Source: http://ca10.washburnlaw.edu/cases/2003/03/02-2045.htm
Timestamp: 2020-02-29 03:48:56
Document Index: 345366201

Matched Legal Cases: ['§3', '§3', '§3', '§3', '§3', '§3', '§3']

02-2045 -- U.S. v. Edwards -- 03/13/2003
| Keyword | Case | Docket | Date: Filed / Added | (25842 bytes) (21204 bytes)
v. (New Mexico)
Defendant - Appellant. (D.C. No. CR-01-399-LH)
As relevant to our disposition of this case, "[w]hether a defendant occupied a position of trust within the meaning of USSG §3B1.3 is a factual question, and we will affirm the sentencing court unless we find its decision clearly erroneous." United States v. Koehn, 74 F.3d 199, 201 (10th Cir. 1996). Applying that standard to the analysis set forth below, we vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing.
In the fraud context, we have recognized that the application of §3B1.3 is categorized and analyzed somewhat differently depending on the defendant's status and type of activity in which the defendant is engaged or purports to be engaged. One of those categories relates to employees of a business, such as to the defendant in this case. It involves those situations "where the defendant steals from his employer, using his position in the company to facilitate the offense." United States v. Koehn, 74 F.3d at 201. See also United States v. Pappert, 112 F.3d 1073, 1080 (10th Cir. 1997). Typically the question of whether an employee occupied a position of trust within the meaning of §3B1.3 is a heavily fact-specific determination to be made by the district court using the guideline and other factors which we have recognized. See, e.g., United States v. Haber, 251 F.3d 881, 890-91 (10th Cir. 2001).
However, as the emphasized portions of the guideline and commentary set out above indicate, the adjustment under §3B1.3 is not intended to be routinely applied to every employee fraud or embezzlement case. As we have stated in an analogous context, the fact is that "in every successful fraud the defendant will have created confidence and trust in the victim, but the sentencing enhancement is not intended to apply in every case of fraud." United States v. Koehn, 74 F.3d at 201. Thus, the fact that Ms. Edwards was trusted by her employer with significant responsibility--even to the point of allowing her to bypass usual accounting controls and pick up customer checks from incoming mail--is not determinative. Nor does the fact that she made entries in and compiled balances from customer accounts and the cash receipts journal necessarily establish that she possessed special accounting skills.
A careful review of the district court's ruling convinces us that with the single important exception discussed below, the court understood the guideline and ably and conscientiously sorted out the facts. Thus, for instance, we agree with the district court's statement during the sentencing hearing that job titles themselves do not control; actual duties and authorized activities do. Tr. Vol. III at 17-18. We also agree with the court's findings that company officials trusted Ms. Edwards, and that her position gave her access to customers' checks and important company records. Id. at 52-53.
However, the evidence does not support the district court's suggestion that Ms. Edwards either had the discretionary authority to grant credits to customers, id. at 53, or, for that matter any other authority to make substantial discretionary judgments regarding company revenues or expenses. Ms. Edwards' work, as she contends on appeal, was indeed clerical and ministerial. Opportunity and access do not equate to authority, or to the kind of "substantial discretionary judgment that is ordinarily given considerable deference."
We agree with the Seventh Circuit, that the guideline language regarding discretion refers, in general, to the type of trusted position in an organizational setting--
United States v. Tiojanco, 286 F.3d 1019, 1021 (7th Cir. 2002) (hotel clerk having authority to evaluate complaints and exercise discretion with respect to issuing refunds and credits).
In sum, the facts show no more than that Ms. Edwards' job was responsible but ministerial, and that the Sentencing Commission, by its language in Application Note 1, deliberately set the bar at a higher level. Ms. Edwards' criminal conduct was the type of offense to which §3B1.3 refers by its statement that "[t]his adjustment may not be employed if an abuse of trust or skill is included in the base offense level or specific offense characteristic." USSG §3B1.3. Accordingly, we hold that the adjustment pursuant to §3B1.3 was clearly erroneous, and we, therefore, VACATE the sentence and REMAND for resentencing.(1)
1.The question of how broadly or narrowly the term "victim" should be defined in relation to the position of trust held by the defendant, was not raised at any point in this case. Thus, we do not address the issue except to observe that it is a matter of dispute among the circuits. See e.g., the discussion in United States v. Guidry, 199 F.3d 1150, 1160 n.6 (10th Cir. 1999). In any event, the judgment in this case specifically included an amount of restitution to Bowlin, as well as restitution to the bank, leaving no doubt that both were victimized on a quantifiable basis.
URL: http://ca10.washburnlaw.edu/cases/2003/03/02-2045.htm.