Source: http://www.rishabhdara.com/sc/view.php?case=1465
Timestamp: 2019-11-15 19:02:07
Document Index: 570785392

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art. 32', 'Art. 31', 'Art. 246', 'Art. 226', 'Art. 32', 'Art. 246', 'Art. 13', 'Art. 246', 'Art. 31', 'Art. 31', 'Art.\t13', 'Art.\t31', 'Art. 31', 'Art. 31', 'Art. 31', 'Art. 31', 'Art. 31', 'Art. 31', 'Art. 31', 'Art. 31', 'Art. 31', 'Art.\t31', 'Art. 31', 'Art. 31', 'Art.\n31', 'Art. 31', 'Art. 31', 'Art. 31', 'Art. 31', 'Art. 31', 'Art. 31', 'Art. 31', 'Art. 31', 'Art. 31', 'Art.\t31', 'Art. 31', 'Art. 31', 'Art. 226', 'Art. 32']

STATE OF BIHAR versus RAMESHWAR PRATAP NARAIN SINGH& ORS
1961 AIR 1649	1962 SCR (2) 383
STATE OF BIHAR V. RAMESHWAR PRATAP NARAIN SINGH& ORS [1961] RD-SC 183 (25 April 1961)
25/04/1961 GUPTA, K.C. DAS GUPTA, K.C. DAS SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ) SARKAR, A.K.
CITATION: 1961 AIR 1649	1962 SCR (2) 383
R	1962 SC 694	(28,65) R	1962 SC 723	(10) R	1965 SC 632	(11) F	1967 SC 427	(3) D	1969 SC1100	(14) R 1974 SC1480	(15)
Mela-Right of ex-proprietors to hold Melas after abolition of proprietory tenures-Enactment empowering State Government to hold such	Melas-If violative of	fundamental rights- Legislative competence-Acquisition without public Purpose- Constitution of India, Arts. 14, 19, 31, 31A, 246-Bihar Land Reforms	Act, 1950 (Bihar Act 30 of 1950), ss.	4, 6-Bihar Land Reforms Amendment Act, 1959 (Bihar Act XVI of 1959), ss. 4, 7A, 7B, 7C.
After the estates and tenures of proprietors	or tenure- holders	had passed to and became vested in the State by virtue of the Bihar Land Reforms Act,	1950,	the Revenue Authorities interfered with	the rights of	those	ex- proprietors and ex-tenureholders to hold Melas on lands which were occupied by them thereafter as occupancy raiyats and collected	tolls from such Melas	on behalf of	the Government whereupon those intermediaries made	applications to the High Court for writs restraining the Government	from such interference which were allowed by the	High Court.
During the pendency in this Court of these appeals preferred by the Officers of the State of Bihar against the order of the High Court the Bihar Land Reforms Amendment Act, 1959, was passed amending the Bihar Land Reforms Act of 1950	with retrospective effect by which the word Mela was added after the words jalkars, hats and bazars in s. 4, cl. (b) of	the amended	Act. Further amendments provided inter alia	that the State Government and not the intermediaries except	with the consent of the State Government shall have the right to hold such Melas. The main question arising for decision in these appeals and certain other applications made to this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India was whether the amending legislation violated Arts. 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution.
Held, that the Bihar Land Reforms Amendment Act, 1959, is a law providing for the acquisition by the State of rights in an "estate" within the meaning of	Art. 31A of	the Constitution and even if it is assumed that it abridges	the rights conferred by Arts. 14, 19 and 31 of the	Constitution its provisions are not void on that ground.
The amending legislation was within the legislative	com- petence	of the Legislature	under	Art. 246 of	the Constitution and after its amendment the legislative	list permitted the State 383 Legislature to	enact a law of acquisition even without a public purpose.
Civil Appeals Nos. 574, 92 411 and 285 of 1960, 351 of	1959 and Petitions Nos. 20 and 106 of 1960.
Appeal	by special leave from the judgment and	order dated August	6, 1957, of the Patna High Court in M. J. C. No. 57 of 1956.
R. C.	Prasad, for the appellants (in C. A.	No. 411 of 1960).
S. P.	Varma,	for the appellants (in C. A.	No. 285 of 1960).
L. K.	Jha, B. K. Garg and S. C. Agarwal, for	the respondent.
Tarkeshwar Dayal, K. K. Sinha and R. C. Prasad, for	the petitioners (in Petition No. 20 of 1960).
R. K.	Garg and S. C. Agarwala, for	the petitioner	(in Petition No. 106 of 1960).
384 1961. April 25. The judgment of the Court was delivered by DAS GUPTA, J.-The common question which arises for decision in this group of cases is as regards the validity of	the Bihar Act No. XVI of 1959 (Bihar Land Reforms Amendment Act, 1959),	in so far as it amends	with retrospective effect sections 4 and 6 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, to be indicated later, and inserts the new sections, s. 7B and s.
7C in that Act. It appears that sometime after the Bihar Land Reforms Act became law and action was	taken under section 3 thereof by the	State	Government issuing notifications,	declaring that the estates or	tenures of proprietors or	tenure-holders, specified in	the noti- fications had passed to and become vested in the State, the Revenue	authorities started interfering with the rights of those ex-proprietors and ex-tenureholders to hold Melas on lands of which they	were thereafter in occupation as occupancy raiyats under the State and started settling rights	to realise tolls from such Melas on behalf of	the State Government. Aggrieved by this action taken by	the Revenue	authorities on behalf of the State Government applications were made by several of these erstwhile intermediaries now occupancy raiyats to the High Court	of Patna for writs restraining the Government and its officers from such interference with their rights.
Five such applications have given rise to the five appeals which are numbered as C. A. No. 351 of 1959, C. A. No. 27 of 1960, C. A. No. 92 of 1960, C. A. No. 285 of 1960 and C. A.
No. 411 of 1960. The High Court held that in view of	the provisions of s. 6 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act (before its amendment) and the fact that the provisions made in s.	4(a) of the Act about the consequences that would ensue on	the vesting	of an estate or tenure in the State were "subject to" the provisions of s. 6, the State had no right to	hold Melas on the Bakasht lands of the ex-intermediaries-now occupancy raiyats. Accordingly the High Court allowed	the applications and issued writs as prayed for. Against these orders of the High Court the State of Bihar and its officers have preferred the 385 five appeals mentioned above, after obtaining special leave from this Court.
Some time after special leave was	obtained by these appellants the Bihar Legislature enacted in 1959, the Bihar Land Reforms Amendment Act, 1959, (Bihar Act XVI of 1959).
This Act amended inter alia section 4, cl. (b) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, by adding the word "Mela" after	the words "jalkars, hats, and bazars" and by omitting the words "subject to the subsequent provisions of this	Chapter" in cl. (a) of section 4. It also amended section 6 of the	1950 Act by substituting for the words "Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act" the words "subject to the provisions of sections 7A and 7B".	Of these s. 7B provides that "Where on any land deemed to be settled with the intermediary under the provisions of section 5, section 6 or section 7, a	Mela was being held by the intermediary at any time within 3 years of the date of vesting, the right to hold such Mela on such land shall, with effect from such date, vest in	the State and notwithstanding anything contained in any law, the State shall have and the intermediary shall not, except with the consent of the State Government have the right to	hold such Mela on	such land or	to do	anything which	may prejudicially affect such Mela". Section 7C contains provisions as regards settlement of hats, bazars or melas referred to in s. 7A and section 7B and provides inter	alia that settlements will be made with the outgoing intermediary or his heir after application is received from him and if there are several of them who apply for settlement, with the most suitable of them.	The Amending Act made the amendments mentioned above, except the insertion of a.	7C, retrospective, with effect from the date of enactment of the parent Act. The Amending Act had already been passed,	when several	other	applications	under Art. 226 of	the Constitution for similar relief against the interference by the Government with the intermediaries' right to hold Melas came up for consideration before the High Court. The	High Court rejected these applicants' attack against the validity of the Amending Act and held that in view of the provisions 386 now made the applicants were not entitled to	any relief.
The two applications under Art. 32 of the Constitution	were filed in this Court for writs of mandamus against the State of Bihar and its officers restraining them from	interfering with the applicant's right to hold melas on their lands.
Both of these	were filed after the	Bihar Land Reforms Amendment Act, 1959, had become law.
6 of the 1950 Act as mentioned above and inserts section 7B, the ex-intermediaries have not and the State has the right to hold melas	on the Bakasht lands.	The main question therefore is whether this is a valid legislation. To answer this question we have to examine in the first place whether the Bihar Legislature which enacted the Amending Act had on that date the legislative competence under Art. 246 of	the Constitution to do so; and secondly, whether the law	was void because	of the	provisions of	Art. 13 of	the Constitution.	The Amending legislation was clearly within Item 42 of the Concurrent List, being a law as regards acquisition of property.
Mr. Tarkeshwar Dayal, who appeared on behalf of one of	the ex-intermediaries submitted that this was really not a matter of land reform; the	purpose of the Amending legislation being only to augment the revenue of the State.
It is true that the law by taking the right to	hold melas from certain persons and giving it to the State is likely to augment the revenues of the State. It may well be that this object	of augmenting	the revenues was one of the	main purposes behind the Amending legislation. That however is no reason to	think that this legislation is not	also concerned with land reform. It is however unnecessary	for us to consider this question further, for whether it is a law as	regards land	reform or not, it is	clearly	and entirely as regards acquisition of property. The question of the legislature having attempted legislation not within 387, its competence by putting it into the guise of	legislation within	its competence does not even arise. The conclusion that necessarily follows is that the amending	legislation was within the legislative	competence of	the Bihar Legislature under Art. 246 of the Constitution.
This brings us to the main question in	controversy, viz., whether the amending legislation is void on the ground	that it violates Arts. 31, 19 and 14 of the Constitution. A complete answer to this question is furnished in favour of the State if this is a law within the saving provisions of Art. 31A. Art. 31A was enacted in the Constitution by	the Constitution (First Amendment Act) with retrospective effect from the commencement of the Constitution. It was further amended	by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act,	also with retrospective effect from the date of the	commencement of the Constitution. This Article provides inter alia, that notwithstanding	anything contained in Art.	13, no	law providing for the acquisition by the State of any estate or of any rights therein............... shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by Arts. 19, 31 and 14 of the Constitution. Is the amending legislation a law "providing for the acquisition by the State of any estate	or of any rights therein?" Two arguments have	been advanced on behalf of the ex-intermediaries to convince us that it is not such a law. The first argument is that	what the amending legislation provides for is not "acquisition" at all	within	the meaning of Art.	31A as	it is	not "acquisition" for a public purpose. It has been urged	that the purpose is a mere augmentation of revenue.
It does not appear to us that when the right of holding	the Mela is taken over by the State the only purpose is	the augmentation of revenue. There is scope for thinking	that the legislature believed that melas would be better run	and be more in the interests of the general public when run by the State than when they are left without control in	the hands of private individuals with whom the profit motive is 388 likely to be the sole guiding principle. It is	unnecessary however to answer this question for, in our opinion, a	law, may be	a law providing for "acquisition" even	though	the purpose behind the acquisition is not a public purpose.
It is	important to notice that the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act made important alterations in Art. 31 also.
One of	the amendments of Art. 31 was that clause 2	now provides that no property shall be compulsorily acquired, (1) save for a public purpose and (2) save by authority of a law which contains provisions for compensation for	the property acquired and either fixes the	amount	of compensation or specifies the principles on which and	the manner	in which the compensation is to be determined	and given.	Then,	Art. 31 A provides inter alia	that a	law providing for "acquisition" will not be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with or takes away or	abridges a right conferred by Art. 31.	Reading the two articles together as they stand after the fourth amendment of	the Constitution it becomes obvious that when Art. 31A speaks of a law of "acquisition" it contemplates a law which may be for acquisition, though not for a public purpose and	lays down that even though this will be in violation of	the fundamental right guaranteed by the first part of Art. 31(2) the law will not be void because of such violation.
The question whether the validity of a law for compulsory acquisition of property by the State can be challenged on the ground that the "acquisition" is	not for a public purpose	bad to be considered by this Court even before	the amendment of Art. 31(2) as mentioned above in The State of Bihar v. Sir Kameshwar Singh (1). Art. 31(2) as it	then stood did not in so many words provide that no	acquisition can be made save for a public purpose; but it was argued on behalf	of the State that such a provision was	implicit in the words of Art. 31(2). This argument was	rejected by Mahajan	and Chandrasekhara Aiyar, JJ., but it was accepted by Patanjali Sastri, C. J., and Das, J., both of whom	held that the requirement of public (1) [1952] S.C.R. 880.
389 purpose	being a condition for compulsory acquisition	laid down by Art.	31(2) the law was saved in spite of	the violation of such condition by Art. 31(4) and also Art. 31A.
Mukherjea, J.,	also said that the requirement of public purpose	was a condition implied in the provisions of	Art.
31(2).	His Lordship then added: "For my part, I would be prepared to assume that cl. (4) of Art. 31	relates to everything that is provided for in clause (2) either in express terms or impliedly and consequently the question of the existence of a public purpose does not come within	the purview	of an inquiry in the present case." It was in	this state of judicial opinion that Art. 31(2) was amended by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act as mentioned above	and the requirement of public purpose was expressly made a condition for	compulsory acquisition by the	State.	The basis for the argument that the question whether there was a public purpose or not is open to judicial review in spite of Art. 31A has therefore disappeared.
It is	worth noticing	in this connection that in	Sir Kameshwar Singh's case(1) the argument that quite apart from anything in Art. 31(2) as it then	stood	no law	of acquisition could be made except for a public	purpose	was sought to be reinforced by the words in Item 36 of the State List and Item 42 of the Concurrent List. These items	read as follows:- "36. Acquisition or	requisitioning	of property,	except	for the purposes of	the Union, subject to the provisions of entry 42 of List Ill." "42. Principles	on which compensation	for property	acquired or requisitioned for	the purposes of the Union or of a State or for any other public purpose is to be determined,	and the form and the manner in	which	such compensation is to be given." The argument on the basis of these entries was that	the State legislatures had no power to	make a, law	for acquisition of property without fulfilling' the condition of public	purpose. The Constitution (.Seventh Amendment)	Act which came into force on the 1st (1) [1952] S.C.R, 889 50 390 day of November, 1956, deleted Entry 36 of the	State	List and substituted for the former phraseology of Item 42 of the Concurrent List the words "acquisition and requisition of property". It is quite clear that after its amendment	the legislative list permits the State legislature to enact a law of acquisition even without a public purpose; and	that the only obstacle to such a law being	enacted without a public	purpose	is the provisions of	Art. 31(2).	That obstacle also	disappears if the law in question is	one within Art. 31 A.
It was next contended that the acquisition of the right to hold the Mela, for which the amending Act provides is	not acquisition, in any case, of "rights" "in any estate" within the meaning of Art. 31A as defined in cl. 2(b) of the	same Article. It was argued that this definition includes	only rights	of persons who are intermediaries and	unless	the raiyat	whose rights are being acquired is an intermediary, that is, a person between the State and the tiller of	the soil, his rights are not rights within the definition of "rights	in relation to an estate"; and consequently, a	law providing for acquisition of the rights of such a raiyat is not a law within the saving provisions of Art. 31A. It is pointed out that on the date the Amending Act was passed the ex-intermediaries had ceased to exist as intermediaries	and had become occupancy raiyats under s. 6 of the parent	Act.
What were being acquired therefore, it is argued, were	not rights	of intermediaries but rights of raiyats who	had ceased to be intermediaries. It has to be noticed that	the impugned provisions amending s. 4 and s. 6 and s. 7(b)	have been given retrospective effect so that the parent Act of 1950 has to be read as containing on the very date of	its enactment provisions in these sections not as originally enacted	but as they stood after the amendment of 1959.	In deciding whether rights of raiyats were being	acquired or not we have to forget what happened in consequence of	the unmended s. 6. Projecting ourselves to the date September 25, 1950, when the President's assent to the	Bihar	Land Reforms Act, 1950, was published in the 391 Gazette	and reading the Act as containing s. 4 and s. 6 as amended	and also s. 7(b) it cannot but be held that	what were being acquired by means of these provisions of	the amending legislation	giving	retrospective effect	were certain rights of the intermediaries. These intermediaries had not on September 25, 1950, ceased to be intermediaries and the fact that under the unmended provisions of section 6 they later on became occupancy raiyats should not be allowed to confuse the fact	that the acquisition	of certain properties by	the amending legislation being	itself	with effect from September 25, 1950, what was being provided	for was acquisition of intermediaries' rights.
Even if it be assumed that what the amending	legislation provided for was the acquisition of raiyats' rights, there is no justification for holding that these rights were	not "rights	in any estate" within the definition of el. 2 of Art. 31A. Clause 2(b) is in these words:- "the expression	'rights' in relation to an estate, shall include any rights vesting in a proprietor, sub-proprietor, under-proprietor, tenure-holder, ralyat, under-raiyat or other intermediary and any rights or privileges in respect of land revenue." The contention on behalf of the ex-intermediaries is	that the rights of raiyats who are not intermediaries, in	the sense of being middlemen between the State and the tiller of the soil, are not within this definition. This contention does not however stand a moment's scrutiny, for the simple reason,	that it is well known that ordinarily at least, a raiyat or an under-raiyat is not a person, who can be called an intermediary. It is reasonable to think that the	word "raiyat"was used in its ordinary well-accepted sense, of the person "who holds the land under the proprietor or a tenure-holder "for the purpose of cultivation" and the	word "under-raiyat"	used in the	equally	well-accepted	and ordinary sense of "a person who holds land under a raiyat for the purpose of cultivation." It is necessary to remember in this 392 connection that Art.	31A as first enacted by the	Con- stitution (First Amendment) Act did not contain these words "raivat, under-raiyat"; and that after the First Amendment the definition ran thus:- "the expression	rights', in relation to an estate shall include any rights vesting in a proprietor, sub-proprietor, under-proprietor,, tenure-holder or other intermediary and	any rights or privileges in respect of	land revenue." It was the Fourth Amendment which in the year 1956 inserted the words "raiyat, under-raiyat "immediately after the words "tenure-holder". At that time laws bad already been passed in most of the States for the acquisition of the rights of intermediaries	in the estates; rights of raiyats or under- raiyats who might answer the description "intermediary" were also within the definition because of the use of the	word "or other intermediary". The only reason for	specifically including the rights of "raiyats" and "under-raiyats" in the definition could therefore be to extend the protection of Art. 31A to laws providing for acquisition by the State Governments of rights of these "raiyats" or "under-raiyats".
In the circumstances and in the particular setting in which the words "raiyat" or "under-raiyat" were introduced	into the definition, it must be held that the words "or other intermediary" occurring at the end, do not qualify or colour the meaning to be attached to the tenures newly added.
Another	contention raised in support of the argument	that the impugned law is not for acquisition of a right in an estate	is that the right to hold a Mela is not a right in the lands at	all. This contention	is wholly unsound.
Holding	a hat, or bazar or mela is only a mode of user by the owner of	his land. Just as he can enjoy the	land belonging to him in other ways, he can use	it for	the purpose	of having a concourse of people-buyers and sellers and others for a hat, or bazar or mela-subject, as in	the case of other user to the requirement that no	nuisance is created	and the legal right of others are not infringed.
Consequently, the right to hold a Mela has always been 393 considered in	this country to be an interest in land, an interest which the owner of the land can transfer to another along with the land or without the land. There can be no doubt therefore that	the right of the proprietor of an estate	to hold a Mela on his own land is a right in	the "estate, being appurtenant to his ownership of the land; so also the right of a	tenureholder,	who it	has to be remembered is	the owner of the land subject only to	the payment	of rent to the proprietor, to hold a mela on	land forming	part of the tenure. It is true that a	licence to hold a	Mela on another's land in which no	interest is transferred is	not an interest in land; but there is no question here of the acquisition of any licence to hold a Mela at another person's land. The	argument that	the impugned law was not a law for acquisition of a right in the "estate" because the right to hold a mela was not a right in the land must therefore be rejected.
Lastly, it was contended that long before the date of the amending Act the "estates" had ceased to exist as a consequence of the notifications issued under s. 3 of	the Parent	Act and consequently whatever was being acquired in 1959 could not be a right in an "estate". Here also we have to take note of the fact that the impugned provisions of the Amending Act were made retrospective with effect from	the date of the original enactment so that we have	to project ourselves to September 25, 1950, the date of the original enactment, and	consider whether on	that date the	law provided for acquisition of	a right in an "estate".
Undoubtedly the "estates" did exist on that date and so	the acquisition retrospectively provided for from that date	was acquisition of a right in an estate.
Even if we ignore the fact that the impugned provisions of the Amending Act were given retrospective effect there is no warrant for saying that what was being acquired was not a right in an "estate".	"Estate" was defined in the Bihar Tenancy	Act to mean "any land included under one entry in any of	the general registers of revenue-paying lands	and revenue-free lands, prepared and maintained under the	law for the time being in force by the Collector of 394 a District". It is not disputed before us that in spite of the fact that in consequence of notifications under section 3 of the Act the "estates" had become vested in the State, these registers continued to be maintained at least up to the date of the Amending Act and even later. The position therefore is that the "estates" have become vested in	the State but have still not ceased to be "estates".
We have therefore come to the conclusion that the impugned provisions of the Amending Act is a law providing for	the acquisition by the State of rights in an "estate" ". within the meaning of Art. 31A of the Constitution and consequently even if we assume that they are inconsistent with or	take away or abridge any of the rights conferred by Arts. 14, 19 and 31	they are not void on that ground. The conclusion cannot therefore be escaped that the ex-intermediaries	have not and the State has the right to hold melas on the Bakasht lands of which they have be. come occupancy raiyats under the provisions of s. 6.
We therefore allow the appeals by the State and set aside the order of the High Court for the issue of writs and order that the applications under Art. 226 made before the	High Court be dismissed. We also dismiss the two petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution filed in this Court, and	also Civil Appeal No. 574 of 1960.