Source: https://casetext.com/case/ruiz-v-tenorio
Timestamp: 2019-12-08 01:44:26
Document Index: 469139476

Matched Legal Cases: ['art. 1', '§ 11603', 'art. 3', '§ 11601', 'art. 3', '§ 11603', 'art. 3', '§ 11601']

Ruiz v. Tenorio, 392 F.3d 1247 | Casetext
Ruiz v. Tenorio
392 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 2004)
ReadReadAttorney AnalysesAnalyses4Citing BriefsBriefs1Citing CasesCiting Cases93
Ruizv.Tenorio
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh CircuitDec 7, 2004
In re Mikovic v. Mikovic
III. Applicable Law "The Hague Convention was enacted to "`secure the prompt return of children wrongfully…
"The [C]onvention is intended as a rapid remedy for the left-behind parent to return to the status quo before…
concluding that the district court did not err in finding that the parents never had a shared intention to abandon the United States and make Mexico their children's place of habitual residence because the evidence showed that although the parents agreed to move to Mexico, it was only for a trial period; the mother never intended to move to Mexico permanently; and even the father's intention about the permanence of the move was ambiguous
upholding district court's finding of no shared intent to abandon United States as a habitual residence where, among other things, "the court expressly credited [the wife's] mother who testified that [the husband] had promised that if it did not work out in Mexico, they would come back to the United States"
Summary of this case from Papakosmas v. Papakosmas
adopting mixed standard of review
No. 03-14850.
Steven L. Brannock, Maegen E. Peek, Holland Knight, LLP, Tampa, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Before ANDERSON, CARNES and BRIGHT, Circuit Judges.
Congress implemented the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670 ("Hague Convention") when it passed the International Child Abduction Remedies Act ("ICARA"). The Hague Convention was enacted to "secure the prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or retained in any Contracting State" and to "ensure that rights of custody and of access under the law of one Contracting State are effectively respected in the other Contracting States." Hague Convention, art. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 4. Under ICARA, a person may petition a court authorized to exercise jurisdiction in the place where a child is located for the return of the child to his or her habitual residence in another signatory country. 42 U.S.C. § 11603; Hague Convention, art. 3(a), T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 4. "The convention is intended as a rapid remedy for the left-behind parent to return to the status quo before the wrongful removal or retention." Shealy v. Shealy, 295 F.3d 1117, 1121 (10th Cir. 2002) (internal quotes and citations omitted). The court's inquiry is limited to the merits of the abduction claim and not the merits of the underlying custody battle. 42 U.S.C. § 11601(b)(4).
Hague Convention, art. 3, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 2. Thus, the petitioner is required to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his children were "wrongfully removed or retained within the meaning of the Convention." 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(1)(A). Therefore, in order to prevail, Juan had to prove that: (1) the children were "habitually resident" in Mexico at the time Melissa removed them to the United States; (2) the removal was in breach of Juan's custody rights under Mexican law; and (3) he had been exercising those rights at the time of removal. Hague Convention, art. 3, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 2.
Had Juan satisfied the burden of proof, certain defenses would have been available to Melissa. Because of our resolution of this case, we need not discuss such defenses.
The standard of review is an issue of first impression in this circuit. Most of the circuits that have reached this issue have decided on a mixed standard, reviewing the district court's findings of fact for clear error and its legal determinations and application of the law to the facts de novo. Silverman v. Silverman, 338 F.3d 886, 896-97 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc); Miller v. Miller, 240 F.3d 392, 399 (4th Cir. 2001); Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067, 1073 (9th Cir. 2001); Blondin v. Dubois, 238 F.3d 153, 158 (2d Cir. 2001); England v. England, 234 F.3d 268, 270 (5th Cir. 2000); Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1064 (6th Cir. 1996); Feder v. Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217, 222 n. 9 (3d Cir. 1995). As explained by the court in Feder, this means that the court "accept[s] the district court's historical or narrative facts unless they are clearly erroneous, but exercis [es] plenary review of the court's choice of and interpretation of legal precepts and its application of those precepts to the facts." 63 F.3d at 222 n. 9.
As part of an extensive discussion of the meaning of habitual residence, the court in Mozes explained why it was appropriate that the determination should be a mixed question of fact and law. 239 F.3d at 1071-73. First of all, Congress stated its desire for "uniform international interpretation of the Convention." Id. at 1071 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 11601(b)(3)(B)). The Perez-Vera Report on the Hague Convention describes "habitual residence" as "`a well-established concept in the Hague Conference, which regards it as a question of pure fact, differing in that respect from domicile.'" Id. (quoting the Report at ¶ 66). However, the term is not defined in any of the Hague Conventions, despite being used throughout them. Id. Courts have been instructed to interpret the expression according to "the ordinary and natural meaning of the two words it contains, as a question of fact to be decided by reference to all the circumstances of a particular case." Id. (citation omitted). The court in Mozes explained that despite the term's primarily factual nature, courts must be able both to explain the meaning of those words and look to other cases for guidance. Id. at 1072. This reference to other cases helps to achieve the Convention's goal of uniformity of application across countries. Id. As the court in Mozes noted, "[t]his is what we refer to in American legal parlance as a mixed question of law and fact." Id. at 1073. We are persuaded by the reasoning of the court in Mozes that a mixed standard of review is appropriate for determining habitual residency. Accordingly, we accept the district court's finding of historical facts unless clearly erroneous, but with regard to the ultimate issue of habitual residency, the appellate court will review de novo, "consider[ing] legal concepts in the mix of facts and law and exercising judgment about the values that animate legal principles." Id.
Elisa Perez-Vera was the official Hague Conference reporter whose report is "recognized by the Conference as the official history and commentary on the Convention and is a source of background on the meaning of the provisions of the Convention available to all States becoming parties to it." Shalit v. Coppe, 182 F.3d 1124, 1137-28 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
the notion [of habitual residence is] free from technical rules, which can produce rigidity and inconsistencies as between legal systems. . . . The facts and circumstances of each case should continue to be assessed without resort to presumptions or presuppositions. . . . All that is necessary is that the purpose of living where one does has a sufficient degree of continuity to be properly described as settled.
In re Bates, No. CA 122.89 at 9-10, High Court of Justice, Fam.Div'n Ct.Royal Court of Justice, United Kingdom (1989) (citation omitted). In Shah v. Barnet London Borough Council and other appeals, 1 All. E.R. 226 (Eng.H.L.), the court held that there must be a "settled purpose," which requires only that "the purpose of living where one does has a sufficient degree of continuity to be properly described as settled." Id. at 235.
As was noted in Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001), such generalities are true, but not very useful. After thoroughly canvassing the relevant case law, we conclude that the opinion of Judge Kozinski in Mozes is not only the most comprehensive discussion of the issue, but also sets out the most appropriate approach. Accordingly, we summarize the approach suggested in Mozes as it is relevant to the facts of the instant case, and adopt it as our own. The first step toward acquiring a new habitual residence is forming a settled intention to abandon the one left behind. Id. at 1075. It is not necessary to have this settled intention at the time of departure, as it could develop during the course of a stay originally intended to be temporary. Id. "Whether there is a settled intention to abandon a prior habitual residence is a question of fact as to which we defer to the district court." Id. at 1075-76. This settled intention is crucial because there can be no bright line rule with respect to the length of an absence. See id. at 1074 ("The absence of an objective temporal baseline, however, requires that we pay close attention to subjective intent."). With respect to whose intent is relevant, for the reasons set out in Mozes, we agree that the relevant "`intention or purpose which has to be taken into account is that of the person or persons entitled to fix the place of the child's residence.'" Id. at 1076 (quoting E.M. Clive, The Concept of Habitual Residence, 1997 Jurid.Rev. 137, 144).
By contrast, the court in Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396, 1401 (6th Cir. 1993), rejected of the use of parental intent. However, in that case, intent was not bolstered by physical presence: the child had never lived in the country to which he was removed, had lived in Germany for all of his life while his parents (one of whom was a German national) worked there, and was only removed when his parents' marriage disintegrated. Standing alone, of course the mother's intent that the child should one day live in the United States could not support a finding of habitual residence. Because of the facts in that case, we find its statement regarding parental intent unpersuasive. Accord Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1080.
On the other hand, there is objective evidence that the move was intended to be conditional. There is evidence that Juan had difficulties with his brother. He was also having difficulties in his employment situation with his father and brother. There were marital problems. Juan's drinking problems may have been symptoms of these work and family problems, and undoubtedly exacerbated them. Other objective evidence more directly indicative of an absence of permanence with respect to the Mexico residence include Juan's own attempts to explore employment in the United States and Melissa's movement of her nursing license from Minnesota to Florida. The family lived with the in-laws, Juan's parents, for six months. Although a new house was being built for them, it was being built and provided by Juan's father. Indeed, it was Juan's father who appears to have been in control of the family's destiny. He moved them from Minnesota, provided them with a substantial loan, paid bills and taxes, and was the one building the family's house. Finally, Melissa retained credit cards and bank accounts in the United States and had her mail forwarded to Florida instead of Mexico. On the basis of this evidence, the district court made a finding of fact that the family was in limbo during its stay in Mexico. In addition, Melissa and the children went to Mexico on tourist visas, and there is no evidence that either Juan or Melissa sought to acquire permanent legal status or Mexican citizenship for Melissa and the children.
Juan did so only after Melissa and the children had left Mexico.
Although we acknowledge that this is a relatively close case, we cannot conclude that the objective facts in the instant case are sufficient to indicate that the habitual residence of the children in the United States had been abandoned and a new habitual residence in Mexico had been established in light of the significant fact that there was never a settled mutual intention on the part of the parents to do so. We also acknowledge that the facts of the instant case are somewhat similar to those in Feder v. Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 1995). In that case, the family moved to Australia after the father obtained employment there. The father moved first, about two months before his wife and son, and bought a new house in Australia in both his and his wife's names. The couple put their American house up for sale and shipped their furniture. The wife was ambivalent about moving to Australia: the marriage was in trouble but she decided to give it a chance. Once in Australia, the Feders lived in an apartment while the mother oversaw extensive renovations to the house and their child attended nursery school. He was enrolled to begin kindergarten the following year and the mother applied to have him admitted to a private school when he reached the fifth grade. To the school, she represented the child as both a permanent resident and an Australian citizen. She pursued contacts she had made during her initial visit with the Australian Opera and auditioned for a part; she won and accepted a part in a performance scheduled for February 1995. Additionally, the father changed his driver's license from Pennsylvania to Australia and completed the paperwork necessary to obtain permanent residency. The mother, by contrast, did not change her driver's license or submit to the physical exam or sign the necessary papers for permanent residency. All of the Feders enrolled in the Australian health system.
Although the facts in Feder are similar to those of the instant case, there are significant distinctions, both with respect to a shared intent to abandon the prior habitual residence, and also with respect to the objective facts evidencing habitual residence. In the instant case, the district court found as a fact that there was no shared intent to abandon the United States as the habitual residence and take up residence in Mexico. As noted above, there is ample evidence to support this finding of fact, and we cannot conclude that the finding is clearly erroneous. By contrast, in Feder, it is not clear from the appellate opinion that the district court made a finding of fact with respect to the couple's shared intent about their move from the United States to Australia. However, the Third Circuit appears to have assumed that there was a shared intent to abandon the prior United States habitual residence and take up a new habitual residence in Australia. Id. at 224 ("Although Mr. and Mrs. Feder viewed Australia very differently, both agreed to move to that country and live there with one another and their son. . . . That Mrs. Feder did not intend to remain in Australia permanently and believed that she would leave if her marriage did not improve does not void the couple's settled purpose to live as a family in the place where Mr. Feder had found work.") (emphasis added).
It is not clear from the Third Circuit's opinion whether or not the district court made a finding of fact with respect to the shared intent of the couple about their move to Australia or, if there was such a finding, whether the Third Circuit failed to defer thereto. We reiterate our agreement with Mozes that the district court's finding of fact with respect to parents' shared intent to abandon a prior habitual residence and take up a new habitual residence is an historical fact entitled to deference and should be reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. Although the shared intent is an historical fact, the ultimate determination of habitual residence is not; rather, it is the result of the application of the applicable law to the underlying facts, and an appellate court's review of the ultimate determination of habitual residence is de novo. To the extent that the district court in Feder made a finding of fact that there was no shared intent of the parents to abandon the habitual residence in the United States and take up a new habitual residence in Australia, and to the extent that the Third Circuit failed to defer to such a finding, we would disagree.