Source: https://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=b8f100ee-3964-4bea-8717-d4ac640c6af4
Timestamp: 2018-06-21 11:58:20
Document Index: 155052224

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 61', '§ 61', '§ 154', '§ 446', '§ 446', '§ 80', '§ 80', '§ 446', '§ 61', '§ 446', '§ 154']

Appellants' Response to Appellees' Petition for Rehearing | Kindle, et al vs. City of Jeffersontown, Ky., et al | Robert L. Abell - JDSupra
Kindle, et al vs. City of Jeffersontown, Ky., et al
The Kentucky Whistleblower Act is applicable to Kentucky cities; the plaintiffs' speech regarding the efficiency and operations of the City of Jeffersontown addressed a matter of public concern and was entitlted to First Amendment protection, the Sixth Circuit ruled on March 15, 2010. The appellees petitioned for rehearing and/or rehearing en banc and to certify a question of state law to the Supreme Court. Appellants responded that the petition should be denied.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT CASE NO. 09-5119 ELECTRONICALLY FILED ---------------------------------------------MELVIN KINDLE, BRADLEY SILVERIA, DIEDRA ADKINS Plaintiffs-Appellants v. CITY OF JEFFERSONTOWN, KENTUCKY; CLAY FOREMAN, Mayor, individually and in his Official capacity; JEFFERSONTOWN CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION Defendants-Appellees ---------------------------------------------Appeal from the United States District Court For the Western District of Kentucky at Louisville Civil Action No. 07-158 Hon. Charles R. Simpson ---------------------------------------------APPELLANTS’ RESPONSE TO APPELLEES’ PETITION FOR REHEARING OR REHEARING EN BANC AND TO CERTIFY QUESTION OF LAW TO THE KENTUCKY SUPREME COURT ---------------------------------------------ROBERT L. ABELL 120 North Upper Street Lexington, KY 405o7 859-254-7076 Robert@RobertAbellLaw.com COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS Case: 09-5119 Document: 006110633296 Filed: 05/20/2010 Page: 1TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No. TABLE OF CONTENTS ......................................................................................ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ………………………………………………………iii 1. The Petition to Grant Rehearing and to Certify a Question of Law to the Kentucky Supreme Court Should be Denied….............1 2. The Panel Majority Followed a Number of This Court’s Precedents and Correctly Ruled that Appellants’ Speech Addressed a Matter of Public Concern and that Foreman Is Not Entitled to Qualified Immunity…………………………………..8 3. The Panel Majority Correctly Ruled that the Jeffersontown Civil Service Commission Is A Necessary Party for Purposes Of Relief…………………………………………………………….............9 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………….10 Certificate of Service…………………………………………………………...10 ii Case: 09-5119 Document: 006110633296 Filed: 05/20/2010 Page: 2TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Page No. Baker v. McDaniel, 2008 WL 215241 (E.D. Ky.) ………………….6-7 Calvert Investments, Inc., v. Louisville and Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer District, 805 S.W.2d 133 (Ky. 1991)………………………………………………………………….7 Christophel v. Kukulinsky, 61 F.3d 479 (6th Cir.1995)……………..9 City of Pineville v. Meeks, 71 S.W.2d 33 (Ky. 1934)…………………4 City of Trenton v. State of New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182 (1923)……….4 Cobb v. Contract Transport, Inc., 452 F.3d 543 (6th. Cir. 2006)………………………………………………………………………..6 Consolidated Infrastructure Mgmt. Auth., Inc. v. Allen, 269 S.W.2d 852 (Ky. 2008)…………………………………………1-3, 6 Dale Baker Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Fiat Motors of North America, Inc., 794 F.2d 213 (6th Cir. 1986)……………………………………….1 Davis v. Powell’s Valley Water District, 920 S.W.2d 75 (Ky.App. 1995)…………………………………………………………….7 Haney v. City of Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738 (Ky. 1964)…………….7 Kindle v. City of Jeffersontown, No. 09-5119 (6th Cir., March 15, 2010)(slip opinion)……………………………………… 3, 8, 10-11 Mansbach Scrap Iron Co. v. City of Ashland, 30 S.W.2d 968 (Ky. 1930)..………………………………………………………………...4 Olsen v. McFaul, 843 F.2d 918 (6th Cir. 1988)……………………..1-2 iii Case: 09-5119 Document: 006110633296 Filed: 05/20/2010 Page: 3Smith v. Board of Education of Ludlow, Ky, 111 F.2d 572 (6th Cir. 1940)……………………………………………………………...4 T. M. Crutcher Dental Depot v. Miller, 64 S.W.2d 466 (Ky. 1933)………………………………………………………………….4 United Bldg. and Const. Trades Council v. Mayor and Council of City of Camden, 465 U.S. 208 (1984)……………………………….4 Wilson v. City of Central City, 2010 WL 135105 (Ky. App.)……..5-7 Workforce Development Cabinet v. Gaines, 276 S.W.3d 789 (Ky. 2008)……………………………………………………………1-3, 6 Statutes & Civil Rules Ky.Rev.Stat. § 61.101-103 (Kentucky Whistleblower Act)…….passim Ky.Rev.Stat. § 61.102……………………………………………………...5 Ky.Rev.Stat. § 154A.020(1)……………………………………………….8 Ky.Rev.Stat. § 446.080(1).………………………………………………...3 Ky.Rev.Stat. § 446.080(4)…………………………………………………5 Fed.R.Civ.P. 19……………………………………………………………9 Other Legal Authorities 56 Am.Jur.2d, Municipal Corporations, Etc., § 80 (2008)…………….2 Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed.)………………………………………...5 iv Case: 09-5119 Document: 006110633296 Filed: 05/20/2010 Page: 4Appellees’ petition for rehearing or rehearing en banc and to certify a question of law to the Kentucky Supreme Court should be denied. 1. The Petition to Grant Rehearing and to Certify a Question of Law to the Kentucky Supreme Court Should Be Denied Appellees’ request that this Court grant rehearing and certify to the Kentucky Supreme Court the question of whether Jeffersontown, a municipality, is an "employer" under the Kentucky Whistleblower Act should be denied. The panel majority correctly reached its ruling based on two recent Kentucky Supreme Court decisions, Consolidated Infrastructure Mgmt. Auth., Inc. v. Allen, 269 S.W.3d 852 (Ky. 2008) and Workforce Development Cabinet v. Gaines, 276 S.W.3d 789 (Ky. 2008). This Court, as to state law issues on which the state's highest court has not directly spoken, must determine "what the state law is and apply it." Olsen v. McFaul, 843 F.2d 918, 928 (6th Cir. 1988). This Court is not bound in this process "by a decision of an intermediate state appellate court when [it is] convinced that the highest state court would decide differently." Dale Baker Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Fiat Motors of North America, Inc., 794 F.2d 213, 218 (6th Cir. 1986). An unpublished 1 Case: 09-5119 Document: 006110633296 Filed: 05/20/2010 Page: 5decision of a state intermediate appellate court that fails to consider principles pertinent to the issue is a factor but "not a very weighty one" in this process. Olsen, 843 F.2d at 928. The Kentucky Supreme Court’s decision in Allen, supra, indicates that a municipality is an "employer" under the Act. In Allen, the pertinent question presented was whether a judgment against a dissolved municipal corporation (Consolidated Infrastructure Management Authority (CIMA)), was enforceable against the municipal corporations, the cities of Russellville and Auburn, which absorbed it. The court answered affirmatively quoting the legal encyclopedia Am.Jur.2d as follows: "Thus, if a municipal corporation goes out of existence by being annexed to, or merged in, another corporation, and if no legislative provision is made respecting the property and liabilities of the corporation which ceases to exist, the corporation to which it is annexed, or in which it is merged, is entitled to all the property is answerable for all its liabilities." 269 S.W.3d at 857, quoting 56 Am.Jur.2d, Municipal Corporations, Etc. § 80 (2008). If a judgment obtained pursuant to the Act is enforceable against a municipal corporation, a municipal corporation is a fortiori a suable “employer” 2 Case: 09-5119 Document: 006110633296 Filed: 05/20/2010 Page: 6under the Act. Accordingly, as the panel majority correctly observed, Allen does strongly indicate that the City of Jeffersontown, a municipal corporation, is an “employer” under the Act. The Kentucky Supreme Court in Gaines detailed the purpose of the Act and the principles of statutory construction applicable to interpreting it. First, in Kentucky "statutes are to be ‘liberally construed with a view to promote their objects and carry out the intent of the legislature[.]’” 276 S.W.3d at 792-93, quoting Ky.Rev.Stat. § 446.080(1). Second, the Act "has a remedial purpose in protecting public employees who disclose wrongdoing" and "statutes which are remedial in nature should be liberally construed in favor of their remedial purpose." 276 S.W.3d at 793-96. Third, the Act’s purpose "is to protect employees who possess knowledge of wrongdoing that is concealed or not publicly known, and who step forward to help uncover and disclose that information." 276 S.W.3d at 793. The panel majority correctly followed these principles in concluding that appellants "are the type of employees that the statute was designed to protect." Slip op. at 7. The panel majority’s ruling that the City of Jeffersontown is an "employer" under the Act is also supported by numerous other 3 Case: 09-5119 Document: 006110633296 Filed: 05/20/2010 Page: 7principles of Kentucky law. First, Kentucky law has long recognized a municipality as a "political subdivision" of the state. Mansbach Scrap Iron Co. v. City of Ashland, 30 S.W.2d 968, 969 (Ky. 1930)(“a city is a political subdivision of the state”); City of Pineville v. Meeks, 71 S.W.2d 33, 35 (Ky. 1934)(“[m]unicipalities are … political subdivisions of the state”). Indeed, this Court concluded in Smith v. Board of Education of Ludlow, Ky. 111 F.2d 573 (6th Cir. 1940), as follows: “the law appears to be well-settled in Kentucky that a municipality is a political subdivision of the State." These pronouncements of Kentucky law align with those of the Supreme Court. See City of Trenton v. State of New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 185-86 (1923)(“[t]he city is a political subdivision of the state”); see also United Bldg. and Const. Trades Council v. Mayor and Council of City of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 215 (1984)(“a municipality is merely a political subdivision of the State”). Second, under Kentucky law its legislature is presumed cognizant of judicial constructions of terms and incorporates those into its statutes. See T.M. Crutcher Dental Depot v. Miller 64 S.W.2d 466, 467 (Ky. 1933)(“It is to be presumed the Legislature enacted this amendment with a full knowledge of the existing conditions of the 4 Case: 09-5119 Document: 006110633296 Filed: 05/20/2010 Page: 8common law and of statutes with respect to the subject-matter."). Accordingly, it is presumed that the Kentucky legislature was aware that municipal corporations were considered political subdivisions of the state under Kentucky law when drafting and enacting the Kentucky Whistleblower Act. Third, the language of the Act also indicates an intent to include cities within its scope. Ky.Rev.Stat. § 61.102 protects an employee that discloses violation of an “ordinance.” “In its most common meaning, the term [ordinance] is used to designate the enactments of the legislative body of a municipal corporation.” Black’s Law Dictionary at 989 (5th Ed.). Terms in Kentucky statutes are to be given their common legal meaning. Ky.Rev.Stat. § 446.080(4). It is nonsensical and would evade the Act’s purpose to conclude that the Act forbids an employer from retaliating against an employee that discloses a violation of a municipal “ordinance” while not including the municipality as such an employer. The unpublished, non-precedential decision of the Kentucky Court of Appeals, Wilson v. City of Central City, 2010 WL 135105 (Ky.App.) relied upon by appellees does not warrant even little weight in this context. First, the decision in Wilson was designated not be published 5 Case: 09-5119 Document: 006110633296 Filed: 05/20/2010 Page: 9and as such "shall not be cited or used as binding precedent in any other case in any court of this state[.]” CR 76.28(4)(c). Second, Wilson’s assertion that municipalities were excluded intentionally from the Whistleblower Act, as a matter of statutory interpretation, is directly contrary to Allen and Gaines. The judgment at issue in Allen could not be enforceable against the two cities if they were each not a suable “employer” under the Act. Furthermore, Gaines held that the Act is a remedial statute that should be construed broadly to achieve its purpose of protecting public employees that disclose wrongdoing in government. 276 S.W.3d at 793, 796. As this Court has noted, “remedial statutes should be construed broadly to extend coverage and their exclusions or exceptions should be construed narrowly.” Cobb v. Contract Transport, Inc., 452 F.3d 543, 559 (6th Cir. 2006). However, the Wilson court instead construes narrowly the Act’s coverage and construes broadly the Act’s exclusions or exceptions. Third, the error by the Wilson court, as well as the similar errors by the court in Baker v. McDaniel, 2008 WL 215241 (E.D. Ky.), and by the court below here, rests on the incorrect supposition that included as an “employer” under the Whistleblower Act are only those entities 6 Case: 09-5119 Document: 006110633296 Filed: 05/20/2010 Page: 10entitled to sovereign immunity from tort liability. Neither cities nor special districts, which are both municipal corporations, are entitled to sovereign immunity from tort liability. See Calvert Investments, Inc. v. Louisville & Jefferson Co. Met. Sewer. Dist., 805 S.W.2d 133, 136-37 (Ky. 1991)(special district); Haney v. City of Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738, 742 (Ky. 1964)(city). Yet the Kentucky Court of Appeals held in Davis v. Powell’s Valley Water Dist., 920 S.W.2d 75 (Ky.App. 1995), that a special district was a “political subdivision” of the state under the Act and therefore a suable “employer” under it. Accordingly, the panel majority correctly analyzed Kentucky law and concluded that “whether an entity receives sovereign immunity in Kentucky does not appear dispositive of whether that entity is a political subdivision for purposes of the Kentucky Whistleblower Act.” Slip op. at 8. Wilson, like Baker and the decision by the court below here, also fails to consider or discuss long-standing recognition in Kentucky law that cities are deemed subdivisions of the state, which the legislature is presumed cognizant of and to have incorporated into the Act. The Kentucky legislature continues to regard a municipal corporation as a political subdivision of the state but one example being the statute, 7 Case: 09-5119 Document: 006110633296 Filed: 05/20/2010 Page: 11Ky.Rev.Stat. § 154A.020(1), creating the Kentucky Lottery Corporation as “an independent, de jure municipal corporation and political subdivision of the Commonwealth of Kentucky[.]” 2. The Panel Majority Followed a Number of This Court’s Precedents and Correctly Ruled that Appellants’ Speech Addressed a Matter of Public Concern and that Foreman Is Not Entitled to Qualified Immunity. As the panel majority observed, "[t]his Court has consistently held that speech on the same topics as [appellants’ speech] at issue --the efficacy and operations of public agencies and allegations of misconduct by public officials --address as a matter of public concern.” Slip op. at 10-11 (collecting cases). Appellees simply disagree with the panel majority regarding which of this Court’s precedents apply and control, and appellees’ assertion that the panel majority has deviated from the precedents of the Supreme Court, this Court and others is without merit.The record indicates that appellants’ speech addressed substantial matters affecting the entirety of the Jeffersontown police department. First, Jeffersontown's city attorney, Fred Fisher, observed that appellants’ speech encompassed the entirety of the police department, and not simply personal and petty grievances. (RE 31-9, Fischer depo. 8 Case: 09-5119 Document: 006110633296 Filed: 05/20/2010 Page: 12at 35). Second, Jeffersontown’s police chief, Fred Roemele, regarded appellants' speech as raising such substantial issues that he resolved to launch an investigation by his department's criminal investigation or narcotics and intelligence divisions of the issues raised in appellants’ report. (RE 45, Roemele depo. at 41; RE 45-4, Roemele depo. ex. 9). Appellees’ contention that defendant Foreman is entitled to qualified immunity rests on their arguments that appellants’ speech did not address a matter of public concern. Because the panel majority correctly ruled that appellants’ speech addressed a matter of public concern, it likewise ruled correctly that Foreman was not entitled to qualified immunity. 3. The Panel Majority Correctly Ruled that the Jeffersontown Civil Service Commission Is A Necessary Party for Purposes of Relief Appellants were terminated from civil service positions and seek reinstatement, which can only be achieved through action by the Jeffersontown Civil Service Commission (JCSC) in accordance with this Court’s decision in Christophel v. Kukulinsky, 61 F.3d 479 (6th Cir. 1995), which held that civil service status is attained only through formal action of the civil service authority. The panel majority correctly ruled that JCSC is a necessary party under Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 19. 9 Case: 09-5119 Document: 006110633296 Filed: 05/20/2010 Page: 13Appellees’ do not dispute in their petition that action by JCSC is necessary for appellants to attain full relief. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, appellees’ petition should be denied. Respectfully submitted, By: /s/Robert L. Abell Robert L. Abell 120 North Upper Street Lexington, KY 40507 859.254.7076 Phone 859.281.6541 Fax robert@robertabelllaw.com COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that the foregoing was electronically filed with the Sixth Circuit’s electronic filing system this 20 day of May 2010, that notice will be sent electronically by that system to All Counsel of Record. I further certify that 25 copies of the foregoing were mailed, postage prepaid this 20 day of May 2010 to Office of the Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 100 E. Fifth Street, Room 540, Cincinnati, OH 45202-3988. /s/Robert L. Abell COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS 10 Case: 09-5119 Document: 006110633296 Filed: 05/20/2010 Page: 14
Reference Info: Federal, 6th Circuit, Kentucky | United States
Opinion by Sixth Circuit on Kentucky Whistleblower Act and First Amendment speech on matters of public concern