Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/824/360/121968/
Timestamp: 2019-11-13 22:00:05
Document Index: 158455932

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 846', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 952', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 841', '§ 960', '§ 4207']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Jorge Manotas-mejia, Justo Estrada-tello, Julianenriquez-castro, and Samuel Ramirez-rios,defendants-appellants, 824 F.2d 360 (5th Cir. 1987) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Fifth Circuit › 1987 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Jorge Manotas-mejia, Justo Estrada-tello, Julianenr...
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Jorge Manotas-mejia, Justo Estrada-tello, Julianenriquez-castro, and Samuel Ramirez-rios,defendants-appellants, 824 F.2d 360 (5th Cir. 1987)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit - 824 F.2d 360 (5th Cir. 1987) Aug. 4, 1987. Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Oct. 1, 1987
A four count indictment charged the appellants and Buyoc with various narcotics offenses involving cocaine. Count I charged that the four appellants and Buyoc conspired to possess over 1,000 grams with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a) (1). Count II charged all five defendants with possession with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1). Count III charged the four appellants (but not Buyoc) with distribution of the cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1), and Count IV charged the appellants with importation, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a) and 960(a) (1).
Counts III and IV also charged violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2, which provides that one "who aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, or procures [the] commission [of a crime] is punishable as a principal."
We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and affirm if substantial evidence supports the verdict, that is, if a reasonable jury could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S. Ct. 457, 469, 86 L. Ed. 680, 704 (1942); United States v. Loalza-Vasquez, 735 F.2d 153, 158 (5th Cir. 1984). Contrary to defendants' contentions, to support a conviction the evidence need not exclude "every reasonable hypothesis of innocence." United States v. Bell, 678 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc), aff'd, 462 U.S. 356, 103 S. Ct. 2398, 76 L. Ed. 2d 638 (1983); United States v. Livingston, 816 F.2d 184, 192 (5th Cir. 1987). "We must reverse if a reasonable jury must have had a reasonable doubt about guilt." United States v. Moreno-Hinojosa, 804 F.2d 845, 847 (5th Cir. 1986).
All four appellants claim that there is insufficient evidence to uphold their convictions for Count I, conspiracy. A conspiracy is an agreement between two or more people to commit a crime. United States v. Ortiz-Loya, 777 F.2d 973, 981 (5th Cir. 1985). The government must prove that each conspirator knew the "essential nature" of the conspiracy and intentionally joined it. United States v. Fowler, 735 F.2d 823, 826 (5th Cir. 1984); see also United States v. Colwell, 764 F.2d 1070, 1072 (5th Cir. 1985) (defendant must intentionally and voluntarily join the conspiracy); Ortiz-Loya, 777 F.2d at 981 (defendant must intend to violate the substantive offense); United States v. Gordon, 712 F.2d 110, 114 (5th Cir. 1983) (defendant must have "deliberate, knowing, and specific intent to join the conspiracy"). The government may prove an agreement by circumstantial evidence, although "close association" with criminals or "mere presence" at the scene of the crime will not support a conviction for conspiracy. Fowler, 735 F.2d at 827; United States v. Magee, 821 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v. Holcomb, 797 F.2d 1320, 1327 (5th Cir. 1986).
An indictment is sufficient if it "first, contains the elements of the offense charged and fairly informs the defendant of the charge against which he must defend, and, second, enables him to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense." Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S. Ct. 2887, 2907, 41 L. Ed. 2d 590 (1974); see United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 414, 100 S. Ct. 624, 636, 62 L. Ed. 2d 575 (1980); United States v. Stratton, 649 F.2d 1066, 1073 (5th Cir. 1981). The indictment and proof must coincide to protect the accused from (1) surprise and (2) the risk of another prosecution for the same crime. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 82, 55 S. Ct. 629, 630, 79 L. Ed. 1314 (1935).
First, we explain that the indictment informed the appellants of the charge against them and guarded against surprise. Count I charged that the appellants and Buyoc conspired "on or about March 22," without specifying the hour or any overt acts. As we interpret this phrase by its plain meaning, there was only one conspiracy with a single object, to possess cocaine "on or about March 22." See United States v. Winship, 724 F.2d 1116, 1122 (5th Cir. 1984) ("crucial factor in finding a single conspiracy [is] whether the alleged coconspirators all took part in a common plan or scheme").
We acknowledge that a government agent cannot be a co-conspirator and that there can be no conspiracy between one defendant and a government informer. See United States v. Martino, 648 F.2d 367, 405 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 949, 102 S. Ct. 2020, 72 L. Ed. 2d 474 (1982). Thus, Buyoc could not be a conspirator while cooperating with the government, although she could be part of a continuing conspiracy until she turned informer. Manotas makes too much of this point. A conspiracy may exist among three or more people "even [if] the link connecting many of the ... co-conspirators is a Government informer." Id.; United States v. Enstam, 622 F.2d 857, 867 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912, 101 S. Ct. 1351, 67 L. Ed. 2d 336 and 451 U.S. 907, 101 S. Ct. 1974, 68 L. Ed. 2d 294 (1981). All four appellants conspired in the Mesa transaction; the fact that Buyoc is named in the indictment hardly caused surprise to the appellants at trial. As set out above, the government clearly proved that overt acts manifesting conspiracy among the appellants occurred at 11:30 p.m. It was not necessary for the government to show what the appellants were doing earlier in the day.1 The events of the 11:30 meeting, however, show that all four of the appellants were aware at that time that there was a substantial amount of cocaine on board, and they were acting together in making the deal with Mesa with respect to cocaine on board.
Clearly, the mere fact that the jury did not--or could not--convict all named co-conspirators is no cause for reversal. As the Supreme Court stated in Berger: "Although an indictment charges a conspiracy involving several persons and the proof establishes the conspiracy against some of them only, the variance is not material." 295 U.S. at 81, 55 S. Ct. at 630; see also United States v. Kaiser, 660 F.2d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 1981) (not fatal that government did not connect all defendants to conspiracy), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 956, 102 S. Ct. 1467, 71 L. Ed. 2d 674 and 457 U.S. 1121, 102 S. Ct. 2935, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1334 (1982), rev'd on other grounds, United States v. DeBright, 730 F.2d 1255 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
Moreover, the fact that Buyoc, a named co-conspirator, may have withdrawn from the conspiracy after her arrest did not end one conspiracy and begin another. Co-conspirators may come and go, and each change in membership does not create a new conspiracy. See United States v. Leach, 613 F.2d 1295, 1299 (5th Cir. 1980) (agreement to burn several houses constituted one conspiracy, even though new arsonists joined and old ones dropped out along the way); United States v. Bates, 600 F.2d 505, 509 (5th Cir. 1979) (a single conspiracy is not split into many simply because of changes in personnel).
As set out above, we find that the indictment charged and the government proved one conspiracy. Even if the government had proved two conspiracies, however, the variance might have been "harmless." Berger, 295 U.S. at 81, 55 S. Ct. at 630; see Martino, 648 F.2d at 382. "The true inquiry ... is not whether there has been a variance ... but whether there has been such a variance as to 'affect the substantial rights' of the accused." Berger, 295 U.S. at 81, 55 S. Ct. at 630. The indictment clearly gave the appellants notice of the charge against them. They did not object at trial to the nature of Mesa's testimony, and the government's proof did not surprise or unfairly prejudice them.3
Next, we must address whether the appellants face "the risk of another prosecution for the same crime." Berger, 295 U.S. at 82, 55 S. Ct. at 630. The government may not split one conspiracy into two prosecutions, and any subsequent prosecution of the appellants would be judged by the five factors identified in United States v. Marable, 578 F.2d 151, 154 (5th Cir. 1978): (1) time, (2) persons acting as conspirators, (3) the statutory offense charged in the indictment, (4) the location where the conspiracy took place, and (5) the overt acts charged by the government or any other description of the charged offense that indicates the scope and nature of the activities that the government sought to punish in each case. See also United States v. Dunn, 775 F.2d 604 (5th Cir. 1985). If the appellants are again indicted and make a "nonfrivolous" claim of double jeopardy, then the government will have to show that the subsequent indictment charges a different offense than the indictment in the case before us. United States v. Nichols, 741 F.2d 767, 771 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1214, 105 S. Ct. 1186, 84 L. Ed. 2d 333 (1985). We hold that the indictment and our interpretation of it adequately protect the appellants from the risk of another prosecution for the same conspiracy.
As set out above, Counts III and IV charged not only substantive offenses but also violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2. To prove aiding and abetting, the government must prove that the defendant "associated with a criminal venture, participated in the venture, and sought by his action to make the venture succeed." Holcomb, 797 F.2d at 1328. The defendant must share the principal's criminal intent and engage in some affirmative conduct designed to aid the venture. Colwell, 764 F.2d at 1072; see United States v. Baresh, 790 F.2d 392, 399 (5th Cir. 1986); Ortiz-Loya, 777 F.2d at 980.
The evidence also supports Manotas' and Ramirez' convictions for Count IV, importation. To prove importation, the government may prove by circumstantial evidence that the defendant brought cocaine to the United States from outside the country; the government need not show that the defendant was seen carrying the drugs across the border. See United States v. Miranda, 593 F.2d 590, 597 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1033 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, Meinster v. United States and Myers v. United States, 457 U.S. 1136, 102 S. Ct. 2965, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1354 (1982) and Platshorn v. United States, 459 U.S. 906, 103 S. Ct. 208, 74 L. Ed. 2d 166 (1982). There was testimony that the CATALINA came to Houston from Barranquilla. As set out above, Manotas boasted that he would bring twenty kilograms on his next trip. He sent for Ramirez, who brought the four kilograms for Mesa. Manotas worked in the engine room where he said the cocaine was kept. The jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Manotas and Ramirez brought the cocaine from Colombia. Sufficient evidence supports the convictions on Count IV.
Manotas claims that his twenty year sentence is disproportionate to his crime and violates the Eighth Amendment's bar against "cruel and unusual punishments." See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 77 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1983). The proportionality analysis set out in Solem is guided by "objective critera, including (i) the gravity of the offensive and harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions." Id. at 292, 103 S. Ct. at 3011. Manotas focuses his attack on the first criterion listed above and argues: "Common sense dictates that a person convicted of five or six kilograms of cocaine should not be [sentenced to twenty years]."
After Manotas was convicted but before he was sentenced, a probation officer conducted a "presentence investigation" ("PSI") and reported his findings to the district court, as provided in Fed. R. Crim. P. 32. The PSI included the defendant's prior record, personal and family data, and sentencing information.
In sentencing, the district court may consider factors not introduced into evidence at trial. See United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446, 92 S. Ct. 589, 591, 30 L. Ed. 2d 592 (1972). Due process requires, however, that the defendant be sentenced on reliable information. Id.;5 see United States v. Fulbright, 804 F.2d 847, 853 (5th Cir. 1986) (district court may consider only facts that have some "minimal indicium of reliability"); United States v. Tobias, 662 F.2d 381, 388 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1108, 102 S. Ct. 2908, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1317 (1982). As an added protection to ensure fair sentencing procedures, Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c) (3) (D) provides:
If the ... defendant ... allege [s] any factual inaccuracy in the presentence investigation report ..., the court shall, as to each matter controverted, make (i) a finding as to the allegation, or (ii) a determination that no such finding is necessary because the matter controverted will not be taken into account in sentencing.
Rule 32(c) (3) (D) serves two functions. First, it protects the defendant from being sentenced on inaccurate information. Second, it creates an accurate record of the factors on which the district court relied at sentencing. Such a record is important, because prison or parole officials may consider information in a PSI when making correctional or parole decisions. See United States v. Velasquez, 748 F.2d 972, 974 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. Lawal, 810 F.2d 491, 494 (5th Cir. 1987) (PSI stated that defendant obtained $100,000 in a mail fraud scheme while defendant claimed he obtained only $1,200); United States v. Petitto, 767 F.2d 607, 611 (9th Cir. 1985). A failure of the district court to comply with Rule 32(c) (3) (D) may be raised for the first time on appeal and requires resentencing. Velasquez, 748 F.2d at 973; Petitto, 767 F.2d at 611; United States v. O'Neill, 767 F.2d 780, 787 (11th Cir. 1985). Thus, if the PSI had contained the contested information about a March 21 delivery, we clearly would have to remand for the district court to resentence Manotas. Rule 32(c) (3) (D), however, applies only to the probation department's PSI. The issue before us now is whether to order resentencing although the disputed information appeared in the government's Sentencing Memorandum rather than the PSI.
The fact that the information contested by Manotas appeared in the Sentencing Memorandum rather than the PSI in no way diminishes the dangers against which Rule 32(c) (3) (D) guards. In imposing sentence, the district court may have considered the government's unsubstantiated but prejudicial allegation that Manotas delivered fifteen kilograms on March 21. Moreover, the Sentencing Memorandum the government filed in district court is part of the public record, available to the Bureau of Prisons, parole commissions, or other agencies that will decide place of incarceration, parole possibilities, and other issues affecting Manotas.6
Ramirez claims on appeal that Mesa's March 23 and in-court identifications violated due process and tainted his convictions. An identification procedure violates due process if it is "unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification." Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302, 87 S. Ct. 1967, 1972, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1199 (1967). Six factors affect whether Mesa's identification was impermissibly suggestive and unreliable: (1) Mesa's opportunity to view Ramirez at the time of the alleged crime; (2) Mesa's degree of attention during the alleged crime; (3) the accuracy of Mesa's identification; (4) Mesa's level of certainty at the time of the identification; (5) the time elapsed between the alleged crime and the identification; and (6) the corrupting influence of the suggestive identification. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114, 97 S. Ct. 2243, 2253, 53 L. Ed. 2d 140 (1977); United States v. Watkins, 741 F.2d 692, 695 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. Atkins, 698 F.2d 711, 713 (5th Cir. 1983).
In United States v. Ylda, 653 F.2d 912 (5th Cir. 1981), the indictment charged that the defendant received money as a bribe, but the district court instructed the jury to convict if the defendant agreed to or did receive money or anything of value. Thus, the jury theoretically could have convicted Ylda of a crime not charged in the indictment. We affirmed the conviction, however, because the evidence clearly showed that Ylda actually received money, so the jury must have convicted for the charged offense in spite of the jury instructions. The case before us is similar to Ylda
Cf. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 66 S. Ct. 1239, 90 L. Ed. 1557 (1946). In Kotteakos, the indictment charged one conspiracy to obtain loans fraudulently but the government proved eight conspiracies involving over thirty people led by Simon Brown, a central figure common to all eight conspiracies. Each conspiracy, however, was independent of the others, and only Brown knew or had reason to know that other conspiracies existed. The Supreme Court held that this variance prejudiced the defendants because the jury might have transferred the guilt of one defendant to a defendant in another, independent conspiracy. Kotteakos recognized, however, that reversal is not always required when the government proves many conspiracies although one is charged. Id. at 756, 66 S. Ct. at 1243 (citing Berger) . In the case before us, the appellants suffered no prejudice similar to that in Kotteakos. All four appellants were present together when the cocaine sale was made. Each participated with each other of the four
Since Manotas was sentenced, Congress increased the maximum imprisonment for each of his crimes to forty years. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1) (B) (distributing 500 grams or more); 21 U.S.C. § 960(b) (2) (importing 500 grams or more)
Tucker was sentenced for bank robbery in 1953, and the sentencing judge knew that he had three prior convictions. After sentencing, two of Tucker's three prior convictions were invalidated by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799 (1963), which was applied retroactively, Pickelsimer v. Wainwright, 375 U.S. 2, 84 S. Ct. 80, 11 L. Ed. 2d 41 (1963). The Supreme Court ordered resentencing for Tucker's 1953 conviction and forbade the sentencing judge to consider the two convictions obtained in violation of Gideon
For instances, in making parole decisions a parole commission may consider presentence reports, reports from prosecutors, and any other "relevant information" about the prisoner. See 28 C.F.R. Sec. 2.19; 18 U.S.C. § 4207; Page v. United States Parole Commission, 651 F.2d 1083, 1086 (5th Cir. 1981); Nunez-Guardado v. Hadden, 722 F.2d 618, 622 (10th Cir. 1983) (parole commission may consider "Border Patrol Report")