Source: http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=87a4547e-0989-411c-8e9f-08f14fea3d64
Timestamp: 2017-08-23 08:52:11
Document Index: 349148618

Matched Legal Cases: ['§116', '§116', '§116', '§116', '§116', '§116', '§107', '§107']

US Supreme Court Decision Reversing & Remanding | Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc., et al., v. Village of Stratton, Ohio, et al. | Electronic Privacy Information Center - JDSupra
This is the US Supreme Court Decision.
Cite as: 536 U. S. ____ (2002) 1 Opinion of the Court NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ No. 001737 _________________ ET AL., PETITIONERS v. VILLAGE ET AL. STATES THE SIXTH [June 17, 2002] JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioners contend that a village ordinance making it a misdemeanor to engage in door-to-door advocacy without first registering with the mayor and receiving a permit violates the First Amendment. Through this facial challenge, we consider the door-to-door canvassing regulation not only as it applies to religious proselytizing, but also to anonymous political speech and the distribution of Petitioner Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc., coordinates the preaching activities of Jehovahs Witnesses throughout the United States and publishes Bibles and religious periodicals that are widely distributed. Petitioner Wellsville, Ohio, Congregation of Jehovahs Witnesses, Inc., supervises the activities of approximately 59 members in a part of Ohio that includes the Village of Stratton (Village). Petitioners offer religious literature without cost to anyone interested in reading it. They allege that they do not solicit contributions or orders This opinion is subject revision of the United States Reports. Readers are requested the Reporter of Decisions, States, Washington, D. C. of any or other corrections maybe made print goes to press. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 00-WATCHTOWER BIBLE AND TRACT SOCIETY OF NEW YORK, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS v. VILLAGE OF STRATTON ET AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. a village ordinance making it to door-registering with the mayor and receiving a permit violates the First Amendment. Through this facial door-to-canvassing regulation only as it applies to religious proselytizing, but political and the distribution handbills. I and Tract Society of New Inc., coordinates the preaching activities of Jehovah's United States and publishes Bibles and religious periodicals that are widely Petitioner Wellsville, Ohio, Congregation of Jehovah's supervises the activities of in part Petitioners without cost to anyone interested in reading it. that Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=87a4547e-0989-411c-8e9f-08f14fea3d64& TRACT SOC. v. OF Opinion of the Court for the sale of merchandise or services, but they do accept donations. Petitioners brought this action against the Village and its mayor in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, seeking an injunction against the enforcement of several sections of Ordinance No. 19985 regulating uninvited peddling and solicitation on private property in the Village. Petitionerscomplaint alleged that the ordinance violated several constitutional rights, including the free exercise of religion, free speech, and the freedom of the press. App. 10a44a. The District Court conducted a bench trial at which evidence of the administration of the ordinance and its effect on petitioners was introduced. Section 116.01 prohibits canvassersand others from going in and uponprivate residential property for the purpose of promoting any causewithout first having permit pursuant to That section 1 Section 116.01 provides: The practice of going in and upon private property and/or the private residence of Village residents in the Village by canvassers, solicitors, peddlers, hawkers, itinerant merchants or transient vendors of merchandise or services, not having been invited to do so by the owners or occupants of such private property or residences, and not having first obtained a permit pursuant to Section 116.03 of this Chapter, for the purpose of advertising, promoting, selling and/or explaining any product, service, organization or cause, or for the purpose of soliciting orders for the sale of goods, wares, merchandise or services, is hereby declared to be a nuisance and is prohibited.App. to Brief for Respondents 2a. The Village has interpreted the term canvassersto include Jehovahs Witnesses and the term causeto include their ministry. The ordinance does not appear to require a permit for a surveyor since such an individual would not be entering private property for the purpose of advertising, promoting, selling and/or explaining any product, service, organization or cause, or for the purpose of soliciting orders for the sale of goods, wares, merchandise or services.Thus, contrary to the assumption of the dissent in its heavy reliance on the example from Dartmouth, post, at 2, 7, 9, the Villages ordinance would have done nothing to prevent that tragic crime. 2 WATCHTOWER BIBLE & TRACT SOC. OF N. Y., INC. v. VILLAGE OF STRATTON sale do accept action against the Village and mayor in the United States District Court for the of Ohio, seeking an injunction against enforcement of several sections of Ordinance 1998-the Village. Petitioners' complaint ordinance including the free exercise of religion, free speech, of the press. App. 10a-44a. District conducted at which evidence of the of the ordinance effect "canvassers" "going in and upon" private residential property for the promoting any "cause" without first having obtained a permit pursuant to §116.03.1 section 'Section "The practice of going in Village in canvassers, solicitors, peddlers, hawkers, itinerant vendors of invited by the of such private or residences, obtained permit pursuant to Section 116.03 Chapter, the purpose organization or or the orders for the sale of goods, is hereby declared to be a nuisance and is prohibited." Respondents 2a. term "canvassers" Jehovah's and the "cause" The ordinance does not appear an be entering private "the purpose of advertising, promoting, selling and/organization or or the orders for the sale of goods, services." Village's done nothing to prevent that Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=87a4547e-0989-411c-8e9f-08f14fea3d64Cite as: 536 U. S. ____ (2002) 3 Opinion of the Court provides that any canvasser who intends to go on private property to promote a cause, must obtain a Solicitation Permitfrom the office of the mayor; there is no charge for the permit, and apparently one is issued routinely after an applicant fills out a fairly detailed Solicitors Registration Form.2 The canvasser is then authorized to go upon premises that he listed on the registration form, but he must carry the permit upon his person and exhibit it whenever requested to do so by a police officer or by a resident.3 The ordinance sets forth grounds for the denial 2 Section 116.03 provides: (a) No canvasser, solicitor, peddler, hawker, itinerant merchant or transient vendor of merchandise or services who is described in Section 116.01 of this Chapter and who intends to go in or upon private property or a private residence in the Village for any of the purposes described in Section 116.01, shall go in or upon such private property or residence without first registering in the office of the Mayor and obtaining a Solicitation Permit. (b) The registration required by subsection (a) hereof shall be made by filing a Solicitors Registration Form, at the office of the Mayor, on a form furnished for such purpose. The Form shall be completed by the Registrant and it shall then contain the following information: (1) The name and home address of the Registrant and Registrants residence for five years next preceding the date of registration; (2) A brief description of the nature and purpose of the business, promotion, solicitation, organization, cause, and/or the goods or services offered; (3) The name and address of the employer or affiliated organization, with credentials from the employer or organization showing the exact relationship and authority of the Applicant; (4) The length of time for which the privilege to canvass or solicit is desired; (5) The specific address of each private residence at which the Registrant intends to engage in the conduct described in Section 116.01 of this Chapter, and, (6) Such other information concerning the Registrant and its business or purpose as may be reasonably necessary to accurately describe the nature of the privilege desired.Brief for Respondents 3a4a. 3 Section 116.04 provides: Each Registrant who complies with Sec-canvasser promote a cause, obtain a "Solicitation Permit" the office routinely detailed "Solicitor's Form."2 then authorized to go upon he listed on the registration form, but he carry the permit upon his person and exhibit it to a police officer or by a 3 forth Section 116.03 "(solicitor, peddler, hawker, itinerant vendor of merchandise or services of this property a private residence the Village for any of the purposes described shall go in private without first the office of the Mayor and obtaining "(The registration required by subsection (a) hereof shall be made a Solicitor's Registration Form, at the office of such The Form shall be completed "(The name of Registrant's for the of registration; "(brief description of the nature and purpose of the business, organization, cause, and/or the goods or services "(The name the or affiliated credentials from the employer or organization showing exact of "(The for which the privilege to canvass "(The specific the Registrant intends to engage in the conduct described Section 116.01 "(concerning business describe desired." Brief for Respondents 3a-4a. 3Section provides: "Each Sec-Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=87a4547e-0989-411c-8e9f-08f14fea3d64& TRACT SOC. v. OF Opinion of the Court or revocation of a permit,4 but the record before us does not show that any application has been denied or that any permit has been revoked. Petitioners did not apply for a permit. A section of the ordinance that petitioners do not challenge establishes a procedure by which a resident may prohibit solicitation even by holders of permits. If the resident files a No Solicitation Registration Formwith the mayor, and also posts a No Solicitationsign on his property, no uninvited canvassers may enter his property, unless they are specifically authorized to do so in the No Solicitation Registration Formitself.5 Only 32 of the tion 116.03(b) shall be furnished a Solicitation Permit. The permit shall indicate that the applicant has registered as required by Section 116.03 of this Chapter. No permittee shall go in or upon any premises not listed on the Registrants Solicitors Registration Form. Each person shall at all times, while exercising the privilege in the Village incident to such permit, carry upon his person his permit and the same shall be exhibited by such person whenever he is requested to do so by any police officer or by any person who is solicited.Id., at 4a. 4 Section provides: Permits Chapter may be denied or revoked by the Mayor for any one or more of the following reasons: (a) Incomplete information provided by the Registrant in the Solicitor’s Registration Form. (b) Fraud or misrepresentation contained in the Solicitors Registration Form. (c) Fraud, misrepresentation or false statements made in the course of conducting the activity. (d) Violation of any of the provisions of this chapter or of other Codified Ordinances or of any State or Federal Law. (e) Conducting canvassing, soliciting or business in such a manner as to constitute a trespass upon private property. (f) The permittee ceases to possess the qualifications required in this chapter for the original registration.Id., at 5a. 5 Section 116.07 provides, in part: (a) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other Section of this Chapter 116, any person, firm or corporation who is the owner or lawful occupant of private property within the territorial limits of the Village of Stratton, Ohio, may prohibit the 4 WATCHTOWER BIBLE & TRACT SOC. OF N. Y., INC. v. VILLAGE OF STRATTON permit,4 the record before us does has or that Petitioners did not apply for a permit. petitioners do not challenge which a resident may solicitation even by holders of permits. If the a "No Solicitation Registration Form" with "Solicitation" sign on his canvassers in "Registration Form" itself.5 32 the a Permit. The permit the applicant has registered as required by Section of this Chapter. No shall go in or upon any premises Registrant's Solicitor's "shall at all by such by any police officer or by any person who is solicited." 4a. 4Section 116.06 provides: "Permits described in Section 116.04 of this by the reasons: "(the Solicitor's "(Fraud or misrepresentation contained the Solicitor's Registration "(misrepresentation or false statements made the course "(Violation of any of the provisions of chapter or of other Codified "(soliciting private "(The permittee ceases the qualifications registration." Id., at 5a. Section 116.07 provides, in part: "(a) Notwithstanding Chapter 116, person, or corporation of private property within limits of the Village of Stratton, Ohio, may prohibit the Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=87a4547e-0989-411c-8e9f-08f14fea3d64Cite as: 536 U. S. ____ (2002) 5 Opinion of the Court Villages 278 residents filed such forms. Each of the forms in the record contains a list of 19 suggested exceptions;6 on one form, a resident checked 17 exceptions, thereby excluding only Jehovahs Witnessesand Political Candidatesfrom the list of invited canvassers. Although Jehovahs Witnesses do not consider themselves to be practice of going in or upon the private property and/or the private residence of such owner or occupant, by uninvited canvassers, solicitors, peddlers, hawkers, itinerant merchants or transient vendors, by registering its property in accordance with Subdivision (b) of this Section and by posting upon each such registered property a sign which reads No Solicitationin a location which is reasonably visible to persons who intend to enter upon such property. (b) The registration authorized by Subsection (a) hereof shall be made by filing a No Solicitation Registration Form, at the office of the Mayor, on a form furnished for such purpose. The form shall be completed by the property owner or occupant and it shall then contain the following information: . . . .Id., at 6a. 6 The suggested exceptions listed on the form are: 1. Scouting Organizations 2. Camp Fire Girls 3. Childrens Sports Organizations 4. Childrens Solicitation for Supporting School Activities 5. Volunteer Fire Dept. 6. Jehovahs Witnesses 7. Political Candidates 8. Beauty Products Sales People 9. Watkins Sales 10. Christmas Carolers 11. Parcel Delivery 12. Little League 13. Trick or Treaters during Halloween Season 14. Police 15. Campaigners 16. Newspaper Carriers 17. Persons Affiliated with Stratton Church 18. Food Salesmen 19. Salespersons. App. 229a. Apparently the ordinance would prohibit each of these 19 categories from canvassing unless expressly exempted. Village's record contains a list of 19 suggested exceptions;6 resident checked excluding "Jehovah's Witnesses" "Candidates" from canvassers. Although Jehovah's Witnesses do not consider themselves to be of in private property and/private of occupant, uninvited canvassers, solicitors, itinerant vendors, property in accordance Subdivision such registered property `No Solicitation' in location which is reasonably intend "(registration authorized by Subsection be by filing `Form', office such The form shall be completed and it information:... ." Id., at 6a. The suggested exceptions listed on the Children's Sports Children's Solicitation for Supporting School Jehovah's Candidates Beauty Products Sales People Watkins Sales League or Treaters during Halloween Season Affiliated with Food App. 229a. the ordinance would prohibit each of these 19 categories Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=87a4547e-0989-411c-8e9f-08f14fea3d64& TRACT SOC. v. OF Opinion of the Court solicitorsbecause they make no charge for their literature or their teaching, leaders of the church testified at trial that they would honor no solicitationsigns in the Village. They also explained at trial that they did not apply for a permit because they derive their authority to preach from Scripture.7 For us to seek a permit from a municipality to preach we feel would almost be an insult God.App. 321a. Petitioners introduced some evidence that the ordinance was the product of the mayors hostility to their ministry, but the District Court credited the mayors testimony that it had been designed to protect the privacy rights of the Village residents, specifically to protect them from flim flamcon artists who prey on small town populations.61 Nevertheless, court concluded that the terms of the ordinance applied to the activities of petitioners as well as to business or political canvassers,id., at 737, 738. The District Court upheld most provisions of the ordinance as valid, content-neutral regulations that did not infringe on petitionersFirst Amendment rights. The court did, however, require the Village to accept narrowing constructions of three provisions. First, the court viewed the requirement in §116.03(b)(5) that the applicant must list the specific address of each residence to be visited as potentially invalid, but cured by the Villages agreement to attach to the form a list of willing residents. Id., at 737. Second, it held that petitioners could comply with §116.03(b)(6) by merely stating their purpose as the 7 Specifically, from the Book of Matthew chapter 28, verses 19 and 20, which we take as our commission to preach. . . . So Jesus, by example, instituted a house-to-house search for people so as to preach the good news to them. And thats the activity that Jehovahs Witnesses engage in, even as Christs apostles did after his resurrection to heaven.Id., at 313a314a. 6 WATCHTOWER BIBLE & TRACT SOC. OF N. Y., INC. v. VILLAGE OF STRATTON "solicitors" they make no charge for their or their teaching, leaders of the church testified at that they would honor "no solicitation" signs in the They also explained at trial that they did not permit because authority to Scripture.' "For us to seek a permit from a to preach we feel would almost be insult to God." App. 321a. some that mayor's hostility ministry, Court credited the mayor's had been designed the privacy rights of the protect them "from `fim flam' con artists who prey on small town populations." F. Supp. 2d 734, 736 (SD Ohio 1999). Nevertheless, the that of petitioners as well as to "business or political canvassers," at 737, 738. Court upheld most provisions of the ordinance content-regulations that did not on petitioners' First Amendment rights. The narrowing of three the court viewed §116.03(5) that applicant must the specific address of each invalid, but cured by the Village's agreement a list of willing residents. Id., at 737. held that petitioners could comply with 116.03(b)(6) by stating their purpose as "the 7Specifically, from "chapter 28, verses our to preach... a house-to-house news to them. that's the activity that Jehovah's Witnesses in, as Christ's did resurrection heaven." at 313a-314a. Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=87a4547e-0989-411c-8e9f-08f14fea3d64Cite as: 536 U. S. ____ (2002) 7 Opinion of the Court Jehovahs Witness ministry.Id., at 738. And third, it held that §116.05, which limited canvassing to the hours before 5 p.m., was invalid on its face and should be replaced with a provision referring to reasonable hours of the day.Id., at 739. As so modified, the court held the ordinance constitutionally valid as applied to petitioners and dismissed the case. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 240 F. 3d 553 (2001). It held that the ordinance was content neutral and of general applicability and therefore subject to intermediate scrutiny.Id., at 560. It rejected petitionersreliance on the discussion of laws affecting both the free exercise of religion and free speech in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872 (1990),8 because that language was dicta and therefore not binding.240 F. 3d, at 561. It also rejected petitionersargument that the ordinance is overbroad because it impairs the right to distribute pamphlets anonymously that we recognized in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commn, 514 U. S. 334 (1995), reasoning that the very act of going door-8 The only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated action have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech and of the press, see Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S., at 304307 (invalidating a licensing system for religious and charitable solicitations under which the administrator had discretion to deny a license to any cause he deemed nonreligious); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105 (1943) (invalidating a flat tax on solicitation as applied to the dissemination of religious ideas); Follett v. McCormick, 321 U. S. 573 (1944) (same), or the right of parents, acknowledged in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925), to direct the education of their children, see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205 (1972) (invalidating compulsory schoolattendance laws as applied to Amish parents who refused on religious grounds to send their children to school).494 U. S., at 881 (footnote omitted). Jehovah's Witness ministry." Id., at 738. And third, it §116.05, canvassing hours on its face and should be replaced a provision referring to "reasonable hours of day." Id., at 739. As so modified, the court held the valid as applied to petitioners case. for the Sixth Circuit (2001). held that the ordinance was "content and of general and therefore subject scrutiny." Id., at 560. It rejected petitioners' discussion affecting both the and free speech in Employment Dept. Human Resources 494 U. S. 8 because that "language was dicta binding." 3d, at 561. also rejected petitioners' the ordinance is overbroad because it impairs right to distribute pamphlets anonymously that in Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 reasoning that "act of going door-8"The only in which we have held that Amendment generally religiously have involved not the Free Exercise Clause Clause in with protections, freedom speech the press, see 310 U. S., at 304-307 (invalidating for charitable solicitations the had discretion to deny a license to any cause he deemed Pennsylvania, S. tax on solicitation as applied to the dissemination McCormick, 321 U. S. of parents, acknowledged in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 to direct children, see Yoder, compulsory schoolattendance children to school)." 494 881 Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=87a4547e-0989-411c-8e9f-08f14fea3d64& TRACT SOC. v. OF Opinion of the Court to-door requires the canvassers to reveal a portion of their identities.240 F. 3d, at 563. The Court of Appeals concluded that the interests promoted by the Villageprotecting its residents from fraud and undue annoyanceas well as the harm that it seeks to preventcriminals posing as canvassers in order to defraud its residentsthough by no means overwhelming,were sufficient to justify the regulation. Id., at 565566. The court distinguished earlier cases protecting the Jehovahs Witnesses ministry because those cases either involved a flat prohibition on the dissemination of ideas, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U. S. 141 (1943), or an ordinance that left the issuance of a permit to the discretion of a municipal officer, see, e.g., Cantwell v. In dissent, Judge Gilman expressed the opinion that by subjecting noncommercial solicitation to the permit requirements, the ordinance significantly restricted a substantial quantity of speech unrelated to the Villages interest in eliminating fraud and unwanted annoyance. In his view, the Village failed to demonstrate either the reality of the harm or the efficacy of the restriction.240 F. 3d, at 572. We granted certiorari to decide the following question: Does a municipal ordinance that requires one to obtain a permit prior to engaging in the door-to-door advocacy of a political cause and to display upon demand the permit, which contains ones name, violate the First Amendment protection accorded to anonymous pamphleteering or discourse?534 U. S. 971 (2001); Pet. for Cert. i.9 9 In their oral argument, the parties debated issue embedded in the question presented, namely, whether the permit contains the speakers name. We need not resolve this factual dispute in order to answer whether the ordinances registration requirement abridges so much protected speech that it is invalid on its face. 8 WATCHTOWER BIBLE & TRACT SOC. OF N. Y., INC. v. VILLAGE OF STRATTON to reveal a portion of identities." 3d, at The Court of Appeals concluded the interests promoted by the Village-"protecting annoyance"-as harm that to prevent-"criminals posing in defraud its residents"-though "overwhelming," were sufficient to justify Id., at 565-566. The court distinguished protecting Jehovah's because either involved a fat on dissemination g., Martin of Struthers, (1943), or an ordinance that a permit of a municipal officer, see, e.Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 302 (1940). the opinion that to the permit requirements, ordinance restricted a substantial quantity of speech unrelated to the Village's fraud and unwanted view, the Village "failed to demonstrate either the of the harm or the efficacy of restriction." to decide the following question: "a municipal that prior to engaging in the door-to-door advocacy cause and to display upon demand the permit, one's name, violate the Amendment discourse?" Cert. 1.9 91n their briefs and at oral argument, the parties debated a factual in the namely, whether the speaker's name. not this factual to answer whether the ordinance's registration requirement much protected speech that it on face. Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=87a4547e-0989-411c-8e9f-08f14fea3d64Cite as: 536 U. S. ____ (2002) 9 Opinion of the Court For over 50 years, the Court has invalidated restrictions on door-to-door canvassing and pamphleteering.10 It is more than historical accident that most of these cases involved First Amendment challenges brought by Jehovahs Witnesses, because door-to-door canvassing is mandated by their religion. As we noted in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105, 108 (1943), the Jehovahs Witnesses claim to follow the example of Paul, teaching publicly, and from house to house.Acts 20:20. They take literally the Go ye into the world, and preach the gospel to every creature.Mark 16:15. In doing so they believe that they are obeying a commandment of God.Moreover, because they lack significant financial resources, the ability of the Witnesses to proselytize is seriously diminished by regulations that burden their efforts to canvass door-to-door. Although our past cases involving Jehovahs Witnesses, most of which were decided shortly before and during World War II, do not directly control the question we confront today, they provide both a historical and analytical backdrop for consideration of petitionersFirst Amendment claim that the breadth of the Villages ordinance offends the First Amendment.11 Those cases involved petty offenses that raised constitutional questions of the most serious magnitudequestions that implicated 10 Hynes v. Mayor and Council of Oradell, 425 U. S. 610 (1976); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U. S. 141 (1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105 (1943); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U. S. 413 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940); Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U. S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U. S. 444 (1938). 11 The question presented is similar to one raised, but not decided in Hynes. The ordinance that we held invalid in that case on vagueness grounds required advance notice to the police before casually soliciting the votes of neighbors.425 U. S., at 620, n. 4. II years, the Court has invalidated door-canvassing and pamphleteering. 10 is historical accident that most of these cases Amendment challenges brought by Jehovah's to-door their As we noted in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, Jehovah's Witnesses "example `to house.' 20. They literally the mandate of the Scriptures, `Go ye into all the world, and the to every creature.' Mark 16:15. they are obeying a commandment God." Moreover, because they lack significant financial the of the Witnesses to proselytize is regulations that our past cases Jehovah's Witnesses, which were decided shortly before and during War II, do not directly control the question we backdrop for consideration of petitioners' First the breadth of the Village's ordinance First Amendment." Those cases involved that questions magnitude-questions implicated 10 425 U. S. v. City of Struthers, 319 U. S. 1943); Murdock Jamison Cantwell Connecticut, State 308 Lovell v. City 303 U. S. 444 "The question presented to one not decided The ordinance we held invalid in that case on vagueness "casually soliciting neighbors." Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=87a4547e-0989-411c-8e9f-08f14fea3d64& TRACT SOC. v. OF Opinion of the Court the free exercise of religion, the freedom of speech, and the freedom of the press. From these decisions, several themes emerge that guide our consideration of the ordinance at issue here. First, the cases emphasize the value of the speech involved. For example, in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, the Court noted that hand distribution of religious tracts is an ageold form of missionary evangelismas old as the history of printing presses. It has been a potent force in various religious movements down through the years. . . . This form of religious activity occupies the same high estate under the First Amendment as do worship in the churches and preaching from the pulpits. It has the same claim to protection as the more orthodox and conventional exercises of religion. It also has the same claim as the others to the guarantees of freedom of speech and freedom of the press.In addition, the cases discuss extensively the historical importance of door-to-door canvassing and pamphleteering as vehicles for the dissemination of ideas. In Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U. S. 147 (1939), the petitioner was a Jehovahs Witness who had been convicted of canvassing without a permit based on evidence that she had gone from house to house offering to leave books or booklets. Writing for the Court, Justice Roberts stated that pamphlets have proved most effective instruments in the dissemination of opinion. And perhaps the most effective way of bringing them to the notice of individuals is their distribution at the homes of the people. On this method of communication the ordinance imposes censorship, abuse of which engendered the struggle in England which eventuated in the establishment of the doctrine of the freedom of the press embodied in our Constitution. To require a censorship through license which makes impossible the free and unhampered distribution of pamphlets strikes at the very heart of the constitutional guarantees.Id., at 164 10 WATCHTOWER BIBLE & TRACT SOC. OF N. Y., INC. v. VILLAGE OF STRATTON free exercise religion, the freedom of speech, and press. From these decisions, several that consideration of the ordinance the cases emphasize the speech that "of religious tracts is an ageold missionary evangelism-as presses. It has been a potent force in various movements the years... of religious activity occupies the same high estate Amendment as the churches from It has the same claim to the more orthodox and conventional exercises of religion. It also has the same as guarantees of freedom press." 319 U. S., at 109. addition, the cases the and pamphleteering for In Schneider was a Jehovah's been based for the Court, Justice Roberts stated that "pamphlets instruments in dissemination And perhaps most effective of individuals is the homes On this method of communication the ordinance imposes censorship, abuse of the which eventuated establishment freedom in our Constitution. To require a censorship makes impossible free pamphlets at the of the constitutional guarantees." Id., at Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=87a4547e-0989-411c-8e9f-08f14fea3d64Cite as: 536 U. S. ____ (2002) 11 Opinion of the Court (emphasis added). Despite the emphasis on the important role that door-todoor canvassing and pamphleteering has played in our constitutional tradition of free and open discussion, these early cases also recognized the interests a town may have in some form of regulation, particularly when the solicitation of money is involved. In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940), the Court held that an ordinance requiring Jehovahs Witnesses to obtain a license before soliciting door to door was invalid because the issuance of the license depended on the exercise of discretion by a city official. Our opinion recognized that a State may protect its citizens from fraudulent solicitation by requiring a stranger in the community, before permitting him publicly to solicit funds for any purpose, to establish his identity and his authority to act for the cause which he purports to represent.Id., at 306. Similarly, in Martin v. City of Struthers, the Court recognized crime prevention as a legitimate interest served by these ordinances and noted that burglars frequently pose as canvassers, either in order that they may have a pretense to discover whether a house is empty and hence ripe for burglary, or for the purpose of spying out the premises in order that they may return later.319 U. S., at 144. Despite recognition of these interests as legitimate, our precedent is clear that there must be a balance between these interests and the effect of the regulations on First Amendment rights. We must be astute to examine the effect of the challenged legislationand must weigh the circumstances and . . . appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the regulation.Ibid. (quoting Schneider, 308 Finally, the cases demonstrate that efforts of the Jehovahs Witnesses to resist speech regulation have not been a struggle for their rights alone. In Martin, after cataloging the many groups that rely extensively upon this on the important door-has played in our tradition of free and open discussion, these also recognized the interests when In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 Court held that an ordinance requiring Jehovah's Witnesses to obtain a license before door door because on the of discretion Our opinion recognized "a State citizens from fraudulent solicitation by requiring a permitting funds for any purpose, to establish his identity to act for the cause represent." at Similarly, in Martin v. City of the Court recognized crime prevention as a interest served by these ordinances noted "burglars frequently pose as canvassers, either in they may have a pretense empty and hence ripe for burglary, or for the of spying out the premises in order that later." Despite recognition of our precedent is clear that be a balance Amendment We "`examine the effect of the challenged legislation' and must `weigh circumstances substantiality of the reasons advanced in regulation."' Ibid. U. S., at 161). the cases of the Jehovah's been alone. In Martin, after cataloging the many groups that rely extensively upon this Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=87a4547e-0989-411c-8e9f-08f14fea3d64& TRACT SOC. v. OF Opinion of the Court method of communication, the Court summarized that [d]oor to door distribution of circulars is essential to the poorly financed causes of little people.319 U. S., at 144146. That the Jehovahs Witnesses are not the only little peoplewho face the risk of silencing by regulations like the Villages is exemplified by our cases involving nonreligious speech. See, e.g., Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U. S. 620 (1980); Hynes v. Mayor and Council of Oradell, 425 U. S. 610 (1976); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516 (1945). In Thomas, the issue was whether a labor leader could be required to obtain a permit before delivering a speech to prospective union members. After reviewing the Jehovahs Witnesses cases discussed above, the Court observed: As a matter of principle a requirement of registration in order to make a public speech would seem generally incompatible with an exercise of the rights of free speech and free assembly. . . . . . . . . If the exercise of the rights of free speech and free assembly cannot be made a crime, we do not think this can be accomplished by the device of requiring previous registration as a condition for exercising them and making such a condition the foundation for restraining in advance their exercise and for imposing a penalty for violating such a restraining order. So long as no more is involved than exercise of the rights of free speech and free assembly, it is immune to such a restriction. If one who solicits support for the cause of labor may be required to register as a condition to the exercise of his right to make a public speech, so may he who seeks to rally support for any social, business, religious or political cause. We think a requirement that one must register before he under-12 WATCHTOWER BIBLE & TRACT SOC. OF N. Y., INC. v. VILLAGE OF STRATTON communication, the Court summarized that "[of circulars is essential to the of little people." U. S., at 144-the Jehovah's Witnesses are not the only "little people" who face the risk regulations like Village's exemplified by our cases nonreligious speech. See, e.g., Schaumburg v. Citizens for a 444 U. S. of Oradell, 425 U. S. 610 (1976); Thomas 1945). Thomas, the issue was permit before a speech prospective members. reviewing the Jehovah's Witnesses cases the observed: "requirement order to make a public speech would seem generally incompatible with an exercise of the rights of and free assembly... "the exercise of free speech cannot do not think can be accomplished the device of requiring registration as a condition for exercising in advance exercise for violating such a restraining order. So is of the and free assembly, it is If one who solicits support for the cause to make a public speech, so he who seeks to rally support for any social, religious or We a requirement that one must register before he under-Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=87a4547e-0989-411c-8e9f-08f14fea3d64Cite as: 536 U. S. ____ (2002) 13 Opinion of the Court takes to make a public speech to enlist support for a lawful movement is quite incompatible with the requirements of the First Amendment.Id., at 539540. Although these World War II-era cases provide guidance for our consideration of the question presented, they do not answer one preliminary issue that the parties adamantly dispute. That is, what standard of review ought we use in assessing the constitutionality of this ordinance. We find it unnecessary, however, to resolve that dispute because the breadth of speech affected by the ordinance and the nature of the regulation make it clear that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding it. The Village argues that three interests are served by its ordinance: the prevention of fraud, the prevention of crime, and the protection of residentsprivacy. We have no difficulty concluding, in light of our precedent, that these are important interests that the Village may seek to safeguard through some form of regulation of solicitation activity. We must also look, however, to the amount of speech covered by the ordinance and whether there is an appropriate balance between the affected speech and the governmental interests that the ordinance purports to serve. The text of the Villages ordinance prohibits canvassersfrom going on private property for the purpose of explaining or promoting any cause,unless they receive a permit and the residents visited have not opted for a no solicitationsign. Had this provision been construed to apply only to commercial activities and the solicitation of funds, arguably the ordinance would have been tailored to the Villages interest in protecting the privacy of its residents and preventing fraud. Yet, even though the Village has explained that the ordinance was adopted to serve to movement is quite incompatible with the requirements the First Amendment." 539-540. II-era cases for not answer one preliminary issue that the parties dispute. That is, what standard of review we use in assessing the constitutionality of this it unnecessary, however, resolve dispute because of speech and regulation make it clear of III prevention of fraud, the prevention of residents' We have concluding, in light of our precedent, that are important the Village may seek through form of regulation We must also look, however, to the amount of covered by the ordinance and whether there that the ordinance purports to of the Village's ordinance prohibits "canvassers" going on private property for the purpose of promoting any "cause," receive the residents visited have not opted for a "no solicitation" Had this provision been construed to of Village's in protecting the privacy of its residents preventing fraud. Yet, even the ordinance was adopted to serve Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=87a4547e-0989-411c-8e9f-08f14fea3d64& TRACT SOC. v. OF Opinion of the Court those interests, it has never contended that it should be so narrowly interpreted. To the contrary, the Villages administration of its ordinance unquestionably demonstrates that the provisions apply to a significant number of noncommercial canvasserspromoting a wide variety of causes.Indeed, on the No Solicitation Formsprovided to the residents, the canvassers include Camp Fire Girls,Jehovahs Witnesses,Political Candidates,Trick or Treaters during Halloween Season,and Persons Affiliated with Stratton Church.The ordinance unquestionably applies, not only to religious causes, but to political activity as well. It would seem to extend to residents casually soliciting the votes of neighbors,12 or ringing doorbells to enlist support for employing a more efficient garbage collector. The mere fact that the ordinance covers so much speech raises constitutional concerns. It is offensivenot only to the values protected by the First Amendment, but to the very notion of a free societythat in the context of everyday public discourse a citizen must first inform the government of her desire to speak to her neighbors and then obtain a permit to do so. Even if the issuance of permits by the mayors office is a ministerial task that is performed promptly and at no cost to the applicant, a law requiring a permit to engage in such speech constitutes a dramatic departure from our national heritage and constitutional tradition. Three obvious examples illustrate the pernicious effect of such a permit requirement. First, as our cases involving distribution of unsigned handbills demonstrate,there are a significant number of persons who support causes anonymously.14 The decision 12 Hynes, 425 U. S., at 620, n. 4. 13 Talley v. California, 362 U. S. 60 (1960); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm n, 514 U. S. 334 (1995). 14 Although the Jehovahs Witnesses do not themselves object to a loss 14 WATCHTOWER BIBLE & TRACT SOC. OF N. Y., INC. v. VILLAGE OF STRATTON has should be so interpreted. To the contrary, the Village's administration of its ordinance unquestionably demonstrates the provisions apply to a significant number of noncommercial "canvassers" a wide variety of "causes." "Forms" include "Camp Fire Girls," "Jehovah's Witnesses," "Candidates," "Trick or Halloween Season," "Stratton Church." The ordinance unquestionably applies, not only to religious causes, but to political as well. It would seem to extend to "residents soliciting the votes of neighbors,"12 ringing support for employing a more efficient the ordinance covers so much speech constitutional offensive-not only to Amendment, to the society-that in the context of everyday first inform the government to do so. Even if the issuance of permits the mayor's office is a ministerial task that is performed and at no cost to the applicant, a law a permit to engage in such speech heritage and constitutional tradition. Three obvious examples illustrate the a permit as our cases involving distribution of unsigned 13 there are a significant causes anonymously.14 "12 Talley v. California, Elections 14 the Jehovah's Witnesses do themselves object a loss Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=87a4547e-0989-411c-8e9f-08f14fea3d64Cite as: 536 U. S. ____ (2002) 15 Opinion of the Court to favor anonymity may be motivated by fear of economic or official retaliation, by concern about social ostracism, or merely by a desire to preserve as much of ones privacy as possible.McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commn, 514 U. S., at 341342. The requirement that a canvasser must be identified in a permit application filed in the mayors office and available for public inspection necessarily results in a surrender of that anonymity. Although it is true, as the Court of Appeals suggested, see 240 F. 3d, at 563, that persons who are known to the resident reveal their allegiance to a group or cause when they present themselves at the front door to advocate an issue or to deliver a handbill, the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the ordinance does not implicate anonymity interests. The Sixth Circuits reasoning is undermined by our decision in Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc., 525 U. S. 182 (1999). The badge requirement that we invalidated in Buckley applied to petition circulators seeking signatures in faceto-face interactions. The fact that circulators revealed their physical identities did not foreclose our consideration of the circulatorsinterest in maintaining their anonymity. In the Village, strangers to the resident certainly maintain their anonymity, and the ordinance may preclude such persons from canvassing for unpopular causes. Such preclusion may well be justified in some situationsfor example, by the special state interest in protecting the integrity of a ballot-initiative process, see ibid., or by the interest in preventing fraudulent commercial transactions. The Village ordinance, however, sweeps more broadly, covering un-of anonymity, they bring this facial challenge in part on the basis of overbreadth. We may, therefore, consider the impact of this ordinance on the free speech rights of individuals who are deterred from speaking because the registration provision would require them to forgo their right to speak anonymously. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601, 612 (1973). may be motivated by fear of economic by concern about social preserve one's possible." McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 341-The that a canvasser a permit application filed in the mayor's office and results that is true, as see 240 F. 3d, at persons allegiance when they at the an issue or to deliver a handbill, the ordinance does The Sixth Circuit's reasoning Law Foundation, Inc., 525 U. S. 182 (1999). that we invalidated in Buckley circulators seeking signatures in faceto-The fact that circulators revealed physical identities did not foreclose circulators' interest in Village, anonymity, and the ordinance may preclude such from for Such preclusion may well be justifed situations-for example, special state interest in protecting the integrity process, by the interest in more unof facial challenge in basis We may, therefore, ordinance rights of individuals the registration provision would require them to speak anonymously. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, S. Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=87a4547e-0989-411c-8e9f-08f14fea3d64& TRACT SOC. v. OF Opinion of the Court popular causes unrelated to commercial transactions or to any special interest in protecting the electoral process. Second, requiring a permit as a prior condition on the exercise of the right to speak imposes an objective burden on some speech of citizens holding religious or patriotic views. As our World War II-era cases dramatically demonstrate, there are a significant number of persons whose religious scruples will prevent them from applying for such a license. There are no doubt other patriotic citizens, who have such firm convictions about their constitutional right to engage in uninhibited debate in the context of door-todoor advocacy, that they would prefer silence to speech licensed by a petty official. Third, there is a significant amount of spontaneous speech that is effectively banned by the ordinance. A person who made a decision on a holiday or a weekend to take an active part in a political campaign could not begin to pass out handbills until after he or she obtained the required permit. Even a spontaneous decision to go across the street and urge a neighbor to vote against the mayor could not lawfully be implemented without first obtaining the mayors permission. In this respect, the regulation is analogous to the circulation licensing tax the Court invalidated in Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233 (1936). In Grosjean, while discussing the history of the Free Press Clause of the First Amendment, the Court stated that [t]he evils to be prevented were not the censorship of the press merely, but any action of the government by means of which it might prevent such free and general discussion of public matters as seems absolutely essential to prepare the people for an intelligent exercise of their rights as citizens.Id., at 249250 (quoting 2 T. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 886 (8th ed. 1927)); see also Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U. S. 444 (1938). The breadth and unprecedented nature of this regulation does not alone render the ordinance invalid. Also 16 WATCHTOWER BIBLE & TRACT SOC. OF N. Y., INC. v. VILLAGE OF STRATTON unrelated protecting the electoral process. requiring a a prior condition on the of the right speech of citizens holding religious or views. War II-era cases demonstrate, number of persons whose prevent them from applying for such a license. There are no doubt other patriotic citizens, who firm about their constitutional right in debate the context of door-that would prefer silence to speech petty there is a significant amount of spontaneous that is effectively banned by the ordinance. A on a a political campaign could pass handbills until after he or she obtained the Even a spontaneous decision to go across neighbor mayor be obtaining mayor's this respect, the regulation is to the circulation licensing tax the Grosjean v. American Press Co., S. In Grosjean, while discussing the history of the Clause of the First Amendment, the Court "'[t]he evils to be prevented were not the censorship of the government it might prevent such free and as seems exercise rights as citizens."' Id., at 249-2 Cooley, 886 (8th ed. 1927)); also Lovell v. City 303 U. S. 444 (1938). unprecedented this regulation does not alone render the ordinance invalid. Also Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=87a4547e-0989-411c-8e9f-08f14fea3d64Cite as: 536 U. S. ____ (2002) 17 Opinion of the Court central to our conclusion that the ordinance does not pass First Amendment scrutiny is that it is not tailored to the Villages stated interests. Even if the interest in preventing fraud could adequately support the ordinance insofar as it applies to commercial transactions and the solicitation of funds, that interest provides no support for its application to petitioners, to political campaigns, or to enlisting support for unpopular causes. The Village, however, argues that the ordinance is nonetheless valid because it serves the two additional interests of protecting the privacy of the resident and the prevention of crime. With respect to the former, it seems clear that §107 of the ordinance, which provides for the posting of No Solicitationsigns and which is not challenged in this case, coupled with the residents unquestioned right to refuse to engage in conversation with unwelcome visitors, provides ample protection for the unwilling listener. Schaumburg, 444 U. S., at 639 ([T]he provision permitting homeowners to bar solicitors from their property by posting [no solicitation] signs . . . suggest[s] the availability of less intrusive and more effective measures to protect privacy). The annoyance caused by an uninvited knock on the front door is the same whether or not the visitor is armed with a permit. With respect to the latter, it seems unlikely that the absence of a permit would preclude criminals from knocking on doors and engaging in conversations not covered by the ordinance. They might, for example, ask for directions or permission to use the telephone, or pose as surveyers or census takers. See n. 1, supra. Or they might register under a false name with impunity because the ordinance contains no provision for verifying an applicants identity or organizational credentials. Moreover, the Village did not assert an interest in crime prevention below, and there is an absence of any evidence of a special crime problem related to door-to-door solicitation in the our conclusion the ordinance does pass Amendment is that it is not tailored to the Village's Even if the interest in preventing could applies provides however, that valid it respect former, it seems clear that §107 of "Solicitation" signs and which is not challenged in this case, with resident's in with provides for listener. Schaumburg, at ("[homeowners property by posting no signs ... suggest[s] the availability of less intrusive effective measures to protect privacy"). The caused by an uninvited the the same whether or not the visitor is armed with a permit. respect to the latter, it seems unlikely that the a permit would preclude criminals from on doors and engaging in conversations not by the They might, for example, ask or permission to use the telephone, or pose or takers. See Or they a false impunity because no provision for verifying applicant's or organizational credentials. Moreover, not assert an interest in crime prevention is an absence to door-to-door solicitation in the Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=87a4547e-0989-411c-8e9f-08f14fea3d64& TRACT SOC. v. OF Opinion of the Court record before us. The rhetoric used in the World War II-era opinions that repeatedly saved petitionerscoreligionists from petty prosecutions reflected the Courts evaluation of the First Amendment freedoms that are implicated in this case. The value judgment that then motivated a united democratic people fighting to defend those very freedoms from totalitarian attack is unchanged. It motivates our decision today. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. 18 WATCHTOWER BIBLE & TRACT SOC. OF N. Y., INC. v. VILLAGE OF STRATTON in saved petitioners' coreligionists from petty reflected the Court's are implicated in this case. then motivated a united democratic to defend those freedoms attack is unchanged. It motivates our decision of Appeals is reversed, case remanded for further proceedings consistent opinion. is so Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=87a4547e-0989-411c-8e9f-08f14fea3d64