Source: http://www.readbag.com/cocklelaw-wp-content-uploads-2011-07-24963-pdf-cowan
Timestamp: 2020-04-09 03:40:44
Document Index: 590419611

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 666', '§ 163', '§ 613', '§ 793', '§ 768', '§ 666', '§ 157', '§ 768', '§ 666', '§ 163', '§ 854', '§ 768', '§ 1056', '§ 1272', '§ 793', '§ 1056', '§ 1272', '§ 157', '§ 1254', '§ 1331', '§ 1651', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 110', '§ 192', '§ 201', '§ 206', '§ 214', '§ 214', '§ 1056', '§ 73', '§ 91', '§ 268', '§ 1', '§ 59', '§ 103', '§ 797', '§ 269', '§ 613', '§ 666', '§ 768', '§ 802', 'Art. 1', '§ 1', '§ 44', '§ 95', '§ 20', '§ 5', '§ 19', '§ 59', '§ 1534', '§ 1962', 'Art. 3', 'Art. 3', '§ 1', 'Art. 4', '§ 2', '§ 1', '§ 1331', 'Art. 3', '§ 1', '§ 103', '§ 793', '§ 793', '§ 73', '§ 1254', '§ 110', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 192', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 206', '§ 206', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 214', '§ 214', '§ 214', '§ 214', '§ 214', '§ 214', '§ 1056', '§ 1983', '§ 91', 'Art. 4', '§ 2', '§ 268', '§ 103', 'Art. 3', '§ 1', '§ 103', 'Art. 3', '§ 103', 'Art. 3', '§ 1', '§ 797', '§ 269', '§ 269', '§ 613', '§ 768', '§ 802', '§ 59', '§ 44', '§ 20', '§ 95', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1534', '§ 1962', '§ 19', '§ 1961', '§ 5', '§ 1962', '§ 59', '§ 1962', '§ 1962', '§ 1', '§ 206', '§ 1983', '§ 269', '§ 793', '§ 1983', '§ 613', '§ 618', '§ 613', '§ 1321', '§ 793', '§ 666', '§ 1159', '§ 206', '§ 1983', '§ 192', '§ 793', '§ 1983', '§ 269', '§ 206', '§ 206', 'Art. 4', '§ 3', '§ 1056', '§ 793', '§ 768', '§ 157', '§ 269', '§ 269', '§ 793', '§ 793', '§ 793', '§ 793', '§ 793', '§ 793', '§ 201', '§ 1983', '§ 192', '§ 613', '§ 1159', '§ 1238', '§ 793']

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No. _________ ================================================================
IN RE LAWRENCE COWAN, JR. and PATRICIA COWAN, Petitioners. ------------------------------------------------------------------
On Petition For A Writ Of Mandamus To The United States Court Of Appeals For The Eleventh Circuit ------------------------------------------------------------------
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS ------------------------------------------------------------------
LAWRENCE COWAN, JR., Pro Se PATRICIA COWAN, wife, Pro Se 1173 Orange Avenue North Fort Myers, FL 33903 Phone: 239-247-3892 ================================================================
i QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW Whether Petitioner's right to fundamental Due Process was denied by both the Middle District of Florida, Honorable District Court Judge, JOHN E. STEELE and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ­ Before TJOFLAT, CARNES and BARKETT Circuit Judges ­ on its own motion, dismissed this Appeal As Frivolous as Briefed. (See Eleventh Circuit Rule 42-4) committed an erroneous reversible error (Federal Courts § 666) resulting in &quot;Miscarriage of Justice&quot; (Doc. § 163), when Petitioner's &quot;Final Complete Edited Third Amended Verified Complaint was Dismissed With Prejudice&quot; (Doc. § 613), totally ignoring Petitioner, Lawrence Cowan's &quot;Amended Sworn Affidavit Proffering Facts and Evidence that is intrinsic relevant evidence inexplicably intertwined with the evidence of the charged crime that forms an integral and natural part of the witness accounts which arose out of the same transactions as the charged offense and is necessary to complete the story of the crime involving the &quot;theft of his personal identity; theft of his personal construction business and theft of his Builder's contractor's license? (Doc. § 793) See United States v. Foster, 889 F.2d 1049 (11th Cir. 1989); United States v. Montes-Cardenas v. Leichtman, 746 F.2d 771 (11th Cir. 1984). Under pendent, &quot;Appellate Jurisdiction Doctrine,&quot; &quot;Federal Jurisdiction Doctrine,&quot; &quot;Federal Appellate Court&quot; may address nonappealable
ii QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ­ Continued decision is necessary to ensure meaningful review later.&quot; Federal Courts § 768.1 Whether Petitioner's right to fundamental Due Process was denied by both the Middle District of Florida Honorable District Court Judge JOHN E. STEELE and the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ­ Before TJOFLAT, CARNES and BARKETT Circuit Judges ­ on its own motion dismiss this Appeal as Frivolous as Briefed. See Eleventh Circuit Rule 42-4 committing an erroneous reversible error (Federal Courts § 666) where issue involved &quot;pure question of law, refusal to consider Respondent, former employee/notary, JODI SHELFER'S &quot;Certified, Sworn Affidavit (Doc. § 157) Testifying to Facts of her previous employer refusing to return her &quot;Stolen Official Notary Seal&quot; to her and forging her signature, witnessing Petitioner, LAWRENCE COWAN'S forged signature on numerous &quot;Sworn Affidavits (a/k/a) falsified, perjured Permit Applications (a/k/a) Predicate Acts, and testifying that her former employer, &quot;Economous&quot; friend, Wilbur Smith (former mayor told Jodi Shelfer that she did not have to worry that they had thrown her &quot;Official Notary Seal&quot; to the bottom of the river, which is intrinsic relevant evidence inexplicable intertwined with the evidence of the charged crime that
iii QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ­ Continued forms an integral and natural part of the witness' accounts which arose out of the same transactions as the charged offenses and is necessary to complete the story of the crime? United States v. Foster, 889 F.2d 1049 (11th Cir. 1989); United States v. Montes-Cardenas, 746 F.2d 771 (11th Cir. 1989); United States v. Leichtman, 742 F.2d 598 (11th Cir. 1984). Under &quot;Pendent&quot; Appellate Jurisdiction Doctrine, &quot;Federal Appellate Jurisdiction Doctrine,&quot; &quot;Federal Appellant Court&quot; may address nonappealable intertwined with Appealable Decision or if review of former decision is necessary to ensure meaningful review of latter. Federal Courts § 768.1. Whether Petitioner's right to fundamental Due Process was denied by &quot;both&quot; the United States District Court for Middle District Court Judge, JOHN E. STEELE and the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ­ Before TJOFLAT, CARNES, and BARKETT, Circuit Judges ­ on its own motion, dismissed this Appeal as FRIVOLOUS as Briefed. (see Eleventh Circuit Rule 42-4 committed an erroneous reversible error (Federal Courts § 666) resulting in &quot;Miscarriage of Justice&quot; (Federal Courts § 163), when Petitioners totally ignored Respondent, Crystal Panse (Dobert's) &quot;Certified, Sworn Affidavit,&quot;
iv QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ­ Continued Doc. § 854), testifying the facts that her former employer, refused to return her &quot;Official Notary Seal&quot; in which this intrinsic relevant evidence is inexplicably intertwined with the evidence of the charged crime that forms an integral and natural part of the witness' accounts which arose out of the same transactions as the charged offenses and is necessary to complete the story of the crime, stating that she was told that they would destroy her &quot;Official Notary Seal,&quot; later discovered that her former Employers had used her &quot;Stolen Official Notary Seal,&quot; forged her signature, witnessing Petitioner, LAWRENCE COWAN, JR.'s forged signatures on numerous permit applications aka Sworn Affidavits aka Predicate Acts, with the intent to use Petitioner, LAWRENCE COWAN, JR.'s &quot;Stolen Personal Identity,&quot; Stolen Construction Business and Stolen Builders Contractors License Number in Commercial Buildings Downtown Fort Myers, Florida, (River District). See United States v. Richardson, 764 F.2d 1514 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v. Montes-Cardenas, 746 F.2d 771 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v. Leichtman, 742 F.2d 598 (11th Cir. 1984). Under &quot;Pendent Appellate Jurisdiction Doctrine,&quot; &quot;Federal Appellate Court&quot; may address nonappealable orders if they are inexplicably intertwined with Appealable decision or if review of former decision is necessary to ensure meaningful review of latter, Federal Courts § 768.1.&quot;
v QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ­ Continued Whether The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Fort Myers Division ­ Case No. 2:07-cv-184-FtM-29SPC with the Honorable District Court Judge JOHN E. STEELE and/or the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ­ Case No. 10-12455 HH ­ Judges, TJOFLAT, CARNES and BARKETT, Circuit Court Judges, violated Petitioners/Plaintiffs, Lawrence and Patricia Cowans' &quot;Civil Rights § 1056&quot; with the deliberate intent to conceal true facts about crime actionable under Federal Rights Statutes as Deprivation of Constitutional Rights By Denying Petitioners'/Plaintiffs' Pro Se &quot;Motion For Reconsideration and Clarification&quot; (Docs. §§ 1272; 1307; 1277-1306; 1307; 1314), refusing to review Petitioners' &quot;Sworn Affidavit Proffering Documents of Evidence and Facts&quot; (Doc. § 793), F.R.A.P. RULE (4)(a)(5), 28 U.S.C.A. Whether the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Fort Myers Division ­ Case No. 2:07-cv-184-FtM-29SPC with the Honorable District Court Judge JOHN E. STEELE and/or the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Case No. 10-12455 HH ­ Judges TJOFLAT, CARNES and BARKETT, Circuit Court Judges, violated Petitioners/Plaintiffs Lawrence and Patricia Cowans' &quot;Civil Rights § 1056&quot; with the deliberate intent to conceal true
vi QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ­ Continued facts about crime actionable under Federal Rights Statutes as Deprivation of Constitutional Rights by Denying Petitioners'/Plaintiffs' Pro Se &quot;Motion For Reconsideration and Clarification (Docs. §§ 1272; 1307; 1314), refusing to review Respondent/Defendant, JODI SHELFER'S (CERTIFIED) SWORN AFFIDAVIT PROFERRING STATEMENT OF FACTS (Doc. § 157) F.R.A.P. RULE (4)(a)(5), 28 U.S.C.A.
vii PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING TIB Bank Nextier Bank IceBank Franklin Arms Court, Incorporated James S. Econonmou Steve Economou Thomas V. Economou John W. Economou Franklin Arms Trust, Inc. Franklin Arms Court, L.P. James Economou &amp; Associates, Ltd. Fort Myers Historic, L.P. Atlantic Bonding Co., Inc. Cumberland Casualty &amp; Surety Company Crystal Panse Jodi Shelfer National Corporate Tax Credit, Inc. Laura Patricia Gaffney Patrick F. Creehan Lynn Knobel Kimberly V. Clark City of Fort Myers Clark Richards Jim Humphrey Florida Community Bank City of Fort Myers Community Development Christine Hurley Economou Partners Hospitality Development Partners, LLC Jeffrey H. Sussman James W. Wallace
viii PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING ­ Continued Hotel Indigo Brian Shuman David Robertson Economou Partners Indoor Sports, Inc. Fort Myers Armitage Works Building Peters La Cuisine Building Joseph D. Sloboda Bruce Grady Philip J. Morgan, Esq. Smithers-Jones Investments, LLC Unknown silent two owners
ix CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT The Corporate Disclosure Statement is the same as the parties to the proceeding as listed above. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 29.6, it is unknown to the Petitioners as to which company owns 10% or more stock and which corporations are nothing more than sham corporations.
x TABLE OF CONTENTS Page QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ........ TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................. OPINIONS AND ORDERS BELOW .................... JURISDICTION ................................................... CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS ........................................................... REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION..... i xi 1 2 4 19 PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING ..................... vii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .............................. 16 CONCLUSION..................................................... 29 APPENDIX Letter from the Eleventh Circuit ........................ App. 1 Denial of Motion for Reconsideration ................. App. 2
xi TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page CASES: Arrington v. Cobb County, 139 F.3d 865 (11th Cir. 1998) .................................................................12 B.K. Instrument, Inc. v. United States, 715 F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1983) ....................................................15 Beck v. Deloitte &amp; Touche, 144 F.3d 732 (11th Cir. 1998) .................................................................12 Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1984) ...........................................................12, 16 Blassingame v. Secretary of the Navy, 811 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1987) ......................................................15 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed. 215 (1963) .............................................7, 12 Central Distributors of Beer, Inc. v. Conn, 5 F.3d 181 (6th Cir. 1993) ....................................12, 27 Chappel v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2003) ....12, 23 Christopher v. Harby, 536 U.S. 403, 122 S.Ct. 2179, 153 L.Ed. 413 (2002) ...............................12, 16 E. F. Hutton &amp; Co., Inc. v. Hadley, 901 F.2d 979 (11th Cir. 1990)........................................................12 Elliott v. Bronson, 872 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1989) (per curiam) .............................................................15 Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)................ 8, 23, 26 Finch v. City of Vernon, 845 F.2d 256 (11th Cir. 1988) ..........................................................................1 Flores v. Satz, 137 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 1998) ....12, 23
xii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ­ Continued Page Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972) (per curiam).............................15 Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 101 S.Ct. 173, 66 L.Ed.2d 163 (1980) (per curiam).............................14 Kent v. Kent, 431 So.2d 279 (Fla.App. 5th Dist. 1983) ........................................................................15 Marsh v. Butler County, Alabama, 268 F.3d 1014 (11th Cir. 2001) ...............................................14 Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida v. Florida State Athletic Commission, 226 F.3d 1226 (11th Cir. 2000)........................................................14 Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465 (11th Cir. 1991) ........................................................................14 Platsky v. Central Intelligence v. U.S. Department of Justice, FBI And Department of Defense, Defense Intelligence Agency, 953 F.2d 26, 21 Fed.R.Serv.3d 97, Argued Oct. 3, 1991, Decided Nov. 25, 1991, Before CARDMORE, PIERCE and WALKER, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM .................................................. 3, 14, 27, 28 Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 105 S.Ct. 3275, 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985) ...................15 Summit Medical Associates, P.C. v. Bill Pryor, 180 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 1999) ..........................15, 23 Swint v. City of Wadley, Alabama, 51 F.3d 988 (11th Cir. 1995)........................................................15 United States v. Foster, 889 F.2d 1049 (11th Cir. 1989) ..................................................... 13, 20, 24
xiii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ­ Continued Page United States v. Leichtman, 742 F.2d 598 (11th Cir. 1984) ..................................................... 14, 20, 24 United States v. Montes-Cardenas, 746 F.2d 771 (11th Cir. 1984) .................................... 14, 20, 24 United States v. Richardson, 764 F.2d 1514 (11th Cir. 1985) ...................................................3, 13 United States Textiles, Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch Cos., 911 F.2d 1261 (7th Cir. 1990) ...................15, 17 Williams v. Mohawk Industries, Inc., 465 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2006) ...............................................15 OTHER AUTHORITIES: 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) .......................................................4 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343 ................................................2 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) .......................................................4 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ................................................. passim 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1983, 1985 .................................. passim Ala. Code 1975, &amp; 26-23-5 .......................................... 11 Civil Rights § 110.1.......................................................4 Civil Rights § 192 ............................................. 4, 23, 27 Civil Rights § 201 .......................................................27 Civil Rights § 206(1) ............................... 4, 5, 14, 22, 24 Civil Rights § 214(1) .....................................................5 Civil Rights § 214(2) .................................................5, 6 Civil Rights § 1056 .................................................6, 24
xiv TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ­ Continued Page Constitutional Law § 73 ...............................................3 Constitutional Law §§ 91-207(3), 305(2) .....................7 Constitutional Law § 268(5) .........................................7 Corporations § 1.7(1) ..................................................12 Eleventh Circuit Rule 42-4 .......................... 1, 3, 21, 28 Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A) ..............................................1 Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) .............................................3, 28 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b).....................................................24 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) .................................... 14, 24, 27 Fed. R. Civ. P. § 59(e) ................................................1, 9 Federal Civil Procedure §§ 103.2, 103.3 ..............2, 7, 8 Federal Civil Procedure § 797 ......................................8 Federal Courts §§ 269, 272 ........................ 8, 16, 23, 26 Federal Courts § 613 ........................................ 8, 19, 27 Federal Courts § 666 ..................................................21 Federal Courts § 768 ..............................................9, 25 Federal Courts § 802 ....................................................9 Federal Evidence ­ Basic Rules Rule 401 .... 1, 3, 12, 13 Federal Evidence ­ Basic Rules Rule 402 ..........1, 3, 13 Florida Administrative Procedures Act (Chap. 120) ............................................................................2 Florida Const. Art. 1, §§ 1, 9, 24 ..................................2 Florida Rules of Evidence Rule 401 .............................3
xv TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ­ Continued Page General Provisions ­ Rule § 44 ....................................9 Limitations of Actions § 95(15) ..................................10 Lis Pendens § 20 .........................................................10 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations § 5 ................................................................... 11 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations § 19 1961(1) .................................................... 11 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations § 59 ................................................................. 11 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations § 1534; 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(c) .................. 11, 17 Supreme Court Rule 13.1 .............................................4 U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 1 ................................ 7, 12, 16 U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5 ............................ 2, 7, 12, 24 U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 11................... 8, 16, 17, 23, 26 U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 14 .......................... 2, 7, 16, 24 U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3 ...................................................7 U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, § 1 ....................................1, 7, 8 U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 4, § 2, cl. 1 ................. 7, 12, 16, 24
1 OPINIONS AND ORDERS BELOW The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit entered in this case on December 30, 2010, before TJOFLAT, CARNES, AND BARKETT, Circuit Judges. By the Court: Appellants' notice of appeal, filed on May 10, 2010, was timely filed as to the district court's January 14, 2010, final judgment. Appellants filed a timely motion for reconsideration from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit on January 26, 2010, which tolled the appeal period. See Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4)(A); Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e); Finch v. City of Vernon, 845 F.2d 256, 258-59 (11th Cir. 1988). The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ­ before TJOFLAT, CARNES, and BARKETT, Circuit Judges ­ On its own motion, this Court hereby DISMISSES THIS APPEAL AS FRIVOLOUS AS BRIEFED. See Eleventh Circuit Rule 42-4, allegedly perjuring their Official Order and Opinion DISMISSING THIS APPEAL AS FRIVOLOUS AS BRIEFED allegedly ignoring Plaintiff/Petitioners' three sworn and certified affidavits (Docs. ##793; 154; 854) the most basic rule of relevancy as set forth in RULE 401, in which is &quot;intrinsic a/k/a important&quot; evidence due to its distinct characterization because of its particular nature; which refers to a kind of prior crimes or acts of misconduct admissible under Rules 401 and 402 meeting requirements for admissibility under those rules; more specifically, evidence is &quot;intrinsic&quot; if it is an uncharged offense
2 which arose out of the same transactions as the charged offense as in this &quot;specific case,&quot; which is inextricably intertwined with evidence regarding the charged offense and is necessary to complete the story in this instant case of these horrendous crimes at trial. That on February 23, 2011, John Ley, Clerk of Court, wrote Petitioners Lawrence Cowan, Jr. and Patricia Cowan regarding Appeal Number: Case Style: Lawrence Cowan, Jr., et al. v. Laura Gaffney, et al., District Court Docket No. 2:07-cv-00181-JESSPC, stating The following action has been taken in the reference case. The enclosed order has been ENTERED. Sincerely, John Ley. Please contact this office for the return of all unfiled documents.
JURISDICTION This Court has jurisdiction to the equal protection and due process clauses to the United States Constitution, Amendments Five and Fourteen and Florida Constitution pursuant to Article 1, §§ 1, 9, and 24. Jurisdiction is involved pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (federal question) and 1343 (civil rights) and pursuant to pendent jurisdiction of the Florida Administrative Procedures Act (Chapter 120). Jurisdiction is involved pursuant to U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, §§ 1 et seq. (a Federal Question) (Federal Civil Procedure §§ 103.2, 103.3), which consists of an
3 invasion of a legally protected interest which: (1) Petitioners/Appellants have presented specific concrete facts showing that the challenged conduct has resulted in a demonstrable, particularized injury to the Petitioners/Appellants, &quot;by reason of substantive RICO violation. (Docs. §§ 793; 157; 854). Jurisdiction is involved pursuant to the most basic rule of relevancy, set forth in Rule 401, Florida Rules of Evidence to F.R.A.P. Rule 4(a)(5), 28 U.S.C.A., where Petitioners have been prejudiced, and are challenging Petitioners' Constitutional Rights to Present their (&quot;intrinsic&quot; a/k/a important evidence admissible under Rules 401 and 402) (Docs. §§ 793; 157; 854), in which it receives its distinct characterization because of its particular nature; (intrinsic evidence refers to a kind of prior crimes or acts of misconduct); and is one of the elementary doctrines of Constitutional Law § 73. United States v. Richardson, 764 F.2d 1514 (11th Cir. 1985); Henry Platsky, Pro Se (Plaintiff-Appellant) v. Central Intelligence Agency, Defendant-Appellee) Henry Platsky, Plaintiff-Appellant v. U.S. Department of Justice, The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Defense, Defendants-Appellees, 953 F.2d 26, 21 Fed.R.Serv.3d 97. The Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirming On its own motion, this Court hereby Dismisses This Appeal As Frivolous As Briefed. See Eleventh Circuit Rule 42-4, of which review is sought, with last Motion dated
4 March 8, 2011, and last order dated March 16, 2011. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 13.1, this petition is timely filed within the prescribed ninety day time period from date of the judgment. The Court has jurisdiction under Title 28, United States Code, §§ 1254(1) and 1651(a).
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS Civil Rights § 110.1; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983: Although 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 requires proof of affirmative causal connection between official's acts or omissions and alleged constitutional deprivation, personal participation is only one of several ways to establish &quot;requisite causal connection. Civil Rights § 192; 42 U.S.C. § 1983: To prevail on claim under § 1983, plaintiff must demonstrate both (1) that defendant deprived her of her right secured under Constitutional or federal law and (2) that such deprivation occurred under color of law. Civil Rights § 206(1): Local government can be directly responsible for a Constitutional violation due to its acts or omissions.
5 Civil Rights § 206(1); 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983: Local government will be liable under § 1983 only for acts for which the local government is actually responsible. Civil Rights § 214(1): In the qualified immunity analysis, courts generally first determine whether plaintiff has stated a claim for a Constitutional violation at all. Civil Rights § 214(1): Qualified immunity applied to monetary damages relief but not to declaratory and injunctive relief. Civil Rights § 214(2): Preexisting case law, tied to the precise facts, is not in every situation essential to establish clearly the law applying to the circumstances facing a public official so that a reasonable official would be put on fair and clear notice that specific circumstances, for purposes of establishing the official's entitlement to qualified immunity. Civil Rights § 214(2): When the facts of previous precedents are necessary to give clear warning that certain conduct of a public official in specific circumstances will violate federal law, court determining whether the official is entitled to qualified immunity must look at the facts in the precedent and at the facts that confronted the
6 official in the case before the court, and the two sets of facts must be materially similar. Civil Rights § 214(2): For qualified immunity purposes, a preexisting precedent is materially similar to the circumstances facing an official when the specific circumstances facing the official are enough alike the facts in the precedent that no reasonable, similarly-situated official could believe that the factual differences between the precedent and the circumstances facing the official might make a difference to the conclusion about whether the official's conduct was lawful or unlawful, in the light of the precedent. Civil Rights § 214(2): Especially here the applicable legal standard is a highly general one, such as &quot;to act reasonably&quot; or &quot;to act with probable cause,&quot; preexisting cause law, that has applied to general law to specific circumstance, will almost always be necessary to draw the bright line that is capable of honestly giving fair and clear note that an official's conduct will violate federal law, for purposes of determining official's entitlement to qualified immunity. Civil Rights § 1056; 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1983, 1985: Interference with right of court access by state agents who intentionally Conceal true facts by state agents about crime may be actionable under federal Rights statutes as deprivation of constitutional rights.
7 Constitutional Law §§ 91-207(3), 305(2); U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 4, § 2, cl. 1; U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 14: Access to courts is a constitutional right grounded in First Amendment, Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause, Fifth Amendment, and/or Fourteenth Amendment. Constitutional Law § 268(5); U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 14: Brady protects accuser's due process right to fair trial, and due process is violated when defendant is convicted in trial in which prosecution failed to disclose to defense exculpatory or impeachment evidence that undermines confidence in outcome of trial. Federal Civil Procedure §§ 103.2, 103.3; U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, §§ 1 et seq.: To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) An injury in fact; (2) A causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of; and (3) That the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. Federal Civil Procedure § 103.2; U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, et seq.: An injury in fact, which is required to establish Article III standing, consists of an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (1) concrete and particularized, and (2) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.
8 Federal Civil Procedure § 103.2; U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, §§ 1 et seq.: To satisfy the injury prong of Article III Standing, a plaintiff must present specific, concrete facts showing that the challenged conduct will result in a demonstrable, particularized injury to the plaintiff. Federal Civil Procedure § 797: In reviewing a grant of a motion to dismiss, the Court of Appeals accepts as true, the complaint's well pleaded facts, even if disputed. Federal Courts §§ 269; 270, U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 11: Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to state agencies, but does not extend to independent entities, such as counties or municipalities. Federal Courts §§ 269, 272; U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 11: Ex parte Young doctrine, an exception to Eleventh Amendment bar of suits against state Officials in federal court, applies only to ongoing and continuous violations of federal law, thus plaintiff, may not use doctrine to adjudicate legality of past conduct. Federal Courts § 613: Where issue involved pure question of law, and refusal to consider issue would result in miscarriage of justice: . . . .
9 Federal Courts § 768.1: Under &quot;pendent appellate jurisdiction doctrine&quot;, federal appellate court may address nonappealable orders if they are inextricable intertwined with appealable decision or if review of former decision is necessary to ensure meaningful review of latter. Federal Courts § 802: In considering denial of defendant's summary judgment motion, court of appeals is required to &quot;view facts&quot;, which are drawn from pleadings, affidavits and depositions, in light most favorable to plaintiffs. Fed. R. Civ. P. § 59(e): Courts have delineated three major grounds justifying reconsideration: (1) An intervening change in controlling law justifying reconsideration; (2) The availability of new evidence; (3) &quot;The need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice.&quot; General Provisions ­ Rule § 44: Case Involving a Constitutional Question When the United States or the Relevant State is not a Party. (a) Constitutional Challenge to Federal Statute. If a party questions the constitutionality of an act of Congress in a proceeding in which the United States or its agency, officer or employee is not a party in an official capacity, the questioning party must give written notice to the circuit clerk immediately upon the filing of the record or as soon as the question is
10 raised in the court of appeals. The clerk must then certify that fact to the Attorney General. (b) Constitutional Challenge to State Statute. If a party Questions the constitutionality of a State in a proceeding in which the State or its agency, officer, or employee is not a party in an official capacity, the questioning party must give written notice to the circuit clerk immediately upon the filing of the record or as soon as the question is raised in the Court of Appeals. The Clerk must then certify that question to the attorney general of the State. Lis Pendens § 20: Since it appeared that trial court discharged lis pendens only because it dismissed Petition seeking to recover for civil conspiracy, upon restatement of complaint on remand, lis pendens likewise should be reinstated. Limitations of Actions § 95(15); 42 U.S.C.A §§ 1983, 1985: Cause of action under §§ 1983 and 1985 will not accrue, and thereby set limitations of clock running until plaintiffs know or should have known (1) that they have suffered the injury that forms the basis of their complaint and (2) who has inflicted the injury.
11 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations § 1534; 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(c): Violation of RICO may be shown by establishing conduct of an enterprise through pattern of racketeering activity. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations § 19; 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961(1), (1)(B), 1962(c): Civil RICO action does not require that there be a prior criminal conviction for conduct forming predicate act. However, conduct used to support civil RICO action must be indictable. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act § 5, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(c): Plaintiff must prove each prong of predicate offense or racketeering activity to maintain civil action under RICO statute. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act § 59; 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(c): Plaintiff only has standing to maintain RICO action if, and can only recover to extend that, he has been injured in his business or Property by predicate act constituting violation. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend.; Ala. Code 1975, &amp; 26-23-5: Where issue involved pure question of law, and refusal to consider issue would result in (miscarriage of justice).
12 Arrington v. Cobb County, 139 F.3d 865 (11th Cir. 1998). Beck v. Deloitte &amp; Touche, 144 F.3d 732, 735 (11th Cir. 1998). Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1260-1262 (7th Cir. 1984). Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196-97, 10 L.Ed. 215 (1963): Central Distributors of Beer, Inc. v. Conn, 5 F.3d 181 (6th Cir. 1993); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(c). Chappel v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2003). &quot;Access to the courts is clearly a &quot;constitutional right, grounded in the First Amendment, the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Fifth Amendment.&quot; Christopher v. Harby, 536 U.S. 403, 415 n. 12, 122 S.Ct. 2179, 153 L.Ed. 413 (2002). Corporations § 1.7(1): Flores v. Satz, 137 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 1998); Constitutional Law 268(5); U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 14. E. F. Hutton &amp; Co., Inc. v. Hadley, 901 F.2d 979, 984 (11th Cir. 1990). Federal Evidence ­ Basic Rules Rule 401:
13 The most basic rule of relevancy is set forth in Rule 401, as follows: &quot;Relevant evidence&quot; means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence of any fact that is determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Intrinsic (a/k/a &quot;important&quot;) Evidence as Relevant Evidence; United States v. Richardson, 764 F.2d 1514 (11th Cir. 1985), states: 1. That evidence which is described as &quot;intrinsic&quot; a/k/a &quot;Important&quot; evidence is merely one kind of relevant evidence; it received its distinct characterization because of its particular characterization because of its particular nature; &quot;intrinsic&quot; evidence refers to a kind of prior crimes or acts of misconduct; this evidence is admissibility under those Rules 401 and 402 as long as it meets the usual requirements for admissibility under those rules; it will meet the usual requirements for admissibility under those rules if it meets the definition of &quot;Intrinsic evidence.&quot;
Intrinsic (a/k/a &quot;important&quot;) Evidence as Relevant Evidence United States v. Foster, 889 F.2d 1049 (11th Cir. 1989). United States v. Foster, supra.
14 United States v. Montes-Cardenas, 746 F.2d 771 (11th Cir. 1984). United States v. Leichtman, 742 F.2d 598 (11th Cir. 1984). More specifically, evidence is &quot;intrinsic if It is an uncharged offense which arose out of the same transactions as the charged offense, if it was inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged offense, or if it is necessary to complete the story of the crime at trial. Marsh v. Butler County, Alabama, 268 F.3d 1014 (11th Cir. 2001); Fed. Rules of Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6), 28 U.S.C.A.; Civil Rights § 206(1); 42 U.S.CA. § 1983. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida v. Florida State Athletic Commission, 226 F.3d 1226 (11th Cir. 2000). Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1496-97 (11th Cir. 1991). Platsky v. Central Intelligence v. U.S. Department of Justice, FBI and Department of Defense, Defense Intelligence Agency, 953 F.2d 26, 21 Fed.R.Serv.3d 97, Argued Oct. 3, 1991. Decided Nov. 25, 1991, Before CARDMORE, PIERCE and WALKER, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9-10, 101 S.Ct. 173, 17576, 66 L.Ed.2d 163 (1980) (per curiam).
15 Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S.Ct. 594, 595-96, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972) (per curiam). Elliott v. Bronson, 872 F.2d 20, 21 (2d Cir. 1989) (per curiam). Blassingame v. Secretary of the Navy, 811 F.2d 65, 6970 (2d Cir. 1987), rev'd on other grounds following remand, 866 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1989); B.K. Instrument, Inc. v. United States, 715 F.2d 713, 723-25 (2d Cir. 1983). Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496, 105 S.Ct. 3275, 3285, 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985). Summit Medical Associates, P.C. v. Bill Pryor, 180 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 1999); U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 11. Swint v. City of Wadley, Alabama, 51 F.3d 988 (11th Cir. 1995). Kent v. Kent, 431 So.2d 279 (Fla.App. 5th Dist. 1983), stating, finally, since it appears that the trial court discharged the lis pendens only because it dismissed the second amended petition, it is proper that upon reinstatement of the complaint, on remand, the &quot;lis pendens&quot; likewise should be reinstated. United States Textiles, Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch Cos., 911 F.2d 1261 (7th Cir. 1990). Williams v. Mohawk Industries, Inc., 465 F.3d 1277, 1282, 1283 (11th Cir. 2006).
16 STATEMENT OF THE CASE This is a High Profile case which allegedly involves the alleged participation of both the Honorable Judge, JOHN STEELE with the United States District Court, Middle District of Florida, Fort Myers Division, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Before TJOFLAT, CARNES and BARKETT, Circuit Judges (both) with the alleged deliberate intent to &quot;shield&quot; the true facts about these ongoing and continuous violations of federal law involving horrendous acts of corruption in this alleged (high profile case) Federal Courts §§ 269, 272; U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 11, Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1260-1262 (7th Cir. 1984), allegedly violating Appellants access to the courts which is clearly a constitutional right, grounded in the First Amendment, the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Fifth Amendment and/or the Fourteenth Amendment. See Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 n. 12, 122 S.Ct. 2179, 153 L.Ed.2d 413 (2002), which is also more than merely formal; it is also adequate, effective and meaningful, where the Courts concluded that a section 1983 claim may be actionable if government officials intentionally conceal ­ as opposed to fail to investigate the true facts about the crime at issue, with the former Governor, Respondent Jeb Bush (party of interest), the now former Governor, Charlie Crist (allegedly the previous former State Attorney General); and State Attorney General Bill McCollum (who are allegedly not concerned over &quot;Government
17 Officials&quot; &quot;criminal activities&quot; for their planned, ongoing, criminal activities to continue (as per this previous &quot;Motion to Dismiss Respondents/Plaintiffs' (Final Complete Third Amended Verified Complaint, with Prejudice&quot;) violating U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 11, and the Respondents, State of Florida's Department of Business and Professional Regulation and their State Officials, Laura Patricia Gaffney; Patrick F. Creehan; Kimberly V. Clark and Lynn Knobel; and the Department of State, Kurt S. Browning, Secretary of State, Division of Historical Resources (Doc. § 793, ex. 42; 101) allegedly combines to produce a pattern in their alleged participation in the alleged operation of the Enterprise (a/k/a Respondents). See United States Textiles, Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch Cos., 911 F.2d 1261 (7th Cir. 1990); were not only directly involved in the alleged &quot;cover-up&quot; of this alleged &quot;corruption&quot; involving (Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act ­ 18 U.S.C.A.) with their threat of &quot;continuing activity&quot; and the &quot;threat of continuing activity to be effective a/k/a the factor continuity plus relationship by using their alleged (bogus), falsified, fraudulent, &quot;perjured&quot; Administrative Complaint, filed 5/02/03, falsely charging Petitioner Lawrence Cowan, Jr. Contractor (three counts of &quot;aiding and abetting&quot;) (sham corporation and/or partner), Appellee/Respondent, James Economou &amp; Associates Ltd.'s employee/ Notary, Respondent, Joseph D. Sloboda to sign as Petitioner, Lawrence Cowan, Jr.'s Agent and/or Power of Attorney on any of the alleged (bogus), falsified, forged (26+-) perjured permit applications (a/k/a sworn affidavits) (with the &quot;unknown silent
18 true owner(s) using sham corporations in guise as the (silent, unknown true owner(s), stockholders and affiliates), using the &quot;theft&quot; of Petitioner, Lawrence Cowan's name; using Petitioner, Lawrence Cowan's &quot;stolen builder's contractor's license number; using (sham corporation in guise as the &quot;silent true owner(s) and silent &quot;stockholders&quot;) on the Franklin Arms Court Building; and the Collier Arcade Building a/k/a Post Office Arcade Building and their build-outs including &quot;Indigo Hotel&quot; knowingly built over a &quot;crime scene&quot; preventing information of wrongdoing involving the use of Petitioner, Lawrence Cowan's stolen personal business; theft of Petitioners' personal construction business and theft of Petitioners' &quot;Builder's Contractor's License Number&quot; that has been in Court since 2005; and 2007) and still active in criminal activities in Civil Court and their (Silent, Unknown True Owners, Stockholders and affiliates; parties of interest, Wilbur Smith; Earl Smith; James Economou; Thomas V. Economou; Steve Economou; John Economou). The former Fort Myers Armitage Works Building a/k/a &quot;sham corporations&quot; such as: Creasy Building a/k/a Creasy Real Estate a/k/a Creasy Appraisal and Brick Alley a/k/a Bay Street Partners a/k/a Bay View Partners, LLC (Silent Unknown true owners, stockholders and affiliates, Parties of Interest, Steve Adkins. The former Respondents, The Warehouse a/k/a (alleged sham corporations) as such: TBLM, Inc.
19 a/k/a The Bottom Line a/k/a The Lady Sings The Blues; Entcom, Inc. a/k/a Mark Grunberg and Donald Hill, alleged affiliates and their (silent unknown true owners, parties of interest, Earl Smith; Sam Galloway; stockholders and affiliates. The former Peter's La Cuisine Restaurant ­ alleged owner Peter Schmid a/k/a Restaurant and Catering a/k/a Vision Realty a/k/a Brick Property Holdings, LLC. (parties of Interest ­ Unknown True Owners, stockholders and affiliates).
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION The Honorable District Court Judge John E. Steele (Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida) with the alleged &quot;participation&quot; element and with the Honorable Circuit Court Judges TJOFLAT, CARNES and BARKETT (with the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit) (both) allegedly intentionally &quot;concealing true facts about crime, actionable under federal rights agents as deprivation of constitutional rights, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1983, 1985, which have allegedly violated (Federal Courts § 613) where issues referred to three (3) (Certified) and Sworn Affidavits Proffering facts, background and &quot;Intrinsic&quot; relevant evidence (Docs. #793; 157; 854) inexplicably intertwined with the evidence of this charged crime that forms an integral and natural
20 part of the witness's accounts and evidence which arose out of the same transaction as the charged offenses and is necessary to complete the story of the crime, but was totally dismissed as &quot;FRIVOLOUS&quot;, knowing it to be false. See United States v. Foster, 889 F.2d 1049 (11th Cir. 1989); United States v. MontesCardenas, 746 F.2d 711 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v. Leichtman, 742 F.2d 598 (11th Cir. 1984). The Honorable District Court Judge JOHN E. STEELE filed his alleged &quot;perjured&quot; Opinion and Order, stating, in part, although a severe sanction, dismissing the Complaint with prejudice is justified in this case. Id. at 813. Accordingly, it is now ORDERED: 1. Defendants' Motions to Dismiss (Docs. §§ 618; 621; 625; 627; 629; 674; 675; 676; 844; 851; 853) are GRANTED. All remaining pending motions are DENIED as moot. 2. The Final Complete Edited Third Amended Complaint (Doc. § 613) is dismissed with prejudice. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly, terminate all deadlines as moot, and close the file DONE AND ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this 12th day of January, 2010. JOHN E. STEELE United States District Judge (Doc. § 1321). (3). The Respondents/Defendants in this instant lawsuit have offered &quot;no evidence&quot; of any significant or specific facts for any defense on their part. The Respondents/Defendants in this lawsuit, have made no attempt to dispute any of the Appellants &quot;Facts and Evidence&quot; (Docs. §§ 793; 157; 854),
21 which Petitioners/Plaintiffs &quot;evidence and facts&quot; will cast doubt on the Respondents/Defendants nondiscriminatory explanations. That on February 1, 2010, the Honorable District Court Judge John E. Steele ­ United States District Court Judge and on December 30, 2010, Circuit Judges TJOFLAT, CARNES, and BARKETT, &quot;On its own motion, this Court hereby DISMISSES THIS APPEAL AS FRIVOLOUS AS BRIEFED. (See Eleventh Circuit Rule 42-4), allegedly committing a number of factual and legal errors (Federal Courts § 666), allegedly destroyed Petitioners' &quot;Constitutional Rights&quot; to Due Process when he made allegedly &quot;false statements&quot; in his alleged &quot;Perjured&quot; &quot;Order and Opinion&quot; (Doc. § 1159), which was essential for the Court to deprive Petitioners of their &quot;Due Process Rights&quot; for the alleged Government Officials a/k/a the former Governor, Petitioner, Jeb Bush; Current Governor, Respondent, former Charlie Crist; Respondent, State Attorney General Bill McCollum and his assistant, Diana R. Esposito, Esq.; Respondents, The State of Florida, Department of Business and Professional Regulation and their Government employees, Respondents, Laura Patricia Gaffney; Patrick F. Creehan; Kimberly V. Clark; Lynn Knobel with the deliberate intent to &quot;shield&quot; their alleged organized crime connection with the alleged Respondents, Government officials, the former mayors Wilbur Smith (alleged &quot;silent partner&quot;) and Respondent City Mayor Jim Humphrey and his planning manager,
22 Respondent Christine Hurley and former mayor Bruce Grady, at the time these activities took place allegedly running alleged (sham corporations as guise of owner(s); conspiracy in allegedly scamming their own government, allegedly smacking of money laundering and tax evasion, involving: (i.) Franklin Arms Court Building;
(ii.) Collier Arcade Building a/k/a Post Office Arcade Building and their build-outs including Indigo Hotel; (iii.) Former Fort Myers Armitage Works Building a/k/a Creasy Building a/ka /Creasy Real Estate a/k/a Creasy Appraisal and Brick Alley a/k/a Bay Street Partners a/k/a Bay View Partners, LLC; (iv.) The Bottom Line a/k/a TBLM, Inc. Building a/k/a The Lady Sings the Blues; corporate officer, Mark Grunberg; (v.) The former Respondent, Peter's La Cuisine (Peter Schmid) at time these criminal activities took place a/k/a Respondents, Restaurant and Catering; a/k/a Vision Realty, a/k/a The Brick Property Holdings, LLC (a/k/a) James Bonaquist, Jr., Esq., and their officers and directors, successors and/or assigns, stockholders and affiliates, using Petitioner Lawrence Cowan's &quot;stolen personal identity; stolen personal construction company, and stolen personal builder's contractor's license number violating Respondents/Plaintiffs' Civil Rights § 206(1) ­ where
23 this local Government is responsible for &quot;Constitutional violations due to their acts and/or omissions for acts which the local government is actually responsible ­ violated (42 U.S.C.A. § 1983)&quot; totally violating Respondent's Civil Rights § 192 ­ by refusing to acknowledge (Docs. §§ 793; 157; 854) depriving Appellants their right secured Constitution and &quot;Federal Law&quot; and that such deprivation occurred &quot;color of law&quot; (42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985); see Flores v. Satz 137 F.3d 1275, 1278 n. 7 (11th Cir. 1998), and shielding from the public the alleged &quot;criminal activities&quot; of the Respondents (a/k/a Enterprise) that Respondent State of Florida, Department of Business and Professional Regulation State Officials (a/k/a Laura Patricia Gaffney; Patrick F. Creehan; Lynn Knobel and Kimberly V. Clark (n/k/a) Menchion (Individuals) allegedly intentionally engaged in conduct using Petitioners' stolen builder's contractor's license number (in State of Florida, DBPR'S care) without Petitioners' knowledge which forms the basis of the Petitioners' claims, in which Federal Courts § 269, 272 ­ requirement of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), doctrine that violation of federal law by state officials be &quot;ongoing and continuous&quot; is satisfied where there is threat of future enforcement that may be remedied by prospective relief. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 11. Summit Medical Associates, P.S. v. Pryor, 180 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 1999); Chappel v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th Cir. 2003).
24 The Honorable District Court Judge, JOHN E. STEELE with the United States District Court for The Middle District of Florida, Fort Myers Division; and The United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit, Before TJOFLAT, CARNES and BARKETT, Circuit Judges, allegedly participating in and taking part in &quot;shielding&quot; the horrendous crimes by the Respondents (a/k/a enterprise) resulting in injury and prejudice on the Petitioners/Plaintiffs, deliberately violating Petitioners' Rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and Civil Rights, which occurred under &quot;color of law&quot;, violating Fed. Rules of Civ. Proc. Rule 12(b), 18 U.S.C.A.; Civil Rights § 206(1); 18 U.S.C.A.; Civil Rights § 206(1); 42 U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 4, § 3, cl. 1; U.S.C.A. 1983, 1985; Civil Rights § 1056, should not have been dismissed, with prejudice. Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), when it appears beyond doubt the Plaintiffs have proven a set of facts and evidence through &quot;Sworn Affidavits (Certified Sworn Affidavits with testimonies, facts and evidence ­ exhibits §§ 793; 157; 854) which is &quot;intrinsic&quot; (Important) relevant evidence inexplicably intertwined with the evidence of the charged crime that forms an integral and natural part of the witness's accounts and evidence which arose out of the same transactions as the charged offenses and is necessary to complete the story of the crime. See United States v. Foster, 889 F.2d 1049 (11th Cir. 1989); United States v. MontesCardenas, 746 F.2d 711 (11th Cir. 1984); United States
25 v. Leichtman, 742 F.2d 598 (11th Cir. 1984); Under &quot;Pendent&quot; Appellate Jurisdiction Doctrine, &quot;Federal Appellate Court&quot; may address nonappealable Decision if necessary to insure meaningful review of latter, Federal Courts § 768.1, involving the use of alleged Stolen &quot;Government Official Notary Seals&quot; (Docs. §§ 157; 854) being used in the theft of Respondent Lawrence Cowan, Jr.'s personal identity; theft of Appellants' personal construction business and theft of Appellants' stolen builder's contractor's license number from the State Agency (DBPR) in charge of the regulation and protection of the Appellant Lawrence Cowan, Jr.'s Contractor's license, with the State of Florida, Department of Business and Professional Regulation and their State Officials, themselves, allegedly involved in their own &quot;conspiracy&quot; using Respondent, Lawrence Cowan's identity as their own, for their own gain. The Honorable District Court Judge John E. Steele's alleged &quot;perjured&quot; Opinion and Order (Doc. 1321), was literally essential for the Respondents' planned, ongoing, criminal activities to continue in their ongoing, criminal activities plus relationship to continue allegedly involving running numerous (sham corporations for the (silent true owner(s), stockholders and affiliates) allegedly running scams in the Government; money laundering; tax fraud; stolen Official notary seals using the theft of Appellants' identity; construction business and builder's contractor's license number on approximately (27+-) (bogus)
26 perjured, falsified, fraudulent permit applications (using sham corporations in guise as the owner(s) of the alleged buildings (a/k/a Historical renovation sites), knowing it to be false, to continue. A requirement of Ex parte Young doctrine (Federal Courts §§ 269, 272) an exception to Eleventh Amendment bar of suits against State Officials in Federal Courts §§ 269, 272 former governor, Jeb Bush (Doc. § 793, ex. 32; 33; 35; 36; 37; 38); present governor Charlie Crist (Doc. § 793, ex. 32; 33; 35; 36; 37; 38); State Attorney General, Bill McCollum and Assistant, Diana R. Esposito, Esq. (Doc. § 793, ex. 613; 676; 851; 862; 869; 1159; 1238; 1271; 1273); The State of Florida's Department of Business and Professional Regulation and their Officials, Laura Patricia Gaffney, Assistant General Counsel for FDBPR and (in her individual capacity) (Doc. § 793, ex. 35; 36; 37; 38); Patrick F. Creehan, Chief Construction Attorney for FDBPR and (in his individual capacity) (Doc. § 793, ex. 36; 37; 38); Kimberly V. Clark, Assistant General Counsel for FDBPR and (in her individual capacity); and Lynn Knobel with the Office of the General Counsel for FDBPR and (in her individual capacity); Department of State, Kurt S. Browning, Secretary of State, Division of Historical Resources (Doc. § 793, ex. 101) allegedly applies to this planned, ongoing, criminal activities plus relationship to continue. (9). The Honorable Judge, JOHN E. STEELE knowingly violated Appellants/Plaintiffs'
27 &quot;Civil Rights § 201&quot; where this Government is responsible for a Constitutional violation due to their acts and/or omissions for acts which the State Government is actually responsible ­ violating 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, totally ignoring &quot;Civil Rights § 192&quot; by refusing to acknowledge the use of Respondent, James Economou Associates, Ltd., using the &quot;Stolen Official Notary Seals&quot; belonging to former employees/notaries, Appellees, Jodi Shelfer and Crystal Panse (Dobert), forging notaries' signatures, notarizing Appellant, Lawrence Cowan's name as the contractor, knowing it to be false resulting in alleged &quot;miscarriage of justice&quot; ­ Federal Courts § 613), in which should not have been dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), filing a &quot;Severe Sanction on the Appellants/Plaintiffs in an alleged `Perjured' OPINION AND ORDER&quot; (Doc. § 1159) Granting defendants' &quot;Motion to dismiss and dismissing plaintiff 's Final Complete Edited Third Amended Complaint with prejudice. Judgment (Doc. § 1238) was entered on January 14, 2010. The numerous motions followed the dismissal and closure of this case, on or about January 19, 2010, and are resolved as below. Petitioners request the Court to review Case Law: 953 F.2d 26; PLATSKY, Pro Se v. Central Intelligence Agency, 953 F.2d 26, 21 Fed.R.Serv.3d 97, Nos. 216, 217, Dockets 91-6109, 91-6113, United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. See Central Distribs. of Beer, Inc. v. Conn., 5 F.3d 181, 183-84 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1207 (1994), stating
28 proof that Defendants/Respondents committed at least two distinct &quot;Predicate Acts&quot; will survive a Motion To Dismiss. Petitioners, &quot;Sworn Affidavit&quot; challenging of Appellants' Constitutional Rights to Present the Evidence (Docs. §§ 793; 157; 854; 613) F.R.A.P. Rule 4(a)(5), 28 U.S.C.A., where Petitioners/Appellants have been prejudiced, and is challenging one of the elementary doctrines of Constitutional Law (#73) and their right to an (Oral Argument) to be reinstated, affecting the denial of accepting Appellants Sufficiency of the sworn certified testimonies and documents of evidence to be heard, and on both 12/29/11 and 12/30/11 ­ filing, in part, &quot;On its own motion, this Court hereby Dismissing this Appeal as FRIVOLOUS as Briefed. See Eleventh Circuit Rule 42-4; in which the weight of the evidence weighs heavily in favor of a &quot;Re-Hearing and Clarification.&quot; 953 F.2d 26, 21 Fed.R.Serv.3d 97, Henry Platsky, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Central Intelligence Agency, Defendant-Appellee' Henry Platsky, PlaintiffAppellant v. U.S. Department of Justice, FBI; and Department of Defense, Defense Intelligence Agency, Defendants-Appellees, Nos. 216, 217, Dockets 91-6109, 91-6113, United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
29 CONCLUSION Petitioners request for their right to an (ORAL ARGUMENT) to be reinstated and put on record rather than being denied as FRIVOLOUS. The petition for an extraordinary writ should be granted. Respectfully submitted, LAWRENCE COWAN, JR., Pro Se and PATRICIA COWAN, wife, Pro Se 1173 Orange Avenue North Fort Myers, FL 33903 Phone: 239-247-3892
App. 1 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ELBERT PARR TUTTLE COURT OF APPEALS BUILDING 56 Forsyth Street, N.W. Atlanta, Georgia 30303 John Ley Clerk of Court For rules and forms visit www.ca11.uscourts.gov March 16, 2011 Lawrence Cowan Jr. 1173 Orange Avenue Ft. Myers, FL 333903 [sic] Patricia Cowan 1173 Orange Avenue Ft. Myers, FL 33903 Appeal Number: 10-12455-HH Case Style: Lawrence Cowan, Jr., et al v. Laura Gaffney, et al District Court Docket No: 2:07-cv-00184-JES-SPC I am returning to you unfiled the papers which you have submitted. &quot;Appellant's Motion to Challenge Circuit Court Judges, Tjoflat, Carnes and Barkett on their Ruling dated February 23, 2011, . . . ,&quot; because this appeal is closed. Sincerely, JOHN LEY, Clerk of Court Reply to: Elora Jackson, HH Phone #: (404) 335-6173 PRO-3 Letter Returning Papers Unfiled
App. 2 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-12455-HH
LAWRENCE COWAN, JR., Building Contractor, Individual, PATRICIA COWAN, Wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, versus LAURA PATRICIA GAFFNEY, PATRICK F. CREEHAN, ET AL., Defendants-Appellees.
Before TJOFLAT, CARNES, and BARKETT, Circuit Judges. BY THE COURT: Appellants &quot;Motion to Clarify this Courts [sic] Order. . . .&quot; and &quot;Motion for Reconsideration and Leave to File an Amended Brief,&quot; which are construed as motions for reconsideration of this Court's December 30, 2010, order, are DENIED.