Source: http://supreme.nolo.com/us/385/589/case.html
Timestamp: 2019-05-27 04:05:02
Document Index: 244001660

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3021', '§ 105', '§ 105', '§ 105', '§ 3022', '§ 12', '§ 105', '§ 105', '§ 161', '§ 105', '§ 105', '§ 105', '§ 3021', '§ 105', '§ 3022', '§ 105', '§ 105', '§ 3022', '§ 105', '§ 105']

KEYISHIAN V. BOARD OF REGENTS, 385 U. S. 589 - Volume 385 - 1967 - Full Text - US Supreme Court Center - USSC Cases - Nolo
US Supreme Court Center > Volume 385 > KEYISHIAN V. BOARD OF REGENTS, 385 U. S. 589 (1967) > Full Text
Appellants, faculty members of the State University of New York and a non-faculty employee, brought this action for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that New York's teacher loyalty laws and regulations are unconstitutional. Their continued employment had been terminated or was threatened when each appellant faculty member refused to comply with a requirement of the University trustees that he certify that he was not a Communist and that, if he had ever been one, he had so advised the university president, and the non-faculty employee refused to state under oath whether he had advocated or been a member of a group which advocated forceful overthrow of the government. Under § 3021 of New York's Education Law, "treasonable or seditious" utterances or acts are grounds for dismissal from the public school system, as well as under § 105, subd. 3, of the Civil Service Law. Other provisions of § 105 of the Civil Service Law disqualify from the civil service or employment in the educational system any person advocating or involved with the distribution of written material which advocates the forceful overthrow of the government. Section 3021 does not define "treasonable or seditious." Section 105, subd. 3, provides that "treasonable word or act" shall mean "treason" as defined in the Penal Law, and "seditious word or act" shall mean "criminal anarchy" as therein defined. Section 3022 (the Feinberg Law) of the Education Law requires the State Board of Regents to issue regulations for the disqualification or removal on loyalty grounds of faculty or other personnel in the state educational system, to make a list of "subversive" organizations, and to provide that membership therein constitutes prima facie evidence of disqualification for employment. The Board listed the National and State Communist Parties as "subversive organizations" under the law, but, shortly before the trial of this case, the university trustees' certificate requirement was rescinded and it was announced that no person would be ineligible for employment "solely" because he refused to sign the
4. The provisions of the Civil Service Law (§ 105, subd. 1(c)) and the Education Law (§ 3022, subd. 2) which make Communist Party membership, as such, prima facie evidence of disqualification
Appellants were members of the faculty of the privately owned and operated University of Buffalo, and became state employees when the University was merged in 1962 into the State University of New York, an institution of higher education owned and operated by the State of New York. As faculty members of the State University, their continued employment was conditioned upon their compliance with a New York plan, formulated
Appellants brought this action for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the state program violated the Federal Constitution in various respects. A three-judge
The Feinberg Law charged the State Board of Regents with the duty of promulgating rules and regulations providing procedures for the disqualification or removal of persons in the public school system who violate the 1917 law or who are ineligible for appointment to or
Adler was a declaratory judgment suit in which the Court held, in effect, that there was no constitutional infirmity in former § 12-a or in the Feinberg Law on their faces, and that they were capable of constitutional application. But the contention urged in this case that
A 1953 amendment extended the application of the Feinberg Law to personnel of any college or other institution of higher education owned and operated by the State or its subdivisions. In the same year, the Board of Regents, after notice and hearing, listed the Communist Party of the United States and of the State of New York as "subversive organizations." In 1956, each applicant for an appointment or the renewal of an appointment was required to sign the so-called "Feinberg Certificate" declaring that he had read the Regents Rules and understood that the Rules and the statutes
The change in procedure in no wise moots appellants' constitutional questions raised in the context of their refusal to sign the now abandoned Feinberg Certificate. The substance of the statutory and regulatory complex remains, and, from the outset, appellants' basic claim has been that they are aggrieved by its application.
Section 3021 requires removal for "treasonable or seditious" utterances or acts. The 1958 amendment to § 105 of the Civil Service Law, now subdivision 3 of that section, added such utterances or acts as a ground for removal under that law also. [Footnote 5] The same wording is used in both statutes -- that "the utterance of any treasonable or seditious word or words or the doing of any treasonable or seditious act or acts" shall be ground for removal. But there is a vital difference between the two laws. Section 3021 does not define the terms "treasonable or
But that section ends with the sentence "The advocacy of such doctrine either by word of mouth or writing is a felony." Does that sentence draw into § 105, Penal Law § 161, proscribing "advocacy of criminal anarchy"? If so, the
Other provisions of § 105 also have the same defect of vagueness. Subdivision 1(a) of § 105 bars employment of any person who "by word of mouth or writing willfully and deliberately advocates, advises or teaches the doctrine" of forceful overthrow of government. This provision is plainly susceptible of sweeping and improper application. It may well prohibit the employment of one who merely advocates the doctrine in the abstract, without any attempt to indoctrinate others or incite
Similar uncertainty arises as to the application of subdivision 1(b) of § 105. That subsection requires the disqualification of an employee involved with the distribution of written material "containing or advocating, advising or teaching the doctrine" of forceful overthrow, and who himself "advocates, advises, teaches, or embraces the duty, necessity or propriety of adopting the doctrine contained therein." Here again, mere advocacy of abstract doctrine is apparently included. [Footnote 8] And does
We do not have the benefit of a judicial gloss by the New York courts enlightening us as to the scope of this complicated plan. [Footnote 9] In light of the intricate administrative machinery for its enforcement, this is not surprising. The very intricacy of the plan and the uncertainty as to the scope of its proscriptions make it a highly efficient in terrorem mechanism. It would be a bold teacher who would not stay as far as possible from utterances or acts which might jeopardize his living by enmeshing him in this intricate machinery. The uncertainty as to the utterances and acts proscribed increases that caution in "those who believe the written law means what it says." Baggett v. Bullitt, supra, at 377 U. S. 374. The result must be to stifle "that free play of the spirit which all teachers ought especially to cultivate and practice. . . ." [Footnote 10] That probability is enhanced by the provisions requiring an
We emphasize once again that "[p]recision of regulation must be the touchstone in an area so closely touching our most precious freedoms," N.A.A.C.P. v. Button,
Page 385 U. S. 604
371 U. S. 415, 371 U. S. 438;
We therefore hold that § 3021 of the Education Law and subdivisions 1(a), 1(b) and 3 of § 105 of the Civil Service Law, as implemented by the machinery created pursuant to § 3022 of the Education Law, are unconstitutional.
Elfbrandt v. Russell, supra, at 384 U. S. 16. In Aptheker, we held that Party membership, without knowledge
These limitations clearly apply to a provision, like § 105, subd. 1(c), which blankets all state employees, regardless of the "sensitivity" of their positions. But even the Feinberg Law provision, applicable primarily to activities of teachers, who have captive audiences of young minds, are subject to these limitations in favor of freedom of expression and association; the stifling effect on the academic mind from curtailing freedom of association in such manner is manifest, and has been documented in recent studies. [Footnote 12] Elfbrandt and Aptheker state the
We therefore hold that Civil Service Law § 105, subd. 1(c), and Education Law § 3022, subd. 2, are invalid insofar as they proscribe mere knowing membership,
3. Removal for treasonable or seditious acts or utterances. A person in the civil service of the state or of
b The school authorities shall require one or more of the officials in their employ, whom they shall designate for such purpose, to submit to them in writing not later than October 31, 1949, and not later than September 30th of each school year thereafter, a report on each teacher or other employe. Such report shall either (1) state that there is no evidence indicating that such teacher or other employee has violated the statutory provisions herein referred
e Following the determination required in subdivision d of this paragraph, the school authorities shall immediately institute proceedings for the dismissal of superintendents, teachers or other employes in those cases in which in their judgment the evidence indicates violation of the statutory provisions herein referred to. In proceedings against persons serving on probation or those having tenure, the appropriate statutory procedure for dismissal shall be followed. In proceedings against persons serving under contract and not under the provisions of a tenure law, the school authorities shall conduct such hearings on charges as they deem the exigencies warrant before taking final action on dismissal. In all cases, all rights to a fair trial, representation by counsel and appeal or court review as provided by statute or the Constitution shall be scrupulously observed.
3 On or before the first day of December of each year, the school authorities of each school district shall render to the Commissioner of Educational a full report, officially adopted by the school authorities and signed by their presiding officer, of the measures taken by them for the enforcement of these regulations during the calendar year ending on the 31st day of October preceding. Such report shall include a statement as to (a) the total number of superintendents, teachers and other employes in the employ of the school district; (b) the number of superintendents, teachers and other employes as to whom the school authorities and/or the officials designated by them have reported that there is no evidence indicating that such employes have violated the statutory provisions
Before any initial appointment shall hereafter be made to any position certified to be in the professional service of the University pursuant to Section 35 of the Civil Service Law the officer authorized to make such appointment or to make the initial recommendation therefor shall send or give to the prospective appointee a statement prepared by the President concisely explaining the disqualification imposed by Section 105 of the Civil Service Law and by Section 3022 of the Education Law and the Rules of the Board of Regents thereunder, including the presumption of such disqualification by reason of membership in organizations listed by the Board of Regents. Such officer, in addition to due inquiry as to the candidate's record, professional training, experience and personal qualities, shall make or cause to be made such further inquiry as may be needed to satisfy him as to whether or not such candidate is disqualified under the provisions of such statute and rules. Should any question arise in the course of such inquiry such candidate may request or such officer may require a personal interview. Refusal of a candidate to answer any question relevant to such inquiry by such officer shall be sufficient ground to refuse to make or recommend appointment. An appointment or recommendation for appointment shall constitute a certification by the appointing or
The blunderbuss fashion in which the majority couches "its artillery of words," together with the morass of cases it cites as authority and the obscurity of their application
The old certificate upon which the majority operates required all of the appellants, save Starbuck, to answer the query whether they were Communists, and if they were, whether they had communicated that fact to the President of the State University. Starbuck was required to answer whether he had ever advised, taught, or been a member of a group which taught or advocated the doctrine that the Government of the United States, or any
Also declared unconstitutional are the subdivisions (1)(a), l(b) and 1(c) of 105 of the Civil Service Law) which prevent the appointment and authorize the discharge of any superintendent, principal, or teacher in any part of New York's public education establishment who willfully advocates, advises, or teaches the doctrine that the Government of the United States, or of any State or any political subdivision thereof should be overthrown by force, violence, or any other unlawful means (1)(a)); or who prints, publishes, edits, issues, or sells any book, paper, document, or written or printed matter, in any form, containing such doctrine and "who advocates, advises, teaches, or embraces the duty, necessity or
This Court has again and again, since at least 1951, approved procedures either identical or at the least similar to the ones the Court condemns today. In Garner v. Board of Public Works of Los Angeles, supra, we held that a public employer was not precluded, simply because it was an agency of the State, "from inquiring of its employees as to matters that may prove relevant to their fitness and suitability for the public service." 341 U.S. at 341 U. S. 720. The oath there used practically the same language
Since that time, the Adler line of cases has been cited again and again with approval: Shelton v. Tucker, 364
1. Section 3021 is not applicable to these appellants. As Attorney General Lefkowitz of New York says on behalf of the State, the Board of Regents and the Civil Service Commission, this section, by its own terms, applies only to superintendents, teachers, and employees in the
Certainly the word "subversive" is attacked as vague, and the Court finds that it "has a
But even if Adler did not decide these questions, I would be obliged to answer them in the same way. The only portion of the Feinberg Law which the majority says was not covered there and is applicable to appellants is § 105, subd. 1(a), 1(b) and 1(c). These have to do with teachers who advocate, advise, or teach the doctrine of overthrow of our Government by force and violence, either orally or in writing. This was the identical conduct that was condemned in Dennis v. United States, supra. There, the Court found the exact verbiage not to be unconstitutionally vague, and that finding was, of course, not affected by the decision of this Court in Yates v. United States, 354 U. S. 298. The majority makes much over the horribles that might arise from subdivision 1(b) of § 105 which condemns the printing, publishing, selling, etc., of matter containing such doctrine. But the majority fails to state that this action is condemned only when and if the teacher also personally advocates, advises, teaches, etc., the necessity or propriety of adopting such doctrine. This places this subdivision on the same
The majority says that the Feinberg Law is bad because it has an "overbroad sweep." I regret to say -- and I do so with deference -- that the majority has, by its broadside, swept away one of our most precious rights, namely, the right of self-preservation. Our public educational system is the genius of our democracy. The minds of our youth are developed there and the character of that development will determine the future of our land. Indeed, our very existence depends upon it. The issue here is a very narrow one. It is not freedom of speech, freedom of thought, freedom of press, freedom of assembly, or of association, even in the Communist Party. It is simply this: may the State provide that one who, after a hearing with full judicial review, is found to have willfully and deliberately advocated, advised, or taught that our Government should be overthrown by force or violence
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