Source: http://openjurist.org/287/f2d/86/greater-baton-rouge-port-commission-v-united-states
Timestamp: 2017-05-28 11:29:47
Document Index: 781661582

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 269', '§ 269', '§ 7', '§ 814', '§ 816', '§ 1', '§ 29']

287 F2d 86 Greater Baton Rouge Port Commission v. United States | OpenJurist
287 F. 2d 86 - Greater Baton Rouge Port Commission v. United States HomeFederal Reporter, Second Series 287 F.2d.
287 F2d 86 Greater Baton Rouge Port Commission v. United States 287 F.2d 86
GREATER BATON ROUGE PORT COMMISSION, and Cargill, Incorporated, Petitioners,v.UNITED STATES of America, and Federal Maritime Board, Respondents.
The Port Commission concedes it is subject to the provisions of the Shipping Act and to the jurisdiction of the Federal Maritime Board. State of California v. United States, 1944, 320 U.S. 577, 585, 64 S.Ct. 352, 88 L.Ed. 322. Cargill, relying on its license under Section 29 of the Warehouse Act (7 U.S.C.A. § 269), asserts that this Act vests in the Secretary of Agriculture exclusive jurisdiction over all activities of a licensed warehouseman, including stevedoring, wharfage, and dockage activities; citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 1947, 331 U.S. 218, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 91 L.Ed. 1447 and Cargill, Inc. v. Commodity Exchange Commission, D.C.D.C.1952, 103 F.Supp. 992. The Warehouse Act does, as Cargill points out, provide that "the power, jurisdiction, and authority conferred upon the Secretary of Agriculture under this Act shall be exclusive with respect to all persons securing a license hereunder so long as said license remains in effect." 7 U.S. C.A. § 269.
Under the original United States Warehouse Act, enacted in 1916, federal regulation was subservient to state regulation. Section 29 of the original act provided that "nothing in this act shall be construed to conflict with, or authorize any conflict with, or in any way to impair or limit the effect or operation of the laws of any State relating to warehouses, warehousemen * * *." Section 6 required any applicant for a federal warehouse license to post a bond to secure the performance of his obligations. Congress amended the Act in 1931, changing Section 29 so that the Secretary of Agriculture, although authorized to cooperate with State officials charged with the enforcement of state laws relating to warehouses, had exclusive power, jurisdiction and authority with respect to all persons securing a license under the Act. Congress amended Section 6 by deleting the requirement that the bond be conditioned on compliance with requirements of state law. The history and purpose of these legislative changes are discussed in Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 1947, 331 U.S. 218, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 91 L.Ed. 1447. This case concludes that a warehouseman is not obligated to operate under the Act, but he may choose to be licensed under it; if he does, he is responsible solely under the federal act, free from the interference of state acts.
In Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 1947, 331 U.S. 218, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 91 L.Ed. 1447, the state regulatory agency having jurisdiction over warehouse activities brought proceedings against a federally licensed warehouseman. The warehouseman sued in the federal courts to enjoin the proceedings before the state agency and to enjoin the state attorney general from enforcing any order of the agency. In granting the injunction, the Supreme Court held that Congress had exercised its preemptive constitutional power over grain warehouses by adopting a uniform regulatory scheme to be administered by the Secretary of Agriculture. The case was decided on the issue of federal-state relations: "The test, therefore, is whether the matter on which the State asserts the right to act is in any way regulated by the Federal Act." Id., 331 U.S. at page 236, 67 S.Ct. at page 1155. Since the matter is regulated by the federal act, the federal scheme of regulation prevails; the matters involved in the suit before the State regulatory commission are beyond its reach. Congress pre-empted the field by declaring its policy in the Warehouse Act. To knock down dual regulation between state and federal systems is a far cry from saying that other federal agencies, within their proper sphere, may not exercise control or regulation along with the Secretary of Agriculture. The Rice decision does not extend the authority of the Secretary of Agriculture into matters beyond the scope of the Warehouse Act.
Cargill relies also on Cargill, Inc. v. Commodity Exchange Commission et al., D.C.1952, 103 F.Supp. 992. In that case Cargill sued the Commission for a declaratory judgment to determine the validity of certain amended rules and regulations adopted by the Chicago Board of Trade. 7 U.S.C.A. § 7a(7), part of the Commodity Exchange Act, authorizes local boards of trade to set up reasonable warehousing requirements for warehouses whose receipts are traded at the local board of trade. The Chicago Board of Trade adopted rules requiring all persons in the Chicago area operating federally licensed warehouses to file formal application with the Board to have each such warehouse declared to be "regular" if the warehouse receipts were to be accepted on grain futures contracts. The local board's regulations went far beyond the "reasonable requirements" authorized by the Act. The district court held, properly enough, that the Act authorizing local boards of trade to set up ground rules for trading in warehouse receipts did not intend to impair the principle of exclusive federal control of the operation of federally licensed warehouses. Again, this is a far cry from holding that the Secretary of Agriculture's control is exclusive as against other federal agencies.
Section 15 of the Shipping Act authorizes the Board to disapprove, cancel or modify any agreement found to be "unjustly discriminatory or unfair" or operating to the "detriment of the commerce of the United States". 46 U.S.C.A. § 814. Section 17 authorizes the Board to determine, prescribe and order the enforcement of a "just and reasonable regulation or practice" whenever it finds regulations or practices established by persons subject to the Act to be "unjust or unreasonable." 46 U.S.C.A. § 816. The Board's decision in the instant case applied both of these sections. After considering Agreement 8225-1, the Board refused to approve it, holding that Agreement 8225-1 resulted in a monopoly of stevedoring services detrimental to the commerce of the United States. See Baker-Whiteley Coal Co. v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 4 Cir., 1911, 188 F. 405; Donovan v. Pennsylvania Co., 1905, 199 U.S. 279, 26 S.Ct. 91, 50 L.Ed. 192. See also Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 1954, 93 U.S.App.D.C. 293, 211 F.2d 51, 57; McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 1944, 321 U.S. 67, 87, 64 S.Ct. 370, 88 L.Ed. 544.
The Shipping Act was entitled: "An Act To establish a United States Shipping Board for the purpose of encouraging, developing, and creating a naval auxiliary and naval reserve and a merchant marine to meet the requirements of the commerce of the United States with its Territories and possessions and with foreign countries; to regulate carriers by water engaged in the foreign and interstate commerce of the United States; and for other purposes." Act, Sept. 7, 1916, c. 451, 39 Stat. 728. The Maritime Commission was established by Congress to safeguard a special aspect of the national interest by stopping all unjust and unreasonable practices in receiving, handling, storing or delivering property "in connection with a common carrier by water." State of California v. United States, 1943, 320 U.S. 577, 64 S.Ct. 352, 357, 88 L.Ed. 322, rehearing denied 321 U.S. 802, 64 S.Ct. 516, 88 L.Ed. 1089. Cf. United States Navigation Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 1932, 284 U.S. 474, 52 S.Ct. 247, 76 L.Ed. 408. "The Shipping Act is a comprehensive measure bearing a relation to common carriers by water substantially the same as that borne by the Interstate Commerce Act (49 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq.) to interstate carriers by land. * * * In its general scope and purpose, as well as in its terms, that act closely parallels the Interstate Commerce Act; and we cannot escape the conclusion that Congress intended that the two acts, each in its own field, should have like interpretation, application, and effect." United States Navigation Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 1932, 284 U.S. 474, 480-481, 52 S.Ct. 247, 249, 76 L.Ed. 408. "The evil of discrimination was the principal thing aimed at by the [Interstate Commerce] Act, see Louisville & N. R. Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 740, 749, 51 S.Ct. 297, [75 L.Ed. 672], and its language is certainly broad enough to embrace all discriminations of the sort described which it was within the power of Congress to condemn." Merchants Warehouse Co. v. United States, 1931, 283 U.S. 501, 512-513, 51 S.Ct. 505, 509, 75 L.Ed. 1227
"The basic program reflected in the [Warehouse] Act was described in HR Rep No 60, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 1, as follows: `The oubreak of the European war emphasized the fact that the farm marketing machinery of this country is seriously weak, insufficient, and inadequate — a condition which already had been more or less recognized by students of farm economics. From a very thorough study of our system of marketing there will appear: (1) A lack of adequate storage facilities; (2) a lack of proper control and regulation of such storage systems as exist; (3) an absence of uniformity in their methods of operation and the form of receipts issued; (4) a multiplicity of standards for grading and classification, or in some cases an entire absence of such standards for grading and classification; (5) a lack of disinterested graders, classifiers, and weighers; (6) a lack of proper relationship between the storage and banking systems of the country. The inauguration under this bill of a permissive system of warehouses licensed and bonded under authority of the Federal Government for the storage of staple and nonperishable agricultural products upon which uniform receipts may be issued, the weights and grades of the products specified therein having been previously determined by licensed weighers and graders in accordance with Government standards, would go far in the direction of standardizing warehouse construction, storage conditions, insurance, accounting, financing, and the handling and marketing of farm products." Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 1947, 331 U.S. 218, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 1154, 91 L.Ed. 1447, footnote 13
This principle is firmly established, beyond the realm of contestation. See 4 Davis, Administrative Law, §§ 29.01-30.14; Federal Maritime Board v. Isbrandtsen Co., 1958, 356 U.S. 481, 78 S.Ct. 851, 2 L.Ed.2d 926; Swift & Co. v. United States, 1952, 343 U.S. 373, 72 S.Ct. 716, 96 L.Ed. 1008; United States Nav. Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 1932, 284 U.S. 474, 52 S.Ct. 247, 76 L.Ed. 408; Manufacturers R. Co. v. United States, 1918, 246 U.S. 457, 38 S.Ct. 383, 62 L.Ed. 831; Pennsylvania Co. v. United States, 1915, 236 U.S. 351, 35 S.Ct. 370, 59 L.Ed. 616