Source: http://fiucivpro.blogspot.com/2017/
Timestamp: 2017-09-19 15:07:42
Document Index: 57012389

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1291', '§ 1404', '§ 1404', '§ 1391', '§ 1404', '§ 1404', '§ 1', '§ 1652', '§ 2072', '§ 1367', '§ 1367', '§ 1367', '§ 1332', '§ 1338', '§ 1332', '§ 1331', '§ 1331', '§ 1331', '§ 1367', '§ 1331']

Wasserman's Civil Procedure: 2017
Naruto Aftermath: The Macaque on Slater's Back
David Slater's financial plight in the wake of the Naruto suit.
Posted by Paul Rice at 12:31 PM
A sues B, in a valid diversity action in federal court(+75k and complete diversity). B then has a third party claims against C , for contribution. Under joinder 18(a), B wants to add another claim against C, for damages in an unrelated claim. 1367(a) dictates that a "same case and controversy " standard controls supplemental juris.
Does 1367(a) bar that "18(a)" claim between B and C because of the" same case and controversy" standard?
I think it does. What bothers me about this question is that it is properly joined , but no SMJ/ SUPP J over that claim. (yes this is simliar to Krista Millea case )
Posted by Howard Wasserman at 9:25 PM
Posted by Howard Wasserman at 8:12 AM
Posted by Howard Wasserman at 5:04 AM
Posted by Howard Wasserman at 5:23 PM
Posted by Howard Wasserman at 5:16 PM
Posted by Howard Wasserman at 10:05 AM
Posted by ktrue at 6:00 PM
Posted by Howard Wasserman at 11:50 AM
Posted by Howard Wasserman at 12:41 PM
Posted by Howard Wasserman at 6:06 PM
Posted by Howard Wasserman at 12:54 PM
Zervos v. Trump:
The defamation lawsuit in Zervos v. Trump was filed in state court in California, the plaintiff’s home state. Trump moves to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
As the court, decide the motion to dismiss.
1) California has a catch-all Long Arm Statute, stating “A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States.”
2) Accept all the facts in the complaint as true.
Posted by Howard Wasserman at 9:05 AM
With respect to any state laws given in the hypo, try to figure out what the underlying policies of those laws might be (i.e., what the state is hoping to accomplish by having such a law). So, for example, why do we have statutes of limitations? With respect to possibly applicable federal laws/rules, if they are ones we have already learned in this class, I have not identified them in the hypo; you have to figure out what federal statutes/rules might be in play (consider this a pleading review). If the federal law/rule is new (or fake), I have identified it in the hypo. Needless to say, you will need your rule book in class.
Posted by Paige Bennett at 9:20 AM
Posted by Howard Wasserman at 8:43 AM
We begin with Venue, Change of Venue, and FNC. Read §§ 1291 and 1404 in light of the discussion of both in Atlantic Marine. What is the connection between transfer venue under § 1404 and forum non conveniens? Is venue proper in VOA? What role might § 1404 have played in Burger King? How does the presence of a forum-selection clause affect both the § 1391 and § 1404 analysis (the Court enumerates 5 ways). What is the connection between § 1404 and Forum Non Conveniens; when does the latter come into play. Look at Fla. § 1.061 for its version of F/N/C.
We then turn to Erie; prepare Introduction and History (which is mainly Erie itself), Problem of Procedure, and Modern Approach (which is mainly Hanna). Read Erie with great care, identifying the five steps Justice Brandeis takes in overturning Swift. Think about how the parties raised these issues procedurally. Read and understand § 1652, which is the touchstone for all of this. Read and understand § 2072 in light of the discussion in Hanna.
Posted by Howard Wasserman at 6:05 PM
I will post the hypos on a separate post.
Posted by Howard Wasserman at 10:03 AM
Posted by Andrew Balthazor at 3:12 PM
Posted by Elizabeth Utset at 5:58 PM
Posted by Howard Wasserman at 11:58 AM
Posted by Mary Berney at 8:07 AM
The plaintiff, Roger Clemens, moved to Texas in 1977 at the age of fifteen. In 1983, after playing college baseball for the University of Texas, he was drafted by the Boston Red Sox, a Major League Baseball team. Clemens played for the Red Sox until 1996, when he signed with the Toronto Blue Jays. As a member of the Blue Jays, Clemens met the defendant Brian McNamee, an athletic trainer for the Toronto organization. In 1999, Clemens joined the New York Yankees, and one year later, the Yankees hired McNamee as an assistant trainer. Clemens trained with McNamee until some point in 2007. Over the course of their professional relationship, McNamee traveled to Texas approximately thirty-five times to train Clemens and other professional athletes. Although he temporarily resided in other cities during his professional baseball career, Clemens returned to Houston at the end of every baseball season. He currently lives in Texas with his wife and four children.
In the summer of 2007, federal authorities contacted McNamee in New York City in connection with the Government's criminal investigation of BALCO, a Bay Area laboratory allegedly involved in the development and sale of performance-enhancing drugs. At the interview, authorities told McNamee that the Government had sufficient evidence to secure a conviction against McNamee for delivering illegal performance-enhancing drugs to athletes. In lieu of prosecution, the United States Attorney's Office for the Northern District of California gave McNamee use immunity for any statements he gave in relation to the Government's investigation. McNamee was interviewed by the Government for two days during which he told investigators that he had injected Clemens with performance-enhancing drugs in 1998, 2000, and 2001. These injections, according to McNamee, took place in Toronto and New York.
A short time after his interview with the Government, federal authorities contacted McNamee again, this time requesting that he cooperate with a Major League Baseball investigation being conducted by former United States Senator George Mitchell into the use of performance-enhancing drugs in the game ("Mitchell Commission"). Federal investigators arranged and participated in McNamee's meeting with Mitchell in New York. On December 12, 2007, the Mitchell Commission released the findings of its investigation in its Report to the Commissioner of Baseball of an Independent Investigation Into the Illegal Use of Steroids and Other Performance Enhancing Substances By Players In Major League Baseball ("Mitchell Report"). The Mitchell Report included McNamee's statements concerning Clemens' use of performance-enhancing drugs. Every national news service, as well as every major newspaper in Texas, republished McNamee's statements. Following the Mitchell Report's release, McNamee spoke with John Heyman, a senior writer for the internet site SI.com. During this interview at McNamee's house in Queens, New York, McNamee repeated the statements that had been published in the Mitchell Report. Heyman posted an article containing these statements to the website SI.com on January 7, 2008.
In January 2008, Clemens filed suit for defamation against McNamee in Texas state court. McNamee removed the action to the United States District Court and moved to dismiss Clemens' complaint for inter alia lack of personal jurisdiction.
For purposes of this analysis, proceed as if Texas has a catch-all long arm statute, giving courts jurisdiction "To the extent permitted by the Constitution of the United States."
Posted by Howard Wasserman at 9:23 AM
Posted by Howard Wasserman at 9:19 AM
Friday audio. Prelim Exam due at beginning of class Monday. Essay VI will be posted shortly.
We continue with Supplemental Jurisdiction and the fundamental problem case of a mix of federal and state claims between non-diverse parties (as in Godin). Think about the bases for jurisdiction over all the different claims in VOA and Godin. Is § 1367 satisfied in Godin? In VOA? What is the connection between the standard for joinder under the rules and the standard for jurisdiction in § 1367? What was going on in Exxon/Ortega? How does § 1367(b) interact with the requirements of § 1332?
Posted by Howard Wasserman at 10:31 AM
We have a few final words on Overview. What is the rule on exclusive v. concurrent jurisdiction? How does § 1338(a) illustrate that? When was subject matter jurisdiction raised and argued in Mas and in Belleville--was that timing permissible?
For Monday, prepare all of Diversity Jurisdiction. Consider:
• What is the policy behind the exception clause in § 1332(a)(2)?
• Review the allegations of diversity jurisdiction in Wal Mart and VOA Was diversity jurisdiction alleged correctly? Why or why not?
We weil get to Federal Question Jurisdiction for Friday and Supplemental Jurisdiction for our make-up class on Saturday, April 1.
Posted by Howard Wasserman at 8:13 PM
Read and review all of Federal Question Jurisdiction. Again, note the Glannon's reading on the difference in meaning of "arising under" between § 1331 and Article III. We left off on the question of when and why we need jurisdictional grants other than § 1331--do they still play a role? What is the purpose of "arising under" federal question jurisdiction? What is the "Well-Pleaded Complaint" Rule and how does it operate? If the Mottleys cannot sue in federal district court, what should they do? And how do they get a federal forum for any federal issues? Under Mims, what is the core meaning of "arising under" for § 1331 purposes?
Because I think we will get there, start Supplemental Jurisdiction. Just for Friday, read Glannon p. 261-69 and 275-79, along with § 1367 (focusing on subpart (a) and (c) and Jones. Think about the bases for jurisdiction over all the different claims in VOA and Godin.
Posted by Howard Wasserman at 11:12 AM
When a golf course is like a cruise line
When is a golf course like a cruise line? When it comes to civil procedure of course!
Yesterday, as part of LSV II requirements, I attended the oral arguments for TRUMP ENDEAVOR 12 LLC, vs. FERNICH, INC. D/B/A THE PAINT SPOT.
Daily Business Review summary here: here http://www.dailybusinessreview.com/id=1202769742287/Paint-Contractor-Wins--Award-Against-Trump-Resort.
Paint contractor The Paint Spot (plaintiff in original complaint and appellee) claims that President Trump's Doral golf club (defendant and appellant) did not pay the last $34k of a $130k paint bill as part of the renovations of the "Blue Monster" golf course. Paint Spot won in lower court and at one point there was a foreclosure auction sale scheduled for the golf club.
The appellant's main claim was that the appellee had failed to provide timely notice of a lien to the correct party. The Paint Spot's attorney argued that since the incorrect party had been provided by the defendant, Paint Spot had substantially performed. Trump's attorney countered that once the error had been discovered, Trump had notified Paint Spot of the correct party, with Paint Spot confirming via email that it would serve the correct party, but never did. Paint Spot's attorney emphasized that despite this error, Trump had treated Paint Spot as though it had filed with the correct party, even asking for lien waivers in order to partially pay Paint Spot.
The key differences in this case versus Krupski v Costar Cruise Lines is that: (a) the defendant informed the plaintiff of the mistake, (b) the plaintiff never corrected the mistake, and (c) the defendant treated the incorrect notice as though it was valid for at least 9 months.
This $34k dispute is now almost $300k with attorney fees.
Posted by Jvossman at 3:09 AM
Monday audio--Part I, Part II.
We continue with Young and the slightly different approach the Court took to the burden-shifting framework in an accommodation case. What evidence was there on each of the points in the framework? We then have a few wrap-up points on summary judgment, looking at the 7th Amendment and FRCP 56(f) and (g). What happens if summary judgment is granted in full? What if denied or granted only in part?
We start with Subject Matter Jurisdiction. Prepare Overview of Federal Jurisdiction, looking at the jurisdictional allegations in our sample pleadings. Then move to Diversity Jurisdiction. Consider:
• How are entities treated for diversity purposes?
Posted by Howard Wasserman at 6:04 PM
Monday audio. Prelim Exam posted earlier; due at the beginning of class on Monday. Essay VI will be posted on Friday, due at the beginning of class next Wednesday, March 29.
We continue with Diversity Jurisdiction. In addition to the cases assigned, download Americold from the blog. Consider who domicile is determined for all types of business corporations. What is the "Nerve Center" and why did the Hertz Court adopt that as the definition of principal place of business? Look at the jurisdictional statements in the complaints in Morgan and VOA; are there problems with the way either alleged diversity jurisdiction? Break down the jurisdiction problems in Belleville and Zambelli. Review FRCP 19(a) and (b). What can/should happen when a party in the case destroys complete diversity?
We then turn to Federal Question Jurisdiction. For Wednesday, read the statutory provisions, Mottley, and the assigned portions in Glannon; note Glannon's discussion of the different meaning of "arising under" for § 1331 and Article III. What is the purpose of "arising under" federal question jurisdiction? What is the "Well-Pleaded Complaint" Rule and how does it operate?
Finally, note that we will not have class on Friday, April 14. We will do an advance make-up in a double session on Friday, March 31 (a week from this Friday).
Posted by Howard Wasserman at 10:24 AM
Preliminary Exam--Both Sections
Here. Due at the beginning of class on Monday, March 27.
So you have a sense of what these look like, three interrogatories and a production request: Here, here, and here. In addition, here is a Response to Request for Admissions in Michael Brown's lawsuit against the City of Ferguson.
Posted by Howard Wasserman at 8:30 AM
For Monday after break--Section A
Friday audio. Have a good break.
Preliminary Exam will be posted on Monday, March 20 and due at the beginning of class on Monday, March 27. Essay VI will be posted on Friday, March 24 and due on Wednesday, March 29.
I realized after class that I did not assign Belleville for today; read it to see how subject matter jurisdiction came up.
We continue with Diversity Jurisdiction. Read the entire section.
• Review the allegations of diversity jurisdiction in Wal Mart and VOA? Was diversity jurisdiction alleged correctly? Why or why not?
Posted by Howard Wasserman at 10:25 AM