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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2000', '§ 1104', '§ 6', '§ 2000', '§ 2102', '§ 213', '§ 213', '§1101', '§ 2000', '§ 105']

United States District Court For The District Of Columbia | Disparate Impact | Civil Rights Act Of 1964
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Marin v. City of Pearsall Police Department - Document No. 5
Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6 (1982)
Caldwell v. Johnson, 4th Cir. (2008)
Case 1:05-cv-01934-EGS-AK
Civil Action No. 05-1934(EGS)
Plaintiff Guadalupe Gonzalez commenced this action alleging
that defendant, Alberto Gonzalez, Attorney General of the United
States, discriminated against her based on her gender and
national origin (Hispanic/Mexican American) in violation of the
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), see 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq
Pending before the Court is defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Upon careful
consideration of defendant’s motion, the response and reply
thereto, the Court DENIES the motion.
Plaintiff is an attorney for the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security in the U.S. Customs Enforcement Agency. Compl. ¶ 2.
She has worked as a federal attorney for twenty-five years; first
as District Counsel for Immigration and Naturalization Services
(“INS”), and currently as Chief Counsel for U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). Id. Plaintiff has extensive
experience in immigration and nationality laws, and has received
numerous awards and consistent high recognition for her
performance in her position. Id. at ¶¶ 2, 9-17.
complaint was filed, plaintiff had a GS-15/10 rank. Id.
In 2002, Plaintiff applied for an Immigration Judge (“IJ”)
position in El Paso, Texas, which was publicly posted. Id. at ¶
18. That position, however, was filled by an IJ who transferred
from another location. Id. In 2004, two IJ positions became
available in El Paso. Id. at ¶ 19. Neither of these positions
were publicly posted and both were filled by white males pursuant
to the Attorney General’s direct appointment authority under 8
U.S.C. § 1104(b) and 5 C.F.R. § 6.3(a). Id. at ¶¶ 19, 23-24.
Attorney General sent a referral list to the DOJ’s Executive
Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”) and the vacancies were
filled by two people from that list. Id. at ¶¶ 25, 27.
The two men appointed to the IJ positions had less
experience and lower GS rating than plaintiff. Id. at ¶¶ 26, 28,
1 INS was previously an agency under the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), but was transferred to the Department of Homeland Security in March 2003. Plaintiff’s change in position is a result of this transfer; however, her duties are similar. Compl. p. 2 n.1.
2 One of the appointees, Robert Hough, was her direct subordinate, and he did not meet the minimum requirements for the position. Compl. ¶¶ 26, 30. Likewise, the candidate appointed to the other IJ position, Thomas Roepke, had less experience overall
30, 32. In April 2005, plaintiff filed an official EEO complaint
alleging discrimination. This complaint was dismissed for
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted in
June 2005. Plaintiff filed this action on September 30, 2005,
within ninety days of her July 2, 2005 receipt of defendant’s
administrative dismissal notice. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5.
In her complaint, plaintiff alleges (1) that she was
discriminated against based on her national origin
(Hispanic/Mexican American) and gender when the Attorney General
failed to select her for appointment as an IJ, but instead
selected two white men; and (2) that the defendant’s use of his
appointment authority has had a disparate impact on plaintiff as
well as other minority applicants for IJ positions within the
Defendant contends that plaintiff has not established a
prima facie case for discrimination under Title VII because the
two IJ positions at issue were never posted; therefore, plaintiff
did not apply for the positions. Second, defendant argues that
because plaintiff did not claim disparate impact in her original
EEO complaint, she is barred from litigating that claim before
this Court for the first time.
and very little experience with EOIR and immigration issues. Id. at ¶ 32.
The Court will not grant a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) unless it
in support of her claim which would entitle her to relief.
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46,
(1957); Kowal v. MCI
Communications Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
Accordingly, at this stage of the proceedings, the Court accepts
as true all of the complaint’s factual allegations. See Does v.
United States Dep’t. of Justice, 753 F.2d 1092, 1102 (D.C. Cir.
1985). Plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of all inferences
that can be derived from the facts alleged. Kowal, 16 F.3d at
1276. The Court must liberally construe the complaint in favor
of the plaintiff. See Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421-
422 (1969).
A. Excepted service positions are subject to Title VII.
Defendant argues that because the two IJ positions at issue
are excepted service positions, the manner in which they were
filled by the Attorney General is not subject to Title VII.
Civil service employees are either in the “competitive
service” or the “excepted service.” 5 U.S.C. §§ 2102(a)(1),
2103(a).
3 Excepted service employees are not subject to the
usual competitive process for obtaining federal employment. See 5
C.F.R. § 213.101(a). IJ positions fall under the excepted
service category because they are attorneys in the executive
civil service, id. at § 213.3102, and the Attorney General has
the option of appointing an IJ through his appointment authority.
See 8 U.S.C. §1101(b)(4) (IJ is defined as an attorney whom “the
Attorney General appoints as an administrative judge within the
Executive Office for Immigration Review”). The plaintiff
concedes that when the Attorney General exercises his appointment
authority, the IJ position can be filled without a public
announcement of the vacancy or a competitive application process.
It is well established that Title VII applies to excepted
service positions. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (extending the
statute’s protection to federal employees, including employees in
executive agencies as defined in 5 U.S.C. § 105). See also Kizas
v. Webster, 707 F.2d 524, 541-42, n. 95 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
(“Title VII’s coverage of executive agency employees is
comprehensive, reaching excepted service as well as competitive
service employees.”). Therefore, the two IJ positions in this
case, filled by the Attorney General’s appointment authority, are
subject to protections under Title VII. Indeed, if Title VII
applied only to competitive service, agencies could easily bypass
3 With the exception of employees in the Senior Executive Service, who do not fall into either one of these categories.
the protections afforded under Title VII by using the appointment
process. Because the defendant cannot exercise his appointment
authority in a discriminatory manner, excepted service positions,
such as that of an IJ, are subject to Title VII.
B. Plaintiff has stated a claim of discrimination based on
gender and national origin.
Defendant next argues that plaintiff has not established a
prima facie case of discrimination because she did not apply for
the open IJ positions. In doing so, however, defendant
incorrectly assumes that the standard prima facie elements apply
in this case. 5
In a Title VII case where a position was filled
noncompetitively, the requirements of a prima facie case are as
follows: 1) plaintiff is a member of a protected class; 2) she
was qualified for the position she sought; 3) she was adversely
affected by the employment decision; and 4) she was rejected
5 Generally speaking, to establish a prima facie case for discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff must show that: 1) she belongs to a protected class; 2) she applied and was qualified for an available position; 3) she was rejected despite her qualifications; and 4) the employer continued to seek applicants who were no more qualified than the plaintiff. See Stella v. Mineta, 284 F.3d 135, 139 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)). These elements are not, however, intended to be rigidly applied in all cases. Because “the precise requirements of a prima facie case can vary depending on the context, [they] were ‘never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic.’” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)).
under circumstances that give rise to an inference of unlawful
discrimination. Underwood v. D.C. Armory Board, No. 83-2843,
1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1297, at *7-*8 (D.D.C. Feb. 10, 1992) (on
remand from Underwood v. D.C. Armory Board, 816 F.2d 769 (D.C.
Cir. 1987)). A plaintiff’s “failure to formally apply for a job
opening will not bar a Title VII plaintiff from establishing a
prima facie case of discriminatory hiring, as long as the
plaintiff made every reasonable attempt to convey his interest in
the job to the employer.”
Cones v. Shalala, 199 F.3d 512, 518
(D.C. Cir. 2000) (citing EEOC v. Metal Service Co., 892 F.2d 341,
348 (3d Cir. 1990).
Further, where there was no notice of a
vacancy, and therefore, no opportunity to apply for the position,
it is sufficient if the plaintiff “might have reasonably expected
selection for promotion.” Underwood v. D.C. Armory Board, No. 83-
2843, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15435, (aff’d in part and remanded in
part, Underwood v. D.C. Armory Board, 816 F.2d 769 (D.C. Cir.
Plaintiff applied for an IJ position in El Paso in 2002. In
2004, two IJ positions became available in El Paso. Drawing all
inferences in favor of the plaintiff, the Court is persuaded at
this juncture that her previous application for a similar
position fairly notified the defendant that she was interested in
becoming an IJ in El Paso and would be interested in future
vacancies. Further, having been an exemplary attorney for the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security in the U.S. Customs
Enforcement Agency for 25 years, it is reasonable that plaintiff
would have expected selection for promotion to an IJ position.
Therefore, at this stage of the proceedings, plaintiff has stated
a claim of discriminatory hiring based on gender and national
Plaintiff Has Stated a Claim for Disparate Impact Discrimination.
prima facie case for discrimination based on disparate impact
because she did not identify a particular policy that has had a
disparate impact on a group of individuals with shared protected
characteristics. The Court disagrees.
A prima facie case for disparate impact requires a showing
of “policies or practices that are neutral on their face and in
intent but that nonetheless discriminate in effect against a
particular group.” Anderson, 180 F.3d at 339 (internal citation
omitted). The Court finds that plaintiff has identified a
particular policy that has a discriminatory effect on a
particular group--defendant’s direct appointment authority.
Specifically, plaintiff alleges that the manner in which this
policy is executed by the defendant has a discriminatory impact
on Hispanic women. Therefore, plaintiff has stated a claim for
disparate impact discrimination at this juncture. 6
6 The parties disagree as to what is the “normal” practice for appointing IJs. The Court finds that this is precisely the
D. Plaintiff Has Exhausted Her Administrative Remedies as to Her Disparate Impact Claim.
Defendant argues that because plaintiff did not raise her
claim of disparate impact in her EEO complaint, she should be
barred from raising it for the first time before this Court
because she has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies.
Plaintiff responds that because her disparate impact claim is
reasonably related to her disparate treatment claim, she need not
exhaust administrative remedies before seeking relief in a
A plaintiff must exhaust all administrative remedies before
bringing a Title VII action. See Currier v. Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty, Inc., 159 F.3d 1363, 1366 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
A Title VII lawsuit is limited to claims “like or reasonably
related to the allegations of the charge and growing out of such
allegations.” Park v. Howard Univ., 71 F.3d 904, 907 (D.C. Cir.
1995). At a minimum, the Title VII claim must stem from
“administrative investigation that can reasonably be expected to
follow the charge of discrimination.” Id. Further, “the
administrative charge requirement should not be construed to
place a heavy technical burden on individuals untrained in
negotiating procedural labyrinths.” Id.
In her administrative charge, the plaintiff not only alleged
type of factual dispute the Court cannot resolve without a more developed record after discovery.
that she was discriminated against as an individual, but also
that the “selection process itself was problematic in important
respects.” Ex. 2, pp. 3, Pl.’s Opp. Further, the plaintiff
asserts in her EEO complaint that the “clandestine ‘direct hiring
not only discriminatory but in contravention of
recognized merit hiring principles.” Id. Although she did not
say in so many words that the “direct hiring process” disparately
impacted Hispanic women by putting them at a disadvantage when it
came to appointments to IJ positions, it was not necessary for
At this stage of the proceedings, if her disparate
impact claim is like or reasonably related to the allegations of
her administrative charge and grows out of such allegations, see
Park, 71 F.3d at 907, then the plaintiff has exhausted her
7 This the plaintiff has done. See also
Jones v. Ashcroft, 321 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9-10 (D.D.C. 2004)(finding
7 Defendant relies on Woodman v. WWOR-TV, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 381, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) for its proposition that failure to exhaust administrative remedies bars plaintiff from bringing a disparate impact claim for the first time in federal court. That case, however, is factually distinguishable, and the Court is not persuaded to follow the Woodman Court. In Woodman, the plaintiff alleged in her administrative complaint that the defendants were motivated by unlawful considerations of her age. However, the plaintiff did not allege in any manner that the defendants promulgated a neutral policy that had a disparate effect of disadvantaging older employees. Id. Therefore, the Woodman Court held that the plaintiff failed to identify a specific facially neutral employment practice and that her disparate impact claim was not reasonably related to her disparate treatment claim. Id. Here, as noted above, the plaintiff did identify in her administrative complaint a particular policy that had a disparate impact on Hispanic women.
that plaintiff’s disparate impact claim fell within the scope of
his EEO charge, which referred to racial discrimination
categorically, because at the administrative stage, plaintiff was
not required to specify under which theory of discrimination he
was proceedings); Byrnie v. Town of Cromwell Public Schools, 73
F. Supp. 2d 204, 220 (D. Conn. 1999) (plaintiff’s administrative
charge only referred to age and gender discrimination, but
because plaintiff need not specify under what theory of
discrimination he was proceeding and the conduct complained of
would “fall within the scope of the EEOC investigation which can
reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of
discrimination,” plaintiff exhausted administrative remedies as
to his disparate impact claim); Brown v. Coach Stores, Inc., 163
F.3d 706, 712 (2d Cir. 1998) (same). Therefore, the Court
concludes that because plaintiff’s disparate impact claim is
reasonably related to her administrative charge, she has
E. Plaintiff relied on sufficient statistics to assert her claim of discrimination.
Defendant argues that because plaintiff provided
insufficient statistics to support her disparate impact claim,
the Court cannot conclude that discriminatory hiring practices
A plaintiff may rely on statistical evidence to show that
applicants were hired or promoted in a racial pattern
significantly different from that of the pool of applicants. See
Berger v. Iron Workers Reinforced Rodmen, 843 F.2d 1395, 1411-
1412 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (internal citations omitted). The
plaintiff, however, cannot establish a prima facie case with
statistics that are so flawed as to be meaningless. Id. at 1413.
The defendant may also introduce alternative statistical evidence
to rebut the plaintiff’s claims. Id.
Plaintiff alleges that only two out of the forty IJs
nationwide are Hispanic. Without providing alternative
statistical evidence, defendant argues unpersuasively that
plaintiff’s numbers are not statistically significant. Further,
the defendant has not shown that the statistics provided by
Plaintiff are “so flawed as to be meaningless” Berger, 843 F.2d
at 1411-1412. Therefore, the Court finds that the statistics
provided by Plaintiff are sufficient to survive defendant’s
motion to dismiss at this time.
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is
DENIED. Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that defendant shall file an appropriate responsive
pleading by no later than October 2, 2006; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that the parties file a meet and confer
report in accordance with Local Civil Rule 16.3 by no later than
October 17, 2006; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that an Initial Scheduling Conference is
scheduled for October 31, 2006, at 12:00 PM in Courtroom 24A.
EMMET G. SULLIVAN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SEPTEMBER 20, 2006
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