Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/423/244/439044/
Timestamp: 2017-11-18 14:02:45
Document Index: 378599586

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 216', '§ 416', '§ 158', '§ 423', '§ 221', '§ 421', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 205', '§ 405', '§ 223', '§ 423', '§ 205', '§ 405']

William Gentile v. Robert H. Finch, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare,united States of America, Appellant, 423 F.2d 244 (3d Cir. 1970) :: Justia
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William Gentile v. Robert H. Finch, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare,united States of America, Appellant, 423 F.2d 244 (3d Cir. 1970)
US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit - 423 F.2d 244 (3d Cir. 1970)
"(A) an individual * * * shall be determined to be under a disability only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work. * * * ` [W]ork which exists in the national economy' means work which exists in significant numbers either in the region where [an] individual lives or in several regions of the country."
The Secretary had deemed these findings adequate to preclude the claimant from satisfying the statutory test for disability. However, the district court ruled that "the issue is whether in 1964 [the claimant] had a reasonable opportunity to secure * * * employment on a substantial basis." Gentile v. Gardner, W.D. Pa. 1969, 298 F. Supp. 1401, 1406. The district court found that the only evidence on the claimant's employment opportunities showed that he would not be hired for the sedentary, light, or moderate work that he could do. The evidence was the testimony of a vocational expert that a prospective employer would not hire a job candidate with the symptoms described in a report of the claimant's family physician. The district court concluded that there was no evidence that the claimant had a reasonable opportunity to engage in substantial gainful activity, and for that reason reversed the Secretary's decision that the claimant was not "disabled" within the meaning of the Act.
The decisions of the other courts of appeals that have considered the amended statutory definition of disability are in accord with our interpretation. See Martin v. Finch, 5th Cir. 1969, 415 F.2d 793, 794-795; Labee v. Cohen, 5th Cir. 1969, 408 F.2d 998, 1000 (per curiam); Wright v. Gardner, 7th Cir. 1968, 403 F.2d 646, 647 (per curiam); Mullins v. Gardner, 6th Cir. 1968, 396 F.2d 139, 140 (per curiam). In Wright v. Gardner, supra, the claimant had filed an application for disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act based primarily upon the loss of the use of his left arm. The Secretary found that the claimant's functional loss of his arm did not preclude him from performing light work. In affirming the district court's judgment upholding the Secretary's determination, the court of appeals rejected the claimant's "principal contention * * * that because of the hiring practices of employers within a reasonable distance from his residence, he would not in fact be hired for any light work which he can perform," on the ground that the amendments to the definition of disability "make it clear * * * that a claimant * * * is not disabled within the meaning of the statute merely because he would not actually be hired for such work." 403 F.2d at 647.
Social Security Act § 216(i), 42 U.S.C. § 416(i) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968) makes the same definition applicable in determining periods of disability. The amended definition is effective with respect to applications that were the subject of pending civil actions under section 205(g) of the Social Security Act in the month when the amendments were enacted. Act of Jan. 2, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 158 (e), 81 Stat. 869, 42 U.S.C. § 423(d) note. The present action was then pending
The present application was filed on December 20, 1965. After an evaluation of the evidence by a disability examiner, the Pennsylvania state agency found that the claimant was not disabled, and the claimant's application was denied initially and on rehearing. See Social Security Act § 221(a), 42 U.S.C. § 421(a) (1964); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.902, 404.905-404.916 (1969). At the claimant's request, a hearing examiner considered the case de novo and found that the claimant was not disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.917-404.940 (1969). The Appeals Council affirmed the hearing examiner's decision after consideration of the entire record. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.945-404.951 (1969).
The claimant brought this action in federal district court under § 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g) (1964), to review the administrative decision. On the Secretary's motion, the district court remanded the case to enable the Secretary to obtain further evidence. A supplemental hearing was held at which the claimant testified and was represented by counsel. The hearing examiner determined that the claimant was not disabled, and the Appeals Council adopted the hearing examiner's supplemental decision. The district court granted the Secretary's request that the civil action be reopened, denied the Secretary's motion for summary judgment, and ruled that the claimant was entitled to disability benefits and the establishment of a period of disability. Gentile v. Gardner, W.D. Pa. 1969, 298 F. Supp. 1401.
In view of the expert's testimony about job openings, it is unnecessary to reach the question whether Social Security Act § 223(d) (5), 42 U.S.C. § 423(d) (5) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968) changes the burden of coming forward with vocational evidence Cf. Flake v. Gardner, 9th Cir. 1968, 399 F.2d 532, 541.
Our disposition of this appeal makes it unnecessary to consider other issues that have arisen in connection with the fact that two prior applications based on the claimant's silicosis were denied after hearings by the Secretary, whose decisions became final when the claimant failed to seek judicial review. See Social Security Act § 205(h), 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (1964). The hearing examiner refused to reopen the prior applications, and we intimate no opinion on the reviewability of the refusal Compare Cappadora v. Celebrezze, 2d Cir. 1966, 356 F.2d 1, with Filice v. Celebrezze, 9th Cir. 1963, 319 F.2d 443.
On the other hand the hearing examiner considered in support of the third application evidence of disability at times before the filing of the second application. But by strict application of the doctrine of res judicata, the district court found that the final decisions of the Secretary on the claimant's prior applications limited the period during which the claimant could establish that he was under a disability. Gentile v. Gardner, supra, 298 F. Supp. at 1404. Here again, we find it unnecessary to consider, and we express no opinion upon, the issue.