Source: http://www.juricaf.org/arret/CONSEILDELEUROPE-COUREUROPEENNEDESDROITSDELHOMME-19830504-997682
Timestamp: 2016-12-04 16:41:05+00:00
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BEN YAACOUB c. BELGIQUE
Page d'accueil > Résultats de la recherche BEN YAACOUB c. BELGIQUE
Type d'affaire : DecisionType de recours : Violation de l'Art. 6-1 ; Violation de l'Art. 8 ; Violation de l'Art. 13 ; Satisfaction équitable réservéeNumérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 9976/82Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1983-05-04;9976.82 Analyses : (Art. 6-1) EGALITE DES ARMES, (Art. 6-1) PROCES EQUITABLE, (Art. 6-1) PROCES ORAL, (Art. 6-3-c) ASSISTANCE D'UN DEFENSEUR DE SON CHOIX, (Art. 6-3-c) ASSISTANCE GRATUITE D'UN AVOCAT D'OFFICEParties : Demandeurs : BEN YAACOUBDéfendeurs : BELGIQUETexte : APPLICATION/REQUETE NÂ° 9976/82 Borham BEN YAACOUB v/BELGIU M Borham BEN YAACOUB c/BELGIQU E DECISION of 4 May 1983 on the admissibility of the application DÃCISION du 4 mai 1983 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃ©t e
Arllcle 6, paragraph 1, of the Convention : Doubts concerning the impartiality of a criminal Court, whose president had also presided over the Court which had commited the accused for trial (Application declared admissible) .
AAlcle 6, paragraphe 1, de la Convention : Doutes sur l'impartialitÃ© d'un tribunal correctionnel prÃ©sidÃ©,par un magistrat qui avait Ã©galement prÃ©sidÃ© la juridiction ayant dÃ©cidÃ© le renvoi du prÃ©venu en jugement (RequBte dÃ©clarÃ©e recevable) .
(English : see p . 295)
Les faits de la cause, tels qu'ils ont Ã©tÃ© exposÃ©s par les parties, peuvent se rÃ©sumer comme suit : Le requÃ©rant est un ressortissant tunisien, nÃ© en 1955 et domiciliÃ© Ã Bruxelles . Devant la Commission, il est reprÃ©sentÃ© par Maitre R . Bfltzler, avocat au barreau de Bruxelles et Maitre L.J . Martens, avocat au barreau de Gand . Le 23 juin 1981, la chambre du tribunal correctionnel de Dendermonde, prÃ©sidÃ© par le juge De Neve, aprÃ¨s avoir ordonnÃ© le maintien en dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive du requÃ©rant, dÃ©cida de le renvoyer devant le tribunal correctionnel de Dendermonde . Le 20 juillet 1981 le tribunal correctionnel de Dendermonde, prÃ©sidÃ© Ã©galement par M . De Neve, condamna le requÃ©rant Ã une peine de trois ans d'emprisonnement pour vols Ã l'aide de violences ou menaces .
Le mÃªme jour le requÃ©rant interjeta appel contre ce jugement . Par arrÃªt du 12 novembre 1981, la cour d'appel de Gand (3Â° chambre), confirma le jugement attaquÃ© . Elle considÃ©ra que le simple fait que le magistrat, qui avait dÃ©cidÃ© en qualitÃ© de PrÃ©sident de la chambre du conseil du tribunal correctionnel de Dendermonde de la dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive du requÃ©rant et de son renvoi en jugement, ait aussi fait partie du tribudal correctionnel, qui avait dÃ©cidÃ© du fond de l'affaire, ne constituait pas une violation du droit belge ou de l'article 6, paragraphe I de la Convention europÃ©enne des Droits de l'Homme . Contre cet arrÃªt, le requÃ©rant se pourvut en cassation . Il fit valoir que son procÃ¨s n'avait pas Ã©tÃ© jugÃ© par un tribunal impartial, au sens de l'article 6 de la Convention, dans la mesure oÃ¹ M . De Neve, qui avait siÃ©gÃ© au tribunal correctionnel, avait dÃ©cidÃ© auparavant en sa qualitÃ© de PrÃ©sident de la chambre du conseil, son renvoi en jugement . Par arrÃªt du 19 janvier 1982, la Cour de cassation .rejeta le pourvoi . Elle souligna qu'aucune disposition lÃ©gale n'interdisait au juge qui, en chambre du conseil avait dÃ©cidÃ© la mise en dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive du prÃ©venu et son renvoi en jugement devant le tribunal correctionnel, de prendre part ultÃ©rieurement, en tant que PrÃ©sident ou membre du tribunal,au jugement de la cause . Elle releva, en outre, qu'il ne ressortait pas des piÃ¨ces de la procÃ©dure que le requÃ©rant ait soulevÃ© avant le dÃ©but des plaidoiries ou pendant le jugement de l'affaire devant le tribunal correctionnel, un motif de rÃ©cusation contre le juge De Neve . La Cour de cassation conclut que, des seules circonstances visÃ©es dans le moyen, il ne pouvait pas Ãªtre dÃ©duit que le droit du requÃ©rant Ã un procÃ¨s Ã©quitable devant une juridiction indÃ©pendante et impartiale eÃ»t Ã©tÃ© mÃ©connu .
GRIEFS Le requÃ©rant se plaint de ne pas avoir Ã©tÃ© jugÃ© par un tribunal impartial en raison du fait que le PrÃ©sident du tribunal correctionnel qui l'a condamnÃ© Ã©tait le mÃªme magistrat qui avait dÃ©cidÃ© auparavant, en sa qualitÃ© de PrÃ©sident de la chambre du conseil, de l'opportunitÃ© du maintien du mandat d'arrÃªt et du renvoi en jugement . Il fait valoir Ã cet Ã©gard que le magistrat, avant le jugement, avait dÃ©jÃ eu connaissance du dossier et'avait statuÃ© par ordonnance du 28 avril 1981, .qu'il y (avait) pour le moment assez d'indications de culpabilitÃ© dans le chef du prÃ©venu .Le requÃ©rant allÃ¨gue de ce fait, la violation de l'article 6, paragraphe 1 de la Convention .
PROCEDURE SUIV[ E La prÃ©sente requÃªte a Ã©tÃ© introduite le 30 juin 1982 et enregistrÃ©e le 2 juillet 1982. Le 9 octobre 1982 la Commission a dÃ©cidÃ© de porter la requÃ©te Ã la connaissance du Gouvemement de la Belgique et d'inviter ce dernier, en application de l'article 42, paragraphe 2 (b) du RÃ¨glement intÃ©rieur, Ã lui prÃ©senter par Ã©crit ses observations sur la recevabilitÃ© et le bien-fondÃ© de la requÃªte dans un dÃ©lai Ã©chÃ©ant le 7 janvier 1983 . Elle a invitÃ© le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur Ã se prononcer sur la question suivante : .Le Gouvemement considÃ¨re-t-il que le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© jugÃ© par un 'tribunal impartial' au sens de l'article 6, paragraphe 1 de la Convention, compte tenu du fait que le magistrat qui a prÃ©sidÃ© le tribunal correctionnel qui a condamnÃ© le requÃ©rant, avait auparavant prÃ©sidÃ© la chambre du consei] qui avait dÃ©cidÃ© notamment son renvoi en jugement . 7 Les observations du Gouvernement ont Ã©tÃ© reÃ§ues le 13 janvier 1983 et celles du requÃ©rant en rÃ©ponse le 24 fÃ©vrier 1983
.ARGUMENTIODSPARE
A . Le Gouvernemen . Quant d /'Ã©puisement des voies de recours internes t1 Le Gouvemement admet que le requÃ©rant a satisfait Ã la condition de l'Ã©puisement des voies de recours-intÃ©rnes ; dans . la mesure o Ã¹ il a fait valoir, en substance, devant la plus haÃ»tÃ© .aÃ»toritÃ©.l ;,-;-- compÃ©tente le grlef qu'il 'natiÃ´nale . . .` .,,â¢' ."`Â£r-
formule devant la Commission et a,pÃ¢r aillÃ©u rs ;3atst~-~- ;cidans le dÃ©lai de .celle ~ s six mois Ã compter de la date de l'arrÃªt de la Cour decÃ¢ssahon .
2 . Quant Ã (a violation allÃ©guÃ©e de l'a rt icle 6 paiÃ graphe_! . de la Convention
(a) Sur la garantie d'impartialitÃ© au regard du droit belge AÃ»x termes de l'a rticle 127, alinÃ©a 2, du code d'instruction criminelle, la chambre du conseil est composÃ©e de trois juges au moins y comp ri s le juge d'instruction . . Cette disposition fut modifiÃ©e par la loi du 25 octobre 1919 dont l'article XV dispose que les att ri butions de la chambre du conseil du tribunal de premiÃ¨re instance en matiÃ¨re rÃ©p ressive sont dÃ©volues Ã une chamb re d'un juge . . Le Gouvernement prÃ©cise que la chambre du conseil du t ribunal de premiÃ¨re instance est une chamb re particuliÃ¨re qui entend, sur rÃ©quisitions du Procureur du Roi, l'Ã©tat de l'affai re . Tous les trente jou rs , la chambre vÃ©ri fi esil'ntrucodÃ©eavlclignrqusetpo rl'Ã©ventu
maintien en dÃ©tention de l'inculpÃ© . A l'occasion de ces examens, elle peut soi l'instructionmtesirqulchages,tquprÃ©nes,otiufae
poussÃ©e assez loin pour dÃ©cider du re nvoi de l'inculpÃ© devant le t ribunal correctionnel . La chamb re du conseil n'examine que l'Ã©tat de la procÃ©dure et ne statue que sur des chÃ rges et non des preÃ»ves,'juge la procÃ©dure et non a l'inculpÃ© . â¢ -- Quant Ã la situa tion qui est Ã la base de la prÃ©sente requÃªte, le Gouvernement relÃ¨ve que conformÃ©ment Ã l'a rticle 292 du code judiciaire, .est nulle la dÃ©cision rendue par un juge qui a prÃ©cÃ©demment connu de la cause dans l'exercice d'une autre fonction judiciaireÂ» . Le rapport de la Commission-de la Jus tice de la Chambre interprÃ©tait ainsi cette disposition : .Alors que cet a rticlÃ© prÃ©voit que le cumul des fonctions judiciaires est interdit, sauf dans les cas prÃ©vus par la loi, il doit toutefois Ãªt re entendu que cela signifie que les fonctions judiciaires ne peuvent Ãªtre exercÃ©es simultanÃ©ment dans des ju ri dictions diffÃ©rentes . L'art icle ne vise pas, entre aÃ¹tres, le cas du juge d'instruction qui reste compÃ©tent pour connaitre de la cause qu'il a instruite, lorsque le tribunal en a Ã©tÃ© saisi . Tel est Ã ussi le cas des membres de la Chambre des mises en accusation, qui peuvent faire pa rt ie du siÃ¨ge de la cour appelÃ©e Ã se prononcer sur le fond des affai re s . . Toutefois, il est st rictement interdit au juge, qui en premiÃ¨re instance a connu d'une cause, d'en prendre connaissance en degrÃ© d'appel, notamment au cas oÃ¹ il aurait Ã©tÃ©, ent re temps, nommÃ© dans la ju ri diction d'appel . Il s'agit lÃ d'un principe fondamental d'organisation judicia'veÂ» . ( Documents parlementaires Chambre NÂ° 5 9/49 du 1Â° juiri 1967, Pasib :, Suppl . 1967, p .929) . La ju ri sprudence de la Cour de cassation va Ã© galement dans le mÃªme sens . Selon le Gouvernement, si le juge qui siÃ¨ge Ã la chambre du conseil puis ensuite au tribunal correctionnel et celui qui, aprÃ¨s avoir rempli les mÃªmes devoirs, siÃ©gerait Ã la cour d'appel ont, l'un et l'autre, prÃ©cÃ©demment connu de la cause, ils en ont toutefois connu, le premier dans l'exercice de la mÃªme fonction judiciaire, le second dans l'exercice d'une autre fonc ti on judiciai re , au sens de l'a rticle 292 dÃ©jÃ citÃ© du Code judiciaire . â¢ Il s'ensuit que, dans le cas d'espÃ¨ce, le magistrat qui a prÃ©sidÃ© l a chambre du conseil, puis le tribunal ' correcti onnel, n'a pas exercÃ© â¢une autre fonction judiciai re Â» .
. (b) Sur la garan tie d'impart ialitÃ© au- regard de l'a rticle 6, paragraphe 1 de la Conven tio
rnement soutient que la distinction Ã©tablie en droit belge Ã nLeGouv propos del'a rt icle 292 du code judiciai re doit Ãªtre transposÃ©e Ã l'examen de la situation au re gard de la Convention .
Le droit Ã un tribunal impartial garanti par l'article 6, paragraphe 1 de la Convention, suppose que les membres qui composent un tribunal n'aient ni intÃ©rÃªt dans le litige, ni prÃ©jugÃ© au sujet de celui-ci . Ainsi, lÃ© jugÃ© qui, Ã quelque titre que ce soit, a prÃ©cÃ©demment connu de la cause dans l'exercice d'une autre fonction judiciaire, ne prÃ©sente sans doute plus les garanties d'impartialitÃ© requises par l'article 6 de la Convention pour participer au jugement de cette cause . Au contraire, de la seule circonstance que le juge a connu de la cause dans l'exercice de la mÃªme fonction judiciaire, comme dans la prÃ©sente affaire, en siÃ©geant Ã la Chambre du conseil et, par la suite, au tribunal correctionnel, on ne saurait dÃ©duire qu'il y a eu violation du droit du prÃ©venu Ã un tribunal impartial . Le Gouvernement souligne, en effet, Ã cet Ã©gard, que la chambre du conseil statue sur le rÃ¨glement de la procÃ©dure . A ce stade de celle-ci, l'opinion du juge ne peut Ãªtre que provisoire et sous rÃ©serve des Ã©lÃ©ments qu'apportera l'instruction d'audience . Si lors de l'ouverture d'une instruction, de simples indices de culpabilitÃ© suffisent Ã justifier l'exÃ©cution de certaines investigations et mÃ©me la dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive, et si, lors du rÃ¨glement de la procÃ©dure l'existence de charges permet le renvoi de l'inculpÃ© au tribunal correctionnel, la condamnation du prÃ©venu par la juridiction de jugement requiert des preuves . Par ailleurs, tout au long de la procÃ©dure, le juge ayant siÃ©gÃ© Ã la chambre du conseil puis au tribunal correctionnel ne cesse jÃ mais d'Ãªtre un juge, c'est-Ã -dire un magistrat qui . tient la balance Ã©gale entre l'accusation et la dÃ©fense, sans prÃ©juger dans un sens ou dans l'autre . . Le Gouvernement de conclure que le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© jugÃ© par un tribunal impartial, au sens de l'article 6, paragraphe 1 de la Convention, en faisant observer qu'il n'a jamais Ã©tÃ© prÃ©tendu que le juge De Neve ait effectivement fait preuve de partialitÃ© alors qu'aucune circonstance objective ne justifiait la mise en question de son impartialitÃ© . Enfin, le Gouvemement entend devoir souligner que si le systÃ¨me en vigueur Ã©n Belgique devait Ãªtre remis en cause par les organes de la Convention, il deviendrait indispensable d'augmenter les cadres de la magistrature dans nombre de tribunaux . En effet, il pourrait souvent s'avÃ©rer impossible de constituer du moins dans des dÃ©lais nortnaux, un tribunal correctionnel Ã trois juges s'il Ã©tait interdit au juge d'instruction comme au PrÃ©sident de la chambre du conseil d'en faire partie. Compte tenu des difficultÃ©s budgÃ©taires actuellement existentes en Belgique, de tels recrutements ne seraient sans doute pas rÃ©alisables et l'intÃ©rÃªt mÃ©me des justiciables ne pourrait qu'en pÃ¢tir . -
B . Le reqoÃ©raot
1 . Quant Ã l'Ã©puisÃ©ment des voies de recours internes
Le requÃ©rant renvoie sur ce point Ã l'opinion Ã©mise par le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur: 2 . Quanr Ã la violation allÃ©guÃ©e de l'art icle 6, pamgraphe 1 de la Convention (a) Sur la garantie d'impartialitÃ© au regard du droit belg e Le requÃ©rant fait observer qu'il importe peu de savoir si en l'occurrence, la situation dont il se plaint est conforme ou non au droit belge, en particulier Ã l'article 292 du code judiciaire . La question essentielle est de savoir s'il a ou non Ã©tÃ© jugÃ© par un tribunal impartial, au sens de l'article 6, paragraphe 1 de la Convention . -"
(b) Sur la garantie d'impartiaGtÃ© au regard de l'article 6, paragraphe 1 de la Convention Le requÃ©rantsouGgne, en premier lieu, que conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 31 de la Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traitÃ©s, l'article 6, paragraphe 1 de la Convention doit Ãªtre interprÃ©tÃ© extensivement, en ce sens que tout juge, dont on peut lÃ©gitimement redouter qu'il ne prÃ©sente pas les garanties d'impartialitÃ© auxquelles tout accusÃ© a droit, s'abstienne de participer Ã la dÃ©cision . Il s'agit d'Ã©viter Ã tout prix que le juge puisse avoir un prÃ©jugÃ© de l'affaire et mÃªme qu'il puisse Ãªtre soupÃ§onnÃ© d'avoir un tel prÃ©jugÃ© (le requÃ©rant s'est rÃ©fÃ©rÃ© Ã cet Ã©gard aux rapports de la Commission dans les affaires Albert et Lecompte et Piersack, ainsi qu'Ã l'arrÃªt rendu par la Cour dans cette derniÃ¨re affaire) . Le requÃ©rant fait remarquer que dans la prÃ©sente affaire, le mÃªme magistrat, M . De Neve, avait dÃ» lors de l'ordonnance de renvoi du requÃ©rant au tribunal correctionnel, apprÃ©cier en sa qualitÃ© de PrÃ©sident d'une juridiction d'instruction, si le fait prÃ©sentait ou non un crime, un dÃ©lit ou une contravention et s'il existait une charge contre l'inculpÃ©, conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 128 du code d'instruction criminelle* pour sÃ© prononcer ultÃ©rieurement, mais cette fois en tant que PrÃ©sident de la juridiction de jugement, sur la question de la culpabilitÃ© quant au fond' dans le chef du mÃªme inculpÃ© .
â¢ Cette disposilion stipule que : .si les juges sont d'avis que le fait ne prÃ©sente ni crime, ni dÃ©lit, ni contravention, ou qu'il n'existe aucune charge contre l'inculpÃ©, il sera dÃ©clarÃ© qu'il n'v a pas lieu B poursuiv re : et si l'inculpÃ© avait Ã©tÃ© arrÃªtÃ©, il sera mis en lihertÃ© - . - 292 -
Le requÃ©rant accepte la thÃ¨se du Gouvernement selon laquelle au stade de la chambre du conseil, statuant sur le rÃ¨glement de la procÃ©dure, l'opinion du juge ne peut Ãªtre que provisoire et sous rÃ©serve des Ã©lÃ©ments complÃ©mentaires qu'apportera l'instruction d'audience . II soutient Ã cet Ã©gard que ceci dÃ©montre la diffÃ©rence fondamentale qui existe entre les attributions et missions respectives des juridictions d'instruction d'une part et des juridictions de jugement de l'autre . Il s'agit d'organes diffÃ©rents dont les membres remplissent des fonctions diffÃ©rentes, d'oÃ¹ il rÃ©sulte que, lorsqu'ils seraient amenÃ©s Ã traiter la mÃªme cause successivement dans l'une et dans l'autre fonction, ils n'offriraient plus assez de garanties d'impartialitÃ© . La procÃ©dure pÃ©nale comprend en effet, deux phases distinctes, Ã chacune correspondant une juridiction qui lui est spÃ©ciale, qui est souveraine et, par suite, indÃ©pendante de l'autre . fa juridiction de jugement n'a pas Ã examiner ce qu'a fait la juridiction d'instruction, qui est souveraine comme elle, parce que sa mission est diffÃ©rente de celle de la juridiction d'instruction .
D'autre part, lorsque la juridiction de jugement est la cour d'assises, i Ã l'article 127 du code judiciaire, qu'Ã peine dealestdmi,confrÃ© nullitÃ©, les magistrats qui ont rempli dans l'affaire .les fonctions de juge d'instruction et de MinistÃ¨re public ou qui ont statuÃ© sur . le rÃ¨glement de l'instruction ne peuvent ni prÃ©sider les assises, ni Ã©tre assesseur . . . . . Cette disposition, qui consacre le principe susmentionnÃ© de la sÃ©paration entre les juridictions d'instruction et les juridictions de jugement, tÃ©moigne, de l'avis du requÃ©rant, de la volontÃ© du lÃ©gislateur belge, d'Ã©viter toute suspicion dans le chef de ceux qui sont appelÃ©s Ã juger . A cet Ã©gard, le requÃ©rant soutient que le mÃªme principe s'applique lorsqu'il s'agit non pas de la cour d'assises,mais de la chambre du conseil ou du tribunal correctionnel Ã .Enfi,lerquÃ©atsÃ¨dnceoxt la situation en France, . oÃ¹ le juge d'instruction du premier degrÃ© est investi, en cette qualitÃ©, des mÃªmes compÃ©tences concernant le rÃ¨glement de laprocÃªdure, que celles de la chambre du conseil en Belgique . Or, dans ce pays,-la dÃ´ctrinen'aâ¢pas manqu Ã©
d'affirmer que la rÃ¨gle de la sÃ©paration de l'instruction et du jugement estÂ£l'u . Par ailleurs, le requÃ©rantctte _-- 'ndespivoturcÃ©depnalfÃ§is sur ce point, les dÃ©clarations du sÃ©nateur M . ThÃ©zard Ã¨ propos de la loi du 8 dÃ©cimbre 1897, selon lesquelles : .le juge d'instruction, par le seul fait qu'il a prÃ©parÃ© l'affaire et a dÃ©cidÃ© le renvoi du prÃ©venu devant le tribunal, a nÃ©cessairement sa conviction faite Ã l'avance ; il apporte donc au jugement une opinion prÃ©conÃ§ue ;( . . .) il importe que tous les membres de la juridiction de jugement aient leur entiÃ¨re indÃ©pendance d'apprÃ©ciation, qu'ils ne se dÃ©cident effectivement que d'aprÃ¨s les dÃ©bats ; pour obtenir ce . rÃ©sultat, l'unique moyen est d'interdire au juge d'instruction de prendre part aujugementâ¢ (DÃ©bats parlementaires, 1897, IV, 118, note 1(b)) .
-2 ) 3-
Se basant sur la dÃ©cision de la Commission du 9 mars 1982, dÃ©clarant recÃ©vable l'affaireDe Cubber(requÃªte NÂ° 9186/80), oÃ¹ il Ã©tait question d'un jtige d'instruction qui avait connu de la mÃªme causeen qualitÃ© de membre du tribunal correctionnel, le requÃ©rant conclut Ã ce que la Commission dÃ©clare la prÃ©sente affÃ ire recevable et bien-fondÃ©e .
â¢ENDROIT
1 . Le requÃ©rant se plaint qu'il n'a pas Ã©tÃ© jugÃ© par un . tribunal impartial ., au sens de l'article 6, paragraphe 1 de la Convention, au motif qae le magistrat qui a prÃ©sidÃ© le tribunal correctionnel de Dendermonde . qui l'a condamnÃ© ;'avait-siÃ©gÃ© auparavant Ã la chambre du conseil quis'Ã©tait prononcÃ©d sur son maintien Ã©n dÃ©tÃ©ntion prÃ©ventive et a4ait dÃ©cidÃ© son renvoi en jugement . . L'article'2 6, paragraphe 1'de la Convention stipule notamment qu e â¢toute personne a droit Ã ce que sa cause soit entendu ( . . .) par un tribunal ( . . .) impartial, ( . . .) qui dÃ©cidera ( . . .) du bien-fondÃ© de toute accusation en matiÃ¨re pÃ©nale dirigÃ©e contre elle . La Commission constate,-en premier lieu, que le Gouvernement dÃ©fen:3 deurreconna4t que le requÃ©rant a Ã©puisÃ© les voies de recours internes, conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 26 de la Convention . Elle constate,en outre . que les deux parties's'accordentÃ admettreqtie le magistrat qui a prÃ©sidÃ© le tribunal correctionnel'quia condamnÃ© le requÃ©rant, avait siÃ©gÃ© auparavant .Ã la chambre du conseil qui avait dÃ©cidÃ© . son renvoi en jugement : Selon le Gouvernement, de cette seule circonstance on ne saurait dÃ©duire qu'il y a eu violation du droit du prÃ©venu Ã un tribunal impartial, dans la mesure oÃ¹ l'opinion du juge . lorsqu'il siÃ¨ge Ã la chambre du conseil ne peut Ã©tre que provisoire et sous rÃ©serve des Ã©lÃ©ments complÃ©mentaires qu'apportera l'instruction d'audience . Le requÃ©rant, quant Ã lui, .contestele bien-fondÃ© de cet argument et soutient que, parle seul fait d'avoir dÃ©cidÃ© son renvoi en jugement, le magistrat siÃ©geant Ã la chambre du conseil a apportÃ© au jugement une opinion prÃ©conÃ§ue . 4 .' Ainsi que la Coui l'arelevÃ© dans l'affaire Piersack, l'impartialitÃ© d'un juge doit Ãªtre apprÃ©ciÃ©e essentiellement sur la base d'une dÃ©marche objective, tendant Ã rechercher si ledit magistrat offrait des garanties suffisantes pour excluretout doute lÃ©gitime (Cour .eur . D .H ., Affaire prÃ©citÃ©e, arrÃªt du 1 - octobre 1982, par .'30) . En la matiÃ¨re, mÃªme les apparences peuvent revÃªtir une certaineimportance (v : Cour eur . D .H ., Affaire Delcourt, arrÃªt du 17 janvier 1970, par. 31- ; et AffairÃ© prÃ©citÃ©e, loc . sit .) . Il y a violation de la disposition-susmentionnÃ©e de la Convention si l'impartialitÃ© du tribunal auquel il incombe de dÃ©cider du - bien-fondÃ© de l'accusation - peut .paraitre sujette Ã cautionâ¢ (Cour eur . D .H ., Affaire Piersack,loc . cit .) .
5 . Dans le cas d'espÃ¨ce, la question qui se pose est celle de savoir si le tribunal correctionnel qui a condamnÃ© le requÃ©rant, offrait des garanties suffisantes pour excture tout doute lÃ©gitime sur son impartialitÃ©, tel que l'exige l'article 6, paragraphe 1 de la Convention . 6 . Dans l'Ã©tat du dossier, la Commission considÃ¨re qu'elle n'est . pas en mesure de dÃ©clarer la requÃªte manifestement mal fondÃ©e, au sens de l'article 27, paragraphe 2 de la Convention, car elle soulÃ¨ve des problÃ¨mes suffisamment complexes pour exiger un examen au fond . Par ces motifs, la Commissio n
DÃCLARE LA REQUÃTE RECEVABLE, tout moyen de fond rÃ©se rvÃ© .
(TRANSLATION ) THE FACTS The facts of the case as presented by the pa rt ies may be summarised as follows : The applicant is a Tunisian national, born in 1955 and resident in Brussels . He is represented before the Commission by Mr R . BÃ¼tzler, a barrister practising in Brussels, and Mr L .I . Ma rt ens, a barrister practising in Gheut . On 23 June 1981, the Dendermonde Criminal Cou rt presided over by Judge De Neve sitting in Chantbers . extended the applicant's detention on remand and committed him for trial to the Dendermonde Crintinal Cou rt . On 20 July 1981 the Dendermonde Criminal Cou rt , again presided over by judge De Neve, sentenced the applicant to three years' imprisonment for robbery with violeuce or threats . On that sante day the applicant appealed against this judgment . In a judgment ot 12 November 1981, the Ghent Court of Appeal ( 3rd Chamber) contirmed the decision in question . It held that the simple fact that the judge who had decided, in his capacity as President of the Dendermonde Criminal Cou rt , sitting iu Chamber, on the applicant's detention on remand an d
committal for trial should also have been a member of the criminal court which tried the case, did not constitute~either . a violation of Belgian law or an infringement of Article 6(1) of the Euiopean Convention on Human Rights . The applicant appealed against this judgment to the Court of Cassation . He argued that his case had not been tried by an impart ial t ribunal, within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention, in that Judge De Neve, who had been a mÃ©mber of the Criminal Court, had previously - as President of the Court in Chambers-decided on his committal . In its judgment of 19 January 1982, the Court of Cassation rejected this appeal . There was no statutory provision prohibiting a judge who had decided in Chambers that an accused should be remanded in custody and committed tor trial in the Criminal Court, from participating subsequently in the trial of the case, as the president or a member of the court . It also mentioned that it was not apparent froni the file that the applicant had put forward any ground for challenging Judge De Neve, either before the pleadings commenced or during the trial in the Criminal Court . The Court concluded .that, from the circumstances presented in the grounds of appeal in themselves, it could not be deduced that there had been any infringement of the applicant's right to a tair trial bet'ore an independent and impartial court .
COMPLAINTS The applicant complains that he was not tried byan impartial tribunal as the President of the Criminal Court by which he was convicted was the same judge who had previously, when acting as President of the court in Chambers, decided on the question of his detention .on remand and committal for trial .Prior to the trial this judge had already seen the file and decided in an order of 28 April 1981 "that there (was) at present sufficient prima facie evidence ot'the accused's guilt" . This leads the applicant to allege a violation of Article 6 (1) of the
Convention . PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMhIISStO N This application was introduced on 30 ]une 1982 and registered on 2 July 1982 . On 9 October 1982 the Commission decided to communicate the application to the Belgian Government and t6request it, in accordance with Rule 42 (2) (b) of the Rules of Procedure, to submit its written observations on the admissibility and the merits of the application by 7 January 1983 . It requested the respondent Government to state its opinion on the following question : "Does the Government consider that the applicant was tried by an 'impartial tribunal' within the meaning of Article 6(1) of the Convention ,
given that the judge, who p re sided over the criminal court which sentenced him, had previously presided over the cou rt in Chambers that had decided that he should be commi tted for trial7 " The Government's observations were received on 13 January 1983 and the applicant's observations in reply on 24 February 1983 .
SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIE . The Goremment
I . Eshaustiat of domestic remedies The Government concedes that the applicant has met the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies, in so far as he has submitted to the highest competent domestic authority the substance of the complaint which he has now brought before the Commission and has, moreover, lodged his petition within a period of six months from the date of the decision of the Court of Cassation . 2 . Alleged violation of Article 6(1) of the Conventiou (a) The guarantees of impartiality in Belgian la w According to Article 127 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the court in chambers shall be "composed of at least three judges including the investigating judge" . This provision was modified by the Act of 25 October 1919 which, in Article XV, provides that "the jurisdiction of the court in chambers of the regional court in criminal matters shall be exercised by a chamber consisting of a single judge" . The Government specifies that the court in chambers of the regional court is a special chamber which, when the Crown Prosecutor states his case, hears evidence regarding the state of the proceedings . Every thirty days, the chamber ascertains whether the investigation is proceeding with the requisite speed and determines whether the accused is to remain in custody . At these examinations, it can either consider that the evidence as presented, is inadequate or that the investigation has proceeded far enough for the accused to be committed for trial to the criminal court . The court in chambers only examines the state of the procedure and only considers the prosecution case and not the evidence as a whole-it judges the state of the proceedings and not the accused . Referring to the situation underlying the present application, theGovernment points out that under Section 292 of the Courts Act "a decision delivered bv a judge who has previously dealt with a case when exercising another judicial function shall be void ." The report of the parliamentary Legal Affairs Committee gave the following interpretation of this provision : "Although this
section forbids the exercise of holding more than one judicial function, except as provided by law, it must be construed as meaning that judicial functions may not be exercised simultaneously in different courts . The article does not cover (inter alia) the case of an investigating judge, who remains competent to try a case which he has investigated, when that case comes before the court . Similarly, members of the Indictments Chamber may sit on the appeal court required to try the case . " However, a judge who has tried acase brought before a court of first instance . is strictly prohibited from hearing the same case on appeal, if, for example, he has, in the meanwhile, been appointed to the court of appeal . This is a basic principle of judicial organisation-. (Documents parlementaires Chambre NÂ° 59/49 du 1 juin 1967, Pasin ., Suppl . 1967, p . 929) . The Court of Cassation has adopted a similar position . , According to the Government, a judge who sits first as a member of the court in chambers, and then as a member of the criminal court and a colleague who, after having likewise served in the former capacity, then becomes a member of the Court of Appeal, have both previously heard a given case, the first having heard it when exercising the same judicial function and the second when exercising another judicial function within the meaning of Section 292 of the Courts Act, cited above . It follows that, in the present case, the judge who presided in the court in chambers and then in the criminal court, was not performing "another judicial function" . (b) On the guarantee of impartiality under Article 6 (1) of the Convention The Government express that the distinction drawn in Belgian .law by Section 292 of the Courts Act is analogous to the examination under the Convention . The right to an impartial tribunal guaranteed by Article 6 (1) of the Convention, presupposes that the members of a court would have no interest in the dispute and entertain no preconceived opinion with regard to it . It follows that a judge who, in any capacity, has previously heard the case when performing another judicial function will undoubtedly no longer satisfy the standard of impartiality required by Article 6 of the Convention, in order to participate in the trial of the same case . On the other hand, it cannot be deduced from the mere fact that the judge heard the case while carrying out the same judicial function as in the present instance-firstly as a member of the court in chambers and then as a member of the criminal court-that there has been a violation of the accused's right to an impartial tribunal . In this connection, the Government emphasises that the court in chambers decides on the procedure to be adopted . At this stage the judge's
opinion must necessarily be provisional and subject to the evidence forthcoming at the trial . Even if, at the outset of an investigation, some simple indications o f guilt sutfice to justify the carrying out of certain investigations and perhaps the detention on remand of the accused, and even if, when the procedure is being determined, the existence of a prima facie case for the prosecution is the accused's being committed for trial in the criminal court, proof of guilt is nevertheless required before the accused can be convicted by the trial court . Moreover, throughout the procedure, the judge who was a member of the court in chambers and then of the criminal court, never ceases to be a judge, that is to say an official who "maintains a balance between the prosecution and the defence without prejudging the issue one way or another" . The Govemment concludes that the applicant was judged by an impartial court, within the meaning of Article 6 (1) of the Convention, while remarking that it was never alleged that Judge De Neve had ever shown any bias and that no objective circumstances justified his impartiality being called into question . Finallv, the Government felt obliged to emphasise that if the system in force in Belgium were called into question by the organs of the Convention, it would become absolutely necessary to increase the numbers of judges in many courts, as it would often be impossible to constitute, at least within a reasonable time, a criminal court of three judges if the investigating judge and the President of the court in chambers were precluded from serving on the bench . Given the budgetary problems currently prevalent in Belgium it would doubtless not be feasible to appoint more judges and this might well have an adverse effect upon the interests of those brought to trial . B . The appllcan l 1 . Exhaustion of domestic reniedies On this point, the applicant refers to the opinion expressed by the respondent Government . 2 . Alleged violation ojArticle 6(1) of the Conventio n (a) Guarantee of impartiality in Belgian la w The applicant observes that it does not really matter in this case whether the situation of which he is complaining is or is not lawful uhder Belgian law, i .e . in particular, Section 292 of the Courts Act . The essential question is whether or not he was judged by an impartial tribuanl, within the meÃ¢ning of Article 6(1) of the Convention . (b) Guarantee of impartiality under Article 6(1) of the Conventio nTheap licantargues,firstly,tha purs ant oArticle31oftheVien a Convention on the law of treaties, Article 6 (1) of the Convention should b e
broadly interpreted to mean that any judge, of whom it may legitimately be teared that he may not present that degree of impartiality to which every accused is entitled, should abstain from taking part in the decision . The judge must on no account have a preconceived view Ã´fthe case or even be suspected of having such a view (the applicant referred in this context to the Commission's reports in the Albert Lecompte and Piersack cases, and the Court's judgment in this latter) . . The applicant observes that, in the present case, the same judge, Judge De Neve, when committing the applicant for trial in the Criminal Court in his capacity as President of the court in chambers, had to consider whether or not the facts amounted to a felony, misdemeanour or summary offence, and whether there was prima facie evidence against the accused, within the meaning of Article 128 of the Code of Criminal Procedure' in order to decide later, but this time in his capacity as PresidÃ©nt of the trial court, whether or twt the same accused was guilty of the offence charged . . The applicant accepts the Government's argument that at the stage when the court in chambers is deciding how to dispose of the case, the judgÃ© s opinion must necessarily be provisional, without pre-judging the elements to be revealed by further investigation . He maintains that this demonstrates the fundamental difference between the respective powers and functions of investigating judges, on - the one hand, and trial courts on the other . They are different organs whose members perform different functions, from which it tollows that, if judges are required to deal with the same case succesively in each of these two functions, they would no longer provide a sufficient guarantee of impartiality . ' There are in fact two distinct phases in criminal proceedings, each wit h its own special cou rt , each of which is entirely independent of the other . The trial cou rt has no occasion to examine what has been done by the investigating chamber ( which is an equally independent cou rt) since it exercises a different function . . Fu rt hermore, when the t ri al court is the CÃ´urt of Assize, it is accepted that under Section 127 of the Courts Acts the proceedings will be void, if its President or members have in the same case, performed " the functions of investigatingjudge or public prosecutor or decided whether the accused be discharged or commi tted . . . ' . Th is provision which sanctions the abovementioned principle of the separation between the investigating and the tria l
â¢ This provision reads as follows :"If the judges are of the opinion that the facts do not antount to a felony, misdemeanour or summary offence, or that there is no prima jarie evidence against the accused . they shall discharge the accused, who shall be released if he has been arrested" .
courts, seems to the applicant to bear witness to the desire of the Belgian legislator to avoid any suspicion of bias in those required to pass judgment . In the light of these considerations, the applicant maintains that the same principle applies when a case is heard not by the Court of Assize by by the court in chambers ot' the Criminal Court . In conclusion, the applicant rerfers in this context to the situation in France, where the investigating judge at first instance has the same powers of committal or discharge as the court in chambers in Belgium . In France, however, legal writers have not hesitated to assert that the rule requiring the separation of investigation and trial proceedings is one of the essential features of French criminal procedure . Moreover, the applicant quotes in this context the Senator, Mr ThÃ©zard's, observations on the Act of 8 December 1897 where he says that "the investigating judge, by mere fact that he has prepared the case and decided to commit the accused for trial, ha .s necessarily formed his belief in advance ; he thus comes to the trial with a preconcieved opinion ;( . . .) all the members of the trial court must be completely indpendent in forming their opinion and not reach their decision until after the hearing . This can only be achieved if the investigating judge is prohibited from sitting at the trial court" (DÃ©bats parlementaires, 1897, IV, 118, note 1(b)) . On the basis of the Commission's decision of 9 March 1982 declaring admissible the De Cubber case (Application No . 9186/80) which concerned an investigating judge who dealt with the same case as a member of the criminal court) the applicant requests the Commission to declare the present case admissible and well-founded .
THE LA W 1 . The applicant complains that he was not tried by an "impartial tribunal" within the meaning of Article 6(1) of the Convention, in that the judge who acted as president of the Dendermonde criminal court by which he was convicted had previously setved in the court in chambers which had ordered the extension of his detention on remand and his committal for trial . 2 . Article 6 (1) of the Convention p rovides ( inter alia) that "in the determination ( . . .) of any charge against him, eve ryone is entitled to a( . . .) hea ri ng by an ( . . .) impa rt ial t ri bunal . " 3 . The Commission notes, firstly, that the respondent Government recognises that the applicant has exhausted domestic remedies as required by Article 26 of the Convention . It fu rther notes that both pa rt ies agree that the judge who preside over the Criminal Court which sentenced the applicant, had previously served in the cou rt in chambe rs by which he was commi tt ed for trial . According to the Government, this circumstance alone does not justify the assumption that there has been an infringement of the accused's right t o
be tried by an impartial court since the opinion of the judge sitting in chambers . was necessarily provisional and subject to the further evidence forthcoming at the trial . The applicant, for his part, contests the validity of this argument and maintains that, from the mere fact of his having committed the accused for trial, the judge sitting .in chambers had approached the trial with a pre-conceived opinion . 4 . As was stated by the Court in the Piersack case, the question of the impartiality ofa judge should essentially be decided with an objective approach in order to asce rt ain whether he offers sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt (Eur . Court HR . Piersack case judgment of 1 .10 .82, para . 30) . In this context, even appearances may be of a certain importance (cf.Eur . Court HR, Delcourt casejudgment of 16 .1 .70, para . 31 ; and above-mentioned case loc . cit .) . There is a violation of the above-mentioned provision of the Convention if the tribunal which has to "determine the merits of the charge was capable of appearing open to doubt" (Eur . Court HR, Piersack case, loc . cit .) . In the present case, the question is one of determining whether th e .S criminal court whichconvicted the applicant offered sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate dÃ´ubt as to its impartiality, as required by Article 6 (1) of the Converition . . . . In the light of the material on the file, the Commission considers thÃ¢t it .6 is unable to find the application manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 (2) of the Convention, as it raises sufficiently complex issues to require a detailed examination on the merits n
DECLARES THIS APPLICATION ADMISSIBLE without prejudging the merits . ' .
- 302 -Origine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Cour (chambre)Date de la décision : 04/05/1983Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page