Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/800/895/270902/
Timestamp: 2020-07-12 01:07:17
Document Index: 426585925

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2113', '§ 2113', '§ 924', '§ 2113', '§ 2113', '§ 2113', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 2113', '§ 2113', '§ 924', '§ 921']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee v. Manuel Gonzalez, Defendant-appellant.united States of America, Plaintiff-appellee v. Tanya Gonzalez, Defendant-appellant, 800 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1986) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Ninth Circuit › 1986 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee v. Manuel Gonzalez, Defendant-appellant.united States o...
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee v. Manuel Gonzalez, Defendant-appellant.united States of America, Plaintiff-appellee v. Tanya Gonzalez, Defendant-appellant, 800 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1986)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 800 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1986) Argued and Submitted Aug. 4, 1986. Decided Sept. 23, 1986. As Amended Nov. 4, 1986
Manuel Gonzalez appeals his convictions for armed bank robbery and use of a firearm to commit a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113 (a) and (d) and 924(c). His wife, Tanya Gonzalez, appeals, in a companion case, her conviction for aiding and abetting the armed robbery. The Gonzalezes base their appeals on a number of grounds. Manuel contends that his convictions violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. He also challenges the district court's refusals to grant a continuance and to substitute counsel. The Gonzalezes challenge the denial of their motions for judgment of acquittal based on insufficiency of the evidence. Tanya contends the district court erred by denying her motion to dismiss the indictment. We affirm the convictions.
At the hearing before the grand jury the agent testified erroneously that Tanya began driving calmly after Manuel got into the car and only sped up when the police turned on their lights. The agent also told the grand jury that there was no evidence pointing to the innocence of either of the defendants. The grand jury charged Manuel with violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d) (armed bank robbery) and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (use of a firearm during a crime of violence). Tanya was indicted for aiding and abetting the armed bank robbery.
Manuel contends that his convictions under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a) and (d) and 924(c) violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Double Jeopardy Clause provides that no person shall "be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." Thus, the clause protects against multiple punishments for the same offense. Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 11 n. 5, 98 S. Ct. 909, 912 n. 5, 55 L. Ed. 2d 70 (1978). In determining multiplicity, we must consider whether each count of the indictment requires proof of a fact that the other does not. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S. Ct. 180, 182, 76 L. Ed. 306 (1932); United States v. Wylie, 625 F.2d 1371, 1381 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080, 101 S. Ct. 863, 66 L. Ed. 2d 804 (1981).
The "proof of a fact" referred to under the Blockburger test does not simply relate to whether the same evidence is used at trial to prove the two charges. So long as each offense requires the proof of a fact that the other does not, the Blockburger test is satisfied, notwithstanding a substantial overlap in the proof offered to establish the crimes. Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 785 n. 17, 95 S. Ct. 1284, 1293 n. 17, 43 L. Ed. 2d 616 (1975); United States v. Gann, 732 F.2d 714, 719 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1034, 105 S. Ct. 505, 83 L. Ed. 2d 397 (1984).
18 U.S.C. § 2113 (a) and (d) provide in pertinent part:
The two statutes meet the Blockburger test. The statutory elements of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a) and (d) not required to be proved for conviction under Sec. 924(c) include the taking of money from a bank and an assault or jeopardizing the life of another. The statutory element of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) not part of Sec. 2113 (a) and (d) is the use or carriage of a firearm.
Moreover, with respect to cumulative sentences imposed in a single proceeding, "the Double Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment that the legislature intended." Missouri v. Hunter 459 U.S. 359, 366, 103 S. Ct. 673, 678, 74 L. Ed. 2d 535 (1983). In 1984, Congress amended 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) with the express purpose of authorizing an additional sentence to that imposed for the underlying felony, specifically including Sec. 2113. S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 312-13 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3182, 3490-91. Therefore, under Missouri v. Hunter, Manuel's convictions and consecutive sentences do not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Manuel contends the district court erred by denying his motion for a continuance. The denial of a motion for a continuance will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion. United States v. Clevenger, 733 F.2d 1356, 1359 (9th Cir. 1984). Denial is a constitutional violation only if the district court unreasonably and arbitrarily insists upon "expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay." United States v. Mitchell, 744 F.2d 701, 704 (9th Cir. 1984) (quoting Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11-12, 103 S. Ct. 1610, 1616, 75 L. Ed. 2d 610 (1983)) . To demonstrate reversible error from the denial of such a motion, the defendant must show that the denial resulted in actual prejudice to his defense. Id.
Manuel contends that the district court's denial of his motion to substitute counsel was an abuse of discretion. The following factors are relevant to this court's review of the denial of a motion to substitute counsel: (1) timeliness of the motion; (2) adequacy of the court's inquiry into the defendant's complaint; and (3) whether the conflict between the defendant and his attorney was so great that it resulted in a total lack of communication preventing an adequate defense. Hudson v. Rushen, 686 F.2d 826, 829 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 916, 103 S. Ct. 1896, 77 L. Ed. 2d 285 (1983). A district court's refusal to substitute counsel is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Williams, 594 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1979).
The Gonzalezes contend that the evidence is insufficient to support their convictions for bank robbery "by use of a dangerous weapon" under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d) because no evidence was introduced at trial that the shotgun was loaded. In McLaughlin v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 106 S. Ct. 1677, 1678, 90 L. Ed. 2d 15 (1986), the Supreme Court held that an unloaded gun is a "dangerous weapon" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2113. Thus, the Gonzalezes' contention is without merit.
Manuel also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) for use of a firearm during the bank robbery. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a) (3) defines firearm as "any weapon ... which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive." The statute imposes no requirement that the gun be loaded or operable. Thus, the evidence is sufficient to support Manuel's conviction under Sec. 924(c).
Tanya contends that the district court erred by denying her motion to dismiss the indictment. The district court's refusal to dismiss the indictment is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Noti, 731 F.2d 610, 613 (9th Cir. 1984). The court may dismiss an indictment as an exercise of its inherent supervisory powers or to protect a defendant's due process rights. United States v. Al Mudarris, 695 F.2d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 932, 103 S. Ct. 2097, 77 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1983). However, governmental or prosecutorial misconduct warrants dismissal only when the misconduct represents a serious threat to the integrity of the judicial process. United States v. Everett, 692 F.2d 596, 601 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051, 103 S. Ct. 1498, 75 L. Ed. 2d 930 (1983).