Source: http://www.chanrobles.com/usa/us_supremecourt/461/273/case.php
Timestamp: 2019-09-17 12:12:28
Document Index: 98817572

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1311', '§ 2409', '§ 2409', '§ 2409', '§ 2409', '§ 2409', '§ 2409', '§ 2409', '§ 2409', '§ 17']

Under the Quiet Title Act of 1972 (QTA), [Footnote 1] the United States, subject to certain exceptions, has waived its sovereign chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
immunity and has permitted plaintiffs to name it as a party defendant in civil actions to adjudicate title disputes involving real property in which the United States claims an interest. These cases present two separate issues concerning the QTA. The first is whether Congress intended the QTA to provide the exclusive procedure by which a claimant can judicially challenge the title of the United States to real chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Seeking to resolve this dispute as to ownership of the riverbed, North Dakota filed this suit in the District Court chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The matter thereafter proceeded to trial. North Dakota introduced evidence in support of its claim that the river was navigable on the date of statehood. [Footnote 5] The federal defendants, while denying navigability, presented no evidence on chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
After trial, the District Court rendered judgment for North Dakota. The court first concluded that the Little Missouri River was navigable in 1889 and that North Dakota attained title to the bed at statehood under the equal-footing doctrine and the Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. § 1311(a). 506 F.Supp. 619, 622-624 (ND 1981). Then, applying what it deemed to be an accepted rule of construction that statutes of limitations do not apply to sovereigns unless a contrary legislative intention is clearly evident from the express language of the statute or otherwise, the court rejected the defendants' claim that North Dakota's suit was barred by the QTA's 12-year statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(f). 506 F.Supp. at 625-626. [Footnote 7] The District Court accordingly entered judgment quieting North Dakota's title to the bed of the river. App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 812337, pp. A-29 - A-30. [Footnote 8] The Court of Appeals affirmed in all respects. 671 F.2d 271 (CA8 1982). chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The States of the Union, like all other entities, are barred by federal sovereign immunity from suing the United States in the absence of an express waiver of this immunity by Congress. California v. Arizona, 440 U. S. 59, 440 U. S. 61-62 (1979); Minnesota v. United States, 305 U. S. 382, 305 U. S. 387 (1939); Kansas v. United States, 204 U. S. 331, 204 U. S. 342 (1907). Only upon passage of the QTA did the United States waive its immunity with respect to suits involving title to land. Prior to 1972, States and all others asserting title to land claimed by the United States had only limited means of obtaining a resolution of the title dispute -- they could attempt to induce the United States to file a quiet title action against them, or they could petition Congress or the Executive for discretionary relief. Also, since passage of the Tucker Act in 1887, those claimants willing to settle for monetary damages rather than chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
As a device for circumventing federal sovereign immunity in land title disputes, the officer's suit ultimately did not prove to be successful. This Court appeared to accept the device in early cases. See United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196 (1882); 13 U. S. 646. Compare, e.g., the cases cited 369 U.S. at 369 U. S. 646, n. 6, with those cited [email protected] at 369 U. S. 646, n. 7.
Malone, supra, at 369 U. S. 647 (quoting Larson, supra, at 337 U. S. 702). chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Congress sought to rectify this state of affairs. The original version of S. 216, the bill that became the QTA, was short and simple. Its substantive provision provided for no qualifications whatsoever. It stated in its entirety: "The United States may be named a party in any civil action brought by any person to quiet title to lands claimed by the United States." 117 Cong.Rec. 46380 (1971). The Executive Branch opposed the original version of S. 216 and proposed, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Senate accepted the Justice Department's proposal, with the notable exception of the provision that would have chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In light of this legislative history, we need not be detained long by North Dakota's contention that it can avoid the QTA's statute of limitations and other restrictions by the device of an officer's suit. If North Dakota's position were correct, all of the carefully crafted provisions of the QTA deemed necessary for the protection of the national public interest chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Accordingly, we need not reach the question whether, prior to 1972, Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Corp., 337 chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
U.S. 682 (1949), and Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U. S. 643 (1962), would have permitted an officer's suit to be maintained under the present circumstances. [Footnote 22] We hold that Congress intended the QTA to provide the exclusive means by which adverse claimants could challenge the United States' title to real property. [Footnote 23] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Proceeding in accordance with these well-established principles, we observe that § 2409a(f) expressly states that any civil action is time-barred unless filed within 12 years after the date it accrued. The statutory language makes no exception for civil actions by States. Nor is there any evidence chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
@ 85 U. S. 132-133 (1938). Because § 2409a(f) does not expressly include the State, North Dakota urges, and the Court of Appeals held, that the State was not barred by the statute. While recognizing that immunity waivers by the United States are to be carefully construed, the Court of Appeals concluded that precedence should be given to the competing canon of statutory construction that statutes of limitations should not apply to the States absent express legislative inclusion. 671 F.2d 275-276.
We do not agree. In fashioning sovereign immunity waiver legislation, Congress is certainly free to exempt the States from a statute of limitations or any other condition of the waiver. But there is no merit to North Dakota's assertion that a condition on a congressional waiver of federal sovereign immunity should be regarded as inapplicable to chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
States in the absence of express intent to the contrary. This Court has never sanctioned such a rule. Quite the contrary, in United States v. Louisiana, 127 U. S. 182 (1888), the Court held that a general statute of limitations, one that did not expressly mention States, barred a State's claim against the Federal Government. And in Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. at 305 U. S. 388-389, where the United States had waived its immunity on the condition that any suit against it had to be brought in a federal court, we concluded without hesitation that the plaintiff State's suit should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, because it had been filed in state court, even though the federal court condition did not expressly apply to States. Thus, neither Congress nor the decisions of this Court have suggested that the States are presumed to be exempt from satisfying the conditions placed by Congress on its immunity waivers; and, in light of our Constitution, which makes the federal law ultimately supreme, these holdings should not have been surprising. [Footnote 25] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Even assuming, however, that this rule has relevance in construing the applicability to the States of a congressionally imposed statute of limitations not expressly including the States, here the will of Congress is apparent, and we must follow it. As the legislative history outlined in 461 U. S. 70. We thus conclude that States must fully adhere to the requirements of § 2409a(f) when suing the United States under the QTA. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The State probably is correct in stating that Congress could not, without making provision for payment of compensation, pass a law depriving a State of land vested in it by the Constitution. Such a law would not run afoul of the equal-footing doctrine or the Tenth Amendment, as asserted by North Dakota, but it would constitute a taking of the State's property without just compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment. [Footnote 26] Section 2409a(f), however, does not purport to strip any State, or anyone else, for that matter, of any property rights. The statute limits the time in which a quiet title suit against the United States can be filed; but, unlike an adverse possession provision, § 2409a(f) does not purport to effectuate a transfer of title. If a claimant has title to a disputed tract of land, he retains title even if his suit to quiet his title is deemed time-barred under § 2409a(f). A dismissal pursuant to § 2409a(f) does not quiet title to the property in the United States. The title dispute remains unresolved. [Footnote 27] Nothing prevents the claimant from continuing to chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. North Dakota's action may proceed, if at chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The legislative history is clear that Congress intended to foreclose totally any suit on claims that accrued more than 12 years prior to the effective date of the QTA. The Constitution, however, requires that statutes of limitations must "allow a reasonable time after they take effect for the commencement of suits upon existing causes of action.'" Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U. S. 516, 454 U. S. 527, n. 21 (1982) (quoting Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U. S. 55, 185 U. S. 62-63 (1902)). Therefore, if an "officer's suit" was available prior to 1972, and if the laches or limitations period for such a suit was longer than 12 years (and we express no opinion on either of these points), § 2409a(f) arguably was unconstitutional to the extent it extinguished claims that could have been brought at the time of its passage. See Herrick v. Boquillas Land & Cattle Co., 200 U. S. 96, 200 U. S. 102 (1906); @ 84 U. S. 599 (1873). North Dakota has not raised this issue, and it could not do so successfully, because, although the QTA was passed in 1972, the State did not bring this suit until 1978. However long the "reasonable time" period must be, it clearly need not be six years. Hence, even if North Dakota had a constitutional right to bring its suit within a short time after enactment of the QTA, it could not do so six years later solely by virtue of the QTA's failure to provide for the requisite "reasonable time."
Although it is indeed true that the Court construes waivers of sovereign immunity strictly, that principle of statutory construction is no more than an aid in the task of determining congressional intent. In a close case, it may help the Court chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The common law has long accepted the principle "nullum tempus occurrit regi" -- neither laches nor statutes of limitations will bar the sovereign. See, e.g., 10 W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 355 (1938); D. Gibbons, A Treatise on the Law of Limitation and Prescription 62 (1835). The courts of this country accepted the principle from English law. See, e.g., 85 U. S. 735 (1824); Iverson & Robinson v. Dubose, 27 Ala. 418, 422 (1855); Stoughton v. Baker, 4 Mass. 522, 528 (1803); see [email protected] J. May, Angell on Limitations 29-30 (5th ed. 1869). As this Court observed:
Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U. S. 126, 304 U. S. 133 (1938). In this country, courts adopted the rule not on the theory that an "impeccable" sovereign could not be guilty of laches, but because of the public policies served by the doctrine. The public interest in preserving public rights and property from injury and loss attributable to the negligence of public officers and agents, through whom the public must act, justified a special rule for the sovereign. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
31 U. S. 673 (1832). Accord, Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, supra, at 304 U. S. 132; Weber v. Board of Harbor Comm'rs, supra, at 85 U. S. 68, 70; 39 U. S. 314 (1840); J. May, supra, at 29. [Footnote 2/2]
The lands in controversy here are held in trust for the public by North Dakota, see App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 81-2337, p. A-6; United Plainsmen v. North Dakota State chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Turning to the statute at issue here, the circumstances of its enactment indicate that Congress did not intend to bar actions by States. As general background, we know that Congress was aware of the rule that, to affect the government, an enactment imposing a burden or a limitation must expressly include the sovereign. See, e.g., Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U. S. 653, 442 U. S. 667 (1979). The particular incident that spurred Congress to pass the Quiet Title Act was a dispute between private landowners and the Federal Government. See Hearings on S. 216 et al. before the Subcommittee on Public Lands of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 83-85 (1971) (affidavit of A. L. Robinson). The statements in the hearings reflect a focus on disputes between private citizens and the Federal Government. See, e.g., id. at 20 (statement of Shiro chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Finally, we cannot ignore the special nature of the lands at issue in this case. The beds of navigable waters pass to the States when they achieve statehood under the constitutional chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
equal footing doctrine, as an incident of sovereignty. Montana v. United States, 450 U. S. 544, 450 U. S. 551 (1981); @ 44 U. S. 552. Given that solicitude for the State's ownership of these lands, it becomes extremely difficult to believe that Congress intended to deny States dominion over these lands by silently extinguishing their right to quiet title. I would affirm the judgment below.
In New Orleans v. United States, the United States argued that the city of New Orleans was estopped to assert title to certain lands held for the public. At the time, estoppel could not be asserted against a sovereign, see, e.g., 76 U. S. 49 (1870), and the Court declined to estop the city, largely on the ground that the lands were held in trust for the public and, since the sovereign could not by act convey them, the sovereign's acts could not estop it from asserting that they were not conveyed. Although the protection against estoppel has since largely dissipated, see [email protected] Note, Equitable Estoppel: Does Governmental Immunity Mean Never Having to Say You're Sorry? 56 St. John's L.Rev. 114 (1981); K. Davis, Administrative Law of the Seventies § 17.01 (1976), the application of that protection in New Orleans contradicts the view of the majority that, in controversies between the United States and another sovereign, only the United States can rely on sovereign attributes.