Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/822/481/373452/
Timestamp: 2020-07-07 12:31:21
Document Index: 708376106

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 401', '§ 3623', '§ 1503', '§ 1623', '§ 3013', 'sui generis', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 4083', '§ 1', '§ 114', '§ 3623', '§ 401', '§ 201', '§ 401', '§ 402', '§ 1705', '§ 32', '§ 1', '§ 893', '§ 916', '§ 3401', '§ 1', '§ 3013', '§ 104', '§ 3565', '§ 2411', '§ 2411']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Paul H. "bud" Holmes, Defendant-appellant, 822 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1987) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Fifth Circuit › 1987 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Paul H. "bud" Holmes, Defendant-appellant
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Paul H. "bud" Holmes, Defendant-appellant, 822 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1987)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit - 822 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1987) July 7, 1987
Appellant Paul H. ("Bud") Holmes challenges the legality of a one-year sentence of imprisonment that, together with a fine of $10,000, was imposed pursuant to his plea of guilty to and consequent conviction of contempt under 18 U.S.C. § 401(1). Holmes contends that the contempt statute does not authorize both imprisonment and a fine for a single offense, but instead only permits a court to impose as alternative sentences either a fine or imprisonment, and not both. Appellant's position is that he fully satisfied his sentence by paying the fine, and that he cannot now be required to undergo imprisonment.
The government contends that the sentence was proper because appellant was convicted of two or more contempt offenses. However, we determine that appellant was charged with, pleaded guilty to, and was convicted of only a single offense of contempt, and that hence under section 401 he could not be sentenced to both a fine and imprisonment, although he could have been sentenced to either. We also reject the government's alternative contention that 18 U.S.C. § 3623, taken together with section 401, authorized imposition of both a fine and imprisonment for a single offense under section 401. Therefore, we hold, pursuant to In re Bradley, 318 U.S. 50, 63 S. Ct. 470, 87 L. Ed. 608 (1943), that appellant, since he has fully paid his fine, must be discharged from his sentence of imprisonment.
Appellant was originally charged in a five-count indictment returned March 29, 1985 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, Hattiesburg Division. Count I of the indictment charged appellant with attempting to interfere with or impede the investigation of the federal grand jury in the Hattiesburg Division by various actions in 1984 and 1985, contrary to 18 U.S.C. § 1503, and Counts II through V charged him with perjury in his testimony before the same grand jury on various dates in 1984 and 1985, contrary to 18 U.S.C. § 1623. The indictment alleged that the grand jury was investigating allegations of official corruption in the Southern District of Mississippi, and as a part of that investigation was examining, among other things, the circumstances of the transfer of mineral royalty interests from Wiley Fairchild, a Hattiesburg businessman, to United States District Judge Walter Nixon, and the handling by appellant, in his then capacity as state district attorney in that area, an office he held from January 1980 to January 1984, of a drug smuggling case involving Wiley Fairchild's son, Drew Fairchild, which arose out of an August 1980 arrest at the Hattiesburg airport. The subject matter of Count I was the allegation that appellant sought to keep the grand jury from learning about a 1982 telephone call from appellant's farm to Wiley Fairchild in which appellant and Judge Nixon assured Wiley Fairchild that the drug smuggling case against his son, Drew Fairchild, would be resolved by appellant to Wiley Fairchild's satisfaction. The other counts in the indictment did not relate to this telephone conversation with Wiley Fairchild, or indeed to any other contact with him.1
On June 18, 1985, just as appellant's trial on this indictment was beginning (though apparently the jury had not yet been impaneled), appellant entered into a plea agreement with the government, pursuant to which he pleaded guilty to an information charging him with contempt under section 401(1), and the government agreed to dismiss the indictment against him. The agreement also called for appellant to give complete and truthful testimony to the United States at interviews, before the grand jury, and at trial, and the United States agreed to make known to the court at sentencing any cooperation provided by appellant. On the same day, appellant filed a waiver of indictment, the court allowed the information to be filed and, after the appropriate hearing under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, accepted appellant's plea of guilty to the information and entered a judgment of guilty on appellant's plea. Appellant was continued on bond.2
On December 11, 1985, Holmes appeared before the district court for sentencing. The court imposed a sentence of a $10,000 fine and one year in prison. The court granted appellant's motion that he be allowed to self-surrender, and directed that appellant report to his designated place of confinement on February 18, 1986, to commence the service of his sentence to imprisonment. The court also imposed a $50 special assessment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3013. Then, on the government's motion, the court ordered the indictment dismissed.
On its face, the information appears to charge only a single offense and to specify three acts done by appellant as the means whereby the offense was accomplished. Several additional factors tend to support this conclusion. First, it is not clear that appellant could have been convicted of section 401(1) contempt merely for "inquir [ing] of others whether they had discussed a telephone call with federal authorities so as to be able to tailor his own grand jury testimony," as the information alleges in clause (a), because these acts may not have occurred in the presence of the court "or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice."10 Second, the form of the information suggests only a single charge, especially when pertinent provisions of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are considered. Unlike the last four counts of the indictment, each of which charges a separate single violation of the same statute and each of which specifically alleges that same statute, the information mentions the statute violated only once and does not plainly and definitely identify separate and multiple counts.11
Third, although clauses (b) and (c) allege acts that might support separate contempt charges,12 the issue is not whether the acts alleged might have been charged as separate offenses, but whether they were in fact so charged. On this point, our decision in Carter v. United States, 135 F.2d 858, 864 (5th Cir. 1943), is plainly controlling and requires us to reject the government's multiple offenses argument. To the same effect is United States v. Berardi, 675 F.2d 894, 897-88 (7th Cir. 1982). Cf. United States v. Hilburn, 625 F.2d 1177 (5th Cir. 1980) (involving multiple acts that resulted in only a single contempt charge and conviction); United States v. Barnette, 546 F.2d 187 (5th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 822, 98 S. Ct. 65, 54 L. Ed. 2d 79 (1977). If the information had charged these acts as separate contempt offenses, and if appellant had pleaded guilty to an information so framed, different and cumulative penalties for each offense could have been imposed. E.g., Rapp v. United States, 146 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1944) (six different violations of an injunction); Hoffman v. United States, 13 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1926) (distinct violations of two different commitment orders). But that is not the case here, and we are governed by Carter.
An additional indication that only a single offense of contempt was charged is that the district court imposed only a single sentence, and did not purport to, for example, impose a fine respecting the allegations of clause (a) and imprisonment respecting the allegations of clauses (b) and (c). If the court's sentence was not imposed as a sentence for a single contempt offense, there is absolutely no way to tell what sentence was imposed on which assertedly separate contempt.13 The experienced district judge was, we must presume, well aware that it had long been the law of this Circuit that distinct and separate sentences must be expressly imposed on each separate offense of which the accused is convicted, and that it is wholly improper to impose a single, general sentence covering two or more separate offenses. Benson v. United States, 332 F.2d 288, 291-92 (5th Cir. 1964).
" [Appellant]: I have, your honor.
" [Appellant]: I did, Your Honor.
" [Appellant]: I do, Your Honor.
"THE COURT: What is the Government's evidence [ ] to this charge ?
" [MR. WEINGARTEN]: Before I get to [the sentencing issue] I will like to just briefly set the scene as the crime was committed in this case....
" [THE COURT]: In accordance with and pursuant to the plea agreement entered into, Mr. Holmes, I sentence you to serve one year in the custody of the Attorney General, impose a fine of $10,000 and a special assessment...."
The government contends that a provision of the Criminal Fine Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 98-596, 98 Stat. 3137, codified at 18 U.S.C.A. Sec. 3623, offers independent authority for the imposition of a fine in addition to a prison sentence ordered under the contempt statute. Section 3623, entitled "alternative fines," applies to offenses committed after December 31, 1984, and in pertinent part provides as follows (footnote added):
"(2) the applicable amount under subsection (c) of this section15 ;
The interpretation of section 3623 advocated by the government is that, for a single contempt offense, a court can order prison under the contempt statute and a fine--as an additional punishment--under section 3623. That section speaks in the disjunctive, allowing a court to impose a fine "not more than the greatest of" alternatives (a) (1), (a) (2), (a) (3), (a) (4), "or " (a) (5). The government does not clearly claim but we view its argument as suggesting that this power to impose a fine as an additional sentence exists either (1) because subsection (a) (1) permits the imposition of a fine as high as that allowed by section 401 or (2) that the court derives the power to impose a fine from the fact that the punishments possible for contempt are such that the offense is a felony or misdemeanor and thus falls within subsection (a) (3) or (a) (5).16
"The first is the oft-cited rule that ' "ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity." ' ... And the second is the principle that a more specific statute will be given precedence over a more general one, regardless of their temporal sequence.... [These principles] serve [ ] as 'an outgrowth of our reluctance to increase or multiply punishments absent a clear and definite legislative directive.' " Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398, 100 S. Ct. 1747, 1753, 64 L. Ed. 2d 381 (1980) (citations omitted).17
Another settled principle is that "repeals by implication are not favored ... and will not be found unless an intent to repeal is ' "clear and manifest." ' " Rodriguez v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 107 S. Ct. 1391, 1392, 94 L. Ed. 2d 533 (1987) (per curiam) (citations omitted). A repeal by implication may be inferred if a newly enacted provision presents an irreconcilable conflict with an earlier statute. Id.
(ii) Section 401 does not specify an amount of fine within subsection (a) (1)
Although section 3623 reflects a congressional purpose of increasing the amount of fines that can be imposed for most offenses, subsection (a) (1) makes it clear that fine amounts specified in offense statutes higher than those permitted under subsections 3623(a) (2) through (a) (5) are preserved.19 Subsection (a) (1) does not mesh so smoothly, however, with the contempt statute, which contains no "amount specified in the law setting forth the offense." Section 401 makes no mention of any amount. Hence subsection (a) (1) would appear to be inapplicable to section 401. We cannot construe subsection (a) (1) as the government urges.
(iii) Contempt is not a felony or misdemeanor within subsections (a) (3) and (a) (5)
Nor does the language of subsections (a) (3) and (a) (5) clearly apply to section 401. Subsection (a) (3) is applicable only to a "felony," and subsection (a) (5) is applicable only to a "misdemeanor." Yet, the Supreme Court has never characterized contempt as either a felony or a misdemeanor, but rather has described it as "an offense sui generis." Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 86 S. Ct. 1523, 1526, 16 L. Ed. 2d 629 (1966). See also Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 89 S. Ct. 1503, 1506 n. 5, 23 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1969) (quoting with approval portion of Cheff containing this language). This is how the government characterized contempt to the district court at the sentencing hearing here ("Of course, it's a unique crime, it's not a felony, it's not a misdemeanor."). And, at the Rule 11 hearing below, the government had made clear that appellant was pleading guilty "to something other than a felony." Although 18 U.S.C. § 1 purports to classify all offenses as either felonies, misdemeanors, or petty offense misdemeanors, based on the maximum potential punishment authorized,20 the Supreme Court has never applied this statute to categorize contempt as a felony, as the terms of section 1 would require. In determining the right to trial by jury for contempt, the Court has rather "decided by analogy to 18 U.S.C. § 1 that penalties not exceeding those authorized for petty offenses could be imposed in criminal contempt cases without affording the right to a jury trial." Frank, 89 S. Ct. at 1506 (emphasis added). Yet at the same time, the Court recognized that "Congress ... has not categorized contempts as 'serious' or 'petty.' " Id. at 1505 (emphasis added). Similarly, the Court has rejected reliance on 18 U.S.C. § 4083, providing that those convicted of offenses punishable by more than a year's imprisonment may be confined in a penitentiary, as basis for concluding that contempts, since they may be so punished, are therefore "infamous crimes" for which the Fifth Amendment requires a grand jury indictment, notwithstanding that potential penitentiary imprisonment was recognized as the standard in this respect for offenses generally. Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 78 S. Ct. 632, 642, 2 L. Ed. 2d 672 (1958). The Green Court likewise implicitly rejected the argument of Justice Black's dissent there that contempt was a felony--for which a grand jury was required--by virtue of the definition in 18 U.S.C. § 1. Id. at 652 & n. 11. See also United States v. Nunn, 622 F.2d 802, 803-04 (5th Cir. 1980) (grand jury not required in federal contempt).21
The title of section 3623--"alternative fines," not "additional fines"--indicates that the section was intended to address the amount of the fine that might be imposed rather than to authorize multiple fines for a single offense. See House v. Commissioner, 453 F.2d 982 (5th Cir. 1972).22 The statute speaks only to the amount of a fine that may be imposed, and not to whether a fine may be imposed. Nowhere in section 3623 did Congress write that fines imposed under that provision were to be in addition to fines authorized by the offense statutes. To the extent that any ambiguity exists about the relationship of section 3623 to other criminal statutes, we view our interpretation of the section as dictated by the principle that we cannot " 'increase or multiply punishments absent a clear and definite legislative directive.' " Busic, 100 S. Ct. at 1753 (citation omitted). Moreover, we must regard section 401 as the more specific statute dealing with the offense of contempt and the imposition of fines in contempt cases, and section 3623 as a more general statute dealing with fines in offense convictions generally. Construing the two together, "a more specific statute will be given precedence over a more general one, regardless of their temporal sequence." Busic, 100 S. Ct. at 1753.
The foregoing principles are particularly applicable where the underlying offense statute provides for a fine. The government's argument would lead to the conclusion that in those instances the section 3623 fine can be imposed in addition to the fine authorized by the underlying offense statute. Thus, for example, under the government's theory, for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 114, a $25,000 fine could be imposed under section 114 and, in addition, a fine of $250,000 could also be imposed under section 3623(a) (3). We reject that construction. We think it unlikely such a result was intended by Congress. And, since that construction is not clearly mandated by the language of section 3623, to adopt it is to run counter to the above-noted principles of Busic.
We are strengthened in this conclusion by the realization that Congress could have easily made its intention in this respect clear. In the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Congress included the provision now codified as 18 U.S.C.A. Sec. 3551. Pub. L. No. 98-473, Sec. 212(a). This section expressly provides, "A sentence to pay a fine may be imposed in addition to any other sentence." Sec. 3551(b). The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, containing section 3551, was passed by Congress on October 11, 1984, the same day Congress passed the Criminal Fine Enforcement Act, containing section 3623. Pub. L. No. 98-596, Sec. 6(a). Yet Congress, in enacting section 3551, provided that it would not go into effect until November 1986, see Pub. L. No. 98-473, Sec. 235, and in December 1985 the effective date was further extended to November 1987. See Pub. L. No. 99-217, Secs. 2, 4. Congress thus had in mind, when it enacted section 3623, the question of whether fines would be additional to all other penalties, as well as the language to provide an affirmative answer to that question. Nevertheless, it chose not to so provide in section 3623 or elsewhere in the Criminal Fine Enforcement Act; it did so provide in section 3551, but chose to postpone the effective date of that section. The government is asking us, in effect, to disregard the effective date provisions of section 3551. We decline to do so.
We have held that appellant was convicted of only one contempt under section 401, and that accordingly his sentence to both a fine and imprisonment is illegal as being contrary to section 401 and not authorized by section 3623. Consequently, the district court, in its determination of appellant's Rule 35 motion, erred in holding that appellant's sentence was legal. The final question, then, is the relief to which appellant is entitled. Appellant contends that, since he has paid his fine, he is entitled to have his prison sentence vacated under In re Bradley, 318 U.S. 50, 63 S. Ct. 470, 87 L. Ed. 608 (1943). The government asserts that if the sentence is illegal the district court should nevertheless be allowed to now resentence appellant to impose imprisonment only, as the court at the Rule 35 hearing indicated it would intend to do in the event the sentence to both fine and imprisonment were ultimately held illegal.24 In this connection, the government argues that Bradley has been undermined by later decisions and is not controlling because district courts now have broader resentencing power and because the fine here was prematurely paid and can be returned before appellant serves any imprisonment. We now turn to these contentions.
"It follows that the subsequent amendment of the sentence could not avoid the satisfaction of the judgment, and the attempt to accomplish that end was a nullity. Since one valid alternative provision of the original sentence has been satisfied, the petitioner is entitled to be freed of further restraint." Id., 63 S. Ct. at 470-71 (footnotes omitted).
Bradley appears to control this case and has been followed without deviation in both this and other Circuits.26 Although the government concedes that the decision has never been explicitly overruled, it contends that the Supreme Court has since undermined Bradley by limiting Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 21 L. Ed. 872 (1873), upon which Bradley relied,27 in United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 101 S. Ct. 426, 66 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1980).
We need not recount in full the argument of the government on this point; it suffices for us to state that the government urges this Court to do what the Supreme Court has declined to do--that is, to read DiFrancesco as impliedly fully overruling Lange and, through Lange, Bradley. The government contends that the latter two decisions rested upon a double jeopardy theory repudiated by DiFrancesco. To the contrary, we find that the Supreme Court in DiFrancesco carefully distinguished Lange and explained why that decision was unaffected. First, DiFrancesco described as dictum language in United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304, 51 S. Ct. 113, 114, 75 L. Ed. 354 (1931), "to the effect that the federal practice of barring an increase in sentence by the trial court after service of the sentence has begun is constitutionally based." DiFrancesco, 101 S. Ct. at 438. Then the Court specifically stated that this "dictum" remained applicable in cases like Lange where resentencing would impose punishment which, when added to that already satisfied, would exceed what could have been imposed initially:
Faced with this plain approval of the rule of Lange (and, impliedly, of Bradley) barring further punishment that, with the punishment already suffered, would exceed the limits legislatively authorized, we cannot view Bradley as having been undermined or overruled by DiFrancesco, as the government urges. The Supreme Court may overrule its own earlier decisions, but this Court cannot.
The government nevertheless calls to our attention numerous cases involving a district court's power to correct an illegal sentence. Indeed, we have stated as a general rule that " [f]ederal courts have uniformly held that resentencing to correct an illegal sentence does not implicate double jeopardy rights." United States v. Denson, 603 F.2d 1143, 1148 (5th Cir. 1979) (en banc).29 Correction of a sentence can occur even if service of the sentence has begun, United States v. Allen, 588 F.2d 183, 185 (5th Cir. 1979), even if the correct sentence may be more onerous to the defendant than the original, e.g., Llerena v. United States, 508 F.2d 78, 80-81 (5th Cir. 1975).
We respect the thrust of language cited by the government from Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160, 67 S. Ct. 645, 649, 91 L. Ed. 818 (1947) (citations omitted):
"This Court has rejected the 'doctrine that a prisoner, whose guilt is established by a regular verdict, is to escape punishment altogether because the court committed an error in passing the sentence.' ... The Constitution does not require that sentencing should be a game in which a wrong move by the judge means immunity for the prisoner.... In this case the court 'only set aside what it had no authority to do, and substitute [d] directions required by the law to be done upon the conviction of the offender.' "35
However, Bozza does not purport to depart from Lange or Bradley. See Bozza, 67 S. Ct. at 649 n. 2 (citing Lange and Bradley as examples of cases in which "the trial court could not correct the sentence without causing him to suffer double punishment"). Furthermore, although appellant will serve no time in prison for this offense, he has not "escape [d] punishment altogether."
Bradley may be overly technical, as Chief Justice Stone contended in his dissent there, arguing that the less than one day the contemnor had been deprived of his money was de minimis. 63 S. Ct. at 471. But it is not for us to overrule or modify Bradley. We also note that Congress has had more than four decades since Bradley was handed down in which to amend the contempt statute's provision limiting punishment to a "fine or imprisonment." Recognizing that an amendment allowing a fine in addition to any other punishment on every offense conviction is scheduled to go into effect in November 1987, we are nonetheless bound to apply existing law.
" [T]o the extent that cases can be hypothesized in which this holding may support curious or seemingly unreasonable comparative sentences, it suffices to say that the asserted unreasonableness flows not from ... this decision, but from the statutes as Congress wrote them. If corrective action is needed, it is ... Congress that must provide it. 'It is not for us to speculate, much less act, on whether Congress would have altered its stance had the specific events of this case been anticipated.' " Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398, 100 S. Ct. 1747, 1752, 64 L. Ed. 2d 381 (1980) (citations omitted).
I therefore vigorously dissent from the Court's holding that the sentence is beyond correction. I concur, however, in the Court's conclusion that Holmes was charged in the information with a single count of contempt and in its conclusion that there is no basis whatsoever for the government's contention that 18 U.S.C. § 3623 authorizes a $10,000 fine in addition to a prison sentence for a single contempt under 18 U.S.C. § 401.
My disagreement with the Court lies entirely with its reliance on the authority of In re Bradley, 318 U.S. 50, 63 S. Ct. 470, 87 L. Ed. 608 (1943). In re Bradley relies entirely on Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 21 L. Ed. 872 (1874), which was restricted to its facts by the Supreme Court in United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 101 S. Ct. 426, 66 L. Ed. 2d 328 (1980). Thus, the continued validity of Bradley is extremely questionable.
Rule 35 provides that " [t]he court may correct an illegal sentence at any time." Not only does the District Court have the ability to correct illegal sentences under Rule 35, we have additionally held that "when a sentence imposed ... does not conform to the applicable penalty statute, [the District Court] has a duty to correct this sentence." United States v. Hilburn, 625 F.2d 1177, 1182 (5th Cir. 1980), citing United States v. Allen, 588 F.2d 183, 185 (5th Cir. 1979). As the Court unanimously concludes, a sentence of both a fine and imprisonment under Sec. 401 is an illegal sentence, the only question is determining what relief is available to correct this illegal sentence.
In United States v. Hilburn, 625 F.2d 1177, 1181 (5th Cir. 1980), we affirmed the District Court's correction of a sentence which imposed both a fine and imprisonment for contempt under Sec. 401. We did not reach the Bradley question there because the illegal sentence was corrected prior to any attempt by the defendant to satisfy either portion.1 Therefore, there is no way to get away from the startling fact that Holmes' sentence, illegal from the very moment it was announced by the District Court, was subject at that time to correction under F.R.Crim.P. 35(a). In re Bradley becomes a necessary factor in our analysis because, unlike Hilburn, Holmes' sentence was not reformed until after he paid his fine.
The primary question on this appeal--and my principal difference with the Court--is whether the Bradley rule has continuing validity following the adoption of F.R.Crim.P. 35 and the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 101 S. Ct. 426, 66 L. Ed. 2d 328 (1980).
Judge Richard T. Rives, former Chief Judge and a distinguished Judge of this Court, found himself in a similar position writing for the three Judge District Court panel in the celebrated Montgomery, Alabama bus case of Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956), aff'd, 352 U.S. 903, 77 S. Ct. 145, 1 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1956), in stating that Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 16 S. Ct. 1138, 41 L. Ed. 256 (1896), was implicitly overruled by Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686, 98 L. Ed. 873 (1954). The Supreme Court referred to Plessy six separate times in Brown v. Board without ever expressly overruling it.2 Nevertheless, over the respectful dissent of District Chief Judge Seybourn H. Lynne, Judge Rives, obviously conscious of the portent of his actions, wrote:
In re Bradley, 318 U.S. at 52, 63 S. Ct. at 471, 87 L. Ed. at 609.
This is not the proposition which Ex parte Lange continues to support. In DiFrancesco the Supreme Court restricted Ex parte Lange to its facts. The Supreme Court stated: "The holding in Lange, and thus the dictum in [United States v.] Benz, [282 U.S. 304, 51 S. Ct. 113, 75 L. Ed. 354 (1931),] are not susceptible of general application. We confine the dictum in Benz to Lange's specific context." DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 139, 101 S. Ct. at 438, 66 L. Ed. 2d at 347.
Lange was sentenced to one year imprisonment and a $200 fine under a statute providing for either fine or imprisonment. After serving five days in jail, he paid his fine and moved to vacate the remaining portion of his prison sentence. The District Court vacated his sentence and re-sentenced Lange to one year's imprisonment commencing from that date. Thus, the total sentence Lange would have served was one year and five days which exceeded the one year maximum under the statute. The Court traced its inability to amend a sentence in 1874 back to the English common law. It concluded that a Court was without authority to vacate a sentence and re-sentence the defendant, even if done during the same term, because it had no way of avoiding the portion already served. Hence, the result would be that the defendant would serve two sentences for a single crime. Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 168-78, 21 L. Ed. at 876-78.
The Supreme Court, in DiFrancesco, held that Ex parte Lange continues to support the proposition that "a defendant may not receive a greater sentence than the legislature has authorized." DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 139, 101 S. Ct. at 438, 66 L. Ed. 2d at 347. It no longer supports the proposition cited in Bradley that once an alternative penalty of a sentence is served, the Court is unable to reform the remaining portion to make the total sentence legal.
The later development of sentence correction law under F.R.Crim.P. 35 demonstrates that, contrary to the Court's conclusion in both Bradley and Lange, the power of a Court is no longer at an end once a portion of the sentence is incurred. "Correction of a sentence imposed in an illegal manner does not violate double jeopardy even if the correction increases the punishment, and the fact that [the defendant] has commenced serving the sentence is irrelevant." United States v. Crawford, 769 F.2d 253, 258 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 106 S. Ct. 887, 88 L. Ed. 2d 922 (1986), quoting United States v. Stevens, 548 F.2d 1360, 1362-63 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 975, 97 S. Ct. 1666, 52 L. Ed. 2d 369 (1977);4 see also, United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 132-39, 101 S. Ct. at 434-38, 66 L. Ed. 2d at 342-47; Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160, 166, 67 S. Ct. 645, 649, 91 L. Ed. 818, 822 (1947), United States v. Allen, 588 F.2d 183, 185 (5th Cir. 1979).
As the majority identifies, since the adoption of F.R.Crim.P. 35, we have not hesitated to correct illegal sentences even after service of the sentence has begun. See, e.g., United States v. Olivares, 786 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v. Crawford, 769 F.2d 253 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 106 S. Ct. 887, 88 L. Ed. 2d 922 (1986); United States v. Denson, 603 F.2d 1143 (5th Cir. 1979) (en banc); United States v. Allen, 588 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1979); Llerena v. United States, 508 F.2d 78 (5th Cir. 1975).
The majority distinguishes these cases by adopting Bradley's language that once the defendant has complied with a portion of the sentence which could lawfully have been imposed, the Court may not later reform that sentence. Yet, in United States v. Rollins, 543 F.2d 574, 575 (5th Cir. 1977), the defendant was sentenced to a term of three years and a term of ten years under a statute which provided for a maximum of ten years imprisonment. After the defendant served his three-year sentence, this Court permitted his ten-year sentence to be reformed so that "when coupled with the other three years already served, [it] will not exceed the statutory maximum." Rollins' reformed sentence did not violate his rights against double punishment because, as reformed, his total sentence did not exceed the statutory maximum.
Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160, 166-67, 67 S. Ct. 645, 649, 91 L. Ed. 818, 822 (1947).
As reflected in the opinion in United States v. Nixon, 816 F.2d 1022 (5th Cir. 1987), Judge Nixon was indicted and tried on one count of accepting something of value respecting an official act (18 U.S.C. § 201(g)) and three counts of perjury in grand jury testimony, was acquitted as to the section 201(g) count and one of the perjury counts, and was convicted on two of the perjury counts involving his testimony concerning his relationship to the Drew Fairchild case and whether appellant ever discussed it with him. Appellant testified as a government witness in that case concerning, among other things, the 1982 telephone call from his farm to Wiley Fairchild in which appellant and Judge Nixon participated and discussed the Drew Fairchild case. Nixon, 816 F.2d at 1029
Rule 35(a), Fed. R. Crim. P., as currently in effect (it has been amended effective November 1, 1987), provides: "The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time...." Appellant contends that his case involves an "illegal sentence."
"(1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice...." 18 U.S.C. § 401 (emphasis added).
In marked contrast to section 401, 18 U.S.C. § 402 defines criminal contempt and authorizes the imposition of "fine or imprisonment, or both " (emphasis added).
Our partial survey of Title 18 (section 1 to section 1992), discloses that the vast majority of criminal statutes allow a court to impose imprisonment, a fine, "or both." We found only two statutory provisions in addition to section 401 that allow the alternative punishments of prison or a fine without "or both" language. See 18 U.S.C. § 1705 (destruction of letter boxes or mail: "shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than three years"); Sec. 1916 (unauthorized employment or disposition of lapsed appropriations: "shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year"). Some sections provide only for a fine, e.g., Sec. 432 (government employee contracting with a member of Congress); Sec. 475 (imitating securities or obligations); Sec. 489 (making or possessing likenesses of coins). A somewhat larger number of sections provide only for imprisonment or death, e.g., Sec. 794(a) (gathering or delivering defense information to aid a foreign government); Sec. 1111 (murder); Sec. 1114 (murder and attempted murder of federal officials); Sec. 1116 (murder or manslaughter of foreign officials); Sec. 1201 (kidnapping); Sec. 1203 (hostage-taking); and Secs. 1651, 1652, 1658(b), 1660 (various piracy provisions).
E.g., Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 78 S. Ct. 632, 642, 2 L. Ed. 2d 672 (1958) (stating that the word "or" in section 401 means that "the court must choose between fine and imprisonment"); In re Bradley, 318 U.S. 50, 63 S. Ct. 470, 87 L. Ed. 680 (1943)
E.g., United States v. Hilburn, 625 F.2d 1177, 1181 & n. 4 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. DiGirlomo, 548 F.2d 252, 254 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Miller, 540 F.2d 1213, 1214 (4th Cir. 1976); United States v. Sampogne, 533 F.2d 766, 767 (2d Cir. 1976)
Rule 7(c) (1), Fed. R. Crim. P., states (emphasis added):
Rule 8(a), Fed. R. Crim. P., provides (emphasis added):
At the Rule 35 motion hearing, the district court indicated that it viewed Holmes' plea as based on two contempts, one outside of the presence of the grand jury (clause (a)) and one in the presence of the grand jury (clauses (b) and (c)). The Supreme Court has held that perjury alone--without additional acts obstructing justice or otherwise contemptuous--during trial was not punishable by a court's contempt power. See In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 66 S. Ct. 78, 79 n. 1, 79-80, 90 L. Ed. 30 (1945). The Court expressly reserved whether one can be punished for contempt for giving perjured testimony before a grand jury. In re Michael, 66 S. Ct. at 80. We have held that grand jury perjury may constitute contempt. United States v. Griffin, 589 F.2d 200, 205 (5th Cir.) (perjury which obstructs the administration of justice by "closing off avenues of inquiry entirely"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 825, 100 S. Ct. 48, 62 L. Ed. 2d 32 (1979)
"(c) (1) If the defendant derives pecuniary gain from the offense, or if the offense results in pecuniary loss to another person, the defendant may be fined not more than the greater of twice the gross gain or twice the gross loss, unless imposition of a fine under this subsection would unduly complicate or prolong the sentencing process.
Subsections (a) (2) and (4) clearly do not apply. Because there is no allegation of pecuniary gain to Holmes or pecuniary loss to another, and there is only one offense, section 3623(c), see note 15, supra, is inapplicable, and hence subsection (a) (2), which depends on section 3623(c), is likewise inapplicable. The absence of any allegation of resulting death suffices to rule out consideration of subsection (a) (4)
For example, setting fire to an aircraft is punishable by up to twenty years in prison and a $100,000 fine, 18 U.S.C. § 32(a) (1); arson involving a dwelling in the territorial jurisdiction of the United States is also punishable by a twenty-year sentence, but only by a $5,000 fine, Sec. 81; setting fire to a vessel, also punishable by a twenty-year sentence, involves a maximum fine of $10,000, Sec. 2275. These variations likely arose from the piecemeal enactment and amendment of various criminal offense provisions in Title 18. Because all three of these arson offenses are felonies, see 18 U.S.C. § 1(1), under section 3623(a) (3) a maximum alternative fine of $250,000 would be applicable to each offense
Our survey of Title 18, by no means exhaustive, indicates that statutes with higher fines than those authorized by section 3623 are comparatively rare but do appear. For example, one who advances $1 million as financing for another offender's loan-sharking activities and who receives back both his principal and $100,000 as profit can be imprisoned for as many as twenty years and fined up to $2 million under an existing statutory offense provision. 18 U.S.C. § 893. In contrast, the maximum fine under section 3623(a) (3) for this felony would be $250,000, and the maximum fine under subsections 3623(c) and 3623(a) (2) would be "twice the gross gain," in this case $200,000
Likewise, section 3623 does not enhance, but in effect preserves, statutory offense section fines for certain petty offenses. Subsection (a) (2) applies to single offenses only if pecuniary gain to the offender or loss to another results. See note 15, supra. Subsections (a) (3) through (a) (5) apply only to felonies, misdemeanors resulting in death, and misdemeanors punishable by prison sentences in excess of six months. As to petty offense misdemeanors not resulting in death or pecuniary gain or loss, subsection 3623(a) (1) thus has the effect of preserving the fine amount specified in the offense statute. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 916 (a fine of not more than $300 and/or not more than six months for fraudulently and falsely representing one's self as associated with the 4-H clubs).
In United States v. Gedraitis, 690 F.2d 351 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1071, 103 S. Ct. 1527, 75 L. Ed. 2d 949 (1983), the Third Circuit held that although " [c]ontempt does not fall within the general classification of felony or misdemeanor," it could nevertheless be regarded as a misdemeanor for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 3401, allowing trial by a magistrate on specific designation by the district judge, because the designation there expressly limited "the potential penalties" to those for misdemeanors as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 1, thus bringing that particular contempt within the literal wording of section 1. Nothing comparable exists here to bring this contempt within that definition.
In United States v. McCargo, 783 F.2d 507, 510 (5th Cir. 1986), we sustained a $25 "special assessment" under 18 U.S.C. § 3013, providing for mandatory assessments on any person convicted of an offense, in addition to a sixty-day prison sentence for contempt. Although section 3013 lists assessment amounts by offense categories described in each instance as "felony" or "misdemeanor," whether contempt fits either category is not addressed in the McCargo opinion. Nor was that issue even suggested in the less than a half page of appellant's brief which was devoted to the assessment. The government's brief respecting the assessment was less than a page and a half, and it too made no mention of whether contempt was a felony or misdemeanor; it merely argued that "the $25.00 was not a fine but an assessment." While not explicit in this respect, we believe that McCargo is properly read as simply agreeing with that contention of the government. Section 3013 does not provide for imposition of any sentence and is not punitive; rather its purpose "was to raise revenue to support state crime victim compensation programs" by "assessment of nominal amounts." United States v. Donaldson, 797 F.2d 125, 127 (3d Cir. 1986). "As Sec. 3013 is not a criminal statute, the rule of lenity" does not apply; nor does the rule concerning the pyramiding of sentences, as the assessment is not a sentence. Id. Here, of course, we are dealing with criminal statutes and criminal sentences. Hence, McCargo is not controlling.
We observe that the statutes governing the construction of the United States Code do not address the significance of headings, but that we have looked to 1 U.S.C. § 104 in this context. E.g., House, supra, at 988.
This case does not require us to speak to those relatively few statutes (see note 6, supra) which authorize imprisonment but make no provision for a fine. In such instances, it may appear less anomalous to treat section 3623 as authorizing a penalty in addition to that authorized in the underlying statute. Also, such treatment would, in those instances, be consistent with Congress' above-noted intention, in enacting section 3623, to encourage the use of fines "as an alternative to prison." H.R.Rep. No. 98-906, supra, at 16, 1984 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 5449. That intention is not, of course, furthered by holding that section 3623 authorizes imprisonment as well as a fine even though the underlying statute allows only one or the other, not both
Section 385, 28 U.S.C. (repealed), addressed the contempt offense and contained the disjunctive "fine or imprisonment" language now found in section 401. See Bradley, 63 S. Ct. at 470
See, e.g., United States v. DiGirlomo, 548 F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1977) (ordering imprisonment portion of sentence vacated after contemnor was sentenced to both fine and prison and fine had been paid); United States v. Miller, 540 F.2d 1213 (4th Cir. 1976) (same); United States v. Sampogne, 533 F.2d 766 (2d Cir. 1976) (same); see also United States v. Hilburn, 625 F.2d 1177 (5th Cir. 1980) (upholding district court's correction of its sentence imposing both fine and imprisonment on a contempt offense when the district court reformed its sentence before the defendant had paid his fine); United States v. Barnette, 546 F.2d 187 (5th Cir.) (permitting district court to reform its sentence when a contemnor appealed a sentence imposing both fine and prison and contemnor had satisfied no portion of either sentence), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 822, 98 S. Ct. 65, 54 L. Ed. 2d 79 (1977)
See Bradley, 63 S. Ct. at 470, 471 n. 1 & n. 3. Lange relied on the grounds of double jeopardy and double punishment in holding that a defendant convicted of violating a "fine or imprisonment" statute fully satisfied his sentence by paying the fine, barring reformation of the sentence by the district court. See Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 175, 21 L. Ed. 872 ("He is not only put in jeopardy twice, but put to actual punishment twice for the same offense.")
See United States v. Henry, 709 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc). Both the plurality opinion, id. at 309, 312-13, and the dissenting opinion joined by six judges, id. at 324, 327-29, 330, discuss Lange and its relationship with DiFrancesco without suggesting that Rule 35 renders Lange inapplicable when a lawful sentence has been fully satisfied, particularly where resentencing would, together with the satisfied sentence, exceed statutory limits. Other Circuits facing the Bradley issue since the adoption of Rule 35 also have treated Bradley as a still controlling precedent. See note 26, supra (citing cases following Bradley and decided after Rule 35 became effective in 1946). See also Gant v. United States, 161 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1947), on later appeal, 308 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1982), where we invoked Rule 35 but observed that it merely restated existing law. 161 F.2d at 796. But see United States v. Crawford, 769 F.2d 253, 258 (5th Cir. 1985) (describing statements in Henry plurality opinion about the relationship of Lange and Rule 35 as "dictum of a minority of the en banc court")
We also observe that in Lange, which of course is relied on in Bradley, the Court stated: "The general power of the court over its own judgments, orders and decrees, in both civil and criminal cases, during the existence of the term at which they are first made, is undeniable." Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 167, 21 L. Ed. 872. The same statement is made in Yavorsky v. United States, 1 F.2d 169 (3d Cir. 1924), which reached a result similar to that of Lange and Bradley. Yavorsky, too, is cited with approval by Bradley. 63 S. Ct. at 471 n. 3. In Bradley, Lange, and Yavorsky, the purportedly "corrective" resentencing was done at the same term as the original sentence, so that was not the problem. It was not want of a procedural or jurisdictional vehicle which governed the outcome of those cases. Further, the power of the court to correct an illegal sentence on motion was recognized in Holiday v. United States, 130 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1942), which relied on the companion case of Holiday v. Johnston, 313 U.S. 342, 61 S. Ct. 1015, 85 L. Ed. 1392 (1941). Of course, these Holiday cases are pre-Bradley.
The government cites numerous cases demonstrating the power of a district court to resentence a defendant; these cases, however, involve resentencing after different sentences of confinement were imposed on duplicitous counts, after illegal juxtapositions of dual sentences, after sentences that were below the maximum authorized by offense statutes, or after a defendant appealed the entirety of his sentence or challenged a sentence but had not fully satisfied a sentence as great as the law allows. None of these cases overcomes the rule of Bradley. See, e.g., Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398, 100 S. Ct. 1747, 64 L. Ed. 2d 381 (1980), on remand, United States v. Busic, 639 F.2d 940 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 918, 101 S. Ct. 3055, 69 L. Ed. 2d 422 (1981); United States v. Rosen, 764 F.2d 763 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 106 S. Ct. 806, 88 L. Ed. 2d 781 (1986); United States v. Jefferson, 760 F.2d 821 (7th Cir.), vacated, 474 U.S. 806, 106 S. Ct. 41, 88 L. Ed. 2d 34 (1985), opinion after remand, 782 F.2d 697 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v. Heredia-Fernandez, 756 F.2d 1412 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 836, 106 S. Ct. 110, 88 L. Ed. 2d 90 (1985); United States v. Raimondo, 721 F.2d 476 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 837, 105 S. Ct. 133, 83 L. Ed. 2d 74 (1984); United States v. Restor, 679 F.2d 338 (3d Cir. 1982); McClain v. United States, 676 F.2d 915 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 879, 103 S. Ct. 174, 74 L. Ed. 2d 143 (1982); United States v. Fiore, 470 F.2d 1149 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 938, 93 S. Ct. 1899, 36 L. Ed. 2d 399 (1973). See also United States v. Crawford, 769 F.2d 253 (5th Cir. 1985) (upholding increased punishment on resentencing after sentences were imposed in an illegal manner and when the original sentences were not fully satisfied). But see United States v. Henry, 709 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc; plurality opinion) (vacating an illegal sentence and refusing to vacate a legal sentence, thereby barring district court from increasing legal sentence on resentencing)
18 U.S.C. § 3565(b)
E.g., United States v. Lewis, 478 F.2d 835, 836 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding one seeking recovery of fine need not rely on the Tucker Act), affirming 342 F. Supp. 833 (E.D. La. 1972) (ordering fines returned without interest after a coram nobis proceeding); see also United States v. Bursey, 515 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir. 1975) (recognizing suit under Tucker Act for recovery of appearance bond deposited with court); id. at 1233-34 (citing cases allowing the recovery of fines improperly imposed); United States v. Summa, 362 F. Supp. 1177 (D. Conn. 1972) (recognizing suit to recover fines under the Tucker Act and allowing only post-judgment interest pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2411(b))
The version of 28 U.S.C. § 2411 in effect at the time Summa, supra, was decided is no longer in effect. 28 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2411 (as amended in 1982) contains no general provision like section 2411(b) allowing post-judgment interest and, instead, is limited to "any judgment of any court rendered ... for any overpayment in respect of any internal revenue tax." In the absence of a specific contractual or statutory provision to the contrary, interest does not run on a claim against the United States. United States v. Louisiana, 446 U.S. 253, 100 S. Ct. 1618, 64 L. Ed. 2d 196 (1980). Even if appellant could recover interest from the date of a judgment requiring the fine to be refunded to him, there apparently is not, and never has been, any provision allowing in such a situation any pre -judgment interest from the date the fine was paid. The government points to no statute allowing appellant to recover interest for the more than one year during which he has lost the use of this $10,000, and we observe that any effort to return the fine without some compensation for the lost use of these funds creates a pecuniary penalty at least equal to the $500 fine involved in Bradley. This is quite different from the less-than-one-day period which Chief Justice Stone regarded as "de minimis" in his Bradley dissent. 63 S. Ct. at 471
We likewise respect the views of our dissenting colleague, whose learning and sound judicial instincts have so graced this Court over the years. Nevertheless, we are unable to concur in his reading of DiFrancesco. The issue in DiFrancesco was "whether the increase of a sentence on review under [18 U.S.C.] Sec. 3576 constitutes multiple punishment in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause." 101 S. Ct. at 438. DiFrancesco "confine [d] the dictum in Benz [that the Constitution prohibits an increase in sentence after service of it is begun] to Lange 's specific context." 101 S. Ct. at 438. Lange 's specific context, as recited in the same passage of DiFrancesco, involved a sentence of fine and imprisonment under a statute authorizing only one or the other, but not both, where the defendant paid the fine and was then resentenced to imprisonment only. That is the specific context which resentencing of Holmes would present. "The holding in Lange " which DiFrancesco refers to and approves, is plainly that described by the latter as " [t]he fine having been paid and the defendant having suffered one of the alternative punishments, 'the power of the court to punish further was gone.' " 101 S. Ct. at 438. DiFrancesco goes on to explain that " [a]s Ex parte Lange demonstrates, a defendant may not receive a greater sentence than the legislature has authorized." Id
None of the cases relied on by the dissent (or the government) involves sentences to alternative and nonfungible punishments under a statute authorizing either but not both. None involves a situation where the defendant has discharged and suffered one of the nonfungible alternatives, so that subsequent resentencing to force him to discharge the other necessarily means that he will suffer "a greater sentence than the legislature has authorized." One erroneously sentenced to a fine and imprisonment, where either but not both are authorized, who serves some of the imprisonment but has not paid the fine, may not thereafter, by resentencing to eliminate the imprisonment sentence, be forced to pay the fine. That the same result obtains where the fine is first paid, and the resentencing seeks to enforce the imprisonment by eliminating the already paid fine, is made clear by Bradley. In either case, the resentencing would exact punishment beyond that legislatively authorized. And, as Bradley also demonstrates, retender of the paid fine does not change the result. Indeed, this case is a fortiori of Bradley, as here, unlike Bradley, there has never been any retender of the $10,000 fine which Holmes paid over a year previously, and the government, with the district court's approval, has continued to retain and claim entitlement to the fine, as well as to the prison sentence. The case for a "de minimis " exception, as urged by Chief Justice Stone's Bradley dissent, is thus less compelling here than in Bradley, where the $500 fine was retendered no more than a day after it was paid. It is, of course, irrelevant that in Bradley (and in Lange) a few days of the six-month (one year in Lange) confinement sentence had been served, as that could have been cured by equivalent reduction of the unserved time.
Today, few would dispute that the Supreme Court overruled Plessy v. Ferguson in Brown v. Board. Yet even today, when one shepardizes Plessy v. Ferguson, Brown v. Board is only listed as questioning it--no where to date has the Supreme Court expressly overruled Plessy. Hence, under the majority's view, we would be required to continue to uphold the separate but equal doctrine in transportation cases as several courts did immediately following Brown. Judge Lynn earnestly argued, as the majority has in this case, that we are bound by prior Supreme Court cases until such time as it is expressly overruled by that Court. Browder, 142 F. Supp. at 717-21, (Lynn, J., dissenting)
In Ex parte Lange, the Court held that it was unable to avoid double punishment because the fine had already passed into the United States Treasury and was beyond the reach of the Courts. In Bradley, the Court held, without discussion, that it was "unimportant that the fine had not been covered into the treasury." Bradley, 318 U.S. at 52, 63 S. Ct. at 471, 87 L. Ed. at 609
In Crawford, this Court rejected the appellants' argument that the case was controlled by United States v. Henry, 709 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc). "Henry contained dictum stating that 'this court is constrained to follow Ex parte Lange--as it was generally understood before the Court's ruling in DiFrancesco--in every Rule 35 case.' ... We are not bound by dictum of a minority of the en banc court, and we decline to follow it." Crawford, 769 F.2d at 258, quoting Henry, 709 F.2d at 310