Source: https://masslawyersweekly.com/fulltext-opinions/2007/09/17/battista-v-murphy-et-al/
Timestamp: 2020-08-06 18:51:45
Document Index: 543603629

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 607', '§ 1983', '§ 10', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 20', '§ 129', '§ 135', '§ 7', '§ 167', '§ 100', '§ 1983', '§ 105', '§ 2', '§ 607', '§ 1', '§ 10', '§ 1', '§ 10']

– BATTISTA v. MURPHY, et al. – Full-text Opinions
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– BATTISTA v. MURPHY, et al.
By: admin	in Fulltext Opinion, Massachusetts Superior Court September 17, 2007
CIVIL ACTION NOS. 06-54
SANDY BATTISTA
ROBERT MURPHY, Superintendent[1] & others[2]
The plaintiff, Sandy Battista (Battista), alleges violations of numerous statutes and regulations[3] prohibiting the release of privileged or confidential communications and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Her claim arises from the release of her medical records to a third party.[4] She seeks a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and damages. The defendants all move on separate grounds for summary judgment. Finding that Battista has no evidence that Nancy Connolly and Karen Methot (collectively Connolly and Methot) or that Maryanne Percuoco and Diane McLaughlin (collectively Percuoco and McLaughlin) disclosed her records to the third party and, as a result, she raises no material issues of fact, the court allows the motions for summary judgment as to these defendants. As to the remaining defendants, Battista presents no evidence as to who released the records and the court cannot hold the defendants liable for the Department’s actions.
Battista is involuntarily committed to the Massachusetts Treatment Center (Treatment Center) as a sexually dangerous person. Connolly and Methot are employees of Forensic Health Services, Inc. (Forensic Health), which contracts with the Department of Correction (Department) to treat persons at the Treatment Center. Connolly is a Forensic Health Program Director, and Methot a Forensic Health Records Secretary. Percuoco and McLaughlin are employees of UMass Correctional Health (UMass), which also contracts with the Department to treat persons at the Treatment Center. Percuoco is a UMass Records Secretary and McLaughlin is a UMass Mental Health Adminstrator. Murphy, Martin, and Weiner are employees of the Department. Murphy is the Superintendent of the Treatment Center, Martin is the former Health Services Director, and Weiner is a Health Services Mental Health Regional Administrator.
On July 6, 2005, Battista filed a civil action in Federal District Court related to the Department’s withholding of treatment for Gender Identity Disorder, Battista v. Dennehy, Civil Action No. 05-11456-DPW (D. Mass.). In that action, Battista referenced a report issued by members of the Fenway Community Health Clinic which allegedly diagnosed her as suffering from Gender Identity Disorder. In response to Battista’s application for preliminary relief in the federal action, the defendants in that action[5] submitted to the court a medical peer review report from forensic consultant Cynthia Osborne, M.S.W. (Osborne). In her report, Osborne reviewed and mentioned some of Battista’s medical, mental health, and sexually dangerous persons treatment records. Battista alleges that these records are privileged and confidential, and should not have been disclosed to Osborne without her consent. She asks the court to declare that the actions of the defendants violated state statutes and her state and federal constitutional rights, grant an injunction preventing the further release of her records, and award damages.
Summary judgment shall be granted where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Mass. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Cassesso v. Comm’r of Correction, 390 Mass. 419, 422 (1983). The moving party bears the burden of affirmatively demonstrating the absence of a triable issue, and that the summary judgment record entitles the moving party to judgment as a matter of law. Pederson v. Time, Inc., 404 Mass. 14, 16-17 (1989). The moving party may satisfy this burden either by submitting affirmative evidence that negates an essential element of the opposing party’s case or by demonstrating that the opposing party has no reasonable expectation of proving an essential element of his case at trial. Flesner v. Technical Communications Corp., 410 Mass. 805, 809 (1991); Kourouvacilis v. Gen. Motors Corp., 410 Mass. 706, 716 (1991). The nonmoving party may not defeat the motion for summary judgment by merely resting on the allegations and denials in the pleadings, but must set forth specific facts with affidavits, deposition testimony, answers to interrogatories, or admissions showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Mass. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The court will interpret all inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Blare v. Husky Injection Molding Systems Boston, Inc., 419 Mass. 437, 438 (1995).
“Bare assertions or conclusions” are not enough to withstand a well-pleaded motion for summary judgment. Polaroid Corp. v. Rollins Envtl. Svcs., Inc., 416 Mass. 684, 696 (1993). “‘Conclusory statements, general denials, and factual allegations not based on personal knowledge [are] insufficient to avoid summary judgment.’” Madsen v. Erwin, 395 Mass. 715, 721 (1985), quoting Olympic Junior, Inc. v. David Crystal, Inc., 463 F.2d 1141, 1146 (3d Cir. 1972). A complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving party’s case renders all other facts immaterial. Kourouvacilis, 410 Mass. at 711, citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
I.	Connolly and Methot’s Motion
The burden of proof is on Battista to show that Connolly or Methot violated her rights by allowing the release of her medical records. Connolly and Methot, by way of affidavit, have asserted that they did not provide or give instructions to provide any Treatment Center records concerning Battista to Osborne. Battista may not rest on her pleadings and unsupported assertions of disputed facts; rather, she must allege specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial in response to the well-pleaded motion for summary judgment.
Battista states that Forensic Health has not provided the court with any evidence as to who released her records. The thrust of her complaint and argument is that: (1) her “confidential” records were released; (2) Connolly and Methot had access to her records as employees of Forensic Health[6]; and therefore (3) Connolly and Methot authorized or were involved in their release. Battista misconstrues the burden at the summary judgment stage. She must articulate specific facts to show that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Connolly or Methot violated her constitutional rights and caused her emotional distress. Instead, she makes conclusory statements with no stated evidentiary basis. In response to the affidavits of the defendants who deny involvement, Battista has produced no evidence to show otherwise. Battista has not raised a material issue of fact sufficient to prevent summary judgment because she fails to allege specific facts to support a claim against either Connolly or Methot.
Where Battista has not met her burden, the court need not address Connolly and Methot’s other arguments concerning whether the records are confidential, and if so, whether any document Battista signed waived her right to confidentiality.
II.	Percuoco and McLaughlin’s Motion
Percuoco and McLaughlin move for summary judgment on the same ground as Connolly and Methot, that Battista has failed to present any evidence that they provided Osborne with Battista’s medical records.
Percuoco and McLaughlin have submitted two affidavits from Weiner that were originally filed with the underlying federal litigation.[7] These affidavits establish that the Department was the entity responsible for retaining Osborne. Osborne’s report lists the documents she reviewed, including Battista’s medical records, and states that she undertook the review at the Department’s request. Osborne never mentions or even refers to UMass or any UMass employee. The records are the property of the Department. 103 DOC § 607.05(1).[8] The only reasonable inference that can be drawn from this evidence is that the Department was the entity responsible for releasing the records to Osborne.
Battista has not presented any evidence to dispute this inference; rather, she argues that since UMass employees had access to these records and because “at least one or more persons actually physically removed and photo-copied the . . . records . . .,” it would be “premature to automatically assume that the defendants, as they put it, ‘simply had no role in disseminating the records supplied to Ms. Osborne.’” Percuoco and McLaughlin have presented undisputed evidence that the UMass employees were not responsible for the disclosure of Battista’s medical records. Battista has not submitted any admissible evidence which presents a genuine issue of material fact as to this issue. Her reliance on her allegations and personal beliefs are insufficient as a matter of law.
The court need not address Percuoco and McLaughlin’s other arguments concerning the deficient pleading of her § 1983 claim and a failure to send a presentment letter.
III.	Murphy, Martin, and Weiner’s Motion
The Department employees, Murphy, Martin, and Weiner, move for summary judgment arguing that the disclosure of Battista’s medical records to Osborne was permitted by Department regulation and that, as a result, they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The court need not address this argument. Weiner’s affidavits and Osborne’s report establish that Weiner initially contacted Osborne on behalf of the Department in order to conduct the peer review. However, there is no evidence as to who personally released her records to Osborne. Evidence that Weiner initially contacted Osborne is not evidence that Weiner provided her with Battista’s medical records. The only evidence submitted to the court is that the Department, as an entity, released her medical records. Murphy, Martin, and Weiner cannot be held liable for the alleged invasion of her privacy by the Department by virtue of their positions within the Department. G. L. ch. 258, § 10(c) (public employees are not liable in their official capacities for “any claim arising out of an intentional tort, including . . . invasion of privacy . . . “); Nelson v. Salem State College, 446 Mass. 525, 537 n.9 (2006) (public employees sued for invasion of privacy under G. L. ch. 214, § 1B not liable in their official capacities on basis of governmental immunity).[9] Battista’s conclusory statements essentially alleging that someone within the Department should be held liable for the disclosure of her records to Osborne is not sufficient to survive summary judgment. Murphy, Martin, and Weiner are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The court need not address Murphy, Martin, and Weiner’s other arguments concerning the availability of private causes of action, waiver, and immunity.
The defendants Nancy Connolly and Karen Methot’s motion for summary judgment is ALLOWED as to all claims made, including those made against them personally and in their official capacity. Likewise, the defendants Maryanne Percuoco and Diane McLaughlin’s motion for summary judgment and the defendants Robert Murphy, Susan Martin, and Lawrence Weiner’s motions for summary judgment are ALLOWED as to all claims made, including those made against them personally and in their official capacity.
DATED:	September 13, 2007
[1] Of the Massachusetts Treatment Center
[2] Nancy Connolly, Forensic Health Services Program Director; Karen Methot, Forensic Health Services Records Secretary; Maryanne Percuoco, UMass Correctional Health Program Records Secretary; Diane McLaughlin, UMass Correctional Health Program Mental Health Administrator; Susan J. Martin, Department of Corrections, (former) Health Services Director; and Lawrence M. Weiner, LICSW, Department of Correction Health Services Mental Health Regional Administrator, sued in their individual and official capacities.
[3] She alleges violations of the following statutes: (1) G. L. c. 214, § 1B (right to privacy); (2) G. L. c. 233, § 20B (psychotherapist-patient privilege); (3) G. L. c. 112, § 129A (psychologist-patient privilege); (4) G. L. c. 112, § 135A (social-worker client privilege); (5) G. L. c. 4, § 7(26)(c) (public records law); (6) G. L. c. 66A (fair information practices act); (7) G. L. c. 6, §§ 167 and 172 (criminal offenders records act); (8) G. L. c. 276, § 100C (sealing of criminal records); and (9) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (violation of federal civil rights). Battista alleges violations of the following regulations: (1) 103 C.M.R. §§ 105.09, 157.10, and 157.11; and (2) 803 C.M.R. §§ 2.03 and 2.04.
[4] Though biologically male, Battista alleges that she suffers from Gender Identity Disorder and is referred to as a female in filings with the court, as this is her stated preference.
[5] Kathleen Dennehy, Commissioner of the Department; Murphy, Steven Fairly, Director of Security of the Treatment Center; Martin, Gregory Hughes, LICSW, and UMass Correctional Health Program, sued in their individual and official capacities.
[6] 103 DOC § 607.05(1) provides that “[c]ontractual medical staff and DOC Health Services personnel may have access to the inmate medical record as is needed in the performance of their duties in accordance with established procedures.”
[7] Battista misconstrues the nature of the present motion in arguing that these affidavits should not be considered because they are “outside the pleadings.” The motion is not a motion to dismiss but rather one for summary judgment. Affidavits based on personal knowledge, such as Weiner’s two affidavits, are properly considered on a motion for summary judgment. Mass. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
[8] Battista admits this in her affidavit.
[9] Battista contends that her lawsuit is brought pursuant to G. L. c. 214, § 1B and is therefore not applicable to the mandates of G. L. c. 258, § 10(c). This argument is without merit. See Nelson, 446 Mass. at 536-537 & n.9 (plaintiff’s G. L. c. 214, § 1B claim barred by G. L. c. 258, § 10(c)).
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