Source: http://wcc.state.ct.us/crb/annotations/an31-307.htm
Timestamp: 2014-12-19 15:10:01
Document Index: 662121976

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 5', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', 'art, 130', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 5', '§ 31', '§ 5', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 7', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 7', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 5', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', 'art, 55', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 29', '§ 31', '§ 55', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', 'art, 65', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 7', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', 'art, 55', '§ 31', '§ 7', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 7', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 5', '§ 31', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 5', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31']

Total disability and occupational disease.
Claimant sustained tachycardial event after extremely stressful day delivering packages. Claimant later found to have PTSD which was claimed to be triggered by event. Trial commissioner found initial physical injury was caused by claimant’s employment and subsequent psychic injuries were a sequalae of that event. Trial commissioner found claimant’s injuries arose out of employment. On appeal, CRB found sufficient evidence on the record to find work was the proximate cause of the claimant’s physical injuries and the physical injury was the source of claimant’s psychic ailments. Respondent’s also challenged duration of claimant’s disability, asserting he was able to return to work within days of event. CRB affirmed commissioner’s determination as it was based on a treating physician’s opinion. See also, Hart, § 31-301 Factual findings; § 31-275(1).
Claimant is the estate of the decedent and appealed from a ruling on a Motion to Dismiss. CRB reversed on issue of jurisdiction and remanded matter for further proceedings, but noted as the claim had not been brought during claimant’s life and he had no presumptive or actual dependents, relief to the estate was limited under the statute, citing Estate of Haburey v. Town of Winchester, 150 Conn. App. 699 (2014). See also, Rock, § 31-294c; § 31-306; § 31-308(b); § 31-308(d).
Hunt v. Sheffield Pharmaceuticals, 5882 CRB-2-13-10 (September 16, 2014).
Claimant appealed award that found that he was not totally disabled from his compensable injury. He argued trial commissioner should have credited his treating physician’s testimony. CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s decision. Trial commissioner is not obligated to credit an expert opinion. Record herein offered a reasonable basis that the claimant had a work capacity, especially as he had not engaged in unsuccessful work searches. Claimant has burden of persuasion and did not persuade the trier of fact. See also, Hunt, § 31-301 Factual findings.
Trial commissioner found claimant was not totally disabled except for short time after a medical procedure. Claimant appealed decision and CRB affirmed trial commissioner. See also Jamieson, § 5-145a; § 31-300; § 31-301 Factual findings; § 31-308(a).
Nisbet v. Xerox Corporation, 5867 CRB-7-13-07 (July 17, 2014).
See, Nisbet, § 31-301 Factual findings. Brey v. State/Dept. of Correction, 5833 CRB-2-13-4 (April 2, 2014).
Claimant, a long-term corrections officer who sustained more than thirty injuries during career, appealed trial commissioner’s dismissal of claim for temporary total disability benefits. Trier found that although record contained expert psychological opinion attesting to claimant’s total disability, respondents’ psychological expert did not find claimant totally disabled and no medical doctor had found claimant totally disabled. Trier did not find vocational expert’s total disability assessment persuasive given that claimant was not fully credible with examiner regarding physical or psychological restrictions. CRB affirmed, and also rejected claimant’s allegation that exchange of pleasantries between trial commissioner and respondents’ counsel at formal hearing gave rise to inference that relationship compromised trier’s impartiality such that recusal was warranted. See also, Brey, § 31-301 Factual findings.
Mauriello v. Greater New Haven Transit, 5845 CRB-3-13-5 (March 28, 2014).
Claimant was injured in motor vehicle accident at work and claimed knee replacement surgery was due to accident, and that he was totally disabled. Claimant’s physicians also recommended revision surgery. Trial commissioner found medical evidence that one of claimant’s knees was not injured in accident persuasive. She also credited medical witness that claimant had a sedentary work capacity. She suspended total disability benefits until claimant decided whether to pursue new surgery. On appeal, CRB affirmed trial commissioner. See also, Mauriello, § 31-301 Factual findings.
Shevlin v. SNET, 5824 CRB-3-13-3 (March 3, 2014).
Claimant argued that her work injury and subsequent spinal surgery left her temporarily totally disabled. Trial commission, citing claimant’s treating physician agreed and granted benefits. On appeal CRB affirmed finding. Treating physician’s testimony was unequivocal and supported decision, which met standard delineated in O’Connor v. Med-Center Home Health Care, Inc., 140 Conn. App. 542 (2013). Decision by commissioner not to rely on opinion of commissioner’s examiner was explained in text of Finding, see Madden v. Danbury Hospital, 5745 CRB-7-12-4 (April 22, 2013).
Claimant argued that he was totally disabled as a result of work injury. Trial commissioner dismissed claim for disability benefits, finding claimant had work capacity. Claimant appealed. CRB determined as an expert witness whom the commissioner found credible opined the claimant had a work capacity the claimant had not met his burden of persuasion, citing Rohmer v. New Haven, 5811 CRB-3-12-12 (December 23, 2013).
Claimant asserted she was totally disabled. Trial commissioner denied claim. On appeal CRB concluded claimant did not meet her burden of proof Hernandez v. American Truck Rental, 5083 CRB-7-06-4 (April 19, 2007). See also, Rohmer, § 31-308a.
Claimant appealed trier’s findings pursuant to remand from Appellate Court relative to claimant’s eligibility for temporary total disability benefits. (See Bode v. Connecticut Mason Contractors, The Learning Corridor, 5423 CRB-3-09-2 (March 3, 2010), aff’d and rev’d in part, 130 Conn. App. 672 (2011), cert. denied, 302 Conn. 942 (2011). CRB affirmed, noting that trier’s findings were in accordance with remand directive and issues raised by claimant on appeal were well outside scope of trier’s findings. CRB also rejected claimant’s attempt to submit additional medical records. See also, Bode, § 31-301b, § 31 301-9.
Bunker v. Bozzuto’s, Inc., 5797 CRB-5-12-11 (November 8, 2013).
Respondents appealed award of temporary total benefits to claimant employed as truck driver from 1986 to 2006 who sustained knee injury in 1989 for which he attained maximum medical improvement in 1990 and did not seek additional medical treatment until 2010. In 2001, claimant was recalled to active military duty in Bosnia and upon his return in 2002 resumed employment as a truck driver but remained on active duty with Connecticut National Guard until 2004 when he began receiving a disability pension from Veterans Administration. Claimant separated from employer in 2006 and in 2007 began receiving Social Security disability payments but testified that he continued to look for work until he resumed medical treatment for his knee in 2010. Trier awarded temporary total benefits commencing November 2010 and respondents appealed, contending that claimant’s inability to work stemmed from his service connected injuries and claimant’s failure to secure employment from 2006 to 2010 demonstrated that claimant was disabled pursuant to Osterlund v. State, 135 Conn. 498 (1949). CRB affirmed, noting that medical record established causation, credibility findings relative to claimant’s efforts to secure employment were not subject to reversal, and adjudication of total disability in another forum is not dispositive for Workers’ Compensation Commission. See also, Bunker, § 31-301 Factual findings. Savageau v. Stop & Shop Companies, Inc., 5808 CRB-3-12-12 (November 7, 2013).
Claimant asserted that he was totally disabled and sought benefits under a Osterlund theory. Trial commissioner reviewed surveillance footage of claimant activities at a bar, and claimant’s testimony, and found claimant had a work capacity. On appeal, claimant argued his expert witness should have been credited that he lacked a work capacity but CRB found as respondent produced expert testimony contesting this claim, commissioner had basis to sustain decision. See also, Savageau, § 31-301 Factual findings; § 31-308a.
Claimant sustained compensable injury falling in manhole and treated for knee injury, and then, asserted he sustained a compensable back injury due to incident. Claimant asserted injuries left him unable to work. Surveillance video showed claimant doing variety of tasks at a nightclub for which claimant and other witnesses said he was not paid for. Trial commissioner found claimant had work capacity and granted Form 36. On appeal, CRB affirmed trial commissioner. Claimant’s credibility was undermined by video and he had burden to prove he was unable to work. Claimant’s medical evidence therefore was unreliable. Precedent in Smith v. Federal Express Corporation, 5405 CRB-7-08-12 (December 1, 2009) and Clukey v. Century Pools, 5683 CRB-6-11-9 (August 22, 2012) supports commissioner’s decision. See also, Ritch, § 31-301 Factual findings; § 31-300.
Brassard v. The Erectors, 5790 CRB-2-12-10 (October 18, 2013).
Claimant appealed trier’s dismissal of claim for permanent and temporary total disability benefits. CRB affirmed denial of permanent total disability benefits on basis that evidentiary record did not indicate claimant had sustained one of the statutorily enumerated injuries required to receive such benefits. CRB affirmed trier’s denial of temporary total disability benefits pursuant to Osterlund, noting that in addition to several medical and vocational opinions in evidentiary record attesting to claimant’s work capacity, trier did not find claimant’s testimony fully credible regarding his alleged difficulties in performing activities of daily living and claimant failed to demonstrate requisite due diligence in seeking alternative employment. See also, Brassard, § 31-301 Factual findings.
Claimant sustained three compensable injuries while employed by respondent. She claimed she was still totally disabled. Trial commissioner credited evidence claimant had a work capacity. CRB affirmed. See also, Aylward, § 31-294d; § 31-301 Factual findings; § 31-308(b); § 31-310.
See also, Mancini, § 31-288; § 31-300; § 31-301 Factual findings.
Olwell v. State/Dept. of Developmental Services, 5731 CRB-7-12-2 (February 14, 2013).
Claimant asserted that her present disability was the result of an accepted compensable injury. Trial commissioner did not find claimant or her medical witnesses persuasive, and adopted opinions of commissioner’s examiners that claimant had a limited work capacity as a result of her compensable injury, and her disability was the result of other factors unrelated to the injury. On appeal, claimant argued that commissioner failed to properly credit the evidence on the record. CRB affirmed the commissioner. Cases such as Dengler v. Special Attention Health Services, Inc., 62 Conn. App. 440 (2001) and Marandino v. Prometheus Pharmacy, 294 Conn. 564 (2010) stand for proposition that claimant must prove their disability is the result of their compensable injury. See also, Olwell, § 31-301 Factual findings.
Claimant sought to continue medical treatment. Trial commissioner found further treatment unwarranted and found claimant had reached maximum medical improvement from compensable injury. Claimant argued that trial commissioner should not have found that date as commissioner’s examiner, whom trier relied on, affixed a different date of MMI. CRB affirmed trial commissioner. Trial commissioner permitted to find a witness persuasive on one issue but another witness more persuasive on another issue. Record supported opinion of witness trier relied on. See also, Putney, § 31-301 Appeal procedure; § 31-301 Factual findings;§ 31-294c.
Claimant suffered compensable injuries at work. Claimant argued that he continued to be totally disabled to presented evidence from his treating physician, a pain management doctor and a vocational expert supportive of this position. Trial commissioner credited their testimony over respondent’s witnesses on this issue. CRB upheld trial commissioner. This was a dueling expert case and objective evidence including claimant’s narcotic usage; was consistent with commissioner’s decision. See also, Bryant, § 31-294d; § 31-296; § 31-301 Factual findings; § 31-349.
Claimant challenged basis of permanent partial disability award and appealed trier’s denial of compensability and temporary total disability benefits. CRB remanded for additional findings. Medical report on which trier relied for permanent partial disability award attributed permanent partial disability to condition trier had found non-compensable. Trier determined that claimant provided no evidence of causation for osteoarthritis but record contained two reports which supported causation and trier’s findings did not specifically address reports’ evidentiary weight. Commissioner’s Examination report on which trier based decision to deny temporary total disability benefits was ambiguous. Denial of claimant’s Motion to Correct constituted error. See also, Hubbard, § 31-275(1); § 31-301 Factual findings; § 31-301-4; § 31-308(b); § 31-349.
Claimant suffered serious work injuries which included near amputation of thumb. After injury, claimant said he could not use hand. Surveillance video showed claimant using injured hand at gas station, holding hands et al. Trial commissioner relied on expert opinions claimant had work capacity and granted Form 36’s. Claimant argued trial commissioner erred in determining he had a work capacity. CRB upheld, trial commissioner’s decision consistent with expert testimony she found persuasive. See also, Montenegro, § 31-294d; § 31-300; § 31-301 Factual findings; § 31-288(b).
Claimant appealed from denial of claim for temporary total disability benefits from alleged RSD ailment. Trial commissioner concluded medical evidence she found credible and persuasive did not establish claimant had RSD, and that claimant had a work capacity. Review of findings indicates trial commissioner reached conclusions entirely consistent with commissioner’s examiner in case; hence, decision well founded. See also, Martinez-McCord, § 31-294f; § 31-278; § 31-301 Factual findings; § 31-278; § 31-308(b).
Claimant sustained numerous orthopedic injuries to both knees. After 2003 injury respondent filed Form 36 in 2008. Trial commissioner concluded claimant had work capacity and approved a Form 36. Claimant appealed. CRB upheld. There was sufficient evidence on the issue of work capacity presented by witnesses the trier found credible. Neither party submitted vocational evidence but none was required to reach a decision, see Romanchuk v. Griffin Health Services, 5515 CRB-4-09-12 (October 20, 2010). See also, Butler, § 31-301Factual findings; § 31-296.
Claimant was totally disabled but respondents filed Form 36 based on medical opinion claimant had work capacity. Neighbor observed claimant engaged in active endeavors around home. Claimant relied on treating physician’s opinions, but trial commissioner found claimant not fully credible based on demeanor at hearing. Claimant appealed granting of Form 36 asserting commissioner needed to explain why he did not rely on opinions of treating physicians. CRB upheld trial commissioner. Commissioner sole judge of credibility and demeanor of witness. Leandres v. Mark IV Construction, Inc., 5159 CRB-4-06-11 (October 22, 2007). If claimant’s credibility in question, trial commissioner may find treating physician’s opinions unreliable. Abbotts v. Pace Motor Lines, Inc., 4974 CRB-4-05-7 (July 28, 2006), aff’d, 106 Conn. App. 436 (2008), cert. denied, 287 Conn. 910 (2008). Trial commissioner must only reference the facts he relied upon and his conclusions in his finding, and need not explain why he chose not to rely on other evidence. Cable v. Bic Corp., 270 Conn. 433, 440 (2004). Case indistinguishable from Smith v. Federal Express Corporation, 5405 CRB-7-08-12 (December 1, 2009). See also, Anderson, § 31-301; § 31-301-3; § 31-301-4; § 31-301-9.
Claimant asserted continuing total disability and Respondents filed Form 36’s to contest. Commissioner’s examiner and respondent’s vocational expert found claimant had work capacity and were found persuasive and credible by trial commissioner. CRB affirmed decision on appeal. Trial commissioner did not find claimant fully persuasive and credible; claimant has burden to establish total disability under an Osterlund theory; see Leandres v. Mark IV Construction, Inc., 5159 CRB-4-06-11 (October 22, 2007) and Hernandez v. American Truck Rental, 5083 CRB-7-06-4 (April 19, 2007). See also, Damon, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-294f.
Smith v. Federal Express Corp., 5405 CRB-7-08-12 (December 1, 2009).
See also, Smith, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-301. Factual findings.
Claimant asserted total disability, although testified at formal hearing that he “probably” had enough work capacity to sit at a desk. Trial commissioner credited treating physician who opined claimant could not do usual tasks either at work or at home. Respondents appealed finding of total disability. CRB upheld award. Trial commissioner relied on expert opinion and CRB unwilling to reverse award based on such evidence. In addition, claimant tried to return to work and failed; inability to perform work probative evidence of temporary total disability, see Howard v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 5063 CRB-2-06-3 (April 4, 2007). See also, Camp, § 31-294d, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-307b.
Claimant suffered compensable back and psychiatric injuries. After receiving authorization for back surgery in the U.S. from trial commissioner, claimant decided against back surgery and relocated to home nation of Jordan to obtain psychiatric treatment. Respondents challenged reasonableness of treatment. Trial commissioner found for claimant, and awarded temporary total benefits. On appeal, CRB remanded issue to trial commissioner. On this issue commissioner improperly relied on a medical report produced at the 11th hour; respondents should have had an opportunity to cross examine the witness prior to commissioner ruling on the issue. See also, Ghazal, §, 31-288, § 31-294d, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-301-9. Additional evidence.
Claimant, a corrections officer, sustained compensable lower back injury in falldown while responding to “code white” for prison inmate attempting suicide. Trial commissioner awarded hazardous duty benefits pursuant to § 5-142(a) C.G.S. for six-month period immediately following the injury and subsequent three year period during which claimant underwent two surgeries. Respondent filed Motion to Correct which was denied in its entirety. CRB reversed, concluding correspondence from claimant’s prior counsel to workers’ compensation commissioner constituted unambiguous election of temporary total incapacity benefits pursuant to § 31-307 C.G.S. CRB declined to address claimant’s eligibility for hazardous duty based on particular circumstances under which claimant sustained injury. See also, Cascella, § 5-142(a), § 31-301-4.
Claimant injured in fork lift accident. CRB concluded claimant did not provide sufficient evidence trial commissioner erred in determining claimant was not “permanently and totally disabled.” See also, Sierra, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-308(b).
Claimant sought payment for various days he missed work, asserting lost time was due to compensable injury. Trial commissioned denied claim in part due to lack of contemporaneous medical examination and intervening motor vehicle accident. CRB upheld, case indistinguishable from Mallozzi v. Stop & Shop Companies, Inc., 5337 CRB-2-08-4 (March 4, 2009). See also, Nicotera, § 31-294d, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.
Following trial de novo on contested Form 36, trial commissioner awarded permanency benefits to claimant’s estate with credit to respondents for temporary total payments since filing date of Form 36. Respondents appealed, contending, per McCurdy v. State, 227 Conn. 261 (1993), permanency benefits do not vest until claimant affirmatively requests them and disputing trier’s determination that a settlement proposal provided to respondents prior to claimant’s death constituted a sufficient “affirmative request” per McCurdy. Respondents also challenged trier’s findings as to extent of impairment to claimant’s lumbar spine. Claimant’s spouse filed cross appeal contending permanency award should have been made directly to her. CRB affirmed trier’s decision on basis that litigation of Form 36 commenced before claimant’s death and findings made by trier at trial de novo relative to claimant’s work capacity, date of maximum medical improvement and permanency ratings were supported by medical reports in record. CRB rejected respondents’ interpretation of McCurdy relative to vesting of permanency benefits, noting McCurdy states such awards vest when claimant reaches maximum medical improvement but trier retains discretion, per Osterlund v. State, 129 Conn. 591 (1943), to continue temporary total benefits beyond date of maximum medical improvement unless claimant specifically requests payment of permanency award. CRB also affirmed trier’s findings regarding extent of impairment but remanded for additional investigation into the appropriate recipient of award as § 31 308(d) C.G.S. does not provide for payment of permanency benefits to a deceased claimant’s estate and record was silent as to whether trier had determined if Margery Churchville was claimant’s spouse or presumptive dependent. DISSENT (Schoolcraft): Disagreed with scope of remand because Margery Churchville failed to carry burden of proof at trial that she was decedent’s spouse and therefore should not be allowed another opportunity to re-litigate her claim. See also, Churchville, § 31 275 (19), § 31-301. Factual Findings, § 31-308(b), § 31-308(d).
Claimant suffered compensable back injury and returned to work. He claimed he was unable to perform light duty work and was later terminated. Treating physician sought referral to specialist; which did not get approved for over a year. At that time claimant diagnosed with herniated disc and determined totally disabled. Trial commissioner ordered total disability from time of injury. Respondent appealed. CRB upheld. Trial commissioner could reasonably infer that claimant was totally disabled due to disc herniation for entire period claimed. Also termination from employment not an absolute bar to benefits, see Levey v. Farrel Corp., 3649 CRB-4-97-7 (July 30, 1998). Applying for unemployment benefits also not a bar, trial commissioner could conclude claimant was willing to work but not able. Latham v. Caraustar Industries, 5241 CRB-2-07-6 (June 25, 2008). See also, McInnis, § 31-294d, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-301. Factual findings.
CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s decision to deny Respondents’ Medical Examination. Respondents alleged claimant, a volunteer fireman who was rendered a paraplegic when he fell from a ladder while fighting a fire, no longer satisfied the statutory conditions for collecting total incapacity benefits pursuant to § 31-307(c) C.G.S. Respondents contended that because medical reports indicated claimant’s paralysis was not complete and video surveillance showed claimant was able to walk and ambulate, trial commissioner’s refusal to authorize respondents’ medical examination constituted denial of due process. Trial commissioner found respondents had failed to challenge a prior trial commissioner’s finding in 2004 establishing claimant’s eligibility for permanent total incapacity benefits and also determined respondents had not adduced sufficient evidence of a change in claimant’s disability to warrant opening the voluntary agreement pursuant to § 31-315 C.G.S. See also, Gilbert, § 7-314a, § 31 294f, § 31 301. Factual findings, § 31-315.
Smith v. Waterbury, 5326 CRB-5-08-3 (February 4, 2009).
Claimant asserted he was totally disabled based on treating physicians opinion’s. Trial commissioner denied claim, finding objective medical tests such as a stress test and a Holter monitor were consistent with sedentary work capacity; in addition, claimant testified to active home life. In addition, respondent’s expert testified claimant had sedentary work capacity. CRB upheld, claimant has burden of proving total incapacity Hernandez v. American Truck Rental, 5083 CRB-7-06-4 (April 19, 2007). Evidence on record did not compel trial commissioner to grant award. See also, Smith, § 7-433a, § 31-301. Factual findings.
Claimant had been previously denied temporary total disability benefits filed at later date claiming he was totally disabled. Trial commissioner agreed and respondents appealed. CRB upheld. Respondent’s expert opined claimant was totally disabled; while he also opined claimant’s condition had not deteriorated trial commissioner could rely on opinion of treating physician on that issue and therefore had grounds to award 31-307 benefits. See also, Schenkel, § 31-300, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-301. Factual findings.
See also, Grant, § 31-301. Factual finding, § 31-308(a), § 31-301-9, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.
Claimant asserted total disability from compensable injury. Two physicians testified, one asserted no work capacity, claimant’s surgeon testified to some sedentary work capacity. Trial commissioner concluded claimant had a sedentary work capacity and the expert testimony was influenced by pressure from claimant. Claimant appealed. CRB upheld trial commissioner. Claimant did not present vocational testimony or evidence of failed job searches; trial commissioner could credit evidence of work capacity.
Martinez-McCord v. State/Judicial Branch, 5275 CRB-7-07-9 (September 12, 2008).
CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s determination that the claimant was not temporarily totally disabled due to arm injury or psychiatric issues sustained as a result of a compensable injury. See also, Martinez-McCord, § 31-301. Factual findings.
Respondents appealed from trial commissioner’s determination on remand that claimant was totally disabled, contending trial commissioner improperly used Motion for Articulation to change his original findings and issue a contradictory ruling. Respondents had filed Form 36 to discontinue temporary total benefits which was denied. On appeal, trier determined claimant was totally disabled. CRB remanded to trier for articulation and/or additional findings because Finding and Dismissal as written was unclear regarding (1) which medical evidence trier had relied on in determining total disability and (2) whether disability assessment had been based on medical or vocational factors. On remand, trier articulated which medical expert testimony he found most persuasive and indicated his initial assessment had been based on medical factors. CRB affirmed. See also, Bazelais, § 31-296, § 31-301. Factual findings.
Somma v. Norwalk Hospital, 5208 CRB-7-07-3 (July 24, 2008).
CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s conclusion claimant was not entitled to total disability for a specific period of time where evidence indicated the claimant made various trips to Italy during period of alleged total incapacity and the trial commissioner was not persuaded any such total incapacity was causally related to her work injury. See also, Somma, § 31-301. Factual findings.
Claimant sought temporary total disability benefits and was denied. CRB upheld trial commissioner. Claimant has burden to established total disability and failed. Whether demeanor evidence is sufficient to grant such an award Sousa v. Intercity Development, LLC, 4878 CRB-8-04-10 (October 17, 2005), is question for trial commissioner, Leandres v. Mark IV Construction, Inc., 5159 CRB-4-06-11 (October 22, 2007). Trial commissioner also not persuaded by claimant’s medical evidence. See also Diaz, § 31-355(b), § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-294d, § 31-301-9.
Trial commissioner awarded claimant temporary total disability during period after respondents sent claimant home from light duty job. Respondents appealed as there was no medical evidence on record claimant was totally disabled during this period. CRB remanded as there was inadequate basis for temporary total award, bureaucratic limitations, not medical condition caused claimant to be sent home. See also Kennedy, § 31-308(a), § 5-142(a).
Latham v. Caraustar Industries, 5241 CRB-2-07-6 (June 25, 2008).
Claimant proved to have punctuality/reliability issues during temporary job assessment. Trial Commissioner concluded claimant met burden of establishing total disability as per holding in Howard v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 5063 CRB-2-06-3 (April 4, 2007). CRB upheld, cases indistinguishable. See also Latham, § 31-301. Factual findings.
Claimant sought temporary total disability benefits asserting original work related back injury had been aggravated. Trial commissioner agreed and CRB upheld on appeal. See also Keeney, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-298, § 31-301. Factual findings.
Franklin v. State/Dept. of Mental Health & Addiction Services, 5224 CRB-8-07-4 (April 11, 2008).
Claimant was long time maintenance worker who suffered compensable cervical injury. He could not return to former post and was awarded state disability retirement. He claimed he was totally disabled. Respondents challenged claim, as claimant had college education and prior white collar work experience. Trial commissioner denied § 31-307 claim. On appeal, claimant argued he had mental ailments covered under § 31-307(c)(6) C.G.S. as well as an Osterlund claim. CRB found claimant failed in his burden of proof on these issues. Case similar to Leandres v. Mark IV Construction, Inc., 5159 CRB-4-06-11 (October 22, 2007), expert testimony found claimant had sedentary work capacity. See also, Franklin, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.
Claimant appealed denial of claim for temporary total disability benefits. Respondents had Form 36 granted, ending her benefits. Claimant cannot assert being on said benefits for five years makes her “permanently disabled,” case law requires her to continue to prove disability. See also, Russell, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-307a, § 31-308a.
See, LaMontagne, § 31- 301 Factual findings, § 31-301-4, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.
Trial commissioner determined claimant’s treating physician more credible than respondent’s expert on the issue of claimant’s disability status and causation. Respondents appealed challenging these findings and also deemed claimant’s testimony unreliable. CRB upheld, treating physician offered probative evidence and trial commissioner entitled to believe him and the claimant. Appellate Court affirmed on these issues. See also, McFarland, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-288, § 31-300, § 31-310.
Trial commissioner limited duration of total disability benefits. Claimant appealed. CRB upheld. Claimant’s burden to prove entitlement to such benefits Hernandez v. American Truck Rental, 5083 CRB-7-06-4 (April 19, 2007), evidence supported trial commissioner. See also, Christy, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-300, § 31-294c.
Following issuance of a Finding and Award, respondent filed Motion to Correct asserting medical evidence supported an earlier date of maximum medical improvement and justified ratification of a Form 36 approved at an informal hearing. Trial commissioner approved Motion to Correct and claimant appealed. CRB upheld trial commissioner, See also, Rizzo, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-301 AP, § 31-301-4.
Heilweil v. Town of Montville-Board of Education, 5161 CRB-8-06-11 (October 24, 2007).
Claimant suffered compensable injury while employed as bus driver. Respondents challenged claim for temporary total disability benefits. Trial commissioner awarded claimant total disability benefits based on testimony from vocational expert and awarded her reimbursement for the cost of the vocational expert. Respondents appealed. CRB upheld on § 31-307 benefits and reversed on reimbursement issue. Vocational expert’s testimony established an Osterlund claim, respondent’s failure to submit contravening evidence meant that if trial commissioner credited claimant’s expert she was entitled to award. Continuing benefits appropriate as per Hodio case. See also Heilweil, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-298.
Leandres v. Mark IV Construction, Inc., 5159 CRB-4-06-11 (October 22, 2007).
Claimant suffered compensable injury as construction worker. He alleged he was totally disabled following injury. Respondent’s vocational expert determined claimant had a work capacity. Trial commissioner found respondent’s expert more credible than claimant’s expert and denied claim. On appeal, CRB rejected claimant’s argument he “out-Osterlunded Osterlund.” Claimant’s expert testified claimant was not inclined to seek employment which paid less than his prior job, which is not the Osterlund standard. In addition, trial Commissioner permitted to determine which expert witness she found more credible. Trial Commissioner’s determination of demeanor evidence of claimant regarding extent of disability is not amenable to appellate reversal. See also, Leandres, § 31-301. Factual findings.
CRB affirmed trier’s dismissal of temporary total disability claim based, in part, on medical report attached to a Form 36 of which the commissioner took administrative notice. See, DiLeone, § 31-298 and § 31-301. Factual findings.
Trial commissioner approved claimant for temporary total benefits “for as long as the Claimant continues to be temporary totally disabled.” Respondent appealed claiming this impermissibly shifted burden of proof. CRB upheld trial commissioner. Order is consistent with Morris v. A&A Acoustics, 3429 CRB-7-96-9 (August 8, 1997). Claimant still has burden of proving continued disability. See also, Hodio § 31-294, § 31-301 Appeal procedure.
CRB affirmed commissioner’s award of total disability. See, O’Connor, § 31-294d, 31-301-Appellate Procedure., § 31-301. Factual findings.
Claimant sought at formal hearing in 2005 to reopen a Form 36 approved in 2002. Issue centered on whether IME report available but not submitted when Form 36 approved would have changed result on Form 36 issue. Trial commissioner concluded report was supportive of issuance of the Form 36 and dismissed appeal. CRB upheld trial commissioner.. Subordinate facts found support commissioner’s findings. In addition, delay in seeking formal hearing to contest approval of a Form 36 makes later relief improvident, see Johndrow v. General Motors Corporation, 4070 CRB-6-99-6 (March 1, 2001), Brinson v. Finlay Brothers Printing Co., 4307 CRB-1-00-10 (November 1, 2001) and Kalinowski v. Meriden, 5028 CRB-8-05-11 (January 24, 2007). See also, Testone § 31-300, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-308(a).
Walter v. Bridgeport, 5092 CRB-4-06-5 (May 16, 2007).
Claimant challenged trier’s conclusion that she was not totally disabled. Trier permissibly relied on opinion of respondents’ examiner that claimant’s medications would not prevent her from doing part-time sedentary work. Trier was also free to credit opinion of respondents’ vocational rehabilitation expert over that of claimant’s expert, where respondent’s expert opined that claimant had numerous transferable abilities, and was a marketable worker capable of many identifiable jobs. See also, Walter, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-301. Factual findings.
Pro Se claimant appealed denial of claim for permanent partial benefits and temporary total benefits. CRB upheld trial commissioner. Case is similar to Dudley v. Radio Frequency Systems, 4995 CRB-8-05-9 (July 17, 2006). CRB must review findings solely to determine if they are supported by evidence. Evidence supported trial commissioner’s findings and claimant did not carry his burden of persuasion, hence CRB dismissed appeal. See also, Bond, § 31-294 d, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-308(a), § 31-308(b).
Trial commissioner limited period of claimant’s total disability. CRB upheld factual finding and rejected claimant’s argument entitlement to social security disability was dispositive of eligibility for Chapter 568 benefits. CRB upheld trial commissioner citing Schenkel v. Richard Chevrolet, Inc., 4639 CRB-8-03-3 (March 12, 2004). See also, Hernandez, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-307, § 31-308(b), § 31-288(c), § 31-295(c).
Hummel v. Marten Transport, LTD, 5080 CRB-5-06-4 (April 19, 2007), aff’d, 114 Conn. App. 822 (2009), cert. denied, Conn. (2009).
CRB affirmed trier’s conclusion respondents were not entitled to offset against dependent’s benefits. See, Hummel v. Marten Transport, LTD, 5080 CRB-5-06-4 (April 19, 2007) § 31-288, § 31-300, § 31-301(f), § 31-303, § 31-306.
Howard v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 5063 CRB-2-06-3 (April 4, 2007).
Claimant suffered compensable neck and shoulder injury and was totally disabled. Treating physician then found some sedentary work capacity and respondent filed Form 36. Commissioner approved Form 36, but then reopened Form 36 to award Sec. 307 benefits after respondent provided evidence of unsuccessful job search and expert vocational testimony. Respondents appealed, but CRB affirmed. Evidence sufficient as per precedent in Dellacamera, 4966 CRB-5-05-6 (June 29, 2006). See also, Howard, § 31-301. Factual findings.
Mana v. SARAH, Inc., 5073 CRB-3-06-3 (March 22, 2007).
Claimant suffered compensable arm injury and was referred by treating physician to pain management specialist. Claimant sought to designate pain management doctor as treating physician and receive temporary total disability benefits. Respondents contested and commissioner had claimant examined by commissioner’s examiner, who deemed her medications excessive and recommended detoxification. Trial Commissioner determined claimant’s present doctor unauthorized, directed respondent to pay for detoxification, and awarded temporary total disability benefits. Respondents appealed finding of disability, claiming disability was due to unauthorized medical care. CRB upheld trial commissioner. Former physician was in chain of authorization. While his care may not have been effectual, precedent in Student v. Corometrics Medical Systems, Inc., 3980 CRB-8-99-2 (February 9, 2000) is that respondents are responsible for the sequelae of the patient’s treatment. Trial Commissioner properly found claimant disabled due to excessive medication. See also, Mana, § 31-294d, § 31-301. Factual findings.
Trial commissioner ordered temporary total disability payments to claimant who asserted he fell off roof working for respondent’s painting company and later determined he had a herniated disc. Respondents challenged factual testimony of claimant regarding cause of injury and challenged sufficiency of medical evidence. Trial commissioner sole party empowered to determine witness credibility, see Liano v. Bridgeport, 4934 CRB-4-05-4 (April 13, 2006) and was entitled to believe claimant. Treating physician’s report offered competent medical evidence regarding causation and severity of injury, respondents did not challenge this evidence. See also, Berube, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-308(b)
Trial commissioner granted Form 36 finding claimant was no longer totally disabled for elbow injury, bifurcated matter for additional hearings on issue of whether the claimant was totally disabled for psychiatric illness. See also, Martinez-McCord, § 31-298, § 31-30. Factual findings.
Whether claimant’s sedentary, two-hour-per-day level of physical demand tolerance rendered her totally disabled as a practical matter was a factual question. Claimant failed to offer proof that she could not find work other than anecdotal evidence. Trier was not required to assume that job search would be futile for this claimant, who had some identifiable job skills. See also, McMahon, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-301-4, § 31-315, also cited at McMahon, § 31-294d.
Claimant can be temporarily totally disabled and permanently partial disabled at same time, although he cannot collect both benefits simultaneously. Cappellino v. Cheshire, 226 Conn. 569 (1993), requires these awards to be concurrent. Claimant must wait until temporary total benefits cease before receiving increased permanency award. See also, Marra, § 31-294d, § 31-300, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-308(b).
Trier determined at Form 36 hearing that claimant remained totally disabled. CRB remanded for articulation and/or additional findings. Unclear what medical evidence factfinder relied on in determining total disability. Also unclear if disability based on medical or vocational factors. Claimant did not introduce expert testimony on vocational disability. See also, Bazelais, § 31-296, § 31-301. Factual findings.
Evidence presented indicated that claimant was totally disabled due to inability to sustain employment. Record indicated increase in pain medication since voluntary agreement reached. As record indicates claimant’s condition deteriorated, finding of total disability was consistent with case law. CRB declined respondent’s entreaty to revisit holding in Osterlund v. State, 135 Conn. 498 (1949); stare decisis required board to uphold precedent. See also, Marandino, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-315.
Gombas v. Custom Air Systems, Inc., 4996 CRB-4-05-9 (September 20, 2006).
Claimant sought total disability pursuant to Osterlund v. State, 135 Conn. 498 (1949). Trier found that claimant had limited part-time work capacity, and had not proven he was unemployable. CRB affirmed. Claimant did not actively seek work within restrictions, while rehabilitation counselor reported that he had some transferable job skills. Conflicting evidence. Trier not required to presume as matter of law that reasonably diligent job search would be futile. Board declined to apply “odd-lot” doctrine, which would shift to respondent burden of showing that there is some job in labor market claimant can perform.
Claimant suffered spinal cord injury when heavy sign fell on neck. See also, Krupa, § 31-275(1), § 31-275(9), § 31-275(10), § 31-301. Factual findings.
Corcoran v. Amgraph Packaging, Inc., 4948 CRB-2-05-5, 4819 CRB-2-04-6 (July 26, 2006).
Testimony of treating physician supported total disability award. Duty of trier to determine which evidence was most credible. Commissioner could discount failure to appear at scheduled medical appointment when claimant offered good cause. See also, Corcoran, § 31-301. Factual findings and Corcoran, 4819 CRB-2-04-6 (July 26, 2006), § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-308(a).
Claimant sought temporary total disability. Evidence presented was inadequate to permit such an award, as it did not comply with Osterlund test. See also, Dudley, § 31-294d, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-308(a).
Dellacamera v. Waterbury, 4966 CRB-5-05-6 (June 29, 2006).
Respondents appealed total disability finding. Claimant had not been awarded total disability previously. Respondents argued “law of the case” doctrine prevented commissioner from awarding such benefits, contending evidence showed claimant’s condition didn’t change. CRB upheld award. Medical evidence supported findings of deteriorating health, and claimant had never reached MMI. Claimant’s expert testimony from a vocational expert sufficient to uphold a § 31-307 award based on precedent in Osterlund v. State, 125 Conn. 498 (1949) and Hidvegi v. Nidec Corporation, 3607 CRB-5-97-5 (June 15, 1998). Work search is not a condition precedent to award of § 31-307 benefits.
Villani v. New Milford, 4990 CRB-7-05-8 (May 18, 2006).
Claimant who reached age 62 but did not apply for early receipt of federal social security old age insurance benefits was not “entitled to receive” such benefits within the meaning of § 31-307(e). Such a claimant cannot be presumed to have left the work force, and purpose of Act is to facilitate return to work by injured employee. Insurer not permitted to apply social security offset against claimant’s total disability benefits.
Respondents claimed Hines v. Naugatuck Glass, 4816 CRB-5-04-6 (May 16, 2005) prevented commissioner from considering additional evidence on issue of temporary total disability. CRB held Hines not applicable when there has been a finding of unreasonable delay on respondents’ part; commissioner entitled to additional evidence to determine whether maximum medical improvement reached. See also, Duffy, § 31-275(1), § 31-288b, § 31-294b, § 31-300, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-308a.
Claimant’s total disability was found by trier to be substantially caused by hip injury. Claimant had returned to work years earlier after recovering from spinal surgery, but following hip injury, he had been unable to return. Despite some difficulty in explaining the exact etiology of the hip injury’s involvement in the claimant’s foot problems and altered gait, two doctors opined that there was a connection, and provided understandable medical basis for that relationship. CRB had duty to uphold trier’s findings. See also, Bailey, § 31-298, § 31-301. Factual findings. Prior decisions at Bailey, 4516 CRB-2-02-4 (May 8, 2003), § 31-298, § 31-307a; Bailey, 3461 CRB-3-96-11 (April 9, 1998), § 31-315, and Bailey, 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 369, 3095 CRB-2-95-6 (June 28, 1996), § 31-278, § 31-298, § 31-308a.
Liano v. Bridgeport, 4934 CRB-4-05-4 (April 13, 2006).
Trial commissioner found respondent’s medical testimony more persuasive than claimant’s. Evidence established claimant had light duty work capacity. Thus, he could not be awarded § 31-307 benefits. See also, Liano, § 31-301. Factual findings. Prior decisions at Liano, 3447 CRB-4-96-10 (January 1, 1998), aff’d, 51 Conn. App. 905 (per curiam), cert. denied, 248 Conn. 907 (1999); Liano, 3561 CRB-4-97-3 (June 3, 1998), rev’d in part, 55 Conn. App. 75 (1999), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 909 (1999); Liano, 3299 CRB-4-95-10 (March 25, 1997); Liano, 2033 CRB-4-94-5 (July 25, 1995); appeal and cross appeal dismissed, lack of final judgment, A.C. 15082 (June 6, 1996), cert. denied, 238 Conn. 906 (1996) and Liano, 3199 CRB-4-95-10 (March 25, 1997).
See, Daddona, § 31-294e, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-308(b).
CRB remanded matter on issue of claimant’s total disability status, as respondents were not given an opportunity to be heard. See also, Claudio, § 31-275(1), § 31-284(a), 31-301.Factual findings, § 31-310.
Sousa v. Intercity Development, LLC, 4878 CRB-8-04-10 (October 17, 2005).
Claimant shot nail through knee with nail gun in conjunction with fall from stepladder, which required surgery and put claimant on crutches for six months. Employer had no insurance and did not pay for medical care. Claimant was unable to get treatment after initial follow-up visit, despite doctor’s recommendation of therapy. Trier found temporary total disability for eight and a half-month period. Second Injury Fund appealed. Held: claimant’s testimony was expressly found credible, and nature of injury, combined with that testimony, claimant’s occupation, and explanation for not obtaining follow-up medical care made finding of total disability reasonable. See also, Sousa, § 31-301.Factual findings.
Piscitelli v. Textron Lycoming Division, 4793 CRB-4-04-3 (July 7, 2005).
CRB affirmed finding of total disability as factual determination within trier’s purview. See also, Piscitelli, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-301.Factual findings.
Milardo v. Hartford, 4808 CRB-1-04-5 (June 15, 2005).
CRB found no error in trier’s factual determination regarding period of total disability. See also, Milardo, § 31-301. Factual findings.
CRB found commissioner improperly left period of total disability open for lack of evidence. Trier should dismiss any period of total disability not supported by the evidence. See also, Hines, § 31-298.
Girasuolo v. West Haven, 4782 CRB-3-04-2 (April 13, 2005).
CRB affirmed trier’s factual determination regarding period of total disability. CRB found no error in trier’s reliance on a physician’s opinion in conjunction with claimant’s testimony, and noted a vocational assessment was not required to substantiate total disability finding.
CRB found no error in trier’s factual determination regarding period of total disability, particularly where no Motion to Correct was filed. See also, Vonella, § 31-301-4, § 31-301-9.
Sufficient evidence existed to support finding of continuing total disability. No specific cutoff date was prescribed in doctor’s report, which stated that gradual return-to-work plan should be implemented “when appropriate.” See, Horobin, § 31-296. Voluntary agreements (approval of), § 31-300, § 31-301. Appeal procedure; § 31-301. Factual findings; § 31-349. See also, Horobin, § 31-298.
CRB remanded case to trier for consideration of whether offset applies to widow’s benefits. See also, Hummel, § 31-301(f). Prior decision at Hummel, 4667 CRB-5-03-5 (May 3, 2004), appeal dismissed for lack of final judgment, 90 Conn. App. 9 (2005), cert. granted, 275 Conn. 913 (2005). Appellate court reasoned the determination of the amount of benefits to be paid was still pending before the trial commissioner, therefore, the case was dismissed for lack of final judgment.
Moran v. Southern Connecticut State University, 4735 CRB-5-03-10 (September 9, 2004).
CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s determination claimant was not totally disabled during a particular period where the only medical opinion regarding such was tentative.
Pasquariello v. Stop & Shop Companies, Inc., 4730 CRB-7-03-9 (September 3, 2004), aff’d, 281 Conn. 656 (2007).
CRB found § 31-307(e) offset could not be waived under any circumstance.
CRB remanded award of temporary total disability benefits for lack of requisite factual basis. See also, Calabro, § 31-300.
Bidoae v. Hartford Golf Club, 4693 CRB-6-03-7 (June 23, 2004), aff’d, 91 Conn. App. 470 (2005), cert. denied, 276 Conn. 921 (2005).
Trial commissioner makes the determination whether claimant met burden of proving eligibility for § 31-307 benefits. See also, Bidoae § 31-301. Appeal procedure. Prior decision at Bidoae, 4424 CRB-6-01-8 (June 27, 2002), appeal dismissed for lack of final judgment, A.C. 23245 (September 11, 2002), later aff’d, 91 Conn. App. 470 (2005).
The claimant lost the tip of his small finger and severed the tendon on his ring finger on his non-master hand while operating a wood chipper. The Second Injury Fund appealed claiming the trier’s temporary total award from September 11, 2001 through December 31, 2001 was without evidentiary support. CRB noted the trier could have reasonably inferred from the medical evidence that claimant was totally disabled for the period of the trier’s award. See also, Garcia, § 31-308(b).
Medical evidence supported cessation of temporary total disability benefits. Trier not required to rely on claimant’s testimony. With regard to permanent total disability, no evidence in record suggested that claimant suffered from incurable imbecility or mental illness, so CRB declined to address argument further. See also, Schenkel, § 31-294d, § 31-295(c), § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-308(b), Schenkel, § 31-349.
See, Fiorillo, § 31-301. Factual findings. See also, Fiorillo, § 31-298, § 31-301-4, § 31-307a. Prior decision at Fiorillo, 4337 CRB-4-01-1 (November 19, 2001), vacated, S.C. 16736 (December 16, 2002).
Existence of total disability is a question of fact. Trier was not required to accept opinion of vocational rehabilitation specialist that claimant was completely unemployable given competitive nature of job market, thereby establishing total disability pursuant to Osterlund v. State, 135 Conn. 498 (1949). Respondents’ witness, also a vocational specialist, opined claimant was employable despite physical limitations and limited cognitive/educational skills. See also, Murray, § 31-294d, § 31-296. Voluntary agreements (discontinuance of payments), § 31-300, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-308(a).
Fantasia v. Milford Fastening Systems, 4574 CRB-4-02-9 (September 30, 2003), rev’d, 86 Conn. App. 270 (2004), cert. denied, 272 Conn. 919 (2005).
CRB affirmed trier’s award of temporary total benefits following remand directive in Fantasia v. Milford Fastening Systems, 4332 CRB-4-00-12 (January 15, 2002). Appellate court reversed on ground that trier failed to properly follow remand directive. See Fantasia, § 31-301, Factual findings; see also prior decision at Fantasia, § 31-301. Factual findings; infra.
CRB affirmed trier’s finding claimant was no longer totally disabled, but remanded for finding as to when claimant’s entitlement to temporary total disability should cease. See also, Simotas, § 31-300.
Affirmed trier’s finding that claimant was totally disabled for period of July 1, 1995 through December 31, 2001. Also affirmed Commissioner’s finding that claimant was totally disabled until a specific date. Setting a finite date not improper as claimant did not meet the statutory criteria for permanent total disability nor does it offend claimant’s rights under § 31-296. See also, Matey, § 31-278, § 31-307a, § 31-300, § 31-303. See, Matey v. Dember, 256 Conn. 456 (2004).
Trier found claimant totally disabled through 10/9/00. Medical progress reports prepared by treating physician kept claimant out of work until 10/9/00; however, doctor subsequently explained that claimant was medically able to perform light duty work as of 9/1/00. CRB affirmed trier’s finding. Claimant should not be faulted for following contemporaneous recommendations of treating physician, evidence existed in record to support finding of total disability, and there was no evidence that claimant was either offered light duty work or told that such work might be available to him while broken arm was recuperating. See also, Milliot, § 31-300.
Claimant sustained compensable hip injury. Prior total disability claim was denied through May 9, 1995 formal hearing. Respondents herein sought to preclude claimant from pursuing subsequent total disability claim from May 10, 1995 forward. Trier denied motion to dismiss claim that alleged res judicata, and denied motion to preclude introduction of evidence that was allegedly based on reports considered at prior hearings. CRB affirmed. Total disability is matter of continuing proof, and commissioner retains jurisdiction to consider whether compensable injury has caused subsequent periods of disability, absent full and final settlement of that claim. Res judicata does not apply, though under collateral estoppel doctrine, earlier factual findings may have some preclusive effect in later action. See also, Bailey, § 31-298. See prior decisions at Bailey v. Stripling Auto Sales, Inc., 3461 CRB-3-96-11 (April 9, 1998), § 31-315 ; Bailey, 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 369, 3095 CRB-2-95-6 (June 28, 1996), § 31-278, § 31-298, § 31-301-9.
Trier awarded claimant COLAs based upon conclusion that she had experienced five years of total disability. CRB reversed and remanded, as said conclusion was not supported by findings of fact. Medical evidence did not clearly establish long periods of disability prior to surgery, and trier did not explain his interpretation of that evidence, nor did he discuss interplay of claimant’s testimony and separate record of total disability payments introduced as exhibit. See also, Yuille, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-307a. Prior decision at Yuille, 3735 CRB-4-97-12 (June 10, 1998), § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-301c, § 31-327.
CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s ruling that the claimant had a work capacity and thus, the Form 36 was appropriately approved and claimant was not totally disabled. See also, Hansen, § 31-296.
Medical evidence supported trier’s finding of total disability from March 1999 through present, even though treating physician did not address issue of work capacity until 2000 and 2001. No error for trier to award ongoing benefits beyond date of formal hearing, as evidence indicated claimant’s condition was unchanging. Respondents and treating physician have duty to monitor claimant’s condition, and respondents may challenge benefits paid beyond date of last formal hearing by filing Form 36 if reasonable ground exists to contest claim for ongoing disability. See also, Papa, § 31-296. Voluntary agreements (discontinuance of payments), § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-301-9.
Avila v. Parcel Port, 4481 CRB-3-02-1 (February 13, 2003).
CRB remanded case for trier to determine total disability through date of June 2001 formal hearing, where trier had originally ordered that total disability after November 2000 be the subject of additional medical opinions by treating physician, presumably due to lack of evidence in record. See also, Avila, § 31-301. Factual findings.
Claimant was entitled to total disability award, as trier properly addressed issue. Jurisdictional argument over “sick time” reimbursement implicitly involved total disability finding, and parties seemed to assume that claimant lacked a work capacity at time trial briefs were submitted. Given absence of strict pleading rules, the listing of various issues in hearing notices that bespoke recognition of entitlement to total disability compensation allowed trier to make such an award. See also, Regan, § 31-278, § 31-300.
CRB explained for benefit of pro se claimant that she was not entitled to total disability benefits during period of time where she worked light duty hours and received wage differential benefits under § 31-308(a), regardless of her belief that, in hindsight, doctor might have better served her medical needs by declaring her totally disabled. See also, Duddy, § 31-296. Voluntary agreements (discontinuance of payments); § 31-298; § 31-301. Factual findings.
CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s finding as to claimant’s period of total disability due to cerebral vascular accident. CRB also affirmed amount of attorney’s fee award for undue delay. See also, Arcano, § 31-300, § 31-301. Factual findings.
Figueiredo v. Barridon Corp., 4442 CRB-1-01-9 (August 16, 2002).
Trier could disregard vocational report of Easter Seals, to whom claimant had been sent by Division of Workers’ Rehabilitation, without explaining why he was doing so. Just as a trier may disregard a § 31-294f examiner’s report, trier here was entitled to instead credit reports by physician and vocational rehabilitation specialist that identified jobs that the claimant was able to perform despite his severe master hand injury. Ultimately, claimant failed to meet his burden of proof, as CRB cannot undo trier’s fact-finding discretion.
Trier found claimant totally disabled from effective date of her resignation of employment, rather than date of injury. Though doctors pronounced her totally disabled, claimant in fact performed work from her home, for which she was paid, through date of resignation. CRB agreed that claimant who is performing job duties is not totally disabled from that job. See also, Prescott, § 31-300, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-310.
Devanney v. Woodcock Refrigeration Co., 4403 CRB-8-01-6 (July 29, 2002).
Affirmance of finding that heel and ankle injuries left claimant totally disabled, based on medical condition and report of vocational specialist. No need for work searches given his pain level and functional restrictions. Finding of permanent total disability pursuant to § 31-307(c)(2) reversed, as claimant retained limited use of his feet.
CRB affirmed trier’s ruling that mentally retarded sufferer of cerebral palsy with compensable hip injury was totally disabled, even though he was able to perform piece work at rehabilitation center. CRB distinguished fitness for light duty job in competitive job market from participation in rehabilitative workshop that offers social and counseling opportunities to mentally retarded clients, while also allowing them to do piece work for fraction of minimum wage. Trier was entitled to conclude that claimant had no true earning capacity. See also, Covaleski, § 31-294d, § 31-296. Voluntary agreements (discontinuance of payments).
No error in finding that heart attack victim who returned to work after three months of recovery and rehabilitation was entitled to total disability benefits until the day he was cleared by doctor to return to full duty. Trier need not apply hindsight by reasoning that claimant must have been capable of light duty work for at least a few weeks before returning to state trooper duties. See also, Fuessenich, § 31-308(b), § 29-4a.
Esposito v. Waldbaum’s, Inc., 4333 CRB-3-00-12 (February 28, 2002).
CRB affirmed ruling that Social Security offset provision of § 31-307(e) does not apply where claimant’s date of injury was before July 1, 1993 effective date of statute, irrespective of when a given disability period began. Section 31-307(e) made substantive change in law, and neither statute nor its legislative history contains anything that would rebut presumption of § 55-3 C.G.S. that such a statute applies only prospectively.
Carlson v. BIC Corporation, 4364 CRB-3-01-2 (January 29, 2002).
Board affirmed trier’s award of § 31-307 benefits despite respondents’ argument on appeal that videotape showed claimant to be less disabled than she presented herself as being. Trier specifically addressed videotapes, including findings that two doctors viewed said tapes and did not alter opinion that claimant was totally disabled. Also, respondents argued it was improper to award total disability benefits beyond date of last formal hearing. Board explained that trier may award ongoing benefits, and set forth its legal reasoning.
Fantasia v. Milford Fastening Systems, 4332 CRB-4-00-12 (January 15, 2002).
Board remanded case to trier for articulation where trier did not award total disability benefits despite finding persuasive a § 31-294f examiner’s opinion stating that claimant was temporarily totally disabled. See also, Fantasia, § 31-301. Factual findings. See subsequent decision at Fantasia, 4574 CRB-4-02-9 (September 30, 2003), rev’d, 86 Conn. App. 270 (2004), cert. denied, 272 Conn. 919 (2005). § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-307.
Fusciello v. Ronnie Demeo, Inc., 4340 CRB-6-01-1 (January 7, 2002).
See, Fusciello, § 31-301. Factual findings. Prior decisions at Fusciello, 3406 CRB-8-96-8 (February 4, 1998), § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-307; Fusciello, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 283, 1535 CRB-6-92-10 (June 7, 1994), § 31-275(1), § 31-275(16), § 31-307.
Greene v. UTC/Pratt & Whitney, 4312 CRB-8-00-11 (November 7, 2001).
Board affirmed trier’s finding that claimant was not temporarily totally disabled where treating physician opined that she was physically capable of light duty employment.
See, Rayhall, § 31-278 (CRB unable to review constitutionality of § 31-307(e)), § 31-295, § 31-298, § 31-308(b).
Board affirmed trier’s award of four weeks of temporary total disability benefits. Claimant argued that she was not told by treater that she was released to light duty work. Trier’s determination was supported by deposition testimony of treater, and thus board affirmed said ruling. See also, LaPierre, § 31-296, § 31-308(a).
CRB affirmed trier’s dismissal of claim for total disability benefits, as trier was not bound to credit opinions of physicians who thought him totally disabled. Burden of proof remained on claimant to persuade trier that his evidence was credible. See also, D’Amico, § 31-301-9. Prior decision at D’Amico, 4029 CRB-5-99-4 (May 18, 2000), § 31-294d.
Laliberte v. United Security, 4264 CRB-5-00-7 (July 26, 2001).
CRB affirmed trier’s ruling that, absent specific statutory permission to suspend benefits, incarcerated claimant remained entitled to receive total disability benefits as long as he can prove continuing absence of work capacity via medical evidence. Lengthy decision; nature of total disability benefits and other states’ decisions discussed in-depth. (Mastropietro, Ch., DISSENTING) (Claimant was incarcerated for voluntary act; thus, he has removed himself from labor marketplace. With no work legally available for him anywhere, claimant cannot be deemed “totally disabled” from any given job. Situation of illegal alien distinguished.)
See, Audi, § 31-298 (insufficient notice that total disability at issue); § 31-301-9, § 31-315, § 31-296 voluntary agreements (discontinuance of payments). See prior decision Audi, 3418 CRB-3-96-9 (August 4, 1997), § 31-349. Subsequent decision Audi, 4311 CRB-3-00-10, 4624 CRB-3-03-2 (February 10, 2004), § 31-278, § 31-284(b), § 31-288, § 31-300.
Calderoni v. B & T Contractors, 4207 CRB-5-00-3 (May 4, 2001).
Affirmance of trier’s conclusion that claimant was not totally disabled. Trier had incorporated findings and conclusions of prior decision (which had not been appealed) into his decision. Previous conclusion was that claimant’s work-related injuries were not substantial cause of inability to work. Subsequently, trier in instant case reviewed evidence, and concluded that claimant had failed to sustain burden of proving a substantial change in medical condition with regard to his compensable injuries.
See, Donaldson, § 31-294d, § 31-298, § 31-301. Factual findings (trier not bound to find claimant permanently disabled due to incurable mental illness).
Azzarito v. State/Office of the County Sheriff, 4173 CRB-7-00-1 (April 26, 2001).
Nine-month gap in claimant’s visits to treating physician did not prevent trier from finding total disability during that span of time. Trier was entitled to credit doctor’s opinion that claimant’s condition had not changed based on doctor’s familiarity with claimant’s symptoms and history, along with claimant’s own testimony regarding his reasons for not returning promptly to treat.
No error in trial commissioner’s denial of total disability benefits, as he was not persuaded by claimant’s evidence due to inconsistencies in doctor’s testimony. See also, Wierzbicki, § 31-294c, § 31-300.
CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s finding that claimant was totally disabled on account of knee injury. Medical evidence in record strongly supported that conclusion, even though no discussion of the matter occurred on the record at trial. CRB ruled that disability issue was subsumed within more general question of compensability of psychiatric condition that allegedly stemmed from accepted knee injury. See also, Vetre, § 31-297, § 31-298, § 31-300. Prior decisions at Vetre, 3948 CRB-6-98-12 (February 14, 2000), § 31-298, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, and Vetre, 3443 CRB-6-96-10 (January 16, 1998), § 31-298. Subsequent decisions at Vetre, 4378 CRB-6-01-4 (March 14, 2002), Vetre, 4728 CRB-6-03-9 (October 8, 2003).
Record offered sufficient support for early portion of total disability award, as trier had discretion to rely on a particular doctor’s office notes. However, that one-time diagnosis could not sustain four-plus years of total disability, which is a matter of continuing proof. Lack of updated medical reports required CRB to reverse the majority of the award. CRB found no error in trier’s award of benefits dating back to February 1994, where a formal hearing was held in December 1994 on a previous total disability claim. Transcripts, prior award supported trier’s determination that the scope of the previous hearing only concerned total disability through date of October 1992 Form 36. Trier may expand scope of hearing to include total incapacity through present date, but he is not required to do so where parties agree to limit issues. See also, Brown, § 31-298; § 31-296 Voluntary agreements (discontinuance of payments). Prior decision at Brown, 3100 CRB-2-95-6 (December 23, 1996), § 31-296 Voluntary agreements (discontinuance of payments), See also, Brown, § 31-298.
Gagliardi v. Raimondo Maintenance, LLC., 4012 CRB-1-99-4 (July 20, 2000).
CRB remanded award of temporary total disability benefits to trial commissioner for clarification where the claimant admitted during his testimony that he returned to work during this period. Medical reports were unclear regarding his disability status, and appeared to indicate that the claimant was partially disabled rather than totally disabled. See also, Gagliardi, § 31-301. Factual findings. Subsequent decision at Gagliardi, 4496 CRB-2-02-2 (February 27, 2003), aff’d, 82 Conn. App. 905 (2004)(per curiam).
Board affirmed trial commissioner’s finding that claimant continued to be temporarily totally disabled due to her numerous physical restrictions, her need to lie down during the day, and her narcotic pain medication. Trier further found that claimant had a restricted employment history, and had been out of the work force for sixteen years. See also, Agosto, § 31-294f.
CRB affirmed trial commissioner’s conclusion that claimant did not meet her burden of proof regarding her claim that she had been totally disabled since 1960. See also, Wlodyka, § 31-298.
Draughn v. Wallace International Silversmith, 3917 CRB-3-98-10 (January 20, 2000).
CRB affirmed trier’s conclusion that claimant was no longer totally disabled. Although two physicians testified that he was totally disabled, it was within the discretion of the trier to rely upon the opinion of the physician who testified with reasonable medical probability that the claimant had a work capacity. Prior decision at Draughn, 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 374, 2290 CRB-3-93-11 (October 4, 1995), aff’d, 42 Conn. App. 910 (1996)(per curiam), § 31-301. Appeal procedure.
Karnane v. Saks Fifth Avenue, 3918 CRB-7-98-10 (January 7, 2000).
CRB affirmed trier’s finding that claimant was temporarily totally disabled after reaching maximum medical improvement. CRB remanded matter to trial commissioner for an order reducing the payment of benefits in accordance with § 31-307(e), which requires that compensation paid to an employee for total incapacity be reduced while he is entitled to receive old age insurance benefits pursuant to the federal Social Security Act. Subsequent decision at Karnane, 3947 CRB-7-98-12 (November 7, 2000), aff’d, 67 Conn. App. 385 (2001), § 31-349, Karnane, 4214 CRB-7-00-3 (March 29, 2001), § 31-349.
Trier found claimant was totally disabled from date of her 1991 mental stress injury through January 1994. Respondent argued on appeal that the record did not support his conclusion, as claimant attended school and student-taught during that time. CRB affirmed finding of total disability; claimant’s ability to achieve academic goals and accept certain responsibilities was not solely determinative of work capacity. Psychiatric difficulties left claimant without the autonomy of a normal adult, and there was evidence to indicate that claimant was not prepared to cope with the pressure of returning to the workplace. Claimant’s request for benefits from employer’s “sick leave bank” was not an admission that her disability was not work-related, and it was unclear that the trier had jurisdiction over the issue of reimbursement given the lack of evidence regarding claimant’s union contract, its ancillary nature to the issue of disability, and the limited nature of the proceedings, which were held pursuant to a remand. Prior decision at Bailey, 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 433, 3152 CRB-5-95-8 (September 3, 1996), § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-301. Factual findings. Trier’s award of § 31-284b insurance benefits and medical bills was affirmed, however, as entitlement to those benefits was part of her total disability status; no further proof was needed. See also, Bailey, § 31-300, § 31-284b, § 31-294b, § 31-301. Factual findings. Prior decision at Bailey, 3694 CRB-1-97-9 (January 12, 1999), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 65 Conn. App. 592 (2001), § 31-298, § 31-301. Appeal procedure.
Murray v. Black Tie Limousine, 3899 CRB-3-98-9. (November 4, 1999).
CRB affirmed trier’s decision that respondent was temporarily totally disabled due to a compensable injury. Board noted that the medical evidence presented by the claimant was “not extremely enlightening” regarding his fitness for any type of reasonable employment. However, respondents presented no evidence to the contrary. Record sufficed to support trier’s decision. See also, Murray, § 31-275(9), § 31-294d. Prior decision at Murray, 3306 CRB-3-96-3 (August 21, 1997), § 31-315.
CRB affirmed trier’s decision claimant was totally disabled for 14-month period in 1994-95. Though neither of the doctors relied upon by the trier directly addressed the period of total disability, it was reasonable to extrapolate from their testimony that claimant suffered from severe, disabling headaches that occurred frequently, and that his right arm injury was severe enough to prevent him from obtaining employment. Claimant, who suffered memory problems due to head injury, testified uncertainly that he thought he had worked during some of the total disability period, but trier was not required to rely on that testimony. See also, Garcia, § 31-308(b).
Trimachi v. State/ Workers’ Compensation Commission, 3749 CRB-1-97-12 (August 25, 1999).
CRB affirmed trier’s denial of temporary total disability. Where medical evidence is conflicting, decision is one of fact for trial commissioner. See also, Trimachi, § 31-294d, § 31-279(c).
Claimant argued that respondent should be estopped from contesting total disability claim, because respondent obtained waiver of claimant’s life insurance premium from the carrier on the ground the claimant was totally disabled under the contract. Trier found that the standards of disability were different, and dismissed that argument. CRB affirmed. It was not patently unreasonable for the respondent to take differing positions regarding total disability where the definition of total disability was less stringent under the insurance contract. Further, claimant did not show that he detrimentally relied on the respondents’ position regarding total disability. See also, Krevis, § 7-433c, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-301. Factual findings.
Award of total disability benefits beyond February 16, 1997 was undone where CRB reversed finding that February 1997 broken leg was related to compensable back injury of August 1996, and there was no /medical evidence that the back injury played a part in any disability after that date. See also, Dengler, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-348.
Aquino v. Clairol, Inc., 3802 CRB-7-98-4 (March 3, 1999).
Respondents contended that claimant’s total disability was caused by her pre-existing hip and left leg condition rather than by the injuries sustained during a compensable fall at work. Board affirmed trier’s conclusion that claimant’s total disability was caused by the compensable fall, as this was a factual issue and was supported by the record and by the findings of fact. Prior decision at Aquino, 3527 CRB-7-97-1 (September 17, 1997), § 31-301. Appeal procedure.
CRB affirmed the trial commissioner’s conclusion that the claimant’s temporary total disability ceased on August 18, 1996, and that his temporary partial disability ceased on October 1, 1996. Determination of the claimant’s periods of disability was dependent upon the weight and credibility of the testimony, including medical evidence, and thus was a matter for the trier as the finder of fact. See also, Rhodes, § 31-308(a).
Cooper v. Storer Communications, 3671 CRB-2-97-8 (July 24, 1998).
Trial commissioner found claimant to be totally disabled, reversing decision of another commissioner at emergency informal hearing on Form 36. However, the trial commissioner explicitly found the opinions of two doctors who thought that the claimant could work more credible than the conflicting opinions, and also found that the claimant did not introduce evidence to show that he needed vocational retraining or other special assistance before returning to work. CRB held that the facts did not support a conclusion of total disability, and reversed.
Hidvegi v. Nidec Corporation, 3607 CRB-5-97-5 (June 15, 1998).
CRB affirmed the trial commissioner’s award of ongoing temporary total disability benefits, despite the claimant’s failure to conduct a work search. Although the claimant may have had a theoretical light duty capability, the commissioner found that her physical restrictions, age, limited education, and lack of transferable skills collectively rendered her labor unmarketable. This conclusion is supported by the opinions of her treating physician and a vocational rehabilitation specialist.
Garcia v. Bridgeport, 3595 CRB-4-97-4 (June 8, 1998).
Existence of continuing total disability is a question of fact, and trier was not required to deem credible the medical reports offered by the claimant in support of his claim for continued total disability following maximum medical improvement.
Early v. Maryland Insurance Group, 3517 CRB-8-97-2 (April 24, 1998).
The CRB affirmed the trial commissioner’s decision that the claimant, who sustained a compensable aggravation of her asthma, was temporarily totally disabled. Under the circumstances of this case, including the claimant’s repeated asthma attacks, the opinion of her treating physician that she could not work unrestricted while construction was being done at her place of employment, and the employer’s decision not to allow her to work, it was reasonable for the trial commissioner to infer that the claimant was temporarily totally disabled. In addition, the CRB held that the employer’s request for a reduction of payments (offset) under the employer’s disability plan should be pursued in another forum.
Meredina v. Anderson Insurance Co., 3460 CRB-3-96-11 (April 8, 1998).
The CRB affirmed the trial commissioner’s determination that the claimant continued to be temporarily totally disabled after reaching maximum medical improvement, even though claimant may have been able to perform “some type of work.”
Fusciello v. Ronnie Demeo, Inc., 3406 CRB-8-96-8 (February 4, 1998).
Trier found that claimant had not been temporarily totally disabled since 1987. Affirmed. Total disability is a question of fact, and the trier found that the claimant had not established that he lacked a light duty capability or the background to take advantage of it. Trier can conclude that work searches are unnecessary given a claimant’s individual circumstances, but is not required to forgo proof that employment cannot be obtained. Here, commissioner’s examiner testified that claimant could work, and the commissioner was not persuaded that the claimant would be unable to find a job that did not involve heavy physical labor. See also, Fusciello, § 31-301. Appeal procedure (no Motion to Correct filed). Prior decision at Fusciello, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 283, 1535 CRB-6-92-10 (June 7, 1994), § 31-275(1), § 31-275(16), § 31-307. Subsequent decision at Fusciello, 4340 CRB-6-01-1 (January 7, 2002), § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-307.
Trial commissioner’s denial of continued temporary total disability benefits was based upon the record, and was affirmed by CRB. See also, Degiacomo § 31-307, § 31-308a.
Disability status of a claimant at any given time is a question of fact. Here, trier was entitled to rely on medical report attributing claimant’s unemployability to her psychological state, which was not clearly related to her compensable back injury. See also, Santala, § 31-296.
See, Campbell, § 31-299b, § 31-301. Factual findings.
Curtiss v. State/Dept. of Mental Retardation Region 2, 3220 CRB-6-95-11 (August 20, 1997).
Claimant must prove total disability as point of fact. Claimant did not present evidence to rebut respondent’s claim that he was not totally disabled, respondent introduced videotape of the claimant working at his coin and jewelry shop on several occasions, and his earning records for the past three years included income from the store. Affirmed. See also, Curtiss, § 31-301. Appeal procedure (claimant failed to file Motion to Correct).
The trial commissioner concluded that the claimant failed to produce credible evidence of temporary total disability for the period from July 2, 1990 through April 10, 1995. CRB affirmed, as the determination was a question of fact for the trial commissioner. See also, Ruiz-Dugue, § 31-308(b)(c).
Liano v. Bridgeport, 3199 CRB-4-96-2 (March 25, 1997).
CRB concluded that the trial commissioner’s determination that the claimant was no longer totally disabled was fully supported by the record, including an independent medical examiner’s report. See also, Liano, § 31-294c, § 31-297, § 31-296 Voluntary agreements (discontinuance of payments). Subsequent decisions at Liano, 3561 CRB-4-97-3 (June 3, 1998), rev’d in part, 55 Conn. App. 75 (1999), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 909 (1999), § 31-300; Liano, 3447 CRB-4-96-10 (January 6, 1998), aff’d, 51 Conn. App. 905 (per curiam), cert. denied, 248 Conn. 907 (1999), § 7-433c; companion decision at Liano, 3199 CRB-4-95-10 (March 25, 1997), § 31-279-3, § 31-298, § 31-307. Prior decision at Liano, 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 201, 2033 CRB-4-94-5 (July 25, 1995), appeal and cross appeal dismissed, lack of final judgment, A.C. 15082 (June 6, 1996), cert. denied, 238 Conn. 906 (1996), § 7-433b, § 31-300, § 31-310.
Total disability is a factual issue. Respondents presented no evidence to contradict doctor’s testimony that there was no meaningful trade the claimant could pursue. No error in finding of ongoing disability. See also, Barnett, § 31-294e.
See, Ryba, § 31-296 (existence of total disability is an issue of fact).
Fact that claimant was an illegal alien unable to obtain other employment in United States did not prevent her from qualifying for total disability benefits, although once she was medically able to work, she would no longer qualify. See also, Dowling, § 31-275(9), § 31-288, and § 31-301. Appeal procedure. Subsequent decision at Dowling, 3468 CRB-4-96-11 (May 6, 1998), § 31-290, § 31-296, § 31-301. Appeal procedure, § 31-301(f).
Bennings v. State/Dept. of Correction, 3213 CRB-4-95-11 (December 18, 1996).
CRB affirmed the trial commissioner’s determination that the claimant was not temporarily totally disabled for a certain period. Issue was one of fact, and was supported by the record.
Monaco v. Metal Masters, Inc., 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 415, 2245 CRB-3-94-12 (August 29, 1996).
Respondents appealed commissioner’s denial of Form 36 on ground that evidence did not support continuation of temporary total disability benefits. Affirmed; total disability is a question of fact, and medical reports could be interpreted as establishing total disability. Commissioner not required to find residual light duty capability. (Tracy, C., DISSENTING) (insufficient evidence of disability).
Ciarleglio v. D.I. Chapman Company, 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 380, 2076 CRB-3-94-6 (August 6, 1996).
CRB affirmed the trial commissioner’s conclusion that the claimant’s injury did not render him unable to work, and thus denied the claimant’s request for temporary total disability benefits pursuant to § 31-307 C.G.S. The trial commissioner found that following his injury the claimant continued working until his business closed due to financial difficulties. Furthermore, the claimant’s unrelated civil law suit was the cause of seventy percent of his mental stress, and was the cause of his inability to accept an employment offer.
Gerena v. Rockbestos Co., 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 394, 1986 CRB-5-94-3 (October 17, 1995).
The respondents contended that the commissioner improperly awarded the claimant temporary total disability benefits pursuant to § 31-307 despite evidence that the claimant had a capacity to perform limited light duty work. CRB affirmed the trial commissioner’s decision. The commissioner’s conclusion that the claimant was totally incapacitated was supported by the record, including: (1) pain of lower back; (2) the claimant’s physical limitations limit him to a sedentary desk job; (3) the claimant is over sixty years of age, and (4) the claimant has limited education and experience for desk jobs.
CRB affirmed commissioner’s denial of permanent partial award of the brain. A claimant’s reduced employability does not require an award of permanent partial disability. See also, Hurley, § 31-296.
Rapuano v. Standard Builders, Inc., 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 290, 293, 1975 CRB-5-94-2 (September 11, 1995).
In the instant case, the commissioner concluded that the claimant had “failed to produce credible evidence that he is in fact totally disabled from any occupation which his education, training, physical ability and experience might reasonably allow him to pursue,” and denied the claim for total disability. CRB affirmed, as the factual determination regarding the claimant’s alleged total disability was based upon the weight and credibility which the trial commissioner accorded the evidence.
Rose v. Hartford Hospital, 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 249, 1980 CRB-1-94-3 (August 30, 1995).
Claimant is totally deaf and is close to illiterate. Practiced carpentry until suffering a 15 percent permanent partial disability of his back. Medical reports established light work capability, but doctor and vocational specialist thought claimant’s labor was in fact unmarketable. Commissioner found claimant totally disabled. Held, total disability and light duty capability are questions of fact for trial commissioner; record supports his findings. Work search advisable, but not specifically required in all cases. Also, no evidence to support reopening of voluntary agreement on ground that it was executed under duress; fact that claimant was totally disabled after June 29, 1993 did not require a finding of total disability before that date as well.
CRB remanded issue of temporary total award made by commissioner because number of weeks of total disability was not supported by the record. See also, Cotton, § 31-275(1).
Guerrera v. Grodel Manufacturing Co., 13 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 305, 1832 CRB-1-93-9 (April 21, 1995).
Although factors cited by claimant, i.e. lack of fluency in English, fifth-grade education, etc., generally support total disability, report of vocational expert and some of the medical evidence suggested otherwise. Commissioner made reasonable factual determination.
Claimant’s entitlement to benefits under § 31-307(e) [now (c)] for total loss of use of legs is unaffected by future wage earning capacity. Claimant’s current employment did not prevent commissioner from properly awarding benefits.
Coutu v. Interroyal Corp., 13 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 215, 1680 CRB-2-93-3 (April 12, 1995), appeal dismissed, A.C. 14694 (October 25, 1995).
Claimant refused back surgery to ease pain. Was practically unemployable, although theoretically capable of light sedentary work. Second Injury Fund filed Form 36 to discontinue payment of total disability benefits, which commissioner approved. Commencement of specific award ordered. Held, existence of total disability is a factual question for the trier of fact; there was testimony that the claimant could do light sedentary work, and had no motivation to return.
Johnson v. Park Avenue Restoration, 13 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 209, 1748 CRB-4-93-6 (March 30, 1995).
Claimant received temporary total disability until 7/10/92 despite evidence that she reached maximum medical improvement on 1/15/92. Held, medical testimony existed to effect that claimant was totally disabled until 7/10/92; fact that maximum medical improvement may have been reached earlier irrelevant, as worker can reach maximum medical improvement and still be entitled to total disability benefits. No suggestion was made that claimant had requested payment of specific award as discussed in McCurdy v. State, 227 Conn. 261 (1993).
Medical records and physician’s testimony support finding of total disability during period claimed. Approved Form 36 subsequently vacated by trial commissioner. See also, Santiago, § 31-296 and § 31-315.
Maerkle v. Triangle/PWC, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 384, 1572 CRB-2-92-11 (August 17, 1994).
The arbiter of whether a claimant is totally incapacitated is the trial commissioner. Where a hypothetical employment position appears to satisfy claimant’s physical needs, other pertinent evidence relied on by trier supports finding of total incapacity.
Madden v. Moore Special Tool, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 373, 1688 CRB-4-93-4 (August 12, 1994).
Although medical evidence as to incapacity to work was in conflict, determination that claimant was not totally disabled during period claimed was not without evidentiary support.
Within power of trial commissioner to reject opinion of treating physician concerning period of total disability. See also, Cummings, § 31-296, § 31-298, § 31-301. Factual findings and § 31-301-9. Additional evidence.
Orlando v. Makula, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 296, 1556 CRB-3-92-11 (June 13, 1994).
Temporary total benefits payable during period claimant delayed having knee surgery because employer refused to pay for surgery related to the compensable injury. See also, Orlando, § 31-301. Factual findings and Appeal procedure.
Evidence presented supports finding of total incapacity. However, CRB corrected trier’s finding of total incapacity beyond the last date claimant saw his treating physician as that finding is not supported by medical evidence. See also, Fusciello, § 31-275(1) and § 31-275(16)[formerly 31-275(8)]. Subsequent decision at Fusciello, 3406 CRB-8-96-8 (February 4, 1998), supra, § 31-301. Appeal procedure and Fusciello, 4340 CRB CRB-6-01-1 (January 7, 2002), § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-307.
Tessier v. Kogut Florist and Nurseryman, Inc., 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 175, 1435 CRB-8-92-6 (May 2, 1994).
Trier’s post remand finding reversed. Factual findings state claimant was active in business during period of claimed total disability. As the destruction of claimant’s capacity to earn failed to exist, claimant was not totally disabled and must reimburse insurer for benefits paid. Prior decision at, Tessier, 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 276, 1088 CRD-8-90-7 (December 13, 1991).
Granoff v. New Haven, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 166, 1555 CRB-3-92-11 (April 29, 1994).
Temporary total disability benefits denied to school teacher disabled from teaching duties who actively continued to operate his own real estate agency during period he was disabled from teaching.
Award for total disability affirmed where trier’s award is based on period after claimant received treatment although physician’s testimony supports a finding of total disability prior to receiving treatment. Trier’s inference was reasonable that claimant was not totally disabled prior to seeking treatment. See also, Prioleau, § 31-299b, § 31-308(b) and § 31-349.
Where factual foundation for physician’s opinion that claimant was totally disabled was insufficient, commissioner reasonably concluded claimant was capable of light duty work. See also, Woznicki, § 31-308a. Additional Compensation.
Dickey v. Harris Graphics, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 218, 1481 CRB-2-92-8 (March 22, 1994).
While treating physician’s opinion would have justified a conclusion claimant was totally disabled, trier was not compelled to reach such a conclusion in light of other evidence before him.
Determination of total disability is a factual issue to be decided by the trial commissioner. See also, Haugh, § 31-284b, § 31-300, and § 31-301. Appeal procedure.
See, Mulligan, § 31-307b and § 31-310.
CRB affirmed trier’s finding awarding temporary total benefits during a certain period. Contention that total disability extended beyond that period because the claim was undisputed and no Form 36 was filed erroneous. See also, Lee, § 31-296.
Period of temporary total disability award upheld where medical evidence supports trier’s finding claimant was totally disabled, although during part of the period in question claimant was being treated by an unauthorized physician. See also, Farkash, § 31-294d.
Dependent widow’s claim (decedent’s estate) that decedent was entitled to temporary total benefits denied where trier found decedent was already disabled by a stroke prior to being diagnosed with occupational mesothelioma as a result of asbestos exposure in the workplace. See also, Maloney, § 31-306.
Claimant sought temporary total benefits for period beyond that found by the trial commissioner and also sought to reopen the last evidentiary hearing by filing a motion to correct in order to introduce evidence concerning total incapacity beyond the last evidentiary hearing. CRB held medical evidence although extensive and conflicting supported trier’s finding concerning periods of total incapacity. CRB further held that a motion to correct is not the proper vehicle to introduce additional evidence. A determination of whether claimant remained totally disabled beyond the last evidentiary hearing must be addressed by further proceedings below not before this appellate tribunal. See also, Coates, § 31-301-9. Additional evidence.
Damelio v. Anaconda, Inc., 11 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 221, 1363 CRD-5-91-12 (November 3, 1993).
Claimant alleged total incapacity continued due to a myelogram performed in 1972 for a back injury sustained in 1950 wherein claimant contends some of the contrast medium spilled into his brain and has remained there causing multiple symptoms. Medical evidence before trier was conflicting. Trier rejected treating physician’s opinion that claimant remained totally disabled and relied on IME physician’s opinion and concluded claimant’s total disability ceased in 1984 at which time claimant was capable of performing light work. CRB held there was evidence to support such a conclusion.
Claimant entitled to receive § 31-308a benefits for a 1981 injury and temporary total benefits for a separate 1985 injury simultaneously. This is not considered double compensation. Trier found with or without the injury of 1985, claimant’s diminished earning capacity would have continued. Remanded to determine amount of benefits due. See also, Graziano, § 31-296, § 31-308a and § 31-310.
Remanded where trier found claimant totally disabled during a time he was actively employed although earning less than his previous job paid. See also, Codding, § 31-299b and § 31-349.
Claimant, a school teacher, was paid full salary during the period of temporary total incapacity. During that period claimant received medical treatment. Claimant sought entitlement to both full salary under collective bargaining agreement and compensation benefits for time spent receiving medical treatment. CRB has limited jurisdiction which does not permit interpretation of contractual agreements. Further, if employer has paid a greater sum than amounts due under § 31-307 and § 31-312 the CRB has no power to order further sums to be paid. See also, Sweeney, § 31-310 and § 31-312.
Lesczynski v. New Britain Memorial Hospital, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 205, 1289 CRD-6-91-9 (December 2, 1992).
CRB affirmed trier’s finding claimant failed to provide any evidence as to an alleged period of total incapacity for a claimed recurrence of a previous compensable back injury. Also, there was insufficient evidence to causally relate certain medical expenses to the original injury or demonstrate a causal relationship between the claimed disability and a previous injury which arose out of and in the course of employment. See also, Lesczynski, § 31-301. Factual findings and § 31-301-9. Additional evidence.
Period of temporary total disability is a factual determination based on the weight and credibility to be accorded the evidence presented. See also, Corona, § 31-294d.
Tessier v. Kogut Florist and Nurseryman, Inc., 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 276, 1088 CRD-8-90-7 (December 13, 1991).
Remanded as trier’s conclusion as to period claimant was eligible to receive and period claimant was not eligible to receive total incapacity benefits inconsistent with facts found and evidence presented. See also, Tessier, § 31-290c, § 31-301. Factual findings and Appeal procedure.
CRD affirmed trier’s finding awarding claimant temporary total benefits as there was evidence to support trier’s conclusion. See also, Ruh, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-298.
CRD affirmed trier’s finding which awarded claimant total disability benefits for disabling condition which rendered claimant a paraplegic even though claimant sought benefits under § 31-308(b). See also, Corcoran, § 31-301, § 31-284(a) and § 31-308(b).
Whether claimant is totally disabled is a factual determination. See also, Holevinski, § 31-296, § 31-300. Remanded on § 31-300 issue.
Trier’s finding claimant was not totally disabled during period in question will not be disturbed on appeal where there is evidence below which supports the trier’s conclusions. See also, Lagueux, § 31-315, § 31-308a.
Marchitto v. Hamden Upholstery Co., 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 138, 953 CRD-3-89-12 (May 24, 1991).
Trier’s finding claimant continued to be totally disabled due to an occupationally related lung disease despite reaching maximum medical improvement will not be disturbed on appeal where evidence clearly supports commissioner’s finding. Remanded to determine date of lung incapacity and whether compensation rate was properly determined.
Receipt of social security benefits does not render claimant ineligible to receive § 31-307 benefits. Remanded to determine if claimant remained totally disabled after last evidentiary hearing. See, Neurath v. UTC/Pratt & Whitney, 7 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 99, 725 CRD-6-88-4 (October 20, 1989).
Under § 5-142(a), provisions for state employees, claimant cannot elect for collection of benefits pursuant to § 31-307. Remedy for benefits lies under § 5-142(a). See also, Palmer, § 5-142(a). N.B. But See, § 5-142(a) Trinkley v. State of Conn., 220 Conn. 739 (1992); Jones v. State of Conn., 220 Conn. 721 (1992).
Beckwith v. Apollo Design Service, Inc., 9 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 34, 903 CRD-1-89-8 (January 17, 1991).
Finding that claimant remained totally disabled supported by evidence.
Determinations as to total disability are factual. See also, Sgambato, § 31-301. Factual findings, § 31-301-9. Additional evidence.
Where claimant was not working during the twenty six weeks preceding the diagnosis of an occupational disease, average weekly wage to be determined by last date worked, not the prevailing wage. See also, Orcutt, § 31-294c.
Remanded. Temporary total benefits under § 31-307 and specific indemnity benefits pursuant to § 31-308(b) cannot be paid concurrently.
Remanded to correct Finding and Award incapacity benefits where found but not so ordered. See also, Traylor, § 31-308a.
Conclusion as to total incapacity is within trier’s discretion. See also, McConnell, § 31-294d, § 31-307.
French v. Greenwich, 7 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 115, 698 CRD-7-88-2 (November 30, 1989).
Where treating physician testified claimant was capable of light duty, commissioner’s finding denying temporary total benefits will stand.
Neurath v. UTC/Pratt & Whitney, 7 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 99, 725 CRD-6-88-4 (October 20, 1989).
Remanded to determine if claimant’s total incapacity existed beyond date of last evidentiary hearing.
Claimant not entitled to temporary total where disability was from former occupation and not work generally. See also, Heyward, § 31-349.
Trial commissioner’s finding as to total incapacity will not be disturbed where evidence was in conflict. See also, Minotti, § 5-142a.
Calculation of average weekly wage relates to date of incapacity, not date of last risk exposure. See also, Lepino, § 31-310.
Time of injury shall be date of total or partial incapacity to work as a result of an occupational disease.
Trial commissioner’s conclusions on duration of disability will not be disturbed when supported by medical evidence. See also, Hicks, § 31-300, § 31-308(c), § 31-308a.
Trial commissioner’s conclusion as to continuing total incapacity will not be disturbed where evidence in conflict.
Remanded for further evidentiary hearings to determine if claimant’s total incapacity existed beyond the last evidentiary hearing. Subsequent decision at Besade, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 103, 1383 CRB-2-92-2 (February 28, 1994), aff’d, 37 Conn. App. 903 (1995).
Mazzone v. Norwalk, 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 111, 482 CRD-7-86 (June 21, 1988).
Payments of temporary total benefits are dependent upon finding that claimant suffered a total incapacity to work. Claimant’s attendance of DWR rehabilitation program was not inconsistent with a finding that claimant was totally disabled. Also respondents entitled to credit against specific indemnity benefits due for period claimant was paid temporary total but claimant was employed.
Whitney v. Lapoint Garden Center, 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 74, 497 CRD-7-86 (April 29, 1988).
Awards for temporary total disability and the time period for which they are to be awarded is a matter within the discretion of the trial commissioner.
Neumann v. Southern Connecticut Gas Co., 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 62, 265 CRD-4-83 (May 8, 1987).
Awards for total disability are based on factual findings and conclusions of trial commissioner.
A finding that claimant was not totally disabled is a factual finding.
Where concurrent causes resulted in disability, apportionment of liability between successive employers is correct.
Interruption of specific indemnity permitted where claimant was found to be entitled to temporary total disability benefits.
Total disability payments permitted until claimant reached maximum medical improvement, not date of claimant’s ability to do some lifting.
Masse v. Becton Dickinson Co., 1 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 83, 83 CRD-5-81 (December 8, 1981).
Award under § 31-307 is in commissioner’s discretion after claimant reaches maximum medical improvement.
Moore v. Southern New England Telephone Co., 1 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 76, 44 CRD-7-80 (November 10, 1981).
Compensation rate applicable to most recent injury when claimant suffered a series of compensable injuries.
Commissioner not limited to only awarding benefits under § 31-308 where evidence of total incapacity to work exists.
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