Source: https://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/arizona/azdce/2:2012cv00800/694055/18
Timestamp: 2017-05-23 15:07:22
Document Index: 319390078

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 405', '§ 423', '§ 423', '§ 423', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§\n404', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§\n404', '§ 404']

ORDER, the decision of the Administrative Law Judge is affirmed; the Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly; the judgment shall serve as the mandate of this Court for Kenner v. Astrue :: Justia Dockets & Filings Log In
Kenner v. Astrue
ORDER, the decision of the Administrative Law Judge is affirmed; the Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly; the judgment shall serve as the mandate of this Court. Signed by Senior Judge James A Teilborg on 7/29/13. (REW)
Michael Astrue, Commissioner, Social)
Security Administration,
Toniann Kenner,
No. CV 12-0800-PHX-JAT
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s appeal from the Administrative Law Judge’s
(“ALJ”) denial of Plaintiff’s Title II application for disability insurance benefits.
Plaintiff Toniann Kenner filed a Title II application for Disability Insurance Benefits
on October 2, 2008, alleging that her disability began on February 22, 2002. (Record
Transcript (“TR”) 116).1 Plaintiff was 38 years old at the time of filing her application, and
listed her illnesses, injuries, and conditions as back, shoulder, neck, and knee pain. (TR 134).
Plaintiff’s application was denied initially and upon reconsideration. (TR 70, 75). On May
8, 2009, Plaintiff filed a request for a hearing, and, on December 11, 2009, Plaintiff appeared
at a video hearing before an ALJ. (TR 80; TR 45). On December 22, 2009, the ALJ issued
Although both parties indicate that Plaintiff’s application was filed in September
2008, the application itself is dated October 2, 2008. (TR 116).
an unfavorable decision. (TR 24). On July 25, 2011, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s
January 11, 2010 request for review. (TR 14; TR 22).
On April 17, 2012, Plaintiff filed her Complaint for Judicial Review of the ALJ’s
decision. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff argues that the Court should vacate the Administrative Law
Decision because: (1) the ALJ erred by rejecting the opinions of treating physicians; and (2)
the ALJ erred by rejecting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony in the absence of clear and
convincing reasons for so doing. (Doc. 12).
The Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits will be overturned “only if it is not
supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error.” Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d
747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal quotation omitted). Substantial evidence is more than a
mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Reddick v. Charter, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir.
1998). It is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion. Id.
In determining whether there is substantial evidence to support a decision, this Court
considers the record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports the administrative
law judge’s conclusions and the evidence that detracts from the administrative law judge’s
conclusions. Id. If there is sufficient evidence to support the Commissioner’s determination,
the Court cannot substitute its own determination for that of the ALJ. Id. Additionally, the
administrative law judge is responsible for resolving conflicts in medical testimony,
determining credibility, and resolving ambiguities. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035,
1039 (9th Cir. 1995). Thus, if on the whole record before this Court, substantial evidence
supports the Commissioner’s decision, this Court must affirm it. See Hammock v. Bowen,
879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
To qualify for disability benefits under the Social Security Act, a claimant must show,
among other things, that he is “under a disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(E). The Social
Security Act defines “disability” as the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity
by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be
expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). A person is “under a disability
only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not
only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work
experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national
economy.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
The Social Security regulations set forth a five-step sequential process for evaluating
disability claims. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; see also Reddick, 157 F.3d at 721 (describing the
sequential process). A finding of “not disabled” at any step in the sequential process will end
the ALJ’s inquiry. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). The claimant bears the burden of proof at
the first four steps, but the burden shifts to the ALJ at the final step. Reddick, 157 F.3d at
First, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is “doing substantial gainful
activity.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so, the claimant is not disabled.
If the claimant is not gainfully employed, the ALJ next determines whether the
claimant has a “severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment.” 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). A severe impairment is one that “significantly limits [the claimant’s]
physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). Basic work
activities means the “abilities and aptitudes to do most jobs.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(b).
Further, the impairment must either be expected “to result in death” or “to last for a
continuous period of twelve months.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1509 (incorporated by reference in
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii)). The “step-two inquiry is a de minimis screening device to
dispose of groundless claims.” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1290 (9th Cir. 1996).
Having found a severe impairment, the ALJ next determines whether the
impairment “meets or equals” one of the impairments specifically listed in the regulations.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is found disabled without considering the
claimant’s age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. at § 404.1520(d).
At step four, the ALJ determines whether, despite the impairments, the
claimant can still perform “past relevant work.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). To make
this determination, the ALJ compares the “residual functional capacity assessment . . . with
the physical and mental demands of [the claimant’s] past relevant work.” 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(f). If the claimant can still perform the kind of work the claimant previously did,
the claimant is not disabled. Otherwise, the ALJ proceeds to the final step.
At the final step, the ALJ determines whether the claimant “can make an
adjustment to other work” that exists in the national economy.
404.1520(a)(4)(v). In making this determination, the ALJ considers the claimant’s residual
functional capacity, together with vocational factors (age, education, and work experience).
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g)(1). If the claimant can make an adjustment to other work, then he
is not disabled. If the claimant cannot perform other work, he will be found disabled. As
previously noted, the ALJ has the burden of proving the claimant can perform other
substantial gainful work that exists in the national economy. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 721.
20 C.F.R. §
Whether the ALJ Erred by Rejecting the Opinions of Treating
Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ erred in assigning only limited weight to the opinion
of Dr. Bajpai while assigning significant weight to the opinion of Dr. Ani. Plaintiff does not
appear to object to the assignment of probative weight to the opinion of Dr. Guice. All three
physicians treated Plaintiff.
The ALJ must consider all medical evidence in the record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(b).
Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1164 (9th Cir. 2008). Such conflicts may arise
between a treating physician’s medical opinion and other evidence in the claimant’s record.
A treating physician’s opinion is usually entitled to “substantial weight.” Bray v. Comm’r,
Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1228 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d
418, 422 (9th Cir. 1988)). A treating physician’s opinion is given controlling weight when
it is “well-supported by medically accepted clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and
is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the claimant’s] case record.” 20
C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). On the other hand, if a treating physician’s opinion “is not well-
supported” or “is inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record,” then it should
not be given controlling weight. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 631 (9th Cir. 2007).
Substantial evidence that contradicts a treating physician’s opinion may consist of
either (1) an examining physician’s opinion or (2) a nonexamining physician’s opinion
combined with other evidence. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1995). In the
case of an examining physician, “[w]hen an examining physician relies on the same clinical
findings as a treating physician, but differs only in his or her conclusions, the conclusions of
the examining physician are not substantial evidence.” Orn, 495 F.3d at 632 (citing Murray
v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 501-502 (9th Cir. 1984)). To constitute substantial evidence, the
examining physician must provide “independent clinical findings that differ from the findings
of the treating physician.” Id. (citing Miller v. Heckler, 770 F.2d 845, 849 (9th Cir. 1985)).
Independent clinical findings can be either “diagnoses that differ from those offered by
another physician and that are supported by substantial evidence, . . . or findings based on
objective medical tests that the treating physician has not herself considered.” Id. (citing
Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1984); Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041
(9th Cir. 1995)).
“The opinion of a nonexamining physician cannot by itself constitute substantial
evidence that justifies the rejection of the opinion of either an examining physician or a
treating physician.” Lester, 81 F.3d at 831. Such an opinion is only substantial evidence if
supported by “substantial record evidence.” Id.
If the ALJ determines that a treating physician’s opinion is inconsistent with
substantial evidence and is not to be given controlling weight, the opinion remains entitled
to deference and should be weighed according to the factors provided in 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(d). Orn, 495 F.3d at 631; SSR 96–2p at 4. These factors include: (1) the length
of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examination; (2) the nature and extent of
the treatment relationship; (3) the extent to which the opinion is supported by relevant
medical evidence; (4) the opinion’s consistency with the record as a whole; and (5) whether
the physician is a specialist giving an opinion within his specialty. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d).
If a treating physician’s opinion is not sufficiently supported by medical evidence and
other substantial evidence in the case, however, the ALJ need not give the opinion
controlling weight. Orn, 495 F.3d at 631.
In this case, the record supports the ALJ’s decision to give limited weight to the
opinion of Dr. Bajpai while assigning significant weight to the opinion of Dr. Ani. The ALJ
set out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence by
recounting Plaintiff’s testimony and the medical reports of all three treating physicians. After
discussing Dr. Bajpai’s opinion, the ALJ stated that she found his opinion to be “not
consistent with the medical evidence of record.” (TR 32). The ALJ further stated, “Dr.
Bajpai’s own reports fail to reveal the type of significant clinical and laboratory
abnormalities one would expect if the claimant were in fact disabled and the doctor did not
specifically address this weakness.” (TR 32). The ALJ did not err in assigning limited weight
to Dr. Bajpai’s opinion after determining that his opinion was brief and conclusory with few
clinical findings to support it. Accordingly, the reasons the ALJ gave for assigning limited
weight to Dr. Bajpai’s opinion were sufficient.
Whether the ALJ Erred by Rejecting Plaintiff’s Symptom
Testimony in the Absence of Clear and Convincing Reasons
Plaintiff’s second argument is that the ALJ failed to provide clear and convincing
reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s subjective reports regarding her symptoms. Plaintiff objects
to the ALJ’s determination that her statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and
limiting effects of the symptoms were not credible to the extent that they were inconsistent
with the residual functional capacity assessment. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ
erred in finding that the evidence regarding Plaintiff’s role as caretaker of her son
contradicted Plaintiff’s reported levels of pain. Plaintiff further argues that the ALJ
improperly found that Plaintiff’s earnings history undermined her credibility. (Doc. 12).
“Once a claimant produces medical evidence of an underlying impairment which is
reasonably likely to be the cause of some pain, the ALJ ‘may not discredit a claimant’s
testimony of pain and deny disability benefits solely because the degree of pain alleged by
the claimant is not supported by objective medical evidence.’” Orteza v. Shalala, 50 F.3d
748, 749-750 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 346-347 (9th Cir.
1991) (en banc)). The ALJ must make specific findings based on the record for discounting
a claimant’s subjective complaints. See Savage v. Astrue, No. CV-11-02103, 2013 WL
551461, at *7 n. 1 (D. Ariz. Feb. 13, 2013).
There is no question in this case that the ALJ found that there was medical evidence
of underlying impairments reasonably likely to cause pain. See TR 31 (“the claimant’s
medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged
symptoms; however, the claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence and
limiting effects of these symptoms are not credible to the extent they are inconsistent with
the above residual functional capacity assessment”).
The question then is whether the ALJ discredited Plaintiff’s subjective reports of pain
solely because such pain was not supported by objective medical evidence. “Although an
ALJ ‘cannot be required to believe every allegation of disabling pain,’ the ALJ cannot reject
testimony of pain without making findings sufficiently specific to permit the reviewing court
to conclude that the ALJ did not arbitrarily discredit the claimant’s testimony.” Orteza, 50
F.3d at 750 (quoting Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989)). The adjudicator
should consider numerous factors when making such credibility determinations, including
the nature, location, onset, duration, frequency, radiation, and intensity of any pain;
precipitating and aggravating factors (e.g., movement, activity, environmental conditions);
type, dosage, effectiveness, and adverse side-effects of any pain medication; treatment, other
than medication, for relief of pain; functional restrictions; and the claimant’s daily activities.
Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 346 (citing SSR 88-13, 1988 WL 236011, July 20, 1988).
“[I]f the claimant engages in numerous daily activities involving skills that could be
transferred to the workplace, an adjudicator may discredit the claimant’s allegations upon
making specific findings relating to the claimant’s daily activities.” Id. (citing Fair, 885 F.2d
at 603). “An adjudicator may also use ‘ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation’ to test
a claimant’s credibility.” Id. (internal citation omitted). “So long as the adjudicator makes
specific findings that are supported by the record, the adjudicator may discredit the
claimant’s allegations based on inconsistencies in the testimony or on relevant character
evidence.” Id.
In this case, the ALJ made specific findings to support her determination that
Plaintiff’s statements regarding the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her
condition were not fully credible and did not prevent her from performing her past relevant
work, which would not exceed her residual functional capacity to perform light work at a
maximum specific vocational preparation (SVP) rating of three. In making the credibility
determination, the ALJ considered the factors required by SSR 88-13.
The ALJ compared the reports of Plaintiff’s treating physicians with Plaintiff’s own
reports of her pain, and also examined Plaintiff’s own reports for internal consistency. The
ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s subjective reports of her pain were inconsistent with the fact
that she “was able to care for her four year old son at home, which can be quite demanding
both physically and emotionally, without any particular assistance on a regular basis.” (TR
32). Plaintiff objects to this conclusion by pointing to her reports that her mother helped her
with her son for a few months, that she would at times call her husband home from work to
help with their son, and that she could not pick up her son once he weighed 10 pounds or
play with him. (Doc. 12). These reports, however, do not overcome the fact that Plaintiff was
regularly the only person at home to care for her son.
The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff worked from 1986 to 2002, but that, during only five
of those years, did she work at substantial gainful activity. The ALJ found that the earnings
record “raise[d] a question as to whether [Plaintiff’s] continuing unemployment [was]
actually due to medical impairments.” Plaintiff objects to this conclusion on the basis that the
first year the ALJ considered was when Plaintiff was 16 years old and that the conclusion
drawn “is unfounded and shows bias against lower wage earners.” (Doc. 12). Even if
Plaintiff’s earnings history from the few years before she reached adulthood are disregarded,
Plaintiff worked at substantial gainful activity for five out of fourteen or fifteen years. As
such, the ALJ’s observation was not unfounded nor does it show bias against lower wage
Based on the foregoing, the ALJ did not “discredit a claimant’s testimony of pain and
deny disability benefits solely because the degree of pain alleged by the claimant was not
supported by objective medical evidence,” but rather made “specific findings that are
supported by the record.”
Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in finding that Plaintiff was not disabled within the
meaning of the Social Security Act.
IT IS ORDERED that the decision of the Administrative Law Judge is AFFIRMED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment
accordingly. The judgment shall serve as the mandate of this Court.
DATED this 29th day of July, 2013.