Source: http://docplayer.it/8499241-Democrazia-sicurezza-democracy-security-review.html
Timestamp: 2018-04-25 21:02:22
Document Index: 249179991

Matched Legal Cases: ['artículo 1', 'artículo 4', 'artículo 5', 'artículo 6', 'artículo 6', 'artículo 4', 'artículo 4', 'artículo 2', 'artículo 8', 'artículo 3', 'artículo 8', 'artículo 3', 'artículo 13']

1 Anno V, n. 2, 2015 Data di pubblicazione: 1 luglio 2015
2 Democrazia & Sicurezza Democracy & Security Review Direttore responsabile: Salvatore Bonfiglio Powered by Direzione e redazione: c/o Laboratorio Multimediale e di Comparazione Giuridica via G. Chiabrera, Roma Università degli Studi ʺRoma Treʺ. Iscrizione presso il Tribunale di Roma, n. 373/2011 del 5 dicembre ISSN X Comitato direttivo Salvatore Bonfiglio (Università degli Studi ʺRoma Treʺ Direttore scientifico) Artemi Rallo Lombarte (Universitat Jaume I Castellòn Condirettore) Consiglio Scientifico Domenico Amirante, Fabrizio Battistelli, Paolo Benvenuti, Salvatore Bonfiglio, Roberto Borrello, Francesco Clementi, Mario De Caro, Rosario Garcia Mahamut, Hermann Groß, Andrew Hoskins, Martin Innes, Luis Jimena Quesada, Luis Maria Lopez Guerra, Stelio Mangiameli, Maria Luisa Maniscalco, Kostas Mavrias, Lina Panella, Otto Pfersmann, Artemi Rallo Lombarte, Angelo Rinella, Marco Ruotolo, Cheryl Saunders, Giovanna Spagnuolo, Alessandro Torre, Matthew C. Waxman. Comitato di redazione Caporedattore: Gabriele Maestri (con la collaborazione di Cristina Pauner Chulvi). Osservatorio sulla normativa: Valentina Fiorillo, Cristina Gazzetta, Massimo Rubechi. Osservatorio sulla giurisprudenza: Giulia Aravantinou Leonidi, Caterina Bova, Pamela Martino. Osservatorio europeo e internazionale: Mario Carta, Massimo Pellingra Contino, Laura Giobbi. Osservatorio sociale: Francesco Antonelli, Pina Sodano, Valeria Rosato. Osservatorio degli operatori della sicurezza: Valerio Sarcone, Francesco Soluri. Recensioni: Beatrice Catallo.
3 Indice Editoriale Inmigración y derechos humanos di Luis López Guerra 3 Saggi The Impact of Counter-Terrorism Security Measures on Fundamental Rights di Rosario Serra-Cristóbal 17 Note Il fenomeno migratorio: esercizi di definizione della grammatica giuridica internazionale di Cristiana Carletti 65 Osservatori Osservatorio sulla normativa Le misure di contrasto al terrorismo internazionale: contenuti e novità di Luca Di Majo 109 Osservatorio europeo e internazionale Politiche migratorie e UE: le risoluzioni del Parlamento e l Agenda europea di Gabriele Maestri 115 Osservatorio sociale La famiglia nella prospettiva sociologica tra nuovi modelli, minacce e sfide di Michela Luzi L Europa dopo gli attentati di Parigi: intervista a Farhad Khosrokhavar di Francesco Antonelli Towards a «Just and Comprehensive Peace in Palestine»: Interviewing Omar Barghouti di Pina Sodano III
4 Indice Recensioni M. Omizzolo, P. Sodano (cur.), Migranti e territori. Lavoro diritti accoglienza, Ediesse, Roma, 2015, pp. 472 di Roberta Sorrentino 219 F. Antonelli, E. Rossi (cur.), Homo dignus. Cittadinanza, democrazia e diritti in un mondo in trasformazione, WKI - Cedam, Roma - Padova, 2014, pp. XIII-146 di Santina Musolino 227 IV
7 Editoriale Inmigración y derechos humanos di Luis López Guerra * En los últimos años el Tribunal de Estrasburgo ha debido ocuparse de un considerable número de demandas en que se planteaba la alegada vulneración de los derechos reconocidos en el Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos derivada de prácticas restrictivas de la inmigración, particularmente expulsiones de inmigrantes y rechazos en frontera. Tales demandas se refieren tanto a supuestos de lo que se ha llamado inmigración económica (es decir, la búsqueda de mejores condiciones de vida y aún de la misma supervivencia, en los países europeos) como a casos de petición de asilo frente a los peligros para la vida e integridad física resultantes de las condiciones de violencia en los países de origen. En consecuencia, el Tribunal ha dictado una serie de sentencias sobre esta materia, en las que viene a precisar los límites y condiciones que el Convenio impone respecto del ejercicio de los poderes y competencias de los Estados sobre esta materia. Sentencias especialmente relevantes * Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; juez del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos. 3
8 Editoriale por cuanto el Convenio y sus Protocolos no contienen muchas referencias a las cuestiones relativas a la inmigración y extranjería. Las disposiciones expresamente dedicadas al tema son el artículo 1 del Protocolo 7 que exige un procedimiento legal de expulsión para extranjeros legalmente residentes y el artículo 4 del Protocolo 4, que prohíbe la expulsión colectiva de extranjeros. Por otro lado, el artículo 5 del Convenio admite expresamente el internamiento de extranjeros para su expulsión. La jurisprudencia del Tribunal viene así a establecer límites y obligaciones a la acción de los Estados en una materia tradicionalmente entregada al ámbito de discrecionalidad estatal, ámbito que ha debido ser reconocido por el Tribunal como punto de partida inicial. Valga señalar de entrada que, como el Tribunal ha declarado repetidamente, los Estados tienen derecho a controlar la entrada y estancia de extranjeros en su territorio y que el Convenio no reconoce un derecho a entrar en un país distinto del de origen ni a residir en ese país por quienes no sean ciudadanos (por ejemplo, Vivararahja c. Reino Unido, de 1991). Y, en consecuencia, al no tratarse de un derecho civil en el sentido adoptado por el Tribunal, tampoco se encuentra protegido por las garantías procesales del artículo 6. En otras palabras, las autoridades nacionales no se encuentran, en principio y desde la perspectiva del Convenio, vinculadas por la exigencias de dicho artículo frente a demandas contra el rechazo o la expulsión de individuos no nacionales. En lo que se refiere a España, en varios casos el Tribunal ha inadmitido demandas de extranjeros que versaban sobre alegadas irregularidades en procedimientos de extradición, ya que tales procedimientos no se encontrarían protegidos por las garantías del artículo 6. En el caso Monedero Angora contra España, de 4
9 Editoriale 2008, el Tribunal además extendió esta inadmisibilidad a las demandas contra la ejecución de órdenes europeas de detención y entrega. En forma similar, el Tribunal ha afirmado reiteradamente que el Convenio no reconoce el derecho de asilo. Los Estados miembros del Convenio disponen pues de un considerable margen de actuación en lo que se refiere a inadmisión y expulsión de extranjeros, especialmente si se encuentran en situación irregular. Sin embargo, la jurisprudencia desarrollada por el Tribunal de Estrasburgo respecto de determinados derechos del Convenio, unida a la doctrina de las obligaciones positivas, ha supuesto que también en este ámbito se haya producido un aumento de la protección de determinadas categorías de extranjeros en situación vulnerable, y muy particularmente de solicitantes de asilo, que reducen la libertad de acción estatal. Podemos indicar varias dimensiones de esta protección. Una barrera inicial frente a actuaciones arbitrarias de los Estados en esta materia es sin duda la que representa la jurisprudencia del Tribunal aplicando el artículo 4 del Protocolo 4 que prohíbe las expulsiones colectivas de extranjeros, que incluyen las llamadas expulsiones en caliente, esto es, las llevadas a cabo en la misma frontera, sin procedimiento alguno de identificación e individualización de las condiciones de la persona que intenta entrar en un país firmante del Convenio. La doctrina del Tribunal se ha establecido fundamentalmente en sus Sentencias en los casos Sharifi y otros c. Italia y Grecia (2014) e Hirsi Jamaa contra Italia (2012). Particularmente ilustrativa de esa doctrina es la últi- 5
10 Editoriale ma citada. En las circunstancias del caso, barcos de la Armada italiana interceptaron en aguas internacionales un barco procedente de Libia a punto de zozobrar, cargado de emigrantes de origen somalí y eritreo. Los emigrantes fueron trasladados a un barco de guerra italiano e inmediatamente devueltos a Libia. Varias docenas de estos emigrantes se quejaron al Tribunal de Estrasburgo que tal devolución, sin trámite alguno, les ponía en grave peligro de malos tratos no sólo en Libia sino también, caso de devolución, en sus países de origen. El Tribunal aceptó este razonamiento, pero además consideró, a la vista de las alegaciones de los recurrentes, que se había vulnerado la prohibición de expulsión colectiva. En efecto, e independientemente del número de afectados, muchos o pocos, esta prohibición supone que para proceder a la expulsión es necesario identificar al afectado, así como el conocimiento e individualización de sus circunstancias; una vez dentro de la jurisdicción de un país del Convenio, para proceder a una expulsión es necesario, para que tal expulsión no puede calificarse de colectiva, un trámite que suponga la precisión de las circunstancias de la persona afectada. Y el concepto del jurisdicción comprende no sólo el territorio internacionalmente reconocido del Estado, sino también aquellas áreas donde el Estado ejerza control y autoridad exclusivas, tales como embajadas o, como en el caso, barcos de guerra. Sin esa averiguación de las circunstancias individuales de la persona a expulsar, su rechazo y devolución debería ser considerada como dentro del concepto de expulsión colectiva, y por tanto, en violación del artículo 4 del Protocolo 4. Pero no se trata sólo de que el Convenio prohíba las expulsiones colectivas, en el sentido indicado por el Tribunal. Pues éste, aun recono- 6
11 Editoriale ciendo el ámbito de actuación de los Estados en una materia con profundas implicaciones sociales y económicas, establece también que la protección del Convenio se extiende también a supuestos de expulsiones individualizadas, en que los Estados adoptan decisiones en casos concretos y sobre la base de su Derecho interno. Pues efectivamente, tales expulsiones pueden supone una violación de derechos sustantivos, particularmente en los ámbitos de la vida familiar y de la integridad física. A este respecto, y como límite a la acción del Estado en este campo, en fecha temprana el Tribunal tuvo en cuenta el nivel de protección que resulta de los mandatos del Convenio y sus protocolos que prohíben la pena de muerte y los tratos inhumanos y degradantes. Estos mandatos se han interpretado no solamente como una prohibición al respecto a las autoridades estatales, sino también como un deber de esas autoridades de no facilitar o hacer posibles esos tratamientos por parte de autoridades de otros países. Ya en el año 1989, en un célebre caso, Soering contra Reino Unido, el Tribunal consideró que la extradición del demandante a Estados Unidos supondría una vulneración de la prohibición de tratos inhumanos o degradantes, ya que, de producirse esa extradición, el demandante corría el peligro de ser condenado a muerte en Estados Unidos y en consecuencias, verse sometido durante años, a la vista del sistema procesal norteamericano, a un situación de angustia incompatible con el mandato del artículo 2 del Convenio. La jurisprudencia posterior ha confirmado esta prohibición en supuestos de expulsión o extradición a países en que existiera un claro riesgo, no sólo de verse sometido a torturas o malos tratos, sino también, tras la aprobación de los protocolos 6 7
12 Editoriale y 13, a una eventual pena de muerte. En algún caso, además, se ha extendido tal prohibición a la expulsión de extranjeros que corrieran graves riesgo para su salud en sus países de origen debido a la falta de los necesarios cuidados médicos. Con aplicación más amplia, la libertad de acción del Estado respecto de los extranjeros residentes en su territorio se ve también limitada como consecuencia indirecta del reconocimiento por el Convenio de otro derecho, el relativo a la vida privada familiar del artículo 8. El Tribunal ha conferido a este derecho un alcance que comprende el establecimiento y mantenimiento de relaciones familiares. Pues bien, la inadmisión de un extranjero, o su expulsión puede eventualmente suponer una vulneración del derecho a la vida familiar, cuando implica una injerencia injustificada y desproporcionada en el mismo. Desde luego, la jurisprudencia del Tribunal no establece que baste la mera existencia de vínculos familiares dentro de un país para garantizar, por así decirlo, el derecho de una persona extranjera a ingresar o a permanecer en su territorio. Pero la presencia y consolidación de esos vínculos puede convertir en desproporcionada la expulsión. Por ejemplo en el caso Maslov contra Austria, del año 2008, el Tribunal consideró que la expulsión de un menor búlgaro tras una condena penal, cuando esa persona había vivido en Austria desde sus primeros años, en el seno de una familia austriaca, habiendo perdido todo contacto con la sociedad búlgara y ni siquiera conociendo el idioma búlgaro, suponía una injerencia inaceptable y desproporcionada en la vida familiar. En un caso similar, Jeunesse contra Holanda, del año 2014, el Tribunal estimó también la presencia de una vulneración del derecho a la vida familiar en caso de expulsión. En este supuesto, la de- 8
13 Editoriale mandante había vivido, sin autorización administrativa, más de veinte años en Holanda, donde había establecido relaciones familiares estables con una persona con nacionalidad holandesa, y habiendo tenido dos hijos también de esa nacionalidad. Para apreciar la proyección del derecho a la vida familiar sobre los límites a la expulsión de extranjeros puede hacerse referencia a un caso español de este tipo, la decisión en el caso G.V.A contra España, de En este supuesto, la demandante era una súbdita argentina que, tras una condena penal, fue objeto de una orden de expulsión, confirmada judicialmente. La afectada alegó ante el Tribunal que tenía una relación estable con una persona de nacionalidad española, con la que tenía una hija también de esa nacionalidad. El problema residía en que el padre estaba en la cárcel, y no podía hacerse cargo de la niña; la expulsión suponía pues, o que la hija quedaba excluida de todo contacto con su padre (quizás durante mucho tiempo) o que debía quedar en España en situación precaria y sin contacto con la madre. Lo que caracteriza este caso en que no fue resuelto por una sentencia del Tribunal (la cuestión quedó imprejuzgada) sino por una declaración unilateral del Gobierno español, que reconoció la existencia de una violación del derecho a la vida familiar, anuló la orden de expulsión e indemnizó a la recurrente con una fuerte cantidad. Es, por cierto, una de las pocas ocasiones en que el Gobierno español se ha avenido a una solución extrajudicial. Debe señalarse además que el Tribunal ha extendido la protección frente a expulsiones de emigrantes y refugiados incluso cuando se trata de expulsiones a países firmantes del Convenio, cuando existe, a juicio 9
14 Editoriale del Tribunal, un peligro manifiesto de vulneración de sus derechos en el país de destino. Ello se ha producido con ocasión de la aplicación de las llamadas Reglas de Dublín. De acuerdo con estas reglas, adoptadas por los países de la Unión Europea y algunos otros, es el país de entrada en la Unión el que se responsabiliza de la situación de los inmigrantes y de la eventual concesión de medidas de protección. De esta forma, si se solicita el asilo en un país distinto del de entrada en la Unión, el solicitante es devuelto al país de entrada, para que se lleve allí a cabo el oportuno procedimiento. Pues bien, dentro del ámbito de las Reglas de Dublín, el Tribunal, en varias ocasiones ha apreciado la existencia de vulneraciones de derechos del Convenio particularmente de los derechos a la vida familiar y a no ser sometido a malos tratos- cuando un Estado parte ha procedido a la expulsión de un emigrante o solicitante de asilo al país de entrada en la Unión, cuando sus condiciones mínimas de vida en este último no estaban aseguradas. Tal fue el caso, por ejemplo, en la sentencia MSS contra Bélgica y Grecia, de 2011: la orden de traslado a Grecia del recurrente, emigrante afgano, dictada por las autoridades belgas fue considerada por el Tribunal como un atentado a su derecho (entre otros) a no sufrir malos tratos, debido a las lamentables condiciones de vida de los solicitantes de asilo en el país griego, que no alcanzaban un nivel mínimo aceptable de supervivencia. Grecia fue también condenada por el Tribunal en la misma sentencia, debido a la presencia de tales condiciones. En este supuesto, pues, el Tribunal aplicó el artículo 3 del Convenio, considerando que una situación de extrema pobreza y abandono de un solici- 10
15 Editoriale tante de asilo no remediada por los poderes públicos representaba un tratamiento contrario al Convenio. Una precisión ulterior de esta jurisprudencia (que vino a tomar en cuenta no sólo la situación individual de los emigrantes o refugiados, sino también su situación familiar) se expresó en la sentencia en el caso Tarakhel contra Suiza (2014). En este supuesto el Tribunal vino a elevar las exigencias derivadas de los artículos 3 y 8 del Convenio. En el caso, los recurrentes ante Estrasburgo eran una familia con hijos menores, que, en virtud de las Reglas de Dublín iban a ser reenviados a Italia por las autoridades suizas, vinculadas por tales reglas. El Tribunal, a la vista de las penosas condiciones de vida de los solicitantes de asilo en Italia consideró que tal devolución constituiría un grave atentado a la vida familiar garantizada por el artículo 8 del Convenio, dadas las malas condiciones presentes en Italia al respecto, así como, a la vista de la presencia de menores, también una violación de la prohibición de malos tratos del artículo 3 del Convenio. De esta forma, la ausencia de unas condiciones mínimas de vida en el país de destino ha venido a tomar cuerpo en la jurisprudencia de Estrasburgo como elemento a tomar en cuenta a la hora de aplicar los derechos del Convenio en casos de expulsión. Pero conviene además examinar otros aspectos de esa jurisprudencia en lo que se refiere a una materia particular: el tratamiento de los que solicitan asilo frente a los peligros para sus derechos que representaría la devolución a su país de origen. 11
16 Editoriale Uno de estos aspectos, con proyección en España, se refiere a los mecanismos de protección de aquellos solicitantes de asilo, que aduzcan que la devolución a su país de origen les expondría a malos tratos por las autoridades, o incluso a riesgos para su vida. En estos supuestos, y desde su sentencia Conka contra Bélgica, del año 2002, el Tribunal ha establecido que, en caso de rechazo por las autoridades administrativas de la petición de asilo, si se inicia una reclamación judicial contra este rechazo, esa reclamación deberá tener efectos suspensivos automáticos sobre la expulsión. De otra forma, se correría el grave riesgo de que, aun cuando recayera en el futuro una sentencia judicial favorable al asilo, el afectado hubiera sido ya expulsado a su país de origen. Tal fue la situación en el caso del año 2014, A.C y otros contra España. En este supuesto treinta saharauis habían solicitado asilo político en España, alegando haber sufrido encarcelamiento y malos tratos a raíz de diversos incidentes en el Sahara Occidental, y correr grave peligro de encarcelamiento y torturas caso de vuelta al país de origen, Marruecos. Las autoridades gubernativas denegaron la petición solicitada de protección, y los saharauis recurrieron por vía contencioso administrativa ante la Audiencia Nacional. Al tiempo, solicitaron que, en tanto se resolvía su recurso, se suspendiera la orden de expulsión contra ellos dictada por el Ministerio del Interior. Pero la Audiencia Nacional, si bien inició el correspondiente proceso judicial, no concedió tal suspensión: de forma que los recurrentes saharauis quedaban sujetos a la orden de expulsión a Marruecos en tanto se tramitaba el procedimiento judicial. 12
17 Editoriale Los recurrentes presentaron una demanda ante el Tribual de Estrasburgo, invocando los artículos 2 y 3 del Convenio, ante el peligro de malos tratos y de riesgo para su vida caso de devolución, e invocando igualmente la falta de un recurso efectivo. Pues bien, el Tribunal primeramente ordenó a las autoridades españolas, como medida cautelar, que no efectuaran expulsión alguna en tanto se decidía sobre el caso; y posteriormente dictó sentencia apreciando que efectivamente, y vulnerando las previsiones del Convenio en su artículo 13, las autoridades españolas habían dejado sin protección efectiva los derechos de los recurrentes a no ser sometidos, siquiera fuera eventualmente, a tratamientos contrarios a los derechos del Convenio en sus artículos 2 y 3, esto es derecho al respeto a su vida y a no ser sometidos a torturas. Dados los indicios presentes en el caso, el Tribunal consideró que, en tanto se resolvía sobre el fondo de su petición, los tribunales españoles deberían haber adoptado la medida provisional de suspensión de la devolución de los recurrentes a Marruecos, ante el peligro razonablemente apreciable que podría sufrir su integridad física. Con ello, se venía a reconocer la necesidad de que los Estados prestaran no sólo una protección sustantiva (concediendo en su caso el asilo) sino también una protección procedimental, suspendiendo la expulsión en tanto resolviesen los tribunales sobre el caso. En resumen, pues, a lo largo de su actividad jurisprudencial en materia de inmigración, el Tribunal si bien ha reconocido la gravedad de los problemas que plantea la inmigración masiva, y que corresponde a los Estados establecer los criterios para enfrentarse con esos problemas, y regular la entrada y residencia de no nacionales, también ha venido a 13
18 Editoriale establecer que la aplicación de esos criterios a cada caso debe llevarse a cabo en el marco de los derechos reconocidos en el Convenio. Conjuntar ambos aspectos (la garantía de los intereses de los Estados, y el respeto a los derechos humanos) no es una opción política, sino una obligación resultante de la pertenencia al sistema del Convenio. 14
21 Saggi The Impact of Counter-Terrorism Security Measures on Fundamental Rights What Constitutionalism and Supranational Human Rights standards offer to respond to the terrorist threat? * di Rosario Serra-Cristóbal ** 1. Introduction: Risks Threatening National Security The issue of global risks has surfaced on every country s political agenda. Those risks include, for example, food safety risks, pandemics, global warming and other environment-related risks, financial crises, * This paper was elaborated within the R&D Group PROMETEO: Justicia social, exigibilidad de los derechos humanos e integración. REMEDY-RIGHTS (Ref. PROMETEO/2014/078). ** Rosario Serra-Cristóbal is Professor of Constitutional Law at the University of Valencia (Spain) and has a Ph.D. in Law. She is a member of the Human Rights Institute of the same University, the International Association of Constitutional Law (IACL) and the Spanish Association of Constitutional Law (ACE). 17
22 Saggi and terrorism. Concerns surrounding these issues generate a sense of insecurity that has to be addressed. The necessary steps may vary, but most of them are subject to the priority governments assign to securing both homeland security and the defense of the sovereign State. This is a challenge that no State can afford to face alone. As risks become increasingly global in nature, the strategic response to these must therefore be shaped at a supranational rather than national level. With this in mind, an effective international cooperation is required. The problem is that, for reasons of domestic security, many governments adopted measures that, although designed to safeguard such interest, were not innocuous. Such measures simply resulted in the erosion and in some cases the infringement of fundamental rights. Ulrich Beck (2011, 5) states that governments sometimes react to global risks in a disproportional manner due to the fact that the political costs of failure are much higher than the political costs of overreaction. To begin with striking a balance between human rights and security requires the analysis of a number of questions: Are those risks always clear? Are possible future risks overestimated? Are the actions that governments carry out to prevent those risks justified in every case? We must analyze when State involvement is necessary in order to prevent further damage to other interests or rights. This intervention must be carried out without unduly prejudicing the rights and freedoms of citizens and, must always observe the rule of law. This has a major impact on everyday life. We must propose ways of striking such balance between ensuring security and safeguarding basic standards if we are to preserve our rights. 18
23 Saggi Therefore, the struggle against terrorism, which precisely aims is specifically intended to protect civil rights", may require the adoption of extraordinary measures that do not meet the minimum international standards for the protection of human rights 1. Examples of this conflict between national security and limits to citizens rights would be find in the way in which countries reacted to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), the bombings in Spain on March 11, 2004 and in Britain on July 7, 2005, or more recently in the announced measures of European governments after the terrorist attack to Charlie Hebdo Magazine in Paris, on January From 2001, the terrorist attacks have created in the Western World a new perception of vulnerability that crystallized, especially in the United States, into a genuine necessity to increase homeland security through the fight against international terrorism which led to the adoption of measures which have generated considerable limitations to many rights and freedoms. In Resolution No (2001), the Security Council of the United Nations (UN) recognized that these attacks constituted a threat to international peace and security. Acting under the aegis of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Council adopted Resolution No (2001), which 1 On the different responses made in the fight against international terrorism after 9/11 see, among others, Roach (2014, 21-60). 2 European leaders have begun looking for exceptional ways, including enhanced surveillance powers, to prevent international terrorism. 19
24 Saggi urged all States to take measures to prevent the commission of terrorist acts, allowing a series of interventions that, over time, have hampered the establishment of a correct balance between the guarantees given by constitutional rights and national security. Indeed, many States prioritized security over civil rights, thus setting blatant limitations to the fundamental rights of citizens (e.g. extraordinary renditions, arbitrary deprivations of liberty and detentions, tortures, lack of public information, unfair trials, restrictions on freedom of expression, violation of privacy, targeted killings, etc.) In the USA, Congress passed the Patriot Act and other bills such as the Detainee Treatment Act that included new counter-terrorism measures with unwelcome results vis-a-vis the traditional respect normally paid to constitutional rights. Since then, many detainees, when presumed to be terrorists, have been subjected to treatment that can be qualified as torture 3, while others continue to be deprived of liberty even after many 3 Several sources reported that numerous abuses of suspected terrorist prisoners occurred at Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo Bay, Bagram and at other such camps. Many of the details of this torture were not known until after the declassification of secret documents ordered by the Obama Administration in April Those documents contain recollections of terrible arrests and interrogations of those prisoners by the USA during the period between 2002 and A similar flood of accusations was made against the British secret service (MI6), for showing complicity with the CIA in the torture of suspected terrorists abroad. In late 2005, the CIA director reported to the White House the suspension of the interrogation program, although there is no confirmation that those practices have been completely abandoned. Since then, a new approach has been implemented, with a shift from detention and interrogation techniques towards an increase in the number of targeted killings (Goldsmith 2012, 21). 20
25 Saggi years, some have been tried by military courts, and targeted killings have been ordered 4. Despite the support that the counter-terrorism policy received from Congress, some of these practices have been brought before the U.S. Supreme Court. In a series of split-vote decisions, the Court ruled that those measures surpassed both the limits and the guarantees of rights enshrined in the Constitution. Some of the interventions authorized by the Patriot Act as part of the fight against Islamic terrorism were found to be excessive by the judges. (See, inter alia, Boumediene et al. v Bush, ruled on June 12, 2008, Revenga Sánchez 2008, See also cases Hamdi et al. v. Rumsfeld, Rumsfeld et al. v. Padilla, and Rasul v. Rumsfeld). Likewise, in 2001, the British Parliament enacted the Counter- Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 5, which raised serious doubts with regard to its compatibility with the European Convention on Human Rights 6. 4 In the last years of the Bush Presidency and with the new Obama Administration, security policies were reviewed. Every area of counterterrorism policy, including military commissions, military detentions, surveillance, black sites, interrogation, habeas corpus, and the like, were revisited. Obama kept those policies unable to change the functioning of the security structures overnight (it is not easy to implement major changes in National Security) until he had access to reserved intelligence information on such policies (Goldsmith 2012, 11-22). 5 About this Act vid. Feldman (2005, ). 6 For instance, in Gillan and Quinton v United Kingdom (January 12, 2010) the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the stop and search power, permitted by Sections 44 & 47 of the Terrorism Act 2000 (UK), violated Article 8 of the European Convention. Those Sections authorised policemen to stop and search vehicles and pedestrians without reasonable suspicion within a broad geographical area for up to 28 days. (Ip 2013, 729) 21
26 Saggi Other countries also implemented aggressive counter-terrorism programs 7 or permitted the use of their airspace and airports for extraordinary rendition operations, authorizing the transfer without due legal process of detainees into the custody of a foreign government for purposes of detention and interrogation 8. Many of these measures were executed not only to prosecute criminals, but also to prevent futures attacks and combat the risk of terrorism. Among these (at times) preventive counter-terrorism actions, another great scandal made the headlines in 2013, due to the leaks of Edward Snowden, a former US National Security Agency contractor 9. The NSA 7 For instance, the Report of the Open Society Foundations Counterterrorism and Human Rights in Kenya and Uganda: The World Cup Bombing and Beyond, published in 2013, looks at how the governments of Kenya, Uganda, the United States, and the United Kingdom responded to the 2010 World Cup bombing in Kampala, Uganda. The counterterrorism actions that were activated after the bombing were characterized by human rights violations, including allegations of arbitrary detention, unlawful renditions, physical abuse, and the denial of due process rights. 8 Regarding the cooperation of different States on extraordinary renditions, see Open Society Justice Initiative (2013). 9 Edward Snowden revealed to a British newspaper The Guardian, together with other information, the existence of a secret program that allowed the NSA to enter directly into the servers of Google, Facebook, Skype, Microsoft and Apple, as well as to the Swift s transfer service of bank data. On September 28, 2013, The New York Times reported that since 2010, the NSA was using this information to develop individual profiles and draw interrelations among different social network users (N.S.A. Examines Social Networks of U.S. Citizens, in The New York Times, September 28, 2013). On July 31, 2013, The Guardian disclosed the existence of a system used by the NSA called XKeyscore, which allows, through the use of metadata, (who, when and where someone accesses an account or sends a message) the extraction and sorting out of information contained in s and digital conversations, in addition 22
27 Saggi was authorized by President Bush (and later by Obama) and by Congress to put into place a program of widespread surveillance of the phone calls made by ordinary citizens as well as those made to suspected terrorists throughout the world. The leaks revealed that the NSA had been engaged in the mass surveillance of data of millions of citizens, and not only American citizens, but also foreigners, including senior officials from many States. This was justified on the grounds of national security. The NSA admitted this in front of a Senate Committee hearing, alleging that the information obtained was used for no other purpose than to safeguard homeland security. Nevertheless, in January 2014, when faced with an international outcry in response to NSA s spying practices, President Obama stated that he would restrict the ability of intelligence agencies to gain access to phone records, and would ultimately remove data from governmental control. However, he went on to defend the need for data surveillance in order to guarantee State security. Except in emergencies, he would seek prior court approval each time an agency analyst needed to access telephone records. Obama added that he had explicitly forbidden the surveillance of the leaders of allied countries 10. In March 2014 Obama s Administration was preparing a new legislative proposal with that objective 11. Nevertheless, at to that from internet browsers (Glenn Greenwald, XKeyscore: NSA tool collects nearly everything a user does on the internet, in The Guardian, July 31, 2013) 10 M. Lander and Ch. Savage, Obama Outlines Calibrated Curbs on Phone Spying, in The New York Times, Jan. 17, Charlie Savage, Obama to Call for End to N.S.A. s Bulk Data Collection, in The New York Times, March 24,
28 Saggi the beginning of 2015 President Obama presented a package of proposals that could result in less protection for citizens data 12. The issue is still open. Regardless of the promised limitations to espionage and the announced guarantees, public concern is still entrenched, not simply because one foreign country is spying on another, but because several States are involved in the same activity. In fact, the press quickly revealed that the practice of mass data collection has, over the years, become common practice in intelligence-gathering communities worldwide 13. Furthermore, in Europe, after the series of terrorist attacks by individuals or small groups across different countries, governments are pressing for more powers to gather intelligence from modern means of communication like Internet sites, including social media 14. They are calling for more authority to intelligence agencies to monitor communi- 12 See The editorial board, Still Waiting for Strong Privacy Laws, in The New York Times, Jan. 14, See J. Follorou and F. Johannès, Révélations sur le Big Brother français, in Le Monde, July 4, S. Ackerman and James Ball, Optic Nerve: millions of Yahoo webcam images intercepted by GCHQ, in The Guardian, February 28, Europa Press, CNI cooperated with the United Kingdom in the mass internet surveillance, in Público.es, February 17, Gemma Galdón, Espionage and human rights: the limits to intrusion of privacy, in eldiario.es, August 4, Web version: 14 Germany wants to revoke the ID cards of those suspected of traveling to join jihadist groups. In France, there is now a debate about increased surveillance powers, through something of a French Patriot Act. In Great Britain are debating on the same issues. And Spain is also amending its Criminal Code on International terrorism. 24
29 Saggi cations. And the same is happening in Canada, where the Prime Minister introduced legislation that would greatly expand the role of the spy service, allowing courts to remove online postings and increasing police detention powers. Against this background, many citizens ask themselves: To what extent am I being controlled? Can the State do this? If they collect my data and control my communications to prevent future risks, are these measures always justified in all cases? Are these risks clear or are they overrated? When are governments entitled to take such measures involving the limitations of my rights? This will form the focus of this essay. Because, «history teaches that after the security crisis has passed, it generally becomes evident that there was not rational factual basis for sacrificing rights in favour of security needs» (Gross 2013). 2. How to Assess the Threat of Terrorism? One of the leading points is to analyze the capacity of the State to provide a timely and appropriate response to terrorism and other global risks. To maintain high security levels, it is necessary to adopt certain measures with the remit to restrict individual rights. However, a proportional balancing between those key interests (security and human rights) must be pursued. Security means protecting people s freedom in such a way that everyone can enjoy life without being threatened, but also without the fear of being continuously under surveillance or constrained. Are measures such as the maintenance of permanent terrorist 25
30 Saggi blacklists or the mass data surveillance proportional to the perceived level of danger from terrorist attacks? Here, Rawls reflections on the rule of clear and present danger theory may prove useful with regard to this question. This theory was used in relation to the possible limitations to freedom of expression, but also, may similarly be applied with regard to the need to limit other rights when faced with a "clear and present threat (Rawls 1981, chapter XI). The U.S. Supreme Court used this when asserting, «in each case [Courts] must ask whether the gravity of the damage, reduced by its improbability, justifies such invasion of [free speech] and is necessary to prevent the danger» 15. Therefore, the rule does not require that the damage is imminent, but that it is at least sufficiently widespread and probable. For Rawls (1981), what is indispensable is the need to specify more precisely the type of situation that can justify the restriction of freedoms. In addition, it is essential that it is an emergency situation in which a present or foreseeable threat of serious prejudice arises. Restrictions on the content of rights can only be imposed if this is necessary to prevent further and more significant, either direct or indirect, damage to these freedoms. Thus, we must consider whether a greater interest exists (a clear risk) that justifies the limitation of certain individual rights. The intensity of the risk, the consequences in the event that the perceived danger occurs, 15 Case Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 in 510, cit. 183 F. 2, in
31 Saggi and the probability of this happening, need to be evaluated. Low risk is not the same as catastrophic risk, with its serious and perdurable consequences. For instance, the probability of losing a large number of lives, as a result of a terrorist attack, can be considered to be a catastrophic risk (Weinstock 2011, 72). It has been suggested that, in order to deal with those risks that threaten the global community, the employment of principles such as prevention, precaution, and anticipation is required, and also those of proportionality, justification, respect for the rule of law and accountability (Van Kempen 2013, 15-16). These features will be discussed at length below. When combating a risk such as terrorism, it is necessary to assess whether there are specific objectives that justify intervention by the State. It should also gauge whether the means used in that struggle are proportional, and if they are truly required. For instance, time should be taken to consider alternative, less invasive solutions, or to calculate the consequences for particular individuals, groups or the society at large. Also one has to determine if there is a way to minimize the inevitable damage caused by counter-terrorism measures. Finally, an established deadline must be a requirement in addition to the periodic review of the maintenance of measures that restrict rights. As Innerarity acknowledged (2011, 13), our main future discussions will revolve around the question of how we assess the risks and what behaviors we recommend as a consequence. This author suggests a democratic management of current existing risks. Other players also seek to express their viewpoints: social movements, civil society (Innerarity 2011, 19; Jáuregui 2011, 241). And, as Ulrich Beck states (2011, 27
32 Saggi 29), «civil society s agenda is surrounded by the halo of human rights and global justice». As a result of global social participation in this realm, some documents have been adopted. The Tshwane Principles (2013) 16 set out detailed guidelines for those engaged in drafting, revising or implementing laws or provisions relating to the State s authority to withhold information on the grounds of national security or to punish the disclosure of such information. These persuasive principles are based on both, international and national law, standards and good practice. Or the Principles on the Application of Human Rights to Communications Surveillance, July 10, 2013, signed by more than 400 organizations and experts around the world 17. Conclusively, it is impossible to forget that both participation and fundamental rights are the basis of constitutionalism. 3. Human Rights Standards as a Limitation to Governmental Security Actions In every culture, fears may differ and governments can react to these in in a variety of ways. The culture of fear, the need to ensure safety, 16 The Principles have been drafted by 17 organizations and five academic centres throughout Africa, the Americas, Europe and Asia based on conversations and information provided by more than 500 experts from more than 70 countries, including government and former government officials and military officers, at meetings around the world over a two-year period. 17 https://en.necessaryandproportionate.org/text. 28
33 Saggi may vary, but in a global world, the trend is towards convergence. Global risk and the fear of such risks (such as terrorism) is an undeniable phenomenon currently occurring on a global scale and, one that involves fundamental rights, which calls for a supranational response. The point is that, as these risks have become globalized, so too has the need to create a ius commune or global constitutionalism to protect fundamental rights against preventive State action. It is crucial to establish international common standards for the protection of such rights. That coincides with the theory of the existence of a Global model of Constitutional Rights (Möller, 2012). This theory argues that there is a coherent conception of constitutional rights in Europe and globally born as a result of a process. As Müller (2014, 74) wrote, «constitutional structures are both a result of (past) and a framework for (future) political struggle at a particular moment of international history and at the same time advance their own historical narrative linking the past, present and future of the respective international society». Global constitutionalism typifies the claim for the promotion of constitutional principles (such as checks and balances, democracy, human rights) in international law. The concept of supranational rights has been present within the United Nations context and in Europe since the Second World War. As is well documented, following the war, and with the creation of the United Nations, the international community vowed never to allow such atrocities against mankind to happen again 18. Human rights were considered 18 In line with this view, Article 55 of the 1945 United Nations Charter provides that universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all 29
34 Saggi to be central to achieving those aims, which prompted the adoption of an international bill of rights, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR, 1948). Despite the many weaknesses inherent in the system and the over-representation of some States within the UN, the fact remains that the UDHR constitutes a global reference document. The continuing posture of the Declaration and its permanent use reinforce its universal acceptance and the common understanding of human rights. In Europe, both within the EU and the Council of Europe, the defense of rights, based on the common constitutional traditions of Member States, has been crucial to their institutional development 19. Hence, the Preamble of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights asserts: «Conscious of its spiritual and moral heritage, the Union is founded on the indivisible, universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity; [...] This Charter reaffirms [...] the rights as they result, in particular, from the constitutional traditions and international obligations common to the Member States, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the Social Charters adopted by the Union and by the Council of Europe and the case-law of with no distinction with regard to race, sex, language or religion are conditions of stability and well-being that are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations. 19 Explicit references to fundamental rights did not exist in the European Treaties at the outset. The Maastricht Treaty (1992) introduced for the first time mention of such: «The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of Community law» (art. F) 30
35 Saggi the Court of Justice of the European Union and of the European Court of Human Rights». This is the perspective that aligns best with this paper. Supranational organizations such as the United Nations (with its Human Rights Committee), the Council of Europe (with the European Court of Human Rights) or the EU (in the remit of its Charter or Fundamental Rights and its Court of Justice) play an important role in the consolidation of a common standard of rights 20. As stated above, a supranational strategy for human rights promotion is required when adopting measures against global risks and, in particular, in order to challenge existing counter-terrorism policies. Certainly, another option for protecting rights against disproportionate counter-terrorism measures presents itself via domestic law, and moreover, through the coordination of national legal systems. Over time, domestic legislation and case law may influence the global framework. They can fertilize (cross-fertilization) other States whose legislators and courts imitate the policies of other countries. As noted by Hamai (2012, 1328), «judicial use of foreign law is a product of globalization of the practice of modern constitutionalism». Holding constructive dialogues among States produces fruitful exchanges of constitutional concepts (the migration and dissemination of ideas, dialogue, borrowing, legal transplants, etc.) (De Vergottini 2010, 56) 21 that shape the inception of comprehensive standards for the protection of rights. These standards 20 In similar terms, see Petersman (2002, ). 21 On the battle of metaphors to refer to this phenomenon, see also Perju (2012, 1306). 31
36 Saggi may act to limit State action justified on security grounds. It can be observed that in recent times, a favorable atmosphere for this mutual understanding among legal systems has been fostered. We must take advantage of this and continue to consolidate the adoption of universal guidelines for rights and freedoms. States may even share a minimum set of measures to protect human rights. This interrelation is also possible among Constitutional/Supreme Courts and supranational courts (García Roca 2012, ), or between two supranational courts, or among courts and human rights monitoring bodies 22. In a multilevel system, it is likely that the degree of protection afforded to fundamental rights which can be guaranteed by one level (e.g. UN) does not attain the same level of protection that another level has developed and considers indispensable (e.g. EU or national level). This is where cross-fertilization assists in defining better standards for human rights protection. Of course, as highlighted by Kokott and Sobotta (2012,1024), it should be admitted that finding the correct balance between constitutional core values and effective international measures against terrorism is never an easy task. The institutionalization of common standards with regard to the norms of human rights protection in supranational spheres could help, as affirmed by Burke-White (2004, 265), «to set a minimum floor of treatment for all citizens within the domestic policy». Therefore, providing a reasonable common standard for human rights protection against 22 Garlicki uses the term cooperation to refer to the interrelations in a triangle where its three vertices are occupied by (1) the various national supreme or constitutional courts, (2) the CJEU, and (3) the ECHR. (Garlicki 2008, 509). 32
37 Saggi counter-terrorism strategies could offer the basis for evaluating national and international policies. 4. Some Steps in the Right Direction: Security from an International Human Rights Perspective Although many rights have been curbed as a result of the implementation of measures to safeguard national and international security, steps in the right direction have been taken with regard to the supranational framework. This involves attempting to understand security from a human rights perspective. As indicated above, the UN, the Council of Europe and the EU operate based on the primacy of the individual over the omnipotent State and the safeguarding of democracy as key instruments in the effective promotion of international peace and security. 4.1 Some Steps taken within the United Nations In the framework of the United Nations, the Security Council has gradually accepted the connection between upholding human rights and preserving international peace and security. For the first time, the Council, in its preamble to Resolution No (1999), expressly referred to human rights in the context of counter-terrorism (Flynn 2007, 378). But, after the 9/11 attacks, new Resolutions (e.g. Res. 1373, 2001) were adopted and a Counter-Terrorism Committee was created (2001). The threat of 33
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