Source: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/452/130
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W. C. McDANIEL et al., Petitioners, v. Jose SANCHEZ et al. | Supreme Court | LII / Legal Information Institute
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452 U.S. 130 (101 S.Ct. 2224, 68 L.Ed.2d 724)
[HTML] Syllabus After holding that the apportionment plan for precincts from which county commissioners were elected to serve on the Commissioners Court for Kleberg County, Tex., was unconstitutional because of substantial population variances in the precincts, the District Court directed county officials to submit a proposed reapportionment plan to the court. The Commissioners Court then employed an expert to prepare a new plan and subsequently adopted his plan and submitted it to the District Court. The court approved the plan and authorized the Commissioners Court to conduct 1980 primary and general elections under it, rejecting respondents' contention that § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (Act) required the county, a jurisdiction covered by the Act, to obtain preclearance from either the Attorney General of the United States or the United States District Court for the District of Columbia before the plan could become effective. The Court of Appeals vacated the District Court's order, holding that "a proposed reapportionment plan submitted by a local legislative body does not lose its status as a legislative rather than court-ordered plan merely because it is the product of litigation conducted in a federal forum," and that the Act required preclearance.
Held : Congress intended to require compliance with the statutory preclearance procedures under the circumstances of this case. Whenever a covered jurisdiction submits a proposal reflecting the policy choices of the elected representatives of the peopleno matter what constraints have limited the choices available to themthe preclearance requirement of the Act is applicable. Pp. 137-153.
(a) The statement in East Carroll Parish School Board v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636, 96 S.Ct. 1083, 47 L.Ed.2d 296which held that a court-adopted reapportionment plan suggested by the local legislative body there involved was a judicial plan for purposes of substantive reviewthat the plan was also a judicial plan for purposes of § 5 preclearance was dictum and does not control this case. Pp. 139-146.
We granted certiorari to decide whether the preclearance requirement of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended,
applies to a reapportionment plan submitted to a Federal District Court by the legislative body of a covered jurisdiction
in response to a judicial determination that the existing apportionment of its electoral districts is unconstitutional. Relying on East Carroll Parish School Board v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636, 96 S.Ct. 1083, 47 L.Ed.2d 296 (per curiam), the District Court held that the plan submitted to it in this case was a judicial plan and thus excepted from the requirements of § 5. Relying on Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 98 S.Ct. 2493, 57 L.Ed.2d 411, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed; it held that because the plan had been prepared by a legislative body, it was a legislative plan within the coverage of § 5. We are persuaded that Congress intended to require compliance with the statutory preclearance procedures under the circumstances of this case. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
the District Court rejected the plaintiffs' claim that the county's apportionment plan unconstitutionally diluted the voting power of Mexican-Americans as a class, but held that individual voters were denied equal representation because of the substantial disparity in the number of residents in each commissioners' precinct.
With one insignificant modification, the
Commissioners Court officially adopted the plan prepared by Dr. Nash as the plan it would submit to the District Court.
Without expressing any opinion with respect to the constitutionality of the new plan, the Court of Appeals vacated the District Court's order in a per curiam opinion. See 615 F.2d 1023 (1980). Reasoning that "a proposed reapportionment plan submitted by a local legislative body does not lose its status as a legislative rather than court-ordered plan merely because it is the product of litigation conducted in a federal forum," id., at 1024, the Court of Appeals held that the Voting Rights Act required preclearance. The court thereafter denied petitioners' application for a stay pending filing and consideration of a petition for writ of certiorari. On August 14, 1980, however, Justice POWELL, in his capacity as Circuit Justice, entered an order recalling the mandate and staying the judgment of the Court of Appeals pending disposition of the petition for certiorari. 448 U.S. 1318, 101 S.Ct. 7, 65 L.Ed.2d 1142. We granted that petition because the question presented is important and because the answer suggested by our prior opinions is not free of ambiguity. 449 U.S. 898, 101 S.Ct. 265, 66 L.Ed.2d 127.
* Texas and its political subdivisions are covered by the Voting Rights Act. Briscoe v. Bell, 432 U.S. 404, 97 S.Ct. 2428, 53 L.Ed.2d 439.
Section 5 of the Act is applicable whenever a covered jurisdiction "shall enact or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1972. . . ." 42 U.S.C. 1973c. A reapportionment plan is a "standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting" within the meaning of § 5, Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 531-535, 93 S.Ct. 1702, 1708, 36 L.Ed.2d 472, and it is undisputed that Kleberg County is a covered jurisdiction. What is in dispute is whether that jurisdiction did "enact or seek to administer" a proposed reapportionment plan when it presented that plan to a Federal District Court as a proposed remedy for a constitutional violation. If the statute does apply, then the plan must be precleared either by the Attorney General of the United States or the United States District Court for the District of Columbia before it may become effective.
In such a preclearance proceeding, it is not sufficient to demonstrate that the new plan is constitutional; the covered jurisdiction also has the burden of demonstrating that the districting changes are not motivated by a discriminatory purpose and will not have an adverse impact on minority voters. See e. g., City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 172-173, 100 S.Ct. 1548, 1559-1560, 64 L.Ed.2d 119. Two polar propositions are perfectly clear. First, the Act requires preclearance of new legislative apportionment plans that are adopted without judicial direction or approval. See Georgia v. United States, supra. Second, the Act's preclearance requirement does not apply to plans prepared and adopted by a federal court to remedy a constitutional violation. See Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690, 91 S.Ct. 1760, 29 L.Ed.2d 268 (per curiam ).
In prior reapportionment cases not arising under the Voting Rights Act, we have recognized important differences between legislative plans and court-ordered plans. Because "reapportionment is primarily the duty and responsibility of the State through its legislature or other body, rather than of a federal court," Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 27, 95 S.Ct. 751, 766, 42 L.Ed.2d 766, the Court has tolerated somewhat greater flexibility in the fashioning of legislative remedies for violation of the one-person, one-vote rule than when a federal court prepares its own remedial decree. Thus, in Chapman we held that "unless there are persuasive justifications, a court-ordered reapportionment plan of a state legislature must avoid use of multimember districts, and, as well, must ordinarily achieve the goal of population equality with little more than de minimis variation." Id., at 26-27, 95 S.Ct., at 765-766 (footnote omitted).
In contrast, reapportionment plans prepared by legislative bodies may employ multimember districts and may result in greater population disparities than would be permitted in a court-ordered plan. See Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 414-415, 97 S.Ct. 1828, 1833-1834, 52 L.Ed.2d 465. Cf. Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 93 S.Ct. 979, 35 L.Ed.2d 320.
In East Carroll Parish School Board v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636, 96 S.Ct. 1083, 47 L.Ed.2d 296 (per curiam), the plaintiff contended that population disparities among the parish's wards had unconstitutionally denied him the right to cast an effective vote for representatives to the school board and the police jury, the governing body of the parish. The District Court found that the parish's existing apportionment was unconstitutional. As a remedy, the court adopted a reapportionment plan, suggested by the police jury, that provided for at-large election of the members of both the police jury and the school board. Following the 1970 census, the District Court directed the police jury and school board to submit revised reapportionment plans. They resubmitted the plan calling for at-large elections, and the District Court again approved this plan. After a divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decision,
"Court-ordered plans resulting from equitable jurisdiction over adversary proceedings are not controlled by § 5. Had the East Carroll police jury reapportioned itself on its own authority, clearance under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act would clearly have been required. Connor v. Waller, 421 U.S. 656 95 S.Ct. 2003, 44 L.Ed.2d 486 (1975). However, in submitting the plan to the District Court, the jury did not purport to reapportion itself in accordance with the 1968 enabling legislation . . . which permitted police juries and school boards to adopt at-large elections. App. 56. Moreover, since the Louisiana enabling legislation was opposed by the Attorney General of the United States under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, the jury did not have the authority to reapportion itself. . . . Since the reapportionment scheme was submitted and adopted pursuant to court order, the preclearance procedures of § 5 do not apply. Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690, 691 91 S.Ct. 1760, 1761, 29 L.Ed.2d 268 (1971)." 424 U.S., at 638-639, n. 6, 96 S.Ct., at 1085, n. 6.
Petitioners rely heavily upon this footnote. While their reliance is understandable, the footnote is not dispositive in this case. The discussion of § 5 in East Carroll was dictum unnecessary to the decision in that case. It is, therefore, not controlling in this case, in which the impact of § 5 is directly placed in issue.
Moreover, our subsequent decision in Wise v Limpscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 98 S.Ct. 2493, 57 L.Ed.2d 411, indicates that, at least to the extent that East Carroll addressed the Voting Rights Act, it must be narrowly limited to its particular facts.
The question this Court addressed was whether the District Court had committed error by failing to apply the usual presumption against multimember districts in judicial reapportionment plans. In his opinion announcing the judgment of the Court, Justice WHITE, joined by Justice STEWART, answered that question by holding that the presumption did not apply because it is "appropriate, whenever practicable, to afford a reasonable opportunity for the legislature to meet constitutional requirements by adopting a substitute measure rather than for the federal court to devise and order into effect its own plan." 437 U.S., at 540, 98 S.Ct., at 2497. Justice WHITE distinguished East Carroll on the ground that the legislative bodies in that case had not been purported to reapportion themselves and, in deed, had been without power to reapportion themselves under state law because the Louisiana enabling statute had been invalidated under the Voting Rights Act.
The Dallas City Council, in contrast, had acted within its inherent legislative authority in devising and submitting a reapportionment plan to replace the plan invalidated by the District Court in Wise. See 437 U.S., at 545-546, 98 S.Ct., at 2500.
Justice POWELL's separate opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, was joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, Justice BLACKMUN, and Justice REHNQUIST. Justice POWELL agreed with Justice WHITE's conclusion that the Dallas reapportionment plan was a legislative plan for purposes of the application of the presumption against multimember districts. However, relying upon Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 86 S.Ct. 1286, 16 L.Ed.2d 376, Justice POWELL disagreed with Justice WHITE's suggestion that East Carroll had held that a proposed reapportionment plan may be considered legislative only if the legislative body that suggested the plan had authority to enact it under state law. 437 U.S., at 548, 98 S.Ct., at 2501.
In Justice POWELL's view, the legislative body's authority under state law was irrelevant to the question before the Court. He explained that the critical difference between a legislative plan and a court-imposed plan for purposes of substantive review was that the former reflected the policy choices of the elected representatives of the people, whereas the latter represented the remedial directive of a federal court.
In dissent, Justice MARSHALL, joined by Justice BRENNAN and Justice STEVENS, expressed the opinion that Wise was indistinguishable from East Carroll and that the Court of Appeals therefore had correctly applied the presumption against multimember districts. 437 U.S., at 550-554, 98 S.Ct., at 2502-2504. Justice MARSHALL, however, agreed with the majority that it would not be proper to reach any question under the Voting Rights Act because Texas had not been subject to the Act when the case was pending in the District Court.
"Plans imposed by court order are not subject to the requirements of § 5, but under that provision, a State or political subdivision subject to the Act may not 'enact or seek to administer' any 'different' voting qualification or procedure with respect to voting without either obtaining a declaratory judgment from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia that the proposed change 'does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color' or submitting the change to the Attorney General and affording him an appropriate opportunity to object thereto. A new reapportionment plan enacted by a State, including one purportedly adopted in response to invalidation of the prior plan by a federal court, will not be considered 'effective as law,' Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S., at 412 97 S.Ct., at 1832; Connor v. Waller, 421 U.S. 656 95 S.Ct. 2003, 44 L.Ed.2d 486 (1975), until it has been submitted and has received clearance under § 5. Neither, in those circumstances, until clearance has been obtained, should a court address the constitutionality of the new measure. Connor v. Finch, supra; Connor v. Waller, supra." Id., at 542, 98 S.Ct., at 2498 (footnote omitted).
This is not a case in which the language of the controlling statute unambiguously answers the question presented. The Solicitor General, on behalf of the United States as amicus curiae, contends that a covered jurisdiction "seeks to administer" a new voting practice when it submits a redistricting plan to a district court as a proposed remedy for a constitutional violation. This is a plausible but not an obviously correct reading of the statutory language. For there is force to the contrary argument that Kleberg County had no intention to administer any new plan until after it was given legal effect by incorporation in a judicial decree. Arguably, therefore, the statute has no application before the District Court enters its decree, and because the Act does not require the District Court to have its decisions precleared, seeConnor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690, 91 S.Ct. 1760, 29 L.Ed.2d 268, once such a decree is entered it is too late for the statute to qualify the county's duty to administer the plan as entered by the District Court. We find sufficient ambiguity in the statutory language to make it appropriate to turn to legislative history for guidance.
In 1975, when Congress adopted the amendments that ultimately brought Texas and Kleberg County within the coverage of the Act, it directed special attention to § 5 and to the redistricting that would be required after the 1980 census.
"By providing that Section 5 protections not be removed before 1985, S. 1279 would guarantee Federal protection of minority voting rights during the years that the post-census redistrictings will take place."
"Thus, for example, where a federal district court holds unconstitutional an appointment plan which predates the effective date of coverage under the Voting Rights Act, any subsequent plan ordinarily would be subject to Section 5 review. In the typical case, the court either will direct the governmental body to adopt a new plan and present it to the court for consideration or else itself choose a plan from among those presented by various parties to the litigation. In either situation, the court should defer its consideration ofor selection amongany plans presented to it until such time as these plans have been submitted for Section 5 review. Only after such review should the district court proceed to any remaining fourteenth or fifteenth amendment questions that may be raised.
"The one exception where Section 5 review would not ordinarily be available is where the court, because of exigent circumstances, actually fashions the plan itself instead of relying on a plan presented by a litigant. This is the limited meaning of the 'court decree' exception recognized in Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690 91 S.Ct. 1760, 29 L.Ed.2d 268 (1971). Even in these cases, however, if the governmental body subsequently adopts a plan patterned after the court's plan, Section 5 review would be required, Connor v. Waller, supra. Furthermore, in fashioning the plan, the court should follow the appropriate Section 5 standards, including the body of administrative and judicial precedents developed in Section 5 cases." Senate Report, at 18-19.
The view expressed by the Committee is consistent with the basic purposes of the statute and with the well-settled rule that § 5 is to be given a broad construction. See, e. g., Dougherty County Board of Education v. White, 439 U.S. 32, 38, 99 S.Ct. 368, 372, 58 L.Ed.2d 269; United States v. Sheffield Board of Commissioners, 435 U.S. 110, 122-123, 98 S.Ct. 965, 974-975, 55 L.Ed.2d 148; Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 387, 91 S.Ct. 431, 436, 27 L.Ed.2d 476. The preclearance procedure is designed to forestall the danger that local decisions to modify voting practices will impair minority access to the electoral process.
The federal interest in preventing local jurisdictions from making changes that adversely affect the rights of minority voters is the same whether a change is required to remedy a constitutional violation or is merely the product of a community's perception of the desirability of responding to new social patterns.
It is true, of course, that the federal interest may be protected by the federal district court presiding over voting rights litigation, but sound reasons support the Committee's view that the normal § 5 preclearance procedures should nevertheless be followed in cases such as this.
The procedures contemplated by the statute reflect a congressional choice in favor of specialized revieweither by the Attorney General of the United States or by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Because a large number of voting changes must necessarily undergo the preclearance process, centralized review enhances the likelihood that recurring problems will be resolved in a consistent and expeditious way.
The application of the statute is not dependent on a showing that the county's proposed plan is defective in any way. Cf. United States v. Board of Supervisors of Warren County, 429 U.S. 642, 97 S.Ct. 833, 51 L.Ed.2d 106 (per curiam); Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491, 97 S.Ct. 2411, 53 L.Ed.2d 506. The prophylactic purposes of the § 5 remedy are achieved by automatically requiring "review of all voting changes prior to implementation by the covered jurisdictions." Senate Report, at 15 (emphasis supplied).
It is therefore not material that the plan submitted by the Commissioners Court of Kleberg County in this case was actually prepared by an independent expert. His expertise may facilitate the satisfactory completion of the preclearance process, but it does not obviate the preclearance requirement itself. For just as the reasons for the county's decision to purpose a new plan are irrelevant to the statutory preclearance requirement, so also is the particular method that is employed in formulating the plan that is submitted to the court on behalf of the county irrelevant.
As Justice POWELL pointed out in Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 98 S.Ct. 2493, 57 L.Ed.2d 411, the essential characteristic of a legislative plan is the exercise of legislative judgment. The fact that particular requirements of state law may not be satisfied before a plan is proposed to a federal court does not alter this essential characteristic. The applicability of § 5 to specific remedial plans is a matter of federal law that federal courts should determine pursuant to a uniform federal rule.
As we construe the congressional mandate, it requires that whenever a covered jurisdiction submits a proposal reflecting the policy choices of the elected representatives of the peopleno matter what constraints have limited the choices available to them the preclearance requirement of the Voting Rights Act is applicable.
The decision today is foreshadowed by Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 98 S.Ct. 2493, 57 L.Ed.2d 411 (1978), and I join the Court's opinion. The constitutionality of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 has been sustained by prior cases. If the question were presented for reconsideration, I would adhere to the contrary view as previously expressed. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 193, 100 S.Ct. 1548, 1570, 64 L.Ed.2d 1119 (1980) (POWELL, J., dissenting); Dougherty County Bd. of Ed. v. White, 439 U.S. 32, 48, 99 S.Ct. 368, 377, 58 L.Ed.2d 269 (1978) (POWELL, J., dissenting); Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 545, 93 S.Ct. 1702, 1713, 36 L.Ed.2d 472 (1973) (POWELL, J., dissenting). See also United States v. Sheffield, Board of Commissioners, 435 U.S. 110, 141, 98 S.Ct. 965, 984, 55 L.Ed.2d 148 (1978) (STEVENS, J., dissenting); Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 586, and n.4, 89 S.Ct. 817, 842, and n.4, 22 L.Ed.2d 1 (1969) (HARLAN, J., concurringin part and dissenting in part); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 358, 86 S.Ct. 803, 833, 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966) (BLACK, J., concurring and dissenting).
The Voting Rights Act was enacted in 1965, 79 Stat. 437, and was amended in 1970, 84 Stat. 314, and in 1975, 89 Stat. 400. In relevant part, § 5, 89 Stat. 404, as set forth in 42 U.S.C. 1973c, now provides:
Section 4 of the Act identifies the jurisdictions that are subject to the Act's prohibitions. One of the determinants of coverage is the use of a "test or device" as a prerequisite for registration or voting. See 42 U.S.C. 1973b(b), (c). In 1975, Congress enlarged the coverage of the Act by changing the definition of "test or device" to protect non-English-speaking citizens who constitute more than 5% of the voting age population in any jurisdiction. The amendment provides:
"In addition to the meaning given the term under subsection (c) of this section, the term 'test or device' shall also mean any practice or requirement by which any State or political subdivision provided any registration or voting notices, forms, instructions, assistance, or other materials or information relating to the electoral process, including ballots, only in the English language, where the Director of the Census determines that more than five per centum of the citizens of voting age residing in such State or political subdivision are members of a single language minority." 89 Stat. 401-402, 42 U.S.C. 1973b(f)(3).
"Needless to say I completely agree with the holding of the majority that a reapportionment plan formulated and ordered by a federal district court need not be approved by the United States Attorney General or the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Under our constitutional system it would be strange indeed to construe § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 439, 42 U.S.C. 1973c (1964 ed., Supp. V), to require that actions of a federal court be stayed and reviewed by the Attorney General or the United States District Court for the District of Columbia." Id., at 695, 91 S.Ct., at 1763.