Source: https://www.flra.gov/decisions/v64/64-25.html
Timestamp: 2017-01-16 17:12:04
Document Index: 206566421

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 7116', '§ 2', '§ 5', '§ 2', '§ 6120', '§ 6121', '§ 6122', '§ 6122', '§ 6122', '§ 2', '§ 5', '§ 2', '§ 7106', '§ 2', '§ 7106', '§ 6122', '§ 5', '§ 14', '§ 14', '§ 14', '§\n2', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 2', '§ 7106', '§ 6122', '§ 5', '§ 14', '§ 5', '§ 14', '§ 7106', '§ 7106', '§ 7106', '§ 2423', '§ 7118', '§ 2423', '§14', '§14', '§14', '§14', '§6121', '§ 2', '§ 5', '§\n5', '§ 14', '§ 5']

Social Security Administration (Respondent) and American Federation of Government Employees, Local 3448, AFL-CIO (Charging Party/Union) | FLRA
You are hereHome Social Security Administration (Respondent) and American Federation of Government Employees, Local 3448, AFL-CIO (Charging Party/Union) Social Security Administration (Respondent) and American Federation of Government Employees, Local 3448, AFL-CIO (Charging Party/Union)
Other Files: Member Beck, Dissenting in Part ALJ Decision
64 FLRA No. 25 FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY
Party/Union)
CH-CA-04-0351
on exceptions to the attached decision of the Administrative Law Judge (Judge)
filed by the Respondent. The General Counsel (GC) filed cross-exceptions and
an opposition to the Respondent’s exceptions, and the Respondent filed an
opposition to the General Counsel’s cross-exceptions.
the Respondent violated § 7116(a)(1) and (5) of the Federal
Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (Statute) by notifying unit employees
assigned to the Painesville, Ohio office (local office) that they could no
longer work after 5:45 p.m. each day, and by failing to provide the Union with
notice or an opportunity to bargain over the change. The Judge found that to
the extent the change concerned credit hours, the Respondent did not violate
the Statute but, to the extent the change concerned overtime, the Respondent
violated the Statute. The Judge recommended a status quo ante (SQA) remedy,
but denied the GC’s request for back pay.
decision and the entire record, we deny the Respondent’s exceptions, and, with
regard to the GC’s cross-exceptions, we grant them in part, deny them in part,
and remand in part to the Chief Administrative Law Judge for further
proceedings consistent with this decision.[2] II. Background and Judge’s Decision
A. Background The Respondent and the Union are parties to a National Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) that became effective
on April 6, 2000 and applied during the time periods encompassed by this case. On January 30, 2004 (hereinafter the “change date”), the local office manager
sent a memorandum to employees stating that: “‘[s]tarting today you may work
credit hours only during core hours 7:15-5:45.’” Judge’s Decision at 6 n.7
(quoting memorandum). When the Respondent refused to bargain over the matter,
the Union filed the unfair labor practice (ULP) charge giving rise to the
Before the Judge, the GC maintained
that the Respondent violated the Statute by unilaterally changing the closing
time of the local office from 7 p.m. to 5:45 p.m. without affording the
Union advance notice or an opportunity to bargain over the change. Specifically,
the GC claimed that: (1) the Respondent’s action was contrary to a
binding past practice that had been in effect since at least 1996; (2) Article
1, § 2 of the CBA specifically provides for the continuation of local past
practices that do not detract from the CBA[3];
and (3) the change in the closing time of the local office had more than a de
minimis effect on unit employees because, absent the change, they would
have been able to work more credit and overtime hours.
In contrast, the Respondent argued
before the Judge that the alleged past practice is inconsistent with Article
10, Appendix A, § 5, which limits credit hours to a period ending one hour
after the end of the normal workday.[4] According to the Respondent, since the normal workday at the local office ends
at 4:45 p.m., the contract prohibits credit hours beyond 5:45 p.m. Additionally,
the Respondent noted that Article 1, § 2 of the CBA permits continuation of only
those past practices that are not specifically covered by, and do not detract
from, the CBA. Finally, the Respondent noted that the CBA incorporates laws
and Government-wide rules and regulations, including the Federal Employees
Flexible and Compressed Work Schedules Act (the Act), 5 U.S.C.
§ 6120, et seq.
B. Judge’s
The Judge found, as to credit
hours, that the past practice permitting employees to work up to 7 p.m. was not
binding.[5] In this regard, the Judge made three findings.
First, the Judge applied the Act,
stating that 5 U.S.C. § 6121(4) defines credit hours as hours falling
within a “‘flexible schedule established under” 5 U.S.C. § 6122. Judge’s
Decision (Decision) at 11. The Judge examined 5 U.S.C. § 6122(a)(2),
which provides, in pertinent part, that “each agency may establish” flexible
designated hours during which an employee
on such a schedule may elect the time of such employee’s arrival at and
departure from work, solely for such purpose or, if and to the extent
the workweek or another workday.
Judge’s Decision at 11. Applying § 6122, the Judge
found that the CBA provides that the flexible band for the local office runs until
5:45 p.m. The Judge concluded that “[s]ince the alleged past practice is
contrary to the Act, there can be no duty to bargain.” Id. at 12.
Second, citing Department of
17 FLRA 1011 (1985) (SSA I), the Judge found that a past practice that departs
from a national policy may not be found in the absence of evidence that
national management condoned the practice. Judge’s Decision at 12. According
to the Judge, a binding past practice did not exist because national management
“promptly terminated” the practice at the local office shortly after it first
learned of it. Id. Third, the Judge rejected the GC’s
reliance on Article 1, § 2 of the CBA, which provides for continuation of
certain past practices. See supra note 3. In this regard, the Judge
found that “the alleged past practice as to credit hours is ‘specifically
covered by [the CBA] and, if allowed to stand, would detract from it.’”[6]
Id. Contrary to his finding regarding
credit hours, the Judge found, as to overtime, that permitting overtime to be
earned up to 7 p.m. was not covered by statute or the CBA. Applying United
States Patent and Trademark Office, 57 FLRA 185 (2001) (PTO),
the Judge found a binding past practice regarding overtime that could not be
changed without providing the Union with notice and an opportunity to bargain. The Judge noted that, as scheduling overtime is a management right, the
Respondent was “only required to bargain [over] the impact and implementation
of the change[.]” Judge’s Decision at 15.
Applying the criteria set forth in Federal
Correctional Institution, 8 FLRA 604 (1982) (FCI), for determining
whether a SQA remedy is appropriate, the Judge found that such a remedy was appropriate. As to back pay, however, the Judge found that employees had sufficient
opportunity to work overtime prior to 5:45 p.m. on weekdays and also on some
Saturdays, and that there was no evidence “to even suggest that any employee
was prevented from working all of the overtime available in spite of the
[subject] change[.]” Judge’s Decision at 17. According to the Judge,
back pay was not warranted because, in the absence of “any evidence of
proximate cause between the change in procedure and a reduction in any
employee’s overtime earnings, the award of back pay could only be based upon
unsupported speculation.” Id. III. Positions of
the Parties A. The Respondent’s
Exceptions Citing United States Customs Serv., Customs
Mgmt. Ctr., Miami, Fla., 56 FLRA 809 (2000) (Customs
Service), and United States Dep’t of Health and Human Svcs., Soc.
Sec. Admin., Balt., Md., 47 FLRA 1004 (1993) (SSA II), the
Respondent argues that the hours in which overtime may be worked is covered by,
and is in “direct conflict” with Article 10, § 5 of the CBA, which
provides that “[w]hen the administration decides to use overtime, qualified
volunteers will be used before non-volunteers.” Exceptions at 8 (emphasis in original). Thus, the Respondent claims that the past practice would “detract” from the
CBA, within the meaning of Article 1, § 2. Id. at 9. Moreover, the
Respondent asserts that there was no past practice of employees working overtime
past 5:45 p.m. because the alleged practice: (1) was not consistently exercised
and followed by both parties; and (2) was not condoned by management. In addition, the Respondent contends that the
SQA remedy affects management’s right to assign work under § 7106(a)(2)(B)
by “mandating” that management bargain on decisions regarding when overtime is
worked. Id. In this regard, the Respondent further contends that the
SQA remedy “would impermissibly mandate bargaining on a managerial decision to
change when overtime is worked.” Id. at 10. B. The GC’s Opposition The GC contends that the Judge properly found a
past practice permitting employees to work overtime up to 7 p.m. GC’s Cross-Exceptions
and Opposition at 30 n.10. The GC also asserts that, although it agrees
with the Judge that one year is a sufficient period to establish a past
practice, “the fact is that the practice for both overtime and credit hours was
in effect since 1996.” Id.at 30 n.9. In addition, the GC
claims that the subject of when overtime may be worked is not covered by the
parties’ CBA and that Article 1, § 2 preserves the past practice because
the past practice does not “detract” from the CBA. Id. at 35.
regard to the Respondent’s management rights claim, the GC states that whether
the decision to change when overtime may be worked is an exercise of a
§ 7106(a) right, as the Respondent claims, is not the issue here. The GC
states that, even if the Respondent is correct, the Respondent failed to give
the Union notice and an opportunity to bargain over the impact and implementation
of the change. Id. at 36. C. The GC’s
Cross-Exceptions The GC excepts to the Judge’s failure to: (1) find that the Respondent unlawfully refused to provide the Union notice and
an opportunity to bargain over its decision to prohibit employees from earning
credit hours up to 7 p.m; (2) conclude that the change in past practice
involving overtime was substantively negotiable; and (3) award back pay with
interest to the employees who lost overtime as a result of the implementation
of the changes. In particular, the GC asserts that the
practice of permitting employees to earn credit hours until 7 p.m. “was in
existence since 1996[,]” and that the practice was “known and condoned” by
managers between 1996 and 2004. Id. at 10-11. Moreover, according
to the GC, the Judge erred in concluding that the past practice of permitting
employees to earn credit hours up to 7 p.m. is contrary to the Act. The GC
asserts that “[n]owhere in [5 U.S.C. § 6122(a)(1)] does the language
require an agency to establish a flexible schedule that must end at 5:45 p.m.” Id. at 12. The GC also asserts that the past practice is not
contrary to national policy because, according to the GC, there is no evidence
that a national policy on this subject exists. Moreover, the GC claims that
the matter of earning credit hours after 5:45 p.m. is not covered by the CBA. In this regard, according to the GC, interpreting Article 10, Appendix A, § 5 as
prohibiting employees from earning credit hours after 5:45 p.m. “ignores” that
Article 10, Appendix A, § 14(F) provides that employees in the local office may
earn up to 2 ½ credit hours per day. Id. at 19 (citing G.C. Exh. 2 at
65)[7]. The GC asserts that, as the Respondent
“admittedly” failed to provide the Union with notice and an opportunity to
bargain over the change in past practice, the Respondent violated the Statute. Id. at 20. As relevant here, the GC requests a SQA remedy, claiming that
the Judge erred when he concluded that the change in past practice concerning
overtime was not substantively negotiable. In support, the GC cites NAGE,
SEIU, AFL-CIO, 40 FLRA 657 (1991) (NAGE). The GC also asserts that
the Judge erred when he failed to award back pay to employees who lost overtime
as a result of the change. According to the GC, the record shows that one
employee’s overtime “decreased from 80 hours . . . in 2003 to .
. . 45 hours in 2004[.]” GC’s Cross-Exceptions and Opposition at 24. D. The Respondent’s Opposition The Respondent contends that the Judge properly found
that the alleged past practice as to credit hours is contrary to the Act and is
covered by the CBA. In particular, the Respondent asserts that: (1) the Act
grants the Agency the authority to establish a flexible band; (2) the
flexible band in the local office was established pursuant to the CBA; and
(3) employees may only work (or earn credit hours) during those hours
designated by the flexible band. The Respondent asserts that the GC’s reliance
on Article 10, Appendix A, § 14(F) is misplaced because the parties agreed that
§ 14(F) “means that employees can earn up to two and half credit hours if their
office’s flexible schedule allows it.” Respondent’s Opposition at 10-11. The
Respondent further asserts that a practice allowing employees to work credit
hours beyond 5:45 p.m. detracts from the CBA and, thus, under Article 1, §
2 of the CBA, is not binding. According to the Respondent, a SQA remedy
is not appropriate, even if a violation is found, because it would violate the
Act and the CBA. Also according to the Respondent, back pay is not appropriate
because it is not possible “to accurately calculate the amount of ‘lost’ credit
or overtime hours employees would have earned.” Id. at 11. IV. Analysis and Conclusions A. Analytic
Frameworks – “Covered by” and IRS[8]
This case involves application of
the “covered by” doctrine as well as the IRS doctrine. Precedent holds that
both doctrines may apply in an individual case. See United States Dep't of Energy, Western Area Power Admin., Golden, Col., 56 FLRA 9, 12 (2000) (WAPA). Nonetheless, the doctrines are distinct.
The “covered by” doctrine/defense, set forth in SSA
II, 47 FLRA at 1018, applies only in cases alleging an unlawful
refusal to bargain. In particular, the doctrine/defense is “available to a
party claiming that it is not obligated to bargain because it has already
bargained over the subject at issue.” WAPA, 56 FLRA at 12 . The
doctrine has two prongs. Customs Service, 56 FLRA at 814. Under the
first, a party properly may refuse to bargain over a matter that is expressly
addressed in the parties’ agreement. Id.. Under the second, a party properly
may refuse to bargain if a matter is inseparably bound up with, and thus an
aspect of, a subject covered by the agreement. Id. Although not
expressly limited to situations where an agency refuses to engage in
union-initiated, mid-term bargaining, the covered by doctrine derives from, and
is most naturally applied in, that situation. See, e.g., SSA II,
47 FLRA at 1015-17 (and decisions cited therein).
The IRS doctrine, on the other hand,
applies when a party claims as a defense not only that it bargained over a
matter but also that the results of that bargaining -- a specific contract
provision -- permitted its action. IRS, 47 FLRA at 1103. Unlike the “covered
by” doctrine, the IRS doctrine/defense applies in any ULP case, not only
bargaining cases. See IRS, 47 FLRA at 1092 (respondent defended
allegation that it improperly refused to recognize a particular union representative
by relying on a contract provision concerning such recognition). Further, in
the bargaining context, the IRS doctrine applies only “when a party
‘relies on a contract provision specifically concerning bargaining (such
as a reopener or zipper clause)’ that relates to the parties’ bargaining
obligations.” WAPA, 56 FLRA at 12 (emphasis added) (citing Social
Security Admin., Region VII, Kansas City, Mo., 55 FLRA 536, 538 (1999)
(SSA III)). Consistent with the foregoing, the covered by
and IRS defenses have one common aspect: to be successful, both require
a determination that a disputed matter is addressed in some matter in an
agreement. Under the covered by doctrine, finding that a matter is addressed
in or an aspect of a matter addressed in an agreement is sufficient to excuse
further bargaining. Under IRS, however, finding that a matter is
addressed in an agreement is not sufficient: it also is necessary to interpret
the specific contract provision(s) relied on and determine whether it/they permitted
the specific disputed action. Moreover, the “covered by” doctrine applies only
in bargaining disputes, while the IRS doctrine applies in all disputes
where a respondent is claiming that a particular contract provision permitted
its disputed action. B. Application
of the frameworks; the Respondent violated the Statute as to overtime and
As set forth above, the Respondent
maintains that the Judge erred in finding that it violated the Statute by
changing the hours during which overtime may be worked on the grounds that,
according to the Respondent: (1) the matter is covered by Article 10, § 5 of
the CBA and (2) there is no binding past practice contrary to the change. As for the first claim, the
Respondent maintains that, consistent with Article 10, § 5, “it is within
management’s purview to decide when overtime can be worked.” Respondent’s
Exceptions at 8. In this regard, the Respondent appears to be relying on the
specific wording of Article 10, § 5 as permitting unilateral management action --
an IRS defense -- and not contending merely that the parties bargained
over the subject matter of the change and, as a result, it is covered by the
agreement. However, under either doctrine, the Respondent offers no evidence
that Article 10, § 5 either addresses the specific hours within which overtime
may be worked or otherwise permits the Respondent unilaterally to determine
such specific hours. Among other things, the Respondent has not demonstrated
that the word “when” in the provision encompasses anything more than a general
determination that overtime is available. In addition, examining the
provision more broadly, Article 10, § 5 concerns the process for the assigning of
overtime: how employees will be notified of and chosen to perform overtime. There is no mention of the hours within which overtime may be worked. Under
Authority precedent, a subject matter must be more than
"tangentially" related to a contract provision in order to establish
that the subject matter is covered by the agreement under prong II of the “covered
by” doctrine. United States Dep’t of the Treasury, Internal Revenue
Service, 56 FLRA 906, 911-12 (2000) (quoting SSA II, 47 FLRA
at 1019). Thus, the Respondent has not shown that the hours in which
overtime may be worked is so tied to Article 10 that “the negotiations are
presumed to have foreclosed further bargaining . . . ." SSA II, 47
FLRA at 1018. As to the Respondent’s second argument, we
reject, based on the reasoning set forth above, the Respondent’s claim that any
practice of permitting employees to work overtime beyond 5:45 p.m. is in
“direct conflict” with Article 10, § 5 and, as a result, would “detract” from
the CBA, within the meaning of Article 1, § 2 of the CBA.[9] We also reject the Respondent’s claim
that the overtime practice was not binding because it was not consistently
exercised and was not followed by both parties. In this regard, a past
practice is not binding unless it has been exercised consistently over a significant
period of time and followed by both parties, or followed by one party and not
challenged by the other. See, e.g., SSA, Office of Hearings and Appeals,
Montgomery, Ala., 60 FLRA 549, 554 (2005) (SSA, OHA) and cases
cited therein. "Essential factors in finding that a past practice exists
are that the practice must be known to management, responsible management must
knowingly acquiesce in the practice, and the practice must continue for a
significant period of time.” Id. As applied here, the Judge
found, and the record supports, that for “several years” prior to the change
date, employees were allowed to work overtime, if available, until 7 p.m.
at their own volition. Judge’s Decision at 12. Moreover, noting
testimonial evidence to this effect, the Judge found it “undisputed” that the
former district director, and another former district manager, signed
employees’ daily time sheets and were “aware” of the hours that employees
worked. Judge’s Decision at 7 n.10. This refutes the Respondent’s claim that the
disputed practice “was not condoned by management.” Exceptions at 18. Based on the foregoing, we reject
the Respondent’s exceptions to the Judge’s finding that the Respondent violated
the Statute by changing the hours in which employees may work overtime. Nevertheless, we reject the GC’s cross-exception
asserting that the Respondent was obligated to bargain over the substance of
the change. In this connection, the right to assign work under § 7106(a)(2)(B)
encompasses the right to determine the particular duties to be assigned, when
work assignments will occur, and to whom or what positions the duties will be
assigned. See, e.g., Prof’l Airways Sys. Specialists, 59 FLRA 485,
487 (2003). Moreover, management’s right to assign work includes the right to
assign overtime and to determine when the overtime will be performed. Id. Consistent with precedent, the Respondent’s change concerning the hours
in which overtime may be worked is an exercise of its right to assign work and,
as a result, is bargainable only as to impact and implementation. Also
consistent with this precedent, we reject as misplaced the GC’s reliance on NAGE
, where the Authority found that a contract provision requiring the agency normally
to schedule overtime in 8-hour blocks on Saturdays was negotiable as an
appropriate arrangement. That a specific proposal may be negotiable as an
management right does not mean that the exercise of the right is substantively
negotiable. Cf. United States Dep’t of Navy, Naval Aviation Depot,
Jacksonville, Fla., 63 FLRA 365, 369 (2009) (“When . . . an agency
exercises a reserved management right and the substance of the decision is not
itself subject to negotiation, the agency has an obligation to bargain over[,]”
among other things, “appropriate arrangements” if the change has greater than
de minimis effects on conditions of employment) (PASS) (citing Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs., Soc. Sec. Admin., 24 FLRA 403, 405-06 (1986)). 2. Credit
Hours According to the GC, the Judge
erred in finding that the Respondent did not violate the Statute by changing
the hours in which credit hours may be earned. As set forth above, the Judge
found that the past practice as to credit hours is inconsistent with the Act,
and that the practice “is specifically covered by [the CBA], and, if allowed to
stand, would detract from it.” Judge’s Decision at 12. According to the GC, the
past practice, which the GC claims was in existence since at least 1996, is: (1) not contrary to the Act; and (2) not inconsistent with, and would not
detract from, the CBA.
With regard to the first argument, 5
U.S.C. § 6122(a)(2) permits a Federal agency to establish “programs which
allow the use of flexible schedules, which include . . . designated [credit
hours].” However, nothing in the Act either permits agencies unilaterally to
determine hours during which credit hours may be earned or precludes agencies
from establishing national programs that permit local modification. Accordingly,
the Judge erred in finding that the local practice was contrary to the Act.
regard to the second argument, we find that the same past practice that existed
with regard to overtime existed with regard to credit hours. As set forth supra
note 5, there is no argument or indication in the record that the past practice
as to credit hours differed from the past practice as to overtime. As also set
forth supra note 5, the Respondent conceded in its post-hearing brief
that employees were permitted to work credit hours up to 7 p.m. “for a number
of years” prior to the change date. Respondent’s Post-Hearing Brief at 3. Moreover,
the Judge differentiated between overtime and credit hours only on the basis
that “[u]nlike the change with respect to credit hours, the hours within which
overtime may be worked is not covered either by [the Act], regulations[,] or
the CBA.”[10]
Judge’s Decision at 12.[11] Accordingly, for the same reasons set forth above in connection with overtime,
we conclude that there was a past practice, consistently exercised and condoned
by management, permitting employees to work credit hours up to 7 p.m. Resolving
the remaining question, whether the past practice concerning credit hours is
contrary to the CBA, requires factual findings that the Judge did not make. In
these circumstances, and as discussed below, we remand this aspect of the case
for further proceedings before an ALJ.
required factual findings involve the interpretation of two contract
provisions. One of the contract provisions, Article 10, Appendix A, § 5, was
relied upon by the Judge when he found that the “alleged” past practice
concerning credit hours was “covered by” and would “detract from” the CBA.[12] This provision limits credit hours to a period ending one hour after the end of
the normal workday. See supra note 4.
second contract provision, Article 10, Appendix A, § 14(F), provides the basis
for the GC’s opposing claim that the credit hours past practice is not contrary
to the CBA. Section 14(F) provides that employees may earn up to 2 1/2 credit
hours per workday. See supra note 7.
Judge rejected the GC’s claim that the credit hours past practice was not
contrary to the CBA. In doing so, however, the Judge neither addressed nor
resolved the GC’s argument that relying solely on Article 10, Appendix A, § 5
would improperly “ignore” § 14(F). Absent factual findings interpreting the
two contract provisions and construing their relationship, it is not possible
to resolve the question whether the credit hours past practice is contrary to
the CBA. These are factual findings that the Judge should make, in the first
instance, during the remand proceedings.[13]
Based on the foregoing, we remand
to the Chief Administrative Law Judge the issue of whether the CBA permitted
the Respondent unilaterally to change the past practice whereby employees of
the local office could earn credit hours up to 7 p.m.[14] C. A SQA remedy with respect to the change in overtime
hours, with back pay, is appropriate. The right to
assign work, under § 7106(a)(2)(B) of the Statute, encompasses the right to
occur, and to whom or what positions the duties will be assigned. See PASS, 59 FLRA at 487 and the cases cited therein. Management’s right to
assign work includes the right to assign overtime and to determine when the
overtime will be performed. Id. Where management has
exercised its reserved rights under § 7106 of the Statute without
fulfilling its duty to bargain with the exclusive representative over
procedures and appropriate arrangements pursuant to § 7106(b)(2) and (3)
of the Statute, a SQA remedy may issue. FCI, 8 FLRA at 605. The
Authority listed specific criteria for determining whether a SQA remedy is
appropriate in such circumstance. See id. at 606. Also, in
situations where management changes a condition of employment without
fulfilling its obligation to bargain over the substance of the decision to make
the change, the Authority orders a SQA remedy absent special circumstances. Fed.
Bureau of Prisons, Fed. Corr. Inst., Bastrop, Tex., 55 FLRA 848, 855 (1999). As set forth below, the Respondent changed the
local office practice of allowing employees to work overtime, if available, until
7 p.m. on weekdays without fulfilling its bargaining obligation. The Judge’s
SQA order remedies the Respondent’s failure to fulfill such bargaining
obligation. Therefore, the Judge’s order is consistent with Authority
precedent and does not affect management’s right to assign work. See Fed.
Bureau of Prisons, Wash., D.C., 55 FLRA 1250, 1256 (2000) (Member
Cabaniss dissenting as to other matters); FCI, 8 FLRA at 605. Moreover, under
the Back Pay Act, an award of back pay is authorized when an appropriate
authority determines that: (1) an aggrieved employee was affected by an
unjustified or unwarranted personnel action; and (2) the personnel action has
resulted in the withdrawal or reduction of the employee’s pay, allowances, or
differentials. See United States Dep't of Health and Human Serv.,
54 FLRA 1210, 1218-19 (1998). As applied here, the record includes an
employee’s testimony that she would have worked more overtime had the office
remained open. See Tr. at 33 (testimony of Victoria Carter) (answering
“Yes[]” when asked, “Would you have worked more hours of overtime” between
January 30, 2004 and October 2004 “had the office been open past 5:45 p.m.?”).
foregoing, we find that a SQA remedy with respect to the change in overtime
hours, with backpay, is appropriate. V. Order
§ 2423.41 of our Regulations and § 7118 of the Statute, the Social Security
(a) Unilaterally changing the
ability of unit employees at the Painesville, Ohio District Office to work
available overtime until 7:00 p.m. on weekdays without giving prior notice to
the American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO (AFGE), either
directly or through its agent, AFGE Local 3448, and affording AFGE the
opportunity to bargain over the proposed change. (b) In any like or related
manner interfering with, restraining or coercing unit employees in the exercise
(a) Promptly restore the
practice of allowing bargaining unit employees at the Painesville, Ohio District Office to work available overtime until 7:00 p.m. on weekdays and
maintaining that practice until AFGE or AFGE Local 3448 have been given notice
of a proposed change to the practice and an opportunity to bargaining over the
(b) Make whole any employees
adversely affected by the change in overtime practice by paying them backpay,
with interest, for all pay that they lost as a result of the change. (c) Post at the Painesville, Ohio District Office, where bargaining unit employees are located, copies of
the attached Notice on forms to be provided by the Federal Labor Relations
Authority. Upon receipt of such forms, they shall be signed by the Area
Director for Northern Ohio, and shall be posted and maintained for
(d) Pursuant to § 2423.41(e)
of the Authority’s Regulations, notify the Regional Director, Chicago Regional
date of this Order as to what steps have been taken to comply.
Social Security Administration violated the Federal Service Labor-Management
Relations Statute and has ordered us to post and abide by this order.
WE WILL NOT unilaterally change the ability of bargaining
unit employees at the Painesville, Ohio District Office to work available
overtime until 7:00 p.m. on weekdays without giving prior notice to the
American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO (AFGE), either directly or
through its agent, AFGE Local 3448, and affording AFGE the opportunity to
bargain over the proposed change. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with,
restrain or coerce unit employees in the exercise of their rights assured by
WE WILL promptly restore the practice of allowing bargaining
overtime until 7:00 p.m. on weekdays, if they so desire, and will maintain that
practice until AFGE or AFGE Local 3448 have been given notice of a proposed
change to the practice and an opportunity to bargain over the proposed change.
WE WILL make whole any employees adversely affected by the
change in overtime practice by paying them backpay, with interest, for all pay
that they lost as a result of the change.
the date of the posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any
Director for the Federal Labor Relations Authority, Chicago Regional Office,
whose address is: 55 West Monroe, Suite 1150, Chicago, IL, 60603-9729, and
whose telephone number is: (312) 886-3465.
Member Beck, Dissenting in Part
I agree with Chairman Pope and
Member DuBester that the Judge did not err in concluding that the Respondent
violated the Statute when it deviated from a past practice that permitted
employees to earn overtime up to 7:00 p.m. without providing the Union notice
and an opportunity to bargain. As the Judge found, the practice was not
covered by statute or the CBA and therefore was not subject to unilateral
change by the Respondent without notice to the Union and an opportunity to
I do not agree, however, with the
conclusion of my colleagues that this matter must be remanded to determine
whether the past practice of permitting employees to earn credit hours until
7:00 p.m. is or is not contrary to the CBA. The Majority concludes that the
Judge failed to consider Article 10, Appendix A, §14(F) of the collective
bargaining agreement, which contemplates that employees “may earn
up to two and one-half (2 ½) credit hours per workday” (emphasis added). As I
understand the Majority’s perspective, this provision, if properly considered,
might salvage the asserted entitlement to 2 1/2 credit hours per workday under
the past practice by reconciling the past practice with the contract. For
§14(F) to do so, this provision must be interpreted as a contractual
entitlement to 2 1/2 credit hours per workday. However, under this contract
language, whether credit hours will be earned by a particular employee on a
particular day is uncertain; an employee “may” -- or, by definition, may not --
have an opportunity to earn credit hours. In contrast, the specific limit on
credit hours earned is certain. Accordingly, the better reading of §14(F) is
not that it grants an entitlement to 2 1/2 credit hours, but rather that it
sets an outside limit on credit hours that may be earned. Consequently, I cannot conclude
that it is necessary for the Judge further to assess the language in §14(F). The Judge specifically found that the past practice is contrary to both 5 USC
§6121(4) and the CBA and the Respondent therefore was under no obligation to
bargain over its termination. ALJ Decision, at 12. Since I would find the
appropriate standard of review in such cases to be whether the Judge’s findings
are supported by substantial evidence, I cannot conclude that the Judge’s
findings are unreasonable or not supported by the record. See United States Dep’t of the Air Force, Air Force Materiel Command, Space &
Missile Sys. Ctr., Detachment 12, Kirkland Air Force Base, N.M.,
64 FLRA No. 24 (2009) (Member Beck concurring); United States Dep’t of
the Air Force, Randolph AFB and AFGE Local 1840, 63 FLRA 256, 262-63 (2009)
(separate opinion of Member Beck).* I would therefore sustain the
Judge’s findings with regard to credit hours and conclude that a remand is
unnecessary. [1]
Member Beck’s opinion, dissenting in part, is set forth at the end of the
[2] Consistent with precedent, we issue an Order and Notice in connection with the
violation found. See SSA, Balt., Md., 60 FLRA 674, 674 (2005). With
regard to the allegation that is remanded, as the Judge who conducted the
hearing in this case is no longer with the Authority. we remand the allegation
to the Chief Administrative Law Judge. See id. at 674 n.1. [3] Article 1, § 2
of the CBA provides that ”prior . . . practices . . . which were in effect on
the effective date of this Agreement . . . and which are not specifically
covered by this Agreement [and] do not detract from it shall not be changed
except in accordance with [the Statute].”. Judge’s Decision 5 - 6.
[4] Article 10, Appendix A, § 5 of the CBA provides that
the flexible band for the local (and other small) offices is: a 1-hour and 45 minute period starting 45 minutes
before the normal start time and ending one hour after the normal start time. It will also be 45 minutes prior to the normal end of the workday to one hour
after the end of the normal workday.
Judge’s Decision at 5 - 6.
The Judge made no specific finding regarding the duration of the past
practice. In this regard, the Judge stated that “for at least a year” prior to
the change date, the local office was open as late as 7 p.m. for employees to
work “credit hours and overtime.” Judge’s Decision at 8. The Judge also
stated, however, that “for several years” prior to the change date, employees
were allowed to work overtime up to 7 p.m. Id. at 12. Although the
latter statement is limited to overtime, there is no argument or indication in
the record that the past practice differed between overtime and credit hours. We note that, in its post-hearing brief, the Respondent conceded that employees
were permitted to work credit hours up to 7 p.m. “for a number of years” prior
to the change date. Respondent’s Post-Hearing Brief at 3. [6]
Although the Judge did not specify the provision on which he relied, we assume,
for the purposes of this decision, that he relied on Article 10, Appendix A, §
5, set forth supra note 4.
Article 10, Appendix A, § 14(F) provides, in pertinent part:
An employee may earn up to
two and one-half (2 ½) credit hours per workday. Credit hours may be earned in
one-quarter (1/4)-hour increments. . . .
Internal Revenue Service, Wash., D.C., 47 FLRA 1091 (1993) (IRS).
We assume for the purposes of this decision – consistent with the parties’
arguments and the record as a whole – that a past practice “detracts” from the
CBA if the practice is inconsistent with a CBA provision. [10]
As the Judge did not find the practice contrary to any regulations, we do not
address that matter further.
The Judge also found, relying on SSA I, 17 FLRA 1101, that the past
practice as to credit hours could not be found because it conflicted with
national policy, set forth in the CBA. Judge’s Decision at 12. As discussed
below, the Authority is unable to determine whether such conflict exists. In
any event, however, the Authority has held that reliance on the portion of SSA
I on which the Judge relied is misplaced. United States Dep’t of the
Air Force, Air Force Materiel Command, Wright-Patterson AFB, Oh., 55 FLRA
968, 972 n.6 (1999). [12]
Although the Respondent argues that the matter is covered by the CBA, the
Respondent relies on a specific provision of the contract -- Article 10,
Appendix A, § 5 -- as permitting its otherwise unlawful unilateral change. Thus, this is an IRS -- not a covered by – issue. [13]
We note that, in determining whether a judge’s factual findings are supported,
the Authority looks to the preponderance of the record evidence, not
substantial evidence as stated in the dissent. See United States Dep’t of the Air Force, Air Force Materiel Command, Space & Missile Sys. Ctr.,
Detachment 12, Kirkland Air Force Base, N.M., 64 FLRA No. 24, slip op. at
10 (2009) (Member Beck concurring).
As noted previously, although we are remanding this allegation regarding credit
hours, we are also issuing an Order and Notice in connection with the violation
found regarding overtime.
* In footnote 13, supra, the
Majority states, as if it is an unremarkable proposition, that the proper
standard for the Authority to apply in reviewing a judge’s factual findings is
“preponderance of the record evidence.” This new standard, announced by a new
two-Member majority only very recently, is a departure from the Authority’s
numerous pronouncements in recent years that it applies a “substantial evidence
in the record” standard of review. See, e.g., United States Dep’t of
Justice, Fed. Bureau of Prisons, Federal Corr. Inst., Elkton, Ohio, 61 FLRA
515, 517 (2006) (citing United States Dep’t of Transp., 48 FLRA 1211,
1215 (1993)) ("When reviewing a judge's factual findings, the Authority
reviews the record to determine whether those factual findings are supported by
substantial evidence in the record as a whole."); United States Dep’t
of Homeland Sec., Border and Transp. Directorate, Bureau of Customs and
Border Prot., 59 FLRA 910, 913 (2004) (same); Dep’t of Justice, 61
FLRA 460, 465 (2006) ("we find that substantial evidence in the record
supports the Judge's findings"); FAA, 59 FLRA 491, 493 (2003)
("there is substantial evidence in the record supporting the Judge's
finding").