Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/350/497
Timestamp: 2016-07-28 03:18:39
Document Index: 322423876

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 371', '§ 207', '§ 2385', '§ 2387', '§ 3231', '§ 2386', '§ 611', '§ 781', '§ 783']

Pennsylvania v. Nelson | US Law | LII / Legal Information Institute
Supreme Court aboutsearch liibulletin subscribe previews Pennsylvania v. Nelson
Argued: November 15-16, 1955
Decided: April 2, 1956
and sentenced to imprisonment for twenty years and to a fine of $10,000 and to costs of prosecution in the sum of $13,000. The Superior Court affirmed the conviction. 172 Pa.Super. 125, 92 A.2d 431. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, recognizing but not reaching many alleged serious trial errors and conduct of the trial court infringing upon respondent's right to due process of law,
decided [p499]
In its opinion, the court stated: '
And, while the Pennsylvania statute proscribes sedition against either the Government of the United States or the Government of Pennsylvania, it is only alleged sedition against the United States with which the instant case is concerned. Out of all the voluminous testimony, we have not found, nor has anyone pointed to, a single word indicating a seditious act or even utterance directed against the Government of Pennsylvania.
which prohibits the knowing advocacy of the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force and violence, supersedes the enforceability of the Pennsylvania Sedition Act, which proscribes the same conduct.
Nor does it limit the jurisdiction of the States where the Constitution and Congress have specifically given them concurrent jurisdiction, as was done under the Eighteenth Amendment and the Volstead Act. United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377. Neither does it limit the right of the State to protect itself at any time against sabotage or attempted violence of all kinds.
Nor does it prevent the State from prosecuting where the same act constitutes both a federal offense and a state offense under the police power, as was done in Fox v. Ohio, 5 How. 410, and Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, relied upon by petitioner as authority herein. In neither of those cases did the state statute impinge on [p501]
the raising of armies for the national defense, nor to rules and regulations for the government of those under arms [a constitutionally exclusive federal power]. It [was] simply a local police measure. . . .
different [p502]
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. at 230. The Congress determined in 1940 that it was necessary for it to reenter the field of anti-subversive legislation, which had been abandoned by it in 1921. In that year, it enacted the Smith Act, which proscribes advocacy of the overthrow of any government -- federal, state or local -- by force and violence and organization of and knowing membership in a group which so advocates.
Conspiracy to commit any of these acts is punishable under the general criminal conspiracy provisions in 18 U.S.C. § 371. The Internal Security Act of 1950 is aimed more directly at Communist organizations.
It distinguishes between "Communist [p503]
action organizations" and "Communist front organizations,"
Members of Communist action organizations who have not been registered by their organization must register as individuals.
Failure to register in accordance with the requirements of Sections 786-787 is punishable by a fine of not more than $10,000 for an offending organization and by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than five years or both for an individual offender -- each day of failure to register constituting a separate offense.
The Communist Control Act of 1954 declares
its role as the agency of a hostile foreign power renders its existence a clear present and continuing danger to the security of the United States.
It also contains a legislative finding that the Communist Party is a "Communist action organization" within the meaning of the Internal Security Act of 1950, and provides that "knowing" members of the Communist Party are "subject to all the provisions and penalties" of that Act.
It furthermore sets up a new classification of "Communist-infiltrated organizations,"
We examine these Acts only to determine the congressional plan. Looking to all of them in the aggregate, the conclusion is inescapable that Congress has intended to occupy the field of sedition. Taken as a whole, they evince a congressional plan which makes it reasonable to determine that no room has been left for the States to supplement it. Therefore, a state sedition statute is superseded regardless of whether it purports to supplement the federal law. As was said by Mr. Justice Holmes in Charleston & Western Carolina R. Co. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U.S. 597, 604: When Congress has taken the particular subject matter in hand, coincidence is as ineffective as opposition, and a state law is not to be declared a help because it attempts to go farther than Congress has seen fit to go.
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. at 230, citing Hines v. Davidowitz, supra.
Congress has devised an all-embracing program for resistance to the various forms of totalitarian aggression. Our external defenses have been strengthened, and a plan to [p505]
to provide for the common defense, to preserve the sovereignty of the United States as an independent nation, and to guarantee to each State a republican form of government. . . .
Congress having thus treated seditious conduct as a matter of vital national concern, it is in no sense a local enforcement problem. As was said in the court below: Sedition against the United States is not a local offense. It is a crime against the Nation. As such, it should be prosecuted and punished in the Federal courts, where this defendant has, in fact, been prosecuted and convicted and is now under sentence.
It is not only important, but vital, that such prosecutions should be exclusively within the control of the Federal Government. . . .
Third, enforcement of state sedition acts presents a serious danger of conflict with the administration of the federal program. Since 1939, in order to avoid a hampering of uniform enforcement of its program by sporadic local prosecutions, the Federal Government has urged [p506]
local authorities not to intervene in such matters, but to turn over to the federal authorities immediately and unevaluated all information concerning subversive activities. The President made such a request on September 6, 1939, when he placed the Federal Bureau of Investigation in charge of investigation in this field: The Attorney General has been requested by me to instruct the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice to take charge of investigative work in matters relating to espionage, sabotage, and violations of the neutrality regulations.
To this end, I request all police officers, sheriffs, and all other law enforcement officers in the United States promptly to turn over to the nearest representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation any information obtained by them relating to espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, subversive activities and violations of the neutrality laws.
And, in addressing the Federal-State Conference on Law Enforcement Problems of National Defense, held on August 5 and 6, 1940, only a few weeks after the passage of the Smith Act, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation said: The fact must not be overlooked that meeting the spy, the saboteur and the subverter is a problem that must be handled on a nationwide basis. An isolated incident in the middle west may be of little significance, but, when fitted into a national pattern [p507]
of similar incidents, it may lead to an important revelation of subversive activity. It is for this reason that the President requested all of our citizens and law enforcing agencies to report directly to the Federal Bureau of Investigation any complaints or information dealing with espionage, sabotage or subversive activities. In such matters, time is of the essence. It is unfortunate that, in a few States, efforts have been made by individuals not fully acquainted with the far-flung ramifications of this problem to interject superstructures of agencies between local law enforcement and the FBI to sift what might be vital information, thus delaying its immediate reference to the FBI. This cannot be if our internal security is to be best served. This is no time for red tape or amateur handling of such vital matters. There must be a direct and free flow of contact between the local law enforcement agencies and the FBI. The job of meeting the spy or saboteur is one for experienced men of law enforcement.
Moreover, the Pennsylvania Statute presents a peculiar danger of interference with the federal program. For, as the court below observed: Unlike the Smith Act, which can be administered only by federal officers acting in their official capacities, indictment for sedition under the Pennsylvania statute can be initiated upon an information made by a private individual. The opportunity thus present for the indulgence of personal spite and hatred or for furthering some selfish advantage or ambition need only be mentioned to be appreciated. Defense of the Nation by law, no less than by arms, should be a public, and not a private, undertaking. It is [p508]
important that punitive sanctions for sedition against the United States be such as have been promulgated by the central governmental authority and administered under the supervision and review of that authority's judiciary. If that be done, sedition will be detected and punished no less, wherever it may be found, and the right of the individual to speak freely and without fear, even in criticism of the government, will, at the same time, be protected.
In his brief, the Solicitor General states that forty-two States plus Alaska and Hawaii have statutes which, in some form, prohibit advocacy of the violent overthrow of established government. These statutes are entitled anti-sedition statutes, criminal anarchy laws, criminal syndicalist laws, etc. Although all of them are primarily directed against the overthrow of the United States Government, they are in no sense uniform. And our attention has not been called to any case where the prosecution has been successfully directed against an attempt to destroy state or local government. Some of these Acts are studiously drawn, and purport to protect fundamental rights by appropriate definitions, standards of proof, and orderly procedures in keeping with the avowed congressional purpose "to protect freedom from those who would destroy it, without infringing upon the freedom of all our people." Others are vague, and are almost wholly without such safeguards. Some even purport to punish mere membership in subversive organizations, which the federal statutes do not punish where federal registration requirements have been fulfilled.
A multiplicity of tribunals and a diversity of procedures are quite as apt to produce incompatible or conflicting adjudications as are different rules of substantive law.
Without compelling [p510]
indication to the contrary, we will not assume that Congress intended to permit the possibility of double punishment. Cf. Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1, 31, 75; Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 105.
Pennsylvania Penal Code § 207The word "sedition," as used in this section, shall mean: Any writing, publication, printing, cut, cartoon, utterance, or conduct, either individually or in connection or combination with any other person, the intent of which is: (a) To make or cause to be made any outbreak or demonstration of violence against this State or against the United States.
The word "sedition" shall also include: (e) The actual damage to, or destruction of, any public property or the property of any public official, perpetrated because the owner or occupant is in official position.
Whoever, with intent to cause the overthrow or destruction of any such government, prints, publishes, edits, issues, circulates, sells, distributes, or publicly displays any written or printed matter advocating, advising, or teaching the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of [p512]
Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize any society, group, or assembly of persons who teach, advocate, or encourage the overthrow or destruction of any such government by force or violence; or becomes or is a member of, or affiliates with, any such society, group, or assembly of persons, knowing the purposes thereof -- Shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both, and shall be ineligible for employment by the United States or any department or agency thereof, for the five years next following his conviction.
318 U.S.C. § 2385. The text of the statute is set out in an Appendix to this opinion, post, p. 511. (Another part of the Smith Act, punishing the advocacy of mutiny, is now 18 U.S.C. § 2387.)
10. Petitioner makes the subsidiary argument that 18 U.S.C. § 3231 shows a congressional intention not to supersede state criminal statutes by any provision of Title 18. Section 3231 provides: The district courts of the United States shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of all offenses against the laws of the United States.
See Appendix, post, p. 511. See also the Voorhis Act, passed in 1940, now codified as 18 U.S.C. § 2386 and the Foreign Agents Registration Act, passed in 1938, 22 U.S.C. § 611
50 U.S.C. § 781
50 U.S.C. § 783(f):
Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 490-491.
Congress has not, in any of its statutes relating to sedition, specifically barred the exercise of state power to punish the same Acts under state law. And we read the majority opinion to assume for this case that, absent federal legislation, there is no constitutional bar to punishment of sedition against the United States by both a State and the Nation.
The majority limits to the federal [p513]
But the federal sedition laws are distinct criminal statutes that punish willful advocacy of the use of force [p514]
In these circumstances, the conflict should be clear and direct before this Court reads a congressional intent to void state legislation into the federal sedition acts.
Chief Justice Marshall wrote: To interfere with the penal laws of a State where they . . . have for their sole object the internal government of the country is a very serious measure which Congress cannot be supposed to adopt lightly or inconsiderately. . . . It would be taken deliberately, and the intention would be clearly and unequivocally expressed.
Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 443. Moreover, it is quite apparent that, since 1940, Congress has been keenly aware of the magnitude of existing state legislation proscribing sedition. It may be validly assumed that, in these circumstances, this Court should not void state legislation without a clear mandate from Congress.
Secondly, the Court states that the federal sedition statutes touch a field "in which the federal interest is so dominant" they must preclude state laws on the same subject. This concept is suggested in a comment on Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, in the Rice case, at 230. The Court in Davidowitz ruled that federal statutes compelling alien registration preclude enforcement of state statutes requiring alien registration. We read Davidowitz to teach nothing more than that, when the Congress provided a single nationwide integrated system of regulation so complete as that for aliens' registration (with fingerprinting, a scheduling of activities, and continuous information as to their residence), the Act bore so directly on our foreign relations as to make it evident that Congress intended only one uniform national alien registration system.
[p516]
In the responsibility of national and local governments to protect themselves against sedition, there is no "dominant interest." [p517]
[p518]
Thirdly, the Court finds ground for abrogating Pennsylvania's anti-sedition statute because, in the Court's view, the State's administration of the Act may hamper the enforcement of the federal law. Quotations are inserted from statements of President Roosevelt and Mr. Hoover, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, to support the Court's position. But a reading of the quotations leads us to conclude that their purpose was to gain prompt knowledge of evidence of subversive activities so that the federal agency could be fully advised. We find no suggestion from any official source that state officials should be less alert to ferret out or punish subversion. The Court's attitude as to interference seems to us quite contrary to that of the Legislative and Executive Departments. Congress was advised of the existing state sedition legislation when the Smith Act was enacted, and has been kept current with its spread.
No declaration of exclusiveness followed. In this very case, the Executive appears by brief of the Department of Justice, amicus curiae. The brief summarizes this point:
The administration of the various state laws has not, in the course of the fifteen years that the federal and state sedition laws have existed side by side, in fact, interfered with, embarrassed, or impeded the enforcement of the Smith Act. The significance of this absence of conflict in administration or enforcement [p519]
of the federal and state sedition laws will be appreciated when it is realized that this period has included the stress of wartime security requirements and the federal investigation and prosecution under the Smith Act of the principal national and regional Communist leaders.
That declaration springs from the federal character of our Nation. It recognizes the fact that maintenance of order and fairness rests primarily with the States. The section was first enacted in 1825, and has appeared successively in the federal criminal laws since that time.
This Court has interpreted the section to mean that States may provide concurrent legislation in the absence of explicit congressional intent to the contrary. Sexton v. California, 189 U.S. 319, 324-325. The majority's position in this case [p520]
Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 328-333; Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137, 148; Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 How. 227, 243; Fox v. Ohio, 5 How. 410, 432-435.