(2) FMT_SMF.1 FMT_MOF.1 FPT_TRC_EXP. - FDP_ACC. None - FTA_TAH_EXP.1 Modifications to the group of Identity of the member of the users that are part of a role.3 FMT_MTD.1 as this SFR is trivially fulfilled because the TOE does not comprise physically separated parts.1-NIAP-0410 FAU_GEN_EXP.1 FTA_MCS.1 FDP_ACF. Security Target Page 29/90 Security Functional Requirement FAU_GEN. object covered by the SFP.1 FMT_SMR.1 FMT_MSA. authorized administrators modifying the role definition None 5 FPT_SEP_EXP.2 FIA_ATD.
User and/or group identity association (FAU_GEN_EXP.2 Auditable Event(s) Additional Audit Record Content Every modifications to the setting Every use of the authentication mechanism.] . Table 8 – Auditable Events for additional SFRs Security Functional Requirement FAU_STG_EXP. b) event type.1 Denial of a session Identity of the individual establishment due to the attempting to establish a session establishment session mechanism. c) object identity. on - Every use of the authentication mechanism.Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005.1. Security Target Page 30/90 FTA_TSE.5 FIA_UID.2. Selective audit (FAU_SEL.1-NIAP-0407) FAU_SEL. f) failure of auditable security events.2 FIA_UAU.1-NIAP-0407 Refinement: The TSF shall allow only the administrator to include or exclude auditable events from the set of audited events based on the following attributes: a) user identity and/or group identity. and g) [no additional criteria]. the TSF shall be able to associate each auditable event with the identity of the user and/or group that caused the event.1 For audit events resulting from actions of identified users and/or identified groups.4 FIA_UAU.2) FAU_GEN_EXP. d) [none]. e) [success of auditable security events. The final decision authentication.
permit access. 5. FDP_ACF.4) FAU_STG_EXP. all DBMS-controlled objects and all operations among them].Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005. either by explicit authorized user action or by default. Security Target Page 31/90 Administrable Prevention of audit data loss (FAU_STG_EXP.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Discretionary Access Control policy] on [all subjects. and • object identity].1. • access operations implemented for DBMS-controlled objects. deny access c) If the requested mode of access is permitted to that authorized user.1-NIAP-0407 The TSF shall enforce the [Discretionary Access Control policy] to objects based on the following: • [the authorized user identity and/or group membership associated with a subject. Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.4.2-NIAP-0407 Refinement: The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and DBMS-controlled objects is allowed: • The Discretionary Access Control policy mechanism shall. grant access e) Else deny access] FDP_ACF.2 Class FDP: User Data Protection Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1-NIAP-0407) FDP_ACF. provide that database management system controlled objects are protected from unauthorized access according to the following ordered rules: [a) If the requested mode of access is denied to that authorized user deny access b) If the requested mode of access is denied to [any] group of which the authorized user is a member. d) If the requested mode of access is permitted to any group of which the authorized user is a member.3-NIAP-0407 Refinement: The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to DBMS-controlled objects based on the following additional rules: [ .1.1.1) FDP_ACC.1.1 The TSF shall take one of the following actions: [ • • Overwrite the oldest stored audit records Stop the TOE] As specified by the administrator and [no other action] if the audit trail is full.
1.2 SQL Server Authentication and Access to Windows Authentication 6 to support user authentication. 5.1 The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the [allocation of the resource to] all objects.1 The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to individual users: • [Database user identifier and/or group memberships.5.Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005.2) Please note that [PP] contained only FDP_RIP.2. Multiple authentication mechanisms (FIA_UAU. For this case the TOE reuses the authentication results of Windows.1.1. However. The TSF shall authenticate any user’s claimed identity according to the [following rules: • If the login is associated with a Windows user or a Windows group Windows Authentication is used.1 while this ST contains FDP_RIP.1 The TSF shall provide [ • • FIA_UAU. FDP_ACF.5. Full residual information protection (FDP_RIP. User authentication before any action (FIA_UAU. and • [login-type (SQL-Server login or Windows Account Name) • For SQL-Server login: Hashed password]]. in every case the TOE enforces the policy that each user has to be successfully authenticated before allowed to perform any other action and provides an interface to the operating system to gain the authentication results and to the user to allow the user to start the process of authentication. • Security-relevant database roles. the owner of an object and owners of parent objects have access • in case of Ownership-Chaining access is always granted].5) FIA_UAU.2. 6 .1 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.2) FIA_UAU. FDP_RIP.4-NIAP-0407 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following rules: [no additional explicit denial rules]. Windows Authentication is not provided by the TOE but by the environment.1) FIA_ATD.2.3 Class FIA: Identification and authentication User attribute definition (FIA_ATD. Security Target Page 32/90 • Authorized administrators.
• ].
If the login is a SQL Server login the SQL Server authentication is used.
User identification before any action (FIA_UID.2) FIA_UID.2.1 The TSF shall require each user to identify itself before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
5.1.4 Class FMT: Security Management
Management of security functions behaviour (FMT_MOF.1) FMT_MOF.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable and enable the functions [relating to the specification of events to be audited] to [authorized administrators]. Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1) FMT_MSA.1.1 Refinement: The TSF shall enforce the [Discretionary Access Control policy] to restrict the ability to [manage] all the security attributes to [authorized administrators].
Static attribute initialization (FMT_MSA_EXP.3) FMT_MSA_EXP.3.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Discretionary Access Control policy] to provide [restrictive] default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP. Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1) FMT_MTD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to [include or exclude] the [auditable events] to [authorized administrators].
Revocation (FMT_REV.1(1)) FMT_REV.1.1(1) The TSF shall restrict the ability to revoke security attributes associated with the users within the TSC to [the authorized administrators]. FMT_REV.1.2(1) The TSF shall enforce the rules [Changes to logins are applied at the latest as soon as a new session for the login is established7]
Revocation (FMT_REV.1(2)) FMT_REV.1.1(2) The TSF shall restrict the ability to revoke security attributes associated with the objects within the TSC to [the authorized
Please refer to chapter 7.3 of the SQL Server guidance addendum for more details
administrators and database users as allowed by the Discretionary Access Control policy]. FMT_REV.1.2(2) The TSF shall enforce the rules [The changes have to be applied immediately].
Specification of Management Functions (FMT_SMF.1) FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following security management functions: [ • • • • • • • • • Add and delete logins Add and delete users Change role membership for DB scoped roles and Server scoped roles Create and destroy database scoped groups Create, Start and Stop Audit Include and Exclude Auditable events Define the mode of authentication Manage Attributes for Session Establishment Define the action to take in case the audit file is full]
Security roles (FMT_SMR.1) FMT_SMR.1.1 Refinement: The TSF shall maintain the roles: • • • FMT_SMR.1.2 [sysadmin]; and [roles as defined in the following tables Roles to be defined by authorized administrators]. The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
Table 9 – Default Server Roles
Role bulkadmin dbcreator diskadmin processadmin securityadmin serveradmin setupadmin Granted Permission(s) ADMINISTER BULK OPERATIONS CREATE DATABASE ALTER RESOURCES ALTER ANY CONNECTION, ALTER SERVER STATE ALTER ANY LOGIN ALTER ANY ENDPOINT, ALTER RESOURCES, ALTER SERVER STATE, ALTER SETTINGS, SHUTDOWN, VIEW SERVER STATE ALTER ANY LINKED SERVER
Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005, Security Target sysadmin CONTROL SERVER (Granted with grant option)
Table 10 - Default Database Roles
Role db_accessadmin Granted Permission(s) ALTER ANY USER, CREATE SCHEMA CONNECT (Granted with grant option) db_backupoperator BACKUP DATABASE, CHECKPOINT SELECT DELETE, INSERT, UPDATE ALTER ANY ASSEMBLY, ALTER ANY ASYMMETRIC KEY, ALTER ANY CERTIFICATE, ALTER ANY CONTRACT, ALTER ANY DATABASE DDL TRIGGER, ALTER ANY DATABASE EVENT NOTIFICATION, ALTER ANY DATASPACE, ALTER ANY FULLTEXT CATALOG, ALTER ANY MESSAGE TYPE, ALTER ANY REMOTE SERVICE BINDING, ALTER ANY ROUTE, ALTER ANY SCHEMA, ALTER ANY SERVICE, ALTER ANY SYMMETRIC KEY, CHECKPOINT, CREATE AGGREGATE, CREATE DEFAULT, CREATE FUNCTION, CREATE PROCEDURE, CREATE QUEUE, CREATE RULE, CREATE SYNONYM, CREATE TABLE, CREATE TYPE, CREATE VIEW, CREATE XML SCHEMA COLLECTION, REFERENCES BACKUP LOG, Denied Permission(s) -
db_datareader db_datawriter db_ddladmin
db_denydatareader db_denydatawriter
SELECT DELETE, UPDATE INSERT,
CONTROL (Granted with grant option)
ALTER ANY APPLICATION ROLE, ALTER ANY ROLE, CREATE SCHEMA, VIEW DEFINITION
5.1.5 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF
TSF domain separation (FPT_SEP_EXP.1) FPT_SEP_EXP.1.1 The TSF shall maintain a security domain that protects it from interference and tampering by untrusted subjects initiating actions through its own TSFI. FPT_SEP_EXP.1.2 The TSF shall enforce separation between the security domains of subjects in the TOE Scope of Control.
Internal TSF consistency (FPT_TRC_EXP.1) FPT_TRC_EXP.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that TSF data is consistent between parts of the TOE by providing a mechanism to bring inconsistent TSF data into a consistent state in a timely manner.
5.1.6 Class FTA: TOE access
Basic limitation on multiple concurrent sessions (FTA_MCS.1) FTA_MCS.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the maximum number of concurrent sessions that belong to the same user. FTA_MCS.1.2 The TSF shall enforce, by default, a limit of [5] sessions per user.
TOE access history (FTA_TAH_EXP.1) FTA_TAH_EXP.1.1 Upon successful session establishment, the TSF shall store and retrieve the date and time of the last successful session establishment to the user. FTA_TAH_EXP.1.2 Upon successful session establishment, the TSF shall store and retrieve the date and time of the last unsuccessful attempt to session establishment and the number of unsuccessful attempts since the last successful session establishment.
TOE session establishment (FTA_TSE.1) FTA_TSE.1.1 Refinement: The TSF shall be able to deny session establishment based on [attributes that can be set explicitly by authorized administrators, including user identity and/or group identity, time of day, day of the week], and [no additional attributes].
5.2 Security Requirements for the IT Environment
This section contains the security functional requirements for the IT environment. With the TOE being a software-only TOE, the IT environment must provide protection of the TOE from tampering and interference. These requirements can also be satisfied by the TOE since the TOE is part of the IT environment. The requirement in this chapter has been directly taken from [PP] without any change.
Table 11 - IT Environment Security Functional Requirements
IT Environment Security Functional Requirements FIT_PPC_EXP.1 IT Environment Protection Profile Compliance
5.2.1 IT Environment (FIT)
IT Environment Protection Profile Compliance (FIT_PPC_EXP.1) FIT_PPC_EXP.1.1 The IT environment shall be compliant with the requirements of [the Controlled Access Protection Profile or an Operating System Protection Profile at the Basic Level of Robustness or Greater].
4 TOE Security Assurance Requirements The assurance requirements for the TOE comprise all assurance requirements for EAL 4 as defined in [CC_PART3] augmented by ALC_FLR.3 Security Requirements for the Non-IT Environment R. .COMM 5. This can be achieved by the use of another IT-product in the environment or by physical protection of the communication path.2 to provide a suitable environment that meets the requirements of the TOE described in this ST.2.Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005. R. Security Target Page 38/90 5.EVL The evaluation of the Operating System in the environment has to be performed to at least EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR. Any communication path from and to the TOE will be appropriately secured to avoid eavesdropping and manipulation.
The following paragraphs contain a more detailed description of the security functions. . Access Control Identification and Authentication Security Audit Session Handling This Security Function realizes the Not appropriate audit functionality for the TOE. The following table gives an overview of these functions and – where appropriate – the SOF claim for the function: Table 12 – Summary of Security Functions Security Function Security Management Description SOF-Claim This Security Function provides the Not appropriate necessary functions to change the behavior of the TSF. This Security Function realizes the Not appropriate Session Handling.Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005. SOF-medium The rating is related to the password for the SQL Server authentication. This Security Function realizes the Not appropriate Discretionary Access Control Policy for all objects under the control of the TOE.1. 6. This Security Function realizes the identification and authentication function of the TOE which is used for the cases where the identity of the user has not been verified by the environment.1 TOE Security Functions This chapter presents the security functions performed by the TOE to satisfy the identified SFRs in chapter 5.1. Security Target Page 39/90 6 TOE Summary Specification This chapter presents an overview of the security functions implemented by the TOE and the Assurance Measures applied to ensure their correct implementation.
AC) The TOE provides a Discretionary Access Control (DAC) mechanism to control the access of users to objects based on the identity of the user requesting access. Members of the database roles “db_owner” or “db_accessadmin” are able to add users to a database. On a database level an end user is represented by a database user. On this level this Security Function controls the access of database users to objects of the database (e. On this level the Security Function controls the access of logins to objects pertaining to the instance (e.g. the requested operation and the ID of the requested object. Each database user can be associated with one instance “login”. 6.g.Default Database Roles. The TOE maintains a security ID for each login on a server level and each database user. to view a database) 2.2 Access Control (SF. Security Target Page 40/90 6.Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005. On an instance level an end user is represented by a login.SM) This Security Function of the TOE allows modifying the TSF data of the TOE and therewith managing the behavior of the TSF. The TOE maintains an internal security identifier (SID) for every user and role. However the concept of "roles" in the TOE covers all aspects as required for "groups" and "roles" in [PP] . Start and Stop Security Audit Include and exclude Auditable events Define the mode of authentication for every login Manage Attributes for Session Establishment Define the action to take in case the audit file is full All these management functions are available via T-SQL statements directly or realized by Stored Procedures within the TOE which can be called using T-SQL. The TOE maintains a set of roles8 on the server level and on the database level as listed in Table 9 – Default Server Roles and Table 10 . to read or create a table). the membership of this user to roles. This comprises the following management functions: • • • • • • • • • Add and delete logins on an instance level Add and delete users on a database level Change role membership for DB scoped roles and Server scoped roles Create and destroy database roles Create.1.1 Security Management (SF. This Security Function additionally ensures that the management functions are only available for authorized administrators.1. 8 Please note that in [PP] the terms “group” and "role" are used while the TOE refers only to “role”. This security ID is used to associate each user with his assigned roles. The TOE maintains two kinds of user representations: 1.
If the requested mode of access is denied to any role of which the authorized user is a member. the TOE decides whether the action is to be permitted based on the following rules: 1. When a user attempts to perform an action to an object under the control of the TOE. he automatically has the same permission on all tables within that schema. This means that if a user or a role has been granted a permission to an object this permission is also valid for all child objects. The TOE maintains an Access Control List (ACL) for each object within its scope. There are only two situations where these access control rules are overridden: 1. the creating user is assigned as the owner of the object and has complete control over the object. The ACL for a newly created object is always empty by default. if the permission has not explicitly been denied. Security Target Page 41/90 Every object controlled by the TOE has an ID. Note: Some actions require more than one permission. so for these users the TOE will always allow access to the object . an owner and a name. Changes to the security relevant attributes of objects are immediately applied. deny or revoke permissions on objects can be assigned to users. regardless of explicit grant permissions. The system administrator.g. Objects in the TOE form a hierarchy and belong to one of three different levels: server. he will be denied the same permission to all tables within that schema. The rules as described before are always applied when a user requests access to a certain object using a certain operation. the TOE will deny access 3.Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005. the TOE will deny access 2. E. grant. If the requested mode of access is denied to that authorized user. When a new object is created. If the requested mode of access is permitted to any role of which the authorized user is a member. the TOE will permit access 4. These ACLs are stored in a system table which exists in every database for database related ACLs and in a system table in the ‘master’ database for instance level ACLs. After creation. The permissions for the object itself and all its parent objects are accumulated together before the aforementioned rules are evaluated. Each entry of an ACL contains a user SID and defines whether a permission is an “Allow” or a “Deny” permission for that SID. the TOE will permit access 5. Similarly. the owner of an object and owners of parent objects always have access. if a user has been denied a permission on a schema. if a user has been granted a permission to a schema. Else: The TOE will deny access The TOE permission check for an action on an object includes the permissions of its parent objects. database and schema. If the requested mode of access is permitted to that authorized user.
This is done on an instance level and means that the user has to be associated with a login of the TOE. and compares the hash to the value stored for that user. The administrator has to specify the type of login for every login he is creating. The possibility for the TOE to perform its own authentication is necessary because not all users connecting to the TOE are connecting from a Windows environment. Any changes which occur to a Windows account in the environment while a user is connected to the TOE are not applied by the TOE until the user logs off and logs on again. Any permission is associated with that SID. If a user is connecting to the TOE using a SQL Server login he has to provide the username and password. Windows authenticates users based on a username and password. 6.9 For these logins the Windows security identifier (SID) from the Windows account or group is used for identification of that login within the TOE. After successful authentication of a user Windows associates a list of SID(s) with every user which represent the user and every group the user is a member of.Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005. Each SQL Server login name is stored in a system table. Details can be found in [WIN_ST].I&A) This Security Function requires each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other actions on behalf of that user. SQL Server generates a SID that is used as a security identifier and stores it in this table. but hashed using the SHA-1 hash function provided by the Operating System in the environment. The TOE hashes the password using the hash function provided by the Operating System in the environment. This SID is internally used as a security identifier for the login. SQL Server login names SQL Server logins are not associated with a user of Windows but are maintained by the TOE itself. For these logins the TOE requires that the Windows environment passes on the Windows SID(s) of that user to authenticate the user before any other action on behalf of that user is allowed. The TOE knows two types of logins: Windows accounts and SQL Server logins. Microsoft Windows account names These logins are associated with a user account of the Windows Operating System in the environment. For every SQL Server login the TOE maintains a login name and a password. The password is not stored in plain text. If the values are identical the TOE has successfully authenticated the user.3 Identification and Authentication (SF.2 in more detail the access is allowed. Security Target Page 42/90 2. 9 . In the case of “Ownership Chaining” which is described in chapter 9.1.
Security Target Page 43/90 Any changes that occur to the definition of SQL Server login are immediately applied by the TOE. Rollover The administrator specifies a maximum size per trace file and a maximum number of files for the Security Audit. covered by the access control function Modifications to the role membership of users The use of the Security Function SF. Identity of the user causing the event (if available) 4. the TOE will start overwriting the oldest audit file. 2. The following two scenarios are supported in the evaluated version: 1. 6. Shutdown . These audit logs are stored into files in the environment of the TOE. Date and Time of the event 2. If one audit file is full.4 Security Audit (SF. The administrator has the possibility to specify. The Security Audit of the TOE especially comprises the following events: • • • • • • • Startup and Shutdown of the TOE Start and Shutdown of Security Audit Function Every login attempt including the processes for authentication and session establishment Every successful request to perform an operation on an object. Outcome (success or failure) of the event 6.SM Every rejected attempt to establish a session The TOE maintains a set of events which can be additionally audited and provides the administrator with the capability to start a Security Audit process to capture these events. For each event in the Security Audit logs the following information is stored: 1. the TOE starts the next file until the maximum number of files has been reached.AU) The TOE produces audit logs for all security relevant actions.1. ID of the object 5. what should happen in case an audit file is full. When the maximum number of files has been reached and the last audit file is full.Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005. For the rejection of a session additionally the reason for the rejection The TOE maintains a category for every audit event. Type of Event 3.
Object identity. If a user reached the limit of concurrent sessions the TOE will deny establishing another session for that user. Time of the day and Day of the week.1. First the TOE enforces a limit of the number of concurrent sessions a user is allowed to have at one time.SE) After a user attempting to establish a session has been successfully authenticated by SF. For every attempt to establish a session (whether successful or not) the TOE stores the date and time of the event and the number of unsuccessful attempts since the last successful attempt. the TOE either directly overwrites the memory completely with new information or with a certain pattern. Before the . modify the Security Audit function and start the Security Audit process again. Furthermore the admin is able to specify a set of rules to explicitly deny session establishment based on: • • • User’s identity. When the maximum size of the trace file has been reached the TOE will stop operation. To ensure this.I&A this Security Function decides whether this user is actually allowed to establish a session to the TOE. After the TOE established a session to a user the user context is held in a context with limited permission. The TOE provides the possibility to create a filter for the audit function. this previous information will not be available for any user. 6.SM. When the TOE reuses memory which could contain previous information content. As soon as a user performs an operation on an object the TOE starts at least one thread to perform this operation. SF.SE maintains a separate context for the execution of each operation by a user. Success or failure of auditable security events However to modify the behavior of the Security Audit function by including additional or excluding events from being audited the administrator has to stop the Security Audit process.Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005. The TOE only establishes a session for a user if no explicit deny rule for that user has been specified. Security Target Page 44/90 The administrator specifies one trace file with a maximum size and the option to shut down the TOE on any audit error. The TOE uses two sets of additional criteria to decide whether a user is allowed to establish a session. This limit is set to 5 by default but can be modified by authorized administrators as described in SF. Using this filter mechanism the administrator is able to exclude auditable events from being audited based on the following attributes: • • • • User identity Event type.5 Session Handling (SF.
which ensures that only empty memory is provided to the TOE.Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005. . For memory which is allocated using the Operating System the TOE uses a function of the OS. Security Target Page 45/90 previous information has been overwritten the resource is not available for any usage. Whenever data is written to or loaded from disc this is done pagewise where a page has the size of 8 KB.
2 ADV_IMP.2 ADV_HLD.1 ACM_CAP.Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005.1 ALC_TAT.1 ADV_SPM.2 AVA_SOF.1 AVA_VLA.1 ADV_FSP. scripts.1 AGD_ADM.2 Assurance Measure(s) Provision of CM system documentation Provision of delivery documentation Provision of installation. This chapter identifies the assurance measures that are or will be applied by Microsoft in the course of the evaluation to satisfy the assurance requirements.Assurance Measures SAR(s) ACM_AUT.1 ADV_LLD. The corresponding assurance measures are listed in Table 13 below (N.2 ALC_LCD.2 apply.1 ATE_IND.2 AVA_MSU. Provision of test tools.2 ATE_DPT. therefore currently corresponding document titles and versions are not available).1 ATE_COV.1 ALC_FLR. Provision of a SOF analysis Provision of vulnerability analysis documentation .1 AGD_USR.2 ADO_DEL.B.4 ACM_SCP. generation and startup documentation (either as part of administrator guidance documentation or as a separate document) Provision of functional specification documentation Provision of high-level design documentation Provision of a subset of the implementation of the TOE Provision of low-level design documentation Provision of representation of correspondence documentation Provision of an informal security policy model documentation Provision of user/administrator guidance documentation Provision of development security documentation Provision of flaw remediation documentation Provision of life-cycle model documentation Provision of tool and techniques documentation Provision of test documentation Provision of the TOE and its platform.2 Assurance Measures For the evaluation of the TOE the assurance requirements according to CC EAL4 augmented with ALC_FLR. Security Target Page 46/90 6.1 ATE_FUN.1 ALC_DVS.2 ADO_IGS..1 ADV_RCR. Some of the documentation listed therein is not prepared yet. etc. Provision of misuse analysis documentation. Table 13 .
S. . Security Target Page 47/90 7 Protection Profile (PP) Claims This Security Target is compliant to the U.1.2006 ([PP]). Version 1. Government Protection Profile for Database Management Systems in Basic Robustness Environments. 07.06.Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005.
Security Target Page 48/90 8 Rationale This chapter demonstrates the completeness and consistency of this ST by providing justification for the following: Traceability The security objectives for the TOE and its environment are explained in terms of threats countered and assumptions met. The SFRs are explained in terms of objectives met by the requirement.Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005. . A mapping is provided as evidence that all dependencies are met. The traceability is illustrated through matrices that map the following: • • • • Assurance Level SOF Dependencies security objectives to threats encountered environmental objectives to assumptions met SFRs to objectives met Security functions to SFRs met A justification is provided for selecting an EAL4+ level of assurance for this ST. A rationale about the SOF claim is provided.
POOR_TEST T.COMM X X X X Table 14 – Summary of Security Objectives Rationale Details are given in the following table.PHYSICAL X OE.PARTIAL_SELF_PROTECTION O.ADMIN_GUIDANCE O. OE.OS_PP_VALIDATED O.AUDIT_GENERATION O.TSF_COMPROMISE T.ACCIDENTAL_ADMIN_ERROR T.COMM O.CONFIGURATION_IDENTIFICATION Threats.PHYSICAL A. These details are directly taken from [PP] with only the changes indicated by bold italic text.RESIDUAL_DATA T.TOE_ACCESS O.ROLES X X X X A.ADMIN_ROLE OE.MEDIATE O. O.DOCUMENTED_DESIGN OE.RESIDUA_INFORMATION O.NO_EVIL A.Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005.VULNERABILITY_ANALYSIS OE.OS_PP_VALIDATED A. OSP / Security Objectives O.NO_EVIL O.I&A .INTERNAL_TOE_DOMAINS O.POOR_DESIGN T. Security Target Page 49/90 8.ACCOUNTABILITY P.NO_GENERAL_PURPOSE A.POOR_IMPLEMENTATION T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS T.1 Rationale for TOE Security Objectives The following table summarizes the rationale for the security objectives.ACCESS_HISTORY O.NO_GENERAL_ PURPOSE O.UNIDENTIFIED_ACTIONS X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X P.PARTIAL_FUNCTIONAL_TEST O.MANAGE T. Assumptions.MASQUERADE T.
CONFIGURATION_IDENTIFICAT ON plays a role in countering this threat by requiring the developer to provide control of the changes made to the TOE’s design. The correct identity of the user is the basis for any decision of the TOE about an attempt of a user to access data. O. .Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005. and by mandating the type and strength of the authentication mechanism this objective helps mitigate the possibility of a user attempting to login and masquerade as an authorized user.ACCIDENTAL_ADMIN_ERR OR An administrator may incorrectly install or configure the TOE resulting in ineffective security mechanisms. O.POOR_DESIGN Errors in requirements specification or design of the TOE may occur.I&A The TOE will provide a mechanism for identification and authentication of users. T.I&A mitigated this threat by providing the means to identify and authenticate the user where the I&A mechanisms of the environment is not used. By constraining how and when authorized users can access the TOE.TOE_ACCESS mitigates this threat by controlling the logical access to the TOE and its resources. Security Target Page 50/90 Table 15 – Rationale for TOE Security Objectives Threat/Policy Objectives Addressing the Threat/Policy O. O. T. Having this guidance helps to reduce the mistakes that an administrator might make that could cause the TOE to be configured in insecurely.CONFIGURATION_IDENTIFICATI ON The configuration of the TOE is fully identified in a manner that will allow implementation errors to be identified and corrected with the TOE being redistributed promptly.ADMIN_GUIDANCE helps to mitigate this threat by ensuring the TOE administrators have guidance that instructs them how to administer the TOE in a secure manner. O.MASQUERADE A user or process may masquerade as another entity in order to gain unauthorized access to data or TOE resources O.TOE_ACCESS The TOE will provide mechanisms that control a user’s logical access to the TOE O. Rationale T.ADMIN_GUIDANCE The TOE will provide administrators with the necessary information for secure management. leading to flaws that may be exploited by an attacker. [Part of the rationale deleted] O.
T. O.POOR_TEST Lack of or insufficient tests to demonstrate that all TOE security functions operate O. O. O.VULNERABILITY_ANALY SIS helps reduce errors in the implementation that may not be discovered during functional testing.VULNERABILITY_ANALYSIS The TOE will undergo some vulnerability analysis to demonstrate the design and implementation of the TOE does not contain any flaws which can be exploited in the intended environment for the TOE and that the TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by attackers possessing a low attack potential. O.DOCUMENTED_DESIGN ensures that the design of the TOE is documented. O. Ambiguous design documentation and the fact that exhaustive testing of the external interfaces is not required may leave bugs in the implementation undiscovered in functional testing.DOCUMENTED_DESIGN helps to ensure that the TOE’s documented design satisfies the security functional requirements.VULNERABILITY_ANALYSI S The TOE will undergo some vulnerability analysis to demonstrate the design and implementation of the TOE does not contain any flaws which can be exploited in the intended environment for the TOE and that the TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by attackers possessing a low attack potential. . In O.DOCUMENTED_DESIGN The design of the TOE is adequately and accurately documented. although the previous three objectives help minimize the introduction of errors into the implementation.CONFIGURATION_IDENTIFICATI ON The configuration of the TOE is fully identified in a manner that will allow implementation errors to be identified and corrected with the TOE being redistributed promptly. Security Target Page 51/90 O.VULNERABILITY_ANALYSIS ensures that the design of the TOE is analyzed for design flaws.PARTIAL_FUNCTIONAL_TEST The TOE will undergo some security functional testing that demonstrates the TSF satisfies some of its security functional requirements. O. O. T. permitting detailed review by evaluators.PARTIAL_FUNCTIONAL_T EST increases the likelihood that any errors that do exist in the implementation (with respect to the functional specification and highlevel design) will be discovered through testing. O. O.Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005.CONFIGURATION_IDENTIFICAT ION plays a role in countering this threat by requiring the developer to provide control of the changes made to the TOE’s design. leading to flaws that may be exploited by an attacker.POOR_IMPLEMENTATIO N Errors in implementation of the TOE design may occur.DOCUMENTED_DESIGN The design of the TOE is adequately and accurately documented.
O.ADMIN_GUIDANCE The TOE will provide administrators with the necessary information for secure management. O. O. O. order to ensure the TOE’s design is correctly realized in its implementation.PARTIAL_FUNCTIONAL_T EST increases the likelihood that any errors that do exist in the implementation (with respect to the functional specification and high level design) will be discovered through testing. how to test the correct operation of the security functions of a fielded TOE. .PARTIAL_FUNCTIONAL_TEST The TOE will undergo some security functional testing that demonstrates the TSF satisfies some of its security functional requirements. This objective provides a measure of confidence that the TOE does not contain security flaws that may not be identified through functional testing. Security Target Page 52/90 correctly (including in a fielded TOE) may result in incorrect TOE behaviour being discovered thereby causing potential security vulnerabilities.VULNERABILITY_ANALYSI S The TOE will undergo some vulnerability analysis to demonstrate the design and implementation of the TOE does not contain any flaws which can be exploited in the intended environment for the TOE and that the TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by attackers possessing a low attack potential. While these testing activities are a necessary activity for successful completion of an evaluation. this testing activity does not address the concern that the TOE continues to operate correctly and enforce its security policies once it has been fielded. Some level of testing must be available to end users to ensure the TOE’s security mechanisms continue to operator correctly once the TOE is fielded. the appropriate level of functional testing of the TOE’s security mechanisms must be performed during the evaluation of the TOE. O.Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005.VULNERABILITY_ANALSIS addresses this concern by requiring a vulnerability analysis be performed in conjunction with testing that goes beyond functional testing. O.ADMIN_GUIDANCE Addresses this threat as it provides the administrator with guidance.
OE.TSF_COMPROMISE A malicious user or process may cause configuration data to be inappropriately accessed (viewed. (see also Table 23). O. Due to the fact that the threat T.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION is necessary to mitigate this threat. O.PARTIAL_SELF_PROTECTION The TSF will maintain a domain for its own execution that protects itself and its resources from external interference. as well as the behaviour of TSF functions.OS_PP_VALIDATED For memory which is allocated from the OS to the TOE the OS ensures that this memory does not contain any residual information. This objective is used to dictate who is able to view and modify TSF data. O. if TSF data were to reside inappropriately in a resource that was made available to a user that user would be able to view the TSF data without authorization. or unauthorized disclosure through its own interfaces. Security Target Page 53/90 T.RESIDUAL_DATA refers to reallocation of a resource.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION The TOE will ensure that any information contained in a protected resource within its Scope of Control is not released when the resource is reallocated. O. O.INTERNAL_TOE_DOMAINS The TSF will maintain internal O. T.PARTIAL_SELF_PROTECTI ON ensures the TOE is capable of protecting itself from attack.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION is sufficient to counter the threat.RESIDUAL_DATA A user or process may gain unauthorized access to data through reallocation of TOE resources from one user or process to another. O. O. modified or deleted).MANAGE The TOE will provide all the functions and facilities necessary to support the authorized administrators in their management of the security of the TOE. and restrict these functions and facilities from unauthorized use.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION counters this threat by ensuring that TSF data and user data is not persistent when resources are released by one user/process and allocated to another user/process. tampering. because even if the security mechanisms do not allow a user to view TSF data. O.INTERNAL_TOE_DOMAINS ensures the TOE will establish .MANAGE is necessary because an access control policy is specified to control access to TSF data.Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005. the combination of this objective for the environment and O. O.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION The TOE will ensure that any information contained in a protected resource within its Scope of Control is not released when the resource is reallocated.
ADMIN_GUIDANCE The TOE will provide administrators with the necessary information for secure management. The threat of an authorized administrator failing to know about malicious audit events produces the objectives of the authorized O. T. Security Target Page 54/90 domains for separation of data and queries belonging to concurrent users. the TSF will ensure that all configured enforcement functions (authentication.ACCESS_HISTORY The TOE will store and retrieve information (to authorized users) related to previous attempts to establish a session.ACCESS_HISTORY is important to mitigate this threat because it ensures the TOE will be able to store and retrieve the information that will advise the user of the last successful login attempt.) must be invoked prior to allowing a user to gain access to TOE or TOE mediated services.Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005. O. O. etc to the administrator.I&A contributes to countering this threat by providing the means to identify and authenticate the user where the I&A mechanisms of the environment is not used.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCSS A user may gain unauthorized access to user data for which they are not authorized according to the TOE security policy. O.I&A The TOE will provide a mechanism for identification and authentication of users. separate domains for data belonging to users. The correct identity of the user is the basis for any decision of the TOE about an attempt of a user to access data. etc. access to authenticated and unauthenticated services.MEDIATE ensures that all accesses to user data are subject to mediation.UNIDENTIFIED_ACTIONS Failure of the authorized administrator to identify and act upon unauthorized actions may O. O. The TOE requires successful authentication to the TOE prior to gaining access to any controlledaccess content Lastly.MEDIATE The TOE must protect user data in accordance with its security policy. O. . T. This feature ensures that no other user can modify the information flow policy to bypass the intended TOE security policy. The TOE restricts the ability to modify the security attributes associated with access control rules. access control rules.
P. and restrict these functions and facilities from unauthorized use. Security Target Page 55/90 occur. In this way an attacker is not able to stop the Security Audit function or to exclude his events from being audited.Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005.TOE_ACCESS The TOE will provide mechanisms that control a user’s logical access to the TOE. The identity of the user is stored in the audit logs. O. The TOE has the objective of providing an authorized administrator role for secure administration. Additionally. administrator having the facilities and knowing how to use them (O.ROLES The TOE shall provide an authorized administrator role for secure administration of the TOE. the administrator’s ID is recorded when any security relevant change is made to the TOE (e. O. O.g.AUDIT_GENERATION addresses this policy by providing authorized administrators with the capability of configuring the Security Audit mechanism to record the actions of a specific user.. O.ADMIN_ROLE The TOE will provide authorized administrator roles to isolate administrative actions.AUDIT_GENERATION The TOE will provide the capability to detect and create records of security relevant events associated with users. O.). O. but only P.TOE_ACCESS supports this policy by requiring the TOE to ensure that any user has been successfully identified and authenticated prior to allowing any TOE access or any TOE mediated access on behalf of those users. This role shall be O.I&A The TOE will provide a mechanism for identification and authentication of users.MANAGE The TOE will provide all the functions and facilities necessary to support the authorized administrators in their management of the security of the TOE. O. The threat of an authorized administrator failing to know about malicious audit events produces the objectives that only authorized administrators shall be able to manage the Security Audit functions. The TOE may provide other roles as well. start/stop of the Security Audit mechanism etc.I&A supports this policy by providing the means to identify and authenticate the user where the I&A mechanisms of the environment cannot be used. access rule modification.ADMIN_GUIDANCE). .ACCOUNTABILITY The authorized users of the TOE shall be held accountable for their actions within the TOE.
Security Target Page 56/90 separate and distinct from other authorized users.ADMIN_ROLE).Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005. . the role of authorized administrator is required (O.
2. compilers or user applications) available on DMBS servers.g.NO_EVIL Administrators are non-hostile. appropriately trained.NO_GENERAL_PURPOSE There will be no generalpurpose computing capabilities (e. have undergone appropriate admin training.2 Rationale for the Security Objectives for the Environment The following table contains the rationale for the IT Environmental Objectives. The OS must provide domain separation. OE. and follow all admin guidance. and Identification and Authentication. are appropriately trained and follow all administrator guidance.NO_EVIL Sites using the TOE shall ensure that authorized administrators are non.hostile.2. The underlying OS must be validated to at least basic robustness to ensure it provides an appropriate level of protection for the DBMS. Audit Review. Security Target Page 57/90 8. This means that the Operating System in the environment has been evaluated on at least the same level as the TOE described in this ST is . other than those services necessary for the operation. Table 16 – Rationale for IT Environmental Objectives Assumption Environmental Objective Addressing the Assumption A. other than those services necessary for the operation. The evaluation and certification of the underlying OS has to be done on at least EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR. OE. Rationale A.OS_PP_VALIDATED It is assumed that the underlying OS has been validated against an NSA sponsored OS PP of at least Basic Robustness. Non-bypassibility. and follow all administrator guidance. A. OE.NO_GENERAL_PURPOSE There are no general-purpose computing or storage repository capabilities (e. having background investigations commensurate with the level of data being protected. The evaluation and certification of the underlying OS has been done on at least EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR. administration and support of the DBMS. compilers or user applications) available on DBMS servers.g. This rationale has directly been taken from [PP] with only the changes indicated by bold italic text.. Audit Storage. administration and support of the DBMS.Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005. The DBMS server must not include any general-purpose commuting or storage capabilities.. This will protect the TSF data from malicious processes.OS_PP_VALIDATED All authorized administrators are trustworthy individuals.
OE. but it does not include physical destructive actions that might be taken by an individual that is authorized to access the TOE environment. A.PHYSICAL Physical security.COMM and A. destruction. the TSF data. is assumed to be provided by the IT environment. processed. and protected user data is assumed to be protected from physical attack (e. Physical attack could include unauthorized intruders into the TOE environment. OE.COMM.COMM It is assumed that any communication path from and to the TOE is appropriately secured to avoid eavesdropping and manipulation. The TOE.COMM both address the requirement that any communication path to and from the TOE has to be appropriately secured.COMM is completely and directly addressed by OE. or eavesdropping). . and transmitted information. OE. theft. commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data it contains.COMM Any communication path from and to the TOE will be appropriately secured to avoid eavesdropping and manipulation. A. modification.PHYSICAL Physical security will be provided within the domain for the value of the IT assets protected by the TOE and the value of the stored.g. Security Target Page 58/90 evaluated on.Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005. A..
1) ADO_DEL. ADO_DEL. This rationale has been directly taken from [PP] with only the changes indicated by bold italic text. and location of the attempts. which is necessary for secure management of the TOE. This requirement ensures the administrator has the ability to begin their TOE installation with a clean (e.Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005. has not been tampered with or corrupted during delivery.3 Rationale for the TOE and environmental Security Requirements The following table contains the rationale for the TOE Security Requirements. method. in whole or in parts. time. malicious code has not been inserted once it has left the developer’s control) version of the TOE.1 The TOE must be able to store and retrieve information about previous unauthorized login attempts and the number times the login was attempted every time the user logs into their account.ACCESS_HISTORY The TOE will store and retrieve information (to authorized users) related to previous attempts to establish a session. The TOE must also store the last successful authorized login. Rationale O. Table 17 – Rationale for TOE Security Requirements Objective Requirements Addressing the Objective O..2 ensures that the administrator is provided documentation that instructs them how to ensure the delivery of the TOE. this will allow the user to detect if another user is attempting to access their account. (FTA_TAH_EXP.ADMIN_GUIDANCE The TOE will provide administrators with the necessary information for secure management. This information will include the date. FTA_TAH_EXP. When appropriately displayed.g. These records should not be deleted until after the user has been notified of their access history. Security Target Page 59/90 8.2 .
AGD_ADM.g.1 mandates the developer provide the administrator with guidance on how to operate the TOE in a secure manner. The documentation also provides a description of how to setup and review the auditing features of the TOE. Often times a vendor’s product contains software that is not part of the TOE and has not been evaluated.1 AGD_USR. password management guidelines). and Startup (IGS) documentation ensures that once the administrator has followed the installation and configuration guidance the result is a TOE in a secure configuration.. AGD_ADM. how to configure the TOE’s rule set and the implications of any dependencies of individual rules.1 ensures the administrator has the information necessary to install the TOE in the evaluated configuration. Security Target Page 60/90 ADO_IGS. The Installation. security parameters that are configurable by the administrator. The guidance must show the administrator how to use the functionality available. Generation. review the results of any tests and/or alerts. This includes describing the interfaces the administrator uses in managing the TOE. AGD_USR.1 . and act accordingly.1 ADO_IGS. but it could be used to provide guidance on security that is common to both administrators and nonadministrators (e.1 is intended for nonadministrative users.Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005.
This requirement ensures that the administrator has the ability to audit any security relevant events that takes place in the TOE.1 O. This requirement also places a requirement on the level of detail that is recorded on any additional security functional requirements an ST author adds to this PP. These privileges include.1-NIAP0410 FAU_GEN_EXP. FMT_SMR. access to audit information and security functions.ADMIN_ROLE The TOE will provide authorized administrators roles to isolate administrative actions. at least. In the case of authorized groups. This requirement also defines the information that must be contained in the audit record for each auditable event.1-NIAP-0407 allows the administrator to configure which auditable events will be recorded in the audit trail. the association is accomplished with the user ID.1-NIAP-0410 defines the set of events that the TOE must be capable of recording. The authorized administrator will be given privileges to perform certain tasks that other users will not be able to perform.Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005.2 AVA_MSU. This provides the administrator with O. Security Target Page 61/90 AVA_MSU.1) FAU_GEN.2 ensures that the guidance documentation is complete and consistent.2 ensures that the audit records associate a user and/or group identity with the auditable event.2 FAU_SEL. FAU_SEL. In the case of authorized users.AUDIT_GENERATION The TOE will provide the capability to detect and create records of security relevant events associated with users. The TOE will establish.1-NIAP0407 . and notes all requirements for external security measures. FAU_GEN. but are not limited to. an authorized administrator role. (FMT_SMR. the association is accomplished with the group ID. FAU_GEN_EXP. The ST writer may choose to specify more roles.
CONFIGURATION_IDENTIFICATIO N The configuration of the TOE is fully identified in a manner that will allow implementation errors to be identified and corrected with the TOE being redistributed promptly. ACM_CAP. FAU_STG_EXP. ADV_FSP. thus reducing the amount of resources consumed by the audit mechanism.DOCUMENTED_DESIGN The design of the TOE is adequately and accurately documented.4 FAU_STG_EXP.4 addresses this objective by requiring that there be a unique reference for the TOE.2 requires the high level design of the TOE be documented and specified and that said design be shown to correspond to the interfaces. and that the configuration items that comprise the TOE are uniquely identified. ADV_FSP.Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005. ACM_CAP.4 allows the administrator to define what should happen in the case where the audit file is full. It also requires that there be a CM system in place.2 addresses this objective by requiring that there be a mechanism in place for identifying flaws subsequent to fielding. ALC_FLR. and for distributing those flaws to entities operating the system. This provides a clear identification of the composition of the TOE.2 ADV_HLD.2 requires that the interfaces to the TOE be documented and specified. and that the TOE is labeled with that reference. This provides the administrator with the possibility to decide about possible audit data loss or stopping of services based on the information stored in the database.1 .2 O.4 ALC_FLR. The low-level design of a TOE provides the description of the internal workings of the TSF in terms of modules and their interrelationships and O. Security Target Page 62/90 the flexibility in recording only those events that are deemed necessary by site policy. ADV_HLD.2 ADV_LLD.
1 ADV_IMP.1 FMT_MSA_EXP. FMT_MSA_EXP. The intention is that access to at least a portion of the TSF will provide the evaluator with an opportunity to examine the implementation representation for those portions of the TOE where such an examination can add significantly to the understanding of.3 FMT_MTD. Security Target Page 63/90 dependencies. FMT_MTD.1 requires that there be a correspondence between adjacent layers of the design decomposition. the mechanisms employed. ADV_RCR. The low-level design provides assurance that the TSF subsystems have been correctly and effectively refined and therewith contributes to the objective that the design of the TOE has to be adequately and accurately documented. and assurance in. ADV_RCR. ADV_IMP.1.1D requires that the developer provide the implementation representation for a subset of the TSF. FMT_MOF.Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005.1 requires that the ability to perform operations on security attributes be restricted to particular roles.1 requires that the ability to use particular TOE capabilities be restricted to the administrator.1 O. In this way this assurance requirement contributes to the objective that the design of the TOE has to be adequately and accurately documented. FMT_MSA.1 FMT_MSA. FMT_MOF.MANAGE The TOE will provide all the functions and facilities necessary to support the authorized administrators in their management of the security of the TOE. and restrict these functions and facilities from unauthorized use.1 .3 requires that default values used for security attributes are restrictive.1 requires that the ability to manipulate TOE content is restricted to administrators.
The requirement is to maintain consistency of replicated TSF data. and operations for how and when mediation takes place in the TOE. FPT_TRC_EXP.1 restricts the ability to revoke attributes to the administrator FMT_SMF. objects.MEDIATE The TOE must protect user data in accordance with its security policy. All the operation between subject and object covered are defined by the TOE’s policy. Security Target Page 64/90 FMT_REV. Replicated TSF data that specifies attributes for access control must be consistent across distributed components of the TOE. ATE_COV.Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005.1 FMT_REV.1 O.1 requires the TOE to maintain a separate domain for its own execution separate from other processes.PARTIAL_FUNCTIONAL_TEST The TOE will undergo some security functional testing that demonstrates the TSF satisfies some of its security FPT_SEP_EXP. FMT_SMR.2 . FMT_SMR.1 ATE_COV.1 identifies the management functions that are available to the authorized administrator. The FDP requirements were chosen to define the policies.2 requires that there be a correspondence between the tests in the test documentation and the TSF as described in the functional specification.INTERNAL_TOE_DOMAINS The TSF will maintain internal domains for separation of data and queries belonging to concurrent users. FPT_SEP_EXP.1 defines the Access Control policy that will be enforced on a list of subjects acting on the behalf of users attempting to gain access to a list of named objects. the subjects.1 defines the specific security roles to be supported. FDP_ACC.1(2) FMT_SMF.1-NIAP0407 FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1-NIAP-0407 defines the security attribute used to provide access control to objects based on the TOE’s access control policy. O. FDP_ACC.1(1) FMT_REV.1 O.
The explicitly specified version was used to distinguish the aspects of FPT_SEP provided by the TOE versus the aspects provided by the IT environment. the tests performed. ATE_IND. and show that the expected results were achieved.PARTIAL_SELF_PROTECTI ON The TSF will maintain a domain for its own execution that protects itself and its resources from external interference.1 .1 defines the attributes of users. Security Target Page 65/90 functional requirements. including a user ID that is used by the TOE to determine ATE_FUN. and test scenarios.2 O.1 requires that the developer provide test documentation for the TOE.TOE_ACCESS The TOE will provide mechanisms that control a user’s logical access to the FDP_RIP.1 was chosen to ensure the TSF provides a domain that protects itself from untrusted users.1 requires that there be a correspondence between the tests in the test documentation and the TSF as described in the high level design. FIA_ATD.2 FIA_ATD.2 is used to ensure the contents of resources are not available to subjects other than those explicitly granted access to the data. These sets should include a subset of the developer run tests. These need to identify the functions tested. FPT_SEP_EXP. tampering. The explicitly specific component FPT_SEP_EXP. or unauthorized disclosure through its own interfaces. There require that the developer run those tests. and actual test results. including test plans. expected test results.1 ATE_DPT.Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005. ATE_FUN. If the TSF cannot protect itself it cannot be relied upon to enforce its security policies. on an equivalent set of resources to those used by the developer for testing. FDP_RIP. ATE_DPT.1 ATE_IND.1 O.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION The TOE will ensure that any information contained in a protected resource within its Scope of Control is not released when the resource is reallocated O. test procedure descriptions.2 requires that the evaluators test a subset of the TSF to confirm correct operation.
1 FTA_MCS.1 ensures that users may only have a maximum of a specified number of active sessions open at any given time. For those vulnerabilities that are not eliminated. FTA_MCS. a rationale must be provided that describes why FTA_TSE. The AVA_VLA.2 component provides the necessary level of confidence that vulnerabilities do not exist in the TOE that could cause the security policies to be violated.2 requires the developer to perform a search for potential vulnerabilities in all the TOE deliverables.e.1 AVA_SOF.2 . the strength of function specified is medium. authentication server) has this same assurance requirement levied against it to ensure a consistent level of assurance.) For this TOE. AVA_VLA.1 requirement is applied to the password mechanism used by the local administrator (The single use authentication mechanism supplies by the IT environment (i. Security Target Page 66/90 TOE. FTA_TSE.1 O. This requirement ensures the developer has performed an analysis of the password mechanism to ensure the probability of guessing a local administrator’s password meets the requirements for an SOF claim of SOF-medium according to the rating as defined in Annex B of the CEM. a user’s identity and/or group memberships and enforce what type of access the user has to the TOE..VULNERABILITY_ANALYSI S The TOE will undergo some vulnerability analysis to demonstrate the design and implementation of the TOE does not contain any flaws which can be exploited in the intended environment for the TOE and that the TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by attackers possessing a low attack potential. AVA_VLA.1 allows the TOE to restrict access to the TOE based on certain criteria. AVA_SOF.Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005.
I&A The TOE will provide a mechanism for identification and authentication of users. FIA_UAU. a key element in this component is that an independent assessment of the completeness of the developer’s analysis is made. FIA_UAU. and more importantly.2 realizes the identification part of O. Security Target Page 67/90 these vulnerabilities cannot be exploited by a threat agent with a low attack potential.2 FIA_UAU. This component provides the confidence that security flaws do not exist in the TOE that could be exploited by a threat agent of low (or lower) attack potential to violate the TOE’s security policies. which is in keeping with the desired assurance level of this TOE. an independent vulnerability analysis coupled with testing of the TOE is performed.I&A as it requires that each user has to get successfully identified before allowing any other TSFmediated action on behalf of that user. FIA_UID.Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005.I&A as it requires that each user has to get successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSFmediated action on behalf of that user.2 FIA_UAU. On the one hand the TOE is able to reuse the authentication results from the environment and on the other hand the TOE provides a password based authentication mechanism.5 .2 realizes the authentication part of O.5 specifies that the TOE uses two methods to ensure that every user has to be successfully authenticated. O. FIA_UID. As with the functional testing.
are appropriately trained and follow all administrator guidance.EVL defines that the evaluation of the underlying OS has to done on at least EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR. compilers or user applications) available on DMBS servers.EVL FIT_PPC_EXP.OS_PP_VALIDATED The underlying OS has been validated against an NSA sponsored OS PP of at least Basic Robustness.NO_GENERAL_ PURPOSE There will be no general-purpose computing capabilities (e.COMM defines that any communication path to and from the TOE will be secured either by the use of another .2 Table 23 gives more details about which parts of the Operating System are involved.. Thus. The evaluation and certification of the underlying OS has to be done on at least EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR. This rationale has been directly taken from [PP] with only the changes indicated by bold italic text .g.Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005. the CC does not mandate it map to any requirements. other than those services necessary for the operation.NO_EVIL Sites using the TOE shall ensure that authorized administrators are non-hostile. OE. This objective does not contain any IT security requirements because it is a non-IT related objective. and transmitted information. Thus. N/A FIT_PPC_EXP.1 states the underlying OS must be validated against a OS PP of at least basic robustness and R. Table 18 – Rationale for Environment Requirements Environmental Objective Requirements Addressing the Objective N/A Rationale This objective does not contain any IT security requirements because it is a non-IT related objective.PHYSICAL Physical security will be provided within the domain for the value of the IT assets protected by the TOE and the value of the stored. This objective does not contain any IT security requirements because it is a non-IT related objective. OE. Thus.COMM Any communication path from and to the TOE will be N/A R. the CC does not mandate it map to any requirements. processed.2. OE.COMM R. OE. the CC does not mandate it map to any requirements. OE.1 R. Security Target Page 68/90 The following table includes the rationale for the IT Environment Requirements. administration and support of the DBMS.
Together with the SARs out of [CC_PART3] the SFRs are suitable to counter the threats against the TOE as shown in the rationale in Table 17.1-NIAP-0407).2.1-NIAP-0407 FAU_STG_EXP.2). FIA_UID.2 is necessary for the objective O.4 Rationale for Assurance Requirements The table in chapter 6.1. The ST does not contain any SFR with requirements which conflict with other SFRs.CONFIGURATION_IDENTIFICATION. FIA_UAU.2.1).1. FTA_MCS.1(2).1. FPT_TRC_EXP.2.2 shows how all assurance requirements were satisfied and that there is at least one assurance measure defined in the TOE Summary Specification to meet each of the security assurance requirements. FIA_UAU. 8. Security Audit (FAU_GEN.1(1).1 Mutual support and internal consistency of security requirements From the details given in this rationale it becomes evident that the functional requirements form an integrated whole and.5.5 Rationale for Strength of Function Claim The SOF-claim for the authentication mechanism of the TOE (which is the only function which is based on a permutational or probalistic algorithm) is SOF-medium. 8. FTA_TAH_EXP.1. the author decided to specify an Evaluation Assurance Level 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005. taken together.1. FAU_GEN_EXP. FMT_MSA.3 it is necessary to perform a vulnerability analysis to show that the TOE is resistant against attacks with a low attack potential. As shown in chapter 8.1. FMT_SMF. IT product of by physical protection. FMT_REV. FMT_MSA_EXP. FMT_REV.3. Based on the definition of the attack potential of a potential attacker in chapter 3. Therefore it has been necessary to use the assurance component AVA_VLA. FMT_MTD. Therefore it becomes clear that the SFRs in this ST mutually support each other and form a consistent whole. Security Management (FMT_MOF.1 and Session Handling (FPT_SEP_EXP. are suited to meet all security objectives. FDP_ACF.2.1. FMT_SMR.3.4).1. FTA_TSE. 8. and to gain a higher level of assurance in the correct implementation of the Security Functions. The core TOE functionality is represented by the requirements for Access Control (FDP_ACC. Requirements from [CC_PART2] and extended requirements are used to fulfill the security objectives.1. Security Target Page 69/90 appropriately secured to avoid eavesdropping and manipulation.2.2 the SAR ALC_FLR. . Because of the dependencies of the component AVA_VLA.1. Identification and Authentication (FIA_ATD. FAU_SEL.1-NIAP-0410.
. For this reason the author specified the strength of this function to be SOF-medium.1 and the definition of the Security Objectives do not contain any explicit requirement regarding the SOF claim.Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005.3 it would have been sufficient to claim it to be SOF-basic as the attacker has only a low attack potential. However the authentication function is an obvious mechanism to start a brute force attack on and the author thinks that this mechanism should be stronger than the overall resistance of the TOE against threats. Security Target Page 70/90 Based on the definition of the attack potential in chapter 3. Also the definitions of SFRs in chapter 5.
1 Satisfied.1-NIAP-0410 FMT_MTD.1 The dependency to FAU_STG.1-NIAP-0407 FDP_ACF. The TOE as a DBMS has to rely on the Operating System to protect the files.1-NIAP-0410 Dependency FPT_STM.3 is satisfied by FMT_MSA_EXP.1-NIAP-0407 FDP_ACC.3.1 Satisfied This requirement must be satisfied by the IT environment because the DBMS is a software only TOE.2 is hierarchical to FIA_UID. Table 19 – Functional Requirements Dependencies Requirement FAU_GEN.1 is either fulfilled by the TOE or by the environment. see explanation for FAU_GEN_EXP.2 FIA_UID. Security Target Page 71/90 8. The dependency on FMT_MSA.1 is either fulfilled by the TOE (for SQL logins) and by the environment (For Windows logins).1 FAU_STG_EXP.Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005.4 FAU_STG.6 Rationale for satisfying all Dependencies The following table contains the rationale for satisfying all dependencies of the Security Functional Requirements.1 is satisfied by the environment.1 FMT_MSA.3 FDP_RIP. Satisfied.2 The dependency to FIA_UID.2 FIA_ATD. FAU_SEL. Satisfied (FIA_UID.1-NIAP-0410 FIA_UID.2 FAU_GEN.1 None None FIA_UAU.1-NIAP-0407 FAU_GEN. N/A N/A FDP_ACC.1) The dependency to FIA_UID.1 Satisfied FAU_GEN_EXP. This rationale has been taken from [PP] with only the changes indicated by bold italic text. .1 FDP_ACF.
Satisfied. FMT_MSA. Security Target Page 72/90 FIA_UAU.1 Satisfied.1 is either fulfilled by the TOE or by the environment.1 [FDP_ACC. N/A Satisfied (FIA_UID.2 is hierarchical to FIA_UID.1) The dependency to FIA_UID.1] FMT_SMF.1 None FIA_UID.1(1) FMT_REV.1 None None N/A N/A .1 FTA_TSE.1) FPT_SEP_EXP.1 None FPT_ITT.1(2) FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1 Satisfied. FMT_SMF.1 None None FMT_SMF.1 FTA_TAH_EXP.Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005.1 N/A N/A Satisfied.1 FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR. Satisfied (FIA_UID.1 Dependency satisfied by the combination of FDP_ACC.1 N/A This dependency does not need to be fulfilled because the TOE does not comprise physically separated parts.1 FPT_TRC_EXP.1 FMT_MSA_EXP.fr FTA_MCS. FMT_MTD.3 FMT_MSA.1 FMT_SMR.1.1 FMT_SMR. FMT_REV.1 and FMT_SMR.1 or FDP_IFC.2 FMT_MOF.1 FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMR.2 is hierarchical to FIA_UID.5 FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1 Satisfied.
2 and has the same component.7 Rationale for Explicit Requirements Table 21 presents the rationale for the inclusion of the explicit functional and assurance requirements. The only additional assurance requirement ALC_FLR.2 does not have any dependency. Specifically.1. However this SFR has been developed based on FAU_GEN.2. this explicit requirement was created to allow the audit function to use the user identity or the group identity or both. Although there is a Common Criteria Requirement that attempts to address this functionality. The rationale has been directly taken from [PP] with no other than the indicated changes.1 has been created to require timely consistency of replicated TSF data.2 Identifier User and/or group identity association Rationale This requirement was needed to replace FAU_GEN. family and class behavior FPT_TRC_EXP. For TOEs with a very large number of components.1 states "The TSF shall ensure that TSF data is consistent when replicated between parts of the TOE.Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005. this is an infeasible requirement. Table 21 – Rationale for Explicit Requirements Explicit Requirement FAU_GEN_EXP." In the widely distributed environment of this PP's TOE. it falls short of the needs of the environment in this protection profile. 8. The explicit requirements that are included as NIAP interpretations do not require a rationale for their inclusion per CCEVS management.1 Internal TSF consistency FPT_TRC_EXP. FPT_TRC.1-NIAP-0410 because this PP does not require the TOE to implement a user identity. 100 percent TSF data . Therefore.1 Dependency None Satisfied N/A The set of assurance requirements for EAL 4 is consistent and all dependencies are met. Security Target Page 73/90 Table 20 – Functional Requirements Dependencies for IT Environment Requirement FIT_PPC_EXP. It does require the TOE to implement a user identity and/or a group identity to satisfy the DAC policy.
This is problematic in this PP's environment in that it is not the intent of the authors to dictate that distributed TSF components keep track of connected/disconnected components.e. the PP authors chose to use . Therefore.1 and has the same component. to meet the needs of this PP. Software Only TOEs should be expected to work in the context of their hardware environment to aid in enforcing domain separation but cannot be required to counter fully the threats without hardware.1 TSF domain separation Given the nature of a PP compliant TOE that is described in the TOE Description. the objectives and functional requirements must ultimately reflect this description. Another concern lies in FPT_TRC.1. however. Upon first inspection. the current FPT_SEP. Typically. Security Target Page 74/90 consistency is not achievable and is not expected at any specific instant in time. family and class behavior FPT_SEP_EXP. The need for explicitly stated requirements is that when invoked.1 Common Criteria Requirement requires the TOE (not its environment) to protect itself from external interference and tampering. the Functional Requirements section) by creating explicitly stated requirements in place of FPT_SEP.. In general. the TSF shall ensure consistency of the TSF replicated data upon "reconnection". it is acceptable to only require a mechanism that provides TSF data consistency in a timely manner after it is determined that it is inconsistent.2 that states that when replicated parts of the TSF are "disconnected". Software Only Toe properties are instantiated in Section 5 of the PP (i. when applying this requirement it becomes clear that it dictates specific mechanisms to determine when a component is "disconnected" from the rest of the TSF and when it is "reconnected". However this SFR has been developed based on FPT_TRC.Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005.1. this seems reasonable. “Software Only” technology cannot fully meet these requirements as written.
2 from the component FMT_MSA.3 and makes the component more secure by requiring the security attributes of the objects on creation to be restrictive and not allowing any user to be able of override the restrictive default values. For the TOE described in this ST it was necessary to provide authorized administrators with the possibility to specify what should happen if the audit log is full. . family and class behavior.4 and has the same family behaviour except that it is not hierarchical to any other SFR.1 and has the same component. However this SFR has been developed based on FMT_MSA. This explicit requirement eliminates the element FMT_MSA. This requirement has been modified to require the TOE to store and retrieve the access history instead of displaying it. FAU_STG_EXP.3 Static attribute initialization The CC does not allow the PP author to specify restrictive values that are not modifiable. Therefore.3. FMT_MSA_EXP.1 and has the same component.1 TOE Access History This PP does not require the TOE to contain a client. However there should only be one action to be taken in this case. However this SFR has been developed based on FTA_TAH.3 and has the same component.Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005. However this SFR has been developed based on the definition of FAU_STG.4 Administrable Prevention of audit data loss It has been necessary to develop this explicit Security Functional Requirement because part II of [CC] does not contain any SFR which allows specifying a set of allowed actions which can be taken in the case where the audit is full. the PP cannot require the client to display a message. family and class behavior FTA_TAH_EXP. family and class behavior. Security Target Page 75/90 explicitly stated requirements for domain separation when attempting to accommodate the “Software Only” TOE. However this SFR has been developed based on FPT_SEP. .
‘TSC’ was replaces with ‘IT Environment Scope of Control’.OS_PP_VALIDATED and the Security Functions defined in this ST the SFRs of the [WIN_ST] listed in the following table are needed to support the Security Functions of the TOE. Throughout each requirement ‘TSF’ was replaced with ‘IT Environment’.Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005. The exact definition and behavior of FIT_PPC_EXP.1 is described in chapter 9. Table 22 – Rationale for Environmental Requirements Environmental Requirement FIT_PPC_EXP. Security Target Page 76/90 The following requirements were modified to refer to the IT environment. Based on the definition of the assumption A. .1. etc. This requirement is fulfilled as the underlying OS for the TOE described in this ST is Windows 2003 Server SP1 which has been certified in accordance to [WIN_PP] (see [WIN_VR] for evidence).1 Identifier IT Environment Protection Profile Compliance Rationale This requirement is necessary to ensure the environment of the TOE will provide the security functionality needed for the secure operation of the TOE.
1 FIA_UID. Security Target Page 77/90 Table 23 .Important SFRs of the environment Aspect Access Control (including Access Control for audit files) Authentication of users Identification of users Non Bypassabiltity Domain Separation Cryptographic Functions (Hashing) Time Stamps Residual Information Protection SFR of the environment FDP_ACC.Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005.1(e) FPT_STM.1 FCS_COP.1 FPT_RVM.1 FDP_RIP.2(a) Title Discretionary Access Control Policy Timing of authentication Timing of identification Non-bypassability of the TSP TSF domain separation Cryptographic Operation (Server SHA Hash) Reliable Time Stamps Object/Subject Residual Information Protection FIA_UAU.1 FPT_SEP.2 Note1_EX .
AC SF. Table 24 .8 TOE Summary Specification Rationale The following table summarizes which SFR is addressed by which Security Function: The following paragraphs give the more detailed justification for this rationale.1(2) FMT_SMF.5 FIA_UID.1 FPT_TRC_EXP.SE X X X X X .3 FMT_MTD.1 FPT_SEP_EXP.1 FTA_TSE.1(1) FMT_REV.1-NIAP-0410 FAU_GEN_EXP.1 FTA_TAH_EXP.1 FTA_MCS.2 FMT_MOF.AU X X X X FAU_GEN.1 FMT_MSA_EXP.1 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X SF.Assignment of SFRs to Security Functions SF.1 FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACC.Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005.1 FMT_MSA.SM SF.1-NIAP-0407 FDP_RIP.1-NIAP-0407 FAU_STG_EXP.2 FAU_SEL.1 FMT_REV.1 FIA_UAU.2 FIA_UAU. Security Target Page 78/90 8.1 FMT_SMR.4.2 FIA_ATD.I&A Requirement/Security Function SF.
1-NIAP0410 SF.AU as this function realizes the Security Audit mechanism of the TOE which logs all events required by FAU_GEN.SM This SFR is addressed by SF.AU FAU_SEL. This SFR is addressed by SF.SM and SF.Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005. However the administration is done using the Security Function SF. SF.AU This SFR is addressed completely by SF. SF.SM allows the admin to specify this action. SF.2 SF. ID of the object 5. Date and Time of the event 2. SF. Type of Event 3. SF.AC as this Security Function describes the Discretionary Access Control Mechanism as realized by the .1-NIAP0407 SF.AU.AU is in these cases able to stop the TOE or to overwrite the old audit logs.SM FDP_ACC.AU as this function describes that the TOE stores the following information for every logged event: 1.1 SF. Security Target Page 79/90 The following rationale shows why this mapping is correct: Table 25 – Rationale for TOE Summary Specification Requirement Fulfilled by Security Function Rationale FAU_GEN.SM additionally ensures that only authorized administrators are allowed to use this management functionality.AC This SFR is completely addressed by SF. FAU_STG_EXP. Outcome (success or failure) of the event 6.AU allows the administrator to specify. what should happen in case the audit file are full.AU as this Security Function allows in principle to include or exclude auditable events from being audited. Identity of the user causing the event (if available) 4.4 SF.1-NIAP-0410 and stores them into files in the environment. For the rejection of a session additionally the reason for the rejection FAU_GEN_EXP.AU.
I&A FIA_UID.SM provides the management function to manage all the security FDP_RIP. It therefore completely realizes FIA_ATD. SF.I&A FMT_MOF.SM .2 SF.1 SF. It therefore completely realizes this SFR.5 SF.2 SF.SE FIA_ATD. This Security Function describes that the TOE maintains a security ID for each login on an instance level and each user on a database level and is able to associate these principals with their assigned roles in this way.1 SF.I&A FIA_UAU.I&A specifies that each user has to be successfully identified and authenticated before the TOE allows any other action on behalf of that user.1NIAP-0407 This SFR is completely addressed by the Security Function SF.5 SF. This completely realizes FIA_UAU.2 SF. It therefore completely realizes this SFR.1.I&A FIA_UAU.I&A specifies that each user has to get successfully identified and authenticated before the TOE allows any other action on behalf of that user.SM FMT_MSA.1-NIAP0407 SF.AC as this Security Function describes the Discretionary Access Control Mechanism as realized by the TOE which invokes the same set of ordered rules as required by FDP_ACF.SM provides the management function to start and stop the Security Audit and restricts the ability to use these functions to authorized administrators. SF. Security Target Page 80/90 TOE which realizes Access Control based on the identity of the user and of the object.1 SF.Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005. SF.AC This SFR is completely addressed by SF. SF. FDP_ACF.I&A describes that depending on the kind of the login the TOE is either reusing authentication results of the environment to authenticate a user or uses a Username/Password based mechanism to identify/authenticate a user.SE as this Security Function ensures that any previous information content in memory is unavailable when the resource is allocated.
Security Target Page 81/90 attributes and restricts the ability to use these functions to authorized administrators.SM.AC provides the functionality to revoke security attributes associated with objects and ensures that the revocation of attributes of these objects follows the DAC and all changes are applied immediately. SF.SM provides the management functions to revoke security attributes associated with users and restricts the ability to use these functions to authorized administrators.SM provides the management function to include or exclude events from being audited and restricts the ability to use these functions to authorized administrators. SF. FMT_MSA_EXP.SM provides all management functions required by FMT_SMF.3 SF.1(1) SF.I&A.SE ensures that for every operation requested by an authorized user at least one separate FMT_MTD.SM FMT_SMR.1 and therefore completely realizes this SFR. SF. Furthermore SF.1 SF.1 SF.SM FMT_REV. SF. the schema or the database) have the same permission on the new object.g.AC realizes the policy of restrictive default values as required by FMT_MSA_EXP. FMT_REV.AC specifies that if a new object is created only the owner(s) and the system administrator have access to this object.3 SF. SF.SE .I&A specifies that changes to a SQL Server login are immediately applied while changes of a Windows Account name require a log of and log on of that user before they are applied.I&A ensures that a user is not allowed to perform any TSF mediated actions before he has been successfully identified and authenticated.AC SF.1 SF. .1 SF.AC SF. SF. SF.SM maintains the role as required by FMT_SMR.1(2) SF.I&A FMT_SMF. In this way SF.1 and therefore completely realizes this SFR. Furthermore only users with a permission to parent objects (e.Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005.SM FPT_SEP_EXP.
06. So this SFR is trivially fulfilled in the context of the Application Note in paragraph 90 in chapter 5.1 SF.2 and FIA_UAU.S. FIA_UID. SF.SE 8.1.SE stores the information about the attempts to establish a session required by FTA_TAH_EXP.2 of [PP].I&A has been introduced.10 Rationale for PP Claims This Security Target is compliant to the U. Government Protection Profile for Database Management Systems in Basic Robustness Environments.1. Additionally the objective O.5.1 SF. Version 1. All SFRs for the TOE have been taken directly from [PP] into this ST without any refinement. The following elements of SFRs contained uncompleted operations in [PP] which have been completed in this ST. SF.Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005. 8.SE ensures that a user is only able to establish a session to the TOE as long as no explicit deny statement has been specified for that user by an administrator.SE FTA_TSE. FPT_TRC_EXP. SF. In this way SF.5) and Prevention of audit data loss (FAU_STG_EXP.2.SE ensures that a user is only able to establish a session to the TOE as long as he has not reached the maximum number of concurrent sessions per user and by default enforces a maximum number of 5. Additionally SFRs for Identification and Authentication (FIA_UAU.SE completely realizes FTA_TSE.1 ) have been introduced.1 SF. • .1 The TOE described in this ST does not comprise physically separated parts.1 SF.Assurance Measures in chapter 6 shows how all assurance requirements were satisfied and that there is at least one assurance measure defined in the TOE Summary Specification to meet each of the security assurance requirements. 07.4.2006 ([PP]) because: • • All security objectives for the TOE from [PP] have been taken directly from [PP] into this ST without any refinement. The rest of the SFRs (except the additional ones mentioned before) has been taken from [PP] without any changes.SE completely realizes FTA_MCS. Security Target Page 82/90 thread of the Operating System is started. FTA_MCS.SE FTA_TAH_EXP.1 and therewith completely realizes this SFR.1. Only the permitted operations have been performed.9 Rationale for Assurance Measures The Table 13 .
1-NIAP-0407 FDP_ACF.2(1) FMT_REV.1.1 FTA_MCS.2-NIAP-0407 FDP_ACF.Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005. Security Target Page 83/90 o o o o o o o o o o o o o • • FAU_GEN. The SFR for the environment has been directly taken from [PP] without any changes.1.2-NIAP-0410 (Reference for table updated) FAU_SEL.1.1 Further FDP_RIP.2(2) FMT_SMF.2 has been used in this ST instead of FDP_RIP.1.1.1 FMT_REV.1.3-NIAP-0407 FDP_ACF.4-NIAP-0407 FIA_ATD.1.1.2 FTA_TSE.1.1.COMM and R.1 as defined in the [PP].1.1 FMT_SMR.1.1.EVL) have been introduced.1-NIAP-0410 FAU_GEN. . Additionally requirements for the non-IT environment (R.
1.1 FIT_PPC_EXP (IT Environment Protection Profile Compliance) Family Behaviour: This family specifies the requirements that the environment of a TOE has to be compliant to a certain Protection Profile. Security Target Page 84/90 9 Appendix 9. The class FIT comprises only one family as seen in the following figure: Figure 2: Class Structure for FIT 9.Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005.1 Definition for FIT_PPC_EXP The additional family FIT_PPC_EXP (IT Environment PP Conformance) of the Class FIT (IT Environment) has been developed here to describe the IT security functional requirements of the environment. Component Levelling: Figure 3: Component Levelling for FIT_PPC_EXP .
9.2. the owner also would have direct access to both objects. IT Environment Protection Profile Compliance (FIT_PPC_EXP. Ownership chaining enables managing access to multiple objects. Management: There are no management activities foreseen in this family. Some objects refer to other objects. So if one user is the owner of both objects. What happens when Alex selects the view? .1 How Permissions Are Checked in a Chain When an object is accessed through a chain. Audit: There are no audit activities foreseen in this family. such as multiple tables. the calling object and the called object.1 shall be used to specify that the environment of a TOE has to be compliant to a certain Protection Profile. when the TOE traverses the links in a chain. Although such chains do not independently exist.2 Example of Ownership Chaining In the following illustration. She has granted to Alex permissions on the view.1. by setting permissions on one object. If both objects have the same owner.1) Hierarchical to: No other components FIT_PPC_EXP. This is especially true for Stored Procedures and Views. 9.Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005.2 Concept of Ownership Chains Database Objects within the TOE are not always only passive objects. In the context of the Discretionary Access Control Mechanism this is not a circumvention of access control as the owner of an object always has complete control over his objects. Security Target Page 85/90 FIT_PPC_EXP. This is the previous link in the chain. When multiple database objects access each other sequentially. permissions on the referenced object are not evaluated. the July2003 view is owned by Mary. the TOE first compares the owner of the object to the owner of the calling object.1 Dependencies: The IT environment shall be compliant with the requirements of [Assignment: Protection Profile]. Ownership chaining also offers a slight performance advantage in scenarios that allow for skipping permission checks. the sequence is known as a chain. These differences have important implications for managing security. No dependencies 9.2. He has no other permissions on database objects in this instance. the TOE evaluates access permissions on the constituent objects differently than it would if it were accessing the objects separately. such as a view.
The required information is returned. Because this view has the same owner as the previous object. all items in the sequence have had one owner (Mary). This is known as an unbroken ownership chain. Because this view has the same owner (Mary) as the view that calls it. not Sam). The TOE checks the ownership of the AcctAgeXZ view. permissions on SalesXZ are not checked. The required information is returned. The TOE checks the ownership of the SalesXZ view. The AcctAgeXZ view requires information from the ExpenseXZ table. The July 2003 view requires information from the SalesXZ view. Because the owner of this table is different from the owner of the previous object (Joe. permissions on InvoicesXZ are not checked. The InvoicesXZ view requires information from the AcctAgeXZ view. Because the owner of this view is different from the owner of the previous object (Sam. If the AcctAgeXZ view has permissions that allow access by Alex. full information about permissions on this view is retrieved. The SalesXZ view requires information from the InvoicesXZ view.Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005. To this point. Security Target Page 86/90 Figure 4: Concept of Ownership Chaining Alex executes SELECT * on the July2003 view. The TOE checks the ownership of the ExpenseXZ table. The TOE checks permissions on the view and confirms that Alex has permission to select on it. full information about permissions on this table . The TOE checks the ownership of the InvoicesXZ view. not Mary). information will be returned.
Version 3.Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005. 2005 Version: 1.asp?url=/library/enus/acdata/ac_oview_4pcx. Version 1. dated August 2005.com/library/default. CCIMB-2005-08-003 Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security – Evaluation Methodology. NSA. Microsoft Corporation Target. 07. Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validation Report Microsoft Windows 2003 Server and XP Workstation Report Number: CCEVSVR-05-0131 Dated: November 6. 9. 1999 [WIN_PP] .3 References The following documentation was used to prepare this ST: [CC_PART2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 2: Security functional requirements. When the July2003 view tries to retrieve information from the ProjectionsXZ table.3. If cross-database chaining is enabled.1.d. If the ExpenseXZ table has permissions that allow access by Alex. Version 1. the TOE first checks to see whether cross-database chaining is enabled between Database 1 and Database 2. version 2. permissions on this table are not checked.3. Version 1.microsoft. dated August 5005. Because this table has the same owner as the calling view (Mary). [CC_PART3] [CEM] [PP] [CIM] [TSQL] [WIN_ST] [WIN_VR] National Information Assurance Partnership. the TOE will check the ownership of the ProjectionsXZ table.1 Controlled Access Protection Profile. The requested information is returned.S. October.2006 Consistency Instruction Manual for Development of US Government Protection Profiles for Use in Basic Robustness Environments.3. information is returned. CCIMB-2005-08-004 U. Security Target Page 87/90 is retrieved. CCIMB-2005-08-002 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 3: Security assurance requirements.asp Microsoft Windows 2003/XP Security 28. version 2.06.0 (CIM) http://msdn. 8th. Government Protection Profile for Database Management Systems in Basic Robustness Environments.2005. version 2.0.09. dated August 2005.
user authentication and various other functions.2 in more detail. Security Target Page 88/90 9.microsoft. However in the TOE an object is not necessarily only a passive entity as some objects refer to other objects. Explained in chapter 9. Method for inter process communication An object within the TOE contains data and can be accessed by subjects. See also http://msdn. Extension of the SQL language in order to support control flow. A DBMS is a computerized repository that stores information and allows authorized users to retrieve and update that information.1 Glossary The following abbreviations are used in this Security Target: Abbreviation Definition Authorized Administrators This term refers to a group of users which comprise the “sysadmin” (sa) and any user who is allowed to perform a management operation because the permission has been granted to him within the DAC either by assigning him to a role with administrator permissions or by granting him the possibility to perform an administrative operation explicitly.asp DAC DBMS Named Pipe Object OC SQL SQL Server TDS T-SQL .4. Ownership Chaining.com/library/default. the ID of the object and a set of access control rules.Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005. variables.4 Glossary and Abbreviations 9. The Structured Query Language is a language which can be used to create. Discretionary Access Control is a mechanism to limit the access of users to objects based on the ID of the user.asp?url=/library/enus/acdata/ac_oview_4pcx. modify and retrieve data from a DBMS. SQL Server is a product of Microsoft to which the TOE belongs. Tabular Data Stream is a data format which is used for communication with the TOE.
2 Abbreviations The following abbreviations are used in this Security Target: Abbreviation Definition ACL CC CCEVS CEM CIM DAC DBMS EAL ETL IT MOM MS NIAP NSA OC ODS OLAP OS OSP PP sa SAR SFR SID SMS SOF SQL ST TDS TOE TSC TSF Access Control List Common Criteria Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Common Evaluation Methodology Consistency Instruction Manual Discretionary Access Control Database Management System Evaluation Assurance Level Extract. Transform. Security Target Page 89/90 9.4. Load Information Technology Microsoft Operations Manager Microsoft National Information Assurance Partnership National Security Agency Ownership Chaining Open Data Services Online analytical processing Operating System Organizational Security Policy Protection Profile System administrator Security Assurance Requirement Security Functional Requirement Security ID System Management Server Strength of Function Structured Query Language Security Target Tabular Data Stream Target of Evaluation TSF Scope of Control TOE Security Function .Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005.
Security Target Page 90/90 Abbreviation Definition T-SQL Transact SQL .Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2005.
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