Source: http://takefromcaesar.us/TFC_FILES/files/tutorial.htm
Timestamp: 2018-12-19 07:06:24
Document Index: 565889623

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 83', '§ 83', '§ 853', '§ 853', '§ 83', '§ 83', '§ 83', '§ 83']

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Only Code Breaker; The § 83 Equation by David R. Myrland has all of this.
Tax Code § 83 applies to any and all compensation for personal services actually performed:
Robinson v. C.I.R., 82 USTC 444, 459 (1984); "The legislative history of section 83 does not require the conclusion that the statute should be applied to tax-avoidance techniques only. To the contrary, the House and Senate reports specifically delineate transactions and transfers to which section 83 was not to apply and do not exclude from its purview contractual provisions that were not tax motivated."
Labor is the most sacred property and inviolable right of man. (See Butcher's Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746; Slaughterhouse case, 16 Wall. 36-130)).
" . . .The 'willing buyer' is the fully informed person who agrees to buy . . . at the redemption price. . . .It is a market made up of informed buyers and informed sellers, all dealing at arm's length."
"Fair market value is that "price which would probably agreed upon by a seller willing, but under no compulsion, to sell, and a buyer willing, but under no compulsion, to buy, where both have reasonable knowledge of the facts." (See Pledger v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 641 F.2d 287, 295 (CA5 1981), quoting Newberry, 39 BTA 1123 (1939).
Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Edition, "Arm's length transaction." Said of a transaction negotiated between unrelated parties, each acting in his or her own self interest; the basis for a fair market value determination. A transaction in good faith in the ordinary course of business by parties with independent interests... The standard under which unrelated parties, each acting in his or her own best interest, would carry out a particular transaction.
As used in statute and regulation, the terms "any" or "any property" are to be construed as all inclusive until express statutory exceptions can be cited to support a contention that such terms are not all inclusive. (See U.S. v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 607-611 and (syllabus) (1989); United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350, 357 (1994); U.S. v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 4-6 (1997); Department of Housing and Urban Renewal v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 130-31 (2002) citing Gonzalez and Monsanto).
"Section 853's language is plain and unambiguous. Congress could not have chosen stronger words to express its intent that forfeiture be mandatory than § 853(a)'s language that upon conviction a person "shall forfeit . . . any property" and that the sentencing court "shall order" a forfeiture. Likewise, the statute provides a broad definition of property which does not even hint at the idea that assets used for attorney's fees are not included. Every Court of Appeals that has finally passed on this argument has agreed with this view. Neither the Act's legislative history nor legislators' post-enactment statements support respondent's argument that an exception should be created because the statute does not expressly include property to be used for attorney's fees, or because Congress simply did not consider the prospect that forfeiture [491 U.S. 601] would reach such property. . . . Moreover, respondent's admonition that courts should construe statutes to avoid decision as to their constitutionality is not license for the judiciary to rewrite statutory language. Pp. 606-611."
"As we have noted before, such post-enactment views "form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent" behind a statute, United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960); instead, Congress' intent is "best determined by [looking to] the statutory language that it chooses," Sedima, S.P.R.L., supra, at 495, n.13. . . . Finally, respondent urges us, see Brief for Respondent 2029, to invoke a variety of general canons of statutory construction, as well as several prudential doctrines of this Court, to create the statutory exemption he advances; among these doctrines is our admonition that courts should construe statutes to avoid decision as to their constitutionality. See, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988); NLRB. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 500 (1979). We respect these canons, and they are quite often useful in close cases, or when statutory language is ambiguous. But we have observed before that such "interpretative canon[s are] not a license for the judiciary to rewrite language enacted by the legislature." United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 680 (1985). Here, the language is clear and the statute comprehensive: § 853 does not exempt assets to be used for attorney's fees from its forfeiture provisions.
§ 83 Property Transferred in Connection with the Performance of Services. If, in connection with the performance of services property is transferred, . . . the excess of . . . the fair market value of such property . . . over . . . the amount (if any) paid for such property, . . . shall be included in the gross income of the person who performed such services . . .
I can't get the government to place onto the record its own interpretation of § 83(a), no matter how antagonistic and confrontational I can get away with being in pleadings in federal tax cases. If you have an interpretation of § 83(a) that differs from my conclusion that it treats all property, including labor or personal services, as a cost, you're a better tax lawyer than all such attorneys at the IRS and the DOJ, and all IRS employees who are "unfamiliar with § 83."
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