Source: http://me.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180223_0000075.DME.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-03-25 19:06:58
Document Index: 574355806

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2902', '§ 2902', '§ 2401', '§ 2902', '§ 859', '§ 859', '§ 859', '§ 2902', '§ 859', '§ 859', '§ 859', '§ 2675', '§ 859']

APRIL M. WOOD, Plaintiff,
April M. Wood, a veteran of the United States Army, claims that she was negligently treated by Dr. Thomas Franchini (hereinafter “Franchini”), a former Veterans Affairs podiatrist at the Togus Veterans Affairs Medical Center (the “VAMC”). She also alleges that the VAMC and Franchini fraudulently concealed Franchini's negligence, preventing her from asserting her rights in a timely fashion. In her Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 102), Wood brings claims against the federal government (alternatively, the VAMC or the “Government”) for vicarious liability for Franchini's alleged negligence (Count I); direct liability for negligence (Count II); lack of informed consent (Count III); and fraudulent concealment (Count IV). The Government has moved to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) (ECF No. 107).
This is the second motion to dismiss that the Government has filed in this case. In an Order issued in February 2016, I resolved almost all of the issues raised in the Government's first Motion to Dismiss in favor of the Government, ruling that Maine's three-year limitations period for bringing claims against health care providers, 24 M.R.S.A. § 2902 (2017) is a statute of repose and not a statute of limitations, and that § 2902 is not preempted by the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C.A. § 2401(b) (2017). See ECF No. 45 at 40. The Government argues that because § 2902 is a statute of repose, the three-year repose period for the medical negligence alleged by Wood began to run no later than December 2009-the date of Wood's last surgery performed by Franchini-rather than from February 2013, when Wood discovered the facts underlying her claims. Thus, the claims alleged by Wood are time-barred absent some basis in law or equity for tolling the three-year statute of repose.
Wood asserts that the statutory tolling provision in 14 M.R.S.A. § 859 (2017) related to fraudulent concealment applies to her claims:
14 M.R.S.A. § 859. If § 859 governs Wood's claims, its six-year limitations period “starts to run when the existence of the cause of action or fraud [was] discovered or should have been discovered by the plaintiff in the exercise of due diligence and ordinary prudence.” Westman v. Armitage, 215 A.2d 919, 922 (Me. 1966). Extending the limitations period from three years from the date of the alleged tortious act in accordance with § 2902's statute of repose, to six years from the time Wood discovered the alleged tortious act, brings Wood's claims within § 859's six-year statute of limitations. Accordingly, I deferred a final ruling on the applicability of § 859 in connection with the first Motion to Dismiss to afford Wood, and the plaintiffs in five related actions, [1] the opportunity to conduct limited discovery on the issue of fraudulent concealment and to seek to amend their complaints on the basis of that discovery.
For the reasons explained below, I conclude that a genuine dispute of material fact exists with regard to whether the VAMC and Franchini fraudulently concealed instances of medical malpractice from Wood, and that these facts are inextricably intertwined with the merits of Wood's claims. Thus, I cannot yet determine whether, as a matter of law, § 859 governs Wood's claims, and I deny the Motion to Dismiss as to Counts I (Vicarious Liability), Count II (Direct Liability), and Count III (Lack of Informed Consent) for that reason. The Government also moves to dismiss Count IV (Fraudulent Concealment) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to restrictions established by the FTCA in 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2675(a) and 2680(h), and, as explained below, I conclude that Count IV should be dismissed.
The Government seeks to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).[2] A federal court generally may not rule on the merits of a case without first determining that it has jurisdiction over the category of claim in the suit, i.e., subject matter jurisdiction. See Sinochem Int'l Co. v. Malaysia Int'l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430-31 (2007).
Wood's Second Amended Complaint alleges facts intended to demonstrate fraudulent concealment in two ways: first, fraudulent concealment allegedly committed by Franchini in misleading Wood as to the results of her initial surgery and the reasons for the continuing problems she experienced with her foot; and second, fraudulent concealment allegedly committed by the VAMC in concealing and/or failing to disclose Franchini's negligent treatment to Wood. I address, in order, (1) the Government's challenge to Wood's allegations of fraudulent concealment; (2) whether a special relationship existed between Wood and the VAMC that imposed a duty on the VAMC to disclose Franchini's alleged negligence to Wood; and (3) the Government's contention that because the FTCA does not afford subject matter jurisdiction for any claim arising out of misrepresentation, Count IV of the Second Amended Complaint should be dismissed because it specifically seeks damages for fraudulent concealment, a form of misrepresentation.
To benefit from the six-year statute of limitations provided by § 859, Wood must establish that the VAMC or Franchini, acting as its employee, actively concealed facts from her and that she relied on the concealment to her detriment. Brawn v. Oral Surgery Assocs., 819 A.2d 1014, 1026 (Me. 2003). “Active concealment of the truth connotes steps taken by a defendant to hide the true state of affairs from the plaintiff.” Kezer v. Mark Stimson Assocs., 742 A.2d 898, 905 (Me. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). Active concealment does not require an affirmative false statement and “may consist as well in the concealment of what is true as in the assertion of what is false.” Horner v. Flynn, 334 A.2d 194, 203 (Me. 1975), overruled on other grounds by Taylor v. Comm'r of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 481 A.2d 139 (Me. 1984); see also Sprague Energy Corp. v. Massey Coal Sales Co., No. 05-222-P-S, 2006 WL 696197, at *17 (D. Me. Mar. 15, 2006) (“Fraud need not necessarily take the form of an express false statement; rather, it can be predicated on active concealment of the truth.”).
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;When a plaintiff alleges fraudulent concealment through the active concealment of facts, the court must assess the allegations against the elements of fraud: (1) the making of a false representation; (2) of a material fact; (3) with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of whether it is true or false; (4) for the purpose of inducing another to act upon it; and (5) justifiable and detrimental reliance by the other person. Brawn, 819 A.2d at 1026; see also Harris Mgmt., Inc. v. Coulombe,151 A.3d 7, 16 n.7 (Me. 2016). “In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the ...