Source: http://patents.hdp.com/?m=201610
Timestamp: 2019-05-26 20:08:54
Document Index: 122855959

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 314', '§ 314', '§314', '§314', '§ 314', '§101', '§101', '§ 101', '§ 102']

October | 2016 | HDP Patents Blog
Posted on October 20, 2016 by bwheelock
In Medtronic, Inc. v. Robert BoschHealthcare Systems, Inc., [2015-1977, 2015-1986, 2015-1987] (October 20, 2016), the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reaffirmed its earlier order that the PTAB’s vacatur of its institution decisions and termination of the
proceedings constitute decisions whether to institute inter partes review and are therefore “final and nonappealable” under § 314(d).
A decision whether to institute inter partes review is “final and nonappealable” under 35 U.S.C. § 314(d). The Supreme Court confirmed this in Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016), holding that §314(d) operates to bar review in cases where the challenge consists of questions that are “closely tied” or “closely related” to “the application and interpretation of statutes related to the Patent Office’s
decision to initiate inter partes review.”
The Federal Circuit concluded that under Cuozzo a decision whether to institute inter partes review proceedings pursuant to §314(a) (the issue in Cuozzo) and a reconsideration of that decision (the current situation are both barred from review by § 314(d). The Federal Circuit said that It is difficult to conceive of a case more “closely related” to a decision to institute proceedings than a reconsideration of that very decision. adding that “[i]t would be strange to hold that a decision to institute review would not be reviewable but a reconsideration of that decision would be reviewable.”
Although the result seemed preordained by Cuozzo, one can relate to Medtronic’s incredulity that Congress can give decision making authority to a government agency, and then completely insulate that agency’s exercise of that authority from review by courts,
There is no dispute that Von Itzstein I discloses the use of zanamivir to treat and prevent influenza. There is also no dispute that Von Itzstein II discloses several pages of different administration methods for an adjacent homologue of zanamivir to achieve the same result—treating or preventing influenza, expressly discloses administration
through “oral,” “nasal,” or other forms “suitable for administration
by inhalation,” among other methodologies.
Efthymiopoulos’s argument that a skilled artisan would not reasonably expect zanamivir to be effective if administered through oral inhalation is also unpersuasive. The Federal Circuit found that substantial evidence supports the determination that a skilled artisan would have a reasonable expectation of success in combining the Von Itzstein references. Efthymiopoulos further argued that the Board disregarded its evidence of unexpected results, namely the testimony of Dr. Hayden. However the Federal Circuit found that the record showed that the Board thoroughly considered and discussed
Dr. Hayden’s declaration in its decision and found that Dr. Hayden’s testimony insufficient to overcome the prima facie case of obviousness.
Posted on October 17, 2016 by bwheelock
In Synopsis, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corporation, [2015-1599] (October 17, 2016), the Federal Circuit affirmed summary judgment that claims of U.S. Patent Nos. 5,530,841; 5,680,318; and 5,748,488 were invalid under 35 U.S.C. §101. The Federal Circuit rejected the argument that the claims were directed to eligible subject matter because they relate to complex algorithms used in computer- based synthesis of logic circuits, instead finding that the are directed to the abstract idea of translating a functional
description of a logic circuit into a hardware component description of the logic circuit.
The Federal Circuit said that the idea of reviewing a description of certain functions and turning it into a representation of the logic component that performs those functions can be—and, indeed, was—performed mentally or by pencil and paper by one of ordinary skill in the art. Furthermore the Federal Circuit said that the claims did not call for the involvement of a computer, and thus they cannot be characterized as an improvement in a computer as a tool.
At Step I of the Alice test, the Federal Circuit said that it continues to treat analyzing
information by steps people go through in their minds, or by mathematical algorithms, without more, as essentially mental processes within the abstract-idea category. The justification for this is that computational methods which can be performed entirely in the human mind are the types of methods that embody the “basic tools of scientific and technological work” that are free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.
Synopsis argued that the complexity of the claims indicated that the method could not be performed mentally, but the Federal Circuit said that claims covered methods that could be performed mentally. While Synopsys may be correct that the inventions were intended to be used in conjunction with computer-based design tools, the claims were not confined to that conception, and the §101 inquiry must focus on the language of the claims themselves.
At Step II of the Alice test, the Federal Circuit rejected the argument that the novelty of the claims saved them from being abstract, noting that a claim for a new abstract idea is
still an abstract idea, and concluded that the search for a § 101 inventive concept is distinct from demonstrating § 102 novelty. Although conceding that the contours of what constitutes an inventive concept are far from precise, the Federal Circuit said that the claims contain no technical solution. To the extent the claims add anything to the abstract idea (of translating a functional description of a logic circuit into a hardware component description of the logic circuit), it is the use of assignment
conditions as an intermediate step in the translation process. But, because the claims are for a mental process, assignment conditions, which merely aid in mental translation as opposed to computer efficacy, are not an inventive concept that takes the claims
beyond their abstract idea.
Posted on October 14, 2016 by bwheelock
Posted on October 11, 2016 by bwheelock
The patent related to ways to detect fraud and misuse by identifying unusual patterns in users’ access of sensitive data. At step I of the Supreme Court’s two step framework for determining patent eligibility, the Federal Circuit found that the patent was directed to the abstract idea of analyzing records of human activity to detect suspicious behavior. The Federal Circuit noted that the “realm of abstract ideas” includes “collecting information, including when limited to particular content.” Furthermore, analyzing
information by steps people go through in their minds, or by mathematical algorithms, without more, as essentially mental processes within the abstract-idea category. Finally, “merely presenting the results of abstract processes of collecting and analyzing
The Federal Circuit distinguished McRO where it was the incorporation of the claimed rules, not the use of the computer, that improved the existing technological process. In contract, the Federal Circuit found the claims in suit to be more like those in Alice, merely implement an old practice in a new environment. The “rules” in the patents in suit pose the same questions that humans in analogous situations
detecting fraud have asked for decades, if not centuries. The Federal Circuit also distinguished Enfish where the claimed invention was “directed to a specific improvement to the way computers operate.”
Because it found the claims were directed to an abstract idea at step one of the patent-eligibility inquiry, the Federal Circuit proceeded to step two. After scrutinizing the claim elements more microscopically under step two, ithe Federal Circuit found nothing sufficient to transform the nature of the claim into a patent eligible application. The claim limitations, analyzed alone and in combination, fail to add “something more” to “transform” the claimed abstract idea of collecting and analyzing information to
detect misuse into “a patent-eligible application.”
The Federal Circuit also found the system claim patent ineligible, noting that while it is not always true that related system claims are patent-ineligible because similar method
claims are, when they exist in the same patent and are shown to contain insignificant meaningful limitations, the conclusion of ineligibility is inescapable.
After closely examining the claims of the ’500 patent in search of “something more” to transform the underlying
abstract idea into a patent-eligible application, we conclude that there is nothing claimed in the patent—either by considering the claim limitations individually or as an ordered combination—that makes its claims patent eligible.
FairWarning complained that the district court’s reliance on the finding that “the human mind can perform each step” was improper. The Federal Circuit dodged the issue, commenting that “the inability for the human mind to perform each claim step
does not alone confer patentability.” Likewise the Federal Circuit rejected FairWarning’s argument about preemption, noting that while preemption may signal patent ineligible subject matter, the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility.
Posted on October 6, 2016 by bwheelock
Consistent with the Miranda warning that anything you say can (and will) be used against you in a court of law. The Federal Circuit looks to every part of a patent when construing the claims, including the lowly abstract. In Hill-Rom Co. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 209 F.3d 1337, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2000) the Federal Circuit used the Abstract to support its claim construction. The Federal Circuit rejected the argument that 37 CFR 1.72(b) provides that the abstract “shall not be sued for interpreting the scope of the claims,” pointing out that this was a Patent Office rule, governing the conduct of patent examiners examining patent applications, and not construction of claims by the courts. The Hill-Rom court noted other instances where it used the Abstract to construe claims: United States Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., 103 F.3d 1554, 1560, 41 USPQ2d 1225, 1230 (Fed.Cir. 1997)(citing the description in the Abstract); Stryker Corp. v. Intermedics Orthopedics, Inc., 96 F.3d 1409, 1412, 40 USPQ2d 1065, 1066 (Fed.Cir. 1996)(citing the description in the Abstract); Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1269, 229 USPQ 805, 810 (Fed.Cir. 1986)(citing the description in the Abstract), and found no legal principle that would require it “to disregard that potentially helpful source of intrinsic evidence as to the meaning of claims.” The Federal Circuit also looked to the Abstract in Honeywell Inc. v. Victor Co. of Japan Ltd., 298 F3d 1317, 63 USPQ2d 1904 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Posted on October 5, 2016 by bwheelock
Does the title have a role in claim construction? In Poly-America LP v. GSE Lining Technology Inc., 383 F3d 1303, [72 USPQ2d 1685, 1689] (Fed. Cir. 2004), the Federal Circuit found that the title of the patent in suit (5,763,047) — Blown-film Textured Liner Having a Smooth Welding Strip — supported treating the term blown-film in the preamble of the claims as a claim limitation.
But, see, Moore U.S.A., Inc. v. Standard Register Co., 229 F.3d 1091, 1111 [56 USPQ2d 1225] (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“[T]he bar on importing limitations from the written description into the claims applies no less forcefully to a title.”); Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1312 [51 USPQ2d 1161] (Fed. Cir. 1999) (noting patent title’s“near irrelevancy” in claim construction).