Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/386/977/632423/
Timestamp: 2017-11-25 01:43:33
Document Index: 450005083

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 725', '§ 725', '§ 725', '§ 718', '§ 725', '§ 725', '§ 725', '§ 718', '§ 718', '§ 718', '§ 718', '§ 718', '§ 718', '§ 718', 'art:\n20', '§ 718', '§ 725', '§ 725', '§ 725', '§ 725', '§ 725', '§ 725', '§ 725', '§ 725', '§ 725', '§ 725', '§ 725', '§ 725', '§ 725', '§ 725', '§ 725', '§ 725', '§ 718', '§ 37', '§ 718', '§ 718', '§ 718', '§ 718']

U.S. Steel Mining Company, Llc, Petitioner, v. Director, Owcp, Roderick Jones, Respondents, 386 F.3d 977 (11th Cir. 2004) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Eleventh Circuit › 2004 › U.S. Steel Mining Company, Llc, Petitioner, v. Director, Owcp, Roderick Jones, Respondents
U.S. Steel Mining Company, Llc, Petitioner, v. Director, Owcp, Roderick Jones, Respondents, 386 F.3d 977 (11th Cir. 2004)
US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit - 386 F.3d 977 (11th Cir. 2004)
The procedural history, essential background and developed facts are straightforward. The Secretary of Labor's black lung benefits program allows coal miners to file more than one benefits claim under certain circumstances. After the first claim by a miner is denied, the claimant may file a second or "duplicate" application more than one year after the denial of the first claim.2 In order to file a duplicate claim, the miner must first establish that "a material change in conditions" has occurred since the earlier denial of the first claim. 20 C.F.R. § 725.309(d). Indeed, duplicate claims are feasible under the BLBA precisely because pneumoconiosis is a latent and progressive disease, from which a miner's condition may deteriorate over time. As a result, if a miner's condition has materially changed, he may allege a new cause of action based on a very different physical condition. See, e.g., Coleman v. Director, OWCP, 345 F.3d 861, 863 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) ("Because pneumoconiosis is a latent and progressive disease, a miner's condition may worsen over time. In recognition of that fact, the Labor Department's regulations permit a miner whose first claim has been denied to pursue a later claim for benefits, provided the miner can establish a change in conditions of entitlement." (citation omitted)); Labelle Processing Co. v. Swarrow, 72 F.3d 308, 313-16 (3d Cir. 1995). The Director of the U.S. Department of Labor's Office of Workers' Compensation Programs ("the Director"), has taken the position that a claimant may establish a "material change" by proving any element of entitlement in the second claim that the miner failed to show in the first one.
Almost two years later, Jones brought this claim on August 2, 1999, seeking benefits for himself, his wife, and four dependent children. Because Jones's second claim was filed more than a year after the denial of the first one, this claim was a "duplicate claim" governed by 20 C.F.R. § 725.309(d), and, therefore, Jones had to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a "material change in conditions" had occurred since the denial of his initial claim. Id. After meeting this threshold requirement, Jones also had to establish that: (1) he had pneumoconiosis; (2) the pneumoconiosis arose out of coal mine employment; (3) he was totally disabled; and (4) the pneumoconiosis contributed to the total disability. Id. § 725.202(d) (2).
Because, under the Act, the characterization of a coal miner as being totally disabled depends in part on whether the miner is unable to perform his "usual coal mine work," 20 C.F.R. § 718.204(b) (1), we examine the work Jones engaged in during the last period of his employment. See Shortridge v. Beatrice Pocahontas Coal Co., 4 BLR 1-534, 1-539 (1982) (" [U]sual coal mine work is the most recent job the miner performed regularly and over a substantial period of time."). The last job Jones performed regularly and over a substantial period of time was a faceman.
The standard we employ in reviewing the BRB's review of an ALJ's decision is by now well established. In Lollar v. Alabama By-Products Corp., we explained the standard in these terms: Decisions of the ALJ are reviewable only as to whether they are in accordance with law and supported by substantial evidence in light of the entire record. This deferential standard of review binds both the BRB and this Court. See Jordan v. Benefits Review Bd., 876 F.2d 1455, 1459 (11th Cir. 1989); Stomps v. Director, OWCP, 816 F.2d 1533, 1534 (11th Cir. 1987); Alabama By-Products Corp. v. Killingsworth, 733 F.2d 1511, 1515 (11th Cir. 1984). Because this Court applies the same standard of review to ALJ decisions as does the BRB, our review of BRB decisions is de novo. "Substantial evidence" has been defined as "more than a scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S. Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L. Ed. 2d 842 (1971) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
893 F.2d 1258, 1261-62 (11th Cir. 1990) (footnote omitted). As we observed in Lollar, when "the BRB upholds the ALJ's decision, this Court's limited review of the ALJ effectively cloaks the BRB's decision with the same deference to which the ALJ is entitled." Id. at 1261 n. 4. "Thus, although the case comes to us from the BRB, we begin our analysis by reviewing the decision of the ALJ." Bradberry v. Director, 117 F.3d 1361, 1365 (11th Cir. 1997).
The central legal issue presented is whether the ALJ erred by using the "one element" standard to evaluate whether Jones had established a "material change in conditions," a necessary finding to bringing a second (duplicate) claim. See 20 C.F.R. § 725.309(d). The ALJ concluded that " [t]o establish a material change in conditions, Claimant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence developed since the denial of the prior claim, at least one of the elements previously adjudicated against him." Jones v. U.S. Steel Mining Co., Decision and Order — Awarding Benefits at 3, Case No.2001-BLA-356 (U.S. Dep't of Labor Office of Admin. Law Judges Aug. 1, 2002) ("ALJ Order"). We have not had occasion to rule on the proper legal standard, an issue that has caused a split among our sister circuits.
The Director has advocated the "one element" standard for evaluating whether or not a miner has proved a material change in conditions.10 Under this standard, when making a duplicate claim, a claimant can establish a material change in conditions by proving one entitlement requirement that was previously resolved against the miner. After establishing a material change, to be eligible for benefits a miner must then prove that (1) he has pneumoconiosis; (2) his pneumoconiosis arose out of his coal mining employment; (3) he is totally disabled; and (4) the pneumoconiosis contributed to his disability. 20 C.F.R. § 725.202(d) (2) (i)-(iv); see also Black Diamond Coal Mining Co. v. Director, OWCP, 95 F.3d 1079, 1082 (11th Cir. 1996). If all of the requirements were resolved against a miner in his first claim — as was the case with Jones — the claimant can establish a material change under the "one element" test by establishing any one of the four eligibility elements in the second claim. If a miner successfully proves a material change in this way, the entire record is then examined to determine whether, at the time of the second claim, the miner has proven all of the eligibility requirements and, thus, may be granted an award of benefits.
U.S. Steel urges us to reject the Director's "one element" standard and instead to adopt a standard enunciated by the Seventh Circuit in Sahara Coal Co. v. Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 946 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1991), which U.S. Steel contends "require [s] a genuine showing of changed conditions." Petitioner's Brief at 19. Under this test, U.S. Steel argues, to prove a "material change," "Jones must establish either (1) that the disease of pneumoconiosis has manifested itself since the earlier denial or (2) that the disease's progress has resulted in total disability although it was not totally disabling at the time of the original application." Id.; see also Sahara Coal, 946 F.2d at 556 (outlining material change test in which a miner would have to establish that he "did not have black lung disease at the time of the first application but has since contracted it and become totally disabled by it, or that his disease has progressed to the point of becoming totally disabling although it was not at the time of the first application").
In evaluating whether to adopt the Director's standard or the one urged by U.S. Steel, "` [i]t is well-established that courts must defer to an agency's consistent interpretation of its own regulation unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.'" Bradberry, 117 F.3d at 1366 (quoting Lollar, 893 F.2d at 1262 (adopting Director's construction of test for disability causation)). Here, this deference is specifically owed to the Director of the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, not to the ALJ or the BRB. Lollar, 893 F.2d at 1262.
The obligation to defer to an agency's reasonable interpretation of its own regulations is rooted not only in our case law, but also in binding Supreme Court precedent. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-45, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 2782-83, 81 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1984); see also Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 696-97, 111 S. Ct. 2524, 2534, 115 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1991) (granting deference to the Department of Labor's construction of its own black lung regulation, and noting that Congress intended to delegate broad policymaking authority to the Department of Labor when it passed the Act); Mullins Coal Co. of Va. v. Director, Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 484 U.S. 135, 159, 108 S. Ct. 427, 440, 98 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1987). The Supreme Court has left no doubt that when an agency has regularly advocated a uniform interpretation of its regulation, the interpretation "is deserving of substantial deference `unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.'" Mullins Coal, 484 U.S. at 159, 108 S. Ct. at 440 (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414, 65 S. Ct. 1215, 1217, 89 L. Ed. 1700 (1945)).
Deference to an agency's consistent interpretation of its own regulations is due when the agency has consistently "maintained a longstanding policy on the subject," McKee v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1436, 1438 n. 3 (11th Cir. 1990), but not when an agency adopts a "mere litigating position." William Bros., Inc. v. Pate, 833 F.2d 261, 265 (11th Cir. 1987); see also Bradberry, 117 F.3d at 1366. That is, we do not afford deference to ad hoc positions of agencies adopted in reaction to the exigencies of litigation; rather, deference is due when an agency has taken a constant and unchanging — and reasonable — position on the proper interpretation of its regulation. See Bradberry, 117 F.3d at 1366; William Bros., 833 F.2d at 265.
The Director has not simply promoted the use of the standard in this case; to the contrary, the Director has consistently advocated the use of the "one element" test before the courts of appeals. See, e.g., Swarrow, 72 F.3d at 318; Lisa Lee Mines v. Director, OWCP, 86 F.3d 1358, 1363-64 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc); Sharondale Corp. v. Ross, 42 F.3d 993, 998 (6th Cir. 1994); Peabody Coal Co. v. Spese, 117 F.3d 1001, 1007-09 (7th Cir. 1997) (en banc); Lovilia Coal Co. v. Harvey, 109 F.3d 445, 454 (8th Cir. 1997); Wyoming Fuel Co. v. Director, 90 F.3d 1502, 1510-11 (10th Cir. 1996).
Federal Respondent's Brief at 17-18. Because the Director's "one element" standard is neither plainly erroneous nor inconsistent with the regulation it interprets, and because the Director has consistently advocated its use before the federal courts of appeals, we can discern "no reason to downgrade the normal deference accorded to [the] agency's interpretation of its own regulation." Mullins Coal, 484 U.S. at 159-60, 108 S. Ct. at 440-41.
The Third, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits have unambiguously embraced the Director's "one element" test. In Swarrow, for example, a panel of the Third Circuit noted that deference to the Director's interpretation of its own regulations was warranted so long as the Director's interpretation was a reasonable one. 72 F.3d at 318 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845, 104 S. Ct. at 2783). The court observed that it would supply its own construction of a regulation only if the agency's interpretation were plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation, and concluded that the Director's construction of the regulation was neither. Id. (citation omitted). In embracing the "one element" standard, the Third Circuit also noted that " [a]doption of the Director's interpretation accords with the principle that courts should liberally construe remedial legislation, such as the BLBA, so as to include the largest number of claimants within its entitlement provisions." Id. The Third Circuit concluded that " [b]ecause the Director's construction of its own regulation is not unreasonable, deference should be given to that interpretation," and adopted the "one element" test. Id.
Because the Director's "one element" standard is both reasonable and consistent with § 725.309, and because using this test will eliminate unnecessary and costly collateral litigation, we adopt the agency's "one element" standard. This standard establishes a simple and uniform approach to material change determinations, protects the integrity of the first denial from the distant, searching eyes of hindsight, and respects the principles of res judicata. The Director's standard gives full credit to the finality of the original denial, but plainly recognizes that pneumoconiosis is a latent and progressive disease, and that a miner's condition can change over time. See 20 C.F.R. § 718.201(c) (stating that pneumoconiosis "is recognized as a latent and progressive disease which may first become detectable only after the cessation of coal mine dust exposure"); see also Coleman, 345 F.3d at 863 ("Because pneumoconiosis is a latent and progressive disease, a miner's condition may worsen over time."); Lovilia Coal Co., 109 F.3d at 450 (same); Lisa Lee Mines, 86 F.3d at 1364 (same); Swarrow, 72 F.3d at 314 (" [P]neumoconiosis is a latent dust disease.... Congress, in enacting the BLBA, recognized the perniciously progressive nature of the disease." (citations omitted)).
First, U.S. Steel claims that the ALJ erred by failing to properly weigh all of the medical evidence together in determining whether a preponderance of the evidence supported a finding of pneumoconiosis. U.S. Steel urges this Court to adopt the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit in Island Creek Coal Co. v. Compton, 211 F.3d 203 (4th Cir. 2000). In Compton, the court concluded that an adjudicator was obliged to weigh, in concert, all of the medical evidence pertaining to the disease, rather than evaluating separately each category of evidence. See id. at 208-09. Thus, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the ALJ in Compton erred by failing to weigh x-ray and medical opinion evidence together—instead, looking at each form of evidence alone—and remanded to the ALJ to do so. Id. at 211.
While Compton is not binding authority, even if it were, U.S. Steel's argument would still fail. In the portion of his decision labeled "Pneumoconiosis," the ALJ stated that " [c]hest x-ray and physician opinion evidence are the means available to Claimant to prove the existence of pneumoconiosis. § 718.202(a)." ALJ Order at 3. The ALJ then went on to review all of the x-ray evidence, as well as all of the medical opinion evidence. After weighing the two forms of evidence, in concert, the ALJ credited some opinions and rejected others:
I find the opinions of occupational/preventative medicine specialist Dr. Marder and Claimant's treating physician Dr. Askew the most persuasive. The report of board-certified pulmonary specialist Dr. Cohen supports their conclusions. I find that Claimant has met his burden of proof. Claimant has proved, by the preponderance of the new physician evidence, the existence of pneumoconiosis at § 718.202(a) (4).
I find physician opinion evidence at § 718.202(a) (4) a more probative basis to prove the existence of pneumoconiosis then [sic] chest x-ray evidence at § 718.202(a) (1). Chest x-ray evidence is one type of isolated evidence whereas physician opinion evidence takes into consideration a totality of factors including evidence of impairment and exposures relevant to the broader definition of pneumoconiosis at § 718.201.
Our review of the record shows substantial evidence in support of the conclusion that Jones suffers from pneumoconiosis. Drs. Marder, Askew and Cohen all opined that Jones was afflicted by the ailment, after carefully studying the x-ray evidence and the pulmonary restriction based on various pulmonary and lung-capacity tests. Based on Jones's work history and his history of not smoking, medical studies of coal-dust induced disease, and the test results, Drs. Marder, Askew and Cohen all concluded that Jones's pulmonary restriction was a result of pneumoconiosis. The ALJ found the opinions of Drs. Marder, Askew and Cohen to be well reasoned and credible, and accorded them more weight than the opinions of Dr. Fino and Dr. Goldstein. We cannot second guess the credibility determinations made by the trial court unless they were unsupported by substantial evidence. See Jordan v. Benefits Review Bd. of the U.S. Dep't of Labor, 876 F.2d 1455, 1460 (11th Cir. 1989) ("The question of whether the medical report is sufficiently documented and reasoned is one of credibility for the fact finder."); Taylor v. Ala. By-Products Corp., 862 F.2d 1529, 1531 n. 1 (11th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) ("We do not question the weight accorded to the evidence by the ALJ, for such is not within our scope of review."). And the opinions of Drs. Marder, Askew and Cohen were amply supported in the record. Taken as a whole, they provide a sufficient evidential foundation for the ALJ's conclusion.14
There was substantial (indeed, the same) evidence to support the ALJ's determinations. The medical opinions of Drs. Marder, Askew and Cohen uniformly concluded that Jones was totally disabled after considering the results of Jones's pulmonary function tests and his other medical records. These doctors concluded that, given the restrictions in Jones's lung functioning capacity, he could no longer perform the rigorous and strenuous work associated with the job of a faceman in the coal mines of Alabama. These doctors were entitled to opine about the extent of Jones's disability by comparing his condition with the requirements of his last mine job. Indeed, a panel of this Court has held that total disability in black lung cases must be decided on a case-by-case basis and by comparing the miner's pulmonary limitations to the specific exertional demands of his last job. Jim Walter Res. v. Allen, 995 F.2d 1027, 1029 (11th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (citing Brown v. Cedar Coal Co., 8 BLR 1-86, 1-88 (1985) ("The determination of what is a claimant's usual coal mine employment is made on a case by case basis and will vary depending on the facts in each case."); Shortridge, 4 BLR at 1-534, 1-539 (" [U]sual coal mine work is the most recent job the miner performed regularly and over a substantial period of time.")).15
U.S. Steel has further refined its argument, suggesting that we should reverse because the ALJ also erred in determining that pneumoconiosis contributed to Jones's disability. We are unconvinced. The issue of disability causation is governed by 20 C.F.R. § 718.204(c) (1), which provides, in pertinent part:
20 C.F.R. § 718.204(c) (1) (emphasis added). As the Department of Labor has observed, "evidence that pneumoconiosis makes only a negligible, inconsequential, or insignificant contribution to the miner's total disability is insufficient to establish that pneumoconiosis is a substantially contributing cause of that disability." 65 Fed. Reg. 79,946 (Dec. 20, 2000) (emphasis added). We, too, have recognized that disability causation should be measured against a "substantially contributing cause" standard. See Lollar, 893 F.2d at 1265 (disability causation can be proved if claimant "establish [es] that his pneumoconiosis was a substantial contributing factor in the causation of his total pulmonary disability" (emphasis added)); see also Black Diamond Coal, 95 F.3d at 1084.
The relevant regulation, 20 C.F.R. § 725.309, was revised in 2000, and "duplicate" claims filed after January 19, 2001 are now denominated "subsequent" claims. However, because Jones's claim was filed on August 2, 1999, the prior version of § 725.309 applies, and, accordingly, we refer to Jones's second claim as a "duplicate" claim. Prior to the 2000 revisions, 20 C.F.R. § 725.309(d) provided in relevant part that " [i]f the earlier miner's claim has been finally denied, the later claim shall also be denied, on the grounds of the prior denial, unless ... there has been a material change in conditions...." 20 C.F.R. § 725.309(d) (1999). Unless otherwise noted, all references to § 725.309(d) in this opinion refer to the version of the regulation in effect before the 2000 Amendments
The procedure miners may use to bring a duplicate or second claim is similar to the one used when filing an initial claim. The duplicate claim is first filed with the District Director, who develops and processes the evidence associated with the claim. 20 C.F.R. § 725.401 et seq. After the parties have submitted evidence, the District Director will issue a proposed decision and order resolving the claim by awarding or denying benefits. Id. § 725.418. Within 30 days of the issuance of a proposed decision and order, either party may request a revision to the proposed decision and order or may request a hearing. Id. § 725.419. If any party requests a hearing, or if the District Director determines that a hearing is necessary, the claim is referred to the Chief Administrative Law Judge, id. § 725.451, who designates an ALJ to hear the claim, see id. § 725.452. Notice of the hearing is given to all parties, see id. § 725.453, and after all the evidence has been received, the witnesses heard, and the pleadings and briefs submitted to the ALJ, the hearing is terminated, id. § 725.475, and within 20 days the ALJ will issue a decision and order awarding benefits or rejecting the claim. See id. § 725.476. Parties then have 30 days to request a reconsideration of the ALJ's decision, see id. § 725.479, or to appeal the decision to the BRB, see id. § 725.481. Following the BRB's decision, aggrieved parties have 60 days to file a petition for review of the BRB's decision within the appropriate United States Court of Appeals. See id. § 725.482.
A B-reader is a physician who has demonstrated proficiency in assessing and classifying lung x-ray evidence for pneumoconiosis by passing an exam established by the National Institute of Safety and Health and administered by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. 20 C.F.R. § 718.202(a) (1) (ii) (E); 42 C.F.R. § 37.51. Courts generally accord greater weight to x-ray readings performed by B-readers See Swarrow, 72 F.3d at 310 n. 3.
Chest x-rays used to establish pneumoconiosis are categorized according to the classification system contained in a document entitled the International Labour Organization Union Internationale Contra Cancer/Cincinnati (1971) International Classification of Radiographs of the Pneumoconioses ("the ILO Classification System")See 20 C.F.R. § 718.102(b); see also Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ("The ILO classification system uses a 12-step scale to measure the concentration of opacities (i.e., areas of darkness or shading) on chest x-rays. A 1/0 rating is the fourth most severe of the ratings."). Chest x-rays classified as category 0-, 0/0, or 0/1 are read as negative for pneumoconiosis. 20 C.F.R. § 718.102(b). A 1/0 classification indicates the presence of pneumoconiosis. Id.
Title 20 C.F.R. § 718.202(a) (4) specifically provides that a diagnosis of pneumoconiosis based on "sound medical judgment" and "objective medical evidence" may be made "notwithstanding a negative X-ray."
Of all the Circuits to consider this issue, only the Tenth Circuit has rejected the Director's "one element" test. In Wyoming Fuel Co., the Tenth Circuit advanced a standard in which a material change is established only if the miner can show, by comparing the old and new evidence, that the specific elements adjudicated against him in the first claim have worsened since the initial denial. 90 F.3d at 1511. The Tenth Circuit recognized that if a particular element was not decided in the first claim, then res judicata does not require the miner to show a change in that element, since there can be no issue preclusion as to that specific element. Id. at 1511 n. 13. However, under the Wyoming Fuel Co. standard, a miner must show a material change in each element that actually was adjudicated against him, as opposed to showing a change as to only a single element. Id. at 1511.
The Sixth Circuit, too, has adopted the Director's "one element" test, although it appears to have applied a modified version of the test. In Sharondale, the Sixth Circuit first observed that it was Chevron-bound to defer to the Director's construction of the regulation unless it was unreasonable. 42 F.3d at 998. The court also recognized that when a miner filed a second claim more than a year after the first, the res judicata effect of the first claim may not be implicated, because the miner's physical condition may be substantially different, given the progressive nature of pneumoconiosis. Id.
Id. at 999 (footnote omitted). Although the Sharondale court expressly adopted the "one element" test, the Sixth Circuit appears to have required more than simply establishing one element that was previously adjudicated against the claimant. Specifically, Sharondale appeared to require a coal miner to make the further showing of actual change in that element, by conducting a comparison of the evidence between the earlier and later claims on the element in question. Both the Fourth and Eighth Circuits have rejected the additional requirement that the Sharondale decision appears to have imposed. See Lisa Lee Mines, 86 F.3d at 1363 n. 11 ("We do not endorse, however, the closing paragraph of Sharondale Corp., 42 F.3d at 999, where, after adopting the Director's standard, the Sixth Circuit seems to have required consideration of the evidence behind the earlier denial to determine whether it `differ [s] qualitatively' from the new evidence."); Lovilia Coal Co., 109 F.3d at 454 n. 7.
The precise contours of the additional showing required in the Sixth Circuit under Sharondale have given rise to some controversy, even within the Sixth Circuit. In Tennessee Consol. Coal Co. v. Kirk, 264 F.3d 602, 608-10 (6th Cir. 2001), the Court followed Sharondale in requiring a comparison of the old and new medical data, in addition to the ordinary requirements of the "one element" test. However, in Grundy Mining Co. v. Flynn, another panel of the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that the interpretation of Sharondale had caused some confusion. 353 F.3d 467, 478 & n. 5 (6th Cir. 2003). Two judges in Grundy Mining agreed that Sharondale required a comparison of old and new medical data on top of the basic requirements of the "one element" standard, but a third judge, concurring, suggested that the overall thrust of Sharondale was to adopt the traditional "one element" standard, with no requirement of an additional showing. 353 F.3d at 486 (Moore, J., concurring). Regardless of the precise parameters of the standard used in the Sixth Circuit, it is clear that that Circuit has adopted — at least in real measure — the Director's "one element" standard.
In Peabody Coal, the Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, described the "one element" test in these terms: "If by that the Director means that at least one element that might independently have supported a decision against the claimant has now been shown to be different (implying that the earlier denial was correct), then we would agree that the `one element' test is the correct one." 117 F.3d at 1009. In a more recent case, Midland Coal Co. v. Director, OWCP, 358 F.3d 486 (7th Cir. 2004), a panel of the Seventh Circuit referring to Peabody Coal concluded that "an en banc decision of this court had ... squarely [held] that traditional principles of res judicata do not bar a subsequent application for black lung benefits where a miner demonstrates a material change in at least one of the conditions of entitlement." Id. at 489.
Moreover, as the ALJ noted, under 20 C.F.R. § 718.203(b), a miner with pneumonoconiosis who has worked for 10 or more years in coal mines is entitled to a rebuttable presumption that his pneumoconiosis arose from coal mine employment. There is substantial evidence on this record to support the ALJ's conclusion that U.S. Steel failed to rebut the presumption that Jones's pneumoconiosis arose out of his coal mine employment See ALJ Order at 8.