Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/451/963/71405/
Timestamp: 2019-07-17 12:59:13
Document Index: 458374963

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1346', '§ 1801', '§ 8102', '§ 8116', '§ 8128', '§ 1346', '§ 8102', '§ 8116', '§ 8128', '§ 8145', '§ 901']

Andy Bailey and Barbara Bailey, Plaintiffs-appellees, v. United States, Through the Department of the Army,defendant-appellant, 451 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1971) :: Justia
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Andy Bailey and Barbara Bailey, Plaintiffs-appellees, v. United States, Through the Department of the Army,defendant-appellant, 451 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1971)
US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit - 451 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1971)
In this case the district court held that plaintiffs' action was maintainable under the Federal Tort Claims Act,1 28 U.S.C. § 1346, because no substantial question of coverage was presented under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA),2 5 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq. We affirm.
The Federal Employees' Compensation Act is but one of a number of workmen's compensation statutes which provide the injured employee with a substitute method of recovery, more efficient and less expensive than a common-law tort action. See United States v. Demko, 1966, 385 U.S. 149, 87 S. Ct. 382, 17 L. Ed. 2d 258. Because such laws are intended to serve as a substitute rather than a supplement for the tort suit, the remedy thereunder is usually exclusive of any recovery which might otherwise be obtained in the absence of a workmen's compensation statute. Johansen v. United States, 1952, 343 U.S. 427, 72 S. Ct. 849, 96 L. Ed. 1051.
Specifically, the FECA requires the United States to pay compensation "for the disability or death of an employee resulting from personal injury sustained while in the performance of his duty . . ." 5 U.S.C. § 8102(a). (Emphasis supplied). The statute further provides that the liability of the United States "is exclusive and instead of all other liability of the United States . . . to the employee". 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c). The Secretary of Labor is vested with the power to "administer, and decide all questions arising under" the FECA and his action in denying or granting compensation is final and conclusive and may not be reviewed by a court of law. 5 U.S.C. § 8128(b) (1) and (2) and Sec. 8145.
The several cases, cited by the government, which deal with workmen's compensation under state statutes serve to clarify our point. Jaynes v. Potlatch Forests, 1954, 75 Idaho 297, 271 P.2d 1016; Davis v. Chemical Construction Company, 1960, 232 Ark. 50, 334 S.W.2d 697; Smith v. Industrial Accident Commission, 1941, 18 Cal. 2d 843, 118 P.2d 6; Warren's Case, 1951, 326 Mass. 718, 97 N.E.2d 184. In each case the state court reviewed the totality of the circumstances surrounding the injury, including, of course, the factor of whether the injury took place on the employer's premises. The injured employee was held to be covered in these cases, but not merely because he was injured on the property of his employer. On the contrary, the Supreme Court of Idaho in Jaynes v. Potlatch Forests, supra, explicitly rejected any distinction based on property boundaries and ruled that the employee was entitled to compensation even though he was injured after he left his job site and entered upon a public highway. The court simply looked at all the surrounding circumstances and made a determination that the particular employee was injured as a result of a "zone of special danger" created by the conditions of his employment. See O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, 1951, 340 U.S. 504, 71 S. Ct. 470, 95 L. Ed. 483; O'Keeffe v. Smith, Hinchman & Grylls Asso., 1965, 380 U.S. 359, 85 S. Ct. 1012, 13 L. Ed. 2d 895.
At the time of the collision Mrs. Bailey had completed her work day; she had departed from the job site in her privately-owned automobile; and she was traveling home on a street which was apparently open to all persons authorized to be on the Army base. She was not under any supervision from her employer, and the driving of the automobile was not an activity connected to the usual hazards of laundry work. See Walker v. United States, D. Alaska, 1971, 322 F. Supp. 769. Absent any showing that the street traveled by Mrs. Bailey was a "zone of special danger"5 incident to her laundry employment, we hold that the location of the collision in this case was of small import and no substantial question of FECA coverage is raised by the fortuitous circumstance that the street was owned by the federal government. United States v. Browning, supra; United States v. Udy, supra.
In pertinent part the Act provides that the district courts shall have "exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for money damages, * * * for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred". 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)
5 U.S.C. § 8102(a):
5 U.S.C. § 8116(c):
5 U.S.C. § 8128(b):
5 U.S.C. § 8145:
United States v. Charles, supra, deals with a question of compensation under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901, et seq., rather than the FECA. However, for the purpose of the instant appeal, this distinction is unimportant