Source: https://openjurist.org/267/f2d/170/air-line-stewards-and-stewardesses-association-v-northwest-airlines-inc
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 12:27:36
Document Index: 117004691

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2', '§ 174', '§ 76', '§ 123', '§ 204', '§ 166', '§ 58', '§ 128', '§ 324', '§ 325']

267 F2d 170 Air Line Stewards and Stewardesses Association v. Northwest Airlines Inc | OpenJurist
267 F. 2d 170 - Air Line Stewards and Stewardesses Association v. Northwest Airlines Inc
267 F2d 170 Air Line Stewards and Stewardesses Association v. Northwest Airlines Inc
267 F.2d 170
AIR LINE STEWARDS AND STEWARDESSES ASSOCIATION, International, Appellant,
No. 16060.
The District Court considered the contentions of the Association as hereinafter referred to and in a clear and logical opinion, Air Line Stewards and Stewardesses Association, International, v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., D.C.Minn. 1958, 162 F.Supp. 684, held that the Railway Labor Act as applicable to air carriers does not include employees who are crew members on flights between points outside the continental United States and its territories, thus sustaining the award. The Association here seeks reversal of that holding.1
The question of the applicability of the act to employees with respect to air flights between points outside the continental United States and its territories is not raised here for the first time. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in Air Line Dispatchers Association v. National Mediation Board, 1951, 89 U.S.App.D.C. 24, 189 F.2d 685, certiorari denied 342 U.S. 849, 72 S.Ct. 77, 96 L.Ed. 641, met the issue squarely and held, 189 F.2d at page 690:
"The act as it is presently worded has been interpreted by the National Mediation Board and the courts not to extend to employees of air carriers based outside the continental limits of the United States and its territories. In 1949, the National Mediation Board ruled that title II of the Railway Labor Act does not cover foreign-based employees. The Board's ruling was based on the view that to extend the act to cover employees based abroad would bring this labor legislation into direct conflict with labor laws of foreign countries. In addition, the Board held that to attempt application of the Railway Labor Act in a foreign country, rather than the law of the country, would be a challenge to its national sovereignty to govern within its own boundaries. It was noted that the United States would rightly reject any attempt of a foreign government to apply its labor laws in this country. This determination by the National Mediation Board as to the construction of the present language regarding jurisdiction appearing in section 201 of the Railway Labor Act was later upheld by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Air Line Dispatchers Association v. National Mediation Board ([89 U.S.App.D.C. 24] 189 F.2d 685) (1951).
We think the foregoing report persuasive of legislative recognition of the construction of the Act by both the Mediation Board and the Court of Appeals to the effect that the Act is non-extraterritorial and that Congress' failure to amend thereafter as indicating agreement with such construction. See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 1940, 310 U.S. 469, 488, 60 S.Ct. 982, 84 L.Ed. 1311.
The appellant argues that the Railway Labor Act imposes upon the representative chosen by the majority to represent all members of the craft or class the duty to represent them without discrimination. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 1944, 323 U.S. 192, 202-204, 65 S.Ct. 226, 89 L.Ed. 173. It argues that the application by the Mediation Board and the District Court of a nondiscriminatory law in a manner which discriminates between persons because of citizenship or race violates the Constitution of the United States, citing Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 1926, 271 U.S. 500, 525, 46 S.Ct. 619, 70 L.Ed. 1059. It says that the award of the Mediation Board as upheld by the District Court
First, we agree that Congress does have the power to make the Railway Labor Act applicable to employees employed on American flag airplanes and who work wholly outside the United States. See United States v. Flores, 1933, 289 U.S. 137, 150, 155 et seq., 53 S.Ct. 580, 77 L.Ed. 1086. The point is that the Congress specifically has not done so. Secondly, as already pointed out, supra, the Interstate Commerce Act, which was incorporated by reference into the Railway Labor Act, definitely limited applicability "* * * only in so far as such transportation or transmission takes place within the United States, * * *" and by Section 182, supra, the Railway Labor Act applies to carriers by air and their employees "in the same manner and to the same extent," which makes it clear that carriers by air and carriers by railroad are covered only to the extent that the commerce or transportation in which they are involved takes place within the United States.
In Cunard S. S. Co. v. Mellon, 1923, 262 U.S. 100, 43 S.Ct. 504, 67 L.Ed. 894, the court was concerned with the applicability of the 18th Amendment and the National Prohibition Act to both foreign and American flag vessels when within the territorial waters of the United States and also with reference to American flag vessels when outside the territorial waters of the United States. The 18th Amendment made its provisions applicable to "* * * the United States and all territories subject to the jurisdiction thereof * * *." The National Prohibition Act, 41 Stat. 305 (1919), as amended 42 Stat. 222 (1921), 27 U.S.C.A. § 2, provided that it "* * * shall apply not only to the United States but to all territory subject to its jurisdiction," which was construed by the Supreme Court to mean that its field coincided with that of the 18th Amendment, page 127 of 262 U.S., page 509 of 43 S.Ct. Obviously, if the Association's contention here with reference to the law of the flag, its applicability to American flag airplanes, and the latter constituting territory of the United States is correct, then foreign vessels sailing under the flags of foreign countries would be territories of the countries whose flags they flew and would not be subject to the 18th Amendment and the National Prohibition Act, even while they were within the territorial waters of the United States and likewise the 18th Amendment and the National Prohibition Act would cover domestic ships while flying the flag of the United States outside the waters of the United States, whether upon the high seas or in territorial waters of a foreign country. In meeting the question, the Supreme Court said, at page 122 of 262 U.S., at page 507 of 43 S.Ct.:
"Various meanings are sought to be attributed to the term `territory' in the phrase `the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof.' We are of opinion that it means the regional areas — of land and adjacent waters — over which the United States claims and exercises dominion and control as a sovereign power. The immediate context and the purport of the entire section show that the term is used in a physical and not a metaphorical sense, — that it refers to areas or districts having fixity of location and recognized boundaries. See United States v. Bevans, 3 Wheat. 336, 390, 4 L.Ed. 404.
"The defendants contend that the Amendment also covers domestic merchant ships outside the waters of the United States, whether on the high seas or in foreign waters. But it does not say so, and what it does say shows, as we have indicated, that it is confined to the physical territory of the United States. In support of their contention the defendants refer to the statement sometimes made that a merchant ship is a part of the territory of the country whose flag she flies. But this, as has been aptly observed, is a figure of speech, a metaphor. Scharrenberg v. Dollar S. S. Co., 245 U.S. 122, 127, 38 S.Ct. 28, 62 L.Ed. 189; In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 464, 11 S.Ct. 897, 35 L.Ed. 581; 1 Moore International Law Digest, § 174; Westlake International Law, 2d ed., p. 264; Hall International Law, 7th ed. (Higgins), § 76; Manning Law of Nations (Amos), p. 276; Piggott Nationality, Pt. II, p. 13. The jurisdiction which it is intended to describe arises out of the nationality of the ship, as established by her domicile registry and use of the flag, and partakes more of the characteristics of personal than of territorial sovereignty. See The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398, 403, 28 S.Ct. 133, 52 L.Ed. 264; American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 355, 29 S.Ct. 511, 53 L.Ed. 826; 1 Oppenheim International Law, 3d ed., §§ 123-125, 128. It is chiefly applicable to ships on the high seas, where there is no territorial sovereign; and as respects ships in foreign territorial waters it has little application beyond what is affirmatively or tacitly permitted by the local sovereign. 2 Moore International Law Digest, §§ 204, 205; Twiss Law of Nations, 2d ed., § 166; Woolsey International Law, 6th ed., § 58; 1 Oppenheim International Law, 3d ed., §§ 128, 146, 260."
The court held, at page 128 of 262 U.S., at page 509 of 43 S.Ct.:
Of equal cogency is the earlier case of Scharrenberg v. Dollar S. S. Co., 1917, 245 U.S. 122, 127, 38 S.Ct. 28, 29, 62 L.Ed. 189, where the Supreme Court stated:
In construing the Railway Labor Act in this case, we have in mind the rule that unless there is an explicit and unequivocal showing of a contrary intent, Acts of Congress are to be given an interpretation which is domestic in nature. In Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 1949, 336 U.S. 281, 69 S.Ct. 575, 93 L.Ed. 680, the Supreme Court had before it the applicability of the Eight Hour Law, 40 U.S.C.A. § 324, as amended by 40 U.S.C.A. § 325a, to work done under a contract between the United States and a private contractor on construction projects in Iraq and Iran. In holding the law inapplicable to the contract involved, Mr. Justice Reed, speaking for the Supreme Court, stated at page 285 of 336 U.S., at page 577 of 69 S.Ct.:
"First. The canon of construction which teaches that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, Blackmer v. United States, supra, 284 U.S. 421, at page 437, 52 S.Ct. 252, at page 254, 76 L.Ed. 375, is a valid approach whereby unexpressed congressional intent may be ascertained. It is based on the assumption that Congress is primarily concerned with domestic conditions."