Source: http://openjurist.org/168/f3d/548
Timestamp: 2016-05-02 19:54:49
Document Index: 410746272

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1903', '§ 2', '§ 1291', '§ 3742', '§ 1903', '§ 1903', '§ 1903', '§ 955', '§ 1902', 'art, 6', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 1903']

168 F3d 548 United States v. Cardales | OpenJurist
168 F. 3d 548 - United States v. Cardales HomeFederal Reporter, Third Series168 F.3d
168 F3d 548 United States v. Cardales 168 F.3d 548
UNITED STATES, Appellee,v.Manuel Julio CARDALES, Defendant, Appellant.United States, Appellee,v.Robinson Rafael Hernandez, Defendant, Appellant.United States, Appellee,v.Arkel Hawkins Peterson, Defendant, Appellant.
Heard Nov. 3, 1998.Decided Feb. 26, 1999.
Edgardo Rodrguez-Quilichini, Assistant Federal Public Defender and Vctor P. Miranda-Corrada, by appointment of the Court, with whom Joseph C. Laws, Jr., Federal Public Defender, were on joint brief, for appellants Manuel Julio Cardales and Robinson Rafael Hernandez.
Linda Backiel for Arkel Hawkins Peterson.
Jonathan L. Marcus, Attorney, Department of Justice, with whom Guillermo Gil, United States Attorney, Timothy Faerber, Aixa Maldonado and Jose A. Quiles, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on brief, for appellee.
Manuel Julio Cardales ("Cardales"), Robinson Rafael Hernandez ("Hernandez"), and Arkel Hawkins Peterson ("Peterson") appeal their convictions for aiding and abetting each other in the possession with intent to distribute marijuana on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States in violation of 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. The district court sentenced Cardales to 120 months in prison, Hernandez to 78 months in prison, and Peterson to 121 months in prison. Peterson appeals his sentence. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), and we affirm.
At approximately 5:40 p.m. on May 31, 1996, a helicopter crew from the U.S.S. GROVES spotted a "go-fast" boat, the CORSICA, traveling at a very high rate of speed in waters approximately 150 miles south of Puerto Rico. The helicopter crew attempted to contact the boat by radio and by hand signal, but all efforts to communicate with the CORSICA were unsuccessful even though the CORSICA's radio was working. The defendants evaded the helicopter for over two hours, turning off the CORSICA's navigation lights when it grew dark. Eventually, the helicopter crew was able to steer the CORSICA toward the GROVES. When the defendants spotted the GROVES, they turned the CORSICA in the opposite direction and fled. When the CORSICA was close enough, the crew from the GROVES launched a rigid hull inflatable boat ("RHIB") to approach the CORSICA, but the RHIB's engine failed before it could make contact. While the crew from the GROVES launched a second RHIB, the helicopter returned to the GROVES for refueling. As a result of the first RHIB's breakdown and the helicopter's refueling, the CORSICA was out of sight for approximately fifteen minutes.
On June 5, 1996, the Venezuelan government notified the State Department that the CORSICA was indeed of Venezuelan registry, reauthorized the boarding and search of the CORSICA, and authorized the arrest of and application of U.S. law to the CORSICA's crew. Cardales, Hernandez, and Peterson were convicted of aiding and abetting each other in possessing with the intent to distribute marijuana while on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States in violation of 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(a). The defendants appealed.
* The Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act ("MDLEA") makes it "unlawful for any person ... on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States ... to possess with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance." 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(a). One of the MDLEA's definitions of a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States is "a vessel registered in a foreign nation where the flag nation has consented or waived objection to the enforcement of United States law by the United States." Id. § 1903(c)(1)(C).
To satisfy due process, our application of the MDLEA must not be arbitrary or fundamentally unfair. See Davis, 905 F.2d at 248-49; see also Martinez-Hidalgo, 993 F.2d at 1056. In determining whether due process is satisfied, we are guided by principles of international law. See Davis, 905 F.2d at 249 n. 2. Under the "territorial principle" of international law, a "state has jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce a rule of law in the territory of another state to the extent provided by international agreement with the other state." United States v. Robinson, 843 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1988). In Robinson, we decided that the United States had jurisdiction over a Panamanian vessel stopped over 500 miles off shore because the Panamanian government authorized the United States to apply U.S. law to the persons on board the vessel. See id. (recognizing informal authorization as valid agreement for purposes of territorial principle, and affirming conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 955a, statutory precursor to MDLEA). In this case, the Venezuelan government authorized the United States to apply United States law to the persons on board the CORSICA. Therefore, jurisdiction in this case is consistent with the territorial principle of international law.
In addition, under the "protective principle" of international law, a nation is permitted "to assert jurisdiction over a person whose conduct outside the nation's territory threatens the nation's security." Robinson, 843 F.2d at 3; see United States v. Romero-Galue, 757 F.2d 1147, 1154 (11th Cir.1985); United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir.) (characterizing protective principle as applying only to conduct generally recognized among nations as a crime), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 936, 88 S.Ct. 2306, 20 L.Ed.2d 1395 (1968). Consistent with this principle, Congress specifically found in the MDLEA that "trafficking in controlled substances aboard vessels is a serious international problem and is universally condemned[, and] ... presents a specific threat to the security ... of the United States." 46 U.S.C. app. § 1902. Therefore, application of the MDLEA to the defendants is consistent with the protective principle of international law because Congress has determined that all drug trafficking aboard vessels threatens our nation's security. See Martinez-Hidalgo, 993 F.2d at 1056 ("Inasmuch as trafficking of narcotics is condemned universally by law-abiding nations, we see no reason to conclude that it is 'fundamentally unfair' for Congress to provide for the punishment of persons apprehended with narcotics on the high seas."); cf. Church v. Hubbart, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 187, 234-35, 2 L.Ed. 249 (1804) ("[A nation's] power to secure itself from injury may certainly be exercised beyond the limits of its territory.").
We therefore hold that when individuals engage in drug trafficking aboard a vessel, due process is satisfied when the foreign nation in which the vessel is registered authorizes the application of United States law to the persons on board the vessel. When the foreign flag nation consents to the application of United States law, jurisdiction attaches under the statutory requirements of the MDLEA without violation of due process or the principles of international law because the flag nation's consent eliminates any concern that the application of United States law may be arbitrary or fundamentally unfair.2II
The defendants contend that the district court removed from the jury's consideration the jurisdictional element of the MDLEA.3 Although the district court stated during the defendant's opening statements that there was jurisdiction, the court corrected itself in its jury instructions. The district court instructed the jury that it was required to find jurisdiction beyond a reasonable doubt. In addition, the district court explicitly corrected its earlier mistake, instructing the jury that it had "to make an independent final determination as to whether there is jurisdiction or not in this case" regardless of the court's earlier comments. Cf. Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987) (assuming that jurors follow instructions); Arthur D. Little, Inc. v. Dooyang Corp., 147 F.3d 47, 53 (1st Cir.1998) (same). Therefore, the district court did not take from the jury the MDLEA's jurisdictional element.
We will reverse the district court's denial of Peterson's motion for a mistrial based on the alleged Brady violation only if the district court abused its discretion. See United States v. Devin, 918 F.2d 280, 289-90 (1st Cir.1990). In the case of delayed disclosure, we examine whether Peterson's " 'counsel was prevented by the delay from using the disclosed material effectively in preparing and presenting' " Peterson's case. See United States v. Catano, 65 F.3d 219, 227 (1st Cir.1995) (quoting United States v. Ingraldi, 793 F.2d 408, 411-12 (1st Cir.1986)). We find that the district court did not abuse its discretion because Peterson's counsel effectively used the report during the presentation of Peterson's case.
Peterson contends that the district court erred by refusing to instruct the jury not to give greater credibility to the testimony of government agents than to the testimony of nongovernment witnesses. We review the district court's jury instructions for abuse of discretion, "to determine whether the charge, taken as a whole fairly and adequately submit[s] the issues in the case to the jury." United States v. Roberts, 119 F.3d 1006, 1016 (1st Cir.1997) (citation omitted). The district court did not err.
Second, Peterson contends that the district court erred by preventing his trial counsel from refreshing the recollection of one of the government's witnesses. However, the district court merely prevented Peterson's counsel from repeatedly and improperly asking, "Has your recollection been refreshed?" to impeach the government's witness when the witness had never indicated that he did not recall his previous statements. The district court did not otherwise prevent Peterson's counsel from legitimately refreshing the recollection of this witness.
Peterson contends that the district court erred by enhancing his sentence under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 for obstruction of justice based on a finding of perjury. We will reverse the district court's obstruction of justice sentencing enhancement only if the district court clearly erred in finding that Peterson committed perjury. See United States v. McKeeve, 131 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir.1997). The district court did not err.
The district court found that Peterson had committed perjury when he testified that he had been hired to search for a lost boat in the area where the helicopter crew spotted the CORSICA. The court found unbelievable the story that Peterson, who claimed to be a salesman, had been hired to travel such a great distance to conduct a less-than-two-hour search for the allegedly missing boat, that the missing boat happened to get lost in an area conducive to drug trafficking, and that Peterson's knowledge of the CORSICA was deficient.7 See United States v. Matiz, 14 F.3d 79, 84 (1st Cir.1994) (defining elements of perjury as "falsity, materiality, and willfulness"). Thus, the district court did not err by enhancing Peterson's sentence for obstruction of justice. See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, application note 1 (including as obstruction of justice "a denial of guilt under oath that constitutes perjury").
Although Martinez-Hidalgo involved a stateless vessel, the Third Circuit stated that its holding "obviously applies to any prosecution under the [MDLEA]." 993 F.2d at 1056 n. 6
In Martinez-Hidalgo, the Third Circuit stated that the MDLEA "expresses the necessary congressional intent to override international law to the extent that international law might require a nexus to the United States." 993 F.2d at 1056. The question of whether Congress intended to override international law is not presented here. To the extent that international law requires a nexus to the United States, that nexus requirement is not overridden by the MDLEA, but instead is satisfied by the foreign flag nation's authorization to apply U.S. law to the defendants and by the congressional finding that drug trafficking aboard vessels threatens the security of the United States
The MDLEA has since been amended to eliminate jurisdiction as one of its elements, making it a threshold question for the trial court to resolve. See 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(f)
Because Peterson presented a defense, he has waived review of the initial Rule 29 motion that he made at the close of the government's case. See United States v. Guerrero, 114 F.3d 332 (1st Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Rivas v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 320, 139 L.Ed.2d 248 (1997). With respect to Peterson, therefore, we may consider the evidence presented in both the government's case and in Peterson's defense. See id. at 339. However, we may not consider the evidence presented in Peterson's defense when reviewing the denial of the Rule 29 motions made by Cardales and Hernandez at the close of the government's case. See United States v. Cruz-Paulino, 61 F.3d 986, 997-98 (1st Cir.1995) (Rule 29 motions made at close of government's case reviewable on appeal when no defense presented). However, we discuss only the evidence presented in the government's case because the government introduced sufficient evidence to convict all three defendants without regard to Peterson's testimony
Although Peterson claimed in an issue heading in his brief that the district court erred in admitting evidence of the marijuana's street value, Peterson failed to develop this argument in his brief, and therefore waived review of this argument. See Gemco Latinoamerica, Inc. v. Seiko Time Corp., 61 F.3d 94, 101 (1st Cir.1995)
Peterson's counsel asked Peterson about his prior deportation during direct examination. The government did not mention Peterson's prior deportation during the trial
For example, Peterson did not know how many gallons of fuel the CORSICA was carrying or how many miles the CORSICA could travel