Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/88085/wilson-vs-united-states
Timestamp: 2017-07-20 18:52:33
Document Index: 560757242

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 34', '§ 762', '§ 778', '§ 37', '§ 224', '§ 225']

Wilson Vs United States - Citation 88085 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Save as PDF Add a Tag Add a Note Semantics Visualize Wilson Vs. United States - Court Judgment	LegalCrystal Citationlegalcrystal.com/88085CourtUS Supreme CourtDecided OnApr-27-1896Case Number162 U.S. 613AppellantWilsonRespondentUnited StatesExcerpt:.....it. the head was crushed with some blunt instrument, and there was testimony that an ax found in wilson's possession had blood on it. wilson was seen at the camp the next morning at sunrise, but thatch was not there. wilson
said that thatch had left about two weeks before the discovery of the body, and that he had heard nothing from him since; told contradictory stories as to where thatch bad gone; asserted that thatch owed him, and the indebtedness was liquidated by his purchasing the wagon and two of the horses; that he bought the clothing after the time he said thatch had left; that the pillowcase was sewed on the bedtick when he bought it; that thatch rode away on horseback, though thatch's saddle was there, the only pair of shoes that thatch had was..... Judgment:
Wilson v. United States - 162 U.S. 613 (1896)
Possession of the fruits of crime, recently after its commission, justifies the inference that the possession is guilty possession, and though only
evidence of guilt, may be of controlling weight unless explained by the circumstances or accounted for in some way consistent with innocence.
Possession of the fruits of crime recently after its commission justifies the inference that the possession is guilty possession, and, though only
evidence of guilt, may be of controlling weight unless explained by the circumstances or accounted for in some way consistent with innocence. 1 Greenl. Ev. (15th ed.) § 34. In
Rickman's Case,
2 East P.C.
1035, cited, it was held that, on an indictment for arson, proof that property was in the house at the time it was burned and was soon afterwards found in the possession of the prisoner raises a probable presumption that he was present and concerned in the offense, and in
Rex v. Diggles,
Wills, Cir.Ev. *53, that there is a like presumption in the case of murder accompanied by robbery. Proof that defendant had in his possession, soon after, articles apparently taken from the deceased at the time of his death is always admissible, and the fact, with its legitimate inference, is to be considered by the jury along with the other facts in the case in arriving at their verdict.
29 Penn.St. 102;
State v. McGorty,
114 Mass. 299;
Sahlinger v. People,
102 Ill. 241;
State v. Raymond,
46 Conn. 345; Whart.Cr.Ev. § 762.
Again, the existence of bloodstains at or near a place where violence has been inflicted is always relevant and admissible in evidence. Whart.Crim. Ev. § 778;
Commonwealth v. Sturtevant,
117 Mass. 122. The trial judge left it to the jury, if they found that there were bloodstains, and that the defendant had not satisfactorily explained them, to draw the inference, in the exercise of their judgment, that there was an act of deadly violence perpetrated against a person while upon or connected with the bed clothing. In other words, that the jury might regard bloodstains, not satisfactorily explained, as a circumstance in determining whether or not a murder had been committed.
Nor can there be any question that if the jury were satisfied from the evidence that false statements in the case were made by defendant or on his behalf at his instigation, they had the right not only to take such statements into consideration in connection with all the other circumstances of the case in
determining whether or not defendant's conduct had been satisfactorily explained by him upon the theory of his innocence, but also to regard false statements in explanation or defense, made or procured to be made, as in themselves tending to show guilt. The destruction, suppression, or fabrication of evidence undoubtedly gives rise to a presumption of guilt, to be dealt with by the jury. 1 Greenl. § 37; 3
5 Cush. 295.
The testimony of the defendant in a criminal case is to be considered and weighed by the jury, taking all the evidence into consideration and giving such weight to the testimony as in their judgment it ought to have.
. The trial judge did not charge the jury to treat the testimony of defendant in a manner different from that in which they treated the testimony of other witnesses, and left it to them to give his evidence, under all the circumstances affecting its credibility and weight, such considerations as they thought it entitled to receive.
No ground of objection is specified to the admission of the picture of Thatch, nor is any particular ground disclosed by the record. It was, we presume, admitted on the question of identity, and as such was admissible in connection with the other evidence.
Udderzook v. Commonwealth,
76 Penn.St. 340;
83 N.Y. 464;
Ruloff v. People,
45 N.Y. 213;
Luke v. Calhoun County,
52 Ala. 115;
69 Ga. 36.
23 How. 515.
This brings us to consider the exception taken to the admission of defendant's statement in evidence. The ground of the objection was that it was not voluntary. Although his answers to the questions did not constitute a confession of guilt, yet he thereby made disclosures which furnished the basis of attack, and whose admissibility may be properly passed on in the light of the rules applicable to confessions. Of course all verbal admissions must be received with caution, though free,
, MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, delivering the opinion of the Court, remarked:
"While some of the adjudged cases indicate distrust of confessions which are not judicial, it is certain, as observed by Baron Parke in
Regina v. Baldry,
2 Den.Cr.Cas. 430, 445, that the rule against their admissibility has been sometimes carried too far, and in its application justice and common sense have too frequently been sacrificed at the shrine of mercy. A confession, if freely and voluntarily made, is evidence of the most satisfactory character. Such a confession, said Eyre, C.B., 1 Leach, 263,"
The same rule that the confession must be voluntary is applied to cases where the accused has been examined before a magistrate, in the course of which examination the confession is made, as allowed and restricted by statute in England, and, in this country, in many of the states. Gr.Ev. § 224. But it is held that there is a well defined distinction between an examination when the person testifies as a witness and when he is examined as a party accused,
People v. Mondon,
103 N.Y. 211;
State v. Garvey,
25 La.Ann. 221, and that where the accused is sworn, any confession he may make is deprived of its voluntary character, though there is a contrariety of opinion on this point, Gr.Ev. § 225;
State v. Gilman,
51 Me. 215;
Commonwealth v. Clark,
130 Penn.St. 641;
47 Cal. 125. The fact that he is in custody and manacled does not necessarily render his statement involuntary, nor is that necessarily the effect of popular excitement shortly preceding.
67 Vt. 365, 31 A. 845;
State v. Ingram,
16 Kan. 14. And it is laid down that it is not essential to the admissibility of a confession that it should appear that the person was warned that what he said would be used against him, but, on the contrary, if the confession was voluntary, it is sufficient, though it appear that he was not so warned. Joy on Confessions *45, *48, and cases cited.
When there is a conflict of evidence as to whether a confession is or is not voluntary, if the court decides that it is admissible, the question may be left to the jury, with the direction that they should reject the confession if upon the whole evidence they are satisfied it was not the voluntary act of the defendant.
Commonwealth v. Preece,
140 Mass. 276;
People v. Howes,
81 Mich. 396;
84 Ga. 613;
3 App.D.C. 35. The question here, however, is simply upon the admissibility of the statement, and we are not prepared to hold that there was error in its admission in view of its nature and the evidence of its voluntary character, the absence of any threat, compulsion, or inducement, or assertion or indication of fear, or even of such influence as the administration of an oath has been supposed to exert.