Source: http://www.lawnotes.in/Shankari_Prasad_vs_Union_of_India_(AIR_1951_SC_455)
Timestamp: 2017-01-18 04:01:04
Document Index: 4895747

Matched Legal Cases: ['art 3', 'Art. 368', 'Art. 379', 'Art. 368', 'Art. 39', 'Art. 392', 'Art. 368', 'Art. 368', 'Art. 13', 'Art. 13', 'Art. 226', 'Art. 32']

Shankari Prasad vs Union of India (AIR 1951 SC 455) - Lawnotes.in
HomeIndian LawSupreme Court of IndiaSupreme Court of India Cases1951 Supreme Court of India CasesOctober 1951
This is a case that challenged the validity of the First Amendment Act to the Constitution of India.
The grounds for the challenge is that it purported to abridge the Fundamental Rights under Part 3 of the Constitution of India.
The Supreme Court of India held that the power to amend the Constitution, including Fundamental Rights is contained in Article 368.
An amendment is not a law within the meaning of Article 13(2).
Article 13(2) states that – “The State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this part and any law made in contravention to this clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void”. An amendment is valid even if it abridges any fundamental Right.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/10/1951
1951 AIR 458 1952 SCR 89
CITATOR INFO&#160;:
F 1952 SC 252 (1,30)
RF 1954 SC 257 (4)
R 1959 SC 395 (28)
E&amp;D 1959 SC 512 (4)
F 1965 SC 845 (20,21,23,24,25,27,33,35,38,39
R 1965 SC1636 (25)
O 1967 SC1643 (12,14,23,27,43,44,56,59,61,63
RF 1973 SC1461 (16,20,27,30,32,38,39,44,46,88
RF 1975 SC1193 (17)
RF 1975 SC2299 (649)
RF 1980 SC1789 (96)
RF 1980 SC2056 (61)
RF 1980 SC2097 (6)
D 1981 SC 271 (19,33,42,43)
RF 1986 SC1272 (78)
RF 1986 SC1571 (34)
RF 1987 SC1140 (3)
Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, Arts. 31A,
31B-Validity--Constitution of India, 1950, Arts. 13(2),
368, 379, 392--Provisional Parliament--Power to amend
Constitution- Constitution (Removal of Difficulties) Order
No. 2 of 1950--Validity --Amendment of Constitution--Proce-
dure--Bill amended by Legislature--Amendment curtailing
fundamental rights--Amendment affecting land--Validity of
The Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, which has
inserted, inter alia, Arts. 31A and 3lB in the Constitution
The provisional Parliament is competent to exercise the
power of amending the Constitution under Art. 368. The fact
that the said article refers to the two Houses of the Par-
liament and the President separately and not to the Parlia-
ment, does not lead to the inference that the body which is
this Constitution on Parliament" in Art. 379 are not con-
al Parliament consisting of a single chamber, but are wide
enough to include the power to amend the Constitution con-
The Constitution (Removal of Difficulties) Order No. 2
made by the President on the 26th January, 1950, which
purports to adapt Art. 368 by omitting "either House of"
and "in each House" and substituting "Parliament" for "that
beyond the powers conferred on him by Art. 39:1 and ultra
vires. There is nothing in Art. 392 to suggest that the
The view that Art. 368 is a complete code in itself in
tion after it has been introduced, and that if the Bill is
amended during its passage through the House, the amendment
Act cannot be said to have been passed in conformity with
the procedure prescribed by Art. 368 and would be invalid,
Although "law" must ordinarily include constitutional
law there is a clear demarcation between ordinary law which
is made in the exercise of legislative power and constitu-
tional law, which is made in the exercise of constituent
power. In the context of Art. 13, "law" must be taken to
mean rules or regulations made in exercise of ordinary
legislative power and not amendments to the constitution
made in the exercise of constituent power with the result
that Art. 13(2) does not affect amendments made under Art.
Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, do not curtail
the powers of the High Court under Art. 226 to issue writs
for enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III
only exclude from the purview of Part III 'certain classes
of cases. These articles therefore do not require ratifica-
Articles 31A and 31B are not invalid on the ground that
they relate to land which is a matter covered by the State
List (item 18 of List II) as these articles are essentially
amendments of the Constitution, and Parliament alone has
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Petitions under
Art. 32 of the Constitution (Petitions Nos. 166,287,317 to
319, 371,372, 374 to 389, 392 to 395, 418, 481 to 485 of
1951). The facts which led to these petitions are stated in
Arguments were heard on the l2th, l4th, l1th, 18th and
P.R. Das (B. Sen, with him) for the petitioners in
Petitions Nos. 37 l, 372, 382,383, 388 and 392. Article 368
of the Constitution is a complete code in itself. It does
not contemplate any amendments to the Bill
after its introduction. The Bill must be passed and assent-
ed to by the President as it was introduced without any
amendment. As the Constitution Amendment Bill was amended in
several respects during its passage through the Parliament,
the Constitution (First Amendment) Act was not passed in
conformity with the procedure laid down in article 368 and
is therefore invalid. When the Parliament exercises its
ordinary legislative powers it has power to amend the Bills
under articles 107. 108, 109(3) & (4). It has no such power
when it seeks to amend the Constitution itself as article
368 does not give any such power: of The Parliament Act of
1911 (of England). The Article 368 vests the power to amend
the Constitution not in the Parliament but in a different
body, viz., a two-thirds majority of the two Houses of the
Parliament. In article 368, the word Parliament which
occurs in other articles is purposely avoided. There is a
distinction between ordinary legislative power and power to
amend the Constitution. This distinction is observed in
America and the power to amend the Constitution is vested
there also in a different body. Vide Willis, page 875,
Coolly Vol. 1. page 4, Orfield, page 146. Article 379
speaks of the power of the provisional Parliament as a
legislative body. The powers under article 368 cannot be and
was not intended to be exercised by the provisional Parlia-
ment under article 379. As it consists only of a Single
Chamber the adaptations made in article 368 by the Constitu-
tion (Removal of Difficulties) Order No. 2 are ultra vires.
Article 392 gives power to the President to remove only such
difficulties as arise in the working of the Constitution. It
cannot be used to remove difficulties in the way of amending
the Constitution that have been deliberately introduced by
the Constitution. No difficulty could have been possibly
experienced in the working of the Constitution on the very
day the Constitution came into force. The Constitution could
legally be amended only by the Parliament consisting of two
Houses constituted under clause 2 of Part V. In any event,
the impugned Act is void under article 13 (2) as contraven-
ing the provisions relating to
fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III. ' Law ' in
article 13 (2) evidently includes all laws passed by the
Parliament and must include laws passed under article 368
amending the Constitution: Constituent Assembly Debates,
Vol. IX No. 37, pp. 1644, 1645, 1661, 1665.
S.M. Bose (M. L. Chaturvedi, with him)for the petitioner
in Petition No. 375. The word "only" in article 368 refers
to all that follows and article 368 does not contemplate
amendment of a Bill after it has been introduced. The
President's Order is ultra rites his powers Under article
392. There is no difficulty in working article 368 and
there could be no occasion for the President to adapt 368 in
the exercise of his powers under article 392.
S. Chaudhuri (M. L. Chaturvedi, with him) for the
petitioner in Petition No. 368 adopted the arguments of P.R.
Das and S.M. Bose.
S.K. Dhar (Nanakchand and M.L. Chaturvedi, with him) for
the petitioner in Petition No- 387. Article 379 on which the
provisional Parliament's jurisdiction to amend the Constitu-
tion is based not only empowers the said Parliament to
exercise the powers of the Parliament but also imposes upon
it the obligation to perform all the duties enjoined upon
the Parliament by the Constitution. Hence Parliament cannot
seek to abridge the rights of property of the citizens
guaranteed by Part III. As the present Act contravenes the
provisions of Part III, it is void under article 13 (2). In
any event, the new articles 31A and 3lB curtail the powers
of the Supreme Court under articles 32, 132 and 136 and
those of the High Court under article 226, and as such, they
required ratification under clause (b) of the proviso to
article 368 and not having been ratified, they are void and
unconstitutional. They are also ultra vires as they relate
to land, a subject matter covered by List II (see item 18)
over which the State Legislatures have exclusive power.
Parliament cannot make a law validating a law which it had
no power to enact.
N.P. Asthana (K. B. Asthana, with him) for the petition-
ers in Petitions Nos. 481 to 484. Article 338 s, does not
confer power on any body to amend the constitution. It
simply lays down the procedure to be followed for amending
the Constitution. In this view u article 379 does not
come into operation at all. Under article 392 the President
himself can alter the Constitution but he cannot authorise
the provisional Parliament to do so.
S.P. Sinha (Nanak Chand, with him) for the petitioner in
Petition No. 485. Article 13(2) is very wide in its scope
and it invalidates all laws past, present and future which
seek to curtail the rights conferred by Part II 1. It does
not exempt laws passed under article 368 from its operation.
N.C. Chatterjee (with V.N. Swami for the petitioner in
PetitiOn No. 287 and with Abdul Razzak Khan for the peti-
tioner in Petition No. 318). Article 368 must be read
subject to article 13(2). Articles 31A and 31IB are legis-
lative in character and were enacted in the exercise of the
law-making power of the Parliament and not in the exercise
of any power to amend the Constitution and Parliament has no
power to validate the laws as it had no power to enact them.
N.R. Raghavachari (V. N. Swami, with him) for the
petitioner in Petition No. 166. The fundamental rights are
supreme and article 13 (2) is a complete bar to any amend-
ment of the rights cenferred by Part III.
N.S.. Bindra (Kahan Chand Chopra, with him) for the
petitioner in Petition No. 319.
374,376, 377, 379, 380, 381,384, 385, 386, 389, 393, 394 and
Bishan Singh for the petitioner in Petition No. 418. Abdul
Razzak Khan and P. 5. Safeer for the petitioner in Petition
No. a17.
M.C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (with G.N.
Joshi) for the Union of India, and (with Lal Narain Singh,
G N. Joshi, A. Kuppuswami and
G. Durgabai) for the State of Bihar. The donee of the
power under article 368 is Parliament. and The process of
the passage of the Bill indicated in the said article is
the same as that of ordinary legislative Bills. The arti-
cle does not mean that the powers under article 368 are to
be exercised by a fluctuating body of varying majority and
not by Parliament. If the constituent authority and the
legislative authority are two different entities the saving
clauses in articles 2,3, 4 and 240, will be meaningless.
Under article 379 provisional Parliament can exercise all
the powers of Parliament; hence Provisional Parliament can
act under article 368. "All the powers" in article 379
include power to amend the Constitution and there is no
reason to restrict the import of these words by excluding
amendment of the Constitution from their ambit. The words
"perform all the duties" in that article do not in any
manner cut down the power of Parliament under article 379
because article 13 (2) does not impose any duty. There is
no conflict between exercising all the powers under article
379 and the prohibition in article 13 (2). No technical
meaning should be given to the word "difficulty" in article
392 (1). The adaptation of article 368 is really an adapta-
tion for the removal of difficulties. The adaptation is not
of a permanent character. This shows that the adaptation is
not an amendment and even if it is an amendment, it is so by
way of adaptation. Article 13 (2) prohibits "laws" incon-
sistent with fundamental rights. It cannot affect article
368 since the word "law" in article 13 (2) refers to ordi-
nary legislative enactments and not constitution making.
The argument that the Bill to amend the Constitution should
be passed as introduced, without amendments, is fallacious.
It cannot be said that the Bill referred to in article 368
has to be dealt with under a procedure different from that
laid down for ordinary Bills in articles 107 and 108. Arti-
cles 31-A and 31B are not legislative in character. The
said articles do not affect the scope of articles 226 and
32, for the power of the Court under the said two articles
remains unaltered. What has been done is to alter the
content of fundamental rights.
P.L. Banerjee, Advocate-General of Uttar Pradesh (U. K.
Misra and Gopalji Mehrotra, with him) for the State of Uttar
Pradesh adopted the arguments of the un. Attorney-General
and added that articles 31-A and 31-B st do not necessarily
stand or fall together; even if 31-B goes, 31-A will remain.
T.L. Shevde, Advocate-General of Madhya Pradesh (T. P.
Naik, with him)for the State of Madhya Pradesh adopted the
arguments of the Attorney General. The Provisional Parlia-
ment is competent to do all that the future Parliament can
do. The adaptation under article 392 does not seek to
amend article 368.
P.R. Dots, S.M. Bose S. Chaudhuri, N.C. Chatterjee, S.K.
Dhar and S.P. Sinha replied.
1951. October 5. The Judgment of the Court was delivered
PATANJALI SASTRI J.--These petitions, which have been
heard together, raise the common question whether the
Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, which was recently
passed by the present provisional Parliament and purports to
insert, inter alia, articles 31A and 3lB in the Constitution
Of India is ultra vires and unconstitutional.
What led to that enactment is a matter of common knowl-
edge. The political party now in power, commanding as it
does a majority of votes in the several State legislatures
as well as in Parliament, carried out certain measures of
agrarian reform in Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh
by enacting legislation which may compendiously be referred
to as Zemindary Abolition Acts. Certain zemindars, feeling
themselves aggrieved, attacked the validity of those Acts in
courts of law on the ground that they contravened the
fundamental rights conferred on them by Part III of the
Constitution. The High Court at Patna held that the Act
passed in Bihar was unconstitutional while the
High Courts at Allahabad and Nagpur upheld the validity of
the corresponding legislation in Uttar Pradesh and, Madhya
Pradesh respectively. Appeals from those decisions are
pending in this Court. Petitions filed in this Court by
some other zemindars seeking the determination of the same
question are "also pending. At this stage, the Union Gov-
ernment, with a view to put an end to all this litigation
and to remedy what they considered to be certain defects
brought to light in the working of the Constitution, brought
forward a bill to amend the Constitution, which, after
undergoing amendments in various particulars, was passed by
the: requisite majority as the Constitution (First Amend-
ment) Act, 1951, (hereinafter referred to as the Amendment
Act). Swiftly reacting to this move of the Government, the
zemindars have brought the present petitions under article
32 of the Constitution impugning the Amendment Act itself as
unconstitutional and void.The main arguments advanced in support of the petitions
may be summarised as follows:First, the power of amending the Constitution provided
for under article 368 was conferred not on Parliament but on
the two Houses of Parliament as a designated body and,
therefore, the provisional Parliament was not competent to
exercise that power under article 379.Secondly, assuming that the power was conferred on
Parliament, it did not devolve on the provisional Parliament
by virtue of article 379 as the words "All the powers con-
ferred by the provisions of this Constitution on Parliament"
could refer only to such powers as are capable of being
exercised by the provisional Parliament consisting of a
single chamber. The power conferred by article 368 calls for
the co-operative action of two Houses of Parliament and
could be appropriately exercised only by the Parliament to
be duly constituted under Ch. 2 of Part V.Thirdly, the Constitution (Removal of Difficulties)
Order No. 2 made by the President on 26th January
1950, in so far as it purports to adapt article 368 by
omitting "either House of" and "in each House" and substi-
tuting "Parliament" for" that House", is beyond the powers
conferred on him by article 392, as "any difficulties"
sought to be removed by adaptation under that article must
be difficulties in the actual working of the Constitution
during the transitional period whose removal is necessary
for carrying on the Government. No such difficulty could
possibly have been experienced on the very date of the
commencement of the Constitution.Fourthly, in any case article 368 is a complete code in
itself and does not provide -for any amendment being made in
the bill after it has been introduced in the House. The bill
in the present case having been admittedly amended in sever-
al particulars during its passage through the House, the
Amendment Act cannot be said to have been passed in conform-
ity with the procedure prescribed in article 368.Fifthly, the Amendment Act, in so far as it purports to
take away or abridge the rights conferred by Part III of the
Constitution, falls within the prohibition of article 13
(2).And lastly, as the newly inserted articles 31A and 3lB
seek to make changes in articles 132 and 136 in Chapter IV
of Part V and article 226 in Chapter V of Part VI, they
require ratification under clause (b) of the proviso to
article 368, and not having been so ratified, they are void
and unconstitutional. They are also ultra vires as they
relate to matters enumerated in List II, with respect to
which the State legislatures and not Parliament have the
power to make laws.Before dealing with these points it will be convenient
to set out here the material portions of articles 368, 379
and 392, on the true construction of which these arguments
have largely turned.368. An amendment of this Constitution may be initiated
only by the introduction of a Bill for the purpose in either
House of Parliament, and when the
Bill is passed in each House by a majority of the total
membership of that House and by a majority of not less than
two-thirds of the members of that House present and voting,
it shall be presented to the President for his assent and
upon such assent being given to the Bill, the Constitution
shall stand amended in accordance with the terms of the
Bill:Provided that if such amendment seeks to make any change(a) articles 54, 55, 78,162 or 241, or(b) Chapter IV of Part V, Chapter V of Part VI, or
Chapter I of Part XI, or(c) any of the Lists in the Seventh Schedule, or(d) the representation of States in Parliament, or (e)
the provisions of this article, the amendment shall also
require to be ratified by the Legislatures of not less than
one-half of the States specified in Parts A and B of the
First Schedule by resolutions to that effect passed by those
Legislatures before the Bill making provision for such
amendment is presented to the President for assent.
379. (1) Until both Houses of Parliament have been duly
constituted and summoned. to meet for the first session
under the provisions of this Constitution, the body func-
tioning as the Constituent Assembly of the Dominion of India
immediately 'before the commencement of this' Constitution
shall be the provisional Parliament and shall exercise all
the powers and perform all the duties conferred by the
provisions of this Constitution on Parliament.392. (1) The President may, for the purpose of removing
any difficulties, particularly in relation to the transition
from the provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935, to
the provisions of this Constitution, by order direct that
this Constitution shall, during such period as may be speci-
fied in the order, have effect subject to such adaptations,
whether by way of modification, addition or omission, as he
may deem to be necessary or expedient:
99Provided that no such order shall be made after the
first meeting of Parliament duly constituted under Chapter
On the 'first point, it was submitted that whenever the
Constitution sought to confer a power upon Parliament, it
specifically mentioned "Parliament" as the done of the
power, as in articles 2, 3, 33, 34 and numerous other arti-
cles, but it deliberately avoided the use of that expression
in article 368. Realising that the Constitution, as the
fundamental law of the country, should not be liable to
frequent changes according to the whim of party majorities,
the framers placed special difficulties in the way of amend-
ing the Constitution and it was a part of that scheme to
confer the power of amendment on a body other than the
ordinary legislature, as was done by article 5 of the Ameri-
can Federal Constitution. We are unable to take that view.
Various methods of constitutional amendment have been adopt-
ed in written constitutions, such as by referendum, by a
special convention, by legislation under a special proce-
dure, and so on. But, which of these methods the framers of
the Indian Constitution have adopted must be ascertained
from the relevant provisions of the Constitution itself
without any leaning based on a priori grounds or the analogy
of other constitutions in favour of one method in preference
to another. We accordingly turn to the provisions dealing
with constitutional amendments.Now, the Constitution provides for three classes of
amendments of its provisions. First, those that can be
effected by a bare majority such as that required for the
passing of any ordinary law. The amendments contemplated in
articles 4, 169 and 240 fall within this class, and they are
specifically excluded from the purview of article 368.
Secondly, those that Can be effected by a special majority
as laid down in article 368. All constitutional amendments
other than those referred to above come within this category
and must be effected by a majority of the total membership
House as well as by a majority of not less than two thirds
of the members of that House present and a voting; and
thirdly, those that require, in addition to the special
majority above-mentioned, ratification by resolutions
passed by not less than one-half of the States specified in
Parts A and B of 'the First Schedule. This class comprises
amendments which seek to make any change in the provisions
referred to in the proviso to article 368. It will be seen
that the power of effecting the first class of amendments is
explicitly conferred on "Parliament", that is to say, the
two Houses of Parliament and the President (article 79).
This would lead one to suppose, in the absence of a clear
indication to the contrary, that the power of effecting the
other two classes of amendments has also been conferred on
the same body, namely, Parliament, for, the requirement of a
different majority, which is merely procedural, can by
itself be no reason for entrusting the power to a different
body. An examination of the language used in article 368
confirms that view.
In the first place, it is provided that the amendment must
be initiated by the introduction of a "bill in either' House
of Parliament", a familiar feature of parliamentary proce-
dure (of. article 107(1) which says "A bill may originate in
either House of Parliament"). Then, the bill must be "passed
in each House"-just what Parliament does when it is called
upon to exercise its normal legislative function [article
107(2)]; and finally, the bill thus passed must be "present-
ed to the President"' for his "assent", again a parliamen-
tary process through which every bill must pass before it
can reach the statute-book (article 111). We thus find that
each of the component units of Parliament is to play its
allotted part in bringing about an amendment to the Consti-
tution. We have already seen that Parliament effects amend-
ments of the first class mentioned above by going through
the same three-fold procedure but with a simple majority.
The fact that a different majority in the same body is
effecting the second and third categories of amendments
cannot make the amending agency a different body. There is
no force, therefore, in the suggestion that Parliament would
have been referred to specifically if that body was intended
to exercise the power. Having mentioned each House of Par-
liament and the President separately and assigned to each
its appropriate part in bringing about constitutional
changes, the makers of the Constitution presumably did not
think it necessary to refer to the collective designation of
the three units.Apart from the intrinsic indications in article 368
referred to above, a convincing argument is to be found in
articles 2, 3, 4, 169 and 240. As already stated, under
these articles power is given to "Parliament" to make laws
by a bare majority to amend certain parts of the Constitu-
tion; but in each case it is laid down that no such law
should be deemed to be an amendment of the Constitution "for
the purpose of article 368." It would be quite unnecessary,
and indeed inappropriate, to exclude these laws from the
operation of article 368, which requires a. special majori-
ty, if the power to amend under the latter article was not
also given to Parliament.Somewhat closely allied to the point discussed above is
the objection based on the bill in the present case having
been passed in an amended form, and not as originally intro-
duced. It is not correct to say that article 368 is a
"complete code" in respect of the procedure provided by it.
There are gaps in the procedure as to how and after what
notice a bill is to be introduced, how it is to be passed by
each House and how the President's assent is to be obtained.
Evidently, the rules made by each House under article 118
for regulating its procedure and the conduct of its business
were intended, so far as may be, to be applicable. There
was some discussion at the. Bar as to whether the process of
amending the Constitution was a legislative process. Peti-
tioners' counsel insisted that it was not, and that, there-
fore, the "legislative procedure" prescribed in article 107,
provides for a bill being passed with amendments, was not
applicable to a bill for amending the Constitution under
article 368. The argument was further supported by pointing
out that if amendment of such a bill were permissible, it
must be open to either House to propose and pass amendments,
and in case the two Houses failed to agree, the whole ma-
chinery of article 368 would be thrown out of gear, for the
joint sitting of both Houses passing the bill by a simple
majority provided for in article 108 in the case of ordinary
bills would be inapplicable in view of the special majority
required in article 368. The argument proceeds on a miscon-
ception. Assuming that amendment of the Constitution is not
legislation even where it is carried out by the ordinary
legislature by passing a bill introduced for the purpose and
that articles 107 to 111 cannot in terms apply when Parlia-
ment is dealing with a bill under article 368, there is no
obvious reason why Parliament should not adopt, on such
occasions, its own normal procedure, so far as that proce-
dure can be followed consistently with statutory require-
ments. Repelling the contention that a Local Government
Board conducting a statutory enquiry should have been guided
by the procedure of a court of justice, Lord Haldane ob-
served in Local Government Board v. Arlidge(1):"Its (the Board's) character is that of an organisation
with executive functions. In this it resembles other great
departments of the State. When, therefore, Parliament en-
trusts it with judicial duties, Parliament must be taken, in
the absence of any declaration to the contrary, to have
intended to follow the procedure which is its own and is
necessary if it is to be capable of doing its work effi-
ciently."These observations have application here. Having pro-
vided for the constitution of a Parliament and prescribed a
certain procedure for the conduct of' its ordinary legisla-
tive business to be supplemented by rules made by each House
(article 118), the makers of the Constitution must be taken
to have intended
(1) [1915] A.C. 120.
Parliament to follow that procedure, so far as it may be
applicable, consistently with the express provisions of
article 368, when they entrusted to it the power of amending
the Constitution,.The argument that a power entrusted to a Parliament
consisting two Houses cannot be exercised under article 379
by the provisional Parliament sitting as a single chamber
overlooks the scheme of the constitutional provisions in
regard to Parliament. These provisions envisage a Parlia-
ment of two Houses functioning under the Constitution framed
as they have been on that basis. But the framers were well'
aware that such a Parliament could not be constituted till
after the first elections were held under the Constitution.
It thus became necessary to make provision for the carrying
on, in the meantime, of the work entrusted to Parliament
under the Constitution. Accordingly, it was provided in
article 379 that the Constituent Assembly should function as
the provisional Parliament during the transitional' period
and exercise all the powers and perform all the duties
conferred by the Constitution on Parliament. Article 379
should be viewed and interpreted in the wider perspective of
this scheme and not in its isolated relation to article 368
alone. The petitioners' argument that the reference in
article 368 to "two Houses" makes that provision inapplica-
ble to the provisional Parliament would equally apply to all
the provisions of the Constitution in regard to Parliamen-
tary action and, if accepted, would rob article 379 of its
very purpose and meaning. It was precisely to obviate such
an argument and to remove the difficulty on which it is
rounded and other difficulties of a like nature in working
the Constitution during the transitional period that the
framers of the Constitution made the further provision in
article 392 conferring a general power on the President to
adapt the provisions of the' Constitution by suitably modi-
fying their terms. This brings us to the construction of
article 392.It will be seen that the purpose for which an adaptation
may be made under that article is widely
expressed. It may be made for the purpose of removing "any
difficulties". The particularisation of one class of diffi-
culties which follows is illustrative and cannot have the
effect of circumscribing the scope of the preceding general
words. It has been urged, however, that the condition
precedent to the exercise of powers under article 392 is the
existence of difficulties to be removed, that is to say,
difficulties actually experienced in the working of the
Constitution whose removal would be necessary for carrying
on the Government, such as for instance, the difficulties
connected with applying articles 112, 113, etc., in the
transitional period. But, the argument proceeds, constitu-
tional amendments cannot be said to be necessary during that
period. Besides, amendment of the Constitution is a very
serious thing, and hence, by providing that both Houses must
deliberate and agree to the amendment proposed and pass the
bill by a special majority, the Constitution has purposely
placed difficulties in the way of amending its provisions.
It would be fantastic to suppose that, after deliberately
creating those difficulties, it has empowered the President
to remove them by a stroke of his pen. We see no force in
this line of argument. It is true enough to say that diffi-
culties must exist before they can be removed by adaptation,
but they can exist before an occasion for their removal
actually arises. As already stated, difficulties are bound
to arise in applying provisions, which, by their terms are
applicable to a Parliament of two Houses. to the provisional
Parliament sitting as a single chamber. Those difficulties,
arising as they do out of the inappropriateness of the
language of those provisions as applied to the provisional
Parliament, have to be removed by modifying that language to
fit in with the situation created by article 379. There is
nothing in that article to suggest that the President should
wait, before adapting a particular article, till an occasion
actually arose for the provisional Parliament to exercise
the power conferred by that article. Nor is there any
question here of the President removing by his adaptation
any of the difficulties which the Constitution
has deliberately placed in the way of its amendment. The
adaptation leaves the requirement of a special majority
untouched. The passing of an amendment bill by both Houses
is no more a special requirement of such a bill than it is
of any ordinary law made by Parliament. We are, therefore,
of opinion that the adaptation of article 368 by the Presi-
dent was well within the powers conferred on him by article
892 and is valid and constitutional.A more plausible argument was advanced in support of the
contention that the Amendment Act, in so far as it purports
to take away or abridge any of the fundamental rights, falls
within the prohibition of article 13(2) which provides that
"the State shall not make any law which takes away or
abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any law made
in contravention of this clause shall to the extent of the
contravention be void." The argument was put thus: "The
State" includes Parliament (article 12)and "law" must in-
clude a constitutional amendment. It was the deliberate
intention of the framers of the Constitution, who realized
the sanctity of the fundamental rights conferred by Part
III, to make them immune from interference not only by
ordinary laws passed by the legislatures in the country but
also from constitutional amendments. It is not uncommon to
find in written constitutions a declaration that certain
fundamental rights conferred on the people should be "eter-
nal and inviolate" as for instance article 11 of the Japa-
nese Constitution. Article 5 of the American Federal Consti-
tution provides that no amendment shall be made depriving
any State without its consent "of its equal suffrage in the
Senate." The framers of the Indian Constitution had the
American and the Japanese models before them, and they must
be taken to have prohibited even constitutional amendments
in derogation of fundamental rights by using aptly wide
language in article 13 (2). The argument is attractive, but
there are other important considerations which point to the
law, there is a clear demarcation between ordinary law,
which is made in exercise of legislative power, and consti-
tutional law, which is made in exercise of constituent
power. Dicey defines constitutional law as including "all
rules which directly or indirectly affect the distribution
or the exercise of the sovereign power in the State." It is
thus mainly concerned with the creation of the three great
organs of the State, the executive, the legislature and the
judiciary, the distribution of governmental power among them
and the definition of their mutual relation. No doubt our
constitution-makers, following the American model, have
incorporated certain fundamental rights in Part III and made
them immune from interference by laws made by the State. We
find it, however,difficult, in the absence of a clear indi-
cation to the contrary, to suppose that they also intended
to make those rights immune from constitutional amendment.
We are inclined to think that they must have had in mind
what is of more frequent occurrence, that is, invasion of
the rights of the subjects by the legislative and the execu-
tive organs of the State by means of laws and rules made in
exercise of their legislative power and not the abridgement
or nullification of such rights by alterations of the Con-
stitution itself in exercise of sovereign constituent power.
That power, though it has been entrusted to Parliament, has
been so hedged about with restrictions that its exercise
must be difficult and rare. On the other hand, the terms of
article 36a are perfectly general and empower Parliament to
amend the Constitution, without any exception whatever. Had
it been intended to save the fundamental rights from the
operation of that provision, it would have been perfectly
easy to make that intention clear by adding a proviso to
that effect. In short, we have here two articles each of
which is widely phrased, but conflicts in its operation with
the other. Harmonious construction requires that one should
be read as controlled and qualified by the other. Having
regard to the considerations adverted to above, we are of
that in the context of article 13 "law" must be taken to
made in exercise of constituent power, with the result that
article 1:3(2) does not affect amendments made under article
368.It only remains to deal with the objections particularly
directed against the newly inserted articles 31A and :3lB.
One of these objections is based on the absence of ratifica-
tion under article 368. It was said that, before these
articles were inserted by the Amending Act, the High Courts
had the power under article 226 of the Constitution to issue
appropriate writs declaring the Zemindari Abolition Acts
unconstitutional as contravening fundamental rights, and
this Court could entertain appeals from the orders of the
High Courts under article 132 or article 136. As a matter
of fact, some High Courts had. exercised such powers and
this Court had entertained appeals. The new articles,
however, deprive the High Courts as well as this Court of
the power of declaring the said Acts unconstitutional, and
thereby seek to make changes in Ch. 4 of Part V and Ch. 5 of
Part VI. It was therefore submitted that the newly inserted
articles required ratification under the proviso to article
368. The argument proceeds on a misconception. These arti-
cles so far as they are material here, run thus :--31A. Saving of laws providing for acquisition of es-
tates, etc.--(1) Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing
provisions of this part, no law providing for the acquisi-
tion by the State of any estate or of any rights therein or
for the extinguishment or modification of any such rights
shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is incon-
sistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights
conferred by, any provisions of this Part :--
31B. Validation of certain Acts and Regulations.Without
prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained in
article :31A, none of the Acts and Regulations specified in
the Ninth Schedule nor any of the
provisions thereof shall be deemed to be void, or ever to
have become void, on the ground that such Act, Regulation or
provision is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges
any of the rights conferred by, any provisions of this Part,
court or tribunal to the contrary, each of the said Acts
and Regulations shall, subject to the power of any competent
Legislature to repeal or amend it, continue in force. It will be seen that these articles do not either in
terms or in effect seek to make any change in article 226 or
in articles 132 and 136. Article 31A aims at saving laws
providing for the compulsory acquisition by the State of a
certain kind of property from the operation of article 13
read with other relevant articles in Part III, while article
3lB purports to validate certain specified Acts and-Regula-
tions already passed, which, but for such a provision, would
be liable to be impugned under article 13. It is not cor-
rect to say that the powers of the High Court under article
226 to issue writs "for the enforcement of any of the rights
conferred by Part III" or of this Court under articles 132
and 136 to entertain appeals from orders issuing or refusing
such writs are in any way affected. They remain just the
same as they were before: only a certain class of case has
been excluded from the purview of Part II/and the courts
could no longer interfere, not because their powers were
curtailed in any manner or to any extent, but because there
would be no occasion hereafter for the exercise of their
power in such cases. The other objection that it was beyond the power of
Parliament to enact the new articles is equally untenable.
It was said that they related tO land which was covered by
item 18 of List II of the Seventh Schedule and that the
State legislatures alone had the power to legislate with
respect to that matter. The answer is that, as has been
stated, articles a IA and 3lB really seek to save a certain
class of laws and certain specified laws already passed from
the combined operation of article 13 read with other rele-
articles of Part III. The new articles being thus essential-
ly amendments of the Constitution, Parliament alone had the
power of enacting them. That the laws thus saved relate to
matters covered by List II does not in any way affect the
position. It was said that Parliament could not validate a
law which it had no power to enact. The proposition holds
good where the validity of the impugned provision turns on
whether the subject-matter falls within or without the
jurisdiction of the legislature which passed it. But to
make a law which contravenes the constitution constitution-
ally valid is a matter of constitutional amendment, and as
such it falls within the exclusive power of Parliament. The
question whether the latter part of article 31B is too
widely expressed was not argued before us and we express no
opinion upon it.
Petitions dismissed.Agent for the Petitioners in Petitions Nos. 871, 372,
382, 383, 388 and 392: I. N. Shroff.Agent for the Petitioners in Petitions Nos. 287, 374 to
381 393, 394, 395: Rajinder Narain. Agent for the Petitioners in Petitions Nos. 387,
418, 481 to 485, 384, 385, 386 and 389: S.S. Sukla. Agent
for the Petitioners in Petition No. 166:
M.S.K. Sastri.Agent for the Petitioners in Petition Nos. 817 and 319:
R.S. Narula.Agent for the Petitioner in Petition No. 318: Ganpat
Rai.Agent for the respondents: P. A. Mehta.
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