Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/116/137/611891/
Timestamp: 2020-02-18 06:55:55
Document Index: 379342919

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915']

Harry Dean Haynes, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Wayne Scott, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice,institutional Division; Raymond Villarreal;calnalas, Lvn, Defendants-appellees, 116 F.3d 137 (5th Cir. 1996) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Fifth Circuit › 1996 › Harry Dean Haynes, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Wayne Scott, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justi...
Harry Dean Haynes, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Wayne Scott, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice,institutional Division; Raymond Villarreal;calnalas, Lvn, Defendants-appellees, 116 F.3d 137 (5th Cir. 1996)
US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit - 116 F.3d 137 (5th Cir. 1996)
Haynes seeks to avoid paying docketing fees by pursuing this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Days after Haynes filed his notice of appeal, the President signed into law the Prison Litigation Reform Act, P.L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) ("PLRA" or "Act"), which amends the requirements for proceeding i.f.p. in the federal courts. The PLRA adds both a new filing procedure and a new fee requirement, and we have held that these requirements apply to appeals pending on the effective date of the Act. Strickland v. Rankin County Correctional Facility, 105 F.3d 972, 974-75 (5th Cir. 1997). Haynes's suit poses the following question: Do the amended filing and fee provisions of section 1915 apply to an appeal by a nonprisoner? We must address the applicability of the PLRA before considering the merits of Haynes's appeal.
The filing provision of the PLRA has two parts. Section 1915(a) (1) requires the filing of an affidavit listing the petitioner's assets, and section (a) (2) requires a certified copy of a prison bank account statement. Under the plain language of section (a) (2), Haynes need not submit a prison account statement:
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (2), as amended. At the time of the triggering event, the bringing of a civil action or appeal, Haynes was a free man, not a prisoner. Because section (a) (2) plainly applies only to prisoners, Haynes does not need to submit any bank statements in order to proceed i.f.p.
By contrast, it is unclear whether the affidavit requirement of section (a) (1) applies to all i.f.p. petitioners, or only prisoners. Section 1915(a) (1) provides:
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1), as amended (emphasis added). The wording of section (a) (1), which refers to both "persons" and "prisoners," makes it unclear whether the affidavit requirement applies to all persons or only prisoners.
Before the passage of the PLRA, section (a) (1) was a general grant of authority for courts to authorize i.f.p. suits without prepayment of fees and costs, both for prisoners and nonprisoners. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1) (1994). The unamended section required a petitioner to make an affidavit that he was unable to pay filing costs or give security therefor. Id. The PLRA was designed to curb frivolous lawsuits by prisoners, because Congress believed that prisoners were abusing the i.f.p. statute. See Leonard v. Lacy, 88 F.3d 181, 185 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing legislative history). The PLRA amended section (a) (1) to require petitioners to be more specific in their affidavits by adding a statement of assets, and section (a) (2) added the requirement that prisoners report their prison account balances.
Throughout amended section 1915, Congress explicitly states whether the provisions apply generally to "persons," presumably anyone (including a prisoner) who qualifies for pauper status, or "prisoners," which the statute defines as "any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h), as amended. The wording of section (a) (1), which refers to both "persons" and "prisoners," makes it unclear whether the affidavit requirement applies to all persons or only prisoners.
Because section (a) (1), as amended, is both a grant of authority an affidavit requirement, reading that section as applying only to prisoners would call into question the ability of the courts to allow nonprisoners to proceed i.f.p. There is no indication in the statute or the legislative history of the PLRA that Congress meant to curb i.f.p. suits by nonprisoners. The statute is, after all, the Prison Litigation Reform Act. We think the most natural reading of the amendments in the PLRA is that Congress intended all petitioners to be more specific in their (a) (1) affidavits and that it intended prisoners to meet additional requirements under (a) (2).
The Sixth Circuit addressed this exact question in Floyd v. United States Postal Service, 105 F.3d 274 (6th Cir. 1997). After noting the tension between a "person" who submits an affidavit listing all assets "such prisoner" possesses, the court concluded that the use of the word "prisoner" was an oversight.2 Id. at 276. The court noted that section (a) (1) begins by using the general noun "person" to indicate that the paragraph applies to all individuals, not just prisoners. Id.
The Floyd court noted that several other provisions of the PLRA, such as section (a) (2) and (b), refer specifically and exclusively to prisoners. Id. The court also noted that section (a) (1) should be read in conjunction with section (a) (2), which requires the reporting of a prison account statement, but only for prisoners seeking i.f.p. status. Id. We agree with the analysis of the Sixth Circuit and hold that the affidavit requirement of section 1915(a) (1) applies to all persons applying to proceed i.f.p.
Although Haynes must file an affidavit to proceed i.f.p., he need not pay the filing fee required by the PLRA. As with the prison account statement in section (a) (2), the fee requirement applies exclusively to prisoners. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b), as amended (" [I]f a prisoner brings a civil action or files an appeal in forma pauperis, the prisoner shall be required to pay the full amount of a filing fee.") (emphasis added). Section 1915(b) requires prisoners who bring civil actions or file appeals to pay the filing fee on a set schedule. When Haynes filed his notice of appeal (the relevant triggering event for section 1915(b)), he was not a prisoner. Therefore it is plain that he need not meet the filing fee requirements of the PLRA. If we grant Haynes leave to file this suit as a pauper, he will not be responsible for the filing fee at all. Cf. McGann v. Commissioner, 96 F.3d 28, 30 (2d Cir. 1996) (declining to assess fees against petitioner who filed notice of appeal while incarcerated, but who was released before his appeal was heard).
We hold that the PLRA requires all petitioners to file an affidavit complying with section 1915(a) (1), but only prisoners must satisfy the requirements of sections 1915(a) (2) and 1915(b). Therefore we allow Haynes thirty days to file an affidavit complying with section 1915(a) (1) to continue with his appeal. After thirty days, if we have not received the affidavit, we will dismiss his appeal for failure to prosecute. See Strickland, 105 F.3d at 976 (allowing petitioner thirty days to meet filing requirements of PLRA); Jackson v. Stinnett, 102 F.3d 132, 137 (5th Cir. 1996) (same).
The Sixth Circuit cited LEXIS for this proposition, because the service has also apparently determined that the use of the word "prisoner" in section (a) (1) was an oversight. In LEXIS's online reporting of the statute, the service places the word "person" in brackets before the word "prisoner" in section (a) (1), then adds an explanatory note stating that "the word 'person' has been inserted in subsec. (a) (1) as the word probably intended by Congress." 28 U.S.C.S. § 1915(a) (1) (Law. Co-op, LEXIS 1996) (cited in Floyd, 105 F.3d at 277)