Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/948/215/286410/
Timestamp: 2020-04-10 10:46:26
Document Index: 553033717

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 841', '§ 2', '§ 841', '§ 2', '§ 924', '§ 4', '§ 3553']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Frankie Lasalle, Defendant-appellee, 948 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1991) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Sixth Circuit › 1991 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Frankie Lasalle, Defendant-appellee
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Frankie Lasalle, Defendant-appellee, 948 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1991)
US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit - 948 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1991) Submitted Sept. 26, 1991. Decided and Filed Nov. 5, 1991
Before MILBURN and SUHRHEINRICH, Circuit Judges, and JORDAN, District Judge* .
LaSalle was indicted on March 8, 1990, with his two co-defendants for possessing with intent to distribute 83.4 grams of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count I); for possessing 31.9 grams of cocaine base (crack) with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count II); and for using or carrying a .38 caliber revolver during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).
(b) Application of guidelines in imposing a sentence.--The court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the range, referred to in subsection (a) (4) unless the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described. In determining whether a circumstance was adequately taken into consideration, the court shall consider only the sentencing guidelines, policy statements, and official commentary of the Sentencing Commission.
A district court may not depart downward because he believes a career offender sentence would be excessive. See, e.g., United States v. Norflett, 922 F.2d 50, 53 (1st Cir. 1990). With regard to the age of a defendant's prior convictions as a basis upon which to depart from a career offender guideline, the Sentencing Commission determined that offenses committed within fifteen years of the instant offense are to be considered. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(e). Thus, the Sentencing Commission fully considered what effect the age of past crimes was to have on a defendant's sentence, and while the age of certain convictions affects where in the guideline range a defendant should fall, it does not justify a departure from the guidelines. United States v. Richardson, 923 F.2d 13, 17 (2d Cir. 1991).
A sentencing court should strive "to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (6) (emphasis added). The objective of this statute is not to eliminate sentence disparities between defendants of the same case who have different criminal records; rather, the objective is "to eliminate unwarranted disparities nationwide. An applicable guideline range may seem harsh ... when compared to that of a co-defendant, but it is the same range applicable throughout the country for all offenders with the same combination of offense conduct and prior record." United States v. Joyner, 924 F.2d 454, 460 (2d Cir. 1991). Furthermore, to reduce a defendant's sentence because of a perceived disparity between the sentences of one defendant and that of his co-defendant in the same case creates a new and unwarranted disparity between that first defendant's sentence and the sentences of all the defendants nationwide who are similarly situated. Id. at 460-461; United States v. Carr, 932 F.2d 67, 73 (1st Cir. 1991). In this connection, it appears that defendant LaSalle's record serves to make him a career offender whereas the records of the others involved in the instant crime do not make them career offenders. Thus, a reduction in LaSalle's sentence simply to eliminate a disparity as compared to his co-defendants' sentences is unreasonable. See, e.g., United States v. Gessa, 944 F.2d 265 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Parker, 912 F.2d 156 (6th Cir. 1990); United States v. Nelson, 918 F.2d 1268, 1275 (6th Cir. 1990).
In addition, it is well established that habitual criminal laws, which the career offender guidelines emulate, withstand ex post facto and double jeopardy challenges. See Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 560, 87 S. Ct. 648, 651-52, 17 L. Ed. 2d 606 (1967). Furthermore, the Sentencing Guidelines and the enabling legislation have passed constitutional muster. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 109 S. Ct. 647, 102 L. Ed. 2d 714 (1989).
Finally, in United States v. Robison, 904 F.2d 365, 373 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S. Ct. 360, 112 L. Ed. 2d 323 (1990), this court, in reversing a departure from the guidelines, stated: