Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/627/499/429907/
Timestamp: 2019-09-22 23:21:30
Document Index: 793188382

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1276', '§ 15', '§ 808', '§ 15', '§ 15', '§ 15', '§ 9', '§ 558', '§ 9', '§ 4', '§ 7', '§ 1276', '§ 7', '§ 102', '§ 4332', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 90', '§ 90', '§ 796']

Swinomish Tribal Community, Upper Skagit Tribe Andsauk-suiattle Tribe, Petitioners, v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Respondent,city of Seattle, Washington, Department of Lighting, Intervenor.swinomish Tribal Community, Upper Skagit Tribe Andsauk-suiattle Tribe, Petitioners, v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Respondent,city of Seattle, Washington, Washington State Department Offisheries and Washington State Dept. of Game,state of Washington, Dept. of Ecology,intervenors.canadian Intervenors (r.o.s.s.) Committee and David M.brusson, Petitioners, v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Respondent,city of Seattle, Washington, Washington State Department Offisheries and Washington State Dept. of Game,state of Washington, Dept. of Ecology,intervenors.american Intervenors, North Cascades Conservation Council,wilderness Society, Sierra Club, Friends of the Earth,national Parks and Conservation Association, Nationalaudubon Society, Federation of Western Outdoors Clubs,washington Environmental Council and the Mountaineers, Petitioners, v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Respondent, 627 F.2d 499 (D.C. Cir. 1980) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › D.C. Circuit › 1980 › Swinomish Tribal Community, Upper Skagit Tribe Andsauk-suiattle Tribe, Petitioners, v. Federal Energ...
Swinomish Tribal Community, Upper Skagit Tribe Andsauk-suiattle Tribe, Petitioners, v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Respondent,city of Seattle, Washington, Department of Lighting, Intervenor.swinomish Tribal Community, Upper Skagit Tribe Andsauk-suiattle Tribe, Petitioners, v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Respondent,city of Seattle, Washington, Washington State Department Offisheries and Washington State Dept. of Game,state of Washington, Dept. of Ecology,intervenors.canadian Intervenors (r.o.s.s.) Committee and David M.brusson, Petitioners, v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Respondent,city of Seattle, Washington, Washington State Department Offisheries and Washington State Dept. of Game,state of Washington, Dept. of Ecology,intervenors.american Intervenors, North Cascades Conservation Council,wilderness Society, Sierra Club, Friends of the Earth,national Parks and Conservation Association, Nationalaudubon Society, Federation of Western Outdoors Clubs,washington Environmental Council and the Mountaineers, Petitioners, v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Respondent, 627 F.2d 499 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit - 627 F.2d 499 (D.C. Cir. 1980) Argued Nov. 19, 1979. Decided June 20, 1980. Rehearing Denied July 22, 1980
To complete this factual recitation, it is appropriate to single out the specific Acts of Congress passed by the same Congress on October 2, 1968 and having a direct bearing on the present proposal. (1) Section 5(a) (24) of the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (hereinafter WSRA), 16 U.S.C. § 1276(a) (24) designated portions of the Skagit River approximately 11 miles below City's Gorge development for potential addition to the Wild and Scenic Rivers System established by the Act. During the Commission's consideration of High Ross, the lower Skagit was a "study river." The provisions of Section 7(b) of the WSRA have a bearing on the Commission's exercise of jurisdiction.6 (2) The North Cascades Park Legislation established a diverse recreational complex comprising 1,642,000 acres in the North Cascades Mountains. A portion includes the headwater drainage of the Skagit River Basin. At the core are some 107,000 acres designated as the Ross Lake National Recreational Area. This area was specifically reserved to FPC jurisdiction because of City's planned further power developments. As Secretary of Interior testified in support of the North Cascades legislation:7
The Tribes argue that the "annual license"10 issued under § 15(a) of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 808(a) (hereinafter FPA), in the interim between the expiration of a license and a decision on an application for its renewal, cannot be amended. Their principal argument is that § 15(a) itself states that annual licenses are to be issued "under the terms and conditions of the original license . . . ." Id. Because the Tribes and the Secretary of Interior filed motions for reconsideration and a 45 day stay was granted by the Commission before the amendment became final and subject to judicial review, and because the initial 50 year term of the original license expired before that stay lapsed and before those motions were denied, the Tribes claim that § 15(a) prevents the addition to Ross Dam from being approved, i. e., that the Ross addition may be considered only in the pending relicensing proceeding. We reject this argument as lacking merit for three reasons: First, but for the Tribes' and the Secretary of Interior's motions for a stay and for reconsideration, the license amendment clearly would have been made final before the 50 year initial license term. Second, § 15(a) licenses are designed simply "to prevent a possible hiatus in the operation of a project . . . ." Lac Courte Oreilles Band v. FPC, 510 F.2d 198, 206 and n.29 (D.C. Cir. 1975), and not to force the licensee back to square one in an amendment proceeding which is on the edge of completion after being seven years in process. Third, § 9(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 558(c) (1976), provides that when a licensee files an application to renew "a license with reference to an activity of a continuing nature," that license "does not expire until the application has been finally determined by the agency." In such circumstances, the expiration date is tolled. City filed a timely application to renew its license for Project No. 553; thus, under § 9(b) City's 50 year license in a sense has not effectively expired.
Both of these issues arise out of the present downstream conditions below the Gorge Dam and the Commission's statutory obligations under § 4(e) of the FPA and § 7(b) of the WSRA. It is acknowledged by all parties that the irregular water flows have caused injury to the spawning of anadromous fish and to the Indian Tribes which depend on them for sustenance and their commercial livelihood. When downstream flows are substantially lowered over a short period of time, anadromous fish fry are left stranded on sandbars and gravel bottoms and die. The problem was addressed, at least in part, more than 30 years ago when City and the Washington State Department of Fisheries in 1947 entered into an agreement which required a minimum discharge from the Gorge Dam of 1,000 cubic feet per second or the natural river flow, whichever is less. The particular interest of the Tribes who fish in the Skagit River stems from their rights under the 1859 Treaty of Point Elliott11 between United States and certain Indian tribes12 in Washington Territory and the decision of the Federal courts in United States v. State of Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff'd and remanded, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975) interpreting the Treaty. It is worth noting that the Treaty does not guarantee the tribes "any constant quantity of fish, but merely equal access to fishing grounds" in common with all citizens of the (Washington) territory. The Treaty thus does not provide an independent basis for arguing that the flow of the river is required to be maintained at any particular level and gives additional support to considering the matter in a separate proceeding.
Section 5(a) (24) of The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1276(a) (24) designated portions of the Skagit River System approximately 11 miles below City's Ross, Diablo and Gorge developments for potential addition to the Wild and Scenic Rivers System established by the Act. During the Commission's consideration of High Ross, the Lower Skagit was a "study river" and the above cited provisions of § 7(b) applied to the Commission's exercise of its jurisdiction. Section 7(a) which is applicable to rivers already designated as part of the natural wild and scenic rivers system likewise prohibits the licensing of construction projects having "a direct and adverse effect on the values for which such river was established, as determined by the Secretary charged with its administration." Section 7(a) goes on to read:
It is well-settled that administrative agencies enjoy a broad discretion in the manner of carrying out their statutory functions and responsibilities. As the Supreme Court recently said in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 543-4, 98 S. Ct. 1197, 1211, 55 L. Ed. 2d 460 (1978):
See also FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 423 U.S. 326, 333, 96 S. Ct. 579, 583, 46 L. Ed. 2d 533 (1976).
The Commission staff prepared and released a draft environmental impact statement (DEIS) in October, 1973, to which it attached as an Appendix the IJC report concerning the Canadian environmental impact. After analyzing the comments on the DEIS, the staff released its final EIS (FEIS) in March, 1974 which cross-referenced the IJC report. Thereafter in April, 1974, the lengthy hearings were commenced which were concluded in March, 1975. At these hearings, the EIS and IJC reports were made a part of the record as were other studies submitted on the record which analyzed the Canadian impact of High Ross. The Commission in considering this question of Canadian impacts was not limited to the FEIS alone. It could and did consider the subsequent testimony and exhibits introduced during 67 days of hearings. Greene County Planning Board v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied 409 U.S. 849, 93 S. Ct. 56, 34 L. Ed. 2d 90 (1972). More than a dozen of these witnesses focused on the matter of Canadian impacts. It was entirely appropriate to incorporate the IJC report as a part of the EIS. Inman Park Restoration, Inc. v. UMTA, 414 F. Supp. 99, 120 (N.D. Ga. 1976), aff'd sub nom. Save our Sycamore v. MARTA, 576 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1978). To insist that the EIS must be prepared and considered in vacuo is to exalt procedural form over substance. To suggest the need of a supplemental EIS focusing specifically on the Canadian impact has an equally hollow ring. In 1974, such a motion by the American intervenors was denied without prejudice to being refiled should the parties "be able to demonstrate the existence of environmental impacts which are not covered by the final EIS and the IJC report." Apparently none of the petitioners saw fit to renew such a motion.
NEPA's requirement that the agency's "detailed statement" address alternatives to a proposed action "has been aptly characterized as 'the linchpin of the entire impact statement.' " Alaska v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 465, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1978), vacated in part sub nom. Western Oil & Gas Assn. v. Alaska, 439 U.S. 922, 99 S. Ct. 303, 58 L. Ed. 2d 315 (1978). The consideration of such alternatives in sufficient detail is required under the Federal Power Act as the basis for a determination that a project will be "in the public interest."
The ALJ reviewed the EIS study and, as stated previously (p. 28 supra), found that "it is the value of High Ross' peaking capacity which makes it less expensive than any other peaking source combined with a base facility" and that "A review of the environmental impacts of all the more expensive alternatives indicates that they would have adverse effects in quantity and quality at least as significant if not more so than High Ross." (R 16318-9). The Commission agreed and in Opinion No. 808-A summarized its position. (R 17145):
To conclude this aspect of our discussion, § 102(2) (C) of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C) requires, "to the fullest extent possible," the preparation of an EIS for "other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." The purpose of such a statement is to enable the decision maker to take a "hard look" at the environmental consequences and to provide the public and Congress with information concerning the environmental issues involved. In this case Commission staff prepared a draft EIS and sent copies of the same to the parties and numerous interested groups for comment. A final EIS reflecting these comments was prepared and made public. The bulk of the long record, including testimony, exhibits and studies, was directed to, and focused on, the environmental impacts of High Ross as compared with alternatives to such construction. Such alternatives were considered and analyzed in detail on the basis of an exhaustive record and a decision rendered. We are satisfied that the procedural requirements of NEPA were complied with.
In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 558, (98 S. Ct. 1197, 1219, 55 L. Ed. 2d 460) (1978), we stated that NEPA, while establishing 'significant substantive goals for the Nation,' imposes upon agencies duties that are 'essentially procedural.' As we stress in that case, NEPA was designed 'to insure a fully-informed and well-considered decision,' but not necessarily 'a decision the judges of the Court of Appeals or of this Court would have reached had they been members of the decisionmaking unit of the agency.' Vermont, Yankee cuts sharply against the Court of Appeals' conclusion that an agency, in selecting a course of action, must elevate environmental concerns over other appropriate considerations. On the contrary, once an agency has made a decision subject to NEPA's procedural requirements, the only role for a court is to insure that the agency has considered the environmental consequences; it cannot 'interject itself within the area of discretion of the executive as to the choice of the action to be taken.' Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n. 21, 96 S. Ct. 2718, 2730 n. 21, 49 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1976). See also FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp., 423 U.S. 326, 96 S. Ct. 579, 46 L. Ed. 2d 533 (1976). (footnote omitted).
Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, et al. v. Karlen (3 cases), 444 U.S. 223, 100 S. Ct. 497, 62 L. Ed. 2d 433 (1980).
Of course, in making the inevitable trade-off decisions between energy and environment, the courts should not play a major role. We are duly cautioned about that in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 558, 98 S. Ct. 1197, 1219, 55 L. Ed. 2d 460 (1978):
. . . The fundamental policy questions appropriately resolved in Congress and the state legislatures are not subject to reexamination in the federal courts under the guise of judicial review of agency action . . . Administrative decisions should be set aside . . . only for substantial procedural or substantive reasons as mandated by statute, Consolo v. FMC, 383 U.S. 607, 620, 86 S. Ct. 1018, 1026, 16 L. Ed. 2d 131 (1966), not simply because the court is unhappy with the result reached.
Several times over the years of these proceedings the Secretary of Interior proposed specific conditions pursuant to § 4(e) designed to ensure adequate water flow and temperature controls to protect the spawning fish a cornerstone of the Indian tribes' livelihood. In May, 1974, for example, the Secretary notified the Commission that Seattle's estimates of minimal environmental effects were "overly optimistic," and that its plan to protect against fish and wildlife loss was "inadequate and . . . unsatisfactory." Letter from Under Secretary of the Interior to Kenneth Plumb, Secretary of FPC (May 13, 1974), J.A. 382, 383 (hereinafter May 1974 Interior Letter) . With reference to downstream effects, Interior indicated that the spawning fish population was presently suffering significant losses, primarily from fluctuations in water levels and that low-temperature water released from a deeper Ross Reservoir "would be of serious concern" and could "retard growth" of the young fish, "resul(t) in high mortalities" and "dela(y) downstream migration." Id. at 383-84. Specifically relying on § 4(e), Interior proposed several license conditions intended to help solve these problems. Id. at 385.
The final EIS acknowledged that "during filling . . ., applicant may propose to maintain downstream flows at a lower level than normal. Sustained low flows could have an adverse effect on the emergence and rearing of salmonid fry. However, a schedule for reduced flows has not been proposed." R. 10714. Filling would take approximately two years. Additionally, Interior appended more detailed comments to its May 1974 letter which predicted "substantial siltation, turbidity and associated water quality problems would occur, which would have an adverse effect on aquatic resources not only in the existing reservoir but downstream as well" during the construction and clearing of lands for the newly enlarged reservoir.9 AI Br., App. A, comments at 8. Interior also evidenced concern about other potential downstream problems that might be "amplified" by the raising of the dam:
But in its petition to intervene in August, 1977, Interior again asserted that "(t)he operation of the Skagit River Project could have a detrimental impact on the Skagit River downstream fishery" and that "(w)ithout proper conditions . . ., the Tribes' fishing rights in the Skagit River would be severely impaired." R. 17071, 17072. The final EIS on this point is somewhat ambivalent, concluding only that the enlargement to Ross Dam "should not be a long-term factor in aggravating or alleviating" the problem of young fish being stranded because of irregular downstream flows. R. 10714 (emphasis supplied).
The Upper Skagit and Sauk-Suiattle Tribes were parties to the Treaty. The Swinomish Reservation is apparently not a separate tribe but a tribal reservation which many tribes, including a majority of the Sauk-Suiattle and some of the Skagit Tribes, presently occupy. In modern times, there are about 30 Sauk-Suiattle Indians, who fish for their personal use but not commercially. Similarly, there are about 30 Upper Skagit Indians interested primarily in subsistence fishing. Their "usual and accustomed fishing places" include "numerous areas along the Skagit River, extending from about Mt. Vernon upstream to Gorge Dam." United States v. State of Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 376, 379
Although an EIS is not defective because it fails to deal completely with "each and every conceivable variation of the alternatives stated," Brooks v. Coleman, 518 F.2d 17, 19 (9th Cir. 1975); accord, NRDC v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 837-38 (D.C. Cir. 1972), here the 1675' reservoir was at least "a colorable alternative," and the Commission's perfunctory rejection of it was insufficient, in my opinion, to indicate that its consideration was reasoned and rational. See Aeschliman v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 547 F.2d 622, 628 (D.C. Cir. 1976). There are significant unanswered questions as to how much less sustained generating capacity a 1675' dam would produce as well as how badly Seattle needs that extra peaking potential, and what environmental benefits would be achieved by the lower dam. What the record does show is that the 1725' height was chosen 50 years ago long before environmental concerns had surfaced and without the benefit of 50 years' experience with varying flows and unpredictable power demands and shortages. While I do not suggest that the Commission was under a duty to evaluate all heights between 1602.5' and 1725', the height of 1675' was an obvious candidate since peak generating capacity is the same there as at the 1725' level.
(1) Ross Dam is located on federal land within the Ross Lake National Recreation Area; the Recreation Area was 98 percent federal land when established in 1968, S. Rep. 700, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1967), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1968, p. 3874. It is separate from North Cascades National Park, which it adjoins, compare 16 U.S.C. § 90 with id. § 90a, and appears to fall under the terms of 16 U.S.C. § 796(2). The Recreation Area extends from the Canadian Border (on both sides of the Skagit River) to several miles below Gorge Dam. See R. 10043. The Tribes' "usual and accustomed fishing places" on the Skagit River at the signing of the Treaty of Point Elliot "extend(ed) . . . upstream to Gorge Dam," United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 379 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff'd, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086, 96 S. Ct. 877, 47 L. Ed. 2d 97 (1976). If the Recreation Area constitutes a reservation, it therefore seems to encompass at least some of those fishing places.
(2) A federal "reservation" includes an implied right to sufficient water to fulfill the purpose of the reservation. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 28 S. Ct. 207, 52 L. Ed. 340 (1908). Ross Dam is thus perhaps "within" the reservation consisting of the Indians' fishing rights below Gorge Dam because Ross Dam is physically "within" the flow of the Skagit River.