Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/170/871/503114/
Timestamp: 2020-05-25 15:57:02
Document Index: 500701152

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 19', '§ 19', '§ 3613', '§ 3664', '§ 3614', '§ 3664']

99 Cal. Daily Op. Ser v. 1805, 1999 Dailyjournal D.a.r. 2325united States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Jeffrey A. Ballek, Defendant-appellant, 170 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 1999) :: Justia
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99 Cal. Daily Op. Ser v. 1805, 1999 Dailyjournal D.a.r. 2325united States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Jeffrey A. Ballek, Defendant-appellant, 170 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 1999)
US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 170 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 1999) Argued and Submitted Sept. 18, 1998. Decided March 11, 1999
The CSRA's clear-cut legislative history supports this construction. The House Report accompanying H.R. 1241, which eventually became the CSRA, addressed the meaning of "willfully fails to pay." See H.R.Rep. No. 102-771, at 6 (1992). The Report notes that " [t]his language has been borrowed from the tax statutes that make willful failure to collect or pay taxes a Federal crime." Id. The Report then instructs that "the willful failure standard of [the CSRA] should be interpreted in the same manner that Federal courts have interpreted [the] felony tax provisions." Id. The Report quotes with approval from our opinion in United States v. Poll, 521 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1975), where we held that, for purposes of proving willful failure to pay,
Id. at 333 (emphasis added). By quoting Poll, the drafters of the House Report clearly embraced a meaning of the term "willfully" that goes beyond merely failing to pay when one has the funds available, and extends to the situation where the defendant has acted willfully in not having funds available. Our interpretation follows that of the Eleventh Circuit, the only other court of appeals to have addressed this question. See United States v. Williams, 121 F.3d 615, 620-21 (11th Cir. 1997).
Ballek argues that the statute, so construed, runs afoul of the prohibition against slavery or its close cousin, the prohibition against imprisonment for debt. Imprisoning someone for failure to pay a debt can run afoul of the Thirteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 64 S. Ct. 792, 88 L. Ed. 1095 (1944). However, not all forced employment is constitutionally prohibited. Where the obligation is one that has traditionally been enforced by means of imprisonment, the constitutional prohibition does not apply. See, e.g., Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 287-88, 17 S. Ct. 326, 41 L. Ed. 715 (1897) (imprisonment for sailors who desert their ships); Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366, 390, 38 S. Ct. 159, 62 L. Ed. 349 (1918) (imprisonment for refusal to perform military service); Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 332-33, 36 S. Ct. 258, 60 L. Ed. 672 (1916) (imprisonment for failure to do roadwork).
The state's strong concern for the welfare of minor children is also manifested by the fact that parental obligations at the dissolution of a marriage are not left to private agreement. Rather, they are supervised by family courts which are charged with the responsibility of securing the children's welfare despite the estrangement of the parents. Experience teaches that the natural bonds, which normally ensure that children are cared for, are sometimes weakened when the affinity between the parents comes to an end. The supervision--and coercive power--of the court is often invoked to prompt the non-custodial parent to continue providing support. The non-custodial parent's obligation to pay child support is thus derivative of the obligation to provide support in a custodial setting, and such awards are routinely enforced by imprisonment. See, e.g., Taylor v. Alaska, 710 P.2d 1019 (Alaska Ct.App.1985) (affirming conviction of non-custodial parent who without lawful excuse failed to provide support for child). The state also has an interest in protecting the public fisc by ensuring that the children not become wards of the state. Cf. Butler, 240 U.S. at 333, 36 S. Ct. 258 (" [The Thirteenth Amendment] certainly was not intended to interdict enforcement of ... duties which individuals owe to the State....") At least one state Supreme Court has rejected the argument that imprisonment for failure to work in order to earn enough money to make child support payments violates state and federal prohibitions against slavery. See Moss v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 4th 396, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 215, 222, 950 P.2d 59, 66 (1998).
The district court did not find that Ballek failed to seek employment as a contractor so that he would be unable to meet his support obligation, but this does not render the finding of willfulness insufficient. The government need not prove that defendant's failure to accept gainful employment was caused by a desire to withhold payments from the spouse and children, or any similar evil motive. Cf. United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10, 12, 97 S. Ct. 22, 50 L. Ed. 2d 12 (1976) (per curiam) (requisite motive for willful tax violation is intentional violation of known legal duty). It is just as much a violation of the CSRA for a non-custodial parent to fail to pay child support where his refusal to work is motivated by sloth, a change of life-styles or pursuit of new career objectives. For most people, bringing children into the world does limit life choices by imposing certain long-term financial obligations. A parent with minor children at home cannot quit work and become a hobo or go back to school as the fancy moves him. Nor may a non-custodial parent stop making child support payments because he has decided to pursue a post-doctoral degree in macrobiotics. A parent who is subject to an order for child support must seek a modification of the order before making such a lifestyle change. The family court judge can then determine whether such a change is consistent with the parent's prior obligation to support the children. Where a parent does not seek such a modification, but chooses (for whatever reason) to eschew work that is otherwise available, he is subject to imprisonment for failure to pay, both under state law and under the CSRA.III
The Supreme Court has told us repeatedly, and in no uncertain terms, that by far the most significant factor in determining whether something is a petty offense is the maximum term of imprisonment. See, e,g., United States v. Nachtigal, 507 U.S. 1, 3, 113 S. Ct. 1072, 122 L. Ed. 2d 374 (1993) (per curiam); Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 541-42, 109 S. Ct. 1289, 103 L. Ed. 2d 550 (1989). Where the maximum term of imprisonment is six months or less, there is a very strong presumption that the offense is petty and defendant is not entitled to a jury trial. See Blanton, 489 U.S. at 543, 109 S. Ct. 1289. Other types of punishment in lieu of, or in addition to, incarceration may have some bearing on the question, but these punishments are normally considered far less significant. See id. at 542-43, 109 S. Ct. 1289.
Nevertheless, there clearly comes a point where potential punishment other than incarceration may be so severe that the offense will no longer be considered petty. See, e.g., Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 882 F.2d at 663. This is especially true if the punishment may be imposed in addition to a term of imprisonment. At the same time, the possibility of some non-custodial punishment, even in addition to a six-month term of imprisonment, will not change the character of the punishment sufficiently to render the offense serious. The question is how intrusive or severe the additional punishment may be. See Blanton, 489 U.S. at 543, 109 S. Ct. 1289. Where the additional punishment could involve the imposition of a very large fine, or a very long period of probation, or the forfeiture of substantial property, the severity of the total punishment may be sufficiently great so as to turn what would otherwise be a petty offense into a serious one.
Ballek raises his Thirteenth Amendment argument for the first time on appeal. Because this is a purely legal question, we exercise our discretion to overlook Ballek's waiver of the issue. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. First Am. Bank, 155 F.3d 1126, 1129 (9th Cir. 1998)
Ballek's proposal for a $50,000 threshold is based on the Second Circuit's holding in United States v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 882 F.2d 656, 663 (2d Cir. 1989), that a criminal contempt fine on a corporation which exceeds $100,000 warrants a jury trial. Ballek argues that because $100,000 constitutes ten times the $10,000 petty offense limit on fines for organizations, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 19, 3571(c) (6), (7) (West Supp.1998), the threshold for individuals should likewise be ten times the $5,000 petty offense limit on fines for individuals, see id. §§ 19, 3571(b) (6), (7)
In addition to the lien upon the defendant's property that the United States automatically receives by virtue of an order of restitution, see 18 U.S.C. § 3613(c) (West Supp.1998), the custodial parent may also obtain such a lien, see id. § 3664(m) (1) (B). Further, if the delinquent parent continues to willfully fail to pay his past due child support, or fails to make bona fide efforts to meet his obligation, the United States may seek to have him resentenced. See id. § 3614; § 3664(o) (2)