Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/712/826/415142/
Timestamp: 2020-08-11 19:11:26
Document Index: 776846372

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3651', '§ 3651', '§ 5512', '§ 5552', '§ 5554', '§ 5552']

United States of America v. John Bazzano, Jr. A/k/a "johnny", A/k/a "j", Joseph De Marcoa/k/a "joe", Joseph Charles Yimin A/k/a "bull", Charlespatrick Kellington A/k/a "chuck", Francis Dattalo A/k/a"frank", A/k/a "hob", Attilio Policastro A/k/a "flat Top",primo Victor Mollica A/k/a "xg", John Franklin Matz A/k/a"jack", A/k/a "mayor", David Rankin Guffey A/k/a "chief",a/k/a "clairton Chief", John Regis Ward A/k/a "jp", A/k/a"ward", Peter Paul Orsini A/k/a "pete", A/k/a "pete Orsi",dominic Paul Serapiglia A/k/a "wilson Constable", Thomas C.poljak A/k/a "eliz Chief", George B. Hines A/k/a "eliz Constable".appeal of Primo Mollica, 712 F.2d 826 (3d Cir. 1983) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Third Circuit › 1983 › United States of America v. John Bazzano, Jr. A/k/a "johnny", A/k/a "j", Joseph De Marcoa/k/a "joe",...
United States of America v. John Bazzano, Jr. A/k/a "johnny", A/k/a "j", Joseph De Marcoa/k/a "joe", Joseph Charles Yimin A/k/a "bull", Charlespatrick Kellington A/k/a "chuck", Francis Dattalo A/k/a"frank", A/k/a "hob", Attilio Policastro A/k/a "flat Top",primo Victor Mollica A/k/a "xg", John Franklin Matz A/k/a"jack", A/k/a "mayor", David Rankin Guffey A/k/a "chief",a/k/a "clairton Chief", John Regis Ward A/k/a "jp", A/k/a"ward", Peter Paul Orsini A/k/a "pete", A/k/a "pete Orsi",dominic Paul Serapiglia A/k/a "wilson Constable", Thomas C.poljak A/k/a "eliz Chief", George B. Hines A/k/a "eliz Constable".appeal of Primo Mollica, 712 F.2d 826 (3d Cir. 1983)
US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit - 712 F.2d 826 (3d Cir. 1983) Argued Feb. 4, 1982. Reargued before the Court In BancNov. 8, 1982
Decided June 17, 1983. Rehearing and Rehearing In Banc Denied July 20, 1983
Of the seven courts of appeals that have considered the question whether the exclusionary rule is applicable to probation revocation proceedings, six have concluded that it is not. See United States v. Frederickson, 581 F.2d 711, 713 (8th Cir. 1978) (per curiam); United States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51, 53-55 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Farmer, 512 F.2d 160, 162-63 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 987, 96 S. Ct. 397, 46 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1975); United States v. Brown, 488 F.2d 94, 95 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam); United States v. Hill, 447 F.2d 817, 819 (7th Cir. 1971); United States ex rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161, 1163 (2d Cir. 1970) (parole revocation). But see United States v. Workman, 585 F.2d 1205, 1211 (4th Cir. 1978) (holding that the rule is applicable).
The balance to be struck between the competing interests involved in determining whether to extend the exclusionary rule has been clearly spelled out by the Supreme Court. In United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 94 S. Ct. 613, 38 L. Ed. 2d 561 (1974), faced with the question of whether the exclusionary rule should be extended to grand jury proceedings, the court stated:
414 U.S. at 349, 94 S. Ct. at 620. This balancing test has been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in subsequent decisions, see Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486-89, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 3048-50, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1067 (1976); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 453-54, 96 S. Ct. 3021, 3031, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1046 (1976), and has been applied as well by courts of appeals dealing with the present issue, see, e.g., United States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1975) (minimal deterrent effect of extending exclusionary rule to probation revocation proceedings outweighed by dangers the rule would pose to probation system); United States v. Workman, 585 F.2d 1205 (4th Cir. 1978) (applying Calandra balancing test to conclude that exclusionary rule does apply to probation revocation proceedings).
Of substantial importance in the weighing of the interests involved is the principle that the rule is not a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved, but rather is a device designed to deter violations of fourth amendment rights. See Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348, 94 S. Ct. at 620. In clarifying the interests to be balanced the Supreme Court has explained that " [t]he purpose of the exclusionary rule is not to redress the injury to the privacy of the search victim.... Instead, the rule's prime purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct." Calandra, 414 U.S. at 347, 94 S. Ct. at 619. "The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter--to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way--by removing the incentive to disregard it." United States v. Calandra, supra, 414 U.S. at 347-48, 94 S. Ct. at 619 ( quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217, 80 S. Ct. 1437, 1444, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1669 (1960)) .
Thus, whether the rule should be extended to probation revocation proceedings must depend on whether its application will significantly enhance the rule's deterrent effect. For, if the marginal increase in deterrence stemming from the rule's application will be slight, then the balance of interests is unlikely to favor applying the rule and thereby depriving revocation proceedings of " 'all the evidence which exposes the truth.' " United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 351, 94 S. Ct. 613, 621, 38 L. Ed. 2d 561 (1974) (quoting Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 175, 89 S. Ct. 961, 967, 22 L. Ed. 2d 176 (1969)).
The Supreme Court has noted that empirical determinations of the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule have shed little light on the questions posed by this balance of interests. See Janis, supra, 428 U.S. at 449-53, 96 S. Ct. at 3029-32 (survey and criticism of empirical studies). As a result, the Court has "relied, instead, on its own assumptions of human nature and the interrelationship of the various components of the law enforcement system." Janis, supra, at 459, 96 S. Ct. at 3034.
When the police conduct a search, their aim generally is to convict the target of the search of a substantive offense, and they know that any unconstitutional conduct on their part incident to the search will be grounds for suppressing the evidence at the defendant's trial. Such evidence, when seized by state police officers, is excludable in both the state criminal trial on the substantive offense, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961), and in any federal criminal trial, Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 80 S. Ct. 1437, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1669 (1960). Thus, "the entire criminal enforcement process, which is the concern and duty of these [state] officers, is frustrated," Janis, supra, 428 U.S. at 448, 96 S. Ct. at 3029 (footnote omitted), and considerable deterrent effect arises from already existing applications of the exclusionary rule.
In determining whether the incremental deterrent effect of extending the exclusionary rule to various proceedings would be substantial, the Court has inquired into whether use of the evidence in the proceeding in question "falls outside the offending officer's zone of primary interest." Janis, supra, at 458, 96 S. Ct. at 3034. See also Tirado v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 689 F.2d 307, 311 (2d Cir. 1982) ("The primary consideration is the relationship between the law enforcement responsibilities and expertise of the seizing officials and the type of proceeding at which the seized material is being offered.")
The "zone of primary interest" for state police officers is the acquisition of evidence for use in criminal proceedings, whether of the state or of the federal government. Janis, supra 428 U.S. at 458, 96 S. Ct. at 3034. The interest of state officers is greatest in state criminal proceedings, but extends to criminal proceedings of another sovereign by virtue of the law enforcement officers' interest in achieving some conviction. See Janis, supra at 458, 96 S. Ct. at 3034 (explaining Elkins v. United States, supra) . Yet the interest of state officers is attenuated to some extent by virtue of the fact that such evidence is used in a proceeding by another sovereign.
In the present case, however, not only is the sovereign conducting the proceeding in question different from the sovereign to which the offending officers are responsible, but the proceeding in question is not the criminal trial which is of primary concern to law enforcement agents. As a result, it is unlikely that state law enforcement agents will be interested in seizing evidence that will be of use in a federal probation revocation proceeding. Thus, in the absence of evidence that the offending agents knew that the target of their search was a probationer,1 the deterrent effect of excluding the relevant evidence will be substantially attenuated. Cf. Janis, supra, at 457-58, 96 S. Ct. at 3033.
Against this minimal increase in deterrence of police misconduct we must weigh "the potential injury to the ... role and functions of [probation]." Calandra, supra, 414 U.S. at 349, 94 S. Ct. at 620. In considering the effect on probation revocation proceedings of extending the exclusionary rule, it must be remembered that because the probationer has already been found guilty of a crime, and his liberty is only "conditional," United States v. Basso, 632 F.2d 1007, 1013 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965, 101 S. Ct. 1480, 67 L. Ed. 2d 613 (1981), a revocation hearing is, in effect, more a resentencing than a taking of rights. As the Supreme Court indicated in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1972), and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S. Ct. 1756, 36 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1973), the "full panoply of rights" due a defendant in a criminal prosecution is not available in a revocation proceeding. Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, 408 U.S. at 480, 92 S. Ct. at 2599. For example, the Government has a lesser burden of proof in revocation proceedings, United States v. Manuszak, 532 F.2d 311, 317 (3d Cir. 1976), and the Federal Rules of Evidence (other than with respect to privileges) do not apply, Fed.R.Evid. 1101(d) (3).
These features of probation revocation proceedings do not imply, of course, that probationers do not possess the fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, or that that right is not protected by the warrant requirement. See United States v. Rea, 678 F.2d 382, 386-88 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v. Hallman, 365 F.2d 289 (3d Cir. 1966).3 Nevertheless, these features of probation revocation proceedings do reflect the fact that the state has a great interest in receiving all information available on the question of whether the probationer has observed the conditions of his probation. As the Supreme Court stated in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 483, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 2601, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1972):
Indeed, all the cases support this view. See Nicholas v. United States, 527 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Strada, 503 F.2d 1081 (8th Cir. 1974); United States v. Bartholdi, 453 F.2d 1225 (9th Cir. 1972). In Nicholas, for example, the court stated:
527 F.2d at 1161 (citation omitted). This court recently rejected an argument similar to Mollica's in the context of parole revocation. Franklin v. Fenton, 642 F.2d 760, 764 (3d Cir. 1980) ("Since the original warrant was issued within the petitioner's original term, it could be executed thereafter.")
It is difficult to think of a reason why a court should arbitrarily lose jurisdiction at the end of the five-year statutory period when the alleged probation violation took place within the five-year period and the probationer was formally notified within that period that the Government would seek to revoke his probation. The five-year provision has not been applied mechanically in other contexts; for example, its running has been tolled during periods when the probationer was not in fact under probationary supervision by virtue of his own wrongful act. See United States v. Workman, 617 F.2d 48, 51 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v. Lancer, 508 F.2d 719, 733-34 (3d Cir.) (in banc), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 989, 95 S. Ct. 1992, 44 L. Ed. 2d 478 (1975). Thus, since the proceedings to revoke Mollica's probation were commenced within the five-year period of 18 U.S.C. § 3651, the revocation of Mollica's probation was not time-barred.
Mollica argues that when a probation revocation hearing is held prior to the disposition of related criminal charges, the probationer is faced with a dilemma. If he chooses to testify in the probation revocation hearing, he may compromise his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination in connection with the related criminal proceeding. If he decides not to testify in the revocation hearing, his probation may be revoked even though he may later be acquitted of the related criminal charges. Thus, Mollica argues that the proper procedure is for the probation revocation proceedings to be postponed until after the related criminal charges are resolved, and if postponement is not desired by the Government and the revocation hearing is held first, for the probationer to be given use immunity so that he can testify without penalty in the revocation proceeding. Cf. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 389-94, 88 S. Ct. 967, 973-77, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1247 (1968) (defendant's testimony at suppression hearing inadmissible at trial). At this point in time, Mollica's argument is also reinforced by the fact that mere postponement of the revocation hearing would not prejudice the Government because, as we have concluded in Part II, supra, revocation proceedings need only be commenced by arrest warrant, petition, or otherwise, within the five-year limitations period of 18 U.S.C. § 3651. Thus, the revocation hearing itself would not have to be commenced or completed within that period. Neither would postponement endanger the public, Mollica argues, because, if necessary and appropriate, a probationer who is accused of violating the terms of his probation can be taken into custody pending the outcome of the revocation hearing, the propriety of which is an issue neither presented by nor addressed on this appeal.
Mollica here does not argue that postponement of revocation hearings or the giving of use immunity are constitutionally required. Courts in numerous cases have held that they are not. See Ryan v. State of Montana, 580 F.2d 988 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 977, 99 S. Ct. 1548, 59 L. Ed. 2d 796 (1979); United States v. Brugger, 549 F.2d 2 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 919, 97 S. Ct. 2186, 53 L. Ed. 2d 231 (1977); Flint v. Mullen, 499 F.2d 100 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1026, 95 S. Ct. 505, 42 L. Ed. 2d 301 (1974). But see Melson v. Sard, 402 F.2d 653 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (per curiam). Rather, Mollica argues that this court should impose a postponement/use immunity requirement as an exercise of its supervisory power over the district courts in this circuit.
The leading case on this subject is People v. Coleman, 13 Cal. 3d 867, 120 Cal. Rptr. 384, 533 P.2d 1024 (1975), in which the Supreme Court of California, exercising its supervisory power over lower California courts, announced that the testimony of a probationer at a probation revocation hearing held prior to the disposition of criminal charges arising out of the alleged violation of the conditions of his probation, and any evidence derived from such testimony, may not be used against the probationer by the prosecution in its case-in-chief on the related criminal charges. Id. at 889, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 402, 533 P.2d at 1042. The supreme courts of Alaska, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin have taken similar positions. See McCracken v. Corey, 612 P.2d 990 (Alaska 1980) (parole revocation); State v. DeLomba, 117 R.I. 673, 370 A.2d 1273 (1977); State v. Evans, 77 Wis.2d 225, 252 N.W.2d 664 (1977). See also People v. Carr, 185 Colo. 293, 524 P.2d 301 (1974). The Ninth Circuit in Ryan, supra, while declining to hold that use immunity was constitutionally required, recognized the desirability of such a procedure:
Mollica contends that the district court should have explained on the record why, after he had successfully completed almost all of his probationary period, it had resentenced him to the five-year term of imprisonment it had originally imposed. Federal appellate courts generally do not require trial courts to state reasons for the imposition of the sentences they impose. See, e.g., United States v. Vasquez, 638 F.2d 507, 534 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 970, 101 S. Ct. 1490, 67 L. Ed. 2d 620, 454 U.S. 847, 102 S. Ct. 165, 70 L. Ed. 2d 135, 454 U.S. 975, 102 S. Ct. 528, 70 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1981); United States v. Garcia, 617 F.2d 1176, 1178 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Del Piano, 593 F.2d 539, 540 (3d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 944, 99 S. Ct. 2889, 61 L. Ed. 2d 315 (1979); United States v. Thompson, 541 F.2d 794, 795 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam). Although this rule has been criticized by a member of this court, see, e.g., United States v. Bazzano, 570 F.2d 1120, 1130-38 (3d Cir. 1977) (Adams, J., concurring in the judgment) (collecting authorities), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 917, 98 S. Ct. 2261, 56 L. Ed. 2d 757 (1978), we have continued to adhere to it.
Since Mollica's sentence is within the statutory limits, it is not subject to challenge. United States v. Dansker, 581 F.2d 69, 75 (3d Cir. 1978); Government of the Virgin Islands v. Richardson, 498 F.2d 892, 894 (3d Cir. 1974). As the Supreme Court said in Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 443, 94 S. Ct. 3042, 3052, 41 L. Ed. 2d 855 (1974), "well-established doctrine bars review of the exercise of sentencing discretion." For these reasons, Mollica's objection to his sentence must fail.
In Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 77 S. Ct. 623, 1 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1957), the Supreme Court recognized that there is a qualified privilege possessed by the Government to refuse to disclose the identity of a confidential informant from whom it has received information about alleged criminal activity. In determining whether the privilege should be sustained, a court must "balanc [e] the public interest in protecting the flow of information against the individual's right to prepare his defense." Id. at 62, 77 S. Ct. at 628.
Mollica's argument, as to why the identity of the informant here would be useful, is vague. " [M]ere speculation as to the usefulness of the informant's testimony to the defendant is insufficient to justify disclosure of his identity." United States v. Estrella, 567 F.2d 1151, 1153 (1st Cir. 1977) (citations omitted). So far as appears, the informant's role in this case was nothing more than that of allegedly providing the police with probable cause for conducting their search, and we have already held in Part II supra that the fruits of the search are not subject to suppression even if the search warrant was defective. The evidence of Mollica's guilt consisted primarily of the physical evidence seized during the search. Where an informant's role was in validating a search, disclosure of his identity is not required. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 87 S. Ct. 1056, 18 L. Ed. 2d 62 (1967). Mollica has failed to present a convincing argument that the informant played any more important role in the Government's case or in his defense.
Mollica argues that the district court erred in refusing to grant immunity to defense witnesses Stagno and Fimmano. As a result, both Stagno and Fimmano invoked their fifth amendment privilege when called to the stand. In United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913, 99 S. Ct. 2014, 60 L. Ed. 2d 386 (1979), this court discussed two situations in which the due process clause might compel the granting of immunity to defense witnesses: one statutory and one judicial.
First, Herman noted that in cases where Government actions denying use immunity to defense witnesses were undertaken with the "deliberate intention of distorting the judicial fact finding process," the court has the remedial power to order acquittal unless on retrial the Government grants statutory immunity. Id. at 1204 (citing United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223 (3d Cir. 1976)). Second, Herman observed that in certain cases a court may have "inherent authority to effectuate the defendant's compulsory process right by conferring a judicially fashioned immunity upon a witness whose testimony is essential to an effective defense." Id.
In Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980), we gave content to both bases of defense witness immunity when we vacated the sentences of certain defendants and remanded for evidentiary proceedings respecting these principles. In particular, we set out the requirements for invoking judicially fashioned defense witness immunity:
In this case, Mollica had made no showing of governmental conduct which would warrant a grant of statutory immunity. There was no evidence of any attempt on the part of the prosecution to distort the facts of the case by keeping Stagno and Fimmano from testifying.6 Nor was there evidence of any other governmental action or misconduct which would fall within the Morrison-Herman standard. As we said in Smith, " [a]bsent [such] prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant is foreclosed from insisting that statutory immunity be granted his witness." Id. at 968.
I agree that as to all issues raised on appeal by Mollica, other than the postponement/use immunity issue, the district court's order of May 18, 1981 should be upheld. However, because I would reverse and remand to the district court so that it might conduct further proceedings consistent with Mollica's postponement/use immunity argument (see Part III, supra), I must respectfully dissent from the judgment of the court affirming the district court's order.
Mollica argues that " [w]here the prosecutor insists on conducting a probation hearing prior to trial on the state charges, then a limited use immunity therefore must arise in favor of the probationer under the privilege against self-incrimination of the U.S. Constitution." This Fifth Amendment guarantee, however, protects the individual only against compelled self-incrimination. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 303-04, 87 S. Ct. 408, 414, 17 L. Ed. 2d 374 (1966).
In McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 91 S. Ct. 1454, 28 L. Ed. 2d 711 (1970), vacated on other grounds, 408 U.S. 941, 92 S. Ct. 2873, 33 L. Ed. 2d 765 (1971), the Supreme Court held that no impermissible coercion resulted when a defendant in a state single-verdict trial system was required to choose whether to stand on his right against self-incrimination at the risk that his failure to testify would be damaging on the issue of punishment. Id. at 217, 91 S. Ct. at 1472. I can perceive no principled basis for distinguishing McGautha from the instant case, in which Mollica was required to choose whether to stand on his right against self-incrimination at the risk that his failure to testify would be damaging concerning probation revocation.1 Therefore, I cannot conclude that Mollica was under the kind of compulsion that violates the privilege against self-incrimination.
Mollica also argued before the district court that use immunity was necessary as a matter of "fundamental fairness". Although he did not elaborate further on this contention, I presume he meant to suggest that forcing him to choose between exercising his constitutional right to be heard in person at his probation revocation hearing, Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782, 93 S. Ct. 1756, 1759, 36 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1982), and preserving his privilege against self-incrimination at the state criminal proceedings, violates due process.
I am not unappreciative of the difficulty of this choice. Yet, not every burden on the exercise of a constitutional right, and not every pressure or encouragement to waive such a right, is constitutionally impermissible. Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 218, 99 S. Ct. 492, 497, 58 L. Ed. 2d 466 (1978). The threshold question in this regard is whether compelling an election impairs to an appreciable extent any of the policies underlying the constitutional rights asserted. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. at 213, 91 S. Ct. at 1470 (state unified guilt-punishment criminal trial system does not violate due process; choice between exercising right of allocution at punishment stage and preserving privilege against self-incrimination at guilt stage does not appreciably undermine policies underlying either right).
As I have indicated, Mollica's forced election of rights did not violate his right against self-incrimination. Therefore, I must conclude also that this election did not impair to an appreciable extent any of the policies underlying that right. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. at 217, 91 S. Ct. at 1472.
Neither did Mollica's forced election impair to an appreciable extent any of the policies underlying his due process right to be heard in person at his probation revocation hearing. Identification of the precise dictates of this due process right requires a careful balancing of the private interest that will be affected by the official action against the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S. Ct. 893, 903, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1975).
The individual interests protected by the due process right to be heard in person at a probation revocation hearing include personal participation in the revocation process, and bringing to the court's attention evidence peculiarly within the probationer's own knowledge. Yet, neither of these interests is substantially undermined by a requirement that a probationer must choose whether to be heard at the expense of waiving the privilege against self-incrimination. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. at 220, 91 S. Ct. at 1474 (same individual interests, which also underlie due process right to be heard at sentencing assumed to exist for purpose of argument, not undermined by requiring defendant to risk that statements made regarding punishment will be damaging with regard to guilt).
In my opinion, the district court is in the best position to balance the several considerations relevant to whether probation revocation hearings based on state criminal charges should be postponed until the resolution of those charges. One of these considerations, for example, is the inconvenience that may result from an untimely motion for postponement. United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 777-78 & n. 5 (2d Cir. 1980) (district court's refusal to grant defense witness immunity did not deny constitutionally protected fairness because demand for immunity was untimely and would, if granted, have resulted in substantial inconvenience to prosecution), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1077, 101 S. Ct. 856, 66 L. Ed. 2d 800 (1981). In the instant case, Mollica did not make his request for postponement or use immunity until his probation revocation hearing had begun. For the district court to have granted this request might have resulted in serious inconvenience; probation officials argued that several of their witnesses were from out of town, and could be returned to a second probation revocation hearing, if at all, only at added expense.
Without doubt, a supervisory rule requiring district courts to grant use immunity to a probationer who faces the same sort of election as did Mollica would advance the federal interest in avoiding revocations of probation based on erroneous information or an erroneous evaluation of the need to revoke probation. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 2601, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1972). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has held that courts of appeals should not promulgate a supervisory rule implementing such a non-constitutionally required goal when the rule would impose a significant corollary burden on a co-equal branch of government. See United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 734-37, 100 S. Ct. 2439, 2445-47, 65 L. Ed. 2d 468 (1979) (court of appeals' use of supervisory power to suppress evidence seized in violation of fourth amendment rights of third party not before the court inappropriate because loss of probative evidence significantly burdens law enforcement efforts of executive branch). Similarly, this Court has declined to exercise its supervisory power when the result would be a significant encroachment on an integral function of state government. See Poteet v. Fauver, 517 F.2d 393, 398 (3d Cir. 1975) (declining to exercise supervisory power to order assignment of new judge for resentencing in state criminal proceeding out of respect for court system of equal sovereignty).
Rather, my objection to a supervisory rule requiring use immunity in the present context concerns the effect immunity would have on state law enforcement, an integral function of state government. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44-45, 91 S. Ct. 746, 750, 27 L. Ed. 2d 669 (1971). Specifically, granting the probationer immunity would require the state to prove that evidence it seeks to use against a probationer in a subsequent criminal trial is derived from a source wholly independent of his previously immunized testimony.
As a general principle, immunization of the "fruits" of immunized testimony is necessary to satisfy the prospective witness that his testimony will not return to haunt him. Cf. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460, 92 S. Ct. 1653, 1664, 32 L. Ed. 2d 212 (1970) (immunity for "use" and "fruits" in federal use immunity statute necessary and sufficient to provide full protection required by privilege against self-incrimination). Requiring the government to prove that evidence it seeks to use against a probationer is derived from a source wholly independent of his previously immunized testimony is but a natural and necessary complement of "fruits" immunity.
Proving that evidence is derived from a source independent of previously immunized testimony would impose a substantial burden on the state prosecution in a subsequent criminal trial. Although the state may in some cases be able to satisfy the independent source burden by cataloguing or freezing the evidence obtained prior to the defendant's immunization, this is not so when a continuing investigation "disclose [s] vital evidence after, though not resulting from, the immunized testimony." United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d at 775. If the state cannot meet its burden in such a case, the result will be the loss of potentially crucial evidence.
Moreover, when the state's investigation is ongoing, it may take measures in order to meet the independent source burden which are in themselves costly. For example, the state may decide that it is necessary to appoint a new team of investigators and prosecutors after the probationer has been granted immunity. United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d at 778. Yet, this would result in the loss of the knowledge and experience of the first team of investigators and prosecutors, as well as much duplication of effort by the second-appointed team. United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 640 n. 26 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 103 S. Ct. 57, 74 L. Ed. 2d 61 (1982). In recognition of these potential burdens, this Court has held that the possibility that a defense witness may be subject to future prosecution is a legitimate reason for denying him immunity. United States v. Lowell, 649 F.2d 950, 965 (3d Cir. 1981). Therefore, given these significant potential burdens on state law enforcement activities, I would decline to use our supervisory power to promulgate a rule requiring district courts to grant use immunity as an alternative remedy in this context.
It is true that the procedural rules applicable to a criminal prosecution, such as jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt, do not apply in a probation revocation proceeding. But it is a classic non-sequitur to suggest that, because the procedural rules of criminal prosecutions and of probation revocation proceedings are not identical, persons on probation have a lesser interest in the zones of privacy and personal autonomy which the fourth amendment protects. This court recognized in United States v. Hallman, 365 F.2d 289 (3d Cir. 1966), that the fourth amendment protects a parolee from a warrantless seizure. It held that such illegally seized evidence could not be admitted in a subsequent counterfeiting case. Certainly that case ought to control on the full applicability of the fourth amendment to probationers, for no meaningful distinction can be drawn, for fourth amendment purposes, between a probationer and a parolee. Moreover, the Hallman court drew no distinction based upon the nature of the proceeding in which the illegally obtained evidence was to be used. From the point of view of the victim of a fourth amendment violation, the government's further invasion of constitutionally protected privacy rights by making use of the fruits of that invasion in a public forum is the same whether that public forum is a prosecution or a proceeding to revoke probation or parole. The public exploitation of the invasion of privacy continues and aggravates it. The court becomes a partner in that exploitation to exactly the same extent in both proceedings. Matters that should, under the law, have remained private are put to a public use, to the ongoing detriment of the victim. A peeping tom looking through a bedroom window commits an egregious invasion of privacy. If he titilates his friends with a description of what he observed in the bedroom, the invasion of privacy is magnified. If a court then affords him a public forum in which the private information becomes a public record, the court participates in that invasion of privacy and magnifies it to the maximum. The exclusionary rule prohibits the court from participating in illegal invasions of privacy by maximization of the dissemination of information which under the standards of privacy enshrined in the fourth amendment should remain private.
Over a decade ago I outlined the reasons why the deterrence of police misconduct as the sole justification for the exclusionary rule is a snare and a delusion. Gibbons, Practical Prophylaxis and Appellate Methodology: The Exclusionary Rule as a Case Study in the Decisional Process, 3 Seton Hall L. Rev. 295 (1972). Almost everything that has occurred in fourth amendment jurisprudence since then has reinforced my conviction as to the unsoundness of the deterrence rationale. The majority opinion on the fourth amendment issue is a typical example. Proceeding from the assumption, unsupported by empirical evidence, that application of the rule in criminal trials does in fact have an effect on police conduct, it jumps to the equally unsupported assumption that non-application of the rule in parole revocation proceedings will have no encouraging effect. Our visceral reaction, and we confess it is only that, is that the case for a deterrence-encouragement rationale is stronger rather than weaker in the probation revocation context. The police, often less interested in convictions than in crime prevention, already have a great incentive in dealing with parolees or probationers to seek their incarceration under the much lower evidentiary standards applicable to revocation proceedings. The holding that illegally obtained evidence may be freely used in a probation revocation proceeding sends a strong signal to law enforcement personnel that the task of building a legal case which would sustain a conviction may be shortcut in the interest of getting a probationer off the street by an invasion of his fourth amendments rights.1 Our visceral reaction as to the rule's deterrence or encouragement of police misconduct is at least as probable as that of the majority on that issue.
Neither visceral reaction, however, is a sound basis for a ruling that the court should become an active participant in an ongoing illegal invasion of constitutionally protected privacy interests. The only valid reason for the exclusionary rule is that advanced by Justices Holmes and Brandeis years ago in their notable dissents in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 469, 471, 48 S. Ct. 564, 569, 570, 72 L. Ed. 2d 944 (1928). The government plays "an ignoble part" when it commits illegal invasions of privacy. Id. at 470, 48 S. Ct. at 569 (Holmes, J., dissenting). The evidence, therefore, is excluded "in order to preserve the judicial process from contamination." Id. at 484, 48 S. Ct. at 574 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). The contamination to which Brandeis referred was that caused by the active participation of the court in providing a public forum for the widespread dissemination and public use of information which should have remained private.
Brandeis was one of the first scholars to recognize the importance of individual privacy as a basic liberty. Warren and Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890). Many years elapsed before a majority of the Supreme Court accepted his normative judgment as to the value of that liberty. Now, we concede, this court's majority is swimming with a strong tide against recognition of the value of privacy rights.2 The head count among the courts of appeals on the precise issue of admissibility of illegally obtained evidence in probation revocation proceedings is evidence of that tide. In this court United States v. Hallman, 365 F.2d 289 (3d Cir. 1966), while technically distinguishable, put us, at least until today, in the same normative camp as the Fourth Circuit. United States v. Workman, 585 F.2d 1205, 1211 (4th Cir. 1978). We would have this circuit stay there. It is offensive to cast federal judges in the role of peeping toms once removed, presiding over a public forum for the public dissemination of information which under the Constitution was and should have remained private. Moreover, embracing that ignoble role, as the majority on that issue does, will in the long run erode the moral authority of the court, which is its only real source of power.
United States v. Hasting, --- U.S. ----, ----, 103 S. Ct. 1974, 1978-79, 76 L. Ed. 2d 96 (1983) (citations omitted). All three purposes apply here. The rule Judge Garth proposes implements a probationer's privilege against self-incrimination. It also assures that the parole revocation proceeding will have the benefit of all evidence possibly favorable to the probationer, and thus that the decision is made on appropriate considerations. Finally, it deters reliance on probation revocation proceedings in circumstances in which the prosecuting authorities could not prove a substantive offense, and prevents those authorities from placing the probationer in the position of leaving a weak case unanswered or running the risk of strengthening it by self-incrimination.
2. I agree with Judge Gibbons that the district court should have held a hearing to determine whether the challenged evidence was illegally obtained. In recent decisions, the Supreme Court has grounded its rationale for the rule more on pragmatism than on principle: "The [exclusionary] rule's prime purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures." United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347, 94 S. Ct. 613, 619, 38 L. Ed. 2d 561 (1974). See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446, 96 S. Ct. 3021, 3028, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1046 (1976). Even if viewed in that light, I am unpersuaded that probation revocation proceedings should stand on a significantly different footing than criminal trials for this purpose. Although empirical evidence is unhappily unavailable, as the Court has recognized, see id., it is reasonable to assume that the deterrent effect on police misconduct would be strengthened if the exclusionary rule is applied in an unwaivering and undeviating fashion whenever the evidence is sought to be used in a proceeding which may subject the victim of the search to imprisonment. See United States v. Workman, 585 F.2d 1205, 1211 (4th Cir. 1978). Therefore, I would remand for the purpose of directing the district court to hold a suppression hearing. Since a majority of the court has not accepted that position, I vote to affirm.
Even assuming that the rule could be more precisely crafted, its rigid application would create an unsatisfactory choice for district courts and prosecutors contemplating probation revocation proceedings: they must grant use immunity or postpone the proceedings. Yet there might well be exceptional circumstances in which the Government can demonstrate a compelling need to avoid postponement, but in which a grant of immunity would be unacceptable. The rule would also have unfortunate consequences in the ordinary probation revocation case in which use immunity is granted. The probationer's testimony will often have little effect on the outcome of a revocation proceeding; the use immunity requirement might do no more than burden the state in subsequent criminal trials with "the affirmative duty to prove that the evidence it proposes to use is derived from a legitimate source wholly independent of the compelled [immunized] testimony." Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460, 92 S. Ct. 1653, 1664, 32 L. Ed. 2d 212 (1972).
In cases involving judicially created use immunity for defense witnesses, we require that the defendant show that the proffered testimony is both clearly exculpatory and essential to his case. Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 972 (3d Cir. 1980). Even Smith may have expanded judicial power too far. The Supreme Court has recently declared that " [n]o court has authority to immunize a witness." Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, --- U.S. ----, ----, 103 S. Ct. 608, 616, 74 L. Ed. 2d 430 (1983). Although this statement appears in the context of a discussion of defense witness immunity pursuant to statute, the Court may have meant to express the view that the judiciary lacks even the nonstatutory power to immunize a witness. If the district court lacks the authority to immunize a witness, it is questionable whether it possesses the power to immunize probationers.
Ordinarily, a judgment represents the agreement of a majority of the members of a court that it is appropriate to dispose of a case in a particular way. It is by no means essential that a rationale supporting a valid judgment also enjoy the majority's favor. Indeed it is not uncommon for a reversal or a remand to be based on a variety of grounds, none of which has sufficient support to become binding precedent. See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 97 S. Ct. 2593, 53 L. Ed. 2d 714 (1977); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 91 S. Ct. 2091, 29 L. Ed. 2d 790 (1971). While such decisions may frustrate a court's role of providing guidance for lower courts and thus constitute an abdication of its responsibility to those "depending on it for direction," Note, Plurality Decisions and Judicial Decisionmaking, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1127, 1128 (1981), the absence of a consensus rationale does not invalidate the court's judgment as to a particular result. To hold otherwise would require all appellate courts to affirm when a majority supports a contrary disposition.
There is another reason why rehearing is in order. Even though a majority of the judges sitting in banc believes that Mollica should have an opportunity to be heard, the judgment compelling revocation of probation comes about because no single rationale for remand can command a majority. Such a result appears inconsistent with the approach taken by the Supreme Court of the United States in the recently decided Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commission of the City of New York, --- U.S. ----, 103 S. Ct. 3221, 77 L. Ed. 2d ---- (1983).
In this case we do not reach the question whether the exclusionary rule should be applied in a probation revocation proceeding if the police knew or had reason to know that the target of their search was a probationer. See United States v. Rea, 678 F.2d 382 (2nd Cir. 1982); United States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51, 55 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Brown, 488 F.2d 94, 95 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam). We expressly leave this question open. There is no evidence in the record of this case that the police who conducted the search knew or had reason to know that Mollica was on probation
United States v. Workman, 585 F.2d 1205 (4th Cir. 1978), relied upon by Mollica, in our view greatly overstates the deterrent effect of applying the exclusionary rule in such a specialized context. See id. at 1210
A refusal to apply the exclusionary rule in probation revocation proceedings would not be inconsistent with this court's decision in United States v. Hallman, 365 F.2d 289 (3d Cir. 1966). In Hallman, we did state that "Hallman was not without basic rights because he was a parolee," id. at 291, and suppressed evidence seized as a result of an unlawful search. But the evidence in Hallman was sought to be used in Hallman's trial on the substantive offense of bank robbery, and not in connection with a revocation of Hallman's parole. Hallman is thus readily distinguishable from the instant case
In Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 92 S. Ct. 1891, 32 L. Ed. 2d 358 (1971), the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a state statute that required a defendant desiring to testify in a criminal proceeding to do so before any other testimony for the defense was heard. Id. at 606, 92 S. Ct. at 1892. Brooks is distinguishable from the instant case because in Brooks the defendant was required to choose whether to stand on his right against self-incrimination at the risk that his failure to testify would be damaging on the issue of guilt. In my view, the risk of conviction and consequent punishment to a defendant presumed innocent until proven guilty is more coercive than the risk of added punishment to a probationer, such as Mollica, who already has been convicted
Commentators have suggested that a court of appeals' supervisory power may be justified either as an inherent power, Hill, The Bill of Rights and the Supervisory Power, 69 Colum. L. Rev. 191, 195 (1969), or as a power impliedly delegated by Congress' enactment of the Court of Appeals Act. Schwartz, The Exercise of the Supervisory Power by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, 27 Vill.L.Rev. 506, 514-25 (1981-82). It is unnecessary for me to decide whether either or both of these sources is the basis of the supervisory authority of the courts of appeals, since the Supreme Court has expressly affirmed the legitimacy of this power. Bartone v. United States, 375 U.S. 52, 54, 84 S. Ct. 21, 22, 11 L. Ed. 2d 11 (1963) (per curiam)
An amicus curiae brief filed in the Supreme Court by Dan Johnston, county attorney for Polk County, Iowa, in Illinois v. Gates, --- U.S. ----, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983), contended that the exclusionary rule is accountable for the extremely low number of dismissals of prosecutions because of suppression of evidence, and that a retreat from Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961), will be perceived by the law enforcement community as a signal that the fourth amendment should not be taken seriously. See argument of counsel in Illinois v. Gates, --- U.S. ----, ----, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2323, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983). Mr. Johnston's visceral reaction is informed by law enforcement experience which the members of this court lack
But see Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 57 L. Ed. 2d 667 (1977) (warrant based on knowingly false affidavit should be voided and fruits of search suppressed)
Mollica was charged under 18 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. §§ 5512, 5514, & 903(a) (1) (Purdon 1973). At the time he was charged, the applicable statute of limitations was two years, 42 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. § 5552 (Purdon 1981), but the time during which the state charges were pending would have been excluded from this period (id. § 5554). Pennsylvania has recently amended § 5552 to extend the limitations period for such charges to five years. Act No. 1982-122, S.B. No. 563, 2 Pa.Legisl.Service 1982, 587 (Purdon). We express no view as to whether this amendment is applicable to Mollica. Even before the 1982 amendment, many offenses had five year limitations periods
See generally Note, A Separation of Powers Approach to the Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 427 (1982); Note, The Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 1656 (1963)
Cf. Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980) (requiring judicially created immunity, under certain conditions, to vindicate constitutional right to fair trial); United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1204 (3d Cir. 1978) ("a case might be made that the court has inherent authority to effectuate the defendant's compulsory process right by conferring a judicially fashioned immunity upon a witness whose testimony is essential to an effective defense"), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913, 99 S. Ct. 2014, 60 L. Ed. 2d 386 (1979); United States v. Inmon, 568 F.2d 326, 333 (3d Cir. 1977) (defendant given limited use immunity because he "may not be required, as the cost of litigating what he and his counsel believe to be a valid fifth amendment double jeopardy claim, to waive the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination in a later trial")
See United States v. Hasting --- U.S. ----, ----, 103 S. Ct. 1974, 1978, 76 L. Ed. 2d 96 (1983) (supervisory rule inappropriate when the error to which the rule is addressed is harmless)