Source: http://www.juricaf.org/arret/CONSEILDELEUROPE-COUREUROPEENNEDESDROITSDELHOMME-19830509-955981
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DE VARGA-HIRSCH c. FRANCE
Page d'accueil > Résultats de la recherche DE VARGA-HIRSCH c. FRANCE
Type d'affaire : DecisionType de recours : Partielllement recevable ; partielllement irrecevableNumérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 9559/81Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1983-05-09;9559.81 Analyses : (Art. 6-1) EGALITE DES ARMES, (Art. 6-1) PROCES EQUITABLE, (Art. 6-1) PROCES ORAL, (Art. 6-3-c) ASSISTANCE D'UN DEFENSEUR DE SON CHOIX, (Art. 6-3-c) ASSISTANCE GRATUITE D'UN AVOCAT D'OFFICEParties : Demandeurs : DE VARGA-HIRSCHDéfendeurs : FRANCETexte : APPLICATION/REQUETE NÂ° 9559/81 Pierre DE VARGA-HIRSCH v/FRANC E Pierre DE VARGA-HIRSCH c/FRANC E DECISION of 9 May 1983 on the admissibility of the application DECISION du 9 mai 1983 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªt e
Article 3 of the Convention : It cannot be excluded that detention of a person who is ill rnay raise issues under this provision . Examination of the medical supervision of the person concerned in the present case. Artlcle 5, paragraph 3, of the Convention : Reasorwble tinte . the deteution to be considered ends with the judgment of the trial court at first instance. Excessive length of detention on remand cannot be compensated by deducting it from the sentence imposed. Article 6, pere g reph 1, of the Convention : Reviev of the case-law coneentiug the determination of the period to be taken into account for "reasonable time" in crintina( proceedings. Evaluation of the length of proceedings according to the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the manner .in which the case was dealt with bv the authorities . Article 25 of the Convention : In the absence of express limitation, a declaration made under this provision is retrospective. Article 26 of the Convention : If there exists mere doubt as to the chances of success of a domestic remedy, it must be tried . In respect of length of detention on remand, an appeal to the Cou rt of Cassation against a refusal to release is a remedy, in France, which must be pursued.
Article 3 de la Convenlion : On ne saurait exclure que la dÃ©tention en prison d'uwte personne rna/ade pose un problÃ¨me sous l'angle de cette disposition . Exanten de la surveillance mÃ©dicale Ã laquelle l'intÃ©ressÃ© a Ã©tÃ© soumis en l'espÃ¨ce . -158-
Article 5, paragraphe 3, de la Convention : DÃ©lai raisonnable. La dÃ©tention Ã prendre en cortsidÃ©ration prend fin au montent de la dÃ©cision de la juridiction de jugement.
Une durÃ©e excessive de la dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive n'est pas compensÃ©e par !'irnputation de celle-ci sur la durÃ©e de la peine. Article 6, paragraphe l, de la Convention : Rappel de la jurisprudence sur la dÃ©termination de la durÃ©e Ã prendre en considÃ©ration quant an Â« dÃ©lai raisortnable . en matiÃ¨re pÃ©nale. ApprÃ©cia(iort de la durÃ©e de la procÃ©dure selon la complexitÃ© de l'affaire, le cornporterrtent du requÃ©rant et la conduite de la procÃ©dure par les autoritÃ©s . Article 25 de la Convention A dÃ©faut d'une lintitation expresse, une dÃ©claration faite en vertu de cette disposition rÃ©troagit .
Article 26 de la Convention S'il existe des doutes sur les chances de succÃ¨s d7ut recours intenre . ce recours doit @tre tentÃ©. S'agissant de la durÃ©e d'une dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive, le pourvoi en cassation contre un refus de rnise en libertÃ© est, en France, un recours qui doit Ãªtre trntÃ©.
(English : see p. 188)
Les faits de la cause, tels qu'ils ont Ã©tÃ© prÃ©sentÃ©s par les parties, peuvent se rÃ©sumer comme suit : I . Le requÃ©rant est nÃ© Ã Budapest en 1910 (ou 1920) . Dans sa requÃªte introductive le requÃ©rant a indiquÃ© qu'il Ã©tait nÃ© le 21 mars 1910 et qu'il possÃ©dait la nationalitÃ© franÃ§aise . 11 ressort cependant des piÃ¨ces versÃ©es par le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur que le requÃ©rant ne possÃ©dait pas la nationalitÃ© franÃ§aise et que l'annÃ©e de sa naissance Ã©tait incertaine . Le requÃ©rant est agent d'affaires et Ã©tait domiciliÃ© Ã Paris au moment des faits qui font l'objet de la prÃ©sente requÃªte . Il Ã©tait dÃ©tenu Ã l'HÃ´tel-Dieu Ã Paris au moment de l'introduction de sa requÃªte . Dans la procÃ©dure devant la Commission, le requÃ©rant est reprÃ©sentÃ© par Mes . J . et C . Imbach, avocats Ã Strasbourg . Contexte gÃ©nÃ©ral de l'affaire 2 . Le 24 dÃ©cembre 1976, Jean de Broglie, dÃ©putÃ© de l'Eure, ancien ministre . a Ã©tÃ© tuÃ© d'un coup de feu en sortant de chez le requÃ©rant, son conseil juridique et financier, demeurant rue des Dardanelles . En raison de la complexitÃ© particuliÃ¨re de l'affaire il est utile de rÃ©sumer briÃ¨vement les activitÃ©s de la victime et les relations qu'elle avait entretenues avec certains inculpÃ©s dans l'affaire .
Jean de Broglie 3 . La victime dans cette affaire a eu de multiples activitÃ©s publiques et privÃ©es . M . de Broglie Ã©tait dÃ©putÃ© de l'Eure depuis 1958 . SecrÃ©taire d'Etat aux DÃ©partements et Territoires d'Outre-Mer, il a nÃ©gociÃ© les accords d'Evian en mars 1962 . II appartenait en qualitÃ© de SecrÃ©taire d'Etat aux diffÃ©rents Gouvernements de 1962 Ã 1967 . De 1968 Ã 1973 il a prÃ©sidÃ© la Commission des affaires Ã©trangÃ¨res de l'AssemblÃ©e nationale . 11 a dG renoncer Ã briguer la prÃ©sidence de la Commission des finances en raison de difficultÃ©s avec son parti et eu Ã©gard Ã l'incompatibilitÃ© entre ces fonctions et ses affaires privÃ©es . A la suite de l'Ã©chec de ses ambitions politiques, il se consacra Ã des affaires - sociÃ©tÃ©s SodÃ©tex . Le Viager-Foncier, Sofradec, Secar, Brincom, etc . - Ã la suite de quoi il Ã©prouva de grosses pertes . Il avait aussi de sÃ©rieuses difficultÃ©s fiscales . Re(ations entre de Bmglie, de Ribemont et le requÃ©ran t 4 . En 1975 de Broglie a fait connaissance de Patrick ABenet dit de Ribemont, qui deviendra l'un des co-inculpÃ©s du requÃ©rant . mais bÃ©nÃ©ficiera ultÃ©rieurement d'un non-lieu . Ribemont . conseiller financier international, a prÃ©sentÃ© le requÃ©rant Ã de Broglie . Le requÃ©rant qui avait purgÃ© depuis 1963, entre autres, une peine de prison de huit ans, mais qui avait Ã©tÃ© libÃ©rÃ© en 1968 sur grÃ¢ce mÃ©dicale, a Ã©tÃ© prÃ©sentÃ© comme un â¢affairiste vÃ©reux et sans scrupules mais habile et juriste averti qui avait fait en sorte que ses activitÃ©s professionnelles, ses ressources, sa fortune Ã©chappent Ã toute apprÃ©ciation mÃªme approximative . (cf . rÃ©quisitoire de transmission de piÃ¨ces du 19 mars 1980 . p . 30) . Le requÃ©rant avait des intÃ©rÃªts dans de nombreuses sociÃ©tÃ©s, la principale Ã©tant la Ficodip, dont il Ã©tait gÃ©rant de fait . Cette sociÃ©tÃ© a Ã©tÃ© mise en liquidation en 1976 avec un important passif . Sachant qu'elle courait Ã sa perte, le requÃ©rant avait crÃ©Ã© avec Ribemont la Soficop, ayant le mÃªme objet . Cette sociÃ©tÃ© a cessÃ© de fonctionner en 1977 . De Broglie qui avait investi dans la sociÃ©tÃ© Publi-MG en offrant sa caution hypothÃ©caire jusqu'Ã 5 millions de francs contre un certain revenu, a remis au requÃ©rant des pouvoirs en blanc en le chargeant de l'aider Ã rÃ©soudre les difficultÃ©s qu'il avait avec Publi-MG . Pour le rÃ¨glement de l'affaire il a, par le truchement du requÃ©rant . contractÃ© de gros emprunts . 5 . C'est l'opÃ©ration de â¢la Reine-PÃ©dauque . qui devait jouer un rÃ´le important pour la prÃ©sente affaire . En effet, parallÃ¨lement Ã l'opÃ©ration Publi-MG . de Broglie a consenti un prÃªt de 4 millions de francs Ã Ribemont pour l'achat dc la rÃ´tisserie â¢La Reine-PÃ©dauque en janvier 1976 . Ce prÃªt a Ã©tÃ© obtenu de la BNP contre inscription hypothÃ©caire portant sur 800 hectares de forÃªts et plusieurs assurances-vie . Les certificats mÃ©dicaux nÃ©cessaires Ã l'un des contrats d'assurance-vie ont Ã©tÃ© Ã©tablis par le Dr . Nelly Azerad . chez
laquelle Ribemont a envoyÃ© de Broglie et qui devait aussi Ãªtre interrogÃ©e dans le cadre de la prÃ©sente affaire . Ribemont l'avait consultÃ©e comme mÃ©decin sur recommandation du requÃ©rant, qui l'avait connue comme mÃ©decin attachÃ©e Ã l'hÃ´pital des prisons de Fresnes, lorsqu'il Ã©tait dÃ©tenu . Il a Ã©tÃ© convenu entre de Broglie et Ribemont que le prÃªt de 4 millions serait mis Ã la disposition de ce dernier, qui se chargerait du remboursement . Cet accord a Ã©tÃ© respectÃ© jusqu'Ã l'ar re station de Ribemont . En revanche, de Broglie n'a jantais reÃ§ u les actions de . La Reine PÃ©dauque â¢, qui ont Ã©tÃ© p ri ses par le requÃ©rant . En violation de l'espri t de l'accord susmentionnÃ© Ribemont a signÃ© avec le requÃ©rant un protocole qui rendait celui-ci en fait prop riÃ©taire occulte de la moitiÃ© de l'affaire . Relations entre le requÃ©rant et Simon Ã© 6 . Guy SimonÃ© . un des co-inculpÃ©s qui furent condamnÃ©s dans la prÃ©sente affaire, Ã©tait inspecteur principal de police . SimonÃ©, qui Ã©prouvait des ditficultÃ©s financiÃ¨res, a obtenu de ses crÃ©anciers des dÃ©lais par le truchement du requÃ©rant . Par l'intermÃ©diaire du requÃ©rant, le Dr . Azerad a procurÃ© Ã SimonÃ© un prÃªt destinÃ© Ã obtenir le retrait d'une plainte en escroquerie Ã l'encontre de ce dernier . Par l'intermÃ©diaire du requÃ©rant, Ribemont a prÃªtÃ© de l'argent Ã SimoziÃ© . Toujours par l'intermÃ©diaire du requÃ©rant, de Broglie lui aussi a prÃªtÃ© de l'argent Ã SimonÃ© . En contrepartie, SimonÃ© rendait au requÃ©rant certains services, tels que retrait de contraventions .
La procÃ©dur e L'itutntctioat 7 . Le jour mÃªme du crime, le 24 dÃ©centbre 1976, le juge d'instruction a Ã©tÃ© saisi d'une information contre X . du chef d'homicide volontaire . Agissant sur commission rogatoire du juge, la brigade criminelle a procÃ©dÃ© Ã l'interpellation le 27 dÃ©cembre 1976 de GÃ©rard Freche, auteur prÃ©sumÃ© du crime, de Serge TessÃ¨dre qui avait recrutÃ© Freche, de l'inspecteur principal Guy SimonÃ©, instigateur prÃ©sumÃ© du meurtre, et le 28 dÃ©cembre de Simon de Kolkowicz . InculpÃ©s le 30 dÃ©cembre, Freche d'homicide volontaire, SimonÃ©, TessÃ¨dre et Kolkowicz de complicitÃ© d'homicide volontaire, ils ont tous Ã©tÃ© placÃ©s sous mandat de dÃ©pÃ´t . Mis en cause par Kolkowicz dÃ¨s sa premiÃ¨re audition, le 28 dÃ©cembre . SimonÃ© a reconnu sa participation Ã l'affaire et a Ã©tÃ© imitÃ© ensuite par Freche et TessÃ¨dre . SimonÃ© a dÃ©clarÃ© qu'il avait Ã©tÃ© chargÃ© par le requÃ©rant de faire supprimer M . de Broglie . SimonÃ© avait d'abord recrutÃ©, avec l'aide de TessÃ¨dre et de Kolkowicz, un premier homme de mains, Bemard AndrÃ©, qui n'avait donnÃ© aucune suite au projet . Par l'entremise de TessÃ¨dre il avait alors trouvÃ© Freche qui avait exÃ©cutÃ© sa mission le 24 dÃ©cembre .
8 . Le requÃ©rant, placÃ© en garde Ã vue le 24 dÃ©cembre, a Ã©tÃ© entendu les 24, 25 et 26 dÃ©cembre 1976 . Le 29 dÃ©cembre . il s'est prÃ©sentÃ© Ã la police pour s'expliquer . ArrÃªtÃ© le 30 dÃ©cembre, sur mandat d'amener, il a Ã©tÃ© placÃ©, en vertu d'un mandat de dÃ©pÃ´t dÃ©cernÃ© le 31 dÃ©cembre 1976 par le juge Guy Floch, en dÃ©tention provisoire comme inculpÃ© de complicitÃ© d'homicide volontaire . Le requÃ©rant a toujours contestÃ© les dÃ©clarations de SimonÃ© en affirmant qu'il n'avait aucune raison de concou ri r Ã la dispa ri tion de la victime . 9 . Deux autres personnes ont encore Ã©tÃ© placÃ©es sous mandat de dÃ©pÃ´t du chef de complicitÃ© d'homicide volontaire : de Ribemont le 14 janvier 1977 et Albert Leyris le 26 janvier 1977 . Tout comme Kolkowicz, ils ont cependant bÃ©nÃ©ficiÃ© en fÃ©vrier et mars 1977 de mesures de mise en libertÃ© et d'une ordonnance de non-lieu le 21 mars 1980 . 10 . L'instruction de cette affaire a Ã©tÃ© confiÃ©e d'abord au juge Guy Floch . A partir du 22 septembre 1978 M . Floch, nommÃ© Ã la cour de Paris, a Ã©tÃ© remplacÃ© par Mlle Martine Anzani, juge d'instruction . Au cours de la procÃ©dure plus de 200 personnes ont Ã©tÃ© entendues, certaines Ã plusieurs reprises, soit sur commission rogatoire, soit par le juge d'instruction . L'instruction a nÃ©cessitÃ© la dÃ©livrance de six commissions rogatoires internationales . Des enquÃªtes ont Ã©tÃ© effectuÃ©es dans plusieurs rÃ©gions de France . Des rÃ©quisitons judiciaires furent adressÃ©es Ã des banques et Ã des compagnies d'assurances . Enfin, plusieurs expertises ont Ã©tÃ© Ã©tablies . Les interrogatoires et dÃ©positions auxquels ont participÃ© les personnes les plus directement liÃ©es Ã l'affaire, ainsi que les commissions rogatoires internationales, figurent dans un tableau produit par le Gouvernement et Ã©numÃ©rant les principales Ã©tapes de la procÃ©dure . Les interrogatoires et les confrontations du requÃ©rant, menÃ©s de dÃ©cembre 1976 Ã avril 1977, ont Ã©tÃ© interrompus par un accident . Le 6 avril 1977 paraissant dans un journal un article consacrÃ© Ã l'affaire, reproduisant une attestation de Mme Azerad, cardiologue, autrefois attachÃ©e aux prisons de Fresnes . Selon ce document, Mme Azerad avait reÃ§u, cinq jours aprÃ¨s le crime, la visite d'un des dÃ©fenseurs du requÃ©rant, venu pour lui proposer d'arranger un alibi pour le requÃ©rant . Le juge d'instruction a donc interrogÃ© pendant le mois d'avril 1977 le joumaliste, l'avocat en question et Mme Azerad, avant de pouvoir reprendre les interrogatoires et confrontations du requÃ©rant et des autres protagonistes de l'affaire . 11 . AprÃ¨s une instruction de trois ans et trois mois, le dossier a Ã©tÃ© communiquÃ© au procureur de la RÃ©publique prÃ¨s le tribunal de grande instance de Paris . Celui-ci a demandÃ© le 19 mars 1980 au juge d'instruction que le dossie r
soit transmis au procureur gÃ©nÃ©ral prÃ¨s la cour d'appel de Paris. Le 21 man 1980, le juge d'instruction a ordonnÃ© la transmission du dossier et des piÃ¨ces Ã conviction au procu re ur gÃ©nÃ©ral . Selon l'ordonnance du juge d'instruction il n'y avait pas lieu Ã suivre contre Kolkovicz, Ribemont et Leyris, qui bÃ©nÃ©ficiÃ¨rent d'un non-lieu . En revanche, il rÃ©sultait de l'information des charges suffisantes contre Freche, SimonÃ©, TessÃ¨dre ainsi que contre le requÃ©rant . Aux trois de rniers il a Ã©tÃ© reprochÃ© de s'Ãªtre â¢ rendus complices de l'homicide volontaire commis par Freche sur la pers onne de Jean-Ma rie de Broglie avec cette circonstance que le dit homicide a Ã©tÃ© commis avec prÃ©mÃ©ditation . . Le rÃ©quisitoire Ã© c ri t du procureur gÃ©nÃ©ral dÃ©posÃ© avec le dossier au greffe de la chamb re d'accusation le 31 mars 1980, concluait dans le mÃ©me sens . 11 demandait Ã la chambre d'accusation de la cour d'appel de Paris (ci-aprÃ¨s : la chambre d'accusation) de prononcer la mise en accusation de Freche, SimonÃ©, TessÃ¨dre et du requÃ©rant . SupplÃ©ment d'informaÃ¹o n 12 . L'instruction close, des Ã©lÃ©ments nouveaux sont apparus . Le 17 avril 1980, Ã la suite d'informations de la presse Ã©crite, radiodiffusÃ©e et tÃ©lÃ©visÃ©e, faisant Ã© tat de l'existence de rapports de police contenant des Ã©lÃ©ments susceptibles d'intÃ©resser la procÃ©dure, le procureur gÃ©nÃ©ral a dÃ©posÃ© des rÃ©quisitions complÃ©mentaires aux fins de supplÃ©ment d'information . De son cÃ´tÃ©, le requÃ©rant a dÃ©posÃ© le 18 avril 1980 un mÃ©moire par lequel il a demandÃ© Ã la cour, entre autres, d'ordonner un complÃ©ment d'information . Le 21 avril 1980, la partie civile demandait elle aussi un complÃ©ment d'information . Enfin, la dÃ©fense de Freche et de SimonÃ© devait faire de mÃªme le 22 avril . 13 . Par arrÃªt du 25 avril 1980, la chambre d'accusation a dÃ©cidÃ© qu'il n'y avait pas lieu de statuer en l'Ã©tat sur la demande du requÃ©rant tendant Ã un non-lieu ; en revanche, elle a ordonnÃ© un supplÃ©ment d'information aux fins de s'assurer de l'existence des deux documents - qui seraient des rapports de police datÃ©s des 1" avril et 24 septembre 1976 - et dans l'affirmative les verser au dossier ; de rechercher les conditions dans lesquelles ils auraient Ã©tÃ© Ã©tablis, vÃ©rifier si ces documents contiennent des Ã©lÃ©ments nouveaux de nature Ã apporter des prÃ©cisions complÃ©mentaires sur le crime et, dans l'affirmative, procÃ©der Ã toutes les investigations utiles . La chambre d'accusation a dÃ©lÃ©guÃ© M . A . Chevalier, conseiller Ã la cour d'appel, ntembre de cette chambre, pour procÃ©der au supplÃ©ment d'information . M . Chevalier a entendu au cours des mois de mai, juin et juillet 1980, de nombreux policiers . A partir d'octobre 1980, il a repris les interrogatoires et auditions des personnes les plus directement liÃ©es Ã l'affaire .
Par arrÃ©t du 19 juin 1981, la chambre d'accusation a ordonnÃ© le dÃ©pÃ´t au greffe du dossier de la procÃ©dure aprÃ¨s supplÃ©ment d'information . 14 . Dans son rÃ©quisitoire du 23 juin 1981, le procureur gÃ©nÃ©ral a demandÃ© Ã la cour de prononcer la mise en accusation de Freche, SimonÃ©, TessÃ¨dre et du requÃ©rant et de les renvoyer devant la cour d'assises . Par mÃ©moire du 30 juin 1981, le requÃ©rant a demandÃ© Ã la cour de prononcer un non-lieu . Par arrÃªt du 8 juillet 1981 la chambre d'accusation a prononcÃ© la mise en accusation de Freche, SimonÃ©, TessÃ¨dre et du requÃ©rant et les a renvoyÃ©s devant la cour d'assises de Paris . ConsidÃ©rant qu'il s'agit de faits complexes la cour a jugÃ© utile d'exposer l'affaire, dans son arrÃªt de prÃ¨s de cent pages, en trois parties : les rÃ©sultats de l'information initiale, les investigations complÃ©mentaires du supplÃ©ment d'information et enfin les mÃ©moires des parties, les explications des inculpÃ©s et les charges relevÃ©es contre ceux-ci . La cour a Ã©tÃ© ainsi amenÃ©e Ã Ã©tudier de maniÃ¨re dÃ©taillÃ©e les phases successives de l'entreprise criminelle, le dÃ©roulement de 1'enquÃªte, les diverses hypothÃ¨ses du crime, le rÃ´le jouÃ© par les inculpÃ©s et les relations complexes entre le requÃ©rant et les protagonistes de l'affaire . Avant de conclure, elle a rappelÃ© la personnalitÃ© des inculpÃ©s . Le requÃ©rant est ainsi prÃ©sentÃ© : douÃ© d'un niveau intellectuel de haute qualitÃ©, rÃ©flÃ©chi, maitre de ses Ã©motions, il est bien extÃ©riorisÃ© et adaptÃ© au rÃ©el . Selon les experts psychiatres sa responsabilitÃ© est entiÃ¨re . Son casier judiciaire comporte plusieurs condamnations Ã des peines d'emprisonnement, dont une Ã huit ans pour escroqueries, abus de confiance, abus de blanc seing, Ã©mission dÃ© chÃ¨ques sans provision et falsification de chÃ¨ques, faux en Ã©critures privÃ©es et usages de faux . 15 . Le 31 juillet 1981, le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© informÃ© qu'il serait appelÃ© Ã comparaitre devant la cour d'assises du 4 novembre au 24 dÃ©cembre 1981 . Le 28 septembre 1981, le procureur gÃ©nÃ©ral prÃ©senta au prÃ©sident de l a cour d'assises une demande de supplÃ©ment d'information et de renvoi Ã une session ultÃ©rieure . En effet, selon le procureur gÃ©nÃ©ral, il ressortait de la procÃ©dure que le Dr Azerad, aprÃ¨s une visite d'un des avocats du requÃ©rant, et en prÃ©vision d'une perquisition Ã son cabinet mÃ©dical, avait dÃ©truit ses agendas de rendez-vous, notamment celui de l'annÃ©e 1976 contenant des indications sur les visites de J . de Broglie, les 26 novembre et 10 dÃ©cembre, ce qui tendait Ã innocenter le requÃ©rant, ces dates ayant Ã©tÃ© prÃ©cisÃ©ment celles prÃ©vues pour l'organisation de deux guet-apens . La recherche de ces agendas Ã©tait nÃ©cessaire Ã l'Ã©tablissement de la vÃ©ritÃ© . Le 1 - octobre 1981, le prÃ©sident de la cour d'assises a dÃ©cidÃ© qu'il appartiendrait au procureur gÃ©nÃ©ral de saisir la cour de cette demande au cours des dÃ©bats, s'il l'estimait utile, au motif que, compte tenu de la nature et de l'importance de l'affaire, la mesure d'instruction complÃ©mentaire devait Ã©tre apprÃ©ciÃ©e contradictoirement par la cour . - 164 -
16 . Les dÃ©bats ont Ã©tÃ© ouverts le 4 novembre 1981 . Le 23 dÃ©cembre 1981, la cour d'assises a condamnÃ© le requÃ©rant Ã dix ans de rÃ©clusion criminelle pour complicitÃ© d'homicide volontaire . Les co-inculpÃ©s Freche et SimonÃ© ont Ã©tÃ© condamnÃ©s chacun Ã dix ans, et TessÃ¨dre Ã cinq ans de rÃ©clusion . Le requÃ©rant s'est pourvu contre cet arrÃ©t devant la Cour de cassation, mais son pourvuoi a Ã©tÃ© dÃ©clarÃ© irrecevable comme tardif par arrÃªt de la chambre criminelle de la Cour en date du 9 juin 1982 . 111 . La dÃ©tention 17 . Le requÃ©rant a prÃ©sentÃ© onze demandes de mise en libertÃ© en invoquant tour Ã tour et simultanÃ©ment son innocence et des motifs de santÃ© . On trouvera ci-dessous l'exposÃ© des dÃ©cisions judiciaires rendues sur ces demandes et des mesures prises concernant l'Ã©tat de santÃ© du requÃ©rant . En cours d'instrvctio n 18 . Dans sa premiÃ¨re demande de mise en libertÃ©, datÃ©e du 15 janvier 1978, le requÃ©rant a contestÃ© la valeur des charges qui pesaient sur lui . Le 19 janvier 1978, le juge d'instruction a ordonnÃ© la mise en libertÃ©, assortie du contrÃ´le judiciaire . Le juge a rappelÃ© qu'aprÃ¨s avoir Ã©tÃ© mis en cause par SimonÃ© le requÃ©rant s'est prÃ©sentÃ© Ã la police pour s'expliquer sur ces accusations, accusations qui .ont Ã©tÃ© longuement dÃ©veloppÃ©es au cours de l'insaruction, non sans qu'il puisse leur @tre fait le reproche d'avoir Ã plusieurs reprises manquÃ© de rigueur, voire de cohÃ©renceâ¢ . Le juge a constatÃ© que les . douze mois d'instruction n'ont pas permis de conforter - notamment d'Ã©lÃ©ments d'ordre matÃ©riel - ces accusations qui demeurent donc, comme aux premiers jours, la seule chargeâ¢ contre le requÃ©rant . En consÃ©quence, .jusqu'Ã plus ample informÃ© â¢ les accusations de SimonÃ© Ã©taient . toujours Ã prendre en considÃ©rationâ¢ mÃªme si elles ne suffisent plus Ã elles seules Ã justifier le maintien en dÃ©tention du requÃ©rant . Sur appel du parquet la chambre d'accusation a infirmÃ© cette ordonnance par arrÃªt du 9 fÃ©vrier 1978 . La chambre a relevÃ© que â¢ l'indÃ©termination du rÃ´le prÃ©cis prÃªtÃ© Ã De Varga (vÃ©ritable et seul instigateur du crime, ou simple Ã©cran-relais), l'indÃ©termination du mobile pouvant l'avoir personnellement dÃ©terminÃ©, tout comme d'ailleurs l'indÃ©termination du rÃ´le exact et du mobile de SimonÃ© (recruteur d'un tueur Ã la solde de De Varga ou d'un autre commanditaire) tÃ©moignent Ã l'Ã©vidence que la manifestation de la vÃ©ritÃ© . . . ne peut Ãªtre prÃ©sentement tenue pour acquiseâ¢ . Par ailleurs, la chambre a constatÃ© que les dÃ©clarations de SimonÃ© . ne sont atteintes par aucun Ã©lÃ©ment de contradiction objectif et fondamentalâ¢ qui vienne ruiner la mise en cause du requÃ©rant . La chambre a Ã©numÃ©rÃ© d'autres Ã©lÃ©ments Ã l'appui des charges contre le requÃ©rant : liens particuliers avec le Dr Azerad et incitations visant Ã la destruction des carnet s
de rendez-vous du docteur qui traitait M . de Broglie (cf . paragraphes 10 et 15), relations frÃ©quentes avec SimonÃ©, utilisation d'un systÃ¨me . Eurosignal . . La chambre a estimÃ© que la dÃ©marche .spontanÃ©e . du requÃ©rant le 29 dÃ©cembre 1976 ne constitue pas une garantie de sa bonne foi, ni de sa reprÃ©sentation future en justice ; le fait que le requÃ©rant a fait l'objet d'un arrÃ©tÃ© d'expulsion en 1967, les multiples condamnations, les renseignements fÃ¢cheux le concernant, la peine encourue, sont des Ã©lÃ©ments rendant prÃ©caires les assurances proposÃ©es en faveur de sa reprÃ©sentation . La chambre a, en outre, relevÃ© la minutieuse prÃ©paration et les modalitÃ©s de l'exÃ©cution du crime qui a perturbÃ© trÃ¨s gravement la paix publique . La chambre a conclu que la dÃ©tention constituait â¢ l'unique moyen de conserver preuves et indices, d'Ã©viter pression sur les tÃ©moins, d'empÃªcher concertations frauduleuses . et qu'elle Ã©tait Ã©galement . nÃ©cessaire pour prÃ©server l'ordre public du trouble causÃ© par l'infraction et garantir le maintien de l'inculpÃ© Ã la disposition de la Iustice . . 19 . La deuxiÃ¨me demande de mise en libertÃ© a Ã©tÃ© prÃ©sentÃ©e le 19 juin 1978 . Par ordonnance du 26 juin 1978 le juge d'instruction a ordonnÃ© la mise en libertÃ© assortie du contrÃ´le judiciaire au motif que â¢ depuis l'arrÃªt . . . du 9 fÃ©vrier 1978 aucun Ã©lÃ©ment nouveau n'a Ã©tÃ© recueilli qui puisse Ã©tayer les accusations portÃ©es contre Pierre De Varga par Guy SimonÃ©, lesquelles demeurent donc, avec leur force et leur constance mais aussi leur discordance et parfois leurs incohÃ©rences, la seule charge vÃ©ritable Ã l'encontre du requÃ©rant . . Le juge posait notamment la question de savoir si le maintien en dÃ©tention Ã©tait encore nÃ©cessaire, le temps Ã©coulÃ© depuis le meurtre â¢ rendant de moins en moins aigus les risques de destruction de preuves, de pression sur les tÃ©moins, de concertation avec d'Ã©ventuels complices ou de trouble Ã l'ordre public . . Sur appel du parquet, la chambre d'accusation a infirmÃ© cette ordonnance par arrÃªt du 12 juillet 1978 . Dans son arrÃªt la chambre d'accusation a repris les motifs de son arrÃªt antÃ©rieur . 20 . Le 9 juillet 1979, les dÃ©fenseurs du requÃ©rant ont demandÃ© au juge d'instruction de faire examiner l'Ã©tat de santÃ© du requÃ©rant . Par ordonnance du 24 juillet 1979 le juge a commis les docteurs Bailly et Sauvan pour examiner le requÃ©rant et dire s'il -reÃ§oit en dÃ©tention les soins appropriÃ©s Ã son Ã©tat, prÃ©ciser si cet Ã©tat est compatible ou non avec la dÃ©tention ordinaire . Dans la nÃ©gative, indiquer si l'inculpÃ© peut recevoir les soins nÃ©cessaires en milieu carcÃ©ral ou s'il doit Ãªtre transfÃ©rÃ© dans un Ã©tablissement hospitalier . . Le rapport mÃ©dico-lÃ©gal des experts, datÃ© du 1â¢r aoÃ»t 1979 et dÃ©posÃ© l e 21 septembre 1979, a conclu que : .1 . L'Ã©tat de santÃ© actuel de M . De Varga, bien que complexe, n'es t pas incompatible avec la tlÃ©tention .
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2 . Des rÃ©serves sont cependant Ã faire Ã©tant donnÃ© l'Ã ge du sujet et l'apparition de manifestations fonctionnelles rÃ©centes . 3 . 11 paraÃ®t donc nÃ©cessaire que soient rÃ©alisÃ©es des explorations complÃ©mentaires, explorations qui peuvent Ãªtre entreprises dans le cadre de l'administration pÃ©nitentiaire ou au besoin, par une hospitalisation Ã l'h8pital central des prisons . . Par ordonnances des 26 septembre et 16 octobre 1979 le juge d'instruction a commis les experts, les docteurs Sauvan, Thervet et Bailly, pour effectuer un nouvel examen mÃ©dical du requÃ©rant, en tenant compte des explorations complÃ©mentaires qui auraient Ã©tÃ© effectuÃ©es dans le cadre des services pÃ©nitentiaires . Le rapport mÃ©dico-lÃ©gal datÃ© du 20 octobre 1979 a conclu que 1) le requÃ©rant .reÃ§ oit actuellement les soins qui lui sont nÃ©cessaires dans le cadre de l'administration pÃ©nitentiaire ; 2) il n'existe actuellement aucun Ã©lÃ©ment permettant de considÃ©rer que son Ã©tat est incompatible avec les conditions de dÃ©tention â¢ . 21 . La troisiÃ¨me demande de mise en libertÃ© est datÃ©e du 22 novembre 1979 . Par ordonnance du 1Â° dÃ©cembre 1979, le juge a rejetÃ© la demande au motif que les sÃ©rieuses prÃ©somptions subsistaient et qu'en raison de la gravitÃ© des faits il Ã©tait Ã craindre que le requÃ©rant tentÃ¢t de se soustraire Ã la justice . En consÃ©quence, la dÃ©tention Ã©tait l'unique moyen de conserver les preuves et d'empÃªcher une pression sur les tÃ©moins et une concertation frauduleuse entre l'inculpÃ© et ses complices .
Invoquant le fait que le juge d'instruction n'aurait pas statuÃ© dans les cinq jours de sa demande, le requÃ©rant a saisi directement la chambre d'accusation, en se fondant sur l'article 148 du Code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale . Par arrÃ©t du 20 dÃ©cembre 1979 la chambre d'accusation a dÃ©clarÃ© irrecevable la requÃªte du requÃ©rant . Elle a constatÃ© que le juge avait communiquÃ© au parquet dÃ¨s rÃ©ception, le 27 novembre 1979, la demande de mise en libertÃ© et que le juge avait rejetÃ© la demande par ordonnance du 1" dÃ©cembre 1979, soit dans le dÃ©lai lÃ©gal de l'article 148 du Code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale . Il en rÃ©sulte que l'ordonnance de rejet rendue le 1^' dÃ©cembre 1979 est devenue dÃ©finitive . Le requÃ©rant a formÃ© un pourvoi en cassation contre cet arrÃªt . Par arrÃªt du Il mars 1980 la Cour de cassation a rejetÃ© le pourvoi Ã©tant donnÃ© que l'arrÃªt attaquÃ© â¢ a dÃ©clarÃ© Ã bon droit inapplicables en la cause les dispositions du demier alinÃ©a de l'article 148 du Code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale qui permet Ã l'inculpÃ© de saisir directement la chambre d'accusation dans le seul cas oÃ¹ le juge d'instruction n'aurait pas statuÃ© dans les cinq jours de la communication de la demande de mise en libertÃ© au procureur de la RÃ©publique . ce qui n'Ã©tait pas le cas de l'espÃ¨ce . .
Pendant le supp(Ã©ment d'informatio n 22 . Le 24 mars 1980, les dÃ©fenseurs du requÃ©rant ont prÃ©sentÃ© une nouvelle demande d'expertise mÃ©dicale au juge d'instruction . Celui-ci ayant Ã©tÃ© dessaisi depuis le 21 mars 1980, le procureur gÃ©nÃ©ral a demandÃ© le 4 avril Ã la chambre d'accusation d'ordonner cette expertise . Par arrÃªt du 24 avril 1980 Ia chambre d'accusation a commis les docteurs Riveline, Sauvan et JonquÃ¨res . Dans leur rapport, datÃ© du 5 mai et dÃ©posÃ© le 22 mai 1980, les experts ont conclu que le requÃ©rant pouvait recevoir dans le cadre de l'administration pÃ©nitentiaire tous les soins que nÃ©cessitait son Ã©tat, notamment un rÃ©gime pour diabÃ©tique . Soulignant que le requÃ©rant a dÃ©passÃ© 70 ans, qu'il Ã©tait en dÃ©tention depuis plus de trois ans et qu'il prÃ©sentait une insuffisance coronarienne progressive, ils ont estimÃ© que l'Ã©tat de santÃ©, bien que prÃ©caire, n'Ã©tait pas absolument incompatible avec la dÃ©tention . Le 4 juin 1980, le procureur gÃ©nÃ©ral a informÃ© le directeur de la maison d'arrÃªt de la SantÃ© que les experts avaient estimÃ© qu'il fallait au dÃ©tenu un rÃ©gime pour diabÃ©tique . Par arrÃªt du 20 juin 1980 la chambre d'accusation a dÃ©cidÃ© que l'Ã©tat de santÃ© du requÃ©rant, bien que prÃ©caire, n'Ã©tait pas incompatible avec la dÃ©tention . Elle a ordonnÃ© que les conclusions de l'expertise du 5 mai 1980 soient portÃ©es Ã la connaissance de l'administration pÃ©nitentiaire . 23 . ParallÃ¨lement, le requÃ©rant a prÃ©sentÃ© les quatriÃ¨me et cinquiÃ¨me demandes de mise en libertÃ©, datÃ©es des 5 et 18 avril 1980 . Par arrÃªt du 9 mai 1980 la chambre d'accusation a ordonnÃ© la jonction des deux procÃ©dures et une expertise mÃ©dicale . Les experts ont dÃ©posÃ© le 22 mai leur rapport datÃ© du 17 mai 1980, concluant que : - 1 . Ce dÃ©tenu de 70 ans, qui est diabÃ©tique, polyartÃ©riel (insuffisance coronarienne progressive, sÃ©quelles d'accidents vasculaires cÃ©rÃ©braux, artÃ©riopathie des membres infÃ©rieurs, affaiblissement intellectuel, baisse de l'acuitÃ© visuelle gauche), peut recevoir dans le cadre de l'Administration pÃ©nitentiaire tous les soins que nÃ©cessite son Ã©tat de santÃ©, soins qui lui sont actuellement normalement prodiguÃ©s ; il est Ã noter qu'il lui faut un rÃ©gime pour diabÃ©tique . 2 . Son Ã©tat de santÃ©, bien que prÃ©caire, n'est pas absolument incompatible avec la dÃ©tention . Il faut noter que ce dÃ©tenu a dÃ©passÃ© 70 ans, qu'il est en dÃ©tention depuis plus de trois ans, qu'il prÃ©sente une insuffisance coronarienne progressive, avec angor instable et des antÃ©cÃ©dents vasculaires cÃ©rÃ©braux . .
Le 24 juin 1980, le mÃ©decin-chef de la Maison d'arrÃªt de la SantÃ© a informÃ© le prÃ©sident de la chambre d'accusation que les dÃ©fenseurs du requÃ©rant lui avaient dÃ©jÃ transmis les expertises des 5 et 17 mai . Il a relevÃ© que le mauvais Ã©quilibre du diabÃ¨te du requÃ©rant ne pouvait Ãªtre mis au compte de la nourriture qui lui Ã©tait servie . Le requÃ©rant recevait un rÃ©gime parfaitement adaptÃ© . Par contre, la cantine Ã©tait libre et il Ã©tait difficile au service mÃ©dical d'intervenir de maniÃ¨re autoritaire pour la rÃ©glementer . D'autre part, le requÃ©rant a toujours refusÃ© son hospitalisation Ã Fresnes - hospitalisation qui a Ã©tÃ© envisagÃ©e dans le but d'amÃ©liorer le traitement du diabÃ¨te . Par arrÃªt du 20 juin 1980 la chambre d'accusation a rejetÃ© les deux demandes de mise en libertÃ© et a ordonnÃ© que les conclusions de l'expertise du 17 mai soient portÃ©es Ã la connaissance de l'administration pÃ©nitentiaire afin que le requÃ©rant reÃ§oive tous les soins nÃ©cessaires Ã son Ã©tat et bÃ©nÃ©ficie d'un rÃ©gime pour diabÃ©tiques . Quant au fond, les motifs Ã©taient en substance les mÃªntes que ceux des arrÃªts antÃ©rieurs . 24 . La sixiÃ¨me demande de mise en libertÃ© est datÃ©e du 9 juillet 198 0 Par arrÃ©t du 31 juillet 1980 la chambre d'accusation a rejetÃ© cette demande, en reprenant de faÃ§on gÃ©nÃ©rale les motifs de ses arrÃªts antÃ©rieurs . Le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© hospitalisÃ© Ã l'hÃ´pital central des prisons de Fresnes du 7 aoÃ»t au 29 septembre 1980 pour crise angineuse et du 22 octobre au 28 octobre 1980 pour Ãªtre examinÃ© Ã la suite d'un malaise . 25 . La septiÃ¨me demande de mise en libertÃ© a Ã©tÃ© prÃ©sentÃ©e le 29 aoÃ»t 1980 . Le requÃ©rant prÃ©tendait que le supplÃ©ment d'information avait fait apparaitre des Ã©lÃ©ments niilitant en faveur de son innocence . Par mÃ©moire du 23 septembre 1980 le requÃ©rant a informÃ© la chambre d'accusation â¢qu'il n'y (avait) plus lieu Ã statuer sur ladite demande . . En effet, n'ayant pas encore Ã©tÃ© interrogÃ© par le magistrat dÃ©lÃ©guÃ© de la chambre d'accusation, il serait fondÃ© Ã invoquer l'article 148-4 du Code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale permettant Ã un inculpÃ© de saisir directement la chantbre d'accusation d'une demande de mise en libertÃ©, Ã l'expiration d'un dÃ©lai de quatre mois depuis sa derniÃ¨re comparution devant le magistrat instructeur . Le requÃ©rant allÃ©guait que, faute pour la chambre d'accusation d'avoir statuÃ© dans le dÃ©lai lÃ©gal de 15 jours (article 148, dernier alinÃ©a), elle ne pourrait que constater la caducitÃ© du mandat de dÃ©pÃ´t du 31 dÃ©cembre 1976 . En consÃ©quence . le requÃ©rant devrait Ãªtre libÃ©rÃ© . Par arrÃªt du 1^ octobre 1980 la chambre d'accusation a rejetÃ© cette demande, en soulignant que . selon les termes mÃªmes de l'article 148, alinÃ©a 4, ces dispositions sont applicables Â«tant que l'ordonnance de rÃ¨glement n'a pas Ã©tÃ© rendueâ¢ . Or . une telle ordonnance a Ã©tÃ© rendue (ordonnance de transmission des piÃ¨ces datÃ©e du 21 mars 1980) . Quant au fond, la chambr e
d'accusation, tenant compte de tous les aspects, y compris mÃ©dicaux, de l'affaire, a rejetÃ© la demande de mise en libertÃ© pour les motifs qu'elle avait antÃ©rieurement dÃ©veloppÃ©s . Le requÃ©rant s'est pourvu en cassation sur la seule question d'applicabilitÃ© de l'article 148 du Code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale . Par arrÃªt du 20 janvier 1981, la Cour de cassation a rejetÃ© ce pourvoi, estimant que l'arrÃªt attaquÃ© avait Ã©noncÃ© Ã bon droit que l'article 148 . alinÃ©a 4 n'Ã©tait pas applicable . 26 . La huitiÃ¨me demande de mise en libertÃ© a Ã©tÃ© prÃ©sentÃ©e le 27 octobre 1980 . Le requÃ©rant rÃ©clamait une nouvelle expertise mÃ©dicale . Par arrÃªt du 7 novembre 1980 la chambre d'accusation a commis les docteurs Riveline, Sauvan et lonquÃ¨res . Les experts ont dÃ©posÃ© le 2 dÃ©cembre un rapport datÃ© du 25 novembre 1980 . Aux termes de teurs conclusions : Â«1 . Monsieur De Varga-Hirsch Pierre ne peut pas Ãªtre traitÃ© correctement en milieu pÃ©nitentiaire pour son diabÃ¨te sÃ©vÃ¨re et du vieillard, facteur d'aggravation cardio-vasculaire et cÃ©rÃ©brale progressive . 2 . L'Ã©tat de santÃ© de plus en plus prÃ©caire est de moins en moins conipatible avec la dÃ©tention prolongÃ©e, avec risque d'accidents : soit comateux, soit d'infarctus, soit cÃ©rÃ©braux . Dans ces conditions, la poursuite de la dÃ©tention est mÃ©dicalement alÃ©atoire, fait courir des risques que nous ne pouvons que dÃ©conseilter . . Le 8 dÃ©cembre 1980, le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© admis Ã l'hÃ´pital central des prisons de Fresnes . Il a Ã©tÃ© examinÃ© successivement le 10 et le Il dÃ©cembre par un mÃ©decin cardiologue de cet hÃ´pital et par le mÃ©decin inspecteur gÃ©nÃ©ral de l'administration pÃ©nitentiaire . Il ressortait de leur rapport que le requÃ©rant suivait mal son rÃ©gime anti-diabÃ©tique . Les mÃ©decins ont dÃ©cidÃ© une surveillance rigoureuse, notamment du point de vue alimentaire, et un contrÃ´le quotidien de sa glycÃ©mie avec traitement des troubles cardio-vascutaires,estimant que ces contrÃ´les et ces soins pouvaient avoir lieu normatement dans un service aussi spÃ©cialisÃ© que l'hÃ´pital de Fresnes . Selon le rapport mÃ©dical l'Ã©tat de santÃ© du requÃ©rant Ã©tait compatible avec la dÃ©tention, sous surveillance mÃ©dicale constante . Compte tenu de certaines imprÃ©cisions du rapport des experts et du placement du requÃ©rant Ã l'hÃ´pital du 8 dÃ©cembre, la chambre d'accusation a . par arrÃªt du 19 dÃ©cembre 1980, ordonnÃ© une nouvelle expertise et a commis de nouveaux experts : les docteurs Martin, Plas et Mundler . Le rapport mÃ©dical, datÃ© du 5 janvier et dÃ©posÃ© le 12 janvier 1981, concluait
- que l'Ã©tat de santÃ© du requÃ©rant ne serait compatible avec la dÃ©tention que si celui-ci pouvait Ãªtre correctement traitÃ©, tant sur le plan diabÃ©tique que sur le plan thÃ©rapeutique : - que de tels soins, une telle surveillance ne pouvaient Ãªtre prodiguÃ©s Ã l'hÃ´pital central des prisons de Fresnes ; - qu'il rÃ©sulte que l'Ã©tat de santÃ© du requÃ©rant n'Ã©tait pas compatible avec la poursuite de la dÃ©tention dans les conditions actuelles . A la suite de cette expertise l'administration pÃ©nitentiaire a transfÃ©rÃ© le 9 janvier 1981 le requÃ©rant Ã l'HÃ´tel-Dieu de Paris, l'hÃ´pital dÃ©pendant de l'Assistance publique, oÃ¹ il pouvait recevoir les soins requis . Par arrÃªt du 30 janvier 1981 la chambre d'accusation a rejetÃ© la demande de mise en libertÃ© pour des motifs exposÃ©s dans les arrÃªts antÃ©rieurs . Elle a ordonnÃ© que la nouvelle expertise soit communiquÃ©e Ã l'administration pÃ©nitentiaire et au mÃ©decin-chef de l'HÃ´tel-Dieu . 27 . La neuviÃ¨me demande de mise en libertÃ© a Ã©tÃ© prÃ©sentÃ©e le 9 mars 1981 . A l'appui de cette demande le requÃ©rant a produit une expertise qui avait Ã©tÃ© Ã©tablie le 16 janvier 1981 par le docteur Lecoeur dans le cadre d'une autre procÃ©dure contre le requÃ©rant, pour indiquer si l'Ã©tat de santÃ© du requÃ©rant permettait son transfert de la prison au Palais de Justice . Selon les conclusions de cette expertise le requÃ©rant Ã©tait susceptible de prÃ©senter un accident cardiaque grave ou un accident cÃ©rÃ©bral pouvant Ãªtre mortels ; en consÃ©quence, le transfert du requÃ©rant au Palais de Justice nÃ©cessiterait le transfert par convoi spÃ©cial et la prÃ©sence en cours d'audience d'une Ã©quipe mÃ©dicale prÃªte Ã intervenir immÃ©diatement .
Par arrÃªt du 1Â° avril 1981 la chambre d'accusation a ordonnÃ© une nouvelle expertise . Les experts ont dÃ©posÃ© le 7 mai un rapport datÃ© du 24 avril 1981 . Ils constataient que le requÃ©rant prÃ©sente un Ã©tat cardio-vasculaire sensiblement identique Ã celui du prÃ©cÃ©dent examen (rapport dÃ©posÃ© le 12 janvier 1981) . En revanche, la situation s'est aggravÃ©e en ce qui concerne le diabÃ¨te, celui-ci Ã©tait particuliÃ¨rement mal Ã©quilibrÃ© Ã dÃ©faut d'un traitement insulinique que le requÃ©rant refuse, allant jusqu'Ã dÃ©charger par Ã©crit les services hospitaliers des consÃ©quences Ã©ventuelles de cette carence . Les experts notent, toutefois, que la surveillance mÃ©dicale est prÃªte Ã intervenir d'urgence . Ils concluent que le requÃ©rant reÃ§oit les soins nÃ©cessaires Ã son Ã©tat de santÃ© . Par arrÃªt du 29 mai 1981 Ia chambre d'accusation a rejetÃ©, pour les mÃªmes motifs que prÃ©cÃ©demment, la demande de mise en libertÃ© . Elle a ordonnÃ© la notification de l'expertise aux autoritÃ©s mÃ©dicales concernÃ©es . 28 . La dixiÃ¨me demande de mise en libertÃ© a Ã©tÃ© prÃ©sentÃ©e le 3 juin 198 1 - 171 -
Par arrÃªt du 12 juin 1981 la chambre d'accusation a ordonnÃ© une nouvelle expertise qu'elle confiait aux docteurs Plas, Ma rtin, Mundler et JonquÃ¨res . Dans leur rapport du 30 juin, dÃ©posÃ© le 2 juillet 1981, les experts ont conclu que l'Ã©tat du requÃ©rant Ã©tait compatible avec la dÃ©tention en milieu hospitalier . Par arrÃªt du 10 juillet 1981 la chambre d'accusation a rejetÃ© la demande de mise en libertÃ© .
29 . La onziÃ¨me demande de mise en libertÃ© est datÃ©e du 29 juillet 1981 . Par arrÃªt du 31 aoGt 1981 la chambre d'accusation a ordonnÃ© une expertise confiÃ©e aux docteurs Plas . Martin . Mundler, JonquÃ¨res et Steg . Dans leur rapport du 28 septembre, dÃ©posÃ© le 13 octobre 1981, les experts ont conclu que l'Ã©tat du requÃ©rant Ã©tait compatible avec la dÃ©tention et que les soins qu'il recevait Ã©taient adÃ©quats . A l'audience de la chambre d'accusation du 23 octobre 1981 le requÃ©rant s'est dÃ©sistÃ© de sa demande de mise en libertÃ© . La chambre d'accusation lui en a donnÃ© acte .
GRIEFS Les griefs du requÃ©rant peuvent se rÃ©sumer comme suit : 30 . Le requÃ©rant allÃ¨gue en premier lieu une violation des articles 2 et 3, combinÃ©s, de la Convention . La dÃ©tention du requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© considÃ©rÃ©e Ã plusieurs reprises par les mÃ©decins experts comme incompatible avec son Ã©tat de santÃ© . Des mesures spÃ©ciales ont certes Ã©tÃ© prises aprÃ¨s les interventions des conseils du requÃ©rant, mais nul ne peut assurer qu'elles soient suffisantes pour Ã©viter tout risque d'accident cardiaque ou cÃ©rÃ©bral cardio-vasculaire . En fait, l'Ã©tat de santÃ© du requÃ©rant s'aggrave . Il se rÃ©fÃ¨re, en particulier, Ã l'expertise du docteur Lecoeur du 16 janvier 1981 . Ce mÃ©decin a estimÃ© qu'un accident mortel n'Ã©tait pas imprÃ©visible et pourrait survenir Ã tout moment . 31 . Le requÃ©rant allÃ¨gue en second lieu une violation de â¢ l'article 5, paragraphe 1 a) ., de la Convention pour les motifs exposÃ©s dans son mÃ©moire du 23 septembre 1980 Ã la chambre d'accusation (cf . paragraphe 25 ci-dessus) . 32 . Le requÃ©rant allÃ¨gue en troisiÃ¨me lieu une violation de l'article 5, paragraphe 3, de la Convention . Lors de l'introduction de la requÃªte le requÃ©rant se trouvait en dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive depuis cinq ans, ce qui dÃ©passe le dÃ©lai raisonnable prÃ©vu Ã l'article 5, paragraphe 3, de la Convention, d'autant plus que le dossier n e
contient aucune charge prÃ©cise contre le requÃ©rant, si ce n'est les dÃ©clarations d'une personne elle-mÃªme compromise dans cette affaire . 33 . Le requÃ©rant allÃ¨gue enfin une violation de l'article 6, paragraphe 1, de la Convention qui offre toutes les garanties Ã un individu de pouvoir Ãªtre jugÃ© dans un dÃ©lai raisonnable . PROCÃDURE 34 . La requÃªte a Ã©tÃ© introduite le 27 octobre 1981 . Elle a Ã©tÃ© enregistrÃ©e le 28 octobre 1981 . Le 5 fÃ©vrier 1982, la requÃªte a Ã©tÃ© soumise Ã un membre de la Commission qui a Ã©tabli un rapport en application de l'article 40 du RÃ¨glement intÃ©rieur de la Commission . La Commission a dÃ©cidÃ© le 3 mars 1982 de porter la requÃªte Ã la connaissance du Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur et d'inviter celui-ci Ã prÃ©senter par Ã©crit ses observations sur la recevabilitÃ© et le bien-fondÃ© de la requÃªte (article 42 . paragraphe 2 b) du RÃ¨glement intÃ©rieur) dans un dÃ©lai Ã©chÃ©ant le 31 mai 1982 . Le Gouvernement a Ã©tÃ© invitÃ© en particulier Ã se prononcer sur les questions : 1 . Qu'en est-il, de l'avis du Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur, de la compÃ©tence rntiutte temporis de la Commission pour ce qui a trait aux faits de la cause ? 2 . Quant au grief portant sur la durÃ©e de la dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive, l e
requÃ©rant aurait-il pu se pourvoir en cassation contre les arrÃªts de la chambre d'accusation rejetant ses demandes de mise en libertÃ© et, dans l'affirmative, un tel pourvoi aurait-il constituÃ© un recours efficace, vu l'article 26 de la Convention ? 3 . La durÃ©e de la dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive du requÃ©rant a-t-elle ou non dÃ©passÃ© le dÃ©lai raisonnable visÃ© Ã l'article 5, paragraphe 3, de la Convention ? 4 . Le maintien du requÃ©rant en dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive pouvait-il, vu son Ã©tat de santÃ©, se justifier au regard des articles 3 et 5, paragraphe 3, de la Convention ? 5 . La durÃ©e de la procÃ©dure a-t-elle ou non dÃ©passÃ© le dÃ©lai raisonnable visÃ© Ã l'article 6, paragraphe 1, de la Convention ? Sur demande de l'agent du Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur le dÃ©lai imparti pour dÃ©poser les observations, a Ã©tÃ© prolongÃ© . Les observations du Gouvernement ont Ã©tÃ© prÃ©sentÃ©es le 19 juillet 1982 . Le conseil du requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© invitÃ© Ã rÃ©pondre Ã ces observations, dans un dÃ©lai Ã©chÃ©ant le 1 - octobre 1982 . Sur demande du conseil du requÃ©rant ce dÃ©lai a Ã©tÃ© prolongÃ© . Les observations en rÃ©ponse du requÃ©rant ont Ã©tÃ© prÃ©sentÃ©es le 2 novembre 1982 .
Le 13 dÃ©cembre 1982, la Commission a dÃ©cidÃ© d'inviter les parties Ã lui prÃ©senter oralement des observations complÃ©mentaires sur la recevabilitÃ© et le bien-fondÃ© de la requtite (article 42, paragraphe 3 b)) du RÃ¨glement intÃ© ri eur . A l'audience, qui s'est tenue le 9 mai 1983, les parties Ã© taient reprÃ©sentÃ©es comme suit : le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur par M . G . Guillaume, Agent, assistÃ© de Mlle A . Pezard, M . S . Amarger et M . M . Amould, conseils, le requÃ©rant par M' C . lmbach et MÂ° J . Imbach
DES PARTIE.ARGUMENTIO S CompÃ©tence ratione tempori s a. Argurnents du Gouvernenien t 35 . En signant le 2 octobre 1981 la dÃ©claration d'acceptation des recours individuels, la France n'a pas prÃ©cisÃ©, comme l'ont fait d'autres Etats, qu'elle reconnaissait la compÃ©tence de la Commission uniquement en raison de faits postÃ©rieurs Ã la date de la dÃ©claration . A trois reprises au moins, la Commission a rejetÃ© des requÃªtes fondÃ©es sur des faits antÃ©rieurs Ã la dÃ©claration, pour un motif autre que l'incompÃ©tence ratione temporis . La doctrine en a dÃ©duit que la Commission avait implicitement reconnu la portÃ©e rÃ©troactive des dÃ©clarations signÃ©es sans prÃ©cision de date . Toutefois dans une dÃ©cision concernant la limitation du caractÃ¨re temporel insÃ©rÃ© dans la dÃ©claration faite par l'Italie au titre de l'article 25, la Commission a signalÃ© les inconvÃ©nients d'un examen portant sur des faits antÃ©rieurs de plusieurs annÃ©es Ã l'acceptation du droit de recours individuel (cf . nÂ° 6323/73 . D .R . 3, p . 80) . Par ailleurs, selon la doctrine, les lois de procÃ©dure n'ont pas d'effet rÃ©troactif et ne s'appliquent qu'aux situations en cours . Enfin, le comitÃ© de l'ONU s'est refusÃ© Ã donner une portÃ©e rÃ©troactive au Protocole facultatif prÃ©voyant un recours analogue Ã celui de l'article 25 . Dans ces conditions, le Gouvernement s'en remet Ã la sagesse de la Commission (cf . la dÃ©claration du Ministre chargÃ© des affaires europÃ©ennes du 13 octobre 1981) . II ajoute que le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© jugÃ© aprÃ¨s le 2 octobre 1981 la requÃªte porte donc en partie sur des faits postÃ©rieurs Ã cette date . b . Arguments du requÃ©ran t . Le requÃ©rant relÃ¨ve que dans plusieurs affaires la Commission a admis la 36 portÃ©e rÃ©troactive des dÃ©clarations signÃ©es sans prÃ©cision de date . D'autre part, sa requÃªte concerne des faits postÃ©rieurs au 2 octobre 1981 . La Commission est donc compÃ©tente ratione ternporis .
Il . Respect du dÃ©lai de six moi s a. Arguments du Gouvernernem 37 . Si la Commission admettait une portÃ©e rÃ©troactive de la dÃ©claration franÃ§aise, le dÃ©lai de six mois devrait Ãªtre dÃ©comptÃ© Ã partir du 2 octobre 1981 . Telle parait Ãªtre la jurisprudence (cf . affaire De Becker, DÃ©cision nÂ° 846/60 c/Pays-Bas) . b. Argumenlsdu requÃ©ran t
38 . Avant le 2 octobre 1981, le requÃ©rant n'avait pas la possibilitÃ© de saisir la Commission d'une requÃªte . C'est donc Ã partir de cette date que le dÃ©lai doit Ãªtre comptÃ© . Ill .
Epuisement des recours internes a . Argurnenu du Gouvernemen t
39 . La dÃ©tention provisoire est prescrite par mandat du juge d'instruction (article 146 du Code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale) . La mise en libertÃ© peut Ãªtre demandÃ©e Ã tout moment (article 148, 1Â° , alinÃ©a) . Le juge doit statuer dans les cinq jours de la communication du dossier au procureur (article 148, 3Â° alinÃ©a) . L'ordonnance du juge est susceptible d'appel (article 186) et l'arrÃªt de la cour d'appel peut faire l'objet d'un pourvoi en cassation (article 567 et suivants) . Faute par le juge d'avoir statuÃ© dans le dÃ©lai lÃ©gal, l'inculpÃ© peut saisir directement la chambre d'accusation qui doit statuer dans les quinze jours faute de quoi l'inculpÃ© est mis en libertÃ© (article 148, 6â¢ alinÃ©a) .
En outre, la Convention est directement applicable en droit interne . Elle peut Ãªtre invoquÃ©e devant toute juridiction . Les dÃ©cisions sur le fond en matiÃ¨re de dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive sont soumises au contrÃ´le de la Cour de cassation . Celle-ci, juge du droit et non des faits, n'apprÃ©cie pas les faits en tant que tels . Mais Ã l'Ã©gard de la dÃ©tention elle contrÃ´le la motivation et exige que celle-ci ne se limite pas Ã des formules de style, mais se fonde sur des circonstances spÃ©ciales . La motivation doit Ãªtre exempte d'insuffisances et de contradictions . La Cour de cassation a dÃ©jÃ appliquÃ© la Convention . Le Gouvernement se rÃ©fÃ¨re, en particulier, Ã un arrÃªt de la Cour de cassation du 22 fÃ©vrier 1982 (nÂ° 81 - 94 .591) statuant sur le pourvoi de Henri Touton . La Commission exige que tous les recours offerts par le droit interne, y compris le pourvoi en cassation soient utilisÃ©s (cf . affaire Bonazzi, D .R . 15, p . 181) . Or, en l'espÃ¨ce, sur onze demandes le requÃ©rant n'a saisi la Cour de cassation qu'Ã deux reprises . La Commission exige aussi que tous les motifs juridiques offerts par le droit interne aient Ã©tÃ© employÃ©s . Or, Ã aucun moment le requÃ©rant n'a invoquÃ© les dispositions de la Convention . Le requÃ©rant n'a donc pas Ã©puisÃ© les voies de recours internes .
b . Arguments du requÃ©ran t 40 . Le reproche relatif Ã la non-saisine systÃ©matique de la Cour de cassation n'est pas fondÃ© . Cette Cour ne peut apprÃ©cier qu'en droit et non en fait . L'Ã©tat de santÃ©, la notion de â¢ dÃ©lai raisonnable . sont des questions d'apprÃ©ciation de faits . Chaque arrÃªt de la chambre d'accusation ayant Ã©tÃ© motivÃ©, les pourvois en cassation auraient Ã©tÃ© vouÃ©s Ã l'Ã©chec, ne s'agissant pas de recours efficaces . Le Gouvernement reconnaÃ®t que le requÃ©rant a formÃ© deux pourvois qui n'ont pas eu de succÃ©s . Le requÃ©rant a, en fait, invoquÃ© la Convention, par exemple dans sa 8' demande, en estimant que la dÃ©tention Ã©tait contraire aux â¢principes gÃ©nÃ©raux du droit* et qu'elle Ã©tait dangereuse pour la vie du requÃ©rant . En outre, en matiÃ¨re pÃ©nale, des conclusions Ã©crites ne sont habituellement jamais dÃ©posÃ©es ; or . les dÃ©fenseurs du requÃ©rant ont toujours invoquÃ© oralement l'incompatibilitÃ© de la dÃ©tention avec les droits de l'homme . Enfin, aprÃ¨s le 2 octobre 1981, date de la dÃ©claration franÃ§aise, le requÃ©rant ne pouvait plus saisir la Cour de cassation . En consÃ©quence, le requÃ©rant a Ã©puisÃ© les voies de recours internes.
IV . QualitÃ© de
a. Arguments du Gouvernemen t 41 . Peu aprÃ¨s l'introduction de sa requÃªte le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© reconnu coupable des faits en raison desquels il avait Ã©tÃ© mis en dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive et il a Ã©tÃ© condamnÃ© Ã 10 ans de rÃ©clusion . Cette dÃ©claration conforte les Ã©lÃ©ments des arrÃªts de la chambre d'accusation se rÃ©fÃ©rant aux charges pesant sur le requÃ©rant . La condamnation Ã une peine largement supÃ©rieure Ã la durÃ©e de la dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive interdit au requÃ©rant de se prÃ©senter comme â¢victime . d'une violation des articles 5 et 6 de la Convention . Il y a lieu de prendre en considÃ©ration le prÃ©judice matÃ©riel ou moral Ã©ventuel du fait de la violation allÃ©guÃ©e . En l'espÃ¨ce, on voit mal quel serait le prÃ©judice . Le requÃ©rant n'avait aucun avantage moral, compte tenu de sa culpabilitÃ©, Ã ce que celle-ci soit Ã©tablie rapidement . Ce n'est que devant la cour d'assises, donc aprÃ¨s l'introduction de la requÃªte, que le requÃ©rant a invoquÃ© pour la premiÃ¨re fois la Convention . D'autre part, en ce qui conceme un Ã©ventuel dommage matÃ©riel, il faut noter que la dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive est imputÃ©e sur la peine prononcÃ©e . Enfin, une Ã©ventuelle mise en libertÃ© dans le cadre de la prÃ©sente affaire n'aurait en pratique pas eu d'effet, le requÃ©rant faisant l'objet de cinq autres procÃ©dures . Le requÃ©rant ne peut Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ© comme . victime . d'une prÃ©tendue violation des articles 5, paragraphe 3, et 6, paragraphe 1 .
b . Arguments du requÃ©ran t
42 . Ce n'est pas parce que le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© condamnÃ© Ã une peine supÃ©rieure Ã la durÃ©e de sa dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive, qu'il ne peut se prÃ©tendre victime d'une violation de la Convention . Le prÃ©judice rÃ©sulte du fait que les peines prononcÃ©es ne sont jamais moindres que la durÃ©e de la dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive . S'il avait comparu libre, la peine prononcÃ©e aurait Ã©tÃ© probablement infÃ©rieure .
V . DurÃ©e de la dÃ©tention prÃ©ventiv e a . Arguments du Gouvernemen t 43 . L'article 5, paragraphe 3, ne pose pas de critÃ¨res prÃ©cis, mais doit Ãªtre interprÃ©tÃ© en tenant compte de tous les Ã©lÃ©ments de l'affaire . Le caractÃ¨ re raisonnable de la durÃ©e d'une dÃ©tention doit Ãªtre apprÃ©ciÃ© essentiellement sur la base des motifs indiquÃ©s dans les dÃ©cisions . L'ordonnance du juge d'instruction prescrivant la dÃ©tention provisoire doit Ãªtre spÃ©cialement motivÃ©e ( articles 144, 145 du Code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale) . 44 . Les motifs de maintien en dÃ©tention retenus par les ju ri dictions sont essentiellemen t - les charges pesant sur le requÃ©rant , - le danger d'altÃ©ration des preuves, de pression sur les tÃ©moins, de concertations frauduleuses et les besoins de l'instruction , - le danger de fuite , - la gravitÃ© des infractions . Dans le cas prÃ©sent, la durÃ©e de la dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive a coÃ¯ncidÃ© ave c .45 la durÃ©e de la procÃ©dure . Celle-ci ne peut Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ©e comme contraire Ã l'article 6, paragraphe 1(cf . Vil ci-dessous) . En ce qui concerne l'article 5, paragraphe 3, il suffit de relever qu e - l'affaire Ã©tait d'une exceptionnelle complexitÃ© - s'agissant d'un crime dans lequel plusieurs personnes Ã©taient impliquÃ©es, les autoritÃ©s devaient enquÃªter sur le rÃ´le de chacune, le sort du requÃ©rant Ã©tant en partie liÃ© Ã celui des co-inculpÃ©s ; - les autoritÃ©s ont procÃ©dÃ© Ã plus de deux cents interrogatoires et auditions de tÃ©moins, dÃ©livrÃ© de multiples commissions rogatoires dont sept internationales, diligentÃ© de nombreuses enquÃªtes, etc . Le requÃ©rant a prÃ©sentÃ© onze demandes de mise en libertÃ© . Les autoritÃ©s ont ainsi Ã©tÃ© amenÃ©es Ã examiner de faÃ§on approfondie la situation du requÃ©rant . Dans leurs dÃ©cisions, motivÃ©es de faÃ§on dÃ©taillÃ©e, les Ã©lÃ©ments prÃ©sentÃ©s par le requÃ©rant ont Ã©tÃ© pris en considÃ©ration . La durÃ©e de la dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive n'a pas dÃ©passÃ© le dÃ©lai raisonnable visÃ© Ã l'article S, paragraphe 3 .
46 . Le requÃ©rant a Ã©galement prÃ©sentÃ© un grief sur le terrain de l'article 5, paragraphe 1 a), de la Convention (cf . Griefs, par. 31, ci-dessus) . Ce grief est basÃ© sur les mÃªmes motifs que le mÃ©moire du requÃ©rant du 23 septembre 1980 (cf . Faits, par . 25) . 11 est manifestement mal fondÃ© . En effet, lors du rejet de sa troisiÃ¨me demande de mise en libe rtÃ© le requÃ©rant a, volontairement ou non, commis une erreur de procÃ©dure . Il a saisi directement la chambre d'accusation, qui a rejetÃ© sa requÃ©te . b. Arguments du requÃ©ran ( 47 . La dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive de cinq ans a dÃ©passÃ© le dÃ©lai raisonnable visÃ© Ã l'article 5, paragraphe 3 . Les motivations des dÃ©cisions de rejet des demandes de mise en libertÃ© sont trop gÃ©nÃ©rales . Les juridictions reprennent systÃ©matiquement ces motivations prÃ©vues par le code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale sans jamais prÃ©ciser en quoi la dÃ©tention serait l'unique moyen de conse rver les preuves, en quoi l'ordre public ne serait plus prÃ©servÃ© ou en quoi le maintien de l'inculpÃ© Ã la disposition de la justice ne serait plus garanti . Le Gouvernement semble reprocher au requÃ©rant que malgrÃ© les charges qui pesaient sur lui, il a niÃ© sa pa rt icipation Ã l'affaire . Si un inculpÃ© prÃ©tend Ãªtre innocent . faut-il systÃ©matiquement le maintenir en dÃ©tention ? Le danger de fuite aurait existÃ© au dÃ©but de l'instruction, mais le requÃ©rant s'est prÃ©sentÃ© volontai re ment . La complexitÃ© de l'a ffaire ne saurait justifier le maintien en dÃ©tention . On ne peut pas reprocher au requÃ©rant d'avoir demandÃ© Ã plusieurs rep ri ses sa mise en libe rtÃ© . VI . DÃ©tention et Ã©tat de santÃ© du requÃ©ren t a . Arguments du Gouvernernen [ 48 . Le requÃ©rant a invoquÃ© les articles 2 et 3 de la Convention . En communiquant la requÃªte la Commission a posÃ© Ã cet Ã©gard une question qui ne portait que sur l'application des articles 3 et 5, paragraphe 3 . Ce n'est donc qu'Ã titre toute Ã fait incident que le Gouvernement signale qu'il ne voit pas sur quelle base on pourrait soutenir que les mesures prises par les autoritÃ©s franÃ§aises Ã l'Ã©gard du requÃ©rant ont portÃ© atteinte au droit Ã la vie de celui-ci . 49 . Le Gouvernement Ã©carte l'idÃ©e que la faÃ§on dont sont traitÃ©s du point de vue mÃ©dical les dÃ©tenus, puisse tomber sous le coup de l'article 3 . Les dÃ©tenus sont sous une surveillance constante, assurÃ©e par un personnel mÃ©dical et infirmier, muni des mÃªmes diplÃ´mes que ceux des personnes qui soignent la population civile . Si une hospitalisation est nÃ©cessaire les dÃ©tenus sont placÃ©s Ã l'hÃ´pital central des prisons de Fresnes ou celui des Baumettes, s'il s'agit d'affections pouvant y Ãªtre traitÃ©es . Dans le cas contraire, ils sont admis dans un hÃ´pital civil .
50 . En l'espÃ¨ce, les autoritÃ©s ont fait droit Ã toutes les demandes du requÃ©rant tendant Ã une expertise mÃ©dicale . Chaque fois qu'un motif mÃ©dical a Ã©tÃ© invoquÃ© dans une demande de mise en libertÃ©, la chambre d'accusation a ordonnÃ© une expertise mÃ©dicale . Le requÃ©rant lui-mÃªme a contribuÃ© Ã son mauvais Ã©tat de sant Ã© - soit en refusant son hospitalisation Ã Fresnes (cf . par . 23 ci-dessus) , - soit en suivant mal son rÃ©gime diabÃ©tique (cf . par . 23 et 26), - soit en refusant le traitement insulinique (cf . par . 27) . Les autoritÃ©s ont toujours tirÃ©, en faveur du requÃ©rant, les consÃ©quences des expertises . A partir du 8 dÃ©cembre 1980 (cf . par . 26), le requÃ©rant qui avait dÃ©jÃ fait deux sÃ©jours Ã l'hÃ´pital (cf. par . 24), s'est trouvÃ© sans interruption en milieu hospitalier. Le maintien en dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive du requÃ©rant Ã© tait, mÃªme compte tenu de son Ã©tat de santÃ©, justifiÃ© au regard des articles 3 et 5, paragraphe 3 . b . Arguments du requÃ©ran t 51 . L'article 2 est le fondement de l'article 3 . Attenter Ã la vie d'une personne, c'est Ã©galement lui faire courir des dangers pour sa santÃ© par une dÃ©tention prolongÃ©e, danger pouvant se manifester par un accident cardiaque . Les autoritÃ©s n'ont pas toujours tirÃ© en faveur du requÃ©rant les consÃ©quences des expertises, si l'on juge par le rapport du docteur Lecoeur du 16 janvier 1981 (cf . par . 27 ci-dessus) . Celui-ci a estimÃ© qu'un accident mortel n'est pas imprÃ©visible et ce Ã tout moment . Il n'existait donc pas de niotifs raisonnables pouvant justifier une prolongation de la dÃ©tention alors que le premier juge d'instruction avait dÃ©cidÃ©, dÃ¨s 1978, la mise en libertÃ© sous contrÃ´le judiciaire .
VI1 . DurÃ©e de la procÃ©dur e a . Argumenls du Gouvernemen t 52 . La pÃ©riode doit Ãªtre calculÃ©e du 30 dÃ©cembre 1976 (mandat d'amener) au 23 dÃ©cembre 1981 (condantnation) . Le pourvoi en cassation, dÃ©posÃ© hors dÃ©lai, constituait une mano,uvre de procÃ©dure dilatoire . La pÃ©riode de la condamnation Ã l'arrÃªt du 9 juin 1982 ne doit pas Ãªtre prise en considÃ©ration . 53 . L'affaire est exceptionnellement complexe . Cette complexitÃ© tient notamment aux multiples activitÃ©s de la victime, aux relations qu'elle avait entretenues avec certains inculpÃ©s et que ceux-ci entretenaient entre eux, ainsi qu'au nombre et Ã la personnalitÃ© de ceux-ci . Comme plusieurs personnes Ã©taient intpliquÃ©es les autoritÃ©s devaient, pour la manifestation de la vÃ©ritÃ©, enquÃªter sur le rÃ´le de chacune d'elles . En effet, le sort du requÃ©rant Ã©tait liÃ© Ã celui de ses co-inculpÃ©s . Ceux-ci ont d'ailleurs demandÃ© Ã plusieurs reprises des investigations supplÃ©mentaires .
L'affaire avait des implications financiÃ¨res extrÃªmement complexes et nombreuses . Elle a conduit Ã des investigations poussÃ©es auprÃ¨s de plusieurs banques et compagnies d'assurances . 54 . Une procÃ©dure dans laquelle un des principaux inculpÃ©s, en l'occurrence le requÃ©rant . nie toute participation Ã l'affaire, est fatalement plus longue qu'une procÃ©dure Ã laquelle l'inculpÃ© coopÃ¨re de faÃ§on raisonnable . Lorsque SimonÃ© a demandÃ© en 1978 de nouvelles investigations, Ribemont, mais non le requÃ©rant, a protestÃ© contre la prolongation de l'instruction . Le requÃ©rant a, au contraire, demandÃ© des actes d'instruction supplÃ©mentaires . Enfin, lorsqu'en avril 1980, se posait la question d'un supplÃ©ment d'information, le requÃ©rant a demandÃ© la prolongation de l'information . 55 . Les autoritÃ©s ont multipliÃ©, tout au long de l'instruction, auditions de tÃ©moins, interrogations, confrontations, expertises, rÃ©quisitions judiciaires, enquÃªtes et commissions rogatoires nationales et internationales . Comme l'affaire suscitait un intÃ©rÃªt particulier dans l'opinion publique, la presse faisait des suppositions que, dans l'intÃ©rÃªt de la manifestation de la vÃ©ritÃ©, les autoritÃ©s ne pouvaient nÃ©gliger . En consÃ©quence, le dÃ©lai raisonnable visÃ© Ã l'article 6, paragraphe 1, n'a pas Ã©tÃ© dÃ©passÃ© . b . Argurnents du requÃ©ran t 56 . En ce qui concerne la pÃ©riode Ã prendre en considÃ©ration, la procÃ©dure en cassation est Ã prendre en considÃ©ration, Ã©tant donnÃ© que le pourvoi a un effet suspensif . Les arguments du Gouvernement concernant la complexitÃ© ne sont pa s .57 convaincants . Toute instruction nÃ©cessite de nombreuses investigations . Le Gouvernement ne donne pas de prÃ©cisions ; ses affirmations sont peu crÃ©dibles parce que trop gÃ©nÃ©rales . 58 . En ce qui concerne le comportement du requÃ©rant, le Gouvernement affirme qu'il serait responsable de la longueur de la procÃ©dure, parce qu'il a niÃ© sa participation Ã l'affaire . C'est prÃ©cisÃ©ment parce qu'il a niÃ© sa participation que le requÃ©rant a demandÃ© Ã plusieurs reprises des actes supplÃ©mentaires . C'Ã©tait son droit que de voir se manifester la vÃ©ritÃ© et on ne saurait lui en faire grief . Le requÃ©rant rappelle qu'il s'est prÃ©sentÃ© volontairement Ã la police . La durÃ©e de la procÃ©dure a dÃ©passÃ© le dÃ©lai raisonnable visÃ© Ã l'article 6, paragraphe 1 .
EN DROIT 1 . Le requÃ©rant a formulÃ© divers griefs concernant sa dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive et la procÃ©dure pÃ©nale dont il a Ã©tÃ© l'objet . Les faits de la cause
remontent Ã une Ã©poque se situant entre le 30 dÃ©cembre 1976, date de l'arrestation du requÃ©rant, et le 9 juin 1982, date de l'arrÃªt de la Cour de cassation dÃ©clarant irrecevable le pourvoi du requÃ©rant contre l'arrÃªt de condamnation du 23 dÃ©cembre 1981 . Les faits sont postÃ©rieurs Ã la ratification par la France de la Convention . le 3 mai 1974, et en partie antÃ©rieurs au dÃ©pÃ´t de la dÃ©claration franÃ§aise d'acceptation du droit de recours individuel selon l'article 25 de la Convention, le 2 octobre 1981 . A la diffÃ©rence d'autres Etats, qui n'ont reconnu la compÃ©tence de la Commission Ã Ãªtre saisie de requÃªtes individuelles qu'en raison de faits postÃ©rieurs Ã la date de dÃ©pÃ´t de la dÃ©claration d'acceptation du droit de recours individuel, la dÃ©claration franÃ§aise ne contient aucune dÃ©claration visant Ã prÃ©ciser le champ d'application, pour le temps passÃ©, du droit de recours individuel . En l'absence d'une limitation expresse dans la dÃ©claration franÃ§aise, la Commission s'estime dÃ¨s lors compÃ©tente ratione temporis pour connaitre des griefs formulÃ©s par le requÃ©rant, les faits de la cause Ã©tant postÃ©rieurs Ã la date de ratification de la Convention par la France, le 3 mai 1974 (cf . RequÃªte nÂ° 9587/81, X . contre la France, dÃ©cision du 13 dÃ©cembre 1982 . D .R . 29, p . 228) . 2 . Le Gouvernement considÃ¨re que le requÃ©rant ne peut Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ© comme . victime . d'une prÃ©tendue violation de la Convention .
Aux termes de l'article 25, paragraphe 1, de la Convention : .la Commission peut Ãªtre saisie d'une requÃªte . . . par toute personne physique . . . qui se prÃ©tend victime d'une violation par l'une des Hautes Pa rt ies Contractantes des droits reconnus dans la prÃ©sente Convention . . . . La Commission estime que les arguments du Gouvernement (cf . par . 4 1 ci-dessus) ont trait au bien-fondÃ© de la requÃªte et ne conce rn ent pas la question de savoir si le requÃ©rant peut se prÃ©tendre victime au sens de l'article 25 . Le fait que le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© condamnÃ© par la cour d'assises Ã dix ans de rÃ©clusion et que la durÃ©e de la dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive vierme en dÃ©compte pour l'exÃ©cution de la peine n'a pas pour consÃ©quence que le requÃ©rant se trouve dans une situation oÃ¹ il ne puisse plus prÃ©tendre Ãªtre victime d'une violation de l'article 5, paragraphe 3 . Les intÃ©rÃªts pris en compte et protÃ©gÃ©s par cette disposition sont indÃ©pendants de l'issue de la procÃ©dure pÃ©nale, leur violation Ã©ventuelle n'est pas compensÃ©e par l'imputation de la dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive sur la durÃ©e de la peine infligÃ©e . La Commission conclut que le requÃ©rant peut se prÃ©tendre victime d'une violation de la Convention au sens de l'article 25 .
a . Quant aux griefs tirÃ©s de l'article 5. paragraphe 3 3 . Le requÃ©rant se plaint de la longueur de sa dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive . Il considÃ¨re que cette dÃ©tention a excÃ©dÃ© le dÃ©lai raisonnable visÃ© Ã l'article 5, paragraphe 3, de la Convention qui stipule : .Toute personne arrÃªtÃ©e ou dÃ©tenue, dans les conditions prÃ©vues au paragraphe 1 c) du prÃ©sent article, doit Ãªtre aussitÃ´t traduite devant un juge ou un autre magistrat habilitÃ© par la loi Ã exercer des fonctions judiciaires et a le droit d'Ãªtre jugÃ©e dans un dÃ©lai raisonnable, ou CibÃ©rÃ©e pendant la procÃ©dure . La mise en libertÃ© peut Ãªtre subordonnÃ©e Ã une garantie assurant la comparution de l'intÃ©ressÃ© Ã l'audience . â¢ 4 . La dÃ©tention a dÃ©butÃ© le 30 dÃ©cembre 1976 et s'est prolongÃ©e de faÃ§on ininterrompue jusqu'au 23 dÃ©cembre 1981, date Ã laquelle le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© condamnÃ© . Elle a ainsi durÃ© presque cinq ans . En fait, la condamnation n'est devenue dÃ©finitive que le 9 juin 1982, suite au rejet de son pourvoi en cassation . Toutefois, selon la jurisprudence de la Commission et de la Cour, le requÃ©rant doit Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ© comme ayant Ã©tÃ© dÃ©tenu entre le 23 dÃ©cembre 1981 et le 9 juin 1982 en conformitÃ© avec l'article 5, paragraphe 1 a), de la Convention . Pour cette pÃ©riode il ne peut donc pas invoquer l'article 5 . paragraphe 3 (cf . Cour eur. D .H ., Affaire Wemhoff, arrÃªt du 27 juin 1968, par . 9, En Droit : cf . dÃ©cision sur la recevabilitÃ© de la RequÃ©te nÂ° 8601/79 . M . c/Suisse, oÃ¹ la Commission a Ã©galement adoptÃ© cette solution) . 5 . Toutefois, la Commission n'est pas appelÃ©e Ã se prononcer sur le point de savoir si les faits allÃ©guÃ©s par le requÃ©rant rÃ©vÃ¨lent l'apparence d'une violation de la disposition invoquÃ©e . En effet, aux termes de l'article 26 de la Convention, .la Commission ne peut Ãªtre saisie qu'aprÃ¨s l'Ã©puisement des voies de recours internes, tel qu'il est entendu selon les principes de droit international gÃ©nÃ©ralement reconnus . . Le requÃ©rant a certes . Ã de nombreuses reprises (cf . supra par . 17 Ã 29), sollicitÃ© des autoritÃ©s judiciaires sa mise en libertÃ© provisoire . Toutefois, sous rÃ©serve de deux exceptions, il n'a pas formÃ© de pourvoi en cassation Ã l'encontre des arrÃªts de la chambre d'accusation qui rejetaient ses demandes . La Commission observe Ã cet Ã©gard qu'Ã l'appui des deux seuls pourvois qu'il ait introduits, le requÃ©rant ne s'est fondÃ© ni sur les dispositions de la Convention, laquelle est directement applicable dans l'ordre juridique franÃ§ais, ni mÃªme sur les dispositions de droit interne de substance identique ; les moyens dÃ©veloppÃ©s Ã l'appui de ces pourvois concernaient des dispositions spÃ©cifiques du code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale ne prÃ©sentant aucun rapport avec l'article S . paragraphe 3, de la Convention . Il est vrai que le requÃ©rant a soutenu (ci . supra par . 40) qu'en ce qui concerne le respect du dÃ©lai raisonnable visÃ© Ã l'article 5, paragraphe 3, de l a
Convention, le pourvoi en cassation constituerait une voie de recours inefficace, en raison de la compÃ©tence limitÃ©e de la Cour de cassation, et qu'il ne devrait donc pas Ãªtre exigÃ© de lui de l'avoir utilisÃ©e pour satisfaire aux exigences de l'article 26 de la Convention . Au contraire, le Gouvernement expose (cf . supra, par . 39) que s'il est exact que la Cour de cassation soit juge du droit et non des des faits, il n'en demeure pas moins que les dÃ©cisions en matiÃ¨re de dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive n'Ã©chappent pas au contrÃ´le de lÃ©galitÃ© de cette haute juridiction . Le Gouvernement a d'ailleurs dÃ©montrÃ© que la Cour de cassation a dÃ©jÃ appliquÃ© la Convention en matiÃ¨re de dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive ; il s'est en particulier rÃ©fÃ©rÃ© Ã un arrÃªt Touton du 22 fÃ©vrier 1982 (nÂ° 81-94 .591) et Ã un arrÃªt B . du 4 janvier 1983 (nÂ° 82-93 .809 B) . En revanche, il n'a pas fourni Ã l'appui de sa thÃ¨se des arrÃªts antÃ©rieur : Ã ou contemporains de la pÃ©riode au cours de laquelle le requÃ©rant se trouvait en dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive . De l'avis de la Commission, il ne rÃ©sulte pas de cette constatation que le requÃ©rant aurait Ã©tÃ©, Ã ladite Ã©poque, dispensÃ© de se pourvoir en cassation . En effet, l'hypothÃ¨se prÃ©sente se distingue de celles envisagÃ©es notamment par la Cour dans ses arrÃªts des 18 juin 1971 (affaire De Wilde, Ooms et Versyp) et 24 juin 1982 (affaire Van Droogenbroeck) . Dans ces deux affaires le Gouveroement dÃ©fendeur avait soulevÃ© en vain l'exception de non-Ã©puisement des voies de recours intemes . Il avait en effet, dans le premier cas, fait Ã©tat d'un renversement de jurisprudence totalement imprÃ©visible de la part du Conseil d'Etat et postÃ©rieur Ã l'introduction des requÃªtes en cause (arrÃªt De Wilde . Ooms et Versyp, par . 62), dans la second, il invoquait deux recours de crÃ©ation . semble-t-il, prÃ©torienne et Ã©galement postÃ©rieure Ã l'introduction de la requÃªte (arrÃ©t Van Droogenbroeck, par . 54 et 55) . Dans la prÃ©sente affaire le recours que le Gouvemement reproche au requÃ©rant de n'avoir pas tentÃ© n'est ni une nouvelle voie de recours par rapport Ã celles existant au moment de sa dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive, ni un recours Ã propos duquel l'opinio com inunis eGt Ã©tÃ©, Ã la mÃªme Ã©poque, qu'il s'exposait au rejet pour cause d'irrecevabilitÃ© . Il s'agit en effet du recours traditionnel devant la Cour de cassation, instance qui a pour mission de contrÃ´ler les dÃ©cisions qui lui sont dÃ©fÃ©rÃ©es pour contravention Ã la loi ou pour violation des formes substantielles ou prescrites Ã peine de nullitÃ© . En l'espÃ¨ce . et mÃªme si la Cour n'avait jamais Ã©tÃ© auparavant amenÃ©e Ã se prononcer sur la conformitÃ© d'une dÃ©cision relative Ã la dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive aux exigences de la Convention, il est Ã©vident aux yeux de la Commission qu'un tel recours Ã©tait offert au requÃ©rant par l'ordre juridique franÃ§ais et qu'il Ã©tait du devoir de l'intÃ©ressÃ© de le tenter . En effet, â¢s'il existe un doute quant Ã la question de savoir si une voie de recours dÃ©terminÃ©e peut Ãªtre ou non de nature Ã offrir une chance rÃ©elle de succÃ¨s, c'est lÃ un point qui doit Ãªtre soumis aux tribunaux internes eux-mÃªmes, avant tout appel au tribunal internationalÂ» (cf . nÂ° 712/609 . Retimag c/R .F .A ., Ann . 4, pp . 385, 4()1) .
Ainsi, la Cour de cassation pÃ¨ut, car il s'agit lÃ d'une question de droit et non de fait, apprÃ©cier si la chambre d'accusation a justifiÃ© Ã suffisance que sont rÃ©unies les conditions requises pour la justification d'une dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive et la prolongation de celle-ci . De mÃªme, dans son arrÃªt Touton ptÃ©citÃ©, elle a constatÃ© qu' .il n'apparai(ssai)t pas au vu des piÃ¨ces de la procÃ©dure que les mesures d'instruction ordonnÃ©es, lesquelles apparaissent complexes, aient entraÃ®nÃ© un dÃ©lai de dÃ©tention qui ne soit pas 'raisonnable' au sens de la Convention europÃ©enne des Droits de l'Homme . . Pour la Commission il rÃ©sulte de cet arrÃªt que la Cour de cassation est donc Ã mÃªme d'apprÃ©cier, sur base d'un examen de la procÃ©dure d'instruction, le respect de la part des autoritÃ©s judiciaires du dÃ©lai raisonnable Ã©tabli Ã l'article 5, paragraphe 3, de la Convention . Il s'agit lÃ en effet d'une opÃ©ration de qualification ju ri dique d'une situation de fait . Au surplus, la Commission rappelle qu'elle a estimÃ© dans l'affaire Bonazzi que le g ri ef concernant le caractÃ¨re dÃ©raisonnable de la durÃ©e de la dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive devait Ãªtre rejetÃ© pour non-Ã©puisement des voies de recours internes, le requÃ©rant n'ayant pas recouru jusqu'en cassation cont re les Ã©ventuelles dÃ©cisions de rejet de ses demandes de mise en libe rt Ã© (cf . nÂ° 7975/77, Bonazzi c/Italie, D .R . 15, pp . 169, 181) . La Commission considÃ¨re que ce raisonnement vaut Ã©galement pour la prÃ©sente affaire . En consÃ©quence, la Commission estime que dans la prÃ©sente affaire et s'agissant du g ri ef ti rÃ© de la durÃ©e excessive de la dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive, le pourvoi en cassation contre les arrÃªts de la chambre d'accusation constituait bien un recours adÃ©quat et efficace visÃ© Ã l'a rt icle 26 de la Convention . L'examen de l'affaire telle qu'elle a Ã©tÃ© prÃ©sentÃ©e n'a permis de dÃ©celer aucune circonstance pa rt iculiÃ©re .qui aurait pu dispenser le requÃ©rant, selon les principes de droit international gÃ©nÃ©ralement reconnus en la matiÃ¨re, d'Ã©puiser les voies de recours internes . Il s'ensuit que le requÃ©rant n'a pas satisfait Ã la condition relative Ã l'Ã©puisement des voies de recours internes et que sa requÃªte doit Ãªtre rejetÃ©e, sur ce point, conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 27, paragraphe 3, de la Convention . b . Quant aux griefs tirÃ©s des arlic(es 6, paragraphe 1
5, paragraphe 1 a) et
6 . Le requÃ©rant estime que sa dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive Ã© tait contraire aux a rticles 2 et 3 de la Convention en raison de son Ã© tat de santÃ© . Aux termes de l'article 2, paragraphe 1-, Le droit de toute personne Ã la vie est protÃ©gÃ© par la loi . La mo rt ne peut Ãªtre in fligÃ©e Ã quiconque intentionnellement . sauf en exÃ©cution d'une sentence capitale prononcÃ©e par un tribunal au cas oÃ¹ le dÃ©lit est puni de cette peine par la loi . . L'article 3 stipule : .Nul ne peut Ãªtre soumis Ã la torture ni Ã des peine s . ou traitements inhumains ou dÃ©gradants . . - 184 -
La Contmission considÃ¨re que le requÃ©rant n'a pas dÃ©montrÃ© en quoi la dÃ©tention a mis sa vie en danger ; il n'y a, partant, aucune apparence de violation de l'article 2 . En revanche, on ne saurait exclure qu'une dÃ©tention d'une personne malade puisse soulever des problÃ¨mes sous l'angle de l'article 3 de la Conven(ion . Il ressort du dossier que l'Ã©tat de santÃ© du requÃ©rant Ã©tait mauvais tout au long de sa dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive et qu'il a empirÃ© . Le requÃ©rant est diabÃ©tique et souffre de troubles cardio-vasculaires . Il faut cependant reconnaitre que les autoritÃ©s ont fait droit Ã toutes les demandes du requÃ©rant tendant Ã une expertise mÃ©dicale . En cas d'imprÃ©cisions d'un rapport les autoritÃ©s n'ont pas manquÃ© de commettre de nouveaux experts . En tout, une dizaine de rapports ont Ã©tÃ© Ã©tablis . Aucune des expertises n'a formellement conclu Ã une incontpatibilitÃ© de l'Ã©tat de santÃ© du requÃ©rant avec la dÃ©tention . Certaines ont signalÃ©, le cas Ã©chÃ©ant, les dangers Ã©ventuels de la prolongation de la dÃ©tention et la dÃ©tÃ©rioration de la santÃ© . Lorsque les experts ont recommandÃ© l'hospitalisation du requÃ©rant . les autoritÃ©s ont ordonnÃ© le placement du requÃ©rant dans un hÃ´pital . deux fois passagÃ¨rement dans un hÃ´pital de l'administration pÃ©nitentiaire et, Ã partir du 9 janvier 1981, dans un hÃ´pital dÃ©pendant de l'Assistance publique . Le Gouvernement a signalÃ© que le requÃ©rant avait contribuÃ© Ã son mauvais Ã©tat de santÃ© en refusant Ã une certaine Ã©poque son placement dans un hÃ´pital de la prison, en suivant mal son rÃ©gime diabÃ©tique et en refusant le traitement insulinique .
La Comntission estime qu'en raison des circonstances spÃ©cifiques de l'affaire, le traitement mÃ©dical du requÃ©rant pendant sa dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive ne constitue pas un traitement contraire Ã l'article 3 t i1 n'y a, partant, aucune apparence de violation de cette disposition . 7 . Le requÃ©rant a Ã©galement invoquÃ© l'article 5, paragraphe 1 a) de la Convention, estimant qu'Ã partir d'une certaine date sa dÃ©tention Ã©tait devenue irrÃ©guliÃ¨re . L'article 5 . paragraphe 1a) stipul e . Toute personne a droit Ã la libertÃ© et Ã la sOretÃ© . Nul ne peut Ãªtre privÃ© de sa libertÃ©, sauf dans les cas suivants et selon les voies lÃ©gales : a) s'il est dÃ©tenu rÃ©guliÃ¨rement aprÃ¨s condamnation par un tribunal compÃ©tent ; . . .. . ...... . .. . .. . . . La Commission souligne que ce grief est formulÃ© Ã propos d'une dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive . La disposition visÃ©e ayant trait Ã la dÃ©tention aprÃ¨s condamnation, n'est pas applicable . Il n'y a, partant, aucune apparence de violation de cette disposition .
8 . Le requÃ©rant se plaint d'une violation de l'article 6, paragraphe l, de la Convention en raison de la longueur de la procÃ©dure . L'article 6, paragraphe 1, stipule : .Toute personne a droit Ã ce que sa cause soit entendue . . . dans un dÃ©lai raisonnable, par un tribunal . . . qui dÃ©cidera . . . du bien-fondÃ© de toute accusation en matiÃ¨re pÃ©nale dirigÃ©e contre elle . ConformÃ©ment Ã la jurisprudence de la Cour et de la Commission, la pÃ©riode Ã prendre en considÃ©ration, au regard de cette disposition, commence au moment oÃ¹ les premiÃ¨res accusations sont formulÃ©es contre l'intÃ©ressÃ© et prend fin lorsqu'il est statuÃ© sur le bien-fondÃ© de l'accusation, mÃªme si cette dÃ©cision est rendue par une juridiction de recours se prononÃ§ant sur le bienfondÃ© de l'accusation (cf . arrÃªt Neumeister du 27 juin 1968, par . 18 et 19 ; arrÃªt KÃ¼nig du 28 juin 1978, par . 98 ; requÃªte nÂ° 8261/78, D .R . 25, p . 180) . Pour prÃ©ciser le dies a quo la Commission a adoptÃ© celui oÃ¹ les soupÃ§ons dont l'intÃ©ressÃ© Ã©tait l'objet ont eu des rÃ©percussions importantes sur sa situation . Tel est le cas lorsque le requÃ©rant est arrÃªtÃ© et mis en dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive, en l'espÃ¨ce . le 30 dÃ©cembre 1976 . La Commission considÃ¨re que, pour prÃ©ciser le dies ad queni, il n'y a pas lieu de tenir compte de la pÃ©riode allant de l'arrÃ¨t de la cour d'assises du 23 dÃ©cembre 1981 Ã l'arrÃªt de la Cour de cassation du 9 juin 1982, Ã©tant donnÃ© que ce pourvoi a Ã©tÃ© dÃ©clarÃ© irrecevable parce qu'il avait Ã©tÃ© fortnÃ© en dehors du dÃ©lai lÃ©gal . Partant, la pÃ©riode Ã prendre en considÃ©ration est de cinq ans . Le caractÃ¨re raisonnable de la durÃ©e d'une procÃ©dure relevant de l'article 6, paragraphe 1, doit s'apprÃ©cier d'aprÃ¨s les circonstances de la cause . Pour dÃ©terminer si la durÃ©e d'un procÃ¨s pÃ©nal a Ã©tÃ© raisonnable, la Cour et la Commission ont pris en considÃ©ration notamment la complexitÃ© de l'affaire, le comportement du requÃ©rant et la maniÃ¨re dont l'affaire a Ã©tÃ© conduite par les autoritÃ©s (cf. affaire KBnig prÃ©citÃ©e, par : 99) . La Commission souligne que la prÃ©sente affaire Ã©tait sans aucun doute d'une trÃ¨s grande complexitÃ© en raison notamment des multiples activitÃ©s de la victime et de ses relations avec les principaux inculpÃ©s . Comme plusieurs personnes Ã©taient impliquÃ©es dans l'assassinat les autoritÃ©s devaient Ã©tablir le rÃ´le de chacune d'entre elles, Ã©tant donnÃ© que le sort du requÃ©rant Ã©tait en partie liÃ© Ã celui des co-inculpÃ©s . L'affaire aux multiples implications a donnÃ© liau Ã plus de 200 interrogatoires et auditions de tÃ©moins, des commissions rogatoires dont sept internationales, de nombreuses enquÃªtes, en particulier auprÃ¨s de plusieurs banques et compagnies d'assurances . Le dossier de la procÃ©dure d'instruction comporte 22 volumes . Cette affaire a d'ailleurs sensibilisÃ© l'opinion publique et a donnÃ© lieu Ã de multiples controverses . En ce qui concerne le comportement du requÃ©rant pendant la procÃ©dure, la Commission relÃ¨ve le grand nombre de demandes de mise en libertÃ© . Toutefois, la Commission rappelle qu'un inculpÃ© ne peut, en fÃ¨gle gÃ©nÃ©rale ,
Ãªtre (enu pour responsable d'une prolongation de la procÃ©dure pendant sa dÃ©tention, du seul fait qu'il a exercÃ© des droits dont il disposait . Il ne faut pas non plus perdre de vue que le requÃ©rant Ã©tait malade et que dans la plupart de ses demandes il invoquait des motifs de santÃ© . En tout cas, le dossier ne rÃ©vÃ¨le pas que la procÃ©dure ait Ã©tÃ© indÃ»ment retardÃ©e par le requÃ©rant ou qu'il ait fait un usage excessif des droits de recours dont il disposait . Quant Ã la maniÃ¨re dont l'affaire a Ã©tÃ© conduite par les autoritÃ©s, la Commission a constatÃ© qu'un examen des renseignements fournis par les parties . et notamment le tableau produit par le Gouvernement sur les principales Ã©tapes de la procÃ©dure et des mesures prises pendant la dÃ©tention du requÃ©rant, fait apparaÃ®tre le grand nombre des actes de procÃ©dure des autoritÃ©s et leur rythme quasiment ininterrompu . On peut notamment constater que l'instruction s'est poursuivie sans relÃ¢che . Il est vrai qu'aprÃ¨s trois ans et 3 niois d'instruction l'affaire a Ã©tÃ© relancÃ©e et un supplÃ©ment d'information a Ã©tÃ© ordonnÃ© en raison d'Ã©lÃ©ments nouveaux qui sont apparus . Or, le requÃ©rant lui-mÃ©me . ainsi que la partie civile et les co-inculpÃ©s ont demandÃ©, Ã ce moment, un complÃ©ment d'information . En conclusion, la Commission est d'avis que, dans l'ensemble, la procÃ©dure a Ã©tÃ© poursuivie sans retards notables . Compte tenu de tous ces Ã©lÃ©ments, la Commission estime qu'en raison notamment du caractÃ¨re complexe de l'affaire, la procÃ©dure n'a pas dÃ©passÃ© le dÃ©lai raisonnable visÃ© Ã l'article 6, paragraphe 1 . Il n'y a, par consÃ©quent, aucune apparence de violation de cette disposition . 9 . II s'ensuit que les griefs tirÃ©s des articles 2, 3, 5, paragraphe 1 a), et 6, paragraphe 1, sont manifestement mal fondÃ©s, au sens de l'article 27, paragraphe 2, de la Convention .
Par ces motifs, la Commissio n DECLARE LA REQUETEIRRECEVABLE .
THE FACT S The t'acts of the case as submitted by the parties may be sumntarised as follows : 1 . The applicaut was born at Budapest in 1910 (or 1920) . In his application he stated that he was born on 21 March 1910 and that he possessed French natiouality . It appears . however, from the documents tiled by the respondent Government that the applicant did not possess French nationality and that the date of his birth was uucertain . The applicaut is a busiuess agent and was permanently resident in Paris at the time of Ihe facts which form the subject-matter of the present application . He was iu detention in the HÃ´tel-Dieu in Paris when his application was lodged . In the proceedings before the Commission the applicant is represented by Mr and Mrs J . aud C . Imbach, barristers practising in Strasbourg . The general beckground of the case 2 . Ou 24 December 1976 Mr Jean de Broglie, Member of Parliament for l'Eure and a former minister, was killed by a gunshot when leaving the premises of the applicant, his legal and financial adviser, in the Rue des Dardanelles . In view of the unusual complexity of the case it is desirable to give a brief accouut of the activities of the victim and his relations with some of the accused in these proceedings .
Jean de Broglie 3 . The victim in this case pursued numerous different public and private activities . Mr de Broglie was Member of Parliament for l'Eure since 1958 . As Minister ot State for the Overseas Departments and Territories, he negotiated the Evian Agreement in March 1962 . As Minister of State he was member of various governments from 1962 to 1967 . From 1968 to 1973 he was chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the National Assembly . He had to give up his candidature for the chairmanship of the Finance Committee on account of ditticulties with his party, and owing to the incompatibility between these fuuctions aud his private affairs . After the collapse of his political ambitions, he concentrated on business aftairs (SodÃ©tex . Le Viager-Foncier, Sofradec, Secar, Brincom, and other comapnies) . as a result of which he sut7ered heavy losses . He also had serious difticulties with the Revenue .
Relations between de Broglie, de Ribetuan and the applican t 4 . In 1975 de Broglie became acquainted with Patrick Allenet, known as de Ribemont, who was to be one of the applicant's co-accused, but was later discharged . De Ribemont, an international financial adviser, introduced the applicant to de Broglie . The applicant, who had since 1963 served, inter alia, 8 years in prison, but had been released in 1968 for medical reasons, was introduced as "an astute, but shady and unscrupulous man of business and a cuuning lawyer, who had so arranged his atfairs that his professional activities, resources and fortune could not even approximately be assessed" . (cf . Prosecution case accompanying the documents of 19 March 1980, p . 3 0) . The applicant had iuterests in numerous companies, the principal being the Ficodip, of which he was the real manager . This company was wound up in 1976, owing considerable sums . Knowing that it was in a bad way, the applicant had, together with de Ribemont, formed the Soficop, with the same object . That company ceased to operate in 1977 . De Broglie had invested in Publi-MG Ltd by providing mortgage security of up to S milliou trancs in return for a certain revenue . He gave the applicant an unlimited power ot' attorney, instructing him to assist in solving his ditticulties with Publi-MG . In order to settle the matter he had, through the applicant, borrowed large sums of money . S. The "La Reiue-Pedauque" transaction was to play an important role in the preseut case . Parallel to the Publi-MG affair, de Broglie had lent 4 million francs to de Ribentont to purchase the "La Reine-PÃ©dauquÃ©" grill room in Jauuary 1976 . This loau had been obtained from the BNP and guaranteed by a mortgage coveriug 800 hectares ot' forest and several life insurances . The medical certificates for one of the life insurances were given by Dr Nelly Azerad, to whont de Ribemont sent de Broglie . and who was also questioned iu conuectiou with the present case . De Ribemont had consulted her as a doctor on the applicant's recomntendation, who had known her as the doctor attached to Fresues Pri .son, when he was serving his sentence . It was agreed betweeu de Broglie and de Ribemont that the loan of 4 million should be placed at the disposal of the latter, who would be respousible for its repavnteut . This agreement was respected until de Ribemont's arrest . Gu the other haud, de Broglie never received the shares in the "La Reine-PÃ©dauquÃ©", which were taken by the applicant . Contrary to the spirit of the above-meutioued agreement, de Ribeniont signed, with the applicant, a documeut . which in tact made the latter the undisclosed proprietor of half the busiuess . Relations betweea the applicant and Sinton Ã© 6 . Guy SimonÃ©, one of the co-accused who were convicted in the present case, was a senior police iuspector . SimonÃ© . who was in financial difficulties ,
had obtained postponements from his creditors through the gÃ´od offices of the applicant . Through the applicant, Dr Azerad had procured for SimonÃ© a loan to obtain the withdrawal of a complaint for fraud against the latter . Through the applicant, de Ribemont had lent money to SimonÃ© and, again, through the applicant, de Broglie had lent money to SimonÃ© . In return SimonÃ© performed certain services for the applicant, such as the withdrawal of the prosecutions tor petty offences .
II . P ro ceedings The pre(iminarv investigatiotr s 7 . On the very day of the crime, 24 December 1976, the investigating judge reeceived a complaiut against X . for intentional homicide . Acting on a request trom the judge . the crime squad interrogated GÃ©rard Freche, the presumed offender, on 27 December 1976 . It also interrogated Serge TessÃ©dre, who had recruited Freche . Senior Inspector Guy SimonÃ©, the presumed instigator of the crime, and, on 28 December, Simon de Kolkowicz . On 30 December Freche, Simonet, TessÃ©dre and Kolkowicz were arrested, Freche being charged with intentional homicide, and SimonÃ© . TessÃ©dre and Kolkowicz as accomplices . Accused by Kolkowicz at his first examination on 28 December, SimonÃ© admitted his participation in the affair and was followed by Freche and TessÃ©dre . SimouÃ© stated that he had been instructed by the applicant to get rid of Mr de Broglie . With the assistance of TessÃ©dre and Kolkowicz, SimonÃ© had recruited a first killer, Bernard AndrÃ© . who had taken no action . Then, through TessÃ©dre, he had found Freche, who carried out thejob on 24 December . 8 . The applicant was taken into custody on 24 December and was examined ou 24 . 25 and 26 December 1976 . On 29 December he reported to the police to explaiu his behaviour . He was arrested on 30 December and placed in detentiou ou remand on 31 December 1976 under a warrant issued by the judge, Mr Guy Floch, as an accessary to intentional homicide . The applicant has always disputed SimonÃ©'s statements, saying that he had no reason to be concerned in the disappearance of the victim . 9 . Two further persons were detained on remand as accessaries to intentional homicide : de Ribemont on 14 January 1977 and Albert Leyris on 26 January 1977 . However, they and Kolkowicz were released in February and March 1977 and granted a discharge on 21 March 1980 . 10 . To begin with, the investigation of this case was in the hands of the judge . Mr Guy Floch . With effect from 22 September 1978, Mr Floch, who had been appointed to the Paris Court of Appeal, was replaced by the . investigating judge, Miss Ma rt ine Anzani .
During the proceedings more than 200 persons were heard, some of them several times, either by way of letters rogatory or by the investigating judge . The investigation involved the issue of six international letters rogatory . Inquiries were conducted in various regions of France . Court orders were sent to banks and insurance companies . Finally, several expert opinions were prepared . The examinations and statements involving the persons most directly connected with the case and the international letters rogatory are set out in a table produced by the Government, specifying the main steps in the proceeding s The examinations of the applicant and his confrontation with other witnesses in the period from December 1976 to April 1977 were interrupted by au incident . On 6 April 1977 there appeared, in a newspaper, an article on the case, setting out a statement by Mme Azerad, a heart specialist formerly attached to Fresnes Prison . According to this document, 5 days after the crime Mme Azerad received a visit from one of the applicant's defence council suggesting that she should arrange an alibi for the applicant . During April 1977, therefore, the investigating judge examined the journalist . the barrister in question and Mme Azerad before being able to resume the examination . and confrontation with other witnesses, of the applicaut and the other principal figures in the case . I I . After prelintinary investigations lasting 3 years and 3 months, the flle was sent to the public prosecutor attached to the Paris Regional Court (Tribunal de grande instance de Paris) . On 19 March 1980 the latter requested the investigatiog judge to send the file to the Attorney General attached to the Paris Court of Appeal . On 21 March 1980 the investigating judge ordered the tile aud iucriminating evidence to be sent to the Attorney Genera! .
According to the investigating judge's order, there were no grounds for proceediug against Kolkowicz . de Ribemont and Leyris, who were discharged . Ou the other hand, the investigatiott had revealed sufficient evidence against Freche, SimonÃ©, TessÃ¨dre and the applicant . The latter three were charged with being "accessaries to intentional homicide committed by Freche on the person ot' Jeau Marie de Broglie with malice aforethought" . The Attoruey General's written case for the prosecution . which was lodged, together with the file, in the registry of the Indictments Chamber on 31 March 1980, contained the same submissions . He requested the Indictnteuts Chamber of the Paris Court of Appeal (hereinafter called the Indictments Chantber) to order proceedings to be taken against Freche, SimonÃ©, TessÃ¨dre and the app)icant . Further invesrigatia n 12 . Atter the preliminary investigations were closed, new evidence came to light . Oo 17 April 1980 . after the press . radio and television had spoken o f
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police reports coutaiuing evidence which might be relevant to proceedings, the Attornev General filed a supplementary application asking for further investigations . Ou 18 April 1980 the applicant also filed a memorial requesting the court . inter alia, to order a further investigation . On 21 April 1980 the party claiming civil damages also applied for further investigations . Defence counsel represeutiug Freche aud SimonÃ© did the same on 22 April . 13 . By au order of 25 April 1980 the Indictments Chamber decided that, in the circumstances, there was no reason to hear and decide the applicant's request for discharge . However, it ordered a further investigation to verify the existence of two documents (alleged police reports dated 1 April, 24 September 1976) and it thev existed, to add them to the fife . It also ordered the investigation of the couditions in which they had been made, and a check whether they contained new evidence ot a nature to throw further light on the crime, and, if so, the pursuit of all necessary further investigations . The Iudictntents Chamber appointed Mr A . Chevalier, a judge of the Court of Appeal and a member of the Indictments Chamber, to conduct this further iuvestigation . During the months of May, June and July 1980, Mr Chevalier heard uunierous police officers and in October he resumed the examinatiou and hearing of the persons more directly connected with the case . By au order of 9 June 1981 the Indictments Chamber ordered the file of the proceediugs, iucludiug further investigations to be lodged with the registry . 14 . Iu the prosecution case of 23 June 1981, the Attorney General applied to the Court to proceed with the indictments of Freche, SimonÃ©, TessÃ©dre and the applicaut and to comntit them for trial at the Assize Court . Bv a ntemorial of 20 June 1981 the applicant requested the court to discharge him . By order of 8 July 1981 the Indictments Chamber confirmed the charges against Freche, SintonÃ©, TessÃ¨dre and the applicant and committed them for trial before the Paris Assize Court . In view of the complexity of the facts, the court found it desirable to set out the case, in its order comprising nearly a 1 00 pages . in three parts : the results of the original preliminary investigations, the supplemeutary iuvestigation and, finally, the parties' memorials, the explauatious of the accused and the charges brought against them . The court had thus fouud itself obliged to study in detail the successive stages of the preparatious of the crime, the conduct of the investigation, the various hypotheses, the role played by the accused and the complex relations between the applicaut aud the ntain figures in the case . Bet'ore reaching its conclusion, it gave an accouut of the personality of the accused . The applicant is described as follows : highlv intelligent, careful, master of his emotions, sure ot himselt and well adapted to realities . According to the psychiatrists, he wa s
fully responsible for his acts . His police record includes several prison sentences, iucluding one of 8 years for fraud, misappropriation, forgery of documents sigued in blank, issue of uncovered cheques, forging cheques, forgery and uttering .
15 . On 31 July 1981, the applicant was notified that he would be required to appear bel'ore the Assize Court from 4 November to 24 December 1981 . Ou 28 September 1981, the Attorney General applied to the President of the Assize Court for a further investigation and adjournment to a later session . In tact, according to the Attorney General, it appeared from the proceedings that Dr Azerad, at'ter receiving a visit from one of the applicant's counsel and auticipating a search of her practice, destroyed her appointment diaries, in particular the one for 1976 . containing details of the visits of Jean de Broglie ou 26 November and 10 Decentber . This would tend to destroy the case agaiust the applicaut, as these dates were precisely those fixed for arranging two ambushes . The search for these diairies was necessary in order to establish the truth . Ou I October 1981 the President of the Assize Court decided that the Attorney Geueral should make the application to the court during the hearing, it' he thought lit, since, in view of the nature and importance of the case, the question ol' a further investigation should be considered by the court in the presence ol' the parties . 16 . The heariug commenced on 4 November 1981 . On 23 December 1981 the Assize Court seulenced the applicant to 10 years' iniprisonntent, as an accessarv to intentional homicide . The two co-accused Freche and SimonÃ© were each seutenced to 10 years' and TessÃ¨dre to 5 years' imprisonment . The applicaut appealed against this judgment to the Court of Cassation . but his appeal was rejected as being out of time, by a judgment of the crintiual division of the court on 9 June 1982 . 111 . Imprisunmen t 17 . The applicaut subniitted 11 applications for release, relying, alternately aud sintultaneously, on his innocence and on health grounds . Below are the court decisious ou these applications and the measures taken with regard to the applicaut's health . Duriug the investiga[ion s 18 . In his lirst application for release, on 15 January 1978, the applicant disputed the cogeucy of Ihe charges against him . On 19 January 1978 the investigating judge ordered his release subject to court supervision peudiug trial . The judge pointed out that, after having been accused by SimonÃ©, the applicant reported to the police to explain these
accusations "which had been put forward at length during the investigation, but had been shown on several occasions to be lacking in consistency and even coherencÃ©' . The judge found that the "12 months of investigation had not made it possible to provide supporting evidence (particularly physical evidence) ot these accusations which thus remain, as at the beginning, the only evidence" agaiust the applicant . In consequence "until better information was received" SimonÃ©'s accusations must "still be taken into consideration" even though thev were not in themselves sutlicient to justify keeping the applicant in prison .
On appeal by the prosecution . the Indictments Chamber set aside this order . by its decision of 9 February 1978 . The Indictments Chamber pointed out that "the uncertainty as to the exact role De Varga was supposed to have played (true and only instigator of the crime, or mere middleman) and the uncertainty of his personal motives, and iudeed the uucertainty about the exact role and motives of SimonÃ© (who had fouud a killer, paid by De Varga or someone else) showed clearly that the truth . . . could not al the moment be considered to have been discovered" . Moreover, it found that SimonÃ©'s siatements were "not affected by any objective or fundamental contradictions" which would destroy the case against the applicant . It set out other eveidence supporting the charges against the applicaut : the close connection with Dr Azerad and incitement to destroy her appointmeuts diary relating to Mr de Broglie (cf . paras . 10 and 15), frequent connections with SimonÃ© . use of a "Eurosignal" system . It considered that the applicaut's "spoutaueous" action on 29 December 1976 was not a guarantee of his good t'aith, or of his appearing before the court in future ; the fact that an expulsion warraut had beeu issued against the applicant in 1967, his numerous couvictious, the uufavourable reports and the sentence served, were all factors which made the assurances that he would appear for trial unreliable . It turther drew atteution to the minute preparation and manner of execution of the crime, which had very seriously disturbed the public peace . It concluded that deteution was "the only means of preserving evidence,, preventing pressure on witnesses aud fraudulent arrangements" . It was also "necessary to preserve public order from the unrest caused by the offence, and guarantee that the accused would remain at the disposal of the court" . 19 . The second application for release was submitted on 19 June 1978 . By Order of 26 June 1978 the investigating judge ordered his release peudiug trial subject to court supervision, on the ground that "since the order . . . of 9 February 1978 . no new evidence had been received which could support the accusations against Pierre De Varga by Guy SimonÃ© . These therefore rentaiu as forceful and consistent as before, but with the same contradictions aud iucoherence, and thus constitute the only real evidence agaiust the applicant" . The judge, in particular, raised the question whethe r -194-
coutiuued detention was still necessary, since the tinte which had passed since the murder "was makiug the risk of destruction of evidence, pressure on wituesses, cottusiou with possible accomplices or disturbance of the public peace, increasingly less acute" . The prosecution appealed and the Indictments Chamber set this order aside by its decisiou of 121uly 1978 . In its decision, the Indictments Chamber repeated the reasons given in its previous decision . 20 . On 9 July 1979, the applicant's defence counsel asked the investigating judge to euquire into the applicant's state of health . Bv order of 24 July 1979 the judge appointed Drs Bailly and Sauvan to examiue the applicaut and say whether "he was receiving in prison the treatntent required by his state of health, and whether this state was or was uot compatible with ordinary intprisonment . If not, to state whether the accused could receive the necessary treatment in a prison, or whether he should be transt'erred to a hospital" . The experts' medico-legal report dated 1 August 1979 and filed on 21 September 1979 reached the following conclusions : "l . Mr De Varga's present state of health, although complicated, is not inconipatible with imprisonment . 2 . Reservations must, however, be made in view of the patient's age and the recent apparition of functional symptoms .
3 . Further examinations would thus appear to be necessary, which could be uudertaken either by the prison's administration or by admission to the Central Prison Hospital" . By orders of 26 September and 1 6 October 1979 the investigating judge appointed as experts Drs Sauvan, Thervet and Bailly, to undertake a further medical examiuation of the applicant, taking account of the additional examinations which had been made by the prison services . The medico-legal report dated 20 October 1979 reached the conclusion that : 1 . the applicant "is at present receiving the necessary treatment with the prison adntinistration ; 2 . there is at present no evidence to suggest that his state is incompatible with the conditious of intprisonmenP" . 21 . The third apptication for release is dated 22 November 1979 . Bv order of 1 December 1979 the judge dismissed the application on the grouuds that there were still serious presumptions of guilt, and, owing to the seriousness of the ot'teuce, it must be feared that the applicant would attemp t
to elude the course of justice . It followed that impri sonment was the only means of preserving evidence . preventing pressure on witnesses and fraudulent collusiou between the accused and his accomplices . Arguing that the investigating judge had not reached a decision within 5 days ot his application, the applicant brought the ma tt er directly before the Indictments Chamber, relying on A rt icle 148 of the Code of Criminal Procedure . By decision ot" 20 December 1979, the Indictments Chamber declared his applicatiou iuadmissible . It found that the judge had sent the application to the prosecution as soon as it was received, on 27 November 1979, and had dismissed the applicatiou by an Order of I December 1979, i .e . within the time prescribed by A rt icle 148 of the Code of C ri minal Procedure . It followed that the order disntissing the application on 1 December 1979 had become liual . The applicant appealed to the Court of Cassation against this decision . By decision of 1I March 1980, the Court of Cassation dismissed the appeal, on the grouod that the decision complained of "had rightly declared that the provisions of the last paragraph of Article 148 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were not applicable in this case . These provisions allow the accused to briug a matter directly before the Indictments Chamber only if the iuvestigatiug judge fails to reach a decision within 5 days of the commuuication of the application for release to the Public Prosecutor . which was not the position in the instant case" . During the jurther investigations 22 . Ou 24 March 1980 the applicant's defence counsel presented a fu rt her application for an expert medical opinion to the investigating judge . As the latter was J'unctus ojficio with effect from 21 March 1980, on 4 April the Attoruey Geueral requested the Indictments Chamber to order this expe rt opiuion . By decisiou of 24 April 1980 the Indictments Chamber appointed Drs Riveliue, Sauvan and JonquÃ¨res . In Iheir repo rt , dated S May and filed on 22 May 1980, the expe rt s reached the conclusion that the applicant could receive any treatment required bv his state of health through the prison administration, pa rt icularly as regards the diabetic diet . Pointing out that the applicant was over 70, had been in prison for more than 3 years, and was suffering from progressive coronary insut}iciency . they considered that his state of health, although precarious, was not absolutely incompatible with imprisonment . Ou 4 June 1980, the Attorney General informed the Governor of the SautÃ© Prison that the experts considered that the prisoner required a diabetic diet .
Bv decision of 20 lune 1980, the Indictments Chamber decided that the applicant's state of health, although precarious, was not incompatible with imprisoument . It ordered that the conclusions of the expert opinion of 5 May 1980 should be brought to the attention of the prison administration . 23 . At the sante time the applicant presented his fourth and fifth applicatious Por release, dated S and 18 April 1980 . By decisiou of 9 May 1980, the Indictments Chamber ordered the joinder of the two proceedings and a medical expert opinion . The experts tiled their report dated 17 May 1980 and 22 May, reaching the couclusiou that , "1 . The prisoner, who is 70 years o1d, diabetic and suffering from geiieralised arterial defects (progressive coronary insufficiency, sequels ot vascular cerebral Iesions . arteriopathy of the lower limbs, weakening of iutelligeuce and reduced vision in the left eye) can and is actually receiving all the treatment required by his state of health through the prison admiuistration ; it should be noted that he requires a diabetic diet . 2 . Although precarious, his state of health is not absolutely incompatible with imprisoumeut . It should be noted that the prisoner is over 70 and has beeu in prison for more than 3 years, is suffering from progressive coronary insutliciency with unstable pseudo-angina pectoris and previous vascular cerebral lesioni" . On 24 Juue 1980, the principal doctor of the SantÃ© Prison told the Presideut of the Indictments Chamber that the applicant's defence counsel had already seut him the expert opinions of S and 17 May . He pointed out that the applicaut's diabetic imbalance was not due to the food he was given . He was receiving a perfectly correct diet . On the other hand, the canteen had lree discretion and it was difticult for the medical service to intervene authoritatively to control it . Moreover the applicant had always refused to euter the hospital at Fresnes, as he had been advised, with a view to improving his diabetic treatment . Bv decision of 20 June 1980, the Indictments Chamber rejected the two applications for release, and ordered that the conclusions of the expert opiuions of 17 Mav should be brought to the knowledge of the prison administratiou in order that the applicant should receive all the care required by his state of health and be given a diabetic diet . On the merits, the reasons given were substautially the same as in the two preceding decisions . 24 . The sixth applicatiou for release was dated 9 July 1980 . Bv decisiou of 31 July 1980 the Indictments Chamber rejected this applicatiou, restating, in general, the reasons in its previous decisions .
The applicant was admitted to the Central Prison Hospital in Fresnes from 7 August to 29 September 1980 because of an attack of angina pectoris, and from 22 October to 28 October 1980 for examination after a malaise . 25 . The seventh application for release was presented on 29 August 1980 . The applicant alleged that the further investigation had produced evidence tending to establish his innocence . Bv a Mentorial of 23 September 1980, the applicant told the Indictments Chamber "that there (was) no longer any reason to proceed on the matter in question" . In fact, not yet having been examined by the judge delegated by the ludictments Chantber, he claimed to be entitled to rely on Article 148 (4) of' the Code of Criminal Procedure, which permits an accused to bring an application for release directly before the Indictments Chamber on the expiration of 4 months after his last appearance before the investigating judge . The Ã¢pplicant alleged that owing to the failure of the Indictments Chaniber to make a decision within the statutory period of 15 days (last paragraph of Article 148) it could ouly confirm that the committal warrant of 3 1 December 1976 had lapsed . As a result the applicant should be released . By decision of I October 1980, the Indictments Chamber rejected this application, pointing out that under the wording of Article 148 (4) these provisions were applicable "only so long as the order terminating the investigation has not been made" . In this case, however, such an order had been ntade (order transferring the documents dated 21 March 1980) . As regards the merits, the Indictments Chamber, taking account of all the circumstauces, including the medical circumstances of the case, dismissed the applicatimt for release, for the reasons it had given previously . The applicaut appealed to the Court of Cassation exclusively on the questiou oP the applicability ot' Articte 148 of the Code of Criminal Procedure . By a decision of 20 January 1981, the Court of Cassation dismissed th e appeal, finding that the decision complained of had rightly stated that Article 148 (4) was not applicable . The eighth application .26 for release was presented on 27 October 1980, th e applicant again asking for a medical expert opinion . By decision of 7 November 1980 the Indictments Chamber appointed Drs Riveline . Sauvan aud JonquÃ¨res . The experts tiled their report, dated 25 November 1980, on 2 December . Their conclusions were as follows : "I . Mr Pierre De Varga-Hirsch cannot be properly treated in prison for his severe old-age diabetes, with progressive cardio-vascular and cerebral complications .
2 . His increasingly precarious state of health is becoming less nnd less contpatible with prolonged detention . There is a risk of accidents e .g . coma, infarctiou, or cerebral lesions . u i these circumstances, continued detention involves medical risks which we can only advise should not be taken" . Ou 8 December 1980 the applicant was admitted to the Central Prison Hospital in Fresnes . He was examined on 10 and 11 December by a hea rt specialist in this hospital and by the Medical Registrar-General of Prison Hospitals . Their repo rt showed that the applicant was not following his anti-diabetic diet properly . The doctors presc ribed strict supervision, especially of diet, and daily coutrol ot' glycemia, with treatment for his cardio-vascular insutliciency . They considered that this supe rv ision and treatment could ordiuarily be giren in a depa rt ment as specialised as the Fresnes hospital . According to the medical repo rt , the applicant's state of health was compatible with detentiou under constant medical supervision . In view ot a certaiu lack of precision in the expe rt s' repo rt and of the applicaut's admissiou to hospital on 8 December, the Indictments Chamber, by a decision of 19 Decentber 1980, ordered a fu rt her expert opinion, and appoiuted new expert s : Drs Martin, Plas and Mundler. The medical repo rt . dated 5 Janua ry and filed on 12 Janua ry 1981, came to the conclusiou that : - the appticaut's state ot' health was not compatible with imprisonmeht, uuless he could be properly treated both for diabetes and as regards the other therapy required ; - such treatmeut and supe rvision were not available at the Central Prison Hospital iu Fresiies ; - it t'ollowed that the applicant's state of health was not compatible with contiuued imprisountent in the present conditions . As a result of htis expe rt opinion, the prison asministration transferred the applicant ou 9 January 1 981 to the H6tel-Dieu in Paris . a hospital run by public assistance, where he could receive the required treatment . By decisiou of 3 0 lauuary 1981, the Indictments Chamber dismissed the applicatiou for release for the reasons sel out in its previous decisions . It ordered that the new expert opinion should be sent to the prison administration aud to Ihe Medical Registrar of the H6tel-Dieu . 27 . The ninth application for release was presented on 9 March 1981 . In support of this application the applicant produced an expert opinion prepared oit 16 Jauua ry 1981 by Dr fxcoeur, in connection with other proceedings against the applicant, to decide whether in his state of health it was possible for hint to be transferred from prison to the Court s . According to this expe rt
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opinion, the applicant was liable to suffer a serious heart attack or brain injury which might be fatal ; this meant that the transfer of the applicant to the court would involve a special convoy and the presence during the hearing of a medical teant ready to act at any moment . By decision of I April 1981 the Indictments Chamber ordered a further expert opinion . The experts tiled their report dated 24 April on 7 May . They found that the applicaut was in a cardio-vascular state practically identical with that showu in the previous exmination (report tiled on 12 January 1981) . On the other hand, the diabetes had become worse and was particularly badly balanced, as a result of the absence of insulin treatment which the applicant refused, going so far as to give a written statement absolving the hospital services from liability for the possible consequences of failing to give this treatment . The experts noted, however, that he was under the supervision of doctors ready to intervene at short notice, and reached the conclusion that he was receiving the treatment required by this state of health . By decision of 29 May 1981 the Indictments Chamber dismissed his apptication for release for the same reasons as before . It ordered that the expe rt opinions should be notified to the medical authorities concerned .
28 . The tenth application for release was presented on 3 June 1981 . By decision of 12 June 1981, the Indictments Chamber ordered a new medical expert opinion, appointing Drs Plas, Martin, Mundler and JonquÃ¨res . In their report of 30 June, filed on 2 July 1981, the experts conclude d that the applicant's state of health was compatible with detention in a hospital . By decision of 10 July 1981 the Indictments Chamber dismissed the application for release
. The eteveuth application for release was dated 29 July 1981 . .29 By decision of 31 August 1981, the Indictments Chamber ordered an expert opinion by Drs Plas . Martin, Mundler . JonquÃ¨res and Steg . In their report of 28 September, filed on 13 October 198 1 , the experts coticluded that the applicant's state of health was compatible with imprisonment and that the treatment he was receiving was adequate . At the hearing in the Indictments Chamber on 23 October 1981, the applicant withdrew his application for release and the Indictments Chamber took formal notice of this decision .
COMPLAINTS The applicant's complaints may be summarised as follows : 30 . The applicant alleges, firstly, a violation of Articles 2 and 3, taken together, of the Convention . The applicant's detention had on several occasions been considered b y the ntedical experts as incontpatible with his state of health . Special measures were, adntittedly, taken after representations by counsel, but no one could allege that they were sufticient to prevent all risk of heart attack or cerebral, cardo-vascular injury . In fact his state of health was deteriorating . He referred, in particular, to the expert opinion by Dr Lecoeur of 16 January 1981 . This doctor considered that a fatal accident could riot be ruled out and might occur at any ntoment . 31 . The applicant alleges, secondly, a violation of "Article 5(1) (n)" of the Conveutiou for the reasons set out in his memorial to the Indictments Chamber of 23 September 1980 (cf . para . 25 above) . 32 . Thirdly . the applicant alleges a violation of Article 5 (3) Convention .
At the time of lodging his application, Mr De Varga had been in deteution ou rentand tor 5 years, which exceeded the reasonable time prescribed by Article 5 (3) of the Convention, particularly in view of the fact that the tile contained no precise evidence against him, other than the statements of a person, who was himself intplicated in the case .
33 . Finally he alleges a violation of Article 6 (1) of the Convention, which guarantees the individual's trial within a reasonable time . PROCEEDINGS 34 . The application was introduced on 27 October 1981 and registered on 28 October 1981 . On 5 Februarv 1982 the application was submitted to a single member of the Comntission, who prepared a report . as required by Rule 40 of the Contniission's Rules ot Procedure . Ou 3 March 1982, the Commission decided to bring the application to the attention ot the respondent Government and invite it to submit its observations in writing ou the admissibility and merits of the application (Rule 42 (2) (b) ot' the Rules of Procedure), by 31 May 1982 . The Governnient was requested, in particular, to comment on the tollowiug questions . What is the:I respoudent Government's opinion concerning the Commissiou's jurisdiction rntione (eniporis in relation to the facts of the case ?
2 . With regard to the complaint concerning the length of detention on remand, could the applicant have appealed to the Court of Cassation against the decisious of the Indictments Chamber, dismissing his applications for release and, if so, would such an appeal have constituted an effective remedy iu view of Article 26 of the Convention ? 3 . Did, or did not, the lengthof the applicant's detention on remand exceed the reasonable time prescribed in Article 5 (3) of the Convention ? â¢ 4 . Could the applicant's continued detention on remand be justified uuder Articles 3 and 5 (3) of the Convention in view of his state of health ? 5 . Had, or had uot, the length of the proceedings exceeded the reasonable tinte prescribed by Article 6(1) of the Convention ?OntheapliconftherspondtGvernmt'sAgen . the period se t
for tiling the observations was extended, and the Government's observations were preseuted on 19 July 1982 . . ~ . The applicant's counsel was invited toreply to theseobservations by I October 1982 . On his application, this period was extended and the observations in reply were presented on 2 Noventber 1982 . On 13 December 1982 the Commission decided to request the parties to submit tfurther oral observations on the admissibility and merits of the application (Rule 42 (3) of the Rules of Procedure) . At the hearing, which was held ou 9 May 1983, the parties were represented as follows : the respondent Government bv Mr G . Guillaunte, Agent, assisted by Miss A . Pezard . Mr S . Amarger and Mr M . Arnould . Advisers, and the applicantby Mrs J . and Mr C . Imbach . -
THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES 1 1 . Jurisdiction ratlone temporis
a. The Governrnen t 35 . When sigtiing the declaration of acceptance of individual petitions on2 October 1981 . France did not declare, . as other states had done . that it recognised the Commission's jurisdiction solely in relation to facts occurring after the date of this declaration . On at least three occasions the Commission had rejected applications based on facts prior-to the declaration for reasons other than-lack of jurisdiction ratlone temporis . Legal writers had drawn the conclusion that the Commission had impliedlv recognised the retrospective effect of declarations signed without spÃ©cifying the date .
However, in a decision relating to the temporal limitation inserted in the dcclaration made by Italy under Article 25, the Commission had pointed out the difliculties involved in an examination relating to facts occurring several years prior to the acceptance of the right of individual petition (cf . No . 6323/73 . DR 3, p . 80) . Moreover, according to legal theorists, procedural legislation has no retrospective effect, but only applies to current situations . Finally, the United Nations Committee has refused to give retrospective effect to the optional Protocol providing a remedy similar to that contained in Article 25 . ut these circunistances the Government leaves the matter to the enlighteued discretion of the Commission (cf . declaration of the Minister responsible fbr European Affairs of 13 October 1981) . It added that the applicant had been tried atter 2 October 1981 ; the application thus related in part to facts subsequent to that date . b. The applicaa t 36 . The applicant poiuted out that in several cases the Commission had accepted the retrospective effect of declarations signed without specifying the date . Moreover, the application related to facts occurring after 2 October 1981 . The Contmissiou thus had jurisdiction rwione tetnporis 11 . Compllance with the six-months' rul e a . The Garerrmtea t
37 . It the Commission accepted the retrospective effect of the French declaration, the six-months' period should begin to run from 2 October 1981 . This seemed to result tFom previous decisions (cf. the De Becker case, Decisiou No . 846/60 v . Netherlands) . b . The applican t 38 . Prior to 2 October 1981 the applicant was not in a position to lodge an application with the Commission . The period must, therefore, run from that date . 111 . Exhaustion of domeetic remedie s a . The Govenunea t 39 . Detention ou remand is ordered by a warrant issued by the investigating judge (Article 146 of the Code of Crintinal Procedure) . Release may be applied for at auy time (Article 148 (1)) . The judge must make a decision within 5 davs of the transmission of the file to the Public Prosecutor (Article 148 (3)) . The judge's order is subject to appeal (Article 186), and an appeal lies against the Court of Appeal's decision to the Court of Cassation (Article 567 et seq) . If the judge fails to ntake a decision within the time prescribed, the accuse d
may bring the matter directly before the Indictments Chamber, which is required to reach a decision within 15 days, failing which the accused is released (Article 148 (6)) . Furthermore, the Convention is directly applicable in domestic law and may be relied on in all courts . Decisions on the merits relating to detention on remand are subject to the control of the Court of Cassation . This Court decides in law and not in fact, and does not make a finding on the facts, as such . But, as regards detention on remand, it examines the reasons given and iusists that they must itot consist of stereotyped formulae, but be based on the particular circumstances . They must be adequate and free from contradictions . The Court of Cassation had already applied the Convention . The Government referred in particular to . a decision of the Court of Cassation of 22 February 1982 (No . 8I-94, 591) on an appeal by Henri Touton .
The Commission requires that all remedies available in domestic law, iucludiug au appeal to the Court of Cassation, should be tried (cf. Bonazzi, DR 15, p . 181) . lit the instant case, however, the applicant had only appealed to the Court of Cassatiou on two of his eleven applications . The Contmission also requires that all legal grounds provided by the dontestic law should have been argued . However, at no time did the applicant rely on the provisions of the Convention . The applicaut had therefore not exhausted domestic remedies .
b. The applican t 40 . The objectiou of systematically failing to bring the matter before the Court ot' Cassation is unfounded . That Court decides only questions of law aud not of fact . His state of health and the concept of "reasonable timÃ©" were questions of fact . As all the decisions of the Indictments Chamber were provided with reasous, appeals to the Court of Cassation would therefore have been ol' uo avail aud were not effective remedies . The Government admits that the applicant made two appeals to the Court of Cassation, which were unsuccessful . The applicant did in fact rely on the Convention, for example in his eighth application, by alleging that his detention was contrary to "the general principles of law", because it involved a danger to his life . Furthermore, in criminal matters written pleadings were scarcely ever fi1ed ; in fact, the applicant's defence counsel had always relied on the incompatibility of his detention with human rights . Finally, after 2 October 1981, the date of the French declaratiou, the applicant could no longer appeal to the Court of Cassatiou . It followed that the applicant had exhausted the domestic remedies .
IV . The status of victi m a . The Governwren t 41 . Shortly after lodging his application, the applicant was found guilty of the charges for which he had been placed in detention on remand, and sentenced to 10 years' intprisonment . This supports the statements in the decisious ot the Indictments Chantber, referring to the evidence against the applicaut . The fact of being sentenced to a term of imprisonment considerably louger than the deteution on remand prevents the applicant from arguing that he is a victim of a violation of Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention . Account should be taken of the possible material or non-material prejudice caused by the alleged violatiou . In the instant case, it was diff-icult to see what was the prejudice sutfered . Given that he was guilty, the applicant had no non-material advantage in having his guilt established rapidly . He did not raise the question ot' the Convention for the first time until he came before the Assize Court, i .e . atter lodging his applicatiou with the Commission . Again, as regards possible material damage . it should be noted that detention on remand is set off against the sentence imposed . Finally, a possible release in the present case would have had no practical effect, as there were tive other proceedings peudiug against the applicant . The applicant cannot be considered to be a victim of an alleged violation ot' Articles 5(3) and 6(1) .
b . The applicu n t r 42 . The tact that the applicant has been given a sentence longer than his deteutiou on reniand does not mean that he cannot claim to be a victim of a violatiou of the Convention . The harm results from the fact that the sentences imposed are uever shorter than the length of the detention on remand . If he had not been in prison, the sentence imposed would probably have been shorter .
Length of detention on reman d a . The Governmen t 43 . Article 5 (3) does not lay down exact criteria, but must be interpreted having regard to all the circumstances of the case . The reasonableness of the leuglh of the period of detention ntust be assessed essentially on the basis of the reasons given in the decisions . The investigating judge's order placing a person in detention on remand must give specific reasons (Articles 144 and 145 of the Code of Crintinal Procedure) .
44 . The reasons given by the courts for keeping the applicant in detention on remand are essentially : - the evidence against hi m - the danger of interference with evidence, pressure on witnesses, fraudulent collusion and the requirements of the investigatio n - the danger of'the accused's absconding,and - Ihe seriousuess of the offences .
45 . In the instaut case, the length of detention on remand coincided with that of the proceedings . This cannot be considered as contrary to Article 6 (1) (cf . VII below) . As regards Article 5 (3), it suffices to point out that : - the case was exceptionally complex ; - as several persons were involved in the crime, the authorities had to euquire into the part played by each of them, the applicant's position being to some extent tied up with that of the co-accused ; - the authorities conducted more than 200 examinations and hearing of witnesses, issued numerous requests for letters rogatory (seven of which were interuational), conducted many enquiries, etc . The applicant sumitted 11 applications for release . The authorities were thus obliged to examine his position very thoroughly . In their decisions, which are turnished wilh detailed reasons, the evidence he produced was taken into consideration . The leugth of detention on remand did not exceed the reasonable time prescribed by Article 5 (3) . 46 . The applicant had also made a complaint under Article 5(1) (a) of the Convention (cf .Complaints, para . 31 above) . This complaint was based on the grounds that were set out in the applicant's Memorial of 23 September 1980 (ct'. Facts, para . 25) and was obviously ill-founded . When his third application tor release was dismissed, the applicant, whether intentionally or otherwise, committed a procedural error . He brought his application directly before the ludictments Chamber, which rejected it . b . The applican r 47 . The detention ou remand, lasting five years . exceeded the reasonable time prescribed by Article 5 (3) . The reasons given in the decisions dismissing his applications for release were too general . The courts systematically repeated the reasons specified in the Code ot Criminal Procedure, without ever stating in what way imprisonment would be the only means of preserving evidence, how public order would be jeopardised or how it would be impossible to guarantee that the accused was kept at the disposal of the court . - 2l16 -
The Government seems to be criticising the applicant because he denied taking part in the otience, in spite of the evidence against him . Must an accused automatically be kept in detention on remand if he claims to be iuuocent? The danger of absconding was alleged to have existed at the begiuning of the investigation, but the applicant reported voluntarily . The complexitv of the case was no justirication for keeping him in detention . The applicant could not be blamed for having applied for release several times .
VI . Imprlsonment and the state of the applicant's healt h
a. The Governmen t 48 . The applicant is relying on Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention . In notifving the Goverumeut o( the application, the Commission put a question in this conuection which related only to the application of Articles 3 and 5 (3) . It is thus merely iucidentally that the Government states that it does not see on what basis it could be argued that the measures taken by the French authorities, with regard to the applicant, constituted an infringement of his right to life . 49 . The Goverument rejects the idea that the way in which prisoners are treated medically can fall under Article 3 . Prisoners are under constant supervision by doctors andnurses with the same qualifications as those caring tor the population outside . If admittance to hospital is necessary, the prisoners are placed in the Central Prison Hospital at Fresnes or the hospital al Baumettes, it their illness can be treated there . In other cases, they are sent to a public hospital .
50 . In the present case the authorities complied with all the applicant's requests for expert medical opinion . Each time a medical ground was put torward in au apptication for release, the Indictments Chamber ordered an expert niedical opinion . The applicant himself was in part responsible for his bad health : - either because he refused to be admitted to Fresnes Hospital (cf . para . 23 above) . o r - by not properlv t'ollowing his diabetes diet (cf . paras . 23 and 26), or - by ret'using insulin treatment (cf . para . 27) . The authorities have always taken the steps indicated in the expert opinious in t'avour of the applicant . With effect from 8 December 1980 (ef . para . 26) . the applicaut, who had already twice been in hospital (cf . para . 24), was coutinuouslv under hospital treatment . The appticant's continued detention on remand, even taking his state of health into account, was justitied, having regard to Article 3 and 5 (3) .
b . The applican t 5 1 . Article 2 provides the basis for Article 3 . An infringement of a person's right to life may take the form of making him run dangers to his health by prolonged detention which might result in a heart attack . The authorities had not always acted on the recommendations, in favour of the applicant, in the expe rt opinions, if one could judge by Dr Lecoeur's repo rt ot 16 January 1981 (cf. para . 27 above) . He had expressed the opinion that the possibility of a fatal accident, at any moment, could not be excluded . There were, there(ore, no reasonable grounds justifying detention, seeing that the tirst investigating judge had, as early as 1978, ordered release under cou rt superv ision .
VII . Length ofthe proceedings u . The Governmen t 52 . The period niust be calculated from 30 December 1976 (arrest warrant) to 23 December 1981 (couviction) . The appeal to the Court of Cassation, which was lodged out-of-time . was merely a delaying tactic . The period betweeu the conviction and the judgment of 9 June 1982 should therefore not be takeu into consideration . 53 . The case was exceptionally complicated . This was due to the multifarious activities of the victim, his relations with some of the accused and the relations oP the accused between themselves, and also the number and characters of the accused . As several persons were implicated, in order to discover the truth, the authorities had to investigate the part played by each of them . In fact the applicant's positiou was tied up with that of his co-accused . Furthermore, the latter had repeatedly asked for further investigations . The case had extremely complicated and numerous financial implications . It had lead to detailed investigations in several banks and insurance companies . 54 . Proceediugs in which one of the principal accused, in this case the applicaut, deuies all connection with the case, inevitably take longer than proceedings in which the accused co-operates in a reasonable way . When SimonÃ© asked for further investigations in 1978, Ribemont, but not the appticaut, protested against the prolongation of the investigation . The applicant, on the contrary, asked-for further investigations . Finally, when the questiou of further investigation was raised in April 1980, the applicant asked tor the investigation to be extended . 55 . Throughout the iuvestigation, the authorities increased the -number of heariugs of witnesses, examinations, confrontations of witnesses, expert opinions, directions by the court, enquiries and national and international letter s
rogatorv . As the case aroused particular interest with the general public, the press put forward theories which, in the interests of discovering the truth, the authorities could not afford to neglect . It tollows that the reasonable time prescribed in Article 6( 1) has not been exceeded . b . The applican t 56 . As regards the period to be taken into consideration, the appeal to the Court of Cassation should be included, as it has a suspensive effect . 57 . The Government's arguments about complexity are not convincing . Nunterous iuvestigations are required in every case . The Government does not give details and its statements are not convincing, as they are too general . 58 . As regards Ihe applicant's conduct, the Government states that he is responsible for the leugth of the proceedings, because he denied any connection with the case . It was precisely because he denied being connected with the case that the applicant had asked for t'urther measures on several occasions . He was entitled to ensure that the truth was brought to light and he cannot be blamed for that . The applicant recalled that he reported voluntarily to the police . The length of the proceedings did exceed the reasonable time prescribed in Article 6 (1) . -
THE LA W 1 . The applicant has made various complaints about his detention on rentand and the criminal proceedings against him . The facts of the case go back to a period between 30 December 1976, the date of the applicant's arrest . and 9 June 1982, the date of the Court of Cassation's judgment declaring iuadniissible the applicant's appeal against his conviction on 23 December 1981 . The facts are subsequent to France's ratification of the Convention on 3 May 1974 and, in part . prior to the deposit of the French declaration acceptiug the right of individuat petition under Article 25 of the Convention on 2 October 1981 . Untike other states which have only recognised the Contmission's jurisdictiou to hear individual petitions in relation to facts subsequent to the date of the deposit of the declaration of acceptance of the right of individual petition, the French declaration contains no statement defining the past, tentporal scope of the right of individual petition . In the absence of an express limitation in the French declaration, the Comntission considers that it has jurisdiction rationr rewporis to deal with th e
applicant's complaints, as the tacts were after the date of the ratification of the Coiiveution bv France on 3 May 1974 (cf . Application No . 9587/81, X . v . Frauce, Decision of 13 December 1982, DR 29 . p . 228) . The Government considers that the applicant cannot be deemed to be a .2 victim ot an alleged violation of the Convention . Under Article 25 (I) : "The Commission may receive petitions . . . from any person . . . claiming to be a victint of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in this Convention . . ." . The Commission considers that the Government's arguments (cf. para . 41 above) relate to the merits of the application and not to the question whether the applicant can claim to be a victim, within the meaning of Article 25 . The tact that the applicant was sentenced by the Assize Court to 10 years' imprisonmeut, aud that the length of the detention on remand is deducted trom the sentence, does not mean that he can no longer claim to be a victim of a violatiou of Article 5 (3) . The interests contemplated and protected by this provision are indepeudent of the result of the criminal proceedings . and their possible violation is not compensated by deducting the length of detention on remand from the sentence imposed . The Comntission concludes that the applicant can claim to be a victim of a viotation of the Convention, within the meaning of Article 25 . a . Coniplaints based on Ar[icle 5 (3 ) 3 . The applicant contplains of the length of his detention on remand and claims that it exceeds the reasonable time prescribed in Article 5 (3) of the Convention, which provides that : "Evervone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph I (e) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitted to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial . Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial" . 4 . The detentimt began on 30 December 1976 and continued without a break uutil 23 December 1981, when the applicant was convicted . It thus lasted nearly five years . In fact the couviction did not become final until 9 June 1982, on the dismissal of his appeal to the Court of Cassation, However, according to the established case-law of the Commission and the Court, the applicant should be coiuidered as having been detained between 23 December 1981 and 9 June 1982 iu accordauce with Article 5( 1 ) (a) of the Convention . He canno t
therefore rely on Article 5 (3) 1'or this period (cf . European Court of Human Rights, Wenihoff case, judgntent of 27 June 1968, para . 9 The Law ; cf. Decision on the adntissibility of Application No . 8601/79, M . v . Switzerlattd, where the Commission followed the same conclusion) . 5 . However the Conimission is not required to decide whether the facts alleged bv the applicant disclose an appearance of a violation of the provision invoked . Under Article 26 of the Convention : "The Commission may only deal with the matter atter all domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the geuerally recognised rules of international law, . . . Admittedlv, the applicant repeatedly (cf . above paras . 17 to 29) applied to the courts for release on bail . However, except on two occasions, he did not appeal to the Court ol' Cassation against the decisions of the Indictments Chamber, dismissing his applications . The Commission notes, in this connection, that, in the grounds of the only two appeals he brought, the applicant did not rely either on the Conveution, which is directly applicable in the French legal system, or even on substantively identical provisions of domestic law ; the grounds submitted iu support of these appeals related to specific provisions of the Code of Crimiual Procedure, completely unconnected with Article 5(3) of the Conreutiou .
It is true that the applicant contended (cf . above para . 40) that, with regard to the observauce of the reasonable time, prescribed in Article 5(3) of the Conveution, au appeal to the Court of Cassation was an ineffective remedy because of the court's limited jurisdiction and that he could not therefore be required to use it iu order to satisfy the requirements of Article 26 of the Conreution . Ou the other haud, the Government states (cf. above para . 39) that although the Court of Cassation decides questions of law and not fact, it is nevertheless true that the lawfulness of decisions relating to detention on remaud is coutrolled by that court . The Government has furiher shown that the Court of Cassation has already applied the Convention in a case relating to detention on remand ; in particular it referred to the Touton judgment of 22 February 1982 (No . 81-94, 591) and to a judgment B of 4 January 1983 (No . 82-93 . 809 B) . It has not, however, cited in support of its argument judgmeuts prior to or contemporary with the period during which the applicant wai in detention on remand . In the Commission's opinion it does not follow from this that the applicaut was at the time in question absolved from appealing to the Court of Cassatiou . The present case can be distinguished from the position contemplated bv the Court . for inslauce, in its judgments of 18 June 1971 (De Wilde, Ooms aud Versyp) aud 24 June 1982 (Van Droogenbroeck) . In these two cases th e - 211 -
respoudent Government unsuccessfully raised the objection of failure to exhaust domestic remedies . In the first case it relied on a completely unforeseeable change in judicial doctrine on the part of Conseil d'Etat, which was subsequent to the lodging of the applications in question (De Wilde . Ooms and Versyp judgments para . 62), and, in the second case, it relied on two remedies apparently created by case-law, and also subsequent to the lodging of the application (Van Droogenbroeck, para . 54 and 55) . In the instant case, the remedy, which the Government criticises the applicant for not having tried, is neither new, in relation to those existing at the time of his detention on remand, nor an appeal, which, in the general opiuiou at that time, was likely to be dismissed as inadmissible . It was, in t'act, a traditional appeal to the Court of Cassation, which exists to control decisions brought before it for failure to comply with the law or for violating l'ornts of procedure, which are either substantial or prescribed, on pain of nullitv .
In the instant case, even if the court had never previously had to adopt a position on the compatibility of a decision concerning detention on remand with the requirements of the Convention, it is clear, in the Commission's view, that such a reinedy was available to the applicant under the French legal svstem, and that it was his duty to try it . Thus, "if there is any doubt as to whether a given remedy is or is not intrinsically able to offer a real chance of success, that is a point which must be submitted to the domestic courts themselves, before any appeal can be made to the international court (cf . No . 712/60, Retimag v . FRG . Yearbook 4, pp . 385, 401) . Since this is a question of law and not of fact, the Court of Cassation may decide whether the Iudictments Chamber has given sufficient reasons to establish that the conditions required to justify detention on remand, and the continuance of deteutiou on remand, have been satisfied . Similarly, in its above cited Touton judgmeul, il held "that it did not appear from the documents on the file that Ihe iuvestigatiou, although seemingly complex, had led to a length of detention which was not "reasonable" within the meaning of the European Couveutiou oo Human Rights" . In the Commission's view, it follows front this judgment that the Court of Cassation is in a position to decide, from its examination of the investigation procedure, whether the courts have complied with the requirement of reasonable time prescribed by Article 5 (3) of the Convention . This amounts to a legal definition of a factual situation . Furthermore, the Commission recalls that in the Bonazzi case it held that thÃ© complaint relating to the unreasonable nature of the length of detention on remand must be rejected for failure to exhaust domestic remedies, because the applicant had not appealed to the Cou rt of Cassation against the decisions rejecting his applications for release (cf . No . 7975/77, Bonazzi v . Italy . DR 15, pp . 169, 181) . The Commission considers that this reasoning applies equally in the instant case .
The Commission, therefore, considers that, in the present case, an appeal to the Court of Cassation against the decisions of the Indictments Chamber, relating to the contplaint concerning the unreasonable length of detention on rentand, was, in fact, an adequate and effective remedy of the kind envisaged by Article 26 of the Convention . An exantination of the case, as submitted, has not disclosed any special circumstances which, according to the generally recognised principles of international law, could have absolved the applicant from exhausting domestic remedies . If follows that the applicant has failed to satisfy the requirement of exhaustion of domestic rentedies, and that this pa rt of his application must be rejected, in accordance with Article 27 ( 3) of the Convention . b . Complaints based on Articles 2. 3 . 5(l) (a) and 6( 1 ) 6 . The applicant considers that his detention on remand was contrary to Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention by reason of his state of health . Under Article 2(1) "Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law . No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally except in execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law" . Article 3 provides : "No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatntent or punishment" .
The Commission considers that the applicant has not established in what way his detention placed his life in danger ; there is, therefore . no appearance of a violation of Article 2 . However, it cannot be excluded that detention of a person who is ill may raise issues under Article 3 ot' the Convention . It appears from the u le that the applicant's state of health was poor throughout his detention on remand, and that it became worse . The applicant is a diabetic and suffers from cardio-vascular disorders . It must, however, be recognised that the authorities complied with all the applicant's requests for medical expert opinions . Where the reports were lacking in precision, the authorities did not fail to appoint new experts . In all . 10 reports were drawn up . None of the expert opinions definitely reached the conclusion that the applicant's state of health was incompatible with detention . Some have pointed out the possible risks, in certain circumstanres, of prolonging detention, and the worsening of his health . When the experts recommended the applicant's adniission to hospital, the authorities ordered his transfer to a hospital, twice, on a temporary basis, first to a hospital of the prison administration and, with effect from 9 January 1981, to a hospital run by the Publi c
Assistance . The Government pointed out that the applicant had contributed to his bad state of health by refusing, at a certain period, his transfer to a prison hospital, not properly following his diabetic diet and refusing insulin treatment . The Commission considers that, owing to the special circumstances of the case, the applicant's medical treatment during his detention on remand does not amount to treatment contrary to Article 3 p there is, therefore, no appearance of a violation of this provision . 7 . The applicant also relies on Article 5(1) (a) of the Convention, alleging that his detention was unlawful with effect from a certain date .
Article S ( 1) (a) provides : "Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person . No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law : (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court ; "
The Commission points out that his complaint relates to detention Ã´n remand . As the provision in question relates to detention after conviction, it does not apply . There is therefore no appearance of a violation of this provision . 8 . The applicant complains of a violation of Article 6 (1) of the Convention, on account of the length of the proceedings . Article 6 (1) reads : "In the determination . . . of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a . . . hearing within a reasonable time by (a) . . . tribunal . . . " According to the case-law of the Court and the Commission, the period to be taken into consideration with regard to this provision begins at the time when the tirst charges are brought against the penon concemed, and terminates when a decision is taken on the merits of the charge, even if this decision is by an appeal court, judging the nterits of the charge . (cf. Neumeister judgment of 27 June 1968, paras . 18 and 19 ; KÃ¼nig judgment of 28 June 1978, para . 98 ; Application No . 8261/78 . DR 25, p . 180) . In fixing the dies a quo, the Commission has chosen the day when the suspicions, to which the person concerned was subject, first had important repercussions on his situation . This is the case when an .applicant is arrested and placed in detention on remand, in the instant case, on 30 December 1976 . The Commission considers that, in fixing the dies a queni, it is not necessary to take account of the period from the judgment of the Assize Court of 23 December 1981 to the judgment of the Court of Cassation on 9 June 1982, as this appeal was declared inadmissible t'or beiug lodged oitt of time . It follows that the period to be taken into consideration is flve years .
The reasonableness of the length of proceedings covered by Article 6(1) must be judged according to the circumstances of the case . In deciding whether the length of criminal proceedings was reasonable, the Court and the Commission have taken into consideration, in particular, the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the manner in which the case was dealt with by the authorities (cf . KÃ´nig cited above, para . 99) . The Commission points out that the instant case was certainly extremely complex, particularly on account of the multifarious activities of the victim and his relations with the principal accused . As several persons were implicated iu the murder, the authorities were obliged to ascertain the role played by each of them, given that the applicant's position was, to some extent, bound up with that of his co-accused . The case, in which many people were concerned, involved more than 200 examinations and hearings of witnesses, letters rogatory (seven of which were international), and numerous enquiries, directed, in particular, to banks and insurance companies . The investigation tile comprised 22 volumes . Moreover, the case raised considerable public iuterest and gave rise to numerous controversies . Ou Ihe question of the applicant's behaviour during those proceedings, the Conimissiou notes the large number of applications for release . However, the Commissian recalls that an accused cannot, as a general rule, be held responsible for the prolongation of the proceedings during his detention, for the sole reason that he has exercised rights to which he was entitled . One should, moreover, not lose sight of the fact that the applicant was ill, and that most of his applications relied on his state of health . In any case, the file does not iudicate that the proceedings were unduly retarded by the applicant, or that he made excessive use of the remedies at his disposal . On the question of how the case was conducted by the authorities, the Commission tinds that an examination of the information supplied by the parties . and, iu particular, the table produced by the Government showing the priucipal steps in the proceedings and the measures taken during the applicaut's detentiou, show the large number of procedural measures taken by the authorities and their almost uninterrupted succession . In particular, it may be noted that the investigation was pursued without interruption . It is true that atler three years and three months the investigation was reopened and t'urther iuvestigations ordered, as new evidence had come to light . However, the applicant himsell', the party claiming civil damages and the co-accused all applied for further investigations at that time . In conclusion, the Commission is ot the opinion that . on the whole, the proceedings were conducted without serious delays . In Ihe light of these factors, and, given the complex nature of the case, iu particular . the Commission considers that the proceedings did not excee d
the reasonable time prescribed by Article 6(1) . There is, therefore, no appearance of a violation of this provision . 9 . It follows that the complaints based on A rt icles 2 . 3 . 5(1) (a) and 6(I) are mauifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 (2) of the Couventiou . For these reasons, the Commissio n DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE .
-216-Origine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Commission (plénière)Date de la décision : 09/05/1983Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page