Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/783/1132/41795/
Timestamp: 2020-06-03 04:15:30
Document Index: 265933876

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 660', '§ 660', '§ 659', '§ 660', '§ 2117', '§ 660', '§ 894']

United States of America, Appellee, v. Frederick Martin Price, Appellant, 783 F.2d 1132 (4th Cir. 1986) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Fourth Circuit › 1986 › United States of America, Appellee, v. Frederick Martin Price, Appellant
United States of America, Appellee, v. Frederick Martin Price, Appellant, 783 F.2d 1132 (4th Cir. 1986)
US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit - 783 F.2d 1132 (4th Cir. 1986) Argued May 10, 1985. Decided Feb. 21, 1986
This is an appeal from a conviction for conversion of the property of a common carrier used in interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 660. Frederick Martin Price was charged in a three count indictment with theft from an interstate shipment, converting the property of a common carrier, and breaking and entering carrier facilities following an alleged attempted sale of a truckload of meat in August of 1983. A confidential informant of the Drug Enforcement Administration played a role in the events leading to Price's arrest. Prior to trial, Price sought disclosure of the identity of the informant. The district court denied Price's motion without a hearing. A bench trial was held in March 1983, and Price was found guilty of conversion on count two. Price now appeals arguing (1) that the district court erred in refusing to compel the disclosure of the identity of the confidential informant, (2) that insufficient evidence was presented at trial to establish that the trailer and its contents belonged to Apple Lines, a common carrier, to support a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 660, and (3) that there was insufficient evidence of conversion. Finding merit to Price's first argument, we reverse and remand the case for a new trial.
Price was indicted on August 16, 1983 by a federal grand jury for the alleged attempted sale. The three count indictment charged him with theft from an interstate shipment, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 659; converting the property of a common carrier used in interstate commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 660; and breaking and entering carrier facilities, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2117. Price was arraigned on August 30, 1983; he entered a plea of not guilty on all counts.
On September 12, 1983, Price filed a motion to compel disclosure of the identity of the DEA informant. The government opposed the motion, and on February 17, 1984, the district court denied the motion without a hearing. Under this circuit's rule that disclosure of an informant is required when the informant is a "participant" in the event and not required when the informant is a "mere tipster," McLawhorn v. North Carolina, 484 F.2d 1, 5 (4th Cir. 1973), the district court found that " [d]isclosure is not required in this instance because [the] informant ... was merely a tipster who led to the eventual contact between the FBI agents and the defendant." (JA 13).
In Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 77 S. Ct. 623, 1 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1957), the Supreme Court recognized the "informer's privilege." According to the Court:
Id. at 60, 77 S. Ct. at 627 (citations omitted). While an informant's identity will often be privileged from disclosure, there are limits to the scope of that privilege arising from
Id. at 60-61, 77 S. Ct. at 627-628 (footnotes omitted). The Court determined that "no fixed rule with respect to disclosure is justifiable." Id. at 62, 77 S. Ct. at 628. Rather,
Id. The Court found that the charge against Roviaro, "when viewed in connection with the evidence introduced at the trial, is so closely related to [the informant] as to make his identity and testimony highly material." As the Court explained, " [t]he circumstances of this case demonstrate that [the informant's] possible testimony was highly relevant and might have been helpful to the defense." Id. at 63-64, 77 S. Ct. at 629. The defendant's ability to cross-examine the police officers involved was
Id. at 64, 77 S. Ct. at 629. The Court believed that the government's use at trial of the defendant's conversation with the informant
Id. The Court reversed the conviction and remanded the case to the district court. Id. at 66, 77 S. Ct. at 630.
In applying Roviaro, this court has drawn a distinction between informants who are "participants" in a criminal transaction, and those who are "mere tipsters." United States v. Brinkman, 739 F.2d 977, 981 (4th Cir. 1984); McLawhorn v. State of North Carolina, 484 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1973). In McLawhorn we held that
Id. at 5 (citations omitted); accord United States v. Barnes, 486 F.2d 776, 778-79 (8th Cir. 1973). We emphasized that
In the case at bar, the government argues that disclosure of the informant's identity was not required because the informant was "barely more than a mere tipster." Appellees' Brief at 12. However, the informant in this case did much more than tip off the government regarding Price's alleged desire to sell his rig. The informant set up the deal. He was a necessary party to the telephone negotiations which led to the attempted sale. It was in the course of the phone call that the informant communicated the alleged offer of sale to the agent, an unidentified person alleged to be Price named his price and both sides, through the informant, agreed. The informant was clearly an "active participant" in this episode under McLawhorn. Further, because agent Nelson did not know the identity of the alleged trucker during the phone conversation, the informant and his partner8 are the only witnesses who can testify as to whether Price was, in fact, the party to the negotiations. Cf. Rovario, 353 U.S. at 54, 77 S. Ct. at 624. The government's failure to present evidence linking Price to the telephone negotiations is particularly troublesome in light of the fact that Weaver, a disinterested witness, corroborated Price's testimony that he could not have been at Rip's at the time the call was made.
In Gaines v. Hess, 662 F.2d 1364 (10th Cir. 1981), for example, the court found that the trial court's refusal to compel disclosure of the identity of an informant who set up a drug sale and was a material witness to the sale would violate the defendant's due process rights "if in fact the informant could provide potentially significant exculpatory testimony." Id. at 1368. The Tenth Circuit remanded Gaines for an in camera hearing to determine "whether the informant's testimony would lend significant credence to [the defendant's] defense." Id. at 1369. If the district court found that the informant would make an exculpatory witness, the state would be required to retry the defendant with the informant present or release the defendant from custody. Id. See also United States v. Freund, 525 F.2d 873, 877-78 (5th Cir. 1976) (remanding case for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Rovario required disclosure where the informant was simply a witness to an alleged improper search). In United States v. Barnes, supra, the Eighth Circuit remanded the case to the district court for an evidentiary hearing on the question of whether the defendant had been prejudiced by the government's refusal to disclose the informant's identity. Having determined from the record that the failure to disclose was in error, the Barnes court did not suggest that the district court conduct an in camera hearing. Rather, the informant was to be examined with the defendant and counsel present. 486 F.2d at 780-81.
As the Fifth Circuit recognized in Freund, the propriety of remanding a case for an evidentiary hearing depends on the particular circumstances of the case. " [T]here will be circumstances in which an in camera hearing is either unnecessary or insufficient to protect the defendant's rights." 525 F.2d at 878; see also Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 88 S. Ct. 748, 19 L. Ed. 2d 956 (1968) (conviction reversed without remand for a hearing where trial court refused to allow defense counsel to question informant as to his real name and address). The case at bar bears important similarities to Rovario and McLawhorn, making remand for an evidentiary hearing both unnecessary and inappropriate in light of those authorities. In this case, as in Rovario and McLawhorn, the informant set up the criminal transaction. In all three cases, the informant was a material witness who could testify to the defendant's knowing participation in the crime. In Rovario, as here, a government agent overheard a conversation between the informant and a person alleged to be the defendant, and testified about the conversation at trial. The Supreme Court found that such testimony "particularly emphasiz [ed] the unfairness of nondisclosure" in Rovario. 153 U.S. at 64, 77 S. Ct. at 629.9 In McLawhorn, as in this case, the defendant wished to present evidence of entrapment perpetrated by the informant.
The cornerstone of the majority's opinion is Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 77 S. Ct. 623, 1 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1957), in which the Supreme Court held that, based on the facts of that case, disclosure of an informer's identity was required by fundamental notions of fairness. In reaching its conclusion, the majority also relies heavily on McLawhorn v. State of North Carolina, 484 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1973), a decision by this court requiring disclosure of an informant's identity "where the informant is an actual participant (in the crime), particularly where he helps set up the criminal occurrence...." Id. at 5. Roviaro and McLawhorn are, however, distinguishable from the case at hand.
In Roviaro, the Supreme Court noted that the purpose behind the privilege of nondisclosure is the furtherance and protection of the public interest in effective law enforcement. 353 U.S. at 59, 77 S. Ct. at 627. The Court noted that this privilege is limited. Id. at 60, 77 S. Ct. at 627. However, the Court refused to articulate a fixed rule defining when disclosure is justifiable. Id. at 62, 77 S. Ct. at 629. Instead, the Court stated that a balancing test must be performed--the public interest in protecting the flow of information balanced against an individual's right to prepare his defense. Id. Factors to be weighed included consideration of the crime charged, possible defenses, the possible significance of the informer's testimony and "other relevant factors." Id.
The facts of Roviaro compelled the tipping of the scales in favor of disclosure. The defendant in that case was accused of knowingly and fraudulently receiving, concealing, buying and facilitating the transportation and concealment of heroin with the knowledge that the drug was unlawfully imported into the United States. 353 U.S. at 54, 77 S. Ct. at 624. The testimony of the confidential informant in Roviaro would be directly related to these charges because the informant had helped to set up the criminal occurrence and played a prominent part in it. 353 U.S. at 64, 77 S. Ct. at 629. The informant's testimony might have cast doubt upon the identity of the defendant or the package of drugs he was accused of transporting. Furthermore, the informant was the only witness who might have testified to the defendant's possible lack of knowledge of the contents of the drug package he transported to the informer's car. Id. Finally, the informant was the only person, other than the defendant himself, who could controvert, explain or amplify the report of a police officer who eavesdropped on a conversation between the defendant and the informant in which the accused directed the informant to the site of the drug pickup. Id. The officer, hidden in the trunk of the informant's car, reported that he had observed the defendant exit from the car, walk to a tree, pick up a package, return to the car, deposit the package and had heard the defendant advise the informant that he would call him in a couple of days. 353 U.S. at 57, 77 S. Ct. at 626. The informant's testimony in Roviaro was thus material and highly relevant.
The facts in this case are much more analogous to those found in our recent decision of United States v. Brinkman, 739 F.2d 977 (4th Cir. 1984). In Brinkman we held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the disclosure of the identity and location of a government informant. Id. at 981. Brinkman was convicted of violating the Extortionate Credit Transaction Act,1 and the Interstate Travel Act.2 His problems with the law stemmed from an unhappy business venture with Manual Kane. Id. The F.B.I. learned that Brinkman wished to hire a hit man to beat up Kane. Id. at 979. Agents arranged for a confidential informant to meet Brinkman. The informant introduced Brinkman to an undercover agent who was described as a hitman. Id. Brinkman told the agent where to find Kane and how to beat him to ensure payment of an alleged $5,000 debt. The agent later notified Brinkman that he had collected the debt. Brinkman was arrested after attempting to pay the "hitman" for his services. Id.
Price does not cite Brinkman in his brief. The majority acknowledges the existence of the decision in footnote six but does not attempt to distinguish the case. I believe Brinkman is on point and controlling. Critics may assert that the present case is distinguishable because entrapment and duress are alleged here but were not issues in the Brinkman case. However, this is a distinction without a difference. Price has merely baldly asserted that he was entrapped. More than mere allegations must be forthcoming to force the release of a confidential informant's name. See United States v. Smith, 780 F.2d 1102, 1107 (4th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (court requires more than mere speculation on usefulness of disclosure of informant's identity). Otherwise, the privilege of confidentiality would be lost automatically upon the inclusion of certain statements in a complaint.
As they drove, Rovario asked the informant about money the latter owed him and told the informant he had brought "three pieces this time." Rovario directed the informant where to drive, and told him where to stop. Once the car stopped, the officer watched from the trunk as Rovario walked to a tree and picked up a package. Rovario gave the package to the informant, saying "Here it is, "and "I'll call you in a couple of days." Id. at 56-57, 77 S. Ct. at 625-626
In Brinkman, we found that the informant in that case was "somewhere in between the role of a mere tipster and that of a participant in the offense." 739 F.2d at 981. The informant ha [d] had two important conversations with the defendant, had "established that [the defendant] wanted a hit man," and had introduced the defendant to government agents. However, the informant was not a party to the discussions which formed the "crux of the government's case." He "was not a witness or a participant in the crime with which the Defendant ha [d] been charged." Id. The district court found that under these circumstances, the government's interest in maintaining the informant's anonymity outweighed the defendant's interest in disclosure of the informant's identity. This court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion. Id
In light of our disposition of this issue, we need not reach the question of whether sufficient evidence was presented at trial to sustain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 660. We simply note, to aid the parties and the district court upon retrial, that the statute concerns conversion of the "moneys, funds, credits, securities, property, or assets" of a common carrier. To the extent the government wishes to establish conversion of the meat, as opposed to conversion of the tractor-trailer, the government must present evidence to show that the meat falls within the terms of the statute
18 U.S.C. § 894(a) (1)
It is within a trial court's discretion to determine whether the testimony of an informer is likely to be relevant to the trial of an accused. Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 61 n. 9, 77 S. Ct. at 628 n. 9; Brinkman, 739 F.2d at 980-81; United States v. Soles, 482 F.2d 105, 109 (2nd Cir. 1973). Furthermore, disclosure is not required unless the trial court determines that an informer's testimony is highly relevant. Smith, 780 F.2d 1102, 1107