Source: https://lundinonchapter13.com/Content/Section/60.1
Timestamp: 2019-12-11 14:58:22
Document Index: 79846689

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 60', '§ 362', '§ 60', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 109', '§ 362', '§ 109', '§ 362', '§ 109', '§ 362', '§ 109', '§ 109', '§ 432', '§ 60', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 432', '§ 60', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 541', '§ 153', '§ 541', '§ 153', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 9', '§ 109', '§ 18', '§ 109', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 109', '§ 109', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 109', '§ 109', '§ 109', '§ 362', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 362', '§ 109', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 1322', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 1325', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 109', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 109', '§ 362', '§ 109', '§ 109', '§ 109', '§ 109', '§ 109', '§ 109', '§ 109', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 109', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 109', '§ 109', '§ 109', '§ 362', '§ 362', '§ 362']

§ 60.1 When Does § 362(c)(3) Apply?
Cite as: Keith M. Lundin, Lundin On Chapter 13, § 60.1, at ¶ ____, LundinOnChapter13.com (last visited __________).
In Chapter 13 cases filed after October 17, 2005, some debtors with prior bankruptcy experience within a year face termination of some aspects of the automatic stay 30 days after the petition under § 362(c)(3). The stay that terminates in 30 days is not the entire automatic stay,1 and the conditions that trigger the 30-day stay termination are narrowly described in § 362(c)(3)(A):
(A) the stay under subsection (a) with respect to any action taken with respect to a debt or property securing such debt or with respect to any lease shall terminate with respect to the debtor on the 30th day after the filing of the later case[.]2
The first sentence of § 362(c)(3) is an English teacher’s nightmare. The sentence begins, “If a single or joint case is filed by or against [a] debtor who is an individual in a case under chapter 7, 11, or 13, . . . .” The sentence could be read to apply only in cases filed by or against an individual who is already a debtor in a case under Chapter 7, 11 or 13. Read this way, § 362(c)(3) requires a three-case scenario: one case that was pending and dismissed within a year; one case that is still pending when the current petition was filed; and a third case in which § 362(c)(3) is now at issue. Courts that have confronted this strange first sentence have reconstructed the words to read: “If a single or joint case is filed under chapter 7, 11, or 13 by or against an individual . . . .”3 Other constructions are possible but less plausible.
Under § 362(c)(3), the automatic stay in § 362(a) with respect to any action taken with respect to debt, property securing debt and leases terminates with respect to4 the debtor 30 days after a bankruptcy filing under Chapter 7, 11 or 135 if the debtor had a case pending within the preceding year that was dismissed.6 This 30-day stay termination does not apply if “a case” was “refiled under a chapter other than chapter 7 after dismissal under section 707(b).”7 The sentence is not clear whether this is the prior case or the current case—opening the possibility that there have been three cases in this string, either the second or third of which was filed after dismissal under § 707(b).8
The exception to termination of the automatic stay when the current case was refiled under a chapter other than Chapter 7 after a dismissal under § 707(b) is interesting. Recall that dismissal under § 707(b) typically will be for “abuse” of the provisions of Chapter 7. By one interpretation, a case refiled under Chapter 13 after dismissal of a Chapter 7 case for abuse under § 707(b) would not be subject to the 30-day stay termination in § 362(c)(3). In contrast, refiling a Chapter 13 case within a year of a prior Chapter 13 case that failed when the debtor was injured at work would trigger stay termination under new § 362(c)(3). Being booted out of Chapter 7 for abuse is okay under BAPCPA; trying and failing in a Chapter 13 case is punishable by truncation of the automatic stay on the 30th day of a second attempt at paying creditors. This is a perverse sense of punishments and entitlements.
The 30-day stay termination in § 362(c)(3) only applies when a prior case was both “pending” and “dismissed” during the year preceding the petition. A Chapter 7 case in which the debtor received a discharge might be a case “pending” within a year, but because it was not dismissed, it does not count for § 362(c)(3) purposes.9 The conjunctive conditions—pending and dismissed—have produced counting issues when a prior case was ordered dismissed but is still “pending” because not yet closed by the bankruptcy clerk. Courts addressing this issue have unanimously concluded that a case is pending for § 362(c)(3) purposes until an order of dismissal is entered and closing is irrelevant.10
The phrase “a single or joint case of the debtor” in § 362(c)(3) signals that married debtors must be considered for purposes of counting prior cases in § 362(c)(3). Courts have rejected the invitation to aggregate separate filings by spouses to determine whether § 362(c)(3) applies.11 There is evidence in the reported decisions that bankruptcy courts will count carefully to determine whether a prior bankruptcy case was both pending and dismissed within a year for § 362(c)(3) purposes.12
Detailed elsewhere,13 there is disagreement whether a prior bankruptcy case dismissed because the debtor failed to satisfy the prepetition briefing requirement in § 109(h)14 counts as a pending and dismissed case for § 362(c)(3) purposes. Not always by the same logic, a majority of the reported decisions concludes that a petition dismissed for ineligibility under § 109(h) was not a pending and dismissed prior case for § 362(c)(3) purposes.15 The minority position—that dismissal under § 109(h) counts as a prior case in § 362(c)(3) analysis16—is consistent with the view of most courts that the petition or case filed by a § 109(h) ineligible debtor is appropriately dismissed, not stricken.17 This potential consequence of ineligibility puts a premium on careful attention to the § 109(h) prepetition briefing requirement before filing a Chapter 13 case.18
1 See § 432.2 [ Which Stays Terminate? ] § 60.2 Which Stays Terminate?.
2 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(A).
3 See In re Baldassaro, 338 B.R. 178, 182–84 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2006) (“[T]he language in new § 362(c)(3) is very poorly written. . . . [T]he provisions of § 362(c)(3) [are] neither consistent nor coherent. . . . [T]he section only applies to individuals who have had three cases pending in one calendar year . . . . Because the legislative history clearly reflects congressional intent to limit the duration of the automatic stay in cases similar to [this] Case, the Court shall apply the subsection to this case, notwithstanding the plain language of the statute.”); In re Paschal, 337 B.R. 274, 277–78 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006) (Although worded to the contrary, § 362(c)(3) applies when there has been only one prior filing by the debtor within a year. “Taken all together, [§ 362(c)(3)] only applies to individuals who have had three cases pending in one calendar year: one case that has been dismissed, one case that is still pending when the petition at issue is filed, and the new case that is before the court for determination. . . . Although arguably contrary to the statute’s literal language, the court considers the statute to apply in a situation, such as is presently before the court, in which a debtor files a petition after the dismissal of a prior case that was pending within the preceding one-year period. Otherwise § 362(c)(3)(A) would in effect have no meaning.”).
4 There are actually four “with respect to[s]” in the single sentence fragment that is 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(A). See § 432.2 [ Which Stays Terminate? ] § 60.2 Which Stays Terminate?.
5 Notice that Chapter 12 is omitted from this.
6 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(A).
7 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3), discussed in § 541.1 [ Consequences of Dismissal ] § 153.2 Consequences of Dismissal Added or Changed by BAPCPA.
8 See § 541.1 [ Consequences of Dismissal ] § 153.2 Consequences of Dismissal Added or Changed by BAPCPA.
9 See In re Lovelace, No. 06-43464, 2007 WL 187733 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. Jan. 16, 2007) (In a Chapter 13 case filed on December 14, 2006, § 362(c)(3) is not applicable when previous Chapter 7 case was filed on May 24, 2005, and discharged on December 26, 2005. “By its terms, § 362(c)(3)(B) is only applicable if the case which was pending during the 1-year period prior to the filing of the current case was dismissed. Here, debtors’ prior case was not dismissed, but instead resulted in a discharge of their obligations. Accordingly, § 362(c)(3)(B) does not apply to these debtors.”).
10 See In re Easthope, No. 06-20366, 2006 WL 851829, at *3 (Bankr. D. Utah Mar. 28, 2006) (unpublished) (For § 362(c) purposes, prior bankruptcy case is “pending” until it is dismissed without regard to when administrative functions are completed and the case is closed. “The plain meaning of the word ‘pending’ as well as policy considerations demonstrate that a case is no longer pending once it has been dismissed.”); In re Moore, 337 B.R. 79, 81 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2005) (Prior case was not “pending” within one year of commencement of present Chapter 13 case when prior case was dismissed more than a year before the filing of the present case but was closed by the bankruptcy court within one year of the present case. “Mr. Moore’s prior case was open within the one year preceding the filing of the current case, but it was dismissed prior to the one-year period. . . . [A] case is no longer ‘pending’ once it has been dismissed. . . . [T]he debtor has no control over when the case is closed after dismissal . . . . Mr. Moore’s first case was no longer ‘pending’ for purposes of § 362(c)(3) as of the date of dismissal, regardless of when the case was closed.”).
11 See In re Maxey, No. 06 36773, 2006 WL 3834218 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2006) (Section 362(c)(3) applies but not § 362(c)(4) when, in a chronicle of nine bankruptcy filings by the debtor and her husband, only one prior case by the debtor was pending and dismissed within the previous year; separate filings by spouses are not aggregated for § 362(c)(3) purposes.); In re Parker, 336 B.R. 678, 680–81 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) (For § 362(c)(3) and (c)(4) purposes, joint debtors must be analyzed separately. John Parker had four bankruptcy filings, two dismissed within a year of the current joint case. Luisa Parker had three voluntary Chapter 13 cases, none of which was pending or dismissed in the year prior to the current filing. “[A]s to John Parker the automatic stay did not go into effect . . . . However, neither Section 362(c)(3) nor (c)(4) applies to Luisa Parker. . . . [T]he stay as to Luisa Parker is still in effect. . . . [I]n a joint bankruptcy case, the application of Section 362(c)(3) and (4) to each debtor must be analyzed separately.”).
12 See, e.g., In re Maxey, No. 06 36773, 2006 WL 3834218 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2006) (Bankruptcy court sorts through a chronicle of nine bankruptcy filings by the debtor and the debtor’s husband to determine that only one prior case by the debtor was pending and dismissed within the previous year, eliminating separate filings by the debtor’s spouse for § 362(c)(3) purposes.); In re Elliott-Cook, 357 B.R. 811 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2006) (Section 362(c)(3) applies because debtor had one prior Chapter 13 case dismissed within a year.); In re Garrett, 357 B.R. 128 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2006) (Section 362(c)(3) applies when Chapter 13 case is filed two months after dismissal of prior Chapter 13 case in which relief from stay was granted to mortgage holder.); In re Thomas, No. 352 B.R. 751 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2006) (Although debtor has two prior bankruptcy cases, both dismissed for failure to make payments to trustee, only one prior case was pending within the year preceding the current case, thus § 362(c)(3) applies.).
13 See § 9.5 Consequences of Ineligibility: Jurisdiction; Automatic Stay; Strike, Dismiss or Excuse?.
14 11 U.S.C. § 109(h) is discussed beginning at § 18.1 In General.
15 See In re Maxey, No. 06 36773, 2006 WL 3834218 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2006) (Striking of a prior petition based on § 109(h) ineligibility does not count for § 362(c)(3) purposes.); In re Thompson, 344 B.R. 899, 905–06 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2006) (Petition by ineligible debtor triggers automatic stay but does not count toward limitation on stay in § 362(c)(3) or (c)(4). “[T]he ‘filing of a petition’ is not synonymous with ‘the commencement of a case.’ The phrase ‘an entity that may be a debtor under such chapter’ or ‘an individual that may be a debtor under such chapter’ qualifies ‘petition’ and . . . only those petitions filed by those eligible to be debtors ‘under such chapters’ can ‘commence’ a ‘case.’ . . . [W]hen it has been determined that a debtor who files a bankruptcy petition is ineligible under § 109(h) to commence a case under title 11 . . . the petition should be stricken. . . . [Sections] 301, 302, and 303 allow for petitions to be filed by ineligible debtors, they just don’t allow cases to be commenced by petitions filed by ineligible debtors.”); In re Valdez, 335 B.R. 801, 803–04 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2005) (Chapter 13 petition dismissed because pro se debtor did not request a § 109(h) briefing and was not eligible will not count as a prior case for purposes of § 362(c)(3) or (4). “Because the petition failed to provide Mirielys Valdez status as a debtor, the Court will not consider this a dismissed case in which the individual was the debtor, for purposes of denying the imposition of the automatic stay in a subsequently filed case pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362. Thus, the Court views the criteria established by 11 U.S.C. § 109 as jurisdictional. Should Mirielys Valdez proceed to obtain budget and credit counseling as required under 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(3), she will then be eligible to become a debtor under 11 U.S.C. § 109 and any petition thereafter filed in a timely manner, within 180 days after completion of the credit counseling services, will be treated as her first petition, not subject to 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3) or (c)(4).”).
16 In re Bell, No. 06-11115 EEB, 2006 WL 1132907 (Bankr. D. Colo. Apr. 27, 2006) (unpublished). See also Adams v. Finlay, No. 06 Civ. 6039(CLB), 2006 WL 3240522, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2006) (“[I]t is by no means clear to this Court that striking a Petition as an alternative to dismissal would necessarily be regarded in a future lawsuit as having the apparent benefit to the Debtor which the Bankruptcy Judge in these cases assumes it would have, or that it would exempt the would be Petitioners from the adverse statutory consequences imposed by BAPCPA.”).
17 See § 9.5 Consequences of Ineligibility: Jurisdiction; Automatic Stay; Strike, Dismiss or Excuse?.
18 See § 9.5 Consequences of Ineligibility: Jurisdiction; Automatic Stay; Strike, Dismiss or Excuse?.
Adams v. Zarnel (In re Zarnel), 619 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. Aug. 26, 2010) (Leval, Katzmann, Livingston) (Without regard to meaning of "pending" for § 362(c)(3) purposes, petition filed by individual ineligible to be a debtor because of § 109(h) nonetheless commences a bankruptcy case and engages automatic stay. On remand, bankruptcy court should reconsider whether striking or dismissal is appropriate remedy for petition by ineligible debtor.).
Ortola v. Ortola (In re Ortola), No. CC-11-1222-KiPaH, 2011 WL 7145793 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Dec. 16, 2011) (unpublished) (Kirscher, Pappas, Hollowell) (Good faith is not element under § 362(c)(3)(A)—creditor need not prove that prior dismissed case was dismissed for bad faith. Section 362(c)(3)(A) controlled when current case was filed within one year of prior dismissal for failure to provide tax returns.).
Novack v. Wurst (In re Novack), Nos. 06-40615, 06-2204 ADM, 2007 WL 2060515 (D. Minn. July 16, 2007) (Rejecting In re Paschal, 337 B.R. 274 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006), and embracing In re James, 358 B.R. 816 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2007), § 362(c)(3) applies and automatic stay terminates 30 days after petition without regard to whether creditor has taken formal action against debtor prior to most recent bankruptcy filing.).
In re Shrum, 597 B.R. 845, 849–59 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Apr. 1, 2019) (Shefferly) (In eighth bankruptcy case, when Chapter 13 debtor filed Official Form 101A and tendered one month’s rent to clerk, stay was in effect for 30 days notwithstanding landlord’s argument—accepted by state court—that debtor’s certification was false. Landlord violated stay by seeking writ of possession during first 30 days. State court holding that stay exception in § 362(b)(22) applied was erroneous and amounted to granting stay relief which is beyond jurisdiction of state court. Procedure for testing validity of certification in Official Form 101A lies exclusively in bankruptcy court under § 362(l)(3). In second case within a year, debtor not entitled to extension of stay beyond 30 days under § 362(c)(3) because failure to file Official Form 101B means that landlord had relief from any stay that would be extended under § 362(c)(3). Debtor overcame presumption of bad faith in second case within a year for § 362(c)(3) purposes with respect to all creditors except landlord. $1,000 punitive damages awarded against landlord for intentionally failing to pursue debtor in bankruptcy court under § 362(l)(3). “[T]wo days prior to [eviction] hearing in State Court, the Debtor filed a pro se Chapter 13 petition. . . . Debtor had filled out an Official Form 101A . . . and paid $ 1,150.00 to the Bankruptcy Court Clerk for rent for the Property for the first 30 days of her bankruptcy . . . . Notwithstanding the filing of the bankruptcy case, the hearing in the State Court went forward . . . . Landlord’s counsel admitted that he had seen a copy of the bankruptcy petition, but argued that the Debtor’s Official Form 101A contained a false certification that the Debtor had the right to cure the monetary default that gave rise to the Judgment. . . . The State Court agreed with the Landlord’s counsel that the Landlord was not stayed from requesting an eviction order . . . . § 362(l )(1) provides that the filing of Official Form 101A only temporarily delays § 362(b)(22)’s exception to the automatic stay for 30 days . . . . To render § 362(b)(22)’s exception to the automatic stay inapplicable past 30 days from the petition date, § 362(l )(2) requires a debtor to make and file the further certification in Official Form 101B within 30 days after the filing of the bankruptcy . . . . [T[he Bankruptcy Court Clerk filed a Notice Indicating the Absence of a Filed Certification . . . . Section 362(l )(3)(A) permits a lessor to file an objection to a debtor’s certifications under § 362(l )(1) and (2), and requires the bankruptcy court to hold a hearing within 10 days after an objection is filed to determine if the debtor’s certifications are true. . . . [T]he Debtor met the requirements of § 362(l )(1)(A) and (B) to temporarily delay the application of the § 362(b)(22) exception for the first 30 days of her case. . . . [I]f the state court wrongly decides that the stay does not apply and continues with a proceeding against the debtor, it has effectively granted relief from the stay, intruding on the exclusive jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. In this case, the State Court erred. . . . Section 362(l )(3) specifies the procedure for a lessor to object to a debtor’s certifications in Official Form 101A and provides for a bankruptcy court to hear and adjudicate that objection on an expedited schedule. . . . Because the Landlord had not availed himself of the § 362(l )(3) procedure to object to the Debtor’s certifications under § 362(l )(1), the Landlord was bound by the legal effect of the Debtor’s certifications in Official Form 101A. . . . Showing up at the State Court hearing . . . and . . . challenging the certifications in the Debtor’s Official Form 101A does not excuse the Landlord’s failure to comply with the statutory procedure specified by § 362(l )(3) to object to the Debtor’s § 362(l )(1) certifications. . . . [B]ecause the Debtor timely filed Official Form 101A and the Landlord did not file an objection to it in this Court, the § 362(b)(22) exception to the automatic stay did not apply for the first 30 days of the Debtor’s case . . . . [T]he Landlord’s request to the State Court for entry of an eviction order . . . was an act to obtain possession of the Property. . . . Landlord willfully violated the automatic stay by requesting an eviction order from the State Court . . . . Here’s the Debtor’s problem under § 362(c)(3)(B): . . . the Debtor did not file Official Form 101B within 30 days after filing her case. Therefore, § 362(l )(2) does not operate to avoid the application of § 362(b)(22)’s exception to the automatic stay after the first 30 days of the Debtor’s bankruptcy case. As a result, the § 362(b)(22) exception to the automatic stay became applicable . . . 31 days after the Debtor filed her petition. Once that exception became applicable, it is irrelevant whether the Debtor has shown by clear and convincing evidence that she filed her case in good faith as to the Landlord under § 362(c)(3)(B). Where a debtor has not timely filed an Official Form 101B with the further certification required by § 362(l )(2), an extension of the automatic stay past 30 days under § 362(c)(3)(B) is of no use to a debtor in trying to retain possession of a residence where there is a judgment of possession because of the § 362(b)(22) exception to the automatic stay. Stated another way, even if the Court were to grant the Debtor’s request to extend the automatic stay under § 362(c)(3)(B), that extension would still be subject to all of the exceptions to the automatic stay set forth in § 362(b), including § 362(b)(22). . . . Debtor’s case was filed in good faith as to any act by the Landlord to seek a money judgment against the Debtor. . . . But, because the § 362(b)(22) exception now applies to this case, the Debtor’s request . . . to extend the automatic stay as to the Landlord’s acts to recover possession of the Property must be denied.”).
In re Jacobs, No. 18-12634-t13, 2019 WL 1421428 (Bankr. D.N.M. Mar. 27, 2019) (Thuma) (Incarcerated debtor states no ground under Rule 9024 for relief from order of dismissal of fifth bankruptcy case filed to stop foreclosure but which will not stop foreclosure even if reinstated because of § 362(c)(3).).
In re Gilbert, No. 16-30040-pcm13, 2016 WL 5864494, at *3 (Bankr. D. Or. Sept. 15, 2016) (unpublished) (McKittrick) (Landlord did not violate stay because no stay was in effect after 30 days after second petition within a year under § 362(c)(3). “There is no evidence that landlord did anything in the 30 days during which the stay existed in the 2016 case[.]”).
Wilson v. Lake St. Indus. LLC (In re Wilson), No. 15-01642-FPC7, 2016 WL 3751620, at *3 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. July 7, 2016) (unpublished) (Corbit) (Defendants did not violate stay because stay expired 30 days after second petition within a year under § 362(c)(3), no motion was filed to extend the stay and defendants took no action during the 30 days in which there was a stay. “[T]he Wilsons’ previous bankruptcy case was dismissed within one year of the Wilsons[’] filing their current bankruptcy petition. . . . [T]here was no request made to extend the automatic stay in their current bankruptcy case beyond the thirty-day period. . . . [T]he automatic stay terminated in its entirety . . . thirty days after the filing of the petition. . . . The Wilsons’ complaint does not allege any actions on the part of the defendants during the thirty (30) days the automatic stay was in effect. Thus, there are no acts that are alleged to have violated the stay.”).
In re Hariprasad, No. 14-21841, 2014 WL 6461770 (Bankr. D. Conn. Nov. 14, 2014) (Dabrowski) (Stay terminated 30 days after second petition within a year under § 362(c)(3) notwithstanding that second case was converted from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7.).
In re Skoglund, No. DM 14-90050, 2014 WL 1089865, at *1 n.3 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. Mar. 19, 2014) (Dales) (Section 362(c)(3) applies when debtor filed three cases within the previous year but only one prior case was "dismissed." "The parties and the court agree that the more draconian provisions of § 362(c)(4) do not apply to the Debtor's Third Case because only one of her two earlier cases was dismissed.").
In re Mayer, No. 9:13-bk-09610-FMD, 2013 WL 4608938 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Aug. 29, 2013) (Delano) (Court must address debtor's § 362(c)(3) request to extend stay beyond 30 days when plan proposes to pay in full a mortgage that matured prepetition under § 1322(c).).
In re Rodriguez, 487 B.R. 275 (Bankr. D.N.M. Feb. 11, 2013) (Jacobvitz) (Section 362(c)(3) applies when debtor's prior Chapter 11 case was pending within a year of filing the current Chapter 13 petition.).
In re Donnell, No. 11-47438-A-13J, 2012 WL 8255546 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2012) (McManus) (Stay terminated in second case within a year under § 362(c)(3) when debtor did not move to extend stay within 30-day period in § 362(c)(3)(B); no purpose would be served in setting aside dismissal because reinstatement of case would not stop pending foreclosure sale.).
FNB Bank v. Carlton (In re Carlton), No. 10-40054-JJR, 2011 WL 3799885 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Aug. 26, 2011) (unpublished) (Robinson) (Although automatic stay terminated under § 362(c)(3)(A) because of prior case dismissal, confirmed plan provided for retention of property and payment of mortgage, and publication of foreclosure notices was sanctionable violation of confirmation order.).
In re Hileman, 451 B.R. 522, 525 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. June 13, 2011) (Tighe) (Although stay terminated under § 362(c)(3) when debtor failed to timely file motion to extend, mortgage creditor was bound by confirmation of plan providing for payment of claim and curing of prepetition arrearages. "OneWest is required under [United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 130 S. Ct. 1367, 176 L. Ed. 2d 158 (Mar. 23, 2010),] to monitor the plan provisions if it seeks to avoid being bound by plan provisions not to its liking.").
In re Clark, No. 10-40215-JJR-13, 2010 WL 774141, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Mar. 5, 2010) (Robinson) (Whether intended or not, filing new Chapter 13 case while prior Chapter 13 case was still pending avoided stay termination in § 362(c)(3); citing § 1325(a)(7), filing while prior case was pending was bad faith per se requiring dismissal. "By filing the 2010 case before the 2008 case was dismissed, and whether they intended to or not, the Debtors avoided Section 362(c)(3) and the ensuing 30-day expiration of the automatic stay and presumption of bad faith, which would have applied if their 2008 case 'was pending within the preceding 1-year period but was dismissed.' This Court concludes that Congress did not intend for Sections 362(c)(3) and (4) to be so easily sidestepped. . . . To demonstrate their good faith, the Debtors filed a Motion to Extend the Automatic Stay . . . on the day after they filed the 2010 case. But when the Debtors filed the 2010 case, they had no case pending in the preceding 1-year that had been dismissed. Thus, Section 362(c)(3) did not apply, the stay would not have expired in 30 days and there was no presumption of bad faith; there was no basis for filing the Motion. . . . The filing of a subsequent chapter 13 case while another is pending, whether or not the debtor intended to avoid the presumption of bad faith and possible loss of the stay under Section 362(c)(3), constitutes bad faith per se. If the Debtors' case was filed in bad faith, no plan may be confirmed, and the case is due to be dismissed.").
In re Irwin, No. 09-20007, 2009 WL 5322418 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Apr. 8, 2009) (Dalis) (Arguably in dicta, when current Chapter 13 case was dismissed because the debtor failed to complete a prepetition briefing, if the debtor refiles, the limitation on the automatic stay in § 362(c)(3) will apply and debtor must prove good faith to extend stay.).
In re Grooms, No. BK08-42630-TLS, 2009 WL 224960 (Bankr. D. Neb. Jan. 29, 2009) (Saladino) (Section 362(c)(3) terminated stay on 30th day when current case was filed on November 5, 2008 and prior Chapter 13 case filed in different district was dismissed on July 21, 2008.).
In re Hedo, No. 1-08-40148-dem, 2009 WL 205059, at *1 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2009) (Milton) (Thirty-day stay termination in § 362(c)(3) applies when seventh bankruptcy case was filed on November 9, 2007, and dismissed on January 20, 2008, and eighth petition was filed on January 11, 2008. "[T]he debtor's Seventh Case was pending within the year prior to the filing of the Eighth Case but was dismissed. . . . [T]he automatic stay in the Eighth Case was scheduled to terminate as of February 10, 2008, the thirtieth day after the filing of the Eighth Case.").
In re Forletta, 397 B.R. 242 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2008) (Trust) (Section 362(c)(3) does not apply when debtor received Chapter 7 discharge in prior case closed within a year of current Chapter 13 filing.).
In re Williams, 390 B.R. 780 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2008) (Morris) (Section 362(c)(3) does not apply when debtor received discharge in Chapter 7 case one day before filing current Chapter 13 case; § 362(c)(3) only applies when prior case was dismissed within a year. "Code Section 362(c)(3) explicitly refers to cases filed under chapter 7, 11 or 13 that were 'pending within the preceding 1-year period but' were dismissed. . . . Congress clearly intended to limit the applicability of Code Section 362(c)(3) to chapter 7 debtors whose cases were dismissed within the preceding 1-year period. . . . Section 362(c)(3)(A) will not terminate the Automatic Stay in Debtor's case because she received a discharge in her prior chapter 7 case.").
In re Taylor, No. 07-31055-KRH, 2007 WL 1234932 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Apr. 26, 2007) (Section 362(b)(2) applies because debtor had a prior case pending and dismissed within a year of current case.).
In re Aldrich, No. 06-11318-DHW, 2007 WL 537721, at *1 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. Feb. 16, 2007) (unpublished) (On mortgage holder's motion for confirmation that automatic stay terminated by operation of law: "Because Ms. Aldrich's prior case was dismissed within one year of the filing of the present case, the automatic stay in this case, which was not extended in accordance with the statute, terminated by operation of law 30 days after the filing.").
In re Lovelace, No. 06-43464, 2007 WL 187733 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. Jan. 16, 2007) (unpublished) (In a Chapter 13 case filed on December 14, 2006, § 362(c)(3) is not applicable when previous Chapter 7 case was filed on May 24, 2005, and discharged on December 26, 2005. "By its terms, § 362(c)(3)(B) is only applicable if the case which was pending during the 1-year period prior to the filing of the current case was dismissed. Here, debtors' prior case was not dismissed, but instead resulted in a discharge of their obligations. Accordingly, § 362(c)(3)(B) does not apply to these debtors.").
In re Maxey, No. 06 36773, 2006 WL 3834218 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2006) (unpublished) (Isgur) (Section 362(c)(3) applies but not § 362(c)(4) when, in a chronicle of nine bankruptcy filings by the debtor and her husband, only one prior case by the debtor was pending and dismissed within the previous year; separate filings by spouses are not aggregated for § 362(c)(3) purposes, and striking of a prior petition based on § 109(h) ineligibility does not count.).
In re Elliott-Cook, 357 B.R. 811 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2006) (Section 362(c)(3) applies because debtor had one prior Chapter 13 case dismissed within a year.).
In re Garrett, 357 B.R. 128 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Dec. 7, 2006) (Fines) (Section 362(c)(3) applies when Chapter 13 case is filed two months after dismissal of prior Chapter 13 case in which relief from stay was granted to mortgage holder.).
In re Williams, 363 B.R. 786 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Nov. 22, 2006) (Bankruptcy case is not pending once dismissed notwithstanding that it is administratively closed at some later time; untimely motion to extend stay under § 362(c)(3)(B) is irrelevant because prior bankruptcy case was dismissed, though not closed, more than a year prior to filing of current case.).
In re Green, No. 6:06-bk-02178-ABB, 2006 WL 4108577 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Nov. 21, 2006) (unpublished) (Because prior Chapter 13 case was converted to Chapter 7 and not dismissed within a year, § 362(c)(3) is not applicable.).
In re Mallett, No. 06-50564, 2006 WL 2844018 (Bankr. W.D. La. Sept. 19, 2006) (unpublished) (Schiff) (Termination of stay under § 362(c)(3) is not relevant when debtor's interest in mobile home was foreclosed under Louisiana law after dismissal of first petition and before filing of second petition.).
In re Thomas, 352 B.R. 751 (Bankr. D.S.C. June 27, 2006) (Although debtor has two prior bankruptcy cases, both dismissed for failure to make payments to trustee, only one of prior cases was pending within the year preceding the current case, thus § 362(c)(3) applies.).
In re Thompson, 344 B.R. 899, 905-08 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. June 5, 2006) (Petition by ineligible debtor triggers automatic stay but does not count toward limitation on stay in § 362(c)(3) or (c)(4). "[T]he 'filing of a petition' is not synonymous with 'the commencement of a case.' The phrase 'an entity that may be a debtor under such chapter' or 'an individual that may be a debtor under such chapter' qualifies 'petition' and . . . only those petitions filed by those eligible to be debtors 'under such chapters' can 'commence' a 'case.' . . . [W]hen it has been determined that a debtor who files a bankruptcy petition is ineligible under § 109(h) to commence a case under title 11 . . . the petition should be stricken. . . . This Court does not believe that the 'commencement' of the case is the exclusive prerequisite of the imposition of the automatic stay. . . . [R]ather the event triggering the stay is the filing of a petition . . . . [Sections] 301, 302, and 303 allow for petitions to be filed by ineligible debtors, they just don't allow cases to be commenced by petitions filed by ineligible debtors. So, it is possible for the stay to be imposed without a case having been commenced. . . . New § 362(b)(21) . . . contemplates that a stay arises upon the filing of a petition by an ineligible § 109(g) debtor . . . . [L]ike § 109(g), petitions filed by ineligible § 109(h) debtors do trigger the automatic stay but, unlike § 109(g), there is no statutory carve out that allows secured creditors to proceed against real property. . . . [P]etitions filed by ineligible § 109(h) debtors are not void ab initio . . . . In the event the debtor is determined to be ineligible under § 109(h), the petition is stricken; there was no 'case' to 'dismiss.' And, if there was no 'case' to 'dismiss,' then there could not have been a 'pending case.'").
In re Bell, No. 06-11115 EEB, 2006 WL 1132907 (Bankr. D. Colo. Apr. 27, 2006) (unpublished) (Brown) (Prior petition dismissed for ineligibility under § 109(h) commenced a case that triggers 30-day stay limitation in § 362(c)(3).).
In re Easthope, No. 06-20366, 2006 WL 851829, at *3 (Bankr. D. Utah Mar. 28, 2006) (unpublished) (For § 362(c) purposes, prior bankruptcy case is "pending" until it is dismissed without regard to when administrative functions are completed and the case is closed. "The plain meaning of the word 'pending' as well as policy considerations demonstrate that a case is no longer pending once it has been dismissed.").
In re Baldassaro, 338 B.R. 178, 182-84 (Bankr. D.N.H. Feb. 24, 2006) ("[T]he language in new § 362(c)(3) is very poorly written. . . . [T]he provisions of § 362(c)(3) [are] neither consistent nor coherent. . . . [T]he section only applies to individuals who have had three cases pending in one calendar year . . . . Because the legislative history clearly reflects congressional intent to limit the duration of the automatic stay in cases similar to [this] Case, the Court shall apply the subsection to this case, notwithstanding the plain language of the statute.").
In re Paschal, 337 B.R. 274, 277-78 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Jan. 6, 2006) (Although worded to the contrary, § 362(c)(3) applies when there has been only one prior filing by the debtor within a year. "Taken all together, [§ 362(c)(3)] only applies to individuals who have had three cases pending in one calendar year; one case that has been dismissed, one case that is still pending when the petition at issue is filed, and the new case that is before the court for determination. . . . Although arguably contrary to the statute's literal language, the court considers the statute to apply in a situation, such as is presently before the court, in which a debtor files a petition after the dismissal of a prior case that was pending within the preceding one-year period. Otherwise § 362(c)(3)(A) would in effect have no meaning.").
In re Valdez, 335 B.R. 801, 803-04 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Dec. 13, 2005) (Cristol) (Chapter 13 petition dismissed because pro se debtor did not request a § 109(h) briefing and was not eligible will not count as a prior case for purposes of § 362(c)(3) or (4). "Because the petition failed to provide Mirielys Valdez status as a debtor, the Court will not consider this a dismissed case in which the individual was the debtor, for purposes of denying the imposition of the automatic stay in a subsequently filed case pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362. Thus, the Court views the criteria established by 11 U.S.C. § 109 as jurisdictional. Should Mirielys Valdez proceed to obtain budget and credit counseling as required under 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(3), she will then be eligible to become a debtor under 11 U.S.C. § 109 and any petition thereafter filed in a timely manner, within 180 days after completion of the credit counseling services, will be treated as her first petition, not subject to 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3) or (c)(4).").
In re Moore, 337 B.R. 79, 81 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Dec. 2, 2005) (Prior case was not "pending" within one year of commencement of present Chapter 13 case when prior case was dismissed more than a year before the filing of the present case but was closed by the bankruptcy court within one year of the present case. "Mr. Moore's prior case was open within the one year preceding the filing of the current case, but it was dismissed prior to the one-year period. . . . [A] case is no longer 'pending' once it has been dismissed. . . . [T]he debtor has no control over when the case is closed after dismissal . . . . Mr. Moore's first case was no longer 'pending' for purposes of § 362(c)(3) as of the date of dismissal, regardless of when the case was closed.").
In re Butler, No. 05-43195, 2005 WL 6777062 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Nov. 15, 2005) (Davis) (Section 362(c)(3) applies notwithstanding that prior case was filed and dismissed before October 17, 2005.).
Klein v. Commissioner, No. 1382-10, 2010 WL 2942031 (T.C. July 27, 2010) (Gustafson) (Although automatic stay typically prevents commencement or continuation of taxpayer's petition for redetermination of tax deficiency, when current Chapter 13 petition was filed within one year of previously dismissed bankruptcy petition, § 362(c)(3) applied and in personam Tax Court deficiency suit was free of stay after 30 days.).