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Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Director, OWCP (full text) :: 449 U.S. 268 (1980) :: Justia US Supreme Court Center Log In
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Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Director, OWCP 449 U.S. 268 (1980)
U.S. Supreme CourtPotomac Elec. Power Co. v. Director, OWCP, 449 U.S. 268 (1980)Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Director, Office of Workers' CompensationPrograms, United States Department of LaborNo. 79-816Argued October 8, 1980Decided December 15, 1980449 U.S. 268CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
(c) The weight of judicial authority also supports a literal reading of the Act. Pp. 449 U. S. 276-280. Page 449 U. S. 269
Under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), 44 Stat. (part 2) 1424, as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1976 ed. and Supp. III), compensation for a permanent partial disability must be determined in one of two ways. First, if the injury is of a kind specifically identified in the schedule set forth in §§ 8(c)(1)-(20) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 908(c)(1)-(20), the injured employee is entitled to receive two-thirds of his average weekly wages for a specific number of weeks, regardless of whether his earning capacity has actually been impaired. Second, in all other cases, § 8(c)(21), 33 U.S.C. § 908(c)(21), authorizes compensation equal to two-thirds of the difference between the Page 449 U. S. 270 employee's pre-injury average weekly wages and his post-injury wage-earning capacity, during the period of his disability. [Footnote 1] The question in this case is whether a permanently partially disabled employee, entitled to compensation under the statutory schedule, may elect to receive a larger recovery under § 8(c)(21) measured by the actual impairment of wage-earning capacity caused by his injury. Although Congress could surely authorize such an election, it has not yet done so. Page 449 U. S. 271 We therefore hold that respondent Cross' recovery must be limited by the statutory schedule.
Because he worked in the District of Columbia, respondent Cross is entitled to compensation under the LHWCA. [Footnote 3] It is undisputed that the injury to his leg is a "permanent partial disability" within the meaning of § 8(c) of the Act; he therefore has an unquestioned right to a compensation award measured by a fraction of his earnings for 288 weeks. [Footnote 4] Page 449 U. S. 272 His claim, however, is for the larger amount measured by two-thirds of the difference between his average weekly earnings before the injury and his present wage-earning capacity, multiplied by the number of weeks that his disability continues. [Footnote 5]
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit also affirmed. 196 U.S.App.D.C. 417, Page 449 U. S. 273 606 F.2d 1324 (1979). Recognizing that the Act "must be construed in light of its humanitarian objectives," and noting a "recent trend in workmen's compensation law away from the idea of exclusivity of scheduled benefits," the court concluded that the "all other cases" language in § 8(c)(21) provided a "remedial alternative" measure of compensation for cases in which "the scheduled benefits fail adequately to compensate for a diminution in [wage-earning] capabilities." [Footnote 6] While expressing sympathy for the result reached by the majority, one judge dissented. [Footnote 7]
The language of the Act plainly supports the view that the character of the disability determines the method of compensation. Section 8 identifies four different categories of disability and separately prescribes the method of compensation Page 449 U. S. 274 for each. [Footnote 8] In the permanent partial disability category, § 8(c) provides a compensation schedule which covers 20 different specific injuries. It then adds an additional subparagraph, § 8(c)(21), that applies to any injury not included within the list of specific injuries. There is no language in that additional subparagraph indicating that it was intended to provide an alternative method of compensation for the cases described in the preceding subparagraphs; quite the contrary, by its terms, subparagraph (21) is applicable "In all other cases." [Footnote 9]
In sum, we find nothing in the statute itself to support the view that the reference to "all other cases" in § 8(c)(21) was intended to authorize an alternative method for computation of disability benefits in certain cases of permanent partial disability already provided for in the schedule. Page 449 U. S. 275
"Obviously, the phrase 'in all other cases' signifies that the provisions of the paragraph shall apply only in cases where the injuries received are not confined to a specific Page 449 U. S. 276 member or specific members."
During the first half century of administration of the LHWCA, federal tribunals consistently construed the schedule benefits provision as exclusive. Although the exclusivity question did not explicitly arise until 1964, prior to that time Page 449 U. S. 277 evidence of loss of wages or wage-earning capacity was considered irrelevant in cases of permanent partial disability falling within the schedule provisions. [Footnote 15] In 1964, in Williams v. Donovan, 234 F.Supp. 135 (ED La.), aff'd, 367 F.2d 825 (CA5 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 977 (1967), the first federal court to address the exclusivity issue found that "the form and language of the Act" indicated that compensation under § 8(c)(21) for loss of wage-earning capacity was not available in cases covered by the schedule. 234 F.Supp. at 139. This construction of the Act went unchallenged for the next decade. [Footnote 16]
It was not until 1975 that the Benefits Review Board announced its dissatisfaction with the Williams construction of the statute and concluded that claimants suffering from a permanent partial disability may elect to proceed under either the schedule or § 8(c)(21). [Footnote 17] The Board has since applied Page 449 U. S. 278 its construction of the Act in a series of decisions of which the instant case is a member. [Footnote 18] The divided opinion of the Court of Appeals is apparently the first and only federal court decision Page 449 U. S. 279 accepting that construction. The notion that the plain language of the LHWCA might not mean what it says is thus a relatively recent development surfacing for the first time almost 50 years after its enactment. The relevant judicial authority prior to 1975, although not abundant, indicates that the schedule benefits were considered exclusive.
While the federal decisional authority on this question is scarce, state law authority apparently is not. The lower court cited, and the respondents rely upon, the "recent trend in workmen's compensation law away from the idea of exclusivity of scheduled benefits." 196 U.S.App.D.C. at 421, 606 F.2d at 1328. [Footnote 19] Although this "trend" unquestionably exists, it is neither uniform nor based entirely on cases presenting issues comparable to the precise issue before us. [Footnote 20] Page 449 U. S. 280 More importantly, a proper understanding of the judicial role in this case reveals that the recent trend actually supports a literal reading of the federal statute. Our task is to ascertain the congressional intent underlying the schedule benefit provisions enacted in 1927; we are not free to incorporate into those provisions subsequent state law developments that we may consider sound as a matter of policy. In attempting to ascertain the legislative intent underlying a statute enacted over 50 years ago, the view that once "dominate[d] the field" is more enlightening than a recent state law trend that has not motivated subsequent Congresses to amend the federal statute. [Footnote 21] The once dominant view is entirely consistent with a literal reading of the Act.
Respondents suggest two reasons why this settled construction is erroneous. They submit that it does not fulfill the fundamental remedial purpose of the Act, and that it may produce anomalous results that Congress probably did not intend. The first submission is not entirely accurate; the second, though theoretically correct, has insufficient force to overcome the plain language of the statute itself. Page 449 U. S. 281 Respondents correctly observe that prior decisions of this Court require that the LHWCA be liberally construed in order to effectuate its remedial purposes. [Footnote 22] Respondents accordingly argue that the Act should be interpreted in a manner which provides a complete and adequate remedy to an injured employee. Implicit in this argument, however is the assumption that the sole purpose of the Act was to provide disabled workers with a complete remedy for their industrial injuries. The inaccuracy of this implicit assumption undercuts the validity of respondents' argument.
The LHWCA, like other workmen's compensation legislation, is indeed remedial in that it was intended to provide a certain recovery for employees who are injured on the job. It imposes liability without fault, and precludes the assertion of various common law defenses that had frequently resulted in the denial of any recovery for disabled laborers. While providing employees with the benefit of a more certain recovery for work-related harms, statutes of this kind do not purport to provide complete compensation for the wage earner's economic loss. [Footnote 23] On the contrary, they provide employers with definite and lower limits on potential liability than would have been applicable in common law tort actions for damages. None of the categories of disability covered by the LHWCA authorizes recovery measured by the full loss of an injured employee's earnings; even those in the most favored categories may recover only two-thirds of the actual loss of Page 449 U. S. 282 earnings. It therefore is not correct to interpret the Act as guaranteeing a completely adequate remedy for all covered disabilities. Rather, like most workmen's compensation legislation, the LHWCA represents a compromise between the competing interests of disabled laborers and their employers. [Footnote 24] The use of a schedule of fixed benefits as an exclusive remedy in certain cases is consistent with the employees' interest in receiving a prompt and certain recovery for their industrial injuries as well as with the employers' interest in having their contingent liabilities identified as precisely and as early as possible.
It is true, however, that requiring resort to the schedule may produce certain incongruous results. Unless an injury Page 449 U. S. 283 results in a scheduled disability, the employee's compensation is dependent upon proving a loss of wage-earning capacity; in contrast, even though a scheduled injury may have no actual effect on an employee's capacity to perform a particular job or to maintain a prior level of income, compensation in the schedule amount must be paid. Conversely, the schedule may seriously undercompensate some employees like respondent Cross. [Footnote 25] The result seems particularly unfair when his case is compared with an employee who suffers an unscheduled disability resulting in an equivalent impairment of earning capacity. Indeed, it is possible that the award for a serious temporary partial disability could exceed the amount scheduled for a permanent disability of like character. [Footnote 26]
As this Court has observed in the past, it is not to be lightly assumed that Congress intended that the LHWCA produce incongruous results. Baltimore Phila. Steamboat Co. v. Norton, 284 U. S. 408, 284 U. S. 412-413 (1932). But if "compelling language" produces incongruities, the federal courts may not avoid them by rewriting or ignoring that language. Page 449 U. S. 284 Id. at 284 U. S. 413. Such compelling statutory language is present in this case. See 449 U. S. supra. The fact that it leads to seemingly unjust results in particular cases does not give judges a license to disregard it. [Footnote 27]
"* * * *" "(c) Permanent partial disability: In case of disability partial in character but permanent in quality the compensation shall be 66 2/3 per centum of the average weekly wages, which shall be in addition to compensation for temporary total disability or temporary partial disability paid in accordance with subdivision (b) or subdivision (e) of this section, respectively, and shall be paid to the employee, as follows:"
"* * * *" "(18) Total loss of use: Compensation for permanent total loss of use of a member shall be the same as for loss of the member."
The Court in this case and the dissent in the Court of Appeals argue rather persuasively (but, for me, not convincingly) that, although they reach an incongruous result, see Page 449 U. S. 285 ante at 449 U. S. 282-284, the statute is to be construed in favor of that incongruity and of the anomalies that concededly exist. It is said that this is so because Congress just wrote the statute that way. Now that the Court has so ruled, the Congress fortunately can remedy the anomalous situation if only it will go about doing it.
"The measure before us, like recent similar legislation in many States, requires employers to make payments for the relief of employees and their dependents who sustain loss as a result of personal injuries and deaths occurring in the course of their work, whether with or without fault attributable to employers. Such laws operate to relieve persons suffering such misfortunes of a part of the burden and to distribute it to the industries and mediately to those served by them. They are deemed to be in the public interest, and should be construed liberally in furtherance of the purpose for which they were enacted and, if possible, so as to avoid incongruous or harsh results. "Page 449 U. S. 286
Today's decision departs from these principles by reaching, rather than avoiding, a harsh and incongruous result. [Footnote 2/1] It is undisputed that respondent Cross has suffered an injury that will reduce his weekly earnings by $130.13 for the rest of his working life. To compensate him for this injury, the Benefits Review Board awarded him two-thirds of his lost earnings -- $86.76 per week or approximately $4,500 per year -- for as long as he continues to work. Under the Court's decision, however, the most that Cross will receive is a total of about $12,800, [Footnote 2/2] less than three years' compensation as awarded by the Board. If the Board now accepts petitioner's argument that Cross has lost only 5% of the use of his leg, he will Page 449 U. S. 287 receive about $3,200, less than one year's compensation. [Footnote 2/3] Of course, if Congress really intended such a result, the Court would be powerless to change it. I believe, however, that neither the language of the statute nor its legislative history warrants the interpretation that the Court adopts.
The Act's treatment of permanent partial disability should be read against this background. As the Court notes, § 908(c) contains 20 subsections establishing compensation for permanent partial disability caused by particular injuries. That compensation is two-thirds of the worker's weekly wages for a specified number of weeks for the injury listed. Subsection (21) then provides that "[i]n all other cases in this Page 449 U. S. 288 class of disability" an employee shall receive two-thirds of the difference between his average weekly wages before the injury and his wage-earning capacity thereafter. The Court prefers to construe "other cases" to mean that the compensation specified for the injuries listed in subsections (1) to (20) is the exclusive method of compensating workers who are permanently, but partially, disabled by these injuries. I believe that "other cases" includes any case in which the worker does not wish to accept the compensation offered in subsections (1) to (20), but elects to bear the burden of proving the difference between his wages before the injury and his wage-earning capacity afterwards.
An additional purpose of the statute was to afford prompt relief to covered workers "without the delay and expense which an action at law entails." Id. at 20. The inclusion of a schedule of benefits in § 908(c) serves this goal by providing an easily ascertainable award to a person who suffers one of the scheduled injuries. [Footnote 2/5] There is no indication in the Page 449 U. S. 289 legislative history, however, that providing prompt and certain relief is to be regarded as more important than providing adequate relief, especially in a case, such as this one, in which it is undisputed that the schedule of benefits will not compensate Page 449 U. S. 290 respondent Cross for the wages he has lost and will lose because of his injury.
Thus, the anomalous results the Court's decision imposes upon respondent Cross and other claimants under the LHWCA [Footnote 2/9] are not mandated, in my view, by the statute. It Page 449 U. S. 291 is possible to construe the statute to allow a claimant seeking compensation for permanent partial disability to choose between the schedule and the provisions of § 908(c)(21). I think we should follow Baltimore & Phila. Steamboat Co. v. Norton, 284 U. S. 408 (1932), and adopt a liberal construction of the statute so as to avoid the amazingly incongruous result approved by the Court.