Source: http://ny.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.19990831_0000037.WNY.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2017-04-28 08:20:56
Document Index: 745473578

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 6527', '§ 2805', '§ 6527', '§ 2805', '§ 11101', '§ 11111']

| SYPOSS v. U.S.
SYPOSS v. U.S.
JOHN W. SYPOSS, JR. AND CAROL SYPOSS, PLAINTIFFS,v.UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, DEFENDANT. IN RE CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL OF BUFFALO; ERIE COUNTY MEDICAL CENTER AND SISTERS OF CHARITY HOSPITAL, NON-PARTIES SUBPOENAED PURSUANT TO FED.R.CIV.P. 45,
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Foschio, United States Magistrate Judge.
This matter was referred to the undersigned on May 26, 1998 for
determination of any non-dispositive matters. In a Decision and
Order, dated July 1, 1998 ("D & O"), the court granted
Plaintiffs' motion to enforce subpoenas issued to non-parties
Sisters of Charity Hospital ("Sisters Hospital") and Erie County
Medical Center ("ECMC"), dated April 13, 1998 and denied
non-party Children's Hospital of Buffalo's ("Children's
Hospital") ("the hospitals") motion to quash Plaintiffs'
subpoena, dated April 14, 1998. Treating the non-parties appeals
of the Decision and Order as a motions for reconsideration, the
matter was referred to the undersigned by the district judge on
Plaintiffs' subpoenas seek "peer review" records as to
procedures undertaken by Dr. Lorenzo T. Teruel and applications,
including supporting documentation, submitted by Dr. Teruel for
privileges at each of the non-party hospitals. Dr. Teruel was a
Veteran's Administration Hospital physician whose surgery is at
issue in this Federal
Tort Claims Act case. Relying on New York Education Law § 6527
subd. 3 and New York Public Health Law § 2805-m, each of the
non-party hospitals refused compliance asserting the requested
information was privileged and thus exempt from disclosure under
Section 6527 subd. 3 of the Education Law exempts from
disclosure pursuant to Article 31 of the New York Civil Practice
Act and Rules, providing for pretrial discovery in state court
civil cases, "proceedings or records relating to performance of a
medical or quality assurance review function." N.Y.Educ.L. § 6527
subd. 3 (McKinney 1985). As relevant, section 2805-m of the
Public Health Law creates a similar exemption from disclosure for
records relating to review of the quality of medical care given
in hospitals, evaluation of staff privileges and credentials and
capacity of health care providers employed by or associated with
a hospital. N.Y. Public Health L. 2805-m (McKinney 1993). The
statutes do not apply to statements made by a person attending a
meeting of a quality assurance committee if the person is a party
to an action the subject of which was reviewed at the meeting.
Both statutes exclude the testimony of persons participating in
such reviews as to what occurred at a quality assurance meeting.
Additionally, both statutes provide for immunity from suit as to
statements or actions taken in connection with such quality
assurance review functions unless based on information which is
"untrue and communicated with malicious intent." N.Y. Public
Health Law § 2805-m (McKinney 1993). However, as the instant
action is one pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act, the
existence of an asserted privilege is a federal question to be
determined in accordance with Fed.R.Evid. 501 (where federal law
provides the rule of decision asserted privileges are to be
determined in accordance with principles of the common law and
based on "reason and experience"). Based on its review of
relevant authority, the court found that a medical "peer review"
privilege should not be recognized in federal actions. D & O at
12-13. Accordingly, it granted Plaintiffs' motion to compel and
denied Children's Hospital's motion to quash.
Oral argument on the motion for reconsideration was conducted
on January 28, 1999. Supplemental material in the form of copies
of legislative history related to the New York statutes relied
upon by the hospital non-parties were submitted on March 1, 1999
by Children's Hospital (Doc. # 106). Affidavits were also
submitted by the medical director of each hospital (Affidavit of
Charles Massaro, M.D., Medical Director, Sisters Hospital dated
July 7, 1999) ("Massaro Affidavit") (Doc. # 107); (Affidavit of
Margaret W. Paroski, M.D.,Medical Director, Erie County Medical
Center dated July 15, 1999) ("Paroski Affidavit") (Doc. # 81);
Affidavit of Paul Montgomery, M.D., President of the Medical
Staff, Kaleida Health, successor to Children's Hospital, dated
July 2, 1999) ("Montgomery Affidavit") (Doc. # 108). ECMC and
Children's Hospital also submitted, in accordance with the
court's order dated June 23, 1999, privilege logs describing the
information relevant to Plaintiffs' subpoena as to which the
privilege is asserted. (Doc.#'s 80, 109, respectively). Sisters
Hospital had filed a privilege log with its opposition to
Plaintiff's motion. For the reasons discussed, the non-parties'
motion for reconsideration is GRANTED and upon reconsideration
the court adheres to its Decision and Order of July 1, 1998
declining to recognize a medical peer review privilege.
In the Decision and Order, the court relied on the Supreme
Court's rejection of peer review privilege in University of
Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 110 S.Ct. 577, 107 L.Ed.2d
571 (1990). D & O at 7 - 9. Additionally, the court found
significant Congress' failure to establish a general medical peer
review privilege when it enacted the Health Care Quality
Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 11101, et seq. ("HCQIA"
or "the Act") which created qualified immunity from suit to
officials conducting medical peer reviews,
42 U.S.C. § 11111(a)(1) (no liability under federal or state law except the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Civil Rights Acts, and the actions
by the United States and state attorney general), but did not
protect documents created in the hospitals' peer review process,
D & O at 8, (citing Johnson v. Nyack Hospital, 169 F.R.D. 550,
560 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Robertson v. Neuromedical Center, 169
F.R.D. 80, 84 (M.D.La. 1996); Swarthmore Radiation Oncology,
Inc. v. Lapes, 1993 WL 517722 (E.D.Pa. 1993)). The court noted
that under the Act, only the information submitted to the
national health-care-quality clearinghouse established by the Act
is confidential and not to be disclosed. D & O at 9. Based on the
Supreme Court's rejection of a peer review privilege in
University of Pennsylvania, supra, and Congress' failure to
enact a privilege for medical peer review information in the
HCQIA, the court held the requested information was not
privileged as matter of federal common law. D & O at 12-13.
The hospitals contend that University of Pennsylvania is
distinguishable as the competing interest in that case was
enforcement of federal anti-discrimination in employment laws
whereas in this case the issue is a malpractice claim. Memorandum
of Law in Support of Objections to Magistrate Judge's Decision
and Order, filed July 15, 1998 (Doc. # 39) ("Sisters Hospital
Memorandum") at 8. However, in University of Pennsylvania, the
fact that because the underlying action was based on job
discrimination the Court found that Congress' failure to
establish a peer review privilege when it enacted Title VII
argued against doing so pursuant to the authority granted to the
courts under Fed. R.Evid. 501. University of Pennsylvania,
supra, at 189, 110 S.Ct. 577. The competing interest to the
asserted privilege in University of Pennsylvania was the same
interest in any litigation, i.e., the "need for probative
evidence." Id. (quoting Trammel v. United States,
445 U.S. 40, 51, 100 S.Ct. 906, 63 L.Ed.2d 186 (1980)).
Moreover, the hospitals' argument fails to recognize that
Congress' waiver of sovereign immunity in the Federal Tort Claims
Act for personal injury based on the torts of government agents
also represents a "substantial governmental interest," Sisters
Hospital Memorandum at 8, quoting Robertson, supra, at 83. To
suggest that the search for truth by the courts has stronger
justification and may override an asserted peer review privilege
in a discrimination case but not a malpractice case minimizes the
strong public interest in the prevention and compensation of
serious personal injuries or death caused by government
employees, an interest at least equal to the interest in
eradicating and compensating for violations of a person's civil
rights. The value of protection against job discrimination is
substantially reduced if the ability to enjoy its benefit is
physically impaired or ended. Privileges usually do not vary
depending upon the nature of the action as their very purpose is
to bar compelled disclosure irrespective of the nature of the
proceeding in connection with which they may arise. The
hospitals' attempt to distinguish University of Pennsylvania on
the basis of the underlying causes of actions in that case and
the other cases relied upon by the court from the one at bar is
The hospitals also contend that the court erred in failing to
recognize that at least two cases, decided after University of
Pennsylvania, "endorsed" a peer review privilege. Sisters
Hospital Memorandum at 5-6. Specifically, Sisters Hospital
asserts that the court overlooked Freeman v. Fairman,
917 F. Supp. 586 (N.D.Ill. 1996) and Brem v. DeCarlo, Lyon, Hearn &
Pazourek, P.A., 162 F.R.D. 94 (D.Md. 1995). However, as neither
case is apposite neither was discussed by the court. In
Freeman, the sole claim to which the requested discovery
related was
a state wrongful death claim. Thus, the rule of decision being
state law, the court's discussion of the possible existence of a
peer review privilege under federal common law is dicta.
Similarly, in Brem, the only claim in that case to which the
deposition request at issue related was a state defamation claim,
not the discrimination claims upon which federal removal
jurisdiction was based. Brem, supra, at 96, 101. Hence, as the
Brem court was required, pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 501, to apply
the Maryland peer review committee privilege statute, it did not
determine the existence of a parallel privilege under federal
common law. Additionally, Freeman does not attempt to
distinguish University of Pennsylvania's rejection of a federal
peer review privilege and Brem fails to even mention the
decision. Thus, neither case supports the objection that the
court failed to consider relevant case law upholding the
existence of a medical peer review privilege following
The hospitals also argue that the court ignored applicable
Second Circuit law. Sisters Memorandum at 9. Specifically, they
rely on United States v. One Parcel of Property at 31-33 York
Street, 930 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1991), a forfeiture case in which
a state law barring disclosure of juvenile offender records was
at issue. In finding that the state's interest in maintaining the
confidentiality of arrest records was outweighed by the federal
interest in "presenting relevant information to the trier of
fact," 930 F.2d at 141, the court stated where the asserted
privilege is one of state law, under Fed.R.Evid. 501, "as a
matter of comity federal courts accord deference to state-created
privileges." 930 F.2d at 140. Hospitals interpret this statement
to require the court to apply the asserted New York medical peer
review privilege statutes in this case. Sisters Memorandum at 11.
However, the statement in One Parcel of Property does not bear
the meaning hospitals attribute to it as the court gave no
deference to the state statutory privilege rejecting it in favor
of the general federal interest in enforcing forfeitures against
illegal drug traffickers. 930 F.2d at 141. Thus, One Parcel of
Property is also inapposite to this case.*fn1 Based on the
Supreme court's explicit rejection of a peer review privilege in
University of Pennsylvania and Congress' failure to enact a
peer review privilege in the HCQIA, this court found no reason to
"defer" to the New York statutory privileges asserted here. D & O
at 12-13.
Finally, the hospitals maintain the court failed to give weight
to the policy considerations underlying the peer review privilege
relying upon statements in Bredice v. Doctors Hospital, Inc.,
50 F.R.D. 249, 250 (D.D.C. 1970), aff'd without opinion,
479 F.2d 920 (D.C.Cir. 1973)*fn2; Freeman, supra, at 589; and
Gillman v. United States, 53 F.R.D. 316, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
Sisters Hospital Memorandum at 10. Specifically, the hospitals
assert, id. at 11, that the statements in these cases asserting
that effective peer review of the care provided by physicians
cannot occur in the absence of a privilege negate this court's
finding the hospitals had failed to "provide any reason to
believe some physicians would not provide candid appraisals of
their peers absent the asserted privilege." D & O at 13. In so
stating, the court relied on the Supreme Court's ...