Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/101641/denver-r-g-w-co-vs-trainmen
Timestamp: 2018-03-18 13:49:17
Document Index: 491023431

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1391', '§ 1391', '§ 1391', '§ 109', '§ 1400', '§ 1391', '§ 1391', '§ 1404', '§ 1391', '§ 1391', '§ 1391', '§ 1391', '§ 1391', '§ 1391', '§ 1391', '§ 1391', '§ 1391', '§ 301', '§ 185', '§ 1404']

Denver and R G W R Co Vs Trainmen - Citation 101641 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Denver and R. G. W. R. Co. Vs. Trainmen - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/101641
Case Number 387 U.S. 556
Appellant Denver and R. G. W. R. Co.
Respondent Trainmen
denver & r. g. w. r. co. v. trainmen - 387 u.s. 556 (1967) u.s. supreme court denver & r. g. w. r. co. v. trainmen, 387 u.s. 556 (1967) denver & rio grande western railroad co. v. brotherhood of railroad trainmen no. 794 argued april 19, 1967 decided june 5, 1967 387 u.s. 556 certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the tenth circuit syllabus petitioner, railroad, brought suit in federal court in colorado against respondent union, an unincorporated association with headquarters in ohio, and certain individual members, for damages resulting from a strike in violation of the railway labor act. at the time the suit was brought, venue in federal question cases lay only in the district "where all.....
U.S. Supreme Court Denver & R. G. W. R. Co. v. Trainmen, 387 U.S. 556 (1967)
1. The residence of an unincorporated association (which should be viewed as an entity for venue purposes) under the previous version of § 1391(b) refers to wherever it is "doing business." Pp. 387 U. S. 559 -563.
2. The District Court should now determine whether or not respondent was "doing business" in Colorado; if it finds that respondent was not, the appropriateness of venue under the current version of § 1391 ( i.e., whether the claim "arose" in Colorado) should be considered. Pp. 387 U. S. 563 -564.
the union's motion to dismiss for improper venue, held the strike illegal because the union had failed to exhaust its statutory remedies to enforce the Adjustment Board awards, and awarded damages based on the railroad's loss of traffic caused by the illegal strike. The judgment ran against both the union and Carroll, the case against the other defendants being dismissed for failure of proof. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the union could be sued under § 1391(b) only in the district of its residence and that its residence was not in Colorado. [ Footnote 1 ] Because of the seeming conflict with Rutland R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 307 F.2d 21, we granted certiorari. 385 U.S. 1000. We reverse.
Of course, venue for a suit against an unincorporated association becomes important only if the association is itself suable. At common law, such an association could be sued only in the names of its members, and liability had to be enforced against each member. This principle was rejected in United Mine Workers v. Coronado Co., 259 U. S. 344 , where this Court, recognizing the growth and pervasive influence of labor organizations and noting that the suability of trade unions "is of primary importance in the working out of justice and in protecting individuals and society . . . ," 259 U.S. at 259 U. S. 390 , held that such organizations were suable in the federal courts, and that funds accumulated by them were subject to execution in suits for torts committed during strikes. The Coronado holding is now reflected in Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 17(b).
The Coronado case dealt with capacity to be sued, not with venue, but it did legitimate suing the unincorporated association as an entity. Although that entity has no citizenship independent of its members for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, Steelworkers v. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U. S. 145 , a case relied upon by the Court of Appeals here, we think that the question of the proper venue for such a defendant, like the question of capacity, should be determined by looking to the residence of the association itself, rather than that of its individual members.
In Sperry Prods., Inc. v. Association of American Railroads, 132 F.2d 408, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dealt with the issue of what district an unincorporated association may be said to inhabit under the special venue statute governing patent suits, then 28 U.S.C. § 109 (1940 ed.), now 28 U.S.C. § 1400. That court thought the association should be treated like a corporation. Under the decisions of this Court, corporations had a single residence for venue purposes, the State of their incorporation. Likewise, the Sperry court thought the unincorporated association should be considered as having a single residence, in its case its principal place of business. Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Corp., 308 U. S. 165 , had already determined, however, that corporations, while having only one residence, nevertheless consented to be sued in federal diversity suits where they were licensed to do business. And Neirbo had much to do with producing the 1948 congressional definition of corporate residence as including not only the State of incorporation
It can be argued, as respondent does, that, had the 1948 Congress intended the expanded definition of corporate residence to apply to labor unions and other unincorporated associations, it would have said so. But even accepting this, the question of what the association's residence is for venue purposes remains unanswered. Saying that Congress did not intend to "change" the venue law with respect to unincorporated associations assumes a settled meaning to the prior law. This was not the case. There was no settled construction of the law in the courts in 1948, and there is none yet. Nor was there anything to indicate that Congress had considered a labor union's residence to be in only one place, or had ever intended a limited view of residence with respect to unincorporated associations. Rather than accepting respondent's position, we view the action of Congress in 1948 as simply correcting an unacceptably narrow definition of corporate residence which had been adopted by the courts, while maintaining its silence with respect to the unincorporated association. And if it is assumed that Congress was aware of Sperry at all, it is surely reasonable to think that Congress anticipated that the approach of that case, analogizing incorporated and unincorporated entities, would continue to be followed by the courts so that, if corporate residence were broadly defined by the Congress, the courts would similarly construe the concept of residence of the unincorporated association. This was the approach of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Rutland R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive En'rs, supra. [ Footnote 2 ]
We therefore conclude that the Court of Appeals improperly applied § 1391(b) as it read when this suit was brought. But even if we instead agreed with the Court of Appeals on this question, the case must be considered in light of the present form of that section, that is, as amended by the Act of November 2, 1966, which provides for venue not only at the place of a defendant's residence, but also in the district where the claim arose. This amendment does not change the substantive law applicable to this lawsuit. It is wholly procedural. Absent some contrary indications by the Congress, and absent any procedural prejudice to either party, the 1966 amendment to § 1391 is applicable to this suit. See United States v. Alabama, 362 U. S. 602 ; Ex parte Collett, 337 U. S. 55 ; American Foundries v. Tri-City Council, 257 U. S. 184 , 257 U. S. 201 ; Pruess v. Udall, 123 U.S.App.D.C. 301, 359 F.2d 615. As this Court said in applying 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to pending actions, "No one has a vested right in any given mode of procedure." Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. at 337 U. S. 71 . And, in any event, if the decision below were affirmed, the petitioner could reinstitute the same action in the same District Court and seek the benefits of the current version of § 1391, absent the barrier of any applicable statute of limitations. We do not, of course, intimate any views as to
Other lower court cases are divided on the question whether an unincorporated association can be sued at a place other than its principal place of business. Cases restricting venue to the association's principal place of business include Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v. Graham, 84 U.S.App.D.C. 67, 69, n. 2, 175 F.2d 802, 804, n. 2, rev'd on other grounds, 338 U. S. 232 ; McNutt v. United Gas, Coke & Chem. Workers, 108 F.Supp. 871, 875; Salvant v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 83 F.Supp. 391, 396; Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers, 92 F.Supp. 841, aff'd without discussion, 194 F.2d 770; Cherico v. Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen, 167 F.Supp. 635, 637-638; cf. Hadden v. Small, 145 F.Supp. 387 (partnership). Cases holding that unincorporated associations may be sued where they do business: Portsmouth Baseball Corp. v. Frick, 132 F.Supp. 922; Eastern Motor Express v. Espenshade, 138 F.Supp. 426, 432; American Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Assn., 169 F.Supp. 777, 781-783; R & E Dental Supply Co. v. Ritter Co., 185 F.Supp. 812; cf. Joscar Co. v. Consolidated Sun Ray, Inc., 212 F.Supp. 634.
This suit for damages caused by an illegal strike was brought by the Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad against the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen and certain of its individual members in the United States District Court for Colorado, where the Brotherhood's local lodges went on strike. The Brotherhood, an unincorporated association with its headquarters and principal place of business in Cleveland, Ohio, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue. The District Court denied this motion, and, after a trial without a jury, gave the railroad a $37,988 judgment against the union. The Court of Appeals reversed. 367 F.2d 137. It held that the applicable venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), [ Footnote 2/1 ] gave venue only to the district court for the district where the union's principal place of business is located. I would affirm this holding.
that, prior to the Judicial Code of 1948, under the predecessor of § 1391(h), [ Footnote 2/2 ] most courts had held that an unincorporated association is suable only at its principal place of business, and that the only express change made in preexisting general venue law by the 1948 Code was the expansion of corporate venue from the place of incorporation to the place of doing business, § 1391(c). [ Footnote 2/3 ] Nevertheless, the court reasoned that there are sound policies for treating unincorporated associations like corporations and that, though the language of § 1391(c) expressly applies to corporations, and not to unincorporated associations, Congress implicitly intended for the expanded concepts of corporate residence under § 1391(c) to be applied in determining the residence of an unincorporated association under § 1391(b).
the unincorporated association," it approves the Rutland holding because "sound policy considerations" indicate it "most nearly approximates the intent of Congress." In reaching this result, the Court adopts the Rutland reasoning that Congress, in 1948, must have approved of assimilating for venue purposes the treatment of unincorporated associations to that of corporations, because such a process of assimilation had been advocated by Judge Learned Hand in Sperry Prods., Inc. v. Association of American Railroads, 132 F.2d 408, cert. denied, 319 U.S. 744. The narrow issue dealt with in Sperry was where, under the special venue provisions for a patent infringement suit, [ Footnote 2/4 ] is an unincorporated association deemed to be an "inhabitant." The Sperry court first held that, since an unincorporated association can be sued in its own name to enforce a federal right, United Mine Workers v. Coronado Co., 259 U. S. 344 , and since it can be served with process under Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 17(b), it should, for venue purposes, be treated as a single individual, not an aggregate of individuals. [ Footnote 2/5 ] The Sperry court then held that, for purposes of the special patent venue provision, an unincorporated association is an "inhabitant" of the district where its principal place of business is located -- precisely what the Court of Appeals held here as to § 1391(b). In reaching this result, Judge Hand advanced legislative policy reasons,
I find many objections to doing what the Court does here. First, even assuming that, in enacting § 1391, Congress was aware of the Sperry decision and thought it applicable to general, as distinguished from patent, venue rules [ Footnote 2/6 ] (an assumption I think completely unfounded), it is doubtful that Congress, without saying so, intended to reject the holding of that case -- that an unincorporated association is suable at its principal place of business -- but at the same time adopt its reasoning -- dicta to the effect that an unincorporated association should be treated like a corporation. Second, the only indication I can find of what Congress intended in 1948 as to unincorporated associations comes from Professor Moore, who participated in drafting the Code and who, in 1949, wrote:
" Sperry Products, Inc. v. Association of American Railroads took the position that an unincorporated association is an 'inhabitant,' i.e., resident, of the district where it has its principal place of business.
And this doctrine has been applied to a partnership. . . . The Code has changed none of these doctrines. [ Footnote 2/7 ] "
Third, Congress, in 1948, was clearly aware of the venue problems involved in suing an unincorporated association. Just the year before, in 1947, it had expressly considered these problems in relation to suits against labor unions to enforce collective bargaining agreements, [ Footnote 2/8 ] and in § 301(c) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 157, 29 U.S.C. § 185(c), explicitly provided for venue in such suits
amended, is a question for Congress, not this Court. Finally, since 1948, the lower courts have been completely divided on the question of whether an unincorporated association can be sued at a place other than its principal place of business. [ Footnote 2/9 ] In the light of all these things, I cannot impute to Congress an unarticulated intent to make an unincorporated association's venue precisely the same as that of a corporation.
Neither the language and history of the general venue statute nor any prior decision of this Court throws any light on the question presented here. In the final analysis, it is simply an important question of public policy. Reasons can logically be advanced for expanding the venue of unincorporated associations to include districts where they engage in business, but just as strong reasons can be advanced for not doing so. Though venue, relating to the convenience of the litigants, is quite different from jurisdiction, relating to the power of a court to adjudicate, Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Corp., 38 U. S. 165 , 38 U. S. 167 -168, and though Congress may have more constitutional leeway to deal with venue than with jurisdiction, Steelworkers v. Boiligny, Inc., 382 U. S. 145 , venue rules
nevertheless pose policy considerations which are and should be weighed by Congress, and not by this Court. As we said in Olberding v. Illinois Central R. Co., 346 U. S. 338 , 346 U. S. 340 :
I think the Court oversteps its boundaries in doing that which Congress did not choose to do in expanding the venue provisions with reference to corporations. I would leave the law of venue as it is until Congress decides its own policy. [ Footnote 2/10 ]
After Sperry, the lower courts divided on whether its holding should be extended to the pre-1948 general venue provision ( see n. 3, supra ). Compare Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v. Graham, 84 U.S.App.D.C. 67, 175 F.2d 802, rev'd on other grounds, 338 U. S. 232 , and Griffin v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 88 F.Supp. 552, 555, with Thermoid Co. v. United Rubber Workers, 70 F.Supp. 228, 233-234.
Moore, Commentary on the U.S. Judicial Code 193 (1949). Now, however, for legislative policy reasons such as the protection from abuse contained in the transfer provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) and the multi-state nature of unincorporated associations' activities, Professor Moore believes the position taken in Rutland "desirable." 1 Moore, Federal Practice Ĺš 0.142[5.-4], at 1508. See also Comment, 44 Calif.L.Rev. 130 (1956); Note, 39 St. John's L.Rev. 353, 358-360 (1965); Note, 13 Okla.L.Rev. 206 (1960); 45 Geo.L.Rev. 132 (1956). But see Kaplan, Suits Against Unincorporated Associations Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 53 Mich.L.Rev. 945, 949-950 (1955); Comment, 8 Stan.L.Rev. 708 (1956).