Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/92556/hendrickson-vs-apperson
Timestamp: 2017-04-23 16:03:34
Document Index: 528752780

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 4131', '§ 3', '§ 4131', '§ 4131', '§ 4131', 'Art. 8', '§ 2', '§ 4131']

Hendrickson Vs Apperson - Citation 92556 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Save as PDF Add a Tag Add a Note Semantics Visualize Hendrickson Vs. Apperson - Court Judgment	LegalCrystal Citationlegalcrystal.com/92556CourtUS Supreme CourtDecided OnNov-05-1917Case Number245 U.S. 105AppellantHendricksonRespondentAppersonExcerpt:.....a mandamus proceeding, the courts below directed the members of the fiscal court of the county to levy taxes to satisfy the judgment at the same time and by the same order which should provide for other county taxes and to place the tax bills for collection in the hands of the sheriff, and in case the sheriff, or successor, should not give bond and qualify, directed the county judge, when appointing a special collector, to include in his order of appointment a direction to collect both the levies to satisfy the judgment and all other levies of county taxes, and to continue such direction until a collector
should qualify and give bond, and to exact of him but one bond covering the collection of all the taxes. it was insisted, on behalf of the county that,..... Judgment:
A valid judgment was recovered against Taylor County, Kentucky, upon bonds which it had issued under a refunding act. 1 Acts Ky., 1877-78, p. 554. Under the law existing when the bonds were issued (Ky.Stats., 1894, § 4131), as construed by the highest court of the state, it was the duty of the county court when the office of sheriff was vacant to appoint a single collector, under a single bond, to collect all county taxes, including those levied to pay the county's debts. An amendment (Acts 1906, p. 153, § 3), as construed by the highest court of the state, authorized the county court to appoint more than one collector, under separate bonds, each charged with the duty of collecting such part of the taxes as should be designated in his appointment -- an arrangement which made it possible to evade the satisfaction of the county's debts without interrupting its revenue for general county purposes. In a mandamus proceeding, the courts below directed the members of the fiscal court of the county to levy taxes to satisfy the judgment at the same time and by the same order which should provide for other county taxes and to place the tax bills for collection in the hands of the sheriff, and in case the sheriff, or successor, should not give bond and qualify, directed the county judge, when appointing a special collector, to include in his order of appointment a direction to collect both the levies to satisfy the judgment and all other levies of county taxes, and to continue such direction until a collector
should qualify and give bond, and to exact of him but one bond covering the collection of all the taxes. It was insisted, on behalf of the county that, under the amendment, the county judge might appoint more than one collector and that his discretion in that regard could not be controlled by mandamus.
that the county's action in other cases, viewed with the present controversy, revealed well defined plans of its officials, in notorious operation long before the passage of the amendment, to avoid payment of the county's adjudicated indebtedness and a deliberate design to deprive its creditors of an efficacious remedy provided by law and incorporated into its contracts; that this Court could not ignore actual conditions. and ought not, through assumptions out of harmony with patent facts, to facilitate the practical destruction of admitted legal obligations; that the circumstances made it clear that the right to have taxes levied to discharge the judgment collected along with taxes for general county purposes was a substantial and valuable one, and that, accepting as this Court must the state court's construction of the laws involved, the amendment could not be sustained as a provision merely for the ordinary and orderly readjustment of administrative matters, but impaired the obligation of the contract under which the judgment creditors' bonds were. issued.
The circuit court of appeals affirmed the action of the district court, but upon a different view, following
Tucker et al. v. Hubbert,
196 F. 849, and
Graham v. Quinlan,
207 F. 268.
Petitioners maintain that § 4131, Kentucky Statutes, as amended in 1906 and construed by the Court of Appeals (
Commonwealth, etc. v. Moody,
150 Ky. 571), empowers the Taylor County Court to appoint one collector of all county taxes, or, if so advised, to designate more than one and direct each to collect certain taxes, under a bond covering only those specified, and that such discretion cannot be interfered with by mandamus.
Respondent maintains that, properly construed, § 4131 permits appointment of only one such collector, and that
It is stated without contradiction that, prior to 1906, § 4131 embodied the applicable statutory provision concerning a collector in effect when the refunding bonds were issued.
Kentucky General Statutes (1873) c. 92, Art. 8, § 2; Kentucky Statutes of 1894, § 4131.
Commonwealth, etc. v. Wade's Adm'r
(Oct.1907), 126 Ky. 791, the Court of Appeals held, that, under the original section, where there was no sheriff, only one person could be appointed to collect all county taxes.
Commonwealth, etc. v. Moody
(Nov.1912), 150 Ky. 571, the same court construed the amendment, and held, we are constrained to conclude, notwithstanding some grave doubts, that it authorized appointment of special collectors, each charged with the duty of collecting only some designated part of assessed county taxes. And, of course, this construction by the state's highest court must be accepted.
-553, through Mr. Justice Swayne, we said:
And see Seibert v. Lewis,
122 U. S. 294
Considered in the light of Taylor County's notable and repeated successful efforts to avoid payment of adjudicated indebtedness and also in connection with the present controversy, we think it clear that the right to have any tax levied to discharge respondent's claim collected along with taxes for general county purposes was a substantial and valuable one. The circumstances indicate a deliberate design upon the part of county officials to deprive its creditors of an efficacious remedy provided by law and incorporated into its contracts. To give the amendment the effect claimed would render easier of accomplishment well defined plans obviously designed to defeat proper judicial process and in notorious operation long before its passage. There is here something more than provision for the ordinary and orderly readjustment of administrative matters evidently intended to facilitate public business. Actual conditions cannot be ignored, and
The declarations of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky in
(pp. 801, 802) are illuminating. Referring to the appointment of a separate collector charged with the sole duty of collecting a special tax ostensibly levied to satisfy a judgment against Taylor County, it said:
The argument for petitioner, that the Refunding Act
of 1878 provided an exclusive remedy through application to the circuit court in case the county court should fail in its duty, is not well founded. The decisions of the Court of Appeals in
Muhlenburg County v. Morehead,
20 Ky.Law Rep. 376, and
Pennington v. Woolfolk,
79 Ky. 13, make it quite plain that an "attempt to impose on the circuit court or judge thereof the duty of levying and collecting taxes is unconstitutional and void" under the jurisprudence of Kentucky.