Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/398/751/597745/
Timestamp: 2018-08-15 08:52:25
Document Index: 538275265

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 100', '§ 4112', '§ 1024', '§ 1024', '§ 1060', '§ 1563', '§ 1024', '§ 1060', '§ 1024', '§ 1024', '§ 1024', '§ 1024', '§ 1024', '§ 1132', '§ 1002', '§ 1024', '§ 2530', '§ 1024', '§ 1024', '§ 1024', '§ 1024', '§ 1024', '§ 1024', '§ 1024', '§ 4112', '§ 1024', '§ 1060', '§ 1024', '§1025', '§ 1025', '§ 1025', '§ 1563', '§ 1563', '§ 1024']

Christina Murphy Minadeo, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Ici Paints D/b/a the Glidden Company, Defendant-appellee, 398 F.3d 751 (6th Cir. 2005) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Sixth Circuit › 2005 › Christina Murphy Minadeo, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Ici Paints D/b/a the Glidden Company, Defendant-ap...
Christina Murphy Minadeo, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Ici Paints D/b/a the Glidden Company, Defendant-appellee, 398 F.3d 751 (6th Cir. 2005)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit - 398 F.3d 751 (6th Cir. 2005)
Argued: September 17, 2004
Decided and Filed: February 18, 2005
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED ARGUED: Diane A. Calta, Joseph W. Diemert, Jr. & Associates, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellant. David A. Posner, Baker & Hostetler, LLP, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Diane A. Calta, Joseph W. Diemert, Jr., Joseph W. Diemert, Jr. & Associates, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellant. David A. Posner, Baker & Hostetler, LLP, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellee.
Plaintiff, Christina Murphy Minadeo ("Murphy"), appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant, The Glidden Company, d/b/a/ ICI Paints ("Glidden"),1 on claims brought pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 100 et seq., ("ERISA"), and OHIO REVISED CODE § 4112.14. Murphy contends that the district court erred: (1) in granting summary judgment to Glidden on claims brought pursuant to §§ 1024(b) (4) and 1025(a) of ERISA; (2) in finding that Murphy's claim under §§ 1024(b) (1) and (b) (2) of ERISA was not properly raised in her complaint; (3) in granting summary judgment to Glidden on Murphy's claim that Glidden violated 29 U.S.C. § 1060 and 26 U.S.C. § 1563 by not crediting her service with a prior employer, a related company, for purposes of pension benefits accrual; and (4) in granting summary judgment to Glidden on Murphy's age discrimination claim under Ohio law.
For the reasons set forth below, we REVERSE the district court's grant of summary judgment to Glidden on Murphy's claim under 29 U.S.C § 1024(b) (4) and 1025(a), and REMAND that claim for further factual development, as explained below. We AFFIRM the district court's grant of summary judgment to Glidden on Murphy's claim under 29 U.S.C. § 1060; we AFFIRM the district court's determination that Murphy did not properly raise a claim under 29 U.S.C. §§ 1024(b) (1) and (b) (2); and, finally, we AFFIRM the district court's grant of summary judgment to Glidden on Murphy's state law age discrimination claims.
As part of her termination package, Murphy received severance pay for forty-eight weeks, totaling $75,323.05 and based on her years of service from 1980 and a base salary of $81,600. The termination letter sent to her by Glidden informed her that " [i]f you are eligible to receive pension benefits, your pension information will be forwarded to you under separate cover." When no such information was forthcoming, Murphy repeatedly called Glidden to inquire about her pension benefits. In the fall of 1999, she had a conversation with Phil Brewer ("Brewer"), an Glidden Human Resources representative, in which she asked him for pension information. During that conversation, Brewer asked Murphy, "you were close to retirement, weren't you [?]" Murphy perceived this comment to be unusual and out of context.
We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, using the same standard as the district court. Farhat v. Jopke, 370 F.3d 580, 587 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y v. Poe, 143 F.3d 1013, 1015 (6th Cir. 1998)). Summary judgment is appropriate where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In reviewing a district court's grant of summary judgment, we view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Combs v. Int'l Ins. Co., 354 F.3d 568, 576-77 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S. Ct. 1598, 26 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1970); Williams v. Int'l Paper Co., 227 F.3d 706, 710 (6th Cir. 2000); Smith v. Thornburg, 136 F.3d 1070, 1074 (6th Cir. 1998)).
In addition to the grants of summary judgment in this case, we are reviewing the district court's determination that Murphy failed to properly plead her claims under 29 U.S.C. §§ 1024(b) (1) or (2). A district court's decision regarding the legal sufficiency of a pleading is a question of law and is therefore also subject to de novo review by this Court. Shields v. Fox Television Station, Inc., No. 98-6689, 2000 WL 658054 (6th Cir. May 9, 2000) (unpublished opinion) (citing LRL Properties v. Portage Metro Housing Auth., 55 F.3d 1097, 1104 (6th Cir. 1995)).
2. Whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment on claims brought under §§ 1024(b) (4) and 1025(a) of ERISA?
Murphy contends that the district court erred in adopting the magistrate judge's recommendation that summary judgment be granted to Glidden on Murphy's claims that Glidden violated 29 U.S.C. §§ 1024(b) (4) and 1025(a).2 Those provisions of ERISA require a benefits plan administrator to furnish certain benefits-related documents to a plan participant upon her written request. Murphy argues that Glidden violated these provisions when, after her attorney sent a written request for specific pension benefits information to Glidden on Murphy's behalf in April 2000, Glidden did not respond until almost four months later and then supplied only some of the requested information.
a. Did the district court correctly conclude that Murphy's claims under 1024(b) (4) and 1025(a) are barred by this Court's decision in Bartling v. Fruehauf Corp., 29 F.3d 1062 (6th Cir. 1994)?
The district court rejected Murphy's claim under §§ 1024(b) (4) and 1025(a) as foreclosed by this Court's decision in Bartling v. Fruehauf Corp., 29 F.3d 1062, 1072 (6th Cir. 1994). We disagree with the district court's interpretation of Bartling, which does not follow from the language of Bartling and is in conflict with the purposes of the ERISA disclosure requirements.
As the Supreme Court noted in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 118, 109 S. Ct. 948, 103 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1989) (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 93-533, p. 11 (1973)), "Congress' purpose in enacting the ERISA disclosure provisions" was to "ensur [e] that `the individual participant knows exactly where he stands with respect to the plan.'" These provisions are given their teeth by 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c), which provides that a benefits plan administrator who fails to respond within thirty days to a request for information made pursuant to ERISA's disclosure provisions may be liable to the plan participant for up to $100 per day.
In Bartling, we held that a plan administrator could not be required under 1024(b) of ERISA to disclose pension benefit information to a non-participant (even the attorney of a participant) without first receiving written authorization from the participant. 29 F.3d at 1072. We note that the factual circumstances of Bartling are quite different from those presented by this case, principally because the actions of the defendant in Bartling can be described as forthright and non-evasive. In Bartling, after receiving an attorney request for pension benefits information on behalf of several participants,3 the defendants furnished much of the information requested, including the pension plan in question, the three most recent Annual Returns, and the latest version of the Summary Plan Description. At the same time, the defendants informed plaintiff's counsel that individual benefits computations would not be provided without authorizations from the plan participants. Once those authorizations were received, defendants provided the individual benefit computations. Bartling affirmed the right of the plan administrator to seek a written authorization whenever any non-participant, even a participant's attorney, requested benefits information.
Pension plan administrators who treat our decision in Bartling as a license to simply disregard a written request for pension benefits information if it is made by a participant's attorney, rather than by a participant herself, both misconstrue the holding of that case and misunderstand their obligations under ERISA. Again, ERISA disclosure requirements exist to help ensure that participants have access to information about their pension plans. As the Third Circuit has cogently observed, "the objective of [the ERISA disclosure requirements] would be ill served ... by permitting administrators to refuse to respond with no indication that authori [zation from the participant] is even an issue." Daniels v. Thomas & Betts Corp., 263 F.3d 66, 77 (3rd Cir. 2001).4
The magistrate judge rejected this argument because it determined that Glidden had raised it for the first time in its reply brief to Plaintiff's brief in opposition to Defendant's motion for summary judgment, and therefore that it was not properly raised before the court. We must disagree with this determination. In its brief in support of its motion for summary judgment, Glidden provided the statutory definition of a pension plan administrator under 29 U.S.C. § 1002(16) (A) (i), noted that the pension plan administrator in this case was the "Pension Committee of ICI Paints," and then argued that Murphy could not establish that she made any written request for information to the plan administrator.
The magistrate judge was correct that it was not until its reply brief that Defendant specifically contended that its argument that Murphy had never requested information from the plan administrator (because Glidden was not the plan administrator) required the court to find that she had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. However, because the issue of whether Murphy's request for information was directed to the wrong party was raised in Defendant's brief in support of its motion for summary judgment, we conclude that we must consider whether Murphy has sued the wrong party with respect to her claims under §§ 1024(b) (4) and 1025(a).
Unfortunately, the record does not suffice to allow us to resolve this question. While " [t]he law in this Circuit is clear that ` [o]nly a plan administrator can be held liable under section 1132(c),' "Hiney Printing Co. v. Brantner, 243 F.3d 956, 961 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting VanderKlok v. Provident Life & Accident Insurance Co., 956 F.2d 610, 617 (6th Cir. 1992)), there is no information before this Court which adequately explains the relationship between Glidden and the "Pension Committee of ICI Paints" ("Pension Committee").
(a) ... any group of —
(A) stock possessing at least 80 percent of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote or at least 80 percent of the total value of shares of all classes of stock of each of the corporations, except the parent corporation, is owned ... by one or more of the other corporations; and
(B) the common parent corporation owns ...stock possessing at least 80 percent of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote or at least 80 percent of the total value of shares of all classes of stock of at least one of the other corporations ...
In support of her claim that ICI Canada and Glidden are part of a controlled group of corporations, Murphy presents Glidden's answer to one of her interrogatories posed during discovery, in which Glidden admitted that it was a wholly owned subsidiary of ICI American Holding, Inc.; that ICI Canada was a wholly owned subsidiary of ICI Omnicron B.V.; and that ICI Omnicron B.V. owns 201 shares of stock in ICI American holding. This evidence, of course, does not satisfy the just-cited statutory definition of a "controlled group of corporations."5
In our view, the district court properly applied the summary judgment standard with respect to this issue and correctly granted summary judgment to Glidden. Where there is not sufficient evidence for a jury to return a verdict for the non-moving party, summary judgment should be granted. Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corporation, 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986); South Ridge Baptist Church v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 911 F.2d 1203 (6th Cir. 1990) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986)). In other words, a party moving for summary judgment may satisfy its burden to show that there are no genuine issues of material fact simply "by pointing out to the court that the respondent, having had sufficient opportunity for discovery, has no evidence to support an essential element of his or her case." Street v. J.C. Bradford & Company, 886 F.2d 1472, 1479 (6th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted). The fact that the evidence may be in the control of the defendant does not change the plaintiff's burden to show sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably find in her favor, again, so long as she has had a full opportunity to conduct discovery. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257, 106 S. Ct. 2505.
We are troubled in this case by our concern, heightened by defense counsel's inability to respond to questioning on this point during oral argument, that it is possible that a controlled group relationship may in fact exist between Glidden and ICI Canada. Our suspicions, however, cannot substitute for the requirement that the plaintiff present sufficient evidence to support a finding in her favor on that issue. In the absence of any indication that Murphy was not afforded a sufficient opportunity for discovery,6 we must affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment. See Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. v. American Eagle Outfitters, Inc., 280 F.3d 619, 627 (citations omitted).
The district court found, as a second basis for granting summary judgment on Murphy's claim that Glidden improperly failed to credit her Canadian employment for purposes of pension benefits accrual, that she had not shown that ICI Canada was a "participating company" under her pension plan with Glidden, as required by 29 C.F.R. § 2530.210(d) (2). That provision of the Code of Federal Regulations states, in relevant part, that
in determining an employee's service for eligibility to participate and vesting purposes, all service with any employer which is a member of the controlled group of corporations shall be taken into account ... in determining a participant's service for benefits accrual purposes, all service during periods of participation covered under the plan with any employer which is a member of the controlled group of corporations shall be taken into account. (emphasis added).
4. Whether the district court erred in finding that plaintiff's claims under § 1024(b) (1) and (2) of ERISA were not properly raised in her complaint.
Murphy argues that the district court erred in finding that her complaint neither alleged nor presented any evidence of violations of §§ 1024(b) (1) or (2). Section 1024(b) (1) requires a pension plan administrator to furnish plan participants with summary plan descriptions within ninety days of becoming a participant. Section 1024(b) (2) requires the plan administrator to make copies of the latest updated summary plan description, the latest annual report, as well as specified other documents, available for examination by any plan participant.
Federal pleadings rules "do not require a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim. To the contrary, all the Rules require is a `short and plain statement of the claim' that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." E.E.O.C. v. J.H. Routh Packing Co., 246 F.3d 850, 851 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S. Ct. 99, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957)). We will construe pleadings "liberally in order to prevent errors in draftsmanship from barring justice to litigants." Ritchie v. United Mine Workers of America, 410 F.2d 827, 833 (6th Cir. 1969) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(f)).
The flexibility that these rules provide cannot be read to save Murphy's claims under §§ 1024(b) (1) or (b) (2). Her complaint repeatedly referenced a statutory requirement that a request for benefits information be made in writing. Neither § 1024(b) (1) nor § 1024(b) (2) requires that information be requested by a participant at all, let alone that such request be in writing.7 Furthermore, the complaint specifically alleged that Glidden had failed to provide information regarding her total benefits accrued and vested. That information is not covered by either § 1024(b) (1) or (b) (2). Because the complaint referenced that specific information, and only that specific information, and because it repeatedly cited the statutory requirement of a written request, it cannot be construed to have put Glidden on fair notice that Murphy was alleging violations of §§ 1024(b) (1) and (b) (2). We therefore affirm the district court's determination on this issue.
Finally, Murphy alleges that she was discharged because of her age in violation of OHIO REV. CODE § 4112. The federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") is applicable to state law claims brought pursuant to Ohio age discrimination law. Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 357 (6th Cir. 1998) (" [u]nder Ohio law, the elements and burden of proof in a state age-discrimination claim parallel the ADEA analysis") (citations omitted).
Murphy points to a comment made by Appell, her supervisor, as direct evidence of age discrimination. Appell remarked to Murphy, "I understand you're forty-seven years old. It's unbelievable."8 Murphy further insists that her own deposition testimony that Appell implied a "correlation between desirability and youth" during his interview of her, as well as the fact that she was terminated close in time (three years) to when her pension would have fully vested, also constituted direct evidence of age discrimination.
A plaintiff who fails to proffer direct evidence of age discrimination may instead establish a prima facie case of age discrimination under the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973). Rowan, 360 F.3d at 547. The parties agree that Murphy satisfies the first three elements of a prima facie case: 1) she was a member of a protected class; 2) she was discharged; and 3) she was qualified for the position she held. Id. (citing Cox v. DOT, 53 F.3d 146, 150 (6th Cir. 1995)).
"It is fundamental that to make a comparison of a discrimination plaintiff's treatment to that of [an employee outside the protected class], the plaintiff must show that the `comparables' are similarly-situated in all respects." Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 1992). Murphy fails to present evidence that she and Post were similarly situated, and she also fails to rebut evidence of substantive differences between the positions occupied by Murphy and Post. Joshi, a Vice President of Finance at Glidden, testified that Post's position, as a "plant controller," "was not a business controller position or at the same level as other business controllers," including Murphy. Post's position was on-site at a plant, whereas Murphy worked in a corporate office. Post's primary responsibilities were for production and "costing" at the Zynolyte Plant, while Murphy was responsible for conducting business analysis for the Macco Division. Murphy does not point to any facts supported by the record to refute this evidence that she and Post were not "similarly situated."9
For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the district court's grant of summary judgment to Glidden on Murphy's claim that Glidden failed to provide pension benefits information in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b) (4) and 1025(a), and REMAND that claim for further factual development, as explained above. We AFFIRM the district court's grant of summary judgment to Glidden on Murphy's claim under 29 U.S.C. § 1060 that Glidden improperly failed to credit her service with her Canadian employer for pension benefits accrual purposes. We also AFFIRM the district court's determination that Murphy did not properly raise a claim under 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b) (1) and (b) (2). Finally, we AFFIRM the district court's grant of summary judgment to Glidden on Murphy's state law age discrimination claims.
The Honorable John T Nixon, United States District Judge for the Middle District of Tennessee, sitting by designation
Defendant is incorrectly identified in the complaint, and, hence, in the caption of this case, as ICI Paints d/b/a The Glidden Company. The company's correct name is the Glidden Company d/b/a ICI Paints
Murphy's appellate brief alleges that "the district court erred when it found that Appellant's claims under 29 U.S.C. 1024(a) and 1024(b) (4) failed," when it fact the district court found that her claims under §§1025(a) and 1025(b) (4) failed. This appears to be an inadvertent typographical error, as Murphy's brief in opposition to Glidden's motion for summary judgment before the district court correctly cited § 1025(a). We therefore will proceed as though Murphy had correctly cited § 1025(a) in her brief before this Court.
Daniels"respectfully disagree [s]" with Bartling's conclusion that requests for benefits information made by attorneys should not be treated differently than such requests from other non-participants. 263 F.3d at 77. Where Bartling always permits a plan administrator to ask an attorney for a signed release from her client-participant, Daniels authorizes such requests only " [i]n the rare case where the administrator has reason to question [the attorney's] authority." Id. This difference does not undermine our citation here to the thoughtful observation that the purposes of ERISA are not served when a plan administrator simply ignores a non-participant's request for information, without asking for an authorization to be provided.
Murphy's brief abbreviates the statutory definition, contending that " [s]ection 1563(a) defines a Controlled Group as follows: (1) Parent Subsidiary controlled group — One or more chains of corporations connected through stock ownership with a common parent corporation-." Pl. Brief at 28. Plaintiff's citation to § 1563 stops there. Of course, if that were the entire definition of a controlled group under § 1563, Murphy would have submitted sufficient evidence to establish a controlled group relationship. However, her brief omits the critical limiting clauses that follow the section of the statute she cites
Defense counsel refused to respond to some interrogatories which may have helped Plaintiff establish the existence of a controlled group of corporations, including questions about Glidden's place of incorporation and the identity of Glidden's ten largest stockholders. We strongly disagree with defense counsel's characterization of those interrogatories as "irrelevant." However, Plaintiff never moved to compel discovery on these issues pursuant to Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Both § 1024(b) (4) and 1025(a) do require a written request. Murphy's claims under those provisions are the subject of the first part of this discussion
Murphy also cites as direct evidence of discrimination the observation of Phil Brewer, a Human Resources employee uninvolved in the decision to terminate her employment, that she had been close to retirement age at the time of her discharge. However, an isolated comment made by a non-decisionmaker is not sufficient evidence of a discriminatory motive Hull v. Cuyahoga Valley Joint Vocational School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 926 F.2d 505, 514 (6th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted). Furthermore, we agree with the district court that even if Brewer had been involved in the decision to discharge Murphy, his remark would not constitute direct evidence of age discrimination.
Rather inexplicably, Murphy attempts to refute this evidence by quoting Joshi as saying "the job, you know, what you do is very different, but yes, it's on the same level of jobs." This statement would not be particularly helpful to Murphy even if it were a comparison of the Zynolyte and Macco Controller positions. Because it is actually a comparison of the Macco Controller and Director of Cost Accounting positions, it is entirely irrelevant. Murphy's error in this regard was pointed out by the district court