Source: http://www.narf.org/nill/bulletins/state/documents/mt.html
Timestamp: 2014-04-24 13:34:26
Document Index: 656071390

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 232', '§ 1', '§ 814', '§ 631', '§ 797', '§ 798', '§ 800', '§ 803', '§ 803', '§ 814', '§ 631']

(Cite as: 2006 WL 1359615 (Iowa))
the Interest of M.T., M.T., and T.B., Minor Children.
05-0179.
Appeal from district court order allowing tribe to intervene pursuant
to the Iowa Indian Child Welfare Act in child-in-need-of-assistance action.
Michelle M. Dreibelbis, Sioux City, for appellants, minor children.
Thomas S. Mullin, County Attorney, and David A. Dawson, Assistant
County Attorney, for appellants, State of Iowa and Woodbury County
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Bruce Kempkes, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee, Iowa Department of Human Services.
Martha M. McMinn, Sioux City, for appellee, The Winnebago Tribe
Jeffrey S. Rasmussen of Olson, Allen & Rasmussen, L.L.C., Bloomington,
Minnesota, Thomas D. Grabinski of Grinnell, and Wilford Stone of
Lynch Dallas, P.C., Cedar Rapids, for amicus curiae, The Sac
& Fox Tribe of the Mississippi in Iowa.
Molly Vakulskas-Joly, Sioux City, for the father of M.T. and
H. Allan Sturgeon, Sioux City, for the mother of the
The district court allowed The Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska to
intervene in this child-in-need-of-assistance action. The children's attorney and the
Woodbury County Attorney challenge this ruling, claiming the Iowa Indian
Child Welfare Act, under which the court authorized the tribe's
intervention, is unconstitutional. We do not reach this issue, however,
because we are compelled to conclude the appeal must be
dismissed on jurisdictional grounds.
The county attorney commenced this proceeding under Iowa Code chapter
232, alleging the minor children, M.T., M.T., and T.B., were
children in need of assistance and asking that their care,
custody, and control be transferred to DHS for placement in
family foster care. More than twelve months after The Winnebago
Tribe of Nebraska was notified of this action, it sought
to intervene pursuant to the Iowa Indian Child Welfare Act
("Iowa ICWA"). See
Iowa Code § 232B.4(3)
(Supp.2003). Rejecting the constitutional challenges made to the Iowa ICWA
by the children's attorney and the county attorney, the district
court permitted the tribe to become a party to the
proceeding. After the children's attorney's
and the county attorney's motions to reconsider under Iowa Rule
of Civil Procedure 1.904(2) were denied, these parties filed notices
At this point, the Iowa Attorney General filed a statement
with the Iowa supreme court, claiming the county attorney had
improperly asserted authority to appeal on the State's behalf. The
attorney general claimed, contrary to the position of the county
attorney, that the Iowa ICWA could be defended against any
constitutional challenge. Subsequently, the attorney general filed a motion to
dismiss the appeal on the basis it was untimely. The
attorney general claimed the appellants' post-ruling motions were not properly
filed under rule 1.904(2) and so did not toll the
time for appeal. Being unpersuaded by the county attorney's resistance
to the attorney general's motion to dismiss, a three-justice panel
of this court held the post-ruling motions did not toll
the period for appealing and so dismissed the appeal. The
dismissal order was filed on May 5, 2005, and procedendo
was issued the next day on May 6, 2005, sending
the matter back to the district court.
On May 11, 2005, the county attorney filed a petition
for rehearing in the supreme court, arguing the panel had
erred in dismissing the appeal. On June 14, 2005, the
panel set aside the dismissal and ordered the clerk of
the supreme court to recall procedendo. The question of appellate
jurisdiction was ordered to be submitted with the appeal.
The attorney general subsequently filed a motion to vacate this
court's June 14,
2005 order, claiming the panel lacked authority to withdraw procedendo
and reinstate the dismissed appeal. Alternatively, the attorney general claimed
that even if the court had authority to recall procedendo,
the circumstances of this case did not warrant the exercise
of this extraordinary power. The county attorney responded that this
court's "jurisdiction did not cease when procedendo was quickly, but
mistakenly, issued on May 6, 2005."
*2 Although the parties dispute whether the county attorney or the attorney general properly represents the interests of the State in this appeal, we need not resolve this dispute prior to determining our jurisdiction in this matter. Questions concerning this court's jurisdiction may be raised upon the court's own motion. See River Excursions, Inc. v. City of Davenport, 359 N.W.2d 475, 477 (Iowa 1984) ("Even though neither party has questioned our jurisdiction to hear and decide this case, we will sua sponte dismiss an appeal that is neither authorized by our rules nor permitted by court order ."); Budde v. City Dev. Bd., 276 N.W.2d 846, 849 (Iowa 1979) ("Although petitioners moved to dismiss the appeal, we are obliged to do so even on our own motion when an appeal is not authorized by rule."). Therefore, the attorney general's standing to challenge our jurisdiction is irrelevant. Accordingly, we proceed directly to a consideration of the propriety of this court's recall of procedendo and reinstatement of this appeal.
An appellate court must have some method of remanding a case to the lower court after the reviewing court has made its decision. See State v. Banning, 205 Iowa 826, 828, 218 N.W. 572, 574 (1928). In Iowa, remand is accomplished by the issuance of a procedendo. See State v. Henderson, 215 Iowa 276, 278, 243 N.W. 289, 290 (1932) ("The bar and the courts of this state have uniformly referred to the order which goes from this court to the district court to proceed with the trial of a cause as a 'procedendo .' "). See generally 62B Am.Jur.2d Procedendo § 1, at 579 (2005) ("In some jurisdictions, the term 'procedendo' is used interchangeably with 'remittitur' and 'mandate' to denote the order issued by a court of review on the decision of a cause on appeal: ..."). The issuance of procedendo is within the court's inherent power. [FN1] See Banning, 205 Iowa at 828, 218 N.W. at 574.
This court has adopted several appellate rules that address the
issuance of procedendo. Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.30 states
that no procedendo will issue "for 15 days after an
opinion of the supreme court is filed, nor thereafter while
a petition for rehearing, filed according to these rules, is
pending." Iowa R.App. P. 6.30. In contrast, procedendo must issue
immediately when the court denies an application for further review
or renders a decision in an abortion notification appeal. See
Iowa Rs.App. P. 6.402(6), 6.502(3).
Once procedendo has issued, the jurisdiction of the supreme court ceases. [FN2] See Henderson, 215 Iowa at 278, 243 N.W. at 290; Iowa Code § 814.25 (providing in reference to criminal matters that "[t]he jurisdiction of the appellate court shall cease when procedendo is issued"); id. § 631.16(7) (setting forth same principle pertaining to discretionary review of small claims actions); see also Iowa R.App. P. 6.12(6) (stating in cases of voluntary dismissal of an appeal that "[t]he issuance of procedendo shall constitute a final adjudication with prejudice"). Indeed, the entire purpose of a procedendo is to notify the lower court that the case is transferred back to that court. See Banning, 205 Iowa at 829, 218 N.W. at 574.
We have found no Iowa cases discussing the court's power
to recall procedendo or the parameters of such a power.
Nonetheless, it appears this court has recalled procedendo in at
least two documented cases. In Fenton
v. Way,
44 Iowa 438 (1876), the defendant filed a petition for
rehearing after this court had filed its opinion and issued
procedendo. 44 Iowa at 438-39. The supreme court ordered that
procedendo be returned and subsequently overruled the petition for rehearing.
at 439. This court's recall of procedendo was not challenged
or explained, but the facts showed the procedendo had issued
prior to the expiration of the time for filing a
petition for rehearing. Id.
at 438. In Hasted
v. Dodge,
39 N.W. 668 (1888), this court, on its own motion,
ordered a rehearing after an opinion had been filed and
procedendo had been issued. 39 N.W. at 668. It appears
the court discovered a conflict between the filed opinion and
a prior decision of the court. Id.
It is not apparent from the opinion whether the time
for rehearing had expired at the time the court ordered
a rehearing on its own accord. Because the court's withdrawal
of procedendo was not challenged in Fenton
or Hasted,
these decisions provide little assistance in the present appeal. Therefore,
we turn for guidance to the general principles followed by
other courts with respect to the recall of procedendo, mandate,
or remittitur.
It is widely recognized that an appellate court has inherent power to recall a procedendo. See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 463 U.S. 1323, 1324, 104 S.Ct. 7, 8, 77 L.Ed.2d 1426, 1428 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice, 9th Cir.1983); Nelson v. James, 722 F.2d 207, 208 (5th Cir.1984); Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 463 F.2d 268, 277 (D.C.Cir.1971); 5 Am.Jur.2d Appellate Review §§ 797, 798, at 463 (1995). Nonetheless, due to the strong interest in finality of judgments, the power of recall is considered an extraordinary remedy to be used sparingly and only to prevent injustice. See Nelson, 722 F.2d at 208; Powers v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 483 F.2d 963, 964 (1st Cir.1973); Greater Boston Television Corp., 463 F.2d at 277-78; 5 Am.Jur.2d Appellate Review § 798, at 463. "The clearest reason for recall or revision of appellate mandate is ... to correct clerical mistakes or to make the judgment consistent with the opinion." Greater Boston Television Corp., 463 F.2d at 278 (footnote omitted); accord 5 Am.Jur.2d Appellate Review §§ 800, 801, at 465. A recall of procedendo is also appropriate to protect judicial integrity. See Greater Boston Television Corp., 463 F.2d at 278; 5 Am.Jur.2d Appellate Review § 803, at 465-66. "Thus, a mandate may be set aside if it was procured by fraud on the court." 5 Am.Jur.2d Appellate Review § 803, at 466; accord Greater Boston Television Corp., 463 F.2d at 278. On the other hand, "[a]lleged erroneous rulings of law are generally not held to be sufficiently unconscionable to justify [the recall of procedendo]." Powers, 483 F.2d at 964; accord State v. Waddell, 191 Minn. 475, 254 N.W. 627, 627 (Minn.1934) (holding remittitur will not be recalled absent "some irregularity in connection with the remittitur").
Turning to the present appeal, we note the appellants have
suggested two bases upon which procedendo was properly withdrawn: (1)
procedendo was "mistakenly" issued by the clerk; and (2) our
dismissal order was erroneous. Adhering to the principles set forth
above, we conclude neither ground is sufficient to justify the
recall of procedendo in this case.
We first consider the argument that the supreme court clerk improvidently issued procedendo the day after our dismissal order was filed. The only rule requiring the clerk to delay the issuance of procedendo is rule 6.30, which instructs the clerk not to issue procedendo for fifteen days after an "opinion" is filed or thereafter while a petition for rehearing is pending. Iowa R.App. P. 6.30. The fifteen-day delay is apparently intended to maintain jurisdiction in the supreme court during the fourteen-day period for filing a petition for rehearing. See Iowa R.App. P. 6.27(1) (allowing a party to file a petition for rehearing "within 14 days after the filing of an opinion by the supreme court"). Rule 6.30 has no application to the dismissal order of the three-justice panel in this case, however, because the dismissal order is not an opinion. It is clear from a review of this court's procedural rules that an order that disposes of a motion is not considered an "opinion." For example, Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.502, which concerns abortion notification appeals, states that the supreme court's "decision may be rendered by order or opinion." Iowa R.App. P. 6.502(3) (emphasis added). In addition, Iowa Court Rule 21.25, a rule governing the organization and procedures of appellate courts, provides for the publishing of "[o]pinions of the supreme court" by West Publishing Company. Iowa R.App. P. 21.25. Clearly, this court does not forward orders rendered on motions to dismiss to West Publishing Company for inclusion in the Northwestern Reporter. The panel's dismissal order in this appeal was not an opinion. Therefore, the clerk was not prohibited by rule 6.30 from promptly issuing procedendo.
For the same reason, the appellants' petition for rehearing of
the panel's dismissal order did not provide a basis to
recall procedendo. Although the petition was purportedly filed under the
authority of rule 6.27, that rule allows a party to
file a petition for rehearing only after the filing of
an "opinion." Because the dismissal order was not an opinion,
rule 6.27 did not authorize the appellants' petition for rehearing.
We have examined our rules of appellate procedure and conclude
no provision is made for the review or rehearing of
three-justice orders. Therefore, the present case is unlike the situation
when we recalled a procedendo issued before the time for
rehearing had expired. Here, there was no period in which
the appellants could ask for rehearing, and consequently, there was
no irregularity in the immediate issuance of procedendo.
*5 Finally, we consider the appellants' assertion that this court could properly recall procedendo in order to correct its allegedly erroneous dismissal order. Even if we assume our dismissal order was wrong, that fact would not provide a basis to recall procedendo. The importance of finality in judgments constrains the exercise of our inherent power to recall procedendo and resubmit the appeal in the absence of an irregularity in the proceedings that affected the integrity or fairness of the court process. The only irregularity in the process suggested by the appellants is the clerk's prompt issuance of procedendo. But as we have already discussed, the clerk's action was entirely consistent with our appellate rules. Therefore, the appellants received the process to which they were entitled under our rules, procedendo was properly issued, and the dismissal is final.
Procedendo was improperly recalled in this matter because there was
no factual or legal basis for the exercise of this
extraordinary power. Accordingly, we vacate this court's June 14, 2005
order recalling procedendo. The three-justice order dismissing the appeal stands
as this court's final decision.
All justices concur except CARTER, J., who dissents without opinion.
Although the supreme court has inherent power to issue a
procedendo, this authority has been codified by the legislature for
criminal cases and small claims actions. See
Iowa Code § 814.24
(2005) (stating with respect to criminal appeals: "The decision of
the appellate court with any opinion filed or judgment rendered
must be recorded by its clerk. Procedendo shall be issued
as provided in the rules of appellate procedure."); id.
§ 631.16(6)
(setting forth same principles pertaining to discretionary review of small
claims actions).
Jurisdiction of a reviewing court may also end without the
issuance of procedendo if the reviewing court has issued its
decision, the time for rehearing has expired, and the lower
court has resumed jurisdiction with all parties having notice. Henderson,
215 Iowa at 278, 243 N.W. at 290; Banning,
205 Iowa at 829, 218 N.W. at 574; Becker
50 Iowa 139, 140-41 (1878). "Under such circumstances, we have
held that by appearance the parties consent to the jurisdiction
of the lower court, and thereby waive the filing of
a procedendo." Henderson,
215 Iowa at 278, 243 N.W. at 290.
The finality of a three-justice dismissal order is not unique
under our rules. Abortion notification appeals are submitted to a
three-justice panel, the panel's decision is not subject to review
or rehearing, and the clerk is instructed to promptly issue
procedendo once an order or opinion is filed. Iowa R.App.
P. 6.502(3).