Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/863/293/336427/
Timestamp: 2019-12-09 21:03:42
Document Index: 54790288

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3161', '§ 637', '§ 3161', '§ 3161', '§ 3161', '§ 3161', '§ 3161', '§ 3161', '§ 3161', '§ 3162', '§ 3161', '§ 3161', '§ 3161', '§ 3500', '§ 637', '§ 3161']

United States of America v. Rivera Construction Company.appeal of Rivera Construction Co., Inc., Appellant in 88-5165.united States of America v. Joseph Rivera.appeal of Joseph L. Rivera, Appellant in 88-5166, 863 F.2d 293 (3d Cir. 1989) :: Justia
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United States of America v. Rivera Construction Company.appeal of Rivera Construction Co., Inc., Appellant in 88-5165.united States of America v. Joseph Rivera.appeal of Joseph L. Rivera, Appellant in 88-5166, 863 F.2d 293 (3d Cir. 1989)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit - 863 F.2d 293 (3d Cir. 1989) Argued Sept. 16, 1988. Decided Dec. 15, 1988. Rehearing and Rehearing In Banc Denied Jan. 19, 1989
Appellants Joseph Rivera and Rivera Construction Company ("RCC") appeal from their convictions of various offenses involving a conspiracy to defraud the United States Department of Defense ("DOD"). Their principal contention is that their rights under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1982), were violated by the district court's decision to order a continuance following disqualification of RCC's original trial counsel. We conclude that all of appellants' claims lack merit and we will affirm the convictions.I.
Under the supervision of the Small Business Administration ("SBA"), small and disadvantaged companies are provided with "set-aside" contracts. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 637(a), SBA nominates minority or "disadvantaged"1 companies to undertake government contracts. Thereafter, the nominated company and the particular government agency negotiate a price for the work to be done.
All four defendants were arraigned on May 11, 1987, starting the clock running for purposes of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c). Trial was originally scheduled for July 8, 1987. However, on June 10, the government moved to disqualify Bosch from representing any defendant in the case. At a hearing on July 20, the district court granted the motion and continued the trial, finding that a continuance was necessary to allow new counsel for RCC to prepare its case.2 The court entered a written order on July 29, 1987, postponing the trial until October 13, 1987.
On October 8, 1987, all the defendants filed a joint motion to dismiss the indictment for violation of the Speedy Trial Act. At a hearing on October 13, 1987, the district court denied the motion, reiterating that the continuance had been necessary for RCC's new counsel to prepare its case and, therefore, that the elapsed time was excludible from the Speedy Trial Act pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (8) (B) (iv).
Rivera and RCC contend that the continuance of the trial date until October 13, 1987 violated their rights under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174. Specifically, they argue that the district court did not place the reasons for ordering the continuance on the record until after the statutory period had expired and a motion to dismiss was filed, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (8) (A). The government responds that the district court placed sufficient reasons for the continuance on the record and, therefore, the period from July 30, 1987 until October 13, 1987 was excludible under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (8) (A). Alternatively, the government argues that the period from July 16, 1987 until October 13, 1987 was excludible, under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (1) (F), because during that entire period a motion was pending before the court for Anthony Rivera to interview witnesses.3
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that " [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial...." U.S. Const. amend. VI. Congress enacted the Speedy Trial Act to "give effect to the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial" by setting specified time limits after arraignment or indictment within which criminal trials must be commenced. H.R.Rep. No. 1508, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 7401, 7402. A defendant must be brought to trial within 70 days following his indictment or first appearance before the court, whichever occurs later. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c). If the trial does not commence within the 70-day period, the Act requires that the indictment be dismissed. 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a) (2).
Certain delays in commencing the trial may be excluded from calculation of the 70-day period. Section 3161(h) provides an exclusive list of nine circumstances which warrant exclusion, United States v. Carrasquillo, 667 F.2d 382, 388 (3d Cir. 1981), including " [a]ny period of delay resulting from a continuance ... if the judge granted such a continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial."4 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (8) (A). The district court may order such a continuance sua sponte but, in doing so, must set out its reasons for granting the continuance on the record, either orally or in writing. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (8) (A).5 If the reasons are not placed on the record, the time is not excludible. United States v. Brooks, 697 F.2d 517, 520 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1073, 103 S. Ct. 1531, 75 L. Ed. 2d 952 (1983); United States v. Carrasquillo, 667 F.2d at 385-88.
First, Congress wanted to ensure that a district judge would give careful consideration when balancing the need for delay against "the interest of the defendant and of society in achieving speedy trial." S.Rep. No. 1021, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1974). Second, the requirement provides a record so that an appellate court may review the decision. United States v. Molt, 631 F.2d 258, 262 (3d Cir. 1980).
Finally, the district court placed its reasons for granting the continuance on the record a third time on October 13, 1987, when it denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. This time the court specified that time was excludible under Sec. 3161(h) (8) (B) (iv):
The time that [new RCC counsel] came into the case to this day I meant to exclude, it was only an oversight that I failed to do so, and I am going to enter an order today excluding that time pursuant to Section 3161 [h](8) (b) [iv]. I am excluding it since I believe it was necessary for this corporation to have that time with independent counsel for the purpose of adequately and properly preparing for trial.
Rivera and RCC also cite our decision in United States v. Carrasquillo, 667 F.2d 382 (3d Cir. 1981), for the proposition that a judge may not provide an after-the-fact justification for unauthorized delays in commencing a trial. We explained in United States v. Brooks, 697 F.2d at 522, however, that while Carrasquillo requires the district court to decide to grant a continuance before the period begins to run, it does not require the court to put its reasons on the record at that time. A subsequent articulation satisfies the purpose of the statute. Here, the district court not only decided on the record to grant a continuance before the delay, but articulated its reasons before the continuance. Furthermore, when denying the motion to dismiss in October, the district court gave the same reasons it gave in July. In this case, there was no after-the-fact justification.
Therefore, we hold that the district court satisfied the statutory requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (8) (A) and, consequently, that the period from July 30, 1987 until October 13, 1987 was excludible under the Speedy Trial Act. In light of our holding, it is unnecessary to address the question of whether the period from July 16, 1987 until October 13, 1987 was excludible because of Anthony Rivera's then-pending motion to interview witnesses.
Fed. R. App. P. 3(c) requires that " [t]he notice of appeal ... shall designate the judgment, order or part thereof appealed from." If a party does not satisfy the requirements of Rule 3, then the appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction over the undesignated issues. Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., --- U.S. ----, 108 S. Ct. 2405, 2409, 101 L. Ed. 2d 285 (1988) ("although a court may construe the rules liberally in determining whether they have been complied with, it may not waive the jurisdictional requirements of Rules 3 and 4").
Where one order or judgment was "a step in the procedural progression" of a second order or judgment for which a timely notice of appeal has been filed, then in certain limited cases, the appeal from the latter judgment may be deemed to include the earlier judgment. Elfman Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 567 F.2d 1252, 1254 (3d Cir. 1977). However, where the order or judgment upon which the appellant seeks review is neither directly nor indirectly referred to in the notice of appeal, then the issue is not fairly raised and the Court of Appeals does not acquire jurisdiction. Compare Elfman Motors, 567 F.2d at 1254 (in multi-defendant lawsuit, notice of appeal specifying judgments in favor of three defendants did not confer jurisdiction for Court of Appeals to review summary judgment granted in favor of two other defendants not identified in notice of appeal); Carter v. Rafferty, 826 F.2d 1299, 1304 (3d Cir. 1987) (failure to name both petitioners in habeas corpus action in notice of appeal deprived Court of Appeals of jurisdiction with regard to unnamed petitioner), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 108 S. Ct. 711, 98 L. Ed. 2d 661 (1988); with Murray v. Commercial Union Ins. Co. (Commercial), 782 F.2d 432, 434-35 (3d Cir. 1986) (where two counts of complaint were dismissed for failure to state a cause of action and then, subsequently, the third count was dismissed in summary judgment, notice of appeal from summary judgment fairly read to include all three counts of complaint as none could be appealed until final judgment entered on all three and parties had briefed all three issues); Gooding v. Warner-Lambert Co., 744 F.2d 354, 357 n. 4 (3d Cir. 1984) (where notice of appeal referred only to order "docketed July 7," but one claim dismissed January 4 could not be appealed until order on second claim July 7, and parties briefed and argued both claims, notice of appeal effectively raised both claims); United States v. Certain Land in the City of Paterson, N.J., 322 F.2d 866, 869 (3d Cir. 1963) (where notice of appeal specified order denying motion to amend prior order, notice held to include prior order).
In this case, the appointment of a receiver was not a step in the procedural progression that culminated in the conviction and sentence from which Rivera and RCC filed their notice of appeal. Rather, it was an order collateral to the criminal proceedings. We also note that appellants first raised the receivership issue in their supplemental brief filed more than three months after the notice of appeal. Finally, appellants never responded to the government's request under Fed. R. App. P. 10(b) (3) to specify what issues would be raised on appeal. Cf. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181, 83 S. Ct. 227, 229, 9 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1962) (appeal permitted where intent to seek review of order was "manifest," and appealing party informed both court and adversary that order was being challenged).
Rivera and RCC raise several other, less complicated issues: 1) that the district court erred in not immunizing Don as an unindicted co-conspirator and, failing that, that it erred in refusing to admit statements made by Don to the government pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 803(24) and 804(b) (5); 2) that the district court admitted character evidence in violation of Fed.R.Evid. 404(b); 3) that the district court erred in excluding a document which purported to be a government estimate, but which appellants never authenticated; 4) that hearsay testimony elicited from a witness and to which the district court immediately directed two curative instructions, requires a retrial; 5) that their right to an impartial jury under the Sixth Amendment was violated by the district court's refusal to conduct individual voir dire of jurors regarding prejudice against Hispanics; and 6) that the district court erred in denying them access to statements by government witnesses, to which they were entitled under either the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500, or under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963). We have considered each of these contentions and find that all lack merit.
"Socially disadvantaged individuals are those who have been subjected to racial or ethnic prejudice or cultural bias because of their identity as a member of a group without regard to their individual qualities." 15 U.S.C. § 637(a) (5) (1988 Supp.)
Appellants concede that, in light of the Supreme Court's opinion in Wheat v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 108 S. Ct. 1692, 100 L. Ed. 2d 140 (1988), the district court's decision to disqualify Bosch cannot be challenged. Appellants' Brief at 4 n. 5
The standard of review of a continuance granted pursuant to Sec. 3161(h) (8) of the Speedy Trial Act depends upon what step in the district court's analysis we are reviewing. Where we review the district court's interpretation of the statute, it is a question of law and, therefore, subject to plenary review. Chrysler Credit Corporation v. First National Bank and Trust Company of Washington, 746 F.2d 200, 202 (3d Cir. 1984). If the district court's factual conclusions are at issue, then a clearly erroneous standard is appropriate. United States v. Theron, 782 F.2d 1510, 1512 n. 1 (10th Cir. 1986); United States v. Nance, 666 F.2d 353, 356 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 918, 102 S. Ct. 1776, 72 L. Ed. 2d 179 (1982). Finally, when the district court grants a continuance after a proper application of the statute to established facts, then an abuse of discretion standard is applied. United States v. Brooks, 697 F.2d 517, 522 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1073, 103 S. Ct. 1531, 75 L. Ed. 2d 952 (1983); United States v. Theron, 782 F.2d 1510, 1512 n. 1 (10th Cir. 1986); United States v. Pringle, 751 F.2d 419, 429 (1st Cir. 1984)
The Act lists some of the factors which the district court must consider when deciding to grant an "ends of justice" continuance, including " [w]hether the failure to grant such a continuance ... would deny counsel for the defendant or the attorney for the Government the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence." 18 U.S.C. § 3161(8) (h) (B) (iv)