Source: https://bruteforcelawyer.com/category/cplr/cplr-%C2%A7-901/
Timestamp: 2019-10-14 12:16:08
Document Index: 225979958

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 901', '§ 901', '§ 901', '§ 901', '§ 901', '§ 901', '§ 349', '§ 901', '§ 901', '§ 901', '§ 901', '§ 901', '§ 901']

Category: CPLR § 901
Author DMGPosted on September 18, 2010 Categories CPLR § 901, [App Div 2d Dept]Leave a comment on A Class Denied
Or, if you don’t want to get it from me, you can go over to The Civil
Procedure & Federal Courts Blog, and get it from them.
CPLR 901(b) Unless a statute creating or imposing a penalty, or a minimum measure
of recovery specifically authorizes the recovery thereof in a class
action1, an action to recover a penalty, or minimum measure of recovery
created or imposed by statute may not be maintained as a class action.
2. "…an action to recover a penalty, or minimum measure of recovery
created or imposed by statute may not be maintained as a class action." CPLR § 901(b)
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Under Erie, when a Federal Court sits in diversity jurisdiction, it must apply a states substantive law and the federal procedural law. It's more complicated than it seems. More information can be found on the case and the issue on wikipedia.
Payments of first party benefits and additional first party benefits
shall be made as the loss is incurred. Such benefits are overdue if not
paid within thirty days after the claimant supplies proof of the fact
and amount of loss sustained. If proof is not supplied as to the entire
claim, the amount which is supported by proof is overdue if not paid
within thirty days after such proof is supplied. All overdue payments
shall bear interest at the rate of two percent per month. If a valid
claim or portion was overdue, the claimant shall also be entitled to
recover his attorney's reasonable fee, for services necessarily
performed in connection with securing payment of the overdue claim,
subject to limitations promulgated by the superintendent in regulations.
an applicant does not request arbitration or institute a lawsuit within
30 days after the receipt of a denial of claim form or payment of
benefits calculated pursuant to Insurance Department regulations,
interest shall not accumulate on the disputed claim or element of claim
until such action is taken. If any applicant is a member of a class in
a class action brought for payment of benefits, but is not a named
party, interest shall not accumulate on the disputed claim or element
of claim until a class which includes such applicant is certified by
court order, or such benefits are authorized in that action by
Appellate Court decision, whichever is earlier. (emphasis added)
9. The Court is referring to this portion of CPLR § 901(b) (which is quoted in its entirety at the top of this post): "Unless a statute creating or imposing a penalty, or a minimum measure
action." (emphasis added). See FN 1.
Author DMGPosted on November 8, 2009 Categories CPLR § 901Leave a comment on UPDATE (after argument): SCOTUS grants cert on CPLR § 901(b) issue
Contrary to defendant's claim, the second cause of action pleads fraud with sufficient particularity to satisfy CPLR 3016(b) (see Lanzi v Brooks,
43 NY2d 778, 780 [1977]). It informs defendant that plaintiff complains
of the significant increase in settlement costs between the Good Faith
Estimate of Settlement Services (GFE) and the HUD-1 statement, and of
the fact that she was informed about this increase only one day before
Plaintiff's allegation that defendant deliberately underestimated
settlement costs to induce her to obtain a loan from it, rather than
from a competing lender states a claim for fraud (see Wright v Selle, 27 AD3d 1065, 1067-1068 [2006]). The GFE was not a mere statement of future intent (see Watts v Jackson Hewitt Tax Serv., Inc., 579 F Supp 2d 334, 352 [ED NY 2008]), and the issue of material misrepresentation is not subject to summary disposition (see e.g. Brunetti v Musallam, 11 AD3d 280, 281 [2004]).
The motion court should have stricken the class action allegations.
First, individual issues will predominate because all claims under
General Business Law § 349 will require [*3]analysis of whether the ultimate closing costs were so unreasonable as to amount to a deceptive practice (cf. Weil v Long Island Savings Bank, FSB,
200 FRD 164, 174 [ED NY 2001] [distinguishing a case where each
plaintiff would have to provide evidence of the services performed
compared to a case where the plaintiffs claim that the alleged scheme
was illegal per se]). Moreover, plaintiff contends that defendant's bad
faith in making estimates is actionable. However, to determine if
defendant acted in bad faith, it will be necessary to individually
examine each of the tens of thousands of transactions at issue.
Finally, plaintiff's proposed class would number in the thousands and
would have individually tailored written disclosures, different types
and amounts of fees and different reasons for the increase in closing
costs. These circumstances negate the possibility that common questions
would predominate (see Rose v SLM Fin. Corp., 254 FRD 269, 272-73 [WD NC 2008]).
Author DMGPosted on September 9, 2009 Categories CPLR § 901, CPLR R. 3016, [App Div 1st Dept]Leave a comment on Sufficiently particular but individual issues predominate: CPLR R. 3016; CPLR § 901
Whether a particular lawsuit qualifies as a class action rests
within the sound discretion of the trial court. In exercising this
discretion, a court must be mindful of our holding that the class
certification statute should be liberally construed (Englade v HarperCollins Publs., 289 AD2d 159 [2001]).
Here, the evidence is
sufficient to establish numerosity, without determining the precise
number, given the number of projects, the certified payroll records and
the testimony and affidavits regarding the number of workers
potentially affected by the allegations (see, Globe Surgical Supply v Gieco Ins. Co., 59 AD3d 129 [2008]; Pesantez v Boyle Envtl. Servs.,
251 AD2d 11 [1998]). While it is true that the exact number of the
putative class has not been determined, and that some members of the
putative class have submitted affidavits affirmatively stating that
they were not aggrieved by the allegations against defendants, the
number of workers alleged to have been underpaid was high enough to
justify the court's exercise of its discretion in certifying the class.
This is particularly true in light of the fact that many workers were
not members of any union, and were of different trades than that of the
main plaintiff.
Moreover, the commonality of claims predominates, given the
same types of subterfuges allegedly employed to pay lower wages. The
fact that different trades are paid on a different wage scale and thus
have different levels of damages does not defeat certification (see Englade, at
160). The ability to resolve such inquiries by referring to payroll and
other documentary evidence distinguishes this case from those in which
individualized inquiries defeat commonality (see e.g. Batas v Prudential Ins. Co., 37 AD3d 320, 322 [2007]; Gaidon v Guardian Life Ins. Co. Of Am., 2 AD3d 130 [2003]).
While it is appropriate in determining whether an action should
proceed as a class action to consider whether a claim has merit, this
"inquiry is limited" (see Bloom v Cunard Line, 76 AD2d 237, 240 [1980]), and such threshold determination is not intended to be a substitute for summary judgment or trial.
Three projects at issue on this appeal were bonded by Fidelity and
Deposit Company of Maryland. The class representative certified by the
court on those projects was Alexander Kudinov, a union carpenter. He
testified that aside from himself, five or six carpenters worked at
P.S. 104, one worked at P.S. 114, and four or five worked at P.S. 198.
Of this maximum total of 13 carpenters, 3 of them submitted affidavits
stating, "I have always been paid the wages due, and all of my benefits
have been paid to my union." Thus, at best, there are 10 carpenters in
the aggregate on these three projects who have wage grievances. I
respectfully submit that 10 does not meet the numerosity requirement
required by the statute. Furthermore, when the projects are viewed on
an individual basis, at best there are five other similarly situated
carpenters on some of the projects, and as few as one other on the P.S.
114 project. I see no reason why resort to class action status is
required to resolve any of the grievances that Kudinov or other
carpenters may have regarding their wages on these particular projects.
Under such circumstances, where the number of people in the class is
not identified, where members of the putative class have sworn that
they do not have any grievances, and where the nature of the claims
requires evidence on an individual basis, it is difficult to discern
how a class action is a superior, or even an appropriate, vehicle for
Author DMGPosted on August 26, 2009 Categories CPLR § 901, [App Div 1st Dept]Leave a comment on CPLR § 901(a) Class certified; 10 is not enough, unless there is no union
In April 2008, Justice Cahn granted class certification and found the Yegers to be proper class representatives.
Noting that the "minuscule" nature of the damages sought did not
bar the claim, the court found the requisite class action element of
commonality based on the allegations that "the same practices were
done" to all members of the class. Aware that plaintiffs had accepted a
refund, the court stated there were "other deductions from the account
for [m]aintenance [f]ees which plaintiffs contend were deducted early
and which were not returned or accepted." After motion practice about
the proper term of the class period, the parties eventually stipulated,
without prejudice to this appeal, to a class period "commencing with
the third quarter of 2003 and ending with the fourth quarter of 2003"
as to all customers charged an AMF "in violation of their customer
The Appellate Division may exercise de novo review of a class
certification decision, "even when there has been no abuse of
discretion as a matter of law by the nisi prius court" (Small v Lorillard Tobacco Co., 94 NY2d 43, 53 [1999]). To determine whether a lawsuit [*3]qualifies
as a class action, a court applies the five criteria of CPLR 901(a)
(numerosity, commonality, typicality, adequacy of representation and
superiority) to the
facts (see Hazelhurst v Brita Prods Co., 295 AD2d 240, 242 [2002])[FN1].
"[T]hat wrongs were committed pursuant to a common plan or pattern does
not permit invocation of the class action mechanism where the wrongs
done were individual in nature or subject to individual defenses" (Mitchell v Barrios-Paoli, 253 AD2d 281, 291 [1999]).
Whether E*Trade's conduct in assessing AMFs a day early caused
an individual class member to suffer actual damages depends upon facts
so individualized that it is impossible to prove them on a class-wide
basis. The motion court concluded that class certification was
appropriate because there was a common question as to whether E*Trade
collected the AMF too early, ie, before the date permitted in E*Trade's
contracts. However, this is only half the question. A breach of
contract claim only exists if E*Trade's common conduct actually damaged
a customer. Therefore, to recover, each class member would have to show
that he or she would have avoided the fee had E*Trade collected it at
the proper time. There were several actions that customers could have
taken to avoid the assessment (such as depositing additional funds or
executing additional securities trades), as well as other conditions
not under their control that could have prevented it, such as when
E*Trade, as a courtesy, refunded those customers who paid the AMF. It
is this aspect of proof that would be subject to a host of factors
peculiar to the individual. This aspect of proof is critical. To allow
the Yegers, or any class member, to recover the fee merely because
E*Trade collected it early—without proof that each member of the class
would have taken steps to avoid the fee had collection occurred at its
proper time—would result in a windfall to those plaintiffs who would
not have taken corrective action. In certain cases, it could also
result in writing the AMF out of the agreement entirely, a fee the
parties had agreed to freely. Accordingly, individualized issues,
rather than common ones, predominate (CPLR 901[a][2]).
In addition, plaintiffs are not proper class representatives
because their rejection of E*Trade's offer to refund the fee renders
their claim atypical (CPLR 901[a][3]). We have considered the
plaintiffs' remaining contentions and find them unavailing.
Author DMGPosted on August 4, 2009 Categories CPLR § 901, [App Div 1st Dept]Leave a comment on CPLR § 901: App. Div. can make de novo review of class certification decision