Source: https://www.ndci.org/resources/law/
Timestamp: 2018-12-19 06:07:52
Document Index: 162522066

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 33', '§ 1983', '§1983', '§ 2', '§1983', '§1983']

Law - National Drug Court Institute - NDCI.org
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NDCI understands how important it is for treatment court professionals to remain informed about the latest statutes, case authority and how treatment courts are impacted. We maintain an up-to-date webliography of the relevant case law pertaining to treatment court operations to help guide court professionals as they navigate the ever-shifting legal landscape.
Sundquist v. State, 122 F. Supp. 3d 876 (D. Nebraska 2015) (Sundquist may have agreed to participate in A.A. as a term of his probationary license. But that choice — to participate in A.A. or lose his livelihood — may have been the result of state-sponsored coercion rather than a voluntary choice. See Jackson, 747 F.3d at 541. At this stage of litigation, it is too early to say that by agreeing, Sundquist has forfeited his claim. In sum, the Court finds that Sundquist has alleged a plausible claim under the Establishment Clause, and that defendants Vierk and Schuldt are not entitled to qualified immunity, because the rights sought to be vindicated implicate firmly grounded Constitutional principles.) https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16871371844519358192&q=747+F.+3d+537+&hl=en&as_sdt=4006
Hazle v. Crofoot, 727 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting with approval the granting of summary judgment for plaintiff on his claim that forcing him into a 12 step religious based treatment program, when he was an atheist, was a violation of the First Amendment and granting a new trial on Plaintiffs’ request for compensatory damages. Instead of a retrial, the matter was reportedly settled with the state paying $1M and the treatment agency $925K, see http://www.sacbee.com/news/local/crime/article2768782.html)
State v. Barth (Iowa Court of Appeals 2016) A majority of the courts across the nation that have considered the issue have concluded that "consent-search provisions in probation agreements constitute a waiver of search-and-seizure rights." Id. at 792-93 (citing cases); see also, e.g., United States v. Barnett, 415 F.3d 690, 691 (7th Cir.2005) ("Constitutional rights like other rights can be waived, provided that the waiver is knowing and intelligent, as it was here."); State v. Gawron, 112 Idaho 841, 736 P.2d 1295, 1297 (1987) (upholding warrantless search of probationer based on consent contained in probation agreement); People v. Absher, 242 Ill.2d 77, 351 Ill.Dec. 163, 950 N.E.2d 659, 668 (2011) (upholding suspicionless search based on consent to a warrantless search).
US v. Laurent, 861 F. Supp. 2d 71 (ED New York 2011) (collecting cases where an indictee may also be subject to pre-trial release conditions that infringe upon his constitutional rights, provided that there has been an independent judicial determination that such conditions are necessary.)
VII. Cases holding that terms of bond or terms of probation which include non consumption of alcohol or mandatory drug testing are proper, when related to defendant’s rehabilitation, protection of the public or assuring defendant appearance in court.
People v. Bird, Cal: Court of Appeal, 4th Appellate Dist., 1st Div. 2018 (not selected) (upholding an electronic search condition of probation)
Commonwealth v. Eldred, 480 Mass. 90 (Mass: Supreme Judicial Court 2018) (We conclude that, in appropriate circumstances, a judge may order a defendant who is addicted to drugs to remain drug free as a condition of probation, and that a defendant may be found to be in violation of his or her probation by subsequently testing positive for an illegal drug.)
State v. Olsen, 399 P. 3d 1141 (Wash. Supreme Court 2017) (Washington Supreme Court upholding random drug testing of DUI probationer: “Random UAs are a permissible means here. UAs are an important monitoring tool utilized by courts during the rehabilitative 1148*1148 process of probation. See, e.g., Williams, 97 Wash.App. at 260, 983 P.2d 687 (authorizing requirement that probationer submit to a breath test, blood test, or UA upon probation officer's request); KING COUNTY DRUG DIVERSION COURT, PARTICIPANT HANDBOOK 5-7 (2015) (drug court participants required to participate in random, observed UAs). Unannounced testing is, arguably, crucial if a court is to impose drug testing at all.[4] Random testing seeks to deter the probationer from consuming drugs or alcohol by putting her on notice that drug use can be discovered at any time. It also promotes rehabilitation and accountability by providing the probation officer with a "practical mechanism to determine whether rehabilitation is indeed taking place." Macias v. State, 649 S.W.2d 150, 152 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (weekly UAs)”.)
Idaho v. Doe, 233 P.3d 1275 (Idaho 2010) (Requiring parents to undergo drug testing as part of daughter’s juvenile probation is a violation of the parent’s 4th Amendment rights)
People v. Beal, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 80, 80 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (“Based on the relationship between alcohol and drug use, we conclude that substance abuse is reasonably related to the underlying crime and that alcohol use may lead to future criminality where the defendant has a history of substance abuse and is convicted of a drug-related offense.” Thus, use of alcohol prohibition proper probation condition.)
People v. Feher, 2018 NY Slip Op 6653 (NY: Appellate Div., 4th Dept. 2018) (Defendant waived his right to appeal, thus could not contest his termination from drug court)
People v. Guerrero, 2018 IL App (3d) 170786 - Ill: Appellate Court, 3rd Dist. 2018 (failure to properly advise defendant of immigration consequences invalidates plea under Padilla)
Commonwealth v. TIBETS, Mass: Appeals Court 2018 (setting aside sentencing hearing where defendant appeared without proper waiver of counsel and Court denied drug court and sentenced defendant to incarceration, despite extensive drug history. The appellate panel observed: “We add this final note about the defendant's argument that the sentencing judge abused his discretion in electing to revoke his probation and impose a sentence of incarceration on January 4, 2017, after acknowledging that as far back as November 1, 2016, the defendant had a longstanding problem with drugs. It is not within our power to review a lawful sentence. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Derouin, 31 Mass. App. Ct. 969 (1992), and cases cited. Nevertheless, we believe notice should be taken of the "important and special role of the drug court in achieving important public policy interests." Deputy Chief Counsel for the Pub. Defender Div. of the Comm. for Pub. Counsel Servs. v. Acting First Justice of the Lowell Div. of the Dist. Ct. Dept., 477 Mass. 178, 187 (2017). The Massachusetts Trial Court has expanded the number of drug courts and encourages judges to recommend appropriate defendants to be screened for participation in such programs. See Arrowood, "Racing in the Right Direction:" Specialty Courts in Massachusetts, 60 Boston Bar J. 1 (Spring 2016); Ellis, Drug Courts Impact Participants, Courts, and Communities, 59 Boston Bar J. 12 (Winter 2015); Sullivan, The Development and Implementation of Specialty Courts in Massachusetts, 59 Boston Bar J. 9 (Winter 2015). See also Latessa & Reitler, What Works in Reducing Recidivism and How Does It Relate to Drug Courts?, 41 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 757, 775 (2015) (Well-designed drug courts produce a statistically significantly greater reduction in recidivism than incarceration).”
People v. Sumter, 2018 NY Slip Op 354 (NY: Appellate Div., 3rd Dept. 2018) (waiver of right to appeal was valid, as part of drug court entry contract)
Christopher C. Edwards and Jacob B. Vail, “A Call to End Prospective Waivers of Judicial Disqualification in Accountability Courts”, The Champion, January-February 2014
People v. Coats, 2018 NY Slip Op 983 (NY: Appellate Div., 4th Dept. 2018) ("Although the drug court contract [signed by defendant] contained a written waiver of the right to appeal, County Court did not conduct any colloquy concerning that waiver at the plea proceeding . . ., and we conclude that the contract alone is insufficient to establish a valid waiver")
State v. Hensley, Iowa: Supreme Court 2018 (finding that jail treatment facility was community correctional residential treatment facility and defendant was entitled to credit for time spent there when he failed to complete the drug treatment program)
People v. Juarez, 2017 COA 127 (Colo. Court of Appeals, 4th Div. 2017) (Court sufficiently complied with Padilla in advising defendant it was probable he would be deported for his plea to drug offense and therefore plea was voluntary)
IN THE MATTER OF TB, 168 A. 3d 83, 451 NJ Super. 391 (NJ: Appellate Div., 2017) (In sum, we remand the three Drug Court expungement applications for reconsideration. Assuming the State can demonstrate that the applicant has a potentially disqualifying conviction under N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(c)(3), the applicant shall bear the burden to establish that expungement of that conviction would serve the public interest, as required by N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(c)(3). The court shall make the appropriate finding consistent with the principles set forth above and in Kollman.) Kearney v. BUREAU OF PROFESSIONAL AND OCCUPATIONAL AFFAIRS, (Pa: Commonwealth Court 2017) (admissions made by physician’s assistant in plea used to enter drug court could not bar him from reobtaining his license, where he successfully completed drug court and charges were dismissed.)
State v. Bowling, 2017 Ohio 8539, (Ohio: Court of Appeals, 12th Appellate Dist. 2017) (Curfew was not sufficient confinement to entitle defendant to jail time credits on sentence)
Callis v. State, Not Selected for Publication, (Ind. Court of Appeals 11/20/2017) (Defendant not entitled to credit for time spent in diversion drug court because if court were to award offenders credit for time spent in diversion programs prior to sentencing, it would diminish the reward for completing the program and ultimately be rewarding offenders for their failure.)
Hendrick v. KNOEBEL, (SD Indiana 5/10/2017) (“Though we need not rule on Defendants' argument concerning the waiver provision in the DTC Agreement, we note our serious doubts as to its enforceability under Indiana contract law, given the conspicuous lack of parity between the parties, the absence of specificity in the provision's language, the fact that it purports to absolve the DTC's employees of liability for intentionally tortious conduct, and the fact that the DTC Program is an entity of the local government performing a public service. See generally LaFrenz v. Lake Cty. Fair Bd., 360 N.E.2d 605, 608 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977). Moreover, because the provision implicates federal common law by purporting to waive federal statutory and constitutional rights, the likelihood of its enforceability is increasingly remote. Federal courts are rightly skeptical, albeit not uniformly dismissive, of claims that a plaintiff has waived his constitutional rights or has released a defendant from liability for violating them. We "indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights," Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); Bayo v. Napolitano, 593 F.3d 495, 503 (7th Cir. 2010), and we acquiesce in a waiver only if it has been "knowing, intelligent, and voluntary." Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 484 (2007). The lack of specific language in the agreement before us, in conjunction with its prospectivity, not only falls short of eliciting "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege," Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 292-93 (1988), but also encourages DTC staffers to violate the DTC participants' constitutional rights, knowing they are acting with impunity. Enforcing such an agreement is inconsistent with the public interest given its potential for abuse and cancellation of the participants' primary means of vindication.”)
People v. Sampson, 2017 NY Slip Op 3291 - NY: Appellate Div., 4th Dept. 2017 (Defendant’s lack of colloquy with the court on waiver of right to appeal in drug court contract was ineffective to waive appellate rights, but the defendant did not properly perfect his appeal)
People v. Mason, 2016 Slip Op 07527 (N.Y. App. Div. 11/10/16) (Drug Court contract that waives the right to appeal not sufficient to waive right without knowing & voluntary waiver in colloquy with judge)
U.S. v. Carrion, 488 F. 2d 12 (1st Cir 1973) (In entering a guilty plea: “The right to an interpreter rests most fundamentally, however, on the notion that no defendant should face the Kafkaesque spectre of an incomprehensible ritual which may terminate in punishment”)
State v. Dimaggio, No. 2011-156, Supreme Court of New Hampshire (April 10, 2012) (drug court program was neither a day reporting center nor home confinement –therefore defendant not entitled to credit for all time in drug ct program, although he was entitled to jail days imposed as sanctions for non-compliance)
Cripe v. State, Ind: Court of Appeals 9/7/2018 (not selected) (defendants due process rights not violated when he was terminated from drug court)
State v. Cabe, (Wash: Court of Appeals, 2nd Div. 2018) Not selected for publication (when defendant is terminated from drug court and sentenced, the refusal to consider a sentencing alternative is an abuse of discretion. As stated in State v. Grayson, 154 Wn.2d 333, 342, 111 P.3d 1183 (2005)"where a defendant has requested a sentencing alternative authorized by statute, the categorical refusal to consider the sentence, or the refusal to consider it for a class of offenders, is effectively a failure to exercise discretion and is subject to reversal.")
IN THE MATTER OF WEAPONS SEIZED PURSUANT TO PREVENTION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ACT FROM JS, (NJ: Appellate Div. 2018) (court could not take judicial notice that total abstinence was the policy of drug courts particularly when notice not given to parties of intent to take judicial notice)
People v. Dowd, Cal: Court of Appeal, (4th Appellate Dist., 2nd Div. 2018) Not selected for publication (pre hearing waiver of probation revocation hearing upon entry into drug court did not violate due process if waiver was knowing, voluntary and intelligently given.)
Tsai, Evan C. (2017) "The Practitioner’s Guide to Due Process Issues in Veterans Treatment Courts," Mitchell Hamline Law Review: Vol.43 : Iss. 3 , Article 4.
State v. Estes, Not Selected for Publication, ___ P. 3d ___, (Idaho Court of Appeals 12/14/17) (Because defendant was on regular probation, not a diversionary after plea, he did not have the same due process rights on termination from mental health court, but did have full due process rights on petition to revoke probation. His liberty interest was in remaining on probation, not remaining in drug court.)
Washington v. Commonwealth, (Va. Court of Appeals 11/14/2017) (Appellant did not prove a Fourteenth Amendment due process violation that occurred in the drug treatment court and entitled him to relief in the circuit court revocation proceeding. Additionally, the appellant received his due process rights to notice and a hearing in the circuit court revocation proceeding regarding his earlier termination from the drug treatment court program. Finally, to the extent that the appellant may have been able to assert an entitlement to more process in the circuit court revocation proceeding, he failed to make a contemporaneous objection that the level of process he received in that proceeding was insufficient.)
State v. Barraza, ____ P.3d ___ (NM Court of Appeals 2017) (defendant received sufficient due process protections in her termination from drug court and the judge was not required to recuse)
Neal v. State, 2016 Ark. 287 (Ark. Sup. Ct. 6/30/16) (Citing Laplaca and Staley, infra , Ark. Sup. Ct. holds: “[T]he right to minimum due process before a defendant can be expelled from a drug-court program is so fundamental that it cannot be waived by the defendant in advance of the allegations prompting the removal from the program.”)
Idaho v. Keene, 2016 Unpublished Opinion 595 (Ida. App 7/13/16) (Much like probation revocation, it is appropriate for the drug court to consider a multitude of factors in making its discharge determination; thus, it was appropriate to consider Keene's lack of progress and honesty issues in deciding to discharge Keene from drug court. See Upton, 127 Idaho at 275, 899 P.2d at 985. As such, there was no due process violation that occurred in Keene's discharge from drug court.)
People v. Shipp, 2016 NY Slip Op 3304 (NY: Appellate Div., 4th Dept. 2016) (Inasmuch as defendant's failure to appear in court after his termination from drug treatment "constituted a proper basis for the court's finding of noncompliance, it was unnecessary for the court to inquire into defendant's complaints about the suitability of the [treatment] program and the circumstances of his termination)
State v. Mayfield (Iowa App., 2015) (defendant’s assertion that counsel’s failure to require record stated an ineffective assistance claim under Strickland.)
State v. LeClech, Washington Court of Appeals, NOT SELECTED (6/15/15) (Where defendant asserted due process violation for not being permitted to be present at staffing, Appellate court rejected assertion finding he had waived right to be present and further noted: The Washington and United States Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant's `fundamental right to be present at all critical stages of a trial.'" Washington courts analyze alleged violations of a defendant's right to be present by applying federal due process jurisprudence. This court reviews de novo a claimed violation of the right to be present.A defendant's right to be present at a proceeding is required "whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge.'" However, this right is not absolute. "`[T]he presence of a defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence.” Thus, the right is not triggered when a defendant's "`presence would be useless, or the benefit but a shadow.'….Just as closed staffings are critical to the success of drug court in the context of public trial rights, the presence of the defendant at staffings would frustrate the collaborative purpose of drug court. In this setting, LeClech does not establish a violation of his right to be present.)
State v. Snow, Not Selected for Publication, 32144-4-III (Wash. App. 12-9-2014) (defendant’s due process rights were not violated during termination procedure, including relying on reports reflecting dilute drug samples, particularly where he did not contest testing result)
State v. Kong, 315 P.3d 720 (Haw. 2013) (Defendant’s self-termination from drug court was voluntary)
State v. Bishop, 429 N.J. Super. 533 (2013), affirmed, per curiam, 10/21/15, (Recognizing that both drug court and traditional court defendants should be similarly treated upon probation revocation, the court said: “The carrot-and-stick approach is integral to the Drug Court concept. Prison-bound offenders are given an opportunity to be diverted from a state prison sentence if they are willing to avail themselves of the rehabilitative opportunities available in Drug Court in an effort to free themselves from the recurring cycle of drug dependency and criminal activity. The legislative history of the 1999 amendments includes the Report to the Governor by the Attorney General on the Need to Update the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act of 1987, December 9, 1996. That document "call[ed] for new ways to support drug court programs. One way is to provide judges with new legal tools with which to 'leverage' addicts into treatment." Id. at 18 (emphasis added). The legislation that followed created special probation, as distinguished from regular probation, and established the new resentencing provision applicable upon revocation of special probation……. The ultimate motivation or leverage, a tool needed to enable Drug Courts to operate effectively, is the threat of the substantial sentence that would have been imposed originally if the defendant were not admitted to Drug Court through special probation.”)
Gibson v. Kentucky, No. 2011-CA-001368-MR.,Court of Appeals of Kentucky, Rendered: January 18, 2013. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED (Finding that the defendant was accorded due process in his termination form drug court, the appellate court observed the following to be a proper trial court consideration in termination: “Gibson's unwillingness or inability to adopt basic tenants of Drug Court, such as honesty, constituted continued "addict thinking" and reflected negatively on Gibson's ability to remain compliant and crime-free within the community.”
Gross v. State of Maine, Superior Court case # CR-11-4805 (2/26/13)(drug court procedures relating to termination violative of due process and, therefore, unconstitutional. Drug Court participant entitled to: notice of the termination allegations and the evidence against him, right to call and x-examine witnesses, a hearing at which he is present, a neutral magistrate, written factual findings and the right to counsel. Here, the drug court team discussed the termination decision during the termination hearing, without defendant’s presence or that of his counsel. That procedure coupled by the fact the Superior Court felt that the drug court judge should have recused, resulted in a finding of constitutional infirmity. Moreover, the appellate court ruled the defendant did not, arguably could not prospectively waive his rights, citing LaPlaca and Staley.
Tornavacca v. State, 2012 Ark. 224 (2012) (Although the majority finds that defendant’s due process rights were not violated during his drug court termination hearing, the dissent finds that status hearing where the initial decision was made to remove defendant from drug court violated his due process rights because he did not get to contest the allegations then although he was represented by counsel and a termination hearing 4 months later did not cure the due process violation)
State v. LaPlaca, 27 A.3d 719 (New Hampshire 2011) (Even where program manual provided: “Any violation of the terms and conditions of the [Program] shall result in the imposition of sanctions, without hearing, by the court as deemed fair and appropriate, consistent with statutory authority and the descriptions as outlined in the [Program] policy manual. The defendant waives any right(s) to any and all hearings. Termination of participation in the [Program] shall result in the imposition of the suspended prison sentences and fines without hearing. The defendant shall affirmatively waive any and all rights to a hearing”, waiver pre-notice of allegations was not enforceable. Court relied upon Staley v. State, 851 So.2d 805 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) Failure to provide the participant a pre termination hearing was a violation of due process in the context of removal from drug court and imposition of a suspended sentence. The court left for another day whether such pre hearing waiver was valid for the drug court sanctioning process)
Bonn v. Commonwealth, No. 2009-CA-002304-MR. (Court of Appeals of Kentucky. May 6, 2011) UNPUBLISHED (Defendant not entitled to continuance of drug court termination hearing to obtain an expert who could testify that defendant’s 3 positive drug tests were due to sexual contact with cocaine users and sweat from barbershop customers)
State v. Watson, No. M2015-00108-CCA-R3-CD., (Tenn. Court of Criminal Appeals 2016) Drug court judge’s decision to leave the termination decision to team was an abdication of responsibility and a violation of due process Citing Tennessee v. Stewart, No. M2008-00474-CCA-R3-CD Filed October 6, 2008 Unpublished Opinion)
PEOPLE, IN INTEREST OF AKA-C., 2017 SD 38 (South Dakota Supreme Court 2017) (in termination hearing, Court did not improperly consider evidence adduced in mother’s drug court status hearings in violation of statute)
Gibson v. Kentucky, No. 2011-CA-001368-MR.,Court of Appeals of Kentucky, Rendered: January 18, 2013.NOT TO BE PUBLISHED (Finding that the defendant was accorded due process in his termination from drug court, the appellate court observed the following to be a proper trial court consideration in termination: “Gibson's unwillingness or inability to adopt basic tenants of Drug Court, such as honesty, constituted continued "addict thinking" and reflected negatively on Gibson's ability to remain compliant and crime-free within the community.”
Tennessee v. Stewart, No. M2008-00474-CCA-R3-CD - Filed October 6, 2008 Unpublished Opinion (Drug court judge’s decision to leave the termination decision to team was an abdication of responsibility and a violation of due process)
In re Day, 362 Or 547, 636, ___ P. 3d ___ (2018) (judge suspended from office for fraternizing with Veteran’s Treatment Court participant, among numerous other ethical and candor issues)
State v. Horne, (Tenn. Court of Criminal Appeals 2017) (Telling defendant that this is his last chance is not prohibited as pre-judging the consequences of the next infraction)
IN RE DISQUALIFICATION OF BLANCHARD, 2017 Ohio 5543 (Ohio Supreme Court 2017) ( “The fact that the same judge presides over a parent's dependency case and her drug-court hearings does not, without more, mandate the judge's disqualification from one of those matters. Nor does the fact that Judge Blanchard may have heard prejudicial information about the parents in drug-court hearings necessarily require his removal from the dependency cases. In general, what a judge learns in his official judicial capacity in another proceeding is not the kind of information that leads to disqualificationJudge Blanchard is also correct, however, that the ability of a judge to preside fairly and impartially in a particular matter must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis. Hypothetically, a judge could be exposed to such highly prejudicial information in a parent's drug-court hearings that the likelihood of bias or an appearance of bias in a parent's dependency case would be unacceptably high. But here, the parents' general and nonspecific claim that Judge Blanchard "heard numerous prejudicial facts" about them in drug-court hearings is insufficient to overcome the presumption of the judge's impartiality.)
Minnesota v. Cleary, 882 N.W.2d 899 (Court of Appeals of Minnesota July 5, 2016.) (When the sole basis for revoking probation is a probationer's termination from drug court and the drug court judge participated in the drug court team's decision to terminate the probationer from drug court, a probationer is entitled to have a judge other than the drug court judge preside over the probation revocation hearing, because of the appearance of lack of impartiality)
State v. Watson, No. M2015-00108-CCA-R3-CD., (Tenn: Court of Criminal Appeals 2016) Drug court judge’s not required to recuse or a violation of due process distinguishing Tennessee v. Stewart, No. M2008-00474-CCA-R3-CD Filed October 6, 2008 Unpublished Opinion and State v. Brent R. Stewart, No. W2009-00980-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 3293920 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 18, 2010). and)
State v. McGill, No. M2015-01929-CCA-R3-CD. (Tenn: Court of Criminal Appeals 7/18/2016) (Based on this Court's ruling in Donte Dewayne Watson, No. M2015-00108-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 791563 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 1, 2016), we conclude that there is no clear and unequivocal rule of law that a trial judge must recuse himself simply because he was also a member of a defendant's drug court team. There must be some proof in the record that the trial judge either received ex parte communications or was actively involved in the defendant's treatment in order to show that the trial judge was neither neutral nor detached. In this case, there is no proof in the record that the trial court judge was privy to any ex parte communications regarding the subject matter of Defendant's community corrections violation or that he relied upon information learned during the course of the drug court program without giving Defendant a fair chance for rebuttal.)
Dominey v. State (Tex. App., 2015) (defendant’s allegations that the judge obtained information from an extrajudicial source was rebutted by defendant’s own statements and no showing was made that the judge was anything but impartial in this deferred adjudication sentence)
Brookman v. State, 158 A.3d 1099 (2017) affirmed ____A. 3d ____ (Md. Ct of App. 7/31/2018) (Sanctions imposed reversed and remanded for a hearing. Defendants wanted to contest sanctions imposed without a hearing for low creatinine results and failure to appear for a drug test. Court held it was a due process violation to not accord an adversarial hearing, including the right to counsel, the ability to call witnesses, the right to put on mitigating evidence and a continuance, if necessary for preparation.)
Hoffman v. KNOEBEL, 894 F. 3d 836 (7th Circuit 2018) (Like many jurisdictions, Indiana has turned to "drug courts" to tackle substance-abuse problems more flexibly than traditional sentencing regimes might allow. Ind. Code § 33-23-16-5. These non-traditional court programs have been shown to reduce recidivism rates, at least in some jurisdictions. Compare Michael W. Finigan, et al., IMPACT OF A MATURE DRUG COURT OVER 10 YEARS OF OPERATION: RECIDIVISM AND COSTS 23-29 (Nat'l Inst. Just. 2007), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/219225.pdf (analyzing the successes of the drug court in Portland, Oregon, in reducing recidivism), with Randall T. Brown, Systematic Review of the Impact of Adult Drug Treatment Courts, 155 J. LABORATORY & CLINICAL MED. 263, 263 (2010) (finding that "randomized trials failed to demonstrate a consistent effect on rearrest rates for drug-involved offenders" participating in drug treatment courts). Unfortunately, the Drug Treatment Court ("DTC") in Clark County, Indiana, was not one of the success stories. Under the stewardship of Judge Jerome Jacobi, the court ran roughshod over the rights of its participants, who frequently languished in jail for weeks and even months without justification. The jail stays imposed as "sanctions" for noncompliance with program conditions were arbitrary and issued without due process. DTC staff made arrests despite a clear lack of authority to do so under state law. After these abuses were brought to light, numerous participants in the program filed a putative class action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Indiana Supreme Court and Indiana Judicial Center shut down the program……While we have no doubt that the plaintiffs' constitutional rights were violated, the question is whether these defendants (chief probation officer, Drug Court bailiff/field officer, Drug Court case manager and the Sheriff) were personally responsible for the systemic breakdown. Plaintiffs have failed to make that showing, and so the district court's judgment dismissing the action must be affirmed
Taylor v. State, CR-15-0354 (Ala. Crim. App. 9/9/16) (Sanctioning hearing using hearsay not due process violation. Concurrence: I realize that developing specific procedures for handling drug-court sanctions can be an arduous task — especially given the dearth of case law in this State addressing drug-court programs. I would encourage other drug-court judges in this State either to use or to develop a drug-court-sanction procedure similar to the one outlined in this Court's opinion (ie: provision of a hearing). I would also recommend to other drug-court professionals that they take advantage of the vast training resources and educational opportunities available through the National Association of Drug Court Professionals.)
Kemper v. State, Ind: No. 82A01-1508-CR-1104.(Court of Appeals 2016) Not Selected for Publication (In an appeal of a drug court’s imposition of a sanctions that the defendant thought were too harsh, the appellate court stated: Drug Court is a forensic diversion program akin to community corrections and probation. Withers v. State, 15 N.E.3d 660, 665 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). Accordingly, we review a trial court's sentencing decisions for Drug Court violations for an abuse of discretion. Id. We will find an abuse of discretion only where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances)
Commonwealth v. Nicely, 2009-SC-000313-DG (Ky. 11-18-2010) (“The dissent also expresses concern that a drug court sanction cannot be a modification of probation because the elements of due process normally accorded a defendant at a probation revocation hearing are not followed. For example, the defendant appearing before the drug court judge usually does not have counsel. However, defendants who enter drug court waive those rights while in the program, and upon discharge from the program, the defendant retains all those rights at any revocation hearing that follows.”)
Tyler T., 279 Neb. 806, 806 (2010) (“Given the therapeutic component of problem-solving-court programs, we are not prepared to say that each and every action taken in such a proceeding must be a matter of record. But we have no difficulty in concluding that when a judge of a problem-solving court conducts a hearing and enters an order affecting the terms of the juvenile's probation, the proceeding must be on the record. We agree with other courts which have held that where a liberty interest is implicated in problem-solving-court proceedings, an individual's due process rights must be respected.”).
Walker v. Lamberti, 29 So. 3d 1172, 1172 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that a defendant who voluntarily agreed to participate in drug court cannot subsequently opt out to avoid jail–based drug treatment program)
Thorne v. Hale, No. 1:08cv601 (JCC), 2009 WL 980136 (E.D. Va. Mar. 26, 2009) aff’d, Thorne v. Hale, No. 09-2305, WL1018048 (4th Cir. Mar. 19, 2010)(§1983 claimant was unsuccessful because of procedural requirements and absolute judicial immunity. However, the federal court makes staffings and the sanctioning process sound like a Star Chamber: “Thorne claims that, during the ‘sanctions’ hearings that followed his failure to adhere to the drug court's rules, the allegations against him, the testimony of witnesses, and the presentation of evidence violated his Sixth Amendment rights. Testimony, he asserts, was "made in secrete [sic] between the Drug Court and RACSB administrators, {Defendants Kelly Hale, Judith Alston and Sharon Gillian}," the RACSB, the Commonwealth's Attorney, and the state court judge, "to include whispered testimony to the presiding Judge at the bench, so as to exclude Plaintiff . . . from all measures of defense and redress commensurate with Due and Compulsory Process of Law.")
State v. Vargas, (N.J. Appellate Div. 2017) (Denial of drug court application merely because defendant went to trial and was convicted was error because “a court cannot impose a "trial penalty" on a defendant who chooses to invoke that constitutional right.”)
Wisc. V. Keister, Wisconsin Circuit Court, Iowa County, 7/16/17 (holding unconstitutional statutes that prohibited defendant from being admitted to drug court or being required to be expelled from drug court because he was charged with a violent offense)
State v. Barclay, ___ N.W. 2d ___ (Iowa Court of Appeals 1/11/2017) (Defendant asserts he was denied access to drug court because of his mental health disability—a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act-ADA. The court doubted whether the ADA provides rights at sentencing and held that Barclay had not proven his mental illness hampered a major life activity. The court also noted Barclay had not properly preserved his equal protection argument.)
State v. Easley, 322 P.3d 296 (Idaho 3-28-2014) (Prosecutor’s veto of court’s ability to re-sentence convicted offender to mental health court violated Separation of Powers doctrine, because the prosecutor was making eligibility determinations for the mental health court post-judgment rather than pre-judgment, it was exercising judicial functions.)
City of Cleveland v. Oke, 2018 Ohio 2846 (Ohio: Court of Appeals, 8th Appellate Dist. 2018) (double jeopardy when court sentenced defendant twice upon termination from drug court)
Hickman v. State, (Ind. Court of Appeals 6/29/2017) (imposition of sanctions in drug court and subsequent revocation did not constitute double jeopardy or res judicata)
One Car v. State, 122 S.W.3d 422, 422 (Tex. App. 2003) (Because the double jeopardy clause prohibits multiple criminal penalties for the same conduct, vehicle forfeitures and driver’s license revocations do not violate the double jeopardy clause)
Fochtman v. DARP, INC., Dist. Court, WD Arkansas 2018 (in putative federal class action lawsuit claiming violations of rights and statutes, arising from Plaintiffs' drug-court ordered participation in DARP's substance abuse recovery program, where DARP required Plaintiffs to work in Defendant Hendren's plastics plant. The federal court ordered that Defendants’ DARP and Hendren's Motions to Dismiss (are GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as follows: (1) Defendants' Motions to Dismiss Counts I (Failure to Pay Minimum Wage) and II (Failure to Pay Overtime) are DENIED; and (2) Defendants Motions to Dismiss Counts III (Slavery/Involuntary Servitude) and IV (Arkansas Human Trafficking Act) are GRANTED.
State v. Guise, Iowa: Court of Appeals 2018 (Use of the Iowa Risk Revised assessment tool at sentencing was improper, where court rejected plea agreement solely based on the IRR results. The court observed: “On this record, we only know that the IRR authorized intensive supervision. We do not know what the IRR is, what factors led to the recommendation of intensive supervision, or whether the factors were appropriate for consideration in the sentencing context. It is impossible to determine whether the IRR was relevant to the question of sentencing within the meaning of section 901.2(1). …… To reiterate, our record contains no information on what the IRR was intended to measure, how it was scored, what factors were considered in arriving at a score, or how the PSI evaluator applied the test to Guise. See Klingele, 91 Notre Dame L. Rev. at 576 ("As an initial matter, risk is a squishy concept and its variations (low, medium, and high) are subject to all manner of manipulation."). The IRR as described in Guise's PSI report was a black box, devoid of transparency.
Beisel v. Espinosa, Dist. Court, (MD Florida 2017) (While Beisel would have preferred a program integrating the use of narcotic medications, Espinosa's threatening to sanction Beisel if Beisel took narcotics obtained outside of the program does not qualify as deliberate indifference to Beisel's medical needs. Cf. Fredericks v. Huggins, 711 F.2d 31, 33-34 (4th Cir. 1983)(holding that requiring pre-trial detainees to stop methadone "cold turkey," causing them to suffer withdrawal, is not an unconstitutional violation of their civil rights).
State v. Nichols, (Wisc. Court of Appeals, 4th Dist. 3/2/2017)( To the extent that the sentencing court considered information regarding Nichols' experiences in drug court, we are satisfied that the court did not improperly rely on information prohibited by the drug court contract. Court finds that information relied upon came from sources other than what occurred in drug court including letters from defendant’s mother.)
State v. Loomis, 2016 WI 68 (Wisc. 2016) (consideration of risk assessment, such as COMPAS, at sentencing is permissible, reliance on such a tool is violation of due process because it would be sentencing on group data and the Constitution requires individualized sentencing.)
People v. JIHAN QQ., 2017 NY Slip Op 4524 (NY Appellate Div., 3rd Dept. 2017) (Sealing of drug court participant’s record was warranted although her case predated legislation)
Watson v. Kentucky, _____F. Supp. 2d ____, (E.D. Kentucky 7/7/15) ( At the hearing, Watson requested the state court take her off the conditional release terms or remove the "blanket prohibition on her taking Suboxone, Methadone or any other drugs that she needs" to treat her addiction. The state attorney clarified that there was not a blanket prohibition on MAT drug use, but that "it's generally the Court's practice to allow [MAT drug use] if the doctor will show [] medical need." The court agreed and instructed Watson to produce "medical proof and recommendations from a treating physician" that she needs to use MAT drugs as part of her treatment.. Watson also asked the state court to declare Kentucky's policy with regards to MAT drugs in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), the Rehabilitation Act. The state court denied Watson's request. At the hearing, Watson did not raise any other claims, constitutional or otherwise. Watson filed a complaint in federal court challenging the medication condition. She claims that conditioning her use of narcotics on a court's review of a doctor's note violates the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution, and § 2 of the Kentucky Constitution. Watson asks the Court to enjoin the Kentucky Administrative Office of the Courts from enforcing the medication condition. Held: Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) bars Watson’s claims because they can be adequately dealt with in state court.)
In Re the Matter of R.A., 2012 OK CIV APP 65 (2012) (“Based upon our review of the record, this Court finds the three ISPs entered in this case failed to adequately address the actual "condition" Mother needs to correct — her mental illness. Mother's substance abuse clearly follows and flows directly from her mental health condition. Matter of C.R.T., , 66 P.3d at 1010. Mother's history of significant trauma leading her to need to self-medicate is a condition that the psychological evaluation and Ms. Wilburn both conceded could not be corrected "solely through the efforts of Mother" without "medical, psychiatric, and psychological intervention." Id., 66 P.3d at 1009. As such, termination of Mother's parental rights based upon a failure to correct conditions where Mother's mental health condition was not correctly identified and/or addressed by DHS constitutes a violation of Mother's substantive due process rights.[fn9]Id. ¶ 34 Additionally, the ISPs failed to effectively offer Mother the "opportunity to ameliorate [her] condition and to effectively defend against termination efforts" by failing to adequately address her mental illness. Matter of C.G. , 637 P.2d at 68. While evidence was presented to show Mother failed to correct the conditions stated in her ISPs, the ISPs failed to properly identify, address or offer services specifically directed to the recognized cause of Mother's substance abuse — her severe mental health issues. In failing to incorporate the information and recommendations garnered from Mother's November 2010 court-ordered psychological evaluation into her ISP, Mother was not afforded the full spectrum of procedural safeguards to guard against termination of her parental rights.”)
Beinor v. ICAO, 262 P.3d 970 (Colo. App.2011) (constitutional authorization to use medical marijuana did not trump employer’s prohibition against drug usage and firing w/o unemployment compensation benefits upheld)
XVIII. Miscellaneous, including suits against Drug Court Team Members
LAVITE v. Dunstan, Dist. Court, (SD Illinois 2018) (Denying summary judgment motion, in large part, in suit against county and sheriff, brought by decorated vet, who formed Veterans Treatment Court, when he had a PTSD incident and was then barred from county buildings).
Hoffman v. KNOEBEL, (Dist. Court, SD Indiana 2017)(Dismissing claims against sheriff and drug court employees but observing: “ In conclusion, we acknowledge Plaintiffs' pervasive, palpable frustration in waging this legal assault, which feeling arises out of their inability to overcome the central obstacle to their success, that is, the fact that the primary tortfeasor responsible for their constitutional deprivations was Clark Circuit Court Judge Jerome Jacobi acting in his role as the presiding judge of the Drug Treatment Court……. In appropriate cases, state actors, including judges, may be subject to suit for prospective injunctive relief to enjoin their future unconstitutional practices from being committed in their official capacities. Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984). This avenue of relief typically is available to a person confined by a state who seeks to challenge the fact or duration of his confinement. Here, however, such remedies are not available because, following the reports of due process violations to the Indiana Judicial Center, the DTC was decertified, the remaining participants were allowed to complete the Program under the guidance of Chief Judge Carmichael, Judge Jacobi was removed from office (along with several members of his staff), and the operations of the problem-solving court officially ended in June 2015.)
Sturkin v. Patrick, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, (Dist. Court, SD Mississippi 2017)(Claimant’s assertion that her drug court parole officer harassed her stated §1983 claim and not barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994)).
SM v. Lincoln County, ___ F. 3d ___, (8th Circuit Court of Appeals, 2017) (affirming substantial verdict against County for failure to supervise drug court tracker who was sexually assaulting drug court participants and whose job involved monitoring drug court participants by home visits and other supervision tools.
Carlisle v. Normand, Dist. Court, ED Louisiana 2017 (§1983 Civil Rights claim based on allegations that Drug Court violated their constitutional rights by imprisoning them without due process, in the form of probation sanctions, contempt convictions, and time spent waiting dismissed because under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994)--a defendant may not impugn a state sentence unless the sentence has already been invalidated)