Source: http://murderpedia.org/male.V/v1/vuong-hai-hai.htm
Timestamp: 2018-01-16 07:29:36
Document Index: 521410272

Matched Legal Cases: ['art. 37', 'art. 37', 'art. 37', 'art. 37', 'art. 37', 'art. 11']

Hai Hai Vuong | Murderpedia, the encyclopedia of murderers
Date of murders: December 7, 1986
Date of birth: September 19, 1955
Victims profile: Tien Van Nguyen, 27, and Hien Quang Tran, 16
Method of murder: Shooting (semi-automatic .223 caliber rifle)
Status: Executed by lethal injection in Texas on December 7, 1995
Vuong, Hai #904
Vuong v. Scott
The facts are set forth in Vuong v. State, 830 S.W.2d 929, 933 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 595, 121 L.Ed.2d 533 (1992), and Vuong v. Collins, 867 F.Supp. 1268, 1271 (E.D.Tex.1994), and are now recounted here.
On December 7, 1986, Vuong and two friends were playing pool and drinking beer at the Tam Game Room in Port Arthur, Texas. Vuong claims that Vietnamese gang members from New Orleans started to threaten him there. Vuong became angry, left the establishment, and went home to retrieve a Colt AR-15 or M-16 automatic or semi-automatic1 .223 caliber rifle.
Vuong's first claim is that the jury was unconstitutionally prevented from adequately considering certain mitigating evidence at the punishment phase of the trial. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 322-24, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 2948-50, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989). In Texas, the jury must answer three "special issues" affirmatively before a sentence of death may be imposed. See TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 37.071(b).
Under Texas law applicable to Vuong, in a multiple murder case under TEX.PENAL CODE Sec. 19.03(a)(6), the court was to submit the three special issues only with regard to the "conduct of the defendant in murdering the deceased individual first named in the indictment." TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 37.071(f).
Under Teague, "a case announces a new rule when it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government" or was not "dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final." Id. at 301, 109 S.Ct. at 1070. The Teague principle seeks to validate "good faith interpretations of existing precedents made by state courts." Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 414, 110 S.Ct. 1212, 1217, 108 L.Ed.2d 347 (1990).
This maxim applies even if those interpretations "are shown to be contrary to later decisions." Id. "Thus, unless reasonable jurists hearing petitioner's claim at the time his conviction became final 'would have felt compelled by existing precedent' to rule in his favor, we are barred from doing so now." Graham v. Collins, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 892, 898, 122 L.Ed.2d 260 (1993) (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 488, 110 S.Ct. 1257, 1260, 108 L.Ed.2d 415 (1990)).
In Jurek, the Court rejected a facial challenge to Texas's unique three special issues scheme and determined that the "constitutionality of the Texas procedures turn[ed] on whether the enumerated questions allow consideration of particularized mitigating factors." Id. at 272, 96 S.Ct. at 2956.
After noting that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals had indicated that as to the second special issue it would "allow a defendant to bring to the jury's attention whatever mitigating circumstances he may be able to show," id. (plurality opinion), the Court held that the system promoted "the evenhanded, rational and consistent imposition of death sentences...." Id. at 276, 96 S.Ct. at 2958 (plurality opinion). Thus, art. 37.071 survived the petitioner's constitutional challenge.
In Franklin, the petitioner contended that the Texas system was unconstitutional as applied because the jury was unable to consider his record of good conduct in prison. 487 U.S. at 172, 108 S.Ct. at 2326-27 (plurality opinion). Between the time of Jurek and Franklin, the Court had determined that, as a matter of law, in a capital case " 'the sentencer ... [may] not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.' " Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110, 102 S.Ct. 869, 871, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982) (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 2965, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978)).
The petitioner in Franklin argued that the instructions in his case violated this so-called "Lockett- Eddings rule." He was not denied the opportunity to present his mitigating evidence but contended that the special issues did not give the jury "sufficient opportunity" to give "adequate weight" to the evidence. 487 U.S. at 172, 108 S.Ct. at 2326-27 (plurality opinion).
Under the sentencing procedure followed in this case the jury could express its views about the appropriate punishment only by answering the special verdict questions regarding the deliberateness of the murder and the defendant's future dangerousness. To the extent that the mitigating evidence introduced by petitioner was relevant to one of the special verdict questions, the jury was free to give effect to that evidence by returning a negative answer to that question.
If, however, petitioner had introduced mitigating evidence about his background or character or the circumstances of the crime that was not relevant to the special verdict questions, or that had relevance to the defendant's moral culpability beyond the scope of the special verdict questions, the jury instructions would have provided the jury with no vehicle for expressing its "reasoned moral response" to that evidence. If this were such a case, then we would have to decide whether the jury's inability to give effect to that evidence amounted to an Eighth Amendment violation.
The Court found just such a situation in Penry, 492 U.S. at 322-28, 109 S.Ct. at 2948-52, in which the Court determined that the Texas system, absent a special instruction, did not allow the jury properly to consider Penry's evidence of mental retardation and childhood abuse. Id. at 322-28, 109 S.Ct. at 2948-52.
The Court reaffirmed the principle, as embodied by Lockett and Eddings, that "punishment should be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal defendant." Id. at 319, 109 S.Ct. at 2947. The special issues, according to the Court, did not provide the sentencer with "a vehicle for expressing its 'reasoned moral response' " to the mitigating evidence. Id. at 328, 109 S.Ct. at 2952.
More specifically, the Court found that, absent a definition of "deliberately," the jury was not able properly to consider the evidence as it bore on Penry's "personal culpability" as encompassed in the first special issue. Id. at 323, 109 S.Ct. at 2949. On the second issue, the Court held that the evidence, absent an instruction, could be a "two-edged sword," both diminishing Penry's blameworthiness for the crime and increasing the probability that he would be dangerous in the future.6 Id. at 324, 109 S.Ct. at 2949-50.
Finally, the Court stated that a juror who concluded that Penry's mental state made him less culpable than a normal adult for his actions, still could conclude that Penry's actions were unreasonable in response to the amount of provocation by the victim. Id. The solution was "instructions informing the jury that it could consider and give effect to the mitigating evidence of Penry's mental retardation and abused background by declining to impose the death penalty...." Id. at 328, 109 S.Ct. at 2952.7
Our narrow interpretation was later approved in Graham, in which the Court held that the petitioner's claim was barred by Teague. Petitioner had argued that the jury was unable to give effect to the mitigating evidence of his youth, family background, and positive character traits. --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 895.
Graham's conviction became final on September 10, 1984. The Court concluded that reasonable jurists in 1984 would have found that, under our cases, the Texas statute satisfied the commands of the Eighth Amendment: it permitted petitioner to place before the jury whatever mitigating evidence he could show, including his age, while focusing the jury's attention upon what that evidence revealed about the defendant's capacity for deliberation and prospects for rehabilitation.
The Court specifically stated that it "did not read Penry as effecting a sea change in this Court's view of the constitutionality of the former Texas death penalty statute; it does not broadly suggest the invalidity of the special issues framework." Id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 901 (footnote omitted). The Court noted that, unlike the situation in Penry, the "mitigating evidence was not placed beyond the jury's effective reach." Id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 902.
The Court held that the jury plainly could have answered "no" to the special issues based upon mitigating evidence, consistently with its instructions. Id. Whereas Penry's evidence "compelled" an affirmative answer to the future dangerousness issue and had some mitigating significance, "Graham's evidence quite readily could have supported a negative answer." Id.
Finally, during the same term as Graham, the Court decided Johnson v. Texas, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 2658, 125 L.Ed.2d 290 (1993). The petitioner presented the Court with a Penry claim similar to the one raised in Graham but on direct review rather than on habeas. Thus, the Court was not constrained by Teague.
The defendant in Johnson, as the petitioner in Graham had done, contended that the Texas special issues, absent special instructions, did not allow the jury to give adequate weight to mitigating evidence of his youth at the time of the offense. Johnson, id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2661. The Court, however, declined to take the step that would have amounted to a new rule in Graham. Id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2668. As this court has indicated, "the Court's analysis of Johnson's claim speaks directly not only to the scope of Penry but also to how the 'rule' Johnson requested would be viewed under Teague." Motley, 18 F.3d at 1233.
The Johnson Court had no doubt that the petitioner's youth was a relevant mitigating circumstance that should be within the effective reach of the sentencer. --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2668. The Court concluded that "there is ample room in the assessment of future dangerousness for a juror to take account of the difficulties of youth as a mitigating force in the sentencing determination." Id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2669.
Furthermore, "the fact that a juror might view the evidence of youth as aggravating, as opposed to mitigating, does not mean that the rule of Lockett is violated." Id. (citing Graham, --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 901-02).
The key is whether the "mitigating evidence is within 'the effective reach of the sentencer'...." Id. Therein was the difference between Penry and Johnson: The jury "had a meaningful basis to consider the relevant mitigating qualities of petitioner's youth...." Id. As a result, Texas was not required to give the jury an additional instruction beyond those given with the special issues. Id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2670.
Vuong's conviction became final on the day certiorari was denied, November 30, 1992. We must decide whether reasonable jurists, at that time, would have deemed themselves compelled to accept Vuong's claim under Penry. In order to grant relief in this case, we would be required to hold that at the time Vuong's conviction became final, the Eighth Amendment, in a multiple murder case in Texas, required that a jury be given a special instruction so that it could give proper weight to mitigating evidence of provocation by a victim not named first in the indictment.
Under Graham, if the jury was able to give proper mitigating effect to the evidence under the instructions as given, such a holding--that a special instruction is required--would constitute a "new rule" of constitutional law under Teague.
The court found that provocation on the part of Davis, who was the second-named victim, was a relevant circumstance of the offense that the jury should have been able to consider as mitigating evidence. Id. at 840. The court further held that the existing special issues did not provide an adequate means whereby that evidence could be considered. Id. at 842.
In rejecting the state's contention that the punishment charge provided an adequate means by which the jury could give mitigating effect to the evidence, the court quoted the charge:
For two reasons, we conclude that Vuong's claim nevertheless must fail. First, the facts in Vuong's case, unlike those in First, simply do not support a special instruction on the assertion that provocation by Nguyen affects Vuong's culpability with respect to the killing of Tran. The evidence indicates that Vuong himself initiated the violence in the first place by going home, retrieving a rifle, and returning to the game room.
At least two persons were shot by Vuong before the alleged provocation by Nguyen occurred. There is no testimony, other than Vuong's, to support the claim that Nguyen was reaching for a gun when he was shot, and no gun was found at the scene. Petitioner then shot a fourth person and one of the previous victims a second time before turning the gun on Tran.
Moreover, reasonable jurists looking at Vuong's conviction would not have felt compelled to conclude that the charge was deficient solely on account of the operation of art. 37.071(f).10 This court has held that the possible mitigating effect of provocation by a victim can be adequately accounted for under Penry in the first two special issues.
In White v. Collins, 959 F.2d 1319 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1001, 112 S.Ct. 1714, 118 L.Ed.2d 419 (1992), the petitioner had not requested that the third special issue be submitted, and consequently it was not submitted as part of the punishment charge. The petitioner, in his habeas proceeding, claimed that the victim had sprayed him with mace, therefore provoking a violent reaction. Id. at 1323-24.
The court decided that the jury could have concluded that "absent such provocation, [petitioner] would be nonviolent" and thus could have rendered a negative answer to the future dangerousness inquiry. Id. at 1324.
In response to White's claim that he accidentally or by reflex action discharged the gun because of the effect of the mace, the court determined that the jury might have answered "no" to the deliberateness inquiry of the first punishment phase. Id.
Similarly, Vuong's jury could have determined that any provocation by Nguyen reduced the probability that the killing of Tran was "deliberate" and, as a result, could have returned a negative answer to the first special issue. See Heckert v. State, 612 S.W.2d 549 (Tex.Crim.App.1981) (holding that "deliberately" and "intentionally" are not linguistic equivalents that would render art. 37.071 a nullity).
Vuong's final two claims arise out of events that occurred during the deliberations at the punishment stage of the trial. While deliberating, the jury submitted a note to the court asking, among other things, about Vuong's eligibility for parole. According to Texas law, "a jury may not consider the possibility of parole in its deliberations on punishment." Felder v. State, 758 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Tex.Crim.App.1988).
The court responded with an explanatory note indicating that a person sentenced to life in prison could earn good time that would reduce the amount of time he had to serve. The court also indicated that the jury was not to consider parole when determining the sentence.
Vuong now alleges two errors, the first of which is that the court communicated with the jury in response to the note without consulting with the defense attorneys. Vuong claims that this ex parte contact violated his Sixth Amendment and Due Process rights.12
Vuong asserts that the federal district court erred in affording a presumption of correctness, and thereby denying an evidentiary hearing on this issue, to the state court's collateral review finding that there had not been an ex parte communication regarding parole between the trial judge and the jury. Vuong now requests a federal evidentiary hearing on this issue. In the event that this court denies the hearing and upholds the presumption, Vuong asserts that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to the communication to the jury.
Federal habeas courts accord state findings of fact a presumption of correctness, provided the factfinding procedures employed were "adequate." 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(d)(2).13 This court has indicated that "it is clear that Sec. 2254(d) does not preclude a federal court from presuming the correctness of factfindings made from a paper record." May v. Collins, 955 F.2d 299, 312 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 901, 112 S.Ct. 1925, 118 L.Ed.2d 533 (1992).
As long as the habeas applicant and the state are parties to the proceeding and the state court evidences its determination with a " 'a written finding, written opinion, or other reliable and adequate indicia,' " a hearing has taken place. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546-47, 101 S.Ct. 764, 769, 66 L.Ed.2d 722 (1981) (quoting Sec. 2254(d)).
In order to determine whether the requirements of Sec. 2254(d)(2) have been met by a paper hearing, "it is necessary to examine in each case whether a paper hearing is appropriate to the resolution of the factual disputes underlying the petitioner's claim." May, 955 F.2d at 312.
Vuong asserts that it was improper for the trial judge to rely upon personal recollections to resolve his state habeas claims. Therefore, Vuong contends, under Sec. 2254(d)(2) and the related provision in Sec. 2254(d)(3),14 that the trial judge's findings on this issue are not entitled to the presumption of correctness that they were accorded by the federal district court. See Vuong, 867 F.Supp. at 1274-75.
We find Vuong's contention to be without merit. Under Texas law, judges may use, among other things, "personal recollection" to resolve any unresolved facts raised by a state habeas petitioner. TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 11.07(2)(d).
In May, the state judge made a decision, based upon affidavits and his own firsthand knowledge of the trial, constituting a credibility determination that was accorded a presumption of correctness. 955 F.2d at 314-15; see also Sawyers v. Collins, 986 F.2d 1493, 1505 (5th Cir.1993) (state habeas judge in a position to assess credibility of competing affiants), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 2405, 124 L.Ed.2d 300 (1993).
Vuong argues that a distinction may be drawn between cases in which a judge is making credibility determinations, as in May, and a case in which the judge is making a factual finding directly related to his own actions. We find Vuong's distinction unpersuasive.
He points this court to no authority that indicates that a state trial judge may not use personal recollection to resolve factual disputes, as Texas law allows, even with respect to his own conduct. Judges are repeatedly asked and trusted to examine their own rulings, for example on a motion for rehearing or reconsideration.
Vuong also contends that the evidence that the state judge relied upon was insufficient to be presumed correct on the issue of whether an ex parte communication had taken place.16
The affidavit of Warren Clark, a member of the defense team, stated that he could not recall seeing the judge's communique to the jury on the law of parole. McWilliams, the prosecutor, stated that he felt "certain that all aspects of the Court's response [to the jury note] including the parole response were discussed with defense counsel."
DeLee, the other defense attorney, did not recall seeing the note asking about parole information, nor did he recall the court's response, though he attributed this to the time lapse between the trial and the affidavit. He also stated that he had "never known of any time that this court answered a note without review by attorneys."
In the alternative, Vuong contends that his attorneys rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by not objecting to the submission of the note to the jury. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Under Washington, Vuong must establish that his attorneys acted objectively unreasonably in failing to object and that he was prejudiced by the failure to object. Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064.17
Specifically, counsel's performance must be deficient under "prevailing professional norms." Id. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2066. Moreover, Vuong must establish more than that the outcome of his proceeding would have been different but for counsel's alleged errors. He must show that "the result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable." Lockhart v. Fretwell, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 838, 842, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993).