Source: http://www.caltrialpractice.com/2011_10_01_archive.html
Timestamp: 2013-12-12 23:51:54
Document Index: 568069692

Matched Legal Cases: ['§632', '§1291', '§632', '§1281', '§3060', '§3110', '§3110', '§3060', '§3060', '§3110', '§3110', '§3110', '§3110', '§1161']

Developments in California Trial Practice: October 2011
On October 19, 2011, the California Supreme Court granted review in People v. Vangelder (S195423), which had held that the trial court erred in excluding expert testimony on the unreliability of breath test results due to physical variabilities that affect the breath sample. See "This Machine Has Bad Breath," posted July 10, 2011.
The trial court had excluded the testimony on the ground that it was irrelevant, because a defendant may not challenge the accuracy of the partition ratio established by the legislature. The court of appeal concluded that the testimony did not address the partition ratio, but rather asserted that the amount of alcohol in a breath sample will vary from person to person based on physical factors.
The prosecution in Vangelder did not challenge the expert's qualifications or the scientific bases for his claims that mucous membranes in the mouth and trachea exude alcohol and that the amount of alcohol emitted is affected by the person's pattern of breathing and body temperature. It will be interesting to see how this concession affects the Supreme Court's decision.
When a dispute arises over the scope of an arbitration provision, and the provision is reasonably susceptible to conflicting interpretations, the court may conduct an evidentiary hearing to aid in its determination of the parties' intent, according to the Second District Court of Appeal in Burch v. Premier Homes, LLC (Sept. 28, 2011, B223148), __ Cal.App.4th __ [2011 DJDAR 14777].
Plaintiff purchased a home from defendant builder. Her offer contained an arbitration clause. The counter-offer included an addendum relating to a limited warranty to be issued by the Home Buyers Warranty Corporation. The addendum also contained an arbitration clause. After negotiations, a sentence of an arbitration clause in the addendum was deleted. When plaintiff sued over alleged construction defects, defendant moved to compel arbitration.
Plaintiff maintained that the sentence was deleted in order to preserve her right to take the builder to court for construction defects. Defendant disagreed. The court held an evidentiary hearing as to the intent of the parties in deleting the sentence in the addendum and concluded that the parties intended to preserve the plaintiff's right to a jury trial on any non-warranty claims against the builder and to limit arbitration to issues related to escrow.
The court of appeal rejected defendant's argument that the court made additions or otherwise reformed the agreement. The trial court merely resolved the conflicting interpretations given to the contract by the parties, it said, and determined the scope of the agreement after considering the evidence. Unless the correct interpretation can be determined "to a certainty and with sureness by a mere reading of the document," extrinsic evidence is admissible as an aid to interpretation. In the exercise of its discretion, the court may hold an evidentiary hearing and weigh the credibility of the witnesses. The court's interpretation of the scope of the arbitration provision was supported by substantial evidence and the order denying the motion to compel was affirmed..
Taking a swipe at the defendant's improper use of an in limine motion to dispose of a cause of action, the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the judgment in Johnson v. Chiu (Sept. 29, 2011, G044252), __ Cal.App.4th __ [2011 DJDAR 14825].
Plaintiff sued her doctor and his medical office for professional negligence when a laser machine used during a skin treatment emitted a loud booming sound, causing loss of hearing and vertigo. She added two causes of action against Doe defendants for strict liability and negligent maintenance. Defendants brought a motion for summary judgment, but before plaintiff's opposition was due she amended the complaint to name her doctor as one of the Does in the third cause of action for negligent maintenance. She argued that the motion for summary judgment should be denied because it did not address the latter claim. The court granted the motion for summary judgment as to the medical office. Since the doctor was now a defendant in the third cause of action, the court deemed the motion to be a motion for summary adjudication as to the first cause of action and granted the motion.
The doctor then brought a summary judgment motion on the negligent maintenance claim, but the motion was denied. When the case was sent out for trial, the doctor filed an in limine motion to dismiss the cause of action on the ground that the granting of summary judgment on the first cause of action necesarily included the negligent maintence claim, but the motion was denied. So he took a writ, which was also denied. When the case came back down, it was assigned to a different trial judge, so the defendant filed the in limine motion again, and this time it was granted and judgment entered in favor of the defendant.
"This case presents a textbook example of the inappropriate use of in limine motions," said the appellate court. A motion in limine is intended to deal with pretrial objections to evidence, in order to avoid having to "unring the bell" by way of a motion to strike. A motion to exclude all evidence pertaining to part or all of a cause of action, said the court, "is but a disguised motion for summary adjudication."
Unfortunately for the plaintiff, she failed to preserve this issue for appeal because she did not object on this ground in the trial court. Fortunately for the plaintiff, the appellate court concluded that it was error to grant the motion, because the negligent maintenance claim was separate from that of professional negligence, and the evidence presented by the plaintiff in support of the former claim was not considered by the court in ruling on the first motion for summary judgment. Posted by
When requested, the court must issue a statement of decision when it denies a petition to compel arbitration, said the First District Court of Appeal in Metis Development LLC v. Bohacek (Sept. 28, 2011, A129650), __ Cal.App.4th __ [2011 DJDAR 14784].
In its tentative ruling the trial court indicated its intention to deny cross-defendants' petition to compel arbitration on the ground that they waived their right to arbitration by engaging in litigation activity and there was a possibility of conflicting rulings on common issues of law or fact if the matter were sent to arbitration. At the hearing counsel requested a statement of decision on the issues set forth in the tentative ruling. Concluding that the proceeding was a law and motion matter and not a trial, the court declined the request.
The appellate court found that although Code of Civil Procedure §632 states that, upon request, a court shall issue a statement of decision in "the trial of a question of fact by the court," C.C.P. §1291 provides that a statement must be made "if requested pursuant to Section 632, whenever an order or judgment ... is made that is appealable under this title." An order denying a petition to compel arbitration is appealable. Harmonizing the two statutes, the court concluded that whenever there is an adjudication of a question of fact in deciding a petition to compel arbitration, the court is obligated to issue a statement of decision if a request is made in the manner required by §632. Since the hearing took less than one day, and the appellant made an oral request on the record before the matter was submitted, and specified the controverted issues, a statement of decision was required.
The court of appeal then considered whether the written order issued by the court satisfied the requirements of a statement of decision, and found that it did not. Although a statement of decision "need only fairly disclose its determinations as to the ultimate facts and material issues in the case," the trial court did not make all the findings necessary to support its decision. To deny arbitration due to waiver, the court must find not only that there has been litigation activity, but also that there was prejudice, and there was no finding as to prejudice. The trial court also did not state that the possibility of conflicting rulings called for the denial of arbitration, rather than for one of the other alternatives set forth in C.C.P. §1281.2, subd. (c). After considering the merits of the arbitration petition in the unpublished portion of the opinion, the appellate court remanded the matter so the trial court could decide whether the risk of conflicting rulings warranted the denial of arbitration under the circumstances.
Having convinced the trial court to overrule a demurrer because its complaint adequately pled the right to enforce a mining lien under Civil Code §3060, plaintiff was judicially estopped from arguing in response to a motion for summary adjudication that it was also entitled to record a mechanic's lien pursuant to Civil Code §3110, said the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Sukut Construction, Inc. v. Rimrock CA LLC (Sept. 30, 2011, D057774), __ Cal.App.4th __ [2011 DJDAR 14846].
Defendants owned and operated a quarry, where rock was extracted for use in construction as bedding for roads, asphalt, concrete and pipes. Plaintiff was contracted to provide the labor and materials for the extraction and to haul the material off to be crushed. Plaintiff didn't get paid for all of its work, and filed the lawsuit, alleging it was entitled to foreclose on a mechanic's lien.
Defendant demurred to the mechanic's lien cause of action, arguing that hauling rock did not constitute a "work of improvement" within the meaning of §3110, and that a quarry was not a "mine" within the meaning of §3060. In opposition, plaintiff relied solely on §3060, and convinced the judge to overrule the demurrer on the ground that a quarry may be a mine and removing rock can constitute surface mining. Later, in response to defendants' interrogatories asking the basis for the foreclosure claim, plaintiff responded that it disclosed its contention in its pleadings and its opposition to the demurrer.
When defendants moved for summary adjudication on the ground that a quarry is not a mine because the rock is not removed from a vein or lode and is not a "mineral," plaintiff argued in the alternative that it was entitled to a mechanic's lien under §3110. The trial court took the motion under submission, indicating it would consider defendants' request that plaintiff be estopped from raising the alternative theory. The court granted the motion without addressing the alternative argument.
The court of appeal concluded that plaintiff was bound by the claim it made in opposition to the demurrer and was estopped from asserting a §3110 claim. Plaintiff succeeded at the demurrer stage by convincing the court that it had a mining lien claim, the contention that it was entitled to a lien under §3110 is inconsistent with this position, and defendants relied on the initial assertion by not arguing §3110 in their summary adjudication motion. As a matter of equity, and to protect against an abuse of the judicial process, the doctrine of judicial estoppel was properly applied. Relying on an 1884 California Supreme Court case, the appellate court agreed with the trial court that a quarry is not a mine and affirmed the judgment.
Sending the jury back to deliberate to resolve an inconsistency in the verdict was error when it resulted in the jury finding that an enhancement was true, when the verdict initially stated that the allegation was not true. People v. Espiritu (Sept. 28, 2011, B224887), __ Cal.App.4th __ [2011 DJDAR 14716].
Defendant was charged with stabbing his ex-wife. The jury returned a verdict of guilty of attempted voluntary manslaughter, found the allegation that he personally inflicted great bodily injury to be true, and found the allegation that he personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon to be not true. The court polled the jury, and all jurors confirmed that this was their verdict. The court then asked the jury if the great bodily injury was inflicted with something other than a knife, and each juror answered in the negative. So the court sent the jury back to "review your findings in terms of the deadly or dangerous weapon as to whether that is, in fact, your finding." The jury returned a new verdict, finding the enhancement to be true.
The finding that the defendant personally used a deadly weapon was reversed. In a criminal case, inherently inconsistent verdicts are generally allowed to stand, because the judicial system accepts that the verdict may be the result of mistake, compromise or lenity. Penal Code §1161 provides that the court may not require the jury to reconsider a verdict of acquittal or not true. In this case the court not only asked the jury to reconsider its verdict, it also effectively communicated to the jury that its finding of not true was incorrect.
Although defense counsel did not object to the the trial court's action, defendant's substantial rights under California law and the U.S. Constitution were violated, and an appellate court has discretion to excuse the forfeiture of an issue on appeal if the case presents an important legal issue. Further, even if an objection was necessary to avoid a forfeiture, defense counsel's failure to object constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. It is below the standard of care not to object, said the court, because the basis for the objection is clearly set forth by statute.