Source: http://tn.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20170104_0000003.ETN.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2018-07-20 22:07:44
Document Index: 671464031

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2255', '§ 924', '§ 2255', '§ 922', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924']

JAMES H. FARMER, Petitioner,
Before the Court is Petitioner's pro se motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 [Doc. 24]. He bases the request for relief on Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015), in which the Supreme Court held that the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), was unconstitutionally vague [Id.]. The United States responded in opposition on July 5, 2016 [Doc. 27]; Petitioner replied in turn on August 8, 2016 [Doc. 28]. For the reasons below, Petitioner's § 2255 motion [Doc. 24] will be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
In 2006, Petitioner pled guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) [Doc. 20]. Based on three prior Tennessee convictions-two for Class D burglary and one for attempted burglary-and two prior federal convictions for burglary of a pharmacy, the United States Probation Office deemed Petitioner to be an armed career criminal subject to the ACCA's fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence [Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) ¶¶ 27, 33, 34, 36, 37]. In accordance with that designation, this Court sentenced Petitioner to 188 months incarceration followed by five years' supervised release on June 22, 2006 [Doc. 20]. No direct appeal was taken and Petitioner's conviction became final for purposes of § 2255(f)(1) on July 10, 2006, at expiration of time to file such appeal.
Nine years and eleven months later-on May 18, 2016-this Court received the instant request for vacatur of Petitioner's sentence in light of the Johnson decision [Doc. 24].
II. TIMELINESS OF PETITIONER'S CLAIM
Section 2255(f) places a one-year statute of limitations on all petitions for collateral relief under § 2255 running from either: (1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final; (2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the movant was prevented from making a motion by such governmental action; (3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or (4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). Supreme Court precedent makes clear that Johnson's invalidation of the ACCA residual clause amounted to a new rule made retroactively applicable on collateral review. See Welch v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 1257, 1265 (U.S. 2016) (“Johnson is . . . a substantive decision and so has retroactive effect . . . in cases on collateral review.”); In re Windy Watkins, 810 F.3d 375, 380-81 (6th Cir. 2015) (finding Johnson constitutes a new substantive rule of constitutional law made retroactively applicable on collateral review and thus triggers § 2255(h)(2)'s requirement for certification of a second or successive petition). Petitioner submitted the instant petition within subsection (f)(3)'s window.
The ACCA mandates a fifteen-year sentence for any felon who unlawfully possesses a firearm after having sustained three prior convictions “for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both, committed on occasions different from one another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (emphasis added). The provision defines “serious drug offense” as any “offense under State law, involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance . . . for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). The Act goes on to define “violent felony” as “any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” that (1) “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another” (the “use-of-physical-force clause”); (2) “is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves the use of explosives” (the “enumerated-offense clause”); or (3) “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another” (the “residual clause”). 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). For purposes of § 924(e)(B)(2)(i), “the phrase ‘physical force' means violent force-that is, force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person.” Johnson v. United States, 130 S.Ct. 1265, 1271 (2010). Only the residual clause was held to be unconstitutionally vague by the Supreme Court in Johnson. 135 S.Ct. at 2563. The Court went on to make clear, however, that its decision did not call into question the remainder of the ACCA's definition of violent felony-the use-of-physical-force and enumerated-offense clauses. Id.; United States v. Priddy, 808 F.3d 676, 682-83 (6th Cir. 2015). Nor does Johnson disrupt the use of a prior serious drug offense as an independent form of ACCA predicate conviction. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, No. 10-CR-20058, 2015 WL 5729114, at *9-13 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 20, 2015) (noting that Johnson does not affect a defendant's categorization as an armed career criminal based on his or her prior serious drug offenses).
The validity of Petitioner's sentence thus depends on whether three or more of his prior convictions qualify as “serious drug offenses” under § 924(e)(2)(A) or, in alternative, “violent felonies” under one of the unaffected provisions of § 924(e)(2)(B). See, e.g., United States v. Ozier, 796 F.3d 597, 604 (6th Cir. 2015) (denying petition where conviction qualified as a predicate offense independent of the residual clause), overruled on other grounds by Mathis v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 2243, 2251 n.1 (2016). To determine whether an offense qualifies under one of the above provisions, courts must first identify the precise crime of conviction by employing a “categorical approach, ” looking “only to the statutory definitions-elements-of a defendant's prior offense, and not to the particular facts underlying [each individual] conviction[].” Descamps v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2276, 2283, 2285 (2013).
Review of Petitioner's PSR reveals that four of his prior convictions categorically qualify as ACCA predicate offenses independent of the now-defunct residual clause. As such, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate an entitlement to the requested collateral relief.
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;As an initial matter, binding Sixth Circuit precedent makes clear Petitioner&#39;s two prior Tennessee Class D burglary convictions remain violent felonies under the enumerated-offense clause [Doc. 27-1]. See, e.g., Priddy, 808 F.3d at 685 (finding that post-1989 Tennessee Class D burglary is categorically a violent felony under the ACCA&#39;s enumerated offense clause).[1 ...