Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/60835266/Yes-a-State-can-declare-who-are-its-citizens
Timestamp: 2017-11-19 11:31:13
Document Index: 436518218

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 50', '§ 11', '§ 11', '§ 16', '§ 16', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 8', '§ 2', '§ 2', 'art. 4', '§2']

Yes a State can declare who are its citizens | Fourteenth Amendment To The United States Constitution | Privileges Or Immunities Clause
Description: The several States can declare who are its citizens. Before the Fourteenth Amendment, the States of Virginia, New York, and Connecticut did so. After the Fourteenth Amendment, the States of Connect...
The several States can declare who are its citizens. Before the Fourteenth Amendment, the States of Virginia, New York, and Connecticut did so. After the Fourteenth Amendment, the States of Connecticut, Virginia, North Dakota did so, with the States of California and Montana currently still doing so. The Fourteenth Amendment did not affect the sovereignty of a particular State. A particular State now has citizens of it own which are not citizens of the United States.
©2011 Dan Goodman Yes a State can declare who are its citizens: “Mr. Crisfield asked by what rule a ‘citizen of this State’ is defined? Who is a citizen of the State of Maryland? The term is indefinite. Unless defined by the Constitution, the Legislature will have power to declare who are citizens. The power of the Legislature in this respect should be limited. Unless restrained by express provision of the Constitution, the Legislature might declare that persons not naturalized should be citizens of this State. Was the gentlemen from Prince Georges prepared to entrust this power to the Legislature without restraint?” Debates and Proceedings of the Maryland Reform Convention to revise the State Constitution to which are prefixed the Bill of Rights and Constitution as adopted; 1851 (Annapolis: William M’neir); Volume I, Page 74.
http://books.google.com/books?id=itN51z5uJsIC&pg=PA74#v=onepage&q&f=false
“ . . . In a dispatch to Mr. Fay, our minister to Switzerland, in March, 1856, Mr. Marcy, Secretary of State under President Pierce, writes: ‘Every society possesses the undoubted right to determine who shall compose its members, and it is exercised by all nations, both in peace and war.’ ‘It may always be questionable whether a resort to this power is warranted by the circumstances, or what department of the Government is empowered to exert it; but there can be no doubt that it is possessed by all nations, and that each may decide for itself when the occasion arises demanding its exercise.’ Report on Chinese Immigration, Report No. 2915, House of Representatives, 51st Congress, 1st Session, August 5, 1890, Page 15.
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Before the Fourteenth Amendment, the States of Virginia and of New York, declared who were its citizens: [Footnote 1] “All free white persons born in this state, all free white persons born in any other state of this Union, who may be or become residents of this state, all aliens being free white persons naturalized under the laws of the United States, who may be or become residents of this state; all persons who have obtained a right to citizenship under former laws, and all children, wherever born, whose father, or if he be dead, whose mother shall be a citizen of this state, at the time of the birth of ‐ 1 ‐
such children, shall be deemed citizens of this state.” Title 2, Chapter 3, Section 1 of the Code of Virginia, 1849.
http://books.google.com/books?id=pCtEAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA61#v=onepage&q&f=false
“The citizens of the state are: 1. All persons born in this state and domiciled within it, except the children of transient aliens and of alien public ministers and consuls; 2. All persons born out of this state who are citizens of the United States and domiciled within this state.” Section 5 of the Political Code of New York, 1859.
http://books.google.com/books?id=l3w4AAAAIAAJ&pg=PA51#v=onepage&q&f=false
“The citizens of the state are: 1. All persons born in this state and domiciled within it, except the children of transient aliens and of alien public ministers and consuls; 2. All persons born out of this state who are citizens of the United States and domiciled within this state.” Section 5 of the Political Code of New York, 1860.
http://books.google.com/books?id=93s4AAAAIAAJ&pg=PA51#v=onepage&q&f=false
After the Fourteenth Amendment, the State of Connecticut declared who are its citizens: “Who are citizens. 1857 All persons born in this State, all persons born without its limits, if children of citizens of this State, who are temporarily absent therefrom, and all other persons being in, or coming into, and locating in this State, with intent to remain and reside permanently as citizens, except aliens, paupers, and fugitives from justice or service, are and shall be deemed citizens of this State, owing it allegiance and entitled to receive its protection, until they shall have voluntarily withdrawn from its limits, and become incorporated into some other State or sovereignty as members thereof; and all persons in the jurisdiction of this State shall, in all cases, be entitled to the protection of its Constitution and laws.* * The right of citizenship in this State has been extended by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.” Title II, Chapter I, Section 1 of the General Statutes of Connecticut, Revised 1875, page 4.
http://books.google.com/books?id=4dsZAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA4#v=onepage&q&f=false
And so did the State of Virginia: “All persons born in this state, all persons born in any other state of this Union, who may be or become residents of this state, all aliens being free white persons naturalized under the laws of the United States, who may be or become residents of this state; all persons who have obtained a right to citizenship under former laws, and all children, wherever born, whose father, or if he be dead, whose mother shall be a citizen of this state, at the time of the birth of such children—shall be deemed citizens of this state.” Section 39 of the Code of Virginia, 1887.
http://books.google.com/books?id=l7gNAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA1166#v=onepage&q&f=false
Currently, the States of California and Montana have declared who are its citizens: “The citizens of the State are: (a) All persons born in the State and residing within it, except the children of transient aliens and of alien public ministers and consuls. (b) All persons born out of the State who are citizens of the United States and residing within the State.” Section 241 of the Government Code of California, 2011.
http://law.onecle.com/california/government/241.html
“The citizens of the State are: (1) all persons born in this State and residing within it, except the children of transient aliens; (2) all persons born out of the State who are citizens of the United States and residing within the State.” 1‐1‐402 of the Montana Code Annotated, 2009.
http://data.opi.mt.gov/bills/mca/1/1/1‐1‐402.htm
Thus, a State can declare who are its citizens: “ . . . A person who is a citizen of the United States is necessarily a citizen of the particular state in which he resides. But a person may be a citizen of a particular state and not a citizen of the United States. To hold otherwise would be to deny to the state the highest exercise of its sovereignty [Footnote 2], the right to declare who are its citizens [Footnote 3].” State of Louisiana v. Fowler: 6 S. 602; 41 La.Ann. 380 (1889). [Footnote 4]
http://books.google.com/books?id=PIA7AAAAIAAJ&pg=PA602#v=onepage&q&f=false
In addition: “ . . . It seems clear, therefore, that by section 526a, Code of Civil Procedure, the right to bring an action like the one plaintiff has here brought for an injunction is limited, in so far as it is conferred upon individuals, to citizens resident within the county. Plaintiff nowhere alleges in his complaint that he is a citizen. On his behalf it is argued that the terms ‘citizen’ and ‘resident’ are sometimes considered as synonymous, and refer merely, where not otherwise defined, to persons having an actual, permanent abode at a definite place. General definitions of the word ‘citizen’ might be looked to to determine the sense in which the term is used in the statute, were it not for the fact that in the Political Code, at section 51, a complete definition is given. Citizens of the state are there defined to be: ‘(1) All persons born in this state and residing within it, except the children of transient aliens and of alien public ministers and consuls; (2) all persons born out of this state who are citizens of the United States and residing within this state.’ It might be argued that a statute depriving nonresident citizens of other states of privileges equal with those of citizens of our own state would be obnoxious to the federal Constitution; but even though some force should be conceded to this contention, the provisions of the statute considered here would not be wholly inoperative. Estate of Johnson, 139 Cal. 532, 73 Pac. 424, 96 Am. St. Rep. 161. For aught that appears from plaintiff’s complaint, he may be an alien, and unless he shows that he belongs to the class of persons entitled to prosecute this kind of an action, he cannot be heard at all, especially when he seeks to nullify the effect of an act of the Legislature by raising constitutional questions. He is not, then, a ‘party interested’ in a legal sense. Davidson v. Von Detten, 139 Cal. 469, 73 Pac. 189.” Thomas v. Joplin: 14 Cl. App. 662, at 665 thru 666; 112 Pac. 729, at 731 (1910).
http://books.google.com/books?id=9_caAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA665#v=onepage&q&f=false http://books.google.com/books?id=1ik8AAAAIAAJ&pg=PA731
“It is true that a citizen, in the full acceptation of that term, may be said to be a member of the civil State, entitled to all its privileges. But the possession of all political rights is not essential to citizenship. (People, etc., v. De la Guerra, 40 Cal. 311.) The term has quite a comprehensive meaning. It includes citizens of the State, and citizens of the United States, and these include political and civil citizens—electors and non‐electors. (§§ 50, 51, Pol. Code.)” Lyons v. Cunningham: 66 Cal. 42, at 44; 4 Pac. 938, at 939 (1884).
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“By section 128 of the same Constitution, women were allowed to vote at school elections provided they satisfied ‘the qualifications enumerated in Section 121 of this article as to age, residence and citizenship.’ (Italics added) ‐ 4 ‐
Section 13 of Political Code of North Dakota provides: ‘Who are citizens. The citizens of the state are: 1. All persons born in this state and residing within it, except the children of transient aliens and of alien public ministers and consuls; 2. All persons born out of this state and who are citizens of the United States and residing within this state.’ R.C. 1905, § 11; R.C. 1895, § 11. Section 18 of the same Code provides: ‘Persons not citizens. Persons in this state not its citizens, are either: 1. Citizens of other states; or, 2. Aliens’ R.C. 1905, § 16; R.C. 1895, § 16. Voting and citizenship are not necessarily coexistent. One may be a citizen without having the right of the vote. Women were such for centuries. At the same time, the right to vote does not confer citizenship.” Petition of Sproule: 19 F. Supp. 995, at 999 (1937).
http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16486693112477151117
“The only ground on which the writ is asked is that Bell and Kent, the architects, are not citizens of the state. Upon this question we heard the evidence in open court. From this evidence it clearly appears to us that Bell and Kent are citizens of the state, and were at the time the contract was awarded to them by the commission. Section 71 of the Political Code defines who are citizens of the state. Under this section it is clear, as shown by the evidence, the architects are citizens of Montana. The writ is therefore denied.” Per Curiam, Donovan v. Smith: 21 Mont 344, at 345 (1898).
http://books.google.com/books?id=npgEAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA345#v=onepage&q&f=false
A State can declare who are its citizens. This was not changed by the Fourteenth Amendment. In the Slaughterhouse Cases (1873), the Supreme Court decided that because of the Fourteenth Amendment, citizenship of a State was to be separate and distinct from citizenship of the United States. A citizen of a State was to be considered as separate and distinct from a citizen of the United States. “Of the privileges and immunities of the citizen of the United States, and of the privileges and immunities of the citizen of the State, and what they respective are, we will presently consider; but we wish to state here that it is only the former which are placed by this clause (Section 1, Clause 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment) ‐ 5 ‐
under the protection of the Federal Constitution, and that the latter, whatever they may be, are not intended to have any additional protection by this paragraph of the amendment.” Slaughterhouse Cases: 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, at 74 (1873). [Footnote 5]
In addition: “In the Slaughter­house cases, 16 Wall. 36, the subject of the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, as distinguished from those of a particular State, was treated by Mr. Justice Miller in delivering the opinion of the court. He stated . . . that it was only privileges and immunities of the citizen of the United States that were placed by the [Fourteenth] amendment under the protection of the Federal Constitution, and that the privileges and immunities of a citizen of a State, whatever they might be, were not intended to have any additional protection by the paragraph in question, but they must rest for their security and protection where they have heretofore rested.” Maxwell v. Dow: 176 U.S. 581, at 587 (1900).
“ . . . In the Constitution and laws of the United States, the word ‘citizen’ is generally, if not always, used in a political sense to designate one who has the rights and privileges of a citizen of a State or of the United States. Baldwin v. Franks: 120 U.S. 678, at 690 (1887).
And there is this: “As a man may be a citizen of a State without being a citizen of the United States, and as Section 1428, Revised Statutes, requires all officers of all United States vessels to be citizens of the United States, all officers of the Naval Militia must be male citizens of the United States as well as of the respective States, Territories, of the District of Columbia, of more than 18 and less than 45 years of age.” General Orders of Navy Department (Series of 1913); Orders remaining in force up to January 29, 1918; General Order No. 153, Page 17, Para 73.
A citizen of the United States can become also a citizen of a State, under Section 1, Clause 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment: “The question is presented in this case, whether, since the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, a woman, who is a citizen of the United States AND the State of Missouri, is a voter in that State, notwithstanding the provision of the constitution and laws of the State, which confine the right of suffrage to men alone. . . . There is no doubt that women may be citizens. They are persons, and by the fourteenth amendment ‘all persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof ‘ are expressly declared to be ‘citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.’ “ Minor v. Happersett: 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, at 165 (1874).
“The Fourteenth Amendment declares that citizens of the United States are citizens of the state within they reside; therefore the plaintiff was at the time of making her application, a citizen of the United States AND a citizen of the State of ‐ 7 ‐
Illinois. We do not here mean to say that there may not be a temporary residence in one State, with intent to return to another, which will not create citizenship in the former. But the plaintiff states nothing to take her case out of the definition of citizenship of a State as defined by the first section of the fourteenth amendment.” Bradwell v. the State of Illinois: 83 U.S. 130, at 138 (1873).
In such case then there would be a citizen of a State, under Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution and also a citizen of the United States and a citizen of a State, under Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment: “The bill filed in the Circuit Court by the plaintiff, McQuesten, alleged her to be ‘a citizen of the United States and of the State of Massachusetts, and residing at Turner Falls in said State,’ while the defendants Steigleder and wife were alleged to be ‘citizens of the State of Washington, and residing at the city of Seattle in said State.’ “ Statement of the Case, Steigleder v. McQuesten: 198 U.S. 141 (1905). “The averment in the bill that the parties were citizens of different States was sufficient to make a prima facie case of jurisdiction so far as it depended on citizenship.” Opinion, Steigleder v. McQuesten: 198 U.S. 141, at 142 (1905).
Therefore, in any State of the Union, there are now two State citizens, a citizen of a State, under Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution, and also a citizen of a State (and a citizen of the United States), under Section 1, Clause 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. [Footnote 6] The only difference between them is that a citizen of a State, under Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution, is one born in a State of the Union; [Footnote 7] whereas a citizen of a State, under Section 1, Clause 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, is one born in the United States [Footnote 8]. __________________ Footnotes: 1. There were other States. For example, The State of Connecticut did so in 1857. However, the author was not able to locate this statute. ‐ 8 ‐
2. “If the United States may control the conduct of its citizens upon the high seas, we see no reason why the State of Florida may not likewise govern the conduct of its citizens upon the high seas with respect to matters in which the State has a legitimate interest and where there is no conflict with acts of Congress. Save for the powers committed by the Constitution to the Union, the State of Florida has retained the status of a SOVEREIGN. . . . . . . . When its action does not conflict with federal legislation, the sovereign authority of the State over the conduct of its citizens upon the high seas is analogous to the sovereign authority of the United States over its citizens in like circumstances.” Skiriotes v. State of Florida: 313 U.S. 69, at 77, 78 thru 79 (1941).
“ . . . While no one disputes the proposition that ‘[t]he Constitution created a Federal Government of limited powers,’ Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991); and while the Tenth Amendment makes explicit that ‘[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people’; the task of ascertaining the constitutional line between federal and state power has given rise to many of the Court’s most difficult and celebrated cases. At least as far back as Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 324 (1816), the Court has resolved questions ‘of great importance and delicacy’ in determining whether particular sovereign powers have been granted by the Constitution to the Federal Government or have been retained by the States. These questions can be viewed in either of two ways. In some cases the Court has inquired whether an Act of Congress is authorized by one of the powers delegated to Congress in Article I of the Constitution. See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819). In other cases the Court has sought to determine whether an Act of Congress invades the province of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985); Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 71 (1869). In a case like these, involving the division of authority between federal and state governments, the two inquires are mirror images of each other. If a power is delegated to Congress in the Constitution, the Tenth Amendment expressly disclaims any reservation of that power to the States; if a power is an attribute of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, it is necessarily a power the Constitution has not conferred on Congress. See United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 649 (1961); Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92, 102 (1946); Oklahoma ex re. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 534 (1941).” State of New York v. United States: 505 U.S. 144, at 155 thru 156 (1992).
http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9243582117703452379
“Although the Constitution establishes a National Government with broad, often plenary authority over matters within its recognized competence, the founding document ‘specifically recognizes the States as sovereign entities.’ Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, supra, at 71, n. 15; accord, Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991) (‘[T]he States entered the federal system with their sovereignty intact’). Various textual provisions of the Constitution assume the States’ continued existence and active participation in the fundamental processes of governance. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 919 (1997) (citing Art. III, § 2; Art. IV, §§ 2‐4; Art. V.). The limited and enumerated powers granted to the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Branches of the National Government, moreover, underscore the vital role reserved to the States by the constitutional design, see, e.g., Art. I, § 8; Art. II, §§ 2‐3; Art. III, § 2. Any doubt regarding the constitutional role of the States as sovereign entities is removed by the Tenth Amendment, which, like the other provisions of the Bill of Rights, was enacted to allay lingering concerns about the extent of the national power. The Amendment confirms the promise implicit in the original document: ‘The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.’ U.S. Const., Amdt. 10; see also Printz, supra, at 919; New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156‐159, 177 (1992). Alden v. State of Maine: 527 U.S. 706, at 713 thru 714 (1999).
http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13106073434362588443
3. “We have in our political system a government of the United States and a government of each of the several States. Each one of these governments is distinct from the others, and each has citizens of its own who owe it allegiance, and whose rights within its jurisdiction, it must protect.” United States v. Cruikshank: 92 U.S. 542, at 549 (1875).
http://books.google.com/books?id=PGwUAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA549#v=onepage&q&f=false
“The act was considered in Johnson v. United States, 160 U.S. 546, and we there held that a person who was not a citizen of the United States at the time of an alleged appropriation of his property by a tribe of Indians was not entitled to maintain an action in the Court of Claims under the act in question. There was not in that case, however, any assertion that the claimant was a citizen of a State as distinguished from a citizen of the United States. . . . [U]ndoubtedly in a purely technical and abstract sense citizenship of one of the States may not include citizenship of the United States . . . Unquestionably, in the general and common acceptation, a citizen of the State is considered as synonymous with citizen of the United States, and the one is therefore treated as expressive of the other. This flows from the fact that the one is normally and usually the other, and where ‐ 10 ‐
such is not the case, it is purely exceptional and uncommon.” United States v. Northwestern Express, Stage & Transportation Company: 164 U.S. 686, 688 (1897).
“We come to the contention that the citizenship of Edwards was not averred in the complaint or shown by the record, and hence jurisdiction did not appear. In answering the question, whether the Circuit Court had jurisdiction of the controversy, we must put ourselves in the place of the Circuit Court of Appeals, and decide the question with reference to the transcript of record in that court. Had the transcript shown nothing more as to the status of Edwards than the averment of the complaint that he was a ‘resident of the State of Delaware,’ as such an averment would not necessarily have imported that Edwards was a citizen of Delaware, a negative answer would have been impelled by prior decisions. Mexican Central Ry. Co. v. Duthie, 189 U.S. 76; Horne v. George H. Hammond Co., 155 U.S. 393; Denny v. Pironi, 141 U.S. 121; Robertson v. Cease, 97 U.S. 646. The whole record, however, may be looked to, for the purpose of curing a defective averment of citizenship, where jurisdiction in a Federal court is asserted to depend upon diversity of citizenship, and if the requisite citizenship, is anywhere expressly averred in the record, or facts are therein stated which in legal intendment constitute such allegation, that is sufficient. Horne v. George H. Hammond Co., supra and cases cited. As this is an action at law, we are bound to assume that the testimony of the plaintiff contained in the certificate of the Circuit Court of Appeals, and recited to have been given on the trial, was preserved in a bill of exceptions, which formed part of the transcript of record filed in the Circuit Court of Appeals. Being a part of the record, and proper to be resorted to in settling a question of the character of that now under consideration, Robertson v. Cease, 97 U.S. 648, we come to ascertain what is established by the uncontradicted evidence referred to. In the first place, it shows that Edwards, prior to his employment on the New York Sun and the New Haven Palladium, was legally domiciled in the State of Delaware. Next, it demonstrates that he had no intention to abandon such domicil, for he testified under oath as follows: ‘One of the reasons I left the New Haven Palladium was, it was too far away from home. I lived in Delaware, and I had to go back and forth. My family are over in Delaware.’ Now, it is elementary that, to effect a change of one’s legal domicil, two things are indispensable: First, residence in a new domicil, and, second, the intention to remain there. The change cannot be made, except facto et animo. Both are alike necessary. Either without the other is insufficient. Mere absence from a fixed home, however long continued, cannot work the change. Mitchell v. United States, 21 Wall. 350. As Delaware must, then, be held to have been the legal domicil of Edwards at the ‐ 11 ‐
time he commenced this action, had it appeared that he was a citizen of the United States, it would have resulted, by operation of the Fourteenth Amendment, that Edwards was also a citizen of the State of Delaware. Anderson v. Watt, 138 U.S. 694. Be this as it may, however, Delaware being the legal domicil of Edwards, it was impossible for him to have been a citizen of another State, District, or Territory, and he must then have been either a citizen of Delaware or a citizen or subject of a foreign State. In either of these contingencies, the Circuit Court would have had jurisdiction over the controversy. But, in the light of the testimony, we are satisfied that the averment in the complaint, that Edwards was a resident ‘of’ the State of Delaware, was intended to mean, and, reasonably construed, must be interpreted as averring, that the plaintiff was a citizen of the State of Delaware. Jones v. Andrews, 10 Wall. 327, 331; Express Company v. Kountze, 8 Wall. 342.” Sun Printing & Publishing Association v. Edwards: 194 U.S. 377, at 381 thru 383 (1904).
4. “It is well settled that each state has the right to determine the civil status and capacities of its inhabitants. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722; 24 L.Ed. 565; Hekking v. Pfaff (C. C. ) 82 Fed. 403.” Town of Watertown v. Greaves: 112 Fed. Rep. 183, at 184 (1901).
http://books.google.com/books?id=sCw4AAAAIAAJ&pg=PA184#v=onepage&q&f=false
“ . . . The several States of the Union are not, it is true, in every respect independent, many of the rights and powers which originally belonged to them being now vested in the government created by the Constitution. But, except as restrained and limited by that instrument, they possess and exercise the authority of independent States, and the principles of public law to which we have referred are applicable to them. One of these principles is, that every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory. As a consequence, every State has the power to determine for itself the civil status and capacities of its inhabitants.” Pennoyer v. Neff: 95 U.S. 714, at 722 (1877).
http://books.google.com/books?id=z78GAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA722#v=onepage&q&f=false
5. It is to be noted that privileges and immunities of a citizen of a State are in the constitution and laws of a particular State: “. . . Whatever may be the scope of section 2 of article IV ‐‐ and we need not, in this case enter upon a consideration of the general question ‐‐ the Constitution of the United States does not make the privileges and immunities enjoyed by the citizens of one State under the constitution and laws of that State, the measure of the ‐ 12 ‐
privileges and immunities to be enjoyed, as of right, by a citizen of another State under its constitution and laws.” McKane v. Durston: 153 U.S. 684, at 687 (1894).
6. “The Constitution forbids the abridging of the privileges of a citizen of the United States, but does not forbid the state from abridging the privileges of its own citizens. The rights which a person has as a citizen of the United States are those which the Constitution and laws of the United States confer upon a citizen as a citizen of the United States. For instance, a man is a citizen of a state by virtue of his being resident there; but, if he moves into another state, he becomes at once a citizen there by operation of the Constitution (Section 1, Clause 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment) making him a citizen there; and needs no special naturalization, which, but for the Constitution, he would need. On the other hand, the rights and privileges which a citizen of a state has are those which pertain to him as a member of society, and which would be his if his state were not a member of the Union. Over these the states have the usual power belonging to government, subject to the proviso that they shall not deny to any person within the jurisdiction (i.e., to their own citizens, the citizens of other states, or aliens) the equal protection of the laws. These powers extend to all objects, which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, privileges, and properties of people, and of the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the state. Federalist, No. 45” Hopkins v. City of Richmond: 86 S. E. Rep. 139, at 145; 117 Va. 692; Ann. Cas. 1917D, 1114 (1915), citing the entire opinion of Town of Ashland v. Coleman, in its opinion (per curiam); overruled on other grounds, Irvine v. City of Clifton Forge: 97 S. E. Rep. 310, 310; 124 Va. 781 (1918), citing the Supreme Court of the United States case of Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60; 38 Sup. Ct. 16, 62 L. Ed. 149.
http://books.google.com/books?id=oDY8AAAAIAAJ&pg=PA145#v=onepage&q&f=false
Town of Ashland v. Coleman:
http://books.google.com/books?id=1SoZAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA427#v=onepage&q&f=false
“. . . It is contended that the 1st section of the Fourteenth Amendment has been violated? That section declares that ‘all persons born in the United States are citizens of the United States and the State wherein they reside,’ and provides that ‘no State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or citizens ‐ 13 ‐
of the United States, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.’ This section, after declaring that all persons born in the United States shall be citizens (1) of the United States and (2) of the State wherein they reside, goes on in the same sentence to provide that no State shall abridge the privileges of citizens of the United States; but does not go on to forbid a State from abridging the privileges of its own citizens. Leaving the matter of abridging the privileges of its own citizens to the discretion of each State, the section proceeds, in regard to the latter, only to provide that no State ‘shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. . . . The rights which a person has a citizen of a State are those which pertain to him as a member of society, and which would belong to him if his State were not a member of the American Union. Over these the States have the usual powers belonging to government, and these powers ‘extend to all objects,,which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, (privileges), and properties of people; and of the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State. Federalist, No. 45. . . . On the other hand, the rights which a person has as a citizen of the United States are such as he has by virtue of his State being a member of the American Union under the provisions of our National Constitution. For instance, a man is a citizen of a State by virtue of his being native and resident there; but, if he emigrates into another State he becomes at once a citizen there by operation of the provision of the Constitution (Section 1, Clause 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment) making him a citizen there; and needs no special naturalization, which, but for the Constitution, he would need to become a citizen.” Ex Parte Edmund Kinney: 3 Hughes 9, at 12 thru 14 (1879) [4th cir ct Va.].
http://books.google.com/books?id=pB0TAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA12#v=onepage&q&f=false
7. (Before the Fourteenth Amendment) “It appears that the plaintiff in error, though a native­born citizen of Louisiana, was married in the State of Mississippi, while under age, with the consent of her guardian, to a citizen of the latter State, and that their domicile, during the duration of their marriage, was in Mississippi.” Conner v. Elliott: 59 U.S. (Howard 18) 591, at 592 (1855). http://books.google.com/books?id=RkcFAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA592#v=onepage&q&f=f alse (After the Fourteenth Amendment) “Joseph A. Iasigi, a native born citizen of Massachusetts, was arrested, ‐ 14 ‐
February 14, 1897, on a warrant issued by one of the city magistrates of the city of New York, as a fugitive from the justice of the State of Massachusetts.” Iasigi v. Van De Carr: 166 U.S. 391, at 392 (1897). http://books.google.com/books?id=xuUGAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA392#v=onepage&q&f=f alse (Before the Fourteenth Amendment) “A naturalized citizen of the United States or a native citizen of any other state of the union, domiciled in Virginia, being entitled to all the privileges of a citizen of this state, is a citizen.” Syllabus, Commonwealth v. Towles: 5 Leigh 743 (1835). “In the case of a naturalized alien, as well as in the case of an individual born out of this commonwealth in some other of the United States, the privileges and immunities of citizenship, implied in naturalization, and expressly declared in the constitution, must be complete under the federal laws, ‐‐ without requiring any aid, or admitting the interference, of any state law. . . . It is obvious, that the privileges and immunities of the naturalized citizen and of the citizen of each state, are exactly the same, under the constitution of the United States art. 4 §2, and the naturalized citizen, and the native citizen of North Carolina, would be both equally entitled to them, whatever they are, in the state of Virginia.” Opinion, Commonwealth v. Towles: 5 Leigh 743, at 748 thru 749 (1835).
http://books.google.com/books?id=aZ4UAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA277#v=onepage&q=&f=false
(After the Fourteenth Amendment) “. . . This court in Commonwealth v. Towles, 5 Leigh 743, expressly decided that a person born in another state of this Union is entitled to all the rights and privileges of this state.” Hannon v. Hounihan: 12 S.E. 157, at 158 (1888); 85 Va. 429.
http://books.google.com/books?id=Tyg8AAAAIAAJ&dq=editions%3ALCCN39018283&lr=& pg=PA158#v=onepage&q=&f=false
8. “All persons born . . . in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.” Section 1, Clause 1 of the Fourteenth Amendent.
“The language of the Fourteenth Amendment declaring two kinds of citizenship is discriminating. It is: ‘All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State ‐ 15 ‐
wherein they reside.’ While it thus establishes national citizenship from the mere circumstance of birth within the territory and jurisdiction of the United States, birth within a state does not establish citizenship thereof. State citizenship is ephemeral. It results only from residence and is gained or lost therewith.” Edwards v. People of the State of California: 314 U.S. 160, 183 (concurring opinion of Jackson) (1941).
“That all persons resident in this state, born in the United States, or naturalized, or who shall have legally declared their intention to become citizens of the United States, are hereby declared citizens of the State of Alabama, possessing equal civil and political rights.” (Declaration of Rights) Article I, Section 2 Constitution of the State of Alabama of 1875. Note: This provision is not in the current constitution of the State of Alabama.
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