Source: http://www.azattorneymag-digital.com/azattorneymag/201006/?pg=55
Timestamp: 2019-01-20 05:01:28
Document Index: 729763131

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 402', '§ 402', '§ 402', '§ 12', 'art, 709', '§ 12', '§ 12', '§ 402', '§ 12', '§ 12']

business and the economy have succeeded to a fault (pun intended).
There is a solution, which would bring the pendulum down to dead center.
The solution would in fact mostly reconcile the incompatibility of product quality vs. conduct. It would in most cases further the original goals of strict products liability law while at the same time ultimately hold parties accountable for their relative degrees of fault.
The solution: Reinstate joint and several liability and the chain of distribution theory while preserving the fault analysis for apportionment of fault among parties and non-parties. Such a change in the law would in most cases result in each party ultimately paying only its fair share of the loss according to its percentage of fault. At the same time, injured consumers would not be left holding the bag when a culpable party could not be sued, or was judgment-proof.
Injured consumers would be permitted to sue and collect all of their judgment against any entity in the chain of distribution. At the same time, more culpable entities could be brought to the party in a contribution action. Consumers would still have to prove fault by some entity in the chain, but any one entity could be found liable vicariously for the fault of others. Ultimately, however, the liability would be divided among those responsible according to their proportionate share of fault.
Yes, there will be situations where a defendant will have to pay more than its fair share. However, between the individual unsuspecting consumer who has paid for the product expecting it to be safe, and those entities establishing business relationships with manufacturers and sellers so that they all can profit from the sale of the product, who is best suited to bear this risk? In fairness, who ought to bear it?
Twenty-five years ago our courts recognized that along with the profits to be made by mass-produced products in an industrialized society came risks to those least able to bear them—individual consumers. The courts saw strict products liability law as the answer.
Since that time, in the name of protecting business and promoting the economy, our Legislature has virtually extinguished the “strict” from products liability law in Arizona. Particularly in our current economic crisis it is not hard to find supporters for this swing of the pendulum. By the same token, the argument that it has swung too far and that there is a more reasonable middle ground is compelling. Amendment of UCATA to allow for joint and several liability and a revival of chain-of-distribution liability would bring the pendulum to rest right in the middle. AZ AT
1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
2.Colvin v. Superior Equip. Co., 392 P.2d 778 (Ariz. 1964); See Nalbandian v. Byron Jackson Pumps, Inc., 399 P.2d 681 (Ariz. 1965) (Lockwood, J., concurring) (interpreting Colvin as adopting the legal concept of a manufacturer’s strict liability in tort with regard to its manufactured products); O.S. Stapley Co. v. Miller, 447 P.2d 248 (Ariz. 1968) (adopting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A).
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965); See Bailey v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 431 P.2d 108 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1967).
4. See A.R.S. § 12-2506 (1987).
5. See Powers v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 174 P.3d 777 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007). 6. See Adams v. Pacific Cycle, L.L.C., 2009 WL 532629 (Ariz. App.
Div. 1 2009).
7. Dart v. Wiebe Mf’g, Inc., 709 P.2d 876, 880 (Ariz. 1985).
8. RAJI (Civil) PLI 1 (4th ed.).
9. For further discussion regarding the consumer expectation test and the risk/utility test, see Dart, 709 P.2d at 876.
10. Id. at 881.
11. Natseway v. City of Tempe, 909 P.2d 441, 444 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that cases “reflect a recognition of the legislature’s strong desire to ensure that comparative fault principles are applied in most cases where the actions of more than one party combine to cause harm”).
12. See State Farm Ins. Co. v. Premier Manufactured Sys., Inc., 172 P.3d 410, 413 (Ariz. 2007).
13. A.R.S. § 12-2506(A) (1987) (emphasis added).
14. Joint and several liability will be allowed if ( 1) the party and the other person were acting in concert; ( 2) the other person was acting as an agent or servant of the party; or ( 3) the party’s liability for the fault of another person arises out of a duty created by the federal employers liability act. Id. § 12-2506(D).
15. Premier Manufactured Sys., 172 P.3d at 410; Jimenez v. Sears, endnotes
16. Dietz v. General Elec. Co., 821 P.2d 166 (Ariz. 1991); See Jimenez, 904 P.2d at 869 (“Moreover, the comparative fault statute apportions fault, even at the expense of the plaintiff); see, e.g., Rosner v. Denim & Diamonds, Inc., 937 P.2d 353 (Ariz. 1997) (holding that jury was allowed to apportion fault to assailants in a bar fight that could not be identified or found); Thomas v. First Interstate Bank, 930 P.2d 1002 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996) (allowing apportionment of fault to an the unidentified murderer of a guard in wrongful death suit); Smith v. Johnson, 899 P.2d 199, 206 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (allowing apportionment of fault to an unidentified driver of a Mercedes Benz who might have been the cause of a car accident); Ocotillo West Joint Venture v. Superior Court, 844 P.2d 653 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (allowing apportionment of fault to an identified, but not civilly liable, good Samaritan).
17. Premier Manufactured Sys., 172 P.3d at 410.
18. See, e.g., id.
19. 709 P.2d 876 (Ariz. 1985).
20. Id. at 880.
21. Id. at 881 n. 2 (“We do not reach the issue of whether a ‘ hindsight test’ is to be applied to strict liability cases involving failure to warn or those involving unavoidably unsafe product.”).
22. 174 P.3d 777 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).
23. Id. at 783.
24. See Pacific Cycle, 2009 WL 532629.
25. O. S. Stapley, 447 P.2d at 253; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, cmt. n (1965); A.R.S. § 12-2505.
26. Gosewisch v. American Honda Motor Co., 737 P.2d 376, 383 (Ariz. 1987) (interpreting A.R.S. § 12-2505 to apply only if plaintiff’s misuse of product was the sole cause of injury).
27. O.S. Stapley, 447 P.2d at 253.