Source: http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/600/70/231386/
Timestamp: 2013-05-19 17:08:17
Document Index: 680173397

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 19', 'art:\n3', '§ 19', '§ 2000', '§ 1983', '§ 1988', 'art:\n13']

600 F.2d 70: 19 Fair Empl.prac.cas. 1540, 19 Empl. Prac.dec. P 9270james Dawson et al., Plaintiffs-cross-appellants, v. Robert B. Pastrick et al., Defendants-appellees,andeast Chicago Firefighters Association, Local 365,intervenor-appellant :: US Court of Appeals Cases :: Justia
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600 F.2d 70: 19 Fair Empl.prac.cas. 1540, 19 Empl. Prac.dec. P 9270james Dawson et al., Plaintiffs-cross-appellants, v. Robert B. Pastrick et al., Defendants-appellees,andeast Chicago Firefighters Association, Local 365,intervenor-appellant
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit. - 600 F.2d 70
Argued June 6, 1978.Decided May 31, 1979
1 The plaintiffs added their Title VII claim after the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 extended the coverage of Title VII to units of government
2 Ind.Code § 19-1-37.5-10 provides in pertinent part:
3 The proposed partial consent decree declared that Ind.Code § 19-1-37.5-9 (the hiring system) was unconstitutional. The proposed relief would have established separate eligibility lists for Black, Spanish surnamed, and white applicants and imposed a 2-2-1 hiring formula for the first 45 positions available and a 1-1-1 formula for the next 55 before combining the separate lists
4 This consent decree would have declared sections 10 and 4(i) of Ind.Code 19-1-37.5 (the promotional system) unconstitutional, established separate eligibility lists for each job classification, and imposed a 2-2-1 promotional formula until sixty percent of the positions in each job classification were filled by minorities. Until the sixty percent figure was reached, seniority and oral interviews were to be disregarded. After attainment of the sixty percent level, promotions were to be based sixty percent on a validated test score, thirty percent on seniority, and ten percent on oral examination. The consent decree also would have eliminated the requirement of the Indiana Act that promotion only be from the next immediate lower rank
5 As to the section of the Indiana Act regulating hiring, the district noted that it
6 The court held that the 1972 amendments to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, which extended the coverage of Title VII to governmental agencies and political subdivisions, did not apply retroactively. Since all of the defendants' hiring practices challenged by the plaintiffs had ceased prior to 1972, the Title VII claim necessarily failed. The court held that Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), foreclosed the section 1983 claim
7 In the pretrial order filed the day of the trial, the parties agreed:
8 The State of Indiana, which participated in the proceedings in the trial court to defend the constitutionality of the Indiana Act, does not regard the trial court's order upholding the Act as being challenged before this court. In a letter to the clerk of this court it disclaims any interest in participating in these appeals
9 They also argue in a footnote in their brief that relief could have been granted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In its judgment of November, 1977, the district court indicated that plaintiffs could not prevail on their section 1983 claim under Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961). After the district court's judgment, however, the Supreme Court overruled Monroe in Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)
10 The defendants have argued that section 1981 requires proof of discriminatory intent, but have not appealed from the trial court's judgment against them. Cf. United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 226 n.2, 95 S.Ct. 926, 43 L.Ed.2d 148 (1975). In light of their willingness to comply with the present decree, we need not decide the difficult issue raised about the elements of section 1981. Compare the majority and dissenting opinions in Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 566 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1977), Vacated as moot, --- U.S. ----, 99 S.Ct. 1379, 59 L.Ed.2d 642 (1979)
11 The district court's opinion states:
12 42 U.S.C. § 1988 provides in pertinent part:
13 Of course, the circumstances of each case must be individually considered in determining who is the prevailing party. In Roesel v. Joliet Wrought Washer Co., 596 F.2d 583 (7th Cir. 1979), this court affirmed the trial court's refusal to grant requests for attorneys' fees by both the defendant and the plaintiff in a Title VII action. We remarked that "(u)nder the circumstances, with each party prevailing in some part, it seems sound to award fees to neither." 596 F.2d at 187. Aside from the fact that Roesel was not decided under the Fees Act, it is distinguishable from the present action because it was an action on behalf of a single individual. A class action like the present case may ordinarily be expected to yield a broader public benefit than an individual action. Moreover, in Roesel, the plaintiff failed to obtain relief on one of her two claims and that probably the more important claim. Here, the plaintiffs have obtained relief for both segments of the class that they represented prospective as well as present minority employees. On the whole, we conclude that the plaintiffs have prevailed in this litigation. Although they did not obtain all the relief they desired, the case cannot be considered a draw
14 The same rule does not apply, however, if it is the party who is claimed to have violated another's civil rights who prevails in the litigation: