Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/95354/united-states-vs-ryan
Timestamp: 2018-02-20 10:03:54
Document Index: 310323307

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3453', '§ 3453', '§ 3453', '§ 3453', '§ 3453', '§ 26', '§ 3450', '§ 5']

United States Vs Ryan - Citation 95354 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
United States Vs. Ryan - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/95354
Case Number 284 U.S. 167
united states v. ryan - 284 u.s. 167 (1931) u.s. supreme court united states v. ryan, 284 u.s. 167 (1931) united states v. ryan no. 49 argued october 26, 27, 1931 decided november 23, 1931 284 u.s. 167 certiorari to the circuit court of appeals for the ninth circuit syllabus 1. statutes designed to prevent fraud on the revenue are construed less narrowly, even though a forfeiture results, than penal statutes and others involving forfeitures. p. 284 u. s. 172 . 2. in r.s. § 3453, which provides for forfeiture of (1) taxable articles found in the possession, custody, or control of any person for the purpose of being sold or removed by him in fraud of the internal revenue laws, (2) raw materials found in.....
United States v. Ryan - 284 U.S. 167 (1931)
U.S. Supreme Court United States v. Ryan, 284 U.S. 167 (1931)
1. Statutes designed to prevent fraud on the revenue are construed less narrowly, even though a forfeiture results, than penal statutes and others involving forfeitures. P. 284 U. S. 172 .
place or building, or within any yard or inclosure where such articles or raw materials are found, the phrase "such articles" in the third clause refers to the articles mentioned in both of the other clauses of the section, so that chattels associated with illicit possession, as well as those associated with illicit manufacture, are subject to forfeiture under the statute. P. 284 U. S. 173 .
3. The uniform construction given to a statute by the lower federal courts for more than sixty years is persuasive in determining its true meaning. P. 284 U. S. 174 .
4. In adopting § 3453 in the Revised Statutes without substantial change of the section as amended seven years previously, Congress must be deemed to have adopted the consistent interpretation theretofore given the amended section by the courts. P. 284 U. S. 175 .
6. The general words "all personal property whatsoever," as used in R.S. § 3453 to define what property is subject to forfeiture, must be construed, by application of the principle noscitur a sociis, to be limited in their meaning to chattels which have some relation to the tax evasion aimed at by the statute. P. 284 U. S. 176 .
We are not called upon to give a strained interpretation in order to avoid a forfeiture. Statutes to prevent fraud on the revenue are construed less narrowly, even though a forfeiture results, than penal statutes and others involving forfeitures. United States v. Stowell, 133 U. S. 1 , 133 U. S. 12 ; Smythe v. Fiske, 23 Wall. 374, 90 U. S. 380 ; United States v. Hodson, 10 Wall. 395, 77 U. S. 406 ; Cliquot's Champagne, 3 Wall. 114, 70 U. S. 145 ; Taylor v. United States, 3 How. 197, 44 U. S. 210 .
Nothing in the legislative history is suggested to indicate that such was the intention, and there is no such plain or obvious distinction to be made, in a section devised for the protection of the revenue, between articles associated with illicit manufacture and those associated with illicit possession, each equally frauds upon the revenue, as to be persuasive that the present act was designed to hit the first and not the second. The companion section, 3450, authorizing the forfeiture of vehicles and horses used for propelling them made no such distinction. By it, vehicles used for transporting or concealing taxable articles with the prescribed intent are forfeitable, as well as those used to transport or conceal contraband raw material or implements of manufacture. See Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U. S. 505 ; United States v. One Ford Coupe, 272 U. S. 321 .
The separation by the revisers of the first clause from the other two by a period instead of a semicolon, retaining the conjunction "And," and the dropping of the conjunction "also" from the second and third clauses are changes hardly substantial enough to warrant any changed construction of the section. McConald v. Hovey, 110 U. S. 619 , 110 U. S. 629 ; Anderson v. Pacific Coast S.S. Co., 225 U. S. 187 , 225 U. S. 199 ; see Buck Stove & Range Co. v. Vickers, 226 U. S. 205 , 226 U. S. 213 .
No. 16106 (1872); compare United States v. Distillery at Spring Valley, Fed.Cas. No. 14963 (1873); United States v. Sixteen Barrels of Distilled Spirits, Fed.Cas. No. 16300 (1879); United States v. One Ice Box, 37 F.2d 120 (D.C.N.D.Ill.1930); contra, In re Hurley, 37 F.2d 397 (D.C.W.D.N.Y.1930); United States v. Ten Bottles of Scotch Whisky, 48 F.2d 545 (C.C.A.2d.1931). By the adoption of § 3453 in the Revised Statutes, as of December 1, 1873, without substantial change of the section as amended in 1866, Congress must be considered to have adopted the consistent interpretation of the latter as authorizing forfeiture of nontaxed articles found in a place in which taxed articles are either possessed or manufactured with intent to defraud the revenue. Sessions v. Romadka, 145 U. S. 29 , 145 U. S. 41 -42; see McCaughn v. Hershey Chocolate Co., 283 U. S. 488 .
It is said that the construction urged by the government is inadmissible because so broad as to lead to absurd results; that it would permit seizure of chattels having no relation to the taxable articles or their intended sale or removal, if anywhere in the same building or inclosure, and might include chattels possessed on the premises by others having no connection with the taxable articles or their intended sale or removal. But we do not so construe it. To do so would be to justify penalties having no relation to the offense, and the infliction of hardship on innocent persons unnecessary for the protection of the revenue. All laws are to be given a sensible construction. A literal application of a statute which would lead to absurd consequences is to be avoided whenever a reasonable application can be given which is consistent with the legislative purpose. United States v. Katz, 271 U. S. 354 ; United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U. S. 394 ; United States v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610, 16 U. S. 631 .
Respondent's objection that forfeiture under R.S. § 3453 is barred by the arrest and prosecution of the offender under the National Prohibition Act is without force. It is true that, by the express command of § 26 the National Prohibition Act, in all cases of arrest for transportation of intoxicating liquors, the transporting vehicle must be seized and proceedings for its forfeiture had under that section, and not under R.S. § 3450. Commercial Credit Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 226 ; Richbourg Motor Co. v. United States, 281 U. S. 528 . But, by § 5 of the Willis-Campbell Act of November 23, 1921, c. 134, 42 Stat. 222, 223, all penalties for violation of the revenue laws not directly in conflict with any provision of the National Prohibition Act are continued in force. See United States v. One Ford Coupe, supra. There is no question here of use of a vehicle for transportation, and there is nothing in the National Prohibition Act necessarily