Source: http://www.chanrobles.com/usa/us_supremecourt/445/23/case.php
Timestamp: 2019-09-15 05:30:22
Document Index: 172478623

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 8331', '§ 8341', '§ 8341', '§ 8341', '§ 8341', '§ 1', '§ 502', '§ 8331', '§ 8341']

At the time of death, Isaacson was a federal employee covered by the Civil Service Retirement Act, 5 U.S.C. § 8331 et seq. The Act provides that each surviving child of a deceased federal employee is entitled to a survivors' annuity. 5 U.S.C. § 8341(e)(1). All legitimate and adopted children under 18 years of age qualify for these benefits, but stepchildren or "recognized natural" children under 18 may recover only if they "lived with the employee . . . in a regular parent-child relationship." 5 U.S.C. § 8341(a)(3)(A). In September, 1974, the Civil Service Commission's Bureau of Retirement, Insurance, and Occupational Health denied the appellee's application for such annuities for Shawn and Tricia. The Bureau held that 5 U.S.C. § 8341(a)(3)(A) bars recovery for otherwise qualified children born out of wedlock who, like Shawn and Tricia, were not living with the employee chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
at the time of his death. The Commission's Board of Appeals and Review affirmed. [Footnote 1]
The Court of Claims granted the appellee's motion for summary judgment. 218 Ct.Cl. 705, 590 F.2d 343. Ignoring the statutory issue, the court granted relief on the authority of its earlier decision in Gentry v. United States, 212 Ct.Cl. 1, 546 F.2d 343 (1976), rehearing denied, 212 Ct.Cl. 27, 551 F.2d 852 (1977), which held that the "lived with" requirement of 5 U.S.C. § 8341(a)(3)(A) unconstitutionally discriminated against illegitimate children. We postponed consideration of our jurisdiction pending hearing on the merits, 441 U.S. 960 (1979), and now affirm on the statutory ground presented to, but not addressed by, the Court of Claims. [Footnote 2] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Civil Service Retirement Act provides survivors' annuities to all legitimate children, but grants the same benefits to chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
children born out of wedlock only if they "lived with the employee . . . in a regular parent-child relationship." Such a classification based on illegitimacy is unconstitutional unless it bears "an evident and substantial relation to the particular . . . interests this statute is designed to serve." Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U. S. 259, 439 U. S. 268 (1978) (plurality opinion); see id. at 439 U. S. 279 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). See also Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U. S. 762, 430 U. S. 767 (1977). [Footnote 3] The Government's asserted justification for the classification -- that it is an administratively convenient means of identifying children who actually were deprived of support by the employee's death -- is itself open to constitutional question, since the statute does not condition benefits to legitimate children on such a showing.
It is well settled that this Court will not pass on the constitutionality of an Act of Congress if a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided. E.g., Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U. S. 682, 442 U. S. 693 (1979); New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U. S. 568, 440 U. S. 582, and n. 22 (1979); Machinists v. Street, 367 U. S. 740, 367 U. S. 749-750 (1961); Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U. S. 101, 323 U. S. 105 (1944). Where both a constitutional issue and an issue of statutory construction are raised, we are not, of course, foreclosed from considering the statutory question merely because the lower court failed to address it. Califano v. Yamasaki, supra at 442 U. S. 693; University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 438 U. S. 328 (1978) chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(opinion of BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ.); id. at 438 U. S. 281 (opinion of POWELL, J.); id. at 438 U. S. 411-412 (opinion of STEVENS, J.). Accordingly, we turn to the statute to determine whether resolution of the constitutional question is necessary to the disposition of this case.
When the statutory language is considered on its face, the appellee's reading is at least as plausible as that of the Government. Shawn and Tricia had "lived with" their father, and we believe those words would not ordinarily imply a temporal limitation. Moreover, Congress has demonstrated in other social welfare legislation that it knows how to restrict the class of eligible beneficiaries to those living with an individual at a particular time. [Footnote 4] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Act of July 31, 1956, Title IV, § 1(j), 70 Stat. 744. [Footnote 7] For the chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Government also urges that Congress intended the "lived with" requirement to serve as a means of thwarting fraudulent claims of dependency or parentage, and to promote efficient administration by facilitating the prompt identification of eligible annuitants. It is evident from the facts chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
of this case, however, that the classification is not narrowly tailored as a means of furthering either goal. As we recognized in Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U. S. 628, 417 U. S. 636 (1974), the prevention of fraud is a legitimate goal, but it does not necessarily follow "that the blanket and conclusive exclusion of [appellee's] subclass of illegitimates is reasonably related to the prevention of spurious claims." Thus, even if the "lived with" requirement is assumed to serve as a device to prevent fraud or to promote efficient administration, it raises serious equal protection problems that this Court must seek to avoid by adopting a saving statutory construction not at odds with fundamental legislative purposes.
Congress enacted the 1966 amendments to the Act upon the request of the Executive Branch's Committee on Federal Staff Retirement Systems. One of these amendments removed the requirement that children must prove they received one-half of their support from the deceased employee in order to recover survivors' annuities. Act of July 18, 1966, Title V, § 502, 80 Stat. 300. Congress deleted the dependency requirement in order to ensure recovery for the children of female civil servants, who typically earned less than their husbands and accordingly contributed less than half of the support of their children. [Footnote 8] Congress also deleted the requirement chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Government views the 1966 amendment as evidence that Congress intended the "lived with" requirement to serve as a convenient method of determining whether the child received support from the deceased employee. This proposition appears implausible, since, in the same sentence, the Committee recommended that, if the "lived with" requirement were met, benefits should be paid "as for any other child, without regard to the dependency requirement." The Committee's use of the word "retained" is a further indication that Congress did not intend the "lived with" provision to assume a new function previously performed by the dependency requirement. Moreover, the Government's position again unnecessarily raises the equal protection question, because legitimate children and adopted children were not required to demonstrate that they had received support from the decedent. In the absence of any persuasive evidence to the contrary, therefore, we assume that Congress' failure to alter the "lived chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
with" requirement likewise failed to modify the purpose of that provision as envisioned by the Congress that enacted it. [Footnote 9]
We conclude that the "lived with" requirement is satisfied when a recognized natural child has lived with the deceased employee in a "regular parent-child relationship," regardless of whether the child was living with the employee at the time of the employee's death. Our consideration of the language and purpose of the statute and of the available legislative history convinces us that this construction is a fair and reasonable reading of the congressional enactment. [Footnote 10] Furthermore, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
the construction is necessary to avoid a serious constitutional question. By so holding, we do not believe that we are creating undue administrative difficulties for the Civil Service Commission. In this case, for example, the Commission relied on the Montana court's paternity decree and affidavits concerning when the appellee's children lived with the deceased employee. Similar documentary evidence would be equally probative of whether an illegitimate child claiming a survivors' annuity had ever lived with the deceased employee in a regular parent-child relationship. [Footnote 11]
The question in this case is whether the illegitimate children of a federal employee, who lived with his children after their birth and had a legal obligation to contribute to their support until his death, are eligible to receive survivors' benefits under the Civil Service Retirement Act, 5 U.S.C. § 8331 et seq. The statutory definition of "child" under that Act includes a "recognized natural child who lived with the employee . . . in a regular parent-child relationship." 5 U.S.C. § 8341(a)(3)(A)(ii). chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Congress may require illegitimate children to demonstrate actual dependency even though legitimate children are presumed to be dependent, Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U. S. 495, 427 U. S. 507-509 (1976), so long as the means by which illegitimates chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
must demonstrate such dependency are substantially related to achievement of the statutory goal. Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U. S. 259, 439 U. S. 275-276 (1978) (opinion of POWELL, J.); see Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U. S. 762, 430 U. S. 770-773 (1977). The possible constitutional infirmity in the Government's construction of the statute is its assumption that only illegitimates who "lived with" a parent at the time of his death were actually dependent. Such a requirement may be unconstitutionally restrictive, because, as in this case, it would bar the claims of children who lived with their father for some part of their lives, and who received support from their father until his death. *
I am in full agreement with the Court that the statutory question should have been resolved in this case prior to any application of the constitutional issue decided by the Court chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Court of Claims in this case was wrong in resolving this case on the basis of its constitutional holding, both as a matter of prudential considerations as well as jurisdiction. See United States v. Testan, 424 U. S. 392, 424 U. S. 397-398 (1976). While the Court of Claims did have jurisdiction to entertain the statutory chanroblesvirtualawlibrary