Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/767/730/40187/
Timestamp: 2020-02-20 04:08:43
Document Index: 382366695

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 841', '§ 846', '§ 3109', '§ 3109', '§ 3109', '§ 3109']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Patrick C. Remigio, A/k/a Joe Cuervo, Defendant-appellant, 767 F.2d 730 (10th Cir. 1985) :: Justia
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United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Patrick C. Remigio, A/k/a Joe Cuervo, Defendant-appellant, 767 F.2d 730 (10th Cir. 1985)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit - 767 F.2d 730 (10th Cir. 1985) July 17, 1985
Before BARRETT and SETH, Circuit Judges, and SEAY, District Judge* .
This appeal arises from verdicts finding the defendant-appellant, Patrick C. Remigio, guilty of unlawfully conspiring to manufacture methamphetamines, and unlawfully attempting to manufacture methamphetamines, both contrary to 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1), and both in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Two co-defendants charged in the same indictment had earlier pled guilty to one or more counts, and do not join in this appeal.
In his first assignment of error, Remigio alleges the trial court erred in overruling his motion to suppress, 573 F. Supp. 998 (D. Kan. 1983). Remigio's claim is based on his allegation that the officers, in the execution of a search warrant, failed to knock and announce prior to entering the residence, as is required by 18 U.S.C. § 3109.1
Remigio disputes the facts as recited above, claiming that the interior door to the kitchen was closed.2 This Court, however, may not disturb the findings of fact rendered by the District Court unless it is convinced the findings are clearly erroneous. After carefully reviewing the record below in the light most favorable to the government, this Court cannot say that the District Court's findings were clearly erroneous. Accordingly, this Court must accept the findings as reported. United States v. Miles, 449 F.2d 1272, 1274 (10th Cir. 1971); Arnold v. United States, 432 F.2d 871, 874 (10th Cir. 1970); Todd v. United States, 362 F.2d 531, 532 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 994, 87 S. Ct. 608, 17 L. Ed. 2d 454 (1966), reh'g denied, 386 U.S. 929, 87 S. Ct. 877, 17 L. Ed. 2d 803 (1967).
The purpose of 18 U.S.C. § 3109 is to restrict the authority of the government to intrude upon the privacy of its citizens, and to protect law enforcement officers who might be mistaken as unlawful intruders if they were to enter a residence unannounced. Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 306-08, 312 n. 12, 78 S. Ct. 1190, 1198 n. 12, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1332 (1958).
The statute requires law enforcement officials to announce their authority and purpose, and to be denied admittance, before they break down the door of a house. Id. at 306, 78 S. Ct. at 1194. The United States Supreme Court, in Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 88 S. Ct. 1755, 20 L. Ed. 2d 828 (1968), found that the use of force was not an essential element of the statute, and ruled that unlatching a closed, unlocked door was an "unannounced intrusion" in violation of the statute. Id. at 590, 88 S. Ct. at 1758. Whether entry through an open door is an "unannounced intrusion" is another matter.
This Circuit has never addressed the issue of whether officials must comply with the knock and announce statute prior to entering through an open door. Other Circuits have addressed the issue, however, and the majority rule is that entry through an open door is not a "breaking" within the meaning of the federal knock and announce statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3109. United States v. Lopez, 475 F.2d 537, 541 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 839, 94 S. Ct. 89, 38 L. Ed. 2d 74 (1973); United States v. Johns, 466 F.2d 1364, 1365 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Conti, 361 F.2d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 1966), vacated on other grounds, 390 U.S. 204, 88 S. Ct. 899, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1035 (1968); Ng Pui Yu v. United States, 352 F.2d 626, 632 (9th Cir. 1965); United States v. Williams, 351 F.2d 475, 477 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 917, 86 S. Ct. 910, 15 L. Ed. 2d 671 (1966). Contra Hair v. United States, 289 F.2d 894, 895-96 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
This Court is persuaded by the majority rule. We hold that government officials, armed with a warrant, entering a house through an open door and in the presence of a defendant, need not comply with the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3109. Accordingly, the entry in this case was lawful, and the motion to suppress was properly denied.
In order to be convicted of an attempt, the government must prove "an intent to engage in criminal conduct and the performance of acts which constitute a 'substantial step' towards the commission of the substantive offense." United States v. Manley, 632 F.2d 978, 987 (2nd Cir. 1980), cert. denied, sub nom. Williams v. United States, 449 U.S. 1112, 101 S. Ct. 922, 66 L. Ed. 2d 841 (1981).
The record in the present case fully establishes the commission of the necessary elements of attempt by Remigio. That the government went beyond the proof required for an attempt, and established the substantive offense as well, is of no consequence. The crime of attempt is a lesser included offense of the substantive crime. United States v. Pino, 608 F.2d 1001, 1003-04 (4th Cir. 1979); United States v. Marin, 513 F.2d 974, 976 (2d Cir. 1975). Moreover, the "substantial step" element of an attempt may be as much as, or less than, the actual commission of the crime. See United States v. Manley, 632 F.2d at 987-88. Accordingly, the United States could have charged Remigio under either the attempt or the substantive crime of manufacturing methamphetamines. The government chose the attempt statute, and proof of the substantive crime at trial was proof of the lesser included offense of attempt. Therefore, the trial court was correct in denying Remigio's motion for acquittal.
Rule 801(d) (2) (E) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that statements offered against a party which are made by co-conspirators of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy, are not hearsay. The statements of a party's co-conspirator are admissible if the trial judge determines it is more likely than not that the conspiracy existed, that the declarant and defendant were members of the conspiracy, and that the statements were made in furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. Andrews, 585 F.2d 961, 965 (10th Cir. 1978). See United States v. Petersen, 611 F.2d 1313, 1327 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 905, 100 S. Ct. 2985, 64 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1980).
In light of this independent evidence, adduced at trial prior to the admission of the evidence at issue, as requested in United States v. Pilling, 721 F.2d 286 (10th Cir. 1983), the trial court was more than justified in finding it more likely than not that a conspiracy existed and that Remigio was a participant therein. Accordingly, the Court finds the statements of the co-conspirator made in furtherance of the conspiracy were properly admitted into evidence.
In Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S. Ct. 2240, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1976), the Supreme Court held that a prosecutor's use of a defendant's post-arrest silence, which followed the giving of Miranda warnings, to impeach the defendant's testimony at trial was violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, this Circuit has consistently held that comments by prosecutors on an accused's silence were plain, fundamental error. See United States v. Gilliland, 586 F.2d 1384, 1390 (10th Cir. 1978); Twyman v. State of Oklahoma, 560 F.2d 422, 424 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1071, 98 S. Ct. 1254, 55 L. Ed. 2d 774, reh'g denied, 435 U.S. 962, 98 S. Ct. 1594, 55 L. Ed. 2d 812 (1978); Deats v. Rodriguez, 477 F.2d 1023, 1024-25 (10th Cir. 1973); Johnson v. Patterson, 475 F.2d 1066, 1067-68 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 878, 94 S. Ct. 64, 38 L. Ed. 2d 124 (1973); United States v. Arnold, 425 F.2d 204, 206 (10th Cir. 1970); United States v. Noland, 416 F.2d 588, 594 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 912, 90 S. Ct. 227, 24 L. Ed. 2d 187 (1969).
Generally, such conduct, no matter how slight, requires reversal for a new trial. See United States v. Arnold, 425 F.2d at 206. If such conduct amounts to harmless error, however, reversal of the conviction would be neither an appropriate nor an efficient method of discouraging such conduct in future prosecutions. Nevertheless, since such error is of constitutional dimension, it will require a new trial unless we are convinced the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt after assessing the record as a whole. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S. Ct. 824, 828, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 reh'g denied, 386 U.S. 987, 87 S. Ct. 1283, 18 L. Ed. 2d 241 (1967); United States v. Massey, 687 F.2d 1348, 1353 (10th Cir. 1982).
687 F.2d at 1353, citing Williams v. Zahradnick, 632 F.2d 353, 361-62 (footnotes omitted) (4th Cir. 1980).
This fact, of itself, may not have been critical to the Court's ruling. Once law enforcement officials lawfully enter a house, they need not always comply with the knock and announce statute before entering every other closed door within the residence. See United States v. Crawford, 657 F.2d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 1981)