Source: https://m.openjurist.org/329/us/304
Timestamp: 2020-07-15 06:03:31
Document Index: 293839223

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 752', '§ 452', '§ 452', '§ 310', '§ 310', '§ 310', '§ 310', '§ 626', '§ 10']

329 US 304 Eagles Nj v. United States | OpenJurist
329 U.S. 304 - Eagles Nj v. United States
67 S.Ct. 313
91 L.Ed. 308
Samuels registered under the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940,1 as amended, and thereafter claimed exemption from military service under § 5(d) of the Act. That exemption includes not only regular or duly ordained ministers of religion but also 'Students who are preparing for the ministry in theological or divinity schools recognized as such for more than one year prior' to the Act. He was classified I—A and inducted into the Army. Thereafter he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the District Court, seeking release from military custody on the ground that he was entitled to an exemption under § 5(d) of the Act and that his classification as I—A was unlawful. There was a return and a hearing, and the District Court ordered the writ dismissed. On appeal the Circuit Court of Appeals, in reliance on United States ex rel. Levy v. Cain, 2 Cir., 149 F.2d 338, reversed and remanded the cause to the District Court with directions to 'discharge' Samuels 'From military custoday, without prejudice to further lawful proceedings under the Selective Service Act'. United States ex rel. Samuels v. Pearson, 3 Cir., 151 F.2d 801, 802.
Under our decisions the case would be moot if the writ of habeas corpus had been denied below and, pending disposition of the petition here, Samuels had received a discharge from the army. Zimmerman v. Walker, 319 U.S. 744, 63 S.Ct. 1027, 87 L.Ed. 1700. And see Weber v. Squier, 315 U.S. 810, 62 S.Ct. 800, 86 L.Ed. 1209; Tornello v. Hudspeth, 318 U.S. 792, 63 S.Ct. 990, 87 L.Ed. 1158. That situation, like the case of a prisoner who, pending an appeal from denial of a writ of habeas corpus, is granted bail, Johnson v. Hoy, 227 U.S. 245, 33 S.Ct. 240, 57 L.Ed. 497; Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564, 572—574, 5 S.Ct. 1050, 1053, 1054, 29 L.Ed. 277, would present no existing controversy. Habeas corpus is the means of making a judicial 'Inquiry into the cause of restraint of liberty.' R.S. § 752, 28 U.S.C. § 452, 28 U.S.C.A. § 452. As stated in McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131, 137, 55 S.Ct. 24, 27, 79 L.Ed. 238, 'There is no warrant in either the statute or the writ for its use to invoke judicial determination of questions which c uld not affect the lawfulness of the custody and detention'. If the custody or restraint of liberty is terminated without use of the writ, the case is finished. Different considerations are brought into play if custody is ended through the writ itself.
Our rules recognize the beneficent function of the writ, Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 26, 27, 59 S.Ct. 442, 445, 446, 83 L.Ed. 455; People ex rel. Sabatino v. Jennings, 246 N.Y. 258, 158 N.E. 613, 63 A.L.R. 14582 by providing that a prisoner to whom the writ has been granted may, pending appeal, be enlarged on a recognizance. Rule 45, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 354. The fact that he has been so enlarged does not render the appeal of the custodian moot. Carr v. Zaja, 283 U.S. 52, 53, 51 S.Ct. 360, 75 L.Ed. 836.3 In such a case the release is obtained through the assertion of judicial power. It is the propriety of the exercise of that power which is in issue in the appellate court, whether the prisoner is discharged or remanded to custody. Though the writ has been granted and the prisoner released, the appellate court by what it does is not rendering an opinion and issuing an order which cannot affect the litigants in the case before it. Cf. St. Pierre v. United States, 319 U.S. 41, 42, 63 S.Ct. 910, 911, 87 L.Ed. 1199, and cases cited. Affirmance makes the prisoner's release final and unconditional. Reversal undoes what the habeas corpus court did and makes lawful a resumption of the custody. Knewel v. Egan, 268 U.S. 442, 448, 45 S.Ct. 522, 525, 69 L.Ed. 1036; Haddox v. Richardson, 4 Cir., 168 F. 635; James v. Amrine, 157 Kan. 397, 140 P.2d 362; State ex rel. Bond v. Langum, 135 Minn. 320, 160 N.W. 858.
Second. On the merits the case involves primarily the use by the Selective Service System in New York City of advisory panels on theological classifications. Under the Act the President is authorized to establish 'Civilian local boards, civilian appeal boards, and such other agencies, including agencies of appeal, as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act.' Section 10(a)(2), 57 Stat. 597, 598, 50 U.S.C.App.Supp. III, § 310(a)(2), 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 310(a)(2). With exceptions not material here, the President is authorized to delegate to the Director of Selective Service any authority vested in him under the Act. Section 10(b), 57 Stat. 597, 598, 50 U.S.C.App.Supp. III, § 310(b), 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 310(b). And the Director may redelegate that authority. Id. The administration of the system in each State is delegated under the regulations to a state director. Sections 603.11, 603.12, 6 Fed.Reg. 6827. In New York City, however, a city director has been appointed who performs within that area the functions of the state director. Section 603.12—1, 8 Fed.Reg. 3514. The city director supervises the local boards and boards of appeal in New York City. He may require a local board to reopen and consider anew the classification of a registrant. Section 626.2(b), 9 Fed.Reg. 11619, § 626.2—1, 10 Fed.Reg. 9210. He may appeal to a board of appeal any determination of a local board. Section 627.1, 8 Fed.Reg. 16720, 10 Fed.Reg. 9210. He may require a board of appeal to reconsider its decision, s 627.61, 8 Fed.Reg. 6017, or appeal from it to the President. Section 628.1, 7 Fed.Reg. 10521.
It appears that the city director, in aid of these functions, established theological panels. It was thought d sirable to give the selective service personnel the benefit of the advice of those familiar with the educational practices of various religious groups so that Selective Service might exercise a more informed judgment in evaluating claims to classifications in IV—D. Accordingly, theological panels were constituted, one of which consisted of prominent laymen and rabbis of the Jewish faith, who gave advisory opinions on those who sought a IV—D classification on the grounds that they were either rabbis or students preparing for the ministry in the Jewish religion. The members of the panel were volunteers, as permitted by the regulations. Section 602.2, 6 Fed.Reg. 6826. And pursuant to the regulations each took the oath of office. Section 602.4(a), 6 Fed.Reg. 6826.
In August, 1942, the local board classified him IV—D. Section 622.44(a), 6 Fed.Reg. 6607, 6766. In May, 1944, he was given a physical examination and found acceptable for military service. Thereafter the city director requested that he appear before the theological panel in respect to his claim to a IV—D classification. He appeared before the panel in June, 1944, stating inter alia, that he expected to graduate from the seminary in 1945, that ill health caused him to leave the school in 1939, that between 1940 and 1942 he worked as a clerk, and that he returned to the seminary as a full time student at about the time he filed his selective service questionnaire.
The local board reclassified Samuels I—A in August, 1944. He submitted additional evidence and requested a hearing. One was had in September, 1944 and another in October, 1944. There is no § owing that the recommendation of the panel or the transcript of the hearing before it was kept from Samuels. They were not marked confidential in the file. The local board, indeed, allowed Samuels to correct alleged inaccuracies in the transcript. The local board ordered him continued in I—A and on appeal, the board of appeal also classified him as I—A. A few days later Samuels filed additional information with the local board and requested that his classification be reopened. Another hearing was held, Samuels being present. He advised the board that he had appeared of his own volition before a committee representing the Union of Orthodox Rabbis (but not connected with the selective service system) and that the committee concluded he was a student preparing in good faith for the ministry. What facts that committee may have acted upon do not appear. In any event, the local board denied Samuels' request to reopen the classification by a divided vote; and shortly thereafter he was inducted into the army.
We agree with the court in United States ex rel. Goodman v. Hearn, supra, at page 188 of 153 F.2d, that advice from well-informed members of the faith in question may 'Both help and speed just classification'. Congress wrote into the Act a comparable procedure for the handling of claims for exemption by conscientious objectors. Where such claims are denied by the local board and appealed, they are referred to the Department of Justice for a hearing and an advisory report. Section 5(g). But the fact that there is no specific statutory provision for the creation of theological panels does not make their use improper. Wise administration may call for the expert advice which they alone can offer. And we see no difference in principle if they are formally constituted and regularly used in lieu of inquiry to members of the particular faith as individual cases arise. The administrative function entrusted to the Selective Service is an enormous one. The Act contemplates an administrative organization highly decentralized so as to operate effectively at the local level. More than the director, local boards, and boards of appeal were authorized. For § 10(a)(2), as we have noted, authorized the creation of 'other agencies' as well. A theological advisory panel, serving solely in an advisory capacity, would seem to be included in that category. The information received by the board from the panel, like information from any other source, must be put in writing in the file so that the registrant may examine it, explain or correct it, or deny it.4 There is, moreover, no confidential information which can be kept from the registrant under the regulations.5 With those safeguards a truly expert panel might serve a most useful function without the administrative process being corrupted by any unfair procedure.
The question is not whether the allegations of the petition are sufficient to justify the grant of the writ or the issuance of a rule to show cause, so that the facts can be ascertained in accord with the procedure outlined in Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 61 S.Ct. 574, 85 L.Ed. 830. In this case there was a return to the writ, a full hearing was had, and all evidence offered was received. Samuels had the burden of showing that he was unlawfully detained. Walker v. Johnston, supra. Not every procedural error, but only those so flagrant as to result in an unfair hearing render the proceedings vulnerable in a collateral attack. United States ex. rel. Tisi v. Tod, supra, at page 133 of 264 U.S., at page 260 of 44 S.Ct., 68 L.Ed. 590; Bridges v. Wixon, supra, at pages 152—156, of 326 U.S., at pages 1451—1453 of 65 S.Ct., 89 L.Ed. 2103. On the case Samuels has made out, the most the has been shown is that t e use of the theological panel might result in a hearing so unfair as to deprive the administrative proceedings of vitality. Samuels has failed to show that in his case it had that effect. He has therefore failed to sustain the burden of proof which was on him.