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Procunier Vs Martinez - Citation 103534 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Save as PDF Add a Tag Add a Note Semantics Visualize Procunier Vs. Martinez - Court Judgment	LegalCrystal Citationlegalcrystal.com/103534CourtUS Supreme CourtDecided OnApr-29-1974Case Number416 U.S. 396AppellantProcunierRespondentMartinezExcerpt:
procunier v. martinez - 416 u.s. 396 (1974)
appellees, prison inmates, brought this class action challenging prisoner mail censorship regulations issued by the director of the california department of corrections and the ban against the use of law students and legal paraprofessionals to conduct attorney-client interviews with inmates. the mail censorship regulations,
proscribed inmate correspondence that "unduly complain[ed]," "magnif[ied] grievances,"..... Judgment:
proscribed inmate correspondence that "unduly complain[ed]," "magnif[ied] grievances," "express[ed] inflammatory political, racial, religious or other views or beliefs," or contained matter deemed "defamatory" or "otherwise inappropriate." The District Court held these regulations unconstitutional under the First Amendment, void for vagueness, and violative of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of procedural due process, and it enjoined their continued enforcement. The court required that an inmate be notified of the rejection of correspondence, and that the author of the correspondence be allowed to protest the decision and secure review by a prison official other than the original censor. The District Court also held that the ban against the use of law students and legal paraprofessionals to conduct attorney-client interviews with inmates abridged the right of access to the courts and enjoined its continued enforcement. Appellants contend that the District Court should have abstained from deciding the constitutionality of the mail censorship regulations.
2. The censorship of direct personal correspondence involves incidental restrictions on the right to free speech of both prisoners and their correspondents, and is justified if the following criteria are met: (1) it must further one or more of the important and substantial governmental interests of security, order, and the rehabilitation of inmates, and (2) it must be no greater than is necessary to further the legitimate governmental interest involved. Pp.
3. Under this standard, the invalidation of the mail censorship regulations by the District Court was correct. Pp.
416 U. S. 415
4. The decision to censor or withhold delivery of a particular letter must be accompanied by minimum procedural safeguards against arbitrariness or error, and the requirements specified by the District Court were not unduly burdensome. Pp.
416 U. S. 417
5. The ban against attorney-client interviews conducted by law students or legal paraprofessionals, which was not limited to prospective interviewers who posed some colorable threat to security or to those inmates thought to be especially dangerous and which created an arbitrary distinction between law students employed by attorneys and those associated with law school programs (against whom the ban did not operate), constituted an unjustifiable restriction on the inmates' right of access to the courts.
393 U. S. 483
POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and BRENNAN, STEWART, WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. MARSHALL, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which BRENNAN, J., joined and in Part II of which DOUGLAS, J., joined,
416 U. S. 422
. DOUGLAS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment,
416 U. S. 428
inmates of California penal institutions and persons other than licensed attorneys and holders of public office was censored for nonconformity to certain standards. Rule 2401 stated the Department's general premise that personal correspondence by prisoners is "a privilege, not a right. . . ." [
] More detailed regulations implemented the Department's policy. Rule 1201 directed inmates not to write letters in which they "unduly complain" or "magnify grievances." [
] Rule 1205(d) defined as contraband writings "expressing inflammatory political, racial, religious or other views or beliefs. . . ." [
] Finally, Rule 2402(8) provided that inmates "may not send or receive letters that pertain to criminal activity;
are lewd, obscene, or defamatory; contain foreign matter, or are otherwise inappropriate." [
mere possibility that a state court might declare the prison regulations unconstitutional is no ground for abstention.
Appellants now contend that we should vacate the judgment and remand the case to the District Court with instructions to abstain on the basis of two arguments not presented to it. First, they contend hat any vagueness challenge to an uninterpreted state statute or regulation is a proper case for abstention. According to appellants, "[t]he very statement by the district court that the regulations are vague constitutes a compelling reason for abstention." Brief for Appellants 8-9. As this Court made plain in
(1964), however, not every vagueness challenge to an uninterpreted state statute or regulation constitutes a proper case for abstention. [
] But we need not decide whether appellants' contention is controlled by the analysis in
As a second ground for abstention, appellants rely on Cal.Penal Code § 2600(4), which assures prisoners the right to receive books, magazines, and periodicals. [
] Although they did not advance this argument to the District Court, appellants now contend that the interpretation of the statute by the state courts and its application to the regulations governing prisoner mail might avoid or modify the constitutional questions decided below. Thus, appellants seek to establish the essential prerequisite for abstention -- "an uncertain issue of state
law," the resolution of which may eliminate or materially alter the federal constitutional question. [
(1965). We are not persuaded. A state court interpretation of § 2600(4) would not avoid or substantially modify the constitutional question presented here. That statute does not contain any provision purporting to regulate censorship of personal correspondence. It only preserves the right of inmates to receive "newspapers, periodicals, and books," and authorizes prison officials to exclude
(Emphasis added.) And the plain meaning of the language is reinforced by recent legislative history. In 1972, a bill was introduced in the California Legislature to restrict censorship of personal correspondence by adding an entirely new subsection to § 2600. The legislature passed the bill, but it was vetoed by Governor Reagan. In light of this history, we think it plain that no reasonable interpretation of § 2600(4) would avoid or modify the federal constitutional question decided below. Moreover, we are mindful of the high cost of abstention when the federal constitutional challenge concerns facial repugnance to the First Amendment.
Traditionally, federal courts have adopted a broad hands-off attitude toward problems of prison administration. In part, this policy is the product of various limitations on the scope of federal review of conditions in state penal institutions. [
] More fundamentally, this attitude springs from complementary perceptions about the nature of the problems and the efficacy of judicial intervention. Prison administrators are responsible for maintaining internal order and discipline, for securing their institutions against unauthorized access or escape, and for rehabilitating, to the extent that human nature and inadequate resources allow, the inmates placed in their custody. The Herculean obstacles to effective discharge of these duties are too apparent to warrant explication. Suffice it to say that the problems of prisons
in America are complex and intractable, and, more to the point, they are not readily susceptible of resolution by decree. Most require expertise, comprehensive planning, and the commitment of resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive branches of government. For all of those reasons, courts are ill-equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison administration and reform. [
] Judicial recognition of that fact reflects no more than a healthy sense of realism. Moreover, where state penal institutions are involved, federal courts have a further reason for deference to the appropriate prison authorities. But a policy of judicial restraint cannot encompass any failure to take cognizance of valid constitutional claims whether arising in a federal or state institution. When a prison regulation or practice offends a fundamental constitutional guarantee, federal courts will discharge their duty to protect constitutional
393 U. S. 486
(1969). This is such a case. Although the District Court found the regulations relating to prisoner mail deficient in several respects, the first and principal basis for its decision was the constitutional command of the First Amendment, as applied to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. [
The issue before us is the appropriate standard of review for prison regulations restricting freedom of speech. This Court has not previously addressed this question, and the tension between the traditional policy of judicial restraint regarding prisoner complaints and the need to protect constitutional rights has led the federal courts to adopt a variety of widely inconsistent approaches to the problem. Some have maintained a hands-off posture in the face of constitutional challenges to censorship of prisoner mail.
E.g., McCloskey v. Maryland,
337 F.2d 72 (CA4 1964);
Lee v. Tahash,
352 F.2d 970 (CA8 1965) (except insofar as mail censorship rules are applied to discriminate against a particular racial or religious group);
Krupnick v. Crouse,
366 F.2d 851 (CA10 1966);
Pope v. Daggett,
350 F.2d 296 (CA10 1965). Another has required only that censorship of personal correspondence not lack support "in any rational and constitutionally acceptable concept of a prison system."
Sostre v. McGinnis,
442 F.2d 178, 199 (CA2 1971),
cert. denied sub nom. Oswald v. Sostre,
405 U.S. 978 (1972). At the other extreme, some courts have been willing to require demonstration of a "compelling state interest" to justify censorship of prisoner mail.
E.g., Jackson v. Godwin,
(CA5 1968) (decided on both equal protection and First Amendment grounds);
Morales v. Schmidt,
340 F.Supp. 544 (WD Wis.1972);
Fortune Society v. McGinnis,
319 F.Supp. 901 (SDNY 1970). Other courts phrase the standard in similarly demanding terms of "clear and present danger."
E.g., Wilkinson v. Skinner,
462 F.2d 670, 672-673 (CA2 1972). And there are various intermediate positions, most notably the view that a
E.g., Carothers v. Follette,
314 F.Supp. 1014, 1024 (SDNY 1970) (citations omitted).
See also Gates v. Collier,
349 F.Supp. 881, 896 (ND Miss.1972);
LeMon v. Zelker,
358 F.Supp. 554 (SDNY 1972).
by the other federal courts that have considered the question. For the most part, these courts have dealt with challenges to censorship of prisoner mail as involving broad questions of "prisoners' rights." This case is no exception. The District Court stated the issue in general terms as "the applicability of First Amendment rights to prison inmates . . . ," 354 F.Supp. at 1096, and the arguments of the parties reflect the assumption that the resolution of this case requires an assessment of the extent to which prisoners may claim First Amendment freedoms. In our view, this inquiry is unnecessary. In determining the proper standard of review for prison restrictions on inmate correspondence, we have no occasion to consider the extent to which an individual's right to free speech survives incarceration, for a narrower basis of decision is at hand. In the case of direct personal correspondence between inmates and those who have a particularized interest in communicating with them, [
] mail censorship implicates more than the right of prisoners.
derives from the First and Fourteenth Amendments a protection against unjustified governmental interference with the intended communication.
accord, Kleindienst v. Mandel,
-765 (1972);
(1943). We do not deal here with difficult questions of the so-called "right to hear" and third-party standing, but with a particular means of communication in which the interests of both parties are inextricably meshed. The wife of a prison inmate who is not permitted to read all that her husband wanted to say to her has suffered an abridgment of her interest in communicating with him as plain as that which results from censorship of her letter to him. In either event, censorship of prisoner mail works a consequential restriction on the First and Fourteenth Amendments rights of those who are not prisoners.
(1969), First Amendment
guarantees must be "applied in light of the special characteristics of the . . . environment."
concerned the interplay between the right to freedom of speech of public high school students and
. In overruling a school regulation prohibiting the wearing of anti-war armbands, the Court undertook a careful analysis of the legitimate requirements of orderly school administration in order to ensure that the students were afforded maximum freedom of speech consistent with those requirements. The same approach was followed in
(1972), where the Court considered the refusal of a state college to grant official recognition to a group of students who wished to organize a local chapter of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), a national student organization noted for political activism and campus disruption. The Court found that neither the identification of the local student group with the national SDS, nor the purportedly dangerous political philosophy of the local group, nor the college administration's fear of future, unspecified disruptive activities by the students could justify the incursion on the right of free association. The Court also found, however, that this right could be limited if necessary to prevent campus disruption,
408 U. S. 189
-190, n. 20, and remanded the case for determination of whether the students had, in fact, refused to accept reasonable regulations governing student conduct.
(1968), the Court dealt with incidental restrictions on free speech occasioned by the exercise of the governmental power to conscript men for military service. O'Brien had burned his Selective Service registration certificate on the steps
391 U. S. 377
Of course, none of these precedents directly controls the instant case. In
the Court considered a federal statute which, on its face, prohibited certain conduct having no necessary connection with freedom of speech. This led the Court to differentiate between "speech" and "nonspeech" elements of a single course of conduct, a distinction that has little relevance here. Both
concerned First and Fourteenth Amendment liberties in the context of state educational institutions, a circumstance involving rather different governmental interests than are at stake here. In broader terms, however, these precedents involved incidental
The case at hand arises in the context of prisons. One of the primary functions of government is the preservation of societal order through enforcement of the criminal law, and the maintenance of penal institutions is an essential part of that task. The identifiable governmental interests at stake in this task are the preservation of internal order and discipline, [
] the maintenance of institutional security against escape or unauthorized entry, and the rehabilitation of the prisoners. While the weight of professional opinion seems to be that inmate freedom to correspond with outsiders advances, rather than retards the goal of rehabilitation, [
] the legitimate governmental
that further an important or substantial interest of penal administration will nevertheless be invalid if its sweep is unnecessarily broad. This does not mean, of course, that prison administrators may be required to show with certainty that adverse consequences would flow from the failure to censor a particular letter. Some latitude in anticipating the probable consequences of allowing certain speech in a prison environment is essential to the proper discharge of an administrator's duty. But any regulation or practice that restricts inmate correspondence must be generally necessary to protect one or more of the legitimate governmental interests identified above. [
On the basis of this standard, we affirm the judgment of the District Court. The regulations invalidated by that court authorized,
censorship of statements that "unduly complain" or "magnify grievances," expression of "inflammatory political, racial, religious or other views," and matter deemed "defamatory" or "otherwise inappropriate." These regulations fairly invited prison officials and employees to apply their own personal prejudices and opinions as standards for prisoner mail censorship. Not surprisingly, some prison officials used the extraordinary latitude for discretion authorized by the regulations to suppress unwelcome criticism. For example, at one institution under the Department's jurisdiction, the checklist used by the mail room staff authorized rejection of letters "criticizing policy, rules or officials," and the mail room sergeant stated in a deposition that he would reject as "defamatory" letters "belittling staff or our judicial system or anything connected with Department of Corrections." Correspondence was also censored for "disrespectful comments," "derogatory remarks," and the like.
it is "within the discretion of the prison administrators." Brief for Appellants 21. Appellants contend that statements that "magnify grievances" or "unduly complain" are censored "as a precaution against flash riots and in the furtherance of inmate rehabilitation."
at 22. But they do not suggest how the magnification of grievances or undue complaining, which presumably occurs in outgoing letters, could possibly lead to flash riots, nor do they specify what contribution the suppression of complaints makes to the rehabilitation of criminals. And appellants defend the ban against "inflammatory political, racial, religious or other views" on the ground that "[s]uch matter clearly presents a danger to prison security. . . ."
at 21. The regulation, however, is not narrowly drawn to reach only material that might be thought to encourage violence, nor is its application limited to incoming letters. In short, the Department's regulations authorized censorship of prisoner mail far broader than any legitimate interest of penal administration demands, and were properly found invalid by the District Court. [
The interest of prisoners and their correspondents in uncensored communication by letter, grounded as it is in the First Amendment, is plainly a "liberty" interest within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment even though qualified of necessity by the circumstance of imprisonment. As such, it is protected from arbitrary governmental invasion.
(1972). The District Court required that an inmate be notified of the rejection of a letter written by or addressed to him, that the author of that letter be given a reasonable opportunity to protest that decision, and that complaints be referred to a prison official other than
The constitutional guarantee of due process of law has as a corollary the requirement that prisoners be afforded access to the courts in order to challenge unlawful convictions and to seek redress for violations of their constitutional rights. This means that inmates must have a reasonable opportunity to seek and receive the assistance of attorneys. Regulations and practices that unjustifiably obstruct the availability of professional representation or other aspects of the right of access to the courts are invalid.
Ex parte Hull,
312 U. S. 546
Appellants' enforcement of the regulation in question also created an arbitrary distinction between law students employed by practicing attorneys and those associated with law school programs providing legal assistance to prisoners. [
] While the Department flatly prohibited interviews of any sort by law students working for attorneys, it freely allowed participants of a number of law school programs to enter the prisons and meet with inmates. These largely unsupervised students were admitted without any security check other than verification of their enrollment in a school program. Of course, the fact that appellants have allowed some persons to conduct attorney-client interviews with prisoners does not mean that they are required to admit others, but the arbitrariness of the distinction between the two categories of law students does reveal the absence of any real justification for the sweeping prohibition of Administrative Rule MV-IV-02. We cannot say that the District Court erred in invalidating this regulation.
This result is mandated by our decision in
(1969). There, the Court struck down a prison regulation prohibiting any inmate from advising or assisting another in the preparation of legal documents. Given the inadequacy of alternative sources of legal assistance, the rule had the effect of denying to illiterate or poorly educated inmates any opportunity to vindicate possibly valid constitutional claims. The Court found that the regulation impermissibly burdened the right of access to the courts despite the not insignificant state interest in preventing the establishment of personal power structures by unscrupulous jailhouse lawyers and the attendant problems of prison discipline that
follow. The countervailing state interest in
is, if anything, more persuasive than any interest advanced by appellants in the instant case.
the Court considered the constitutionality of loyalty oaths required of certain state employees as a condition of employment. For the purpose of applying the doctrine of abstention, the Court distinguished between two kinds of vagueness attacks. Where the case turns on the applicability of a state statute or regulation to a particular person or a defined course of conduct, resolution of the unsettled question of state law may eliminate any need for constitutional adjudication. 377 U.S. at
-377. Abstention is therefore appropriate. Where, however, as in this case, the statute or regulation is challenged as vague because individuals to whom it plainly applies simply cannot understand what is required of them and do not wish to forswear all activity arguably within the scope of the vague terms, abstention is not required.
. In such a case, no single adjudication by a state court could eliminate the constitutional difficulty. Rather it would require "extensive adjudications, under the impact of a variety of factual situations," to bring the challenged statute or regulation "within the bounds of permissible constitutional certainty."
The District Court did stay its hand, and the subsequent decision in
In re Jordan,
7 Cal.3d 930, 500 P.2d 873 (1972) (holding that § 2600(2) barred censorship of attorney-client correspondence), rendered Count II moot. This disposition of the claim relating to attorney-client mail is, however, quite irrelevant to appellants' contention that the District Court should have abstained from deciding whether the mail regulations are constitutional as they apply to personal mail. Subsection (2) of § 2600 speaks directly to the issue of censorship of attorney-client mail, but says nothing at all about personal correspondence, and appellants have not informed us of any challenge to the censorship of personal mail presently pending in the state courts.
Note, Decency and Fairness: An Emerging Judicial Role in Prison Reform, 7 Va.L.Rev. 841, 842-844 (1971).
"(1) Any material which might violate postal regulations,
threats, blackmail, contraband or which indicate plots of escape."
Notice of Disapproval of Inmate Mail
As Mr. Justice Holmes observed over a half century ago, "the use of the mails is almost as much a part of free speech as the right to use our tongues. . . ."
Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Co. v. Burleson,
255 U. S. 407
255 U. S. 437
(1921) (dissenting opinion), quoted with approval in
400 U. S. 416
381 U. S. 305
(1965). A prisoner does not shed such basic First Amendment rights at the prison gate. [
] Rather, he "retains all the rights of an ordinary citizen except those expressly, or by necessary implication, taken from
Coffin v. Reichard,
143 F.2d 443, 445 (CA6 1944). [
] Accordingly, prisoners are, in my view, entitled to use the mails as a medium of free expression not as a privilege, but rather as a constitutionally guaranteed right. [
It seems clear that this freedom may be seriously infringed by permitting correctional authorities to read all prisoner correspondence. A prisoner's free and open expression will surely be restrained by the knowledge that his every word may be read by his jailors, and that his message could well find its way into a disciplinary file, be the object of ridicule, or even lead to reprisals. A similar pall may be cast over the free expression of the inmates' correspondents.
Cf. Talley v. California,
362 U. S. 60
362 U. S. 65
(1958). Such an intrusion on First Amendment freedoms can only be justified by a substantial government interest and a showing that the means chosen to effectuate the State's purpose are not unnecessarily restrictive of personal freedoms.
The First Amendment must in each context "be applied
in light of the special characteristics of the . . . environment,'"
(1972), and the exigencies of governing persons in prisons are different from and greater than those in governing persons without.
Barnett v. Rodgers,
133 U.S.App.D.C. 296, 301-302, 410 F.2d 995, 1000-1001 (1969);
Rowland v. Sigler,
327 F.Supp. 821, 827 (Neb.),
452 F.2d 1005 (CA8 1971). The State has legitimate and substantial concerns as to security, personal safety, institutional discipline, and prisoner rehabilitation not applicable to the community at large. But these considerations do not eliminate the need for reasons imperatively justifying the particular deprivation of fundamental constitutional rights at issue.
Cf. Healy v. James, supra,
such as fluoroscoping letters. [
] If physical tests were inadequate, merely opening and inspecting -- and not reading -- incoming mail would clearly suffice. [
It is also suggested that prison authorities must read all prison mail in order to detect escape plans. The State surely could not justify reading everyone's mail and listening to all phone conversations on the off chance that criminal schemes were being concocted. Similarly, the reading of all prisoner mail is too great an intrusion on First Amendment rights to be justified by such a speculative concern. There has been no showing as to the seriousness of the problem of escapes planned or arranged via the mail. Indeed, the State's claim of concern over this problem is undermined by the general practice of permitting unmonitored personal interviews during which any number of surreptitious plans might be discussed undetected. [
] When prison authorities have reason to believe that an escape plot is being hatched by a particular inmate through his correspondence, they may well have an adequate basis to seize that inmate's letters; but there is no such justification for a blanket policy of reading all prison mail.
It is also occasionally asserted that reading prisoner mail is a useful tool in the rehabilitative process. The therapeutic model of corrections has come under increasing criticism, and, in most penal institutions, rehabilitative programs are more ideal than reality. [
] Assuming the validity of the rehabilitative model, however, the State does not demonstrate that the reading of inmate
mail, with its attendant chilling effect on free expression, serves any valid rehabilitative purpose. Prison walls serve not merely to restrain offenders, but also to isolate them. The mails provide one of the few ties inmates retain to their communities or families -- ties essential to the success of their later return to the outside world. [
] Judge Kaufman, writing for the Second Circuit, found two observations particularly apropos of similar claims of rehabilitative benefit in
442 F.2d 178, 199 (1971) (en banc):
"'Letter writing keeps the inmate in contact with the outside world, helps to hold in check some of the morbidity and hopelessness produced by prison life and isolation, stimulates his more natural and human impulses, and otherwise may make contributions to better mental attitudes and reformation.' [
"'The harm censorship does to rehabilitation . . . cannot be gainsaid. Inmates lose contact with the outside world and become wary of placing intimate thoughts or criticisms of the prison in letters. This artificial increase of alienation from society is ill-advised.' [
416 U. S. 412
Balanced against the State's asserted interests are the values that are generally associated with freedom of speech in a free society -- values which "do not turn to dross in an unfree one."
Sostre v. McGnnis, supra,
at 199. First Amendment guarantees protect the free and uninterrupted interchange of ideas upon which a democratic society thrives. Perhaps the most obvious victim of the indirect censorship effected by a policy of allowing prison authorities to read inmate mail is criticism of prison administration. The threat of identification and reprisal inherent in allowing correctional authorities to read prisoner mail is not lost on inmates who might otherwise criticize their jailors. The mails are one of the few vehicles prisoners have for informing the community about their existence and, in these days of strife in our correctional institutions, the plight of prisoners is a matter of urgent public concern. To sustain a policy which chills the communication necessary to inform the public on this issue is at odds with the most basic tenets of the guarantee of freedom of speech. [
The First Amendment serves not only the needs of the polity, but also those of the human spirit -- a spirit that demands self-expression. Such expression is an integral part of the development of ideas and a sense of identity. To suppress expression is to reject the basic human desire for recognition and affront the individual's worth and dignity. [
394 U. S.
Brown v. Peyton,
437 F.2d 1228, 1230 (CA4 1971);
452 F.2d 1005 (CA8 1971);
319 F.Supp. 901, 903 (SDNY 1970).
Accord, Moore v. Ciccone,
459 F.2d 574, 576 (CA8 1972);
451 F.2d 545, 547 (CA1 1971);
343 F.Supp. 128, 131 (ND Cal.1972);
Burnham v. Oswald,
342 F.Supp. 880, 884 (WDNY 1972);
Carothers v. Follette,
314 F.Supp. 1014, 1023 (SDNY 1970).
See, e.g., Sostre v. McGinnis,
442 F.2d 178, 199 (CA2 1971) (en banc);
Preston v. Thieszen,
341 F.Supp. 785, 786-787 (WD Wis.1972);
cf. Gray v. Creamer,
465 F.2d 179, 186 (CA3 1972);
Palmigiano v. Travisono,
317 F.Supp. 776 (RI 1970);
Carothers v. Follette, supra.
See Marsh v. Moore,
325 F.Supp. 392, 395 (Mass.1971).
See Moore v. Ciccone, supra,
at 578 (Lay, J., concurring);
cf. Jones v. Wittenberg,
330 F.Supp. 707, 719 (ND Ohio 1971),
aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger,
456 F.2d 854 (CA6 1972).
J. Mitford, Kind and Usual Punishment: The Prison Business (1973).
National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Corrections 67-68 (1973).
See Palmigiano v. Travisono, supra,
Various studies have strongly recommended that correctional authorities have the right to inspect mail for contraband but not to read it. National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Corrections, Standard 2.17, pp. 66-69 (1973);
California Board of Corrections, California Correctional System Study: Institutions 40 (1971); Center for Criminal Justice, Boston University Law School, Model Rules and Regulations on Prisoners' Rights and Responsibilities, Standards IC-1 and IC-2, pp. 46-47 (1973).
See, e.g., Nolan v. Fitzpatrick,
451 F.2d at 547-548.
While Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, in
, stated that the First Amendment was applicable to the States by reason of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it has become customary to