Source: https://www.flra.gov/decisions/v43/43-042.html
Timestamp: 2017-01-16 12:52:11
Document Index: 238643988

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 4209', '§ 4208', '§ 4209', '§ 4209', '§ 4209', '§ 4209', '§ 4209', '§ 4208', '§ 4208', '§ 4208', '§ 4208', '§ 4208', '§ 4208', '§ 4209', '§ 4209', '§\n4209', '§ 4209', '§ 4209', '§ 4209', '§ 4209', '§ 4208', '§ 4209', '§ 5545', 'art 550', '§\n5343', 'art 532', 'art 550', '§ 5545', '§ 550', '§ 5545', '§ 5545', '§ 5545', 'art 550', '§ 5545', '§ 5343', '§ 532', 'art 532', '§ 531', '§ 531', '§ 430', '§\n430', '§ 430', '§ 531', '§ 531', '§ 531', '§ 531', '§ 430', '§ 430', '§ 430', 'art 430', '§ 430', '§ 430', '§ 430', '§ 430', '§ 430', '§ 430', '§ 6302', '§ 6302', '§ 4209', '§ 4208', '§ 4209', '§\n113', '§ 5545', 'art 532', '§ 531', 'art 430', '§ 430', '§ 430']

43:0414(42)NG - - NAGE and VA, Washington, DC - - 1991 FLRAdec NG - - v43 p414 | FLRA
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The decision of the Authority follows: 43 FLRA No. 42 FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY WASHINGTON, D.C. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF GOVERNMENT
(Agency) 0-NG-1947
0-NG-1949 December 13, 1991 DECISION AND ORDER ON NEGOTIABILITY
proposals in two petitions for review which we have consolidated for
decision. For the following reasons, we conclude that Proposal 1, which would
require that child care services be provided at each of the Agency's facilities
for fees which are comparable to fees charged at similar Department of Defense
(DoD) facilities in the area, is negotiable. We find that Proposal 2, which
would require that GS and WG employees receive hazard pay differentials or
environmental differential pay for exposure to tobacco smoke, is negotiable.
Proposal 3, which would require that employees receive a quality step increase
or a cash award for superior or outstanding performance, is nonnegotiable
because it is inconsistent with Government-wide regulations. Proposal 4, which
applies when the Agency decides that an employee's services are not needed on a
particular day and which would require the Agency to permit the employee to
remain on duty or grant administrative leave, is negotiable. II. Proposal 1 Child Care Article Twenty[-]four hour a day child care will be available at each facility
for unit employee's [sic] children. The fee for child care will be comparable
to fees charged at Department of Defense Facilities in the
area. A. Positions of the Parties 1. The Agency The Agency contends that Proposal 1 concerns a matter which is
specifically provided for by 38 U.S.C. § 4209(a)(1) and, therefore, does not concern conditions of
employment under section 7103(a)(14)(C) of the Statute. The Agency also
contends that it has "unfettered authority" over child care matters pursuant to
38 U.S.C. § 4208.(2) Statement of
Position at 3. Finally, the Agency argues that the requirement that the
Agency's child care fees be comparable to DoD fees conflicts with 38
U.S.C. § 4209(b).(3) 2. The Union The Union argues that child care facilities concern a condition of
employment and that, although 38 U.S.C. § 4209(a) authorizes the Agency to
operate child care centers, the Agency has "discretion" to negotiate. Reply
Brief at 2. The Union asserts that the proposal constitutes an appropriate
arrangement because it would ameliorate the adverse effect on employees, who
are "subject to shift work, call back and overtime," of having no place to
leave their children when they are assigned work at irregular hours.
Id. B. Analysis and Conclusions 1. Conditions of Employment Under the Statute, parties are obligated to bargain over proposals
concerning conditions of employment, provided that the proposals do not violate
law, Government-wide regulation, or an agency regulation for which there is a
compelling need. Conditions of employment are defined in section 7103(a)(14) of
the Statute as personnel policies, practices, and matters, whether established
by rule, regulation, or otherwise, affecting working conditions. Matters which
Statute. See, for example, American Federation of Government
States Merchant Marine Academy, Kings Point, New York, 39 FLRA 187, 192-93
(1991) (Merchant Marine Academy); American Federation of Government
Center, Sacramento, California, 36 FLRA 894, 899 (1990). The Authority has long held that the establishment of child care
centers at agency facilities concerns a condition of employment. See,
Local 32 and Office of Personnel Management, Washington, D.C., 6 FLRA 423,
424 (1981), aff'd sub nom. Office of Personnel Management v.
FLRA, 706 F.2d 1229 (1983). Although the Agency does not dispute that the
establishment of child care facilities is a condition of employment, the Agency
argues that child care is specifically provided for in Title 38 and, therefore,
that it is nonnegotiable under section 7103(a)(14)(C). Reference to a particular matter in a statute is insufficient to except
that matter from the definition of conditions of employment under section
7103(a)(14)(C). However, where a statute specifically provides for or
establishes a particular aspect of a matter, that aspect of the
matter is not included within the conditions of employment about which an
agency is obligated to bargain. See American Federation of Government
Station, Concord, California, 32 FLRA 1023, 1060-61 (1988), reversed as
to other matters sub nom. Department of the Navy, Naval Weapons Station,
Concord, California, v. FLRA, No. 88-7408 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 1989). 38 U.S.C. § 4209(a)(1) requires that the Agency head, through the
Veterans' Canteen Service (VCS), provide for the operation of child care
centers at the Agency's facilities. In addition, 38 U.S.C. § 4209 requires
that specific requirements be met in the operation of centers. However, that
section does not specify that each facility will have a child care center or
provide the hours of operation of such centers. Because the availability of
child care facilities and the hours of operation of these facilities are not
specified in 38 U.S.C. § 4209, we find that these matters are not
specifically provided for by statute, within the meaning of section
7103(a)(14)(C) of the Statute. Consequently, Proposal 1 concerns conditions of
employment. See, for example, Merchant Marine Academy at
193-94 (pay and pay procedures were not specifically provided for by statute).
2. 38 U.S.C. § 4208 Where law or applicable regulation vests an agency with exclusive
authority or unfettered discretion over a matter, the agency's discretion is
not subject to negotiation. See U.S. Department of Defense, Office of
Dependents Schools and Overseas Education Association, 40 FLRA 425, 442
(1991). The Agency has failed to establish that, under 38 U.S.C. § 4208,
its authority to operate child care centers is not subject to bargaining under
the Statute. We note two things. First, nothing in the plain wording of 38 U.S.C. § 4208 indicates
that the Agency's authority to operate child care centers is to be exercised
without regard to other laws in general or the Statute in particular.
Compare Illinois National Guard v. FLRA, 854 F.2d 1396, 1402
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (where the governing statute provided that agency head was
required to grant compensatory time for overtime work instead of paying
overtime pay and prescribe duty hours for employees "'notwithstanding any other
provision of law,'" court found that the agency head had "unfettered
discretion"); Police Association of the District of Columbia and Department
of the Interior, National Park Service, U.S. Park Police, 18 FLRA 348, 353
(1985) (agency head was found to have "'final and conclusive'" authority
regarding minor fines and suspensions where the governing statute recognized
the agency head had such authority "'notwithstanding . . . any other law'").
Second, nothing in the legislative history of 38 U.S.C. § 4208
indicates that Congress intended that the Agency's discretion concerning child
care facilities be exclusive of other laws, including the Statute. We note the
statement in the legislative history of 38 U.S.C. § 4208 that "[s]ince the
[VCS] is to function as a unit and its operations are of a commercial nature,
it is considered essential that [VCS] have maximum direct control over its
activities." H.R. Rep. No. 2432, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1946
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1433, 1437. This explanation indicates that
Congress intended VCS to operate commercially without restrictions similar to
those imposed by the Agency on other activities. The statement does not support
a conclusion that VCS's control over its activities was intended to be
exercised without regard to the Agency's bargaining obligations under the
Statute. As there is no support in the plain wording of 38 U.S.C. § 4208
or in its legislative history for the Agency's argument that its discretion
over the operation of child care centers is not subject to collective
bargaining, we reject that argument. Consequently, as no other basis for
finding the first sentence of Proposal 1 nonnegotiable is argued or is apparent
to us, we find that it is negotiable. 3. 38 U.S.C. § 4209(b) The Agency asserts that the requirement that the Agency's child care
fees be comparable to DoD child care fees is inconsistent with 38 U.S.C.
§ 4209(b), which requires that the VCS "establish reasonable charges" for child
care services and that the charges for such services, when provided directly by
the VCS, "be sufficient to provide for . . . operating expenses . . . ." The
Agency contends that establishing fees comparable to those at DoD facilities
would result in fees which would not meet the requirement of 38 U.S.C. §
4209(b) because DoD fees are based, under the Military Child Care Act of 1989,
on family income and, if parents participate in the parent participation
program, fees are lower.(4) Statement of
Position at 4. According to the Agency, the Child Care Act requires DoD to set
fees "on the basis of family income, with an exception of lower fees for
parents involved in parent participation programs." Id. We disagree with the Agency's assertion that Proposal 1 is inconsistent
with 38 U.S.C. § 4209(b). There is nothing in the proposal's wording or in
the record which establishes that child care fees could not be established that
satisfied the requirements of both 38 U.S.C. § 4209(b) (fees that are
reasonable and sufficient to provide for operating expenses) and the proposal
(fees that are comparable to fees at DoD child care centers). It is well
established that parties bear the burden of creating a record upon which the
Authority can make a negotiability determination. See, for
example, National Association of Government Employees, Local R1-134 and
U.S. Department of the Navy, Naval Underwater Systems Center, Newport, Rhode
Island, 38 FLRA 589, 596 (1990). A party failing to meet this burden acts
at its peril. Here, nothing in the proposal or the record supports the Agency's
assertion that the second sentence of Proposal 1 would result in fees
inconsistent with 38 U.S.C. § 4209(b). Accordingly, we find that the
second sentence is not inconsistent with 38 U.S.C. § 4209(b). As no other
basis for finding the second sentence of Proposal 1 nonnegotiable is argued or
is apparent to us, we conclude that it is negotiable. In sum, we conclude that Proposal 1 concerns a condition of employment,
within the meaning of section 7103(a)(14) of the Statute. We conclude also that
the Agency does not have exclusive authority to operate child care
centers at Agency facilities under 38 U.S.C. § 4208 and that the second
sentence of Proposal 1 is not inconsistent with 38 U.S.C. § 4209(b). As no
other bases for finding Proposal 1 are argued or apparent to us, we conclude
that the proposal is negotiable. III. Proposal 2 Facility Use Article, Section 4. Employees exposed to smoke in their work areas will be compensated as
follows: GS 25% Hazardous Pay WG 8% Environmental Differential
Pay A. Positions of the Parties 1. The Agency The Agency contends that Proposal 2 is inconsistent with statutory
provisions and Government-wide regulations which preclude hazard pay or
environmental differential pay (EDP) for employees exposed to tobacco smoke in
the workplace. The Agency argues that GS employees are not entitled to a hazard pay
differential for exposure to tobacco smoke because employees' exposure to
tobacco smoke does not meet the requirement of 5 U.S.C. § 5545(d) that
hazard pay be for "hazardous duty 'not usually involved' in the employees'
performance of their duties." Statement of Position at 6. In addition, the
Agency asserts that such exposure is not listed as a hazardous duty in the
schedule in 5 C.F.R. Part 550, subpart I, appendix A. The Agency concedes that
tobacco smoke "contains airborne toxic chemicals." Id. at 5. In
addition, the Agency acknowledges that certain patients in its medical
facilities are permitted to smoke tobacco. However, the Agency asserts that
hazard pay is only authorized "'when there is a possibility of leakage or
spillage[]'" of toxic chemical materials and that employees' exposure to
tobacco smoke "occurs by its diffusion throughout a common airspace[]" rather
than through leakage or spillage. Id. at 6. The Agency argues that the requirement that wage grade (WG) employees
receive EDP for exposure to tobacco smoke is inconsistent with 5 U.S.C. §
5343(c)(4) because exposure to airborne tobacco smoke is not listed as a hazard
in 5 C.F.R. part 532, appendix A. The Agency asserts that EDP is not authorized
for tobacco smoke under the toxic chemical category because the examples given
in appendix A concern "work situations directly involving work with or near
toxic chemicals which are a part of the work itself." Id. at 8. Tobacco
smoke, according to the Agency, is "a by-product of patient activity not
related to [the Agency's] work itself." Id. The Agency also argues that
EDP is authorized only for "'unusually' severe hazards." Id. Because
employees are exposed to tobacco smoke in "everyday life," the Agency asserts
that exposure at the Agency's facilities is not unusual. Id. at 9. 2. The Union The Union contends that GS employees are authorized hazard pay for
exposure to toxic chemicals under 5 C.F.R. part 550, subpart I, appendix A, and
WG employees are entitled to EDP under the Federal Personnel Manual (FPM)
Supplement 532-1, appendix J. The Union contends that whether "exposure to
tobacco smoke and the toxic chemicals contained therein is a work situation"
which falls within those Office of Personnel Management (OPM) categories "is a
proper subject for bargaining." Reply Brief at 4. B. Analysis and Conclusions 1. General Schedule Employees Hazard pay differentials for GS employees are authorized by the
Hazardous Duty Act, 5 U.S.C. § 5545(d).(5) Employees may be
compensated for physical hardship or hazardous duty encountered in the
performance of their duties in two ways. First, if the hazardous duty or
physical hardship is performed "with sufficient regularity," it may be taken
into account in the classification of a position and a differential is not
payable. 5 C.F.R. § 550.904(b)(1). Second, if an employee is occasionally
subjected to unusual physical hardship or hazardous duty, a differential may be
paid under 5 U.S.C. § 5545(d) for any period the employee "is subjected to
physical hardship or hazard not usually involved in carrying out the duties of
his position." The Agency asserts that hazard pay is not payable for GS employees'
exposure to tobacco smoke because such exposure fails to meet the "not usually
involved" requirement of 5 U.S.C. § 5545(d). However, the Agency concedes
that only "certain patients" are permitted to smoke and does not otherwise
establish that employees' exposure to tobacco smoke is more than occasional.
Statement of Position at 5, 6. Accordingly, we reject the Agency's argument
that employees' exposure to tobacco smoke does not satisfy the requirement in 5
U.S.C. § 5545(d) that a differential be paid only for physical hardship or
hazard that is "not usually involved" in the performance of an employee's
duties. We also reject the Agency's argument that GS employees are not entitled
to hazard pay for exposure to tobacco smoke under Part 550, subpart I, appendix
A because, as relevant here, the toxic chemicals in tobacco smoke are not
covered by that regulation. The Agency offers no support for its argument that
it has no authority to determine that hazard pay could not be provided unit
employees under this provision. Moreover, where a GS employee claimed hazard
pay under 5 U.S.C. § 5545(d) for exposure to tobacco smoke under the toxic
chemical category, the Comptroller General held that "whether a particular
situation warrants a payment of a hazardous duty differential is a decision
which is vested primarily in the employing agency . . . ." Comp. Gen. No.
B-197978 (June 5, 1980) (unpublished). We conclude, in agreement with the Comptroller General, that agencies
have discretion to decide whether payment of a hazard pay differential to GS
employees exposed to tobacco smoke is appropriate. Where an agency has
discretion over a matter affecting conditions of employment, the agency is
obligated under the Statute to exercise that discretion through bargaining
unless the governing law or regulation specifically limits the exercise of
discretion to the agency or the proposal or provision is otherwise
nonnegotiable. See, for example, National Association of Government Employees, Local R7-72 and U.S. Department of the Army, Rock
Island Arsenal, Rock Island, Illinois, 42 FLRA 1019, 1025 (1991) (Rock
Island II). Accordingly, we conclude that the portion of Proposal 2
encompassing GS employees is negotiable. 2. Wage Grade Employees OPM is authorized under 5 U.S.C. § 5343(c)(4) to issue regulations
providing EDP for WG employees "for duty involving unusually severe working
conditions or unusually severe hazards[.]" Under 5 C.F.R. § 532.511(a)(1),
a WG employee may be paid an environmental differential for exposure to certain
working conditions or hazards. Category 4 of 5 C.F.R. part 532, appendix A,
Part II, provides EDP when an employee is exposed to toxic chemicals which
present a "high degree hazard." Category 5 permits EDP when employees are
"[w]orking with or in close proximity to . . . toxic chemicals . . . in
situations for which the nature of the work does not require the individual to
be in as direct contact with, or exposure to, the more toxic agents . . . ."
We reject the Agency's argument that EDP for exposure to tobacco smoke
at the Agency is inappropriate because it is "not related" to the "work
itself." Statement of Position at 8. We find no such requirement in Categories
4 or 5 of appendix A. Moreover, the Agency concedes that tobacco smoke contains
toxic chemicals and that unit employees are exposed to smoke at work. Further,
FPM Supplement 532-1, subchapter S8-7g.(3)(6) provides that
the specific work situations for which an environmental differential is payable
under the categories in appendix A may be negotiated. Accordingly, consistent
with long-standing Authority precedent, we conclude that the specific work
situations for which an environmental differential is payable under the
categories in appendix A are negotiable and, therefore, that Proposal 2 is
negotiable. See, for example, U.S. Department of the Navy,
Charleston Naval Shipyard, Charleston, South Carolina and Federal Employees
Metal Trades Council, 39 FLRA 987, 991 (1991); U.S. Department of the
Army, McAlester Army Ammunition Plant, McAlester, Oklahoma, 36 FLRA 434,
438 (1990). IV. Proposal 3 Performance Appraisal Article, Section 9. All unit employees receiving a superior/outstanding rating will
receive a QSI or a cash award. Cash awards will be the same percentage for all
employees. The Union will be provided a list of QSI's, cash awards, and
superior/outstanding ratings. [Only the underscored portions are in dispute.] A. Positions of the Parties 1. The Agency The Agency asserts that proposals requiring quality step increases
(QSI's) are nonnegotiable because they conflict with 5 C.F.R. § 531.504,
"which makes them discretionary."(7) Statement of
Position at 9. The Agency also asserts that to the extent that Proposal 2
"requires a QSI for employees receiving a superior rating," the proposal
conflicts with 5 C.F.R. § 531.504, which limits QSIs "to employees with
outstanding ratings." Id. at 10. In addition, the Agency claims that the
guarantee of a performance award violates 5 C.F.R. § 430.503(c)(1)(8), which "requires 2 levels of management review of each
award[.]" Id. The Agency also contends that Proposal 3 violates 5 C.F.R. §§
430.203, 430.204, 430.206(b) "by causing management to consider non-merit
factors (i.e., factors not reflected in critical elements), in assigning the
ratings mandating the awards, namely the impact of the mandatory awards on the
budget." Id. Finally, the Agency argues that Proposal 3 directly interferes with
budget. The Agency asserts that mandatory awards violate the requirement of 5
C.F.R. §§ 430.503(f) and 430.506(a) that awards programs be
administered within existing appropriated funds. 2. The Union The Union asserts that it intends the terms "superior" and
"outstanding" to be synonymous. Reply Brief at 4. According to the Union, in
the past some Agency officials have used the term "superior" instead of
"outstanding" to describe the highest performance rating level. Id. The
Union argues that Proposal 3 would make an employee receiving an outstanding
performance rating eligible for, but would not mandate, a QSI. The Union claims
that cash awards exist as an "option" to a QSI under the proposal. Id.
at 5. The Union contends that the intent of Proposal 3 "is to ensure fairness
in the distribution of cash awards for performance." Petition for Review at 2.
The Union claims that the proposal "does not mandate a fixed percentage cash
award." Reply Brief at 5. Rather, the Union contends that the proposal "merely
provides that the same percentage be paid to all employees receiving cash
awards for outstanding performance." Id. B. Analysis and Conclusions Proposal 3 requires that all unit employees rated superior/outstanding
receive either a QSI or a cash award. The proposal is negotiable only if one of
the options is negotiable. See, for example, American
Federation of Government Employees, Local 2022 and U.S. Department of the Army,
Headquarters, 101st Airborne Division, Fort Campbell, Kentucky, 40 FLRA
371, 377-78 (1991) (Fort Campbell). For the following reasons, we
conclude that both options are inconsistent with Government-wide regulations
and, therefore, that Proposal 3 is nonnegotiable under section 7117(a)(1) of
the Statute. 1. The QSI Option is Nonnegotiable In National Treasury Employees Union, Chapter 245 and Department of
Commerce, Patent and Trademark Office, 30 FLRA 1219, 1224-26 (1988), the
Authority found that Proposal 2, which required that an agency grant a QSI to
an employee who met certain criteria, was inconsistent with 5 C.F.R. § 531.504, a Government-wide regulation. The Authority found that 5
C.F.R. § 531.504 prohibits an agency from "establishing a requirement that a QSI will be
granted, even to an employee who meets established criteria." Id. at
1226. Consequently, the Authority held that the proposal was inconsistent with
5 C.F.R. § 531.504 and was nonnegotiable under section 7117(a)(1) of the
Statute. Proposal 3 would require that the Agency grant a QSI to an employee who
is rated superior/outstanding if the employee is not given a cash award.
Because Proposal 3 would require the Agency to give a QSI in certain
circumstances, it is inconsistent with 5 C.F.R. § 531.504 and is
nonnegotiable. Id. 2. The Cash Award Requirement Conflicts with a Government-wide
Regulation and Is Nonnegotiable Proposals which mandate the granting of cash awards are inconsistent
with 5 C.F.R. § 430.503(c)(1), a Government-wide regulation, and are
nonnegotiable under section 7117(a) of the Statute. In Tidewater Virginia
Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth, Virginia, 37 FLRA 938, 950 (1990) (Norfolk
Naval Shipyard), we found that 5 C.F.R. § 430.503(c)(1) requires that
each determination to grant a cash award be reviewed and approved by an agency
official at a higher level than the recommending official and by the agency
manager responsible for the performance awards budget. We also stated that "the
expressed authority to review and approve inherently encompasses the authority
to review and disapprove." Id. at 950. Accordingly, proposals which do
not permit disapproval of awards are inconsistent with 5 C.F.R. § 430.503(c)(1). In revising 5 C.F.R. part 430, OPM removed 5 C.F.R. § 430.503(c)
and added 5 C.F.R. § 430.504(d), which contains a requirement for review
and approval of decisions to grant awards that is similar to that formerly
contained in section 430.503(c)(1).(9) 56 Fed. Reg.
20331, 20332 (1991). The rationale that we applied in Norfolk Naval
Shipyard in the context of former section 430.503(c) applies equally to
Proposal 3 in the context of 5 C.F.R. § 430.504(d). See National
Office, 41 FLRA 1349, 1361 (1991), petition for review filed sub
nom. National Treasury Employees Union v. FLRA, No. 91-1503 (D.C.
Cir. Oct. 15, 1991). Proposal 3 mandates that all employees who are rated
superior/outstanding receive cash awards unless they receive QSIs. By its plain
wording, the proposal prevents the Agency from disapproving a cash award if an
employee receives the required performance rating and does not receive a QSI.
Because Proposal 3 would require approval of performance awards in situations
where, under 5 C.F.R. § 430.504(d), Agency officials may disapprove such
awards, we find that the option of a cash award in Proposal 3 is inconsistent
with 5 C.F.R. § 430.504(d). In reaching this conclusion, we reject the
Union's assertion that Proposal 3 meets regulatory requirements because an
Agency regulation requires that "the performance rating must be approved by the
approving official and the official with the responsibility for managing the
performance awards budget prior to informing employees of the performance
rating." Reply Brief at 6. Proposal 3 would not allow disapproval of a cash
award if an employee received a superior/outstanding performance rating.
Accordingly, because Proposal 3 is inconsistent with 5 C.F.R. § 430.504(d), it is nonnegotiable under section 7117(a)(1) of the Statute.
Employees, Local R1-144, Federal Union of Scientists and Engineers and U.S.
Island, 43 FLRA No. 3 (1991). In view of our conclusion, it is unnecessary to address the Agency's
additional contentions regarding
Proposal 3. V. Proposal 4 When an employee reports for duty in accordance with the regular work
schedule, and it is determined by the Employer that the employee's services are
not required that day, the employee may request annual leave. In the absence of
a request, the employee will remain on duty or will be administratively
excused.(10) A. Positions of the Parties 1. The Agency The Agency asserts that Proposal 4 "violates management's right to
assign employees and work and to curtail operations when deemed necessary."
Statement of Position at 11. By requiring management to keep employees on duty,
the Agency argues that Proposal 4 "impermissibly" requires the Agency to assign
work to employees, "irrespective of need or employee qualification, and
irrespective of the need to curtail operations." Id. at 12. The Agency
also asserts that the requirement that management grant administrative leave is
nonnegotiable. Finally, the Agency argues that Proposal 4 directly interferes with
management's rights to assign work and employees under section 7106(a)(2)(A)
and (B) of the Statute because it prohibits the Agency from placing employees
on annual leave. 2. The Union The Union contends that Proposal 4 is intended as an appropriate
arrangement for "employees who thru [sic] no fault of theirs are prevented from
performing their regular duties on a scheduled workday." Reply Brief at 7. The
Union asserts that the proposal "would prevent management from placing
employees on enforced leave" which adversely affects employees' leave balances.
Id. B. Analysis and Conclusions Proposal 4 requires the Agency to exercise one of two options when
management determines that an employee's services are not needed on a regularly
scheduled workday and the employee does not request annual leave. One option is
to permit the employee to remain on duty. This option, the Agency argues, would
require management to assign work to the employee. If the Agency does not
permit the employee to remain on duty, then Proposal 4 requires that the Agency
administratively excuse the employee. The negotiability of Proposal 4 depends
on whether one of these options is negotiable. See, for example,
Fort Campbell at 377-78. We find that the decision to grant administrative leave to an employee
when management decides it does not need that employee on a scheduled work day
is within management's discretion and, therefore, is negotiable. In National
Federation of Federal Employees, Local 2119 and U.S. Department of the Army,
Rock Island Arsenal, Rock Island, Illinois, 42 FLRA 993, 995-97 (1991)
(Rock Island I), we noted that the head of an agency has discretion,
which is subject to negotiations, to grant administrative leave to employees of
the agency in certain situations for brief periods of time. We held that the
proposal in Rock Island I, which required that the agency place
employees on administrative leave for 40 hours during a holiday shutdown, was
negotiable. Proposal 4 is substantively similar to the proposal in Rock Island
I because it requires the Agency to grant administrative leave to an
employee if the agency decides that the employee's services are not required on
a scheduled work day and that the employee will not remain on duty.
Accordingly, consistent with our decision in Rock Island I, we find that
Proposal 4's option of granting administrative leave to an employee on a day
when the Agency decides that the employee's services are not required is
negotiable. See also Rock Island II 42 FLRA 1019 at
1026-28 (proposal providing 1 day of administrative leave after a shutdown for
each day of LWOP, annual leave, or other leave employees used during the
shutdown held to be a negotiable appropriate arrangement). As the Agency has the option under Proposal 4 to grant administrative
leave to an employee whose services are not required, the proposal does not
require that management allow the employee to remain on duty. Accordingly,
Proposal 4 preserves management's right to decide not to assign work to the
employee. In this regard, Federal Employees Metal Trades Council of
Charleston, AFL-CIO and Charleston Naval Shipyard, Charleston, South
Carolina, 33 FLRA 618 (1988) (Charleston Naval Shipyard), relied on
by the Agency, is inapposite. The proposal in Charleston Naval Shipyard
required that, during shutdowns, available work be assigned to employees who
lacked annual leave. By contrast, under Proposal 4, management is not required
to assign work to employees who are not needed. Moreover, by its plain wording,
Proposal 4 takes effect after the Agency has decided that an employee's
services are not required on a particular day and concerns only the status of
that employee. Therefore, unlike the proposal in Charleston Naval
Shipyard, we conclude that the proposal does not directly interfere with
management's rights to assign employees and work under section 7106(a)(2)(A)
and (B) of the Statute and would not prevent the Agency from curtailing its
operations. In addition, we note the Union's assertion, which is consistent
with the wording of Proposal 4, that the proposal does not apply to "advanced
planned situations for which advance notice is required such as furloughs."
Reply Brief at 7. Finally, we reject the Agency's assertion that Proposal 4 directly
interferes with management's rights to assign work and employees by
"prohibiting enforced annual leave[.]" Statement of Position at 12. 5
U.S.C. § 6302(d) provides that "[t]he annual leave provided by this subchapter, .
. . may be granted at any time during the year as the head of the agency
concerned may prescribe." FPM chapter 630, subchapter 3-4.b., which implements
this statutory provision, states, in relevant part: Annual leave provided by law is a benefit and accrues automatically.
However, supervisors have the responsibility to decide when the leave may be
taken. This decision will generally be made in the light of the needs of the
service rather than solely on the desires of the employee. Consistent with these provisions, an agency may deny an employee's
request to use accrued annual leave when the agency requires an employee's
services. However, where an agency has decided it does not need an employee's
services on a particular day, neither 5 U.S.C. § 6302(d) nor its
implementing regulations support a conclusion that an agency may require an
employee to take annual leave on that day. The Agency has not cited any other
statute or regulation, and none is apparent to us, which provides the Agency
such a right.(11) Accordingly,
we reject the Agency's argument that it may require employees to take annual
leave in the circumstances encompassed by Proposal 4. Compare Rock
Island II, 42 FLRA 1019, 1024 (where group dismissal is appropriate,
agencies have discretion to decide among various types of leave or, if
appropriate, to furlough employees and must negotiate to the extent of that
discretion). To the extent that previous decisions have indicated that agencies
have the right to require employees to take annual leave, they will no longer
be followed. In sum, we conclude that the portion of Proposal 4 requiring the Agency
to grant employees administrative leave is negotiable. Accordingly, Proposal 4
does not require the Agency to permit an employee to remain on duty and does
not, therefore, directly interfere with management's right to assign work and
employees under section 7106(a)(2)(A) and (B) of the Statute. VI. Order The Agency must bargain, upon request or as otherwise agreed to by the
parties, over Proposals 1, 2, and 4.(12) We dismiss
the petition as to Proposal 3. FOOTNOTES: (If blank, the decision does not
have footnotes.) 1. 38 U.S.C. § 4209(a) provides, in pertinent
part: (1) The Administrator, through the Service, shall provide for the
operation of child care centers at Veterans' Administration facilities in
accordance with this section. The operation of such centers shall be carried
out to the extent that the Administrator determines, based on the demand for
the care involved, that such operation is in the best interest of the Veterans'
Administration and that [sic] is practicable to do so. 2. 38 U.S.C. § 4208 provides: It is the purpose of this chapter that, under control and supervision
of the Administrator, the Service shall function as an independent unit in the
Veterans' Administration and shall have exclusive control over all its
activities including sales, procurement and supply, finance, including
disbursements, and personnel management, except as otherwise provided in this
chapter. 3. 38 U.S.C. § 4209(b) provides, in pertinent
part: (b) The Service shall establish reasonable charges for child-care
services provided at each child-care center operated under this section. The
charges shall be subject to the approval of the Administrator. In the case of a
center operated directly by the Service, the charges with respect to the center
shall be sufficient to provide for the operating expenses of the center . . . .
In the case of a center operated by a contractor which is a for-profit entity,
the charges shall be established by taking into consideration the value of
[any] space and services furnished with respect to the center . . .
. 4. The Military Child Care Act of 1989, 10 U.S.C. §
113 note (Supp. I 1989) provides in pertinent part: SEC. 1504 PARENT FEES The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe regulations establishing fees
to be charged parents for the attendance of children at military child care
development centers. Those regulations . . . shall require that, in the case of
children who attend the centers on a regular basis, the fees shall be based on
family income. . . . . SEC. 1506. PARENT PARTNERSHIPS WITH CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTERS . . . . (b) Parent Participation Programs.--The Secretary of Defense shall
rates lower than the rates that otherwise apply. See generally 42 FLRA at 696-98; 40 FLRA at 145-46. 5. 5 U.S.C. § 5545(d) provides, in relevant part,
that the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) shall: establish a schedule or schedules of pay differentials for duty
involving unusual physical hardship or hazard. Under such regulations . . . an
employee . . . is entitled to be paid the appropriate differential for any
period in which he is subjected to physical hardship or hazard not usually
involved in carrying out the duties of his position. 6. FPM Supplement 532-1, subchapter S8-7g.(3) provides, in
relevant part: [n]othing in this section shall preclude negotiations through the
collective bargaining process for: (a) determining the coverage of additional local situations under
appropriate categories in appendix J and application of appendix J categories
to local work situations. The schedule of payments in appendix J of FPM Supplement 532-1 was
included in 5 C.F.R. Part 532 as appendix A. See 55 Fed. Reg. 6878,
46140 (1990). 7. 5 C.F.R. § 531.504 provides: A quality step increase shall not be required but may be granted only
to an employee who receives a rating of record at level 5 (Outstanding), as
defined in Part 430, Subpart B, of this chapter. 8. 5 C.F.R. § 430.503(c)(1) provides: (c)(1) Agency procedures for making performance awards determinations
must include a requirement for review and approval of each determination by an
awards budget within the agency. 9. 5 C.F.R. § 430.504(d) provides: (d) The decision to grant a performance award, including the amount of
is no official at a higher level in the agency. 10. Although Proposal 4 uses the term "administratively
excused," the parties refer to administrative leave and we will use that term.
The FPM defines administrative leave as "an excused absence from
duty, administratively authorized, without loss of pay and without charge to
leave." FPM chapter 610, subchapter 11-7 (emphasis in original). 11. We note, however, that generally Federal employees may
accumulate annual leave "up to a maximum of 30 days." FPM chapter 630,
subchapter 3-5.a. The FPM provides that "[s]upervisors should insure that
end of the leave year." Id. at 3-4.b. 12. In finding these proposals to be negotiable, we make