Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/95/272/546981/
Timestamp: 2020-08-08 20:55:48
Document Index: 134040366

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1291', '§ 1415', '§ 1415', '§ 1415', '§ 1415', '§ 1983', '§ 794', 'art:\n29', '§ 794', '§ 504', '§ 12132', '§ 1415', '§ 1415', '§ 1983', '§ 794', '§ 794', '§ 794', '§ 300', '§ 300', '§ 300', '§ 1415', '§ 1415', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1415', '§ 1983', '§ 1415', '§ 300', '§ 300']

Jeremy H., a Minor, by His Father and Next Friend, W.e.hunter; W.e. Hunter, on His Own Behalf; Rita Hunter v. Mount Lebanon School District; Robert German, Personallyand in His Official Capacity As a Member of the Mountlebanon School Board; Judy Mcverry, Personally and in Herofficial Capacity As a Member of the Mount Lebanon Schoolboard; Marie Loretta Humphreys, Personally and in Herofficial Capacity As a Member of the Mount Lebanon Schoolboard; Henry J. Kaski, Personally and in His Officialcapacity As a Member of the Mount Lebanon School Board;carol J. Walton, Personally and in Her Official Capacity Asa Member of the Mount Lebanon School Board; Templetonsmith, Personally and in His Official Capacity As a Memberof the Mount Lebanon School Board; Jean Palcho, Personallyand in Her Official Capacity As a Member of the Mountlebanon School Board; Beverly Maurhoff, Personally and Inher Official Capacity As a Member of the Mount Lebanonschool Board; Dr. Glenn Smartschan, Personally and in Hisofficial Capacity As Superintendent of the Mount Lebanonschool Board; Dr. Deborah Allen, Personally and in Herofficial Capacity As Director of Pupil Services of the Mountlebanon School District; Dr. Monica Sullivan, Personallyand in Her Official Capacity As Supervisor of Specialeducation of the Mount Lebanon School District; Dr. Lindamiller, Personally and in Her Official Capacity Assupervisor of Special Education of the Mount Lebanon School District,jeremy H., a Minor, and W.e. Hunter, Appellants, 95 F.3d 272 (3d Cir. 1996) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Third Circuit › 1996 › Jeremy H., a Minor, by His Father and Next Friend, W.e.hunter; W.e. Hunter, on His Own Behalf; Rita...
Jeremy H., a Minor, by His Father and Next Friend, W.e.hunter; W.e. Hunter, on His Own Behalf; Rita Hunter v. Mount Lebanon School District; Robert German, Personallyand in His Official Capacity As a Member of the Mountlebanon School Board; Judy Mcverry, Personally and in Herofficial Capacity As a Member of the Mount Lebanon Schoolboard; Marie Loretta Humphreys, Personally and in Herofficial Capacity As a Member of the Mount Lebanon Schoolboard; Henry J. Kaski, Personally and in His Officialcapacity As a Member of the Mount Lebanon School Board;carol J. Walton, Personally and in Her Official Capacity Asa Member of the Mount Lebanon School Board; Templetonsmith, Personally and in His Official Capacity As a Memberof the Mount Lebanon School Board; Jean Palcho, Personallyand in Her Official Capacity As a Member of the Mountlebanon School Board; Beverly Maurhoff, Personally and Inher Official Capacity As a Member of the Mount Lebanonschool Board; Dr. Glenn Smartschan, Personally and in Hisofficial Capacity As Superintendent of the Mount Lebanonschool Board; Dr. Deborah Allen, Personally and in Herofficial Capacity As Director of Pupil Services of the Mountlebanon School District; Dr. Monica Sullivan, Personallyand in Her Official Capacity As Supervisor of Specialeducation of the Mount Lebanon School District; Dr. Lindamiller, Personally and in Her Official Capacity Assupervisor of Special Education of the Mount Lebanon School District,jeremy H., a Minor, and W.e. Hunter, Appellants, 95 F.3d 272 (3d Cir. 1996)
US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit - 95 F.3d 272 (3d Cir. 1996) Argued March 21, 1996. Decided Sept. 12, 1996
On appeal, the Hunters assert that these findings were error. We have jurisdiction over the Hunters' appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of a Rule 12(b) (6) dismissal is plenary. See Scattergood v. Perelman, 945 F.2d 618, 621 (3d Cir. 1991).
As the final stage of this enforcement procedure, IDEA permits "any party aggrieved by the findings and decision" of the state appellate procedure to "bring a civil action with respect to the complaint presented pursuant to this section, which action may be brought in any State court of competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the United States without regard to the amount in controversy." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (2).7 IDEA further provides that, in such an action, "the court shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings, shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party, and, basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (2).
In part, the Hunters' complaint seeks to contest adverse decisions by the state hearing officer and the appellate panel.8 To the extent that this is the relief that the Hunters seek, their complaint would seem to be properly brought under § 1415(e) (2). However, the Hunters' complaint also apparently seeks in part to enforce elements of the decision of the state administrative process.9 There may be some question whether this aspect of the complaint can properly be pursued under § 1415(e) (2);10 but the question is not one we need to resolve in the context of this case, since, as we note hereafter (see infra, typescript at 16-17), section 1983 (42 U.S.C. § 1983) provides an adequate vehicle for a suit to enforce an IDEA administrative decision.
IDEA sets forth a positive right to a "free appropriate public education." By contrast, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C § 794, also invoked by the Hunters, is cast in negative terms, barring all federally funded entities (governmental or otherwise) from discriminating on the basis of disability. See W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 492 (3d Cir. 1995). Section 504 states, in relevant part:
29 U.S.C. § 794(a).11 We noted in Matula that, as this portion of the Rehabilitation Act has been interpreted, " [t]here appear to be few differences, if any, between IDEA's affirmative duty and § 504's negative prohibition." 67 F.3d at 492-93. We also found in Matula that both injunctive relief and monetary damages are available under section 504. See Matula, 67 F.3d at 494.
The Hunters do not cite a specific provision of the ADA in their complaint. We will assume, however, that it was their intention to rely upon 42 U.S.C. § 12132, which extends the nondiscrimination rule of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act to services provided by any "public entity" (without regard to whether the entity is a recipient of federal funds). See Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 331-32 (3d Cir. 1995). Section 12132 states:
In the present case, whether or not an IDEA decision of a state hearing officer or appellate body is enforceable under IDEA directly, such a decision would seem to be enforceable under section 1983. The Fourth Circuit found, in Robinson v. Pinderhughes, 810 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1987), that a section 1983 action could be brought to enforce the decision of an IDEA administrative proceeding.12 We agree with the reasoning of Pinderhughes, and note that the Supreme Court's present methodology for ascertaining whether a section 1983 action is available to redress a violation of federal law produces the same result.13 III. THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
In Tokarcik v. Forest Hills School District, 665 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1981), this court found, drawing on Pennsylvania law, that either a two-year or a six-year limitations period applied to the filing of IDEA actions.14 We did not then have occasion to decide between these two periods, although we suggested that a two-year period might be appropriate. See id. at 454-55.15
IDEA requires, in section 1415(e) (2), that an aggrieved party must invoke a state's administrative procedures before bringing an IDEA claim in state or federal court. Section 1415(f) of IDEA adds to this the requirement that, before bringing claims under other statutes that "seek [ ] relief that is also available under this subchapter," the administrative procedures set forth in section 1415 "shall be exhausted to the same extent as would be required had the action been brought under this subchapter." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f). This provision bars plaintiffs from circumventing IDEA's exhaustion requirement by taking claims that could have been brought under IDEA and repackaging them as claims under some other statute--e.g., section 1983, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, or the ADA. See W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484 495-96 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing the legislative history of § 1415(f) as stating that "parents alleging violations of section 504 [of the Rehabilitation Act] and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are required to exhaust administrative remedies before commencing separate actions in court where exhaustion would be required under [IDEA].") (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 99-296, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1985)); Hope v. Cortines, 69 F.3d 687, 688 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that exhaustion is required as to ADA claims).
After finding that the statute of limitations barred all of the Hunters' IDEA claims based on events occurring before November 17, 1992, the district court went on to conclude that all of their claims based upon events occurring after that date were barred for failure to comply with IDEA's exhaustion requirement, as the only administrative proceeding that the Hunters had initiated began much earlier, in October 1991. The district court also, citing Spence v. Straw, 54 F.3d 196, 201 (3d Cir. 1995), held that the plaintiffs were required to exhaust the administrative remedies provided by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 before bringing their ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims, and that the plaintiffs' failure to do so barred those claims. We will begin by considering the latter holding.
The exhaustion rule applied in Spence was the result of what we termed an "incongruent enforcement scheme." 54 F.3d 196, 199 (3d Cir. 1995). The Rehabilitation Act provides two avenues by which a plaintiff may sue to redress employment discrimination. The Act contains a provision, section 501, directed specifically at employment discrimination. See 29 U.S.C. § 794. Violations of this provision may be redressed through section 505(a) (1), which permits plaintiffs to invoke " [t]he remedies, procedures and rights" set forth in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a) (1). Title VII's exhaustion requirement therefore applies to plaintiffs suing under section 501. The Act also, however, has a general provision, section 504, which bars discrimination against the disabled (including employment discrimination) in all federally-funded programs. Violations of section 504 may be redressed through section 505(a) (2), which permits plaintiffs to invoke " [t]he remedies, procedures and rights" not of Title VII, but of Title VI, a title which includes no exhaustion requirement. 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a) (2). Although this structure created the appearance that a plaintiff might be able to circumvent the exhaustion requirement applicable to section 501 through the simple expedient of suing under section 504, in Spence we found that it was appropriate to conclude that Congress intended to require that a plaintiff bringing an employment discrimination claim under either section 501 or section 504 first exhaust her administrative remedies. See Spence, 54 F.3d at 199-202.
The Ninth Circuit, in Hoeft v. Tucson Unified School Dist., 967 F.2d 1298 (9th Cir. 1992), suggested in dicta that a plaintiff could, as to certain types of claims, be required to exhaust the Education Department General Administrative Regulations (or EDGAR) procedures, a regulatory forerunner of the present sections 300.660-300.662. See Hoeft, 967 F.2d at 1307-08.19 The Hoeft court noted that this process might serve as an alternative exhaustion mechanism to IDEA's own administrative procedures in certain cases, concluding that " [w]hether to require or to accept exhaustion of the EDGAR procedure as a substitute for exhausting IDEA procedures in challenges to facially invalid policies, however, is a determination which must be made on a case-by-case basis." 967 F.2d at 1308. Hoeft did not, however, cite any legal authority, either in the EDGAR regulations or in the text of IDEA, under which a court might require exhaustion of EDGAR procedures. Nor can we discern any such authority, either as to the previous EDGAR procedures or as to the present §§ 300.660-300.662. Indeed, the text of §§ 300.660-300.662, and the various statements made in the Federal Register as they took their present shape, both evince an expectation that invocation of the complaint procedures they establish will be elective, not mandatory.20
We reach this conclusion with some reluctance, as it could entail further delay in an already much-delayed case. However, the issue of MLSD's involvement in evaluation and programming for Jeremy seems to be central to the Hunters' complaint. Accordingly, the administrative process should be allowed an opportunity to address that central issue. A principal purpose of IDEA's administrative procedure is to permit "state and local education agencies [,] in cooperation with the parents or guardian of the child," to take "primary responsibility for formulating the education to be accorded a handicapped child," Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207, 102 S. Ct. 3034, 3051, 73 L. Ed. 2d 690 (1982); thus, we find that it is appropriate to permit the Commonwealth to address this issue before it is considered in the district court.23 We also note that the IDEA hearing and appeal process currently includes strict time limits, and that the entire exhaustion process should take no longer than a few months if these limits are observed. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.512 (1995).24
We have described an IEP as "a detailed written statement arrived at by a multi-disciplinary team summarizing the child's abilities, outlining the goals for the child's education and specifying the services the child will receive." Polk v. Central Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 173 (3d Cir. 1988)
Three of the remaining eight grounds for dismissal were directed at particular damages claims in the Hunters' complaint (their claims for compensatory education, compensatory damages, and punitive damages). One ground for dismissal (which might have been better styled as a motion to strike) was directed at the plaintiff's demand for a jury trial. Three were directed at particular parties (the parent-plaintiffs, the individual defendants in their official capacities, and the individual defendants in their personal capacities). The last asserted that the IDEA was the exclusive remedy for violations of a disabled student's right to public education, and so sought to dismiss the Hunters' claims under section 1983, the ADA, and the Rehabilitation Act.App. at 125-29. (We note--without meaning to comment on the others--that the last of these contentions has recently been rejected by this court. See Susan N. v. Wilson School District, 70 F.3d 751, 763 (3d Cir. 1995).)
The argument against the applicability of § 1415(e) (2) would be that the Hunters, in seeking judicial assistance to enforce portions of the IDEA administrative decision, were not persons "aggrieved by the findings and decision" within the meaning of § 1415(e) (2), but rather persons aggrieved by the failure of the local school officials to implement the decision. The counter-argument would be that the Hunters were "aggrieved" by the fact that the administrative orders favorable to the Hunters contained no enforcement mechanisms
Four district courts have also come to this conclusion. See Hoekstra v. Independent School District No. 283, 916 F. Supp. 941, 942 (D. Minn. 1996) (forthcoming); Reid v. Board of Educ. of Lincolnshire-Prairie View, 765 F. Supp. 965, 969 (N.D. Ill. 1991); Grace B. v. Lexington School Committee, 762 F. Supp. 416, 418 (D. Mass. 1991); Blazejewski v. Board of Education of Allegany Central School District, 599 F. Supp. 975, 979 (W.D.N.Y. 1985)
That methodology was set forth in Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 114 S. Ct. 2068, 129 L. Ed. 2d 93 (1994), in which Justice Souter said, writing for a unanimous Court:
We have, it is true, recognized that even the broad statutory text [of section 1983] does not authorize a suit for every alleged violation of federal law. A particular statutory provision, for example, may be so manifestly precatory that it could not fairly be read to impose a "binding obligation [ ]" on a governmental unit, Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 26, 101 S. Ct. 1531, 1544, 67 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1981), or its terms may be so "vague and amorphous" that determining whether a "deprivation" might have occurred would strain judicial competence. See Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority, 479 U.S. 418, 431-432, 107 S. Ct. 766, 774-775, 93 L. Ed. 2d 781 (1987). And Congress itself might make it clear that violation of a statute will not give rise to liability under § 1983, either by express words or by providing a comprehensive alternative enforcement scheme. See Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U.S. 1, 101 S. Ct. 2615, 69 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1981). But apart from these exceptional cases, § 1983 remains a generally and presumptively available remedy for claimed violations of federal law.
S. Ct. at 2083
In the present case, section 1415's hearing and appeal procedures cannot be said to be precatory. Not only would it be curious for Congress to have established section 1415's detailed procedural apparatus solely in order to generate advisory opinions, but section 1415 provides (1) that the results of a hearing "shall be final," except that the parties to that hearing may appeal, and (2) that the results of the appeal "shall be final," except that the parties may bring a civil action. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (1). It also seems plain that section 1415 provides a judicially applicable standard. The state administrative process provides the parties and the court with a detailed interpretation of the parties' IDEA obligations, permitting a court to determine readily whether compliance has occurred. Finally, Congress has not made it "clear that violation of [IDEA] will not give rise to liability under § 1983, either by express words or by providing a comprehensive alternative enforcement scheme." Livadas, 512 U.S. at ----, 114 S. Ct. at 2083. Indeed, this court recently found that, in enacting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f), Congress "explicitly approved" the assertion of section 1983 claims predicated upon IDEA. See Matula, 67 F.3d at 494 (emphasis omitted).
The first approach would also sit most uneasily with Bernardsville Board of Education v. J.H., 42 F.3d 149 (3d Cir. 1994), in which this court found that parents' initiation of the state administrative process is governed by an equitable standard, which requires that the parents invoke their administrative remedies within a reasonable time after the events complained of occur. See id. at 157-60
The regulation's text provides only that " [a]n organization or individual may file a signed written complaint," 34 C.F.R. § 300.662 (emphasis added), not that an organization or individual must do so in order to bring a subsequent lawsuit
As noted in the text (see supra, typescript at 13-14, 16-17), we have found it unnecessary to decide whether the Hunters' enforcement claim may be brought only under section 1983, or whether an enforcement action is also available directly under section 1415. Should it be the case that section 1983 is the only available basis for the Hunters' enforcement claim, however, we observe that the policies of section 1983 strongly disfavor the imposition of additional exhaustion requirements. See Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516, 102 S. Ct. 2557, 2568, 73 L. Ed. 2d 172 (1982); see also Mrs. W. v. Tirozzi, 832 F.2d 748, 758 (2d Cir. 1987) (rejecting, on this ground, the argument that a predecessor of 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.660-300.662 must be exhausted before a plaintiff may bring a section 1983 action predicated on an asserted IDEA violation).
The specialized expertise of state education officials is also likely to be helpful in determining (1) whether it is necessary to select an entity other than MLSD to perform evaluation and programming for Jeremy, and (2) if so, what entity or person should be selected. Specialized fact-finding of this type is an important function of IDEA's administrative hearing process. Cf. Lester H. v. Gilhool, 916 F.2d 865, 869 (3d Cir. 1990) (referring to "the peculiar expertise of an administrative hearing officer")