Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/542/166/25005/
Timestamp: 2019-12-09 19:29:33
Document Index: 231501472

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1826', '§ 1826', '§ 1826', '§ 35681', '§ 913', '§ 4202', '§ 4208', '§ 4202', '§ 4208', '§ 1826']

In Re Grand Jury Investigation.appeal of Alexander Hartzell, a Witness, 542 F.2d 166 (3d Cir. 1976) :: Justia
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In Re Grand Jury Investigation.appeal of Alexander Hartzell, a Witness, 542 F.2d 166 (3d Cir. 1976)
US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit - 542 F.2d 166 (3d Cir. 1976) Submitted Under Third Circuit Rule 12(6) May 4, 1976. Decided June 22, 1976. As Amended July 7 and July 9, 1976. Rehearing and Rehearing In Banc Denied Aug. 2, 1976
On April 6 the government petitioned the district court for an order holding Hartzell in civil contempt for refusing to answer the questions posed to him on March 31. On April 9 the court scheduled a hearing on that petition for April 14. During the hearing the district court advised Hartzell of the possible penalties for contempt, and inquired whether he wished to purge himself of contempt of the March 22 order. He also advised Hartzell of the right to counsel. Hartzell waived the assistance of counsel and refused to testify. The court thereupon ordered Hartzell confined until he testified, or for a maximum of 18 months. See 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a) (2). The order also provides that the running of Hartzell's federal sentence on his 1975 conviction is suspended during the period of his civil confinement.
Hartzell's first contention on appeal is that the March 22 order directing him to testify was void because it was entered without any showing by the government of relevance of the proposed interrogation to a legitimate grand jury investigation. See In re Grand Jury Impaneled January 21, 1975, 529 F.2d 543 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 96 S. Ct. 2203, 48 L. Ed. 2d 816, 44 U.S.L.W. 3670 (1976); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield I), 486 F.2d 85 (3d Cir. 1973). This contention, however, was never presented to the district court. That alone should preclude its consideration on appeal, for although Hartzell was unrepresented, and thus may not have been fully aware of the defenses which might have been available in the contempt proceeding, he made an informed choice to waive counsel. But even if the district court had been asked to consider the point, on the record in this case it would have to conclude that the affidavit in support of the government's application for the March 22 order sufficiently established relevancy and proper purpose. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield II), 507 F.2d 963, 966-67 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1015, 95 S. Ct. 2424, 44 L. Ed. 2d 685 (1975); In re Grand Jury Impaneled January 21, 1975, supra, 529 F.2d at 548. That affidavit was before the court in the contempt proceeding.
Hartzell next argues that he did not receive adequate notice of the contempt hearing. As with the Schofield I objection, this contention was not urged in the district court and should, perhaps, for that reason be disregarded. Nevertheless, we have examined the record to determine whether, either from lack of time or from lack of information, the notice here give resulted in prejudice, and we have found none. Hartzell urges that in a proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 1826 the court should comply with the notice and hearing provisions of Rule 42(b), Fed. R. Crim. P. Those circuits which have considered the question have concluded that despite the "civil" nature of a § 1826 proceeding Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 92 S. Ct. 2357, 33 L. Ed. 2d 179 (1972), and despite the "summarily" language in that statute, Rule 42(b) does provide the appropriate standard for notice and hearing. The leading case is United States v. Alter, 482 F.2d 1016 (9th Cir. 1973). See also In re Grand Jury, 524 F.2d 209, 218-19 (10th Cir. 1975); In re Sadin,509 F.2d 1252, 1255-56 (2d Cir. 1975); In re Lochiatto, 497 F.2d 803, 807 & n.9 (1st Cir. 1974).
Hartzell's principal attack on the contempt order is addressed to the provision which suspends the running of his criminal sentence during his civil confinement. He urges that once service of a sentence has commenced, the running of that sentence cannot be tolled. The theory underpinning this argument is that at common law the running of a sentence could not have been interrupted to punish a contemnor, and that 18 U.S.C. § 35681 codifies the common law rule. This argument has been rejected by the four courts of appeals which have considered it. Martin v. United States, 517 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1975); Williamson v. Saxbe, 513 F.2d 1309 (6th Cir. 1975) (per curiam); United States v. Liddy, 166 U.S.App.D.C. 95, 510 F.2d 669 (1974) (en banc), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 980, 95 S. Ct. 1408, 43 L. Ed. 2d 661 (1975); Anglin v. Johnston, 504 F.2d 1165 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962, 95 S. Ct. 1353, 43 L. Ed. 2d 440 (1975). Two Justices of the Supreme Court have expressed approval of these holdings. United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309, 321 n.2, 95 S. Ct. 1802, 44 L. Ed. 2d 186 (1975) (Blackmun & Rehnquist, JJ., concurring). Hartzell would have us adopt the view of the dissenters in Martin v. United States, supra, 517 F.2d at 910, and United States v. Liddy, supra, 510 F.2d at 667.
My beginning point is the basic precept succinctly articulated by Justice Hughes in United States v. Mayer, 235 U.S. 55, 67, 35 S. Ct. 16, 19, 59 L. Ed. 129 (1914): "In the absence of statute providing otherwise, the general principle obtains that a court cannot set aside or alter its final judgment after the expiration of the term at which it was entered . . .." (Citing cases.) Rule 35, F.R.Crim.P. has since been adopted, and now controls the period during which a court may correct or reduce a sentence:
Although Rule 35 does not speak to an increase of sentence, United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304, 306-07, 51 S. Ct. 113, 114, 75 L. Ed. 354 (1931), addresses the issue precisely:
The general rule is that judgments, decrees and orders are within the control of the court during the term at which they were made. They are then deemed to be "in the breast of the court" making them, and subject to be amended, modified, or vacated by that court. Goddard v. Ordway, 101 U.S. 745, 752 (25 L. Ed. 1040). The rule is not confined to civil cases, but applies in criminal cases as well, provided the punishment be not augmented. In re Lange, 18 Wall. 163, 167-174 (21 L. Ed. 872); Basset v. United States, 9 Wall. 38 (19 L. Ed. 548). In the present case the power of the court was exercised to mitigate the punishment, not to increase it, and is thus brought within the limitation. Wharton, in Criminal Pl. and Pr. (9th Ed.) § 913, says: "As a general practice, the sentence, when imposed by a court of record, is within the power of the court during the session in which it is entered, and may be amended at any time during such session, provided a punishment already partly suffered be not increased."
Cases relied upon to support the government's position did not present the precise jurisdictional infirmity that inheres in this case.5 None of the cases squarely decided the question of the court's jurisdiction to alter a sentence beyond the time limits of Rule 35. Nor was the issue discussed by the concurring justices in United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309, 321 n.2, 95 S. Ct. 1802, 44 L. Ed. 2d 186 (1975). Accordingly, I cannot agree that the "analytical weight of authority lies with the sixteen federal appellate judges" who did not address the issue. On the contrary, no precedential authority has been cited suggesting that any court has jurisdiction beyond the 120-day period to interfere with the operation of a legal sentence.
When appellant began serving his five-year sentence of April 29, 1975, he had a reasonable expectation of parole after serving one-third of that period. 18 U.S.C. § 4202. Moreover, because his sentence was imposed under 18 U.S.C. § 4208(a) (2) he had a possibility of parole at an earlier date as determined by the parole board.
Further, speaking through Judge Garth, we have held that a sentence of 10 years with parole governed by 18 U.S.C. § 4202 was more severe than a sentence of 10 years with parole governed by § 4208(a) (2). "We interpret (North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S. Ct. 2072, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1969)) as prohibiting the trial court from increasing the severity of either the custodial portion of a sentence or the special parole term following appeal . . .." United States v. Hawthorne, 532 F.2d 318, 324 n.9 (3d Cir. 1976).
The section-by-section analysis of the bill advises "Section 1826(a) becomes applicable to any proceeding before or ancillary to any court or grand jury in which a witness unjustifiably refuses to testify or produce other information. . . . The procedure is designed to codify present practice. See Giancana v. United States, 352 F.2d 921 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 959, 86 S. Ct. 437, 15 L. Ed. 2d 362 (1965)." (Emphasis added.) 1970 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, pp. 4007, 4022.
Anglin v. Johnston, 504 F.2d 1165 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962, 95 S. Ct. 1353, 43 L. Ed. 2d 440 (1975), a second case relied on by the majority, does not meet the critical issue of interfering with the prisoner's right to a timely release with appropriate deduction for good conduct. Aside from quoting the statute, the Anglin court's entire discussion of it was this:
504 F.2d at 1167. Martin v. United States, 517 F.2d 906 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 856, 96 S. Ct. 105, 46 L. Ed. 2d 81 (1975), blindly followed Liddy and Anglin without perceiving the illicit reasoning and illegitimate conclusion. Williamson v. Saxbe, 513 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974), the final case relied on by the majority, also followed Anglin without reasoned analysis of the serious issue involved.4
Should the court in banc find no statutory violation, it then properly could consider two important constitutional issues which lurk in this proceeding. First, does the sandwiching of the additional period of incarceration with consequent effects on early release violate the Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy prohibition? See United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304, 306-07, 51 S. Ct. 113, 75 L. Ed. 354 (1931). This is an important issue that has not been thoroughly considered in any of the opinions. Second, does the thirty-day limitation for disposition of appeals in 28 U.S.C. § 1826(b)5 deprive a defendant of due process of law? I now have second thoughts about my previous agreement with the majority on this point. It is no answer that courts traditionally cannot adhere to this unreasonable and unworkable deadline. Thus, though this appeal was filed on April 15, it was submitted on May 4, and not decided until June 22 68 days after filing. Nevertheless, appellant had counsel appointed under the Criminal Justice Act as of April 20 (he appeared pro se in the trial court) and was necessarily required to file his brief by April 30, two weeks after filing the appeal and ten days after the appointment of counsel. It is one thing to conclude, as the panel did, that the briefs in this case were adequate. It is quite another to conclude that a procedure which requires the briefing of novel and complex issues within such a short period passes due process muster. I would have the full court meet this issue too.
"(Rule 35) was a codification of existing law and was intended to remove any doubt created by the decision in United States v. Mayer, 235 U.S. 55, 67 (35 S. Ct. 16, 18, 59 L. Ed. 129), as to the jurisdiction of a District Court to correct an illegal sentence after the expiration of the term at which it was entered." Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415, 422, 79 S. Ct. 451, 455, 3 L. Ed. 2d 407 (1959)
Piemonte v. United States, 367 U.S. 556, 81 S. Ct. 1720, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1028 (1961), and Reina v. United States, 364 U.S. 507, 81 S. Ct. 260, 5 L. Ed. 2d 249 (1960), implicated criminal contempt sentences and did not address the double jeopardy issue
Accord, United States v. Flores, 507 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Regan, 503 F.2d 234 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1006, 95 S. Ct. 1449, 43 L. Ed. 2d 764 (1975); United States v. Mehrtens, 494 F.2d 1172 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 900, 95 S. Ct. 182, 42 L. Ed. 2d 145 (1974); United States v. Ellenbogen, 390 F.2d 537 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 918, 89 S. Ct. 241, 21 L. Ed. 2d 206 (1968)
In Martin v. United States, 517 F.2d 906 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 856, 96 S. Ct. 105, 46 L. Ed. 2d 81 (1975), Martin was convicted on January 3, 1973 and sentenced prior to February 20, 1973 when he was incarcerated for civil contempt. In Anglin v. Johnston, 504 F.2d 1165 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962, 95 S. Ct. 1353, 43 L. Ed. 2d 440 (1975), although Anglin was originally sentenced February 23, 1972, he did not begin to serve the sentence until March 27, 1973, following modification of his sentence on March 19, 1973. The civil contempt commitment was ordered on June 20, 1973. The per curiam opinion in Williamson v. Saxbe, 513 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974), though not setting forth the date of the original criminal sentence, relies on Anglin v. Johnston, the facts of Anglin being "squarely on point." 513 F.2d at 1310. In United States v. Liddy, 166 U.S.App.D.C. 95, 510 F.2d 669 (1974) (in banc), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 980, 95 S. Ct. 1408, 43 L. Ed. 2d 661 (1975), the criminal sentence was imposed on March 23, 1973 and the civil contempt commitment ordered on April 3, 1973