Source: https://casetext.com/case/in-re-us-16
Timestamp: 2020-02-20 02:54:38
Document Index: 171284794

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3591', '§ 3593', '§ 3593', '§ 3593', '§ 3593', '§ 3594']

In re U.S., 197 F.3d 310 | Casetext
High ranking government officials, such as "[h]eads of government[al] agencies[,] are not normally subject to…
As mayor, Huether has greater duties and time constraints than an average witness. In re U.S., 197 F.3d 310,…
Full title:In re: United States of America; Janet Reno, Attorney General; and Eric…
197 F.3d 310 (8th Cir. 1999)
holding that "an internal policy [regarding death penalty procedures] 'confers no substantive rights on the accused' United States v. Moore, 822 F.2d 35, 38 (8 Cir.1987) (per curiam), and its implementation by DOJ 'cannot form the basis of a claim [by a defendant] that the prosecution was improper.'"
Counsel who presented argument on behalf of the petitioner was Gwynn X. Kinsey, Washington, D.C. Additional attorneys appearing on the petition were Margaret P. Griffey and Lane Liroff.
Counsel who presented argument on behalf of the respondent was Cathlee V. Compton, Little Rock, AR. Additional attorneys appearing on the response were Jack Lassiter and Pamela Epperson.
The Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994 provides procedures for federal capital cases. 18 U.S.C. § 3591(a) et seq. (Supp. II 1999). If the government decides to seek the death penalty in a federal criminal case, it must file and serve upon the defendant a notice of that intention at a "reasonable time" prior to trial. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a). The district court conducts a separate sentencing hearing to determine whether the death penalty will be imposed in cases where a defendant is found guilty of a capital count. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(b). Special findings on any aggravating or mitigating factor are to be returned by the jury, or the court if it is the factfinder 18 U.S.C. § 3593(d). The factfinder then makes the ultimate sentencing finding of death, life imprisonment without release, or some lesser sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(e). If the recommendation is "death or life imprisonment without possibility of release, the court shall sentence the defendant accordingly." 18 U.S.C. § 3594.
The district court denied the government's motion to quash. In its written opinion, the court suggested that the death penalty protocol contained in the Manual might be enforced by a criminal defendant under certain circumstances, rejected the privilege claims and the argument that Lee had failed to comply with the Touhy regulations, and decided that the sworn statements that Attorney General Reno had been unavailable and that Holder was authorized to act in her absence did not foreclose the need for discovery. The district court concluded that the DiGregory affidavit was insufficient to resolve questions of fact it considered relevant to Lee's motion to set aside the jury verdict and that further discovery from Reno and Holder was required before it would address the merits of Lee's motion.
The district court stated that additional discovery was required on the following issues:
[T]he whereabouts of the Attorney General on May 10, 1999, and the extent of her knowledge of, or participation in, the Protocol [;] whether the Defendant had an adequate opportunity to be heard; whether a recommendation was in fact made by the committee; whether the recommendation was conveyed to the individual vested with `final' authority; whether, if in fact the Attorney General did not participate, she was legally `absent' on that date; whether she specifically authorized the Deputy Attorney General to act in her stead in this case; and whether, after the fact, the Attorney General has reviewed the procedures and the decision of the Deputy Attorney General and approves or disapproves of the procedures used and agrees with or disagrees with the decision of the Deputy Attorney General.
Attorney General Reno and Deputy Attorney General Holder then filed a petition for a writ of mandamus, asking this court to intervene to protect them from the subpoenas issued in the district court. They argue that the circumstances of this case do not permit the particular discovery sought against them as high government officials and that Lee's argument that he has a due process right to enforce the death penalty protocol has no merit. Lee continues to assert a right to obtain more discovery before the resolution of his motion to set aside the jury's death verdict.
The district court has stayed the subpoenas pending this court's decision on the petition.
The writ of mandamus is an "extraordinary writ and `is not ordinarily available to a litigant to obtain appellate review of interlocutory discovery orders.'" In re Bieter, 16 F.3d 929, 931 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 599 (8th Cir. 1977)). Nonetheless, the writ is the appropriate remedy when there are "serious policy considerations . . . sufficiently compelling to require immediate appellate attention" and direct appeal cannot provide an adequate remedy. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The need for controlling the use of subpoenas against high government officials was recognized by the Supreme Court in United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421-22 (1941). In that case involving a subpoena directed to the Secretary of Agriculture, the Court stated that regular examination of high officials concerning the reasons for their official actions would undermine the integrity of the administrative process. Id. at 422. Other courts have reasoned similarly. Because "[h]igh ranking government officials have greater duties and time constraints than other witnesses . . . [they] `should not, absent extraordinary circumstances, be called to testify regarding their reasons for taking official actions.'" In re United States (Kessler), 985 F.2d 510, 512 (11th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (quoting Simplex Time Recorder Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 766 F.2d 575, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1985)). If other persons can provide the information sought, discovery will not be permitted against such an official. Id. at 513; see also In re FDIC, 58 F.3d 1055, 1062 (5th Cir. 1995) ("We think it will be the rarest of cases . . . in which exceptional circumstances can be shown where the testimony is available from an alternate witness."). Allegations that a high government official acted improperly are insufficient to justify the subpoena of that official unless the party seeking discovery provides compelling evidence of improper behavior and can show that he is entitled to relief as a result. See In re FDIC, 58 F.3d at 1062.
Petitioners argue that Lee has not established that no one else could provide the information he seeks from Reno and Holder and that the DiGregory affidavit provides all the facts Lee needs for the legal claim he is pursuing. Lee asserts that the district court found that only Reno and Holder can testify to "the transparency of the record; what Ms. Reno knew or did not know about the decision to move forward with Mr. Lee's penalty phase; whether Ms. Reno had issued standing orders that might permit the Deputy Attorney General to, contrary to protocol, make the final decision about Mr. Lee's penalty phase; and whether Ms. Reno was, in fact, legally `unavailable' on May 10, 1999, so that Mr. Holder could act in her absence." He further suggests that Reno and Holder could have offered testimony by stipulation or affidavit, and that the rules protecting high government officials should be relaxed in this case.
No case has ever held that the Accardi doctrine applies to the internal regulations of the DOJ. Courts have generally refrained from judicial review of asserted violations of DOJ policies or regulations because of the unique nature of prosecution and the "broad discretion" granted the Attorney General and federal prosecutors in their enforcement of the laws of the United States. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985)). See United States v. McVeigh, 944 F. Supp. 1478, 1483-84 (D. Colo. 1996). Many cases in this circuit and elsewhere have applied this principle in connection with the Petite policy, an internal DOJ policy that prohibits a federal prosecution `if the alleged criminality was an ingredient of a previous state prosecution against that person'" unless "specifically authorized in advance by the Department of Justice itself, upon a finding that the prosecution will serve `compelling interests of federal law enforcement.'" United States v. Basile, 109 F.3d 1304, 1308 (8th Cir. 1997) (quoting Thompson v. United States, 444 U.S. 248, 248 (1980) (per curiam)). This court has held that this internal policy "confers no substantive rights on the accused[,]" United States v. Moore, 822 F.2d 35, 38 (8th Cir. 1987) (per curiam), and its implementation by DOJ "cannot form the basis of a claim [by a defendant] that the prosecution was improper." United States v. Lester, 992 F.2d 174, 1308 (8th Cir. 1993).
Courts that have addressed directly whether the death penalty protocol described in the Manual creates any substantive or procedural rights enforceable by a defendant have held almost uniformly that it does not. Nichols v. Reno, 931 F. Supp. 748, 751 (D.Colo.), aff'd, 124 F.3d 1376 (10th Cir. 1997) (death penalty protocol does not create enforceable rights); see also United States v. McVeigh, 944 F. Supp. 1478, 1483-84 (D.Colo. 1996) (same); United States v. Feliciano, 998 F. Supp. 166, 169 (D.Conn. 1998) (same); United States v. Roman, 931 F. Supp. 960, 964 (D.R.I. 1996) (same); but see Walker v. Reno, 925 F. Supp. 124, 132 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (failure to follow protocol might provide basis to "remand the matter to the Attorney General for reconsideration[.]").
holding that "an internal policy [regarding death penalty procedures] 'confers no substantive rights on the accused' United States v. Moore, 822 F.2d 35, 38 (8th Cir.1987) (percuriam), and its implementation by DOJ 'cannot form the basis of a claim [by a defendant] that the prosecution was improper.'"
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