Source: http://www.juricaf.org/arret/CONSEILDELEUROPE-COUREUROPEENNEDESDROITSDELHOMME-19850705-1056383
Timestamp: 2017-07-23 01:33:25+00:00
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EKBATANI c. SUEDE
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Type d'affaire : DécisionType de recours : Partiellement recevable ; partiellement irrecevableNumérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 10563/83Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1985-07-05;10563.83 Analyses : (Art. 5-3) DUREE DE LA DETENTION PROVISOIRE, (Art. 6) PROCEDURE PENALEParties : Demandeurs : EKBATANIDéfendeurs : SUEDETexte : APPLICATION/REQUÃTE NÂ° 10563/83 John EKBATANI v/SWEDE N
John EKBATANI c/SUÃD E DECISION of 5 July 1985 on the admissibility of the application DÃCISION du 5 juillet 1985 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃ©te
Article 6, paragraph I of the Convention : Although this provision does not guaranree a right to an appeal, its fundamental guarantees appir ro persons amenable to the laav before such appeal courts as do exist . Lack of a public hearing on appeal (Contplaint declared admissible). Article 6, paragraph 3(d) of the Convention : 7Ã¼is provision does not guarantee an todimited right for an accused to have witnesses called. Article 26 of the Convention : To exhaust domestic rentedies the person concemed must have raised before the national authorities, at least in substance, the complaint he puts to the Commission . Article 6, paragraphe 1, de la Convention : Bien que cette dispositiort ne garamisse aucun droit Ã un double degrÃ© de juridiction, les justiciables jouissent des garanties fondainentale .s de cette disposition devant les instances de recours esistantes. Absertce d'audience publique en appel (Grief dÃ©clarÃ© recevable) . ArUcle 6, paragraphe 3, lilt . d), de la Convention : Cette disposition ne reconnait pas Ã l'accusÃ© un droit illimitÃ© d'obtenir la convocation de tÃ©ntoins en justice . Article 26 de la Convention : Pour avoir Ã©puisÃ© les voies de recours intentes, l'intÃ©ressÃ© doit avoir fait valoir, au moins en substance, devant les instances nationales le grief qn'il smrmet Ã la Commission .
(franÃ§ais : voir p . 119)
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows . The applicant is a citizen of the United States of America, bom in 1930 . He is a teacher by profession and lives in Gtiteborg, Sweden . Before the Commission the applicant is represented by Mr . Christer Arnewid . a lawyer practising in GÃ¼teborg . The applicant came to Sweden in 1978 where he intended to do some research work at the University of Gtiteborg . However, his initial plans did not come trve and his financial situation forced him to look for other jobs . This led to contacts with various Swedish authorities, in particular in December 1980 . His experience with the authorities appears to have been rather unsuccessful but in March 1981 the applicant managed to find a job as a tram driver . However, he was obliged to pass a Swedish driving test, since he only had an American driver's licence . On 14 April 1981 he tried to pass the test but the traffic assistant decided that he had not passed it . This eventually led to an angry exchange of views on 7 May 1981 between the applicant and the traffic assistant, who reported the incident to the police . In August 1981 the applicant was questioned by the police about the matter and by indictntent of 7 October 1981, he was charged with threatening a civil servant contrary to Chapter 17 Section I of the Penal Code (brottsbalken) . During the trial before the Gtiteborg City Court (Gtiteborgs tingsrÃ¼tt) on 9 February 1982 where he was represented by an officially assigned lawyer, the applicant was heard as well as the civil servant in question . Based on these two persons' testimony the Court found the applicant guilty of the charge brought against him and sentenced him to pay a fine of 600 Swedish crowns . The costs were bome by the State . The applicant appealed against this judgmeiit to the Court of Appeal for Westem Sweden (Hovrtitten fdr VÃ¯stra Sverige) . Before the Court of Appeal, the applicant requÃ©sted that a character witness be heard by the Court . Specifically, this witness was to be heard regarding the applicant's person in order to prove that his version of the incident of 7 May 1981 had been the correct one . The witness had not been present at this incident . In response, the prosecutor requested that three witnesses be heard, all of them to testify as to the applicant's behaviour on various previous occasions in the premises of the Road Safety Office (trafiksÃ¯kerhetsverket) i .e . the authority with whom applications for driver's licences are lodged . On 27 September 1982 the applicant's lawyer asked the Court of Appeal to refuse to hear the witnesses proposed by the prosecution since they would not be able to contribute with any relevant information . Furthermore, the applicant referred to the fac t 114
that the case only involved a fine and ought not to be burdened with unnecessary evidence . The prosecutor submitted, in reply to this request, the opinion that he did not object to the case being adjudicated without a main hearing having been held . Counsel for the applicant objected to the case being adjudicated without a main hearing on the ground that the credibility of the applicant, as well as that of the injured party, needed thorough examination by the Court of Appeal . It appears that the Court of Appeal decided to reject both the applicant's and the prosecution's request to hear further witnesses . In its decision of 12 November 1982 the Coun of Appeal wrote : "Claims before the Court of Appeal . [The applicant] has requested that the charges against him be rejected . The prosecutor objects to a change . [The applicant] has in case of acquittal requested compensation for legal costs . The Court of Appeal judgmen t The Court of Appeal upholds the judgment of the City Court ." The costs were borne by the State . The judgment of the Cou rt of Appeal was based on the written material submitted by the pa rt ies and the City Cou rt . Before the Coutt of Appeal there was no public hearing and neither the applicant or his representative nor the prosecutor were present . This procedure was possible according to Chapter 51 Section 2 1 para . 2 of the Code of Judicial Procedure . Section 21 reads : "The Court of Appeal may determine the case without a main hearing if the public prosecutor has appealed only to the benefit of the accused or the appeal, if submitted by the accused, has been acceded to by the other pa rty . The case may be determined without a main hearing if the lower cou rt has acquitted the accused or remitted the sentence imposed or found him to be exempted from punishment by vi rt ue of mental abnormality or sentenced him to a fine or ordered him to pay a penalty ( vite) and there is no reason to impose a more severe sentence than what has just been said or to impose any other sanction . . . " On 7 December 1 982 the applicant appealed against the judgment of the Court of Appeal and against the proceedings before this Court to the Supreme Cou rt (Htigsta Domstolen) . He asked the Supreme Court either to repeal the Court of Appeal's decision and send the case back for a new hearing, or to acquit the applicant, or to remit the sentence imposed . The applicant argued that his credibility was at stake and that he had requested before the Cou rt of Appeal the hearing of a witness who had not been heard before the City Court . The prosecution had also requeste d 115
the hearing of further witnesses and since new evidence of importance was at stake it ought not to be possible to apply the above-mentioned Chapter 51 Section 21 para . 2 of the Code of Judicial Procedure and deal with the case without a public hea ri ng . In its decision of 3 May 1983 the Supreme Court wrote : "The Supreme Court finds no reason to grant leave to appeal for which reason the Court of Appeal judgment shall stand . " COMPLAINTS Under Article 3 of the Convention the applicant refers to his unfortunate experiences with the Swedish authorities in December 1980 which he alleges amounted to degrading treatment . Furthermore, he is of the opinion that the police questioning in August 1981 discloses a violation of Article 6 para . 2 since it was obvious that he was not presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law . With regard to his trial, the applicant alleges under Article 6 of the Convention that the courts were not impartial . Secondly, he feels that the refusal to hear a witness on his behalf violates his rights guaranteed under Article 6 para . 3 (d) . Thirdly, he complains that he was not allowed to choose his legal assistance and that he was obliged to pay for the assistance he got . Finally, the applicant complains of the Court of Appeal procedure . He argues that the Court of Appeal should not have applied Chapter 51 Section 21 para . 2 of the Code of Judicial Procedure and that the failure to hear him in public before this Court was contrary to Article 6 of the Convention . The applicant invokes Articles 2, 3, 6, .7 . 13 and 14 of the Convention .
THE LA W 1. The Commission has first considered the applicant's above complaints under Articles 2 . 3 . 6 para . 2, 7, 13 and 14 of the Convention . However, the documents and information submined by the applicant do not disclose any substantiated allegations which could justify a further examination of these complaints . It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para . 2 of the Convention .2 . The applicant has furthermore complained that the courts in question were no t impartial tribunals, that he was not allowed to choose his legal counsel and that he was obliged to pay for the assistance he got .
The Commission, however, is not required to decide whether or not the facts alleged by the applicant disclose any appearance of a violation of the Convention with regard to this complaint as, under Article 26 of the Convention, it ntay only deal with a ntatter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted according to the generally recognised rules of international law . The mere fact that the applicant has submitted his case to the various competent courts does not of itself constitute compliance with this rule . It is also required that the substance of any complaint made before the Commission should have been raised during the proceedings concerned . In this respect the Contmission refers to its constant jurisprudence (see e .g . No . 6861/75, Dec . 14 .7 .75 . D .R . 3 p . 147 ; Nos . 5573/72 and 5670/72, Dec . 16 .7 .76 . D .R . 7 p . 8) . In the present case the applicant did not raise either in form or in substance, in the proceedings before the Supreme Court . the complaint which he now makes before the Commission . Moreover, an examination of the case does not disclose the existence of any special circumstances, which might have absolved the applicant, according to the generally recognised rules of international law, from raising his complaint in the proceedings referred to . It follows that the applicant has not complied with the condition as to the exhaustion of domestic remedies and his application must in this respect be rejected under Article 27 para . 3 of the Convention . 3 . Under Article 6 para . 3 (d) of the Convention, the applicant has also complained that he was not allowed to obtain the attendance of a witness on his behalf . By Ihe terms of Article 6 para . 3(d) of the Convention any person charged with a criminal offence has a right to "examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him" . However, this provision does not grant the accused an unlimited right to secure the appearance of witnesses in court (cf . No . 8417/78, Dec . 4 .5 .79 . D .R . 16 p . 200) . In the present case the Commission recalls that the applicant as well as the prosecution requested the hearing of further witnesses and that both requests were turned down . Furthermore, the information submitted by the applicant does not show that the witness whom he wanted examined could submit any information relevant to the determination of the issue in question . In these circumstances an examination of the facts complained of does not disclose to the Commission any appearance of a violation of the right guaranteed to the applicant by Article 6 para . 3(d) of the Convention . It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para . 2 of the Convention . 4 . Finally, the applicant has complained that he was not heard at a public hearing before the Court of Appeal . He considers that the failure so to hear him was contrary to Article 6 para . I of Ihe Convention which, in his opinion, grants to everybody the right to a trial in public to review a criminal charge against him . 117
The respondent Government have argued that Article 6 does not apply to the proceedings before the Court of Appeal . Article 6 does not in itself demand a hearing before more thanone tribunal and does not even provide any guidelines regarding the right to appea) . Furthermore, the Government have argued that if Article 6 were applicable, the right to a hearing in more thah one instance cannot be Ã»nlimited . The right to a hearing before the Court of Appeal should be considered in the light of the circumstances of the case in question which in this case would lead to the conclusion that the applicant's rights under Article 6 were not violated . With regard to the applicability of Article 6 to the proceedings before the Swedish Coun of Appeal in the circumstances of the present case, the Commission recalls the established case-law of the European Court of Human Rights from which it isclear that Article 6 para . I of the Convention does not compel the Contracting States to set up courts of appeal or of cassaiion . Nevertheless,a State which does institute such courts is required to ensure that persons amenable to the law shall enjoy before these courts the fundamental guarantees contained in Article 6 (see notably Eur . Court H .R ., Delcourt judgment of 17January 1970, Series A no . 11, para . 25 and the Sutter judgment of 22 January 1984, Series A no . 74, para . 28 with further references) . However, the way in which Article 6 para . I applies must depend on the special features of the proceedings in question . In this respect the Commission finds that this case raises substantial questions of interpretation of that provision which are of suc hcomplexityadrnoshulepdnaf.xmitohers It follows that this pan of the application cannot be regarded as manifestly illfounded within the meaning of Article 27 para . 2 of the Convention and must be declared adrttissible, no other ground for declaring it inadmissible having been established . For these reasons, the Commissio n DECLARES ADMISSIBLE without prejudging in any way the merits of the case the complaint that the applicant did not get a public hearing before the Court of Appeal ; . , .. .
DECLARES INADMISSIBLE the remainder of the application .
(/RADUCTION) EN FAIT Les faits de la cause, tels qu'ils ont Ã©tÃ© exposÃ©s par les parties . peuvent se rÃ©sumer comme suit . Le requÃ©rant est un ressonissant des Etats-Unis d'AmÃ©rique, nÃ© en 1930 . 11 est enseignani de son Ã©tat et habite GÃ¼teborg en SuÃ¨de . Il est reprÃ©semÃ© devant la Commission par Me Christer Arnewid, avocat Ã G&teborg . C'est en 1978 que le requÃ©rant est arrivÃ© en SuÃ©de, oÃ¹ il se proposait d'effectuer certains travaux de recherche Ã l'UniversitÃ© de GBteborg . Cependant, ses plans initiaux ne s'Ã©tant pas rÃ©alisÃ©s, sa situation financiÃ¨re l'obligea Ã chercher d'autres emplois, ce qui le conduisit Ã des contacts avec diverses administrations suÃ©doises, en dÃ©cembre 1980 notamment . Ces contacts avec les autoritÃ©s furent peu fructueux jusqu'en mars 1981, oÃ¹ le requÃ©rant rÃ©ussit Ã trouver un emploi de conducteur de tramway . Il Ã©tait cependant tenu de passer un examen de conduite automobile, puisque son permis de conduire Ã©tait amÃ©ricain . Le 14 avril 1981, le requÃ©rant se prÃ©senta Ã l'examen mais l'inspecteur estima qu'il avait Ã©chouÃ© . Il s'ensuivit le 7 mai 1981 un Ã©change de propos virulents entre le requÃ©rant et ce fonctionnaire, lequel signala l'incident Ã la police .
En aoÃ»t 1981, le requÃ©rant fut interrogÃ© Ã ce propos par la police et inculpÃ© le 7 octobre 1981, en vertu de l'article 1Â°' du chapitre 17 du Code pÃ©nal (brottsbalken), de ntenaces envers un fonctionnaire . Le 9 fÃ©vrier 1982, au cours du procÃ¨s devant le tribunal de district de GÃ´teborg (GSteborgs tingsrÃ tl), oÃ¹ il Ã©tait reprÃ©sentÃ© par un avocat commis d'office, le requÃ©rant fut entendu ainsi que le fonctionnaire en question . Sur la foi de leurs dÃ©clarations, le tribunal dÃ©clara le requÃ©rant coupable de l'accusation portÃ©e contre lui et le condamna Ã payer une amende de 600 couronnes suÃ©doises . Les frais furent supportÃ©s par le TrÃ©sor . Le requÃ©rant fit appel de ce jugement devant la cour d'appel de SuÃ©de occidentale (HovrÃ¢tten fdr VÃ«stra Sverige), devant laquelle il demanda l'audition d'un tÃ©moin de moralitÃ© . Plus prÃ©cisÃ©ment, la cour devait entendre ce tÃ©moin au sujet de la personnalitÃ© du requÃ©rant afin d'Ã©tablir que la version de l'incident du 7 mai 1981 donnÃ©e par le requÃ©rant Ã©tait la bonne . Mais le tÃ©moin n'Ã©tait pas prÃ©sent lors de l'incident . Par rÃ©action, le procureur demanda Ã son tour l'audition de trois tÃ©moins, devant tous attester du comportement du requÃ©rant Ã diverses occasions dans les locaux des Bureaux de la sÃ©curitÃ© routiÃ¨re (traftksÃ kerhetsverket) Ã qui sont adressÃ©es les demandes de permis de conduire . Le 27 septembre 1982, l'avocat du requÃ©rant demanda Ã la cour d'appel de refuser d'entendre les tÃ©moins proposÃ©s pa r 119
l'accusation, puisqu'ils ne pouvaient fournir aucune information pertinente . Le requÃ©rant soulignait en outre qu'il ne s'agissait en l'espÃ¨ce que d'une amende et que l'affaire ne devait pas Ãªtre encombrÃ©e de tÃ©moignages inutiles . Le procureur fit savoir en rÃ©ponse qu'il n'avait pas d'objection Ã ce que l'affaire soit tranchÃ©e sans audience . L'avocat du requÃ©rant rÃ©clama cependant une audience au motif que la crÃ©dibilitÃ© du requÃ©rant et celle de la victime nÃ©cessitaient un examen approfondi de la part de la cour d'appel . II senible que la cour d'appel dÃ©cida de rejeter les demandes - tant du requÃ©rant que de l'accusation - d'entendre d'autres tÃ©moignages . Dans sa dÃ©cision du 12 novembre 1982, la cour Ã©crivait :
Â« RequÃªte Ã la cour d'appel : [Le requÃ©rant] a conclu au rejet par la Cour des accusations portÃ©es contre lui . Le ministÃ¨re public s'oppose Ã une rÃ©forme du jugement . [Le requÃ©rant] deniande le remboursement de ses frais en cas d'acquittement . DÃ©cision de la cour d'appe l La cour d'appel confirme le jugement du tribunal de district . Â» Les dÃ©pens ont Ã©tÃ© mis Ã la charge de l'Etat . L'arrÃ©t rendu par la cour d'appel se fondait sur les piÃ¨ces produites par les parties et par le tribunal de district . Devant la cour, il n'y a pas eu d'audience publique et ni le requÃ©rant, ni son reprÃ©sentant ni le procureur, n'ont comparu . Cette procÃ©dure Ã©tait conforme Ã l'article 21 par . 2 du Code de procÃ©dure judiciaire . Le chapitre 51, article 21 . est ainsi libellÃ© : Â« La cour d'appel peut statuer sans audience publique si le parquet n'a fait appel que dans l'intÃ©r@t du prÃ©venu ou si la partie adverse s'est jointe Ã l'appel interjetÃ© par le prÃ©venu . L'affaire peut Ã©tre tranchÃ©e sans audience publique si le tribunal de premiÃ¨re instance a acquittÃ© le prÃ©venu ou remis la peine ou estimÃ© que l'intÃ©ressÃ© devait Ã©tre exemptÃ© de toute peine pour raisons d'anomalie mentale ou si le tribunal a infligÃ© une amende ou ordonnÃ© une sanction pÃ©cuniaire (vite) et qu'il n'y a pas lieu d'infliger une peine plus lourde que celles mentionnÃ©es ci-dessus ou d'infliger toute autre sanction . . . Le 7 dÃ©cembre 1982 . le requÃ©rant se pourvut devant la Cour suprÃ©me (HÃ¼gsta Domstolen) contre l'arrÃ©t rendu par la cour d'appel et contre la procÃ©dure suivie devant cette juridiction . Il demanda Ã la Cour de casser l'arrÃ©t de la cour d'appel et de renvoyer l'affaire pour statuer Ã nouveau, ou d'acquitter le prÃ©venu, ou encore de faire remise de la peine . Il fit valoir que sa crÃ©dibilitÃ© Ã©tait en jeu et qu'il avait demandÃ© l'audition par la cour d'appel d'un tÃ©moin que le tribunal de district n'avait pas entendu . L'accusation ayant elle aussi demandÃ© l'audition de plusieurs tÃ©moin s
et des preuves nouvelles et importantes Ã©tant eu jeu, le requÃ©rant estimait qu'il ne devait pas Ãªtre possible d'appliquer le chapitre 51, a rt icle 21 par . 2 susmentionnÃ© du Code de procÃ©dure judiciaire et de traiter l'affaire sans audience publique . Dans son arrÃªt du 3 mai 1983, la Cour suprÃ©me jugea : . La Cour suprÃªme ne voit pas de raison d'accorder l'autorisation de dÃ©poser un pourvoi et confirme en consÃ©quence la validitÃ© de l'arrÃ©t rendu par la Cour d'appel . .
GRIEFS Invoquant l'article 3 de la Convention, le requÃ©rant Ã©voque ses expÃ©riences malheureuses avec les autoritÃ©s suÃ©doises en dÃ©cembre 1980 qui Ã©quivaudraient selon lui, Ã un traitement dÃ©gradam . Il estime en outre que l'interrogatoire menÃ© par la police en aoÃ¹t 1981 constitue une violation de l'article 6 par . 2, puisqu'il est Ã©vident qu'il n'a pas Ã©tÃ© prÃ©sumÃ© innocent jusqu'Ã ce qu'il ait Ã©tÃ© reconnu coupable aux yeux de la loi . S'agissant de son procÃ¨s, le requÃ©rant allÃ¨gue que, contrairement Ã l'article 6 de la Convention, les tribunaux n'ont pas Ã©tÃ© impartiaux . DeuxiÃ¨mement, le requÃ©rant estime que le refus d'entendre un tÃ©moin Ã dÃ©charge a enfreint les droits que lui garantit l'article 6 par . 3 d) . TroisiÃ¨mement, le requÃ©rant se plaint de n'avoir pas pu choisir son dÃ©fenseur et d'avoir Ã©tÃ© obligÃ© de payer pour l'assistance obtenue . Enfin, le requÃ©rant se plaint de la procÃ©dure de la Cour d'appel . Selon lui, l a
cour n'aurait pas dÃ¹ appliquer le chapitre 51, article 21, par . 2 du Code de procÃ©dure judiciaire et le fait de n'avoir pas Ã©tÃ© entendu publiquement devant cette Cour est contraire Ã l'article 6 de la Convention . Le requÃ©rant invoque les articles 2, 3, 6, 7 . 13 et 14 de la Convention .
EN DROI T 1 . La Contmission a examinÃ© en premier lieu les griefs tirÃ©s par le requÃ©rant des articles 2, 3 . 6 par . 2 . 7, 13 et 14 de la Convention . Cependant, les documents et renseignements produits par le requÃ©rant ne font apparaPtre aucune allÃ©gations dÃ¹ment Ã©tayÃ©e qui pourrait justifier un examen approfondi de ces griefs . 11 s'ensuit que la requÃ©te est, sur ce point, manifestement mal fondÃ©e au sens de l'article 27 par . 2 de la Convention . 2 . Le requÃ©rant s'est plaint en outre de ce que les tribunaux en cause n'ont pas Ã©tÃ© impartiaux, qu'il n'a pas Ã©tÃ© autorisÃ© Ã choisir son dÃ©fenseur et a Ã©tÃ© tenu de supporter les frais de l'assistance qui lui a Ã©tÃ© fournie .
La Commission n'est cependant pas appelÃ©e Ã dÃ©cider si les faits allÃ©guÃ©s par le requÃ©rant rÃ©vÃ©lent ou non l'apparence d'une violation de la Convention en ce qui concerne ce grief puisqu'aux termes de l'article 26 de la Convention, elle ne peut Ã©tre saisie qu'aprÃ¨s Ã©puisement des recours internes selon les rÃ¨gles de droit international gÃ©nÃ©ralement reconnues . Le'seul fait que le requÃ©rant ait soumis son affaire aux divers tribunaux compÃ©tenNs'ne suffit pas pour que cette rÃ¨gle soit respectÃ©e . II faut Ã©galement que le grief prÃ©sentÃ© Ã la Commission ait Ã©tÃ© soulevÃ©, en substance, pendant les procÃ©dures en cause . A cet Ã©gard, la Commission renvoie Ã sa jurisprudence constante (voir par exemple No 6861/75, dÃ©c . 14 .7 .75, D .R . 3 p . 147 ; No 5573/72 et 5670/72, dÃ©c . 16 .7 .76 . D .R . 7 p . 8) . - Or en l'espÃ¨ce, le requÃ©rant n'a soulevÃ© devant la Cour suprÃ©me, ni formellentent ni en substance, le grief qu'il formule Ã prÃ©sent devant la Commission . Par ailleurs, un examen de l'affaire ne rÃ©vÃ©le l'existence d'aucune circonstance particuliÃ¨re qui aurait pu le dispenser, conformÃ©ment aux rÃ¨gles de droit international gÃ©nÃ©ralement reconnues, de soulever ce grief dans la procÃ©dure visÃ©e . Il s'ensuit que le requÃ©rant n'a pas rempli la condition de l'Ã©puisement des voies de recours internes et que sa requÃªte doit, Ã cet Ã©gard, Ãªtre rejetÃ©e conformÃ©ment Ã l'anicle 27 par . 3 de la Convention . 3 . Invoquant l'art icle 6 par . 3 d) de la Convention, le requÃ©rant s'est plaint Ã©galentent de n'avoir pas Ã©tÃ© autorisÃ© Ã faire convoquer un tÃ©moin Ã dÃ©charge . Aux termes de l'a rt icle 6 par . 3 d) de la Convention, toute personne accusÃ©e d'une infraction pÃ©nale a le droit d' Â« interroger ou faire interroger les tÃ©moins Ã charge et obtenir la convocation et l'interrogation des tÃ©moins Ã dÃ©charge dans les mÃªmes conditions que les tÃ©moins Ã charge- . Cependant, cette disposition n'accorde pas Ã l'accusÃ© un droit illimitÃ© d'obtenir la convocation de tÃ©moins en justice (cf . No 8417/78 . dÃ©c . 4 .5 .79, D .R . 16 p . 200) . En l'espÃ¨ce, la Commission rappelle que le requÃ©rant et l'accusa( ion ont tous deux demandÃ© l'audition de tÃ©moins supplÃ©mentaires et que les deux demandes ont Ã©tÃ© rejetÃ©es . En outre, les renseignements foumis par le requÃ©rant ne montrent pas que le tÃ©moin qu'il dÃ©sirait faire interroger aurait pu produire des informations utiles pour dÃ©cider du litige . Dans ces conditions, l'examen des faits dont se plaint le requÃ©rant ne rÃ©vÃ¨le aucune apparence de violation du droit garanti au requÃ©rant par l'a rt icle 6 par . 3 d) de la Convention . Il s'ensuit que la requÃ©te est, sur ce point Ã©galement, manifestement mal fondÃ©e au sens de l'article 27 par. 2 de la Convention . 4 . Enfin, le requÃ©rant s'est plaint de n'avoir pas Ã©tÃ© entendu en audience publique par lacourd'appel . Il estime cette lacune contraire Ã l'article 6 par . I de la Convention qui, Ã son avis, garantit Ã toute personne le droit Ã bÃ©nÃ©ficier d'un procÃ¨s public pour faire rÃ©examiner une accusation pÃ©nale portÃ©e contre elle. Selon le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur, l'article 6 ne s'applique pas Ã la procÃ©dure de la cour d'appel car cet article n'exige pas une audience publique devant plus d'u n
~s . .
tribunal et ne fournit mÃ¨me pas de directive quant au droit d'appel . En outre, le Gouvernemmnl soutient qu'Ã supposer l'anicle 6 applicable, le droit Ã bÃ©nÃ©ficier d'une audience devant une juridiction de second degrÃ© ne saurait Ãªtre illimitÃ© . Selon lui, le droit Ã une audience devant la cour d'appel devrait Ã¨tre considÃ©rÃ© Ã la lumiÃ¨re des particularitÃ©s de l'affaire, ce qui, en l'espÃ¨ce, mÃ¨nerait Ã la conclusion que les droits garantis au requÃ©rant par l'article 6 n'ont pas Ã©tÃ© mÃ©connus . S'agissant de l'applicabilitÃ© de l'article 6 Ã la procÃ©dure de la cour d'appel suÃ©doixe dans les circonstances de l'espÃ¨ce, la Commission rappelle lajurisprudence constante de la Cour europÃ©enne des Droits de l'Homme, selon laquelle l'article 6 par . 1 de la Convention n'oblige manifestement pas les Etats Ã crÃ©er des cours d'appel ou de cassation . NÃ©anmoins, un Etat qui se dote de juridictions de cette nature a l'obligation de veiller Ã ce que les justiciables jouissent auprÃ¨s d'elles des garantie ; fondamentales de l'article 6 (voir notamment Cour Eur . D .H ., arrÃªt Delcourt du 17 janvier 1970, sÃ©rie A n" 11, par . 25 et arr@t Sutter du 22 janvier 1984, sÃ©rie A n" 74, par . 28 et les rÃ©fÃ©rence .s qui s'y trouveno . Cependant, la maniÃ¨re dont s'applique l'anicle 6 par . I doit dÃ©pendre des particularitÃ©s de la procÃ©dure en question . A cet Ã©gard, la Commission estime que la prÃ©sente affaire soulÃ¨ve de dÃ©licates questions d'interprÃ©tation de cette disposition, questions dont la complexitÃ© appelle, pour en dÃ©cider, un examen du bien-fondÃ© de l'affaire . Il s'ensuit que cette panie de la requÃªte ne saurait, sur ce point, Ã¨tre considÃ©rÃ©e comme manifestement mal fondÃ©e au sens de l'anicle 27 par . 2 de la Convention et qu'elle doit Ã©tre dÃ©clarÃ©e recevable, aucun autre motif d'irrecevabilitÃ© n'ayant Ã©tÃ© Ã©tabli . Par ces motifs . la Commissio n DÃCLARE RECEVABLE, tous moyens de fonds rÃ©servÃ©s, legrief selon lequel le requÃ©rant n'a pas bÃ©nÃ©ficiÃ© d'une audience publique devant la cour d'appel ; DÃCLARE LA REQUÃTE IRRECEVABLE pour le surplus .
123Origine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Commission (plénière)Date de la décision : 05/07/1985Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page