Source: https://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/vagueness-in-johnson-and-thereafter/
Timestamp: 2019-05-19 07:28:10
Document Index: 82665714

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3553', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 846', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 16', '§924', '§ 111', '§ 4']

The full Eleventh Circuit needed only one sentence in this order in Lester v. US to deny en banc review in a case in which a pre-Booker career offender sought collateral review based on the void-for-vagueness doctrine of Johnson. But a number of judges on that court, including the former Acting Chair of the US Sentencing Commission, Judge William Pryor, needed more than 60 pages to explain their views on the soundness of this denial. While hard-core fans of habeas doctrines will likely enjoy all the back-and-forth within all the separate opinions, many sentencing fans might get a kick out of how Judge Rosenbaum characterizes Judge Pryor's account of the the past and present of sentencing law:
According to the Pryor Statement, the Booker Court did not make the Guidelines advisory because they were always advisory, since the Sixth Amendment never allowed them to be mandatory. Id. at 19. That is certainly interesting on a metaphysical level.
But it ignores reality. Back here on Earth, the laws of physics still apply. And the Supreme Court’s invalidation of a law does not alter the space-time continuum. Indeed, there can be no dispute that from when the Guidelines were adopted in 1984 to when the Supreme Court handed down Booker in 2005, courts mandatorily applied them, as § 3553(b) required, to scores of criminal defendants — including many who still sit in prison because of them.
I am tempted to joke that I still kind of feel like it was Justice Scalia's opinion in Blakely that did, in some sense, "alter the space-time continuum." But rather than further joke or philosophize on these matters, I will just encourage readers to check out all the sound and fury to be found in Lester.
April 29, 2019 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Vagueness in Johnson and thereafter | Permalink | Comments (0)
A helpful reader made sure I did not miss the Fourth Circuit delivery today of over 100 pages of debate over vagueness challenges to the application of “crime of violence” as set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) in the form of an en banc ruling in US v. Simms, No. 15-4640 (4th Cir. Jan. 24, 2019) (available here). Here is the start of the majority opinion:
Joseph Decore Simms was convicted of brandishing a firearm in connection with a “crime of violence,” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B). He appeals, contending that § 924(c)(3)(B), as long understood, is unconstitutionally vague. The Government concedes this point but urges us to abandon the settled meaning of the statute and employ a new definition of “crime of violence.”
We cannot do so. Neither the statutory language nor controlling precedent offer any support for the Government’s proposed reinterpretation. Rather, the text and structure of § 924(c)(3)(B) plainly set forth a definition of “crime of violence” that fails to comport with due process. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The majority needs about 40 pages to explain its conclusions, and then we get a lengthy concurrence and a series of dissents. Judge Wilkinson's dissent has this notable starting paragraph:
Once upon a time, now seemingly a geologic age ago, the federal judiciary appeared sold on the inherent advantages that trial courts and trial juries bring to fact-finding in our criminal justice system. No longer. My colleagues in the majority ably demonstrate that application of the categorical approach to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) saddles that statute with a fatal constitutional infirmity. My colleagues in dissent — whom I join — ably demonstrate why that infirmity need not exist; the better reading of the statute avoids it by applying the case-specific approach in place of the categorical. I write separately to further explain how application of the categorical approach here is part of a troubling trend: the gratuitous conversion of issues of fact into questions of law; the usurpation of authority by appellate courts and the resultant atrophy of trial courts’ fact-finding function.
Notably, the issue in this case is now before SCOTUS after its grant three weeks ago in US v. Davis. So, if you are not content with 100 pages on this issue today (coming a few months after the Eleventh Circuit gave us 150 pages coming out the other way), you can look forward to full SCOTUS briefing and more in the months ahead.
January 24, 2019 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Vagueness in Johnson and thereafter, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)
October 4, 2018 in Gun policy and sentencing, Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Vagueness in Johnson and thereafter, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (5)
As noted in this post a few weeks ago, law professor Rory Little had this great lengthy post at SCOTUSblog previewing the criminal side of the Supreme Court's docket under the heading "Criminal cases in the October 2018 term: A law professor’s dream." But as the Court's term officially gets started today, this first SCOTUS order list may seem a bit like a criminal defense lawyer's nightmare because of the extraordinary number of criminal cases in which cert is denied. Of course, every first order list to start every new Term includes a huge number of denials of cert in all the criminal cases that stack up over the summer break. But it still is a bit startling to scroll through page after page after page after page of what all appear to be criminal cases in which cert has been denied this morning.
That all said, the SCOTUS order list does include a bunch of GVRs based on the vagueness ruling in Sessions v. Dimaya, most of which appear to involve criminal cases. I have not been able to follow all the Dimaya fall-out as closely as some true experts, but I suspect that these GVRs are noteworthy not only because they come amidst a sea of cert denials. Also, there might well be some significant criminal case relists hiding in the certiorari carnage that today's order list reflects. So criminal justice fans and sentencing fans may still be able to find a SCOTUS silver lining in today's order list. And, of course, on so many fronts, SCOTUS activity is just getting heated up.
October 1, 2018 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Vagueness in Johnson and thereafter, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)
August 2, 2018 in Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Offender Characteristics, Vagueness in Johnson and thereafter, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (4)
August 1, 2018 in Criminal justice in the Trump Administration, Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Offender Characteristics, Vagueness in Johnson and thereafter, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (5)
Fascinating split Sixth Circuit discussion of how Johnson-invalidated ACCA sentences are to be corrected and reviewed
For those who like to think a lot about federal collateral review procedures and the aftermath of Johnson and sentencing retroactivity (and who doesn't), the Sixth Circuit today handed down a fascinating split panel decision in US v. Nichols, No. 17-5580 (6th Cir. July 30, 2018) (available here). In Nichols, the defendant succeeded in challenging in the district court his 24-year sentence for a firearm offense under the Armed Career Criminal Act based on the Supreme Court's Johnson ruling that one ACCA provision was unconstitutionally vague. So far so good. But here is where it gets interesting:
By the time the district court entered Defendant’s corrected sentence, Defendant had already served twelve years in prison — two years in excess of the ten-year statutory maximum for his firearm offense. The Guidelines range for Defendant’s conduct, absent the ACCA enhancement, was 51 to 63 months’ imprisonment, which is well below the statutory maximum of ten years. Based on his belief that a period of over-incarceration can be calculated and credited toward the completion of a consecutive sentence, Defendant asked the district court to impose a Guidelines-range sentence and, in any event, to impose a sentence of a specific term of months. The district court denied Defendant’s request and instead imposed a corrected sentence of “time served,” which was equivalent to a term of about twelve years’ imprisonment. (R. 52 at PageID #347.) Defendant requested reconsideration, which the district court denied. Defendant then filed this timely appeal.
Why does the defendant care? Here is why: "While in prison, Defendant was convicted and sentenced for conspiracy to distribute heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(b)(1)(C); possession of heroin by an inmate ... and conspiracy. The district court sentenced Defendant to an additional 151 months’ imprisonment, to be served consecutively to Defendant’s existing 24-year term of imprisonment for the firearm offense." The defendant here is eager to be fully resentenced on his gun crime to as low a term as possible so that extra time already served will be credited against his drug crime sentence.
Because the statutory maximum sentence for the defendant's gun crime is only 10 years after the ACCA correction, the majority in Nichols reasonably asserts that "time served" is functionally a 12-year illegal sentence that must be corrected. Interestingly, the panel also concludes that reasonableness review applies in this corrected sentencing setting, and they also find the time-served sentence procedurally unreasonable for lack of adequate explanation.
Judge Batchelder pens a lengthy dissent in which she laments the way the majority frames and remedies the situation here. The tail end of her dissent summarizes her concerns with the panel ruling and her suggested solution:
Finally, I question the merit of the majority’s proffered legal doctrine that holds, in three parts: (1) that a time-served sentence equates to a term-of-months sentence in the number of months actually served; (2) that the sentence is illegal when that post hoc term of months exceeds the newly applicable statutory maximum (or, broadly stated, actions that were taken pursuant to a statute are ex post facto unlawful when the statute is retroactively unconstitutional); and (3) the resulting illegal sentence is per se reversible plain error. So, again, as applied here: any corrected sentence of time served for an inmate who has already served more than the newly applicable 10-year maximum is per se reversible plain error. Moreover, the inmate must receive a full resentencing sufficient for reasonableness review.
Given the breadth of this holding and the vast number of sentences to which it might henceforth apply, this opinion will doubtless have consequences, foreseeable and unforeseen. How many corrected sentences will now be per se reversible plain error? How many inmates, like Nichols, will discover that they have long been unlawfully incarcerated, and what will be the effect of that discovery? Will they, like Nichols, pursue a time bank or offset? Or will they seek compensation for that newly discovered unlawful incarceration? What of an inmate who suffered an injury, committed a crime, or unsuccessfully demanded special accommodations while so incarcerated — how does the calculus change when it is later declared via post hoc stipulation that the inmate was only in prison because he was being held unlawfully?
Rather than holding that the corrected sentence of time served necessarily equates to a term of years equal to the amount of time already served and invoking the legal fictions and consequences that follow, we might be better served by viewing a “time-served sentence” as different in kind from a “term of years sentence,” either of which could satisfy the district court’s discretionary choice of relief under § 2255. That is, of course, an entirely different analysis from the one the majority has undertaken here, though compatible with the approach taken by the district courts that have been resolving § 2255 motions based on Johnson/Welch.
July 30, 2018 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Vagueness in Johnson and thereafter | Permalink | Comments (1)
Guest post: "The Eleventh Circuit’s Take On Handling The Wave of Dimaya-Related Litigation"
A helpful reader alerted me to an order recently issued by the Eleventh Circuit concerning how it wished to handle prisoner litigation in the wake of the Supreme Court's big recent Dimaya vagueness ruling. In response, I reached out to the academic rock-star who comes to mind in conjunction with federal habeas litigation, Leah Litman, as she was kind enough to write up this terrific guest post:
In the wake of Sessions v. Dimaya, at least one court of appeals has changed its practice from the post-Johnson days, and happily so. Even better, that court is the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
By way of background: Dimaya, like Johnson before it, immediately precipitated a wave of resentencing requests by prisoners seeing to have their sentences corrected in light of the decision. Some of these prisoners were sentenced under statutes that incorporate section 16(b); others were sentenced under statutes that merely resemble section 16(b) (sometimes resembling section 16(b) in every possible way, such as section 924(c)). Some of these prisoners are seeking to file their first section 2255 motion; others seeking permission to file a second or successive section 2255 motion.
In a post for the Harvard Law Review blog, I wrote about some of the obstacles that prisoners in these situations will face. Prisoners seeking to file second or successive 2255 motions face significantly more obstacles than prisoners seeking to file their initial section 2255 motions. For example, prisoners seeking to file second or successive 2255 motions have to obtain authorization from a court of appeals before they can file in the district court. And to obtain that authorization, prisoners have to show not only that the decision on which they are relying is retroactive, but that the Supreme Court has made it retroactive. By contrast, prisoners seeking to file their initial section 2255 motions have to show only that the decision on which they are relying is retroactive.
In the post-Johnson litigation, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit adopted an approach under which it would adjudicate all section 2255 motions relying on Johnson. It maintained that approach even after the Supreme Court had granted certiorari in Welch to decide whether Johnson is retroactive (the Court likely granted certiorari in Welch just to make Johnson retroactive). It also maintained that same approach after the Court granted certiorari in Beckles to decide whether an analogous provision in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines was also unconstitutionally void for vagueness.
The Eleventh Circuit’s case-management decision was fairly high stakes, as I explained in this essay in the Northwestern Law Review with Shakeer Rahman and in this Take Care post with Lark Turner. For one thing, processing defendant’s initial section 2255 motions would push defendants’ cases toward second or successive 2255 motions, at which the obstacles to recovery would be greater. Processing so many section 2255 motions in short order also risked losing cases in the fray, particularly given that defendants have no constitutional right to counsel in their section 2255 motions. Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit had also interpreted section 2244 to require it to dismiss any claim in a second or successive 2255 motion that had been presented in a previous petition. The Eleventh Circuit’s practice was also contrary to the other circuits: In In re Embry, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in a decision by Judge Sutton, explained why holding cases in abeyance of Beckles made the most sense. Other courts of appeals did the same.
In the wake of Dimaya, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has brought its practices into line with other circuits. The Eleventh Circuit issued an order (“General Order 43”) in which it ordered all second or successive 2255 motions involving section 924(c) to be held in abeyance for the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Ovalles v. United States. The Eleventh Circuit took Ovalles en banc to decide whether section 924(c) is unconstitutionally void for vagueness in light of Dimaya (the court ordered briefing on whether courts must use the categorical approach to interpret section 924(c), but General Order 43 recognizes the court will decide the constitutionality of section 924(c) as part of the case). Thus, Ovalles is to Dimaya as Beckles was to Johnson: Both cases will or would decide whether an analogous provision is unconstitutionally vague in light of the preceding Supreme Court decision. But whereas the Eleventh Circuit refused to hold cases in abeyance for Beckles, it is doing so for Ovalles.
I am not exactly optimistic that the Eleventh Circuit is going to invalidate section 924(c) in light of Dimaya. I think the Eleventh Circuit is likely to hold that courts need not use the categorical approach when interpreting section 924(c), and distinguish section 924(c) from 16(b) on that basis.
Nonetheless, I think a rare kudos is appropriate here for the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in General Order 43. By electing to hold cases for Ovalles, the Eleventh Circuit is avoiding unnecessary duplication in litigation, which would waste everyone’s (the courts, public defenders, and litigants) time. It is also avoiding generating a slew of unfavorable precedents for defendants: In the wake of Johnson, the Eleventh Circuit disposed of many Guidelines cases by holding that the defendant’s prior convictions qualified as violent felonies under the enumerated offense or element of force clauses, even assuming the Guideline’s residual clause was vague. Doing so ensured that the court’s decisions would be insulated from having to go through another round of review in the event the Supreme Court ultimately held the Guideline unconstitutionally vague. But it also generated a ton of unfavorable precedent to the defendants, without argument and even without full briefing, given that that is how courts of appeals dispose of requests to file second or successive motions. By changing course and holding cases for Ovalles, the Eleventh Circuit is avoiding repeating the same error. And that’s something, these days.
June 5, 2018 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Vagueness in Johnson and thereafter, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (5)
It was a "civil" morning for US Supreme Court today, with two opinions from the civil side of its docket (one big, one little) and four cert grants on matters that are mostly civil and somewhat procedure (although one, Royal v. Murphy, deals with tribal jurisdiction over a capital prosecution). But there was still some interesting news for sentencing fans in today's SCOTUS order list in the form of somewhat surprising denials of certiorari in cases dealing with the residue of the Johnson vagueness ruling for guideline-sentenced defendants before Booker make the guidelines advisory.
This part of this SCOTUSblog Relist Watch post by John Elwood from a few weeks ago spotlights cases I have had my eye on:
Lester v. United States, 17-1366, would justify readers in feeling a bit of déjà vu all over again. The case presents the question whether the residual clause of the career offender sentencing guideline was unconstitutionally vague back before United States v. Booker when the Sentencing Guidelines were still mandatory. If that seems as familiar as Indiana Jones 4, that very question is already before the court in a number of serial relists: Allen v. United States, 17-5684, Gates v. United States, 17-6262, James v. United States, 17-6769 (all relisted nine times) and Robinson v. United States, 17-6877 (relisted seven times).
Sentencing gurus know that the Supreme Court in Beckles decided that the Court's big vagueness ruling in Johnson dealing with a key clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act did not entail constitutional problems for a parallel clause of the sentencing guidelines because the guidelines are now advisory, not mandatory. But defendants in the cases above, which SCOTUS had been mulling over now for many months, were sentenced with the problematic parallel clause of the sentencing guidelines before Booker made the guidelines advisory. But because judges could (and sometimes did) depart from the guidelines even before Booker made them mandatory (but cannot depart from applying ACCA), these cases presented an interesting and uncertain push-pull between the Johnson ruling and Beckles' gloss on its application.
I had been hoping that the collection of these cases as "serial relists" meant that SCOTUS was busy looking for the right vehicle for considering these post-Johnson matters. But today, as noted above, certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court in all these cases without any explanation. Of course, explanations for cert denials are not common. But because relists often lead to a cert grant or at least some discussion by some justice of the issue, I am starting my week bummed that an interesting intricate piece of sentencing jurisprudence did not prompt any substantive SCOTUS engagement.
May 21, 2018 in Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Vagueness in Johnson and thereafter, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)
The title of this post is the title of this notable new paper available via SSRN authored by Leah Litman that is a must read for anyone following post-Miller or post-Johnson litigation (and who isn't?). Here is the abstract:
Although it has long been thought that innocence should matter in federal habeas corpus proceedings, innocence scholarship has focused almost exclusively on claims of factual innocence — the kind of innocence that occurs when new evidence reveals that the defendant did not commit the offense for which he was convicted. The literature has largely overlooked cases where a defendant was convicted or sentenced under a statute that is unconstitutional, or a statute that does not apply to the defendant. The Supreme Court, however, has recently begun to recognize these cases as kinds of innocence and it has grounded its concern for them in innocence-related considerations.
This Article highlights how the doctrine has started to treat these “legal innocence” cases as cases in which defendants are innocent, as well as the reasons why it has done so. As this Article explains, legal innocence is conceptually and inextricably linked with factual innocence; in both kinds of cases, the defendant was convicted or sentenced under a law she did not violate. These cases raise similar concerns and implicate many of the same features of our criminal law system. By recognizing the emerging category of legal innocence as a kind of innocence, this Article maps out how the existing federal habeas system can provide relief to legally innocent defendants.
May 17, 2018 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Vagueness in Johnson and thereafter, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (3)
May 14, 2018 in Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Vagueness in Johnson and thereafter, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)
May 9, 2018 in Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Vagueness in Johnson and thereafter | Permalink | Comments (0)
First ripple of Dimaya disruptions appears in SCOTUS relists
In this post the day after the Supreme Court's big ruling in Sessions v. Dimaya, No. 15-1498 (S. Ct. April 17, 2018) (available here), I asked "How many federal prisoners may have Dimaya claims and how many procedural challenges will they face raising them?". Though not providing a direct answer to this question, this most recent Relist Watch posting by John Elwood over at SCOTUSblog reinforces my sense that the Dimaya disruptions are likely to be plentiful and complicated. Here are amusing excerpts from John Elwood's post (with links from the original):
We have a record number of relists, at least during the seven-plus years I’ve been watching carefully: 44. Of those, 42 are cases that obviously were held for Dimaya, and now the court is trying to decide what to do with them. Just identifying all those relists on the court’s docket, and then figuring out the legal issues involved, was a big job for people who really do have other responsibilities. But although the task was a bit dull, at least it involved an enormous amount of backbreaking labor. And so let me begin where I usually end: Thanks to Kevin Brooks for identifying all the relists, and thanks to Aurora Temple Barnes for sorting through the heaps of PDFs I lobbed at her and identifying the questions presented and creating tidy case pages.
The Dimaya relists fall into three main groups. First, there are many cases that simply present the very same question as Dimaya about the constitutionality of § 16(b). This group is enormous, including Sessions v. Magana-Pena, 15-1494, Sessions v. Lopez-Islava, 15-1496, Sessions v. Miranda-Godinez, 16-398, Sessions v. Baptiste, 16-978, Sessions v. Shuti, 16-991, Gonzalez-Longoria v. United States, 16-6259, Solano-Cruz v. United States, 16-6288, Perdomo v. United States, 16-7214, Bello v. United States, 16-7667, Alvaro-Velasco v. United States, 16-8058, Castaneda-Morales v. United States, 16-8734, Maldonado-Landaverde v. United States, 16-9318, Linares-Mazariego v. United States, 16-9319, Larios-Villatoro v. United States, 16-9660, Diaz-Esparza v. Session, 17-820, Gomez-Ureaba v. United States, 17-5283, Garcia-Hernandez v. United States, 17-5305, Hernandez-Ramirez v. United States, 17-6065, Ontiveros-Cedillo v. United States, 17-6721, Gutierrez-Lopez v. United States, 17-6751, Casabon-Ramirez v. United States, 17-7183, and -- so far as we can tell (the parties haven’t gotten back to us yet), Eaton v. United States, 17-6680. These cases should have been easy to resolve by denying cert or granting, vacating and remanding for further consideration in light of Dimaya. That they were not is the clearest example that the volume was just too great.
The second group of Dimaya relists involves application of that case to a Sentencing Guidelines provision -- a type of claim the government argues is foreclosed by Beckles v. United States. Those cases include first-time relists United States v. Hernandez-Lara, 16-617, Aguirre-Arellano v. United States, 16-8675, and Rodriguez v. United States, 17-5476, as well as returning relist Robinson v. United States, 17-6877.
The third and final group of Dimaya relists involves cases that ask whether the logic of that case and Johnson v. United States invalidates 18 U.S.C. §924(c)(3)(B), yet another criminal code provision defining “crime of violence.” This week’s new relists that involve that question include Taylor v. United States, 16-6392, Prickett v. United States, 16-7373, Glover v. United States, 16-8777, Taylor v. United States, 16-8996, Davis v. United States, 16-8997, United States v. Jenkins, 17-97, United States v. Jackson, 17-651, McCoy v. United States, 17-5484, Winters v. United States, 17-5495, Lin v. United States, 17-5767, Eizember v. United States, 17-6117, Enix v. United States, 17-6340, Ecourse-Westbrook v. United States, 17-6368, and Carreon v. United States, 17-6926. The government argues that after Dimaya, these cases should be sent back to the courts of appeals to consider narrowing constructions of Section 924(c) that might resolve the constitutional issues. Unsurprisingly, criminal defendants argue that the court should just grant review on this issue. We’ll see which side prevails.
April 29, 2018 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Vagueness in Johnson and thereafter, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (4)
March 12, 2018 in Offender Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Vagueness in Johnson and thereafter | Permalink | Comments (6)
November 20, 2017 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Vagueness in Johnson and thereafter, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)
October 3, 2017 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Vagueness in Johnson and thereafter, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (5)
Can a federal sentence really "be close to absurd" and yet also be affirmed as reasonable?
The peculiar and perhaps metaphysical question in the title of this post is prompted by a Second Circuit panel decision today in US v. Jones, No. 15‐1518 (2d Cir. Sept. 11, 2017) (available here). The Jones case get intricate thanks to the timing and uncertainties of criminal history litigation. The start of the panel opinion provides a flavor of the mess:
Defendant Corey Jones appeals from a sentence entered in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Garaufis, J.) following a jury trial conviction for assaulting a federal officer in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111. He was sentenced as a career offender principally to 180 months in prison to be followed by three years of supervised release. The primary basis for Jones’ appeal is that, in light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (Johnson I), New York first‐degree robbery is no longer categorically a crime of violence under the force clause of the Career Offender Guideline, U.S.S.G. §§ 4B1.1 and 4B1.2, and that the district court therefore erred in concluding that his prior conviction for first‐degree robbery would automatically serve as one of the predicate offenses for a career offender designation.
After oral argument in this matter, the Supreme Court decided Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017), which held that the residual clause of the Career Offender Guideline — a second basis for finding a crime of violence — was not unconstitutional. The Court reached this conclusion notwithstanding the government’s concession to the contrary in cases around the country that the residual clause, like the identically worded provision of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), was void for vagueness. In light of Beckles, we find that New York first‐degree robbery categorically qualifies as a crime of violence under the residual clause and therefore need not address Jones’ argument based on the force clause. We also find that his sentence is substantively reasonable and therefore AFFIRM the sentence imposed by the district court.
Judge Calabresi (my former boss) authors a separate concurring opinion in which he explains the various factors and fortuities which he thinks requires an affirmance of a sentence that seems technically sound by infused with problems of timing and equity. I cannot briefly recount he are the curious particulars, but this sentence captures Judge Calabresi's obvious frustration:
What is more — and this may be the true source of my sense of absurdity — there appears to be no way in which we can ask the district court to reconsider the sentence it ordered in view of the happenstances that have worked against Jones, and in view of its assessment of Jones’ crimes and of its downward departure.
For what it is worth, I think reasonableness review can and should be a very flexible and robust means for circuit courts to require resentencing whenever it has a basis for being concerned, procedurally or substantively, with any aspects of the proceedings below in light of the sentencing commands of 3553(a). Consequently, I think the Second Circuit could have said simply that "happenstances that have worked against Jones" since the time of his initial sentencing cast new light on the 3553(a) factors and thus his sentence is procedurally unreasonable and he should be resentenced.
September 11, 2017 in Booker in the Circuits, Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Vagueness in Johnson and thereafter | Permalink | Comments (1)
March 6, 2017 in Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Vagueness in Johnson and thereafter, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (3)
March 6, 2017 in Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Sentences Reconsidered, Vagueness in Johnson and thereafter, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (2)
The title of this post is the title of this timely new commentary now on SSRN authored by Leah Litman about the latest "hot name" to replace Justice Scalia on the Supreme Court. Here is the first paragraph:
Jan Crawford has reported that President Donald Trump is strongly considering appointing Judge Neil Gorsuch of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit to the U.S. Supreme Court. I do not know Judge Gorsuch, but I do know his opinion in Prost v. Anderson, which is a rather wonky case on a somewhat technical area of federal habeas law. Prost provides an interesting insight into Judge Gorsuch’s jurisprudence. The case concerns an issue on which the court of appeals disagree, and so it provides a nice glimpse into how Judge Gorsuch might address matters that are reasonably susceptible to different resolution, as many of the Supreme Court’s cases are. Prost illustrates how Judge Gorsuch will balance competing considerations of fairness and administrability in criminal law. While there is much to like about Prost — it is well written, clearly reasoned, and adopts an administrable rule — the opinion also raises some concerns. The opinion overvalues proceduralism relative to substantive rights in a way that will have the effect of eroding litigants’ access to courts.
January 24, 2017 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Vagueness in Johnson and thereafter, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)
The title of this post is the title of this new and timely short piece authored by Scott Meisler now available via SSRN that ought to be of special interest to sentencing fans. Here is the abstract:
Recent press reports indicate that federal appellate judges William Pryor and Diane Sykes are among the finalists for the Supreme Court vacancy created by Justice Scalia’s death. But just as Justice Scalia and fellow conservative Justice Alito often differed on questions of criminal and habeas corpus procedure, so too have Judges Pryor and Sykes. This short essay analyzes four legal issues on which the two judges have recently reached contrary results or demonstrated different approaches — including two legal issues arising from Justice Scalia’s last major criminal procedure opinion, Johnson v. United States. The essay concludes that, though the decisions analyzed here represent only a small sample, they suggest that Judge Sykes’s approach to criminal procedure questions would more closely resemble Justice Scalia’s, while Judge Pryor’s would be more similar to that of Justice Alito.
January 9, 2017 in Criminal justice in the Trump Administration, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Vagueness in Johnson and thereafter, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (4)
November 28, 2016 in Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Vagueness in Johnson and thereafter, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (7)
November 28, 2016 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Vagueness in Johnson and thereafter, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (15)
Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015)
, held that the so-called “residual clause” of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) was unconstitutionally vague. Johnson generated a large amount of litigation in the federal courts. Less than a year after it was decided, the Supreme Court decided another Johnson case, Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016), which held that the rule in Johnson should be applied retroactively to those defendants whose convictions and sentences have already become final. The Supreme Court has also agreed to hear two new Johnson cases in the 2016 Term.
October 25, 2016 in Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Vagueness in Johnson and thereafter | Permalink | Comments (0)
This Essay considers how significant the differences between the Armed Career Criminal Act and the Sentencing Guidelines are to one question the Supreme Court is poised to address in Beckles v. United States -- namely, whether a rule invalidating the so-called "residual clause" in the Sentencing Guidelines applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. This Essay collects evidence from resentencings that have occurred after courts have found the Guidelines' residual clause invalid. These resentencings have resulted in defendants receiving significantly less prison time.
The extent to which a rule invalidating the Guidelines' residual clause affects defendants' sentences -- often significantly -- justifies revisiting defendants' sentences because whatever finality interests exist in the defendants' sentences are outweighed by the effects that a rule invalidating the Guidelines' residual clause has on the amount of prison time defendants serve. The Supreme Court should also not hesitate to make a rule invalidating the Guideline retroactive because the Sentencing Commission decided not to make retroactive an amendment deleting the Guideline's residual clause. The Commission never investigated how difficult it would be to make that amendment retroactive.
October 17, 2016 in Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Vagueness in Johnson and thereafter, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)
October 15, 2016 in Advisory Sentencing Guidelines, Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Recommended reading, Sentences Reconsidered, Vagueness in Johnson and thereafter, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)
"Clarity in Criminal Law"
The title of this post is the title of this timely new article authored by Shon Hopwood now available via SSRN. Here is the abstract:
Over the past thirty years, thousands of new federal criminal laws have been enacted, many of which are unclear and leave prosecutors and courts to now define the boundaries of the criminal code. Tolerating unclear laws in the criminal arena has always been problematic, but it is especially so in this era of overcriminalization and excessive punishment, where a lack of clarity can result in arbitrary application of criminal statutes and the sentencing consequences of a conviction are so severe. Although several justices have noted the lack of clarity in the criminal law, the Court as a whole has not fully reacted.
This Article suggests what that reaction should be. It argues for a more robust review of unclear federal criminal laws, using amplified versions of two tools already at the Court’s disposal: the rule of lenity and void for vagueness doctrine. Employing those doctrines vigorously would, in effect, create a clear statement rule in criminal law.
September 16, 2016 in Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Vagueness in Johnson and thereafter, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)
Eleventh Circuit judges discuss guidelines and vagueness at great length after denying en banc review in Matchett
As regular readers should recall (and as I like to remind everyone), in this post right after the US Supreme Court ruled that a key clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act violated "the Constitution’s prohibition of vague criminal laws" in Johnson v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (available here), I flagged the question of how Johnson would impact application of the (now older, pre-reform version) career-offender guideline of the US Sentencing Guidelines. As I have noted before, the Justice Department has consistently conceded Johnson-based constitutional problems with that guideline, even though there was some prior rulings in some circuits that the federal guidelines could not be attacked based on traditional void-for-vagueness doctrines.
As I have previously noted, I consider the ruling Matchett suspect; but an amicus brief I helped put together urging en banc review in Matchett was not sufficiently convincing to that court. Today, as revealed here, the Eleventh Circuit announced that a majority of its members voters against considering this issue en banc. (For practical reasons, even though I disagree on the merits, this decision now makes sense: as blogged here this past June, we now have the ultimate judicial authority on this issue poised to weigh in:the final Supreme Court order list of last Term included a grant of certiorari in Beckles v. United States, No. 15-8544, which will explore whetherJohnson's constitutional holding applies to the residual clause in the older, pre-reform version of the career offender guideline.)
The actual order denying en banc review is only one-sentence long. But following the order comes 80+ pages of fascinating concurring and dissenting opinions that will surely intrigue any and everyone closely following the legal and practical issues that Beckles implicates. Highly recommended reading for all sentencing fans and law nerds.
September 13, 2016 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Vagueness in Johnson and thereafter, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)
September 6, 2016 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Vagueness in Johnson and thereafter, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (2)
August 30, 2016 in Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Vagueness in Johnson and thereafter, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (2)
I highlighted in this post here last week the potent opinions by a number of Eleventh Circuit judges explaining why they think the Circuit's precendents for dealing with prisoner petitions based on the Supreme Court's landmark ruling in Johnson v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), are so very wrong and unjust. A helpful reader made sure that I did not miss this recent Bloomberg commentary on this topic authored by Noah Feldman headlined "This Is What 'Travesty of Justice' Looks Like." Here are excerpts:
Call it Scalia’s revenge. In one of the last cases that he authored before he died in February, Justice Antonin Scalia convinced his colleagues to strike down a key clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act because it was unconstitutionally vague. As a result, thousands of convicted felons are now asking courts to have their sentences reduced.
The legal rules for considering such post-conviction requests are tricky and technical. But in most of the country, prisoners are getting another day in court to have their ACCA convictions reviewed in the light of the new legal principle. In the Eleventh Circuit, which includes Alabama, Georgia and Florida, the process has gone badly awry [and] a judge on the circuit's court of appeals cried foul, calling for a fundamental change in how its handling these cases....
Before a prisoner can go back to the district court for what’s called a “second, successive” post-conviction petition, he or she needs special permission from a federal court of appeals. The stakes are high for the prisoners. In some cases, the difference might be between the 15-year minimum imposed on felons with three prior convictions, and a sentence of 10 years or less for fewer convictions.
Consequently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has been immersed in the time-consuming process of figuring out who should be allowed a second chance to file a petition in District Court seeking review of their sentence. It's studying presentence reports to ascertain whether any of the prior convictions should still count, and, if so, how that might change the petitioner's sentence. Yet no other court of appeals appears to be engaging in this kind of case-by-case analysis. They’ve been approving the requests automatically and allowing a federal district court to sort out the details.
Judge Beverly Martin of the Eleventh Circuit issued an unusual and stirring opinion ... declaring that the process in her court wasn’t working. Martin asserted that among the thousands of applications and hundreds of denials, her court has been making mistakes -- mistakes that, by their legal nature, can't be appealed. “A court of appeals is simply not equipped to construct a new basis for a prisoner’s old sentence in this way,” she wrote.
To make matters worse, the Eleventh Circuit gives itself 30 days to rule on each request. The presentence report can be inadequate or misleading, and there are no attorneys involved to explain what it means. And most prior convictions are under state law, which varies from place to place and have technical details that are hard for the court to determine without a lawyer’s help.
What's more, the Eleventh Circuit had rejected petitions for reconsideration before the Supreme Court said its Johnson ruling applied retroactively.
The upshot is that something very like a travesty of justice is happening in the Eleventh Circuit. And as you know if you’re still reading this, the issue is sufficiently technical that it’s hard to draw attention to the problem. But real people are spending potentially many extra years in prison on the basis of an unconstitutional law. That’s wrong. In the spirit of Justice Scalia, the Eleventh Circuit should change course and start allowing district courts to review post-Johnson ACCA petitions the way the other circuits do.
July 27, 2016 in Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Vagueness in Johnson and thereafter, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (2)
Perhaps previewing coming SCOTUS work in Beckles, four Eleventh Circuit judges make case against circuit's refusal to apply Johnson to guidelines
In this post after the US Supreme Court ruled that a key clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act violated "the Constitution’s prohibition of vague criminal laws" in Johnson v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (available here), I flagged the question of how Johnson would impact application of the (now older, pre-reform version) career offender guideline of the US Sentencing Guidelines. Notably, the Justice Department has consistently conceded Johnson-based constitutional problems with that career offender guideline, which in turn has led to most circuit courts finding Johnson-based constitutional problems with sentences based on that guideline.
But, as noted in this post last September, an Eleventh Circuit panel in US v. Matchett, 802 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2015) (available here), squarely addressed this issue and ruled that Johnson and its vagueness problem just do not apply to advisory sentencing guidelines. I considered this ruling suspect, but an amicus brief I helped put together urging en banc review in Matchett did not led to its reconsideration. As blogged here last month, though, we know have the ultimate judicial authority on this issue poised to weigh in: the final Supreme Court order list of last Term included a grant of certiorari in Beckles v. United States, No. 15-8544, which will explore whether Johnson's constitutional holding applies to the residual clause in the older, pre-reform version of the career offender guideline.
July 19, 2016 in Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Vagueness in Johnson and thereafter, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)
Notably and significantly, the SCOTUS order list reports that "Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of ... this petition." In other words, it seems that Justice Kagan's prior history as Solicitor General has caused her to be conflicted out of this case. Ergo, it will likely be only be a seven (or perhaps and eight-member) Court that will be resolving the application of vagueness doctrines in this case.
June 27, 2016 in Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Sentences Reconsidered, Vagueness in Johnson and thereafter, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)
A year ago, as first reported in this post and immediate follow-ups here and here, the Supreme Court in Johnson v. United States, No. 13-7120 (S. Ct. June 26, 2015) (available here), ruled that a key clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act violated "the Constitution’s prohibition of vague criminal laws." This morning's Washington Post has this effective (and well-timed) extended article, headlined "Local Small words, big consequences for possibly thousands of federal prisoners,"looking at the impact of that ruling now a year later. I recomment the piece in full, and here are excerpts:
Hundreds if not thousands of federal prisoners are likely to have their sentences shortened — and in some cases get immediate release — due to one of the final opinions written by Justice Antonin Scalia. Scalia’s little-noticed opinion focused on one phrase in federal law but has created uncertainty and upheaval for judges, prosecutors and defense attorneys facing a pile of prisoner requests to have their cases reviewed.
Federal inmates have until Sunday to try to challenge their prison terms after the Supreme Court labeled 12 words in the criminal code “unconstitutionally vague” in an opinion announced by Scalia last June, eight months before his death. The ruling eliminated a section of law that prosecutors relied on to seek stiffer penaltiesfor defendants they said were especially dangerous. Defense attorneys had decried the wording because it was used to brand too many defendants as violent....
For defense attorneys, the court’s decision provides a new avenue to challenge lengthy sentences for prisoners who received severe penalties for nonviolent offenses, such as resisting arrest. “It was a dumping ground,” said Amy Baron-Evans of the Sentencing Resource Counsel Project of federal public defenders. “It ended up sweeping in crimes that no one would think of as being violent.”
Filings from inmates are piling up in judicial chambers throughout the country. In Atlanta, one judge took the unusual step this spring of flagging the names of 110 prisoners from her district eligible to refile for shorter sentences to alert them to the deadline this month — one year from the date the Supreme Court decision was handed down. In Richmond last month, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit, which covers Virginia, Maryland, West Virginia, North Carolina and South Carolina, received more than 500 filings for sentence reviews, according to the clerk’s office. In the same period last year, there were 18. More than 350 petitions have been filed in the 8th Circuit in St. Louis since May, contributing to a record number of filings in a single month....
The language overturned by the Supreme Court in the criminal code echoes in other parts of the justice system. Nearly identical words about career offenders appear in federal sentencing guidelines, which use a formula to give judges a recommended range of possible prison time for the defendants who come before them.
Federal public defenders and the U.S. Justice Department agree that the Supreme Court ruling negates those words in the guidelines for defendants sentenced since Scalia’s 2015 opinion. The Supreme Court separately is being asked to settle a dispute about whether inmates punished before the 2015 opinion should have another chance at sentencing.
The Justice Department says they should not, according to the government’s court filings. The judges who handed down those prison terms were not bound to a particular mandatory sentence and imposed what they thought were appropriate punishments that should stand, the government says. To the public defenders, that position is at odds with the Obama administration’s advocacy for clemency. If the court rules that the decision does apply retroactively to the guidelines, another 6,000 federal inmates sentenced between 1992 and 2015 could ask to have their prison time cut, according to an estimate from the public defenders’ sentencing project.
In response to the Supreme Court’s decision, attorneys for Dustin John Higgs in May asked the 4th Circuit for permission to challenge his death sentence. Higgs was sentenced in 2001 for ordering the murders of three young women in Beltsville. The women were shot to death on a desolate stretch of federal land near the Patuxent Wildlife Research Center. Higgs was convicted of using a firearm during a “crime of violence” — in this case kidnapping and murder....
The article states that "federal inmates have until Sunday to try to challenge their prison terms," based on the one-year statute of limitations in AEDPA for bringing 2255 collateral appeals following certain critical legal development. As the title of my post indicates, it seems clear that inmates serving ACCA sentences need to get Johnson claims filed now due to this statutory deadline. Less clear, though, is whether inmates eager to extend the reach of Johnson to the career offender guidelines or other statutes are subject to the smae deadline (and, as noted in this prior post, SCOTUS has been relisting throughout June two notable petitions on Johnson's applicability to the career offender guidelines). Also, I suppose, based on the right facts, equitable tolling arguments could be made (though probably would face an uphill battle) for any inmates who missed the AEDPA deadline for bringing Johnson claims in various settings.
Long story short, as I forecasted in some of the posts below right after the Johnson ruling last year, it seems all but certain that many thousands of inmates (and thousands of lawyers) are going to be having Johnson dreams or nightmares for many years to come.
June 24, 2016 in Offender Characteristics, Sentences Reconsidered, Vagueness in Johnson and thereafter | Permalink | Comments (1)