Source: http://www.juricaf.org/arret/CONSEILDELEUROPE-COUREUROPEENNEDESDROITSDELHOMME-19791204-729975-749676
Timestamp: 2017-07-28 03:21:22+00:00
Document Index: 187226795

Matched Legal Cases: ['arrêt ', "l'article 6", "l'article 6", "l'article 6", "l'article 6", "l'article 6", "l'article 6", "l'article 6", "l'article 6", "l'article 6", "l'article 6", "l'article 38", "l'article 11", "l'article 17", "l'article 2", "l'article 11", "l'article 11", "l'article 11", "l'article 17", "l'article 6", "l'article 6", "l'article 6", "l'article 6", "l'article 6", "l'article 3", "l'article 3", "l'article 17", "l'article 6", "l'article 6", "l'article 6", "l'article 6", "l'article 6", "l'article 6", 'in fine', "l'article 6", "l'article 6", "l'article 3", "l'article 27", "l'article 3", "l'article 3", "l'article 3", "l'article 26", "l'article 27", "l'article 17", "l'article 3", "l'article 6", "l'article 3", "l'article 6", "l'article 3", "l'article 6", "l'article 17", "l'article 11", "l'article 11", "l'article 17", "l'article 3", "l'article 6", "l'article 6", "l'article 17", "l'article 29", "l'article 6", "l'article 27"]

Page d'accueil > Résultats de la recherche ALBERT et LE COMPTE c. BELGIQUE
Type d'affaire : DecisionType de recours : Partiellement irrecevable ; partiellement recevableNumérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 7299/75;7496/76Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1979-12-04;7299.75 Analyses : (Art. 35-1) EPUISEMENT DES VOIES DE RECOURS INTERNESParties : Demandeurs : ALBERT et LE COMPTEDéfendeurs : BELGIQUETexte : APPLICATIONS/REQUETES NÂ° 7299/75 & 7496/76 (joined/jointes )
Alfred ALBERT and Hermann LE COMPTE v/BELGIU M Alfred ALBERT et Hermann LE COMPTE c/BELGIQU E DECISION of 4 December 1979 on the admissibility of the applications DÃCISION du 4 dÃ©cembre 1979 sur la recevabilitÃ© des requÃªtes
Article 6 of the Convention : Does a decision of a body in the exercise of its official functions, suspending or withdrawing the right to practise medicine by way of penalty constitute the determination of civil rights and obligations or of a criminat charge ) (Complaint declared admissible) . Article 26 of the Convention : Domestrc remedies have been exhausted if, before the highest domestic body, the applicant has submitted in substance his complaint before the Commission, even without particular reference to the Convention .
Article 6 de la Convention : La dÃ©cision d'un organisme exerÃ§ant des fonctions officielles prononÃ§ant, Ã titre de sanction, la suspension ou le retrait du droit de pratiquer la mÃ©decine porte-t-elle sur une contestation sur des droits et obligations de caractÃ©re civil ou sur le bien-fondÃ© d'une accusation en matiÃ¨re pÃ©nale ? (RequÃªte dÃ©clarÃ©e recevable) . Article 26 de le Convention : L'Ã©puisement des voies de recours internes est rÃ©alisÃ© lorsque, devant l'instance nationale suprAme, le requÃ©rant a exposÃ© la substance du grief soumis Ã la Commission, mÃªme sans faire allusion Ã la Convention .
(English : see p. 19)
A . Les faits de la cause Alfred ALBERT peuvent se rÃ©sumer comme sui t Le requÃ©rant, de nationalitÃ© belge, est nÃ© le 5 mars 1906 Ã Anvers . Il est docteur en mÃ©decine et a son domicile Ã Molenbeek (Belgique) . -5-
Il est reprÃ©sentÃ© dans la procÃ©dure devant la Commission par Me Xavier MagnÃ©e, avocat au barreau de Bruxelles . Le 9 avril 1974, le requÃ©rant est averti par le Conseil provincial de l'Ordre des mÃ©decins du Brabant qu'une enquÃªte a Ã©tÃ© ordonnÃ©e contre lui et qu'il est invitÃ© Ã se prÃ©senter devant le Conseil le 8 mai 1974 pour s'expliquer sur une sÃ©rie de certificats d'incapacitÃ© de travail dÃ©livrÃ©s par lui . C'est lors de sa comparution le 8 mai 1974 qu'il est informÃ© du reproche qui lui est fait d'avoir Ã©tabli des certificats de Â« complaisance Â» . Le 4 juin 1974, le Conseil provincial de l'Ordre des mÃ©decins du Brabant prononce Ã l'encontre du requÃ©rant une suspension du droit d'exercer l'art mÃ©dical d'une durÃ©e de deux ans . La dÃ©cision est notifiÃ©e au requÃ©rant le 11 juin 1974 et celui-ci interjette appel, le 18 juin 1974, de mÃ¨me que le magistrat assesseur au Conseil de l'Ordre le fait, en date du 26 juin 1974, ce dernier dans le but d'obtenir le renforcement de la peine . Le Conseil d'appel, par dÃ©cision du 19 novembre 1974, confirme la dÃ©cision des premiers juges . Le requÃ©rant se pourvoit en cassation mais la Cour de cassation rejette le pourvoi par arrÃªt du 12 juin 1975 .
GRIEFS Le requÃ©ranf allÃ¨gue la violation de l'article 6, paragraphe 1 . 6 para-
graphe 2 et 6, paragraphes 3 a), b) et dl . L'argumentation du requÃ©rant peut se rÃ©sumer ainsi : L'article 6 s'applique Ã toute procÃ©dure concernant des contestations sur des droits et obligations de caractÃ©re civil ou le bien-fondÃ© de toute accusation portÃ©e en matiÃ©re pÃ©nale . Il importe donc peu que soit saisie de la question, comme en l'espÃ©ce, une instance non dÃ©nommÃ©e Â« tribunal Â» c'est la nature de la contestation qui importe . Les dispositions de l'article 6 doivent par consÃ©quent s'appliquer Ã ces juridictions . a . Sur la prÃ©tendue violation de l'article 6, paragraphe 1, qui confÃ¨re le droit Ã ce que sa cause soit entendue Ã©quitablement . . . et par un tribunal impartial, le requÃ©rant fait observer que la notion de procÃ©s Ã©quitable implique le respect des droits Ã©noncÃ©s aux paragraphes 2 et 3 de l'article 6 mais pas exclusivement ; en effet, d'autres circonstances peuvent rendre le procÃ©s inÃ©quitable, il faut donc examiner la procÃ©dure dans son ensemble .
Dans le cas prÃ©sent, les violations ne manquent pas . En particulier, le caractÃ¨re impartial du Conseil de l'Ordre semble en l'espÃ©ce Â«Ã©s douteux . b . Sur la prÃ©tendue violation de l'article 6, paragraphe 2, le requÃ©rant fait valoir que cette disposition assure le respect d'un droit Ã©lÃ©mentaire de la dÃ©fense, Ã savoir la prÃ©somption d'innocence . Elle implique que le juge doit aborder une affaire criminelle sans l'idÃ©e prÃ©conÃ§ue que l'accusÃ© a commis l'infraction en question . Cela concerne au premier chef l'Ã©tat d'esprit dans lequel le juge s'acquitte de sa tÃ¢che . En l'espÃ©ce, il semble bien que le Conseil de l'Ordre se soil laissÃ© influencer par les antÃ©cÃ©dents judiciaires du requÃ©rant . En effet, l'accusation se fonde principalement sur un tÃ©moignage non seulement contradictoire Ã plusieurs reprises mais encore obtenu par une ruse et une provocation qui le rendent des plus suspects, au point qu'on n'a pas osÃ© dÃ©fÃ©rer le serment Ã ce tÃ©moin . De mÃ¨me, l'article 6, paragraphe 2, impose Ã l'accusation de fournir la preuve de la culpabilitÃ© . Cette preuve ne peut pas consister dans la constatation de l'impossibilitÃ© pour l'accusÃ© de fournir des fiches mÃ©dicales justifiant ses actes . C'est mettre par un artifice la preuve de son innocence Ã charge de ce dernier : l'absence de preuves nÃ©gatives n'est pas une preuve positive . Enfin, les juges doivent permettre Ã l'accusÃ© de faire valoir ses contrepreuves, ce qui lui fut refusÃ©, en l'espÃ©ce, car on lui a imposÃ© pour ce faire un dÃ©lai ridiculement bref et un mode de preuve unique . c . Sur la prÃ©tendue violation de l'article 6, paragraphe 3, le requÃ©rant fait observer que : - Aux termes de l'article 6, paragraphe 3 a) : Le droit d'Ãªtre informÃ© de la nature et de la cause de l'accusation recouvre, non seulement l'information des fails matÃ©riels qui sont mis Ã sa charge, mais aussi celle de la qualification juridique de ces faits matÃ©riels . En l'espÃ©ce, le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© convoquÃ© devant le Conseil de l'Ordre avec la seule mention des noms de quelques personnes au sujet desquelles on allait l'interroger . On ne l'informe pas du reproche qui lui est fait d'avoir dÃ©livrÃ© Ã ces personnes des certificats de complaisance et on lui cache leurs adresses pour qu'il ne puisse les contacter pour prÃ©parer sa dÃ©fense . - Aux termes de l'article 6, paragraphe 3 bl : Une dÃ©fense raisonnable et efficace exige une prÃ©paration qui requiert un certain temps et des facilitÃ©s ; cet article a pour but d'en garantir l'octroi . Le temps nÃ©cessaire peut varier selon les espÃ¨ces et on ne peut donner de rÃ©gle prÃ©cise Ã priori mais il apparait absurde de soutenir qu'un dÃ©lai d'une heure ou deux Ã partir du moment oÃ¹ l'on apprend les charges - et donc les Ã©lÃ©ments sur lesquels doit porter la dÃ©fense - soit suffisant pour assurer un e - 7 -
dÃ©fense effective, d'autant plus que l'interrogatoire se dÃ©roule la nuit, entre 21 et 23 heures, et qu'il aurait fallu aller rechercher plusieurs tÃ©moins . - Enfin, aux termes de l'article 6, paragraphe 3 dl : Le droit d'interroger les tÃ©moins Ã charge et de faire valoir des tÃ©moins Ã dÃ©charge ne confÃ©re sans doute pas le droit de faire citer des tÃ©moins sans aucune restriction . Si l'on dÃ©cide d'accepter la preuve testimoniale, celle-ci doit cependant Ãªtre ouverte Ã©galement aux deux parties ; c'est une application de principe d'Ã©galitA des armes, du procÃ©s Aquitable . En l'espÃ©ce, le Conseil de l'Ordre a refusÃ© la confrontation du requÃ©rant avec le tÃ©moin de l'accusation lui enlevant toute chance d'interroger ce tÃ©moin Ã charge : de plus, il n'a pas fait dÃ©poser les deux autres bÃ©nÃ©ficiaires des certificats suspects .
Le requÃ©rant demande l'octroi de dommages-intÃ©rÃ¨ts pour le prÃ©judice matÃ©riel et moral subi . En ce qui concerne le dommage matÃ©riel, il rÃ©clame une indemriitÃ© reprÃ©sentant le revenu professionnel qu'il aurait pu avoir pendant la pÃ©riode de sa suspension effective, calculÃ©e sur la base de sa dÃ©claration fiscaleAe l'annÃ©e antÃ©rieure . Quant au prÃ©judice moral, l'indemnitÃ© est Ã©valuÃ©e Ã titre provisionnel,Ã© 1 franc belge . B . Les faits de la cause Hermann LE COMPTE peuvent se rÃ©sumer comme suit : Le requÃ©rant, de nationalitÃ© belge, est nÃ© le 26 avril 1929 Ã Alost IBelgiquel . II est docteur en mÃ©decine et a son domicile Ã Knokke-Heist (Belgique) . Il est reprÃ©sentÃ© dans la procÃ©dure devant la Commission par Me John Bultinck, avocat au barreau de Gand . Le requÃ©rant a saisi la Commission d'une premiÃ©re requÃ¨te dirigÃ©e contre la Belgique . Cette requÃªte, inscrite sous le NÂ° 6878/75, a Ã©tÃ© dÃ©clarÃ©e par la Commission partiellement recevable le 6 octobre 1976 . ' Les faits qui sont Ã l'origine de la prÃ©sente requÃªte sont en rÃ©sumÃ© les suivant s Le 22 fÃ©vrier 1974 le requÃ©rant est averti par le Conseil provincial de l'Ordre des mÃ©decins de la Flandre occidentale qu'une enquÃªte a Ã©tÃ© ordonnÃ©e contre lui pour Â« publicitÃ© et diffamation de l'Ordre n : publicitÃ© au motif qu'il avait accordÃ© trois interviews Ã des hebdomadaires et diffamation parce qu'il avait adressÃ© une lettre au PrÃ©sident de l'Ordre . DA . 6/79
Le 22 mars 1974 le requÃ©rant adresse au PrÃ©sident de l'Ordre une lettre dans laquelle il fait connaitre sa volontÃ© d'exercer son droit de rÃ©cusation dans le cadre des articles 40 et 41 de l'ArrÃ©tÃ© Royal du 6 fÃ©vrier 1970 .
Le 27 mars 1974, le Conseil provincial de l'Ordre des mÃ©decins de la Flandre occidentale rejette la demande de rÃ©cusation formulÃ©e par le requÃ©rant et prononce Ã son encontre une suspension du droit d'exercer l'art mÃ©dical d'une durÃ©e de deux ans . La dÃ©cision est rendue par dÃ©faut . Le requÃ©rant fait appel de cette dÃ©cision le 5 avril 1974 . Par dÃ©cision du 28 octobre 1974 rendue par dÃ©faut, le Conseil d'appel de l'Ordre des mÃ©decins rejette les moyens de rÃ©cusation et transforme la suspension en radiation .
Contre cette dÃ©cision le requÃ©rant forme opposition le 4 novembre 1974 . Compte tenu du fait qu'il est convoquÃ© Ã l'audience du 16 dÃ©cembre 1974 il formule une nouvelle demande de rÃ©cusation le 6 dÃ©cembre 1974 .
Opposition et rÃ©cusation sont rejetÃ©es par dÃ©cision du 6 janvier 1975 . Contre cette dÃ©cision le requÃ©rant se pourvoit en cassation, mais la Cour de cassation rejette le pourvoi par arrÃ©t du 7 novembre 1975, signifiÃ© au requÃ©rant le 25 novembre 1975 . La radiation du requÃ©rant de la liste de l'Ordre des mÃ©decins est ainsi rendue dÃ©finitive Ã compter du 26 dÃ©cembre 1975 et a comme consÃ©quence pour le requÃ©rant la dÃ©fense d'exercer la mÃ©decine en application des articles 7, paragraphe 1 et 31 de l'ArrÃ©tÃ© Royal NÂ° 79 du 10 novembre 1967 concernant l'Ordre des mÃ©decins et l'article 38, paragraphe 1, 1Â° de l'ArrÃªtÃ© Royal N" 78 du 10 novembre 1967 concernant l'art de guÃ©rir .
GRIEFS Le requÃ©rant allÃ©gue la violation des articles 3, 6 paragraphe 1, 11 para-
graphes 1 et 2 et 17 de la Convention . Les moyens invoquÃ©s sont en principe les mÃªmes que ceux dÃ©veloppÃ©s dans la premiÃ¨re requÃªte INÂ° 6878/751 . 1 . Le requÃ©rant allÃ©gue en premier lieu la violation de l'article 11, tant pris isolÃ©ment qu'en liaison avec l'article 17 de la Convention . Son argumentation peut se rÃ©sumer comme suit : a . les dÃ©cisions incriminÃ©es des conseils provinciaux et d'appel de l'Ordre des mÃ©decins ont Ã©tÃ© rendues par les organes instituÃ©s par l'ArrÃ©tÃ© Royal NÂ° 79 du 10 novembre 1967 .
Le requÃ©rant est soumis Ã leur juridiction en vertu de l'article 2, alinÃ©a 2 dudit ArrÃ©tÃ© Royal qui dispose : Â« Pour pouvoir pratiquer l'art mÃ©dical en Belgique, tout mÃ©decin doit Ãªtre inscrit au tableau de l'Ordre . Â» L'Ordre des mÃ©decins est une association dans le sens de l'article 11, paragraphe 1 de la Convention . L'ArrÃ©tÃ© Royal prÃ©citÃ© dispose dans son article 1 . alinÃ©a 3, que l'Ordre a jouit de la personnalitÃ© civile de droit public Â» . Le requÃ©rant estime que l'affiliation forcÃ©e Ã l'Ordre des mÃ©decins constitue une entrave Ã la libertÃ© d'association, qui implique la libertÃ© de ne pas s'associer . b . En outre, le requÃ©rant estime que cette affiliation forcÃ©e, imposÃ©e par ArrÃªtÃ© Royal, donc par acte du pouvoir exÃ©cutif, excÃ¨de les limites des restrictions autorisÃ©es par le paragraphe 2 de l'article 11 de la Convention, vu que ni cette obligation de s'affilier, ni mÃªme l'association des mÃ©decins dans un Ordre ne constituent des mesures nÃ©cessaires Ã la prolection de la santÃ© dans une sociÃ©tÃ© dÃ©mocratique . De telles mesures existent par ailleurs dans la lÃ©gislation belge, par exemple dans les prescriptions de l'ArrÃ¨tÃ© Royal NÂ° 78 du 11 novembre 1967 Â« relatif Ã l'art de guÃ©rir, Ã l'exercice des professions qui s'y rattachent et aux commissions mÃ©dicales n . Selon le requÃ©rant, la crÃ©ation de l'Ordre des mÃ©decins et plus spÃ©cialement l'obligation d'y adhÃ©rer n'ajoute rien Ã la protection de la santÃ© publique et ne vise que l'Ã©tablissement d'une association qui dÃ©fend ses propres intÃ©rÃ©ts (essentiellement de caractÃ©re matÃ©riel) ainsi que ceux de ses membres et dont le fonctionnement est contraire Ã l'intÃ©rÃ©t gÃ©nÃ©ral d'une sociÃ©tÃ© dÃ©mocratique . c . Le requÃ©rant estime non seulement que l'ArrÃªtÃ© Royal NÂ° 79 prÃ©citÃ© et les dÃ©cisions rendues par les organes instituÃ©s par celui-ci violent la libertÃ© d'association mais il affirme Ã©galement que la crÃ©ation mÃ©me de l'Ordre des mÃ©decins constitue un acte des pouvoirs lÃ©gislatif et exÃ©cutif belges qui n'a pas seulement pour but d'apporter des restrictions Ã la libertÃ© d'association, comme l'y autorise le paragraphe 2 de l'article 11 de la Convention, mais qui vise l'abolition pure et simple de cette libenÃ© . La crÃ©ation de l'Ordre des mÃ©decins tend donc Ã la destruction d'une des libertÃ©s reconnues par la Convention, ou au moins Ã une limitation de celle-ci qui est plus ample que celles prÃ©vues Ã la Convention et constituerait donc Ã©galement une violation de l'article 17 . 2 . Le requÃ©rant allÃ©gue ensuite la violation de l'article 6, paragraphe 1 de la Convention par le fait que les conseils provinciaux et d'appel de l'Ordr e
des mÃ©decins seraient, tant en ce qui concerne leur institution que leur composition et leurs rÃ©gles de procÃ©dure, contraires aux prescriptions de cette disposition . Il affirme que, contrairement Ã ce que soutient la jurisprudence belge, les organes de l'Ordre des mÃ©decins ne sont pas uniquement des collÃ©ges disciplinaires, mais de vÃ©ritables tribunaux qui connaissent de droits et obligations de caractÃ©re civil tels que la libertÃ© d'expression et le droit d'exercer la profession de mÃ©decin . Les dispositions de l'article 6 doivent, par consÃ©quent, s'appliquer Ã ces juridictions . Le requÃ©rant fait observer Ã cet Ã©gard : - que celles-ci ne sont pas Ã©tablies par la loi mais par un ArrÃªtÃ© Royal lacte de l'exÃ©cutifl alors que le paragraphe 1 de l'article 6 exige un tribunal Ã©tabli par la loi ; - que, d'autre part, les conseils provinciaux de l'Ordre sont composÃ©s de mÃ©decins originaires de la mÃ©me province que le requÃ©rant, - confrÃ©res de celui-ci, qui se considÃ¨rent comme partie lÃ©sÃ©e, par consÃ©quent comme adversaires du justiciable . Ouant aux conseils d'appel de l'Ordre des mÃ©decins, ils ont une composition paritaire, Ã©tant composÃ©s pour la moitiÃ© de mÃ©decins et pour la moitiÃ© de magistrats de carriÃ¨re . Cette composition paritaire n'offre cependant aucune garantie d'impartialitÃ© puisque la moitiÃ© des membres du conseil - les mÃ©decins confrÃ©res et concurrents du requÃ©rant - serait partiale . Le requÃ©rant estime d'ailleurs que la prÃ©sence au sein d'un tel conseil d'un seul membre dont les intÃ©rÃ©ts pourraient Ãªtre contraires Ã ceux des iusticiables serait inconciliable avec une justice impartiale . D'autre part, il n'existerait dans 'ces conseils aucune sÃ©paration entre les personnes qui occupent la fonction d'accusateur public et celles qui occupent celles d'organe d'instruction et de juge du fond .
Toutes ces qualitÃ©s sont confondues dans le chef des m@mes personnes . Le requÃ©rant estime que ces faits constituent des violations du paragraphe 1 de l'article 6 de la Convention qui garantit Ã toute personne le droit Ã un procÃ©s Ã©quitable par un iribunal indÃ©pendant et impartial . - que les conseils de l'Ordre des mÃ©decins siÃ¨gent Ã huis clos (article 19 de l'ArrÃ©tÃ© Royal du 6 fÃ©vrier 1970) ce qui serait contraire Ã la rÃ©gle de la publicitÃ© des procÃ©dures, instaurÃ©e par le paragraphe 1 de l'article 6 prÃ©citÃ© . 3 . Enfin, le requÃ©rant allÃ©gue la violation de l'article 3 de la Convention . - 11 -
En dÃ©cidant la radiation du requÃ©rant de l'Ordre des mÃ©decins et en lui interdisant par consÃ©quent le droit d'exercer l'art mÃ©dical, l'Ordre des mÃ©decins a infligÃ© au requÃ©rant une peine humiliante, au sens de l'article 3, eu Ã©gard au fait qu'elle est injustifiÃ©e et intentionnelle, lui causant un mal moral dÃ©mesurÃ© . En effet, aucun motif d'incompÃ©tence professionnelle, ou de faute, n'a Ã©tÃ© retenue contre lui . Tout s'est dÃ©roulÃ© sur le plan de la publicitÃ© et de la diffamation . Le requÃ©rant demande la rÃ©paration du prÃ©judice matÃ©riel et moral Ã©valuÃ© Ã titre provisionnel Ã 1 franc belge .
PROCÃDUR E Le 10 dÃ©cembre 1976, la Commission dÃ©cide (article 42, paragraphe 2 b) de son RÃ¨glement intÃ©rieur) de porter les requÃªtes Albert et Le Compte Ã la connaissance du Gouvernement belge sans toutefois demander des observations sur la recevabilitÃ© de ces requÃªtes . En ce faisant, la Commission estime que les deux requÂ®tesposent des problÃ©mes semblables Ã ceux soulevÃ©s dans les affaires Le Compte, Van Leuven et De Meyere (RequÃªtes NÂ° 6878/75 et 7238/75) qui se trouvent Ã un stade d'examen plus avancÃ© . La Commission avait, en effet, dÃ©clarÃ© recevables les griefs sous l'angle des articles 6 et 11 considÃ©rÃ© isolÃ©ment ou combinÃ© avec l'article 17 de la Convention .
Le 12 dÃ©cembre 1978, la Commission dÃ©cide de demander aux parties des observations Ã©crites sur la recevabilitÃ© des deux requÃªtes en question . Le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur prÃ©sente ses observations sur la recevabilitÃ© des requÃªtes Le Compte et Albert, respectivement le 9 et le 15 fÃ©vrier 1979 . Le conseil du requÃ©rant Albert, Maitre Xavier MagnÃ©e, prÃ©sente la rÃ©ponse aux observations du Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªte en date du 29 mars 1979 . Maitre John Bultinck, conseil du requÃ©rant Le Compte prÃ©sente les observations en rÃ©ponse Ã celles du Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur, en date du 20 avril 1979 .
ARGUMENTATION DES PARTIE S A . RequÃ©te A/bert : Article 6 paragrephes 1, 2 et 3 e), b) et d) 1 . Le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur plaide le non-Ã©puisement des voies de recours internes . Le requÃ©rant n'aurait invoquÃ© Ã aucun stade de la procÃ©dure - conseil provincial, conseil d'appel et Cour de cassation - des moyens allÃ©guant explicitement ou implicitement des violations de la Convention .
II s'est bornÃ© Ã faire valoir au stade de la procÃ©dure de cassation la violation des droits de la dÃ©fense . Quant Ã la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªte (article 27 de la Convention), le Gouvernement se rÃ©tÃ©re Ã ses observations sur la recevabilitÃ© du 15 dÃ©cembre 1975 dans l'affaire Le Compte IrequÃªte NÂ° 6878/75) et confirme la position qu'il a adoptÃ©e dans les premiÃ¨res affaires (Le Compte, Van Leuven et De Meyere) Ã savoir l'inapplicabilitÃ© de l'article 6, paragraphe 1 en matiÃ©re disciplinaire et, subsidiairement, l'absence de violation de l'article 6, paragraphe 1 . 2 . La partie requÃ©rante soutient pour sa part qu'il a fait valoir devant les juridictions internes et, en particulier, devant la Cour de cassation, l'irrÃ©gularitÃ© de la procÃ©dure et le fait que celle-ci violait les droits de la dÃ©fense . Il a donc fait valoir en substance l'absence de procÃ¨s Ã©quitable . Par consÃ©quent, il a satisfaitaux exigences d'Ã©puisement des voies de recours internes . Ne l'eÃ»t-il point fait, les juridictions internes et, en particulier, la Cour de cassation avaient l'obligation de soulever d'office les moyens et griefs fondÃ©s sur la violation de la Convention, eu Ã©gard au fait que les dispositions de la Convention sont d'ordre public . Quant Ã la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªte larticle 27, paragraphe 21, le requÃ©rant se fonde sur l'arrÃ©t de la Cour europÃ©enne des Droits de l'Homme dans l'affaire Kdnig et parvient Ã la conclusion que l'article 6, paragraphe 1 est d'application au cas d'espÃ¨ce et que la requÃªte n'est pas manifestement mal fondÃ©e . En effet, la Cour dans l'arrÃªt KÃ´nig a confirmÃ© la thÃ©orie qu'elle partage avec la Commission du principe d'autonomie des termes de la Convention tant en ce qui concerne la mention Â« droit de caractÃ©re civil Â» que la mention de Â« matiÃ©re pÃ©nale Â» . La Cour justifie ce principe en estimant que toute autre solution risquerait de conduire Ã des rÃ©sultats incompatibles avec l'objet et le but de la Convention (cf . mutatis mutandis, arrÃ©t Engel p . 34, paragraphe 81) . En ce qui concerne le champ d'application de l'article 6, paragraphe 1, la Cour a jugÃ© dans son arrÃªt Ringeisen du 16 juillet 1971 Â« qu'il n'est pas nÃ©cessaire Â» pour que l'article 6, paragraphe 1 s'applique Ã une contestation Â« que les deux parties au litige soient des personnes privÃ©es Â» . Le libellÃ© de l'article 6, paragraphe 1 est beaucoup plus large ; les termes franÃ§ais Â« contestation sur des droits et obligations de caractÃ©re civil Â» couvrent toute procÃ©dure dont l'issue est dÃ©terminante pour les droits et obligations de caractÃ©re privÃ© . Le texte anglais qui vise Â« the determination of civil right and obligation Â» confirme cette interprÃ©tation . Peu importe, dÃ©s lors, la nature de la loi suivant laquelle la contestation doit Ãªtre tranchÃ©e . . . et celle de l'autoritÃ© compÃ©tente en la matiÃ©re . . .
Si la contestation oppose un particulier Ã une autoritÃ© publique, il n'est donc pas dÃ©cisif que celle-ci ait agi comme personne privÃ©e ou en tant que dÃ©tentrice de la puissance publique . Â« En consÃ©quence, pour savoir si une contestation porte sur la dÃ©termination d'un caractÃ©re civil, seul compte le caractÃ©re du droit qui se trouve en cause Â» larr6t KÃ´nig, paragraphe 90 in fine) . MÃªme conventionnÃ©e, la profession de mÃ©decin n'est pas un service public : une fois autorisÃ©, le mÃ©decin est libre de pratiquer ou non et il assure le traitement de ses patients sur la base d'un contrat passÃ© avec eux . Sans doute, par-dei8 le traitement de ses patients, le mÃ©decin Â« veille Ã la santÃ© de la population dans son ensemble Â» . Cette responsabilitÃ© qui incombe Ã la profession mÃ©dicale envers la sociÃ©tÃ© toute entiÃ©re, ne modifie pourtant pas le caractÃ©re privÃ© de l'activitÃ© de mÃ©decin ; malgrÃ© sa grande importance sociale, elle est accessoire dans l'activitÃ© du mÃ©decin et l'on en trouve l'Ã©quivalent dans d'autres professions de caractÃ©re indÃ©niablement privÃ© (cf . arrÃªt Kdnig, paragraphe 93) . a Dans ces conditions, il importe peu que les contestations concernent en l'occurrence des actes administratifs pris par les autoritÃ©s compÃ©tentes dans l'exercice de la puissance publique . Sous l'angle de l'article 6, paragraphe 1 de la Convention, seul compte le fait que les contestations dont il s'agit ont pour objet la dÃ©termination de droit de caractÃ©re privÃ© . Estimant que les droits mis en cause 'par les procÃ©dures destinÃ©es Ã dÃ©terminer le droit de l'exercice d'une profession mÃ©dicalÃ© qui font l'objet des contestations devant les tribunaux administratifs, sont des droits privÃ©s, la Cour conclut Ã l'applicabilitÃ© de l'article 6, paragraphe 1 sans qu'il lui faille en l'espÃ©ce se prononcer sur la question de savoir si la notion de droit el obligation de caractÃ©re civil au sens de cette disposition, va au-delÃ des droits de caractÃ©re privÃ© . Â» larrÃ©t Kiinig, paragraphe 95) . RequÃªte Le Compte : Artic/es 3, 6 paragraphe 1, 11 et 1 7 1 . Le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur confirme la position qu'il a adoptÃ©e dans les premiÃ¨res affaires (Le Compte, Van Leuven et De Meyere) en ce qui concerne les articles 6, paragraphe 1, 11 et 17 . Quant Ã l'article 3 de la Convention, le Gouvernement reconnait que la condition de l'Ã©puisement des voies de recours a Ã©tÃ© respectÃ©e, le requÃ©rant ayant expressÃ©ment soulevÃ© ce moyen devant la Cour de cassation . Ouant Ã la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªte en vertu de l'article 27, paragraphe 2 de la Convention, le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur estime que le moyen tirÃ© de l'article 3 est incompatible avec les dispositions de la Convention, manifestement mal fondÃ© et abusif . Le Gouvernement parvient Ã cette conclusion aprÃ©s avoir analysÃ© les dÃ©finitions donnÃ©es par ia Commission et la Cour europÃ©ennes des Droits d e _ M -
l'Homme du traitement Â« inhumain et dÃ©gradant n au sens de l'article 3 dans les affaires grecque, irlandaise et Tyrer et considÃ©re Â« qu'aucune de ces dÃ©finitions ne peut raisonnablement Ãªtre appliquÃ©e Ã la radiation d'un mÃ©decin du tableau de l'Ordre en raison de faits de publicitÃ© et d'outrage incompatibles avec la dÃ©ontologie de sa profession Â» . Ce grief doit donc Ã¨tre dÃ©clarÃ© irrecevable . 2 . La partie requÃ©rante se rÃ©fÃ©re, quant aux articles 6, paragraphe 1, 11 et 17, Ã la dÃ©cision de la Commission sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªte Le Compte (requÃªte NÂ° 6878/75) . Quant Ã l'article 3, le requÃ©rant estime sa requÃ©te recevable aussi bien par rapport Ã l'article 26 qu'Ã© l'article 27, paragraphe 2 de la Convention . La Commission et la Cour europÃ©ennes ont donnÃ© dans diffÃ©rents cas une dÃ©finition de la notion de " peine ou traitement inhumains ou dÃ©gradants Â» et des gradations IdiffÃ©rence dans l'intensitÃ© des souffrances impliquÃ©esl qu'elle comporte . IComm . Rapp . 5 .11 .69, affaire grecque, chapitre IV, Introduction paragraphe 2 ; Comm . Rapp . 25 .1 .76 Â« affaire irlandaise Â», II - partie, Il A paragraphe 2 ; Cour eur . ArrÃªt 18 .1 .1979 ; Cour eur . ArrÃ¨t 25 .4 .1978, affaire Tyrer, paragraphes 28-35) . C'est avant tout Ã l'analyse des notions de peine inhumaine ou dÃ©gradante faite dans le dernier arrÃªt citÃ©, que le requÃ©rant dÃ©sire se rÃ©fÃ©rer en soulignant le rappel fait par le Cour Â« que la Convention est un instrument vivant Ã interprÃ©ter Ã la lumiÃ¨re des conditions de vie actuelle libid . paragraphe 32) n . Le requÃ©rant estime que la dÃ©finition de peine inhumaine, au moins dÃ©gradante est applicable Ã la sanction qui lui a Ã©tÃ© imposÃ©e . II estime notamment que le caractÃ©re inhumain ou dÃ©gradant de la peine peut se trouver aussi bien dans sa nature que dans ses effets . La peine infligÃ©e au requÃ©rant Ã©tait sa radiation du tableau de l'Ordre des mÃ©decins, ce qui entraine l'interdiction d'exercer l'art de guÃ©rir en Belgique . Cette peine doit Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ©e comme inhumaine et dÃ©gradante aussi bien d'aprÃ©s sa nature que d'aprÃ©s ses effets . 1 . La sanction est disproportionnÃ©e par rapport aux faits incriminÃ©s IdÃ©lits d'opinion et refus de se soumettre aux juridictions de l'Ordre des mÃ©decins, mais aucune faute professionnellel ; 2 . la sanction serait Â« l'Ã©manation d'une volontÃ© Ã©vidente de nuire Â» . Elle tend Ã rÃ©primer des actes jugÃ©s nuisibles Ã l'Ã©gard de l'Ordre lui-mÃªme, alors que toute peine, soit-elle pÃ©nale ou disciplinaire, doit avoir pour seul but le rÃ©tablissement de l'ordre ou de la morale publics mis en danger par certains actes ; - 15 -
3 . la sanction porte atteinte au respect de la dignitÃ© humaine et professionnelle du requÃ©rant ; 4 . enfin, la sanction a eu des effets dÃ©sastreux dans la vie privÃ©e, professionnelle et familiale du requÃ©rant . En conclusion, la sanction de la radiation a engendrÃ© chez le requÃ©rant des effets de nature dÃ©gradante, dÃ©passant de loin le caractÃ¨re humiliant, inhÃ©rent Ã toute peine pÃ©nale ou disciplinaire . Donc, le grief n'est pas manifestement mal fondÃ©
1 . Le requÃ©rant Le Compte prÃ©tend que les dÃ©cisions des organes de l'Ordre des mÃ©decins et les procÃ©dures affÃ©rentes Ã©ces dÃ©cisions constituent une violation des articles 3, 6 paragraphe 1 et 11, ce dernier tant considÃ©rÃ© isolÃ©ment que combinÃ© avec l'article 17 de la Convention . Pour ce qui concerne les articles 6, 11 et 17, les moyens invoquÃ©s sont en principe les mÃªmes que ceux dÃ©veloppÃ©s dans la premiÃ©re requÃªte INÂ° 6878/751 que la Commission a dÃ©clarÃ© partiellement recevable le 6 octobre 1976 ID .R . 6, p . 79) . Pour ce qui est de l'article 3 de la Convention le requÃ©rant estime que les tribunaux professionnels, en dÃ©cidant sa radiation de l'Ordre des mÃ©decins et en lui retirant le droit d'exercer la profession mÃ©dicale, lui ont infligÃ© une peine humiliante et dÃ©gradante, au sens de cette dispositions .
Le requÃ©rant Albert se borne Ã allÃ©guer la violation de l'article 6 de la Convention, quant aux procÃ©dures dont il a Ã©tÃ© l'objet devant les organes de l'Ordre des mÃ©decins . Quant Ã l'Ã©puisement des voies de recours internes 2 . Le requÃ©rant Le Compte se plaint, en particulier, de la dÃ©cision rendue Ã son encontre par le conseil d'appel de l'Ordre des mÃ©decins, le 28 octobre 1974, qui transforma la suspension du droit d'exercer la profession mÃ©dicale d'une durÃ©e de deux ans, qui avait Ã©tÃ© prononcÃ©e Ã son encontre le 27 mars 1974 par le conseil provincial de l'Ordre des mÃ©decins de la Flandre occidentale, en radiation de l'Ordre . En l'espÃ©ce, il n'est pas contestÃ© que ce requÃ©rant a soulevÃ© formellement, et cela jusqu'en cassation, les griefs ayant trait Ã des violations des articles 6, paragraphe 1, 11 et 17 de la Convention . Il est vrai qu'en ce qui concerne l'article 3 le requÃ©rant n'a pas soulevÃ© ce moyen devant les organes de l'Ordre des mÃ©decins mais il l'a explicitement soulevÃ© dans son pourvoi en cassation .
La Commission est donc d'avis que le requÃ©rant Le Compte a Ã©puisÃ© les voies de recours internes . 3 . Le requÃ©rant Albert se plaint de la dÃ©cision du conseil provincial de l'Ordre des mÃ©decins du Brabant, dÃ©cision qui fut rendue le 4 juin 1974 et qui prononÃ§a Ã son encontre une suspension du droit d'exercer la profession mÃ©dicale d'une durÃ©e de deux ans . Le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur soutient que ce requÃ©rant n'a pas soulevÃ© devant les juridictions internes saisies de l'affaire, les griefs ayant trait Ã une violation de l'article 6 La Commission, toutefois, relÃ©ve que le requÃ©rant a allÃ©guÃ©, en particulier devant la Cour de cassation, l'irrÃ©gularitÃ© de la procÃ©dure et le fait que celle-ci violait les droits de la dÃ©fense . Elle estime donc, que le requÃ©rant doit Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ© comme ayant fait valoir en substance l'absence de Â« procÃ©s Ã©quitable n . En consÃ©quence, la Commission est d'avis que le requÃ©rant Albert a satisfait Ã l'exigence de l'Ã©puisement des voies de recours internes . B . Quant Ã l'applicabilitÃ© de l'article 3, de l'article 6 et de %artic% 11, ce dernier considÃ©rÃ© isolÃ©ment ou combinÃ© avec l'article 17 de la Convention . 4 . Le requÃ©rant Le Compte allÃ©gue que l'affiliation obligatoire Ã l'Ordre des mÃ©decins constitue une entrave Ã la libertÃ© d'association Ã©noncÃ©e Ã l'article 11 de la Convention, laquelle implique, selon lui, la libertÃ© de ne pas s'associer . Il affirme par ailleurs que la crÃ©ation de l'Ordre des mÃ©decins constitue un acte des pouvoirs lÃ©gislatif et exÃ©cutif belges qui non seulement apporte des restrictions Ã la libertÃ© d'association, comme l'y autorise le paragraphe 2 de l'article 11, mais qui vise Ã l'abolition de cette libenÃ©, en violation de l'article 17 de la Convention . 5 . Le requÃ©rant Le Compte allÃ©gue, en outre, que sa radiation de l'Ordre des mÃ©decins et, par consÃ©quent, l'interdiction qui lui est faite d'exercer la profession mÃ©dicale par les organes de l'Ordre, constitue une peine humiliante et dÃ©gradante, au sens de l'article 3 de la Convention, eu Ã©gard au fait qu'elle est injustifiÃ©e et intentionnelle, lui causant un tort moral dÃ©mesurÃ© . 6 . Enfin, les requÃ©rants Le Compte et Albert affirment que les conseils provinciaux et d'appel de l'Ordre des mÃ©decins, tant en ce qui concerne leur institution que leur composition et leurs rÃ©gles de procÃ©dure, violeraient l'article 6, paragraphe 1 de la Convention, aux termes duquel Â« toute personne a droit Ã ce que sa cause soit entendue Ã©quitablement, publiquement et dans un dÃ©lai raisonnable, par un tribunal indÃ©pendant et impartial, Ã©tabli par la loi, qui dÃ©cidera, soit des contestations sur ses droits et obligations de caractÃ©re civil, soit du bien-fondÃ© de toute accusation en matiÃ©re pÃ©nale dirigÃ©e contre elle Â» .
En faisant valoir une violation non seulement du paragraphe 1â¢ 1 de l'article 6, mais aussi de ses paragraphes 2 et 3 a), b) et d), le requÃ©rant Albert considÃ¨re qu'il se trouvait sous le coup d'une accusation pÃ©nale . En l'espÃ©ce, les organes de l'Ordre des mÃ©decins ont prononcÃ©, dans un des cas, la suspension d'exercer la profession mÃ©dicale pour une pÃ©riode de deux ans, dans l'autre cas, la radiation de l'Ordre, emportant retrait du droit d'exercer la mÃ©decine . La Commission estime que la question se pose, en l'occurrence, de savoir si les organes de l'Ordre des mÃ©decins, en dÃ©cidant de b suspension ou de l'interdiction du droit d'exercer la profession mÃ©dicale, ont Ã©tÃ© appelÃ©s Ã se prononcer sur des contestations portant sur des droits et obligations de caractÃ¨re civil ou bien sur le bien-fondÃ© d'une accusation en matiÃ©re pÃ©nale dirigÃ©e contre les requÃ©rants . 7 . La Commission relÃ¨ve que les griefs tirÃ©s des articles 6 et 11, ce dernier considÃ©rÃ© isolÃ©ment ou combinÃ© avec l'article 17 de la Convention, sont de mÃªme nature que ceux que prÃ©sentent les requÃªtes Le Compte, Van Leuven et De Meyere dirigÃ©e contre la Belgique (requÃªtes NÂ° 6878/75 et 7238/751, dÃ©clarÃ©es partiellement recevables par la Commission respectivement les 6 octobre 1976 et 10 mars 1977 et jointes, en application de l'article 29 du RÃ©glement intÃ©rieur de la Commission . Elle considÃ©re Ã la lumiÃ©re d'un examen prÃ©liminaire de l'argumentation des parties, de la jurisprudence de la Cour europÃ©enne des Droits de l'Homme et de sa propre jurisprudence, que les griefs formulÃ©s par les requÃ©rants soulÃ©vent de dÃ©licates questions d'interprÃ©tation, notamment en ce qui concerne l'article 6 de la Convention . Elle est d'avis que ces griefs posent des problÃ©mes d'interprÃ©tation suffisamment complexes et importants pour que leur solution doive relever d'un examen du bien-fondÃ© de l'affaire . Les requÃªtes ne peuvent donc Ãªtre dÃ©clarÃ©es irrecevables ni comme incompatibles avec les dispositions de la Convention, ni comme manifestement mal fondÃ©es, au sens de l'article 27, paragraphe 2 de la Convention .
Par ces motifs, la Commissio n DECLARE LES REDUÃTES RECEVABLES, tout moyen de fond Ã©tant rÃ©servÃ© .
(TRANSLATION) THEFACTS A . The facts of the Alfred ALBERT case can be summarised as follows . The applicant, a Belgian national, was born in Antwerp on 5 March 1908 . He is a doctor of medicine and resides at Molenbeek . Belgium . He is represented in the proceedings before the Commission by Mr Xavier MagnÃ©e, a barrister practising at the Brussels Bar . On 9 April 1974 the applicant was warned by the Brabant Provincial Board IConseil provinciall of the Belgian Medical Council IOrdre des MÃ©decinsl that an inquiry had been ordered into his conduct and that he was invited to appear before the Board on 8 May 1974 to explain a series of certificates of incapacity for work which he has issued . When he appeared on 8 May 1974 he was informed of a charge against him of having issued certificates as personal favours . On 4 June 1974 the Provincial Board banned the applicant from praciising medicine !or 2 years . The applicant was informed of this decision on 11 June 1974 . He appealed on 18 June 1974 . The Board's assessor did likewise on 26 June 1974 with the aim of securing an increase in the penalty . In a decision of 19 November 1974 the Appeals Board IConseil d'appel) confirnied the original judges' decision . The applicant appealed to the Court of Cassation, which however rejected the appeal in a judgment of 12 June 1975 . COMPLAINTS The applicant alleges violation of Article 6 111, 121 and (3) (a), Ibl and Idl . The applicant's argument may be summarised as follows . Article 6 applies to any proceedings for the determination of civil rights and obllgations or of any criminal charge . It is therefore of little importance whether the matter comes, as in the present case, before a body not actually called a"tribunal" the nature of the dispute is what matters The provisions of Article 6 must accordingly apply to such bodies . a . As to the alleged violation of Article 6(1), which confers the right to a fair hearing by an independent tribunal, Ihe applicant submits that the notion of fair trial implies respect for the rights set out in Article 6 121 and 131, but not exclusively those : other circumstances may take the trial unfair, and the procedure must be looked at as a whole .
In the present case breaches are not lacking . In particular, the impartiality of the Provincial Board seems very doubtful . b . As to the alleged breach of Article 6(2) . the applicant argues that the clause safeguards an elementary defence right, namely the presumption of innocence . It implies that the judge should approach a criminal case without any preconceived idea that the accused has committed the offence in question . This relates primarily to the state of mind in which the judge carries out his task .
In the instant case, he alleges, it could seem that the Provincial Board did let itself be influenced by the applicant's previous convictions The charge is based mainly on evidence which is not only contradictory in several places but was obtained by ruse and incitement, these make it so suspect that no one ventured to administer the oath to the witness concerned . Similarly, Article 6 121 requires the prosecution to adduce proof of guilt . A finding that the accused cannot provide medical record sheets justifying his conduct cannot constitute such proot ; it is no more than a device for shlfting the burden of proving his innocence to the accused . Absence of negative proof does not constitute positive prooi . Finally, the judge must enable the accused to adduce rebutting evidence ; this was refused him in the present case, since he was allowed only a ridiculously short space of time and a single means of proof . c . As to the alleged breach of Article 6(3 ) , the applicant submits that - Under Article 6 131 lal, the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation covers not only information about the material acts with which he is charged but also information about what offences the facts constitute . In this case the applicant was summoned to appear before the Provincial Board simply with a mention of the names of a few people about whom he was to be questioned He was not informed of the charge against him that he had issued certificates to these people as personal favours, and their addresses were withheld so that he would not be able to contact them in order to prepare his defence . - Article 6 131 Ibl is intended to ensure that the time and facilities needed to prepare a proper defence are granted . The time necessary may vary according to the circumstances of the case, and no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in advance However, it seems ridiculous to maintain that a period of an hour or two from the time of being lold the charges-and thus the matters to which ihe defence must address itself-is enough to prepare an effective defence, particularly as the examination of the applicant took place at night, between 9 p .m . and 11 pm, and it would have been necessary to fetch several witnesses .
- Lastly, under Aricle 6 131 Idl, the right to examine prosecution witnesses and to have witnesses heard for the defence no doubt does not confer a right to call witnesses without limit If the decision has been taken to admit witnesses' evidence, this possibility must be available equally to both parties, in application of the principle of "equality of arms" or fair trial . In the instant case the Provincial Board refused to bring the applicant face to face with the prosecution witness, thereby depriving the former of any opportunity of examining the latter ; moreover, the Board did not call for evidence Irom the other two people who had been issued with suspect certificates . The applicant seeks damages for the material and moral injury sustained . As regards the material damage, he seeks compensation equal to the professional income he could have had during the period for which he was actually suspended, calculated on the basis of his tax return for the previous year As to the moral injury, compensation is provisionally assessed at 1 Belgian franc . B . The facts of the Hermann LE COMPTE case may be summarised as follows . The applicant, a Belgian national, was born at Aalst, Belgium, on 26 April 1929 . He is a doctor of medicine and resides at Knokke-Heist, Belgiu m
He is represented in the proceedings before the Commission by Mr John Bultinck, a barrister at the Ghent Bar . The applicant has already made an application to the Commission against Belgium This application, which was registered under file No . 6878/75, was declared partly admissible by the Commission on 6 October 1976 ' The facts which gave rise to the present application are briefly as follows . On 22 February 1974 the applicant was informed by the West Flanders Provincial Board of the Belgium Medical Council that an inquiry was to be held into his conduct on account of "advertising and defamation of the Council" : advertising, on the grounds of three interviews he had granted to weeklies ; defamation, because of a letter he had sent to the Chairman of the Council . On 22 March 1974 the applicant wrote to the Chairman of the Council informing him of his wish to exercise his right of challenge under sections 40 and 41 of the Royal Decree of 6 February 1970 . ' D.R . 6/79
On 27 March 1974 the Provincial Board dismissed the applicant's challenqe and banned him from practising medicine for two years . The decision was made in absentia . . The applicant appealed against this decision on 5 April 1975 . In a decision made, also in absentia, on 28 October 1974, the Medical Council Appeals Board rejected the case for a challenge and in place of the two-years ban ordered him to be struck off the register . The applicant appealed against this new decision on 4 November 1974 . As he was summoned to appear on 16 December 1974, he lodged a further challenge on 6 December 19/4 . Appeal and challenged were dismissed in a decision of 6 January 1975 . The applicant appealed against this decision to the Court of Cassation, which however dismissed the appeal in a judgment of 7 November 1975, notified to the applicant on 25 November 1975 . The applicant was thus permanently struck off the Medical Council Register with effect from 26 December 1975 and was consequently banned from practising medicine under section 7, paragraph 1 and section 31 of Royal Decree No . 79 of 10 November 1967 concerning the Medical Council and section 38, paragraph 1(1 ) , of Royal Decree No . 78 of 10 November 1967 concerning the art of healing . COMPLAINTS The applicant alleges breaches of Articles 3, 6(1 ) , 11 (1 ) and (2) and 17 of the Convention . The grounds alleged are essentially the same as those set out in the first application (No . 6878/75 ) . 1 . The applicant firstly alleges breach of Article 11, both taken by itself and taken together with Article 17 of the Convention . His argument may be summarised as follows . a . The impugned decisions of the Provincial Board and Appeals Board of the Belgian Medical Council were taken by the bodies set up under Royal Decree No . 79 of 10 November 1967 . The applicant is subject to their jurisdiction in virtue of section 2, paragraph 2, of the Royal Decree, which provides that :
"In order to be able to practise medicine in Belgium a doctor must be entered on the Council's Register" . The Medical Council is an association within the meaning of Article 11 111 of the Convention .
The Royal Decree provides in section 1, paragraph 3, that the Council "has the status of a public-law body" . The applicant considers that compulsory membership of the Medical Council restricts freedom of association, which implies freedom not to associate . Furthermore, the applicant considers that compulsory membership, imposed by royal decree, and therefore by an act of the executive, goes beyond the limits of the restrictions authorised in Article 11 (2) of the Convention, seeing that neither the obligation to join nor even the associating of doctors in a council is a measure necessary for the protection of health in a democratic society . Such requirements appear elsewhere in Belgian legislation, for example in Royal Decree No . 78 of 10 November 1967 "on the art of healing, the practice of the relevant professions and on medical committees" . According to the applicant, the incorporation of the Medical Council, and more particularly the requirement to belong to it, does nothing for the protection of public health and serves only to establish an association which defends its own interest (mainly material ones) and those of its members and whose functioning is contrary to the general interests of a democratic society . c. The applicant not only considers that Royal Decree No . 79 and the decisions made by the bodies instituted under it infringe freedom of association but also claims that the very establishment of the Medical Council was an act of the Belgian legislative and executive powers which was designed not just to restrict freedom of association in accordance with Article 11 121 of the Convention but to abolish it altogether . The establishment of the Medical Council is therefore intended to destroy one of the liberties recognised in the Convention or at least to limit it to a greater extent than provided for in the Convention . It is thus also in breach of Article 17 . 2 The applicant goes on to allege a breach of Article 6 (1) of the Convention, on the grounds that the Provincial Boards and Appeals Board of the Medical Council contravene this provision both in their establishment and in their membership and rules of procedure . He holds that, contrary to the rulings of the Belgian courts, the Medical Council's organs are not merely disciplinary bodies but actual tribunals which determine civil rights and obligations such as freedom of expression and the right to practise the medical profession . Article 6 must accordingly apply to these tribunals .
In this connection the applicant points out tha t - They are not established by statute but by royal decree (an act of the executive) . whereas paragraph I of Article 6 requires a tribunal "estabAshed by law" ("par la loi") ; - The Provincial Boards of the Belgian Medical Council consist of doctors from the same province as the applicant -fellow practitioners who regard themselves as injured parties and consequently as adversaries of the person over whom they are exercising juwisdiction . As to the Medical Council's Appeals Boards, half of their members are medical practitioners and half professional judges . This joint membership, however, offers no guarantee of impartiality, since half the members of the Board-the applicant's fellow doctors and rivals-must be partial . The applicant considers in fact that it is irreconcilable with impartial justice that such boards should have a single member whose interests might conflict with those of the persons appearing before them . Moreover, there is no separation of function on these boards between the members who carry out the duties of public prosecutor, investigating agent and trial judge . The applicant considers that these facts constitute breaches of Article 6, paragraph 1, of the Convention, which secures everyone the right to a fair trial by an independent and imparrial tribunal ; - The Medical Council boards sit in private (section 19 of the Royal Decree of 6 February 1970), contrary to the rule laid down in Article 6(1 ) that proceedings must be public . 3 . Lastly, the applicant alleges a breach of Article 3 of the Convention . By deciding to strike the applicant off its register and consequently depriving him of his right to practise medicine, the Medical Council imposed on him an humiliating penalty within the meaning of Article 3, seeing that the penalty was unjustified and deliberate and caused him excessive moral suffering There had not, after all, been any finding against him of professional incompetence or misconduct . The sole issues were advertising and defamation . The applicant seeks compensation for material and moral injury, provisionally assessed at 1 Belgian franc .
PROCEEDING S On 10 December 1976 the Commission decided lunder Rule 42 (2) of its Rules of Procedurel to inform the Belgian Government of the Albert and Le Compte applications, without however requesting observations on their admissibility .
The Commission considered that the two applications raised problems similar to those raised in the Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere cases (Applications Nos . 6878/75 and 7238/75), which were at a more advanced stage of investigation . The Commission had declared these complaints admissible with respect to Articles 6 and 11 taken alone or in conjunction with Article 17 of the Convention . On 12 December 1978 the Commission decided to ask the panies for observations in writing on the admissibility of the two applications in question . The respondent Government submitted its observations on the admissibility of the Le Compte and Albert applications on 9 and 15 February 1979 respectively . Counsel for the applicant Albert, Mr Xavier MagnÃ©e, submitted a reply to the respondent Government's observations on the admissibility of the application on 29 March 1979 Mr John Bultinck, counsel for the applicant Le Compte, submitted observations in reply on 20 April 197 9 SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIE S A . Albert application : Artic% 6(1), (2) and (3) (a), (b) and (d ) 1 The respondent Government submits that domestic remedies have not been exhausted . At no stage in the proceedings-Provincial Board, Appeals Board or Court of Cassalion-did the applicant advance any arguments explicitly or implicitly alleging breaches of the Convention . At the slate of the proceedings before the Court of Cassation he confined himself to claiming that defence rights had been violate d As to the admissibility of the application fArticle 27 of the Conventionl, the Government refers to its observations of 15 December 1975 on the admissibility of the Le Compte case (Application No . 6878/75) and confirms its position adopted in the previous cases (Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyerel, namely that Article 6 (1) does not apply to disciplinary proceedings and, alternatively, that Article 6 (1) has not been violated . 2 . The applicant maintains that before the domestic courts-in particular, the Court of Cassation-he pleaded that the proceedings were unlawful and violated the rights of the defence . In substance, therefore, he pleaded that he had not had a fair trial . Consequently he has satisfied the requirement that domestic remedies must be exhausted . Even if this were not so, the domestic courts-in particular, the Court of Cassation-were under an obligation to raise ex officio the objections and complaints based on breaches of the Convention, seeing that the Convention's provisions form part of the public order ("ordre public") .
As to the admissibility of the application fArticle 27 1211, the appGcant relies on the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the Kbnig case, and concludes that Article 6 111 applies in the instant case and that the application is not manifestly ill-founded . In the Kiinig case, the Court agreed with the Commission in confirming the theory of the autonomous character of the concepts in the Convention both as regards the expression "civil rights" and as regards the expression "criminal" . The Court justifies this principle by holding that any other solution might have consequences incompatible with the aim and purpose of the Convention (cf . mutatis mutandis the judgment in the Engel case, p . 34, para . 81) . As regards the scope of Article 6(1 ) the Court held in its judgment in the Ringeisen case on 16 July 1971 that, for that provision to be applicable "it is not necessary that both parties to the proceedings should be private persons" . "The wording of Article 6(1 ) , is far wider ; the French expression 'contestation sur (des) droits et obligations de caractÃ¨re civil' covers all proceedings the result of which is decisive for private rights and obligations . The English text, 'determination of . . . . . civil rights and obligations', confirms this interpretation . The character of the legislation which governs how the matter is to be determined ( . . . . . ) and that of the authority which is invested with jurisdiction in the matter I . . . . . I are therefore of little consequence . " If the dispute is between a private individual and a public authority, it is not therefore a determining factor whether the latter acted as a private person or in its sovereign capacity . "Accordingly, in ascertaining whether a case l'contestation'1 concerns the determination of a civil right, only the character of the right at issue is relevant" (K6nig judgment, end of para . 90) . The profession of medical practitioner cannot be regarded as a public service, even under a national health scheme . Once licensed, a doctor is free to practise or not and provides treatment for his patients on the basis of a contract concluded with them, although he no doubt "has the care of the health of the community as a whole" besides treating his individual patients . The medical profession's responsibility towards society as a whole, however, does not alter the private character of the medical practitioner's activity ; despite its great social imponance, that responsibility forms an, incidental part of his work and its equivalent is to be found in other professions which are undeniably private (cf . Kbnig judgment, para . 93) . "In these conditions, it is of little consequence that here the cases concern administrative measures taken by the competent bodies in the exercise of public authority . ( . . . . . ) All that is relevant under Article 6 111 of. the Convention is the fact that the object of the cases in question is the determination of rights of a private nature" (Kdnig judgment, para . W .
"Since it thus considers the rights affected by the withdrawal decisions and forming the object of the cases before the administrative courts to be private rights, the Courts concludes that Article 6(1 ) is applicable, without it being necessary in the present case to decide whether the concept of 'civil rights and obligations' within the meaning of that provision extends beyond those rights which have a private nature" (Kbnig judgment, para . 95 ) .
B . Le Compte application : Artic%s 3, 6(1 ), 11 and 1 7 1 . The respondent Government confirms the position it adopted in the previous case ILe Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere) as regards Articles 6(1 ) , 11 and 17 . As regards Article 3 of the Convention, the Government acknowledges that the requirement that domestic remedies must have been exhausted has been fulfilled, since the applicant specifically argued this point before the Court of Cassatio n As to the admissibility of the application under Article 27 121 of the Convention, the respondent Government considers that the argument from Article 3 is incompatible with the provisions of the Convention, manifestly ill-founded and abusive . The Government reaches this conclusion after studying the definitions of "inhuman and degrading" treatment within the meaning of Article 3 given by the European Commission and Court of Human Rights in the Greek, Irish and Tyrer cases, and considers that "none of these definitions can reasonably be applied to striking off a doctor from the Medical Council register on the grounds of advertising and insulting behaviour incompatible with the ethics of his profession" . This complaint should therefore be declared inadmissible . 2 The applicant refers, with respect to Articles 6(1 ) , 11 and 17, to the Commission's decision as to the admissibility of the Le Compte application (Application No . 6878/75) . As to Article 3, the applicant considers his application to be admissible both under Article 26 and under Article 27 121 of the Convention . In various cases the European Commission and Court have given a definition of the notion of "inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" and of the degrees it presupposes (difference in the intensity of the implied suffering) . (Comm . Rep . 5 .11 .69, Greek case, Chap . IV, Introd ., para . 2 ; Comm . Rep . 25 .1 .76, "Irish case", Part Two, II A, sect . 2 ; Eur . Court Judgment 18 .1 .1979 ; Eur . Court Judgment 25 .4 .1978, Tyrer case, paras . 28-35) . It is above all with reference to the analysis of the notions of inhuman or degrading punishment made in the last-mentioned judgment that the applicant draws attention to the Court's reminder "that the Conventio n
is a living instrument ( . . . . . ) must be interpreted in the light of present-da . 31) . ycondits"lb,par The applicant considers that the penalty imposed on him is covered by the definition of inhuman-or, at the very least, degrading-punishment . In particular, he considers that inhumanity or degradation can be found in both the nature and the effects of a punishment . The punishment inflicted on the applicant was that he should be struck off the register of the Medical Council, a proceeding which has the effect of banning him from practising the art of healing in Belgium . Such a punishment is to be regarded as inhuman and degrading whether one considers its nature or its effects, for 1 . The penalty is disproportionate to the charges loffences of opinion and refusal to submit to the authority of the Medical Council, but no professional misconduct) . 2 . The punishment was "the manifestation of an obvious will to harm" . It was intended to punish acts judged harmful to the Council itself, whereas any punishment, whether criminal or disciplinary, should be designed solely to re-establish public order or morals threatened by certains acts . 3 . The punishment was an affront to the applicant's human and professional dignity . 4 . The punishment had disastrous effects on the applicant's private, professional and family life . In conclusion, the punishment of being struck off the register had degrading effects on the applicant which far outstripped the humiliation inherent in any criminal or disciplinary punishment . The complaint is therefore not manifestly ill-founded . THE LAW The applicant Le Compte claims that the decisions of the Medical 1 Council bodies and the proceedinqs in connection with these decisions violate Articles 3, 6 111 and 11, this last provision being taken either alone or in conjunction with Article 17 of the Convention . As regards Articles 6, 11 and 17, the arguments are essentially the same as those set out in the first application INo . 6878/751 which the Commission declared partly admissible on 6 October 1979 ID .R . 6, p . 79) . As for Article 3 of the Convention, the applicant considers that in deciding to suike him off the register of the Medical Council and withdrawing his right to practise medicine the professional tribunals inflicted a humiliating and degrading punishment on him within the meaning of that provision . The applicant Albert confines himself to alleging a breach of Article 6 ofthe Convention in respect of the proceedings taken against him before the Medical Council bodies .
A . Exhaustion of domestic remedie s 2 . The applicant Le Compte complains in particular of the decision against him taken by the Medical Council Appeals Board on 28 October 1974, which substituted the penalty of siriking him off the Council's register for the 2-year suspension of the right to practise medicine imposed by the West Flanders Provincial Board of the Medical Council on 27 March 1974 . It is not disputed that the applicant formally put the complains concerning breaches of Articles 6 111, 11 and 17 of the Convention at each stage right up to the Court of Cassation . Admittedly, the applicant did not argue the points under Article 3 before the Medical Council bodies, but he did explicitly plead Article 3 in his appeal to the Court of Cassation . The Commission therefore considers that the applicant Le Compte has exhausted domestic remedies . 3 . The applicant Albert complains of the decision taken by the Brabant Provincial Board of the Medical Council on 4 June 1974 banning him from practising medicine for two years . The respondent Government claims that this applicant did not raise the complaints concerning a breach of Article 6 before the domestic tribunals which dealt with the case . The Commission, however, finds that the applicant did allege-in particular before the Court of Cassation -that the proceedings were irregular and infringed defence rights . It therefore considers that the applicant must be regarded as having in substance pleaded want of a "fair trial" . The Commission is consequently of the opinion that domestic remedies must be exhausted . B . The applicability of Artic%s 3 and 6, and Article 11 taken alone or in conjunction with Article 17 of the Conventio n 4 . The applicant Le Compte alleges that compulsory membership of the Medical Council is an infringement of the freedom of association secured in Article 11 of the Convention, which freedom implies, according to him, the freedom not to associate . He also states that the establishment of the Medical Council was an act of the Belgian legislative and executive powers which not only places restrictions on the freedom of association, as authorised by Article 11 121 . but aims to abolish this freedom completely, in contravention of Article 17 of the Convention . 5 . The applicant Le Compte moreover alleges that striking him off the register of the Medical Council and thereby banning him from practising medicine is a humiliation and degrading punishment within the meaning o f
Article 3 of the Convention, seeing that it was injustified and deliberate and did him excessive moral wrong . 6 . Lastly, the applicants Le Compte and Albert maintain that, both as regards their establishment and as regards their membership and rules of procedure, the Provincial and Appeals Boards of the Medical Council contravene Article 6 (1) of the Convention, according to which "in the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charges against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law" . In alleging a breach not only of Article 6 (1) but also of Article 6 121 and (3) (a), Ibl and Idl, the applicant Alben considers that there was a criminal charge against him . The Medical Council bodies banned one of the applicants from practising medicine for a period of two years and struck the other off the register of the Council, thereby withdrawing his right to practise medicine . The Commission considers that in the circumstances the question does in fact arise whether the Medical Council bodies in deciding to ban persons temporarily or permanently from practising medicine were determining civil rights and obligations or a criminal charge against the applicants . 7 . The Commission finds that the complaints based on Articles 6 and 11, the latter being taken alone or in conjunction with Article 17 of the Convention, are similar to those submitted in the Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere applications against Belgium (Applications No . 6878/75 and 7238/751, which were declared partly admissible by the Commission on 6 October 1976 and 10 March 1977 respectively and were joined under Rule 29 of the Commission's Rules of Procedure . After a preliminary examination of the parties' submissions, the caselaw of the European Court of Human Rights and that of its own, the Commission considers that the complaints made by the applicants raise difficult questions of interpretation, particularly as regards Article 6 of the Convention . It is therefore of the opinion that these complaints raise problems of interpretation which are sufficiently complex and important to require a study of the merits of the case . The applications cannot therefore be declared inadmissible either as being incompatible with the provisions of the Convention or as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 (2) of the Convention .
For these reasons, the Commissio n DECLARES THE APPLICATIONS ADMISSIBLE, without prejudice to the merits of the case .
-30-Origine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Commission (plénière)Date de la décision : 04/12/1979Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page