Source: http://mjpetro.typepad.com/7th_circuit_alert/2011/10/index.html
Timestamp: 2013-05-22 02:07:36
Document Index: 211481339

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1951', '§ 1001', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2']

USA v. Aida Salem and Bogdan Ganescu, 10-3682 & 3715. Between November 2003 and at least August 2006, more than two thousand fell victim to the internet fraud scheme in which Salem and Ganescu participated with others. Individuals outside the United States, often based in Romania (the "foreign co-schemers"), posed as sellers of goods on eBay and other internet auction sites. The victims of the scheme were directed to send payment by wire transfer, typically through Western Union. The foreign co-schemers developed a network of individuals in the United States, including numerous co-schemers in the Chicago area, who collected payment using false identifications. The co-schemers kept a percentage of the proceeds for themselves and forwarded the remainder to the foreign co-schemers.
Following their guilty pleas, Salem and Ganescu were sentenced and then appealed. They argued that the district court erred in applying U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) and in making its relevant conduct findings. Discussion We review the district court's interpretation and application of the sentencing guidelines de novo and review its factual findings for clear error. United States v. Wright, Nos. 10-1249 & 10-1956. Under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B), "a defendant may be held accountable for the conduct of others 'if that conduct was in furtherance of a jointly undertaken criminal activity and reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal activity.' " United States v. Fouse, 578 F.3d 643, 653 (7th Cir. 2009). The defendants argue that to establish jointly undertaken criminal activity, the government had to prove that they "assisted or agreed to promote" a coconspirator's conduct, which they interpret as "doing something to help the co-conspirator commit his/her criminal acts." None of our cases requires that a defendant at the bottom of a conspiratorial hierarchy or pyramid engage in some affirmative conduct to help a co-conspirator commit each of his or her criminal acts before the defendant may be held accountable for such acts. Rather, the district court "may consider any explicit agreement or implicit agreement fairly inferred from the conduct of the defendant and others." U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 cmt. n.2. Several factors are relevant in determining the scope of jointly undertaken criminal activity: (1) the existence of a single scheme, see United States v. Adeniji, 221 F.3d 1020, 1028 (7th Cir. 2000); (2) similarities in modus operandi, see id. 1028-29 (noting that the defendants "took virtually identical steps in setting up mailing addresses and bank accounts for the fictional . . . vendors" closely in time); (3) coordination of activities among schemers, see id. at 1028 (multiple telephone calls between phones associated with the defendants confirmed that they were coordinating their activities; (4) pooling of resources or profits, see Adeniji, 221 F.3d at 1028 (sharing of proceeds); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 cmt. n.2, illus. (c)(6); (5) knowledge of the scope of the scheme, see United States v. Thomas, 199 F.3d 950, 954 (7th Cir. 1999); and 6) length and degree of the defendant's participation in the scheme, see id. On remand, the district court made appropriate findings regarding jointly undertaken criminal activity, and its findings are well-supported by the record and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. In this case, there is a single scheme, similarities in modus operandi, coordination of activities among co-schemers, and sharing of resources, including information and rides to currency exchanges. Further, both Salem and Ganescu knew of the scope of the scheme and participated in it fully and for a lengthy time period-more than two years. Conclusion The district court made appropriate findings on remand, and its findings are supported in the record. We therefore AFFIRM its judgments.
Posted by Michael J. Petro on October 25, 2011 at 06:04 PM | Permalink
Walter Hill, in his capacity as deputy liquor commissioner for East St. Louis, Illinois, exerted his position and authority to demand bribes, property, and, in at least one instance, sexual favors from liquor license holders. He pleaded guilty to attempting to commit extortion under color of official right in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 and making false statements to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Internal Revenue Service in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2). The district court sentenced Hill to sixty months' imprisonment. In sentencing Hill, the district court determined that he was subject to a four-level upward adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1(b)(3) for conduct by a public official in a high-level decision-making or sensitive position.
After considering sentencing testimony, the district court applied a four-level upward adjustment to Hill's sentence under U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1(b)(3). Pursuant to that Guideline section, a defendant convicted of "soliciting, or receiving a bribe" is subject to a four-level increase "[i]f the offense involved . . . any public official in a high-level decision-making or sensitive position . . . ." U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1(b)(3). The commentary defines "[h]igh-level decision-making or sensitive position" as "a position characterized by a direct authority to make decisions for, or on behalf of, a government department, agency, or other government entity, or by a substantial influence over the decision-making process." Id. at cmt. n.4(A). The commentary provides examples of public officials in high-level decision-making positions: "a prosecuting attorney, a judge, an agency administrator, and any other public official with a similar level of authority." Id. at cmt. n.4(B). The commentary similarly provides examples of public officials who hold sensitive positions: "a juror, a law enforcement officer, an election official, and any other similarly situated individual." Id.
The district court found that Hill qualified for the adjustment. The court acknowledged that Hill didn't establish liquor law policy or liquor commissioner policy, nor did he supervise other employees, but found that he qualified for the enhancement because he exercised substantial influence over the decision-making process. The sentencing judge found, based on testimony at the hearing, that "Hill was the [m]ayor's eyes and ears on liquor in the East St. Louis area," and the "[m]ayor basically deferred to him . . . so everything went through . . . Hill." The judge also found that Hill "had the authority to recommend to the [m]ayor, who apparently listened to him, as to who should and should not get a license in the first instance or have one renewed after that." The court explained that Hill "was the primary individual responsible for . . . overseeing the process of renewing liquor licenses[, and] exercised an inordinate amount of discretion over the licensing of liquor establishments and the renewal of those licenses."
The commentary defines "[h]igh-level decision-making or sensitive position" as "a position characterized by . . . a substantial influence over the decision-making process." U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1(b)(3) cmt. n.4(A). Because we find that the district court properly determined that Hill held a sensitive position, we don't have to reach the question of whether he was also a high-level decisionmaker. In United States v. Reneslacis, 349 F.3d 412, 415 (7th Cir. 2003), we considered whether an Immigration and Naturalization Service district-adjudications officer qualified as either a high-level decision-maker or held a sensitive position. Id. The district court's findings in this case similarly support its conclusion that Hill was in a sensitive position given his relationship with the mayor and authority as deputy liquor commissioner. Courts have found the enhancement appropriate based on the official's ability to use his position to influence another in the exercise of his discretion. See, e.g., United States v. ReBrook, 58 F.3d 961, 970 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding that part-time attorney for state's lottery commission held sensitive position based on his relationship to director of lottery commission, the advice he gave him, the influence he had with other lottery commission members, and the fact that he was privy to confidential information), abrogated on other grounds by Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999); United States v. Tomblin, 46 F.3d 1369, 1391 (5th Cir. 1995) ("A senator's top administrative aide holds a position of substantial influence, because he often serves as the senator's functional equivalent."). The district court properly found that Hill was subject to the enhancement based on his position and substantial influence over the decision-making process. And if that wasn't enough, the district court's finding that Hill was in a similar position to a law enforcement officer was well supported by the record.
The commentary at issue here provides examples of officials in "sensitive positions" and includes "any other similarly situated individual." U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1 cmt. n.4(B) (emphasis added). Hill's limiting interpretation of the commentary is neither in line with the Commission's use of the word "any," which indicates a broad inclusion of similarly situated individuals, nor other provisions of the commentary, which expressly decline to narrowly construe U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1. See U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1 cmt. n.1 ("`[P]ublic official' shall be construed broadly."); Id. at cmt. background ("The object and nature of a bribe may vary widely from case to case . . . consequently, a guideline for the offense must be designed to cover diverse situations."). The enumerated examples are not categories and not intended to be exhaustive. The district court properly found that Hill's position impacted applicants' ability to obtain and renew licenses. His de facto authority to deny license applications or suspend licenses (even if temporary and subject to review), could significantly impact businesses' ability to operate and earn revenue. This authority placed Hill in a sensitive position.