Source: https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/essick-v-city-los-angeles-26195
Timestamp: 2019-08-26 00:23:07
Document Index: 383094217

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 12', '§ 1061', '§ 97', '§ 98', '§ 98', '§ 97']

Essick v. City of Los Angeles - 34 Cal.2d 614 - Fri, 01/13/1950 | California Supreme Court Resources
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Citation 34 Cal.2d 614
Essick v. City of Los Angeles , 34 Cal.2d 614
Morris Lavine, as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Appellants. [34 Cal.2d 616]
Plaintiffs appeal from a judgment of dismissal of their action for declaratory relief against the city of Los Angeles, the individual members of the council of such city, and Forest Lawn Company, a corporation (hereinafter termed, respectively, the city, the council, and the company). By such action plaintiffs sought to have declared null and void because allegedly violative of various sections of the city charter certain ordinance provisions and one resolution passed by the council, having to do in general with the granting of "conditional use permits" under the "Comprehensive Zoning Plan" of the city and in particular with the granting of such a permit to the company. For the reasons hereinafter stated, we have concluded that the judgment should be modified in form as hereinafter specified and, as so modified, affirmed. [1] Plaintiffs also attempt to appeal from the court's order granting defendants' motions to dismiss the action; such order, having directed that judgment of dismissal be prepared, is not appealable and the attempted appeal therefrom will be dismissed. (See McColgan v. Jones, Hubbard & Donnell, Inc. (1938), 11 Cal.2d 243 [78 P.2d 1010]; 2 Cal.Jur. 156-159.)
Plaintiffs in their complaint (first amended) allege as follows: They are qualified voters and electors of the city. Under ordinance No. 90500 passed by the council in March, 1946, and known as the Comprehensive Zoning Plan of the city, certain land owned by plaintiffs together with some 486 acres of land owned by the company was designated as falling within the same "continuous and unbroken" R1 One Family Zone. Plaintiffs sue for themselves and "for the benefit of all the other owners of real property within the said R1 One Family Zone." No cemeteries "are to be located within areas so zoned as R1 One Family Zones except that a procedure for the obtaining of a permit for the 'Conditional Use' for cemetery purposes of real property so zoned as an R1 One Family [34 Cal.2d 617] Zone" is established by subsection C of section 12.24 of ordinance 90500. In February, 1947, the council "purportedly" passed ordinance No. 91503, section 20 of which amends subsection C of section 12.24 fn. 1 of ordinance 90500. Acting under the provisions of subsection C as so amended, the company thereafter filed with the City Planning Commission an application for a "Conditional Use" for cemetery purposes of its property mentioned above, the commission denied the application, the company appealed to the council, and the council, [34 Cal.2d 618] in March, 1948, "purported" to pass a resolution reversing the action of the commission and granting the application of the company. Pursuant "to said resolution ... the ... Company has commenced the construction of a cemetery" upon its property, the creation and maintenance of which will diminish the value, use, and enjoyment of real property owned by the other property owners, including plaintiffs, within the same R1 One Family Zone. Section 12.24 of ordinance 90500, section 20 of ordinance 91503 (amending § 12.24, subsec. C), and the resolution granting the company's application are pleaded in full in the complaint and are averred to be in conflict with certain provisions of the city charter. Plaintiffs allege, finally, that an actual controversy exists between themselves and defendants relating to their legal rights and duties arising out of the resolution and pray that the court declare null and void the resolution and the ordinance provisions pursuant to which it was passed.
Defendants filed motions to dismiss the action on the grounds that (1) the court had no jurisdiction of the subject of the [34 Cal.2d 619] action for the reason that the complaint presented no justiciable controversy, and (2) it was not necessary or proper at that time for the court to make a declaration or determination of the rights and duties of the parties under the circumstances alleged. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1061.) The motions were granted, judgment was entered accordingly, and this appeal followed.
Section 98 fn. 2 of the charter created the office of Zoning Administrator and gave him the power, among other things, [34 Cal.2d 620] to "investigate, hear and determine all applications for variances from the rules, regulations, restrictions and requirements of the zoning ordinances and [to] ... grant such variances ... when practical difficulties, unnecessary hardships or results inconsistent with the general purposes of the zoning regulations may result" otherwise. The administrator's determination "shall be final except that appeals therefrom may be taken to the Board of Zoning Appeals," which by section 99 of the charter was given the power to "affirm, change or modify the ... determination ... subject to the same limitations as are placed upon the Zoning Administrator."
Plaintiffs contend that the charter has thus "provided for two distinct procedures whereby an owner of real property might obtain relief from onerous zoning restrictions, rules and regulations as they limit him in the use and enjoyment of his property"; that a third procedure, in conflict with the charter, is set forth in subsection C of section 12.24 of ordinance 90500, as amended by section 20 of ordinance 91503; and that such sections, as well as the council's resolution adopted pursuant [34 Cal.2d 621] thereto, granting the company a conditional use permit, are null and void.
It appears, however, that so far as here material the charter contemplates three situations, or means (apparently mutually exclusive since procedure for each is detailed in the charter), under or by which action relative to zoning matters may be taken: (1) The "creation" of zones or "the changing, amending or altering of any such zones" (§ 97 (c)); (2) the "granting of variances" (§ 98(c)); (3) "changes to zoning ordinances" (§ 98(b)). Several problems are thus presented: First, does the granting of "conditional use" permits fall within any of the three situations so designated by the charter? Second, if so, does the procedure laid down by the ordinances attacked by plaintiff comply with charter provisions? Third, if either the granting of conditional use permits or the ordinance procedure is not expressly authorized by the charter, is either or are both forbidden by it? Plaintiffs concede that the charter operates "as a limitation and not a grant of power, and hence should be strictly construed [against the limitation]. The city charter of the city of Los Angeles comes within this rule." (Thille v. Board of Public Works of City of Los Angeles (1928), 82 Cal.App. 187, 189 [255 P. 294]; see, also, West Coast Advertising Co. v. San Francisco (1939), 14 Cal.2d 516, 522 [95 P.2d 138]; City of Oakland v. Williams (1940), 15 Cal.2d 542, 549- 550 [103 P.2d 168].) Section 2 of the charter itself provides that "The City of Los Angeles ... shall have the right and power, subject to the restrictions in this charter contained: ... (4) to make and enforce all laws and regulations in respect to municipal affairs, subject only to the restrictions and limitations provided in this charter ..." The charter further states, in section 21, that "All legislative power of the city except as herein otherwise provided is vested in the Council and shall be exercised by ordinance, subject to the power of veto or approval by the Mayor as herein set forth. Other action of the Council may be by order or resolution, upon motion." (Italics added.)
Plaintiffs have not attacked the procedure followed in the adopting either of ordinance 90500--hereinafter sometimes referred to as the Zoning Plan of the city--under which they claim protection, or of ordinance 91503 (which amends, or "changes," subsection C of section 12.24 of the Zoning Plan). Consequently we must assume that each of such ordinances was submitted to the planning commission for consideration [34 Cal.2d 622] prior to adoption by the council (charter, §§ 97(c), 98 (b)), and is valid insofar as concerns adoption procedure.
Defendants' viewpoint appears sound and is supported by the recent case of Wheeler v. Gregg (1949), 90 Cal.App.2d 348, 363 [203 P.2d 37] (hearing denied), in which the court, in considering the same section 12.24 of the same ordinance (Comprehensive Zoning Plan) here involved, especially "noted that conditional use permits are confined to uses of public concern, such as airports, cemeteries ... By the specific terms of the ordinance such uses are permitted in any zoning district subject only to a finding by the planning commission, in the first instance, or the city council on appeal, that the use is essential or desirable to the public convenience or welfare. The decision to grant a conditional use permit does not create a new zone. It merely affirms as a fact the existence of the circumstances under which the ordinance by its terms prescribes that such permit shall issue." [34 Cal.2d 623]
[3] It should be borne in mind throughout our discussion that the granting of either a "use" permit or a "variance" permit is administrative or quasi-judicial, rather than legislative, action (see Johnston v. Board of Supervisors (1947), 31 Cal.2d 66, 73-74 [187 P.2d 686]; Wheeler v. Gregg (1949), supra, 90 Cal.App.2d 348, 362-363; North Side etc. Assn. v. Hillside etc. Park (1945), 70 Cal.App.2d 609, 616 [161 P.2d 618]) and may be accomplished by resolution rather than by ordinance without violating charter section 21, quoted hereinabove.
We are satisfied that defendants are correct on this point. Aside from the difference in language between the variance provisions of the charter and the conditional use provisions of the Zoning Plan, which indicates the difference in character of the purposes sought to be accomplished, the case of Johnston v. Board of Supervisors (1947), supra, 31 Cal.2d 66, 73, recognizes that a "use permit" and a "variance" are not the same and at least suggests that the granting of the latter involves a "broader power" than does the granting of a use permit. Also, Wheeler v. Gregg (1949), supra, 90 Cal.App.2d 348, 363, makes the distinction with respect to the same Los Angeles ordinance which we are considering here. (See, also, Thomson v. Tafel (1949), 309 Ky. 753 [218 S.W.2d 977, 981]; Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Fox (1949), 402 Ill. 617 [85 N.E.2d 43, 50].) It therefore appears that the variance provisions of charter section 98 neither encompass nor prohibit the granting of the conditional use here in controversy. [34 Cal.2d 624]
We hold that the granting of the conditional use permit to defendant did not violate and was not prohibited by the charter. [7] However, as was held in Maguire v. Hibernia S. & L. Soc. (1944), 23 Cal.2d 719, 728-731 [146 P.2d 673, 151 A.L.R. 1062] (see, also, Columbia Pictures Corp. v. DeToth (1945), 26 Cal.2d 753, 760 [161 P.2d 217, 162 A.L.R. 747]), rather than a judgment of dismissal the trial court should have entered its judgment decreeing expressly (as is implied by the judgment of dismissal) that the plaintiffs are not entitled to the declarations in their favor, which they seek. [34 Cal.2d 625] Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is modified by: (A) Striking therefrom the words reading "the plaintiffs take nothing by this action and that the same is hereby dismissed," and inserting in lieu thereof the words: "the resolution adopted in March, 1948, by the Council of the City of Los Angeles, granting the application of the defendant Forest Lawn Company, a corporation, for a conditional use permit for cemetery purposes, and applying to that certain land owned by the defendant corporation and more particularly described in plaintiffs' complaint, is not null or void, and does not violate and is not prohibited by the charter of the City of Los Angeles; and that the conditional use permit issued pursuant to such resolution is valid as against all contentions of plaintiffs at issue in this suit"; and (B) Striking from the final paragraph of such judgment of the trial court the words "of dismissal."
­FN 1. Section 12.24, after the amendment of subsection C, reads as follows:
­FN 2. So far as here material section 98 reads as follows: The Zoning Administrator "shall have the following powers and duties, subject, however, to the supervision and direction of the City Planning Commission as to matters of policy:
Fri, 01/13/1950 34 Cal.2d 614 Review - Civil Appeal Opinion issued
1 BRYANT ESSICK et al., Appellants, v. THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES et al. (Respondent)
Jan 13 1950 Opinion: Affirmed
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