Source: http://openjurist.org/956/f2d/223
Timestamp: 2013-06-20 04:59:55
Document Index: 613109383

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 241', '§ 1251', '§ 212', '§ 212', '§ 212', '§ 212', '§ 552', '§ 212', '§ 212', '§ 212', '§ 212', '§ 241', '§ 1251', '§ 1182']

956 F2d 223 Nunez-Pena v. Immigration & Naturalization Service | OpenJurist
956 F. 2d 223 - Nunez-Pena v. Immigration & Naturalization Service	Home956 f2d 223 nunez-pena v. immigration & naturalization service
956 F2d 223 Nunez-Pena v. Immigration & Naturalization Service 956 F.2d 223
Ruben NUNEZ-PENA, Petitioner,v.IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERVICE, Respondent.
No. 91-9510.
Shortly after his conviction, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) charged Petitioner with deportability under § 241(a)(11) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(11).2 An immigration judge found Petitioner deportable and denied his application for a waiver of deportation under § 212(c).3 The BIA affirmed.I.
In support of his Petition for Review, Petitioner first argues that the BIA erred by requiring him to show "unusual or outstanding equities" before relief under § 212(c) could be granted. The BIA exercises its discretion under § 212(c) by "balanc[ing] the adverse factors evidencing an alien's undesirability as a permanent resident with the social and humane considerations presented in his behalf." In re Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581, 584 (BIA 1978). Where an applicant for § 212(c) relief has engaged in serious criminal conduct, such as drug trafficking, the BIA requires the applicant to "introduce additional offsetting favorable evidence, which in some cases may have to involve unusual or outstanding equities." In re Buscemi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 628, 633 (BIA 1988); see also Marin, 16 I. & N. at 585. Specific factors which the BIA considers to be outstanding equities include the length of the applicant's residence in this country, his immediate family's residence here, his close family ties, and a history of gainful employment. Buscemi, 19 I. & N. at 634.
Petitioner argues that the BIA could not validly apply the "outstanding equities" standard articulated in Buscemi and Marin because it was established through adjudication rather than through the rulemaking procedures under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 552, 553. Other circuits have recognized the heightened standard under Buscemi and Marin, but have not considered the precise argument made by Petitioner. See, e.g., Cordoba-Chaves v. INS, 946 F.2d 1244, 1246-47 (7th Cir.1991); Blackwood v. INS, 803 F.2d 1165, 1168 (11th Cir.1986).
We conclude that the "outstanding equities" standard was properly formulated by the INS through the course of issuing adjudicatory opinions. An agency "is not precluded from asserting new principles in an adjudicative proceeding." NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294, 94 S.Ct. 1757, 1771, 40 L.Ed.2d 134 (1974). "Adjudicated cases may and do ... serve as vehicles for the formulation of agency policies, which are applied and announced therein." NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon, 394 U.S. 759, 765, 89 S.Ct. 1426, 1429, 22 L.Ed.2d 709 (1969). The Supreme Court has consistently held that "the choice made between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative agency." SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203, 67 S.Ct. 1575, 1580, 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947); accord Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 294-95, 94 S.Ct. at 1771-72. Thus, the INS was empowered to articulate standards for the exercise of its discretion under § 212(c) by adjudication in Buscemi and Marin. See Stoller v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 834 F.2d 262, 265 (2d Cir.1987) ("An agency is free ... to interpret its governing statute case by case through adjudicatory proceedings rather than by rulemaking.").
We note that "there may be situations where the [agency's] reliance on adjudication would amount to an abuse of discretion or a violation of the [APA]." Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 294, 94 S.Ct. at 1771. However, this is not such a case. Unlike Patel v. INS, 638 F.2d 1199, 1202 (9th Cir.1980), this case does not involve a situation where the INS used adjudication to add a requirement to a regulation which had been expressly discarded during a prior rulemaking proceeding. Nor is this case like Ruangswang v. INS, 591 F.2d 39, 43-44 (9th Cir.1978), where the INS suddenly changed its policy in an adjudicatory opinion and caused undue hardship to those who had relied on past policy. Buscemi and Marin were decided well before Petitioner sought relief under § 212(c). Thus, Petitioner had adequate notice of the principles used to adjudicate his application.4II.
Petitioner does not question whether his criminal conduct was serious enough to justify application of the outstanding equities standard. Instead, Petitioner next argues that even if the standard is valid, it was misapplied by the BIA to his case. We review the BIA's balancing of the equities for § 212(c) relief for abuse of discretion. Joseph v. I.N.S., 909 F.2d 605, 607 (1st Cir.1990); Vargas v. I.N.S., 831 F.2d 906, 908 (9th Cir.1987). The denial of § 212(c) relief "will be upheld unless it was made without a rationale explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis." Joseph, 909 F.2d at 607 (quoting McLean v. I.N.S., 901 F.2d 204, 205 (1st Cir.1990)).
Under § 241(a)(11):
8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(11) (1988). Petitioner concedes that he is deportable under this provision.
8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1988). On its face, this provision seems to apply only to exclusion proceedings. However, it has uniformly been found applicable to deportation proceedings as well. See Variamparambil v. INS, 831 F.2d 1362, 1364 n. 1 (7th Cir.1987); Chiravacharadhikul v. INS, 645 F.2d 248, 248 n. 1 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 893, 102 S.Ct. 389, 70 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981); Tapia-Acuna v. INS, 640 F.2d 223, 224 (9th Cir.1981).
We need not consider Petitioner's passing reference to the "outstanding equities" standard as vague. A litigant who mentions a point in passing and fails to press it by supporting it with pertinent authority, or by showing why it is sound despite the lack of supporting authority, forfeits the point. Pelfresne v. Village of Williams Bay, 917 F.2d 1017, 1023 (7th Cir.1990)
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