Source: http://inforrm.wordpress.com/2013/01/26/case-law-court-of-human-rights-ashby-donald-v-france-copyright-versus-freedom-expression-dirk-voorhoof-and-inger-hoedt-rasmussen/
Timestamp: 2013-06-18 21:37:54+00:00
Document Index: 242038212

Matched Legal Cases: ['art. 5', '§ 2', '§ 61', '§ 72', '§ 43', '§ 45', 'art 2']

Case Law, Court of Human Rights, Ashby Donald v France, Copyright versus Freedom Expression – Dirk Voorhoof and Inger Høedt-Rasmussen | Inforrm's Blog
In the case of Ashby Donald and others v France (Judgment of 10 January 2013) the Court of Human Rights has, for the first time in a judgment on the merits, clarified that a conviction based on copyright law for illegally reproducing or publicly communicating copyright protected material can be regarded as an interference with the right of freedom of expression and information under Article 10 of the European Convention. Such interference must be in accordance with the three conditions enshrined in the second paragraph of Article 10 of the Convention. This means that a conviction or any other judicial decision based on copyright law, restricting a person’s or an organisation’s freedom of expression, must be pertinently motivated as being necessary in a democratic society, apart from being prescribed by law and pursuing a legitimate aim. It is, in other words, no longer sufficient to justify a sanction or any other judicial order restricting one’s artistic or journalistic freedom of expression on the basis that a copyright law provision has been infringed. Neither is it sufficient to consider that the unauthorised use, reproduction or public communication of a work cannot rely on one of the narrowly interpreted exceptions in the copyright law itself, including the application of the so-called three-step test (art. 5.5 EU Directive 2001/29 of 22 May 2001).
The judgment of 10 January 2013 in the case of Ashby Donald unambiguously declares Article 10 of the Convention to be applicable in copyright cases interfering with the right of freedom of expression and information of others, adding an external human rights perspective to the justification of copyright enforcement. Due to the important wide margin of appreciation available to the national authorities in this particular case, the impact of Article 10 however is very modest and minimal.
In this case, the applicants were Robert Ashby Donald, Marcio Madeira Moraes and Olivier Claisse, respectively an American, a Brazilian and a French national living in New-York, Paris and Le Perreux-sur-Marne. All three are fashion photographers. The case concerned their conviction in France for copyright infringement following the publication of pictures on the Internet site Viewfinder of a fashion company run by Mr. Donald and Mr. Moraes. The photos were taken by Mr. Claisse at fashion shows in Paris in 2003 and published without the permission of the fashion houses. The three fashion photographers were ordered by the Court of Appeal of Paris to pay fines between €3.000 and €8.000 and an award of damages to the French design clothing Federation and five fashion houses, all together amounting to €255.000. Donald, Moraes and Claisse were also ordered to pay for the publication of the judgment of the Paris Court of Appeal in three professional newspapers or magazines.
In its judgment of 5 February 2008 the Supreme Court (Court de Cassation) dismissed the applicants’ argumentation based on Article 10 of the Convention and on Article 122-9° of the French Copyright Act (Code de la Propriété Intellectuele). The Supreme Court was of the opinion that the Court of Appeal had sufficiently justified its decision. Accordingly, the applicants could not rely on an exception in French copyright law, allowing the reproduction, representation or public communication of works exclusively for news reporting and information purposes.
In Strasbourg the applicants complained in particular of a breach of their rights under Article 10 (freedom of expression and information) of the European Convention. The European Court declared the application admissible and not manifestly ill-founded ([25]), but concluded on the merits of the case that the conviction of the applicants because of breach of the French Copyright Act did not amount to a violation of Article 10 of the Convention by the French authorities. The Court was indeed of the opinion that the conviction for breach of copyright and the award of damages was to be considered as an interference with their rights protected by Article 10 of the Convention. However, this interference was prescribed by law, pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the rights of others and was to be considered necessary in a democratic society.
The Court explicitly recognises the applicability of Article 10 in this case :
“La Cour rappelle que l’article 10 de la Convention a vocation à s’appliquer à la communication au moyen de l’Internet (..), quel que soit le type de message qu’il s’agit de véhiculer (..), et même lorsque l’objectif poursuivi est de nature lucrative (..). Elle rappelle aussi que la liberté d’expression comprend la publication de photographies (..). Elle en déduit que la publication des photographies litigieuses sur un site Internet dédié à la mode et proposant au public des images de défilés à la consultation libre ou payante et à la vente relève de l’exercice du droit à la liberté d’expression, et que la condamnation des requérants pour ces faits s’analyse en une ingérence dans celui-ci” ([34]).
The Court hereby confirms its approach that while freedom of expression is subject to exceptions, these exceptions must be construed strictly, and the need for any restrictions must be established convincingly :
“La liberté d’expression (..) telle que la consacre l’article 10, (..) est assortie d’exceptions qui appellent toutefois une interprétation étroite, et le besoin de la restreindre doit se trouver établi de manière convaincante” [38].
The Court is of the opinion that in this case a wide margin of appreciation is to be given to the domestic authorities, as the publication of the pictures of models at a fashion show and the fashion clothing shown on the catwalk in Paris was not related to an issue of general interest for society and concerned rather a kind of “commercial speech”. As the Court points out:
“En l’espèce, les photographies litigieuses ont été publiées sur un site Internet appartenant à une société gérée par les deux premiers requérants, dans le but notamment de les vendre ou d’y donner accès contre rémunération. La démarche des requérants était donc avant tout commerciale. De plus, si l’on ne peut nier l’attrait du public pour la mode en général et les défilés de haute couture en particulier, on ne saurait dire que les requérants ont pris part à un débat d’intérêt général alors qu’ils se sont bornés à rendre des photographies de défilés de mode accessibles au public” [39].
The member states are furthermore in a position to balance conflicting rights and interests, such as the right of freedom of expression under Article 10 of the Convention with the right of property as protected by Article 1 of the First Protocol to the Convention. The Court, referring to its 2007 Grand Chamber judgment in Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal, reiterates that
“l’ingérence dans le droit à la liberté d’expression des requérants visait à la protection des droits d’auteur des créateurs de mode. Dès lors que l’article 1 du Protocole No. 1 s’applique à la propriété intellectuelle (..), elle visait ainsi à la protection de droits garantis par la Convention ou ses Protocoles” ([40]).
Two crucial elements in this case justify that the national authorities enjoy a particularly wide margin of appreciation. The European Court refers to “une marge d’appréciation particulièrement importante” ([41]). These elements are the “commercial speech”-character of the publication of the pictures on the website and the balancing exercise the Court needs to undertake regarding the conflicting rights guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention and the right of property as protected by Article 1 of the First Protocol to the Convention.
The European Court consequently refers to the Paris Court of Appeal’s finding that the applicants had reproduced and represented the pictures without authorisation by the copyright holders, hence infringing the rights of intellectual property of others. The European Court refers to the reasoning by the Paris Court
“que les requérants avaient, en connaissance de cause, diffusé les photographies litigeuses sans l’autorisation des titulaires des droits d’auteurs, qu’ils ne pouvaient se dégager de leur responsabilité en se prévalant du fait que le système de l’engagement de presse était inadapté ou mal respecté, et qu’ils s’étaient donc rendus coupables du délit de contrefaçon. Elle ne voit pas de raison de considérer que le juge interne a excédé sa marge d’appréciation en faisant par ces motifs prévaloir le droit au respect des biens des créateurs de mode sur le droit à la liberté d’expression des requérants” ([42]).
Finally the European Court does not consider the fines and the substantial award of damages as disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, arguing that the applicants gave no evidence that these sanctions had “financially strangled” them : “La Cour observe toutefois avec le Gouvernement que, si les requérants affirment avoir été « étranglés financièrement », ils ne produisent aucun élément relatif aux conséquences de ces condamnations sur leur situation financière ». The Court accepts the reasoning of the domestic courts and their calculation of the damages, with respect for the guarantees of a fair trial not being under dispute in this matter. The Court “relève en outre que le juge interne a fixé ces montants à l’issue d’une procédure contradictoire dont l’équité n’est pas en cause et a dûment motivé sa décision, précisant en particulier les circonstances qui, selon son appréciation, les justifiaient”([43]).
In these circumstances and taking into account the particular importantmargin of appreciation of the national authorities, the Court concludes unanimously that there is no violation of Article 10 of the Convention.
1. Emerging internet cases.
First of all, the judgment illustrates that cases of (alleged) breaches of fundamental rights and freedoms, enshrined in the European Convention and its Protocols, situated in the digital, online world have started to find their way to the European Court of Human Rights. During the past few years and months the European Court has delivered several judgments in “internet”-cases related to freedom of expression and information, such as in Times Newspapers Ltd. v. United Kingdom (ECtHR 10 March 2009),Editorial Board of Pravoye Delo and Shtekel v. Ukraine (5 May 2011) and in its Grand Chamber judgment in Mouvement Raëlien Suisse v. Switzerland (13 July 2012).
2. Money or message driven?
This approach was also recently confirmed in Mouvement Raëlien Suisse v. Switzerland, in which the Court stated :
“Whilst there is little scope under Article 10 § 2 of the Convention for restrictions on political speech(..), a wider margin of appreciation is generally available to the Contracting States when regulating freedom of expression in relation to matters liable to offend intimate personal convictions within the sphere of morals or, especially, religion (..). Similarly, States have a broad margin of appreciation in the regulation of speech in commercial matters or advertising” (§ 61, also referring to ECtHR 20 November 1989, Markt intern Verlag GmbH and Klaus Beermann v. Germany and ECtHR 24 February 1994, Casado Coca v. Spain).
If the publication or the public communication of the litigious pictures had contributed to such a debate of general interest, and if the publication of the pictures had been justified in this context (ECtHR 18 January 2011,MGN Limited v. United Kingdom and ECtHR (Grand Chamber) 7 February 2012, Von Hannover nr. 2 v. Germany), a more strict scrutiny by the European Court from the perspective of Article 10 would have been necessary, and at the same time reducing the margin of appreciation available to the national authorities.
3. Copyright law enforcement must be in accordance with Article 10 of the Convention
Another reason why the European Court accepts a wide margin of appreciation in Ashby Donald and other v. France is because it has to balance two conflicting fundamental rights enshrined in the Convention and its Protocols. In such a context the Court is required to verify whether the domestic authorities struck a fair balance when protecting two values guaranteed by the Convention and its Protocols. In this case the Court had to balance on the one hand, freedom of expression protected by Article 10 and, on the other, the right to property enshrined in Article 1 of the First Protocol. Especially since its Grand Chamber judgment inAnheuser-Busch Incl. v. Portugal in a trademark dispute, there can be no doubt that “Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is applicable to intellectual property as such” (ECtHR (Grand Chamber) 11 January 2007, § 72). Indeed, inMelnychuk v. Ukraine, which concerned an alleged violation of the applicant’s copyright, the Court had earlier decided that Article 1 of the First Protocol was applicable to intellectual property (ECtHR (decision) 7 July 2005, Melnychuk v. Ukraine).
The European Court of Justice in some recent judgments has also confirmed this approach when it had to balance the enforcement of copyright on the internet with other rights. The EU Court of Justice inScarlet v. Sabam (24 November 2011) has reiterated that “the protection of the right to intellectual property is indeed enshrined in Article 17(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’). There is, however, nothing whatsoever in the wording of that provision or in the Court’s case-law to suggest that that right is inviolable and must for that reason be absolutely protected” (§ 43).
According to the CJEU “the protection of the fundamental right to property, which includes the rights linked to intellectual property, must be balanced against the protection of other fundamental rights”, including the right of freedom of expression and information guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention (CJEU 24 November 2011, C-70/10, Scarlet Extended NV v. Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten en Uitgevers CVBA (SABAM); CJEU 16 February 2012, C‑360/10, Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten en Uitgevers CVBA (SABAM) v. Netlog NV. See also CJEU (GC) 16 December 2008, C-73/07,Tietosuojavaltuutettu / Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy, Satamedia Oy).
The CJEU clarified that “in the context of measures adopted to protect copyright holders, national authorities and courts must strike a fair balance between the protection of copyright and the protection of the fundamental rights of individuals who are affected by such measures” (CJEU 24 November 2011, C-70/10, § 45). From this perspective, theCJEU considered that an injunction to install an internet filtering system as a measure of enforcement of copyright “could potentially undermine freedom of information”, since that system might not distinguish adequately between unlawful content and lawful content, with the result that its introduction could lead to the blocking of lawful communications (compare with ECtHR 18 December 2012, Ahmet Yildirim v. Turkey).
The deferential approach by the European Court, due to the appropriate way the French courts have handled the case and especially due to the fact that it ‘only’ concerned an interference in the context of “commercial speech” does not exclude at all that in other cases the European Court may scrutinize in a more strict way the balancing of a conflict between the right of freedom of expression and copyright. That will especially be the case in matters that concern prior restraint, such as the blocking of internet sites, artistic freedom of expression, political speech, use of official documents, reproduction and public communication of works for educational or scientific purposes or NGOs participating in debate on matters of public concern such as health and environmental issues. Similarly, in cases where journalists and media are exercising their public watchdog function in a democracy, in cases of parody, caricatures or other forms of transformative use and when sanctions risk to have achilling effect on the freedom of expression and information in a democracy. In such cases interferences with the right of freedom of expression and information, based on copyright law, will indeed need to undergo a more careful balancing test between Article 10 and Article 1 of the First Protocol.
Some national courts, within their margin of appreciation, already have referred to or have applied Article 10 in cases where the enforcement of copyright law otherwise could lead to a violation of the right of freedom of expression and information guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention (see e.g. Cass. Fr. 19 October 2006 Camel/Japan Tobacco v. CNMRT; Rb. Amsterdam, 22 December 2006, Staat der Nederlanden v. Greenpeace and Rb. ‘s-Gravenhage (Summary Proceeding) 4 May 2011,Louis Vuitton v. Nadia Plesner).
S. FEYEN, “Auteursrecht en vrije meningsuiting. Een verhouding uit balans?”,Auteurs & Media 2009, 584-607.
This post originally appeared on the ECHR Blog and is reproduced with permission and thanks
Share this:PrintEmailTwitterFacebookLike this:Like Loading...	« Ireland: I still know what you did last Summer, Mr Cowen – Eoin O’Dell
Was Leveson wrong to reject a statutory right of reply? – Mark Thomson »
Tags: Copyright, Dirk Voorhoof
Law and Media Round Up – 28 January 2013 « Inforrm's Blog (00:08:34) : [...] Case Law, Court of Human Rights, Ashby Donald v France, Copyright versus Freedom Expression – Dirk… [...]
Case Law, Court of Human Rights, Ashby Donald v France ... | Media Law | Scoop.it (20:19:32) : [...] Due to this emerging case law related to internet and other new forms of technology, including rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention, the European Court has recently updated its fact sheet on the European Court's case law on New… [...]
Case Law, Court of Human Rights, The Pirate Bay v. Sweden, Copyright versus Freedom of Expression II – Dirk Voorhoof and Inger Høedt-Rasmussen, | Inforrm's Blog (07:36:10) : [...] Court’s judgment in the case of Ashby Donald and others v. France (ECtHR 10 January 2013, see our Inforrm post here) the Court of has decided a new case of conflicting rights between copyright and freedom of [...]
Top PostsSocial Media: How many people use Twitter and what do we think about it?
Case Law, Australia: Jeffrey v Giles, Low defamation damages for crushed rock operators - Justin Castelan
Law and Media Round Up – 17 June 2013
PRISM: The real concern is that governments may not be breaking any law at all - Matthew Ryder QC and Simon McKay
Case Law, Strasbourg: Ageyevy v Russia, Breach of Article 8, including right to reputation - Hugh Tomlinson QC
News: French President's Partner Awarded Privacy Damages over "Three in a Relationship" Case
Charles Wheeler Lecture: Part 2, Media Plurality - Harriet Harman MP
The growth of the Brown Moses blog: a model for crowd-funded public interest journalism? - Judith Townend
Forthcoming Events	31 May 2013, Rethinking Media and Journalism Practice, University of Winchester.
6-7 June 2013, The 6th Annual Privacy Law Scholars Conference, Berkeley Center for Law & Technology
8 June 2013, ORGCon2013 digital rights conference, Institute of Engineering and Technology, 2 Savoy Place, London WC2R 0BL.
17 June 2013, Our Media - not theirs! Rally for media reform , University of Westminster, 309 Regent Street, London W1 24-25 June 2013, The Constitution of the Public Sphere: the post-Leveson Landscape (W G Hart Legal Workshop 2013), Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, London.
8-9 April 2014, "1984: Freedom and Censorship in the Media – Where Are We Now?", Centre for Research in Media and Cultural Studies at the University of Sunderland