Source: https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/category/vehicle-and-traffic-law-2/
Timestamp: 2020-04-10 05:22:06
Document Index: 468190657

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 600', '§ 1194', '§ 1126', '§ 1120', '§ 1162', '§ 388', '§ 205', '§ 1146', '§ 1146', '§ 1142', '§ 1142', '§ 1231', '§ 1142', '§ 1146', '§ 1231', '§ 1111']

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TRAFFIC STOP WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE DEFENDANT HAD COMMITTED A TRAFFIC VIOLATION (FOURTH DEPT).
The Fourth Department, reversing the Administrative Law Judge, determined defendant’s driver’s license should not have been revoked. The record lacked substantial evidence that the police officer had probable cause to believe defendant had committed a traffic violation when he made the traffic stop which resulted in defendant’s refusing to submit to a chemical test:
A police officer initially stopped petitioner on a suspected violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 600 (1) (a), i.e., leaving the scene of an accident that caused property damage without reporting it. The officer observed petitioner approximately one mile from the accident site driving a white pickup truck, which matched the description of the vehicle involved in the accident. The officer effected a stop of the truck by activating the patrol vehicle’s lights and ultimately took petitioner into custody after petitioner exhibited signs and made statements that indicated he was intoxicated. Petitioner refused to submit to a chemical test, and thus his driver’s license was temporarily suspended. A refusal revocation hearing was thereafter held pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 (2) (c). The Administrative Law Judge revoked petitioner’s license after concluding, inter alia, that the traffic stop was legal. In affirming that determination on petitioner’s administrative appeal, respondent concluded that the stop was lawful because the officer “had a reasonable basis for stopping” petitioner.
We agree with petitioner that respondent reviewed the determination under an incorrect legal standard inasmuch as “the Court of Appeals has made it abundantly clear’ . . . that police stops of automobiles in this State are legal only pursuant to routine, nonpretextual traffic checks to enforce traffic regulations or when there exists at least a reasonable suspicion that the driver or occupants of the vehicle have committed, are committing, or are about to commit a crime’ . . . [,] or where the police have probable cause to believe that the driver . . . has committed a traffic violation’ ” … . We further agree with petitioner that the record lacks substantial evidence to support the determination that the officer had the requisite probable cause at the time of the stop … . Matter of Deraway v New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs. Appeals Bd., 2020 NY Slip Op 01727, Fourth Dept 3-13-20
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The Second Department, setting aside the defense verdict in this traffic accident case, determined the bus driver was negligent as a matter of law. To avoid a stopped vehicle the driver (Barreto) crossed a double yellow line and lost control of the bus which crashed into a store. The plaintiffs were bus passengers:
This Court has held that “a driver who crosses over a double yellow line into opposing traffic, unless justified by an emergency not of the driver’s own making, violated the Vehicle and Traffic Law and is guilty of negligence as a matter of law” (… see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1126[a] …). Here, although the evidence demonstrated that there was snow or slush on the surface of the subject road, the adverse weather conditions, as well as the fact that the road sloped downhill, were foreseeable and known to Barreto and did not provide a nonnegligent explanation for Barreto’s violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law … . Although the evidence demonstrated that there was a vehicle stopped in the bus’s lane of travel, thereby obstructing its path, the evidence also demonstrated that the stopped vehicle was observable from a far distance, that the bus did not slow down after the stopped vehicle came into Barreto’s view, and that Barreto crossed over the double-yellow line without slowing down. Under the circumstances, Barreto’s loss of control over the bus was the result of his own negligent driving in adverse weather conditions, rather than the result of an emergency not of his own making. The absence of an emergency was recognized by the Supreme Court in its refusal to grant the defendant’s request that the jury be given an instruction on the emergency doctrine.
Barreto’s operation of the bus under the circumstances here violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1120(a). Such violation constitutes negligence as a matter of law and could not properly be disregarded by the jury … . Hodnett v Westchester County Dept. of Pub. Works & Transp., 2020 NY Slip Op 01603, Second Dept 3-11-20
March 11, 2020 /by Bruce Freeman
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PLAINTIFF WAS LEANING INSIDE THE OPEN DOOR OF A VAN WHEN THE VAN SUDDENLY MOVED FORWARD; THE RELATED VIOLATION OF THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW CONSTITUTED NEGLIGENCE PER SE; PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s summary judgment motion in this vehicle-injury case should have been granted. Plaintiff was leaning into the open sliding door of a van when the van suddenly moved forward. Plaintiff sued the owner of the van (J & D) and the driver. The related violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law constituted negligence per se:
A violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law constitutes negligence as a matter of law … . Here, the plaintiff established her prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by presenting uncontroverted evidence that the driver stepped on the gas pedal while she was leaning into the vehicle, causing the vehicle to move forward and her to be injured by the sliding of the minivan’s door into her back (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1162 … ). This negligence can be imputed to J & D, which was the owner of the vehicle, through the presumption that the operator was driving the vehicle with the owner’s express or implied consent (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388[1]). Edwards v J&D Express Serv. Corp., 2020 NY Slip Op 01145, Second Dept 2-19-20
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Contract Law, Employment Law, Municipal Law, Negligence, Vehicle and Traffic Law, Workers' Compensation
PLAINTIFF POLICE OFFICER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST THE DRIVER OF THE TRACTOR TRAILER WHICH STRUCK HIM WHEN HE WAS STANDING IN THE ROADWAY SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, FREEDOM FROM COMPARATIVE FAULT NO LONGER NEED BE SHOWN; OTHER ISSUES ADDRESSED IN THE DECISION INCLUDE THE EMPLOYER’S LIABILITY, THE TRUCK RENTAL COMPANIES’ LIABILITY, THE EMERGENCY DOCTRINE, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION AND GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW 205-e (SECOND DEPT).
The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court determined plaintiff police officer was entitled to summary judgment against the driver of the tractor trailer which struck the officer who was standing in the roadway both under a common law negligence theory and under General Municipal Law 205-e. The court dealt with several other issues including: (1) whether a second police officer was engaged in an emergency operation, giving rise to the reckless disregard standard, when he stopped to assist the plaintiff who had made a traffic stop (the answer is no); (2) whether the second officer was liable based upon the position of his car (the answer is no, the car furnished a condition for the accident but was not the cause); (3) whether the injured officer’s recovery was confined to Workers’ Compensation (there is a question of fact whether the injury was “grave”); (4) whether the Graves Amendment protected the truck rental companies (the answer is yes); (5) whether vicarious liability applies to the truck driver’s employer (there is a question of fact on that issue). With respect to the common law negligence and the General Municipal Law 205-e causes of action, the court wrote:
… [T]he plaintiffs were not required to demonstrate that the injured plaintiff was free from comparative negligence in order to obtain summary judgment on the issue of Burke’s [the truck driver’s] liability on the first cause of action [negligence]. * * *
When the light changed, Burke began his left turn onto northbound Midland Avenue. Prior to beginning his turn, Burke was aware that there was a police officer conducting a traffic stop on foot and a police car parked on the northbound side of Midland Avenue. Although Burke believed he could make the turn safely, the rear of the trailer hit the injured plaintiff. * * *
The plaintiffs also established … Burke’s liability as to … a violation of General Municipal Law § 205-e. … [T]hat statute permits a police officer to bring a tort claim for injuries sustained “while in the discharge or performance at any time or place of any duty imposed by . . . superior officer[s]” where such injuries occur “directly or indirectly as a result of any neglect, omission, willful or culpable negligence of any person or persons in failing to comply with the requirements of any of the statutes, ordinances, rules, orders and requirements of the federal, state, county, village, town or city governments” … . In order to recover under the statute, “a police officer must demonstrate injury resulting from negligent noncompliance with a requirement found in a well-developed body of law and regulation that imposes clear duties” … .
Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1146(a) requires a driver to “exercise due care to avoid colliding with any . . . pedestrian.” Here, the unrebutted evidence established a prima facie violation of § 1146(a), as it demonstrated that Burke failed to exercise due care to avoid hitting the injured plaintiff. Cioffi v S.M. Foods, Inc., 2019 NY Slip Op 09251, Second Dept 12-24-19
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THE CAR IN WHICH PLAINTIFFS WERE PASSENGERS HAD THE RIGHT OF WAY ON A THROUGH ROAD; WHETHER DEFENDANT’S CAR STOPPED AT THE STOP SIGN BEFORE PULLING OUT INTO THE PATH OF PLAINTIFFS’ CAR WAS NOT DISPOSITIVE; PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff-passengers’ motion for summary judgment in this intersection traffic accident case should have been granted. The Hernandez/Transit car, in which plaintiffs were passengers, had the right of way on a through road. The defendant Desriviere’s car was on an intersecting street with a stop sign. The Second Department held that the fact the Desriviere car may have stopped at the stop sign before entering the intersection did not raise a relevant question of fact:
As a general matter, a driver who fails to yield the right-of-way after stopping at a stop sign in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1142(a) is negligent as a matter of law … . The driver with the right-of-way is entitled to anticipate that the other motorist will obey traffic laws that require him or her to yield … . Yet, “a driver traveling with the right-of-way may nevertheless be found to have contributed to the happening of the accident if he or she did not use reasonable care to avoid the accident” … . Here, Hernandez and Julie P. Transit established their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting evidence demonstrating that (1) Hernandez had the right-of-way, (2) that because Desriviere failed to yield the right-of-way upon entering the intersection in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1142(a), he was negligent as a matter of law, and (3) that Desriviere’s negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident … . The question of whether Desriviere stopped at the stop sign is not dispositive, since the evidence established that he failed to yield even if he did stop … . Belle-Fleur v Desriviere, 2019 NY Slip Op 09244, Second Dept 12-24-19
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DEFENDANT DRIVER WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS BICYCLE-CAR TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE; PLAINTIFF BICYCLIST WAS TRAVELING THE WRONG WAY ON A ONE-WAY STREET AND DID NOT SLOW DOWN APPROACHING THE INTERSECTION WHERE HE COLLIDED WITH THE SIDE OF DEFENDANT’S CAR (FIRST DEPT).
The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant driver was entitled to summary judgment in this bicycle-car collision case. Plaintiff was bicycling in the wrong direction on a one-way street. Defendant pulled out into the intersection after checking the traffic in the appropriate direction and plaintiff ran into the side of defendant’s car:
Pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1231, a person riding a bicycle on a roadway has the same rights and responsibilities as a driver of a motor vehicle. Therefore, a bicyclist is required to use reasonable care for his or her own safety, to keep a reasonably vigilant lookout for vehicles, and to avoid placing himself or herself into a dangerous position … .
Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1142(b) states that a “driver of a vehicle approaching a yield sign shall . . . slow down to a speed reasonable for existing conditions, or shall stop if necessary,” and “yield the right of way . . . to any vehicle in the intersection or approaching on another highway so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard during the time such driver is moving across or within the intersection.” In addition, Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1146(a) requires motorists to “exercise due care to avoid colliding with any bicyclist, pedestrian, or domestic animal” on the roadway and to “give warning by sounding the horn when necessary.”
The undisputed testimony was that plaintiff was traveling in the opposite direction of traffic, in clear violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1231, and traveled into the intersection without stopping or yielding to defendant’s vehicle which was clearly already in the intersection. Admittedly, plaintiff made no attempt to stop, or to alert defendant of his presence. Although a driver of a motor vehicle has a duty to see what is there to be seen, defendant was not required to look in the opposite direction of the intersecting one-way street to see if someone was traveling in the wrong direction and at a speed indicating no intent to stop. Felix v Polakoff, 2019 NY Slip Op 09100, First Dept 12-19-19
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Evidence, Negligence, Vehicle and Traffic Law
PLAINTIFFS (CUPID AND ROBINSON) DEMONSTRATED DEFENDANT DRIVER WAS NEGLIGENT AND HIS NEGLIGENCE CAUSED THE TRAFFIC ACCIDENT; DEFENDANTS’ ALLEGATION THAT PLAINTIFF CUPID, NOT PLAINTIFF ROBINSON, WAS DRIVING THE CAR DID NOT CREATE A RELEVANT QUESTION OF FACT (SECOND DEPT).
The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment in this traffic accident case should have been granted. The evidence demonstrated defendant driver (Paul) went through a red light and failed to see what he should have seen. The defendants’ argument that the plaintiffs claimed that Cupid was driving when in fact the other plaintiff, Robinson, was driving was irrelevant:
The evidence submitted in support of Robinson’s motion demonstrated, prima facie, that Paul entered the subject intersection against a red light, in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1111(d) … . That evidence further showed that Paul failed to see the plaintiffs’ vehicle before colliding with it in the middle of the intersection, thus demonstrating that Paul failed to see that which he should have seen through the proper use of his senses. Contrary to the defendants’ contention in the Supreme Court, Robinson was not required to demonstrate her freedom from comparative fault in order to establish her prima facie entitlement to summary judgment on the issue of liability … .
Thus, Robinson made a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of the defendants’ liability by demonstrating that Paul was negligent and that his negligence was a proximate cause of the subject accident and her resulting injuries … . In opposition, the defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact. On the facts presented here, whether Robinson or Cupid was driving their vehicle is not germane to the issue of the defendants’ liability. Robinson v City of New York, 2019 NY Slip Op 08881, Second Dept 12-11-19
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