Source: http://www.nysl.nysed.gov/edocs/ethics/00-01.htm
Timestamp: 2014-03-09 10:46:51
Document Index: 767811094

Matched Legal Cases: ['§94', '§73', '§74', '§4', '§73', '§73', '§73', '§73', '§73', '§73', '§73', '§7806', '§7804', '§73', '§73', '§74', '§73', '§74', '§74', '§74', '§74', '§18', '§124', '§553']

New York StateEthics Commission
The following advisory opinion is issued in response to a request from [ ], a commissioner of the Public Service Commission ("PSC"), inquiring about his representation of private clients in proceedings in the Supreme Court under Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules ("CPLR"). As counsel to private clients in such Article 78 proceedings, and while a full-time commissioner of the PSC, [the requesting individual] proposes to challenge the legality of certain determinations made by other New York State agencies, officers and employees. Pursuant to the authority vested in the State Ethics Commission ("Commission") by Executive Law §94(15), the Commission renders the following advisory opinion. First, [the requesting individual] may not serve as counsel to private parties in Article 78 proceedings to the extent that such proceedings involve any of the matters specified in subparagraphs (i) through (vi) of Public Officers Law §73(7)(a). Second, under Public Officers Law §74, [the requesting individual] may not represent private parties in Article 78 proceedings against certain State agencies, and their officers or employees, that are regulated by, or regularly appear before, the PSC. These State agencies include the New York Power Authority ("NYPA"), the Long Island Power Authority ("LIPA"), the Department of Agriculture and Markets ("DAM"), the Department of Economic Development ("DED"), the Department of Environmental Conservation ("DEC"), the Department of State ("State"), the Office of Parks, Recreation and Historic Preservation ("Parks"), and the State Consumer Protection Board ("CPB").
[The requesting individual] has not limited his request for the Commission's approval to serve as counsel to any particular private party bringing any particular Article 78 proceeding involving any specific agency. Instead, [the requesting individual] has sought the Commission's blanket approval of his continued representation of private clients in Article 78 proceedings in matters involving agencies other than the PSC. Prior to becoming a full-time commissioner of the PSC, [the requesting individual] represented approximately six clients per year in Article 78 proceedings, including in proceedings involving the New York State Department of Health ("DOH") and the New York State Education Department ("SED"). This is not the first time the Commission has acted on [the requesting individual's] request for approval of aspects of his outside law practice. On [date], the Commission formally approved [the requesting individual's] request to continue his private law practice with respect to trusts and estates and alternative dispute resolution (see, Advisory Opinion 99-12). In addition, on [date], the Commission provided an informal opinion to [the requesting individual] permitting him to engage in the private practice of law provided that: (1) each particular case or matter does not involve any State agency; (2) his client, the opposing party or any other party to the matter each has no relationship to the PSC or the Public Service Law, and is not subject to the jurisdiction of either; and (3) the Chair of the PSC has approved [the requesting individual's] outside activity.
. . . . (d) No officer or employee of a state agency . . . should use or attempt to use his official position to secure unwarranted privileges or exemptions for himself or others.
Discussion This is a case of first impression. The Commission presumes (and the public expects) that as a commissioner of the PSC, who receives a substantial salary of $109,800 per year, [the requesting individual] devotes a substantial portion of his time to the important matters of the PSC. Indeed, §4 of the Public Service Law expressly provides, without limitation, that "commissioners shall serve on a full-time basis" (emphasis added). [The requesting individual] has asked the Commission to provide an advisory opinion permitting his prospective representation of unspecified private clients in up to six unspecified Article 78 proceedings per year filed against unspecified State agencies and officers other than the PSC. In a vacuum, the Commission cannot determine whether [the requesting individual's] proposed Article 78 practice would violate the Public Officers Law. In this advisory opinion, the Commission will identify those provisions of the Public Officers Law that prohibit [the requesting individual] from representing private clients in Article 78 proceedings involving certain matters and/or against certain State agencies and officers. The Commission's authority in this matter is, of course, limited by the terms of the Public Officers Law, and the Commission's own view of the ethical propriety or appearance of [the requesting individual's] proposed representation of private clients is not determinative here. The language of the Public Officers Law must control.
We note that the Legislature has expressly barred full-time salaried State officers and employees from representing private clients for compensation "against the interest of the state in relation to any case, proceeding, application or other matter before . . . the court of claims" (see, Public Officers Law §73[3][a]). The Commission has recommended, most recently in 1999, that §73(3)(a) be amended to include "any court of competent jurisdiction". The Legislature has not acted on this recommendation. The fact that the Legislature has not seen fit (as the Commission believes it should) to amend §73(3)(a) to bar the representation of private clients in courts other than the Court of Claims does not mean that other provisions of the Public Officers Law do not apply to [the requesting individual's] representation of private clients in Article 78 proceedings. Obviously, just because one provision of the Public Officers Law does not expressly prohibit an activity does not mean that other provisions of the statute do not bar that activity. The statute must be interpreted as a whole, and all of its provisions given effect.
In interpreting §73(7)(a), the Commission must be mindful of the purpose of this provision of the Public Officers Law: to prevent State officers and employees, by virtue of their position in State government, from receiving preferential treatment or undue access for their private clients before State agencies, officers and employees in relation to the matters specified in subparagraphs (i) through (vi) therein. By barring contacts by State officers and employees with respect to these specified matters, and by requiring that the matter not be ministerial (see, Public Officers Law §73[7][c]), the Legislature reflected its judgment that certain contacts involving agency discretion presented a risk of preferential treatment and undue access and should be absolutely barred. Under §73(7)(a)(iii) and (v), for example, [the requesting individual] could not represent an opthalmic dispenser, challenging a training regulation promulgated by the SED, in an administrative proceeding before the agency, including contacting SED officials prior to the promulgation of that regulation. The matter clearly would involve "the adoption or repeal of any rule or regulation having the force and effect of law," and the "licensing" of opthalmic dispensers (see, §73[7][a][iii] and [v]). The question before the Commission is whether [the requesting individual], simply by filing an Article 78 petition, could contact the same officials to seek the reconsideration of that regulation, even though he could not do so the day before filing the petition. Specifically, the Commission must decide whether, after the filing of an Article 78 proceeding, a matter is still "before" a State agency, or is solely and exclusively before the courts. At the outset, we note that nothing in the Public Officers Law provides that a case, proceeding, application or related proceeding may not be simultaneously "before" both a state agency and a court. The Commission interprets terms or words used in the Public Officers Law in accordance with their ordinary meaning. Black's defines "before" as: "[i]n the presence of; under the official purview of; as in a magistrate's jurat, 'before me personally appeared,'etc." (Black's Law Dictionary 140 [5th ed. 1979][emphasis added]). In relevant part, Webster's defines "before" as " being considered, judged, or decided by (the matter before the committee)" (Webster's New World Dictionary 124 [3d ed. 1989][emphasis in original]). By filing an Article 78 proceeding, a petitioner seeks a judgment from the Supreme Court annulling or modifying the determination of a State agency, officer or employee or prohibiting some agency action (see, CPLR §7806). Although the challenged determination is now pending before the court, it also remains pending "before" the agency. At a minimum, the agency, officer or employee named as respondent in the proceeding must file an answer or move to dismiss the petition or risk the entry of judgment in favor of petitioner (see, CPLR §7804[e]). These involve discretionary decisions.
Therefore, even though an Article 78 proceeding is pending before a court, that proceeding also remains pending before the relevant State agency or officer, because such agency or official is free to reverse or reconsider -- at any time prior to judgment -- the determination or action under review and thereby render the Article 78 proceeding moot. In other words, the resolution of the matter presented by an Article 78 proceeding remains squarely within the State agency or official's discretionary control and, therefore, is "before" the agency or official under any reasonable interpretation of that statutory term. Moreover, the Commission believes that the rationale for the prohibition contained in §73(7)(a) -- to prevent State officers and employees from receiving preferential treatment or undue access for their private clients before State agencies with respect to certain discretionary decisions -- clearly remains following the filing of an Article 78 proceeding. Although our dissenting colleagues compare a State agency that reverses its own discretionary decision and, thereby, moots an Article 78 proceeding to a pedestrian who steps out of the way of a speeding car, the agency might just as well be compared to the driver of the car. After the filing of an Article 78 petition, as was the case the day before the filing of the petition, the agency retains the power to reverse its own decision, regardless of the likelihood that the agency's decision will be upheld by a court. In fact, the greatest public harm would occur if a State agency did not take an entirely lawful action, or reversed a determination that would be upheld in court, because a high State official was advancing the interests of private parties. For these reasons, the Commission concludes that [the requesting individual] may not represent private clients in Article 78 proceedings for compensation in connection with those specified matters listed under Public Officers Law §73(7)(a)(i)-(vi). 2. Public Officers Law §74
Section 74 sets forth the Code of Ethics. Unlike §73(7)(a), which expressly prohibits certain specified conduct, §74 establishes certain minimum standards of conduct that State officers and employees should follow to avoid actual and apparent conflicts of interest. The Attorney General, in commenting on the outside activities of a State employee that could lead to a conflict of interest, stated the following:
We believe that two standards specified in §74(3) are relevant to [the requesting individual's] proposed representation of private clients in Article 78 proceedings: paragraph (a), which bars a State officer from "accept[ing] other employment which will impair his independence of judgment in the exercise of his official duties"; and paragraph (d), which precludes a State officer from "us[ing] or attempt[ing] to use his official position to secure unwarranted privileges or exemptions for himself or others" (emphasis added). In the present case, the Commission believes that the perception that [the requesting individual] would receive preferential treatment for his private clients in connection with the litigation of Article 78 proceedings is greatest with respect to those State agencies and officials that are regulated by, or regularly appear before, the PSC. As discussed above, the State agency or official complained about in the Article 78 proceeding would have a role in defending the litigation and could "moot" the proceeding by administratively reversing the determination being challenged by [the requesting individual's] client. The Commission believes that the perception reasonably exists that an agency or official that is regulated by, or regularly appears before, the PSC might make a concession to [the requesting individual] and his private clients in the hope of obtaining [the requesting individual's] vote in an unrelated PSC matter in which the agency or official had an interest (see, Public Officers Law §74[3][d]). Moreover, a PSC commissioner is paid a full-time salary to decide important matters affecting the public. To the extent that [the requesting individual] and his private clients in Article 78 proceedings seek to annul or modify the decisions of State agencies or officials that are regulated by, or regularly appear before, the PSC, the Commission believes that the perception reasonably exists that [the requesting individual's] independence of judgment as a PSC commissioner might be adversely affected by his private practice (see, Public Officers Law §74[3][a]). Accordingly, [the requesting individual] should not represent private parties in Article 78 proceedings involving the following agencies: NYPA and LIPA, which are subject to the regulatory authority of the PSC (see, Public Service Law §§18-a, 24-b and 126); DAM, DED, DEC, State, and Parks, which are statutory parties to certification proceedings in Article VII siting of major utility transmission facilities (see, Public Service Law §124[1]); and CPB, which regularly intervenes in PSC rate cases (see, Executive Law §553[2][c]).