Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/21304728/Reply-Brief-to-Objection-to-Attorneys-Fees
Timestamp: 2017-04-26 13:07:07
Document Index: 108819569

Matched Legal Cases: ['§9', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§9', '§9', '§ 9', '§915', '§ 271']

Reply Brief to Objection to Attorneys Fees | Attorney's Fee | Motion In United States Law
ScribdBrowseInterestsPolitics & Current AffairsCareer & MoneyPersonal GrowthFictionHealth & FitnessLifestyleEntertainmentBiographies & HistoryScience & TechBrowse byBooksAudiobooksNews & MagazinesSheet MusicBrowse allUploadSign inJoinReply Brief to Objection to Attorneys FeesUploaded by Janet and JamesAttorney's FeeMotion In United States LawLawyerFeeDefendant0.0 (0)DownloadEmbedDescription: This is a Brief we wrote after the Brief for the award of attorneys fees was granted. The opposing attorneys gave some BS reason that they didn't pursue a hearing before the Judge Granted the Motio...View MoreThis is a Brief we wrote after the Brief for the award of attorneys fees was granted. The opposing attorneys gave some BS reason that they didn't pursue a hearing before the Judge Granted the Motion. This Brief was fun to write too.Copyright: Attribution Non-Commercial No-Derivs (BY-NC-ND)Download as DOC, PDF or read online from ScribdFlag for inappropriate contentIN THE STATE COURT OF CHEROKEE COUNTY STATE OF GEORGIA CAPITAL ONE BANK (USA), N.A., Plaintiff V XXXXX XXXXXX, Defendant
CIVIL ACTION FILE NO: 08-SC-1031
DEFENDANT’S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO VACATE AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES
COMES NOW, Defendant xxxxxxxxx, who files her Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Motion to Vacate Award of Attorney’s Fees, and gives argument why this Court should DENY the Motion. According to Plaintiff Motion to Vacate is based upon 1. That I, the Defendant filed a Motion for attorney’s fees. 2. The Plaintiff responded to the Motion with a Rule Nisi
That I, the Defendant filed a Motion to Withdraw the Motion
for Attorney’s fees and that Plaintiff “relied upon this document” in not pursuing a hearing. Defendant responds only to ¶¶s 2, 3.
PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES Defendant has found no caselaw showing that where an attorney relied upon a Court to Grant a Motion to Withdraw a Motion was appropriate grounds to vacate an award of attorney’s fees. Plaintiff responded to Motion for Attorney’s Fees with a Rule Nisi, an improper response. Should Plaintiff have prevailed, a defendant requesting return of attorney’s fees they had incurred be returned would be an entirely different matter; that is the not scenario here. Plaintiff had known for two years the Defendant had been a victim of identity theft, and Plaintiff had advised the Defendant that the matter was closed to further inquiry, therefore this action should have never been filed. Nevertheless, the complaint was filed, and thereby vexatious, frivolous litigation begun by Plaintiff. The Grant of attorneys fees provided for under O.G.C.A. §9-15-14 is a sanction for such circumstances and is wholly warranted. Furthermore, Defendant’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees clearly asked only for the reasonable and necessary fees that it had cost her to defend against the vexatious, frivolous action. To have a hearing at this late stage for whether or not Defendant is deserving of attorney’s fees that it cost her to defend herself, is in itself a frivolous attempt to cost Defendant even more time and expense and must
be Denied. The Plaintiff also appears to complain that they relied upon the Motion to Withdraw Motion for Attorney’s fees. Defendant has a hard time believing that
an attorney has actually portrayed to the Court something so ludicrous. Knowing full well that the Court could find in favor of Defendant’s Motion for Attorney’s fees whether or not a Withdrawal has been filed, the proper response would have been to give a Brief arguing why attorney’s fees should not be granted. Nevertheless, the Award is justified both statutorily and discretionally, and there has been no abuse of discretion. The only reason Defendant Withdrew the Motion for Attorney’s fees is because she feels ill equipped to handle herself in a hearing without representation; in other words, she was intimidated by the Rule Nisi filed by Plaintiff. Now, Defendant realizes that is most probably the reason that a Rule Nisi, rather than a proper response to the Motion for Attorney’s Fees was filed. Further, like the improper response to Defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees, the Plaintiff has again improperly responded to this Court. The proper
response to an award of attorney’s fees, like any other award, is to file Notice of Appeal, not a motion to vacate on the grounds that the opposing party relied upon yet another motion filed by a pro se defendant. Defendant has a hard time
imagining any other purpose for opposing legal counsel to file a Rule Nisi rather
than a real, and proper response. ARGUMENT AND CITATIONS OF AUTHORITY An award of attorney’s fees under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 is reviewed by the Appellate Courts for an abuse of discretion. The Appeals Court will not vacate an award of attorney’s fees when they are granted by statute, the award is reviewed under the “any evidence” rule; and the “abuse of discretion” rule respectively. “Attorney fees are recoverable only where authorized by some statutory provision or by contract. (Cit.) [Cit.]" Glynn County Fed. &c. Credit Union v. Peagler, 256 Ga. 342, 344 (3) (348 SE2d 628) (1986). The standard of review for motions under OCGA 9-15-14 (a) is the "any evidence" rule, and the standard for review for motions under OCGA 9-15-14 (b) is the "abuse of discretion" rule." Sacha v. Coffee Butler Svc., 215 Ga. App. 280, 282 (2) (450 SE2d 704) (1994). “(N)otwithstanding the ‘any evidence’ standard of review . . . , when considering an appeal from an award of attorney fees made under OCGA 9-15-14 (a), we must determine whether the claim asserted below either had some factual merit or presented a justiciable issue of law.' [Cit.]" Moore v. Harris, 201 Ga. App. 248, 249 (1) (410 SE2d 804) (1991). Under subsection (b) the Appellate Court must determine whether the court abused its discretion in finding that the complaint was "substantially frivolous, substantially groundless, or substantially vexatious." (Citations and punctuation
omitted.) Cobb County School Dist. v. MAT Factory, 215 Ga. App. 697, 703 (4) (452 SE2d 140) (1994). “It is presumed that when enacting legislation, the General Assembly acts with full knowledge of the existing state of the law” Price v. City of Snellville, 253 Ga. 166, 167 (317 SE2d 834) (1984); “and in construing acts of the legislature, we must accord all words (other than words of art) their ordinary significance.” City of Roswell v. City of Atlanta, 261 Ga. 657 (410 SE2d 28) (1991). Accordingly, OCGA § 9-15-14 applies to "any civil action," “OCGA 9-15-14 (a) provides for a mandatory award” as shown by: “reasonable and necessary attorney's fees and expenses of litigation shall be awarded”,1 shall is a must word . The standard of review for this section is the 'any evidence' rule. “OCGA 9-15-14 (b) is discretionary and the standard of review is abuse of discretion,” as shown by the word shall. The matter before this
Honorable Court falls under “both standards the record supports” this Court's award. Haggard v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. System, 257 Ga. 524, 527 (4 c) (360 SE2d 566) (1987). Further, words that remove a Judge’s discretion when a party has moved for relief which the Georgia General Assembly has used to show their intentions as a sanction to the offending party are understood to be “shall” and “must”.
Haggard v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. System, 257 Ga. 524, 527 (4 c) (360 SE2d 566) (1987)
word may is a different matter entirely, that leaves the decision solely to the Judge’s discretion. See O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14: (a) In any civil action … reasonable and necessary attorney's fees and expenses of litigation shall be awarded to any party against whom another party has asserted a claim, …which there existed such a complete absence of any justiciable issue of law or fact …. Attorney's fees and expenses so awarded shall be assessed against the party asserting such claim, defense, or other position, or against that party's attorney, or against both in such manner as is just. (b) The court may assess reasonable and necessary attorney's fees and expenses of litigation in any civil action in any court of record if, upon the motion of any party or the court itself, it finds that an attorney or party brought or defended an action, or any part thereof, that lacked substantial justification … other improper conduct… In Hutchison v. Divorce & Custody Law Center of Arline Kerman & Asociates, P.C., et., al., (207 Ga. App. 421) (427 SE2d 784) (1993), the Court discussed other “plain language” phrases within statute §9-15-14 addressing the time frame for filing the motion for attorney fees: “Finally, we cannot avoid the fact that the plain language of that part of the statute relating to procedure, i.e., subsection (e), provides for a ‘motion’ and Subsection (b) also refers to ‘motion,” “Subsection (e) also uses the term ‘within,’ …in referencing the time frame for the request. The word ‘may’ means that the litigant is authorized to seek such an award after the case is concluded, when the basis for an award has matured. See generally Hollowell v. Jove, 247 Ga. 678, 681 (279 SE2d 430) (1981).
The Appellate Court reviews a grant of attorneys fees under O.C.G.A. §9-514(b) for an abuse of discretion, ("OCGA § 9-15-14 (b) is discretionary and the standard of review is abuse of discretion." (Punctuation omitted.) Hill v. Doe,*fn5 quoting Haggard v. Bd. of Regents &c. of Ga.) Defendant, the prevailing party against whom a frivolous, vexatious action was brought, had the right to be granted fees that she otherwise would not have had to incur, she asked for nothing more than her own expenses. Under O.C.G.A. §915-14(b) “the trial court must limit the fees award to those fees incurred because of the sanctionable conduct.” (Punctuation omitted.) Trotter v. Summerour, 273 Ga. App. 263, 267 (2) (614 SE2d 887) (2005). See Lawrence v. Direct Mtg. Lenders Corp., 254 Ga. App. 672, 674 (3) (563 SE2d 533) (2002) at 676 (4) (court may only award those attorney fees attributable to successful claim). This Court clearly stated the reasons for the Award of Attorney’s Fees, as required by the Appellate Court. When a Court has indicated a basis for its award, such as fees incurred by the prevailing party, and the party is not seeking damages, a hearing is not warranted; see Huggins v. Chapin, 233 Ga. App. 109 (503 SE2d 356) (1998) where the Ruling was vacated and Remanded the court was instructed: “The court is directed to indicate the basis for its award. If the court needs supplemental evidence to determine the amount of attorney fees reasonably attributable to [the] prevailing claim, it may hold a hearing. Alternatively, if the court concludes it can
make the required determination without such evidence, by further considering the evidence already submitted . . . , it may do so.”. This Court clearly made findings in support of the award of attorney’s fees, the award was authorized, the amount was for expenses incurred and that the amount was reasonable, citing authority in support of the decision. CONCLUSION Defendant has shown that this Court’s Award of Attorney’s fees was not only justified and proper, but she has also shown that the Appellate Courts will not vacate and remand the Ruling absent obvious abuse of discretion, or failure to provide the reasons for the decision. Defendant in this matter had been a victim of identity theft, then became a victim of vexatious, frivolous litigation for which cost her $850.00 in attorney’s fees. She asked for no damages, nothing more than the costs she had incurred. Further, the defendant has shown that opposing counsel’s Motion to vacate is the improper response to the award of attorney’s fees. Defendant MOVES this Honorable Court to DENY Plaintiff’s Motion to Vacate Award. Respectfully submitted, this 19th day of October, 2009 By: _____________________________ GA 30189
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby Certify that I have this 19th day of October, 2009 served a true and correct copy of Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Motion to Vacate Award of Attorney’s Fees upon Plaintiff through their counsel on record by causing to be deposited with USPS, First class Mail, proper postage affixed and mailed as follows: Trace Dillon The Dillon Law Firm, P.C. 2775 Cruse Road, Ste. 201 Lawrenceville, GA 30044 By: ___________________________ GA 30189
Documents Similar To Reply Brief to Objection to Attorneys FeesSkip carouselMotion to Dismiss because of Fraud & Fraud on the CourtDoc 730Chapter 11 Seeking Attorney Fees Pursuant to Fee Shifting PL94Ch11Wong v. Jing Attorneys' Fee Award4:10-cv-01564 #127Lightspeed AppealMahan v. Roc Nation and Jay Z - attorneys fees opinion.pdfShloss v. Sweeney et al - Document No. 76Compensation of Attorney Pale Ganibe MontillaAmerican Board of Interna Medi v. Sarah Muller, 3rd Cir. (2013)Rural Bank of CalapeLarchmont Engineering, Inc. v. Toggenburg Ski Center, Inc., Larchmont Engineering, Inc. v. Greek Peak, Inc., 444 F.2d 490, 2d Cir. (1971)3:14-cv-00057 #50eAlmeda v. Carino DigestCase Digests for Canons 10-13Notes.docin Re AlmacenStipulation for Corrective Action Plan 12.16.11 #100Santos v LlamasLegal Ethics 2006Metropolitan Bank vs CA10000027781Joseph B. Sanchez v. The Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Company, 538 F.2d 304, 10th Cir. (1976)Corrupt Jackson Lewis Attorneys Respond to Appellant's Docketing Statement that clearly demonstrates their collusion with court staff and fraud upon the court. These attorneys should not even be allowed to stand bar for a cocktail.155-6United States v. Brooks, 10th Cir. (2000)Sue C. Wagoner, Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant-Appellant v. Robert J. Wagoner, Defendant-Counter-Claimant-Appellee, 938 F.2d 1120, 10th Cir. (1991)Law on Negotiable InstrumentsRory Walsh v. United States, 3rd Cir. (2016)Documents About Attorney's FeeSkip carouselContract AssignmentAFFIRMED - Motion to Dismiss Granted WITH Prejudice, Defendants' Attorney's Fees AwardedPersonal Appearance AgreementTannen Campbell v. Magic Leap, Inc.David Azar v. National City Bank, 11th Cir. (2010)Haedicke Rebuttal Expert ReportDCBS News Release - State to fine four insurers for violations involving mental health coverageNorman's Heritage Real Estate Company, D/B/A Realty World--Norman's Heritage Real Estate Company v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, 727 F.2d 911, 10th Cir. (1984)Murray Tillman, Rosalind N. Tillman, Harry C. Press, Francella Press and Grace Rosner v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Association, Inc., Bernard Katz, Philip S. Trusso, Sidney M. Plitman, Anthony J. Desimone, Robert Friedland, Mrs. Robert Bennington, E. Richard McIntyre James v. Welch, Mrs. Ellen Fenstermaker and James M. Whittles, Murray Tillman, Rosalind N. Tillman, Harry C. Press, Francella Press and Grace Rosner v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Association, Inc., and E. Richard McIntyre Individually, and to His Own Use and to the Use of Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., and Bernard Katz, Philip S. Trusso, Sidney M. Plitman, Anthony J. Desimone, Albert Friedland, Mrs. Robert Bennington, James v. Welch, Mrs. Ellen Fenstermaker, and James M. Whittles, 580 F.2d 1222, 4th Cir. (1978)Sample Employment AgreementAetna Casualty & Surety Company, Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant-Appellee v. Retail Local 906 Afl-Cio Welfare Fund Nemiah Soanes Vincent Fuentes Althea Neblett John Economos George Rosenfeld George Schwartz, Defendants-Counter-Claimants-Appellants, Max Goldweber Marcia Berger Hershkowitz, D/b/u in the Firm Name of Goldweber & Hershkowitz, 106 F.3d 34, 2d Cir. (1997)Rosendin Electric, Inc. v. United Pacific Insurance Company, Defendant-Third-Party-Plaintiff-Appellee v. J.A. Jones Construction Company, a North Carolina Corporation, Third-Party-Defendant-Appellant. Rosendin Electric, Inc. v. United Pacific Insurance Company, Defendant-Third-Party-Plaintiff-Appellant v. J.A. Jones Construction Company, a North Carolina Corporation Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, a Connecticut Corporation, Third-Party-Defendants-Appellees, 42 F.3d 1401, 3rd Cir. (1994)David Provost v. Martin F. Unger, Aetna Life & Casualty Co., Third-Party v. Budget Rent a Car of New Orleans, Inc., Third-Party Cross-Appellee v. Columbia Casualty Insurance Company, D/B/A Cna, Third-Party Cross-Appellant. Isaac Stevens v. Martin F. Unger, Aetna Life & Casualty Co., Third-Party v. Budget Rent a Car of New Orleans, Inc., Third-Party v. Farmers Insurance Company, Inc., Third-Party, 949 F.2d 161, 3rd Cir. (1992)United States of America for the Use of Yonker Construction Company, an Iowa Corporation, Appellee/cross-Appellant v. Western Contracting Corporation, a Corporation, and the Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, Appellants/cross-Appellees v. Concrete Industries D/B/A General Steel Products Co., Inc., Third Party Western Contracting, Counter, 935 F.2d 936, 3rd Cir. (1991)Hudson v. Citibank (South Dakota) NA, Alaska (2016)Hudson v. Citibank (South Dakota) NA, Alaska (2016)Legal Services Agreement1:13-cv-00501 #70Brunswick Corporation, a Delaware Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant/cross v. Spinit Reel Company, an Oklahoma Corporation, and Don McIntire Defendants- Appellees/cross-Appellants, 832 F.2d 513, 10th Cir. (1987)United States of America, F/u/b/o Krupp Steel Products, Inc., D/B/A Diversified Steel Services v. Aetna Insurance Company, 831 F.2d 978, 11th Cir. (1987)Storani v. Arnstein & Lehr2007 09 10 Dennis Montgomery Declaration (Montgomery v eTreppid)Family Code § 271 Sanctions AbuseEsmat Zaklama, M.D. v. Mount Sinai Medical Center, 906 F.2d 645, 11th Cir. (1990)The Aetna Casualty and Surety Company v. Stuart E. Liebowitz, D/B/A Claridge Agency Ltd., Claridge Brokerage, Inc., Andrew Brokerage, Inc., Dina Brokerage, Inc., Eric Brokerage, Inc., Jeffrey Brokerage, Inc., Kevin Brokerage, Inc., Lisa Brokerage, Inc., Marian Brokerage, Inc., Mickie Brokerage, Inc., and Robin Brokerage, Inc., 730 F.2d 905, 2d Cir. (1984)Cotriss v RoswellSzymoniakTranscript_5-6-12Tech company wage-fixing suitBowen v. Paisley - Remind Me Decision on CounterclaimsCrandall StrutherCrandall Struthers v Hudgins Fibonacci et al.pdfs v Hudgins Fibonacci Et AlMore From Janet and JamesSkip carouselNotice of Filing DeKalb County Georgia Superior CourtMotion for Reconsideration Georgia Court of AppealsWrongful Foreclosure Appeal 11th Cir.Plaintiffs' Initial Disclosures in Rights CaseReply to Motion to Void OrderPetition for Cert. To US Supreme Court, v. GA PowerJudicial NoticeUS Supreme Court Stegeman V GA PowerWrongful Foreclosure Xyz ABCReply Brief to GA Power Defendants Opposition to Plaintiff's Rule 60(b) MotionMotion for Reconsideration Denial Of Plaintiff's Rule 60(b) MotionEmergency Motion to Order Clerks to Cease Hindering and Tampering With AppealCollector v McDonald State Court DeKalb County, GAIn the Magistrate Court of Dekalb CountyPlaintiff's Objection to Order and Request for District Judge to De Novo ReviewZuccarini v NameJet, VeriSign, eNom, and Network Solutions Defendant Zuccarini's Reply to Request for Contempt Merrick Bank (Frank J Hannah) v Stegeman Stegeman's CounterclaimDS Holdings v Zuccarini Appellant Brief 9th Circuit Court of AppealsUS Supreme Court Docket Report Stegeman v LilligOrderonTROIn Georgia Court of Appeals, Motion for ReconsiderationGa. Ct. App. Affirmation Heritage Bank v StegemanReply to Superior Court Defendants Objection to Plaintiffs' Rule 60(b) Motion Reply to GA Power Rule 60(b)(2),(3),(4),(6)Judicial NoticeMotion to Produce DocumentsReply To GA Power Defendants 1:08-cv-1971-WSDStegeman v Lillig Appellate HoaxState of the Ga Judiciary Address March 2010