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Timestamp: 2020-08-12 04:16:06
Document Index: 710832501

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art. 226', 'Art. 226', 'Art. 226', 'Art. 226', 'Art. 226', 'Art,\t226', 'Art. 226', 'Art. 226', 'Art. 226']

STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH versus S. SREE RAMA RAO
1963 AIR 1723	1964 SCR (3)	25
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH V. S. SREE RAMA RAO [1963] RD-SC 94 (10 April 1963)
10/04/1963 SHAH, J.C.
CITATION: 1963 AIR 1723	1964 SCR (3)	25
R	1965 SC1103	(8) RF	1969 SC 983	(4) RF	1970 SC1334	(11) F	1975 SC2151	(25) RF	1980 SC1896	(180) R 1983 SC1102	(6) RF	1986 SC 995	(16)
Public Servant--Disciplinary action--Writ Petition- Interference by High	Court--Principles--Constitution	of India, Art. 226.
The	respondent was a Sub-Inspector of Police in charge 01 a police station. One D, suspected of having committed an offence, was apprehended by the village Munsif and	was sent to the police station.	He was handed over to	the respondent. The respondent declined	to give a written acknowledgment	of having received 1)and made no entries in the station diary regarding him. D was confined in	the police	station	for several days without being produced before	a Magistrate.	A departmental inquiry	was started against	him for reprehensible conduct in	wrongfully confining D. The defence set up by him was that D had never been handed over to him because he had escaped while on	his way to	the police station. The Deputy Superintendent of Police, who held the enquiry, found	him guilty of	the charge.	The Deputy Inspector-General of Police gave him a show cause notice and after considering his	explanation ordered	that he be dismissed from service. On appeal,	the Inspector-General of Police modified the order of dismissal and converted	it into one for removal	from service.	The respondent filed a writ petition before the	High Court challenging the validity of the order and the	High Court quashed the orders.
Held that	the High Court had	no jurisdiction to interfere with the orders. The High Court was wrong in	its view that in a departmental enquiry the rule followed in a criminal trial that an offence is not established unless proved	by evidence beyond	reasonable doubt to	the satisfaction of the court must be applied and that if such a rule was not applied the high court could set aside	the order of the	departmental authority in exercise of	its power .under Art. 226 of the constitution. The High Court does not sit as a court of appeal over the decision of	the authority holding a departmental enquiry:
26 it has only to see whether the enquiry has been held by a competent authority	and according	to the procedure prescribed and	whether the rules of natural justice	have been observed.	Where	there is some	evidence which	the authority has	accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the officer is guilty, it is not the function of the High Court exercising its	jurisdiction under Art. 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at	an independent finding on the evidence.	If the	enquiry	has been properly held the question of adequacy or	reliability of the evidence cannot be convassed before the High Court.
In the present case, the proceedings before the departmental authorities were regular, no rules of natural justice	were voilated, the conclusions were borne out by the evidence and the respondent	had ample opportunity of examining	his witnesses. Therefore, the conclusions of the punishing authority were	not open tO be questioned before the	High Court.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 626 of 1961.
Appeal by	special leave from the	judgment and order dated November 18, 1959, of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Petition No. 922 of 1956.
T.V.R. Tatachari and P.D. Menon, for the appellants.
K. Bhimasankaram and T.	Satyanarayana, for the respondent.
1963. April 10.	The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SHAH J.--On March 10, 1955, the Deputy Inspector General of Police, State of Andhra, passed an order dismissing	the respondent (who was a sub-inspector of police appointed on probation) from service. On appeal to the Inspector General of Police, the order was altered into one of removal	from service. The	respondent then. moved the High Court of Andhra	pradesh	by a	petition under	Art. 226 of	the Constitution for a writ of certiorari or other appropriate 27 writ or direction quashing the proceedings of the Inspector General	of Police including his order dated September 24, 1955, and the order of the Deputy Inspector	General of Police	dated March 10, 1955, and for such other orders as the Court may deem fit. The High Court quashed the	two impugned orders. Against the order passed by the	High Court, this appeal is preferred with special leave.
It	is necessary to set out in some detail the facts which gave rise to the departmental proceedings against	the respondent resulting in his removal	from service.	The respondent was at the material time in charge of the police station	Kodur,	Visakhapatnam District. On February	18, 1954, an offence of house-breaking and theft was reported at the police station and was registered on February 19,1954.
It was	recited in the report of the	Village Munsif of Vechalam that	one Durgalu who was then absconding	was suspected to be-the offender. This Durgalu was	apprehended by the Village Munsif of Kalogotla on March 5, 1954, and was handed	over to the Village Munsif of Vechalam, who in	his turn sent Durgalu to Kodur police station with village servants V. Polayya, Vechalapu Simhachalam,	Kodamanchali Simhachalam and Koduru Sumudram. It is the case of	the State that Durgalu was handed over to the respondent on	the night of March 5, 1954, but no written acknowledgment in token of having received Durgalu from the village servants was given by the respondent, nor was any entry posted in the station	diary, and Durgalu was thereafter confined in	the police station from the night of March 5, 1954, without	any order from a Magistrate remanding him to police custody. On March	7, 1954, the' respondent entrusted charge of	the police station to a head constable and left for Kakinada on casual leave for five	days.	He returned to Kodur on March 12, 1954. After the departure of the respondent, 28 some constables arrested one Reddy Simhachalam	and brought him to the police station in the evening of March 7, 1954.	It is	the case of the State that as a result of torture	by police constables Nos. 1199, 363 and	662, Reddy	Simhachalam became unconscious.	The dead body of Reddy Simhachalam was found floating in a well near	the police	station	on the morning of March 9, 1954, and an enquiry into the circumstances in which the death took place was commenced	by the Revenue Divisional Officer, Narsipatnam. In the enquiry, Durgalu made a statement	that he had witnessed the torture of Reddy Simhachalam, in	the police station, by the three constables. Police constables Nos. 1199, 363' and 662 were then charged before the	Sub- Magistrate, Chodavaram, for offences under ss.	304(2)	and 201 read with s. 114 I.P. Code, for causing the death of Reddy Simhachalam by	torturing him and for causing disappearence of the evidence of his death. Before the	Sub- Magistrate, Durgalu retracted his earlier statement and stated	that the statement that he was	an eye-witness	to the torture of Reddy Simhachalam was untrue and that he	was induced to make that statement by the police.	He deposed that he had escaped from the custody of the village servants before he reached the police-station Kodur on March 5, 1954, and that he was re-arrested on March 8, 1954.	The	Sub- Magistrate discharged the police constables holding	that once Durgalu the only eye-witness turned hostile, there	was no direct evidence on which even a prima facie case could be made out against them.	The record of the case	before	the Sub-Magistrate	was called	by the Sessions Judge, Visakhapatnam,	suo motu. The Sessions Judge held it proved on the evidence that Durgalu was arrested on March 5,	1954 and was taken to the police-station Kodur and was wrongfully confined since	that date in the police station, and	the story of Durgalu before the Sub-Magistrate that after he was arrested on March 5, 1954 and was taken to the 29 Kodur village on that very day he had escaped from custody and that he remained in his village Vechalam could not be believed.
A departmental enquiry was commenced in May 1954:
against	the respondent. The charge in the	disciplinary proceedings against the respondent after it was amended	ran as follows :-- "Reprehensible conduct in wrongfully confining a	K.D,	Chandana Durgalu accused in	Cr.
No.17/54:	of Kodur Police Station from	the night of 5-3-54: to 7-3-1954: in the Police Station when he went on	five	days casual leave.' ' To the charge was appended a "statement of facts" reciting inter aria, that Durgalu was apprehended by	the Village Munsif, Kaligotla and was handed over to the Village Munsif, Vechalam, that	Durgalu was sent by the latter with	the written report with the assistance of village servants, that on the	same night the latter handed over Durgalu to	the respondent in	the police station Kodur at about 12	mid- night,	with the report of the Village Munsif and demanded acknowledgment	but the acknowledgment was refused by the respondent, and that the respondent did not mention these facts in any of the station records and wrongfully confined Durgalu	in the police station till March 7, 1954:, when he proceeded on casual leave for five	days.	This, the "statement of	facts" added, constituted	grave	and reprehensible conduct and hence the charge. The respondent submitted an explanation in which he submitted that Durgalu was not handed over to him on March S, 1954:, as alleged	nor at any time before he proceeded on March 7, 1904:, on casual leave. His plea was that when he proceeded on leave he entrusted charge of the police station to	the head constable leaving instructions to trace Durgalu and to take action.
30 The	Deputy Superintendent of	Police	held	the departmental enquiry and submitted his report on October 27, 1954, setting out the evidence of the witnesses examined on behalf	of the State and the respondent, and summing up	the conclusion by reciting that the evidence in the case for the State made out a strong case against the respondent, that it was established that Durgalu was arrested on March 5, 1954, and was sent by the Village Munsif to Vechalam who in his turn sent him	with the village servants to	the police station Kodur, and Durgalu was handed over to the respondent on the night o.f March 5, 1954, that the story	of Durgalu that after he was arrested on March 5, 1954, he escaped from the custody of the village servants and was again arrested on March 8, 1954, was false. The report then concluded "All these facts go to show that he was arrested	on the	5th without	a shadow of doubt, but if the judgment of	the learned Court which is based on the retracted statement of Durgalu is considered the 'sacred truth' the delinquent	may have benefit of doubt." This report was considered by	the authority competent to impose punishment and a	provisional conclusion that the	respondent merited punishment	of dismissal for the charges held established by the report was recorded. A copy of the report of the Enquiry Officer	was sent to the respondent and he was called upon to submit	his representation	against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him.	The respondent submitted his representation which was considered by the Deputy Inspector	General	of Police, Northern Range, Waltair. That Officer referred to the evidence of witnesses for the State about the arrest of Durgalu on March 5, 1954, and the handing over of Durgalu to the respondent	on the same day. He	observed that	the evidence of Durgalu 'that after he was arrested on March 5:
1954, he had made good his escape and was again arrested on March 8, 1954, could	not be accepted. Holding that	the charge 31 against	the respondent was serious and had on the evidence been adequately proved, in his view the only punishment which the respondent deserved was of	dismissal from	the police force.- In	appeal	the Inspector General of Police accepted the evidence of the witnesses who had deposed that they	had handed	over Durgalu to the respondent	on March 5, 1954.
In his view the respondent had "betrayed gross	dishonesty and lack of character in falsifying the records by omitting to write what he had done and what happened in	the police station, thereby .proving himself thoroughly dishonest	and untrustworthy,"	and "showing	himself unfit to hold	the responsible post of a SubInspector of police," and that "his records	as a probationary Sub-Inspector of	police	are generally unsatisfactory. and he has earned a reputation for inefficiency and lack of interest in work for weakness in dealing with his subordinates, which are all attributes that militate against his becoming useful SubInspector of Police." But taking into consideration his young age	and inexperience,	the Inspector General of Police reduced	the order of dismissal into one for removal from service.
In	the departmental proceeding a simple question of fact fell to	be determined--viz. whether Durgalu	was arrested on March 5, 1954, and was delivered over by	the village	servants to the respondent at police station Kodur on the	night of March 5, 1954. There is no dispute	that Durgalu	was arrested on March 5, 1954, and was sent by	the Village	Munsif, Vechalam with	his report to	the police station	Kodur.	The only question in dispute	was whether Durgalu was handed over to the respondent on March 5, 1954, as stated by the witnesses for the State. The case of	the State was accepted by the Deputy Inspect.or	.General of Police who passed the order of dismissal and the Inspector 32 General of Police in appeal. But the High Court declined to accept this view of the evidence. In so doing, with respect it must be observed, the High Court	assumed to itself jurisdiction which it did not possess.	The High Court	was of the	view that the conclusion of the	departmental authorities was vitiated, because the Enquiry Officer dealt with the evidences of witnesses for the State, and	the witnesses for the respondent separately, and	the Deputy Inspector General of Police and the Inspector	General of Police	did not in recording their orders refer to all	the evidence led before the Enquiry Officer and they "failed to appreciate the full significance of the rule concerning	the onus of proving. The rule meant that everything essential to the	establishment of a charge lies on the	person,	who seeks to establish the charge.	It further means that	the two sets of evidence in the case must not	be examined separately in	order to ascertain first whether those	for establishing the charge have proved it and then to examine the defence in order to see how far the conclusions	are unjustified. The better approach, which has been described as the	golden	thread in the web of criminal	law is to examine the law, the whole evidence in order to ascertain how far the liability of the person proceeded against	has been established beyond reasonable doubt". The High Court then observed that ordinarily the conclusions on questions of fact by a body or tribunal in a proceeding under Art. 226 of the Constitution are accepted by the High Court but	that general rule does not apply "whenever an important principle of jurisprudence is discarded in reaching such findings", and since the fundamental rule that a person should be punished only after the entire evidence in the case had been considered and he is found liable beyond reasonable doubt, had not been followed, the conclusions of the	departmental authorities were vitiated. The High Court again observed that the orders passed by the departmental authorities	were vitiated because of two 33 other matters:	(i) that the Enquiry Officer	declined to summon and examine two witnesses for the defence even though a request in that behalf was made; and (ii) that there	was no charge against the respondent of "falsifying the record by omitting to write what he had done or what	happened in the police station",	and he had not been given	an opportunity of	meeting such a charge	and therefore the respondent had no fair hearing consistent	with	the principles of natural justice.
There is no warrant for the view expressed by the	High Court that in considering whether a public officer is guilty of the misconduct charged against him, the rule followed in criminal trials that an offence is not	established unless proved	by evidence	beyond reasonable doubt to	the satisfaction of the Court, must be applied, and if that rule be not applied, the High Court in a petition under Art,	226 of the Constitution is competent to declare the order of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry invalid. The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Art. 226 of the Constitution a Court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry	against a public	servant: iris concerned to determine	whether	the enquiry	is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated.
Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that	the delinquent Officer is guilty of the charge, it is not	the function of the High Court in a petition for a	writ under Art. 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence.	The High Court	may undoubtedly interfere	where the departmental	authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the 34 rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules	prescribing the mode	of enquiry or	where	the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a	fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by	irrelevant considerations or	;where	the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar	grounds. But	the departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence	on which their findings can be	based,	the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a	proceeding for	a writ under	Art. 226 of	the Constitution.
The	Enquiry Officer had	accepted the evidence	of witnesses for the Sate that Durgalu was handed over to	the respondent on March 5, 1954, and the observation that	the respondent may have the benefit of doubt if the judgment of the Magistrate is considered "sacred truth" appears to	have been made in a somewhat sarcastic vein, and does not	cast any doubt upon the conclusion recorded by him.	The Enquiry Officer	appears to have stated that the judgment of	the Magistrate holding a	criminal trial against a public servant	could	not always be regarded as binding in a departmental enquiry against that public servant. in so stating, the Enquiry Officer did not commit any error.	The first ground on which the High Court interfered with	the order of the punishing authorities is	therefore wholly unsustainable.
The two other grounds on which the High Court also based its conclusion, namely, refusal to	summon	and examine witnesses for	the respondent and holding the respondent guilty of a charge of which he had no 35 notice are equally without substance. It appears that	the respondent desired to examine police constables Nos.	178, 506 and 569 to prove that Durgalu was not in	the lock-up till March 8, 1954. Police constable No. 506 was examined as a witness for the respondent, and the Enquiry Officer has not accepted his evidence.	The other two witnesses were neither	summoned nor examined, but it appears from	the record	that on September 20, 1954, the respondent promised to produce the witnesses whom he had cited in his defence.
At the	hearing dated September 26, 1954, three witnesses were examined by the respondent and the respondent was given another opportunity to secure the presence of the remaining defence	witnesses. On September 27, 1954 police constable 506 was examined and it appears that the respondent expressed his desire not to examine any more witnesses. In the proceeding of the Enquiry Officer there is a note	that "your defence	witnesses have been	examined and	such documents you required have been produced and	exhibited".
The respondent subscribed his signature in acknowledgment of the correctness of that recital. He	did not raise	any objection in the representation made by him	before	the Deputy Inspector General of Police when notice was issued on him to	show cause why he should not be punished. In	the memo of appeal to the Inspector General of Police, it	was submitted by the respondent that the police witnesses	were to be summoned by the Enquiry Officer, and that he did	not summon them. It was also submitted that the statement signed by the respondent was only in respect of private witnesses, and not police witnesses. But the endorsement made by	the Enquiry	Officer is	not susceptible of	any	such interpretation,	which	refers to all	witnesses for	the respondent. The record does not show that an application for summoning the	police witnesses was made and	the Enquiry Officer in breach of the rules declined to summon them.	We are in the light of this evidence 36 of the	view that the respondent did not,	after the examination of police constable No. 506, desire to examine the two police constables Nos. 178	and 569, whom	he.
originally wanted to examine.
It was next urged that the findings recorded were not in respect	of the charge which the respondent was called	upon to answer. The charge against the respondent was that he had wrongfully confined Durgalu on March 5, 1954, to March 7, 1954, in the	police station. In	the statement	of facts which accompanied the charge-sheet it was stated in express	terms that the respondent had not recorded in	any of the	diaries of the police station that	Durgalu	was handed	over to him on	March 5, 1954. The charge and	the "statement of facts" form part of a single document on	the basis	of which proceedings	were started against	the respondent and it would be hypercritical to proceed' on	the view that though the respondent was expressly told in	the statement of facts which formed part of the charge-sheet, that he had failed to record that Durgalu was handed over to him, that ground of reprehensible conduct' was not included in the charge, and on that account the enquiry was vitiated.
No objection appears to have been raised before the Deputy Inspector General or	even the Inspector	General	of police,	that there was infirmity in the charge on	that account, and that infirmity had prejudiced the respondent in the enquiry. The respondent had full notice of the charge against	him, and he examined witnesses in support of	his defence	and made several argumentative representations before the Deputy Inspector General, the Inspector General of Police and the Government of Andhra Pradesh.
In our Judgment the proceedings before the	departmental authorities were regular and were not vitiated on account of any breach of the rules of natural justice. The conclusions of the departmental 37 officers were fully borne out by the evidence	before	them and the High Court had no jurisdiction to set aside	the order either on the	ground that the "approach to	the evidence was not consistent with the approach in a criminal case,"	nor on the ground that the High Court would have on that evidence	come to a different	conclusion.	The respondent had	also ample opportunity of examining	his witnesses after he was informed of the charge against	him.
The conclusion	recorded by the punishing authority	was therefore not open to be canvassed, nor was the liability of the respondent to be punished by removal from service	open to question before the High Court.
The	appeal is allowed and the order passed by the	High Court is set aside. The petition filed by the respondent is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. The order as to costs passed by the High Court will stand.