Source: https://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/california/cacdce/2:2017cv05739/685590/19
Timestamp: 2018-10-15 13:40:52
Document Index: 175435261

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 405', '§ 405', '§ 416', '§ 416', '§ 416', '§ 416', '§ 416', '§ 416', 'art, 400', '§ 405']

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF REMAND by Magistrate Judge Alka Sagar for Judy Maciel v. Nancy A Berryhill :: Justia Dockets & Filings
Justia Dockets & Filings Ninth Circuit California California Central District Court Judy Maciel v. Nancy A Berryhill Filing 19
Judy Maciel v. Nancy A Berryhill
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF REMAND by Magistrate Judge Alka Sagar. The decision of the Commissioner is reversed, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings pursuant to Sentence 4 of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (See document for complete details) (afe)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA-WESTERN DIVISION 11 12 JUDY MACIEL, 13 Plaintiff, 14 v. 15 NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting 16 Commissioner of Social 17 Security, Defendant. 18 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. CV 17-05739-AS MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF REMAND 19 20 PROCEEDINGS 21 22 On August 3, 2017, Plaintiff filed a Complaint seeking review of 23 the denial of her application for Supplemental Security Income. (Docket 24 Entry No. 1). The parties have consented to proceed before the 25 undersigned United States Magistrate Judge. (Docket Entry Nos. 11-12). 26 27 28 On December 28, 2017, Defendant Administrative Record (“AR”). filed an Answer along (Docket Entry Nos. 15-16). with the The parties filed a Joint Submission (“Joint Stip.”) on April 4, 2018, setting forth 1 1 their respective positions regarding Plaintiff’s claim. (Docket Entry 2 No. 18). 3 4 The Court has taken this matter under submission without oral 5 6 argument. See C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15. 7 8 BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION 9 10 11 On December 10, 2013, Plaintiff, formerly employed as an office worker for a college (see AR 265, 288), filed an application for 12 13 Supplemental Security Income, alleging a disability since January 1, 14 2006. (AR 195-201). 15 16 On July 21, 2015 and January 14, 2016, the Administrative Law Judge 17 (“the ALJ”), James Goodman, heard testimony from Plaintiff (who was 18 represented by counsel). (See AR 40-63, 66-85). On March 21, 2016, the 19 ALJ issued a decision denying Plaintiff’s application. (See AR 22-32). 20 21 22 After determining that Plaintiff had severe impairments –- rheumatoid arthritis and Sjogren’s syndrome, in combination (AR 25)1 –- but did not 23 have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically 24 equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments (AR 26), the ALJ 25 26 27 1 The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s other impairments –- lower back 28 dysfunction, Raynaud’s phenomenon, obesity, and depression -- were nonsevere. (AR 25-26). 2 1 found that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”)2 to 2 perform light work3 with the following limitations: can lift and/or carry 3 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; can stand/walk with 4 normal breaks for 4 hours in an 8-hour workday; can sit with normal 5 6 breaks for 8 hours in an 8-hour workday; can climb, balance, bend, 7 stoop, kneel and crawl frequently; and should avoid dangerous heights 8 and dangerous moving machinery. (AR 26-30). The ALJ then determined 9 that Plaintiff was not able to perform any past relevant work (AR 30), 10 but that jobs existed in significant numbers in the national economy 11 that Plaintiff can perform, and therefore found that Plaintiff was not 12 disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. (AR 30-32). 13 14 15 The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review on 16 February 22, 2016. (See AR 1-5, 194). Plaintiff now seeks judicial 17 review of the ALJ’s decision which stands as the final decision of the 18 Commissioner. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c). 19 20 STANDARD OF REVIEW 21 22 This Court reviews the Administration’s decision to determine if 23 it is free of legal error and supported by substantial evidence. See 24 Brewes v. Comm’r, 682 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012). “Substantial 25 26 27 28 2 A Residual Functional Capacity is what a claimant can still do despite existing exertional and nonexertional limitations. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1). 3 “Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(b). 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 evidence” is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1009 (9th Cir. 2014). To determine whether substantial evidence supports a finding, “a court must consider the record as a whole, weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that detracts from the [Commissioner’s] conclusion.” Aukland v. Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation omitted). As a result, “[i]f the evidence can support either affirming or reversing the ALJ’s conclusion, [a court] may not substitute [its] judgment for that of the ALJ.” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006). 11 12 PLAINTIFF’S CONTENTION 13 14 15 16 Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ erred in failing to properly consider the opinion of licensed clinical social worker Marina Compean. (See Joint Stip. at 4-6, 13). 17 18 DISCUSSION 19 20 21 22 After consideration of the record as a whole, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s sole claim of error warrants a remand for further consideration. 23 24 A. The ALJ Did Not Properly Consider Marina Compean’s Opinion 25 26 Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ did not provide a legally sufficient 27 reason for rejecting Marina Compean’s opinion. (See Joint Stip. at 4-6, 28 13). Defendant asserts that the ALJ did not err in discouting Marina 4 1 Compean’s opinion, and, alternatively, that any error by the ALJ in 2 failing to provide a legally sufficient reason for discounting Marina 3 Compean’s opinion was harmless. (See Joint Stip. at 7-12). 4 5 An ALJ must take into account all medical opinions of record. 20 6 C.F.R. § 416.927(b). Only “acceptable medical sources” can give medical 7 opinions. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(a)(1); Social Security Ruling 06-03p, *2 8 (rescinded for claims filed after March 27, 2017, 2017 WL 3928298). A 9 licensed clinical social worker is not an “acceptable medical source,” 10 but rather is an “other source.” 11 Security Ruling 06-03, *2. 20 C.F.R. § 416.913(d)(1); Social The opinion of “other sources” cannot 12 establish the existence of a medically determinable impairment. 13 C.F.R. § 416.913(a); Social Security Ruling 06-03p, *2. 20 However, the 14 opinion of “other sources” “are important and should be evaluated on key 15 issues such as impairment severity and functional effects, along with 16 the other relevant evidence in the file. Social Security Ruling 06-03p, 17 *3; see also 416.913(d)(1); Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1013–14 18 (9th Cir. 2014)(“other sources” “can provide evidence about the severity 19 of a claimant’s impairment(s) and how it affects the claimant’s ability 20 to work”)(citation and alterations omitted). The ALJ may discount the 21 testimony of “other sources” if the ALJ “gives reasons germane to each 22 witness for doing so.” Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1161 (9th Cir. 23 2014)(citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Turner 24 v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 613 F.3d 1217, 1224 (9th Cir. 2010). 25 26 On December 30, 2015 (between the administrative hearings that were 27 held on July 21, 2015 and January 14, 2016), Plaintiff submitted a 28 Mental Capacity Assessment prepared by Marina Compean, LCSW on December 3, 2015. (See AR 640-43). Ms. Compean opined inter alia that 5 1 Plaintiff had (1) moderate limitations in the abilities to maintain 2 attention and concentration for extended periods, to sustain an ordinary 3 routine without special supervision, to complete a normal workday 4 without interruption from psychologically-based symptoms, and to 5 complete a normal workweek without interruptions from psychologically 6 based symptoms; (2) marked limitations in the abilities to perform 7 activities within a schedule, maintain regular attendance, and be 8 punctual within customary tolerances, and to perform at a consistent 9 pace with a standard number and length of rest periods; and (3) slight 10 limitations in the abilities to respond appropriately to changes in the 11 work setting and to be aware of normal hazards and take appropriate 12 precautions. 13 14 (See AR 641-42). At the January 14, 2016 administrative hearing, Plaintiff testified 15 that she had received therapy for depression from Ms. Compean, a 16 counselor at St. John’s Well Child and Family Center who works under the 17 supervision of Dr. Rodriguez. 18 19 (See AR 70-71). The ALJ addressed Ms. Compean’s opinion as follows: “Marin Compean, 20 LCSW, opined in December 2015 that the claimant had moderate to marked 21 limitations in certain aspects of sustained concentration and 22 persistence (Exhibit B19F/2-3). [¶] I accord little weight to Ms. 23 Compean’s opinion because she is not an acceptable medical source.” (AR 24 25). 25 26 The ALJ’s reason for discounting Ms. Compean’s opinion was 27 insufficient. See Haagenson v. Colvin, 656 Fed. Appx. 800 (9th Cir. 28 2016)(“The only reason that the ALJ offered for rejecting their opinions 6 1 is that they are not ‘acceptable medical sources’ within the meaning of 2 the federal regulation. However, the regulation already presumes that 3 nurses and counselors are non-acceptable medical sources, yet still 4 requires the ALJ to consider them as ‘other sources.’”) 5 6 Defendant alternatively contends that the ALJ’s error in 7 discounting Ms. Compean’s opinion was harmless because (1) the opinion 8 is not supported by any treatment notes, (2) the opinion is not 9 supported by the medical record, and (3) Plaintiff did not testify at 10 the hearings that she had issues with sustained concentration and 11 persistence, and Plaintiff did not allege in her disability reports that 12 she suffered a mental condition which limited her ability to work. (See 13 Joint Stip. at 9-12). 14 15 Contrary to Defendant’s contention, the ALJ’s failure to consider 16 Ms. Compean’s opinion was not harmless error. It is not “clear from the 17 record . . . that [the ALJ’s error] was “inconsequential to the ultimate 18 non-disability determination.” 19 1038 (9th Cir. 2008)(citation Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, omitted); see also Carmickle v. 20 Commissioner, 533 F.3d 1155, 1162 (9th Cir. 2008)(“[T]he relevant 21 inquiry in this context is not whether the ALJ would have made a 22 different decision absent any error, . . ., it is whether the ALJ’s 23 decision remains legally valid, despite such error.”); Burch v. 24 Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005)(“A decision of the ALJ will 25 not be reversed for errors that are harmless.”). 26 27 // 28 // 7 1 B. Remand Is Warranted 2 3 The decision whether to remand for further proceedings or order an 4 immediate award of benefits is within the district court’s discretion. 5 Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1175-78 (9th Cir. 2000). Where no 6 useful purpose would be served by further administrative proceedings, 7 or where the record has been fully developed, it is appropriate to 8 exercise this discretion to direct an immediate award of benefits. Id. 9 at 1179 (“[T]he decision of whether to remand for further proceedings 10 turns upon the likely utility of such proceedings.”). However, where, 11 as here, the circumstances of the case suggest that further 12 administrative review could remedy the Commissioner’s errors, remand is 13 appropriate. McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d 881, 888 (9th Cir. 2011); 14 Harman v. Apfel, supra, 211 F.3d at 1179-81. 15 16 ORDER 17 18 For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Commissioner is 19 reversed, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings pursuant 20 to Sentence 4 of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 21 22 LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY. 23 24 DATED: April 13, 2018 25 26 27 /s/ ALKA SAGAR UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 28 8