Source: https://ielrblog.com/?s=interpol
Timestamp: 2020-05-25 16:48:39
Document Index: 118792657

Matched Legal Cases: ['art. 36', 'art. 3', '§ 57', 'art. 12', 'art. 4', 'art. 12', 'art. 18', 'art. 9', 'art. 14', 'art. 14', 'art 83', 'art. 35', 'art. 3', 'art 34']

You searched for interpol | IELR Blog
Search Results for: interpol
INTERPOL Announces Large-Scale Operation to Arrest nearly 250 Fugitives across Asia
October 2, 2019 by Alexandra Haris Leave a Comment
On September 23, INTERPOL announced the recent success of its coordinated operation, Operation Tighten the Net, arresting 241 fugitives across Asia between June and August 2019. These fugitives were wanted for serious crimes including human trafficking, terrorism, and murder, and some of the fugitives had been on the run for decades.
The operation involved the 10 countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China, Japan, and Korea (ASEAN+3). Operation Tighten the Net targeted fugitives that these countries wanted for years, but only with a coordinated effort were they able to find success. The countries took a multilateral approach to share information about the fugitives’ cases, which serves as an example of the power and success that can arise with international cooperation.
In order to achieve the goals of the operation, the countries identified high-profile fugitives and shared intelligence with participating members. Equipped with new and crucial information, these countries could then target the fugitives to bring them to justice. Of the individuals arrested, 80 were subjects of INTERPOL Red Notices for crimes ranging from fraud, drug trafficking, money laundering, and crimes against children.
One particular case that stands out involves a Korean national who was wanted on fraud charges and had been on the run for 25 years. Through this operation, the national was finally discovered living in Thailand, their home for the last 20 years.
The results encompassed not only hundreds of arrests, but they also included the issuance of 248 Red Notices and 20 Blue Notices. A Blue Notice differs from a Red Notice in that it is used by member countries to collect additional information about an individual’s identity, location or activities in relation to a crime.
INTERPOL’s goal is to continue this cooperative crackdown and arrest more fugitives suspected of these serious crimes. INTERPOL’s Head of the Liaison Office in Thailand, Kitaek Kang, reaffirmed the organization’s intent to continue working with all ASEAN+3 partners to build on the momentum of the operation.
INTERPOL credits some of the operation’s success to a training it held in May for participating member states. The training workshop focused on INTERPOL’s fugitive investigation capabilities and criminal databases, as well as the organization’s support to mutual legal assistance matters. This educated participants on the organization’s resources and illustrated how they could then use these resources to capture the alleged criminals.
INTERPOL also claimed the operation’s success derived from the efforts of the participating National Central Bureaus (NCBs) as well as partner law enforcement organizations.
This operation is distinctive as it marks the first regional fugitive investigative action coordinated by the INTERPOL Liaison Office in Bangkok, Thailand, with support from the INTERPOL NCB in Korea.
As a result, the Commissioner General of the Korean National Police Agency, Min Gab Ryong, commented on the operation with the confirmation of Korea’s commitment to collaborate with INTERPOL against crime while securing the rule of law in the region by “synchronizing efforts with regional partners as a member of ASEAN+3.”
This positive reception was encouraging for INTERPOL since, in the past, the organization has experienced scrutiny over its true effectiveness due to its absence of police power and ability to make arrests. However, this action helps to demonstrate the impact that the organization can have on global policing. In this case, the organization facilitated international cooperation and policing while providing resources in order to complete these 241 arrests. It will be interesting to see if INTERPOL attempts to make similar efforts in other global regions.
U.S. Director of INTERPOL NCB Remarks Help Celebrate USNCB’s 50th Anniversary
September 20, 2019 by Bruce Zagaris Leave a Comment
On September 17, 2019, Wayne H. Salzgaber, Director of the United States National Central Bureau (USNCB) of INTERPOL gave remarks, highlighting some of its unique achievements.
A unique aspect of the USNCB has been that it co-managed by the Deputy Attorney General and the Deputy Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS – formally Treasury). The co-management structure enables to USNCB to marshal the resources necessary to handle whatever international challenge occurs.
Salzgaber pointed as a reason to the USNCB’s success as its partner agencies in the U.S. United States partners detail their subject matter experts to the USNCB, helping the USNCB deliver the support required to all 18,000 U.S. law enforcement agencies across the United States.
An example of the contribution of the USNCB to INTERPOL is the development and operation of INTERPOL’s Maritime Piracy database out of the USNCB before the latter gate it to INTERPOL as a means of bringing in more international partners. Nearly a decade later, that database is still being utilized to combat maritime piracy and prosecute persons involved in maritime piracy. (see https://www.interpol.int/Crimes/Maritime-crime)
USNCB personnel and detailees with expertise in traveler screening and passport data, collaborated with a handful of member country representatives to develop INTERPOL’s Stolen and Lost Travel Document database. The database now has more than 90 million records of stolen or lost travel documents reported by more than 160 countries and is used virtually every second of every day to screen international travelers across the globe.
Since 9/11, USNCB has developed and used multiple Counter Terrorism Information sharing programs with its law enforcement and Department of defense partners. Operations such Vennlig,[1] Hamah, Tread, and Cellblock.
According to Salzgaber, INTERPOL has adopted the USNCB’s model under a program called “MILEX” or Military to Law Enforcement Exchange. Today, a number of U.S.> foreign partners are using MILEX to collect and disseminate foreign terrorist fighter identity data obtained from conflict zones across the globe.
Salzgaber said of the more impactful programs USNCB developed was the integration of the INTERPOL notice system with U.S. national law enforcement indices. The solution enables any border official or law enforcement officer to access INTERPOL’s global advisories on missing or wanted persons, foreign terrorist fighters and other subjects of interest within minutes of their publication right on their agency’s native law enforcement or border systems.
However, on September 12, the Helsinki Commission held a hearing on the abuse of the INTERPOL Red Notice and diffusion systems, whereby many autocratic countries use the system to prevent political exiles from traveling and they try to arrest them. The following day members of the Helsinki Commission introduced a bill to remedy the abuses.
Salzgaber said the success of the USNCBI solution has resulted in the USNCB and now INTERPOL deploying technical assistance teams to help other countries in integrating their immigration and border security systems with INTERPOL’s system, thereby creating truly global security architecture.
[1] Project Vennlig successfully provides terrorist information among INTERPOL member countries and the U.S. law enforcement community. See INTERPOL USNBC, U.S. Department of Justice, FY 2010 Performance Budget, Congressional Submission, 2. Sept. 18, 2013 https://www.justice.gov › legacy › 2013/09/28 › fy10-usncb-justification.
September 5, 2019 by Bruce Zagaris 1 Comment
The following is an announcement of a Helsinki Commission hearing (TOOLS OF TRANSNATIONAL REPRESSION: How Autocrats Punish Dissent Overseas) on September 12, 2019, that should be of interest to followers of international enforcement cooperation — especially the role of INTERPOL.
Alexander Cooley, Director, Columbia University’s Harriman Institute for the Study of Russia, Eurasia and Eastern Europe; Claire Tow Professor of Political Science, Barnard College
Filed Under: INTERPOL, Uncategorized
INTERPOL’s Power to Prevent Diffusion Abuse: Legal, Political and Technological Considerations (in response to Dr. Theodore Bromund’s ‘INTERPOL’s Lack of Power to Act Preemptively in Fighting Government Abuse of the Diffusion System’)
July 17, 2019 by Yuriy Nemets Leave a Comment
The Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files is an independent body with the exclusive power to adjudicate complaints from individuals seeking the deletion of information about them from INTERPOL’s files.[2] In its 2017 annual report (its most recent) published this year, the Commission acknowledges that some governments have succeeded in disseminating diffusions against the same individuals whom the Commission has already found to be victims of their INTERPOL abuse, and INTERPOL lacks a comprehensive mechanism to stop the unlawful practice.[3] Even before the Commission published its report, I had been calling upon INTERPOL to monitor and block all incoming red notices and diffusions to ensure that no such request entered its channels if it concerned an individual already found to be a victim of INTERPOL abuse from the same government.[4] I have suggested that the organization should implement reliable software to conduct such monitoring.[5] In his recent publication ‘INTERPOL CCF’s Latest Annual Report Highlights Fundamental Flaw in the System,’ Dr. Theodore Bromund disagrees with my suggestion and argues that INTERPOL cannot simply introduce a new technology to fix the problem.[6] According to Dr. Bromund, stopping the unlawful practice “would require both changing the diffusion system at a technical level and making appropriate changes in INTERPOL’s Rules on the Processing of Data,” which “in turn would require a good deal of time and a vote in favor of the changes in INTERPOL’s one-nation, one-vote General Assembly — where it is far from clear that the nations wanting reform would be in the majority.”[7]
In my article ‘INTERPOL’s Power to Act Preemptively in Fighting Government Abuse,’ I respond to Dr. Bromund’s argument by citing and quoting multiple INTERPOL rules that already unequivocally grant the organization the power, and indeed require it, to monitor all incoming diffusions and block the non-compliant ones before they enter its channels.[8] I, therefore, strongly disagree with Dr. Bromund’s argument that changes in INTERPOL’s rules are needed for the organization to exercise that power. In response, Dr. Bromund has written another article ‘INTERPOL’s Lack of Power to Act Preemptively in Fighting Government Abuse of the Diffusion System.’[9] It is my understanding from this latter publication that Dr. Bromund agrees with my argument that under its rules, INTERPOL already has the power to monitor and block diffusions before they enter its channels, but at the same time argues that the organization cannot exercise that power, which he refers to as the “legal power,” because of “technical and political” barriers.[10] In this regard, Dr. Bromund writes that while he accepts my legal analysis and conclusions as an “accurate depiction of the legal position,” he does not accept it as an “accurate assessment of the technical reality.”[11] He argues that “INTERPOL’s lack of power to act preemptively in fighting government abuse of the diffusion system” stands not on legal grounds but on the lack of INTERPOL’s “technical ability to do so.”[12] Dr. Bromund reasons that because the nature of diffusions is such that governments exchange them directly, bypassing any preliminary check from the General Secretariat, it is “not currently possible to make this legal position into a reality.”[13] He argues that to “allow INTERPOL to screen diffusions before transmission,” a “fundamental rewiring” and “fundamental reworking at a technical level of the diffusion system . . . would be necessary,” which in turn would “require a vote in the General Assembly, which by adopting the RPD in 2012 has endorsed the diffusion system as it exists and works today.”[14] I disagree with this position.
In his article ‘INTERPOL’s Lack of Power to Act Preemptively in Fighting Government Abuse of the Diffusion System,’ Dr. Bromund writes: “Mr. Nemets calls on INTERPOL to “monitor and block all incoming requests, including diffusions, to prevent governments from violating INTERPOL’s rules . . . [b]ut he does not explain how this can be done, given the fact that INTERPOL cannot review diffusions – including all abusive diffusions – until after they have been sent and received.”[15] Dr. Bromund argues that “INTERPOL can (and must) prevent abuse before it publishes a notice, precisely because it is the one doing the publishing . . . [b]ut in the context of diffusions, INTERPOL is responsible for preventing abuse, but it lacks the technical power to prevent governments from sending or receiving abusive diffusions.”[16] Dr. Bromund does not explain what he means by the “technical power,” and how it is different from and can exist without the “legal power,” as Dr. Bromund calls it, to monitor and block all incoming non-compliant diffusions, the latter of which, it is my understanding, we both agree INTERPOL already has.
Dr. Bromund seems to think that I suggest that prior to allowing a government to communicate a diffusion, the General Secretariat must first approve it following a compliance check akin to the one it carries out for notices. This is not what I suggest. Instead, I propose a simple filter, a software that would match every incoming diffusion with a database containing the names of individuals whose information the Commission or the General Secretariat have decided to delete due to a violation of INTERPOL’s rules. It is true that such filter must be maintained by the General Secretariat, but so are all INTERPOL databases, mechanisms, and tools, including those that member countries already use to communicate diffusions, as I have already mentioned in my previous article.[17] The diffusion would be blocked from reaching its intended recipients and rerouted to the General Secretariat for further screening only if the filter were to match an incoming diffusion with a name in the database. Such a mechanism cannot be seen as “akin to the notice system’s hub and spoke model,” as Dr. Bromund calls it,[18] changing the nature of diffusions,[19] requiring a “fundamental rewiring” or “fundamental reworking on a technical level of the diffusion system,” as Dr. Bromund argues,[20] or encroaching on the member countries’ right or ability to communicate diffusions directly. In this regard, I also want to reiterate what I have already stressed in my previous article – under INTERPOL’s rules, member countries’ right to communicate diffusions directly does not trump INTERPOL’s power to act preemptively to prevent abuse of its channels and screen and block incoming diffusions before they reach their intended recipients.[21]
In support of his argument, Dr. Bromund also writes: “INTERPOL only receives a diffusion after it has been transmitted and it receives the diffusion simultaneously with the NCBs (or international entities) to which it was sent.”[22] He argues that “INTERPOL cannot review diffusions — including all abusive diffusions — until after they have been sent and received.”[23] From this, he concludes that the mechanism that I suggest should be implemented “could at best only detect the diffusion once it arrives at INTERPOL, and after it has already arrived at its other intended destinations.”[24] Whether this is presented as a legal argument or a description of a process from a purely technical standpoint, we must always remember that although governments exchange diffusions directly, the process, as I have already mentioned here and in my previous article, from its very beginning to its very end, is carried out via INTERPOL’s channels and maintained by the General Secretariat, as is the process of publishing notices.[25] To argue that INTERPOL cannot oversee any part of an operation, which is conducted through its channels, is to contradict the organization’s rules, which unequivocally require the opposite. Dr. Bromund’s argument that INTERPOL does not detect diffusions until after they have already arrived at their intended destination may be an accurate depiction of how the General Secretariat chooses the process to work now, but it is not how it should be working under the INTERPOL rules. If the General Secretariat has indeed adopted the approach that Dr. Bromund describes, it must abandon it and start monitoring all incoming diffusions before they reach their final destination.
Finally, as I have already mentioned here and in my previous article, INTERPOL’s rules already contain provisions that unequivocally grant the organization the power, and indeed require it, to screen and block diffusions before they enter its channels to prevent abuse. The rules also give the General Secretariat broad discretion over mechanisms and tools it can implement and use in order to exercise that power.[26] Therefore, no changes to INTERPOL’s rules are needed, and none of those rules requires INTERPOL to seek authorization from the General Assembly to exercise that power, even if we accepted Dr. Bromund’s recommendation of “fundamental rewiring” and “fundamental reworking at a technical level of the diffusions system.” If any such changes or authorization were necessary, neither Dr. Bromund nor I would be justified in drawing the conclusion that INTERPOL has the power, or as Dr. Bromund refers to it the “legal power,” to screen and block incoming diffusions before they enter the organization’s channels, which, it is my understanding, both Dr. Bromund and I agree INTERPOL already has.
Yuriy Nemets is the managing member at NEMETS, a law firm based in Washington, DC. Yuriy is an attorney with over fifteen years of experience in domestic and international litigation and arbitration, INTERPOL and international extradition defense, corporate, banking, transportation, international trade and investments, and intellectual property law. He has authored publications on INTERPOL and international extradition, corporate, banking, and intellectual property law.
[2] Constitution of the ICPO-INTERPOL, art. 36, June 13, 1956, available at https://www.interpol.int/Who-we-are/Legal-framework/Legal-documents; Statute of the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files, art. 3(2)(C), available at https://www.interpol.int/Who-we-are/Legal-framework/Legal-documents.
[3] Activity Report of the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files for 2017 § 57, available at https://www.interpol.int/Who-we-are/Commission-for-the-Control-of-INTERPOL-s-Files-CCF/CCF-sessions-and-reports.
[4] Yuriy Nemets, Bill Browder’s Case Highlights Loopholes in Relief INTERPOL Grants Victims of Red Notice Abuse, Red Notice Abuse Report (July 16, 2018), https://rednoticeabuse.com/interpol-must-publicly-explain-why-russia-finally-succeeded-in-placing-bill-browder-on-the-international-wanted-list.
[6] Ted Bromund, INTERPOL CCF’s Latest Annual Report Highlights Fundamental Flaw in the System, Forbes (Mar. 31, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tedbromund/2019/03/31/interpol-ccfs-latest-annual-report-highlights-fundamental-flaw-in-the-system/#20e6152b3a11.
[8] Yuriy Nemets, INTERPOL’s Power to Act Preemptively in Fighting Government Abuse, 35 (Issue 5) International Enforcement Law Reporter 166 (May 2019).
[9] Ted Bromund, INTERPOL’s Lack of Power to Act Preemptively in Fighting Government Abuse of the Diffusion System, 35 (Issue 6) International Enforcement Law Reporter 227 (June 2019).
[12] Id. at 228.
[15] Id. at 228.
[17] INTERPOL’s Rules on the Processing of Data art. 12(3), 22, 125(1) 2016, available at https://www.interpol.int/Who-we-are/Legal-framework/Legal-documents [hereinafter RPD]; Nemets, supra note 8, at 168-169.
[18] Bromund, supra note 9, at 229.
[20] Id. at 229
[21] Nemets, supra note 8, at 167.
[22] Bromund, supra note 9, at 228.
[24] Id. at 228-229.
[25] RPD, supra note 17, art. 4(1), 12(3), 22, 125(1); Nemets, supra note 8, at 167-168.
[26] RPD, supra note 17, art. 12(3), 22, 125(1); Nemets, supra note 8, at 168-169.
Thai Authorities Detain Bahraini Refugee Soccer Player After INTERPOL Red Notice Request
February 6, 2019 by Zarine Kharazian Leave a Comment
Hakeem al-Araibi, a 25-year-old refugee soccer player from Bahrain, will remain in a Thai jail for at least two months as he prepares to fight an extradition request from his native country.
Al-Araibi claims the Bahraini government arrested and tortured him in 2012 because of his outspoken criticism of the country’s human rights record. Two years later, al-Araibi was sentenced to ten years in absentia for allegedly vandalizing a police station. He fled to Australia as a refugee in 2017.
In November, al-Araibi boarded a flight to Bangkok, and Australian authorities alerted Thai officials that the soccer player was the subject of an INTERPOL Red Notice issued by Bahrain. Thai police arrested al-Araibi upon his arrival in Bangkok.
Article 3 of INTERPOL’s Constitution expressly prohibits the international police organization from “undertak[ing] any intervention or activities of a political, military, religious or racial character.” Several authoritarian governments, such as Russia and Turkey, however, have recently come under fire for their abuse of the red notice system as a tool to punish political opponents.
Numerous human rights organizations have criticized the Thai government’s handling of the al-Araibi case. Human Rights Watch has launched a digital campaign called “#SaveHakeem” to encourage athletes and the public to write Thai Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha to demand al-Araibi’s release.
For the IELR Blog’s previous coverage on INTERPOL red notice abuse, see here.
December 12, 2018 by Yuriy Nemets Leave a Comment
Over the past several years, thanks to human rights advocates’ hard work and growing attention from the media, the general public has had the opportunity to learn more about how governments abuse INTERPOL to persecute political opponents and other victims of unlawful criminal prosecutions. The discussion about INTERPOL’s internal mechanism, which provides individuals the opportunity to fight the abuse, and its shortcomings, has travelled beyond scholarly publications and entered the general news cycle. INTERPOL, in turn, has carried out reforms to eliminate some of those shortcomings. The organization has rightfully been praised for the improvements it has made and called upon to close remaining serious loopholes. Yet these reforms have also limited the rights of victims of INTERPOL abuse, and it is what the victims have lost as a result of the reforms that hasn’t received wide attention.
Article 18 of INTERPOL’s Rules on the Processing of Data (RPD) proclaims: “Any person or entity shall be entitled to submit directly to the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files a request for access to, or correction and/or deletion of data processed in the INTERPOL Information System concerning that person or entity. These rights of access to, or correction and deletion of data shall be guaranteed by the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files and be governed by separate rules.”[1] The two sentences contradict each other. The first guarantees the right to submit a request for access only, whereas the second points to an unconditional right of access. The truth is that what INTERPOL has for a long time been loosely calling the “right of access” has never been an unconditional right.[2]
Under the Operating Rules of the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files, adopted in 2008, prior to providing an individual access to the information about her or him in INTERPOL’s databases, the Commission had to obtain consent from the government source of that information.[3] The rule, however, permitted the Commission to provide access without the government’s consent if the individual possessed “sufficient evidence showing that he/she [knew] that there [was] information about him/her in INTERPOL’s files.”[4] The latter provision made a difference. It is hard to overstate how critical it is for an individual, who is fighting a request to locate and provisionally arrest her or him pending extradition (red notice or diffusion), to access the information the government submits to INTERPOL. It is often impossible to prepare a comprehensive argument against an abusive red notice or diffusion without possessing all information recorded in INTERPOL’s files, and it is not uncommon for an individual fleeing persecution to be unaware of the full extent of the criminal prosecution, including all accusations on which the red notice or diffusion is based.[5] The provision, however, was repealed in 2017 as part of the reforms following the adoption of the Statute of the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files and the Commission’s new Operating Rules.
INTERPOL’s regulations do not directly address a situation in which a red notice or diffusion is based on several offenses only some which have been proven to be politically motivated or defy the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The regulations, however, suggest how INTERPOL could approach such a situation, in which an individual successfully argued against all but one offence behind the red notice or diffusion. Consider Article 83(1)(c) of the RPD: “[I]f the request includes several offences, the red notice may be published for all offences that meet INTERPOL’s Rules provided that at least one offence meets the above criteria.” The “above criteria” refers to the minimum requirements a red notice must comply with: the offence behind a red notice must be a serious ordinary law crime, must not raise “controversial issues relating to behavioral or cultural norms,” “relate to family/private matters,” originate from a “violation of laws of an administrative nature” or “private disputes,” must satisfy the penalty threshold and be “of interest for the purposes of international police cooperation.”[6] Would INTERPOL apply this rule by analogy and publish a red notice or diffusion if the individual proved that all but one accusation, of which he was not aware, were politically motivated or defied the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and thereby violated the INTERPOL Constitution?
There seems to be no clear answer to this question from INTERPOL. Under the Commission’s Statute adopted as part of the recent reforms, a government must justify any restriction on the disclosure of information.[7] However, “[t]he absence of justification alone will not lead to the disclosure of the content of the information but may be taken into consideration by the [Commission’s] Requests Chamber in assessing and deciding on a request.”[8] At the same time, the RPD requires that to determine whether a red notice complies with Article 3 of its Constitution, which strictly prohibits INTERPOL from undertaking “any intervention or activities of a political, military, religious or racial character,”[9] the organization must examine “all relevant elements.”[10] Therefore, both the Statute and the RPD can be interpreted as giving the Commission the power to assess all information related to a red notice, including accusations an individual has not had the opportunity to address. However, even if the Commission adopted this approach, its assessment would often lack objectivity because it would not include the individual’s argument and evidence and would be limited to the government’s submissions and information in the public domain, if any.
By allowing individuals who possessed evidence of the existence of information about them in INTERPOL’s files access to that information without government authorization, the repealed rule guaranteed a fairer, closer to due process adjudication of their complaints.[11] The rule also provided INTERPOL with more opportunities to maintain neutrality and thereby comply with its Constitution.[12] By repealing the rule, INTERPOL harmed not only the victims of red notice and diffusion abuse but itself too.[13]
Governments known for their abuse of INTERPOL’s resources have wasted no time in taking advantage of the repeal of the rule. They have used it to limit access to individuals who possess evidence that there is information about them in the organization’s databases by either agreeing to release only part of the information (partial disclosure), or by denying access altogether. The Commission, in turn, has reportedly refused such individuals access without first obtaining consent from the respective governments, and explained this approach by citing the difference between the repealed rule, which explicitly empowered the Commission to disclose the information without consulting governments, and the new rules, which do not.
The repeal of the rule has negated much of the progress INTERPOL has made in protecting individuals from persecution, which the organization considers one of its “primary objectives.”[14] INTERPOL should reinstate the rule without delay. The organization should also change its approach towards individuals who do not possess evidence of the existence of information about them in its files. In this regard, in light of its refugee policy, INTERPOL should provide refugees unconditional access to the information about them.[15] Because INTERPOL must protect all individuals from persecution, not just refugees and individuals who possess evidence of the information recorded in its databases,[16] the organization should provide unconditional – without obtaining prior consent from a government – access to every other individual who can prove that there is a reason to believe that she or he may be a target of a politically motivated or otherwise unlawful prosecution which can be used as a basis for a red notice or diffusion.
[1] INTERPOL’s Rules on the Processing of Data art. 18(1), (2), 2016, https://www.interpol.int/About-INTERPOL/Legal-materials [hereinafter RPD].
[2] See also Rules on the Control of Information and Access to INTERPOL’s Files art. 9(a), 11(a) II.E/RCIA/GA/2004(2009) (abrogated 2016).
[3] Operating Rules of the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files art. 14(1), II.E/RCCF/CCF/2008 (abrogated 2017).
[4] Id. art. 14(5).
[5] See Fair Trials, Dismantling the Tools of Oppression: Ending the Misuse of INTERPOL, 49 (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.fairtrials.org/publication/dismantling-tools-oppression-1 (“Applicants need to have access to information about the data being held on INTERPOL’s databses, as well as the arguments being made, to justify the data. Without such information, applications will inevitable be based on guess work, and individuals cannot be expected to make focused, succinct complaints to challenge the data.”).
[6] RPD, supra note 1, art 83(1)(a).
[7] Statute of the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files art. 35(4), 2016, https://www.interpol.int/About-INTERPOL/Commission-for-the-Control-of-Files-CCF [hereinafter Statute].
[9] Constitution of the ICPO-INTERPOL, art. 3, June 13, 1956, http://www.interpol.int/About-INTERPOL/Legal-materials/The-Constitution.
[10] RPD, supra note 1, art 34(3).
[11] See also Fair Trials, supra note 5, at 20, 21.
[12] See also INTERPOL, Neutrality (Article 3 of the Constitution), https://www.interpol.int/About-INTERPOL/Legal-materials/Neutrality-Article-3-of-the-Constitution.
[13] In this regard, Fair Trials argues that the rule, which provided individuals who were aware of their INTERPOL status access to the information, has been repealed because the Commission’s Statute and its new Operating Rules contain “new broader presumptions of disclosure” and promote “improved transparency and the equality of arms” and that the repeal is “unlikely to create significant changes in practice given [Fair Trials’] experience that this provision did not, in fact, lead to disclosure in such cases.” Fair Trials, supra note 5, at 45, 50. Regardless of the Commission’s unwillingness to comply with the now-repealed provision, the provision provided individuals aware of their INTERPOL status a clear basis to argue that they had the right of access independent of any government’s will. By repealing the provision, INTERPOL has eliminated that right and, thereby, moved further away from the presumption of disclosure and towards the presumption of secrecy. The latter, as Fair Trials has rightfully noted, “prevents even people who have good reasons to believe that they are subject to an INTERPOL alert from accessing the data.” Id. at 40.
[14] INTERPOL, supra note 12.
[15] Fair Trials, INTERPOL Text on Refugee Policy – Excerpts (last visited Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.fairtrials.org/wp-content/uploads/INTERPOL-TEXT-ON-REFUGEE-POLICY.pdf?platform=hootsuite; See also Fair Trials, supra note 5, at 56.
[16] INTERPOL, supra note 12.
INTERPOL Elects South Korean President, But Concerns About Red Notice Abuse Loom
November 26, 2018 by Evan Schleicher Leave a Comment
After a snap election in Dubai, South Korean Kim Jong Yang has officially been named INTERPOL’s new president.
Multiple news sources had previously reported that Alexander Prokopchuk, a Russian who has served as the INTERPOL vice chair for Europe since 2016, was the favorite to become the next President of INTERPOL.In recent weeks, Prokopchuk’s strong bid for the presidency led many international actors, including the United States, to openly decry the misuse of INTERPOL by authoritarian regimes as a political tool. These allegations did not begin with the Russian candidate. In fact, Chinese use of the ‘red notice’system under Meng Hongwei to target political and ideological opponents led groups like Human Rights Watch to declare that the system has long been abused to support particular political agendas. Sources show that in recent years there has been a sharp increase in the number of diffusions (in which a country requests that INTERPOL issue a ‘red notice’against an individual or group) and a less significant, but still apparent, increase in the number of ‘red notices’ issued.
The use of red notices as a political tool has damaged the supposed objectivity of INTERPOL, revealing that it is, at its root, largely dominated by international realpolitik. It is very telling that the US and European leaders who campaigned against Prokopchuk emphasized the need for INTERPOL to remain neutral and independent, arguing that electing a Russian president would lead to further abuses of power. Lithuania and Ukraine both threatened to leave INTERPOL altogether if Prokopchuk were to be elected. It is even more telling that, in response, the Russians accused the U.S. and other actors of overly politicizing the issue and of smearing Prokopchuk, a seasoned professional, in the name of personal gain. What this reveals is that, reflecting common trends across international institutions, states tend to use these institutions not as a mechanism to support rule of law, but rather as another site for the contestation of power and influence in international politics.
While many see Yang’s election as an uncontroversial choice, it does little to assuage concerns about the continued misuse and abuse of INTERPOL and its mechanisms. The number of red notices has increased since last year, even as Yang has been at the helm of INTERPOL for nearly two months of this year already, suggesting that his presidency might be merely more of the same. In fact, the truly troubling part of this saga is that countries used the the snap election as an opportunity to pursue highly partisan agendas, and that, in some sense, Yang’selection represents a highly partisan victory against Russia. Beyond that, the confusion of INTERPOL during the disappearance of its former president Meng raises significant concerns about its ability to uphold global rule of law and to counter partisan efforts to misuse INTERPOL’s institutions. All in all, this election has not resolved many of the tensions within INTERPOL, and many serious questions remain.
Head of INTERPOL Resigns, As Bribery Charges Loom in China
October 9, 2018 by Zarine Kharazian Leave a Comment
Interpol president Meng Hongwei has resigned, according to reports by various news outlets on Sunday, October 7.
The surprise announcement comes just over a week after Meng’s wife reported him missing, after he left France to travel home to China. His wife later reported that the last communication she received with him was a text message containing the knife emoji.
On Monday, October 8, China’s Ministry of Public Security released a statement confirming that Meng had been detained by party authorities upon his arrival in China as part of an anti-corruption probe. According to a translation of the press release by the Associated Press, the Minister of Public Security, Zhao Lezhi, stated that “[w]e should deeply recognize the serious damage that Meng Hongwei’s bribe-taking and suspected violations of the law have caused the party and the cause of public security and deeply learn from this lesson.” The statement also said that Meng’s alleged corruption had “definitely dealt a blow to China’s image.”
China has not released further details on the charges against Meng, and observers suspect they are politically motivated. The Economist noted that the language in the Ministry of Public Security’s statement stressed the need for “absolute loyalty” and “resolute support” to Xi Jinping. It is also worth nothing that, as of April, Meng was apparently no longer a member of the Ministry of Public Security’s party committee.
China has faced ongoing criticism from human rights bodies for its abuse of Interpol’s “red notice” system. In September of last year, Human Rights Watch penned a letter to the international police agency expressing concerns about China’s misuse of the red notice. “In recent years, the Chinese government, against Interpol’s regulations, has tried to control and persecute dissidents and activists abroad by issuing politically motivated red notices through Interpol,” the letter stated.