Source: https://casetext.com/case/crapp-v-city-of-miami-beach
Timestamp: 2020-01-25 06:48:58
Document Index: 145042158

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2000', '§ 1201', '§ 093', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1738', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 2000']

Crapp v. City of Miami Beach, 242 F.3d 1017 | Casetext
Crapp v. City of Miami Beach
Stokes v. Sec. Eng'rs, Inc.
Both the Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit have recognized that state agency administrative findings not…
Johnson v. American Sec. Ins. Co.
United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 828 (11th Cir. 2007) (recusal); Sunseri v. Macro Cellular Partners,…
Full title:Walter CRAPP, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CITY OF MIAMI BEACH,…
Date published: Feb 21, 2001
holding that the court's decision to deny the plaintiff "backpay for a discriminatory termination and yet award him compensatory damages for that termination" was appropriate and consistent with McKennon
Summary of this case from In re Standard Jury Instructions in Civil Cases
Nos. 99-13492, 00-10643.
Donald M. Papy, Legal Dept. City of Miami Beach, Miami, FL, Kelli Cohen, Murray H. Dubbin, Miami Beach, FL, for Defendant-Appellant.
Keith Thomas Grumer, Grumer Levin, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, FL, Nicolas A. Manzini, Miami, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
The appeal of this Title VII race discrimination case presents two main issues: whether the district court erred by treating the suspension of a police officer's certification made retroactive to the date of his termination as after-acquired evidence under McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 513 U.S. 352, 115 S.Ct. 879, 130 L.Ed.2d 852 (1995), and whether decisions by state administrative agencies unreviewed by state courts are entitled to preclusive effect in Title VII cases. We answer both in the negative.
Walter Crapp, who is black, worked as a police officer for the City from September 10, 1986 until his termination on November 26, 1996. In September 1996, following an argument with his supervisor, Crapp filed a complaint with Internal Affairs alleging that his supervisor had battered him. In the course of its investigation, Internal Affairs came to the conclusion that Crapp had lied about the incident. Richard Barreto, the City's Chief of Police, recommended that Crapp be fired. Chief Barreto then held a pre-determination hearing during which Crapp was given an opportunity to present evidence why he should not be terminated. After investigating Crapp's evidence, Chief Barreto again concluded that Crapp was lying, and subsequently fired him. Crapp appealed his termination to the City's Personnel Board. Counsel represented Crapp at the hearing and called witnesses on his behalf. The Personnel Board upheld Chief Barreto's decision.
Crapp filed suit against the City in federal court, alleging that his termination was racially motivated in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1997). Crapp claimed that similarly situated non-minority police officers were not terminated for similar disciplinary problems. The jury found for Crapp and awarded him $150,000 in compensatory damages. In a Final Order dated July 28, 1999, the district court entered judgment in favor of Crapp and awarded him backpay and reinstatement. The court stayed reinstatement, however, pending a decision by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement ("FDLE") regarding whether Crapp would be decertified as a police officer. The district court subsequently denied the City's Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, and the City filed its first notice of appeal (No. 99-13492).
Crapp also brought a hostile work environment claim under Title VII and a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1201, et seq. (1997). The district court granted summary judgment to the City on those claims, and Crapp has not appealed them.
Pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 093.1395(5), the City notified the FDLE of the results of its Internal Affairs investigation. After an administrative hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") at which Crapp was represented by counsel, the ALJ concluded that Crapp had lied in his complaint to Internal Affairs and during the subsequent investigation. The ALJ further recommended that Crapp be decertified for conduct unbecoming an officer. On November 19, 1999, following another hearing to review the ALJ's report and recommendation, the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission of the FDLE unanimously accepted the ALJ's findings of fact and suspended Crapp's certification for two years, effective from the date of his termination.
The FDLE suspended Crapp's certification for two years effective from the date of his termination. The City then moved for relief pursuant to Rule 60(b), asking the court to set aside the judgment or order a new trial. Although the district court denied the motion, it vacated the award of backpay and reinstatement. The court reasoned that under McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 513 U.S. 352, 115 S.Ct. 879, 130 L.Ed.2d 852 (1995), Crapp was not entitled to backpay or reinstatement because he was no longer certified to be a police officer. The court entered an Amended Final Judgment on January 25, 2000, pursuant to which the City filed its second notice of appeal (No. 00-10643).
Along with its second notice of appeal, the City filed a Notice of Suggestion of Lack of Jurisdiction regarding the first notice of appeal. The City argues that its first notice of appeal was premature because there was no final judgment until the district court entered its Amended Final Judgment on January 25, 2000. Even if the first notice of appeal was premature, this court has jurisdiction over the entire case by virtue of the second notice of appeal and the order consolidating the two appeals. See United States v. Olavarrieta, 812 F.2d 640, 642-43 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding that a second notice of appeal filed after a final judgment vested the court with jurisdiction over the entire underlying judgment.)
The City contends that the FDLE's retroactive suspension of Crapp's certification vitiated his ability to make out a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). To establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination, a plaintiff must show that: "(1) he belongs to a racial minority; (2) he was subjected to adverse job action; (3) his employer treated similarly situated employees outside his classification more favorably; and (4) he was qualified to do the job." Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1562 (11th Cir. 1997). The City argues that the FDLE's decision to suspend retroactively Crapp's certification prevented Crapp from showing that he was qualified to be employed as a police officer.
Even assuming that the requirements of either Rule 60(b)(2) or 60(b)(6) have been met, we are unpersuaded that the FDLE's decision affected Crapp's ability to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. The burden shifting scheme articulated in McDonnell Douglas is designed to "bring the litigants and the court expeditiously and fairly to the ultimate question [of discrimination]," and the prima facie requirement "is not an onerous one." Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). We have recognized that in termination cases, the question of whether the plaintiff was qualified to do the job is not often at issue. "[I]n cases where a plaintiff has held a position for a significant period of time, qualification for that position sufficient to satisfy the test of a prima facie case can be inferred." Rosenfield v. Wellington Leisure Products, Inc., 827 F.2d 1493, 1495 n. 2 (11th Cir. 1987). Thus, "allegations of poor performance against plaintiffs discharged from long-held positions may be properly considered . . . when a court evaluates the pretextual nature of an employer's proffered nondiscriminatory reasons for termination." Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Fla., Inc., 196 F.3d 1354, 1360 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1109, 120 S.Ct. 1962, 146 L.Ed.2d 793 (2000).
After learning of the FDLE's decision, the district court vacated its award of backpay and reinstatement without vacating the compensatory damage award. In doing so, the court appropriately recognized that the City could have fired Crapp for a lawful reason-lack of certification-on the same day that it fired him for a discriminatory reason. We conclude that the district court properly took account of the FDLE's decision as "after-acquired evidence" under McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 513 U.S. 352, 115 S.Ct. 879, 130 L.Ed.2d 852 (1995).
In McKennon, the employer conceded that it had discriminated against the plaintiff, but argued that its after-acquired evidence justified the termination. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that after-acquired evidence should not be used to determine liability because "[t]he employer could not have been motivated by the knowledge it did not have and it cannot now claim that the employee was fired for the nondiscriminatory reason." Id. at 360, 115 S.Ct. 879. Rather, the Court held that after-acquired evidence should be used in fashioning the remedy: neither reinstatement nor frontpay generally is appropriate, and backpay should be limited to the point when the employer discovered the after-acquired evidence. Id. at 361-62, 115 S.Ct. 879.
The City argues that it is inconsistent to deny Crapp backpay for a discriminatory termination and yet award him compensatory damages for that termination. The district court's action, however, is consistent with the treatment of after-acquired evidence under McKennon. The district court vacated its award of backpay and reinstatement because the FDLE's decision precluded the City from retaining Crapp as a police officer. The FDLE's decision does not, however, change the fact that the jury concluded that the City's decision to fire Crapp was a racially motivated adverse employment action for which Crapp should be compensated. The district court's Amended Final Judgment complies with the Supreme Court's statement in McKennon that "[r]esolution of the [problem of after-acquired evidence] must give proper recognition to the fact that [unlawful discrimination] has occurred which must be deterred and compensated without undue infringement upon the employer's rights and prerogatives." Id. at 362, 115 S.Ct. 879. Denying Crapp any damages in this case would neither compensate him for the discrimination he suffered nor deter the City from future acts of discrimination.
After his termination, Crapp appealed to the City's Personnel Board. Following a hearing at which Crapp was represented by counsel, the Personnel Board found that Crapp had engaged in conduct unbecoming an officer. The City argues that the district court erred by not instructing the jury on the preclusive effect of the Personnel Board's findings. This court applies a deferential standard of review to a trial court's jury instructions: If the instructions accurately reflect the law, the trial judge is given wide discretion as to the style and wording of the instructions. See Eskra v. Provident Life Accident Ins. Co., 125 F.3d 1406, 1415 (11th Cir. 1997).
In Maniccia v. Brown, 171 F.3d 1364, 1368 (11th Cir. 1999), this court held that a "state court's decision upholding an administrative body's findings has preclusive effect in a subsequent federal court proceeding if: (1) the courts of that state would be bound by the decision; and (2) the state proceedings that produced the decision comported with the requirements of due process." Unlike this case, however, Maniccia, dealt with the preclusive effect to be given state judicial proceedings. Id.
In University of Tennessee v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 106 S.Ct. 3220, 92 L.Ed.2d 635 (1986), the Supreme Court distinguished between claims under Title VII and claims under § 1983 in determining whether unreviewed state administrative decisions should be given preclusive effect. In Elliott, a University of Tennessee employee, fearing that he would be fired for misconduct, requested a hearing under the Tennessee Uniform Administrative Procedures Act. Id. at 790, 106 S.Ct. 3220. Following an administrative hearing, a university official acting as an ALJ concluded that the plaintiff had engaged in acts of misconduct and that the charges against him were not racially motivated. Id. at 791, 106 S.Ct. 3220. Rather than seeking review of this decision in the state courts, the plaintiff decided to pursue claims under Title VII and § 1983 in federal district court. Id. at 792, 106 S.Ct. 3220. After noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1738, which requires federal courts to give preclusive effect to decisions of state courts, does not apply to unreviewed state administrative decisions, the Court considered whether general rules of preclusion applied to the plaintiff's claims. Id. at 794, 106 S.Ct. 3220.
With respect to the § 1983 claims, the Court held that the state administrative agency's findings should be given preclusive effect. Id. at 799, 106 S.Ct. 3220. The Court noted that "[w]e . . . see no reason to suppose that Congress, in enacting the Reconstruction civil rights statutes, wished to foreclose the adaptation of traditional principles of preclusion to such subsequent developments as the burgeoning use of administrative adjudication in the 20th century." Id. at 797, 106 S.Ct. 3220. Accordingly, the factual findings of a state administrative agency must be given preclusive effect in § 1983 proceedings. Id. at 799, 106 S.Ct. 3220.
The Court reached a different result, however, with respect to the plaintiff's Title VII claims. Title VII requires the EEOC to give "substantial weight to final findings and orders made by State or local authorities in proceedings commenced under State or local law." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). The Court noted that "it would make little sense for Congress to write such a provision if state agency findings were entitled to preclusive effect in Title VII actions in federal court." Id. Therefore, the Court concluded that "Congress did not intend unreviewed state administrative proceedings to have preclusive effect on Title VII claims." Id. at 796, 106 S.Ct. 3220.
Applying Elliott, other circuits have held that unreviewed state agency decisions are not entitled to any preclusive effect in Title VII cases. See Rao v. County of Fairfax, Va., 108 F.3d 42, 45 (4th Cir. 1997); Roth v. Koppers Indus., Inc., 993 F.2d 1058, 1060-63 (3d Cir. 1993); McInnes v. California, 943 F.2d 1088, 1093-94 (9th Cir. 1991); DeCintio v. Westchester County Med. Ctr., 821 F.2d 111, 114-15 (2d Cir. 1987); Duggan v. Board of Educ., 818 F.2d 1291, 1293-95 (7th Cir. 1987); Abramson v. Council Bluffs Community School Dist., 808 F.2d 1307, 1308-09 (8th Cir. 1987). In McInnes, the Ninth Circuit explained "[t]he clear teaching of Elliott is that in a Title VII action a prior state decision enjoys issue preclusive effect only if rendered or reviewed by a court. . . . In contrast, unreviewed administrative determinations lack preclusive effect in a subsequent Title VII action, regardless of any preclusive effect state law might accord to them." 943 F.2d at 1093-94. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not err by refusing to instruct the jury that the Personnel Board's findings of fact should be given preclusive effect.
finding plaintiff's time in the job sufficient for the court to infer that plaintiff was qualified for the purpose of establishing prima facie case of racial discrimination
Summary of this case from PENN v. USF HOLLAND, INC.
concluding that a law enforcement agency's retroactive suspension of a police officer's certification did not vitiate the officer's prima facie case because the officer was certified at the time the agency made the decision to fire him
noting that "where a plaintiff has held a position for a significant period of time, qualification for that position sufficient to satisfy the test of a prima facie case can be inferred"
Summary of this case from Adams v. Fairfield S. Co.
noting in the related area of termination cases that qualifications may often not be at issue and may be inferred if the plaintiff has held a position for a significant period of time
In Crapp, the Eleventh Circuit inferred that the employee was qualified to do his job because he had worked as a police officer for ten years before he was terminated.
Summary of this case from Mallory v. Soc. Sec. Admin.
In Crapp v. City of Miami Beach, 242 F.3d 1017 (11th Cir. 2001), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's application of McKennon to vacate backpay and reinstatement awarded to a plaintiff police officer who had his state certification suspended after his termination.
Summary of this case from Cohen v. Gulfstream Training Academy, Inc.
stating qualification for the particular job is assumed when an employee has been in position for a significant period of time
Summary of this case from Israel v. Sonic-Montgomery FLM, Inc.
applying McKennon to employee's Title VII race discrimination claim
Summary of this case from Johnson v. Board of Trustees