Source: http://openjurist.org/291/f3d/276/chao-v-virginia-department-of-transportation-l
Timestamp: 2013-12-06 14:41:10
Document Index: 110138909

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 16', '§ 201', '§ 255', '§ 207', '§ 7', '§ 207', '§ 254', '§ 217', '§ 8', '§ 7', '§ 207', '§ 217', '§ 11', '§ 211', '§ 1291']

291 F3d 276 Chao v. Virginia Department of Transportation L | OpenJurist
291 F. 3d 276 - Chao v. Virginia Department of Transportation L	Home291 f3d 276 chao v. virginia department of transportation l
291 F3d 276 Chao v. Virginia Department of Transportation L 291 F.3d 276
Elaine L. CHAO, Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor, Plaintiff-Appellee,v.VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Defendant-Appellant.Elaine L. Chao, Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor, Plaintiff-Appellee,v.Virginia Department of Transportation, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 01-2195.
ARGUED: Sydney E. Rab, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Ford Friel Newman, United States Department of Labor, Washington, D.C., for Plaintiff-Appellee. ON BRIEF: Randolph A. Beales, Attorney General of Virginia, Francis S. Ferguson, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Judith W. Jagdmann, Deputy Attorney General, Guy W. Horsley, Jr., Senior Assistant Attorney General/Chief, Anthony P. Meredith, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Richmond, Virginia, for Defendant-Appellant. Eugene Scalia, Solicitor of Labor, Steven J. Mandel, Associate Solicitor, Paul L. Frieden, for Appellate Litigation, United States Department of Labor, Washington, D.C., for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before LUTTIG and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and HENRY M. HERLONG, JR., United States District Judge for the District of South Carolina, sitting by designation.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded by published opinion. Judge GREGORY wrote the opinion, in which Judge LUTTIG and Judge HERLONG joined.
Two questions are presented for review in this appeal. First, we must determine whether Virginia's sovereign immunity bars an action brought by the Secretary of Labor under §§ 16(c) and 17 of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA or the Act), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., against the Virginia Department of Transportation (VDOT). Second, we must determine whether the Secretary of Labor is entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations applicable to certain actions brought by the Secretary under the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 255. For the following reasons, we hold that the VDOT is not immune from suit by the Federal Government for violations of the Act, and that the Secretary's claims that are subject to the statute of limitations are time-barred. Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part.
The Secretary's suit alleges that the VDOT has violated the over-time wage and record-keeping provisions of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 207, 211(c), 215(a)(2), by not paying VDOT inspectors for time traveling between work sites. The Secretary asserts that site-to-site travel must be regarded as work and hence is compensable as over-time under § 7 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 207. The VDOT asserts that time spent traveling between sites should be regarded as commuting, and therefore should not be counted in calculating the maximum workweek, 29 U.S.C. § 254. See also Hours Worked, 29 C.F.R. pt. 785 (2001). The Secretary seeks permanent and restitutionary injunctive relief in the form of back wages. 29 U.S.C. § 217. The VDOT takes the position that it is immune from suit, and that certain of the Secretary's claims are, in any event, time-barred.
To understand the issues presented by this appeal, a brief review of two prior lawsuits is necessary. In 1995, several VDOT inspectors filed a private action against the VDOT in the Eastern District of Virginia seeking back wages, based on the same violations at issue here. Three-hundred fifty-two inspectors eventually joined the suit. Taylor v. Commonwealth of Virginia, No. 3:95cv1026. On March 27, 1996, while the VDOT inspectors' suit was pending in the district court, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996), holding that Congress could not abrogate a State's Eleventh Amendment immunity1 from private suit by the citizens of the State in federal court pursuant to Article I's Commerce Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. 517 U.S. at 76, 116 S.Ct. 1114. After the decision in Seminole Tribe, the VDOT inspectors asked the Secretary of Labor to intervene in the federal suit. Citing limited resources, the Secretary declined to intervene. The Secretary did, however, offer to file an amicus brief addressing sovereign immunity if the VDOT inspectors refiled their lawsuit in state court. Letter from Diane A. Heim, Counsel, Office of the Solicitor, Dept. of Labor, to James B. Thorsen, Esq. (June 21, 1996); J.A. 110. The federal lawsuit was dismissed pursuant to Seminole Tribe. Taylor v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 170 F.R.D. 10 (E.D.Va.1996).
The VDOT inspectors then filed a second lawsuit against the VDOT in the Richmond Circuit Court alleging the same violations of the FLSA. Griffin v. VDOT, LB-2505-1 (Va. Cir. Ct. Richmond Oct. 8, 1996). The VDOT moved for dismissal, again arguing the suit was barred by Virginia's sovereign immunity. The Secretary sought to file an amicus brief arguing that Virginia was not immune from suit under the FLSA by private individuals in state court. Despite refusing to permit the participation of the Secretary as amicus curiae, the circuit court judge concluded that the suit was not barred by Virginia's sovereign immunity. For procedural reasons not relevant here, the circuit court judge then ordered that the case be split into groups of VDOT inspectors. The claims of the first group of forty inspectors proceeded to trial in November 1998, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the VDOT. The claims of the remaining plaintiffs remained in a pre-trial posture. On June 23, 1999, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 119 S.Ct. 2240, 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999), holding that the Eleventh Amendment bars employees from bringing FLSA enforcement cases against nonconsenting states in state court. Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court of Virginia held, in an unrelated case, that the Commonwealth had not consented to suit under the FLSA. Commonwealth v. Luzik, 259 Va. 198, 208, 524 S.E.2d 871, 878 (2000). The Secretary then sought to intervene in the VDOT inspectors' state case, but her motion was denied. The VDOT renewed its motion to dismiss based on Alden, and the motion was granted on May 10, 2000. J.A. 61.
On July 18, 2000, the Secretary filed the instant lawsuit, alleging violations of §§ 7 and 15(a)(2) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 207, 215(a)(2), and seeking a permanent injunction and back wages on behalf of the inspectors whose claims were not heard in the prior litigation, 29 U.S.C. § 217. The Secretary also alleged that the VDOT violated § 11(c) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 211(c), by not keeping adequate records of hours worked by inspectors. The VDOT filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, again arguing that Virginia was immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. The VDOT also filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the Secretary's suit was time-barred. The district court denied both motions, holding that the VDOT was not immune from suit by the Federal Government and that the Secretary was entitled to equitable tolling of her claims seeking back wages. The district court also held that the Secretary's claims asserting record-keeping violations were not subject to the statute of limitations.2
The VDOT took an immediate appeal of the order denying sovereign immunity, 29 U.S.C. § 1291; see Eckert Int'l Inc. v. Sovereign Democratic Republic of Fiji,