Source: https://m.openjurist.org/431/f2d/1097
Timestamp: 2020-02-26 04:58:32
Document Index: 535294796

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 19814', '§ 19825', '§ 1981', '§ 1982', '§ 1', '§ 1982', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1982', '§ 2000', '§ 2000', '§ 1983', '§ 1981', '§ 1983']

431 F. 2d 1097 - Sanders v. Dobbs Houses Inc
Mrs. Fannie M. SANDERS, Plaintiff-Appellant,
DOBBS HOUSES, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
In Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, etc., 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. April 28, 1970), the Seventh Circuit recently held that § 19814 prohibits "private racial discrimination in employment by companies and unions." Such a conclusion was clearly forecast by the Supreme Court's opinion in Jones v. Alfred Meyer Co., supra, n. 1. In Jones the Court held that 42 U.S.C.A. § 19825 prohibited "all racial discrimination, private as well as public, in the sale or rental of property. * * *" The Seventh Circuit reasoned that since § 1981 and § 1982 are both derived from § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,6 they must be construed consistently and that since § 1982 is enforceable against private entities, § 1981 is similarly enforceable. We agree.
The contentions of Dobbs to the contrary are without merit. First, it argues that problems arising out of the Civil Rights Act have been associated with the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States,7 which would demand State action as a prerequisite to jurisdiction. This argument was devitalized in Jones where the Court stated:
The second contention of Dobbs — that Jones is distinguishable since it was fore-shadowed by a long line of cases forbidding racial discrimination in the sale of real property — is equally without merit. The defendants in Waters made the same unfounded contention, provoking the following judicial reply: "If, by foreshadowing, the defendants mean that the State action concept has sometimes been employed in a flexible fashion to achieve just results, the cases upon which they rely foreshadow the demise of the requirement of State action under § 1981 as well. Furthermore, it is mistaken to suggest that courts have not used similar means to circumvent the requirement of State action in the area of employment contracts: See Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 198-199, 65 S.Ct. 226, 89 L.Ed. 173 (1944)." 427 F.2d at 483. We would only note further that defendant's concern that this decision is unprecedented is much too myopic. The result in this case is both predicted and required by Jones.
So too, the equal employment provisions of the same Civil Rights Act of 1964 do not supersede the provisions of § 1981, which had its origins in the very same section of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 as did § 1982. Consistent with this reasoning, we have previously held that the enactment of Title VII did not repeal redundant remedies before the National Labor Relations Board.8
Furthermore, occurrences within the Congress culminating in the passage of Title VII strongly support the conclusion that it was not intended to supersede existing remedies. Congress rejected by more than a two-to-one margin Senator Tower's amendment that would have made Title VII the exclusive federal remedy for employment discrimination.9
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 88 S.Ct. 2186, 20 L.Ed.2d 1189 (1968). The Court agreed with the Attorney General of the United States, who in oral argument asserted: "The fact that the statute lay partially dormant for many years cannot be held to diminish its force today." 392 U.S. at 437, 88 S.Ct. at 2202
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e — 5 (1970)
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e — 5(e) (1970)
Subsequent to oral argument in this case, the Supreme Court decided Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). Because the case distinguishedJones and found a prerequisite of State action, we requested additional comments from counsel of both parties to this suit. From our examination of this opinion and these comments, it is clear that Adickes only dealt with an action based upon 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 and that the mutual genesis of §§ 1981 and 1982 was chronologically and conceptionally separated from § 1983.
Local Union No. 12, United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5 Cir. 1966)
110 Cong.Rec. 13650-52 (1964)