Source: https://trellis.law/ca/motion-type/cross-complaint-310
Timestamp: 2020-07-12 04:05:26
Document Index: 288379640

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 426', '§ 428', '§ 412', '§428', '§ 426', '§ 426', '§ 428', '§ 426', '§ 1060', '§ 412', '§428', '§ 426', '§ 128', '§ 128', '§ 128', '§ 1798', '§ 428', '§ 428', '§ 426', '§ 412', '§428']

Cross-Complaint?
Filing a Cross-Complaint?
Types of Cross-Complaints
Cross-complaints fall into two categories: compulsory and permissive.
Compulsory Cross-Complaints
A "compulsory" cross-claim is a claim that (i) a defendant has against the plaintiff at the time the plaintiff filed his/her complaint against the defendant; and (ii) is "related" to the complaint/cross-complaint in that it "arises out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences" as cause of action in the complaint/cross-complaint. (K.R.L. Partnership v. Sup. Ct. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 490, 498; Code Civ. Proc. § 426.30(a)). To avoid piecemeal litigation, courts liberally construe the term “transaction”—it is “ ‘not confined to a single, isolated act or occurrence . . . but may embrace a series of acts or occurrences logically interrelated.’ ” (Align Technology, Inc. v. Tran (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 949, 960).
Permissive Cross-Complaint
Claims arising after service of the answer are permissive, not compulsory, even if the subject matter is related to the complaint. (Crocker Nat. Bank v. Emerald (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 852, 864). Leave to file permissive cross-complaint is solely within the trial court's discretion. (Crocker Nat. Bank v. Emerald (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 852).
Unrelated claims and those claims arising after service of the answer are permissive, not compulsory. (Crocker Nat. Bank v. Emerald (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 852, 864). Permissive cross-complaints are governed by Code of Civil Procedure § 428.50(c), which provides, “A party shall obtain leave of court to file any cross-complaint except one filed within the time specified in subdivision (a) or (b). Leave may be granted in the interest of justice at any time during the course of the action.” The decision to grant permission to file a permissive cross-complaint rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. (Orient Handel v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 684, 701).
A cross-complaint against any of the parties who filed the initial complaint or cross-complaint against the cross-complainant must be filed before or at the same time as the answer to the initial complaint or cross-complaint, which answer must be filed within 30 days of service of the complaint or cross-complaint. (CCP §§ 412.20(a)(3), 428.50(a), 432.10). Any other cross-complaint may be filed at any time before the court has set a trial date. (CCP §428.50(b)).
If a party fails to file a cross-complaint within the time limits described above, he or she must obtain permission from the court to file the cross-complaint. (CCP §§ 426.50, 428.50(c)). Parties seeking to file untimely compulsory cross-complaints may file with the Court for leave to do so, even though the failure to timely file resulted from oversight, inadvertence, mistake, neglect, or other cause. (Code Civ. Proc. § 426.50). Leave to file a mandatory cross-complaint must be granted absent bad faith. (Silver Organizations, Ltd. v. Frank (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 94, 99). In such a case, after notice to the adverse party, the Court generally must grant leave to file the cross-complaint if the party acted in good faith. Permission to file a permissive cross-complaint may be granted in the interest of justice at any time during the course of the action. (CCP § 428.50(c)).
The California Supreme Court recognized over 20 years ago that “a defendant is generally authorized to file a cross-complaint against a concurrent tortfeasor for partial indemnity ... even when such concurrent tortfeasor has not been named a defendant in the original complaint.” (American Motorcycle Assn. v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 578, 607). Together, sections 428.10 and 428.20 of the Code of Civil Procedure authorize the joinder of additional parties through a permissive cross-complaint.
If the cross-complaint adds new parties, the cross-complaint must be served on all parties and proofs of service on the new parties must be filed within 30 days of the filing of the cross-complaint. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.110(c)).
Neither Code of Civil Procedure section 428.60 nor California Rules of Court, rule 3.110(c) provide a basis for a motion to quash resulting from a delay in serving the cross-complaint. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.110(f)).
Failure to File a Cross-Complaint
“Once judgment is entered, the party cannot assert his or her unpleaded claim in a separate lawsuit.” (City of Hanford v. Superior Court (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 580, 586–587 (internal citation omitted)). “A party who fails to plead a cause of action subject to the requirements of this article, whether through oversight, inadvertence, mistake, neglect, or other cause, may apply to the court for leave to amend his pleading, or to file a cross-complaint, to assert such cause at any time during the course of the action. The court, after notice to the adverse party, shall grant, upon such terms as may be just to the parties, leave to amend the pleading, or to file the cross-complaint, to assert such cause if the party who failed to plead the cause acted in good faith. This subdivision shall be liberally construed to avoid forfeiture of causes of action.” (CCP § 426.50).
“The legislative mandate is clear. A policy of liberal construction of section 426.50 to avoid forfeiture of causes of action is imposed on the trial court. A motion to file a cross-complaint at any time during the course of the action must be granted unless bad faith of the moving party is demonstrated where forfeiture would otherwise result. Factors such as oversight, inadvertence, neglect, mistake or other cause, are insufficient grounds to deny the motion unless accompanied by bad faith.” (Silver Organizations Ltd. v. Frank (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 94, 98–99). “While it may be argued that [defendant], acting as their own counsel, may have been guilty of neglect, inadvertence or oversight, thereby causing delay, section 426.50 expressly disallows denial of a motion based on these grounds.” (Silver Organizations Ltd. v. Frank (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 94, 101).
“‘‘Bad faith,’ is defined as ‘[t]he opposite of ‘good faith,’ generally implying or involving actual or constructive fraud, or a design to mislead or deceive another, or a neglect or refusal to fulfill some duty or some contractual obligation, not prompted by an honest mistake . . ., but by some interested or sinister motive[,] . . . not simply bad judgment or negligence, but rather . . . the conscious doing of a wrong because of dishonest purpose or moral obliquity; . . . it contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will.’’” (Id. at 100 (internal citations omitted)).
The determination that the moving party acted in bad faith must be supported by substantial evidence. (Silver Organizations Ltd. v. Frank (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 94, 99; Foot’s Transfer & Storage Co. v. Superior Court (1980) 114 Cal.App.3d 897, 902).
The “principle of liberality requires that a strong showing of bad faith be made in order to support a denial of the right to file a cross-complaint under this section.” (Foot’s Transfer & Storage Co. v. Superior Court (1980) 114 Cal.App.3d 897, 902).
“Any person interested under a written instrument …, or under a contract, or who desires a declaration of his or her rights or duties with respect to another, … may, in cases of actual controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the respective parties, bring an original action or cross-complaint in the superior court for a declaration of his or her rights and duties in the premises, including a determination of any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument or contract.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1060.)
Useful Rulings on Cross-Complaint
AG&Y ENTERPRISES, INC. VS ROBERT OKUM, ET AL.
JUDGE JOHN P. DOYLE DEPARTMENT 58 Hearing Date: April 19, 2019 Case Name: AG&Y Enterprises, Inc. v. Okum, et al. Case No.: 18STCV01975 Motion: Motion for Leave to File Cross-Complaint Moving Party: Defendant American Medical Supplies, LLC (sued as Global Healthcare Strategy, LLC) Responding Party: Plaintiff AG&Y Enterprises, Inc. Tentative Ruling: The Motion for Leave to File a Cross-Compl...
..e with contractual relations, (3) interference with contractual relations, (4) violation of the UCL, and (5) breach of contract. Defendant American Medical Supplies, LLC (“AMS”) seeks leave to file a cross-complaint against Plaintiff and non-parties K and S Owl, Inc., Saint Paul Enterprises, Inc., Maher Awad, Maged T. Gindi, Kamal H. Yousef, Maher Kaldas, and Albert Soliman. The Cross-Complaint a...
Lindsay Mulhall vs. Superior Computer Products LLC
..ned to Judge DeNoce for all purposes. Absent waiver of notice and in the event an order is not signed at the hearing, the prevailing party shall prepare a proposed order and comply with CRC 3.1312 subdivisions (a), (b), (d) and (e). The signed order shall be served on all parties and a proof of service filed with the court. A "notice of ruling" in lieu of this procedure is not authorized. For ge...
WHITE ZUCKERMAN WARSAVSKY LUNA VS JACOBSON, JILL H
Defendant Jill H. Jacobson’s Motion for Leave to File Cross-Complaint is GRANTED. Defendants are to file his proposed cross-complaint within 7 days from the date of this Order. I. Background On February 16, 2017, Plaintiff White Cukerman Warsasky Luna & Hunt, LLP (“Plaintiff”), a law firm, filed this action for common counts against its former client, Defendant Jill H. Jacobson (“Defendant”), fo...
..a cross-complaint against any of the parties who filed the complaint or cross-complaint against him or her before or at the same time as the answer to the complaint or cross-complaint. (b) Any other cross-complaint may be filed at any time before the court has set a date for trial. (c) A party shall obtain leave of court to file any cross-complaint except one filed within the time specified i...
IRMA P HERNANDEZ VS MARIA GUTIERREZ ET AL
CASE NAME: Hernandez v. Gutierrez, et al. CASE NUMBER: BC551786 HEARING DATE: 3/28/17 CALENDAR NUMBER: 6 DATE FILED: 7/16/14 TRIAL DATE: 05/23/17 NOTICE: OK PROCEEDING: Motion for Leave to File Cross-Complaint MOVING PARTY: Defendants Jesus C. Figueroa and Myrna Z. Figueroa OPPOSING PARTY: None COURT’S TENTATIVE RULING The Motion for Leave to File a Cross-Complaint is granted. Counse...
..int against Plaintiff Hernandez and Defendants Perez, Gutierrez, and Andrade, as well as Jose Luis Legaria, Sr., Marcos Jose Luis Legaria, Jr., Patricia Portillo, Cardona Investments, and Caliber Homeloans, who are not yet parties to the instant action. The Figueroas’ Motion is unopposed. Parties generally must file a cross-complaint against the party who filed the complaint before or at the s...
BEAL VS. BEAL
HEARING ON MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE CROSS-COMPLAINT FILED BY DEREK BEAL * TENTATIVE RULING: * Cross-Complainant Derek Beal’s motion for leave to file a Cross-Complaint is granted. Both parties agree that the Cross-Complaint is a permissive Cross-Complaint, governed by CCP Section 428.10. Defendant files this motion for leave to file a permissive Cross-Complaint under CCP Section 428.10(a). Defe...
..laintiff erroneously believes that Section 426.50 (permission to assert unpleaded cause) applies to the Cross-Complaint. However, this rule is only true for compulsory Cross- Complaints. The correct rule for when to file a permissive Cross-Complaint is set out in CCP Section 428.50. This section is entitled, “Time for Filing of Cross-Complaint,” and it appears in the Article (Article 4), concernin...
PASSI v. CHISICK
Defendant Chisick’s Demurrer to 1st Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs filed a 1st Amended Complaint against defendants asserting causes of action for fraud, promissory fraud, fraudulent concealment, negligent misrepresentation, civil conspiracy, and aiding and abetting. Defendant Chisick demurs to all causes of action of the 1st amended complaint on following grounds: CS360 Towers, LLC is a necessary...
..t they fail to plead facts with the required specificity to establish each of the elements of those causes of action; the conspiracy cause of action fails to adequately allege facts establishing a viable cause of action for conspiracy; the conspiracy cause of action is fatally detective, because it fails to allege defendant Chisick owed plaintiffs any duty; and the 1st amended complaint fails to a...
Recent Rulings on Cross-Complaint
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., §§ 412.20, subd. (a)(3), 428.50, subd. (a), 432.10.) Any other cross-complaint may be filed at any time before the court has set a trial date. (Code Civ. Proc., §428.50, subd, (b).) If a party fails to file a cross-complaint within the time limits described above, he or she must obtain permission from the court to file the cross-complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 426.50, 428.50, subd. (c).)
201- CITY OF COSTA MESA V. NATIONAL THERAPEUTIC SERVICES, INC.
Section 128.7’s incorporation of section 1010 is compulsory not permissive.” Id. (emphasis in original). If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court determines that Code Civ. Proc. § 128.7(b) has been violated, the court may, subject to the certain conditions, impose an appropriate monetary sanction upon the attorneys, law firm, or parties that have violated Code Civ. Proc. § 128.7(b) or are responsible for the violation. Code Civ. Proc. § 128.7(c).
However, “a compulsory predispute arbitration agreement is not rendered unenforceable just because it is required as a condition of employment or offered on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis.” (Lagatree v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1127; Serpa v. California Surety Investigations, Inc. (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 695, 704 [the “adhesive aspect of an agreement is not dispositive. [Citation.]
“In civil litigation generally, the question whether a person must be joined as a party to a suit is governed by the compulsory joinder statute, section 389 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Orozco asserts that he “meets the requirements for both mandatory and permissive intervention.” (Id. at p. 12:24-25.) A. Legal Standard Code of Civil Procedure section 387 sets forth the requirements and procedures for intervention by a non-party in an existing case.
CAMPBELL VS FORTUNEBUILDERS INC
The notice and proposed order granting preliminary approval of the class action settlement shall be amended such that a written objection is permissive, not mandatory. (Exhibit A, ¶6; Exhibit B, Pages 8-9.) A class member may appear at the Final Approval Hearing and orally object. The parties may not deem an oral objection invalid by stipulation. (Exhibit B, Notice Pages 8-9.) The Final Approval Hearing is scheduled November 6, 2020 at 9:00 a.m. in this department.
., including section 1283.05 and all of the Act's other mandatory and permissive rights to discovery). (ROA 12, Ex. A, ¶ 2 (underline added).) The problem with this provision in this case, according to Plaintiff, is that, while cost-sharing may be appropriate where the claims at issue pertain to general common law such as breach of contract [see Chin, et al., Cal. Prac. Guide: Emp. Lit. (TRG 2019) ¶ 18:621.22, citing Giuliano v.
“[A] compulsory pre-dispute arbitration agreement is not rendered unenforceable just because it is required as a condition of employment or offered on a 'take it or leave it' basis.” (Lagatree v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps (1999) 74 Cal. App. 4th 1105, 1127.) However, the fact that an arbitration agreement is mandatory for employment may be a factor in determining that it is procedurally unconscionable. (See, e.g., Trivedi v. Curexo Technology Corp. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 387, 393; Armendariz v.
MELVYN GOLDSMITH, ET AL. V. HOPE RANCH PARK HOMES ASSOCIATION
While the Hope Ranch Rules state that any determination by the Board regarding a view dispute “shall be binding on the parties,” the use of the term “may” indicates that it is permissive rather than mandatory for a member to bring such a dispute to the Board for resolution. “Generally speaking, of course, the word ‘may’ is permissive – you can do it if you want, but you aren’t being forced to – while the word ‘shall is mandatory . . . .” County of Orange v.
PARMANAND KUMAR VS RODOLFO CERRILLO LOPEZ, INDIVIDUALLY
Matters which are subject to permissive judicial notice must be specified in the notice of motion, the supporting points and authorities, or as the court otherwise permits. (Id.) The motion may not be supported by extrinsic evidence. (Barker v. Hull (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 221, 236.)
(k) To any person pursuant to a subpoena, court order, or other compulsory legal process if, before the disclosure, the agency reasonably attempts to notify the individual to whom the record pertains, and if the notification is not prohibited by law. . . . (Civ. Code, § 1798.24 [bold emphasis and underlining added].)
JULIA SARADJIAN, ET AL. VS ARMEN KHACHATRYAN, ET AL.
The complaint alleges negligence and permissive use liability for an automobile collision that occurred on May 12, 2018. On June 11, 2019, Defendant/Cross-Complainant Armen Khachatryan filed a cross-complaint against Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Julia Saradjian alleging negligence. On March 9, 2020, Plaintiff Helen Titizian and Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Julia Saradjian filed a motion to quash a deposition subpoena pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.1.
KENNETH A LOVEMAN VS AILEEN LEAVITT
If a party fails to file a cross-complaint within the time limits described in CCP section 428.50(a), the party must obtain leave of court to file the cross-complaint. (CCP § 428.50(c).) If the proposed cross-complaint is permissive, leave may be granted “in the interest of justice” at any time during the course of the action. (CCP § 428.50(c).) If the proposed cross-complaint is compulsory, leave shall be granted so long as defendant acted in good faith. (CCP § 426.50.)
., § 412.20, subd. (a)(3).) Defendants present evidence that they only learned of this action in February, 2020, following service of a trial setting notice. (Motion, Gomez Decl., ¶¶1-3; Mata Decl., ¶¶1-3.) Therefore, good cause exists for the timing of the instant Motion to Quash. Conclusion Specially Appearing Defendants Jimmy A. Gomez and Leonard Mata’s Motion to Quash Service of Summons and Complaint is GRANTED. Court clerk to give notice. *Hearing may be heard at 2:00 p.m.
The decision to grant or deny a permissive cross-complaint under Code of Civ. Proc. §§428.50 & 428.10 is solely within the discretion of the Court, and “[t]he reason for allowing cross-complaints is to have a complete determination of a controversy among the parties in one action, thus avoiding circuity of action and duplication of time and effort.” City of Hanford v. Superior Court (1989) 208 Cal. App. 3d 580, 587.
It legitimizes a myriad of situations the Legislature may not have cared to spell out, by establishing the principle of permissive disclosure when specifically authorized by law.” (Shaddox v. Bertani (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1406, 1414 [2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 808] (Shaddox).) (McNair v. City and County of San Francisco (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1154, 1165 [bold emphasis added].)
Plaintiff alleges negligence and liability for permissive use of a vehicle in the complaint arising from an automobile collision that occurred on March 12, 2017. On June 5, 2020, Defendant filed motions to compel Plaintiff to provide verified responses without objections to Form Interrogatories, Special Interrogatories, and Request for Production (All Set One) pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure sections 2030.290 and 2031.300.
OLIVIER SAINT-VICTOR VS SANTA MONICA POLICE DEPARTMENT
This is permissive language. While a school district must abide by certain requirements if it chooses to provide adult education, it is not mandated to provide adult education at all. Therefore, CAEP funds used in DACE are “categorically-funded projects which are not required by federal or state statutes.” Opp. at 11. Petitioners analogize to Zalac and Kamin.
Further, the enactment at issue must be obligatory, rather than merely discretionary or permissive; it must require, rather than merely authorize or permit, that a particular action be taken or not taken. (Haggis v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 490, 498.) The mandatory duty liability of a public entity under Section 815.6 is not predicated on the theory of vicarious liability under Government Code section 815.2 for the torts of its employees.
DREAMLAND HOLDING, LLC VS EDWARD SARKISSIAN
CCP 415.20(b); CCP 412.20(a)(3); CCP 430.40(a). Defendant failed to timely respond. On 11/5/19, Plaintiff filed and served a Request for Entry of Default which was entered on 11/5/19. (Brown Decl., ¶5, Ex.2). On 12/17/19, Plaintiff filed a Request for Entry of Default Judgment which was rejected. On 12/18/19, Plaintiff filed and served a Request for Entry of Default Judgment. Brown Decl. ¶7, Ex.3). On 12/20/19, Plaintiff filed and served another Request for Entry of Default. (Brown Decl. ¶8, Ex.4).
FATIMA PATRICIA CISNEROS DE MANCIA ET AL VS GARY TAGLYAN ET
Precluding defendant from filing a compulsory cross-complaint is not an appropriate response to its allegedly insufficient discovery responses which plaintiffs failed to timely raise in the appropriate motion. Plaintiffs’ argument that defendant acted in bad faith is rejected as a ground for denying this motion for leave to file a cross-complaint. Therefore, defendant’s motion to file a cross-complaint is granted.
Finally, the Court notes the Evidence Code section 452 is entirely permissive. Therefore, the Court exercises its discretion not to take judicial notice of the FAE Defendants’ Exhibit 1 and any facts which the FAE Defendants attempt to derive from it. Next, the FAE Defendants argue that the breach of contract claim must fail because Plaintiff does not allege facts showing breach, Mr. Ahr’s performance, causation, or damages. The FAE Defendants contend that there are no facts showing that Mr.
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