Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/330/116/115862/
Timestamp: 2020-08-14 21:18:52
Document Index: 168909131

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 201', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 206', '§ 213', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13']

Acme Tire and Battery Company, Inc., Appellant, v. W. Willard Wirtz, Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor, Appellee, 330 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1964) :: Justia
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Acme Tire and Battery Company, Inc., Appellant, v. W. Willard Wirtz, Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor, Appellee, 330 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1964)
US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit - 330 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1964) April 9, 1964
Bessie Margolin, Associate Sol. Dept. of Labor, Washington, D. C., Charles Donahue, Sol. of Labor, Beate Bloch, Warren M. Laddon, Attys., U. S. Dept. of Labor, Washington, D. C., Beverley R. Worrell, Regional Atty., for appellee.
Acme Tire and Battery Company, Inc., hereinafter referred to as Acme, was engaged in the business of selling tires and batteries and recapping tires. From February 5, 1960, to September 15, 1961, Acme employed Frank Mathis as a recapper at its recapping shop in Tampa, Florida, and paid him $69 per week without regard to the specific hours worked per week or per day and without additional compensation for hours worked in excess of 40 per week. The Secretary of Labor, pursuant to a written request from Mathis, filed the instant action against Acme to recover unpaid minimum wages and overtime compensation alleged to be due to Mathis under the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C.A. § 201, et seq.), hereinafter referred to as the Act.
Acme defended on the ground, among others, that its operations were exempt from coverage as a retail or service establishment under § 13(a) (2) and § 13 (a) (4) of the Act. Trial was had to the court and the court concluded that Acme failed to sustain its burden of proving that it was exempt from coverage as a retail or service establishment. Judgment for the Secretary in the amount of $794 was entered and Acme has appealed.
At all times here material, Acme's main place of business was an L-shaped building in Tampa, Florida. One leg of such building housed a central office and a retail outlet, and the other leg housed a recapping shop and warehouse. The two legs of the building were separated by a wall. Acme also maintained two warehouses located elsewhere in Tampa and owned the stock of four separate corporations, each of which operated a retail tire store under the name of Acme Retail Store Corporation, hereinafter referred to collectively as Acme Stores.
Facts were stipulated showing that Acme employed Mathis in "commerce," as defined in the Act, from February 5, 1960, to September 15, 1961.
"§ 206. Minimum wages; * * *
"(a) Every employer shall pay to each of his employees * * * wages at the following rates —
"(1) not less than $1 an hour;2
"(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, no employer shall employ any of his employees * * * for a workweek longer than forty hours, unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed.
"§ 213. Exemptions
"(a) The provisions of sections 206 and 207 of this title shall not apply with respect to * * * (2) any employee employed by any retail or service establishment, more than 50 per centum of which establishment's annual dollar volume of sales of goods or services is made within the State in which the establishment is located. A `retail or service establishment' shall mean an establishment 75 per centum of whose annual dollar volume of sales of goods or services (or of both) is not for resale and is recognized as retail sales or services in the particular industry; * * * or (4) any employee employed by an establishment which qualifies as an exempt retail establishment under clause (2) of this subsection and is recognized as a retail establishment in the particular industry notwithstanding that such establishment makes or processes at the retail establishment the goods that it sells: Provided, That more than 85 per centum of such establishment's annual dollar volume of sales of goods so made or processed is made within the State in which the establishment is located; * * *."
In Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388, 392, 80 S. Ct. 453, 456, 4 L. Ed. 2d 393, the Supreme Court in discussing the exemption provisions of the Act said:
"We have held that these exemptions are to be narrowly construed against the employers seeking to assert them and their application limited to those establishments plainly and unmistakably within their terms and spirit. The three conditions of § 13(a) (2) are explicit prerequisites to exemption, not merely suggested guidelines for judicial determination of the employer's status."
The burden of proving the existence of the three conditions of § 13(a) (2) of the Act is upon the employer3 and we agree with the trial court that Acme did not sustain that burden as to the existence of two of those conditions, namely, that 75 per cent of its annual dollar volume of sales is not for resale and that 75 per cent of its annual dollar volume of sales is recognized as retail sales in the tire industry.
Approximately 40 per cent of Acme's total volume of sales was derived from "commercial sales" and Acme wholly failed to establish the nature of such commercial sales; that they were not for resale; or that they were recognized in the industry as retail sales. Hence, Acme failed to prove that 75 per cent of its sales were not for resale or were recognized in the industry as retail sales.
Moreover, the only evidence as to the dollar volume of sales from Acme's main place of business covers a 19-month period, rather than an "annual" period, as required by the Act. There is no evidence from which Acme's annual dollar volume of sales can be determined.
We conclude that Acme failed to prove that its operations were those of a retail establishment and within the exemption from the coverage of the Act.
Since Acme failed to establish the basic requirements of § 13(a) (2) of the Act, to qualify for exemption as a retail establishment, it is unnecessary to determine whether it meets the additional requirements of § 13(a) (4).
Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388, 393, 80 S. Ct. 453, 4 L. Ed. 2d 393; Mitchell v. Kentucky Finance Co., 359 U.S. 290, 291, 79 S. Ct. 756, 3 L. Ed. 2d 815; Walling v. General Industries Co., 330 U.S. 545, 547, 548, 67 S. Ct. 883, 91 L. Ed. 1088; Goldberg v. Warren G. Kleban Engineering Corporation, 5 Cir., 303 F.2d 855, 859; Gatlin v. Mitchell, 5 Cir., 287 F.2d 76, 78; Mitchell v. Hunt, 5 Cir., 263 F.2d 913, 916; Foremost Dairies v. Ivey, 5 Cir., 204 F.2d 186, 188