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06CA2204 | Arrest | Prosecutor
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United States v. Jalid Jose Amer, 824 F.2d 906, 11th Cir. (1987)
Court of Appeals No. 06CA2204
City and County of Denver District Court No. 06CR10572
Announced March 18, 2010
John W. Suthers, Attorney General, Rebecca A. Adams, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Douglas K. Wilson, Colorado State Public Defender, Karen Mahlman Gerash,
Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
Defendant, Martin Novotny, appeals the judgment of conviction
entered on jury verdicts finding him guilty of first degree murder
(after deliberation) and first degree burglary. We reverse and
Defendant first contends the trial court committed reversible
error by denying his challenge for cause to a prospective juror who
was employed as an assistant attorney general. We agree.
Section 16-10-103(1)(k), C.R.S. 2009, requires a trial court to
sustain a challenge for cause to a prospective juror who is “a
compensated employee of a public law enforcement agency.” Accord
Crim. P. 24(b)(1)(XII). The court’s determination that a prospective
juror is not a compensated employee of a public law enforcement
agency is subject to de novo review. People v. Sommerfeld, 214 P.3d
570, 572 (Colo. App. 2009).
When a trial court erroneously denies a defendant’s challenge
for cause, reversal is mandatory if the record shows that the
defendant used a peremptory challenge to excuse the prospective
juror and exhausted his remaining peremptory challenges. Ma v.
People, 121 P.3d 205, 212 (Colo. 2005).
Here, the court asked the panel of prospective jurors if any of
them worked for a law enforcement agency. J.D. responded
affirmatively and told the court that he was an assistant in the state
attorney general’s office with responsibility for representing the
Department of Corrections (DOC). He added that he did not
consider himself to be a sworn law enforcement agent.
Defendant challenged J.D. for cause because he was employed
by a law enforcement agency. The court denied the challenge,
explaining that J.D. was not subject to disqualification under
section 16-10-103(1)(k) because “the Attorney General does a whole
bunch of things besides law enforcement” and “this guy works in an
area that’s not law enforcement.” Defendant used a peremptory
challenge to remove J.D. and exhausted his remaining peremptory
We conclude that the trial court erred by focusing on whether
J.D.’s work as an attorney for the DOC made him a compensated
employee of a “law enforcement agency” for purposes of section 16-
10-103(1)(k). A prospective juror’s “particular responsibilities are
not relevant for purposes of applying section 16-10-103(1)(k) and
Crim. P. 24(b)(1)(XII).” Sommerfeld, 214 P.3d at 573; see People v.
Coleman, 844 P.2d 1215, 1218 (Colo. App. 1992) (section 16-10-
103(1)(k) applies to “any employee under the control of a law
enforcement agency, irrespective of his or her job duties, so long as
he or she was under the control of such agency”). The rationale for
this bright line rule is a “concern . . . that one who is employed by a
law enforcement agency will favor, or will be perceived to favor, the
prosecution side of a criminal case.” Ma, 121 P.3d at 210; see also
People v. Speer, 216 P.3d 18, 26 (Colo. App. 2007) (cert. granted
Dec. 15, 2008) (employees of law enforcement agencies are subject
to challenge for cause because a perception of partiality flows from
the fact that their “livelihoods depend on law enforcement
agencies”).
Therefore, even though the DOC constitutes a “law
enforcement agency” under 16-10-103(1)(k), see People v. Scott, 41
Colo. App. 66, 68, 583 P.2d 939, 941 (1978), this appeal can be
resolved solely by analyzing the law enforcement responsibilities of
J.D.’s actual employer: the office of the state attorney general.1
In Ma, 121 P.3d at 212, the supreme court held that the Army
We express no opinion whether J.D. also might have been properly
subject to challenge for cause based on the extent of his working
relationship with the DOC.
Military Police Corps constitutes a “law enforcement agency” under
16-10-103(1)(k). The court began its analysis by observing that the
phrase “law enforcement agency” is not defined in any of the
statutes that govern jury selection and composition. The court then
examined the common understanding of the phrase “law
enforcement” and narrowly construed it as being limited to “the
enforcement of criminal laws.” Id. at 210-11. It explained that
such a narrow construction, which excluded the enforcement of
civil regulations, would “keep the pool of dismissible jurors to an
appropriate size” and also achieve “the General Assembly's goal of
maintaining actual and apparent jury impartiality.” Id. at 211.
Of particular significance here, the court in Ma also
considered how the term “law enforcement agency” is used in
various Colorado’s statutes:
In addition to reflecting the phrase’s common definition
and the General Assembly's intent, our construction of
the phrase “law enforcement” finds support throughout
Colorado statutory . . . law. The statutes that define the
term “law enforcement agency” also identify several types
of law enforcement agencies, including: any police
department, sheriff's department, or district attorney’s
office; the office of the state attorney general; the Colorado
bureau of investigations; and the Colorado state patrol.
§§ 8-47-203.3(2), 8-72-111(2), 24-50-127(2)(b), 26-1-
114(3)(a)(III)(B), C.R.S. (2005) (statutes about state
employee benefits and protections); § 42-5-201(6), C.R.S.
(2005) (a statute about traffic regulations). Notably, each
of these agencies enforces criminal laws, thus reinforcing
the notion that the phrase “law enforcement” does not
imply the enforcement of civil regulations.
Ma, 121 P.3d at 211 (emphasis added).
The court also observed that several divisions of this court
have “implicitly construed the phrase ‘law enforcement,’ contained
in section 16-10-103(1)(k), to connote only the enforcement of
criminal laws,” before summarizing its holding as follows:
Combining the common meanings of the phrase “law
enforcement” and the word “agency,” we reason that the
term “law enforcement agency” means a division of
government that detects and punishes criminal violations
of the law by performing police-like duties such as
investigating crimes and arresting, prosecuting, or
detaining suspected criminals. Put in a less cumbersome
way, a law enforcement agency is a police-like division of
government that has the authority to investigate crimes
and to arrest, to prosecute, or to detain suspected
The first statutory definition cited by the court in Ma appears
in a section which specifies that the state division of workers’
compensation in the Department of Labor and Employment shall
provide information concerning the location of any person whose
name appears in the division’s records, and who is the subject of an
outstanding felony arrest warrant, to “law enforcement agencies.”
§ 8-47-203.3(1), C.R.S. 2009. For purposes of this section, “‘[l]aw
enforcement agency’ includes . . . the office of the state attorney
general.” § 8-47-203.3(2), C.R.S. 2009. This same definition
appears in the three similar provisions cited by the court in Ma.
See § 8-72-111(2), C.R.S. 2009 (the attorney general is a “law
enforcement agency” entitled to receive information about the
whereabouts of an individual who is the subject of an outstanding
arrest warrant from the division of employment and training); § 24-
50-127(2)(b), C.R.S. 2009 (using the same definition with respect to
wanted individuals whose whereabouts are known to the state
personnel director); § 26-1-114(3)(a)(III)(B), C.R.S. 2009 (using the
same definition with respect to wanted individuals who receive
public assistance, and whose whereabouts are known to the
Department of Human Services). 2 These statutory definitions
classifying the office of the state attorney general as a “law
enforcement agency” weigh heavily in favor of a similar
The final statutory definition of a “law enforcement agency” cited
in Ma has no bearing on our analysis because it does not name any
agency other than the Colorado State Patrol. § 42-5-201(6), C.R.S.
classification for purposes of section 16-10-103(1)(k).
But an even more compelling reason for making a like
classification is that, in certain circumstances, the attorney general
is vested with the type of prosecutorial and investigatory powers
which the court in Ma identified as being central to its definition of
a “law enforcement agency.” For example, the attorney general
must “appear for the state and prosecute . . . all actions and
proceedings, civil and criminal, when the state is a party or is
interested when required to do so by the governor.” § 24-31-
101(1)(a), C.R.S. 2009; see, e.g., People on Info. of Witcher v. Dist.
Court, 190 Colo. 483, 485, 549 P.2d 778, 780 (1976) (when
prosecuting a case at the request of the governor, the attorney
general has the right to assume prosecutorial responsibilities and
duties); see also § 6-4-117, C.R.S. 2009 (attorney general
prosecutes criminal antitrust violations); §§ 11-51-603, 603.5,
C.R.S. 2009 (attorney general may prosecute criminal securities act
violations); §§ 12-25-305(1), 24-31-101(1)(f), C.R.S. 2009 (giving the
attorney general concurrent original jurisdiction to prosecute the
criminal offense of practicing architecture without a license). In
addition, the attorney general acts as a criminal investigator when
presenting evidence to a statewide grand jury. See § 13-73-106,
C.R.S. 2009; People ex rel. Tooley v. Dist. Court, 190 Colo. 486, 488-
89, 549 P.2d 774, 776 (1976). Further, section 24-31-101(1)(a)
requires the attorney general to represent the state in all appeals
from criminal convictions, a responsibility that clearly constitutes
an important part of the prosecutorial process by virtue of the fact
that a conviction challenged on appeal does not become final unless
and until the prosecution prevails. See People v. Hampton, 876
P.2d 1236, 1239 (Colo. 1994) (“[A] conviction is not final and has no
legal force until after appeals have been exhausted.”).
Therefore, we conclude that the office of the state attorney
general is a “law enforcement agency” for purposes of section 16-
10-103(1)(k). See Sommerfeld, 214 P.3d at 573 (concluding that the
Division of Youth Corrections is a “law enforcement agency” for
purposes of section 16-10-103(1)(k), and distinguishing those cases
in which divisions of this court have held that other agencies --
which either did not have authority to conduct traditional law
enforcement functions, or else had some such authority incidental
to their essential functions -- were not law enforcement agencies
within the meaning of this same section).
Accordingly, we further conclude that because J.D. was a
compensated employee of a law enforcement agency, the trial court
erred by denying defendant’s challenge for cause. Because
defendant used a peremptory challenge to remove J.D. and then
exhausted his remaining peremptory challenges, we must reverse
the judgment of conviction and remand for a new trial. See Ma, 121
P.3d at 212. Consequently, we need not address defendant’s claim
that the court also erred by denying his challenge for cause to
another prospective juror.
Defendant next contends the trial court abused its discretion
by excluding the testimony of a witness with expertise in the field of
applied linguistics. We decline to address this argument because it
is unlikely that, in a new trial, defendant would seek to introduce
this witness’s testimony without developing the record to address
the foundational shortcomings identified by the trial court in its
ruling. See Sommerfeld, 214 P.3d at 574 (declining to address the
sufficiency of an evidentiary foundation where it was unclear the
same issue would arise again on retrial).
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for a new
JUDGE TERRY concurs.
JUDGE CONNELLY specially concurs.
JUDGE CONNELLY specially concurring.
I agree it was legal error to deny defendant’s challenge to a
prospective juror employed by the Attorney General’s Office. I write
separately only to re-emphasize the “significant social costs,” People
v. Merrow, 181 P.3d 319, 322 (Colo. App. 2007) (Webb, J., specially
concurring), of a rule requiring new trials in cases such as this.
Defendant was convicted of murder based on a jury’s verdict
supported by compelling evidence. There is no question as to the
impartiality of the twelve jurors who returned the verdict. The basis
for reversal is the erroneous denial of a for-cause challenge to a
prospective juror who ultimately did not serve on the jury because
defense counsel used a peremptory strike to excuse him.
As noted in Judge Russel’s opinion for the division in Merrow,
this type of error would be harmless in federal courts. 181 P.3d at
320 (citing United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304 (2000));
see also Rivera v. Illinois, 556 U.S. ___, ___, 129 S. Ct. 1446, 1453-
56 (2009) (discussing Martinez-Salazar). The error would also be
harmless in most state courts, including some that applied a rule of
automatic reversal before Martinez-Salazar. See, e.g., State v.
Hickman, 68 P.3d 418, 427 (Ariz. 2003) (overruling automatic
reversal precedent); Klahn v. State, 96 P.3d 472, 480-84 (Wyo.
2004) (describing and following “movement away from an automatic
reversal standard”); see generally Kopsho v. State, 959 So. 2d 168,
175 & n.3 (Fla. 2007) (Bell, J., concurring in result only) (providing
citations to “the ever-growing majority of state courts that apply the
federal actual prejudice rule and do not require reversal unless a
legally objectionable juror actually served on the jury” (footnote
omitted)); but see, e.g., Shane v. Commonwealth, 243 S.W.3d 336,
340-41 (Ky. 2007) (readopting automatic reversal rule).
Leading commentators agree an otherwise fair conviction
should not be reversed simply because the trial judge erroneously
denied a for-cause challenge to a prospective juror later removed
with a peremptory challenge. E.g., 7 Wayne R. LaFave, et al.,
Criminal Procedure § 27.6(b), at 103 n.21 (3d ed. 2007) (describing it
as “the better rule” that erroneous denial of for-cause challenge is
harmless “so long as the jury that actually sits is impartial”).
Indeed, the experienced trial judge in this very case is among the
advocates for a harmless error rule. See William T. Pizzi & Morris
B. Hoffman, Jury Selection Errors on Appeal, 38 Am. Crim. L. Rev.
1391, 1431-32 (2001).
The longstanding Colorado rule, however, requires automatic
reversal where a criminal defendant uses a peremptory strike to
cure an erroneous for-cause denial and exhausts all other
peremptory strikes. See People v. Macrander, 828 P.2d 234, 244
(Colo. 1992) (tracing genesis of this rule to a 1911 civil case); accord
People v. Vecchiarelli-McLaughlin, 984 P.2d 72, 75 (Colo. 1999);
Carrillo v. People, 974 P.2d 478, 486-87 (Colo. 1999). Thus far at
least, our supreme court has not been persuaded to adopt the
contrary rule of Martinez-Salazar. See People v. Lefebre, 5 P.3d 295,
305-08 (Colo. 2000).
Our court is bound to apply this Colorado rule. I therefore
must concur in the opinion reversing defendant’s conviction.
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