Source: https://www.scribd.com/doc/63957191/bottiappeal
Timestamp: 2017-02-28 17:28:34
Document Index: 679571747

Matched Legal Cases: ['art, 129', '§371', '§666', '§1001', '§1341', '§1346', '§3231', '§1291', '§5317', '§5324', '§3231', '§1291', '§1346', '§1346', '§371', '§666', '§1341', '§371', '§5324', '§1001', '§5317', '§371', '§5324', '§5317', '§371', '§666', '§1341', '§1346', '§1346', 'art, 129', '§1341', '§1346', '§1346', '§1346', '§1346', '§1346', '§1346']

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10-3891
United States of America, Appellee, v. James Botti, Defendant - Appellant.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT JAMES BOTTI
GEORGE W. GANIM, JR THE GANIM LAW FIRM P.C. 4666 MAIN STREET BRIDGEPORT, CT 06606 (203) 372-7772 Counsel for the Appellant Becker Gallagher · Cincinnati, OH · Washington, D.C. · 800.890.5001
Case: 10-3891
TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... iii 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ...............................................................1 STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ......................................................................1 STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................1 STATEMENT OF FACTS ..............................................................................9 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .....................................................................15 ARGUMENT .................................................................................................18 I. DID THE DISTRICT COURT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN CHARGING THE JURY ON HONEST SERVICES MAIL FRAUD AND DENYING THE MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL IN LIGHT OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISION IN UNITED STATES V. SKILLING? ..........................................................................................18 A. B. Standard of Review ...................................................................18 Discussion .................................................................................19 (i.) The Skilling and Black Cases..........................................20 (ii.) The Jury Instruction ........................................................20 (iii.) Failure to Convict on the Charge of Bribery ..................26 (iv.) Evidence of Non-Bribery Actions. .................................29 (v.) Government’s Opening and Closing Arguments ...........31 (vi.) Rule 29 Motion ...............................................................34 (vii.) Motion in Limine ............................................................34 i Case: 10-3891
7. CONCLUSION..............................................................................................35 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE .......................................................................37 CERTIFICATION OF SERVICE............................................................................38 ii Case: 10-3891
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Clark v. Crosby, 335 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2003) ..................................................................... 25 Griffin v United States, 502 U.S. 46, 112 S.Ct. 466 (1991) ..........................................................23, 25 Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461 (1997)....................................................................................... 18 McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 107 S.Ct. 2875, 97 Ed.2d 292 (1987). .................................. 20 Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999)........................................................................................... 29 Ryan v. United States, 759 F.Supp.2d 975, 2010 WL 5495015 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 21, 2010) ................ 28 Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931)....................................................................................... 25 Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993)....................................................................................... 28 United States v. Black, 130 S.Ct 2963 (2010)...............................................................7, 19, 20, 22, 35 United States v. Black, 530 F.3d 596 (7th Cir. 2008), CERT granted, 129 S.Ct. 2379 (U.S. May 18, 2009) .................................................................................................. 5 United States v. Boone, 628 F.3d 927 (7th Cir. 2010) ......................................................................... 20 United States v. Coniglio, 417 Fed.Appx. 146 (3d Cir. 2011) ..........................................................28, 29 iii Case: 10-3891
United States v. Desnoyers, 637 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2011) .......................................................................... 23 United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 732 (1993)....................................................................................... 18 United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2003) ............................................................................ 4 United States v. Skilling, 130 S.Ct. 2896 (2010).............................................................................passim United States v. Skilling, 554 F.3d 529 (5th Cir. 2009) 130 S.Ct. 393 (U.S. Oct. 13, 2009) .................. 5 United States v. Viola, 35 F.3d 37 (2d Cir. 1994) .............................................................................. 19 United States v. Weyhrauch, 130 S.Ct 2971 (2010)....................................................................................... 7 United States v. Weyhrauch, 548 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir. 2008), CERT granted in part, 129 S.Ct. 2863 (U.S. June 29, 2009) ........................................................................................ 5 Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391 (1991)....................................................................................... 28 Yeager v. United States, 129 S.Ct. 2360 (2009)..............................................................................27, 28 Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983) ................................. 26 Constitutional Provisions U.S. Const. Amend. VI .......................................................................................... 4, 7
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Statutes 18 U.S.C. §371 ....................................................................................................... 3, 4 18 U.S.C. §666 ....................................................................................................... 3, 4 18 U.S.C. §1001 ......................................................................................................... 3 18 U.S.C. §1341 .................................................................................................3, 4, 7 18 U.S.C. §1346 ................................................................................................passim 18 U.S.C. §3231 ......................................................................................................... 1 28 U.S.C. §1291 ......................................................................................................... 1 31 U.S.C. §5317 ......................................................................................................... 3 31 U.S.C. §5324 ......................................................................................................... 3 Rules Fed.R.App.P. 4(b) ...................................................................................................... 1 Fed.R.Crim.P. 29..................................................................................................6, 34 Fed.R.Crim.P. 33........................................................................................................ 6 Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b) ................................................................................................. 18
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction of this case pursuit to 18
U.S.C. §3231 in that the Indictment alleged offenses against the United States. On September 17, 2010, Judge Haight imposed sentence upon the Appellant, James Botti. Final judgment as to Appellant was filed and entered on the docket that same day. Dtk. # 386, App. A291-A294. A timely notice of appeal was filed
on September 23, 2010 pursuant Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 4(b). Dkt. # 389, App. A294-A295. Appellate jurisdiction rests within 28 U.S.C. §1291. 2. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE DID THE DISTRICT COURT COMMIT REVERSABLE ERROR WHEN INSTRUCTING THE JURY ON HONEST SERVICES MAIL FRAUD AND DENYING THE MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL AS A RESULT OF THE SUPREME COURT’S RULING IN THE CASE OF UNITED STATES V. SKILLING. 3. STATEMENT OF THE CASE Nature of the Case This appeal challenges a conviction and sentence imposed after a jury trial before Senior District Court Judge Charles S. Haight, Jr. on the charges of conspiracy to commit mail fraud; bribery of a public official and honest services mail fraud. The Defendant was convicted only on Count Three, honest services
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mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1346.1 Following the verdict in this matter, but prior to sentencing, the United States Supreme Court issued its landmark decision in the case of United States v. Skilling, 130 S.Ct. 2896 (2010). The decision in that case dramatically changed the broad reaches of 18 U.S.C. §1346 with regard to honest services mail fraud. In light of the Skilling decision, Judge Haight permitted both sides to brief the impact of Skilling in their post trial motions.2 On September 8, 2010 Judge Haight denied the Defendant’s motions by written decision entitled “Ruling on Motion for New Trial and Motion for Judgment of Acquittal”. Dkt #381, App. A272-A290. In that ruling, Judge Haight correctly noted the issue to be whether or not the "Skilling decision transformed a charge and verdict from proper when given at trial into an improper instruction requiring that the jury verdict be set aside." Id. This appeal challenges the correctness of the pre-Skilling jury charge based on constitutional grounds as well as the court's Ruling on a Motion for New Trial as it
The jury was unable to reach a decision on the first count, Conspiracy to Defraud, and the second count, Bribery of Public Official, thereby resulting in the court entering a mistrial on those two counts. The Defendant filed a Motion for Judgment of Acquittal and Motion for New Trial. The Government filed objections to those motions.
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relates to the jury charge concerning honest services mail fraud. This case has not previously been before this Court. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below On November 6, 2008, a Grand Jury in the District of Connecticut returned a seven-count Indictment against the Appellant, James Botti. Specifically, Botti was charged in Count One with Conspiracy to defraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §371; Count Two with Bribery of a Public Official in violation of 18 U.S.C. §666; Count Three with mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§1341 & 1346; Count Four with Conspiracy to Structure in violation of 18 U.S.C. §371; Count Five with Structuring in violation of 31 U.S.C. §5324; and Counts Six and Seven with False Statements to the Internal Revenue Service in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1001. The Appellant was also charged with one count of Criminal Forfeiture in violation of 31 U.S.C. §5317. On September 22, 2009, Judge Haight issued an order severing Counts Four, Five, Six, and Seven from Counts One, Two and Three of the Indictment. Dkt. #90. Counts Four, Five, Six and Seven were tried separately and are not the subject of this appeal. Dkt. #200.3
In an amended Indictment James Botti was charged with 4 counts: (1) conspiracy to structure in violation of 18 U.S.C. §371; (2) structuring in violation of 31 U.S.C. §5324, and (3) 2 counts of false statement in violation of 31 U.S.C. §5317. A jury trial on these counts commenced on November 2, 2009 and 3 3
On January 8, 2010, a redacted Indictment (herein after referred to as the “Indictment”) containing only Counts One, Two and Three of the original Indictment was docketed by the Government. Dkt #229, App. A54-A67. This Indictment contained the following charges: Count One - Conspiracy to Defraud, 18 USC §371; Count Two - Bribery of a Public Official 18 U.S.C. §666; and Count Three - Honest Services Mail Fraud 18 U.S.C. §§1341, 1346. On January 29, 2010, prior to trial, the Appellant filed a Motion to Dismiss Count Three of the Indictment along with a Memorandum of Law in Support of the Motion to Dismiss. Dkt #243 and 244, App. A68-A69, A70-A76. In his
Memorandum of Law, the Appellant claimed that 18 U.S.C. §1346 "...is unconstitutionally vague on its face under the 6th amendment both for the lack of notice and for encouraging arbitrary enforcement by the Government.” The
Appellant noted in his motion that the Second Circuit had decided the issue in United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2003). The Appellant also noted in a footnote that a "conflict in the Circuit and the Supreme Court's granting of
continued through November 10, 2009 when the Defendant was found guilty of conspiracy to structure (Count one) and of structuring (Count Two). The jury acquitted the Defendant of the two false statement counts (Count Three and Four). Additionally the jury returned a verdict of $120,000 on the forfeiture count. (Dkt. #200)
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certiorari on this issue, as discussed infra, requires us to preserve this claim should an appeal be necessary”. Dkt. #244, App. A70-A77. As set forth in the Appellant’s Motion to Dismiss, the U.S. Supreme Court had granted certiorari in three cases to address the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. §1346. Those cases were United States v. Black, 530 F.3d 596 (7th Cir. 2008), CERT granted, 129 S.Ct. 2379 (U.S. May 18, 2009) (No. 08-876); United States v. Weyhrauch, 548 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir. 2008), CERT granted in part, 129 S.Ct. 2863 (U.S. June 29, 2009) (No. 08-1196); and United States v. Skilling, 554 F.3d 529 (5th Cir. 2009) 130 S.Ct. 393 (U.S. Oct. 13, 2009) (No. 08-1394). Dkt. #244, App. A70-A77. On February 17, 2010, the District Court denied the Appellant’s Motion to Dismiss Count Three of the Indictment. Dkt. #257. On March 8, 2010, the jury trial began on Counts One, Two and Three of the Indictment. During said trial, the Government put on various witnesses and
evidence to substantiate the allegations that the Appellant had engaged in conspiracy (Count One), bribery (Count Two) and honest services mail fraud (Count Three) as discussed below. In both its opening statement at the commencement of trial and its closing arguments at the close of trial, the Government argued to the jury that it was the Appellant’s actions in having people who worked for him testify before the
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Planning and Zoning Commission in favor of his zoning application without disclosing to the Commission that they had a relationship with him or who the Appellant instructed to lie about that relationship. It was that evidence the
Government claimed constituted the basis for the jury to convict the Appellant of Count Three, Honest Services Mail Fraud. Dkt. # 361, 3/11/10 Tr. pp.68-73; Dkt. #362, 3/16/10 Tr. pp.203-206; Dkt. # 354, 3/17/11 Tr. pp.137-144, 182. On April 1, 2010, the jury announced that it was deadlocked on Count One of the Indictment charging the Appellant with Conspiracy to Defraud and Count Two of the Indictment charging the Appellant with Bribery of a Public Official. The jury, however, did convict the Appellant on Count Three of Honest Services Mail Fraud. Dkt #315, App. A77-A79. Following the verdict, the Appellant, on April 28, 2010, filed a Motion for Judgment of Acquittal pursuant to Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure along with a Memorandum of Law in support thereof. Dkt #335 & 336, App. A80-81, A82-97. The basis of the motion was the Appellant’s claim that “the evidence at trial was insufficient to sustain a conviction”. On that same day, the Appellant also filed a Motion for a New Trial pursuant to Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure along with a Memorandum of Law in support thereof. The Appellant claimed in this motion that “the
evidence presented by the Government at trial was insufficient to sustain the
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conviction of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§1341 and 1346.” Dkt. #337, App. A98-A100; Dkt. #339. The Appellant further claimed in the motion and accompanying Memorandum of Law that "the statute under which the Appellant has been convicted – – 18 U.S.C. §1346 – – is unconstitutionally vague on its face under the 6th amendment, both for its lack of fair notice and for encouraging arbitrary enforcement by the Government”. The Government, in written response to the motions, pointed to specific bribery, as well as non-bribery evidence that it contended supported the conviction for honest services mail fraud. Dkt. #344 & 345, App. A101-A120, A121-A133. Prior to ruling on the motions, Judge Haight issued an “ORDER” on June 25, 2010, stating in part: "On June 24, 2010 the United States Supreme Court issued decisions in the Skilling, Black, and Weyhrauch cases regarding honest services, which was the only count on which Mr. Botti was convicted in the second trial. Should the parties wish to supplement their briefing on the pending motion in light of the Supreme Court’s decisions, or otherwise advise the court of their position on how said decisions impact this case, such supplemental briefing shall be due from both parties on July 30, 2010, with cross-replies due on August 16, 2010”4 Dkt. #364.
The court was referring specifically to the cases of United States v. Skilling, 130 S.Ct. 2896 (2010); United States v. Black, 130 S.Ct 2963 (2010); and United States v. Weyhrauch, 130 S.Ct 2971 (2010). Hereinafter referred to as “Skilling”, “Black” and “Weyhrauch”. 7 Case: 10-3891
The parties filed supplemental briefs. Dkt. #374, 375, 378, 379, App. A199-A216, A217-A242, A243-A262, A263-A271. On September 8, 2010, the Court issued its ruling. Dkt. #337, App. A98-A100. In this ruling, the District Court denied the Defendant's Motion for New Trial,5 Dkt. #335, App. A80-A81, and denied the Defendant's Motion for Judgment of Acquittal. Dkt. #381, App. A272-A290.6 On September 17, 2010, Judge Haight sentenced Mr. Botti to 72 months of incarceration on Count 3 (Honest Services Mail Fraud); 60 months on Count 4 and 60 months on Count 5, all to run concurrently.7 Upon release, Mr. Botti is to be placed on Supervised Release for 30 months on Count 3, 36 months on Count 4 and 36 months on Count 5. The Appellant was also ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $25,000. Dkt. #386, App. A291-A293. On September 23, 2010, the Appellant filed a timely Notice of Appeal to this Court. Dkt. #389, App. A294A295.
The court’s ruling denying the Appellant's motion for a new trial is also incorporated into this appeal only as it relates to the charge to the jury on honest services mail fraud and Skilling. Dkt #337, App. A98-A100. In that ruling, the Court also denied the Defendant's oral Motion for Judgment of Acquittal. Dkt. #294. Counts 4 and 5 convictions stem from an earlier trial on the severed counts contained in the original indictment.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS As to Count One (Bribery of a Public Official), the Government claimed the
Appellant conspired with Shelton Mayor, Mark Lauretti (previously referred to as "Public Official #1” in the indictment) to defraud the citizens of Shelton of the honest services. This was with respect to the approval by the Shelton Planning and Zoning Commission of a special exception permit for the Appellant’s development project located at 828 Bridgeport Ave ("828 Project"). It was the approval of this zoning project that was the major focus of the Government's evidence at trial and argument to the jury. Dkt #229, pp. 1-11, App. A54-A64. As to Count Two, (Bribery of a Public Official) the Government claimed that the Appellant gave, offered or agreed to give things of value to Public Official #1 with the intent to influence him in connection with the 828 Project. Dkt #229, p.12, App. A65. It was clear from the Indictment as well as from the Government's case at trial that the Appellant’s alleged relationship with Public Official #1 was the linchpin around which the viability of the conspiracy and bribery charges revolved. As to count three (Honest Service Mail Fraud), the Government re-alleged and incorporated all of the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 6 and 8 through 44 of the first two counts, with the exception of the allegations of bribery as contained in paragraph 45 and 46 of the Indictment. The Government did
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not allege bribery in Count Three, the honest services mail fraud count. App Dkt #229, App. A54-A67. 8 The allegations set forth by the Government in Count Three were that the Appellant intended to defraud the citizens of Shelton of the intangible right to the honest services of Public Official #1 and other public officials concerning the 828 Project. The Government specifically alleged in the Indictment that the Appellant caused to be delivered by the United States Postal Service a certified letter containing the Shelton Planning and Zoning Commission’s approval of the 828 Project. Dkt #229, p. 13, App. A66. The underlying acts alleged in the indictment leading to the charge of mail fraud committed by the Appellant, Botti consisted in part of him directing employees and persons affiliated with his business to attend a public hearing before the Planning and Zoning Commission and speak in favor of his application without disclosing their affiliation with Botti. Dkt #229, p.7, App. A60. The
indictment further alleged that Botti gave gift certificates to two Planning and Zoning Commissioners who voted in favor of the 828 Project. It alleged that he provided Commissioner Leon Sylvester construction services without charge and gave a gift certificate to Commissioner Sylvester after he convinced Commissioner
It should also be noted that the Public Official #1 was never indicted nor was he ever called as a witness in this case by either side.
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Daniel Orazietti to attend a meeting and vote favorably on the 828 Project. It further alleged that he paid Commissioner Orazietti money for an event the Appellant, Botti held at his restaurant. Dkt #229, p. 8, App. A61. The Indictment also alleged as part of the honest services mail fraud charge that the Appellant, "Botti sought to conceal from the IRS and federal law enforcement authorities the cash that he maintained in his office" and that he "structured bank transactions to prevent financial institutions from filing required forms with the IRS that would reveal the existence of cash". Dkt #229, p.9, App. A62. A jury trial commenced on March 8, 2010, and the jury heard evidence on various days from March 8, 2010 through March 23, 2010. The Government presented evidence that from 2002 through 2006, the Appellant, James Botti provided benefits to Shelton public officials which included the Mayor, building official and members of the Planning and Zoning Commission. The benefits the Government claimed were provided to the Mayor included home repairs (Dkt. # 362, 3/16/10 Tr. pp.189, 226–227, 230, App. A170, A171171, A173); the hiring of the Mayor's brother to work at the Appellant's company (Dkt. #361, 3/11/11 Tr. p.115); and paying for the mayor and his family to travel to Florida in 2001 (Dkt. #352, 3/10/10 Tr. pp.266-267, App. A140-141; Dkt. #355, 3/19/10 Tr. p.66, App. A142).
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The benefit the Government claimed was provided to the City of Shelton's building official concerned the sale of a truck directly to said official. It was alleged by the Government that the truck was sold for approximately $4500 less than the price that it had been purchased for by the Appellant. Dtk. #351, 3/8/10 Tr. p.101, App. A139. The benefits the Government claimed that were provided to Shelton Planning and Zoning Commissioners were gift certificates.9 Commissioner Allen Cribbins testified that he received a fruit basket with a gift certificate in the amount of $150 to a restaurant from the Appellant, Botti in December of 2006. He further testified that it was not inappropriate to receive such a gift under the Shelton Ethics Code. Dkt. #362, 3/16/10 Tr. pp.84, 88, App. A167, A169. He testified that the receipt of those items did not affect his relationship with the Appellant, James Botti, nor did it affect his ability to vote on any other projects thereafter. Dkt. #362, 3/16/10 Tr. p.86, App. A168. Richard Schultz, the Planning Administrator for the Shelton Planning and Zoning Commission, testified that it was not atypical for gifts to be delivered to public officials in Shelton. He testified that he himself had received gifts. Dkt.
The Zoning Commissioners testified that they did not consider gift certificates in a reasonable amount to be improper under the Shelton Ethics Code. Dkt. # 361, 3/11/10 Tr. p.187.
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#361, 3/11/10 Tr. p.189, App. A166. He further testified that the giving of gifts to public officials was an acceptable occurrence in Shelton and that it was not inappropriate to present a Shelton official with a bottle of wine or reasonable gift certificate. Dkt. #361, 3/11/10 Tr. p.189, App. A166. The Government also presented evidence in which it claimed that Commissioner Leon Sylvester acted improperly in discussing the upcoming zoning meeting with Commissioner Daniel Orazietti and encouraging him to attend the June 20, 2006 Planning and Zoning meeting and to vote in favor of the 828 Project. Dkt. #363, 3/18/10 Tr. pp.179-184, App. A174-A179. Additional evidence by the Government included the Appellant holding a Christmas party at Commissioner Orazietti's restaurant around the holidays in 2006, which it claimed was a "reward" to Orazietti for his vote on the 828 Project. Dkt. # 363, 3/18/10 Tr. p.185, App. A180.10 The Appellant contended at trial that he interacted with Shelton officials under a good faith belief, based on the Shelton Ethics Code, that it was appropriate to present non-substantial items to Shelton officials.
Mr. Orazietti testified that there was no promise by Mr. Sylvester or Mr. Botti to have a Christmas party at his restaurant or to give him a gift basket at the time he voted in favor of the project. Dkt. #363, 3/18/10 Tr. p. 215.
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It was the Appellant’s further contention that none of these items were ever given or presented to any official as a bribe or kickback with any quid pro quo. The record does support the defense presented by the Appellant. (Dkt. #363, 3/18/10 Tr. pp.215-217; Dkt. #356, 3/22/10 Tr. pp.246, 248) There was testimony that there is nothing wrong with accepting Christmas gifts or fruit baskets from individuals that deal with the city. Dkt. #363, 3/22/10 Tr. pp.178-9, App. A174. There also was testimony from members of the
Planning and Zoning Commission who testified that the mayor does not dictate how the Planning and Zoning Commission votes. Dkt. #355, 3/19/10 Tr. p.104, App. A143; Dkt. # 356, 3/22/10 Tr. p.190, App. A154. That the chairman of the commission does occasionally inform members of the board whether the mayor supports or opposes a project; or that the mayor believes something may be a good or bad project Dkt. #356, 3/22/10 Tr. p.191, App. A155. That the mayor will also from time to time offer opinions in public and in private about a particular project. Dkt. #356, 3/22/10 Tr. p.191, App. A155. And that the mayor’s position on a project would have no effect on how they voted even if the mayor had interacted with the commissioners concerning the vote. Dkt. #356, 3/22/10 Tr. p.201, App. A156. In rendering its verdict of guilty on Count Three, the jury answered “Yes” to Interrogatory Question A. By checking yes to Interrogatory Question A, the jury
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indicated that they found the Appellant guilty of honest services mail fraud by depriving the citizens of Shelton of the intangible right of honest service of their public official or officials. Dkt #315, App. A77-A79. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on Count One (Conspiracy) and Count Two (Bribery). A mistrial was then ordered on those counts. The jury was also unable to answer to Interrogatory Question B relating to its verdict on Count Three (substantive mail fraud). 11 It is from the conviction on Count Three of the Indictment for honest services mail fraud that the Appellant appeals. 5. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT The Indictment of the Appellant alleged acts or actions in the nature of both bribery and non-bribery honest services mail fraud. The jury instruction failed to limit the jury's consideration on Count Three of the Indictment in honest services
Question B asked the jury: if you find the Defendant guilty on Count Three, do you unanimously find that: B. James Botti engaged in a scheme or artifice to obtain money or property by means of a material false or fraudulent pretense, representations or promises by utilizing or causing the United States mails to be used for the purpose of executing that scheme or artifice (check either no or yes). ____________No _______________Yes
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mail fraud to bribery and kickback schemes in accordance with the United States Supreme Court decision in Skilling. In charging the jury, the trial court defined a scheme to defraud as a: "plan… or course of action to obtain money or property or of the intangible right of honest services by means of materially false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises reasonably calculated to deceive persons of average prudence". [emphasis added] This language clearly failed to limit the jury’s consideration to bribery or kickbacks in order to convict the Appellant of Honest Services Mail Fraud. The instruction further contained language that permitted the Appellant to be convicted of Honest Services Mail Fraud if the jury found the Appellant had engaged in a scheme to defraud…of the intangible right to honest services by "trick, deceit, deception or swindle." Both of the above sections of the charge allowed the jury to a convict on a much broader legal standard than is permissible under the law, as articulated in Skilling. The only reference to bribery in the Honest Services Mail Fraud count of the charge was a “for instance” used by the court to describe one of an unspecific number of ways in which a “Public Official” -- not a private person such as the Appellant -- could commit honest services mail fraud. The charge failed to contain any language about how someone other than a “public official” could commit
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honest service mail fraud through a bribery or kickback scheme.
importantly, it failed to instruct the jury to limit its consideration to evidence of bribery or kickbacks when deciding the Appellant’s guilt or innocence on the Honest Services Mail Fraud count. This broad language of the jury charge combined with the substantial evidence of “materially false or fraudulent representations” as well as “trick, deceit, deception or swindle” all support the conclusion that the jury did not find the Appellant guilty of honest services mail fraud by way of a bribery or kickback scheme in Count Three. Finally, the Verdict Form used in this case provides evidence that strongly supports the Appellant’s argument that although he was convicted of honest services mail fraud in Count Three, the jury failed to conclude that there existed proof beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of bribery in Count Two. A guilty verdict on the bribery charge would logically be an essential preliminary finding in order for the jury to properly conclude, per Skilling, that the Appellant was guilty of Count Three, Honest Services Mail Fraud by way of a bribery (or kickback) scheme. The verdict form supports the conclusion that the errors in the jury instructions were not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as the Appellant’s conviction may have been based upon an improper theory of honest services mail
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fraud. This constitutional error affected the Appellant’s substantial rights, and as a result, he is entitled to a new trial. 6. ARGUMENT I. DID THE DISTRICT COURT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN CHARGING THE JURY ON HONEST SERVICES MAIL FRAUD AND DENYING THE MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL IN LIGHT OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISION IN UNITED STATES V. SKILLING? A. Standard of Review
Generally, a failure to object to jury instructions means that appellate courts may review the instruction only for “plain error that affects substantial rights.” Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). The plain error standard of review dictates that reversal is warranted only where there has been (1) error; (2) that is plain; (3) that affects the substantial rights; and (4) where the error seriously affects the fairness integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461 466-67 (1997); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 732 (1993). The plain error standard of review will apply if there were no legal grounds for challenging a jury instruction at the time it was given, but arose due to a new rule of law between the time of conviction and the time of appeal. Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 464-68 (1997). It should also be noted that although the defendant generally has the burden of persuasion on the third prong, in this case where the error was not clear at the time of the conviction, but a supervening decision renders it so by 18 Case: 10-3891
the time of the appeal, the burden then shifts to the Government on this issue of “affecting substantial rights.” United States v. Viola, 35 F.3d 37, 42 (2d Cir. 1994) Nevertheless, it is the Appellant’s contention that he had adequately preserved this issue in numerous motions throughout the proceedings, including post-trial filings and, therefore, the issue should be reviewed as a fully preserved claim. The Appellant directs this court to Judge Haight’s ruling on his post trial motions for new trial and acquittal, wherein he addressed this very issue as follows: “The Government seeks to deflect this contention by arguing, first that Botti’s failure to object to the jury charge at the time waives any post trial criticism and secondly that any defect in the charge would be harmless. Neither argument is persuasive. The charge was fashioned by counsel and the Court before the Supreme Court decided Skilling. No one knew what the court was going to hold. Defense counsel cannot be faulted for failing to criticize the charge on the basis of what the Court might say in Skilling.” Dkt #381, p.14, App. A285. B. Discussion
The District Court’s honest services mail fraud charge to the jury was clearly erroneous in light of the United States Supreme Court’s rulings in Skilling and Black which limited the reach of that statute [§1346] to bribery and kickback schemes. It allowed the jury to convict the Appellant under a definition of honest services mail fraud that has been ruled to be unconstitutional. As a result, this Court must vacate his conviction and order a new trial. 19 Case: 10-3891
The Skilling and Black Cases
The United States Supreme Court addressed the scope and constitutionality of Section 1346 in Skilling and Black. In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court reviewed the history of the honest services statute based upon case law predating McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 107 S.Ct. 2875, 97 Ed.2d 292 (1987). The Supreme Court noted that the "`vast majority' of the honest services cases involved offenders who are in violation of a fiduciary duty, and participated in bribery or kickback schemes". Skilling at 2927-28. Based on this history and to "preserve the statute without transgressing constitutional limitations," the Supreme Court held that "§1346 criminalizes only the bribe and kickback core of the pre McNally case law." Id. See also United States v. Boone, 628 F.3d 927, 929 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting that the Supreme Court held that "in order to avoid vagueness problems, §1346 must be read as criminalizing only bribery and kickback schemes."). (ii.) The Jury Instruction
The District Court’s instruction to the jury on honest services mail fraud was as follows: “In order to prove the Defendant guilty of mail fraud the Government must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt. First, that the Defendant devised a scheme or artifice. There are two types of schemes charged in Count Three of the Indictment. One as a scheme or artifice for obtaining money or property by material
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false and fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, as alleged in the Indictment. The other is a scheme or artifice to deprive the citizens of Shelton of the intangible right of the honest services of their public officials as alleged in the Indictment. Second that the Defendant knowingly and willfully participated in the scheme or artifice, with the knowledge of its fraudulent nature and with specific intent. Third: that in execution of that scheme or artifice, the Defendant used or caused the use of the mail, as specified in the Indictment. The first element that the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the Defendant devised a scheme or artifice. This element can be proven in two different ways in order for you to find that the Government has satisfied the first element of mail fraud, you must be unanimous that the Government has proven at least one of these ways. And you must all agree as to which way the element has been proven. You may find that the Government has proven both of these ways, one of these ways or neither of these ways. I repeat, in order to find that the Government has satisfied this first element beyond a reasonable doubt all of you must agree unanimously that at least one of these two ways has been proven. And all of you must agree unanimously as to which way or ways it was proven if at all. Thus the first element that the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the Defendant devised either (a) a scheme or scheme or artifice for obtaining money or property by means of materially false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises as alleged in the Indictment or, (b) a scheme or artifice to deprive the citizens of Shelton of the intangible right of the honest services of the officials as alleged in the Indictment. The Government need not prove both of these ways, but it must prove at least one of these ways beyond a reasonable doubt or else the element is not satisfied and you must acquit the Defendant of this Count. Some definitions. A scheme or artifice is merely a plan for the accomplishment of that objective. A scheme to defraud is any plan in place or course of action to obtain money or property or the intangible right of honest services by means of materially false or fraudulent
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pretenses, representations, and promises reasonably calculated to deceive persons of average prudence. Fraud is a general term, which embraces all of the various means by which human ingenuity can devise, and which are resorted to by an individual to gain an advantage over another by materially false representations, suggestions, or suppression of the truth or deliberate disregard for the truth. Thus, a scheme to defraud is a plan to deprive another of money or property or of the intangible right to honest services by trick, deceit, deception, or swindle.” *** “Let me explain to the jury honest services. A public official or local Government employee owes a duty of honest, faithful, and disinterested service to the public and to the Government that he or she serves. The public relies on officials of the Government to act for the public interest not for their own enrichment. A Government official who uses his or her public position for self-enrichment breaches the duty of honest services owed to the public and to the Government. So, for instance, a public official who accepts a bribe or corrupt payment [breaches] the duty of honest, faithful and disinterested service, while outwardly appearing to be exercising independent in his or her official work, the public official instead has been paid privately for his or her public conduct. Thus, the public is not receiving the public officials honest and faithful service to which is entitled.” Dkt. #366, 3/25/10 Tr. pp.67-78, App. A181-A192. [emphasis added] Although the jury instruction given by the trial Court may very well have been proper prior to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Skilling and Black, it was constitutionally flawed because the Supreme Court determined in those cases that a bribe or kickback scheme is an essential element of honest services mail fraud. The District Court’s instruction to the jury barely mentions bribery and, as previously stated, when it does, it is only with the language “…for instance…”
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meaning that it is only one example of the ways that an individual may commit honest services mail fraud. The District Court's instruction allowed the payment of a bribe to be but one of many paths rather than the only path (along with kickbacks) to a conviction. Skilling. In Skilling, the Supreme Court clearly held that “bribes and kickback schemes were the only types of conduct that remained as a basis for a conviction under §1346. Following Skilling, there is little doubt that honest services mail fraud “encompasses only bribery and kickback schemes." [emphasis added] The language of the charge given by the District Court provided disjunctive theories for the jury to consider in rendering a verdict: “Jurors are not generally equipped to determine whether a particular theory of conviction submitted to them is contrary to law.... When, therefore, jurors have been left the option of relying upon a legally inadequate theory, there is no reason to think that their own intelligence and expertise will save them from that error." Griffin v United States, 502 U.S. 46, 59, 112 S.Ct. 466 (1991) as cited in: United States v. Desnoyers, 637 F.3d 105,110 (2d Cir. 2011). The charge, as given, left open the distinct possibility that the jury could have convicted the Appellant of honest services mail fraud based upon some other theory or alternate path than that permitted under Skilling. Skilling at 2933. This is very different from the ruling issued in
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One theory provided by the District Court in the charge that the jury could have relied upon was its definition of a scheme or artifice. It defined it as follows: “Some definitions. A scheme or artifice is merely a plan for the accomplishment of that objective. A scheme to defraud is any plan in place or course of action to obtain money or property or the intangible right of honest services by means of materially false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises reasonably calculated to deceive persons of average prudence.” Dkt. #366, 3/25/10 Tr. p.73, App. A187. [emphasis added] That definition provided the jury with an alternative path on which to convict the Appellant that did not include a bribery or kickback scheme. Another alternative path the District Court provided to the jury was through its definition of scheme to defraud. It defined it as a "plan to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services by trick, deceit, deception, or swindle." It states: “Thus, a scheme to defraud is a plan to deprive another of money or property or of the intangible right to honest services by trick, deceit, deception, or swindle.” Dkt. #366, 3/25/10 Tr. p.74. App. A188. [emphasis added] It likewise does not include the requirement of a bribery or kickback scheme. Finally, the District Court provided a third path for the jury to convict the Appellant when it charged on “self enrichment” and once again failed to limit it to a bribery or kickback scheme. That part of the charge states: "A Government official who uses his or her public position for selfenrichment breaches the duty of honest services owed to the public and to the Government." Dkt. #366, 3/25/10 Tr. p.77, App. A191. 24 Case: 10-3891
Neither “materially false or fraudulent pretenses”, “trick, deceit, deception or swindle” or even “self-enrichment” equate to a “bribery or kickback” schemes under the Skilling definition of honest services mail fraud. The Court’s use of the above referenced language in the charge allowed the jury to conclude that the Appellant was guilty of honest services mail fraud -- without necessarily having to determine that he did so by way of a bribery or kickback scheme. Notwithstanding the special verdict form in this case, the multiple grounds included in the jury charge is the equivalent of having a general verdict. “In a line of cases originating with Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931), and running through Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46 (1991), the Supreme Court has discussed the circumstances in which a general verdict must be set aside. Among other things, vacatur is "constitutionally compelled," Clark v. Crosby, 335 F.3d 1303, 1309 (11th Cir. 2003), "where a provision of the Constitution forbids conviction on a particular ground [and] the general verdict may... have rested on that ground," Griffin, 502 U.S. at 53 [emphasis added] Given the over breadth of the jury instruction and the resulting uncertainty about the basis for the verdict, the honest-services fraud convictions of Childree and Stayton under §1346 must be set aside. Stayton v. U.S. (M.D. Ala. 2-28-2011) (Civil Action no. 1:09-CV209-WSD, Criminal Action No. 1:06-cr-66-2-wsd.) p. 20. These three broadly worded examples of language used by the District Court in its charge clearly demonstrates how this jury may have convicted the Appellant on an invalid theory of honest services mail fraud. That is one that does not include a bribery or kickback scheme.
25 Case: 10-3891
A “constitutional error occurs when a jury is instructed on alternative theories of guilt and returns a general verdict that may rest on a legally invalid theory.” Skilling at 2934 (citing Yates, 354 U.S. 298). “[A] general verdict must be set aside if the jury was instructed that it could rely on any of two or more independent grounds, and one of those grounds is [legally or constitutionally] insufficient, because the verdict may have rested exclusively on the insufficient ground.” Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 881, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983) (iii.) Failure to Convict on the Charge of Bribery The verdict on its face clearly indicates that it is based upon evidence and a legal standard that is something other than bribery (or kickbacks). The three page special verdict form sent to the jury contained interrogatories for Count One charging Botti with conspiring to commit mail fraud and Count Three charging Botti with honest services mail fraud. Dkt. #315, App. A77-A79. The specific language in Count Three of the Indictment, paragraph 48, charged the Appellant as follows: "From in or about 2002 to in or about July 2006, in the District of Connecticut and elsewhere, James Botti the Defendant herein, knowingly and willfully and with the intent to defraud devised and intended to devise a scheme or artifice to obtain money and property and to defraud the citizens of Shelton of the intangible right to honest services of Public Official #1 and other public officials free from deceit, favoritism, bias, conflict of interest and self-enrichment by means of material false and fraudulent pretenses, representations and promises, which scheme and artifice is in substance as set forth in paragraphs 8 through 44 of Count One Indictment." Dkt #229, p.13, App. A66. The jury in this case could not have found the Appellant guilty of honest service mail fraud by bribery (or kickbacks) without also finding the Appellant 26 Case: 10-3891
guilty of bribery in Count Two. Bribery is, in all respects, an essential element that must be proven in order to convict on honest service mail fraud. The only
alternative result would have been for the jury to also have been deadlocked on Count Three along with Count Two if they were in fact relying on a bribery theory to convict the Appellant of honest services mail fraud. When the significance of the special verdict form was raised in the post conviction Motion for New Trial, the trial court denied the motion by relying on the holding in Yeager v. United States, 129 S.Ct. 2360 (2009). The Yeager case however is distinguishable because it is a case that deals with a Defendant’s double jeopardy rights. Yeager dealt with the meaning of a hung count in determining the effect of an acquitted count for double jeopardy purposes. The Appellant, Botti's case is significantly different. It deals with reconciling the meaning of a hung count with a guilty count for Rule 33 purposes.12 It is the Appellant’s contention that the split verdict coupled with the improper charge as well as the abundance of evidence of pre-Skilling honest services deprivation(s) makes this an entirely different situation than the matter
The District Court found there is to be no principled difference between the two." Dkt #381, p.8, App. A279. The Appellant contends that the court’s conclusion is erroneous.
27 Case: 10-3891
decided by the Supreme Court in Yeager. The verdict form in its entirety is hardly an item that this Court can ignore in deciding whether or not the jury charge was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. “Thus, as one Court recently explained: The relevant inquiry is whether a reasonable jury, properly instructed, must necessarily have convicted based on a proper theory.” Ryan v. United States, ___ F.Supp.2d ___, 2010 WL 5495015, at *14 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 21, 2010). In reaching this decision, the Court looks to the charges in the Indictment, the evidence and the arguments made at trial. The Court also looks to the jury's actual findings. See Black, 625 F.3d at 393 (noting jury's split verdict finding that the "only rational explanation for the split verdict is that the jury believed that the $600,000 that the Defendants received from Forum-Paxton without covenants not to compete, unlike the other transactions with that company, were proceeds of a plain-vanilla pecuniary fraud - and only a pecuniary fraud. For had the jury believed that a failure to disclose the fees for promising not to compete with the little newspapers was honestservices fraud, it would have convicted the Defendants on all the fraud counts, because the Defendants disclosed those fees neither to the board nor to the shareholders; and the jury didn't do that."). See also Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993) ("Harmless-error review looks, we have said, to the basis on which `the jury actually rested its verdict.'") (quoting Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 404 (1991)) [emphasis in original] United States v. Rezko (N.D. Ill 3/3/2011) No. 05 CR-691 at p.13. The situation in this case before this Court is whether it is possible to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury convicted the Appellant based solely upon the bribery theory. Confronted with a similar situation in the case of United States v. Coniglio, 417 Fed.Appx. 146, 149 (3d Cir. 2011), the Third Circuit reasoned and concluded that:
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“Upon careful review of the record below, it is not possible for us to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have convicted Coniglio based solely upon the Bribery Object. At trial, the Government inextricably intertwined evidence of bribery and concealment. The District Court itself specifically charged the jury that it might convict Coniglio on either the Bribery Object or the Concealed Conflict Object, and the District Court's evidentiary rulings throughout the trial may have been affected by the existence of the Concealed Conflict Object charges. Moreover, there is no escaping the fact that, while understandably emphasizing the Bribery Object to a greater degree, the United States did argue that the Concealed Conflict Object alone was a sufficient basis for conviction. While we do not say it is probable, we do conclude that it is indeed possible that the invalid Concealed Conflict Object could have contributed to the verdict. Stated differently, on the record before us we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have convicted Coniglio of HSMF absent the invalid Concealed Conflict theory. Accordingly, the plain error was not harmless and we must vacate the HSMF convictions.” United States v. Coniglio, 417 Fed.Appx. 146, 149 (3d Cir. 2011). (iv.) Evidence of Non-Bribery Actions. In Skilling, on remand, (5th Circuit April 6, 2011) No. 0620885, it was noted that in Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999), the Supreme Court explained that when an element of the offense was omitted from the jury instructions, the reviewing Court "asks whether the record contains evidence that could rationally lead to a contrary finding with respect to the omitted element," and if the answer is "no," the error is harmless. Neder at 19. Here, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the Appellant, Botti was guilty of honest services mail fraud as described in the District Court’s charge without concluding that he had committed it by way of a bribery (or kickback) scheme. 29 Case: 10-3891
In fact, the indictment itself did not even contain a bribery allegation in the Honest Services Mail Fraud Count. Such is consistent with the Government’s arguments to both the District Court in reply to various defense motions and to the jury in both its opening statement and closing argument. In the Government’s post trial response to the Appellant’s motion for acquittal as well the motion for a new trial, the Government stressed some of this non-bribery evidence in support of the mail fraud conviction as a basis for the jury's verdict. In its response, the Government proffered that the non-bribery acts or actions were part of the evidence that support the honest services mail fraud charge in Count Three. These included, “...hiding his cash from the IRS...”;
“...preventing banks from filing CTRs by their air structuring his bank deposits in amounts under $10,000”; “...instructing a mason in 2007 not to tell anyone about the $10,000 and $5,000 bundles ($65,000 total) the Appellant gave him and warn the mason in 2008 not to reveal this information to federal authorities”; and “Botti sought to intimidate Mr. Czaplinski by suggesting that if Mr. Czaplinski told the IRS about the cash Botti and his father were going to jail,” Dkt #344, pp.11-14, App. A111-A114, & Dkt. #345, App. A121-A133. 13
The Government, on pp. 11-14 of the Government’s Response to Defendant’s Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, Dkt #344, App. A111-A114, listed numerous items of evidence that are claimed to be “more than sufficient evidence to find a scheme or artifice to deprive citizens of their right to honest services of its public 30 13
This non-bribery evidence of misrepresentation, false pretenses and trick, deceit and swindle, coupled with an overly broad jury charge has resulted in uncertainty about the basis for the verdict, thus requiring reversal. (v.) Government’s Opening and Closing Arguments
The Governments opening and closing arguments to the jury must also be considered when reviewing the extent of the prejudice and the likelihood that these errors contributed to the outcome. The Government repeatedly argued to the jury in both its opening statement and closing argument that the Appellant committed honest services mail fraud in Count Three by misrepresentation (false pretenses, trick, and deceit). In its opening statement, the Government contented that the Appellant committed honest services mail fraud by “misrepresenting the truth” with regards to the hearing before the Planning and Zoning Commission. See below: “The conspiracy, (referring to the first count) ladies and gentlemen is the secret agreement between Mark Lauretti and James Botti. Look to see what efforts James Botti took to conceal their relationship from the public. The next count of the Indictment is the June 2006 bribery count. That concerns the 828 Project. What you are looking for here ladies and gentlemen is evidence of the bribe to Lauretti. If you recall that James Botti admitted to his friend that he bribed Mark Lauretti, listen
officials.) They are listed as Nos. 1 through 4, (with number 2 including examples listed as A through K, and number 3 including examples listed A through D).
31 Case: 10-3891
to the evidence. It’s all about buying votes, getting the necessary approvals and it’s all being done by the backdoor. Again, ladies and gentlemen, you’re going to see things that the people in Shelton never saw. You’re going to see how the process was corrupted. The last count of the Indictment the third count is called a mail fraud count. And what that is ladies and gentlemen as it concerns what happen after the Planning and Zoning Commission approves a project. Well they mail you the approval, and they mail it to you by of Unites States Postal Service, in fact, they mail it by certified mail and that occurred on June 28, 2006. Ladies and gentlemen, this count is about manipulating the process. Did James Botti manipulate the Planning and Zoning Commission hearing to get approved? It is about misrepresenting the truth. Did James Botti send people to support the project without disclosing the fact that they worked for James Botti. And finally look for the mailing on June 28, 2006” Dkt. #351, 3/8/10 Tr. pp.47-8, App. A136-A137. [emphasis added] In its closing argument, the Government again stressed the fact that the mail fraud charged in Count Three of the Indictment was premised on misrepresentation and deception. “Again, what did he do? You heard all of the evidence about how he tried to con the Planning and Zoning Commission into voting “yes”. The Government also has to show that Botti knowingly and willfully participated with knowledge of the fraud. Look at the phone chart. And finally, the Defendant caused or used the mail, the letter from the Planning and Zoning Commission.” Dkt. #357, 3/24/10 Tr. p.83, App. A158. [emphasis added] *** "And we submit to you that James Botti’s ability to lie, ability to be deceitful and ability to use false pretenses simply makes him, qualifies him to be corrupt and qualifies him to commit mail fraud. It doesn’t mean he couldn’t have done it merely because he’s bombastic.” Dkt. #357, 3/24/11 Tr. p.160, App. A159. 32 Case: 10-3891
At no time during the open statement or the close argument or even in response to the Appellant’s Rule 29 motion did the Government ever argue that it was relying on evidence of a "bribe or kickbacks" as part of the scheme to commit honest services mail fraud.14 It is true the Government did charge Botti with bribery in Count Two and did argue that point extensively, but only as to the bribery count. In fact, the Government was specific in its allegation as well as the evidence as to what it was relying upon in order to prove each of the three counts of the Indictment. The Indictment, the evidence, the Government’s opening statement and closing argument as well as the jury charge all lead one to conclude that the Appellant was convicted of Honest Services Mail Fraud without the requirement of bribery (or kickbacks) as an essential element. As previously stated, the only mention of bribery at all in this section of the jury charge is as a “for instance” of the way in which a “public official” can commit honest services mail fraud. That is not sufficient to convict the Appellant, who is not a public official, of honest services mail fraud.
The Government does use the term "grease the wheel" when referring to Botti providing "gifts and benefits" to various city officials. The Government does not call them "bribes" nor are they alleged as "bribes" in the indictment. Dkt. #357, Tr. 3/24/10 pp.46-49. The Government also uses the term "quid pro quo" with regards to the holiday party at Commissioner Daniel Orazietti's restaurant (Dkt. #357, Tr. 3/24/10 p.50), but never uses the term "bribe" as it does when referring to Mayor Lauretti (referring to Count Two of the indictment) "How do we know Mark Lauretti took a bribe ?" Dkt. #357, 3/24/10 Tr. p.51. 33 Case: 10-3891
(vi.) Rule 29 Motion The Appellant’s argument is further supported by the Government’s response to the Rule 29 motion as to Count Three wherein it stated to the court: “Specifically, his actions, he sent from the get go-he sent employees of his and told them not to tell the truth to the Planning and Zoning Commission. That in itself is a scheme and artifice to defraud.” Dkt. 356, 3/22/10 Tr. p.113, App. A147. (vii.) Motion in Limine The Appellant filed a Motion in Limine to limit or preclude certain testimony being admitted into evidence during the trial to which the Government argued in opposition the following: “We anticipated that Gregory Fracassini will then take the stand next week and testify about the direction he was given by James Botti to go to the public hearing and misrepresent who he was representing. This is in the Indictment, your Honor. It’s a paragraph in furtherance of the fraud and just so the record is clear, your Honor, this is paragraph number 26, and the paragraph reads, so the record is clear, “In or about may 2006, Botti directed employees and person’s affiliated with his business to attend a public hearing before P&Z and speak in favor of Botti’s application, without disclosing their affiliations with Botti.” So one employee will take the stand and testify that he was told to go there and misrepresent who he worked for. And he observed the Defendant give that direction to another person by the name of Dan Widkins. We’re also going to offer testimony from Andre Czaplinski who will be a witness which he if that he too was directed by the Defendant to attend the public hearing and support the Project. So, what I’m saying, your Honor, is when Mr. Schultz testifies today, we are going to ask him if there are – is there a record of who attended the hearing. And I’m just going to have him put on the record the names of Gregory Fracassini, Andre Czaplinski, Dan Widkins, and a woman by the name of Gail Coleman. And then I’m 34 Case: 10-3891
going to ask the witness, did these four people come to the hearing; yes or no? Did these four people support the Project; yes or no? And did these four people indicate they had any affiliation with James Botti; yes or no. And we anticipate they’ll say they did come to the hearing, they did support the Project, and they did not disclose they had any affiliation with James Botti. Subsequent witnesses will say that James Botti directed those people to attend the hearing. And this is in the Indictment. It’s part of the fraud. It’s part of the conspiracy and we’re going to offer that”. Dkt. #361, 3/11/10 Tr. pp.15-17, App. A161-A163. [emphasis added] Clearly, the Government’s theory on the Honest Services Mail Fraud charge was based on misrepresentations fostered by the Appellant and not bribery or kickbacks. To argue differently now would be disingenuous. 7. CONCLUSION Based upon the above, it is clear that regardless of whether this issue is decided on a plain error standard or preserved error analysis, this court must conclude that the verdict rendered may have been based on a standard of law that does not comply with the recent Supreme Court decisions in Skilling and Black. As a result, this Court must reverse and remand this matter for a new trial with instructions on a proper jury charge consistent with Skilling and Black.
35 Case: 10-3891
Respectfully submitted, By /s/ George W. Ganim, Jr. George W. Ganim, Jr. The Ganim Law Firm P.C. 4666 Main Street Bridgeport, CT 06606 (203) 372-7772 Counsel for the Appellant
36 Case: 10-3891
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B) because this brief contains 9,225 words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B)(iii). This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6) because this brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Word in 14-point Times New Roman. By /s/ George W. Ganim, Jr. George W. Ganim, Jr.
37 Case: 10-3891
CERTIFICATION OF SERVICE CAPTION: United States of America v. Botti DOCKET NUMBER: 10-3891 I, George W. Ganim, Jr., hereby certify under penalty of perjury that on August 31, 2011, I served a copy of the Brief for Appellant James Biotti by ___ United States Mail ___ Federal Express ___ Overnight Mail ___ Facsimile X E-mail (via ECF) ___ Hand delivery on the following parties: Richard Schechter, Senior Litigation Counsel Rahul Kale, Assistant U.S. Attorney United States Attorney's Office, District of Connecticut Room 309 1000 Lafayette Boulevard Bridgeport, CT 06604 (203) 696-3000
August 31, 2011 /s/ George W. Ganim, Jr. George W. Ganim, Jr.,
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