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Murphy v. Johns-Manville Products Corp. :: 1957 :: New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division - Published Opinions Decisions :: New Jersey Case Law :: New Jersey Law :: US Law :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › New Jersey Case Law › New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division - Published Opinions Decisions › 1957 › Murphy v. Johns-Manville Products Corp.
45 N.J. Super. 478 (1957)
133 A.2d 34
THOMAS MURPHY, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. JOHNS-MANVILLE PRODUCTS CORPORATION, A CORPORATION OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE, LICENSED TO DO BUSINESS IN THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.
*482 Before Judges GOLDMANN, FREUND and CONFORD.
Mr. Thomas L. Morrissey argued the cause for respondent (Messrs. Carpenter Bennett, Beggans & Morrissey, attorneys; Mr. Carl S. Kuebler, of counsel; Mr. Morrissey, on the brief).
The practice in the plant is for employees to draw materials necessary in their work from the company storeroom on requisitions. Although the storeroom is manned by a regular storekeeper on weekday nights, no one is in attendance on Sunday nights, when employees are expected under an honor system to fill out a withdrawal slip. Plaintiff went to the storeroom during his lunch hour at 3:30 A.M., Monday, August 16, and, without filling out a withdrawal slip, took three new wire brushes and put them in his locker, and also 18 sheets of emery cloth which he put in his lunch bag. He had not, as was required, requested permission *483 from any one in authority to take company property out of the plant, even though a supervisor had been present on Thursday and Friday and was readily available at the plant on this weekend. At quitting time, between 7 and 7:30 Monday morning, plaintiff wrapped the brushes in his overalls, took his lunch bag and proceeded to the company gate. He was stopped by one Pascale, chief of plant protection, who called him into the gatehouse and interrogated him. Plaintiff admitted he had taken the company property without permission an admission repeated during cross-examination. His excuse then, as now, is that he had on previous occasions taken articles for the volunteer fire company without asking permission.
Some time before 9 A.M. Monday Pascale informed the company supervisor of industrial relations, Reynolds, of what had transpired at the gatehouse that morning. Reynolds *484 told him to notify plaintiff not to come to work that evening and to report at 9 o'clock the next morning for a hearing. Pascale also informed plant engineer Merrill, head of the department where plaintiff worked, of the incident. Merrill testified that it was he who determined to discharge plaintiff, that being within his jurisdiction, after checking with the personnel department to see if the penalty was consistent with company action in other matters. He apparently did this after consulting with Reynolds, because the latter had authority to act in an advisory capacity where discharge was involved and had decided upon plaintiff's discharge after hearing from Pascale and checking plaintiff's personnel record.
In accordance with Article XV of the labor agreement, the company promptly notified plaintiff's union representatives and arranged with them for a hearing on plaintiff's discharge to be held the following day, August 17. Union president Shuleski notified plaintiff, who appeared at the hearing and participated in the discussion of his discharge. In addition to plaintiff, there were three union and five management representatives at the meeting. The original notes of the meeting reveal that plaintiff said he should have asked Pascale for permission to take the brushes and emery paper out of the plant; "There was always someone around, but in this case there wasn't [parenthetically, the record shows a supervisor was in the plant, readily reachable as plaintiff knew through the gatehouse guard] and he didn't think it was necessary to ask for permission inasmuch as the material was for his own use." He stated: "I admit I was wrong. I should have asked for the taking. I have a disability to my hand and can't get another job." Shuleski asked if the discharge could be reduced to a lesser penalty. Reyonlds replied that it could not in view of company policy, but said that the company would take the matter under consideration.
After the longhand notes had been transcribed, they were turned over to Reynolds who put the minutes of the meeting in the form in which they ultimately appeared and sent *485 five mimeographed copies to union president Shuleski and 13 copies to management personnel. The entire claim of libel in the second count of the complaint rests upon the following statement of defendant concerning plaintiff, appearing in paragraph IV of the minutes:
Very truly yours, S.J. Reynolds, Supervisor, Industrial Relations." II.
*486 The second count, based upon paragraph IV of the union-management meeting minutes of August 17, 1954, alleges by way of innuendo that defendant, by reason of the language it used therein, meant that plaintiff had committed the crime of larceny; that this charge was malicious and false; and that publication of the minutes was maliciously made as a subterfuge to justify plaintiff's discharge, the actual motive being the compensation matter.
The evidence adduced by the plaintiff now clearly contains a categorical denial that the pending compensation claim had anything to do with the severance of the plaintiff from his employment. *487 The testimony further clearly indicates, as now before the Court, that the action of severance was effected before there was any conversation relative to a compensation claim of the plaintiff."
*488 III.
We need not deal with the first of these questions. There can be no dispute with plaintiff's contention that any printed or written statement which falsely and maliciously charges another with the commission of a crime is libelous per se. 33 Am. Jur., Libel and Slander, § 11, p. 44 (1941); 53 C.J.S. Libel and Slander § 53, p. 101 (1948). This clearly includes the express charge of theft. Shaw v. Bender, 90 N.J.L. 147, 149 (E. & A. 1917); 33 Am. Jur., Libel and Slander, § 31, p. 54 (1941); 53 C.J.S., Libel and Slander, § 70, p. 115 (1948), and likewise includes an unavoidable implication that the property was stolen. Jorgensen v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 38 N.J. Super. 317, 343 (App. Div. 1955). It may be said, as defendant does, that the union-management minutes contain nothing more than what plaintiff had freely admitted in the course of the meeting, so that the statement included in paragraph IV quoted above was truthful. There is considerable merit to this, but we do not pass upon the point. Nor do we decide that the use of the word "theft" in the letter to Shuleski was not libelous because truthful. Here defendant urges that the reference to "theft" was to that word as defined in company rule 19 which we have quoted. But we may *489 observe that here, as in other contexts, the word implies "theft as common thought and common speech would now image and describe it." Van Vechten v. American Eagle Fire Ins. Co., 239 N.Y. 303, 146 N.E. 432, 38 A.L.R. 1115 (Ct. App. 1925).
In its brief defendant contends that although there is some minority view to the contrary, the general rule at common law is that the communication of allegedly libelous matter to an agent acting within the scope of his agency does not constitute a publication, citing 33 Am. Jur., Libel and Slander, § 109, p. 112 (1941); McDaniel v. Crescent Motors, Inc., 249 Ala. 330, 31 So. 2d 343, 172 A.L.R. 204 (Sup. Ct. 1947) (communication to president of plaintiff's union). There is responsible authority to the contrary. See Restatement of Torts, § 577, comment e, p. 194 (1938); Prosser, Law of Torts (2d ed. 1955), § 94, p. 597; 1 Harper and James, Law of Torts, § 5.15, p. 393 (1956). All of these authorities, however, point out that the communication *490 may be privileged, depending upon the circumstances. The determination as to whether the communication has been published is not a matter of idle import, even if it be found that the communication was qualifiedly privileged, since a qualified privilege must be exercised in good faith. On the other hand, if there is no publication, the matter of good faith is, of course, not even reached. Were it necessary to decide whether there was publication of the letter, we would follow the rule of the Restatement and of the other authorities mentioned, for the capacity of a libelous statement to subject the reputation of the person defamed to injury is not eliminated, though it may be neutralized, by the circumstance that the publication was to his agent.
As to qualified privilege, the evidence overwhelmingly establishes the justification for the ruling of the trial court that there was no genuine factual issue. It is, of course, settled that in the absence of any material dispute as to facts, the question of whether the factual situation raises a case of qualified privilege is a matter of law for the courts. Prosser, Law of Torts (2d ed. 1955), § 95, p. 629.
We deal first with the distribution of the union-management minutes. Plaintiff for the first time at the oral argument took the position that he was in no way chargeable with what happened at the meeting of August 17 or with any of the consequences of that meeting, because he did not ask for it. There is no merit in the contention. Plaintiff was a union member and bound by the provisions of the existing labor agreement involving situations like his. Article XI of the agreement deals with complaints and grievances and provides that in the adjustment of such matters the union shall be represented by a shop committee of five member *491 employees. Article XV, quoted above, deals with company rules and provides that refusal or failure to comply with such rules may be cause for immediate discharge, but any discharged employee "shall have the right of immediate appeal to management through Article XI, Step 3," the hearing to be held within two working days. True, it does not appear that there was a formal appeal by plaintiff from his discharge, or that he was clearly notified he was discharged until he appeared at the meeting. But the union president notified him to appear at that meeting, he did appear (as did the union shop committee), and the record is clear that he took advantage of the opportunity to speak in his own justification. He and the union committee therefore regarded the meeting as being to all intents and purposes an occasion for him to make such representations to management as might dissuade the company from discharging him. Thus, by ratification by both sides to the controversy, the parties themselves constituted this meeting as an occasion for hearing the subject matter of the complaint against plaintiff, with a view toward reconsideration and final determination of the matter by the company thereafter. Plaintiff may not now contend that the meeting and its sequel were not, procedurally, with his concurrence.
Defendant's industrial relations manager, Naylor, who prescribed the dissemination of the minutes, testified that it was a practice of many years' standing to send five copies of grievance meeting minutes to the union, and this was done to accommodate the labor agreement provision that the union have a five-man committee on grievances. He also testified in some detail as to why 13 copies were distributed to various representatives of management. In the considered opinion of management, each of the persons who received a copy needed to have this information either because his job required that he keep abreast of the handling of labor relations problems such as the one involving plaintiff or, if he participated in the meeting, in order that he might have a record of what transpired. Naylor summarized his testimony by stating that this distribution was prescribed in *492 order to have uniform procedures and policies throughout the company in the administration of the labor agreement.
It is the common law and the law of this State that "a communication, made bona fide, upon any subject matter in which the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty, is privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, although it contain criminatory matter which, without this privilege, would be actionable." Rothholz v. Dunkle, 53 N.J.L. 438, 440 (E. & A. 1891), quoting from King v. Patterson, 49 N.J.L. 417 (E. & A. 1887). The court in Finkelstein v. Geismar, 91 N.J.L. 46, 48 (Sup. Ct. 1917), affirmed 92 N.J.L. 251 (E. & A. 1918), put the rule this way:
The application of the rule of qualified privilege has been analyzed in a number of decisions by our courts, among them Butterworth v. Todd, 76 N.J.L. 317 (Sup. Ct. 1908); Ramsdell v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 79 N.J.L. 379 (Sup. Ct. 1910); and, most recently, Jorgensen v. Pennsylvania R. Co., above, 38 N.J. Super. 317, 343 ff. (App. Div. 1955). See, also, Prosser, Law of Torts (2d ed. 1955), § 95, p. 614 ff.; 33 Am. Jur., Libel and Slander, §§ 126, 171, pp. 124, 166 (1941); 53 C.J.S. Libel and Slander §§ 89 et seq., 107, pp. 143 et seq., 184 (1948). As to statements to labor union representatives, see Annotation, 172 A.L.R. 208, 220; and Jorgensen v. Pennsylvania R. Co., above, 38 N.J. Super., at page 343 et seq., a case very similar to this one.
Plaintiff claims that the qualified privilege was abused; it cannot extend to disclosure to all of the 18 persons who received copies of the minutes. However, once the existence of the privilege is established, the burden is on plaintiff to prove it has been abused by excessive publication, *493 either by use of the occasion for an improper purpose, or by lack of belief or grounds for belief in the truth of what was said. Prosser on Torts (2d ed. 1955), § 95, p. 629. There was no proof forthcoming to show that the publication, which was entirely within the defendant corporation and the union group, exceeded the bounds of its qualified privilege. It is entirely clear to us that all of the people to whom copies of the minutes were sent had a sufficient interest in the matter, from the standpoint of the company and union-management relations, as to make the communication not only qualifiedly privileged, but its distribution well within reason, as a matter of law.
"Having in mind the statutory background and the collective bargaining agreement produced thereby, we have no hesitancy in holding that a qualified privilege existed in the case at bar. When Jorgensen and his attorney demanded the trial, the company was under an obligation to grant it. And when the notices of the hearing and *494 the result thereof were issued, the statement of the charge to be tried was entitled to the benefit of the privilege." (38 N.J. Super., at page 344)
It has been said that express malice, in a setting like the one here at hand, means "some motive, actuating the defendant, different from that which prima facie rendered *495 the communication privileged, and being a motive contrary to good morals," and that plaintiff has the burden of proving such express malice. Fahr v. Hayes, 50 N.J.L. 275, 279 (Sup. Ct. 1888). Prosser points out (op. cit., § 95, pp. 627-8) that "malice" in the law of defamation "means something more than the fictitious `legal malice' which is `implied' as a disguise for strict liability in any case of unprivileged defamation." Even if a defendant feels indignation and resentment toward a plaintiff, he will not always forfeit his qualified privilege, citing, among other authorities, the Fahr case. See also, Evans, "Legal Immunity for Defamation," 24 Minn. L. Rev. 607, 610 (1940). The statement which best fits the decided cases is that the court will look to the primary motive or purpose by which the defendant apparently was inspired. Prosser would discard "malice" as a "meaningless and quite unsatisfactory term"; the privilege is lost if the publication "is not made primarily for the purpose of furthering the interest which is entitled to protection." Accord: Restatement, Torts, § 603 (1938).
We will not indulge plaintiff his fancy that defendant was so irritated at his rejection of the compensation settlement that it was moved to discharge him on the slightest pretext. On the record before us, such inference could be based upon nothing more than suspicion. As the trial court put it, the jury could find express malice only if it resorted to speculation. There is not an iota of specific testimony which would directly justify the inference plaintiff seeks to have the court draw from the phone call made by Reynolds to Stanton a call which was quite satisfactorily explained and entirely natural in the circumstances. The plaintiff himself as the trial judge noted adduced evidence containing a clear and categorical denial that the pending compensation claim had anything to do with his discharge.
Where the case is clearly or admittedly one of qualified privilege, and there is no evidence, or not more than a scintilla of evidence, of malice, it is the duty of the trial judge to withdraw that issue from the consideration *496 of the jury. Prosser on Torts (2d ed. 1955), § 95, p. 629; Odgers on Libel and Slander (5th ed. 1911), pp. 688, 691; Seelman, Law of Libel and Slander (1941), p. 272; 33 Am. Jur., Libel and Slander, § 272, p. 255 (1941). Accord, Domchick v. Greenbelt Consumer Services, Inc., 200 Md. 36, 87 A.2d 831 (Ct. App. 1952); Charles Parker Co. v. Silver City Crystal Co., 142 Conn. 605, 116 A.2d 440 (Sup. Ct. Err. 1955). The evidence upon which plaintiff relies to establish express malice constitutes no more than a scintilla, if that, so that the trial judge was entirely right in concluding that a jury issue was not present.