Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/724/965/265097/
Timestamp: 2020-07-13 05:43:31
Document Index: 264866930

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 285', '§ 1295', '§ 102', '§ 102', '§ 282', '§ 102', '§ 285']

Tp Laboratories, Inc., an Indiana Corporation,appellant/cross Appellee, v. Professional Positioners, Inc., a Wisconsin Corporation,professional Positioners, Inc., a Delawarecorporation, Gerald W. Huge and Richardw. Allessee, Appellees/cross Appellants, 724 F.2d 965 (Fed. Cir. 1984) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Federal Circuit › 1984 › Tp Laboratories, Inc., an Indiana Corporation,appellant/cross Appellee, v. Professional Positioners,...
Tp Laboratories, Inc., an Indiana Corporation,appellant/cross Appellee, v. Professional Positioners, Inc., a Wisconsin Corporation,professional Positioners, Inc., a Delawarecorporation, Gerald W. Huge and Richardw. Allessee, Appellees/cross Appellants, 724 F.2d 965 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit - 724 F.2d 965 (Fed. Cir. 1984) Jan. 4, 1984
In the cross-appeal Professional Positioners et al. (PRO) appeal the denial of an award of attorney fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285, and seek an increase in the amount awarded under Rule 37(d) of the Fed. R. Civ. P. for costs attributable to TP's late production of certain documents during discovery. We affirm the district court's decisions on these matters.
Our jurisdiction is found in 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (1).
* The patent statute provides in pertinent part in 35 U.S.C. § 102:
"The general purpose behind all the [Sec. 102(b) ] bars is to require inventors to assert with due diligence their right to a patent through the prompt filing ... of a patent application." 2 D. Chisum, Patents Sec. 601 (1981 & Supp.1983).
More specifically, courts have discerned a number of factors which must be weighed in applying the statutory bar of Sec. 102(b).2 Operating against the inventor are the policies of 1) protecting the public in its use of the invention where such use began prior to the filing of the application, 2) encouraging prompt disclosure of new and useful information, 3) discouraging attempts to extend the length of the period of protection by not allowing the inventor to reap the benefits for more than one year prior to the filing of the application. In contrast to these considerations, the public interest is also deemed to be served by allowing an inventor time to perfect his invention, by public testing, if desired, and prepare a patent application.
The evidence in this case clearly establishes use by at least three patients more than one year prior to the application date. Furthermore, these users were "under no limitation, restriction or obligation of secrecy to the inventor." Randolph v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co., 264 F.2d at 535 [120 USPQ at 513]. Certainly there is no evidence to the contrary and there is testimony to support such a finding.... Consequently, the Court can only conclude that the patients were under no obligations of secrecy or for that matter any restrictions.
TP argues that these items were in secret because even the patients were not aware of the "testing." This is not significant. The plain fact is that the claimed invention was not kept secret. It was open to public observation without restriction which is sufficient to constitute "public use." See Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333 [26 L. Ed. 755] (1881). Furthermore, Dr. Furst was aware that the precision seating springs were a new device.... In addition, several of Mrs. Spiers Elliott's associates saw the device. Consequently, the feigned secrecy relied upon by TP accords it no aid in claiming that the "use" was not "public."
It is important to note that the burden was on the plaintiff TP to show that use was a genuine experiment. Accurate records of the results of an experiment are certainly an indicia that the use was a bona fide experiment. In contrast the dearth of such records indicate that the use was not an experiment. The experimental use exception "is to be guarded closely." Atlas Chemical Industries, Inc. v. Moraine Products, [509 F.2d 1, 4] 184 U.S.P.Q. 281, 283 (6th Cir. 1974). TP has simply failed to prove that the inventor, Dr. H. Kesling, was conducting a bona fide experiment.
* * *The delay here was unreasonable because the device proved satisfactory immediately. At least as early as 1960 Dr. Kesling learned that the invention was workable. At that point his time began to run under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Even if he had made minor improvements over the period, all this Court needs [sic] find is that the application was filed more than one year after the basic invention was disclosed within the meaning of section 102(b). Franz [Frantz] Manufacturing Co. v. Phenix Manufacturing Co., 457 F.2d 314 [173 USPQ 266] (7th Cir. 1972). This Court is of the opinion that when an experiment tolls section 102(b), the one-year period of limitations commences to run when the invention disclosed proves workable.
The above quotation is from City of Elizabeth v. American Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 136, 24 L. Ed. 1000 (1877), which is the starting place for analysis of any case involving experimental use. There, a toll road, built according to the invention of the patent in suit, was in daily use for a period of 6 years before the inventor filed for a patent. In upholding the validity of the patent, the Supreme Court spoke with clarity but through the years the guidelines set forth therein have been obfuscated. Returning to the original, we quote the following passages which are particularly pertinent to our analysis here:
That the use of the pavement in question was public in one sense cannot be disputed. But can it be said that the invention was in public use? The use of an invention by the inventor himself, or of any other person under his direction, by way of experiment, and in order to bring the invention to perfection, has never been regarded as such a use. Curtis, Patents, sect. 381; Shaw v. Cooper, 7 Pet. 292 [8 L. Ed. 689].
In the decision on appeal, the trial court looked for proof of an exception to the public use bar. However, in Elizabeth, the Supreme Court did not refer to "experimental use" as an "exception" to the bar otherwise created by a public use. More precisely, the Court reasoned that, if a use is experimental, even though not secret, "public use" is negated. This difference between "exception" and "negation" is not merely semantic. Under the precedent of this court, the statutory presumption of validity provided in 35 U.S.C. § 282 places the burden of proof upon the party attacking the validity of the patent, and that burden of persuasion does not shift at any time to the patent owner. It is constant and remains throughout the suit on the challenger. As stated in Richdel, Inc. v. Sunspool Corp, 714 F.2d 1573, 1579, 219 USPQ 8, 11-12 (Fed. Cir. 1983):
35 USC 282 permanently places the burden of proving facts necessary to a conclusion of invalidity on the party asserting such invalidity. Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 218 USPQ 871 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Solder Removal, supra, 582 F.2d at 633, 199 USPQ at 133.
Under this analysis, it is incorrect to impose on the patent owner, as the trial court in this case did, the burden of proving that a "public use" was "experimental." These are not two separable issues. It is incorrect to ask: "Was it public use?" and then, "Was it experimental?" Rather, the court is faced with a single issue: Was it public use under Sec. 102(b)?
Thus, the court should have looked at all of the evidence put forth by both parties and should have decided whether the entirety of the evidence led to the conclusion that there had been "public use." This does not mean, of course, that the challenger has the burden of proving that the use is not experimental. Nor does it mean that the patent owner is relieved of explanation. It means that if a prima facie case is made of public use, the patent owner must be able to point to or must come forward with convincing evidence to counter that showing.3 See Strong v. General Electric Co., 434 F.2d 1042, 1044, 168 USPQ 8, 9 (5th Cir. 1970). The length of the test period is merely a piece of evidence to add to the evidentiary scale. The same is true with respect to whether payment is made for the device, whether a user agreed to use secretly, whether records were kept of progress, whether persons other than the inventor conducted the asserted experiments, how many tests were conducted, how long the testing period was in relationship to tests of other similar devices. In other words, a decision on whether there has been a "public use" can only be made upon consideration of the entire surrounding circumstances.
Applying the principles set forth above to this case, that non-secret uses of the device were made prior to the critical date is not in itself dispositive of the issue of whether activity barring a patent under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) occurred. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co. v. Johnson & Johnson, 179 USPQ 216, 220 (N.D. Ill. 1973). The fact that the device was not hidden from view may make the use not secret but non-secret use is not ipso facto "public use" activity. City of Elizabeth v. American Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. at 136. Nor, it must be added, is all secret use ipso facto not "public use" within the meaning of the statute, if the inventor is making commercial use of the invention under circumstances which preserve its secrecy.
Fees Under Rule 37(d) of the Fed. R. Civ. P.
PRO's cross-appeal from the district court's denial of attorney fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285 is dismissed as moot. In view of our disposition of the appeal, PRO is no longer a prevailing party to whom an award could be made. Stickle v. Heublein, Inc., 716 F.2d 1550, 1564, 219 USPQ 377, 386 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
Compare Watson v. Allen, 254 F.2d 342, 117 USPQ 68 (DC Cir. 1958) with In re Blaisdell, 242 F.2d 779, 113 USPQ 289 (CCPA 1957); See G.T. Welch, Patent Law's Ephemeral Experimental Use Doctrine, 11 Tol.L.Rev. 865-92 (1980); Note, The Public Use Bar to Patentability; Two New Approaches to the Experimental Use Exception, 52 Minn. L. Rev. 851 (1968); Wells & Riggins, Public Use and Sale as a Bar to Obtaining a Patent and Its Application to Government Activities, 18 Am.U.L.Rev. 43, 51-57 (1968); Pigott, The Concepts of Public Use and Sale, 49 J.Pat.Off.Soc'y 399, 411-26 (1967); Comment, Experimentation and Public Use of Inventions--An Analysis of Appellate Anemia, U.Ill.L.F. 585 (1960); Vassil, Public Use; The Inventor's Dilemma, 36 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 297 (1958)
See generally, In re Smith, 714 F.2d 1127, 1135, 218 USPQ 976, 983 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
We do not read Smith & Griggs Mfg. Co. v. Sprague, 123 U.S. 249, 267, 8 S. Ct. 122, 131, 31 L. Ed. 141 (1887) as contrary to this view, as urged by appellees. However, assuming that in Smith & Griggs, the Court intended to impose the ultimate burden of persuasion on the patent holder rather than merely the burden of going forward with countering evidence, we do not believe that view is tenable in the face of the subsequently enacted statutory presumption. As stated in Austin Machinery Co. v. Buckeye Traction Ditcher Co., 13 F.2d 697, 700 (6th Cir. 1926), where a similar argument was advanced with respect to the meaning of Smith & Griggs :
The presumption of the validity of the patent is such that the defense of invention by another must be established by the clearest proof--perhaps beyond reasonable doubt. The same rule apparently should apply to the defense of prior public use or sale by the inventor. When an actual sale in the critical period appears, it may well be that the trier of fact will mentally shift the burden of evidence necessary to show this sale to have been so modified that its existence did not make the device "on sale" within the meaning of the statute; but we see no reason why the legal burden of proof should shift, and we know of no authoritative and considered decision to that effect. It would seem that the legal and heavy burden of proof as to all the elements involved continues until the end upon one who attacks the patent grant.