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Timestamp: 2018-07-19 17:15:29
Document Index: 689679817

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 423', '§ 416', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 416', '§ 416', '§ 416']

Josephine Mora v. Jo Anne B Barnhart - PDF EBook Free Download
Case 5:06-cv-00027-PJW Document 16 Filed 06/07/07 Page 1 of 18 Page ID #:58 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CAL...
Case 5:06-cv-00027-PJW Document 16 Filed 06/07/07 Page 1 of 18 Page ID #:58
JOSEPHINE MORA, Plaintiff,
Case No. ED CV 06-00027-PJW MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff brings this action, challenging the decision by
defendant Social Security Administration (“the Agency”), denying her
application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”).
Court to reverse the Agency’s decision and award benefits, or, in the
alternative, to remand the case to the Agency for further proceedings.
For the reasons discussed below, the Agency’s decision is REVERSED and
Case 5:06-cv-00027-PJW Document 16 Filed 06/07/07 Page 2 of 18 Page ID #:59
Plaintiff’s Personal History and Work History Plaintiff was born on December 15, 1954, and was 50 years old at
She has an eighth-grade education and prior work experience as a
housekeeper in a convalescent facility.
that, beginning in September 2000, her physical ailments rendered her
(Administrative Record (“AR”) 55, 257.)
(AR 257.)
(AR 55.)
Plaintiff’s Medical Condition and Treatment In her disability report, Plaintiff stated that she suffered from
degenerative joint disease, two hernia repair surgeries, and other
limited her ability to work because they caused her aches and pains in
all parts of her body, numbness in her left arm, loss of strength and
balance, fatigue, and depression.
report, Plaintiff stated that she had been diagnosed with diabetes and
arthritis, and that she slept “all the time.”
(AR 64.)
Plaintiff asserted that these conditions
(AR 64, 70.)
In a later disability
(AR 94.)
Plaintiff sought medical care from her physician, Dr. Frederick
Curlin, and Dr. Curlin’s physician’s assistant Ezequiel Martinez.
Although the record contains minimal evidence regarding testing or
examination findings, Dr. Curlin made a variety of diagnoses,
including obesity, osteoarthritis, fibromyalgia, asthma, cervical
degenerative disc disease, cervical radiculopathy, lumbar spinal
stenosis, lumbar degenerative disc disease, hepatomegaly (fatty
liver), anxiety, and depression.
188-89, 249, 251, 253.)
(AR 162-68, 170-71, 174-182, 185-86,
In 2005, Plaintiff was diagnosed with breast
Case 5:06-cv-00027-PJW Document 16 Filed 06/07/07 Page 3 of 18 Page ID #:60
cancer, and underwent a lumpectomy approximately one month before the
(AR 222-23).
The Administrative Proceedings Plaintiff filed an application for SSI on September 3, 2003.
87-90.)
again on reconsideration on March 4, 2004.
Thereafter, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an administrative law
judge (“ALJ”), which was granted, and a hearing was held on June 10,
The application was initially denied on January 20, 2004, and (AR 22-25, 27-31.)
(AR 39-43, 254-284.) At the hearing, Plaintiff testified that her only work in the
preceding fifteen years was as a housekeeper.
testified that she stopped working because of pain in her neck, back,
she took for pain provided some relief, and that they did not cause
pain, she had numbness and tingling in both arms and hands, and
swelling in her ankles.
headaches, for which she took Tylenol.
that she had been treated for hernias, which still caused pain
sometimes with moving or bending.
(AR 262-63.)
(AR 258, 263).
She told the ALJ that the medications
She explained that, in addition to
(AR 265, 267.)
She also complained of (AR 266.)
Plaintiff testified
(AR 268).
Plaintiff also testified that she had suffered from asthma for a
long time, and had started using Albuterol spray to control it.
recommended exercise for weight loss, and that she had started walking
for periods of about ten minutes.
She offered that her diabetes was also controlled with (AR 268-69.)
She told the ALJ that her doctor had
(AR 269-70.)
According to Plaintiff, her conditions had affected her ability to do things around the house.
She testified that she would sometimes 3
Case 5:06-cv-00027-PJW Document 16 Filed 06/07/07 Page 4 of 18 Page ID #:61
drop things such as a five-pound bag of sugar or plates.
that she still washed dishes, but that she was slow, and did not do as
much housework.
(AR 271-72.)
Plaintiff testified that, not long before the hearing, she had
been diagnosed with breast cancer and had undergone surgery for the
cancer, but had not yet started chemotherapy.
explained that she was depressed and was taking medication for
depression and anxiety, but had not obtained any mental health
(AR 258-59, 273.)
(AR 273-74.)
Dr. Doren, the medical expert, testified that Plaintiff’s medical
records lacked significant objective findings to support the diagnoses
of her treating doctor.
medical evidence, including the findings and opinions of state agency
and consulting physicians, Dr. Doren agreed with state agency
physicians Dr. George Spellman and Dr. Albert Lizarraras that
Plaintiff could perform light duty.
(AR 275-79.)
Based upon his review of the
(AR 282.)
Vocational expert Sandra Fioretti testified about Plaintiff’s
convalescent facility, and that it was light, unskilled work with an
SVP of 2.
person with the limitations testified to by the Plaintiff could find
work, Ms. Fioretti testified that the combination of upper extremity
problems and other limitations would eliminate all work.
She explained that this work was in housekeeping in a
(AR 284.)
In response to a hypothetical as to whether a
The ALJ issued a decision denying Plaintiff’s application for DIB
under the Agency’s five-step sequential evaluation process.
one, he found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since her alleged onset date.
(AR 12-19.)
The ALJ analyzed Plaintiff’s claims
(AR 13, 18.)
At step two, he
Case 5:06-cv-00027-PJW Document 16 Filed 06/07/07 Page 5 of 18 Page ID #:62
found that Plaintiff suffered form severe impairments of the back,
neck, arms, and legs, following two hernia repair surgeries, and also
was afflicted with diabetes, obesity, atypical chest pain, and
the impairments alone or in combination met or equaled a Listed
At step three, he determined that none of
(AR 13-14.)
The ALJ analyzed the medical evidence, including evidence from
Plaintiff’s treating physician and physician’s assistant, state agency
doctors, and consulting examiners, including an internist, an
orthopedist, and a psychiatrist.
Plaintiff’s alleged limitations were not fully credible, citing lack
of objective medical support, conservative treatment, and
inconsistency between her complaints and her daily activities.
in-law in a third-party activities questionnaire, finding her sister-
in-law not credible because of her personal relationship with
Plaintiff and because her observations were not supported by the
(AR 14-15.)
The ALJ also rejected the statements of Plaintiff’s sister-
The ALJ determined that Plaintiff could perform “light work,”
further limited by occasional postural limitations and no climbing
ladders, ropes, or scaffolds.
specific mental limitations, but found that Plaintiff retained the
mental capacity to perform “simple, repetitive tasks.”
Based on the vocational expert’s testimony that Plaintiff’s past work
was light and unskilled, and that Plaintiff could perform her past
work as previously performed, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was able to
perform her past work as a housekeeper.
(AR 18.)
The ALJ did not identify any
Case 5:06-cv-00027-PJW Document 16 Filed 06/07/07 Page 6 of 18 Page ID #:63
Plaintiff requested that the Appeals Council review the ALJ’s
(AR 7.)
On December 17, 2005, the Appeals Council denied
Plaintiff’s request for review.
(AR 4-6.)
Plaintiff then filed the
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred when he concluded that
Plaintiff could perform her past work as a housekeeper.
that the ALJ: (1) failed to properly consider the opinion of the
consultative psychiatrist; (2) posed an incomplete hypothetical to the
vocational expert; (3) improperly discounted the statements of
Plaintiff’s sister-in-law; and (4) failed to give proper weight to the
opinion of Plaintiff’s treating physician.
finding that Plaintiff could perform her past work was not supported
by substantial evidence and is reversed.
(Joint Stipulation (“JS”)
For the following reasons, the Court concludes that the ALJ’s
Standard Of Review “Disability” under Agency regulations is defined as the inability
to perform any substantial gainful activity due to any “medically
continuous period of not less than 12 months.”
§ 423(d)(1)(A).
claimant is not disabled only if the decision is not supported by
substantial evidence or if the decision is based on legal error.
Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989)(quoting Green
v. Heckler, 803 F.2d 528, 529 (9th Cir. 1986)).
evidence” is such “relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
The Court may overturn the ALJ’s decision that a
Case 5:06-cv-00027-PJW Document 16 Filed 06/07/07 Page 7 of 18 Page ID #:64
as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 750.
It is “more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance.”
Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 1998).
The ALJ Properly Considered The Opinion Of Plaintiff’s Treating
In his fourth claim of error (which the Court elects to address
first), Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to give due weight to
the disability opinion of her treating physician, Dr. Frederick J.
Curlin, and improperly credited the opinion of the non-examining
medical expert, Dr. Walter W. Doren.
For the following reasons, the
Although a treating physician’s opinion is generally afforded
more weight in disability cases than a non-treating physician’s
opinion, it is not binding on an ALJ.
1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 2001).
physician’s opinion which is brief and conclusionary in form with
little in the way of clinical findings to support [its] conclusion."
Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751 (internal quotations omitted); see also
Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1432 (9th Cir. 1995).
uncontroverted opinion of a treating physician, an ALJ must set forth
clear and convincing reasons for doing so.
contradicted, and the opinion of a nontreating source is based on
independent clinical findings that differ from those of the treating
physician, the opinion of the nontreating source may itself be
substantial evidence; it is then solely the province of the ALJ to
resolve the conflict.”
Cir. 1995)(emphasis added).
Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d
The ALJ “need not accept a treating
Magallanes, 881 F.2d at
“Where the opinion of the claimant’s treating physician is
Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th If, on the other hand, the nontreating 7
Case 5:06-cv-00027-PJW Document 16 Filed 06/07/07 Page 8 of 18 Page ID #:65
source relies on the same findings as the treating source, the ALJ
must provide specific and legitimate reasons for disbelieving the
treating source.
The ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s treatment records consisted
principally of examination records and diagnoses--mostly prepared by a
physician’s assistant and co-signed by Dr. Curlin--without evidence of
any significant objective testing.
discussed the lack of objective findings by consultative examiners and
state agency doctors, as highlighted by the testimony of the medical (AR 14-15.)
The ALJ additionally
Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that the
disability opinions of Dr. Curlin were not controlling and could not
be given “substantial persuasive weight.”
As noted by the ALJ, Plaintiff’s treatment records are
conspicuously devoid of objective findings, such as examination
findings or test results, to support the diagnoses by her treating
Ezequiel Martinez and co-signed by Dr. Curlin repeatedly referred to
diagnoses of osteoarthritis, cervical disc disease, lumbar disk
disease, and spinal stenosis, without any objective findings (such as
MRI, radiological studies, or lab tests) other than occasional
explanation or findings supporting the diagnosis.
167, 170, 175, 176, 179, 180.)1
Examination reports prepared by physician’s assistant
(AR 162-68, 170-71, 174-182, 185-86, 188-89, 249, 251,
Similarly, the reports indicate fibromyalgia without any (AR 162, 164, 166,
Generally, fibromyalgia is exhibited by “‘multiple tender spots, more precisely 18 fixed locations on the body (and the rule of thumb is that the patient must have at least 11 of them to be 8
Case 5:06-cv-00027-PJW Document 16 Filed 06/07/07 Page 9 of 18 Page ID #:66
In addition to the lack of clinical findings to support his
diagnoses, Dr. Curlin’s disability opinions were conclusory and
unsupported by explanations or findings.
any evaluation of Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity or provide
any explanation of limitations on Plaintiff’s abilities.
disability opinions Plaintiff contends were improperly discounted were
set forth on short, check-the-box forms.
completed by physician’s assistant Ezequiel Martinez on December 4,
2002, indicates permanent incapacitation from work due to degenerative
Dr. Curlin did not complete
The first such form,
joint disease and fibromyalgia, which caused chronic pain.
On January 15, 2003, Mr. Martinez signed another form, again
indicating permanent disability, however, no condition or specific
limitations were identified.
Martinez again assessed Plaintiff as permanently disabled, due to
asthma, arthritis, and depression.
Curlin both signed an April 7, 2004, form indicating that Plaintiff
was permanently disabled due to fibromyalgia, osteoarthritis, and
degenerative disc disease, causing “moderate to severe pain and muscle
stiffness.”
completed a form, indicating only that Plaintiff was permanently
disabled, without specifying her conditions or limitations.
(AR 249.)
(AR 252.)
(JS 253.)
On November 18, 2003, Mr.
(AR 251.)
Mr. Martinez and Dr.
Finally, on March 21, 2005, Mr. Martinez again
(AR 248.)
Plaintiff does not contest the ALJ’s finding that her doctor’s
diagnoses appeared to be based on minimal objective findings.
she argues that Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96-2p mandated
diagnosed as having fibromyalgia) that when pressed firmly cause the patient to flinch.’” Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 855 (9th Cir. 2001)(quoting Sarchet v. Chater, 78 F.3d 305, 306 (7th Cir. 1996). 9
Case 5:06-cv-00027-PJW Document 16 Filed 06/07/07 Page 10 of 18 Page ID #:67
consideration of several factors before discounting the treating
clarified that the Agency could not substitute its judgment for the
opinion of a treating source when the opinion was “well-supported by
medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.”
SSR 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188 at *1 (July 2, 1996); see also 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.927(d)(2).
whether an opinion is entitled to controlling weight: (1) it must come
from a treating source; (2) it must be a “medical opinion” about the
(JS at 15-16.)
The ruling sets forth four criteria for determining
nature and severity of an impairment; (3) it must be well-supported by
medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques;
and (4) even if well-supported, it must be not inconsistent with other
these criteria are not met, the opinion is not entitled to controlling
It appears that most of the work was done by a physician’s assistant,
and the lack of any discussion of severity or identification of
limitations attributable to those diagnoses, the disability opinion
barely qualifies as a “medical opinion” regarding the nature and
severity of Plaintiff’s impairments.
expert and the ALJ, the opinion is not even minimally supported by
inconsistent with other substantial evidence, most notably, the
opinion of the examining orthopedist, who found “no evidence of any
orthopedic problem” or any functional limitations.
Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1041 (holding that findings of consultative
examiner may be “substantial evidence).
SSR 96-2p at *2.
In Plaintiff’s case, arguably none of the criteria are met.
Moreover, given the extremely conclusory diagnoses,
Further, as noted by the medical
Finally, it is also
(AR 146.)
Accordingly, the ALJ did not
Case 5:06-cv-00027-PJW Document 16 Filed 06/07/07 Page 11 of 18 Page ID #:68
err in finding that Dr. Curlin’s opinion was not entitled to
SSR 96-2p provides further that, even if the opinion of a
treating source is not entitled to controlling weight, it must be
considered under all the factors set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527
and 416.927.
extent of the treatment relationship, consistency with evidence in the
record, the source’s specialization, and “any factor” the Agency is
aware of or alerted to.
These factors take into account the length, nature, and
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d).
Despite Plaintiff’s assertions to the contrary, the ALJ specifically
referenced and considered these factors, noting inconsistencies in the
record, the lack of diagnostic testing, and diagnoses given based upon
minimal examinations.
factor that was improperly considered by the ALJ or to explain how
additional consideration would have led the ALJ to a different
Tellingly, Plaintiff fails to identify any
Based upon his consideration of the factors set forth in 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1527 and 416.927, the ALJ concluded that Dr. Curlin’s
opinions were not entitled to “substantial persuasive weight.”
opinion, and the ALJ’s consideration of the relevant factors, the
Court finds that the ALJ did not err in his evaluation of Dr. Curlin’s
opinion, or in concluding that the opinion was not entitled to
controlling or substantial weight.
In light of the lack of objective support for Dr. Curlin’s
Having found that Plaintiff’s treating source was not entitled to
substantial weight, it was not error for the ALJ to credit the
opinions of medical expert Dr. Doren, who had thoroughly reviewed the
Case 5:06-cv-00027-PJW Document 16 Filed 06/07/07 Page 12 of 18 Page ID #:69
record, and testified regarding all the medical evidence before the
20 C.F.R. § 416.927(f). The ALJ’s Finding That Plaintiff Could Perform Past Work Was Not
Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s finding that she could perform her
past work as a housekeeper, arguing that the ALJ failed to properly
incorporate her mental impairments in his residual functional capacity
assessment, and, in turn, failed to obtain necessary testimony from
the vocational expert.
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to give adequate weight to
the opinion of examining psychiatrist Dr. Divy J. Kikani, who examined
Plaintiff in connection with a previous application in 2000, and again
on December 8, 2003.
“excessive anxiety” and symptoms of depression, had a poor fund of
knowledge, and impaired abstracting ability and judgement.
Dr. Kikani gave Plaintiff a global assessment of functioning (“GAF”)
recurrent type major depressive disorder.
Plaintiff had moderate impairments in social functioning, daily
activities of living, and the ability to respond appropriately to
others in the work place.
Plaintiff had mild to moderate impairment in concentration,
persistence, and pace, and that Plaintiff could be expected to have
moderate episodes of emotional deterioration under customary work
Plaintiff’s Mental Impairments
In 2003, Dr. Kikani noted that Plaintiff showed
(AR 150.)
Dr. Kikani assessed Plaintiff as suffering from a
(AR 151.)
Dr. Kikani also opined that
The ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from depression.
(AR 13.)
He also described Dr. Kikani’s findings, and summarized Dr. Kikani’s 12
Case 5:06-cv-00027-PJW Document 16 Filed 06/07/07 Page 13 of 18 Page ID #:70
opinion as that Plaintiff was “moderately psychiatrically impaired.”
however, the ALJ did not identify any functional limitations related
to her psychiatric impairment, and merely concluded that Plaintiff
retained the capacity for “simple, repetitive tasks.”
Court finds that this assessment failed to take into account all of
Plaintiff’s mental impairments as established by the evidence, and
that, in making this assessment, the ALJ improperly rejected the
opinion of Dr. Kikani.
When evaluating Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity,
The ALJ summarized Dr. Kikani’s opinion, but implicitly rejected
it, finding only that Plaintiff retained the capacity to perform
“simple, repetitive tasks.”2
Kikani’s opinion inasmuch as it failed to incorporate Plaintiff’s
mental impairments as noted by Dr. Kikani.
“simple, repetitive tasks” may incorporate limitations on
concentration, persistence, and pace, it plainly does not incorporate
moderate impairment in dealing with co-workers, supervisors, and the
public, nor does it incorporate impairments related to the inability
to work under customary pressures.
explanation for his decision not to incorporate Dr. Kikani’s opinion
and these limitations in his findings.
This finding implicitly rejected Dr.
While a limitation to
The ALJ did not provide any
The Agency argues that there was no error because “Dr. Kikani
never expressed an opinion of Plaintiff’s residual functional
(JS at 6-7.)
The Court is not persuaded by this argument.
The ALJ also noted that the State Agency doctors opined that Plaintiff should be further limited to working in a non-public setting. (AR 16.) The ALJ omitted the “non-public” restriction from his findings without explanation. (AR 18.) 13
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As the Agency well knows, the determination of residual functional
capacity is reserved for the Agency, which looks to medical sources to
provide opinions on the nature and severity of a claimant’s
did not complete a psychiatric review technique form, his evaluation
set forth opinions regarding Plaintiff’s mental limitations in terms
similar to those in the form, specifically that Plaintiff showed:
moderate impairment in social functioning and daily activities; mild
to moderate impairment of concentration, persistence, and pace;
20 C.F.R. § 416.927(e)(2).
Moreover, while Dr. Kikani
moderate impairment in the ability to respond appropriately to co-
workers, supervisors, and the public; moderate impairment in the
ability to persist in a work situation under customary pressure; and a
likelihood to have moderate episodes of emotional deterioration in a
work situation under customary pressure.
While the Court is mindful of the fact that determination of
residual functional capacity at step four of the sequential evaluation
process is the province of the ALJ, the ALJ’s assessment must take
into account all of Plaintiff’s impairments.
§§ 416.920a(c), 416.927(e)(2), 416.945, 416.946(b).
may not reject the opinion of an examining doctor in favor of the
opinion of a non-examining doctor without setting forth specific,
legitimate reasons for doing so, which are supported by substantial
(remanding ALJ’s decision implicitly rejecting opinion of examining
psychiatrist); and Moore v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 278 F.3d
920, 924 (9th Cir. 2002).
less specific reasons supported by substantial evidence, for rejecting
Dr. Kikani’s opinion, and, therefore, erred.
20 C.F.R. Moreover, an ALJ
See Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1466
The ALJ failed to give any reasons, much
This error requires
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remand for further consideration of Plaintiff’s mental impairments and
Assessment of Past Relevant Work
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in finding that Plaintiff
could perform her past relevant work because that work encompasses
more than “simple, repetitive tasks.”
complains that the ALJ failed to comply with the requirement of SSR
82-62, which mandate specific factual findings regarding a claimant’s
(JS at 4-6.)
(JS at 3-4).
Because the Court has found that the ALJ’s
assessment of Plaintiff’s mental residual functional capacity failed
to incorporate all of Plaintiff’s mental impairments, and that the ALJ
improperly disregarded Dr. Kikani’s opinion regarding those
impairments, the Court need not resolve these issues.
ALJ should perform the step-four analysis and decide whether Plaintiff
can perform her past work as a housekeeper based upon his conclusion
on remand as to Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity, and in
accordance with applicable regulations and rulings.
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ presented an incomplete
hypothetical to the vocational expert by failing to include
Plaintiff’s specific limitations.
inasmuch as the ALJ did not rely on his very restrictive hypothetical,
in response to which the vocational expert testified that Plaintiff
could not perform any work.
Plaintiff could perform light work, and used the vocational expert’s
Plaintiff’s argument is confusing,
26 27 28 15
Rather, the ALJ found that
Case 5:06-cv-00027-PJW Document 16 Filed 06/07/07 Page 16 of 18 Page ID #:73
testimony that Plaintiff’s past work as a housekeeper was light work
to support his step-four conclusion that Plaintiff could perform her
past work.3
(AR 17-18, 284.)
An ALJ is not required to obtain vocational expert testimony to
support his finding that a claimant can perform past work.
Shalala, 76 F.3d 251, 255 (9th Cir. 1996).
ALJ elected to rely upon expert testimony, implying that he believed
that the testimony was necessary in Plaintiff’s case.
troubled by the fact that the ALJ relied on this testimony despite the
fact that his assessment of Plaintiff’s capacity was more limited than
simply “light work,” adding postural, climbing, and mental
restrictions not presented to the vocational expert.
The ALJ relied upon his characterization of the vocational expert's testimony regarding Plaintiff's past work, stating that the vocation expert testified that Plaintiff's past work was "light level, unskilled work." (AR 17.) The actual testimony was that: There was work in housekeeping in a convalescent facility, that is light, unskilled, SVP 2. The housekeeping that she mentioned I believe would fall under a category of medium work and unskilled, SVP 2.
Plaintiff testified only about one prior job--as a housekeeper for eight months. (AR 257.) The Court finds this testimony ambiguous, and, therefore, finds it difficult to assess the ALJ’s reliance on it. While the Ninth Circuit has not required an ALJ to make explicit findings at step four regarding past work both as generally performed in the economy and as actually performed by Plaintiff (See Pinto v. Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 845 (9th Cir. 2001), on remand, the ALJ should clarify the record and make specific findings of fact with respect to Plaintiff’s past work in compliance with SSR 82-62.
Case 5:06-cv-00027-PJW Document 16 Filed 06/07/07 Page 17 of 18 Page ID #:74
discussed above, the Court need not decide this issue, as a new step-
four analysis must be performed based upon the determination of
Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity on remand.
The ALJ Improperly Discredited Lay Witness Evidence The ALJ rejected the statements of Plaintiff’s sister-in-law in a
third-party activities questionnaire on the grounds that she was
“colored by affection for the claimant,” and, therefore, not
impartial, and that her statements were inconsistent with the medical
Neither ground is a proper basis for rejecting
lay testimony.
be ground for rejecting his or her testimony.”
F.3d 1273, 1289 (9th Cir. 1996).
was a family member and saw Plaintiff frequently over an extended
period of time, she had particular insight into Plaintiff’s
see the claimant daily, such as family members, are of particular
“The fact that a lay witness is a family member cannot Smolen v. Chater, 80
In fact, because the sister-in-law
See id. (noting that testimony from lay witnesses who
The ALJ also found that the sister-in-law’s testimony was not
credible because it was inconsistent with the preponderance of medical
This is likewise an improper basis to reject lay witness
It is precisely this situation--when pain is a significant
factor of the claimed disability, and such pain is not supported by
objective medical evidence--where the Agency is directed to seek
information from knowledgeable third parties regarding daily
activities, the claimant’s pain, and its effects on the claimant.
88-13; see also Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1289.
rejection of the sister-in-law’s statements regarding Plaintiff’s
daily activities was in error and should be reconsidered on remand. 17
Accordingly, the ALJ’s
Case 5:06-cv-00027-PJW Document 16 Filed 06/07/07 Page 18 of 18 Page ID #:75
For all the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby REVERSES and
REMANDS this case to the Agency for further proceedings consistent
8 DATED:
9 10 11 PATRICK J. WALSH UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
S:\PJW\Cases-Soc Sec\MORA, J\Memo Opinion _Order.wpd