Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/2/1385/616110/
Timestamp: 2018-10-22 20:59:40
Document Index: 475476360

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 701', '§ 6701', '§ 706', '§ 12102']

Lyle S. Chandler and Adolphus A. Maddox, on Behalf Ofthemselves and Others Similarly Situated,plaintiffs-appellees, v. the City of Dallas, et al., Defendants,the City of Dallas, Defendant-appellant, 2 F.3d 1385 (5th Cir. 1993) :: Justia
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Lyle S. Chandler and Adolphus A. Maddox, on Behalf Ofthemselves and Others Similarly Situated,plaintiffs-appellees, v. the City of Dallas, et al., Defendants,the City of Dallas, Defendant-appellant, 2 F.3d 1385 (5th Cir. 1993)
US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit - 2 F.3d 1385 (5th Cir. 1993)
Sept. 20, 1993. Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc Denied Nov. 2, 1993
In December 1985, Chandler and Maddox filed suit against the City, alleging that the Program discriminated against them in violation of the Rehabilitation Act3 (the Act), the Fourteenth Amendment, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They also sought to represent a class of persons adversely affected by the Program. The complaint was subsequently amended to include claims under the Revenue Sharing Act4 and the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act.5
The definition of a qualified handicapped individual also includes a personal safety requirement--an otherwise qualified handicapped individual is defined as one who "can perform the essential functions of the position in question without endangering the health and safety of the individual or others."39 " [U]nder section 504, an individual is not qualified for a job if there is a genuine substantial risk that he or she could be injured or could injure others, and the employer cannot modify the job to eliminate that risk."40
The district court awarded the plaintiffs equitable relief and compensatory damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of their Constitutional rights. The plaintiffs argue that their First Amendment rights were violated by the City's taking retaliatory action against them for opposing the application of the Program. They also argue that they were denied equal protection and due process because the City did not have a rational basis for discriminating against them and because Chandler was not given adequate opportunity to be heard in relation to his demotion.
As the plaintiffs have failed to establish any actionable violation of their constitutional rights, they are not entitle to relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The plaintiffs failed to establish that they were both handicapped and otherwise qualified, either with or without reasonable accommodation by the City, for Primary Driver positions. Consequently, their claims under the Rehabilitation Act must fail. Further, class certification and relief are inappropriate in the instant case, given the strong preference for individualized determinations under the Act. As the plaintiffs' claims fail to meet the standards of the Act, so to do they fail to meet the more stringent standards of the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act. Finally, the plaintiffs failed to establish any Constitutional violations that would permit recovery under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796
31 U.S.C. § 6701 et seq
Chandler v. City of Dallas, 958 F.2d 85, 90-91 (5th Cir. 1992)
29 U.S.C.S. Sec. 706(8) (B) (1990)
School Board of Nassau Co. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 280, 107 S. Ct. 1123, 1127, 94 L. Ed. 2d 307 (1987)
45 C.F.R. Sec. 84.3(j) (2) (i) (1992)
45 C.F.R. Sec. 84.3(j) (2) (ii) (1992)
45 C.F.R. Sec. 84.3(j) (2) (iv) (1992)
See 29 U.S.C.S. Sec. 706(8) (B) (i) (1990)
Compare Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 706(8) (B) (defining an "individual with handicaps" (now an "individual with a disability") as a person "who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment") with Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (defining the term disability, with respect to an individual, as "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment")
See infra Part II(A) (2)
See 29 U.S.C.S. Sec. 706(8) (B) (iii) (1990)
794 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1986)
755 F.2d 1244, 1249-50 (6th Cir. 1985)
Id. at 1249; see also Welsh v. City of Tulsa, 977 F.2d 1415, 1419 (10th Cir. 1992) (applying these factors in affirming summary judgment against plaintiff on grounds that he failed to establish that he was regarded as handicapped)
755 F.2d at 1249 n. 3. Such a "narrow range of jobs" need not be numerically insignificant. See, Daley v. Koch, 892 F.2d 212, 215 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that a perceived impairment that prevented the plaintiff from successfully applying for a position as a police officer for the City of New York did not constitute a substantial limitation of a major life activity). This court takes judicial notice that New York City employs over 27,000 police officers, considerably more positions than are at issue in the instant suit
863 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1988) (unpublished opinion), aff'd 659 F. Supp. 1328 (S.D. Tex. 1987)
659 F. Supp. at 1343
863 F.2d 881, slip op. at 2; see also de la Torres v. Bolger, 610 F. Supp. 593, 596-97 (N.D. Tex. 1985), aff'd, 781 F.2d 1134 (5th Cir. 1986) ("An impairment that interferes with an individual's ability to do a particular job, but does not significantly decrease that individual's ability to obtain satisfactory employment otherwise is not 'substantially limiting' for purposes of the Rehabilitation Act.")
Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 406, 99 S. Ct. 2361, 2367, 60 L. Ed. 2d 980 (1979)
Id. at 407 n. 7, 99 S. Ct. at 2367 n. 7
Id. at 406, 99 S. Ct. at 2367 (emphasis added)
Serrapica v. City of New York, 708 F. Supp. 64, 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
Davis v. Meese, 692 F. Supp. 505, 521 (E.D. Pa. 1988), aff'd, 865 F.2d 592 (3d Cir. 1989)
We nonetheless share the hope of the court in Davis that medical science will soon progress to the point that "exclusions on a case by case basis will be the only permissible procedure; or, hopefully, methods of control may become so exact that insulin-dependent diabetics will present no risk of ever having a severe hypoglycemic episode." 692 F. Supp. at 520. But, as Chandler's two severe hypoglycemic reactions while employed by the City amply demonstrate, it has not yet reached that point
Arline, 480 U.S. at 287 n. 16, 107 S. Ct. at 1131 n. 16
Cf. Wood v. Omaha School Dist., 985 F.2d 437, 438-39 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that Type II (non -insulin dependent) diabetic plaintiffs raised a genuine issue of material fact by presenting evidence regarding how they could readily monitor their blood sugar levels and maintain them at proper levels during work so as to reduce or eliminate the risk of a hypoglycemic reaction while driving)
Chiari, 920 F.2d at 315; Wood v. Omaha School Dist., 985 F.2d 437, 439 (8th Cir. 1993)
Elstner v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 659 F. Supp. 1328, 1342 (S.D. Tex. 1987), aff'd, 863 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1988) (internal quotation omitted); see also Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 933 (4th Cir. 1986) ("The inquiry is, of necessity, an individualized one--whether the particular impairment constitutes for the particular person a significant barrier to employment.")
Arline, 480 U.S. at 287, 107 S. Ct. at 1130 (emphasis added)
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (2)
Flannery v. Carroll, 676 F.2d 126, 129 (5th Cir. 1982)
See Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 192 & n. 10, 104 S. Ct. 3012, 3018 & n. 10, 82 L. Ed. 2d 139 (1984); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 94 S. Ct. 1633, 40 L. Ed. 2d 15 (1974)