Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/130/301/case.html
Timestamp: 2017-01-22 20:34:17
Document Index: 262789290

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 914', '§ 914', '§ 2', '§ 1', '§ 2637', '§ 4240']

Amy v. Watertown (full text) :: 130 U.S. 301 (1889) :: Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center Log In
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Amy v. Watertown 130 U.S. 301 (1889)
U.S. Supreme CourtAmy v. Watertown , 130 U.S. 301 (1889)Amy v. Watertown (No. 1)No. 196Argued March 12-13, 1889Decided April 8, 1889130 U.S. 301ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED
Between the time when the Process Act of May 8, 1792, 1 Stat. 275, went into effect and the passage of the Act of June 1, 1872, 17 Stat. 196, Rev.Stat. § 914, it was always in the power of the federal courts, by general Page 130 U. S. 302 rules, to adapt their practice to the exigencies and conditions of the times, but since the passage of the latter act, the practice, pleadings and forms and modes of proceeding must conform to the state law and to the practice of the state courts except when Congress has legislated upon a particular subject and prescribed a rule.
The principal question in this case is whether the defendant, the City of Watertown, was served with process in the suit so as to give the court below jurisdiction over it. In order to understand the bearing of the facts of the case, it will be necessary to give a brief abstract of the laws of Wisconsin which relate to it, and these are mostly to be found in the Page 130 U. S. 303 charter of the City of Watertown and the acts supplementary thereto. The state laws are referred to because they govern the practice of the federal courts in the matter under consideration. By the fifth section of the Act of June 1, 1872, Rev.Stat. § 914, it is declared that
By the Temporary Process Act of September 29, 1789, 1 Stat. 93, if not otherwise provided, the forms of writs and executions (except their style) and modes of process in the circuit and district courts in suits at common law were directed to be the same as in the supreme courts of the states respectively. By the Permanent Process Act of May 8, 1792, 1 Stat. 275, it was enacted that the forms of writs, executions, and other process, and the forms and modes of proceeding, in suits at common law should be the same as directed by the act of 1789, subject to such alterations and additions as the said courts should deem expedient, or to such regulations as the Supreme Court of the United States should think proper by rule to prescribe to any circuit or district court. So that the practice in United States courts in the old states was made to conform to the state practice, as it was in 1789, subject to alteration by rule of court. In 1828, a law was passed adopting for the federal courts in the new states, admitted since 1789, the forms of process, and forms and modes of proceeding, of the highest courts of those states respectively, as then existing, subject to alteration by the courts themselves or the Supreme Court of the United States. 4 Stat. 278. By the Act of August 1, 1842, the provisions of the act of 1828 were extended to the states admitted in the intermediate time. This review of the statutes shows that after 1792 it was Page 130 U. S. 304 always in the power of the courts by general rules to adapt their practice to the exigencies and conditions of the times.
"Chapter 2, § 2. The mayor, when present, shall preside over Page 130 U. S. 305 the meetings of the common council, and shall take care that the laws of the state and the ordinances of the city, within the corporation, are duly enforced and observed, and that all officers of the city discharge their respective duties. He shall appoint the police force. . . . He shall have a vote in case of a tie only. . . ."
"Chapter 5, § 1. . . . All funds in the treasury . . . shall be under the control of the common council, and shall be drawn out upon the order of mayor and clerk, duly authorized by a vote of the common council. . . . "Page 130 U. S. 306
"Section 1. The senior alderman of each ward of the City of Watertown shall constitute a board of street commissioners, who are hereby authorized, subject to the regulation and control of the common council, to audit and allow accounts against the city, . . . and, when allowed, orders on the treasury shall issue therefor, and in case of vacancy in the office of mayor, and there is no president of the common council to act, said orders may be signed by the chairman of said board and the city clerk. The city clerk shall be the clerk of said board, and shall keep record of its proceedings. The mayor may preside at the meetings of said board, and they may elect a chairman, who shall preside in his absence. . . . Said board shall have all the powers conferred upon the common council by the city charter in relation to streets Page 130 U. S. 307 and bridges and sidewalks. . . . Said board are also authorized to canvass the returns of all votes polled at the election for city or ward officers, and determine and declare the result of such election."
By the Revised Statutes of Wisconsin of 1878, § 2637, the manner prescribed by law for service of process on cities generally is "by delivering a copy thereof to the mayor and city Page 130 U. S. 308 clerk." As there was a special law with regard to the City of Watertown, contained in its charter, requiring a copy to be left with the mayor, the general law probably did not supersede it. But as the mayor must be served with process according to both laws, it can make no difference in the disposition of the case which is assumed to prevail.
Thereupon the plaintiff filed an affidavit of the marshal stating that at the time of service of the summons, there was no mayor or acting mayor of said city, and had been none since the 14th day of February, 1873, the writ being dated and issued the 3d day of March, 1873. The defendant filed a counter-affidavit of the city clerk stating that he had examined the records of the city and the proceedings of the board of street commissioners for the months of January, February, March, and April, 1873, and from these it appeared that F. Kusel, mayor of the city, resigned the office of mayor on the 30th of January; that from thence to the 24th of February, Street Commissioner Maak was the chairman of the board of street commissioners and acting mayor of the city; that from the 24th of February to the 17th of March, Street Commissioner Prentice was temporary chairman of said board and acting mayor, and that on the 6th and 8th of March, 1873, said Prentice was acting mayor. Page 130 U. S. 309
Thereupon, on June 19, 1883, plaintiffs filed their complaint setting out four bonds of $1,000 each, dated June 1, 1856, issued by the defendant to aid in the construction of the Watertown and Madison Railroad, and payable January 1, 1877, with eight percent interest, payable semiannually, upon presentation and surrender of the interest warrants or coupons attached to the bond, and setting forth also 84 of such coupons of $40 each, and demanding judgment for the amount of said coupons, $3,360, together with interest at seven percent on the amount of each coupon from the time it became due. On the same day, June 19, 1883, plaintiffs filed an affidavit of no answer or appearance, caused the amount due on the 84 coupons to be computed by the clerk, and thereupon Page 130 U. S. 310 the court rendered judgment against the defendant by default for the amount so found due, to-wit, $7,762.44 damages and $49.70 costs.
That there were only three meetings of said board in December, 1882, to-wit, regular meetings December 4th and 18th, and a special meeting December 27th. That, there being Page 130 U. S. 311 no mayor nor chairman elected by the board to preside at its meetings in the mayor's absence, present at either of said meetings of December 4th or 27th, said Baxter was chosen at each said meeting by a viva voce vote of the members present chairman pro tem., to preside at that particular meeting, and that said meetings adjourned sine die, respectively, on December 4th and 27th, after the transaction of their business, and that said Baxter ceased to be such temporary chairman after the adjournment of said meetings. That the meeting of December 18th, being without a quorum, adjourned without the transaction of any business, and that no meeting of said board was held after December 27th until January 15, 1883.
1. That the book in the city clerk's office containing the record of the proceedings of the common council and of the board of street commissioners for about five years before January, 1884, contains a record of the meeting of the common council, April 11, 1882, the last entry of which is, Page 130 U. S. 312 "the common council adjourned sine die," and that there is no further record of a common council meeting thereafter until after the municipal election in April, 1883, and that immediately following said record commences the record of a meeting of the board of street commissioners, April 11, 1882, which is followed by the record of other meetings of the board up to December 27, 1882 at each of which meetings some member of the board, either Commissioner Stacey, Commissioner Baxter, or Commissioner Voss was chosen chairman pro tem., and the record of the adjournment of each meeting is, "on motion the board adjourned," and at one of such meetings a resolution was passed retaining Mr. Daniel Hill "to assist the city attorney in the suits commenced by E. Mariner."
On the hearing of the motion, May 16, 1884, the court made an order setting aside the judgment "on the ground that the summons herein was not properly served on said defendant, and the court had no jurisdiction thereof." To review the decision of the court in making that order the plaintiffs in error have sued out the present writ of error. Page 130 U. S. 313
As we have stated, the main question is whether there was legal service of process on the city. We may dismiss the attempt at service in March, 1873. It was set aside by the court as not made in the manner prescribed by law, so as to give the court jurisdiction, and the prosecution was dropped by the plaintiffs. No further steps were taken until after the lapse of nine years and nine months, when a second effort was made Page 130 U. S. 314 to serve the writ, upon which the present proceedings arose. It cannot be pretended that the action was pending during that long period, without further effort to procure a service of process. The common law provided a remedy in such cases by a return of non est inventus (or what was equivalent thereto) and a reissue of the writ from term to term until a service could be made, or by process of outlawry. The issue of successive writs kept the suit alive so as to prevent the running of the statute of limitations. But the making of one spasmodic and unsuccessful effort, and then abandoning the case for ten years, cannot be regarded as having any such effect unless aided by some statutory provision. No such provision has been cited. There is a provision in the Revised Statutes of Wisconsin, § 4240, which was evidently intended to meet such a case, but no attempt was made to comply with it. The section referred to is substantially as follows:
As the attempted service of the summons in 1873 can have no effect upon the solution of the present controversy, the question then arises whether the attempted service in December, 1882, was a sufficient and legal service. The court below held that it was not. We have already quoted the return of the marshal on that occasion. It appears from this return Page 130 U. S. 315 that he made the attempted service by delivering a copy of the summons to William H. Rohr, the last Mayor of the city; a copy to Henry Bieber, City Clerk; a copy to Charles H. Gardner, City Attorney, and a copy to Thomas Baxter, the last presiding officer of the Board of Street Commissioners of the City of Watertown; the office of mayor being vacant, and there being no president of the common council, nor presiding officer thereof, in office. Was this such a service upon the city as the law requires? It clearly was not unless, by the law of Wisconsin, the circumstances of the case were such as to dispense with a literal compliance with the charter. The charter requires service on the mayor of the city. No such service was made. There was no mayor in office at the time. The last mayor had resigned, and his resignation had taken effect. Service on him was of no more avail than service on an entire stranger. The case is different from those in which we have held that a resignation of an officer did not take effect until it was accepted or until another was appointed. In those cases, either the common law prevailed or the local law provided for the case, and prevented a vacancy. Such were the cases of Badger v. Bolles, 93 U. S. 599; Edwards v. United States, 103 U. S. 471; Salamanca v. Wilson, 109 U. S. 627. In Badger v. Bolles, the law of Illinois was in question, and it appeared that by the constitution of that state the officers elected were to hold their offices until their successors were elected and qualified. In Edwards v. United States, the case arose in Michigan, and it was held that the common law rule prevailed there by which the resignation of a public officer is not complete until the proper authority accepts it or does something tantamount thereto such as appointing a successor. In Salamanca v. Wilson, a case arising in Kansas, the treasurer of a township moved across the township line into another township. By the Constitution of Kansas, township officers were to hold their offices one year from their election, and until their successors were qualified, and nothing was said either in the constitution or laws about residence or nonresidence. We held that the removal did not necessarily vacate the office, and that service of summons on the treasurer was good. Page 130 U. S. 316
The question then is reduced to this: whether, in case the mayor has resigned and there is no presiding officer of the board of street commissioners (a body which seems to take the place of the common council of the city for many purposes), service of process on the city clerk, and on a conspicuous member of the board, is sufficient. If the common law (which is common reason in matters of justice) were permitted to prevail, there would be no difficulty. In the absence of any head officer, the court could direct service to be made on such official persons as it might deem sufficient. But when a statute intervenes and displaces the common law, we are brought to a question of words, and are bound to take the words of the statute as law. The cases are numerous which decide that where a particular method of serving process is pointed out by statute, that method must be followed, and the rule is especially Page 130 U. S. 317 exacting in reference to corporations. Kibbe v. Benson, 17 Wall. 624; Alexandria v. Fairfax, 95 U. S. 774; Settlemier v. Sullivan, 97 U. S. 444; Evans v. Dublin &c. Railway, 14 M. and W. 142; Walton v. Universal Salvage Co., 16 M. and W. 438; Brydolf v. Wolf, 32 Ia. 509; Hoen v. Atlantic & Pacific Railway Co., 64 Mo. 561; Lehigh Valley Ins. Co. v. Fuller, 81 Penn.St. 398. The courts of Wisconsin strictly adhere to this rule. Congar v. Railroad Co., 17 Wis. 478, 485; City of Watertown v. Robinson, 59 Wis. 513; City of Watertown v. Robinson, 69 Wis. 230. The two cases last cited related to the charter now under consideration. In the first case, service was made upon the city clerk and upon the chairman of the board of street commissioners while the board was in session, in the absence of the mayor, who could not be found after diligent search. The court, after referring to the provisions of the charter and the Revised Statutes on the subject, said:
"When the statute prescribes a particular mode of service, that mode must be followed. Ita lex scripta est. There is no chance to speculate whether some other mode will not answer as well. . . . This has been too often held by this court to require further citations. . . . When a statute designates a particular officer to whom the process may be delivered, and with whom it may be left, as service upon the corporation, no other officer or person can be substituted in his place. . . . The designation of one particular officer upon whom service may be made excludes all others. . . . The temporary inconvenience arising from a vacancy in the office of mayor affords no good reason for a substitution of some other officer Page 130 U. S. 318 in his place, upon whom service could be made, by unwarrantable construction not contemplated by the statute."
It is contended that this act gives to the chairman of the board of street commissioners the same power as the mayor has to receive service of process against the city. But the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, as we have seen, has expressly decided otherwise. And the language of the act of 1879 is not that the chairman of the board shall have the power of the mayor, but that the board and the chairman shall have concurrent power with the mayor and common council -- evidently referring to the power of the body, not to the separate power of the officers. Besides, if it were conceded that the chairman of the board had the same power as the mayor, Baxter, who was served with process as chairman of the board, was not permanent chairman, but was only temporary chairman of the particular meeting, and ceased to have any official position as such after the meeting adjourned. He was in no sense chairman of the board at the time when he was served with process. This fact, however, does not seem material in the view of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, for in the cases before it, the chairman of the board was served with process during its actual session, and while he was presiding. In the construction of a state statute in a matter purely domestic (as this is), we always feel strongly disposed to give great weight to the decisions of the highest tribunal of the state. Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S. 20. Page 130 U. S. 319
The cases of Broughton v. Pensacola, 93 U. S. 266, and Mobile v. Watson, 116 U. S. 289, cannot aid the plaintiffs in this case. Those were cases in which a new name was given to an old corporation, or a new corporation was made out of an old one -- that was the substance of it -- and the question was whether the new corporation, or the old corporation by its new name, was liable for the old debts, and we held that it was. That was a question of liability, not a question of procedure. There, the way was open for looking into the actual Page 130 U. S. 320 relations of the old and new corporations, and deciding according to the justice of the case. Here, we are bound by statute, and not by the state statute alone, but by the act of Congress, which obliges us to follow the state statute and state practice. The federal courts are bound hand and foot, and are compelled and obliged by the federal legislature to obey the state law, and according to this law, the judgment of the circuit court was correct, and is therefore