Source: http://openjurist.org/185/f3d/1108/united-states-of-america-v-dan-talmadge-rose
Timestamp: 2017-06-22 19:27:56
Document Index: 23195773

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3583', '§ 3584', '§ 3553', '§ 3584', '§ 3553', '§ 3584', '§ 3553', '§ 3553', '§ 3553', '§ 3553', '§ 3553', '§ 3553', '§ 3553', '§ 3553', '§ 3553', '§ 3553', '§ 3553', '§ 3553', '§ 3553']

185 F3d 1108 United States of America v. Dan Talmadge Rose | OpenJurist
185 F. 3d 1108 - United States of America v. Dan Talmadge Rose HomeFederal Reporter, Third Series185 F.3d
185 F3d 1108 United States of America v. Dan Talmadge Rose 185 F.3d 1108 (10th Cir. 1999)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,v.DAN TALMADGE ROSE, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 98-7108
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The court therefore honors the parties' requests and orders the case submitted without oral argument.
This appeal arises from a consolidated action in the district court to revoke, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) and (g), Dan T. Rose's concurrent terms of supervised release. After a hearing on the matter, the district court concluded that Rose had violated the conditions imposed on each term of supervised release. Accordingly, the district court revoked both terms of supervised release, sentenced Rose to a term of imprisonment of twenty-four months in each case, and ordered that the terms of imprisonment be served consecutively.
Rose asserts that the district court failed to comply with 18 U.S.C. § 3584 in ordering his terms of incarceration to run consecutively. Section 3584 grants district courts discretion in choosing between consecutive and concurrent terms of imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. 3584(a) ("If multiple terms of imprisonment are imposed on a defendant at the same time . . . , the terms may run concurrently or consecutively . . . ."). Nevertheless, in exercising that sentencing discretion, a district court must consider the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See id. § 3584(b). Those factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense; (2) the history and characteristics of the defendant; (3) the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, afford adequate deterrence, protect the public, and provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most efficient manner; (4) the kinds of sentences available pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines; (5) pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission; (6) the need to avoid unwanted sentence disparities; and (7) the need to provide restitution. See id. § 3553(a).
Rose contends the district court failed to comply with § 3584(b) because it failed to weigh on the record each of the statutorily mandated factors in determining that Rose's sentences should run consecutively. In circumstances indistinguishable from those at issue here, the Fourth Circuit recently rejected an argument identical to the one advanced by Rose. See United States v. Johnson, 138 F.3d 115, 119-20 (4th Cir. 1998). The Johnson court began by noting that although "[s]tatutory changes and the sentencing guidelines have dramatically altered the sentencing landscape[,] Congress never intended . . . for sentencing to become a hyper-technical exercise devoid of common sense." Id. at 119; see also United States v. Davis, 53 F.3d 638, 642 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that a sentencing court need not engage in a "ritualistic incantation in order to establish its consideration of a legal issue"). Absent any contrary indication in the record, the Fourth Circuit concluded it was appropriate to presume "that a district court properly considered the pertinent statutory factors." Johnson, 138 F.3d at 119; see also United States v. Caves, 73 F.3d 823, 825 (8th Cir. 1996) (rejecting contention that district court must recite mandatory sentencing factors before revoking term of supervised release); United States v. Cervantes-Valenzuela, 931 F.2d 27, 29 (9th Cir. 1991) ("We assume that the district court knows and applies the law correctly, and therefore considers the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).").
Section 3553(c) imposes a general burden on a sentencing court to "state in open court the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). Subsections (1) and (2) to section 3553(c) impose further specific burdens on a sentencing court where the sentencing-guidelines range exceeds twenty-four months or the district court chooses to impose a sentence outside the sentencing-guidelines range. See id. § 3553(c)(1) (district court must state on record reason for imposing sentence at particular point in sentencing range where that range exceeds twenty-four months); id § 3553(c)(2) (district court must state on record reason for departing from sentencing guidelines). Despite the United States' assertion to the contrary, this court has concluded that the general requirement set out in § 3553(c) extends to all cases and is not limited by the conditions to applicability of subsections (1) & (2). See United States v. Underwood, 938 F.2d 1086, 1091-92 (10th Cir. 1991) ("We agree with the courts that have held that § 3553 subsection (c), without regard to subsections (c)(1) and (c)(2), requires a district court to make a general statement of its reasoning for the sentence imposed. Otherwise, we would be left in a zone of speculation on appellate review." (quotation omitted)); see also United States v. Lockard, 910 F.2d 542, 546 (9th Cir. 1990) (cited with approval in Underwood) ("We hold that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) requires the district court to state, in open court, its general reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence, notwithstanding the absence of the conditions described in subsections (1) and (2)."). Any other interpretation of § 3553(c) would read a key word out of the statute.1 Accordingly, this court rejects the United States' contention that § 3553(c) is not applicable to this case because neither of Rose's sentences exceeded twenty-four months.2
The United States' reliance on United States v. Garcia, 919 F.2d 1478 (10th Cir. 1990), is misplaced. In Garcia, this court held that it did not have jurisdiction to review a claim that the district court had erred in sentencing a defendant at a particular point within an otherwise proper sentencing guideline range. 919 F.2d at 1479. In so holding, the Garcia court noted that because the defendant's sentencing range was from one to seven months, the district court was not required to state its reasons for sentencing the defendant at a particular point within that range. See id. at 1482 ("Section 3553(c) explicitly contemplates that the district court need not state its reasons for imposing sentence at a particular point unless the applicable range exceeds twenty-four months."); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(1) (providing that if a sentence imposed "is of the kind, and within the range, described in subsection (a)(4) and that range exceeds 24 months," the sentencing court must state on the record "the reason for imposing a sentence at a particular point within the range"). As noted above, however, § 3553(c) extends to all cases and is not limited by the conditions to applicability of subsections (1) & (2). Accordingly, the limitation on the applicability of § 3553(c)(1) to cases involving sentencing ranges exceeding twenty-four months discussed in Garcia is not relevant to the general obligation, contained in § 3553(c), of the district court to state on the record its reasons for imposing a particular sentence.