Source: https://casetext.com/case/us-v-nyhuis-2
Timestamp: 2019-05-23 09:15:56
Document Index: 324460572

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2255', '§ 2253', 'art, 876', '§ 5', '§ 2241', '§ 5']

U.S. v. Nyhuis, 211 F.3d 1340 | Casetext
U.S. v. Nyhuis
211 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir. 2000)
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U.S.v.Nyhuis
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh CircuitMay 17, 2000
No. 98-2716
Jeffrey J. Balgooyen, Ada, MI, John A. Vos, Grand Rapids, MI for Nyhuis.
Rick L. Jancha, Orlando, FL, Charles Truncale, Jacksonville, FL, for United States.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. D.C. Docket No. 97-00422-CV-ORL-19.
Douglas Nyhuis was tried and convicted in the Middle District of Florida on one count of conspiracy to possess, with intent to distribute, in excess of five kilograms of cocaine during the period from March, 1985, through October, 1989. On direct appeal, his conviction was affirmed by ths court. He filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct an illegal sentence. After the district court denied this motion, he filed this appeal.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253, Nyhuis filed an application for a certificate of appealability in the district court which the court denied. He then applied to this court for the certificate, which was granted as to two issues only. Subsequently, a third issue was certified.
Nyhuis' first issue on appeal is whether the government's prosecution of him in the Middle District of Florida constituted a breach of his Michigan plea agreement which violated due process of law. The second issue is whether the government conducted itself in this case in a manner which violated due process of law. The final issue is whether his trial and appellate counsel was ineffective at sentencing. We consider each of these issues de novo. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).
II. The Breach of the Michigan Plea Agreement
The Government "agree[d] not to bring additional criminal charges against the defendant in the Western District of Michigan arising out of his involvement in the distribution of marijuana." It has not done so. The Government further agreed not to bring additional charges against Nyhuis arising out of "those transactions disclosed by the defendant in the proffer already made to the government." (Emphasis added.) It has not done so. . . . To permit Nyhuis retroactively to sweep his cocaine involvement within the ambit of the plea agreement would be an endorsement of the strategy of telling a little and hiding a lot.
Upon review of the present motion, the district court concluded that, despite Nyhuis' protestations to the contrary, his Section 2255 due process claim is based upon the same alleged plea agreement violation resolved against him by this court on direct appeal of his conviction. We agree with the district court. We can discern no fact or other evidence underlying the present due process claim which was not raised by Nyhuis and considered by us in his prior immunity claim. The district court is not required to reconsider claims of error that were raised and disposed of on direct appeal. United States v. Rowan, 663 F.2d 1034, 1035 (11th Cir. 1981). "[O]nce a matter has been decided adversely to a defendant on direct appeal it cannot be re-litigated in a collateral attack under section 2255." United States v. Natelli, 553 F.2d 5, 7 (2d Cir. 1977). Nyhuis has merely re-characterized his prior immunity claim as a due process claim. A rejected claim does not merit rehearing on a different, but previously available, legal theory. Cook v. Lockhart, 876 F.2d 220 [ 878 F.2d 220], 222 (8th Cir. 1989). Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not err in denying the motion to set aside the verdict as a violation of due process.
Nevertheless, the government maintains that the district court correctly denied collateral relief on the alternative ground that this claim is procedurally barred. Nyhuis concedes that this claim has not been previously litigated. Therefore, he is barred from asserting it on motion for collateral relief unless he can show cause excusing his failure to raise the issue previously and actual prejudice resulting from the alleged error. Mills v. United States, 36 F.3d 1052, 1055 (11th Cir. 1994); Cross v. United States, 893 F.2d 1287, 1289 (11th Cir. 1990).
Contrary to Nyhuis' belief, the issuance of a certificate of appealability does not guarantee consideration of his underlying constitutional claims. Slack v. McDaniel, S.Ct., (April 26, 2000) No. 98-6322. Although it is true that the certificate should not issue unless the court determines that the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right, it is also true that the court "will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of." Id. citing Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936). This principle "allows and encourages the court to first resolve procedural issues." Slack, slip. op. at 8.
These unsupported assertions do not entitle Nyhuis to habeas relief. The defense [of outrageous conduct] can be invoked only in the "rarest and most outrageous circumstances," United States v. Haimowitz, 725 F.2d 1561, 1577 (11th Cir. 1984), and must be supported by more than mere speculation and theory. The arguments which Nyhuis asserts his prior counsel should have raised on appeal in support of an outrageous conduct claim are without substantial merit. We conclude, therefore, that his present claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel which excuses his failure to raise these arguments on appeal is similarly without merit. Accordingly, Nyhuis' is procedurally barred from raising this claim in his Section 2255 petition and the district court did not err in denying him collateral relief on this issue.
The procedural bar to our review of this claim does not result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice in this case because Nyhuis does not allege that he is innocent. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 493-94 (1991).
This argument is without merit. Sentencing Guideline § 5G1.3 does not authorize a district court to grant credit for time served prior to the imposition of sentence. The granting of credit for time served "is in the first instance an administrative, not a judicial, function." United States v. Flanagan, 868 F.2d 1544, 1546 (11th Cir. 1989). A claim for credit for time served is brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 after the exhaustion of administrative remedies. Id. The guideline commentary does permit the district court the discretion to achieve a "total" sentence by imposing combinations of concurrent and consecutive sentences. USSG § 5G1.3, comment. (Nov. 1990). The Florida court did this by imposing a sentence and ordering that it run concurrently with the Michigan sentence.
Nyhuis' claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, therefore, fails because he has not shown that his counsel's performance was deficient or that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different but for counsel's allegedly deficient performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
We conclude that Nyhuis' present claims do not entitle him to relief under Section 2255. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court denying relief and dismissing the case with prejudice is