Source: http://t.openjurist.org/306/f3d/295/united-states-v-stewart
Timestamp: 2018-02-25 02:01:35
Document Index: 663966942

Matched Legal Cases: ['art\n306', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 3231', '§ 3231', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 841', '§ 841']

306 F3d 295 United States v. Stewart | OpenJurist
306 F. 3d 295 - United States v. Stewart
306 F3d 295 United States v. Stewart
Gregg L. Sullivan (argued and briefed), Assistant United States Attorney, Chattanooga, TN, for U.S.
We also emphasize that the constitutional error likewise does not lie in the indictment itself. The government's failure to allege a drug quantity does not render a drug distribution indictment constitutionally infirm. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974) ("[An indictment is sufficient if it, first, contains the elements of the offense charged and fairly informs a defendant of the charge against which he must defend, and, second, enables him to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense."]). Instead, when specific quantities are not alleged, a defendant should be sentenced under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C), which establishes the default statutory maximum sentences and does not require as an element of the offense a specific quantity of drugs. See Page, 232 F.3d at 543 (holding that because indictment failed to mention drug quantity and no such quantity was found by the jury, defendants could only be subjected to the penalties prescribed under § 841(b)(1)(C)). Thus, it would be imprudent for defense counsel to object to an indictment which, by all rights, is facially sound. To do so would be in direct opposition to his client's penal interests; the only logical outcome of such a challenge would be for the government to replace the charge under 21 U.S.C. § 841 with a more specific charge, specifically alleging a drug quantity, which might expose the defendant to a higher statutory penalty range. Instead of objecting to a valid indictment or jury instruction, the proper time for a defendant to raise a challenge to his sentence is at the time the actual violation occurs — at the time of sentencing. See United States v. Jackson, 240 F.3d 1245, 1248 (10th Cir.2001) ("The error ... is best characterized as sentencing in excess of the statutory maximum penalty applicable to the offense of conviction.").
Specifically, in Strayhorn, we considered the appropriate standard of review for the case of a defendant who brought a seemingly belated constitutional challenge to his sentence on direct appeal. Apprendi was decided after the Defendant's sentencing hearing and subsequent to briefing on appeal. Thus, he raised the constitutional challenge to his sentence for the first time at oral argument. We dismissed the notion that the constitutional issue had been waived and instead held that, because the defendant was asserting a new constitutional rule that was decided while his case was pending, Apprendi should apply retroactively to his case. Strayhorn, 250 F.3d at 467 (citing Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987)) (holding that appellate courts should apply the new constitutional rules retroactively to cases still on direct review). We further found that, because the defendant had steadfastly challenged the district court's drug quantity determination and the amounts attributed to him in the presentence investigation report ("PSIR"), his failure to articulate a constitutional challenge at trial did not require application of the plain error standard of review:
As explained previously, we need not decide with respect to the issue of drug quantity whether Rossell, Tramble, or Stewart's sentences violated Apprendi. Even assuming that there was error, that was plain and that affected substantial rights, Olano, 507 U.S. at 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770, we still believe these Defendants would not be entitled to relief. This is so because even "[i]f all three [of these] conditions are met, an appellate court may... exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, ... only if ... the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings." United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, ___, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 1785, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002) (emphasis added). In Cotton, the Supreme Court dealt with an issue in a case analogous to the one now before this Court, where drug quantity in a vast drug conspiracy case was neither charged in the indictment nor proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court held that because the overwhelming evidence in the record showed that the defendants' drug conspiracy involved drug quantities well above that necessary to impose sentences under the higher ranges of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b), then despite the fact that Apprendi had been violated, and even assuming the defendants' substantial rights had been affected, the Court would not address the error because the error did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. at 1786-87. According to the Court, inasmuch as these defendants, who were involved in a wide-spread drug conspiracy, failed to raise their Apprendi argument before the district court, the "real" threat to the judicial proceedings would be to allow them "to receive a sentence prescribed for those committing less substantial drug offenses." Id. at 1787. Likewise, the overwhelming and largely uncontroverted evidence regarding drug quantity in this vast drug conspiracy to which each of these Defendants pleaded guilty convinces us that affirming their sentences would not seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public confidence of the judicial proceedings. Id. Because the Supreme Court has instructed that under plain error review, we may only correct error that seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings, and we find no such error in this case with respect to these three Defendants, we decline to correct any Apprendi error that may have occurred in the imposition of their sentences.13
Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that "[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." In Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999), which was decided shortly after Jones, the Supreme Court distinguished between "trial errors" which may be reviewed for harmless error and "structural errors" which are excluded from harmless error review. Structural errors reflect a "defect affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply error in the trial process itself." Id. at 8, 119 S.Ct. 1827 (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991)).14 The Court in Neder recognized that "most constitutional errors can be harmless." Id. at 8, 119 S.Ct. 1827 (quoting Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 306, 111 S.Ct. 1246). Indeed, "if the defendant had counsel and was tried by an impartial adjudicator, there is a strong presumption that any other [constitutional] errors that may have occurred are subject to harmless-error analysis." Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579, 106 S.Ct. 3101, 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986).
With these principles in mind, the Supreme Court determined that a district court's error in failing to charge the jury on an element of an offense is simply an absence of a "complete verdict" on every element of an offense which violates a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. However, the Court held that failure to deliver a jury instruction was subject to harmless review because the error did not render the trial fundamentally unfair. The Court noted that omission of a jury instruction "differs markedly from the constitutional violations [it has] found to defy harmless-error review." Neder, 527 U.S. at 8, 119 S.Ct. 1827.
Further, the Second Circuit has held that a failure to allege drug quantity in an indictment or submit the question of drug type or quantity to a jury is subject to plain error review, pursuant to Fed. R.Crim.P. 52(b), when the defendant failed to object to these errors before the district court. See United States v. Thomas, 274 F.3d 655, 659 (2d Cir.2001) (en banc). In Thomas, the Second Circuit overruled a prior circuit panel's holding in another case, which had held that where an element of the offense is not charged in the indictment, the defect is not subject to plain error review inasmuch as the error is jurisdictional. Id. at 659 (overruling United States v. Tran, 234 F.3d 798 (2d Cir. 2000)). Similarly, the Tenth Circuit initially held that where the indictment failed to allege drug quantity, such a defect was not subject to plain or harmless error review. See Jackson, 240 F.3d at 1248-49 (rejecting government's argument that defendant's 30 year sentence was subject to harmless or plain error review where the indictment failed to include essential element of drug quantity). However, that court has revisited its position regarding indictments that fail to allege essential elements of a crime. See United States v. Prentiss, 256 F.3d 971, 981 (10th Cir.2001) (en banc) (holding that a "failure of an indictment to allege an essential element of a crime does not deprive a district court of subject matter jurisdiction; rather, such failure is subject to harmless error review"). The Tenth Circuit further held that "[t]o the extent that this Court's prior decisions ... hold otherwise, we overrule them."16 Id. The Tenth Circuit also expressly rejected the argument that a failure to allege an essential element of a crime in an indictment necessarily falls into the category of structural error, requiring automatic reversal. Id. at 983-85. Finally, a panel of the Fifth Circuit previously held that where Apprendi error occurs because of a failure to charge drug quantity in the indictment, the error must be corrected inasmuch as the error is jurisdictional, and a district court only has jurisdiction to sentence a defendant to a sentence equal to or less than the statutory maximum. United States v. Gonzalez, 259 F.3d 355, 360-61 & n. 3 (5th Cir.2001). However, relying on Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 152 L.Ed.2d 860, the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, recently overruled Gonzalez, to the extent that case held that an indictment that fails to allege the essential element of drug quantity deprives a court of jurisdiction. United States v. Longoria, 298 F.3d 367 (5th Cir.2002).
However, it is now settled that the omission of the element of drug quantity from the indictment did not deprive the district court of subject matter jurisdiction over the cases now before us. See Cotton, 535 U.S. at ___, 122 S.Ct. at 1784 (rejecting Fourth Circuit's holding that failure to allege drug quantity in an indictment is jurisdictional, such that it deprives a court of jurisdiction to impose a sentence for an offense not charged in the indictment). "Jurisdiction is the power to decide a justiciable controversy, and includes questions of law as well as fact ... [and] even the unconstitutionality of the statute under which the proceeding is brought does not oust a court of jurisdiction." United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58, 66, 71 S.Ct. 595, 95 L.Ed. 747 (1951) (citations omitted); Cotton, 535 U.S. at ___, 122 S.Ct. at 1785 (explaining that jurisdiction means "the courts' statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case"). Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231, district courts "have original jurisdiction ... over all offenses against the laws of the United States." Id. "[E]rrors in a non-frivolous indictment do not strip the district court of jurisdiction under § 3231." United States v. Bjorkman, 270 F.3d 482, 490 (7th Cir. 2001). Therefore, "[an indictment's failure to allege an element of a crime is not jurisdictional in the sense that it affects a court's subject matter jurisdiction, i.e., a court's constitutional or statutory power to adjudicate [the] case.... ]" Prentiss, 256 F.3d at 982 (quoting United States v. Martin, 147 F.3d 529, 532 (7th Cir.1998)).
We also decline to categorize the omission from the indictment that occurred in these cases as structural error. The Supreme Court has identified "a limited class of fundamental constitutional errors that defy analysis by harmless error standards." Neder, 527 U.S. at 7, 119 S.Ct. 1827 (internal quotation marks omitted). Structural errors require automatic reversal, despite the effect of the error on the trial's outcome. Id. As for all other errors, "courts must apply Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a)'s harmless error standards, and disregard errors that are harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Neder, 527 U.S. at 7, 119 S.Ct. 1827 (emphasis in the original). The error complained of in the instant case is not among those listed in Neder that classify as structural.17 As previously mentioned, structural "errors infect the entire trial process ... and `necessarily render a trial fundamentally unfair....'" Neder, 527 U.S. at 8, 119 S.Ct. 1827 (citations omitted). In other words, structural errors "deprive defendants of `basic protections' without which `a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence... and no criminal punishment may be regarded as fundamentally fair.'" Id. at 8-9, 119 S.Ct. 1827; Sanchez, 269 F.3d at 1272-73.
In Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 152 L.Ed.2d 860, the Supreme Court declined to address the defendants' argument that the failure to allege drug quantity in the indictment was structural error. Id. at 1786. As we previously explained, on plain error review, the Court instead assumed the error affected the defendants' substantial rights but found that the error did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. However, the fact that the Court declined to notice the error under plain error review supports the view that such error was not necessarily "structural" requiring automatic reversal, inasmuch as it is difficult to imagine that an error that "necessarily render[s] a criminal trial fundamentally unfair or an unreliable vehicle for determining guilt or innocence," such that "no criminal punishment may be regarded as fundamentally fair," Neder, 527 U.S. at 8-9, 119 S.Ct. 1827, does not also "seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings," Cotton, 535 U.S. at ___, 122 S.Ct. at 1786.
This reasoning is buttressed by the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997), in which the issue of materiality in a perjury prosecution was decided by the district court rather than the jury. Id. at 464, 117 S.Ct. 1544. Under the law that existed at the time of trial, the district court instructed the jury that it did not have to decide the issue of materiality. Id. Reviewing the issue for plain error, the Supreme Court reserved the decision as to whether the error affected substantial rights, but ultimately decided not to notice the error inasmuch as it did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings because the evidence pertaining to materiality was overwhelming and essentially uncontroverted. Id. at 469-70, 117 S.Ct. 1544. The Court later noted in Neder, when analyzing whether omission of an element of the offense from jury instructions was structural error, that the conclusion reached in Johnson "cuts against the argument that the omission of an element will always [or necessarily] render a trial unfair." Neder, 527 U.S. at 9, 119 S.Ct. 1827 (emphasis in the original). Likewise, the Supreme Court's holding that the erroneous omission of drug quantity from the indictment does not seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings, lends strong support for the proposition that such error is not structural and will not always or necessarily render a criminal trial unfair. After all, structural error is not to be determined on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 14, 119 S.Ct. 1827. "[A] constitutional error is either structural or it is not." Id. The Supreme Court's approach to such errors has been categorical. Id. Inasmuch as only a limited class of "fundamental constitutional errors" defies harmless error review, and all other constitutional errors are subject to such review, id. at 7, 119 S.Ct. 1827, we believe harmless error analysis is appropriate under the facts of this case.
Finally, King, 272 F.3d 366, supports the view that harmless error analysis is appropriate where drug quantity is neither charged in the indictment nor submitted to the trier of fact for proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The Apprendi-based challenge in King was reviewed for plain error. Under that standard of review, before a court may correct an error, it must determine whether (1) there was error, (2) that was plain, and (3) that affected substantial rights. Id. at 375. Even then, the error can only be corrected if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. We ultimately determined that the defendants' substantial rights were not affected by the Apprendi error. Id. at 379-80. We explained in King that the substantial rights prong of the plain error analysis "is akin to the harmless error analysis employed in preserved error cases...." Id. at 378. The difference, however, is that under plain error review the burden is on the defendant to show that the error was prejudicial, i.e., that his substantial rights were affected. United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, ___, 122 S.Ct. 1043, 1048, 152 L.Ed.2d 90 (2002). The tables are turned under harmless error review, as the government bears the burden of showing that the error had no effect on a defendants' substantial rights. Id. Nevertheless, the fact that we found in King that the defendants' substantial rights had not been affected by the failure to allege drug quantity in the indictment or to have the quantity issue proven beyond a reasonable doubt, supports the view that such error may be harmless if the government can shoulder its burden. Vonn, 535 U.S. at ___, 122 S.Ct. at 1048.
Having made the determination that harmless error analysis is appropriate, however, does not end our inquiry. Where a reviewing court, after examining the entire record, "cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury verdict would have been the same absent the error — for example, where the defendant contested the omitted element and raised evidence sufficient to support a contrary finding — it should not find the error harmless." Neder, 527 U.S. at 19, 119 S.Ct. 1827. Thus, "a court reviewing a defendant's sentence in which it finds an Apprendi error must look to whether the `omitted element is supported by uncontroverted evidence,' and also `ask[] whether the record contains evidence that could rationally lead to a contrary finding with respect to the omitted element.'" Candelario, 240 F.3d at 1308 (citing Neder, 527 U.S. at 18-19, 119 S.Ct. 1827); King, 272 F.3d at 378 (explaining that "some circuits have concluded that a factual finding that Apprendi would otherwise require to be determined by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt may be harmless if the court can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury verdict would have been the same absent the error."). As the Court in Neder explained:
Neder, 527 U.S. at 19, 119 S.Ct. 1827.
In the instant case, however, Nathan Benford not only fails to challenge the amount of drugs attributed to him, but also the uncontroverted evidence — witness testimony and otherwise — presented at trial shows that Benford trafficked in quantities far above the 50 grams of crack cocaine or 5 kilograms of cocaine powder required for sentencing under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). Numerous witnesses testified that they had been involved with Benford in distributing kilogram quantities of cocaine or storing large quantities of crack cocaine for him. Benford even stipulated to the quantities of some of these drugs, such as the 1,369 grams of crack that co-defendant Eddie Joe Mitchell testified that he retrieved at Benford's direction. Myron Hilt testified that he had once delivered a kilogram of cocaine to Tramble at Benford's direction. On another occasion, Benford and Hilt were counting money after selling a kilogram of cocaine, when Rena Benford asked them if they needed help. Although they told her they did not, they directed that she put the money in a safe located in the Uptown Supper Club. Hilt also testified that he and Benford had once purchased a kilogram of cocaine, and that Rena Benford delivered some of the money to her husband in order that he might make the purchase. Co-defendant Cleveland Billingsley testified that upon his release from prison in 1998, he received several ounces of crack and powder cocaine directly from Benford. He also testified that he witnessed Benford possessing other quantities of cocaine, including a kilogram of cocaine powder that Benford distributed to Billingsley and to others. Co-defendant Tracy Ellis testified that she stored drugs in her apartment for Benford. Pursuant to a search warrant, police recovered 408.2 grams of crack and 148.5 grams of cocaine hydrochloride from Ellis's apartment. After reviewing the presentence report, which recounted the above-cited events regarding Benford's cocaine dealings and numerous others, the district court found that more than 3,000 grams of crack and 6,000 grams of cocaine hydrochloride were properly attributable to Benford. We have no doubt based on this uncontroverted evidence that a jury would have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Benford was involved with quantities of drugs well above the requisite amounts needed for sentencing under § 841(b)(1)(A). See Sanchez, 269 F.3d at 1273 (explaining that omission from a § 841 indictment is similar to the jury instruction error in Neder inasmuch as part of the defendant's argument is that quantity must be charged so that "it can be submitted to the jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt"). Therefore, we believe that the Apprendi error in Benford's case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Neder, 527 U.S. at 8, 119 S.Ct. 1827.
However, unlike the panel majority on this issue, I believe Mrs. Benford's case presents a different matter. Mrs. Benford's guideline range under the Sentencing Guidelines was 290 to 365 months. The district court concluded that "being hypersuperconservative," the quantity of drugs attributable to Mrs. Benford fell within the statutory range of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B), although her judgment indicates that she was actually sentenced under the higher provisions of § 841(b)(1)(A). (J.A. at 366-72.) The government also argues on appeal that the evidence was sufficient to show Mrs. Benford's involvement with quantities of crack cocaine and cocaine hydrochloride to support a sentence under § 841(b)(1)(B). However, a review of the record shows that testimony regarding Mrs. Benford's actual involvement with drugs was minimal compared to her husband. As her counsel noted at sentencing, he would go a day or two at trial without cross-examining witnesses because Mrs. Benford was not mentioned. (J.A. at 1513.) The district court based Mrs. Benford's sentence largely on testimony that she offered to assist counting money earned from selling a kilogram of cocaine; placed money in a safe located in Uptown Supper Club that according to Hilt, he and Mr. Benford planned to later use to buy a kilogram of cocaine powder; and helped transport 500 grams of crack on one occasion. Billingsley also testified that he witnessed Mrs. Benford cook cocaine into crack on one occasion. I cannot on this record, with so few references to Mrs. Benford's actual involvement with the drug amounts in this vast conspiracy, determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the grand jury would have indicted her for conspiracy to possess 50 grams or more of crack or five kilograms of cocaine. See Jordan, 291 F.3d at 1095-96. More importantly, inasmuch as Mrs. Benford had no notice that drug quantity was an issue at trial, there is no way of knowing whether she would have contested drug quantity, and if so, of assessing the evidence that she would have presented contesting quantity. I therefore cannot find based on the present record that the failure to allege drug quantity in the indictment or to have the jury determine drug quantity beyond a reasonable doubt was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Contrary to the government's arguments, it is not enough that there might be some evidence in the record that might permit affirming the sentence the district court imposed in Mrs. Benford's case. Rather, in determining whether Mrs. Benford's substantial rights were affected, the evidence must be over-whelming and essentially uncontroverted. See Neder, 527 U.S. at 19, 119 S.Ct. 1827; Candelario, 240 F.3d at 1308 (emphasis added). Further, the Court must be convinced that the record evidence could not lead to a contrary finding with respect to the element omitted. Id. Had Mrs. Benford realized that drug quantity would be an issue at trial, she through her counsel might have posed different questions or attacked witness testimony regarding her involvement in drug trafficking in ways that might have raised sufficient doubt in juror's minds regarding the exact quantities of drugs that Mrs. Benford was charged with cooking or transporting, etc. See Jordan, 291 F.3d at 1095-96. Determining whether the jury would have reached the same results as the district court on this record would be speculative at best. Because I cannot find that the Apprendi error in Mrs. Benford's case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, I would vacate Mrs. Benford's sentence and remand her case to the district court for re-sentencing under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C).18
"A district court's finding that a defendant possessed a firearm during a drug crime is a factual finding subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review." United States v. Elder, 90 F.3d 1110, 1133 (6th Cir.1996) (citations omitted). The Sentencing Guidelines provide that the base offense level of a defendant convicted of a drug offense should be increased by two levels "[i]f a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was possessed." United States v. Owusu, 199 F.3d 329, 347 (6th Cir.2000) (citing USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1)). To apply the enhancement, the government must establish that (1) the defendant actually or constructively "possessed" the weapon; and (2) that such possession was during the commission of the offense. United States v. Hill, 79 F.3d 1477, 1485 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 858, 117 S.Ct. 158, 136 L.Ed.2d 102 (1996). "Once it is established that a defendant was in possession of a weapon during the commission of an offense, a presumption arises that such possession was connected to the offense." Id. The burden then shifts to the defendant to show that "it was clearly improbable that the weapon was connected to the offense." Id. (citing USSG § 2D1.1, comment. (n.3)). "Constructive possession of an item is the `ownership, or dominion or control' over the item itself, `or dominion over the premises' where the item is located." Id. (citation omitted). "If the offense committed is part of a conspiracy, however, the government does not have to prove that the defendant actually possessed the weapon, but instead may establish that a member of the conspiracy possessed the firearm and that the member's possession was reasonably foreseeable by other members in the conspiracy." Owusu, 199 F.3d at 347 (citation omitted).
Apprendi was decided a year after Jones, which was decided on March 24, 1999. See Jones, 526 U.S. 227, 119 S.Ct. 1215, 143 L.Ed.2d 311. Strayhorn was sentenced in February 1999. 250 F.3d at 465-66.
Stewart also contends that her due process rights were violated underApprendi because the district court increased her base-offense level by two levels after finding by a preponderance of the evidence that she possessed a firearm, pursuant to USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1). She failed to raise this issue before the district court. In any event, we do not believe that the district court's factual finding in this regard violated Stewart's due process rights. Cf. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 87, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (holding that due process not offended by Pennsylvania statute that allowed trial court to increase a defendant's sentencing range up to a five-year minimum upon finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant visibly possessed a firearm while committing an underlying offense; while statute allowed court to "up the ante" on defendant's sentence, it did not alter the maximum penalty for the underlying offense). Further, Stewart pleaded guilty to the drug conspiracy and was subject to a statutory maximum 20-year sentence under § 841(b)(1)(C). We also have already held that the 190 month sentence she received was proper under plain error review, considering the amount of drugs involved in the conspiracy. The fact that her sentencing range under the Sentencing Guidelines was increased because of the district court's factual finding does not change that result. See, e.g., Harper, 246 F.3d at 531 n. 7 (holding that because defendant's sentence under § 841(b) was proper, the fact that the district court imposed a two-level enhancement to his base offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines for obstruction of justice did not implicate Apprendi; resulting sentence did not exceed statutory maximum for crime for which defendant pleaded guilty).
The Court even recited a short list of errors, including total denial of counsel, biased trial judge, racial discrimination in grand jury selection, denial of self-representation at trial, denial of public trial, and defective reasonable doubt instruction as examples of structural errorsSee Neder, 527 U.S. at 8, 119 S.Ct. 1827.
The lead opinion compares the evidence that was presented at trial regarding Nathan Benford's involvement in drug trafficking with the testimony that implicated Rena Benford in this illegal activity. Although I recognize that the quantity of the government's proof against Nathan Bedford was substantially greater than its evidence against Rena Benford, this fact does not, in my opinion, preclude us from concluding that a jury would have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Rena Benford conspired to possess at least 5 grams of crack cocaine or 500 grams of cocaine powder. To put it simply, we need not be concerned with whether the evidence against Rena Benford was "super-overwhelming" or just "barely overwhelming," so long as it was indeed overwhelming. See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 17, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (explaining that "where a reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the omitted element was uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence, such that the jury verdict would have been the same absent the error, the erroneous instruction is properly found to be harmless").
I believe that one final matter tangentially related to Rena Benford's sentence merits a brief comment. The lead opinion relies upon United States v. Ramirez, 242 F.3d 348 (6th Cir.2001), at several points in its discussion of the Apprendi issue. In Ramirez, this court held that where the quantity of drugs increases a defendant's mandatory minimum sentence, even if it does not increase the potential penalty above the statutory maximum sentence, the quantity must be set forth in the indictment, submitted to the jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 351-52. But in Harris v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 2406, 153 L.Ed.2d 524 (2002), the Supreme Court held that Apprendi does not apply to mandatory minimum sentences, so long as the required minimum sentence remains below the statutory maximum penalty for the offense committed. Harris, ___ U.S. at ___, ___, 122 S.Ct. at 2418, 2420 (holding that Apprendi did not apply to the two-year increase in the defendant's mandatory minimum sentence for brandishing a firearm during a drug-trafficking crime because "the facts guiding judicial discretion below the statutory maximum need not be alleged in the indictment, submitted to the jury, or proved beyond a reasonable doubt"). This apparent conflict between Harris and Ramirez does not affect the lead opinion's disposition of the Apprendi issue, nor is it necessary for us to resolve the question of whether Ramirez remains good law. Nevertheless, in my view, continued reliance upon Ramirez is questionable at best.