Source: http://circuit9.blogspot.com/2013_01_01_archive.html
Timestamp: 2016-02-13 15:16:42
Document Index: 334306032

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1704', '§ 3146', '§ 3146', '§ 3146', '§ 3146', '§ 3146', '§ 3146', '§ 3146', '§ 3146', '§ 3146', '§ 3145']

Congratulations to AFPD Carolyn Wiggin, FPD ED Calif (Sacramento). U.S. v. Jesus-Casteneda, No. 11-10397 (1-30-13)(Bea with Wallace and Restani) The drama that is trial is driven home when a witness appears in disguise. Does it violate the Confrontation Clause? The 9th holds that it does not, affirming a drug conviction. The witness in this case was a CI. Deep undercover in the Sinaloa Cartel, he testified as to defendant's actions wearing a wig and a fake mustache. He did so because the government stated that he was at risk. The defense objected, arguing that the court could be sealed, and the witness protected by other means. The district court said this was not a "close question." The 9th pondered the disguise, and the need under the Confrontation Clause to assess credibility. The 9th concluded that confrontation was not violated because (1) the gov't showed that it had a state interest (safety); and (2) the witness was (a) physically present; (b) under oath; (c) cross examined; and (4) the jury could hear his voice, see his eyes, and observe his body and partial face. The 9th acknowledged that there might be a due process violation given the impression conveyed that the defendant was dangerous. The 9th sidestepped ruling on due process issue because, even if there was error, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
posted by Jon Sands at 1/31/2013 04:09:00 PM
“In attempting to comply with this misguided decision, district
courts are left to navigate the shoals of Scylla and Charybdis.” United States v. Dreyer, 2013 65430 (9th
Cir. Jan. 7, 2013) (ord. denying rh’g en banc) (Tallman, J., dissenting),
order and superseding opinion available here.
Or, to put it differently, the Ninth’s new competency case presents
opportunities for the defense.
Players: Dissent from order denying rehearing en banc by Judge
Tallman, joined by CJ Kozinski and Judges O’Scannlain, Bybee, Callahan, Bea,
Ikuta, and N.R. Smith. Facts: Defendant Joel Dreyer suffered from
diagnosed mental illnesses. Id. at *5
(superseding opinion). Because of the effect of this dementia on his behavior,
Dreyer did not allocate at sentencing. Id.
Without a competency hearing at sentencing, the district court proceeded –
and the defense did not object. Id. In an opinion issued August 21, 2012, Judge Reinhardt wrote that the failure to
order a competency hearing sua sponte
was plain error. 693 F.3d 803, 813. Judge
Wardlaw joined Judge Reinhardt, and Judge Callahan dissented. A Ninth Circuit judge
sought rehearing en banc. 2013 WL 65430, *1 (ord).
matter failed to receive a majority of the votes of the nonrecused active
judges in favor of en banc reconsideration.” Id. at *1.
Of Note: In August, we touted Dreyer and commended as a must-read for
anyone representing mentally ill clients. See blog post here. The Dissenting Eight from the order
denying rehearing agree with us (or at least, agree that Dreyer is a seminal decision). In his dissent from the order
denying rehearing en banc, Judge
Tallman complains that the opinion “adds to the existing standard of legal
competence by requiring that the defendant be able to speak persuasively on his
own behalf at sentencing.” Id. at *4.
He explains that a district court “may rationally conclude that it must sua sponte order a hearing when any number
of impairments are identified.” Id.
at *4. Judge Tallman worries that the case will “wreak havoc on sentencing
proceedings.” Id. at *1. In other
words, defense opportunities await.
Use: Dreyer requires some thought. There are times where the
greatest service an attorney can render his or her client is to convince them
to stay mum at sentencing – indeed, that may have been the case in Dreyer. If a client has a diagnosed
mental illness, that strategy of silence may prompt a district judge into
ordering a sua sponte competency
evaluation (often by a hostile BOP shrink fond of “anti-social personality
disorder” diagnoses). Remember that a defendant has the Fifth Amendment right to
remain silent at sentencing, and can’t be punished for asserting that right. Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314,
330 (1999) (“By holding petitioner's silence against her in determining the
facts of the offense at the sentencing hearing, the District Court imposed an
impermissible burden on the exercise of the constitutional right against
compelled self-incrimination.”) Dreyer
is certainly a defense win and is intended to protect the mentally ill, but
will it occasionally run afoul of Mitchell
by forcing our lovable loony clients to choose between a disastrous sentencing allocution
or being forced to speak to a BOP shrink? Interesting litigation in our future.
Further Reading: What is the base offense level in the
Sentencing Guidelines for unlawfully hacking a government web page?
bother looking for the answer on the Sentencing Commission’s web page – it was just
hacked by Anonymous and then taken down by the Feds. See CNET article here. Fresco of the shoals of Scylla
and Charybdis from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Caught_between_a_rock_and_a_hard_place.jpg
Steven Kalar, Federal
Defender N.D. Cal FPD. Website at www.ndcalfpd.org
posted by Steve Kalar at 1/26/2013 02:26:00 PM
posted by Jon Sands at 1/25/2013 04:27:00 PM
client violates supervised release, is given prison time, and fails to
surrender to serve the sentence imposed for the violation of supervised release, for what “offense”
has he failed to appear?
(Careful - trick
question). United States v. Jensen,
2013 WL 174387 (9th Cir.
Jan. 14, 2013), decision available here.
Players: Decision by Judge Graber (above left), joined by
Judges Wallace and Berzon. Hard-fought appeal by D. Nev. AFPD Brenda Weksler.
Facts: Jensen was
convicted of unlawful possession of a mail key in violation of 18 USC § 1704. Id. at *1. He was sentenced to three
years of supervised release following a custodial term. Id. Soon after his release from prison Jensen violated supervised release.
The district court revoked and sentenced him to 14 months in custody. Id. Jensen was ordered to
self-surrender. He didn’t. Jensen was caught and pleaded guilty to failure to appear in violation of
18 USC § 3146. Id. The
failure-to-appear statute, § 3146(b), has no fixed stat max: the maximum
sentence is tied to the “offense” for which the defendant didn’t appear. Id. at *2. Jensen argued that the stat
max was for the supervised release violation “offense” (with a two-year stat
max). Id. The district court
disagreed, and held the “offense” was the mail theft crime, which (under § 3146(b))
produces a stat max of five years for failure-to-surrender. Id. at *1. Jensen was sentenced to 27
months for the § 3146, failure-to-surrender crime. Id. at *1.
in this case is which ‘offense’ is relevant: Defendant’s criminal offense or
his violation of supervised release. If the mail-key offense is the measuring
stick for purposes of § 3146(b)(1)(A), then subsection (ii) applies, and the
statutory maximum for failure to appear is five years. By contrast, if his
violation of supervised release is the relevant underlying offense for purposes
of § 3146(b)(1)(A), then subsection (iii) applies, and the statutory maximum
for failure to appear is two years.” Id.
at *2. Held: “We have no trouble concluding that Defendant’s release
was ‘in connection with’ the original criminal charge. Id. at *3. . . . We agree with the First, Sixth, and Seventh
Circuits that the text clearly answers the interpretation question presented .
. . . Nothing in the text of § 3146(b)
or elsewhere suggests that Congress clearly intended that a violation of
supervised release constitutes an ‘offense’ for purposes of § 3146; indeed,
Congress used words that foreclose that possibility.” Id. at *4.
Note: 18 USC § 3146 is a weird statute. The way it is written, the statutory
maximum of the underlying offense is
a fact that increases the statutory maximum of the Section 3146 (failure to
appear) crime. Facts necessary to increase a statutory maximum? That’s Apprendiville –indeed, the Ninth has held
that it is Apprendi error when the
government fails to prove that the defendant failed to surrender on a felony,
rather than a misdemeanor. United States
v. Locklin, 530 F.3d 908, 912 (9th Cir. 2008). Given Judge Graber’s new
rule in Jensen, mustn’t the
government allege and prove the specific type
of offense that gives rise to the failure-to-appear beef? Or, at minimum, plead
and prove the statutory maximum of that underlying offense? See 18 USC § 3145(b)(1)(A)(i)-(iv)? Apprendi mischief to be made, thanks to
the new Jensen rule.
to Use: Remember Jensen when advising clients who are
permitted to self-surrender to on violations. Of course, it is always prudent to
surrender when ordered to do so -- but beware Jensen significantly raises the stat-max stakes when a self-surrendering
defendant loses his way to the clink. For
Further Reading: “The
case of Alleyne v. United States . .
. is a potentially historic dispute over the modern phenomenon of “mandatory
minimum” sentences, and the roles of judges and juries in imposing such
sentences.” So says SCOTUS blog contributor Lyle Denniston, For his thoughtful
summary of the recent sharp argument on this (potentially) seminal case, visit
his article here (“It … appeared that there was a
fairly solid nucleus of Justices willing at least to seriously re-think the
Harris precedent.) Ima
ge of the Honorable Susan P. Graber from
http://www.law.gwu.edu/News/newsstories/Pages/2010_VanVleck.aspx
.Labels: 18 USC 3146, Berzon, Graber, Supervised Release, Wallace
posted by Steve Kalar at 1/21/2013 05:02:00 PM
posted by Jon Sands at 1/15/2013 07:33:00 AM
Case o' The Week: He Lost, We Juan -- Juan, Due Process, and Perjury Threats When disgruntled AUSAs
threatens defense witnesses with
perjury, it is a due process violation. But when AUSAs threatens their own witnesses with perjury -- to make testimony fit the government's story -- it is just effective “witness preparation,” right?
Wrong, wrong, most happily,
wrong. United States v. Jarvis
Martin Juan, 2013 WL 57894 (9th Cir. Jan. 7, 2013), decision available here. Players: Important Defense (though not defendant) win for D. Az.
AFPD Dan Kaplan. Decision by Judge M. Smith, in an important opinion that provides two new and welcome rules of first impression. Facts: Juan and his wife celebrated her
birthday on an Indian reservation, with malt liquor, whiskey, and cocaine. Id. at *1. When the celebration soured Juan
punched his wife, kicked her, and ran over her with an SUV. Id. Juan was charged federally with
assault offenses. Id. At trial, the
wife was called by the government,
refused to cooperate, and her testimony was compelled. Id. She then testified and exonerated Juan. Id. In an extended sidebar where
the wife was not present, the AUSA mused of perjury charges for the wife
and suggested that she be appointed counsel. Id. The district court appointed counsel who consulted with the
wife – the next day, she returned to trial, inculpated Juan, and he was
convicted. Id. at *2. (Note: the Supremes
have prohibited the government from substantially interfering with the
testimony of a defense witness. Id. (citing Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95 (1972)).
Issue(s): “[W]hether the government’s
substantial interference with the testimony of
its own witness can ever violate a defendant’s due-process rights. To our
knowledge, no court applying Webb has
ever extended its principles to prosecution witnesses. Similarly, no court
applying Webb has ever extended it to
situations, like this one, where the allegedly threatened witness continued to
testify after the alleged threat. Instead, the prototypical Webb challenge involves conduct so
threatening as to effectively drive [the] witness off the stand . . . . Despite
this dearth of precedent, Juan persuasively argues that Webb and its progeny should apply to all witnesses.” Id. at *3 (emphasis in original)
Held: “Regardless of
whose witness is interfered with, the constitutional harm to the defendant is
the same – the inability to mount a fair and complete defense. We see no reason
to doubt that the government’s substantial interference with the testimony of
its own witnesses can violate the Due Process Clause. It also seems clear that
the substantial and wrongful interference with a prosecution or defense witness
that does not ‘drive the witness off the stand’ but instead leads the witness
to materially change his or her prior trial testimony can, in certain
circumstances, violate due process.” Id.
at *3. Of Note: Juan, sadly, didn’t win because he
couldn’t show that the perjury threat was actually
conveyed to the witness-wife. Id.
(Though it is safe to assume that any competent attorney appointed to the wife
would have immediately spoken with the AUSA, and – persuasively – conveyed all “dangers”
(i.e. perjury threats) to the client
as she evaluated her testimony). Nonetheless, Juan’s loss is still two big wins
for the Defense. Here’s two great new rules from
this important opinion: 1. It violates due process for the government to threaten its own witnesses to get the testimony it
wants, and 2. The government can trigger this violation even if the witness ultimately testifies.
Use: Can the government hide its threats
to witnesses by conveying them through the witnesses’ counsel? Safe bet that’s what
happened here – anyone who has represented a snitch has had (and conveyed) that
“cautionary” chat with a “concerned” AUSA. Is that little talk Giglio impeachment information that must
be disclosed by the AUSA, trumping any attorney-client privilege for the
witness? Juan invites discovery
litigation for counsel confronted with a witness whose testimony has – “evolved”
– after counsel was appointed. For
Further Reading: The Sixth Amendment requires that any
fact that triggers a mandatory-minimum sentence must be alleged in an
indictment and proved beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury. So say we – will the
Supremes agree? For a thoughtful preview of January 14th’s Alleyne argument, see SCOTUS blog here. Preserve
the issue! We’re just one vote shy of kissing Harris goodbye. “Perjury”
highlight image fromhttp://crimeaftercrime.com/the-case/the-hidden-memo/ Image of the Honorable Judge Milan Smith from http://www.willamette.edu/wucl/news/library/2011/commencement_2011.html
. Labels: Confrontation Clause, Due Process, Milan Smith, Perjury, Sixth Amendment
posted by Steve Kalar at 1/13/2013 12:44:00 PM