Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/997/248/382162/
Timestamp: 2020-06-01 20:41:20
Document Index: 462348298

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 846', '§ 846', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. David P. Johnson and Ainsley Richards, Defendants-appellants, 997 F.2d 248 (7th Cir. 1993) :: Justia
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United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. David P. Johnson and Ainsley Richards, Defendants-appellants, 997 F.2d 248 (7th Cir. 1993)
US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit - 997 F.2d 248 (7th Cir. 1993) Argued Sept. 9, 1992. Decided June 16, 1993
David P. Johnson pled guilty to a charge of conspiracy to distribute marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and the district court, departing downward from the Sentencing Guidelines, sentenced him to thirty-three months of confinement to be followed by a five-year period of supervised release. Ainsley Richards1 also pled guilty to a charge of conspiracy to distribute marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and was sentenced to 210 months of confinement with five years of supervised release to follow, 784 F. Supp. 1373. We affirm.
David Johnson reasons that the limited size of the district court's downward departure, based upon his substantial assistance to the authorities, was unreasonable. See U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 (delineating five factors to consider in granting a downward departure). Johnson emphasizes his truthfulness in dealing with the authorities as well as his invaluable assistance in apprehending one of the co-conspirators (Rex Froedge). It is well settled in this circuit that "appellate courts lack jurisdiction to review a defendant's challenge to the extent of a downward departure from an otherwise appropriate sentence." United States v. Heilprin, 910 F.2d 471, 475 (7th Cir. 1990) (citing United States v. Gant, 902 F.2d 570 (7th Cir. 1990)). Thus, regardless of how beneficial Johnson believes his assistance was to the government, an appellate court lacks jurisdiction to review a defendant's appeal challenging the exercise of judicial discretion concerning a downward departure unless the sentence imposed violates the law or resulted from a misunderstanding of the law. See United States v. Poff, 926 F.2d 588, 590 (7th Cir.) (appellate courts "have no jurisdiction to review a refusal to depart from the Guidelines ... when the refusal reflects an exercise of the judge's discretion"), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S. Ct. 96, 116 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1991); United States v. Dean, 908 F.2d 215, 218 (7th Cir. 1990) ("where the defendant fails to suggest any law that the district court violated in departing downward, his appeal will be denied"); United States v. Gant, 902 F.2d 570, 573 (7th Cir. 1990) ("section 3742(a) does not provide for appellate review of a downward departure of an otherwise appropriate sentence"); United States v. Franz, 886 F.2d 973, 978 (7th Cir. 1989) ("Congress did not intend for departure-related decisions, including refusals to depart, to be appealable under section 3742(a) (2)").
This court does have jurisdiction to review a departure from the Guidelines if the district court imposed a sentence in violation of law or "if it is the product of a conclusion that the judge lacks authority to depart." Poff, 926 F.2d at 591. Based on the language in Poff, the defendant Johnson argues that the court should have granted a ten-level downward departure rather than an eight-level departure under § 5K1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines and that the court's error was not one of discretion but the result of an incorrect application of the law. He maintains that the court adopted an overly conservative interpretation of United States v. Thomas, 930 F.2d 526, 530-31 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S. Ct. 171, 116 L. Ed. 2d 134 (1991). Thomas addressed the role of the sentencing court in granting downward departures and concluded:
" [W]eighing the impact of any given factor on the quality of the defendant's cooperation is an imprecise art, at best. We do not intend to preclude the district court from utilizing a scale with more gradations in order to assign greater or lesser weight to the factors it considers."
Johnson argues that the court erred in only granting him a three-level reduction as a minor participant under § 3B1.2 rather than a four-level reduction as a minimal participant under § 3B1.2(a). We review the district court's determination under a clear error standard. United States v. Navarez, 954 F.2d 1375, 1382 (7th Cir. 1992).
The mere fact that another member in the conspiracy played a more significant role (i.e. leading, organizing or managing) does not, of itself, entitle Johnson to a reduction as a minimal participant. See United States v. Osborne, 931 F.2d 1139, 1158 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Rexford, 903 F.2d 1280, 1282 (9th Cir. 1990). Clearly, Johnson's role in the conspiracy was far more involved than simply offloading a single shipment or acting as a courier for a small amount of drugs. The defendant was a trusted and an active member of the conspiracy who not only assisted in harvesting large quantities of marijuana (3000-4000 lbs.) but was also allowed to receive and deliver a substantial money order in payment for a drug shipment. Thus, the court's determination that Johnson's conduct was between that of a minimal participant and a minor participant was not clearly erroneous.
Richards maintains that the exclusive use of hearsay testimony at his sentencing hearing denied him of Due Process because he did not have an opportunity to rebut the evidence. Richards relies on United States v. Barnes, 907 F.2d 693, 695 (7th Cir. 1990), which held that if the sentencing court relies on unreliable information, the sentence will be vacated. Accord United States v. Musa, 946 F.2d 1297, 1306 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Guerrero, 894 F.2d 261, 266 (7th Cir. 1990). The defendant contends that he was unable to examine the witnesses ("Chickie" Velez, Leslie Allen, April Johnson, Tammy Porter or Mike Rector whose testimony was recounted by Agent Magrames) and the sentencing court likewise was unable to view them directly and assess their veracity.4
Congress has expressly permitted the use of hearsay in sentencing proceedings, Fed.R.Evid. 1101(d) (3), to prevent the sentencing hearing from becoming a full-blown trial with " 'an endless parade of witnesses.' " United States v. Agyemang, 876 F.2d 1264, 1271 (7th Cir. 1989) (quoting United States v. Harris, 558 F.2d 366, 377 (7th Cir. 1977) (dissenting opinion)). This court has likewise authorized a sentencing judge "to consider a wide variety of information that would be inadmissible at trial, including hearsay." Beal, 960 F.2d at 634. "The district court is empowered to consider this broad range of information so that it may impose the sentence most appropriate to the defendant's circumstances." Id. In United States v. Campbell, 985 F.2d 341, 348 (7th Cir. 1993), we held that a defendant "has a due process right to be sentenced on the basis of reliable information ... [thus] a defendant [must] have a reasonable opportunity to rebut contested hearsay and that contested hearsay [must] be reliable." Id. Only if a defendant "show [s] that the information before the court was inaccurate, and that the court relied on it" can the defendant successfully challenge his sentence. Musa, 946 F.2d at 1306. Furthermore, " [w]e give great deference to the district court's determination that the hearsay is worthy of credence, and will review that ruling only for an abuse of discretion." Campbell, 985 F.2d at 348.
Richards contends that the district court erred in assessing him a base offense level of thirty-four (3,000 to 10,000 kilograms of marijuana) and that he should only have an offense level of thirty-two (1,000 to 3,000 kilograms). "Under the guidelines, the base offense level for drug offenses is determined by the type and quantity of drug involved in the offense. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a) (3), (c)." United States v. Jewel, 947 F.2d 224, 233 (7th Cir. 1991). We review the court's findings as to the facts under a clearly erroneous standard. United States v. Schuster, 948 F.2d 313, 315 (7th Cir. 1991).
The Sentencing Guidelines authorize a two-level enhancement for the possession of a firearm during the course of the conspiracy. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b) (1). Section 2D1.1(b) (1) does not require the defendant to possess the firearm, rather it only states "If a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was possessed, increase by 2 levels." United States v. Rodriguez-Nuez, 919 F.2d 461, 466 (7th Cir. 1990) (quoting § 2D1.1(b) (1)) (emphasis added). Application Note 3 adds "The enhancement for weapon possession reflects the increased danger of violence when drug traffickers possess weapons. The adjustment should be applied if the weapon was present, unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense...." § 2D1.1(b) (1), comment. (n. 3) (emphasis added).5 We review the sentencing court's factual findings relating to the weapons enhancement for clear error only. United States v. Ewing, 979 F.2d 1234, 1238 (7th Cir. 1992).
Sentencing Transcript at 191. This court has reversed a two-level weapons enhancement when "there was no proximity between the weapon and the contraband," United States v. Edwards, 940 F.2d 1061, 1063 (7th Cir. 1991) (citing Rodriguez-Nuez, 919 F.2d at 466), but as Agent Magrames' testimony clearly establishes, the people possessing weapons were individuals under Ainsley Richards' control and in close proximity to the drug transactions.
To enhance Richards' sentence, the district court relied on United States v. Morgan, 942 F.2d 243, 246-47 (4th Cir. 1991) ("section 2D1.1(b) (1) enhancement properly applies when a defendant has knowledge of his coconspirator's possession of a firearm during acts furthering the conspiracy") and United States v. Bianco, 922 F.2d 910, 912 (1st Cir. 1991) ("the sentencing guidelines expressly require a two-level increase in a defendant's base offense level whenever a codefendant's possession of a firearm in furtherance of their joint criminal venture was reasonably foreseeable by the defendant"). Richards argues that Bianco and Morgan are clearly distinguishable because, in both Bianco and Morgan, a co-conspirator did possess a weapon whereas in this case the testimony fails to place a weapon in the hands of a co-conspirator. The district court rejected this argument stating, "Given the surrounding circumstances--armed people greeting those who arrived with drugs--the court finds that the weapons were connected with the offense and that Mr. Richards was aware of the weapons' presence." Mem. Op., 784 F. Supp. at 1381.
We are of the opinion that United States v. Nino, 967 F.2d 1508, 1514 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S. Ct. 1432, 122 L. Ed. 2d 799 (1993), is relevant to the case before us. In Nino, one conspirator died before the conspiracy ended and a second conspirator cooperated with the government and was never charged. The third conspirator, Nino, was charged with the conspiracy and his sentence was enhanced for a weapon possessed by one of the uncharged co-conspirators. The court concluded that "the rules of co-conspirator liability as explained in Pinkerton [v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 66 S. Ct. 1180, 90 L. Ed. 1489 (1946) ] and the Sentencing Guidelines do not require that the firearm possessor be a charged co-conspirator when that co-conspirator dies or is otherwise unavailable for indictment." Id. at 1514. In the same opinion, when distinguishing a prior case, the court stated "the [United States v. Otero, 890 F.2d 366, 367 (11th Cir. 1989) ] reasoning avoids artificial sentence enhancement for firearm possession when the weapon is actually or constructively possessed by a person outside the conspiracy (for example, an undercover agent, confidential informant, or other nonconspirator)." Id. at 1514.
Nino makes clear that the one possessing the weapon need not be an indicted co-conspirator. We think this is especially true when the weapon was in the possession of someone under the defendant's control and in close proximity to the defendant and the drugs. See Rodriguez-Nuez, 919 F.2d at 466 (" [p]hysical proximity of the weapon and contraband is usually enough to support an enhancement").
The plain language of Application Note 3 states that the weapon need only be present and says nothing about the defendant or a co-conspirator possessing that weapon. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b) (1), comment. (n. 3). The evidence before the district court makes it clear that persons under Richards' control possessed weapons in close proximity to Richards at the time of unloading the marijuana. Even though those persons' exact identity remains unknown and they remain unindicted, the record is clear that the weapons were present during the drug transactions in question, possessed by associates of Richards, and known to Richards. This court has been unable to locate, nor has the defendant directed us to any case law requiring that the weapons be possessed by indicted co-conspirators when the weapons were in such close proximity to the defendant and so obviously possessed by his bodyguards who were ready, willing and able to act if needed. The weapons were possessed in the course of the conspiracy and Richards had full knowledge of their presence at the unloading of the marijuana. We hold, therefore, that the two-level enhancement of Richards' sentence was proper.
Richards argues that the court committed clear error in finding that his role in the conspiracy warranted a three-level enhancement. The government in the presentence report recommended a four-level enhancement because Richards was an organizer/leader of five or more people. Richards maintains that he was merely a middleman who bought marijuana from the Rector organization. The sentencing court found that Richards was a "manager or supervisor (but not an organizer or leader) of criminal activity that involved five or more participants." Mem. op., 784 F. Supp. at 1384 (citing U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b)). The court held, "The guideline only requires that the criminal activity involve five or more participants and that the defendant play a managerial or supervisory role. This conspiracy and Mr. Richards satisfied both requirements." Id. at 1385.
There is no question that the conspiracy involved five or more persons, the indictment itself names twelve defendants and does not include those conspirators who were previously convicted (Ron Rector, Mike Rector and Chickie Velez). The testimony of Agent Magrames at the sentencing hearing clearly established that Richards supervised Eric Clark, Ali, and Berris (last names unknown) in the unloading of marijuana shipments from Florida and Indiana. Richards' supervisory role demonstrates that he was more than a mere middleman. United States v. Lawson, 947 F.2d 849, 852 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S. Ct. 1505, 117 L. Ed. 2d 643 (1992) (exercising authority and handling large sums of money are evidence that one is more than a "mere 'intermediary' "). Furthermore, we are of the opinion that United States v. McGuire, 957 F.2d 310, 316-17 (7th Cir. 1992), is controlling based on the facts before us.
" [T]here is no requirement in § 3B1.1(b) that a defendant control the activities of all the participants in the criminal activity.
" [The defendant] controlled the activities of at least three people in the criminal activity, and was, therefore, a 'manager' within the meaning of § 3B1.1(b). Further, the criminal activity involved seven participants. Thus, the requirements of § 3B1.1(b) are met in this case by the showing that [the defendant] was a 'manager' and the criminal activity involved 'five or more participants.' The district court correctly increased [the defendant's] offense level by three."
Richards argues that United States v. Brown, 944 F.2d 1377 (7th Cir. 1991), and United States v. Thompson, 944 F.2d 1331 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S. Ct. 1177, 117 L. Ed. 2d 422 (1992), require that this court reverse the three-level enhancement for Richards' role as a manager or supervisor in the conspiracy. In Brown, this court held that because the defendant did not exercise any control over his ultimate purchasers, he could not be regarded as their supervisor. 944 F.2d at 1381. In Thompson, the court held that " [o]ne's status as a middleman in a drug distribution chain does not, standing alone, make one a manager or supervisor." 944 F.2d at 1349. Even though Richards controlled neither the delivery of the marijuana shipments from Indiana, nor the couriers, Agent Magrames' testimony reveals that Richards did supervise the unloading of the marijuana in New York. In his leadership role, Richards clearly exercised control and supervision over at least three individuals (Clark, Ali and Berris). We therefore affirm the district court's holding that the conspiracy involved five or more persons, and that Richards had a managerial or supervisory role.CONCLUSION
For further discussion on the Rector organization, see United States v. Crawford, 991 F.2d 1328 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Tolson, 988 F.2d 1494 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Paiz, 905 F.2d 1014, 1017-18 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S. Ct. 1319, 113 L. Ed. 2d 252 (1991); United States v. Tolson, 760 F. Supp. 1332 (N.D. Ind. 1991); United States v. Tolson, 760 F. Supp. 1322 (N.D. Ind. 1991)
The sentencing court neither barred nor limited the number of witnesses the defendant Richards could call, yet even though he had the full power of subpoena, he made no attempt to call any of the three witnesses at the sentencing hearing. We think his failure to subpoena the witnesses in part undermines his argument that neither he nor the sentencing court had an opportunity to examine the witnesses. In order for hearsay to be admissible at sentencing, two requirements must be met: (1) the hearsay must be reliable, and (2) the defendant must have a reasonable opportunity to rebut the contested hearsay. United States v. Beal, 960 F.2d 629, 634 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S. Ct. 230, 121 L. Ed. 2d 166 (1992); United States v. Rodriguez-Luna, 937 F.2d 1208, 1212 n. 4 (7th Cir. 1991). The defendant's failure to call the witnesses at the sentencing hearing is but one factor we weigh in determining whether he had a reasonable opportunity to rebut the hearsay (additional factors are stated below in this opinion). In addition to permitting the defendant the opportunity to rebut the hearsay, the court must be convinced that the hearsay is reliable. Id. We examine the record to ascertain whether the defendant had an opportunity to rebut the hearsay and whether the district court's determination that the hearsay was reliable rose to the level of an abuse of discretion
The Supreme Court recently announced that the Sentencing Commission's commentary to the guidelines is binding on the federal courts unless it conflicts with either the U.S. Constitution or a federal statute. Stinson v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 113 S. Ct. 1913, 123 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1993)