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Matched Legal Cases: ['§\n22', '§ 22', 'Art. 27', '§ 36', '§ 18', '§ 18', '§\n2423', '§ 318', '§ 318', '§ 318', '§ 22', '§ 22', '§ 4', '§ 11']

50:0728(90)CA - - GSA, National Capital Region, Federal Protective Service DIvision, Washington DC and AFGE, Local 1733 - - 1995 FLRAdec CA - - v50 p728 | FLRA.GOV
Authority Chairman and Members Find Types of Cases, Biographical Data, and Contact Information.Office of the General Counsel Regional Offices, Guidances, Policies, Manuals, ULP Process, Forms, Representation, ADR Services, and Training.Federal Service Impasses Panel Find Jurisdiction, Statute, Work Schedules Act, Biographical Data, and Contact Information.Solicitor, Administrative Law Judges, IG & Others Find General Information about these Offices and Contact Information.training & alternative dispute resolutionFind FLRA Training Information and ADR Services. 50:0728(90)CA - - GSA, National Capital Region, Federal Protective Service DIvision, Washington DC and AFGE, Local 1733 - - 1995 FLRAdec CA - - v50 p728 [ v50 p728 ] 50:0728(90)CA
The decision of the Authority follows: 50 FLRA No. 90 FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY WASHINGTON, D.C. _____ GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE DIVISION WASHINGTON, DC (Respondent) and AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
LOCAL 1733, AFL-CIO (Charging Party) WA-CA-30469 _____ DECISION AND ORDER July 31, 1995 _____ Before the Authority: Phyllis N. Segal, Chair; Tony Armendariz
and Pamela Talkin, Members.(1) I. Statement of the Case This unfair labor practice case is before the Authority on exceptions
Counsel.(2) The complaint alleges that the Respondent violated section 7116(a)(1)
by changing a condition of employment without notifying the Union and providing
it with an opportunity to bargain over the change prior to implementing
it.(3) Pursuant to section 2423.29 of our Regulations and section 7118 of the
Statute, upon consideration of the Judge's decision and the entire record, we
hold, for the following reasons, that the Agency committed an unfair labor
practice when it unilaterally changed its past practice of permitting police
officers to transport their weapons between their homes and duty stations
without providing the Union with notice and opportunity to bargain over the
change prior to its implementation. Accordingly, we reverse the Judge's
dismissal of the complaint and order an appropriate remedy. II. Judge's Decision The facts are fully set forth in the Judge's decision and are briefly
summarized here. The Union is the exclusive bargaining representative of the
Respondent's uniformed police officers. The officers are assigned to mobile
patrol units to protect designated sectors in the Washington Metropolitan
Area.(4) Until 1991, before each duty
shift, the officers reported for roll call at the Washington Navy Yard, where
they picked up their firearms and received their assignments, and then reported
to their assigned sectors. At the end of each shift the officers again reported
to the Navy Yard, where they returned their firearms. In January 1991, the
Agency issued a Temporary Special Order, which authorized the officers to carry
their firearms between their homes and duty stations, in order to facilitate
the ability of officers to get to their assigned sectors more efficiently and
to respond more readily to disorders.(5) Subsequently, the Agency
indefinitely extended the authorization by memorandum stating that the
extension was "consistent with effective operational practices, by eliminating
the need for the time consuming administrative process of firearm issuance and
retrieval, and improving our capability to respond to emergency situations
under employee recall conditions." Judge's Decision at 5. The Agency's Associate General Counsel, Real Property Division,
thereafter concluded, based on a 1978 memorandum of the General Counsel
(Memorandum), and on a 1972 Opinion of the Assistant Attorney General, Office
of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice (DOJ Opinion), that no authority exists
permitting the officers to carry their firearms in a non-duty status between
their duty station and their residence, except in exceptional duty-related
circumstances such as those outlined in the DOJ Opinion. The Agency's Office of
Physical Security and Law Enforcement accordingly instructed the Division
Directors to immediately ensure complete compliance with the legal opinion.
Without any notice to the Union, the Director of the Federal Protective Service
(FPS) Division then issued an order for immediate discontinuance of the
practice by all Agency police officers.(6) The Judge held that the Agency in "good faith, reasonably concluded,
based upon the available resources, that the practice of permitting police
officers to carry their weapons home when off duty was illegal." Judge's
Decision at 12. The Judge concluded that "[w]hile it has not been conclusively
established that it would be illegal" for the officers to continue transporting
their weapons between their duty stations and residences, "the record upon
which [the Agency] relied in making its decision to terminate the practice
strongly suggests the illegality of the practice." Id. at 11-12.
The Judge relied on two "litigated D.C. court cases" which "give reasonable
indication of the possible illegality of such conduct" and on the DOJ Opinion
and Agency General Counsel's Memorandum. Id. at 12. The Judge determined
that because the disputed practice probably was illegal, the Agency was not
obligated to negotiate with the Union prior to terminating the practice.(7) In addition, the Judge held that a
status quo ante remedy was not appropriate.(8) III. General Counsel's Exceptions The General Counsel argues that the Judge erred in concluding
that the Agency's past practice was illegal, and, therefore, that the Agency
was not obligated to negotiate with the Union prior to terminating the
practice. The General Counsel contends that, in order to find that the Agency
was privileged to unilaterally terminate its past practice, the Judge was
required to make a specific finding that the practice was illegal, and failed
to do so. IV. Analysis and Conclusions When an agency changes a condition of employment of bargaining unit
employees, it is obligated to notify and negotiate with the collective
bargaining representative prior to effectuating the change.(9) Portsmouth Naval Shipyard,
Portsmouth, New Hampshire, 49 FLRA 1522, 1527 (1994). There is no
obligation to bargain over a decision to change a past practice which is
unlawful. Id. at 1527-28. The Judge, however, did not conclude that the Agency's practice of
permitting the police officers to carry their weapons between their residences
and duty stations was illegal. Instead, the Judge concluded that the Agency had
made a reasonable determination, in good faith, that the practice probably was
illegal. See Judge's Decision at 12. However, whether an agency acts in
good faith is irrelevant in determining whether a change is unlawful. Marine
Corps Logistics Base, Barstow, California, 33 FLRA 196, 202 (1988). It is
well established that when an agency changes conditions of employment and
refuses to bargain with the union concerning those changes, the agency acts at
its peril. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Social Security
Hartford District Office, Hartford, Connecticut and American Federation of
Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 1164, 41 FLRA 1309, 1317 (1991). Thus,
the Judge erred in determining that the Agency's showing of possible illegality
of the Agency's practice was sufficient to conclude that the Agency did not
violate the Statute by unilaterally changing its practice. In addition, the record does not establish that the Agency's practice
was illegal. First, the two cases the Judge relied on -- Middleton v. United
States, 305 A.2d 259 (D.C. 1973)(Middleton) and McKenzie v.
United States, 158 A.2d 912 (D.C. 1960)(McKenzie) -- are entirely
distinguishable from the Agency's practice at issue in this case. In Middleton, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held
that a FPS officer was not a "policeman" or "other duly appointed law
enforcement officer" within the meaning of the exemption from the District of
Columbia's ban on carrying concealed weapons, D.C. Code Ann. §§
22-3204, 3205.(10) The court also held that "Defendant's trip to Baltimore on
the night of his arrest was a personal one totally unrelated to his duties as a
[FPS] officer, and as such placed him outside the exemption provided for on
duty law enforcement officers as contained in D.C. Code § 22-3205." 305
A.2d at 262. Moreover, the court noted, the defendant did not transport his
weapon unloaded and securely wrapped, as required by the statute for persons
not otherwise exempt from the ban on carrying concealed weapons. Id. For
all these reasons, the court concluded that the defendant did not fall within
an exemption from the prohibition on carrying concealed weapons. Middleton is clearly distinguishable. Under the Agency's
practice in this case, unlike Middleton, the officers were authorized to
carry their weapons directly between their duty stations and their residences,
and were required to unload and secure their weapons before transporting them
to or from their duty stations.(11) Also unlike Middleton, the matter of whether the unit
employees in this case are permitted to carry weapons between residences and
duty stations concerns a condition of their employment and, under the Agency's
practice, is not merely a "personal" matter "totally unrelated to [their]
duties . . . ." Middleton, 305 A.2d at 262. See n.9,
supra. In McKenzie, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals sustained
the conviction of a "special policeman"(12) for carrying a weapon without a license. The court
determined that, as a special policeman, the defendant was neither a
"policeman" nor "law enforcement officer," within the meaning of section 3205
of the D.C. Code, so as to be exempt from the prohibition on carrying a
concealed weapon. The court also concluded that the defendant failed to satisfy
the special requirements for exemption from the ban applicable to special
policemen. Like Middleton, McKenzie is distinguishable from this
case. In particular, there is no contention, or other basis on which to
conclude, that the unit employees in this case are special policemen, to whom
the exemption in section 3205 of the D.C. Code for "policemen or other duly
appointed law-enforcement officers" would not apply. Moreover, the exemption
for policemen and law enforcement officers is not the only exemption from the
ban on carrying concealed weapons available; the unit employees may also
qualify for an exemption as "officers or employees of the United States duly
authorized to carry a concealed pistol in the usual or ordinary course of . . .
business[.]" Second, the cases the Judge relied on to find a "reasonable
indication of the possible illegality" of the police officers' carriage of the
weapons between their homes and duty stations concern only the District of
Columbia weapons statute. Judge's Decision at 12. The Judge did not consider
whether the officers' carriage of the weapons violated the relevant state
weapons statutes in Maryland and Virginia, where, in addition to the District
of Columbia, the officers presumably could reside. The Maryland handgun
statute, which makes it unlawful to wear, carry or transport a handgun, excepts
from coverage "the wearing, carrying, [and] transporting of a handgun by . . .
law enforcement personnel of the United States." Md. Ann. Code of 1957 Art. 27,
§ 36B(C). The Virginia statute permits any person at least 21 years
of age to apply for and obtain a permit to carry a concealed handgun. Va. Code
Ann. § 18.2-308 D (1995). As with the D.C. statute, nothing in these
statutes supports the conclusion that permitting the officers to carry their
weapons between their residences and duty stations is illegal. Third, we find unpersuasive the DOJ Opinion and Agency General Counsel
Memorandum. Both memoranda relied on the same case law distinguished above. In
addition, the DOJ Opinion relied on the nature of the officers' duties at the
time the Opinion was written, noting that the officers had "relatively narrow
and specific duties -- to guard, enforce regulations, and keep the peace in and
around federal buildings," and that the officers thus would have no enforcement
authority while off-duty. The Opinion noted that there might be circumstances
where an officer might have a "special duty-related reason" for carrying his
weapon while off-duty: For example, if some officers are assigned to different and widely
separated buildings on different days, the only feasible procedure might be for
them to take their weapons home with them overnight. The same might be true
during a riot situation when they might be subject to special call to places
not ascertainable in advance. Judge's Decision at 8. Since the time of issuance of the DOJ Opinion, the nature of the
officers' job duties has changed significantly. The position description for
the officers was changed from "Federal Protective Service Officer" to "Police
Officer," and the job was changed from one involving assignment to fixed posts
to one involving assignment to mobile patrol units to protect designated
sectors in the Washington Metropolitan Area. See Id. at 2.
Moreover, the job duties of the officers were greatly expanded. The officers no
longer merely guard and enforce regulations around federal buildings. The
officers investigate criminal activity, and perform a variety of functions,
including locating lost children, assisting tourists and breaking up fights in
federal office buildings. G.C. Exh. 11 at 2. Thus, consistent with the
hypothetical circumstances envisioned in the DOJ Opinion, the nature of the
officers' job duties might well constitute a duty-related reason, under the
reasoning of that Opinion, for permitting the officers to carry their weapons
between their residences and duty stations. In addition, the officers are now
subject to immediate recall due to an extreme shortage of officers, and may be
recalled immediately in response to changes in threat levels. Id. Thus,
under the Opinion, the officers may be "subject to special call to places not
ascertainable in advance," and this might constitute another "special
duty-related reason" which, according to the Opinion, might justify permitting
the officers to carry their weapons between their homes and duty stations.
Id. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the Judge erred by relying on
the Agency's good faith and by failing to make a determination of the
illegality of the Agency's practice. Moreover, while acknowledging the
Respondent's apparent good faith reliance on, among other things, a 1972 DOJ
Opinion, we are compelled to conclude that the record before us does not
establish the illegality of the practice. Accordingly, the Respondent violated
section 7116(a)(1) and (5) of the Statute by changing its past practice of
permitting the officers to carry their weapons between their homes and duty
stations without notifying and bargaining with the Union. Where management changes a condition of employment without fulfilling
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 41 FLRA 272, 279 (1991). No
special circumstances are alleged in this case and none are apparent to us.
Accordingly, we find that a return to the status quo ante
is appropriate to remedy the Agency's unfair labor practice. V. Order Pursuant to section 2423.29 of the Authority's and Regulations and
General Services Administration, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Unilaterally changing the prior policy permitting federal police
officers to carry their weapons between their homes and duty stations, without
affording the Union prior notice of and the opportunity to bargain over the
change in this practice. (b) In any like or related manner, interfering with, restraining, or
purposes and policies of the Statute: (a) Direct the Agency's Director of the Federal Protective Service
Division to rescind its order for immediate discontinuance of the policy of
permitting the police officers to transport their weapons between their homes
and duty stations. (b) Post at its facilities in Washington, D.C., where bargaining unit
employees represented by the Union are located, copies of the attached Notice
of such forms, they shall be signed by the Administrator of the General
Services Administration, and shall be posted and maintained for 60 consecutive
by any other material. (c) Pursuant to section 2423.30 of the Authority's Regulations, notify
steps have been taken to comply. NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES AS ORDERED BY THE FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY AND TO EFFECTUATE THE POLICIES OF THE FEDERAL SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS STATUTE WE NOTIFY EMPLOYEES THAT: WE WILL rescind our order for immediate discontinuance of the policy of
permitting police officers to transport their weapons between their homes and
duty stations. WE WILL NOT prohibit police officers from carrying their .38 caliber
revolvers while off duty when traveling to and from their place of residence
and official duty station, so long as the officers comply with the required
procedures. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner, interfere with, restrain, or
Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute. _______________________________ (Agency) Dated:_______________ By:________________________________ (Signature) (Title) This Notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of
is: 1255 22nd Street, NW., Suite 400, Washington, D.C. 20037-1206 and whose
telephone number is: (202) 653-8500. Member Armendariz, dissenting: I respectfully disagree with the conclusion of my colleagues that the
Respondent's prior practice of allowing employees to carry their guns to and
from work was legal. Consequently, I dissent from their finding that the
Respondent violated the Statute by failing or refusing to bargain over a
substantively negotiable condition of employment when it unilaterally
implemented a change in that prior practice without bargaining. The majority concludes, contrary to the Judge, that the Respondent's
previous practice of allowing Federal Protective Service officers to transport
their weapons between home and work was legal. The majority bases that
conclusion, in part, on a determination that the cases relied on by the Judge,
and cited by the Respondent, do not support a finding that the practice was
illegal. Specifically, the majority distinguishes McKenzie v. United
States, 158 A.2d 912 (D.C. 1960) (McKenzie) and Middleton v.
United States, 305 A.2d 259 (D.C. 1973) (Middleton), relied on by
the Respondent in defense of its unilateral change, on the ground that those
cases do not involve officers who were transporting their weapons between home
and work. I agree that McKenzie can be distinguished from this case on
the grounds that Federal Protective Service officers are not "special
policemen." Contrary to the majority, however, I believe that Middleton
supports the Respondent's position, as affirmed by the Judge, that the
Respondent's previous practice was illegal. The crux of the majority's analysis is that the officer involved in
Middleton was subject to the prohibition in section 22-3204 of the
District of Columbia Code (Code or D.C. Code) against carrying concealed
weapons or, more precisely, did not fall within the exception for "duly
appointed law-enforcement officers" in section 22-3205 of the Code, because he
was carrying his weapon while traveling within the District of Columbia, but
not between home and work. I agree that this is true, but I do not believe that
that is the significant fact in the decision. I believe that Middleton supports the conclusion that Federal
Protective Service officers carrying their weapons between home and work would
not fall into the exception for "duly appointed law-enforcement officers" in
section 22-3205. In Middleton, a case involving a Federal Protective
Service officer, the court specifically states that "research of the District
of Columbia and United States statutes and regulations fails to disclose any
authorization for Federal Protective Service officers to carry firearms other
than while on duty or while in a travel status to and from duty assignments,
wherever those duty assignments may be located." Id. at 262. I do
not interpret the court's reference to travel to and from duty assignments as
applying to travel in a nonduty status before and after a tour of duty between
the duty site and the employee's residence. In particular, I note that the
court makes no reference at all to travel to and from officers' residences.
Rather, I find that the court was referring to travel by officers while they
are in a duty status between duty sites, an interpretation that is confirmed by
the court's reliance on a legal opinion submitted to the Respondent's
Administrator by legal counsel stating that the Administrator did not have
authority to permit the carrying of weapons by Federal Protective Service
officers in a nonduty status. In my view, the court's reference to travel to
and from duty site is simply a clarification of the limited circumstances under
which Federal Protective Service officers can travel with their weapons. Consequently, unlike the majority, I do not interpret Middleton
as holding that the Federal Protective Service officer in that case was outside
the exception in section 22-3205 for "duly appointed law-enforcement officers"
because he was carrying a weapon while returning from a trip to Baltimore
instead of traveling between his residence and his duty site. On the contrary,
I find, as the court stated, that the officer was outside the statutory
exception "for on duty law enforcement officers" because the trip was
"unrelated to his duties as a Federal Protective Service officer[.]" Id.
at 262 (emphasis added). I conclude, therefore, contrary to the majority, that
Middleton supports the Respondent's position that Federal Protective
Service officers in a nonduty status, traveling within the District of Columbia
between home and work, are not within the exception for "duly appointed
law-enforcement officers" under section 22-3205 of the D.C. Code. Moreover, I
believe that this conclusion conforms to the principles set forth in the
Opinion of the Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Department
of Justice, see Judge's Decision at 6-8. For this reason, I also
conclude that the Judge properly concluded that the Respondent's previous
practice was illegal and that the Respondent did not violate the Statute by
unilaterally changing that practice to conform with applicable law. Nonetheless, where an agency institutes a change in conditions of
employment in order to comply with a legal requirement, although the agency is
not obligated to negotiate over the change itself, it is obligated to bargain
over the impact and implementation of that change, if the change is more than
de minimis. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Customs Service,
New Orleans, Louisiana and National Treasury Employees Union, Chapter 168,
38 FLRA 163, 174 (1990). In my opinion, it is reasonably foreseeable that
the change instituted by the Respondent would have more than a de
minimis impact on the officers in this case. It would involve officers
in a much more time-consuming process of checking out weapons prior to a shift
and checking them back in afterwards. This conclusion comports with the
Respondent's own evaluation of the process, see Judge's Decision
at 5, quoting memorandum of the Respondent's Assistant Commissioner, and
with Respondent's reasons for adopting the previous practice of allowing
officers to transport their weapons between home and work. Consequently, I
conclude that the Respondent was obligated to negotiate over the impact and
implementation of its weapons policy. Because the Respondent failed and refused to bargain over the impact
and implementation of its decision to discontinue the practice of allowing
Federal Protective Service officers to transport their weapons between their
residences and their duty sites within the District of Columbia, I would find
that in this regard the Respondent violated the Statute. I do not believe,
however, that a status quo ante remedy is possible in this
case because it would involve the reinstitution of an illegal practice.
Naturalization Service, El Paso District Office, 34 FLRA 1035, 1048
(1990). Accordingly, I would order the Respondent to bargain over the impact
and implementation of the change and apply retroactively any matters about
which the parties reach agreement. Department of Veteran Affairs, Veterans
Administration Medical Center, Decatur, Georgia, 46 FLRA 339, 346-47
(1992). UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES WASHINGTON, D.C. 20424-0001 GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION, FEDERAL
PROTECTIVE SERVICE DIVISION, WASHINGTON, DC Respondent and AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 1733,
AFL-CIO Charging Party Case No. WA-CA-30469 Gary F. Davis, Esq. and Edward P. Denney For the Respondent Christopher M. Feldenzer, Esq. For the General Counsel Before: SALVATORE J. ARRIGO Administrative Law Judge DECISION Statement of the Case This case arose under the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations
Regional Director for the Washington Regional Office, issued a Complaint and
Notice of Hearing. The General Counsel alleges Respondent violated the Statute
by discontinuing the authorization for bargaining unit police officers to carry
their firearms between their duty station and residence without providing the
Union with notice and an opportunity to negotiate on the impact and
implementation of the change. A hearing on the Complaint was conducted in Washington, D.C. at which
and cross-examine witnesses and argue orally. Briefs were filed by Respondent
and their demeanor and from my evaluation of the evidence I make the
representative of various of Respondent's employees and AFGE Local 1733 has
been the agent of AFGE for the purpose of representing those employees. The
Union represents approximately 225 of Respondent's employees, including
uniformed police officers and various support employees. Prior to 1971 Respondent's uniformed officers held "Guard" positions
and were assigned to fixed posts. Guards were primarily responsible for
controlling access to federal buildings, which included checking badges and
building passes. All Guards carried a Colt 38 firearm, which was kept in a
locked safe at the worksite when the Guard was not on duty and was obtained
from supervisors prior to the start of each shift. In 1971 the Federal Protective Service was created through an Executive
Order. Subsequently, the Guard position was converted to "Federal Protective
Officer" (GS-083 series). As a result of this change, the training for Federal
Protective Officers was increased from a two week course to a four week course
and although this enhanced training included more training for these officers
in the use of a firearm, officers were not authorized to carry their firearms
between their home and duty station. In December 1988 the position description for Federal Protective
Officers was changed to "Police Officer" (GS-083 series). The job itself had
been transformed from a stationary one at fixed posts of duty to one where
police officers were assigned to mobile patrol units to protect designated
sectors in the Washington metropolitan area. This change required all of
Respondent's police officers to report for roll call before each duty shift at
the Washington Navy Yard rather than reporting to various duty posts. After
receiving their assignments as well as a briefing, officers then reported to
their assigned sectors. At the end of each shift police officers again reported
to the Navy Yard. Firearms were picked up by officers at the Navy Yard at the
beginning of each tour of duty and returned at the conclusion of the tour.
Consistent with this change, the training afforded Respondent's police officers
was further enhanced to include an 8 week initial training course with an
additional 40 hours of training required semiannually. On January 17, 1991, Respondent issued a Temporary Special Order which
authorized police officers to carry their service firearm between their home
and duty station. Essentially, the Desert Storm events of January 1991 and
concerns over the possibility of terrorists attacks had caused Respondent to
reduce the number of daily work shifts from 3 to 2 and implement 13 hour shifts
each day for all police officers. The order helped to facilitate the ability of
officers to get to their assigned sectors in a more efficient manner and
respond more readily to any disorders. Originally, the weapons authorization
provided that it would self-cancel on April 1, 1991.(1) The Temporary Special Order of January 17, 1991 provided,
inter alia: 1. PURPOSE: The purpose of this order is to establish temporary
procedures for the carrying of assigned revolver by police officers and
supervisors to and from home and duty station. 2. CANCELLATION: This order supersedes all Divisional orders and
policy statements previously issued concerning this matter . . . 3. AUTHORIZATION: A. Effective upon the date of this order, all Police Officers and
Police Supervisors (further referred to as "officer") in the 083 occupational
series assigned to the National Capital Region, Federal Protection Division,
General Services Administration are hereby authorized to wear and carry their
Government assigned .38 caliber revolver, while off duty when travelling to and
from their place of residence and official duty station. B. All officers must agree upon either procedure 1 or 2, if neither
then procedure 3 is the default. 4. PROCEDURES: PROCEDURE 1: a) Officers who are off-duty leaving their duty
station must remain in uniform and carry their assigned revolver in their
issued holster in plain view. Officers must go directly to their place of
residence without deviation to the most direct route. The officer should not
stop at convenience stores, gas stations, or other public areas while off-duty
and in full uniform. These needs should be accomplished after the weapon is
properly secured. b) Once the officer arrives at home, the officer will
immediately secure the weapon with an issued trigger lock, safely unload the
weapon and place the revolver where it can be tightly controlled (access
restricted) in the home out of reach and sight of children or others. c) An
officer leaving home must again use the most direct route to the duty station
and other measures prescribed in (a & b) above. An officer who fails to
bring the weapon when reporting for duty will not be allowed to work and will
be placed in a leave (for up to two hours) or if longer, absent without leave
category (nonpay status) until such time the officer reports for duty with all
assigned equipment. PROCEDURE 2: a) Officers who are off-duty leaving their duty
station who do not wish to wear their uniform home are not authorized to carry
the revolver concealed or on their person. Officers in this instance will
unload their weapon, place the trigger lock on and place the weapon in the
trunk of their personal vehicle. The weapon will not be carried in the
passenger compartment of the vehicle and the officer must go directly to their
place of residence without deviation by the most direct route. The officer
should not stop at convenience stores, gas stations, or other public areas
while off-duty with the weapon left in the vehicle. b) Once the officer arrives
at home, the officer will ensure that the issued trigger lock is in place, that
the weapon is unloaded and then place the revolver where it can be tightly
controlled (access restricted) in the home out of reach and sight of children
or others. Procedure 1(c) also applies. PROCEDURE 3: Officers who do not follow either procedure 1 or
2 are not authorized to carry their assigned weapon home and must upon arrival
for duty, checkout their weapon as normally prescribed by Patrol Operations,
FPD and other GSA guidelines. The authorization for police officers to carry their service firearms
between their home and duty station was continued even after the end of the
Persian Gulf War. Indeed, on January 30, 1992, Garrett De Yulia, GSA's
Assistant Commissioner, Office of Physical Security and Law Enforcement, sent a
memorandum to Federal Protective Service Division Director Wulf R. Lindenau,
which stated that his previous authorization which allowed police officers to
transport assigned firearms from their duty station to their residence of
record, was "extended indefinitely." The memorandum stated, in relevant part:
We have reviewed your memorandum dated January 21, 1992, regarding an
authorization permitting Federal Protective Officers of the National Capital
Region to transport their assigned firearms from their duty stations to their
residence of record. After careful consideration, we feel that your request is consistent
with effective operational practices, by eliminating the need for the time
consuming administrative process of firearm issuance and retrieval, and
improving our capability to respond to emergency situations under employee
recall conditions. Furthermore, we agree that a firearm procedure such as the
one you have proposed requires establishment of regulatory procedures similar
to those which you have described. Therefore, my previous authorization which
allowed FPOs to transport their assigned firearm from their duty stations to
their residences of record is extended indefinitely, . . . Apparently Assistant Commissioner De Yulia thereafter inquired as to
the feasibility of issuing a General Order authorizing police officers to carry
their weapon to their residence. The record reveals that De Yulia was sent a
memorandum dated February 16, 1993 from Melville Valkenburg, Respondent's
Associate General Counsel, Real Property Division, addressing the matter as
follows: This is in reply to your request for our views concerning the
proposed General Order of the Federal Protective Service Division (FPSD),
National Capital Region (NCR), authorizing Federal Protective Officers (FPOs)
to carry assigned firearms between their duty station and their
residence. The issue of FPOs carrying their assigned firearms while in a
non-duty status to and from duty assignments has been previously considered by
both the General Counsel and the Office of Legal Counsel, Department of
Justice. See General Counsel memorandum of December 1, 1978 and the October 2,
1972, Opinion of the Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel,
Department of Justice which are attached. It remains our office's opinion that
no authority exists to permit FPOs to carry their assigned firearms in a
non-duty status between their duty station and their residence except in
exceptional duty-related circumstances such as those outlined in the Justice
Department opinion. The 1972 Opinion of the Assistant Attorney General, referred to by
Valkenburg in his memorandum to the GSA Administrator, states: The Attorney General has asked me to provide you with my views on
whether the Administrator of the General Services Administration is authorized
to permit Federal Protective Service officers to carry their weapons while in a
non-duty status. These officers are assigned to protect particular federal
buildings and we understand that, under present general practice, their weapons
remain at their assigned buildings. The question concerns whether the officers
may be permitted as a general practice to carry their weapons back and forth
between home and work and to other places when they are off duty, either openly
or concealed on their persons. Except in the narrow circumstances noted below,
such carriage of weapons by off-duty officers would not be authorized by
federal law, and officers attempting it would probably be subject to
prosecution under some State weapons laws. The Administrator is expressly authorized "to furnish arms and
ammunition" for Federal Protective Service officers. 40 U.S.C. 490(a)(2). This
express statutory authority carries with it, by necessary implication,
authority for the officers to carry weapons while on duty. There is, however,
no express statutory provision governing carriage of weapons by these officers
when they are in off-duty status, and no directly controlling judicial
decisions. Therefore, the question is whether such carriage of weapons is
either necessary or reasonably related to the performance of their official
duties. Unlike most law enforcement officers, who have broad duties and
authority to enforce the laws throughout their jurisdictions, Federal
Protective Service officers have relatively narrow and specific duties --to
guard, enforce regulations, and keep the peace in and around federal buildings.
The relevant statute specifically states that their "jurisdiction and policing
powers . . . shall be restricted to Federal property over which the United
States has acquired exclusive or concurrent criminal jurisdiction."
40 U.S.C. 318. Accordingly, should a Federal Protective Service officer
observe or have reason to believe that an offense is being committed in his
presence while he is off duty and away from federal buildings, he would have no
more authority to act than would any other private citizen. State criminal laws prohibiting the carrying of deadly weapons,
particularly concealed weapons, reflect widely accepted legislative judgments
that carriage of weapons by substantial numbers of people, away from their
homes or places of business, is inherently dangerous and should be kept to a
minimum, consistent with law enforcement needs. Such statutes typically contain
exemptions for policemen, and some include exemptions for other narrow
categories of employment. For example, the Virginia statute exempts rural mail
carriers. VA. Code § 18.1-269. However, the courts have tended to construe
these exemptions narrowly. In McKenzie v. United States, 158 A.2d 912 (1960), the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia sustained a conviction of a
"special policeman" for carrying a weapon without a license. The defendant was
what is generally called a security guard hired to guard particular private
businesses. He was specially licensed to carry a weapon while on duty at
assigned posts. However, at the time of the arrest, he had not been on duty or
at a building he had been assigned to guard. The court held that the defendant
was neither a "policeman" nor a "law enforcement officer" within the meaning of
the District's weapons statute. Other courts have adopted similar reasoning in
sustaining weapons convictions of off-duty postal employees carrying weapons
away from their offices or routes. See, e.g., State v.
Boone, 44 S.E. 595 (N.C. 1903); Lane v. State, 22 S.W. 140
(Tex. 1983). In our view, the McKenzie decision is sound and substantially
analogous to the present situation. Further, it should be noted that the
District of Columbia statute, unlike most concealed weapons laws, prohibits
carriage of weapons "either openly or concealed on or about his person." 22
D.C. Code 3204. We can envision circumstances in which a Federal Protective Service
officer may have a special duty-related reason to carry his weapon while
off-duty. For example, if some officers are assigned to different and widely
not ascertainable in advance. It would be impossible to catalogue in detail all
such situations before the fact. The Administrator might establish general
guidelines governing special duty-related situations justifying off-duty
carriage of weapons. Off-duty carriage of weapons in conformity with such
guidelines would be impliedly authorized by federal law and would not, by the
same token, provide a basis for prosecution under State weapons statutes.
However, in view of the limited powers and duties of Federal Protective Service
officers, it is clear that the Administrator would not be authorized to permit
off-duty carriage of weapons as a general practice, and that such carriage
might well violate State weapons statutes. The 1978 memorandum from the GSA General Counsel, referred to in
Associate General Counsel Valkenburg's memorandum dated February 16, 1993, was
also addressed to the GSA Administrator and essentially reached the same
conclusion as the 1972 Department of Justice memorandum. The General Counsel's
opinion relied in part on a 1973 case, decided by the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals, wherein a Federal Protective Service police officer (FPO) was
arrested for possession of a weapon in the District of Columbia. His defense
was that as an FPO, he was within certain exceptions to the District of
Columbia statute which restricted carrying a weapon. The exemption applied to
"duly appointed law-enforcement officials." The General Counsel's memorandum,
inter alia, related that the court had ruled the FPO did not fall
within the exception since his only authority to carry a weapon derived from
the GSA Administrator and that a "thorough search of the District of Columbia
and United States statutes fails to disclose any authorization for FPOs to
carry firearms other than while on duty or while in a travel status to and from
duty assignments, wherever those assignments may be located." The memorandum
also included the following observation: "It should be emphasized that since FPO's jurisdiction is restricted
to property under the Administrator's control, the fact that an FPO may possess
a weapon while on non-duty status would give the FPO no more authority to use
the weapon outside of Federal property than would any other private
citizen." By memorandum dated February 24, 1993 Assistant Commissioner De Yulia
informed his Division Directors of the Agency's legal opinion that no authority
exists to permit FPOs, in normal situations, to carry their assigned firearms
in a non-duty status between their duty station and residence. Federal
Protective Service Division Directors were instructed to take immediate steps
to ensure complete compliance with the legal opinion. The record reveals that sometime between February 16 and February 24,
1993 Director Lindenau became aware of Respondent's decision to discontinue the
practice of allowing police officers to carry their weapons between their
residence and the Navy Yard. Thereupon Lindenau issued an order for the
immediate discontinuance of the practice by all Respondent's police officers.
The announcement was made without prior notice having been given to the Union
President, Albert Moody, or any agent of the collective bargaining
representative.(2) Moody heard from his Union Vice President who worked the
6:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. shift that at the end of the shift, all police officers
were required to turn in their weapons at the Navy Yard. Moody immediately met
with Lindenau and was informed of the new policy. Moody expressed his
displeasure with the change and Lindenau indicated that he had no choice but to
implement the new policy immediately. Within a few days after the new policy was put into effect, Moody, by
memorandum dated February 26, 1993, requested to bargain on the change and
requested the policy be rescinded while the parties negotiate on the impact and
implementation of the change. Respondent never replied to the Union's request
to bargain on the matter. Additional Findings, Discussion and Conclusions The General Counsel alleges Respondent's terminating the
practice of allowing police officers to carry their weapons between their home
and the Navy Yard (their duty station) violated the Statute, contending: police
officers transporting their weapons is a condition of employment; Respondent
was obligated to negotiate with the Union over the impact and implementation of
the change since the impact of the change was more than de
minimis; and Respondent failed to bargain on the change. In addition to
challenging Respondent's defenses, the General Counsel also argues that a
status quo ante remedy be imposed. Respondent takes the position that the practice of permitting police
officers to carry their weapons from their duty station to their residence was
illegal and accordingly the Agency was privileged to immediately terminate the
practice and that, in any event, the Union was afforded prior notice and an
opportunity to negotiate on the matter but declined to do so.(3) Respondent also opposes any
imposition of a status quo ante remedy. The test the Authority has applied in deciding whether a matter
concerns a condition of employment within the meaning of the Statute was set
Consolidated School System, 22 FLRA 235 (1986). In that case the Authority
stated that in making such a determination it would consider: whether the
matter pertains to bargaining unit employees; and the nature and extent of the
effect of the matter on working conditions of those employees. Id. at
236-237. Clearly the matter at issue herein pertains bargaining unit employees
and whether police officers carry their weapons home is a matter which flows
solely from the employment relationship. See American Federation of
Government Employees, National Border Patrol Council and National Immigration
and Naturalization Council and U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and
Naturalization Service, 40 FLRA 521, 542-543, (1991). Accordingly, I
conclude the matter at issue herein concerns a condition of employment within
the meaning of the Statute. When an agency changes a condition of employment of bargaining unit
employees it is normally obligated under the Statute to notify and negotiate
with the collective bargaining representative prior to effectuating the change.
Department of the Air Force, Scott Air Force Base, 5 FLRA 9 (1981). Even
though an agency in some cases may be privileged under the Statute to
effectuate a change without bargaining on the decision itself, for example the
methods and means of performing the agency's work or a matter involving the
agency's internal security, it has been long held that the agency may
nevertheless be required to negotiate on the impact and implementation of the
change before effectuating the change. See Social Security
Administration, 8 FLRA 517 (1982). In the case herein the allegation is that Respondent failed to bargain
with this Union regarding the impact and implementation of the change.(4) However, Respondent contends
that the practice of permitting police officers to take their weapons to their
residences at the completion of their tour of duty was illegal. If illegal,
Respondent had no obligation to negotiate with the Union before terminating the
practice. Department of the Interior, U.S. Geological Survey, Conservation
Division, Gulf of Mexico Region, Metaire, Louisiana, 9 FLRA 543 (1982).
While it has not been conclusively established that it would be illegal
for Respondent's police officers to continue the practice of transporting their
official weapons between their duty station and residence, the record upon
which Respondent relied in making its decision to terminate the practice
strongly suggests the illegality of the practice. Two litigated D.C. court
cases give a reasonable indication of the possible illegality of such conduct
and the legal advice given by the Justice Department and the Agency's office of
its General Counsel, directly urging the discontinuance of the practice based
upon conclusions of illegality, appears to be sound. While some of the legal
guidance relied upon is not particularly current, the record does not suggest
that police officer's duties are substantially different than they were
immediately prior to the change in practice in 1991 which allowed the
transportation of weapons. Nor does the record disclose any authorization, or
particular functions police officers currently perform, which would somehow
undermine the basis upon which the legal opinions were formed. On the record
herein I find and conclude Respondent, in a good faith, reasonably concluded,
officers to carry their weapons home when off duty was illegal. In these
circumstances I conclude Respondent was privileged to immediately discontinue
the practice prior to providing the Union with notice and an opportunity to
negotiate on the decision without violating the Statute. Id. Notwithstanding the above, Respondent was nevertheless obliged under
the Statute to promptly notify the Union of the change and provide it with an
opportunity to negotiate on the impact and implementation of the change unless
the impact of the change was de minimis. In Department of
Health and Human Services, Social Security Administration, 24 FLRA 403, 408
(1986), the Authority held that in determining whether a change is more than
de minimis it would look to "the nature and extent of the effect
or reasonably foreseeable effect of the change on conditions of employment of
bargaining unit employees." Counsel for the General Counsel avers that the
following portion of a February 23, 1993 letter from Director Lindenau to
Assistant Commissioner De Yulia arguing that police officers should retain
authority to carry their weapons between their residences and the duty station
supports its contention that the change was not de minimis: . . . FPS officers remain subject to immediate recall due to extreme
shortages of FPS law enforcement officers and as changes occur to the regional
threat level posture. Officers today are expected to report to their base
headquarters office in the Southeast Federal Center for assignment and shift
briefings. This must be accomplished quickly and efficiently. Officers must be
available for dispatch in the region within minutes of reporting for work. The
Government benefits by officers taking their firearm home by avoiding the
time-consuming chore of issuing firearms at the beginning and end of each
shift. Assuming that the issuance of a firearm takes from 30 to 60 seconds each
(checking and verifying the serial number, inspecting the condition of weapon,
and signing the checkout register), it would take the Government about one hour
at the beginning of each eight hour shift and another hour at the end of the
shift to checkout/in each officer's firearm, daily (from the first officer
issuance to the last based on a 60-75 officer shift). . . . Director Lindenau cleary describes a foreseeable effect of the change
which appears to have significant adverse impact on the Agency in terms of
nonproductive time spent by police officers checking firearms in and out at the
Navy Yard. However, each police officer would be affected only possibly one
minute at the beginning and end of each workday by following an additional, but
apparently innocuous, procedure and I am unable to discern on this record any
other impact, adverse or otherwise, on police officers' conditions of
employment by the effectuation of the change. A police officer is not required
to use a weapon or enforce any law when not in duty status. Indeed officer's
movements are severely restricted when transporting a weapon. Therefore it
appears that transporting the weapon to the police officer's residence was for
the benefit and convenience of the Agency, not the employee. Thus it is not
apparent that the nature of the work is such that employees' ability to perform
their work is related in any meaningful way to transporting their weapon to
their residence. See U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Social
Security Administration, Baltimore, Maryland, 36 FLRA 655, 666-667 (1990).
Accordingly I conclude that the impact of the change was de
minimis and that Respondent was not obligated to negotiate with the
Union concerning the impact and implementation of the change. Id. Were I to find Respondent obligated to bargain on the impact and
implementation of the change I would nevertheless not recommend ordering a
status quo ante remedy on the facts herein.(5) In Federal Correctional
Institution, 8 FLRA 604 (1982), the Authority announced: . . . in determining whether a status quo ante
other things, (1) whether, and when, notice was given to the union by the
agency concerning the action or change decided upon; (2) whether, and when, the
union requested bargaining on the procedures to be observed by the agency in
implementing such action or change and/or concerning appropriate arrangements
for employees adversely affected by such action or change; (3) the willfulness
of the agency's conduct in failing to discharge its bargaining obligations
under the Statute; (4) the nature and extent of the impact experienced by
adversely affected employees; and (5) whether, and to what degree, a
status quo ante remedy would disrupt or impair the
efficiency and effectiveness of the agency's operations. I have considered the above factors when evaluating the matter
presented herein and having noted particularly the impact on bargaining unit
employees occasioned by the change, see id. at 606, and that a return to
the status quo ante would require Respondent to return to
a practice which may be unlawful. See United States Department of
Office, 34 FLRA 1035, 1048 (1990). In the circumstances herein I conclude
that even if Respondent was found to be obligated to bargain with the Union on
the impact and implementation of the change, a status quo
ante remedy would not be appropriate in this case. Accordingly, in view of the foregoing and my evaluation of the entire
record herein I conclude it has not been established that Respondent violated
the Statute as alleged and, in any event, it would not effectuate the purposes
and policies of the Statute to impose a status quo ante
remedy even if a violation of the Statute was found to have occurred and I
recommend the Authority issue the following: ORDER It is hereby ordered that the Complaint in Case No. WA-CA-30469
be, and hereby, is, dismissed. Issued, Washington, DC, November 3, 1994 ___________________________SALVATORE J. ARRIGO Administrative
have footnotes.) 1. Member Armendariz' dissenting
opinion is set forth at the end of this decision. 2. Because Respondent's Opposition to
the General Counsel's Exceptions was untimely filed under 5 C.F.R. §
2423.28(b), the Authority will not consider it. 3. Although the Judge initially
characterized the case as one involving impact and implementation bargaining,
it is clear that the complaint alleged that the Respondent violated the Statute
by failing to bargain over both the substance of the change and its impact and
implementation. GC's Exh. 1(b) at para. 12. 4. The officers are employed pursuant
to 40 U.S.C. § 318, which provides authority for the General Services
Administration to appoint "special policemen" to police "all buildings and
areas owned or occupied by the United States and under the charge and control
of the Administrator." 40 U.S.C. § 318(a). The federal police officers
have the following powers, as described in the statute: Special policemen appointed under this section shall have the same
powers as sheriffs and constables upon property referred to in subsection (a)
of this section to enforce the laws enacted for the protection of persons and
property, and to prevent breaches of the peace, to suppress affrays or unlawful
assemblies, and to enforce any rules and regulations promulgated by the
Administrator of General Services or such duly authorized officials of the
General Services Administration for the property under their jurisdiction;
except that the jurisdiction and policing powers of such special policemen
shall not extend to the service of civil process. 40 U.S.C. § 318(b). 5. The order states that all officers
are "authorized to wear and carry their Government assigned .38 caliber
revolver, while off duty when travelling [sic] to and from their place of
residence and official duty station." Judge's Decision at 3. The order
requires the officers to agree to one of two alternative procedures, or else be
subjected to a third procedure. Under Procedure 1, officers leaving their duty
station are required to remain in uniform, carry their firearm in their issued
holster in plain view, go directly home without deviating from the most direct
route, and upon arriving home, immediately secure the weapon with an issued
trigger lock, unload the weapon and place it in an area of restricted access.
Similar requirements apply when officers leave home to return to duty. If the
officer fails to bring the weapon when reporting for duty, the officer will not
be permitted to work and will be placed on leave until the officer reports for
duty with all assigned equipment. Under Procedure 2, an officer who does not
wish to wear his or her uniform home must unload his or her weapon and place it
in the trunk of his or her personal vehicle, and should not stop in any public
area while off-duty with the weapon left in the vehicle. Upon arriving home,
and upon returning to duty, the officer must follow the same steps as in
Procedure 1. Under Procedure 3, officers who do not follow either Procedure 1
or 2 are not authorized to carry weapons home and must, upon arrival for duty,
and at the end of the their shift, check their weapons in and out according to
the usual procedures. 6. Within a few days after the policy
was put into effect, the Union Vice President requested to bargain on the
change, and requested that the policy be rescinded until the parties negotiated
on the impact and implementation of the change. The Agency did not reply to the
Union's request. 7. The Judge also held that the Agency
was not obligated to bargain with the Union over the impact and implementation
of the change because the impact of the change was de minimis.
The General Counsel excepted to this portion of the Judge's decision. However,
in view of our decision that the Agency committed an unfair labor practice in
failing to notify and bargain with the Union prior to implementing the change,
it is unnecessary to further consider this aspect of the Judge's decision. 8. The Judge concluded that even if the
Agency was obligated to bargain on the impact and implementation of the change,
a status quo ante remedy was inappropriate, given the
minimal impact of the change on the employees, and because of the unlawful
nature of the Agency's practice. 9. The Agency does not dispute that the
matter of whether unit employees are permitted to carry their weapons between
their residences and duty stations concerns unit employees' conditions of
employment. Moreover, the record indicates that the police officers in this
case are required to carry weapons in the regular course of their employment.
As such, the question of whether those police officers may be permitted to
carry weapons between their residences and duty stations clearly pertains to
bargaining unit employees and flows solely and directly from their employment
relationship. See American Federation of Government Employees,
Council and U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization
Service, 40 FLRA 521, 542-43 (1991) reversed as to other matters,
975 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1992). Consequently, we find, in agreement with the
Judge, that the matter at issue concerns a condition of employment within the
meaning of section 7103(a)(14) of the Statute. See generally,
System, 22 FLRA 235 (1986). 10. The D.C. Code provided then, and
now, in relevant part: § 22-3204 (a) No person shall within the District of Columbia carry either
openly or concealed on or about his person, except in his dwelling house or
place of business or on other land possessed by him, a pistol, without a
license therefor issued as hereinafter provided, or any deadly or dangerous
weapon capable of being so concealed . . . . § 22-3205 The provisions of section 22-3204 shall not apply to . . . policemen
or other duly appointed law-enforcement officers . . . or to officers or
employees of the United States duly authorized to carry a concealed pistol in
the usual or ordinary course of such business . . . or to any person while
carrying a pistol unloaded in a secure wrapper from the place or purchase to
his home or place of business or to a place of repair or back to his home or
place of business in moving goods from one place of abode or business to
another. 11. To the extent that our dissenting
colleague interprets Middleton as requiring that an officer be in a duty
status in order to carry a weapon, we disagree. The court stated that its
research failed to disclose authority for officers to carry firearms except
"while on duty or while in a travel status to and from duty
assignments." 305 A. 2d at 262 (emphasis added). If, as the dissent concludes,
the second alternative is interpreted to refer only to travel by officers while
they are in a duty status, it is redundant of the first alternative and, as a
result, is rendered meaningless. 12. The D.C. Code Ann. § 4-114,
provides for the appointment of "special policemen" to be paid by corporations
or individuals whose property the policemen are appointed to guard. Applicable
regulations provide that a weapon carried by a special policeman whose
commission extends to more than one person's or corporation's property "may be
carried only when such special policeman is on actual duty in the area thereof
or while traveling, without deviation, immediately before and immediately after
the period of actual duty, between such area and the residence of such special
policeman." Timus, 406 A.2d at 1272 (quoting Manual of the Metropolitan
Police Department, Ch. XI, § 11.8). ALJ's Footnotes Follow: 1. Apparently during this period
police officers were still reporting to the Navy Yard headquarters at the
beginning and end of each shift. 2. Lindenau testified that the Union
had some notice of the change in that a few days earlier he told Moody that he
had heard a "negative interpretation may be forthcoming" regarding the
authorization for carrying weapons to residences. 3. Respondent raised this at opening
argument during the hearing but did not address it in its brief. 4.