Source: https://openjurist.org/114/f3d/869
Timestamp: 2018-03-21 11:17:22
Document Index: 571390138

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2', '§ 1', '§ 2', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 1']

114 F3d 869 United States v. Zelaya | OpenJurist
114 F. 3d 869 - United States v. Zelaya
114 F3d 869 United States v. Zelaya
114 F.3d 869
97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 4127, 97 Daily Journal
D.A.R. 6929
Scottie Lee ZELAYA, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 95-10291.
The district court applied the enhancement provision found at § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F), which provides that a robbery sentence should be increased by two levels if "an express threat of death was made" during the course of the robbery. Because Zelaya was convicted as an accomplice to Motz's bank robbery, the application to his sentence of the death threat enhancement is governed by USSG § 1B1.3(a), which states that "in the case of jointly undertaken criminal activity" the sentencing court should take into account "all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity that occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction."
Thus the district court, applying § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F) by way of § 1B1.3(a), must first determine the scope of the criminal activity that the particular defendant agreed, either explicitly or implicitly, to undertake jointly. USSG § 1B1.3 Application Note 2. The court must then determine whether the conduct that forms the basis of the enhancement (here, Motz's death threat) (1) occurred during the course of the criminal activity; (2) was done "in furtherance of" the criminal activity; and (3) was "reasonably foreseeable in connection with" the criminal activity. Id.
We conclude that a finding of reasonable foreseeability must be based upon something more than the district court's observations about bank robberies in general. C.f. United States v. Castaneda, 9 F.3d 761, 767 (9th Cir.1993) (despite recognized nexus between guns and drugs, there is no presumption that guns are foreseeable in drug transactions, and the burden of proving foreseeability is on the Government). Indeed, it would make little sense for the Commission to have fashioned a robbery enhancement the basis for which could properly be implied from the fact of the robbery alone. If this were the Commission's intent, it could simply have provided for a two-level enhancement to an accomplice's sentence whenever it is determined that the perpetrator made an express death threat during the robbery. Further, the Commission's commentary indicates that the enhancement should apply only in particularly egregious cases: "[t]he intent of the [death threat] provision is to provide an increased offense level for cases in which the offender(s) engaged in conduct that would instill in a reasonable person, who is a victim of the offense, significantly greater fear than that necessary to constitute an element of the offense of robbery." USSG § 2B3.1 Application Note 6. We cannot agree with the district court's reasoning that in every bank robbery the perpetrator's accomplice reasonably can foresee an express death threat being made.
The Government correctly states that this court has applied this application note to conclude that a defendant-accomplice could reasonably foresee an injury to a victim as part of a jointly undertaken bank robbery. See United States v. Luna, 21 F.3d 874 (9th Cir.1994). However, in Luna, we stated that the facts of that case--a jointly undertaken bank robbery with resulting injuries to victims--fit the application note precisely. Id. at 884. Such is not the case here.
Id. Such fact-specific inquiry has consistently been the focus of our foreseeability analysis in similar cases. See, e.g., United States v. Shaw, 91 F.3d 86, 89 (9th Cir.1996) (physical restraint of bank robbery victims "reasonably foreseeable" because defendant was under orders from cohort to make sure nobody entered or left the bank during robbery, and to "pull in" anybody from the parking lot); United States v. Lipsey, 62 F.3d 1134, 1137 (9th Cir.1995) (use of gun during robbery foreseeable because defendant pled guilty to armed robbery and saw one cohort hand another a pistol before the robbery); United States v. Garcia, 909 F.2d 1346, 1349-50 (9th Cir.1990) (cohort's possession of gun during drug transaction foreseeable because of the amount of drugs involved and the length of negotiations leading up to the transaction); United States v. Willis, 899 F.2d 873, 875 (9th Cir.1990) (cohort's possession of gun during drug transaction reasonably foreseeable to accomplice because cohort was wearing gun in waistband, and because there were only a few co-conspirators, suggesting that each knew the others' methods of operation).
It is not as though the enhancement applies to any bank robbery. It applies only where there is an "express threat of death." U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F). An implied threat, which perhaps is present in any robbery, will not suffice. Without an express threat of death, neither the robber who goes inside nor the getaway car driver is subject to the enhancement. But if the robber who goes inside expressly threatens to kill someone, the getaway driver is in no better position to say he did not foresee what took place than the hypothetical robber in the Application Note.
The case at bar is not distinguishable from United States v. Shaw, 91 F.3d 86, 89 (9th Cir.1996). There we followed the Application Note and imposed an enhancement, even though the criminal being sentenced did not know what his accomplices were going to do. Likewise, the Tenth Circuit affirmed an express threat of death enhancement with nothing to support foreseeability of the accomplice's conduct beyond the bank robbery itself, in United States v. Lambert, 995 F.2d 1006 (10th Cir.1993). In addition to the Application Note already discussed, the Tenth Circuit points to one of the illustrations in the Application Notes: a getaway driver is accountable for an injury by the robber who went inside, because it is "reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal activity (given the nature of the offense)." U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, illustration (b)(1).