Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/06/07JAKARTA1757.html
Timestamp: 2013-05-24 14:24:45
Document Index: 9321727

Matched Legal Cases: ['ARTA1757', 'ARTA1757', 'ARTA1757', 'ARTA 001757', 'ARTA 1656', 'ARTA 00001757']

Viewing cable 07JAKARTA1757, PSI AND LAW OF THE SEA: DISCUSSION WITH HASYIM
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07JAKARTA1757
2007-06-26 09:19
VZCZCXRO5793&#x000A;PP RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM&#x000A;DE RUEHJA #1757/01 1770919&#x000A;ZNY CCCCC ZZH&#x000A;P 260919Z JUN 07&#x000A;FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA&#x000A;TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5222&#x000A;INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY&#x000A;RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0851&#x000A;RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 1295&#x000A;RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 1555&#x000A;RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 4132&#x000A;RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 4083&#x000A;RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0563&#x000A;RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY&#x000A;RHHJJPI/USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 001757 &#x000A; &#x000A;SIPDIS &#x000A; &#x000A;SIPDIS &#x000A; &#x000A;DEPARTMENT FOR L/OES A.ROACH &#x000A;USPACOM FOR J6 P.PEDROZO &#x000A; &#x000A;E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2017 &#x000A;TAGS: PARM MOPS PREL BEXP UNO ID&#x000A;SUBJECT: PSI AND LAW OF THE SEA:  DISCUSSION WITH HASYIM &#x000A;DJALAL &#x000A; &#x000A;REF: JAKARTA 1656 &#x000A; &#x000A;Classified By: CDA John A. Heffern, for reasons 1.4 (b,d). &#x000A; &#x000A;¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  On June 19, Charge discussed the &#x000A;Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) with Ambassador &#x000A;(ret.) Hasyim Djalal, Indonesia's foremost authority on &#x000A;maritime law.  Djalal advises the GOI on martime matters and &#x000A;his views are widely acknowledged to be a major factor in the &#x000A;GOI's reluctance to join PSI.  While Djalal's writings make &#x000A;legal arguments against PSI, citing UNCLOS, his key verbal &#x000A;objection to us centered on the political pressures Indonesia &#x000A;could face as a major shipping country, if it were to join &#x000A;PSI.  If Indonesia allowed another PSI member to board and &#x000A;inspect one of its flag ships, Djalal said, the action would &#x000A;be challenged by nationalists in the press, public fora and &#x000A;Parliament.  If it declined to permit boarding of the suspect &#x000A;vessel, it would be subject to criticism by its PSI partners. &#x000A; The GOI resisted endorsing PSI, Djalal said, largely to &#x000A;avoid facing this dilemma.  Charge also briefed Djalal on the &#x000A;Administration's recent announcement of support for UNCLOS, &#x000A;and on U.S. assistance to build Indonesia's maritime radar &#x000A;capability under Section 1206.  Embassy would welcome &#x000A;additional input in responding to Djalal's concerns about PSI &#x000A;(see para 8).  End summary. &#x000A; &#x000A;¶2. (U) Indonesian officials routinely invoke concerns about &#x000A;the Law of the Sea in explaining Indonesia's reservations &#x000A;about joining the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). &#x000A;Typically they refer to a possible incompatibility of PSI &#x000A;with the UNCLOS (1982 agreement), but seldom cite specific &#x000A;UNCLOS provisions.  This view is fairly uniform across the &#x000A;Department of Foreign Affairs (DEPLU), Department of Defense &#x000A;and Indonesian Navy.  The official Indonesian view of PSI is &#x000A;informed largely by Ambassador (ret.) Dr. Hasyim Djalal, &#x000A;Indonesia's foremost expert on the Law of the Sea (and father &#x000A;of President SBY's foreign policy advisor, Dino Djalal). &#x000A;DEPLU's Secretary General Imron Cotan implicitly cited &#x000A;Djalal's concerns on UNCLOS in a recent discussion of PSI &#x000A;with PM Acting Assistant Secretary Stephen Mull (reftel). &#x000A; &#x000A;PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE &#x000A; &#x000A;¶3. (U) Djalal said Indonesia's main point of concern over &#x000A;PSI's implications for UNCLOS centered on Indonesia's &#x000A;expected role as a PSI member in cases of interdiction: &#x000A; &#x000A;-- Interdiction could be conducted only with the consent of &#x000A;the flag state; in Indonesia's case, approval to board an &#x000A;Indonesian-flagged ship could generate a nationalist backlash &#x000A;from the DPR, while refusal could open the GOI to accusations &#x000A;from the international community of abetting proliferation. &#x000A; &#x000A;In reply, Charge acknowledged that Indonesia faced a set of &#x000A;competing priorities and needed to decide where WMD &#x000A;proliferation stood among these priorities. &#x000A; &#x000A;¶4. (C) Djalal stated President Yudhoyono had recently asked &#x000A;the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense to review the &#x000A;requirements for PSI to see if Indonesia could associate &#x000A;itself with it.  The ministers had recommended Indonesian &#x000A;participation on an "ad hoc, case-by-case" basis, but this &#x000A;approach had been rejected by the legislature's Commission I &#x000A;(responsible for foreign and security affairs).  Djalal said &#x000A;he was unfamiliar with the notion of a "bilateral PSI," &#x000A;something DEPLU has offered to explore with us in the past. &#x000A;Noting that India, China and South Korea had not joined PSI, &#x000A;Djalal suggested their accession might encourage Indonesia to &#x000A;reconsider its position. &#x000A; &#x000A;ADDITIONAL RESERVATIONS &#x000A; &#x000A;¶5. (U) At an international conference on maritime law in &#x000A;Kuala Lumpur in April 2007, Djalal took a different tack.  In &#x000A;that discussion, he maintained PSI "could fundamentally &#x000A;affect the development of the Law of the Sea and maritime &#x000A;issues" and might "negatively affect" freedom of navigation &#x000A;on the high seas.  PSI was an attempt, he opined, to change &#x000A;customary international law by expanding interdiction &#x000A;authority at the expense of coastal state and flag state &#x000A; &#x000A;JAKARTA 00001757  002 OF 002 &#x000A; &#x000A; &#x000A;authority and jurisdiction; any such changes should be &#x000A;effected through "regional arrangements or organizations." &#x000A;Djalal did not cite these more legalistic points in our &#x000A;discussion on June 19, which focused only on the political &#x000A;issue. &#x000A; &#x000A;¶6. In asserting that the application of PSI in Indonesian &#x000A;waters might be inconsistent with UNCLOS, Djalal cited three &#x000A;UNCLOS provisions: &#x000A; &#x000A;o Article 17, which guarantees the right of innocent passage &#x000A;through the territorial sea," &#x000A;o Article 38, which assures all ships and aircraft of &#x000A;unimpeded transit rights, and &#x000A;o Article 52, which grants to ships of all states the right &#x000A;of innocent passage through archipelagic waters. &#x000A; &#x000A;CONTAINER SECURITY INITIATIVE NOT A SUBSTITUTE &#x000A; &#x000A;¶6. (C) Djalal said Indonesia had tried to strike a balance &#x000A;with the Container Security Initiative (CSI), and that an &#x000A;initially skeptical GOI had eventually become persuaded of &#x000A;CSI's merits.  However, the United States had not yet &#x000A;approved Indonesia for CSI.  Charge said CSI, which focused &#x000A;on ports, worked well in friendly countries but was &#x000A;ineffective in stopping direct shipments from one &#x000A;proliferator to another.  Inspections and possible &#x000A;interdiction at sea was the only effective solution to the &#x000A;matter.  A proliferator would remain outside the scope of CSI &#x000A;and, most likely, other international nonproliferation &#x000A;agreements as well.  Any intervention in such a country's &#x000A;ports or other facilities would be tantamount to an act of &#x000A;war and was therefore something to avoid if at all possible. &#x000A;It was less aggressive to interdict a suspect ship in &#x000A;international waters, as PSI was designed to do.  Djalal was &#x000A;not presuaded. &#x000A; &#x000A;COMMENT AND REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE &#x000A; &#x000A;¶7. (C) Djalal's argument appears to be, at least implicitly, &#x000A;that the UNCLOS provisions are absolute and override any &#x000A;interdiction authority under PSI.  We have tried to challenge &#x000A;this interpretation, so far to no avil.  We believe the &#x000A;alleged legal contradictions are a smokescreen for avoiding &#x000A;tough political decisions on boarding, inspection and &#x000A;interdiction.  In that vein, we will continue to remind the &#x000A;GOI of its nonproliferation obligations and commitments and &#x000A;urge GOI to review its priorities. &#x000A; &#x000A;¶8. (C) Post welcomes Washington agencies' input for &#x000A;responding to these and any other legal objections Djalal has &#x000A;formally raised elsewhere to PSI. &#x000A; &#x000A;HEFFERN