Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/104221/united-states-vs-antelope
Timestamp: 2017-11-18 19:40:45
Document Index: 414398143

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1111', '§ 1153', '§ 1111', '§ 1153', '§ 1111', '§ 1111', '§ 3242', '§ 1151', '§ 1111']

United States Vs Antelope - Citation 104221 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
United States Vs. Antelope - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/104221
Case Number 430 U.S. 641
Respondent Antelope
united states v. antelope - 430 u.s. 641 (1977) u.s. supreme court united states v. antelope, 430 u.s. 641 (1977) united states v. antelope no. 75-661 argued january 18, 1977 decided april 19, 1977 430 u.s. 641 certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit syllabus respondents, enrolled coeur d'alene indians, were indicted by a federal grand jury on charges of burglary, robbery, and murder of a non-indian within the boundaries of their reservation. one respondent was convicted of second-degree murder only; the other two were convicted of all three crimes as charged, including first-degree murder under the felony murder provisions of the federal enclave murder statute, 18 u.s.c. § 1111, as.....
United States v. Antelope - 430 U.S. 641 (1977)
U.S. Supreme Court United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977)
Held: Respondent Indians were not deprived of the equal protection of the laws. Pp. 430 U. S. 645 -650.
(a) The federal criminal statutes enforced here are based neither in whole nor in part upon impermissible racial classifications. Federal regulation of Indian tribes is rooted in the unique status of Indians as "a separate people" with their own political institutions, and is not to be viewed as legislation of a " racial' group consisting of I ndians.' . . ." Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535 , 417 U. S. 553 n. 24. Pp. 430 U. S. 645 -647.
(b) The challenged statutes do not otherwise violate equal protection. Respondents were subjected to the same body of law as any other individuals, Indian or non-Indian, charged with first-degree murder committed in a federal enclave. Congress has undoubted power to prescribe a criminal code applicable to Indian country, and the disparity between federal law and Idaho law has no equal protection or other constitutional significance. Pp. 430 U. S. 647 -650.
On the night of February 18, 1974, respondents, enrolled Coeur d'Alene Indians, broke into the home of Emma Johnson, an 81-year-old non-Indian, in Worley, Idaho; they robbed and killed Mrs. Johnson. Because the crimes were committed by enrolled Indians within the boundaries of the Coeur d'Alene Indian Reservation, respondents were subject to federal jurisdiction under the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153. [ Footnote 1 ] They were, accordingly, indicted by a federal grand jury on
charges of burglary; robbery, and murder. [ Footnote 2 ] Respondent William Davison was convicted of second-degree murder only. Respondents Gabriel Francis Antelope and Leonard Davison were found guilty of all three crimes as charged, including first-degree murder under the felony murder provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 1111, [ Footnote 3 ] as made applicable to enrolled Indians by 18 U.S.C. § 1153.
were unlawful as products of invidious racial discrimination. They argued that a non-Indian charged with precisely the same offense, namely the murder of another non-Indian within Indian country, [ Footnote 4 ] would have been subject to prosecution only under Idaho law, which, in contrast to the federal murder statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1111, does not contain a felony murder provision. [ Footnote 5 ] To establish the crime of first-degree murder in state court, therefore, Idaho would have had to prove premeditation and deliberation. No such elements were required under the felony murder component of 18 U.S.C. § 1111.
The decisions of this Court leave no doubt that federal legislation with respect to Indian tribes, although relating to Indians as such, is not based upon impermissible racial classifications. Quite the contrary, classifications expressly singling out Indian tribes as subjects of legislation are expressly provided for in the Constitution [ Footnote 6 ] and supported by the ensuing history of the Federal Government's relations with Indians.
United States v. Mazurie, 419 U. S. 544 , 419 U. S. 557 (1975).
Legislation with respect to these "unique aggregations" has repeatedly been sustained by this Court against claims of unlawful racial discrimination. In upholding a limited employment preference for Indians in the Bureau of Indian Affairs, we said in Morton. v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535 , 417 U. S. 552 (1974):
"The preference, as applied, is granted to Indians not as a discrete racial group, but, rather, as members of quasi -sovereign tribal entities. . . ."
Id. at 417 U. S. 554 .
"[W]e reject the argument that denying [the Indian plaintiffs] access to the Montana courts constitutes impermissible racial discrimination. The exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribal Court does not derive from the race of the plaintiff, but rather from the quasi -sovereign status of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe under federal law."
424 U.S. at 424 U. S. 390 .
Both Mancari and Fisher involved preferences or disabilities directly promoting Indian interests in self-government, whereas, in the present case, we are dealing not with matters of tribal self-regulation, but with federal regulation of criminal conduct within Indian country implicating Indian interests. But the principles reaffirmed in Mancari and Fisher point more broadly to the conclusion that federal regulation of Indian affairs is not based upon impermissible classifications. Rather, such regulation is rooted in the unique status of Indians as "a separate people," with their own political institutions. Federal regulation of Indian tribes, therefore, is governance of once-sovereign political communities; it is not to be viewed as legislation of a " racial' group consisting of I ndians.' . . ." Morton v. Mancari, supra at 417 U. S. 553 n. 24. Indeed, respondents were not subjected to federal criminal jurisdiction because they are of the Indian race, but because they are enrolled members of the Coeur d'Alene Tribe. [ Footnote 7 ] We
The challenged statutes do not otherwise violate equal protection. [ Footnote 8 ] We have previously observed that Indians indicted
under the Major Crimes Act enjoy the same procedural benefits and privileges as all other persons within federal jurisdiction. Keeble v. United States, 412 U. S. 205 , 412 U. S. 212 (1973). See 18 U.S.C. § 3242. Respondents were, therefore, subjected to the same body of law as any other individual, Indian or non-Indian, charged with first-degree murder committed in a federal enclave. [ Footnote 9 ] They do not, and could not, contend otherwise.
There remains, then, only the disparity between federal and Idaho law as the basis for respondents' equal protection claim. [ Footnote 10 ] Since Congress has undoubted constitutional power to prescribe a criminal code applicable in Indian country, United States v. Kagama, 118 U. S. 375 (1886), it is of no consequence that the federal scheme differs from a state criminal code otherwise applicable within the boundaries of the State
of Idaho. Under our federal system, the National Government does not violate equal protection when its own body of law is evenhanded, [ Footnote 11 ] regardless of the laws of States with respect to the same subject matter. [ Footnote 12 ]
racial classifications; hence, no violation of the Due Process Clause infected respondents' convictions. [ Footnote 13 ]
The background leading up to enactment of the Major Crimes Act is discussed in Keeble v. United States, 412 U. S. 205 , 412 U. S. 209 -212 (1973). As noted in that case, the Government has characterized the Major Crimes Act as
Id. at 412 U. S. 209 .
As was true in Mancari, federal jurisdiction under the Major Crimes Act does not apply to "many individuals who are racially to be classified as I ndians.'" 417 U.S. at 417 U. S. 553 n. 24. Thus, the prosecution in this case offered proof that respondents are enrolled members of the Coeur d'Alene Tribe, and thus not emancipated from tribal relations. Moreover, members of tribes whose official status has been terminated by congressional enactment are no longer subject, by virtue of their status, to federal criminal jurisdiction under the Major Crimes Act. United States v. Heath, 509 F.2d 16, 19 (CA9 1974) ("While, anthropologically, a Klamath Indian, even after the Termination Act, obviously remains an Indian, his unique status vis-a-vis the Federal Government no longer exists"). In addition, as enrolled tribal members, respondents were subjected to federal jurisdiction only because their crimes were committed within the confines of Indian country, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1151. Crimes occurring elsewhere would not be subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction. Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game, 391 U. S. 392 , 391 U. S. 397 n. 11 (1968).
Congress has provided for federal jurisdiction over the crime of murder on a reservation, much as on other federal enclaves, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111, 1153. But, as our opinions have recognized that Indian reservations differ in certain respects from other federal enclaves, the statute has been construed as not encompassing crimes on the reservation by non-Indians against non-Indians. United States v. McBratney, 104 U. S. 621 (1882); see Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U. S. 647 , 281 U. S. 651 (1930); Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217 , 358 U. S. 219 -220 (1959); McClananan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U. S. 164 , 411 U. S. 171 (1973). Federal statutes do not single out Indians as such; non-Indian defendants are also covered if the victim was a member of the tribe.
It should be noted, however, that this Court has consistently upheld federal regulations aimed solely at tribal Indians, as opposed to all persons subject to federal jurisdiction. See, e.g., 70 U. S. Holliday, 3 Wall. 407, 70 U. S. 417 -418 (1866); Perring v. United States, 232 U. S. 478 , 232 U. S. 482 (1914). See also Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, ante at 430 U. S. 613 -615, n. 47. Indeed, the Constitution itself provides support for legislation directed specifically at the Indian tribes. See n 6, supra. As the Court noted in Morton v. Mancari, the Constitution therefore "singles Indians out as a proper subject for separate legislation." 417 U.S. at 417 U. S. 552 .
Id. at 368 U. S. 359 .