Source: http://www.leagle.com/xmlResult.aspx?xmldoc=20071368474FSupp2d894_11278.xml
Timestamp: 2013-05-21 17:10:46
Document Index: 513034039

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 301', '§ 185', '§ 175', '§ 323', '§ 324', '§ 301', '§ 324']

STRINGER v. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE - February 1, 2007.
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474 F.Supp.2d 894 (2007)
Kelci STRINGER, Plaintiff,
NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE, et al., Defendants.
No. 2:03 CV 665.
Louise Malbin Roselle, Paul M. De Marco, Renee Arm Infante, Stanley Morris Chesley, Waite, Schneider, Bayless & Chesley Co., L.P.A., Cincinnati, OH, for Plaintiff.
Benjamin C. Block, Gregg H. Levy, Covington & Burling, Washington, DC, Sarah Daggett Morrison, Chester Willcox & Saxbe, Columbus, OH, Robert C. Tucker, Tucker Ellis & West LLP, Cleveland, OH, for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDERHOLSCHUH, District Judge.Plaintiff Kelci Stringer, on behalf of herself and the estate of Korey Stringer, and on behalf of a class of similarly-situated persons, brought this wrongful death/survivorship action and class action complaint for injunctive relief against the National Football League ("NFL"), NFL Properties LLC ("NFL Properties"), and John Lombardo, M.D. (hereinafter collectively "NFL Defendants"), and against Riddell, Inc., also doing business as Riddell Sports Group, Inc., Riddell/All American, and All American Sports Corporation (hereinafter collectively "Riddell Defendants").This matter is before the Court on the NFL Defendants' motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, motion for summary judgment (Record at 7), and on the Riddell Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings (Record at 20). Defendants all contend that Plaintiff's claims are preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). On December 12, 2005, the Court heard oral arguments on the NFL Defendants' motion. The parties then conducted limited discovery and submitted supplemental briefs.I. Procedural History and Nature of ClaimsKorey Stringer was a 27-year-old Pro Bowl offensive lineman for the Minnesota Vikings ("Vikings"). (Compl. at ¶ 1). In July 2001, Stringer participated in the Vikings' summer training camp in Mankato, Minnesota. On July 30, 2001, he suffered heat exhaustion during practice. The next day, during a morning practice, Korey Stringer developed heatstroke. He died from complications of heatstroke at 1:50 a.m. on August 1, 2001. (Id. at ¶ 11).Kelci Stringer, Korey Stringer's widow and the personal representative of his estate, filed a five-count complaint. Plaintiff generally alleges that Korey Stringer was forced to participate in practices conducted in extreme heat and humidity while wearing unsafe, heat-retaining, league-mandated equipment and without proper acclimatization, supervision, or medical care. (Id. at ¶ 2). <<Prev 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Next>> Footnotes1. The court must look "to the essence of the plaintiff's claim, in order to determine whether the plaintiff is attempting to disguise what is essentially a contract claim as a tort." De-Coe v. General Motors Corp.,32 F.3d 212, 216 (6th Cir.1994).Back to Reference2. A copy of the CBA has been attached as Exhibit A to the Declaration of Dennis L. Curran, which is attached to the NFL Defendants' motion to dismiss.Back to Reference3. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."Back to Reference4. As a federal court whose jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship, this Court must apply the choice-of-law rules of the state in which it sits. In Ohayon v. Safeco Insurance Co.,91 Ohio St.3d 474, 476, 747 N.E.2d 206, 208 (2001), the Ohio Supreme Court held that "different choice-of-law rules apply depending on whether the cause of action sounds in contract or in tort." In tort actions, Ohio has adopted the approach set forth in Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. See Muncie Power Prod., Inc. v. United Tech. Auto., Inc.,328 F.3d 870, 873-74 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Morgan v. Biro Mfg. Co.,15 Ohio St.3d 339, 342, 474 N.E.2d 286 (1984)). In wrongful death actions, § 175 of the Restatement creates a presumption in favor of the law of the place where the injury occurred, in this case, Minnesota. This presumption can be overcome by a showing that another state has a more significant relationship to the action. Id.Citing Mecanique CNC, Inc. v. Durr Environmental, Inc.,304 F.Supp.2d 971, 975 (S.D.Ohio 2004), Plaintiff argues that the Court must apply Ohio law because the NFL Defendants have failed to establish that there is any true conflict between the laws of Ohio, Minnesota, and New York. But Mecanique was a contract case. Ohio's choice-of-law rules governing tort actions require this Court to apply Minnesota law, the law of the place where the injury occurred, absent proof that another state has a more significant relationship to the action.Back to Reference5. These Restatement sections have been adopted by Minnesota courts. See Isler v. Burman, 305 Minn. 288, 232 N.W.2d 818, 822 (1975) (adopting § 323); Erickson v. Curtis Investment Co.,447 N.W.2d 165, 170 (Minn. 1989) and Laska v. Anoka County,696 N.W.2d 133, 139 (Minn. Ct.App 2005) (adopting § 324A).Back to Reference6. The NFL argues that the Game Operations Manual containing the guidelines is "of no significance" because, as its name suggests, it regulates only the conduct of NFL games, and does not regulate conduct of preseason training camps which are overseen by the individual clubs. (Davey Decl. ¶¶ 3-4; Ex. to Defs.' Supp. Mem.). This argument, however, is contradicted by the deposition testimony of former NFL Commissioner Paul Tagliabue, taken in the related case, Stringer v. Minnesota Vikings Football Club, and filed in the Minnesota state courts. Tagliabue testified as follows:
Q. Is heat during training camp one of the subjects that the NFL is empowered to create rules for?A. I think that the climatic conditions for playing the game and practicing are generally within the area that we have some responsibility and the authority for, yes.Q. Prior to the death of Korey Stringer, did you enact rules or did the NFL enact rules governing how teams needed to handle heat during training camp?A. I think we had some guidelines or policies on the matter, yes.Q. Do you know where those were contained?A. In our administrative operations materials.(Tagliabue Dep. at 95-96, Ex. 4 to Pl.'s Mot. for Class Certification)(emphasis added).Back to Reference7. In its supplemental memorandum, the NFL urges the Court to find that Plaintiff's claim arises out of the CBA because the duty that was allegedly voluntarily assumed by the NFL, i.e., the duty to protect players from the risk of heat-related illness, is part of this larger duty imposed by the CBA on the individual clubs, i.e., the duty to provide medical care to NFL players. The Court notes, however, that the Hot Weather Guidelines were first published in 1991. At that time, there was no CBA in effect. An earlier agreement had expired in 1987. See Tice v. Pro Football, Inc.,812 F.Supp. 255, 256 n. 2 (D.D.C.1993); Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.,782 F.Supp. 125, 129 (D.D.C.1991). The CBA in effect at the time of Stringer's death was not executed until May 6, 1993. (CBA, Introduction and Preamble). More importantly, as discussed at the end of this subsection; the relevant inquiry, for purposes of this prong of the test, is how the duty allegedly owed came into being. In this case, the duty allegedly owed arose solely because the NFL voluntarily undertook the task of issuing Hot Weather Guidelines; it does not have its source in the CBA.Back to Reference8. For example, the NFL is required to: bargain in good faith with the NFLPA over material changes in the NFL Constitution and Bylaws that affect terms and conditions of player employment; use its best efforts to secure orientation time for NFLPA representatives; impose a fine on any club that violates certain commitments; notify NFLPA of any proposed rule changes; allow arbitration of NFL rule changes that may "adversely affect player safety;" and share arbitration costs. In addition, the NFL and its affiliates are prohibited from acquiring Group Player Licensing rights, and must allow players to share in the revenues of NFL Properties. (Defs.' Reply at 5-6) (citing various CBA provisions).Back to Reference9. Another case cited by the NFL, Michigan Mutual Insurance Co. v. United Steelworkers of America,774 F.2d 104 (6th Cir.1985), is distinguishable for the same reasons. Defendants also cite to Sherwin v. Indianapolis Colts,752 F.Supp. 1172 (N.D.N.Y.1990), and Smith v. Houston Oilers, Inc.,87 F.3d 717 (5th Cir.1996), cases in which the courts found that tort claims brought by NFL players were preempted by § 301. These cases, however, are also factually distinguishable because they were brought directly against the NFL clubs who were bound by the CBA. Moreover, the rights asserted, and duties allegedly breached, were expressly created by the terms of the CBA.Back to Reference10. To the extent that Plaintiff also relies on § 324A(b) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the parties disagree about whether Plaintiff must prove that the NFL "completely supplanted" duties owed by the Vikings to Stringer. Since the Court has already found that Plaintiff's wrongful death claim is preempted because the question of the degree of care owed by the NFL is inextricably intertwined with certain provisions of the CBA, the Court need not resolve this particular dispute.Back to Reference11. Nothing in this opinion should be construed as indicative of the Court's views concerning the ultimate merits of these claims.Back to Reference