Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/442/758/641949/
Timestamp: 2018-09-21 21:49:21
Document Index: 571630746

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 12101', '§ 12112', '§ 1630', '§ 12102', '§ 1630', '§ 12102', '§ 1630', '§ 12101', '§ 12102', '§ 1630', '§ 1630', '§ 12102', '§ 1630', '§ 1630']

Neal F. Gasser, Appellee/cross-appellant v. District of Columbia, Appellant/cross-appellee, 442 F.3d 758 (D.C. Cir. 2006) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › D.C. Circuit › 2006 › Neal F. Gasser, Appellee/cross-appellant v. District of Columbia, Appellant/cross-appellee
Neal F. Gasser, Appellee/cross-appellant v. District of Columbia, Appellant/cross-appellee, 442 F.3d 758 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit - 442 F.3d 758 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
The District of Columbia appeals from the judgment entered after a verdict in favor of Neal F. Gasser, a sergeant in the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department, finding the District liable to him under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("Disabilities Act"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213. Gasser cross-appeals from the district court's order refusing to direct the Police Department to promote him to Lieutenant. Among the matters in controversy is the proper application of the evidentiary standard laid down in Duncan v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 240 F.3d 1110 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc).
Gasser's complaint alleged that the Police Department violated the Disabilities Act when it refused to return him to full duty. See Gasser v. Ramsey, 125 F. Supp. 2d 1, 1-2 (D.D.C. 2000). After a jury failed to reach a verdict, the case was set for retrial. The district court denied the District's motions for judgment as a matter of law after Gasser presented his case-in-chief and after the close of all the evidence. The jury returned a special verdict in Gasser's favor and awarded him $34,096 for emotional distress.
The evidence, viewed most favorably to Gasser, see Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150-51, 120 S. Ct. 2097, 147 L. Ed. 2d 105 (2000), showed as follows. Gasser joined the Police Department as a patrol officer in 1986 and was promoted to master patrol officer in 1991 and to sergeant in 1994.1 Police Department policy requires that all officers be "street ready" or "fit for full duty" regardless of rank. This means that all officers — including the Chief of Police — must be able to perform patrol functions from time to time. Each officer is expected to be able to subdue a suspect within a matter of minutes, with or without assistance.
Ultimately, Drs. Thorne and Smith-Jeffries decided to refer Gasser to another hematologist, Dr. Joseph P. Catlett, for an "independent opinion." After examining Gasser in late June 1999, Dr. Catlett sent a letter to Dr. Smith-Jeffries in which he concluded that Gasser had an increased risk of "trauma-associated bleeding due to Coumadin use." However, rather than giving Dr. Smith-Jeffries an independent opinion of Gasser's fitness for full duty, Dr. Catlett "defer [red] to [her] expertise" and told her "the decision lies with [her] office." Dr. Smith-Jeffries was not satisfied with this deferential position and decided to have another physician render an independent judgment.
We review de novo the district court's denial of the District's motion for judgment as a matter of law. See Curry v. District of Columbia, 195 F.3d 654, 658-59 (D.C. Cir. 1999). If the evidence supporting the verdict is "significantly probative," the verdict will stand "unless the evidence and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are so one-sided that reasonable men and women could not disagree on the verdict." Id. at 659 (quoting Smith v. Wash. Sheraton Corp., 135 F.3d 779, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Our duty is to "draw all reasonable inferences" in Gasser's favor without "mak [ing] credibility determinations or weigh [ing] the evidence." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S. Ct. 2097, 147 L. Ed. 2d 105 (2000). We will therefore "disregard all evidence favorable to" the District "that the jury is not required to believe" and "give credence to the evidence favoring" Gasser. Id. at 151.
The District asks us to vacate the judgment below for either of two reasons: because Gasser presented insufficient evidence that his disability, if any, substantially limited his ability to work, see Duncan v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 240 F.3d 1110, 1114-16 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc), or because the District adequately showed that he poses a direct threat to his own safety, which the Supreme Court has held is an affirmative defense to Disabilities Act liability, see Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 86-87, 122 S. Ct. 2045, 153 L. Ed. 2d 82 (2002). We reach only the District's first argument.
The Disabilities Act provides that a covered employer shall not "discriminate" against a disabled individual because of his disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.4. A "disability" is not just a "physical or mental impairment," as common usage might suggest. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (A); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g) (1). The Disabilities Act also prevents employers from taking adverse employment actions against those they "regard [] as having" a physical or mental impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (C) (emphasis added); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g) (3).6 The purpose of "regarded as" claims is to protect employees from "misperceptions [that] often `resul [t] from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of ... individual ability.'" Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489, 119 S. Ct. 2139, 144 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1999) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(7)) (second and third alterations in original). An employer therefore may run afoul of the Disabilities Act "when it makes an employment decision based on a physical or mental impairment, [whether] real or imagined." Id. at 490, 119 S. Ct. 2139.
In "regarded as" cases, not every adverse employment action gives rise to liability under the Disabilities Act. The "regarded as" disability must "substantially limit []" a "major life activit [y]." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (A); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g) (1); see Haynes v. Williams, 392 F.3d 478, 481-82 (D.C. Cir. 2004).7 The District argues that any limitations it regarded Gasser as having were not "substantial []," see Sutton, 527 U.S. at 490-91, 119 S. Ct. 2139, and that Gasser did not prove that they were, as he must, see Haynes, 392 F.3d at 482.
In Sutton, the Supreme Court, relying on Equal Employment Opportunity Commission regulations, held that a Disabilities Act plaintiff like Gasser must demonstrate that he is precluded from a "substantial class of jobs" or a "broad range of jobs,"8 not just "one type of job, a specialized job, or a particular job of choice." 527 U.S. at 492, 119 S. Ct. 2139; Duncan, 240 F.3d at 1115; see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (3) (i). "If jobs utilizing an individual's skills . . . are available, one is not precluded from a substantial class of jobs. Similarly, if a host of different types of jobs are available, one is not precluded from a broad range of jobs." Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492, 119 S. Ct. 2139.
Id. at 1115-16 (citing Sutton, 527 U.S. at 491-92, 119 S. Ct. 2139). The plaintiff's evidence must be "significantly probative" so that the jury is not "left in the dark" about the vocational limitations the plaintiff faces. Id. at 1115.
Gasser concedes that the District's liability was premised on its view that he is "medically unable to perform jobs having duties or even possible duties with potential for trauma." Corrected Br. of Appellee/Cross-Appellant 22. But rather than looking to the reason Gasser was precluded from being a full-duty officer — potential for trauma — Dr. Thomas based his jobs analysis on the functions Gasser performed as a limited-duty officer. Dr. Thomas's analysis treated Gasser as precluded from "heavy duty jobs" and "medium type jobs" because, in Dr. Thomas's words, " [Gasser's] job now is to fill out forms on injured police officers." Dr. Thomas assumed Gasser was "restricted from a vast number of . . . jobs that require hard, outside kind of work, given the limitations that are placed on him."
This was error, as the district court recognized. Under Duncan, if the perceived impairment is, as Gasser concedes, that he cannot be exposed to risk of trauma, then the question is whether his preclusion from exposure to a risk of trauma "disqualified him from a substantial class or broad range of jobs." 240 F.3d at 1115. Dr. Thomas answered a different question — whether preclusion from engaging in heavy physical exertion disqualified Gasser from a substantial class or broad range of jobs. Dr. Thomas's testimony therefore was probative of jobs that require physical exertion, not just jobs that involve risk of trauma. Compare Giordano v. City of New York, 274 F.3d 740, 749 (2d Cir. 2001) (" [Plaintiff] introduced evidence that establishes at most that the defendants regarded him as disabled from police or other investigative or security jobs that involve a substantial risk of physical confrontation."). Gasser should have presented evidence of the number of jobs he would be unable to perform because they involve a risk of trauma. It is not sufficient to short-cut this analysis by looking at Gasser's responsibilities in his limited-duty role. There may well be medium- and heavy-duty jobs that do not involve risk of trauma. Dr. Thomas's analysis therefore was not probative — significantly or otherwise — of whether Gasser was precluded from a broad range or a substantial class of jobs, as Duncan requires. See 240 F.3d at 1115; Giordano, 274 F.3d at 749 ("The record contains no evidence from which we can infer that the [police department] thought, or had grounds for thinking, that other jobs in the public or private sector . . . carry the same nature or degree of risk."); Colwell v. Suffolk County Police Dep't, 158 F.3d 635, 644 (2d Cir. 1998) (concluding that police officer's back injury "disqualifies him from only a narrow range of jobs (those involving physical confrontation) and thus his impairment is not a substantially limiting one") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).9
Gasser argues that Duncan's evidentiary standard applies only to plaintiffs claiming preclusion from a broad range of jobs. Based on that premise, he urges us to uphold the judgment below despite the flaws in Dr. Thomas's analysis because the District regarded Gasser as unable to perform two classes of jobs: driving jobs and law enforcement jobs. The premise is mistaken. The class-of-jobs limitations he alleges must be "substantial" under the Disabilities Act. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (A), (C). Duncan's evidentiary standard applies to all claims of "substantial limitation," whether from a broad range or a substantial class of jobs. 240 F.3d at 1115-16. Gasser therefore failed to satisfy his evidentiary burden.
The district court reached the same conclusion but decided that the "error was more than offset by the fact that [Dr. Thomas] did not omit from his consideration positions involving driving, which [the District] has precluded Plaintiff from doing." Gasser v. Ramsey, No. 00-534, mem. op. at 6 n.2 (D.D.C. Nov. 7, 2003). We do not believe this is correct. As discussed above, Gasser presented no evidence of the number of jobs erroneously included in Dr. Thomas's tally of jobs he could not perform — that is, medium- and heavy-duty jobs without a risk of trauma. Nor did Gasser present evidence of the number of jobs "involving driving" the District regards him as unable to perform. In fact, Dr. Thomas testified that when he conducted his analysis he did not know that the District had restricted Gasser from driving. The district court's ruling that one unquantified number can somehow "offset" another is inconsistent with Duncan's requirement that the plaintiff present "some evidence" that is "significantly probative" of the "number and types of jobs" unavailable to the plaintiff. 240 F.3d at 1115. The District claims the limitation was not on driving generally, but on being in a squad car that, in an emergency, could be diverted to a crime scene where Gasser could be exposed to life-threatening trauma. Gasser presented no evidence justifying an inference that the driving limitation was more substantial than this. Compare Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 524, 119 S. Ct. 2133, 144 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1999) ("At most, petitioner has shown that he is regarded as unable to perform the job of mechanic only when that job requires driving a commercial motor vehicle — a specific type of vehicle used on a highway in interstate commerce.").
In a case like this, in which the jury-verdict loser was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we have discretion to "instruct the district court to enter judgment against the jury-verdict winner" or to "return the case to the trial court" for it to assess "whether a new trial, rather than judgment for [the] defendant, should be ordered." Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 443-44, 120 S. Ct. 1011, 145 L. Ed. 2d 958 (2000). The latter disposition is appropriate if "the district court is better positioned" than we are to decide whether circumstances warrant a new trial. Id. Here it is not. Gasser was on "notice, before the close of evidence, of the. . . evidentiary deficienc [ies]" repeatedly alleged by the District in its motions for judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 454, 120 S. Ct. 1011. The expert testimony he elicited from Dr. Thomas was insufficient. "It is implausible to suggest . . . that parties will initially present less than their best expert evidence in the expectation of a second chance should their first try fail." Id. at 455, 120 S. Ct. 1011. Gasser "had a full and fair opportunity to present [his] case," and "further proceedings are unwarranted." Id. at 444, 120 S. Ct. 1011.
The Supreme Court has recognized two ways an individual may be "regarded as" disabled See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489, 119 S. Ct. 2139, 144 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1999) (employer's mistaken belief either that employee has a disability or that employee's actual disability substantially limits major life activity); see also Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 521-22, 119 S. Ct. 2133, 144 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1999); Haynes v. Williams, 392 F.3d 478, 481 n. 2 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's regulations suggest a third. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l) (2) (substantial limitation arising from others' attitudes about impairment).
What constitutes a "major life activity" is not at issue in this appeal, although the District raised the issue before the district court. Gasser claims that the District discriminated against him because of a perceived disability that would substantially limit his ability to work. Whether "working" is a "major life activit [y]" under the Disabilities Act, as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's regulations suggest, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i), is a question we have not yet decided. Like the Supreme Court,see Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492, 119 S. Ct. 2139, we have assumed arguendo that it is, see Duncan, 240 F.3d at 1114 n. 1, despite the "difficulties the issue presents," id. at 1117 (Randolph, J., concurring); see Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492, 119 S. Ct. 2139. We do so again in this case.
Gasser urges affirmance based on his preclusion from a substantial class or broad range of jobs. The District claims Gasser is limited to arguing only that he has been precluded from a broad range of jobs because he did not present the other theories to the jury. The usual rule is that a prevailing party may support the judgment on any ground raised or decided in the district court See, e.g., Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 38-39, 109 S. Ct. 2782, 106 L. Ed. 2d 26 (1989); Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Ludwig, 426 U.S. 479, 481, 96 S. Ct. 2158, 48 L. Ed. 2d 784 (1976); Nat'l Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Greenberg, 983 F.2d 286, 289 (D.C. Cir. 1993). The record sufficiently supports Gasser's having raised his contention regarding a substantial class of jobs.