Source: http://supremecourtindia.in/supreme-court-observed-in-mcculloch-vs/
Timestamp: 2019-01-23 11:11:05
Document Index: 617146398

Matched Legal Cases: ['§38', '§1325', '§1325', '§1325', '§1325', '§1325', '§1325', '§1325', '§1325']

Supreme Court Observed In McCulloch Vs | Lawyer in Supreme Court of India
Supreme Court Observed In McCulloch Vs
The ground for challenge is that the said Act is violative of Articles 14, 15, and 27 of the Constitution. The grievance of the petitioner is that he is a Hindu but he has to pay direct and indirect taxes, part of whose proceeds go for the purpose of the Haj pilgrimage, which is only done by Muslims. For the Haj, the Indian Government inter alia grants a subsidy in the air fare of the pilgrims. The petitioner contends that his fundamental right under Article 27 of the Constitution is being violated. There are not many decisions which have given an indepth interpretation of Article 27. The decision in Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments vs. In our opinion Article 27 will be attracted in both these eventualities. This is because Article 27 is a provision in the Constitution, and not an ordinary statute. Principles of interpreting the Constitution are to some extent different from those of interpreting an ordinary statute vide judgment of Hon’ble Sikri, J. in Kesavanand Bharati vs.
State of Kerala, 1973 (4) SCC 225 (vide para 15). The object of Article 27 is to maintain secularism, and hence we must construe it from that angle. As Lord Wright observed in James vs. Commonwealth of Australia, (1936) AC 578, a Constitution is not to be interpreted in a narrow or pedantic manner (followed in re C.P. This is because a Constitution is a constituent or organic statute, vide British Coal Corporation vs. The King, AIR 1935 P.C. 158 and Kesavanand Bharati vs. However, the petitioner has not made any averment in his Writ Petition that a substantial part of any tax collected in India is utilized for the purpose of Haj. “(i) That the respondent herein has been imposing and collecting various kinds of direct and indirect taxes from the petitioner and other citizens of the country. Thus, it is nowhere mentioned in the Writ Petition as to what percentage of any particular tax has been utilized for the purpose of the Haj pilgrimage. The allegation in para 5(ii) of the Writ Petition is very vague.
In our opinion, if only a relatively small part of any tax collected is utilized for providing some conveniences or facilities or concessions to any religious denomination, that would not be violative of Article 27 of the Constitution. It is only when a substantial part of the tax is utilized for any particular religion that Article 27 would be violated. Moreover, in para 8(iii) of the counter affidavit the Central Government has stated that it is not averse to the idea of granting support to the pilgrimage conducted by any community. In our opinion, we must not be too rigid in these matters, and must give some free play to the joints of the State machinery. As observed by Mr. Justice Holmes, the celebrated Judge of the U.S. Supreme Court in Bain Peanut Co. vs. Pinson, 282 U.S. 499, 501 (1931) “The interpretation of constitutional principles must not be too literal. We must remember that the machinery of the government would not work if it were not allowed a little play in its joints” (see also Missourie, Kansas and Tennessee Railroad vs.
May, 194 U.S. 267 (1904). Hence, in our opinion, there is no violation of Article 27 of the Constitution. There is also no violation of Articles 14 and 15 because facilities are also given, and expenditures incurred, by the Central and State Governments in India for other religions. Thus there is no discrimination. In Transport & Dock Workers Union vs. Mumbai Port Trust, 2010(12) Scale 217 this Court observed that Article 14 cannot be interpreted in a doctrinaire or dogmatic manner. Apart from the above, we have held in Government of Andhra Pradesh vs. P. Laxmi Devi, AIR 2008 SC 1640 that Court should exercise great restraint when deciding the constitutionality of a statute, and every effort should be made to uphold its validity. “Pilgrimages to places outside India”. Thus there is no force in this petition and it is dismissed. It may be mentioned that when India became independent in 1947 there were partition riots in many parts of the sub-continent, and a large number of people were killed, injured and displaced. Religious passions were inflamed at that time, and when passions are inflamed it is difficult to keep a cool head. It is the greatness of our founding fathers that under the leadership of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru they kept a cool head and decided to declare India a secular country instead of a Hindu country. This was a very difficult decision at that time because Pakistan had declared itself an Islamic State and hence there must have been tremendous pressure on Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and our other leaders to declare a Hindu State. It is their greatness that they resisted this pressure and kept a cool head and rightly declared India to be a secular state. This is why despite all its tremendous diversity India is still united.
In-ordinate delay : When an aggrieved person can apply before the Court, if no limitation is prescribed in the statute for filing an appeal before the appropriate forum ? Now, the sole question which falls for our consideration is : when an aggrieved person can apply before the Court, if no limitation is prescribed in the statute for filing an appeal before the appropriate forum. We have duly considered the said question. Even if we assume that no limitation is prescribed in any statute to file an application before the court in that case, can an aggrieved person come before the court at his sweet will at any point of time ? The answer must be in the negative. If no time-limit has been prescribed in a statute to apply before the appropriate forum, in that case, he has to come before the court within a reasonable time. This Court on a number of occasions, while dealing with the matter of similar nature held that where even no limitation has been prescribed, the petition must be filed within a reasonable time.
In our considered opinion, the period of 9 years and 11 months, is nothing but an inordinate delay to pursue the remedy of a person and without submitting any cogent reason there for. The court has no power to condone the same in such case. Dattatraya Eknath Mane & Ors. 3. The appellant being aggrieved by the said order has preferred this appeal. 4.1 On August 16, 1996 the appellant was appointed as the Headmaster of Shri Chatrapati Shivaji Vidhyalaya run by Jijamata Shikshan Prasarak Mandal. Then respondent No.1 was acting as the in-charge Headmaster of the said School. The appointment of the appellant was approved in a meeting held on August 14, 1996 and the respondent No.1 presided over the said meeting. On August 21,1996 such appointment of the appellant was duly approved by the Education Officer, after following due procedure. It appears from the facts that on July 11, 2007, respondent No.1, after a delay of 9 years and 11 months, filed an application for condonation of delay before the School Tribunal (being Misc. By an order dated 14th March, 2007, the said application was dismissed by the School Tribunal.
4.2. The School Tribunal, after hearing the parties, found that respondent No.1 herein on August 9, 1995 voluntarily resigned from the post of the In-charge Headmaster of the said School. Such resignation was duly accepted by the Management. Such permission was granted to the Management. 4.3. The School Tribunal duly considered the matter on merits and noticed that respondent No.1 himself presided over the meeting of the Managing Committee and approved the appointment of the present appellant as Headmaster of the said School. Admittedly, the appellant was working since then and the said fact was known to the respondent No.1. Admittedly, he did not apply before the appropriate authority for appropriate remedy, save and except he filed representations addressed to R/M. In these circumstances, the School Tribunal refused to condone the delay and dismissed the application. 6. In these circumstances, the only question that arises is, whether an application can be filed by an aggrieved party even long after 10 years. “9. Right of appeal to Tribunal to employees of a private school. § Provided that, where such order was made before the appointed date, such appeal may be made within sixty days from the said date.
The answer must be in the negative. If no time-limit has been prescribed in a statute to apply before the appropriate forum, in that case, he has to come before the court within a reasonable time. This Court on a number of occasions, while dealing with the matter of similar nature held that where even no limitation has been prescribed, the petition must be filed within a reasonable time. In our considered opinion, the period of 9 years and 11 months, is nothing but an inordinate delay to pursue the remedy of a person and without submitting any cogent reason there for. The court has no power to condone the same in such case. ] and K.R. Mudgal v. R.P. ]. In these cases, it has been held that the application should be rejected on the ground of inordinate delay. Furthermore, it is to be noted that appointment of the appellant was within the knowledge of respondent No.1 from day one but he did not take any steps for such a long time. 8. In these circumstances, we find it is difficult for us to uphold the decision of the High Court. We are sure that the said question of inordinate delay missed out from the mind of the court at the time of sending back the matter before the Tribunal. Accordingly, we set aside the order passed by the High Court, allow the appeal and affirm the order of the Tribunal.
The opinion drew a spirited dissent from Justice Scalia, who argued that merely because Congress chose a poor measure for predicting future income did not give the court license to ignore the statutory text. Stephanie Kay Lanning’s trip to the Supreme Court began when she filed for chapter 13 in October 2006. During the six months prior to filing, Ms. Lanning had received a one-time buyout from her former employer. This raised the issue of whether the Bankruptcy Court was required to use the historical but outdated income amount or the current amount in confirming a plan. The Bankruptcy Court, the Tenth Circuit BAP and the Tenth Circuit all agreed that the Debtor was not required to make payments based upon a one-time occurrence which was not going to recur. The Tenth Circuit found that the court should start with the presumption that the historical number was the correct amount but that this figure could be rebutted by evidence of a substantial change in the debtor’s circumstances. The issue in the case arises from the use of the words “projected disposable income” in 11 U.S.C.
Sec. 1325(b)(1)(B). In the face of an objection, a chapter 13 debtor must pay the lesser of the allowed unsecured claims or the debtor’s “projected disposable income” for a defined period of time. The term “projected disposable income” was already used in the statute prior to BAPCPA. It relied in turn upon a definition of “disposable income.” The definition of “disposable income” was changed by BAPCPA. Prior to BAPCPA, “disposable income” referred to the debtor’s income less amounts necessary for the maintenance or support of the debtor and the debtor’s dependents as well as business expenses. BAPCPA made two changes to this definition. First, it replaced the term “income” with the defined term “current monthly income.” The term “current monthly income” was defined as the average of the debtor’s income during the six months prior to bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. Sec. 101(10A). Second, the expenses allowed to be deducted for maintenance or support of the debtor would be determined under the chapter 7 means test if the debtor’s “current monthly income” exceeded the median income. Two lines of cases developed.
Eight Justices agreed that the “forward looking approach” was the best way to give meaning to the term “projected disposable income.” Justice Alito noted that when words are not defined, that they are given their usual meaning. “When terms used in a statute are undefined, we give them their ordinary meaning.” (citation omitted) . Here, the term “projected” is not defined, and in ordinary usage future occurrences are not “projected” based on the assumption that the past will necessarily repeat itself. For example, projections concerning a company’s future sales or the future cash flow from a license take into account anticipated events that may change past trends. Hamilton v. Lanning, slip op., pp. The majority opinion also argued that the structure of Sec. The majority opinion is also noteworthy for its recognition of the practical realities of bankruptcy. See also id. , §38.1 (“Debtor’s counsel often has little discretion when to file the Chapter 13 case”). As a result, the Supreme Court concluded that a one-time aberration in income would not require a chapter 13 debtor to propose a plan based on projections of non-existent income. However, the forward-looking approach cuts both ways.
The Supreme Court cited the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in In re Nowlin, 576 F.3d 258 (5th Cir. In Nowlin, the Fifth Circuit held that a debtor would be required to increase his chapter 13 payments when a permissible expense would terminate during the period of a plan. Under the same logic, a debtor whose contract provided for guaranteed increases in pay could be required to devote these sums to the plan. Not content with the reasoning of his other eight colleagues, Justice Scalia wrote a 14 page dissent which argued that the court was not being faithful to the words used by Congress. He argued that the word “projected” did not give the court latitude to “fiddle” with the formula provided by Congress, since the use of a formula provided the means for the projection. This definition of “disposable income” applies to the use of that term in the longer phrase “projected disposable income” in §1325(b)(1)(B), since the definition says that it applies to subsection (b).
In the Court’s view, this modifier makes all the difference. Projections, it explains, ordinarily account for later developments, not just past data. Thus, the Court concludes, in determining “projected disposable income” a bankruptcy court may depart from §1325(b)(2)’s inflexible formula, at least in “exceptional cases,” to account for “significant changes” in the debtor’s circumstances, either actual or anticipated. That interpretation runs aground because it either renders superfluous text Congress included or requires adding text Congress did not. It would be pointless to define disposable income in such detail, based on data during a specific 6-month period, if a court were free to set the resulting figure aside whenever it appears to be a poor predictor. And since “disposable income” appears nowhere else in §1325(b), then unless §1325(b)(2)’s definition applies to “projected disposable income” in §1325(b)(1)(B), it does not apply at all. Next, he argued that projections could be made solely on historical data if that is how Congress said to do it. The Court rejects this reading as unrealistic. A projection, the Court explains, may be based in part on past data, but “adjustments are often made based on other factors that may affect the final outcome.” (citation omitted).
Past performance is no guarantee of future results. ]” that are based only on a football team’s play before its star quarterback was injured. And no pundit would keep his post if he “projected” election results relying only on prior cycles, ignoring recent polls. ]” a debtor’s “disposable income” when it considers only what he earned in a specific 6-month period in the past. Such analogies do not establish that carrying current monthly income forward to determine a debtor’s future ability to pay is not a “projection.” They show only that relying exclusively on past data for the projection may be a bad idea. One who is asked to predict future results, but is armed with no other information than prior performance, can still make a projection; it may simply be off the mark. Dissent, at 4-7 (emphasis added). He also responded to the majority’s criticism of the mechanical approach. The Court’s remaining arguments about the statute’s meaning are easily dispatched. A “mechanical” reading of projected disposable income, it contends, renders superfluous the phrase “to be received in the applicable commitment period” in §1325(b)(1)(B).
Not at all. That phrase defines the period for which a debtor’s disposable income must be calculated ( i.e. , the period over which the projection extends), and thus the amount the debtor must ultimately pay his unsecured creditors. Similarly insubstantial is the Court’s claim regarding the requirement that the plan provide that the debtor’s projected disposable income “will be applied to make payments” toward unsecured creditors’ claims, §1325(b)(1)(B). The Court says this requirement makes no sense unless the debtor is actually able to pay an amount equal to his projected disposable income. But it makes no sense only if one assumes that the debtor is entitled to confirmation in the first place; and that assumption is wrong. The requirement that the debtor pay at least his projected disposable income is a prerequisite to confirmation. The “will be applied” proviso does not require a debtor to pay what he cannot; it simply withholds Chapter 13 relief when he cannot pay.
Dissent, at 7 (emphasis added). Justice Scalia also found that the ability to modify a chapter 13 plan provided an answer to the problem which concerned the majority. In any event, the effects the Court fears are neither as inevitable nor as “senseless” as the Court portrays. The Court’s first concern is that if actual or anticipated changes in the debtor’s earnings are ignored, then a debtor whose income increases after the critical 6-month window will not be required to pay all he can afford. ]t any time after confirmation” to “increase … the amount of payments” on a class of claims or “reduce the time for such payments.” (citation omitted). The Court offers no explanation of why modification would not be available in such instances, and sufficient to resolve the concern. Justice Scalia’s modification argument may cut against his position. If a plan could be modified immediately after confirmation to reflect changed circumstances, why is it unreasonable to give effect to those circumstances at confirmation?
In conclusion, Justice Scalia noted the importance of following the language used by Congress even when that appears that Congress was mistaken. Underlying the Court’s interpretation is an understandable urge: Sometimes the best reading of a text yields results that one thinks must be a mistake, and bending that reading just a little bit will allow all the pieces to fit together. But taking liberties with text in light of outcome makes sense only if we assume that we know better than Congress which outcomes are mistaken. And by refusing to hold that Congress meant what it said,(citation omitted), we deprive it of the ability to say what it means in the future. It may be that no interpretation of §1325(b)(1)(B) is entirely satisfying. But it is in the hard cases, even more than the easy ones, that we should faithfully apply our settled interpretive principles, and trust that Congress will correct the law if what it previously prescribed is wrong. I have admittedly given more space to Justice Scalia’s words than to those of the majority. While the majority’s view is the law and provides the more workable solution for bankruptcy practitioners, Justice Scalia’s words have a seductive quality. The majority wants the Bankruptcy Code to make sense. The problem here is that Justice Scalia may well have the better argument for what Congress meant. However, the language they used didn’t completely do the job. Congress intended to replace the court’s discretion with an objective formula. In the case of Sec. Hamilton v. Lanning provides a practical solution which does not do obvious violence to the text, Justice Scalia notwithstanding. However, it is also a prime example of the imprecision with which BAPCPA was drafted.
Alamance County, North Carolina is considering a ban on all firearms in county buildings. Currently, only concealed weapons are banned. However, they are reacting to two non-incidents where an open carrier went in to pay their tax bills at the Tax Collector’s Office. These individuals went in, paid their bills, and left. They were not like some open carry protesters carrying a slung shotgun or rifle but merely carrying a pistol on their hip. Open carry has been legal in North Carolina since the early 1920s based upon the North Carolina Supreme Court case of State v. Kerner. Grass Roots North Carolina has issued an alert on the moves by county commissioners to consider the ban. The Times-News is reporting that Alamance County Commissioners are considering a comprehensive gun ban in County Buildings. Not known for being an anti-Second Amendment group, it may seem perplexing that Alamance County leaders would consider such a thing. Apparently, the discussion springs from a couple of recent incidents that are only remarkable in the fact that they are not “incidents” at all.
http://supremecourtindia.in/wp-content/uploads/advocate-simranjeet-singh-sidhu-.png 300 900 admin admin2018-11-21 08:35:022018-11-23 05:14:30Supreme Court Observed In McCulloch Vs