Source: https://casetext.com/brief/37d708b0-in-the-matter-of-talib-w-abdur-rashid-appellantvnew-york-city-police-department-et-al-respondents-in-the-matter-of-samir-hashmi-appellant-v-new-york-city-police-department-et-al-respondents-brief-4
Timestamp: 2020-04-05 13:28:34
Document Index: 742675681

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3', '§ 700', '§ 700', '§ 240', '§ 240', '§ 240', '§ 240', '§ 240', '§240', '§240', '§ 240', '§ 440', '§ 63', '§ 84', '§ 87', '§ 87', '§ 87', '§ 87', '§ 89', '§ 552', '§ 84', '§ 700', '§ 552', '§ 84', '§ 89', '§ 87', '§ 87', '§ 87', '§ 87', '§ 87', '§ 87', '§ 87', '§ 3', '§ 63', '§ 700', '§ 87', '§ 51', '§ 700', '§ 240', '§ 240', '§ 240', '§ 240', '§ 240', '§ 240', '§ 240', '§ 87', '§ 440', '§ 240', '§ 440', '§ 670']

APL -2016-00219 Court of Appeals i£>tate of gork In the Matter of The Application of TALIB W. ABDUR-RASHID, Petitioner-Appellant, - against - NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al., Respondents-Respondents. For aJudgment Pursuant to Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules. In the Matter of The Application of SAMIR HASHMI, Petitioner-Appellant, - against - NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al., Respondents-Respondents. For aJudgment Pursuant to Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules. BRIEF FOR AMICUS CURIAE DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK SCOTT D. McNAMARA District Attorney, Oneida County President, District Attorneys Association Of the State of New York c/o Nassau County District Attorney 262 Old Country Road Mineola, New York 11501 Telephone: (516) 571-3732; Fax: (516) 571-3806 Email: Andrea.DiGregorio@nassauda.org TammyJ. Smiley, Andrea M. DiGregorio, Monica M.C. Leiter Assistant District Attorneys of Counsel Brief Completed October 6, 2017 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Table of Authorities .i Preliminary Statement, .vii Statement of Amicus Curiae .1 Relevant Facts and Procedural History .2 Argument A Glomar Response Is Necessary To Effectuate The Legislative Intent Of Protecting Enumerated Categories Of Information Under The Freedom Of Information Law. 6 A. Application Of The Glomar Doctrine To FOIL Effectuates The Exemptions Set Forth In The Public Officers Law 8 B. Application Of The Glomar Doctrine To FOIL Protects Confidential Informants And Other Non-Testifying Witnesses, And Fosters Trustful Relationships Between Communities And Prosecutorial Offices 9 C. Application Of The Glomar Doctrine Protects Innocent Individuals Who Have Been The Subject Of An Investigation That Did Not Result In Criminal Charges 12 D. Application Of The Glomar Doctrine Effectuates Legislative Intent To Prevent Interference With Law Enforcement Investigations 14 Page E. A Glomar Response Should Be Connected To A FOIL Exemption And Accompanied By An Appropriate Representation Of Necessity To Prevent Abuse And Further Legislative Intent Of FOIL 15 F. Utilization Of The Glomar Response, To Both Pending And Future FOIL Requests, Effectuates The Legislative Intent Of Protecting Certain Information From Public Disclosure 16 G. The Application Of The Glomar Doctrine Would Not Impact Criminal Defendants’ Right To A Fair Trial 20 Conclusion. .27 Certificate of Compliance TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page CASES STATE CASES Abdur-Rashid v. N.Y. City Police Dep’t, 28 N.Y.3d 908 (2016) 5 Abdur-Rashid v. N.Y. City Police Dep’t, 140 A.D.3d 419 (1st Dept. 2016) ... 4, 5,7 Abdur-Rashid v. N.Y. City Police Dep’t, 45 Misc. 3d 888 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 2014). 3,4 Asian Am. Legal Def. <&Educ. Fund v. N.Y. City Police Dep’t, 125 A.D.3d 531 (1st Dept. 2015) 13, 14 City Council ofWatervliet v. Town Bd. of Colonie, 3 N.Y.3d 508 (2004) 18 Data Tree, LLC v. Romaine, 9 N.Y.3d 454 (2007) 8 Fink v. Lefkowit 47 N.Y.2d 567 (1979) 8 Goodwin v. Perales, 88 N.Y.2d 383 (1996). 18 Hashmi v. N.Y. City Police Dep’t, 46 Misc. 3d 712 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 2014). 4 Holtyman v. Goldman, 71 N.Y.2d 564 (1988) 19 i Page Legal Aid Soc’y v. N.Y. City Police Dep’t, 274 A.D.2d 207 (1st Dept. 2000) 22 Ees-her v. Hynes, 19 N.Y.3d 57 (2012). 22 North Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Bergen Cnty. Prosecutor's Office, 146 A.3d 656 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2016) 7, 13, 14, 18 People v. Anderson, 29 N.Y.3d 69 (2017). 20 People v. Bueno, 18 N.Y.3d 160 (2011) 17 People v. Copicotto, 50 N.Y.2d 222 (1980) 21 People v. Gordon, 23 N.Y.3d 643 (2014) 17 Pittari v. Pirro, 258 A.D.2d 202 (2d Dept. 1999) 22, 23 Rodrigueÿ v. Perales, 86 N.Y.2d 361 (1995) 18 Tuck-lt-Away Associates L.P. v. Empire State Development Corp., 54 A.D.3d 154 (1st Dept. 2008) 20 Xerox Corp. v. Town of Webster, 65 N.Y.2d 131 (1985) 20 ii Page FEDERAL CASES Bassiouni v. CIA, 392 F.3d 244 (7th Cir. 2004) 6 Ctr. for Constitutional Rights v. CIA, 765 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2014), cert, denied,_U.S. _, 135 S. Ct. 1530 (2015) 16 Carson v. Dep*t of State, 565 F.3d 857 (D.C. Cir. 2009) .6,11 Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724 (D.C Cir. 1981) viii Minier v. CIA, 88 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. 1996) 7 People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Nat’l Institutes of Health, Dep V of Health and Human Services, 745 F.3d 535 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 11,13,14 Phillippi v. CIA, 546 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1976) .viii, 7, 18 Taylor v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 618 Fed. App’x 478 (11th Cir. 2015) 6 Wilner v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 592 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2009) viii, 6, 9, 16 Wolfv. CIA, 473 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007) 6 hi Page STATUTES STATE STATUTES New York Constitution, Article IV, § 3 18 County Law § 700. 1,18 County Law § 700(i) 20 C.P.L. § 240.10 24 C.P.L. § 240.20 21 C.P.L. § 240.30 21 C.P.L. § 240.45, 21 C.P.L. § 240.50, .21, 22 C.P.L. §240.70, 21 C.P.L. §240.80, 21 C.P.L. § 240.90, 21 C.P.L. § 440.30, 24 Executive Law § 63(2). .18 Pub. Off. Law § 84 viii Pub. Off. Law § 87 19 Pub. Off. Law § 87(2)(e) 11 Pub. Off. Law § 87(2)(e)(i) 15, 23 Pub. Off. Law § 87(2)(f) viii, 9, 12, 16 Pub. Off. Law § 89(2) viii iv Page FEDERAL STATUTES 5 U.S.C. § 552. 4 OTHER AUTHORITIES Brooklyn District Attorney’s Office Community Engagement Page, http://www.brooklynda.org/community-engagement/ (last visited October 3, 2017) . . 9, 25 Bronx County District Attorney’s Office Bureaus and Units Page, http://bronxda.nyc.gov/html/units/units.shtml (last visited October 3, 2017) 25 John Browning, US flitches Get Stitches: Witness Intimidation In The Age Of Facebook And Twitter, 35 Pace L. Rev. 192 (Fall 2014) 10 Kelly Dedel, A Guide to Witness Intimidation, Center For Problem Oriented Policing (2006), http:/ /wvvw.popcenter.org/problems/wimess_intimidation/print/. 10 Daniel Kroepsch, Prosecutorial Best Practices Committees And Conviction Integrity Units: How Internal Programs Are Fulfilling The Prosecutor’s Duty To Serve Justice, 29 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1095 (Fall 2016) .25 Patrick Lohmann, Syracuse Crimes Go Unsolved As Witnesses Stay Silent, Syracuse.com (December 20, 2015), http://www.syracuse.com/crime/index.ssf/2015/12/ syracuse_crimes_go_unsolved_as_witnesses_remain_mum.html (last visited October 3, 2017) 10 New York County District Attorney’s Office Community Office Page, http://manhattanda.org/community-offices (last visited October 3, 2017) 9 New York County District Attorney’s Office Conviction Integrity Program Page, http://manhattanda.org/preventing-wrongful-convictions (last visited on October 3, 2017) 25 v Page New York State Office of the Attorney General’s Conviction Review Board Page, https:/ /ag.ny.gov/bureau/conviction-review-bureau ) (last visited on October 3, 2017) 25 Margaret O’Malley, Witness Intimidation In The Digital Age (Parti), The Prosecutor (July/August/September 2014), http://pceinc.org/wp- content/uploads/2015/06/ Witness-Cooperation-and-Intimidation-Witness- Intimidation-In-The-Digital-Age.pdf (last visited October 3, 2017) 10 Schenectady County District Attorney’s Office Community Prosecution Page, http://www.schenectadycounty.com/districtattorney (last visited October 3, 2017) .9,10,11 United States Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, The Stop SnitchingPhenomenon: breaking The Code Of Silence (2009), https://ric-zai-inc.com/ Publications/cops-pl58-pub.pdf (last visited October 3, 2017) ..10 vi Court of Appeals !§>tate of iSelu fÿorfc In the Matter of The Application of TALIB W. ABDUR-RASHID, Petitioner-Appellant, APL-2016-00219 - against - NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al., Respondents-Respondents. For a Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules. In the Matter of The Application of SAMIR HASHMI Petitioner-Appellant, - against - NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al, Respondents-Respondents. For a Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules. BRIEF FOR AMICUS CURIAE DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK PRELIMINARY STATEMENT The District Attorneys Association of the State of New York (“DAASNY”) submits this brief as amicus curiae in support of respondent, New York City Police Department (“NYPD”), in the above-captioned appeals. By permission of this Court, Talib W. Abdur-Rashid and Samir Hashmi (“petitioners”) appeal from an order of the vii Appellate Division, First Department, which unanimously held that the NYPD acted properly when, in reply to petitioners’ requests for documents pursuant to New York’s Freedom of Information Law (“FOIL”),' it issued a so-called Glomar response, i.e., the NYPD neither confirmed nor denied the existence of responsive records, but set forth that if any responsive records did exist, they would not be subject to disclosure pursuant to certain, enumerated, statutory exemptions under FOIL.2 1 See Pub. Off. Law § 84, et seq. 2The Glomar doctrine originated in a federal Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) case concerning records pertaining to the Hughes Glomar Explorer, an oceanic research vessel that purportedly was being used by the Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) to recover a sunken Soviet submarine that contained nuclear weapons. See Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724, 728 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Pbillippi v. CIA, 546 F.2d 1009, 1010-12 (D.C. Cir. 1976); see also Wilnerv. Nat’ISec. Agency, 592 F.3d 60, 66-67 (2d Cir. 2009). In response to a FOIA request for records relating to the Glomar Explorer, the CIA refused to confirm or deny the existence of responsive records, contending that the existence or nonexistence of the requested records was itself a classified fact exempt from FOIA disclosure. Pbillippi, 546 F.2d at 1011; see also Wilner, 592 F.3d at 67. In Pbillippi, the District of Columbia, Court of Appeals recognized the legitimacy of a Glomar response, but required the CIA to provide a detailed public affidavit explaining the basis for its claim that it could not be required to either confirm or deny the existence of the requested records. Pbillippi, 546 F.2d at 1013-15. V1U STATEMENT OF AMICUS CURIAE The District Attorneys Association of the State of New York (“DAASNY”) is a state-wide organization composed of sixty-two District Attorneys from New York, the New York State Attorney General, the Office of the Special Narcotics Prosecutor (New York City), and the New York Justice Center for the Protection of People with Special Needs, and the nearly 3,000 assistants of these agencies. County Law § 700 requires all District Attorneys to investigate and prosecute crimes committed in their respective jurisdictions. In effectuating this mandate, District Attorneys’ Offices interview innumerable individuals, including confidential informants, and individuals who, though reluctant to speak with law-enforcement authorities, nonetheless do so under an assumption that anonymity is being provided to them. In addition, at times, District Attorneys’ Offices conduct investigations joindy with federal law-enforcement agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the United States Drug Enforcement Agency, and the United States Department of Homeland Security. However, not all investigations result in an arrest or criminal charges. Nonetheless, documentation regarding investigations — including those that do not result in prosecutions, and those containing statements imparted by confidential informants and other individuals who expect anonymity — are often included in District Attorney case files. DAASNY urges this Court to affirm the Appellate Division’s order and recognize the propriety of a Glomar-type response to FOIL requests. State-wide 1 acceptance of the applicability of the Glomar doctrine to the New York’s Public Officers Law is gready important to protect non-testifying informants, foster an atmosphere of trust between communities and District Attorneys’ Offices, and avoid unjustified stigmatization, public scorn, and damage to the reputation or livelihood of individuals who were the subject of an investigation that did not result in an arrest or prosecution. Moreover, to reject the Glomar doctrine as inapplicable to FOIL would create an unwarranted anomaly: records created during a joint federal-state investigation and possessed by a federal agency would be subject to the protection afforded by the Glomar doctrine, but that same document, if possessed by a state agency, would not. Furthermore, depriving an agency of the appropriate use of a Glomar-type response could result in disclosure of the very information that the Public Officers Law is designed to protect. Criminal defendants and other requestors are becoming increasingly sophisticated and calculating in framing their FOIL requests to discover, by a process of elimination, protected information, such as the identity of a confidential informant. RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Talib W. Abdur-Rashid and Samir Hashmi submitted separate FOIL requests to the NYPD seeking records of surveillances and investigations of themselves and certain organizations/communities with which they associated (R. 258-60, 720-21).3 The 3 Numbers preceded by “R.” refer to the pages of the Record on Appeal. 2 NYPD denied both requests, invoking, inter alia, a Glomar-type response, i.e., while neither confirming nor denying the existence of responsive records, the agency set forth that if any responsive record did exist, it would be exempt from disclosure under certain, specified, provisions of the Public Officers Law (R. 267-68, 727-28). Abdur-Rashid and Hashmi filed unsuccessful administrative appeals (R. 269-70, 730-31). In response to the administrative appeals, the NYPD affirmed its denial of the FOIL requests, thoroughly explained its reasons for its prior determinations, and once again incorporated, inter alia, a Glomar-type response (R. 271-74, 733-36). Abdur-Rashid and Hashmi then each brought a proceeding pursuant to C.P.L.R. Article 78 in the Supreme Court of New York County (R. 236-50, 705-15). Each case was assigned to a different judge, and resulted in disparate rulings regarding the applicability of the Glomar doctrine to FOIL. In Abdur-Rashid’s case, New York County Supreme CourtJustice Alexander W. Hunter, Jr., held that the Glomar doctrine and response were applicable to FOIL {Abdur-Rashid v. N.Y. City Police Dep’t, 45 Misc. 3d 888, 895 [Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 2014]; R. 20-24). In reaching that determination, the court noted that the case was one of first impression, that it could therefore look to holdings in other jurisdictions for guidance, and that the application of the Glomar doctrine to FOIL requests was in keeping with the spirit of similar appellate court cases (Abdur-Rashid, 45 Misc. 3d at 894-95; R. 23-24). Justice Hunter noted that respondents had made a showing — through an affidavit of a NYPD Chief — that the disclosure of records (if they existed) would 3 undermine police operations and could impair the life and safety of undercover officers (Abdur-Rashid, 45 Misc. 3d at 893-94; R. 23). In contrast, about two months after the Abdur-Rashid decision, New York County Supreme Court Justice Peter H. Moulton rejected the use of the Glomar doctrine for FOIL matters {see Hashmi v. N.Y. City Police Dep’t, 46 Misc. 3d 712, 722 [Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 2014]; R. 27-45). The court held, inter alia, that adopting the Glomar doctrine would create a “profound change” to the statutory scheme constructed by the New York Legislature, and that, therefore, the decision to adopt the Glomar doctrine should be “left to the State Legislature” (Hashmi, 46 Misc. 3d at 722; R. 41). Upon the ensuing appeals from the Abdur-Rashid and Hashmi orders, the First Department, Appellate Division, unanimously held that a Glomar response is a permissible reply to FOIL requests, provided that the agency adequately demonstrates that confirmation or denial of the record’s existence would cause harm cognizable under a FOIL exemption (Abdur-Rashid v. N.Y. City Police Dep’t, 140 A.D.3d 419, 420- 21 [1st Dept. 2016]; R. 15). In reaching its conclusion, the Appellate Division noted that the federal case law regarding the federal Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. § 552) (“FOIA”) upon which FOIL is patterned — was “instructive” when interpreting FOIL provisions, and that the application of the Glomar doctrine to FOIA requests was “widely approved” by federal circuit courts {Abdur-Rashid, 140A.D.3d at 420; R. 16). The court rejected the notion that differences between FOIA and 4 FOIL would justify rejecting the Glomar doctrine in the context of FOIL (Abdur- Rashid, 140 A.D.3d. at 420; R. 16). This Court granted petitioners leave to appeal from the Appellate Division’s order {Abdur-Rashid v. N.Y. City Police Dep’t, 28 N.Y.3d 908 [2016]; R. 10-11). In this brief, amicus DAASNY will discuss why the Glomar doctrine is applicable to FOIL, and the dangers of not recognizing the Glomar doctrine under New York State’s public-disclosure laws. In addition, this brief will assuage concerns that invocation of the Glomar doctrine will serve to thwart legitimate public access to government records. 5 ARGUMENT A Glomar Response Is Necessary To Effectuate The Legislative Intent Of Protecting Enumerated Categories Of Information Under The Freedom Of Information Law. Appellate courts — both state and federal — have consistently and uniformly recognized the applicability of a Glomar-type response to requests made for documents pursuant to open-records laws under general statutory authorization to withhold enumerated categories of information, even in the absence of independent statutory authorization for a “neither confirm nor deny” reply. See, e.g., Taylor v. Nat’/ Sec. Agency, 618 Fed. App’x 478, 479-80, 482 (11th Cir. 2015) (Glomar response appropriate to requests under FOIA and the Privacy Act of 1974 for documents relating to, inter alia, surveillance of requestor); Wilner v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 592 F.3d 60, 67-70 (2d Cir. 2009) (Second Circuit joins the “firmly established” and “well settled” holdings of other federal circuits that a Glomar response can be a proper reply to a FOIA request, even when the Glomar doctrine was invoked to protect the methods, targets, and information gleaned from a publicly disclosed surveillance program); Larson v. Dep’t of State, 565 F.3d 857, 861-64, 870 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Glomar response appropriate reply to FOIA request, including request for document that, if disclosed, could have led to the identification of a confidential source); Wolfv. CIA, 473 F.3d 370, 373-74, 377 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (recognizing the applicability of Glomar response to FOIA requests and acknowledging the legitimacy of the government’s interest in the appearance of confidentiality in its covert operations); Bassiouni v. CIA, 392 F.3d 244, 246 (7th Cir. 6 2004) (recognizing that “[e]very appellate court to address the issue has held that the FOIA permits [a federal agency] to make a 'Glomar response’”); Minierv. CLA, 88 F.3d 796, 800-02 (9th Cir. 1996) (recognizing applicability of Glomar response to FOIA requests); North Jersey Media Grp. v. Bergen Cnty. Prosecutor's Office, 146 A.3d 656, 666-67 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2016) (Glomar response applicable to New Jersey’s Open Public Records Act, although there is no explicit statutory authority for a “neither admit nor deny” response); Abdur-Rashid v. N.Y. City Police Dep’t,140 A.D.3d 419, 420- 21 (1st Dept. 2016) (Glomar response applicable to New York’s Freedom of Information Law). Notably, the very open-records law from which the Glomar doctrine emerged — the Freedom of Information Act — authorizes agencies to widihold exempt material but does not independendy provide for a “refuse to confirm or deny” response. SeePhillippi v. CIA, 546 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1976). This Court, too, should recognize the applicability of the Glomar doctrine and response to New York’s Freedom of Information Law. Indeed, the structure of the Public Officers Law — which provides for disclosure-exemptions for certain material — invites the application of the Glomar doctrine to prevent revelation of information protected under FOIL. Such safeguarding is important to amicus DAASNY in light of the numerous investigations undertaken by prosecutorial offices, which may involve memorialized statements made by non-testifying confidential informants, and unique investigation techniques which may not result in an arrest or criminal prosecution. An acknowledgement of even the existence of responsive records to requests regarding 7 such investigations or informants would serve to expose the very sort of information that the Public Officers Law protects. A. Application Of The Glomar Doctrine To FOIL Effectuates The Exemptions Set Forth In The Public Officers Law. Although the reach of New York’s open-records legislation — the Freedom of Information Law (Public Officers Law § 84, et seq.) — is broad, it is not limitless. See Data Tree, LL.C v. Komaine, 9 N.Y.3d 454, 462 (2007); Fink v. Lefkomtÿ 47 N.Y.2d 567, 571 (1979). Rather than create an unfettered ability for the public to access all agency records, the Legislature “recognized a legitimate need on the part of government to keep some matters confidential”4 and developed exemptions to disclosure. Exemptions include information that, if disclosed, would create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy5 or endanger the life or safety of a person,6 and also records compiled for law enforcement purposes which, if disclosed, would identify a confidential source, reveal confidential information relating to a criminal investigation, or divulge non-routine criminal investigative techniques or procedures.7 4 Fink, 47 N.Y.2d at 571. 5 Public Officers Law § 89(2). 6 Public Officers Law § 87(2)(f). 7 Public Officers Law § 87(2)(e). 8 Application of the Glomar doctrine and response to New York’s open-records law would serve to prevent the harm that FOIL was designed to protect against and would, thus, effectuate the Legislature’s intent when it created the Public Officers Law disclosure exemptions. Cf. Wilner, 592 F.3d at 68 (a federal agency may refuse to confirm or deny the existence of records where to answer the FOIA inquiry would cause harm cognizable under a FOIA exception). B. Application Of The Glomar Doctrine To FOIL Protects Confidential Informants And Other Non-Testifying Witnesses, And Fosters Trustful Relationships Between Communities And Prosecutorial Offices. The security and safety of victims and other witnesses to criminal activity is of great importance to prosecutorial offices, as is fostering a climate of trust and cooperation between civilian communities and law enforcement.8 Witness and victim safety is assuredly worthy of great consideration. See, e.g., Public Officers Law § 87(2)(f) (exemption for disclosure of information that would endanger the life or safety of a 8 See, e.g., Office of Public Engagement of the Brooklyn District Attorney’s Office, which is “committed to building mutual trust and respect between law enforcement and the community,” (http://www.brooklynda.org/community-engagement/) (last visited October 3, 2017); the Community Partnership Unit of the New York County District Attorney’s Office, which provides a “a critical link between the District Attorney’s Office and the community at large” (http://manhattanda.org/community-partnerships-unit) (last visited October 3, 2017); and the Community Prosecution Team at the Schenectady County District Attorney’s Office, which works “with residents and other organizations to better the community” and is developing a “Stop the Silence” event to overcome the reluctance of some civilians to provide information because of fear or to avoid “snitching” (http://www.schenectadycounty.com/districtattorney) (last visited on October 3, 2017). 9 person). Civilian witnesses are, however, increasingly reluctant to divulge information regarding their knowledge of criminal activity.9 Fear of reprisal, as well as being labeled a “snitch,” are factors that contribute to witness reticence. Seegenerally, Browning, #Snitches Get Stitches: Witness Intimidation In the Age ofFacebookAnd Twitter,; 35 Pace L. Rev. 192 (Fall 2014).10 The prospect of merely being perceived as cooperating with law enforcement — let alone actually cooperating with law enforcement — is sufficient to deter potential witnesses from proffering information in a criminal investigation." The anti-snitch culture has become so pronounced that the Schenectady District Attorney’s Office is developing a “Stop the Silence” event to address the phenomenon and civilians’ fears of reprisal for cooperating with law enforcement. See Schenectady County District Attorney 9 See Patrick Lohmann, Syracuse Crimes Go Unsolved As Witnesses Stay Silent, Syracuse.com (December 20, 2015), http://www.syracuse.com/crime/index.ssf/2015/12/syracuse_crimes_go _unsolved_as_witnesses_remain_mum.html (last visited October 3, 2017); Margaret O’Malley, Witness Intimidation In The Digital Age (Part I), The Prosecutor (July/August/September 2014), http://pceinc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/ Witness- Cooperation-and-Intimidation-Witness-Intimidation-In-the-Digital-Age.pdf (last visited October 3, 2017); Kelly Dedel, A Guide To Witness Intimidation, Center for Problem Oriented Policing (2006), http://www.popcenter.org/problems/witness_intimidation/print/ (last visited October 3, 2017). 10 See also Patrick Lohmann, Syracuse Crimes Go Unsolved As Witnesses Stay Silent, Syracuse.com (December 20, 2015), http://www.syracuse.com/crime/index.ssf/2015/12/syracuse_crimes_go _unsolved_as_witnesses_remain_mum.html (last visited October 3, 2017); Margaret O’Malley, Witness Intimidation In The Digital Age (Part I), The Prosecutor (July/ August/September 2014), http://pceinc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Witness-Cooperation- and-Intimidation-Witness-Intimidation-In-the-Digital-Age.pdf (last visited October 3, 2017). 11 See U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, The Stop Snitching Phenomenon: Breaking The Code Of Silence, p. 14 (2009), https://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/ cops-pl58-pub.pdf (last visited October 3, 2017). 10 Community Prosecution Page, http:/ /www.schenectadjcounty.com/ districtattomey (last visited October 3, 2017). The prospect of having his or her identity revealed — direcdy or indirectly — pursuant to a FOIL request would undoubtedly result in a non-testifying witness or informant being even less inclined to provide information or otherwise cooperate with a prosecutorial office. The use of the “neither admit nor deny” Glomar response provides needed protection for safeguarding an informant’s identity in situations where the mere acknowledgment of the existence of a particular record would result in harm cognizable under a FOIL exemption. Seegenerally Larson, 565 F.3d at 863- 64; see also People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Nat’l Institutes of Health, Dep’t of Health and Human Services, 745 F.3d 535, 541 (D.C. Cir. 2014). For example, in a hypothetical case where a requestor pointedly asks for all the statements made by “P.J.” (whom the requestor suspects of being a confidential informant), an agency’s response that such statements are exempt from disclosure pursuant to Public Officers Law § 87(2)(e)(iii), because they would identify a confidential source, does not sufficiently protect P.J.’s identity. Indeed, such a response serves to confirm the requestor’s suspicions that P.J. is an informant. However, a “neither confirm nor deny” response far more adequately protects P.J.’s identity. See generally Larson, 565 F.3d at 863; see also People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, 745 F.3d at 541. 11 Safeguarding a confidential witness’s identity through the use of a Glomar-type response serves to foster effective law enforcement and criminal prosecutions, aids in acquiring the public’s and witness’s cooperation, and assists in keeping the flow of information unimpeded. Disclosure of a confidential witness’s identity could hinder the attainment of valuable information necessary for successful and just prosecutions. Moreover, protection of a confidential witness is not limited to merely pretrial circumstances. The very real possibility of retaliation even after a case has concluded warrants the continued protection offered by a Glomar-type response. There is no time limit on retaliation, and, without the continuing protection offered by a Glomar-type response tethered to the FOIL exemption that protects disclosure of information that could endanger the life or safety of a person,12 a criminal defendant could easily learn from a post-judgment FOIL disclosure about a witness who provided law enforcement with information but, for reasons of safety and security, did not become a witness at trial. C. Application Of The Glomar Doctrine Protects Innocent Individuals Who Have Been The Subject Of An Investigation That Did Not Result In Criminal Charges. Application of the Glomar doctrine does not, of course, merely protect confidential witnesses. The Glomar response also protects individuals who were targets 12 See Public Officers Law § 87(2)(f). 12 of investigations that did not result in an arrest or criminal prosecution. See generally People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, 745 F.3d at 541 (noting that courts have “repeatedly” recognized the “substantial” privacy interest held by “the targets of law- enforcement investigations ... in ensuring that their relationship to the investigations remains secret”). District Attorneys’ Offices sometimes receive allegations that are determined following investigation — to be unprovable, unfounded, or untrue. Identifying the target of such allegations, or even providing a non-Glomar response that effectively acknowledges that an individual has been the target of an investigation, could unfairly subject that individual to irreparable harm, such as ruined reputation or livelihood. See generally id. at 541-42; see also Asian Am. Legal Def. <&Educ. Fund v. N.Y. City Police Dep’t, 125 A.D.3d 531, 532 (1st Dept. 2015) (revelation that a certain person, business, or organization was the subject of counterterrorism-related surveillance would not only have the potential to be embarrassing or offensive, but could also be detrimental to the reputations or livelihoods of such persons or entities). The importance of protecting an individual from the unwarranted public scorn and stigma that can arise from being identified as the target of a criminal investigation, through disclosure of such information via a public-records request, is a concept that has been accepted in New York, New Jersey, and the federal forum. See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, 745 F.3d at 541; North Jersey Media Grp., Inc., 146 A.3d at 660, 670; Asian Am. Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 125 A.D.3d at 532. Invocation of a statutory exemption to FOIL 13 disclosure — without the benefit of the “neither admit nor deny” response — does not fully protect the target of the investigation from such unwarranted invasion of privacy. A broad request for information that does not specify a particular individual, such as the request made in Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund,13 may well be answered without a Glomar-type response and still protect the privacy interest of an individual who might have been associated with a criminal investigation. However, such a broad request differs from a more pointed request that seeks “all records related to any investigation of [a named individual].” See, e.g., People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, 745 F.3d at 538, 541-42. Under those circumstances, invocation of a statutory exemption, without the benefit of a Glomar-type response, could serve to confirm to the requestor that the named individual has, in fact, been the subject of an investigation, and cause the type of harm that the FOIL exemption was designed to prevent. See generally North Jersey Media Grp., Inc., 146 A.3d at 660, 670 (Glomar response properly invoked, under NewJersey’s open-records law, to protect from harm a person who had been subject of an information request, but who had not been arrested or charged with an offense); see also People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, 745 F.3d at 538, 541-42. 13 See Asian Am. Legal Def. &Edtic. Fund, 125 A.D.3d at 531. 14 D. Application Of The Glomar Doctrine Effectuates Legislative Intent To Prevent Interference With Law Enforcement Investigations. Public Officers Law § 87(2)(e)(i) exempts from disclosure records that, if unveiled, would interfere with law enforcement investigations. Id. Once again, reliance merely on an invocation of a statutory exemption — without the added availability of a “neither admit nor deny” response -- may not sufficiently protect the statutory interest of non-interference with law enforcement investigations. For example, an individual who suspects that he or she is under investigation could frame a FOIL request in such a way that an agency’s mere acknowledgement that it has responsive records could cause harm cognizable under the FOIL exception by alerting the requestor that he or she is under investigation. The requestor could then tailor his or her activities to prevent lawful discovery of criminal conduct. E. A Glomar Response Should Be Connected To A FOIL Exemption And Accompanied By An Appropriate Representation Of Necessity To Prevent Abuse And Further The Legislative Intent Of FOIL. The concerns raised by petitioners and their amici that agencies would invoke the Glomar doctrine to thwart legitimate public access to government records can easily be assuaged by employing measures currently applicable to FOIL requests, and incorporating procedures as are employed in the federal forum. 15 For example, in order to invoke Glomar response in the federal setting, an agency must “tether” its refusal to one of nine FOIA exemptions. See Wilner, 592 F.3d at 71. The burden is placed on the party resisting disclosure to demonstrate with “reasonably detailed” explanations that the information being withheld falls within the claimed exemption. See Ctr. for Constitutional Slights v. CIA, 765 F.3d 161, 166 (2d Cir. 2014), cert, denied,_ U.S. _, 135 S. Ct. 1530 (2015); Wilner, 592 F.3d at 68, 73. So too, in the state setting, a Glomar-type response could be required to be tethered to a FOIL exemption, such as Public Officers Law § 87(2)(f), which exempts disclosure of records, that, if disclosed, could endanger the life or safety of a person. Moreover, as when an agency invokes any FOIL exemption, the state agency could be required to make a sufficient showing that it is entitled to the Glomar-type exemption, such as adequately establishing that the mere acknowledgment that responsive records exist could impair the life and safety of a person. F. Utiliaation Of The Glomar Response, To Both Pending And Future FOIL Requests, Effectuates The Legislative Intent Of Protecting Certain Information From Public Disclosure. Petitioners assert that Glomar responses are unnecessary because New York state agencies have responded to FOIL requests for decades without invoking Glomar and have been able to protect sensitive information. See Petitioner-Appellant’s Brief at 1-2; Petitioner-Appellant’s Reply Brief at 15; Amicus Curiae New York Civil Liberties 16 Union Brief at 1. Petitioners’ assertions, however, are disingenuous. There is no indication in Petitioner’s papers that they made any attempt to quantify harm done by the disclosure of the existence of confidential sources under the existing interpretation of FOIL. Such reticence is unsurprising, as it can be difficult to measure the impact that such disclosures have on the viability of prosecutions or safety of witnesses. Indeed, it would be unlikely for criminal defendants to admit that they have harassed or harmed witnesses after FOIL disclosure. See, eg., People v. Gordon, 23 N.Y.3d 643, 650 (2014) (“The element of intent is rarely proved by an explicit expression of culpability by the perpetrator.”) (quoting People v. Bueno,18 N.Y.3d 160, 169 [2011]). In any event, even if there has not been an attempt to invoke a Glomar-type response in previous matters, such circumstance does not prove that it is not now necessary to use such a response. The dangers to witnesses have grown exponentially since die introduction of social media, and FOIL requestors are becoming increasingly calculating in the way they frame their queries for agency records. Moreover, petitioners’ position that agencies should not be permitted to effectuate the legislative intent of protecting the integrity of criminal investigations and personal safety because it would constitute a “new method” is misplaced. A Glomar- type response effectuates die legislative intent to protect certain exempt information specifically enumerated in the statute and thus should not rightly be considered a new method of responding to FOIL requests. Indeed, the open-records law from which the Glomar doctrine emerged — FOIA — likewise authorizes agencies to withhold exempt 17 information but does not independently provide for a “refuse to confirm or deny” response, yet the federal court that first assessed the validity of a Glomar response ruled that such a type of response could validly be given in reply to a FOIA request. See Phillippi, 546 F.2d 1009. New Jersey courts too have recognized the validity of Glomar-type response even in the absence of independent statutory authority for a “neither admit nor deny” reply to a request for records under that state’s open-records law. North Jersey Media Grp., 146 A.3d at 666-67 (noting “the absence of specific statutory authorization posed no obstacle to the adoption of the Glomar doctrine in . . . federal caselaw”). In any event, the Executive has the obligation to ensure that laws are faithfully executed. See New York Constitution, Article IV, § 3. This obligation is, of course, executed through various inferior officers, including agency heads, across state government. See, e.g., Executive Law § 63(2) (general duties of New York Attorney General); County Law § 700 (duties and powers of District Attorney). Ensuring that the laws are faithfully executed surely requires that those laws are interpreted by the officers charged with enforcing or carrying them out. See, e.g., Rodrigue v. Perales, 86 N.Y.2d 361, 367 (1995) (“[a]n agency’s interpretation of the statutes it administers generally should be upheld if not unreasonable or irrational”); Goodwin v. Perales, 88 N.Y.2d 383, 392 (1996) (same); see also City Council of Watervliet v. Town Bd. of Colonie, 3 N.Y.3d 508, 518 (2004) (where an agency is charged with implementing a statute, its interpretation is entitled to judicial deference). With this in mind, it is unpersuasive to 18 suggest that application of the Glomar doctrine ought to be rejected because it is a new method. Furthermore, in the absence of contrary judicial interpretation, it must be that it is well within the prerogative of any agency within the executive branch to conclude that the reason certain exemptions were adopted by the Legislature was to insure integrity of investigations and witness safety. Thus, as an agency that is part of the executive branch,14 and absent contrary judicial interpretation, a District Attorney’s Office should be authorized to adopt what petitioners have characterized as a new method if, in the agency’s view, the rule serves to carry out the intent of the law the agency is being asked to implement. And, to the extent that petitioners’ complaint may be viewed as one contending that the Court is not the proper branch of government to recognize a Glomar-type response under FOIL, their argument may be discounted. It is surely the Court’s obligation to ensure that the protections authorized by the Legislature are actually carried out, minimizing the very risks against which the Legislature wants to protect. Indeed, FOIL is not a static law. Rather, it is continually evolving through judicial interpretation. Public Officers Law § 87 has been cited and/or interpreted in well over a thousand published decisions in New York State. And, despite petitioners’ evident wish to downplay the role of federal law in FOIL’S evolution, federal law has 14 See Holliman v. Goldman, 71 N.Y.2d 564, 573 (1988). 19 played an influential part in New York State courts’ interpretations of FOIL. For example, in Tuck-lt-Away Associates L.P. v.Umpire State Development Corp., 54 A.D.3d 154, 162-65 (1st Dept. 2008), the Appellate Division, First Department, relied on a decision from the United States Supreme Court interpreting FOIL’S federal equivalent to distinguish this Court’s holding in Xerox Corp. v. Town of Webster, 65 N.Y.2d 131 (1985), and to require additional disclosure. The sound reasoning of federal law cannot only be instructive when effectuating the Legislature’s goal of transparency; it must apply equally to the Legislature’s aim of protecting specified material from compelled disclosure. As such, the mere facts that the Glomar doctrine only recently finds itself under examination in this Court and that it first appeared in federal practice are insufficient to outweigh its necessity as agencies seek to effectuate the legislative intent to protect exempt information such as confidential sources, pending investigations, and non-routine investigative techniques. See Xerox Corp., 65 N.Y.2d at132 (grafting FOIL’S exemptions onto General Municipal Law § 51 in order to avoid nullifying the Legislature’s intent to exempt documents from disclosure). G. The Application Of The Glomar Doctrine Would Not Impact Criminal Defendants’ Rights To A Fair Trial. District Attorneys’ Offices are charged with conducting “all prosecutions for crimes and offenses” within their respective jurisdictions. County Law § 700(1). In fulfilling that purpose, prosecutors have a duty to ensure that justice is served through fair trials. See People v. Anderson, 29N.Y.3d 69, 76 (2017) (a prosecutorial 20 agency’s interest in a criminal proceeding is “that justice shall be done” rather than winning at any cost) (internal citation omitted). Critically, the application of the Glomar doctrine would not interfere with defendant’s right to a fair trial because criminal defendants are provided with discovery through Criminal Procedure Law Article 240, not FOIL. On the other hand, Glomar- type responses would protect a defendant’s fair-trial rights by averting prejudicial pre¬ arrest publicity that would flow from a District Attorney’s Office being forced to prematurely acknowledge the existence of an investigation in response to a FOIL request. Discovery rules for criminal proceedings are set forth in Article 240 of the Criminal Procedure Law. See People v. Copicotto, 50 N.Y.2d 222, 225 (1980) (“pretrial discovery by the defense and prosecution is governed by statute, CPL article 240”). That Article governs, interalia, discovery demands and motions by both defendants and prosecutors (C.P.L. §§ 240.20, 240.30, 240.90), protective orders (C.P.L. § 240.50), discovery about trial witnesses (C.P.L. § 240.45), die timing for demands and responsive disclosures (C.P.L. § 240.80), and sanctions for failure to comply with discovery obligations (C.P.L. § 240.70). In short, it is a comprehensive mechanism by which a defendant can obtain all appropriate records from the prosecution relating to his or her criminal case. In circumstances where the prosecution believes that disclosure of specific materials could cause “danger to the integrity of physical evidence or a substantial risk 21 of physical harm, intimidation, economic reprisal, bribery or unjustified annoyance or embarrassment to any person or an adverse effect upon the legitimate needs of law enforcement, including the protection of the confidentiality of informants,” the prosecutorial agency can move for a protective order “denying, limiting, conditioning, delaying or regulating discovery.” C.P.L. § 240.50(1). One acceptable type of protective order mandates that the provided information remains in the exclusive possession of the attorney and be used solely for the criminal action. See C.P.L. § 240.50(2). As such, the concerns necessitating the use of the Glomar doctrine for FOIL responses are inapplicable to criminal discovery and the doctrine could not be invoked to deprive a criminal defendant of the discovery to which he or she is entitled. FOIL is not a statutorily authorked method for criminal defendants to obtain discovery. Courts have refused to allow criminal defendants to circumvent the statutory discovery procedure with FOIL requests that have the potential to “interfere with the orderly process of disclosure in the criminal proceeding set forth in CPL article 240.” Pittari v. Pirrv, 258 A.D.2d 202, 206-07 (2d Dept. 1999); see also Lesher v. Hynes,19 N.Y.3d 57, 67 (2012) (during the pendency of a criminal case, the prosecution may name the “generic kinds of documents” and “generic risks” of disclosure because particular kinds of disclosure during criminal cases would generally interfere with the proceedings); Legal Aid Soc} v. N.Y. City Police Dep’t, 274 A.D.2d 207, 214 (1st Dept. 2000) (“FOIL disclosure during the course of the prosecution would not only ‘interfere with the orderly process of disclosure’ set forth in CPL article 240, it would also create a 22 substantial likelihood of delay in the adjudication of that proceeding, thereby effecting a chill on that prosecution”) (internal citations omitted). Premature FOIL requests from criminal defendants, if allowed, could also potentially create substantial delays in a criminal proceeding and improperly circumvent the criminal appeals process because the defendant-requestors would be entided to administrative FOIL appeals and C.P.L.R. Article 78 procedures. See Pittari, 258 A.D.2d at 206-07. Thus, while the Glomar doctrine would not impact a criminal defendant’s ability to obtain documents necessary to prepare for trial because he or she cannot use FOIL requests to obtain discovery, its use could benefit a defendant. If a third party sent a FOIL request to a District Attorney’s Office requesting documents relating to an investigation of an individual that had not yet resulted in an arrest, the District Attorney’s Office would be forced to acknowledge the existence of the investigation while likely denying access to those documents pursuant to Public Officers Law § 87(2)(e)(i). The acknowledgment that the investigation exists could result in prejudicial pre-arrest publicity that could jeopardize the defendant’s ability to have a fair trial. That potential harm could be avoided if, in the proper circumstances and with proper safeguards in place, the District Attorney’s Office were allowed to use a Glomar- type response. In addition, while the possibility that an innocent person has been convicted after trial is a dire result that DAASNY members actively seek to avoid, the application of the Glomar doctrine to FOIL requests for documents from completed prosecutions 23 would not deprive a defendant who has a colorable claim of actual innocence from obtaining documents necessary to pursue his or her claim. First, it is important to reiterate that the use of the Glomar doctrine would not deprive a requestor of any documents to which he or she would otherwise be entitled because invocation of a Glomar response must be tethered to an existing FOIL exemption. Rather, a Glomar response would simply allow the responding agency, in limited and appropriate circumstances, to avoid acknowledging the existence of exempt documents. Second, several mechanisms are in place that ensure that the invocation of the Glomar doctrine would not deprive an innocent defendant of access to documents related to the claimed innocence. The Legislature has addressed the discovery that convicted defendants, who are no longer presumed to be innocent and to whom the presumption of guilt applies, may seek in the context of an actual-innocence claim. Criminal Procedure Law § 440.30(1)(b) allows a court to order reasonable discovery of property, as defined by C.P.L. § 240.10(3), to defendants who were convicted after trial, who have come forward with credible claims of actual innocence, and who have been granted an evidentiary hearing in regard to a C.P.L. § 440.10 motion to vacate judgment. Third, DAASNY members take the possibility of wrongful convictions seriously and have implemented measures that should alleviate concerns that the use of a Glomar-type response could thwart an attempt to vacate a wrongful conviction. For instance, various DAASNY members have conviction integrity or conviction review 24 units tasked with reviewing convictions.15 Furthermore, DAASNY has created a best- practices committee to, in part, respond to wrongful-conviction issues and to ensure all prosecutors in the State are advised about ethical duties and disclosure obligations. See Daniel Kroepsch, Prosecutorial Best Practices Committees and Conviction Integrity Units: How Internal Programs Are Fulfilling The Prosecutor’s Duty To Serve Justice, 29 Geo.J. Legal Ethics 1095, 1106-09 (Fall 2016). As such, multiple safeguards exist that would ensure that the use of a Glomar-type response would not prevent an innocent defendant from challenging a wrongful conviction. In sum, this Court should uphold die First Department’s recognition diat a Glomar-type response is applicable to New York’s Freedom of Information Law. The application of the Glomar doctrine to New York’s public-records access law effectuates the legislative intent of exempting certain information from public disclosure. In ls See, eg, New York State Office of the Attorney General’s Conviction Review Board Page, https://ag.ny.gov/bureau/conviction-review-bureau )(last visited on October 3, 2017) (“statewide initiative to address issues related to wrongful convictions”); Brooklyn District Attorney’s Office Conviction Review Unit Page, http:// www.brooklynda.org/conviction-review-unit/ (last visited October 3, 2017) (unit is “tasked with looking into old, questionable convictions”); Bronx County District Attorney’s Office Bureaus and Units Page, http://bronxda. nyc.gov/html/units/units.shtml (last visited October 3, 2017) (Conviction Integrity Unit “reviews post-judgment claims of actual innocence and wrongful conviction in our most serious cases”); Nassau County District Attorney’s Office, 2016 Annual Report, page 32 (2016), https://www.nassaucountyny.gov/DocumentCenter/View/17952 (last visited October 3, 2017) (“Conviction Integrity Unit reviews and thoroughly investigates post-conviction claims of innocence. The Unit also keeps apprised of developments in forensic science, which could affect the use, import, or interpretation of evidence in past cases.”); New York County District Attorney’s Office Conviction Integrity Program, http://manhattanda.org/preventing-wrongful-convictions (last visited on October 3, 2017) (“The Program is comprehensive in scope, and is unique in purpose: not only does it address claims of actual innocence, it also seeks to prevent wrongful convictions from occurring.”). 25 reaching such a determination, the Court would join the uniform recognition by federal and state appellate courts that a Glomar-type response is applicable to requests made for documents pursuant to open-records laws, even in the absence of specific statutory authorization for such a reply. For these reasons, and for all the reasons detailed in respondent’s brief, DAASNY, as amicus curiae, urges this Court to affirm the order of the Appellate Division. 26 CONCLUSION In Light Of The Foregoing. Amicus Respectfully Urges This Court To Affirm The Order Of The Appellate Division. First Department. Dated: Mineola, New York October 6, 2017 Respectfullysubmitted, SGOTT D. McNAMARA District Attorney, Oneida County President, DistrictAttorneys Association Of the State of New York do Nassau County District Attorney 262 Old CountryRoad Mineola, New York 11501 Telephone: (516) 571-3732; Fax: (516) 571-3806 Email: AndreaDiGregorio@nassauda.org /5/By: Andrea M. DiGregorio Assistant District Attorney Nassau County 27 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH 22 NYCRR § 670.10.3(f) ANDREA M. DiGREGORIO does hereby certify as follows: This brief was prepared by computer; the body of the brief is double-spaced and utilizes a proportionatelyspaced typeface (Garamond) of 14-point size; the footnotes are single¬ spaced and utilize the same typeface and 12-point size; and, according to the word count of the word processing system used (Microsoft Word 2016), the brief contains 6,549 words, exclusive of the cover, table of contents, table of authorities, certificate of compliance, and proof of service. Dated: Mineola, New York October 6, 2017 /5/ ANDREA M. DiGREGORIO Assistant District Attorney