Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/new-york/court-of-appeals/2019/41.html
Timestamp: 2019-10-16 03:00:41
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Kosmider v. Whitney :: 2019 :: New York Court of Appeals Decisions :: New York Case Law :: New York Law :: US Law :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › New York Case Law › New York Court of Appeals Decisions › 2019 › Kosmider v. Whitney
The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the Appellate Division affirming the judgment of Supreme Court directing disclosure of electronic copies of ballots stored by Essex County voting machines in the November 2015 general election, holding that N.Y. Elec. Law 3-222 protects disclosure of ballot copies during the relevant time frame.
In December 2015, Petitioner requested the electronic ballot copies preserved by the Essex County Board of Elections (County Board). The County Attorney determined that section 3-222(2), which prohibits examination of "voted ballots" absent a court order or legislative committee direction during the first two years following an election, barred examination of the "voted ballots." In ordering immediate release of the ballot images Supreme Court concluded that section 3-222 did not protect the copies from disclosure and that the two-year limitation on examination of voted ballots outlined in section 3-222(2) did not encompass electronic ballot copies. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that section 3-222(2) prevented the County Board from granting Petitioner's request for disclosure of electronic copies of those ballots.
Matter of Kosmider v Whitney 2019 NY Slip Op 04757 Decided on June 13, 2019 Court of Appeals DiFiore, Ch. J. Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.
[*1]In the Matter of Bethany Kosmider, Respondent,
Mark Whitney, as Commissioner of the Essex County Board of Elections, Respondent, Allison McGahay, as Commissioner of the Essex County Board of Elections, et al., Appellants.
Daniel R. Novack, for respondents Kosmider and Whitney.
In June 2016, petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding in Supreme Court against the Commissioners of the County Board and the County FOIL Appeals Officer, seeking an order directing release of the ballot copies. Petitioner argued that Election Law § 3-222(1), which restricts access to voting data on removable memory cards, does so only until the data is preserved and that subsection (2) restricts access to paper ballots but not electronic copies of the ballots. Respondents answered and raised affirmative defenses, including that the electronic ballot copies were barred from release by Election Law § 3-222(2) without court order or legislative committee direction, which precluded disclosure of those materials pursuant to a FOIL request.[FN1]
The Appellate Division affirmed, with two Justices dissenting (160 AD3d 1151 [3d Dept 2018]). A two-Justice plurality agreed with Supreme Court that the ballot images should be disclosed pursuant to FOIL, noting that FOIL exemptions are to be interpreted narrowly and that the statute's two-year preservation and restricted examination rule encompasses paper ballots but not electronic copies (160 AD3d at 1154). It determined that the statute reflects only a legislative intent to prevent tampering — not to protect confidentiality of ballots — and, thus, the distinction between paper ballots and electronic copies reflects the Legislature's awareness of different preservation procedures for what it viewed as two categories of materials (id. at 1154-55). One Justice concurred on a different rationale, reasoning that even if the electronic ballot copies are exempted from FOIL disclosure for two years, that time passed while the case was pending on appeal and a court order was no longer required (160 AD3d at 1157 [Aarons, J., concurring]).[FN2]
The plain text of a statute is the best indicator of legislative intent and thus the proper starting place in discerning its meaning (Majewski v Broadalbin-Perth Cent. School Dist., 91 NY2d 577, 583 [1998]). When a statute [*2]is part of a broader legislative scheme, its language must be construed "in context and in a manner that harmonizes the related provisions and renders them compatible" (Matter of M.B., 6 NY3d 437, 447 [2006] [internal punctuation and citation omitted]). With respect to the Election Law, we have cautioned that "where . . . the Legislature erects a rigid framework of regulation, detailing . . . specific particulars,' there is no invitation for the courts to exercise flexibility in statutory interpretation" (Matter of Gross v Albany County Bd. of Elections, 3 NY3d 251, 258 [2004], quoting Matter of Higby v Mahoney, 48 NY2d 15, 20 n 2 [1979]). Legislative pronouncements specific to voting and the electoral process must be faithfully executed, as "[t]he sanctity of [that] process can best be guaranteed through uniform application of the law" (Matter of Gross, 3 NY3d at 258). Thus, we must also honor these principles in determining whether the FOIL standard is met.
Election Law § 3-222 contains three subsections relevant to this dispute that set forth a complex system of preservation and judicially supervised "examination" of ballots. Subsection (1) addresses preservation and examination of removable memory cards and similar media that temporarily store voting data [FN3]. Subsection (2) states a general rule as to preservation and examination of "voted ballots," providing,
"Voted ballots shall be preserved for two years after such election and the packages thereof may be opened and the contents examined only upon order of a court . . . , or by direction of such committee of the senate and assembly if the ballots relate to the election under investigation by such committee."
At the expiration of this two-year period of preservation and restricted access, "such ballots may be disposed of at the discretion of the officer or board having charge of them." Subsection (3) includes a similar preservation and examination rule for "protested, void and wholly blank ballots, open packages of unused ballots and all absentee and military, special federal, special presidential and emergency ballots and ballot envelopes." [FN4] In other words, all voted [*3]ballots — whether cast at the polls on election day or through some other process, such as absentee or military voting — are covered under the statute.
Together, therefore, subsections (2) and (3) establish a general default rule that ballots — whether counted or uncounted — are not freely accessible by the public during the first two years after an election and that, to examine them, a party must go through the prescribed channels supervised by the court or legislative committee, which were not followed here. There is no dispute that subsection (2) — addressing "voted ballots" — applies this default rule to the underlying paper ballots cast at the polls, and nothing in the text of section 3-222 indicates the Legislature intended to treat the electronic copies any differently than the underlying paper ballots [FN5]. There is no basis in the language of the statute to conclude that the restriction could be circumvented merely because the agency makes a copy (electronic or otherwise) of the voted ballot. Thus, taken at face value, the rule in Election Law § 3-222(2) that "voted ballots" are protected from examination during the first two years after an election absent court order or direction from a relevant legislative committee extends to electronic copies of those ballots. The same is true of absentee and military ballots, which are "voted ballots" under subsection (2) and, along with their envelopes, are also specifically protected in subsection (3).
The current version of the statute is the result of amendments enacted in 2011 that preserved its general purpose but conformed the text to reflect the transition from mechanical lever voting systems to the ballot scanning machines currently in use. Subsection (1) was revised to replace references to "lock[ing]" and "unlock[ing]" the lever voting machines with the current requirements for handling removable memory cards (L 2011, ch 169). These [*4]amendments "establish[ed] procedures designed to ensure that election data recorded on the new voting systems are safeguarded and protected throughout the tabulation process," just as that information was protected during tabulation under the prior version of subsection (1) (Budget Division Mem, Bill Jacket, L 2011 ch 169). The amendments were intended to "ensure that all data collected during an election will be available for any subsequent examination pursuant to a court order or at the direction of a Senate or Assembly committee" (Budget Division Mem, Bill Jacket, L 2011 ch 169 [emphasis added]). This language — conveying that a court order is needed for access to data "subsequent" to preservation (i.e., after subsection [1] no longer applies) — reflects a legislative intent that the subsection (2) restrictions on examination extend to all versions of voted ballots, whether paper or electronic.
The 2011 amendments also show that the Legislature knew how to distinguish between paper and electronic materials when that was its intent. The amendments repurposed subsection (2), which previously applied only to "write-in" ballots, to confer its two-year preservation and restricted access rule on the broader category of "voted ballots" (L 2011, ch 282). At that time, subsection (3) specifically referenced (as it does now) "boxes containing voted paper ballots" (emphasis added), which were already protected. The Legislature clearly understood how the new voting system functioned — that paper ballots completed by voters were scanned into the machines and recorded in the form of electronic data. Yet, instead of using the narrower phrase "voted paper ballots" utilized in subsection (3), the Legislature chose the broader term "voted ballots" when it amended subsection (2) — indicating that the Legislature did not intend to restrict the scope of subsection (2) to paper ballots or otherwise create a different rule for electronic ballot copies [FN6]. Notably, the 2011 amendments did carve out a special rule as to another category of materials, providing in subsection (3) that, although ballots are generally subject to the two-year preservation rule, "sealed packages of unused ballots" need only be retained for four months (L 2011, ch 282)[FN7]. Given the absence of a [*5]similar carveout for electronic ballot copies, we discern no legislative intent to treat those images differently from their voted paper ballot counterparts, which are specifically subject to the statute's general two-year restriction.
The Election Law provides for a recanvass of votes within, at most, 20 days from an election and dictates procedures in case of discrepancy between the results of the canvass and recanvass (Election Law § 9-208). It also requires an audit of "voter verifiable audit records from three percent of voting machines or systems" in each voting [*6]jurisdiction within 15 days of a general election (Election Law § 9-211). Further, election disputes are resolved in special summary proceedings, which "have preference over all other causes in all courts" (Election Law § 16-116) and abbreviated limitations periods (see e.g., Election Law § 16-106 [stating limitations periods for proceedings regarding casting or canvassing of ballots of 10, 20, or 30 days]).
Petitioner's reading of the statute would allow for near-immediate public access to electronic ballot copies, thereby circumventing the Election Law's established process for ensuring the accuracy and transparency of election results in a timely, orderly, and transparent manner. Because the preservation process involves simply transferring data onto a hard drive and can be completed within hours after an election, petitioner's interpretation would enable disclosure of electronic ballot copies and invite any FOIL requester's interpretation of the results (based on incomplete data, since not all voted ballots are scanned) prior to completion of critical post-polling procedures like the canvass and three-percent audit. Political parties, candidates, news agencies (or quasi news agencies) could obtain this data and offer the public their own version of the "canvass" before the official results were certified by the [*7]Board of Elections [FN8]. Competing pronouncements concerning the results of elections from various unofficial sources — or post hoc challenges to official results based on these private vote canvasses — would undermine the integrity of the official results and the principle of election finality.[FN9]
A review of certain provisions of the Election Law and their history is helpful to understanding the thrust of the FOIL request under review and the precise question before this Court. Beginning in 2005 with its enactment of the Election Reform and Modernization Act, the legislature made a series of amendments to the Election Law requiring the replacement of lever voting and punch card machines with electronic optical scan voting systems or direct recording electronic machines (see L 2005, ch 181 §§ 6, 9, 11; L 2007, ch 506, § 1; Election Law §§ 7—202 [4]; 7-209), as mandated by federal law (see 52 USC §§ 20902, 21081). Generally, to cast a vote on an electronic optical scan voting machine, a voter scans a marked paper ballot into a ballot scanner (see Election Law § 8-312 [1], [2]). The electronic machine scans the paper ballot, interprets the vote marked on the ballot, tabulates the voting results of all ballots thus cast, and saves images of every cast ballot in both its resident memory and on portable memory devices (see Election Law § 9-102 [1], [2]; 9 NYCRR 6209.1 [u]; 6209.2 [a] [7]). The Election Law also authorizes [*8]the use of direct recording electronic machines, upon which a voter may cast a vote directly on the face of the machine; the machine then produces a "voter verified permanent paper record" (Election Law § 7-202 [1] [j]; see Election Law § 7-202 [4]).
The issue before us distills to whether, as respondents argue, electronic ballot images are exempt from FOIL disclosure as "voted ballots" under Election Law § 3-222 (2) that must be preserved for two years, subject to [*9]examination only upon court order or legislative direction. The proper analysis of this question necessitates a review of the well-established principles governing FOIL disputes. Codified in the Public Officers Law, FOIL mandates that governmental "agenc[ies] shall . . . make available for public inspection and copying all records, except that such agenc[ies] may deny access to records or portions thereof that" fit within certain statutory exceptions (Public Officers Law § 87 [2]). FOIL is grounded in "the premise that the public is vested with an inherent right to know" and, "[b]y permitting access to official information long shielded from public view, the act permits the electorate to have sufficient information in order to make intelligent, informed choices with respect to both the direction and scope of governmental activities" (Matter of Fink v Lefkowitz, 47 NY2d 567, 571 [1979]). Indeed, "judicious use of the provisions of [FOIL] can be a remarkably effective device in exposing waste, negligence and abuses on the part of government; in short, to hold the governors accountable to the governed'" (id., quoting NLRB v Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 US 214, 242 [1978]).
Election Law § 3-222 (2)—included in a provision entitled "Preservation of ballots and records of voting machines"—provides that
"[v]oted ballots shall be preserved for two years after [an] election and the packages thereof may be opened and the contents examined only upon order of a court or judge of competent jurisdiction or by direction of [a] committee of the senate and assembly if the ballots relate to [an] election under investigation" (emphasis added).
The majority's analysis relies on an unfounded assumption that electronic images of cast paper ballots are, themselves, "ballots." However, electronic images of paper ballots do not meet the statutory definition of "ballots" or "official ballots" because they are neither a paper ballot nor an electronic display within the ballot frame on the face of a voting machine as prepared for a voter to cast a vote. By logical extension, electronic images of cast ballots cannot constitute "voted ballots" under Election Law § 3-222 (2) [emphasis added])[FN10]. A voter casts only one "ballot" in an election, and a scanned image thereof is not, itself, a voted "ballot." Thus, while the majority may be correct [*10]that the Election Law closely regulates access to "ballots" in order to ensure the integrity of elections (see majority op, at 16), it does not follow that the legislature intended to restrict access to scanned electronic ballot images—the records sought by petitioner in this case.
In other words, the preservation of ballots and the statutory restrictions on access to paper ballots were aimed at ensuring that the actual ballots upon which citizens cast their votes were available for verification of election results and were maintained in such a manner that they were not vulnerable to alteration or tampering. Indeed, the [*11]majority's contrary claim that Election Law § 3-222 (2) is partly intended to ensure the confidentiality of voted ballots is belied both by the fact that the voted ballots do not identify the voter and by the legislature's choice to permit packages of voted ballots to be sold after expiration of the two-year preservation period (see Election Law § 3-222 [3]; Comm on Open Govt, FOIL-AO-19107 [2014]).[FN11]
The absence of legislative history reflecting an intent to maintain confidentiality of the content of voted ballots, or electronic images of voted ballots, is significant. As the majority points out, if an original record is protected from disclosure under a FOIL exemption because another statute grants that record confidentiality, then a [*12]copy of that confidential record would be protected from disclosure to the same extent as an original. This is because, where confidentiality is the goal, the same harm comes from release of the original and any copies, electronic or otherwise. However, because the purposes of the sealing requirement of Election Law § 3-222 (2) are preservation and prevention of tampering—not confidentiality—a logical distinction may easily be drawn between the original ballot and the electronic image thereof. Providing copies of digital images—where those images are, as here, possessed by the agency without necessitating access to the paper ballots in contravention of Election Law § 3-222 (2)'s sealing requirement—simply does not undermine the preservation of, or increase the risk of tampering with, the original ballots in the same manner as providing direct access to those original paper ballots, nor does it alter or affect the security of the electronically preserved images retained by election authorities.
The remainder of the majority's analysis strays far from the legislative purpose underlying Election Law § 3-222 to reflect, instead, on the general public policies of ballot secrecy, minimization of opportunities for vote bribing or extortion, and finality in elections. While the legislative purpose of section 3-222 is relevant to whether it creates a FOIL exemption, the majority's subjective balancing of policy concerns is not. To be sure, these are significant and laudable public policy concerns, and the legislature has undertaken steps to further these goals (see e.g. Election Law §§ 8-312 [1]; 17-130 [10]; 17-126; see also NY Const art. II, § 7). However, there is no indication that the legislature believed these objectives would be undermined by permitting the release of electronic ballot images under FOIL and, notably, the majority fails to adequately explain how disclosure of the images will have any adverse effect on the accuracy, transparency, integrity, or timeliness,[FN12] of the electoral process.[FN13]
Ultimately, if the legislature intended to exempt electronic ballot images from FOIL disclosure, such an intent could have been clearly evinced through either the statutory text or the legislative history of Election Law § 3-222 (2) (see Burns, 67 NY2d at 567; Matter of M. Farbman & Sons, 62 NY2d at 81). In the absence of any such proof of intent, we are empowered only to " read and give[] effect [to the relevant statutes] as . . . written by the [l]egislature, not as the court may think [they] should or would have been written if the [l]egislature had envisaged all the problems and complications which might arise'" (People v Tychanski, 78 NY2d 909, 911 [1991], quoting Parochial Bus Sys. v Board of Educ., 60 NY2d 539, 548—549 [1983]). Insofar as the majority engages in its own weighing of policy considerations to draw conclusions unsupported by the language or legislative history of Election Law § 3-222 (2), I respectfully dissent.[FN14] Matter of Kosmider v Whitney
Allowable responses [1] and [2] govern most disputes, because records are typically confidential or not. Here, however, the records are protected from disclosure for a limited, legislatively predetermined time only: two years. [*13]Neither [1] nor [2] is appropriate, but allowable response [3] plainly is. "FOIL is based on a presumption of access in accordance with the underlying premise that the public is vested with an inherent right to know and that official secrecy is anathematic to our form of government'" (Matter of Madeiros v N.Y. State Educ. Dep't, 30 NY3d 67, 73 [2017], quoting Matter of Fink v Lefkowitz, 47 NY2d 567, 571 [1979]). "FOIL is to be liberally construed and its exemptions narrowly interpreted" (Capital Newspapers, Div. of Hearst Corp. v Whalen, 69 NY2d 246, 252 [1987]). Those principles, coupled with the statutory text, required the Essex Board of Elections to follow the third course, by promptly informing Ms. Kosmider that it would provide the requested ballot images to her on or shortly after November 3, 2017.
Here, the legal issue raised is: what response is required to a FOIL request made for access to ballot images when the request is made shortly after an election? That is a pure question of statutory interpretation, in which our responsibility is to reconcile the Freedom of Information Law and the Election Law. When the issue "raises solely a question of statutory interpretation, however, . . . we may address [it] even though it was not presented below" (Richardson v Fiedler Roofing, Inc., 67 N.Y.2d 246, 250 [1986]). Of course, if the outcome would depend on facts that have not yet been determined by the lower courts, we would not reach the issue. Thus: "a new argument may be raised for the first time in the Court of Appeals if it could not have been obviated or cured by factual showings or [*14]legal countersteps in the court of first instance" (Rivera v Smith, 63 N.Y.2d 501, 516 n 5 [1984] [citing American Sugar Refining Co. v Waterfront Comm., 55 NY2d 11, 25, app dsmd sub nom. New York Shipping Assn. v Waterfront Comm., 458 U.S. 1101; Telaro v Telaro, 25 NY2d 433, 439; Cohen and Karger, Powers of the New York Court of Appeals (rev ed), §§ 161-163]).[FN15]
Footnote 1: One Commissioner of the County Board, Mark Whitney, supported the petition. The second Commissioner, Allison McGahay, opposed the petition. In addition to contending that Election Law § 3-222 precluded disclosure, Commissioner McGahay asserted that the action was time-barred by the abbreviated statutes of limitations contained in the Election Law — an argument we do not reach.
Footnote 2: We must resolve this appeal based on the preserved arguments of the parties in light of the circumstances reflected in the record at the time the FOIL determination was made — and not based on subsequent events, including the passage of time. In a lone dissent, one of our colleagues determines that, rather than denying the request, the FOIL officer should have held it during the two-year post-election period and granted it at the expiration of that time. Because petitioner never made any such alternative request during the FOIL proceeding, nor was relief of that nature sought in the petition, we could not entertain that argument in this CPLR article 78 proceeding even if it was made by a party (see Matter of Khan v New York State Dept. of Health, 96 NY2d 879, 880 [2001] ["Judicial review of administrative determinations pursuant to CPLR article 78 is limited to questions of law. Unpreserved issues are not issues of law"] [citation omitted]). Moreover, the views expressed in the lone dissent involve issues never litigated at any point in this proceeding, including in this Court, to which neither party has had an opportunity to respond and which extend beyond the scope of this appeal. We therefore have no occasion to further address them (see Misicki v Caradonna, 12 NY3d 511, 519-520 [2009]).
Footnote 3: Subsection (1) states, in relevant part, that such media "shall remain sealed against reuse" until preservation of the data and that, during the pre-preservation period, the data "may be examined upon the order of any court . . . of competent jurisdiction or . . . at the direction of a committee of the senate or assembly to investigate and report upon contested elections of members of the legislature."
Footnote 4: Subsection (3), referring to boxes of various types of voted and unvoted paper ballots and envelopes, provides that, "[u]nless otherwise ordered or directed by such a court, justice or committee, such boxes shall be opened and their contents and such packages and the envelopes containing voted ballots and ballot envelopes shall be destroyed, at the expiration of the [statutory preservation] period . . . , except that instead of being destroyed, they may be sold and the proceeds paid over in the manner provided with respect to the sale of books, records and papers pertaining to an election." There are no cases interpreting this provision, or indicating that such a sale has ever occurred. The propriety of such a sale is a matter beyond the scope of this appeal.
Footnote 5: The reference in subsection (2) to "packages" of "voted ballots" — cited by the Appellate Division plurality as evidence that this provision excludes electronic copies — is not to the contrary. That language reflects the fact that the phrase "voted ballots" encompasses voted paper ballots, but it does not limit the scope of subsection (2) or imply that copies of such paper ballots are outside the statute's scheme of restricted access.
Footnote 6: We do not dispute that "voted ballots" includes "ballots cast directly on a voting machine—i.e., the display frame of the electronic machine on which the vote is cast" in addition to voted paper ballots (dissenting op [Stein, J.] at 11 n 1). This supports our conclusion that the term "voted ballots" in subsection (2) broadly encompasses all voted ballots, whether in paper or electronic form. The Legislature chose not to use a term that would have quite clearly achieved the result advocated by petitioner here — that only voted paper ballots are protected by the restricted access scheme in the statute.
Footnote 7: With the change to paper ballots for the majority of voters, election boards were compelled to order more than enough ballots to accommodate any voter that might come to the polls — even though many registered voters do not vote. As a result, election boards would be left, after election day, with a proliferation of sealed packages of unused ballots. This exception was crafted to relieve the burden on election districts of storing such packages for two years in costly warehouse space (Mem in Support, Bill Jacket, L 2011, ch 282, 2011 NY Legis Ann at 207). When the Legislature amended subsection (3) to provide that "sealed packages of unused ballots" need only be preserved for four months, it created a carveout from the general rule in subsections (2) and (3) that ballots (particularly voted ballots) are preserved and protected from unrestricted examination for two years.
Footnote 8: To the extent that petitioner argues that unrestricted public access to electronic ballot copies via FOIL would serve a public interest in ensuring the accuracy of results soon after an election, such a view is overstated. Only a subset of ballots cast in an election are scanned and produce ballot images — some are hand counted (see Election Law §§ 9-110, 9-209). Thus, review of electronic data of this type affords an incomplete picture of election results. A comprehensive review of all ballots cast in an election could be conducted only pursuant to the restricted access scheme set forth in Election Law § 3-222(2), (3).
Footnote 9: Although electronic ballot copies are stored in a randomized fashion, certain political parties (particularly minor parties) have so few members in less populated districts that electronic ballot copies from primary elections may enable a FOIL requester to ascertain the substance of individual voters' cast votes shortly after an election. Likewise, under petitioner's interpretation of section 3-222, the statute would not preclude FOIL disclosure of absentee ballots and ballot envelopes (which could, like other documents subject to FOIL, be copied for the purpose of FOIL disclosure) — despite its express interdiction against "examination" of such documents absent a court order or legislative direction. Such results would undermine ballot secrecy and finality in elections and circumvent the statutory mechanisms in place for review of ballots.
Footnote 10: The majority asserts that the legislature knew how to differentiate between "voted paper ballots" and electronic ballot images, observing that the term "voted paper ballots" appears in Election Law § 3-222 (3). However, while Election law § 3-222 (3) does refer specifically to "voted paper ballots," the distinction between "voted paper ballots" and "voted ballots" is not that the latter includes electronic images of paper ballots but, rather, that the former does not include those ballots cast directly on a voting machine—i.e., the display frame of the electronic machine on which the vote is cast. This distinction is made clear by the context of the legislature's use of the term "voted paper ballots"; specifically, subdivision (3), uses the term "voted paper ballots" in reference to the reuse of the "boxes containing" such ballots.
Footnote 11: I note that any actual decision by a board of elections regarding whether to sell or discard the voted ballots is irrelevant. The salient fact is that the legislature has authorized the sale of such ballots, as it is the legislature's intent that governs the dispute before us.
Footnote 12: A FOIL requestor who obtains electronic ballot images will nevertheless be bound by the time limitations prescribed in the Election Law (see generally Election Law art 16). While the majority speculates that news agencies, political parties, and candidates may falsely or inaccurately report results of canvasses, it overlooks the possibility that such entities could actually advance election transparency by verifying and checking the accuracy of the results reported by election officials.
Footnote 13: The majority posits that, in some political districts, certain political parties may have so few members that electronic ballot images from primary elections may enable a FOIL requester to ascertain the nature of an individual's vote. As the majority recognizes, ballot secrecy is not absolute and, insofar as voter registration rolls are accessible by the public and election results may be announced by geographic area (see generally Election Law §§ 5-602; 5-604), a determined individual could—even without electronic ballot images—possibly identify a particular individual's vote in a sparsely populated district by means of other available public records. Notably, however, FOIL does permit—under a different exception not invoked by respondents here—the denial of access to records that, if disclosed "would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy" (Public Officers Law § 87 [2] [b]; see Public Officers Law § 89 [2] [b]). As respondents did not assert this exemption as a basis for denying petitioner's FOIL request, respondents may not rely on it now (see Matter of Madeiros v New York State Educ. Dept., 30 NY3d 67, 74-75 [2017]).
Footnote 14: I also find unavailing respondents' argument that the proceeding was untimely inasmuch as petitioner commenced this proceeding within four months of the denial of her administrative appeal (see CPLR 217 [1]; Public Officers Law § 89 [4] [b]).
Footnote 15: A different set of considerations, not relevant here, prevents us from reaching errors that could have been corrected if they had been raised in the court of instance (see e.g. People v Alfaro, 66 NY2d 985 [1985])
The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the Appellate Division affirming the judgment of Supreme...