Source: http://supreme.nolo.com/us/422/749/case.html
Timestamp: 2019-07-19 08:32:33
Document Index: 703425266

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 405', '§ 405', '§ 405', '§ 405', '§ 405', '§ 45', '§ 1331']

WEINBERGER V. SALFI, 422 U. S. 749 - Volume 422 - 1975 - Full Text - US Supreme Court Center - USSC Cases - Nolo
US Supreme Court Center > Volume 422 > WEINBERGER V. SALFI, 422 U. S. 749 (1975) > Full Text
Stanley and LaFleur, a noncontractual claim to receive funds from the public treasury enjoys no constitutionally protected status, Dandridge v. Williams, supra, though, of course, Congress may not invidiously discriminate among such claimants on the basis of a "bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group," U.S. Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U. S. 528, 413 U. S. 534 (1973), or on the basis of criteria which bear no rational relation to a legitimate legislative goal. Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U. S. 628, 417 U. S. 636 (1974); U.S. Dept. of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U. S. 508, 413 U. S. 513-514 (1973). Unlike the statutory scheme in Vlandis, 412 U.S. at 412 U. S. 449, the Social Security Act does not purport to speak in terms of the bona fides of the parties to a marriage, but then make plainly relevant evidence of such bona fides inadmissible. As in Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F.Supp. 234 (Minn.1970), summarily aff'd, 401 U.S. 985 (1971), the benefits here are available upon compliance with an objective criterion, one which the Legislature considered to bear a sufficiently close nexus with underlying policy objectives to be used as the test for eligibility. Like the plaintiffs in Starns, appellees are completely free to present evidence that they meet the specified requirements; failing in this effort, their only constitutional claim is that the test they cannot meet is not so rationally related to a legitimate legislative objective that it can be used to deprive them of benefits available to those who do satisfy that test.
the appellants seem to have conceded as much in this case, since it argued here that §§ 405(g) and (h) were preclusive only with regard to retroactive benefits, see n. 1, supra.
Moreover, and significantly, it flagrantly distorts the record in this case to say that the Secretary waived the exhaustion requirements of § 405(g), recognizing their futility. True, the Secretary does not here claim a lack of jurisdiction for failure to exhaust on the individual claim, see n. 1, supra. But he did, in the District Court, move to dismiss the entire action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Notice and Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, at Record 114-117. The Secretary said, referring to §§ 405(g) and (h):
Other indices of legislative intent and administrative interpretation, although sparse, also suggest that §§ 405(g) and (h) were intended and interpreted as nothing more than a codification of ordinary administrative exhaustion requirements, applicable to cases presenting questions of fact and of interpretation of the statute. The 1939 Report of the Social Security Board, see n. 7, supra, suggested that the amendments include a
373 F.Supp. 961, 966 (ND Cal.1974). (Emphasis added.) As the Court points out, ante at 422 U. S. 759 n. 6, in most instances, see n. 6, supra, a person is not "eligible" for benefits until he files an application. Further, the order obviously contemplates administrative proceedings in order to determine whether "such persons are otherwise fully eligible." Finally, if exhaustion of § 405(g) is indeed, as the Court holds, always a prerequisite to eligibility, then a person would not be "otherwise fully eligible" unless and until he exhausts § 45(g). Thus, I believe that the order can be read not to mandate retroactive benefits, but only to require that claims of the class members be treated as if the nine-month marriage requirement did not exist. Such an order does not constitute recovery on a claim, and, in my view, was proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
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