Source: http://www.rishabhdara.com/sc/view.php?case=2089
Timestamp: 2020-04-06 02:02:05
Document Index: 291228691

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art. 226', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 309', 'Art. 33', 'Art.\t132', 'Art. 226', 'Art.\n19', 'Art.\n309', 'Art. 19', 'Art.\n19', 'Art. 132', 'Art. 309', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 309', 'Art.\n13', 'Art. 13', 'Art. 33', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 309', 'Art. 310', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 19', 'Art.\n19', 'Art. 33', 'Art.\t22', 'Art. 33', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 19', 'Art.\n19', 'Art.\n19', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 1', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 19', 'Art.\t19']

KAMESHWAR PRASAD & ORS versus THE STATE OF BIHAR & ANR
1962 AIR 1166	1962 SCR Supl. (3) 369
KAMESHWAR PRASAD & ORS V. THE STATE OF BIHAR & ANR [1962] RD-SC 69 (22 February 1962)
22/02/1962 AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.
CITATION: 1962 AIR 1166	1962 SCR Supl. (3) 369
Government Servant-Participation in strikes or demonstra- tions-Rule prohibiting strikes or demonstrations pertaining to conditions of service-Constutional	validity of rule- "Demonstration". meaning of-Bihar Government Servants Conduct	Rules,	1956, r. 4-A-Constitution of India, Arts.
19(1)(a), 19(1)(b), 19(1) (c),33,309.
By a notification dated August 16, 1957, the Government of Bihar introduced r. 4-A into the Bihar Gevernment Servants' Conduct Rules, !956, which provided "No Government servant shall participate in any demonstration or resort to any form of strike in connection with any matter pertaining to	his conditions of service.	" The appellants filed	a petition before	the High Court of Patna under Art. 226 of the	Con- stitution of India challenging the validity of the rule on the grounds, inter alia, that it violated sub-cls. (a),	(b) and (c) of Art. 19 and that, in consequence, the rule was in excess of the rule making power conferred by Art. 309.	The High Court took the view that the freedom guaranteed under Arts. 19 (1) (a) and 19 (1) (c) did not include a right to demonstrate or to strike so far as servants of Government were concerned, and that in any case, the impugned rule	was saved as imposing reasonable restrictions.
Held, that r. 4-A of the Bihar Government Servants' Conduct Rules,	1956, in so far as it prohibited any form of demostration, be it however innocent or however incapable of causing	a breach of public tranquillity, was violative of Arts. 19 (1) (a) and 19 (1)(b) of the Constitution of India, and since on the language of the rule as it stood it was not possible to so read it as to separate the legal from	the unconstitutional portion of the -.,,vision, the entire	rule relating to participation in any demonstration must he declared as ultra vires.
The Superetendant, Central Prison, Fetehgarh v. Ram Manohar Lohia, [1960] 2 S. C. R. 821, relied on.
The Constitution has under Art. 33, selected	two of	the Services under the State, the members of which might be 370 deprived of the benefit of	the.	fundamental rights guaranteed to	other persons and citizens and also	has prescribed the	limits within which such restrictions or abrogation might take	place; but the	other	clausses of servants of Government in common with	other	persons	and citizens of the country cannot be	excluded from	the protection of the rights guaranteed by part III by reason merely	of their being Government servants,	-though on account	of nature and incidents of the duties	which they have to discharge in that capacity, certain restrictions on their freedoms might have to be imposed.
Held, further,	that the rule in so far as it prohibited strikes was valid, because there was no fundamental right to resort to a strike.
All India Bank Employees Association v. National Industrial Tribunal, [1962] 3 S.C.R. 269, followed.
Civil Appellate Jurisdiction : Civil Appeal.	No. 413 of 1959.
Appeal	from the judgment and decree dated July 7 1958, of the Patna High Court in M. J. C.. No. 456 of 1957.
B. P. Maheshwari, for the appellants.
S. P. Varrma, for the respondents.
B. Sen and R.H. Dhebar, for the Intervener No. I (Union of India).
A' S. R. Chari " M. K. Ramamurthi, R. K. Garg, D. P. Singh and S. C. Agarwal, for the Intervener No. 2 (E.	X. Joseph).
1962. February 22. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by AYYANGAR, J.-This appeal comes before us by virtue of a certificate of	fitness granted under Art.	132 of	the Constitution by the High Court of Patna. The question involved in the -appeal is	a short one	but is	of considerable public importance and of great constitutional significance.	It is	concerned with	the Constitutional validity of r. 4-A, 371 which	was introduced into the	Bihar	Government Servants'Conduct Rules, 1956,	by a notification of	the Governor of Bihar dated August 16, 1957 and reads :
"4-A. Demonstrations and strikes.- No Government servant shall participate in any demonstration or resort to any form of strike in connection with any matter pertaining to his conditions of service." Very soon after this rule was notified the six	appellants, the first of whom is the President of the Patna	Secretariat Ministerial Officers'	Association and the	others	are Assistants or Clerks under the Bihar State Government, filed on August 26, 1957, a petition before the High Court of Patna under Art. 226 of the Constitution challenging	the validity of the rule on various grounds including inter alia that it interfered with the	rights	guaranteed to	the petitioners by sub-cls. (a), (b) and (c) of cl. (1) of	Art.
19 of the Constitution of India and that in consequence	the rule was in excess of the rulemaking power conferred by Art.
309 of	the Constitution which was	the source of	the authority enabling service-rules to be framed.	They prayed for an order restraining the respondent-State	from giving effect	to the rule and to desist from interfering with	the petitioners' right to go	on strike or to	hold demonstrations.	The learned Judges of the High Court	who heard the petition were of the opinion that	the freedom guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(a) and	19(1)(c) of	the Constitution did not include a right to resort to a strike or the right to demonstrate so far as servants of Government were concerned. The	learned Judges however, further considered the validity of the rule on the assumption	that the freedoms enumerated in sub-cls. (a) and (c) of	Art.
19(1) did include those rights. On this basis they	held that the rule	impugned was	saved as being reasonable restraints on these guaranteed freedoms.
372 The learned Judges therefore directed the petition to be dismissed, but on application by the appellants they granted a certificate under Art. 132 of the Constitution to enable them to approach this Court.
At this stage it is necessary to mention that a similar conclusion as the one by the High Court of Patna now under appeal was reached by the learned Judges of the High Court of Bombay before whom the constitutional validity of a, rule in identical terms as r. 4A of the Bihar Rules was impugned.
The correctness of that decision is under challenge in	this Court in S.L. Ps. (Civil) Nos. 499 and 500 of 1961 and	the appellants in that appeal sought leave to intervene in	this appeal and we have permitted them to do so, and we heard Mr.
Chari-learned Counsel for the interveners in further support of the appeal.
Before	entering on a discussion of the	arguments advanced before	us it might be convenient to state certain matters which are common ground and not in controversy :
(1) The impugned rule 4-A was framed under Art. 309 of	the Constitution which enacts, to quote the material words:
"309. Subject to the	provisions of	this Constitution, Acts of the appropriate Legisla- ture may regulate the recruitment, and condi- tions of	service of persons appointed, to public services.................
and provision is made by the proviso to the Article for	the Governors of States to make rules until ,,provision in	that behalf	is made by or under an Act	of the	appropriate Legislature".	We are' drawing attention to	the Article under which the rule is made for the purpose of pointing out that the rulemaking power being subject to the Constitution, the validity of the rule would have to be tested by the same criteria as are applicable to all laws and	subordinate legislation. In other words, if 373 there are any constitutional limitations upon lawmaking, such of them as are appropriate to the subject dealt with by the rule would be applicable to them.
(2)It would be seen that the rule prohibits two types	of activities, both in connection with matters pertaining to the conditions of service (i) the holding of demonstrations, and (ii) resort to strikes to achieve the purpose indicated.
This -Court had, in All India Bank Employees' Association v.
National Industrial Tribunal	(1) (Bank disputes Bombay etc.),	to consider the question as to whether the right to form an association guaranteed by Art. 19(1) (c) involved or implied	the right to resort to a strike and answered it in the negative. In view of this decision learned Counsel	for the appellants, as also Mr. Chari for. the	interveners confined their arguments to the question of the legality of the provision	as regards the	right	,,,to hold demons- trations". The validity of the rule therefore in so far as it prohibits strikes, is no longer under challenge.
The argument addressed to us on behalf of the appellants may be shortly stated thus : The servicerule being	one framed under Art. 309 is a "law" within the	definition of	Art.
13(3) of the Constitution and it would have to be pronounced invalid	to the extent that it is inconsistent with	the provisions of	Part III of the Constitution .	Art. 13(2).
Article	19(1) confers on all citizens the right by sub-cl.
(a) to freedom of speech and expression, and by sub-cl.	(b) to assemble peacefully and without arms, and the right to "demonstrate"would be covered by these two sub-clauses.	By the mere fact that a person enters Government	service, be does not cease to be "a citizen of India", nor does	that disentitle him	to claim the freedoms guaranteed to every citizen. In fact, Art. 33 which enacts :
"Parliament may by law determine to (1) CA, 154 of 1961 (Not yet reported).
374 what extent any of the rights conferred by this Part shall, in their application to	the members of the Armed Forces or	the Forces charged with maintenance of public order, be restricted or abrogated so as to	ensure	the proper discharge of their duties and the main- tenance of discipline among them." obviously proceeds on the basis of persons in the service of Government being entitled to the Protection of	the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III of	the Constitution and is inserted to enable special provision being made for the abrogation, if	necessary, of	the guaranteed freedoms in the case of two special services only, viz., the army and the police force. The approach to the question regarding the constitutionality of the	rule should be whether the ban that it imposes on demonstrations would be covered by the limitation of the guaranteed rights contained in Art. 19(2) and 19(3). In regard to both these clauses the only relevant criteria which has been suggested by the respondent-State is that the rule is framed -in	the interest of public order". A demonstration may be defined as "an expression of one's feelings by outward	signs". A demonstration such as is prohibited by, the rule may be of the most innocent type- peaceful orderly such as the	mere wearing	of a badge by a Government servant or	even by a silent	assembly say outside	office	hours-demonstrations which could in no sense be suggested to involve any breach of tranquillity, or of a type involving incitement to or capable	of leading to disorder. If the rule had confined itself to demonstrations of	type which would lead to disorder then	the validity of that rule could have	been sustained but	what the rule does is the imposition of a blanket-ban on all demonstrations of whatever type-innocent as well as otherwise-and in consequence its validity cannot be upheld.
Before considering these arguments of learned 375 Counsel	it is necessary to deal with the submission by	Mr.
Sen who appeared for the Union of India who intervened in this appeal which, if accepted, would cut at the root of the entire argument for the appellant.	He endeavoured to persuade us to hold that though the power to frame Service Rules under Art. 309 was subject to the Constitution with.
the result that the	rules so framed	ought	not to	-be contrary to any constitutional provision, still it did	not follow	that every one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III could be claimed by a Government servant.	He urged that as	a person voluntarily	entered Government service he must by that very act be demeed to have consented to enter that service in such reasonable conditions as might be framed for ensuring the proper working of	the administrative	machinery of the Government and for	the proper	maintenance of discipline in the Service itself.
Under Art. 310 every	office	is held, subject to	the provisions of	the Constitution, at the pleasure of	the President or of the	Governor as the	case may be,	and provided a rule regulating the conditions of	service	was reasonable and was calculated to ensure the purposes above- named he submitted that its reasonableness and validity could not be tested solely by reference to the criteria laid down in cls.(2), (3) or (4) of Art. 19.
In this connection we were referred to a few decisions of the American	Courts	for the proposition	that	the constitutionality of	special rules	enacted for	the discipline of those in the service of Government bad to be tested	by criteria different from those applicable to ordinary citzens. Thus in Ex Parte: Curtis (1)	the constitutionality of a law prohibiting officers or employees of the	United	States	from '(requesting, giving to or receiving from	any other officer or employee of the government any money or property or other thing of value for political purposes," under a penalty of being discharged and, on conviction fined, was upheld. In the majority (1) 27 Law. Ed. 232, 106 U. S. 371.
376 judgment which was	delivered by	Waite,	C.J.,	the reasonableness of such a rule is pointed out. It is however manifest that no fundamental right could be claimed to	have been infringed by the provision there impugned. In United Public	Workers	v. Mitchell(1), which was another case to which our attention was invited, one of the questions raised related	to the validity of an Act of Congress	(The Hatch Act, 1940) making it unlawful for the employees in	the Executive Branch of the Federal Government to take part in political campaigns and making the same the basis	for disciplinary departmental action. It was contended tbat this was an interference with the right of free speech as well as with political rights.	Keed, J., who spoke for	the majority observed:
"The interference with free expression has to be seen in comparison with the requirements of orderly	management of administrative personnel.......	.... We accept	appellant's contention that the nature of political rights reserved	to the people	are involved.	The right claimed as inviolate may be stated as the right of a citizen to act	as a party official	or worker to	further his	own political	views.	Thus we have a	measure of interference by the Hatch Act and the Rules with what otherwise would be the	freedom of the civil servant under the First Amendment.
And, if	we look upon	due process as a guarantee of freedom in those fields, there is a corresponding impairment of that right under the Fifth Amendment................ We do	not find persuation in appellants' argument that such activities	during	free time are	not subject to regulation even though admittedly political	activites cannot be	indulged in during working	hours.	The influence	of political activity by government employees, if evil in its effects on the (1) 91 Law -Ed. 754, 330 U.S. 75.
377 service, the employees or people dealing	with them, is hardly less so because that activity takes place after hours............ It is accepted	constitutional doctrine	that these fundamental human rights are	not absolutes............ The essential rights of the First Amendment are subject to	the elemental need for order without which	the guarantees, of civil rights to others would be a mockery".
Mr. Sen also referred us to Mc Auliffe v. New	Bedford	(1) which is cited at p.791 in 91' Law. Ed. in support of	the position that servants of Government formed a class and that conditions of service imposed upon them which are reasonable and necessary to ensure efficiency and discipline cannot be questioned on	the ground of their	contravening	any constitutional	guarantees. Mr. Sen drew our attention in particular to	the following passage in. the	judgment of Holmes, J.:
"There is nothing in the Constitution or	the statute to prevent the city from attaching obedience	to this rule as a condition to	the office of policeman, and making it part of the good conduct required.	The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, -but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman. There are few employments for hire in which	the, servant	does not agree to suspend his constitutional right of	free speech, as well as of idleness, by the-implied terms of	his contract.	The servant cannot complain, as he takes the employment on	the terms which are offered him. On the	same principle, the city may impose any reasonable condition	upon holding	offices	within	its control.	This	condition seems to	us reasonable, if that be a question open to revision	here	(The	Police	Regulation prohibiting members of the depart- (1) (1892) 155 Mass. 216.
378 ment from soliciting money etc. for political purposes)".
As regards these decisions of the American Courts, it should be borne in mind that though the First Amendment to	the Constitution of the United State reading "Congress shall make	no law......... abridging	the freedom	of speech........... appears to confer no power on the Congress to impose any restriction on the exercise of the guaranteed right, still it has always been understood that the freedom guaranteed is subject to the' police power --the scope. of which however	has not been	defined	with precision or uniformly. It	is on the basis of the police power to abridge	that freedom that the constitutional	validity of lawa penalising libels, and those relating to sedition, or to obscene publications etc., has been sustained.	The resultant flexibility of the restrictions that could be validly imposed renders the American decisions	inapplicable to and without must use for resolving the questions arising under Art. 19(1)(a) or (b) of our Constitution wherein	the grounds, on which limitations might	be placed on	the guaranteed right are	set out with	definiteness	and precision.
Learned	Counsel invited our attention also to the decision of this Court	in Balakotaiah v.Union of India (1) to a similar effect. But	it must however, be noted that in Balakotaiah's case the validity of	the rule was	not challenged.
In further support of his submission	that the freedoms guaranteed to	citizens by Art. 19 cannot in	their	very nature,	be applied to those who are employed in government service	out attention was invited to sub-cls. (d), (e)	and (g) of cl. (1). It was said that a Government servant	who was posted to	a particular place could obviously	riot exercise the freedom to move throughout the territory of India and similarly, his right to reside and settle in	any part of India could be said to be violated by his (1) [1958]S.C.R.1052.
379 being posted to any particular place. Similarly, so long as he was	in government service he would not be	entitled to practicise any	profession or trade and it was therefore urged that to hold that these freedoms guaranteed under Art.
19 were applicable to government servants would render public	service or administration impossible. This line of argument, however, does not take	into account	the limitations which might be imposed on the exercise of these rights by cls. (5) and (6) under which res' trictions on the exercise of the rights conferred by sub-cls. (d) and (g) may be imposed if reasonable in the interest of	the general public.
In this connection he laid stress on the fact	that speial provision had been made in regard to Service underthe State in some of the Articles in Partlll-such as for instance Arts. 15, 16 and 18(3) and (4)-and he desired us therefrom to draw the inference that the other Articles in which there was no	specific reference to Government servants	were inapplicable to them.	He realised	however, that	the implication arising from Art. 33 would run counter to	this line of argument but as regards this Article his submission was that it was concerned solely to save Army	Regulations which permitted detention in a manner which would not be countenanced by Art.	22 of the Constitution. We	find ourselves unable to	accept	the argument	that	the Constitution excludes Government servants as a	class	from the protection	of the several rights	guaranteed by	the several Articles in Part III save in those cases where	such persons were specifically named.
In our opinion, this argument even if	otherwise possible, has to be repelled in view of the terms of Art. 33.	That Article- selects two of the Services under the State-members of the armed forces charged with the maintenance of public order and saves the rules prescribing	the conditions of service	in regard to them-from invalidity on the ground of violation of-any of the fundamental 380 rights	guaranteed by Part III and also defines the purpose for which such abrogation or restriction migeht take place, this being limited to ensure the proper discharge of duties and the maintenance of discipline among them.	The Article having thus selected the Services members of which might be, deprived of the benefit of the fundamental rights guaranteed to other persons and citizens and also having prescribed the limits	within which such restrictions or abrogation might take place, we consider that other classes of	servants of Govern. ment in common with other persons and other citizens of the country cannot be excluded from the protection of the rights	guaranteed by Part III by reason merely of their being Government servants and the nature and incidents of the duties which they have to discharge in that capacity might necessarily involve restrictions of certain freedoms as we have pointed out in relation to Art. 19 (1) (e)	and (g).
The first question that falls to be considered	is whether the right to make a ",demonstration" is covered by either or both of the two freedoms guaranteed by Art. 19(1)(a)	and 19(1)(b). A "'demonstration" is defined in	the Concise Oxford	Dictionary as "an outward exhibition of feeling, as an exhibition	of opinion on political	or other question especially a public meeting or procession". In Webster it is defined as	"a public exhibition by a party, sect or society......... as by a parade or mass-meeting". Without going very much into the niceties of language it might be broadly	stated that	a demonstration is	a visible manifestation of the feelings or sentiments of an individual or a group. It is thus a communication of one's ideas to others	to whom it is intended to be conveyed.	It is in effect therefore a form of speech or of expression, because speech	need not be vocal since signs made by a dumb person would also be	a form of speech. It	has however to be recognised that 381 the argument before us is confined to the rule	prohibiting demonstration which is a form of speech and expression or of a mere assembly and speeches therein and not other forms of demonstration which do not fall within the content of	Art.
19(1)(a) or 19(1)(b).	A demonstration might take the	form of an assembly and even then the intention is to convey to the person or	authority to	whom the communication is intended the feelings of the group which assembles.	It necessarily follows that there are forms of demonstration which would fall within the freedoms	guaranteed by	Art.
19(1)(a) and 19(1) (b).	It is needless to add that from the very nature of things a demonstration may take various forms; It may be noisy and disorderly, for instance stone- throwing by a crowd may be cited as an example of a violent and disorderly demonstration and this would not obviously be within Art. 19(1)(a) or (b). It can equally be peaceful and orderly such as happens when the members of the group merely wear some badge drawing attention to their grievances.
If thus particular forms of demonstration fall	within	the scope of Art. 19(1)(a) or 19(1)(b), the next	question is whether r. 4-A, in so far as it lays an embargo on any	form of demonstration for	the redress of	the grievances of Government employees, could be sustained as falling within the scope of Art. 19(2) and (3).
These clauses run:
"19. (2) Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law, or prevent the State from making any	law in so far as such law	imposes reasonable restrictions on	the exercise of the right conferred	by the said	sub-clause in	the interests	of the security of	the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality or in relation to 382 contempt of court defamation or incitement to an offence.
(3)Nothing in sub-clause (b) of	the said clause shall affect the operation of any exis- ting law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests	of public	order'	reasonable restrictions on the exercise Of the right con- ferred by the said sub-clause." The learned Judges of the High Court have,	-as stated earlier, upheld the validity of the rule by considering them as reasonable restrictions in the interest of public order.
In coming to this conclusion the learned Judges of the	High Court did not have the benefit of the	exposition of	the meaning of the expression in the interest of public order" in these two	clauses by this Court	in Superintendent, Central	Prison, Fatehgarh v. Ram Manohar	Lohia	(1).
Speaking for the Court Subba Rao,	J., summarised	his conclusion on the point in these terms:
"Public	order (Art. 19(2) and (3))	is synonymous with 'public safety	and tranquillity. It is the absence of disorder involving	breaches of local significance in contradistinction	to national upheavals such as revolution, civil strike, war affecting the security of the State." The learned Judge further stated that in order that a legislation may be "in the interests of public order" there must be a proximate and reasonable nexus between the nature of the	speech prohibited and public order.	The learned Judge rejected	the argument	that the phrase "in	the interests of public order" which is wider than the words ',for the maintenance of public order" which were found in the Article as originally enacted-thereby sanctioned	the enactment of a law which restricted the right merely because the speech had a tendency however (1) [1960) 2 S.C.R. 821.
383 remote	to disturb public order. The connection has to be intimate, real and rational. The validity of the rule	now impugned has to be judged with reference to	tests	here propounded.
If one	had to consider the propriety of the rule as	one intended to ensure proper discipline apart from	the limitations on law-making, in a Government servant and in the context of the other provisions made for the making of representations and for the redress of services, grievances, and apart from the limitiations imposed by the	Constitution there could be very little doubt nor would it be even	open to argument that the rule now impugned was both reasonable and calculated to ensure discipline in the Services and in that sense conducive to ensure efficiency in the Service.
Based on this	aspect	of the function of the rule	the argument as regards Art. 1 9(2) & (3) was put on a twofold basis: (1) that the maintenance of public order was directly dependent upon the existence of a body of Government	ser- vants who were themselves subject to strict discipline.	In other words, the maintenance of discipline among Government servants not only contributed to the maintenance of public order but was a sine qua non of public order. (2) The other aspect in which it was presented was the negative of the one just now mentioned that if Government servants were	ill- disciplined and were themselves to agitate in a disorderly manner	for the redress of their service grievances,	this must lead to a demoralisation of the public and would be reflected in the disappearance of public order.
We find ourselves unable to uphold this submission on behalf the State. In the first place we are not here concerned with any rule for ensuring discipline	among	the police, which is the	arm of the law primarily charged with	the maintenance of	public order.	The threat to public order should therefore arise from the nature of the demonstration prohibited. No doubt, if the rule were so framed 384 as to	single out those types of demonstration	which	were likely	to lead to a disturbance of public tranquillity or which	'Would	fall under the other	limiting criteria specified in Art. 19(2) the validity of the rule could	have been sustained. The	vice of the rule, in our opinion, consists in this that it lays a ban	on every type of demonstration--be the	same however innocent	and however incapable of causing a breach of public tranquillity	and does not confine itself to those forms of demonstrations which might lead to that result.
Learned	Counsel for the respondent and those who supported the validity of the rule could not suggest that on	the language of the rule as -it stood, it was possible to	read it as	to separate the legal	from the unconstitutional portion of the provision. As no such separation is possible the entire rule has to be struck down as unconstitutional.
We have rejected the broad contention that persons in	the service of government form a class apart to whom the rights guaranteed by	Part III do not, in general,	apply.	By accepting the	contention that the freedoms guaranteed by Part III and in particular those in Art. 19(1)(a) apply to the servants of government we should not be taken to imply that in, relation to this	class of citizen	'the ,responsibility arising from official position would not by itself	impose	some limitations on the	exercise of their rights as citizens. For instance, s.54(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, enacts:
"If a public servant discloses	any parti- culars .	contained in any such statement, return, accounts, documents, evidence affi- davit, deposition or record, he shall be punishable 'with imprisonment which may extend to six months, and shall also be liable to fine." Section	128(1)	of the Representation of the	People Act, 1951, enjoins	on every officer, clerk, agent etc.	Who performs any duty in connection, with the 385 recording or counting of votes at an election shall maintain the secrecy of the voting and shall not communicate to	any person	any information calouluted to violate such secrecy, and visits the breach of the rule	by punishment	with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three. months or with fine. It cannot be contended that provisions on these or similar lines in these or other enactments restrict the freedom	of the officers etc. merely because they	are prohibited from communicating information which comes to them in the course of the performance of the duties of their office, to others. The information having been obtained by them in the course of their duties by virtue of their official position, rules or provisions of the	law prescribing the circumstances in	which	alone	such information might be given out or used do not infringe	the right of freedom of speech as is guaranteed by the	Con- stitution.
We would therefore allow the appeal in part and grant	the appellants a declaration that r. 4A in the form in which it now stands prohibiting "any	form of demonstrations is violative of the appellants' rights under Art.	19(1)(a) & (b) and should therefore be	stuck	down.	It is	only necessary to add that the rule, in so far as it prohibits a strike, cannot be struck (own since there is no	fundamental right to resort to a strike. As the appellants	have succeeded only in part, there will be no order as to costs in the appeal.