Source: http://openjurist.org/271/f2d/199/in-the-matter-of-virginia-m-eatherton
Timestamp: 2017-05-26 21:22:57
Document Index: 635845083

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2', '§ 40', '§ 32', '§ 32', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 1406']

271 F2d 199 In the Matter of Virginia M Eatherton | OpenJurist
271 F. 2d 199 - In the Matter of Virginia M Eatherton HomeFederal Reporter, Second Series 271 F.2d.
271 F2d 199 In the Matter of Virginia M Eatherton 271 F.2d 199
In the Matter of Virginia M. EATHERTON, Bankrupt, Appellant.
Subsequent to the 1952 amendments, however, it is apparent that the courts and other authorities have been unanimous in interpreting the territorial limitations set out in § 2, sub. a(1).2 As stated in the 1958 Supplement to Remington, 5th Edition, Vol. I, § 40, supra, "The 1952 changes in § 32 of the Bankruptcy Act * * * have tended to increase the feeling that the statutory provisions as to institution of bankruptcy proceedings in the district where the alleged bankrupt has his residence, domicile, or place of business relate to proper venue rather than to jurisdiction to entertain the proceedings." (Emphasis supplied). The few cases decided since 1952 all recognize that the amendment to § 32 demonstrates congressional recognition that the § 2, sub. a(1) requirements related to venue. See Saper v. Long, D.C.S.D.N.Y., 131 F.Supp. 795, and In re Fada Radio & Electric Co., D.C.S.D.N.Y., 132 F.Supp. 89. See also, In re Elk City Placer Mines, Inc., D.C. S.D.Idaho, 171 F.Supp. 894. Factually very similar to the appeal before us is (1) as relating to venue. In re Martinez, the latest decision construing § 2, sub. a 10 Cir., 241 F.2d 345. There, the Tenth Circuit reversed the order of the district court which had dismissed petitions filed by Missouri and Nebraska residents in the Kansas District Court under Chapter XIII of the Act. See also, In re Miller, D.C.Kan., 172 F.Supp. 208, and Note, 6 Duke Bar Journal 137, and Comment, 71 Harvard Law Review 728. In the interest of uniformity, we have always deferred to the views of another Circuit unless we could demonstrate to our own satisfaction that they were clearly wrong. Birmingham v. Geer, 8 Cir., 185 F.2d 82, 85, and cases cited; Cosentino v. Local 28, International Organization of Masters, etc., 8 Cir., 268 F.2d 648.
Prior to 1949, § 1406(a) read: "The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or districtshall transfer such case * * *" Thus the 1949 amendment inserting additional words was designed to give the district court power to dismiss and to make a transfer discretionary.