Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/88157/lynch-vs-murphy
Timestamp: 2017-07-25 08:41:08
Document Index: 570879159

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 787', '§ 440', '§ 124', '§ 162', '§ 1020', '§ 162']

Lynch Vs Murphy - Citation 88157 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Save as PDF Add a Tag Add a Note Semantics Visualize Lynch Vs. Murphy - Court Judgment	LegalCrystal Citationlegalcrystal.com/88157CourtUS Supreme CourtDecided OnMar-02-1896Case Number161 U.S. 247AppellantLynchRespondentMurphyExcerpt:.....of counsel for appellant, the matter is thus stated:
having concluded that the deed of trust was inoperative as a legal instrument, we recur to the question whether or not its spreading upon the land records of the district constituted constructive notice. as said by pomeroy..... Judgment:
Lynch v. Murphy - 161 U.S. 247 (1896)
, affirmed to the point that the duty of determining unsettled questions respecting title to real estate is local in its nature, to be discharged in such mode as may be provided by the state in which the land is situated when such mode does not conflict with some special prohibition of the Constitution or is not against natural justice.
Applying that doctrine to this case, it is held that the decree in the equity cause of
Pippert v. English
was not void for want of personal service on English and his wife, as the laws relating to the District of Columbia permit service by publication upon absent defendants.
The complainant below was Christeina Murphy, who sued
Relief was sought as to the Bean deed of trust upon the ground that it was executed on behalf of Mrs. English by her husband, who had no proper or competent authority in law to execute the same, and it was urged at the trial, among other objections, that the power of attorney under which English assumed to execute the deed of trust was defective, and was not entitled to record, because of the absence therefrom of a certificate of the official character of the officer before whom, in Michigan, Mrs. English acknowledged the instrument. It was further urged in the bill as ground of relief that the notes to Lynch were made without consideration
We will premise that the decree in the equity cause of
Pippert v. English et al.
was not void because English and his wife were not personally served with process. Constructive service by publication was authorized by § 787 of the Revised Statutes, relating to the District of Columbia.
, relied upon as supporting the proposition that the rights of Mr. and Mrs. English in the land could not be affected by such constructive notice, and that the decree rendered thereon was not entitled to recognition in a federal court, does not support the contention. The
case was explained in
which last case it was held that the duty of determining unsettled questions respecting the title to real estate was local in its nature, to be discharged in such mode as might be provided by the state in which the land was situated, where such mode did not conflict with some special inhibition of the Constitution, and was not against natural justice, and we held (pp.
-328) that nothing inconsistent with this doctrine was decided in
Hart v. Sansom.
"The doctrine as to the registration of deeds being constructive notice as to all subsequent purchasers is not to be understood of all deeds and conveyances which may be
registered, but of such only as are authorized and required by law to be registered, and are duly registered in compliance with law. If they are not authorized or required to be registered, or the registry itself is not in compliance with the law, the act of registration is treated as a mere nullity, and then the subsequent purchaser is affected only by such actual notice as would amount to a fraud."
It follows that the recording of the instrument under consideration
was a mere nullity in a jurisdiction such as the District of Columbia (Rev.Stat. Dist.Col. § 440), where particular formalities are required to authorize the recording. To the cases referred to by the authors first cited may be added
Dohm v. Haskin,
88 Mich. 144, and
Musgrove v. Bouser,
5 Or. 313, 315, 316, the defect in the recorded instrument in both cases being the absence of a certificate as to the official character of the officer before whom a deed was acknowledged.
3 Washburn Real Prop. *592; Wade, Notice, §§ 124-126.
The effect of the decree in Pippert's suit annulling his conveyance to Schwartz and English was that Pippert, as the consideration of such cancellation, surrendered the benefit of his vendor's lien and the security of the deed of trust. When this result was accomplished, the unpaid purchase money amounted to $10,390.42, and was in fact but $500 less than the entire consideration for the sale, and practically represented the full value of the property. By the reconveyance to him under the decree, Pippert stood in the position of a
purchaser of the property for value, and, as we have found he did not have actual or constructive notice of the real or supposed equity of Mrs. Lynch, there would seem to be no ground upon which to base the claim that, at the time of the institution of this suit, Mrs. Lynch had an equitable mortgage or lien upon the property. Let us assume, for the sake of the argument, that, as claimed by counsel for the appellant, Alexander English should be regarded in equity as having been the real owner of the property at the time of the transaction with Lynch, though the legal title was in his wife; that Lynch paid to English full consideration for the cash paid and notes delivered by English, and that Lynch accepted the notes on the faith of the security of the property in question. As against English, it is clear under the authorities that from the nature of the transaction, upon the hypothesis we have stated, a lien would have arisen in equity against English's interest in the land. Jones on Mortgages §§ 162, 163, 166, 168, 169; Story, Eq.Jur. §§ 1020, 1231;
Peckham v. Haddock,
36 Ill. 38;
McClurg v. Phillips,
49 Mo. 315;
29 N.J.Eq. 222, 224. But a
purchaser for value of property subject to an equitable mortgage, without notice of such mortgage, takes the property free of the equitable mortgage. Jones on Mortgages § 162, citing
Watkins v. Reynolds,
123 N.Y. 211.
Watkins v. Reynolds
was a case where a
for life executed a mortgage in fee on the trust estate, and after her death, the remainderman in fee executed, under seal, an unattested paper covenanting, for sufficient consideration, that the mortgage should continue to be a lien on the land. Afterwards he sold and conveyed to another, who paid a sum in cash, and contracted to assume certain mortgages and pay certain debts of the vendor to third persons, equal in amount to the remainder of the purchase price. The cash payment and part of these debts were made before the purchaser had actual notice of the agreement to continue the mortgage lien. Upon this state of fact, the court, speaking through Peckham, J., held that since the purchaser's agreements were made before notice, and remained in full force after notice, there was no equitable lien against the property in favor of the mortgagee for the purchase money unpaid at the time of such notice.
Pippert instituted and prosecuted his suit for cancellation of his conveyance against all persons known to him as claiming an interest in or encumbrance on the property. He did what the law required in order to make his judgment binding upon all the world, and, when the court divested Mrs. English of all her interest in the property, appellant's alleged rights, acquired through her, not having been legally recorded before judgment, were divested by the decree as effectually as if