Source: https://medvinlaw.com/virginia-hit-and-run-laws-penalties-defense-lawyer/
Timestamp: 2018-07-21 05:32:04
Document Index: 387274553

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 46', '§ 46', '§ 46', '§ 46', '§ 46', '§ 46']

Virginia Hit and Run Lawyer Explains Laws, Penalties, Defenses for Felony & Misdemeanor Hit & Run Charges
Hit and Run in Virginia: Leaving the Scene of an Accident
What are hit and run laws in Virginia? Under Virginia law, a Hit and Run is defined as a criminal offense, and it is charged when you leave the scene of an accident without providing your insurance information to the other driver. The hit and run will be charged as a Misdemeanor criminal offense if the vehicle damage after the hit and run is below $1000, and the hit and run will be charged as a Felony offense if the damage value is above $1000 or if the collision resulted in injuries as a result of the hit and run collision.
Penalties for a Virginia hit and run conviction include incarceration, fines, and restitution. Hit and run of a parked vehicle, or any property that was unattended at the time of the collision, is a Misdemeanor criminal offense punishable by up to 1 year in jail, a $2500.00 fine, and restitution. If damage to property after a hit and run collision is valued at $500.00 or above, then the court may suspend a driver’s license for up to 6 months.
There are various types of hit and run charges that people can face for a driver or a passenger leaving the scene of an accident in Virginia. The following is a charge list organized in order of most serious:
Class 1 Misdemeanor – the driver is punishable by up to 1 year in jail IF a) the vehicle or property was attended, and there was less than $1,000 in property damage, or b) the vehicle or property was unattended, and there was property damage valued between $250 and $1,000. A passenger who did not report the accident in this instance is punishable by up to 5 years in prison. A passenger who did not report the accident in one of these instances is punished equally to the driver.
Virginia Hit and Run Penalty Outline
Description of Hit & Run Charge
Va 46.2-894 Attended Property Damage < $1000.00 Class 1 Misdemeanor 12 months $2,500.00 Fine 6 months
Va 46.2-894 Attended Property Damage > $1000.00 or Injury / Death Class 6 Felony 5 Years $2,500.00 Fine 6 months
Va 46.2-896 Unattended Property Damage < $250.00 Class 4 Misdemeanor N/A $250.00 Fine N/A
Va 46.2-896 Unattended Property Damage > $250.00 Class 1 Misdemeanor 12 months $2,500.00 Fine 6 months
Virginia Hit & Run Attorney
This article is written by Virginia hit and run attorney Marina Medvin, an award-winning defense lawyer serving Alexandria, Fairfax, and Arlington, VA. She successfully represents individuals charged with hit and run in Alexandria, Arlington, Fairfax, Vienna and Falls Church. Please call for a Virginia hit and run attorney consultation.
FAIRFAX, VIRGINIA: Virginia Hit and Run misdemeanor charge under VA Code 46.2-896, for leaving the scene of an accident in Fairfax, VA after a collision, resulted in DISMISSAL of the charge for insufficient evidence. Read more about Virginia Hit and Run Law: Virginia Hit and Run Laws, Penalties and Defenses [...]
FAIRFAX VIRGINIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE ATTORNEY CASE RESULT: Misdemeanor Hit and Run charge under VA Code 46.2-896, was REDUCED to a non-criminal traffic infraction with a fine of $250. Fairfax County General District Court at 4110 Chain Bridge Road, Fairfax, Virginia 22030 Read more about Hit and Run Law: Virginia Hit [...]
FAIRFAX VIRGINIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE ATTORNEY CASE RESULT: Misdemeanor Hit and Run charge under VA Code 46.2-896, was REDUCED to a non-criminal local Fairfax county ordinance with a fine of $50. Fairfax County General District Court at 4110 Chain Bridge Road, Fairfax, Virginia 22030 Read more about Hit and Run Law: Virginia [...]
FAIRFAX VIRGINIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE ATTORNEY CASE RESULT: Felony Hit and Run charge under VA Code 46.2-894 for failure to report an accident with injuries, was AMENDED and REDUCED to a Misdemeanor Hit and Run of unattended property under VA Code 46.2-896, without any active jail time and without a fine. [...]
FAIRFAX VIRGINIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE ATTORNEY CASE RESULT: Fairfax County Hit and Run misdemeanor charge under VA Code 46.2-896 was REDUCED to a non-criminal local county ordinance with a fine of $50. Fairfax County General District Court at 4110 Chain Bridge Road, Fairfax, Virginia 22030. The client was represented by Marina [...]
CITY OF FAIRFAX: A Fairfax City felony hit and run charge for an accident involving vehicle damage over $1000, a felony under Virginia law 46.2-896, was REDUCED to a local Fairfax City infraction with a fine of $125. City of Fairfax General District Court at City Hall, 10455 Armstrong Street, [...]
FAIRFAX, VIRGINIA: Hit and Run charge for a Fairfax accident involving unattended property, VA law 46.2-896, was DROPPED at the first hearing for insufficient evidence to prosecute. Fairfax County General District Court at 4110 Chain Bridge Road, Fairfax, Virginia 22030. The client was represented by Fairfax attorney Marina Medvin. Read [...]
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA: Arlington felony Hit and Run charge for a collision in Arlington, VA with property damage over $1000, prosecuted under Virginia law § 46.2-894, was AMENDED and REDUCED to a misdemeanor Reckless Driving, which was penalized by 75 hours of community service and restitution. No felony record, no jail [...]
ATTORNEY CASE RESULT FOR FAIRFAX COUNTY, VIRGINIA: Fairfax Felony Hit and Run charge under VA law § 46.2-894 resulted in a reduction of the charge to a misdemeanor with no jail time, just a fine of $150 (a result that was strongly opposed by the victim). Read more about Hit [...]
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA: Facing up to 10 years in prison on a class 5 felony Hit and Run charge for a collision in Arlington, Virginia, VA law § 46.2-894, with four strong government witnesses, Client was able to walk away with a REDUCED class 2 misdemeanor charge for Aggressive Driving Charge [...]
VIRGINIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE ATTORNEY CASE RESULT: Virginia Hit & Run charge under VA law § 46.2-894 was DROPPED after defense attorney suppressed evidence and government was left with insufficient evidence to prosecute. Client was represented by Virginia attorney Marina Medvin. Read more about Hit and Run Law: Virginia Hit and Run [...]
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Hit and Run / DUI: Leaving the Scene of an Accident Due to Fear of DWI Charge
One of the most common reasons that drivers leave the scene of an accident is due to the fear of being arrested for a DWI upon arrival of police. Indeed, both Drunk Driving and Hit and Run are criminal charges, either of which may be charged as a Felony or a Misdemeanor.
Driver Responsibility After An Auto Accident
5. If you hit a parked vehicle, or any unattended property at the time of the accident, you must use reasonable effort to find the owner of the vehicle and if you cannot, then you much leave a note with your contact information and report the accident to the police within 24 hours of it taking place. Hit an run of a parked vehicle will become a criminal offense if these rules are not followed.
HIT AND RUN POLICE INVESTIGATION
If the police are investigating you for a hit and run, you need to invoke your rights and contact an attorney immediately. Police investigations are most commonly done via home visits, phone calls, emails, requests for interviews at the police station, etc. Regardless of where you are or what you are advised, anything you say can be used against you to charge you and/or to convict you of a crime. I cannot stress this enough: do not say anything without first speaking to an attorney.
Federal United States Park Police Regulation for Reporting Accidents on the GW Parkway
36 CFR 4.4 – Report of motor vehicle accident
This evidence failed to prove Tooke knew that the driver lost control of the van and crashed after returning to the southbound lane. “Knowledge necessarily is an essential element of the crime. . . . `[I]t must be present in [the driver’s] mind that there has been an injury; and then, with that in mind, he must deliberately go away.'” Herchenbach v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 217, 220, 38 S.E.2d 328, 329 (1946) (citation omitted). Thus, to prove the driver “guilty of violating the statute,” the evidence must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that “`the driver [was] aware that harm has been done.'” Id. (citation omitted).
On appeal, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions. “`When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on appeal, we determine whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, the Commonwealth, and the reasonable inferences fairly deducible from that evidence support each and every element of the charged offense.'” Crest v. Commonwealth, 40 Va.App. 165, 174, 578 S.E.2d 88, 92 (2003) (quoting Haskins v. Commonwealth, 31 Va. App. 145, 149-50, 521 S.E.2d 777, 779 (1999)). “`In so doing, we must discard the evidence of the accused in conflict with that of the Commonwealth, and regard as true all the credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair inferences that may be drawn therefrom.'” Id. (quoting Watkins v. Commonwealth, 26 Va.App. 335, 348, 494 S.E.2d 859, 866 (1998)). “`[I]t is our duty to look to that evidence which tends to support the [conviction] and to permit the [conviction] to stand unless plainly wrong.'” Edwards v. Commonwealth, 41 Va.App. 752, 767, 589 S.E.2d 444, 451 (2003) (en banc) (quoting Snyder v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 1009, 1016, 121 S.E.2d 452, 457 (1961)), aff’d, No. 040019 (Va. Sup. Ct. Order of 10/15/04). Indeed, “`[t]he judgment of a trial court sitting without a jury is entitled to the same weight as a jury verdict and will not be set aside unless it appears from the evidence that the judgment is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.'” Id. (quoting Reynolds v. Commonwealth, 30 Va.App. 153, 163, 515 S.E.2d 808, 813 (1999)).
“It is well established that, `when, as here, a statute contains no express definition of a term, [we] infer the legislature’s intent from the plain meaning of the language used,’ in light of the context in which the term at issue is used.” Id. at 425, 611 S.E.2d 631, 611 S.E.2d at 640 (quoting Hubbard v. Henrico Ltd. Partnership, 255 Va. 335, 340, 497 S.E.2d 335, 338 (1998)); see also Sansom v. Bd. of Supervisors, 257 Va. 589, 594-95, 514 S.E.2d 345, 349 (1999) (“An undefined term must be `given its ordinary meaning, given the context in which it is used.'” (quoting Dep’t of Taxation v. Orange-Madison Coop. Farm Serv., 220 Va. 655, 658, 261 S.E.2d 532, 533-34 (1980))). “Involve” is defined, in pertinent part, as “to draw in as a participant,” to “implicate,” “to relate closely,” to “connect,” “to have an effect on,” to “concern directly,” to “affect.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1191 (1993). Nothing in these definitions suggests that, for purposes of determining criminal liability under Code § 46.2-894, a driver must have legally caused an accident in order to be considered “involved” in the accident. Indeed, the various definitions make it clear, given the breadth of their scope, that a driver need only be “implicated in or connected with the accident in a substantial or logical manner” to be “involved” in an accident under the statute. People v. Oliver, 242 Mich. App. 92, 617 N.W.2d 721, 724 (2000) (holding that the defendant was “involved” in an accident when he used his vehicle to push an inoperative car being steered by someone else that then swerved into the path of another car); see also People v. Sell, 96 Cal.App.2d 521, 215 P.2d 771, 772 (1950) (holding that a defendant is “involved” in an accident if his conduct was “connected with [the] accident[] in a natural or logical manner” and that the defendant was “involved” in an accident when she changed lanes and caused the car next to her to swerve into the path of another car); People v. Kerger, 191 Ill.App.3d 405, 138 Ill.Dec. 806, 548 N.E.2d 36, 39 (1989) (holding that “involved” means “implicated in an accident or connected with the accident in a substantial manner” and that the defendant was “involved” in an accident when she swerved to miss a pedestrian who was then struck by the vehicle behind the defendant).
We hold, therefore, that the application of the statute is not exclusively limited to those drivers who legally cause an accident. Accordingly, a conviction under Code § 46.2-894 does not require proof that the defendant legally caused the accident. See Sell, 215 P.2d at 772 (“The [failure to stop after an accident] statute . . . is in no way made dependent upon . . . who may ultimately be found to have been . . . at fault.”); Kerger, 138 Ill.Dec. 806, 548 N.E.2d at 39 (“[I]t is not necessary to determine, for purposes of deciding whether defendant was involved in a motor vehicle accident, whether defendant caused or was at fault for the accident. . . .”); Oliver, 617 N.W.2d at 724 (noting that the defendant’s “acquittal of [involuntary manslaughter and negligent operation of a vehicle causing homicide] charges is not inconsistent with a finding that he was involved in the accident for the purposes of [the failure to stop after an accident statute]”). Thus, we reject appellant’s claim that he was not “involved” in the subject accident because the trial court found he did not cause it.
The accident caused “[n]ot a great deal [of damage to Swanson’s car], but some.” She described the damage as “a crack in the cover of the light on the back” and said, “I can’t hardly tell it’s there.” Her insurance company estimated the cost to repair the damage as “$600 and some.”
“[W]ithin seconds” after the impact, Deputy Christefano approached Swanson’s car and inquired whether “everybody” in Swanson’s vehicle was “okay” and whether anybody was “hurting.” Swanson looked at the other occupants of her vehicle, two of her grandchildren, and responded to Deputy Christefano that “she was fine,” they were “okay.” Deputy Christefano told Swanson to pull over to the side of the road, and she did so. Deputy Christefano did not know whether appellant was able to hear his conversation with Swanson. Deputy Christefano did not assess the damage to Swanson’s vehicle at the time, but he did not recall that “any pieces of [Swanson’s] car” or any “broken glass that was attributable to this accident” were “in the roadway” at that time.
Although admitting that a “jury’s verdict will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it,” Guda v. Commonwealth, 42 Va.App. 453, 457, 592 S.E.2d 748, 750 (2004), the majority nonetheless concludes “as a matter of law that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, was insufficient to support a finding that appellant knew or should have known anyone in [the victim’s] car was injured.” Respecting the jury’s decision to the contrary, I dissent.
This entry was posted in Criminal Defense, Hit and Run, Virginia Criminal Law and tagged 18.2-36.1, 18.2-51.4, 46.2-894, 46.2-896, Alexandria Hit and Run Lawyer, ALEXANDRIA MANSLAUGHTER LAWYER, Arlington Hit and Run Lawyer, ARLINGTON MANSLAUGHTER LAWYER, Fairfax Hit and Run Lawyer, HIT AND RUN, Hit and Run in Alexandria, Hit and Run in Arlington, Hit and Run in Fairfax, VIRGINIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE ATTORNEY, VIRGINIA HIT AND RUN LAW, Virginia Hit and Run Lawyer.