Source: http://elibrary.verlagoesterreich.at/main/e-journals/icl-vienna-journal-on-international-constitutional-law/2013/heft-1/icl-2013-1.html
Timestamp: 2017-04-30 03:15:22
Document Index: 91510512

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art 6', 'Art 47', 'Art 6', 'Art 47', 'Art 52', 'Art 47', 'Art 6', 'Art 6', 'Art 51', 'Art 6', 'Art 6']

ICL 2013/1 - Heft 1 - 2013 - ICL - Vienna Journal on International Constitutional Law - e-Journals
/ ICL 2013/1
Volltext Cover Download EditorialICL 2013/1, Jahrgang 2013, Heft 1, S. 3–3
ICL 2013, 3 The year 2013 marks a new beginning in the Journal’s development. For... The year 2013 marks a new beginning in the Journal’s development. For the past six years the Journal has been published independently from any publishing house. Starting with this issue (volume seven of the Journal) we are happy to announce having established a cooperation with ‘Verlag Österreich’, thus being able to offer a print version to our readers while still providing many pieces on an open access basis as well as full online access to our subscribers on our website <icl-journal.com>.
New beginnings sometimes, however, also bring about some changes one is not as eager to announce. As from this issue we have to deal with the decision of our friend and esteemed colleague Konrad Lachmayer to leave the Journal’s Editorial Board. Of course, personally as well as academically this means a great loss to all who are involved in this publication. Konrad’s leave, however, does not come undeserved: It was his initiative that helped founding the Journal in the first place and it was his energy that contributed to its successful development during these past important years beyond measure. In light of the workload such few words stand for, we understand and accept his decision to focus on the countless projects he pursues apart from the Journal in the future. Still, we are grateful that Konrad agreed to further support our efforts by coordinating the Journal’s enlarged Board of Advisors – those distinguished jurists who thankfully agreed to monitor the Journal’s further development.
Given these changes, many things, however, will stay the same in the future – or so we hope. The Journal will still aim to provide a scientific forum for critical discussion on topics of International Constitutional Law, featuring contributions by scholars and legal professionals from around the globe addressing recent developments in National Constitutional Orders and in Public International Law as well as questions in the field of Legal Theory. Furthermore, our quarterly released publication will continue to keep track of constitutional developments in CEE and beyond, particularly by assessing select case law of National High Courts.
Volltext	ArticlesICL 2013/1, Jahrgang 2013, Heft 1, S. 4–27
De Hert, Paul | Somers, Stefan Principles of National Constitutionalism limiting Individual Claims in Human Rights Law
Constitutionalism and the Balance between National and International Legal Reform Hierarchy of Legal Norms, National Constitutions, European Human Rights, Religious Freedoms, Conflicts, ICL 2013, 4 Abstract:The scope of the fundamental right to freedom of religion has been broadly discussed in... Abstract:The scope of the fundamental right to freedom of religion has been broadly discussed in recent jurisprudence and doctrine. Doctrine has however paid little attention to the role of constitutionalism and its principles such as this of the separation of church and state and the division of power. These principles are often not mentioned as such in international human rights treaties. Does this mean that they are irrelevant in human rights adjudication?
This article addresses the proper function of constitutionalism in human rights jurisprudence and in settling religious conflicts more in general. The Lautsi judgment of the European Court of Human Rights is used as a trigger to look at the relationship between religion, constitutionalism and human rights, and at the legitimacy of supranational courts. The article argues that international human rights jurisprudence must take national constitutionalism and its principles into account when dealing with the freedom of religion, even when those principles are not explicitly enshrined in human rights treaties. For this the use of the margin of appreciation seems to be appropriate.
Volltext	ArticlesICL 2013/1, Jahrgang 2013, Heft 1, S. 28–48
Hessebon, Gedion T Some Major Themes in the Study of Constitutionalism and Democracy in Africa
Africa, Constitutionalism, Democracy, themes, ICL 2013, 28 Abstract:We have now been through two decades since the onset of what has been deemed the... Abstract:We have now been through two decades since the onset of what has been deemed the ‘second liberation’ of Africa. In these two decades, interest in the study of constitutionalism has been gaining momentum and an increasing body of scholarly literature is being produced on constitutionalism and multi-party democracy in African states. Though an exhaustive treatment of this literature in a single paper is impossible, in this paper an attempt will be made to identify and highlight some of the major themes in the comparative constitutional law and democratization scholarship focused on Africa. Specifically, four themes will be identified and discussed. These are: i) autochthony and cultural contextualization of constitutionalism, ii) executive hegemony and imperial presidencies, iii) economic critiques and discontents with the liberal democratic model and iv) the effects and accommodation of ethnicity.
Volltext	ArticlesICL 2013/1, Jahrgang 2013, Heft 1, S. 49–67
Qerimi, Qerim | Qorrolli, Vigan A Constitutional Tradition in the Making:
The Presidents’ Cases and the Role of Kosovo’s Constitutional Court in the Process of Democratic Consolidation Constitutional Court, judicial activism and supremacy, Constitutional Courts and democracy, election of Presidents, Kosovo, democracies in transition, ICL 2013, 49 Abstract:In a period of less than a year, two decisions of the newly established Constitutional... Abstract:In a period of less than a year, two decisions of the newly established Constitutional Court of the Republic of Kosovo resulted in the resignation of two Presidents of the new State. Ruling on the unconstitutionality of the act of simultaneously holding the position of the head of State and that of his political party, in one case; and ruling on the unconstitutionality of his election due to procedural irregularities in the other, the Court prompted fundamental changes to the political landscape of Kosovo that in the first case led to new and extraordinary elections, whereas in the second to a political arrangement that would ultimately lead to constitutional reforms. Following the Court’s decisions, both Presidents (Sejdiu and Pacolli) resigned from their posts.
This article offers a textual analysis of the merits and controversies surrounding both decisions, which will be situated in the broader context of the seemingly powerful role of Constitutional Courts in certain societies in transition. The overall analysis demonstrates the weaknesses inherent to the initial stages of State formation, and to the foundational constitutional instrument, indicating the importance of the Constitution’s clarity for political stability. In an environment characterized by a dominant perception of a politicized judiciary, the Court’s decisions testify to the judicial activism of the Constitutional Court and, in terms of the substance and consequences of its key decisions, also to judicial supremacy. The Court’s decisions have also had some significance for testing the country’s political culture, a test that has been met in both cases eventually with compliance by those most affected.
Volltext	NotesICL 2013/1, Jahrgang 2013, Heft 1, S. 68–70
Vasek, Markus Constitutional Comparison and Legislation
2nd conference of the Vienna Journal on International Constitutional Law Keywords: constitutional comparison, European Union, federal state, human rights protection, legislation, ICL 2013, 68 Two years ago, the Vienna Journal on International Constitutional Law... Two years ago, the Vienna Journal on International Constitutional Law held a conference on Constitutional Courts and Constitutional comparison. On September 7th 2012, the conference was dedicated to the relationship between the legislative process and the practice of constitutional comparison.
Under the chairmanship of Georg Lienbacher (Vienna University of Economics and Business), the opening lecture on the topic was given by Claudia Fuchs (Vienna University of Economics and Business) who asserted a difficult relationship between public law and constitutional comparison. Nevertheless, the speaker emphasized that constitutional comparison had its scope of application especially under the influence of International and European law. Finally, jurisprudence should be aware of the methodological challenges in connection with the practice of constitutional comparison.
The lecture of Harald Eberhard (Vienna University of Economics and Business) analysed the practice of constitutional comparison within the Austrian federal legislature. The federal legislator may look at the European supra-national legal order, the national constitutions as well as at the constitutions of the federal states. The speaker gave different examples of the use of constitutional comparison in prospective as well as in recently finished constitutional reforms. Finally, the practice of constitutional comparison often depended on political considerations.
Volltext	Development AustriaICL 2013/1, Jahrgang 2013, Heft 1, S. 71–72
Trofaier-Leskovar, Valerie Focus: The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union in the Austrian Constitutional Court’s case law
ICL 2013, 71 While the framework for the Austrian accession to the EU in order to... While the framework for the Austrian accession to the EU in order to ‘open up’ the domestic legal system to the influence of EU law was set by a constitutional law in 1994, according to the well-established case law of the Constitutional Court and the widely shared doctrine EU law does not form a part of national constitutional law. Thus, contrary in particular to the status of the European Convention on Human Rights within the domestic legal order, neither the Treaties of the Union nor the Charter of Fundamental Human Rights of the European Union (hereinafter: CFREU) enjoy constitutional rank. Consequently, and strictly according to the hierarchical system of norms as established in the Austrian Federal Constitutional Law (B-VG), the Constitutional Court itself originally denied its ability to assess a violation of rights granted by the CFREU, even if such a violation would be obvious in singular cases. However, deviating from this rather formal point of view the Constitutional Court stated in its judgment U 466/11 et al, handed down on 14 March 2012, that rights of the CFREU can be alleged as constitutionally guaranteed rights.
Unlike other Constitutional Courts in Europe the Austrian Constitutional Court is regarded as considerate towards EU Law as it has already requested preliminary rulings of the European Court of Justice on a number of occasions and appears to take the primacy of EU law for granted even in relation to constitutional law. Nevertheless, the judgment ‘has been celebrated as ground-breaking’ as Gisela Kristoferitsch observes in this issue, or rather ‘indicatory’ as the Constitutional Court itself points out on its website. After all, it was the first judgment that has been made available also in full English translation.
Reason enough to consider the judgment under various aspects and to localise it in the context of previous case law dealing with the relationship between domestic (constitutional) law and EU law:Johannes Dopsch discusses the judgment ‘Achtsnit’ which had for a long time accounted for the leading case in the topic area. Peter Thalmann gives an example of the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court concerning the failure to request a preliminary ruling, which – from a national constitutional perspective – constitutes a violation of the right to a lawful judge. Gisela Kristoferitsch finally presents the judgment at hand, on which basis manifold comments are given by Heinz Verdino, Christoph Bezemek, Harald Eberhard, Gisela Kristoferitsch herself, Konrad Lachmayer and Claudia Fuchs.
Volltext	Developments AustriaICL 2013/1, Jahrgang 2013, Heft 1, S. 73–78
Dopsch, Johannes EU-Law Infringements in Austria: Constitutional Review Restricted
B 877/96 (VfSlg 14.886/1997), ICL 2013, 73 EU-Law Infringements in Austria: Constitutional Review Restricted
... EU-Law Infringements in Austria: Constitutional Review Restricted
Volltext	Developments AustriaICL 2013/1, Jahrgang 2013, Heft 1, S. 79–87
Thalmann, Peter Failure to refer a preliminary question to the ECJ and the right to a lawful Judge
B 614/01, B 1642/02 (VfSlg 16.988/2003), ICL 2013, 79 Failure to refer a preliminary question to the ECJ and the right to a... Failure to refer a preliminary question to the ECJ and the right to a lawful Judge
Volltext	Developments AustriaICL 2013/1, Jahrgang 2013, Heft 1, S. 88–92
Kristoferitsch, Gisela The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to be treated like Constitutional Law
U 466/11 et al, ICL 2013, 88 The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to be treated... The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to be treated like Constitutional Law
Volltext	Developments AustriaICL 2013/1, Jahrgang 2013, Heft 1, S. 93–94
Verdino, Heinz The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union as review standard in proceedings before the Constitutional Court
ICL 2013, 93 In this remarkable and indicatory decision, the Austrian Constitutional... In this remarkable and indicatory decision, the Austrian Constitutional Court deviates from its jurisdiction developed after the accession of Austria to the EU based upon which Union law is no review standard for constitutional proceedings – at least for the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (hereinafter: CFREU). According to the Constitutional Court there are circumstances under which the rights of the CFREU can be alleged similarly to rights guaranteed by Austrian constitutional law (socalled ‘constitutionally guaranteed rights’).
Strikingly, such a decision was only made in spring 2012 although – as the Constitutional Court points out as well – the CFREU has been validly ranked as primary law since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon and, thus, since December 1, 2009. Besides, fundamental rights – as general principles of law – have been ranked as primary law even before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon through the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the EU and, subsequently established in the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992. In this regard the Constitutional Court holds that ‘the applicability of a detailed catalogue of rights and duties as set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights is not comparable to the derivation of legal positions from general legal principles’. Nevertheless, it could be argued that the fundamental rights secured by Union law could have served as review standards for national constitutional proceedings, even before. After all, the CFREU was a political document with the Treaty of Nice in the year 2000 and at least since this very moment the Constitutional Court could have made reference to it.
Irrespective of the Court’s forthcoming jurisprudence concerning the alleged violation of the CFREU, the consultation of the principle of equivalence, serving as a bridge for the existing responsibility of the Constitutional Court for the enforcement of rights of the CFREU, can at least be seen as a clever legal move and its consequence in any case – as the Austrian university professor Funk put it as well – as a milestone. But still, it cannot be completely disregarded that no provision in the Austrian Constitution assigns the Constitutional Court the application of the CFREU.
Volltext	Developments AustriaICL 2013/1, Jahrgang 2013, Heft 1, S. 95–98
Bezemek, Christoph Wording and Determinateness – Indeterminately Worded
A few Remarks on Questions to be Asked again ICL 2013, 95 For a start, the Constitutional Court’s judgment summarized above,... For a start, the Constitutional Court’s judgment summarized above, declaring the European Union’s Charter of Fundamental Rights to be a standard of review in national constitutional procedure, may be best understood as trying to answer a question no longer asked either in Austrian academia or legal practice. For years now the Constitutional Court’s case law left no doubt that the law of the European Union in general, and the fundamental rights individuals enjoy according to European Primary Law in particular, were not to be applied on par with domestic constitutional law by the Austrian Constitutional Court; thus, setting aside select scenarios, not providing relevant criteria for assessing the constitutionality of domestic legislation in procedures according to Articles 139, 140, and 144 of the Austrian Constitution. March 14th 2012 may be remembered as the day this view changed; thereby, of course, re-opening the debate which has been considered settled for many years.
Academics have already begun to scrutinize the Court’s reasoning in a critical manner based on a variety of arguments of great weight; for sure many more (arguments as well as academics) will follow during the next months and years. Still, in my opinion, the judgment’s result is to be applauded. Partly for its progressive character, partly for its effort to claim the sphere of fundamental rights for the Constitutional Court, aiming for a more coherent fundamental rights jurisprudence within the Austrian judiciary.
Such policy arguments (and others) do carry weight themselves, even though it would be naive to assume judgments like the one at hand lack calculations beyond their scope: It is quite obvious that the Constitutional Court in particular was no longer pleased to witness the Administrative Court entering its privileged playground of administrative jurisdiction, applying fundamental rights scrutiny (albeit solely its European Union variety) to administrative action, and in general is keen to redefine its own position within the European Framework of legal protection.
Volltext	Developments AustriaICL 2013/1, Jahrgang 2013, Heft 1, S. 99–101
Eberhard, Harald Rights of the Charter of Fundamental Rights as constitutionally guaranteed rights – VfSlg 14.886/1997 revisited?
ICL 2013, 99 The problem, The ‘answer’ in the judgment of 14 March 2012, U... The problem, The ‘answer’ in the judgment of 14 March 2012, U 466/11 et al, Conclusion
Volltext	Developments AustriaICL 2013/1, Jahrgang 2013, Heft 1, S. 102–104
Kristoferitsch, Gisela Can the constitutionality of omitting a public hearing in the Austrian Constitutional Court’s CFREU decision legitimately be based on thejurisdiction on Art 6 ECHR?
ICL 2013, 102 While the decision has been celebrated as ground-breaking and its... While the decision has been celebrated as ground-breaking and its overall consequences have been discussed extensively, the underlying cases of two Chinese asylum seekers whose complaints have ultimately been dismissed by the Austrian Constitutional Court have only been given little attention. This is particularly striking given the fact that the cases involved questions of the application of fundamental rights, in particular procedural rights, conveyed by the ECHR and the CFREU. The crucial question was whether omitting a public hearing before the Asylum Court infringes Art 47 CFREU. It is hard to follow the arguments of the Constitutional Court on that question, as it barely links the case-law it draws its arguments from to the case at hand. Additionally, the judgment barely gets into details with the facts of the case, which would facilitate to reconstruct its argumentation. Given the ambiguous circumstances it is surprising that the Constitutional Court did not see a need to refer the case to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling.
In its finding, the Constitutional Court argues that it could decide the case without bringing the matter to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling, given that Art 6 ECHR and Art 47 CFREU have a shared scope of application and are thus to be interpreted alike – as stated in Art 52 para 3 CFREU. Yet, where Art 47 CFREU has a broader scope of application than Art 6 ECHR, like in asylum cases, it should be interpreted ‘accordingly’. As a consequence, taking into account the case-law on Art 6 ECHR, the principle of proportionality (as enshrined in Art 51 para 2 CFREU), and constitutional traditions of the Member States, the Constitutional Court expresses no reservations against the constitutionality of omitting a public hearing in the case at hand. Thus, according to the Court, a violation of Art 6 ECHR has not taken place. However, this conclusion might not be as obvious as presented in the judgment.
In its reasoning, the Constitutional Court gives a short overview of the ECtHR’s jurisdiction on Art 6 ECHR concerning the obligation to hold an oral hearing. A detailed analysis shows that the conclusions that may be drawn from these cases seem to point in opposite directions.
Volltext	Developments AustriaICL 2013/1, Jahrgang 2013, Heft 1, S. 105–107
Lachmayer, Konrad The Austrian approach towards European Human Rights
ICL 2013, 105 The change of perspective by the Constitutional Court, Looking back in... The change of perspective by the Constitutional Court, Looking back in the Austrian tradition of applying European human rights, The Austrian accession to the European Union and recent developments on human rights in Austria, The deeper logic of the judgment and future challenges
Volltext	Developments AustriaICL 2013/1, Jahrgang 2013, Heft 1, S. 108–109
Fuchs, Claudia An Austrian enthusiasm towards European human rights protection
Some short remarks on the Constitutional Court’s EU Charter Judgment ICL 2013, 108 With the ground-breaking judgment at hand (as the Constitutional Court... With the ground-breaking judgment at hand (as the Constitutional Court itself refers to its decision from 14 March 2012, U 466/11 et al) the Constitutional Court’s case law dealing with the relationship of EU law and Austrian (constitutional) law has experienced a noteworthy shift which, from a doctrinal point of view, has already been analyzed and profoundly commentend on.
Yet, beyond doctrine, the 2012 Constitutional Court’s EU Charter judgment also expresses an enthusiasm towards European integration through human rights protection which may without any reservation be considered as outstanding among the Member States of the European Union. While the Austrian scientific community by and large applauded the judgment’s outcome and the prospect of the direction the Constitutional Court has signalized to be willing to take in human rights protection in the future, scholarship abroad rather displayed certain surprise.
Indeed, the Court’s impetus to declare the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (in the following: CFREU) to be a standard for constitutional scrutiny may in its core only be fully understood when put into a socio-political context. Other than especially the German, more sceptic (Solange I) and only later on reconciling (Solange II and the following case law of the Federal Constitutional Court) approach vis à vis EU fundamental rights protection, the Austrian constitutional identity has never been similarly interweaved with a ‘patriotism’ regarding human rights. Quite on the contrary, the body of fundamental rights in the Austrian legal order has always been largely fragmented between legal sources of different date and design which has ever since lead to periodic calls for a general reform, usually towards a catalogue-based regulatory approach and – recently also – a more ‘modern’ conception of fundamental rights.
Volltext	Developments CEEICL 2013/1, Jahrgang 2013, Heft 1, S. 110–115
Nagy, Krisztina | Polyák, Gábor Hungarian Constitutional Court: New Media Regulation partly under Constitutional Scrutiny
Ruling No 165/2011 (XII 20) AB, ICL 2013, 110 The Hungarian Constitutional Court published the results of a review... The Hungarian Constitutional Court published the results of a review regarding the constitutionality (of certain elements) of the new media regulation which entered into force as of January 1st 2011. The Court repealed in this decision some rules on the press and online content and on the procedure of the media authority. The decision established significant changes in the media acts even if it did not deal with other important media freedom questions raised in these laws.
Volltext	Developments CEEICL 2013/1, Jahrgang 2013, Heft 1, S. 116–118
Blagojevi?, Anita Croatian Constitutional Court: The electoral procedure for voters/members of national minorities for representatives to the Croatian Parliament
U-I-3597/2010 et al, ICL 2013, 116 The Croatian Constitutional Court repealed Article 1 paras 2 and 3 of... The Croatian Constitutional Court repealed Article 1 paras 2 and 3 of the Constitutional Act on Amendments to the Constitutional Act on the Rights of National Minorities.
Volltext	Book ReviewsICL 2013/1, Jahrgang 2013, Heft 1, S. 119–120
Aziz, Sinur Said Amir Arjomand (ed), Constitutional Politics in the Middle East: With special reference to Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan, Hart Publishing, 2008, ISBN 978-1-841-13774-2, xii + 210 pp
ICL 2013, 119 This book gives an overview of the constitution-making process in the... This book gives an overview of the constitution-making process in the Middle East, with special reference to political aspects. It covers the range of ancient Middle Eastern concepts of government, governance and political polities to current constitutions of selected states in the Middle East.
The first contribution shows convincingly that Islamic government or Islamic politics has generated its pattern from sources other than just Qur’anic precepts about the righteous community, the example of the prophet as leader of the Muslim community or the history of the early Muslim caliphs. Most Muslim governments have also been influenced by the example of the Persian emperor Khusrau – who reigned at the time Prophet Muhammad was born –, the ancient Near Eastern and the Mediterranean bureaucratic empire traditions, aspects of tribal chieftainship of the Turkish and Mongol sultanates and others, too. The so-called ‘Circle of Justice’, a concept of government employed by Khusrau and other emperors, described and legitimized the relationship between governments and their people throughout Islamic history. The ‘Circle of Justice’ can be encapsulated in the following formula: ‘There can be no government without money, no money without prosperity, and no prosperity without justice and good administration.’ Every epoch modified the formula to the needs of the era, but the core of the formula remained. Islamic scholars have continued to consider the Circle as an instrument against tyranny. The careful reader, who keeps this formula and its variations in mind while reading the further contributions, recognizes that the ‘Circle’ is still active within the Middle Eastern societies and that it has remained in the people’s conscience.
The next article ‘Islam and Constitutionalism since the Nineteenth Century’ authored by the Editor of the Book, Said Amir Arjomand, explores the correlation between the constitution-making processes since the nineteenth century and Islamic law (shari’a). He hypothesizes that the shari’a had initially been considered as a limitation to government and legislation, but was transformed after the wave of ideological constitution making more and more into a basis for the constitution and the state. Particularly, the case of Iran allows him to substantiate his hypothesis. Further, the contribution issues the tension between Islamic law and modern ideas of statehood with regard to constitutional theories discussed and developed by some Ulemas at the time. He finally concludes that the idea of the shari’a as a limitation to the constitution is more historically rooted and vastly less problematic than the ideological insistence of a shari’a based constitution. The first part of the conclusion is coherent and well demonstrated, the second part is not readily clear. The limitation of parliamentary legislation by Islamic law leads mostly to the same result as a shari’a-based constitutional approach. This can be well deduced by the often-animadverted example of the non-discrimination clause in matters of equation of heir and heiress. When the legislator is not capable to establish this equation in the personal status law, it is quite irrelevant if this occurs because of either his limited power to enact or because he decrees in accordance with the Islamic Law. Either way the heiress inherits half of the heir’s part. The contradiction between constitutionalism and Islamic law can be settled by open and broad discussion without presuming supremacy of one legal system and adherence to medieval jurisdiction, which is properly shown at the beginning of the article of Ann Elizabeth Mayer on ‘The Respective Roles of Human Rights and Islam: an Unresolved Conundrum for Middle Eastern Constitutions’. She demonstrates that Islamic law does not necessarily contradict international human rights, if constitutions manage to refrain from defining the supremacy of Islamic law at the expense of human rights. However, she seems to believe that secularism is more suitable for assuring effective implementation of international human right standards. Interestingly the contributions ‘The Guardian of the Regime: the Turkish Constitutional Court in Comparative Perspective’ and ‘Constitution, Legitimacy and Democracy in Turkey’ (Chapter 6, p 99–146) substantiate by comparative approach in the case of the states Turkey and Iran that secular states under specific requirements lead to the same restrictions of individual rights as declared Islamic states. They conclude that this is rather a consequence of the concept of ideological constitutions than of secular or religious constitutions.
Volltext	Book ReviewsICL 2013/1, Jahrgang 2013, Heft 1, S. 121–123
Weber, Teresa Donald K Anton and Dinah L Shelton, Environmental Protection and Human Rights, Cambridge University Press, 2011, ISBN 978-0-521-74710-3 (paperback), ISBN 978-0-521-76638-8 (hardback), 986 pp
ICL 2013, 121 Today, there is widespread consent within the international community... Today, there is widespread consent within the international community that many environmental problems, such as climate change, are global problems and thus must be dealt with on an international level. Apart from signing (multilateral) environmental agreements, other forms of international law can be utilised for the protection of the environment as well. In their book, Anton/Shelton highlight the connectivity between human rights law and environmental protection.
Both authors have an academic background, are experienced international environmental lawyers and teach in this field as well; Donald K Anton at the Australian National University College of Law, Dinah L Shelton at the George Washington University Law School. Both have already written and/or edited many publications in the field of international law and environmental law.
Explaining the interactions between individual rights and environmental protection, which is the aim of the book, requires interdisciplinary expertise and cross-border legal knowledge. Thus, not only do the authors present relevant human rights instruments and case law by international or regional bodies, but they also compare selected national laws. Geographically, the book is not focussed on any specific region; examples are taken from all over the world (Argentina, Bulgaria, India, South Africa ...).