Source: https://www.calattorneysfees.com/2011/06/index.html
Timestamp: 2019-12-07 21:19:05
Document Index: 146550069

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 6204', '§ 6204', '§ 55', '§ 527', '§ 1029', '§ 1988', '§ 1021', '§ 412', '§ 998']

CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY'S FEES : June 2011
Fee Award for SLAPP Motion Defendant Sustained.
In a SLAPP motion context, defendant won a fee award of $13,900 based predominantly on the declaration of their counsel calculating the fee for services but not attaching detailed time records.
Did this prevail on appeal?
You bet. The appellate court in Souza v. Farrer, Case No. A129544 (1st Dist., Div. 5 June 29, 2011) (unpublished), relying on Weber v. Langholz, 39 Cal.App.4th 1578, 1587 (1995), decided that an attorney declaration providing the names and hourly fees charged by the working attorneys was sufficient, coupled with the trial court’s independent review of the case file and internal notes of what occurred in the case. Enough said; sufficient substantiation in this one.
Posted at 09:34 AM in Cases: Substantiation of Reasonableness of Fees | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Arbitration: Client Rejecting Nonbinding Arbitration Award But Failing To File Complaint About Fee Recovery Precluded Challenge To Award
Appellate Court Has Great Discussion on Fee Arbitration Rejection Requirements.
Here is one that reminds everyone--clients and attorneys--engaging in fee arbitrations to keep a very open eye on complaint filing prerequisites applicable to rejection of adverse non-binding fee arbitration awards.
The opinion discussing these topics is Clyne v. Hoover, Case No. H035539 (6th Dist. June 29, 2011) (unpublished), where an ex-client lost her bid to get a new trial after losing a fee arbitration award of over $69,000 to her ex-lawyer under Business and Professions Code section 6204. We will tell you why she lost her bid soon.
There are two sets of rules that operate, as the appellate court cogently reminded us. Set number 1 is that the losing party need only file a rejection of the award and request for trial de novo within 30 days of the award if a court action is pending. (Bus. & Prof., § 6204(b).) Set number 2, which is where ex-client stumbled, specifies that the loser must initiate the commencement of a court action within 30 days after service of the fee arbitration award. (Bus. & Prof., § 6204(c).)
Client, unfortunately, did not file a complaint. She argued that her Judicial Council Form ADR-104 (rejection form) did the trick, but the appellate court was not impressed. After all, the form itself has language indicating that a complaint was being filed by which a new action was commenced--something not done by client. Ouch, we say.
Posted at 09:30 AM in Cases: Arbitration | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Posted at 09:14 AM in Cases: Family Law Awards | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
SLAPP/In The News . . . . Two SLAPP Victories Means Probable Attorney’s Fees To the Winners
Yelp!/Youch!: Plastic Surgeon Hit With $20,000 in SLAPP and $2,000 in Private Attorney General Fee Awards.
As reported by Gary Klien in a June 24, 2011 post carried in MercuryNews.com, a Marin County cosmetic surgeon (Ms. Kimberly Henry of Greenbrae) was assessed $20,000 in attorney’s fees for losing a SLAPP motion brought by a former patient who was sued for her patient’s bad Yelp reviews. The surgeon was also ordered to pay $2,000 in fees to defendant’s lawyer for the “public interest benefit” aspect of his work on the case.
Oceano Community Services District May Get SLAPPed Harder--Nearly $75,000 in Fees According to a Tentative Decision.
Lisa Rizzo, in her June 24, 2011 post on calcoastnews.com, reports that the Oceano Community Services District may get SLAPPed harder, with a tentative decision assessing nearly $75,000 in attorney’s fees after it was found to have illegally appointed Lori Angelo to the board after Barbara Mann resigned from the board. That was the recent tentative decision by San Luis Obispo County Superior Court Judge Charles Crandall.
Posted at 10:49 AM in Cases: SLAPP, News | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Class Actions: Pennsylvania Wal-Mart Fee Award Remanded On “Double Dip” Issue
Trial Court Cannot Double Count Contingent Risk in Both the Lodestar and Enhancement Analyses.
In Braun v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2011 Pa.Super. 121 (June 10, 2011) (per curiam), the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the major portions of $187.65 million judgment in a plaintiffs’ class action against Wal-Mart for certain state wage/hour violations. (This judgment included Wal-Mart having to pay plaintiffs’ attorneys about $33.8 million in fees.)
The plaintiffs’ attorneys requested and were awarded $12.34 million in fees and $3.6 million in expenses, which was then enhanced with a 3.7 multiplier so that fees and expenses totaled $45.6 million or 31% of the value of the total monetary recovery of about $151 million when the fee award assessed against Wal-Mart was backed out. Interestingly enough, the court ordered Wal-Mart to produce its defense expenses, which totaled about $10 million in fees and $7 million in expenses--which actually showed that plaintiffs‘ counsel was under defense expenses for lodestar purposes. The fee award was apportioned this way: $33.8 million payable by Wal-Mart; about $11 million payable by the common fund.
On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed the fee award to two of plaintiffs’ firms because the lower court appears to have “double counted” the contingency risk factor in setting the lodestar and in awarding a multiplier enhancement. In reaching this conclusion, it relied on Perdue v. Kenny A., 130 S.Ct. 1662, 1672 (2010) and other like-minded cases for remand purposes to correct the “double dip” concern.
Posted at 04:51 PM in Cases: Class Actions | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Class Actions: Attorney’s Fee Recovery Percentages In Mega-Class Action Settlements.
Above: Elephant Calisthenics
For those of you who are interested in the percentage of fee recoveries in mega-class action settlements, here is an excellent summary we share from National Association of Legal Fee Analysis’ (NALFA’s) June 22, 2011 post on its attorney’s fees website:
LARGEST CLASS ACTION FEE AWARDS IN U.S. HISTORY
1. Multi-State Tobacco Litigation
$206 Billion Settlement; ?? Fee Award Percentage of Settlement
$7.272 Billion Settlement; 9.52% Fee Award Percentage
3. World Com
$6.133 Billion Settlement; 5.48% Fee Award Percentage
4. Vioxx (Merck)
$4.85 Billion Settlement; 6.49% Fee Award Percentage
5. Cobell (Dept. of the Interior)
$3.4 Billion Settlement; 3.40% Fee Award Percentage
$3.2 Billion Settlement; 14.50% Fee Award Percentage
7. Cendant (2000)
$3.166 Billion Settlement; 1.73% Fee Award Percentage
$2.5 Billion Settlement; 5.90% Fee Award Percentage
9. Nortel I
$1.142 Billion Settlement; 3.00% Fee Award Percentage
10. Royal Ahold
$1.1 Billion Settlement; 11.88% Fee Award Percentage
11. Nortel II
$1.074 Billion Settlement; 7.74% Fee Award Percentage
$1.042 Billion Settlement; 7.64% Fee Award Percentage
13. Countrywide/KPMG
$624 Million Settlement; 7.59% Fee Award Percentage
$600 Million Settlement; 18.00% Fee Award Percentage
15. Lucent
$517 Million Settlement; 17.00% Fee Award Percentage
16. Bank America
$490 Million Settlement; 18.00% Fee Award Percentage
17. Dyengy, Inc.
$474 Million Settlement; 8.73% Fee Award Percentage
$460 Million Settlement; 21.40% Fee Award Percentage
$460 Million Settlement; 9.00% Fee Award Percentage
20. Waste Management II
$457 Million Settlement; 7.93% Fee Award Percentage
21. Global Crossing
$447.8 Million Settlement; 16.04% Fee Award Percentage
22. Health South
$445 Million Settlement; 15.25% Fee Award Percentage
23. Freddie Mac
$410 Million Settlement; 20.00% Fee Award Percentage
24. Qwest
$400 Million Settlement; 15.00% Fee Award Percentage
25. Cendant (2006)
$374 Million Settlement; 7.71% Fee Award Percentage
Source: NALFA Research Library
Posted at 04:34 PM in Cases: Class Actions | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Prevailing Party/Section 1717: Trope Restriction Applies To Non-Section 1717 Contexts
Bad News for Attorneys . . . Co-Counsel Cannot Try to Circumvent Limitation By Representing Each Other In De Novo Collection Matter Following Fee Arbitration.
Here is a somewhat of a wild one, where two attorneys co-counseling for the same clients were denied fee recovery after a successful jury verdict, following on the heels of a fee arbitration award de novo request by attorneys’ former client. The restriction in Trope v. Katz, 11 Cal.4th 274 (1995) was found dispositive, a restriction that generally denies Civil Code section 1717 fees to a self-represented lawyer-litigant in a contractual action against a former client.
In Law Office of Edward M. Higginbotham v. Horejsi, Case No. A128521 (1st Dist., Div. 2 June 24, 2011) (unpublished), two attorneys representing client eventually won a jury verdict against client after he rejected an adverse fee arbitration award and then requested a trial de novo, in a situation where each attorney represented the other. The two attorneys then sought recovery of attorney’s fees from client for their de novo win under Business and Professions Code section 6204(d), which allows for a discretionary award to a repeat fee arbitration prevailing party. However, the trial court denied fees by virtue of the Trope restriction, triggering an appeal by the disappointed attorneys.
Continue reading "Prevailing Party/Section 1717: Trope Restriction Applies To Non-Section 1717 Contexts" »
Posted at 07:20 PM in Cases: Prevailing Party, Cases: Section 1717 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Request For Admission: First District, Division 3 Sides With Manuel Decision
RFA Cost-of-Proof Sanctions Cannot Be Assessed Against Litigant’s Attorney.
In our August 11, 2010 post, we explored Estate of Manuel, 187 Cal.App.4th 400, 404-405 (2010), where the Second District, Division 3 concluded that RFA cost-of-proof sanctions can only be assessed against a party rather than the party’s attorney.
Now, in an unpublished decision, the First District, Division 3 expressly agrees with the Second District’s conclusion on this issue. That concurrence occurred in McManus v. Security Public Storage--Vallejo, Case No. A127457 (1st Dist., Div. 3 June 24, 2011) (unpublished), where a $4,095 cost-of-proof sanction against plaintiff’s attorney was reversed on appeal.
Posted at 08:39 AM in Cases: Requests for Admission | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Water District Did Not Sue in a Representative or User Capacity.
Our state supreme court in County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court, 50 Cal.4th 35 (2010) [reviewed in our July 27, 2010 post] and People ex rel. Clancy v. Superior Court, 39 Cal.3d 740 (1985) found that a heightened duty of neutrality applies to firms representing public agencies on a contingency fee basis.
In Orange County Water District, v. The Arnold Engineering Co., Case No. G043502 (4th Dist., Div. 3 June 24, 2011) (certified for publication), defendants sought to disqualify a law firm representing a Water District under a contingency fee arrangement because it did not meet the heightened Santa Clara/Clancy standards.
Not so, said Justice Aronson is rebuffing the disqualification challenge in a 3-0 unanimous decision from the Fourth District, Division 3.
Water District did not bring a representative or user public abatement action, which would be a different matter completely. Instead, it brought an action in its own name to recover compensatory damages it suffered from defendants’ alleged groundwater contamination. This was a situation to which Santa Clara and Clancy did not apply.
Posted at 11:23 AM in Cases: Retainer Agreements | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Civil Rights Two-Fer: Fee Awards Reversed And Affirmed In Two Different Contexts
Disability Fee Reversal--Mundy v. RLA Properties, Case Nos. B224667/B225612 (2d Dist., Div. 1 June 23, 2011) (unpublished).
In this one, plaintiff in a Disabled Persons Act case, which has a fee-shifting provision in favor of the “prevailing party” (Civ. Code, § 55), lost his attempt to obtain statutory damages in a bench trial, with the lower court ultimately awarding the defense $7,052 in attorney’s fees. The merits judgment was affirmed, but the fee award was reversed. Because plaintiff’s suit did cause a remediation of ADA violations, it was an abuse of discretion to find that the defense was the clear “prevailing party.”
Anti-Harassment Fee Affirmance--Rahmat v. Miller, Case No. B226053 (2d Dist., Div. 6 June 23, 2011) (unpublished).
Here, the defendant was awarded $2,950 in total fees in an anti-harassment lawsuit, which also has a fee-shifting provision (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.6(i)). Even though a symmetrical injunction was entered into by both sides, “prevailing party” status does not turn on a rigid definition. The appellate court found there was no abuse of discretion because an appearance had to be made by the defense because plaintiff did not timely get settlement papers to the court containing the mutual stay-aways.
Posted at 11:11 AM in Cases: Civil Rights, Cases: Special Fee Shifting Statutes | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Civil Rights: Substantial $311,218.26 Excessive Force Fee Award Affirmed On Appeal Using Up to $750 Hourly Rates
Fee Petitioner Shows How a Successful Fee Request Should Be Structured.
In Jochimsen v. County of Los Angeles, Case No. B223518 (2d Dist., Div. 1 June 23, 2011) (unpublished), plaintiff narrowed an excessive police force case down to one civil rights claim, won a difficult jury verdict of $35,000, and then won attorney’s fees of $311,218.26 (out of a requested $406,821.26, or a 23.5% reduction after fee petitioners recommended a 20% reduction). The unhappy County (who was likely funding the litigation as well as being one of the named defendants) appealed. The result was affirmed in a well-written opinion by Justice Johnson of the Second District, Division 1.
The fee petition proceeding was quite contentious, with lots of papers/objections filed with the lower court, and the trial judge was not pleased with the approximate $60,000 spent on the fee motion alone. However, the fee petitioners did provide the lower court with a good roadmap of how to successfully obtain a large award. Here is what we picked up from what was done below as tips for a good fee petition:
Continue reading "Civil Rights: Substantial $311,218.26 Excessive Force Fee Award Affirmed On Appeal Using Up to $750 Hourly Rates" »
Posted at 11:04 AM in Cases: Civil Rights | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Probate: Extraordinary Fees For Services Rendered To Trustee Not Justified
They Only Benefitted the Trustee, Not the Trust, Justifying Fee Request Denial.
The Second District, Division 6, in Waters v. Conkle, Case No. B225166 (2d Dist., Div. 6 June 23, 2011) (unpublished), reminds all of you probate practitioners that extraordinary fees will only be awarded where the attorney’s actions had some benefit for the trust, rather than just benefitting the trustee. In this one, trustee’s attorney lost his fee reimbursement request of $28,431.50, with the lower court determining he had already been paid over $66,000, had not completed activities in line with the trust intent, and had only taken actions to make up for the trustee’s failure to account properly to beneficiaries. Probate courts have special responsibilities to insure that extraordinary fees are reasonable (Donahue v. Donahue, 182 Cal.App.4th 259, 269 (2010)), and no fees are justified when the benefits are only to the trustee rather than to the trust (Estate of Gump, 1 Cal.App.4th 582, 605 (1991)). The appellate court found the fee denial was no abuse of discretion.
Posted at 10:53 AM in Cases: Probate | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Special Fee Shifting Statute: Our Local Santa Ana Court Of Appeal Considers CCP § 1029.8 Relating To Fee Recovery Against Unlicensed Professionals
Maybe an Oxymoron, But Stay With Us To See What This Covers.
Our local Santa Ana appellate court recently considered a writ proceeding that involved Code of Civil Procedure section 1029.8. That particular provision allows someone to sue an unlicensed person causing injury to recover treble damages not exceeding $10,000 as well as a discretionary grant of “all costs and attorney’s fees to the injured person if that person prevails in the action.”
In a very complicated procedural and writ proceeding that authoring Justice Fybel described on a post-judgment basis “as the legal equivalent of Mr. Toad’s Wild Ride,” the appellate court issued writ relief so that the section 1029.8 fee motion had to be considered, especially given that it was timely filed from the date of an order stating that a certain party had violated section 1029.8. The “injured” parties sought $595,125 in fees, but the appellate court refused--in line with the majority view of courts of appeal--to weigh in on the issue, remanding back to the trial court to adjudge in the first instance.
This “Wild Ride” case is Wilson v. Superior Court (Gladych), Case No. G043930 (4th Dist., Div. 3 June 23, 2011) (unpublished).
Posted at 10:45 AM in Cases: Special Fee Shifting Statutes | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Family Law: Fourth Time Appeal Is No Charm For Losing Wife
She Has To Pay $26,650 In Appellate Fees And Costs To Husband Under Needs-Based Statute.
We knew one would not go well for the loser--in this case, the ex-wife--when the appellate court ominously observed early on: “This case is before us for the fourth time.” It didn’t.
Ex-wife lost two prior fee battles and appeals. She won the third fee battle on appeal, but only for a remand on the reasonableness issue. That brought the parties in Marriage of Moody, Case No. A128515 (1st Dist., Div. 5 June 22, 2011) (unpublished) to the fourth appeal of a trial court’s decision to award husband $26,650 in appellate fees and costs so he could defend the third appeal. [We have blogged on the prior appellate decisions in our March 21, 2009, June 24, 2009, and June 26, 2010 posts--a virtual appellate trifecta!] She did not win the appeal of the $26,650 award.
Wife first made an argument that we have seen frequently: the appellate court’s earlier directive of “each side bearing their costs on [the third] appeal” precluded a fee award. Not so, said the appellate panel, citing Mustachio v. Great Western Bank, 48 Cal.App.4th 1145, 1149-1150 (1996). [Butler-Rupp v. Lourdeaux, 154 Cal.App.4th 918, 925-928 (2007) also supports this conclusion, relying on Mustachio.]
She also challenged the needs-based determination, but the record supported the award to husband--wife had more income than husband and the current economic slump had impacted husband’s earning power. The appellate court also found that $26,650 in fees was not grossly excessive for the time spent by husband on the third appeal.
Posted at 02:00 PM in Cases: Family Law | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
In The News . . . . Burbank City Council Will Pay Fees/Costs to Newspaper Obtaining Individual Bonus Payout Information
California Public Records Act Provides for Fee Shifting.
Under our category “Specific Fee Shifting Statutes,” we have posted on the past about the California Public Records Act, which does allow litigants the opportunity to collect attorney’s fees and court costs if prevailing on a request to obtain a release of public documents.
Now we can report that the Burbank City Council this week approved the payment of $39,218 in fees and costs to The Burbank Leader, a news organization that successfully obtained a Public Records Act directive to release public records on individual bonus payouts for Los Angeles city employees. The Public Records Act ruling was issued by Los Angeles County Superior Court Judge Ann I. Jones, with the City deciding to pay up rather than fight anymore.
For more on this one, see Gretchen Meier’s June 17, 2011 post “Burbank to pay Leader’s court costs,” available for reading at www.burbankleader.com.
Posted at 10:18 AM in Cases: Special Fee Shifting Statutes, News | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
SLAPP: Texas Recently Enacts SLAPP Statute Similar to California’s Statute, With Similar Fee Shifting Provisions
U.S. Congress and North Carolina Also Considering SLAPP Legislation.
We have posted frequently on California’s anti-SLAPP statute and its fee-shifting provisions.
We can now report that, according to a June 20, 2011 post on the Reporters Committee for Freedom of Press News website, Texas is the 27th state, along with the District of Columbia, to adopt anti-SLAPP litigation. The U.S. Congress and North Carolina are considering similar legislation.
Much like California’s statute, the trial judge in a Texas anti-SLAPP proceeding must (shall language) award to the moving party “court costs, reasonable attorney’s fees, and other expenses incurred in defending against the legal action as justice and equity may require.” (BLOG OBSERVATION--This statute appears to be broader than California’s, with some decisions indicating that the work must be related to the anti-SLAPP proceeding rather than broader “in connection” work. Compare Lafayette Morehouse, Inc. v. Chronicle Publishing Co., 39 Cal.App.4th 1379 (1995) [stricter “related” work interpretation of California anti-SLAPP statute] with Rosenaur v. Scherer, 88 Cal.App.4th 260, 285-286 (2001) [Lafayette supplanted by later legislative amendment requiring only an “in connection” work test]. However, the Texas statute talks about costs, fees, and expenses incurred in defending against the legal action--seemingly much broader than the California provision.) Also in line with California, the trial judge may (discretionarily) award costs and fees to the responding party where he/she finds that the plaintiff’s motion was frivolous or intended solely for delay.
Posted at 09:35 AM in Cases: SLAPP, Legislation | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Ruling Expressly Limited to Sophisticated Business Clients.
In Desert Outdoor Advertising v. Superior Court (Murphy), Case No. A129051 (1st Dist., Div. 1 June 17, 2011) (certified for publication), an appellate court held that a lawyer having clients signing a new retainer agreement with an arbitration clause when lawyer changed firms, even though the earlier retainer with a different firm contained no such clause, had no fiduciary duty to separately explain the clause when the clients were sophisticated business persons. Arbitration was properly compelled in a suit where clients later sued lawyer for malpractice.
The reviewing court found that clients’ failure to read the agreement or all portions of it was inexcusable, refusing to extend the form and content requirements for medical malpractice arbitration provisions because even those requisites presumed the clients read the agreements (a critical factor missing in this situation).
However, the ruling was limited to sophisticated clients, although we would surmise that the principle still might be the same for less sophisticated clients who also fail to read their attorney retention agreements.
Posted at 10:30 AM in Cases: Retainer Agreements | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Civil Rights: TRO Win, Mooted When Opponent Voluntarily Changed Position To Moot Further injunctive Proceedings, Was Not Merits Win To Justify Civil Rights Fee Award
Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in Divided Ruling, Felt Bound by Buckhannon, With Interesting Dissents on the Merits and on Jurisprudential Thinking.
The federal civil rights statute has a pro-plaintiff fee shifting provision in 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598 (2001), decided that a civil rights plaintiff must get a change in the legal relationships between the parties in a “judicially sanctioned” context, identifying a merits-judgment or court-ordered consent decree as examples of those that would qualify. Buckhannon, which did change the seascape as what qualified as a catalyst in this area, drew a very divided en banc decision from the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
Singer Management Consultants, Inc. v. Milgram, 2011 WL 2342733 (3d Cir. June 15, 2011), was a situation where plaintiff obtained a TRO against the State of New Jersey so that a concert could go ahead in Atlantic City, with the State later taking a 180 degree change in position at the preliminary injunction hearing which led to a concession that the constitutional claims had been resolved. Plaintiff then moved for civil rights fees as the prevailing party, but the both the district judge and Third Circuit majority (12 circuit judges) found that the TRO was not a merits-based decision under Buckhannon. The majority did seem to concede that the law might have been different under its own pre-Buckhannon decisions, but found itself bound by Buckhannon.
Circuit Judge Roth, who obtained the concurrence of three other jurists, dissented, finding that the TRO grant was the functional equivalent of a merits-based “judicially sanctioned” decision. The dissenters agreed that the proper test was whether the relief placed a judicial imprimatur on plaintiff’s entitlement to substantially all the relief it sought in the complaint, a test they believed was readily met under the circumstances.
Circuit Judge Aldisert, in a separate dissent (although he joined In Circuit Judge Roth’s dissent), has a very interesting discussion of jurisprudential decisionmaking and reasoning. He described the evolution of American jurisprudence from conceptual jurisprudence to a new school of thought factoring in a concern for society’s welfare into judicial process. Judge Aldisert believed the majority was backtracking from the civil rights reforms in precedents past and employed a “stingy interpretation” of Buckhannon’s “judicially sanctioned” requirement.
In describing what happens when judges are faced with a result that is not pre-determined and law that is not clear, Judge Aldisert colorfully observed: “Some judges have lower thresholds than others, and are more inclined to find solace in shades and fringes rather than the black-letter law.” The decision is interesting reading for practitioners, as well as legal philosophers. (Or, as Justice Bedsworth was apt to observe while on the trial bench, “Welcome to the Hotel California.”)
Posted at 08:03 PM in Cases: Civil Rights | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Specific Fee Shifting Statute/Allocation: Plaintiff Winning A Brown Act and Public Records Dispute Received $20,000 In Fees
Request For $571,495.60 in Fees Rebuffed; Fifth District Gives Great Review of Fee Standards For Both Trial and Appellate Levels.
This next case is an interesting sequel to an on-going dispute by which a plaintiff prevailed against the Orosi Public Utility District for Brown Act and California Public Records Act violations, with the first scheme carrying a discretionary fee shifting provision and the latter scheme carrying a mandatory fee shifting provision. After dismissing a deadline to file appellate fees in connection with a prior appeal, plaintiff claimed entitlement to a “remarkable” (that is the appellate court’s word, not ours) $571,495.60 in attorney’s fees (and an increased 2.0-plus multiplier). The trial court, after denying appellate attorney’s fees due to the blown deadline, pared down the hourly rate request, eliminated time not related to the Brown Act/Public Records Act claims, and reduced some excessive time, then applied a 1.25 multiplier as an enhancement, and awarded a combined $20,000 fee award for both causes of action.
Plaintiff’s appeal of this award in Galbiso v. Orosi Public Utility Dist., Case No. F059461 (5th Dist. June 15, 2011) (unpublished) was not successful.
Continue reading "Specific Fee Shifting Statute/Allocation: Plaintiff Winning A Brown Act and Public Records Dispute Received $20,000 In Fees" »
Posted at 07:23 PM in Cases: Allocation, Cases: Special Fee Shifting Statutes | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Section 998: Failure To Award Expert Expenses Reversed For Inverting Burden Of Proof
Burden of Proof Is On Plaintiff to Prove Unreasonableness of 998 Offer.
In Leve v. Patient Safety Technologies Inc., Case No. B220274 et al. (2d Dist., Div. 5 June 15, 2011) (unpublished), a lower court granted a plaintiff’s motion to tax requested expert witness fees by the defense, ruling the defense did not carry its initial burden to establish the reasonableness of its rejected 998 offer.
Reversed. The lower court got the burden of proof mixed up, because the burden is on plaintiff to show that the 998 offer was unreasonable in nature. (Essex Ins. Co. v. Heck, 186 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1528 (2010).)
Posted at 09:19 AM in Cases: Section 998 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Class Actions: Attorney’s Fees Before Cy Pres Payments?
No Way, Said Appellate Court in Affirming Decision Interpreting Scope of Class Action Settlement.
Here is a post on a case demonstrating that the trial court is the ultimate gatekeeper as far as determining that a class action settlement is fair, including the attorney’s fees award under a settlement.
In In re General Chemical Cases, Case Nos. A126881/A127769 (1st Dist., Div. 5 June 14, 2011) (unpublished), a $6.25 million settlement was reached in a sulfuric acid company chemical release class action by which attorney’s fees of $2.25 million were paid in common benefit fees with a cy pres feature for unclaimed funds. After a claimant calculation error was discovered, attorneys requested more fees and argued a lower court was mistaken in ordering the unclaimed settlement payment to be paid to the cy pres-designated charity.
Not so, said the appellate court. The settlement agreement was clear on this aspect, and there was no mutual mistake of fact justifying equitable relief. Beyond that, the court properly played its gatekeeper role with respect to fees (with such an award being reviewed for abuse of discretion). The lower court was within its province to not award more contingent fees when the result would be that attorneys would have garnered more than 51% of the settlement amount considering the fees previously awarded and paid.
Posted at 09:28 AM in Cases: Class Actions | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Private Attorney General Statute: $627,796.74 Fee Award Reversed And Remanded For Facial Lodestar Miscalculation
1.5 Multipler Must Be Revisited, But Likely Proper.
After a bench trial, taxpayers of a closely-held corporation obtained invalidation of a decades-long Board of Equalization practice and obtained tax refunds, with the lower court finding that a public benefit had been provided to other closely-held companies so as to trigger fee entitlement under California’s private attorney general statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 1021.5). As a result, the trial court awarded the winning plaintiffs $627,796.74 in attorney’s fees (out of a 1.8 multiplier requested $1,392,577.40), an award using a 1.5 multiplier.
Although there was a partial reversal on a standing issue, the fee award was remanded too for recalculation in Parmar v. Board of Equalization, Case No. B215789 (2d Dist., Div. 7 June 14, 2011) (partially published; fee discussion unpublished). However, the Court of Appeal found that there was public benefit aplenty to justify a fee award.
Presiding Justice Perluss, for a unanimous panel, determined that the lodestar amount had been miscalculated, with the lower court adopting an aggregate lodestar sum from the defense’s fee expert which did not jive with the $450 reasonable hourly rate calculation adopted in fashioning the award. Also, because of the partial reversal, the lower court needed to determine if there was a further need to back out work on successful versus unsuccessful claims. The appellate court found that the 1.5 multiplier was no abuse of discretion, but also remanded that ruling given the overall need for a redetermination of the fee award.
Here was a more than subtle hint to the litigants found in a concluding footnote: “In light of the trial court’s finding the case achieved significant nonpecuniary objectives, a finding unaffected by our reduction of the amount of compensatory damages awarded, the trial court’s intention to award substantial attorney fees in the case would seem clear. Thus, it appears the parties would do well to resolve their dispute over the amount of fees without an additional evidentiary hearing, which would require further expenditure of attorney fees and resources.” (Slip Opn., p. 23 n. 19.)
Posted at 09:15 AM in Cases: Private Attorney General (CCP 1021.5) | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Section 1717/Prevailing Party: Only Winning Fee Recovery Issue On Appeal Does Not Make One A Prevailing Party
Plaintiff Won Below, But Denied Fees Based on Trope, With Affirmance on Fee Recovery Not Making Defendant the Prevailing Party.
The next case is an elegant, short unpublished decision that demonstrates Civil Code section 1717 “prevailing party” status must be based upon consideration of the whole lawsuit, not just an appellate win on a non-merits fee recovery issue.
Law Offices of Nejadpour & Associates v. Gonzalez, Case No. B226082 (2d Dist., Div. 5 June 13, 2011) (unpublished) involved an attorney who successfully sued an ex-client and recovered a $23,029.60 judgment. However, attorney was denied the request for attorney’s fees based upon the Trope restriction--attorney used an employee with whom the firm did not have an attorney-client relationship, a determination precluding a fee award and one affirmed in a prior appellate decision. Ex-client did obtain appellate costs, but also moved to recoup fees--a request that was granted by the lower court.
The fee award was reversed, in a 3-0 panel decision authored by Acting Presiding Justice Armstrong, because the matter was a legal issue reviewed on a de novo basis.
Wood v. Santa Monica Escrow Co., 176 Cal.App.4th 802, 804, 808 (2009) was dispositive in this particular cause. Much like Gonzalez, Wood held that a party prevailing on appeal is not necessarily the prevailing party for purposes of a 1717 award. The winning of the appeal on the fee recovery issue did not negate that attorney did win and obtain a money judgment against client in the lower court proceedings. Although ex-client prevailed on appeal, attorney prevailed in the whole lawsuit, such that a fee award to ex-client was not sustainable.
Posted at 09:36 AM in Cases: Prevailing Party, Cases: Section 1717 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Substantiation Of Fee Requests: Plaintiff’s Counsel Shows Us How To Do It In A Case Where They Were Awarded 100% Of Requested Discretionary Fees And Expenses
Defense Did Not Oppose, But Plaintiffs Documented Things Well.
Plaintiff’s counsel in Situation Management Systems, Inc. v. Lamoco Consulting, LLC, Civil Action No. 06-11557-RGS (D. Mass. June 6, 2011 Order) requested $718,015.53 in attorney’s fees and expenses for their winning client in a copyright infringement action where the governing statute allows fees to be awarded in the court’s discretion if the work was registered prior to infringement. (17 U.S.C. § 412.) Although the fee request was unopposed, U.S. District Judge Richard G. Stearns awarded the “whole tamale,” plus costs of $25,733.39 and a chance for plaintiffs to recoup fees for this successful fee application.
District Judge Stearns gave us all a nice “roadmap” of factors that led to this award:
1. Presenting good billing statements for judicial review;
2. Documenting efforts by supervising attorneys to weed out duplicative/inefficient items from billing statements;
Demonstrating that the defense infringement was willful/predatory in nature;
Showing the seasoned experience of plaintiff’s attorneys working the areas ofthe case that required the greatest skill;
Using reasonable hourly rates for the Boston legal community; and,
Documenting well the comparable costs of similar intellectual property litigationmatters.
U.S. District Court Judge David O. Carter is considering MGA’s request for fees under the same copyright fee entitlement statute in the Bratz litigation pending in the Central District of California, Santa Ana courthouse. A ruling is expected to come out soon.
Posted at 01:50 PM in Cases: Substantiation of Reasonableness of Fees | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Attorney Winning Contractual Costs Assessment Dispute Collected Substantial Costs.
Here is one demonstrating how prevailing party costs determinations are frequently discretionary in nature in multi-count litigation involving both monetary and nonmonetary claims.
In Petrik v. Mahaffey, Case No. G042114 (4th Dist., Div. 3 June 9, 2011) (unpublished), plaintiff was represented by a law firm (attorney) who sent 13 separate CCP § 998 offers in a construction defect case, with the various offers exceeding the amount of the prior rejected global demand Plaintiff’s counsel later tried to withdraw these offers, arguing he did not have authority to extend them even though the offers had been accepted. Attorney’s argument for withdrawal was rejected by both the trial and appellate courts in earlier proceedings. Client then sued attorney on a number of legal and equitable theories, but the thrust was legal malpractice in failing to obtain 998 offer transmittal authorization as well as centering on the contractual interpretation of whether a costs assessment was triggered under the parties’ legal services engagement agreement.
The matter was bifurcated for trial, with the court initially granting partial nonsuits in favor of attorney. The jury found some for and some against each side, but determined that the client owed lawyer about $28,000 in costs under the costs assessment provision. The court found this latter determination was “purely advisory” in nature and proceeded to change it so that attorney was owed $228,260 by client under the contract costs assessment claim. Then, the lower court determined that attorney was the prevailing party and assessed litigation costs of $274,594.27 against client, which obviously prompted an appeal.
Continue reading "Costs/Prevailing Party: Where Party Obtains Nonmonetary Relief In Mixed Claims Litigation, Costs Prevailing Party Determination Is A Discretionary Call" »
Posted at 09:00 AM in Cases: Costs, Cases: Prevailing Party | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
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In The News . . . . Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe Requests To Withdraw In Representing MGA Entertainment, Inc. In New York Action
Follows on the Heels of Requesting $129 Million in Fees For MGA in California Federal Action.
As reported by Amanda Bronstad in a June 2, 2011 post at Law.com, Orrick--which represented MGA Entertainment Inc. in a California federal court case resulting in a $88.5 million jury verdict win--has filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for MGA in a New York federal court case. The reason? MGA owes Orrick over $1.2 million in fees for work on the New York case.
This has struck some as ironic, given that Orrick on MGA’s behalf recently asked a California federal district judge to award MGA $129 million in attorney’s fees for prevailing over Mattel after a jury trial.
MGA is also in litigation with its insurers and O’Melveny & Myers, according to the post, with O’Melveny suing last year to recover $10.2 million in fees.
MGA refused to give a public statement outside of court submissions. U.S. District Judge David O. Carter, the California judge deciding the fee request, has taken the matter under submission.
Dawn Steele recites Tae a Moose
Family Law: $3,250 Needs-Based Attorney’s Fees Award Affirmed On Appeal
No Particular Order Wording Needed to Show Relevant Financial Factors Weighed.
The lesson in Marriage of Walter, Case No. B225762 (2d Dist., Div. 6 June 2, 2011) (unpublished) is not that spectacular as far as results: the appellate court affirmed a needs-based attorney’s fees award of $3,250 under Family Code section 2030 in favor of wife when husband dismissed a count and had other counts in a multi-count contempt OSC adjudged against him--an exercise making a needy wife miss multiple days of work.
Husband argued on appeal that the lower court failed to make mention of any facts or findings related to the needs-based factors having to be considered under section 2030. Not so, said the reviewing court. “But no particular language is required in the order,” with the record simply needing to establish that the lower court properly considered the statutory factors (which it did). See, e.g., Alan S. v. Superior Court, 172 Cal.App.4th 238, 254 (2009).
Posted at 12:36 PM in Cases: Family Law | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
In The News . . . . Criminal Defense Lawyers Battling City of San Diego Over Reimbursement Of Fees Incurred By Former Pension Board Members In Dismissed State Criminal Case
$5.4 Million in Fees At Issue.
As reported in Greg Moran’s May 30, 2011 post in the on-line version of The San Diego Union-Tribune, criminal defense lawyers are battling City of San Diego to obtain reimbursement of $5.4 million in fees incurred in defending six former members of the San Diego pension board after state criminal charges were dropped.
The dispute focuses on a 2002 City Council resolution provision purporting to indemnify pension board members sued over support of a pension plan allowing the City to put less money into the system than required. City claims that the resolution was only intended to reimburse fees incurred in civil actions, rejecting the former six members’ claims for payment. Defense lawyers see the situation differently, with San Diego County Superior Court Judge William Dato denying City’s motion to dismiss the recent action filed by the members to obtain fee reimbursements. However, Judge Dato did reject members’ argument that a state law gives the City discretion to cover the costs of defending pension board members in criminal cases.
We will keep you posted as more development happen in this action which is destined to get quite a bit of publicity.
On the back of an elephant at the San Diego Zoo. Circa 1920. San Diego Historical Society.