Source: https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/514-u-s-334-605256630
Timestamp: 2020-07-09 02:50:25
Document Index: 537500945

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3599', '§ 3599', '§ 3599', '§ 3599', '§ 3599', '§ 3599', '§ 3599', '§ 3599']

514 U.S. 334 (1995), 93-986, McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n - Federal Cases - Case Law - VLEX 605256630
Docket Nº: No. 93-986
Citation: 514 U.S. 334, 115 S.Ct. 1511, 131 L.Ed.2d 426, 63 U.S.L.W. 4279
Party Name: McINTYRE, executor of ESTATE OF McINTYRE, DECEASED v. OHIO ELECTIONS COMMISSION
115 S.Ct. 1511, 131 L.Ed.2d 426, 63 U.S.L.W. 4279
After petitioner's decedent distributed leaflets purporting to express the views of "CONCERNED PARENTS AND TAX PAYERS" opposing a proposed school tax levy, she was fined by respondent for violating § 3599.09(A) of the Ohio Code, which prohibits the distribution of campaign literature that does not contain the name and address of the person or campaign official issuing the literature. The Court of Common Pleas reversed, but the Ohio Court of Appeals reinstated the fine. In affirming, the State Supreme Court held that the burdens § 3599.09(A) imposed on voters' First Amendment rights were "reasonable" and "nondiscriminatory" and therefore valid. Declaring that § 3599.09(A) is intended to identify persons who distribute campaign materials containing fraud, libel, or false advertising and to provide voters with a mechanism for evaluating such materials, the court distinguished Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, in which this Court invalidated an ordinance prohibiting all anonymous leafletting.
Section 3599.09(A)'s prohibition of the distribution of anonymous campaign literature abridges the freedom of speech in violation of the First Amendment. Pp. 341-357.
(b) This Court's precedents make abundantly clear that the Ohio Supreme Court's reasonableness standard is significantly more lenient than is appropriate in a case of this kind. Although Talley concerned a different limitation than § 3599.09(A) and thus does not necessarily control here, the First Amendment's protection of anonymity nevertheless applies. Section 3599.09(A) is not simply an election code provision subject to the "ordinary litigation" test set forth in Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, and similar cases. Rather, it is a regulation of core political speech. Moreover, the category of documents it covers is defined by their contentonly those publications containing speech designed to influence the voters in an election need bear the required information. See, e.g., First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776-777. When a law burdens such speech, the Court applies "exacting scrutiny,"
upholding the restriction only if it is narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state interest. See, e.g. , id., at 786. Pp. 343-347.
(d) This Court's opinions in Bellotti, 435 U.S., at 792, n. 32which commented in dicta on the prophylactic effect of requiring identification of the source of corporate campaign advertisingand Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 75-76which approved mandatory disclosure of campaign-related expendituresdo not establish the constitutionality of § 3599.09(A), since neither case involved a prohibition of anonymous campaign literature. Pp. 353-356.
67 Ohio St. 3d 391, 618 N.E.2d 152, reversed.
Andrew I. Sutter, Assistant Attorney General of Ohio, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the briefs were Lee Fisher, Attorney General, Andrew S. Bergman, Robert A. Zimmerman, and James M. Harrison, Assistant Attorneys
General, Richard A. Cordray, State Solicitor, and Simon B. Karas. [*]
The question presented is whether an Ohio statute that prohibits the distribution of anonymous campaign literature is a "law . . . a bridging the freedom of speech" within the meaning of the First Amendment.[1]
The proposed school levy was defeated at the next two elections, but it finally passed on its third try in November 1988. Five months later, the same school official filed a complaint with the Ohio Elections Commission charging that Mrs. McIntyre's distribution of unsigned leaflets violated § 3599.09(A) of the Ohio Code.[3] The commission agreed and imposed a fine of $100.
The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed by a divided vote. The majority distinguished Mrs. McIntyre's case from Talley on the ground that § 3599.09(A) "has as its purpose the identification of persons who distribute materials containing false statements." 67 Ohio St. 3d 391, 394, 618 N.E.2d 152, 154
(1993). The Ohio court believed that such a law should be upheld if the burdens imposed on the First Amendment rights of voters are " ' reasonable '" and "' nondiscriminatory. '" Id., at 396, 618 N.E. 2d, at 155, quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983). Under that standard, the majority concluded that the statute was plainly valid:
In dissent, Justice Wright argued that the statute should be tested under a more severe standard because of its significant effect "on the ability of individual citizens to freely express their views in writing on political issues." Id., at 398, 618 N.E. 2d, at 156-157. He concluded that § 3599.09(A) "is not narrowly tailored to...
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