Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/10/1327/583997/
Timestamp: 2020-01-27 20:54:26
Document Index: 561852774

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 844', '§ 924', '§ 844', '§ 924', '§ 1153', 'art, 868', '§ 844', '§ 924', '§ 844', '§ 924', '§ 844', '§ 1302']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Steven B. Funmaker, Defendant-appellant, 10 F.3d 1327 (7th Cir. 1993) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Seventh Circuit › 1993 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Steven B. Funmaker, Defendant-appellant
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Steven B. Funmaker, Defendant-appellant, 10 F.3d 1327 (7th Cir. 1993)
US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit - 10 F.3d 1327 (7th Cir. 1993) Argued Sept. 15, 1993. Decided Dec. 2, 1993
Defendant Steven Bern Funmaker set fire to the Ho Chunk Bingo Hall and Casino at the direction of tribal leaders. As a result, a federal grand jury sitting in the Western District of Wisconsin returned an indictment charging Funmaker with violations of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), damaging by fire a building involved in interstate commerce, and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), using a destructive device in connection with a crime of violence. Funmaker pled guilty to both counts of the indictment, reserving his right to appeal a district court order denying his motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. This appeal ensued.
State and federal authorities investigated events surrounding the fire, and on March 4, 1992, a federal grand jury sitting in the Western District of Wisconsin returned a two count indictment against Funmaker. Count one charged Funmaker with attempting to destroy by fire a building involved in interstate commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i). Count two charged Funmaker with using a destructive device in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Funmaker moved to dismiss the indictment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and upon the recommendation of a magistrate judge the district court denied the motion on September 2, 1992.
The "New World": a region in which the Pilgrims sought religious freedom, the British sought resources, and colonists sought political independence. Of course, the area now known as the United States hardly was a new world to the Indian tribes that had inhabited the territory for thousands of years. Those tribes existed as independent political communities long before the Colonies, Great Britain, or their institutions existed, a fact recognized by Chief Justice John Marshall in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559, 8 L. Ed. 483 (1832) ("The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil, from time immemorial....").
What Indian tribes do possess are "inherent powers of a limited sovereignty...." Felix S. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 122 (1948), quoted in United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322, 98 S. Ct. 1079, 1086, 55 L. Ed. 2d 303 (1978). That sovereignty allows Indian tribes to regulate their internal affairs, Roff v. Burney, 168 U.S. 218, 18 S. Ct. 60, 42 L. Ed. 442 (1897), and enforce those regulations in their own forums, Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 79 S. Ct. 269, 3 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1959). The sovereignty of Indian tribes is limited, however, in that it exists only in the absence of federal law to the contrary. U.S. Const. Art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 3 (Congress has power " [t]o regulate Commerce ... with the Indian Tribes"); Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294, 305-07, 23 S. Ct. 115, 119-20, 47 L. Ed. 183 (1902). For example, in the Major Crimes Act Congress specifically gave federal courts criminal jurisdiction over Indians who commit certain felonies, including murder, kidnapping, and burglary, a provision that has existed in various forms since 1885. See 18 U.S.C. § 1153.
As a general rule, statutes written in terms applying to all persons include members of Indian tribes as well. Federal Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 116, 80 S. Ct. 543, 553, 4 L. Ed. 2d 584 (1960). An exception, however, follows on the heels of the rule, namely that when the application of a statute would affect Indian or tribal rights recognized by treaty or statute, or would affect rights essential to self-governance of intramural matters, the law specifically must evince Congressional intent to interfere with those rights. Smart v. State Farm Ins. Co., 868 F.2d 929, 932-34 (7th Cir. 1989). As the Ninth Circuit put it:
A federal statute of general applicability that is silent on the issue of applicability to Indian Tribes will not apply to them if: (1) the law touches "exclusive rights of self-governance in purely intramural matters"; (2) the application of the law to the tribe would "abrogate rights guaranteed by Indian treaties"; or (3) there is proof "by legislative history or some other means that Congress intended [the law] not apply to Indians on their reservations ..." [quoting United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890, 893-94 (9th Cir. 1980) ]. In any of these three situations, Congress must expressly apply a statute to Indians before we will hold that it reaches them.
Donovan v. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 1985), quoted in Smart, 868 F.2d at 933-34. Because 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) fail to address Indian tribes specifically, we must analyze both the impact on Indian tribal self-governance and congressional intent with regard to each statute.
Funmaker argues that the decision to set fire to the bingo hall was a valid exercise of police power, which he properly implemented. If indeed 18 U.S.C. 844(i) and 18 U.S.C. 924(c) reach Indian tribes, the fact that Funmaker was following the orders of tribal authorities does not immunize him from federal prosecution. Most recently in the public eye, that argument was rejected when those involved in the Iran-Contra scandal were prosecuted. See United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 926 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("our criminal law does not recognize a 'following orders' or 'Nuremberg' defense."). It must be clear that defendants cannot circumvent federal prosecution by claiming that they were merely following orders.
Because the government is entitled to prosecute individuals who follow orders to violate federal law, the next logical step is to ask whether the statutes Funmaker conceded he violated extend to members of Indian tribes. The first issue is whether 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) invade "exclusive rights of self-governance in purely intramural matters...." Coeur d'Alene, 751 F.2d at 1116. Without addressing the question of whether the decision to set ablaze tribal property involves exclusive rights of self-governance, we hold that Funmaker's actions extended beyond purely intramural matters.
The primary statute at issue, 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), applies to the damaging or destroying of property used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce only. One need look no further than the Constitution to see that the federal government has a unique interest in the protection of goods in interstate commerce. See U.S. Const. art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 3 (Commerce Clause). Indian tribes, like states, have no incentive to analyze how their decisions would affect federal interests. Even if Indian tribes had the same enforcement options available as the federal government,2 tribal leaders could not always be expected to exercise those options similarly.
Funmaker never contested that the gambling hall was used in or affected interstate commerce. Instead, Funmaker relies on the fact that the bingo hall was on tribal property and was involved in a tribal dispute. Given the long reach of the Commerce Clause, however, that reliance is misplaced. If Ollie's Barbecue, a Birmingham restaurant that served no interstate travellers but purchased food that had moved through interstate commerce, was sufficiently involved in interstate commerce to fall within federal jurisdiction, a bingo hall and casino designed to attract tourists from surrounding states undeniably affects interstate commerce for Commerce Clause purposes. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 85 S. Ct. 377, 13 L. Ed. 2d 290 (1964).
Funmaker's final two arguments, that federal prosecution of him violates the political question and act of state doctrines, can be dispatched easily. The political question doctrine, which arose from separation of powers concerns, precludes as nonjusticiable consideration of cases in which there exists a "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217, 82 S. Ct. 691, 710, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663 (1962). Funmaker contends that the decision by Chairperson Jones to destroy the bingo hall somehow raises a political question.
Lastly, Funmaker contends that the government prosecuted him in violation of the act of state doctrine. That doctrine dictates that courts will not sit in judgment on the acts of another country done within that country's territory. See Antolok v. United States, 873 F.2d 369, 384 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Courts apply the act of state doctrine if deciding a case "might frustrate the conduct of foreign relations by the political branches of the government...." First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 767-68, 92 S. Ct. 1808, 1813-14, 32 L. Ed. 2d 466 (1972).
This case raises no such possibility. Courts long have held that Indian tribes are not foreign states for jurisdictional purposes. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 19, 8 L. Ed. 25 (1831). Congress can limit the sovereignty enjoyed by Indian tribes, and Section 844(i) and Section 924(c) constitute precisely such limitations. Rather than frustrating congressional policy regarding the Indian tribes, the district court furthered that policy by allowing the government to prosecute Funmaker. The act of states doctrine simply does not apply to Indian tribes.
In fact, they do not; tribal courts may impose penalties limited to six months imprisonment and/or a $500 fine. 25 U.S.C. § 1302