Source: https://openjurist.org/156/f3d/49/acosta-mestre-v-hilton-international-of-puerto-rico-inc
Timestamp: 2019-02-19 23:58:18
Document Index: 638542693

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1487', '§ 402', '§ 402', '§ 100', '§ 402', '§ 402', '§ 402']

156 F3d 49 Acosta-Mestre v. Hilton International of Puerto Rico Inc | OpenJurist
156 F. 3d 49 - Acosta-Mestre v. Hilton International of Puerto Rico Inc
156 F3d 49 Acosta-Mestre v. Hilton International of Puerto Rico Inc
156 F.3d 49
41 Fed.R.Serv.3d 698, Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 15,343
Antonio ACOSTA-MESTRE, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellants,
HILTON INTERNATIONAL OF PUERTO RICO, INC., et al.,
No. 97-2183.
Heard May 7, 1998.
In denying Acosta's motion to amend the complaint to name Tropitone as an additional defendant, the district court reasoned that the motion to amend, which Acosta filed near the close of discovery and after three previous extensions of the discovery deadline had been granted, was tardy, and that Acosta lacked any sufficient excuse for delaying so long before moving to amend. We review the district court's denial of leave to amend the complaint "for an abuse of discretion, and defer to the district court if any adequate reason for the denial is apparent on the record." Grant v. News Group Boston, Inc., 55 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.1995).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), a litigant may amend a pleading once as a matter of right before a responsive pleading is filed and subsequently by the parties' consent or "by leave of court." Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). While "leave [to amend] shall be freely given when justice so requires," id., "the liberal amendment policy prescribed by Rule 15(a) does not mean that leave will be granted in all cases." 6 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1487, at 611 (2d ed.1990). Among the adequate reasons for denying leave to amend are "undue delay" in filing the motion and "undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment." Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962); see also Grant, 55 F.3d at 5. Here defendant did not consent to the motion, and we find no abuse of discretion in the court's conclusion that Acosta's request for leave to file a second amended complaint was preceded by undue delay.
Hence by the time of the motion for leave to amend, nearly all the case's pre-trial work was complete. According to the district court's undisputed estimate, allowing the motion would have resulted in at least an additional four months of discovery and would have delayed trial by at least an additional twelve months. These consequential delays put the ball in Acosta's court, for when "considerable time has elapsed between the filing of the complaint and the motion to amend, the movant has the burden of showing some 'valid reason for his neglect and delay.' " Stepanischen v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Corp., 722 F.2d 922, 933 (1st Cir.1983) (quoting Hayes v. New England Millwork Distribs., Inc., 602 F.2d 15, 19-20 (1st Cir.1979)). The district court could reasonably determine that Acosta failed to carry this burden.
The first point is contrary to Supreme Court and circuit precedent holding that, especially where allowing the amendment will cause further delay in the proceedings, "undue delay" in seeking the amendment may be a sufficient basis for denying leave to amend. Foman, 371 U.S. at 178, 83 S.Ct. 227. See Grant, 55 F.3d at 5 (affirming denial of leave after fourteen-month delay); Stepanischen, 722 F.2d at 933 (affirming denial of motion for leave filed after seventeen-month delay); Hayes, 602 F.2d at 19 ("[I]t is clear that 'undue delay' can be a basis for denial.").
At the completion of voir dire, the district court did not rule on Hilton's motion to strike Dr. Soderstrom. Rather, the court found that while Dr. Soderstrom was qualified as a "general mechanical engineering expert without a specialization," he was not qualified to opine specifically as to chaise lounges either under the standard for admission of "scientific" evidence set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993),or pursuant to the general principles articulated in Fed.R.Evid. 702.3
This circuit has not yet decided whether Daubert applies to the type of "technical" evidence proffered by Dr. Soderstrom. Bogosian v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc., 104 F.3d 472, 479 (1st Cir.1997). We find it unnecessary to decide that issue here. Nor do we find it necessary to decide whether the district court erred when it excluded Dr. Soderstrom's testimony, whether pursuant to Daubert or the general standard set forth in Rule 702. Even if the district court erred in excluding Dr. Soderstrom's testimony, we conclude, for the reasons stated below, that such error was harmless. See Bates v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 42 F.3d 79, 84 (1st Cir.1994) (exclusion of testimony deemed harmless where testimony would not have established viable cause of action); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 61.
The district court's latter ruling was correct. Since this is a diversity case, we follow the law of Puerto Rico. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). No Puerto Rico case has been called to our attention4 that addresses whether strict products liability claims lie against a hotel in circumstances analogous to those in this case. Nor has case law been called to our attention supporting the district court's earlier suggestion that a non-manufacturer or non-seller who tangentially "makes money" from utilization of a product is subject to strict products liability under Puerto Rico law if a guest or other user is injured by the product.
While there is no black-letter precedent in Puerto Rico that controls here, we find relatively clear the course that the courts of that jurisdiction would take. Hence we see no need to certify the question to Puerto Rico's highest court, nor have we been asked to do so. See VanHaaren v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 989 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1993) ("Absent controlling state court precedent, a federal court sitting in diversity may certify a state law issue to the state's highest court, or undertake its prediction 'when the course [the] state courts would take is relatively clear' ")(quoting Porter v. Nutter, 913 F.2d 37, 41 n. 4 (1st Cir.1990)). We find guidance by looking to " 'analogous state [and, since Puerto Rico is not a state, Puerto Rican] court decisions, persuasive adjudications by courts of [Puerto Rico and the] states, learned treatises, and public policy considerations identified in [Puerto Rican and] state decisional law' in order to make an 'informed prophecy' of how the [Puerto Rico Supreme Court] would rule." Rodriguez-Suris v. Montesinos, 123 F.3d 10, 13 (1st Cir.1997) (quoting Blinzler v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 81 F.3d 1148, 1151 (1st Cir.1996)).
The Puerto Rico courts generally embrace the principles of strict products liability prescribed in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965). See Malave-Felix v. Volvo Car Corp., 946 F.2d 967, 971 (1st Cir.1991) (citing Mendoza v. Cerveceria Corona, Inc., 97 P.R.R. 487, 495-96 (1969)); Perez-Trujillo v. Volvo Car Corp., 137 F.3d 50, 52 (1st Cir.1998). Section 402A applies strict liability, or liability without regard to negligence, to manufacturers and sellers of products that are in a "defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer...." Section 402A applies, however, only if "the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product." Restatement (Second) Torts § 402A (emphasis supplied). See also W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 100 at 705 (5th ed. 1984) ("Only a seller who can be regarded as a merchant or one engaged in the business of supplying goods of the kind involved in the case is subject to strict liability, either on warranty or in tort."). This limitation serves various public policies, among them placing the burden of accidental injuries caused by products upon those who market them "as a cost of production against which liability insurance can be obtained." § 402A, comment c.
We conclude that the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, which has embraced generally the principles set forth in § 402A, would limit the application of strict products liability, whether for alleged design defects or breach of implied warranty, to those "in the business of" manufacturing or selling the product at issue. See Benitez-Allende v. Alcan Aluminio do Brasil, 857 F.2d 26, 34 (1st Cir.1988) (predicting Puerto Rico law in light of fact that "Puerto Rico ... has chosen to adopt the principles of strict liability laid out in [§ 402A]"). Since Hilton was not in the business of manufacturing or selling chaise lounges, Acosta had no viable strict products liability claims against Hilton.
We have noted that the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico has consistently relied upon California Supreme Court precedent when considering issues raised by the doctrine of strict product liability. Collazo-Santiago v. Toyota Motor Corp., 149 F.3d 23, 25 (1st Cir.1998). Our conclusion that Puerto Rico law would prohibit Acosta's strict products liability claims against Hilton is bolstered by our reading of California law.
The Supreme Court of California has specifically addressed the issue raised by Hilton. In Peterson v. Superior Court, 10 Cal.4th 1185, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 899 P.2d 905 (1995) (in bank), a hotel guest injured when she fell in a bathtub in her room sued, among others, the hotel owner alleging claims of negligence and breach of warranty. The Supreme Court of California held that the proprietor of a hotel cannot be held strictly liable on the basis of products liability for injuries to its guests caused by alleged defects on the premises. Id. 899 P.2d at 907.5 The court, reversing its earlier decision in Becker v. IRM Corp., 38 Cal.3d 454, 213 Cal.Rptr. 213, 698 P.2d 116 (1985), held that "[t]he mere circumstance that it was contemplated customers ... would use the products in question or be benefitted by them does not transform the owners of the businesses into the equivalent of retailers of the products." Id. 899 P.2d at 913. Because hotel owners are not part of the chain of distribution for most products on their premises,6 the court held that public policy considerations supporting strict liability for sellers and manufacturers of products (including the spread of loss, the availability of expertise and resources to correct product defects, and the incentive to manufacture safer products) do not apply in the case of hotel owners. Id. at 918-20. The court noted that guests still may sue hotel owners for alleged breaches of the applicable standard of care and, of course, may sue those in the business of manufacturing and selling products for strict products liability. Id. at 920-21.
To warrant granting a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, the movant must demonstrate that (1) the evidence has been discovered since trial; (2) the evidence could not by due diligence have been discovered earlier; (3) the evidence is not merely cumulative or impeaching; and (4) the evidence is of such a nature that it would probably change the result if a new trial is granted. Duffy v. Clippinger, 857 F.2d 877, 879 (1st Cir.1988). An order denying a motion for a new trial must be upheld unless the trial court abused its discretion. D. Federico Co. v. New Bedford Redevelopment Auth., 723 F.2d 122, 130 (1st Cir.1983).
We add that even if Acosta had viable products liability claims against Hilton, we would uphold the district court's denial of Acosta's motion for a new trial. We agree with the district court that with due diligence Acosta would have discovered both the recalls before trial. Tropitone initially recalled several of its lounge chair models in 1992, well before Acosta injured his finger. Acosta could have included Tropitone as a defendant, see supra, and easily obtained information about the 1992 recall through discovery. Moreover, as a defendant, Tropitone would have been subject to a continuing duty to supplement its discovery responses. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(e). Thus, Acosta could also have readily obtained information concerning the impending 1997 recall from Tropitone prior to trial.
Acosta challenges two evidentiary rulings made by the district court. We review the district court's evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. Rodriguez-Hernandez v. Miranda-Velez, 132 F.3d 848, 855 (1st Cir.1998). We find no merit in Acosta's claims of error.
Other courts in the United States that have considered the issue have reached the same conclusion. See Ely v. Blevins, 706 F.2d 479, 481 (4th Cir.1983) ("[W]hile an innkeeper is often held to a specially high duty of care, the general rule, nationally, falls short of warranty."); Summers v. Fort Crockett Hotel, Ltd., 902 S.W.2d 20, 27 (Tex.App.1995) (hotel which did not sell or manufacture balcony railing cannot be held liable on design defect theory); cf. Jones v. Keetch, 388 Mich. 164, 167-68, 200 N.W.2d 227, 229 (Mich.1972) (hotel guest has viable claim against hotel for breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose)