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DELSA/HEA/WD/HWP(2008)4
21-Oct-2008 ___________________________________________________________________________________________ English - Or. English
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OECD HEALTH WORKING PAPERS NO. 39 PHARMACEUTICAL PRICING AND REIMBURSEMENT POLICIES IN GERMANY
Valérie Paris and Elizabeth Docteur
JT03253525
This series is designed to make available to a wider readership health studies prepared for use within the OECD. Authorship is usually collective, but principal writers are named. The papers are generally available only in their original language – English or French – with a summary in the other. Comment on the series is welcome, and should be sent to the Directorate for Employment, Labour and Social Affairs, 2, rue André-Pascal, 75775 PARIS CEDEX 16, France. The opinions expressed and arguments employed here are the responsibility of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the OECD
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The authors wish to thank the Federal Ministry of Health for helping to arrange the mission during which much of the information used in this report was collected, for serving as an important source of information, and for commenting on a draft of this report. Particular thanks go to Angela Kratzer and Thomas Hofmann. We also wish to thank Matthias Rumpf from the OECD Berlin Centre for his contribution to the organisation of our mission. Thanks are due also to the experts and stakeholders interviewed in the course of preparing this report, many of whom furnished data or publications referenced in the work: M. Wolfgang Kaesbach, Head of the Department of Medicinal Products at BKK (BetriebsKrankenkassen Bundesverband); Peter Sawicki, Director of IQWiQ (Institüt für Qualität und Wirtschaftlischkeit im Gesundheitswesen); Helmut Schröder, Head of research activities at WIdO (Wissenschaftlisches Institut der Allgemeine Ortskrankenkasse ), Dr Roland Jopp, Health Unit, Federal Chancellery (former expert at the Ministry of Health), Stefan Walz, Head of Division – Patent Law, Ministry of Justice; Bork Bretthauer, Head of International and Regional Affairs and Ulrich Vorderwülbecke, Director Market Affairs/ Health Care System at VFA (Verband Forschender Arzneimittelhersteller); Sven Jansen, Assistant to M. Bauer (Christlich Demokratische Union’s rapporteur for pharmaceuticals at the Parliament); Silke Baumann, Head of the Pharmaceutical Pricing and Reimbursement Unit, Ministry of Health (former representative of the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands to the Parliament); Dr Eckart Bauer, Economic and Social Affairs and Michael Jung, Legal Assistant at ABDA (Bundesvereinigung Deutscher Apothekerverbände). The authors thank Lihan Wei for assistance in the production of tables and figures included in this report; Pierre Moïse, Michael Schönstein, and Peter Scherer for their comments and suggestions; and Gabrielle Luthy for secretarial support.
both for patented and generic drugs. All the same. Second. and assesses their impact on the achievement of a number of policy goals. JEL Classification: I18. pricing and reimbursement. The 2007 reform introduced two important changes with the aim of ensuring value for money in pharmaceutical expenditures. statutory health funds are allowed and encouraged to contract with manufacturers to obtain lower prices in exchange for a “preferred status” for their drug on their formulary. However. putting pressure on prices of clustered products. First. have helped Germany to contain the growth of pharmaceutical expenditures.DELSA/HEA/WD/HWP(2008)4 ABSTRACT This paper describes pharmaceutical pricing and reimbursement policies in Germany. Maximum reimbursement amounts are in effect for a large part of the pharmaceutical market covered by statutory health insurance funds (representing 44% of value and 70% of volume in 2006). the Institute for Quality and Efficiency in Health Care will assess the benefits and costs of new drugs with the aim of capping reimbursement prices of new entrants if necessary to ensure that their use is not less efficient than existing therapies. and rebates have been regularly imposed on manufacturers. German pharmaceutical prices have been found to be among the highest in OECD. maximum reimbursement amounts (known as reference prices) are set for products which can be clustered in groups of equivalent (generic) or comparable products. I11 Keywords: Pharmaceutical policy. On the other hand. Pharmaceutical coverage is comprehensive. with a high level of public funding. along with incentives influencing physicians’ prescriptions. These measures. when considered at either the ex-manufacturer or the retail level. Though these reforms may encourage price erosion in some market segments. Germany 4 . In addition. recent increases in out-of-pocket payments may impair affordability for the poorest part of the population. across-the board price reductions or freezes have occurred on several occasions. pharmaceutical market. considering them in the broader environment in which they operate. they will not address all issues: health insurance funds will remain price takers for new drugs without therapeutic alternatives and losses in transparency will be significant. and ensures access to treatments. Germany does not regulate ex-manufacturer prices of pharmaceuticals at market entry (though distribution margins are regulated for reimbursed drugs).
les caisses d’assurance maladie sont autorisées et encouragées à passer des contrats avec les laboratoires pour obtenir de meilleurs prix en échange d’un statut privilégié pour leur médicament sur le formulaire (liste positive) de la caisse. prix et remboursement . D’un autre côté. De plus. mais seulement les marges des distributeurs pour les médicaments pris en charge par l’assurance maladie. Si ces réformes peuvent conduire à des baisses de prix sur certains segments de marché. Cependant. Cependant. et permet un bon accès aux traitements.DELSA/HEA/WD/HWP(2008)4 RESUME Ce document décrit les politiques de prix et de remboursement des médicaments en Allemagne. Deuxièmement. Premièrement. des montants maximum de remboursement (souvent nommés “prix de référence ") sont fixés pour les produits qui peuvent être rassemblés au sein de groupes de produits équivalents (génériques) ou comparables. I11 Mots-clés : Politique du médicament . et des rabais régulièrement imposés aux fabricants. L’Allemagne ne régule pas les prix fabricant des médicaments à leur entrée sur le marché. caractérisée par un haut niveau de prise en charge publique. si nécessaire. à la fixation d’un montant maximum de remboursement. en les replaçant dans le contexte plus large dans lequel elles s’insèrent. Ces mesures. qu’ils s’agissent des prix fabricant ou des prix de détail. pour les produits brevetés comme pour les génériques. des baisses et gels des prix ont été décidés à plusieurs reprises. Ces montants maximum de remboursement affectent une grande partie du marché pharmaceutique couvert par l’assurance maladie (44% en valeur et 70% en volume en 2006). les augmentations récentes des paiements à la charge des usagers pourraient entraver l’accessibilité financière pour les populations les plus modestes. les prix des médicaments allemands sont parmi les plus élevés des pays de l’OCDE. marché pharmaceutique . ont permis à l’Allemagne de contenir la croissance des dépenses pharmaceutiques. l’Institut pour la qualité et l’efficience des soins de santé (IQWiG) devra évaluer les coûts et bénéfices des nouveaux médicaments. associées aux incitations influençant les prescriptions des médecins. qui pourra conduire. et évalue leur impact sur l’atteinte de plusieurs objectifs. elles ne régleront pas tous les problèmes : les caisses d’assurance maladie n’auront guère plus de moyens pour peser sur les prix des médicaments réellement innovants et le recours aux contrats implique une perte de transparence sur les prix réellement payés par les caisses. Allemagne 5 . La couverture des médicaments par l’assurance maladie est bonne. exerçant ainsi une pression sur les prix des produits concernés. Codes JEL : I18. afin d’assurer que leur utilisation ne sera pas moins efficiente que le recours à des thérapies existantes. La réforme de 2007 a introduit d’importants changements dont l’objectif est d’assurer une meilleure efficience des dépenses de médicament.
.................... 48 Containment of drug expenditures............................. 29 Other policies relating to innovation ......................................................................................................... 21 Payment for hospital drugs by health insurance funds ................................................... 31 PHARMACEUTICAL MARKET CHARACTERISTICS .................................................................................................... 23 Pharmaceutical pricing policy ....................... 26 Policies to influence drug prescription .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 13 Reimbursement and cost-sharing arrangements for drugs .................................................................................................................................................................................................... 13 Health insurance coverage .......... 22 Adequacy of drug coverage and financial protection against drug expenditures ............................................. 38 Volume and Consumption ..................................................................................................... 35 Components of expenditure growth ......................................................................................................... 5 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................................... 25 Policies and other initiatives intended to influence drug use ..................................... 33 Expenditure level............................................................ 29 Innovation policies ............. 39 Generics and parallel imported products ..................................................................................................................................................................................................... 9 THE POLICY ENVIRONMENT ............................................................................. 37 Prices ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 48 Goals for health-system performance....................................................................................... 47 ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF PHARMACEUTICAL POLICIES ON POLICY GOALS ................................ 24 Impact of reimbursement and pricing regulation on German pharmaceutical prices ................................................................................................................................................... 34 Expenditure growth ................................................. 10 Coverage of pharmaceuticals .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 41 Supply and distribution of pharmaceuticals ............................. 15 Contracts between health insurance funds and manufacturers for rebates on listed prices ..................... 33 Financing .......... 20 Perspectives of the 2007 reform: new levers to activate contracting opportunities and price caps based on pharmaco-economic assessment .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 29 Policies to regulate promotion ............................................................................................................ 39 Pharmacy industry activity ...........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................DELSA/HEA/WD/HWP(2008)4 TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT . 26 Policies to influence drug dispensing ..... 13 Pharmaceutical coverage .............. 23 From ex-factory to public price . 4 RESUME ....................................................................... 23 Manufacturers freely set their price at market entry ........................................................................ 48 6 ............................................................................ 37 Changes in volume and therapeutic mix ................................................ 29 Intellectual property rights................................................................. 48 Sustainability and equity of financing for pharmaceuticals.............................................. 10 Pharmaceutical market approval procedures and outcomes ..........................................................
.................................................................... 1997-2005....... 59 Comparison of ex-factory prices .......... 63 Tables Table 1............................................ 2005 ........................................................................................................................ by firm's nationality ............................... 34 Figure 4......... 2005.......................DELSA/HEA/WD/HWP(2008)4 Efficiency of expenditures in the pharmaceutical sector ......... 51 KEY FINDINGS........... 36 Figure 6.......................... 59 Comparison of retail prices ....................................... 51 Industrial policy goals .......................... Prescriptions and sales of SHI-covered pharmaceuticals...................................... Table 4............................................................................... public and private spending..... 45 Figure 15............................... Drug expenditure per capita..... 33 Figure 3......................................... 25 Generic penetration in SHI pharmaceutical market 1989-2006 .................................................................. Parallel imports 1998-2006 .................................................................................................. Generic market shares in OECD countries 2004 ...................... Average delay between application and market approval (months) for drugs with worldwide launch between 1999-2003............... 2005 .. health outcomes ....... Price trend for SHI-covered pharmaceuticals 1999-2006 (monthly data) .............. Real annual growth in pharmaceutical spending and total health expenditure (net of pharmaceutical expenditure)............................ New chemical entities (NCEs) launched between 1993 and 2003................ 54 REFERENCES ..................................... 40 Figure 10...................................... 13 Figure 2................................... 37 Figure 8............. Table 3.............................. 35 Figure 5............................... Trend of Import and exports of pharmaceuticals ................. 18 The Festbetrag market in July 2006 ......................................................................................... Share of pharmaceutical expenditure in total health spending and in GDP..................... 36 Figure 7....................................................... Pharmaceutical trade balance 2006 .................................................................... Relative retail pharmaceutical prices in OECD countries............... 49 Quality of care............................................. 48 Availability of pharmaceuticals in Germany ................................................................... 50 Patient and consumer satisfaction.......... 41 Figure 11............................................... Business expenditures for R&D performed by the pharmaceutical industry 2005 ............................................................................................................................................................................................................. 20 Wholesale mark-up for prescription-only medicines and reimbursable OTC ............................................................................................................................................................. 24 Pharmacy mark-up for reimbursed OTC drugs...................................................................................................... Table 2................................................. Production in the pharmaceutical industry and in total manufacturing industry 1993-200642 Figure 12..... 38 Figure 9......................... Private expenditures for prescription and OTC medicines ................................. 52 LIST OF ACRONYMS ................................................................................................................... 1997-2005 .................................................... 47 Figure 17... 63 Examples of Festbetrag clusters................ 46 Figure 16... 43 Figure 13................................................................................................. Figures Figure 1......... Real annual growth of pharmaceutical expenditure in Germany...................................................................................... 55 ANNEX 1: INTERNATIONAL PRICE COMPARISONS ......... Table 5................. Average delay between first launch in the world and launch in each country for drugs launched between 1999 and 2002 ............. 44 Figure 14................... 39 7 ........ 49 Accessibility of pharmaceuticals in Germany .....
......................... 15 Box 3.........................DELSA/HEA/WD/HWP(2008)4 Boxes Box 1........................ Reforms affecting the pharmaceutical sector since 1989 .................................. 16 Box 4.......... The Institute for Quality and Efficiency in Health Care (IQWiG) ..................... 21 8 .......................... Marketing Authorisation in the European Economic Area ..... 11 Box 2................... The Federal Joint Committee.........................................................................................
This report is the sixth in a series of case studies aimed at describing and analysing pharmaceutical policies used in selected OECD countries. 3. These case studies are part of a broader OECD project on the impact of pharmaceutical pricing and reimbursement policies.DELSA/HEA/WD/HWP(2008)4 INTRODUCTION 1. to assess their effects at the national level. 2. this paper presents the main policies pertaining to the pharmaceutical sector in Germany and the characteristics of the German pharmaceutical market. since these policies cannot be considered in isolation from other policies and contextual elements. and then offers an assessment as to how well policy goals are being achieved and what role pharmaceutical policies have played in this respect. as far as possible. The main objective of this paper is to describe and analyse the German pharmaceutical reimbursement and pricing policy and. 9 . However.
safety and quality criteria. In 2007 about 55. according to latest available estimates. allergen and antigen tests as well as blood products. The BfArM assesses pharmaceuticals against efficacy. approval delays for new drugs with worldwide launch are relatively short in Germany by international standards (see Figure 1). 10 . and grants marketing authorisations – normally for an unlimited period. The Federal Institute for Pharmaceuticals and Medical products (Bundesinstitut für Arzneimittel and Medizinprodukte-BfArM).500 pharmaceuticals and 4. 2003). 7. more than 140. When the 1978 reform came into effect. Since the 1978 Pharmaceutical Act.700 products have a marketing authorisation (BfArM. Though the Pharmaceutical Act established a targeted delay of 7 months. 8. Overall. 5. 2007).DELSA/HEA/WD/HWP(2008)4 THE POLICY ENVIRONMENT Pharmaceutical market approval procedures and outcomes 4. forthcoming). new pharmaceutical products are required to obtain a marketing authorisation in order to enter the German market. the decentralised procedure and the national procedure (see Box 1). vaccines. many more than any other European market (ÖBIG. but this can be limited to a five-year period on the basis of any concern requiring monitoring through pharmaco-vigilance procedures following introduction of the product. Yet. is limited to safety and quality (BfArM. i. The German pharmaceutical market comprises a very high number of products. BfArM is responsible for post-marketing pharmaco-vigilance. the number of available products has been decreasing continuously over the last 25 years. BfArM has faced criticism for long approval delays. Due to market withdrawals of old products and to work accomplished by BfArM. the assessment of these drugs. BfArM also grants market authorisation for pharmaceuticals used in alternative or traditional medicine. the average delay for approvals sought through national procedure by the Institute was estimated at 26 months in 2005 (Schmucker.e. 6. These long delays are likely to affect less innovative drugs since European procedures are used for these products. an independent administrative body under the supervision of the Ministry of Health. herbal medicine. three routes are available to obtain marketing authorisation in Germany: the centralised procedure. Since the creation of the European Medicines Agency in 1995. However. homeopathy and anthroposophy. 2005). Another institute (the Paul Ehrlich Institute) is responsible for granting marketing authorisation to sera.000 existing products were supposed to be re-assessed against the new criteria for approval. is responsible for market approval. 2003).000 homeopathic products were on the waiting list for assessment in 2003 and the re-assessment of the whole pharmacopeia was supposed to end in 2005 (BfArM. whose effectiveness is presumed (rather than demonstrated).
neurodegenerative disorder medicines as well as orphan drugs. Under this procedure. seeking agreement on elements that must be harmonised in CMS and provides a decision. The competent authority of each concerned member state has 90 days in which to agree with the reference member state’s decision for granting marketing approval. (2) The Decentralised and Mutual recognition procedures are based upon the principle of recognition by other member states of a first assessment performed by the authorities of one member state. EEA).e. The CPMP provides a recommendation to the European Commission. They provide for the extension of marketing authorisation granted by a member state to one or more other member states identified by the applicant. manufacturers still often use decentralised and national procedures for products which are not included 1. The Committee for Proprietary Medical Products (CPMP) – comprised of 2 experts nominated by each member state – evaluates applications and subcontracts the assessment to two rapporteurs. a medicine must obtain a marketing authorisation. or granted for the entire Community (i. the reference member state sends the concerns to the CPMP. The CPMP has 210 days to assess the dossier but the clock can be stopped when rapporteurs request additional information from the applicant. Through the Mutual Recognition Procedure. The use of this procedure is mandatory for biotechnology. manufacturers designate a “reference member state” (RMS) to undertake the assessment of their drug and submit identical dossiers to “concerned member states” (CMS) where approval is also sought. A maximum of 210 days is granted (including a maximum of three months for clock stops to allow for applicants to respond or resolve to objections raised during evaluation) to the RMS and the CMSs to come to an agreement on the full dossier. the decentralised and mutual recognition procedures. The authorisation may be issued by the competent authority of any EEA country and valid for its own territory. with a final decision by the CPMP. However. cancer. 11 . Three main procedures exist for obtaining marketing authorisation in an EEA country: the centralised procedure. EEA is composed of European Union member countries plus Norway. The mutual recognition procedure is used for products that have already obtained market authorisation in at least one member state while the decentralised procedure is used for new products not yet marketed in Europe (and not obliged to use the centralised procedure). In reality. Legislative changes introduced the Decentralised Procedure (DP) in 2005 in order to increase the EMEA’s coordinating role and facilitate the harmonisation of marketing approvals. from a pool of 3 500 drug evaluation specialists in national regulatory agencies. (3) Manufacturers can also seek National Marketing Authorisation – at least for medicines not included in the mandatory scope of the Centralised Procedure – when they intend to market a drug in a single country or as a first step to mutual recognition procedure. In any case. and the national procedure. The EMEA operates under the aegis of the European Commission’s DG Enterprise. The recommendation is then forwarded to the European Commission for final decision on granting or refusing a marketing authorization valid in all concerned member states. the procedure can be used for other types of products. which is responsible for final approval. In case of disagreement. the marketing authorisation holder must be established within the EEA. if a consensus is not reached after a further 60 days then the procedure moves into arbitration by the CPMP. Marketing Authorisation in the European Economic Area To be marketed in the European Economic Area (EEA)1. The RMS steers the approval process.DELSA/HEA/WD/HWP(2008)4 Box 1. assessment reports and reasoning for decision. (1) The Centralised Procedure ends up with a marketing authorisation valid in all EEA countries. AIDS. diabetes. The London based European Medicines Agency (EMEA) was established in 1995 to coordinate the evaluation and European market authorisation for both human and animal medicinal products. Total accumulated clock stop time generally should not exceed 6 months. Recent legislation to increase transparency requires that national regulatory bodies make marketing authorisations available ‘without delay’ and publicly release clinical documentation. Iceland and Liechtenstein. If agreement is not forthcoming then an additional 90 days are granted for arbitration. Manufacturers submit applications to the EMEA. manufacturers can obtain marketing authorisations in designated or “concerned” member states by validating the national marketing authorisation previously granted in another member country (“reference member state”).
8. proposed to change the BfArM’s status from an administrative body to an independent agency. The BPI (Bundesverband der Pharmazeutischen Industrie). for two main reasons: (1) expiring dates of patents and supplementary protection certificates may be different from one country to another. A bill. Wang and Wang (2005). patients with life-threatening disease or severe disability may obtain access to drugs whose marketing authorisation application through the centralised EU procedure is pending. Garattini and Bertele (2004). since they afford a greater degree of flexibility and control over their products. Since 2005. Other stakeholders argued that the proposed reform prioritized industry’s interests over those of patients by playing down safety standards (BUKO Pharma-Kampagne. Private funding would be higher. Given the variety of factors under consideration. generic medicinal equivalents of centrally authorised products may be authorised through centralised procedure. 9. from the point of view of public health and in particular from the viewpoint of therapeutic innovation (EMEA.DELSA/HEA/WD/HWP(2008)4 in the mandatory scope of the centralised procedure. 2007). subject to annually reviewable conditions.g. necessitating different studies to prove bio-equivalence. despite the ease the central procedure was intended to provide. The time frame of accelerated assessment is reduced to 150 days. generic manufacturers often seek approval through national procedures. In addition. 2007). with a more efficient management structure. Specifically. According to EU legislation. Danzon. As long delays were considered harmful to the German pharmaceutical industry. some products may obtain temporary authorisations. protested against the risk of inequitable treatment of applications due to differential fees and the unnecessary burden such pricing practice would put on an already overwhelmed agency (Ginnow. Moreover. expected effects from parallel trade and reference pricing and flexibility in national marketing (e. labelling requirements and limitations). manufacturers may request an accelerated assessment procedure in EU marketing approval for products of major therapeutic interest. a Task Force created in 2003 with members of both government and industry agreed to take steps to accelerate the national marketing authorisation procedure. 12 . dosing. or to products which are being tested in clinical trials when there is sufficient evidence of their efficacy and safety (compassionate use). and labelling. strength. manufacturers often opt for approval via mutual recognition or the decentralised mechanism. While the centralised procedure was developed to better facilitate market harmonisation and reduce authorisation delays. manufacturers’ choice of approval path often depends on issues related to final marketing expectations such as firm experience. packaging. This provision was only recently implemented and the first accelerated assessment took place in 2007. 10. as a remnant (heritage) of former differences in patent legislation and marketing dates. 2006). Source: European Commission (2005). mainly coming from application fees supposed to be related to the applicants’ turnover. examined by the Parliament in March 2007. (2) original products may have different forms. familiarity with national agency. representing German pharmaceutical companies. This bill faced strong opposition from many stakeholders. EMEA 2007).
the basket of reimbursed pharmaceuticals is defined negatively by the exclusion of several categories of products from statutory health insurance coverage (5th Sozial Gesetzbuch –hereafter SGB – V §34. people can choose their health insurance fund. For pharmaceuticals. About 90% of the German population is covered by the statutory health insurance and 10% by private health insurance.. 13 . OTC products are generally not covered. Statutory coverage of prescription medicines is comprehensive.. Unlike most OECD countries. In any case.DELSA/HEA/WD/HWP(2008)4 Figure 1. 2002). sometimes extended. the basket of health goods and services covered by the statutory health insurance (SHI) is defined at the national level by law and government regulations (Busse et al. with the exception of a relatively small number of prescription medicines included on a negative list. Health insurance coverage 12. Coverage of pharmaceuticals 11. 13. The German population is covered for pharmaceutical consumption. Though health insurance funds compete in the market. from Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry calculations. 2004. Brandt. as in many OECD countries.. 2005. Private health insurers generally cover the same basket of goods and services but may offer extended or restrained coverage in some areas (Thomson et al. The self-employed and people whose earnings are above a certain level can opt out of social insurance and take out private health insurance. Patients usually share the cost of prescriptions drugs. the rest of the population is covered by the statutory health insurance (Busse and Riesberg. 2008). Average delay between application and market approval (months) for drugs with worldwide launch between 1999-2003 Source: Pharmaceutical Industry Competitiveness Task Force. Nguyen-Kim et al. 2004). Pharmaceutical coverage 14. private coverage is most often equivalent to that offered by statutory health insurance. either by statutory or private health insurance. 2004).
which were at that time limited to issue practice guidelines. appetite suppressants. 2. For instance. pharmaceuticals whose effectiveness cannot be assessed because they contain too many active ingredients. and painkillers. Pharmaceuticals mainly used in the treatment of minor health disorders (SGB V § 34..2) So-called “non economic pharmaceuticals”. In addition. §34. G-BA Arzneimittel Richtlininien. in 1996 and 2000. 16. including cold medications.DELSA/HEA/WD/HWP(2008)4 15. vaccination for communicable diseases was not part of the drug benefit package but was included in the “optional services” that SHI funds were allowed to offer to their affiliates (Busse et al. 14 . an attempt of the Federal Committee to issue guidance limiting the scope of reimbursement faced lawsuits by the pharmaceutical industry. Similarly. and pharmaceuticals whose therapeutic benefit is not proven (SGB V §34. in 1999. The 2004 reform consequently extended the scope of the Federal Committee’s competencies. drugs used in the treatment of cold and flu syndrome. 20. defined as pharmaceuticals which contains unnecessary active ingredients. 18. OTC and lifestyle drugs were excluded by the Health Insurance Modernisation Act of 2004.. 2. contraceptives are reimbursed only up to 20 years of age. in accordance with the Ministry of Economy and Labour and with Parliamentary approval. the law states that the Minister of Health. The law excludes from reimbursement the following categories (SGB V.1): Pharmaceuticals used in adults for the treatment of minor ailments. may further exclude from reimbursement medications pertaining to one of the following categories: 1. The coverage of medicines used in preventive care may appear less extensive than in some other OECD countries. 1. but never implemented (Busse et al. Pharmaceuticals whose main indication aims to improve the of quality of life. slimming drugs. Over-the-counter drugs are not covered unless they are prescribed to children up to 12 years (up to 18 years in certain cases) or they are used in standard treatment of serious diseases according to guidelines established by the Federal Joint Committee (hereafter G-BA. 2004). cough suppressants and expectorants. 2005). The definition of the pharmaceutical benefit basket has generated longstanding debates.e.pdf. and capillary treatments. While the first category of drugs has been excluded from reimbursement since 1983. see Box 2). laxatives. The last category has existed since 1991 and corresponds to a list of identified products.de/downloads/38-254-9/RL_AMR3-2003-1018. 2007. mouth and throat medications other than antifungal. 2. which is referred to in Germany as the “Negativliste”2. i. Anlage 3 http://www. 19.3). anti-obesity drugs. particularly treatments of the erectile dysfunction. smoking cessation treatments. A Court stated that the Committee exceeded its competencies. The introduction of a positive list has been envisaged several times and was introduced in the law twice. accessed on October 26. reform attempts and litigation. This was changed by the 2007 reform which included vaccines in the benefit basket. 17. and drugs for motion sickness. 3.g-ba. Until 2007.
Patients’ representatives attend the meetings and are consulted by the Committee. taking various forms (fixed prescription fee. 2006. 23. patients have to apply for exemption and show that they are entitled to it in order to be exempted for the rest of the year. 2006. Overall. like the whole market.. 39)... with a minimum of €5 and a maximum of €10. Copayments 22. Source : http://www. see Schröder et al. The Federal Joint Committee The Federal Joint Committee (Gemeinsame Bundesausschuss – G-BA) is a college composed of physicians’. Since January 2004. Before the exclusion of rebates paid by manufacturers. Cost-sharing takes two different forms: statutory copayments applying to all reimbursed medicines and “extra-billing” for products subject to maximum reimbursement amounts (Festbeträge in German) whose price exceeds the maximum reimbursement amount. 2006.de Reimbursement and cost-sharing arrangements for drugs 21.9% and 15% of annual expenditures for reimbursed medicines (Schröder et al.g-ba. 3. on product whose price does not exceed €50. products may be exempted from copayments in two cases: when their price is at least 30% under the Festbetrag (since 2006) or when the health insurance fund decides to eliminate copayments for products for which a contract was signed with the manufacturer (since 2007).. hospitals’ and health insurance funds’ head associations. later linked to the price of every item. p. Patients are exempted from copayments in various cases. Copayments for drugs were introduced in 1977 and have been continuously increasing. patients may be exempted from copayments once they have reached an annual cap. 24. including children up to 12 years. Copayments have been used as a means to tackle annual health insurance fund deficits and have represented between 3. 4. or up to 18 years in case of growth problem or serious disease.4% of total SHI expenditures for drugs3 in 2006 (Coca et al. through several missions: • • • • define indications for which OTC products will be reimbursed. copayments have taken the form of a 10% co-insurance. In addition to these exemptions linked to patients’ characteristics. Categorical exemptions were reduced in 2004 to two categories. then to the package size)4. Patients are generally required to contribute to meeting the cost of the pharmaceuticals they use. The G-BA plays an important role in the definition of pharmaceutical coverage. 2006). This means that copayments are concentrated. In addition. The Committee is in charge of issuing recommendations for coverage of health goods and services and practice guidelines. Nink and Schröder.DELSA/HEA/WD/HWP(2008)4 Box 2. set at 1% of their income for chronically ill patients and 2% for other patients (Busse et al. compose Festbetrag clusters. pp. Overall. about half of prescriptions do not require user’s participation and the average copayment on non-exempted prescriptions is estimated at 20% (Schwabe. 2005). For a complete history. user charges for medicines reimbursed by statutory health insurance are relatively low since they averaged 7. 55-56 15 . select products to be included in the NegativListe. In those cases. make an inventory of drugs with insufficiently proven efficacy. 2007).
6 and 8 − Cancellation of pharmaceutical spending caps (from 1998) 1997-98 Gesetz zur Neuordnung von Selbstverwaltung und Eigenverandwortung in der Krankenversicherung – Reform for reorganization. 1996 1996-97 KrankenversicherungsbeitragsentlassungsGesetz –Health Insurance Contribution Rate Exoneration Act − Increase in users’ participation to DM 4. 1995 Exclusion of drugs patented from the maximum reimbursement amount system after December 31. 9 and 10 2000 GKV-Gesundheitsreform – SHI Reform Act 2000 − Introduction of a positive list for pharmaceuticals (never implemented) − Introduction of mandatory treatment guidelines 2001 2002 ABAG – Arzneimittelbudget Ablösung Gesetz – Elimination of collective prescription budgets AABG – Arzneimittelausgabenbegrenzungsgesetz – Pharmaceutical expenditure limitation act − Aut-idem regulation 16 . Reforms affecting the pharmaceutical sector since 1989 1989 Gesundheitsreformgesetz (GRG) – Health Care Reform Act − Implementation of Festbeträge (Reimbursement amounts) − Setting of Festbeträge for level 1 clusters − Increase in users’ cost-sharing for products not subject to maximum reimbursement amounts (set at the lowest of DM 3 or the product’s price. − Introduction of the Negativliste 1992 1993 Setting of Festbeträge for level 2 clusters Gesundheitsstrukturgesetz (GSG) – Health Care Structure Act − National budget cap for prescription drugs. whichever was less). from January 1994 − Setting of Festbeträge for level 3 clusters − Introduction of a positive list (never enforced). related to the box size (DM 3.DELSA/HEA/WD/HWP(2008)4 Box 3. those subject to Festbetrag). with a three-tiered copayment. self-administration and individual responsibility in health insurance − Increase in users’ participation to DM 9. 2% for non reimbursable products and price freeze until the end of 1994 − Extension of users’ copayment to all reimbursed drugs (incl. 5 or 7). 11 and 14 − Introduction of individual prescription volume targets for physicians 1998 Gesetz zur Stärkung der Solidarität in der Gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung – Act to Strengthen Solidarity in Statutory Health Insurance − Maintenance of pharmaceutical spending caps in spite of 1996-97 Act − Decrease in users’ copayment to DM 8. with financial liability of manufacturers and physicians in case of excess − Across-the-board price reduction of 5% for reimbursable products not subject to maximum reimbursement amounts.
(2006).30) and a percentage of the ex− Wholesalers’ mark-up halved but cancellation of rebates paid by wholesalers to SHI funds. €). Festbeträge in clusters of 2nd and 3rd levels must be set at the lowest third of the price distribution in each cluster. with a minimum of €5 and a maximum of €10. 2006 AVWG-Arzneimittelversorgungs-Wirtschaftlichkeitsgesetz Pharmaceutical care Efficiency Act − Introduction of a 10% rebate on off-patent drug prices − Lowering of Festbeträge in all clusters. 17 . liberalization of distribution margins in this market Possibility to include patented drugs in Festbetrag clusters (first groups created in January 2005) Price freeze for products not subject to Frestbeträge from 2003 Introduction of a cap for total patients’ copayments (1% or 2% of revenues) instead of the previous system of exemption categories. (2006). based on pharmaco-economic studies. − New possibilities for SHI-providers contracting − Introduction of vaccines (formerly reimbursed by health insurance funds on a voluntary basis) in the mandatory benefit package − Second opinion will be necessary to prescribe special pharmaceuticals with high costs or high risk potential (the list of which will be prepared by the G-BA) − Increase of rebates paid by pharmacists to SHI funds to €2. Coca et al. − − − − − Exclusion of OTC drugs from reimbursement Deregulation of the OTC market. − − − − 2007 Two-year freeze of ex-factory prices from April 2006 to March 2008 Cancellation of users’ cost-sharing for drugs whose price is 30% below the Festbetrag Prohibition of benefits in-kind supplied by manufacturers to pharmacists Introduction of bonus-malus linked to physicians’ prescribing in January 2007 GKV-WSG WettbewerbStärkungGesetz – Health Insurance Competition Enhancing Act − Introduction of the possibility to set a maximum reimbursement price for products not subject to maximum reimbursement amounts.30 per package. (2002). Increase in VAT from 16% to 19% (following a general VAT increase in Germany) Source: Haússier et al. from mid 2008. − Pharmacy mark-up changed to a combination of a fixed fee (€8. of a manufacturers’ rebate of 6% for non referencepriced drugs.DELSA/HEA/WD/HWP(2008)4 − Rebates paid by pharmacies increases from 5 to 6% − Exceptional “solidarity payment” by the pharmaceutical industry (200 Mo. increase of pharmacists’ rebates to 10% for high-priced drugs 2004 GMG GKV-Modernisierungsgesetz – Health insurance modernisation Act − Change in copayment: 10% co-insurance. Busse and Riesberg (2004). Paris et al. 2003 Beitragssatzsicherunggesetz – Contribution Safeguard Act − Introduction of the possibility for SHI funds to contract with pharmaceutical companies to obtain rebates − Introduction of a wholesalers’ rebate of 3%. Pharmaceutical companies’ rebate set at 16% for one year (2004) until the Joint Federal Committee had clustered products for maximum reimbursement amounts factory price (3%).
Perenteral Angiotensin II receptor antagonist. This policy is often referred to as “reference price policy” though it does not aim to regulate the prices of pharmaceuticals. Irbesartan. Telmisartan. Table 1 provides examples of Festbetrag clusters. Examples of Festbetrag clusters Level Cluster Active ingredients Level 1 Aciclovir. but patients are required to pay any difference between the price and the reimbursement amount. Suspension Aciclovir Level 1 Level 2 Aciclovir. Losartan. group 4. clusters include products with therapeutically or pharmacologically comparable active ingredients. parenteral. In 1989. group 7 Selective Serotonin Ruptake Inhibitors. etc. The general principle of this policy is now well-known: health insurance funds define a reimbursement level for a cluster of products considered to be therapeutically equivalent. Capsules Source : BKK (2007b) 27.DELSA/HEA/WD/HWP(2008)4 Festbeträge or maximum reimbursement amounts 25. Oral. group 1. clusters include products with comparable therapeutic effects. Oral Tablets. capsules Aciclovir Candersation. Valsartan Fluoxetin. At least 1/5 of packages and 1/5 of prescriptions should be available without extra-payment from patients. Film-coated tablets. The maximum reimbursement amount is computed for each cluster using an econometric model that takes into account the prices of existing products. Eprosartan. the pharmaceutical company is still free to set any price above this reimbursement amount. Tablets. 5 . Effervescent tablets. Oral. 18 . Film-coated tablets. Olmesartan. Products with different administration modes (oral. normal release.) are never clustered in the same groups. At the second level. products are clustered by the Federal Joint Committee according to three different At the first level. levels: • • • In Germany. Paroxetin Level 3 Antidepressants. Film-coated tablets. At the third level. in such a way as to ensure that a certain share of the products in the cluster will be available at no additional out of pocket expense to patients5 (Stargardt et al. Table 1. 26.. Germany was the first European country to introduce maximum reimbursement amounts (Festbeträge in German) for clusters of products. Tablets. clusters include products with identical active ingredients and comparable administration mode and/or bioavailability. Fluvoxamin maleate.
. in clusters of generic groups (level 1). Reimbursement amounts are checked annually and updated if necessary to adapt to new market conditions. however. which represents only 4% of all products (Haüssler et al. before being re-introduced in 2004. more than half of which were clustered in generic groups. Initially.975 products over the 27. patients are not always able to autonomously assess the clinical benefits of drugs and the potential differences across products. as soon as three products compete in a therapeutic area.. fixed reimbursement amounts had to belong to the first tercile of the cluster’s price distribution. physicians are required to inform patients about any price supplement they will be exposed to when the price of the prescribed product exceeds the reimbursement amount. manufacturers most often set prices under the Fesbetrag for products included in reference price groups. only 1. along with clustering opportunities.908 included in the maximum reimbursement amounts scheme had prices above the Festbetrag. 2005). However.DELSA/HEA/WD/HWP(2008)4 2005). 19 . It also may serve as a disincentive to prescribe products whose prices exceed the reference price. In practice.000 pharmaceuticals. side effects. in principle. The 2006 AVWG Act lowered all maximum reimbursement amounts (see Box 3) and extended the rule of the first tercile to cluster levels 2 and 3 (Schröder et al.9 billion and 409 million prescriptions (see Table 2). The market share covered by the maximum reimbursement amounts scheme changes over time. relative prices of clustered products and the entry of new drugs not subject to the scheme in the pharmaceutical market. well known thanks to a media campaign by the company. health insurance limits the reimbursement to a maximum level for all products judged to have similar therapeutic effects. the market share of products subject maximum reimbursement amounts fell to 35% in 2003 before rising again and reach a level of 48% in 2005 (Häussler et al. physicians are responsible for the choice of the prescription medicine and may prescribe drugs with a price differential with or without any substitution opportunity. which are not always directly related to clinical effectiveness. 2005). or on trademarks. Actually. In 2005. manufacturers chose not to lower their price to the reference price level. the firm chose to keep the price above the reference price but undertook to reimburse the price surcharge to those patients who were exempted from co-payments (SBEG. Since then. This provides the opportunity to inform patients about the added value likely to justify this price supplement. Doing so. they take into account consumers’ willingness to pay for any perceived added value of the product. The model ensures financial accessibility since the patient has. the option to select a product without a price differential in each therapeutic class. In 2006. 28. Initially. 30. they may be clustered and subject to maximum reimbursement amounts. Manufacturers are still free to price their products at the desired level. in 1989. 32. 2006). and even prevent any substitution whenever possible. the Festbetrag market covered almost 28. 29. 31. From a maximum of 60% in 1997. it represented € 9. patented products were excluded from the scheme in 1996. notably to avoid spill-over effects in countries using Germany as a benchmark country in their price regulation. In addition. however. Under the reference price policy. Following lobbying by the industry. Their preferences will rest largely on comfort and quality of life characteristics (symptom relief. In the case of a Pfizer drug. 2005). In some cases. patented products were included in the maximum reimbursement amounts scheme and potentially included in clusters.. this act allowed health insurance funds to exempt patients from copayments for every product whose price is at least 30% below the Festbetrag. In fact. convenience).
032 1. since health funds had few possibilities to influence volumes of drugs.0 49. 20 . The scheme proposed to modify the current national benefit basket (in which each marketed product eligible for reimbursement must be reimbursed by any health insurance fund) by a list of reimbursable active ingredients and to let SHI funds define their own positive list or formulary. Since 2003. Local health insurance funds. Under these scenarios. There was a notable exception for the case of rapid-acting insulin analog in the treatment of type II diabetes. which cover about one third of the total population.8 57 26 combinations 4. Such a scheme would allow funds to negotiate prices with one or several manufacturers in exchange for guaranteed volumes of sales.9 223 Contracts between health insurance funds and manufacturers for rebates on listed prices 33. the G-BA recommended that health funds not reimburse this drug. However. except at a price 30% lower than that proposed by the manufacturer (to equalize the price with that of its competitors). The idea of fostering competition through contracting between SHI funds and manufacturers was 6 formulated first by academics and the scientific institute of the AOK and further developed by academics in a report commissioned by a pharmaceutical industry union and published in 2005 (Klauber and Schleert. which may be referred to by other countries using international benchmarking to regulate their prices.DELSA/HEA/WD/HWP(2008)4 Table 2. 2007a of 14.362 3. 6. health insurance funds have been allowed to contract with pharmaceutical companies to obtain rebates on listed prices. 34.712 9. this contracting opportunity was not really exploited. Allgemeine Ortskrankenkasse. reference prices were supposed to disappear in the long run.2 434 Not available 27. Health funds contracted with the manufacturer to obtain rebates on the list price and made the drug available to their members. Following this assessment.318 5. The Festbetrag market in July 2006 Level 1 Type of cluster Number of groups 313 Level 2 Level 3 Total 64 210 substances 9.0 136. 2006).9 409 Number of active 192 substances substances Number packages Turnover (billion €) Prescriptions (million) Source: BKK. The Institute for Quality and Efficiency in Health Care (hereafter IQWiG. see Box 4) assessed the clinical effectiveness of this product against the effectiveness of existing drugs and concluded that superiority of the insulin analog was not proven. 35. This solution allowed the manufacturer to obtain a subsidy from the German health insurance funds without lowering the list price. SHI funds could increase their negotiation power through group purchasing.
impact on quality of life.2. there was no political consensus and the mission assigned to IQWiG in 2004 was limited to clinical effectiveness. physicians. IQWiG is in charge of defining concrete methods and criteria to be used for cost-benefit assessment.000 products. on the basis of acknowledged international standards and published a report for consultation in January 2008. as well as for any other significant product. 36. cost-benefit assessment can be undertaken for any new patented prescription product. Since April 2007. a contracted product for the prescribed medicine. IQWiG generally conducts evaluations on request of the G-BA. significantly affecting the generic market. the disease burden and patients’ opinion. The Law defines the conditions and criteria to be used in evaluations (SGB V §35). 38. by comparison with existing pharmaceuticals or other treatments. Before the 2007 reform. and of a representative of the Federal Joint Committee (G-BA) with a consultative voice. The Concerted Action on Health Care recommended in 2001 the creation of an institute to conduct cost-effectiveness analyses of health care strategies. In addition. SHI funds have signed agreements with generic manufacturers. Economic assessment shall address whether coverage by health insurance seems appropriate. The board of directors is composed of representatives of the Federal Ministry of Health. of health insurance funds. a reduction in adverse events as well as an improvement in quality of life. The Health 37. It was created in 2004 and is expected to play a more and more important role in the pharmaceutical policy. The 2007 Act designed a set of incentives to activate the existing contracting opportunities. a reduction in duration of illness. of hospitals. to reinforce contracting opportunities and second to introduce price caps for new products. 2008 Perspectives of the 2007 reform: new levers to activate contracting opportunities and price caps based on pharmaco-economic assessment Insurance Competition Enhancing Act (GKV-WSG for GKV Wettbewerbsstärkunggesetz) had two main objectives in the pharmaceutical sector: first.iqwig. but rather makes available the results of evidence-based assessment to help stakeholders to make decisions. However. SHI funds are allowed to sign contracts with physicians and pharmacists to encourage them to prescribe or dispense products for which they have signed contracts with manufacturers and have the possibility to reduce or eliminate patients' copayments for those “contracted products”. These new rules allow health insurance funds to obtain price reductions from manufacturers in exchange for volume commitments. The Law now obliges pharmacists to substitute. patients’ representatives in the G-BA and the Commissioner of the Federal Government for patients’ issues can request evaluations from IQWiG. In a few months sales of "contracted products” 21 . The Institute for Quality and Efficiency in Health Care (IQWiG) The Institute for Quality and Efficiency in Health Care (Institut für Qualität und Wirkschaftlichkeit im Gesundheitswesen – hereafter IQWiG) is an independent body in charge of evaluating the quality and efficiency of health services and health products. benefits for patients shall notably be assessed against the following outcomes: improvement of health status. nor reimbursement decisions. For pharmaceuticals. The Institute does not produce practice guidelines. based on pharmacoeconomic assessment. acceptable and reasonable. As of July 2007.html. The 2007 reform extended this mission to cost-effectiveness assessment. impact on morbidity and symptoms. Besides the G-BA. IQWiG employs 60 staff members and works with a network of about 100 experts and thus works with means comparable to those of the English National Institute for Clinical Excellence and of the French High Authority on Health.DELSA/HEA/WD/HWP(2008)4 Box 4. IQWiG used to consider 5 dimensions to assess the benefits of a pharmaceutical: impact on mortality. 239 funds had signed such contracts with 55 companies for about 18. whenever possible.de/index. Source : http://www. in relation to costs. accessed on January 16. According to the Law. the Federal Ministry of Health. These criteria should be enhanced in the future to take account of IQWiG’s new missions. The assessment must consider the added therapeutic value of the assessed product. an increase in life expectancy.
. based on national data costs. if they show no or marginal benefits over existing products.g. Afterwards. 40. the lack of appropriate incentives has not favoured the development of contracts for them. In addition. a procedure exists to guarantee access to innovative treatments. If a new drug is both more effective and more costly. Hospitals usually draw up their own formularies and negotiate directly with manufacturers on the basis of volume-price agreements. Some have been challenged by manufacturers in front of German social or civil courts. IQWiG will not propose a price cap and policy makers will make a decision depending on budget impact (assessed by IQWiG) and affordability.137) and 51 high-cost medicines or implants (over 115). there have been some challenges in implementing contracts. IQWiG published in January 2008 a report on methods to be used for the assessment of relation of benefits to costs in the German statutory health care system (IQWiG. In an effort to avoid impairing access to very expensive technologies. however. 2007). their price will be capped at the price of alternatives. This method does not allow setting price cap for new drugs for which no therapeutic alternative is available. health-related quality of life and validate surrogate will be used to assess benefits. However. morbidity. meaning that the costs of most medicines used in the course of a hospital stay are included in the payment to the hospital. health insurance funds are expected to issue EU-wide calls for tender). rather than billed separately. costly medicines and implants are financed through “specific additional payments” (Zusatzentgelte) on top of DRG payments. 41. 39.DELSA/HEA/WD/HWP(2008)4 increased dramatically while sales of competitors decreased (Beck et al. in some cases. leading in some cases to contracts being cancelled. In most cases. among others. The list of drugs financed through this channel includes. One of the contentious issues is compliance with European public procurement directives (e. The Institute proposes to define efficiency frontiers within therapeutic areas to compare the relative costs and benefits of new therapies to the most efficient existing therapeutic alternatives. The InEK annually reviews hospitals’ applications for the funding of new diagnostic and therapeutic methods in the following 22 . 43. individual payments were negotiated for 43 DRGs (over 1. pharmaceuticals are mainly financed via the Germany’s DRG payment scheme.. Though the law does not explicitly exclude patented products from contracting opportunities. Moreover. 2008). In hospitals. the InEK defines homogeneous payments for DRG and for high cost drugs at the national level. Costs will be considered from the perspective of SHI patients: they should include costs for SHI funds (net of any savings achieved) but may also take into account significant costs faced by users. German competition authorities and the European Commission. In 2008. New drugs should be at least as efficient as older ones to be approved for reimbursement by health insurance funds at the proposed price. the 2007 reform states that pharmaceuticals which are not clustered in maximum reimbursement amount groups must be subject to pharmaco-economic assessment by IQWiG and that a maximum reimbursement price will be either negotiated with the manufacturer or set by the Federal association of health insurance funds (Spitzenverband Bund der Krankenkassen) according to the results of the assessment. Payment for hospital drugs by health insurance funds 42. The National Institute for payment in hospitals (Institut für das Entgeltsystem im Krankenhaus – InEK) annually updates both the DRGs and additional payments. In a few cases. IQWiG is in charge of producing the methodology for this assessment. follow-on products’ efficiency will be benchmarked to costs and benefits of the first entrant. according to criteria defined by the SGB and to international standards of cost-effectiveness assessment (SGB V §35b). 44. such payments cannot be defined due to lack of cost data and payments are negotiated at the level of individual hospitals. Mortality. cancer drugs and immunoglobulins. which means that SHI funds will remain price takers for this kind of innovative drugs –as it is the case in other OECD countries.
In Australia. retail listed prices corresponded to the prices paid by health insurance. pharmaceuticals covered by statutory health insurance have been subject to regulation limiting the amount to be reimbursed under certain circumstances (maximum reimbursement amounts). The extent to which copayments may hinder access to medications is not known. Ten per cent of German patients with chronic conditions said they spent $500 or more out of pocket to buy prescribed medicines over the past year. it may be that patients are not aware of the cap or do not choose to apply for the exemption.2007). 2007). Adequacy of drug coverage and financial protection against drug expenditures 45. The German market is characterised by the absence of direct regulation of ex-factory prices. almost all of the German population is covered by health insurance and has access to a comprehensive drug benefit package. In addition. distribution margins are regulated and the listed retail price of a reimbursed product must be the same for the whole German territory. the InEK decides whether the new treatment should be financed by health insurance or not and whether its cost can be included in DRG payments. Manufacturers freely set their price at market entry 47. health insurance funds used to act as price-takers until the 2007 reform. since they were required to cover any pharmaceutical eligible for reimbursement at the price set by the manufacturer. the percentage reached respectively 30%. additional funding for high cost drugs represents 2% of total hospital expenditures (Aoustin. This share is higher than that of the Netherlands (5%). Generally limited to 5-6% of 7 Survey responses appear inconsistent with the existence of a cap for out-of-pocket payment. 48. 20% mentioned that they “did not see the doctor. In 1993. In Germany.. 27% and 42%. In order to curb health insurance funds deficits. 49. Alternatively.. 2003-2004. In a survey of about 700 German adults with chronic conditions that were asked about their experience in health care. and most recently from November 2005 to March 2008 (Schröder et al. did not get recommended care. Patients are required to pay any difference between the retail price and the amount paid by his/her health insurance fund. the United Kingdom (9%) and Canada (14%). Overall. 23 . 50. Since 1989. but is half the share reporting this in the United States (42%). necessitates a specific additional payment or –due to lack of data – must be funded by a special budget outside the DRG system Overall. the ex-factory prices of pharmaceuticals are not regulated at market entry. prices of pharmaceuticals not included in the maximum reimbursement amount were lowered (by 5% for prescription drugs and by 2% for OTC drugs). Before 2007. 2006). After a clinical assessment. even for reimbursed products. On the other hand.7 where only 1% of Dutch patients and 2% of British patients said so. across-the board price freezes and price reductions have been used several times. effective prices can differ substantially from listed prices. Since the 2007 reform has been introducing new contracting opportunities between health insurance funds and manufacturers. Further price freezes were imposed in 1993-1994. .DELSA/HEA/WD/HWP(2008)4 year. set at 1% of chronic patients’ income. manufacturers are usually required to pay rebates to health insurance funds for all products which are not included in maximum reimbursement amount clusters. Pharmaceutical pricing policy 46. Manufacturers are always permitted to price their products above this cap. skipped doses or did not fill prescriptions because of cost” (Schoen et al. Canada and the United States. except for products priced above the Festbetrag. In the market segment not subject to maximum reimbursement amounts. Respondents may have overstated their expenses.
10.45 3.34 1. Wholesalers’ mark-ups are capped for prescription medicines as well as reimbursable OTC drugs.23. From ex-factory to public price 51. updated 26. Since then.50 2.3.67 .00 .64 . The 2004 reform amended this payment scheme to disconnect –at least partly– the payment of pharmacists’ services from the price of pharmaceuticals.04 .6.0.75 . A 10% rebate was created in 2006 for offpatent products (both generics and originals) whose price is not at least 30% below the Festbetrag (Klauber and Schleert.1.11 . except in the few cases where they are covered by SHI.57 .00% 3.55.70 3.61 26.82 €1.00% 1.70 20.76 .75 .5.59 . 2006.92 €1.64 10.88 €0.DELSA/HEA/WD/HWP(2008)4 the ex-manufacturer price. Schröder et al.50% 2.71 . Pharmacists were also paid through a sliding-scale margin until 2004.67 55. Wholesale and retail margins are no longer regulated for OTC products since their exclusion from the benefit basket in 2004.56 €0.46 15. pharmacists receive a fixed amount of €8.18 0.2. Like many OECD countries. 2006 53. Wholesale mark-up for prescription-only medicines and reimbursable OTC Prescription-only medicines Ex-factory price Max mark-up 0.01 .00 9% 9.6.3.00 .00% 0.).6.03 18.60 6.57 .63 €0.200 6% From 1200 €72.2.63 Source: Arzneimittelpreisverordnung Act.11.74 €0.2007.44.26.01 . Maximum mark-ups are defined by law according to a sliding-scale that includes both mark-ups expressed as a percentage of ex-factory prices and fixed amounts (see Table 3).85 .684.77 3.10 per prescription as well as 3% of the wholesale price for prescription medicines (Arzneimittelpreisverordnung Act). 2006).3.00% 9.00 15% 3.9. ÖBIG. SGB V §130a.00 12% 5.75 €0. these rebates reached 16% in 2004.74 €0. 2006. Germany regulates distribution margins for prescription drugs covered by statutory health funds.50% 6.76 12.66 €0.12 6.00% From 684.58 €6.65 19.10 18..56 19.00 Reimbursed OTC medicines Ex-factory price Max mark-up 0. 24 . Table 3.9. The wholesalers’ mark-up was halved by the 2004 reform (ÖBIG.01 .0% € 61.00% 44. 52.83 .1.81 11.0.03.1.3.01 .21 .89 .66 . Mark-ups for reimbursed OTC medicines are still set according to a sliding scale margin (see Table 4).84 21.93 .20 €1.00 7% 23.47 .
0 . updated 26. pharmaceuticals are subject to the full VAT rate in Germany. see Annex 1.15 .. In the past. comparable to those of Canada. set in 2007 at €2.95 .263% + € 118.22 1.2% for pharmacists). 56. By contrast with most European countries.30 7. 2006.94 35.34 1.30 for prescription drugs and 5% of the price for OTC drugs.41 57% €4. however.23 .13. but studies are not available to confirm this fact.1% through rebates paid by manufacturers and pharmacists (Coca et al.78 30% 8. (For a detailed review of these studies.12.68 .35 . Recent reforms are reported to have decreased generic prices. 55.03.29.16 48% €5.43 .56 .2007.2%. ÖBIG. Though results are very sensitive to the methodology.83 43% €8. pharmaceutical companies can choose their prices freely at market entry. distribution costs accounted for 21% of the average retail price of reimbursed medicines (3.1. and exceeded by those of Switzerland and the United States. Germany generally ranks among the countries where manufacturers receive the highest prices for their products. but they then have to be sold at the same price to all wholesalers. 58.8% for wholesalers and 17.67 8.DELSA/HEA/WD/HWP(2008)4 Table 4. German ex-manufacturer prices of generic pharmaceutical products have also been found to be high. both in comparison to other European countries and to the United States. 2007). However.58 . The share accruing to manufacturers was 57.22. Pharmacy mark-up for reimbursed OTC drugs Wholesale price in € 0. Pharmacists are required to pay rebates to health insurance funds.89 .83 62% €2. 2007). prices of generics were found to be higher in Canada.15 . German distribution costs used to be higher than those of other European countries.4. 54. The government got 13. The VAT rate increased in 2007 from 16% to 19% (ÖBIG. Wholesalers’ and pharmacies’ mark-up being fixed implies that prices of pharmaceuticals are the same in every pharmacy and that there is no price competition in distribution (OECD.31 . 2007).8% through VAT and health insurance funds received 8.14 29.8.35 37% €10.22 4. As seen before. 2008b).) German ex-factory prices of patented pharmaceuticals have been found to be among the highest in Europe.35.19.55 13. In 2006.42 19.92 Pharmacy mark-up 68% €0..57 22. Germany is included in many studies comparing ex-factory prices of pharmaceuticals.1. the recent reform of pharmacists’ margins and changes in the basket of covered medicines lowered the relative share of distribution costs to bring it more in line with other countries (Coca et al.91 From 543. Impact of reimbursement and pricing regulation on German pharmaceutical prices 59.23 .7.24 Source: Arzneimittelpreisverordnung Act.543.88 3. 25 .14 12. 57.3.
Two main tools are used to influence drug prescription: the definition of practice guidelines and the setting of prescription targets at the collective or individual level. Regional physicians’ associations define individual volume targets by attributing to each specialty its share in prescriptions in year n-1 to the expected volume of prescription in year n. through collective as well as individual incentives. pharmaceutical expenditures did not exceed the fixed target and even declined by comparison to the previous year. a relatively high VAT on pharmaceuticals. However. he is 26 . Professional autonomy is emphasised in Germany. 65.DELSA/HEA/WD/HWP(2008)4 60. In 1993. ÖBIG. § 12). Both involve physicians’ associations or representatives in the decision or negotiation process. However. When a physician exceeds by 15% the volume target. Policies to influence drug prescription 62. but were never enforced because of uncertainty about the legal implications of sanctioning an individual (a physician) who was not personally responsible for any “breach”. Individual volume targets (Richtgrössen) were introduced in 1989 but could not immediately be enforced because appropriate data were not available to monitor physicians’ prescriptions. and (until recent reforms) relatively high distribution costs explains the finding that Germany’s retail pharmaceutical prices were the highest in the European Union in 2005 (Eurostat. The German Code of Social Security (Sozial Gesetzbuch) states that benefits financed by statutory health insurance funds must be “sufficient. 2006. Prescription budgets and targets 63. 2006. Cost-containment has long been the main objective of German pharmaceutical policies. The combination of high ex-manufacturer prices. the latter being liable in case of excess. Since the early 1990s. When all OECD countries are taken into account. regional targets were reintroduced in 1999 in a revised version. 2007). these targets were progressively enforced. but quality improvement has become more apparent as a motive in the 2000s. 2007). 64. several incentives have been developed to improve the efficiency of drug prescription and drug dispensing. These agreements may contain provisions for financial penalties when targets are exceeded as well as bonus payments when objectives are achieved (Busse and Schreyögg. 2008). Volume targets are expressed as the average expected cost per patient and per year. Germany’s retail prices appeared to be comparable to those of Canada and the United States and exceeded only by Switzerland and Iceland (see Annex 1 and OECD. To achieve this objective. this policy was applied only once and replaced from 1994 by expenditure targets negotiated at the regional level by health insurance funds’ and physicians’ associations. Policies and other initiatives intended to influence drug use 61. Financial sanctions were theoretically applicable. appropriate and efficient (wirtschafltlich) and must not exceed what is necessary” (SGB V. Schröder. Collective financial liability was abolished in 2001 but regional associations of funds and physicians are still mandated to negotiate regional agreements (Zielvereinbarungen) which may contain regional expenditure targets as well as other objectives such as targets for the prescription of generics or parallel imports. Abandoned for a time (due to a political transition). The first expenditure target with collective liability was implemented in 1992 for the following year. A target budget was set and both regional physicians’ associations and the pharmaceutical industry were supposed to refund a portion of any excess above this target. Very expensive drugs are not taken into account and volume targets for each specialty are split into two sub-targets corresponding to retired and no-retired patients. several measures have aimed to affect physicians’ prescriptions.
Any excess of 10% (20%or 30%) over this targeted cost was supposed to lead to financial sanctions. Thresholds for control and refund were provisionally lowered by the 2000 reform (to respectively 5% and 15%) but were raised again a few months later. However. eight regions applied the bonus-malus rules defined at the Federal level. 2007). 68. SHI funds were allowed to pay bonuses to physicians’ associations under the form of "prescription credit". In 2007. In 2006. computed that for the first quarter of April 2007. If not justified by specific characteristics of his patients. For 2007. If the target is exceeded by 25%8 or more. SHI funds used to carry out both targeted (for high-prescribing physicians) and random (2% of physicians each quarter) controls. 9 27 . physicians’ and SHI funds’ associations were supposed to identify the most commonly prescribed therapeutic classes with some potential for efficiency 9 improvement . alpha-reductase inhibitors (for the treatment of prostatic hyperplasia). . However. For each of these therapeutic classes. when average costs were below the targeted cost. in October 2007. According to the Law. allowing SHI to recuperate (after several years) about 0. known as the Bonus-Malus-Regelung. 66. 67. in Berlin in 2002. physicians’ and SHI’ regional association had the choice between applying the bonus-malus regulation and contracting on the basis of other arrangements with comparable objectives to improve the efficiency of physicians’ prescriptions. three regions applied them with some variations and six regions concluded other arrangements (BKK. as compared to those of physicians of the same specialty. triptans (migraines) and selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (antidepressants). Regional associations of physicians and health insurance funds are responsible for monitoring physicians’ prescriptions.DELSA/HEA/WD/HWP(2008)4 alerted by a letter and invited to revise his prescription habits. the following classes were identified: proton pump inhibitors (antiulcer drugs – excluded from the scheme in the course of 2007). with 12% exceeding them by more than 25%. On the other hand. almost 20% of the city’s physicians had to refund SHI funds of an average sum of €90. biphosphonates (osteoporosis). set at 20% (30%or 50%) of the excess amount. Each year. selective beta-blockers (anti-hypertensives). Since 2003. Financial penalties can take the form of reduced fees or physicians’ payments to SHI funds. the average cost of the daily prescribed dose was computed and set as a targeted cost for each physician. the statutory health insurance funds have made information available to physicians on their recent prescriptions. To ensure compliance with these rules. federal associations of SHI funds and physicians agreed that objectives set in terms of average cost of prescriptions were not compatible with the existence and development of SHI-manufacturers contracts and that the bonus-malus regulation was no longer 8 .700 (Hyde. the physician must reimburse the excess amount comprised between 15 and 25% of the volume target and all sickness funds must be paid back au prorata of the number of patients covered. 16% of physicians had exceeded volume targets by more than 15%. the physician is asked to justify this excess. Since 2001. the AVWG introduced a new scheme for the regulation of physicians’ prescriptions. sanctions are relatively rare since the existence of multiple SHI funds makes the collection of data and production of evidence quite complex and physicians often invoke exceptional circumstances to justify their outlying prescriptions. with a maximum penalty of €2. The Berlin physicians’ associations. applying the federal framework. information about SHI physicians’ prescriptions has been systematically collected by health insurance funds through the GAmsi system (GKVArzneimittelschnellinformation). According to Busse and Schreyögg (2006). 2007). statins (anti-cholesterol).3% of the total of the region’s pharmaceutical expenditures. based on review of claims processed.
psychotherapy). http://www.pdf 11 . 2005). According to SBEG (2005).. quality circles and peer visits 70. in some occasions. it includes 60 therapeutic groups. among which antiemetic medicines. with the aim to provide evidence-based information. These recommendations rely on IQWiG’s assessment reports. of standard antibiotics. Other pharmacotherapy circles have developed but there has been no generalization of the experience.g-ba. The 8 therapeutic classes mentioned in the last note + four other classes: ACE inhibitors (antihypertensive). This new framework requires (at the least) the redefinition of methods used to set expenditure targets. (Schwabe. and loop diuretics. In parallel. The first pharmacotherapy circles were created by the regional physicians’ association of North Essen and targeted high prescribers and some therapeutic areas (hypertension. Practice guidelines. 28 . This list of active ingredients has been published in annual reports on SHI prescriptions since 1985 and updated every year. In addition. 2006). 71. 10 . Contracted products cannot really be taken into account in expenditure targets since their “real” price is not known by all stakeholders. gastro-intestinal therapy. numerous products are still present in the German market without due assessment by the BfArM or authorised via an alleviated registration procedure not based on evidence-based medicine (Busse et al.de/downloads/62-492-57/RL-AMR-2007-06-21. low-molecular-weight-heparin (thrombosis). 20-23). SHI funds hence took the initiative to publish a list of drugs with contested effectiveness (Umstrittene Arzneimittel) as assessed by their own experts. In spite of continuous efforts undertaken to re-assess the whole pharmacopeia against criteria in operation for granting marketing authorisations. these visits were well accepted and viewed as successful. as well as decrease in the prescription of drugs of disputed effectiveness (SGEB.DELSA/HEA/WD/HWP(2008)4 applicable. targeting high prescribers or practices with high savings potential. p. 2005). as appropriate. Health insurance funds’ initiatives relating to drugs with disputed effectiveness 74. Though such types of incentives do not seem to exist yet. vitamin combinations. new contracts may have other consequences on prescription targets and regional agreements. several activities have been developed to counterbalance the information delivered by pharmaceutical companies to doctors. Beyond the withdrawal of the bonus-malus regulation. 69. They decided to replace these targets by regional prescription targets allowing the exploitation of efficiency potential in twelve therapeutic classes10. A few quality circles have appeared on a voluntary basis in ambulatory as well as in hospital sector. 2006. the 2007 reform allows SHI funds to create incentives to encourage physicians to prescribe “contracted products”. cardiac or antiprostatic phytotherapy products. Health insurance funds and physicians’ associations have sent peers to medical doctors. of generics. The list contains preparations “whose effectiveness is not or not yet evidence-based or whose riskbenefit ratio was negatively assessed” by health insurance funds’ experts (Schwabe. In 2005. etc. In addition. cholesterol treatment. non-steroid antirheumatic drugs. 73. oral antidiabetics. the 2007 reform decided that the prescription of very expensive products ought to be subject to second opinion. The G-BA (see Box 2) prepares and publishes practice guidelines which are legally binding for physicians11. One of the successes of the pharmaceutical policy is the reduction in the prescription of drugs with disputed effectiveness. The assessment of these experiences showed positive effects on both quality and efficiency of prescription: increase in the prescription of established antidiabetics and anti-cholesterol drugs. they may be used in the future. 72.
according to Busse et al. without taking into account listed prices. In the last years. the older substitution rule applies. Since 2002. pharmacists had no financial incentives to substitute and no sanction if they do not. The prescription of drugs with contested effectiveness has continuously decreased since 1991. the decrease has concentrated on drugs used in the treatment of dementia. In Germany. as well as what is considered as inappropriate or misleading. the substitution rate was still quite low (7. with a price included in the lower tercile of price distribution for a given substance. pharmacists have been obliged to substitute whenever possible by a cheaper drug. such as development of high skilled human capital. intellectual property rights are shaped by international treaties and EU regulations. Where no “contracted” product is available. Policies to regulate promotion 78. neuropathics and veinotonics. The physician is still allowed to oppose such a substitution for medical reasons.000 pharmaceutical reps had 20 million contacts with physicians in Germany. Until August 2002. In addition. The Law prohibits direct-to-consumer advertising for prescription medicines (SBEG.6% of cases). pharmacists could only substitute a generic product for the prescribed drug if the physician had expressly authorised it on the prescription form. with a general savings target set at 5. Intellectual property rights play an important role in shaping pharmaceutical markets and providing incentives to invest in R&D. In detailing. deliver samples of products to physicians. pharmacists have been required to substitute whenever possible by a product for which the health insurance fund contracted with the manufacturer. Those products represented 30% of SHI-covered turnover in 1992 and only 4% in 2005.5% in 2002 and 7% in 2003 (Busse et al. although gifts of limited value may be permissible under certain circumstances (SBEG. 2005). which represented 200 contacts per physician (SBEG. Representatives are not allowed to offer and physicians are not allowed to accept gifts. who can dispense them free of charge to patients. 77. under certain conditions. Schwabe (2006) mentions that many of these drugs are not even available in the United States or in the United Kingdom. 80. It determines the type of information that promotion messages must contain and not contain. the 2002 Act required pharmacists to dispense parallel imports when their price is 15% or €15 below the price of the prescribed products. Innovation policies 81. Other policies.. 2005). Since April 2007. However. Policies to influence drug dispensing 76. 15. As a result. public investments in R&D and tax incentives are important to make a country attractive for R&D investments. The number of such prescriptions decreased by 87% over the 1991-2005 period. 2005). 29 . 2005). pharmaceutical firms’ representatives may. Intellectual property rights 82. vasodilatators.DELSA/HEA/WD/HWP(2008)4 75. 79. In 2000. (2005). The Law on advertising in the field of medicine (Gesetz über die Werbung auf dem Gebiete des Heilwesens) regulates the promotion of pharmaceuticals.
Germany is one of the 32 contracting states to the European Patent Convention (EPC) treaty. the owner can no longer rely on this national rights to prevent the importation of the product from that State into another Member Sate. An SPC is a tool governments use to compensate manufacturers for the lengthy period of time it sometimes takes for granting marketing authorisation. Applications can be made in one of the official languages of an EPC contracting state to the EPO’s offices in Munich. but the standard on which the determination is made is that of national law.” 12. A favourable decision by the EPO grants a patent in each of the designated states. In any case. and to the extent that patent application dates (for national patents) differ. terms and end of SPCs may vary from one country to another. For the purpose of granting an SPC. The EPC provides a single. The basis for determination of validity of a patent by national law is limited to a few reasons. an extension of intellectual property rights for said patent.DELSA/HEA/WD/HWP(2008)4 Patents 82. A European patent is. The European Patent Office (EPO) grants so-called European patents which are valid in all countries designed by the applicant. the determination of ownership. with different lengths of protection. non-unitary across all EU countries and independent in each. validity and infringement are subject to respective national laws. 84. 12 Supplementary Protection Certificate 85. Furthermore. however it does delay the entry of generic drugs onto the market. However. either the date of filing with the EPO for a European patent or for an international application under the Patent Cooperation Treaty. the total term of the SPC cannot exceed 5 years and the total term of “patent + SPC” protection cannot exceed 15 years. The Patent Cooperation Treaty provides a unified procedure for filing patent applications. An SPC is a unique. marketing authorisations granted in Switzerland are also considered since Liechtenstein automatically accepts authorisations granted in Switzerland. Before 1992. The term of the SPC equals the time elapsed between patent application and granting of the first marketing authorisation in the European Union14. the European patent remains valid in the other designated countries. 30 . 83. Under this doctrine. French and German). patent-like IPR that comes into force after the patent expires. by or with the consent of the legitimate trademark owner. while a national court may invalidate a patent in one country. The convention also requires all jurisdictions to give a European patent a term of 20 years from the filing date. Intellectual property rights exhaustion and parallel trade 86. but processing of the patent is done in one of the three official languages of the EPO (English. “once a product has been put on the market in a particular Member State. a holder of a pharmaceutical patent still in force in the European Economic Area can apply for a supplementary protection certificate (SPC). harmonised procedure for granting patents in contracting countries. 14. Since 199213. in effect. The member states of the European Union have developed a hybrid of the national and international IPR exhaustion regimes – Community-wide exhaustion. 13. less 5 years. SPC applications are made on a country by country basis.The applicant designates which countries of the EPC it wishes to file for patent protection. The EPC does impose some limits on its signatories. some European countries had national instruments to extend patent life or pharmaceuticals.
such as supplying or exporting on-patent medicines to generic manufacturers. innovative activity has somewhat declined in the first half of the 1990s with a drop of total and business-financed R&D. Complementary to Bolar type provisions are legislation that protect the clinical trial data that original product manufacturers are required to submit in their applications to regulatory agencies for marketing authorisation.DELSA/HEA/WD/HWP(2008)4 87. 92. been governed in Europe by each member state’s national law. these states can request derogation. during the eightyear data-exclusivity period.Data exclusivity 90. Member states had until 30 October 2005 to implement the new Directive. The European Commission decided that a provision for generic manufacturers similar to the Hatch-Waxman Act’s so-called “Bolar provision” should be permitted for all member states. the EC has apparently left the interpretation to national courts (Ashurst. This period of exclusivity is followed by a two-year period during which generic versions of the original product may not be launched on the market of any member state. 91. restricting parallel trade to within the member states of the European Union. Community-wide exhaustion was adopted in the spirit of harmonizing trade within the EU. this new regulation creates the so-called “8+2+1” formula which guarantees the original producer a period of market exclusivity equivalent to ten years. 2005). Finally. it is the IPR issue underlying the parallel trade of pharmaceuticals within the European Union. The amendment clearly allows the use of on-patent medicines by users other than the holder of the patent for “conducting the necessary studies and trials” for “consequential practical requirements”. By using the ambiguous wording “consequential practical requirements”. The law came into full effect in November 2005. It provided that test data supplied by the manufacturer of an original product. although marketing authorisation can be granted during this period. In the face of opposition to the new law from prospective member states who were not able to vote on it. European Court of Justice rulings have made it clear that the principle of community-wide exhaustion supersedes national exhaustion regimes (Carboli. The European “Bolar-type” provision 88. the producer obtains marketing authorisation for additional indications which bring a substantial clinical benefit compared with existing therapies. Member states had 18 months from April 2004 to implement the Directive into their national laws. several factors have been put 15 . 2002). The use by generic manufacturers of pharmaceuticals still under patent protection for the purpose of submitting information to regulatory agencies for obtaining marketing authorization has. to include the following amendment: “Conducting the necessary studies and trials … and the consequential practical requirements shall not be regarded as contrary to patent rights or to supplementary protection certificates for medicinal products. the EC revised Directive 2001/83/EC on the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use. Directive 2004/27/EC. as required by marketing authorisation legislations. 31 . Other policies relating to innovation 93. However. 2006). In effect. One of the 2004 European Commission’s amendments to Directive 2001/83/EC revised EU aspects of data protection. In 2004. Apart from the effects of reunification. meaning that the first generic drugs to be affected by this law will not come on to the market in the European Union until 2015. but left uncertain the legality of other actions. with the possibility of extending that exclusivity to 11 years (Sanjuan. 31 March 2004. Article 10(6). In Germany.15 89. the original producer can obtain an additional one-year period of market exclusivity beyond the two-year period if. until recently. are protected for a period of eight years following the first marketing approval in a member state.
the relative inability for Germany to reap the benefits of ICT for raising the productivity in other industries. 95. It issued a first set of recommendations in 2004. 2005). A Task force was set up in 2003 with the mission to improve location conditions and innovation opportunities for the pharmaceutical industry in Germany. Task Force pharma. to a lesser extent. of education and research as well as representatives of the pharmaceutical industry. 2006). the small size of venture capital market.DELSA/HEA/WD/HWP(2008)4 forward to explain this relative decline: the administrative burden to create enterprises. and some deficiencies in the education and availability of high-skilled manpower (OECD. 2005). the task force included members of the ministries of industry. 32 . 2004). As a result. 2006. several measures were implemented to facilitate the realisation of non-commercial clinical trials (clarification of funding responsibilities. 94. whose status and implementation were assessed in 2005 in the second Report of plan of action (Task Force Pharma. creation of clusters) (OECD. creation and funding of clinical trials centres in universities) and to finance R&D activities in biotechnology (project funding. the United Kingdom (OECD. The pharmaceutical sector did not escape the general trend and Germany lost in the beginning of the 1990s its traditional leadership in pharmaceutical R&D to the benefit of the United States and. Chaired by the Ministry of health and social security.
Drug expenditure per capita. including expenditure trends and components of spending. supply and trade. pharmaceutical production.2%. Figure 2.1 billion USD PPP in 2005 on drugs. In 2005. 2005 USD PPP 800 792 Public 700 589 554 517 509 498 465 458 449 445 436 Private 600 500 400 417 415 409 398 390 380 372 362 360 351 320 290 276 243 300 200 144 100 0 St at es an ad Fr a an ce Sp ai n Ita G e ly Lu rm x e an m y bo ur Ic g el J a and pa n ( P 1) Sw ortu i tz ga er l la nd Au O E st ra CD li a (1 Au ) st r N ia H orw un a ga y ry (1 C ze Fi ) ch nla R n Sl ov ep d a k ub R li c ep ub lic Ko re Sw a ed en N Ire ew la Ze n d al a D nd en m ar Po k la n M d ex ic o C (1) 2004 Source: OECD HEALTH DATA 2007. below the OECD average of 17.DELSA/HEA/WD/HWP(2008)4 PHARMACEUTICAL MARKET CHARACTERISTICS 96. third highest among OECD countries. July 07 U ni te d 33 .6% of GDP. Pharmaceutical spending was 1.2% of its total health spending to pharmaceuticals. Germany devoted 15. This section reviews the various components of the pharmaceutical market in Germany. above the OECD average and not far behind other neighboring European countries of France. public and private spending. Expenditure level 97. Spain and Italy (see Figure 2). Per capita pharmaceutical expenditure was 498 USD. Germany spent 41. above the OECD average (see Figure 3).
observed in 1998) and 74.5 0 (1) 2004. households’ expenditures increased by 15% (+13% for OTC purchase and +19% for copayments). out-ofpocket expenditures averaged 118€ per inhabitant. Luxembourg. observed in 2002).5 2 % GDP 1.DELSA/HEA/WD/HWP(2008)4 Figure 3. Private insurance financed 6.5 1 0. the public sector financed almost three quarters of pharmaceutical expenditures (69% via social security funds and 4. through out-of-pocket payments for prescribed and reimbursed medicines (35% of households’ expenditures) and self-purchase of OTC medicines (the remaining 65%). (2) 2002 Source: OECD HEALTH DATA 2007. only 4 countries (Ireland. In 2005.2% of total pharmaceutical expenditures. 100. (the peak. The share of public funding is relatively high. In 2004.3% (the lowest level. by comparison with other OECD countries. 99. Households financed 20.2% via direct governmental expenditures). the share of public funding has fluctuated in a small range between 67. Fluctuations in public funding logically impacted households’ expenditures. In 2005. In 2005. July 07 Financing 98.6%. Sl H ov un a k ga R ry ep u Po b lic rtu ga l U ni Sp C ted a in ze ch Sta R te s ep ub Fr li c an ce Ita C ly an ad Po a la G er nd m an y Ko J a re a pa n (1 ) O EC Au Me D st x ic ra o li a (1 Ic ) el an Au d st r F ia Sw inl an i N tze d ew rl a Ze nd al an N et Sw d he ed rl a e nd n s D (2) en m a Ire rk la Lu n x e No d m r wa bo ur y g (1 ) 34 . 2005 50 % in total health spending 45 40 35 % total health spending 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 % of pharmaceutical spending in GDP 3 2.5% of these expenditures. equally split between self-medication and copayments for reimbursed pharmaceuticals (see Figure 4). Since the middle of the 1970’s. Czech and Slovak Republics) had higher levels of public funding. Share of pharmaceutical expenditure in total health spending and in GDP.
In the meantime. This 8-year trend hides significant variations in annual growth rates between 1997 and 2005 (see Figure 6).DELSA/HEA/WD/HWP(2008)4 Figure 4.7%) than in other health spending (1. If the shift towards private funding is easily attributable to the narrowing of the benefit basket.6%) over the last 8 years. Germany has been experiencing greater annual growth in pharmaceutical spending (3. 156) and a subsequent increase in 2004/2005. 2007. The SHI Modernization Act caused a dramatic decrease in public expenditures in 2004. private spending for drugs increased by more than 10% in 2004 (see figure 6).. 35 . this decrease was somehow compensated by a sharp increase in public expenditures in the last quarter of 2003 (Coca et al. although both have been below the OECD averages (see Figure 5). However. the sharp increase of public spending in 2005 is less easy to interpret. October 2007. Private expenditures for prescription and OTC medicines Source: OECD Health Data. p. Expenditure growth 101.
7 3.3 3.3 3.0 1 .4 5.DELSA/HEA/WD/HWP(2008)4 Figure 5.0 8.3 5. (2) 1992-2002.9 3.1 6.6 1 .2 5.3 2.0 6.8 9.5 6. (3) 1999-2004 Source: OECD HEALTH DATA 2007.2 4.0 8. October 07 36 .9 3.9 5.4 3.4 4.2 5. July 07 H Figure 6.6 1 .7 4.4 3.7 3.4 4.0 4.5 7.3 5.1 4.6 6.3 3.0 3. Real annual growth in pharmaceutical spending and total health expenditure (net of pharmaceutical expenditure).8 6.0 8.0 9.7 2.4 3.8 4.6 4.6 7.9 3. Real annual growth of pharmaceutical expenditure in Germany.3 6.8 6.5 3.0 4.5 4.1 2.1 THE (net pharmaceutical) 10.6 1 Pharmaceutical expenditure 1 0. 1997-2005 Source: OECD HEALTH DATA 2007.4 7.3 8.2 5.0 0.1 3.4 4.1 8.0 Ire un lan ga d U ni ry ( te 1) d S M tate ex s Au ico (3 st ) ra li a (1 ) Ko Sl re ov a a k Ca na R ep d ub a lic (3 ) Lu Sp ai xe n m bo ur g N et he OE rl a C nd D s (2 Fi ) nl an Ic d el an d Fr an Sw ce ed e Po n rtu ga C ze Au l ch st R ria e N ew pu b Ze li c al an G d er m Sw an i tz er y la n N d or w ay D en m ar k Ita Ja ly pa n (1 ) (1) 1997-2004. 1997-2005 12.
Price trend for SHI-covered pharmaceuticals 1999-2006 (monthly data) 140 130 120 Non-Festbetragsmarkt Price index (January 1989 = 100) 110 100 Total Market 90 80 Festbetragsmarkt 70 60 50 1 1989 1 1990 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Source : Schröder et al. In fact. 2006. Hence.. which contains mainly generic products. German generic prices are relatively high in international comparisons (see annex 1).4% to 31. 2006) even conclude that the reference price scheme had adverse effects on generic prices by not stimulating price competition below the reference price. Pharmaceutical prices have been relatively stable since 1989. 2006). from 43. In addition. 37 . but this general trend results from two opposing trends: a price increase of almost 20% in the market segment not affected by reference prices and a 35% decrease in the affected segment (see Figure 6). 2006). it is not easy to disentangle the impact of the reference price scheme from what would have happened absent this scheme in this market segment. the average price differential between original preparations and generics has regularly decreased since 1993. which takes inventory of all studies presenting a high level of evidence. does not mention any conclusive study on the German case (Aaserud et al.DELSA/HEA/WD/HWP(2008)4 Components of expenditure growth Prices 102.2% in 2005 (Nink and Schröder. However. The literature review recently undertaken by the Cochrane collaboration on the impact of reference prices.. Figure 7. Some analysts (quoted in Schröder et al. analysts generally consider that reference prices have contributed to the relative stability of prices in the German market.. 103.
the rest resulting from changes in package size.DELSA/HEA/WD/HWP(2008)4 Changes in volume and therapeutic mix 104. when global budgets were first implemented.6% increase of the average cost per prescription. expenditure growth is highly driven by new and expensive products. 4).. Overall.3% decrease in prices more than offset by a change in the therapeutic mix explaining 6. between 1992 and 2006.1) (Schwabe. As in many countries. Prescriptions and sales of SHI-covered pharmaceuticals Prescriptions (millions) Sales (billions) € 1100 26 1000 24 Prescriptions (millions) 20 800 18 700 16 600 14 500 12 400 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 10 Note: Sales of SHI-covered pharmaceuticals include both patients’ copayments and manufacturers’ and pharmacist’s rebates. p. Further analysis of this change shows that more than half of it came from real changes in the mix of drugs used (+3. the number of prescriptions is not an ideal indicator of consumption since the package size has continuously grown during this period to allow savings in the treatment of chronic disease (Schwabe. the result of a 3% decrease in the volume of prescription and a 3. However. 2007). Coca et al. dosage or form for the same product (+2. the growth of pharmaceutical turnover for SHI-reimbursed products was 0. In 2006. for instance. The volume of prescriptions financed by SHI has regularly decreased since the beginning of the 1990s: from 1 billion in 1992 to 574 million in 2006 (see Figure 7. Source: Arzneiverordnungs Report 2007 (2007) 105. the use of newer and more expensive products explains a large share of German pharmaceutical expenditure growth. when OTC and lifestyle products were excluded from the benefit basket. 38 Sales (billions) € 900 22 . Year after year. and again in 2004. These components should be subtracted from sales to obtain SHI expenditures. 2007. the average cost of prescription jumped from €16 to € 41 (Coca et al. Figure 8. 2007). the latter being in turn explained by a 2.9%). 2007). in 1997.6%..1% of the growth. Nonetheless. the number of SHI-covered prescriptions decreased dramatically in 1993.
with a volume level very closed to the OECD average (OECD.3 70. Penetration rates are slightly lower when the whole market is considered.6 30.1 74.DELSA/HEA/WD/HWP(2008)4 Volume and Consumption 106. which makes respectively 60% and 35.9 59.1 63.SHI prescriptions 28.3 54.9 30.3 31.1 37.6 41.8 60. volume consumed in some therapeutic classes (antidepressants. Generic prescription has continuously increased since the beginning of the 1980’s (Coca et al.8 51.0 32. In Germany.3 43.0 44.0 47.1 60.3 74. Germany ranks only 11th for the volume of pharmaceuticals consumed per capita (expenditure converted using pharmaceutical-specific purchasing power parities). Germany ranked nonetheless among OECD countries with the highest generic penetration in 2004 (Figure 9).2 74.5 62.4 45.0 50.0 42. Similarly.2 52. i.8 29.3 55.0 Share of generic in total market .2 31. They chose the first option in 55% of cases. In addition.7 75.0 65.0 74.2 76.3 34. Generics represent 76.7 47. 108.4 63..SHI sales 23.9 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Source : Coca et al.0 29. Generic penetration in the SHI pharmaceutical market 1989-2006 Year Share of generic in off-patent market SHI prescriptions 49.1 49.1 65.3 33.6 35.3 28.3 59.e.2 54.7% of prescriptions and 74% of SHI turnover for the off-patent market in 2006.0 Share of generic in total market . physicians are allowed to prescribe either by international non-proprietary name (INN) or by brand name. which is quite high compared to international standards.9% of the total SHI-market (see Table 4). Table 5.2 71.0 72.3 32.2 32.4 34.9 30. 2007 39 .7 65.9 44. antibiotics.3 32.2 67.8 50. Generics and parallel imported products 107.8 62.3 44.3 36. Despite a high level of expenditure. 2008).5 37.2 57.3 60.2 55. lipid-lowering drugs) is below the OECD average when measured in Defined Daily Doses (OECD.1 68.4 24.4 31.9 47. 2007).7 68.7 Share of generic in off-patent market SHI sales 36.9 41. 2007b). including OTC and hospital markets.0 51..2 68. generic prescribing and substitution have been encouraged by measures adopted to influence physicians’ and pharmacists’ behaviour.
2 55.8 20.6 7.0 32.7 Source: EGA.5 49.1 43.8 6.4 14.0 30. 2007). Several studies have estimated savings due to parallel trade.3 50 40 30 20 10 0 9. The most recent (Enemark et al. with somewhat contradictory results.4 5.7 7.0 5. i.0 19.0 55.8 8.e. ANAFAM.5 16. (2) IMS.0 5. market in which parallel imported products are available (WIDO. Parallel imports deceased by almost 30% in 2004 (see Figure 10) because of across-the-board price reductions imposed by the SHI Modernization Act which rendered them less attractive for traders.0 13.5 65.2 12.5% of SHI-covered turnover and 22. creating some savings for health insurance funds.1 4.2 2.1 12. However. In 2006.1 6.4 41.6 86.0 % Market Share 60 53. 40 .0 49.3 39.6 22. Parallel imports have also sharply increased since the end of the 1990s.0 33. 110.DELSA/HEA/WD/HWP(2008)4 Figure 9.3 8..0 48.9 13. (3) 2002.5% of the potential market. parallel imported products represented 7. (1) EFPIA. the growing trend resumed the following year (VFA. 2007).4 41.3 12.0 40. which was however a trough in parallel trade activity.9 19.1 12.4 5. Generic market shares in OECD countries 2004 100 % Share (Value) % Share (Volume) 90 80 70 65. (4) CGPA Parallel imports 109.2 35. 2006) estimated direct savings to €145 for 2004.
which invest significantly in R&D.5 2. Two types of companies co-exist in the German pharmaceutical industry. 2005). The VFA (Verband Forschender Arzneimittelhersteller) represents German companies and affiliates of foreign companies with international scope.2 28.9% of sales).bpi. with 20 companies representing 39.1 0 1998 -20 -29.4 2006 Source: IMS Health. The United States ranks first. The VFA’s 44 affiliates account for almost twothirds of the German pharmaceutical market16. InsightHealth. 10. 80 Growth rate of parallel imports and the global market1998-2006 Parallel imports 65.1 20 17. in the United Kingdom and in France (5% annually between 1991 and 2001). it counts 260 members.9 9. only the United Kingdom (3 companies 15. 2008 http://www. represented by two distinct associations. Switzerland (3 companies.9 0. accessed on January 15.1 36.de. 8.1 6. 16. 2006)18.6 -0. 113.vfa. but lower than those observed in a few European countries such as Sweden. 41 .17 112.4 60.1 -40 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 5. The BPI (Bundesverband der Pharmazeutischen Industrie) represents smaller German companies with smaller investments in R&D. In Europe.DELSA/HEA/WD/HWP(2008)4 Figure 10.2 Overall market 60 40 28. Five German companies are among the world’s Top 50 pharmaceutical companies and generate 8.7% of worldwide sales (Gray. In terms of production.7% of sales) and France (one company. 2007). 17.3 11. 18.7 6. Production grew in the 1990s at a rate comparable to that of the United States.6% of sales) have a better or equivalent position. Denmark and Belgium (+12%) or Ireland (+23%) (OECD Health Data. Germany ranks third in Europe.6 5.7 52. 2007).6% of total sales among this group. with sometimes diverging interests (Blankart and Wolf. 2008 The Top 50 pharmaceutical companies account for about 70% of worldwide sales. accessed on January 15.7 5. http://www. behind France and the United Kingdom (EFPIA.de. VFA Pharmacy industry activity 111.
2007). 19. cited by BPI. Main destinations for German pharmaceutical exports are Belgium (28% of exports19). the Netherlands (7%) and Switzerland (6%) (Statistisches Bundesamt. In 2006. Within Germany. Figure 11. followed by the United States (18%). the United States (12%). 113. A big pharmaceutical company has set up a distribution centre in Belgium. Nonetheless. where drugs are imported from production centres to be re-exported to other countries. 150 145 140 135 130 125 120 115 110 105 100 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Production in the pharmaceutical industry and in total manufacturing industry 1993-2006 Pharmaceutical industry All manufacturing industry Source: Federal Statistical Office. 115. Switzerland (10%) and France (7%).8% between 2003 and 2006). Both imports and exports have been increasing sharply since 2002 (see Figure 13). ranking third among OECD countries in 2006 (see Figure 12). cited by VFA 2007.234 people work in the pharmaceutical industry. Germany has long been a net exporter of pharmaceuticals. This probably explains the volume of exports to Belgium. Ireland is the main source for pharmaceutical products imported to Germany (30% of imports). total employment in the sector has been slightly decreasing since 2004 (-4.DELSA/HEA/WD/HWP(2008)4 114. the production of pharmaceuticals grew faster than production in other manufacturing sectors between 1993 and 2006. 42 .
DELSA/HEA/WD/HWP(2008)4 Figure 12. 43 . 20 000 Pharmaceutical trade balance 2006 15 000 10 000 5 000 million US$ - (5 000) (10 000) (15 000) (20 000) Source: OECD International Trade Statistics. 2007.
. 44 . US companies overtook their European counterparts in terms of worldwide market shares and R&D outcomes (Gambardella et al. see figure 14). 2003). United Kingdom. 118. a level comparable to those of Switzerland though the discoveries of Swiss firms are on average more innovative (more often global. Nevertheless. EFPIA. 116. the R&D activities of German firms are not restricted to Germany. outcomes of R&D investments by German firms are comparable to those of their European counterparts. the firm nationality does not dictate the location of R&D activities. 2007). During this period. 2007. led by shareholders and a flexible labour market are deemed to be more adaptable and oriented to the search of short-term financial results. which are widely internationalized.15% of GDP in 2004.4% of all Business R&D expenditures. 2000). However. a trend that some analysts attribute to differences in institutional frameworks in which they operate: British firms. biotech). Sweden or Ireland. They also represented 8. 117. Trend of Import and exports of pharmaceuticals 50 000 Imports Exports 45 000 40 000 35 000 30 000 million USD 25 000 20 000 15 000 10 000 5 000 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Source: OECD International Trade Statistics. These investments represented 0. German firms originated 42 of the new chemical entities launched between 1993 and 2003 (see Figure 14).DELSA/HEA/WD/HWP(2008)4 Figure 13. Belgium. 2007a. Denmark. which make them more likely to produce blockbuster drugs (Casper and Matraves. The decline was more pronounced for German firms than for British ones. which is similar to the average level observed on OECD countries for which data are available. The European pharmaceutical industry’s competitiveness has deteriorated in the 1990s. after the United Kingdom (OECD. Germany ranks second in Europe for R&D performed in the pharmaceutical industry. In other words. and similar to the United Sates’ level. which is much lower than in some European countries (such as Switzerland. first-in-class.
9 0.1 0 15 10 5 0 1. Business expenditures for R&D performed by the pharmaceutical industry 2005 % 0. 2.4 20 0.DELSA/HEA/WD/HWP(2008)4 Figure 14.8 0. 4. 3. 2004. 2001.2 0. 2002. 2003. BERD: Business expenditure for R&D Source: OECD Science and Technology Indicators.5 % of GDP % of total BERD % 50 45 40 35 30 25 0.3 0.7 0. 2007 45 .6 0.
11. However.6%) (IMS Health.1%). about 24 months after first world application. Rest of the World Source: Grabowski and Wang. 16% in the Netherlands and 20.DELSA/HEA/WD/HWP(2008)4 Figure 15. Australia. According to VFA statistics. though similar to the diffusion rate observed in the United Kingdom (Danzon and Furukowa. 120. 2007).3%) and France (5. and there is no "reimbursement and pricing" delay since drugs eligible for reimbursement are immediately reimbursed by health insurance funds as soon as they enter the market. France. at the price set by the manufacturer. Delays for marketing authorisations are not long. 14. New chemical entities (NCEs) launched between 1993 and 2003. the diffusion of new molecules (measured by the number of daily doses per capita within the three years following launch in the country) is slower than in many other countries (Japan. 2003 Germany is an attractive market for the global pharmaceutical industry 119. Canada). Italy. by comparison with other countries. 2007). Japan (9.9% in Sweden (VFA. by firm's nationality All NCEs 160 140 120 100 88 Global NCEs First-in-class NCEs Biotech NCEs Orphan NCEs 1 52 80 60 42 81 40 27 36 27 1 4 41 33 1 6 30 1 1 23 2 1 2 3 37 30 27 8 8 9 0 1 3 122 2 20 0 1 8 1 1 33 4 5 6 5 100 0 7 3 2 France Germany Italy United Kingdom Other EU countries Sw itzerland Japan U. 2008). ranking fourth behind the United States (45. in 2005.7% in Switzerland. With 80 million inhabitants and a relatively high income.8% in Norway and Denmark.5% against 9. pharmaceutical products are promptly available in Germany. quicker than in all other markets but the United States (see Figure 16). the market share of new molecules 5 years after market launch in Germany was the lowest among a set of EU countries : 6.S.3% of worldwide sales. 46 . 121. United States. Spain. i. Germany represents 5. As a result.6% in the United Kindgom.e.
from Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry calculations. Sixteen full-line wholesalers operate in the German market. The 2004 GMG reform liberalised the pharmacy sector in order to foster competition: pharmacy owners are now allowed to own up to 4 outlets. N 47 Fr an ce Ja pa n an y SA K Sp ai n U U . More than 95% of approved pharmaceutical products are available only in pharmacy (BfArM. the density of pharmacies is just above the EU average (20 pharmacies per 100. 123. Supply and distribution of pharmaceuticals 122. mail order has been authorised and the price of nonreimbursed OTC drugs was completely liberalised (Busse and Riesberg. from ÖBIG.000 inhabitants. Physicians are generally not allowed to dispense drugs.000 inhabitants. 2007). 2005. the remaining may be sold in drugstores or supermarkets. 125. With about 25 pharmacies per 100.DELSA/HEA/WD/HWP(2008)4 Figure 16. 2006). 4 of which operate nationwide and 12 regionally (ÖBIG. 124. 2004). while 90% of pharmacies’ purchases transit by wholesalers. Average delay between first launch in the world and launch in each country for drugs launched between 1999 and 2002 application in market-approval in market approval in market-launch in market 1st w orld application-application in market 50 45 40 35 30 Months 25 20 15 10 5 0 Ita ly et he rla nd s an ad a Au st ra li a i tz er la nd Sw ed en er m G Sw C Source: Pharmaceutical Industry Competitiveness Task Force. 2006). Hospitals usually purchase pharmaceuticals directly from manufacturers.
However. However. as well as ongoing policies such as employment of maximum reimbursement amounts and prescription targets. Measures adopted to improve the efficiency of pharmaceutical expenditures have achieved some success: prescriptions of drugs with contested effectiveness have decreased while generic prescribing and dispensing has continuously increased. where manufacturers or wholesalers offer lower prices or benefits in kind to pharmacists which they do not pass on savings to health insurance funds. New contracts are stated to have led to price reductions in generics. manufacturers have the incentive to launch products early in Germany at relatively high prices. This section provides an overall assessment of the impact of the German pharmaceutical reimbursement and pricing policies on goals set for health-system performance. retail prices of pharmaceuticals are relatively high by international standards. Containment of drug expenditures 127. as has the use of parallel imported drugs. the recent prohibition of benefits in kind and the proliferation of SHI-manufacturers contracts should intensify competition whose effect will be reflected in retail prices. As to the generic market. Though out-of-pocket payments remain the less equitable way to finance health care. no study is yet available to confirm this. aware that they will serve as a benchmark for many other European countries. First. The reference price scheme has sometimes been suspected of placing a floor. Moreover. It seems that competition in the generic market mainly takes place at the pharmacy level. 128. it has only a one-shot impact and second. explanations are more complex. the main component of growth is the shift towards new and more expensive products. this kind of measure has important the drawbacks. price decreases in the market segment subject to maximum reimbursement amounts have compensated price increases in the other market segment. 48 . Pharmaceutical prices have remained relatively stable since the beginning of the 1990s. Germany has succeeded in containing pharmaceutical expenditures growth since the end of the 1990s. In this market segment. The Parliament has regularly levied rebates on manufacturers’ and pharmacists’ sales to avoid deficits and managed to curb pharmaceutical expenditure growth. up to 2007. it creates a relatively unstable environment. By comparison with other OECD countries. For the bulk of the on-patent market (as far as they are not subject to maximum reimbursement amounts). though this is belied by the fact that products often have prices below the Festbetrag. “price takers”. As in other countries. on generic prices. for example. Sustainability and equity of financing for pharmaceuticals 130. safety nets exist to prevent people from spending more than 2% (1% for chronically ill) of their revenues for health care. Out-of-pocket payments have often been used to tackle health insurance funds’ deficits. and second. First. 131. rather than a ceiling. they are not particularly high in Germany as far as pharmaceuticals are concerned. This success reflects a number of one-off measures to lower or stabilise ex-factory prices and/ or distribution margins. high exmanufacturer prices are explained by two factors. 129. Efficiency of expenditures in the pharmaceutical sector 132. SHI funds were.DELSA/HEA/WD/HWP(2008)4 ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF PHARMACEUTICAL POLICIES ON POLICY GOALS Goals for health-system performance 126. however.
Similarly. This is a well-known adverse effect of incentives based on silo-budget approaches. In any case. Availability of pharmaceuticals in Germany 139. given the fact that the most important drugs are approved through European centralised or decentralised procedures. allowing some savings for health insurance funds. 138. 136. Accessibility of pharmaceuticals in Germany 140.. are based on past expenditures. 137. These “analogue products” are defined as new products with no or marginal therapeutic advantage over existing products. 2005). the new contracting opportunities have enhanced price competition between generic manufacturers and generated price erosion. Though prescription budgets have succeeded in slowing pharmaceutical expenditure growth. The authors of these studies do not explain these differences by differences in copayments (which are not mentioned at all) but rather by the fact that physicians’ prescriptions for privately insured patients are not subject to prescription targets. Ziegenhagen et al. pharmaceuticals are promptly available in the German market. Nonetheless. but the actual outcome of the reform will be difficult to assess given that contracts and rebate agreements are confidential. prescription targets. was somewhat counter-balanced by the fact that generic prices were relatively high by international standards. 134. this does not imply poor availability of treatments for patients –though it may affect manufacturers’ revenues. Until 2007. 135. Pharmaceuticals approved through the national procedure may incur longer approval delays. Other studies have shown that patients with private health insurance were more likely to receive newer and more expensive drugs for some diagnoses (Ziegenhagen et al. One study showed that macro-budgets for pharmaceuticals in 1993 led to an increase to specialist referrals and in hospital expenditures (SBEG. in terms of efficiency. Germany shows a high generic penetration in the pharmaceutical market. According to the German Ministry.DELSA/HEA/WD/HWP(2008)4 133. (2004) observed that there were no significant difference in the prescription of drugs with disputed effectiveness between private health insurance and social health insurance. collective and individual. the 2007 reform made 49 . By international standards. the fact that declines in the prescription of such drugs were particularly pronounced in years with stringent cost-containment measures (mainly budgets) suggests that physicians have responded to those incentives by eliminating the less effective medicines from their prescriptions. However. 2007). The lack of health insurance coverage has never been an important issue in Germany. Each year. parallel imports are encouraged by incentives and have been increasing since the beginning of the 1990s. These studies claim that further savings could be achieved by a more efficient prescription (Schwabe. medicines not authorised for marketing in Germany can be made available to patients when medically appropriate. Finally. this positive outcome. as the few uncovered people were deemed to be rather wealthy and healthy. the annual report on pharmaceutical prescription prepared by the scientific institute of health insurance WiDO estimates the potential savings which could be achieved through the prescription of cheaper so-called “analogue pharmaceuticals”. These studies confirm the effect of prescription targets on doctors’ behaviour without drawing conclusions about differences in quality or efficiency in pharmaceutical spending for PHI and SHI patients. Wild. several studies mentioned that they may have had spill-over effects on other sectors. However. 2004. 2008). The reduction in the prescription of drugs with contested effectiveness is probably the result of both pharmaceutical policy and market trends. which are not necessarily at efficient levels. They more or less correspond to what is usually referred to as “me-too” products.
DELSA/HEA/WD/HWP(2008)4 health insurance coverage mandatory and introduced measures to improve its affordability (OECD, 2008b, Brandt, 2008). The list of reimbursable medicines is quite comprehensive though OTC drugs are no longer reimbursed since 2004 (as is the case in many other OECD countries). Vaccines, previously reimbursed on a voluntary basis by health insurers, have been included in the mandatory benefit basket since 2007. 141. Though copayments exist for pharmaceuticals, total copayments for health care are capped at 1% (for chronically ill persons) or 2% of income, which guarantees that no insured German patients can be exposed to exceptionally high levels of copayment. 142. The fact that diffusion of new medicines is relatively slow in comparison with other countries may reflect incentives established by physician prescription targets or other factors. On the other hand, access to expensive drugs seems more than satisfactory by international standards. Germany ranks in the top 5 for the uptake of new cancer drugs in share of total oncology market (European Society for Medical Oncology, 2007). Similarly, orphan drugs are readily available and almost always reimbursed by health insurance (Alcimed, 2005). Quality of care, health outcomes 143. Several reports mentioned inadequacies of pharmaceutical therapy in some areas. For instance, results of an epidemiological study on hypertensive patients showed several shortfalls in treatments by general practitioners (SBEG, 2005): • The majority of hypertensive patients are not correctly regulated: more than 70% of them have a blood pressure ≥ 140/90 mmHg though more than 80% of them were prescribed at least one hypertensive drug; Antihypertensive treatments are often installed or augmented when it is already too late for preventive care, especially for older people and/or when complications or other diseases have begun.
144. The publication of guidelines led to improvement in some therapeutic areas but some failures persist. For instance, the prescription of drug hormonal therapy to relieve menopause symptoms has been decreasing since the 2003 guideline recommending against this therapy for most women, but 2.5 million women are still treated (SBEG, 2005). 145. However, the gap between evidence-based guidelines and doctors’ prescriptions is not a problem unique to Germany. It is explained by numerous factors relating to the practice of medicine traditionally being considered an “art” subject to factors relating to the physicians’ decision-making process, patients’ expectations, and last but not least, by promotional activities of the pharmaceutical industry. 146. Adverse effects of medicines are reported to BfArM by health professionals and other stakeholders through a system of spontaneous reporting, which is well known to lead to under-reporting. A few studies have estimated the incidence of adverse drug reactions (ADRs) in Germany. They show that 5% of patients with drug treatment experienced ADRs, that 3 to 6% of hospital admissions are due to ADRs, and that 0.15% of hospitalised patients died because of ADRs, about half of which are due to inadequate use (SBEG, 2007). According to death certificates, the standardised mortality rate for ADRs is of 0.1 per 100,000 inhabitants in Germany, similar to the OECD average (OECD Health Data, 2007).
DELSA/HEA/WD/HWP(2008)4 Patient and consumer satisfaction 147. We did not find national studies about patients’ satisfaction with pharmaceutical care in Germany. In the survey realised in 2007 by the Commonwealth Fund in seven countries among adults, 26% of German citizens declared that they are “not very or not confident at all that they receive the most effective drugs”. This percentage is higher than in the Netherlands (9%), Australia (15%), Canada (16%) and the United States (21%) but equivalent to percentages observed in New Zealand and the United Kindgom (Schoen et al., 2007). Such beliefs may well relate to the existence of constraints on physicians’ prescriptions. Industrial policy goals 148. Like other OECD countries, Germany has implemented innovation policies to make the country attractive to value-added generating activities. These policies are not directly linked to pricing and reimbursement policies, which surely influence decisions to launch or not in the German market, but are not the main determinants for the location of the industry’s activities.
149. Below are some conclusions and observations drawn based on the overview and assessment of pharmaceutical reimbursement and pricing policies in Germany presented in this paper: • The German population benefits from comprehensive coverage and good access to pharmaceuticals, with a high level of public funding. However, the impact of increasing out-ofpocket payments (due to increased co-payments and de-listing of OTC drugs) on the affordability and effective access for the poorest part of the population should be monitored. By comparison with other OECD countries, Germany has succeeded in containing pharmaceutical expenditure growth, thanks to structural reforms (e.g. maximum reimbursement amounts, constraints on physicians’ prescriptions ) but also to one-shot measures (e.g. increases in rebates and in cost-sharing, delisting). Ex-manufacturer as well as retail prices of pharmaceutical were found to be relatively high, by comparison with other European countries. This situation is explained by free pricing at market entry, ‘price-taking’ by health insurance funds obliged to cover any new drug not explicitly excluded from the benefit basket, and by the fact that Germany is often referred to by countries using international benchmarking for the purpose of price regulation, which incites manufacturers to set high prices. Prices of generic products were also found to be relatively high, which could be partly explained by the fact that there has been, until recently, no price competition at the distribution level. New contracting opportunities are reported to have lowered generic prices but no assessment is publicly available yet. Changes introduced by 2007 reforms are expected to tackle some of these issues. New contracting opportunities should lead to price erosion in the generic market as well as in therapeutic classes in which patented competitors are available. Similarly, price caps should help limit the prices of new drugs to those of existing drugs with similar benefits. However, these changes will not address all of the weak spots of the German system. − For technical and other reasons, IQWiG proposes to assess relative costs and benefits of new drugs within therapeutic areas rather than to define a cost-benefit threshold for reimbursement, comparing costs and benefits of treatments at the system level. This means that price caps cannot be set as long as there is no therapeutic alternative –as is the case in many other OECD countries. Subsequently, follow-on drugs will be benchmarked to this first entrant for potential price cap setting. While the approach should result in more cost-effective expenditures within therapeutic classes, there is no mechanism for considering relative value across classes. − New contracting opportunities overlap and sometimes conflict with existing instruments (maximum reimbursement amount, prescription targets) which are supposed to disappear but are still in effect, increasing the complexity of the system. Benefits and costs of this reform 52
53 . Indeed.DELSA/HEA/WD/HWP(2008)4 should be monitored to check that the benefits of price erosion exceed transaction costs and compensate for the loss of transparency in the system. − This lack of transparency is likely to affect the cost-benefit assessment. is compromised by the new reform. Germany’s remarkable tradition of monitoring prescriptions and prices of pharmaceuticals. since price caps will be set by reference to list prices of existing comparators rather than to confidential prices effectively paid by health insurance funds. with public reports widely available to stakeholders and the general public.
DELSA/HEA/WD/HWP(2008)4 LIST OF ACRONYMS BfArM Bundesinstitut für Arzneimittel and Medizinprodukte BPI (Bundesverband der Pharmazeutischen Industrie) Association of the pharmaceutical industry CPMP DRG EEA EMEA EPC EPO G-BA Committee for Proprietary Medical Products Diagnostic-related groups European Economic Area European Medicines Agency European Patent Convention European Patent Office (Gemeinsame Bundesausschuss) Federal Joint Committee – GKV GMG Gesetzliche Krankenversicherung – Statutory health insurance GKV-WSG Wettbewerbsstärkunggesetz Health Insurance Competition Enhancing Act GKV-Modernisierungsgesetz – Health insurance modernisation Act InEK (Institut für das Entgeltsystem im Krankenhaus) National Institute for payment in hospitals IQWiG (Institut für Qualität und Wirkschaftlichkeit im Gesundheitswesen) Institute for Quality and Efficiency in Health Care OTC SHI SGB SPC Over-the-counter Statutory Health Insurance (Sozial Gesetzbuch) German Code of Social Security Supplementary protection certificate VAT Value-added tax VFA (Verband Forschender Arzneimittelhersteller) Association of R&D based pharmaceutical industry WIdO (Wissenschaftlisches Institut der Allgemeine Ortskrankenkasse) AOK’s Scientific institute 54 .
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No. Discussion paper 2005-1.. VFA (2007). R. International comparison of generic medicine prices. Drucksache 16-6339. (2004). preisberechnung mittels Regressionsverfahren and Wirkungen”.C.. Schreyogg. (2007). J. H. in Gutachten 2007: Kooperation und Verantwortung: Voraussetzungen einer zielorientierten Gesundheitsversorgung. Schmucker.. Task Force Pharma. 108-115. Busse (2005). Busse (2005). 77-96. 67. 14. 2647-2654. Der Arzenimittelmarkt in Deutschland – Januar bis Dezember 2006. Busse and E. Deutscher Bundestag. No. 23.DELSA/HEA/WD/HWP(2008)4 SBEG (2007).J. Berlin.) Arzneiverordnungs-Report 2006. Bericht und Aktionsplan: Verbesserung der Standortbedigungen und der Innovationsmöglichkeiten der Pharmazeutische Industrie in Deutschland. Schreyögg J and R. 15-18. Gesundheitswesen. Springer-Verlag Berlin and Heidelberg GmbH & Co. Paffrath (eds. T. pp. “Patientsicherheit in der Arzneimittel Versorgung”. Vol. Task Force Pharma (2005). NAFTA 10 Years Later. Croatian Medical Journal. Johann Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität. pp. Simoens. Steuerung der Arzneimittelausgaben and Stärkung des Forshungsstandortes für die pharmazeutische Industrie. Ziegenhagen D. Ausgaben und Wettbewerb im Arzneimittelbereich”. Die Verordnungen von neuen Arzneimittels bei Privatversicherten im Vergleich zu GKVVersicherten. 2. pp. U. 11. (2008). pp. WIDO (2007). “Arzneiverordnungen 2005 im Überblick”. pp. 425-432. Vol. Gesundheitsökonomie and Qualitätsmanagement . and R. No. Statistics 2007. Gutachten für das Bundesministerium für Gesundheit. 3. “Low demand for substitutive health insurance in Germany”. Office of Industry Trade Policy. Wild. pp. International Trade Administration. Schwabe. WIDO. Schröder. (2005). 523-549. “Physician Drug Budgets in Germany and Effects on Prescription Behavior”. 58 . Arzeimittelversorgung von PKV-Versicherten im Vergleich zur GKV. S. Bonn. F. Nink and C. Verband Forschender Arzneimittelhersteller e. D. in U. V. Mossialos (2002). Berlin. 4. Thomson. Washington. Vol. “Arzneimittelfestbeträge: Gruppenbildung. Berlin. Stargardt. Current Medical Research and Opinion. S. pp. US Department of Commerce (2004). pp. Institut für Medizinische Soziologie. 455 pages. Vol. 146. Schwabe and D. (2006). Die deutsche Arzneimittelzulassung im Europaïschen Vergleich. R. “Versorgung. Journal of pharmaceutical finance economics and policy. 13. 9. K. Lankers (2006). Vol. Vol. Gesundheitsökonomie & Qualitätsmanagement. Frankfurt. et al. J. 43. 468-477.
prices were converted using exchange rates. Comparison of ex-factory prices 151. 155. Another study by IMS (2003) compares prices of the top 100 reimbursed drugs in Switzerland. Similarly. 59 . According to this study. as US discounts were not considered. The authors computed price indexes by weighting foreign-toSwiss unit price ratios (e. German prices were found to be lower than Swiss prices. as well as (more surprisingly) French prices. but the share of the market covered in Germany is not known. UK exfactory prices have been estimated by reducing NHS prices by 16%. with prices in a set of OECD countries. considering only identical form-strengths in all countries. the United Kingdom. In this study. Swiss prices are compared to prices in Germany. for the entire sample of products as well as for the sub-group of generic drugs. just after Switzerland. Germany ranks fourth in Europe. This study considered primarily ex-factory prices. Germany ranked second for ex-factory prices20 (Santésuisse. The unit price per Defined Daily Dose and then Laspeyres indexes were computed. We nevertheless tried to assess the relative level of German pharmaceutical prices using the available comparisons. converted using exchange rates. A study published by the US Department of Commerce (2004) compares the prices of patented products in the United States with prices in ten OECD countries (bilateral comparisons) in 2003. France. The study covers the June 2000-June 2001 period and is based on the top 100 selling drugs in Switzerland (products with one active ingredient only). as well as original analysis using OECD data on retail prices of pharmaceuticals. Denmark. German prices appear to be 48% (per SU) to 41% (per kg) below US prices and comparable to Canadian. per tablet) in 2005. 152. Price indexes are computed as the un-weighted average of elementary indexes taking the Swiss price as the reference. France. The OFSP estimates that ex-factory prices in these countries may be respectively 2-10% and 6-12% lower than the pharmacy purchasing price. further extended to all products containing this molecule (on. 153. 154. 2006). the Netherlands and the United States. 20. in the second quarter of 2003.DELSA/HEA/WD/HWP(2008)4 ANNEX 1: INTERNATIONAL PRICE COMPARISONS 150. However. In a report published by INFRAS/BASYS (2002). Swiss and UK prices. Santésuisse published in 2006 a study comparing prices of the top 100 reimbursed products in Switzerland with prices in the seven countries used as comparators by the Swiss Office of Public Health (UK. Sweden and United Kingdom for ex-manufacturer prices (see table 6). and using exchange rates for monetary conversion. Netherlands. Italy). Germany. by 2004 Swiss sales. Fisher Indexes have been calculated based on ex-manufacturer price per standard unit (SU) or per kg of active ingredient. This annex presents the results of a literature review of ex-factory prices. except in Denmark and the Netherlands where only pharmacy purchasing price was available.or off-patent). representing 47% of the Swiss market value. Although a number of studies of ex-manufacturer prices have been published since 2000. The sample represents 56% of Swiss turnover for reimbursable outpatient drugs. and Austria. the price differential between Germany and the United States is overestimated. It represents 26% of drug sales across the ten OECD countries. none of them took Germany as the reference country.g. The sample is composed of the US top 54 patented prescription products containing a single molecule.
DELSA/HEA/WD/HWP(2008)4 156. 159.8% of units sold. In this study. Prices were converted in Euros using exchange rates. weighted by sales in Canada. and lower than US prices (PMPRB. Canada. Prices were converted using exchange rates and indexes of prices per unit are weighted by US sales. By contrast. These price comparisons are based on “publicly available ex-factory prices” obtained by manufacturers in foreign countries and provided to PMPRB for the review of excessive price (PMPRB. although it was not the case for each product. the German price index is 74 for single-source originator products. PMPRB shows that German prices of generic drugs are higher than prices in all comparator countries but Canada and Switzerland (PMPRB. Danzon and Furukawa (2008) compared ex-factory prices of originator and generic drugs in the United States with 11 countries. 157. The average foreign-to-Canadian price ratio for each product is computed. Switzerland. German prices were slightly higher than UK prices (108 against 100). 77 for prescription products and 192 for OTC products. Annual reports from the Canadian Patented Medicines Prices Review Board present bilateral comparisons of Canadian ex-factory prices of patented drugs with prices in the seven countries considered in the Canadian price regulation (France. 65 for multiple-source originator products.22 Here again. This means that further confidential discounts or rebates consented by the manufacturers are not taken into account. the average price was computed as the average of prices of all existing presentations. the United Kingdom and France. In 2005. weighted by sales in each country. Germany had the highest price per standard unit. a set of European countries and the United States (OFT. Italy.21. Using the same methodology. Bilateral comparisons are based on patented products available in Canada and in each comparator country. 60 .or over-estimates of differentials between Canadian and foreign prices. Comparisons are based on the match of the top 150 branded medicines in the United Kingdom with available medicines in each comparator country. which could lead to under. 2). p. Simoens (2007) compared ex-factory prices of 15 high-selling generic molecule-strengths in selected European countries in 2005. 22. 2006b. In 2005. 2002).7% of sales and 32. US-Germany matching products represent 18. 2006b). On average. Prices are converted by current exchange rates. German prices were close to Canadian prices and higher than all European countries but Switzerland. the extent to which the sample is representative of the German market is not known. Germany. When US prices are indexed at 100. lower than generic prices observed in Japan. 21 PMPRB uses a fully-lagged 36-month moving average of spot exchange rates for this purpose. For each molecule-strength. the report shows that German generic prices are just above US generic prices. while a short-term fluctuation will influence the ratios up to 36 months after it has been reversed. of which 9 are OECD member countries. 160. 151 for generics (branded or not).7% of German products but 49. the United Kingdom and the United States). The British Department of Health publishes annually bilateral comparisons of ex-manufacturer prices in the United Kingdom. This means that long-term exchange-rate movements will be fully reflected in PMPRB’s average price ratios only 36 months after they occur. 158. US prices of generics and OTC drugs were found to be lower than in all comparator countries. Switzerland. When products are matched by molecule-indication-form-strength and formulation. 2007). 2006a. Sweden.
further extended to all products containing this molecule (on. Canada = 100 The average foreign-to. Bilateral comparisons. PMPRB (2006a) 2005 ex-factory prices of patented drugs available in Canada and in each comparator country 61 . Ex-factory prices of the top 100 reimbursed drugs in Switzerland US Department Commerce (2004) of 2003 ex-factory prices of US top 54 patented prescription products containing a single molecule.or off-patent) 2005 Ex-factory prices of the top 100 reimbursed products in Switzerland (extended) Patented drugs: United States = 100 Germany = 52 Generics: United States = 100 Germany = 110 Santésuisse (2006) Bilateral comparison. X-rate: Switzerland = 100 Germany = 86 PPPs: Switzerland = 100 Germany =120 IMS (2003) Second quarter of 2003. Comparisons of ex-manufacturer prices – review of recent studies Study INFRAS/BASYS (2002) Price comparison Second half 2001 Exfactory prices for the top 100 selling drugs in Switzerland Methodology Findings Bilateral comparison. weighted by sales in Canada. converted Germany = 84 using exchange-rates Generics: Switzerland = 100 Germany = 56 Price indexes computed as the un-weighted average of elementary indexes taking the Swiss price as the reference. prices Switzerland = 100 per DDD. considering only identical form-strengths in all countries.Germany = 96 Canadian price ratio for each product is computed. All products: Laspeyres index.Germany = 86 to-Swiss unit price ratios (per tablet…) weighted by 2004 Swiss sales. Xrate. Bilateral comparisons to the US. Switzerland = 100 price indexes of foreign. Prices are converted by current exchange rates.DELSA/HEA/WD/HWP(2008)4 Table 1. and using exchange rates (Xrate) and Purchasing Power Parities (PPPs) for monetary conversion. Fisher Indexes calculated based on exmanufacturer price per standard unit (SU) or per kg of active ingredient.
206 Norway = 0. Prices are converted by current exchange rates. Average (15 molecules): Germany = 0.104 Single-source originator products: United States = 100 Germany = 74 Multiple-source originator products United States = 100 Germany = 65 Generics: United States = 100 Germany = 151 OTC products: United States = 100 Germany = OTC Danzon and Furukawa 2005 ex-factory prices.269 Netherlands = 0. (2007). bilateral comparison with UK. generics and non-patented branded prescription drugs available in Canada and in each comparator country Methodology Bilateral comparisons. For each moleculestrength. Prices per standard unit. the average price was computed as the average of prices of all existing presentations. based on the top 150 branded medicines in the UK.171 Sweden = 0. Price indexes weighted by US sales. weighted by sales in Canada.254 UK = 0. (2008) all out-patient drugs available in the United States and each comparator country 62 . weighted by sales in each country. Findings Patented Canada = 100 Germany = 106. Simoens (2007) 2005 ex-factory prices of 15 high-selling selected generic molecule-strengths in selected European countries.123 Denmark = 0.4 Non-patented branded Canada = 100 Germany = 91 Generics Canada = 100 Germany = 84 United Kingdom = 100 Germany = 108 Office of Fair Trading 2005 ex-factory prices.220 Belgium = 0.222 Finland = 0. converted using exchange rates. Products matched by molecule-indicationform-strength and formulation. Prices were converted in Euros using exchange rates. 2006b Price comparison 2005 ex-factory prices of patented. The average foreign-toCanadian price ratio for each product is computed.260 France = 0.DELSA/HEA/WD/HWP(2008)4 Study PMPRB.
Indices have been computed to show 2005 price levels relative to the OECD average price. it suggests that German retail prices are almost 30% higher than the OECD average. These are drawn from pharmaceutical purchasing power parities developed by the OECD and Eurostat for input into economywide purchasing power parities (PPPs) for OECD countries. 2007 63 . Comparative price levels (CPLs) provide a measure of the differences in pharmaceutical price levels between countries by indicating the number of units of a common currency needed to buy the same volume of pharmaceuticals in each country. rather than a precise ranking.DELSA/HEA/WD/HWP(2008)4 Comparison of retail prices 161. but lower than Swiss and Icelandic prices (Figure 17). Relative retail pharmaceutical prices in OECD countries. The OECD (2008) published relative retail price levels of pharmaceuticals. and reported data for 86 products. Figure 17. geometric mean) 180 200 Source : Eurostat-OECD Purchasing Power Parity Programme. 2005 Switzerland Iceland Canada United States Germany Denmark Norway Ireland Japan Italy New Zealand Finland Netherlands Mexico Austria Belgium Luxembourg Sweden Portugal United Kingdom France Australia Spain Hungary Greece Korea Czech Republic Slovak Republic Turkey Poland 0 20 40 185 159 134 130 127 120 119 118 118 117 113 111 109 106 106 105 103 94 94 92 91 81 77 73 73 71 71 70 69 68 60 80 100 120 140 160 Retail price (OECD=100. While the index serves to provide a general sense of relative price levels. similar to prices observed in the United States and Canada. on average. Countries were invited to report retail prices of products representing the country’s sales from a list of 181 products drawn from top-selling drugs in the OECD.
37 No. 25 No. Hofmarcher. Cooper THE OECD PROJECT ON HEALTH WORKFORCE MIGRATION: THE CASE OF FRANCE (2008) Roland Cash and Philippe Ulmann NURSE WORKFORCE CHALLENGES IN THE UNITED STATES: IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY (2008) Linda H. Maria Luisa Gil Lapetra. 21 No. 31 No. Gaëlle Balestat. Susanna Baldwin and Miranda Munro THE US PHYSICIAN FORCE: WHERE DO WE STAND? (2008) Richard A. 26 No. 38 No. 30 No. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK PAPER (2006) Edward Kelley and Jeremy Hurst HEALTH CARE QUALITY INDICATORS PROJECT. 29 MIGRATION OF HEALTH WORKERS: THE UK PERSPECTIVE TO 2006 (2008) James Buchan. Lihan Wei. 32 No. EMPLOYMENT AND FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY? (2005) Jens Lundsgaard TACKLING NURSE SHORTAGES IN OECD COUNTRIES (2004) Steven Simoens. 18 . Peter Scherer. INCLUDING PAYMENTS FOR INFORMAL CARE: HOW CAN IT HELP IMPROVE CARE OUTCOMES. 35 No. Howard Oxley and Elena Rusticelli HEALTH CARE QUALITY INDICATORS PROJECT 2006 DATA COLLECTION UPDATE REPORT (2007) Sandra Garcia-Armesto. 27 No. 19 No. 24 No. INITIAL INDICATORS REPORT (2006) Soeren Mattke. EXPANSION OF THE INFORMAL SECTOR: IMMIGRATION OF HEALTH PROFESSIONALS TO ITALY (2008) Jonathan Chaloff HEALTH WORKFORCE AND INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION: CAN NEW ZEALAND COMPETE? (2008) Pascal Zurn and Jean-Christophe Dumont THE PREVENTION OF LIFESTYLE-RELATED CHRONIC DISEASES: AN ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK (2008) Franco Sassi and Jeremy Hurst PHARMACEUTICAL PRICING AND REIMBURSEMENT POLICIES IN SLOVAKIA (2008) Zoltán Kaló. 28 No. 34 No. and the Disability Study Expert Group Members PHARMACEUTICAL PRICING AND REIMBURSEMENT POLICIES IN MEXICO (2007) Pierre Moïse and Elizabeth Docteur PHARMACEUTICAL PRICING AND REIMBURSEMENT POLICIES IN CANADA (2006) Valérie Paris and Elizabeth Docteur HEALTH CARE QUALITY INDICATORS PROJECT. Edward Kelley and the Members of the HCQI Expert Group PHARMACEUTICAL PRICING AND REIMBURSEMENT POLICIES IN SWEDEN (2007) Pierre Moïse and Elizabeth Docteur PHARMACEUTICAL PRICING AND REIMBURSEMENT POLICIES IN SWITZERLAND (2007) Valérie Paris and Elizabeth Docteur TRENDS IN SEVERE DISABILITY AMONG ELDERLY PEOPLE: ASSESSING THE EVIDENCE IN 12 OECD COUNTRIES AND THE FUTURE IMPLICATIONS (2007) Gaetan Lafortune. A CASE STUDY (2004) Nicole Tapay and Francesca Colombo 64 No.DELSA/HEA/WD/HWP(2008)4 OECD HEALTH WORKING PAPERS No. Elizabeth Docteur and Pierre Moïse IMPROVED HEALTH SYSTEM PERFORMANCE THROUGH BETTER CARE COORDINATION (2007) Maria M. 20 No. Maria Luisa Gil Lapetra and the HCQI Expert Group Members THE SUPPLY OF PHYSICIANS IN OECD COUNTRIES (2006) Steven Simeons and Jeremy Hurst CONSUMER DIRECTION AND CHOICE IN LONG-TERM CARE FOR OLDER PERSONS. 22 No. 36 No. Edward Kelley. 33 No. 23 No. Aiken and Robyn Cheung MISMATCHES IN THE FORMAL SECTOR. Mike Villeneuve and Jeremy Hurst PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE IN THE NETHERLANDS. Jeremy Hurst.
HEALTH AT A GLANCE: OECD INDICATORS 2007 (2007).oecd. 17 No.org.KOREA (2003) A DISEASE-BASED COMPARISON OF HEALTH SYSTEMS: WHAT IS BEST AND AT WHAT COST? (2003) For a full list.MEXICO (2005) PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE IN OECD COUNTRIES (2004).org/els/health/workingpapers RECENT RELATED OECD PUBLICATIONS: PHARMACEUTICAL PRICING POLICIES IN A GLOBAL MARKET (2008) OECD HEALTH DATA 2008 (2008). Italian and Spanish on CDROM (Windows XP/Vista). consult the OECD On-Line Bookstore at www. or write for a free written catalogue to the following address: OECD Publications Service 2. See www. available in English.SWITZERLAND (2006) LONG-TERM CARE FOR OLDER PEOPLE (2005). OECD HEALTH PROJECT SERIES HEALTH TECHNOLOGIES AND DECISION MAKING (2005). German. OECD HEALTH PROJECT SERIES OECD REVIEWS OF HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS .oecd.oecd.POLICY STUDIES (2004). French. 16 No. OECD HEALTH PROJECT SERIES TOWARDS HIGH-PERFORMING HEALTH SYSTEMS (2004). OECD HEALTH PROJECT SERIES TOWARDS HIGH-PERFORMING HEALTH SYSTEMS .org/health/healthataglance for more information OECD REVIEWS OF HEALTH SYSTEMS . 15 SKILL-MIX AND POLICY CHANGE IN THE HEALTH WORKFORCE: NURSES IN ADVANCED ROLES (2004) James Buchan and Lynn Calman SHA-BASED NATIONAL HEALTH ACCOUNTS IN THIRTEEN OECD COUNTRIES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (2004) Eva Orosz and David Morgan PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE IN OECD COUNTRIES: THE BENEFITS AND COSTS FOR INDIVIDUALS AND HEALTH SYSTEMS (2004) Francesca Colombo and Nicole Tapay A full list of the papers in this series can be found on the OECD website: www. rue André-Pascal. online version features these languages. 75775 PARIS CEDEX 16 or to the OECD Distributor in your country 65 .DELSA/HEA/WD/HWP(2008)4 No. OECD HEALTH PROJECT SERIES OECD REVIEWS OF HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS .FINLAND (2005) OECD REVIEWS OF HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS .
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