Source: http://www.law.gonzaga.edu/gjil/2013/01/unifil-mission-challenges/
Timestamp: 2015-10-09 10:33:30
Document Index: 786557151

Matched Legal Cases: ['art. 39', 'art. 37', 'art. 2', 'art. 29', 'art. 51', 'art. 1', 'art. 1', 'art. 9', 'art. 3', 'art. 3', 'art. 3', 'art. 3', 'art. 33', 'art. 2', 'art. 39', 'art. 39']

International Instruments Backing the Lebanese Sovereignty: UNIFIL’s Mission and Challenges | Gonzaga Journal of International Law
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International Instruments Backing the Lebanese Sovereignty: UNIFIL’s Mission and Challenges006 Jan 2013Download this article
International Instruments Backing the Lebanese Sovereignty: UNIFIL’s Mission and Challenges
Fady Fadel and Cynthia Eid
Abstract: This article consists of a legal comparative reading of two United Nations (UN) Resolutions: 1559 and 1701. The main questions asked are: what are the legal common points between them? What are the differences? What changed, and why? What can be regarded as obsolete or not up-to-date in light of UNIFIL’s current external circumstances? Furthermore, this comparative reading is inspired from the new missions of peacekeeping operations, such as the reconstruction of fragile states, namely the situation in Lebanon while under Syrian supervision.
II. The Geostrategic Context of the Adoption of Resolutions 425, 426, 1559, and 1701
A. Similarity of Geopolitical Context Between Resolutions 425 and 1701
B. Towards a New Scope of International Reports Between 2000 and 2004
III. Central Tenants of Resolution 1701: UNIFIL 2 and the Beneficiary of a Political and Legal Mandate Reinforcement
A. A Political Will at the Basis of the Creation andReinforcement of UNIFIL’s Mandate
B. UNIFIL’s Juridical Foundation
IV. The Links Between Resolutions 1559 and 1701 and Why They Are Important
A. The Strong Link Between Resolutions 1559 and 1701
B. The Challenges Facing the Application of Resolutions 1559 and 1701 From the Lebanese Side
C. A Case Study of the Village of Khirbit Silim in South Lebanon:An Example of the Violation of Resolution 1701
D. The Israili’s Breach of Resolution 1701: Israel’s Incursion of Airspace
E. Security Along the Lebanese/Syrian Border
V. The Strategic Implications of the Combined Effects of Resolutions 1559 and 1701 on UNIFIL’s Mission
Most experts agree that UN Resolutions 1559 and 1701 involve understanding the role of United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL) within the Middle Eastern context.[1] However, experts disagree on how these two resolutions relate to one another since they were written in different time periods in Lebanese and Israeli history. Through UN Security Council (SC) reports and other reliable sources, this article argues that the fundamental symbiotic relationship between the two resolutions at the political and legal level has been central to the success of UNIFIL.
Resolutions 425 and 426 in 1978 and Resolution 1701 in 2006 clearly defined the mission and mandate of UNIFIL.[2] After the Israeli invasion of South Lebanon in 1978, the SC created UNIFIL through Resolutions 425 and 426,[3] which were then supported by Resolution 1559, which dealt with the presidential election in Lebanon in 2005.[4] Resolution 1701 was adopted subsequent to the war of July, 2006, and reinforced UNIFIL’s mandate.[5]
By passing Resolution 425 on March 19, 1978, the SC called on Israel to withdraw from Lebanon and, at the request of the Lebanese government, the SC established a United Nations force in Lebanon under the SC’s authority.[6] However, Israel remained in Lebanon “in contravention of [R]esolution 425.”[7] Resolution 425 established two requirements. First, the SC called for “strict respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries.”[8] Second, the SC called on Israel to immediately cease its military action against Lebanon and withdraw forces from Lebanese territory.[9] Resolutions 425 and 426 were both written and adopted by the SC on the same day.[10] In addition, the SC established UNIFIL for six months, with the possibility of continuing the operation thereafter at the discretion of the SC.[11] The Secretary-General’s report included guidelines for UNIFIL operations, named inter alia, which would continue to be applicable.[12]
Resolution 1559, passed September 2, 2004[13] encompasses all previous SC Resolutions dealing with Lebanon, in particular Resolutions 425 and 426 of 1978, Resolution 520 of 1982, and Resolution 1553 of 2004. Additionally, Resolution 1559 encompassed the statements of the SC President concerning the situation in Lebanon, in particular those statements made on June 18, 2000.[14] In Resolution 1559, the SC reaffirmed “its call for the strict respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity, and political independence of Lebanon under the sole and exclusive authority of” the Lebanese government.[15] It called “upon all remaining foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanon” and asked for “the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias.”[16] The SC reaffirmed the Lebanese government’s control over its territory and “[d]eclare[d] its support for a free and fair electoral process in Lebanon’s upcoming presidential election conducted according to Lebanese constitutional rules devised without foreign interference or influence.”[17] In addition, Resolution 1559 “call[ed] upon all parties concerned to cooperate fully and urgently with the [SC] for the full implementation of [Resolution 1559] and all relevant resolutions concerning the restoration of the territorial integrity, full sovereignty, and political independence of Lebanon.”[18] It also requested the “Secretary-General report to the [SC] within thirty days on the implementation by the parties of this resolution and . . . remain actively seized of the matter.”[19]
So far we have provided a brief description of SC Resolutions 425, 426, and 1559. The next critical step is to study the link between Resolution 1559 and UNIFIL. The two main issues are: (1) whether Resolution 1559 is still relevant now that other Resolutions are in place, and (2) whether 1559 limits UNIFIL’s action post passage of Resolution 1701.
The link between Resolution 1559 and UNIFIL must be examined for a number of reasons. First, since no close link or cause-and-effect relation is perceived between Resolution 1559 and UNIFIL, the UN Secretary-General constantly recalls the relevant provisions of 1559 in his reports on the implementation of Resolution 1701.[20] Conversely, he confirms the relevant provisions of 1559 in his reports on the implementation of resolution 1701.[21] Moreover, in the preamble of 1559, the SC refers to the specific resolutions related to UNIFIL (Resolutions 425, 426 and 1553).[22] Similarly, in the preamble of Resolution 1701, Resolution 1559 is deliberately referenced.[23]
Do references to these two documents suffice to make an argument for the existence of a relationship between them or between UNIFIL and Resolution 1559? Or is there a more strategic orientation with political and legal implications regarding the mission to be accomplished by UNIFIL?
Former Secretary-General Assistant for Peacekeeping Operations, Alain Le Roy, stressed to the Security Council on June 29, 2009, the necessity of guaranteeing a continuous “political support for the missions.”[24] The political support issue was addressed in the document “A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping.”[25] Le Roy also addressed the issue during the SC’s session on August 5, 2009, when he explained UNIFIL’s struggle to find not only the staff, the equipment, and the high-level representatives, but also the necessary political means to face the scale of UNIFIL’s activities.[26] The working document also asks the members of the SC to continue to exercise their influence in order to supply constant political and material support for peacekeeping operations.[27]
Resolution 1559 resulted from a political will and an influence exercised by SC members to restore Lebanese sovereignty, which is also a primary objective of Resolution 1701. To elaborate on this common objective, it is important to understand the context surrounding Resolutions 1701 preludes, Resolutions 425, 426, and 1559. Furthermore, Resolutions 1559 and 1701 share commonalities in currently implemented provisions, as well as those that are not yet implemented. A comparative approach of the two resolutions will help to gain understanding of UNIFIL’s strategic objectives.
The UN has played a significant role, with much success, in other armed conflicts in the Middle East. These successes will be compared to the success of both Resolutions 1559 and 1701.
Lebanese peace and security preservation cannot be approached independently from the regional context. Resolutions 425, 426, and 1701 fall within the scope of the Arab-Palestinian regional conflict, while Resolution 1559 defines the scope of international relations between Lebanon and its neighboring states.
In the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a Palestinian commando had, according to the Israelis, crossed the border from Lebanon on March 11, 1978, and attacked a civilian bus on a Tel-Aviv road.[28] Israel retaliated against Lebanon in an effort to rid the country of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and on March 14, 1978, Israeli troops penetrated Lebanon at several points.[29] Israel eventually occupied the entire southern portion of Lebanon, except for the city of Tyre.[30]
In a letter addressed to the president of the SC on March 15, 1978, the permanent representative of Lebanon at the UN informed the SC of the movement Israeli troops into Lebanese territory: “in addition to this naked aggression against Lebanese territory, Israeli patrol vessels penetrated Lebanese territorial waters,” and Israeli airplanes continued to fly over Lebanese airspace.[31]
The Lebanese Government, while it vehemently deplores this aggression and protests strongly against it, wishes to make the following clarifications:
First, Lebanon had no connection with the commando operation on the road between Haifa and Tel Aviv or with any other commando operation.
Secondly, it is a well-known fact that Lebanon is not responsible for the presence of Palestinian bases in southern Lebanon in the present circumstances. The Lebanese government has exerted tremendous efforts with the Palestinians and the Arab States in order to keep matters under control. However, Israeli objections regarding the entry of the Arab Deterrent Forces to the south have prevented the accomplishment of Lebanon’s desire to bring the border area under control.
Thirdly, the only solution to the problem lies in putting an end to Israeli aggression and in Israel’s withdrawing its forces from Lebanon so that the Lebanese authorities can exercise their functions fully.[32]
In another letter addressed to the Secretary-General on March 13, 1978, the Israeli government informed the UN of the aforementioned Palestinian commando attack on March 11, 1978, for which the PLO had claimed full responsibility.[33] On March 17, 1978, Israel’s permanent UN representative addressed the following letter to the president of the SC:
On instructions of my government and further to my letter of 13 March 1978 (A/33/64-S/12598), I have the honour to request you to convene a meeting of the Security Council to consider the continuous acts of terror and violence against Israeli civilians, together with the frequent shelling, sabotage incursions, bombing and murder being perpetrated from Lebanese territory against Israel, its people and property . . . [such results constitute] flagrant violation of the international law and the Charter of the United Nations . . . [in addition, it reveals the] declared intention of throwing into jeopardy the negotiations aimed at achieving a final peace agreement between Israel and its Arab neighbours.[34]
Resolutions 425 and 426 were passed shortly thereafter.
The territoriality of the commando attack was the only event to which Israel referred in the March 13, 1978 letter to the SC.[35] During the debates in the SC, Israel emphasized that its operation was directed at the PLO, justifying the incursion into Lebanese territory on the premise that the Lebanese authorities’ lacked control of the region.[36] The Israeli representative insisted that the PLO used Lebanon as an operations base against Israel and had considerably augmented and reinforced its military arsenal: “[these] continuous acts of terror and violence against Israeli civilians . . . being perpetrated from Lebanese territory against Israel . . . [are] in flagrant violation of international law . . . [and have a] declared intention of throwing into jeopardy the negotiations aimed at achieving a final peace agreement between Israel and its Arab neighbors.”[37] Therefore, the Israeli objective was not to acquire part of the Lebanese territory, but to eliminate the PLO so “Official Central Lebanese Authorities, helped by an appropriate Force, can go back to the region and regain control so that the terrorist forces cannot go back to the zones that are actually under the grip of Israeli forces.”[38] These statements also appeared in a report for the Secretary-General about the UN missions in charge of maintaining peace in the Middle East.[39]
There are two reasons why the conflict creating UNIFIL’s mission has no inter-state aspect, even if a regular army state crossed the into the territory of another state. The first is linked to hostile acts and the parties which undertake them; namely the PLO. The second is related to the absence of any effective Lebanese authority in the hostility zone since the triggering of an intra-state conflict in April 1975.[40] The presence of the PLO and its activities in South Lebanon constitute the common denominator and the correlative factor between the disappearance of the Lebanese authority in the region and the entry of the Israeli forces. Thus, the Israeli operation was directed towards the PLO, and not against the Lebanese State. Therefore, the peace preservation force in Lebanon is intended to impede the return of the PLO, and to hinder its actions.[41]
Lebanon was not part of either the conflict or the debate in the passing of Resolution 425 and the creation of UNIFIL; thus UNIFIL was not created to cease hostilities between the two states.[42] Resolution 1701 recalls the principles of international law related to the reestablishment of the Lebanese authority and the extension of the Lebanese authority over its territory, without mentioning that Lebanon constitutes a threat to Israel.[43] On the contrary, Resolution 1701 seeks to restore peace throughout the region by prohibiting arms and armed parties in the zone between the south of Litani River and the Blue Line.[44] B. Towards a New Scope of International Reports Between 2000 and 2004
The year 2000 was marked by a major event in the Lebanese-Israeli conflict: namely, the Israeli retreat from the Lebanese territory, according to the report of the UN Secretary-General on June 16, 2000 and the declaration of the SC President on June 18, 2000.[45] The SC successfully achieved its goals by monitoring the Israeli retreat and the deployment of Lebanese armed forces to southern Lebanon.[46]
However, Hezbollah continued to struggle with Israel between 2000 and 2004 in South Lebanon.[47] By contrast, the Lebanese government merely sent a police force to maintain the minimum internal order in the area, and UNIFIL only observed hostile acts of the two parties, since it was powerless in trying to prevent Hezbollah from continuing military operations against Israel.[48]
At the end of Lebanese President Lahoud’s term in 2004, Lebanon was placed under the Syrian guardianship, whether through the process of decision-making in the hands of the “guardian authority” or through the “temporary” presence of the Syrian soldiers on Lebanese soil.[49] SC permanent members met on September 2, 2004, and adopted Resolution 1559, a decisive factor in reestablishing Lebanese sovereignty.[50]
Following the UN’s (the SC’s and Secretary-General’s) consideration that Israel had completely withdrawn from Lebanon in 2000, and due to political reasons that carry regional considerations, the SC adopted Resolution 1559 to firmly support the Lebanese territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence and to consider every armed or unarmed militia member in Lebanon as an outlaw.[51]
Resolution 1559 has two noticeable points. First, it notes that the SC has taken action after noticing the “determination of Lebanon to ensure the withdrawal of all non-Lebanese forces from Lebanon.”[52] This determination reveals that as the basis of this resolution, Lebanon has entered a new level of importance in international relationships. Following the conclusion of the Taif Agreement in 1989, the Lebanese government expressed the will to act independently of Syrian influence for the first time.[53] It was on the basis of the Lebanese government’s interest in controlling its own territory, as clearly defined in the third paragraph of the preamble of 1559, that the SC acted by demanding the retreat of all non-Lebanese troops.[54]
The demand of the SC for the disarmament of Lebanese militias must be analyzed from the perspective of the Lebanese government, as impliedly expressed in Resolution 1559. The fourth paragraph recognizes that armed militias continued to prevent the Lebanese government from “exercising full sovereignty over all Lebanese territory.”[55] The Resolution, however, expresses a desire by the Lebanese government to extend its authority to the entire area, preferably by ejecting the armed militias from within its borders.[56] Though the Lebanese would like the territory to be free from militias, there are some obstacles that hinder this objective.[57]
The dispositions applied to Resolution 1559 are numerous: presidential elections occurred in times of a mixed political regional environment, Syrian troops withdrew from Lebanon, and the government agreed on a need to disarm non-Lebanese militias through a political process.[58] The powerful dispositions have yet to be applied, and the Lebanese have thus far failed to recover sovereignty over the area.[59]
Before comparing the contents of Resolutions 1559 and 1701, it is important to know that the Lebanese government has consented to both.[60] Resolution 1559 has been studied and analyzed before: when conflict broke out between Israel and Hezbollah from July to August 2006, and specifically on August 11, the SC adopted Resolution 1701 to end hostilities, reestablish the Lebanese sovereignty, and reinforce UNIFIL’s mandate.[61]
The SC has affirmed, through the Peace Maintain Force in 1978 and the reinforcement of its mandate in 2006, a commitment to reaffirm Lebanese sovereignty.[62] III. Central Tenants of Resolution 1701: UNIFIL 2 and the Beneficiary of a Political and Legal Mandate
Resolution 1701 ended the thirty-four-day war between Israel and Hezbollah in 2006, and strengthened UNIFIL’s function to conduct peacekeeping missions in South Lebanon.[63] Due to the strengthened mission and mandated reinforcement, some researchers refer to the post Resolution 1701 UNIFIL as UNIFIL 2.[64]
Although the general objective assigned to the original UNIFIL mission statement, pursuant to Resolutions 425 and 426, and to the new UNIFIL mission statement, pursuant to Resolution 1701, are the same with respect to “territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized borders,”[65] the concept of implementation of that objective fundamentally differs between 1978 and 2006. This is because of the political situation that prevailed in 1978, and the evolution of international relations.[66] Facing this evolution, two major questions arose: How was the changed mission adapted, and does the juridical foundation of UNIFIL change?
A. The Political Will at the Basis of the Creation and Reinforcement of UNIFIL’s Mandate
Resolutions 425 and 426 were adopted by the SC when the Lebanese were unable to maintain control over their territory.[67] The Cairo Agreement of 1969 authorized the PLO to wage war against Israel from South Lebanon, thereby weakening the position of the Lebanese state in practicing its national sovereignty.[68] By necessity, because it was alone in the field, UNIFIL became more of an observation force than a peacekeeping force, which damaged its credibility following the Israeli invasion of 1982.[69]
Since 1982, many things have changed. Resolution 1701 became the culmination of political work on both the international and national levels.[70] One of the determining elements of Resolution 1701 was the clear will of the Lebanese government: “to extend its authority on its territory, through its own legitimate armed forces, such that there will be no weapons without the consent of the Government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the Government of Lebanon.”[71] Consequently, after over thirty years without its own forces in Southern Lebanon, the Lebanese government was able to exercise some authority in the region with the assistance of UNIFIL.[72] After this, UNIFIL was no longer relegated to the observation mission. It began working jointly with the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) by accompanying and supporting them on deployment to the troubled area (south of the Litani River to the Blue Line).[73] UNIFIL’s support mission is based on three pillars: (1) controlling the cessation of hostilities; (2) assisting the LAF in taking measures to establish the zone of exclusion for all armed personnel, goods, and weapons other than those deployed by the Lebanese government and UNIFIL’s forces in that zone; and (3) assisting the Lebanese government in exercising its authority over the entire Lebanese territory.[74]
For each of the three pillars, UNIFIL has many assets to help it succeed. In addition to UNIFIL’s high-level military equipment, the Euro-Asiatic composition of UNIFIL’s contingents contributes a significant maritime component, considered to be the first of its kind in UN Peacekeeping operations.[75]
In sum, the implementation of Resolution 1701 has two main components: securing control and disarming militias in South Lebanon (especially the south area of the Litani River).[76] Security depends on the deployment of up to 15,000 Lebanese troops concurrent with the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from the area.[77] The Lebanese army is intended to be the enforcement arm of the Lebanese government over South Lebanon, and the only armed force in the region.[78] In this role, it is responsible for decreasing presence and activities of Hezbollah.[79] The Lebanese army is supported in this mission by an upgraded UNIFIL force.[80]
The second component relates to the complete disarmament of militias and non-Lebanese militant organizations. Resolution 1701 calls for the disarming of Hezbollah and other “armed groups” based on previous SC resolutions and internal Lebanese decisions (mainly the 1989 Taif Agreement).[81] The Taif Agreement imposed an embargo on arms delivery to Hezbollah and other armed groups and called for the Lebanese government to closely monitor the Lebanese borders with the support of UNIFIL.[82] Resolution 1701 also calls for the unconditional release of the Israeli soldiers abducted by Hezbollah.[83]
UNIFIL has a strong mandate to increase its effectiveness, but the juridical foundation also contributes to its overall effectiveness.
The SC “shall determine the existence of a threat” and “decide what measures shall be taken” when conflict arises.[84] Disagreements between parties that are brought to the SC have the potential to threaten international peace and security, or escalate to aggressive action.[85] Therefore, the SC must carefully establish what happened, and evaluate the situation like a judge prior to taking action.
In response to the Lebanese conflict, the SC passed Resolution 1701, a resolution quite different from Resolution 425. In the latter, the SC did not expressly state the articles on which the resolution is based, nor did it formally determine in the preamble or the pronouncement whether the situation it dealt with corresponded to one of the three indications of Article 39 or to those of Articles 1, 33, or 37 of the Charter.[86] However, in Resolution 1701, the SC expressly qualifies the Lebanese situation as a threat to international peace and security.[87] The case submitted to the SC also indirectly qualified under Articles 1, 33, 34, and 37 as being a threat that could endanger international peace and security.[88] This direct qualification falls somewhere between the text of Articles 33, 37 and Article 39.[89]
The formula for determining a threat to peace is mainly a political casuistry. One must think about the disagreements in the context of UN Charter Chapter VI, and what might be potentially threatening to international peace and security according to the SC.[90]
Thus, how can we understand this qualitative leap between Chapters VI and VII — namely the passage from consensual to coercive action where the eventual imposition of a constraining measure lies on a preliminary qualification according to the terms of Article 39?[91]
While the SC expressly excluded the coercive measures provided for in Chapter VII, it assumed responsibility to take general measures based on Article 36 or specific measures as necessary based on litigation.[92]
Under the terms of Resolution 1701, the SC recommends measures that allow regulation of the litigation. The proposed regulation terms are as follows:
2. [The Council], [u]pon full cessation of hostilities, calls upon the Government of Lebanon and UNIFIL as authorized by paragraph 11 to deploy their forces together throughout the South and calls upon the Government of Israel, as that deployment begins, to withdraw all of its forces from southern Lebanon in parallel;
3. Emphasizes the importance of the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory in accordance with the provisions of resolution 1559 (2004) and resolution 1680 (2006), and of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, for it to exercise its full sovereignty, so that there will be no weapons without the consent of the Government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the Government of Lebanon . . . [93]
A coherent reading of Resolutions 425, 426, and 1701 in the light of the UN Charter shows that when the SC referred to the principles of “international law and justice,” stated in Chapter I — using terms such as “territorial integrity,” “independence,” “sovereignty” — it had the foundation to use the recommendation hitting the core of the problem stated in Article 37; thus it secured justification for intervention for a well-accepted feeling of justice, just like the juridical truth.[94]
The recommended measures provide a possible solution to litigation and would bind the SC in a “decision-making” process to create a subsidiary organization whose mission is to watch over the application of the principles of “international law and justice.”[95] This was the objective of UNIFIL’s creation; it is therefore distinguishable from the other international forces by its own characteristics relative to its constitution.
Moreover, having the power granted by Resolution 1701 to back and accompany the Lebanese armed forces in the control of South Lebanon makes UNIFIL an internal character.[96] In fact, Article 2, Section 7 of the UN Charter emphasizes that “this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.”[97] This article applies only to measures of coercion.[98]
Yet, UNIFIL is not a coercive force from a juridical perspective, even if it addresses internal conflicts.[99] It was created by the technical juridical arm of the UN in accordance with a request of the Lebanese government.[100] It is a persuasive force that does not have the right to use weapons except in cases of legitimate defense, or when its mission is impeded.[101] That was clearly mentioned in the twelfth paragraph of Resolution 1701,[102] and fully developed in the rules of engagement. However, there is a risk that similar circumstances to the UN operation may occur in the Congo, and thus change UNIFIL into a coercive force.[103]
UNIFIL is an innovation in international conflict management, particularly in the domain of peace preservation operations since it is not only a preservation force for peace, but is also one that is principally intended to create new peace conditions.
UNIFIL is distinguished from the majority of the UN forces that were conceived to “reestablish” peace that existed before the situation that triggered the operation or preserved a fragile peace.[104] It is instead adapted to a particular context.[105] UNIFIL’s mission is unique due to its intervention in an ongoing conflict between numerous state and non-state actors, despite lacking UN Charter Chapter VII powers for use of force. The SC endeavored to create and reinforce the mandate of a subsidiary organ by virtue of Article 28 of the UN Charter, which is responsible for the preservation of international peace and security.[106] IV. The Links Between Resolutions 1559 and 1701 and Why They Are Important
This section illustrates the strong link between Resolutions 1559 and 1701, and also discusses the lessons learned from Resolution 1701. Finally, this section demonstrates the trends of Resolutions 1559 and 1701 from both sides: Lebanon’s and Israel’s.
Resolution 1559 is mentioned four times in Resolution 1701.[107] The frequency of references to Resolution 1559 in Resolution 1701 suggests the former is essentially the core of the latter.
In Resolution 1701, the objective of reinforcing UNIFIL’s mandate is clarified by building upon the provisions of Resolution 1559, and by recalling the principles through which “the Government should extend its authority on the entire Lebanese territory in order to fully exercise its sovereignty in such a way that no weapon shall be found in such territory without the consent of the Lebanese Government and no authority shall be exercised in it other than that of the Lebanese Government.”[108] Furthermore, Resolution 1701 emphasizes the support role of UNIFIL to effect “full implementation of relevant provisions of Taif Agreements and Resolutions 1559 and 1680, which require the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon so that, according to the decision issued by the Lebanese government on July 27, 2006, only the Lebanese State shall be authorized to hold weapons and exercise its authority in Lebanon.”[109]
Finally, the SC calls for “proposals to implement the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, and resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), including disarmament, and for delineation the international borders of Lebanon, especially in those areas where the border is contested or uncertain, including by dealing with the Shebaa farms area, and to present to the SC those proposals within thirty days.”[110]
What can then be concluded from the fact that Resolution 1701 draws directly, and in substantive ways, from Resolution 1559? Resolutions 1559 and 1701 converge on fundamental points: the recovery of Lebanese sovereignty, the extension of the government’s authority, and the control over the entire Lebanese territory.[111] Resolution 1559 inaugurates a new cycle of UN documents (resolutions, presidential statements, press statements and reports of the Secretariat General) where the main objective is to consolidate the national and international efforts in the recovery of Lebanese sovereignty.[112] In this context Resolution 1701 brings in new elements that solidify the peaceful settlement of ongoing disputes.[113]
Several common provisions adopted in the two documents are already implemented in the name of respect, recovery of sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence, cessation of hostilities, withdrawal of Syrian and Israeli troops from Lebanon, and the extension of the Lebanese government’s control across the territory.[114]
Other provisions have also been implemented in correspondence with each Resolution, including the presidential elections in 2004, the final settlement of the Lebanese prisoners, and the release of captured Israeli soldiers.[115] The release of data from the war of 2006 to UNIFIL was a significant development in the reporting period, as were the full deployment of UNIFIL troops next to the Lebanese Air Force in UNIFIL’s operation zone, the return of displaced citizens to South Lebanon, and most poignantly, Hezbollah’s decision not to use South Lebanon to conduct reprisal acts against Israel.[116]
Conversely, some of the provisions in Resolutions 1559 and 1701 have yet to be successfully implemented, including the disarmament of Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias, and the absence of complete political independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Lebanon.[117] These two points represent major challenges in the accomplishment of UNIFIL’s mission with respect to Resolutions 425, 426, 1559, and 1701.
The continuous presence of Lebanese and non-Lebanese military factions within Lebanon, including those in UNIFIL’s deployment zone, represents a constant threat to the stability and security of Lebanon and the surrounding region.[118] This phenomenon threatens both the state control of the area, and constitutes a pretext for an armament race among non-state factions in Lebanon.
Thus, one of UNIFIL’s major challenges is to ensure its deployment region is not used for hostile activities.[119] Unfortunately, during the Israeli-Palestinian war in Gaza in January 2009, this zone appeared to be used as a base to launch missiles on Israel.[120] This violation of international law and breach of the mission of UNIFIL and LAF was due at least in part to the fact the non-state-supported militias were not yet disarmed.[121] Although there was a national consensus in 2006 to disarm the non-state factions, the Lebanese government had not yet been able to achieve it.[122]
The disarmament of the Lebanese militias, whose weapons are distinct from those of the Lebanese government,[123] has been discussed in the Lebanese political process. Many Lebanese fear that as long as the militias are armed, there will not be stability.[124] C. A Case Study of the Village of Khirbit Silim in South Lebanon:
An Example of the Violation of Resolution 1701
The political and legal struggles in Khirbit Silim, a village in South Lebanon, provide a pertinent illustration of Resolution 1701 violations. On July 14, 2009, an arms dump exploded in Khirbit Silim, which is located under UNIFIL’s deployment zone.[125] UN authorities in Lebanon, both UNIFIL and those from the diplomatic mission, denounced the explosion as a violation of Resolution 1701 because the arms dump violated the resolution.[126]
Resolution 1701 declares that the LAF, assisted by UNIFIL, must adopt “security arrangements to prevent the resumption of hostilities, including the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani river of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL as authorized in paragraph 11, deployed in this area.”[127] According to UNIFIL’s representative and the UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon, this explosion strikes a blow to the credibility of Resolution 1701, and constitutes a worrisome and disturbing violation.[128]
After investigating the incident, Alain Le Roy, the head of the Peacekeeping Operations’ Department, described the explosion that took place at Khirbit Silim as a “serious violation” of Resolution 1701.[129] In his report to the SC, Le Roy noted:
A number of indications suggest that the depot belonged to Hezbollah, and, in contrast to previous discoveries by UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces of weapons and ammunition, that it was not abandoned but, rather, actively maintained.[130]
It appeared the weapons may have been left over from the war or 2006 and included “mortars, AK-47s, artillery shells and 122 mm rockets.”[131] The weapons were from different countries, were dated from the 1970s to the 1990s, and appeared to be in good condition.[132] However, as of June 2009, “UNIFIL has neither been provided with, nor found evidence of . . . the smuggling of arms into the area of operations.”[133] These comments, however, contradict the Israeli assertion that the weapons were, in fact, smuggled into Lebanon post-war.[134]
In an August 6, 2009 letter to the SC, the Secretary-General of the UN, Ban Ki-Moon, described the July 14 incident near Khirbit Silim, noting also the attempts to hinder UNIFIL’s freedom of movement on July 15 and 18, 2009.[135] While noting that the investigation was not finalized, Ban Ki-Moon commented that:
There are a number of indications that suggest that the depot was under the control of Hizbullah, and that, in contrast to weapons and ammunition previously discovered by UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces, it was not abandoned but rather actively maintained. Some of the individuals present on 15 July at the site of the explosions were identified to UNIFIL as belonging to Hizbullah.
This presence of unauthorized assets or weapons between the Blue Line and the Litani River constitutes a clear violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006). The incident highlights the importance of intensifying the efforts of the Lebanese Armed Forces, assisted by UNIFIL, to discover and remove weapons and related material that may still be present in the area of operations; make sure that there are no armed elements in the area; and prevent the possible smuggling of weapons across the Litani River.[136]
Conversely, the Lebanese government contended the weapons were abandoned by Israeli after the war of 2006, and that the explosion did not violate Resolution 1701.[137] An investigation was launched shortly thereafter, with the facts favoring the Secretary-General’s version of the events.[138] Regardless of the outcome, the explosion in the region between the Litani River and the Blue Line indicates the fragility of the process for restoring complete Lebanese sovereignty over the entire nation. This fragility is due in large part to the presence of armed groups on the fringe of Lebanon.
Another complication surrounding the explosion was the clash between the people of Khirbit Silim and UNIFIL soldiers leading the investigation.[139] Even if the clash can be categorized as merely a misunderstanding, the fulfillment of UNIFIL’s mission towards the demilitarization nevertheless remains problematic and should take place in narrow collaboration with the LAF.
In the twelfth report on the application of Resolution 1701, the Secretary-General acknowledged UNIFIL’s limited right to search private property only if there is “credible evidence of a violation of Resolution 1701 (2006), including an imminent threat of hostile activity emanating from that specific location.”[140]
This case study of Kirbit Silim indicates a violation of 1701, illustrating the issues faced by the United Nations forces. The central issue is balancing UNIFIL’s reach, guided by persuasive and credible proof available to UN authorities, with the collaborative efforts of the LAF, while accomplishing Resolution 1701’s objectives and maintaining peace. Le Roy indicated the importance of this triangular equation by repeatedly stressing the importance of collaborative efforts in applying the mandate of Resolution 1701.[141] This symbiotic relationship serves as the central nexus to UNIFIL’s success, directly contributing to the restoration of Lebanese sovereignty.
In the twelfth report the Secretary-General claimed, “the presence of unauthorized explosives [between the Litani River and the Blue Line] constitutes a violation to Resolution 1701.[142] Another violation is that Hezbollah has continued to “maintain a significant military capacity distinct from that of the Lebanese government.”[143] This acknowledgement gives great credibility to the idea that Hezbollah does have firearms and military power.
However, the only recommended solution to disarm Hezbollah is through a “political process” led by the Lebanese President, Michel Suleiman.[144] Through its commitment to this process, the Lebanese government must continually fulfill its international obligations in accordance with the above-mentioned Resolutions.
Indeed, there are restraints on the complete demilitarization of South Lebanon; therefore this constitutes “a long-term endeavor” for the UN.[145] In the tenth report on the application of Resolution 1701, the Secretary-General pointed out that there is no proof of weapons smuggling in UNIFIL’s zone of operations; however, that is not proof that the region is or soon will be demilitarized.[146] This long-term endeavor is a fragile political process during which LAF and UNIFIL must proceed militarily in the promotion of disarmament and demilitarization.[147] At the same time, the Lebanese political actors agree upon the importance of their activities, and the LAF has continued to “play a key role in the implementation of [R]esolution 1701 . . . and continued to act with strong commitment and resolve.”[148]
D. The Israeli’s Breach of Resolution 1701: Israel’s Incursion of Airspace
The full restoration of Lebanon’s sovereignty is far from reality.[149] In fact, the frequent penetration of Lebanese air space by the Israeli Air Force represents a violation of conventional international law, Lebanese sovereignty, and Resolution 1701.[150] If Lebanon were attacked, the LAF would have the right to justifiably defend the country.[151]
The Chicago Convention, an international agreement signed on December 7, 1944, states: “[t]he contracting States recognize that every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over airspace above its territory.”[152] As a result, any state is free to regulate and even to forbid flight over its territory.[153] Any unauthorized over-flight constitutes a breach to the territorial sovereignty of the state.[154] Thus, States may intercept and force foreign civil aircraft to land if the aircraft violates the State’s airspace.[155] However, a forced landing should not endanger the lives of any passengers.[156] These rules were clarified and amended in the Montreal Protocol, adopted May 10, 1984,[157] following an incident involving Korean Airlines.[158]
Eventually, according to the Protocol, the new standard is “that every State must refrain from resorting to the use of weapons against civil aircrafts.”[159] Due to the lack of logistic means and appropriate weapons in Lebanon, the LAF is unable to prevent the daily flights of Israeli military planes over Lebanese territory.[160]
This violation of Lebanese airspace, mentioned in the Secretary-General’s reports on the application of Resolution 1701, concerns at the same time both Lebanese sovereignty and the Resolution itself.[161] The sovereignty of Israel, however, has not been endangered since the adoption of Resolution 1701.[162] Consequently, Israel cannot insist on a pseudo “preventive” self-defense right, since its actions have not been recognized as defensive.
The International Court of Justice stated in 1986, “exceptions to the principle of not resorting to [] force must be restrictively interpreted (exceptio est strictissimae interpretationis).”[163] A fortiori, it is unthinkable to artificially and arbitrarily create new and legally unfounded exceptions to the over-flight and self-defense rules.[164] Not surprisingly, one-sided interventions have been repeatedly condemned by the UN and the International Court of Justice in other contexts, e.g., the incident of the Strait of Corfu, and the military and paramilitary activities in Nicaragua.[165]
The putative “self-defense” argument differs from the reactive or interceptive self-defense exercised when an armed attack is waged against a state, and is “sharply incompatible with jus contra bellum.[166] The exercise of putative self-defense would be a return to the policies of the Nineteenth Century, with a virtually unlimited discretion concerning the use of force.[167] The Israeli occupation of the Lebanese territory of Ghajar is not self-defense.[168] This occupation, despite UNIFIL mediation, is a direct threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon.[169]
UNIFIL recommended a solution to the Ghajar occupation, and the Lebanese government has agreed on this recommendation.[170] However, as recent as February 2012, Israeli Defense Forces remained in Ghajar.[171] The solution presented is for Israel to withdraw from the aforementioned Lebanese territory, ceding the control to UNIFIL, and in particular, to the Spanish army battalion.[172] This battalion would station within the village between forty and sixty soldiers and civil agents, and would set up check points at the entrance of the village with a possibility of supplementary deployment if necessary.[173] UNIFIL would be in charge of maintaining order and security in this territory, as well as conducting counter-smuggling operations.[174] An officer of the Lebanese army would be authorized to be present regularly inside the territory, as a sign of Lebanese sovereignty in the village.[175] E. Security Along the Lebanese/Syrian Border
While border security between Lebanon and Syria remains ineffective, the Lebanese government cannot claim to prevent the illegal import of weapons and subsidiary equipment into Lebanon.[176] Despite UNIFIL’s ability to assist in border security, the Lebanese government has decided to proceed on its own, both with Syria and the UN Commission for the Evaluation of Borders.[177] Since these border issues are a matter of international concern, the involvement of other stakeholders has made border security even more complicated.[178] This is yet another area where the sovereignty of Lebanon is threatened and definitely remains unresolved.[179]
Despite the complications related to border issues, the UN Secretary-General sees positive momentum.[180] In addition to the first common force organized for border control consisting of the Lebanese army, Internal Security Forces, and Customs officials, the Lebanese government has developed an operational plan for the deployment of the second common border force along its border with Syria.[181] “Once the plan has been implemented, common border forces will be deployed along more than 50 per cent of the border between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic.”[182] Syria has deployed a comparable border force at these points.[183]
According to the Secretary-General, the real management of the Lebanese frontiers “continues to be affected by the lack of demarcation of the border between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic, and by the continued presence of Palestinian military bases which straddle the border between the two countries.”[184] The Lebanese and Syrian officials insist that management of their common frontier falls within “the scope of bilateral cooperation”[185] and is far from the pressures exerted by other countries.[186] Therefore, the Joint Frontier Force, composed of 700 employees from the four organs of the Lebanese security (Army, Internal Security Forces, Security General Service, and the Customs Service), continued its operations in along the Syrian border.[187]
On February 2, 2010, the ambassadors of sympathetic countries met with Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri and reasserted the backing of the international community in the Lebanese border security efforts.[188] The countries determined the border security efforts fell within the scope of a frontier management strategy.[189]
The Lebanese government had answered the challenge of the second independent evaluation team of the Lebanese borders[190] to develop a strategic plan clearly describing the frontier control system to be instituted, as well as its application modalities.[191] It also challenged Lebanon to propose a self-assessment procedure to assess the level of competence and efficiency of the border security.[192] The procedure needed to take into consideration the notion of the frontier integrated management and the recommendations of the first team.[193]
For such a strategic management to succeed, Syrian cooperation was required because the overall success depends on cooperation among concerned countries,[194] absent a restrictive resolution by the SC that forces litigants to clearly delimit and manage the common frontier.[195]
As for Sheba’a farms, they were mentioned for the first time in a UN document as being a territorial object of contention.[196] In fact, in Resolution 1701, the SC took into account the governmental approach regarding the farms and invited the Secretary-General to thoroughly examine this object of contention.[197] In a report regarding the application of Resolution 1701, the Secretary-General described the lack of progress in resolving this issue;[198] because neither the Syrian nor the Israeli government would respond to requests for documentation in order to temporarily define this zone.[199] Syrian officials publicly consider the farms to be part of Lebanese territory, however there is no regional agreement.[200] As such, in order to resolve the issue pacifically and temporarily, the concerned parties must provide relevant documentation to the Secretary-General so that he can propose a temporary definition to the SC.
Lebanon submitted a letter to the Secretary-General in an attempt to define the area of Sheba’a Farms,[201] while Syria and Israel have yet to reply to the Secretary-General’s request.[202] Until settlement of this conflict, the Lebanese frontiers, internationally acknowledged by the UN, likely do not include Sheba’a farms.[203] Therefore, UNIFIL (whose deployment zone stretches between the south of Litani and the Blue Line according to Resolution 1701) cannot penetrate this zone without an express mandate from the SC.[204] Similarly, Hezbollah cannot maintain an occupying resistive force in front of the territory as long as this parcel is not considered by international law to be Lebanese.[205]
In summary, both Resolutions 1559 and 1701 are aimed at restoring Lebanon’s sovereignty through peaceful regulations, and according to political and diplomatic means, prohibiting the use of force and denouncing violations and breaches of international law.[206] The question that presents itself at this stage is whether there are strategic consequences in approaching Resolutions 1701 to 1559 with respect to UNIFIL’s mandate.
Resolutions 1559 and 1701 both call for the peaceful settlement of conflict and recovery of national sovereignty.[207] The focus on Lebanese sovereignty was first noted in Resolution 1559, and a clear call for peace was established by Resolution 1701.[208] The UN acts as a mediator in the settlement of existing and continuing disputes among belligerents.[209]
Lebanese and Syrian officials have stated that management of their common frontier will fall within “the comprehensive framework of bilateral cooperation.”[210] Indeed, UN influence and intervention has served numerous purposes including: the exchange of Israeli-held Lebanese prisoners for Lebanese-held Israeli soldiers,[211] the Israeli disclosure of landmine locations to UN officials,[212] the negotiations regarding Israeli withdrawal from Ghajar,[213] the potential settlement of conflict concerning the Sheba’a Farms region,[214] the cessation of unauthorized crossings of the Blue Line separating Lebanon and Israel,[215] and the collection of data from the war of 2006.[216]
In a third generation of peacekeeping operations,[217] UNIFIL actively seeks to extend Lebanon’s control over its entire national territory, as required by Resolution 1559 and 1701.[218] Such assistance is most effective where the LAF is not able to act directly and immediately.[219] Under these Resolutions, UNIFIL has the power to intercept, arrest suspects, and return fire in the event of confrontation, pursuant to the rules of engagement.[220]
UNIFIL’s rules of engagement, marked as “UN Restricted” and distributed on August 18, 2006 to the interested countries at the UN headquarters in New York, require UNIFIL to “operate mostly defensively, though cleared to ‘use appropriate and credible force . . . if necessary.’”[221] These rules of engagement unambiguously preserve an inherent right to self-defense.[222]
Beyond legitimate self-defense, the use of force is authorized to ensure that UNIFIL’s “area of operations [i.e., from the Litani River to the Blue Line,] is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind.”[223] This enables UNIFIL to
[R]esist attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council, and to protect United nations personnel, facilities, installations, and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel, humanitarian workers and, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Lebanon, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.[224]
However, the use of the force by UNIFIL must be proportional and limited in scope.[225]
To combat hostile activities in UNIFIL deployment areas,[226] UNIFIL is authorized to use lethal force against illegally armed combatants who refuse to surrender to UNIFIL, as long as the Lebanese army is not in a position to intervene.[227] UNIFIL is not charged with searching for and destroying weapons; however, it is obliged to prevent weapon circulation.[228]
UNIFIL may set up fixed and mobile checkpoints within its zone of operation to check for illegal weapons.[229] If a vehicle attempts to pass by through illegally, UNIFIL may use force.[230] However, once again, UNIFIL may act accordingly only where Lebanese forces are not in a position to intervene.[231]
Just as with Resolution 1559, Resolution 1701 is not based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter,[232] despite the fact that the SC described the situation as a threat to international peace and security.[233] Nevertheless, in order for UNIFIL to be equipped with the means of fulfilling its mission to actively aid in the restoration of Lebanese sovereignty, it must have significant powers.[234] Some have described UNIFIL as having “a robust Chapter VII,” power[235] because the rules of engagement have been infused with parts of the Chapter.[236]
Resolution 1701 is not based on UN Charter Chapter VII, therefore it depends on the political will of the parties involved to proceed with credibility and efficiency.[237] Conversely, the peacekeeping force in Darfur (UNAMID), was created pursuant to SC Resolution 1706 with Chapter VII powers.[238] Though it had the strong backing of Chapter VII, UNAMID lacked the equipment and materials necessary to accomplish its mission.[239] UNAMID Commander, General Martin Luther Agwali, stated that an effective deployment was not only expressed by the number of troops on the ground, but also by the timely arrival of supplies.[240] Because of the great political will of all parties involved, UNIFIL has not suffered the same problems, even without Chapter VII powers. The ultimate objective of both UNIFIL and UNAMID is to reduce the number UN Resolution violations.[241]
UNIFIL plays an important mission in regional stabilization. The latest reports of the UN Secretary-General on the implementation of Resolutions 1559 and 1701 similarly address belligerents in the Lebanese-Israeli and Lebanese-Syrian conflict to consolidate the stability and security status quo in the country.[242] Resolution 1701 asserts that settlement of the Lebanese conflict is critical for a global, just, and sustainable peaceful ambiance in the Middle East; considering all relevant resolutions, including Resolutions 242 of 1967, 338 of 1973, and 1515 of 2003.[243]
If Lebanon represents a fundamental factor for the regional peace and stability,[244] it also represents the impact that the positive evolution of the regional situation has on the stability of the country.[245] Lebanese stability is critical to regional stability, and achieving a “just and sustainable peace.”[246] There are, however, several other regional factors that stand as roadblocks to the achievement of such success.
In two implementation reports of Resolutions 1559 and 1701, the Secretary-General urged the Lebanese political players not to jeopardize stability, by making sure that elections take place freely and regularly, without violence, intimidation, or incitement.[247] First, he urged Lebanon to guarantee a secure environment favorable to holding peaceful parliamentary elections, without violence or incendiary statements.[248] Second, he “urge[d] all the parties not to let the process be derailed by short-signed electoral interests.”[249] UNIFIL is an invaluable player in the promotion of said security, enabled by the stability created,[250] by fulfilling its mandate to the LAF and functioning as a mediator in the settlement of Lebanese-Israeli disputes.[251]
The credibility of UNIFIL now depends on its rigorous presence by undertaking the challenge of establishing stability in South Lebanon, stability that may extend to all Lebanese territory. However, without the support of the Lebanese Army, instability may dismantle Lebanon again and there may be a resurgence of Resolution 1559, notably those that threaten the sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon.
UNIFIL is the only power equipped with the means to be an effective peacekeeper in the Middle East. It is well supplied to support the mission with military personnel, equipment, materials, and a reinforced mandate in Resolution 1701. It is a sui juris, a global partnership unique of its kind.[252]
Unlike other regional conflicts, the Israeli-Lebanese conflict is being successfully settled with mutual support of both nations and the SC. UNIFIL is capable of acting impartially to affect change since it is not subject to negotiations, pressure, or influence from forces outside the UN. This is why UNIFIL has been successful in stabilizing Lebanon and restoring Lebanese sovereignty. The stability in Lebanon contributes to promoting stability in the region. Thus, UNIFIL has become not only a player of the new military and security strategic environment and of stability in South Lebanon,[253] but also a player at national and regional levels. Surely UNIFIL has contributed to restoring confidence and credibility in peacekeeping operations world-wide.
[1]. Cf. S.C. Res. 1559, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1559 (Sept. 2, 2004); S.C. Res. 1701, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1701 (Aug. 11, 2006).
[2]. S.C. Res. 425, U.N. Doc. S/RES/425 (Mar. 19, 1978); S.C. Res. 426, U.N. Doc. S/RES/426 (Mar. 19, 1978); S.C. Res. 1701, supra note 1; see also UNIFIL Mandate, United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/ missions/unifil/mandate.shtml.
[3]. S.C. Res. 425, supra note 2; S.C. Res. 426, supra note 2.
[4]. S.C. Res. 1559, supra note 1.
[5]. S.C. Res. 1701, supra note 1.
[6]. S.C. Res. 425, supra note 2, at 1, ¶¶ 2, 3.
[7]. U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Security-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978), ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/2000/460 (May 22, 2000).
[8]. S.C. Res. 425, supra note 2, ¶ 1.
[9]. Id. at ¶ 2.
[10]. S.C. Res. 425, supra note 2; S.C. Res. 426, supra note 2.
[11]. S.C. Res. 426, supra note 2, ¶ 2.
[12]. U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Security-General on the Implementation of Security Council Res. 425 (1978), ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/12611/1978 (Mar. 19, 1978).
[13]. S.C. Res. 1559, supra note 1, at 1 (citing S.C. Res. 425, supra note 2; S.C. Res. 426, supra note 2; 520 U.N. Doc. S/RES/520 (Sept. 17, 1982); and S.C. Res. 1553, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1553 (July 29, 2004)).
[14]. Id. (citing Statement by President of Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2000/21 (June 18, 2000)).
[15]. Id. ¶ 1.
[16]. Id. ¶¶ 2-3.
[17]. Id. ¶ 5.
[18]. Id. ¶ 6.
[19]. Id. ¶ 7 (emphasis in original).
[20]. U.N. Secretary-General, Eighth Semi-Annual Rep. of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Res. 1559, ¶¶ 22, 24-26, U.N. Doc. S/2008/654 (Oct. 16, 2008) [hereinafter Eighth Semi-Annual Report].
[21]. U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Res. 1701, ¶¶ 46, 61, 66, U.N. Doc. S/2007/147 (Mar. 14, 2007).
[22]. S.C. Res. 1559, supra note 1, at 1.
[23]. S.C. Res. 1701, supra note 1, at 1.
[24]. U.N. SCOR, 64th Sess., 6153d mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6153 (June 29, 2009).
[25]. Alain Le Roy, A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping, (July, 2009), http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/ newhorizon.pdf.
[26]. Press Release, Security Council, Credible Mandates, Adequate Resources Among Needs Highlighted in Presidential Statement as Security Council Continues Debate on Future use of Peacekeeping, U.N. Press Release SC/9724 (Aug. 5, 2009).
[28]. See UNIFIL Background, United Nations Interim Force In Lebanon, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unifil/background.shtml (last visited Oct. 15, 2012).
[31]. Permanent Rep. of Lebanon to the U.N., Letter dated Mar. 15, 1978 from the Permanent Rep. of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/12600 (Mar. 15, 1978).
[33]. Permanent Rep. of Israel to the U.N., Letter dated Mar. 13, 1978 from the Permanent Rep. of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/12598 (Mar. 13, 1978).
[34]. Permanent Rep. of Israel to the U.N., Letter dated Mar. 17, 1978 from the Permanent Rep. of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/12607 (Mar. 17, 1978) [hereinafter 1978 Israel Letter].
[35]. Fady Fadel, L’Action du Conseil de Sécurité au Liban-Sud (1948-1986) : Mouvement oscillatoire entre les chapitres 6 et 7 de la Charte de l’ONU 73 (L’Université Antonine ed., 2007).
[36]. Id. at 55.
[37]. 1978 Israel Letter, supra note 34.
[38]. Fadel, supra note 35, at 73-74.
[39]. See generally U.N. Sec. Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2000/21 (June 18, 2000) [hereinafter Statement of the President].
[41]. See Sami Salhab, L’évolution du mandat des Forces des Nations unies, in La Finul : 30 Ans d’Éxistence Signe de Pérennité?, 76 (Fady Fadel & Cynthia Eid eds., 2009).
[42]. See id. at 77; UNIFIL Background, supra note 28.
[43]. S.C. Res. 1701, supra note 1; see Salhab, supra note 41, at 78.
[44]. UNIFIL Background, supra note 28.
[45]. Statement of the President, supra note 39.
[46]. See S.C. Res. 1559, supra note 1.
[47]. Statement of the Lebanese President Emile Lahoud, before the UN General Assembly in September 22nd 2003: Lebanon and Syria are deeply committed and united in their foreign policy, in Annahar Newspaper, September 23rd 2003, pp. 1 & 5.
[48]. UNIFIL Background, supra note 28.
[49]. Fadel F., Les échéances libanaises, op. cit. p. 104.
[50]. Eighth Semi-Annual Report, supra note 20, ¶¶ 42-44.
[51]. See S.C. Res. 1559, supra note 1.
[52]. Id. at 1.
[53]. S.C. Res. 1701, supra note 1, ¶ 3.
[55]. S.C. Res. 1559, supra note 1, at 1.
[58]. S.C. Res. 1701, supra note 1.
[59]. See Eighth Semi-Annual Report, supra note 20, ¶¶ 45-47.
[60]. S.C. Res. 1553, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1553 (July 29, 2004); S.C. Res. 1701, supra note 1, ¶ 12; cf. S.C. Res. 1559, supra note 1, at 1.
[61]. S.C. Res. 1701, supra note 1, ¶¶ 1-3, 8-9, 12.
[62]. Id. ¶ 3.
[63]. UNIFIL Background, supra note 28; cf. S.C. Res. 1701, supra note 1, ¶ 12.
[64]. See, e.g., Muriel Asseburg, UN Resolution 1701, UNIFIL-2 and the “New Greater Middle East Project” – A German Perspective, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin /contents/ products/fachpublikationen/UN_res_1701___pages_69_74_ks.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2012).
[65]. S.C. Res. 1701, supra note 1, ¶ 5.
[66]. See UNIFIL Background, supra note 28.
[67]. See S.C. Res. 425, supra note 2, at 5; S.C. Res. 426, supra note 10, ¶ 2; Helena Cobban, The Palestinian Liberation Organisation: People, Power, and Politics 3 (Edmund Burke, et al. eds, 1984) (noting that the entire area faced occupation and invasion by Israel under the premise of stopping PLO “terrorists”).
[68]. Cobban, supra note 67, at 47.
[69]. Cf. S.C. Res. 425, supra note 2, at 5, ¶¶ 1-3; S.C. Res. 426, supra note 2, ¶ 2; Cobban, supra note 67, at 3-4.
[70]. Cf. S.C. Res. 1701, supra note 1, at 1, ¶¶ 5, 6, 12.
[71]. S.C. Res. 1701, supra note 1, at 1, ¶ 3.
[72]. Cf. Cobban, supra note 67, at 47 (noting that guerilla tactics had tacitly become the primary military actor in Lebanon).
[73]. S.C. Res. 1701, supra note 1, ¶¶ 2, 4.
[74]. Id. ¶ 11.
[75]. Maritime Task Force, United Nations Interim Force In Lebanon, http://unifil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=11584&language=en-US (last visited Oct. 16, 2012).
[76]. S.C. Res. 1701, supra note 1, ¶ 11(b).
[77]. Id. at ¶ 2.
[78]. Id. at ¶ 3.
[79]. Id. at ¶¶ 1, 2, 11.
[80]. Id. at ¶ 11.
[81]. S.C. Res. 1701, supra note 1, ¶ 3.
[82]. Id. at ¶ 10.
[83]. Id. at 1.
[84]. U.N. Charter art. 39.
[86]. Compare S.C. Res. 425, supra note 2 with U.N. Charter arts. 1, 33, 37, and 39.
[87]. S.C. Res. 1701, supra note 1, at 2.
[88]. See S.C. Res. 1701, supra note 1, at 1; U.N. Charter arts. 1, 33, 34, 37.
[89]. See U.N. Charter arts. 33, 37, 39.
[90]. See U.N. Charter ch. VI.
[91]. U.N. Charter, chs. VI-VII.
[92]. U.N. Charter arts. 2, 37.
[93]. S.C. Res. 1701, supra note 1, ¶¶ 2-3.
[94]. U.N. Charter ch. I; U.N. Charter art. 37.
[95]. Cf. Rosalyn Higgins, The Place of International Law in the Settlement of Disputes by the Security Council, 64 Am. J. Int’l L. 1, 16 (1970) (discussing the Security Council’s role in addressing political questions within the confines of international law).
[96]. S.C. Res. 1701, supra note 1, ¶¶ 2, 11, 12.
[97]. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7.
[99]. Trevor Findlay, The use of force in UN peace operations, 104-05, 111 (2002) (analyzing U.N. prohibition of use-of-force as limiting effectiveness of UNIFIL operations).
[100]. S.C. Res. 1701, supra note 1, at 1-2.
[101]. Findlay, supra note 100, at 105.
[102]. S.C. Res. 1701, supra note 1, ¶ 12.
[103]. See Christine Gray, Int’l Law and the Use of Force 263 (3rd ed. 2008).
[104]. S.C. Res. 1701, supra note 1, ¶ 12 (The Security Council “authorizes UNIFIL to take all necessary action in areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities, to ensure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind . . . .”).
[105]. Gray, supra note 104, at 100-03 (describing the Security Council’s function of quelling the ongoing hostilities in Lebanon between Israel, Hezbollah, and Syria).
[106]. U.N. Charter art. 29; Danesh Sarooshi, The United Nations and the Development of Collective Security 92 (1999).
[107]. S.C. Res. 1701, supra note 1, at 1, ¶¶ 3, 8, 10.
[108]. U.N. Charter arts. 24, 29.
[109]. S.C. Res. 1701, supra note 1, at 1, ¶¶ 3, 8, 10.
[110]. Id. at ¶ 10.
[111]. Compare S.C. Res. 1559, supra note 1, at 1 with S.C. Res. 1701, supra note 1, ¶ 3.
[112]. See S.C. Res. 1559, supra note 1, at 1.
[113]. See S.C. Res. 1701, supra note 1, at 1.
[114]. See S.C. Res. 1559, supra note 1, at 1, ¶¶ 1, 4; S.C. Res. 1701, supra note 1, ¶¶ 1-3, 5.
[115]. See S.C. Res. 1559, supra note 1, at 1, ¶ 5.
[116]. See S.C. Res. 1701, supra note 1, at 1, ¶¶ 2, 4, 6-7, 11.
[117]. See S.C. Res. 1559, supra note 1, at 1, ¶¶ 1, 3-4; S.C. Res. 1701, supra note 1.
[118]. See S.C. Res. 1701, supra note 1.
[119]. S.C. Res. 1559, supra note 1; S.C. Res. 1701, supra note 1.
[120]. U Sue Pleming & Nidal al-Mughrabi, UN Security Council Calls for Immediate Gaza Truce, REUTERS (Jan. 8, 2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/01/09/ idUSL9116659; see U.N. Secretary-General, Tenth Report of the Security-General on Security Council Res. 1701(2006), ¶¶ 11, 32, U.N. Doc. S/2009/330 (June 29, 2009) [hereinafter Tenth Report].
[121]. Lebanon Needs to Make More Progress on Disarming Militias, UN Envoy Says, UN News Centre (Oct. 30, 2008), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID= 28779&Cr=lebanon&Cr1#.UJMzmYYSGuI.
[122]. See S.C. Res. 1701, supra note 1, at 1.
[123]. Hezbollah, N.Y.Times, Aug. 15, 2012, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/ timestopics/ organizations/h/hezbollah/index.html.
[124]. No Lebanese Stability as Long as Armed Parties are Present, Gemayel Says, NowLebanon (Sept. 14, 2010), http://nowlebanon.com/NewsArchiveDetails.aspx? ID=200883.
[125]. ‘Hezbollah Arms Cache’ Blows Up, BBC News, July 14, 2009, http://news.bbc.co. uk /2/hi/8150250.stm.
[126]. Louis Charbonneau, Hezbollah Arms Cache Violated U.N. Embargo: U.S., Reuters (July 23, 2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/07/24/us-lebanon-un-usa-idUSTRE56M6UV20090724 [hereinafter Hezbollah Arms Cache].
[127]. S.C. Res. 1701, supra note 1, ¶ 8.
[128]. See Explosion in Hezbollah Weapons Depot in the Village of Khirbet Silim Exposes . . . Hezbollah, Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2htt (Aug. 3, 2009), http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/data/pdf/PDF_09_198_2.pdf.
[129]. Louis Charbonneau, Illegal Lebanon Arms May Have Been Hezbollah’s – UN, Reuters (July 24, 2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/07/24/idUSLO110591.
[133]. Tenth Report, supra note 121, ¶ 28.
[134]. U.N. Secretary-General, Identical Letters dated 22 July 2009 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, 2, U.N. Doc. A/63/933-S/2009/379 (July 23, 2009) [hereinafter Identical Letters].
[135]. U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated 6 August 2009 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/2009/407 (June 7, 2009).
[136]. Id. at 2.
[137]. Identical Letters, supra note 135, at 1-2.
[138]. See, e.g., Hezbollah Arms Cache, supra note 127.
[139]. Tom Perry, UN Urges Restraint after Lebanon Peacekeepers Clash, Reuters (July 20, 2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/07/20/idUSKL239194.
[140]. U.N. Secretary-General, Twelfth Rep. of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Res. 1701 (2006), ¶ 24, U.N. Doc. S/2010/105 (Feb. 26, 2010) [hereinafter Twelfth Report].
[141]. See Tenth Report, supra note 121, ¶¶ 22, 24, 29, 57, 65, 67. Indeed, Le Roy noted that he was “impressed by the work of the mission,” pointing out that “[t]he civilian population is extremely pleased by the presence of UNIFIL.” UN Peacekeeping Chief ‘Impressed’ with Work of Blue Helmets in Middle East, UN News Centre (May 20, 2009), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=30871&Cr=le+roy&Cr1=#. UJS7qYYSGuJ.
[142]. Twelfth Report, supra note 141, ¶ 10.
[143]. Id. at ¶ 34.
[144]. Id. at ¶ 36.
[145]. Tenth Report, supra note 121, ¶ 66.
[146]. Id. [147]. See id. [148]. Id. at ¶ 67.
[149]. Tenth Report, supra note 121, ¶ 1.
[150]. Id. ¶ 7.
[151]. U.N. Charter art. 51.
[152]. Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, I.C.A.O. Doc. 7300/9, art. 1 [hereinafter Chicago Convention]. The Chicago Convention’s precursor, the Paris Convention of 1919, had similar language. See Convention Relating to the Reg. of Aerial Navigation Signed at Paris, Oct. 13, 1919, art. 1, http://www.spacelaw.olemiss.edu/ library/aviation/IntAgr/multilateral/1919_Paris_conevention.pdf.
[153]. Chicago Convention, supra note 153, art. 9.
[154]. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. V. U.S.) 1986 I.C.J. 128 (June 27).
[155]. Chicago Convention, supra note 153, art. 3.
[156]. Id. art. 3 bis.
[157]. Protocol Relating to an Amendment to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, May 10, 1984, art. 3 bis.
[158]. John F. Burns, U.S. Says Soviet Downed Korean Airliner; 269 Lost; Reagan Denounces ‘Wanton’ Act, N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1983, at A1.
[159]. Chicago Convention, supra note 153, art. 3 bis. [160]. See Merchet Jean-Dominique, Au Sud-Liban, Israël frôle la <<catastrophe>> avec la France, Libération (Nov. 10, 2006), http://www.liberation.fr/monde/010165985-au-sud-liban-israel-frole-la-catastrophe-avec-la-france.
[161]. E.g., Tenth Report, supra note 121, ¶ 19.
[162]. E.g., id.
[163]. Constantin Éconimidès, Le droit de la sécurité collective : questions à inscrire au programme de la Commission du Droit International, 57 Revue Hellénique de Droit International 1, 5 (2004).
[164]. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 33 (requiring resolving disputes through “negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangments, or other peaceful means of their own choice.”).
[165]. Éconimidès, supra note 163, at 5.
[166]. Robert Kolb, Quelques réflexions sur le droit relatif au maintien de la paix au début du XXIème siècle, 11 Afr. Y.B. Int’l L. 193, 201 (2003).
[168]. Tenth Report, supra note 121, ¶¶ 7, 12, 64.
[170]. Id. ¶ 12.
[171]. See U.N. Secretary-General, Eighteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Res. 1701 (2006), ¶ 18, U.N. Doc. S/2012/124 (Feb. 28, 2012) [hereinafter Eighteenth Report].
[172]. Id. ¶ 9; Twelfth Report, supra note 141, ¶ 54; Israel Reportedly Planning to Leave Northern Ghajar, Haaretz (June 12, 2009, 10:37 PM), http://www.haaretz.com/news/ israel -reportedly-preparing-to-leave-northern-ghajar-1.2684.
[173]. Haaretz, supra note 172; Nicholas Blanford, Lebanon: Israel to Withdraw from a Divided Border Town, Time (Nov. 19, 2010), http://www.time.com/time/world/article/ 0,8599,2032264,00.html.
[174]. See Haaretz, supra note 172; Blanford, supra note 173.
[175]. Haaretz, supra note 173; see also Nothing New on Israeli Withdraw from Ghajar, Al-Manar Reports, NOW Lebanon, (Dec. 29, 2009), http://www.nowlebanon.com/ NewsArchiveDetails.aspx?ID=135363.
[176]. U.N. Secretary-General, Ninth Report of the Secretary-General on Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006), ¶ 36, U.N. Doc. S/2009/119, (Mar. 3, 2009) [hereinafter Ninth Report].
[177]. See id. ¶¶ 37, 39-40.
[179]. See, e.g., Eighteenth Report, supra note 172, ¶ 19.
[180]. Tenth Report, supra note 121, ¶¶ 45, 78.
[181]. Id. ¶¶ 44-45.
[182]. Id. ¶ 45.
[183]. See Ninth Report, supra note 177, ¶ 40.
[184]. Twelfth Report, supra note 141, ¶ 40.
[185]. See id.
[186]. Naharnet Newsdesk, Rising Int’l Pressure on Lebanese Gov’t Over Influx of Syrian Refugees, Naharnet Beta (Mar. 30, 2012, 2:25 PM), http://www.naharnet.com/ stories/en/32379.
[187]. Twelfth Report, supra note 141, ¶ 42.
[188]. Id. ¶ 43.
[189]. Id. ¶ 42.
[190] U.N. Secretary-General, Letter Dated 25 August 2008 from Security-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2008/582, ¶ 4 (2008).
[191]. Id. ¶ 79.
[194]. Id. ¶ 78.
[196]. S.C. Res. 1701, supra note 1, ¶ 10.
[198]. Twelfth Report, supra note 141, ¶ 48.
[200]. Id. ¶ 48.
[201]. U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Res. 1701 (2006), S/2008/425, ¶ 49 (2006).
[203]. Id. ¶ 62.
[204]. S.C. Res. 1701, supra note 1, at 1-2, ¶ 12.
[205]. Id. ¶ 5.
[206]. S.C. Res. 1701, supra note 1, ¶ 3; S.C. Res. 1559, supra note 1, at 1, ¶ 2.
[207]. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 3.
[208]. See S.C. Res. 1559, supra note 1, at 1, ¶ 2; see also S.C. Res. 1701, supra note 1.
[209]. Twelfth Report, supra note 141, ¶¶ 4-6.
[210]. Id. ¶ 40.
[211]. See Israel Agrees Prisoner Exchange With Lebanon, The Guardian (June 29, 2008, 10:39 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jun/29/israelandthe palestinians.lebanon.
[212]. See Twelfth Report, supra note 140, ¶¶ 44-46, 55-56; see also Aharon Etengoff and Gerald Steinberg, Israeli Landmine Policy and Related Activity, Journal of Mine Action (last updated Apr. 30, 2012, 1:36 PM), http://maic.jmu.edu/journal/5.3/ focus/etengoff_steinberg_israel/etengoff_steinberg.htm.
[213]. Twelfth Report, supra note 141, ¶¶ 55-58.
[214]. See id. ¶¶ 47-48, 55-56.
[215]. See id. ¶¶ 57-58.
[216]. See id. ¶¶ 44-46; see also UNIFIL Gets Cluster Bomb Data From Israel, United Press International (May 14, 2009, 5:52 PM), http://www.upi.com/Top_News/ Special/2009/05/14/UNIFIL-gets-cluster-bomb-data-from-Israel/UPI-60261242337931/.
[217]. See generally Twelfth Report, supra note 141 (Peacekeeping operations of the third generation go beyond security concerns and embrace a broader scheme to address the political, legal, educational, and societal aspects of a conflict. In contrast, first generation peacekeeping operations were meant simply to separate combatants, and second generation peacekeeping operations actively took sides in order to punish aggressors and protect victims).
[218]. See generally id.
[219]. See generally id.
[220]. See generally id.
[221]. U.N. Peacekeepers Allowed to Defend Themselves But not Fight, Pravda.ru (Aug. 22, 2008), http://english.pravda.ru/news/world/22-08-2006/84035-peacekeepers-0/ [hereinafter pravda.ru].
[222]. See id.
[223]. S.C. Res. 1701, supra note 1, ¶ 12.
[225]. See generally id.
[226]. The 2007 conflict began when fighting broke out between Fatah al-Islam, an Islamist militant organization, and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) on May 20, 2007, in Nahr al-Bared, an UNRWA Palestinian refugee camp near Tripoli. Most of the fighting was related to the Siege of Nahr al-Bared, but minor clashes also occurred in the Ain al-Hilweh refugee camp in southern Lebanon, as well as several terrorist bombings around Lebanon’s capital, Beirut. Fighting continued into early September until the LAF declared victory on September 7, 2007.
[227]. See S.C. Res. 1701, supra note 1, ¶ 12.
[228]. S.C. Res. 1701, supra note 1, ¶¶ 3, 8; see UNIFIL Wields Authority to Challenge Gunmen, But Israelis Off-Limits, The Daily Star (Sept. 30, 2006), http://www.dailystar. com. lb/News/Politics/Sep/30/UNIFIL-wields-authority-to-challenge-gunmen-but-Israelis-off-limits.ashx#axzz1qhyOjtba.
[229]. Pravda.ru, supra note 222.
[230]. See id.
[231]. See id.
[232]. U.N. Charter art. 39, para. 1 (providing that “[t]he Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.”).
[233]. See S.C. Res. 1701, supra note 1, at 1.
[234]. See id. ¶¶ 12-14.
[235]. Helena Cobban, Lebanese War; Post-War; Role of UNIFIL, ‘Just World News’ with Helena Cobban, http://justworldnews.org/archives/002143.html (last visit Oct. 14, 2012); U.N. Charter art. 39, para. 1.
[236]. See S.C. Res. 1701, supra note 1, ¶ 10.
[237]. See S.C. Res. 1701, supra note 1, at 1, ¶¶ 12, 14, 15.
[238]. S.C. Res. 1706, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1706 (Aug. 31, 2006); see U.N. Charter arts. 33-38.
[239]. Joint AU-UN force in Darfur still lacking crucial equipment, Ban Say, GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2010/05/mil-100505-unnews02.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2012).
[240]. Lawrence Gist, Summary of Int’l Statements Made to the Security Council Regarding Peacekeeping Operations, Politics, examiner.com, http://www.examiner.com/ article/summary-of-international-statements-made-to-the-security-council-regarding-peacekeeping-operations (last visited Oct. 14, 2012).
[241]. See S.C. Res. 1706, supra note 227, ¶ 12.
[242]. U.N. Secretary-General, Remarks to the Ministerial Meeting of the Security Council on the Situation in the Middle East, U.N. Doc. SC/9724 (May 11, 2009) (by Ban Ki-moon) [hereinafter Ministerial Meeting].
[243]. S.C. Res. 1701, supra note 1, ¶ 18; cf. Xavier Zeebroek, Pamphile Sebhara et Fedurico Santopinto, Darfour, Tchad, Cetrafique: Des processus de paix à l’epreuve de feu, GRIP Note d’Analyse (Feb. 12, 2008).
[244]. Ministerial Meeting, supra note 242.
[245]. See U.N. Secretary-General, Seventeenth Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of the Security Council Res. 1701 (2011), ¶¶ 76-78, U.N. Doc. S/2011/715 (Nov. 14, 2011).
[246]. See S.C. Res. 1701, supra note 1, ¶ 12.
[247]. Ninth Report, supra note 177, ¶ 75.
[248]. U.N. Secretary-General, Ninth Semi-Annual Rep. of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of the Security Council Res. 1559 (2008), ¶¶ 29, 52, U.N. Doc. S/2009/118 (Apr. 24, 2008) [hereinafter Ninth Semi-Annual Report]; see U.N. Secretary-General, Fifteenth Semi-Annual Rep. of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Res. 1559 (2004), ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/2012/244 (Apr. 20, 2012).
[249]. Ninth Semi-Annual Report, supra note 249, ¶ 52.
[250]. See Ninth Report, supra note 177, ¶ 75.
[251]. See id.
[252]. See Ninth Semi-Annual Report, supra note 249, ¶¶ 29, 52.
[253]. See Ninth Report, supra note 177, ¶ 60.