Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/994/1027/271676/
Timestamp: 2020-06-06 12:22:12
Document Index: 320582944

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1291', '§ 1541', '§ 703', '§ 1001', '§ 1612', '§ 1983', '§ 1651', '§ 1612', '§ 23', '§ 336', '§ 1574', '§ 1574', '§ 32', '§ 79', '§ 479', '§ 1983', '§ 1983']

Ronald Brow, Appellant, v. Alexander Farrelly, Governor; United States Virgin Islandspolice Department and Its Commissioner Milton Frett;rudolph Krigger, Commissioner of Finance, Territorial Courtjudge George Eltman, Nominal Respondent in D.c.ronald Brow, Appellant, v. Alexander Farrelly, Governor; United States Virgin Islandspolice Department and Its Commissioner Miltonfrett; Rudolph Krigger, Commissioner of Finance, 994 F.2d 1027 (3d Cir. 1993) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Third Circuit › 1993 › Ronald Brow, Appellant, v. Alexander Farrelly, Governor; United States Virgin Islandspolice Departme...
Ronald Brow, Appellant, v. Alexander Farrelly, Governor; United States Virgin Islandspolice Department and Its Commissioner Milton Frett;rudolph Krigger, Commissioner of Finance, Territorial Courtjudge George Eltman, Nominal Respondent in D.c.ronald Brow, Appellant, v. Alexander Farrelly, Governor; United States Virgin Islandspolice Department and Its Commissioner Miltonfrett; Rudolph Krigger, Commissioner of Finance, 994 F.2d 1027 (3d Cir. 1993)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit - 994 F.2d 1027 (3d Cir. 1993) Submitted Under Third Circuit Rule 12(6)Dec. 8, 1992
Decided May 13, 1993. As Amended May 26, 1993
Brow commenced this action by seeking a writ of review1 in the Territorial Court to challenge the decision of the Government Employees Service Commission upholding his suspension without pay from the Police Department. The Territorial Court reversed and ordered Brow's reinstatement with full pay retroactive to April 1, 1986, the date of the suspension. Brow v. Farrelly, No. 1986-0744 (Terr.Ct.V.I. Dec. 22, 1989). The defendants appealed the Territorial Court's order to the District Court Appellate Division, which dismissed the case pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 3(a) for failure to timely prosecute. Brow v. Farrelly, No. 1990-0054 (D.V.I. June 27, 1990).
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over the District Court's dismissal of Brow's petitions for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, including the District Court's prediction, interpretation and application of Virgin Islands law. Government of V.I. v. Smith, 949 F.2d 677, 680 (3d Cir. 1991). Our review of the District Court's order enjoining Brow from filing any further documents without leave of court is for abuse of discretion. Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 901 F.2d 329, 331 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 806, 111 S. Ct. 237, 112 L. Ed. 2d 196 (1990).
To resolve the jurisdictional issue before us, we must begin with Article IV, Section 3 of the United States Constitution, which empowers Congress to establish all necessary rules and regulations concerning the unincorporated territory of the Virgin Islands, including the power to designate the jurisdiction of the District Court and the Territorial Court. See Territorial Ct. of V.I. v. Richards, 673 F. Supp. 152, 157 (D.V.I. 1987), aff'd, 847 F.2d 108 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 955, 109 S. Ct. 390, 102 L. Ed. 2d 380 (1988). Congress exercised this power by enacting the Revised Organic Act of the Virgin Islands, 48 U.S.C. §§ 1541 et seq. (1987).
The Revised Organic Act was intended to operate as a "new basic charter of government for the territory." Virgo Corp. v. Paiewonsky, 384 F.2d 569, 576 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1041, 88 S. Ct. 1633, 20 L. Ed. 2d 303 (1968). The Organic Act is the Virgin Islands' equivalent of a constitution, Estate of Thomas Mall, Inc. v. Territorial Ct. of V.I., 923 F.2d 258, 262 n. 4 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S. Ct. 50, 116 L. Ed. 2d 28 (1991); Mapp v. Lawaetz, 882 F.2d 49, 51 (3d Cir. 1989), and as such, it is the body of law that defines the jurisdictional boundaries of the Virgin Islands courts. While the Virgin Islands Code also appears to define jurisdictional limits of the Virgin Islands courts, it is axiomatic that whatever power the Virgin Islands legislature possesses to vest jurisdiction in the Territorial Court and divest jurisdiction from the District Court must derive from the Revised Organic Act.
In 1984, Congress rewrote Section 1612, designating the existing provision subsection (a) and adding subsections (b) and (c), thereby modifying the jurisdiction of the District Court. Act of October 5, 1984, Pub. L. 98-454, Title VII, § 703(a), Title X, § 1001, 98 Stat. 1738, 1745 (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1612(a)-(c) (1988)). Subsection (a) of section 1612 establishes the basic jurisdictional foundation of the District Court. It reads:
Congress' addition of subsection (b) to section 1612 of the Revised Organic Act further modified the jurisdictional scope of the Virgin Islands courts, but the extent to which the amendment affected the status quo was unclear from face of the statute. In January of 1991, however, this court decided Estate of Thomas Mall, Inc. v. Territorial Ct. of V.I., 923 F.2d 258 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S. Ct. 50, 116 L. Ed. 2d 28 (1991), which interpreted the effect of the 1984 amendments to section 1612 on the jurisdiction of the Virgin Islands courts.
Estate of Thomas Mall, Inc., 923 F.2d at 262. We also concluded, however, that the exercise of the power conferred by section 1611(b) did not itself divest the District Court of jurisdiction in these areas by the application of section 1612(b). More specifically, addressing the question on whether section 1612(b) is self-executing, or whether the section requires legislation to effect its purpose, we held that section 1612(b) does not ex proprio vigore5 divest the District Court of jurisdiction over local actions. By examining the language "not then vested by local law in the local courts," we concluded that " [s]uch divestment will not occur until the Virgin Islands legislature enacts a law which effects the power created by the 1984 amendments," Estate of Thomas Mall, Inc., 923 F.2d at 264, i.e., until the legislature vested jurisdiction of local actions in the local courts.
Second, the District Court incorrectly interpreted the nature of the relief Brow requests in this "mandamus" petition. While Brow may have entitled his first action "Petition for Writ of Mandamus," if read liberally, we are satisfied that Brow merely seeks enforcement of the Territorial Court's December 22, 1989 judgment.9 (Appellant's Br. at 3); see Riley v. Jeffes, 777 F.2d 143, 147 (3d Cir. 1985) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S. Ct. 594, 595-96, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1972)) (pro se pleadings are read liberally and are not held to the same stringent standards as pleadings prepared by an attorney).
The dismissal of Brow's petition was ultimately appropriate, however, because neither the Territory of the Virgin Islands nor its officers acting in their official capacities are "persons" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Ngiraingas v. Sanchez, 495 U.S. 182, 192, 110 S. Ct. 1737, 1743, 109 L. Ed. 2d 163 (1990). Thus, Brow's action for injunctive relief to prevent further violation of his civil rights failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted and was properly dismissed.12
The All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), made applicable to the District Court of the Virgin Islands through 48 U.S.C. § 1612(a), enables the District Court to issue such injunctions to preclude abusive, groundless and vexatious litigation. See In re Oliver, 682 F.2d 443, 445 (3d Cir. 1982). The broad scope of the District Court's power, however, is limited by two fundamental tenets of our legal system--the litigant's rights to due process and access to the courts.
To ensure these rights, we have held that the District Court must comply with the following requirements when issuing such prohibitive injunctive orders against pro se litigants. At the outset, the District Court should not restrict a litigant from filing claims absent exigent circumstances, such as a litigant's continuous abuse of the judicial process by filing meritless and repetitive actions. Matter of Packer Ave. Assoc., 884 F.2d 745, 747 (3d Cir. 1989); Chipps v. United States Dist. Ct. for the Middle Dist. of Pa., 882 F.2d 72, 73 (3d Cir. 1989); In re Oliver, 682 F.2d at 446. If the circumstances warrant the imposition of an injunction, the District Court must give notice to the litigant to show cause why the proposed injunctive relief should not issue. Gagliardi v. McWilliams, 834 F.2d 81, 83 (3d Cir. 1987); In re Oliver, 682 F.2d at 446. This ensures that the litigant is provided with the opportunity to oppose the court's order before it is instituted. Likewise, the scope of the injunctive order must be narrowly tailored to fit the particular circumstances of the case before the District Court. See Chipps, 882 F.2d at 73; Matter of Packer Ave. Assoc., 884 F.2d at 746, 748; see also In re Oliver, 682 F.2d at 446; Gagliardi, 834 F.2d at 83.
The Revised Organic Act also provided that the local courts shared concurrent jurisdiction with the District Court over actions which may be conferred upon it by local law. Act of July 22, 1954, ch. 558, § 23, 68 Stat. 506 (amended 1978, 1984). This grant, however, did not include diversity jurisdiction. See Carty v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 679 F.2d 1051, 1057 (3d Cir. 1982)
In 1978, Congress amended section 1612 to reflect that the District Court of the Virgin Islands additionally possessed the jurisdiction of a bankruptcy court. Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. 95-598, § 336(a), 92 Stat. 2680 (amended 1984)
As we stated at the outset, Article IV, Section 3 of the United States Constitution authorized Congress to enact the Revised Organic Act of the Virgin Islands, which operates as the basic charter of government for the territory. In the Revised Organic Act, Congress established complete provisions for the legislative, executive and judicial branches of the government, and defined the limitations of their powers and obligations. Virgo Corp., 384 F.2d at 576; see, e.g., 48 U.S.C. § 1574(a) (1988) (the Virgin Islands legislature may not enact laws that are inconsistent with the Revised Organic Act or the laws of the United States applicable to the Virgin Islands); 48 U.S.C. § 1574(c) (1988) (the Virgin Islands legislature may not amend or repeal local laws so as to be inconsistent with the Revised Organic Act or the laws of the United States applicable to the Virgin Islands). It is axiomatic, therefore, that the Virgin Islands legislature may not enact laws beyond the limits of the authority Congress vested in it. See Norman's on the Waterfront, Inc. v. Wheatley, 317 F. Supp. 247, 250 (D.V.I. 1970), aff'd, 444 F.2d 1011, 1014 (3d Cir. 1971) (every enactment of the Virgin Islands legislature must be measured against the power granted to it by Congress)
Compare Black's Law Dictionary 866 (5th ed. 1979) (Mandamus is an " [e]xtraordinary writ which lies to compel performance of ministerial act or mandatory duty where there is a clear legal right in plaintiff, a corresponding duty in defendant, and want of any other appropriate and adequate remedy. " (emphasis added)) with id. at 510 ("Execution upon a money judgment is the legal process of enforcing the judgment.") and Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a) ("Process to enforce a judgment for the payment of money shall be a writ of execution, unless the court directs otherwise.")
In its discretion, the District Court could have elected to transfer Brow's case to the Territorial Court pursuant to 4 V.I.Code § 32(b) or § 79(b) (Supp.1991). These sections provide for the permissive transfer of cases from the District Court to the Territorial Court when the cases are within the jurisdiction of the Territorial Court and in the interests of justice. Nevertheless, it would appear that the District Court's failure to transfer Brow's action would not constitute an abuse of discretion as it seems unlikely that Brow could succeed on the merits in the Territorial Court. See 5 V.I.Code § 479(a) (4) (1967 & Supp.1991) (all property of the Virgin Islands government is exempt from execution); see also Lindway v. Government of V.I., 19 V.I. 193, 194 (D.V.I. 1982) (money judgment against Virgin Islands government cannot be enforced by writ of execution or writ of mandamus)
Notwithstanding the verbiage of Brow's prayer for relief, it is evident that his "injunctive" claim for past wages and benefits was essentially a claim for retrospective damages, see supra Part I., and thus not actionable against territorial officials in their official capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Cf. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 666-68, 94 S. Ct. 1347, 1357-58, 39 L. Ed. 2d 662 (1974) (the practical effect of the prayer for relief governs because every request for equitable relief is not permissible in official capacity suits against state officials). Similarly, Ngiraingas dealt with a claim for retrospective damages, not with a claim for prospective injunctive relief. 495 U.S. at 184, 110 S. Ct. at 1738. Although the Supreme Court stated its holding in Ngiraingas broadly, we cannot rule out the possibility that it did not intend its pronouncement to bar section 1983 actions for prospective injunctive relief against territorial officials in their official capacities. Cf. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 n. 10, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 2311 n. 10, 105 L. Ed. 2d 45 (1989) ("Of course a state official in his or her official capacity, when sued for injunctive relief, would be a person under § 1983 because 'official capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as actions against the State.' " (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n. 14, 105 S. Ct. 3099, 3105 n. 14, 87 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1985) and citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-160, 28 S. Ct. 441, 453-454, 52 L. Ed. 714 (1908)). However, since Brow did not seek prospective relief in his petition, we need not address this issue here