Source: http://ca10.washburnlaw.edu/cases/2003/01/02-5007.htm
Timestamp: 2019-01-17 00:27:13
Document Index: 278495600

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 922', '§ 3', '§ 2', '§ 1291', '§ 3742', '§ 922', '§ 922', '§ 922', '§ 922', '§ 3', '§ 3742', '§ 2', '§ 3', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 924', '§ 2', '§ 924', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 4', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 4', '§2', '§ 751', 'art, 922', 'art, 922', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 924', '§ 5', '§ 230101', '§ 4']

02-5007 -- U.S. v. Brown -- 01/08/2003
| Keyword | Case | Docket | Date: Filed / Added | (69515 bytes) (53898 bytes)
(D.C. No. 00-CR-119-C)
Timothy Lee Faerber, Assistant United States Attorney (and David E. O'Meilia, United States Attorney, on the brief), Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff - Appellee.
Art Fleak, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Defendant - Appellant.
On appeal, Mr. Brown challenges his conviction on the basis that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied in this case because the government was not required to prove the gun possession had any actual or substantial effect on interstate commerce. He challenges his sentence on the basis that the district court erred (1) by enhancing his sentence pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2 for reckless endangerment during flight; (2) by enhancing his sentence pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5) for possessing a firearm in connection with another felony offense; (3) by failing to make particularized findings in response to his objections to the Presentence Report ("PSR") and by failing to reduce those findings to writing; and (4) by ordering him to pay a $1,000 fine when it was clear that he had no ability to pay a fine. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), affirm the conviction and sentence, and remand to the district court to enter a determination pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(1).
who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year[,] . . . to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.
Mr. Brown first argues that his conviction should be overturned because § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied in this case since the government was not required to prove the gun possession had any actual or substantial effect on interstate commerce. At trial, the government showed only that the gun was manufactured in California, was in Mr. Brown's possession in Oklahoma, and therefore must have traveled in interstate commerce at some point. Aplt. Br. at 13. Mr. Brown believes that his conviction under § 922(g)(1) requires some evidence of a commercial or transactional aspect to his possession. Id. To support his argument, Mr. Brown points to a trend of the United States Supreme Court of limiting the federal government's reach under the Commerce Clause, demonstrated in his view by two cases, Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000), and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
We review challenges to the constitutionality of a statute de novo. United States v. Bolton, 68 F.3d 396, 398 (10th Cir. 1995). Mr. Brown acknowledges that his argument "might be foreclosed" by our holding in United States v. Dorris, 236 F.3d 582 (10th Cir. 2000), but seeks to preserve the argument for review by the Supreme Court. Aplt. Br. at 12. In Dorris, after thoroughly reviewing Morrison and Jones, we explicitly rejected an argument substantially similar to Mr. Brown's and held that the government has no duty to prove that the gun possession had any actual or substantial effect on interstate commerce. 236 F.3d at 584-86.
"We cannot overrule the judgment of another panel of this court. We are bound by the precedent of prior panels absent en banc reconsideration or a superseding contrary decision by the Supreme Court." In re Smith, 10 F.3d 723, 724 (10th Cir. 1993). Because Mr. Brown cites no Supreme Court authority other than Morrison and Jones, which Dorris specifically considered, his argument regarding the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) is indeed foreclosed. Accordingly, we conclude that Mr. Brown's conviction under § 922(g)(1) does not violate the Commerce Clause.
Next, Mr. Brown argues that the district court erred by enhancing his sentence pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2 for reckless endangerment during flight. Our review of the district court's determination that Mr. Brown's flight constituted reckless endangerment is deferential; we will disturb that finding only if it is clearly erroneous. United States v. Conley, 131 F.3d 1387, 1389 (10th Cir. 1997); 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e). Evidence underlying a district court's sentence is reviewed by viewing the evidence, and inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the district court's determination. Conley, 131 F.3d at 1389.
U.S.S.G. § 2A1.4 cmt. n.1 (referred to by U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2 cmt. n.2). The standard of care envisioned by the Guidelines is that of the reasonable person, not the reasonable fleeing criminal suspect. Conley, 131 F.3d at 1389.
Section 2K2.1(b)(5) of the Sentencing Guidelines provides that "[i]f the defendant used or possessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony offense . . . increase by 4 levels." U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5). A "felony offense" "means any offense (federal, state or local) punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, whether or not a criminal charge was brought, or conviction obtained." U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 cmt. n.7.
Except for its plain language, § 2K2.1(b)(5) provides little guidance regarding the nexus required between firearm possession and the felony offense. While we have noted that judicial interpretations of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) provide "some guidance" in construing § 2K2.1(b)(5)'s "in connection with" requirement, United States v. Gomez-Arrellano, 5 F.3d 464, 466 (10th Cir. 1993), we have rejected any assertion that judicial precedent interpreting § 924(c) controls when a sentence may be enhanced under § 2K2.1(b)(5). United States v. Bunner, 134 F.3d 1000, 1006 (10th Cir. 1998). "Guided by these principles, we have generally held that if the weapon facilitated or had the potential to facilitate the underlying felony, then enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(5) is appropriate." Id. (citing Gomez-Arrellano, 5 F.3d at 466). However, the enhancement is not appropriate if possession of the weapon is coincidental or entirely unrelated to the offense. Walters, 269 F.3d at 1219.
In his objections to the PSR, I R. Doc. 55 at 6, Mr. Brown argued that the enhancement should not apply because his gun was not used or possessed "in connection with" the escape from jail in Oklahoma City. He argued that "in connection with" requires not just mere possession of the gun, but that the gun "facilitated or had the potential to facilitate another felony offense, either the on-going escape or some other offense." Id. (emphasis added). Mr. Brown did not specifically argue that the escape was complete before he was confronted by and ran from the police in Tulsa. See id. at 8 ("Mr. Brown emphatically chose not to use the gun to help facilitate his continuing escape from custody . . . ." (emphasis added)).
At the sentencing hearing, the district court found that "while trying to escape," Mr. Brown "had the gun in his possession" either specifically "in furtherance of his escape, which is a continuing offense" or because he was "contemplating some other action with the gun, which would be violence." VII R. at 11-12. The court stressed that "when Mr. Brown saw the officers he put his hand down on the gun . . . and hesitated" such that "the officer could be justified in believing that [Mr. Brown] was trying to decide whether to shoot or whether to run." Id. at 13. Thus, in light of all the evidence, including the fact that Mr. Brown had the gun later in the day of the jail escape, the court concluded that it was clear that Mr. Brown possessed the gun in furtherance of the continuing escape. Id. Accordingly, the court overruled Mr. Brown's objection to the enhancement.
A discernible premise underlying many of our sentencing decisions is that "uniformity in sentencing may best be achieved by applying the Guidelines without strict reference to state criminal law definitions." United States v. Brunson, 907 F.2d 117, 121 (10th Cir. 1990) (relying on federal law to hold that burglary of a dwelling is a crime of violence under § 4B1.1 because it involves a substantial risk that force may be used, regardless of the state law definition of burglary). We decline to rely on state law definitions for sentencing because "the uniformity in sentencing the Guidelines was intended to ensure would be jeopardized. Criminals with similar records might receive vastly different sentences simply because their past crimes were defined differently by different states." Id.
See also United States v. Diaz-Bonilla, 65 F.3d 875, 877 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that "felony" as used in § 2L1.2 was to be defined by reference to the standardized federal law definition regardless of the state law classification); United States v. Vasquez-Flores, 265 F.3d 1122, 1124-25 (10th Cir. 2001) (refusing to rely on state law definition of theft when deciding what constitutes an "aggravated felony" under § 2L1.2(b)); United States v. Saenz-Mendoza, 287 F.3d 1011, 1014 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that "aggravated felony" in § 2L1.2 can include offenses characterized as misdemeanors under state law); United States v. Gosling, 39 F.3d 1140, 1142-43 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that state escape qualified as a "crime of violence" under § 4B1.2 because escape "by its nature involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another" even if state law offense involved required no violence); id. ("[E]ven in a case where a defendant escapes from a jail by stealth and injures no one in the process, there is still a serious potential risk that injury will result when officers find the defendant and attempt to place him in custody."); United States v. Springfield, 196 F.3d 1180, 1185 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that a defendant's state law conviction for a nonviolent, walk-away escape constituted a "crime of violence" under the Guidelines because "escape is always a violent crime" regardless of "whether defendant was convicted under a state statute that defines escape as a nonviolent offense."); United States v. Turner, 285 F.3d 909, 915-16 (10th Cir. 2002) (deeming irrelevant the fact that state law distinguishes between violent and nonviolent escape for federal sentencing considerations).
Though each of the preceding situations presented a question that differs from the one we now face, we are satisfied that taken together, these cases demonstrate that we should not rely on a given state's assessment of whether escape is a continuing offense or is complete at the moment the escapee successfully escapes custody. Because we believe "uniformity in sentencing may best be achieved by applying the Guidelines without strict reference to state criminal law definitions," we decline to jeopardize that uniformity by relying on each state's possibly varying interpretation of whether escape is a continuing offense. Brunson, 907 F.2d at 121. Therefore, in light of our recognition that escape presents a continuing threat of violence until the escapee is safely returned to custody, we hold that for purposes of §2K2.1(b)(5), every escape is sufficiently continuing such that possession of a gun subsequent to the initial departure from custody can qualify as being "in connection with" the escape. Our conclusion in this regard is buttressed by the Supreme Court's reasoning explaining why escape is a continuing offense under federal law, 18 U.S.C. § 751. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 413 (1980).
Our conclusion assumes greater importance because at oral argument in this case, it was suggested that escape is not a continuing offense under Oklahoma law pursuant to Jackson v. State, 964 P.2d 875, 891 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998). Our review of Oklahoma law convinces us that this issue has not been squarely addressed, much less decided, by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals ("OCCA"). In considering whether a felony murder instruction was warranted based on an underlying escape offense, the OCCA in Jackson answered in the negative, because the "facts indicate that Jackson had completed the crime of escape from a penal institution long before the homicide occurred." 964 P.2d at 891. Apparently, this passage alone is asserted to stand for the proposition that escape is not a continuing offense in Oklahoma.
We disagree. The OCCA in Jackson was clearly not addressing the question of whether escape is a continuing offense; rather, it was applying the rule for when the underlying felony is terminated for purposes of felony murder. That rules states that "if the homicide is committed during the one, continuous transaction, the acts are so closely connected as to be inseparable in terms of time, place, and causal relation, and the actions tend to be explanatory and incidental to each other, the homicide has been committed during the felony in our statutory sense." Clark v. State, 558 P.2d 674, 678 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977); see also Irvin v. State, 617 P.2d 588, 597 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980). In Jackson, the OCCA merely determined that since the crime of escape was not part of one continuous transaction, inseparable in terms of time, place and causal relation, the escape could not qualify as the underlying felony for purposes of felony murder.
We note that in a case focused directly on escape, not felony murder, the OCCA gave an indication that an escape does continue beyond the initial successful escape from custody. In Davis v. State, 763 P.2d 109, 110 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988) (emphasis added), in ruling that the facts did not support a duress defense to an escape charge, the OCCA relied on the fact that, "[a]t the time of his arrest, [the defendant] was still attempting to avoid detection and complete his escape, rather than surrender to outside authorities." Thus, though the defendant there had successfully removed himself from the jail, the court indicated that the escape was not yet complete. Therefore, cases defining the minimum elements constituting the offense of escape such as Boone v. State, 642 P.2d 270 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982) and Urbauer v. State, 744 P.2d 1274 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987) do not address whether an escape is necessarily complete upon the initial successful escape from custody. Furthermore, the OCCA's analysis of the availability of the duress defense for an escape charge mirrors the Supreme Court's analysis in Bailey, further supporting the conclusion that escape is a continuing offense in Oklahoma, as it clearly is under federal law. Compare Bailey, 444 U.S. at 409-15 with Davis, 763 P.2d at 110 (discussing availability of the duress defense in Oklahoma and collecting cases). However, given our conclusion above that we rely on federal law in this context, we need not definitively resolve this issue of Oklahoma law.
Mr. Brown also argues that the district court erred by failing to make particularized findings in response to his objections to the PSR and by failing to reduce those findings to writing. Mr. Brown asserts that the district court was required to do so by Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(3)(D).(1) Aplt. Br. at 44. The requirements imposed by Rule 32(c)(1) are best understood in their proper context.
Rule 32(b)(6)(B) requires a defendant, within 14 days after receiving the PSR, to "communicate in writing to the probation officer . . . any objections to any material information . . . contained in" the PSR. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(b)(6)(B). Thereafter, the probation officer may meet with the defendant to discuss the objections to try to resolve any differences. Id. At a time not less than seven days prior to the sentencing hearing, the probation officer must submit the PSR to the court, "together with an addendum setting forth any unresolved objections, the grounds for those objections, and the probation officer's comments on the objections." Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(b)(6)(C). "Except for any unresolved objection under subdivision (b)(6)(B), the court may, at the hearing, accept the [PSR] as its findings of fact." Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(b)(6)(D). At the sentencing hearing, the district court may, in its discretion and "[f]or good cause shown," allow a "new objection to be raised at any time before imposing sentence." Id.
At the sentencing hearing, the court must . . . rule on any unresolved objections to the presentence report. . . . For each matter controverted, the court must make either a finding on the allegation or a determination that no finding is necessary because the controverted matter will not be taken into account in, or will not affect, sentencing. A written record of these findings and determinations must be appended to any copy of the presentence report made available to the Bureau of Prisons.
In construing Rule 32(c)(1) and its predecessor, Rule 32(c)(3)(D), we have held that the district court does not meet its burden by simply adopting the PSR as its finding. United States v. Henning, 77 F.3d 346, 349 (10th Cir. 1996). However, unless unresolved objections remain and those objections involve non-perfunctory "specific allegations of factual inaccuracy," no controverted matter exists, and the district court's fact-finding obligation under Rule 32(c)(1) is not implicated. United States v. Pedraza, 27 F.3d 1515, 1530 (10th Cir. 1994); United States v. LeRoy, 944 F.2d 787, 790 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v. Hart, 922 F.2d 613, 615-16 (10th Cir. 1990) overruled on other grounds as stated in United States v. Warner, 23 F.3d 287, 290 n.3 (10th Cir. 1994). Arguments that merely challenge the district court's "application of the guidelines to the facts and not the facts themselves" do not trigger any obligation on the part of the district court to make specific findings. United States v. Windle, 74 F.3d 997, 1002 (10th Cir. 1996).
In his objections to the PSR and again at the sentencing hearing, Mr. Brown levied general allegations of inaccuracies against the information in the PSR. I R. Doc. 55 at 1 ("The Offense Conduct . . . contains many inaccuracies, unsupported assumptions and conclusions based upon unreliable sources."); VII R. at 3 (referring generally to information in the PSR as "a whole bunch of fluff" that is "just not true"). It is clear that such generalized, perfunctory objections are not "specific allegations of factual inaccuracy" and are insufficient to controvert a matter such that the district court's fact-finding obligation under Rule 32(c)(1) is invoked. See, e.g., Hart, 922 F.2d at 615 (vague and cryptic objections are not sufficient to invoke Rule 32).
Our review of these objections leads us to conclude that they were specific allegations of factual inaccuracy sufficient to implicate Rule 32(c)(1). Although these two disputed facts were obviously not relied upon by the district court in arriving at its sentence,(2) "[i]f the disputed facts are not important to the sentencing determination and will not be relied upon in sentencing, the district court should say so." United States v. Rutter, 897 F.2d 1558, 1565 (10th Cir. 1990). Doing so serves as a safeguard against the manifest unfairness to a defendant if false or unreliable information is relied upon by the Bureau of Prisons or the Parole Commission in their custody and parole determinations. United States v. Wach, 907 F.2d 1038, 1041 (10th Cir. 1990). Our review of the record leads us to conclude that the district court did not make an explicit determination that no finding was necessary as required by Rule 32(c)(1). Accordingly, we remand to the district court for the ministerial task of entering a determination that it did not take the controverted matters into account in sentencing Mr. Brown. United States v. Easterling, 921 F.2d 1073, 1081 (10th Cir. 1990).
The Sentencing Guidelines require the imposition of a fine "except where the defendant establishes that he is unable to pay and is not likely to become able to pay any fine." U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(a) (emphasis added). Thus, Mr. Brown had the burden to establish both his present and future inability to pay. Id. With a total offense level of 26, the fine range for Mr. Brown's conviction was $12,500 to $125,000 pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(c)(3) and 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2). The district court found that "the defendant does not have the ability to pay a fine, the minimum fine," and thus exercised its discretion to impose a fine significantly lower than the guideline minimum. VII R. at 31; U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2 cmt. n.3.
In this case, we perceive no plain error in the district court's imposition of a fine. At sentencing, Mr. Brown did not object to the fine. Even assuming he established a present inability to pay a fine, he did not establish a future inability to pay. As in United States v. Klein, 93 F.3d 698, 706 (10th Cir. 1996), here Mr. Brown has not submitted any evidence establishing an inability to find future employment or any evidence indicating current or future financial liabilities that would prevent him from using future earnings to pay a fine. Mr. Brown's indigence at the time of sentencing did not preclude the imposition of a fine. Id. Accordingly, though the district court invoked its discretion to significantly reduce the fine based on a finding of Mr. Brown's present inability to pay, we observe no plain error in the imposition of the $1,000 fine.
1. Since December 1, 1994, when the relevant amendment to Rule 32 became effective, the proper basis for such an objection has been Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(1). See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-322, Title XXIII, §§ 230101(b), (c).
2. The objection to page 6, ¶ 24 related to a description of Mr. Brown's juvenile adjudications for which no points were added to his criminal history total. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(d). The objection to page 8, ¶ 27 related to facts wholly immaterial to Mr. Brown's plea of guilty to possession of a firearm, for which three points were added to his criminal history total.
URL: http://ca10.washburnlaw.edu/cases/2003/01/02-5007.htm.