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Document Index: 273423735

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 612', '§ 1412', '§ 612', '§ 1412', '§ 612', '§ 1412', '§ 612', '§ 1412', '§ 612', '§ 1412', '§ 612', '§ 1412', '§ 1401', '§ 1415', '§ 1415', '§ 1415', '§ 1291', '§ 1412', '§ 1412', '§ 56101', '§ 56101', '§ 1412']

14 F. 3d 1398, 4 A. D. D. 75, 89 Ed. Law Rep. 57
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14 F.3d 1398, 4 A.D.D. 75, 89 Ed. Law Rep. 57
SACRAMENTO CITY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, BOARD OF EDUCATION, Plaintiff-Appellant,
RACHEL H., By and Through her guardian ad litem, Robert HOLLAND; William Honig, California State Superintendent of Public Instruction; California State Department of Education Hearing Office, McGeorge School of Law; and Mary Cote, Hearing Officer, Defendants-Appellees.
Parents of moderately mentally retarded nine-year-old daughter appealed decision of school district to educate child half-time in special education class with other handicapped children, and half-time in regular classroom. Hearing officer ruled in favor of parents, and ordered that district place child full-time in regular classroom with certain support services. District appealed. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, David F. Levi, J., 786 F.Supp. 874, upheld hearing officer's ruling. District appealed. The Court of Appeals, Sneed, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) District Court applied proper test in determining appropriate placement, and (2) record supported District Court's ruling.
[1] Schools 345 155.5(2.1)
345k155.5(2.1) k. In General. Most Cited Cases
Appropriateness of special education placement under IDEA is reviewed de novo; clearly erroneous standard applies to district court's factual determinations regarding whether child was receiving academic and nonacademic benefits in regular classroom, whether her presence was detriment to others in classroom, and whether school district demonstrated that cost of placing her in regular classroom would be significantly more expensive. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, § 612(5)(B), as amended, 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(5)(B).
School district's appeal from district court's determination that appropriate placement for moderately mentally retarded child was full-time in regular classroom was not moot, even though it had been over one year since district court rendered its decision; conduct giving rise to suit was capable of repetition, yet evading review, as district and parents had conflicting educational philosophies and perceptions of district's mainstreaming obligation. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, § 612(5)(B), as amended, 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(5)(B).
[3] Schools 345 148(2.1)
345k148(2.1) k. In General. Most Cited Cases
IDEA sets forth Congress' preference for educating children with disabilities in regular classrooms with their peers. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, § 612(5)(B), as amended, 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(5)(B).
[4] Schools 345 148(3)
345k148(3) k. Mental or Emotional Handicap; Learning Disabilities. Most Cited Cases
Schools 345 155.5(4)
345k155.5(4) k. Evidence. Most Cited Cases
School district, which was challenging agency's decision as to appropriate placement for moderately mentally retarded student under IDEA, had burden of demonstrating in district court that its proposed placement provided mainstreaming to “maximum extent appropriate.” Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, § 612(5)(B), as amended, 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(5)(B).
[5] Schools 345 148(2.1)
In determining whether school district's proposed placement of handicapped child under IDEA provided mainstreaming to “maximum extent appropriate,” court considers educational benefits of placement full-time in regular class, nonacademic benefits of such placement, effect student had on teacher and children in regular class, and costs of mainstreaming student. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, § 612(5)(B), as amended, 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(5)(B).
[6] Schools 345 148(3)
Under IDEA, appropriate placement for moderately mentally retarded nine-year-old student was in regular second grade classroom, with some supplemental services, as full-time member of that class; although school district claimed that it would lose up to $190,764 in state special education funding if student were not enrolled in special education class at least 51% of day, district did not seek statutory waiver, and district's proposal that child be taught by special education teacher ran directly counter to congressional preference that children with disabilities be educated in regular classes with children who are not disabled. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, § 612(5)(B), as amended, 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(5)(B).
*1399 Jane E. Slenkovich, Phoebe G. Graubard, Saratoga, CA, for plaintiff-appellant.
The Sacramento Unified School District (“the District”) timely appeals the district court's judgment in favor of Rachel Holland (“Rachel”) and the California State Department of Education. The court found that the appropriate placement for Rachel under the Individuals with Disabilities Act (“IDEA”) was full-time in a regular second grade classroom with some supplemental services. The District contends that the appropriate placement for Rachel is half-time in special education*1400 classes and half-time in a regular class. We affirm the judgment of the district court.
FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS FN1
FN1. The district court's opinion is reported in Board of Educ. v. Holland, 786 F.Supp. 874 (E.D.Cal.1992).
The Hollands and the District were able to agree on an Individualized Education Program (“IEP”) FN2 for Rachel. Although the IEP is required to be reviewed annually, see 20 U.S.C. § 1401a(20)(B), because of the dispute between the parties, Rachel's IEP has not been reviewed since January 1990.FN3
FN2. An IEP is prepared for each child eligible for special education at a meeting between a representative from the school district, the child's teacher, and the child's parents. Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 182, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 3038, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982). The purpose of the IEP is to tailor the child's education to her individual needs. Id. at 181, 102 S.Ct. at 3037.
FN3. The 1990 IEP objectives include: speaking in 4- or 5-word sentences; repeating instructions of complex tasks; initiating and terminating conversations; stating her name, address and phone number; participating in a safety program with classmates; developing a 24-word sight vocabulary; counting to 25; printing her first and last names and the alphabet; playing cooperatively; participating in lunch without supervision; and identifying upper and lower case letters and the sounds associated with them.
The Hollands appealed the District's placement decision to a state hearing officer pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(2). They maintained that Rachel best learned social and academic skills in a regular classroom and would not benefit from being in a special education class. The District contended Rachel was too severely disabled to benefit from full-time placement in a regular class. The hearing officer concluded that the District had failed to make an adequate effort to educate Rachel in a regular class pursuant to the IDEA. The officer found that (1) Rachel had benefitted from her regular kindergarten class-that she was motivated to learn and learned by imitation and modeling; (2) Rachel was not disruptive in a regular classroom; and (3) the District had overstated the cost of putting Rachel in regular education-that the cost would not be so great that it weighed against placing her in a regular classroom. The hearing officer ordered the District to place Rachel in a regular classroom with support services, including a special education consultant and a part-time aide.
The District appealed this determination to the district court. Pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2), the parties presented additional evidence at an evidentiary hearing. The court affirmed the decision of the hearing officer that Rachel should be placed full-time in a regular classroom.
In considering whether the District proposed an appropriate placement for Rachel, the district court examined the following factors: (1) the educational benefits available to Rachel in a regular classroom, supplemented with appropriate aids and services, as compared with the educational benefits of a special education classroom; (2) the non-academic benefits of interaction with children who were not disabled; (3) the effect of Rachel's presence on the teacher and other children in the classroom; and (4) the cost of *1401 mainstreaming Rachel in a regular classroom.
The district court found the first factor, educational benefits to Rachel, weighed in favor of placing her in a regular classroom. Each side presented expert testimony which is summarized in the margin.FN4 The court noted that the District's evidence focused on Rachel's limitations but did not establish that the educational opportunities available through special education were better or equal to those available in a regular classroom. Moreover, the court found that the testimony of the Hollands' experts was more credible because they had more background in evaluating children with disabilities placed in regular classrooms and that they had a greater opportunity to observe Rachel over an extended period of time in normal circumstances. The district court also gave great weight to the testimony of Rachel's current teacher, Nina Crone, whom the court found to be an experienced, skillful teacher. Ms. Crone stated that Rachel was a full member of the class and participated in all activities. Ms. Crone testified that Rachel was making progress on her IEP goals: She was learning one-to-one correspondence in counting, was able to recite the English and Hebrew alphabets, and was improving her communication abilities and sentence lengths.
FN4. The Hollands' experts testified Rachel had made significant strides at the Shalom School and suggested that her motivation stemmed from her regular classroom placement. They stated Rachel was learning language and other skills from modeling the behavior of the other students. The District's experts from the state Diagnostic Center, testified that Rachel had made little progress toward her IEP goals and derived little benefit from regular class placement. They also suggested supplementary aids would be ineffective.
Finally, the district court found that the District had not offered any persuasive or credible evidence to support its claim that educating Rachel in a regular classroom with *1402 appropriate services would be significantly more expensive than educating her in the District's proposed setting.
The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
[1] The appropriateness of a special education placement under the IDEA is reviewed de novo. W.G. v. Board of Trustees, 960 F.2d 1479, 1483 (9th Cir.1992); Gregory K. v. Longview Sch. Dist., 811 F.2d 1307, 1314 (9th Cir.1987). The district court's findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. Ash v. Lake Oswego Sch. Dist., 980 F.2d 585, 588 (9th Cir.1992); W.G. v. Board, 960 F.2d at 1483. The clearly erroneous standard applies to the district court's factual determinations regarding (1) whether Rachel was receiving academic and non-academic benefits in the regular classroom; (2) whether her presence was a detriment to others in the classroom; and (3) whether the District demonstrated that the cost of placing her in a regular classroom would be significantly more expensive. See Ash, 980 F.2d at 588 (district court's factual determination that student was incapable of deriving educational benefit outside of residential placement is reviewed for clear error); see also Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1048 (5th Cir.1989) (whether education in the regular classroom, with supplemental aids and services, can be achieved satisfactorily is an “individualized, fact specific inquiry”).
[2] It has been over a year since the district court rendered its decision. The court concluded that the appropriate placement at that time was full-time in a regular classroom. It noted that Rachel and the educational demands on her may change and that the IDEA had foreseen such changes in providing for an annual IEP review.
*1403 This court cannot determine what would be the appropriate placement for Rachel at the present time. However, we conclude that this case presents a live controversy, because the conduct giving rise to the suit “is capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 318, 108 S.Ct. 592, 601, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988); Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1040. As the district court noted, the District and the Hollands have conflicting educational philosophies and perceptions of the District's mainstreaming obligation. The District has consistently taken the view that a child with Rachel's I.Q. is too severely disabled to benefit from full-time placement in a regular class, while the Hollands maintain that Rachel learns both social and academic skills in a regular class and would not benefit from being in a special education class. This conflict is a continuing one and will arise frequently. See Holland, 786 F.Supp. at 877 n. 4. Moreover, it is likely to evade review since the nine-month school year will not provide enough time for judicial review. See Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 186-87 n. 9, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 3040-41 n. 9, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982); Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1041.
[3] This provision sets forth Congress's preference for educating children with disabilities in regular classrooms with their peers. Department of Educ. v. Katherine D., 727 F.2d 809, 817 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1117, 105 S.Ct. 2360, 86 L.Ed.2d 260 (1985); see also Oberti v. Board of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1213 (3d Cir.1993) (as corrected, June 23, 1993); Greer v. Rome City Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 688, 695 (11th Cir.1991), withdrawn, 956 F.2d 1025 (1992), and reinstated, 967 F.2d 470 (1992); Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1044.
[4] There is a conflict regarding which party bears the burden of proof. The Third Circuit has held that a school district has the initial burden of justifying its educational placement at the administrative level and the burden in the district court if the student is challenging the agency decision. See Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1219. Other circuits have held that the burden of proof in the district court rests with the party challenging the agency decision. See Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d 983, 991 (1st Cir.1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 912, 111 S.Ct. 1122, 113 L.Ed.2d 230 (1991); Kerkam v. McKenzie, 862 F.2d 884, 887 (D.C.Cir.1988). Under either approach, in this case the District, which was challenging the agency decision, had the burden of demonstrating in the district court that its proposed placement provided mainstreaming to “the maximum extent appropriate.”
We have not adopted or devised a standard for determining the presence of compliance with 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B). The Third, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits use what is known as the Daniel R.R. test. Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1215; Greer, 950 F.2d at 696; Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1048.FN5 The Fourth, Sixth and Eighth Circuits apply the Roncker test. *1404 Devries v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 882 F.2d 876, 879 (4th Cir.1989); A.W. v. Northwest R-1 Sch. Dist., 813 F.2d 158, 163 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 847, 108 S.Ct. 144, 98 L.Ed.2d 100 (1987); Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864, 104 S.Ct. 196, 78 L.Ed.2d 171 (1983).FN6
FN5. First, the court must determine “whether education in the regular classroom, with the use of supplemental aids and services, can be achieved satisfactorily....” Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1048. If the court finds that education cannot be achieved satisfactorily in the regular classroom, then it must decide “whether the school has mainstreamed the child to the maximum extent appropriate.” Id.
Factors the courts consider in applying the first prong of this test are (1) the steps the school district has taken to accommodate the child in a regular classroom; (2) whether the child will receive an educational benefit from regular education; (3) the child's overall educational experience in regular education; and (4) the effect the disabled child's presence has on the regular classroom. Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1048-49; see also Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1215-1217; Greer, 950 F.2d at 696-97. In Greer the court added the factor of cost, stating that “if the cost of educating a handicapped child in a regular classroom is so great that it would significantly impact upon the education of other children in the district, then education in a regular classroom is not appropriate.” 950 F.2d at 697.
FN6. According to the court in Roncker: “[W]here the segregated facility is considered superior, the court should determine whether the services which make that placement superior could be feasibly provided in a non-segregated setting. If they can, the placement in the segregated school would be inappropriate under the Act.” 700 F.2d at 1063.
[5] Although the district court relied principally on Daniel R.R. and Greer, it did not specifically adopt the Daniel R.R. test over the Roncker test. Rather, it employed factors found in both lines of cases in its analysis. The result was a four-factor balancing test in which the court considered (1) the educational benefits of placement full-time in a regular class; (2) the non-academic benefits of such placement; (3) the effect Rachel had on the teacher and children in the regular class; and (4) the costs of mainstreaming Rachel. This analysis directly addresses the issue of the appropriate placement for a child with disabilities under the requirements of 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B). Accordingly, we approve and adopt the test employed by the district court.
[6] The District strenuously disagrees with the district court's findings that Rachel was receiving academic and non-academic benefits in a regular class and did not have a detrimental effect on the teacher or other students. It argues that the court's findings were contrary to the evidence of the state Diagnostic Center and that the court should not have been persuaded by the testimony of Rachel's teacher, particularly her testimony that Rachel would need only a part-time aide in the future. The district court, however, conducted a full evidentiary hearing and made a thorough analysis. The court found the Hollands' evidence to be more persuasive. Moreover, the court asked Rachel's teacher extensive questions regarding Rachel's need for a part-time aide. We will not disturb the findings of the district court.
The District is also not persuasive on the issue of cost. The District now claims that it will lose up to $190,764 in state special education funding if Rachel is not enrolled in a special education class at least 51% of the day. However, the District has not sought a waiver pursuant to California Education Code § 56101. This section provides that (1) any school district may request a waiver of any provision of the Education Code if the waiver is necessary or beneficial to the student's IEP, and (2) the Board may grant the waiver when failure to do so would hinder compliance with federal mandates for a free appropriate education for children with disabilities. Cal.Educ.Code § 56101(a) & (b) (Deering 1992).
Finally, the District, citing Wilson v. Marana Unified Sch. Dist., 735 F.2d 1178 (9th Cir.1984), argues that Rachel must receive her academic and functional curriculum in special education from a specially credentialed teacher. Wilson does not stand for this proposition. Rather, the court in Wilson stated:
*1405 The school district argues that under state law a child who qualifies for special education must be taught by a teacher who is certificated in that child's particular area of disability. We do not agree and do not reach a decision on that broad assertion. We hold only, under our standard of review, that the school district's decision was a reasonable one under the circumstances of this case.
735 F.2d at 1180 (emphasis in original). More importantly, the District's proposition that Rachel must be taught by a special education teacher runs directly counter to the congressional preference that children with disabilities be educated in regular classes with children who are not disabled. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B).
C.A.9 (Cal.),1994.
Sacramento City Unified School Dist., Bd. of Educ. v. Rachel H. By and Through Holland