Source: http://al.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20181206_0001119.NAL.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2020-04-05 20:36:09
Document Index: 502203717

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 405', '§ 636', '§ 404', '§ 404', 'art 404', 'art, 284', '§ 404', 'art, 357']

FindACase™ | Wise v. Berryhill
PATRICK WISE, Plaintiff,
The plaintiff, Patrick William Wise, appeals from the decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”)[1] denying his application for a period of disability and Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”). Mr. Wise timely pursued and exhausted his administrative remedies and the decision of the Commissioner is ripe for review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). The parties have consented to the exercise of dispositive jurisdiction by a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (Doc. 24). Accordingly, the court issues the following memorandum opinion.
The plaintiff was 47 years old on the date of the ALJ's opinion. (Tr. at 35). His past work experience includes employment as a master carpenter. (Tr. at 34). The plaintiff claims that he became disabled on August 21, 2013, due to severe low back pain, severe neck pain, carpal tunnel syndrome, depression, panic disorder with agoraphobia, post-traumatic stress disorder, and attention deficit disorder with hyperactivity. (Doc. 15, p.2).
The fourth step requires a determination of whether the claimant's impairments prevent him from returning to past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant can still do his past relevant work, the claimant is not disabled and the evaluation stops. Id. If the claimant cannot do past relevant work, then the analysis proceeds to the fifth step. Id. Step five requires the court to consider the claimant's RFC, as well as the claimant's age, education, and past work experience, in order to determine if he do other work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). If the claimant can do other work, the claimant is not disabled. Id. The burden is on the Commissioner to demonstrate that other jobs exist which the claimant can perform; once that burden is met, the claimant must prove his or her inability to perform those jobs in order to be found disabled. Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999).
Applying the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found that the plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since his alleged onset date of August 21, 2013. (Tr. at 20). According to the ALJ, the plaintiff has the following impairments that are considered “severe” based on the requirements set forth in the regulations: “cervical disc disease, obesity, s/p carpal tunnel surgery, and lumbar back pain.” Id. He also determined that the plaintiff's “major depression-recurrent and anxiety disorder” are non-severe. Id. at 27. The ALJ found that the plaintiff's severe and non-severe impairments, separately and in combination, neither meet nor medically equal any of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Id. at 29. The ALJ found the plaintiff to have mild restriction in activities of daily life, mild difficulties in social functioning, and mild difficulties with regard to concentration. (Tr. at 28). The ALJ determined that the plaintiff has the residual functional capacity to perform work at a sedentary level of exertion as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(a). Id. The ALJ further elaborated:
The claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(a), which allows for occasional stooping and crouching; no upper extremities pushing or pulling; no driving; and a temperature controlled environment.
(Tr. at 24)
According to the ALJ, the plaintiff is unable to perform any of his past relevant work and has “a high school education, a 2-year electronics degree, and is able to communicate in English” as those terms are defined by the regulations. (Tr. at 33). He determined that “[t]ransferability of job skills is not material to the determination of disability because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework supports a finding that the claimant is ‘not disabled,' whether or not the claimant has transferable job skills.” Id. Even though the plaintiff is limited to sedentary work, the ALJ determined that there are a significant number of jobs in the national economy that he is capable of performing, such as assembler, table worker, and surveillance monitor. (Tr. at 36). The ALJ concluded his findings by stating that Plaintiff “has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, since August 21, 2013, the amended onset date of disability.” Id.
The court's role in reviewing claims brought under the Social Security Act is a narrow one. The scope of its review is limited to determining (1) whether there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the findings of the Commissioner, and (2) whether the correct legal standards were applied. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390, 401 (1971); Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002). The court approaches the factual findings of the Commissioner with deference, but applies close scrutiny to the legal conclusions. See Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996). The court may not decide facts, weigh evidence, or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Id. “The substantial evidence standard permits administrative decision makers to act with considerable latitude, and ‘the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency's finding from being supported by substantial evidence.'” Parker v. Bowen, 793 F.2d 1177, 1181 (11th Cir. 1986) (Gibson, J., dissenting) (quoting Consolo v. Federal Mar. Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966)). Indeed, even if this court finds that the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner's decision, the court must affirm if the decision is supported by substantial evidence. Miles, 84 F.3d at 1400. No. decision is automatic, however, for “despite this deferential standard [for review of claims] it is imperative that the Court scrutinize the record in its entirety to determine the reasonableness of the decision reached.” Bridges v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 622, 624 (11th Cir. 1987). Moreover, failure to apply the correct legal standards is grounds for reversal. See Bowen v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 629, 635 (11th Cir. 1984).
Mr. Wise argues that the ALJ's decision was erroneous and should be remanded for three reasons. (Doc. 15, p.1). First, he claims that the ALJ failed to afford the proper weight to the opinions of his treating physician, Dr. Tariq, and his treating psychologist, Dr. Lachman, and failed to show good case for doing so. Id. Second, Wise argues that the ALJ failed to state his reasons for affording less weight to the opinions of Dr. June Nichols and Dr. David Wilson with “at least some measure of clarity.” Id. Third, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not consider all of his severe mental impairments. Id.
A. Treating Medical Providers
A treating physician's testimony is entitled to “substantial or considerable weight unless ‘good cause' is shown to the contrary.” Crawford v. Commissioner of Social Security, 363 F.3d 1155, 1159 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997)) (internal quotations omitted). The weight to be afforded a medical opinion regarding the nature and severity of a claimant's impairments depends, among other things, upon the examining and treating relationship the medical source had with the claimant, the evidence the medical source presents to support the opinion, how consistent the opinion is with the record as a whole, and the specialty of the medical source. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d). Furthermore, “good cause” exists for an ALJ not to give a treating physician's opinion substantial weight when the: “(1) treating physician's opinion was not bolstered by the evidence; (2) evidence supported a contrary finding; or (3) treating physician's opinion was conclusory or inconsistent with the doctor's own medical records.” Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1241 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1440); see also Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 583-84 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that “good cause” existed where the opinion was contradicted by other notations in the physician's own record).
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The court must also be aware of the fact that opinions such as whether a claimant is disabled, the claimant&#39;s residual functional capacity, and the application of vocational factors &ldquo;are not medical opinions, . . . but are, instead, opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner because they are administrative findings that are dispositive of a case; i.e., that would direct the determination or decision of disability.&rdquo; 20 C.F.R. &sect;&sect; 404.1527(e), 416.927(d). The court is interested in the doctors&#39; evaluations of the claimant&#39;s &ldquo;condition and the medical consequences thereof, not their opinions of the legal consequences of his [or her] condition.&rdquo; Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1440. Such statements by a physician are relevant to ...