Source: http://sc.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20150130_0000356.DSC.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2017-04-24 11:15:23
Document Index: 446909055

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 636', '§ 405', 'art 404', '§ 405', '§ 405', '§ 405', '§ 405']

Melissa Tomeki Evette Joyner, Plaintiff,v.Carolyn W. Colvin, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
This matter is before the Court for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(a), D.S.C.[1] Plaintiff brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) to obtain judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("the Commissioner"), denying Plaintiff's claim for disability insurance benefits ("DIB").[2] For the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that the decision of the Commissioner be affirmed.
On February 13, 2011, Plaintiff filed an application for DIB, alleging disability beginning October 1, 2010. [R. 125-32.] The claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration by the Social Security Administration ("the Administration"). [R. 67-68.] Plaintiff requested a hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ") and, on March 20, 2012, Plaintiff appeared and testified before ALJ Maria C. Northingham, in Augusta, Georgia. [R. 29-66.] Plaintiff was informed of her right to representation and chose to appear and testify without the assistance of an attorney or other representative. [R. 32, 124.]
On August 3, 2012, the ALJ issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled. [R. 9-23.] At Step 1, [3] the ALJ found Plaintiff last met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act ("the Act") on December 31, 2014, and had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since October 1, 2010, the alleged onset date. [R. 11, Findings 1 & 2.] At Step 2, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the severe impairment of mild lumbar disc bulge. [R. 11, Finding 3.] The ALJ also found Plaintiff had non-medically determinable impairments of hand pain and carpal tunnel syndrome.[4] [R. 12.] Further, the ALJ found Plaintiff's mild right knee arthritis was a non-severe impairment. [R. 12, Finding 4.] At Step 3, the ALJ determined Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the criteria of one of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. [R. 12, Finding 5.] The ALJ specifically considered Listing 1.04. [R. 12.]
The claimant is capable of performing a wide range of individual is limited to light work with the ability to occasionally lift and/or carry up to 20 pounds as defined in the DOT and regulations, as well as, lift and/or carry 10 pounds frequently. The claimant can also do sedentary work as defined in the DOT and regulations. She has no limitations for sitting in an 8-hour workday. She is capable of standing and/or walking for up to 6 hours in an 8-hour workday. She is able to perform occasional postural functions of climbing ramps or stairs, balancing, kneeling, crouching, and stooping. She can do work that does not require crawling and no climbing of ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. In the course of work, she can do work that permits her with the opportunity to optionally alternate positions from sitting to standing, but such would not cause her to be off tasks. She is capable of performing no constant, fine, bilateral manipulations, but gross handling is unlimited. The claimant is able to perform sustained work activity on a regular and continuous basis for 8 hours per day, 40 hours per week with normal breaks being sufficient.
[R. 12-13, Finding 6.] Based on this RFC, at Step 4, the ALJ determined Plaintiff was capable of performing her past relevant work as a cashier. [R. 20, Finding 7.] In the alternative, the ALJ determined that considering Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and RFC, there were jobs in significant numbers in the national economy that the Plaintiff could perform. [R. 21.] Thus, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not been under a disability, as defined in the Act, from October 1, 2010, through the date of the decision. [R. 22, Finding 8.]
Plaintiff requested Appeals Council review of the ALJ's decision, and the Council declined review. [R. 1-3.] Plaintiff, acting pro se, filed this action for judicial review on November 1, 2013 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). [Doc. 1.]
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, argues she is not able to work as a result of the pain she experiences from pinched nerves in her back and neck. [Doc. 30 at 1.] Plaintiff contends that she is a single mother of three who has worked two jobs at times to provide for her family. [ Id. ] Plaintiff states she has seen numerous doctors, has had injections in her neck and back that have not relieved her pain, and has been on ten different prescriptions for pain which cause her to sleep for long periods of time. [ Id. at 2.] Plaintiff also states she has to pay for treatment out of pocket and does not have the finances to continue paying. [ Id. at 2-3.]
The Commissioner argues the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence and that the ALJ did not err in finding Plaintiff's allegation that her pain is disabling was not fully credible. [Doc. 32 at 3-9.]
42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A reviewing court may remand a case to the Commissioner on the basis of new evidence only if four prerequisites are met: (1) the evidence is relevant to the determination of disability at the time the application was first filed; (2) the evidence is material to the extent that the Commissioner's decision might reasonably have been different had the new evidence been before him; (3) there is good cause for the claimant's failure to submit the evidence when the claim was before the Commissioner; and (4) the claimant made at least a general showing of the nature of the new evidence to the reviewing court. Borders v. Heckler, 777 F.2d 954, 955 (4th Cir. 1985) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Mitchell v. Schweiker, 699 F.2d 185, 188 (4th Cir. 1983); Sims v. Harris, 631 F.2d 26, 28 (4th Cir. 1980); King v. Califano, 599 F.2d 597, 599 (4th Cir. 1979)), superseded by amendment to statute, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), as recognized in Wilkins v. Sec'y, Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 925 F.2d 769, 774 (4th Cir. 1991).[5] With remand under sentence six, the parties must return to the court after remand to file modified findings of fact. Melkonyan, 501 U.S. at 98. The reviewing court retains jurisdiction pending ...