Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/97776/bowles-vs-seminole-rock-sand-co
Timestamp: 2020-06-04 22:42:17
Document Index: 452523020

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1499', '§ 2', '§ 1499', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 1499']

Bowles Vs Seminole Rock and Sand Co - Citation 97776 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Bowles Vs. Seminole Rock and Sand Co. - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/97776
Case Number 325 U.S. 410
Appellant Bowles
Respondent Seminole Rock and Sand Co.
..... for the fifth circuit syllabus 1. under rule (i) of § 1499.163(a)(2) of maximum price regulation no. 188, issued by the administrator of the office of price administration under § 2(a) of the emergency price control act of 1942, a seller's ceiling price for an article which was actually delivered during march, 1942, is the highest price charged for the article so delivered, regardless of when the sale or charge was made. p. 325 u. s. 416 . page 325 u. s. 411 2. in interpreting an administrative regulation, a court must necessarily look to the administrative construction of the regulation if the meaning of the words used is in doubt. the intention of congress or the principles of the constitution in some situations may be relevant in the first.....
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co. - 325 U.S. 410 (1945)
U.S. Supreme Court Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945)
1. Under Rule (i) of § 1499.163(a)(2) of Maximum Price Regulation No. 188, issued by the Administrator of the Office of Price Administration under § 2(a) of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, a seller's ceiling price for an article which was actually delivered during March, 1942, is the highest price charged for the article so delivered, regardless of when the sale or charge was made. P. 325 U. S. 416 .
2. In interpreting an administrative regulation, a court must necessarily look to the administrative construction of the regulation if the meaning of the words used is in doubt. The intention of Congress or the principles of the Constitution in some situations may be relevant in the first instance in choosing between various constructions. But the ultimate criterion is the administrative interpretation, which becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation. Pp. 325 U. S. 413 -414.
3. This Court does not here determine the constitutionality or statutory validity of the regulation as so construed (matters determinable in the first instance by the Emergency Court of Appeals), nor any question of hardship of enforcement of such ceiling price (the procedure for relief therefrom being prescribed by § 2(c) of the Act and § 1499.161 of the Regulation). P. 325 U. S. 418 .
Our consideration here is directed to the proper interpretation and application of certain provisions of Maximum Price Regulation No. 188, [ Footnote 1 ] issued by the Administrator of the Office of Price Administration under Section 2(a) of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942. [ Footnote 2 ]
In January, 1942, respondent had contracted to sell crushed stone to V. P. Loftis Co., a government contractor engaged in the construction of a government dam, for $1.50 a ton. [ Footnote 3 ] This stone was to be delivered by respondent by barge when needed at the dam site. A small portion of stone of a different grade than that sold to seaboard was delivered to Loftis Co. during January pursuant to this contract. For some time thereafter, however, Lotfis Co. was unable to pour concrete or to store crushed stone at the dam site. Respondent thus made no further deliveries under this contract until August, 1942, at which time stone of the same grade as received by Seaboard was delivered to Loftis Co. at the $1.50 rate.
Subsequently, and after the effective date of Maximum Price Regulation No. 188, respondent made new contracts to sell crushed stone to Seaboard at 85 cents and $1.00 per ton. Alleging that the highest price at which respondent could lawfully sell crushed stone of the kind sold to Seaboard was 60 cents a ton, since that was asserted to be the highest price charged by respondent during the crucial month of March, 1942, the Administrator of the Office of Price Administration brought this action to enjoin respondent from violating the Act and Maximum Price Regulation No. 188. [ Footnote 4 ] The District Court dismissed the action
In his efforts to combat wartime inflation, the Administrator originally adopted a policy of piecemeal price control, only certain specified articles being subject to price regulation. On April 28, 1942, however, he issued the General Maximum Price Regulation. [ Footnote 5 ] This brought the entire economy of the nation under price control, with certain minor exceptions. The core of the regulation was the requirement that each seller shall charge no more than the prices which he charged during the selected base period of March 1 to 31, 1942. While still applying this general price "freeze" as of March, 1942, numerous specialized regulations relating to particular groups of commodities subsequently have made certain refinements and modifications of the general regulation. Maximum Price Regulation No. 188, covering specified building materials and consumers' goods, is of this number.
The problem in this case is to determine the highest price respondent charged for crushed stone during March, 1942, within the meaning of Maximum Price Regulation No. 188. Since this involves an interpretation of an administrative
Section 1499.163(a)(2), [ Footnote 6 ] in turn, provides that, for purposes of this regulation, the term:
As we read the regulation, however, rule (i) clearly applies to the facts of this case, making 60 cents per ton the ceiling price for respondent's crushed stone. The regulation recognizes the fact that more than one meaning may be attached to the phrase "highest price charged during March, 1942." The phrase might be construed to mean only the actual charges or sales made during March, regardless of the delivery dates. Or it might refer only to the charges made for actual delivery in March. Whatever may be the variety of meanings, however, rule
(i) adopts the highest price which the seller "charged . . . for delivery" of an article during March, 1942. The essential element bringing the rule into operation is thus the fact of delivery during March. If delivery occurs during that period, the highest price charged for such delivery becomes the ceiling price. Nothing is said concerning the time when the charge or sale [ Footnote 7 ] giving rise to the delivery occurs. One may make a sale or charge in October relative to an article which is actually delivered in March, and still be said to have "charged . . . for delivery . . . during March." We can only conclude, therefore, that, for purposes of rule (i), the highest price charged for an article delivered during March, 1942, is the seller's ceiling price, regardless of the time when the sale or charge was made.
This conclusion is further borne out by the fact that rule (ii) becomes applicable only where "the seller made no such delivery during March, 1942," as contemplated by rule (i). The absence of a delivery, rather than the absence of both a charge and a delivery, during March is necessary to make rule (i) ineffective, thereby indicating that the factor of delivery is the essence of rule (i). It is apparent, moreover, that the delivery must be an actual, instead of a constructive, one. Section 1499.20(d) of General Maximum Price Regulation, incorporated by reference into Maximum Price Regulation No. 188 by Section 1499.151, defines the word "delivered" as meaning "received by the purchaser or by any carrier . . . for shipment to the purchaser" during March, 1942. Thus, an article is not
Any doubts concerning this interpretation of rule (i) are removed by reference to the administrative construction of this method of computing the ceiling price. Thus, in a bulletin issued by the Administrator concurrently with the General Maximum Price Regulation entitled "What Every Retailer Should Know About the General Maximum Price Regulation," [ Footnote 8 ] which was made available to manufacturers as well as to wholesalers and retailers, the Administrator stated (p. 3):
Finally, the Administrator has stated that this position has uniformly been taken by the Office of Price Administration
Our reading of the language of Section 1499.163(a)(2) of Maximum Price Regulation No. 188 and the consistent administrative interpretation [ Footnote 9 ] of the phrase "highest price charged during March, 1942," thus compel the conclusion that respondent's highest price charged during March for crushed stone was 60 cents per ton, since that was the highest price charged for stone actually delivered during that month. The two courts below erred in their interpretation of this regulation, and the judgment below must accordingly be reversed.
We do not, of course, reach any question here as to the constitutionality or statutory validity of the regulation as
we have construed it, matters that must in the first instance be presented to the Emergency Court of Appeals. Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U. S. 182 ; Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414 , 321 U. S. 427 -431. Nor are we here concerned with any possible hardship that the enforcement of the 60-cent price ceiling may impose on respondent. Adequate avenues for relief from hardship are open to respondent through the provisions of Section 2(c) of the Act and Section 1499.161 of the regulation.