Source: https://www.chanrobles.com/usa/us_supremecourt/419/186/case.php
Timestamp: 2020-08-15 16:42:23
Document Index: 350554930

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 2', '§ 7', '§ 1', '§ 3', '§ 7', '§ 2', '§ 1', '§ 12', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 18']

1. The fact that interstate highways are instrumentalities of commerce does not render petitioners' conduct with respect to a material sold for use in constructing these highways "in commerce" as a matter of law for purposes of §§ 2(a), 3, and 7 of the Clayton Act. Overstreet v. North Shore Corp., 318 U. S. 125, and Alstate Construction Co. v. Durkin, 345 U. S. 13, distinguished. Pp. 419 U. S. 193-199. chanrobles.com-red
POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J.,and STEWART, WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. MARSHALL, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 419 U. S. 203. DOUGLAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, J., joined, post, p. 419 U. S. 204. chanrobles.com-red
Asphaltic concrete is a product used to surface roads and highways. It is manufactured at "hot plants" by combining, at temperatures of approximately 375¡ F, about 5% liquid petroleum asphalt with about 95% aggregates and fillers. The substance is delivered by truck to construction sites, where it is placed at temperatures of about 275¡ F. Because it must be hot when placed and because of its great weight and relatively low value, asphaltic concrete can be sold and delivered profitably only within a radius of 35 miles or so from the hot plant.
Petitioners Union Oil Co., Gulf Oil Corp., and Edgington Oil Co., defendants below, produce liquid petroleum chanrobles.com-red
Respondents Copp Paving Co., Inc., Copp Equipment Co., Inc., and Ernest A. Copp, [Footnote 1a] operate a hot plant in Artesia, Cal., where they produce asphaltic concrete both for Copp's own use as a paving contractor and for sale to other contractors. Copp's operations and asphaltic concrete sales are limited to the southern half of Los Angeles County, where it competes with Sully-Miller and Industrial in the asphaltic concrete market. All three firms sell a more than de minimis share of their asphaltic concrete for use in the construction of local segments of the interstate highway system. Neither Copp, Industrial, nor Sully-Miller makes any interstate sales of the product. [Footnote 2] chanrobles.com-red
Copp filed this complaint in the District Court for the Central District of California against the oil companies, Sully-Miller, and Industrial, seeking injunctive relief and treble damages. [Footnote 3] The complaint, as amended, alleged that the various defendants had committed a catalog of antitrust violations with respect to both the asphalt oil and asphaltic concrete markets. Claiming harm to itself as a consumer of liquid asphalt, Copp alleged: that the defendants had fixed prices and allocated the asphalt oil market geographically, in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1; that they had sold liquid asphalt at discriminatory prices to Copp and other purchasers, in violation of § 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act; and that Gulf Oil had violated § 7 of the Clayton Act by acquiring Industrial. Also claiming harm to itself as a competitor in the asphaltic concrete market, Copp further alleged: that the defendants had fixed prices, divided the market geographically, and employed various methods of monopolizing and attempting to gain a monopoly in the Los Angeles area market, in violation of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act; that, in violation of § 3 of the Clayton Act, Industrial and Sully-Miller had conditioned sales of asphaltic concrete in areas where Copp did not compete on customers' agreeing to buy only from the defendants in areas where Copp did compete, and had "tied" sales of asphaltic concrete to sales of other commodities and to favorable extensions of credit; that, in violation of § 7 of the Clayton Act, Gulf Oil had acquired Industrial and Union Oil had acquired Sully-Miller, these acquisitions apparently having the effect of lessening competition in the Los Angeles asphaltic concrete market; and, finally, that Industrial and Sully-Miller had discriminated in the prices at which they sold asphaltic concrete, charging chanrobles.com-red
In its opinion accompanying this order, the court explicitly discussed only the jurisdictional requirements of the Sherman Act. [Footnote 5] On the facts presented to it, the court found that asphaltic concrete is made wholly from components produced and purchased intrastate, and that chanrobles.com-red
487 F.2d 204. Having so concluded, the court held that jurisdiction properly attached to Copp's Clayton and Robinson-Patman Act claims as well, since those Acts were intended to supplement the purpose and effect of the Sherman Act. Id. at 205-206. [Footnote 6]
We granted certiorari, despite the interlocutory character of the Ninth Circuit's judgment, because of the importance of the issues both to this litigation and to chanrobles.com-red
The text of each of the statutory provisions involved here is set forth in the margin. [Footnote 9] In brief, § 2(a) of the chanrobles.com-red
The explicit reach of these provisions extends only to persons and activities that are themselves "in commerce," the term "commerce" being defined in § 1 of the Clayton Act, insofar as relevant here, as "trade or commerce among the several States and with foreign nations. . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 12. This "in commerce" language differs distinctly from that of § 1 of the Sherman Act, which includes within its scope all prohibited conduct "in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations. . . ." The jurisdictional reach of § 1 thus is keyed directly to effects on interstate markets and the interstate flow of goods. Moreover, our cases have recognized that, in enacting § 1 Congress "wanted to go to the utmost extent of its Constitutional power in restraining trust and monopoly agreements. . . ." chanrobles.com-red
Copp argues, and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed, that it had made exactly this sort of "in commerce" showing. Copp does not contend that Industrial and Sully-Miller, in fact, make interstate asphaltic concrete sales or are otherwise directly involved in national chanrobles.com-red
But we are concerned in this case with significantly different statutes. As in Overstreet and Alstate, there is no question of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause to include otherwise ostensibly local activities within the reach of federal economic regulation, when chanrobles.com-red
Congress has deemed interstate highways critical to the national economy and has authorized extensive federal participation in their financing and regulation. Nothing, however, in the Federal-Aid Highway Act [Footnote 13] or other legislation evinces an intention to apply the full range of antitrust laws to persons who, as part of their local business, supply materials used in construction of local segments of interstate roads. Nor does the fact that interstate highways are instrumentalities of commerce somehow render the suppliers of materials instrumentalities of commerce as well, in the sense used in Overstreet. No different conclusion can be drawn from Alstate. The statute involved there explicitly reached persons employed "in the production of goods for commerce." Congress could and, according to the Court in Alstate, did find that the federal concerns embodied in the Fair Labor Standards Act required its application to employees producing chanrobles.com-red
In short, assuming, arguendo, that the facially narrow language of the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts was intended to denote something more than the relatively restrictive flow-of-commerce concept, we think the nexus approach would be an irrational way to proceed. The justification for an expansive interpretation of the "in commerce" language, if such an interpretation is viable at all, must rest on a congressional intent that the Acts chanrobles.com-red
The Conference Committee, however, deleted this "effects on commerce" provision, leaving only the "in commerce" language of § 2(a). [Footnote 15] Whether Congress took this action because it wanted to reach only price discrimination in interstate markets or because of its then understanding of the reach of the commerce power, [Footnote 16] its action strongly militates against a judgment that Congress intended a result that it expressly declined to enact. Moreover, even if the legislative history were ambiguous, the courts in nearly four decades of litigation have interpreted the statute in a manner directly contrary to an "effects on commerce" approach. With almost perfect consistency, the Courts of Appeals have read the language requiring that "either or any of the purchases involved in such discrimination [be] in commerce" to mean that § 2(a) applies only where "at least one of the two transactions which, when compared, generate a discrimination . . . cross[es] a state line.'" [Footnote 17] In the face of this longstanding chanrobles.com-red
With respect to §§ 3 and 7 of the Clayton Act, the situation is not so clear. Both provisions were intended to complement the Sherman Act and to facilitate achievement of its purposes by reaching, in their incipiency, acts and practices that promise, in their full growth, to impair competition in interstate commerce. E.g., United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U. S. 586, 353 U. S. 589 (1957); Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U. S. 346 (1922). The United States argues in its amicus brief that, given this purpose, the "in commerce" language of 3 and 7 should be seen as no more than a historical anomaly. When these sections were originally enacted, it was thought that Congress' Commerce Clause power reached only those subjects within the flow of commerce, then defined rather narrowly by the Court. Thus, it is argued, the "in commerce" language was thought to be coextensive with the reach of the Commerce Clause and to bring within the ambit of the Act all activities over which Congress could exercise its constitutional authority. Since passage of the Act, this Court's decisions chanrobles.com-red
Copp was allowed full discovery as to all interstate commerce issues. It relied primarily on the nexus theory rejected above, and presented no evidence of effect on interstate commerce. Instead it argued merely that such effects could be presumed from the use of asphaltic concrete in interstate highways. The District Court concluded, chanrobles.com-red
1972 CCH Trade Cases ¦ 74,013
1972 CCH Trade Cases ¦ 74-013, p. 92,208. Copp makes no specific objection here to the District Court's use of summary judgment procedure, see Brief for Respondents 11-12, nor to the form of the judgment. Moreover, there is no indication that Copp was foreclosed from presenting all available evidence concerning the interstate commerce issues, at least as to §§ 3 and 7. Cf. McBeath v. Inter-American Citizens for Decency Comm., 374 F.2d 359, 363 (CA5 1967). In any event, assuming that the interstate commerce requirements of §§ 3 and 7 are properly deemed issues of subject matter jurisdiction, rather than simply necessary elements of the federal claims, cf., e.g., United States v. Employing Plasterers Assn., 347 U. S. 186 (1954); Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U. S. 219 (1948); 5 J. Moore, Federal Practice 38.36[2.-2], p. 299 (2d ed.1974), there is, as the dissenting opinion by MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS notes, an identity between the "jurisdictional" issues and certain issues on the merits, and hence, under Land v. Dollar, 330 U. S. 731 (1947), no objection to reserving the jurisdictional issues until a hearing on the merits. By the same token, however, there is no objection to use, in appropriate cases, of summary judgment procedure to determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact as to the interstate commerce elements.
I join in the judgment and opinion of the Court, with one qualification. Part III-B of the opinion correctly notes that we have no occasion today to pass upon the chanrobles.com-red
While the Clayton Act modified the Sherman Act by restricting possible application of the antitrust laws to labor unions, [Footnote 2/1] and by expanding the scope of those laws to cover the aggregation of economic power through stock acquisitions, [Footnote 2/2] there is not a word to suggest that chanrobles.com-red
when Congress defined the term "commerce" it desired to contract the scope of that term. [Footnote 2/3] The legislative history does not furnish even a bare suggestion or inference that "commerce" under the Clayton Act meant something less than it meant under the Sherman Act. The Clayton Act became the law in 1914; and prior to that time the Court had held over and over again that acts or conduct wholly intrastate might be "in restraint of trade or commerce" as that phrase was used in the Sherman Act. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375, 196 U. S. 397 (1905); United States v. Patten, 226 U. S. 525, 226 U. S. 541-543 (1913). These holdings were reflected in the "affecting commerce" standard of the Shreveport Rate Cases, Houston Texas R. Co. v. United States, 234 U. S. 342, 234 U. S. 353-355 (1914). The primary definition of commerce, for Clayton Act purposes, is "trade or commerce among the several States." [Footnote 2/4] In the years just preceding passage of chanrobles.com-red
The holding in Transamerica Corp. v. Board of Governors, 206 F.2d 163, 166 (CA3 1953), that Congress, when it enacted the Clayton Act, desired "to exercise its power under the commerce clause of the Constitution to the fullest extent," has nothing to rebut it. Congress apparently was not as timorous as the present Court in moving against centers of economic power and practices that aggrandize it. Heretofore, that is the way we have read the Clayton Act: that Act was intended to complement the Sherman Act by regulating in their incipiency actions which might irreparably damage competition before reaching the level of actual restraint proscribed by the Sherman Act, and, in the absence of some indication of legislative intent to the contrary, we should not lightly assume that Congress intended to undercut that complementary function by circumscribing the jurisdictional reach of the Clayton Act more narrowly than that of the chanrobles.com-red
Sherman Act. [Footnote 2/5] See United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378 U. S. 158, 378 U. S. 170-171 (1964); United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U. S. 586, 353 U. S. 589, 597 (1957); Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U. S. 346, 258 U. S. 355-356 (1922); S.Rep. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1914). And that is the way in which we assumed that the Celler-Kefauver Act in 1950, 64 Stat. 1125, 15 U.S.C. § 18, addressed itself to the problem. For we said in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U. S. 294, 370 U. S. 315-323 (1962), that the legislative history showed congressional concern over the "desirability of retaining local control' over industry and the protection of small businesses." Id. at 370 U. S. 315-316. One dramatic way of leveling local business is pulling it into a vast interstate business regime of the nature alleged in this complaint. chanrobles.com-red
In the FLSA and in many other regulatory enactments, Congress itself has determined that certain classes of activities have a sufficient impact upon interstate commerce to warrant regulation of the entire class, regardless of whether an individual instance of the activity in question can be shown to be in or to affect commerce. See generally Perez v. United States, 402 U. S. 146, 402 U. S. 152-154 (1971); United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 312 U. S. 119-121 chanrobles.com-red
It is in this respect that the antitrust laws differ from the FLSA and other regulatory enactments. The present case, however, does not turn on that difference, because it does not raise the issue of whether the actions of the chanrobles.com-red
An alternative ground for affirming the judgment below, likewise rejected by the majority, is that the Clayton Act's "engaged in commerce" jurisdictional language is sufficiently broad to encompass corporations which are chanrobles.com-red
There has been no trial. The case was disposed of on pleadings and affidavits. The District Judge ordered discovery so that all the parties could "develop the facts bearing upon the question of whether the alleged conspiracy chanrobles.com-red
487 F.2d 206.
The allegations and the complaint plainly gave the District Court jurisdiction. [Footnote 2/9] What a trial on the merits might chanrobles.com-red
Federal Rule Civ.Proc. 56 "deals with the merits" of a claim and if in favor of the defendant is "in bar and not in abatement," 6 J. Moore, Federal Practice ¦ 56.03, p. 2051 (2d ed.1974). Lack of jurisdiction of the court is a matter in abatement and thus is not usually appropriate for a summary judgment, which is not a substitute for a motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. Id. at 2052-2053.
Id. at 26-191. See also the discussion in 419 U. S. 10, infra.
The cases cited for the proposition that a district court may inquire into jurisdictional facts on a motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction are cases in which the jurisdictional issue was whether the plaintiff met the amount in controversy requirement. That jurisdictional issue is sufficiently independent of the merits of the claim to warrant independent examination, if challenged. Where the jurisdictional issue is more closely linked to the merits, disposition of the jurisdictional issue on motion becomes inappropriate. Thus, in Land v. Dollar, where the complaint alleged that members of the United States Maritime Commission were unlawfully holding chanrobles.com-red