Source: http://echr.dk/niemietz-mod-tyskland-sagsnummer-1371088/
Timestamp: 2020-06-07 09:44:43
Document Index: 51489297

Matched Legal Cases: ['art. 43', 'art. 32', 'art. 47', 'art. 25', 'art. 50', 'art. 31', 'art. 8', 'art. 8', 'art. 8', 'art. 8', 'art. 8', 'art. 8', 'art. 8', 'art. 8', 'art. 8', 'art. 8', 'art. 6']

Portal om Den Europæiske Menneskerettighedskonvention | Niemietz mod Tyskland, sagsnummer 13710/88
Gottfried Niemietz (herefter N), en tysk advokat, fik i 1986 ransaget sit advokatkontor af de tyske myndigheder. Baggrunden for ransagningen var, at en byretsdommer i Freiburg havde modtaget et fornærmende brev vedr. en verserende straffesag mod en arbejdsgiver, som nægtede at betale kirkeskat førend han udbetalte sine ansattes løn. Brevet var afsendt – formentlig under et alias eller af en opdigtet person – på vegne af en gruppe, hvis formål var at mindske kirkens indflydelse i samfundet. Blandt andet N’s politiske aktiviteter havde vakt mistanke hos politiet, og politiet håbede at finde beviser, der forbandt N til navnet i brev, men ransagningen af N’s advokatkontor frembragte ingen beviser.
N påstod for både kommissionen og Den Europæiske Menneskerettighedsdomstol (Domstolen), at hans ret efter artikel 8 til respekt for privatliv og familieliv, sit hjem og sin korrespondance var blevet krænket, og kommissionen havde fundet en krænkelse af artikel 8.
Domstolen så først på, om der kunne siges at være en forstyrrelse af N’s “privatliv”. I denne vurdering gjorde Domstolen det klart, at al professionel aktivitet til en vis grad involverede fortrolige oplysninger, hvorfor der ikke kunne siges at være et specielt kriterium omkring fortroligheden i advokat-klient forholdet. På den anden side mente Domstolen ej heller, at “privatliv” alene skulle forstås som den indre cirkel, hvor en person måtte leve sit eget personlige liv, hvorved det professionelle liv blev ekskluderet. Ifølge Domstolen kunne man ikke nægte det professionelle liv beskyttelsen i artikel 8, fordi en stor del af personlige forhold også var en del af det professionelle liv, og at det ville være umuligt at skelne de to fra hinanden. “Privatliv” måtte derfor ikke ifølge Domstolen skulle fortolkes indskrænkende. Ligeledes måtte “hjem” ifølge Domstolen ikke skulle fortolkes indskrænkende, idet dette eksempelvis ville ramme personer, der valgte at arbejde hjemme fra. I forbindelse med ransagningen af N’s advokatkontor, fik N ransaget fire sagskabinetter og 6 individuelle sagsmapper, og Domstolen mente, at dette måtte siges at være omfattet af “korrespondance”, som indeholdt i artikel 8, hvorfor der måtte siges at være tale om en forstyrrelse af N’s privatliv.
Domstolen fandt yderligere, at forstyrrelsen (ransagningen) var i overensstemmelse med lov, og at ransagningen forfulgte et lovligt formål (bekæmpelse af kriminalitet).
Endeligt påså Domstolen, om forstyrrelsen kunne siges at være “nødvendigt i et demokratisk samfund” (proportionalitet). I denne forbindelse fandt Domstolen, at det kriminelle forhold (fornærmelse og forsøg på en lægge pres på en dommer) måtte anses for at være en mild forseelse. Endvidere burde retssikkerhedsmæssige overvejelser, den effekt en ransagning kunne have for en virksomhed og eventuelle uafhængige observatører være inddraget, når der var tale om ransagning af et advokatkontor (præmis 37). Domstolen fandt, at forstyrrelsen samlet ransagningen havde været “unødvendig i et demokratisk samfund” (uproportionelt), hvorfor der var sket en krænkelse af artikel 8.
In the case of Niemietz v. Germany[],
The European Court of Human Rights, sitting, in accordance with Article 43 (art. 43) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”)[] and the relevant provisions of the Rules of Court, as a Chamber composed of the following judges:
1. The case was referred to the Court by the European Commission of Human Rights (“the Commission”) on 12 July 1991, within the three-month period laid down by Article 32 para. 1 and Article 47 (art. 32-1, art. 47) of the Convention. It originated in an application (no. 13710/88) against the Federal Republic of Germany lodged with the Commission under Article 25 (art. 25) on 15 February 1988 by a German citizen, Mr Gottfried Niemietz, who is a lawyer.
4. Mr Ryssdal assumed the office of President of the Chamber (Rule 21 para. 5) and, through the Deputy Registrar, consulted the Agent of the German Government (“the Government”), the Delegate of the Commission and the applicant on the organisation of the procedure (Rules 37 para. 1 and 38). In accordance with the order made in consequence, the Registrar received, on 16 December 1991, the applicant’s claims under Article 50 (art. 50) of the Convention and, on 23 December, the Government’s memorial. By letter of 4 March 1992, the Secretary to the Commission informed the Registrar that the Delegate would submit his observations at the hearing.
7. On 9 December 1985 a letter was sent by telefax from the Freiburg post office to Judge Miosga of the Freising District Court (Amtsgericht). It related to criminal proceedings for insulting behaviour (Beleidigung) pending before that court against Mr J., an employer who refused to deduct from his employees’ salaries and pay over to the tax office the Church tax to which they were liable. The letter bore the signature of one Klaus Wegner – possibly a fictitious person -, followed by the words “on behalf of the Anti-clerical Working Group (Antiklerikaler Arbeitskreis) of the Freiburg Bunte Liste (multi-coloured group)” and a post-office box number. It read as follows:
“On 10.12.1985 the trial against Mr [J.] will take place before you. We, the Anti-clerical Working Group of the Freiburg Bunte Liste, protest most strongly about these proceedings.
This attempt – in a State which counts the separation of State and Church among its basic principles – to insist upon just such a separation has not only exposed [J.] to persistent vexation and interferences on the part of State authorities, culminating in the tax office employing coercive measures, such as attachment, to collect from him Church tax which his employees had already paid a long time previously. It has in addition involved him – when he called these underhand methods by their name – in the present proceedings for alleged insulting behaviour.
Were it your task as the competent judge to conduct an unbiased examination of this ‘case of insulting behaviour’, then it must be said that you have not only failed to carry out this task, but also abused your office in order to try – by means which give a warning and a reminder of the darkest chapters of German legal history – to break the backbone of an unloved opponent of the Church. It was with extreme indignation that we learned of the compulsory psychiatric examination which was conducted on your instructions, and to which [J.] has had to submit in the meantime. We shall use every avenue open to us, in particular our international contacts, to bring to public notice this action of yours, which is incompatible with the principles of a democratic State subscribing to the rule of law.
We shall follow the further course of the proceedings against [J.] and expect you to abandon the path of terrorisation which you have embarked upon, and to reach the only decision appropriate in this case – an acquittal.”
“Preliminary investigations against Klaus Wegner concerning Article 185 of the Criminal Code
1. Office premises shared by the lawyers Gottfried Niemietz and …,
2. Home (including adjoining rooms and cars) of Ms [D.] …,
Until now it has not been possible to identify the signatory. The Freiburg Bunte Liste could not be contacted by mail otherwise than through a box number. Until the end of 1985 such mail was forwarded to the office of Niemietz and …, and since the start of 1986 to Ms [D.]. It has therefore to be assumed that documents throwing light on the identity of Klaus Wegener can be found at the premises of the above-mentioned persons.
For these reasons, it is to be expected that evidence will be found in the course of a search of the premises indicated in this decision.”
Those conducting the search examined four filing cabinets with data concerning clients, three files marked respectively “BL”, “C.W. -Freiburg District Court …” and “G. – Hamburg Regional Court” and three defence files marked respectively “K.W. – Karlsruhe District Court …”, “Niemietz et al. – Freiburg District Court …” and “D. – Freiburg District Court”. According to the applicant, the office’s client index was also looked at and one of the files in question was its “Wegner defence file”. Those searching neither found the documents they were seeking nor seized any materials. In the proceedings before the Commission, the applicant stated that he had been able to put aside in time documents pointing to the identity of Klaus Wegner and had subsequently destroyed them.
14. The criminal proceedings against “Klaus Wegner” were later discontinued for lack of evidence.
15. On 27 March 1987 the Munich I Regional Court declared an appeal (Beschwerde) lodged by the applicant, pursuant to Article 304 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, against the search warrant to be inadmissible, on the ground that it had already been executed (“wegen prozessualer Überholung”). It considered that in the circumstances there was no legal interest in having the warrant declared unlawful. It had not been arbitrary, since there had been concrete indications that specified material would be found. There was no ground for holding that Article 97 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 21 below) had been circumvented: the warrant had been based on the fact that mail for the Freiburg Bunte Liste had for some time been delivered to the applicant’s office and it could not be assumed that that mail could concern a lawyer-client relationship. In addition, personal honour was not so minor a legal interest as to render the search disproportionate. There could be no question in the present case of preventing a lawyer from freely exercising his profession.
18. Article 13 para. 1 of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) guarantees the inviolability of the home (Wohnung); this provision has been consistently interpreted by the German courts in a wide sense, to include business premises (see, in particular, the Federal Constitutional Court’s judgment of 13 October 1971 – Entscheidungssammlung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, vol. 32, p. 54).
22. In its judgment of 21 September 1989 in Joined Cases 46/87 and 227/88 Hoechst v. Commission [1989] European Court Reports (“ECR”) 2859 at 2924, the Court of Justice of the European Communities stated as follows:
“Since the applicant has also relied on the requirements stemming from the fundamental right to the inviolability of the home, it should be observed that, although the existence of such a right must be recognized in the Community legal order as a principle common to the laws of the Member States in regard to the private dwellings of natural persons, the same is not true in regard to undertakings, because there are not inconsiderable divergences between the legal systems of the Member States in regard to the nature and degree of protection afforded to business premises against intervention by the public authorities.
None the less, in all the legal systems of the Member States, any intervention by the public authorities in the sphere of private activities of any person, whether natural or legal, must have a legal basis and be justified on the grounds laid down by law, and, consequently, those systems provide, albeit in different forms, protection against arbitrary or disproportionate intervention. The need for such protection must be recognized as a general principle of Community law. In that regard, it should be pointed out that the Court has held that it has the power to determine whether measures of investigation taken by the Commission under the ECSC Treaty are excessive (judgment of 14 December 1962 in Joined Cases 5 to 11 and 13 to 15/62 San Michele and Others v. Commission [1962] ECR 449).”
In its report of 29 May 1991 (Article 31) (art. 31), the Commission expressed the unanimous opinion that there had been a violation of Article 8 (art. 8) of the Convention and that no separate issue arose under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1). The full text of the Commission’s opinion is reproduced as an annex to this judgment[].
A. Was there an “interference”?
28. In arriving at its opinion that there had been an interference with Mr Niemietz’s “private life” and “home”, the Commission attached particular significance to the confidential relationship that exists between lawyer and client. The Court shares the Government’s doubts as to whether this factor can serve as a workable criterion for the purposes of delimiting the scope of the protection afforded by Article 8 (art. 8). Virtually all professional and business activities may involve, to a greater or lesser degree, matters that are confidential, with the result that, if that criterion were adopted, disputes would frequently arise as to where the line should be drawn.
29. The Court does not consider it possible or necessary to attempt an exhaustive definition of the notion of “private life”. However, it would be too restrictive to limit the notion to an “inner circle” in which the individual may live his own personal life as he chooses and to exclude therefrom entirely the outside world not encompassed within that circle. Respect for private life must also comprise to a certain degree the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings.
There appears, furthermore, to be no reason of principle why this understanding of the notion of “private life” should be taken to exclude activities of a professional or business nature since it is, after all, in the course of their working lives that the majority of people have a significant, if not the greatest, opportunity of developing relationships with the outside world. This view is supported by the fact that, as was rightly pointed out by the Commission, it is not always possible to distinguish clearly which of an individual’s activities form part of his professional or business life and which do not. Thus, especially in the case of a person exercising a liberal profession, his work in that context may form part and parcel of his life to such a degree that it becomes impossible to know in what capacity he is acting at a given moment of time.
To deny the protection of Article 8 (art. 8) on the ground that the measure complained of related only to professional activities – as the Government suggested should be done in the present case – could moreover lead to an inequality of treatment, in that such protection would remain available to a person whose professional and non-professional activities were so intermingled that there was no means of distinguishing between them. In fact, the Court has not heretofore drawn such distinctions: it concluded that there had been an interference with private life even where telephone tapping covered both business and private calls (see the Huvig v. France judgment of 24 April 1990, Series A no. 176-B, p. 41, para. 8, and p. 52, para. 25); and, where a search was directed solely against business activities, it did not rely on that fact as a ground for excluding the applicability of Article 8 (art. 8) under the head of “private life” (see the Chappell v. the United Kingdom judgment of 30 March 1989, Series A no. 152-A, pp. 12-13, para. 26, and pp. 21-22, para. 51.)
30. As regards the word “home”, appearing in the English text of Article 8 (art. 8), the Court observes that in certain Contracting States, notably Germany (see paragraph 18 above), it has been accepted as extending to business premises. Such an interpretation is, moreover, fully consonant with the French text, since the word “domicile” has a broader connotation than the word “home” and may extend, for example, to a professional person’s office.
In this context also, it may not always be possible to draw precise distinctions, since activities which are related to a profession or business may well be conducted from a person’s private residence and activities which are not so related may well be carried on in an office or commercial premises. A narrow interpretation of the words “home” and “domicile” could therefore give rise to the same risk of inequality of treatment as a narrow interpretation of the notion of “private life” (see paragraph 29 above).
31. More generally, to interpret the words “private life” and “home” as including certain professional or business activities or premises would be consonant with the essential object and purpose of Article 8 (art. 8), namely to protect the individual against arbitrary interference by the public authorities (see, for example, the Marckx v. Belgium judgment of 13 June 1979, Series A no. 31, p. 15, para. 31). Such an interpretation would not unduly hamper the Contracting States, for they would retain their entitlement to “interfere” to the extent permitted by paragraph 2 of Article 8 (art. 8-2); that entitlement might well be more far-reaching where professional or business activities or premises were involved than would otherwise be the case.
32. To the above-mentioned general considerations, which militate against the view that Article 8 (art. 8) is not applicable, must be added a further factor pertaining to the particular circumstances of the case. The warrant issued by the Munich District Court ordered a search for, and seizure of, “documents” – without qualification or limitation – revealing the identity of Klaus Wegner (see paragraph 10 above). Furthermore, those conducting the search examined four cabinets with data concerning clients as well as six individual files (see paragraph 11 above); their operations must perforce have covered “correspondence” and materials that can properly be regarded as such for the purposes of Article 8 (art. 8). In this connection, it is sufficient to note that that provision does not use, as it does for the word “life”, any adjective to qualify the word “correspondence”. And, indeed, the Court has already held that, in the context of correspondence in the form of telephone calls, no such qualification is to be made (see the above-mentioned Huvig judgment, Series A no. 176-B, p. 41, para. 8, and p. 52, para. 25). Again, in a number of cases relating to correspondence with a lawyer (see, for example, the Schönenberger and Durmaz v. Switzerland judgment of 20 June 1988, Series A no. 137, and the Campbell v. the United Kingdom judgment of 25 March 1992, Series A no. 233), the Court did not even advert to the possibility that Article 8 (art. 8) might be inapplicable on the ground that the correspondence was of a professional nature.
B. Was the interference “in accordance with the law”?
34. The applicant submitted that the interference in question was not “in accordance with the law”, since it was based on suspicions rather than facts and so did not meet the conditions laid down by Article 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 19 above) and since it was intended to circumvent the legal provisions safeguarding professional secrecy.
D. Was the interference “necessary in a democratic society”?
37. As to whether the interference was “necessary in a democratic society”, the Court inclines to the view that the reasons given therefor by the Munich District Court (see paragraph 10 above) can be regarded as relevant in terms of the legitimate aims pursued. It does not, however, consider it essential to pursue this point since it has formed the opinion that, as was contended by the applicant and as was found by the Commission, the measure complained of was not proportionate to those aims.
It is true that the offence in connection with which the search was effected, involving as it did not only an insult to but also an attempt to bring pressure on a judge, cannot be classified as no more than minor. On the other hand, the warrant was drawn in broad terms, in that it ordered a search for and seizure of “documents”, without any limitation, revealing the identity of the author of the offensive letter; this point is of special significance where, as in Germany, the search of a lawyer’s office is not accompanied by any special procedural safeguards, such as the presence of an independent observer. More importantly, having regard to the materials that were in fact inspected, the search impinged on professional secrecy to an extent that appears disproportionate in the circumstances; it has, in this connection, to be recalled that, where a lawyer is involved, an encroachment on professional secrecy may have repercussions on the proper administration of justice and hence on the rights guaranteed by Article 6 (art. 6) of the Convention. In addition, the attendant publicity must have been capable of affecting adversely the applicant’s professional reputation, in the eyes both of his existing clients and of the public at large.
[] The case is numbered 72/1991/324/396. The first number is the case’s position on the list of cases referred to the Court in the relevant year (second number). The last two numbers indicate the case’s position on the list of cases referred to the Court since its creation and on the list of the corresponding originating applications to the Commission.
[] As amended by Article 11 of Protocol No. 8 (P8-11), which came into force on 1 January 1990.
[] Note by the Registrar: for practical reasons this annex will appear only with the printed version of the judgment (volume 251- B of Series A of the Publications of the Court), but a copy of the Commission’s report is available from the registry.