Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/05-8820.ZO.html
Timestamp: 2018-06-18 06:13:51
Document Index: 109789671

Matched Legal Cases: ['§2244', '§2244', '§2244', '§2244', '§2244', '§2244', '§2244', '§2255', '§2244', '§2244', '§2244', '§2244']

Petitioner Gary Lawrence and his wife used a pipe and baseball bat to kill Michael Finken. A Florida jury convicted Lawrence of first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit murder, auto theft, and petty theft. The trial court sentenced Lawrence to death. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed Lawrence’s conviction and sentence on appeal, and this Court denied certiorari on January 20, 1998. 522 U. S. 1080 .
On January 19, 1999, 364 days later, Lawrence filed an application for state postconviction relief in a Florida trial court.1 The court denied relief, and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed, issuing its mandate on November 18, 2002. See Lawrence v. State,831 So. 2d 121 (per curiam). Lawrence sought review of the denial of state postconviction relief in this Court. We denied certiorari on March 24, 2003. 538 U. S. 926 .
Based on this provision, the parties agree that AEDPA’s limitations period was tolled from the filing of Lawrence’s petition for state postconviction relief until the Florida Supreme Court issued its mandate affirming the denial of that petition. At issue here is whether the limitations period was also tolled during the pendency of Lawrence’s petition for certiorari to this Court seeking review of the denial of state postconviction relief. If it was tolled, Lawrence’s federal habeas application was timely. So we must decide whether, according to §2244(d)(2), an “application for State post-conviction or other collateral review” “is pending” while this Court considers a certiorari petition.2
Read naturally, the text of the statute must mean that the statute of limitations is tolled only while state courts review the application. As we stated in Carey v. Saffold, 536 U. S. 214, 220 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted), a state postconviction application “remains pending” “until the application has achieved final resolution through the State’s postconviction procedures.” This Court is not a part of a “State’s post-conviction procedures.” State review ends when the state courts have finally resolved an application for state postconviction relief. After the State’s highest court has issued its mandate or denied review, no other state avenues for relief remain open. And an application for state postconviction review no longer exists. All that remains is a separate certiorari petition pending before a federal court. The application for state postconviction review is therefore not “pending” after the state court’s postconviction reviewis complete, and §2244(d)(2) does not toll the 1-year limitations period during the pendency of a petition forcertiorari.
Yet we have said that state prisoners need not petition for certiorari to exhaust state remedies. Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 435–438 (1963) ; County Court of Ulster Cty. v. Allen, 442 U. S. 140, 149–150, n. 7 (1979) . State remedies are exhausted at the end of state-court review. Fay, supra, at 435–438; Allen, supra, at 149–150, n. 7.
Lawrence argues that §2244(d)(2) should be construed to have the same meaning as §2244(d)(1)(A), the trigger provision that determines when AEDPA’s statute of limitations begins to run. But §2244(d)(1)(A) uses much different language from §2244(d)(2), referring to “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” §2244(d)(1)(A) (emphasis added). When interpreting similar language in §2255, we explained that “direct review” has long included review by this Court. Clay v. United States, 537 U. S. 522, 527–528 (2003) . Indeed, we noted that “[t]he Courts of Appeals have uniformly interpreted ‘direct review’ in §2244(d)(1)(A) to encompass review of a state conviction by this Court.” Id., at 528, n. 3 (collecting cases). By contrast, §2244(d)(2) refers exclusively to “State post-conviction or other collateral review,” language not easily interpreted to include participation by a federal court.
Lawrence argues that even greater anomalies result from our interpretation when the state court grants relief to a prisoner and the state petitions for certiorari. In that hypothetical, Lawrence maintains that the prisoner would arguably lack standing to file a federal habeas application immediately after the state court’s judgment (because the state court granted him relief) but would later be time barred from filing a federal habeas application if we granted certiorari and the State prevailed. Again, this particular procedural posture is extremely rare. Even so, equitable tolling may be available, in light of the arguably extraordinary circumstances and the prisoner’s diligence. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U. S. 408 , and n. 8 (2005).3 We cannot base our interpretation of the statute on an exceedingly rare inequity that Congress almost certainly was not contemplating and that may well be cured by equitable tolling.
Lawrence makes several arguments in support of his contention that equitable tolling applies to his case. First, he argues that legal confusion about whether AEDPA’s limitations period is tolled by certiorari petitions justifies equitable tolling. But at the time the limitations period expired in Lawrence’s case, the Eleventh Circuit and every other Circuit to address the issue agreed that the limitations period was not tolled by certiorari petitions. See, e.g., Coates, 211 F. 3d,at 1227. The settled state ofthe law at the relevant time belies any claim to legal confusion.
Second, Lawrence argues that his counsel’s mistake in miscalculating the limitations period entitles him to equitable tolling. If credited, this argument would essentially equitably toll limitations periods for every person whose attorney missed a deadline. Attorney miscalculation is simply not sufficient to warrant equitable tolling, particularly in the postconviction context where prisoners have no constitutional right to counsel. E.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U. S. 722, 756–757 (1991) .
1 Lawrence contends that delays in Florida’s program for appointing postconviction counsel and other issues outside of his control caused 298 days to pass before Florida appointed an attorney who took an active role in his postconviction case. These facts have little relevance to our analysis. Lawrence did not seek certiorari on the question whether these facts entitle him to equitable tolling. Indeed, Lawrence was able to file his state postconviction petition on time in spite of these delays. And before this Court, he argues that his attorney mistakenly missed the federal habeas deadline, not that he lacked adequate time to file a federal habeas application.
2 We have previously held that the word “State” modifies both the terms “post-conviction” and “other collateral review.” Duncan v. Walker, 533 U. S. 167, 172–174 (2001) . The question, therefore, is whether “an application for State post-conviction or other [State] collateral review … is pending.” §2244(d)(2) (emphasis added).
3 As discussed below, we assume, as the parties do, the availability of equitable tolling under §2244.