Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/371/1354/642125/
Timestamp: 2020-08-08 02:26:54
Document Index: 527966940

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 59', '§ 84', '§ 1630', '§ 1630', '§ 1630', '§ 1630']

Steve Rossbach, Raul Cairo, Ernesto R. Sam, Lawson Sutton, Francisco J. Gorordo, Plaintiffs-appellants, v. City of Miami, Defendant-appellee, 371 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir. 2004) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Eleventh Circuit › 2004 › Steve Rossbach, Raul Cairo, Ernesto R. Sam, Lawson Sutton, Francisco J. Gorordo, Plaintiffs-appellan...
Steve Rossbach, Raul Cairo, Ernesto R. Sam, Lawson Sutton, Francisco J. Gorordo, Plaintiffs-appellants, v. City of Miami, Defendant-appellee, 371 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir. 2004)
US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit - 371 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir. 2004) June 7, 2004
We review the district court's granting of the City's motion for judgment as a matter of law de novo, considering only the evidence that may properly be considered and the reasonable inferences drawn from it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Slicker v. Jackson, 215 F.3d 1225, 1229 (11th Cir. 2000). Where "no legally sufficient evidentiary basis exists for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue," judgment as a matter of law is proper. Moore's Federal Practice, § 59.50 [5], 3d Ed., Vol. 12 (1998).
Disability under the first definition above, according to the Supreme Court, involves a three-step analysis. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 141 L. Ed. 2d 540 (1998). First, plaintiffs must be impaired. Next, the court must identify the life activity that the plaintiff claims has been limited and determine whether it is a major life activity under the ADA. The regulations interpreting the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 define major life activities as "functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning and working." 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j) (2) (ii).4 If not contained within these exemplars, the activity must be "significant" to everyday life. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 638, 118 S. Ct. 2196. Several courts, for example, have found that sleeping constitutes a major life activity. See Pack v. Kmart Corp., 166 F.3d 1300, 1305 (10th Cir. 1999). Finally, the court must determine whether the impairment "substantially limits" that life activity. The EEOC defines this phrase to mean "significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform the same major life activity." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (1).
Proceeding to the second step, the district court sorted through the variety of activities that the Officers claimed were hindered by their impairments, and properly focused on the major life activities of walking, sitting, standing and sleeping.6 The court rejected the Officers' contention that these particular life activities were substantially limited by their impairments. We agree. Though our Court has not squarely addressed this issue, other courts have consistently held that someone who walks, sits, stands or sleeps "moderately below average" is not disabled under the Act. See, e.g., Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 107 (3d Cir. 1996); Harmon v. Sprint United Mgt. Corp., 264 F. Supp. 2d 964 (D. Kan. 2003); 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j). Particularly relevant to our analysis is a Second Circuit decision remarkably similar to ours, in which that court reversed the jury's verdict and found that three light duty police officers failed to prove they were disabled under the ADA. Colwell v. Suffolk County Police Dept., 158 F.3d 635 (2d Cir. 1998).
Id. at 644; see also, Chanda v. Engelhard, 234 F.3d 1219, 1222 (11th Cir. 2000) ("substantially limits" meant that "a diminished activity tolerance for normal daily activities such as lifting, running and performing manual tasks, as well as lifting restriction, did not constitute a disability under the ADA."); Hilburn, 181 F.3d at 1228 ("diminished activity tolerance" is not the same as substantial limitation).
The Officers argue either that they were substantially limited in the major life activity of working, or otherwise were regarded as such by the City. Essential to either claim, according the EEOC regulations, is a showing that each plaintiff was "significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (3) (i) (emphasis added). Our Court shares the same interpretation. Carruthers v. BSA Advertising, 357 F.3d 1213, 1216 (11th Cir. 2004) (adopting the language of the EEOC regulations). The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working. Id. Thus, an impairment must preclude — or at least be perceived to preclude — an individual from more than one type of job, even if the job foreclosed is the individual's job of choice. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 492, 119 S. Ct. 2139, 144 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1999).
A plaintiff is "regarded as" being disabled if he meets one of three conditions: (1) he has a physical impairment that does not substantially limit major life activities but is treated by an employer as constituting such a limitation; (2) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major life activities only as a result of the attitude of an employer toward such impairment; or (3) has no physical or mental impairment but is treated by an employer as having such an impairment. 29 C.F.R. 1614.203(a) (5). Our Court has held that, for a plaintiff to prevail under this theory, he must show two things: (1) that the perceived disability involves a major life activity; and (2) that the perceived disability is "substantially limiting" and significant. Sutton v. Lader, 185 F.3d 1203, 1209 (11th Cir. 1999).
The City also directs our attention to Gordon v. E.L. Hamm & Assocs., in which this Court rejected plaintiff's "regarded as" claim because he failed to show that, after being diagnosed with cancer, his employer perceived that he could not do the work assignments he performed before. 100 F.3d 907 (11th Cir. 1996). Significantly, following plaintiff's diagnosis with cancer, he continued to perform the same or similar work (maintenance work on military housing) that he had previously performed at the original job site. Id. at 913. Moreover, plaintiff's reassignment after returning from chemotherapy treatment resulted simply from being absent during a busy season — a situation which required his employer to assign time-sensitive work to another employee. Id. Unlike in Gordon, the Officers here were not merely reassigned to different, but similar, work assignments. Testimony from former Police Chief Donald Warshaw made it clear that light duty officers were those not "combat-ready," and therefore limited to administrative duties. The City's policy and practice certainly suggest that the City regarded them as being substantially limited as to working as police officers in general.
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2151, 144 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1999).
This Court's analysis of this issue has, for the most part, been relegated to cases where the plaintiff proved he or she was regarded as being substantially limited only with respect to fairly narrow tasks within a particular job — that is, situations which clearly failed to satisfy the "broad range of jobs" test. See, e.g., Cash v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1301, 1306-07 (11th Cir. 2000) (employee failed to show that employer regarded her as substantially limited in major life activity of working, based on evidence that employer prohibited her from driving a company vehicle once it became aware of extent of her medical problems); Swain v. Hillsborough County School Bd., 146 F.3d 855, 857-58 (11th Cir. 1998) (vague assertion that plaintiff unable to perform any job that precludes her from having regular access to a restroom not "broad range of jobs" under ADA). One decision seems particularly relevant to the case at hand, however. In Witter v. Delta Air Lines Inc., we found that piloting airplanes is too narrow a range of jobs to constitute a "class of jobs" as that term is defined in the EEOC regulations. 138 F.3d 1366, 1369-70 (11th Cir. 1998).
Likewise, other circuits directly addressing this issue with respect to police officers have consistently found that "police officer" is not a broad range or class of jobs. For example, in Epps v. City of Pine Lawn, 353 F.3d 588, 590 (8th Cir. 2003), plaintiff police officer injured his neck and back in an auto accident while on duty. The City concluded that he no longer could perform "the particular job of police officer" and fired him because it had no light duty positions available with the force. Id. Plaintiff argued that the City perceived him as disabled because his termination suggested that the City believed he was substantially limited in performing the major life activity of working as a police officer. Id. at 591. Affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment in the City's favor, the court found the evidence insufficient to establish an ADA "regarded as" claim, reasoning that the inability to perform a "single, particular job [police officer] does not constitute a substantial limitation on the major life activity of working." Id. at 592. Similarly, in Sheehan v. City of Gloucester, 321 F.3d 21, 25-26 (1st Cir. 2003), the First Circuit held:
The Second and Fourth Circuit courts made identical findings in Foore v. City of Richmond, 6 Fed.Appx. 148, 154 (4th Cir. 2001) ("the position of police officer is simply too narrow of a field to be considered a `class of jobs' [under the ADA]."), and Colwell, 158 F.3d at 647. The Second Circuit initially made this finding in a case brought under the Rehabilitation Act. Daley v. Koch, 892 F.2d 212, 215 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that the particular position of police officer is not a class of jobs). Similarly, the Fifth Circuit reached the same conclusion in the context of a firefighter. Bridges v. City of Bossier, 92 F.3d 329, 334 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Daley and concluding that a limitation preventing one from becoming a firefighter affected only a narrow range of jobs).
In construing the various terms of this definition of disability, there are two potential sources for guidance — the regulations interpreting the Rehabilitation Act and the EEOC regulations interpreting the ADA at 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 193, 122 S. Ct. 681, 689, 151 L. Ed. 2d 615 (2002). Because Congress drew the ADA's definition of disability almost verbatim from the definition of "handicapped individual" in the Rehabilitation Act, the Supreme Court has stated that it is proper to construe that term in accordance with pre-existing regulatory interpretations under the Rehabilitation Act. Id. at 193-94, 122 S. Ct. at 689. The Supreme Court has noted that the "persuasive authority of the EEOC regulations is less clear" because Congress gave no agency "authority to issue regulations interpreting the term `disability' in the ADA." Id. at 94, 122 S. Ct. at 689. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has previously construed the ADA in light of the EEOC regulations without deciding what deference is due the regulations, id., and this Court also frequently looks to the EEOC regulations for interpretive guidance regarding Subsection A of the ADA. See e.g., Hilburn v. Murata Electron. N. Am., 181 F.3d 1220, 1226 (11th Cir. 1999); Gordon v. E.L. Hamm & Assocs., Inc., 100 F.3d 907, 911 (11th Cir. 1996).
After oral argument was heard in this matter, counsel for the Officers submitted supplemental authority when this panel questioned whether a plaintiff could ever be disabled in the major life activity of working if he was employed in a re-employment job with the same employer. In the opinion cited by the Officers, this Court did indeed reverse a district court's judgment as a matter of law on this very issue, finding that the fact alone that plaintiffs were re-employed by defendant in positions tailored to their limitations did not establish that they could not show that they were disabled Mullins v. Crowell, 228 F.3d 1305, 1315 (11th Cir. 2000). But that panel went on to conclude that a genuine issue of material fact as to whether jobs utilizing plaintiffs' skills were available in the relevant geographical areas precluded a finding that plaintiffs were substantially limited in the major life activity of working. Id. The Officers simply do not take a comparable position here. Their contention is that the City regarded them as being substantially limited not as to working in general, but only with respect to working as police officers. The Officers do not contend, nor does the record reflect, that they were precluded from performing (or the City viewed them as precluded from performing) a broad range of jobs. The Officers position is that "police officer" is a broad range or class of jobs. Our decision is not based on the fact that the Officers continued to work within the police department. Rather, the Officers' argument fails, as described in great detail above, because the job of "police officer" is not a "class of jobs" under the ADA.