Source: http://www.chanrobles.com/usa/us_supremecourt/351/192/case.php
Timestamp: 2018-06-19 16:34:05
Document Index: 528431835

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1003', '§ 402', '§ 1034', '§ 402', '§ 1009', '§ 309', '§ 402', '§ 309', '§ 309', '§ 309', '§ 309', '§ 1034', '§ 1034', '§ 1034']

As required by 5 U.S.C. § 1003(b), the notice permitted "interested" parties to file statements or briefs. Such parties might also intervene in appeals. 47 U.S.C. § 402(d) and (e). Respondent, licensee of a number of radio and television stations, filed a statement objecting to the proposed changes, as did other interested broadcasters. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In November, 1953, the Commission entered an order amending the Rules in question without significant changes from the proposed forms. [Footnote 1] A review was sought chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
in due course by respondent in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit under 5 U.S.C. § 1034, [Footnote 2] 47 U.S.C. § 402(a), [Footnote 3] and 5 U.S.C. § 1009(a), (c). [Footnote 4] Respondent alleged it owned or controlled, within the meaning of the Multiple Ownership Rules, seven standard radio, five FM radio, and five television broadcast stations. It asserted that the Rules complained of were in conflict with the statutory mandates that applicants should be granted licenses if the public interest would be served and that applicants must have a hearing before denial of an application. 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) and (b). [Footnote 5] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
While the question of respondent's right to appeal has not been raised by either party or by the Court of Appeals, our jurisdiction is now mooted. It may be considered. Federal Communications Commission v. National Broadcasting Co., 319 U. S. 239, 319 U. S. 246. Jurisdiction depends upon standing to seek review, and upon ripeness. If respondent could not rightfully seek review from the order adopting the challenged regulations, it must await action to its disadvantage under them, and neither the Court of Appeals nor this Court has jurisdiction of the controversy. Under the above-cited Code sections, review of Commission action is granted any party aggrieved or suffering legal wrong by that action. [Footnote 6] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Again, in Columbia Broadcasting System v. United States, 316 U. S. 407, this Court considered the problem of standing to review Commission action under the then existing § 402(a), 48 Stat. 1093, and the Urgent Deficiencies Act, 38 Stat. 219. CBS there sought review of the adoption of Chain Broadcasting Regulations by the Commission. Against the contention that the adoption of regulations did not command CBS to do or refrain from doing anything (dissent, 316 U.S. at 316 U. S. 429), this Court held that the order promulgating regulations was chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The regulations here under consideration presently aggrieve the respondent. The Commission exercised a power of rulemaking which controls broadcasters. The Rules now operate to control the business affairs of Storer. Unless it obtains a modification of this declared administrative chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In its petition for review, Storer prayed the court to vacate the provisions of the Multiple Ownership Rules insofar as they denied to an applicant already controlling the allowable number of stations a "full and fair hearing" to determine whether additional licenses to the applicant would be in the public interest. [Footnote 8] The Court of Appeals struck out, as contrary to § 309(a) and (b) of the Communications Act ( n 5, supra), the words italicized in Rule 3.636 ( n 1, supra) and the similar words in Rules 3.35 and 3.240. The case was remanded to the Commission with directions to eliminate these words. 95 U.S.App.D.C. 97, 220 F.2d 204. We granted certiorari, 350 U.S. 816 chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The challenged Rules contain limitations chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
This Commission, like other agencies, deals with the public interest. Scripps-Howard Radio v. Federal Communications Commission, 316 U. S. 4, 316 U. S. 14. Its authority covers new and rapidly developing fields. Congress sought to create regulation for public protection with careful provision to assure fair opportunity for open competition in the use of broadcasting facilities. Accordingly, we cannot interpret § 309(b) as barring rules that declare a present intent to limit the number of stations consistent with a permissible "concentration of control." It is but a rule that announces the Commission's attitude on public protection against such concentration. [Footnote 12] The Communications Act must be read as a whole and with appreciation of the responsibilities of the body charged with its fair and efficient operation. The growing complexity of our economy induced the Congress to place regulation of businesses like communication in specialized agencies with broad powers. Courts are slow to interfere with their conclusions when reconcilable with statutory directions. [Footnote 13] We think the Multiple Ownership Rules, as adopted, are reconcilable with the Communications chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In the National Broadcasting case, we called attention to the necessity for flexibility in the Rules there involved. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Id. at 319 U. S. 225. That flexibility is here under the present § 309(a) and (b) and the FCC's regulations. See n 10, supra. We read the Act and Regulations as providing a "full hearing" for applicants who have reached the existing limit of stations, upon their presentation of applications conforming to Rules 1.361(c) and 1.702, that set out adequate reasons why the Rules should be waived or amended. The Act, considered as a whole, requires no more. We agree with the contention of the Commission that a full hearing, such as is required by § 309(b), note 5 supra, would not be necessary on all such applications. As the Commission has promulgated its Rules after extensive administrative hearings, it is necessary for the accompanying papers to set forth reasons, sufficient if true, to justify a change or waiver of the Rules. We do not think Congress intended the Commission to waste time on applications that do not state a valid basis for a hearing. If any applicant is aggrieved by a refusal, the way for review is open. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Court has properly deemed it necessary to question sua sponte the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to entertain this case, [Footnote 2/1] but I am unable to agree with its decision that such jurisdiction existed. In my view, Storer was not a "party aggrieved by a final order" of the Commission, within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 1034, and hence was not entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, I would vacate the judgment below and remand the case to the Court of Appeals with directions to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
1. These regulations do not, in my view, constitute an "order" within the meaning of § 1034. They simply establish certain standards to be followed by the Commission in the future exercise of its licensing powers; they do not require any licensee to do or to refrain from doing anything, attach no consequences to his action or inaction, and determine no questions as to his legal status. As such, they are quite unlike the Chain Broadcasting regulations which were held to be a reviewable "order" in Columbia Broadcasting System v. United States, 316 U. S. 407, in a proceeding comparable to this one. Those regulations were held reviewable not because every Commission action in the form of a regulation was considered to be an "order," but for the specific reason that they proscribed certain kinds of contracts between licensees and the national networks and, by prescribing the sanction of license cancellation for noncompliance, operated to coerce action by the licensees and to determine the legal status of the networks' contracts. Of their own force and with no further administrative action's being taken, the regulations induced licensees to cancel existing network contracts, and deterred them from entering into new ones. That coercive effect of the regulations on present conduct, the very characteristic which led the Court to regard the Chain Broadcasting regulations as an "order" despite their form, is totally lacking here. [Footnote 2/2] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
However these allegations are read, they assert no more than that the Commission may, in the future, take action chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
3. So clear is it, in fact, that Storer has not been "aggrieved" by the mere issuance of the regulations that the Court's grant of review in this case must be premised not upon the effect of the regulations themselves, but simply upon Storer's interest in knowing whether or not a future application of them would be valid. The result is that the statutory procedure for obtaining relief from a present injury caused by an order has been converted into something quite different -- namely, a procedure for obtaining a declaratory judgment as to the validity of a chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In the second place, even if § 1034 is to be construed as authorizing declaratory relief, I see no reason why the usual requirements for invoking equity jurisdiction should not be as applicable to such a proceeding as they are to chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
It is said, however -- again without support of any allegations by Storer -- that Storer "cannot cogently plan its present or future operations" unless it is advised whether or not the regulations are valid. But plans for expansion of communications facilities have always had to be made subject to the contingency that the Commission might refuse to grant the necessary license for any one of a number of reasons. Storer's position in this respect is now no different than it was before the regulations were issued: any plan to acquire a new station must simply take into account, among the several contingencies, the likelihood that a denial of a license under the regulations would be upheld on appeal. What this argument comes down to, therefore, is that Storer needs to know whether or not it can validly be denied a license under the regulations so that, if it can, it need not make an application. That is, the injury that Storer will have suffered if the decision on the validity of the regulations is postponed until Storer in fact applies for a license is the expense of making that very application, the same injury that is suffered by all unsuccessful license applicants. Until today, I should not have thought argument was necessary to reject such chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
4. The holding of the Court today amounts to this: that regulations which impose no duty and determine no rights may be reviewed at the instance of a person who alleges no injury to settle whether a future application of the regulations that may never occur would be valid. The lack of support for this decision is disclosed by the Court's primary reliance on CBS, [Footnote 2/4] a case which, in my view, not only fails to support the Court's conclusion but is persuasive, if not controlling, authority for precisely the opposite result. [Footnote 2/5] In my opinion, the implications of the chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Procedural and jurisdictional limitations on judicial action by the federal courts are not playthings of lawyers, nor obstructions on the road of justice. Whether formulated by the Constitution, congressional enactments, or settled judicial precedents, they are means designed to keep the courts within appropriate limits, and to enforce chanroblesvirtualawlibrary