Source: https://openjurist.org/471/us/808/city-of-oklahoma-city-v-tuttle
Timestamp: 2018-10-22 15:22:12
Document Index: 85450290

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1', '§ 114', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', 'arty27', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 17', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 39', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 41', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1983']

471 US 808 City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle | OpenJurist
471 U.S. 808 - City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle
471 US 808 City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle
105 S.Ct. 2427
85 L.Ed.2d 791
CITY OF OKLAHOMA CITY, Petitioner
Rose Marie TUTTLE etc.
Rehearing Denied Aug. 14, 1985.
See 473 U.S. 925, 106 S.Ct. 16.
An officer on petitioner city's police force shot and killed respondent's husband outside a bar in which a robbery had been reported in progress. Respondent brought suit in Federal District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the officer and petitioner, alleging that their actions had deprived her husband of certain constitutional rights. With respect to the liability of petitioner city, the trial judge informed the jury that petitioner could be held liable only if a municipal "policy" had caused the deprivation, and further instructed the jury that it could "infer," from "a single, unusually excessive use of force . . . that it was attributable to inadequate training or supervision amounting to 'deliberate indifference' or 'gross negligence' on the part of the officials in charge." The jury returned a verdict in favor of the officer but against petitioner, and awarded respondent damages. Rejecting petitioner's claim that the jury instruction was improper, the Court of Appeals held that proof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity by a police officer could suffice to establish municipal liability.
728 F.2d 456 (CA 10 1984), reversed.
Justice REHNQUIST, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, Justice WHITE, and Justice O'CONNOR, delivered an opinion with respect to Part III, concluding that the instruction at issue improperly instructed the jury concerning the standard for imposing liability on municipalities under § 1983. The inference in the instruction was unwarranted in its assumption that the act at issue arose from inadequate training and in its further assumption concerning the state of mind of the municipal policymakers. More importantly, the inference allowed a § 1983 plaintiff to establish municipal liability without submitting proof of a single action taken by a municipal policymaker. The requirement of Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611, that municipal liability under § 1983 can only be imposed for injuries inflicted pursuant to Government "policy or custom," makes it clear that, at the least, that requirement was intended to prevent the imposition of municipal liability under circumstances where no wrong could be ascribed to municipal decisionmakers. The fact that in this case respondent introduced independent evidence of inadequate training makes no difference, because the instruction allowed the jury to impose liability even if it did not believe respondent's expert witness' testimony that the police officer's training was inadequate. There must at the very least be an affirmative link between the municipality's policy and the particular constitutional violation alleged. Here, the jury instruction allowed the jury to infer a thoroughly nebulous "policy" of "inadequate training" on petitioner's part from the single incident in question, and at the same time sanctioned the inference that the "policy" was the cause of the incident. Pp. 816-824.
Burck Bailey, Oklahoma City, Okl., for petitioner.
Carl Hughes, Oklahoma City, Okl., for respondent.
In Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), this Court held that municipalities are "persons" subject to damages liability under § 1 of the Ku Klux Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for violations of that Act visited by municipal officials. The Court noted, however, that municipal liability could not be premised on the mere fact that the municipality employed the offending official. Instead, we held that municipal liability could only be imposed for injuries inflicted pursuant to government "policy or custom." Id., at 694, 98 S.Ct., at 2037. We noted at that time that we had "no occasion to address . . . the full contours of municipal immunity under § 1983 . . .," id., at 695, 98 S.Ct., at 2038, and expressly left such development "to another day." Today we take a small but necessary step toward defining those contours.
* On October 4, 1980, Officer Julian Rotramel, a member of the Oklahoma City police force, shot and killed Albert Tuttle outside the We'll Do Club, a bar in Oklahoma City. Officer Rotramel, who had been on the force for 10 months, had responded to an all-points bulletin indicating that there was a robbery in progress at the Club. The bulletin, in turn, was the product of an anonymous telephone call. The caller had reported the robbery in progress, and had described the robber and reported that the robber had a gun. The parties stipulated at trial that Tuttle had placed the call.
"Absent more evidence of supervisory indifference, such as acquiescence in a prior matter of conduct, official policy such as to impose liability . . . under the federal Civil Rights Act cannot ordinarily be inferred from a single incident of illegality such as a first excessive use of force to stop a suspect; but a single, unusually excessive use of force may be sufficiently out of the ordinary to warrant an inference that it was attributable to inadequate training or supervision amounting to 'deliberate indifference' or 'gross negligence' on the part of the officials in charge. The city cannot be held liable for simple negligence. Furthermore, the plaintiff must show a causal link between the police misconduct and the adoption of a policy or plan by the defendant municipality." Id., at 42-44 (Emphasis supplied.)
Viewing the instructions "as a whole," that court first determined that the trial court properly had instructed the jury that proof of "gross negligence" was required to hold the city liable for inadequate training. The court then addressed petitioner's contention that the trial court nevertheless had erred in instructing the jury that petitioner could be held liable based on proof of a single unconstitutional act. It distinguished cases indicating that proof of more than a single incident is required, and decided that where, as here, the act "was so plainly and grossly negligent that it spoke out very positively on the issue of lack of training . . .," the "single incident rule is not to be considered as an absolute. . . ." Id., at 461. The instruction at issue was therefore "proper." Id., at 459. The court also referred to "independent evidence" of inadequate training, and concluded that the "action, coupled with the clearly inadequate training," was sufficient to justify municipal liability. Id., at 461. We granted certiorari because the Court of Appeals' holding that proof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity by a police officer could suffice to establish municipal liability seemed to conflict with the decisions of other Courts of Appeals. 469 U.S. 814, 105 S.Ct. 79, 83 L.Ed.2d 27 (1984). See, e.g., Languirand v. Hayden, 717 F.2d 220, 228-230 (CA5 1983); Wellington v. Daniels, 717 F.2d 932, 936-937 (CA4 1983). But cf. Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1246-1247 (CA2 1979).2 We reverse.
We do not mean to give short shrift to the provisions of Rule 51. Indeed, respondent's argument might have prevailed had it been made to the Court of Appeals.3 But we do not think that judicial economy is served by invoking the Rule at this point, after we have granted certiorari and the case has received plenary consideration on the merits. Our decision to grant certiorari represents a commitment of scarce judicial resources with a view to deciding the merits of one or more of the questions presented in the petition. Nonjurisdictional defects of this sort should be brought to our attention no later than in respondent's brief in opposition to the petition for certiorari; if not, we consider it within our discretion to deem the defect waived. Here we granted certiorari to review an issue squarely presented to and decided by the Court of Appeals, and we will proceed to decide it. Cf. On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 749-750, n. 3, 72 S.Ct. 967, 969-970, n. 3, 96 L.Ed. 1270 (1952).
Respondent's lawsuit is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Although this Court has decided a host of cases under this statute in recent years, it can never hurt to embark on statutory construction with the Act's precise language in mind. The statute states:
By its terms, of course, the statute creates no substantive rights; it merely provides remedies for deprivations of rights established elsewhere. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140, 144, n. 3, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 2692, 2694, n. 3, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979). Here respondent's claim is that her husband was deprived of his life "without due process of law," in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, or that he was deprived of his right to be free from the use of "excessive force in his apprehension"—presumably a right secured by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.4 Having established a deprivation of a constitutional right, however, respondent still must establish that the city was the "person" who "cause[d] [Tuttle] to be subjected" to the deprivation. Monell teaches that the city may only be held accountable if the deprivation was the result of municipal "custom or policy."
In Monell, the plaintiffs challenged the defendant's policy of compelling pregnant employees to take unpaid sick leave before such leave was necessary for medical reasons, on the ground that the policy violated the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Since the defendant was a municipal entity, this Court first addressed whether such an entity was a suable "person" as that term is used in § 1983. The Court's analysis focused on § 1983's legislative history, and in particular on the debate surrounding the proposed "Sherman amendment" to the 1871 Ku Klux Klan Act, from which § 1983 is derived. The Sherman amendment would have held municipalities responsible for damage to person or property caused by private persons "riotously and tumultuously assembled." Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 749 (1871). Congress' refusal to adopt this amendment, and the reasons given, were the basis for this Court's holding in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187-192, 81 S.Ct. 473, 484-486, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), that municipalities were not suable "persons" under § 1983; a more extensive analysis of the Act's legislative history led this Court in Monell to overrule that part of Monroe. The principal objections to the Sherman amendment voiced in the 42d Congress were that the section appeared to impose a federal obligation to keep the peace—a requirement the Congressmen thought was of doubtful constitutionality, but which in any event seemed to place the municipalities in the position of insurers for harms suffered within their borders. The Monell Court found that these concerns, although fatal to the Sherman amendment, were nevertheless consistent with holding a municipality liable "for its own violations of the Fourteenth Amendment." Monell, 436 U.S., at 683, 98 S.Ct., at 2032 (emphasis supplied).
The Monell Court went on to hold that the sick-leave policy at issue was "unquestionably" "the moving force of the constitutional violation found by the District Court," and that it therefore had "no occasion to address . . . what the full contours of municipal liability may be." Id., at 694-695, 98 S.Ct., at 2037. Subsequent decisions of this Court have added little to the Monell Court's formulation, beyond reaffirming that the municipal policy must be "the moving force of the constitutional violation." Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326, 102 S.Ct. 445, 454, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981). Cases construing Monell in the Courts of Appeals, however, have served to highlight the full range of questions, and subtle factual distinctions, that arise in administering the "policy" or "custom" standard. See, e.g., Bennett v. City of Slidell, 728 F.2d 762 (CA5 1984); Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 737 F.2d 894 (CA11 1984), reheard en banc, January 1985; Languirand, 717 F.2d, at 220.
The District Court apparently accepted this theory of liability, though it charged the jury that the city's "policy makers" could not merely have been "negligent" in establishing training policies, but that they must have been guilty of "gross negligence" or "deliberate indifference" to the "police misconduct" that they could thus engender.
Respondent then proceeds to argue that the question presented by petitioner—whether a single isolated incident of the use of excessive force by a police officer establishes an official custom or policy of a municipality—is in truth not presented by this record because there was more evidence of an official "policy" of "inadequate training" than might be inferred from the incident giving rise to Tuttle's death. But unfortunately for respondent, the instruction given by the District Court allowed the jury to impose liability on the basis of such a single incident without the benefit of the additional evidence. The trial court stated that the jury could "infer," from "a single, unusually excessive use of force . . . that it was attributable to inadequate training or supervision amounting to 'deliberate indiffernce' or 'gross negligence' on the part of the officials in charge." App. 44.
We think this inference unwarranted; first, in its assumption that the act at issue arose from inadequate training, and second, in its further assumption concerning the state of mind of the municipal policymakers. But more importantly, the inference allows a § 1983 plaintiff to establish municipal liability without submitting proof of a single action taken by a municipal policymaker. The foregoing discussion of the origins of Monell § "policy or custom" requirement should make clear that, at the least, that requirement was intended to prevent the imposition of municipal liability under circumstances where no wrong could be ascribed to municipal decisionmakers. Presumably, here the jury could draw the stated inference even in the face of uncontradicted evidence that the municipality scrutinized each police applicant and met the highest training standards imaginable. To impose liability under those circumstances would be to impose it simply because the municipality hired one "bad apple."
The fact that in this case respondent introduced independent evidence of inadequate training makes no difference, because the instruction allowed the jury to impose liability even if it did not believe respondent's expert at all. Nor can we read this charge "as a whole" to avoid the difficulty. There is nothing elsewhere in this charge that would detract from the jury's perception that it could impose liability based solely on this single incident. Indeed, that was the intent of the charge, and that is what the Court of Appeals held in upholding it. The Court of Appeals' references to "independent evidence" in portions of its opinion are thus irrelevant; the general verdict yields no opportunity for determining whether liability was premised on the independent evidence, or solely on the inference sanctioned by the instruction. Cf. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 367-368, 51 S.Ct. 532, 535, 75 L.Ed. 1117 (1931).
Respondent contends that Monell suggests the contrary result, because it "expressly provided that an official 'decision' would suffice to establish liability, although a single decision will often have only a single victim." App. 14. But this very contention illustrates the wide difference between the municipal "policy" at issue in Monell and the "policy" alleged here. The "policy" of the New York City Department of Social Services that was challenged in Monell was a policy that by its terms compelled pregnant employees to take mandatory leaves of absence before such leaves were required for medical reasons; this policy in and of itself violated the constitutional rights of pregnant employees by reason of our decision in Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 94 S.Ct. 791, 39 L.Ed.2d 52 (1974). Obviously, it requires only one application of a policy such as this to satisfy fully Monell § requirement that a municipal corporation be held liable only for constitutional violations resulting from the municipality's official policy.
Here, however, the "policy" that respondent seeks to rely upon is far more nebulous, and a good deal further removed from the constitutional violation, than was the policy in Monell. To establish the constitutional violation in Monell no evidence was needed other than a statement of the policy by the municipal corporation, and its exercise; but the type of "policy" upon which respondent relies, and its causal relation to the alleged constitutional violation, are not susceptible to such easy proof. In the first place, the word "policy" generally implies a course of action consciously chosen from among various alternatives;6 it is therefore difficult in one sense even to accept the submission that someone pursues a "policy" of "inadequate training," unless evidence be adduced which proves that the inadequacies resulted from conscious choice—that is, proof that the policymakers deliberately chose a training program which would prove inadequate. And in the second place, some limitation must be placed on establishing municipal liability through policies that are not themselves unconstitutional, or the test set out in Monell will become a dead letter. Obviously, if one retreats far enough from a constitutional violation some municipal "policy" can be identified behind almost any such harm inflicted by a municipal official; for example, Rotramel would never have killed Tuttle if Oklahoma City did not have a "policy" of establishing a police force. But Monell must be taken to require proof of a city policy different in kind from this latter example before a claim can be sent to a jury on the theory that a particular violation was "caused" by the municipal "policy." At the very least there must be an affirmative link between the policy and the particular constitutional violation alleged.
Here the instructions allowed the jury to infer a thoroughly nebulous "policy" of "inadequate training" on the part of the municipal corporation from the single incident described earlier in this opinion, and at the same time sanctioned the inference that the "policy" was the cause of the incident. Such an approach provides a means for circumventing Monell § limitations altogether. Proof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to impose liability under Monell, unless proof of the incident includes proof that it was caused by an existing, unconstitutional municipal policy, which policy can be attributed to a municipal policymaker. Otherwise the existence of the unconstitutional policy, and its origin, must be separately proved. But where the policy relied upon is not itself unconstitutional, considerably more proof than the single incident will be necessary in every case to establish both the requisite fault on the part of the municipality,7 and the causal connection between the "policy" and the constitutional deprivation.8 Under the charge upheld by the Court of Appeals the jury could properly have imposed liability on the city based solely upon proof that it employed a non-policymaking officer who violated the Constitution. The decision of the Court of Appeals is accordingly
I agree that the "single incident" instruction, ante, at ---, is properly before us and therefore join Part II of Justice REHNQUIST's opinion. Although I concur in the judgment reached by the Court today, I am unable to join the balance of the plurality opinion.
Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), held that municipalities, like other state actors, are subject to liability under § 1983 when their policies "subjec[t], or caus[e] to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 1983. I agree with the plurality that today we must take a "small but necessary step," ante, at ----, toward defining the full contours of municipal liability pursuant to § 1983.1 However, because I believe that the plurality opinion needlessly complicates this task and in the process unsettles more than it clarifies, I write separately to suggest a simpler explanation of our result.
* Given the result in this case, in which a jury verdict in favor of the respondent is overturned, it is useful to keep in mind respondent's theory of the case. Respondent introduced two types of evidence at trial. First, respondent elicited testimony concerning the circumstances surrounding Tuttle's killing. This included Rotramel's admission that he never saw a weapon in Tuttle's possession, App. 150, 158, 225, and evidence that there was no reasonable ground to believe that Tuttle had committed a felony. Id., at 155.2 It also included evidence that Rotramel made no effort to employ alternative measures to apprehend Tuttle, id., at 225-226. Second, respondent introduced substantial direct evidence concerning what she alleged to be the city's grossly inadequate policies of training and supervising police officers. An expert testified that Rotramel's training included only 24 minutes of instruction in how to answer calls concerning a robbery in progress, although "these are statistically one of the most dangerous calls that an officer has to handle." Id., at 288. In addition, there was evidence that Rotramel had little or no training in when or how to enter a "blind" building with an armed robbery in progress and whether to wait for a backup unit to arrive. Id., at 146-147. Finally, Rotramel himself seemed to believe that he had been inadequately trained. Id., at 153, 159, 165.
The trial court permitted respondent to submit both theories to the jury. The jury was instructed that "a single, unusually excessive use of force may be sufficiently out of the ordinary to warrant an inference that it was attributable to inadequate training or supervision amounting to 'deliberate indifference' or 'gross negligence' on the part of the officials in charge." Id., at 44. The court had previously instructed that "deliberate indifference" or "gross negligence" on the part of the city was sufficient to prove the existence of a city policy. Id., at 43. Putting these instructions together, the jury could infer solely from evidence concerning the conduct of a single policeman on a single night that the city was liable under § 1983. As for the second theory, the jury was instructed that the city could be held liable "only if an official policy which results in constitutional deprivations can be inferred from acts or omissions of supervisory city officials and if that policy was a proximate cause of the denial of the civil rights of the decedent." Ibid.
The question presented in the petition for certiorari is "[w]hether a single isolated incident of the use of excessive force by a police officer establishes an official policy or practice of a municipality sufficient to render the municipality liable for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983." The thrust of petitioner's argument is that it was improper to instruct the jury that it could impose liability on petitioner based solely on evidence regarding Rotramel's actions on the night of Tuttle's killing.
Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), held that "Congress did intend municipalities and other local government units to be included among those persons to whom § 1983 applies." Id., at 690, 98 S.Ct., at 2035 (emphasis in original). Nonetheless, we recognized certain limits on the theories of liability that could be asserted against a municipality. As the plurality correctly notes, ante, at ----, our reading in Monell of the legislative history of § 1983, including its rejection of the Sherman amendment, see 436 U.S., at 664-704, 98 S.Ct., at 2022-2042, led us to conclude that Congress desired not to subject municipalities to liability "without regard to whether a local government was in any way at fault for the breach of the peace for which it was to be held for damages." Id., at 681, n. 40, 98 S.Ct., at 2031, n. 40. We therefore concluded that a city could not be held liable under a vicarious liability or respondeat superior theory in a § 1983 suit, for such liability would violate the evident congressional intent to preclude municipal liability in cases in which the city itself was not at fault.
Because Congress intended that § 1983 be broadly available to compensate individuals for violations of constitutional rights, see Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650-653, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 1415-1416, 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980); Monell, supra, at 683-687, 98 S.Ct., at 2032-2034, a municipality could be held liable where a plaintiff could show that it was the city itself that was at fault for the damage suffered. To make this showing, a plaintiff must prove, in the broad causal language of the statute, that a policy or custom of the city "subjected" him, or "caused him to be subjected" to the deprivation of constitutional rights. In a case in which the plaintiff carries this burden, the city's liability would be mandated by the language, the legislative history, and the underlying purposes of § 1983.
"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . ., subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law. . . ."
A jury finding of liability based on this theory would unduly threaten petitioner's immunity from respondeat superior liability. A single police officer may grossly, outrageously, and recklessly misbehave in the course of a single incident. Such misbehavior may in a given case be fairly attributable to various municipal policies or customs, either those that authorized the police officer so to act or those that did not authorize but nonetheless were the "moving force," Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326, 102 S.Ct. 445, 454, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981), or cause of the violation. In such a case, the city would be at fault for the constitutional violation. Yet it is equally likely that the misbehavior was attributable to numerous other factors for which the city may not be responsible; the police officer's own unbalanced mental state is the most obvious example. Cf. Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 466, 105 S.Ct. 873, ----, 83 L.Ed.2d 878 (1985). In such a case, the city itself may well not bear any part of the fault for the incident; there may have been nothing that the city could have done to avoid it. Thus, without some evidence of municipal policy or custom independent of the police officer's misconduct, there is no way of knowing whether the city is at fault. To infer the existence of a city policy from the isolated misconduct of a single, low-level officer, and then to hold the city liable on the basis of that policy, would amount to permitting precisely the theory of strict respondeat superior liability rejected in Monell.6
Respondent objects that in Monell and Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980), we found a municipality liable despite evidence that showed only a single instance of misconduct. If the city's argument here depended on the premise that municipal conduct that resulted in only a single incident was immune from liability, I would have to agree with respondent that Monell and Owen provide authority to the contrary. A rule that the city should be entitled to its first constitutional violation without incurring liability—even where the first incident was the taking of the life of an innocent citizen—would be a legal anomaly, unsupported by the legislative history or policies underlying § 1983. A § 1983 cause of action is as available for the first victim of a policy or custom that would foreseeably and avoidably cause an individual to be subjected to deprivation of a constitutional right as it is for the second and subsequent victims; by exposing a municipal defendant to liability on the occurrence of the first incident, it is hoped that future incidents will not occur.
The city's argument, however, does not depend on any such unlikely or extravagant premise. It depends instead merely on that fact that a single incident of police misbehavior by a single policeman is insufficient as sole support for an inference that a municipal policy or custom caused the incident. And this was not an inference comparable to any on which the plaintiffs in Monell or Owen relied. In Monell, both parties agreed that the City of New York had a policy of forcing women to take maternity leave before medically necessary. 436 U.S., at 661, n. 2, 98 S.Ct., at 2020, n. 2. This policy, of course, violated the interest we recognized in Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 94 S.Ct. 791, 39 L.Ed.2d 52 (1974). In Owen, the municipality's city council, in the course of dismissing the plaintiff from his post as Chief of Police, passed a resolution releasing to the press material that smeared the reputation of the plaintiff. There was no doubt that the release of the information was an official action—that is, a policy or custom—of the city. Thus, the crucial factor in both cases was that the plaintiff introduced direct evidence that the city itself had acted.7 In both cases, the jury was not required to draw any further inference concerning the existence of the city policy, let alone an inference from the isolated conduct of a single nonpolicymaking city employee on a single occasion.8
When a police officer is engaged in the performance of his official duties, he is entrusted with civic responsibilities of the highest order. His mission is to protect the life, the liberty, and the property of the citizenry. If he violates the Federal Constitution while he is performing that mission, I believe that federal law provides the citizen with a remedy against his employer as well as a remedy against him as an individual. This conclusion is supported by the text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, by its legislative history, and by the holdings and reasoning in several of our major cases construing the statute. The Court's contrary conclusion rests on nothing more than a recent judicial fiat that no litigant had asked the Court to decree.
* As we have frequently noted, § 1983 "came onto the books as § 1 of the Ku Klux Act of April 20, 1871. 17 Stat. 13."1 The law was an especially important, remedial measure, drafted in expansive language.2 The class of potential defendants is broadly defined by the words "every person."3 It is now settled that the word "person" encompasses municipal corporations,4 and, of course, it was true in 1871 as it is today, that corporate entities can only act through their human agents.5 Thus, if Congress intended to impose liability on municipal corporations, it must have intended to make them responsible for at least some of the conduct of their agents.
The legislative history of the Ku Klux Act supports this conclusion for two reasons. First, the fact that "nobody" objected to § 114 is consistent with the view that Congress expected normal rules of tort law to be applied in enforcing it. Second, the debate on the Sherman Amendment—an amendment that would have imposed an extraordinary and novel form of absolute liability on municipalities—indicates that Congress seriously considered imposing additional responsibilities on municipalities without ever mentioning the possibility that they should have any lesser responsibility than any other person.15 The rejection of the Sherman Amendment sheds no light on the meaning of the statute, but the fact that such an extreme measure was even considered indicates that Congress thought it appropriate to require municipal corporations to share the responsibility for carrying out the commands of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Of greatest importance, however, is the nature of the wrong for which § 1983 provides a remedy. The Act was primarily designed to provide a remedy for violations of the United States Constitution—wrongs of the most serious kind.16 As the plurality recognizes, the individual officer in this case was engaged in "unconstitutional activity."17 But the conduct of an individual can be characterized as "unconstitutional" only if it is attributed to his employer. The Fourteenth Amendment does not have any application to purely private conduct.18 Unless an individual officer acts under color of official authority, § 1983 does not authorize any recovery against him. But if his relationship with his employer makes it appropriate to treat his conduct as state action for purposes of constitutional analysis, surely that relationship equally justifies the application of normal principles of tort law for the purpose of allocating responsibility for the wrongful state action.
The central holding in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), confirms this analysis. In that case, the city of Chicago had rested its entire defense on the claim that the individual officers had acted "ultra vires" when they invaded the petitioners' home.19 Putting to one side the question whether the city was a "person" within the meaning of the Act, the only issue that separated the Members of the Court was whether liability could attach without proof of a recurring "custom or usage." In terms of today's decision, the question was whether it was necessary for the petitioners to prove that the conduct of the police officers represented the city's official "policy." Over Justice Frankfurter's vehement dissent,20 the Court held that a "single incident" could constitute a violation of the statute.21
" 'It is abundantly clear that one reason the legislation was passed was to afford a federal right in federal courts because, by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment of rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment might be denied by the state agencies. . . .'
"without being certain that Congress meant to deal with anything other than abuses so recurrent as to amount to 'custom, or usage.' One can agree with my Brother FRANKFURTER, in dissent, that Congress had no intention of taking over the whole field of ordinary state torts and crimes, without being certain that the enacting Congress would not have regarded actions by an official, made possible by his position, as far more serious than an ordinary state tort, and therefore as a matter of federal concern."22
While the plurality purports to answer a question of statutory construction—which it properly introduces with a quotation of the statutory text, see ante, at 816—its opinion actually provides us with an interpretation of the word "policy" as it is used in Part II of the opinion in Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690-695, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2035-2038, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). The word "policy" does not appear in the text of § 1983, but it provides the theme for today's decision.23 The plurality concludes:
Part II of Monell contains dicta of the least persuasive kind. As Justice POWELL noted in his separate concurrence, language that is "not necessary to the holding may be accorded less weight in subsequent cases."25 Moreover, as he also pointed out, "we owe somewhat less deference to a decision that was rendered without benefit of a full airing of all the relevant considerations."26 The commentary on respondeat superior in Monell was not responsive to any argument advanced by either party27 and was not even relevant to the Court's actual holding.28 Moreover, in the Court's earlier decision in Monroe v. Pape, although the petitioners had explained why it would be appropriate to apply the doctrine of respondeat superior in § 1983 litigation, no contrary argument had been advanced by the city.29 Thus, the views expressed in Part II of Monell constitute judicial legislation of the most blatant kind. Having overruled its earlier—and, ironically also volunteered—misconstruction of the word "person" in Monroe v. Pape, in my opinion, the Court in Monell should simply have held that municipalities are liable for the unconstitutional activities of their agents that are performed in the course of their official duties.30
The Court's contrary conclusion can only be explained by a concern about the danger of bankrupting municipal corporations. That concern is surely legitimate, but it is one that should be addressed by Congress—perhaps by imposing maximum limitations on the size of any potential recovery or by requiring the purchase of appropriate liability insurance—rather than by this Court. Moreover, it is a concern that is relevant to the law of damages rather than to the rules defining the substantive liability of "every person" covered by § 1983.35
The injection into § 1983 litigation of the kind of debate over policy that today's decision will engender can only complicate the litigation process. My rather old-fashioned and simple approach to the statute would eliminate from this class of civil-rights litigation the time consuming "policy" issues that Monell gratuitously engrafted onto the statute. Of greatest importance, it would serve the administration of justice and effectuate the intent of Congress.
This case was tried some three weeks prior to our decision in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982), which modified the standard for qualified executive immunity. An executive official is now entitled to immunity unless he violated "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Id., at 818, 102 S.Ct., at 2738.
The actual "question presented" in the petition for certiorari is:
"Whether a single isolated incident of the use of excessive force by a police officer establishes an official policy or practice of a municipality sufficient to render the municipality liable for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Pet. for Cert. i.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51 requires counsel objecting to a jury instruction to "stat[e] distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objection." Apparently, the only objection to the single-incident instruction contained in the record consists of the statement: "we make a second objection, your honor, particularly to the one, the Oklahoma City language, the language in the light of the City of Oklahoma City, which is single occurrence language." Tr. 693.
The trial court correctly charged the jury that a federal right—here a constitutional right—had to be violated to establish liability under § 1983. Petitioner did not object to the trial court's description of the rights at issue, and we do not pass on whether the jury was correctly charged on this aspect of the case. The facts of this case are, of course, very similar to the facts of Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985), in which we recently held that "[w]here the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly force." Id., at 11, 105 S.Ct., at ----. Here the jury's verdict in favor of Rotramel must have been based upon a finding that he acted in "good faith and with a reasonable belief in the legality of his actions." We note that this Court has never held that every instance of use of "unreasonable force" in effecting an arrest constitutes a violation of the Fourth Amendment; nor has this Court held under circumstances such as these that there has been a deprivation of life "without due process of law."
Although apparently agreeing with the result we reach in light of Monell, see post, at 842, Justice STEVENS' dissent would have us overrule Monell § limitation on
municipal liability altogether. We see no reason here to depart from the important and established principle of stare decisis. The question we address involves only statutory construction, so any error we may commit is subject to reversal by Congress. Cf. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406-407, 52 S.Ct. 443, 447, 73 L.Ed. 815 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). In addition, the law in this area has taken enough 90-degree turns in recent years. Monell was decided only seven years ago. That decision, of course, overruled Monroe v. Pape '§ 17-year-old holding that municipalities were never subject to suit under § 1983. One reason why courts render decisions and written opinions is so that parties can order their conduct accordingly, and we may assume that decisions on issues such as this are appropriately considered by municipalities in ordering their financial affairs. The principle of stare decisis gives rise to and supports these legitimate expectations, and, where our decision is subject to correction by Congress, we do a great disservice when we subvert these concerns and maintain the law in a state of flux.
We note in addition that Justice STEVENS' position, which is based substantially on his perception of the common law of municipal liability at the time § 1983 was enacted, is by no means representative of all the contemporary authorities. Both the majority and dissenting opinions in Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980), recognized that certain rather complicated municipal tort immunities existed at the time § 1983 was enacted, see id., at 644-650, 100 S.Ct., at 1412-1415; id., at 676-679, 100 S.Ct., at 1428-1429 (POWELL, J., dissenting); we are therefore somewhat surprised to learn that the "common law" at the time applied the doctrine of respondeat superior "to municipal corporations, and to the wrongful acts of police officers." Post, at 836-837. Even those cases known to allow municipal liability at the time hardly support the broad vicarious liability suggested by the dissent; the famous case of Thayer v. Boston, 36 Mass. 511, 516-517 (1837), for example, spoke in guarded language that seems in harmony with the limitations on municipal liability expressed in Monell. That court stated:
One well-known dictionary, for example, defines "policy" as "a definite course or method of action selected from among alternatives and in light of given conditions to guide and determine present and future decisions." Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 910 (1983).
We express no opinion on whether a policy that itself is not unconstitutional, such as the general "inadequate training" alleged here, can ever meet the "policy" requirement of Monell. In addition, even assuming that such a "policy" would suffice, it is open to question whether a policymaker's "gross negligence" in establishing police training practices could establish a "policy" that constitutes a "moving force" behind subsequent unconstitutional conduct, or whether a more conscious decision on the part of the policymaker would be required.
In this regard, we cannot condone the loose language in the charge leaving it to the jury to determine whether the alleged inadequate training would likely lead to "police misconduct." The fact that a municipal "policy" might lead to "police misconduct" is hardly sufficient to satisfy Monell § requirement that the particular policy be the "moving force" behind a constitutional violation. There must at least be an affirmative link between the training inadequacies alleged, and the particular constitutional violation at issue.
See Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 695, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2038, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Since Monell, of course, the contours of municipal liability have become substantially clearer. See, e.g., Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 101 S.Ct. 2748, 69 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981) (punitive damages not permitted); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980) (qualified immunity not available to municipalities).
Rotramel himself admitted at the time he entered the bar, Tuttle was standing with a drink in his hand. App. 155. There was also testimony that the bartender told Rotramel that no robbery had occurred, id., at 82-83, 106, 234, and Rotramel conceded that no one in the bar told him that a robbery had occurred. Id., at 209.
Of course, nothing hinges on whether the "policy or custom" inquiry is seen as a part of the plaintiff's burden to prove causation, or whether instead it is seen as an independent element of a § 1983 cause of action.
These included official decisions concerning the following matters: whether to permit rookie police officers to patrol alone; what rules should govern whether a police officer should wait for backup units before entering a felony-in-progress situation; how much time and emphasis to be placed on training in such matters as how to approach felony-in-progress situations, when to use firearms, and when to shoot to kill. Respondent bore the burden at trial of proving that the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights (the killing of Tuttle) resulted from these "conscious choices," ante, at 823 made by the city concerning police training and supervision.
Rotramel was a low-level police officer. Some officials, of course, may occupy sufficiently high policymaking roles that any action they take under color of state law will be deemed official policy. See Monell, 436 U.S., at 694, 98 S.Ct., at 2037 ("[I]t is when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983").
This is in some respects analogous to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in ordinary tort cases. Only in certain circumstances in ordinary tort cases may a jury infer defendant's fault from the fact that an injury of a certain type occurred. See generally W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts § 39, p. 243 (5th ed. 1984). The purpose of the restriction is of course to protect the defendant from liability in a case in which he is not at fault and has not caused the injury. The jury instruction in question here similarly would have permitted the city to be held liable, absent fault and causation. This suggests that there may be cases, analogous to those in which the res ipsa loquitur doctrine applies, where the evidence surrounding a given incident is sufficient to permit a jury to infer that it was caused by a city policy or custom.
The distinction between Monell and Owen, on the one hand, and the instant case, on the other, is thus rather simple. In Monell and Owen, the plaintiff introduced evidence of official actions taken by the defendant municipality. Respondent here, of course, also introduced evidence concerning official actions taken by the city, mostly centering on the city policies governing training and supervision of police officers. However, as the plurality points out, ante, at 821-822, the judgment must be reversed in this case because the instructions permitted the jury to find the city liable even if the jury did not believe this direct evidence. Cf. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 367-368, 51 S.Ct. 532, 535, 75 L.Ed. 1117 (1931).
I do not understand, nor do I see the necessity for, the metaphysical distinction between policies that are themselves unconstitutional and those that cause constitutional violations. See ante, at 823-824, and n. 7. If a municipality takes actions whether they be of the type alleged in Monell, Owen, or this case that cause the deprivation of a citizen's constitutional rights, § 1983 is available as a remedy.
The plurality seems to believe that there is a serious threat that a court might submit to a jury the theory that a municipal policy of having a police department was the "cause" of a deprivation of a constitutional right. Ante, at 823. Of course, I agree that such a theory should never be submitted to a jury, but the reason has little to do with the presence of the municipality as the defendant in the case or the structure of § 1983. Ordinary principles of causation used throughout the law of torts recognize that "but for" causation, while probably a necessary condition for liability, is never a sufficient condition of liability. See generally Prosser & Keeton on Law of Torts § 41, at 265-266. I would think that these principles are sufficient to avoid the unusual theory of liability suggested by the plurality.
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171, 81 S.Ct. 473, 475, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961).
"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
"Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides that '[e]very person' who acts under color of state law to deprive another of a constitutional right shall be answerable to that person in a suit for damages. The statute thus creates a species of tort liability that on its face admits of no immunities, and some have argued that it should be applied as stringently as it reads." Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417, 96 S.Ct. 984, 988, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976) (footnotes omitted).
Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 663, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2021, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). It should be noted that the contrary proposition announced in Part III of the Court's opinion in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S., at 187-192, 81 S.Ct., at 484-486 had not been advanced by respondent city of Chicago in that case. Indeed, the primary defense asserted on behalf of the city was that neither the City nor the individual detectives were liable because the officers' conduct was forbidden by Illinois law and therefore ultra vires. The city did not take issue with petitioners' submission that the doctrine of respondeat superior applied to the city. Compare Brief for Petitioners in Monroe v. Pape, O.T.1960, No. 39, pp. 8, 21 ("The theory of the complaint is that under the circumstances here alleged the City is liable for the acts of its police officers, by virtue of respondeat superior "), and id., at 25-27, with Brief for Respondents in Monroe v. Pape, O.T.1960, No. 39, p. 3.
Indeed, "by 1871, it was well understood that corporations should be treated as natural persons for virtually all purposes of constitutional and statutory analysis." Monell, 436 U.S., at 687, 98 S.Ct., at 2034. Moreover, "municipal corporations were routinely sued in the federal courts and this fact was well known to Members of Congress." Id., at 688, 98 S.Ct., at 2034 (footnotes omitted). See, e.g., Louisville, C. & C.R. Co. v. Letson, 2 How. 497, 558, 11 L.Ed. 353 (1844); see also Cowles v. Mercer County, 7 Wall. 118, 121, 19 L.Ed. 86 (1869).
Thus William Blackstone wrote the following in 1765:
In 1862, in Limpus v. London General Omnibus Co., 1 Hurl. & C. 526, the Exchequer Chamber held that the owner of an omnibus company could be liable for injury inflicted on a rival omnibus company by a driver who violated the defendant's specific instructions. Judge Willes wrote:
See, e.g., Allen v. City of Decatur, 23 Ill. 332, 335 (1860), where the court stated:
"Governmental corporations then, from the highest to the lowest, can commit wrongful acts through their authorized agents for which they are
responsible; and the only question is, how that responsibility shall be enforced. The obvious answer is, in courts of justice, where, by the law, they can be sued."
In Johnson v. Municipality No. One, 5 La.Ann. 100 (1850), a Louisiana court affirmed a $600 damages judgment against a city for the illegal detention in its jail of the plaintiff's slave. In the course of its decision, the court acknowledged the correctness of the following statement:
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 696-697, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 1957-1958, 60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
Imbler v. Patchman, 424 U.S., at 417, 96 S.Ct., at 988.
The passage from which this language is taken is worth quoting in full:
"It is by now well settled that the tort liability created by § 1983 cannot be understood in a historical vacuum. In the Civil Rights Act of 1871, Congress created a federal remedy against a person who, acting under color of state law, deprives another of constitutional rights. . . . One important assumption underlying the Court's decisions in this area is that members of the 42d Congress were familiar with common-law principles, including defenses previously recognized in ordinary tort litigation, and that they likely intended these common-law principles to obtain, absent specific provisions to the contrary." Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 258, 101 S.Ct. 2748, 2755, 69 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981).
See also Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 330, 334, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 1113, 1115, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-554, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 1217, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967).
"Given that municipal immunity from punitive damages was well established at common law by 1871, we proceed on the familiar assumption that 'Congress would have specifically so provided had it wished to abolish the doctrine.' Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S., at 555, 87 S.Ct., at 1218. Nothing in the legislative debates suggests that, in enacting § 1 of the Civil Rights Act, the 42d Congress intended any such abolition." 453 U.S., at 263-264, 101 S.Ct., at 2757-2758.
See, e.g., Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S., at 330, 103 S.Ct., at 1113; Associated General Contractors v. Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 531, 103 S.Ct. 897, 905, 74 L.Ed.2d 723 (1983).
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S., at 171, 81 S.Ct., at 475 (referring to § 1, which of course is now § 1983, Senator Edmunds, Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, stated: " 'The first section is one that I believe nobody objects to' ").
Monell, 436 U.S., at 666-676, 98 S.Ct., at 2023-2028.
Id., at 683-686, 98 S.Ct., at 2032-2033.
Ante, at 824.
As the Court in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13, 68 S.Ct. 836, 842, 92 L.Ed. 1161 (1948), correctly noted:
365 U.S., at 202-259, 81 S.Ct., at 492-522.
Id., at 187, 81 S.Ct., at 484.
Id., at 193, 81 S.Ct., at 487 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Notwithstanding the absence of the word "policy" in the statute, the plurality makes the remarkable statement that "custom or policy" is language that "tracks the language of the statute." Ante, at 818.
Ante, at 823-824.
Monell, 436 U.S., at 709, n. 6, 98 S.Ct., at 2045, n. 6.
Compare Brief for Petitioners and Brief for Respondents in Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, O.T.1977, No. 75-1914, with the Court's dicta in Part II of Monell, 436 U.S., at 690-695, 98 S.Ct., at 2035-2038.
For that reason I did not join Part II of the opinion and did not express the views that I am expressing today. See 436 U.S., at 714, 98 S.Ct., at 2047 (STEVENS, J., concurring in part). Today the plurality deems it appropriate to characterize the discussion of respondeat superior as a "holding," see ante, at 818; thus one ipse dixit is used to describe another.
The plurality's principal response to this dissent is based on the doctrine of stare decisis. See ante, at 830, n. 5. That doctrine, however, does not apply to Part II of Monell because that part of the opinion was wholly irrelevant to the ratio decidendi of the case. See Carroll v. Lessee of Carroll, 16 How. 275, 287, 14 L.Ed. 936 (1854); Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 399-400, 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821). As is so often true, Justice Cardozo has provided us with the proper response:
See, e.g., Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S., at 266-271, 101 S.Ct., at 2762; Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650-656, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 1415-1418, 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980).
Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 163, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803) ("The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection").
As one observer stated:
See also Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S., at 652, n. 36, 100 S.Ct., at 1416, n. 36 ("In addition, the threat of liability against the city ought to increase the attentiveness with which officials at the higher levels of government supervise the conduct of their subordinates. The need to institute systemwide measures in order to increase the vigilance with which otherwise indifferent municipal officials protect citizens' constitutional rights is, of course, particularly acute where the frontline officers are judgment-proof in their individual capacities").
"A public servant who is conscientiously doing his job to the best of his ability should rarely, if ever, be exposed to the risk of damage liability." Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 569, 98 S.Ct. 855, 863, 55 L.Ed.2d 24 (1978) (STEVENS, J., dissenting).
D. Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies 1 (1973) ("The law of judicial remedies concerns itself with the nature and scope of the relief to be given a plaintiff once he has followed appropriate procedure in court and has established a substantive right. The law of remedies is thus sharply distinguished from the law of substance and procedure").