Source: https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/885-f-3d-984-730114537
Timestamp: 2020-02-20 01:58:55
Document Index: 570684300

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2255', '§ 160', '§ 924', '§ 922', '§ 922', '§ 924', '§ 2255', '§ 924', '§ 924']

885 F.3d 984 (6th Cir. 2018), 17-3419, Perez v. United States - Federal Cases - Case Law - VLEX 730114537
Docket Nº: 17-3419
Citation: 885 F.3d 984
Party Name: Moises PEREZ, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee.
Attorney: Claire C. Curtis, FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellant. Brian M. McDonough, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS OFFICE, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellee. Claire C. Curtis, FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellant. Brian M. McDonough, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS OFFICE, Cleveland,...
Judge Panel: Before: MERRITT, SUTTON, Circuit Judges, and CLELAND, District Judge. SUTTON, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which CLELAND, D.J., joined. MERRITT, J. (pg. 992), delivered a separate dissenting opinion. MERRITT, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
In January 2015, Perez pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of firearms and ammunition, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(i), imposes a mandatory minimum sentence for defendants convicted of violating section 922(g) who have three prior convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses. The presentence report identified: a 1987 New York... (see full summary)
885 F.3d 984 (6th Cir. 2018)
No. 17-3419
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio at Cleveland. Nos. 1:14-cr-00312; 1:16-cv-02434— Patricia A. Gaughan, District Judge.
Brian M. McDonough, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS OFFICE, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellee.
Before: MERRITT, SUTTON, Circuit Judges, and CLELAND, District Judge.[*]
SUTTON, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which CLELAND, D.J., joined. MERRITT, J. (pg. 992), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.
Moises Perez pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The court deemed Perez an armed career criminal and sentenced him to 210 months. Our court affirmed the sentence. Perez filed this § 2255 motion, claiming his prior conviction for New York second degree robbery should not have qualified as a predicate violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act. The district court denied relief. Because the state robbery offense requires the defendant to " use[ ] or threaten[ ] the immediate use of physical force upon another person," N.Y. Penal Law § § 160.00, 160.10, and because that offense includes " as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another" under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i), we affirm.
On January 27, 2015, Moises Perez pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of firearms and ammunition. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The Armed Career Criminal Act imposes a mandatory minimum sentence for defendants convicted of violating § 922(g) who have three prior convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses. Id. § 924(e)(1). The presentence report identified five predicate offenses: (1) a 1987 New York conviction for second degree robbery, (2) a 2003-Ohio-conviction for attempted intimidation, (3) a 2003-Ohio-conviction for attempted felonious assault, (4) a 2011-Ohio-conviction for burglary, and (5) a 2011-Ohio-conviction for attempted felonious assault. The district court agreed that the five prior convictions qualified and sentenced Perez to 210 months. We affirmed. United States v. Perez, 667 Fed.Appx. 543 (6th Cir. 2016) (per curiam).
Perez seeks post-conviction relief on the ground that the district court imposed a sentence " in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2255. He claims that three of his predicate offenses (Ohio attempted intimidation, Ohio burglary, and New York second degree robbery) do not qualify because they turned on the residual clause of ACCA, which the Supreme Court invalidated on vagueness grounds.
Johnson v. United States, __ U.S. __, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015). The government concedes that the two Ohio convictions no longer qualify but maintains that the New York robbery conviction remains a violent felony under ACCAs elements clause. The district court agreed, concluding that the New York robbery conviction amounted to a crime of violence. Perez appealed.
Any " violent felony" trek requires some preparation for the climb.
What part of the Armed Career Criminal Act applies? If a defendant has " three previous convictions ... for a violent felony or a serious drug offense," ACCA imposes a mandatory minimum 15-year sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). A felony qualifies as " violent," among other ways, if it " has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another." Id. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). Check.
How do we determine whether the elements of a crime satisfy the violence requirement? To figure out whether a crime meets the elements clause, we look to the statutory definition of the state offense rather than the underlying facts of the conviction, what has come to be known as the categorical approach. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990). That means we care only whether each predicate crime requires the government to prove that the defendant used, attempted to use, or threatened to use physical force against another— not what actually happened on that day. If a State convicts a person of criminal trespass, it would not matter whether he dug a hole or punched a security guard to commit the offense. Because our touchstone is whether the crime requires physical force, not whether the criminal conduct involves physical force, our test case becomes the least forceful conduct generally criminalized under the statute. The predicate conviction qualifies if that conduct involves violent physical force. Check.
Relevant state law to put under this microscope? Here is the language of New Yorks second degree robbery statute:
3. The property consists of a motor vehicle, as defined in section one hundred twenty-five...