Source: http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/archives/ross_curtis-palmer.htm
Timestamp: 2015-05-29 12:23:50
Document Index: 458329218

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 200', '§ 240', '§ 241', '§ 240', '§ 241', '§ 200', '§ 200', '§ 240', '§ 241', '§ 241', '§ 240', '§ 200', '§ 241', '§ 200', '§ 241', '§ 240', '§ 240', '§ 240', '§ 240', '§ 240', '§ 240', '§ 240', '§ 240', '§ 240', '§ 240', '§ 240', '§ 241', '§ 240', '§ 241', '§ 240', '§ 241', '§ 241', '§ 241']

Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co.
Charles Ross, Respondent-Appellant,vCurtis-Palmer Hydro-Electric Company et al., Defendants, and InternationalPaper Company, Appellant-Respondent.
Argued April 27, 1993
Decided June 10, 1993
81 NY2d 494
CITE TITLE AS: Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co.
Plaintiff, a welder, was allegedly injured in an industrial accident, which, he contends, was caused by the absence of an adequate and properly placed structure or device that would have enabled him safely to perform his work at the elevated job site. The issue presented on these cross appeals taken by the injured plaintiff and the general contractor hired to oversee the work is whether plaintiff, whose injury resulted from back strain rather than a fall, may recover in damages from the general contractor under Labor Law § 200 (1), § 240 (1) or § 241 (6). More specifically, these cross appeals require us to consider whether plaintiff's accident is within the class of hazards contemplated by Labor Law § 240 (1), whether the specific [*498] Industrial Code regulations on which plaintiff relies support a cause of action under Labor Law § 241 (6) and, if not, whether plaintiff's submissions at this early stage of the litigation are sufficient to satisfy his burden under Labor Law § 200 (1) of showing defendants' supervision or control over the injury-producing work. Under the circumstances of this case, we hold that plaintiff has no cause of action under sections 240 (1) and 241 (6) of the Labor Law, but that his submissions are sufficient to create triable questions of fact under section 200 (1).
Plaintiff was employed by Bechtel Corporation to perform certain welding tasks at a construction site owned by defendant Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Electric Co. and managed by defendant International Paper Co., the general contractor. Bechtel had been retained by International Paper to do a portion of the construction. According to plaintiff's allegations, plaintiff was assigned the task of welding a 26- to 30-inch seam near the top of a shaft that was some 40 to 50 feet deep. A temporary platform was placed over the shaft to enable plaintiff to perform this task. In order to complete his welding job without falling from his perch, plaintiff had to sit at the platform's edge, extend one leg forward against the top edge of the shaft and stretch forward and down with his upper torso and head to reach the seam that needed welding. Although plaintiff had complained about having to work in this position and had asked his Bechtel supervisor to provide a ladder instead, he was told that he had to complete the welding job from the temporary platform because of time constraints. After working from the platform for some 2 1/2 hours, plaintiff experienced difficulty and pain when he attempted to straighten his back. He was unable to stand up straight and was forced to crawl off the platform. Plaintiff was eventually referred to an orthopedic surgeon, but, despite subsequent back surgery, he remains disabled.
Plaintiff commenced the present action against International Paper, Curtis-Palmer and Saratoga Development Corp., Curtis-Palmer's general partner, alleging causes of action under Labor Law § 200 (1), § 240 (1) and § 241 (6). Following limited discovery, defendant International Paper moved for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's three causes of action, and plaintiff cross-moved for partial summary judgment imposing liability under sections 240 (1) and 241 (6). The trial [*499] court granted all three defendants relief by dismissing the complaint against each of them in its entirety. On plaintiff's appeal, however, a divided Appellate Division reinstated all of plaintiff's causes of action except the Labor Law § 241 (6) claim asserted against defendant International Paper.[1] The majority concluded that, even under our recent holding in Rocovich v Consolidated Edison Co. (78 NY2d 509), plaintiff could assert a cause of action under Labor Law § 240 (1) because he had been exposed to an "elevation-related risk" arising from the inadequacy of the protective device with which he had been supplied (180 AD2d, at 390). As to plaintiff's Labor Law § 200 (1) claim, the Appellate Division held that International Paper's contractual promise to manage and supervise the construction was sufficient to establish prima facie that that defendant may have exercised the requisite control or supervision of the work. Finally, the Court held that plaintiff's Labor Law § 241 (6) claim against defendant International Paper was not sustainable because his allegations were too general to support recovery under that provision. The Court subsequently granted plaintiff and defendant International Paper leave to appeal to this Court, certifying a dispositive question of law.[2] We agree with the Appellate Division's conclusion on plaintiff's Labor Law § 200 (1) and § 241 (6) causes of action, but we reject that Court's determination on plaintiff's Labor Law § 240 (1) claim.
I. Liability Under Labor Law § 240 (1) Labor Law § 240 (1), often called the "scaffold law," provides that "[a]ll contractors and owners ... shall furnish or erect, [*500] or cause to be furnished or erected ... scaffolding, hoists, stays, ladders, slings, hangers, blocks, pulleys, braces, irons, ropes, and other devices which shall be so constructed, placed and operated as to give proper protection to [construction workers employed on the premises]."[3] The purpose of this statute is to protect workers and to impose the responsibility for safety practices on those best situated to bear that responsibility (see, Zimmer v Chemung County Performing Arts, 65 NY2d 513, 520; 1969 NY Legis Ann, at 407). It is by now well established that the duty imposed by Labor Law § 240 (1) is nondelegable and that an owner or contractor who breaches that duty may be held liable in damages regardless of whether it has actually exercised supervision or control over the work (see, e.g., Haimes v New York Tel. Co., 46 NY2d 132, 136-137).
We recently had occasion to consider the nature of the occupational hazards to which Labor Law § 240 (1) was addressed. Noting that the statute " 'is to be construed as liberally as may be for the accomplishment of the purpose for which it was ... framed' " (Koenig v Patrick Constr. Corp., 298 NY 313, 319, quoting Quigley v Thatcher, 207 NY 66, 68), we held in Rocovich v Consolidated Edison Co. (supra) that Labor Law § 240 (1) was aimed only at elevation-related hazards and that, accordingly, injuries resulting from other types of hazards are not compensable under that statute even if proximately caused by the absence of an adequate scaffold or other required safety device.
The injury sustained by the plaintiff in this casesevere and disabling back strainis not the kind of harm that is typically associated with elevation-related hazards. Nonetheless, plaintiff contends that he should be permitted to recover under Labor Law § 240 (1) because his injury was "related to the effects of gravity" in that it was allegedly produced by plaintiff's need to work in a contorted position in order to avoid falling down the deep shaft on which he was working.
The problem with plaintiff's argument is that it misconstrues the import of our analysis in Rocovich. As we observed in that case, Labor Law § 240 (1)'s list of required safety devices (e.g., "scaffolding," "hoists," "braces," "irons" and "stays"), all of which are used in connection with elevation differentials, evinces a clear legislative intent to provide "exceptional [*501] protection" for workers against the "special hazards" that arise when the work site either is itself elevated or is positioned below the level where "materials or load [are] hoisted or secured" (78 NY2d, at 514). The "special hazards" to which we referred in Rocovich, however, do not encompass any and all perils that may be connected in some tangential way with the effects of gravity. Rather, the "special hazards" referred to are limited to such specific gravity-related accidents as falling from a height or being struck by a falling object that was improperly hoisted or inadequately secured (see, DeHaen v Rockwood Sprinkler Co., 258 NY 350). In other words, Labor Law § 240 (1) was designed to prevent those types of accidents in which the scaffold, hoist, stay, ladder or other protective device proved inadequate to shield the injured worker from harm directly flowing from the application of the force of gravity to an object or person. The right of recovery afforded by the statute does not extend to other types of harm, even if the harm in question was caused by an inadequate, malfunctioning or defectively designed scaffold, stay or hoist.
The facts in this case provide a good illustration of the distinction. If plaintiff's allegations are accurate, the platform with which plaintiff was provided could well be found deficient or even unsafe, since it was placed in a way that required its occupant to work in a strained and contorted position. Nevertheless, however unsafe the makeshift "scaffold" may have been in that respect, it cannot be said that the device did not serve the core objective of Labor Law § 240 (1)preventing plaintiff from falling down the shaft. In that regard, the device did not malfunction and was not defective in its design. Thus, as was noted by the dissenter in the Court below, plaintiff's injuries allegedly flowed from a deficiency in the device that was "wholly unrelated to the hazard which brought about its need in the first instance" (180 AD2d, at 394 [Mercure, J., dissenting in part]). Accordingly, contrary to the views of the Appellate Division majority, plaintiff cannot rely on Labor Law § 240 (1) as a basis for recovery.
II. Liability Under Labor Law § 241 (6)
As an alternative to the rights conferred by Labor Law § 240 (1), plaintiff relies on Labor Law § 241 (6), which requires owners and contractors to "provide reasonable and adequate protection and safety" for workers and to comply with the specific safety rules and regulations promulgated by [*502] the Commissioner of the Department of Labor. As is the duty imposed by Labor Law § 240 (1), the Labor Law § 241 (6) duty to comply with the Commissioner's regulations is nondelegable (e.g., Long v Forest-Fehlhaber, 55 NY2d 154, 159; Allen v Cloutier Constr. Corp., 44 NY2d 290).[4] Thus, to the extent that plaintiff has asserted a viable claim under Labor Law § 241 (6), he need not show that defendants exercised supervision or control over his worksite in order to establish his right of recovery. Nonetheless, in this case, plaintiff's Labor Law § 241 (6) claim must fail because of the inadequacy of his allegations regarding the regulations defendants purportedly breached.
In support of his claim under section 241 (6), plaintiff relied exclusively on 12 NYCRR 23-1.25 (d), which requires that "[a]ll persons engaged in welding or flame-cutting ... be provided where necessary with proper scaffolds installed and used in compliance with th[ese regulations]." Plaintiff doe