Source: http://nj.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.19680918_0040073.C03.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2017-02-22 01:58:21
Document Index: 468758553

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 462', '§ 1625', '§ 1625', '§ 456', '§ 1625', '§ 1621', '§ 1625']

UNITED STATES OF AMERICAv.WILLIAM FRANCIS KROLL, APPELLANT
Appellant, William Francis Kroll, was convicted by a jury of violating 50 U.S.C.App. § 462 by failing and neglecting to comply with an order of his local draft board to report for and submit to induction into the Armed Forces. It is from the district court's denial of his motion for a new trial that this appeal is taken.*fn1
Although there is a difference of opinion among courts of appeal as to whether the belief of conscientious objection, if it arises after the notice of induction is sent, is the kind of change or event "over which the registrant had no control,"*fn2 we are aware of no appellate decision holding that if a registrant has had ample time to notify the board of his claim before the induction notice is sent, but has failed to do so, he is entitled to have his classification reopened under § 1625.2. Indeed, such a holding would be most anomalous since 32 C.F.R. § 1625.1(b) specifically requires a registrant to report to his local board "within 10 days after it occurs * * * any fact that might result in the registrant being placed in a different classification."
Appellant next directs our attention to several district court cases holding that 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j), which exempts conscientious objectors from combatant training and service, cannot be restricted or limited by the provisions contained in 32 C.F.R. § 1625.2. See United States v. Underwood, 151 F. Supp. 874 (E.D.Pa.1955); United States v. Crawford, 119 F. Supp. 729 (N.D.Cal. 1954); United States v. Clark, 105 F. Supp. 613 (W.D.Pa.1952). The Government, on the other hand, counters by stating that of the many appellate courts that have considered this question, it is unable to find even one tribunal that has not rejected the rationale followed by the above-mentioned district courts. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 374 F.2d 1, 4 (C.A. 5, 1967) (and cases cited therein in note 5.) And after our own independent study, we conclude that we too must reject the reasoning of appellant's authorities, for, as stated by Judge Kaufman in United States v. Gearey, 368 F.2d 144, 149 (C.A. 2, 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 959, 88 S. Ct. 335, 19 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1967),
The weaknesses in this argument are readily apparent. In the first place, the local board was required by 32 C.F.R. § 1621.11 to furnish appellant, upon request, with a copy of the conscientious objector form. Boyd v. United States, 269 F.2d 607 (C.A. 9, 1959). And in the second place, it is evident to us that appellant's local board was acting pursuant to rather than in evasion of § 1625.2 when it met to see whether the information filed by Kroll contained facts indicating "a change in registrant's status resulting from circumstances over which the registrant had no control." Since such a change was not found, appellant's classification was not reopened. There was no waiver.*fn3
After carefully considering all of appellant's contentions we can only conclude that the district court did not err in refusing to grant appellant's motion for a new trial. Accordingly, ...