Source: http://www.chanrobles.com/usa/us_supremecourt/529/848/case.php
Timestamp: 2018-01-21 00:54:06
Document Index: 284252268

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 844', '§ 924', '§ 5861', '§ 844', '§ 844', '§ 844', '§ 922', '§ 844', '§ 844', '§ 844', '§ 844', '§ 35']

*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Cato Institute by Ronald D. Rotunda; for the Center for the Original Intent of the Constitution by Michael P. Farris; for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. by Jeffrey J. Pokorak and Barbara Bergman; for the Pacific Legal Foundation by Anne M. Hayes and M. Reed Hopper; and for Dale Lynn Ryan by John G. Roberts, Jr., and Gregory G. Garre.cralaw
1 The question on which we granted review refers solely to Jones's § 844(i) conviction. See infra, at 852. We therefore do not address his § 924(c) and § 5861(f) convictions.cralaw
3 Compare United States v. Pappadopoulos, 64 F.3d 522 (CA9 1995) (application to owner-occupied residence unconstitutional), with 178 F. 3d 479 (CA7 1999) (decision below), and Ramey, 24 F. 3d, at 602 (application constitutional).cralaw
5We noted in Russell that the original version of the bill that became § 844(i) applied to destruction, by means of explosives, of property used "'for business purposes.''' 471 U. S., at 860, n. 5. Mter some Housecralaw
6 The defendants in Mennuti destroyed two buildings. One was the residence of the owner and her family, the other was a rental property. See 639 F. 2d, at 108-109, n. 1. The Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's dismissal of the entire indictment. Our decision in Russell v. United States, 471 U. S. 858 (1985), supersedes Mennuti with respect to the building held for rental. Regarding the family residence, we find Mennuti's reasoning persuasive.cralaw
7 In Ryan, Chief Judge Arnold dissented from a panel decision holding that the arson of a permanently closed fitness center fell within § 844(i)'s prohibition. The panel majority considered adequate either of two interstate commerce connections: the building was owned and leased by out-ofstate parties, and received natural gas from across state borders. The panel added, however, that it would not extend the decision "to property which is purely private in nature, such as a privately owned home, used solely for residential purposes." 9 F. 3d, at 666-667. Sitting en bane, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the panel's judgment. See United States v. Ryan, 41 F.3d 361 (1994), cert. denied, 514 U. S. 1082 (1995).cralaw
8 Notably, the Court in Russell did not rest its holding on the expansive interpretation advanced by the Government both in Russell and in this case. Compare Brief for United States in Russell v. United States, O. T. 1984, No. 435, p. 15 ("Petitioner used his building on South Union Street in an activity affecting interstate commerce by heating it with gas that moved interstate."), with Russell, 471 U. S., at 862 (focusing instead on fact that "[t]he rental of real estate is unquestionably ... an activity" affecting commerce).cralaw
Our reading of § 844(i) is in harmony with the guiding principle that "where a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter." United States ex rel. Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U. S. 366, 408 (1909), quoted in Jones v. United States, 526 U. S. 227, 239 (1999); see also DeBartolo, 485 U. S., at 575; Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). In Lopez, this Court invalidated the Gun-Free School Zones Act, former 18 U. S. C. § 922(q) (1988 ed., Supp. V), which made it a federal crime to possess a firearm withincralaw
Given the concerns brought to the fore in Lopez, it is appropriate to avoid the constitutional question that would arise were we to read § 844(i) to render the "traditionally local criminal conduct" in which petitioner Jones engaged "a matter for federal enforcement." United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 350 (1971). Our comprehension of § 844(i) is additionally reinforced by other interpretive guides. We have instructed that "ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity," Rewis v. United States, 401 U. S. 808, 812 (1971), and that "when choice has to be made between two readings of what conduct Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate, before we choose the harsher alternative, to require that Congress should have spoken in language that is clear and definite," United States v. Universal C. 1. T. Credit Corp., 344 U. S. 218, 221-222 (1952). We have cautioned, as well, that "unless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly changed the federal-state balance" in the prosecution of crimes. Bass, 404 U. S., at 349. To read § 844(i) as encompassing the arson of an owneroccupied private home would effect such a change, for arson is a paradigmatic common-law state crime. See generally Poulos, The Metamorphosis of the Law of Arson, 51 Mo. L. Rev. 295 (1986).cralaw
Part II of the Court's opinion convincingly explains why its construction of 18 U. S. C. § 844(i) better fits the text and context of the provision than the Government's expansive reading. It also seems appropriate, however, to emphasize the kinship between our well-established presumption against federal pre-emption of state law, see Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U. S. 151, 157 (1978), and our reluctance to "believe Congress intended to authorize federal intervention in local law enforcement in a marginal case such as this." United States v. Altobella, 442 F.2d 310, 316 (CA7 1971). The fact that petitioner received a sentence of 35 years in prison when the maximum penalty for the comparable state offense was only 10 years, Ind. Code §§ 35-43-1-1, 35-502-5 (1993), illustrates how a criminal law like this may effectively displace a policy choice made by the State. Even when Congress has undoubted power to pre-empt local law,cralaw