Source: https://buckleybrown.wordpress.com/2008/02/
Timestamp: 2020-08-09 12:10:22
Document Index: 565699734

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981']

February | 2008 | The Buckley Brown Blog
Possible Expansion of Law Supporting Employees’ Race Retaliation Claims
Published February 29, 2008	Employment Law Closed
The United States Supreme Court is considering whether race retaliation claims are allowable under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The Supreme Court’s answer to CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, Docket No. 06-1431, argued before the Court last week, could dramatically affect employment litigation.
Currently, several federal statutes provide protection from racial discrimination. The most well-known, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, explicitly prohibits certain employers from retaliating against an employee who makes a claim for racial discrimination. In contrast, while the federal statute at issue in CBOCS West, (§ 1981), protects individuals from racial discrimination, it does not explicitly permit retaliation claims. Nevertheless, many federal courts have allowed individuals to bring retaliation claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
The differences between Title VII and § 1981 are significant. Title VII imposes strict time requirements on employees asserting a retaliation claim. For instance, a Georgia employee must report the alleged retaliation within 180 days of the discriminatory or retaliatory action with the EEOC and must file a lawsuit within 90 days of receiving a right to sue letter from the EEOC. Additionally, only private employers, state and local governments, and education institutions that employ 15 or more individuals are subject to Title VII. Finally, Title VII limits the amount of damages that can be awarded based on the employer’s size. However, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 is not so restrictive. Employees have several years to file a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, it applies to all employers regardless of their size, and it does not limit the amount of damages that can be awarded. Because it eliminates some of the limits of Title VII, § 1981 is an attractive provision for employees to use as a basis for a retaliation claim.
The employer’s argument in CBOSC West is that retaliation claims should not be allowed under § 1981 because they were not explicitly included. The employer also claims that allowing retaliation claims under § 1981 erodes the limitations of Title VII. The employee contends that § 1981 is a broad protection of race-based discrimination, including retaliation, and that Title VII was meant to supplement § 1981. At oral argument, the Court seemed concerned about the lack of explicit language in § 1981 allowing retaliation claims, leading some to speculate that the Court may prohibit retaliation claims under § 1981.
The Court’s opinion should be published in a few months.
The attorneys at Buckley Brown are available to assist you in preventing and defending retaliation and other employment discrimination claims.
Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Extension Act of 2007 Imposes Additional Notice Requirements
Published February 19, 2008	Litigation Closed
Beginning July 1, 2009, the new Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Extension Act of 2007 requires liability insurers, including self-insurers, no-fault insurers and workers’ compensation insurers, to:
Determine Medicare/Medicaid status for all claimants; and
Georgia Supreme Court Refuses to Extend Public Duty Doctrine
Published February 1, 2008	Municipal Liability Closed
The public duty doctrine dictates whether a governmental entity owes a duty of care to an individual. Previously, the Georgia Supreme Court has applied the public duty doctrine only to cases involving police protection. The defendant in Gregory v. Clive, S06G2138 (10/9/2007) asked for the public duty doctrine to be extended to the “general provision of government services under the ‘police power’ of local governments, if a special relationship between the plaintiff and the governmental entity can be shown.” In Gregory, the plaintiffs built a house and barn on their property. Clive, a building inspector with the county, inspected Gregory’s house and issued a certificate of occupancy, but did not inspect the barn. The barn collapsed, injuring Gregory. In the lawsuit, Gregory alleged that if the barn had been inspected, its defects would have been discovered. The Georgia Supreme Court rejected plaintiff’s request to extend the doctrine, confirming that the public duty doctrine applies only in the context of the “provision of police protection services traditionally done by police enforcement personnel.”