Source: http://www.ecases.us/case/scotus/c109410/william-t-coleman-jr-secretary-of-transportation-applicant-v-paccar
Timestamp: 2019-11-18 03:21:54
Document Index: 148404314

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1651', '§ 1651', '§ 1253', '§ 1254', '§ 701', '§ 1', '§ 1381', '§ 1397', '§ 1254']

William T. Coleman, Jr., Secretary of Transportation, Applicant v. Paccar Inc. No. A-651, United States Supreme Court, Supreme Court, Federal Courts, COURT CASE
William T. Coleman, Jr., Secretary of Transportation, Applicant v. Paccar Inc. No. A-651 , 424 U.S. 1301 ( 1976 )
96 S. Ct. 845
47 L. Ed. 2d 67
William T. COLEMAN, Jr., Secretary of Transportation, Applicant,
It is incumbent upon me first to determine whether I have jurisdiction to grant the relief requested by the Secretary. This case does not come before me in the usual posture of a stay application, where a court of appeals has rendered a judgment disposing of a case before it and the losing litigant seeks a stay of the judgment of the court of appeals pending the filing of a petition for certiorari to review that judgment in this Court. There the question is whether four Justices are likely to vote to grant certiorari, and what assessment is to be made of the equities pertinent to the grant of such interim relief. Edelman v. Jordan, 414 U.S. 1301, 94 S. Ct. 13, 38 L. Ed. 2d 15 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers). Here the Court of Appeals has not finally disposed of the case; indeed, it has not ruled on the merits nor apparently rescheduled oral argument on the question presented by the petition for review of the safety standard.
Pursuant to Rules 50 and 51 of this Court I have authority as Circuit Justice to take any action which the full Court might take under 28 U.S.C. § 1651. But even the full Court under § 1651 may issue writs only in aid of its jurisdiction. The Secretary contends that the Court of Appeals' stay order is the equivalent of a preliminary injunction which, if issued by a three-judge district court, would be reviewable here. Certainly the full Court, in the exercise of its normal appellate jurisdiction, has noted probable jurisdiction, heard argument, and written opinions in cases where the district court has issued only a preliminary injunction. See Brown v. Chote, 411 U.S. 452, 93 S. Ct. 1732, 36 L. Ed. 2d 420 (1973); Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 95 S. Ct. 1456, 43 L. Ed. 2d 712 (1975). But in each of those cases the action of the District Court was made appealable to this Court by statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1253. There is no similar provision for appeal eo nomine from an interlocutory order of a court of appeals.
This Court has jurisdiction to review by certiorari any case in a court of appeals, 28 U.S.C. § 1254. Although the Secretary is not presently seeking certiorari from this Court in order to review the stay order of the Court of Appeals, if I have authority as Circuit Justice to vacate the stay, it must be on the ground that the vacation of the stay is "in aid of this Court's jurisdiction" to review by certiorari a final disposition on the merits of respondents' petition to review and set aside the safety standard in question. See McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 279-280, 30 S. Ct. 501, 503-504, 54 L. Ed. 762 (1910).
The closest opinions in point seem to be the in-chambers opinions of my Brother Marshall in Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S. 1304, 94 S. Ct. 1, 38 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1973), and of Mr. Justice Black in Meredith v. Fair, 83 S. Ct. 10, 9 L. Ed. 2d 43 (1962). Both opinions considered on their merits motions to vacate interlocutory stays issued by a judge or panel of judges of a Court of Appeals; in Holtzman the motion was denied and in Meredith it was granted. I think the sense of the two opinions, and likewise that of Mr. Justice Douglas' dissent in Schlesinger v. Holtzman, 414 U.S. 1321, 1322, 94 S. Ct. 11, 38 L. Ed. 2d 33 (1973), is that a Circuit Justice has jurisdiction to vacate a stay where it appears that the rights of the parties to a case pending in the court of appeals, which case could and very likely would be reviewed here upon final disposition in the court of appeals, may be seriously and irreparably injured by the stay, and the Circuit Justice is of the opinion that the court of appeals is demonstrably wrong in its application of accepted standards in deciding to issue the stay. A narrower rule would leave the party without any practicable remedy for an interlocutory order of a court of appeals which was ex hypothesi both wrong and irreparably damaging;* a broader rule would permit a single Justice of this Court to simply second-guess a three-judge panel of the court of appeals in the application of principles with respect to which there was no dispute.
The Secretary contends that since the action of the Court of Appeals is equivalent to a preliminary injunction issued by a district court, the Court of Appeals should be required to make the same sort of findings before granting such a stay as are required of a district court by Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 65. Perhaps the full Court in the exercise of its supervisory authority could impose such a requirement, even though no rule or statute does, but certainly a Circuit Justice in chambers may not do so. A court in staying the action of a lower court, see O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1, 3, 92 S. Ct. 2718, 2719, 34 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1972), or of an administrative agency, Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 94 S. Ct. 937, 39 L. Ed. 2d 166 (1974), must take into account factors such as irreparable harm and probability of success on the merits. But in the absence of a statute, rule, or controlling precedent there is no fixed requirement that a court recite the fact that it has taken these into consideration, or explain its reason for taking the action which it did.
I can readily understand the uncertainty of the Court of Appeals with respect to the issues in controversy, the parties' position on them, and the like. I have resolutely resisted the efforts of both parties to dispel my own uncertainty on these issues, which remains pristine. Congress in a complex statute has imposed an arduous burden on the Secretary's delegate, and then provided for judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., which places enormously difficult burdens on the Court of Appeals. But the complexity of the issue does not change the time-honored presumption in favor of the validity of the Administrator's determination, nor shift the burden of showing probable success from the shoulders of the parties who seek to upset that determination. See FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602, 64 S. Ct. 281, 288, 88 L. Ed. 333 (1944); Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 767, 88 S. Ct. 1344, 1360, 20 L. Ed. 2d 312 (1968).
I do not find the Court of Appeals' direction to the parties with respect to the formulation of issues and stipulation as to the record to be consistent with a finding, which must be implied since it is not expressed, that respondents would probably succeed on the merits of their petition to set aside the standard promulgated by the Secretary's delegate. Moreover, applicant has persuasively urged that the Government will suffer irreparable harm if MVSS-121 is not permitted to remain in effect during the pendency of the litigation on the merits. Congress' desire "to reduce traffic accidents and deaths and injuries to persons resulting from traffic accidents," § 1, 80 Stat. 718, 15 U.S.C. § 1381, is currently being pursued under the statutory scheme by requiring compliance with prescribed motor vehicle safety standards at the time of vehicle manufacture. 15 U.S.C. § 1397(a)(1). Presently, vehicles manufactured while a standard is not in effect may be later sold or transferred without restriction and may thereby find their way to the highways although not in compliance with safety requirements properly deemed necessary by the Secretary.
The losing litigant could, of course, petition this Court for a writ of certiorari to review the stay order of the court of appeals. Since the case is "in" the court of appeals within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1254, the Court would presumably have jurisdiction to grant the writ if it chose to do so in the exercise of its discretion. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 942, 91 S. Ct. 2270, 29 L. Ed. 2d 853 (1971). See also Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 72 S. Ct. 492, 96 L. Ed. 576 (1952). But the exercise of such power by the Court is an extremely rare occurrence. Supreme Court Rule 20.
Citation Numbers： 424 U.S. 1301
Filed Date： 2/2/1976
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