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ESCONDIDO WATER CO. V. LA JOLLA INDIANS, 466 U. S. 765 (1984) - US SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON-LINE
US Supreme Court Decisions On-Line> Volume 466 > ESCONDIDO WATER CO. V. LA JOLLA INDIANS, 466 U. S. 765 (1984)
ESCONDIDO WATER CO. V. LA JOLLA INDIANS, 466 U. S. 765 (1984)
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Section 8 of the Mission Indian Relief Act of 1891 (MIRA), pursuant to which six reservations were established for respondent Indian Bands (respondents), provides that any United States citizen, firm, or corporation may contract with the Bands for the right to construct a flume, ditch, canal, pipe, or other appliances for the conveyance of water over, across, or through their reservations, which contract shall not be valid unless approved by the Secretary of the Interior (Secretary) under such conditions as he may see fit to impose. When the original license covering hydroelectric facilities located on or near the six reservations, including a canal that crosses respondent La Jolla, Rincon, and San Pasqual Bands' reservations, was about to expire, petitioner Escondido Mutual Water Co. (Mutual) and petitioner city of Escondido filed an application with the Commission for a new license. Thereafter the Secretary requested that the Commission recommend federal takeover of the project, and respondents applied for a nonpower license. After hearings on the competing applications, an Administrative Law Judge concluded that the project was not subject to the Commission's licensing jurisdiction. The Commission reversed and granted a license to Mutual, Escondido, and petitioner Vista Irrigation District, which had been using the canal in question. The Court of Appeals in turn reversed the Commission, holding, contrary to the Commission, (1) that § 4(e) of the FPA required the Commission to accept without modification any license conditions recommended by the Secretary; (2) that the Commission was required to satisfy its § 4(e) obligations with respect to all six of the reservations, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The San Luis Rey River originates near the Palomar Mountains in northern San Diego County, Cal. In its natural condition, it flows through the reservations of the La chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Following the enactment of the Federal Water Power Act of 1920, ch. 285, 41 Stat. 1063 (codified as Part I of the FPA, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
After lengthy hearings on the competing applications, [Footnote 6] an Administrative Law Judge concluded that the project was not subject to the Commission's licensing jurisdiction, because chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
the power aspects of the project were insignificant in comparison to the project's primary purpose -- conveying water for domestic and irrigation consumption. 6 FERC ¦ 63,008 (1977). [Footnote 7] The Commission, however, reversed that decision and granted a new 30-year license to Mutual, Escondido, and the Vista Irrigation District, which had been using the canal for some time to convey water pumped from Lake Henshaw, a lake located some nine miles above Mutual's diversion dam. 6 FERC ¦ 61,189 (1979).
In its licensing decision, the Commission made three rulings that are the focal point of this case. First, the Commission ruled that § 4(e) of the FPA did not require it to accept without modification conditions which the Secretary deemed necessary for the adequate protection and utilization of the reservations. [Footnote 8] Accordingly, despite the Secretary's insistence, the Commission refused to prohibit the licensees from interfering with the Bands' use of a specified quantity of water, id. at 61,415, and n. 146, or to require that water pumped from a particular groundwater basin [Footnote 9] not be transported through the licensed facilities without the written consent of the five Bands, id. at 61,145, and n. 147. Other conditions proposed by the Secretary were similarly rejected or modified. See id. at 61,414-61,417. Second, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed each of these three rulings. Escondido Mutual Water Co. v. FERC, 692 F.2d 1223, amended, 701 F.2d 826 (1983). The court held that § 4(e) requires the Commission to accept without modification any license conditions recommended by the Secretary, subject to subsequent judicial review of the propriety of the conditions, that the Commission is required to satisfy its § 4(e) obligations with respect to all six of the reservations affected by the project, and not just the three through which the canal passes, and that § 8 of the MIRA requires the licensees to obtain right-of-way permits from the La Jolla, Rincon, and San Pasqual Bands before using the licensed facilities located on the reservations. [Footnote 11] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
North Dakota v. United States, 460 U. S. 300, 460 U. S. 312 (1983) (quoting Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U. S. 102, 447 U. S. 108 (1980)). Congress' apparent desire that the Secretary's conditions "shall" be included in the license must therefore be given effect unless there are clear expressions of legislative intent to the contrary. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Members of Congress understood that under the Act the Secretary of the Interior had authority with respect to licenses issued on Indian reservations over and above that chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Petitioners next argue that a literal reading of the conditioning proviso of § 4(e) cannot be squared with other portions of the statutory scheme. In particular, they note that the same proviso that grants the Secretary the authority to qualify the license with the conditions he deems necessary also provides that the Commission must determine that "the license will not interfere or be inconsistent with the purpose for which such reservation was created or acquired." 16 U.S.C. § 797(e). Requiring the Commission to include the Secretary's conditions in the license over its objection, petitioners maintain, is inconsistent with granting the Commission the power to determine that no interference or inconsistency will result from issuance of the license, because it will allow the Secretary to "veto" the decision reached by the Commission. Congress could not have intended to "paralyze with one hand what it sought to promote with the other,'" 461 U. S. 421 (1983) (quoting Clark v. Uebersee Finanz-Korporation, A.G.,@ 332 U. S. 480, 332 U. S. 489 (1947)), petitioners contend.
Petitioners contend that such a scheme of review is inconsistent with traditional principles of judicial review of administrative action. If the Commission is required to include the conditions in the license even though it does not agree with them, petitioners argue, the courts of appeals will not be chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
in a position to grant deference to the Commission's findings and conclusions because those findings and conclusions will not be included in the license. However, that is apparently exactly what Congress intended. If the Secretary concludes that the conditions are necessary to protect the reservation, the Commission is required to adopt them as its own, and the court is obligated to sustain them if they are reasonably related to that goal, otherwise consistent with the FPA, and supported by substantial evidence. [Footnote 20] The fact that, in reality, it is the Secretary's, and not the Commission's, judgment to which the court is giving deference is not surprising, since the statute directs the Secretary, and not the Commission, to decide what conditions are necessary for the adequate protection of the reservation. [Footnote 21] There is nothing in the statute chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Since the Commission failed to comply with this statutory command when it issued the license in this case, the Court of Appeals correctly reversed its decision in this respect. [Footnote 23] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
If a project is licensed "within" any reservation, the Commission must make a "no interference or inconsistency" finding with respect to "such" reservation, and the Secretary may impose conditions for the protection of "such" reservation. Nothing in the section requires the Commission to chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
There is no doubt that "reservations" include "interests in lands owned by the United States" [Footnote 24] and that, for many purposes, water rights are considered to be interests in lands. See 1 R. Clark, Waters and Water Rights § 53.1 p. 345 (1967). But it does not follow that Congress intended the "reservations" spoken of in § 4(e) to include water rights. [Footnote 25] The section deals with project works to be located "upon" and "within" a reservation. As the Court of Appeals itself indicated, the section does tend to "paint a geographical picture in the mind of the reader," 692 F.2d 1236, and we find the chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Respondents additionally contend that, under other provisions of the FPA, the § 4(e) proviso at issue applies any time a reservation is "affected" by a licensed project, even if none of chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Under § 4(e), the Commission is authorized to license projects in two general types of situations -- when the project is located on waters (navigable or nonnavigable) over which Congress has jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause and when the project is located upon any public lands or reservations. It is clear that the Commission's obligations to make a "no inconsistency or no interference" determination and to include the Secretary's conditions in the license apply only in the latter situation -- when the license is issued "within any reservation." The fact that a person is required to obtain a license in the former situation any time a project on nonnavigable waters affects a reservation indicates only that Congress concluded that, in such circumstances, the possible disruptive effects of such a project were so great that the Commission should regulate the project through its licensing powers. That is not, as respondents seem to imply, a meaningless gesture if all of the provisions of § 4(e) do not apply. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In essence, § 8 increased the Bands' authority over its land, so that they had almost the same rights as other private landowners. [Footnote 28] The Bands were authorized to negotiate with any chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
FPC v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U. S. 99, 362 U. S. 118 (1960). chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In short, while § 8 of the MIRA gave the Bands extensive authority to determine whether to grant rights-of-way for water projects, that authority did not include the power to override Congress' subsequent decision that all lands, including tribal lands, could, upon compliance with the provisions of the FPA, be utilized to facilitate licensed hydroelectric projects. Under the FPA, the Secretary, with the duty to safeguard reservations, may condition, but may not veto, the issuance of a license for project works on an Indian reservation. We cannot believe that Congress nevertheless intended to leave a veto power with the concerned tribe or tribes. The Commission need not, therefore, seek the Bands' permission before it exercises its licensing authority with respect to their lands. [Footnote 30] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Judge Anderson dissented from the order entered on petition for rehearing, 701 F.2d 827-831, concluding that neither § 8 of the MIRA nor § 16 of the Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 476, requires that tribal consent be obtained before the Bands' lands can be used for a hydroelectric project licensed under the FPA. He also concluded that the Secretary's § 4(e) conditions have to be included in the license only to the extent they are reasonable, and that the reasonableness determination is to be made initially by the Commission.
6 FERC ¦ 61,189, p. 61,411 (1979). The licensees did not object to this conclusion in their petition for rehearing to the Commission, and they may not challenge it now. 16 U.S.C. § 8251(b). Accordingly, we have no reason to decide whether § 4(e) applies to relicensing proceedings.