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Timestamp: 2019-10-22 22:11:53
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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 688', '§ 1331', '§ 1331', '§ 1331', '§ 2', '§ 8', '§ 1331', '§ 1441', '§ 1331', '§ 1331', '§ 1331', '§ 1672', '§ 688', '§ 1331', '§ 1331', '§ 1331', '§ 1331', '§ 1332', '§ 1331', '§ 1331', '§ 1331', '§ 9', '§ 21', '§ 2', '§ 1333', '§ 1332', '§ 9', '§ 1333', '§ 1332', '§ 1331', '§ 1331', '§ 1331', '§ 1331', '§ 8', '§ 1331', '§ 1331', '§ 1441', '§ 1331', '§ 1331', '§ 1391', '§ 1391', '§ 1391', '§ 1331', '§ 1331', '§ 1331', '§ 1333', '§ 1332', '§ 7', '§ 8']

ROMERO V. INTERNATIONAL TERMINAL OPERATING CO., 358 U. S. 354 (1959) - US SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON-LINE
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6. The claims for unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure against the husbanding agent were properly dismissed in light of the District Court's findings of fact. Pp. 358 U. S. 384-385. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Petitioner Francisco Romero, a Spanish subject, signed on as a member of the crew of the S.S. Guadalupe for a voyage beginning about October 10, 1953. The Guadalupe was of Spanish registry, sailed under the Spanish chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The amended complaint claimed damages from four separate corporate defendants. Liability of Compania Trasatlantica and Garcia & Diaz, Inc., a New York corporation which acted as the husbanding agent for Compania's vessels while in the port of New York, was asserted under the Jones Act, 41 Stat. 1007, 46 U.S.C. § 688, and under the general maritime law of the United States for unseaworthiness of the ship, maintenance and cure, [Footnote 1] and a maritime tort. Liability for a maritime tort was alleged against respondents International Terminal Operating Co. and Quin Lumber Co. These two companies were working on board the S.S. Guadalupe at the time of the injury pursuant to oral contracts with Garcia & Diaz, Inc. Quin, a New York corporation, was engaged in carpentry work preparatory to the receipt of a cargo chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Following a pretrial hearing, the District Court dismissed the complaint. 142 F.Supp. 570. [Footnote 4] The court chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, 244 F.2d 409. We granted certiorari, 355 U.S. 807, because of the conflict among Courts of Appeals as to the proper construction of the relevant provision of the Judiciary Act of 1875 (now 28 U.S.C. § 1331) and because of questions raised regarding the applicability of Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U. S. 571, to the situation before us. The case was argued during the last Term and restored to the calendar for reargument during the present Term. 356 U.S. 955. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(b) Jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.. -- Petitioner, a Spanish subject, asserts claims under the general maritime law against Compania Trasatlantica, a Spanish corporation. The jurisdiction of the Federal District Court, sitting as a court of law, was invoked under the previsions of the Judiciary Act of 1875 which granted jurisdiction to the lower federal courts "of all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity, . . . arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, . . . ." (now 28 U.S.C. § 1331). [Footnote 5] Whether the Act of 1875 permits maritime claims rooted in federal law to be brought on chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Article III, § 2, cl. 1 (3d provision) of the Constitution and section 9 of the Act of September 24, 1789, have, from the beginning, been the sources of jurisdiction in litigation based upon federal maritime law. Article III impliedly contained three grants. (1) It empowered Congress to confer admiralty and maritime jurisdiction on the "Tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court" which were authorized by Art. I. § 8, cl. 9. (2) It empowered the federal courts in their exercise of the admiralty chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Section 9 of the First Judiciary Act [Footnote 6] granted the District Courts maritime jurisdiction. This jurisdiction has remained unchanged in substance to the present day. [Footnote 7] Indeed it was recognition of the need for federal tribunals to exercise admiralty jurisdiction that was one of the controlling considerations for the establishment of a system of lower federal courts. [Footnote 8] Such a system is not an inherent requirement of a federal government. There was strong opposition in the Constitutional Convention to any such inferior federal tribunals. [Footnote 9] No comprehensive system of lower federal courts has chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Up to the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1875. [Footnote 14] these jurisdictional bases provided the only claim for jurisdiction chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Indeed, what little legislative history there is chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
These provisions of Article III are two of the nine separately enumerated classes of cases to which "judicial power" was extended by the Constitution and which thereby authorized grants by Congress of "judicial Power" to the "inferior" federal courts. The vast stream of litigation which has flowed through these courts from the beginning has done so on the assumption that, in dealing with a subject as technical as the jurisdiction of the courts, the Framers, predominantly lawyers, used precise, differentiating, and not redundant language. This assumption, reflected in The Federalist Papers, [Footnote 19] was authoritatively confirmed by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in @ 26 U. S. 544:
This lucid principle of constitutional construction, embodied in one of Marshall's frequently quoted opinions, was never brought into question until 1952. [Footnote 20] It chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
had been treated as black letter law in leading treatises. [Footnote 21] It was part of the realm of legal ideas in which the authors of the Act of 1875 moved. Certainly the accomplished lawyers who drafted the Act of 1875 [Footnote 22] drew on chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
the language of the constitutional grant on the assumption that they were dealing with a distinct class of cases, that the language incorporated in their enactment precluded "identity" with any other class of cases contained in Article III. Thus, the grant of jurisdiction over "suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity . . . arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, . . . " in the Act of 1875, as derived from Article III, could not reasonably be thought of as comprehending an entirely separate and distinct class of cases -- "Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction." [Footnote 23] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Not only does language and construction point to the rejection of any infusion of general maritime jurisdiction into the Act of 1875, but history and reason powerfully support that rejection. The far-reaching extension of national power resulting from the victory of the North, and the concomitant utilization of federal courts for the vindication of that power in the Reconstruction Era, naturally led to enlarged jurisdiction of the federal courts over federal rights. But neither the aim of the Act of 1875 to provide a forum for the vindication of new federally created rights nor the pressures which led to its enactment suggest, even remotely, the inclusion of maritime claims within the scope of that statute. The provision of the Act of 1875 with which we are concerned was designed to give a new content of jurisdiction to the federal courts, not to reaffirm one long established, smoothly functioning since 1789. [Footnote 24] We have uncovered no basis for finding the additional design of changing the method by which federal courts had administered admiralty law from the chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Indeed, until 1950, in a dictum in Jansson v. Swedish American Line, 185 F.2d 212, 217-218, followed by an opinion in Doucette v. Vincent, 194 F.2d 834, judges, scholars, and lawyers alike made the unquestioned assumption that the original maritime jurisdiction of the federal courts had, for all practical purposes, been left unchanged since the Act of 1789. Thus, Mr. Justice Clifford, an experienced admiralty judge, in 1876, one year after the passage of the Act here in question, could reiterate the classic formulation without the faintest indication of doubt as to its continued vitality. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The history of archeology is replete with the unearthing of riches buried for centuries. Our legal history does not, however, offer a single archaeological discovery of new, revolutionary meaning in reading an old judiciary enactment. [Footnote 27a] The presumption is powerful that such a far-reaching, dislocating construction as petitioner would now have us find in the Act of 1875 was not uncovered by chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Thus, the historic option of a maritime suitor pursuing a common law remedy to select his forum, state or federal, would be taken away by an expanded view of § 1331, [Footnote 29] since saving clause actions would then be freely chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
removable under § 1441 of Title 28. [Footnote 30] The interpretation of the Act of 1875 contended for would have consequences more deeply felt than the elimination of a suitor's traditional choice of forum. By making maritime cases removable to the federal courts it would make considerable inroads into the traditionally exercised concurrent jurisdiction of the state courts in admiralty matters -- a jurisdiction which it was the unquestioned aim of the saving clause of 1789 to preserve. This disruption of principle is emphasized by the few cases actually involved. [Footnote 31] This small number of cases is only important in that it negatives the pressure of any practical consideration for the subversion of a principle so long established and so deeply rooted. The role of the States in the development of maritime law is a role whose significance is rooted in the Judiciary Act of 1789 and the decisions of this Court. [Footnote 32] Recognition of the part the States have played from the beginning has a dual significance. It indicates the extent to which an expanded view of the Act of 1875 would eviscerate the postulates of the saving clause, and it undermines the theoretical basis for giving the Act of 1875 a brand new meaning. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Although the corpus of admiralty law is federal in the sense that it derives from the implications of Article III evolved by the courts, to claim that all enforced rights pertaining to matters maritime are rooted in federal law is a destructive oversimplification of the highly intricate interplay of the States and the National Government in their regulation of maritime commerce. It is true that state law must yield to the needs of a uniform federal maritime law when this Court finds inroads on a harmonious system. [Footnote 33] But this limitation still leaves the States a wide scope. State-created liens are enforced in admiralty. [Footnote 34] State remedies for wrongful death and state statutes providing for the survival of actions, both historically absent from the relief offered by the admiralty, [Footnote 35] have been upheld when applied to maritime causes of action. [Footnote 36] Federal courts have enforced these statutes. [Footnote 37] State rules for the partition and sale of ships, [Footnote 38] state laws governing the specific performance of arbitration agreements, [Footnote 39] state laws regulating the effect of a breach of warranty under contracts of maritime insurance [Footnote 40] -- all these laws and others have been accepted as rules of chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
decision in admiralty cases, even at times, when they conflicted with a rule of maritime law which did not require uniformity. "In the field of maritime contracts," this Court has said, "as in that of maritime torts, the National Government has left much regulatory power in the States." [Footnote 41] Thus, if one thing is clear, it is that the source of law in saving clause actions cannot be described in absolute terms. Maritime law is not a monistic system. The State and Federal Governments jointly exert regulatory powers today as they have played joint roles in the development of maritime law throughout our history. [Footnote 42] This sharing of competence in one aspect of our federalism has been traditionally embodied in the saving clause of the Act of 1789. Here, as is so often true in our chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
These difficulties, while nourishing academic speculation, have rarely confronted the courts. This Court has been able to wait until an actual conflict between state and federal standards has arisen, and only then proceed to resolve the problem of whether the State was free to chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Typical also of the consequences that are implicit in this proposed modification of maritime jurisdiction is the restriction of venue that would result from this novel interpretation of § 1331 of the Act of 1875. Litigants chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In the face of the consistent and compelling inferences to be drawn from history and policy against a break with a long past in the application of the Act of 1875, what justification is offered for this novel view of the statute? Support is ultimately reduced, one is compelled to say, to empty logic, reflecting a formal syllogism. The argument may thus be fairly summarized. It was not until recently, in a line of decision culminating in Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U. S. 406, that it became apparent that the source of admiralty rights was a controlling body of federal admiralty law. This development led to a deepened consideration of the jurisdictional consequences of the federal source of maritime law. And so one turns to the Act of 1875. The Act of 1875 gave original chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The simple language of the Act of 1875 conceals complexities of construction and policy which have been already examined. When we apply to the statute, and to the clause of Article III from which it is derived, commonsensical and lawyer-like modes of construction, and the evidence of history and logic, it becomes clear that the words of that statute do not extend, and could not reasonably be interpreted to extend, to cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. The statute is phrased in chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(c) "Pendent" and Diversity Jurisdiction. -- Rejection of the proposed new reading of § 1331 does not preclude consideration of petitioner's claims under the general maritime law. These claims cannot, we have seen, be justified under § 1331. However, the District Court may have jurisdiction of them "pendent" to its jurisdiction under the Jones Act. Of course, the considerations which call for the exercise of pendent jurisdiction of a state claim related to a pending federal cause of action within the appropriate scope of the doctrine of Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U. S. 238, are not the same when, as here, what is involved chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
We now turn to the claims against Compania Trasatlantica under the Jones Act and the general maritime law. In light of our recent decision in Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U. S. 571, these claims present the narrow issue, whether the maritime law of the United States may be applied in an action involving an injury sustained in an American port by a foreign seaman on board a foreign vessel in the course of a voyage beginning and ending in a foreign country. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
We are not here dealing with the sovereign power of the United States to apply its law to situations involving one or more foreign contacts. [Footnote 54] But, in the absence of a contrary congressional direction, we must apply those principles of choice of law that are consonant with the needs of a general federal maritime law and with due chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In Lauritzen v. Larsen, the injury occurred in the port of Havana, and the action was brought in New York. Romero was injured while temporarily in American territorial waters. This difference does not call for a difference in result. Discussing the significance of the place of the chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(a) Petitioner made claims based both on the Jones Act and the general maritime law against Garcia & Diaz, Inc. At the pretrial hearing, the District Court concluded that Garcia & Diaz was not Romero's employer, and did not operate and control the vessel at the time of chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
See 47 U. S. 390; The Hamilton, 207 U. S. 398, 207 U. S. 404; 2 Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, § 1672. See [email protected] Dodd, The New Doctrine of the Supremacy of Admiralty Over the Common Law, 21 Col.L.Rev. 647 (1921); Black, Admiralty Jurisdiction: Critique and Suggestions, 50 Col.L.Rev. 259 (1950).
74 U. S. 644; 78 U. S. 188.
See treatises cited in 358 U. S. 385. Lack of clarity in Marshall's opinion was suggested in Doucette v. Vincent, 194 F.2d 834, 834-844, note 8.
PHILLIPS, Statutory Jurisdiction and Practice of the Supreme Court of the United States (1878). chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1908). chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
MONTGOMERY, Manual of Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure (4th ed. 1942). chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Much the same reason leads me also to dissent from 358 U. S. By its terms, the Jones Act applies to "any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment." 41 Stat. 1007, 46 U.S.C. § 688. (Italics added.) This Court, in Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U. S. 571, held that the words "any seaman" did not include foreign seamen sailing foreign ships and injured in foreign waters. I dissented from that holding. It was based, I thought, on the Court's concepts of what would be good or bad for the country chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
I regret that I cannot agree with the Court's holding that § 1331 of the Judicial Code does not give jurisdiction to a Federal District Court, sitting at law, over a seaman's claims against his employer for maintenance and cure and for indemnity damages for injury caused by unseaworthiness, where the claims are asserted in the manner of a chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The petitioner brought this suit in a Federal District Court. The element in his action with which I am dealing is his claim for money damages from Compania Trasatlantica, his employer, for breach of the shipowner's duty to maintain a seaworthy ship and for maintenance and cure. Since there was no diversity of citizenship between petitioner and Compania Trasatlantica, [Footnote 2/1] jurisdiction was predicated on the grant in 28 U.S.C. § 1331 of jurisdiction in "civil actions wherein the matter in controversy . . . arises under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States." [Footnote 2/2] Jurisdiction of such claims chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
It is true that, early in our history, maritime law was thought to be an international law merchant which was impartially administered by the several maritime nations of the world. This concept was expressed by Chief Justice Marshall's language in @ 26 U. S. 545-546:
But that this did not mean that there was some supranational law by which American courts were bound was made clear by Mr. Justice Bradley in @ 88 U. S. 572, where he said for the Court:
The sovereign power which determines the rules of substantive law governing maritime claims of the sort which petitioner asserts here is federal power, speaking through Congress, as in the case of the Jones Act, or through this Court, in the case of judicially defined causes of action. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, supra. This is an area where the federal courts have defined substantive rules themselves, and have not applied state law. Indeed, it is federal substantive law so created which the States must enforce in such actions brought in state courts, Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., supra, and which the federal courts have applied in actions at law in which diversity of citizenship has been relied upon as a jurisdictional basis, Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, supra. The causes of action asserted against his employer by petitioner here present "no claim created by or arising out chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Second. Since petitioner's causes of action for unseaworthiness and for maintenance and cure are created by federal law, his case arises under the "laws . . . of the United States" within the meaning of § 1331, for it is clear that "a suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action." Holmes, J., in American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U. S. 257, 241 U. S. 260. [Footnote 2/4] The contention cannot be accepted that, since petitioner's rights are judicially defined, The Osceola, 189 U. S. 158, they are not created by "the laws . . . of the United States" within the meaning of § 1331; or, in other words, that only maritime rights created by Act of Congress are created by "the laws . . . of the United States." In another context, that of state law, this Court has recognized that the statutory word "laws" includes court decisions. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64. The converse situation is presented here, in that federal courts have an extensive responsibility of fashioning rules of substantive law in maritime cases. See Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U. S. 310, 348 U. S. 314. These rules are as fully "laws" of the United States as if they had been enacted by Congress. Cf. Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., supra; Warren v. United States, 340 U. S. 523, 340 U. S. 526-528; and see Mater v. Holley, 200 F.2d 123. [Footnote 2/5] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Id. at 264 U. S. 388. And the unchallenged maintenance of the very cause of action in question here at law in the District Courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, where diversity of citizenship is present, is further proof that no constitutional inhibition to the maintenance of such an action at law under § 1331 exists. @Cf. 74 U. S. 644. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Paduano v. Yamashita Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha, supra, 221 F.2d 618. Continuously since 1789, Congress has provided specially for admiralty courts in which rights under the federal maritime law could be asserted. The argument runs that it follows that claims under the maritime law were not intended to fall within the scope of § 1331. And here, the Court's conclusion rests primarily on an analysis of the terms and background of the 1875 Act which was the ancestor of § 1331, and on various inferences drawn from silence after that Act's passage.
The members of the First Congress, in agreement that national courts of admiralty were an imperative necessity of the times, 1 Annals of Cong. 797-798 (1789), gave to the District Courts in § 9 of the First Judiciary Act original jurisdiction over "all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. . . ." 1 Stat. 76, 77. Under § 21, the Circuit Courts were given appellate jurisdiction "in causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. . . ." 1 Stat. 83. These phrases followed almost literally the wording of Art. III, § 2, of the Constitution, extending the federal judicial power "to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction. . . ." Significantly, the First chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
It is thus clear that any argument that § 1333 is an exclusive grant of jurisdiction would be false to the history of enactments allocating the judicial power of the United States. The fact that, in a diversity case under § 1332, the claimant is free to proceed on the law side of the federal court to enforce rights created by the federal maritime law, Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U. S. 85, 328 U. S. 88-89, clearly runs counter to any theory that the federal courts, because of § 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, can adjudicate maritime claims only while sitting in admiralty. There is no compelling reason why § 1333, which does not exclude maritime actions from being brought at law in a federal court under § 1332, should exclude them chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Plainly there is nothing in the language of § 1331 which would exclude jurisdiction of maritime claims of the nature asserted by petitioner. Rather, in more than a manner of speaking, the language of that section fits the cause of action in question here "like a glove," Jenkins v. Roderick, 156 F.Supp. 299, 301. But the Court reasons that the section must be read restrictively because the corresponding jurisdictional grant in the Constitution speaks of "Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States. . . ." This specification of "law and equity," reflected in the 1875 ancestor [Footnote 2/7] of present § 1331 as "suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity . . . arising under the Constitution or laws . . . ," is said to indicate that a suit arising under the substantive maritime law is not comprehended under the section. But the argument mistakes the nature of a Saving Clause action. An action brought under the Saving Clause is maintained "at law" or "in chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The legislative history of § 1331 does not indicate any intent on the part of Congress to exclude claims asserted under federal maritime law from its ambit. The present section is but the latest recodification of the provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1875, 18 Stat. 470, alluded to above, which, for the first time with any permanence, vested in the federal courts an original general federal question jurisdiction over any claim which "arises under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States." The congressional debates focused so largely on proposed chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Court argues, however, that Congress, aware of Chief Justice Marshall's statement that Article III created the admiralty jurisdiction as "distinct" from the "arising under" jurisdiction, [Footnote 2/9] American Ins. Co. v. Canter, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
supra, 1 Pet. at 26 U. S. 545, intended that the jurisdictional statutes be mutually exclusive. The manager of the 1875 legislation in the Senate declared of the bill generally that it conferred "precisely the power which the Constitution confers -- nothing more, nothing less." 2 Cong.Rec. 4987. It is difficult to infer that Congress meant to crystalize any particular interpretation of the Constitution in the statute. But even if it were proper, in the absence of concrete indication, speculatively to breathe into our construction of § 1331 views of the Constitution [Footnote 2/10] which might have served as a silent premise of congressional chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
At issue in American Ins. Co. v. Canter was the power of a territorial court to make a decree selling cargo to satisfy a maritime lien in rem existing in favor of its chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
salvors. A state court, even under the Saving Clause, could not pass such a decree at all; it is the enforcement of the classic admiralty remedy, and a matter solely within the competence of the federal admiralty courts. The Hine v. Trevor, 4 Wall. 555. In the passage from Marshall's opinion relied upon, the Chief Justice was saying only that the Act of Congress which conferred on certain territorial courts jurisdiction in "cases arising under the laws and constitution of the United States," § 8, 3 Stat. 752, did not, by that token alone, grant them power to enforce a remedy peculiarly within the competence of admiralty courts. [Footnote 2/11] In its broadest permissible interpretation, the dictum only means that the fact that the Constitution creates admiralty jurisdiction does not make all admiralty cases cases arising under the Constitution. [Footnote 2/12] But Marshall's opinion does not say that an action seeking remedial relief of a sort which the common law is competent to give, and in which the plaintiff's right to recover is rooted in federal law, ceases to be a suit arising under the laws of the United States merely because it is of a maritime nature. [Footnote 2/13] No one is contending here, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Much is made by the Court of Marshall's language that the categories of actions he mentions are "distinct," and not "identical." Of course this is so, in a real sense and the only sense in which Marshall meant it. A matter affecting an ambassador or a counsel is not per se an action "arising under," just as it is not per se a maritime action. But could not a case involving a consul be also a case of admiralty jurisdiction under certain fact situation? And could not a suit by or against a consul happen, perchance, to be also one "arising under"? The fact that the jurisdictional categories are separate and distinct, as Marshall demonstrates, does not mean that a particular action could not come under the heading of more than one of them. Everyone recognizes that this is the case in a maritime matter in which the parties are of diverse citizenship. I see no reason why it should not be true here of Romero's general maritime law claims against his employer. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
And it was understood before 1875 that this concurrent jurisdiction at law was not one merely existent in the state courts, but one available to suitors in the federal courts. See 74 U. S. 644; infra,@ pp. 358 U. S. 406-407.
Accordingly, I cannot see how it can be concluded that Congress, in 1875, read Marshall's opinion as creating some sort of gulf that would make it impossible for any maritime case to be also one "arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States." [Footnote 2/14] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Of course, one cannot rely, to prove the Court's thesis, on dicta in cases decided before 1875 to the effect that Saving Clause actions could be brought on the law side of a federal court only when there is diversity of citizenship, and the Court does not so rely. 74 U. S. 643-644; 78 U. S. 188; 83 U. S. 533. The 1875 Act, for the first time with any permanence, granted general federal question jurisdiction to the federal courts of first instance. It can hardly be denied that these statements were correct when made, but it is equally plain that they are no authority for limiting the law side jurisdiction to diversity cases once the 1875 Act had been passed. Moreover, I cannot seriously attach any significance, as the Court does, to the repetition, obiter, of their formulation in a case decided shortly after the Act's passage, where the effect of the new statute was not at all presented or discussed. Norton v. Switzer,@ 93 U. S. 355, 93 U. S. 356. In fact, the approach this Court followed in the interpretation of the Saving Clause during this period supports, rather than detracts from, my conclusion here. It was observed in 1869 that the remedies saved by the Saving Clause were saved
@ 74 U. S. 644. It is clear from the Court's language that the common law remedies saved to suitors could properly be enforced in any tribunal otherwise having jurisdiction; the remedies saved were saved generally to suitors without discrimination as to any tribunal.
Nor can I consider it sound to place the reliance the Court has placed on the fact that the arguments we are considering today were not raised until 1950. Till then, no court ever considered the problem that we discuss here at great length. None of the assortment of commentators listed in the Court's 358 U. S. The Court's argument, in fact, claims to draw force from the fact that it was not discussed at all. From the fact that the issue was never explored or tried at all until 1950, when Judge Magruder, in a dictum in Jansson v. Swedish American Line, [Footnote 2/16] 185 F.2d 212, 216-218, took a point of view similar to the one expressed here, we are asked to infer that the argument for jurisdiction should not succeed when finally raised. I cannot accept this as a convincing argument in the construction of a broadly written statute which was intended, at least in some aspects, to be as broad and dynamic as the Constitution itself, and which has served as the basic jurisdiction entitlement for the vindication of the numerous and increasing types of federally created rights in the lower federal courts ever since its chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
It is, finally, true that this Court has adhered to a policy of construing jurisdictional statutes narrowly. Healy v. Ratta, 292 U. S. 263, 292 U. S. 270; Thomson v. Gaskill, 315 U. S. 442, 315 U. S. 446. In regard to the grant of federal question jurisdiction to the District Courts, this Court has insisted that a claim created under federal law be a necessary part of the plaintiff's case, Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U. S. 149, and that this claim be truly federal in nature, Gully v. First National Bank, 299 U. S. 109. But the present problem is apart from this line of cases, for here it is clear that petitioner is presenting to a federal court a claim created by federal law, and the objection is that, somehow, Congress intended to exclude claims of this particular sort from the grant in § 1331. But the arguments presented for such a narrow construction appear to me too insubstantial to withstand the logic of petitioner's chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
It is first argued that the recognition of jurisdiction under § 1331 would, combined with the removal provisions of § 1441(b) of the Judicial Code, operate to destroy the competence of the States in maritime matters altogether. A source cited by the Court itself [Footnote 2/17] indicates that, in the five-year period 1953 to 1957, inclusive, only about 150 decisions in Saving Clause actions have been rendered in all of the state courts of the country. As I have developed, resolution of the jurisdictional issue contrary to the majority's view would not mean that all these cases would be assertable originally in the federal court or removable there, even present $10,000 in controversy. It is apparent, then, that the removability point addresses itself to a situation nearly de minimis. Saving Clause suitors seem long ago to have deserted the state courts. I therefore cannot share the concern that chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In further elaboration of the inroads on state competence which rejection of the Court's view is supposed to entail, it is stated that it is a destructive oversimplification to claim that all enforced rights pertaining to maritime matters are rooted in federal law. So it is, and no one is so claiming. The point is not that all Saving Clause actions meet the "arising under" test of § 1331. [Footnote 2/18] It is, however, perfectly evident from the past holdings of this Court that the seaman's action for unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure is rooted in federal law, and it is only this claim that need present the issue of the case as chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Court next argues that a holding to the contrary of its own will produce venue problems, and will, in fact, be unduly restrictive toward plaintiffs in their choice of forums. Where the District Courts have jurisdiction under § 1331 (even though diversity may also be present) § 1391(b) of the Judicial Code, rather than § 1391(a), governs, and the suit must be brought in the defendants' residence district, and may not be brought in the plaintiffs' residence district, unless, of course, it also happens to be the defendants'. But one reading the discussion of the consequences this will have for plaintiffs is apt to forget (for the Court does not inform him) that defendants in maritime actions are most likely to be corporations (particularly in personal injury litigation, the sort of case we have at bar), and that § 1391(c) declares that the residence of a corporation for venue purposes is any district where it is incorporated or any district in which it is licensed to do, or actually doing, business. With corporate venue so widely defined, it will be a rare plaintiff (and a rarer personal injury plaintiff, for seamen and longshoremen are apt to live near where their employers carry on business, or where the vessel owners their employers chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Court, though it rejects Romero's assertion of jurisdiction over his general maritime law claims against his employer under § 1331, proceeds to adjudicate them on the merits. It reaches them through a "pendent" jurisdiction theory analogous to Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U. S. 238. The Court's action appears unprecedented, as it appears to recognize. The prior applications of the doctrine recognized here have been limited to cases where claims arising under state law, over which there was no independent jurisdiction in the federal court, have been intertwined with federal claims. The theory has not been here applied to cases where there have been two types of claims, both admittedly within the District Court's jurisdiction, one of which was admittedly cognizable according to the forms of the common law and the other, except for the theory, not. Here, a plaintiff comes into court desiring that his claims be adjudicated strictly according to the common law, and disclaiming federal jurisdiction in admiralty. In short, he desires that a common law jury pass upon his claims. If the federal chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Obviously what we have here, once the Court's view of § 1331 is accepted, and as claims are presented which can survive summary judgment, is not a problem in pendent jurisdiction, but a glaring problem in judicial administration, and in the separation of functions between judge and jury. Crew members' maritime tort suits almost invariably urge claims under the Jones Act and under the general maritime law for breach of the duty to maintain a seaworthy vessel. These claims are legally, and generally factually, completely bound up with each other. McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U. S. 221; Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U. S. 316. It would be productive of extraordinary problems if the two elements of the claim are presented to different triers of fact at the same time, as would be one consequence of holding that there was no jurisdiction at law of any sort over unseaworthiness claims where diversity of citizenship was absent. Cf. Jenkins v. Roderick, 156 F.Supp. 299, 304-306. Should an advisory jury (with the same membership, doubtless, as the "mandatory" one hearing the Jones Act claim) hear the unseaworthiness claim? To what extent would its verdict bind the judge? If the judge passes on the issues himself, how to avoid overlapping damages, or contradictory findings? And what would be chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
It is argued that the policy of § 1331 "to insure the availability of a forum designed to minimize . . . hostility . . . to the vindication of federally created rights" has no application here because of the availability of a federal forum under § 1333. Substantially the same argument could be made in a diversity case under § 1332, since it would be assumed that the admiralty would be impartial in treatment of out-of-state parties. Cf. Paduano v. Yamashita Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha, supra, 221 F.2d 618.
The power to enforce the remedy was, in fact, found in another section of the territorial organic act, § 7, 3 Stat. 752, under which jurisdiction could be vested in the court in question, rather than in the territorial Superior Court, to which § 8 related. Cf. 358 U. S. infra.
This seems to be the import of the first sentence from the Marshall dictum quoted in 358 U. S. supra. And see 358 U. S. infra.
The opinion of Justice Johnson in the Canter case, rendering the judgment in the Circuit Court which Marshall's opinion affirmed on appeal, makes this very distinction. Johnson rejected the idea that the constitutional grant of admiralty jurisdiction made all admiralty cases cases arising under the Constitution. He did not believe that the cause of action for salvage arose under the Constitution or the laws of the United States. Yet he recognized, and enumerated, cases of a maritime nature where the substantive rights were rooted in federal law, and to which the grant of "arising under" jurisdiction would extend. American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Fed.Cas. No. 302a. Johnson sat in the Supreme Court on the appeal, and did not express any indication that Marshall's opinion was contrary to what he had said at circuit. In fact, Marshall's language that "jurisdiction over the case does not constitute the case itself," 358 U. S. 483.