Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/604/1075/7863/
Timestamp: 2020-07-14 11:29:33
Document Index: 277332121

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1788', '§ 1788', '§ 1788', '§ 1684', '§ 1788', '§ 1788', '§ 1684', '§ 1684', '§ 1788', '§ 1684', '§ 1684', '§ 1788', '§ 1788', '§ 210', '§ 1684']

Ca 79-2883 Merged Area X (education) in the Counties Ofbenton, Cedar, Iowa, Johnson, Jones, Linn Andwashington, State of Iowa, and Normancarpenter, Appellees, v. Max Cleland, Administrator, Veterans Administration, A. H.thornton, Director, Education and Rehabilitation Service,veterans Administration, and Robert L. Winters, Director,veterans Administration Regional Office, Des Moines, Iowa, Appellants, 604 F.2d 1075 (8th Cir. 1979) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Eighth Circuit › 1979 › Ca 79-2883 Merged Area X (education) in the Counties Ofbenton, Cedar, Iowa, Johnson, Jones, Linn And...
Ca 79-2883 Merged Area X (education) in the Counties Ofbenton, Cedar, Iowa, Johnson, Jones, Linn Andwashington, State of Iowa, and Normancarpenter, Appellees, v. Max Cleland, Administrator, Veterans Administration, A. H.thornton, Director, Education and Rehabilitation Service,veterans Administration, and Robert L. Winters, Director,veterans Administration Regional Office, Des Moines, Iowa, Appellants, 604 F.2d 1075 (8th Cir. 1979)
US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit - 604 F.2d 1075 (8th Cir. 1979) Submitted March 14, 1979. Decided Aug. 1, 1979
Appellant's second contention of error is that Kirkwood has no standing in this case. Appellant argues that veteran's educational benefits are not paid to the school but are paid directly to the student for tuition, fees and books, as well as subsistence. Therefore, argues appellant, any rights allegedly violated by the regulations belong to the veteran, not the school. We cannot agree. The institution is injured in that its definition of full-time student is overruled by the VA. Even the VA recognizes this as shown by the fact that it notified Kirkwood of its decision to cease full-time funding for students enrolled in Kirkwood's non-traditional program. Thus there is a sufficient injury to Kirkwood to fulfill the case or controversy requirement of the constitution. Wayne State University v. Cleland, 440 F. Supp. 811, 813 (E.D. Mich. 1977), Rev'd on other grounds, 590 F.2d 627 (6th Cir. 1978).
The answer to the first question lies in the proper interpretation of 38 U.S.C. § 1788(a) (4) which, as set forth below, establishes when an undergraduate curriculum is deemed to be full-time:
The lower court in this case based its decision entirely on Wayne State University v. Cleland, supra, 440 F. Supp. 811, which, at the time the court reached its decision, was the only case on point. In Wayne State, the district court held that the proviso in § 1788(a) (4) applied only to subpart (B), therefore leaving it up to the individual institutions to determine what constitutes a full-time student by charging full-time tuition as provided in subpart (A). Based on this finding, the district court was forced to conclude that the VA usurped the power given to Wayne State University by imposing the twelve semester hour minimum.
We cannot agree with the above interpretation of § 1788(a) (4). The Sixth Circuit has since overruled the district court in Wayne State and rightly so. Wayne State University v. Cleland, 590 F.2d 627 (6th Cir. 1978). As the Sixth Circuit pointed out, a comparison of § 1684(a) (4),1 the predecessor to § 1788(a) (4), and § 1788(a) (4) reveals Congress's intent that the proviso, and thus the twelve semester hour minimum requirement, apply to subparts (A) and (B), thereby effectively limiting the institution's ability to define "full-time" student. In § 1684(a) (4) the proviso explicitly stated it applied only to subpart (B). In 1972, the section was amended and the words limiting the proviso to subpart (B) were deleted, leaving the clear impression that the twelve hour minimum in the proviso now applies to both subparts (A) and (B).
As the district court correctly interpreted, the above language indicates that the twelve hour requirement applies only to subpart (B). However, this is the 1970 legislative history for § 1684(a) (4), not the 1972 legislative history for § 1788(a) (4), which is the current law. Therefore, the court's reference to the legislative history does not support its position that the proviso applies only to subpart (B) but supports the position of the Sixth Circuit, which we adopt, that the proviso in § 1684(a) (4) applies only to subpart (B). As stated, by comparing the provisos in § 1684(a) (4) and § 1788(a) (4), it is clear the current law intends to impose the twelve hour minimum on both subparts (A) and (B).2
The next question is whether the VA has exceeded its authority in defining § 1788(a) (4)'s term "semester hour" as one hour (or fifty minutes) in the classroom per week for a standard semester. Again, we agree with the Sixth Circuit that the definition of "semester hour" is within the VA's authority to "make all rules and regulations which are necessary or appropriate to carry out the laws administered by the Veterans' Administration." 38 U.S.C. § 210(c) (1). As even the district court in Wayne State acknowledged, "one credit for each one hour per week of class attendance throughout the term is the traditional measurement of academic credit hours in college and universities throughout the country." Wayne State University v. Cleland, Supra, 440 F. Supp. at 816. Moreover, the imposition of uniform criteria is necessary to prevent circumvention of the twelve semester hour limit which would occur if each institution could define "semester hour" as it wished.
An institutional undergraduate course offered by a college or university on a quarter- or semester-hour basis for which credit is granted toward a standard college degree shall be considered a full-time course when a minimum of fourteen semester hours or its equivalent is required; except that where such college or university certifies, upon the request of the Administrator, that (A) full-time tuition is charged to all undergraduate students carrying a minimum of less than fourteen semester hours or the equivalent thereof, or (B) all undergraduate students carrying a minimum of less than fourteen semester hours or the equivalent thereof are considered to be pursuing a full-time course for other administrative purposes, then such an institutional undergraduate course offered by such college or university with such minimum number of semester hours, for which credit is granted toward a standard college degree, shall be considered a full-time course, But in the event such minimum number of semester hours under (B) is less than twelve hours or the equivalent thereof, then twelve semester hours or the equivalent thereof shall be considered a full-time course. (Emphasis added). 38 U.S.C. § 1684(a) (4)
The appellees also rely on the decision of Evergreen State College v. Cleland, 467 F. Supp. 508 (W.D. Wash. 1979), Appeal docketed, No. 79-4372 (9th Cir. May 4, 1979), which rejected the Sixth Circuit's position in Wayne State University v. Cleland, Supra, 590 F.2d 627. However, the district court in Evergreen relied on the 1970 legislative history in reaching its decision. As explained above, such reliance is not only misplaced but supports the contrary conclusion
In light of the controversy surrounding this issue already one institution, Wayne State University, has sought and been afforded injunctive relief in Federal District Court (Wayne State University, Et al. v. Max Cleland, Administrator, et al., (440 F. Supp. 811) USDC E.D. Mich., CA 77-0973.) the Committee has required the study and report thereof mandated to be conducted under this paragraph to include comprehensive examination and evaluation of the need for and effectiveness of the "seat time" requirement.