Source: http://www.google.com/patents/US20080091945?dq=5095480
Timestamp: 2017-06-24 20:05:35
Document Index: 697596747

Matched Legal Cases: ['art 600', 'art 600', 'art 600', 'art 600', 'art 600', 'art 600', 'art 600', 'art 600', 'art 600', 'art 600', 'art 600', 'art 600', 'art 600', 'art 600', 'art 600', 'art 600', 'art 600', 'art 600', 'art 600', 'art 600', 'art 600', 'art 600', 'art 600', 'art 600', 'art 600', 'art 600', 'art 600', 'art 600', 'art 600']

Patent US20080091945 - Secure device authentication system and method - Google PatentsSearch Images Maps Play YouTube News Gmail Drive More »Sign inPatentsA technique for security and authentication on block-based media includes involves the use of protected keys, providing authentication and encryption primitives. A system according to the technique may include a secure device having a security kernel with protected keys. A disk drive security mechanism...http://www.google.com/patents/US20080091945?utm_source=gb-gplus-sharePatent US20080091945 - Secure device authentication system and methodAdvanced Patent SearchTry the new Google Patents, with machine-classified Google Scholar results, and Japanese and South Korean patents.Publication numberUS20080091945 A1Publication typeApplicationApplication numberUS 11/586,446Publication dateApr 17, 2008Filing dateOct 24, 2006Priority dateOct 16, 2006Also published asEP2080311A2, EP2080311A4, US7624276, US7991999, US20100031035, WO2008048403A2, WO2008048403A3Publication number11586446, 586446, US 2008/0091945 A1, US 2008/091945 A1, US 20080091945 A1, US 20080091945A1, US 2008091945 A1, US 2008091945A1, US-A1-20080091945, US-A1-2008091945, US2008/0091945A1, US2008/091945A1, US20080091945 A1, US20080091945A1, US2008091945 A1, US2008091945A1InventorsJohn Princen, Pramila Srinivasan, Craig Steven AndersonOriginal AssigneeJohn Princen, Pramila Srinivasan, Craig Steven AndersonExport CitationBiBTeX, EndNote, RefManPatent Citations (99), Referenced by (28), Classifications (28), Legal Events (5) External Links: USPTO, USPTO Assignment, EspacenetSecure device authentication system and method
US 20080091945 A1Abstract
[0001] Authentication and other security issues are currently areas of extensive research and development, both theoretical and practical. One field of endeavor is the authentication of data on a DVD or comparable technology, which may or may not include CDs and new DVD technologies, but is typically applicable across DVD technologies due to the similarities between DVD technologies. With DVDs, CDs, and other freely distributable media disks, the authentication has to be particularly strong (e.g., use a cryptographic method).
[0002] Disk-based media are typically block-based devices. So the access time of block data and the computation time of any cryptographic algorithm used should meet the specifications of a system on which the disk-based media are used. Moreover, the contents could sometimes be encrypted for secrecy. Other considerations for secure device secrecy and authenticity techniques for disk-based media include that the technique should support a read-only medium, should support mass production of disks (not requiring custom or unique data on each disk), and the additional data stored on the disk for authentication should only impose a reasonable overhead.
[0003] Some efforts to meet these requirements have been proposed, but, as is the case with many solutions in secrecy and authentication techniques, there is room for improvement. For example, one could attach a block signature based on public key cryptography (example, RSA signature), but this is relatively slow since every block of data that is read would require an RSA signature calculation. Besides, the size of an RSA signature for every block would impose a relatively high overhead. As another example, one could attach a SHA hash (or equivalent) for every block written in a custom protected area of disk, but this would require the manufacture of custom disks. As another example, one could attach a secret-key based message authentication code such as HMAC (or equivalent) for each block, but if the HMAC has to be the same for all disks, this becomes a common secret key mechanism, which may not provide a desired level of security. As another example, one could use a hierarchical signature approach that requires multiple seeks of the block device for every block access, to read the members of the hierarchy, but this may lead to increased latency.
[0006] A technique for security and authentication on block-based media includes involves the use of protected keys, providing authentication and encryption primitives. A system according to the technique may include a secure device having a security kernel with protected keys. A disk drive security mechanism may support authentication of data, secrecy, and ticket validation using the security kernel and, for example, a ticket services module (e.g., a shared service that may or may not be used by other storage devices like flash). Depending upon the implementation, the security kernel, disk drive security mechanism, and ticket services module may operate in three different execution spaces, and can be commonly used by various I/O and storage devices including, by way of example but not limitation, an optical disk.
[0007] In a non-limiting embodiment, the block-based media is read-only, but the technique may be applicable on write once, read many (WORM), writable, or other block-based media. The technique may also be applicable to other storage media, other licensing mechanisms leading to alternate methods to derive the encryption key, and/or other transport media (for example, Internet packet-based download.
[0009] FIG. 1 depicts an example of a binary tree structure associated with a hierarchical hashing technique.
[0010] FIG. 2 depicts a non-binary tree structure associated with a hierarchical hashing technique.
[0011] FIG. 3 depicts an example of a 32 KB block.
[0013] FIG. 5 depicts an example of a secure system suitable for implementation of the techniques described above with reference to FIGS. 1-3.
[0014] FIGS. 6A and 6B depict a flowchart of an example of a method for secure block-based media access.
[0000] where F(Yi) is a one-way function such as SHA-1. It follows that H(i, j, Y) is a one-way function of Yi, Yi+1, . . . Yj, and H(1, n, Y) is a one-way function of Y1 through Yn. Thus, the receiver can selectively authenticate Yk and a set of values of H.
[0033] Referring once again to FIG. 3, the hash block 302, which is subdivided, in this example, into 31 H0 hashes and padding 310, 8 H1 hashes and padding 312, and 8 H2 hashes and padding 314.
[0034] A header (not shown), such as a disk header, would typically be included with the 32 KB block 300. The header may be prepended, appended, or otherwise included with the block of data. In a non-limiting embodiment, the header includes the H4 hash and the relevant H3 hash (see, e.g., FIG. 2). In an alternative embodiment the relevant H3 could be derived from all 8 of the H2 hashes, and would not have to be provided, though this may require accessing data from the whole block-based device.
[0035] In a non-limiting embodiment, the header may include a signed data structure called a “ticket” which includes at least the final hash (e.g., H4), a content identification, and an optional key. The key may, for example, be signed by a content publishing server using a public key signature method such as, by way of example but not limitation, RSA. In a non-limiting embodiment, the ticket may include other rights management data granting rights to the content and a signature by another licensing server. The header may further include ancillary data structures to help validate the signatures, such as a chain of certificates, revocation lists, etc. Rights management licenses may be used in conjunction with other rights management licenses delivered by alternate means, to reduce or extend the rights applicable to the content.
[0037] In an embodiment, all data blocks are encrypted (e.g., using AES encryption) to ensure copy protection of the content. In an alternative embodiment, some of the data blocks may not be encrypted. In a non-limiting embodiment, data is decrypted starting from the hash block 302. Any known or convenient technique may be used to decrypt the hashes. For example, a constant known value may be chosen to decrypt the beginning of the hash block 302, and a portion of the H2 hashes may be used as a value for the data block decryption. The decryption key may be obtained as a byproduct of a ticket validation procedure (see, e.g., FIG. 5).
[0047] The computer system 400 may be controlled by an operating system (OS). An OS is a software program-used on most, but not all, computer systems—that manages the hardware and software resources of a computer. Typically, the OS performs basic tasks such as controlling and allocating memory, prioritizing system requests, controlling input and output devices, facilitating networking, and managing files. Examples of operating systems for personal computers include Microsoft Windows®, Linux, and Mac OS®. Delineating between the OS and application software is sometimes rather difficult. Fortunately, delineation is not necessary to understand the techniques described herein, since any reasonable delineation should suffice.
[0054] In the example of FIG. 5, the secure system 500 includes a secure processor 502, an OS 504, a block-based media driver 506, a block-based media device 508, protected memory 510, and ticket services 512. In the example of FIG. 5, the OS 504 includes a security kernel 514, which in turn includes a key store 516 and a security API 518. It should be noted that one or more of the described components, or portions thereof, may reside in the protected memory 510, or in unprotected memory (not shown). It should further be noted that the security kernel 514 is depicted as residing inside the OS 504 by convention only. It may or may not actually be part of the OS 504, and could exist outside of an OS or on a system that does not include an OS. For the purposes of illustrative simplicity, it is assumed that the OS 504 is capable of authentication.
[0055] For illustrative simplicity, protected memory is represented as a single memory. However protected memory may include protected primary memory, protected secondary memory, and/or secret memory. It is assumed that known or convenient mechanisms are in place to ensure that memory is protected. The interplay between primary and secondary memory and/or volatile and non-volatile storage is known so a distinction between the various types of memory and storage is not drawn with reference to FIG. 5.
[0056] The ticket services 512 may be thought of as “digital license validation services” and, in a non-limiting embodiment, may include known or convenient procedures associated with license validation. For example, the ticket services 512 may include procedures for validating digital licenses, PKI validation procedures, etc. In the example of FIG. 5, the ticket services 512 can validate a ticket on the block-based media device 508. In operation, the block-based media driver 506 obtains the ticket from the block-based media device 508. The block-based media driver 506 then provides the ticket to the ticket services 512, which proceeds to validate the ticket. If the ticket is valid, the block-based media driver 506 is permitted to decrypt blocks associated with the ticket.
[0057] In an embodiment, the security kernel 514 may be loaded at start-up. In another embodiment, a portion of the security kernel may be loaded at start-up, and the remainder loaded later. An example of this technique is described in application Ser. No. 10/360,827 entitled “Secure and Backward-Compatible Processor and Secure Software Execution Thereon” filed on ______ by Srinivasan et al., which is incorporated by reference. Any known or convenient technique may be used to load the security kernel 514 in a secure manner.
[0058] The key store 516 is a set of locations for keys. The key store 516 may be thought of as an array of keys, though the data structure used to store the keys is not critical. Any applicable known or convenient structure may be used to store the keys. In a non-limiting embodiment, the key store 516 is initialized with static keys, but variable keys are not initialized (or are initialized to a value that is not secure). For example, some of the key store locations are pre-filled with trusted values (e.g., a trusted root key), with the remaining extra index slots left unused.
[0059] The security API 518 is capable of performing operations using the keys in the key store 516 without bringing the keys out into the clear (i.e., the keys do not leave the security kernel 514). The security API 518 may include services to create, populate and use keys (and potentially other security material) in the key store 516. In an embodiment, the security API 518 also provides access to internal secrets and non-volatile data, including secret keys and device private key. Depending upon the implementation, the security API 518 may support AES and SHA operations using hardware acceleration.
[0060] In an embodiment, some operations performed by the security API 518 include encryption and decryption. For example, in operation, an application may request of the security API 518 a key handle that the application can use for encryption, then request that the API 518 encrypt data using the key handle. Advantageously, the API 518 provides the key handle in the clear, but the key itself never leaves the security kernel 514.
[0061] In the example of FIG. 5, the block-based media driver 506 may be configured to perform the following security operations while reading from the block-based media device 508:
[0062] 1) Decrypt the media device 508 using a secret key, and
[0063] 2) Authenticate content on the media device 508 using authentication data on the media device 508. (Read fails if the authentication fails.)
[0064] In the example of FIG. 5, to perform these security operations, the block-based media driver 506 may make use of other secure services in the system 500, such as the ticket services 512 and the security API 518. In an embodiment, each of these modules executes in a separate execution space for system security. In order to validate data blocks, the block-based media driver 506 reads a data block header, and uses the ticket services 512 to validate the ticket using data in the header. To support the decryption of the blocks, the ticket may include an encrypted key. The ticket services 512 decrypts the key using services in the security kernel 514.
[0065] In an embodiment, the security kernel 514 uses secret common keys from the key store 518 to perform this decryption. In another embodiment, the ticket services 512 could use a device personalized ticket obtained from flash or network (not shown), validate some rights to content, and then return the key. In any case, this process returns to the block-based media driver 506 a reference to a key for use in decrypting blocks. This key reference is used by the block-based media driver 506 to make subsequent calls to the security kernel 514 to decrypt blocks associated with the key.
[0066] After decryption, the block-based media driver 506 makes calls to the security API 516 (or some other interface to a hash computation engine) to validate a hierarchical hash tree associated with the ticket. (See, e.g., FIG. 3.) The security API 516 validates the root hash against the one in the ticket. Assuming validation is successful, the content associated with the ticket is made available for use.
[0067] An example of data flow in the system 500 is provided for illustrative purposes as arrows 520-536. Receiving the block header at the block-based media driver 506 is represented by a data block header arrow 520 from the block-based media device 508 to the block-based media driver 506. Sending data from the data block header, including a ticket, to the ticket services 512 is represented by an authentication data arrow 522. The ticket may include an encrypted key. Sending a request to the security API 516 to decrypt the key is represented as a key decryption request arrow 524. Returning a reference to the decrypted key, now stored in the key store 518, is represented by a reference to key arrow 526. After a successful validation of the ticket, the ticket services will send ticket validation data to the block-based media driver 506, including a reference to a key that the driver can use to decrypt blocks. The data sent from the ticket services 512 to the block-based media driver 506 is represented as a ticket validation arrow 528. A data block access arrow 530 represents reading blocks from the block-based media device 508 by the block-based media driver 506. The data access may or may not occur concurrently with the receipt of the header (520). The accessed blocks are decrypted using the ticket validation data (528) and a block decryption request arrow 532 represents the request. A hash tree validation arrow 534 represents a subsequent validation of the content of a block.
[0068] In an alternative embodiment, values of portions of a hierarchical hash tree could be hashed for future reference. This could save some hash computation time.
[0069] FIGS. 6A and 6B depict a flowchart 600 of an example of a method for secure block-based media access. In the example of FIG. 6A, the flowchart 600 begins at module 602 where a block-based media header is read. In the example of FIG. 6A, the flowchart 600 continues to module 604 where a ticket is validated and a reference to a decryption key is obtained.
[0070] In the example of FIG. 6A, the flowchart 600 continues to decision point 606 where it is determined whether the ticket is valid. If it is determined that the ticket is not valid (606-N), the process aborts and the flowchart 600 ends. If, on the other hand, it is determined that the ticket is valid (606-Y), the flowchart 600 continues to module 608 where a hash of H3 hashes are compared with the root hash value in the ticket. The comparison may be performed, for example, by security services.
[0071] In the example of FIG. 6A, the flowchart 600 continues to decision point 610 where it is determined whether the ticket is valid. If the comparison (608) is a match, it is assumed the ticket is valid. If it is determined that the ticket is not valid (610-N), the process aborts and the flowchart 600 ends. If, on the other hand, it is determined that the ticket is valid (610-Y), the flowchart 600 continues to module 612 where an H3 hash value of the set of H3 hashes is stored; and then a read request is awaited. The H3 hash value may be stored, for example, in secure DRAM.
[0072] In the example of FIG. 6A, the flowchart 600 continues to module 614 where a reference to a key to decrypt content is obtained. The reference to the key to decrypt content may be obtained, for example, by making a call to ticket services (with header information) to obtain the reference. In the example of FIG. 6A, the flowchart 600 continues to module 616 where a hash sub-block and a data sub-block of a read request are located. In the example of FIG. 6A, the flowchart 600 continues to module 618 where the hash sub-block and the data sub-block are decrypted. In the example of FIG. 6B, the flowchart 600 continues to module 620 where a hash of the data sub-block is calculated.
[0073] In the example of FIG. 6B, the flowchart 600 continues to module 622 where the hash of the data sub-block is compared against a corresponding H0 hash value in the set of H0 hashes. (See, e.g., FIG. 3.) In the example of FIG. 6B, the flowchart 600 continues to decision point 624 where it is determined whether the comparison yields a valid result. If it is determined that the result is not valid (624-N), then the flowchart 600 aborts the read request from the block-based media device. If, on the other hand, it is determined that the result is valid (624-Y), then the flowchart 600 continues to module 626 where a hash of the set of H0 hashes, including the H0 hash value, is calculated.
[0074] In the example of FIG. 6B, the flowchart 600 continues to module 628 where the hash of the set of H0 hashes is compared against a corresponding H1 hash value in the set of H1 hashes. (See, e.g., FIG. 3.) In the example of FIG. 6B, the flowchart 600 continues to decision point 630 where it is determined whether the comparison yields a valid result. If it is determined that the result is not valid (630-N), then the flowchart 600 aborts the read request from the block-based media device. If, on the other hand, it is determined that the result is valid (630-Y), then the flowchart 600 continues to module 632 where a hash of the set of H1 hashes, including the H1 hash value, is calculated.
[0075] In the example of FIG. 6B, the flowchart 600 continues to module 634 where the hash of the set of H1 hashes is compared against a corresponding H2 hash value in the set of H2 hashes. (See, e.g., FIG. 3.) In the example of FIG. 6B, the flowchart 600 continues to decision point 636 where it is determined whether the comparison yields a valid result. If it is determined that the result is not valid (636-N), then the flowchart 600 aborts the read request from the block-based media device. If, on the other hand, it is determined that the result is valid (636-Y), then the flowchart 600 continues to module 638 where a hash of the set of H2 hashes, including the H2 hash value, is calculated.
[0076] In the example of FIG. 6B, the flowchart 600 continues to module 640 where the hash of the set of H2 hashes is compared against the corresponding stored H3 hash value (612). (See, e.g., FIG. 3.) In the example of FIG. 6B, the flowchart 600 continues to decision point 642 where it is determined whether the comparison yields a valid result. If it is determined that the result is not valid (642-N), then the flowchart 600 aborts the read request from the block-based media device. If, on the other hand, it is determined that the result is valid (642-Y), then the flowchart 600 continues to module 644 where the block read request is fulfilled.
[0077] As used herein, the term “content” is intended to broadly include any data that can be stored in memory.
[0078] As used herein, the term “embodiment” means an embodiment that serves to illustrate by way of example but not limitation.
[0079] It will be appreciated to those skilled in the art that the preceding examples and embodiments are exemplary and not limiting to the scope of the present invention. It is intended that all permutations, enhancements, equivalents, and improvements thereto that are apparent to those skilled in the art upon a reading of the specification and a study of the drawings are included within the true spirit and scope of the present invention. It is therefore intended that the following appended claims include all such modifications, permutations and equivalents as fall within the true spirit and scope of the present invention.
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H04L9/32Q2, G11B20/00P5, H04L9/32D2, G11B20/00P5G1B, G11B20/00PLegal EventsDateCodeEventDescriptionOct 24, 2006ASAssignmentOwner name: BROADON COMMUNICATIONS, INC., CALIFORNIAFree format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNORS:PRINCEN, JOHN;SRINIVASAN, PRAMILA;ANDERSON, CRAIG STEVEN;REEL/FRAME:018470/0471Effective date: 20061023Jun 18, 2010ASAssignmentOwner name: IGWARE INC.,CALIFORNIAFree format text: CHANGE OF NAME;ASSIGNOR:BROADON;REEL/FRAME:024555/0857Effective date: 20100609Owner name: IGWARE INC., CALIFORNIAFree format text: CHANGE OF NAME;ASSIGNOR:BROADON;REEL/FRAME:024555/0857Effective date: 20100609May 11, 2012ASAssignmentOwner name: ACER CLOUD TECHNOLOGY, INC., CALIFORNIAFree format text: CHANGE OF NAME;ASSIGNOR:IGWARE, INC.;REEL/FRAME:028196/0632Effective date: 20120112May 23, 2013FPAYFee paymentYear of fee payment: 4May 10, 2017FPAYFee paymentYear of fee payment: 8RotateOriginal ImageGoogle Home - Sitemap - USPTO Bulk Downloads - Privacy Policy - Terms of Service - 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