Source: http://ga.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20190723_0001040.C11.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2020-08-04 06:13:16
Document Index: 291180777

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2244', '§ 1513', '§ 373', '§ 924', '§ 922', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 924', '§ 16', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924']

FindACase™ | In re Hammoud
In re Hammoud
IN RE: WISSAM T. HAMMOUD, Petitioner.
Before: WILLIAM PRYOR, JORDAN and HULL, Circuit Judges.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2255(h) and 2244(b)(3)(A), Wissam T. Hammoud has filed an application seeking an order authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his federal sentence, 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Such authorization may be granted only if this Court certifies that the second or successive motion contains a claim involving one of the following two circumstances:
28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). "The court of appeals may authorize the filing of a second or successive application only if it determines that the application makes a prima facie showing that the application satisfies the requirements of this subsection." Id. § 2244(b)(3)(C); see also Jordan v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corrs., 485 F.3d 1351, 1357-58 (11th Cir. 2007) (explaining that this Court's determination that an applicant has made a prima facie showing that the statutory criteria have been met is simply a threshold determination).
In 2004, Hammoud was charged by a federal grand jury with various crimes in a 13-count superseding indictment. In 2005, pursuant to a written plea agreement, Hammoud pleaded guilty to these four counts: (1) retaliating against a witness, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1513 (Count 1); (2) solicitation to commit murder, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 373 (Count 3); (3) use of a firearm during a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Count 5); and (4) possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (Count 13). As to the § 924(c) firearm charge in Count 5, the plea agreement specified that Hammoud possessed a firearm during the solicitation crime charged in Count 3. The district court dismissed the remaining nine counts and sentenced Hammoud to a total imprisonment term of 240 months, consisting of (1) concurrent 180-month sentences as to Counts 1 (retaliation) and 3 (solicitation); (2) a concurrent 120-month sentence as to Count 13 (felon in possession); and (3) a consecutive 60-month sentence as to Count 5 (the § 924(c) offense).
In 2006, Hammoud filed a direct appeal challenging his guilty pleas as to Counts 1 and 13 and his total sentence. See United States v. Hammoud, 229 Fed.Appx. 869, 871 (11th Cir. 2007). On appeal, this Court affirmed Hammoud's convictions and dismissed his sentencing claim based on the sentence appeal waiver provision in his plea agreement. Id. at 877. In 2008, Hammoud filed his original § 2255 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence raising a single ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim, which the district court denied on the merits.
In 2018, Hammoud filed an application for leave to file a second or successive § 2255 motion with this Court, arguing, among other things, that § 924(c)(3)(B) was unconstitutional, in light of the new rule of constitutional law announced in Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S.___, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015), and Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 U.S. ___, 138 S.Ct. 1204 (2018), which held, respectively, that the residual clauses in the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA") and 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) were unconstitutionally vague. We denied Hammoud's 2018 application on the merits because, under our then-binding precedent in Ovalles v. United States ("Ovalles II"), 905 F.3d 1231, 1253 (11th Cir. 2018) (en banc), abrogated by United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. ___, 139 S.Ct. 2319 (2019), and In re Garrett, 908 F.3d 686, 689 (11th Cir. 2018), abrogated in part by Davis, 588 U.S. ___, 139 S.Ct. 2319, neither Johnson nor Dimaya could support a vagueness-based challenge to § 924(c)(3)(B).
In his present application, Hammoud contends that his § 924(c) conviction in Count 5 is no longer constitutionally valid. Specifically, Hammoud asserts that § 924(c)(3)(B)'s residual clause is unconstitutional, in light of the new rule of constitutional law set forth in Davis, Dimaya, and Johnson, and that his companion solicitation conviction in Count 3 could have qualified as a "crime of violence" only under § 924(c)'s now-defunct residual clause.[1]
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;To determine whether Hammoud&#39;s proposed Davis claim meets the statutory criteria, we must first address three preliminary issues: (1) whether Davis announced a new rule of constitutional law; (2) if so, whether Davis has been made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court; and (3) whether Hammoud&#39;s Davis claim is barred under our precedent in In re Baptiste, 828 ...