Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/99212/united-states-vs-korpan
Timestamp: 2017-01-22 21:05:06
Document Index: 154192512

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 4462', '§ 4461', '§ 4462', '§ 4462', '§ 4462', '§ 4462', '§ 4462', '§ 4462', '§ 4462', '§ 4462', '§4462', '§ 4462', '§ 4462', '§ 4462', '§ 3267']

United States Vs Korpan - Citation 99212 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Save as PDF Add a Tag Add a Note Semantics Visualize United States Vs. Korpan - Court Judgment	LegalCrystal Citationlegalcrystal.com/99212CourtUS Supreme CourtDecided OnJun-17-1957Case Number354 U.S. 271AppellantUnited StatesRespondentKorpanExcerpt:.....u. s. 273
the evidence at the trial showed that korpan maintained on his premises a number of coin-operated gambling machines. these machines were played by inserting a coin into the machine through a slot. the player was then able to shoot several balls onto a playing surface which was interspersed with pockets or holes. if he succeeded in getting balls into certain holes he received a varying number of free games. he had the option of either playing the free games or of cashing them in at a designated rate. by inserting extra coins the player could sometimes secure additional balls or increased "odds" (in other words, increase the number of free games he could win). the machines were equipped with electrical devices which over a period of time controlled the number of free games..... Judgment:
United States v. Korpan - 354 U.S. 271 (1957)
1. A coin-operated gambling machine of the "pin-ball" type, the operation of which involves the element of chance, as a result of which the player may become entitled to money, is a "so-called
slot' machine" within the meaning of 26 U.S.C. (Supp. IV) § 4462(a)(2), and is, therefore, subject to the tax of $250 per annum imposed by 26 U.S.C. (Supp. IV) § 4461. Pp.
354 U. S. 271
2. Section 4462(a)(2), as here construed, is not unconstitutionally vague. P. 273,
of the element of chance, may deliver, or entitle the person playing . . . the machine to receive cash, premiums, merchandise, or tokens. [
The district Judge found respondent guilty as charged and fined him $750. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that respondent's machines did not come within the definition laid down by § 4462(a)(2). 237 F.2d 676. On the Government's petition, we granted certiorari because the case raised important questions in the administration of the revenue laws. 352 U.S. 980. The issue before us is whether the machines maintained by petitioner were included within the definition given by § 4462(a) (2). [
] For the reasons stated hereafter we believe that they were within that definition and that the judgment of the Court of Appeals setting aside Korpan's conviction on the ground that they were not must be reversed.
It is clear that respondent's machines were operated by the insertion of a coin, and that persons playing them could receive cash for any free games won. The machines also involved an element of chance sufficient
On its face, the language of § 4462(a)(2) and related sections does not manifest an intent to limit the application of the otherwise broad terms of § 4462(a)(2) to any particular kind of "slot-machine" gambling device. The phrase "so-called "slot" machine" is, if anything, more consistent with the position advanced by the Government than that taken by Korpan. And the remainder of § 4462(a)(2), as well as § 4462(c), has language which affirmatively suggests that § 4462(a)(2) was designed to include all sorts of coin-operated gambling devices, regardless
"any machine which returns any sort of a premium, and that was the intention of the amendment, and it was the intention of the committee in adopting it. [
Your committee divides these devices into two categories.
Upon so-called pinball or other
devices operated by the insertion of a coin or token, the tax is reduced to $10 per year. Upon so-called slot machines, however, the tax is placed at $200 per year. [
(Emphasis added.) Respondent contends that this report, as well as similar language in other parts of the legislative history, is indicative of an intent on the part of Congress to draw a distinction between "one-armed bandits" and other coin-operated gambling or amusement machines. [
] We interpret this history, however, as demonstrating a congressional
The administrative interpretation of § 4462(a)(2) and its predecessors adds additional strength to this view. In 1942, the Treasury Department published interpretative regulations which included so-called "pin-ball" gambling machines under §4462(a)(2). [
] This administrative ruling was publicized in the trade paper of the coin-operated machine industry. In both 1942 and 1954, the representatives of that industry complained to Congress about the Treasury's interpretation, which is still in effect, and asked that § 4462(a) (2) be amended so that it expressly excluded "pin-ball" gambling machines. [
] In each instance, Congress left the existing provisions of § 4462(a)(2) standing, although, at the request of others in the industry, it did provide an exception for certain penny-operated gambling machines. [
If the respondent's position were adopted, § 4462(a)(2) would be restricted to a peculiar type of gambling device -- the so-called "one-armed bandit" -- even though ingenuity, a desire to avoid taxes, and technological
For the legislative history of what became § 3267
H.R.Rep. No. 1040, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 60; H.R.Rep. No. 1203, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 18; S.Rep. No. 673, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 21; 87 Cong.Rec. 6476, 7297Ń7307.
Hearings before the House Committee on Ways and Means on Revenue Revision of 1942, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 2055Ń2061, 2682Ń2688; Hearings before the Senate Committee on Finance on H.R. 7378, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 1132Ń1141; Hearings before House Committee on Ways and Means on General Revision of the Internal Revenue Code, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 2505Ń2522; Hearings before Senate Committee on Finance on H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 1874Ń1879.
56 Stat. 978Ń979.