Source: http://www.juricaf.org/arret/CONSEILDELEUROPE-COUREUROPEENNEDESDROITSDELHOMME-19830302-974282
Timestamp: 2017-07-24 11:02:03+00:00
Document Index: 287775048

Matched Legal Cases: ['arrêt ', "l'article 47", "l'article 52", "l'article 6", "l'article 6", "l'article 26", "l'article 27"]

Type d'affaire : DecisionType de recours : Violation de l'Art. 6-1 ; Violation de l'Art. 8 ; Violation de l'Art. 13 ; Satisfaction équitable réservéeNumérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 9742/82Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1983-03-02;9742.82 Analyses : (Art. 10-1) LIBERTE D'EXPRESSION, (Art. 13) DROIT A UN RECOURS EFFECTIF, (Art. 6-1) ACCES A UN TRIBUNAL, (Art. 6-1) PROCES EQUITABLE, (Art. 8-1) RESPECT DE LA CORRESPONDANCE, (Art. 8-2) DEFENSE DE L'ORDRE, (Art. 8-2) INGERENCE, (Art. 8-2) NECESSAIRE DANS UNE SOCIETE DEMOCRATIQUE, (Art. 8-2) PREVENTION DES INFRACTIONS PENALES, (Art. 8-2) PREVUE PAR LA LOI, (Art. 8-2) PROTECTION DE LA MORALE, (Art. 8-2) PROTECTION DE LA SANTEParties : Demandeurs : X.Défendeurs : IRLANDETexte : APPLICATION/REQUETE NÂ° 9742/82 X . v/IRELAN D X . c/IRLAND E DECISION of 2 March 1983 on the admissibility of the application DÃCISION du 2 mars 1983 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªt e
AAlcle 27, peret(raph 2 of the Conventlon : Au application concerning the tength oJ'extradition proceedings between two High Contracting Parties to the Convention . whereas this length is mainly due to the fact that the person concerned has failed to comply with the conditions for his release on bail by the requesting State and has fled the enforcement of the extradition by the respotr dent State. constitutes an abuse of the right of petition .
Arqcle 27, perngrephe 2, de la Convention : Est abusive une requÃªte portan t sur la durÃ©e d'une procÃ©dure d'extradition entre deux Etats Parties Ã la Convention . alors que cette durÃ©e est due esserttiellement au fait que l'intÃ©ressÃ© n a pas respectÃ© les conditions de sa mise en libertÃ© provisoire par l'Etat requÃ©ranu et s'est soustrait Ã l'exÃ©cution de la dÃ©cision d'extradition par l'Etat requis.
(franÃ§ais : voir p. 254 )
The facts as they have been submitted by the applicant, an Irish citizen born in 1936 and resident in County . . .,may be summarised as follows . In 1971 the police raided the applicant's flat in London where they found a quantity of electric detonators . As a result the applicant was arrested and charged at West London Magistrates' Court with handling stolen goods contrary to Section 22 (1) of the Theft Act 1968 . He was remanded in custody from November 1971 until January 1972, when he was granted bail, which he broke in March 1972 by travelling to Ireland .
The British police traced him to an address in Dublin and the Metropolitan Stipendary Magistrate sitting in the West London Magistrates' Court issued a warrant for the applicant's arrest in connection with the charge under Section 22 (1) of the Theft Act 1968, on . . . October 1974 . An application was then made for the applicant's extradition . On . . . November 1974 a District Justice in Dublin issued an order under Section 47 of the Extradition Act 1965 directing that the applicant be delivered into the custody of a member of the Metropolitan Police Force Flying Squad at Dublin airport . The applicant then issued a Special Summons on . . . November 1974, relying on the Extradition Act 1965 to the effect that the warrant issued in London should not be executed on him in Dublin on the grounds that the otfences alleged were political and did not correspond to offences under Irish law . The applicant's action came before the High Court on . . . February 1975 and on . . . April 1975 judgment was reserved . The applicant had entered into a recognisance pursuant to Section 52 (3) of the Extradition Act 1965 on issuing his Special Summons, and was therefore at liberty, but obliged to report to the Police twice weekly . The judgment of the High Court was given on . . . October 1980 . and the applicanl's Summons was rejected . The applicant appealed from the decision of the High Court to the Supreme Courl on the grounds, inter a1ia, that the right to extradite in the case had been lost by the inordinate length time since the btfence had allegedly been committed . This argument, and the other grounds relied upon by the applicant, was rejected by the Supreme Court, which held that the applicant's breaking of bail was the initial cause of the delay in his trial in the United Kingdom and that the subsequent delay in the giving of judgment by the Irish High Court could only raise an issue as to the fairness of the applicant's trial in the United Kingdom and did not represent a ground to refuse extradition . The applicant's further grounds, that the offence in . question was political, and that it would not constitute a criminal offence in Ireland, were also rejected by the Court, after a long and detailed analysis of the nature of the offence with which the applicant was charged . The applicant did not attend the Supreme Court to hear judgment given since his solicitors, who were notified on Friday . . . October 1981 that the judgment would be given on Monday . . . October 1981 were unable to contact him in time to inform him of the date . Since the judgment of the Supreme Court the applicant has been avoiding arrest and desc ri bes himself as being on the run . - 252 -
COMPLAINTS The applicant complains at the length of the extradition proceedings to which he has been subjected and which lasted nearly seven years . He also complains that the judgment of the Supreme Court on his appeal was unlawful since the Court did not have a transcript of the proceedings before the High Court available, but merely the Registrar's notes . The applicant invokes Article 6 of the Convention .
THE LA W I . The applicant complains of the duration and legality of extradition proceedings against him and invokes Article 6 (1) of the Convention, which provides : "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law" . However the Commission must first consider the respondent Government's submission that in the light of the applicant's conduct the application is an abuse ot' the right of petition .
The Contntission recalls that under the terms of Article 26 of the Convention it may only consider a complaint where all effective domestic remedies have been exhausted . This provision required the applicant to pursue the remedies before the High Court and the Supreme Court, the propriety of which the applicant now challenges bet'ore the Comntission . Furthermore the Commission notes that the judgments of both the High Court and the Suprente Court examined the applicant's contentions in detail and concludes that it could not be said that the domestic proceedings pursued by the applicant were frivolous . It follows that the pursuit of these proceedings iu themselves did not constitute an abuse of the right of petition . Nevertheless, although the appeal proceedings in question were a sine qua uon for the present application, the Commission must also take account of the exceptional factors of the applicant's conduct of the proceedings which the Commission notes arose as a result of the applicant having broken bail in the United Kingdom and fled to Ireland . In particular the Commission must examine the applicant's conduct of the proceedings before the Commission itsetl' . In his first letter to the Commission the applicant described himself as being'on the run', following the rejection of his appeal by the Supreme Court . -253-
Until this time and during the delay prior to the decision of the High Court, the applicant was not in detention and was peacefully residing at his home . He had taken no steps to accelerate the proceedings in question, but when they were finally concluded he immediately went into hiding to avoid their operation . The Commission recognises that occasions may arise where an alleged violation of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention may excuse an applicant froni compliance with the operation of the rule of law . However, in the present case the applicant's proposed extradition to the United Kingdom to face trial in the jurisdiction of another member state of the Council of Europe does not justify the applicant's flight from domestic law enforcement . It follows that in the circumstances of this case the applicant's conduct of his proceedings before the Commission constitute an abuse of the ri ght of petition within the meaning of Article 27 ( 2) of the Convention . For these reasons the Commissio n
DECLARES THIS APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE :
EN FAI T Les faits, tels qu'ils ont Ã©tÃ© exposÃ©s par le requÃ©rant, citoyen irlandais nÃ© en 1936 et habitant le comtÃ© de . . . peuvent se rÃ©sumer comme suit : En 1971, Ia police fit une descente dans l'appa rt ement londonien du requÃ©rant, oÃ¹ elle trouva une grande quantitÃ© de dÃ©tonateurs Ã©lect ri ques . Le requÃ©rant fut par la suite arrÃªtÃ© et inculpÃ© devant la Magistrates' Court de Londres Ouest de recel de marchandises, en contravention Ã l'a rt icle 22, paragraphe l, de la loi de 1968 sur le vol . L'intÃ©ressÃ© demeura en dÃ©tention provisoire de novembre 1971 Ã janvier 1972, date Ã laquelle il fut mis en libe rt Ã© sous caution ; mais il en viola les conditions en mars 1972 en se re ndant en Irlande .
La police britannique apprit qu'il se trouvait Ã Dublin et le magistrat compÃ©tent du t ribunal de Londres Ouest lan Ã§ a contre lui, le . . . octobre 1974, un mandat d'arrÃªt en raison de l'inculpation prononcÃ©e en ve rtu de l'art icle 22, paragraphe 1, de la loi de 1968 sur le vol . L'extradition du re quÃ©rant fut ensuite demandÃ©e . Le . . . novembre 1974, conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 47 de la loi de 1965 sur l'extradition, un juge de Dublin ordonna la remise du requÃ©rant Ã la garde d'un agent de l'Ã©quipe volante de la police mÃ©tropolitaine Ã l'aÃ©ropo rt de Dublin . Le requÃ©rant invoqua alors la loi de 1965 sur l'extradition pour dÃ©poser le . . . novembre 1974 une demande spÃ©ciale tendant Ã ce que le mandat lancÃ© Ã Londres ne soit pas exÃ©cutÃ© contre lui Ã Dublin au motif que les infractions allÃ©guÃ©es Ã©taient d'ordre politique et ne correspondaient pas Ã des infractions au regard du droit irlandais . La demande du requÃ©rant fut examinÃ©e le . . . fÃ©vrier 1975 par la High Court, qui rÃ©serva son jugement le . . . avril 1975 . En signant sa demande spÃ©ciale, le requÃ©rant avait pris l'engagement prÃ©vu Ã l'article 52, paragraphe 3, de la loi de 1965 sur l'extradition et se trouvait donc en libertÃ© mais tenu de se prÃ©senter deux fois par semaine Ã la police . La High Court rendit son jugement le . . . octobre 1980 en dÃ©boutant le requÃ©rant .
L'intÃ©ressÃ© se pourvut alors devant la Cour suprÃªme, arguant notamment de la dÃ©chÃ©ance du droit d'extrader en raison du temps inhabituellement long Ã©coulÃ© depuis que le dÃ©lit aurait Ã©tÃ© commis . Cet argument, et les autres motifs invoquÃ©s par le requÃ©rant, furent rejetÃ©s par la Cour suprÃªme, qui dÃ©clara que le non-respect par le requÃ©rant des conditions de sa mise en libertÃ© sous caution Ã©tait la cause initiale du retard apportÃ© Ã le juger au Royaume-Uni et que le retard subsÃ©quent de la High Court irlandaise Ã rendre son jugement ne pourrait Ãªtre invoquÃ© qu'en ce qui conceme l'Ã©quitÃ© du procÃ¨s du requÃ©rant au Royaume-Uni, mais ne constituait pas un motif de refuser l'extradition . La Cour rejeta Ã©galement les autres motifs invoquÃ©s par le requÃ©rant, Ã savoir que l'infraction Ã©tait d'ordre politique et qu'elle n'Ã©tait pas punissable en Irlande, aprÃ¨s avoir analysÃ© longuement en dÃ©tail la nature de l'infraction reprochÃ©e au requÃ©rant . Le requÃ©rant n'assista pas au prononcÃ© de l'arrÃªt de la Cour suprÃªme car ses solicitors, avisÃ©s le vendredi . . . octobre 1981 que l'arrÃªt serait rendu le . . . octobre 1981, ne purent pas le joindre Ã temps pour l'informer de la date . Depuis l'arrÃªt de la Cour suprÃªme, le requÃ©rant Ã©chappe aux recherches et se dÃ©crit lui-mÃªme comme Ã©tant en fuite .
GRIEF S Le requÃ©rant se plaint de la durÃ©e de la procÃ©dure d'extradition le concernant, commencÃ©e depuis prÃ¨s de 7 ans . Il se plaint Ã©galement de l'irrÃ©gularitÃ© de l'arrÃ©t rendu par la Cour suprÃªme, qui ne disposait pas d'un compte rendu de la procÃ©dure devant la High Court mais seulement des notes du greffier. Le requÃ©rant invoque Ã cet Ã©gard l'article 6 de la Convention .
EN DROIT 1 . Le requÃ©rant se plaint de la durÃ©e et de la rÃ©gularitÃ© de la procÃ©dure d'extradition engagÃ©e contre lui et invoque l'article 6, paragraphe 1, de la Convention, ainsi libellÃ© : -Toute personne a droit Ã ce que sa cause soit entendue Ã©quitablement, publiquement et dans un dÃ©lai raisonnable, par un tribunal indÃ©pendant et impartial, Ã©tabli par la loi, qui dÃ©cidera, soit des des contestations sur ses droits et obGgations de caractÃ¨re civil, soit du bien-fondÃ© de toute accusation en maniÃ¨re pÃ©nale dirigÃ©e contre elle . Cependant, la Commission doit tout d'abord examiner l'argument d u Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur selon lequel, compte tenu du comportement du requÃ©rant, la requÃªte constitue un abus du droit de recours . La Commission rappelle qu'aux termes de l'article 26 de la Convention, elle ne peut examiner une plainte qu'aprÃ¨s Ã©puisement de tous les recours internes efficaces . Cette disposition obligeait donc le requÃ©rant Ã utiliser les recours Ã la High Court et Ã la Cour suprÃªme, dont il conteste Ã prÃ©sent l'opportunitÃ© devant la Commission . En outre, la Commission relÃ¨ve que la High Court comme la Cour suprÃªme ont examinÃ© Ã fond l'argumentation du requÃ©rant et en conclut qu'on ne saurait taxer d'abusives les procÃ©dures internes utilisÃ©es par le requÃ©rant . Il en dÃ©coule que l'usage de ces procÃ©dures ne constitue pas en soi un abus du droit de recours. NÃ©anmoins, bien que ces procÃ©dures de recours fussent une condition prÃ©alable absolue Ã la prÃ©sente requÃªte, la Commission Ã©galement tenir compte des Ã©lÃ©ments exceptionnels que constitue la maniÃ¨re dont le requÃ©rant a conduit ces procÃ©dures, suite, relÃ¨ve la Commission, au fait qu'il n'a pas respectÃ© les conditions de sa mise en libertÃ© au Royaume-Uni en s'enfuyant en Irlande . La Commission doit notamment examiner comment le requÃ©rant a conduit la procÃ©dure devant elle-mÃªme . Dans sa premiÃ¨re lettre Ã la Commission, le requÃ©rant a lui-mÃªme reconnu Ãªtre -en fuite ., aprÃ¨s le rejet de son pourvuoi par la Cour suprÃ©me .
Jusqu'Ã cette date et pendant la pÃ©riode qui a prÃ©cÃ©dÃ© l'arrÃªt de la High Court, le requÃ©rant n'Ã©tait pas en dÃ©tention et habitait tranquillement chez lui . Il n'a pris alors aucune mesure pour accÃ©lÃ©rer la procÃ©dure en question mais lorsque celle-ci a Ã©tÃ© terminÃ©e, il a immÃ©diatement pris la fuite pour Ã©viter l'exÃ©cution de la dÃ©cision . La Commission reconnait qu'il peut y avoir des circonstances oÃ¹ une violation allÃ©guÃ©e des droits et libertÃ©s garantis par la Convention peut excuser un requÃ©rant de ne pas se soumettre Ã la loi . En l'espÃ¨ce cependant, l'extradition du requÃ©rant envisagÃ©e vers le Royaume-Uni pour qu'il soit jugÃ© dans un autre Etat membre du Conseil de l'Europe ne justifie pas que le requÃ©rant se soit soustrait Ã l'application de la loi nationale . Il s'ensuit que, dans les circonstances de la cause, la manidre dont le requÃ©rant a conduit la procÃ©dure devant la Commission constitue un abus du droit de recours, au sens de l'article 27, paragraphe 2, de la Convention . Par ces motifs, la Commissio n
-257-Origine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Cour (chambre)Date de la décision : 02/03/1983Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page