Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/712/899/415188/
Timestamp: 2020-08-11 10:42:13
Document Index: 519801567

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 46', '§ 46', '§ 46', '§ 46', '§ 1', '§ 43', '§ 46', '§ 1', '§ 46', '§ 46', '§ 46', '§ 469', '§ 46', '§ 46', '§ 46', '§ 205', '§ 5', '§ 46', '§ 46', '§ 46', '§ 46']

Richard Arnold, Iv, Appellee, v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., Appellant, v. United States of America, Appellee.francis C. Mihalek, Appellee, v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., Appellant, v. United States of America, Appellee.helen Rae Weston, As Executrix of the Estate of Lewis M.weston, Deceased, Appellee, v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., Appellant.the Aetna Casualty and Surety Company; Aetna Insurancecompany; American Empire Insurance Company; Commercialunion Insurance Company; Compagnies D'assurances Du Groupe;concorde; Continental Casualty Company; Employers Mutualliability Insurance Company of Wisconsin; Hartford Fireinsurance Company; Industrial Indemnity Company; Marylandcasualty Company; Reliance Insurance Company; Royalindemnity Company; St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurancecompany; Security Insurance Company of Hartford; Thetravelers Indemnity Company; Underwriters at Lloyd's Andassociated British Insurance Companies; United Statesfidelity and Guaranty Company; United States Fire Insurancecompany; Zurich Insurance Company, Appellants, v. United States of America; Bernard C. Groseclose; Alden E.hare; William L. Hogan; Dennis L. Hunter, Appellees, 712 F.2d 899 (4th Cir. 1983) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Fourth Circuit › 1983 › Richard Arnold, Iv, Appellee, v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., Appellant, v. United States of America, Ap...
Richard Arnold, Iv, Appellee, v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., Appellant, v. United States of America, Appellee.francis C. Mihalek, Appellee, v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., Appellant, v. United States of America, Appellee.helen Rae Weston, As Executrix of the Estate of Lewis M.weston, Deceased, Appellee, v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., Appellant.the Aetna Casualty and Surety Company; Aetna Insurancecompany; American Empire Insurance Company; Commercialunion Insurance Company; Compagnies D'assurances Du Groupe;concorde; Continental Casualty Company; Employers Mutualliability Insurance Company of Wisconsin; Hartford Fireinsurance Company; Industrial Indemnity Company; Marylandcasualty Company; Reliance Insurance Company; Royalindemnity Company; St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurancecompany; Security Insurance Company of Hartford; Thetravelers Indemnity Company; Underwriters at Lloyd's Andassociated British Insurance Companies; United Statesfidelity and Guaranty Company; United States Fire Insurancecompany; Zurich Insurance Company, Appellants, v. United States of America; Bernard C. Groseclose; Alden E.hare; William L. Hogan; Dennis L. Hunter, Appellees, 712 F.2d 899 (4th Cir. 1983)
US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit - 712 F.2d 899 (4th Cir. 1983) Argued Feb. 8, 1983. Decided July 8, 1983
The panel of the Fourth Circuit which heard the appeal affirmed judgments on behalf of the plaintiffs in two of the accident cases, reversed and remanded the third for a new trial on the issue of compensatory damages and affirmed judgments in favor of the United States and the air traffic controllers. Arnold v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 681 F.2d 186 (4th Cir. 1982). There was a dissent at the panel level limited to the affirmance of awards for plaintiffs in the two accident cases. Id. at 206.
At the outset, it should be observed that the majority's decision has been taken for the purposes of the present case. It is, of course, entitled to the precedential weight attaching to any decision of the court. However, in Shenker v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 374 U.S. 1, 4-5, 83 S. Ct. 1667, 1670-1671, 10 L. Ed. 2d 709 (1963), there appears a suggestion that the area may well be one in which achieving fulfillment of our administrative responsibilities would allow us by rule to select, as a quorum for purposes of ascertaining a majority, when votes on suggestions for hearings or rehearings en banc are taken, either (a) all judges in regular active service, including those disqualified for the purposes of the particular case or (b) all judges otherwise in regular active service who are not, for the purposes of the particular case, disqualified from participating in any way.2 Accordingly, we do not, by our decision today preclude a possible change in practice, brought about by adoption of a rule of general applicability. Nor, of course, do we have occasion to determine whether applicable statutory language would permit or forbid such a change in practice. The uncertainties are not minimized by the Supreme Court's observation in Western Pacific Rr. Corp. v. Western Pacific Rr. Co., 345 U.S. 247, 260, 73 S. Ct. 656, 662, 97 L. Ed. 986 (1953):
With that proposition established, we turn to the language describing the body, a majority of which is required to order hearing or rehearing en banc. In § 46(c), in a sentence immediately preceding the one stating who shall sit in an en banc hearing or rehearing, the body is described in substantially identical terminology: "the circuit judges of the circuit7 who are in regular active service." Again Judge Ervin does not meet the description because, for purposes of the present case, he is "out of service." It would obviously contradict the purpose of disqualification to treat the situation precisely as though the disqualified judge had voted "No." The canon of construction is well established that words repeated within the same statutory section have an identical meaning in the several places employed. E.g., United States v. Nunez, 573 F.2d 769, 771 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 930, 98 S. Ct. 2828, 56 L. Ed. 2d 774 (1978).
We are not unmindful of authority to the contrary. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033, 1041 (2d Cir. 1972), affirmed on other grounds, 414 U.S. 291, 94 S. Ct. 505, 38 L. Ed. 2d 511 (1973).8 However, the opinions in that case, both majority opinions and a dissent, concentrate on the policy considerations and do not allude to the language of the second sentence in § 46(c) or to the problems of directly conflicting meanings assigned to the same language, appearing cheek by jowl in adjacent sentences in a single statute. It is perhaps possible that members of the Second Circuit concentrated their attention, reasonably enough, on FRAP 35(a). That rule, headed "When Hearing or Rehearing in Banc Will be Ordered," restricts itself, so far as present purposes are concerned, to a setting forth in haec verba of the language of the first sentence of § 46(c). Consequently, the conflict between the conclusion reached in Zahn and the language of the second sentence of § 46(c) was not so readily apparent.
The result later reached in Zahn had been described as the correct one in En Banc Hearings in the Federal Courts of Appeals: Accommodating Institutional Responsibilities, 40 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 563 (Part I), 726 (Part II) (1965):
Better reasoned, we find, are two law review notes favoring a result contrary to that reached in Zahn: Comment, Federal Jurisdiction and Practice, 47 St. John's L.Rev. 339, 348 (1972) ("Upon disqualification, the Chief Judge should have properly been accorded no weight; his vote should have been neutralized by reducing the count of the regular active bench to seven and, thus, the four judges who voted for en banc reconsideration of Zahn should have carried the day."); Comment, In Banc Procedures in the United States Courts of Appeals, 43 Fordham L. Rev. 401, 420 (1974).11
The rationale for the majority decision en banc is largely to be found in the panel dissenting opinion. See Arnold v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 681 F.2d 186, 206 (4th Cir. 1982). It would serve no purpose to repeat. However, it must be added that, although the panel dissent restricted itself to a description of perceived reversible error solely on the basis of improper conduct of counsel for the plaintiffs and the United States, we en banc, see substantial error in the joinder for trial or refusal to sever of the accident cases on the one hand and the indemnification or contribution actions on behalf of Aetna and other insurers of Eastern.
Of course, our judicial system could hardly function if appellate courts liberally indulged in second guessing of trial judges. The trial judges are on the scene, and properly are allowed extensive discretion in deciding such questions as whether the disclosure that a defendant is insured, while normally a grounds precluding consolidation or mandating severance, may be overborne by other considerations such as those relied on by the panel majority.13 Nevertheless, a trial must remain fair to both parties, and such considerations of convenience may not prevail where the inevitable consequence to another party is harmful and serious prejudice. Molever v. Levenson, 539 F.2d 996, 1003 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1024, 97 S. Ct. 643, 50 L. Ed. 2d 625 (1976). Consolidation, or refusal to sever, where prejudice results under the facts and circumstances of the particular case, amounts to abuse of discretion, constituting reversible error. Dupont v. Southern Pacific Co., 366 F.2d 193, 196 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 958, 87 S. Ct. 1027, 18 L. Ed. 2d 106 (1967).
In response to various problems concerning the proper role of retired judges in the affairs of the Courts of Appeal, Congress enacted a bill, proposed by the Judicial Conference of the United States, the purpose of which was to clarify the status of circuit and district judges who retired from regular active service. Act of Nov. 13, 1963, Pub. L. 88-176, 77 Stat. 331. S.Rep. No. 596, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1963 U.S.Code Cong. and Ad.News, 1105, 1106. This legislation defined the composition of each of the various Courts of Appeal as consisting of the circuit judges of the circuit in regular active service, that is, those judges not retired. Pub. L. 88-176, § 1(a) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 43(b)). The Act then amended 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) to put control of the en banc proceedings in the hands of "a majority of the circuit judges of the circuit who are in regular active service." Id. at § 1(b). All the amendment did, as it affects us here, was to insert "regular" between "in" and "active" in the then existing statute.
Prior to the enactment of that amendment, the Supreme Court had discussed en banc courts in Textile Mills Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326, 62 S. Ct. 272, 86 L. Ed. 249 (1941), and in the Western Pacific Railroad Case, 345 U.S. 247, 73 S. Ct. 656, 97 L. Ed. 986 (1953), as well as in Shenker hereinafter mentioned. Textile Mills held that the statutes with respect to the composition of the Courts of Appeals did not prohibit a Court of Appeals of more than three judges from hearing a case en banc, and the Western Pacific case construed the predecessor of the statute involved here as simply a grant of power to order hearings and rehearings en banc and to establish the procedure governing the exercise of that power. 345 U.S. at 267, 73 S. Ct. at 666. Its holding was simply that a Court of Appeals could not restrict the initiation of the en banc procedure to the court itself, and that a decision striking out an application by a party for en banc consideration was error. In discussion the Court did construe § 46(c) as neither forbidding nor requiring each active judge of a Court of Appeals to entertain each petition for en banc consideration, which is entirely consistent with its later ruling in Shenker.
In Shenker v. Baltimore & Ohio RR Co., 374 U.S. 1, 4-5, 83 S. Ct. 1667, 1670-1671, 10 L. Ed. 2d 709 (1962), the Supreme Court affirmed a decision of the Third Circuit which required an affirmative vote of an absolute majority of the active members of the court and which did not require each member of the court to vote on petitions for hearing en banc. At the time Shenker filed his petition for rehearing en banc, eight judges were in active service. Four of the eight voted to rehear the case; two voted not to rehear; and two abstained for reasons that do not appear either in the Supreme Court's or the Court of Appeals' opinion. See Shenker v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 303 F.2d 596, 600 (1962). On this vote, the Third Circuit denied the petition for rehearing en banc, and the Supreme Court found no error in the denial. 374 U.S. at 4-5, 83 S. Ct. at 1670-1671. The Supreme Court also found no error in the Third Circuit's procedure for polling its judges, which did not require a judge to vote on a petition. Id. at 5, 83 S. Ct. at 1670. The Court found such a procedure to be within the discretion of the Court of Appeals.
The Second Circuit decided a similar question in Zahn v. International Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033, 1040 (2d Cir. 1972), aff'd on other grounds, 414 U.S. 291, 94 S. Ct. 505, 38 L. Ed. 2d 511 (1973), in a way that supports my contention that the motion for rehearing in this case failed for want of a majority. When the petition for rehearing was considered in the Second Circuit, the court consisted of nine judges. At the time, there was one vacancy.2 One judge did not vote because of disqualification. Of the seven judges who voted, four voted to rehear the case, and three voted not to rehear. Despite this four-to-three vote in favor of rehearing en banc, the Second Circuit denied the petition "for want of an affirmative vote 'by a majority of the circuit judges of the circuit who are in regular active service.' " Zahn, supra at 1040, quoting 28 U.S.C. § 46(c). The Second Circuit has adhered to its literal reading of § 46(c). E.g., Boyd v. Lefrak Organization, 517 F.2d 918 (1975) (rehearing en banc denied; four affirmative votes to rehear, three negative votes, one disqualification, one vacancy).
Besides Zahn, a majority of circuits which have confronted the problem now before us have read § 469(c) as requiring an absolute majority of the circuit judges in regular active service to order a rehearing en banc. Copper and Brass Fabricators Council, Inc. v. Department of Treasury, 679 F.2d 951 (D.C. Cir. 1982), reh'g denied, unpublished order, No. 81-2091 (Aug. 3, 1982) (five votes to rehear; three votes not to rehear; two judges not participating in the matter); Clark v. American Broadcasting Co, 684 F.2d 1208, 1226 (6th Cir. 1982) (rehearing denied; five votes in favor of rehearing, four against, and one judge disqualified); Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 599 F.2d 1259 (3d Cir. 1979) (rehearing denied; four votes to rehear en banc, three votes not to rehear, two judges not participating); Porter County Chapter of Izaak Walton League v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 515 F.2d 513, 533-34 (7th Cir. 1975) (rehearing denied; four votes for rehearing en banc, three votes against, one judge taking no part), rev'd on other grounds, sub nom. Northern Indiana Public Service Co. v. Porter County Chapter of Izaak Walton League, 423 U.S. 12, 96 S. Ct. 172, 46 L. Ed. 2d 156 (1975). See also Internal Operating Procedures for the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, ch. IX, B.4.b. (rev. Sept. 4, 1980) (effect of non-response to a poll of circuit judges on decision whether to rehear a case en banc is the same as a vote not to rehear). Accord Maris, Hearing and Rehearing In Banc, 14 F.R.D. 91, 93 (1954) (the Third Circuit follows § 46(c) literally; hearing or rehearing en banc is ordered only with the concurrence of an absolute majority of the circuit judges in regular active service).
Although the Ninth Circuit apparently does not reveal the results of a poll of its members on whether to hear or rehear a case en banc, one of its members has described the circuit's policy in a footnote to a dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc. Ford Motor Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 673 F.2d 1008, 1012, n. 1 (9th Cir. 1982) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). The Ninth Circuit rehears cases en banc only when a majority of its active members who are not disqualified vote to do so.
Strong practical considerations also support the plain reading of the majority requirement of § 46(c), and of Fed. R. App. P. 35(a), which was adopted pursuant to the statute. "The principal utility of determinations by the courts of appeals en banc is to enable the court to maintain its integrity as an institution by making it possible for a majority of its judges always to control and thereby to secure uniformity and continuity in its decisions...." United States v. American-Foreign S.S. Corp., 363 U.S. 685, 689-90, 80 S. Ct. 1336, 1339-1340, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1491 (1960) (quoting from Maris, Hearing and Rehearing In Banc, 14 F.R.D. 91, 96 (1954). In this connection, since the very direction of the court is in the hands of itself assembled en banc, less than a majority does not hold so steady a course.
Since 1973, two Congresses have seen fit to amend § 46(c), without addressing themselves to the specific problem posed by the Judicial Conference's draft legislation. See The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-164, § 205, 96 Stat. 25, 53 (1982); Act of Oct. 20, 1978, Pub. L. 95-486, § 5, 92 Stat. 1629 (1978). If any inference is to be drawn from the subsequent legislative history of § 46(c), it is that Congress, the only body competent to change the statute, was aware of the construction of the statute sought to be changed by the Judicial Conference and chose not to change it.
The critical verb in both the statute and the rule governing en banc review is "order." The power to order a rehearing en banc is clearly confined to those circuit judges who are in regular active service. Moody v. Albemarle Paper Company, 417 U.S. 622, 626, 94 S. Ct. 2513, 2515, 41 L. Ed. 2d 358 (1974); Allen v. Johnson, 391 F.2d 527, 532 (5th Cir. 1968).
In United States v. American-Foreign Steamship Corp., 363 U.S. 685, 688-89, 80 S. Ct. 1336, 1338-1339, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1491 (1960), the Supreme Court construed the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) and concluded that the crucial time for ascertaining a judge's eligibility to participate in an en banc decision was fixed by the statute's use of the verb "determined." Based on this construction, the Court held that a circuit judge who assumed senior status after the grant of a petition for rehearing en banc, but before the case was decided, was not eligible to participate in the decision.1
* The standards by which courts of appeals are to decide whether to rehear an appeal en banc are concededly not subject to precise formulation and wholly consistent application. The controlling rule, Fed. R. App. P. 35(a), implementing the undergirding statutory grant of power, 28 U.S.C. § 46(c), tells us only that the procedure is "not favored and ordinarily will not be ordered except (1) when consideration by the full court is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of its decisions, or (2) when the proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance." There is enough flexibility built into the very text of this rule--in the word "ordinarily" and in the open-ended expression of "exceptional importance"--that it could not be claimed that the rule itself either compels or excludes rehearing en banc in any case.
But of course, we know--as the introductory "not favored" admonition directly tells us--that the procedure is intended by Congress and the Supreme Court to be used sparingly and with careful discrimination, and that some other standard than a purely subjective, eye-of-the-beholder perception of "exceptional importance" should constrain us in the matter. The Supreme Court, which wisely has deferred as a matter of deliberate policy to the courts of appeals' discretion in invoking this procedure, see Western Pacific Railroad Corp. v. Western Pacific Railroad, 345 U.S. 247, 269, 73 S. Ct. 656, 667, 97 L. Ed. 986 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), has, however, adjured caution and circumspection upon us. So we have been reminded by the Court that " [e]n banc courts are the exception, not the rule"; that they should be "convened only when extraordinary circumstances exist that call for authoritative consideration and decision by those charged with the administration and development of the law of the circuit," United States v. American-Foreign Steamship Corp., 363 U.S. 685, 689, 80 S. Ct. 1336, 1339, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1491 (1960); and that the policy of the en banc rehearing statute is " 'that the active circuit judges shall determine the major doctrinal trends of the future for their court,' " id. at 690, 80 S. Ct. at 1339 (emphasis added). See also Church of Scientology v. Foley, 640 F.2d 1335, 1338-41 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (en banc) (Robinson, C.J., dissenting).
Notwithstanding these wise admonitions suggesting the existence of objective criteria by which we should discipline ourselves in this matter, it remains the fact that we are constrained only by that discipline. And it cannot be gainsaid that in practical terms the standard for invoking the en banc rehearing procedure remains--to paraphrase Chief Justice Hughes on the Constitution--whatever a sufficient majority of active circuit judges in a particular case considers it to be. For this reason, it is not possible to insist that there are any cases which are improper "as a matter of law" for en banc rehearing, and of course I make no such claim for this or any case. See United States v. Lynch, 690 F.2d 213, 215 n. 22 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Robinson, C.J.).
It is possible, however, to insist that there is a discernible scale of case-types in terms of probable fitness for en banc rehearing. We need periodically--if for no other reason than possibly to stem the tide of almost routine suggestions these days for rehearing en banc2 --to consider that scale as an aid to principled and sparing invocation of the procedure. This case provides a particularly appropriate occasion for the exercise because it involves the most flagrant disregard of the principles of restraint that the scale teaches.
Without attempting to define in detail the categories of cases most fit for en banc rehearing,3 it is certain that lowest in the order is that general category wherein the suggestion is only of non-constitutional error leading to an arguably unjust or incorrect panel decision having no significant precedential implications. As to such cases, former Chief Judge Kaufman has expressed the general view that a "judge should [not] cast a vote for reconsideration by the entire court merely because he disagrees with the result reached by the panel ... Rule 35 was not adopted to provide that luxury." Gilliard v. Oswald, 557 F.2d 359, 359 (2d Cir. 1977). This bespeaks a general perception, with which I certainly agree, that it is not the intended function of the en banc procedure simply to provide in effect another intermediate appellate court to review for "mere" panel error. See Western Pacific Railroad, 345 U.S. at 275, 73 S. Ct. at 670 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (use of procedure for this purpose likened to "appeal from the three-judge court to a swollen circuit court"); Church of Scientology, 640 F.2d at 1341 (Robinson, C.J., dissenting); United States v. Robinson, 560 F.2d 507, 526 (2d Cir. 1977) (Feinberg, J., dissenting). This case is obviously in that general category.
At the highest level of potential importance in the general low-fitness category must be cases involving misapprehensions or misapplications of significant legal principle, even of non-constitutional dimensions. These principles may in some cases be of such precedential moment that en banc rehearing is justified, not "merely" to correct an arguably erroneous panel result, but to bring to bear the full court's consideration of a major doctrinal problem having serious precedential implications for circuit, and possibly national, law. See, e.g., Adams v. Proctor & Gamble Manufacturing Co., 697 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (effect on individual Title VII claims of consent judgment in EEOC action). See generally Walters v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 312 F.2d 893, 894 (2d Cir. 1963) (en banc) (Lumbard, C.J.).
In fact-dispositive cases, even if the controlling legal principles are of the greatest significance, rehearing en banc simply to consider a suggestion of panel error in its review of trial court findings of predicate facts is not warranted under the procedure.4 See, e.g., United States v. Collins, 462 F.2d 792, 802 (2d Cir. 1972) (en banc) (rehearing en banc improvidently granted where appeal turns solely upon validity of trial court factual determinations that controlled application of unchallenged Miranda principle).
Western Pacific Railroad, 345 U.S. at 273, 73 S. Ct. at 669 (Jackson, J., dissenting); see also Church of Scientology, 640 F.2d at 1341 (Robinson, C.J., dissenting) ("drains judicial resources [and] leads to multiplicity of opinions [resulting in] inability to offer authoritative guidance").
Aside from insuring in the end a more principled administration of the disfavored en banc procedure in this case, this would also yield the proper result on the merits. For, as I believe will be shown in Part II, the most that could be said for the en banc decision is that it simply substitutes for any injustice in the panel decision at least equal, and arguably greater, injustices running in the opposite direction. Where this is the only consequence of an en banc rehearing of trial court discretionary rulings, it confirms the improvidence of the initial decision to rehear en banc. It also points up the wisdom of the rule that accords great appellate deference to trial court discretion in balancing the risks of relative injustices (the very essence of discretionary judicial action) in an attempt to achieve the most just solution possible. In such situations, the questionable ability of appellate courts in general to strike any better discretionary balance cautions doubly against the expense and investment of resources involved in two-tiered efforts to do so. See generally, Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 Minn. L. Rev. 751 (1957).
The en banc decision on the merits is, apparently, that largely because of the special risks of prejudice created by trial consolidation the misconduct of counsel took on such special color that the verdicts of all three plaintiffs against Eastern Airlines must be set aside and new trials on those claims ordered.9 The displaced panel decision rested on a contrary assessment that despite the conceded impropriety of much of the challenged conduct, a careful review of the record, undertaken with proper deference to trial court discretion, revealed that improper influence of the jury could not be assumed a probable consequence of the misconduct. Arnold v. Eastern Air Lines, 681 F.2d 186 (4th Cir. 1982) (Arnold I), superseded, Arnold v. Eastern Air Lines, 712 F.2d 899 (4th Cir. 1983) (en banc).
That in the overall scheme it is not given to us to root out this particular evil whenever and however it comes to our attention in cases properly before us may be a matter of deep regret to different ones of us from time to time. But the temptation to range beyond our limited function of reviewing for judicial error should be resisted. The way systematically to resist it lies precisely in doing what I am satisfied was not done here: making pragmatic inquiry past the misconduct into whether improper influence upon the jury from that misconduct can be accepted as a probability, see City of Cleveland v. Peter Kiewit Sons' Co., 624 F.2d 749, 756 (6th Cir. 1980), being content to leave to other forces of correction--or to oblivion--any misconduct not found legally prejudicial as well as ethically opprobrious. That exhausts both our responsibility and our power to correct for legal error.
Though the contours of this residual appellate power are understandably vague, it is undoubtedly drawn upon by federal courts from time to time in situations where justice, or the appearance of justice, has been thought to require corrective intervention even though actual prejudice to aggrieved parties cannot be demonstrated or is concededly absent. See, e.g., Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 66 S. Ct. 984, 90 L. Ed. 1181 (1946) (tort defendant's verdict set aside for misconduct of jury commission and clerk of court in excluding daily wage earners from jury lists; "unnecessary to determine" actual prejudice to plaintiff); Young & Simon, Inc. v. Merritt Savings & Loan, 672 F.2d 401 (4th Cir. 1982) (new trial because of two-week interruption, over objection of counsel, of plaintiff's presentation of complicated case; no assessment of actual prejudice). It is arguable that within this general usage of the power, a court may properly intervene to correct and deter sufficiently opprobrious misconduct by trial counsel--officers of the court--even though no actual prejudice stemming from the misconduct can fairly be demonstrated under ordinary standards for reviewing the trial court's discretionary handling of the misconduct. Though the en banc majority does not say that this is the basis of its decision here, it seems to me implicit in what is said in the opinions giving the court's formal rationale. See supra note 10.
Reserving the question whether the misconduct of private counsel for prevailing parties should ever be an occasion for invoking supervisory corrective powers--a point on which I have grave doubt13 --I am satisfied that in this case the misconduct does not. For two basic reasons.
Despite the trial judge's finding, as trier-of-fact on a related, essentially congruent, non-jury issue, that " [Eastern's] crew were not simply inadvertent but rather were grossly negligent," see Arnold I, 681 F.2d at 190 n. 1, 194 n. 8, the judge declined to set aside as against the weight of the same evidence the jury's verdict against plaintiffs on their claims for punitive damages based on the alleged gross negligence of that crew.
That technical impediment to cross-relief still exists of course. But it would be a singularly unjust withholding of the court's supervisory power not to grant that cross-relief now as an adjunct to the substantial relief given Eastern in the process of eradicating the perceived injustice stemming from counsel's misconduct. The improvidence of the trial judge's ruling, with its inevitable lulling effect on plaintiffs' counsel, should not be charged to those plaintiffs even if the misconduct of their counsel is now to be. Ample precedent exists for giving this relief, notwithstanding the technical barrier, in an exercise of the same supervisory jurisdiction that is arguably the most defensible basis of the court's decision to benefit Eastern so handsomely for the dereliction of opposing counsel. See, e.g., Tug Raven v. Trexler, 419 F.2d 536, 548 (4th Cir. 1969); National Association of Broadcasters v. FCC, 554 F.2d 1118, 1127 & n. 24 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
This concerns the ironic plight of Eastern's insurers (Aetna) in the final denouement. In their consolidated appeals Aetna heavily relied, as did Eastern, on the prejudice allegedly caused it by misconduct of opposing counsel. See Arnold I, 681 F.2d at 192-94. Aetna's challenge on this score was rejected by the panel, as was Eastern's, but in the case of Aetna, the rejection was by unanimous decision of the panel. On Aetna's and Eastern's ensuing petitions for rehearing and suggestions for rehearing en banc, Eastern's suggestion for rehearing en banc of course carried by the narrowest of margins. At the same time, Aetna's petition for rehearing was being denied unanimously by the panel, and its suggestion for rehearing en banc failed when it prompted no request for consideration by any member of the court. Now Eastern, because of counsel misconduct, has secured a new trial limited to the determination of compensatory damages and has been freed of the potential for punitive liability, while Aetna's appeal based primarily on the same ground has ended in apparent failure, with the Supreme Court's recent denial of Aetna's petition for certiorari following our denial of its petition for rehearing. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. United States, cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 103 S. Ct. 1801, 76 L. Ed. 2d 366 (U.S.1983).
In light of the decision we have reached, it is unnecessary to decide, and we purposely have avoided deciding, whether the taking of senior status by Judge Butzner on November 1, 1982, after the voting on whether to rehear the case en banc had been completed, but before an order was promulgated recording the vote, changed the equation so that the vote was, whatever view was taken, five of at most nine, and hence, in all events, a majority. Cf. United States v. Martorano, 620 F.2d 912, 920 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. American-Foreign Steamship Corp., 363 U.S. 685, 80 S. Ct. 1336, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1491 (1960); Burns v. Estelle, 626 F.2d 396, 397 (5th Cir. 1980)
In Shenker, it was said that the denial of rehearing en banc fell within the discretion of the Third Circuit "to devise its own administrative machinery to provide the means whereby a majority may order such a rehearing." Western Pacific Rr. Corp. v. Western Pacific Rr. Co., 345 U.S. 247, 250, 73 S. Ct. 656, 658, 97 L. Ed. 986 (1953)
Cf. Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 673 F.2d 1008, 1012 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1982). Other circuits, without being so unequivocally explicit, have adopted and construed rules requiring that disqualified judges be counted for purposes of a quorum when the question is whether or not to hear or rehear a case en banc. For example, the Third Circuit has, by its Rule 2(3) essentially picked up the language of the applicable statute, 28 U.S.C. § 46. We are informed that the interpretation in the Third Circuit has uniformly been to require, to set a case for en banc hearing or rehearing, a majority of all judges in regular active service, even those altogether disqualified in the case concerned. Respecting the Third Circuit, we note that Shenker was a case from that Circuit where rehearing was held to have failed, when two judges abstained and counting them as voting against rehearing resulted in a 4-4 split. The Supreme Court regarded the abstainers as voluntary non-voters, however, and that distinguishes the facts in Shenker from those of a case dealing with a disqualified judge who is under a binding compulsion not to vote.
The Sixth Circuit by order in a specific case which made clear that it was dealing with the question in the circumstances of a disqualified judge, Clark v. American Broadcasting Co., Inc., 684 F.2d 1208 (6th Cir. 1982), and the D.C. Circuit and the Seventh Circuit, in Copper and Brass Fabricators Council, Inc. v. Department of Treasury, 679 F.2d 951 (D.C. Cir. 1982) and Porter County Chapter of Izaak Walton League v. Atomic Energy Comm., 515 F.2d 513, 533 (7th Cir. 1975), have also required for a majority more than one-half of all the judges in regular active service, including those "disqualified" (6th Cir.), "not participating" (D.C. Cir.) or "taking no part" (7th Cir.).
I.e., not senior or retired. United States v. American Foreign Steamship Co., 363 U.S. 685, 688, 80 S. Ct. 1336, 1338, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1491 (1960); Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 417 U.S. 622, 94 S. Ct. 2513, 41 L. Ed. 2d 358 (1974)
Zahn was applied in Boyd v. LeFrak Organization, 517 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1975)
See, however, Langley v. Turner's Express, Inc., 375 F.2d 296, 297 (4th Cir. 1967) ("... [W]e are in accord with Virginia law, which has consistently held that evidence as to insurance coverage is inadmissible and prejudicial to a defendant and the admission of such testimony or argument of counsel disclosing insurance coverage is reversible error.")
In a similar vein is this court's decision in Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Mathews, 571 F.2d 1273 (4th Cir. 1978). Relying on the Supreme Court's holding in American-Foreign Steamship, we concluded in that case that the vote of Judge Craven, who had died after he had concurred in a draft opinion, but before the court's decision was announced, could not be counted in disposing of the appeals
The judicial vacancy created by Judge Butzner's withdrawal from active service does not count in determining whether a majority exists. See United States v. Martorano, 620 F.2d 912, 920 (1st Cir. 1980)
Cf. Western Pac. R.R., 345 U.S. at 270, 73 S. Ct. at 667 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (noting in 1952 "a growth in the tendency to file petitions for rehearing in the courts of appeals")
The rule itself specifically identifies only the most obvious type, that wherein the panel decision conflicts with another, thereby threatening the "uniformity of [the circuit's] decisions." Fed. R. App. P. 35(a) (1). Certainly also high in any reckoning of "special importance" must be cases presenting difficult or novel constitutional issues having potentially wide application. Beyond these, "special importance" becomes less manifest. See generally Church of Scientology, 640 F.2d at 1341-42 (Robinson, C.J., dissenting)
It is of course possible that in a "fact-review" case the real question is not simply one of panel judgment in applying the agreed standard for fact-finding review, but is of the proper standard to be applied. This is itself a matter of legal principle, and a court might properly consider it necessary to address that significant legal principle en banc. Such an issue was, for example, recently the dispositive one in Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 102 S. Ct. 1781, 72 L. Ed. 2d 66 (1982) (appropriate standard for review of ultimate finding of employer motivation under Title VII)
Achieving the narrow precedential effect of deterring comparable counsel misconduct by failing to reward that here is in fact given as a specific justification for the en banc decision. In the incorporated panel dissent it is suggested that the " [panel] majority's opinion [is] an open invitation to outrageous misbehavior by trial lawyers."
Every decision rejecting challenges to marginal ethical conduct or questionable trial tactics of counsel contains some risk of condonation, but cases have to be decided up or down. It would be quite as reasonable now to suggest that the en banc decision necessarily condones trial court sandbagging tactics. Certainly a signal of some sort is given that trial counsel may with impunity raise no objection on trial to opposing counsel's conduct and take their chances on a favorable verdict, secure in the knowledge that if the verdict is unfavorable this court will nevertheless entertain their belated perception of prejudice (particularly if presented by different appellate counsel), paying no attention to what is probably the clearest on-the-scene indication of the degree of prejudice actually involved. See Arnold v. Eastern Air Lines, 681 F.2d 186, 195, 200 § n. 15 (4th Cir. 1982) (Arnold I), superseded, Arnold v. Eastern Air Lines, 712 F.2d 899 (4th Cir. 1983) (en banc).
In its written brief Eastern apparently, though imprecisely, contended both that the damage awards were excessive per se, and that counsel misconduct had improperly inflated them, whether or not they were excessive per se. The panel opinion considered and rejected both arguments. See Arnold I, 681 F.2d at 200-04. During oral argument on the rehearing en banc, Eastern's counsel confined argument to counsel misconduct as an impermissibly inflating factor, correctly pointing out in response to a question from the bench that it was not necessary to prove an award "outrageous" in amount under the test of Grunenthal v. Long Island R.R., 393 U.S. 156, 89 S. Ct. 331, 21 L. Ed. 2d 309 (1968), to show that it was improperly inflated by counsel's misconduct. This implicit concession that excessiveness per se is not now challenged is apparently reflected as well in the en banc court's opinion which is essentially confined to identifying counsel misconduct as the sole basis for setting aside the verdicts
The en banc court's decision rejecting the conclusion drawn by the panel majority from the latter's detailed review cannot fairly be taken as, by implication, a comparable review that simply has led to a contrary conclusion. The gist of the en banc court's basis for decision is fairly found in the panel dissent, which in fact is said largely to contain the en banc decision's rationale. Arnold v. Eastern Air Lines, 712 F.2d 899, 905 (4th Cir. 1983) (en banc). The unmistakable impression from the panel dissent is that misconduct so egregious is so necessarily prejudicial that this ends the matter and makes detailed review to assess the probability of actual prejudice unnecessary
Though Aetna is not before us on this rehearing en banc, the en banc majority, apparently recognizing the irony of the situation, has oddly resurrected, at the end of its opinion, that party's rejected appellate claim just long enough to declare summarily that, in contrast to Eastern's, it has no merit. Arnold v. Eastern Air Lines, 712 F.2d 899, 907 (4th Cir. 1983) (en banc). The suggestion is made that the revelation of insurance coverage could only have prejudiced Eastern. But that is not the prejudice claimed by Aetna. See Arnold I, 681 F.2d at 192