Source: https://docs.dos.ny.gov/coog/ftext/f8620.htm
Timestamp: 2017-10-23 09:51:00
Document Index: 307214941

Matched Legal Cases: ['§30', '§57', '§87', '§3101', '§3101', '§3101', '§89']

Hon. Carole A. Clearwater
Dear Ms. Clearwater:
I have received your letter of December 6 and a variety of related materials. In brief, you wrote that the attorney for the Town's insurance carrier "has demanded that he be in control of all information given to the public" concerning a particular case.
First, as Town Clerk, you are, by statute, the custodian of all Town records [see Town Law, §30(1)] and the Town's records management officer (Arts and Cultural Affairs Law, §57.23). Moreover, assuming that you have been designated as records access officer by the Town Board, you have been given the duty of coordinating the Town's responses to requests for records. In that role, I believe that you have the authority to determine to grant or deny access to records sought under the Freedom of Information Law.
Second, certainly there is nothing in the Freedom of Information Law or any of the provisions referenced above that would preclude you from communicating with or seeking the advice of an attorney prior to granting or denying access to records. However, from my perspective, decisions to grant or deny access to records are invested in you and other Town officials (i.e., in the event of an appeal of a denial of access), and there is no requirement that you relinquish "control" of records.
The initial ground for denial, §87(2)(a), pertains to records that are "specifically exempted from disclosure by state or federal statute." One such statute is §3101(d) of the Civil Practice Law and Rules, which exempts material prepared for litigation from disclosure. Nevertheless, some of the records sought would apparently have been prepared or acquired in the ordinary course of business, such as minutes of meeting, insurance policies, audits, etc., rather than for any purpose relating to litigation. Further, it has been determined judicially that if records are prepared for multiple purposes, one of which includes eventual use in litigation, §3101(d) does not serve as a basis for withholding records; only when records are prepared solely for litigation can §3101(d) be properly asserted to deny access to records [see e.g., Westchester-Rockland Newspapers v. Mosczydlowski, 58 AD 2d 234 (1977)].
Lastly, in one item of correspondence from the attorney for the insurance carrier, he wrote that the Freedom of Information Law "provides that an agency shall not disclose information resulting in an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy" and referred to disclosure of residence addresses of current and former town employees. While I agree that home addresses of present and former public employees need not be disclosed [see Freedom of Information Law, §89(7)], I point out that the Freedom of Information Law is permissive. As stated by the Court of Appeals:
"while an agency is permitted to restrict access to those records falling within the statutory exemptions, the language of the exemption provision contains permissible rather than mandatory language, and it is within the agency's discretion to disclose such records, with or without identifying details, if it so chooses" [Capital Newspapers v. Burns, 67 NY 2d 562, 567 (1986); see also, Buffalo Teachers Federation v. Buffalo Board of Education, 156 Ad 2d 1027 (1990)]."
It is noted that in Buffalo Teachers Federation, it was specifically found that a school district could choose to disclose home addresses of teachers, even though that information could have been withheld.
cc: Brian S. Sokoloff