Source: http://www.chanrobles.com/usa/us_supremecourt/540/375/case.php
Timestamp: 2017-12-17 23:30:56
Document Index: 622323038

Matched Legal Cases: ['§2255', '§2255', '§2255', '§2255', '§2255', '§2253', '§2255', '§2255', '§2244', '§2255', '§2255', '§2255', '§2255', '§2255', '§2255', '§2255', '§2255', '§2255', '§2255', '§2255', '§2255', '§2255', '§2255', '§2255', '§2255', '§2255', '§2255', '§2255']

290 F.3d 1270, vacated and remanded.
Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C.J., and Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined, and in which Scalia and Thomas, JJ., joined with respect to Parts I and II. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Thomas, J., joined.
HERNAN O'RYAN CASTRO, PETITIONER v. UNITED
(4) Castro, still acting pro se, appealed, but he did not challenge the District Court's recharacterization of his motion.
(5) The Court of Appeals summarily affirmed. It said in its one-paragraph order that it was ruling on a motion based upon both Rule 33 and §2255. Judgt. order reported at 82 F.3d 429 (CA11 1996); App. 147.
(2) The District Court denied the motion; Castro appealed; and the Court of Appeals remanded for further consideration of the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. It also asked the District Court to consider whether, in light of the 1994 motion, Castro's motion was his second §2255 motion, rather than his first.
(3) On remand, the District Court appointed counsel for Castro. It then decided that the 1997 motion was indeed Castro's second §2255 motion (the 1994 motion being his first). And it dismissed the motion for failure to comply with one of §2255's restrictive "second or successive" conditions (namely, Castro's failure to obtain the Court of Appeals' permission to file a "second or successive" motion). §2255, ¶ ;8. The District Court granted Castro a certificate to appeal its "second or successive" determination. §2253(c)(1).
(4) The Eleventh Circuit affirmed by a split (2-to-1) vote. 290 F.3d 1270 (2002). The majority "suggested" and "urged" district courts in the future to "warn prisoners of the consequences of recharacterization and provide them with the opportunity to amend or dismiss their filings." Id., at 1273, 1274. But it held that the 1994 court's failure to do so did not legally undermine its recharacterization. Hence, Castro's current §2255 motion was indeed his second habeas motion. Id., at 1274.
Other Circuits have taken a different approach. E.g., United States v. Palmer, 296 F.3d 1135, 1145-1147 (CADC 2002) (announcing a rule requiring courts to notify pro se litigants prior to recharacterization and refusing to find the §2255 motion before it "second or successive" since such notice was lacking). We consequently granted Castro's petition for certiorari.
"grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file a second or successive application ... shall not be the subject of a petition for ... a writ of certiorari." 28 U. S. C. §2244(b)(3)(E).
After receiving the parties' responses, we conclude that this provision does not bar our review here.
Castro's appeal to the Eleventh Circuit did not concern an "authorization . . . to file a second or successive application." The District Court certified for appeal the question whether Castro's §2255 motion was his first such motion or his second. Castro then argued to the Eleventh Circuit that his §2255 motion was his first; and he asked the court to reverse the District Court's dismissal of that motion. He nowhere asked the Court of Appeals to grant, and it nowhere denied, any "authorization ... to file a second or successive application."
The Government argues that the Eleventh Circuit's opinion had the effect of denying "authorization . . . to file a second . . . application" because the court said in its opinion that Castro's motion could not meet the requirements for second or successive motions. 290 F. 3d, at 1273. For that reason, the Government concludes, the court's decision falls within the scope of the jurisdictional provision. Brief for United States 16.
Federal courts sometimes will ignore the legal label that a pro se litigant attaches to a motion and recharacterize the motion in order to place it within a different legal category. See, e.g., Raineri v. United States, 233 F.3d 96, 100 (CA1 2000); United States v. Detrich, 940 F.2d 37, 38 (CA2 1991); United States v. Miller, 197 F.3d 644, 648 (CA3 1999); Raines v. United States, 423 F.2d 526, 528, n. 1 (CA4 1970); United States v. Santora, 711 F.2d 41, 42 (CA5 1983); United States v. McDowell, 305 F.2d 12, 14 (CA6 1962); Henderson v. United States, 264 F.3d 709, 711 (CA7 2001); McIntyre v. United States, 508 F.2d 403, n. 1 (CA8 1975) (per curiam); United States v. Eatinger, 902 F.2d 1383, 1385 (CA9 1990) (per curiam); United States v. Kelly, 235 F.3d 1238, 1242 (CA10 2000); United States v. Jordan, 915 F.2d 622, 625 (CA11 1990); United States v. Tindle, 522 F.2d 689, 693 (CADC 1975) (per curiam). They may do so in order to avoid an unnecessary dismissal, e.g., id., at 692-693, to avoid inappropriately stringent application of formal labeling requirements, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U. S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam), or to create a better correspondence between the substance of a pro se motion's claim and its underlying legal basis. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U. S. 5, 10 (1980) (per curiam); Andrews v. United States, 373 U. S. 334 (1963).
We here address one aspect of this practice, namely, certain legal limits that nine Circuits have placed on recharacterization. Those Circuits recognize that, by recharacterizing as a first §2255 motion a pro se litigant's filing that did not previously bear that label, the court may make it significantly more difficult for that litigant to file another such motion. They have consequently concluded that a district court may not recharacterize a pro se litigant's motion as a request for relief under §2255--unless the court first warns the pro se litigant about the consequences of the recharacterization, thereby giving the litigant an opportunity to contest the recharacterization, or to withdraw or amend the motion. See Adams v. United States, 155 F.3d 582, 583 (CA2 1998) (per curiam); United States v. Miller, supra, at 646-647 (CA3); United States v. Emmanuel, 288 F.3d 644, 646-647 (CA4 2002); In re Shelton, 295 F.3d 620, 622 (CA6 2002) (per curiam); Henderson v. United States, supra, at 710-711 (CA7); Morales v. United States, 304 F.3d 764, 767 (CA8 2002); United States v. Seesing, 234 F.3d 456, 463 (CA9 2000); United States v. Kelly, supra, at 1240-1241 (CA10); United States v. Palmer, 296 F. 3d, at 1146 (CADC); see also 290 F. 3d, at 1273, 1274 (case below) (suggesting that courts provide such warnings).
We agree with these suggestions. We consequently hold, as almost every Court of Appeals has already held, that the lower courts' recharacterization powers are limited in the following way:
The limitation applies when a court recharacterizes a pro se litigant's motion as a first §2255 motion. In such circumstances the district court must notify the pro se litigant that it intends to recharacterize the pleading, warn the litigant that this recharacterization means that any subsequent §2255 motion will be subject to the restrictions on "second or successive" motions, and provide the litigant an opportunity to withdraw the motion or to amend it so that it contains all the §2255 claims he believes he has. If the court fails to do so, the motion cannot be considered to have become a §2255 motion for purposes of applying to later motions the law's "second or successive" restrictions. §2255, ¶ ;8.
The District Court that considered Castro's 1994 motion failed to give Castro warnings of the kind we have described. Moreover, this Court's "supervisory power" determinations normally apply, like other judicial decisions, retroactively, at least to the case in which the determination was made. McNabb, supra, at 347 (applying new supervisory rule to case before the Court). Hence, given our holding in Part III, supra, Castro's 1994 motion cannot be considered a first §2255 motion, and his 1997 motion cannot be considered a "second or successive" motion--unless there is something special about Castro's case.
The Government argues that there is something special: Castro failed to appeal the 1994 recharacterization. According to the Government, that fact makes the 1994 recharacterization valid as a matter of "law of the case." And, since the 1994 recharacterization is valid, the 1997 §2255 motion is Castro's second, not his first.
The law of the case doctrine cannot pose an insurmountable obstacle to our reaching this conclusion. Assuming for argument's sake that the doctrine applies here, it simply "expresses" common judicial "practice"; it does not "limit" the courts' power. See Messenger v. Anderson, 225 U. S. 436, 444 (1912) (Holmes, J.). It cannot prohibit a court from disregarding an earlier holding in an appropriate case which, for the reasons set forth, we find this case to be.
I concur in Parts I and II of the Court's opinion and in the judgment of the Court. I also agree that this Court's consideration of Castro's challenge to the status of his recharacterized motion is neither barred by nor necessarily resolved by the doctrine of law of the case.
I write separately because I disagree with the Court's laissez-faire attitude toward recharacterization. The Court promulgates a new procedure to be followed if the district court desires the recharacterized motion to count against the pro se litigant as a first 28 U. S. C. §2255 motion in later litigation. (This procedure, by the way, can be ignored with impunity by a court bent upon aiding pro se litigants at all costs; the only consequence will be that the litigants' later §2255 submissions cannot be deemed "second or successive.") The Court does not, however, place any limits on when recharacterization may occur, but to the contrary treats it as a routine practice which may be employed "to avoid an unnecessary dismissal," "to avoid inappropriately stringent application of formal labeling requirements," or "to create a better correspondence between the substance of a pro se motion's claim and its underlying legal basis." Ante, at 6. The Court does not address whether Castro's motion filed under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 should have been recharacterized, and its discussion scrupulously avoids placing any limits on the circumstances in which district courts are permitted to recharacterize. That is particularly regrettable since the Court's new recharacterization procedure does not include an option for the pro se litigant to insist that the district court rule on his motion as filed; and gives scant indication of what might be a meritorious ground for contesting the recharacterization on appeal.
The risk of harming the litigant always exists when the court recharacterizes into a first §2255 motion a claim that is procedurally or substantively deficient in the manner filed. The court essentially substitutes the litigant's ability to bring his merits claim now, for the litigant's later ability to bring the same claim (or any other claim), perhaps with stronger evidence. For the later §2255 motion will then be burdened by the limitations on second or successive petitions imposed by AEDPA (the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 1214). A pro se litigant whose non-§2255 motion is dismissed on procedural grounds and one whose recharacterized §2255 claim is denied on the merits both end up as losers in their particular actions, but the loser on procedure is better off because he is not stuck with the consequences of a §2255 motion that he never filed.
It would be an inadequate response to this concern to state that district courts should recharacterize into first §2255 motions only when doing so is (1) procedurally necessary (2) to grant relief on the merits of the underlying claim. Ensuring that these conditions are met would often enmesh district courts in fact- and labor-intensive inquiries. It is an inefficient use of judicial resources to analyze the merits of every claim brought by means of a questionable procedural vehicle simply in order to determine whether to recharacterize--particularly in the common situation in which entitlement to relief turns on resolution of disputed facts. Moreover, even after that expenditure of effort the district court cannot be certain it is not prejudicing the litigant: the court of appeals may not agree with it on the merits of the claim.