Source: http://www.justice.gov/osg/briefs/2005/3mer/1ami/2004-1324.mer.ami.html
Timestamp: 2014-08-27 23:00:27
Document Index: 700255221

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 101', '§ 104', '§\n8', '§ 1278', '§ 8', '§ 2', '§ 1', 'art, 354', '§ 2255']

No. 04-1324: Day v. Crosby - Amicus (Merits)
No. 04-1324
PATRICK DAY, PETITIONER
JAMES V. CROSBY, JR., SECRETARY,
Attorney Department of Justice
1. Whether the State forfeits a defense under the statute of limitations governing habeas corpus petitions when it fails to plead or otherwise raise that defense, but instead mistakenly concedes that the petition was timely.
2. Whether, after a State has filed an answer to a habeas petition, Rule
4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases permits a district court to dismiss
the petition sua sponte based on a ground not raised in the answer. In the Supreme Court of the United States
This case presents the question whether a district court has the power sua sponte to dismiss a habeas petition as un timely, when the State has erroneously
conceded in its re sponse that the petition was timely. Because the one-year
time limit for a state prisoner to file a habeas petition is the same as
the period within which a federal prisoner must file a motion for postconviction
relief, see 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1); 28 U.S.C. 2255 para. 6, and in light of
similarities between the relevant procedural rules governing collateral review
of state and federal convictions, compare Rule 4 of the Rules Govern ing
Section 2254 Cases (Section 2254 Rules) with Rule 4(b) of the Rules Governing
Section 2255 Proceedings (Section 2255 Rules), the Court's decision in this
case will influence, if not control, the resolution of cases presenting similar
questions under 28 U.S.C. 2255. See, e.g., United States v. Bendolph, 409
F.3d 155 (3d Cir. 2005) (en banc), petition for cert. pend ing, No. 05-3
(filed June 24, 2005). The United States there fore has a significant interest
1.	In 1998, following a jury trial in a Florida state court, petitioner Patrick Day was convicted of second-degree mur der and sentenced to imprisonment for a term of 55 years. J.A. 1, 10. Day appealed only his sentence, and the Florida First District Court of Appeals affirmed on December 21, 1999. Day v. State, 746 So. 2d 1219. Because Day did not seek review in this Court,
the one-year limitations period for filing a federal habeas petition, established
by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub.
L. No. 104-132, § 101, 110 Stat. 1217 (28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)), began
running 90 days after the state court's decision, when the time to file a
petition for certiorari expired, i.e., on March 20, 2000. Pet. App. 2a,
9a. See 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(A); Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 532
2.	On March 9, 2001, Day filed a motion for post conviction relief in state court, claiming five grounds of inef fective assistance of counsel. J.A. 10-13; Pet. App. 9a. The filing of that state court application tolled Day's one-year period for filing a federal habeas petition, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(2), but at that point Day had already used 353 of his 365 days. Pet. App. 2a, 12a. The state trial court denied Day's motion for relief, as well as an amended motion, which the court construed as a second motion. Id. at 9a. The state district court of appeals affirmed on October 9, 2002, and, following the denial on November 15, 2002, of Day's motion for rehearing, the court of appeals' mandate issued on Decem ber 3, 2002. J.A. 14-16. With that event,
pursuant to Elev enth Circuit precedent, Day's unexpired time for filing
a fed eral habeas petition began to run again. See Nyland v. Moore, 216
F.3d 1264, 1267 (11th Cir. 2000) (motion for postconviction relief is pending
until Florida court of appeals' mandate issues). Thus, Day had until December
16, 2002 (a Monday), to file a federal habeas petition. Day did not, how
ever, file his federal petition until January 8, 2003, after the limitations
period had run. Pet. App. 2a, 9a-10a; J.A. 17-20.
3.	Day's petition did not include the information that would be necessary to determine if it was timely. Although the petition reflected the dates on which his conviction was affirmed and his state court motion for postconviction relief was filed, J.A. 18, it did not specify the date on which the court of appeals' mandate issued in the state habeas proceeding. See J.A. 19. Nor were the court documents that would have revealed that information attached
On February 4, 2003, a magistrate judge issued an order indicating that the petition was "in proper form" and directing the State to file a response,
which was to include all argu ments on exhaustion of state remedies or procedural
default. J.A. 21-22. The order did not mention the statute of limita tions.
Ibid. In its March 17, 2003, response, Florida stated that the petition
"is timely; filed after 352 days of untolled time." J.A. 24. The State
attached to its response copies of the relevant state court proceedings,
including a copy of the Florida appellate court's December 3, 2002, mandate.
On December 11, 2003, a new magistrate judge to whom Day's petition had
been assigned issued an order sua sponte directing Day to show cause why
his petition should not be dismissed as untimely. J.A. 26-30. The order
to show cause explained that, because 353 days had passed between the last
day for filing a petition for certiorari on direct appeal and the filing
of Day's state postconviction motion, his federal habeas petition was due
within twelve days of when the state court of appeals issued its mandate
affirming the denial of postconviction relief, i.e., by Monday, December
16, 2002. See J.A. 29 (citing Nyland v. Moore, supra; Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)).
In his response to the Order to Show Cause, Day noted that Florida's response
had "agreed the Petition was timely" and that the court had waited nearly
a year to raise the issue of timeliness. Day then argued that the petition
was not un timely because the one-year period for filing a federal petition
under Section 2244(d) continued to be tolled for 90 days after the denial
of his motion for rehearing in the state collateral appeal, during which
time he could have filed a petition for certiorari in this Court. In addition,
Day urged that the Sec tion 2244(d) deadline should be further tolled because
state public defenders had withheld his trial transcript for 352 days, thereby
delaying his ability to file his state collateral attack. J.A. 31-32.
The magistrate judge recommended dismissal of the peti tion. Pet. App. 8a-15a. The magistrate judge rejected Day's argument that his petition was
timely. Id. at 12a (citing Coates v. Byrd, 211 F.3d 1225 (11th Cir. 2000)
(90-day period for filing a petition for certiorari from a collateral appeal
does not toll the time for filing a federal habeas petition), cert. denied,
531 U.S. 1166 (2001)). The magistrate judge also found that Day's argument
that he was denied prompt access to trial transcripts did not justify equitable
tolling under 28 U.S.C. 2244. Pet. App. 13a-14a. Day filed an objection
to the magistrate's Report and Recommendation with the district court. Day
did not renew either of his arguments why his petition was timely. Instead,
Day argued for the first time that the State's statement, in its response,
that the petition was timely foreclosed a sua sponte dismissal by the court
on that basis. J.A. 34-36.
The district court adopted the magistrate's report and dismissed Day's petition. Pet. App. 7a. The court also denied a certificate of appealability. J.A. 8. The Eleventh Circuit granted a certificate of appealability to determine
whether the district court had erred in addressing the timeliness of the
petition after the State had conceded that it was timely. J.A. 37.
4.	The court of appeals, in a per curiam opinion, affirmed the district court's dismissal of Day's petition. Pet. App. 1a- 6a. The court of appeals first noted that it had, in Jackson v. Secretary for the Department of Corrections, 292 F.3d 1347, 1349 (11th Cir. 2002), joined four other courts of appeals in holding that, "even though the statute of limitations is an af firmative defense, the district court may review sua sponte the timeliness of the section
2254 petition" under AEDPA. Pet. App. 4a. The court of appeals reasoned
that "there is no meaningful difference between an erroneous failure to plead
the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense, as oc curred in Jackson,
and a concession of timeliness that was patently erroneous, as occurred here."
Ibid.1 The court fur ther explained that, while "[i]n an ordinary civil
case, a 'fail ure to plead the bar of the statute of limitations constitutes
a waiver of the defense,'" ibid. (quoting Day v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins.
Co., 122 F.3d 1012, 1015 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. de nied, 523 U.S. 1119 (1998)),
habeas petitions are controlled by different considerations. Unlike ordinary
civil suits, Rule 4 of the Section 2254 Rules provides, in relevant part,
that "[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits
that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the
judge must dismiss the petition and direct the clerk to notify the petitioner."
Thus, the court of appeals concluded, in order to "promote comity, finality,
and federalism," Con gress had, in AEDPA, assigned federal courts "an obligation
to enforce the federal statute of limitations" on habeas petitions. Pet.
App. 5a.2
District courts have authority to give effect to the one-year statute of limitations period Congress has established for federal court review of
state court convictions, whether or not a State has overlooked or mistakenly conceded the limitations bar in its answer. It is undisputed that the limitations bar can be vindicated by the district court sua sponte before the State has
been called upon to respond. But the district court's deci sion to call
for an answer does not strip the court of the au thority to give effect sua
sponte to Congress's determination that federal courts should not hear untimely
There is nothing in the rules concerning habeas proce dure, or, indeed, in the rules governing civil proceedings gen erally, that divests the district court of its independent au thority to abide by the limitations on habeas review. Nor would the importation of such a restriction be sensible. Be cause habeas petitioners are not required by the Section 2254 Rules to supply the district court at the outset with all of the information necessary to determine whether a petition is timely, the district court will often have to call for a response from the State in order to obtain that information. Once the habeas court does so and becomes aware of the limitations obstacle, sound principles of finality, comity, and federalism require the district court to dismiss the petition, at least ab sent prejudice or other countervailing concerns. Any sugges tion that the habeas rules, or borrowed rules of civil proce dure, imply an absence of such power is squarely foreclosed by the Court's
decisions. Thus, the State's act of filing a re sponse in this case, even
one that erroneously conceded that the petition was timely, did not deprive
the district court of its authority to enforce the limitations period that
Congress has adopted to promote the prompt filing and disposition of ha beas
corpus petitions.
I.	A DISTRICT COURT MAY DISMISS AN UNTIMELY HA BEAS PETITION SUA SPONTE, EVEN IF THE STATE FAILS TO RAISE THE DEFENSE IN ITS ANSWER In order "to advance the finality of criminal convictions," Congress
has "adopted a tight time line, a one-year limitation period" for federal
habeas cases. Mayle v. Felix, 125 S. Ct. 2562, 2573 (2005); 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1);
28 U.S.C. 2255 para. 6. AEDPA's one-year limitations period "quite plainly
serves the well-recognized interest in the finality of state court judg ments";
it "reduces the potential for delay on the road to final ity by restricting
the time that a prospective federal habeas petitioner has in which to seek
federal habeas review." Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 179 (2001); Rhines
v. Weber, 125 S. Ct. 1528, 1534 (2005). To further that policy, district
courts may dismiss untimely habeas petitions sua sponte, even when the State
has erroneously conceded the timeliness of the petition.
A.	Congress Has Assigned A Unique Gatekeeper Function To Federal District Courts In Habeas Cases
This Court has long recognized the important principles of comity, federalism, and finality that are implicated by fed eral habeas review of state court judgments. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 491 n.31 (1976). In
light of "the pro found societal costs that attend the exercise of habeas
juris diction," Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 554 (1998) (quoting Smith
v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 539 (1986)), the Court has "impose[d] significant
limits on the discretion of federal courts to grant habeas relief," id. at
554-555. It has, for example, restricted the courts' ability to grant habeas
relief on the basis of procedurally defaulted claims, United States v. Frady,
456 U.S. 152, 164-169 (1982); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90-91 (1977),
retroactive application of "new rules," Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 308-310
(1989) (plurality opinion), non-prejudicial claims of trial error, Brecht
v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-638 (1993), or where the petitioner has
abused the writ, McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 487 (1991).
Congress's purposes in enacting AEDPA were "to further the principles of comity, finality, and federalism" that gave rise to this Court's own limitations
on habeas relief. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436 (2000). See Mayle,
125 S. Ct. at 2573-2574. In particular, Congress understood that collateral
review of state convictions undermines the finality that "is essential to
both the retributive and the deterrent functions of criminal law," Calderon,
523 U.S. at 555, a concern that applies to postconviction review of federal
as well as state convictions, Frady, 456 U.S. at 164-165. See Woodford v.
Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 206 (2003) (noting that one of AEDPA's purposes is
to "reduce delays in the execution of state and federal criminal sentences,
particularly in capital cases").
Like the other limits on habeas review, AEDPA's statute of limitations "implicates values beyond the concerns of the parties." Acosta v. Artuz,
221 F.3d 117, 123 (2d Cir. 2000). The habeas limitations period "promotes
judicial efficiency and conservation of judicial resources, safeguards the
accu racy of state court judgments by requiring resolution of con stitutional
questions while the record is fresh, and lends final ity to state court judgments
within a reasonable time." Ibid. See United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S.
111, 117 (1979) (noting that limitations periods "protect defendants and
the courts") (emphasis added); Robinson v. Johnson, 313 F.3d 128, 137 (3d
Cir. 2002) (habeas time limit protects against "wasting pre cious legal and
judicial resources"), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 826 (2003).
Because the costs associated with federal habeas review are "societal costs," Calderon, 523 U.S. at 554, society's inter ests in enforcing the
judicially and congressionally imposed limits on such review "transcend the
concerns of the parties to [the] action." Acosta, 221 F.3d at 122 (citation
omitted). As such, the habeas rules have provided, since their adoption
by Congress in 1976, for the courts to exercise a unique gate keeper function.3
Unlike most civil litigation, in habeas cases Congress assigned to district
courts the responsibility to dismiss unmeritorious petitions, including on
grounds of untime liness, even before the government has filed a responsive
pleading. Rule 4 of the Section 2254 Rules (1976).
Rule 4 explicitly provides that the district court "must promptly examine"
the petition and "[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached
exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court,
the judge must dismiss the petition." Rule 4 of the Section 2254 Rules.
Only if the petition is not dismissed sua sponte under this provision does
the district court "order the respondent to file an an swer, motion, or other
response." Ibid. Rule 4(b) of the Sec tion 2255 Rules similarly establishes
that the district court is to perform an initial screening function and dismiss
a motion that, on its face, does not entitle the movant to relief. Indeed,
as the terms of Rule 4 make clear, the district court is not only authorized
to dismiss a habeas petition for any apparent reason that would foreclose
relief, it is required to do so. See Rule 4 of the Section 2254 Rules (directing
that the district court "must promptly examine" the petition and "must dis miss" it if "the petitioner is not entitled to relief") (emphasis added).
See also Rule 4(b), Section 2255 Rules (same). The Advisory Committee Notes
confirm that intent, noting that under 28 U.S.C. 2243 "it is the duty of
the court to screen out frivolous applications and eliminate the burden that
would be placed on the respondent by ordering an unnecessary an swer." Rule
4 of the Section 2254 Rules, Advisory Committee Notes (1976) (emphasis added);
28 U.S.C. 2243 (directing dis trict court to issue an order to show cause
to the respondent "unless it appears from the application that the * *
* person detained is not entitled" to relief).
Rule 4 thus clearly contemplates summary dismissal of a Section 2254 petition
or Section 2255 motion by a district court on any fatal ground, even if the
ground is one that, in an ordinary civil case, generally must be asserted
by the oppos ing party. "Congress intended the courts to play a more ac
tive role in [habeas] cases than they generally play in many other kinds
of cases." Hardiman v. Reynolds, 971 F.2d 500, 504 (10th Cir. 1992). And
Rule 4, in particular, "differentiates habeas cases from other civil cases
with respect to sua sponte consideration of affirmative defenses." Kiser
v. Johnson, 163 F.3d 326, 328 (5th Cir. 1999).4
B.	The Courts' Gatekeeper Role Justifies Judicial Initiative In Enforcing The Limitations Period Placed On Habeas Petitions Even When The State Fails To Raise Or Erro neously Concedes The Limitations Issue
As the court of appeals observed, Pet. App. 4a, the circuit courts that have addressed the issue have uniformly con cluded that Rule 4 authorizes a district court sua sponte to dismiss a habeas petition, without requiring any answer from the government, if the court can determine from the face of
the petition and accompanying documents that it is out of time, as long as
the court gives the petitioner notice and an opportunity to be heard. See
ibid.; Long v. Wilson, 393 F.3d 390, 402-403 (3d Cir. 2004); Hill v. Braxton,
277 F.3d 701, 706 (4th Cir. 2002); Scott v. Collins, 286 F.3d 923, 930 (6th
Cir. 2002); Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039, 1042-1043 & n.3 (9th Cir.
2001); Acosta, 221 F.3d at 124; Kiser, 163 F.3d at 328-329. See also United
States v. Bendolph, 409 F.3d 155, 164 (3d Cir. 2005) (en banc), petition
for cert. pending, No. 05-3 (filed June 24, 2005) (Section 2255 case); United
States v. Sosa, 364 F.3d 507, 513 (4th Cir. 2004) (same).5 Indeed, petitioner
concedes (Br. 42) that "[b]efore an answer is filed, Habeas Rule 4 al lows
courts to dismiss untimely petitions summarily." The power of a habeas court to act sua sponte does not vanish once the State files a response. Although petitioner states (Br. 28) that "the Habeas
Rules prohibit post-answer sua sponte dismissals," there is nothing in Rule
4 or any other rule that expressly precludes a court from doing so. Nor,
contrary to petitioner's contention (Br. 29), does Rule 4's ex press grant
of authority sua sponte to dismiss defective peti tions pre-answer prohibit,
by "negative implication," post-answer court-initiated dismissals. This
Court rejected a simi lar inference in Link v. Wabash Railroad, 370 U.S.
626 (1962). There, the petitioner argued that Federal Rule of Civil Proce
dure 41(b)'s grant to the district court of authority to dismiss a complaint
on a defendant's motion for failure to prosecute, "by negative implication,
prohibits involuntary dismissals for failure of the plaintiff to prosecute
except upon motion by the defendant." Id. at 630. The Court rejected that
argument, holding that "[n]either the permissive language of the Rule * * * nor its policy requires us to conclude that it * * * abrogate[s] the
power of courts, acting on their own initiative" to dismiss a dilatory plaintiff's
complaint. Ibid. Petitioner advances the same argument here, and it fares
As in Link, the courts' express authority under Rule 4 to dismiss an unmeritorious
habeas petition sua sponte is not a unique exception to some general prohibition
or an authoriza tion of a judicial power that would otherwise be absent.
Rather, it is a specific exhortation to exercise a more general authority
to screen out and dismiss procedurally defective habeas petitions that exists
even in the absence of specific authorization in a statute or rule. This
Court has recognized the distinctive role the judiciary plays in enforcing
limitations on habeas relief, even where doctrines of forfeiture might preclude
their enforcement in private civil litigation. In Granberry v. Greer, 481
U.S. 129 (1987), for example, the Court held that a court of appeals has
the power to dismiss a habeas petition for failure of the petitioner to exhaust
state remedies even though the State failed to raise nonexhaustion in the
district court. Id. at 134. Applying Granberry, at least eleven courts
of appeals have held that a federal court in a habeas proceeding may similarly
raise a petitioner's proce dural default sua sponte, even if the respondent
fails to do so.6 The policy underlying that rule-that habeas courts have
an independent role in promoting finality and reducing federal- state friction
by avoiding habeas litigation that is precluded by a plain procedural bar-equally
applies to a district court that has ordered a response by the State under
Rule 4 and that thereafter notices a statute of limitations obstacle that
the State itself overlooked.7
The courts' well-established gatekeeper role in habeas cases justifies the district court's exercise of authority to con sider AEDPA's statute of
limitations sua sponte, even when the State has filed an answer that fails
to address the issue or that makes an erroneous concession of timeliness. See Pet. App. 4a-5a; Jackson v. Secretary for the Dep't of Corrs., 292 F.3d
1347, 1349 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam); Long, 393 F.3d at 401-404; Bendolph,
409 F.3d at 164 (same with respect to Section 2255 postconviction motion).
As discussed, habeas limitations, including the statute of limitations, further
broader societal interests in comity, federalism, and finality that transcend
the interests of the parties themselves. As the Third Circuit explained:
The spectrum of interests that we identify * * * -finality and judicial efficiency, most notably, but also the public interest and the public reputation of judicial pro ceedings-are just as ably advanced post-answer as pre-answer when an untimely case is dismissed upon a district court's own motion. Recognition
of this disentangles the overriding federal, judicial, and societal interests
that are relevant to our analysis from those that concern the par ties alone.
* * * The above considerations * * * are no less persuasive in instances
where the government has either waived the limitations defense or so concedes.
Not only are habeas cases different, but, as for the AEDPA limitations provision,
the government can claim no monopoly on its use.
409 F.3d at 167.
The district court's authority to raise AEDPA's statute of limitations sua sponte does not, contrary to petitioner's protestations (Br. 36-37), "offend[]"
the adversarial system. As discussed below, see pp. 25-28, infra, courts
can, in certain circumstances, raise issues that the parties themselves have
not, even in traditional civil litigation. That is especially ap propriate
where, as in the habeas context, "[t]here are broader interests at stake
* * * than only those belonging to the parties." McMillan v. Jarvis, 332
F.3d 244, 248 (4th Cir. 2003). See Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392,
412 (noting propriety of court raising res judicata defense sua sponte because
the doctrine is "not based solely on the defendant's interest," but also
"the avoidance of unnecessary judicial waste") (citation omitted), supplemented
by 531 U.S. 1 (2000). Rule 4 itself makes clear Congress's understanding
that "broader interests [are] at stake" in habeas litigation, and petitioner's "adversary system" argument (Br. 36) cannot be squared with the district
court's conceded authority (see id. at 42) to grant sua sponte dismissals
under that Rule. That is particularly true because, as this Court has noted,
it will fre quently be the case that the timeliness of a habeas petition
will not be ascertainable until after the State has filed, along with its
answer, copies of documents from the state court proceedings. See Pliler
v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 232 (2004).8
II.	RULES 8(c) AND 12(b) OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE DO NOT DEFEAT THE DISTRICT COURT'S AUTHORITY TO RAISE A HABEAS PETI TION'S UNTIMELINESS SUA SPONTE Petitioner bases his argument that the district court lacked authority to raise his petition's untimeliness on the characterization of habeas proceedings as "civil" in nature and on the claim that the Court should import into habeas
proce dure an assertedly strict rule under Rules 8(c) and 12(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure that a defendant forfeits any affirmative defenses
not raised in its answer. See Pet. Br. 10-11. Petitioner maintains that
under Rule 81(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "the Civil Rules
apply to matters of procedure not directly addressed by a habeas stat ute
or rule," Pet. Br. 20 (emphasis added), and that Rule 11 of the Section 2254
Rules "compels" the courts to follow the Fed eral Rules of Civil Procedure
"where the [Habeas Rules] are silent on an issue," Pet. Br. 20 n.25 (quoting
Kiser, 163 F.3d at 328). Petitioner misunderstands the relationship of the
Civil Rules to habeas proceedings to that extent.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply to ha beas review if
such application would be inconsistent with the distinctive role of the courts
in enforcing limits on habeas review. Thus, if it were correct, as petitioner
argues, that sua sponte enforcement of the AEDPA statute of limitations would
be inconsistent with the Civil Rules, the consequence would not be to defeat
the district court's authority to enforce the AEDPA statute of limitations,
but rather to render Civil Rules 8(c) and 12(b) inapplicable to habeas proceedings.
A.	The Courts Borrow Civil Rules In Habeas Cases Only To The Extent That
Such Application Is Consistent With The Overall Framework And Policies Of
It is a considerable oversimplification to claim that habeas review is
just like any other civil case. As this Court has ob served, labeling habeas
corpus proceedings as civil "is gross and inexact," since "[h]abeas corpus
practice in the federal courts has conformed to civil practice only in a
general sense." Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 293-294 (1969). "Essentially,"
the Court has noted, "the proceeding is unique." Id. at 294. While a habeas
case is nominally civil, the proceeding "re views a criminal punishment with
the potential of overturning it," so that it "necessarily assumes part of
the underlying case's criminal nature." O'Brien v. Moore, 395 F.3d 499, 505
(4th Cir. 2005). Consistent with the unique character of habeas proceed ings, the courts are far less constrained to follow the ordinary Civil Rules than petitioner suggests. Although Rule 11 of the Section 2254 Rules "permits application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in habeas cases," Mayle, 125 S. Ct.
at 2569 (emphasis added), it does so only "to the extent that [the civil
rules] are not inconsistent with any statutory provisions or [the habeas]
rules," ibid. (quoting Rule 11). Similarly, the Advisory Committee Notes
stress that the Civil Rules are to be borrowed only "when in its discretion
the court decides they are appropriate." Rule 11 of the Section 2254 Rules,
Advisory Committee Notes (1976). The Notes further empha size that "[t]he
court does not have to rigidly apply rules which would be inconsistent or
inequitable in the overall framework of habeas corpus." Ibid. (Rule 11 "permits
application of the civil rules only when it would be appropriate to do so").
The Section 2255 Rules, applicable to federal post conviction motions, make even more clear the extent of discre tion the courts possess to determine the appropriate proce dural rule to apply. As originally adopted by Congress, Rule 12 provided that "[i]f no procedure is specifically prescribed by these
rules, the district court may proceed in any lawful manner not inconsistent
with these rules, or any applicable statute, and may apply the Federal Rules
of Criminal Proce dure or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Rule 12
of the Section 2255 Rules (1976) (emphasis added).9 Cf. Frady, 456 U.S.
at 166-167 n.15 (interpreting Rule 12 of the Section 2255 Rules with reference
to Rule 11 of the Section 2254 Rules).
In addition to its permissive language, the Advisory Com mittee Notes to Rule 11 are significant because they direct that courts should depart from
the Civil Rules not only when those rules are inconsistent with a specific habeas rule or statutory provision, but also when they are "inconsistent or
inequitable in the overall framework of habeas corpus." Rule 11 of the Section
2254 Rules, Advisory Committee Notes (1976) (emphasis added). This Court
has embraced that ad monition, see Mayle, 125 S. Ct. at 2569 (quoting "overall
framework" language from Advisory Committee Notes); Frady, 456 U.S. at 168
n.15 (same), an understanding that is fundamentally inconsistent with petitioner's
proposed analyti cal approach (Br. 20-21), pursuant to which the courts must
presumptively apply the most analogous Federal Rule of Civil Procedure unless
doing so would be inconsistent with a partic ular statutory provision or
habeas rule.
In Mayle, for example, the Court did not set a standard of positive conflict
between Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(2)-regarding relation back
of amendments to a com plaint-and Rule 2(c) of the Section 2254 Rules or
the AEDPA statute of limitations. Rather, the Court upheld lim ited application
of Rule 15(c)(2) to habeas proceedings in a manner consistent with habeas
principles, such as "AEDPA's 'finality' and 'federalism' concerns." Mayle,
125 S. Ct. at 2574. See id. at 2570 (noting that the majority of the courts
of appeals had construed Rule 15(c)(2) "in federal habeas cases less broadly"
in light of "Congress' decision to expedite collateral attacks by placing
stringent time restrictions on [them]") (citation omitted).
In other situations, likewise, the Court has held certain civil rules inapplicable, or applicable in a modified fashion, in light of general habeas principles, rather than in reference solely to a particular rule or statute. See Harris, 394 U.S. at 293, 296 (Fed. R. Civ. P. 33, regarding discovery in civil ac tions, did not apply to habeas proceedings in light of "the his
tory of habeas corpus procedure" and because civil discovery rules "are ill-suited
to the special problems and character of such proceedings"); O'Neal v. McAninch,
513 U.S. 432, 440 (1995) (applying a criminal harmless-error standard in
a ha beas proceeding, because, "although habeas is a civil proceed ing, someone's
custody, rather than mere civil liability, is at stake"); Schlanger v. Seamans,
401 U.S. 487, 490 n.4 (1971) (noting that national service of process, which
is authorized in "civil actions" against federal officials under 28 U.S.C.
1391(e), is not authorized in a habeas proceeding, even though the statute
does not explicitly exclude habeas proceedings).10
B.	Applying Civil Rules 8(c) And 12(b) To Bar District Courts From Giving
Effect To Limitations On Habeas Review Would Be Inconsistent With Habeas
Application of Civil Rules 8(c) and 12(b) to habeas pro ceedings in the
manner envisioned by petitioner would be "inconsistent * * * in the overall
framework of habeas cor pus." Rule 11 of the Section 2254 Rules, Advisory
Committee Notes (1976). As previously discussed, see pp. 7-10, supra, because
of the unique nature of habeas review, and the way in which it implicates
principles of federalism, comity, and final ity, Congress has assigned to
the courts a distinctive role in enforcing appropriate limits on collateral
review. Indeed, petitioner recognizes (Br. 13) there is no equivalent under
the Civil Rules to the district court's responsibility as gatekeeper under
28 U.S.C. 2243 and Rule 4 of the Section 2254 Rules to dismiss sua sponte
unmeritorious habeas petitions. While petitioner concedes (Br. 20) that
Rules 8(c) and 12(b) of the Civil Rules must give way to the extent of an
affirmative con flict with Rule 4, he maintains that Rules 8(c) and 12(b)
apply to preclude any sua sponte action by the district court beyond the
explicit authority conferred by Rule 4 to dismiss petitions sua sponte before
calling for a response by the State. But the "overall framework" of habeas
cases posits a more active role for the courts, such that a court is not
limited to the defenses asserted in the State's answer. There is, therefore,
no gen eral principle that a State's failure to raise an issue cuts off a
habeas court's power to notice it.
1. Petitioner cites several of this Court's habeas decisions (Br. 15-16,
26) in support of the proposition that "affirmative defenses must be raised
timely or else they are waived." Id. at 16. Notably, the purported "waiver"
(or forfeiture) in those cases all concerned defenses that a State first
raised, or the court first noticed, after proceedings in the district court
had already been completed and the case was on appeal. See Trest, 522 U.S.
at 89 (State had "neither raised nor argued" procedural default, even on
appeal); Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 228-229 (1994) (State raised non-retroactivity
for the first time in its merits brief in the Supreme Court); Collins v.
Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 40-41 (1990) (State had never as serted non-retroactivity
defense and, when a member of this Court raised it sua sponte at oral argument,
the State dis claimed reliance on it); Granberry, 481 U.S. at 135-136 (State
interposed non-exhaustion for the first time on appeal). See also Gray v.
Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 165-166 (1996) (noting possibility of forfeiture
with citation to Schiro, and Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 234 n.1 (1980)
(State "failed to raise [procedural default] in either the District Court
or the Court of Appeals")); Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 705 (2004) (not
ing possibility of forfeiture, with reliance on Gray and Granberry).
None of the cases relied upon by petitioner even suggests that forfeiture in habeas cases is to be determined with exclu sive reference to the State's answer, let alone holds that a court is barred from noting a habeas defense sua sponte in the absence of an answer asserting it. In fact, several of this Court's decisions are directly contrary to any such narrow limitation on the courts' authority. See, e.g., Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 389 (1994) ("a federal court may, but need not, decline to apply Teague if the
State does not argue it"); Schiro, 510 U.S. at 229 (declining to address
non-retroac tivity defense that State raised only in Supreme Court merits
brief, "[a]lthough we undoubtedly have the discretion to reach" the argument);
Granberry, 481 U.S. at 134 (holding that State's failure, "whether inadvertently
or otherwise," to raise nonexhaution in its answer did not preclude court
of appeals from addressing it if "the interests of comity and fed eralism"
warrant); Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 234 n.1 (exercising discretion not to address
procedural default defense that State raised for the first time in the Supreme
Court). Cf. Trest, 522 U.S. at 89-92 (holding there is no requirement that
a court of appeals "must raise [procedural default] where the State itself
does not do so," but declining to decide whether the court of appeals was
permitted to raise the issue sua sponte); Youngblood, 497 U.S. at 41 (Teague
non-retroactivity rule is not one the Supreme Court "must raise and decide
* * * sua sponte" in light of State's affirmative rep resentation that
it "had chosen not to rely on Teague").
To the extent the Court's decisions suggest any general rule about when a State's defense to a habeas petition might be deemed forfeited, they emphasize the completion of district court proceedings, not the filing of the State's answer. See Granberry, 481 U.S. at 132 (noting reluctance to allow State "to withhold raising a defense until after the 'main event' - * * * , the
proceeding in the District Court-is over"); id. at 135 ("if a full trial
has been held in the district court * * *, it may * * * be appropriate
for the court of appeals to hold that the nonexhaustion defense has been
waived"); Banks, 540 U.S. at 705 (quoting same); Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S.
443, 458 (2004) (defendant forfeited untimeli ness argument "by failing to
raise the issue until after [the] complaint was adjudicated on the merits").
2. Petitioner also urges importing Civil Rules 8(c) and 12(b) based upon
Rule 5(b) of the Section 2254 Rules, which requires the State to include certain
defenses in its answer. Pet. Br. 30. Although petitioner concedes that
the statute of limitations was not among the affirmative defenses listed in
Rule 5 at the time of the State's answer in this case, petitioner urges that
the later addition of that defense was not a sub stantive change, and that
Rule 5 is "[f]unctionally * * * the same as the mandatory language in
Civil Rules 8 and 12, which gives rise to the waiver principle of the Civil
Rules." Ibid.
This Court's decision in Granberry demonstrates that Rule 5 is not dispositive of the question whether the district court has the power to raise a defense when the State fails to assert it in its answer. At the time of the Granberry decision, Rule 5 specified only one affirmative defense that the State was required to address in the answer: "whether the peti tioner has exhausted his state remedies including any post- conviction remedies available to him
under the statutes or procedural rules of the state." See 481 U.S. at 132
n.5; Rule 5 of the Section 2254 Rules (1976). This Court observed that the
rule imposed on the State "a duty to advise the district court whether the
prisoner has, in fact, exhausted all available state remedies." Granberry,
481 U.S. at 134. The Court nev ertheless held that the court of appeals
"is not obligated to regard the State's omission as an absolute waiver of
the claim." Id. at 133. Rather, the appellate court should con sider the
interests of comity, federalism, and judicial effi ciency, id. at 135, and
decide "whether the administration of justice would be better served by insisting
on exhaustion or by reaching the merits of the petition forthwith," id. at
131. If an appellate court is free to reach a defense that was not asserted
in the answer, then a fortiori, while a case is still pending in district
court, that court is authorized to apply controlling legal principles despite
the State's failure to com ply with Rule 5. See Caspari, 510 U.S. at 389
(federal court may apply non-retroactivity rule of Teague, though State does
not argue it); Schiro, 510 U.S. at 228-229 (same). Cf. 28 U.S.C. 2243 para.
8 (district courts in habeas proceedings are empowered to "determine the
facts, and dispose of the matter as law and justice require").
3. Petitioner's reliance on 28 U.S.C. 2254(b)(3) is similarly misplaced. Petitioner cites that provision, which provides that a "State shall not
be deemed to have waived the exhaus tion requirement * * * unless the
State * * * expressly waives the requirement," ibid., as support for
the proposition that other defenses, as to which Congress has made no similar
provision, are forfeited under more stringent rules that pur portedly apply
to civil cases generally. Pet. Br. 25. That stat utory provision was not
added to Section 2254 until AEDPA's enactment in 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
§ 104, 110 Stat. 1218, several years after this Court had already upheld,
in Granberry, a court's authority to address an exhaustion de fense despite
the State's failure to raise it in its answer, 481 U.S. at 135. Thus, to
the extent petitioner suggests that Sec tion 2254(b)(3) supports the notion
that strict forfeiture of defenses not timely raised in a habeas answer
is the rule, absent an express statutory exception, Granberry refutes that
Nor does Congress's adoption in Section 2254(b)(3) of an explicit rule with respect to waiver of the defense of exhaus tion give rise to a negative inference that Congress intended to adopt a stricter rule of timely assertion or forfeiture with respect to other habeas defenses than the approach expressed in Granberry. There is no indication that, by establishing a higher threshold for inferring a State's waiver of the exhaus tion requirement, Congress intended
in AEDPA to make it easier for States to forfeit inadvertently the other
limitations on habeas review. Rather, the amendment was specifically "designed
to disapprove those decisions which have deemed states to have waived the
exhaustion requirement, or barred them from relying on it, in circumstances
other than where the state has expressly waived the requirement." H.R. Rep.
No. 23, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1995). Thus, "[h]aving pin pointed the
problem, [Congress] gave a pinpoint answer." United States v. Vonn, 535
U.S. 55, 71 (2002) (Congress's adoption of a harmless-error standard in Fed.
R. Crim. P. 11(h) to respond to judicial holdings failing to conduct harmless-error
review evinced no intent to displace plain-er ror review of forfeited claims).
4.	Finally, strict enforcement of forfeiture principles derived from Rules
8(c) and 12(b) of the Civil Rules with re spect to Section 2254 habeas petitions
is inappropriate be cause it would introduce, based solely upon procedural
techni calities, significant substantive disparities between habeas petitions
under Section 2254 challenging state convictions and postconviction motions
under Section 2255 to contest federal convictions. Although petitioner does
not expressly state his rationale for urging application of Civil Rules 8(c)
and 12(b) to Section 2254 proceedings, the implicit basis of his theory is
that a habeas petition under Section 2254 is the equivalent of a civil complaint,
and the State's response, if the court calls for one, is the equivalent of
a defendant's answer. While that analogy is not entirely correct even with
respect to Section 2254, it is even more inapt with respect to Section 2255.
Unlike a state prisoner seeking federal court review of his conviction, a federal prisoner does not initiate a new civil com plaint in the district where he is incarcerated, but must file a motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255 in the
district court that imposed his sentence. 28 U.S.C. 2255 para. 1. By the
terms of the statute, a federal prisoner's filing is a motion to "set aside
or correct the sentence," ibid., which is a "further step in the movant's
criminal case and not a separate civil action," Rule 1 of the Section 2255
Rules, Advisory Committee Notes (1976); Frady, 456 U.S. at 182 (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (quot ing S. Rep. No. 1526, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1948)).
Thus, Section 2255, unlike Section 2243, does not specifically call for
an answer to the prisoner's motion, and Rule 5 of the Section 2255 Rules
does not mention any requirement of raising affir mative defenses.
Rather than looking to Civil Rules 8(c) and 12(b) to fill any gap in the
Section 2255 Rules, a court would likely look to practice regarding untimely
motions to challenge a conviction or sentence under Rule 33 or Rule 35 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or a similar motion to amend a judgment
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Although the Court recently
held, in Eberhart v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 403 (2005) (per curiam), that
Rule 33's time limitation for fil ing a postconviction motion is "nonjurisdictional,"
id. at 405, such that it need not be noticed for the first time by an appel
late court, id. at 407, the Court did not question that the dis trict court
itself, had it noticed the untimeliness, would have had authority to give
effect to the time limitation before rul ing on the Rule 33 motion, despite
the government's failure to raise the defect. The same power exists for
a district court to enforce sua sponte the AEDPA statute of limitations in
a Sec tion 2255 proceeding.
It would be anomalous for a significant difference between postconviction review of state and federal convictions to turn on technical distinctions in the procedural description of the two proceedings. Rather, in both contexts, the unique role of the postconviction court justifies judicial initiative in enforc ing procedural limitations. III.	ALLOWING THE DISTRICT COURT TO RAISE THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS SUA
SPONTE, EVEN AFTER AN ANSWER HAS BEEN FILED, DOES NOT CONFLICT WITH GENERAL
PRACTICE UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Although Civil Rules 8(c) and 12(b) would be rendered inapplicable to habeas proceedings by habeas Rule 11 as "inconsistent * * * [with] the
overall framework of habeas corpus," Rule 11 of the Section 2254 Rules, Advisory
Commit tee Notes (1976), if they were as strict as petitioner maintains,
they are not in fact so limiting. Permitting the district court to raise
AEDPA's statute of limitation sua sponte is not incon sistent with general
principles of civil procedure.
Contrary to the implication of petitioner's arguments, a court with subject
matter jurisdiction always has authority to apply the governing law. See
Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99 (1991) (an appellate court
"is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties
but rather retains the independent power to identify and apply the proper
construction of governing law"); Arcadia v. Ohio Power Co., 498 U.S. 73,
77 (1990) (addressing a legal question that the parties had not argued).
Although, in ordinary civil cases, affirmative defenses generally must be raised in a first responsive pleading, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c), "a defense
may be raised in a number of ways even if the defense is not presented in
the initial re sponse." 2 James W. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice §
8.07[3], at 8-38 (3d ed. 2005). Under Rule 15(a) of the Fed eral Rules of
Civil Procedure, leave of court to amend an an swer "shall be freely given
when justice so requires." See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)
(in the absence of "undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive," "repeated
failure to cure deficiencies," "undue prejudice to the opposing party," or
"futility of amendment," "the leave sought should, as the rules require,
be 'freely given'"); 5 Charles A. Wright & Ar thur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1278, at 684- 685 (3d ed. 2004). Because "[t]he
purpose of [Rule 8(c)] is to give the opposing party notice of the [defense]"
and a chance to rebut it, Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of Ill.
Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971), the courts of appeals have routinely upheld
a district court's discretion to allow a late amendment, in the absence of
prejudice to the opposing party or bad faith, to add affirmative defenses,
including a statute of limitations defense. E.g., Williams v. Lampe, 399
F.3d 867, 871 (7th Cir. 2005); Commander Oil Corp. v. Barlo Equip. Corp.,
215 F.3d 321, 333 (2d Cir.) (upholding discretion to allow amendment despite
defendant's "seven-year delay to add its statute of limitations defense"),
cert. denied, 531 U.S. 979 (2000); Zotos v. Lindbergh Sch. Dist., 121 F.3d
356, 360 (8th Cir. 1997); Phelps v. McClellan, 30 F.3d 658, 662 (6th Cir.
1994). Likewise, the habeas statute expressly provides that "[t]he return
* * * may be amended, by leave of court, before or after being filed."
28 U.S.C. 2243 para. 7.
In addition to formal amendment, in ordinary civil prac tice, affirmative defenses may be raised for the first time by the district court sua sponte when it is done in a fashion that does not result in unfair surprise or prejudice
to the plaintiff. See Moore, supra, § 8:07[2] and [3], at 8-36 to 8-41;
Grand Rapids Plastics, Inc. v. Lakian, 188 F.3d 401, 407 (6th Cir. 1999)
(sua sponte dismissal on statute of limitations grounds), cert. denied, 529
U.S. 1037 (2000); Mowbray v. Cameron County, 274 F.3d 269, 281 (5th Cir.
2001) (res judicata), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1035 (2002); Salahuddin v. Jones,
992 F.2d 447 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 992 (1993). Al though
petitioner urges the Court (Br. 30-31) to treat the State's failure to amend
its pleading under Rule 15(a) as dispositive, no purpose would be served
by insisting on that formality, especially in a context in which the courts
concededly have express authority to dismiss sua sponte be fore an answer
is filed. See Bendolph, 409 F.3d at 166 n.16 (a "federal habeas court acting
sua sponte need not invite the government to amend an answer pursuant to
Rule 15(a)"). Cf. Moore v. McDonald, 30 F.3d 616, 618 (5th Cir. 1994) (uphold
ing sua sponte dismissal of in forma pauperis complaint as frivolous on statute
of limitations grounds, citing 28 U.S.C. 1915(d) (1988)); Street v. Vose,
936 F.2d 38, 39 (1st Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (Breyer, C.J., presiding) (same),
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1063 (1992); Ali v. Higgs, 892 F.2d 438 (5th Cir.
1990) (citing 28 U.S.C. 1915(d) (1988), court of appeals dismissed complaint
on statute of limitations grounds not raised or de cided in district court).
Moreover, any district judge who wished to enforce a limitations period
that the State had not raised would have to do no more than to invite a motion
to amend the pleadings to raise the defense. Cf. Carlisle v. United States,
517 U.S. 416, 423-424 n.3 (1996) (same observa tion with respect to a motion
for judgment of acquittal under Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c)). The Court should
not require such empty formalism.11
IV.	A DISTRICT COURT SHOULD SUA SPONTE DISMISS A HABEAS PETITION AS UNTIMELY ABSENT ACTUAL PREJUDICE OR WASTE OF JUDICIAL RESOURCES
Of course, just because a court has the authority to raise a procedural bar sua sponte after the State has filed its an swer does not mean that it
should do so in every case. As the Third Circuit explained in Bendolph, sua
sponte action by the district court after the government has responded should
give the petitioner "notice of the issue and an opportunity to re spond,"
and must "analyze[] the prejudice components of Rule 15(a)" to determine
whether the petitioner would be preju diced by the State's failure to assert
the defense earlier. 409 F.3d at 169. Cf. Castro v. United States, 540
U.S. 375, 383 (2003) (recognizing court's sua sponte authority to rechar
acterize pro se litigant's motion as a first Section 2255 motion if it first
provides notice and an opportunity to withdraw the motion). In some circumstances,
such as after an extensive evidentiary hearing has already been held, the
court might conclude that belatedly raising the statute of limitations would
be inconsistent with the principles and policies that underlie the defense.
Cf. Haskell v. Washington Township, 864 F.2d 1266, 1273 (6th Cir. 1988)
(reversing order allowing amendment of answer to add statute of limitations
defense "[b]ecause of the length of time (over three years) and exten sive
litigation (three published decisions) between the filing of this action
and the district court's sua sponte raising of the issue").
None of those concerns is present here. There is no claim that petitioner was prejudiced by the State's erroneous state ment in its answer that the petition was timely. Nor is this the case of a State that made an affirmative determination "not to interpose [AEDPA's] limitation defense" for one or
another reason. Pet. Br. 37. Cf. Youngblood, 497 U.S. at 40- 41 (State
affirmatively disavowed reliance on Teague). This is a case of forfeiture,
not waiver. See note 2, supra. Here, the State's answer clearly did not
"waive" the statute of limi tations defense, in the sense of an "intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right." Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 458
n.13 (citation omitted). The State did not, for example, re spond that the
petition, though filed after AEDPA's one-year period, would be answered only
on the merits. Rather, it is evident from the State's reference to "352
days of untolled time" having elapsed, J.A. 24, that the State was under
the mistaken belief that the one-year limitations period had not run, a fact
that is further demonstrated by the State's subse quent embrace of the untimeliness
Nor did the omission of the defense in the State's answer result in unnecessary
expenditure of effort and resources. The magistrate judge's order to show
cause concerning the petition's untimeliness was the first thing that the
magistrate judge did in the case following receipt, in connection with the
State's answer, of the court documents that were necessary to determine the
date on which petitioner's state collateral ap peal was no longer pending and the tolling of the habeas stat ute of limitations ceased. Thus, contrary to petitioner's con tention (Br. 11), the district court's sua sponte dismissal unde niably furthered, rather than undermined, the goal of "quickly identify[ing]
successful defenses and terminat[ing] the proceedings, saving time and expense
for itself and the parties."
Accordingly, the court of appeals' conclusion that the district court retains its authority to raise sua sponte the is sue of the statute of limitations in a habeas proceeding is con sistent with a proper understanding of Civil Rules 8(c), 12(b), and 15(a), and it gives full effect to the important societal
concerns at stake in habeas proceedings, as well as to the intent of Congress
in enacting AEDPA's strict one-year time limit. See Mayle, 125 S. Ct. at
2575. Neither prejudice nor judicial efficiency concerns prevented the district
court from exercising that power here.
Attorney JANUARY 2006
1	In the district court, the State had not responded to the Order to Show
Cause or to Day's objections to the magistrate judge's Report and Recom mendation
before the court had acted. On appeal, however, the State affirmatively argued
that the habeas petition was untimely and that the concession of timeliness
in the State's response was due to "a clerical mistake by counsel; that is,
the failure to account for the 36 days which passed between conclusion of
state court proceedings and the date Day submitted his habeas petition to
prison officials." C.A. Appellee Br. 5.
2	As petitioner notes (Br. 9 n.9), the Court distinguished in Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443 (2004), between a defendant's "waiver" of a defense,
i.e., "the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right," and
"forfeiture," which is "the failure to make the timely assertion of a right."
Id. at 458 n.13 (citation omitted). Although the court of appeals referred
to this case as raising a question of "waiver," Pet. App. 4a, petitioner
makes no claim that the State knowingly abandoned its statute of limitations
defense. Thus, this brief refers to the State's alleged "forfeiture," although many of the sources cited are not always so precise in their terminology.
3	Congress initially delayed implementation of the proposed rules for proceedings
under Sections 2254 and 2255. See Pub. L. No. 94-349, § 2, 90 Stat.
822. By statute, Congress subsequently "approved" the proposed rules, with
certain amendments. Pub. L. No. 94-426, § 1, 90 Stat. 1334.
4	The judicial responsibility established in Rule 4 is just one example of the gatekeeper function the courts serve with respect to habeas petitions. "In AEDPA, Congress established a 'gatekeeping' mechanism for the consideration
of 'second or successive habeas corpus applications' in the federal courts."
Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637, 641 (1998) (quoting Felker
v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 657 (1996)). Thus, "[b]efore a second or successive
application [for a writ of habeas corpus] is filed in the district court,
the applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order
authorizing the district court to consider the application." 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(3)(A).
5	While recognizing a district court's authority under Rule 4 to raise a petition's untimeliness sua sponte, the Sixth and Ninth Circuits have held
that the district court loses that authority once the State has filed an
answer. See Scott, 286 F.3d at 930; Nardi v. Stewart, 354 F.3d 1134, 1141
6	See Sweger v. Chesney, 294 F.3d 506, 520-521 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. denied,
538 U.S. 1002 (2003); Lorraine v. Coyle, 291 F.3d 416, 425-426 (6th Cir.),
amended on denial of reh'g, 307 F.3d 459 (2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 947
(2003); King v. Kemna, 266 F.3d 816, 822 (8th Cir. 2001) (en banc), cert.
denied, 535 U.S. 934 (2002); Yeatts v. Angelone, 166 F.3d 255, 261-262 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1095 (1999); Boyd v. Thompson, 147 F.3d 1124,
1127-1128 (9th Cir. 1998); Magouirk v. Phillips, 144 F.3d 348, 357 (5th Cir.
1998); Brewer v. Marshall, 119 F.3d 993, 999 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
522 U.S. 1151 (1998); Esslinger v. Davis, 44 F.3d 1515, 1524-1525 (11th Cir.
1995); Washington v. James, 996 F.2d 1442, 1448 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
510 U.S. 1078 (1994); Hardiman, 971 F.2d at 501-505; Burgin v. Broglin, 900
F.2d 990, 997-998 (7th Cir. 1990); see Trest v. Cain, 522 U.S. 87, 90 (1997)
(reserving the issue). Cf. United States v. Ishmael, 343 F.3d 741, 743 (5th
Cir. 2003) (court of appeals could apply the limitations on postconviction
review established in Powell and Teague despite government's failure to raise
those limitations in district court), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1204 (2004).
7	Similarly, even before Congress's statutory assignment to the courts of a gatekeeper function with respect to second and successive petitions, 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(3)(A), the courts had enforced the limitation on abusive writs by denying such petitions sua sponte. See Rodriguez v. Johnson, 104 F.3d 694, 697 n.1 (5th Cir.) (citing pre-AEDPA cases), cert. denied, 520 U.S.
1267 (1997); Femia, 47 F.3d at 523. See United States v. Barrett, 178 F.3d
34, 44 (1st Cir. 1999) ("The core of AEDPA restrictions on second or successive
§ 2255 peti tions is related to the longstanding judicial and statutory
restrictions * * * known as the 'abuse of the writ' doctrine."), cert. denied,
528 U.S. 1176 (2000).
8	Petitioner now contends (Br. 45-50) that his habeas petition was timely filed, and that the Court should for that reason as well hold that the district court erred in dismissing his petition. The United States takes no position on the question whether petitioner's habeas petition was, in fact, untimely. The question on which the Court granted certiorari assumes that the petition was untimely under AEDPA's statute of limitations, and this brief proceeds on that assumption.
9	Although the language of Rule 12 was amended in 2004, after the district court's decision in this case, "the[] changes are intended to be stylistic and no substantive change is intended." Rule 12 of the Section 2255 Rules,
Advisory Committee Notes (2004).
10	Neither Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 489 (2000), which petitioner cites (Br. 9) for the proposition that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are "applicable as a general matter to habeas cases," nor Woodford v. Garceau,
538 U.S. 202 (2003) (cited at Pet. Br. 20), is to the contrary. The Court
did not discuss in either case what happens when there is tension between
the Civil Rules and habeas principles. Indeed, in Slack, the Court emphasized
the fact that the Civil Rules "vest the federal courts with due flexibility
to prevent vexatious litigation," such as if a habeas petitioner injected
undue delay by repeatedly bringing petitions with mixed exhausted and unexhausted
claims. 529 U.S. at 489. That is entirely consistent with the authority
exercised by the lower court here. Nor do Gonzalez v. Crosby, 125 S. Ct. 2641 (2005), cited by petitioner at Br. 20 n.25, 32 & n.33, or Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314 (1996), relied on by petitioner at Br. 32-33, hold that application of the Civil Rules
is to be measured solely against the text of the habeas statutes and rules.
To the contrary, Gonzalez recognized that, in Calderon, the Court had rejected
the Ninth Circuit's recall of its mandate as inconsistent with the federal
rules and "the policies embodied in AEDPA," 125 S. Ct. at 2649, and in Lonchar,
the Court rejected the district court's assertion of a "general 'equitable'
power to create exceptions" to Rule 9(a) of the Section 2254 Rules, 517 U.S.
at 316.
11	Petitioner cites several cases for the proposition that "courts lack
the authority to apply a waived limtations defense sua sponte in an ordinary
civil case." Pet. Br. 13 & n.17. Those cases, from the Second, Fifth,
Sixth, and Seventh Circuits, do not stand for any absolute rule that an unasserted
affirmative defense cannot be raised by the court, as is clear from the cases
cited in the text from those same circuits that allow the district courts
to raise sua sponte such defenses in certain circumstances. Moreover, while
the courts of appeals plainly frown on sua sponte dismissals that give the
plaintiff no warning or opportunity to respond, see, e.g., Davis v. Bryan,
810 F.2d 42, 44 (2d Cir. 1987) (sua sponte raising and deciding statute of
limitations issue without notice to parties), or that come after the expenditure
of considerable resources, Haskell v. Washington Township, 864 F.2d 1266,
1273 (6th Cir. 1988) (three years of litigation and three published decisions),
it is evident, from the cases cited in the previous paragraph, that those
circuits do permit the raising of a statute of limitations post-answer by
way of an amended answer. As indicated in the text, there is no reason to
insist on that formality in this context.