Source: http://openjurist.org/print/28944
Timestamp: 2014-08-23 02:04:09
Document Index: 582672946

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 371', '§ 794', '§ 951', '§ 951', '§ 605', '§ 605']

394 US 165 Alderman v. United States a Ivanov
394 US 165 Alderman v. United States a Ivanov 394 U.S. 165
89 S.Ct. 961
22 L.Ed.2d 176
Willie Israel ALDERMAN et al., Petitioners,v.UNITED STATES. Igor A. IVANOV, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES. John William BUTENKO, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.
Nos. 133, 11, 197.
No. 133 Oct. Term, 1967
Reargued Oct. 14, 1968.
Nos. 11 and 197 Argued Oct. 14, 1968.
See 394 U.S. 939, 89 S.Ct. 1177.
[Syllabus from 166 intentionally omitted]
Edward Bennett Williams, Washington, D.C., for petitioners Alderman and Ivanov.
Charles Danzig, Newark, N.J., for petitioner Butenko.
After the convictions of petitione § had been affirmed, and while their cases were pending here, it was revealed that the United States had engaged in electronic surveillance which might have violated their Fourth Amendment rights and tainted their convictions. A remand to the District Court being necessary in each case for adjudication in the first instance, the questions now before us relate to the standards and procedures to be followed by the District Court in determining whether any of the Government's evidence supporting these convictions was the product of illegal surveillance to which any of the petitioners are entitled to object.
No. 133, O.T., 1967. Petitioners Alderman and Alderisio, along with Ruby Kolod, now deceased, were convicted of conspiring to transmit murderous threats in interstate commerce, 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 875(c). Their convictions were affirmed on appeal, 371 F.2d 983 (C.A.10th Cir. 1967), and this Court denied certiorari, 389 U.S. 834, 88 S.Ct. 40, 19 L.Ed.2d 95 (1967). In their petition for rehearing, petitioners alleged they had recently discovered that Alderisio's place of business in Chicago had been the subject of electronic surveillance by the Government. Reading the response of the Government to admit that Alderisio's conversations had been overheard by unlawful electronic eavesdropping,1 we granted the petition for rehearing over the objection of the United States that 'no overheard conversation in which any of the petitioners participated is arguably relevant to this prosecution.' In our per curiam opinion, 390 U.S. 136, 88 S.Ct. 752, 19 L.Ed.2d 962 (1968), we refused to accept the ex parte determination of relevance by the Department of Justice in lieu of adversary proceedings in the District Court, vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and remanded the case to the District Court for further proceedings.
The United States subsequently filed a motion to modify that order. Although accepting the Court's order insofar as it required judicial determination of whether any of the prosecution's evidence was the product of illegal surveillance, the United States urged that in order to protect innocent third parties participating or referred to in irrelevant conversations overheard by the Government, surveillance records should first be subjected to in camera inspection by the trial judge, who would then turn over to the petitioners and their counsel only those materials arguably relevant to their prosecution. Petitioners opposed the motion, and the matter was argued before the Court last Term. We then set the case down for reargument at the opening of the current Term, 392 U.S. 919, 88 S.Ct. 2257, 20 L.Ed.2d 1381 (1968), the attention of the parties being directed to the disclosure issue and the question of standing to object to the Government's use of the fruits of illegal surveillance.2
Nos. 11 and 197. Both petitioners were convicted of conspiring to transmit to the Soviet Union information relating to the national defense of the United States, 18 U.S.C. § 794(a), (c), and of conspiring to violate 18 U.S.C. § 951 by causing Butenko to act as an agent of the Soviet Union without prior notification to the Secretary of State. Butenko was also convicted of a substantive offense under 18 U.S.C. § 951. The Court of Appeals affirmed all but Ivanov's conviction on the second conspiracy count. 384 F.2d 554 (C.A.3d Cir. 1967). Petitions for certiorari were then filed in this Court, as was a subsequent motion to amend the Ivanov petition to raise an issue similar to that which was presented in No. 133, O.T.1967.3 Following the first argument in Alderman (sub nom. Kolod v. United States), the petitions for certiorari of both Ivanov and Butenko were granted, limited to questions nearly identical to those involved in the reargument of the Alderman case.4
The exclusionary rule fashioned in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914), and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), excludes from a criminal trial any evidence seized from the defendant in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Fruits of such evidence are excluded as well. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 391—392, 40 S.Ct. 182, 183, 64 L.Ed. 319 (1920). Because the Amendment now affords protection against the univited ear, oral statements, if illegally overheard, and their fruits are also subject to suppression. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 743 (1961); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967).
In Mapp and Weeks the defendant against whom the evidence was held to be inadmissible was the victim of the search. However, in the cases before us each petitioner demands retrial if any of the evidence used to convict him was the product of unauthorized surveillance, regardless of whose Fourth Amendment rights the surveillance violated At the very least, it is urged that if evidence is inadmissible against one defendant or conspirator, becuase tainted by electronic surveillance illegal as to him, it is also inadmissible against his codefendant or coconspirator.
This expansive reading of the Fourth Amendment and of the exclusionary rule fashioned to enforce it is admittedly inconsistent with prior cases, and we reject it. The established principle is that suppression of the product of a Fourth Amendment violation can be successfully urged only by those whose rights were violated by the search itself, not by those who are aggrieved solely by the introduction of damaging evidence. Coconspirators and codefendants have been accorded no special standing.
Thus in Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114, 62 S.Ct. 1000, 86 L.Ed. 1312 (1942), testimony induced by disclosing to witnesses their own telephonic communications intercepted by the Government contrary to 47 U.S.C. § 605 was held admissible against their coconspirators. The Court equated the rule under § 605 with the exclusionary rule under the Fourth Amendment.5 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963), came to like conclusions. There, two defendants were tried together; narcotics seized from a third party were held inadmissible against one defendant because they were the product of statements made by him at the time of his unlawful arrest. But the same narcotics were found to be admissible against the codefendant because '(t)he seizure of this heroin invaded no right of privacy of person or premises which would entitle (him) to object to its use at his trial. Cf. Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114, 62 S.Ct. 1000, 86 L.Ed. 1312.' Wong Sun v. United States, supra, at 492, 83 S.Ct. at 419.
The rule is stated in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261, 80 S.Ct. 725, 731, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960):
'In order to qualify as a 'person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure' one must have been a victim of a search or seizure, one against whom the search was directed, as distinguished from one who claims prejudice only through the use of evidence gathered as a consequence of a search or seizure directed at someone else. * * *
'Ordinarily, then, it is entirely proper to require of one who seeks to challenge the legality of a search as the basis for suppressing relevant evidence that he allege, and if the allegation be disputed that he establish, that he himself was the victim of an invasion of privacy.'6
This same principle was twice acknowledged last Term. Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 88 S.Ct. 2120, 20 L.Ed.2d 1154 (1968); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct. 967 (1968).7
We adhere to these cases and to the general rule that Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which, like some other constitutional rights, may not be vicariously asserted. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960). Cf. Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44, 46, 63 S.Ct. 493, 494, 87 L.Ed. 603 (1943). None of the special circumstances which prompted NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958), and Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 73 S.Ct. 1031, 97 L.Ed.1586 (1953), are present here. There is no necessity to exclude evidence against one defendant in order to protect the rights of another. No rights of the victim of an illegal search are at stake when the evidence is offered against some other party. The victim can and very probably will object for himself when and if it becomes important for him to do so.
The necessity for that predicate was not eliminated by recognizing and acknowledging the deterrent aim of the rule. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960). Neither those cases nor any others hold that anything which deters i legal searches is thereby commanded by the Fourth Amendment. The deterrent values of preventing the incrimination of those whose rights the police have violated have been considered sufficient to justify the suppression of probative evidence even though the case against the defendant is weakened or destroyed. We adhere to that judgment. But we are not convinced that the additional benefits of extending the exclusionary rule to other defendants would justify further encroachment upon the public interest in prosecuting those accused of crime and having them acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evidence which exposes the truth.
We do not deprecate Fourth Amendment rights. The security of persons and property remains a fundamental value which law enforcement officers must respect. Nor should those who flout the rules escape unscathed. In this respect we are mindful that there is now a comprehensive statute making unauthorized electronic surveillance a serious crime.8 The general rule under the statute is that official eavesdropping and wiretapping are permitted only with probable cause and a warrant. Without experience showing the contrary, we should not assume that this new statute will be cavalierly disregarded or will not be enforced against transgressors.
Of course, Congress or state legislatures may extend the exclusionary rule and provide that illegally seized evidence is inadmissible against anyone for any purpose.9 But for constitutional purposes, we are not now inclined to expand the existing rule that unlawful wiretapping or eavesdropping, whether deliberate or negligent, can produce nothing usable against the person aggrieved by the invasion.
Mr. Justice HARLAN and Mr. Justice STEWART, who are in partial dissent on this phase of the case, object to our protecting the homeowner against the use of third-party conversations overheard on his prem ses by an unauthorized surveillance. Their position is that unless the conversational privacy of the homeowner himself is invaded, there is no basis in the Fourth Amendment for excluding third-party conversations overheard on his premises. We cannot agree. If the police make an unwarranted search of a house and seize tangible property belonging to third parties—even a transcript of a third-party conversation—the homeowner may object to its use against him, not because he had any interest in the seized items as 'effects' protected by the Fourth Amendment, but because they were the fruits of an unauthorized search of his house, which is itself expressly protected by the Fourth Amendment.10 Nothing seen or found on the premises may legally form the basis for an arrest or search warrant or for testimony at the homeowner's trial, since the prosecution would be using the fruits of a Fourth Amendment violation. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 40 S.Ct. 182, 64 L.Ed. 319 (1920); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).
The Court has characteristically applied the same rule where an unauthorized electronic surveillance is carried out by physical invasion of the premises. This much the dissent frankly concedes. Like physical evidence which might be seized, overheard conversations are fruits of an illegal entry and are inadmissible in evidence. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961); Wong Sun v. United States, supra. When Silverman was decided, no right of conversational privacy had been recognized as such; the right vindicated in that case was the Fourth Amendment right to be secure in one's own home. In Wong Sun, the words spoken by Blackie Toy when the police illegally entered his house were not usable against him because they were the fruits of a physical invasion of his premises which violated the Fourth Amendment.
Because the Court has now decided that the Fourth Amendment protects a person's private conversations as well as his private premises, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), the dissent would discard the concept that private conversations overheard through an illegal entry into a private place must be excluded as the fruits of a Fourth Amendment violation. Although officers without a valid warrant may not search a house for physical evidence or incriminati g information, whether the owner is present or away, the dissent would permit them to enter that house without consent and without a warrant, install a listening device, and use any overheard third-party conversations against the owner in a criminal case, in spite of the obvious violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be secure in his own dwelling. Even if the owner is present on his premises during the surveillance, he would have no complaint unless his own conversations were offered or used against him. Information from a telephone tap or from the microphone in the kitchen or in the rooms of guests or children would be freely usable as long as the homeowner's own conversations are not monitored and used against him. Indeed, if the police, instead of installing a device, secreted themselves on the premises, they could neither testify about nor use against the owner anything they saw or carried away, but would be free to use against him everything they overheard except his own conversations. And should police overhear third parties describing narcotics which they have discovered in the owner's desk drawer, the police could not then open the drawer and seize the narcotics, but they could secure a warrant on the basis of what they had heard and forthwith seize the narcotics pursuant to that warrant.11
These views we do not accept. We adhere to the established view in this Court that the right to be secure in one's house against unauthorized intrusion is not limited to protection against a policeman viewing or seizing tangible property—'papers' and 'effects.' otherwise, the express security for the home provided by the Fourth Amendment would approach redunancy. The rights of the owner of the premises are as clearly invaded when the police enter and install a listening device in his house as they are when the entry is made to undertake a warrantless search for tangible property; and the prosecution as surely employs the fruits of an illegal search of the home when it offers overheard third-party conversations as it does when it introduces tangible evidence belonging not to the homeowner, but to others. Nor do we believe that Katz, by holding that the Fourth Amendment protects persons and their private conversations, was intended to withdraw any of the protection which the Amendment extends to the home or to overrule the existing doctrine, recognized at least since Silverman, that conversations as well as properly are excludable from the criminal trial w en they are found to be the fruits of an illegal invasion of the home. It was noted in Silverman, 365 U.S. at 511—512, 81 S.Ct. at 683, that
'This Court has never held that a federal officer may without warrant and without consent physically entrench into a man's office or home, there secretary observe or listen, and relate at the man's subsequent criminal trial what was seen or heard.'
The Court proceeded to hold quite the contrary. We take the same course here.
The remaining aspect of these cases relates to the procedures to be followed by the District Court in resolving the ultimate issue which will be before it—whether the evidence against any petitioner grew out of his illegally overheard conversations or conversations occurring on his premises.12 The question as stated in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 83 S.Ct. 407, 417, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963), is "whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint." See also Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341, 60 S.Ct. 266, 268, 84 L.Ed. 307 (1939).
The Government concedes that it must disclose to petitioners any surveillance records which are relevant to the decision of this ultimate issue. And it recognizes that this disclosure must be made even though attended by potential danger to the reputation or safety of third parties or to the national security—unless the United States would prefer dismissal of the case to disclosure of the information. However, the Government contends that it need not be put to this disclose-or-dismiss option in the instant cases because none of the information obtained from its surveillance is 'arguably relevant' to petitioners' convictions, in the sense that none of the overheard conversations arguably underlay any of the evidence offered in thse cases. Although not now insisting that its own evaluation of relevance should be accepted automatically and without judicial scrutiny, the United States urges that the records of the specified conversations be first submitted to the trial judge for an in camera examination. Any record found arguably relevant by the judge would be turned over to the petitioner whose Fourth Amendment rights have been violated, and that petitioner would then have the opportunity to use the disclosed information his attempt to show that the Government has used tainted evidence to convict him. Material not arguably relevant would not be disclosed to any petitioner.13
Although this may appear a modest proposal, especially since the standard for disclosure would be 'arguable' relevance, we conclude that surveillance records as to which any petitioner has standing to object should be turned over to him without being screened in camera by the trial judge. Admittedly, there may be much learned from an electronic surveillance which ultimately contributes nothing to probative evidence. But winnowing this material from those items which might have made a substantial contribution to the case against a petitioner is a task which should not be entrusted wholly to the court in the first instance. It might be otherwise if the trial judge had only to place the transcript or other record of the surveillance alongside the record evidence and compare the two for textual or substantive similarities. Even that assignment would be difficult enough for the trial judge to perform unaided. But a good deal more is involved. An apparently innocent phrase, a chance remark, a reference to what appears to be a neutral person or event, the identity of a caller or the individual on the other end of a telephone, or even the manner of speaking or using words may have special significance to one who knows the more intimate facts of an accused's life. And yet that information may be wholly colorless and devoid of meaning to one less well acquainted with all relevant circumstances. Unavoidably, this is a matter of judgment, but in our view the task is too complex, and the margin for error too great, to rely wholly on the in camera judgment of the trial court to identify those records which might have contributed to the Government's case.14
The United States concedes that when an illegal search has come to light, it has the ultimate burden of persuasion to show that its evidence is untainted. But at the same time petitioners acknowledge that they must go forward with specific evidence demonstrating taint. '(T)he trial judge must given opportunity, however closely confined, to the accused to prove that a substantial portion of the case against him was a fruit of the poisonous tree. This leaves ample opportunity to the Government to convince the trial court that its proof had an independent origin.' Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341, 60 S.Ct. 266, 268, 84 L.Ed. 307 (1939). With this task ahead of them, and if the hearings are to be more than a formality and petitioners not left entirely to reliance on government testimony, there should be turned over to them the records of those overheard conversations which the Government was not ontitled to use in building its case against them.
Adversary proceedings will not magically eliminate all error, but they will substantially reduce its incidence by guarding against the possibility that the trial judge, through lack of time or unfamiliarity with the information contained in and suggested by the materials, will be unable to prov de the scrutiny which the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule demands. It may be that the prospect of disclosure will compel the Government to dismiss some prosecutions in deference to dismiss some prosecutions party interests. But this is a choice the Government concededly faces with respect to material which it has obtained illegally and which it admits, or which a judge would find, is arguably relevant to the evidence offered against the defendant.15
We think this resolution will avoid an exorbitant expenditure of judicial time and energy and will not unduly prejudice others or the public interest. It must be remembered that disclosure will be limited to the transcripts of a defendant's own conversations and of those which took place on his premises. It can be safely assumed that much of this he will already know, and disclosure should therefore involve a minim