Source: https://bruteforcelawyer.com/category/cplr/cplr-%C2%A7-302/
Timestamp: 2020-04-04 02:47:10
Document Index: 543792304

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 302', '§ 302', '§ 302', '§ 302', '§ 302', '§ 302', '§ 88', '§ 302', '§ 302']

Category: CPLR § 302
Author DMGPosted on May 31, 2011 Categories CPLR § 302, CPLR R. 3211, [App Div 1st Dept], [App Div 2d Dept]Leave a comment on 3211(a)(8) Long Arm 302(a)(1)
Author DMGPosted on May 8, 2011 Categories CPLR § 302, CPLR R. 3211, Jurisdiction, [App Div 2d Dept]Leave a comment on Jurisdiction
3211(a)(8) “no relationship between defendant’s transaction of business and plaintiff’s claims.”
Author DMGPosted on April 13, 2010 Categories CPLR § 302, CPLR R. 3211, [App Div 1st Dept]Leave a comment on 3211(a)(8) “no relationship between defendant’s transaction of business and plaintiff’s claims.”
While third-party defendants were retained in California by a
non-New York plaintiff with respect to a California action, in
conducting their representation of plaintiff they had contacts with
this State of sufficient quantity and quality to confer jurisdiction
over them (see CPLR 302[a][1]; Fischbarg v Doucet, 9 NY3d 375, 380 [2007]; Scheuer v Schwartz, 42 AD3d 314
[2007]). The record demonstrates that third—party defendants engaged in
extensive communications with New York counsel, both outside
(defendants/third-party plaintiffs) and in-house, of an entity related
to plaintiff, referred to as LVMH, which was acting on plaintiff's
behalf. Third-party defendants related every aspect of the California
litigation to the New York attorneys in detail and sought input from
all counsel. The memorandum prepared by third-party defendants
analyzing the underlying claim against plaintiff and recommending
action to be taken by plaintiff was addressed to LVMH's counsel and an
LVMH employee and cited previous discussions among them. In addition,
the individual third-party defendant made at least three trips to New
York in connection with the representation (see e.g. L & R Exploration Venture v Grynberg, 22 AD3d 221 [2005], lv denied 6 NY3d 749 [2005]).
Due process is not offended by the maintenance of this action
against third-party defendants. Given their "purposeful activities"
within this State (see Deutsche Bank Sec., Inc. v Montana Bd. of Invs., 21 AD3d 90, 93 [2005], affd 7 NY3d 65 [2006], cert denied 549 US 1095 [2006]), they "should reasonably anticipate being haled into court []here" (LaMarca v Pak-Mor Mfg. Co., 95 NY2d 210, 216 [2000], quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v Woodson, 444 US [*2]286,
297 [1980]), and the prospect of defending such an action "comport[s]
with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" (id. [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).
Long-arm jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1) was correctly found where
the complaint alleges that defendant breached the subject agreement in
New York by permitting its licensee to sell nonconforming products
here, and where the agreement regulates defendant's use of the subject
trademark throughout the entire United States, was negotiated in New
York by defendant's long-standing New York counsel, contains a New York
choice-of-law clause, and extends to "all those acting in concert or
participation with [defendant] or under [its] direction and control" (see Deutsche Bank Sec., Inc. v Montana Bd. of Invs., 7 NY3d 65, 71 [2006]; Sunward Elecs., Inc. v McDonald,
362 F3d 17, 22, 23 [2d Cir 2004]). Given long-arm jurisdiction under
CPLR 302(a)(1), we need not reach the question of whether there is also
jurisdiction under CPLR 301 (see Deutsche Bank, 7 NY3d at 72 n 2).
The court lacked jurisdiction to order plaintiffs to withdraw claims
pending in the state courts of Pennsylvania and Delaware, since, as we
recently found in the companion appeal, "the relief sought did not
relate to a cause of action raised in the initial complaint, nor was
the issue involved previously litigated in this action" (60 AD3d 528,
529 [2009]). Furthermore, the order improperly intrudes on the
jurisdiction of the Delaware and Pennsylvania courts, in violation of
principles of comity (see Ackerman v Ackerman, 219 AD2d 515
[1995]). There is no basis for the court's finding that the Delaware
and Pennsylvania actions were brought in bad faith or with an intent to
harass defendant.
Author DMGPosted on June 28, 2009 Categories CPLR § 302, [App Div 1st Dept]Leave a comment on CPLR § 302(a)(1) -Long Arm Jurisdiction; and Another Jurisdiction Issue (comity)
Acts which are the basis of jurisdiction. As to a cause of action
arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section, a court may
executor or administrator, who in person or through an agent:
commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or
property within the state, except as to a cause of action for
expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the
state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international
The plaintiff was injured as she exited a jitney bus operated by the
defendant, a non-New York domiliciary, in Atlantic City, New Jersey.
Contrary to the plaintiff's contention, neither the fact that she is a
New York resident (see Fantis Foods v Standard Importing Co., 49
NY2d 317, 326), nor the fact that she sought and obtained medical
treatment in New York, provided a basis for the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over the defendant. Pursuant to the portion of the New
York long-arm statute relied upon by the plaintiff, CPLR 302(a)(3),
personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary may be exercised when the
defendant, inter alia, "commits a tortious act without the state
causing injury to person or property within the state." "The situs of
the injury is the location of the original event which caused the
injury, not the location where the resultant damages are subsequently
felt by the plaintiff (see, McGowan v Smith, 52 NY2d 268, 273-274)" (Herman v Sharon Hosp., 135 AD2d 682, 683; see Lang v Wycoff Hgts. Med. Ctr., 55 AD3d 793; Marie v Altshuler, 30 AD3d 271, 272-273; Polansky v Gelrod, 20 [*2]AD3d 663, 665; Carte v Parkoff, 152 AD2d 615, 616).
Accordingly, we affirm the granting of the defendant's, in
effect, renewed motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(8) to dismiss the
complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, albeit on a basis slightly
different from that relied upon by the Supreme Court. The situs of the
plaintiff's injury was Atlantic City, New Jersey. Given that the injury
occurred in New Jersey, and involved a nondomiciliary, it was not
necessary to consider whether the additional aspects of CPLR
302(a)(3)(ii) were met (see Siegel, NY Prac § 88, at 164 [4th ed]).
Author DMGPosted on April 26, 2009 Categories CPLR § 302, CPLR R. 3211Leave a comment on CPLR R. 3211(a)(8); CPLR § 302(a)(3)(ii) Jurisdiction