Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/99422/bonetti-vs-rogers
Timestamp: 2017-05-23 15:58:41
Document Index: 743531513

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 22', '§ 1', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 22', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 22', '§ 4', '§4', '§ 4', '§ 22', '§4', '§ 212', '§ 1182', '§ 19']

Bonetti Vs Rogers - Citation 99422 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Save as PDF Add a Tag Add a Note Semantics Visualize Bonetti Vs. Rogers - Court Judgment	LegalCrystal Citationlegalcrystal.com/99422CourtUS Supreme CourtDecided OnJun-02-1958Case Number356 U.S. 691AppellantBonettiRespondentRogersExcerpt:.....624. we granted certiorari. 355 u.s. 901.
nor when, after his one-day visit to mexico, he reentered in september, 1939. [
section 1 of the anarchist act of october 16, 1918, [
] as amended by § 22 of the internal security act of 1950, [
] deals with the subject of exclusion of aliens from admission and provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
"(2) aliens who at any time, shall be..... Judgment:
Bonetti v. Rogers - 356 U.S. 691 (1958)
since petitioner's claim of right to remain in the United States is based upon his entry in 1938, and he was not then and has not since been a member of the Communist Party, he is not deportable under §§ 1 and 4(a). Pp.
356 U. S. 692
(a) Since petitioner claims no right under his entry in 1923, and the Government does not, by the deportation proceeding, seek to annul any right acquired under that entry, the date of his entry in 1938 constituted his "time of entering the United States" within the meaning of § 4(a). Pp.
356 U. S. 696
356 U. S. 697
This is a deportation case. It presents a narrow and vexing problem of statutory construction. The principal question here is which, if less than all, of several entries of this country by the alien petitioner was "the time of entering the United States" within the meaning of § 4(a) of the Anarchist Act of October 16, 1918, [
] as amended by § 22 of the Internal Security Act of 1950. 64 Stat. 1008.
The facts are clear and undisputed. Petitioner, an alien who was born in France of Italian parentage, was admitted to the United States for permanent residence on November 1, 1923, at the age of 15. He became a member of the Communist Party of the United States at Los Angeles in 1932, and remained a member to the end of 1936, when he voluntarily ceased paying dues and left the Party. He never rejoined it. On June 28, 1937, he departed the United States -- abandoning all rights of residence here -- and went to Spain to fight with the Spanish Republican Army. [
] He fought in that army for one year, was wounded in action, and suffered the loss of his left foot. On September 19, 1938, he came to the United States as a new or "quota immigrant," and applied for admission for permanent residence. He was detained at Ellis Island. A hearing was held by a Board of Special Inquiry on the issue of his admissibility. At that hearing, he freely admitted that he had been a member of the Communist Party of the United States at Los
"(C) Aliens who
members of . . . the Communist Party of the United States. . . ."
"Any alien who was
at the time of entering the United States, or has been at any time thereafter
. . . a member of any one of the classes of aliens enumerated in section 1(2) of this Act, shall,
upon the warrant of the Attorney General, be taken into custody and deported in the manner provided in the Immigration Act of February 5, 1917. The provisions of this section shall be applicable to the classes of aliens mentioned in this Act, irrespective of the time of their entry into the United States. [
To decide the question presented, it is necessary to examine and construe the statutes involved. It seems plain that the reference in § 4(a) to the "classes of aliens enumerated in section 1(2)" incorporates only the classes enumerated in subsections (A) through (H), [
] and that the only one of those classes which is applicable here is class "(C)," namely, "Aliens who
members of . . . the Communist Party of the United States." (Emphasis added.) There being no question about the fact that petitioner was not a member of the Communist Party at the time of entering the United States on October 8, 1938, or at any time thereafter, the question is whether that entry -- as affected, if at all, by his reentry as a returning resident alien after his one-day trip to Mexico in September, 1939 -- or the one of November 1, 1923, constituted "the time of [his] entering the United States," within the meaning of § 4(a), as amended by § 22 of the Internal Security Act of 1950. If it was the latter, he is deportable, but if the former, he is not.
It is obvious that Congress, in enacting these statutes, did not contemplate the novel factual situation that confronts us, and that these statutes are, to say the least, ambiguous upon the question we must now decide. Our study of the problem, in the light of the facts of this case, has brought us to these conclusions: the first phrase of § 4(a) -- "Any alien who was
of entering the United States" -- necessarily refers to "the time" of petitioner's adjudicated lawful admission, as affected, if at
all, by his reentry as a returning resident alien after his one-day trip to Mexico in September 1939, under which he claims the right to remain. The next phrase -- "or has been at any time thereafter" -- necessarily refers
to all times subsequent
to such lawful admission. Thus, the two phrases, when read together, refer to the particular time the alien was lawfully permitted to make the entry under which he claims the status and right of lawful presence that is sought to be annulled by his deportation, and to any time subsequent thereto. Inasmuch as petitioner claims no right of lawful presence under his entry of November 1, 1923, and respondent does not, by the deportation order here, seek to annul any right of presence acquired under that entry, we must hold that petitioner's entry of October 8, 1938 -- as affected, if at all, by his returning from Mexico in September 1939 -- constituted "the time of entering the United States," within the meaning of §4(a). Since petitioner was not a member of the Communist Party "at the time of entering the United States" on October 8, 1938, and has not been a member "at any time thereafter," including, of course, the time of his returning entry from Mexico in September, 1939, he is not deportable under § 4(a), as amended by § 22 of the Internal Security Act of 1950.
In a different context this Court has said that the word
"includes any coming of an alien from a foreign country into the United States whether such coming be the first or any subsequent one."
] While that holding is quite correct, it is not here apposite or controlling, for the question here is not whether petitioner's coming to the United States in 1923 constituted an
it did. Rather, our question is whether it was that entry, or the adjudicated lawful entry of October 8, 1938, as affected, if at all, by petitioner's reentry as a returning resident alien in September 1939, which constituted the time of petitioner's entry upon which his present status depends. In the novel circumstances here, we think it evident that it could not be his entry of November 1, 1923, since petitioner had abandoned all rights of residence under that entry.
did not involve any question of abandonment.
Of course, if petitioner had become a member of the Communist Party after the entry of October 8, 1938, or the reentry of September 1939, he would have been deportable under §4(a).
. But it is admitted that he was not a member of that party at those times or "at any time thereafter." Likewise, if he had applied for entry after June 27, 1952, he would be excludable under § 212(a)(28)(C)(iv) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. 66 Stat. 182, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28)(C)(iv).
The Government argues that the construction which we adopt would enable a resident alien who, after lawfully entering the United States for permanent residence, became a member of the Communist Party, to avoid deportation for that cause simply by quitting the party and thereafter stepping across the border and returning. While a resident alien who leaves the country for any period, however brief, does make a new entry on his return, he is then subject, nevertheless, to all current exclusionary laws, one of which at present excludes from admission any alien who has ever been a member of the Communist Party. Section 212(a)(28)(C)(iv) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,
If he enters when excludable, he is deportable even though he would not have been subject to deportation if he had
not left the country. [
] Hence, our construction of the statutes here involved does not enable an alien resident to evade the deportation laws by leaving the country and returning after a brief period, for if, at the time of his return, he is with an excluded class, he would be excludable, or, if he nevertheless enters, he would be deportable. It is admitted that, when petitioner returned from Mexico after his one-day trip in September, 1939, he was not excludable under then current exclusionary laws. That entry, being lawful, can only support our conclusion in this case.
. And we cannot
Cf. Berrebi v. Crossman,
208 F.2d 498, and
Klig v. Brownell
(dissenting opinion), 100 U.S.App.D.C. 294, 299, 300, 244 F.2d 742, 747-748 (
355 U.S. 809;
judgment of the Court of Appeals vacated and case remanded to the District Court with directions to dismiss the cause as moot, sub nom. Klig v. Rogers,
355 U. S. 605
Cf. Lewis v. Frick,
at 16. Additional classes of aliens were made deportable "at any time after entry, whether or not membership in the class has ceased."
at 23. The construction of the section as applying to membership after any entry -- including the first as well as the last -- seems to be demanded by this legislative history.
84 Cong.Rec. 10448-10449 (remarks of Representative Hobbs), 86 Cong.Rec. 8343 (remarks of Senator Connally). That the Act applies retroactively to all aliens, regardless of the time of their entry, is admitted.
(1954). The simple test, therefore, is whether the alien was at any time a member of the Communist Party upon or after coming to the United States, regardless of how many entries he may have made. Petitioner was a Party member subsequent to his arrival in 1923, so the language "at any time thereafter" clearly makes the section applicable to him.
This innovation is contrary to decades of uninterrupted administrative interpretation and practice, and also to prior cases of this Court. The Immigration and Naturalization Service has always construed "entry" as meaning any coming of an alien from a foreign country to the United States. [
] The Congress recognized this interpretation when considering the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. H.R.Rep. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 32; S.Rep. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 4. [
] The Court, however, sidesteps this authority by saying that "the novel circumstances here" preclude our consideration of the 1923 entry, because "petitioner had abandoned all rights of residence under that entry." But that is not the question. True, petitioner makes no claim under the
(1933), the question was whether an alien's criminal conviction had occurred "prior to entry" within the meaning of § 19 of the Immigration Act of 1917. 39 Stat. 889. The alien contended that "entry" should be construed as meaning, in effect, "first entry," but the argument was rejected. The Court said,
See also United States ex rel. Claussen v. Day,
(1929). Petitioner here makes the converse argument that the word "entering" should be modified to read "last entering." I would not so amend the statute in disregard of the long and uniform judicial, legislative, and administrative history whereby "entry" has acquired a definitive, technical gloss, to-wit, its ordinary meaning, and nothing more or less . Therefore, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
For a comprehensive review of administrative action with regard to reentry of resident aliens,
Lowenstein, The Alien and the Immigration Law 206-213.