Source: http://openjurist.org/88/f3d/56
Timestamp: 2016-12-06 18:26:19
Document Index: 273983925

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1738', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 7804', '§ 7804']

88 F3d 56 Giakoumelos v. A Coughlin III | OpenJurist
88 F. 3d 56 - Giakoumelos v. A Coughlin III HomeFederal Reporter, Third Series 88 F.3d
88 F3d 56 Giakoumelos v. A Coughlin III 88 F.3d 56
John GIAKOUMELOS, Plaintiff-Appellant,v.Thomas A. COUGHLIN, III, Stephan Vladyka, Correction Officerat Great Meadow Correctional Facility, Arthur Leonardo,Superintendent, and Donald Selsky, Director of SpecialHousing, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 1214, Docket 95-2211.
Argued March 19, 1996.Decided June 20, 1996.
Giakoumelos then moved for relief under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) on the ground that before the deadline to respond to the summary judgment motion, he had been granted an extension of time to answer by a staff attorney in the district court. The Magistrate, who was apparently not aware of this extension when he granted the motion, vacated his June 1994 decision and ordered Giakoumelos to answer.
Under the Full Faith and Credit Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, federal courts must give a prior state court judgment the same preclusive effect that such a judgment would be given in the courts of the state from which the judgment emerged. See Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 466, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 1889-90, 72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982). This rule applies to actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 103-04, 101 S.Ct. 411, 419-20, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980) (issue preclusion); Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 84-85, 104 S.Ct. 892, 897-98, 79 L.Ed.2d 56 (1984) (claim preclusion). We therefore look to New York law to determine what preclusive effect the prior judgment in the Article 78 Proceeding has in this case.
1. Requirements of New York Law
Under New York law, the doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, applies when a litigant in a prior proceeding asserts an issue of fact or law in a subsequent proceeding and (1) the issue "has necessarily been decided in the prior action and is decisive of the present action," and (2) there has been "a full and fair opportunity to contest the decision now said to be controlling." Schwartz v. Public Administrator, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 71, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955, 246 N.E.2d 725 (1969); see also Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 869 (2d Cir.1995). Therefore, we must examine the Article 78 Proceeding closely to determine what was decided there.
Giakoumelos has pointed to a number of procedural deficiencies in prison disciplinary hearings and prison administrative appeals in comparison to a full judicial adversary proceeding. Indeed, in the context of whether to accord prison disciplinary officials absolute immunity from suit both the Supreme Court and this court have recognized some of these shortcomings: the organizational pressure on prison hearing officers, see Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 203-04, 106 S.Ct. 496, 501-02, 88 L.Ed.2d 507 (1985), Young v. Selsky, 41 F.3d 47, 53 (2d Cir.1994), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 1837, 131 L.Ed.2d 756 (1995); the absence of counsel, the restrictions on cross-examination of witnesses, the reliance on hearsay and confidential informants, see Young, 41 F.3d at 53-54. Giakoumelos adds to this list the limited ability of prisoners to compel witnesses to testify and to otherwise review the evidence against them. Giakoumelos further argues that DOCS prison administrative appeals provide no additional procedural protections and rely on the same evidence as the disciplinary hearing. See Id. at 53. Moreover, Giakoumelos says, review of an administrative determination for substantial evidence under Article 78, given the low standard of review of factual determinations1 and review limited to the administrative record, cannot rectify the procedural errors of the disciplinary proceedings.
This court stated in Colon, in passing, that "[w]e think there is a substantial question as to whether, under New York law, collateral estoppel should ever apply to fact issues determined in a prison disciplinary hearing and reviewed for substantial evidence in an Article 78 proceeding, given the procedural laxity of such prison hearings, and the limited nature of substantial-evidence review." 58 F.3d at 869 (quotation and citations omitted). But whatever may be the force of that language, which was not essential to the decision in that case, it affords Giakoumelos no comfort, for the issues raised in his § 1983 complaint are all issues of law, not of fact. And whatever preclusive effect an Article 78 proceeding may or may not be given where issues of fact are concerned, an issue that we need not decide today, we think it is clear that where issues of law are concerned, Giakoumelos cannot simply rely on the relatively limited procedural protections of prison disciplinary proceedings and Article 78 review. He must at least show that the alleged deficiencies in his disciplinary proceedings produced some significant effect on their review by the Appellate Division in the Article 78 Proceeding.
Were the district court to review the merits of all of Giakoumelos's claims it appears that it would have before it essentially the same record (including the Urban transcript) that the Appellate Division had before it. This is the situation--the relitigation of claims already decided under constitutionally adequate circumstances--that the Full Faith and Credit Statute seeks to avoid. See Allen, 449 U.S. at 94-96, 101 S.Ct. at 414-16. Giakoumelos chose to litigate his claims by way of an Article 78 proceeding. Collateral estoppel in a subsequent § 1983 action is one of the risks attendant to his decision to follow that route.
Giakoumelos argues that because monetary relief was not available in the Article 78 Proceeding he should not be precluded from relitigating the constitutionality of the disciplinary proceedings in federal court. Under New York law, if the initial forum did not have the power to grant the relief sought in the subsequent forum, res judicata, or claim preclusion, may not apply. See Davidson v. Capuano, 792 F.2d 275, 278 (2d Cir.1986). Although Giakoumelos therefore may not be estopped from bringing his claim for damages, the correct application of collateral estoppel requires that the issues raised in the subsequent action be decided by reference to the previous state court judgment. See Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 792-93 (2d Cir.1994). In other words, Giakoumelos's claim for damages must be rejected because the constitutionality of the disciplinary proceedings was already determined against him in the Article 78 Proceeding.
2. Requirements of Federal Law
Even if a judgment satisfies New York State law requirements for issue preclusion, as a matter of federal law a state cannot give preclusive effect in its own courts to a constitutionally infirm judgment. See Kremer, 456 U.S. at 482, 102 S.Ct. at 1898. But "state proceedings need do no more than satisfy the minimum procedural requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause in order to qualify for the full faith and credit guaranteed by federal law." Id. at 481, 102 S.Ct. at 1897-98. The only serious issue raised by Giakoumelos's disciplinary proceedings in this regard is that the determination was apparently based primarily on confidential evidence.
A prison disciplinary finding must be supported by some evidence, Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 2773-74, 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985), and an informant's testimony is enough at least as long as there has been "some examination of indicia relevant to [an informant's] credibility", as there apparently was here. Russell v. Scully, 15 F.3d 219, 223 (2d Cir.1993), as modified on denial of rehearing (1994).
It is true that in a criminal case, on facts similar to this, the government would probably be put to the choice of disclosure of an informant's testimony or dropping the case. See United States v. Saa, 859 F.2d 1067, 1073 (2d Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1089, 109 S.Ct. 1555, 103 L.Ed.2d 858 (1989) (In a criminal trial "[t]he defendant is generally able to establish a right to disclosure [of an informant's identity and testimony] where the informant is a key witness or participant in the crime charged, someone whose testimony would be significant in determining guilt or innocence." (quotation omitted)). But this is not a criminal case, and in the context of a prison disciplinary proceeding (on such a serious matter as a plot to escape) the prison officials need not be put to the same choice. The reason is obvious: the requirements of prison security are unique. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 561-62, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2977-78, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974).
We have held that in a civil contempt proceeding a court can rely upon evidence that it reviews in camera and withholds from the party against whom the evidence is offered when the interest in disclosure is outweighed by an important governmental interest in secrecy. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 72 F.3d 271, 276-77 (2d Cir.1995); see also Stoddard v. United States, 710 F.2d 21, 23-24 (2d Cir.1983); In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482, 489-90 (2d Cir.1982). We have reviewed the Urban transcript, and it shows that a substantial interest in the form of prison security is present in this case. We can find no due process impediment to affording collateral estoppel effect to the judgment in the Article 78 Proceeding.
B. Due Process in Light of Sandin v. Conner
Independent of their argument for collateral estoppel, defendants argue that, in light of the recent Supreme Court opinion in Sandin v. Conner, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995), Giakoumelos has not made out a due process claim because he has no constitutionally-protected liberty interest in remaining free from disciplinary confinement. They argue that the 365 days Giakoumelos spent in the SHU and his loss of 12 months good time is not an "atypical and significant hardship ... in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Id. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 2300. This court has recently remanded cases decided by the district court prior to the decision in Sandin (as this case was) for a factual determination of whether the punishment received by the prisoner was an "atypical and significant hardship." See Branham v. Meachum, 77 F.3d 626 (2d Cir.1996); Samuels v. Mockry, 77 F.3d 34 (2d Cir.1996). Giakoumelos has called to our attention, among other things, a recent decision from the Eleventh Circuit that may throw doubt on defendants' argument. See Williams v. Fountain, 77 F.3d 372, 374 n. 3 (11th Cir.1996). Given our disposition of this case on grounds of collateral estoppel, however, we see no need to address the question of the effect of Sandin on Giakoumelos's claims.
The parties agree that the discovery of significant new evidence would, under New York law, defeat the application of collateral estoppel. See Khandhar v. Elfenbein, 943 F.2d 244, 249 (2d Cir.1991). Giakoumelos argues that summary judgment was inappropriate in this case because there was a genuine issue of fact regarding whether the statements made in the Braun affidavit constituted significant new evidence. In support of this argument, Giakoumelos points to the Magistrate's September 1994 and March 1995 summary judgment decisions, each reaching a different result based on the submission of apparently conflicting factual allegations. Giakoumelos characterizes this as an inappropriate determination of a factual issue on a motion for summary judgment. He further argues that, to the extent the ultimate summary judgment decision was based on defendants' in camera submission, it was impossible for him to respond to information to which he had no access.
Summary judgment is appropriate when, resolving all ambiguities and drawing all inferences in favor of the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Burgos, 14 F.3d at 789. The court's function on a summary judgment motion is to determine if any material factual issue is in dispute and not to resolve any such issues. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513-14, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Reviewing the record that the Magistrate had before him, including the Urban transcript, summary judgment was appropriate in this case. The full record does not disclose any evidentiary material that would cause a rational trier of fact to conclude that Braun was a co-conspirator, despite Giakoumelos's unsupported assertions to the contrary.
The procedural rules for Article 78 proceedings apparently do allow for some limited supplementation of the administrative record on procedural issues, see CPLR §§ 7804(d) and (e), and a trial "[i]f a triable issue of fact is raised" in the proceeding, see CPLR § 7804(h)