Source: http://www.juricaf.org/arret/CONSEILDELEUROPE-COUREUROPEENNEDESDROITSDELHOMME-19780508-736176
Timestamp: 2016-12-11 04:51:45+00:00
Document Index: 204290856

Matched Legal Cases: ['arrêt ', "l'article 11", "l'article 7", "l'article 7", "l'article 11", "l'article 14", "l'article 11", "l'article 11", "l'article 11", "l'article 11", "l'article 11", "l'article 11", "l'article 11", "l'article 11", "l'article 27", "l'article 14", "l'article 14", "l'article 14", "l'article 14", "l'article 27"]

SYNDICAT X. c. BELGIQUE
Page d'accueil > Résultats de la recherche SYNDICAT X. c. BELGIQUE
Type d'affaire : DecisionType de recours : Exception préliminaire rejetée (disparition de l'objet du litige) ; Violation de l'Art. 3 ; Satisfaction équitable non appliquéeNumérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 7361/76Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1978-05-08;7361.76 Analyses : (Art. 14) DISCRIMINATION, (Art. 3) PEINE DEGRADANTE, (Art. 3) PEINE INHUMAINEParties : Demandeurs : SYNDICAT X.Défendeurs : BELGIQUETexte : APPLICATION/REQUETE NÂ° 7361/76 Trade Union X . v/BELGIUM ' Syndicat X . c/BELGIQUE ' DECISION of 8 May 1978 on the admissibility of the application DÃCISION du 8 mai 1978 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªt e
Artic% 11, paragraph 1 of the Convention : Article 11, paragraph 1, does not guarantee to trade unions or their members a particular kind of treatment by the State . It guarantees that trade unions should be heard and collective bargaining is only one of the means to, achieve thts . Artic%14 of the Convention, together with Article 11 of the Convention : Exclusion from collective bargaining of trade union organisations representing a particular sector constitutes a difference of treatment . However, the aim of ensuring a uniform state policy towards public service personnel is legitimate and, in this case, the disadvantage suffered by the applicant union is not disproportionate
paragraphe . 1, de la Convention : L'article 71, parag2phe 1 , :Article1, n Ã¢ssure ni aux syndicats ni Ã leurs membres un traitement prÃ©cis de la part de l'Etat . If garantit que les syndicats soient entendus et les nÃ©gociations collectives ne sont qu'un des moyens, parmi d'autres, d'y parvenir . Article 14 de la Convention, combinÃ© avec l'article 11 de la Convention : Le fait d'exclure des nÃ©gociations collectives les organfsations syndicales carÃ©gorielles constitue une diffÃ©rence de traitement . Toutefois, le but consistant Ã assurer l'unitÃ© de la politique de l'Etat Ã f'Ã©gard du personnel des services publics est lÃ©gitime et, en l'espÃ¨ce, le dÃ©savantage subi par le syndicat requÃ©rant n'est pas disproportionnÃ© .
Th e applicant trade union was represented before the Commission by Mr Pierre Henri, a barrister practisinp in Brussels .
Le svndicat requArant 6tan reprAsentA devant la Commission par Mâ¢ Pierre Henri, avocat ! Bruxelles . -q0-
(English : see p . 45 )
Le syndicat requÃ©rant vise Ã reprÃ©senter les agents et fonctionnaires de l'administration des finances . 1/ s'oblige B/a neutralitÃ© politique . La loi belge du 19 dÃ©cembre 1974, organisant les relations entre les autoritÃ©s publiques et les syndicats des agents relevant de ces autoritÃ©s, a crÃ©Ã© des comitÃ©s de nÃ©gociation seuls compÃ©tents pour nÃ©gocier avec les pouvoirs publics diverses rÃ©glementations de base . Pour pouvoir siÃ©ger dans ces comitÃ©s, les syndicats doivent Ã©tre reprÃ©sentatifs et, en particulier, dÃ©fendre les intÃ©rÃªts de toutes les catÃ©gories du personnel des services publics et Ãªtre affiliÃ©s Ã© une organlsation syndicale reprÃ©sentÃ©e au Conseil National du 7ravail . Or, selon le syndicat requÃ©rant, le Conseil National du Travail n'intÃ©resse que le secteur privÃ© et, d'autre part, les candidats ne peuvent, en fait, y Ãªtre prÃ©sentÃ©s que par des fÃ©dÃ©rations syndicales de caractÃ©re politique . En consÃ©quence, le syndicat requÃ©rant, qui invoque les articles 11 et 14 de la Convention, s'estime victime d'une discriminarion .
EN DROI T 1 . Le syndicat requÃ©rant met en cause la loi du 19 dÃ©cembre 1974 Â« organisant les relations entre les autoritÃ©s publiques et les syndicats des agents relevant de ces autoritÃ©s Â» . De par les dispositions de cette loi, il se verrait exclu de toute nÃ©gociation des rÃ©glementations de base ayant trait au statut administratif et pÃ©cuniaire, au rÃ©gime des pensions, aux relations avec les organisations syndicales et Ã l'organisation des services sociaux, car il ne satisfait pas Ã deux des quatre critÃ©res de reprÃ©sentativitÃ© Ã©noncÃ©s Ã l'article 7, paragraphe 2, de ladite loi . Le syndicat requÃ©rant se plaint notamment de ne pouvoir participer aux comitÃ©s de nÃ©gociation et ce pour deux raisons . D'une part, en vertu de ses statuts, il a pour objet de dÃ©fendre les intÃ©rÃ©ts du Personnel des Finances et non pas ceux de toutes les catÃ©gories du Personnel des services publics ; il s'ensuit qu'il ne rÃ©pond pas au deuxiÃ©me critÃ¨re Ã©noncÃ© par l'article 7, paragraphe 2, de la loi mise en cause . D'autre part, il prÃ©sente un caractÃ¨re apolitique, ce qui l'empÃªcherait de s'affilier Ã une organisation syndicale reprÃ©sentÃ©e au Conseil National du Travail ; il ne satisfait donc pas au troisiÃ¨me critÃ©re Ã©noncÃ© par ladite loi . 2 . Etant ainsi Ã©cartÃ© de la nÃ©gociation collective, le syndicat requÃ©rant estime ne pas se trouver en mesure de dÃ©fendre, dans le cadre de la loi, les intÃ©rÃ©ts de ses membres . Il allÃ©gue Ã cet Ã©gard la violation de l'article 11, paragraphe 1, de la Convention, considÃ©rant que la nÃ©gociation collectiv e
constitue un des Ã©lÃ©ments nÃ©cessairement inhÃ©rents Ã l'activitÃ© syndicale qui entre dans le domaine d'application de la disposition prÃ©citÃ©e . Le syndicat requÃ©rant considÃ©re, en outre, qu'il y a violation de l'article 14 de la Convention dans la mesure oÃ¹ la loi mise en cause opÃ¨re une distinction de traitement entre les diffÃ©rents syndicats assurant la dÃ©fense des intÃ©rÃ©ts d'une mÃªme catÃ©gorie de prestateurs de service .
Quant Ã l'article 11, paragraphe 1 de la Conventio n 3 . La Commission examinera, en premier lieu, si l'article 11, paragraphe 1, lequel reconnaÃ®t Ã toute personne Â« la libertÃ© d'association, y compris le droit de fonder avec d'autres des syndicats et de s'affilier Ã des syndicats pour la dÃ©fense de ses intÃ©rÃ©ts Â», garantit un droit Ã la nÃ©gociation collective . La Cour europÃ©enne des Droits de l'Homme, lors de l'examen des affaires syndicales dont elle a Ã©tÃ© saisie (voir ArrÃªt Affaire Â« Syndicat National de la Police belge Â» du 27 octobre 1975, ISÃ©rie A, Vol . 191et ArrÃªt Affaire Â« Syndicat suÃ©dois des conducteurs de locomotives Â» du 6 fÃ©vrier 1976, ISÃ©rie A, Vol . 2011 a jugÃ© que l'article 11, paragraphe 1 n'assure ni aux syndicats ni Ã leurs mÃ©mbres un traitement prÃ©cis de la part de l'Etat . La Convention protÃ©ge la libertÃ© de dÃ©fendre les intÃ©rÃ©ts professionnels des adhÃ©rents d'un syndicat par l'action collective de celui-ci . Il s'ensuit que pour dÃ©fendre leurs intÃ©rÃªts, les membres d'un syndicat ont droit Ã cÃ© que le syndicat Â« soit entendu Â», l'article 11, paragraphe 1, laissant cependant Ã chaque Etat le choix des moyens Ã employer Ã cette fin :Â« la consultation Â» ou Â« la conclusion de conventions collectives Â» constituent, l'une et l'autre, un de ces moyens . 4 . La Commission considÃ©re qu'il en va de mÃ©me de la nÃ©gociation collective . Celle-ci, au mÃªme titre que la consultation et la conclusion de-conventions collectives, constitue l'un des moyens qui peuvent Ãªtre choisis par les Elats pour permettre qu'un syndicat soit entendu . Il s'ensuit que l'article 11, paragraphe 1, ne garantit pas Ã un syndicat un droit spÃ©cifique Ã participer Ã des nÃ©gociations collectives . En consÃ©quence, le simple fait que le syndicat requÃ©rant soit Ã©cartÃ© de la nÃ©gociation collective ne contrevient pas aux dispositions de l'article 11, paragraphe 1 . Ce qu'exige la Convention, c'est que la lÃ©gislation nalionale permette aux sÃ¿ndicats, selon des modalitÃ©s non contraires Ã l'article 11, de lutter pour le dÃ©fense des intÃ©rÃ©ts de leurs adhÃ©rents . Ainsi que le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur l'a dÃ©clarÃ© devant la Cour dans l'Affaire Â« Syndicat National de la Police belge Â» et ainsi que la Cour ellemÃ©me l'a relevÃ© (paragraphe 40 de son arrÃªt) un syndicat Â« non reprÃ©sentatif x a toujours la possibilitÃ© de prÃ©senter des revendications syndicales, de demander audience au Ministre et, d'une faÃ§on gÃ©nÃ©rale, d'intervenir pour la dÃ©fense des intÃ©rÃ©ts de ses membres .
Or, dans le cas d'espÃ©ce, le syndicat requÃ©rant n'allÃ¨gue point que pareilles initiatives de sa part aient Ã©tÃ© ignorÃ©es par l'Etat . La Commission parvient donc Ã la conclusion que le syndicat requÃ©rant n'a pas Ã©tÃ© entravÃ© dans sa lutte pour la dÃ©fense de ses membres d'une maniÃ©re qui soit contraire aux exigences de l'article 11, paragraphe 1 et elle considÃ¨re que, sur ce point, la requÃªte dÃ´it Ãªtre rejetÃ©e du chef de dÃ©faut manifeste de fondement, au sens de l'article 27, paragraphe 2 de la Convention . Quant aux a rtic%s 11, paragraphe 1, et 14 combinÃ©s de la Conventio n 5 . La Commission recherchera, Ã prÃ©sent, si les diffÃ©rences de traitement dÃ©noncÃ©es par le syndicat requÃ©rant contreviennent aux articles 11 et 14 combinÃ©s . Quant Ã l'application de l'article 14 de la Convention, la Commission se fondera sur l'interprÃ©tation donnÃ©e par la Cour europÃ©enne des Droits de l'Homme dans son ArrÃªt du 23 juillet 1968, Affaire Â« relative Ã certains aspects du rÃ©gime linguistique de l'enseignement en Belgique n (SÃ©rie A . NÂ° 6, pp . 33-35, paragraphes 9-101 ainsi que dans les affaires syndicales prÃ©citÃ©es , notamment dans l'affaire Â« Syndicat National de la Police belge n (ArrÃªt prÃ©citÃ©, paragraphes 44-47) . Le syndicat requÃ©rant se trouve, sans nul doute, dans une situation dÃ©savantageuse par rapport Ã certains autres syndicats qui sont appelÃ©s Ã la nÃ©gociation collective parce qu'ils rÃ©pondent aux critÃ©res de reprÃ©sentativitÃ© Ã©noncÃ©s par la loi . L'Etat belge ayant choisi la nÃ©gociation collective comme l'un des moyens de rendre possibles la conduite et le dÃ©veloppement par les syndicats d'une action collective destinÃ©e Ã la dÃ©fense des intÃ©rÃ©ts professionnels de leurs adhÃ©rents, l'article 14 entre donc en jeu en l'espÃ©ce . 6 . II se pose, dÃ©s lors, la question de savoir si l'inÃ©galitÃ© constatÃ©e entre un syndicat considÃ©rÃ© comme reprÃ©sentatif et un syndicat Ã©cartÃ© de la nÃ©gociation collective, comme le syndicat requÃ©rant, engendre une distinction de traitement contraire Ã l'article 14 de la Convention . Selon la jurisprudence de la Cour europÃ©enne des Droits de l'Homme Icf . les deux arrÃªts prÃ©citÃ©sl, une diffÃ©rence de traitement est contraire Ã l'article 14 de la Convention si elle manque de justification objective et raisonnable, l'existence d'une pareille justification devant s'apprÃ©cier par rapport au but et aux effets de la mesure considÃ©rÃ©e, ou s'il n'existe pas de rapport raisonnable de proportionnalitÃ© entre les moyens employÃ©s et le but visÃ© . 7 . Le syndicat requÃ©rant fait valoir trois sources de discrimination consÃ©cutives, selon lui, Ã la loi du 19 dÃ©cembre 1974 .
D'une part, le fait qu'il s'oblige statutairement Ã la neutralitÃ© politique, philosophique ou religieuse l'empÃªche en fait de s'affilier Ã l'une quelconque des trois fÃ©dÃ©rations interprofessionnelles nationales, Ã savoir la FÃ©dÃ©ration GÃ©nÃ©rale du Travail de Belgique, la ConfÃ©dÃ©ration des syndicats chrÃ©tiens et la Centrale GÃ©nÃ©rale des syndicats libÃ©raux de Belgique qui ont une coloration politique et qui sont seules habilitÃ©es Ã participer aux nÃ©gociations . D'autre part, le syndicat requÃ©rant se trouverait placÃ© sous la dÃ©pendance des organisations syndicales dites Â« reprÃ©sentatives Â» reprÃ©sentÃ©es par les comitÃ©s de nÃ©gociation . Enfin, les pouvoirs de nÃ©gociation n'Ã©tant confÃ©rÃ©s qu'Ã des syndicats d'agents de l'Etat affiliÃ©s Ã une fÃ©dÃ©ration reprÃ©sentÃ©e au Conseil National du Travail et cette derniÃ©re reprÃ©sentation s'effectuant, selon le syndical requÃ©rant, uniquement dans le cadre du syndicalisme du secteur privÃ©, il en rÃ©sulterait que les syndicats du secteur public se trouvent placÃ©s sous la dÃ©pendance des syndicats du secteur privÃ© . La Commission rappelle que sous l'empire de la loi du 19 dÃ©cembre 1974 , .8 les nÃ©gociations entre les syndicats et le Gouvernement sont rÃ©servÃ©es aux syndicats les plus reprÃ©sentatifs . Ce caractÃ©re reprÃ©sentatif est dÃ©terminÃ© grÃ¢ce Ã quatre critÃ¨res dont l'un exige que les syndicats dÃ©fendent les intÃ©rÃªts de toutes les catÃ©gories des membres des services publics, l'autre qu'ils soient affiliÃ©s Ã une fÃ©dÃ©ration reprÃ©sentÃ©e au Conseil National du Travail . Cette loi engendre donc une inÃ©galitÃ© de traitement, ainsi que cela a dÃ©jÃ Ã©tÃ© relevÃ©, au dÃ©triment des organisations Â« catÃ©gorielles Â», tel que le syndicat requÃ©rant, lequel ne satistait Ã aucun de cesdeux critÃ¨res . . En instaurant ce systÃ¨me, le lÃ©gislateur belge a voulu Ã©viter le morcellement des organisations syndicales, estimant nÃ©cessaire d'assurer une politique du personnel cohÃ©rente et Ã©quilibrÃ©e, tenant compte des intÃ©rÃ©ts professionnels de l'ensemble des agents des services publics . D'autre part, il avait le souci que les autoritÃ©s compÃ©tentes ne se trouvent pas face Ã un nombre trop important d'interlocuteurs, afin de parvenir plus aisÃ©ment Ã un rÃ©sultat concret . Ce double but est en lui-mÃªme lÃ©gitime et il n'y a aucune raison de supposer que le Gouvernement ait eu d'autres desseins qui soient abusifs . Rien ne prouve, en particulier, que l'on ait voulu accorder en la matiÃ¨re un privilÃ©ge exclusif aux grandes centrales syndicales en raison de leur coloration Â« politique Â» . D'autre part, l'argument du syndicat requÃ©rant selon lequel les syndicats du secteur public se trouveraient placÃ©s sous la dÃ©pendance des syndicats du secteur privÃ©, en raison de ce que la reprÃ©sentation au sein du Conseil National du Travail ne s'effectuerait que dans le cadre du secteur privA, n'est pas justifiÃ© en fait . En effet, il rÃ©sulte de la loi du 29 mai 1952, qui port e
crÃ©ation du Conseil National du Travail, que tant par sa mission que par le choix de ses membres, le Conseil National du Travail n'est pas limitÃ© au secteur privÃ© . II peut, en effet, appeler en consultation des reprÃ©sentants des administrations, des Ã©tablissements publics ou des Ã©tablissements d'utilitÃ© publique . La Commission considÃ©re que le but visÃ© par le Gouvernement, tendant Ã assurer l'unitÃ© de sa politique par rapport au personnel des services publics, apparaÃ®t lui aussi comme lÃ©gitime, mÃªme s'il a pour consÃ©quence que des syndicats de caractÃ©re catÃ©goriel, comme le syndicat requÃ©rant, ne peuvent Ã©tre appelÃ©s Ã nÃ©gocier avec le Gouvernement . Enfin, la Commission considÃ©re qu'il n'est pas Ã© tabli que le dÃ©savantage subi par le syndical requÃ©rant soit excessif par rapport au but lÃ©gitime poursuivi par le Gouvernement . Il s'ensuit que le rapport de proportionnalitÃ© entre les moyens employÃ©s et le but visÃ© n'est pas transgressÃ© en l'espÃ©ce . La Commission conclut donc Ã l'abence de violation des articles 11 et 14 combinÃ©s . Il s'ensuit que la requÃªte doit Ãªtre rejetÃ©e, sur ce point Ã©galement, du chef de dÃ©faut manifeste de fondement, au sens de l'article 27, paragraphe 2, de la Convention . Par ces motifs, la Commission DECLARE LA REOUETEIRRECEVABLE .
Summary of the facts The applicant untbn seeks to represent the officials and civil servants of the Department of Finance . It undertakes to be politically neutral . The Belgian Act of 19 December 1974 governing the re/ationships between public authorities and the unions of officials emp/oyed by these authorities, created negotiating committees so%ly competent to negotiate basic regulations with public authorities . In order to be allowed to take part in these committees the unions must be representative anr1, in particular, defend the interests of all categories of public service personnel and be affiliated to a trade union organisation represented on the National Labour Council .
However, according to the applicant union, the National Labour Council only involves the private sector and furthermore the candidates can in fact only be put forward by trade unions of a political characters . Consequently, the applicant union, who invokes Articles 11 and 14 of the Convention, considers irself to be a victim of discrimination .
THE LAW 1 . The applicant union complains of the Act of 19 December 1974 "governing relationships between public authorities and unions of officials employed by those authorities" . The union argues that, according to the provisions of that law, it is precluded from all negotiations on basic regulations relating to its administrative and financial status, the pension scheme, relations with trade union organisations and the organisation of social services, since it does not satisfy twÃ´ of the four criteria required for representation as set forth in Section 7 (2) of the said act . In particular, the union complains that for, two reasons it is unable to play any part in negotiating committees . First according to its own regulations, its purpose is to defend the interests of officials of the Finance Department, not of all categories of public service personnel ; as a result, it does not satisfy the second criterion laid down by Section 7 (2) of the act complained of . Secondly, it is non-political in character, and cannot therefore be affiliated to a trade union organisation represented on the National Labour Council ; consequently, it does not meet the third criterion laid down in the said act . 2 . Being thus excluded from collective bargaining, the applicant union considers that it is unable to defend the interests of its members within the lramework of the law . In this regard, it alleges a violation of Article 11 ( 1) of the Convention, considering that the collective bargaining consitutes one of the elements necessarily inherent in the trade union activity which falls within the scope of the aforementioned provision . The applicant union further considers that Article 14 of the Conventio n is violated in so far as the act complained of makes a distinction in the treatment accorded to the different unions defending the interests of the same category of personnel .
With regard to Article 11 ( 1) of the Convention 3 The Commission will consider, firstly, whether Article 11 ( 1) which secures to everyone "freedom of association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of his interests", guarantee sarightoclevbanig . The European Court of Human Rights, when examining the trade unio n cases relerred to it (see judgment in the "National Union of Belgian Police Case" of 27 October 1975, Series A, Volume 19 and judgment in the "Swedish Engine Drivers' Union Case" of 6 February 1976, Series A, Volume 20), ruled that Article 11 (1) does not guarantee to trade union or their members a particular kind of treatment by the State . The Convention safeguards the freedom to protect the occupational interests of trade union members by trade union action . It follows that the members of a trade union have a right, In order to protect their interests, that the trade union "should be heard" . Article 11 (1) leaves each State to choose the means to attain this end ; "consultation" or "the conclusion of collective agreements" are both among such means . 4 . The Commission considers that the same applies to collective bargaining . Like consultations and the conclusions of collective agreements, collective bargaining is one of the means which may be employed by States in order to enable a trade union to be heard . It follows that Article 11 (1) does not guarantee a trade union a specific right to take part in collective bargaining . Consequently, the mere fact that the applicant union is excluded from collective bargaining does not contravene the provisions of Article 11 (1) . What the Convention requires is that national legislation should enable trade unions to actively defend the interests of their members according to methods which are not at variance with Article 11 . As the respondent Government stated to the Court in the "National Union of Belgian Police Case", and as the Court itself pointed out (Section 40 of its judgment), a non-representative" union is always free to submit union claims, to request an audience with the Minister and, generally speaking, to make representations for the protection of the interests of its members . In the present case, the applicant union does not allege that similar initiatives on its part have been ignored by the State . The Commission therefore comes to the conclusion that the applicant union has not been impeded in its efforts to protect its members in a manner contrary to the requirements of Article 11 ( 1), and considers that the application must be rejected on this count as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 (2) of the Convention .
With regard to Artic%s 11 (1) and 14 of the Conventio n 5 . The Commission will now consider whether the differences of treatment indicated by the applicant union contravene Articles 11 and 14 together . Regarding the application of Article 14 of the Convention, the Commission will base itself on the interpretation given by the European Court of Human Rights in its judgment of 23 July 1968 in the case "relating to certain aspects of the laws on the use of languages in education in Belgium" ISeries A, No . 6, pages 33-35, Sections 9-101 and in the above-mentioned trade-union cases, particularly the "National Union of Belgian Police Case" Ijudgment, loc .cit ., Sections 44-47) . The applicant union is undoubtedly at a disadvantage compared with certain olher trade unions which are involved in collective bargaining procedures who satisfy the criteria required for representation as laid down by the law . Since the Belgian State has selected consultation as one of the mean s ol making possible the conduct and development by trade unions of collective action for the protection ol their members' occupational interesfs . Article 14 is relevant in the present context . 6 . The question thus arises whether the inequality which is found to exist between a trade union that is regarded as representative and a trade union that is excl uded from collective bargaining, as in the case of the applicant union entails a difference of treatment which is contrary to Article 14 of the Convention . According to the case-law of the European Court of Human Righrs (cf . the two-mentioned judgmentsl, any difference of treatment is contrary to Article 14 of the Convention if it lacks objective and reasonable justification, Ihe existence of such justification being assessed in relation to the aim and effects of the measure under consideration, or if there is no reasonable relationship of proportionality, between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised . . 7 . The applicant union refers to three sources of discrimination which, i t argues, derive from the Act of 19 December 1974 . Firstly, the fact that its own rules require it to be politically, philosophically and religiously neutral in fact prevent it from being affiliated to any one ol Ihree national inter-professional lederations, namely the FÃ©dÃ©ration GÃ©nÃ©rale du Travail de Belgique (General Federation of Belgian Labour), the ConfÃ©dÃ©raGon de Syndicats ChrÃ©tiens IConfederation of Christian Trade Unions) and the Centrale GÃ©nÃ©rale des syndicats libÃ©raux de Belgique (General Federation of Free Trade Unions in Belgium) which have political leanings and are the only ones entitled 10 take pan in negotiations .-48
Secondly, the appiicant union alleges that it is dependent on the socalled "representative" trade union organisations represented by the negotiating committees . Lastly, since negotiating powers are conferred on trade unions of State officials affiliated to a federation represented on the National Labour Council, and since this latter representation, according to the applicant union, takes place solely within the framework of trade union activity on the private sector, the result is that trade unions in the public sector are in a position of dependence on trade unions in the private sector . 8 . The Commission notes that, pursuant to the Act of 19 December 1974, negoliations between the trade unions and the Government are the preserve of the most representative unions . This representative character is decided on the basis of four criteria, one being the requirement that trade unions must defend the interests of all categories of public servants, and the other being that they must be affiliated to a federation represented on the National Labour Council This act consequently gives rise to an inequality of treatment, to the detriment of organisations representing specific categories, such as the applicant union which meets neither of these two criteria . The aim of the Belgian legislation in establishing this system was to prevent fragmentation of trade union organisations, it being thought necessary to pursue a consistent, balanced personnel policy taking account of the professional interests of all public service officials . The legislation also reflects a concern that the competent authorities should not be faced with too large a number of intermediaries, so that tangible results might be Imore easily) achieved . This twofold aim is legitimate in itself, and there is no reason to suppose that the Government had any other -improper- intentions In particular, there is nothing to show that there was any intention of granting exclusive privileges in this matter to the major trade union organisations by reason of lheir "political" colouring . Further, the argument of the applicant union that trade unions in the public sector are in a position of dependence on trade unions in the private sector because representation on the National Labour Council takes place only in the framework of the private sector, is not borne out by the facts . It is clear from the Act of 29 May 1952 establishing the National Labour Council that neither in its function nor in the selection of its members is the National Labour Council confined to the private sector . It can in fact seek the views of representatives of Government departments, public institutions and public service establishments . The Commission considers that the aim pursued by the Government and designed to ensure a unified policy vis-Ã -vis public service personnel also
seems legitimate, even if a consequence of this is that trade unions representing specific categories, such as the applicant union, cannot be involved in negotiations with the Government . Finally, the Commission considers that it has not been shown that the disadvantage suffered by the applicant union is out of proportion to the legitimate aim pursued by the Government . Consequently, the relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised is not absent in this case . The Commission therefore concludes that Articles 11 together with 14 have not been violated . It follows that the application mÃ»st also be re)ected on this point as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 (2) of the Convention . . For these reasons, the Commissio n
- 50 -Origine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Cour (chambre)Date de la décision : 08/05/1978Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page