Source: http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/942/680/282194/
Timestamp: 2017-09-19 11:51:53
Document Index: 415870725

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 841', '§ 846', '§ 1291', '§ 2', '§ 3', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Mark Wayne Kelso, Defendant-appellant, 942 F.2d 680 (9th Cir. 1991) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Ninth Circuit › 1991 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Mark Wayne Kelso, Defendant-appellant
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Mark Wayne Kelso, Defendant-appellant, 942 F.2d 680 (9th Cir. 1991)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 942 F.2d 680 (9th Cir. 1991)
Submitted March 8, 1991. *Decided Aug. 21, 1991
Mark Wayne Kelso pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess a controlled substance with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1) and § 846. He appeals the sentence imposed under the Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines"). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and reverse.
To arrive at a sentence after the guilty plea, the district court employed a base level of 30 pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c). The base level was reduced by 2 points for acceptance of responsibility, U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, and increased by two points for possession of a firearm in connection with the conspiracy. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b) (1). Kelso was found to have a criminal history category of VI, and was sentenced to 168 months.
Kelso argues that there is no evidence he possessed the firearm and thus the § 2D1.1(b) (1) enhancement was improper. We review the district court's finding that Kelso possessed a firearm during the commission of a narcotics offense for clear error. United States v. Garcia, 909 F.2d 1346, 1349 (9th Cir. 1990).
Kelso asserted in his presentence statement, and at the sentencing hearing, that he had no knowledge of the weapon. Despite Kelso's objections, the district court found that because the loaded weapon was in close proximity to the drugs and was within Kelso's reach the gun was in his possession for the purpose of § 2D1.1(b) (1). The court also based its analysis of the facts on Kelso's criminal record, which contained a series of narcotics violations and at least two offenses involving guns. The court held that it was not improbable,2 given the facts here and Kelso's criminal history, that he was aware of the weapon and that he intended to employ it if any problems arose during the narcotics deal.
Under the Sentencing Guidelines, a trial court is required to apply the § 2D1.1(b) (1) enhancement if it finds that "a firearm or other dangerous weapon was possessed during the commission of the offense...." This enhancement "reflects the increased danger of violence when drug traffickers possess weapons." § 2D1.1, Comment. (n. 3).
In this case, there is no question that the firearm was present during the commission of the offense. It was located in the same bag, along with extra ammunition, as the narcotics intended to be distributed. The question here is who possessed the gun? The government does not argue, and indeed there is no evidence, that Kelso had actual physical possession of the weapon. To apply the § 2D1.1(b) (1) enhancement, then, Kelso must have had constructive possession of the weapon. To demonstrate constructive possession
the government must prove "a sufficient connection between the defendant and the contraband to support the inference that the defendant exercised dominion and control over the substance." United States v. Disla, 805 F.2d 1340, 1350 (9th Cir. 1986). It is not the same as merely knowing the weapon is nearby. "The circumstances of each case must be examined to determine if there is 'such a nexus or relationship between the defendant and the goods that it is reasonable to treat the extent of the defendant's dominion and control as if it were actual possession.' " United States v. Cousins, 427 F.2d 382, 384 (9th Cir. 1970) (quoting United States v. Casalinuovo, 350 F.2d 207, 209-11 (2nd Cir. 1965)).
United States v. Terry, 911 F.2d 272, 278 (9th Cir. 1990).3
In view of the above, it was clear error for the district court to find Kelso was in "possession" of the weapon for the purpose of § 2D1.1(b) (1). We reverse and remand for resentencing in accordance with this opinion.
Application Note 3 to Guideline § 2D1.1(b) (1) states: "The enhancement for weapons possession reflects the increased danger of violence when drug traffickers possess weapons. The adjustment should be applied if the weapon was present, unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense."
Alternatively, the adjustment would have been appropriate if the district court had found that possession by Kelso's co-conspirator had been reasonably foreseeable to Kelso. See United States v. Garcia, 909 F.2d 1346, 1349-50 (9th Cir. 1990)