Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/277/11/521289/
Timestamp: 2020-07-13 21:35:59
Document Index: 283559028

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1962', '§ 1959', '§ 1959', '§ 1959', '§ 1959', '§ 1']

United States of America, Appellee, v. Vincent Michael Marino, A/k/a Gigi Portalla, and John J. Patti Iii, Defendants, Appellants, 277 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2002) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › First Circuit › 2002 › United States of America, Appellee, v. Vincent Michael Marino, A/k/a Gigi Portalla, and John J. Patt...
United States of America, Appellee, v. Vincent Michael Marino, A/k/a Gigi Portalla, and John J. Patti Iii, Defendants, Appellants, 277 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2002)
US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit - 277 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2002) Heard Oct. 1, 2001Decided January 14, 2002
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS. Hon. Nathaniel M. Gorton, U.S. District Judge[Copyrighted Material Omitted][Copyrighted Material Omitted][Copyrighted Material Omitted][Copyrighted Material Omitted][Copyrighted Material Omitted]
(3) Coconspirators' Statements: Marino and Patti challenge the admission of coconspirator statements admitted pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d) (2) (E), because they claim the declarants were members of a warring faction and so could not be their coconspirators within the meaning of the Rule.
(e) Rejected Instruction on Credibility of Rule 801(d) (2) (E) Declarants -- Marino argues that the court erred when it refused to instruct the jury on assessing the credibility of nontestifying declarants whose testimony was admitted pursuant to an exception to the hearsay rule.
1) We hold on the facts of this case that statements made by defendants' fellow members of a larger conspiracy in furtherance of that larger conspiracy are admissible as coconspirator statements under Rule 801(d) (2) (E), even when the declarants are members of an opposing faction fighting over control of the larger conspiracy.
3. Coconspirators' Statements (Rule 801(d) (2) (E))
Marino and Patti both argue that the district court erred when it admitted hearsay evidence based on the coconspirators' statements exception to the hearsay rule. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d) (2) (E). Specifically, they object to the admission of authorized surveillance tape recordings of a December 11, 1991 conversation between Frank Salemme, Natale Richichi, and Kenneth Guarino which took place at a Hilton hotel (the "Hilton tapes"). The conversation was a general discussion about the Patriarca Family and its business: the members of the Family, the structure, and the activities of the organization. The government used the tapes to show that the Patriarca Family existed and that it engaged in illegal activities. The defense theory is that the three men whose conversation was recorded were part of the rival Salemme faction and so could hardly be the defendants' coconspirators, and therefore the evidence is inadmissible.
Under Rule 801(d) (2) (E), "a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy" is not hearsay. Patti and Marino argue that because the statements were made by members of a faction which was at war with their faction, there was no unity of interest between them, so the statements could not have been made by coconspirators.
This argument raises issues of law and of fact. We review the trial court's determination that statements were coconspirator statements under the clear error standard. United States v. Mojica-Baez, 229 F.3d 292, 304 (1st Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 2215 (2001). To admit a statement under the coconspirator exception, the government must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant and declarant were in the same conspiracy, and that the statement was made "during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy." Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 801(d) (2) (E)); United States v. Ciampaglia, 628 F.2d 632, 638 (1st Cir. 1980). The rule is that
In contrast, RICO contains a jurisdictional element: "It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate . . . in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs . . . ." 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (emphasis added). A number of circuit courts have held, post-Lopez, that the government does not need to show that the RICO enterprise's effect on interstate commerce is substantial. United States v. Riddle, 249 F.3d 529, 537 (6th Cir.) (holding that "RICO enterprise's necessary relationship to interstate commerce" is still "de minimis"), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 292 (2001); United States v. Juvenile Male, 118 F.3d 1344, 1347 (9th Cir. 1997) ("[A]ll that is required to establish federal jurisdiction in a RICO prosecution is a showing that the individual predicate racketeering acts have a de minimis impact on interstate commerce."); United States v. Miller, 116 F.3d 641, 674 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that in a RICO case "the government need only prove that the individual subject transaction has a de minimis effect on interstate commerce"). We agree. See United States v. Doherty, 867 F.2d 47, 68 (1st Cir. 1989) ("RICO requires no more than a slight effect upon interstate commerce."). Marino makes the same claim as to VICAR. VICAR applies only to those defendants whose violent acts are "as consideration for" payment from, or in hopes of "gaining entrance to or maintaining or increasing position in an enterprise engaged in racketeering activity." 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a). Such an enterprise must be "engaged in," or its "activities . . . affect, interstate or foreign commerce." Id. § 1959(b) (2). VICAR also has a jurisdictional element. United States v. Torres, 129 F.3d 710, 717 (2d Cir. 1997). As a result "§ 1959's requirements are met if the government establishes a connection between the § 1959 act of violence and a RICO enterprise which has a de minimis interstate commerce connection." Riddle, 249 F.3d at 538.
e. Rejected Instruction on Credibility of Rule 801(d) (2) (E) Declarants
Under relevant conduct analysis "in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity (a criminal plan, scheme, endeavor, or enterprise undertaken by the defendant in concert with others, whether or not charged as a conspiracy), all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity" should be considered in determining the base offense level. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a) (1) (B). In Carrozza, this court interpreted this guideline to mean that in sentencing a defendant in a jointly undertaken criminal activity case, such as a RICO violation,
When a hearsay statement, or a statement defined in Rule 801(d) (2) (C), (D), or (E), has been admitted in evidence, the credibility of the declarant may be attacked . . . by any evidence which would be admissible for those purposes if declarant had testified as a witness.