Source: https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/411-u-s-564-606766410
Timestamp: 2020-08-13 12:22:20
Document Index: 301795936

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 210', '§ 211', '§ 206', '§ 210', '§ 211', '§ 1983']

411 U.S. 564 (1973), 71-653, Gibson v. Berryhill - Federal Cases - Case Law - VLEX 606766410
411 U.S. 564 (1973), 71-653, Gibson v. Berryhill
Docket Nº: No. 71-653
Citation: 411 U.S. 564, 93 S.Ct. 1689, 36 L.Ed.2d 488
Party Name: Gibson v. Berryhill
93 S.Ct. 1689, 36 L.Ed.2d 488
Appellees, licensed optometrists employed by Lee Optical Co., who were not members of the Alabama Optometric Association (Association), were charged by the Association with unprofessional conduct within the meaning of the state optometry statute because of their employment with the company. The complaint was filed with the Alabama Board of Optometry (Board), all members of which were Association members. The Board deferred proceedings while a suit it had brought against Lee Optical and optometrists employed by it to enjoin the company from practicing optometry was litigated in the state trial court. The charges against the individual defendants were dismissed but the court enjoined Lee Optical from engaging in the practice of optometry. The company appealed. When the Board revived the Association's charges against appellees, they sought an injunction in the Federal District Court under the Civil Rights Act claiming that the Board was biased. The court concluded that it was [93 S.Ct. 1691] not barred from acting by the federal anti-injunction statute, since only administrative proceedings were involved, and that exhaustion of administrative remedies was not mandated where the administrative process was biased in that the Board, by its litigation in the state courts, had prejudged the case against appellees, and the Board members had an indirect pecuniary interest in the outcome. The District Court enjoined the Board proceedings, but, thereafter and before this appeal was taken, the State's highest court reversed the judgment against Lee Optical and held that the optometry law did not prohibit a licensed optometrist from working for a corporation.
1. The anti-injunction statute did not bar the District Court from issuing the injunction, since appellees brought suit under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pp. 572-575.
2. Nor did the rule of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, or principles of comity require the District Court to dismiss appellees' suit in view of the pending Board proceeding, since the appellees
advertising practices of of optometrists and which, until 1965, appeared to contemplate the existence of commercial stores with optical departments.1 In 1965, § 210 was repealed in [93 S.Ct. 1692] its entirety by the Alabama Legislature, and § 211 was amended so as to eliminate any direct reference
to optical departments maintained by corporations or other business establishments under the direction of employee optometrists.2
Soon after these statutory changes, the Alabama Optometric Association, a professional organization whose membership is limited to independent practitioners of optometry not employed by others, filed charges against various named optometrists, all of whom were duly licensed under Alabama law but were the salaried employees of Lee Optical Co. The charges were filed with the Alabama Board of Optometry, the statutory body with authority to issue, suspend, and revoke licenses for the practice of optometry. The gravamen of these charges was that the named optometrists, by accepting employment from Lee Optical, a corporation, had engaged in "unprofessional conduct" within the meaning of § 206 of the Alabama optometry statute, and hence were practicing their profession unlawfully.3 More particularly,
the Association charged the named individuals with, among other things, aiding and abetting a corporation in the illegal practice of optometry; practicing optometry under a false name, that is, Lee Optical Co.; unlawfully soliciting the sale of glasses; lending their licenses to Lee Optical Co.; and splitting or dividing fees with Lee Optical.4 It was apparently the Association's position that, following the repeal [93 S.Ct. 1693] of § 210 and the amendment of § 211, the practice of optometry by individuals as employees of business corporations was no longer permissible in Alabama, and that, by accepting such employment, the named optometrists had violated the ethics of their profession. It was prayed that the Board revoke the licenses of the individuals charged following due notice and a proper hearing.
Proceedings on the Association's charges were held in abeyance by the Board while its own state court suit progressed. The individual defendants in that suit were dismissed on grounds that do not adequately appear in the record before us, and, eventually, on March 17, 1971, the state trial court rendered judgment for the Board, and enjoined Lee Optical both from practicing optometry without a license and from employing licensed optometrists.5 The company appealed this judgment.
Meanwhile, following its victory in the trial court, the Board reactivated the proceedings pending before it since 1965 against the individual optometrists employed by Lee, noticing them for hearings to be held on May 26 and 27, 1971. Those individuals countered on May 14, 1971, by filing a complaint in the United States District Court naming as defendants the Board of Optometry and its individual members, as well as the Alabama Optometric Association and other individuals. The suit, brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, sought an injunction against the scheduled hearings on the grounds that the statutory scheme regulating the practice of optometry in Alabama6 was unconstitutional
insofar as it permitted the Board to hear the pending charges against the individual plaintiffs in the federal suit.7 The thrust of the complaint was that the Board was biased, and could not provide the plaintiffs with a fair and impartial hearing in conformity with due process of law.
In its supporting opinion, 331 F.Supp. 122, the District Court first considered whether it should stay its hand and defer to the then-pending state proceedings -- that is, whether the situation presented was one which would permit of immediate federal intervention to restrain the actions of a state administrative body. That question was answered in the affirmative, the court holding [93 S.Ct. 1694] that 28 U.S.C. 2283, the federal anti-injunction statute, was not applicable to state administrative proceedings even where those proceedings were adjudicatory in character. Moreover, the District Court also held that neither Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), nor the doctrine normally requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies forbade a federal injunction where, as the court found to be true here, the administrative process was so defective and inadequate as to deprive the plaintiffs of due process of law.
actually biased, but whether, in the natural course of events, there is an indication of a possible temptation to an average man sitting as a judge to try the case with bias for or against any issue presented to him.
331 F.Supp. at 125. Such a possibility of bias was found to arise in the present case...