Source: http://patlit.blogspot.co.uk/2015_06_01_archive.html
Timestamp: 2017-07-21 14:42:47
Document Index: 454657931

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 101', '§ 101', '§ 101', '§ 271', '§271', '§ 271', '§285', 'CJEU ']

“the skilled team, particularly the chemist, would understand from the 508 patent that pemetrexed disodium is also used to refer to solutions which contain pemetrexed ions and sodium ions in solution”. Applying that construction, Floyd LJ held that pemetrexed dipotassium is a means relating to an essential element of the invention, and therefore the Actavis product infringes under s. 60(2) of the Patents Act 1977. Whereas we can follow the logic of Floyd LJ’s approach, we believe that it leads to a rather arbitrary outcome, and that Arnold J’s approach was to be preferred. The saline solution is nothing more than an inert carrier, and if Actavis’s formulation was dissolved in another (non sodium-containing) carrier, infringement under s. 60(2) would presumably not have been made out. In fact, according to the postscript to the judgment Actavis has now asked for a declaration of non-infringement in respect of its same formulation but using a dextrose solution instead of a saline solution.
British Gas Services v VanClare SE LLC (2015) is an extempore 17 June judgment of Mr Justice Arnold, sitting in the Intellectual Property Enterprise Court (IPEC) for England and Wales. While that court is technically part of the High Court, it's really the successor to the junior Patents County Court -- though High Court judges do occasionally sit in it. This was an application by VanClare, the defendant in patent revocation proceedings brought by British Gas Services (BGS) to be transferred to the Patents Court, together with an application by BGS for its revocation claim to be heard before Vanclere's infringement claim.
application to stay infringement proceedings,
In a series of cases addressing whether inventions are
eligible for patent protection under 35 U.S.C. § 101, the U.S. Supreme Court has adopted a two-step
analysis. Two recent decisions by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit illustrate the potentially restrictive effect of that test in two
completely different technological fields.
'The first decision, Ariosa
Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., No. 2014-1139 (Fed. Cir. Jun. 12,
2015) concerned the discovery of cell-free fetal DNA (“cffDNA”), minute amounts
of fetal DNA that circulate in the blood of a pregnant woman. The inventors
discovered cffDNA in maternal blood samples, which previously had been
discarded as useless, and claimed methods to amplify the trace molecules and
test them using standard genetic testing procedures.
The Federal Circuit affirmed a lower court ruling that
Sequenom’s claims covering methods of performing prenatal diagnosis and
detecting parental inherited DNA in samples were invalid. The court applied the
two-step test crafted in Mayo
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
First, the court ruled that the claims were directed to a form of
naturally-occurring DNA molecule, which itself would not be patent-eligible. See Assn. for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). Second, the claims lacked elements that
either individually or as an ordered combination amounted to an “inventive
concept” sufficient to transform the nature of the claims into something
different from merely the ineligible cffDNA discovery. The court relied on
repeated statements by the inventors that the cffDNA molecules should be
amplified using conventional polymerase chain reaction (PCR) techniques and
analyzed using one of several common detection protocols. The court concluded
that, “Thus, in this case, appending routine, conventional steps to a natural
phenomenon, specified at a high level of generality, is not enough to supply an
inventive concept. . . . The claims of the ‘540 patent at issue
in this appeal are not directed to patent eligible subject matter and are,
therefore, invalid.” Slip op. at 13.
The court rejected Sequenom’s argument that the claims
should be valid because the newly-discovered cffDNA has many uses beyond those
claimed in the patent, and thus the patent did not “preempt” future
developments in the field. The court ruled that, “While preemption may signal
ineligible subject matter, the absence of complete preemption does not
demonstrate patent eligibility.” Slip op. at 14.
As a result, the Sequenom patent is invalid even though the
underlying discovery of cffDNA was undoubtedly a historic breakthrough in the
field of prenatal medicine. The court noted that “groundbreaking, innovative,
or even brilliant discovery does not by itself satisfy the § 101 inquiry.” Slip op.
at 16, quoting Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at
2117. In a concurring opinion, Circuit Judge Richard Linn lamented the result,
stating that the claimed diagnostic methods based on cffCNA were “truly
meritorious” and should be patentable, but nonetheless are ineligible under the
“sweeping” language used in the Supreme Court’s Mayo decision. OIP Techs. v. Amazon.com
In a second decision issued on the same day, the Federal
Circuit ruled that a computer-implemented process for determining optimum
product prices was ineligible under § 101.
OIP Technologies, Inc. v. Amazon.com,
Inc., Case No. 2012-1696 (Fed. Cir. Jun. 11, 2015). The patent at issue in OIP claimed a process for automatically
determining the price of a product offered for sale (such as over the internet)
by testing multiple prices, collecting data on consumer response, calculating a
demand curve for the product, and choosing the optimum price. The court applied
the same two-step test for patent eligibility. See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., v. CLS Bank Int’l, 132 S. Ct. 2347
(2014) (applying Mayo two-step test
to computer-implemented processes).
First, the court concluded that the use of consumer data to
set product prices by calculating a demand curve is itself an ineligible
abstract idea similar to the “fundamental economic concepts” found to be
ineligible in previous cases, including Alice
(intermediated settlement) and Bilski v.
Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010)(hedging against risk of commodity price
fluctuation). Applying the second step of the test, the court ruled that the OIP
patent claims did not provide an “inventive concept” because they only called
for the use of “well-understood, routine, conventional activities,” such as the
operation of a general-purpose computer and common computer and network
functions. The court noted that the OIP claims were “exceptionally broad” and the
patents made clear that one could perform the automated pricing method by “any
sequence of instructions designed for implementation on a computer system.”
Slip op. at 7. Thus, the court held that OIP’s patent was invalid as
The Ariosa and OIP cases underscore the potentially
restrictive effect of the Mayo/Alice
two-step on patent eligibility across a variety of technologies. The key to
establishing eligibility rests in drafting claims that recite a sufficient
“inventive concept,” such using a specific unconventional apparatus, employing
non-routine activities, or physically transforming an object. In addition,
broad statements in the patent specification or prosecution history that an invention
takes advantage of prior art practices, while potentially supportive of
enablement, may tend to suggest that the invention lacks a sufficient inventive
concept. Furthermore, although preemption of future developments in a field is one
factor to be considered, it is not part of the two-step test and thus is not
enough to salvage a claim that lacks a significant inventive concept.
Alice v CLS Bank,
"The creation of the Unified Patent Court represents a turning point in the history of European intellectual property law. The judges of the Unified Patent Court will be central actors for the success of the Unified Patent Court and the entire patent package". Not so easy: so willtraining help?
1st. module: 24, 25 and 26 September 2015 2nd. module: 29, 30 and 31 October 2015 3rd. module: 19, 20 and 21 November 2015
training course for judges,
in-house attitudes,
Our friend Marlou van de Braak has directed our attention to an article by journalist Jeroen Segenhout, published yesterday in leading Dutch newspaper Het Financieele Dagblad. This piece alludes to the current state of play in The Netherlands regarding the new European patent regime for Europe and contains a couple of notable comments from veteran Dutch patent litigation expert Willem Hoyng. "The Netherlands still has not ratified the establishment treaty of the UPC. It is also not very motivated to push forward The Hague, its own international legal capital, as a local division alongside the central courts in Munich, Paris and London. ‘That is very disappointing. The Netherlands should be leading with a European patent court, especially now we are always boasting about innovation. Germany is already busy promoting its court. We are in danger of losing the battle.’ Hoyng says he is not preaching to his own parish. ‘You almost see them thinking at the Ministry of Economic Affairs: that fellow Hoyng is a lawyer, he wants to make money [sadly, this reflects the cynical attitude expressed by some European and national legislators when faced with expert advice on the form which the new European patent package should take]. But if the government does not take a pro-active position, it runs the risk of losing a lot of expertise.’
New European patent package,
(The following is a guest contribution from Thomas A. Lewry of Brooks Kushman P.C., a patent and technology law firm with offices in Detroit and Los Angeles. Thomas has over 30 years of experience in patent litigation. He can be contacted at tlewry@brookskushman.com.) In a case at odds with long-standing assumptions about the
legal status of invalid patents, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that a defendant’s
good faith belief that a patent is invalid is not a defense to active
inducement of infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b). Commil
USA, LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc., No. 13-896 (U.S. May 26, 2015). Full
opinions HERE. The decision raises a number of practical concerns for companies
facing potential claims for indirect infringement of process patents arising
from the activities of customers and other product end users.
USA, LLC sued Cisco Systems, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Texas, alleging that Cisco infringed U.S. Patent No. 6,430,395
(entitled “Wireless private branch exchange (WPBX) and communicating between
mobile units and base stations”). The ‘395 patent claims methods for improved
protocols used to hand-off communications between mobile devices and base
stations in a wireless network. Commil alleged that Cisco directly infringed
the ‘395 patent and also actively induced infringement by causing users of its
wifi network products to practice the claimed methods. A jury found that Cisco actively
induced infringement and awarded over $60 million in damages. On
appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Cisco challenged
the judgment on multiple grounds. Among other things, Cisco argued that the
district court erred in excluding evidence that it believed in good faith that
the ‘395 patent was invalid. Cisco offered this evidence to prove that it
lacked an intent to cause infringement. In a divided opinion, the Federal
Circuit vacated the judgment below. The majority agreed with Cisco by holding
“that evidence of an accused infringer’s good-faith belief of invalidity may
negate the requisite intent for induced infringement.” Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc., 720 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed.
Cir. 2013). The Federal Circuit denied Commil’s petition for en banc review, although five judges
dissented from that denial.
6-2 decision written by Justice Kennedy, the Supreme Court vacated the Federal
Circuit’s opinion and remanded. (Justice Breyer did not participate in the
case). The principal question presented in the appeal was whether a defendant
accused of active inducement may defend by proving that it believed in good
faith that the patent at issue was invalid. The Court held that such a belief is
not a defense. Rejecting
long-accepted patent dogma, the Court rules that an invalid patent can be
infringed, but the infringer may raise invalidity as a defense to liability.
the Court reaffirmed the high intent standard for indirect infringement
established in Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v.
SEB SA, 563
U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011). In that case, the Court held that “induced
infringement under §271(b) generally requires knowledge that the induced acts
constitute patent infringement.” 131 S. Ct. at 2068. The Court rejected
Commil’s suggestion that the standard only requires that the defendant know of
the patent, not that the induced actions infringe the patent. The Court noted
that the defendant in Global-Tech was
liable for active inducement not only because it knew of the patent, but because
it “knew it would be causing customers to infringe [the] patent.” Slip op. at 8. Thus, indirect
infringement requires both knowledge of the patent and knowledge that the
induced acts result in direct infringement.
Second, the Court ruled that a belief that a patent is
invalid does not negate knowledge that a customer or other third party is
infringing the patent. The Court stressed that invalidity and infringement are
“different” and “separate” issues governed by provisions in different sections
of the Patent Act. Moreover, the Court noted that conjoining the two legal
concepts would erode the presumption of validity that each issued patent
enjoys: “But if belief in invalidity were a defense to induced infringement,
the force of that presumption would be lessened to a drastic degree, for a
defendant could prevail if he proved he reasonably believed the patent was
invalid.” Thus, the Court concluded invalidity is unrelated to infringement,
and consequently irrelevant to a
defendant’s intent to cause infringement:
An accused infringer can, of
course, attempt to prove that the patent in suit is invalid; if the patent is
indeed invalid, and shown to be so under proper procedures, there is no
liability. That is because invalidity is not a defense to infringement, it is a
defense to liability. And because of that fact, a belief as to invalidity
cannot negate the scienter required for induced infringement.
Slip op. at 11
(citation omitted). This analysis would appear to apply both to active
inducement and contributory infringement based on the legislative history of 35
U.S.C. § 271(b) and
(c). In a dissent, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice
Roberts, argued that, “It follows, as night the day, that only valid patents
can be infringed. To talk of infringing an invalid patent is to talk nonsense.”
Impact on Patent
The Commil
decision raises a number of practical issues for companies seeking to contain
their patent liability risk. The decision is likely to impact companies that are potential
targets for induced and contributory infringement claims. In the past,
companies could disprove intent to infringe by relying on an opinion of counsel
that a patent of interest was invalid. Although opinions may remain useful,
especially since the Court reaffirmed Global-Tech’s
high intent standard, such opinions now should focus on noninfringement, not
validity. In fact, the Court suggested that a defendant may lack the necessary
intent to cause infringement if it relies on a reasonable interpretation of the
patent claims that is different from the patentee’s interpretation. Slip op. at 9.
decision may be particularly problematic for companies accused of inducing
customers or other third parties to infringe patents directed to business
methods and other abstract computer-implemented processes that appear to be
ineligible for patent protection under recent cases including Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l,
573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). Many of these patents may claim
abstract ideas and thus appear to be invalid as ineligible in light of current
law, but the applicable eligibility standards are continuing to evolve. Commil suggests that a defendant may not
avoid liability for indirect infringement by pointing out that it reasonably
viewed a patent to be invalid at one point in time, if the claimed invention
proves eligible under a later standard.
The Court conceded that its decision would increase the risk
of liability for indirect infringement claims amid public concern about perceived
abuses of the patent system, including infringement actions by patent-assertion
entities and deceptive patent demand letters. It pointed out however, that the
“proper ways” to challenge patents as invalid are to commence a declaratory
judgment action or AIA post-grant proceeding. Besides the obvious expense
required, these procedures may not be available in all situations. For example,
declaratory judgment jurisdiction requires an actual case and controversy, and
AIA inter partes review proceedings only are available for prior art-based
validity challenges. Nonetheless, companies should weigh the benefits of
proactively challenging the validity of a patent if a noninfringement opinion
is unavailable. Furthermore, the Court cited last term’s Octane Fitness decision in again endorsing attorney fee awards as
sanctions for frivolous infringement suits:
Nonetheless, it is still necessary
and proper to stress that district courts have the authority and responsibility
to ensure frivolous cases are dissuaded. If frivolous cases are filed in
federal court, it is within the power of the court to sanction attorneys for
bringing such suits. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 11. It is also within the district
court’s discretion to award attorney’s fees to prevailing parties in
“exceptional cases.” 35 U. S. C. §285; see
also Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U. S.
___ (2014) (slip op., at 7–8). These
safeguards, combined with the avenues that accused inducers have to obtain
rulings on the validity of patents, militate in favor of maintaining the
separation expressed throughout the Patent Act between infringement and
Slip op. at 14. Finally, the Commil
decision creates an apparent tension with current law and practice relating to
willful infringement. Although the Court suggested that its decision would
prevent the additional discovery and cost of litigating the defendant’s belief
as to the validity of the patent in suit, a defendant’s good faith belief of
invalidity remains relevant to the Seagate
Technology willfulness standard. In
re Seagate Technology, LLC., 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Under that
standard, defendants frequently rely on invalidity opinions to disprove willful
infringement. If, however, belief as to invalidity is not related to
infringement for purposes of indirect infringement, then its role in avoiding willfulness
may be open to question in future cases. Pubblicato da
The Association has, on the latest review of an upward curve
of interest, 168 members from 17 countries. I didn’t count the delegates or conduct a statistical survey of the
geographic mix but I estimate that there were 60-plus people there and I
identified individuals from at least 9 different countries. More effective reporters than this one would no doubt
provide readers with a full summary of each presentation, including the
progress reported by each of the Association’s Working Groups (Substantive Law,
Qualifications, Costs, Privilege, Code of Conduct and Education/Training). I will do no more than record, with source
accreditation, the various “take home” points I picked up. News A positive tone to the meeting was encouraged by:
The recent dismissal by the CJEU of Spain’s
challenge to the legality of the Unitary Patent Regulation;
The failure of a similar challenge in the
A statement by Margot Fröhlinger (Principal Director at the EPO) that the Italian government had decided that, subject to
the approval of its parliament, it would now ratify the UPC Agreement; and
The apparent intention of the EPO (again
according to Margot Fröhlinger) to press ahead with a planned commencement date
in 2016, without regard to the UK’s planned referendum on continued EU
membership. Patent Litigators
Certificate The next iteration of the Rules on the European Patent
Litigation Certificate will provide that non-profit organisations (i.e. not
only universities) will be entitled to seek course accreditation. This was a point of criticism of the last
draft which was raised by CIPA’s Chris Mercer, in his capacity as Chair of the Working Group on Qualification, and
subsequently clarified by Bernadette
Makoski from the German Ministry of
Justice during her review of “Development towards a litigators certificate for
European Patent Attorneys. It is not just senior members of the UK Patent Attorney
profession who worry that the “grandfathering” route to qualify to represent
clients before the Unified Patent Court is currently unclear and potentially
unfair – delegates from other countries (including Germany) are also concerned. They received a sympathetic acknowledgement
from Bernadette Makoski but, so far as I could detect, no unequivocal assurance
that the final version of the rules will include them among those qualified to
represent clients. Bernadette did indicate that the approach likely to be
adopted towards grandfathered qualification through previous course attendance
is to be inclusive, in respect of qualifying courses (I think that means the
list in the last draft will increase), but to give those wanting to make use of
the provision a strictly enforced 12 months, and no more, to submit an
application. The right to represent
clients enjoyed by those qualifying by this route will be permanent – the
provision is not transitional in that sense. The rules are expected to be finalised in the course of this
summer (Bernadette again). Renewal Fees There was an awful lot of detail (from both Eugen Popp of Meissner Bolte and Margot
) on the recently proposed level of Unitary Patent renewal fees and the complex
financial modelling that lies behind the current proposal to align them with
the renewal cost of a European Patent designating the four or five most popular
national jurisdictions. My
strongest recollection of the day was
the weariness in the voice of Margot Fröhlinger when faced with the prospect
of re-calibrated financial modelling to
reflect Italy’s change of heart and
consequent replacement of the Netherlands as the fourth most popular country
for European Patent designation. A final
decision on this is expected within the (relatively wide) window of “end of
June or in the fall”. Value-based Court
Fees New to me (but maybe not others) was the explanation by
Eugen Popp that if the UPC approach to valuing claims were to follow the
approach that is well established in the German Courts, the pattern would be
something like * 80% based on an evaluation of the “cease and
desist” element, taking account of:
§ Patent proprietor’s turnover, size and position
§ Magnitude of harmfulness of the infringing
* 20% based on the available financial remedies. More understandable was the importance of Rules of Procedure
requiring the exercise to be carried out by the court early in the process and
well before either side could seek to influence the conduct of the valuation
exercise on the basis of the way the court seemed to be going. Recoverable Costs While those used to high costs recovery (UK and Germany)
were fairly relaxed about the recent proposals, others found the upper range
alarming both in terms of the level and the adviser’s difficulty in evaluating
a client’s cost risk within the €3M top-level cap.
Two minutes from me on the true horror of the detailed cost assessment procedures for courts in England and Wales did nothing to allay anyone’s fears about
the court’s ability to come to the assistance of a client who has lost a high
value claim. Is it ironic that, as English procedures move to address the
concerns of clients about costs risk that are both large and difficult to
assess in advance (at least in the IPEC regime), the UPC recoverable cost
proposals seem to be edging in the opposite direction. Training for Technically Qualified Judges Xavier Seuba from
CEIPI at the Université de Strasbourg demonstrated that, in developing the
soon-to-be-launched course for technical judges, a very careful analysis had
been undertaken of the challenge of testing technical/scientific data in
litigation and the precise nature of the role of a technical judge, as distinct
from that of a court appointed expert (or others likely to have an impact on
this aspect of patent trials). Not
surprisingly, against that background, the course outline Xavier disclosed was
impressive and the support for the course by both judges (as tutors) and
potential trainees reportedly at a high level. Rules of Procedure 18th draft expected during or after the summer
(another fairly wide window) – this again from Margot Fröhlinger. And finally… … after all the legal, procedural and political debate came
a breath of fresh air when Max Brunner, from
the French Ministry of Justice, gave
a fascinating presentation on the project planning for the establishment of the
Central Division in France. He included
the chilling opinion that, based on long experience of managing projects, this
was the most difficult one he had faced. The difficulties were in part due to the disbursed nature of the
decision-making and, more particularly, the uncertainties – “project management
without any reliable kick off date” he called it. And without any idea of how many cases would
arise – how many filings and how many opt outs: what would the “litigation
rate” be: and how many cases would end
up in the local court or the central division in Paris. Against the background of those difficulties M Brunner
presented a hugely impressive (to this project non-manager) of the steps being
taken in respect of premises, facilities, support staff planning and IT
development. There was a passing
suggestion on this last topic that the Paris team may not have been totally
convinced by some of the security and user authentication features of the
system presented by the UK IPO team during a recent workshop exercise. The conference ended with a discussion by a panel of industry
representatives. But, bearing in mind
the circumstances in which the late Ruth Rendell lost her first job as a
reporter on a local paper, I won’t include anything arising out of it in this report.
EPLIT meeting 2015