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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 307', '§ 307', '§ 307', '§ 307', '§ 60', '§ 60', '§ 307', '§ 7607', '§ 307', '§ 307', '§ 1331', '§ 307', '§ 307', '§ 307', '§ 307', '§ 307', '§ 307', '§ 307', '§ 307', '§ 307', '§ 307', '§ 307', '§ 307', '§ 307', '§ 307', '§ 7607', '§ 112', '§ 7412', '§ 307', '§ 307', '§ 307', '§ 111', '§ 7411', '§ 112', '§ 7412', '§ 113', '§ 7413', '§ 119', '§ 7419', '§ 307', '§ 60', '§ 60', '§ 307', '§ 307', '§ 307', '§ 110', '§ 7410', '§ 111', '§ 7411', '§ 60', '§ 307']

HARRISON V. PPG INDUSTRIES, INC., 446 U. S. 578 (1980) - US SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON-LINE
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(a) The rule of ejusdem generis does not apply to § 307(b)(1) so as to limit "any other final action" to actions similar to those under the specifically enumerated provisions on the theory that the latter actions (unlike the Administrator's informal decision here) must be based on administrative proceedings reflecting at least notice and opportunity for a hearing. At least one of the specifically enumerated provisions in § 307(b)(1) does not require the Administrator to act only after notice and opportunity for a hearing, and thus, even if the rule of ejusdem generis were applied, it would not significantly narrow the ambit of "any other final action" under § 307(b)(1). Moreover, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
STEWART, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J.,and BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, and POWELL, JJ., joined. POWELL, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 446 U. S. 594. BLACKMUN, J., filed an opinion concurring in the result, post, p. 446 U. S. 595. REHNQUIST, J., post, p. 446 U. S. 595, and STEVENS, J., post, p. 446 U. S. 602, filed dissenting opinions.
Section 307(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act (Act) provides for direct review in a federal court of appeals of certain locally and regionally applicable actions taken by the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under specifically enumerated provisions of the Act, and of "any other final action of the Administrator under [the] Act . . . which is locally or regionally applicable." (Emphasis chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
added.) [Footnote 1] The issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was correct in concluding that it was without jurisdiction under § 307(b)(1) to entertain a petition for review in which PPG Industries, Inc. (PPG), chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In 1971, the Administrator included "fossil fuel-fired steam generators" in his list of stationary sources. 36 Fed.Reg. 5931. Later that year, pursuant to his mandate to promulgate "new source" performance standards, the Administrator established certain emission limits for any "fossil fuel-fired steam generating unit" of more than 250 million Btu's per hour heat input, the construction or modification of which was commenced after August 17, 1971, the date on which the standards were proposed. 40 CFR §§ 60.1-60.15, 60.40-60.46 (1979). These "new source" regulations define the term "fossil fuel-fired steam generating unit," § 60.41(a), and also create a procedure under which the Administrator, upon chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On the basis of PPG's submissions, the Regional Director for Enforcement of the EPA notified PPG of his conclusion that the boilers were subject to the "new source" standards, since construction of the boilers themselves had not begun until long after January 14, 1971, the date on which the standards had been proposed. In response, PPG took the position that the boilers were part of an integrated unit, the construction of which had begun in 1970, before the proposed date of the standards. The Regional Director, nevertheless, reaffirmed his initial decision. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Responding to PPG's request, the Regional Administrator notified PPG by letter that he had concluded that the waste-heat boilers were, indeed, subject to the "new source" standards for "fossil fuel-fired steam generators," and rejected PPG's argument that construction of the boilers had begun with the construction of other facets of the Lake Charles facility. Thus, the Regional Administrator affirmed the previous EPA determination that the waste-heat boilers were subject to the "new source" performance standards. With regard to the manner in which those standards were to apply to the waste-heat boilers, the Regional Administrator indicated that, since PPG's gas turbine generators were not subject to the "new source" standards, PPG would be held accountable only for those emissions from the waste-heat boilers attributable to the combustion of fossil fuel, not those emissions attributable to waste heat from the gas turbine generators. [Footnote 2] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
PPG's uncertainty, and the issue in this case, stem from conflicting views as to the proper interpretation of § 307(b)(1) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (1976 ed., Supp. II). Before 1977, § 307(b)(1) provided for exclusive review in an appropriate court of appeals of certain locally or regionally applicable actions of the Administrator under several specifically enumerated provisions of the Act. Actions of the Administrator under provisions not specifically enumerated in § 307(b)(1) were reviewable only in a district court under its federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Congress expanded the ambit of § 307(b)(1) in 1977. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub.L. 95-95, 91 Stat. 776, added to the list of locally or regionally applicable actions reviewable exclusively in the appropriate court of appeals both (1) actions of the Administrator under another specifically enumerated provision of the Act, and (2) "any other final action of the Administrator under [the] Act which is locally or chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Id. at 243. The "most revealing" aspect of the legislative history of § 307(b)(1), the court thought, was the complete absence of any discussion of such a "massive shift" in jurisdiction. Moreover, the court found it unlikely that Congress could have intended a shift of jurisdiction that would require the courts of appeals to review decisions of the Administrator that simply applied or interpreted his regulations, as in this case. Such a decision, the court noted, is often based on a "skeletal record" that may leave the reviewing court unable to chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
587 F.2d 245. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals dismissed PPG's petition for lack of jurisdiction under § 307(b)(1). We granted certiorari, 444 U.S. 823, because of the importance of determining the locus of judicial review of the actions of EPA.
At the outset, we note that the parties are in agreement that the Administrator's decision was "final action" as that term is understood in the context of the Administrative Procedure Act and other provisions of federal law. It is undisputed that the Administrator's ruling represented EPA's final determination concerning the applicability of the "new source" standards to PPG's power facility. Short of an enforcement action, EPA has rendered its last word on the matter. The controversy thus is not about whether the Administrator's decision was "final," but rather about whether it was "any other final action" within the meaning of § 307(b)(1), as amended in 1977. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The petitioners argue that the phrase "any other final action" should be construed in accordance with its literal meaning so as to reach any action of the Administrator under the Act that is "final" and not taken under a specifically enumerated provision in § 307(b)(1). The respondents argue that the statutory language should be construed more narrowly. Relying on the familiar doctrine of ejusdem generis, they assert that the phrase, "any other final action," should be read not to reach all final actions of the Administrator, but rather only those similar to the actions under the specifically enumerated provisions that precede that catchall phrase in the statute. [Footnote 3] The similarity that the respondents discern among the actions under the specifically enumerated provisions in § 307(b)(1) is that those actions must be based on what the respondents refer to as "a contemporaneously compiled administrative record," by which they mean a record "based on administrative proceedings reflecting at least notice and opportunity for hearing." Since the Administrator's informal decision in this case was not based on such a record, the respondents argue that his decision was not "other final action" within the meaning of § 307(b)(1), and thus not within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. [Footnote 4] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
United States v. Powell, 423 U. S. 87, 423 U. S. 91, quoting Gooch v. United States, 297 U. S. 124, 297 U. S. 128. With regard to § 307(b)(1), we discern no uncertainty in the meaning of the phrase, "any other final action." When Congress amended the provision chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
We have found nothing in the legislative history to support a conclusion that the phrase, "any other final action," in § 307(b)(1) means anything other than what it says. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The respondents also rely on what the Committee and the chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The respondents finally argue that, as a matter of policy, the basic purpose of § 307(b)(1) -- to provide prompt preenforcement review of EPA action -- would be better served by providing for judicial review of cases such as this in a district court, rather than a court of appeals. [Footnote 9] It is the respondents' chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
We add only that, as a matter of policy, this conferral of jurisdiction upon the courts of appeals is not wholly irrational. The most obvious advantage of direct review by a court of appeals is the time saved compared to review by a district court, followed by a second review on appeal. It may be seriously questioned whether the overall time lost by court of appeals remands to EPA of those cases in which the chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
I continue to have reservations about the constitutionality of the notice and review preclusion provisions of § 307(b). Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U. S. 275, 434 U. S. 289 (1978) (POWELL, J., concurring); see ante at 446 U. S. 592-593, n. 9. Congress has extended to 60 days the period within which a petition for review may be filed under § 307(b)(1). But publication in the Federal Register still is unlikely to provide constitutionally adequate notice that a failure to seek immediate review will bar affected parties from challenging the noticed action in a subsequent criminal prosecution. An informal exchange of letters, like those involved in this case, often will provide no greater protection. Although these constitutional difficulties well may counsel a narrow construction of § 307(b)(1), cf. Chrysler Corp. v. EPA, 195 U.S.App.D.C. 90, 98-100, 600 F.2d 904, 912 914 (1979) (parallel provisions of Noise Control Act), no such construction is chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The effort to determine congressional intent here might better be entrusted to a detective than to a judge. The Court rejects the application of the traditional canon of ejusdem generis to the phrase "any other final action" on the grounds that (1) there is no uncertainty as to the meaning of that phrase, ante at 446 U. S. 588, and (2) at least one of the provisions now included in § 307(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (1976 ed., Supp. II) -- i.e., § 112(c), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c) (1976 ed., Supp. II) -- does not require the Administrator to act after notice and opportunity for comment or hearing, ante at 446 U. S. 588. While I agree with the Court that the phrase "any other final action" may not, by itself, be "ambiguous," I think that what chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Before 1977, § 307(b)(1) granted exclusive jurisdiction to courts of appeals to review only a limited class of actions taken by the Administrator. [Footnote 2/1] District of Columbia v. Train, 175 U.S.App.D.C. 115, 119, 533 F.2d 1250, 1254 (1976); Utah Power & Light Co. v. EPA, 180 U.S.App.D.C. 70, 72, 553 F.2d 215, 217 (1977). The EPA was required to provide for notice and an opportunity for hearing or comment with respect to all such actions. These procedural requirements generally result in the creation of an administrative record chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The revision of § 307(b)(1) during the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, when Congress added the phrase "any other final action," does not, in my view, support the Court's chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
If Congress had done nothing more than enact this amendment, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
I doubt that the Court would find application of the rule of ejusdem generis problematic. See infra at 446 U. S. 601. The difficulty in ascertaining Congress' intention here arises from the so-called "technical amendments" enacted three months after Congress adopted the Clean Air Act Amendments in 1977. Clean Air Act Technical and Conforming Amendments of 1977, Pub.L. 95-140, 91 Stat,. 1404. The amendments purportedly made no substantive changes in the earlier amendments. [Footnote 2/5] They nonetheless altered § 307(b)(1) by specifying four additional sections that would trigger the original jurisdiction of courts of appeals: § 111(j), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(j) (1976 ed., Supp. II); § 112(c), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c) (1976 ed., Supp. II); § 113(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d) (1976 ed., Supp. II); and § 119, 42 U.S.C. § 7419 (1976 ed., Supp. II). EPA maintains that these additions make no substantive changes, because the "any other final action" phrase already included actions under these sections, and, under the Court's interpretation of that phrase, this would clearly be the case. This view, however, also leads to the conclusion that the technical amendments were a largely meaningless exercise of Congress' legislative authority. But, as previously noted, in presenting the technical amendments, Senator Muskie said they were "necessary to correct technical errors or unclear phrases." 123 Cong.Rec. 36252 (1977) (emphasis added); n. 4, supra. Thus, the technical amendments, coupled with Senator Muskie's statement in introducing them, present this Court with a paradox in attempting to ascertain Congress' intention: under the Court's interpretation of the phrase "any other final action," the technical amendments, contrary to their advance billing, were entirely unnecessary, because the phrase chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In my view, absent any clear indication to the contrary, the statute should not be construed as creating a broad expansion of the jurisdiction of the federal courts of appeals. Such an approach is quite appropriate in this case, because the jurisdictional expansion wrought by the Court is thoroughly inconsistent with the traditional role of appellate courts. Indeed, I think it is difficult to believe that Congress would adopt a massive shift in jurisdiction from the district courts to the courts of appeals without any comment whatsoever. The sketchy legislative history here indicates that Congress considered the Administrative Conference's recommendations, and that the principal purpose of the 1977 amendment was to effect the change in venue that was recommended by the Administrative Conference. The change would be far less substantial chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
If the phrase "any other final action" is interpreted by reference to § 307(b)(1) at the time the phrase was added, this case is clearly a proper one in which to apply the rule of ejusdem generis. The rule of ejusdem generis ordinarily "limits general terms which follow specific ones to matters similar to those specified." Gooch v. United States, 297 U. S. 124, 297 U. S. 128 (1936). It rests on the notion that statutes should be construed so that the "sense of the words . . . best harmonizes with the context and the end in view." Ibid. At the time the general language "any other final action" was adopted, notice and opportunity for comments or hearing were required for the actions listed in the sections that preceded it -- a requirement that distinguished those sections from the Administrator's action at issue here. Thus, under the principle of ejusdem generis, the general phrase refers to similar types chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In April, 1977, PPG submitted a formal request, pursuant to 40 CFR § 60.5(a), for a definitive determination on these issues. Although § 60.5(a) provides for such determinations only with respect to the first issue raised by PPG, [Footnote 3/2] EPA's Regional Administrator apparently rejected both arguments chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Although informal advice by agency personnel as to how the agency is likely to react to a particular set of circumstances chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Assuming that EPA's letter in this case would constitute "final agency action" under the APA, the second question is whether we are compelled by the language of § 307(b)(1) to hold that the Court of Appeals had exclusive jurisdiction to chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Under § 307(b)(2) of the Clean Air Act, any agency action that was reviewable in the courts of appeals cannot be challenged in an enforcement proceeding, whether or not review was actually sought. [Footnote 3/6] Under § 307(b)(1), a petition for review must be filed within 60 days of the publication of the agency action in the Federal Register. Although EPA apparently did not publish letters like its letter to PPG in the Federal Register prior to the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, it is now embarking on a program to do so. [Footnote 3/7] Because chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Section 307(b)(1) mandates exclusive review in the courts of appeals of the Administrator's actions under certain specific subsections of the Act. Those subsections contain specific grants of authority to the Administrator to make certain determinations. Thus, §§ 110 and 111(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7410 and 7411(d) (1976 ed., Supp. II), empower the Administrator to approve state implementation plans; §§ 111(j), 112(c), 113(d), and 119, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(j), 7412(c), 7413(d), chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
By contrast, agency advice as to whether or not particular sources are subject to previously promulgated regulations does not, in itself, change any party's legal status; nor is there anything in the statute that specifically requires or permits the Administrator to give such advice. This does not mean that it is beyond the Administrator's power to do so, or to set up his own procedures, as he has done in 40 CFR § 60.5(a) (1979), for giving advice in a formalized manner. But I do not believe Congress intended the review provisions of the statute to cover this type of "agency action" as well as those types specifically contemplated by the statute. In making reviewable "any other final action of the Administrator under this chapter," Congress must have been thinking of actions it had specifically directed or authorized the Administrator to take under sections of the Act not specifically enumerated in § 307(b)(1). This interpretation is consistent with both an ejusdem generis construction of the statute and its plain language. It is also supported by Congress' apparent belief that it was extending court of appeals review only to the types of actions that EPA had been accustomed to publishing in the Federal Register. See 446 U. S. 7, supra.
See National Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Shultz, 143 U.S.App.D.C. 274, 281, 443 F.2d 689, 696 (1971), in which the court held a letter signed by the Wage-Hour Administrator concerning a particular application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to be "final action" in light of the fact that noncompliance with the agency's policy could have led to criminal liability and actions for double damages by affected employees. But see West Penn Power Co. v. Train, 522 F.2d 302, 31311 (CA3 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 947; 522 F.2d 317-319 (Adams, J., dissenting), where the court refused to consider a notice of violation issued pursuant to the Clean Air Act to be final agency action despite the severe penalties that could have attached to future noncompliance.