Source: https://casetext.com/case/mclean-v-city-of-new-york-2
Timestamp: 2020-07-05 23:27:19
Document Index: 96936295

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 390', '§ 390', '§ 390', '§ 390', '§ 390', '§ 390', '§ 390', '§ 390', '§ 390', '§ 390', '§ 390', '§ 390', '§ 390', '§ 389', '§ 390', '§ 420', '§ 420']

McLean v. City of New York, 12 N.Y.3d 194 | Casetext Search + Citator
Saint-Guillen v. State of New York
Similarly, the State demonstrated that it is entitled to judgment dismissing claimants' remaining conclusory…
Wittorf v. the City of N.Y.
Plaintiff argues in opposition that the jury was properly asked about the DOT employee's actions, and its…
Full title:CHARLENE McLEAN, Individually and as Mother and Natural Guardian of BRIANA…
2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 2449 (N.Y. 2009)
2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 2449
878 N.Y.S.2d 238
905 N.E.2d 1167
Summary of this case from Newton v. City of New York
APPEAL, by permission of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the First Judicial Department, from an order of that Court, entered March 18, 2008. The Appellate Division affirmed so much of an order of the Supreme Court, New York County (Doris Ling-Cohan, J.; op 14 Misc 3d 922), as had denied defendant City of New York's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3212 or for dismissal of the complaint and all cross claims, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), for failure to state a cause of action. The following question was certified by the Appellate Division: "Was the order of the Supreme Court, as affirmed by this Court, properly made?"
Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York City ( Edward EX. Hart, Stephen J. McGrath and Leonard Koerner of counsel), for appellant. The City of New York is not liable for plaintiff infant's injuries because the City neither placed the infant in Patricia Theroulde's care nor advised her mother to place the child with Theroulde, because the statutory scheme pursuant to which plaintiff sued does not create a private right of action and because no special duty of care or reliance thereon existed between the City and plaintiff. ( Lauer v City of New York, 95 NY2d 95; Tango v Tulevech, 61 NY2d 34; Mark G. v Sabol, 93 NY2d 710; Pelaez v Seide, 2 NY3d 186; Sheehy v Big Flats Community Day, 73 NY2d 629; Uhr v East Greenbush Cent. School Dist., 94 NY2d 32; Haggerty v Diamond, 251 AD2d 455; Carossia v City of New York, 39 AD3d 429; Sean M. v City of New York, 20 AD3d 146; Smullen v City of New York, 28 NY2d 66.)
Sullivan Papain Block McGrath Cannavo P.C., New York City ( Brian J. Shoot of counsel), and John J. Appell for respondent. I. Irrespective of whether defendant City of New York owed plaintiff's a "special duty" of care, there are, at the very least, triable issues of fact concerning whether the City should stand liable at common law for its plainly negligent performance of admittedly ministerial functions. ( Tango v Tulevech, 61 NY2d 34; Lauer v City of New York, 95 NY2d 95; Florence v Goldberg, 44 NY2d 189; Steitz v City of Beacon, 295 NY 51; Mon v City of New York, 78 NY2d 309; Kovit v Estate of Hallums, 4 NY3d 499; Rottkamp v Young, 21 AD2d 373, 15 NY2d 831; Haddock v City of New York, 75 NY2d 478; Arteaga v State of New York, 72 NY2d 212; Mosher-Simons v County of Allegany, 99 NY2d 214.) II. Assuming, arguendo, that defendant City of New York owed plaintiff's no duty in the absence of a "special relationship" with plaintiff's, there are, at the least, triable issues of fact as the existence of such a relationship and as to whether the City negligently breached the duty imposed by that relationship. ( Pelaez v Seide, 2 NY3d 186; Sanchez v State of New York, 99 NY2d 247; Schuster v City of New York, 5 NY2d 75; Garrett v Holiday Inns, 58 NY2d 253; Mark G. v Sabol, 93 NY2d 710; Sean M. v City of New York, 20 AD3d 146; Merice v County of Westchester, 305 AD2d 383; Barnes v County of Nassau, 108 AD2d 50; Bartels v County of Westchester, 76 AD2d 517; Blanca C. v County of Nassau, 103 AD2d 524.) III. There are triable issues of fact concerning whether defendant City of New York's negligence should, in addition, subject it to statutory liability under the Social Services Law. ( Pelaez v Seide, 2 NY3d 186; Sheehy v Big Flats Community Day, 73 NY2d 629; Uhr v East Greenbush Cent. School Dist., 94 NY2d 32; Mark G. v Sabol, 93 NY2d 710.)
Before: Judges CIPARICK, GRAFFEO, READ, PIGOTT and JONES concur.
Patricia Theroulde had a business caring for young children at her home in Manhattan. Her facility was of the kind classified by the Social Services Law as a "family day care home" — "a program caring for children for more than three hours per day per child in which child day care is provided in a family home for three to six children" (Social Services Law § 390 [e]). Family day care homes are not licensed by the State, but are required to register with the State Department of Social Services (DSS) ( id. § 390 [2] [b]). A registration is valid for two years ( id. § 390 [2] [d] [ii] [A]), and an application for the renewal of registration may not be accepted unless "the office of children and family services [OCFS] has received no complaints . . . alleging statutory or regulatory violations" or, having received such complaints, OCFS has inspected the home and determined that it is operated in compliance with law ( id. § 390 [2] [d] [ii] [B] [4]). DSS entered into a contract with the New York City Department of Health (DOH), in which DOH in substance agreed to perform DSS's registration duties in New York City.
Ms. Theroulde registered in 1997. During the two year period of her initial registration, the New York City Administration for Children's Services (ACS) received two complaints about her home, asserting that her husband had dipped a child's hand into a bowl of hot oatmeal, and that a child had been left alone for an hour and a half in a nearby store. ACS investigated the complaints and found both of them to be "indicated" — i.e., substantiated. There is no evidence that the home was later inspected and found to be in compliance, so it seems clear that Ms. Theroulde should not have been permitted to renew her registration when it expired in 1999.
But DOH did permit her to renew. The reasons for this are not entirely clear. The record does not show whether ACS reported the two complaints about Ms. Theroulde's home to OCFS — but that question is academic, because, amazingly, DOH did not make a practice of checking with OCFS before renewing registrations. It is debatable whether the City or the State is to blame for this failure; DOH, a city agency, says it complied with regulations of DSS, a state agency, which do not expressly require a search for complaints prior to renewal of a registration. Since we consider the case on a motion for summary judgment, we assume that DOH was at fault.
In the course of obtaining the list from ACS, Ms. McLean had a telephone conversation with an ACS representative. According to Ms. McLean's version of the conversation, she specifically asked for "a licensed baby-sitter that gets investigated routinely by your office." She testified that the conversation continued: "`Yes. All of our day cares are licensed and they get investigated routinely between six months to a year.' And then I said, `They don't have any complaints,' and she assured me that all of the ones on the list have no complaints."
After Ms. McLean's daughter Briana was born, Ms. McLean placed her in Ms. Theroulde's care. It is a fair interpretation of the evidence (though the City disputes the point) that she did so in reliance on information the City provided — that she would not have chosen Ms. Theroulde as a day care provider but for the inclusion of Ms. Theroulde's home on a city-generated list, and the information about that list provided by an ACS representative on the phone. When Briana was three months old she fell from a bed to the floor while in Ms. Theroulde's care, and suffered a brain injury.
Ms. McLean brought this action against the City on Briana's and her own behalf, claiming that the City's negligence was the cause of the injury. Supreme Court denied the City's motion for summary judgment ( 14 Misc 3d 922), and the Appellate Division affirmed ( 49 AD3d 393) The Appellate Division granted leave to appeal to us on a certified question, and we now reverse.
We have long followed the rule that an agency of government is not liable for the negligent performance of a governmental function unless there existed "a special duty to the injured person, in contrast to a general duty owed to the public" ( Garrett v Holiday Inns, 58 NY2d 253, 261; see also e.g. Kircher v City of Jamestown, 74 NY2d 251; Lauer v City of New York, 95 NY2d 95; Pelaez v Seide, 2 NY3d 186; Laratro v City of New York, 8 NY3d 79). Such a duty, we have explained — "a duty to exercise reasonable care toward the plaintiff — is "born of a special relationship between the plaintiff and the governmental entity" ( Pelaez, 2 NY3d at 198-199). Here, Ms. McLean has not shown a special relationship giving rise to a special duty, and so cannot recover against the City.
"A special relationship can be formed in three ways: (1) when the municipality violates a statutory duty enacted for the benefit of a particular class of persons; (2) when it voluntarily assumes a duty that generates justifiable reliance by the person who benefits from the duty; or (3) when the municipality assumes positive direction and control in the face of a known, blatant and dangerous safety violation." ( 2 NY3d at 199-200 [citation omitted]; see also Garrett, 58 NY2d at 261-262.)
"To form a special relationship through breach of a statutory duty, the governing statute must authorize a private right of action. One may be fairly implied when (1) the plaintiff is one of the class for whose particular benefit the statute was enacted; (2) recognition of a private right of action would promote the legislative purpose of the governing statute; and (3) to do so would be consistent with the legislative scheme ( see Sheehy v Big Flats Community Day, 73 NY2d 629, 633 [1989]). If one of these prerequisites is lacking, the claim will fail." ( 2 NY3d at 200.)
Here, as in Pelaez and Sheehy, the claim fails the last of these tests. To recognize a private right of action under Social Services Law § 390 would be inconsistent with the legislative scheme.
Section 390 is a detailed statute, with 13 subdivisions and many more subparts, occupying 10 pages of McKinney's Consolidated Laws. It specifies which child care providers shall be licensed and which only registered (Social Services Law § 390 [a]-[c]); sets out some prerequisites for registration ( id. § 390 [2] [d] [ii] [B]); requires OCFS to establish, by regulation, requirements for licensed and registered providers ( id. § 390 [2-a]); provides for inspections and investigations ( id. § 390 [3] [a], [d], [e] [iii]; [4] [a]); requires certain information to be available to the public ( id. § 390 [8]); authorizes OCFS to prevent noncompliant providers from caring for children ( id. § 390 [3] [e] [ii]); provides for denial, suspension and revocation of licenses and registrations for violations of law ( id. § 390 [10]); and requires OCFS to establish civil penalties for such violations ( id. § 390 [11]). Social Services Law § 389 (1) imposes criminal liability for willful violations of the provisions of the Social Services Law, including section 390. But there is no statutory provision for governmental tort liability. It is fair to infer that the Legislature considered carefully the best means for enforcing the provisions of Social Services Law § 390, and would have created a private right of action against erring government agencies if it found it wise to do so. This is not a case where the Legislature has simply prohibited or required certain conduct, and left the mechanism of enforcement to the courts ( see e.g. Negrin v Norwest Mtge., 263 AD2d 39, 47-48 [2d Dept 1999]).
We addressed a similar issue in Mark G. v Sabol ( 93 NY2d 710). The plaintiff's there, children alleging that they had suffered abuse or neglect in the foster homes where they had been placed by New York City child welfare officials, sought recovery from the City, relying on provisions of the Social Services Law designed to protect foster children and to prevent child abuse generally. Emphasizing the detailed, comprehensive nature of the statutes the plaintiff's relied on, we rejected their claim that those statutes implied a private right of action. "[I]t would be inappropriate," we said, "for us to find another enforcement mechanism beyond the statute's already `comprehensive' scheme. . . . Considering that the statute gives no hint of any private enforcement remedy for money damages, we will not impute one to the lawmakers" ( 93 NY2d at 720-721). We reach a like conclusion here.
Nor is this one of the narrow class of cases in which a "special relationship" can arise from a duty voluntarily undertaken by a municipality to an injured person. We listed the elements of such a special relationship in Cuffy v City of New York ( 69 NY2d 255, 260):
Our cases on governmental tort liability have long distinguished between discretionary and ministerial acts of government officials. In Tango v Tulevech ( 61 NY2d 34, 40), we made clear that discretionary acts may not be a basis of liability: "[W]hen official action involves the exercise of discretion, the officer is not liable for the injurious consequences of that action even if resulting from negligence or malice." We added that "when the action is exclusively ministerial, the officer will be liable if it is otherwise tortious and not justifiable pursuant to statutory command." ( Id.) In Lauer ( 95 NY2d at 99-100), we elaborated on Tango, repeating that a public employee's discretionary acts "may not result in the municipality's liability even when the conduct is negligent," but adding that even negligent ministerial acts are not "otherwise tortious" where a plaintiff cannot show "a duty running directly to the injured person." Even where an act is ministerial, we said, "[t]o sustain liability against a municipality, the duty breached must be more than that owed the public generally" ( id. at 100).
Ms. McLean relies, however, on admittedly confusing language in two more recent cases. In Pelaez, we said: "As a rule, municipalities are immune from tort liability when their employees perform discretionary acts. . . . In a narrow exception to the rule, we have upheld tort claims when plaintiff's have established a `special relationship' with the municipality" ( 2 NY3d at 193). And in Kovit v Estate of Hallums ( 4 NY3d 499, 505), we said, citing Pelaez: "municipalities generally enjoy immunity from liability for discretionary activities they undertake through their agents, except when plaintiff's establish a `special relationship' with the municipality." If these comments are taken to mean that the special duty/special relationship rule applies to discretionary rather than ministerial acts, then Tango and Lauer on the one hand, and Pelaez and Kovit on the other, seem inconsistent.
Ms. McLean's other argument — that we should recognize a new category of special relationship applicable to this case — is a hybrid. It is derived in part from a provision of the contract between DOH and DSS in which DOH (a city agency) agreed to perform, in New York City, the registration duties assigned to DSS (a state agency) by statute. Under the heading "Indemnification," DOH agreed among other things to "be solely responsible and answerable in damages for any and all accidents and/or injuries to persons . . . or property arising out of or related to the services to be rendered." We find this provision to be without significance in this case. It is plainly designed to protect the State, by requiring the City alone to bear any liability that might arise. It does not create any liability that would not otherwise exist — and it does not create a special relationship between the City and any person or class of people.
The rationale of the rule, as we explained in Laratro ( 8 NY3d at 82), is that exposing municipalities to tort liability would be likely to render them less, not more, effective in protecting their citizens. Lawsuits, as we said in Pelaez ( 2 NY3d at 201), are not the only way of dealing with governmental failure — and might even impel governments to withdraw or reduce their protective services. In Lauer ( 95 NY2d at 101), we quoted our warning in Steitz v City of Beacon ( 295 NY 51, 55 [1945]) that a "crushing burden" should not be imposed on a governmental body "in the absence of [statutory] language clearly designed to have that effect." These reasons forbid the making the sort of ad hoc exceptions to the special duty/special relationship rule that Ms. McLean seeks in this case.
In McLean, the Court of Appeals analyzed four of its prior decisions which had dictated the scope of municipal tort liability for discretionary and ministerial acts and which were arguably in conflict.
Summary of this case from Denis v. Town of Haverstraw
noting how infrequently the government's failure to properly do its job results in liability because of the special relationship requirement
In McLean, however, the Court, in the course of addressing the plaintiff's contention that she was entitled to prevail even if she had not established the existence and breach of a special duty, since the sued upon negligence was assertedly in the performance of a ministerial function, undertook to address the distinction apparently drawn in our cases respecting the actionability of discretionary as opposed to ministerial government conduct.
Summary of this case from Valdez v. City of New York
In McLean, we recognized our own role in blurring the distinctions between the two theories, acknowledging the existence of potentially misleading dicta in some of our prior cases (12 N.Y.3d at 203, 878 N.Y.S.2d 238, 905 N.E.2d 1167). For this reason, we have endeavored here to explain the rationale underlying each doctrine in the hope of bringing further clarity to this complex area of the law.
In McLean, we recognized our own role in blurring the distinctions between the two theories, acknowledging the existence of potentially misleading dicta in some of our prior cases (12 NY3d at 203).
In McLean, this Court held that government action, if discretionary, may never form the basis for tort liability, even if a special relationship exists between the plaintiff and the municipality.
Summary of this case from Dinardo v. City of New York
In McLean, 12 N.Y.3d 194, 878 N.Y.S.2d 238, 905 N.E.2d 1167, the Court of Appeals did not discuss the doctrine of a special duty or relationship in terms of misfeasance and nonfeasance, but clearly intended to apply the special relationship doctrine to all acts that constitute a government function.
In McLean v City of New York (12 NY3d 194), the Court of Appeals reiterated the long-standing rule that "[a] special relationship can be formed in three ways: (1) when the municipality violates a statutory duty enacted for the benefit of a particular class of persons; (2) when the municipality voluntarily assumes a duty that generates justifiable reliance by the person who benefits from the duty; or (3) when the municipality assumes positive direction and control in the face of a known, blatant and dangerous safety violation" (id. at 199 [internal quotation marks omitted]).
In McLean v City of NewYork (12 NY3d 194, 203), the Court of Appeals held that "[government action, if discretionary, may not be a basis for liability, while ministerial actions may be, but only if they violate a special duty owed to the plaintiff, apart from any duty to the public in general" (see also Dinardo v City of New York, 13 NY3d 872, 874).
Summary of this case from Albino v. Hou. Auth
In McLean v City of New York (12 NY3d 194 [2009]), the Court of Appeals clarified the distinction between "ministerial" functions and "discretionary" actions, and held that "[g]overnment action, if discretionary, may not be a basis for liability, while ministerial actions may be, but only if they violate a special duty owed to the plaintiff, apart from any duty to the public in general."
In McLean v City of New York (12 NY3d 194 [2009]), the Court of Appeals held that "[g]overnment action, if discretionary, may not be a basis for liability, while ministerial actions may be, but only if they violated a special duty owed to the plaintiff, apart from any duty to the public in general" (id. at 203).
Summary of this case from Avila v. State
In McLean v. City of New York, 12 N.Y.3d 194, 878 N.Y.S.2d 238, 905 N.E.2d 1167 [2009], the Court of Appeals held that “[g]overnment action, if discretionary, may not be a basis for liability, while ministerial actions may be, but only if they violated a special duty owed to the plaintiff, apart from any duty to the public in general” (id. at 203, 878 N.Y.S.2d 238, 905 N.E.2d 1167).
In McLean v City of New York (12 NY3d 194 [2009]), the Court of Appeals clarified that "[g]overnment action, if discretionary, may not be a basis for liability, while ministerial actions may be, but only if they violate a special duty owed to the plaintiff, apart from any duty to the public in general" (Id. at 203; see also Dinardo v City of New York, 13 NY3d 872 [2009]; Lewis v State of New York, 68 AD3d 1513 [2009]).
In McLean, the Court of Appeals specifically held that the "special relationship" exception can only apply if the governmental action at issue is ministerial, See id. Subsequently, in Dinardo v City of New York, 13 N.Y.3d 872 (2009), Chief Judge Lippman stated in his concurrence that although he believed that the McLean decision "effectively eliminates the special relationship exception," the court was nevertheless constrained by its holding.
Summary of this case from Hernandez v. City of New York
In McLean, the Court of Appeals specifically held that the "special relationship" exception can only apply if the governmental action at issue is ministerial.
Summary of this case from Culler v. City of New York
Summary of this case from Cristina v. City of New York
In McLean the Court of Appeals acknowledged that this rule of law can have seemingly unfair results, by stating in relevant part: "[This] well settled rule of law denies recovery in cases like this, and that rule, by its nature, bars recovery even where a government blunder results in injury to people deserving of the government's protection."
Summary of this case from Rivera v. Westchester County
In McLean v City of New York (12 NY3d 194), the Court of Appeals read its holding in Mark G. expansively and found that in the absence of a statutory provision permitting a private right of action, such as Social Services Law § 420, there is no private right of action for claims made pursuant to title 6 of article 6 of the Social Services Law.
In McLean v. City of New York, 12 N.Y.3d 194, 878 N.Y.S.2d 238, 905 N.E.2d 1167 [2009], the Court of Appeals read its holding in Mark G. expansively and found that in the absence of a statutory provision permitting a private right of action, such as Social Service Law § 420, there is no private right of action for claims made pursuant to title 6 of the Social Service Law.
Summary of this case from Carmen Rivera As Adm'x D.B.N. of The Estates of Elijah Santana v. County of Westchester
In McLean, the Court of Appeals held that plaintiff, whose infant daughter was injured while being cared for at a city-registered family day care home, failed to state a cause of action against defendant City, even though it renewed the home's registration despite substantiated complaints about the home and placed the home on a list of registered day care providers furnished to plaintiff.
Summary of this case from Lance v. State of New York