Source: http://courts.mrsc.org/supreme/117wn2d/117wn2d0093.htm
Timestamp: 2019-06-25 17:54:34
Document Index: 634480930

Matched Legal Cases: ['art. 1', '§ 22', '§ 19', '§ 19', '§ 125', '§ 19', '§ 123', 'art, 640', 'art, 640', '§ 125', '§ 125', '§ 19', '§ 19', '§ 19', '§ 125', '§ 125', '§ 19']

117 Wn.2d 93, P.2d 86, STATE v. KJORSVIK
[No. 57492-8. En Banc. June 20, 1991.]
THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. NICHOLAS KJORSVIK, Petitioner.
[1] Robbery – Elements – Intent – In General. An intent to steal is an essential element of the crime of robbery.
[2] Indictment and Information – Sufficiency – Nonstatutory Elements – Necessity. Under the Sixth Amendment, Const. art. 1, § 22 (amend. 10) and CrR 2.1(b), informations, indictments, and criminal complaints must include the essential common law elements, as well as the statutory elements, of the crime charged in order to apprise the accused of the nature of the charge so that the accused can prepare an adequate defense.
[3] Indictment and Information – Sufficiency – Review – Failure To Raise in Trial Court – Effect. A challenge to the constitutional sufficiency of a charging document may be raised initially on appeal.
[4] Indictment and Information – Sufficiency – Review – Failure To Raise in Trial Court – Construction. When a challenge to a charging document is first raised after the return of the verdict, a court will construe the document more liberally in favor of validity than a charging document challenged before or during trial.
[5] Indictment and Information – Sufficiency – Review – Failure To Raise Before Verdict – Standard of Review. When a criminal defendant first raises a challenge to a charging document after return of the verdict, the court will determine the validity of the document by applying the following test: (1) do the necessary facts appear in any form, or by fair construction can they be found, in the charging document; and, if so, (2) can the defendant show actual prejudice by the inartful language which caused a lack of notice?
[6] Indictment and Information – Sufficiency – Omission of Elements – Effect on Jurisdiction. The issue of whether a charging document sets forth all the required elements of the crime charged is not jurisdictional.
[7] Indictment and Information – Sufficiency – Notice of Charge – Language Used – Nonstatutory Elements. A charging document need not express a nonstatutory element in the same language as the case that established the element; it is sufficient if words conveying the same meaning are used so as to reasonably apprise the accused of the element.
[8] Indictment and Information – Construction – Considered as a Whole – Rational Construction – Implication of Facts. A charging document is construed as a whole, according to common sense, and as including facts which are necessarily implied.
[9] Indictment and Information – Sufficiency – Notice of Charge – Intent – "Unlawfully". Whether the term "unlawfully" in a charging document is a sufficient allegation of a criminal intent element depends on the elements of the particular crime charged and the meaning fairly derived from the language of the charging document.
Superior Court: The Superior Court for King County, No. 88-1-03836-4, Terrence A. Carroll, J., on November 4, 1988, entered a judgment on a verdict of guilty.
Court of Appeals: By order dated July 20, 1990, the court denied the defendant's motion to modify a commissioner's ruling affirming the judgment.
I, . . . , Prosecuting Attorney for King County . . . accuse Nicholas Jay Kjorsvik and Michael Marcelouse, and each of them, of the crime of robbery in the first degree, committed as follows:
And I, . . . , Prosecuting Attorney for King County, . . . further do accuse the defendant at said time of being armed with a deadly weapon, to-wit: a knife, under the authority of RCW 9.94A.125.
ISSUE ONE. Must a charging document, such as an information, indictment or criminal complaint, «1»
«1» The issue of the sufficiency of misdemeanor citations is not before the court in this case and, therefore, we do not consider it.
include the common law elements of a crime as well as the statutory elements in order to apprise the accused of the nature of the charges against the accused?
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall . . . be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; . . .
Although our robbery statute, RCW 9A.56.190, does not include an intent element, «2»
«2» "A person commits robbery when he unlawfully takes personal property from the person of another or in his presence against his will by the use or threatened use of immediate force, violence, or fear of injury to that person or his property or the person or property of anyone. Such force or fear must be used to obtain or retain possession of the property, or to prevent or overcome resistance to the taking; in either of which cases the degree of force is immaterial. Such taking constitutes robbery whenever it appears that, although the taking was fully completed without the knowledge of the person from whom taken, such knowledge was prevented by the use of force or fear." RCW 9A.56.190.
our settled case law is clear that "intent to steal" is an essential element of the crime of robbery. «3»
«3» State v. Hicks, 102 Wn.2d 182, 184, 683 P.2d 186 (1984); State v. Self, 42 Wn. App. 654, 657, 713 P.2d 142, review denied, 105 Wn.2d 1017 (1986).
At issue is whether this nonstatutory element should have been included in the information in order to fully inform the defendant of the accusation made against him.
In the case of State v. Leach, 113 Wn.2d 679, 689, 782 P.2d 552 (1989), we recently stated that "the 'essential elements' rule requires that a charging document allege facts supporting every element of the offense, in addition to adequately identifying the crime charged". This core holding of Leach requires that the defendant be apprised of the elements of the crime charged and the conduct of the defendant which is alleged to have constituted that crime. Leach explains that merely reciting the statutory elements of the crime charged may not be sufficient.
Leach, 113 Wn.2d at 688. We have recently reiterated that it is sufficient to charge in the language of a statute if the statute defines the offense with certainty. «4»
«4» State v. Elliott, 114 Wn.2d 6, 13, 785 P.2d 440, cert. denied, ____ U.S. ____, 112 L. Ed. 2d 80, 111 S. Ct. 110 (1990). See also State v. Royse, 66 Wn.2d 552, 403 P.2d 838 (1965); State v. Thomas, 73 Wn.2d 729, 730, 440 P.2d 488 (1968).
We recognize that different divisions of our Court of Appeals are divided on the issue of whether nonstatutory essential elements of a crime need to be included in the charging document. A number of cases hold that nonstatutory elements of the charged crime need not be included in the charging document. «5»
«5» See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 59 Wn. App. 867, 872, 802 P.2d 137 (1990); State v. Sims, 59 Wn. App. 127, 132-33, 796 P.2d 434 (1990); State v. Hernandez, 58 Wn. App. 793, 796, 794 P.2d 1327 (1990); State v. Sly, 58 Wn. App. 740, 746, 794 P.2d 1316 (1990); State v. Strong, 56 Wn. App. 715, 718, 785 P.2d 464, review denied, 114 Wn.2d 1022 (1990); State v. Smith, 49 Wn. App. 596, 599, 744 P.2d 1096 (1987), review denied, 110 Wn.2d 1007 (1988); State v. Bower, 28 Wn. App. 704, 707 n.2, 626 P.2d 39 (1981).
However, a number of other decisions of the Court of Appeals have held that all essential elements, common law as well as statutory, must be included in the charging document. «6»
«6» State v. Robinson, 58 Wn. App. 599, 606-07, 794 P.2d 1293 (1990), review denied, 116 Wn.2d 1003 (1991); State v. Nieblas-Duarte, 55 Wn. App. 376, 378-79, 777 P.2d 583, review denied, 113 Wn.2d 1030 (1989); State v. Minium, 26 Wn. App. 840, 841, 615 P.2d 511 (1980).
There is also a significant split of authority among the federal circuits concerning the necessity of charging nonstatutory elements. «7»
«7» A number of cases indicate that all elements must be contained in the charging document: United States v. Wilson, 884 F.2d 174, 179 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Crow, 824 F.2d 761, 762 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Opsta, 659 F.2d 848, 850 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v. Morrison, 536 F.2d 286, 288 (9th Cir. 1976); Honea v. United States, 344 F.2d 798, 804 (5th Cir. 1965); Lott v. United States, 309 F.2d 115, 117 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 950, 9 L. Ed. 2d 498, 83 S. Ct. 504 (1963).
Compare the preceding cases with the following cases which indicate that implied or nonstatutory elements need not be included in a charging document: Tamapua v. Shimoda, 796 F.2d 261, 263 (9th Cir. 1986); Miller v. Stagner, 757 F.2d 988, 994, 768 F.2d 1090 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1048, 89 L. Ed. 2d 577, 106 S. Ct. 1269 (1986); United States v. Hester, 719 F.2d 1041, 1043 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Fusaro, 708 F.2d 17, 23 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1007, 78 L. Ed. 2d 708, 104 S. Ct. 524 (1983).
The United States Supreme Court held in Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117, 41 L. Ed. 2d 590, 94 S. Ct. 2887 (1974) (citing United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612, 26 L. Ed. 1135 (1882)) as follows: «8»
«8» See also Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 765, 8 L. Ed. 2d 240, 251, 82 S. Ct. 1038 (1962).
(Footnotes omitted.) 2 W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 19.2, at 448-52 (1984) notes that
The primary goal of the "essential elements" rule is to give notice to an accused of the nature of the crime that he or she must be prepared to defend against. «9»
«9» 2 W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 19.2, at 446 (1984); 1 C. Wright, Federal Practice § 125, at 365 (2d ed. 1982).
In Leach, «10»
«10» State v. Leach, 113 Wn.2d 679, 695, 782 P.2d 552 (1989).
we noted that defendants are entitled to be fully informed of the nature of the accusations against them so that they can prepare an adequate defense. «11»
«11» See also Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763-64, 8 L. Ed. 2d 240, 82 S. Ct. 1038 (1962) (requiring the elements of the offense to sufficiently apprise the defendant of what he must be prepared to meet); State v. Grant, 89 Wn.2d 678, 686, 575 P.2d 210 (1978).
It is neither reasonable nor logical to hold that a statutory element of a crime is constitutionally required in a charging document, but that an essential court-imposed element of the crime is not required, in light of the fact that the primary purpose of such a document is to supply the accused with notice of the charge that he or she must be prepared to meet. Statutory elements are, of course, easier to ascertain since the statutes are usually cited in the charging document, whereas court-imposed elements must be discovered through at least cursory legal research. This court has stated that defendants should not have to search for the rules or regulations they are accused of violating. «12»
«12» State v. Jeske, 87 Wn.2d 760, 765, 558 P.2d 162 (1976).
We therefore conclude that the correct rule is that all essential elements of an alleged crime must be included in the charging document in order to afford the accused notice of the nature of the allegations so that a defense can be properly prepared. «13»
«13» Imposing the responsibility to include all essential elements of a crime on the prosecution should not prove unduly burdensome since the "to convict" instructions found in the Washington Pattern Jury Instructions – Criminal (WPIC) delineate the elements of the most common crimes. See 11 Wash. Prac., Washington Pattern Jury Instructions – Criminal (1977 & Supp. 1986).
In this case, the defendant did not challenge the sufficiency of the charging document until he appealed following his conviction at a jury trial. Before discussing whether the defendant was afforded adequate notice of the elements of the charge against him, it is first necessary to clarify the standard of appellate review to be used in such cases. Once again, there also exists a significant split of authority among the divisions of the Court of Appeals on the standard of review for challenges to a charging document first raised on appeal. «14»
«14» The following cases utilized a stricter standard of review by liberally construing charging documents in favor of validity when they were first challenged on appeal: Sims, 59 Wn. App. at 129; Strong, 56 Wn. App. at 717; State v. Warren, 55 Wn. App. 645, 656, 779 P.2d 1159 (1989), review denied, 114 Wn.2d 1004 (1990); Smith, 49 Wn. App. at 598. However, some cases have recently declined to utilize the stricter standard of review because of uncertainty as to whether this court has sanctioned such a standard. Sly, 58 Wn. App. at 745-46; Auburn v. Brooke, 60 Wn. App. 87, 90 n.3, 803 P.2d 1325 (1991).
[3] A challenge to the constitutional sufficiency of a charging document may be raised initially on appeal. «15»
«15» Leach, 113 Wn.2d at 697; State v. Holt, 104 Wn.2d 315, 321, 704 P.2d 1189 (1985); RAP 2.5(a)(3).
However, the question posed here is whether a different standard of review should be applied when, as here, the accused first raises the issue on appeal.
Justice Brachtenbach, concurring by a separate opinion in Leach, «16»
«16» Leach, 113 Wn.2d at 700 (Brachtenbach, J., concurring).
noted that when faced with the question of whether a charging document sufficiently states an offense, "federal courts have held that 'indictments which are tardily challenged are liberally construed in favor of validity.'" In his opinion, Justice Brachtenbach also suggested that "in the proper case, with full briefing and argument by the parties," this court should consider adopting this rule of liberal construction. «17»
«17» Leach, 113 Wn.2d at 700-01 (Brachtenbach, J., concurring).
A different standard of review should be applied when no challenge to the charging document has been raised at or before trial because otherwise the defendant has no incentive to timely make such a challenge, since it might only result in an amendment or a dismissal potentially followed by a refiling of the charge. «18»
«18» It is unnecessary herein to decide when amendment is appropriate and when dismissal is required. The issue of whether amendment of an information is permissible is controlled by CrR 2.1(e) and cases interpreting that rule and is not an issue in the present case. We recently held that amendments to an information are liberally allowed before trial with continuances granted to a defendant if necessary to prepare to meet the altered charge, but when a charging document is amended to charge an entirely different crime after the State has rested its case, the defendant is prejudiced. State v. Pelkey, 109 Wn.2d 484, 490, 745 P.2d 854 (1987).
Applying a more liberal construction on appeal discourages what Professor LaFave has described as "sandbagging". He explains this as a potential defense practice wherein the defendant recognizes a defect in the charging document but forgoes raising it before trial when a successful objection would usually result only in an amendment of the pleading. «19»
«19» 2 Criminal Procedure § 19.2, at 442 & n.36. See also Leach, 113 Wn.2d at 700 (Brachtenbach, J., concurring).
The standard of review utilized by the federal courts for challenges to charging documents which are raised for the first time on appeal was set forth by the United States Supreme Court in the leading case of Hagner v. United States, 285 U.S. 427, 433, 76 L. Ed. 861, 52 S. Ct. 417 (1932):
Under this rule of liberal construction, even if there is an apparently missing element, it may be able to be fairly implied from language within the charging document. «20»
«20» United States v. Ellsworth, 647 F.2d 957, 962 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 944, 72 L. Ed. 2d 465, 102 S. Ct. 2008 (1982).
Many cases utilize the Hagner standard and hold that if the necessary facts appear in any form, or by a fair construction can be found within the terms of the charge, then the charging document will be upheld on appeal. «21»
«21» See, e.g., Kaneshiro v. United States, 445 F.2d 1266, 1269 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 992, 30 L. Ed. 2d 543, 92 S. Ct. 537 (1971); United States v. Shoup, 608 F.2d 950, 960 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Mallen, 843 F.2d 1096, 1102 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 849, 102 L. Ed. 2d 103, 109 S. Ct. 130 (1988); United States v. Wabaunsee, 528 F.2d 1, 2 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353, 361 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. Inciso v. United States, 429 U.S. 1099, 51 L. Ed. 2d 546, 97 S. Ct. 1118 (1977). 1 Federal Practice § 123, at 354 n.31.
Thus, when an objection to an indictment is not timely made the reviewing court has considerable leeway to imply the necessary allegations from the language of the charging document. «22»
«22» Pheaster, 544 F.2d at 362 (citing Kaneshiro v. United States, 445 F.2d at 1268-69).
The orderly administration of criminal justice demands that a defendant who is dissatisfied with the form or substance of an indictment or information filed against him shall make that known to the trial court at or before the time when sentence is imposed, . . . It would create an intolerable situation if defendants, after conviction, could defer their attacks upon indictments or informations until witnesses had disappeared, statutes of limitation had run, and those charged with the duty of prosecution had died, been replaced, or had lost interest in the cases.
[4, 5] We hereby adopt the federal standard of liberal construction in favor of the validity of charging documents where challenges to the sufficiency of a charging document are initially raised after verdict «23»
«23» Hagner v. United States, 285 U.S. 427, 433, 76 L. Ed. 861, 52 S. Ct. 417 (1932); Mallen, 843 F.2d at 1102.
or on appeal, but we further include in that standard both an essential elements prong and an inquiry into whether there was actual prejudice. Not all of the federal cases appear to overtly require both inquiries but the leading case of Hagner so suggests. In addition, a number of federal courts in dealing with this issue have gone on to question whether the accused was prejudiced by the inartful or vague language in the charging document. «24»
«24» United States v. Joseph, 781 F.2d 549, 554 (6th Cir. 1986); Mallen, 843 F.2d at 1102; United States v. Hart, 640 F.2d 856, 857 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 992, 68 L. Ed. 2d 853, 101 S. Ct. 2334 (1981); Kaneshiro, 445 F.2d at 1269; Wabaunsee, 528 F.2d at 4; Pheaster, 544 F.2d at 363.
A close reading of the federal cases shows that the federal standard is, in practice, often applied as a 2-prong test: (1) do the necessary facts appear in any form, or by fair construction can they be found, in the charging document; and, if so, (2) can the defendant show that he or she was nonetheless actually prejudiced by the inartful language which caused a lack of notice? «25»
«25» See, e.g., Wabaunsee, 528 F.2d at 4; Mallen, 843 F.2d at 1102; Joseph, 781 F.2d at 554; Hart, 640 F.2d at 857.
The standard of review we here adopt will require at least some language in the information giving notice of the allegedly missing element(s) and if the language is vague, an inquiry may be required into whether there was actual prejudice to the defendant. The second prong – allowing the defendant to show that actual prejudice resulted from inartful or vague language – affords an added layer of protection to a defendant even where the issue is first raised after verdict or on appeal.
The first prong of the test – the liberal construction of the charging document's language – looks to the face of the charging document itself. The second or "prejudice" prong of the test, however, may look beyond the face of the charging document to determine if the accused actually received notice of the charges he or she must have been prepared to defend against. «26»
«26» United States v. Salazar, 720 F.2d 1482, 1487 (10th Cir. 1983) (citing United States v. French, 683 F.2d 1189, 1194 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 972, 74 L. Ed. 2d 284, 103 S. Ct. 304 (1982)), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1110, 83 L. Ed. 2d 783, 105 S. Ct. 789 (1985); Wabaunsee, 528 F.2d at 4; United States v. Martin, 783 F.2d 1449, 1453-54 (9th Cir. 1986).
It is possible that other circumstances of the charging process can reasonably inform the defendant in a timely manner of the nature of the charges. This 2-prong standard of review strikes a balance: on the one hand it discourages the defense from postponing a challenge to the charge knowing the charging document is flawed; on the other hand, it insures that the State will have given fair notice of the charge to the defendant.
[6] The defendant here argues that if a charging document does not explicitly set forth all elements of the offense then the conviction must automatically be reversed because the trial court lacked "subject matter jurisdiction". Defendant further argues that on this basis the federal standard of review is inappropriate. While it is true that some courts have referred to a defective charging document as impacting jurisdiction, «27»
«27» See, e.g., Auburn v. Brooke, 60 Wn. App. 87, 91 n.8, 803 P.2d 1325 (1991) (noting, however, that the subject matter jurisdiction issue may have been erroneously blurred with the issue whether a charging document properly states an offense); State v. Nieblas-Duarte, 55 Wn. App. 376, 379 n.4, 777 P.2d 583, review denied, 113 Wn.2d 1030 (1989).
we do not agree. We decline to view a constitutional challenge to a charging document as an issue regarding the power of the trial court to act. Although the Court of Appeals opinion in State v. Leach, 53 Wn. App. 322, 329, 766 P.2d 1116, aff'd, 113 Wn.2d 679, 782 P.2d 552 (1989) did state that the essential elements rule has "assumed a quasi-jurisdictional character", it relied upon out-of-state authority and also recognized a split on this issue.
In our opinion in State v. Leach, 113 Wn.2d 679, 782 P.2d 552 (1989), we declined to base the holding on the theory that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. «28»
«28» See also State v. Holt, 104 Wn.2d 315, 704 P.2d 1189 (1985).
Leach indicates that a challenge to the sufficiency of a charging document can be initially raised on appeal "because it involves a question of constitutional due process"; «29»
«29» State v. Leach, 113 Wn.2d 679, 691, 782 P.2d 552 (1989).
had such insufficiency deprived the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction, it could be raised at any time because of that lack, and a constitutional basis for such a motion would be unnecessary. Similarly, in Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 753, 8 L. Ed. 2d 240, 82 S. Ct. 1038 (1962), the United States Supreme Court held the issue was "preserved for appeal" because it was raised at trial; such an inquiry would be unnecessary if the lower court lacked jurisdiction.
Our Court of Appeals recently observed that although some courts have referred to the essential elements rule as "quasi-jurisdictional", it is questionable whether the essential elements rule contains any jurisdictional questions which would result in the harsh consequence of automatic dismissal. «30»
«30» State v. Sims, 59 Wn. App. 127, 132 n.3, 796 P.2d 434 (1990).
We agree. Recent case law from this court has not viewed charging document challenges as involving subject matter jurisdictional issues, and we decline to adopt such a view. «31»
«31» Accord, People v. Gilmore, 63 Ill. 2d 23, 344 N.E.2d 456, 458 (1976) (holding failure to charge an offense does not go to jurisdiction); Lamar v. United States, 240 U.S. 60, 64-65, 60 L. Ed. 526, 36 S. Ct. 255 (1916) (in which Mr. Justice Holmes made his classic statement to the effect that the question of sufficiency of an indictment was not a question going to the jurisdiction of the court, but one relating to the merits of the case); see also Keto v. United States, 189 F.2d 247, 250 (8th Cir. 1951); United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58, 65-66, 95 L. Ed. 747, 71 S. Ct. 595, 599 (1951) (the fact that it is ultimately determined on appeal that the indictment was defective does not affect the jurisdiction of the trial court to determine the case presented by the indictment).
[7, 8] Applying this 2-prong standard of review to the present case, our first inquiry is whether the nonstatutory element of "intent to steal" appears in any form, or by fair construction can be found in this information. In this connection, we observe that it has never been necessary to use the exact words of a statute in a charging document; it is sufficient if words conveying the same meaning and import are used. «32»
«32» State v. Leach, 113 Wn.2d 679, 689, 782 P.2d 552 (1989); State v. Jeske, 87 Wn.2d 760, 765, 558 P.2d 162 (1976); State v. Moser, 41 Wn.2d 29, 31, 246 P.2d 1101 (1952); RCW 10.37.160.
This same rule applies to nonstatutory elements. «33»
«33» State v. Nieblas-Duarte, 55 Wn. App. 376, 380, 777 P.2d 583, review denied, 113 Wn.2d 1030 (1989).
It is therefore not fatal to an information or complaint that the exact words of a case law element are not used; the question in such situations is whether all the words used would reasonably apprise an accused of the elements of the crime charged. Words in a charging document are read as a whole, construed according to common sense, and include facts which are necessarily implied. «34»
«34» United States v. Buckley, 689 F.2d 893, 899 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1086, 76 L. Ed. 2d 349, 103 S. Ct. 1778 (1983); see United States v. Kilpatrick, 821 F.2d 1456, 1462 (10th Cir. 1987), aff'd sub nom. Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 101 L. Ed. 2d 228, 108 S. Ct. 2369 (1988); 1 C. Wright, Federal Practice § 125, at 385 (2d ed. 1982).
[9] The State argues that the word "unlawfully" sufficiently alleges the intent to steal element of the crime of robbery. Authority is divided on whether the allegation that an act was done feloniously or unlawfully is a sufficient allegation of criminal intent. «35»
«35» See United States v. Airdo, 380 F.2d 103, 105 (7th Cir.) (the word "unlawfully" supplied the required element of knowledge that goods were stolen), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 913, 19 L. Ed. 2d 260, 88 S. Ct. 238 (1967); Austin v. United States, 414 F.2d 1155, 1158 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (intent to deprive element is sufficiently alleged in a pleading which charges that by force and violence and against resistance and by putting in fear, the defendant stole and took from the person). But see Hughes v. United States, 338 F.2d 651, 652 (1st Cir. 1964) (in conviction for unlawful removal of materials from Customs' control, the word unlawfully alone did not suffice to imply the requisite felonious intent).
This inquiry turns on the elements of the particular crime charged and the meaning to be derived from the language of the charging document.
(Footnotes omitted. Italics ours.) «36»
«36» 1 C. Wright, Federal Practice § 125, at 365-66 (2d ed. 1982).
Moreover, a state statute, RCW 10.37.050, provides in part:
The . . . information is sufficient if it can be understood therefrom –
In the present case, however, the information charged that the defendant unlawfully, with force, and against the baker's will, took the money while armed with a deadly weapon. It is hard to perceive how the defendant in this case could have unlawfully taken the money from the cash register, against the will of the shopkeeper, by use (or threatened use) of force, violence and fear while displaying a deadly weapon and yet not have intended to steal the money. The case before us is thus clearly distinguishable from Hicks. Giving the information charging this defendant a liberal construction in favor of its validity, reading it as a whole and in a commonsense manner, we conclude that it did inform the defendant of all the elements of robbery. «37»
«37» This is not to say, of course, that it would not be preferable to include the "intent to steal" element in a robbery charge, since situations are foreseeable where the failure to plead such a mens rea element might actually result in prejudice to an accused.
UTTER, J. (dissenting) – I concur in the majority's resolution of Issue One. However, I dissent in the majority's conclusion that the court should adopt a stricter standard of review for challenges to the sufficiency of a charging document «38»
«38» The majority excludes misdemeanor citations from its holding. Majority opinion, at 97 n.1. I note, however, that the essential elements rule applies to misdemeanor citations. Seattle v. Hein, 115 Wn.2d 555, 799 P.2d 734 (1990). Therefore, the majority's interpretation of that rule should also apply to citations.
first raised on appeal. That conclusion ignores past precedent of this court, undercuts the importance of the essential elements rule, and denies defendants due process.
The essential elements rule has always been the law of this state. State v. Leach, 113 Wn.2d 679, 688, 782 P.2d 552 (1989). The first Washington case to overturn a conviction due to the insufficiency of the charging document was Leonard v. Territory, 2 Wash. Terr. 381, 7 P. 872 (1885). The defendant in Leonard was convicted of murder. The prosecutor charged Leonard with "purposely . . . deliberate[ly] and [with] premeditated malice" assaulting and shooting the victim. 2 Wash. Terr. at 390. The charging document did not, however, specifically allege that the killing was done purposely and with premeditated malice. In holding that the indictment was insufficient to sustain a charge of murder, the court specifically rejected an argument that the missing element could be inferred from the language of the indictment.
Under our laws an indictment must be direct and certain, both as regards the crime charged and as regards the particular circumstances thereof, when they are necessary to constitute a complete crime. The circumstances of purpose and malice, as ingredients of the killing, are necessary to constitute the complete crime of murder . . ..
2 Wash. Terr. at 392. «39»
«39» The prosecutor contended that this objection "should have been taken by demurrer, and not by motion in arrest of judgment." 2 Wash. Terr. at 387. Therefore, it appears the challenge to the sufficiency of the indictment was raised for the first time after the verdict.
Since 1885 the courts of this state have consistently refused to liberally construe the language of a charging document to find a missing essential element. Blanton v. State, 1 Wash. 265, 24 P. 439 (1890) (issue raised for first time on appeal); State v. Dengel, 24 Wash. 49, 63 P. 1104 (1901) (failure to allege property of another in robbery charge, raised for first time after verdict); State v. Morgan, 31 Wash. 226, 71 P. 723 (1903) (failure to allege property of another in larceny charge); State v. Hall, 54 Wash. 142, 102 P. 888 (1909) (robbery); State v. Catalino, 118 Wash. 611, 204 P. 179 (1922); Seattle v. Jordan, 134 Wash. 30, 235 P. 6 (1925); Seattle v. Proctor, 183 Wash. 299, 48 P.2d 241 (1935); State v. Taes, 5 Wn.2d 51, 104 P.2d 751 (1940); State v. Unosawa, 29 Wn.2d 578, 188 P.2d 104 (1948) (raised for first time on appeal); State v. Moser, 41 Wn.2d 29, 246 P.2d 1101 (1952) (raised for first time on second appeal); State v. Royse, 66 Wn.2d 552, 403 P.2d 838 (1965); State v. Holt, 104 Wn.2d 315, 704 P.2d 1189 (1985) (raised for first time on appeal); State v. Leach, 113 Wn.2d 679, 782 P.2d 552 (1989) (raised for first time on appeal). Thus, it has always been the rule in this state that the failure to state an element of the offense renders the charging document constitutionally defective and subject to dismissal. Leach, 113 Wn.2d at 687; Holt, 104 Wn.2d at 321.
The rule the majority adopts today asks whether the words of the charging document "would reasonably apprise an accused of the elements of the crime charged." Majority opinion, at 109. Since the defendant is presumed to be innocent, and therefore to know nothing of the charge, we must ask this question from the perspective of the common person. Note, Indictment Sufficiency, 70 Colum. L. Rev. 876, 894 (1970). Therefore, the majority's interpretation of the essential elements rule is essentially the same as our common understanding rule. Decisions of this court and of the Court of Appeals make it clear, however, that the common understanding rule does not apply where an essential element of the offense is missing from the charging document. State v. Moser, 41 Wn.2d at 32; State v. Ternan, 32 Wn.2d 584, 587, 203 P.2d 342 (1949); State v. Unosawa, supra; State v. Smith, 49 Wn. App. 596, 600 n.1, 744 P.2d 1096 (1987), review denied, 110 Wn.2d 1007 (1988).
Interpreting the language of the information liberally in order to fill in a missing element of the offense undercuts the importance of the essential elements rule. The majority states that "[t]he primary goal of the 'essential elements' rule is to give notice to an accused of the nature of the crime that he or she must be prepared to defend against." Majority opinion, at 101.
2 W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 19.2(b), at 445 (1984) (hereinafter LaFave & Israel). Thus, the essential elements rule is considered separate from, and serves a different purpose than, the notice requirement. LaFave & Israel § 19.2(b), at 449. LaFave and Israel describe the functions of the essential elements rule as facilitating judicial review, allowing the trial court to assess the sufficiency of the prosecution's case prior to trial, and as reflecting the historic importance of the charging document in both initiating the proceedings and providing the formal basis for the judgment. LaFave & Israel § 19.2(b), at 446-50.
Another commentator describes the function of the essential elements rule as providing the court with sufficient information to determine whether the facts are "sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had.'" 1 C. Wright, Federal Practice § 125, at 363 (2d ed. 1982) (quoting United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 558, 23 L. Ed. 588 (1876)). While Wright notes that this role of the essential elements rule is not often cited, he asserts that it is still important. 1 C. Wright § 125, at 363. See also Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763-64, 8 L. Ed. 2d 240, 82 S. Ct. 1038 (1962); United States v. Bohonus, 628 F.2d 1167, 1173 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 928 (1980).
(Italics mine.) Hagner v. United States, 285 U.S. 427, 431, 76 L. Ed. 861, 52 S. Ct. 417 (1932). Since that time the Court has consistently held that convictions are not to be overturned based on "minor and technical deficiencies" in the form of the charging document. Smith v. United States, 360 U.S. 1, 9, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1041, 79 S. Ct. 991 (1959). Thus, the liberal interpretation rule applies only to matters of form, not of substance. Carlson v. United States, 296 F.2d 909, 912 (9th Cir. 1961); United States v. Tornabene, 222 F.2d 875, 878 (3d Cir. 1955). See also LaFave & Israel § 19.2, at 442. The omission of an essential element, however, is more than just a technicality, and therefore requires reversal. United States v. Wabaunsee, 528 F.2d 1, 3 (7th Cir. 1975).
This is especially true where the missing element goes to mens rea. In Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 49 L. Ed. 2d 108, 96 S. Ct. 2253 (1976), the Court invalidated a guilty plea where the defendant was never informed that intent to cause death was an element of second degree murder. The Court noted that the defendant's attorney was "certainly" familiar with the intent requirement, and the Court assumed the defendant would have pleaded guilty even if he had been told of the element. 426 U.S. at 644 n.1. Nonetheless, the Court overturned the guilty plea because
"real notice of the true nature of the charge against him, [is] the first and most universally recognized requirement of due process."
(Italics mine.) 426 U.S. at 645 (quoting Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 334, 85 L. Ed. 859, 61 S. Ct. 572 (1941)). The Court also noted that, while a description of every element may not always be necessary, "intent is such a critical element of the offense" that notice of that element is always required. 426 U.S. at 647 n.18.