Source: http://www.ecases.us/case/ca1/c201361/cloutier-v-costco-wholesale
Timestamp: 2020-03-28 11:40:32
Document Index: 325397019

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2000', '§ 4', '§ 2000', '§ 4', '§ 11', '§ 4']

Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale, First Circuit, US Court of Appeals Cases, Federal Courts, COURT CASE
390 F.3d 126
Kimberly M. CLOUTIER, Plaintiff, Appellant,
COSTCO WHOLESALE CORP., Defendant, Appellee.
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED Michael O. Shea for appellant.
Kimberly Cloutier alleges that her employer, Costco Wholesale Corp. (Costco), failed to offer her a reasonable accommodation after she alerted it to a conflict between the "no facial jewelry" provision of its dress code and her religious practice as a member of the Church of Body Modification. She argues that this failure amounts to religious discrimination in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), and the corresponding Massachusetts statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4(1A). The district court granted summary judgment for Costco, concluding that Costco reasonably accommodated Cloutier by offering to reinstate her if she either covered her facial piercing with a band-aid or replaced it with a clear retainer. We affirm the grant of summary judgment, but on a different basis. See Estades-Negroni v. Assocs. Corp. of North Am., 377 F.3d 58, 62 (1st Cir.2004) ("We may affirm ... on any grounds supported by the record."). We hold that Costco had no duty to accommodate Cloutier because it could not do so without undue hardship.
We set forth the relevant facts from the summary judgment record, viewing them in the light most favorable to Cloutier. Diaz v. City of Fitchburg, 176 F.3d 560, 561 (1st Cir.1999) ("Because this is an appeal from a grant of summary judgment to defendants, we recite the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiffs."). Kimberly Cloutier began working at Costco's West Springfield, Massachusetts store in July 1997. Before her first day of work, Cloutier received a copy of the Costco employment agreement, which included the employee dress code. When she was hired, Cloutier had multiple earrings and four tattoos, but no facial piercings.
The EEOC determined in May 2002 that Costco's actions violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. It found that Cloutier's refusal to remove her facial jewelry was "religiously based as defined by the EEOC," that Costco did not allow her to wear her facial jewelry at work, and that there was no evidence that allowing her to wear the jewelry would have constituted an undue hardship. Based on this determination, Cloutier filed a suit against Costco in federal district court in August 2002 alleging a Title VII violation. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). She amended the complaint four months later, adding state law claims for religious discrimination, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B § 4(1)(A), and violation of her civil rights, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12 § 11I.
In ruling on that motion, the court applied the two-part framework set forth in EEOC v. Unión Independiente de la Autoridad de Acueductos y Alcantarillados de Puerto Rico, 279 F.3d 49, 55 (1st Cir.2002). First, the court evaluated Cloutier's prima facie case, which required her to show that (1) a bona fide religious practice conflicted with an employment requirement, (2) she brought the practice to Costco's attention, and (3) the religious practice was the basis for the termination. Id. The court expressed serious doubts as to whether Cloutier's claim was based on a "bona fide religious practice" for purposes of the first element, noting that even assuming arguendo that the CBM is a bona fide religion, it "in no way requires a display of facial piercings at all times. The requirement that she display her piercings, open and always, represents the plaintiff's personal interpretation of the stringency of her beliefs." The court also questioned the sincerity of Cloutier's personal interpretation, given that she initially offered to cover her piercing with a band-aid, an alternative that she now claims would violate her religion.
Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale, 311 F. Supp. 2d 190, 199 (D.Mass.2004).
Under the foregoing framework, the district court concluded that summary judgment for Costco was appropriate. Although it noted the possibility that the state statute "casts a broader net than Title VII in covering purely personal beliefs that may be entitled to protection from discrimination," the court relied on its previous finding that Costco's offer to let Cloutier return to work wearing a band-aid or plastic retainer was "reasonable as a matter of law." Cloutier, 311 F.Supp.2d at 202.
Cloutier now appeals, arguing that the court erred in finding no violation of Title VII or Mass. Gen. L. ch. 151B § 4(1A) and that disputed material facts made summary judgment inappropriate.5 Summary judgment is appropriate when, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the court finds that there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Dasey v. Anderson, 304 F.3d 148, 153 (1st Cir.2002). Our review is de novo. Whitlock v. Mac-Gray, Inc., 345 F.3d 44, 45 (1st Cir.2003) ("We review a summary judgment de novo, construing the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and resolving all reasonable inferences in that party's favor.").
Although the district court's decision rested on the conclusion that Costco had offered Cloutier a reasonable accommodation, "[w]e may affirm ... on any grounds supported by the record." Estades-Negroni v. Assocs. Corp. of North Am., 377 F.3d 58, 62 (1st Cir.2004). We find dispositive that the only accommodation Cloutier considers reasonable, a blanket exemption from the no-facial-jewelry policy, would impose an undue hardship on Costco.6 In such a situation, an employer has no obligation to offer an accommodation before taking an adverse employment action. EEOC v. Ilona of Hungary, Inc., 97 F.3d 204, 211 (7th Cir.1996); Toledo v. Nobel-Sysco, Inc., 892 F.2d 1481, 1490 (10th Cir.1989).
Courts in at least two of our sister circuits have ruled that an accommodation offered after an adverse employment action does not shield an employer from liability under Title VII. See Heller v. EBB Auto Co., 8 F.3d 1433, 1440 (9th Cir.1993) (accommodation offer following termination was "relevant only to the issue of mitigation of damages"); Toledo, 892 F.2d at 1487-88 (settlement offer extended after refusal to hire does not qualify as a reasonable accommodation). Courts have also acknowledged that the opposite rule, treating as reasonable a post-termination offer extended during the EEOC mediation process, would "encourage the making of such offers, thus furthering [Title VII's] important statutory policy favoring voluntary reconciliation." Toledo, 892 F.2d at 1487. Yet, as the Tenth Circuit has noted, this rule would also leave employers' conduct "virtually unregulated" when conflicts first arise. Id. at 1488. As a consequence, "Title VII would provide employees no protection until after the fact, an important consideration given the impact a suspension, termination, or rejection may have on an individual's life." Id.
An accommodation constitutes an "undue hardship" if it would impose more than a de minimis cost on the employer. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84, 97 S. Ct. 2264, 53 L. Ed. 2d 113 (1977). This calculus applies both to economic costs, such as lost business or having to hire additional employees to accommodate a Sabbath observer, and to non-economic costs, such as compromising the integrity of a seniority system. United States v. Bd. of Educ., 911 F.2d 882, 887 (3d Cir.1990) (citing Hardison, 432 U.S. at 79-83, 97 S. Ct. 2264); see also EEOC v. Townley Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 615 (9th Cir.1988) ("Cost cannot always be measured in terms of dollars.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
Courts are "somewhat skeptical of hypothetical hardships that an employer thinks might be caused by an accommodation that never has been put into practice." Draper v. U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515, 520 (6th Cir.1975). "Nevertheless, it is possible for an employer to prove undue hardship without actually having undertaken any of the possible accommodations...." Id. It can do so by "examining the specific hardships imposed by specific accommodation proposals." Toledo, 892 F.2d at 1490. Here, Costco has only one proposal to evaluate (allowing Cloutier to wear and display her body jewelry as she demands) and has determined that it would constitute an undue hardship.
Costco is far from unique in adopting personal appearance standards to promote and protect its image. As the D.C. Circuit noted, "Perhaps no facet of business life is more important than a company's place in public estimation.... Good grooming regulations reflect a company's policy in our highly competitive business environment. Reasonable requirements in furtherance of that policy are an aspect of managerial responsibility." Fagan v. Nat'l Cash Register Co. 481 F.2d 1115, 1124-25 (D.C.Cir.1973). Courts have long recognized the importance of personal appearance regulations, even in the face of Title VII challenges. See Woods v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 35, 43 (E.D.Va.1976), aff'd, 579 F.2d 43 (4th Cir.1978) (citing "a plethora" of cases in upholding an employer's right to "maintain grooming standards" in Title VII cases). Such regulations are often justified with regard to safety concerns. E.g., Bhatia v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 734 F.2d 1382 (9th Cir.1984) (affirming summary judgment for employer who refused to exempt a Sikh employee from the requirement that all machinists be clean-shaven, where the policy was based on the necessity of being able to wear a respirator with a gas-tight face seal because of potential exposure to toxic gases).
Courts considering Title VII religious discrimination claims have also upheld dress code policies that, like Costco's, are designed to appeal to customer preference or to promote a professional public image. E.g., Hussein v. The Waldorf-Astoria, 134 F. Supp. 2d 591, 599 (S.D.N.Y.2001) ("Some courts have found that clean-shavenness is a bona fide occupational qualification in certain businesses and, in those situations, as long as the employer's grooming requirement is not directed at religion, enforcing the policy is not an unlawful discriminatory practice."), aff'd, 31 Fed.Appx. 740 (2d Cir.2002) (unpublished). The majority of religious discrimination cases in this arena appear to involve policies regulating facial hair. E.g., Hussein, 134 F. Supp. 2d 591; EEOC v. Sambo's of Georgia, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 86 (N.D.Ga.1981) (holding that exempting a Sikh job applicant whose religious practice required that he wear a beard from a restaurant's no-facial-hair policy would constitute undue hardship); cf. Woods, 420 F.Supp. at 43 (upholding employer's no-beard policy against a claim of racial discrimination, finding that it served a legitimate business interest in maintaining an image of cleanliness to attract and retain customers).
But we are not the first court to consider a religious discrimination claim involving jewelry. In Daniels v. City of Arlington, 246 F.3d 500 (5th Cir.2001), a former police officer claimed that his dismissal for wearing a gold cross pin on his uniform in violation of the police department's no-pin policy violated Title VII. The only reasonable accommodation that Daniels cited was to exempt him from the no-pin policy. The Fifth Circuit granted summary judgment for the police department, concluding that "[t]he only accommodation Daniels proposes is unreasonable and an undue hardship for the city as a matter of law." Id. at 506. See also Wilson v. U.S. West Communications, 58 F.3d 1337, 1342 n. 3 (8th Cir.1995) (accommodating employee's religious vow to wear a graphic anti-abortion button, where employee insisted that no alternative was reasonable, was an undue hardship).
The assessment of what constitutes an undue hardship may be somewhat different for a private employer than for a police department. See Daniels, 246 F.3d at 503-04. Still, we are faced with the similar situation of an employee who will accept no accommodation short of an outright exemption from a neutral dress code. Granting such an exemption would be an undue hardship because it would adversely affect the employer's public image. Costco has made a determination that facial piercings, aside from earrings, detract from the "neat, clean and professional image" that it aims to cultivate. Such a business determination is within its discretion. As another court has explained, "Even assuming that the defendants' justification for the grooming standards amounted to nothing more than an appeal to customer preference, ... it is not the law that customer preference is an insufficient justification as a matter of law." Sambo's of Georgia, Inc., 530 F.Supp. at 91.
We find Cloutier's contention, and the affidavits underlying it, unpersuasive. To the extent that the ambiguous term "allowed" implies that Costco was aware of the piercings, the affidavits are marred by an evidentiary flaw: the affiants do not appear to have personal knowledge of Costco's awareness. See Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 50 (1st Cir.1990) (affidavits can block summary judgment "only insofar as they are `made on personal knowledge ... [and] set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence'" (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e))). And to the extent that the affidavits suggest that other employees' piercings went unnoticed, we do not believe that such isolated violations diminish the hardship Costco would suffer if it were forced to exempt Cloutier from its no-facial-jewelry policy.
B. Chapter 151B
Title VII's reasonable accommodation framework is an effort to reconcile conflicts between religious practices and business concernsSee, e.g., Union Independiente, 279 F.3d at 55 ("[I]n general terms, Title VII requires employers ... to accommodate, within reasonable limits, the bona fide religious beliefs and practices of employees.") The availability and amount of back pay at issue are not pertinent to whether Costco's August 2001 offer reasonably reconciled the conflict between Cloutier's religious practice and Costco's interest in presenting a professional workforce. Indeed, these factors seem more appropriate to assessing the reasonableness of a settlement offer than of an accommodation offer.
DocketNumber： 04-1475
Citation Numbers： 390 F.3d 126
Filed Date： 12/1/2004
Dasey v. Massachusetts Depart , 304 F.3d 148 ( 2002 )
Whitlock v. Mac-Gray, Inc. , 345 F.3d 44 ( 2003 )
17 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1246, 17 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 8494 Mr. ... , 579 F.2d 43 ( 1978 )
Manjit Singh Bhatia v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. , 734 F.2d 1382 ( 1984 )
united-states-of-america-in-no-89-1694-v-board-of-education-for-the , 911 F.2d 882 ( 1990 )
EEOC v. Sambo's of Georgia, Inc. , 530 F. Supp. 86 ( 1981 )
Woods v. Safeway Stores, Inc. , 420 F. Supp. 35 ( 1976 )
Ramirez-Rodriguez v. Boehringer , 425 F.3d 67 ( 2005 )
Feddersen v. Garvey , 427 F.3d 108 ( 2005 )
Webb v. City of Philadelphia , 562 F.3d 256 ( 2009 )
Bennett v. Saint-Gobain Corp. , 507 F.3d 23 ( 2007 )
Picard v. St. Tammany Parish Hosp. , 611 F. Supp. 2d 608 ( 2009 )
Bennett v. SAINT-GOBAIN CORPORATION , 453 F. Supp. 2d 314 ( 2006 )
Sanchez-Rodriguez v. AT & T WIRELESS , 728 F. Supp. 2d 31 ( 2010 )
Marchant v. Tsickritzis , 506 F. Supp. 2d 63 ( 2007 )
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