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Ashland Oil, Inc. v. F. T. C, 409 F. Supp. 297 | Casetext
Ashland Oil, Inc. v. F. T. C.
409 F. Supp. 297 (D.D.C. 1976)
Ashland Oil, Inc.v.F. T. C.
Affirmed by D.C. Cir. in 1976Ashland Oil, Inc. v. F.T.C548 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
United States District Court, D. ColumbiaFeb 2, 1976
…Neither the Federal Trade Commission Act nor agency regulations define "trade secret." One court, in…
…Plaintiff&apos;s contention that his article, or the information contained therein, constituted a trade secret is…
applying Restatement definition to § 6(f) of the FTC Act
Summary of this case from Public Citizen Health Research Grp. v. F.D.A
Ray S. Bolze and Roger C. Simmons, Howrey Simon, Washington, D.C., for plaintiff.
Jeffrey Axelrad, Dept. of Justice, and William A.E. Doying, F.T.C., Washington, D.C., for defendants FTC, and others.
Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Benjamin W. Heineman, Jr. and Richard M. Cooper, Williams, Connolly Califano, Washington, D.C., for intervenor-defendant John E. Moss.
I. BACKGROUND A. The Action and Parties
This civil action for declaratory and injunctive relief was commenced pursuant to Chapter 7 of the Administrative Procedure Act ( 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331-32, 1337, 1361, 1651, and 2201-02. The amount in controversy, exclusive of interest and costs, is in excess of $10,000. Venue properly lies in this district by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1).
Defendant Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") is a federal regulatory agency established under, operating pursuant to, and administering the Federal Trade Commission Act ("FTC Act") ( 15 U.S.C. § 41 et seq.). Paul Rand Dixon, Acting Chairman of the FTC, and Charles A. Tobin, Secretary, as well as FTC Commissioners M. Elizabeth Hanford and Stephen A. Nye, have been named as defendants in their official capacities.
At the time of commencement of this action, Louis A. Engman was Chairman of the FTC and was named as a party-defendant. Upon Mr. Engman's subsequent resignation, Paul Rand Dixon became acting Chairman and has been substituted as party-defendant pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 25(d)(1).
John E. Moss is a member of the United States House of Representatives and Chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee ("Subcommittee"). Congressman Moss has intervened of right in this action as party-defendant by virtue of Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a) and House Resolution 899 (94th Cong., 1st Sess.).
On or about April 15, 1975, the FTC served upon the plaintiff a "Natural Gas Survey Special Report" order ("Special Report") issued pursuant to Section 6(b) of the FTC Act ( 15 U.S.C. § 46(b)). By this order, Ashland was required to file a "Special Report" and was advised that non-compliance would result in the imposition of penalties under applicable provisions of federal law. On August 27, 1975, Ashland responded by filing with the Commission a completed Special Report containing the information sought by the FTC. Included in the information submitted was highly sensitive competitive data detailing the company's reserve estimates for all of its natural gas leases and contracts nationwide. Ashland's submission was accompanied by a letter from J. Creig Coogan, Vice President of Ashland Exploration Company (a division of Ashland Oil, Inc.) stating that the company's information on gas reserves was confidential and of a proprietary nature, such that disclosure would result in competitive injury and that such information was submitted to the Commission with the specific reservation that plaintiff could claim its right to have the materials therein provided "accorded confidential treatment and be protected from disclosure." (Plaintiff's Complaint, Exhibit AA).
On October 6, 1975, Congressman John E. Moss, in his capacity as a member of Congress, requested the FTC to make available to him data gathered by the Commission pertaining to lease extensions on federal lands. ( Id., Exhibit A). By letter dated October 24, 1975, Charles A. Tobin, Secretary of the Commission, denied the Congressman's request for the reason that the data sought constituted "trade secrets and commercial or financial information [and] geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells" which were exempt from mandatory disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act ( 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) and (b)(9)). Consequently, Secretary Tobin concluded that the Commission was without discretion to release such exempt records. ( Id., Exhibit B).
On October 29, 1975, Congressman Moss sent a second request to the FTC, but this time in his official capacity as Chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. ( Id., Exhibit C). Congressman Moss's letter noted that the Freedom of Information Act was not authority to withhold information from Congress, and that this second request was made not in the Congressman's individual capacity, but "as Chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations" for the purpose of fulfilling the Subcommittee's general oversight responsibilities.
Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 552(c).
The FTC treated Congressman Moss's second letter as a formal Congressional request and, by letter of November 18, 1975, advised the Congressman that the natural gas reserve data which he requested would be furnished on November 28, 1975. In this reply, Chairman Engman cautioned that several of the companies involved considered the data "competitively very sensitive and might constitute trade secrets which the Commission is prohibited from making public under Section 6(f) of the Federal Trade Commission Act," and that the U.S. Geological Survey also was "of the opinion that this is confidential, proprietary information." He went on to mention that the Commission continued to be involved in litigation with companies refusing to provide such data under the Special Report order. Therefore, Chairman Engman emphasized that:
Therefore, the Commission respectfully but strongly urges your Subcommittee to maintain the confidentiality of the information submitted in response to your request and in particular, the reserve estimates furnished in response to Question 5 of the Natural Gas Energy Study Order. ( Id., Exhibit D).
Ashland was advised of the Commission's decision on November 18, 1975. On November 21, 1975, plaintiff received written notice of the Commission's intention to disclose its reserve data to Congressman Moss's Subcommittee. ( Id., Exhibit E). On the same day, Ashland was informed by telephone that the Commission intended to turn over the data to Congressman Moss on demand and would not be bound to the November 28th date mentioned in Chairman Engman's letter.
This action was filed on November 24, 1975, and on that date, plaintiff moved for and was granted a temporary restraining order enjoining the Federal Trade Commission from releasing the information in issue, thereby preserving the status quo until the Court considered the merits of Ashland's claims.
By stipulation among the parties, the Temporary Restraining Order remained in effect until February 3, 1976.
any and all records within the Federal Trade Commission's control or custody or within the Federal Trade Commission's means to produce appertaining to or involving oil and/or gas lease extensions on Federal lands, including Ashland Oil, Inc. and including all correspondence between the Federal Trade Commission and Ashland Oil, Inc. relating in any manner to agreements or proposed agreements to hold such records confidential or to give advance notice of the release thereof. ( See H.R. Rep. No. 94-756, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., at 3-4 (1975)).
By letter of December 3, 1975, Chairman Moss informed Mr. Engman that the Subcommittee planned "no enforcement action of this subpoena until after the Court has considered" the questions arising in this case. ( Id., at 5).
Plaintiff has moved for preliminary and permanent injunction. Defendants Moss and FTC have filed motions for summary judgment or, alternatively, to dismiss. The Court, sua sponte, advanced and consolidated the hearing on the merits of Ashland's complaint with that on its motion for preliminary injunction. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(a)(2).
Congressman Moss and the FTC respond that Section 6(f) clearly does not restrict Congressional access to trade secrets or other types of information collected by the FTC, since such a limitation upon the inherent investigatory power of Congress may not be imposed by implication. The pertinent language of the Section — "to make public" — does not explicitly refer to Congress, and, thus, according to defendants' argument, cannot be read as an inhibition of Congress' statutory right to "annual and special reports" or its Article I subpoena power. Also relying on legislative history, defendants Moss and FTC conclude that the Commission was intended to be no more than an extension of the Congressional "visitorial power," at least in its information gathering function, and, therefore, a convenient storehouse of information readily accessible to the Congress.
II. ASHLAND'S NATURAL GAS RESERVE ESTIMATES
Since plaintiff endeavors to invoke common law and statutory protection for its reserve estimates, the Court must make a threshold determination whether such materials fall within the "widely relied-upon definition of a trade secret found at 4 Restatement of Torts § 757, comment b (1939)," viz.:
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of his business; (2) the extent to which it is known by employees and others involved in his business; (3) the extent of measures taken by him to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the information to him and to his competitors; (5) the amount of effort or money expended by him in developing the information; (6) the ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired or duplicated by others. 4 Restatement of Torts § 757, Comment b, p. 6 (1939).
This statement of the applicable test has received judicial approval. See, e. g., Speedry Chemical Products, Inc. v. Carter's Ink Co., 306 F.2d 328, 331 (2d Cir. 1962).
On the record before the Court, it is evident that Ashland's natural gas reserve estimates satisfy each of these criteria. The data in issue has been compiled at the considerable expense of "hundreds of thousands of man-hours and millions of dollars" and enables plaintiff to successfully bid on federal natural gas leases, in competition with "dozens of other companies." Consequently, such information is "highly valued and closely guarded," not only by Ashland, but throughout the natural gas industry. ( See Affidavit of George C. Hardin, Jr., Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction).
Similarly determining such reserve data to constitute "valuable property" in Reliability of Electric and Gas Service, 49 F.P.C. 1428, 1429 (1973), the FPC discussed the underpinnings of its holding as follows:
In Abbott v. United States, 239 F.2d 310, 314 (5th Cir. 1956), the Court found the geophysical surveys underlying a company's reserve estimates to be of "almost inestimable practical value in the essential program of continuous exploration and development of mineral resources which is the life blood of an oil producing company." Moreover, once disclosed, such data possesses "a `negative' value" in the hands of a competitor who can use it to "undertake development, procure leases, and impede or thwart the company's plans." Accord Hunter v. Shell Oil Co., 198 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1952); Ohio Oil Co. v. Sharp, 135 F.2d 303 (10th Cir. 1943); Pratt v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 100 F.2d 833 (10th Cir. 1938). See also John T. Lloyd Laboratories, Inc. v. Lloyd Brothers Pharmacists, Inc., 131 F.2d 703, 707 (6th Cir. 1942); Dollac Corp. v. Margon Corp., 164 F. Supp. 41, 59 (D.N.J. 1958), aff'd, 275 F.2d 202 (3d Cir. 1960); Jerrold-Stephens Co. v. Gustaveson, Inc., 138 F. Supp. 11, 15-16 (W.D.Mo. 1956); Newell v. O.A. Newton Son, 104 F. Supp. 162, 165 (D.Del. 1952). And in Continental Oil Co. v. FPC, 519 F.2d 31, 32, 35 (5th Cir. 1975), the Fifth Circuit voided an FPC order permitting public access to materials submitted by interstate natural gas companies which contained "detailed intrastate sales information, including the names of purchasers, date and location of the sale, pressure base, annual sales volume and price terms," and data with reference to "extent of supply." The Court held that such information fell squarely within the Freedom of Information Act's "trade secret" exemption from public disclosure, reasoning that disclosure "would alter industry custom and existing relationships to the disadvantage of petitioner's competitive positions." 519 F.2d at 35.
While the investigatory power of Congress is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, the courts have long held the power to be necessarily implied in the legislative function under Article I, as well as other portions of the Constitution. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 161, 47 S.Ct. 319, 71 L.Ed. 580 (1927); see also Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. (19 U.S.) 204, 5 L.Ed. 242 (1821); United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 46, 73 S.Ct. 543, 97 L.Ed. 770 (1953). Absent such a power, a legislative body could not "wisely or effectively" evaluate those conditions "which the legislation is intended to affect or change." McGrain v. Daugherty, supra, 273 U.S., at 175, 47 S.Ct. at 329.
"In actual legislative practice, power to secure needed information . . . has long been treated as an attribute of the power to legislate. It was so regarded in the British Parliament and in the colonial Legislatures before the American Revolution, and a like view has prevailed and been carried into effect in both houses of Congress and in most state Legislatures." McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 161, 47 S.Ct. 319, 324, 71 L.Ed. 580 (1927).
Although the investigatory power is "penetrating and farreaching" in scope, Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111, 79 S.Ct. 1081, 3 L.Ed.2d 1115 (1959), it is not unlimited. "Its boundaries are defined by its source." Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 197, 77 S.Ct. 1173, 1 L.Ed.2d 1273 (1957); Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, at 504, n. 15, 95 S.Ct. 1813, 44 L.Ed.2d 324 (1975). Hence, the parameters of the inquiry may be no broader than the "legitimate sphere of legislative activity." See Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, supra, 421 U.S., at 504, 95 S.Ct. 1813; Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 189, 26 L.Ed. 377 (1881); McGrain v. Daugherty, supra, 273 U.S., at 174, 47 S.Ct. 319.
The standard to be applied in determining whether the Congressional investigatory power has been properly asserted in a particular case was articulated by the Supreme Court in Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399, 408-09, 81 S.Ct. 567, 5 L.Ed.2d 633 (1961): (1) the Committee's investigation of the broad subject matter area must be authorized by Congress; (2) the investigation must be pursuant to "a valid legislative purpose"; and (3) the specific inquiries involved must be pertinent to the broad subject matter areas which have been authorized by the Congress.
The types of legislative activities which have justified exercise of the power to investigate include: the primary functions of legislating and appropriating, Barenblatt v. United States, supra, 360 U.S., at 109, 79 S.Ct. 1081; the function of deciding whether or not legislation is appropriate, Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 161, 75 S.Ct. 668, 99 L.Ed. 964 (1955); oversight of the administration of laws by the executive branch, McGrain v. Daugherty, supra, 273 U.S., at 177, 47 S.Ct. 319; Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 295, 49 S.Ct. 268, 73 L.Ed. 692 (1929); and the essential Congressional function of informing itself in matters of national concern, United States v. Rumely, supra, 345 U.S., at 43, 45, 73 S.Ct. 543; Watkins v. United States, supra, 354 U.S., at 200, n. 3, 77 S.Ct. 1173.
In evaluating these requirements, the Court must consider the relevant rules of the House, the authorizing resolution, the full committee's resolution by which the Subcommittee was authorized to proceed, and the nature and context of the legislative proceedings. Watkins v. United States, supra, 354 U.S., at 209-15, 77 S.Ct. 1173; Barenblatt v. United States, supra, 360 U.S., at 117, 79 S.Ct. 1081; see also, United States v. Rumely, supra, 345 U.S., at 51, 73 S.Ct. 543; Sacher v. United States, 356 U.S. 576, 78 S.Ct. 842, 2 L.Ed.2d 987 (1958). And, in deciding the pertinency, the specific inquiries need only be reasonably related to the major subject matter area under investigation. Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 299, 49 S.Ct. 268, 73 L.Ed. 692 (1923).
Applying the foregoing legal principles to the facts of the present case, we note first, that the broad subject matter areas which the Subcommittee is investigating — national energy policy, natural gas supply and production, the need for emergency natural gas legislation and the role of federal agencies in national energy affairs — are areas committed to the Subcommittee's jurisdiction by proper Congressional authorization.
Rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives (94th Cong.) gives the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce jurisdiction over, inter alia, "interstate and foreign commerce generally," "interstate oil compacts and petroleum and natural gas except on public lands," and "consumer affairs and consumer protection." House Rule X, § 1(L)(1), (3) and (8). The committee has extensive oversight responsibilities including the duty to review and study on a continuing basis the "application, administration, execution, and effectiveness" of existing legislation and "any conditions or circumstances which may indicate the necessity or desirability of enacting new or additional legislation" within the jurisdiction of the committee. House Rule X, § 2(b); see also 2 U.S.C. § 190d.
Rule X also confers upon each of the standing committees of the House the power to "establish an oversight subcommittee . . . to conduct oversight in the area of their respective jurisdictions, to assist in carrying out its responsibilities. . . ." House Rule X, § 2(b)(1). Rule X of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce (94th Cong.) establishes the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, giving it jurisdiction, inter alia, to ". . coordinate its work with the work of the other standing subcommittees . . ." and to "maintain regular communication with the standing subcommittees in order to obtain advice on subjects for investigation."
Pursuant to the authority of these Rules and the resolution of February 26, 1975, and in order to carry out its legislative review functions under 2 U.S.C. § 190d, the Subcommittee on April 17, 1975, approved an extensive study of national energy policy, specifically including the subject of "natural gas supplies" and "curtailments of natural gas." Under the Rules of the House of Representatives and an enabling resolution of the full committee, the Subcommittee has subpoena power to compel attendance of witnesses and production of documents in furtherance of such an investigation. The subpoena in this case was issued by the Subcommittee to the FTC pursuant to that enabling resolution.
Section 190d requires, inter alia, that each standing committee of the Congress "shall review and study, on continuing basis, the application, administration, and execution of those laws, or parts of laws, the subject matter of which is within the jurisdiction of that committee."
The House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce agreed to a resolution on April 17, 1975, which gave the Subcommittee authority to require by subpoena the attendance of witnesses and production of documents. Cf. House Rule XI, § 2(m) (94th Cong.)
Second, we note that the committee and Subcommittee are clearly engaged in "a valid legislative purpose" with respect to the present study of energy problems, natural gas supply and production, emergency natural gas legislation and the role of the Federal Trade Commission, the Federal Power Commission, and other agencies responsible for national energy policy. The broad subject matters under investigation have direct relation to pending legislation, to the decision whether or not to legislate, to the function of overseeing the administration of laws by federal agencies, and to the function of informing itself generally concerning matters of national importance.
See, e. g., H.R. 9464, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
See generally, Hearings on Natural Gas Supplies Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (two volumes).
And finally, we find that the Subcommittee's specific inquiries to the FTC in the instant case are pertinent to the broad subject matter areas which the House of Representatives has authorized the committee and Subcommittee to investigate. The supply and production of natural gas on federal lands has a distinct impact on the interstate market and national energy policy. The accuracy of reporting regarding natural gas supplies on federal lands relates to an important question of whether natural gas producers, like Ashland, are properly reporting their reserves.
Moreover, the legitimacy of the specific inquiry to the FTC here has been ratified by the full House which authorized Chairman Moss to intervene in this action to secure the subpoenaed information "now in the possession of the Federal Trade Commission for the use of the committee and the House" H.Res. No. 899, § 1, 121 Cong.Rec. 12, 918-19 (daily ed. December 18, 1975).
In summary, we find that the particular investigation here in issue is directly related to and in furtherance of "a legitimate task of Congress." Watkins v. United States, supra, 354 U.S., at 187, 77 S.Ct. 1173. The Subcommittee, in issuing the subpoena, was acting under the clear mandate of the full committee and the House of Representatives to investigate within the "sphere of legitimate legislative activity" and that grant of authority is itself sufficient to show that the investigation upon which the Subcommittee has embarked "concerned a subject on which `legislation could be had.'" Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, supra, 421 U.S., at 506, 95 S.Ct. at 1823; McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S., at 177, 47 S.Ct. 319; see also Communist Party v. Control Board, 367 U.S. 1, 81 S.Ct. 1357, 6 L.Ed.2d 625 (1961).
Injunctive relief is appropriate only "to prevent existing or presently threatened injuries" and "will not be granted against something merely feared as liable to occur at some indefinite time in the future." Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 674, 51 S.Ct. 286, 291, 75 L.Ed. 602 (1930). See also, General Fireproofing Company v. Wyman, 444 F.2d 391, 393 (2d Cir. 1971). Injunctions will not be granted where the injuries complained of are prospective and "which may, indeed, never occur." Crimmins v. American Stock Exchange, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1256, 1262 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). The injury complained of must be of such imminence that there is a "clear and present" need for equitable relief to prevent irreparable harm. Hershey Creamery Co. v. Hershey Chocolate Corp., 269 F. Supp. 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); see also Assn. of Professional Engineering Personnel v. Radio Corp. of America, 183 F. Supp. 834 (D.C.N.J. 1960). And the required showing of irreparable injury is not eliminated simply by virtue of a claim alleging violation of statutory or constitutional rights (unless the requirement has been specifically eliminated by statute). Thus, in United Fuel Gas Co. v. Railroad Commission, 278 U.S. 300, 49 S.Ct. 150, 73 L.Ed. 390 (1928), the Supreme Court noted:
See also Newtex S. S. Corp. v. United States, 107 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), aff'd, 344 U.S. 901, 73 S.Ct. 285, 97 L.Ed. 696; Ellis Raw Bar v. District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency, 139 U.S. App.D.C. 385, 433 F.2d 543 (1970).
While Ashland couches its concerns in terms of "public disclosure," any irreparable injury to it would result, more precisely, in disclosure to its competitors. Certainly, such injury might logically result as well from general dissemination. But the transfer of such data from the FTC to the Subcommittee and the Subcommittee's review of that information, does not lead inexorably to either public dissemination or disclosure to Ashland's competitors. Moreover, the courts must presume that the committees of Congress will exercise their powers responsibly and with due regard for the rights of affected parties. See, Ansara v. Eastland, 143 U.S.App.D.C. 29, 442 F.2d 751, 754 (1971); United States v. Tobin, 195 F. Supp. 588, 613 (D.D.C. 1961).
"This court cannot assume, as plaintiffs urge, that the members of the committee will fail to give consideration to constitutional claims they consider may have merit. On the contrary, we may rightly assume that the legislators are sensitive to, and will endeavor to act conformably to, the principle that the Bill of Rights applies to the legislature's investigations as well as to its enactments." Ansara v. Eastland, 143 U.S.App.D.C. 29, 442 F.2d 751, 753-54 (1971).
Ashland argues that this presumption is rebutted by "Congressman Moss's own past practices" and the Subcommittee's handling of trade secrets in the past which, according to plaintiff, "has shown either a total incapacity to protect such trade secrets or a callous indifference to the proprietary nature of those secrets." (Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum, p. 59). In addition, Ashland suggests that the Court take judicial notice of the fact that throughout the pendency of this action, "there has been no promise or commitment that Ashland's trade secret data would be given confidential treatment." Id., at 58. While the Court can appreciate Ashland's concern under these circumstances, it does not appear to the Court that isolated instances of breached confidentiality in the past are sufficient to overcome the continuing presumption of Congressional propriety.
Ashland cites several instances in the past in which it appears that either Chairman Moss or his Subcommittee has failed to accord confidentiality to admittedly sensitive trade materials, viz.:
(a) On a prior occasion, involving natural gas reserve estimates submitted to the FTC "subject to an agreement restricting access to and disclosure of the data," Congressman Moss released such proprietary information to the general public. Cf., Federal Trade Commission v. Texaco, Inc., 517 F.2d 137, 141, n. 4, 151, n. 37 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
Through its staff counsel, the Subcommittee has indicated that there is "no indication" that the Subcommittee "would release information originating from Ashland." (Affidavit of Michael R. Lemov, Intervenor's Motion to Dismiss). And Chairman Moss, through counsel, has represented:
Ordered, That the effect of this order should be, and the same is hereby, stayed until the expiration of ten (10) days from the entry thereof, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 62(a).