Source: http://openjurist.org/137/f3d/1220
Timestamp: 2014-07-30 01:26:26
Document Index: 440365507

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 846', '§ 1956', '§ 1291', '§ 3742', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3']

137 F3d 1220 United States v. Cruz Camacho | OpenJurist
137 F. 3d 1220 - United States v. Cruz Camacho	Home137 f3d 1220 united states v. cruz camacho
137 F3d 1220 United States v. Cruz Camacho 137 F.3d 1220
98 CJ C.A.R. 1010
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,v.Santiago CRUZ CAMACHO, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 96-6361.
March 3, 1998.
M. Jay Farber, Assistant United States Attorney (Patrick M. Ryan, United States Attorney with him on the brief), Oklahoma City, OK, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
David T. McKenzie, Oklahoma City, OK, for Defendant-Appellant.
Before PORFILIO, ANDERSON, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.
Defendant Santiago Cruz Camacho pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine, three counts of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, eight counts of distribution of methamphetamine, and two counts of money laundering, in respective violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1). The district court sentenced Defendant to concurrent sentences of 292 months imprisonment for the drug offenses and 240 months imprisonment for the money laundering offenses. On appeal, Defendant attacks only his sentences, arguing that the district court erroneously: (1) enhanced his sentence four levels on the basis that he was a leader and organizer of a conspiracy involving five or more participants; (2) calculated his base sentence level by improperly determining the amount of methamphetamine attributable to him; and (3) failed to award him a two-level sentence reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742. We affirm.
In June 1995, a confidential informant notified the Drug Enforcement Agency of a large-scale drug conspiracy in Chickasha, Oklahoma. The informant's tip led to further investigation which indicated that Defendant and Jose Hernandez planned to bring large amounts of methamphetamine from California to Chickasha for distribution throughout the area. Under the plan, Hernandez provided the methamphetamine and Defendant arranged to transport it to Chickasha. Notably, Defendant did not carry the methamphetamine himself. Instead, he recruited and directed others to transport the methamphetamine to Chickasha, where upon arrival he distributed it to various dealers.
Between December 1994 and January 1995, the conspiracy1 led and organized by Defendant and Hernandez distributed approximately twelve kilograms of methamphetamine. Defendant's role in the conspiracy ended, however, when en route to Chickasha from California, Arizona law enforcement officials stopped him for a routine traffic violation and discovered one pound of methamphetamine in his vehicle. Subsequently, the government named Defendant and numerous co-conspirators in the indictment which ultimately led to the sentences Defendant now appeals.
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a) provides for a four-level enhancement where "the defendant was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive." Defendant argues that the district court erroneously enhanced his sentence four levels pursuant to § 3B1.1(a). Specifically, Defendant maintains that enhancement under § 3B1.1(a) is appropriate only where the leader or organizer controls at least five co-conspirators. Defendant contends that the evidence before the court shows, at most, that he controlled no more than one co-conspirator and that his organization "was nothing more than a hit or miss operation involving large amounts of methamphetamine." Therefore, he asserts that his sentence cannot be enhanced pursuant to § 3B1.1(a). We disagree.
The parties' briefs indicate confusion over whether we review the district court's finding that Defendant is an organizer or leader under § 3B1.1(a) de novo or for clear error. Indeed, a review of our precedent reveals cases supporting either position. See United States v. Yarnell, 129 F.3d 1127, 1138 (10th Cir.1997). For example, we have stated that a district court's conclusion that a defendant is a leader or organizer under § 3B1.1(a) is primarily legal, and therefore reviewed de novo. United States v. Albers, 93 F.3d 1469, 1487 (10th Cir.1996) (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Brown, 995 F.2d 1493, 1501 (10th Cir.1993)) (reciting standard of review in relation to conclusion that defendant was supe