Source: http://supreme.nolo.com/us/508/36/case.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 00:50:35
Document Index: 369520806

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 4', '§ 922', '§ 991', '§ 994', '§ 994', '§ 994', '§ 994', '§ 3553', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§994']

STINSON v. UNITED STATES - 508 U.S. 36 - 1993 - Full Text - US Supreme Court Center - USSC Cases - Nolo
US Supreme Court Center > Volume 508 > STINSON v. UNITED STATES 508 U.S. 36 (1993) > Full Text
All concede that petitioner was at least 18 years old when the events leading to the indictment occurred and that he then had at least two prior felony convictions for crimes of violence, thereby satisfying the first and third elements in the definition of career offender. It is the second element in this definition, the requirement that the predicate offense be a crime of violence, that gave rise to the ultimate problem in this case. At the time of his sentencing, the Guidelines defined "crime of violence" as, among other things, "any offense under federal or state law punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year that ... involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another." § 4B1.2(1). The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida found that petitioner's conviction for the offense of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U. S. C. § 922(g), was a crime of violence, satisfying the second element of the career offender definition. AI-
1 Amendment 433 was contrary to a substantial body of Circuit precedent holding that the felon-in-possession offense constituted a crime of violence in at least some circumstances. See, e. g., United States v. Williams, 892 F.2d 296, 304 (CA3 1989), cert. denied, 496 U. S. 939 (1990); United States v. Goodman, 914 F.2d 696, 698-699 (CA5 1990); United States v. Alvarez, 914 F.2d 915, 917-919 (CA7 1990), cert. denied, 500 U. S. 934 (1991); United States v. Cornelius, 931 F.2d 490,492-493 (CA8 1991); United States v. O'Neal, 937 F.2d 1369, 1374-1375 (CA9 1990); United States v. Walker, 930 F.2d 789, 793-795 (CAlO 1991); 943 F.2d 1268, 12711273 (CAll 1991) (case below).
2With the decision below compare, e. g., United States v. Weston, 960 F. 2d 212, 219 (CA1 1992) (when the language of a guideline is not "fully self-illuminating," courts should look to commentary for guidance; while commentary "do[es] not possess the force of law," it is an "important interpretive ai[d], entitled to considerable respect"); United States v. Joshua, 976 F.2d 844, 855 (CA3 1992) (commentary is analogous to an administrative agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statute; courts should defer to commentary if it is a "reasonable reading" of the guideline); United States v. Wimbish, 980 F.2d 312, 314-315 (CA5 1992) (commentary has the force of policy statements; while courts "must consider" commentary, "they are not bound by [it] as they are by the guidelines"), cert. pending, No. 92-7993; United States v. White, 888 F.2d 490, 497 (CA7 1989) (commentary constitutes a "contemporaneous explanatio[n] of the Guidelines by their authors, entitled to substantial weight"); United States v. Smeathers, 884 F.2d 363, 364 (CA8 1989) (commentary "reflects the intent" of the Sentencing Commission); United States v. Anderson, 942 F.2d 606, 611613 (CA9 1991) (en bane) (commentary is analogous to advisory committee notes that accompany the federal rules of procedure and evidence; commentary should be applied unless it cannot be construed as consistent with the Guidelines); United States v. Saucedo, 950 F.2d 1508, 1515 (CAlO 1991) (refuses to follow amendment to commentary that is inconsistent with Circuit precedent; "our interpretation of a guideline has the force of law until such time as the Sentencing Commission or Congress changes the actual text of the guideline").
and practices for the Federal criminal justice system," § 991(b)(1). See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U. S. 361, 367-370 (1989). The Commission executed this function by promulgating the Guidelines Manual. The Manual contains text of three varieties. First is a guideline provision itself. The Sentencing Reform Act establishes that the Guidelines are "for use of a sentencing court in determining the sentence to be imposed in a criminal case." 28 U. S. C. § 994(a)(1). The Guidelines provide direction as to the appropriate type of punishment-probation, fine, or term of imprisonment-and the extent of the punishment imposed. §§ 994(a)(1)(A) and (B). Amendments to the Guidelines must be submitted to Congress for a 6-month period of review, during which Congress can modify or disapprove them. § 994(p). The second variety of text in the Manual is a policy statement. The Sentencing Reform Act authorizes the promulgation of "general policy statements regarding application of the guidelines" or other aspects of sentencing that would further the purposes of the Act. § 994(a)(2). The third variant of text is commentary, at issue in this case. In the Guidelines Manual, both guidelines and policy statements are accompanied by extensive commentary. Although the Sentencing Reform Act does not in express terms authorize the issuance of commentary, the Act does refer to it. See 18 U. S. C. § 3553(b) (in determining whether to depart from a guidelines range, "the court shall consider only the sentencing guidelines, policy statements, and official commentary of the Sentencing Commission"). The Sentencing Commission has provided in a Guideline that commentary may serve these functions: commentary may "interpret [a] guideline or explain how it is to be applied," "suggest circumstances which ... may warrant departure from the guidelines," or "provide background information, including factors considered in promulgating the guideline or reasons underlying promulgation of the guideline." USSG § 1Bl. 7.
In the case before us, the Court of Appeals determined that these principles do not apply to commentary. 957 F. 2d, at 814-815. Its conclusion that the commentary now being considered is not binding on the courts was error. The commentary added by Amendment 433 was interpretive and explanatory of the Guideline defining "crime of violence." Commentary which functions to "interpret [a] guideline or explain how it is to be applied," USSG § 1B1. 7, controls, and
Different analogies have been suggested as helpful characterizations of the legal force of commentary. Some we reject. We do not think it helpful to treat commentary as a contemporaneous statement of intent by the drafters or issuers of the guideline, having a status similar to that of, for example, legislative committee reports or the advisory committee notes to the various federal rules of procedure and evidence. Quite apart from the usual difficulties of attributing meaning to a statutory or regulatory command by refer-
Although the analogy is not precise because Congress has a role in promulgating the guidelines, we think the Government is correct in suggesting that the commentary be treated as an agency's interpretation of its own legislative rule. Brief for United States 13-16. The Sentencing Commission promulgates the guidelines by virtue of an express congressional delegation of authority for rulemaking, see
According this measure of controlling authority to the commentary is consistent with the role the Sentencing Reform Act contemplates for the Sentencing Commission. The Commission, after all, drafts the guidelines as well as the commentary interpreting them, so we can presume that the interpretations of the guidelines contained in the commentary represent the most accurate indications of how the Commission deems that the guidelines should be applied to be consistent with the Guidelines Manual as a whole as well as the authorizing statute. The Commission has the statutory obligation "periodically [to] review and revise" the guidelines in light of its consultation with authorities on and representatives of the federal criminal justice system. See 28 U. S. C. §994(o). The Commission also must "revie[w] the presentence report, the guideline worksheets, the tribunal's
We note that this discussion is phrased in predictive terms. To the extent that this commentary has prescriptive content, we think its exposition of the role of interpretive and explanatory commentary is inconsistent with the uses to which the Commission in practice has put such commentary and the
We decline to address this argument. In refusing to upset petitioner's sentence, the Court of Appeals did not consider