Source: http://www.txcourts.gov/All_Archived_Documents/ccaInformation/opinions/73804.htm
Timestamp: 2017-10-20 21:38:05
Document Index: 653844554

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 11', 'art. 37', '§ 2', '§ 2', 'art. 37', '§ 2', 'art. 44', 'art. 37', '§ 2']

NO. 73,804
185th DISTRICT COURT OF HARRIS COUNTY
Holcomb, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Keller, P.J., and Meyers, Womack, Johnson, Keasler, Hervey, and Cochran, JJ., joined. Price, J., joined the judgment, but not the opinion, of the Court.
In his first point of error, appellant argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance, in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, (1) when, during the punishment stage of trial, counsel elicited certain damaging testimony from defense witness Dr. Walter Quijano, a clinical psychologist. Appellant, an Hispanic, argues that the testimony in question "tacitly asked [the jury] to consider race and ethnic stereotypes" in its determination of the first punishment issue, which concerned his future dangerousness to society. (2)
The record reflects that defense counsel's examination of Quijano covered his educational and professional background first and then turned generally to the subjects of predicting and, within a prison setting, controlling an individual's proclivity for criminal violence, i.e., his dangerousness. Defense counsel's examination also touched briefly on the subject of race vis-a-vis an individual's dangerousness:
The record does not reflect defense counsel's reasons for examining Quijano on the subject of race vis-a-vis an individual's dangerousness.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to the reasonably effective assistance of counsel in state criminal prosecutions. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n. 14 (1970). In general, to obtain a reversal of a conviction on the ground of ineffective assistance, an appellant must demonstrate that (1) defense counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional error(s), the result of the proceeding would have been different. (3) Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). In assessing a claim of ineffective assistance, an appellate court "must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct [fell] within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the [appellant] must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy." Id. at 689 (some punctuation omitted). Also, in the absence of evidence of counsel's reasons for the challenged conduct, an appellate court "commonly will assume a strategic motivation if any can possibly be imagined," 3 W. LaFave, et al., Criminal Procedure § 11.10(c) (2d. ed 1999), and will not conclude the challenged conduct constituted deficient performance unless the conduct was so outrageous that no competent attorney would have engaged in it. See Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 814 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999). Finally, an appellant's failure to satisfy one prong of the Strickland test negates a court's need to consider the other prong. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 697.
Appellant has failed to demonstrate that his trial counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Counsel might have been attempting, with Quijano's testimony, to do two things: (1) place before the jury all the factors it might use against appellant, either properly or improperly, in its assessment of his future dangerousness and (2) persuade the jury that, despite all those negative factors, appellant would not be a future danger if imprisoned for life because the prison system's procedures and techniques would control or eliminate his tendency toward violence. Under the circumstances - the State had already presented evidence before the jury that appellant had a long and violent criminal record - we cannot say that counsel's conduct could not be considered sound trial strategy. We overrule appellant's first point of error.
In his second point of error, appellant argues that the evidence adduced at trial was legally insufficient to support the jury's affirmative answer to the first punishment issue. As we noted in footnote three, supra, the first punishment issue asked the jury to determine "whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society." See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 37.071, § 2(b)(1). The State had the burden of proving the first punishment issue beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at § 2(c). Thus, the State had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that there is a probability that appellant, if allowed to live, would commit criminal acts of violence in the future, so as to constitute a continuing threat to people and property, whether in or out of prison. Ladd v. State, 3 S.W.3d 547, 557 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1680 (2000). In its determination of the issue, the jury was entitled to consider all of the evidence presented at trial. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 37.071, § 2(d)(1). As an appellate court reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's affirmative finding, we consider all of the record evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether, based on that evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the correct answer to the first punishment issue was "yes." Ladd v. State, 3 S.W.3d at 558. This standard of review gives full play to the jury's responsibility fairly to resolve conflicts in the evidence, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). If, given all of the evidence, a rational jury would have necessarily entertained a reasonable doubt as to the probability of appellant's future dangerousness, we must reform the trial court's judgment to reflect a sentence of imprisonment for life. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 44.251(a).
Viewed in the necessary light, the evidence at trial established that (1) on June 24, 1992, when appellant was twelve years old, he committed the offense of terroristic threat; (2) on May 6, 1993, when appellant was thirteen years old, he committed misdemeanor theft; (3) on August 31, 1998, when appellant was eighteen years old, he committed three separate aggravated robberies; (4) on September 15, 1998, appellant again committed aggravated robbery; (5) on September 17, 1998, appellant shot and killed Hugo Solano, the victim in this case; (6) on that same date appellant also committed two aggravated robberies; (7) on September 20, 1998, appellant committed aggravated robbery and attempted capital murder; (8) on September 21, 1998, appellant committed aggravated robbery and attempted capital murder; and, finally, (9) on one day in November 1999, while appellant was incarcerated in the Harris County Jail awaiting trial in this case, he committed misdemeanor assault.
We conclude that the evidence adduced at appellant's trial was legally sufficient to support the jury's affirmative answer to the first punishment issue. Given the evidence of appellant's extensive criminal history, a rational jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that he exhibited a dangerous aberration of character, that he was essentially incorrigible, and that the correct answer to the first punishment issue was "yes." We overrule appellant's second point of error.
1. The Sixth Amendment provides in relevant part that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the assistance of counsel for his defence." This right to counsel was made applicable to state felony prosecutions by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963).
2. The first punishment issue asked the jury to determine "whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society." See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 37.071, § 2(b)(1).
3. In some circumstances, none of which are applicable here, a showing that the result would have been different is not sufficient to show prejudice. See Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1512 (2000).