Source: http://www.uclpractitioner.com/ucl_remedies_in_general/index.html
Timestamp: 2017-10-23 11:49:53
Document Index: 325942955

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1701', '§ 1798', '§ 1798', '§ 17204', '§ 14501', '§ 17203', '§ 16700', '§ 17200']

Interesting discussion of equitable vs. non-equitable monetary relief: Bayer v. Neiman Marcus Group
The Ninth Circuit's recent opinion in Bayer v. Neiman Marcus Corp., ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. Jun. 26, 2017), contains a thought-provoking discussion of equitable vs. non-equitable forms of monetary relief. See slip op. at 16-20.
The case does not involve the UCL, and it considers federal law rather than California law, but the discussion resonates for me as I think about UCL restitution and the differences between restitutionary and non-restitutionary disgorgement. Because of course I think about that all the time, especially on warm summer days like today.
Posted by Kimberly A. Kralowec at 04:00 AM in UCL - federal decisions, UCL - remedies in general, UCL - restitution | Permalink | Comments (0)
The UCL and secondary liability: Daniels v. Select Portfolio Services, Inc.
In an opinion handed down in April of this year, the Court of Appeal (Sixth Appellate District) reconfirmed the rule that UCL liability can be predicated on an agency or conspiracy theory. Daniels v. Select Portfolio Services, Inc., 246 Cal.App.4th 1150, 1188 (2016) (citing People v. JTH Tax, Inc., 212 Cal.App.4th 1219, 1242 (2013); People v. Bestline Products, Inc., 61 Cal.App.3d 879, 918-19 (1976)).
This blog's discussion of People v. JTH Tax, Inc. is available at this link. People v. Bestline Products was a little before the blog's time, but see this post for a discussion of more recent decisions on aiding and abetting liability under UCL.
In Ebner v. Fresh, Inc., ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. Sept. 27, 2016), the plaintiff asserted UCL, FAL and CLRA claims based on the defendant's labeling and marketing of its "Sugar" lip balm. According to the plaintiff, the statements of "net weight" are wrong and the "oversize" tubes and boxes in which the lip balm is sold "create the misleading impression that each unit has a larger quantity of lip product than it actually contains." Slip op. at 6. The district court dismissed the action in its entirety. Id. at 4-5.
The Ninth Circuit held that claims based on misstatements of "net weight" were properly dismissed because the federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act created a Cel-Tech safe harbor for such statements. Slip op. at 8-9. However, plaintiff also argued that the defendant omitted any "supplemental or clarifying statement" explaining that part of the next weight would be inaccessible to the consumer because of the tube design. Claims based on this omission theory enjoyed no safe harbor, nor were they expressly or impliedly preempted. Id. at 9-12.
The Court then held that claims based on misleading packaging (as opposed to labeling) also failed "for largely the same reasons that the label-based claims fail." Id. at 16. In "the high-end cosmetics market, Sugar's elaborate packaging and the weighty feel of the tub is commonplace and even expected by a significant portion of Fresh's 'targeted consumers.'" Id. (citing Lavie v. Procter & Gamble Co., 105 Cal.App.4th 486 (2003) (discussed in this blog post)).
This opinion accompanies an order denying the plaintiff's petition for panel rehearing or en banc rehearing, which challenged an earlier opinion handed down in March. The main difference between the current opinion and the earlier opinion (which has been superseded) is that the current opinion spends more time distinguishing Williams.
(Hat tip: The Complex Litigator.)
Posted by Kimberly A. Kralowec at 04:00 AM in The CLRA, UCL - "fraudulent" prong, UCL - remedies in general | Permalink | Comments (0)
Recent Ninth Circuit UCL opinion: Beaver v. Tarsadia Hotels
In Beaver v. Tarsadia Hotels, 816 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. Mar. 10, 2016), the Ninth Circuit considered a UCL "unlawful" prong claim predicated on violation of a federal statute. The UCL's four-year statute of limitations governed, the court held—not the shorter limitations period of the "borrowed" federal statute. Id. at 1177-78. Nor did the shorter limitations period preempt "the UCL's more generous" one. Id. at 1778-81.
A cert. petition was filed in June and remains pending. Possibly, the petition focuses on the court's holdings in the second half of the opinion, which considered whether the "borrowed" federal statute (the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq.) applied to the defendant's conduct. Id. at 1781-88.
Many thanks to the blog reader who brought this case to my attention. Although I have not been blogging as frequently this year as I have in the past, I always enjoy and appreciate hearing from my wonderful readers.
Posted by Kimberly A. Kralowec at 03:55 PM in UCL - federal decisions, UCL - remedies in general | Permalink | Comments (0)
In Guerrero v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., ___ Cal.App.4th ___ (Oct. 10, 2014), the Court of Appeal (First Appellate District, Division Three) affirmed the trial court's ruling that allowing the plaintiff's UCL claim against PG&E to proceed would interfere with the jurisdiction of the Public Utilities Commission.
The UCL action was filed in the wake of the 2010 San Bruno gas line explosion, and sought retitution of those portions of PG&E's revenues that plaintiffs claimed should have been, but were not, expended on safety-related projects. Slip op. at 1-2.
New opinion construes UCL in wrongful foreclosure context: Rufini v. CitiMortgage, Inc.
In Rufini v. CitiMortgage, Inc., ___ Cal.App.4th ___ (May 28, 2014; pub. ord. Jun. 23, 2014; mod. Jul. 22, 2014), the Court of Appeal (First Appellate District, Division Three) held that the trial court improperly sustained the defendant's demurrer to a UCL claim arising out of the alleged wrongful foreclosure of the deed of trust on plaintiff's home.
There's nothing particularly earth-shattering in the discussion of the UCL claim, which appears at pp. 11-13 of the slip opinion.
Posted by Kimberly A. Kralowec at 04:00 AM in UCL - "unfair" prong, UCL - "unlawful" prong, UCL - remedies in general | Permalink | Comments (0)
In Boorstein v. CBS Interactive, Inc., ___ Cal.App.4th ___ (Dec. 19, 2013), the Court of Appeal (Second Appellate District, Division Four) held that the plaintiff lacked standing to bring a claim against the defendant for violating the "shine the light" law (Civil Code §§ 1798.83 et seq.). Slip op. at 9-18. The panel determined that the plaintiff had not been "injured by a violation of this title," as the "shine the light" law requires. Id. at 9 (quoting Civ. Code § 1798.84).
As a result, the plaintiff also lacked standing to bring a UCL "unlawful" prong violation predicated on violation of that statute:
The UCL provides that to pursue a claim for relief under the statute, an individual must have “suffered injury in fact and ha[ve] lost money or property as a result of the unfair competition.” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17204.) For the reasons stated above, plaintiff failed to allege an “injury in fact.” Thus, he has not stated a claim for relief under the UCL. The demurrer to the second cause of action was properly sustained.
Other courts have reached a different conclusion on the prejudgment interest question,1 but if Rodriquez and M&F stand up, what it means as a practical matter is that prejudgment interest is discretionary, but not mandatory, in UCL actions.
1 See, e.g., In re Neurontin Marketing and Sales Practices Litigation, 2011 WL 3852254, *60 (D. Mass. Aug. 31, 2011); Irwin v. Mascott, 112 F.Supp.2d 937, 956 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (citing Tripp v. Swoap, 17 Cal.3d 671, 681 (1976)).
UPDATE: On December 11, 2013, the Supreme Court issued a "grant and hold" order in this case, making the Court of Appeal opinion uncitable as precedent. Rodriguez v. RWA Trucking Co., No. S214150. Briefing has been deferred pending resolution of People ex rel. Harris v. Pac Anchor Transportation, Inc., No. S194388, in which the Court is considering preemption by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (49 U.S.C. § 14501) ("FAAAA").
Posted by Kimberly A. Kralowec at 05:00 AM in UCL - "unlawful" prong, UCL - preemption, UCL - remedies in general | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
The UCL and wrongful foreclosure: Glaski v. Bank of America, N.A.
In Glaski v. Bank of America, N.A., ___ Cal.App.4th ___ (Jul. 31, 2013; pub. ord. Aug. 8, 2013), an individual wrongful foreclosure action, the Fifth District has a single paragraph addressing the UCL:
Slip op. at 26-27. The citation to a federal district court decision suggests that no other California Court of Appeal opinion has addressed whether conduct constituting wrongful foreclosure (which is a catch-all term that can encompass a variety of defects in the foreclosure process, including statutory violations) can form the predicate for a UCL claim. There's no reason why it shouldn't, particularly after Rose and Zhang reconfirmed the broad scope of the UCL's "unlawful" prong.
Posted by Kimberly A. Kralowec at 05:00 AM in UCL - "unfair" prong, UCL - "unlawful" prong, UCL - remedies in general | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Posted by Kimberly A. Kralowec at 05:00 AM in UCL - "unlawful" prong, UCL - public prosecutor actions, UCL - remedies in general | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
The case is not a class action. It involves alleged misrepresentations by a lender and broker in connection with a home purchase.
Posted by Kimberly A. Kralowec at 05:00 AM in UCL - remedies in general | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
In its original three-judge panel opinion last year, the Ninth Circuit held in no uncertain terms that under Concepcion, "the FAA preempts the Broughton-Cruz rule." Kilgore v. KeyBank, N.A., 673 F.3d 947, 951 (9th Cir. 2012) (hyperlinks added).
We hold that the Broughton-Cruz rule does not survive Concepcion because the rule "prohibits outright the arbitration of a particular type of claim"—claims for broad public injunctive relief. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. at 1747. Therefore, our statement in Davis—that Broughton and Cruz prohibit the arbitration of public injunctive relief claims in California—is no longer good law. See 485 F.3d at 1082.
In its opinion handed down last week, the en banc panel did not reach the issue. Kilgore v. KeyBank, N.A., ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. Apr. 11, 2013). The rewritten en banc opinion reads:
The UCL authorizes broad injunctive relief to protect the public from unfair business practices. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17203. The Supreme Court has suggested that claims arising from a statute whose underlying purpose creates an “inherent conflict” with the federal policy favoring arbitration may be exempt from the FAA. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991). Relying on Gilmer, the California Supreme Court has found an inherent conflict between the FAA policy favoring arbitration and California statutes authorizing “public” injunctive relief. Broughton v. Signa Healthplans of Cal., 988 P.2d 67, 73, 78 (Cal. 1999).
The opinion concludes, as did the original opinion, that the arbitration clause was not unconscionable under Armendariz. Id. at 10-14.
Judge Pregerson dissented. His opinion provides some additional factual context and includes the plaintiffs' fine-print contracts (for tuition loans for an education they never received) as an appendix. Slip op. at 18-26 & Appx. A.
In article on the opinion Friday, the San Francisco Chronicle reported that "[s]tudents at an Oakland helicopter pilot school that folded in 2008 can't sue a bank for relief from unpaid loans and must take their cases to arbitration, a federal appeals court ruled Thursday. .... In an indignant dissent, Judge Harry Pregerson said the [arbitration] fee, a confidentiality requirement and other arbitration provisions were one-sided and unfair. KeyBank 'participated in the fraud that Silver State [Helicopters] perpetrated on unwitting students' and should be held accountable in court, Pregerson said."
Posted by Kimberly A. Kralowec at 05:00 AM in Class actions - arbitration, UCL - remedies in general | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
In AT&T Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. Feb. 14, 2013), the Ninth Circuit took up one of the indirect-purchaser opt-out cases in the LCDs price-fixing matter, and held as follows:
To the extent a defendant’s conspiratorial conduct is sufficiently connected to California, and is not “slight and casual,” the application of California law to that conduct is “neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair,” and the application of California law does not violate that defendant’s rights under the Due Process Clause. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312–13 (1981).
The opinion focuses on the Cartwright Act claim, but it has this footnote on the UCL:
We focus on Plaintiffs’ claims under the California Cartwright Act, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 16700–16770 (Cartwright Act or Act), but the principles articulated herein apply equally to Plaintiffs’ claims under California’s Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et seq. (UCL). The UCL provides a cause of action for harms caused by “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” Id. It thereby “‘borrows’ violations from other laws by making them independently actionable as unfair competitive practices.” Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 63 P.3d 937, 943 (Cal. 2003). Because a violation of the Cartwright Act is, by definition, actionable under the UCL, we do not belabor our analysis in this case with respect to Plaintiffs’ UCL claims.
Slip op. at 4 n.1 (emphasis added).
See this post for more on the UCL's extraterritorial reach.
Posted by Kimberly A. Kralowec at 05:00 AM in Class actions - choice of law, UCL - remedies in general | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
This doctrine is sometimes referred to as the "equitable abstention doctrine," but this is a misnomer. It applies only in cases involving "complex economic and/or political issues [and where] the nature of the relief sought would uncommonly burden the court." Acosta, slip op. at 12 n.7 (citing Alvarado).