Source: https://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/arizona/azdce/3:2013cv08110/780117/33
Timestamp: 2017-11-19 10:56:25
Document Index: 605322472

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 2254', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 2254', '§ 2254']

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION: IT IS ORDERED that the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation for Hiland v. Ryan et al :: Justia Dockets & Filings
Justia Dockets & Filings Ninth Circuit Arizona Arizona District Court Hiland v. Ryan et al Filing 33
Hiland v. Ryan et al
ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION: IT IS ORDERED that the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation (Doc. 29 ) is accepted and adopted (see document for further details). IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Petition Under 28 U.S.C.  7; 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (Doc. 1 ) is DENIED and that this action is DISMISSED. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no certificate of appealability shall be issued and that the petitioner is not entitled to appeal in forma pauperis. Signed by Senior Judge Paul G Rosenblatt on 6/28/15. (KGM)
1 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 10 Travis Donovan Hiland, Petitioner, 11 12 ORDER v. 13 No. CV-13-08110-PCT-PGR Charles L. Ryan, et al., 14 Respondents. 15 16 Hiland is an Arizona state prisoner who was convicted pursuant to a guilty plea of 17 theft, in violation of A.R.S. § 13-1802, and fraud schemes, in violation of A.R.S. § 13- 18 2310. The state trial court imposed a sentence of nine years of imprisonment for the theft 19 conviction, and a consecutive sentence of seven years of probation for the fraud schemes 20 conviction. Hiland filed a Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus 21 by a Person in State Custody in which he challenges his conviction and sentence. The 22 Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) (Doc. 29) 23 recommending that the Petition be denied. Hiland has filed objections to the R&R (Doc. 24 32). For the reasons set forth below, the Court will over rule Hiland’s objections, will 25 adopt in part the R&R, and will deny the Petition. 26 A. Ground Two 27 In Ground Two of his Petition, Hiland argues that “he was convicted on the basis 28 of a guilty plea that was the product of ineffective assistance of counsel.” (Doc. 1 at 7, 1 15-16.) Hiland does not deny that he has procedurally defaulted Ground Two because he 2 failed to raise it in his PCR proceeding, but objects to the R&R’s conclusions that he has 3 failed to show cause and prejudice to overcome his procedural default. (Doc. 32 at 2-6.) 4 Under Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012), “a procedural default by state 5 PCR counsel in failing to raise trial-counsel IAC is excused if there is ‘cause’ for the 6 default.” Dietrich v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1237, 1244 (9th Cir. 2013). To demonstrate such 7 “cause,” a petitioner must show, among other things, that the trial counsel IAC claim is a 8 “substantial” claim. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318-19. Hiland contends that he met this 9 requirement. He contends that his trial counsel IAC claim is “substantial” because his 10 trial counsel advised him to enter a guilty plea to both theft and fraud schemes even 11 though a conviction and sentence on both of these offenses violates the Double Jeopardy 12 Clause. (Doc. 32 at 3.) 13 The Double Jeopardy Clause protects “an individual from being subjected to the 14 hazards of trial and possible conviction more than once for an alleged offense.” Missouri 15 v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 365 (1983) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Because 16 Hiland was convicted of both of the offenses in a single proceeding, his “right to be free 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 from multiple trials for the same offense” is not implicated. Id. Rather, at issue is the imposition of cumulative sentences in a single proceeding. “With respect to cumulative sentences imposed in a single trial, the Double Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended.” Id. at 366. Thus, “where the offenses are the same . . . cumulative sentences are not permitted unless elsewhere specially authorized by” the legislature. Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 693 (1980). Where the legislature intended “to impose multiple punishments, imposition of such sentences does not violate the Constitution.” Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 344 (1981). The Arizona legislature has provided notice of its intent to allow multiple punishments for the same act. See A.R.S. § 13-116 (“An act or omission which is made punishable in different ways by different sections of the laws may be punished under both, but in no event may sentences be other than concurrent.”) Assuming that theft and -2- 1 fraud schemes are the “same” for double jeopardy purposes,1 imposition of cumulative 2 sentences in the same trial is authorized by the legislature and does not, therefore, violate 3 the Double Jeopardy Clause. Accordingly, Hiland’s claim – that his trial counsel was 4 ineffective because he advised Hiland to enter guilty pleas that violated Hiland’s rights 5 under the Double Jeopardy Clause – is not a “substantial” claim, and Hiland has failed to 6 meet his burden of demonstrating cause for his procedural default of Ground Two. 7 Ground Two is therefore dismissed. 8 B. Ground Five 9 In Ground Five of his Petition, Hiland contends that the trial court’s imposition of 10 consecutive sentences for his convictions for theft and fraud schemes violates the Double 11 Jeopardy Clause. (Doc. 1 at 19-20.) He objects to the R&R’s recommendation to 12 dismiss Ground Five as unreviewable in habeas. He contends that Ground Five is 13 reviewable in habeas because the state court’s decision to impose consecutive sentences 14 involves “an unreasonable determination of the facts and an unreasonable application of 15 clearly established federal law.” (Doc. 32 at 13.) 16 17 In determining that the sentences for theft and fraud schemes could be run consecutively rather than concurrently under state law, the sentencing judge determined: 23 The misrepresentations of the information [for the fraud] is different than the theft of the items that are taken, . . . the crux of a fraud case is the misrepresentation. The crux of the theft case is actually the taking. . . . . . . . I looked at the State versus Gordon analysis . . . [and an unpublished case from toward the end of 2008]. . . . [T]he theory of it is equally applicable here as it was in that particular case, distinguishing between the offense of fraudulent schemes and artifices and a theft count. And it is true that the shared characteristic of that is victims of the theft count may also be victims of the fraud count. But that case law supports consecutive sentencing. 24 (Doc. 16-5 at 140-141.) Thus, the sentencing judge determined that “these are not the 25 same elements and that consecutive sentencing is available to the Court.” (Id. at 159.) 18 19 20 21 22 26 27 28 1 The Court disagrees with and thus does not adopt the portion of the R&R that analyzes whether theft and fraud schemes are the “same” offenses for double jeopardy purposes in relation to Ground Two. (See Doc. 29 at 23-24.) -3- 1 The state PCR court interpreted the sentencing judge as finding that “each of the 2 Defendants knowingly obtained a benefit by misrepresenting that they had actual 3 investments for the victims to invest in and that those investments would result in a 4 benefit to the victims. The Defendants then received money from the victims and kept 5 that money for their own gain.” (Doc. 15-3 at 10 (citing Doc. 16-5 at 140-141.) The 6 PCR court thus rejected Hiland’s challenge to the consecutive sentences, finding that the 7 fraud schemes and theft were separate acts, and that, accordingly, consecutive sentences 8 were authorized under A.R.S. § 13-116 and State v. Gordon, 778 P.2d 1204 (Ariz. 1989). 9 (See Doc. 15-3 at 10.) 10 A review of the indictment, which is the basis of the convictions for theft and 11 fraud schemes, indicates that this decision by the state court may be based on an 12 unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state 13 court proceeding.2 However, the mere fact that a state court made an unreasonable 14 determination of facts does not provide a basis for this Court to grant habeas relief. 15 Rather, “it is only noncompliance with federal law that renders a State’s criminal 16 judgment susceptible to collateral attack in the federal courts.” Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 17 18 19 20 21 22 U.S. 1, 5 (2010). Thus, a state court’s unreasonable determination of facts applied to state law, and that may result in a violation of state law, does not provide an avenue for relief in habeas. Id. at 5-6; see Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991) (“‘federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law’” (citation omitted)). Hiland contends that federal law was violated here, citing the Double Jeopardy Clause. However, as discussed previously in relation to Ground Two, the imposition of 23 24 25 26 27 28 2 The indictment, which is the basis for Hiland’s guilty plea, charges Hiland with committing a violation of the fraud schemes statute by engaging in the following conduct: “[P]ursuant to a scheme or artifice to defraud, [he] knowingly obtained a benefit of approximately $1,658,849.71 by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, misrepresentations, promises or material omissions.” (Doc. 15-1 at 4.) Thus, the “benefit” to which Hiland pled guilty on the fraud schemes charge was the $1,658,849.71 in funds, not the “benefit” of having the victims believe or trust in the value of the investments, as found by the state court. -4- 1 sentences in the same proceeding for both theft and fraud schemes does not violate the 2 Double Jeopardy Clause because state law allows imposition of cumulative sentences.3 3 Further, the determination of whether consecutive cumulative sentences, as opposed to 4 concurrent cumulative sentences, can be imposed is a question of state law, not federal 5 law. See A.R.S. § 13-116; State v. Gordon, 778 P.2d 1204, 1211 (Ariz. 1989). Thus, in 6 Ground Five, Hiland is actually challenging the state court’s application of what may be 7 an unreasonable determination of facts to state law, and in particular to A.R.S. § 13-116 8 and Gordon. This challenge is not cognizable in habeas. See Wilson, 562 U.S. at 5-6. 9 Ground Five is therefore dismissed. 10 11 C. Ground One In Ground One of his petition, Hiland contends that his guilty plea was not 12 knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. 13 Hiland’s challenge to his guilty plea lacks merit because Hiland cannot show that the 14 state court’s rejection of his claim was based on an unreasonable determination of the 15 facts or that it was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, established federal law. 16 (Doc. 29 at 38-42.) Hiland raises a general objection to the R&R’s conclusion and 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 (Doc. 1 at 14-15.) The R&R concludes that recommendation that Ground One be dismissed, but does not raise any specific objection, relying instead on the argument he “set forth in his Traverse in relation to this ground.” (Doc. 32 at 7-8.) The Court has reviewed the entire record and Hiland’s objection, and overrules the objection. The Court agrees with the R&R that Hiland has not demonstrated that his guilty plea was involuntary or that there was a Due Process violation. The Court further finds that the record refutes Hiland’s factual allegations and demonstrates that those allegations are not credible. The Court adopts the R&R’s findings, analysis, and conclusion on this issue. (See Doc. 29 at 38-42.) Ground One is therefore dismissed. 26 27 28 3 The Court disagrees with and thus does not adopt the portion of the R&R that analyzes whether theft and fraud schemes are the “same” offenses for double jeopardy purposes in relation to Ground Five. (See Doc. 29 at 55-56.) -5- 1 D. Ground Four 2 In Ground Four of his petition, Hiland contends that he did not receive a fair 3 hearing or a fair sentence due to the bias and prejudice of the trial court judge, and that 4 this violated his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Doc. 1 at 17-19.) 5 The R&R concludes that Hiland’s claim that the trial judge was biased and prejudiced 6 lacks merit because Hiland cannot show that the state court’s rejection of this claim was 7 based on an unreasonable determination of the facts or that it was contrary to, or an 8 unreasonable application of, established federal law. (Doc. 29 at 42-46.) Hiland raises a 9 general objection to the R&R’s conclusion and recommendation that Ground Four be 10 dismissed, but does not raise any specific objection, relying instead on the argument he 11 “set forth in his Traverse in relation to this ground.” (Doc. 32 at 8-9.) 12 The Court has reviewed the entire record and Hiland’s objection, and overrules the 13 objection. The Court agrees with the R&R that Hiland has not demonstrated that the state 14 court’s resolution of this claim was based on an unreasonable determination of facts, or 15 that it was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. 16 The Court adopts the R&R’s findings, analysis, and conclusion on this issue. (See Doc. 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 at 42-46.) Ground Four is therefore dismissed. E. Ground Three In Ground Three of his petition, Hiland contends that he did not receive fair hearings and a fair sentence due to prosecutorial misconduct, and that this violated his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. (Doc. 1 at 16-17.) The R&R concludes that Hiland did not establish a due process violation based on the alleged instances of prosecutorial misconduct, and that the prosecutorial misconduct claim lacks merit because Hiland cannot show that the state court’s rejection of his claims of prosecutorial misconduct, individually or cumulatively, was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts or that it was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, established federal law. (Doc. 29 at 46-52.) Hiland raises a general objection to the R&R’s conclusion and recommendation that Ground Three be dismissed, but does not raise any specific objection, relying instead on the argument he “set forth in his Traverse -6- 1 in relation to this ground.” (Doc. 32 at 9-11.) 2 The Court has reviewed the entire record and Hiland’s objection, and overrules the 3 objection. The Court agrees with the R&R that Hiland has not established a due process 4 violation based on the alleged instances of prosecutorial misconduct, and that the 5 prosecutorial misconduct claim lacks merit because Hiland cannot show that the state 6 court’s rejection of his claims of prosecutorial misconduct, individually or cumulatively, 7 was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts or that it was contrary to, or an 8 unreasonable application of, established federal law. 9 findings, analysis, and conclusion on this issue. (See Doc. 29 at 46-61.) Ground Three is 10 therefore dismissed. 11 F. The Court adopts the R&R’s Ground Six 12 In Ground Six of his petition, Hiland contends that the trail court improperly 13 considered aggravating and mitigating factors and thereby violated the protections 14 provided by the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. (Doc. 1 at 20-21.) The R&R 15 concludes that the sentencing court considered Hiland’s role in the offenses and his 16 argument that the money that he did receive was only a salary and did not constitute a 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 pecuniary gain; that the record did not support Hiland’s contention that the imposition of the sentences violated his due process rights; and that Hiland had not demonstrated that the state court’s rejection of his sentencing claims was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts or that it was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. (Doc. 29 at 57-59.) Hiland raises a general objection to the R&R’s conclusion and recommendation that Ground Six be dismissed, but does not raise any specific objection, relying instead on the argument he “set forth in his Traverse in relation to this ground.” (Doc. 32 at 14.) The Court has reviewed the entire record and Hiland’s objection, and overrules the objection. The Court agrees with the R&R that Hiland has not established a due process violation based on the imposition of the sentences; that the record reflects that the sentencing court considered Hiland’s role in the offenses and his argument that the money that he did receive was only a salary and did not constitute a pecuniary gain; and -7- 1 that Hiland did not demonstrate that the state court’s rejection of his sentencing claims 2 was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts or that it was contrary to, or an 3 unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. The Court adopts the R&R’s 4 findings, analysis, and conclusion on this issue. (See Doc. 29 at 57-61.) Ground Six is 5 therefore dismissed. 6 G. Request for Evidentiary Hearing 7 In his petition, Hiland requests an evidentiary hearing. (Doc. 1 at 13.) The R&R 8 recommends denying an evidentiary hearing. (Doc. 29 at 59-60.) Hiland objects to the 9 recommendation, contending that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing because he has 10 presented “meritorious claims” and exercised reasonable diligence in developing a factual 11 record in state court. (Doc. 32 at 14-15.) 12 “In deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court must consider 13 whether such a hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition’s factual 14 allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief.” Schriro v. 15 Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007) (citation omitted). 16 standards prescribed by § 2254 control whether to grant habeas relief, a federal court 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 “Because the deferential must take into account those standards in deciding whether an evidentiary hearing is appropriate.” Id. (citations omitted). Moreover, “if the record refutes the applicant’s factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.” Id. Here, the record precludes habeas relief on Grounds Two and Five, for the reasons discussed above. As to Ground One, challenging the voluntariness of Hiland’s guilty plea, the record refutes Hiland’s factual allegations and demonstrates that those allegations are not credible. (See Doc. 20 at 38-42.) Further, the Court finds that Hiland has not made a colorable claim and that his factual allegations are refuted by the record as to Ground Four, claiming that the trial court judge was biased and prejudiced; Ground Three, claiming prosecutorial misconduct; and Ground Six, claiming the trial court improperly considered aggravating and mitigating factors. (See Doc. 29 at 42-52, 57-59.) Accordingly, Hiland is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. See Landrigan, 550 U.S. at -8- 1 474. 2 3 Conclusion The Court will deny Hiland’s petition because the claims in his petition either lack 4 merit or are procedurally defaulted and barred from review and are therefore dismissed. 5 Further, because the record precludes habeas relief as to Grounds Two and Five; and the 6 record refutes Hiland’s factual allegations and/or Hiland has not made a colorable claim 7 as to Grounds One, Three, Four, and Six, he is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. 8 Accordingly, 9 10 IT IS ORDERED that the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation (Doc. 29) is accepted and adopted to the extent set forth herein. 11 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ 12 of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (Doc. 1) is DENIED and that this action 13 is DISMISSED. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly. 14 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no certificate of appealability shall be issued 15 and that the petitioner is not entitled to appeal in forma pauperis because dismissal is 16 justified by a plain procedural bar, and reasonable jurists would not find the ruling 17 18 19 20 debatable; or the petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right in that he has failed to demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the Court’s assessment of his constitutional claims to be debatable or wrong. Dated this 28th day of June, 2015. 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 -9-