Source: http://www.rishabhdara.com/sc/view.php?case=8023
Timestamp: 2020-08-13 10:39:12
Document Index: 744726017

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art. 21', 'Art.\t136', 'Art.\t32', 'Art.\t21', 'Art 21', 'Art. 21', 'Art 136', 'Art. 32', 'Art. 21', 'Art. 21', 'sui generis', 'Art. 21', 'Art. 21', 'Art. 21', 'Art. 21', 'Art. 21', 'Art. 21', 'Art. 21', 'Art. 21']

JAVED AHMED ABDUL HAMID PAWALA versus STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
1985 AIR 231	1985 SCR (2)	8 1985 SCC (1) 275	1984 SCALE (2)697
JAVED AHMED ABDUL HAMID PAWALA V. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [1984] RD-SC 208 (9 November 1984)
CITATION: 1985 AIR 231	1985 SCR (2)	8 1985 SCC (1) 275	1984 SCALE (2)697
1985 SC1293	(*) 1986 SC 806	(*) 1988 SC1531	(4) RF	1989 SC 142	(1) RF	1989 SC1335	(1,3,28,30,31,33,34) RF	1989 SC1933	(27)
Constitution of India-Article 21-Scope of-Protection of Art. 21	can be	invoked by a person awaiting execution of sentence of death for commuting death sentence	into imprisonment for life if there is delay exceeding two years in the execution of sentence of death.
Practice &	Procedure-A Division Bench of three Judges cannot purport	to overrule decision of a Division Bench of two judges.
The petitioner was convicted and sentenced to death by the Sessions Judge on 6. 2. 1982 . The High Court confirmed the sentence of death on 29130. 4.1982. An appeal preferred by the	petitioner to this Court under Art.	136 of	the Constitution was dismissed on 20. 4. 1983. The petition for review was dismissed on 12, 8. 1983. A petition for clemency was also rejected by the President of India. The petitioner filed the present writ petition under Art.	32 of	the Constitution praying that in view of	his tender age, his reformation in	jail and the long lapse of time since the passing of the sentence of death on him the execution of the sentence of death may	be stopped and the sentence may be commuted to one of imprisonment for life. On being asked by this Court, the Superintendent of the jail where	the petitioner had	been kept reported that so	far nothing adverse to the petitioner had came to the notice of	the authority.
HELD; In T. V. Vatheeswaran v. State of Tamil Nadu, a Division Bench	of this	Court consisting of one of us and R.B. Misra, J. held that making all reasonable allowance for the time necessary for appeal and consideration of reprieve, delay exceeding	two years in the execution of a sentence of death should be considered sufficient to entitle the person under sentence	of death to invoke Art.	21 of	the Constitution and demand the quashing of the	sentence of death. Shortly	thereafter in Sher Singh v. Stat of Punjab, another Division Bench of three learned Judges of this Court presided over by Chandrachud,	C.J while expressing almost complete agreement with most of what	had been said in Vatheeswaran's case dissented from the opinion expressed therein that a delay of two years and more was sufficient to entitle a person under	sentence of death to invoke Art 21.
Of the Constitution. The reason was, they said "The fixation of time	limit of two years does not	seem to us to accord with the 9 common experience of the time	normally consumed by	the litigative process and the	proceedings	before	the executive". They also said that besides delay there	were also other factors to be	taken	into account while considering the	question whether the	sentence of death should be vacated. Referred Trials and Confirmations Cases are dealt with speedily by High Courts and are never kept pending longer	than two or three months. It	is only when they reach this Court that the delay occurs. But surely, our inability to devise a	procedure to deal expeditiously with such matters of life and death can be no justification for silencing what	the learned Chief Justice has	himself so eloquently described as 'the voice of justice and fairplay' which demands that 'so long as life lasts, so long shall it be the	duty and endeavour of	this Court to give to	the provisions of our Constitution a meaning which will prevent human suffering and degradation. [17A-F] T. V. Vatheeswaran v. Sate of Tamil Nadu, [1983] 2 S.
C.C. 68, Furman v. State of Georgia, 408 US 238, Noel Riley v. Attorney-General, 1982 Crl. Law Review 679 and Sher Singh v. Slate of Punjab, AIR 1983 SC 465, referred to.
Whether a Division Bench of three Judges can purport to overrule the judgment of a Division Bench of	two Judges merely because	three is larger than two. The Court sits in Divisions of	two and three Judges for the sake of convenience and	it may	be in-appropriate for	a Division Bench of three Judges to purport to overrule the decision of a Division Bench of two Judges. Vide Young	v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd. It may be otherwise where a Full Bench or a Constitution Bench does so. [17G-H; 18A] Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd., 1944 (2) All ER.
In the instant case, an over all view	of all	the circumstances appears to us to entitle the petitioner to invoke the protection of Art. 21 of the Constitution. We accordingly quash the sentence	of death and substitute in its place the sentence of imprisonment for life. [l8B]
(Under article 32 of the Constitution of India) Mrs. K.	Hingorani and	Mrs Rekha Pandey for	the Petitioner.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by CHINNAPPA REDDY, J. To be or not to be", is	the question which	Javed Ahmed Abdul Hamid Pawala has posed us.
In connection with certain cruel and	multiple murders the petitioner was	convicted and sentenced to death by	the Learned Sessions H 10 Judge of Thane, on 6. 2. 1982. The High Court of Maharashtra confirmed the sentence of death on 29/3()-4-1982. An appeal preferred by the petitioner to this Court under Art 136 of the Constitution was dismissed	by us	on 20.	4. 1983. The petition for review was dismissed on 12. 8. 1983. A petition for clemency was also rejected by the President of India The Petitioner has filed the present writ petition under Art. 32 of the	Constitution praying that in view of his tender age, his reformation in jail and the long lapse of time since the passing of the sentence of death on him, the execution of the sentence of death may he stopped and the sentence may be commuted to one of imprisonment for life. In his petition he has frankly confessed to the dastardly crimes committed by him. He has stated that he now releases the enormity of what he has	done and wants to atone and make good the injury inflicted upon	society by him by striving to serve humanity if given a chance to do so. Moved by the apparent ring of sincerity in the sentiments expressed by the petitioner in his petition, one of us (E. S. Venkataramiah, J.) admitted the petition and later	it has	been directed	by the Court that the petition should be heard by a Bench consisting of the two	of us.	On 14.	9. 1984 we called for a report from the Superintendent, Yeravada Central Prison, Pune to report about the conduct and	behavior of the prisoner during the period	of his incarceration. The report of	the Superintendent Central	Jail is	to the	effect that so far nothing adverse	to the petitioner has came to the notice of the authority.	The question therefore is what is to be done in the	circumstances ?	The petitioner is an young man aged about 22 years. He appears to be genuinely repentant and he now desires to atone for the	grievous wrong that has been done by	him. The repentance and the desire appear to be sincere as far as we are able to judge. The Jail authority has no	adverse comment	to make against his conduct.	The sentence of death has now been hanging over his head for two years and nine months.
In T.V. Vatheeswaran v. State of Tamil	Nadu(l), a Division Bench	of this	court consisting of one of us and R.B. Misra, J. considered at length the question whether delay in the	education of the sentence of death	was sufficient to entitle the person under the sentence of death to invoke Art. 21 of the Constitution. In (1) [1983] 2 S.C.C. 68.
11 opining that a delay exceeding two years would so entitle the prisoner, we first observed :- "First, let	us get rid of the	cob-webs of prejudice. Sure, the murders were wicked and diabolic.
The appellant and his friend showed no mercy to their victims. Why should any mercy be shown to them ? But, gently, we	must remind ourselves it is not Shylock's pound of flesh that we seek, nor a chilling of	the human spirit. It is justice to the killer too and not justice untempered by mercy that we dispense. Of course, we	cannot refuse to pass the sentence of death where the	circumstances cry for it. But, the question is whether	in a case where after the sentence of death is given, the accused person is made to undergo inhuman and degrading punishment or where the execution of the sentence is endlessly delayed and the accused is made to suffer	the most excruciating agony and anguish, is it not open to a court of appeal or a court exercising writ jurisdiction, in an appropriate proceeding to take note of the circumstance	when it	is brought to	its notice and give relief where necessary ? After referring to Ediga	Anamma, Lalla Singh, Bhagwan Bux Singh, Sadhu Singh	and Sahai, we proceeded to quota Justice	Brennan's observation in Furman	v.State of Georgia(l), where he had said:
"The prospect of pending execution exacts a frightful toll during the	inevitable long wait	between	the imposition of sentence and the actual infliction of death." F We then referred	to the	minority opinion of	Lord Scarman and Lord Brightman in Noel	Riley v. Attorney- General(2)7 where they had said:- "It is no exaggeration, therefore, to say that the jurisprudence of the civilised world, much of which is derived from common law principles and the prohibition against cruel and unusual	punishments in	the English Bill of Rights, has recognised and acknowledged that (1) 408 US 238.
12 prolonged delay in executing a sentence	of death can make the	punishment when it	comes	inhuman	and degrading. As the Supreme Court of California commented in Anderson case, it is cruel and has	dehumanising effects. Sentence	of death is one thing; sentence of death followed by lengthy imprisonment prior to execution is another.
It is	of course true that a period of anguish and suffering is an inevitable consequence of sentence of death. But a prolongation of it beyond the	time necessary for appeal and	consideration of reprieve is not. And it is no answer to say	that the man	will struggle to stay	alive.	In a	truth,	it is	this ineradicable human desire which	makes prolongation inhuman and degrading. The anguish of alternating hope and despair, the agony of uncertainty, the consequences of	such	suffering on the mental, emotional,	and physical integrity	and health of the individual	are vividly described	in the evidence of the effect of the delay in the circumstances of these five cases. We need not rehearse the facts, which are not in dispute. We do not doubt	that the appellants have proved that	they have been	subjected to a cruel and	dehumanising experience Prolonged delay when it arises from factors outside the control of the condemned man can render a decision to carry out the sentence of death an inhuman and degrading punishment. It is, of course, for	the applicant or constitutional protection to show that the delay was inordinate, arose from no act of his, and was likely to	cause	such	acute suffering that	the infliction	of the death	penalty would	be in	the circumstances which had arisen inhuman or degrading Such a case has been established in our view, by these appellants." We added, "While we entirely agree with Lord	Scarman	and Lord Brightman about the	dehumanising effect of	pro longed delay after the sentence of death, we enter a little caveat, but only that we	may go	further. We think that	the cause of the delay is immaterial when the sentence 13 is	death.	Be the cause	for the delay, the	time necessary A for appeal and consideration of reprieve or some other	cause for which the accused himself may be responsible, it	would not alter the	dehumanising character of the delay." Thereafter we proceeded to consider the implications of Art. 21	in the light of Menaka Gandhi, Sunil, Batra, Bachan Singh, Bhuvan Mohan Patnaik, Pandurang Sangzgiri, Champalal Plmjaji Shah, Hussainara Khatoon and M.H. Hoskot.We	then said:- "So, what do we have now ? Articles 14,19 and 21 are not mutually exclusive. They sustain, strengthen	and nourish each other. They are available to prisoners as well as free men. Prison walls do not keep	out Fundamental Rights. A person under sentence of death may also claim Fundamental Rights. The fiat of Article 21, as explained, is that any procedure which deprives a person of his life or liberty must be just, fair and reasonable. Just, fair and reasonable procedure implies a right to free legal services where he cannot avail them. - It implies a right to a speedy trial. It implies humane conditions of detention, preventive or punitive. 'Procedure established by law' does not end with the pronouncement of	sentence, it includes	the carrying out of sentence.	That is as far as we have gone so far. It seems to	us but	a short step, but a step in the right direction, to	hold that prolonged detention to await the execution of a sentence of death is an unjust, unfair and unreasonable procedure and the only way to undo the wrong is to quash the sentence of death. In	the United State of America where the right to a speedy trial	is a	Constitutionally guaranteed right, the	denial of a speedy trial has been held to entitle an	accused person	to the dismissal of	the indictment or the vacation of the sentence (vide Strunk v. United	States [1973] 37 L Ed. 2d S6). Analogy of American law is not permissible, but interpreting our Constitution sui generis, as we are bound to do, we find no impediment in holding that the	dehumanising factor of	prolonged delay in the execution of a sentence of death has the Constitutional implication of depriving a person of his life in an unjust, unfair and unreasonable way	as to	offend	the Constitutional guarantee that no 14 person shall be deprived	of his life	or personal liberty except - according to procedure established by law. The appropriate relief in such a case is to vacate the sentence of death." We proceeded to consider what delay could be considered prolonged enough to attract the Constitutional protection of Art. 21, We thought that making all responsible allowance for the	time necessary for appeal and consideration of reprieve, delay	exceeding two	years in the execution of a sentence of death should be considered sufficient to entitle the person under sentence of death to invoke Art. 21 of the Constitution and demand the quashing of the sentence of death.
Very shortly after the	Court	had pronounced	its judgment, in Vatheeswaran's case, in Sher Singll v. State of Punjab1) another Divison Bench	of three learned Judges of this Court presided	over by Chandrachud,	C.J. while expressing almost complete agreement with most of what had been said in Vatheeswaran's case dissented from the opinion expressed by therein that a delay of two years and more was sufficient to entitle a person under	sentence of death to invoke Art. 21 of the Constitution. The learned Judges first observed:- "But we	must hasten to add that this Court has not taken the	narrow view	that the jurisdiction to interfere with a death sentence can be exercised only in an appeal against the judgment of conviction and sentence. The question which arises in such appeals is whether the extreme penalty provided by law is called for in the circumstances	of the	case. The question which arises in proceedings such as P those before us is whether, even if the death sentence was the only appropriate sentence to impose in the case and	was therefore imposed, it will be harsh and unjust to execute that sentence by reason of supervening events.
In very recent times, the sentence of death has been commuted to life imprisonment by this Court in quite a few cases for the reason, inter alia, that the prisoner was under	the specter of the sentence of death for an unduly LONG time after the final confirmation of that sentence,	consequent upon the	dismissal of	the prisoner's Special	Leave Petition	or Appeal by	this Court Tradi- (1) AIR 1983 SC 46S.
15 tionally, subsequent events are taken into account in the area of civil	law. There is no reason why	they should not receive due	consideration	in other jurisdictions, particularly when their relevance on the implementation or	execution of judicial	verdicts is undeniable. Undoubtedly,	principles analogous	to resjudicata govern	all judicial proceedings but	when new SITUATIONS emerge, particularly factual, after a verdict has assumed finality in	the course of	the hierarchical process, advertence to those situations is not barred on the ground that a final decision has been rendered already. That final decision is not a decision on new facts. Courts are never powerless to do justice, that is say, to ensure that the processes of law do not result in	undue misery, suffering or hardship That is why, even	after the final seal of approval is placed upon a sentence of death, this Court has exercised its power to direct, ex debito justitiae, that though the sentence was justified when passed, its execution, in the circumstances	of the	case, is not justified by reason of	the unduly long time which has elapsed since the confirmation of that	sentence by this Court. Some of us dealing with this case have been	parties to decisions directing in appropriate cases, that	the death sentence shall not	be executed by reason of supervening circumstances." They then	proceeded to agree with our agreement with the view expressed by Lord Scarman and Lord Brightman. They said:- "Like our learned Brethren, we too consider that the . view expressed in this behalf	by Lord	Scarman and Lord Brightman in the Privy Council decision of Neel Riley 1982	Crl. Law Review 679	is. with respect, correct. The majority in	that case did not pronounce upon this	matter The minority expressed	the opinion that the jurisprudence of the civilized world	has recognized and acknowledged that	prolonged delay in executing a sentence of death can make the punishment when it comes inhuman and degrading. Sentence of death is one thing; sentence of death	followed by lengthy imprisonment prior to execution is another.	The prolonged anguish	of alternating hope and despair, the agony of	uncertainty, the consequences of	such suffering on the mental, emotional 16 and physical integrity and health of the individual can render A the decision to execute the sentence of death an	inhuman and degrading punishment in	the circumstances of a given case." After referring to Robert Johnson's 'Condemned to die, life under sentence of death', they observed:
"A prisoner who has experienced living death	for years on end is	therefore entitled to	invoke	the jurisdiction of this Court for examining the question whether, after all the agony and	torment he has been subjected to, it is just and fair to allow the sentence of death to be executed. That is the true implication of Art. 21 of the Constitution and to that extent, we express our broad and respectful agreement with	our learned Brethren in their visualisation of the meaning of that article. The horizons of	Art. 21 are	ever widening and the final word on its conspectus shall never have	been said. So long as life lasts, so long shall it be the duty and	endeavour of this Court to give to the provisions of our Constitution a meaning which will	prevent human	suffering and	degradation.
Therefore, Art. 21 is as much relevant at the stage of execution of the	death sentence	as it	is in	the interregnum between the imposition of that sentence and its execution. The essence of the matter is that all procedure, no matter what the stage, must be fair, just and reasonable. It is well established that a prisoner cannot be	tortured or subjected to unfair or inhuman treatment (See Prabhnkar Pandurang Sanzgiri (AIR 1966 SC 424), Bhuvau Mohan Patniak (AIR 1974 SC 2092) and Sunil Batra (AIR 1978 SC,j,167S). It is a logical extension of the selfsame	principle that the death sentence,	even if justifiably	imposed, cannot be executed if supervening	events	make its execution harsh, unjust or unfair. Art. 21 stands like a sentinel over human	misery, degradation and oppression.	Its voice is the voice of justice and fairplay. That voice can never	be silenced on the ground that the time to heed to its imperatives is long since past in the story of a trial. It reverberates through all stages-the trial, the sentence, the incarceration and finally, the execution of the sentence," 17 After saying so much, the learned Judges found it impossible A to agree,	with that part of the judgment in T.V. Vatheesawaran v. State of Tamil Nadu (supra), where it had been said that delay exceeding two years in executing a sentence of death should be considered sufficient to entitle the person under sentence of death to invoke	Att. 21 and demand the quashing of	the sentence of death. The reason was, they said "The fixation of time limit of two years does not seem to us	to accord with the common experience of the time normally consumed by the litigative process and the proceedings before the	executive." They also said	that besides delay there were also other factors to be taken into account while considering the question whether the sentence of death should be vacated. The observations of the learned Judges purporting to	dissent from	the view taken in T'atheeswaral1's case were made, curiously enough, while admitting ,SherSingh's	petition on other grounds. It	was perhaps thought	desirable and	necessary to express firmly their views on one of the questions raised which they were not accepting	while	admitting the	petition on other questions lest	further damage	be done to the cause of justice by following the wrong rule thought to have been laid down in Vatheeswaran's case and unworthy people saved from the gallows. We do not wish to	dwell any further on this aspect of the matter except to point out that as far as we know	Referred Trials and Confirmation Cases are 1 dealt with speedily by High	Courts and are never kept pending longer than two or three months. It is only when they reach this Court that the delay occurs. But surely, our inability to devise a procedure	to deal expeditiously with	such matters of life and death can be no justification	for silencing what	the learned Chief Justice has	himself so eloquently described as 'the voice of justice and fairplay' which demands that 'so long as life lasts, so long shall it be the	duty and endeavour of	this Court to give to	the provisions of our Constitution' a meaning which will prevent human suffering	and degradation. 'Tlle case also raises the further question whether a Division Bench of three Judges
two judges merely because three is larger than two.	The Court sits in Divisions of two and three judges for the sake of convenience and it	may be in-appropriate for a Division Bench of three judges to purport to overrule the decision of a Division Bench of two judges. Vide Young	v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd.(l) It may be otherwise where a full Bench or a Constitution Bench does so.
18 We do not however desire to embark upon this question in this case. In the present case we are satisfied that an over all view of all the circumstances appears to us to entitle the petitioner	to invoke the protection of Art. 21 of the Constitution. We accordingly quash the sentence of death and substitute in its place the sentence	of imprisonment	for life.