Source: http://nj.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20150520_0001097.DNJ.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2017-02-21 21:11:18
Document Index: 785707

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1001', '§ 1144', '§ 1441', '§ 1331', '§ 1332', '§ 301', '§ 502', '§ 85', '§ 502']

| Sautter v. Comcast Cable Co.
Sautter v. Comcast Cable Co.
THERESA SAUTTER, Plaintiff,v.COMCAST CABLE COMPANY, Defendant.
Roger A. Barbour, Esquire, Barbour & Associates LLC, Maple Shade, New Jersey, Attorneys for Plaintiff.
Frank A. Chernak, Esquire, Ballard Spahr LLP, Cherry Hill, New Jersey, and Christopher T. Cognato, Esquire, Ballard Spahr LLP, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Attorneys for Defendant.
Presently before the Court is a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) filed by Defendant, Comcast Cable Company. Plaintiff, Theresa Sautter, opposes the motion. The Court has considered the submissions of the parties and decides this matter pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 78. For the reasons that follow, Defendant's motion is denied without prejudice.
Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Burlington County. She alleges in her complaint that she was employed by Defendant for twenty years and one month. (Compl. ¶ 2.) At the time her employment with Defendant ceased, she was fifty-six years old and was about to turn fifty-seven two months later. (Id. ¶ 3.) Apparently in anticipation of turning fifty-seven, Plaintiff contacted the Human Resources Manager, Magda Carroll, to inquire about her retirement options. (Id. ¶ 5.) According to Plaintiff, Ms. Carroll advised Plaintiff that she did not have to wait until she turned fifty-seven to retire, but could retire immediately and still receive Comcast's standard retirement package. (Id. ¶ 7.) This package included receiving cable services for three years at a reduced rate of approximately $50 per month, as well as a monthly stipend toward the cost of Plaintiff's monthly health care insurance premium. (Id. ¶¶ 8, 9.) In reliance upon the advice of Ms. Carroll, Plaintiff avers that she retired immediately rather than waiting two months until she turned fifty-seven. (Id. ¶¶ 14, 40.) Defendant, however, apparently has not provided Plaintiff with the benefits that she was told she would receive. (Id. ¶ 41.)
Plaintiff's complaint contains eight counts for alleged state law violations. These counts include negligence, unjust enrichment, "agent breaching duty to principal, " breach of contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, detrimental reliance, promissory estoppel, and implied contract in-fact. Defendant removed the action to this Court on the basis that Plaintiff's complaint alleges a cause of action for alleged failure to provide Plaintiff with benefits pursuant to a retirement plan that is governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., and, as such, is predicated upon a federal question.
Defendant now moves to dismiss the complaint, asserting that Plaintiff's state law claims are preempted under ERISA. Specifically, Defendant argues that the contract referred to in the complaint is an employee welfare benefit plan governed by ERISA and subject to ERISA's preemption provision. (Br. in Supp. of Mot. of Def. to Dismiss the Compl. [Doc. No. 6-3] 1.) According to Defendant, Plaintiff's state law claims fall within ERISA's preemption provision because they "relate to" Defendant's "standard retirement package, " a plan or fund which, Plaintiff implicitly alleges, exists in order to provide employees like her with retirement income. (Id. at 5.) Defendant relies on Section 514 of the statute, which "supersede[s] any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan." (Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)). Defendant also moves to dismiss the complaint under the "economic loss doctrine, " which bars tort claims that sound in contract, and on grounds that the complaint fails to meet the pleading requirement of Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). (See id. at 8-16.)
In opposition to the motion to dismiss, Plaintiff does not address Defendant's preemption argument. The thrust of Plaintiff's opposition is that she has submitted sufficient facts to demonstrate that Defendant committed a wrong, and Plaintiff must therefore be permitted to pursue her claim in a court of law. (Pl.'s Br. in Opp. to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss the Compl. for Failure to State a Claim [Doc. No. 8] 9-10.) In this regard, Plaintiff states: "Intentionally, negligently or whatever way, the Defendant has established a valid cause of action for Plaintiff to pursue in court.... Thus, Plaintiff has certainly presented justiciable claims and issues which require redress by the court, and submission of the claims to the trier-of-fact." (Id. at 10.)
A defendant may remove a civil action from state court to the appropriate federal district court if the action pled by the plaintiff is one over which the federal district courts have original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Federal courts have original jurisdiction over actions "arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, " 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or actions between citizens of different States when the amount in controversy exceeds $75, 000, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
Generally, when considering the propriety of removal, courts look to the allegations in the complaint to determine whether a basis for federal jurisdiction exists. Under the "well-pleaded complaint" rule, federal question jurisdiction exists when an issue of federal law appears on the face of the complaint. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 207, 124 S.Ct. 2488, 159 L.Ed.2d 312 (2004); Pryzbowski v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 245 F.3d 266, 271 (3d Cir. 2001). "A federal defense to a plaintiff's state law cause of action ordinarily does not appear on the face of the well-pleaded complaint, and, therefore, usually is insufficient to warrant removal to federal court." Dukes v. United States Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 353 (3d Cir. 1995)(citation omitted).
However, "[t]he Supreme Court has recognized an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule - the complete preemption' exception - under which Congress may so completely pre-empt a particular area that any civil complaint raising this select group of claims is necessarily federal in character.'" Dukes, 57 F.3d at 354 (quoting in part Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63-64, 107 S.Ct. 1542, 95 L.Ed.2d 55 (1987)). The "complete preemption" doctrine has only been recognized in three instances: § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, § 502(a) of ERISA, and §§ 85 and 86 of the National Bank Act. New Jersey Carpenters and the Trustees Thereof v. Tishman Const. Corp. of New Jersey, 760 F.3d 297, 302 (3d Cir. 2014) (citations omitted).
Section 502(a) of ERISA "is one of those provisions with such extraordinary pre-emptive power' that it converts an ordinary state common law complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule.''" Pascack Valley Hosp. v. Local 464A UFCW Welfare Reimbursement Plan, 388 F.3d 393, 399-400 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Aetna Health, 542 U.S. at 209, 124 S.Ct. 2488), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 813, 126 S.Ct. 336, 163 L.Ed.2d 48 (2005); see also Dukes, 57 F.3d at 354 ("The Supreme Court has determined that Congress intended the complete-preemption doctrine to apply to state law causes of action which fit within the scope of ERISA's civil-enforcement provisions"). "As a result, state law causes of action that are within the scope of... § 502(a)' are completely pre-empted and therefore removable to federal court." Pascack Valley Hosp., 388 F.3d at 400 (internal citations omitted). Under Section 502, a "civil action may be ...