Source: http://ca.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20191210_0003062.SCA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2020-07-14 14:43:24
Document Index: 535981569

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1915', '§ 1914', '§ 1983', '§ 1914', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1983', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915']

FindACase™ | Haywood v. U.C. San Diego
Haywood v. U.C. San Diego
ERICA D. HAYWOOD, Booking #19750859, Plaintiff,
U.C. SAN DIEGO, et al., Defendants.
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS AS BARRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1915(G); [DOC. NO. 2] DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION FOR FAILURE TO PAY FILING FEE REQUIRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1914(A)
Plaintiff, Erica D. Haywood, while in custody at the San Diego County Sheriff Department's Las Colinas Detention & Reentry Facility, has a civil rights Complaint (“Compl.”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Compl., Doc. No. 1. Haywood seeks $18 million in general and punitive damages from several municipalities, a non-profit agency, the University of California Medical Center in San Diego, the U.S. Postal Service, JCPenney, and the Fashion Valley Mall, based on what appear to be unrelated incidents of alleged harassment, entrapment, stalking, mail theft, false reporting, and negligent medical and mental health care treatment. Id. at 3‒8, 16‒19, 21. Haywood did not pay the civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) at the time she filed her Complaint; instead, she filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Doc. No. 2.
“All persons, not just prisoners, may seek IFP status.” Moore v. Maricopa County Sheriff's Office, 657 F.3d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 2011). Prisoners like Haywood, however, “face an additional hurdle.” Id.
Once a prisoner has accumulated three strikes, section 1915(g) prohibits her pursuit of any subsequent IFP civil action or appeal in federal court unless she faces “imminent danger of serious physical injury.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1051-52 (noting § 1915(g)'s exception for IFP complaints which “make[] a plausible allegation that the prisoner faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury' at the time of filing.”).
Haywood does not clearly allege any basis for § 1983 liability, let alone assert “plausible allegations” to suggest she “faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury' at the time of filing.” Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)). Instead, as best the Court can decipher, Haywood seeks to sue various governmental and private entities for having stalked, harassed, entrapped, “banned, ” defrauded, and “exasperated” her, both before and during her current term of detention. See Compl. at 3‒4, 16‒19; Sierra v. Woodford, 2010 WL 1657493, at *3 (E.D. Cal. April 23, 2010) (finding “long, narrative, rambling stat[e]ments regarding a cycle of violence, and vague references to motives to harm” insufficient to show “ongoing danger” as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and Cervantes.), aff'd sub nom. Sierra v. Woodford, Dir. of Corr., 505 Fed.Appx. 641 (9th Cir. 2013).
And while Defendants typically carry the initial burden to produce evidence demonstrating a prisoner is not entitled to proceed IFP, Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119, “in some instances, the district court docket may be sufficient to show that a prior dismissal satisfies at least one on the criteria under § 1915(g) and therefore counts as a strike.” Id. at 1120. That is the case here.
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;A court may take judicial notice of its own records, see Molus v. Swan, Civil Case No. 3:05-cv-00452-MMA-WMc, 2009 WL 160937, *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2009) (citing United States v. Author Services, 804 F.2d 1520, 1523 (9th Cir. 1986)); Gerritsen v. Warner Bros. Entm&#39;t Inc., 112 F.Supp.3d 1011, 1034 (C.D. Cal. 2015), and &ldquo;&lsquo;may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.&#39;&rdquo; Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, ...