Source: http://www.oblon.com/publications/beginning-an-inter-partes-proceeding-before-the-trademark-trial-and-appeal-board-nature-grounds-and-initial-pleadings/
Timestamp: 2017-08-20 00:15:53
Document Index: 20179725

Matched Legal Cases: ['§1063', '§303', '§303', '§1052', '§1052', '§1052', '§1209', '§2', '§310', '§2', '§310', '§310']

Beginning an Inter Partes Proceeding Before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board: Nature, Grounds and Initial Pleadings
I. Challenges to Registrability v. Challenges to Use
Since the Board can determine only the right to register, it is not authorized to determine the right to use, nor may it decide broader questions of infringement or unfair competition. Similarly, the Board has no authority to declare any portion of the Lanham Act, or any other act of Congress, unconstitutional. See Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. v. Advantage Rent-A-Car Inc., 62 USPQ2d 1857, 1858 (TTAB 2002), aff'd, 300 F.3d 1333, 66 USPQ2d 1811 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (no jurisdiction to decide issues arising under state dilution laws); Person's Co. v. Christman, 900 F.2d 1565, 1571, 14 USPQ2d 1477, 1481 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (cannot adjudicate unfair competition issues); Paramount Pictures Corp. v. White, 31 USPQ2d 1768, 1771 n.5 (TTAB 1994) (no jurisdiction over claims of trademark infringement and unfair competition); Yasutomo & Co. v. Commercial Ball Pen Co., 184 USPQ 60, 61 (TTAB 1974) (no jurisdiction to address anti-trust issues); and American-International Travel Service, Inc. v. AITS, Inc., 174 USPQ 175, 179 (TTAB 1972) (no jurisdiction to determine whether opposer violated criminal statute); Harjo v. Pro Football Inc., 30 USPQ2d 1828, 1832-33 (TTAB 1994) (no authority to declare provisions of the Act unconstitutional nor to determine whether Section 2(a) is overbroad or vague) and Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 50 USPQ2d 1705, 1735 n.88 (TTAB 1999),rev'd on other grounds, Pro-Football Inc. v. Harjo, 68 USPQ2d 1225 (DC DC 2003); and Zirco Corp. v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 21 USPQ2d 1542, 1544 (TTAB 1991) (no jurisdiction to determine whether Section 7(c) of the Act, the constructive use provision, violates the Commerce Clause of the Constitution).
Any person who believes he or she is or will be damaged by registration of a mark, can show a "real interest" in the proceeding, and has a "reasonable basis for its belief of damage" has standing to file an opposition or cancellation proceeding. Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092, 1095, 50 USPQ2d 1023, 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1999) and Lipton Industries, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 670 F.2d 1024, 1028, 213 USPQ 185, 189 (CCPA 1982); see also Lanham Act Sections 13 and 14, 15 U.S.C. §§1063 and 1064, and TBMP §303(b). The party in the position of the plaintiff[2] must allege a "direct and personal stake" in the outcome of the proceeding in order to have a "real interest" and the allegations in support of plaintiff's belief of damage must have a reasonable basis "in fact." Ritchie v.Simpson, 50 USPQ2d at 1026-1027. Actual damage need not be pleaded or proved in order to establish standing or to prevail in an opposition or cancellation proceeding, and the party in the position of the plaintiff need not assert proprietary rights in a term in order to have standing. Jewelers Vigilance Committee Inc. v. Ullenberg Corp., 823 F.2d 490, 492, 2 USPQ2d 2021, 2024 (Fed. Cir. 1987), on remand, 5 USPQ2d 1622 (TTAB 1987), revâ€™d on other grounds, 853 F.2d 888, 7 USPQ2d 1628 (Fed. Cir. 1988); TBMP §303.03.
2. The grounds specified in Lanham Act Section 2(e), 15 U.S.C. §1052(e) include, for example, that the party in position of the defendant's mark, when used on or in connection with the goods or services of the party in position of the defendant, is merely descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive of them,or that the mark is primarily geographically descriptiveor primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive of them; or that the mark is primarily merely a surname. SeeLanham Act Sections 2(e)(1), (2), (3) and (4); 15 U.S.C. §1052(e)(1), (2), (3) and (4); In re California Innovations, Inc., 329 F.3d 1334, 66 USPQ2d 1853 (Fed. Cir. 2003); In re Save Venice New York, Inc., 259 F.3d 1346, 59 USPQ2d 1778 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re Nett Designs Inc., 236 F.3d 1339, 57 USPQ2d 1564 (Fed. Cir. 2001);In re Abcor Development Corp., 588 F.2d 811, 813, 200 USPQ 215, 217 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
In In re Les Halles de Paris J.V., 67 USPQ2d 1539 (CAFC 2003), the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals further defined prongs (2) and (3) established inCalifornia Innovations, as they apply to service marks. Under In re Les Halles de Paris, the second prong of the test requires some additional reason for the consumer to associate the services with the geographic location invoked by the service mark. For example, it must be shown that patrons will likely be misled into making some meaningful connection between the services and the relevant place named in the service mark. Furthermore, the third prong of the test requires a showing that some heightened association between the services and the relevant geographic denotation in order to raise an inference of deception or materiality for a service mark. Without such an inference, direct evidence of materiality must be presented. In re LesHallesde Paris, 67 USPQ2d at 1542.
8.Registration of a mark may be opposed or cancelled if the mark is or has become generic. Lanham Act Sections 2(e)(1), 14(3); 15 U.S.C. §§1052(e)(1), 1064(3). Generic terms are terms that the relevant purchasing public understands primarily as the common or class name for the goods or services. TMEP §1209.01(c); In re Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp., 240 F.3d 1341, 1345, 57 USPQ2d 1807, 1811 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
[4] must be filed. The Notice will also specify the opening and closing dates for the parties' discovery period and each parties' time for taking testimony. 37 CFR §§2.105, 2.113 and 2.120(a); TBMP §310.01. A party in the position of the defendant does not have to file an answer to the complaint in an opposition or cancellation proceeding until it receives the Board's Institution Notice and Trial Order setting the time for filing an answer, which is generally 40 days from the mailing date of the Notice. 37 CFR §2.113; TBMP §310.03(a). Upon stipulation by both parties and approved by the Board, or upon motion filed by one of the parties and approved by the Board, the time for filing an answer may be extended or reopened. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b); TBMP §§310.03(c) and 509.
Attached are: Model Notice of Opposition and Model Petition to Cancel; Excerpts from Federal Register Notice of September 26, 2003 pages 55,762-55,770 and Excerpts of the TTAB's ESTTA website.