Source: http://nj.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.19700608_0041636.SCT.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2016-10-27 14:58:44
Document Index: 589665647

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 688', '§ 688', '§ 688', '§ 688', '§ 1132', '§ 883', '§ 1180']

| HELLENIC LINES LTD. ET AL. v. RHODITIS
HELLENIC LINES LTD. ET ALv.RHODITIS
Burger, Black, Douglas, Harlan, Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall, Blackmun
[ 398 U.S. Page 307]
This is a suit under the Jones Act*fn1 by a seaman who was injured aboard the ship Hellenic Hero in the Port of New Orleans. The District Court, sitting without a jury, rendered judgment for the seaman, 273 F.Supp. 248. The Court of Appeals affirmed, 412 F.2d 919. The case is here on petition for a writ of certiorari which we granted, 396 U.S. 1000, in light of the conflict between the decision below and Tsakonites v. Transpacific Carriers Corp., 368 F.2d 426, in the Second Circuit.
Petitioner*fn2 Hellenic Lines Ltd. is a Greek corporation that has its largest office in New York and another office in New Orleans. More than 95% of its stock*fn3 is owned by a United States domiciliary who is a Greek citizen -- Pericles G. Callimanopoulos (whom we call Pericles). He lives in Connecticut and manages the corporation out of New York. He has lived in this country [ 398 U.S. Page 308]
The Jones Act speaks only of "the defendant employer" without any qualifications. In Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, however, we listed seven factors to be considered in determining whether a particular shipowner should be held to be an "employer" for Jones Act purposes:
The Lauritzen test, however, is not a mechanical one. 345 U.S., at 582. We indicated that the flag that a ship flies may, at times, alone be sufficient. Id., at 585-586. [ 398 U.S. Page 309]
The significance of one or more factors must be considered in light of the national interest served by the assertion of Jones Act jurisdiction.*fn4 Moreover, the list of seven factors in Lauritzen was not intended as exhaustive. As held in Pavlou v. Ocean Traders Marine Corp., 211 F.Supp. 320, 325, and approved by the Court of Appeals in the present case, 412 F.2d, at 923 n. 7, the shipowner's base of operations is another factor of importance in determining whether the Jones Act is applicable; and there well may be others.
Pericles became a lawful permanent resident alien in 1952. We extend to such an alien the same constitutional protections of due process that we accord citizens.*fn5 [ 398 U.S. Page 310]
Section 688 of Title 46, U. S. C., 41 Stat. 1007, the Jones Act, provides:
The language of § 688 is, as Mr. Justice Jackson noted in Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953), all-embracing. By its terms it is not limited to American [ 398 U.S. Page 312]
seamen nor to vessels bearing the American flag. Yet despite the sweeping language it can hardly be doubted that congressional concern stopped short of the lengths to which the literal terms of the statute carry the Jones Act. This was emphasized in Lauritzen which pointed out that Congress wrote against a backdrop of "usage as old as the Nation," that "such statutes have been construed to apply only to areas and transactions in which American law would be considered operative under prevalent doctrines of international law." 345 U.S., at 577. This principle the Court reiterated in Romero v. International Terminal Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959), where we reaffirmed the presumption that domestic legislation has been enacted with "respect for the relevant interests of foreign nations in the regulation of maritime commerce as part of the legitimate concern of the international community." 358 U.S., at 383.
This Court only recently applied this principle in McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional, 372 U.S. 10 (1963), where we were called upon to determine whether labor relations dealing with an alien crew on a foreign-flag vessel, beneficially owned by an American corporation, affected "commerce" within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act. In holding that the Act was not "intended to have any application to foreign registered vessels employing alien seamen," the Court declined to rely on the beneficial ownership of the vessel and other "substantial United States contacts," including regular visits to the United States and the "integrated maritime operation" of the United Fruit Company, the beneficial owner of the vessel, to override the well-settled principle that the law of the country whose flag a ship flies governs shipboard transactions, absent some "clear expression" from Congress to the contrary. See Wildenhus's Case, 120 U.S. 1 (1887); United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 155-159 (1933); Cunard Steamship Co. v. Mellon, [ 398 U.S. Page 313262]
U.S. 100, 124 (1923); cf. Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64, 118 (1804).*fn1
The McCulloch case followed a course marked early in our jurisprudence, and, in fact, built upon Lauritzen which had announced that the law of the flag, "the most venerable and universal rule of maritime law," would in Jones Act cases "overbear most other connecting events in determining applicable law . . . unless some heavy counterweight appears." 345 U.S., at 584, 585-586.
The only justification that I can see for extending extraterritorially a remedial-type provision like § 688 [ 398 U.S. Page 314]
is that the injured seaman is an individual whose well-being is a concern of this country. It was for this reason that Lauritzen recognized the residence of the plaintiff as a factor that should properly be considered in deciding who is a "seaman" as Congress employed that term in § 688. See D. Cavers, The Choice-of-Law Process 96-97 (1965). In so doing it reflected earlier decisions where recovery was had by resident alien seamen who were serving aboard foreign-flag vessels. See, e. g., Gambera v. Bergoty, 132 F.2d 414 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1942); cf. Uravic v. F. Jarka Co., 282 U.S. 234 (1931).
In the early decisions involving citizen and resident alien seamen serving on foreign vessels, some additional factor, such as the vessel's presence in American waters or beneficial American ownership, was considered to be an element justifying recovery. See Uravic v. F. Jarka Co., supra; Gerradin v. United Fruit Co., 60 F.2d 927 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1932); compare Gambera v. Bergoty, supra, with O'Neill v. Cunard White Star, 160 F.2d 446 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1947). Lauritzen in enumerating these factors ("contacts") as independent considerations, was attempting to focus analysis on those factors that are the necessary ingredients for a statutory cause of action: first, as a matter of statutory construction, is plaintiff within that class of seamen that Congress intended to cover by the statute? and, second, is there a sufficient nexus between the defendant and this country so as to justify the assertion of legislative jurisdiction?*fn2 In other words the Court must define "seaman" and "employer" as those words are used in [ 398 U.S. Page 315]
§ 688. In this regard the situs of the accident or the vessel's contacts with this country by virtue of its beneficial ownership or the frequency of calls at our ports simply serves as an adequate nexus between this country and defendant to assert jurisdiction in a case where congressional policy is otherwise furthered. But no matter how qualitatively substantial or numerous these kinds of contacts may be, they have no bearing in themselves on whether Jones Act recovery is appropriate in a given instance. For transactions occurring aboard foreign-flag vessels that question should be answered by reference to the plaintiff's relationship to this country. See Note, Admiralty and the Choice of Law: Lauritzen v. Larsen Applied, 47 Va. L. Rev. 1400 (1961).
Viewed in this perspective, today's decision and decisions of several lower courts that have taken the phenomenon of "convenient" foreign registry as a wedge for displacing the law of the flag, see, e. g., Southern Cross Steamship Co. v. Firipis, 285 F.2d 651 (C. A. 4th Cir. 1960); Pavlou v. Ocean Traders Marine Corp., 211 F.Supp. 320 (D.C. S. D. N. Y. 1962); Voyiatzis v. National Shipping & Trading Corp., 199 F.Supp. 920 (D.C. S. D. N. Y. 1961), have, I believe, misconstrued these basic premises on which Lauritzen was founded. This is underscored by the fact that the Lauritzen allusion to the practice of American owners of finding a "convenient" flag "to avoid stringent shipping laws by seeking foreign registration eagerly offered by some countries," 345 U.S., at 587, was prefaced by citation and discussion of Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941), and Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952), both of which dealt with the question of when legislative jurisdiction existed to apply domestic law to American nationals abroad. In both cases the application of domestic law [ 398 U.S. Page 316]
presupposed or construed legislative purpose to be furthered by reaching across the border.*fn3
The Lauritzen statement, lifted out of context, has acquired a dynamism and become the justification for recovery by foreign seamen simply on the ground that convenient "registry" somehow circumvents an obligation that Congress desired to impose on all owners within its jurisdiction.*fn4 [ 398 U.S. Page 317]
This underlies today's decision which relies on the fact that Hellenic Lines is an American-based operation and its vessels would be accorded a competitive advantage over American-flag vessels were we to permit petitioners to avoid responsibility under the Jones Act. Liability is only one factor that contributes to the higher cost of operating an American-flag vessel. Indeed, recognizing the insurance factor, it is doubtful that this factor is a significant contribution to the competitive advantage of foreign-flag ships, especially given the higher crew wages (see 46 U. S. C. § 1132 requiring American crews) and construction costs for American-flag ships, which must be built in American yards if they are to participate in the congressional programs specifically designed to offset the higher costs that the Court today takes as justification for displacing settled international principles of choice of law. See, e. g., 46 U. S. C. § 883 (coastwise trade); 46 U. S. C. § 1180 (subsidy). See generally S. Lawrence, United States Merchant Shipping Policies and Politics 61-67 (1966).
Even were Jones Act liability a significant uncompensated cost in the operation of an American ship, I could not regard this as a reason for extending Jones Act recovery to foreign seamen when the underlying concern of the legislation before us is the adjustment of the risk of loss between individuals and not the regulation of commerce or competition. [ 398 U.S. Page 318]
Today's decision suggests that courts have become mesmerized by contacts, and notwithstanding the purported eschewal of a mechanical application of the Lauritzen test, they have lost sight of the primary purpose of Lauritzen which, as I conceive it, was to reconcile the all-embracing language of the Jones Act with those principles of comity embodied in international and maritime law that are designed to "foster amicable and workable commercial relations." 345 U.S., at 582. Lauritzen, properly understood, should, I submit, be taken to focus the judicial inquiry on the purpose of Congress and the presence or absence of an adequate basis for the assertion of American jurisdiction, when that purpose may be furthered by application of the statute in the circumstances presented.