Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/98-387.ZO.html
Timestamp: 2018-12-14 03:12:16
Document Index: 501342852

Matched Legal Cases: ['§1304', '§ 2701', '§2710', '§ 1301', '§1304', '§ 2720', '§ 1307', '§1301', '§1307', '§1304', '§6', '§13', '§2', '§1', '§27', '§75', '§27', '§1304', '§4801', '§461', '§42', '§25', '§42', '§29', '§1304']

149 F.3d 334, reversed.
GREATER NEW ORLEANS BROADCASTING ASSOCIATION, INC., etc., et al., PETI-
TIONERS v. UNITED STATES et al.
In 1988, Congress enacted two additional statutes that significantly curtailed the coverage of §1304. First, the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq., authorized Native American tribes to conduct various forms of gamblingincluding casino gamblingpursuant to tribal-State compacts if the State permits such gambling for any purpose by any person, organization, or entity. §2710(d)(1)(B). The IGRA also exempted any gaming conducted by an Indian tribe pursuant to the Act from both the postal and transportation restrictions in 18 U.S.C. § 13011302, and the broadcast restriction in §1304. 25 U.S.C. § 2720. Second, the Charity Games Advertising Clarification Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 1307(a)(2), extended the exemption from §§13011304 for state-run lotteries to include any other lottery, gift enterprise, or similar schemenot prohibited by the law of the State in which it operateswhen conducted by: (i) any governmental organization; (ii) any not-for-profit organization; or (iii) a commercial organization as a promotional activity clearly occasional
and ancillary to the primary business of that organization. There is no dispute that the exemption in §1307(a)(2) applies to casinos conducted by State and local governments. And, unlike the 1975 broadcast exemption for advertisements of and information concerning State-conducted lotteries, the exemptions in both of these 1988 statutes are not geographically limited; they shield messages from §1304s reach in States that do not authorize such gambling as well as those that do.
1. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 2, 1895, 28 Stat. 963 (prohibiting the transportation in interstate or foreign commerce, and the mailing of, tickets and advertisements for lotteries and similar enterprises); Act of Mar. 2, 1827, §6, 4 Stat. 238 (restricting the participation of postmasters and assistant postmasters in the lottery business); Act of July 27, 1868, §13, 15 Stat. 196 (prohibiting the mailing of any letters or circulars concerning lotteries or similar enterprises); Act of July 12, 1876, §2, 19 Stat. 90 (repealing an 1872 limitation of the mails prohibition to letters and circulars concerning illegal lotteries); Anti-Lottery Act of 1890, §1, 26 Stat. 465 (extending the mails prohibition to newspapers containing advertisements or prize lists for lotteries or gift enterprises).
2. See, e.g., La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§27:2, 27:15B(1), 27:4227:43, 27:44(4), 27:44(10)27:44(12) (1999); Miss. Code Ann. §§75763, 973325 (1972); see also La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§27:202B27:202D, 27:205(4), 27:205(12)27:205(14), 27:210B (1999).
3. See, e.g., Pet. for Cert. 23; Brief for Petitioners 10; Reply Brief for Petitioners 1820; 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 526528 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring); Kozinski & Banner, Whos Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 Va. L. Rev. 627 (1990); Brief for Association of National Advertisers, Inc., as Amicus Curiae 34; Brief for American Advertising Federation as Amicus Curiae 2.
4. Brief for Respondents 12, 15, 28. We will concentrate on the Governments contentions as to casino gambling: They are the focus of the Governments argument and are more closely linked to the speech regulation at issue, thereby providing a more likely basis for upholding §1304 as applied to these broadcasters and their proposed messages.
5. Some form of gambling is legal in nearly every State. Government Lodging 192. Thirty-seven States and the District of Columbia operate lotteries. Ibid.; National Gambling Impact Study Commission, Staff Report: Lotteries 1 (1999). As of 1997, commercial casino gambling existed in 11 States, see North American Gaming Report 1997, Intl Gaming & Wagering Bus., July 1997, pp. S4S31, and at least 5 authorize state-sponsored video gambling, see Del. Code Ann. Title 29, §§4801, 4803(f)(g), 4820 (1974 and Supp. 1997); Ore. Rev. Stat. §461.215 (1998); R. I. Gen. Laws §4261.22(a) (1998); S. D. Const. Art. III, §25 (1999); S. D. Codified Laws §§427A4(4), (11A) (1991); W. Va. Code Ann. §2922A4 (1999). Also as of 1997, about half the States in the Union hosted Class III Indian gaming (which may encompass casino gambling), including Louisiana, Mississippi, and four other States that had private casinos. United States General Accounting Office, Casino Gaming Regulation: Roles of Five States and the National Indian Gaming Commission 46 (May 1998) (including Indian casino gaming in five States without approved compacts); cf. National Gambling Impact Study Commission, Staff Report: Native American Gaming 2 (1999) (hereinafter Native American Gaming) (noting that 14 States have on-reservation Indian casinos, and that those casinos are the only casinos in 8 States). One count by the Bureau of Indian Affairs tallied 60 tribes that advertise their casinos on television and radio. Government Lodging 408, 435437. By the mid-1990's, tribal casino-style gambling generated over $3 billion in gaming revenue
increasing its share to 18% of all casino gaming revenue, matching the total for the casinos in Atlantic City, New Jersey, and reaching about half the figure for Nevadas casinos. See Native American Gaming 2; Government Lodging 407, 423429.
6. The Government cites several secondary sources and declarations that it put before the Federal District Court in New Jersey and, as an alternative to affirming the judgment below, requests a remand so that it may have another chance to build a record in the Fifth Circuit. Remand is inappropriate for several reasons. First, the Government had ample opportunity to enter the materials it thought relevant after we vacated the Fifth Circuits first ruling and remanded for reconsideration in light of 44 Liquormart. Second, the Governments evidence did not convince the New Jersey court that §1304 could be constitutionally applied in circumstances similar to this case, see Players Intl, Inc. v. United States, 988 F. Supp. 497, 502503, 506507 (1997), and most of the sources that the Government cited in the New Jersey litigation were also presented to the Fifth Circuit, see Supplemental Brief for Appellees in No. 9430732 (CA5), pp. ivv. Indeed, the Government presented sources to the Fifth Circuit not provided to the New Jersey Court, and the Fifth Circuit relied on material that the Government had not proffered. In any event, as we shall explain, additional evidence to support the Governments factual assertions in this Court cannot justify the scheme of speech restrictions currently in effect.
7. See, e.g., Letter to DR Partners, 8 F. C. C. Rec. 44 (1992); In re WTMJ, Inc., 8 F. C. C. Rec. 4354 (1993) (disapproving of the phrase Vegas style games); see also 2 Record 493, 497498 (Mass Media Bureau letter to Forbes W. Blair, Apr. 10, 1987) (concluding that a proposed television commercial stating that the odds for fun are high at the sponsors establishment would be lawful); id., at 492, 500501.
8. As we stated in Edge, applying the restriction to a broadcaster such as [respondent] directly advances the governmental interest in enforcing the restriction in nonlottery States, while not interfering with the policies of lottery States like Virginia  . [W]e judge the validity of the restriction in this case by the relation it bears to the general problem of accommodating the policies of both lottery and nonlottery States. 509 U.S., at 429430. The Government points out that Edge hypothesized that Congress might have held fast to a more consistent and broader antigambling policy by continuing to ban all radio or television advertisements for State-run lotteries, even by stations licensed in States with legalized lotteries. Id., at 428. That dictum does not support the validity of the speech restriction in this case. In that passage, we identified the actual federal interest at stake; we did not endorse any and all nationwide bans on nonmisleading broadcast advertising related to lotteries. As the Court explained, Instead of favoring either the lottery or the nonlottery State, Congress opted to accommodate the policies of both; and it was [t]his congressional policy of balancing the interests of lottery and nonlottery States that was the substantial governmental interest that satisfie[d] Central Hudson. Ibid.