Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/58/1355/574558/
Timestamp: 2019-07-17 16:55:00
Document Index: 745957817

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1182', '§ 1105', '§ 1255', '§ 1255', '§ 1182', '§ 1255', '§ 1255', '§ 1255', '§ 1255', '§ 1160']

Francisca Elena Ortega De Robles, Petitioner, v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Respondent, 58 F.3d 1355 (9th Cir. 1995) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Ninth Circuit › 1995 › Francisca Elena Ortega De Robles, Petitioner, v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Respondent
Francisca Elena Ortega De Robles, Petitioner, v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Respondent, 58 F.3d 1355 (9th Cir. 1995)
US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 58 F.3d 1355 (9th Cir. 1995)
Argued and Submitted Jan. 11, 1995. Decided June 2, 1995
Petitioner Francisca Elena Ortega de Robles petitions from an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying her application for discretionary relief under section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c). The BIA determined that Petitioner did not qualify for consideration for Sec. 212(c) relief. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1105a, and grant the petition and remand to the BIA for consideration of such relief.
On February 29, 1988, pursuant to amnesty provisions of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), 8 U.S.C. § 1255a, Petitioner applied to legalize her status. Having presented a prima facie case, she was granted status as a legal "temporary resident alien" on June 8, 1988 and was issued an employment authorization card.1 Her status was adjusted on October 4, 1990 to an alien "lawfully admitted for permanent residence." 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(b) (1)
Petitioner first asserts that the INS has not proven her deportability because it did not produce evidence that she possessed cocaine. Petitioner claims that her conviction is void and ambiguous. However, because Petitioner did not appeal her conviction, it was a final conviction. Criminal convictions cannot be collaterally attacked in deportation proceedings. Urbina-Mauricio v. INS, 989 F.2d 1085, 1089 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Avila-Murrieta v. INS, 762 F.2d 733, 736 (9th Cir. 1985) and Ocon-Perez v. INS, 550 F.2d 1153, 1154 (9th Cir. 1977)). "A criminal conviction is final for the purposes of immigration review if the alien has exhausted or waived direct appellate review." Urbina-Mauricio, 989 F.2d at 1089 (citing Hernandez-Almanza v. INS, 547 F.2d 100, 103 (9th Cir. 1976)). This court cannot reexamine Petitioner's conviction here. The BIA did not err in affirming the finding of deportability.
8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (emphasis added). In addition to exclusion proceedings, Sec. 212(c) also applies to deportation proceedings. Tapia-Acuna v. INS, 640 F.2d 223 (9th Cir. 1981). It provides eligible resident aliens facing deportation a chance for discretionary relief. Id.
Petitioner asserts that she began accruing time earlier, beginning on February 29, 1988, when she acquired status as a "temporary resident alien" pursuant to IRCA. She cites Castellon-Contreras v. INS, 45 F.3d 149, 154 (7th Cir. 1995) (alien gained lawful domicile for purposes of Sec. 212(c) on date that he applied for amnesty under IRCA); Lok v. INS, 548 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1977) ("Lok I ") (seven year period could include periods of residency prior to date of lawful permanent residence); and Mark A. Hall, Lawful Domicile Under Section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 47 U. Chi. L. Rev. 771 (1980).
The INS, on the other hand, argues that our holding in Castillo-Felix v. INS, 601 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1979) precludes the relief that Petitioner seeks. Castillo-Felix held that the period of "lawful unrelinquished domicile" for Sec. 212(c) purposes begins accruing when an alien gains "lawful permanent residence." 601 F.2d at 467.
No decision of this circuit has squarely examined the holding and reasoning of Castillo-Felix in light of IRCA.4 Notably, IRCA was enacted over seven years after this circuit decided Castillo-Felix. Therefore, the holding of Castillo-Felix does not necessarily apply to aliens obtaining legal status under IRCA. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, --- U.S. ----, ---- n. 5, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2545 n. 5, 120 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1992) ("It is of course contrary to all traditions of our jurisprudence to consider the law on [a] point conclusively resolved by broad language in cases where the issue was not presented or even envisioned"); United States v. Vroman, 975 F.2d 669, 672 (9th Cir. 1992) (precedent not controlling on issue not presented to prior panel), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S. Ct. 1611, 123 L. Ed. 2d 172 (1993); United States v. Faulkner, 952 F.2d 1066, 1071 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1991) (same).
In Lepe-Guitron v. INS, 16 F.3d 1021, 1024 (9th Cir. 1994), we distinguished Castillo-Felix on the basis of facts not considered in that case. We took a closer look at the term "domicile" for Sec. 212(c) purposes and reiterated that Castillo-Felix adopted a definition "consonant with its common law meaning: that 'aliens must not only be physically present here, but must intend to remain.' " 16 F.3d at 1025 (quoting Castillo-Felix) .
The IRCA amnesty provision at issue here, INA Sec. 245A, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1255a, "was a broad legalization program for aliens who had resided unlawfully in the United States since 1982, had been continuously physically present here since 1986, and who were otherwise admissible as immigrants." Naranjo-Aguilera v. INS, 30 F.3d 1106, 1108 (9th Cir. 1994).5 Congress reasoned as follows:
Under Sec. 245A, an alien was adjusted to "temporary resident status" by making a timely prima facie showing that the alien (1) had been in continuous unlawful status since 1982, (2) had been continuously physically present in the United States since November 6, 1986 (excluding "brief, casual, and innocent" absences), and (3) was otherwise admissible as an immigrant. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1255a(a) (1), (2), (3), and (4). If granted, temporary resident status was effective as of the date the application was filed. 8 C.F.R. Sec. 245a.3(m).
"The legalization program was seen as a process by which aliens initially eligible would be brought within the fold of lawful permanent residence in two steps. An alien who is eligible for temporary residence is ordinarily eligible in due course for permanent residence, unless he or she meanwhile commits a disqualifying act." Gordon & Mailman, supra, Sec. 52.08 at 52-41. An alien's status is adjusted from temporary to permanent resident upon timely application and a showing of (1) continuous residence since obtaining "temporary" status, (2) admissibility as an immigrant, and (3) basic citizenship skills. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1255a(b) (1) (A), (B), (C), and (D). For purposes of "continuous residence" an alien is permitted "to return to the United States after such brief and casual trips abroad as reflect an intention to adjust to lawful permanent resident status [.]" 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(b) (3) (A).
"People v. West" refers to People v. West, 3 Cal. 3d 595, 91 Cal. Rptr. 385, 477 P.2d 409 (1970) (holding that plea of guilty or nolo contendere is not rendered involuntary because it is a product of plea bargaining; an accepted plea bargain must be recorded; and court may accept a bargained plea to a lesser offense reasonably related to a charged offense)
This circuit followed Castillo-Felix in a similar context in Raya-Ledesma v. INS, 42 F.3d 1263, 1265 (9th Cir. 1994). Although the alien in Raya-Ledesma also obtained legal status as a temporary resident alien under IRCA, the arguments raised here were not raised in that case. See Raya-Ledesma v. INS, 55 F.3d 418, 420 (" [w]e decline to reach this issue")
Similarly, a separate IRCA provision, section 210, referred to as the Special Agricultural Workers program applied to certain undocumented alien farmworkers. See 8 U.S.C. § 1160
a crucial distinction exists between temporary residents under section 210 of the Act on the one hand, and aliens eligible for adjustment under section 245A, lawful permanent residents, and applicants for suspension of deportation on the other. All members of the latter classes possess some form of long-term residence in the United States and concomitant ties to this country. ... We do not believe that the language of section 210(a) (4) of the Act, without more, dispenses with the preferential treatment previously provided only to aliens with long-term residences in this country.
Because Petitioner made a nonfrivolous challenge to her deportability, she has continued to accrue time since 1988 during the pendency of this appeal. Wall v. INS, 722 F.2d 1442, 1444-45 (9th Cir. 1984)