Source: http://ny.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.19780505_0040293.C02.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2016-12-06 18:19:43
Document Index: 257169094

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2255', '§ 892', '§ 894', '§ 894', '§ 2255', 'art, 427', '§ 2255', '§ 1983']

LOUIS CHARLES KING, APPELLANT,v.UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, APPELLEE
Appeal by Louis Charles King from an order of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (MacMahon, D.J., of the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation) filed July 29, 1977, which denied a motion by King under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate a sentence imposed on him on May 25, 1973, after conviction by a jury on all counts of a seven count indictment charging King and others with making extortionate extensions of credit (18 U.S.C. § 892(a)), using extortionate means to collect extensions of credit (18 U.S.C. § 894(a)(1)), and conspiring to use such extortionate means to collect (18 U.S.C. § 894(a)).
On Thursday, March 1, the jury returned a verdict finding King and the other defendants guilty on all counts as charged. King then moved for judgment of acquittal and for a new trial, asserting very many of the grounds now urged on this appeal five years later. The motion was in all respects denied. During the argument of the motion, counsel for King expressed disbelief that King had in fact thrown a grenade into Kelly's house and then, to avoid shots and apprehension, had run away. Thereupon, the Court decided to have a hearing to establish the facts. An FBI agent testified to the incident at Kelly's house, counsel for King declined to cross-examine and declined to produce any evidence. The Court found the facts to be as related hereinabove. The Court rejected the absence of defendant as any reason for having delayed the trial, citing Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 25 L. Ed. 2d 353, 90 S. Ct. 1057 (1970), as having established the principle that absence from a trial caused by misconduct of a defendant is a voluntary waiver of the right to be present at the trial.
King appealed his conviction in the loan sharking case (73 Cr. 9) to this Court and on November 28, 1973, the judgment of conviction was unanimously affirmed, without opinion. 486 F.2d 1397 (Moore, Hays, and Timbers, C. JJ.) Certiorari was denied on April 22, 1974. 416 U.S. 958, 94 S. Ct. 1974, 40 L. Ed. 2d 309.
A motion for King for reduction of sentence (Fed. R. Crim. P. 35) was denied by Judge MacMahon by order dated September 12, 1974.
More than a year later and on January 7, 1977, King, represented by new counsel, filed a second motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Such a vacatur was the "ultimate relief" sought by the motion; various forms of "interim relief" were also sought, including the disqualification of Judge MacMahon. A protective order was sought prohibiting any communication with prospective witnesses and any dissemination to the press of the fact of the pendency of the proceeding. By order filed January 18, 1977, Judge MacMahon denied the motion so far as it asked for a protective order, citing Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 49 L. Ed. 2d 683, 96 S. Ct. 2791 (1976); he did, however, order that the file be sealed.
As counsel for King correctly points out, Section 455 was passed, among other reasons, to eliminate the "duty to sit" concept which had found expression in many judicial opinions. Some of these are cited in the memorandum of Mr. Justice Rehnquist in Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 837, 34 L. Ed. 2d 50, 93 S. Ct. 7 (1972). While Judge MacMahon quoted one such expression (App. 175), it is not true, as argued by counsel for King (Brief, pp. 21, 27) that this was the rationale of his opinion below nor did he rely on the concept in refusing to disqualify himself.
The grounds urged for disqualification are for the most part rulings made by Judge MacMahon during the trial or statements made by him in the course of his jurisdictional duties: (1) denial of King's moves to poll the jurors as to the publicity, (2) description of King at the time of sentence, (3) length of the sentence, and (4) refusal to consider the earlier 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion as having been withdrawn by King. Nothing of this kind, what the judge has learned from or done in the proceedings before him, is any basis for disqualification; to be sufficient for disqualification the alleged bias or prejudice must be from an extrajudicial source. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583, 16 L. Ed. 2d 778, 86 S. Ct. 1698 (1966); United States v. Bernstein, 533 F.2d 775, 784-85 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Sclafani, 487 F.2d 245, 255-56 (2d Cir. 1973).
Finally it is urged that, if King were granted an evidentiary hearing, Judge MacMahon would be a witness to identify a marshal who was in charge of the jury and to testify to what that marshal told him about possible exposure of the jurors to publicity. We do not believe that any showing is made sufficient to require such a hearing. But in any event -- and assuming that Judge MacMahon would be a witness -- this would not disqualify him prior to the hearing, specifically from determining whether a hearing should be held. Panico v. United States, 412 F.2d 1151, 1155-56 (2d Cir. 1969).
There is a judicial reluctance, for sound and easily understood reasons, "to inquire into the state of mind of any juror and into the conduct of the jurors during their deliberations." United States v. Dioguardi, 492 F.2d 70, 79 (2d Cir. 1974). This is to avoid harassment of jurors, inhibition of deliberation in the jury room, a deluge of post-verdict applications mostly without real merit, and an increase in opportunities for jury tampering; it is also to prevent jury verdicts from being made more uncertain. United States v. Crosby, 294 F.2d 928, 950 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 984, 82 S. Ct. 599, 7 L. Ed. 2d 523 (1962).
We are forced quickly to conclude that the evidence for King falls far short of what would be required to justify an inquiry at this late date into the possible knowledge by jurors of the King publicity and its possible effect on them. The frail and ambiguous showing here contrasts sharply with the "specific and detailed factual assertions" in Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 496, 7 L. Ed. 2d 473, 82 S. Ct. 510 (1962), on which King relies for an evidentiary hearing, which was described by the majority opinion as "not far from the line", and from which three of the justices dissented. Moreover, it cannot be ignored that the prejudicial publicity, of which King now complains, was the foreseeable result of the voluntary act of King himself.
It is puzzling in this connection to find a contention by counsel for King that such voluntary act was found by Judge MacMahon without "the benefit of a truly adversary hearing" (Brief, p. 44). After the jury verdict, there were motions by all defendants. In presenting his motions, counsel for King denied that King had done the grenade acts claimed by the government (App. 103). Thereupon, Judge MacMahon conducted a hearing to determine the facts. An FBI Agent testified to King's going to Agent Kelly's home and punching in a front window; then to circumstances establishing that King threw a grenade into the house. Counsel for King declined to cross-examine and declined to present any evidence. App. 121-123. If there was no "truly adversary hearing", it can be seen that this was entirely a decision made by counsel for King, who can scarcely now complain of what he himself caused.
This Court has held that a district judge may provide that questioning of jurors after a verdict be conducted only under supervision of the trial court. In United States v. Brasco, 385 F. Supp. 966, 970 fn. 5 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), Judge Cannella held:
". . . all post-trial questioning of jurors must only be conducted under the strict supervision and control of the court, with inquiry restricted to those matters found by the court as both relevant and proper."
On appeal, the quoted language was specifically approved by this Court in affirming the judgment of conviction. 516 F.2d 816, 819 fn. 4, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 860, 96 S. Ct. 116, 46 L. Ed. 2d 88 (1975). See also Miller v. United States, 403 F.2d 77, 81-84 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v. Driscoll, 276 F. Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1967; McLean, J.); United States v. Sanchez, 380 F. Supp. 1260, 1265-66 (N.D. Tex. 1973; Brewster, J.), affirmed, 508 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1975).
The direction of Judge MacMahon to the jurors is no proper ground for complaint by King. If there were any real justification for interviewing the jurors, application for this could be made to Judge MacMahon and any interviews conducted under his control and supervision.
King may, conceivably, have some claim for money damages against the officers if they used excessive force, this claim being enforceable either under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or in an action patterned under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, etc., 403 U.S. 388, 29 L. Ed. 2d 619, 91 S. Ct. 1999 (1971). As to this, we express no opinion.