Source: http://www.juricaf.org/arret/CONSEILDELEUROPE-COUREUROPEENNEDESDROITSDELHOMME-19820709-902480-931781
Timestamp: 2016-12-09 06:19:32+00:00
Document Index: 208715830

Matched Legal Cases: ['arrêt ', "l'article 6", "l'article 173", "l'article 268", "l'article 500", "l'article 268", "l'article 173", "l'article 557", "l'article 6", "l'article 268", "l'article 268", "l'article 26", "l'article 26", "l'article 13", "l'article 6", "l'article 6", "l'article 26", "l'article 6", "l'article 6", "l'article 6"]

COLOZZA et RUBINAT c. ITALIE
Page d'accueil > Résultats de la recherche COLOZZA et RUBINAT c. ITALIE
Type d'affaire : DecisionType de recours : Partiellement recevable ; Partiellement irrecevableNumérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 9024/80;9317/81Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1982-07-09;9024.80 Analyses : (Art. 34) RECOURS, (Art. 34) VICTIME, (Art. 6-1) DELAI RAISONNABLEParties : Demandeurs : COLOZZA et RUBINATDéfendeurs : ITALIETexte : APPLICATIONS/REQUiTES Nos 9024/80 & 9317/81 Ooined/jointes ) Giacinto COLOZZA and Pedro RUBINAT v/ITAL Y
Giacinto COLOZZA et Pedro RUBINAT c/ITALI E DECISION of 9 July 1982 on the admissibility of the applications DÃCISION du 9 juillet 1982 sur la recevabilitÃ© des requÃªte s
Article 6 of the Convention : Questiorr whether proceedings in abstentia ttnder the Itahun criminal Code of procedure are compmible with Anic(e 6 us a whole . (Complaint declared admissible) . Article 13 of the Convention : Existence of an effective remedy assessed in concreto . Article 26 of the Convention : a) Nnn-exlmustiun of domestic remedies cannot be held against the applicant if in spite of the latter's failure tn . observe rlre forrns prescribed bv latv, the competent atuhori(v has nevertheless examined the appeal . b) bt /Yalv, the applicant does not have tn challenge the constitutionality of a provision applied to hint . if that provision has alreadv been considered constitutional and the complaint concerrrs in reality the iruerpretation given to it by the competent audtoritv. c) Six rnonths period interrupted by the applicant's first letter, even if he has subsequent(v suspended his correspondence. while he lried a dontestic remedv .
Article 6 de la Convention : Questiou de la crornputibilitÃ©, avec !'ensemble des dispositions de l'article 6, de la proc'Ã©dure pÃ©nale itnnierene par contuntace. (Grief dÃ©clarÃ© recevable) . Art icle 13 de la Convention : Eristence d'un recours effectif apprÃ©ciÃ©e in corrcreto.
Article 26 de la Convention : a) On ue suurait opposer au requÃ©rant le non-Ã©puisernent des
recours internes si. nonobstant ( 'inobse rvation par lui des forrnes prescrites, le recours a nÃ©anmoins Ã©tÃ© examinÃ© par !'autoritÃ© contpÃ©tenle.
b) En halie, le requÃ©rant n'a pus Ã¹ soulever !'inconstitutionnalitÃ© de la disposition qui lui es i appliquÃ©e. lorsque celle-ci a dÃ©jÃ Ã©tÃ© reconnue coufornne d lu Constitution et que le grief porte en rÃ©afilÃ© sur l'interprÃ©tation qui lui est donnÃ©e pur l'autoritÃ© corupÃ©tente. c) Cours du dÃ©lai de six trtois interrompu par la premiÃ¨re lettre du requÃ©ra n alors ntÃ©tne que celui-ci a ensuite suspendu sa correspondance pendant n. qu Ã¯( teutait un recours interne .
(Englisb : see p. 149 )
Les faits de la cause, tels qu'ils ont Ã©tÃ© exposÃ©s par les requÃ©rants, peuvent se rÃ©sumer comnie suit : A . RequÃªte de M . Giacinto Colozza (nÂ° 9024/80 ) Giacinto Colozza est un ressortissant italien nÃ© le 26 juillet 1924 Ã Rome oÃ¹ il rÃ©side habituellenient . Il exerce la profession d'agent d'affaires (Â«commercialista .) . Au moment de l'introduction de la requÃ©te il Ã©tait dÃ©tenu Ã la prison de Viterbe .
Pour la procÃ©dure devant la Contntission, il est reprÃ©sentÃ© par Me Angelo Miele, avocat au barreau de Rome . Le requÃ©rant fut poursuivi pour escroquerie suite Ã des plaintes dÃ©posÃ©es par des personnes qui l'accusaient de s'Ãªtre fait passer pour un avocat attachÃ© auprÃ¨s de l'administration coniniunale de Rome et . en cette qualitÃ©, de s'Ãªtre fait remettre des sommes d'argent en contrepartie de proniesses d'attribution d'un logement H .L .M . Le parquet ouvrit une instruction contre le requÃ©rant qui fut tou t d'abord recherchÃ© Ã son domicile connu . Il apparut toutefois que le requÃ©rant en avait Ã©tÃ© expulsÃ© par le propriÃ©taire, que ses meubles avaient Ã©tÃ© saisis et confiÃ©s Ã l'administrateur de l'imnieuble . Ni ce dernier, ni les autres personnes interrogÃ©es ne furent en mesure de fournir la nouvelle adresse du requÃ©rant . Par ailleurs, le domicile mentionnÃ© aux registres de l'Ã©tat civil n'Ã©tait plus celui du requÃ©rant depuis longteinps . ce dernier ayant omis d'effectuei auprÃ¨s des autoritÃ©s compÃ©tenles une dÃ©claration de changement de domicile . Les recherches ultÃ©rieures confiÃ©es aux autoritÃ©s de police Ã©tant demeurÃ©es vaines, le juge d'instruction Ã©mit le 14 novembre 1973 un dÃ©cret dÃ©clarant le requÃ©rant introuvable (â¢irreperibile . ) .
Le 12 novembre 1974 le juge d'instruction dÃ©livra contre le requÃ©rant un ntandat d'arrÃ©t, qui . comme les mandats Ã©mis successivement les 30 mai et 3 juin 1975, resta sans effet malgrÃ© les recherches supplÃ©mentaires effectuÃ©es par les autoritÃ©s de police . Le 30 juillet 1975, les autoritÃ©s de police transmirent au juge d'instruction un procÃ¨s-verbal de vaines recherches . Pour la suite de la procÃ©dure le requÃ©rant fut considÃ©rÃ© comme Ã©tant en fuite (â¢ latitante â¢)' . Le juge d'instruction lui nomma un dÃ©fenseur d'office . La procÃ©dure pÃ©nale qui dans le cas oÃ¹ l'accusÃ© est dÃ©clarÃ© â¢latitanteâ¢ est, en droit italien, rÃ©putÃ©e contradictoire, suivit son cours'lToutes les notifications relatives Ã la procÃ©dure pÃ©nale ouverte contre le requÃ©rant furent notifiÃ©es dans les formes prexcrites dans ce cas par l'article 173 du code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale . par dÃ©pÃ´t au greffe du tribunal et avis au dÃ©fenseur nommÃ© d'office . Le requÃ©rant lut renvoyÃ© en jugement devant le tribunal de Rome le 9 aoÃ»t 1975 . La premiÃ¨re audience fixÃ©e pour le procÃ¨s dut Ã©tre reportÃ©e car ni l'accusÃ©, ni le dÃ©fenseur nommÃ© d'office ne se prÃ©sentÃ¨rent devant le tribunal . Ce dernier, aprÃ¨s avoir dÃ©signÃ© Ã nouveau un dÃ©fenseur d'office au requÃ©rant, ajourna le procÃ¨s au 26 novembre 1976 . Deux audiences eurent lieu dans cette affaire, les 26 novembre et 17 dÃ©cembre 1976 . Au cours de la seconde audience l'avocat nommÃ© au requÃ©rant ne se prÃ©senta pas . Un autre avocat fut alors dÃ©signÃ© par le tribunal . Il s'associa au rÃ©quisitoire prÃ©sentÃ© par le MinistÃ¨re public . Ce mÃªme jour le tribunal rendit son jugement . Il condamna le requÃ©rant Ã une peine de six ans d'emprisonnement et Ã 600 .000 lires d'amende . Le jugement fut dÃ©posÃ© au greffe du tribunal le 29 dÃ©cembre 1976 . L'avis de dÃ©pÃ´t du jugement au greffe fut notifiÃ© au dernier dÃ©fenseur d'office du requÃ©rant . Le tribunal en ordonna, en outre, la publication par extrait dans deux journaux de Rome, â¢Paese Seraâ¢ et .11 Tempoâ¢ . â¢ Aux termes de l'article 268 du Code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale italien, est considÃ©rÃ© comme â¢latitanteâ¢, â¢toute personne qui se soustrait volontairement Ã l'exÃ©cution d'un mandat d'arrÃªt . . ." En droit italien, il peut y avoir dans les procÃ¨s in absentia, rÃ©putÃ©s contradictoires, deux â¢profils . juridiques de l'accusÃ© absent : - le â¢contumax - : lorsque l'accusÃ© auquel la citation Ã comparaPtre a Ã©tÃ© notifiÃ©e dans les formes et dÃ©lais prescrits par la loi ne se prÃ©sente pzs Ã l'audience, s'il n'est pas prouvÃ© que son absence est due Ã une impossibilitÃ© absolue de comparaitre pour empÃªchement lÃ©gitime . Dans ce cas, aux termes de l'article 500 du CPP . le jugement est notifiÃ© Ã l'accusÃ© par extrait, Ã son domicile, et peut Ã©tre attaquÃ© dans les trois jours qui suivent la notification (anicle 199 du CPP . 3â¢ alinÃ©a) . - le â¢latitanteâ¢ : lorsque l'accusÃ© s'est volontairement soustrait Ã l'exÃ©cution d'un mandat d'arrestation . Dans ce cas Ã©galement le jugement est notifiÃ© par extrait .
Le 29 septembre 1977 le requÃ©rant fut arrÃªtÃ© . A cette date, le jugement rendu par le t ri bunal de Rome Ã©tait passÃ© en force de chose jugÃ©e depuis le 16 janvier 1977 . Toutefois le requÃ©rant souleva devant ce mÃªme tribunal un incident d'exÃ©cution visant Ã l'annulation du titre de dÃ©tention et dÃ©posa en mÃªme temps une dÃ©claration d'appel apparemment tardif visant Ã l'annulation du jugement* . Il faisait valoir par lÃ que les notifications n'Ã©taient pas rÃ©guliÃ¨res en ce qu'il avait Ã©tÃ© Ã tort dÃ©clarÃ© .latitante ., c'est-Ã -dire comme s'Ã©tant volontairement soustrait Ã l'exÃ©cution d'un mandat d'arrÃªt (art . 268 du code pÃ©nal) . En consÃ©quence, la notification du jugement devait Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ©e comme non avenue et celui-ci n'avait pas pu passer en force de chose jugÃ©e . L'incident d'exÃ©cution fut rejetÃ© le 29 avril 1978 . Par ailleurs le tribunal transmit le dossier Ã la cour d'appel de Rome afin qu'elle statue sur l'appel apparemment tardif, interjetÃ© par le requÃ©rant . Le requÃ©rant fit valoir qu'ayant reÃ§u congÃ© de son propriÃ©taire, il avait habitÃ© quelques mois Ã l'hÃ´tel avant de s'installer Ã l'adresse Ã laquelle il avait Ã©tÃ© arrÃªtÃ© . Il souligna que son adresse Ã©tait parfaitement connue des autoritÃ©s de police, qui lui avaient notifiÃ© Ã ce mÃªme domicile un avis de poursuites du parquet de Rome concernant d'autres faits . Il demandait Ã©galement de pouvoir apporter la preuve qu'il ne s'Ã©tait pas volontairement soustrait Ã l'exÃ©cution d'un mandat d'arrÃªt et n'Ã©tait donc pas â¢ latitante . au sens de l'article 268 du code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale italien .
Le Procureur gÃ©nÃ©ral prÃ¨s la cour d'appel requit Ã©galement l'annulation du jugement . Le 10 novembre 1978, la cour d'appel de Rome considÃ©ra que l'appel Ã©tait imecevable car les motifs Ã l'appui de ce dernier avaient Ã©tÃ© prÃ©sentÃ©s tardivement . Le requÃ©rant se pou rv ut en cassation contre cette dÃ©cision . Le 5 novembre 1979, la Cour de cassation rejeta le pou rv oi . Elle affirma, il est vrai, que la cour d'appel avait Ã to rt dÃ©clarÃ© le pou rv oi irrecevable pour prÃ©sentation tardive des motifs de l'appel sans examiner au prÃ©alable si au cou rs du jugement de premiÃ¨re instance la nullitÃ© d'ordre gÃ©nÃ©ral allÃ©guÃ©e par le requÃ©rant, Ã savoir qu'il aurait Ã©tÃ© dÃ©clarÃ© .latitante . Ã tort, s'Ã©tait ou no n â¢ II faut ici distinguer entre demande de rÃ©ouverture des dÃ©lais (article 183 du Code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale) et appel apparemment tardif . En effet la premiÃ¨re suppose que les notifications ont Ã©tÃ© effectuÃ©es en bonne et due fonne mais qu'un cas fortuit ou de force majeure a empÃªchÃ© l'intÃ©ressÃ© d'observer les dÃ©lais utiles pour l'introduction de l'appel, alors que le second suppose que les notifications n'Ã©taient pas rÃ©gutiÃ©res et que, par consÃ©quent, les dÃ©lais n'ont pas pu courir l'appel ne serait donc tardif qu'en apparence .
vÃ©rifiÃ©e . Ce n'est qu'en l'absence d'une telle nullitÃ© de caractÃ¨re gÃ©nÃ©ral que l'appel pouvait Ãªtre dÃ©clarÃ© irrecevable pour prÃ©sentation tardive des motifs . Toutefois la Cour de cassation rejeta le pou rv oi . Elle estima en effet qu'en l'espÃ¨ce une telle nullitÃ© ne s'Ã©tait pas vÃ© ri fiÃ©e car le t ri bunal de Rome avait, Ã bon droit, dÃ©clarÃ© le requÃ©rant tout d'abord .irrepe ri ble ., puis â¢latitanteâ¢ et que l'appel Ã© tait bien irrecevable car l'appel lui-mÃªme Ã©tait tardif . En effet, selon la ju ri sprudence constante de la Cour de cassation, .la volontÃ© de se soustraire Ã l'arrestation est prÃ©sumÃ©e, lorsque les recherches adÃ©quates effectuÃ©es par la police judiciaire sont demeurÃ©es vaines .' . Cette prÃ©somption ne tombe pas du fait que la personne recherchÃ©e n'a pas utilisÃ© d'artifices pa rticuliers pour se soustraire Ã l'arrestation, aprÃ¨s avoir transfÃ©rÃ© son domicile ailleurs sans avoir effectuÃ© les dÃ©clarations de changement de domicile prÃ©vues par la loi ( Sez . 111, 12 mars 1973, NÂ° 559 . Rep . 1974, 3440 ; Sez . IV, 20 octobre 1975, NÂ° 3195, Rep . 19743, 4897 ; Cass . pen . mass . 1972, 1959) . Les griefs du requÃ©rant peuvent se rÃ©sumer comme suit : Le requÃ©rant se plaint de n'avoir Ã aucun moment eu connaissance de la procÃ©dure ouverte contre lui, de n'avoir donc pas eu la possibilitÃ© de se dÃ©fendre de faÃ§on concrÃ¨te et effective, et de n'avoir pas eu de recours effectif contre la condamnation prononcÃ©e par le tribunal de Rome . condamnation dont il ne connaissait pas l'existence .
B . RequÃªte de M . Pedro Rubinat (NÂ° 9317/81 ) Le requÃ©rant, Pedro Rubinat . est un ressortissant espagnol . nÃ© le 23 septembre 1933 Ã Barcelone . Au moment de l'introduction de la requ@te il Ã©tait dÃ©tenu Ã la prison de Civitavecchia (Italie) . Pour la procÃ©dure devant la Commission il est reprÃ©sentÃ© par Maitre Giorgio Barile, avocat Ã Viterbe et par MaÃ®tre Joaquin Ruiz Jimenez, avocat Ã Madrid . Le 27 avril 1972, le parquet de GÃªnes fut informÃ© par les autoritÃ©s de police que dans l'aprÃ¨s-midi un marin, ressortissant nicaraguÃ©en . dÃ©nommÃ© Tercero, avait Ã©tÃ© mortellement blessÃ© d'un coup de couteau Ã la gorge dan s
â¢ D'aprÃ¨s la Cour de cassation . le terme . recherches adÃ©quates , implique de la part des autoritÃ©s de police judiciaire, un pouvoir discrÃ©tionnaire qui trouve cependant une limite dans l'obligation de rechercher la personne Ã la rÃ©sidence indiquÃ©e dans le mandat d-arrÃ©t ( Sez . I1, sent . 19 .10 .1978, nÂ° 12968. nÂ° 140224) . Contra, une jurisprudence antÃ© ri eure de la Cour de cassation ( Sez . II, pen . du 30 .7 .1965, nÂ° 1415) . aux termes de laquelle pour l'application de l'article 173 du Code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale, l'accusÃ© ne peut Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ© .latitanteâ¢, que lorsqu'il est conscient de l'exercice imminent d'un pouvoir de restriction Ã sa libertÃ© personnelle et adopte un comportement visant Ã rendre vain le commandement de l'auto ri tÃ© .
une pension de G@nes par un individu qui avait pris la fuite mais avait pu Ãªtre identifiÃ© comme Ã©tant Pedro Rubinat . le requÃ©rant . Le mandat d'arr@t Ã©mis le 28 avril 1972 contre le requÃ©rant resta sans effet et les recherches effectuÃ©es par Interpol demeurÃ¨rent vaines . Toutefois, en l'absence de l'inculpÃ© l'action pÃ©nale suivit son cours . Ainsi, le 25 noventbre 1974, la cour d'assises de GÃªnes, statuant par dÃ©faut, dÃ©clara le requÃ©rant .auquel un avocat d'office avait Ã©tÃ© nomniÃ©, coupable d'homicide volontaire . et le condamna Ã 21 ans de rÃ©clusion . La version des faits adoptÃ©e en premier ressort par le cour d'assises, fondÃ©e notamment sur la dÃ©position du tÃ©moin Taglieri, est la suivante : Tercero, qui logeait dÃ©jÃ depuis un certain temps dans la pension oÃ¹ eu t lieu le crime . avait prÃ©sentÃ© le matin mÃªme le requÃ©rant au gÃ©rant de la pension Taglieri . comme Ã©tant un ami avec lequel il envisageait de partager la chantbre qu'il occupait Ã la pension . Les deux hommes avaient ensuite dÃ©jeunÃ© ensemble, fort cordialement, dans le cafÃ©-restaurant situÃ© au rez-de-chaussÃ©e de la pension . AprÃ¨s le dÃ©jeuner, ils s'Ã©taient rendus dans la chambre occupÃ©e par Tercero . Peu de temps aprÃ¨s, le gÃ©rant de la pension fut averti qu'une violente dispute avait Ã©clatÃ© . Accouru sur les tieux, il avait constatÃ© que les bruits provenaient de la . chanibre de Rubinat, qui Ã©tait verrouillÃ©e de l'intÃ©rieur . Le gÃ©rant avait alors dÃ©foncÃ© la porte et vu Rubinat ensanglantÃ©, un couteau dans la main droite, qui rÃ©pÃ©tait .un million, un millionÂ» et Tercero couven de sang qui appelait Ã l'aide . MalgrÃ© son Ã©tat ce dernier avait rÃ©ussi Ã s'enfuir . Rubinat se lanÃ§a Ã sa poursuite mais revint quelques instants plus tard sans l'avoir rattrapÃ© . II commanda un taxi, se fit conduire Ã Savona, puis dans une pension de Spotorno oÃ¹ il changea de vÃªtements avant de partir pour une destination inconnue .
Le jugentent de la cour d'assises fut confirmÃ© le 28 juin 1976 par la cour d'assises d'appel de GÃ©nes, statuant Ã©galement par dÃ©faut . devant laquelle l'avocat d'office commis au requÃ©rant soutint Ã nouveau la thÃ¨se selon laquelle le requÃ©rant ne pouvait pas Ãªtre condamnÃ© pour homicide volontaire, certains faits dÃ©montrant qu'il n'avait pas eu l'intention de donner la mort . Le 31 mai 1976, le mÃªme avocat se pourvut en cassation contre l'arrÃªt de la cour d'assises . Toutefois . n'Ã©tant pas habilitÃ© Ã exercer devant la Cour de cassation . il fut remplacÃ© pour les besoins de l'examen du pourvoi par un deuxiÃ¨me avocat dÃ©signÃ© par la cour d'appel le 7 juillet 1976 . Les motifs sur lesquels se fondait le pourvoi Ã©taient la violation et une fausse application de la loi . qui seraient rÃ©sultÃ©s de ce que les Ã©lÃ©ments de fait relevÃ©s par les juges auraient dÃ» les porter Ã conclure qu'il s'agissait en l'espÃ¨ce d'un homicide involontaire . Le pourvoi fut rejetÃ© le 4 juillet 1978 .
Entretemps, le requÃ©rant, contre lequel un mandat d'arrÃªt inte rn ational avait Ã©tÃ© Ã©mis , fut arrÃªtÃ© en France . Une procÃ©dure d'extradition commen Ã§ a alors . Le requÃ©rant reÃ§ut notification du mandat d'arrÃªt qui indiquait les faits pour lesquels il Ã©tait poursuivi et le titre du dÃ©lit dont il Ã©tait accusÃ© . Le requÃ©rant ne s'opposa pas Ã son extradition . Il affirme qu'il pensait pouvoir faire entendre sa version des faits aux auto ri tÃ©s judiciaires italiennes au cours d'un procÃ¨s et qu'il ignorait, lorsqu'il s'Ã©tait enfui, que les blessures qu'il avait causÃ©es Ã©taient mort elles . Il n'a pu Ã©tre Ã©tabli Ã partir des piÃ¨ces du dossier en possession du Gouvernement italien si le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© ou non informÃ© officieusement ou officiellement qu'entretemps un procÃ¨s avait dÃ©jÃ Ã©tÃ© ouve rt contre lui . Il fut extradÃ© le 27 mai 1977 . DÃ¨s son arrivÃ©e en Italie . le requÃ©rant nomma successivement deux dÃ©fenseurs et put prendre connaissance de son dossier . Il n'apparaÃ®t pas que ces dÃ©fenseurs aient de quelque maniÃ¨re participÃ© Ã l'examen du pourvoi en cassation ni que le requÃ©rant ait pu prendre contact avec l'avocat chargÃ© de dÃ©fendre son pourvoi en cassation . Le 5 septembre 1979, le requÃ©rant souleva un incident d'exÃ©cution contre l'ordre d'incarcÃ©ration . Il contestait en effet le passage en force de chose jugÃ©e de sa condamnation, dans la mesure oÃ¹ l'arrÃªt lui avait Ã©tÃ© notifiÃ© selon les formes prÃ©vues dans le cas d'un accusÃ© â¢ latitante . , alors qu'en rÃ©alitÃ© il n'aurait pas dÃ» Ã©tre considÃ©rÃ© comme tel, puisqu'il ne s'Ã©tait pas volontairement soustrait Ã un mandat d'arrÃªt . L'incident d'exÃ©cution fut rejetÃ© par le tribunal de GÃªnes le 20 novembre 1979 . Le requÃ©rant s'adressa Ã la Commission le 21 juillet 1978 . Il semble qu'Ã ce moment lÃ il n'avait pas eu encore connaissance de la dÃ©cision de la Cour de cassation . Le SecrÃ©tariat l'informa de la nÃ©cessitÃ© d'Ã©puiser les voies de recours internes avant de s'adresser Ã la Commission . Le requÃ©rant ne reprit contact avec la Commission que le 17 fÃ©vrier 1981 . Au cours de cet intervalle il avait tentÃ© la voie du recours en rÃ©vision . qui fut introduit par l'avocat du requÃ©rant Ã une date qui n'est pas prÃ©cisÃ©e . Le requÃ©rant y affirmait que le tÃ©moignage rendu par le gÃ©rant de la pension Ã©tait faux . En effet, il Ã©tait arrivÃ© du Luxembourg le matin mÃªme des faits . Il avait pris une chambre en versant un acompte de 20 .000 lires . Il ne connaissait pas Tercero . n'aurait pas dÃ©jeunÃ© avec lui, mais avec deux autres marins espagnols, aprÃ¨s quoi, rentrÃ© dans sa chambre il aurait surpris Tercero qui fouillait dans ses affaires . Celui-ci l'aurait attaquÃ© et c'est en Ã©tat de lÃ©gitime dÃ©fense que le requÃ©rant aurait mortellement blessÃ© la victime qu'il soupÃ§onnait l'avoir dÃ©pouillÃ© de la somme d'un million de lires . Le 13 mars 1980 la Cour de cassation dÃ©cida, en accueillant cette demande, qu'elle devait Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ©e comme une demande de supplÃ©ment d'information concernant l'affaire, aux termes de l'article 557 du CPP . Le 27 septembre 1980 cette dÃ©cision parvint Ã la cour d'appel de GÃªnes . Le -14q-
29 septembre les dÃ©fenseurs demandÃ¨rent au juge chargÃ© de l'affaire de recueillir certaines informations et notamment des tÃ©moignages prouvant que le requÃ©rant ne connaissait pas la victime, ce qui fut accordÃ© le 8 juillet 1980 par une dÃ©cision de la cour d'appel rÃ©unie en chantbre du conseil . Le dossier Ã©tabli, il fut transmis Ã la Cour de cassation . Celle-ci ayant pris connaissance du supplÃ©ntent d'enquÃ©te, rejeta le 29 janvier 1981 la demande de rÃ©vision . Le requÃ©rant ne dispose d'aucune voie de recours . Les jugements rendus Ã son encontre sont dÃ©finitifs . En effet, la procÃ©dure contre un contumax .latitanteâ¢ est rÃ©putÃ©e contradictoire en Italie . Le requÃ©rant . dans cette situation a dÃ©jÃ entaniÃ© plusieurs grÃ¨ves de la faint . Les griefs du requÃ©rant peuvent se rÃ©sinier comme suit : Le requÃ©rant se plaint de n'avoir pas eu un procÃ¨s Ã©quitable et en particulier de n'avoir jantais Ã©tÃ© entendu par les autoritÃ©s judiciaires avant d'Ã©tre condamnÃ© .
EN DROIT A . RequÃªte de M . Gfacinto Colozza 1 . Le requÃ©rant se plaint d'une violation de diverses dispositions de l'article 6 de la Convention qui garantissent Ã tout accusÃ© un procÃ¨s Ã©quitable . Il allÃ¨gue notamment n'avoir eu Ã aucun moment connaissance de la procÃ©dure ouverte contre lui et de n'avoir donc pas eu la possibilitÃ© de se dÃ©fendre de faÃ§on concrÃ¨te et effective . (a) Le Gouvernement fait grief au requÃ©rant de n'avoir pas Ã©puisÃ© les voies de recours internes et affirme tout d'abord que l'appel formÃ© par le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© dÃ©clarÃ© irrecevable Ã la suite d'une nÃ©gligence de ce dernier, qui a prÃ©sentÃ© tardivement les motifs Ã l'appui de son appel, de sorte que les autoritÃ©s judiciaires italiennes n'ont pu se prononcer sur son bien-fondÃ© . La Commission constate que l'appel formÃ© par le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© examinÃ© par la cour d'appel puis par lÃ Cour de cassation . Il est vrai que la prentiÃ¨re a dÃ©clarÃ© l'appel irrecevable pour prÃ©sentation tardive des motifs . Toutefois, la Cour de cassation a contredit sur ce point la dÃ©cision de la cour d'appel . Elle a affirmÃ© que les griefs du requÃ©rant pouvaient engendrer une nullitÃ© absolue du jugement rendu par le tribunal de Rome et qu'il importait donc d'exantiner si une telle nullitÃ© s'Ã©tait bien produite . Ce n'est qu'aprÃ¨s avoir constatÃ© que tel n'Ã©tait pas le cas que la Cour de cassation a confirmÃ© la dÃ©cision de la cour d'appel dÃ©clarant l'appel du requÃ©rant irrecevable .
L'appel du requÃ©rant a donc bien Ã©tÃ© examinÃ© quant au fond par les t ri bunaux italiens . (b) Le Gouvernement soutient encore que le requÃ©rant n'aurait pas Ã©puisÃ© les voies de recours internes car il aurait omis de soulever une exception d'inconstitutionnalitÃ© des dispositions concernant le procÃ¨s par contumace et la dÃ©fense d'office . La Commission se rÃ©fÃ¨re tout d'abord sur ce point aux dÃ©clarations du . Gouvernement italien, aux termes desquelles la Cour Constitutionnelle italienne a, par une juri spmdence constante, affirmÃ© que la procÃ©dure par contumace n'est pas en elle-mÃªme inconstitutionnelle . Elle relÃ¨ve en outre que le seul point dÃ©battu devant la cour d'appel de Rome concernait la question de savoir si le tribunal de Rome avait Ã bon droit estimÃ© que le requÃ©rant Ã©tait introuvable, â¢ irreperibile . tout d'abord, contumax, .latitante ., ensuite . Or, les seules dispositions lÃ©gales pert inentes pour l'examen de cette question Ã©taient respectivement les articles 170 et 268 du Code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale . Ces articles cependant ne soulevaient pas de problÃ¨mes de constitutionnalitÃ© . Le requÃ©rant se plaint en effet de n'avoir pas Ã©tÃ© admis Ã fournir la preuve qu'il n'Ã©tait pas contumax . Or, l'article 268 du Code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale n'Ã©tablit pas de prÃ©somption absolue de contumace, ainsi que l'a affirmÃ© Ã plusieurs reprises la Cour constitutionnelle italienne . Par contre, la Cour de cassation dans son arrÃªt du 5 novembre 1979 a affirmÃ© que .la volontÃ© de se soustraire Ã un mandat est prÃ©sumÃ©e lorsque les recherches opportunes effectuÃ©es par la police judiciaire sont demeurÃ©es vaines . Cette prÃ©somption ne tombe pas du fait que la personne recherchÃ©e n'a pas utilisÃ© de moyens particuliers pour Ã©chapper Ã l'arrestation aprÃ¨s s'Ãªtre Ã©loignÃ©e de son domicile habituel et s'Ãªtre transportÃ©e ailleurs, sans effectuer de changement de domicile . . C'est donc l'application faite en l'espÃ¨ce par la Cour de cassation de l'article 268 du Code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale qui est mise en cause par le requÃ©rant, et non la constitutionnalitÃ© de la disposition prÃ©citÃ©e . La Commission en conclut que la question de constitutionnalitÃ© n'avait pas Ã Ãªtre soulevÃ©e par le requÃ©rant pour satisfaire Ã la condition de l'Ã©puisement des voies de recours internes prÃ©vue Ã l'article 26 de la Convention . Il s'ensuit, de l'avis de la Comntission, que le requÃ©rant a Ã©puisÃ© les voies de recours intemes, conformÃ©ntent Ã l'article 26 de la Convention . 2 . Le requÃ©rant se plaint Ã©galement d'une violation de l'article 13 en ce qu'il n'aurait pas eu de recours effectif contre le jugement du tribunal de Rome .
L'article 13 garantit Ã toute personne Â« dont les droits et fibertÃ©sgarantis dans la prÃ©sente Convention ont Ã©tÃ© violÃ©s, ( . . .) l'octroi d'un recours effectif devant une instance nationale, alors mÃªme que la violation aurait Ã©tÃ© commise par des personnes agissant dans l'exercice de leurs fonctions officiellesÂ» . La Commission constate que, pour attaquer le jugement rendu contre lui par le tribunal de Rome, le requÃ©rant a tentÃ© d'user de la voie de l'appel apparemment tardif, qui lui aurait permis de faire valoir que la procÃ©dure par contumace engagÃ©e contre lui n'Ã©tait pas compatible avec les exigences de l'article 6 de la Convention . Il est vrai que cet appel fut dÃ©clarÃ© irrecevable par la cour d'appel de Rome . Toutefois, sur pourvoi du requÃ©rant, la Cour de cassation examina nÃ©anmoins le grief formulÃ© par lui et conclut qu'il avait Ã juste titre Ã©tÃ© dÃ©clarÃ© contumax . Le requÃ©rant a donc disposÃ© d'un recours effectif . Il s'ensuit que sur ce point le gtief du requÃ©rant est manifestement mal fondÃ© et doit Ãªtre rejetÃ© conformÃ©ment Ã f'article 27 . paragraphe 2 de la Convention .
B . RequÃªte de M . Pedro Rubina t 3 . Le requÃ©rant se plaint de n'avoir pas eu un procÃ¨s Ã©quitable et en particulier de n'avoir jamais Ã©tÃ© entendu par les autoritÃ©s judiciaires . Il invoque les dispositions de l'article 6 de la Convention . (a) Le Gouvernement a tout d'abord affirmÃ© que la requÃªte est tardive . Il soutient en effet que la dÃ©cision interne dÃ©finitive en l'espÃ¨ce est l'arrÃªt de la Cour de cassation du 4 juillet 1978 et que la requÃªte doit Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ©e comme ayant Ã©tÃ© introduite par la lettre que le requÃ©rant a adressÃ©e Ã la ComnÂ»ssion le 17 fÃ©vrier 1981 . Ã l'exclusion de toute autre lettre . Quant Ã cette derniÃ¨re affirmation, la Commission constate que le requÃ©rant s'est adressÃ© pour la premiÃ¨re fois Ã la Commission le 21 juillet 1978 . Dans cette lettre il se plaignait des dÃ©cisions rendues en premier et deuxiÃ¨me ressort dans son affaire sans qu'il ait Ã©tÃ© entendu par les auto ri tÃ©s judiciaires . Il ne faisait pas rÃ©fÃ©rence Ã l'existence d'un pou rvoi en cassation . Compte tenu du fait qu'aucune formalitÃ© n'est requise pour s'adresser Ã la Comntission et que dans ses premiÃ¨res lettres le requÃ©rant a exposÃ© en substance ses griefs, la Commission n'a pas de raison d'exclure que la requÃªte ait pu Ãªtre valablement introduite par la premiÃ¨re lettre du requÃ©rant . Suivant l'usage, le SecrÃ©tariat de la Commission a attirÃ© l'attention du requÃ©rant sur la nÃ©cessitÃ© d'Ã©puiser les voies de recours internes . Une telle information a pu Ãªtre interprÃ©tÃ©e par le requÃ©rant comme une invitation Ã tenter la voie du recours en rÃ©vision . En tout cas, le requÃ©rant n'a repris contact avec le SecrÃ©tari at de la Commission que le 17 fÃ©vrier 1981, aprÃ¨s
avoir utilisÃ© cette voie de recours (le rejet de sa demande de rÃ©vision est datÃ© du 29 janvier 1981) . Le fait pour ce dernier d'avoir suspendu sa correspondance avec la Commission en attendant que la Cour de cassation statue sur sa demande de rÃ©vision, ne saurait, dans les circonstances de l'espÃ¨ce . porter prÃ©judice au requÃ©rant . La requÃªte doit donc Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ©e comme ayant Ã©tÃ© introduite 2 juillet 1978 .
En consÃ©quence . la Commission estime ne pas devoir trancher en l'occurrence la question de savoir si la dÃ©cision interne dÃ©finitive est bien l'arrÃªt de la Cour de cassation du 4 juillet 1978 . En effet, mÃªnte Ã supposer que le recours en rÃ©vision exercÃ© ensuite par le requÃ©rant ne constitue pas un recours effectif au sens de l'article 26 de la Convention et que la dÃ©cision interne dÃ©finitive soit l'arrÃªt prÃ©citÃ© de la Cour de cassation, la requÃªte a bien Ã©tÃ© introduite dans le dÃ©lai de six mois prÃ©vu Ã ce mÃªme article . (b) Le Gouvernement a Ã©galement soutenu que le requÃ©rant n'avait pas Ã©puisÃ© les voies de recours internes faute d'avoir soulevÃ© une exception d'inconstitutionnalitÃ© des dispositions concernant les procÃ¨s par contumace . A cet Ã©gard la Commission renvoie tout d'abord Ã ses considÃ©rants relatifs Ã la requÃªte de M . Colozza . Elle relÃ¨ve en outre que le recours constitutionnel n'est ouvert que dans le cadre d'une procÃ©dure en cours . Or . le requÃ©rant ne pouvait plus l'exercer en l'espÃ¨ce, puisque lorsqu'il fut extradÃ© Ã l'Italie les motifs du pourvoi en cassation avaient dÃ©jÃ Ã©tÃ© prÃ©sentÃ©s et qu'il ne lui Ã©tait pas possible - aux terntes des articles 529 et 533 du Code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale italien - d'en prÃ©senter de nouveaux . Il s'ensuit qu'Ã supposer qu'une exception d'inconstitutionnalitÃ© ait pu constituer en l'espÃ¨ce un recours efficace, le requÃ©rant devrait Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ© comme relevÃ© de l'obligation d'exercer un tel recours . L'objection tirÃ©e par le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur du non-Ã©puisement des voies de recours internes ne peut donc Ãªtre retenue . C . Quant aux deux requÃªtes jointes 4 . Les deux requÃ©rants mettent en cause, au regard de l'article 6 de la Convention, les procÃ©dures par contumace qui ont Ã©tÃ© engagÃ©es contre eux et qui ont abouti Ã leur condamnation Ã des peines privatives de libertÃ© de 6 ans et 21 ans, respectivement . La Contmission ne perd pas de vue que la procÃ©dure par contumace . telle qu'elle est organisÃ©e par le droit italien, se distingue par un souci d'assurer Ã l'accusÃ© absent certaines possibilitÃ©s de dÃ©fense contre les accusa- 148-
tions portÃ©es contre lui . Toutefois, la question se pose de savoir dans quelle mesure cette procÃ©dure rÃ©pond aux exigences de l'article 6 de la Convention lorsque l'accusÃ© ne comparait pas et ne peut influencer lui-mÃªme sa dÃ©fense . que son absence est prÃ©sumÃ©e volontaire et que, s'il se prÃ©sente ultÃ©rieurenient . il ne peut plus obtenir que sa cause soit entendue contradictoirement . Ces questions, de l'avis de la Commission, posent des problÃ¨mes complexes d'interprÃ©tation de la Convention qui . en l'espÃ¨ce, ne sauraient Ãªtre rÃ©solus sans un exanien du fond de l'affaire . Les requ@tes, sur ce point, ne peuvent donc Ãªtre rejetÃ©es pour dÃ©faut manifeste de fondement . Par ces motifs, la Commissio n DÃCLARE LES REQUÃTES RECEVABLES . tout moyen de fond rÃ©servÃ©, dans la mesure oÃ¹ les requÃ©rants se plaignent que les procÃ©dures par contuniace engagÃ©es contre eux ont coniportÃ© une violation de l'article 6 de la Convention ; DÃCLARE IRRECEVABLE . pour le surplus, la requÃ©te NÂ° 9024/80 introduite par M . Colozza .
(TRANSLAT/ON )
THE FACT S The facts of the case as submitted by the applicants may be summarised as follows :
Appficatlon of Mr Giecinto Colova (No . 9024/80 ) Giacinto Colozza, an Italian national, was born on 26 July 1924 in Rome, where he usually resides . He is a business consultant ("commercialista") . When the application was lodged, he was in detention at Viterbe prison . He was represented in proceedings before the Commission by Mr Angelo Miele, a lawyer practising at the Rome Bar . The applicant was prosecuted for fraud following complaints lodged against him by persons accusing him of having passed himself off as a lawyer attached to the Rome municipal authority and, in this capacity, of having received sums of money in exchange for promises of municipal housing .
The Public Prosecutor's department commenced an investigation procedure against the applicant, who was initially sought at his known address . It appeared however that he had been expelled by the owner, that his furniture had been conf9scated and entrusted to the manager of the block of flats . Neither the latter nor the other persons questioned were able to provide the applicant's new address . The residence mentioned on the civil status registers had for a long time ceased to be the applicant's address as he had failed to notify the competent authorities of a change of residence . As the subsequent search entrusted to the police authorities was unsuccessful, the investigating judge declared on 14 November 1973 that the applicant was untraceable ("irreperibile") . On 12 November 1974, the investigating judge issued a warrant for the applicant's arrest . Like the subsequent warrants issued on 30 May and on 3 June 1975, this warrant produced no result despite further endeavours by the police to find the applicant . On 30 July 1975, the police sent the investigating judge a report stating that the search had been unsuccessful . For the remainder of the proceedings, the applicant was regarded as a fugitive ("latitantÃ©') .â¢ The Investigating judge assigned him official defence counsel . Criminal proceedings, which under Italian law are deemed to have been held in the presence of the parties where the accused is declared "latitante", took their course'lAII notification concerning the criminal proceedings against the applicant was served in accordance with the relevant formalities laid down by Article 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, namely by being lodged in the registry of the Court and by serving notice on the officially appointed defence counsel . The applicant was committed for trial before the Rome Regional Court on 9 August 1975 . The first hearing of the case had to be deferred because neither the accused nor the officially appointed defence lawyer appeared before the Court . â¢ Under Article 268 of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure, "any person who has voluntarily evaded the execution of an arrest warrant . . ." is deemed to have absconded . â¢' Under Italian law for trials in absentia, deemed to be adversary proceedings, an accused person who fails to appear may fall into two legal categories : -"conrumax" : where an accused who has been summonsed in accordance with the fonnalities and time-limits laid down by law fails to appear at the hearing, unless it is established that he had legitimate grounds for failing to appear . In this event, under Article 500 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, an extract of the judgment is served on the accused at his residence and an appeal lies within thre days of service (Article 199, para . 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure) . -"(arirnnre" : where the accused has intentionally evaded the execution of an arrest wartant . In this case also he is served with an extract of the judgment .
Having again appointed a lawyer to defend the applicant, the Court adjourned the case until 26 November 1976 . Two hearings were held in this case, on 26 November and 17 December 1976 . During the second heari ng, the lawyer appointed to defend the applicant failed to appear . The Cou rt the re fore appointed another lawyer who conceded the charges made by the Public Prosecutor day the Court delivered its judgment . It sentenced th e .Onthesam applicant to six years' imprisonment and a fine of 600,000 lire . The judgment was lodged in the regist ry of the Court on 29 December 1976 . The applicant's most recently appointed defence counsel was notified that the judgment had been lodged in the regist ry . The Court also ordered that an extract be published in two Roman newspapers, Paese and // Tempo . On 29 September 1977 the applicant was arrested . By that date the judgment of the Rome Regional Cou rt had become binding (since 16 Janua ry 1977) . However, the applicant made an interiocuto ry application to this Cou rt to have the committal order set aside and also lodged notice of appeal against the judgment that was prima facie out of time'. He submi tt ed that notification had not been lawful because he had wrongly been declared "latitante", i .e . that he had intentionally evaded the execution of an arrest warrant ( A rt . 268 of the Criminal Code) . Consequently, notification of the judgment had to be regarded as void and the judgment itself could not therefore have become binding . The interlocutory application was dismissed on 29 April 1978 . The Regional Court sent the case-file to the Rome Court of Appeal for a ruling on the applicant's appeal that was prima jacie out of time . The applicant argued that having received notice to quit from his landlord, he had lived for a few months in a hotel before moving to the address where he was arrested . He stated that the police were perfectly well aware of his address and had served a prosecution summons issued by the Rome Public Prosecutor's department concerning other offences on him at that address . H e
â¢ A distinction must be drawn here between an application for an extension of the time-limits (Article 18 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure) and an appeal that is prima /acro out of time . The (ormer assumes that notification has been effected in the ptescribed form bu t owing to an accident or an unforeseeable event the person concemed has been unable to comply with the relevant time-limits for lodging an appeal, whereas the latter assumes that notification has not been lawful and that accordingly time-limits did not run ; the appeal is therefore only prima farie out of time .
also applied for leave to adduce evidence that he had not intentionally evaded the execution of an arrest warrant and was not therefore "latitante" within the meaning of Article 268 of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure . The Public Prosecutor attached to the Court of Appeal also applied to have the judgment set aside . On 10 November 1978 the Rome Court of Appeal held that the appeal was inadntissible because the grounds had been submitted out of time . The applicant appealed to the Court of Cassation against this decision . On 5 November 1979, that Court rejected the appeal . It did hold that the Court of Appeal had wrongly declared the appeal inadmissible in that the grounds had been submitted out of time, without firstly determining whether or not the proceedings of the Court of first instance were generally void as the applicant alleged, i .e . that he had been wrongly dectared "latitante" . Only if the proceedings were not generally void in this sense could the appeal be declared inadmissible as out of time . Neve rtheless the Court of Cassation dismissed the appeal . It considered that in the instant case the proceedings were not void in this way because the Rome Regional Court had correctly declared that the applicant was untraceable (" irrepe ri bilÃ©') and subsequently that he was "latitante", and that the appeal was indeed inadmissible because it had been brought out of time . The Court of Cassation has consistently held that "the intention to evade arrest shall be presumed where a proper police search is unsuccessful' :' . This presumption is not rebutted if the person being searched for has not been pa rt icularly devious in evading arrest, after changing his residence and failing to make the statutory declaration of change of residence ( Sez . 111, 12 March 1973, No . 559, Rep . 1974 . 3440 ; Sez . IV, 20 October 1975, No . 3195, Rep . 197443, 4897 ; Cass . pen . mass . 1972, 1959) . The applicant's complaints may be summarised as follows : At no stage was he aware that proceedings had been instituted against him and, therefore he was denied the possibility of defending himself properly, and had no effective remedy against the conviction and sentence of the Rome Regional Court of which he had no knowledge .
â¢ According to the Court of Cassation, the term proper search implies that the police authorities have a discretionary power, which however is limited in that the person must be sought at the residence mentioned in the artest warrant (Sez . 11, sent . 19 .10 .1978, No . 12698 . No . 140224) . On the other hand, the Court of Cassation had previously held (Sez . 11, pen . of 30.7 .1965, No . 1415) in applying Article 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure that the accused may be considered "latitantÃ©" only if he is aware of the imminent exercise of a power restricting his personal freedom and behaves in such a way as to frustrate the official order . -152-
B . AppRcatlon of Mr Pedro Rubinal (No. 9317/81 1 The applicant, Pedro Rubinat, a Spanish national, was born on 23 Septentber 1933 in Barcelona . When the application was lodged, he was in detention in the prison of Civitavecchia (Italy) . In proceedings before the Commission he was represented by Mr Giorgio Barile, a lawyer practising in Viterbe and by Mr Joaquin Ruiz Jimenez, a lawyer practising in Madrid . On 27 April 1972 the Genoa Public Prosecutor's depa rt ment was informed by the police that on that afternoon a sailor named Tercero, a Nicaraguan national, had been mo rt ally stabbed in the throat in a boardinghouse in Genoa by a person who had fled but had been identified as Pedro Rubinat . the applicant . The warrant issued on 28 April 1972 for the applicant's arrest produced no result and the search carried out by Interpol was unsuccessful . However, in the absence of the accused, the prosecution took its course . On 25 November 1974 the Assize Court of Genoa, delivering judgment in absentia, found the applicant, who had been officially assigned defence counsel, guilty of murder and sentenced him to 21 years' imprisonment . The facts as established in the proceedings at first instance by the Court of Assize, based particularly on the evidence of Taglieri, are as follows : Tercero, who had been staying for a time in the boarding-house wher e
the crime took place, had that morning introduced the applicant to the manager of the boarding-house, Taglieri, as a friend with whom he intended to share the roont in which he was staying . The two men then had a very cordial lunch together in the cafÃ©-restaurant on the ground floor of the boarding-house . After lunch they went to the room occupied by Tercero . Shortly afterwards the owner of the boarding-house was informed that a violent dispute had broken out . Having hurried to the spot, he noticed that the noise was coming from Rubinat's room, which was locked from inside . He then broke down the door and saw Rubinat, covered with blood, holding a knife in his right hand and repeating the words "a million, a million" . Tercero, also covered in blood, was crying for help and in spite of his state managed to escape . Rubinat ran after him but came back a few moments later after failing to catch up with him . He ordered a taxi, was driven to Savona, and then to a boarding-house at Spotorno where he changed his clothes and left for an unknown destination . The judgment of the Court of Assize was upheld on 28 June 1976 by the Appeal Court of Assize of Genoa, which also delivered its judgment in abstentia . Before the Court the applicant's officially appointed lawyer again submitted that his client could not be found guilty of murder as certain facts showed that he had not intended to kill .
On 31 May 1976 the same lawyer appealed to the Court of Cassation against the Court of Assize's judgment . However, as he was not entitled to appear before the Court of Cassation, he was replaced for the purposes of the consideration of that appeal by a second lawyer appointed by the Court of Appeal on 7 July 1976 . The grounds of the appeal were that a violation and incorrect application of the law resulted from the fact that the evidence adduced by the Courts should have led them to conclude that this was a case of manslaughter . The appeal was rejected on 4 July 1978 . In the meantime, the applicant, of whose arrest an international warrant had been issued, was arrested in France . Extradition proceedings were then commenced . The applicant was served notice of the arrest warrant which set out the acts for which he was being prosecuted and the charge he faced . He did not oppose his extradition . He claims that he thought he could establish his version of the facts at a trial before the Italian judicial authorities and was unaware when he absconded that the injuries he had caused proved to be fatal . It could not be established from the documents in the file in the possession of the Italian Government whether the applicant was informed officially or unofficially that criminal proceedings had in the meantime been instituted against him . He was extradited on 27 May 1977 . On his arrival in Italy, the applicant appointed two defence lawyers in turn and was able to consult his file . It seems that these lawyers did not take part in any way in the consideration of the appeal before the Court of Cassation, nor was the applicant able to contact the lawyer appointed to present his appeal before that court . On 5 September 1979, he brought an interlocutory application against the detention order . He challenged the fact that his conviction had become res judicata, in so far as he had been notified of the judgment in accordance with the form prescribed for an accused who is "latitantÃ©", whereas in fact he should not have been regarded as a fugitive as he had not intentionally evaded an arrest warrant . This application was dismissed by the Genoa Regional Court on 20 November 1979 . The applicant wrote to the Commission on 21 July 1978 . It appears that on this date he was still unaware of the decision of the Court of Cassation . The Secretariat told him that he had to exhaust all domestic remedies before turning to the Commission . He did not contact the Commission again until 17 February 1981 . During that period he had exhausted the remedy of an application to have the proceedings reopened, which his lawyer had brought on an unspecified date . The applicant stated in this application that the evidence of the owner of the boarding-house was false . Indeed he had arrived from Luxembourg on the
very morning the events took place . He had taken a room on payment of a 20,000 lire deposit . He did not know Tercero, had not lunched with him but with two other Spanish sailors and having gone to his room afterwards, he surprised Tercero who was going through his belongings . The latter attacked him and it was in self-defence that the applicant fatally wounded the victim whom he suspected of having robbed him one million lire . On 13 March 1980 the Court of Cassation granted this application and decided that it should be regarded as a request for supplementary information on the case within the meaning of Article 557 of the Code of Criminal Procedure . On 27 September 1980 this decision was received by the Genoa Court of Appeal . On 29 September the defence lawyers applied to the judge dealing with the case to have certain facts admitted, particularly evidence showing that the applicant did not know the victim . This application was granted on 8 July 1980 by a decision of the Court of Appeal sitting in private . Once the file had been drawn up, it was sent to the Court of Cassation . Having been informed of the additional inquiries, that Court rejected the application for proceedings to be reopened on 29 January 1981 . The applicant had no further remedy . The decisions against him had become final . Proceedings against a person who is "contumax (latitante)" and is tried in absentia are deemed in Italy to have been held in the presence of the parties .
Under the circumstances the applicant had already begun several hunger strikes . His complaints may be summarised as follows : He had not been given a fair trial and in particular he had never been heard by the judicial authorities before being convicted and sentenced .
THE LA W A . AppOcatlon of Mr Glacinto Coloua 1 . The applicant complains of a violation of various provisions of Article 6 of the Convention guaranteeing eve ry accused person a fair trial . He alleges, in particular, that at no stage was he aware that proceedings had been instituted against him and consequently he was unable to put forward an effective defence . a . The Government accuses the applicant of having failed to exhaust domestic remedies and states firstly that the applicant's appeal was declared inadmissible because of his negligence in submitting the grounds of his appea l
out of time, so that the Italian judicial authorities were unable to decide the merits of his appeal . The Commission finds that the applicant's appeal was considered by the Court of Appeal and subsequently by the Court 6f Cassation . Admittedly the former Court declared it admissible because the grounds had been submitted out of time . However the Court of Cassation reversed this part of the Court of Appeal's decision . It held that the applicant's complaints could have resulted in the Rome Regional Court's judgment being declared null and void and that it was important to examine whether this was actually the case . Only after it had established that this judgment was not null and void did the Court of Cassation uphold the Court of Appeal's decision that the applicant's appeal was inadmissible . The merits of the applicant's appeal were therefore considered by the Italian Courts . b . The Government also argues that the applicant did not exhaust domestic remedies because he failed to challenge the constitutionality of the provisions relating to proceedings in absentia and officially appointed defence counsel . The Commission refers, firstly, to the declarations of the Italian Government whereby the Italian Constitutional Court has consistantly held that proceedings conducted in absentia are not per se unconstitutional . It also notes that the only point considered before the Rome Court of Appeal was whether the Rome Regional Court had correctly decided that the applicant was untraceable "irreperibilÃ©" and subsequently that he was a fugitive "contumax (latitante)" . However the only statutory provisions relevant to the consideration of this question were Articles 170 and 268 respectively of the Code of Criminal Procedure . They did not raise problems of constitutionality . The applicant complains that he had not been allowed to adduce evidence showing that he had not absconded . Article 268 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not raise an irrebuttable presumption that a person has absconded, as the Italian Constitutional Court has held on several occasions . Moreover, the Court of Cassation, in a judgment of 5 November 1979 held that "the intention to evade arrest shall be presumed where a proper police search is unsuccessful . This presumption shall not be rebutted if the person being searched for has not actively evaded arrest after leaving his normal address and going elsewhere without a formal change of residence" . It is the Court of Cassation's application of Article 268 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to this case that the applicant is challenging and not th e
constitutionality of that provision . The Commission concludes that the question of constitutionality did not have to be raised by the applicant in order to comply with the condition laid down in Article 26 of the Convention that domestic remedies must be exhausted . Accordingly, the Commission considers that the applicant did exhaust domestic remedies in accordance with Article 26 of the Convention . 2 . The applicant also complains of a violation of Article 13 in so far as he had no effective remedy against the judgment of the Rome Regional Court . Article 13 guarantees everyone "whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated ( . . .) an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity" . The Commission observes that in order to challenge the Rome Court's judgment against him, the applicant attempted to bring an appeal that was prima facie out of time but which would have enabled him to claini that the proceedings instituted in absernin against him were incompatible with the requirements of Article 6 of the Convention . Admittedly this appeal was declared inadmissible by the Rome Court of Appeal . However the applicant appealed to the Court of Cassation which considered his complaint and concluded that he had been correctly declared "contumax" . The applicant accordingly did have an effective remedy . It follows that his complaint on this point is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 27 (2) of the Convention .
B . Appucatton of Mr Pedro Rubinat 3 . The applicant complains that he did not have a fair trial and in particular that he was not heard by the judicial authorities . He relies on the provisions of Article 6 of the Convention . a . The Government maintained firstly that the application was out of time . The final domestic decision in this case is the Court of Cassation's judgment of 4 July 1978 and the application had to be regarded as having been lodged by the applicant's letter to the Commission of 1 7 February 1981 and not by any other letter . The Commission notes that the applicant contacted the Commission for the first time on 21 July 1978 . In that letter he complained of the decisions of the Court of first instance and the Court of Appeal although he had not been heard by the judicial authorities . He did not refer to the existence ot' an appeal to the Court of Cassation .
In view of the fact that there is no formality laid down in order to contact the Commission and that the applicant set out the substance of his complaints in his first letter, the Commission cannot justifiably exclude the possibility that the application had been validly brought by the applicant's first letter . As is customary, the Secretariat of the Commission drew the applicant's attention to the requirement that domestic remedies be exhausted . This information could have been interpreted by the applicant as an invitation to bring an application for the reopening of proceedings . In any case the applicant did not contact the Secretariat of the Commission again until 1 7 February 1981, having exhausted the latter remedy (his application to have the proceedings reopened was rejected on 29 January 1981) . The fact that he suspended his correspondence with the Commission pending the Court of Cassation's decision on his application to have the proceedings reopened did not, under the circumstances, adversely affect him . The application must therefore be considered to have been introduced on 2 July 1978 . Consequently the Commission considers that it does not, in this case, have to decide the question whether the final domestic decision was indeed the Court of Cassation's judgment of 4 July 1978 . Even assuming that the application to have proceedings reopened subsequently brought by the applicant does not constitute an effective remedy within the meaning of Article 26 of the Convention and that the final domestic decision is the aforementioned judgment of the Court of Cassation, the application was in fact lodged within the six-month period prescribed in this Article . b . The Government also contended that the applicant did not exhaust domestic remedies because he failed to challenge the constitutionality of the provisions concerning proceedings conducted in absentia . In this respect the Commission refers firstly to its reasoning in relation to Mr Colozza's application . Secondly, it notes that a constitutional appeal lies only while proceedings are pending . However, in this case, the applicant could not have brought such an appeal because, when he was extradkted to Italy, the grounds of his appeal to the Court of Cassation had already been lodged and he was not entitled under Article 529 and 533 of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure to submit further grounds . Accordingly, even assuming that a constitutional action might hav e amounted to an effective remedy in this case, the applicant must be considered absolved of the obligation to pursue such proceedings .
The respondent Government's objection based on non-exhaustion of domestic remedies cannot be accepted . C . The two Jolned applicationa 4 . Both applicants challenge, under Article 6 of the Convention, the proceedings instituted against them in absentia that led to sentences of six years and twenty-one years respectively . The Commission bears in mind that a feature of proceedings conducted in absentia under Italian law is a concern to provide the absent accused with certain possibilities of defending himself against the charges proferred against him . However the question arises as to what extent these proceedings comply with the requirements of Article 6 of the Convention where the accused fails to appear and cannot himself determine his defence, where his absence is presumed to be intentional and where, on entering a subsequent appearance, he cannot obtain a hearing of the case in the presence of both parties . In the opinion of the Commission, these questions raise complex problems of interpretation of the Convention which, in this case, cannot be settled without an examination of the merits . The applications cannot be rejected on this point on the ground that they are manifestly ill-founded . For these reasons, the Commission , DECLARES THE APPLICATIONS ADMISSIBLE, without prejudice to the merits, in so far as the applicants complain that the proceedings instituted against them in absentia violated Article 6 of the Convention ; DECLARES INADMISSIBLE, as to the remainder, Application No . 9024/80 brought by Mr Colozza .
- 159 -Origine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Commission (plénière)Date de la décision : 09/07/1982Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page