Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/51572461/kerns-v-cse-sua-sponte-change-and-section-1008
Timestamp: 2017-03-27 21:00:50
Document Index: 356389144

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 4', '§ 2', '§ 1', 'art. 460', '§ 1', 'art. 185', '§ 1', '§ 3', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 533', '§ 533', '§ 1008', '§ 1008', '§ 276']

kerns v cse sua sponte change and section 1008 | Summary Judgment
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FindLaw > FindLaw California > Case Law > California Case Law > slip Cal.App.4th 2003/a092076
Kerns v. CSE Insurance Group (2003) , Cal.App.4th
[No. A092076. First Dist., Div. Three. Feb. 19, 2003.] DARLENE KERNS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CSE INSURANCE GROUP, Defendant and Respondent. (Superior Court of Contra Costa County, No. MSC98-05388, William Kolin, Judge.) (Opinion by McGuiness, P. J., with Corrigan and Parrilli, JJ., concurring.) COUNSEL Semansky & Jenny and Scott E. Jenny, Law Office of Scott E. Jenny and Scott E. Jenny for Plaintiff and Appellant.
" fn. had never met or known appellant before this incident. That's what I intended to do. Appellant "had some plants and stuff hanging. J." and was "hearing voices. C.000. At issue on this appeal are the following contentions: (a) the trial court acted in excess of its jurisdiction by entertaining and ruling on respondent's motion for summary judgment when a different judge had previously denied the identical motion and the renewed motion was in violation of the controlling procedural requirements set forth in section 1008. In the portion dealing with coverage for personal liability." fn. "[s]omething triggered" her. 1 and the denial of her crossmotion for summary judgment. or [¶] b. did not know whom she was attacking." although she "intended to injure the person who was putting the symbols [the hanging plants] up in the front porch. Stein & Richland LLP and Marc J. M. When searched by a Contra Costa County deputy sheriff. 3 In the early morning hours of March 1. which results. P. because in so doing it violated the exclusive and controlling procedural prerequisites set by section 1008 for the reconsideration or renewal of a previously denied motion.'s daughter. Motooka for Defendant and Respondent. Poster. 1997. Martin. She was released to the custody of her father. appellant's assignors." Among the standard endorsements expressly incorporated in the Policy were exclusions from liability coverage for (a) any bodily injury "which is expected or intended by an insured or {Slip Opn. and stab her. grab a knife from the kitchen. LLP and Marjorie E. M." "paranoid. and (c) the undisputed facts demonstrate that appellant herself was entitled to summary judgment on the issue of respondent's duty to defend. According to D. the Policy specified that respondent would defend and indemnify claims made against the insured on account of bodily injury or property damage "caused by an occurrence. Page 2} On the procedural and factual record presented. go into appellant's room. property damage. For these reasons. Prestholt & Fidone.
On February 12. had filed suit to enforce respondent's alleged duty to defend its insureds in a previously-settled personal injury lawsuit.Greines. M. and actually thought she was attacking "[a] man. and "any illegal act commited [sic] by or at the direction of an insured.'s own deposition testimony." as she had for some "[t]wo months or so." When D. was arrested for vandalizing a house with a crowbar. including continuous and repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions. {Slip Opn. bodily injury. during the policy period." Even when she made a conscious attempt to stop using crank. 1997. Page 3} which is the forseeable [sic] result of an act or ommission [sic] intended by an insured". we conclude that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by entertaining respondent's renewed motion for summary judgment. D. the assignee of respondent's insureds. The trial court left unaddressed and undecided important triable issues of material fact on the basis of which summary judgment had previously been denied. Appellant. she was found in possession of two hypodermic syringes. she had been using "[c]rank..." or methamphetamine. Approximately two hours later. "heard" the hanging plants. she broke a window of appellant's house and entered. D. we must reverse. 16-year-old D.Darlene Kerns appeals from summary judgment entered in favor of respondent CSE Insurance Group upon the latter's motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 437c fn. for at least two months. 1998. (b) the trial court erred in determining as a matter of law that there was no potential for coverage under respondent's policy and thus no duty to defend the insureds. "regardless of the number of insureds." The specified limit of liability on coverage "for all damages resulting from any one occurrence" was $100. and found it "addicting."
. respondent issued a personal homeowners policy (the Policy) to C. to January 28. in: [¶] a." {Slip Opn. claims made or persons injured. OPINION MCGUINESS. she continued to hear voices and have visual and auditory hallucinations. effective for the policy period from January 28. causing her to break into appellant's house. 2 The Policy specifically defined "occurrence" as "an accident. Page 4} At the time of the incident she was feeling "temporarily schiz." She "[n]ever intended to hurt" appellant "if I would have known it was a woman. 1997.
. 1998. and that "[i]n doing the acts as {Slip Opn. M. and Mrs.'s acts were intentional. family without a trial on the merits. Each of the three subsequent causes of action incorporated by reference and thereby realleged these particular allegations of intentionality on D. and each of them.'s attorney to respondent. that it would not defend or indemnify appellant's claims and lawsuit. or failed to consume medication. pursuant to appellant's covenant not to execute on or enforce the judgment and the concurrent assignment by the M. was arrested outside appellant's home. based upon California Civil Code Section 1714. contact" with appellant's person. a letter reserving its rights {Slip Opn. . malicious and illegal." and therefore excluded by the provisions of the Policy and by Insurance Code section 533.'s behavior was intentional in the second cause of action. intentional. alleging four causes of action and seeking damages for assault. with the exception of their rights to attorney's fees incurred as a result of respondent's failure to defend them. 1997. appellant filed a complaint against D. and added specific allegations that her parents were "liable for the aforementioned intentional and negligent acts .D.1." as a result of which appellant suffered injuries and damages." After an investigation. family of their rights against respondent." fn. family in exchange for an assignment of their rights against respondent. was willfull [sic] and malicious and was intended to oppress and cause injury to [appellant]. alcohol. such that she was unable to control her own behavior. and "[t]he aforementioned conduct of [D. family accept the offer. fn. negligence and negligent supervision. She told police that she had recently resumed her heavy methamphetamine use. respondent sent Mr. appellant realleged the earlier allegations that D. 5 C. On the day of the settlement conference. and her parents (the M. 4 In the first cause of action. Mr.000. with a reservation of their right to seek attorney fees and costs from respondent. M. asked respondent to reconsider its decision not to defend. respondent again denied Mr. with a covenant not to execute against the M. On this basis. fn. Thus. in count two appellant alleged that D. [D. for assault. M. stabbed appellant multiple times in the area of appellant's head and shoulders. . notified respondent of appellant's claim against him and D. appellant again realleged the earlier allegations that D. defenants [sic]. A doctor who examined her at juvenile hall opined that she "may be psychotic. Mr. and informed respondent that appellant had proposed a stipulated settlement judgment in the amount of $250. M. 1997.'s attorney stated that he would recommend the M. in the amount of $250." D. acted deliberately and with the intent to make a contact with [appellant's] person. 1997. M. . respondent informed its insured by letter dated October 8. M.'s claim by letter dated December 11. In September 1997. Respondent thereafter obtained the independent legal opinion of outside coverage counsel that there was no coverage or duty to defend any of the insureds under the Policy. She entered appellant's house because the hanging plants reminded her of a man who had sexually attacked her. 6 On November 13. Thereafter. Page 5} alleged above. Appellant also made additional specific allegations that D. Page 7} appellant and against D.000. appellant settled with the M. . appellant alleged that D. Page 6} under the various applicable endorsements of the Policy. were willful.] intended to cause or place [appellant] in apprehension of a harmful and offense [sic] contact with [appellant's] person. adding allegations that in doing so she "negligently injured" appellant and "negligently consumed drugs. medication. through his attorney." In the third cause of action.'s attorney notified respondent in writing of an impending settlement conference scheduled for April 9. 1997.] . . on the terms outlined in the letter of Mr. in the fourth cause of action against D. M. and was feeling "paranoid" before the incident. for battery. 1997. "[i]n doing the acts as alleged above. entered a plea of no contest to attempted second degree murder with personal use of a deadly weapon and infliction of great bodily injury. Mr. the trial court entered judgment in favor of {Slip Opn. family). battery. as though people were following her. .'s parents for negligent supervision. M. "placed [her] in fear for her personal safety" by threatening her with bodily injury with a knife. Appellant's case against the M. acted "deliberately and with the intent to make . on March 28. She was sentenced to a California Youth Authority facility.'s part "the same as if [they] had been expressly repeated" in the other causes of action. and for "any illegal act committed by or at the direction of an insured. Respondent's letter stated that it had "determined" that "the actions of D. including the exclusions for bodily injury "expected or intended" by an insured or which is the foreseeable result of an act or omission intended by an insured." Finally. On April 23. family proceeded to settlement.
appellant submitted argument and evidence to the effect that D. assignment of rights against respondent. there was sufficient evidence in the record to raise triable issues of material fact as to whether D. In reply to appellant's procedural argument that respondent's second summary judgment motion was barred by section 1008. was "legally insane" at the time of her attack on appellant. respondent argued that appellant had "failed to introduce any credible evidence" that D. family a duty to defend or indemnify. the trial court ruled that: (1) respondent's objections to psychologist Murray's declaration "go to the weight of the expert's opinion" and would require an assessment of his credibility. respondent cited and relied upon the Policy exclusions for bodily injury "intended by an insured" or which is the foreseeable result of an act or omission intended by an insured. 7 In opposition to the motion for summary judgment. The case proceeded to trial. Respondent's second motion for summary judgment was a verbatim duplication of its earlier motion. Judge Kolin bifurcated proceedings on legal and factual issues. and the trial court permitted. 9 {Slip Opn. Dwight Murray. family because the acts of D.On December 1. fn. respondent argued that appellant had essentially waived that hurdle by stipulating to the filing of cross motions for summary judgment. family a duty to defend. On July 2. Appellant did not dispute respondent's citation of these exclusions. D. the trial court denied respondent's motion for summary judgment. and therefore whether respondent owed the M. fn. In addition. it filed a petition for writ of mandate to this court which we denied without opinion on October 29. Instead. Page 9} seek reconsideration of this order. 1999. appellant filed this action against respondent for declaratory relief. or if she did know. 1998.'s conduct and actions was illegal. was legally insane for purposes of section 533." In reply. and had therefore failed to show the existence of a triable issue of material fact on that question.'s juvenile records and the transcript of her videotaped deposition. Murray opined that D. that she could not distinguish right from wrong when she was committing the act. appellant's evidence included the {Slip Opn. 2000." Respondent's separate statement of undisputed facts. specifically set out these Policy exclusions for intentional and illegal acts. in response to appellant's discovery requests. respondent argued that there was no potential for coverage under the Policy because appellant's injury was not the result of an accident.D. and for "any illegal act committed by or at the direction of an insured. seeking to recover the amount of the underlying stipulated judgment from respondent based on the M. Respondent's separate statement of undisputed facts was also identical to the statement it filed in connection with its first motion for summary judgment. and (3) even assuming "arguendo" that Murray's declaration was inadmissible. Ph. In opposition to appellant's motion. 1999. which was "precluded" in the summary judgment context. Page 10} In April 2000. respondent moved for summary judgment on the grounds it had no duty to defend or indemnify the M. In the interim the parties stipulated to. On the first day of trial to the court. whether her conduct was willful for purposes of section 533. "was laboring under such a defect of reason from disease of the mind as to not know the nature and quality of the act she was doing when she attacked [appellant]. Page 8} declaration of a psychologist. appellant and respondent filed cross motions for summary judgment on the issue of coverage. 1999. breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. appellant argued that Judge Zuniga's prior denial of respondent's earlier motion for summary judgment amounted to a dispositive ruling that respondent owed the M. and D. The parties waived the right to a jury trial. March 20. fn. In its decision.'s subjective intent to harm someone other than appellant was irrelevant to the willfulness of her act. Among other things. was legally insane when she attacked appellant. the filing of cross-motions for summary judgment or summary adjudication. on which appellant's underlying claims were based were intentional and willful under section 533. "was capable at the time of the attack [of] distinguishing right from wrong". Judge Kolin continued the trial to resolve this issue. (2) respondent failed to address the issue of whether D. On the basis of his review of D. Both separate statements specifically called the trial court's attention to the Policy exclusions for injuries "intended by an insured" and for "any illegal act committed by or at the direction of an insured. 8 Respondent did not {Slip Opn. respondent had produced a complete copy of the Policy in force at the time of the loss. an evidentiary dispute arose regarding whether. filed in connection with the motion. By order filed September 15.
. At pretrial conference." In her motion for summary judgment.
appellant's attorney again argued that (1) respondent's motion for summary judgment was procedurally barred by section 1008 as a tardy motion for reconsideration that failed to raise any new factual or legal arguments and was in fact identical to the earlier such motion. thereby triggering respondent's duty to defend. Page 12} since attempted murder is a specific intent crime". (2) her "pleas [sic] of no contest to the charge of attempted murder is admissible in this action as an admission of an intentional act. and which had been denied by Judge Zuniga in September 1999 based on the finding that there were triable disputed issues of material fact.'s stabbing of appellant was "an illegal act. Appellant argues that respondent failed to comply with the statutory prerequisites of section 1008 when it simply refiled the identical motion for summary judgment before Judge Kolin in April 2000 that it had previously filed in law and motion in July 1999. Because respondent's motion failed to comply with the requirements of section 1008. Judge Kolin granted respondent's motion for summary judgment. (3) "[t]herefore. and (3) the evidence regarding D.'s drug use and psychological instability at the time of the attack established at least a potential for coverage under the Policy. 11 On this basis.asserted that the second motion was proper under the statute because Judge Zuniga did not have the "complete" Policy before her at the time of the earlier motion for summary judgment. Section 1008. respondent's second motion for summary judgment. fn. willful and illegal. oral argument on the cross-motions took place on May 25. 2000. each sets out the
." coverage of which was "precluded by the illegal act exclusion" of the Policy. {Slip Opn. Section 1008. Respondent replies that (1) its second motion was in compliance with section 1008 because. 12 Under the factual and procedural circumstances presented on this record. and contended that because both parties {Slip Opn. acting through Judge Kolin. subdivision (a) states the procedure for seeking reconsideration of a previous order. Page 13} appellant contends the trial court. Respondent replied that (1) its renewed motion for summary judgment was not procedurally barred because appellant had stipulated to its filing. the trial court would in any event be required to decide the coverage issues as a matter of law at the very outset of trial. 10 After the trial court issued a tentative ruling in favor of respondent. since the Policy excludes intentional acts". we must agree with appellant's contention that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant respondent's second motion for summary judgment. much less grant. the trial court issued an order sustaining the tentative ruling. This appeal timely followed entry of judgment on June 12. subdivision (b) sets out similar prerequisites for filing a renewed motion for an order that has previously been denied. Although the two subdivisions differ in certain minor details. Following the hearing. At the hearing. and (2) the undisputed facts of D. {Slip Opn. respondent had "gone beyond its initial reliance" on section 533 to argue that coverage was additionally barred by the Policy exclusions for intentional and illegal acts. The trial court found that: (1) "as a matter of law" D. 2000. (2) even if respondent's second motion was in violation of section 1008. and thus excluded from coverage both contractually and by statute. lacked jurisdiction to rule on. we must address the important procedural issue of whether the trial court erred in even considering respondent's second summary judgment motion. (b) the parties had waived jury trial and Judge Kolin was required to try the issue of coverage as a matter of law. and (4) respondent had no duty to defend or to indemnify. in responding to appellant's arguments in favor of her cross-motion for summary judgment. fn. "any alleged violation of Section 1008 could not have been prejudicial" because (a) Judge Zuniga's denial of respondent's first summary judgment motion was erroneous on its merits.
JURISDICTION TO RULE ON RESPONDENT'S SECOND SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION
Before we analyze the substantive correctness of the order granting summary judgment. and (3) in any event. and (c) it was ultimately immaterial whether the trial court made its ruling in the context of a renewed motion for summary judgment or a court trial. (2) the trial court was required to decide the issues raised by the motion because it was being heard at the outset of the bifurcated portion of trial on legal issues much like a motion to dismiss or for nonsuit. Page 11} had waived jury trial.'s mental condition did not contradict the fact that her acts and conduct were intentional. fn. the trial court still had jurisdiction to correct an earlier "erroneous summary judgment ruling" under cases holding that trial courts have inherent jurisdiction to reconsider their interim rulings. there was no potential for coverage.
circumstances. Superior Court (1993) 19 Cal.same essential requirements. Home Savings of America (1997) 59 Cal. within 10 days after service of notice of entry {Slip Opn. 98 Cal. (Baldwin v. what order or decisions were made. make a motion for reconsideration thereof "based upon new or different facts. respondent's second summary judgment motion before Judge Kolin was identical in all respects to the one it had earlier filed before Judge Zuniga in the law and motion department. circumstances. 460." provided a showing is made to the court "by affidavit what application was made before. or law are claimed to be shown. subtractions or modifications." Subdivision (d) in turn states that a violation of section 1008 "may be punished as a contempt and with sanctions. or for the renewal of a previous motion.4th at p. Thus. may make a subsequent application for the same order upon new or different facts. Contrary to respondent's assertion on appeal. supra. Garcia v.App. v. As appellant correctly points out. § 4. and the trial court was jurisdictionally barred by section 1008 from entertaining it. Kollander. ch. the record shows respondent simply submitted to Judge Kolin an exact copy of the same motion it had already argued to Judge Zuniga. § 2.4th 1192. respondent's renewed motion for summary judgment did not raise any "additional circumstances and grounds establishing the absence of coverage under specific terms of the {Slip Opn.App. (Stats. or law. (Stats. 310. circumstances. Morite of California v. ch. respondent's original motion for summary judgment before Judge Zuniga specifically cited the Policy exclusion provisions for intentional and illegal acts." (Kollander. {Slip Opn. or law are claimed to be shown. and specifically declares that "[n]o application to reconsider any order or for the renewal of a previous motion may be considered by any judge or court unless made according to this section. or law." Most significantly. circumstances. the Legislature expressly intended to make section 1008 both jurisdictional and applicable to all motions for reconsideration of interim orders. Neither did respondent's renewed motion for summary judgment comply with the statutory requirements set out in section 1008. The statute dictates that such an application must be "upon new or different facts. or law. Hejmadi (1997) 58 Cal.App. and what new or different facts. 13 {Slip Opn. Page 16} [Policy]" that had not already been raised in the previous motion. having been brought more than 10 days after service of written notice of entry of Judge Zuniga's order denying the first motion. and expressly set out these two exclusions in the separate statement of undisputed facts filed in conjunction with that motion. "[s]ection 1008 purported to be neither jurisdictional nor exclusive. it was amended again in 1998 to add current subdivision (g). without any additions. subdivision (e) provides that section 1008 "applies to all applications to reconsider any order of a judge or court. 1992. Page 14} of the order. the current subdivisions (c) and (e). among other things. p. when and to what judge. 310. p. Even the separate statements of undisputed facts respondent submitted in connection with each motion were verbatim identical. Superior Court (2002) 98 Cal. what order or decisions were made. 1833. subdivision (a). supra. 1194-1201 (Baldwin). Page 15} Appellant contends that respondent's second motion constituted a flagrant attempt to circumvent the trial court's earlier order denying the same motion.4th at p. 1992. case law interpreting section 1008 has specifically held that a moving party must give a satisfactory explanation for the previous failure to present the allegedly new or different evidence or legal authority offered in the second application. 490-492 (Morite).App. Significantly. subdivision (b) states that a party who has previously "made an application for an order which was refused in whole or part." Similarly.) In adding these provisions. respondent did not introduce any "new or different facts. circumstances.) As seen. Subdivision (a) provides that "any party affected" by a previous trial court order may.4th 304. ch.4th 485. Indeed.App. 98 Cal.App. 1831. when and to what judge. as well as all renewed motions for interim orders previously denied. Page 17} Section 1008 was amended in 1992 to add. Inc.)
. circumstances. much less any explanation for the fact the two motions were identical. and what new or different facts. 310." fn. § 1. 1998." In addition. or law" in support of its second motion which it had not already raised in the first motion. or granted conditionally or on terms." on condition of filing an affidavit stating "what application was made before.4th 674. respondent's second motion for summary judgment did not qualify as a motion for reconsideration under section 1008. Stats. 688691. 313-314 (Kollander). and before a different judge." and "specifies the court's jurisdiction" with regard to this subject matter. see Kollander Construction. 200. the two exclusion provisions upon which Judge Kolin based his decision granting respondent's second motion for summary judgment were also before Judge Zuniga at the time she denied the identical motion several months before that. subdivision (b) for an application for an order that had previously been refused in whole or in part. 460. Without question.) Prior to those amendments.
4th at pp. finding that "[r]espondent [trial] court circumvented the jurisdictional limits of section 1008.4th 421. at p. trial court's inherent authority to reconsider its own earlier ruling sua {Slip Opn. . circumstances or law]. Ignoring (i. "the court's inherent power to correct its own rulings is based on the California Constitution and cannot be impaired by statute"].e. Trader (1996) 50 Cal.4th at pp. as amended. . 685 {Slip Opn. Three.App. 426-427 (Remsen) [Fourth Dist.. Inc. . "denies trial courts jurisdiction to reconsider. (1998) 62 Cal. .. the appellate court issued a writ of mandate commanding the trial court to vacate the order setting the declaratory relief action for trial. the Legislature clearly intended to prevent courts from modifying. 178-179 [Second Dist.App. and its jurisdiction to do so cannot be impaired by section 1008]. such as the prior stay order.App. 14 More recently. as respondent correctly points out. at pp. AC Transit (1995) 32 Cal. 1042 (Wozniak) [Second Dist. The first such reported case was Morite."Amended section 1008 has generated a considerable body of law.App. Garcia v. at p. 19 Cal. and some disagreement." (Id. 490) the Morite court held that section 1008. Concluding that section 1008 "is the exclusive means for modifying. then the procedural. supra.) Indeed.App. supra. except pursuant to the procedure set forth" in the statute. 310-
. Seven. Remsen v. undermines the legislative intent behind section 1008.4th 485. amend or revoke their prior orders. concluding that to the extent it restricts a trial court's inherent power to reconsider and correct its own interim rulings.4th at pp. whether final or interim... supra. 492-493. Some courts. modify. trial court acted in excess of jurisdiction when it granted motion for reconsideration of earlier order denying motion for summary judgment without an adequate showing of new or different facts. supra. amending or revoking an order. or for reconsideration of prior interim orders. . 98 Cal. 679-681. Crotty v. amending or revoking them after due consideration.) fn. several courts have reconsidered and rejected this line of authority. Div. underlying lawsuit. Page 19} -691 [trial court lacked jurisdiction to vacate earlier grant of summary judgment under section 1008 because movant failed to present newly discovered evidence or a satisfactory explanation for failing to provide the mistakenly omitted evidence earlier]. Baldwin. . 771 [section 1008 does not give trial court authority to reevaluate or reanalyze facts and authority already presented in the earlier motion]. 58 Cal." and {Slip Opn.4th 172." (Case v. (Pazderka v. the trial court retains the ability to reconsider its interim rulings and to change those rulings at any time prior to entry of judgment"]. Div. have concluded that section 1008 is jurisdictional and prescribes the sole procedural mechanism for renewal of a previously denied motion. Page 18} is "expressly jurisdictional.) The leading published opinions in this Appellate District. subdivision (e). amending or revoking prior orders without due reconsideration. 1194-1201 [trial court acted in excess of jurisdiction in granting motion for reconsideration of attorney fees award where party moving for reconsideration failed to present any new or different law that could not have been cited in the original motion]. 487. [I]f courts may simply ignore interim orders instead of modifying. By making section 1008 expressly jurisdictional. and "the exclusive avenue" for reconsideration of interim court orders "whether initiated by a party of the court itself".App. Page 20} sponte is derived from the California Constitution. (See Wozniak v. 1498-1502 [section 1008 is jurisdictional. have expressly followed Morite in affirming that section 1008 is both jurisdictional and the exclusive procedural means for renewal of a previously denied motion or reconsideration of an interim order. including Division Two of this District.) On this basis. Hejmadi." (Id. Kollander.App. section 1008 may be unconstitutional.App.App. 180. implicitly revoking) interim orders. there is a split among the appellate courts of the state on the issue of the extent to which section 1008 operates to jurisdictionally preclude a trial court from granting a renewed motion-whether for summary judgment or for some other form of relief--after denying an earlier such motion based on the same facts. section 1008 notwithstanding. 59 Cal. [¶] .4th 1031.App. Lucutz (2002) 102 Cal.4th 765. from Division Seven of the Second Appellate District. all from Division Two. and to compel reinstatement of a prior order of the same trial court staying trial of that action pending trial of another. Lavacot (2001) 87 Cal.4th 1494. circumstances and law. supra. Gilberd v. (2002) 99 Cal.. substantive and jurisdictional requirements of section 1008 are meaningless." (id. subdivision (e) by consciously ignoring the stay order which had been entered by a predecessor judge of the same court. Div. Three. 669-670 (Pazderka) [trial court had no jurisdiction to grant motion for reconsideration of attorney fees award in absence of showing of new and different facts and satisfactory explanation for failure to present such new facts at the time of first motion]. "[w]e choose to follow that line of cases which recognizes that .4th at pp.App. Lazben Financial Co. 99 Cal. Morite concerned a writ petition to compel vacation of a lower court order setting a declaratory relief action for trial. Case v. Lazben Financial Co.4th 658. in the appellate courts. . Caballeros Dimas Alang.
16 On this basis the appellate court upheld the trial court's jurisdiction to reconsider and grant sua sponte a motion for summary judgment it had previously {Slip Opn. the trial court had initially denied the plaintiff's motions for summary judgment. supra. (1997) 54 Cal. 17 Similarly. reasoning instead that because a trial court has inherent constitutional power to change its decision at any time before entry of judgment. disapproved on other grounds in Vandenberg v. 1450 [section 1008 did not affect trial court's jurisdiction to vacate prior order setting juvenile petition for hearing because it "was not acting on a motion for reconsideration. at pp. 774 (Bernstein).) On appeal.App. Upon the motion of the trustees for reconsideration. the same division of the Second Appellate District that had issued the decision in Morite six years earlier held that section 1008 does not govern a trial court's inherent authority and jurisdiction to reevaluate its own interim rulings on its own motion. but was correcting an erroneous ruling on its own motion"]. In Remsen.4th 1446. Castello (1998) 65 Cal. Division Three of the Fourth Appellate District specifically held that section 1008 {Slip Opn. at least two appellate courts have gone further and rejected the distinction between a court's reevaluation of its interim orders upon its own motion. (Id. .4th at pp. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.App. 75 Cal. Five. Four. the ability of the trial court to correct what it perceives to be an incorrect interim ruling can only further the policy of conserving judicial resources. 1246-1250 [Fourth Dist. Co. on its own motion. reconsider and correct its own interim rulings. 1156 (Darling) [Second Dist.4th at pp. supra. 5 [section 1008.App. People v.) fn. 1155-1156.4th 1031. supra. at pp. Seven.4th 815. but was correcting an erroneous ruling"]. 102 Cal. Kritt (1999) 75 Cal. not the court's inherent power to reconsider its own interim rulings"]. One.) Since Darling.4th 421. 87 Cal." and "trial court retains the inherent authority to change its decision at any time prior to the entry of judgment"].314 [Second Dist. its own prior ruling erroneously denying summary adjudication. Page 21} Several of these cases have distinguished between a trial court's inherent power to reconsider and correct its own prior rulings sua sponte. on its own motion. it expressly followed Remsen to hold that "it is irrelevant whether the court acts sua sponte or pursuant to a party's motion . Consolidated American Ins. even in the absence of new facts or law." (Id. Thus. in Darling. Page 23} could not restrict the trial court's inherent power to reconsider and change its own interim ruling even though it did so upon the motion of a litigant. 1042.App. (Id.App. and the limitations imposed by section 1008 on the ability of parties to bring motions for reconsideration or to renew an application for an order previously denied. Subsequently. on its own motion.) We agree with the principle enunciated in Darling.App.) fn. upon its own rereading and reconsideration of papers previously filed with the motions. supra. 1247-1249 & fn. governs only a litigant's ability to renew a motion or advance an application. and section 1008 cannot impair the exercise of this inherent power]. cf. In re Jamika W. courts have inherent constitutional power to control their order and business. Bernstein v.App. Castello. see also People v. Castello. Div.4th 763. "section 1008 does not govern the court's ability.App. Darling. the trial court had originally ruled that trust beneficiaries were entitled to interest on their bequests. to rehear.. section 1008 cannot govern the court's jurisdiction or authority. the defendant argued the trial court had acted in excess of its jurisdiction under section 1008. including the power to correct their own interim rulings]. a court has broad power. however. In Darling. to reevaluate and change its own interim rulings at any time before entry of judgment. it vacated its own earlier ruling and granted summary judgment. Div. Div. inherent in the California Constitution. circumstances or law. fn.. reconsideration upheld because "court was not entertaining a motion [by a party] for reconsideration of the prior ruling.App. Hall & Rae v. .4th 1148. In either case. 424-427. Page 22} denied. Kollander. . Div. at pp. The Darling court considered and found inapplicable the line of cases from Division Two of this Appellate District holding section 1008 jurisdictional. 13 [Second Dist. and their progeny that trial courts have the inherent power to reconsider and correct their own interim decisions in order to achieve
. the court later modified the order to hold the reverse. (Id. 841. 65 Cal. to reevaluate its own interim rulings. at p. Acknowledging that the trustee's motion for reconsideration of the prior order was on its face in violation of section 1008 because it was not based on new or different facts. section 1008 does not preclude trial court's inherent power to correct. 15 {Slip Opn.4th 1242.4th 1148. People v. 98 Cal. rather than upon its own motion sua sponte. supra. 1150-1154.. and can only be understood to apply to motions for reconsideration brought by litigants. when Division Seven of the Second Appellate District revisited this issue recently in Wozniak. (1995) 37 Cal. 312-313. the Remsen court nevertheless affirmed the trial court's modification and reversal of its own interim order upon the trustee's motion. "by its express terms. fn.. versus such a reconsideration upon the motion of the parties.
) To the extent section 1008 bars trial court's from sua sponte reconsidering their own interim orders and decisions. Case v. we may not simply disregard the language of a statute in defiance of the clear intent and policy judgments of the Legislature.4th at p. supra. or renewals of motions themselves. 1177 [same]. Manduley v.2d 829.
..4th 1173. 661.4th at pp. Lazben Financial Co. We are constrained by two essential principles of statutory interpretation.) Although the Legislature may enact statutes regulating the inherent powers of the courts. all of these cases involved situations in which the disputed reconsideration. 18 {Slip Opn. Summary Dig.4th 45. This statutory language unambiguously confines the procedural requirements of section 1008 to applications or motions for renewal brought by parties. 1992. fn.). Page 24} Electronics Lab GmbH v. Harth v. Nevertheless.) fn. p. § 1. Bill No. 20 Both the plain language of the statute itself and the uncodified expressions of legislative intent in the original legislation and the Legislative Counsel's Digest consistently refer to "applications" for reconsideration or "renewals" of previous "motions" brought by parties. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal. Superior Court v.App. Fair Employment & Housing Com. v. Page 26} Applying these principles. the more recent cases such as Remsen and Wozniak go too far toward eviscerating the clear jurisdictional language of section 1008. supra. 99 Cal.4th 1. 99 Cal.4th at p. 129. Bunn. (Kopp v. art. Page 27} of an order on its own motion. 14-16. essentially rendering the provisions of the statute meaningless. III.4th at p.App. Trinity Management Services. 1232 (Ziller) [a trial court has jurisdiction "to reconsider and correct its erroneous interim rulings to achieve justice"]. 65 Cal. 5. (Cal. 1722. 460. subject to review for abuse of discretion]. but did not contemplate restricting the discretion of a trial judge who realizes he or she has erred in making a ruling and wishes to remedy the mistake. p. Inc. Phillips (1953) 41 Cal. Lazben Financial Co.3d 1222. it may not do so in a way that would defeat or materially impair the courts' exercise of their core constitutional powers and functions. motions. 37 Cal. supra.substantial justice.) "Clearly. a legislative enactment must be construed in such a way as to preserve its constitutionality.4th at p.) Second. People v.. V. 19 {Slip Opn.App. 1831. Significantly.. Dyna-Med. First. Page 25} Consequently. trial courts do not make applications. 874 [trial court may change its decision on law or facts at any time before judgment is entered]... 313. Const. (1995) 11 Cal. 183-185. 557. City of Oakland (1979) 88 Cal.App. Superior Court (1993) 15 Cal. Sess. we conclude that section 1008 may be reasonably be construed as intended to regulate the actions of parties to a civil litigation rather than the inherent powers of the trial court itself.4th 116. 1387. Lazben Financial Co. with no reference whatsoever to restrictions on a trial court's reconsideration of its own orders sua sponte or on its own motion. 98 Cal. ch. 98 Cal. Counsel's Dig.3d 1379. supra. 99 Cal. 165. Case v.4th 1248-1249.App. largely from Division Two of this court. (1987) 43 Cal. 58-59. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal. in order to avoid encroaching on the legislative function.App. 4 Stats.App. if and when possible. art. 185. supra. 187. Case v. (Phillips v. § 1.) It is clear to us that this power is derived from the California Constitution.App. (2000) 23 Cal. 99 Cal. Lazben Financial Co.4th at pp. 1805. Taggart (1995) 34 Cal.4th at p. County of Mendocino (1996) 13 Cal. Nave v. we hold that the separation of powers doctrine precludes an interpretation of section 1008 that would deprive a trial court of jurisdiction to reconsider its own interim orders sua sponte. § 3.App. Legis. Kollander. 52. Rowe v. We agree with Division Three of the Second Appellate District that. Inc. art. Fair Pol.. Lazben Financial Co. The language chosen by the Legislature strongly suggests it intended to restrict the actions of parties in bringing motions to reconsider. executive and judicial branches of government].App. 774 [same]. § 1.4th at p.4th at pp. art. Ziller {Slip Opn.App. (Kraus v. 1992 (Reg. it clearly hinders the core power of the judiciary to decide and resolve controversies between litigants. 833-834 [trial court had power to change previous order to serve the ends of justice. (Stats. 188.) fn. supra. we must also conclude that by eliminating the distinction between a trial court's action taken sua sponte and that made in response to a litigant's motion.App. 313.2d 869. Sen.. supra. Bunn (2002) 27 Cal. § 1 [providing for legislative. supra.. IV. 27 Cal.4th 1711. supra.4th 537. section 1008 violates the separation of powers doctrine embodied in the California Constitution. Castello. VI.) We believe that this construction of section 1008 may be reconciled with the reported decisions. Practices Com. 14-16. Ten Eyck (1941) 16 Cal. and does not purport to govern a court's reconsideration {Slip Opn.4th 607." (Case v. supra. 351." (Case v. 99 Cal.App.3d 349. (People v. 186-187. fn. Bernstein. People v. "if interpreted to eliminate a court's jurisdiction to reconsider its interim orders on its own motion. Kollander. Razeto v. holding that the requirements of section 1008 are jurisdictional and exclusive.
trial court entered judgment dismissing plaintiff's complaint after granting motion to reconsider previous order granting plaintiff relief]. Thus. Garcia v. after the parties had waived a jury. 59 Cal. respondent's verbatim reapplication for summary judgment--the provisions of section 1008 were jurisdictional and controlling. (Cf. supra. 21 None of these cases addressed the specific question of whether and to what extent section 1008 may {Slip Opn.4th at pp. In sum. it would only have been putting off for a few days a determination it would be required to make shortly thereafter. 685-691 [trial court erroneously vacated summary judgment previously granted to defendant upon motion for reconsideration by plaintiff filed without a satisfactory showing of compliance with section 1008]. Gilberd v. AC Transit. and not by the trial court acting on its own motion. and construing the language section 1008 in a manner consistent with the requirements of the California Constitution. 1197-1201 [same].) We hold the trial court was jurisdictionally barred from considering respondent's renewed motion for summary judgment. supra. Baldwin. trial judge set insurance coverage action for trial after insurer asked the judge to do so in status conference statement.4th at pp. Respondent nevertheless urges that. supra. as it was a kind of motion for nonsuit or for judgment made at the outset of trial on the very issues which the court was required to decide anyway. On their face. Had the trial court denied or refused to consider respondent's renewed motion for summary judgment. then. respondent argues. (Case v. 1498. circumstances or legal authorities cited in respondent's renewed motion for summary judgment filed in April 2000 which it had not previously presented in its original motion of July 1999. 664-665. Lazben Financial Co. because it was not in compliance with the requirements of section 1008.App. Hejmadi. Its argument may be summarized as follows.4th at pp. 32 Cal. (Pazderka. supra. Instead. Gilberd v. Page 29} circumstances presented here the trial court did not err in entertaining and granting it. much less for its resubmission of the identical motion before a different judge. 19 Cal. 58 Cal. but from the final disposition of the case. this appeal is thus not from a trial court order undoing an earlier interim order without compliance with the statutory requirements for such a reconsideration.App.App. despite previous order entered by different judge staying that action pending disposition of underlying wrongful termination case]. Page 28} impair a trial court's inherent constitutional power sua sponte to reconsider. On this record. respondent contends. That these issues of coverage were the same ones embraced by the earlier motion for summary judgment itself was the necessary result of the trial court's previous denial of that motion. even if its renewed motion for summary judgment was in technical violation of section 1008. it is difficult to distinguish respondent's proceedings below from the kind of brazen forum shopping section 1008 is specifically intended to bar.App. supra. supra.App. more specifically. we conclude that appellant's jurisdictional argument is meritorious. and before the trial judge who would actually be trying the case. correct and change its own interim decisions. Unlike the situation addressed by the opinions of this court upon which appellant relies. 488-492 [without following section 1008. 32
. its renewed application was not so much an attempt to obtain reconsideration of the earlier denial of summary judgment by circumventing the requirements of section 1008. Respondent gave no satisfactory explanation whatsoever for its failure to offer any new facts.4th at pp. The motion was made on the mixed legal and factual issues of coverage that the trial court itself of necessity had to address and decide before proceeding to any other determinations of liability. a denial that required those issues to be decided at trial.) fn. The undisputed record shows there were no new facts. the renewed motion for summary judgment in this case was not made as a motion for reconsideration in a law and motions context prior to trial. 186-188. Morite. As applied to the circumstances of this case--in which Judge Zuniga's previous denial of summary judgment was clearly put in issue not on the trial court's own motion but instead by the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment and. it was made at the outset of trial. Significantly. supra. respondent's original motion for summary judgment before Judge Zuniga specifically cited the same two Policy exclusions for intentional and illegal acts upon which Judge Kolin subsequently based his decision granting the motion. 1502 [without complying with section 1008. we hold that the procedural prerequisites set forth for reconsideration of orders and renewal of motions previously denied are jurisdictional as applied to the actions of parties to civil litigation.. In practical effect.4th at pp.App. under the particular facts and {Slip Opn. 99 Cal. AC Transit.4th at pp. circumstances or law.modification or reversal of a prior interim order was brought about upon the motion of a party litigant. 62 Cal. 669-670 [defendant moved for reconsideration of attorney fees award without compliance with section 1008].
492-493. Exchange. At the point the parties submitted their cross-motions for summary judgment on the issue of coverage under the Policy. There was never any trial on the specific triable issues of material fact identified by the trial court's earlier order denying summary judgment. Co. 4 [remedy for any substantive error in the trial court's original ruling denying summary judgment lies in an appeal from the final disposition of the case].K. it ultimately founders on the actual record. Fire Ins. The existence of these disputed facts prevented a decision on the issues of coverage and duty to defend in the summary judgment context. 206 Cal. Because we must remand for further proceedings. Garcia v. v. for all intents and purposes it simply ignored them. (1978) 22 Cal. 1232. the grant of respondent's second motion for summary judgment cannot be upheld by the simple expedient of construing it as a grant of nonsuit or judgment on the merits. 1019-1025. substantive and jurisdictional requirements of section 1008. 1194-1201. AC Transit. we now address those issues for the guidance of the trial court. see Morite. 1502-1503. By the same token. and the impact of that law on the facts of this case. Co. 58 Cal. the order granting summary judgment was in violation of section 1008 and in excess of the trial court's jurisdiction. since the trial court never had the opportunity to weigh the credibility of the parties' conflicting evidence on this issue by hearing testimony and argument. 32 Cal. 879-887. Penney Casualty Ins. but it would completely undermine "the general rule that one trial court judge may not reconsider and overrule an interim ruling of another judge. 740-743. because the earlier decision clearly stated that underlying facts were in dispute.Cal. Yet it was precisely the issues identified in the trial court's earlier order that Judge Kolin's decision did not address.App. M.App.) Despite the surface appeal of respondent's argument.C." this very argument simply serves to underscore the trial court's complete failure even to address this precise issue. Shell Oil Co.App.3d at pp. Page 30} prepared to try that issue as a matter of law. to the contrary. the trial court was required to make a determination of those issues at trial. Hartford Insurance Co. Not only would such a procedure render inoperative the procedural. Thus.4th at pp. supra.App.4th at pp.) fn. Gilberd v.3d 865. The fact that Judge Zuniga had previously ruled there were triable issues of material fact connected with coverage did not change Judge Kolin's responsibility to decide those triable issues himself. 1268-1275. 1498-1501. 1261. {Slip Opn. Yet Judge Kolin's subsequent order granting the identical motion-resubmitted on the eve of trial--did not even mention these factual issues. 19 Cal. Page 31} Moreover." (Ziller. As such. 59 Cal. v.) In short.4th at pp. 36 Cal.4th at pp. Nor could it.App.4th at pp. much less decide them.) Although respondent now asserts we should uphold the grant of summary judgment because Judge Zuniga's denial of the motion for summary judgment "erroneously" gave "undue emphasis to the role an alleged insanity might play in determining liability insurance coverage.. supra. Winterthur Swiss Ins. 679-691. (Baldwin. and not a final determination on the merits of the disputed factual issues identified in that earlier order.
. Section 1008 bars the reconsideration of an earlier order denying summary judgment under the circumstances presented here. fn.App. The trial court did not even purport to address those issues at all.4th at pp.4th at pp. Page 32}
Aside from the procedural and jurisdictional issues of its noncompliance with section 1008.3d at p. Judge Kolin was {Slip Opn. supra. (J. the order granting summary judgment did not address or analyze the controlling decisional law on the effect of cognitive incapacity on willfulness and intent for purposes of insurance coverage. supra. 22 {Slip Opn.. the earlier denial of respondent's first motion for summary judgment was based on Judge Zuniga's express finding that there were triable issues of fact regarding D.App. 52 Cal. 12 Cal. the trial court's grant of summary judgment upon respondent's second motion also suffered from substantive errors which would independently require reversal. Hejmadi.'s mental capacity and sanity. supra. The only practical interpretation of the trial court's order granting respondent's second motion for summary judgment was that it was simply a reversal of the earlier order by a different judge denying the identical motion upon reconsideration thereof. Clemmer v.App. supra. one trial judge may not reconsider and overrule the previous interim ruling of a predecessor judge of the same court by the expedient of simply ignoring the existence of that prior ruling. Jacobs v. supra. supra.
) The other basis for the trial court's grant of summary judgment was its apparent determination that D. 26 Cal. Page 33} construction of a contract. because such a plea "may reflect a compromise or a choice not to undergo prosecution.C. Page 34} 1268-1275. The actual weighing of conflicting evidence by the factfinder is a process which can never take place in the context of a summary judgment motion. Montrose Chemical Corp. supra. supra. whether civil or criminal. 879-887. Flores (1996) 45 Cal. v. that issue has not yet been decided by the trial court.App.App..App.In granting summary judgment. 300-301. because the illegal act exclusion cannot reasonably be given meaning under established rules of {Slip Opn.'s stabbing of appellant was "an illegal act" for which insurance coverage was precluded.App. (Interinsurance Exchange v." it is not a conclusive admission.) As seen. it must be applied retroactively as a bar to the enforcement of the illegal act exclusion here. In Safeco Ins. or more narrowly.4th at pp. 276-277.]" (Id..4th 661. depends on the resolution of the disputed factual issue of D. and with it.. On this basis. (Buss v.) However. Shell Oil Co. supra. (Garcia v. Only after the actual process of factfinding takes place can the ultimate issue be decided. 680 [with "rare" exceptions. supra. 46-47.e.'s plea was "admissible in this action as an admission" of the crime of attempted murder was.) Although this decision of our Supreme Court was issued after the trial court's grant of summary judgment in this case. (1966) 65 Cal.'s plea of no contest to the charge of attempted murder constituted conclusive evidence of the intentionality of her act of stabbing appellant. 12 Cal. On its face. Exchange. Superior Court (1993) 6 Cal. whether the claim was
.4th 35. M. Whether the admitted stabbing was "willful" or "intentional" for purposes of section 533 and the Policy exclusion for intentional acts. J. 766.. The trial court's declaration that D. 672. Co. at p. Fire Ins.'s legal sanity.3d at pp.4th at p.. the "general rule" is that "statutes operate only prospectively. the trial court relied first on the Policy exclusion for "any illegal act commited [sic] by or at the direction of an insured" in determining "as a matter of law" that D.4th 287.3d at pp. v. appellant asserts that the trial court's finding of triable issues of material fact on the issue of coverage affirmatively established such a potential for coverage. At best. v. it was in error. "[i]n short. the Supreme Court concluded that an insurance policy provision excluding coverage for an "illegal act"--for all intents and purposes identical to the one at issue in this case--was unenforceable under the controlling principles for the construction and interpretation of insurance contracts. Penney Casualty Ins. Thus. [Citation.4th at pp. and that this court should therefore direct entry or judgment in appellant's favor. Hartford Insurance Co. or course. appellant points to case authority for the proposition that a duty to defend exists as long as there is any potential for coverage. 52 Cal. The argument is premised on the well-established principle that the duty to defend arises whenever there is a potential for indemnification coverage. italics added. all D. a correct statement of the law.) Based on this principle.4th 758. Robert S. Co. The contention is without merit. 58 Cal. it must be rejected as invalid. (Clemmer v." (Id. 672 [a plea of nolo contendere is admissible in a subsequent civil action as an admission of the crime]. at p. The Supreme Court found the phrase "illegal act" may reasonably be construed either broadly to mean an act prohibited by any law. to imply a violation of criminal law only. Co. Winterthur Swiss Ins. 36 Cal. {Slip Opn. 22 Cal.'s plea of nolo contendere by itself established the intentionality of her act. Hejmadi.) To the extent the trial court's grant of summary judgment on respondent's motion was based on the assumption that D. and has no collateral estoppel effect. supra.
APPELLANT NOT ENTITLED TO ENTRY OF JUDGMENT IN ITS FAVOR
Appellant next argues that the trial court's initial order in August 1999 denying respondent's first motion for summary judgment established respondent's duty to defend its insureds as a matter of law. 1019-1025. the Supreme Court concluded the exclusion was inherently ambiguous and incapable of being given any enforceable meaning. the existence of a duty to defend. 295.) However. Judge Zuniga's denial of respondent's initial motion for summary judgment established nothing more than the existence of triable issues of material fact to be finally determined at trial. Under the recent decisional authority of our Supreme Court. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal. supra.K. The court held. 740-743. In the first place. (Gray v. however. 1261. this determination can no longer stand. "it does not necessarily establish the underlying factual matters at issue in the civil litigation.2d 263.'s plea meant was that she would not contest the charge of doing the deed. Jacobs v. while judicial decisions operate retrospectively"]. Zurich Insurance Co. appellant offers no authority for the novel proposition that the denial of a defendant's motion for summary judgment can affirmatively require entry of judgment for the plaintiff. v. i.
actually covered. and Parrilli. Page 36} The superior court lacked jurisdiction either to reconsider the earlier denial of summary judgment on respondent's motion. bodily injury or property damage arising out of: [¶] (1) the entrustment by any insured to any person.. Until the trial court actually weighs the conflicting evidence on the material factual issues identified in Judge Zuniga's order denying respondent's motion for summary judgment.'s mental incapacity. if any. or motor vehicle (or any other motorized land conveyance) which is not covered under Section II of this policy. false or fraudulent.[¶] . the issue of respondent's duty to defend simply remains unresolved. then the duty to defend is necessarily {Slip Opn. she argues that respondent's duty to defend the M. [¶] (2) the negligent supervision by any insured of any person."
. We may investigate and settle any claim or suit that we decide is appropriate. the following exclusions are added: [¶] g. and [¶] 2. [¶] i. respondent may offer. "Under item 2. Page 35} also extinguished. whatever its strength. punitive or exemplary damages awarded against an insured.'s alleged mental disorder or incapacity. . based on evidence of D. concurred. . 23 Turning from appellant's procedural arguments to those of substance. J. maintenance or use of any aircraft. Our duty to settle or defend ends when the amount we pay for damages resulting from the occurrence equals our limit of liability. we will: [¶] 1. fn. for "Personal Liability. provide a defense at our expense by counsel of our choice. and the cause is remanded for consideration of the triable disputed issues of material fact identified in the original order denying summary judgment. which is expected or intended by an insured or which is the forseeable [sic] result of an act or ommission [sic] intended by an insured." FN 3. .
{Slip Opn. states in pertinent part: "Under item 1.. Coverage E--Personal Liability and Coverage F--Medical Payments to Others." provides in pertinent part as follows: "If a claim is made or a suit is brought against an insured for damages because of bodily injury or property damage caused by an occurrence to which this coverage applies. As seen. the judgment entered thereon is reversed. Coverage E--Personal Liability. the trial court has not yet tried these factual issues. pay up to our limit of liability for the damages for which the insured is legally liable . J. [¶] (3) any liability statutorily imposed on any insured. [¶] h. watercraft. the following changes are made: [¶] Item a. like appellant's argument based on the denial of respondent's motion for summary judgment. The evidence of D. from the Exclusions section of endorsement number H300CA00188. Until that takes place. This argument. If the ultimate decision on that question is negative. even if the suit is groundless. [¶] with regard to the ownership. Corrigan. In short. . The order granting respondent's motion for summary judgment is accordingly vacated. she contends the trial court erred in denying her own motion for summary judgment because respondent failed to demonstrate that the potential for indemnification coverage had been eliminated. Coverage E of the Policy. Unless otherwise indicated. all further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure. or [¶] (4) any liability assumed through an unwritten or written agreement by any insured. FN 2. Appellant is no more entitled than is respondent to entry of judgment on an issue that at this point remains to be decided. ignores the fact there has not yet been any final determination of the disputed factual issues upon which she bases her claim. family was necessarily established by respondent's failure to disprove the potential for coverage under the Policy. The quoted language. FN 1. there can be no final determination of the questions of Policy coverage and respondent's alleged duty to defend thereunder. or to consider and rule upon respondent's reapplication therefor. is replaced by the following: [¶] a. must be weighed against the opposing evidence. In essence. Respondent shall pay appellant's costs on this appeal. any illegal act commited [sic] by or at the direction of an insured. appellant's request for entry of judgment regarding any duty to defend is premature.
's mother did not reside with C.].'s] conduct was willful within the meaning of Insurance Code § 533. 1999.App. Civil Code section 1714. Shell Oil Co. M.] there is still sufficient evidence in the record to raise a triable issue of material fact regarding whether [D. identified as "Mrs. Judge Zuniga filed an "unreported minute order" confirming the earlier tentative ruling and stating in pertinent part as follows: "1.4th 715. Winterthur Swiss Ins. M. family] in plaintiff's action against them. and in favor of the objectively reasonable expectations of the insured. Court also notes in motion [respondent] focuses solely on the issue of whether [D.] was capable at the time of the attack [of] distinguishing right from wrong. On its face."
. or did not know or understand the nature and quality of her act. Nor does failure to conduct a personal interview render the opinion speculative. 739. sets out respondent's initial statement of undisputed facts in full. "3.Respondent cites the latter exclusion provision for "negligent supervision by any insured of any person" in support of its contention that the Policy excluded coverage for C. Dr. (1991) 52 Cal. Robert S. a psychologist does not have to personally interview a subject in order to render an opinion. . That is whether [D. Co. and the parent or guardian having custody and control shall be jointly and severally liable with the minor for any damages resulting from the willful misconduct. hereinafter referred to as section 533. 1268. or of the insured's agents or others. [Respondent] is incorrect. Murray's testimony is inadmissible[. the copy of appellant's own initial statement of disputed and undisputed facts filed in response thereto on August 10.4th 1258. and her mother. To the extent the exclusion may be ambiguous. v. respondent fails to acknowledge the immediately following language. maintenance or use of motor vehicles. Prior to the hearing date. 763. Penney Casualty Ins. There are triable issues of material fact as to whether Insurance Code § 533 applies." However. D. The objections voiced by [respondent] go to the weight of the expert's opinion and would require the court to engage in assessing the expert's credibility. Jacobs v. M. (Safeco Ins. the trial court. 1019. M. and appellant has made no claim that D. Defendant's evidence actually confirms that whether D. This is precluded in a motion for summary judgment/summary adjudication..] did . Co.1 provides in pertinent part: "(a) Any act of willful misconduct of a minor which results in injury or death to another person or in any injury to the property of another shall be imputed to the parent or guardian having custody and control of the minor for all purposes of civil damages. Judge Barbara Zuniga. M. M.) FN 7. Finally. v. . Court has re-reviewed the Murray declaration and objections thereto. we must resolve any ambiguity regarding this language against the insurer who drafted the policy. issued a tentative ruling as follows: "Defendant has failed to establish it had no duty to defend or indemnify the [M. v. [C. Exchange (1995) 36 Cal. provides that "[a]n insurer is not liable for a loss caused by the wilful act of the insured. at the time of the incident.) FN 4. Although appellant's appendix on appeal does not include a copy of respondent's separate statement of undisputed facts filed with its first motion for summary judgment.. "2. [Respondent] totally failed to address second prong of insanity test.C. her father C. was legally insane when she attacked plaintiff is disputed. (1993) 12 Cal.App. (2001) 26 Cal. M. FN 5. However. Insurance Code section 533. Co. The numbered paragraphs of the separate statement of undisputed facts referring to the Policy exclusions for intentional and illegal acts are specifically cited and referred to in the body of respondent's memorandum of points and authorities in support of its original motion for summary judgment.'s mother was an insured under the Policy issued by respondent.'s alleged negligent supervision of his daughter D.3d 1009. FN 8.K." The statute constitutes an implied exclusionary clause read into all insurance contracts. but he is not exonerated by the negligence of the insured." On September 15.4th 758. 1999. (J. this language--which does not appear ambiguous to us--limits the applicability of the exclusion for "negligent supervision" to situations involving bodily injury or property damage arising from the use of ownership. Fire Ins." FN 6. Appellant's underlying complaint named D. assuming arguendo..
(1984) 160 Cal. Therefore. hearing in the record indicates the agreement to file cross-motions was made "tentatively" on the basis of respondent's alleged failure to provide evidence of the Policy endorsement booklet in connection with its earlier motion for summary judgment. circumstances. since the parties have waived jury. Flores (1996) 45 Cal. it is impossible for us to determine the actual terms thereof. v. The trial court issued two minute orders dated May 25. Section 1008 states in pertinent part as follows: "(a) When an application for an order has been made to a judge. when and to what judge. 2000. on this appeal. . nor indemnify. what order or decisions were made. circumstances. and refused in whole or in part. We note that. See Allstate Insurance Co. The record does not contain any formal stipulation between the parties to file cross motions for summary judgment. FN 10. any order made on a subsequent application may be revoked or set aside on ex parte motion.3d 326 and Interinsurance Exchange v. Accordingly. or to a court. amend. or law are claimed to be shown. Plaintiff has not presented admissible evidence that these exclusions were not in force at the time of the incident. memorandum of points and authorities submitted in reply to appellant's opposition to the motion for summary judgment. the parties disagree about the scope and intent of their agreement in this regard. Respondent argues that the agreement to permit the filing of cross-motions was made at appellant's insistence in order to accommodate her failure to file a timely motion for summary judgment prior to the initial trial date. any party affected by the order may. given the exclusions for intentional and for illegal acts. For a failure to comply with this subdivision. The trial court's minute order denying appellant's motion for summary judgment stated: "Plaintiff has failed to carry her burden of showing that there was potential coverage under the [P]olicy. 2000. and coverage is precluded by the illegal act exclusion of the [P]olicy. In addition. within 10 days after service upon the party of written notice of entry of the order and based upon new or different facts. Appellant insisted she had only agreed to respondent filing a new motion for summary judgment on the basis of her assumption the new motion would be in compliance with section 1008 and based on new facts or law. . and that her claim to have never received a complete copy of the Policy prior to respondent's first motion for summary judgment was at best suspect. 2000]. The party making the application shall state by affidavit what application was made before. or revoke the prior order. and which had already been denied. or granted.App. Moreover. or law are claimed to be shown. may make a subsequent application for the same order upon new or different facts." The trial court's minute order granting respondent's second motion for summary judgment. Hence. in turn.App.
. or law. FN 13.4th 661. both signed by a deputy clerk. this court will have to decide these issues as part of the trial. the minor's pleas [sic] of no contest to the charge of attempted murder is admissible in this action as an admission of an intentional act." FN 12. circumstances. respondent does not specifically rely on the parties' alleged "stipulation" in defending its filing of a second motion for summary judgment identical to the one earlier denied. In its May 16. In the absence of a written agreement or other evidence of the terms of the parties' stipulation. what order or decisions were made. and she had not agreed to respondent simply refiling the same motion for summary judgment it had previously filed. or granted conditionally or on terms. and what new or different facts. "(b) A party who originally made an application for an order which was refused in whole or part. respondent argued: "Lastly. when and to what judge. make application to the same judge or court that made the order. It appears that any such stipulation was informal and oral. 2000. or law. and what new or different facts. to reconsider the matter and modify. . [appellant's] argument that [respondent's] motion for summary judgment should not be considered because it was previously denied has no procedural benefit as this court will have to decide these issues anyway. nor does it argue that the agreement to file such cross-motions somehow trumped the statutory procedural requirements set out in section 1008. circumstances.FN 9. defendant had no duty [to] defend. since the [P]olicy excludes intentional acts. Kim W." FN 11. since attempted murder is a specific intent crime. either on May 25 or June 19[. was as follows: "The court finds as a matter of law that the stabbing was an illegal act. The only page of transcript from the March 20. there was no potential for coverage. in which case it shall be shown by affidavit what application was made before.
. Div. [T]he court's inherent power to correct its own rulings is based on the California Constitution and cannot be impaired by statute. "We find this line of cases holding Code of Civil Procedure section 1008 is jurisdictional to be inapplicable because section 1008 does not govern the court's ability. Similar reported decisions from other courts include Wilson v. the Fourth District. the statute requires it to be based on new or different facts. supra. or for the renewal of a previous motion. we cannot consider Gailing as relevant to our analysis. (a)) or renewal (§ 1008. [Citation. even if prerequisites of the section are not met. 1499-1501.4th 1017. it may do so on its own motion and enter a different order. In Gailing. . whether the order deciding the previous matter or motion is interim or final. 1031-1033 [Fourth Dist."(c) If a court at any time determines that there has been a change of law that warrants it to reconsider a prior order it entered. Dept. 58 Cal.4th at p. 75 Cal. supra. 180.App.App.App.. supra. [Citation. the court retained its inherent jurisdiction to modify interim orders. subd. In addition. (1992) 8 Cal.) FN 15.) This holding. however. Division Two of this court is not alone in following this line of authority by enforcing the statutory procedures and requirements set out in section 1008 as the jurisdictionally exclusive means of obtaining reconsideration of interim trial court orders or renewing previously denied motions. Ad Way." FN 14. Div. the decision of Division Five of this District in People ex rel. 1579 (Gailing). Division Three held broadly that "[t]he provisions of section 1008 are not jurisdictional" and "[t]he trial court has broad discretion to hear a renewed motion. Rose. (Case v. Morite. However. "The Remsens are correct that Code of Civil Procedure section 1008 was not followed. was in turn based entirely on the sole case authority cited in its support. . Klein & Marias (1996) 43 Cal. Hejmadi. Lazben Financial Co. 99 Cal. Gilberd v. subd. Division One of the Fourth Appellate District relied in part on the 1996 case of Gailing v.. [¶] The Remsens claimed at oral argument that the Darling
." (Ibid. Notwithstanding section 1008. Castello. or to impose exclusive procedural requirements for such motions and orders. 19 Cal. In People v. "(g) This section applies to all applications for interim orders.4th at pp. supra.App. supra. 310. . FN 16. to reevaluate its own interim rulings. and applies to all applications to reconsider any order of a judge or court. an alleged new or different law shall not include a later enacted statute without a retroactive application. "(d) A violation of this section may be punished as a contempt and with sanctions . The motion to reconsider here was not. Science Applications Internat. 313-314. Prior to that time. [Citation. Inc.App. Six]. an order made contrary to this section may be revoked by the judge or commissioner who made it. [Citation.App. 1156-1157.4th at pp. (1997) 52 Cal.] Therefore. "(e) This section specifies the court's jurisdiction with regard to applications for reconsideration of its orders and renewals of previous motions. section 1008 did not purport to be jurisdictional.4th 309. (b)). 1027-1028 [Second Dist.4th 1570. "(f) For purposes of this section. One]. made without any analysis or discussion. Those amendments were specifically designed to make clear the Legislature's intention that the procedures set forth in section 1008 be construed as jurisdictional and the exclusive means for modifying.App. AC Transit.] Instead. on its own motion. or revoking its prior orders. . 490-493. . on its own motion. of Transportation v. Corp. the trial court retains the inherent authority to change its decision at any time prior to the entry of judgement. supra.) FN 17. amending or revoking prior interim orders.) Thus. Santa Maria Public Airport Dist. supra. or vacated by a judge of the court in which the action or proceeding is pending.App.4th at pp.4th at p. .App.] Section 1008 is designed to conserve the court's resources by constraining litigants who would attempt to bring the same motion over and over.App.]" (Darling. 98 Cal. Garcia v. . (1995) 39 Cal. review and change its interim rulings. the latter decision was based on the terms of section 1008 before the 1992 amendments thereto. Kollander. No application to reconsider any order or for the renewal of a previous motion may be considered by any judge or court unless made according to this section.. [¶] .4th at pp. Whether a motion for reconsideration (§ 1008. circumstances or law. On the other hand.4th 1025. Lucas v. these same judicial resources would be wasted if the court could not. 32 Cal. 685-686. amending. the only requirement of the court is that it exercise 'due consideration' before modifying.
As previously noted." [Citation. it is prohibited from revisiting its ruling. Lazben Financial Co.4th at pp. supra.App. Instead.App.App.App.4th at p. supra. exercising its discretion to rule upon controversies between the parties and ensuring the orderly administration of justice. supra.]" (Rowe v. "[i]f feasible within bounds set by their words and purposes. AC Transit. That issue may therefore be regarded as having been waived. supra.case does not control here because the judge was not acting sua sponte but reconsidered in response to a litigant's motion. whenever possible. 99 Cal. 1501.. section 1008 would emasculate the judiciary's core power to decide controversies between parties.. 1996) Jurisdiction. Cal. 1499 ["[s]ection 1008 governs reconsideration of court orders whether initiated by a party or the court itself"]). Gilberd v. Hejmadi. 19 Cal. Courts are empowered to decide controversies. 426-427. supra. supra. Trinity Management Services. if a court realizes it has misunderstood or misapplied the law. supra. . and not by the respective trial courts themselves acting sua sponte.App. 102 Cal. 'A court could not operate successfully under the requirement of infallibility in its interim rulings. Baldwin. 185.4th at p. Under [this statutory] reading.4th at pp. Garcia v. construe a statute so as to preserve its constitutional validity. 32 Cal. such a restriction would directly and materially impair and defeat the court's most basic functions. 129.) FN 19. 2 Witkin.4th at p. by parties or the court itself" (Morite. 58 Cal. 23 Cal. AC Transit. nor does it argue that the requirements of section 1008 were either met or avoided by that stipulation.4th at p. 1198-1200. Lazben Financial Co. (Case v.. 32 Cal. supra. Although the decisions in both Morite and Gilberd v. 15 Cal. (Id.) To the extent our opinion conflicts with the holdings or analyses in Remsen. ' [Citation.4th 421. statutes should be construed to preserve their constitutionality. the parties could not confer jurisdiction on the trial court to act in violation of the provisions of section 1008 by consent.4th 1031.App. 492493.4th at p.]' [Citation. . AC Transit contain language broadly stating that section 1008 "governs motions for reconsideration. Whether the trial judge has an unprovoked flash of understanding in the middle of the night or is prompted to rethink an issue by the stimulus of a motion is 'constitutionally immaterial' to the limitation on the power of the Legislature to regulate the judiciary. a power derived from the state constitution. §§ 276. 185-188. Gilberd v. supra. and no matter how obvious its error or how draconian the effects of its misstep. which comprehensively addresses and convincingly analyzes the vexing problems posed by the language of section 1008 as amended and the conflicting interpretations thereof in the appellate courts of this state. Inc. "[A] court must.]" (Remsen. 178-189.]" (Kraus v.App. In coming to this conclusion. we disagree with those decisions. Superior Court." [Citations. 99 Cal. FN 21.4th at pp. in both cases the actual facts and appellate court analyses make it clear that the disputed trial court actions vacating or reversing previous orders were instigated by the requests or motions of parties. 1722. [Citations.
. 87 Cal.. 59 Cal.App. . 87 Cal. In any event.App.4th at pp. and Kollander.App. supra.App. We find this to be a distinction without a difference. Lazben Financial Co. rather than another in conflict with the Constitution. Morite. Miscarriage of justice results where a court is unable to correct its own perceived legal errors . "Interpreted [as barring a trial court from reconsidering its own orders sua sponte]. J. 99 Cal. 490. at pp. supra. Procedure (4th ed. Wozniak.4th at p. 19 Cal.App. 98 Cal.) As such.4th at pp. 290-292. supra.] Consequently. any action by the trial court on such an application not in compliance with the dictates of section 1008 would be in excess of its jurisdiction. whether it realizes its mistake 10 minutes or 10 days later. FN 22. on this appeal respondent does not raise the fact of the parties' alleged "stipulation" to file cross-motions for summary judgment. supra.) " 'If "the terms of a statute are by fair and reasonable interpretation capable of a meaning consistent with the requirements of the Constitution.App. because the requirements of section 1008 are jurisdictional with respect to applications by civil parties litigant for reconsideration of previous orders or renewing previously denied motions.App. the statute will be given that meaning. supra. supra.) FN 18. we are persuaded by the thoughtful and well-reasoned decision of Division Three of the Second Appellate District in Case v.4th 172 [Aldrich. The legislative restriction of a court's ability to sua sponte reconsider its own rulings is not merely a reasonable regulation on judicial functions. 685690.]. [Citation.4th 304.) FN 20. We are hard pressed to conceive of a restriction that goes more directly to the heart of a court's constitutionally mandated functions.]" (Case v.
) Nevertheless. (Buss v.com
. a residual duty to defend may have existed for some interim period of time based on the mere potential for such coverage at that point. 674-675. the stipulated settlement between appellant and the M. 16 Cal. the necessity of complying with section 1008 could not be stipulated away by any agreement of the parties.com More than 50.) In short.. v.stipulation. estoppel or waiver.2d 120.4th at pp. Estate of Hanley (1943) 23 Cal. (See Hollister Convalescent Hosp.000 state-specific legal documents for your business.com USLegalForms. 122-123. Superior Court. 666667. demands and causes of action for the actual cost to them of attorneys fees incurred as a result of [respondent's] failure to defend" them in the underlying tort cause of action. Even if it is ultimately concluded that there is no coverage under the Policy. FN 23.uslegalforms. Inc. whatever its actual terms. www. Return to Top Do Another California Case Law Search
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AbacusLaw Software The only program that combines multiple practice areas so easily www.3d 660. In light of this express reservation of rights. Rico (1975) 15 Cal. any such phantom interim duty to defend can be of little possible value to appellant. 46-47. family specifically reserved to the latter "their rights. supra.abacuslaw.
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