Source: https://www.animallaw.info/case/wilderness-society-v-us-fish-and-wildlife-service
Timestamp: 2017-10-23 06:26:32
Document Index: 368236931

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1131', '§ 668', '§ 35', '§ 1131', '§ 1133', '§ 668', '§ 706', '§ 668', '§ 304', '§ 668', '§ 668', '§ 303', '§ 668', '§ 668', '§ 668', '§ 668', '§ 668', '§ 3101', '§ 3101', '§ 3101', '§ 1133', '§ 1131', '§ 1133', '§ 1603', '§ 668', '§ 668', '§ 303', '§ 715', '§ 29']

Wilderness Society v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service | Animal Legal & Historical Center
Full Case Name: Wilderness Society v. United States Fish and Wildlife Service
Country of Origin: United States Court Name: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Primary Citation: 316 F.3d 913 (9th Cir. 2003) Date of Decision: Monday, August 5, 2002 Judge Name: GRABER, Circuit Judge Jurisdiction Level: Federal Alternate Citation: 3 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 309, 2003 Daily Journal D.A.R. 385 Judges: GRABER dissented and filed a separate opinion. Circuit Judge Circuit Judge. Betty B. Fletcher Attorneys: Jack K. Sterne, Trustees for Alaska, Anchorage, AK, for the plaintiffs-appellants. Kathryn E. Kovacs, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for the defendant-appellee.
Plaintiffs, The Wilderness Society and the Alaska Center for the Environment, challenge a decision by Defendant United States Fish and Wildlife Service (the Service) to permit a sockeye salmon enhancement project (the Project) at Tustumena Lake. Tustumena Lake is located in Alaska, within a designated wilderness area in the Kenai National Wildlife Refuge. Plaintiffs argue that the Project violates the Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131- 1136, because it contravenes that Act's requirement to preserve the "natural condition" and "wilderness character" of the area, and because it constitutes an impermissible "commercial enterprise" within a wilderness area. Plaintiffs also allege that the Project violates the National Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act of 1966, 16 U.S.C. §§ 668dd-668ee (the Refuge Act), because it is not "compatible" with the purposes of the Refuge Act.
Beginning in 1974, the Alaska Department of Fish and Game (the Alaska Department) collected sockeye salmon eggs annually at Tustumena Lake as part of a state-funded research project. The eggs were incubated at the Crooked Creek Hatchery, [FN1] and the resulting salmon fry were later released. Beginning in 1975, the fry were returned to tributaries of Tustumena Lake, as well as to other sites. Between 1976 and 1987, the number of fry released annually at Tustumena Lake varied between 400,000 and 17 million. Each year after 1987 the number of fry released there has remained at about 6 million. [FN2] Until 1980, the Project was conducted without a special use permit, or other kind of permit, from the Service.
FN1. In 1977 some incubation occurred at the Tutka Bay Lagoon facility as well. The Crooked Creek Hatchery closed in 1996. Since then, eggs from the Project have been incubated at the Trail Lakes Salmon Hatchery.
FN2. In 1977 and 1994, however, no fry were released at Tustumena Lake.
[a] variety of fishery enhancement efforts would be undertaken although natural processes would continue to dominate fish production on most areas of the refuge. Management efforts would focus on the refuge's most popular fisheries. Most current fishery management and research projects, including ... the experimental stocking of sockeye fry in Tustumena and Hidden lakes, ... could continue. Abundance and diversity of salmon ... probably would remain near current levels.
Populations of species of high public interest will continue to receive management emphasis in the most highly accessible locations. Populations of species such as ... salmon, will be maintained at relatively constant, high levels. The substantial recreational and commercial benefits ( ... fishing ... and commercial fishing) associated with these species will continue.....
• A final EA was released.
• At the same time, the Service issued a "Mitigated Finding of No Significant Impact," concluding that mitigation measures contained in the special use permit would minimize risks associated with the Project, so that preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement was not required.
• The Refuge Manager released a "Wilderness Act Consistency Review" posing, and answering in the negative, two questions: (1) whether the Project was inconsistent with the Wilderness Act's requirement to maintain the natural condition of the wilderness, and (2) whether the Project constituted a commercial activity precluded by regulation, 50 C.F.R. § 35.5. Relying on an opinion prepared by the Interior Department's Solicitor's Office, the Refuge Manager found the Project consistent with relevant environmental statutes, including both the Wilderness Act and the Refuge Act. The Solicitor's opinion concluded that, "[u]nder present law, the Fish and Wildlife Service has administrative discretion sufficient to grant Cook Inlet Aquaculture Association a 'special use permit' for operation of a compatible enhancement project within the Kenai Wilderness." The opinion explained that the Wilderness Act was a legislative compromise that did not mandate pure preservationism. With respect specifically to wilderness areas in Alaska, the opinion noted Congress' intention to allow activities enhancing fish populations.
• Finally, the Service also issued a "Compatibility Determination" acknowledging that "the [P]roject cannot ... be considered as supporting Refuge purposes," but concluding that the Project still was not "incompatible with" Refuge purposes.
In 1998, Plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking to enjoin the Project and seeking a declaration that the Service's decision to permit the Project violated the Wilderness Act, ANILCA, the Refuge Act, NEPA, and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on their Wilderness Act and Refuge Act claims, which are the only claims that are before us on appeal. Specifically, plaintiffs argued that the Project (1) violates the Wilderness Act, which requires preservation of the "wilderness character" and "natural conditions" of the Kenai Wilderness, 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a), (c), and prohibits "commercial enterprise" in the wilderness area, 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c); and (2) violates the Refuge Act's requirement of "compatib[ility]" with Refuge purposes, 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(d)(1)(A). The district court disagreed with Plaintiffs' theories under both statutes and denied their motion for summary judgment. After considering a supplemental record, the court again denied Plaintiffs' motion. The parties stipulated to voluntary dismissal of the claims as to which Plaintiffs had not sought summary judgment. The district court dismissed those claims without prejudice and entered a final judgment in favor of the Service. [FN3]
FN3. In order to decide this appeal, we consider some documents that were developed through NEPA procedures, the same procedures that are the subject of claims that were dismissed without prejudice. Considering only the claims before us, we must assume that NEPA procedures were followed properly. However, we need not and do not decide whether the Service complied with NEPA.
The APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706, governs judicial review of agency action. We may set aside an agency's action only if it is " 'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.' " United States v. Snoring Relief Labs Inc., 210 F.3d 1081, 1085 (9th Cir.2000) (quoting 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A)).
As an initial matter, the parties disagree about how much deference we owe to the Service's decision to permit the Project. Plaintiffs challenge the Service's interpretation of its own statutory mandate. Under United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221, 121 S.Ct. 2164, 150 L.Ed.2d 292 (2001), we must first assess whether the permit is the type of agency decision that Congress intended to "carry the force of law." If so, we owe Chevron [FN4] deference to the agency's interpretation.
FN4. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984).
In Mead, the Court concluded that a letter ruling issued by the Customs Service, interpreting a regulation defining the appropriate category for a certain type of goods, did not warrant Chevron deference. The Court explained that deference lies on a continuum based on the nature of the agency's action. At one end of that continuum, Chevron deference applies when Congress has delegated to the agency authority "generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and ... the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority." Mead, 533 U.S. at 226- 27, 121 S.Ct. 2164. For example, the highest deference applies to actions that are the result of "express congressional authorizations to engage in the process of rulemaking or adjudication that produces regulations or rulings for which deference is claimed." Id. at 229, 121 S.Ct. 2164. At the other end of the continuum, an agency interpretation "advanced for the first time in a litigation brief" is due almost no deference at all. Id. at 228, 121 S.Ct. 2164 (citing Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212-13, 109 S.Ct. 468, 102 L.Ed.2d 493 (1988)).
Congressional delegation of authority "may be shown in a variety of ways." Id. at 227, 121 S.Ct. 2164. "Congress contemplates administrative action with the effect of law when it provides for a relatively formal administrative procedure tending to foster the fairness and deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement of such force." Id. at 230, 121 S.Ct. 2164. Although notice-and-comment rulemaking is a good indicator that Chevron deference is warranted, the absence of notice-and-comment rule- making does not foreclose the application of Chevron deference. Id. at 230-31, 121 S.Ct. 2164; Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 122 S.Ct. 1265, 1271-72, 152 L.Ed.2d 330 (2002).
As the Court itself recognized, "the limit of Chevron deference is not marked by a hard-edged rule." Mead, 533 U.S. at 237 n. 18, 121 S.Ct. 2164. After Mead, we are certain of only two things about the continuum of deference owed to agency decisions: Chevron provides an example of when Chevron deference applies, and Mead provides an example of when it does not. Id. In those "other, perhaps harder, cases" that do not clearly track either Chevron or Mead, we must "make reasoned choices between the two examples, the way courts have always done." Id.
Reasoning through the criteria for determining the level of deference applicable to agency action, we conclude that Chevron deference applies to the Service's decision to permit the Project. First, Congress unquestionably delegated to the Service the authority to manage the Kenai Wilderness, including the authority to issue regulations permitting compatible uses within the Refuge. 16 U.S.C. §§ 668dd(d)(1)(A), 1133(b), 3124. Second, the permit was issued after the public had an opportunity to comment on the EA prepared for the Project. Third, the decision to permit the Project is consistent with the Service's Final Plan for the Refuge, which itself is undoubtedly owed Chevron deference. The Final Plan is analogous to a rule; Congress expressly mandated its preparation, and the Service had to comply with notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures in preparing the Plan. ANILCA § 304(g)(1). Finally, the permit was issued after NEPA procedures were followed. Although the permit is not a rule, NEPA provides a "relatively formal administrative procedure tending to foster ... fairness and deliberation." Mead, 533 U.S. at 230, 121 S.Ct. 2164.
Even if we were convinced that the permit is more analogous to the letter in Mead, the Service's decision still would merit respect. [FN5] "[A]n agency's interpretation may merit some deference whatever its form," id. at 235, 121 S.Ct. 2164, depending on a number of factors that imbue the interpretation with the " 'power to persuade,' " id. at 228, 121 S.Ct. 2164 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944)). Under Skidmore, the Service's decision still would warrant respect because of its persuasiveness. The Service has considered the issue thoroughly. Its reasoning is not unsound. The Service had adequate information to permit the Project to operate at its current level, consistent with its operation since 1974. Even if we were to conclude that the Service's decision was "beyond the Chevron pale," we nevertheless would respect the decision because it has the "power to persuade" as defined in Skidmore. Mead, 533 U.S. at 234-35, 121 S.Ct. 2164; see Pronsolino v. Nastri, 291 F.3d 1123, 1135 (9th Cir.2002) (concluding that "[i]n the end, though, it does not much matter in this case whether we review the EPA's position through the Chevron or Skidmore/Mead prism. Under both the more and less rigorous versions of the judicial review standard, the Agency's position is ... more than sufficiently supported by the statutory materials.").
FN5. Like the letter in Mead, arguably the permit binds only the parties and thus does not have the general "force of law." The Service has permitted the CIAA to conduct the enhancement operation. Another organization seeking to perform the same type of project could not, for example, simply point at the Project on Tustumena Lake and begin its own egg-take operation on a nearby creek. Nonetheless, the permit does bind third parties in other ways. For example, a Refuge visitor could not insist that the weir be moved so that she could use its location for recreational fishing.
Having held that Chevron establishes the appropriate level of deference, we turn to the familiar two-step analysis that the Supreme Court prescribes: (1) If the statute is unambiguous and the intent of Congress is clear, we--and the Service--must give effect to that unambiguous intent; but (2) if the statute is ambiguous, Congress implicitly has left a gap for the Service to fill. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842, 104 S.Ct. 2778. "In such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency." Id. at 844, 104 S.Ct. 2778.
Second, it is not obvious how an agency must protect and manage an area "so as to preserve its natural conditions." In general, the term "natural" means wild, formed by nature, and not artificially made. See Black's Law Dictionary 1026 (6th ed. 1990). However, there are two plausible inferences to be drawn from the quoted phrase in this context. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132, 120 S.Ct. 1291, 146 L.Ed.2d 121 (2000) ("The meaning--or ambiguity--of certain words or phrases may only become evident when placed in context."). On the one hand, to preserve the "natural conditions" of the Refuge could mean protecting against the introduction of artificial propagation programs, like the Project, that alter the natural ecological processes within the Refuge. On the other hand, to preserve the "natural conditions" of the Refuge could mean preserving the natural ecological processes as they would exist in their wild state, in the absence of artificial disturbance from outside the wilderness area.
Indeed, the definition's use of the phrase "protected and managed" highlights this ambiguity. "Management" suggests affirmative steps taken to maintain wilderness character, while "protection" suggests a more hands-off approach. Compare Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 1372 (unabridged ed. 1993) (defining "manage" as "to adjust the ecological factors to best meet the needs and ensure the survival of (a wild animal) usu. by controlling predators and hunting and by providing shelter or supplementary food supplies"), with id. at 1822 (defining "protect" as "to cover or shield from that which would injure, destroy, or detrimentally affect"). If "natural conditions" may be preserved only through a program of strict nonintervention, what is the purpose of the word "managed" in the definition? See City of Los Angeles v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 307 F.3d 859, 870 (9th Cir.2002) (stating that it is " 'a cardinal principle of statutory construction that a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant' " (quoting TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 122 S.Ct. 441, 448, 151 L.Ed.2d 339 (2001))). If strict nonintervention was Congress' intent, the word "protect" would have sufficed.
We are particularly persuaded by the fact that the Final Plan for the Refuge supports the Service's decision to permit the Project. The Project addresses one of the most significant problems identified by the Final Plan-- commercial fishing outside the Refuge. The Final Plan determines that a reduced salmon population within the Refuge, caused by commercial fishing outside the Refuge, endangers the viability of other species and the aquatic fertility of waters within the Refuge. Brown bears, bald eagles, and other wildlife rely on the salmon runs for their very existence. After more than 25 years of the Project's enhancements, the ecosystem may have come to depend on the "supplemental" fish that the Project provides.
The Refuge Act tells the Service to permit only those uses within the Refuge that "are compatible with the major purposes" for which the area was established. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(d)(1)(A). Congress has clearly delegated to the Secretary the authority to determine whether a use is "compatible" with those purposes. Id. ("The Secretary is authorized, under such regulations as he may prescribe, to ... permit the use of any area within the System for any purpose ... whenever he determines that such uses are compatible with the major purposes for which such areas were established." (emphasis added)). The definition of "compatible use" similarly confers broad discretion: " 'compatible use' means a wildlife-dependent recreational use or any other use of a refuge that, in the sound professional judgment of the Director, will not materially interfere with or detract from the ... purposes of the refuge." 16 U.S.C. § 668ee(1) (emphasis added). [FN6]
FN6. In 1997, Congress amended the Refuge Act to include this definition within the statutory scheme. Before 1997, the Refuge Manual defined the term in substantially the same way. The 1997 amendments affirm that Congress intended "compatible" to mean what the Service said it meant at the time the Project was permitted. Further, the 1997 amendments persuade us that Congress intended such compatibility determinations to be within the Service's "sound professional judgment."
Plaintiffs argue that the Project is incompatible with the first stated purpose of the Refuge: to "conserve fish and wildlife populations and habitats in their natural diversity." ANILCA § 303(4)(B)(i). [FN7] The Service defines "natural diversity" to mean the "number and relative abundance of native species which would occur without human interference." Final Plan at 174.
FN7. ANILCA lists the purposes of the Refuge:
The purposes for which the Kenai National Wildlife Refuge is established and shall be managed, include--
(i) to conserve fish and wildlife populations and habitats in their natural
diversity including, but not limited to, moose, bears, mountain goats, Dall sheep, wolves and other furbearers, salmonoids and other fish, waterfowl and other migratory and nonmigratory birds;
• One purpose of the Act is the "conservation of fish ..., including species that are threatened with extinction." 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(1).
• The mission of the [National Wildlife Refuge] System is "to administer a national network of lands and waters for the conservation, management, and where appropriate, restoration of the fish, wildlife, and plant resources and their habitats...." Id. § 668dd(a)(2) (emphasis added).
• The System must be administered not only to "provide for the conservation of fish," but also to "ensure that the biological integrity, diversity, and environmental health of the System are maintained." Id. § 668dd(a)(4).
It is the intent of Congress in this Act ... to provide for the maintenance of sound populations of, and habitat for, wildlife species of inestimable value to the citizens of Alaska and the Nation ... and to preserve wilderness resource values and related recreational opportunities including but not limited to ... fishing ....
• Congress intends for "compatibility" determinations to be made by the Service, using "sound professional judgment";
• "Compatible uses" are uses that do not materially interfere with the purposes of a refuge;
• Congress views Alaska as unique and intends Alaska-specific laws to trump more general laws in some instances;
• Congress contemplates that management of both refuges and wilderness areas in Alaska can include fishery enhancement;
• Congress has as one of its goals the restoration of fish production in Alaska "to optimum sustained yield levels," including "enhancement" and "rehabilitation" activities;
• Congress intends to ensure that fish populations in Alaska remain adequate to sustain at least subsistence uses and also some recreational uses; and
• Congress intends more generally to prevent the extinction of species of fish and, where "appropriate," to permit restoration of fish resources.
The majority holds that, because the relevant provisions of the Wilderness Act and the Refuge Act are "materially ambiguous," we are required to accord Chevron deference to USFS's decision to allow the Tustumena Lake salmon enhancement project to go forward in the Kenai National Wildlife Refuge. Because the majority's ambiguity analysis is deeply flawed, and seeks to hold the English language to an unattainable standard of clarity--particularly in the statutory context--I respectfully dissent.
Before launching into the nuts and bolts of statutory analysis, it is useful to begin with an overview of the three main statutes at issue--the Wilderness Act, the National Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act ("Refuge Act"), and the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act ("ANILCA")--and how they interact in the Kenai Refuge. Enacted in 1964, the Wilderness Act sets forth this statement of purpose:
The Refuge Act, originally enacted in 1966 and amended in 1997, established the National Wildlife Refuge System as a centralized mechanism for administering "all lands, waters, and interests[ ] administered by the Secretary as wildlife refuges, areas for the protection and conservation of fish and wildlife that are threatened with extinction, wildlife ranges, game ranges, wildlife management areas, or waterfowl production areas." 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(1). "The mission of the System is to administer a national network of lands and waters for the conservation, management, and where appropriate, restoration of the fish, wildlife, and plant resources and their habitats within the United States for the benefit of present and future generations of Americans." Id., § 668dd(a)(2). In contrast to the Wilderness Act, the Refuge Act contemplates more extensive non-preservation use of lands designated as wildlife refuges:
With respect to the System, it is the policy of the United States that--
President Carter signed ANILCA into law in 1980 for the purpose of "preserv [ing] for the benefit, use, education, and inspiration of present and future generations certain lands and waters in the State of Alaska that contain nationally significant natural, scenic, historic, archeological, geological, scientific, wilderness, cultural, recreational, and wildlife values." 16 U.S.C. § 3101(a). The next subsection explains Congress's intent as follows:
It is the intent of Congress in this Act to preserve unrivaled scenic and geological values associated with natural landscapes; to provide for the maintenance of sound populations of, and habitat for, wildlife species of inestimable value to the citizens of Alaska and the Nation, including those species dependent on vast relatively undeveloped areas; to preserve in their natural state extensive unaltered arctic tundra, boreal forest, and coastal rainforest ecosystems; to protect the resources related to subsistence needs; to protect and preserve historic and archeological sites, rivers, and lands, and to preserve wilderness resource values and related recreational opportunities including but not limited to hiking, canoeing, fishing, and sport hunting, within large arctic and subarctic wildlands and on freeflowing rivers; and to maintain opportunities for scientific research and undisturbed ecosystems. 16 U.S.C. § 3101(b); see also id. § 3101(c) (setting forth statutory intent "to provide the opportunity for rural residents engaged in a subsistence way of life to continue to do so").
All three statutes apply to the Kenai Refuge. The ultimate question, then, is this: Taking into account the boundaries established by the three sets of statutory mandates, does the Tustumena Lake commercial salmon enhancement project fall within those boundaries? Even if the project arguably falls within the range of activity permitted under the Refuge Act and ANILCA--a point I do not concede--it is clearly barred by the Wilderness Act.
These "tools of construction require us first to engage in a textual analysis of the relevant statutory provisions and to read the words of a statute 'in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.' " Student Loan Fund of Idaho, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Educ., 272 F.3d 1155, 1165 (9th Cir.2001) (quoting Rucker v. Davis, 237 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc), overruled on other grounds by Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 122 S.Ct. 1230, 152 L.Ed.2d 258 (2002)). In other words, we read the statute "as a whole, giving effect to each word and making every effort not to interpret a provision in a manner that renders other provisions of the same statute inconsistent, meaningless or superfluous." Boise Cascade Corp. v. EPA, 942 F.2d 1427, 1432 (9th Cir.1991). A "fundamental canon of statutory construction is that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning." United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir.1998) (quoting Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42, 100 S.Ct. 311, 62 L.Ed.2d 199 (1979)). Where such words are defined, "[a] definition which declares what a term 'means' ... excludes any meaning that is not stated." Smith, 155 F.3d at 1057 (internal citations omitted). When an agency's interpretation of a statute is in conflict with the plain language of the statute, we do not defer to the agency's interpretation. Downey v. Crabtree, 100 F.3d 662, 666 (9th Cir.1996).
The language at issue in the Wilderness Act is not ambiguous unless we find ambiguity simply because the entire English language contains inherent ambiguity. In fact, as statutes go, the Wilderness Act is remarkably explicit. The Act provides that USFW "shall be responsible for preserving the wilderness character of the area and shall so administer such area for such other purposes for which it may have been established as also to preserve its wilderness character." 16 U.S.C. § 1133(b). As defined in the Act, the Wilderness Area must be "protected and managed so as to preserve its natural conditions." § 1131(c). Black's Law Dictionary defines "natural" as "[u]ntouched by man or by influence of civilization; wild; untutored, and is the opposite of the word 'artificial.' The juristic meaning of this term does not differ from the vernacular...." Id. at 1026 (6th ed. 1990); "Existing in or formed by nature; not artificially made or constructed; not manufactured or processed ..." 2 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 1889 (1993 edition). These definitions comport fully with our everyday understanding of the term "natural."
In numerous documents USFW itself recognizes the tension between the mandate of the Wilderness Act and the Project. In its "Compatibility Determination," USFW observed that "[w]ilderness resources will be affected by this project .... The project's potentially biggest intrusion of wilderness management principles is its failure [to] allow natural processes to dominate." Similarly, a USFW "Briefing Statement" prepared by the Alaska Regional Director, states that the Lake's value as a "natural system" is "compromised" by the "artificial enhancement," noting that the Project's activities, including construction of temporary facilities, stocking of fry, and potential alteration of natural fish stocks, "may ... violate the intent and purpose of the Wilderness Act ..." The risks associated with the introduction of hatchery salmon into populations of natural salmon are well understood by the scientific community, [FN1] not to mention within government. [FN2]
FN1. Plaintiffs cite a number of articles discussing the risks to wild fish posed by hatchery projects. See Jack Sterne, Supplementation of Wild Salmon Stocks: A Cure for the Hatchery Problem or More Problem Hatcheries?, 23 Coastal Management 123, 126-29 (1995) and sources cited therein.
FN2. As mentioned in Alsea Valley Alliance v. Evans, 161 F.Supp.2d 1154, 1158 (D.Or.2001) (holding that NMFS decision to list only natural spawning coho salmon as "threatened" was arbitrary and capricious, and thus invalid), the NMFS's "Hatchery Policy" discusses the issues surrounding artificial propagation and the potential effects of interaction with natural salmon runs. 58 Fed. Reg. 17,573. In part, the Policy states:
Because there is ... considerable uncertainty about artificial propagation as a means to increase natural salmon populations, and because artificial propagation may have profound consequences for the viability of natural salmon populations, consideration of its use should be based on an objective assessment of genetic and ecological risks, balancing the potential for deleterious effects against risk to the population ... if artificial propagation is not implemented.
Genetic problems that may arise through artificial propagation are of three general types. First, taking wild broodstock may contribute directly to the decline of the natural population.... Second, ... artificial propagation can substantially reduce genetic differences between populations.... Finally, adaptation to hatchery conditions can lead to domestication during artificial propagation....
Artificial propagation may also pose a variety of ecological risks to
salmon populations. These risks include increased competition and predation, displacement of natural fish, altered migratory and spawning behavior, and disease transfer.
The majority's claim not to understand what "permanent" means is also a red herring in this context. No one disputes that the fishery project effectuates an annual, ongoing alteration of the natural ecological balance in Kenai by removing salmon eggs and reintroducing large numbers of hatchery- raised fry to Bear Creek. The entire purpose of the project is to create a lasting alteration in the number and type of salmon present in Cook Inlet and, perforce, Bear Creek in Kenai. See, e.g., Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 1683 (1993 ed.) (defining "permanent" as "continuing or enduring (as in the same state, status, place) without fundamental or marked change: not subject to fluctuation or alteration: fixed or intended to be fixed: LASTING, STABLE"); Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989, online version) (definition 1a of "permanent": "Continuing or designed to continue indefinitely without change; abiding, lasting, enduring; persistent. Opposed to temporary.").
Again, there is no ambiguity here. As discussed above, the egg harvesting and fry return all unquestionably occur within the boundaries of the Kenai Refuge. And the record reflects that enhancement of commercial fishing stock in Cook Inlet is the sole purpose for the program at issue. Under the Wilderness Act, "[e]xcept as specifically provided for in this chapter, ... there shall be no commercial enterprise and no permanent road within any wilderness area designated by this chapter ..." 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c); see Alaska Wildlife Alliance v. Jensen, 108 F.3d 1065, 1069 (9th Cir.1997) (holding that Wilderness Act prohibits commercial fishing in wilderness areas of the Glacier Bay National Park).
Black's Law Dictionary defines "commercial," somewhat tautologically, as "[r]elates to or is connected with trade and traffic or commerce in general; is occupied with business or commerce." Id. at 270. Webster's defines "commercial" as "1.a. [o]f or relating to commerce, b. [e]ngaged in commerce, c. [i]nvolved in work designed or planned for the mass market." Second New Riverside University Dictionary 286 (1988). While true, as defendant notes, that courts have struggled with different understandings of the term "commercial" in different contexts and with regard to different statutes, [FN3] in the context of the Wilderness Act, the term is relatively straightforward--activities purposefully oriented toward industry and commerce are prohibited, unless otherwise excepted, in the Wilderness Area.
FN3. In most instances, such cases discuss statutes directly related to tax and commerce. See, e.g., Portland Golf Club v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 497 U.S. 154, 161, 110 S.Ct. 2780, 111 L.Ed.2d 126 (1990) (contrasting "commercial" with "tax-exempt"); Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 612, 112 S.Ct. 2160, 119 L.Ed.2d 394 (1992) (interpreting "commercial" in context of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d)). We are dealing here with an environmental statute, with respect to which the term "commercial" should be interpreted by its plain, common sense meaning.
Here, defendant concedes that over eighty percent of the fish produced from the Project are harvested by commercial fishermen, to the tune of approximately $1.6 million annually on average. Although it is true that CIAA has non-profit status, that a general, though limited, public benefit is conferred by CIAA's release of the hatchery salmon (in terms of sport fishing and general salmon enhancement), and that the State of Alaska closely regulates CIAA's activities, these facts do not change the underlying reality that the CIAA operates primarily as a vehicle to enhance the commercial salmon fishing industry--the industry whose success is the condition precedent for the organization's continued existence. Dedication and Everlasting Love to Animals v. Humane Soc. of U.S., Inc., 50 F.3d 710, 713 (9th Cir.1995) ("A nonprofit organization ... may engage in commercial activity").
What is truly extraordinary here is that, despite the majority's purported inability to understand what terms like "wilderness," "natural," and "permanent" mean, the majority nonetheless maintains such a firm grasp on the meaning of the word "manage" as to read into it an entire swath of regulatory activity flatly incompatible with the statute. The majority sets up a straw man of "strict nonintervention"--an approach to wilderness management and protection that no one in this case has advanced--and claims that the term "natural" must be ambiguous because it could encompass that definition. This argument is specious.
The Refuge Act allows USFW to "permit the use of any area within the [National Wildlife Refuge] System for any purpose, ... whenever [the Secretary] determines that such uses are compatible with the major purposes for which such areas were established." 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(d)(1)(A); Wilderness Soc'y v. Babbitt, 5 F.3d 383, 388 (9th Cir.1993) (noting "compatibility" standard). "The term 'compatible use' means a wildlife-dependent recreational use or any other use of a refuge that, in the sound professional judgment of the Director, will not materially interfere with or detract from the fulfillment of the mission of the System or the purposes of the refuge." 16 U.S.C. § 668ee(1).
One purpose of the Kenai Refuge is to "conserve fish and wildlife populations and habitats in their natural diversity." ANILCA § 303(4), 94 Stat. 2391 (1980). USFW has defined "natural diversity" to mean the "number and relative abundance of indigenous species which would occur without human interference." Kenai National Wildlife Refuge Final Comprehensive Conservation Plan. The parties dispute the meanings of these definitions. [FN4]
FN4. USFW recently adopted a regulation that the agency "may only authorize public or private economic use of the natural resources of any national wildlife refuge, in accordance with 16 U.S.C. § 715s, where we determine that the use contributes to the achievement of the national wildlife refuge purposes or the National Wildlife Refuge System mission." 65 Fed. Reg. 62458 (Oct. 18, 2000), codified at 50 C.F.R. § 29.1 (emphasis added). Though this regulation specifically refers to compatibility determinations under another provision of the Refuge Act, as defendant notes, it is not irrelevant to observe the agency's continued concern for limiting economic activity in wilderness areas.
It is simply impossible to avoid the conclusion that the Project conflicts with USFW's understood mandate to preserve natural diversity, since the number and abundance of indigenous species is directly altered by the enhancement project, changing significantly the "natural diversity" that exists "without human interference." Coupled with USFW's admission that "the project ... cannot be considered as supporting Refuge purposes" ("Compatibility Determination"), it is clear that the Project cannot possibly be reconciled with the purposes of the Refuge Act. [FN5]
FN5. Defendant's reliance upon the decision in Alaska Wildlife Alliance v. Jensen, 108 F.3d 1065, 1070 (9th Cir.1997), where the court determined, inter alia, that allowing commercial fishing in non-wilderness areas of the national park did not conflict with the directive to conserve fish and wildlife, is misplaced. No hatchery fish were introduced and no depletion of natural fish runs was involved.
Thus, even if the majority is correct that the language of the Wilderness Act contains some ambiguities--a point that I do not concede--the ambiguities are immaterial as applied to the facts of this case. Keep in mind the nature of the salmon fishery project: Each summer, approximately ten million salmon eggs are removed from Bear Creek, within Kenai. The eggs are incubated outside of the wilderness area, and then, the following spring, approximately six million fry are released into the mouth of Bear Creek, also within Kenai. The project is, in its own terms, a "commercial enhancement project"--its purpose, in short, is to increase the number of salmon available to be fished by commercial fishermen. Even if the terms "wilderness," "natural," or "within" contain some ambiguity, then, the introduction of large numbers of salmon fry into Bear Creek in order to enhance the salmon stock for commercial fishing is simply not "preserving the natural ecological processes as they would exist in their wild state" under--any interpretation.
In the meanwhile, USFS has not developed any sort of record as to what the "natural" wild salmon population was or is in Kenai prior to the commercial fishery project, and what the competition among species there is and was. Currently, nothing in the record suggests that the species was diminished or in danger--only that it could be enhanced for commercial purposes. Based on the statutes we now have in place, these commercial enhancement activities directly contravene Congress's mandates in the Wilderness and Refuge Acts, and allow commercial interests to trump the preservation of the wilderness conditions in the Kenai Wilderness Area. I cannot acquiesce in this result or in its reasoning. I therefore dissent.