Source: http://www.rishabhdara.com/sc/view.php?case=1984
Timestamp: 2020-06-01 22:59:55
Document Index: 652122444

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art. 226', 'Art.\t226', 'Art. 31', 'Art. 14', 'Art. 254', 'Art. 17', 'Art. 226']

BISWAMBHAR SINGH & ORS versus STATE OF ORISSA
BISWAMBHAR SINGH & ORS V. STATE OF ORISSA [1962] RD-SC 318 (16 November 1962)
Sovereign-Zamindar whether sovereign-Etates-Intermediaries- Constitutionality of Act XVII of 1954-The Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1952 (Orissa 61 of 1952), ss. 2 (g), 2 (h).
When the Orissa Estates Abolition Act came into force in February 1952,	the appellants along with another person moved the High Court under Art. 226 of the	Constitution challenging the constitutionality of the Act. The	High Court held that the Act was valid and the lands of	the appellants could be taken over by the State. When the	case came to this Court in appeal, it held that the Act did	not apply to the proprietors of Hemgir and Sarpgarh as they were not intermediaries as defined in s. 2 (h) of the Act.	The Zamindar of Nagra was held to be an intermediary as he	had acknowledged overlordship of	the Raja of Gangpur. The Orissa	legislature passed Act XVII of 1954 and changed	the definitions of estate' and intermediary' to cover the cases of the proprietors of Hemgir and Sarpgarh.
The appellants, the Zamindars of Hemgir and Sarpgarh, moved the High Court for a writ of mandamus against the State of Orissa and the Collector of Sundargarh. The appellants claimed sovereign status and contended that the Amending Act did not apply to them.	Their petitions were dismissed 363 by the High Court which held that as a result of historical process	the appellants had lost all	vestiges of their sovereignty and become subject to the laws promulgated by ruler of Gangpur and when that ruler merged his State	with the State of Orissa, the appellants 'were not	better	than mere subjects	and had absolutely no claims to sovereign power.	The other contentions raised	by the appellants regarding discrimination etc. were also rejected by the High Court.	The appellants came to this Court after securing the certificate.
Held, that the appellants or their ancestors had ceased to be sovereigns	on the eve of the merger of the State of Gangpur with the State of Orissa and their position was that of intermediaries who	held or owned	interests in	land between	the Raiyat and the State and	their interests in their lands could be acquired by the State under the	Act.
Although there	was no evidence of actual conquest of	the territory of the appellants by the Raja of Gangpur or	the active imposition of the sovereignty of the Raja over	the territories in	question, as a matter of fact	the former rulers of those territories had submitted to the sovereignty of the Raja as a result of a continuous process. The	Raja of Gangpur exercised sovereign authority	over those territories. The outward symbols of sovereignty were	that the laws of Gangpur State were in force in	Hemgir	and Sarpgaph. The whole of the administrative control was in the hands of the Raja of Gangpur. Neither in fact nor in law was there any vestige left of the sovereignty of	the appellants when the Raja merged his State with the State of Orissa.
Biswambhar Singh v. State of Orissa, [1954] S. C. R.	842, Promod Chandra Deb v. State of Orissa [1962] Supp. I S. C.
R. 405, Thakur Amar Singhji v. State of Rajasthan, [1955] 2 S. C. R. 303 and Amarsarjit Singh v. State of Punjab, [1962] Supp. 3 S. C. R. 346, referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 11 2	and 11 3 of 1960.
N. C.	Chatterjee, M. S. Mohanty, A. N. Singh and B. P.
Maheshwari, for the appellants.
364 C. B.	Agarwala, R. Gopalakrishnan and R. H.	Dhebar,	for the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 (in C. A. No. 112/60) and	for the respondents (in C. A. No. 113/60).
1962. November 16. The judgment of the Court was delivered by SINHA,	C. J.-These two appeals on certificates	of fitness granted by the High Court of Orissa raise the	question of the constitutionality	of the	Orissa	Estates Abolition (Amendment) Act (Orissa XVII of 1954) amending the main Act, the Orissa Estates Abolition Act (Orissa 1 of 1952), which hereinafter will be referred to as	the Act. As	the questions raised in the High Court and in this Court are the same in both the appeals, they have been heard together	and this judgment will govern them both.
It appears that the two Zamindars of Hemgir and Sarpgarh moved the High Court	of Orissa under Art.	226 of	the Constitution for a writ of mandamus against the State of Orissa and the Collector of Sundargarh, which is a district formed	after Merger. Previously it	was part of	the feudatory State of	Gangpur. The	two	petitioners' Zamindaries covered about 540 sq. miles between them.	The petitioners in the High Court in their petitions, claimed a sovereign status and	referred to a	mass of historical literature, including references to the Imperial Gazetteer by W. W. Hunter, Sir Richard Temple's Treaties, Zamindaries, Chieftainships	in Central Provinces,	and other official records. The High Court has found that the remote ancestors of the	petitioners were Bhuiyan Chiefs, who were	the original settlers and who had in course of time become	the chieftains of	the place, exercising	sovereign powers.
Subsequently, when the Rajput Rulers of Gangpur settled in that area, these Bhuiyan Chiefs accepted the suzerainty of those Rulers and gradually surrendered their sovereign 365 rights.	They	used to pay annual "Takolis",	which	they originally paid as tributes to the suzerain, but which later became	indistinguishable from land revenue. Their status vis-a-vis the Ruler of Gangpur remained undefined, though in successive revenue settlements made by the Ruler of Gangpur, with the concurrence of the then political Department, of the Government of India, they were described as Zamindars, and 'Khewats' were issued to them. The High Court, on an examination of the relevant evidence, came to the conclusion that these Zamindars ultimately lost all vestiges of their sovereignty, and as a result of historical process became subject to the laws promulgated by the Ruler of Gangpur, and that when the	Ruler merged his State with the State of Orissa, with effect from January 1, 1948, these	petitioners were no better than mere subjects and had absolutely no claims	to sovereign power. The High Court also found	that considerable forest areas formed part of the	land which belonged to them, and that these forest areas had no separate and distinct existence in the eye of law. The High Court repelled the petitioners' contention that their lands were not restates' as defined in Art. 31A(2)(a) of	the Constitution. The High Court also rejected the contention that the Act, in so far as it applies to the	petitioners, was discriminatory. The High Court thus held that Art. 14 of the Constitution had not been contravened. It also	held that the Act	was not void	under Art. 254(1) of	the Constitution. It further held that the so called violation of Art. 17(2) of the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights" promulgated by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 10, 1948, to which India was a party, was not justiciable. In that view of the matter, these petitions were dismissed and both parties were directed to bear their own costs. The petitioner, in each case, moved the	High Court and obtained the necessary certificate for coming up in appeal to this Court. That is how	these	appeals	are before us.
366 This is not the first time that these petitioners,	now appellants in this Court, have figured as litigants in	the High Court and in this Court in respect of their respective lands.	When the Orissa Act 1 of 1952, the main Act,	was enacted and came into force in February 1952, the Government of Orissa notified the petitioners' property also as coming within	the purview of the Act.	The appellants	along	with another person claiming the same rights, belonging to Nagra, moved the High Court under Art. 226 of the	Constitution challenging the constitutionality of the Act. Those applications were heard by the High Court, and by majority it was	held that the Act was valid and that the lands belonging to the petitioners could be taken over by the State,	as a result of the operation	of the Act.	The petitioners in the High Court preferred an appeal to	this Court. The judgment of this Court is reported as Biswambhar Singh v. State of Orissa(1) This Court allowed the appeal of the proprietors of Hemgir and Sarpgarh on the	ground	that they were not 'Intermediaries' as defined in s. 2(h) of	the Act. As regards the proprietor of Nagra Zamindari, by a majority judgment, it was decided that he came	within	the definition of an 'intermediary', and that, therefore,	his land would come within the definition of an 'estate', as defined in s. 2(g) of the Act.	This Court distinguished the case of Nagra from that of the other two on the ground	that the Zamindar of Nagra had acknowledged the overlordship of the Raja of Gangpur. As a result of the decision of	this Court,	allowing the appeals of the Zamindars of Hemgir	and Sarpgarh and prohibiting the State of Orissa	from taking over possession of those two zamindaries under the Act,	the Orissa	Legislature passed the Amending Act (XVII) of	1854 recasting the	definition of the two	terms 'estate'	and ,intermediary'.	The amended definition of these two terms is as follows :- "(g) 'estate' includes a part of an estate and (1) [1954] S.C.R. of 842.
367 means any land held by or vested in an Inter- mediary and included under one entry in	any revenue rolls or any of the general registers of revenue-paying lands and	revenue-free lands, prepared and maintained under the	law relating to land revenue for the time being in force or	under any rule, order, custom or usage having the force of law, and includes revenue-free lands not entered in any register or	revenue-roll and all classes of tenures	o f under-tenures and any jagir, inam or muafi or other similar grant ;
Explanation I-Land Revenue means all sums	and payments in money or in kind, by whatever name designated or locally known, received	or claimable by or on behalf of the State from an Intermediary on account of or in relation to any land held	by or	vested in	such Intermediary ;
Explanation II-Revenue-free land includes land which is, or but for any special covenant, agreement, engagement or contract would	have been liable to settlement and assessment of land revenue or with respect to which	the State has power to make laws for settlement and assessment of land revenue;
Explanation III-In relation to merged terri- tories, 'estate'	as defined in	this clause shall also include any mahal or	village or collection of more than one such mahal or village held by or vested in an	Intermediary which has been or is liable to be assessed as one unit	to land revenue whether such	and revenue be payable or has been	released or compounded for or redeemed in whole or in part." (h) 'Intermediary' with reference to	any estate 368 means a proprietor, sub-proprietor, landlord, land-holder, malguzar,	thekadar, gaontia, tenure-holder,	under-tenure-holder	and includes	an inamdar, a	jagirdar, zamindar, Ilaquedar, Khorposhdar, parganadar, Sarbarakar and Muafidar including the Ruler of an Indian State merged with the State of Orissa and	all other holders or owners of interest in	land between the raiyat and the state;
Explanation 1 Any two or more intermediaries holding a joint interest in an estate which is borne either on the revenue-roll or on	the rentroll	of another Intermediary shall be deemed to be one Intermediary for the purposes of his Act;
Explanation II-The heirs and successors-in interest	of an	Intermediary and where an Intermediary is a minor or of unsound mind or an idiot, his guardian, Committee or, other legal curator shall be	deemed	to be	an Intermediary for	the purposes of this	Act.
All acts done by an Intermediary	under	this Act shall be deemed to have been done by	his heirs and successors-in-interest and shall be binding on them." In the	statement of objects and reasons for amending	the Act, it was indicated that these wide definitions of those two terms were enacted so that the decision of	this Court with particular reference to these two properties may	not stand in the way of acquiring them.
Though	the arguments in the High Court occupied a every large field, on these appeals Mr. Chatterjee, on behalf of the appellants, has confined	his submissions, in	the ultimate analysis. to only one point,	namely, that	even after the amendment of the Act 369 the legislature has failed to achieve its objective of bringing the land of these two petitioners	within	the mischief of the Act. In other words, the contention is that the appellants were sovereign rulers whose States could	not be taken over	by the State	of Orissa even after	the amendment of the Act, as aforesaid.	The definition of 'intermediary' in s. 2 (h) as amended, the argument proceeds further, would not take in the appellants' properties so as to entitle the State	to acquire them, nor does	the definition of	'estate' in the amended s. 2 (g) cover	the interest of the appellants in their respective	lands.	It is, therefore, necessary to find whether the interest of the appellants, in order to be liable to acquisition under	the Act, could come within the purview of the definition of in termediary'. It is difficult to accede to the argument that the all inclusive definition of "intermediary', as given in the amended cl. (11) of s. 2 would not cover the interest of the appellants. If it is held, as we must hold in agreement with the High Court, as will presently appear, that	the appellants were not holders of sovereign States, then	the inference is clear that they held or owned an 'interest in land between the Raiyat and the State.' As admitted on	all hands, they are not Raiyats. Then, whatever their interest may be, whether as proprietors or tenure-holders or Inamdars or Jagirdas or Khorposhdars, etc.	etc.,	specifically mentioned in the definition, they would come	within	the purview of the last clause and their interest would be	that of an intermediary, because they stand in between the state at the apex and the cultivating Raiyat at the base. If	the interest of these appellants is not that of	a sovereign State,	they hold their property as intermediaries and	the payment which they used to make to the Raja of Gangpur,	and later to the State of Orissa, would be in the nature of land revenue.
The main argument, therefore, of Mr. Chatterjee was directed to showing that the 370 appellants held the lands as sovereign power, and that the Takoli which they paid to the Raja of Gangpur was	only in the	nature	of tribute and not land revenue. In our opinion, there is no substance in this contention. It is true that there is no evidence of an act of State in	the nature of a conquest by the Raja of Gangpur or that the Raja imposed his sovereignty on these principalities by force of arms or by express agreement.	It was, therefore, argued that there was no scope for applying the doctrineof "act of State" to these principalities. There	is a fallacy in this argument. It was pointed out by this Court in Promod Chandra Deb v. Stateof	Orissa(1) that an act of State may be	the taking over of sovereign powers either by conquest or by treaty or by cession or otherwise. It may have happened on a particular date by a public	declaration or proclamation, or it may have been the result of a historical process spread over many years, and sovereign powers	including the right to legislate in that territory and to administer it may be acquired without the territory itself	merging in the new State. It has been found by	the High Court that the various laws which were in force in Gangpur State were in force in Hemgir and Sarapgarh also, by their own force and not as a result of any agreement between sovereign States. Furthermore the various departments of administration	were also in	the hands of the staff maintained and supervised by the Ruler of Gangpur. Hence, at the date of the merger of the Gangpur State in the State of Orissa, not even a vestige of sovereignty was left	with these appellants. It is, therefore, not necessary to refer to a large mass of historical evidence which shows that at one time in the ancient past these appellants or their ancestors were	sovereign chiefs. They may have occupied that position	in the	remote past, but as a result of historical process spread over many years, those rights became	vested in tile Ruler of Gangpur not necessarily by express agreement but impliedly, by (1) [1962] Supp. 1 S.C. R. 405, 434.
371 conduct, over a series of years. We are concerned with	the year 1947, and in that there is no evidence on behalf of the appellants that they had any sovereign authority left in them.	Their	position is analogous	to that of	the Bhomicharas of Rajasthan, dealt with by this Court in Thakur Amar Singhji v. State of Rajasthan (1) and that of the	Cis- Sutlej	jagir in Punjab, dealt with	by this Court in Amarsarjit Singh v. State of Punjab (2). Hence, even though there is no evidence of actual conquest of the territory of the appellants	by the Raja of Gangpur, nor of active imposition of	the sovereignty of that Raja over the territories in question, the fact remains that as a result of a continuous process, the erstwhile rulers of these territories submitted to the sovereignty of the Raja	with the result that the Ruler of Gangpur became, in effect,	the sovereign power exercising his sovereign authority	over those	territories also, and	the outward	symbols	of sovereignty were that the laws of Gangpur State were in force in Hemgir and Sarpgarh areas also not by virtue of any orders of the appellants but by their own force, as has been pointed out by the High Court on a consideration of all	the relevant evidence, which need not be	recapitulated here.
The administrative control also had passed into the hands of the Ruler of Gangpur. Hence, neither in fact nor in law was there any vestige left of the sovereignty of the appellants by 1947 though it may not be possible to determine by	what exact process and by what exact date, this transition	was complete. Apparently	it was spread over many	years.	We know only this much that at the relevant date, i. e., at the end of 1947, and on the eve of the integration of the State of Gangpur with the State of Orissa, the territories in question were not sovereign states and had become part of the territory	of the Ruler of Gangpur. The law does	not know any tertium quid between a sovereign State and a State which is partly sovereign and partly not so. The erstwhile rulers of these, (1) (1955) 2 S.C.R. 303. (2) [1962] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 346.
372 territories were either sovereigns in their own rights or had become subjects of the Ruler of Gangpur, and	all indications are that the appellants had become subjects of the Ruler of Gangpur before the latter's territory merged with the State of Orissa.
On the finding that the petitioners, or their ancestors, had ceased	to be sovereign States, on the eve of the merger of the State of	Gangpur	with the State of Orissa,	the petitioners' position would be that of	intermediaries	who held or owned "interest in land between the Raiyat and	the state",	within the meaning of s. 2 (h) of the Act, and	the 'Takoli' paid by them to the Ruler of Gangpur and later to the State of Orissa was land revenue within Explanation I read with Explanation	III to s. 2	(g) which defines "'estate". There is, thus, no escape from the conclusion that their interest in their lands was liable to be acquired under the Act.
No other point was urged before us	in support of	the appeals, and as the only point urged in this Court has no substance in it, the appeals must be held to be without	any merit.	They are accordingly dismissed with costs, one	set of hearing fees.