Source: http://masslawyersweekly.com/fulltext-opinions/1990/01/01/sharpe-v-dormitzer/
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SHARPE v. DORMITZER | Full-text Opinions
Home / Fulltext Opinion / SHARPE v. DORMITZER	SHARPE v. DORMITZER
January 1, 1990	SHARPE
NO. 02-1848-B
KRISTEN DORMITZER
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF SHANNON SHARPE’S MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION OF MOTION FOR
The plaintiff, Shannon Sharpe, has moved reconsideration of the court’s Order of April 29, 2002 denying her motion for an order restraining and enjoining “the defendant, Kristen Dormitzer, her agents, representatives and/or designees from playing all or any portion of an play
tape which contains the voice of plaintiff Shannon Sharpe’s deceased mother, Karen Sharpe, on the nationally syndicated program Inside Edition scheduled for the week of April 29, 2002, and/or from utilizing all or any portion of the play
tape in any manner, at any other time, for her own pecuniary or financial gain.”[1] Shannon Sharpe alleges that the audiotape contains a message that Karen Sharpe left on Kristen Dormitzer’s home answering machine at an undetermined point prior Karen Sharpe’s murder on July 14, 2000.
Shannon Sharpe asserts that “the unauthorized use of the play
tape by defendant Dormitzer in pursuit of her own personal financial and pecuniary gain, or for any other purpose, constitutes an unreasonable, substantial and serious interference with the privacy of plaintiff, Shannon Sharpe, her younger siblings Michael and Alexandra Sharpe, and other members of the Sharpe and Hatfield families, in violation of G.L. c. 214, § 1B.”
The court held a hearing on the present motion on May 1, 2002. Shannon Sharpe was represented by counsel, who advised the court that he had served notice of the hearing on the motion (though the motion had not yet been filed) on Kristen Dormitzer at about 10:00 p.m. on April 30, 2002. Ms. Dormitzer, who had appeared at the first hearing on this matter on April 29, 2002 without counsel, had advised the court at that time that she was a college student and was in the midst of taking her final exams throughout the week.
In order to prevail on her request for preliminary injunctive relief, Shannon Sharpe must demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of her claim and a need for injunctive relief that rises to the level of a substantial risk of irreparable harm. The court must then balance that risk, assuming it exists, against any similar risk of irreparable harm which granting the injunction would create for the opposing party. Packaging Industries Group, Inc. v. Cheney, 380 Mass. 609, 617 (1980).
General Laws c. 214, § 1B provides that:
Upon the limited record before the court in the present case, Shannon Sharpe has not shown a likelihood of success on the merits of her claim that Kristen Dormitzer is or is about to violate G.L. c. 214, § 1B. First, it is not clear to the court that Shannon Sharpe has standing to assert a claim under G.L. c. 214, § 1B in the circumstances of this case. She is not seeking to prevent the public disclosure or dissemination of her own tape recorded voice, but rather that of her mother, who is now deceased. See Brauer v. Globe Newspaper Co., 351 Mass. 53, 58 (1966) (stating, prior to enactment of G.L. c. 214, § 1B, that it is doubtful “that a cause of action may accrue to anyone other than the immediate victim of an invasion of privacy”); Kelley v. Post Pub. Co., 327 Mass. 275, 277-279 (1951) (holding parents could not recover for invasion of privacy against newspaper that published picture of their daughter’s dead body).
Shannon Sharpe has apparently not listened to or heard the audiotape, and she is apparently unable to describe the nature or contents of the audiotape. Nor has she sought, through discovery, even on an expedited basis, to secure a copy or transcript of the audiotape. Thus, the court is not in a position to determine whether the tape itself contains any matter which would appropriately be considered private, or which would bring the audiotape within the ambit of the statute.[2] See Warner-Lambert Co. v. Execuquest Corp., 427 Mass. 46, 50 (“G.L. c. 214, § 1B, protects against the ‘disclosure of facts about an individual that are of a highly personal or intimate nature’”), quoting Bratt v. International Business Machs. Corp., 392 Mass. 508, 518 (1984); see also Kelley v. Post Pub. Co., 327 Mass. at 278 ( “The law does not provide a remedy for every annoyance that occurs in everyday life. Many things which are distressing or may be lacking in propriety or good taste are not actionable”).
Nor is it clear that one can claim a right of privacy in the voice of another individual, apart from whatever words that voice may have spoken. Karen Sharpe apparently voluntarily and knowingly left a message on Kristen Dormitzer’s answering machine. If so, it would appear doubtful that Karen Sharpe herself intended or expected that her message would be kept private.[3] See Commonwealth v. Cote, 407 Mass. 827, 833-834 (1990) (defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in phone messages left at answering service). Put another way, Karen Sharpe presumably understood that she did not have control over Kristen Dormitzer’s ability to do as she wished with the audiotape or its recorded message. See Schlesinger v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 409 Mass. 514, 521 (1991) (“a person may relinquish a privacy right by engaging in certain activities, or by placing himself in certain contexts where his legitimate expectation of privacy is reduced”); Commonwealth v. Eason, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 114, 121 (1997) (stating rational for Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy is that a speaker voluntarily assumes that the listener may broadcast conversation to others).
Finally, Shannon Sharpe contends that disclosure of her mother’s voice on the tape, as well as the private facts and information on the tape, “would be highly offensive to me, my younger siblings, Michael and Alexandra, and other members of my family.” While the court is sympathetic to Shannon Sharpe’s plight, Karen Sharpe’s murder, and the trial of her estranged husband, Richard Sharpe for that murder, have been highly publicized in the media for a substantial period of time. See George W. Prescott Publishing Co. v. Register of Probate for Norfolk County, 395 Mass. 274, 278-279 (1985) (right to privacy must be balanced against public’s interest); see also Boston Herald Inc. v. Sharpe, 432 Mass. 593, 612 (2000) (stating that subject matter, the same that is involved here, was of legitimate public concern, thus no invasion of privacy). At the very least, a determination of the degree of privacy to which Shannon Sharpe and her family are entitled under the statute in the circumstances on this case is difficult to judge on the present limited record.
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff Shannon Sharpe’s Motion for Reconsideration of Motion for Temporary Restraining Order is DENIED.
[1] Shannon Sharpe’s first motion for injunctive relief was denied by the court after a hearing on April 29, 2002, for her failure to file an affidavit or verified complaint in support of that motion. See Mass. R. Civ. P. 65(a).
[2] The sole factual basis for Shannon Sharpe’s request for injunctive relief is a conversation that she had with her uncle, James Hatfield, about a conversation that he allegedly had with one Rick Kramer, a producer for Inside Edition, about his apparent intention to include the audiotape, or a portion of it, in a feature story on Kristen Dormitzer that he apparently intended to produce and broadcast in the near future. Thus, Shannon Sharpe’s application for injunctive relief is supported solely by totem pole hearsay statements made on information and belief.
[3] Nothing in the record suggests that Karen Sharpe indicated her desire to keep the message confidential or that it was intended solely for Kristen Dormitzer.