Source: https://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/california/caedce/2:2015cv00685/279499/20
Timestamp: 2016-09-26 03:45:54
Document Index: 86740500

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1381', '§ 1382', '§ 1381', 'art, 341', '§ 406', 'art, 454', 'art, 278', 'art, 340', 'art, 400', '§ 423', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 416', 'art 404', '§ 416', '§ 404', '§ 404']

ORDER signed by Magistrate Judge Allison Claire on 9/15/2016 GRANTING Plaintiff's 15 Motion to Summary Judgment/Remand and DENYING Commissioner's Cross 16 Motion for Summary Judgment for De La Paz v. Commissioner of Social Security :: Justia Dockets & Filings Log In
ORDER signed by Magistrate Judge Allison Claire on 9/15/2016 GRANTING Plaintiff's 15 Motion to Summary Judgment/Remand and DENYING Commissioner's Cross 16 Motion for Summary Judgment. This matter is REMANDED to the Commissioner for further proceedings consistent withthis opinion. CASE CLOSED. (Jackson, T)
ENRICO DE LA PAZ,
No. 2:15-cv-00685 AC
Petitioner seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security
(“Commissioner”) denying his application for supplemental security income (“SSI”)1 under Title
XVI of the Social Security Act (“the Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 1381-1383f. For the reasons that follow,
plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment will be granted and defendant’s cross-motion for
SSI is paid to financially needy disabled persons. 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a); Washington State Dept.
of Social and Health Services v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371, 375 (2003) (Title
XVI of the Act, § 1381 et seq., is the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) scheme of benefits for
aged, blind, or disabled individuals, including children, whose income and assets fall below
specified levels).
Plaintiff initially applied for SSI on September 1, 2011, alleging his disability began on
that date. Administrative Record (“AR”) 2 at 13 (ECF No.11-3 at 14). The claim was initially
denied on December 20, 2011, and on reconsideration on September 18, 2012. Id. Plaintiff then
filed a request for hearing on October 18, 2012. 20 CFR 416.1429 et seq. Id. Administrative
Law Judge (“ALJ”) Nancy Lisewski presided over a hearing on May 12, 2014, attended by
plaintiff’s attorney and Impartial Vocational Expert (“IVE”) Thomas G. Linvill, who testified.
AR 31-32 (ECF No. 11-3 at 32-33). Plaintiff testified by telephone after waiving the notice of
hearing. AR 13 (ECF No. 11-3 at 14).
On May 21, 2014 ALJ Lisewski found plaintiff “not disabled” and plaintiff requested
review by the Appeals Council, AR 8 (ECF No. 11-3 at 9), which request was denied on January
28, 2015. AR 1 (ECF No. 11-3 at 2). The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the Magistrate
Judge. ECF Nos. 9 (plaintiff) and 7 (defendant). The cross-motions for summary judgment,
based upon the Administrative Record filed by the Commissioner, have been fully briefed. ECF
Plaintiff was born in 1976 and thus was under fifty years of age at all relevant times. ECF
No. 15 at AR 20 (ECF No, 11-3 at 21). He has at least a high school education and can
communicate in English. Id.
The Commissioner’s decision that a plaintiff is not disabled will be upheld “if it is
Howard ex rel. Wolff v Barnhart, 341 F.3d 1006, 1011 (9th Cir. 2003). “The findings of the
Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . .” Andrews
v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 406(g)).
The Administrative Record, comprising 523 pages was filed in ten (10) parts and is found at
Substantial evidence is “‘more than a mere scintilla [but] may be less than a
preponderance.’” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012). Substantial evidence
“means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (internal quotations omitted).
“While inferences from the record can constitute substantial evidence, only those ‘reasonably
drawn from the record’ will suffice.” Widmark v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2006)
(citation omitted). Although this court cannot substitute its discretion for that of the
Commissioner, the court nonetheless must review the record as a whole, “weighing both the
evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the [Commissioners] conclusion.”
Desrosiers v. Secretary of HHS, 846 F2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988); Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d
993, 95 (9th Cir. 1985) (“The court must consider both evidence that supports and evidence that
detracts from the ALJ’s conclusion; it may not affirm simply by isolating a specific quantum of
supporting evidence.”)
testimony, and resolving ambiguities.” Edlund v. Massnari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001).
Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports
the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947,
954 (9th Cir. 2002). However, the court may review only the reasons stated by the ALJ in his
decision “and may not affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which he did not rely.” Orn v. Astrue,
495 F3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007); Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2003) (“It was
error for the district court to affirm the ALJ’s credibility decision based on evidence that the ALJ
did not discuss”).
which exists only when it is “clear from the record that an ‘ALJ’s error was inconsequential to the
ultimate nondisability determination.’” Robbins v. Social Security Administration, 466 F.3d 880,
885 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Stout v. Commissioner, 454 F.3d 1050-1056 (9th Cir. 2006)); see
also Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005).
individual who is “disabled.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382(a)(3)(A). The Commissioner
uses a five-step sequential evaluation process to determine whether an applicant is disabled and
entitled to benefits. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4); Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S.
20, 24-25 (2003) (setting forth the “five-step sequential evaluation process to determine
disability” under Title II and Title XVI. The following summarizes the sequential evaluation:
The plaintiff bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation
process. 20 C.F.R § 404.1512(a) (“In general, you have to prove to us that you are blind or
disabled”), 20 C.F.R. § 416.912(a) (same). However, “[a]t the fifth step of the sequential
analysis, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to demonstrate that the plaintiff is not disabled
and can engage in work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy.” Hill v.
Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1162 (9th Cir. 2012).
[Step One:] The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since September 1, 2011, the application date (20 CFR
416.971 et seq.). […]
[Step Two:] The claimant has the following severe impairments:
anxiety disorder NOS, depressive disorder NOS, and polysubstance
abuse, most extensively with alcohol (20 CFR 416.920(c)). […]
[Step Three:] The claimant does not have an impairment or
Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 46.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).
[Step Four3:] The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant
work (20 C.F.R. 416.965). […]
[Step Five:] After careful consideration of the entire record, In find
that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform a
full range of work at all exertional levels but with the following
nonexertional limitations: he is limited to routine non-public work.
[Step Five, continued:] The claimant was born on August 9, 1976
and was 35 years old, which is defined as a younger individual age
18-49, on the date the application was filed (20 CFR 416.963).
[Step Five, continued:] The claimant has at least a high school
education and is able to communicate in English (20 CFR 416.964).
[Step Five, continued:] Transferability of job skills is not material
to the determination of disability because using the MedicalVocational Rules as a framework supports a finding that the
claimant is “not disabled,” whether or not the claimant has
transferable job skills. (See SSR 82-41 and 20 CFR Part 404,
[Step Five, continued:] Considering the claimant’s age, education,
plaintiff can perform (20 C.F.R. 416.969 and 4416.969(a)). […]
The ALJ made this finding out of order. See AR 20 (ECF No. 11-3 at 21). It is restored here to
its logical place in the sequential analysis.
Social Security Act, since September 1, 2011, the date the
application was filed. (20 C.F.R. § 416.920(g)).
AR 15-21 (ECF No. 11-3 at 16-22) (excerpted).
Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ committed the following legal errors: (1) she improperly
rejected the opinions of plaintiff’s treating and examining doctors; (2) she improperly found
plaintiff less than fully credible; and (3) she consequently assessed a Residual Functional
Capacity which is not based on the evidence.
The ALJ’s Evaluation of Medical Opinion Evidence
1. Principles Governing Consideration Of Medical Opinion Evidence
In the Ninth Circuit, courts “distinguish among the opinions of three types of physicians:
(1) those who treat the claimant (treating physicians); (2) those who examine but do not treat the
claimant (examining physicians); and (3) those who neither examine nor treat the claimant
(nonexamining physicians).” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). Generally, more
weight should be given to a treating physician’s opinion than to those who do not treat the
claimant, and more weight should be given to an examining physician’s opinion that to those who
do not examine the claimant. Id. at 830, 832-33.
The opinion of a claimant’s treating physician is presumptively entitled to special weight:
SSR 96-2p, available at 61 Fed. Reg. 34,490, 34,492 (July 2, 1996).4
Even where the treating doctor’s opinion is contradicted by another doctor’s opinion, the
ALJ “may not reject this opinion without providing ‘specific and legitimate reasons’ supported by
substantial evidence in the record for so doing.” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir.
1996) (as amended) (quoting Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1983)). Those
reasons must include a weighing of “all of the factors provided” in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c) and
416.927(c), namely, length, nature and extent of the treatment relationship; supportability;
consistency; and specialization. See Orn, 495 F.3d at 632.
2. The Medical Opinion Evidence Before The ALJ
a. Treating Psychiatrist Lisa Wang, M.D.
Dr. Wang had been plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist for approximately four years at the
time of the ALJ’s hearing. The medical record before the ALJ contained Dr. Wang’s treatment
records from January 2010 through January 2014. AR 431-481, 497-523 (ECF No. 11-10 at 2-52,
68-94). At the hearing, plaintiff highlighted a Medical Source Statement from Dr. Wang (Exh.
2F) which is a Mental Impairment Questionnaire completed on August 26, 2011.
The August 2011 statement noted that Dr. Wang was seeing plaintiff every two months. The
assessment reflects a diagnosis of Anxiety Disorder NOS, being treated with Celexa and
Welbutrin. This treatment regimen was complicated by plaintiff’s sensitivity to the side effects of
the drugs – restless legs, high anxiety, and akathisia. Dr. Wang assigned plaintiff a Global
Assessment of Functioning (GAF) score of 40, which was also his highest score for the past
year.5 She assessed his prognosis as fair to poor. Id.
Dr. Wang identified the following signs and symptoms of mental impairment: anhedonia
(pervasive loss of interest in almost all activities); decreased energy; thoughts of suicide; feelings
of guilt of worthlessness; generalized persistent anxiety mood disturbance difficulty thinking or
concentrating; psychomotor agitation or retardation; recurrent obsessions or compulsions which
are a source of marked distress; perceptual or thinking disturbances; hallucinations or delusions;
emotional lability; deeply ingrained, maladaptive patterns of behavior; and sleep disturbance. AR
345 (ECF No. 11-9 at 27). She found plaintiff to have moderate to marked functional limitations
with regard to activities of daily living, deficiencies of concentration, and persistence of pace, and
moderate limitations with regard to maintaining social functioning. She found repeated episodes
of decompensation of at least two weeks duration within the last 12 month period. AR 346 (ECF
No. 11-9 at 28).
Review of Dr. Wang’s treatment notes for the following two-and-a-half years, AR 431-
481, 497-523, reveals a history of fluctuating symptoms including panic attacks and suicidality,
medication changes in relation to persistent problems with side-effects, and fluctuations in
reported alcohol use.
The final assessment from Dr. Wang is a Psychiatric Assessment Annual Update dated
January 29, 2014, AR 502-503 (ECF No. 11-10 at 73-74), which gives diagnoses of Anxiety
Disorder NOS, Major Depression and ETOH abuse. Panic Disorder with Agoraphobia is also
noted. Dr. Wang notes that plaintiff was experiencing panic attacks primarily when he leaves the
house. Dr. Wang assessed a GAF score of 50. Id.
The Ninth Circuit has defined a GAF score as a “rough estimate” of an individual’s
psychological, social and occupational functioning, used to reflect the individual’s need for
treatment. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1003 n.4 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Vargas v.
Lambert, 159 F.3d 1161, 1164 (9th Cir. 1998)). A GAF score of 41-50 describes “serious
symptoms” or “any serious impairment in social, occupational or social functioning,” while
scores of 51-60 describe “moderate symptoms.” Id. Because GAF scores “are typically assessed
in controlled, clinical sets that may differ from work environments in important respects,” they
are not determinative of disability. However, they are “a useful measurement” of functioning. Id.
b. Examining Psychologist C. Arpaci, Psy.D.
On August 16, 2012, Dr. Arpaci conducted a Mental Status Evaluation of plaintiff at the
request of the Department of Social Services. AR 412-16 (ECF No. 11-9 at 94-98). The only
medical record available to Dr. Arpaci was a 2-page progress note dated August 29, 2011. AR
412 (ECF No. 11-9 at 94). All information that he considered came from the claimant, who he
considered to be a fair to poor historian. Id. The report does not indicate how much time Dr.
Arpaci spent with plaintiff.
Dr. Arpaci’s diagnostic impressions were as follows: Depression NOS, Generalized
Anxiety Disorder (with diagnostic note to rule out Panic Disorder with Agoraphobia) on Axis I;
borderline traits on Axis II; irritable bowel syndrome, chronic fatigue syndrome and allergies on
Axis III; problems with occupation, finances, social environment on Axis IV; and a GAF score of
52 on Axis V.6 AR 415-416 (ECF No. 11-9 at 97-98). The prognosis was “fair to guarded.” AR
415 (ECF No. 11-9 at 97).
Dr. Arpaci rated the plaintiff’s work-related abilities as moderately to severely impaired in
four (4) categories;7 moderately impaired in two (2) categories;8 mildly impaired in two (2)
categories;9 and unimpaired in one (1) category;10 and found him able to manage his own funds.
AR 416 (ECF No. 11-9 at 98).
c. Non-Examining Psychologist Harvey Bilik, Psy.D.
Dr. Bilik conducted the mental health portion of the agency case review following Dr.
Arpaci’s consultative examination. AR 62-76 (ECF No. 11-4 at 13-27).11 He considered Dr.
It should be noted that this GAF is the highest one in the record.
These categories are (1) ability to adapt to changes in job routine; (2) ability to withstand the
stress of a routine day; (3) ability to interact appropriately with co-workers, supervisors, and the
public on a regular basis; and (4) ability to adapt to changes, hazards, stressors in the workplace
These categories are (1) ability to maintain adequate pace or persistence to perform complex
tasks and (2) ability to maintain adequate concentration and attention.
These categories are (1) ability to follow complex/detailed instructions and (2) ability to
maintain adequate pace or persistence to perform one or two step simple repetitive tasks.
Plaintiff was found unimpaired in his ability to follow simple instructions.
The ALJ’s decision refers to Dr. Bilik as “the State agency psychological examiner,” AR 19
(ECF No. 11-3 at 20), but Dr. Bilik did not examine plaintiff. Together with Dr. Pong (who
Arpaci’s findings, and disregarded Dr. Wang’s findings because the “source opinion [addressed]
an issue reserved to the Commissioner.” AR 73 (ECF No. 11-4 at 24). Dr. Bilik rated plaintiff in
nineteen (19) categories relevant to Residual Functional Capacity. He found that plaintiff was
“moderately limited” in most categories and “not significantly limited” in six categories. AR 71-
73 (ECF No. 11-4 at 22).
3. The ALJ’s Findings
The ALJ rejected Dr. Wang’s opinion because she found it “far too restrictive and not
consistent with her own treatment notes of the claimant.” AR 20 (ECF No. 11-3 at 21).12 She
gave the following supplemental reasons for disregarding Dr. Wang’s opinion: (1) the opinion
was issued in August 2011, prior to the alleged disability onset date, and therefore was not
germane to the disability determination; (2) Dr. Wang’s treatment notes following the opinion are
inconsistent with the restrictive findings; (3) plaintiff’s mental treatment was “intermittent and
sparse in nature;” (4) plaintiff’s “mental symptoms appear to improve and be well-controlled by
psychotropic medications when he takes them and if he were to abstain from his polysubstance
abuse.” Id.
The ALJ based her RFC determination “for the most part” on the assessment of Dr. Bilik,
“as supported by the findings and opinion of Dr. Arpaci,” which she accorded “great weight”
because consistent with the “preponderance of the longitudinal mental evidence of record as a
whole.” AR 19-20 (ECF No. 11-3 at 20-21).
The ALJ’s stated reasons for rejecting Dr. Wang’s opinion are inadequate. The ALJ fails
to identify with specificity any inconsistencies between Dr. Wang’s restrictive findings and her
treatment notes. An ALJ may only discount the opinion of a treating physician, even when that
opinion is contradicted by another medical source,13 by articulating “specific, legitimate reasons
addressed medical issues not relevant here), Dr. Bilik conducted the agency’s internal file review.
Dr. Arpaci conducted the only consultative examination for the agency.
The ALJ purported to give Dr. Wang’s opinion “little weight,” id., but it is clear that she gave
it no weight at all.
Here the court assumes without deciding that Dr. Wang’s opinion is “contradicted” by Dr.
for doing so that are based on substantial evidence in the record.” Magallanes v. Bowen, 881
F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989). An ALJ satisfies the requirement for “substantial evidence” by
“setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence,
stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1012
(9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1996)). The ALJ failed
to do so here. Moreover, her opinion fails to expressly weigh “all of the factors provided” in 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c) and 416.927(c), namely, length, nature and extent of the treatment
relationship; supportability; consistency; and specialization. See Orn, 495 F.3d at 632. For these
reasons alone, the ALJ’s decision cannot stand.
The ALJ’s other stated reasons are equally insufficient as a basis for discounting the
opinion of a treating physician:
First, the August 2011 medical source statement was prepared less than a week prior to
the alleged onset date, and thus was current on that date.
Second, Dr. Wang’s treatment records from August 2011 through January 2014, shortly
before the hearing before the ALJ, reflected continued severe symptoms that affected plaintiff’s
functioning. The ALJ fails to specifically identify what in those records is inconsistent with the
earlier restrictive findings; the undersigned finds no inconsistency. The ALJ also fails to address
the fact that the most recent of those records reported continuing panic attacks when plaintiff left
his house, recent troublesome side-effects from medication, and a GAF that remained within the
“serious impairment” range.14
Arpaci. Dr. Arpaci, as discussed above, found plaintiff to be “moderately/severely” limited in
four work-related domains. His opinion thus appears closer to that of Dr. Wang than to that of
Dr. Bilik, who found plaintiff to be no more than moderately limited in any area -- and whose
opinion the ALJ accepted “as supported by” the findings and opinion of Dr. Arpaci. If Dr.
Arpaci’s opinion does not contradict Dr. Wang, then the ALJ was required to articulate “clear and
convincing reasons” for rejecting Dr. Wang’s opinion. See Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. Reasons that
fail the “specific and legitimate” standard necessarily also fail the “clear and convincing”
Third, the ALJ does not explain how periodic gaps in treatment affect the weight to be
given to Dr. Wang’s findings, especially in light of the length of the treatment relationship and
how well Dr. Wang knew her patient as a result.
Fourth, periods of improvement are not inconsistent with findings that mental illness
limits functioning. As the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly reminded the lower courts in the context
of mental health issues:
[I]t is error to reject a claimant’s testimony [or treating physician
opinion] merely because symptoms wax and wane in the course of
treatment. Cycles of improvement and debilitating symptoms are a
common occurrence, and in such circumstances it is error for an
ALJ to pick out a few isolated instances of improvement over a
period of months or years and to treat them as a basis for
concluding a claimant is capable of working. See, e.g., Holohan v.
Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1205 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[The treating
physician’s] statements must be read in context of the overall
diagnostic picture he draws. That a person who suffers from severe
panic attacks, anxiety, and depression makes some improvement
does not mean that the person’s impairments no longer seriously
affect her ability to function in a workplace. [fn. omitted.] Reports
of “improvement” in the context of mental health issues must be
interpreted with an understanding of the patient’s overall well-being
and the nature of her symptoms. See U, 528 F.3d at 1200-01 (“Nor
are the references in [a doctor’s] notes that Ryan’s anxiety and
depression were ‘improving’ sufficient to undermine the repeated
diagnosis of those conditions, or [another doctor’s] more detailed
report.”). They must also be interpreted with an awareness that
improved functioning while being treated and while limiting
environmental stressors does not always mean that a claimant can
function effectively in a workplace. See, e.g., Hutsell, 259 F.3d at
712 (“We also believe that the Commissioner erroneously relied too
heavily on indications in the medical record that Hutsell was ‘doing
well,’ because doing well for the purposes of a treatment program
has no necessary relation to a claimant’s ability to work or to her
work-related functional capacity.”) [fn. omitted.]
Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1017. The ALJ disregarded these important principles when she stated that
Dr. Wang’s opinion deserved little weight in light of plaintiff’s periodic improvements and
responsiveness to medication.15
The court further notes that although plaintiff did report periodic improvement in response to
medication, he also frequently reported negative side-effects that required changes to his
medication regime. That pattern does not support the ALJ’s characterization of plaintiff’s
condition as “well-controlled by psychotropic medications,” AR 20.
Finally, the ALJ relies on her own medically unsupported opinion that plaintiff’s
psychiatric condition would improve “if he were to abstain from his poly-substance abuse.” AR
20 (ECF No. 11-3 at 21). Polysubstance abuse is one of plaintiff’s severe impairments, AR 15
(ECF No. 11-3 at 16), not a condition that somehow renders his other impairments within his
control. Moreover, the ALJ points to no medical finding that abstinence from alcohol would
improve plaintiff’s anxiety disorder or limit his panic attacks. There are certainly many treatment
notes that indicate discussion of plaintiff’s drinking, which makes sense as substance abuse is one
of the disorders for which he was being treated. But the ALJ’s assumption about the relationship
between plaintiff’s substance use and the severity of his other mental disorders is unsupported,
and does not constitute an inference “reasonably drawn from the record.” See Widmark, 454
F.3d at 1066.
For all these reasons, the ALJ erred in her consideration of Dr. Wang’s opinions.
Moreover, her adoption of the non-examining psychologist’s conclusions is unsupported by
substantial evidence. The ALJ states that Dr. Bilik’s opinion, which found plaintiff unimpaired or
only moderately impaired in each assessed area, was supported by the examination of Dr. Arpaci.
But Dr. Arpaci, while not identifying as many severe limitations as had Dr. Wang, did find
plaintiff moderately to severely impaired in several areas. The ALJ’s error in this regard
compounds her error regarding Dr. Wang.
Plaintiff testified telephonically at the hearing, because he was in jail at the time. He
stated inter alia that he was unable to work because his panic attacks made it difficult or
impossible for him to leave the house. When he has a panic attack he has trouble walking,
experiences tunnel vision, gets cold sweats, and feels like he is having a heart attack. Attacks last
from five minutes to one hour, and can occur when he was at home as well as when he is in open
places. He was experiencing panic attacks approximately once or twice a week at the time of his
testimony, i.e. while incarcerated (and not able to drink).16 AR 35-40 (ECF No. 11-3 at 36-41).
If accepted as credible, this testimony casts further doubt on the ALJ’s unsupported belief that
The ALJ found the claimant’s testimony regarding the severity of his symptoms to be “not
generally credible.” AR 20 (ECF No. 11-3 at 21). She based this finding on plaintiff’s
intermittent treatment record, missed appointments, and continued use of alcohol. The ALJ also
found that plaintiff’s ability to “enter into a new relationship” was inconsistent with his
complaints of agoraphobia. Id.
In determining that a claimant’s testimony is unreliable, an ALJ may consider, among
other things, “(1) ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation such as the claimant’s reputation
for lying, prior inconsistent statements concerning the symptoms, and other testimony by the
claimant that appears less than candid; (2) unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek
treatment or to follow a prescribed course of treatment; and (3) the claimant’s daily activities.”
Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1283; see also Light v. Social Security Administration, 119 F.3d 789, 783 (9th
Cir. 1997) (ALJ “must rely on reasons unrelated to subjective testimony (e.g. reputation for
dishonesty), on conflicts between . . . testimony and . . . conduct, or on internal contractions in
that testimony”).
Here, plaintiff testified telephonically and the ALJ therefore did not have the opportunity
to observe his demeanor. The ALJ identified no specific inconsistencies within plaintiff’s
testimony, or between his testimony regarding the severity of his symptoms and the medical
record regarding his psychiatric condition. As previously noted, plaintiff’s four year history of
treatment with Dr. Wang cannot fairly be characterized as a “sparse” treatment record. Missed
appointments, the waxing and waning of symptoms over time, and inconsistent compliance with
medication, are all widely understood to be symptomatic of chronic mental illness. The ALJ does
not explain how these common features, on the facts and circumstances of this case, detract from
the credibility of plaintiff’s testimony. Nor does she explain why a history of substance abuse
relapses undermines credibility regarding the severity of other psychiatric symptoms. Finally, the
ALJ offers no medical source for her assertion that claims of agoraphobia are necessarily
inconsistent with having a personal relationship.
plaintiff’s other psychiatric symptoms would be controlled by abstinence from alcohol and drugs.
The ALJ’s grounds for finding plaintiff’s testimony not credible are legally insufficient.
The errors identified above are not harmless. Further development of the record is
necessary to a determination of disability, however. For example, the undersigned notes that the
record before the ALJ did not include certain documents referenced in Dr. Wang’s records,
including a May 2013 “medical assessment of employability.” See AR 518 (ECF No. 11-10 at
89). On remand, the ALJ should take care to exercise her “special duty” to fully and fairly
develop the record by, inter alia, requesting further information from plaintiff’s treating
psychiatrist. See Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1288.
1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 15) is GRANTED;
2. The Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 16) is DENIED;
3. This matter is REMANDED to the Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion; and
4. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment for plaintiff and close this case.