Source: https://www.flra.gov/decisions/v32/32-085.html
Timestamp: 2016-07-24 10:58:51
Document Index: 278017858

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 5335', '§ 5335', '§ 8906', '§ 531', '§ 5335', '§ 5335', '§ 531', '§ 531', '§ 531', '§ 4302', '§ 7103']

You are hereHome [Decision Number] 32:0578(85)NG - - NTEU Chapter 213 and 228 and Energy, Washington, DC - - 1988 FLRAdec NG - - v32 p578
[ v32 p578 ] 32:0578(85)NG
The decision of the Authority follows: 32 FLRA No. 85 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
CHAPTER 213 AND 228
Union and UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Agency Case No. O-NG-1496 DECISION AND ORDER ON NEGOTIABILITY
I. Statement of the Case This case is before the Authority because of a
Labor-Management Relations Statute (the Statute) and presents issues concerning
the negotiability of five provisions of a contract which were agreed to locally
but disapproved during review of the agreement by the Agency head pursuant to
section 7114(c) of the Statute. The Union has withdrawn its appeal of another
provision designated "Article 34; section 5." The Agency did not file a
statement of position in response to the Union's petition for review. We find that Provision 1, which merely requires the
Agency to negotiate over whether existing statutory provisions concerning
periodic within-grade increases will be included in the parties' agreement, is
within the duty to bargain. Provision 2, which paraphrases applicable
regulations concerning what constitutes an acceptable level of competence for
purposes of granting within-grade increases, is within the duty to bargain
because it is consistent with applicable law, rule or regulation. The first
sentence of Provision 3, which requires the Agency to comply with applicable
law in establishing performance standards, is within the duty to bargain. The
remaining portion of Provision 3, which requires performance standards to be
written in conformance with particular criteria, is outside the duty to bargain
because it interferes with management's rights to direct employees and assign
work. Provision 4, which provides that reassignments will be made only for
mission-related reasons, is outside the duty to bargain because it interferes
with management's right to assign employees. Provision 5, which prohibits
bargaining unit employees from being placed under the supervision of contract
employees, is outside the duty to bargain because it interferes with
management's rights to assign work and to determine the personnel who will
conduct agency operations. II. Provision 1 Article 16, Section 1(A) and (B) (A) An employee will be granted a within grade increase
when the employee has completed the required waiting period and the supervisor
determines that the employee has performed at an acceptable level of competence
during the waiting period. (B) The waiting period is as
follows: 1. One year to move to steps 2, 3, and 4. 2. Two years to move to steps 5, 6, and 7.
3. Three years to move to steps 8, 9, and
10. A. Positions of the Parties (1) The Agency contends that the provision is nonnegotiable
because it concerns a matter specifically provided for by statute (5
U.S.C. § 5335(a)) and, thus, is not a condition of employment. The Union contends
that the provision: (1) concerns a condition of employment; (2) reflects the
basic requirements of 5 U.S.C. § 5335; and (3) is consistent with relevant
provisions of the Federal Personnel Manual. The Union asserts that the intent
of the provision is "simply to reiterate the statutory requirements, including
management's discretion, for granting a within-grade increase." Union statement
of position at 5. B. Analysis and Conclusions Section 7103(a)(14) of the Statute provides as
follows: (14) "conditions of employment" means personnel
policies, practices, and matters-- (A) relating to political activities prohibited under
subchapter III of chapter 73 of this title; (B) relating to the classification of any position;
or (C) to the extent such matters are specifically
provided for by Federal statute[.] Pursuant to section 7103(a)(14), an agency has no
obligation to bargain over proposals which concern matters affecting working
conditions to the extent that those matters are specifically provided for by
Federal statute. See for example, American Federation
of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 3804 and Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, Madison Region, 21 FLRA 870 (1986) (Proposal
1) (FDIC); Association of Civilian Technicians, Wisconsin
Chapter and Wisconsin Army National Guard, 26 FLRA 682 (1987) (Proposal
1) (ACT, Wisconsin). As the Union states, Provision 1 merely reiterates
statutory requirements relating to granting within-grade increases. A finding
that the provision is negotiable requires only that the Agency negotiate over
whether applicable statutory provisions will be incorporated in the collective
bargaining agreement. The Agency would not be required to negotiate over the
substance or content of the statutory provisions. Thus, the provision does not
concern the matters which are specifically provided for by statute.
Rather, the provision concerns the incorporation of the intact statutory
provisions in the contract. This provision is therefore distinguishable from
the proposals in FDIC and ACT, Wisconsin. The proposals involved
in cases such as FDIC and ACT, Wisconsin did not merely reiterate
existing statutory provisions. Findings that these proposals were negotiable
would have required negotiations over the substantive content of matters which
were specifically provided for by statute. In FDIC the proposal required the agency to pay
all costs associated with certain medical expenses as well as the deductible
costs associated with medical insurance programs. The Authority found that the
employees involved were subject to the provisions of 5 U.S.C. § 8906,
which establishes the amount of an agency's contribution to the cost of
employee health insurance. Consequently, because the proposal sought to
negotiate over agency contributions to the costs of employee health insurance,
the Authority found that it concerned a matter which was specifically provided
for by Federal statute and was not within the duty to bargain. In ACT, Wisconsin, the proposal required the
agency to provide sewing and laundering services to civilian technicians who
were required to wear the military uniform. We found that Subchapter I of 5
U.S.C. Chapter 59 sets forth a comprehensive scheme for the payment of a
uniform allowance by an agency for the maintenance of the required uniform.
Because the proposal sought to require the agency to provide services relating
to that maintenance of the uniform, a matter specifically provided for by
Federal statute, we found that the proposal was excepted from the definition of
conditions of employment under section 7103(a) (14)(C) of the
Statute. A proposal such as Provision 1 in the instant case, which
is limited to incorporating existing statutory provisions in a collective
bargaining agreement, does not fall within the exclusion from the definition of
conditions of employment which is set forth in section 7103(a)(14)(C) of the
Statute. Rather Provision 1 is similar to a proposal which requires management
to take action in accordance with law. See, for example,
American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, National
Council of EEOC Locals and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
10 FLRA 3 (1982) (Proposal 1), aff'd sub nom. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission v. FLRA, 744 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir. 1984),
cert. dismissed 476 U.S. 19 (1986). See also
National Treasury Employees Union and Internal Revenue Service, 3
FLRA 693 (1980) (Proposals 2 and 3). Based on the foregoing analysis we find that Provision 1
is within the duty to bargain. III. Provision 2 Article 16, Section 1(C) (C) An employee will be considered to have attained an
acceptable level of competence when the employee is rated "fully satisfactory"
or higher overall on the annual performance appraisal based on the performance
standards which have been made known to the employee in accordance with the
provisions of Article 17, Performance Standards. A. Positions of the Parties The Agency contends that Provision 2 violates
7106(a)(2)(A) and (B) of the Statute because it would require negotiations over
(1) the quality of employee performance which is necessary to obtain an
acceptable level of competence rating, and (2) the performance requirements for
a "fully successful" overall performance rating. The Union argues that the provision simply reiterates the
provisions in 5 C.F.R. § 531.404(a), the implementing regulation for 5
U.S.C. § 5335(a). Moreover, the Union argues that the provision does not
define the performance requirements for achieving a "fully successful" or a
"fully satisfactory" overall performance rating. According to the Union,
management retains the right to establish performance standards pursuant to
Article 17 of the parties' collective bargaining agreement. Union statement of
position at 6. B. Analysis and Conclusions We find that this provision (1) does not interfere with
the Agency's rights to direct employees and assign work, and (2) reflects and
is consistent with implementing regulations for 5 U.S.C. § 5335(a). An acceptable level of competence is the necessary
standard of performance which an employee must attain in order to qualify for a
within-grade increase. 5 C.F.R. § 531.404(a). Provision 2 merely
reiterates the requirements of these OPM regulations (5 C.F.R. § 531.404(a)), which we have held to be Government-wide regulations within the
meaning of 7117(a)(1) of the Statute. Patent Office Professional Association
and Patent and Trademark Office, Department of Commerce, 29 FLRA 1389, 1407
(1987) (Patent and Trademark Office), petition for review filed sub
nom. Patent Office Professional Association v. FLRA, Nos. 87-1824
and 88-1118 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 24, 1987). 5 C.F.R. § 531.404(a) does not
restrict management's rights to direct employees and assign work by
establishing performance standards because the regulation permits agencies to
determine the level of performance necessary to obtain a rating of level 3
under its performance appraisal plan. The regulation states that: To be determined at an acceptable level of competence,
the employee's most recent rating of record as defined in the agency
Performance Management Plan, must be at least level 3 ("Fully
Successful"). Neither the regulation nor Provision 2 is concerned with
what performance standards an employee must meet in order to be rated at level
3 under the Agency's performance plan. Under the regulation and the provision,
the Agency-established performance standards apply. Hence, the Agency is free
to define "fully successful" or "fully satisfactory" performance (the Union
uses the phrases interchangeably), which determines what performance level
constitutes an acceptable level of competence. Therefore, we reject the
Agency's contention that the provision prescribes the level of performance
necessary to attain an acceptable level of competence rating and the
performance requirements for a "fully successful" or "fully satisfactory"
overall rating. A proposal which paraphrases Government-wide rules and
regulations is within the duty to bargain unless the proposal directly
interferes with management rights under the Statute or is inconsistent with
applicable regulations. National Treasury Employees Union and Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, 31 FLRA 566, 588-89 and 610 (1988),
petition for review filed sub nom. United States Nuclear
Regulatory Commission v. FLRA, No. 88-2086 (4th Cir. Apr. 20, 1988).
Provision 2 does not interfere with management's rights and is not inconsistent
with applicable Government-wide regulations. Thus, Provision 2 is distinguishable from proposals which
establish the quality of employee performance necessary to attain a positive
acceptable level of competence rating restrict management's discretion to
determine the level of performance sufficient for a within-grade increase and
work. Patent and Trademark Office, 29 FLRA at 1406-09. In Patent and Trademark Office, 29 FLRA at
1406-09, the proposal defined performance which was "marginal" as constituting
an acceptable level of competence for a within-grade increase. We found the
proposal to be nonnegotiable because it restricted management's discretion to
determine the level of performance sufficient for a within-grade increase. We
held that the proposal violated management's right to establish performance
standards and, thereby, directly interfered with management's rights to direct
employees and assign work. Id. Accordingly, based on the foregoing analysis we find that
Provision 2 is within the duty to bargain. IV. Provision 3 Article 17, Section 2(C) Performance standards shall be written for each element
in a way which will permit, to the maximum extent feasible, the accurate
evaluation of job performance on the basis of objective criteria. Also, to the
extent feasible, standards will include expectations of quantity, quality, or
timeliness, and may include expectations concerning the manner of performance,
where manner of performance is actually related to job duties and
responsibilities. For example, manner of performance is related to the actual
duties of an employee who regularly provides information to the public through
direct contact. A. Positions of the Parties The Agency asserts that the provision violates
7106(a)(2)(A) and (B) of the Statute. It argues that because the provision
would subject management's determination concerning the content of performance
standards to the grievance procedure and arbitral review, the provision
substantively interferes with these rights. The Union asserts that the provision "was put forward
during negotiations by the Agency simply to reiterate" the Agency's regulations
regarding its Performance Appraisal System (DOE Order 3430.3). Union statement
of position at 7. The Union argues that the provision is intended to establish
a nonquantitative requirement by which the application of established
performance standards may be measured. The Union asserts that Provision 3 is
similar to proposals held negotiable in American Federation of
Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 1940 and Department of
Agriculture, Plum Island Disease Center, 16 FLRA 816 (1984) and
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Chicago Region, Illinois, 7
FLRA 217 (1981). Union statement of position at 8. B. Analysis and Conclusions We conclude that the first sentence of Provision 3 is
within the duty to bargain. The remaining sentences of Provision 3 are
nonnegotiable because they conflict with management's rights to direct
Statute. Management's rights to direct employees and assign work
include the right to determine the content of performance standards and
critical elements. POPA, 25 FLRA 384, 385; National Treasury
Debt, 3 FLRA 769 (1980), affirmed sub nom. National Treasury
Employees Union v. FLRA, 691 F.2d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1982). A provision
which requires the Agency to comply with applicable laws and regulations in the
establishment of an employee performance appraisal plan does not interfere with
management's rights because section 7106 rights are to be exercised in
accordance with law. See Newark Air Force Station and American
Federation of Government Employees, Local 2221, 30 FLRA 616, 627, 631-35
(1987). The first sentence of Provision 3 requires that the
Agency's performance standards will, to the maximum extent feasible, permit the
accurate evaluation of job performance on the basis of objective criteria. This
sentence reflects statutory requirements. 5 U.S.C. § 4302(b)(1). It is not
more restrictive than the law governing the establishment of performance
standards and does not establish a separate contractual limitation on
management's determination of the content of performance standards. See
POPA, 25 FLRA at 391-94. Furthermore, a determination by a arbitrator of
whether the agency's performance standards comply with law is not inconsistent
with management's rights. Newark Air Force Station, 30 FLRA at
635-37. Therefore, the first sentence of Provision 3 is negotiable. The remaining portion of Provision 3, however, does not
merely require performance standards to be in accordance with applicable laws.
It is more restrictive than the law governing the establishment of performance
standards. It expressly prescribes that various separate additional contractual
criteria will govern the content of standards to the "extent feasible." It
precludes management from establishing performance standards which the Agency
is legally entitled to prescribe. See POPA, 25 FLRA at 391-94. By
precluding the Agency from establishing legally permissible performance
standards, the provision directly interferes with management's rights to direct
employees and assign work. Id. A finding that Provision 3 is consistent with an Agency
regulation does not alter this conclusion. The regulation restricts the
exercise of management's rights to assign work and direct employees.
Incorporation of those restrictions into the collective bargaining agreement
requires management to comply with them during the period of the collective
bargaining agreement regardless of whether the regulation is revised or
rescinded. Although law or regulation may limit the exercise of management's
rights, the Statute prohibits the negotiation of contractual limitations on
management's rights. American Federation of Government Employees,
AFL-CIO, National Council of Social Security Administration Field Operations
Locals and Social Security Administration, 25 FLRA 622, 624 (1987)
(proposal requiring adherence to existing agency policy concerning management's
right to assign work constitutes an independent limitation on the right),
enforced sub nom. American Federation of Government Employees,
AFL-CIO, National Council of Social Security Administration Field
Operations Locals v. FLRA, 836 F.2d 1408 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
The Union's reliance on Plum Island Disease
Center, 16 FLRA 816 (1984) (Proposal 1), and Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, 7 FLRA 217 (1981), is misplaced. In those cases, the
Authority found that the proposals involved general, nonquantitative
requirements by which the application of established performance standards
could be evaluated. In contrast, Provision 3--apart from the first
sentence--prescribes independent contractual restrictions on the content of the
performance standards. Therefore, except for the first sentence, Provision 3 is
outside the duty to bargain. V. Provision 4 Article 21, Section 3 Reassignments between positions or between work units
are made only for mission related reasons. A. Positions of the Parties The Agency asserts that the provision violates
management's right to assign employees under 7106(a)(2)(A) because it would
require negotiation over the conditions under which a reassignment would be
made. The Union argues that (1) the Agency retains the sole
discretion to determine what is mission-related, and (2) the provision would
require only that the Agency act in accordance with law and regulation. It
asserts that Provision 4 is negotiable under the Authority's decision in
Council of U.S. Marshals Service Locals and Department of Justice, U.S.
Marshals Service, 11 FLRA 672, 676 (1983), because the phrases
"mission-related reasons," as used in this case, and "the efficiency of the
service," as used in U.S. Marshals Service are "synonymous." Union
statement of position at 9. B. Analysis and Conclusions In U.S. Marshals Service, 11 FLRA at 676-78, the
Authority found Proposal 4 to be negotiable. Proposal 4 provided: Involuntary reassignments will only be made to promote
the efficiency of the service, and will not be made to discriminate or punish,
or for any reason that would violate law, rule, regulation, or this
agreement. Based on the wording of Proposal 4 and the union's stated
intent, the Authority determined that the purpose and effect of the proposal
was to require management to exercise its right to assign employees in
accordance with applicable law, regulation, and contractual procedures.
Therefore, the Authority held that the proposal was negotiable because it
merely required the agency to exercise its statutory right in accordance with
law. In contrast to the proposal in U.S. Marshals
Service, Provision 4 establishes the absolute criterion that reassignments
must be made "only for mission related reasons." The provision does not define
that phrase, which in our view, is not synonymous with "efficiency of the
service," as the Union claims, or with "in accordance with applicable laws."
The phrase is not self-explanatory and does not reflect the Union's stated
intent. The Union could have drafted this provision to reflect its intent but
has not done so. The provision, as worded, interferes with the Agency's
reserved right and is outside the duty to bargain. See Overseas
Education Association, Inc. v. FLRA, 827 F.2d 814, 818 (D.C. Cir.
1987). VI. Provision 5 Article 36, Section 5 Bargaining unit employees will not be placed under the
supervision of contract employees. A. Positions of the Parties The Agency contends that the provision interferes with
"management's right to assign." The Union argues that the intent of the provision is to
ensure that bargaining unit employees are not "adversely affected by the
exercise of management's right to assign work." Union statement of position at
10. The Union argues that contract employees are not "supervisory employees,"
as defined in 5 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(10), because they do not have the
authority to hire, promote, reward, transfer, lay off, discipline, furlough,
remove, or adjust grievances. Thus, the Union argues that bargaining unit
employees could be adversely affected if they were supervised by contract
employees. The Union also asserts that the supervision of bargaining unit
employees by contract employees "would subvert the integrity of the negotiated
grievance procedure." Union statement of position at 11. It argues that since
contract supervisors would have "no authority to adjust grievances or to
discipline employees, the filing of grievances at the lowest levels of the
mutually agreed upon grievance procedure would be futile."
Id. B. Analysis and Conclusions Provision 5 directly interferes with management's rights
to assign work and to determine the personnel who will conduct agency
operations. The provision restricts the Agency's ability to require bargaining
unit employees to carry out tasks assigned to them by contract employees and
precludes the Agency from requiring contract personnel to perform supervisory
functions in connection with the bargaining unit. For these reasons, the
provision conflicts with section 7106(a)(2)(B). American Federation of
Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 1808 and Department of the Army,
Sierra Army Depot, 30 FLRA 1236, 1250-51 (1988); Defense Logistics
Agency, Council of AFGE Locals, AFL-CIO and Department of Defense, Defense
Logistics Agency, 24 FLRA 367, 374-76 (1986). We reject the Union's argument that the provision does
not interfere with management's rights because under section 7103(a)(10) of the
Statute, contract employees do not have the authority to supervise. We
considered and rejected the same argument in Defense Logistic Agency, 24
FLRA at 375. In that case, we concluded that although section 7103(a)(10)
enumerates duties and responsibilities which would identify individuals as
supervisors for purposes of including or excluding them from bargaining units,
the section does not limit an agency's discretion to determine which personnel
will perform those duties and responsibilities. Id. at 375-76. The same
reasoning applies here. Consequently, we also reject the Union's claim that
employees could be adversely affected by the exercise of management's right to
assign work, since that claim is premised on the Union's erroneous
interpretation of section 7103(a)(10). Accordingly, we find that Provision 5 is
nonnegotiable. VII. Order The Agency must rescind its disapproval of Provisions 1,
2 and the first sentence of Provision 3.(2) The petition for
review as to the remainder of Provision 3, Provision 4 and Provision 5 is
dismissed. Issued, Washington, D.C., _________________________Jerry L. Calhoun, Chairman
have footnotes.) 1. Since the Agency did not file a statement of position,
the Agency contentions referred to are those set forth in the Agency's
disapproval of the agreement. 2. In finding these provisions negotiable, we make no