Source: http://ca.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20110223_0002841.ECA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2016-12-05 00:34:08
Document Index: 138749774

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2254', '§ 636', '§ 667', '§ 2254', '§ 667', '§ 2254']

| Isaac Martinez v. James D. Hartley
Isaac Martinez v. James D. Hartley
ISAAC MARTINEZ, PETITIONER,v.JAMES D. HARTLEY,RESPONDENT.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO DISMISS PETITIONER'S FIRST, SECOND, THIRD, AND FIFTH CLAIMS WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND FOR FAILURE TO STATE A COGNIZABLE CLAIM (Doc. 1) AND TO DECLINE TO ISSUE A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO DISMISS PETITIONER'S FOURTH CLAIM WITH LEAVE TO AMEND (Doc. 1) OBJECTIONS DEADLINE: THIRTY (30) DAYS
Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The matter has been referred to the Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Rules 302 and 304. Pending before the Court is the petition, which was filed on February 8, 2011.
Petitioner, an inmate of the California State Prison at Avenal, California, is serving a sentence of ten (10) years to life imposed by the Los Angeles Superior Court in case number VAO24361 on June 14, 1993. (Pet. 4.) Petitioner challenges a decision of California's Board of Parole Hearings (BPH), which became final on August 12, 2009, after a hearing held on April 14, 2009. The BPH denied parole for five years. (Id.)
Petitioner raises the following grounds: 1) there was no evidence supporting the denial of parole, and thus Petitioner suffered a violation of due process of law with respect to his liberty interest; 2) there was no evidence of any nexus between the reasons for parole denial and the crime or between the decision and public safety; 3) the BPH violated Petitioner's right to due process of law in relying on Petitioner's confession, which was obtained in violation of Petitioner's privilege against self-incrimination; 4) the trial court's sentencing Petitioner under Cal. Pen. Code, § 667.5 violated Petitioner's rights to due process of law and double jeopardy under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; and 5) the BPH failed to provide an individualized consideration of the parole suitability factors. (Pet. 8-15, 28, 32.) Petitioner also requests "proof of claims" concerning various aspects of the BPH and the California and federal governments. (Pet. 35-39.) *fn1
Petitioner seeks a new parole hearing. (Pet. 40.)
Petitioner attaches to his petition a transcript of the hearing before the BPH held at Avenal State Prison on April 14, 2009. (Pet. 44-129.) The transcript reflects that Petitioner appeared at the hearing, responded to questions from the commissioners, made a closing statement, and was represented by counsel who participated on Petitioner's behalf. (Pet. 46, 47, 50-77, 71-72, 77-109, 111-19.) The transcript further reflects that after a brief recess, the board stated its reasons for denying parole. (Pet. 120-28.)
Swarthout, 2011 WL 197627, *2. The Court concluded that the petitioners had received the following process that was due:
Swarthout, 2011 WL 197627, *3. The Court in Swarthout expressly noted that California's "some evidence" rule is not a substantive federal requirement, and correct application of California's "some evidence" standard is not required by the federal Due Process Clause. Id. at *3.
Petitioner's first and second claims concerning the absence of evidence to support the decision and to demonstrate a nexus between Petitioner's offense or history and the public safety are essentially claims concerning the merits of the decision and the sufficiency of the evidence to support the decision. Likewise, Petitioner's third claim concerning the BPH's reliance on Petitioner's confession also challenges the quality or sufficiency of the evidence to support the decision. In these claims, Petitioner does not state facts that point to a real possibility of constitutional error or that otherwise would entitle Petitioner to habeas relief because California's "some evidence" requirement is not a substantive federal requirement. Swarthout, 2011 WL 197627, *3. Review of the record for "some evidence" to support the denial of parole is not within the scope of this Court's habeas review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Petitioner's fifth claim concerning the BPH's failure to give an individualized consideration of the state's substantive factors of parole suitability is also foreclosed by Swarthout. Due process of law requires only that Petitioner have an opportunity to be heard; it does not require any specific degree of individualized consideration.
With respect to amendment of the petition, a petition for habeas corpus should not be dismissed without leave to amend unless it appears that no tenable claim for relief can be pleaded were such leave granted. Jarvis v. Nelson, 440 F.2d 13, 14 (9thCir. 1971).
Petitioner did not allege that the procedures used for determination of his suitability for parole were deficient because of the absence of an opportunity to be heard or the lack of a statement of reasons for the ultimate decision reached. However, the documentation that Petitioner submitted with the petition demonstrates that Petitioner cannot state a tenable claim for relief based on a violation of due process with respect to his first, second, third, and fifth claims. Petitioner attended the parole hearing and had the right to speak at the hearing and to contest the evidence against him. Petitioner's counsel exhibited familiarity with Petitioner's record (pet. 71), and thus it may be concluded that there was effective access to Petitioner's records in advance of the hearing. Petitioner's submission to this Court of the decision of the BPH in which the reasons were stated warrants the conclusion that Petitioner received a statement of reasons why parole was denied. (Pet. 120-28.)
Accordingly, it is concluded that with respect to the first, second, third, and fifth claims, Petitioner could not state a tenable due process claim for relief. Thus, leave to amend should not be granted with respect to these claims.
Petitioner's fourth claim concerns the sentencing court's application of a state statute (Pen. Code § 667.5) at Petitioner's sentencing in 1993. Petitioner alleges that enhancement of his sentence under California's habitual criminal laws was erroneous, constituted multiple punishment in contravention of the Fifth Amendment's protection against double jeopardy, and was a violation of due process.
Preliminarily the Court notes that this particular claim appears to address the conduct of the sentencing court and not the BPH. However, in other parts of the petition, Petitioner noted that his criminal record was used against him to deny parole. (Pet. 42.) He also alleged that use of his prior convictions to deny parole was erroneous based on the nature of his criminal history. (Pet. 23-24.) Petitioner may be attempting to argue that the board's consideration or weighing of this evidence constituted a violation of the Federal Constitution's Due Process Clause. To the extent Petitioner raises this claim, the preceding analysis based on Swarthout applies, and the claim is foreclosed.
To the extent that this claim rests on the application of the state's sentencing law, it is not cognizable on federal habeas corpus. Federal habeas relief is not available to retry a state issue that does not rise to the level of a federal constitutional violation. Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. - , 131 S.Ct. 13, 16 (2010); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). Alleged errors in the application of state law are not cognizable in federal habeas corpus. Souch v. Schiavo, 289 F.3d 616, 623 (9th Cir. 2002).
With respect to due process, it is established that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments do not require proof of the fact of a prior conviction to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt in order to use the prior conviction to increase a sentence. Butler v. Curry, 528 F.3d 624, 643-44 (9th Cir. 2008).
Insofar as Petitioner alleges that the trial court's enhancement of his sentence resulted in multiple punishments prohibited by the prohibition against double jeopardy, Petitioner's claim is devoid of specific facts that point to a real possibility of constitutional error. (Pet. 11.) The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment protects against not only a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal or conviction, but also multiple punishments for the same offense. U.S. Const. amend. V; Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 395-96 (1995). However, reliance on prior convictions or prison terms to enhance punishment for a subsequent offense generally does not constitute imposition of multiple punishments. See, Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 247 (1998) (noting that recidivism has been the most traditional basis for increasing an offender's sentence, and rejecting a contention that an enhancement for recidivism that significantly increased the sentence must be considered an element of the offense). Generally, the Double Jeopardy Clause requires only that a court not exceed the authorization given to it by the legislature; if the legislature enacts statutes that indicate an intent to impose separate punishments, the statutes define separate offenses, and the punishments do not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. United States v. Wolfswinkel, 44 F.3d 782, 783-84 (9th Cir. 1995) (Congress); Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 499 (1984) (state legislature).
Further, California state courts have considered the legislative intent and have upheld the use of prior convictions to enhance a sentence in various contexts. See, e.g., People v. Acosta, 29 Cal.4th 105, 128 (2002); People v. Garcia, 25 Cal.4th 744, 757-58 (2001); People v. White Eagle, 48 Cal.App.4th 1511, 1519-20 (1996).
Therefore, Petitioner's generalized allegations do not state a claim cognizable in habeas corpus.
It is possible that Petitioner might amend his petition to allege specific facts concerning the use his prior convictions or recidivist history. However, this claim relates to the conduct of the trial court, and not the conduct of the BPH, which is the gravamen of Petitioner's claims in the present petition. A claim challenging the Los Angeles County sentence would concern a different judgment of a different tribunal.
Rule 2(e) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts (Habeas Rules) provides:
A petitioner who seeks relief from judgments of more than one state court must file a separate petition covering the judgment or judgments of each court. Petitioner thus cannot properly challenge the judgments of two different tribunals in a single proceeding. Bianchi v. Blodgett, 925 F.2d 305, 308-11 (9th Cir. 1991). Specifically, it is not permissible to challenge both a denial of parole by the BPH and an underlying conviction in the same habeas corpus action. Williams v. Sisto, 2009 WL 3300038, *12 (E.D.Cal. Oct. 14, 2009).
Amendment of the present petition to allege facts in support of Petitioner's fourth claim would thus be proper only if the remaining claims against the BPH do not go forward in this action; otherwise, the result would be improper joinder of claims.
In summary, with respect to the fourth claim, Petitioner has not stated a violation of due process of law or other basis for relief. It is possible that Petitioner could state a tenable claim for relief. Petitioner should be given an opportunity to amend the present petition if the remaining claims against the BPH are dismissed. If any of the claims against the BPH remain, then Petitioner's fourth claim should be dismissed without prejudice to refiling it in a separate action.
1) Petitioner's first, second, third, and fifth claims be DISMISSED without leave to amend for failure to state a claim cognizable in a habeas corpus proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254; and
2) Petitioner's fourth claim be DISMISSED with leave to file a first amended petition within thirty days; and