Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/810/687/355543/
Timestamp: 2019-10-16 07:06:46
Document Index: 178383108

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 241', '§ 1503', '§ 924', '§ 1962', '§ 241', '§ 1503', '§ 1503', '§ 924', '§ 922', '§ 4205', '§ 4205', '§ 3161']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Richard Guzzino and Robert Ciarrocchi, Defendants-appellants, 810 F.2d 687 (7th Cir. 1987) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Seventh Circuit › 1987 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Richard Guzzino and Robert Ciarrocchi, Defendants-a...
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Richard Guzzino and Robert Ciarrocchi, Defendants-appellants, 810 F.2d 687 (7th Cir. 1987)
US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit - 810 F.2d 687 (7th Cir. 1987) Argued Oct. 24, 1986. Decided Jan. 27, 1987
On April 11, 1984, defendants Richard Guzzino and Robert Ciarrocchi were charged with conspiracy to deprive a United States citizen of his right to provide information and testify as a witness in a judicial proceeding, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1982) (Count I),1 obstruction of justice, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1982) (Count II),2 and use of a firearm in the commission of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1) (1982) (Count III).3
Pilotto, a high-ranking official of the Laborers' International Union, was indicted June 3, 1981, in the Southern District of Florida along with Anthony Accardo, the reputed head of the Chicago organized crime family, and fourteen other defendants. All were charged with conspiracy to conduct the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity (RICO), specifically, for receiving a two million dollar kickback from union insurance programs, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1976). See United States v. Accardo, No. 81-230-CR-ALH (S.D. Fla. June 3, 1981).6 The Accardo defendants were arraigned on June 19, 1981, pleaded "not guilty," and the court set trial for Monday, July 27, 1981. The facts of the present case, set primarily in Chicago, Illinois, intervene in the Accardo case time sequence. On July 25, 1981, two days before the date set for trial, Bounds, aided by coconspirators Sam Guzzino, Richard Guzzino and Ciarrocchi, shot and wounded, but did not succeed in killing Pilotto.
On July 17, 1981, Sam Guzzino and Bounds were alone when Sam advised Bounds he had a job for him--murder. Bounds reluctantly accepted the assignment, induced by Sam's assurances that he would make it easier for Bounds to visit Bounds's daughter, and that, in addition, there would be certain financial benefits. Sam also promised a down payment of $2,000, plus a weekly stipend and a job at one of his several businesses. Bounds's decision to accept this assignment may have been slightly influenced by Sam's pointed reference to the way these matters are customarily handled if, after a friendly discussion of the job, the recruit hesitates. Sam explained the remedy for hesitation. "Now [that] you know about the hit coming down," he said, "I can't guarantee how long you're going to live." Sam also admitted that he personally stood to gain "millions" from it. The hit was to be accomplished "soon," but Sam declined to identify the victim because, as he explained, "the least [Bounds] kn [e]w about it ... the better off [he was]."
We have closely scrutinized the conspiracy evidence in the record, as the defendants have strongly urged, and find it to be sufficient for the jury to relate the attempted murder to the Accardo Miami trial beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Papia, 560 F.2d 827, 835 (7th Cir. 1977); United States v. Buschman, 527 F.2d 1082, 1085 (7th Cir. 1976). That determination admittedly depends to a large extent on Bounds's testimony about his conversation with Sam Guzzino. The most controversial and critical testimony was Bounds's assertion that Sam Guzzino had told him that Pilotto had to die because there was fear Pilotto would "spill some names" in the Miami case and that the murder had been "blessed."10 According to the defendants, " [i]t is this single statement by a dead man, outside the presence of the defendants, testified to by a moral degenerate, convicted felon and chronic multiple drug user upon which federal jurisdiction is based." That is largely true, but we will not second-guess the jury's determination of Bounds's credibility. See United States v. Noble, 754 F.2d 1324, 1332 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 106 S. Ct. 63, 88 L. Ed. 2d 51 (1985). The jury heard all about Bounds's unsavory character and heard his inconsistent testimony about some dates and other details. Nevertheless, his story remained substantially intact and the jury obviously chose to believe it. Bounds's testimony was sufficient to form a basis for the convictions of his accomplices, defendants Guzzino and Ciarrocchi. See United States v. Velasquez, 772 F.2d 1348, 1352 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 106 S. Ct. 1211, 89 L. Ed. 2d 323 (1986) (a conviction may properly be based on accomplice testimony).
Nor is it important whether or not Pilotto actually testified in Accardo, or ever intended to testify and thereby possibly endanger others. The evidence of Pilotto's actual intent about testifying was correctly not admitted by the trial judge. What is important, is what the concerns, thoughts, and fears of the coconspirators may have been about Pilotto's possible actions, even if those concerns were totally mistaken. The evidence suggests that they were taking no chances with Pilotto and the Accardo case. We find that the evidence, regardless of how it is weighed, when viewed in the light most favorable to the government, could have persuaded a rational trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the nexus between the attempted murder and the Accardo trial. See United States v. Howard, 774 F.2d 838, 841 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Redwine, 715 F.2d 315, 319 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1216, 104 S. Ct. 2661, 81 L. Ed. 2d 367 (1984).
Sensing that we might view the evidence as sufficient, defendants contend that even if the evidence may be considered sufficient, it does not have adequate probative value to establish federal jurisdiction. The defendants argue that " [i]f Sam Guzzino had wanted Pilotto killed for other reasons--paranoia, a private feud, desire to move up in the 'mob,'--he may well have made that statement to give Bounds a feeling of confidence that it had, indeed [,] been blessed." That is a jury argument, which apparently did not impress the jury any more than it does us.
The defendants claim that the evidence is insufficient to sustain their convictions under Counts I and II because there is no direct evidence that the defendants knew of the Accardo trial or evidence to show that the defendants' intent was to prevent Pilotto from attending the Accardo trial.11 Defendants cite United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 760, 86 S. Ct. 1170, 1179, 16 L. Ed. 2d 239 (1966), for its holding that in a criminal conspiracy prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 241, the government must show a specific intent to interfere with a protected federal right. The government has no quarrel with that specific intent requirement, or the application of the specific intent requirement in a substantial obstruction of justice prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1503. To prove a violation of section 1503, the government must show that each defendant knew of the pending judicial proceeding and specifically intended to impede its administration. See United States v. Ardito, 782 F.2d 358, 361 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 106 S. Ct. 2281, 90 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1986).
It is difficult to find in this record direct evidence of the requisite knowledge and intent of the defendants. Direct evidence, however, although it may be considered more reliable, is by no means the only evidence from which a jury may find the necessary knowledge and intent. United States v. Cogwell, 486 F.2d 823, 828 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 959, 94 S. Ct. 1975, 40 L. Ed. 2d 310 (1974). It has long been established that "the verdict of a jury must be sustained if there is substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to the government, to support it."12 Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S. Ct. 457, 469, 86 L. Ed. 680 (1942). The "substantial evidence" necessary to prove a criminal conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence as the common conspiratorial purpose and plan may be inferred from "a 'development and a collocation of circumstances.' " Id. (quoting United States v. Manton, 107 F.2d 834, 839 (2d Cir. 1939)). As we noted in United States v. Zuideveld, 316 F.2d 873, 878 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 916, 84 S. Ct. 671, 11 L. Ed. 2d 612 (1964), it is indeed a "rare case" where there is direct evidence to show the requisite knowledge and intent of coconspirators.
We recognize that an appellate court must exercise caution in reviewing a verdict based on circumstantial evidence. The verdict must not rest "solely on the piling of inference upon inference"; but neither should we view each bit of evidence in isolation. United States v. Redwine, 715 F.2d 315, 319 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1216, 104 S. Ct. 2661, 81 L. Ed. 2d 367 (1984). In Redwine, we held that as a practical matter it is necessary for a reviewing court to " 'use its experience with people and events [in determining] that the evidence correctly points to guilt [to guard] against the possibility' " of mistakenly affirming a guilty verdict based only on an " 'innocent or ambiguous inference.' " Id. (quoting United States v. Kwitek, 467 F.2d 1222, 1226 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1079, 93 S. Ct. 702, 34 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1972)).
Juries must also use experience and are entitled to use ordinary common sense in determining whether the evidence proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Perry, 747 F.2d 1165, 1169 (7th Cir. 1984). Common sense is no substitute for evidence, but common sense should be used to evaluate what reasonably may be inferred from circumstantial evidence. Knowledge and specific intent are as susceptible of proof in that manner as is any other criminal requisite. That must be so lest conspirators be permitted to avoid the consequences of their illegal acts because of a factfinder's artificial and unrealistic view of real life.
The defendants next allege as error the district court's refusal to allow defense counsel to question a former United States attorney for his opinion whether "defendants generally are very concerned lest anything happen to somebody during the course of the proceedings." That line of questioning was properly terminated by the trial judge. The trial judge likely did the defense a favor. If the judge had allowed the testimony, government cross-examination and other rebuttal evidence could have demonstrated, as is well known, that criminal defendants are not always reluctant to silence a potentially adverse witness by violent means. See, e.g., United States v. Walker, 710 F.2d 1062, 1064-65 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005, 104 S. Ct. 995, 79 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1984); United States v. Bufalino, 683 F.2d 639, 640-41 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1104, 103 S. Ct. 727, 74 L. Ed. 2d 952 (1983); United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 623-24, 648 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Smith, 623 F.2d 627, 628-29 (9th Cir. 1980).
The last defense claim is that the court erred in not letting an old and close friend of Sam Guzzino's, Peter Guidotti, answer on cross-examination whether there was any reason why Sam Guzzino would have wanted Pilotto shot. Apparently, defense counsel anticipated that Guidotti would say he knew of no reason for Sam to kill Pilotto. The issue here depends on an interpretation of Federal Rule of Evidence 701, which limits the admissibility of lay opinion.14 The government argues that courts in applying Rule 701 "have commonly barred testimony concerning a witness' impressions regarding a third person's thoughts and motivations."15 This court, however, in Bohannon v. Pegelow, 652 F.2d 729 (7th Cir. 1981), analyzed Rule 701 and concluded that lay opinion testimony as to the mental state of another is indeed competent under that rule. Id. at 731-32. Such testimony is therefore neither conclusively nor presumptively inadmissible, as the government appears to argue. In determining whether the testimony should be admitted, the trial judge should employ the criteria set forth in Rule 701. The testimony must be within the personal knowledge of the witness and " 'helpful to a clear understanding of [the witness's] testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.' " Id. at 732 (quoting Fed.R.Evid. 701). Ultimately, "the decision as to admissibility is within the sound discretion of the trial judge and the issues involved are peculiarly suited to his determination." Id. Thus to justify reversal, a trial judge's decision must be a "clear abuse of discretion." Id.
18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1982), with minor amendments since the time of the alleged offenses, provides:
18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1) (1982) provided in relevant part at the time of the alleged offenses:
Additionally Guzzino was charged in Count IV with unlawful receipt of a firearm by a previously convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(h) (1) (1982), but this charge was dismissed before trial upon the government's motion
Guzzino was sentenced to consecutive terms of seven and one-half years imprisonment on Counts I and III; sentence on Count II was suspended in favor of five years probation. Appellant Ciarrocchi was sentenced to a maximum aggregate term of 25 years imprisonment and committed for evaluation pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4205(c) (1982) (repealed effective Nov. 1, 1987). At the completion of the evaluation, Ciarrocchi's sentence was reduced to consecutive terms of six years imprisonment on Count I and four years imprisonment on Count III, subject to the early release provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 4205(b) (2) (1982) (repealed effective Nov. 1, 1987); his sentence on Count II was suspended in favor of five years probation
Of the other eleven defendants, three, including Accardo, were acquitted. The remaining eight, including Pilotto, were sentenced September 14, 1982, and their convictions were affirmed in United States v. Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487 (11th Cir. 1986).
18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1982 & Supp. II 1984)
The defendants have not argued that the district court mistakenly admitted Sam Guzzino's statement. Coconspirator declarations are admissible if the judge finds from a preponderance of the independent evidence that a conspiracy existed and that the accused were members of it. United States v. Dalzotto, 603 F.2d 642, 644 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 994, 100 S. Ct. 530, 62 L. Ed. 2d 425 (1979)
The defendants concede that the government need not prove that the defendants knew that a federal judicial proceeding was involved, but must prove only that the defendants knew of some judicial proceeding. United States v. Ardito, 782 F.2d 358, 360-62 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 106 S. Ct. 2281, 90 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1986). That concession makes little difference because the evidence in this case concerns only the federal Accardo trial
To support its argument, the government cites United States v. Ness, 665 F.2d 248, 249-50 (8th Cir. 1981) (bank employees precluded from offering opinions on whether coworker intended to defraud the bank); United States v. Cox, 633 F.2d 871, 875-76 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 844, 102 S. Ct. 159, 70 L. Ed. 2d 130 (1981) (error to allow witness to offer impressions regarding what the accused meant by accused's statements and contemporaneous conduct); United States v. Jackson, 569 F.2d 1003, 1011 n. 17 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 907, 98 S. Ct. 3096, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1137 (1978) (district court properly refused to permit wife to give reasons for husband's depression)