Source: http://www2.austlii.edu.au/privacy/secure/Guides/allprivacy/allprivacy-4.html
Timestamp: 2017-12-15 08:16:13
Document Index: 339410919

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art. 17', 'EWCA ', 'EWCA ', 'EWCA ', 'EWCA ', 'EWCA ', 'EWCA ', 'EWCA ', 'EWCA ']

Privacy & Surveillance - 4. General law protection of privacy (including constitutional protection)
4. General law protection of privacy (including constitutional protection)
4.1. Privacy protection outside data protection laws
4.1.1. General resources
4.2. Constitutional protections of privacy, including Bills of Rights
4.2.4. Australia - Lack of constitutional protection of privacy
4.2.5. Restrictive interpretation of statutes to protect fundamental rights
4.2.1. Hong Kong - Basic Law and Bill of Rights implement ICCPR
BORO - Bill of Rights A14 and ICCPR A17(1)
Other privacy protections in the Basic Law
4.2.2. United Kingdom - Human Rights Act 1988 implements ECHR
4.2.3. New Zealand - Bill of Rights
Canada - Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982
4.3. A separate tort of invasion of privacy?
4.3.3. United Kingdom]
4.3.5. New Zealand
4.4. Breach of confidence re personal information
4.4.1. Relation ships involving obligations of confidence
4.4.2. 'Improperly obtained information'
4.4.3. Governments and obligations of confidence
Obligations of confidence on government agencies arising under administrative law
Australian Privacy Act 1988 Pt VIII - Breaches of confidence by Federal government
Sexual relationships as relationships of confidence
4.4.5. Breach of confidence compared with IPPs
4.5. Defamatory disclosure of personal information
4.5.1. Defamation and IPPs
4.6. Negligent disclosure of personal information
4.6.1. Negligence and the subject of information
4.7. Other tortious protection of privacy interests
4.7.1. Trespass
4.7.2. Intentional infliction of emotional distress?
4.7.3. Trespass to the person (battery and assault)
4.7.4. Private nuisance
4.7.6. Malicious falsehood
4.8. Other forms of protection
4.8.1. Breach of contract, and inducement to breach of contract
4.8.2. Breach of statutory duty
4.9. Administrative law
4.10. The special position of the USA
4.10.1. The limited privacy protection under US constitutional law
4.10.2. The First Amendment as a barrier to privacy protection
4.10.3. Consequences of the USA's weak privacy laws for the ROW
Graham Greenleaf, last revised 19 March 2003
Why are special privacy laws needed, and in particular the sets of `information privacy principles' found in most privacy laws? This Part gives a summary of how the general law (common law, equity and general principles of administrative law) protects privacy. In part, this is for the purpose of showing that the general law (at least in common law jurisdictions) does not provide sufficient protection for privacy, but gives only sporadic and incidental protection to privacy interests.
It is equally true that general law protections must not be ignored as they often provide stronger protection than IPPs (including in relation to remedies), and may sometimes be able to be relied in situations where the other party is exempt from an obligation to comply with statutory IPPs.
Here, each type of general law remedy is summarised. When we deal with each of the Information Privacy Principles, the analogous protections found in the general law will be examined again, in comparison with the relevant IPP.
The special position of the USA is discussed at the end of this Reading Guide.
The various sources of privacy protection outside data protection laws (usually non-statutory but not always) requiring consideration are:
Constitutional rights of privacy, developed through court decisions;
Statutory Bills of Rights (sometimes implementing international conventions),
Implementation of international privacy obligations through the Courts;
General privacy torts;
Protections of privacy arising incidentally from other remedies (tortious, equitable or administrative law).
M Berthold & R Wacks Data Privacy Law in Hong Kong (Sweet and Maxwell, 1997) (hereinafter 'Berthold & Wacks') Chapter 1 'Data privacy and the common law' - a very readable summary
Hong Kong Law Reform Commission Consultation Paper Civil Liability for Invasion of Privacy (1999); unofficial HTML version - a recent and comprehensive study
R Wacks Privacy and Press Freedom (Blackstone Press, 1995) Chapter 3 'Privacy and the Common Law'
Australia has neither any developed implied constitutional right of privacy (contrast the USA) nor a statutory 'Bill of Rights' privacy right as in NZ, HK or the UK
The effect on Australian domestic law of international agreements protecting privacy, particularly A17 of the International Covernant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), is dealt with in a following Reading Guide. However, it has relatively little effect on domestic law.
The following comparisons with other jurisdictions show how unusual is Australia's position in its lack of constitional / Bill of Rights privacy protection.
Courts in all common law jurisdictions may protect privacy by restrictive interpretation of statutes to protect 'fundamental' rights, which may be thought of as (unwritten) constitutional rights - at least in Australia.
Coco v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 427 involved privacy issues relating to listening devices and the interpretation of the Invasion of Privacy Act 1971 (Qld).
P Gunning Casenote: Coco v The Queen [1994] PLPR 34; (1994) 1 PLPR 51 summarises that the High Court held that 'the courts should not impute to the legislature an intention to interfere with fundamental rights. Such an intention must be clearly manifested by unmistakable and unambiguous language. General words will rarely be sufficient for that purpose if they do not specifically deal with the question.'
When will the Courts take a restrictive interpretation of statutory provisions in order to protect privacy? Gunning observes:
'In order to determine whether the protection of privacy is enhanced by this approach, it is necessary to identify those aspects of privacy which the courts will regard as ''basic immunities which are the foundation of our freedom'. As Coco (and Plenty v Dillon before it) made clear, the courts have long recognised territorial privacy as an essential element of common law ownership of land. Physical or bodily privacy is also jealously protected by the common law (see P v P , Unreported, High Court of Australia, 20 April 1994, per Brennan J (dissenting)). Information privacy is more problematic.' 'Reputation is an interest which the courts have recognised in a variety of circumstances, such as in the granting of suppression orders or injunctions to prevent the publication of defamatory or confidential information. In these cases the courts must also place weight upon competing public interests, such as freedom of expression and the principle of open justice. In the absence of concrete factual circumstances, it is virtually impossible to speculate as to the importance to be placed upon an individual's interest in controlling the collection and dissemination of personal information.'
Difficult though it may be to know when it will apply, Coco indicates that carelessly worded statutory interferences with privacy can easily face difficulties before the Courts. Despite the absence of constitutional privacy rights, the Courts are able to provide some protection for privacy against government.
* <IMG ALIGN=MIDDLE SRC="http://www2.austlii.edu.au/itlaw/required.gif"> http://www.hklii.org/hk/legis/ord/hkboro282/s8.html Article 14 Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance - implementing ICCPR Art. 17, which provides 'No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence ...'
Section 7 'provides that the Ordinance binds only (a) the Government and all public authorities, and (b) any person acting on behalf of the Government or a public authority. The Bill of Rights therefore has no direct effect on inter-citizen relationship.' (HKLRC 1999) - BORO therefore has no 'horizontal effect'
'Nonetheless, since section 6 of the Ordinance provides that a court in an action for breach of the Ordinance "may grant such remedy or relief, or make such order, in respect of such a breach, violation or threatened violation as it has power to grant or make in those proceedings", it is arguable that an individual has a cause of action for breach of the right to privacy' against government authorities or public bodies.' (HKLRC 1999)
Article 28 Basic Law of the Hong Kong SAR: 'The freedom of the person of Hong Kong residents shall be inviolable. No Hong Kong resident shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful arrest, detention or imprisonment. Arbitrary or unlawful search of the body of any resident or deprivation or restriction of the freedom of the person shall be prohibited. Torture of any resident or arbitrary or unlawful deprivation of the life of any resident shall be prohibited.'
Article 29 Basic Law of the Hong Kong SAR: : ' The homes and other premises of Hong Kong residents shall be inviolable. Arbitrary or unlawful search of, or intrusion into, a resident's home or other premises shall be prohibited.'
The HKLRC 1999 comments that A28 and A29 together are similar to the 4th Amendment to the US Constitution. See later Reading Guide for further discussion of the application of these provisions to electronic surveillance.
see HKLRC 1999 [1.4]-[1.8] for discussion of these three provisions.
UK law includes both law arising under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (A8 of which is almost the same as ICCPR A17(1) - see the topic on International Laws Protecting Privacy), and the UK's own Human Rights Act 1988.
Although it does not contain a right of privacy as such, s21 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 provides that everyone ''has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure, whether of the person, property, or correspondence or otherwise'. Section 21 therefore has many similarities to A28 and A29 of the HK Basic Law.
McBride comment that:
'Unlike the US Bill of Rights and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982, the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 is not ''supreme law'. It operates as an ordinary statute.'
T McBride and R Tobin Privacy in New Zealand case law (1994) 1 PLPR 48 expresses early optimism about the role of the Bill of Rights Act to protect privacy, but T McBride in 'Recent New Zealand case law on privacy: Part I -- the Privacy Act and the Bill of Rights Act' (2000) 6 PLPR 106 - New Zealand Bill Of Rights Act 1990 s 21 - reports on the retreat of the Courts from using s21 to protect privacy, and in particular the failure of all recent attempts to exclude evidence on the basis of s21.
Courts in common law countries (with the exception of the USA) have in most jurisdictions not developed a general tort of privacy protection.
What do we mean by 'a general tort of privacy protection'? It means something more than an extension of an existing remedy based on protection of an interest other than privacy but incidentally giving more protection to privacy. At the least it means the development toward one the four US privacy torts (below), or toward a tort broader than one of the US torts.
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis by their article "The Right to Privacy" Harvard Law Review Vol. IV December 15, 1890 No. 5 are credited with starting American jurisprudence concerning a common law right of privacy, by arguing that the common law already implied a right of privacy.
US law has since developed four 'privacy torts' (subsequently identified by Prosser from the case law that emerged after the Warren and Brandeis article):
(a) Intrusion upon the plaintiff's solitude or seclusion;
(b) Public disclosure of private facts about the plaintiff;
(c) Appropriation of the plaintiff's name or likeness;
(d) Placing the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye.
These can conveniently be called the US 'intrusion', 'public disclosure of private facts', 'appropriation' and 'false light' torts. This has generated a very large body of case law, but it is (at least as yet) of limited relevance to other common law countries.
HKLRC 1999 Tort law privacy rights - a summary of the four US torts
R Wacks Chapter 2, Part I 'The American Law' in Personal Information: Privacy and the Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1993, for a critical summary. Wacks considers that the 3rd and 4th US torts have little to do with privacy, or at least with personal information. In the other two torts ('intrusion' and 'public disclosure of private facts', the Courts have used the test of whether 'the intrusion or disclosure is offensive and objectionable to a reasonable man of ordinary sensibilities'. Professor Wacks views seem to be shared by the Hong Kong Law Reform Commission (see below), of whose Privacy Subcommittee he was a member while living in Hong Kong.
HKLRC 1999 Chapter 4 - Protection of privacy at common law commences with the comment that 'The common law does not recognise a general right to privacy.' and concludes 'Since the courts do not recognise a right of privacy, the interest in privacy has been protected only if another interest of an individual which is recognised by the courts has also been violated.'
HKLRC Consultation Paper Civil Liability for Invasion of Privacy (1999); The Law Reform Commission made 28 recommendations, including the following key recommendations:
Recommendation 1 - We recommend that any person who intentionally or recklessly intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or into his private affairs or concerns, should be liable for a statutory tort of invasion of privacy, provided that the intrusion is seriously offensive and objectionable to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities. (Chapter 7)
Recommendation 3 We recommend that any person who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another should be liable for a statutory tort of invasion of privacy provided that the disclosure in extent and content is of a kind that would be seriously offensive and objectionable to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities and he knows or ought to know that such disclosure is seriously offensive and objectionable to such a person. (Chapter 8)
Recommendation 4 - We recommend that for the purposes of the statutory tort of invasion of privacy based on public disclosure of private facts recommended above, matters concerning the private life of another should include information about an individual's private communications, home life, personal or family relationships, private behaviour, health or personal financial affairs. (Chapter 8)
Discussion question: What is the relationship between the proposed HK statutory torts and the US privacy torts?
There have been a number of major UK decisions where questions of breach of confidence did not arise, and consequently the question of a 'privacy tort' was not merely a question of extending the law of breach of confidence.
Kaye v Robertson [1991] FSR 62 (see HKLRC 1999 discussion) is generally cited as authority that in English law there is no general tortious right to privacy; An actor suffered severe injuries to his brain and was hospitalised in a private room which had a notice asking visitors to see a member of the staff before visiting. The defendant journalists ignored the notice and entered the room. Any consent by P to be photographed or interviewed was held not to be informed consent. Glidewell LJ held that in English law there was no right to privacy, other torts having failed to provide the required relief.
Home Office v Mary Jane Wainwright & Anor [2001] EWCA Civ 2081 - In this case, decided in December 2001, the Court of Appeal followed Kaye v Robertson and Khorasandjian v Bush to find that there is in English law no tort of invasion of privacy. Buxton LJ pointed out that the importance of the case lies in that recovery (in the lower Court) 'has been achieved simply for a breach of the right to privacy' and the case did not involve any possible breach of confidence. Leave to appeal to the House of Lords has now been granted. Read at least the facts as stated by Wolff LCJ at [1]-[15] and Buxton LJ at [69]-[97]; The decision is important in a number of areas relating to privacy torts:
The Human Rights Act 1998 had no effect in this case (Wolff LCJ) (this aspect is on appeal to the House of Lords concerning the 'horizontal effect');
Trespass will not be extended to this type of case (Buxton LJ) - see later;
Wilkinson v Downton will not be extended to emotional distress - see later;
An 'intrusion' privacy tort is rejected on the authority of Kaye v Robertson and Khorasandjian.
A v B & C [2002] EWCA Civ 337 - CA suggests 'Guidelines' for judges to follow in cases concerning publication and privacy; attempts to limit consideration of a privacy tort on the grounds that in most `if not all' situations where privacy protection is justified, it will be protected by breach of confidence (at least since the Human Rights Act 1998, which expands UK confidence law); The `vexed question' of a separate privacy tort may then be ignored. So, does not rule out a separate privacy tort, just attempts to stop arguments about it being introduced into breach of confidence cases.
Other UK cases have dealt with the question of extending the law of breach of confidence to cover protection of privacy, and in those cases the UK courts have been far more willing to act. They are discussed later in relation to breach of confidence.
In Australia there is no recognition as yet of a general tort of protection of privacy, but the question has been re-opened by the recent Lenah v ABC decision of the High Court.
Victoria Park Racing and Recreation Grounds v Taylor (1937) 58 CLR 479 was very often regarded as confirming that there is no general `right of privacy' recognised in Australian common law. Latham C.J., considering the law of torts as it then stood, said that no "general right of privacy exists".
Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd [2001] HCA 63 (15 November 2001) - Decided shortly before Wainwright, this case gave the High Court an opportunity to reconsider Victoria Park.
Like Wainwright, Lenah is a case where there was no breach of confidence issue, in this case because Lenah conceded that information about the nature of the processing was not confidential and not imparted in confidence.
However, the Court declined to consider whether their might be a tort of invasion of privacy despite Victoria Park, in part because (even if there was such a tort) it would not apply to a corporation (Callinan J dissenting; Gleeson CJ not deciding). Discussing Victoria Park, Gummow and Hayne JJ (with whom Gaudron J agreed) said:
108.In the course of his judgment, Latham CJ rejected the proposition that under the head of nuisance the law recognised a right of privacy[111]. But the decision does not stand for any proposition respecting the existence or otherwise of a tort identified as unjustified invasion of privacy. ..
Kirby J explicitly refrained from dealing with the question until a more appropriate case arose (at [191]). Callinan J is of the opinion that 'the time is ripe for consideration whether a tort of invasion of privacy should be recognised in this country, or whether the legislatures should be left to determine whether provisions for a remedy for it should be made' (at [335]). Gleeson CJ referred to 'the lack of precision of the concept of privacy is a reason for caution in declaring a new tort of the kind for which the respondent contends' (at [41]) but did not consider the matter beyond argument.
It is reasonable to conclude that in Lenah the Australian High Court has left open the possibility (without endorsing it in any significant way) that subsequent Courts, faced with a more appropriate case, might develop a general tort of invasion of privacy. Victoria Park is no longer of any significant authority in relation to privacy.
Commentary on Lenah:
David Lindsay Protection of Privacy under the General Law Following ABC v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd: Where to Now? (2002) Privacy Law & Policy Reporter (forthcoming). Lindsay concludes:
"Taking these considerations into account, it is suggested that the relatively ad hoc, somewhat chaotic, reasoning of the High Court in the Lenah decision is an example of what can happen in a legal system that refuses to take individual rights seriously and that, as a result, has an inadequate legal framework for recognising and protecting individual rights. While judicial recognition of an Australian tort of privacy would improve the position of individuals under the general law, then, an adequate legal regime must await the extra-judicial development of a bill of rights. As this seems unlikely, it would seem that protection of rights and freedoms under Australian law is destined to be influenced indirectly by developments elsewhere. By this, I am referring mainly to European human rights jurisprudence, via it effect on substantive principles of English law, including confidentiality law. In this sense, the relatively unsatisfactory reasoning evident in the judgments in Lenah is symptomatic of fundamental weaknesses in the structure of Australian law, just as much as it is a reflection of fundamental differences of opinion among the members of the current High Court."
Patrick Gunning Casenote on ABC v Lenah (for publication in PLPR); summarises the complex relationships between the individual judgments.
Discussion question: In what directions might the Australian common law develop in relation to privacy?
There have been periodic attempts to introduce a general statutory tort of invasion of privacy in Australia (see HKLRC 1999 summary), but they have not proceeded and have usually been rejected on the grounds that its scope and effect would be too uncertain, particularly in relation to the press. The conclusion reached by bodies such as the Australian Law Reform Commission in its Report Privacy (ALRC, 1983) is that legislation embodying a specific set of information privacy principles (and other legislation dealing with other specific aspects of privacy) is preferable. The ALRC Report was a major factor leading to the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) and its 11 Information Privacy Principles. (The ALRC in 1979 also recommended a statutory tort of disclosure of private facts , but this would have covered only one corner of privacy issues. The proposed tort was not proceeded with by government).
In contrast, the common law in New Zealand has gone some way toward the development of a tort of invasion of privacy. See T McBride and R Tobin Privacy in New Zealand case law (1994) 1 PLPR 48, and in particular note the following cases:
Tucker v News Media Ownership Ltd [1986] 2 NZLR 716 - injunction to restrain media publication of facts previously in public knowledge
Bradley v Wingnut Films [1993] 1 NZLR 415
In 'Evolution of New Zealand privacy law' (in 'Recent New Zealand case law on privacy: Part I -- the Privacy Act and the Bill of Rights Act' (2000) 6 PLPR 106 ), McBride summarises the current position of the privacy tort in New Zealand as follows:
'The decisions are discussed in the specialist commentaries (see The Law of Torts in New Zealand 2nd edition, 1997, (S Todd, General Editor), Ch 17, `Privacy' by Professor John Burrows, pp 964-968; Burrows and Cheer, Media Law in New Zealand 4th edition, 1999 pp 173-178). After analysing the decision of Gallen J in Bradley v Wingnut Films Ltd, Professor Burrows, the leading New Zealand academic commentator in this area, identifies the elements of the tort of privacy under New Zealand law as follows.
There must be a `public disclosure' of private facts.
The facts disclosed must be `private' facts.
`The matter made public must be one which would be highly offensive and objectionable to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities.'
The High Court has held that common law privacy remedies may still be available, despite the enactment of the Privacy Act: Hobson v Harding (1995) 1 HRNZ 342 (Thorp J).'
This is a very large topic, and only a couple of main issues can be summarised here.
See the following sources for more detailed discussion:
HKLRC 1999 Breach of confidence
Berthold and Wacks (1997) pgs 30-49
Information is not regarded in law as capable of being property per se (Oxford v Moss - stolen examination papers were not 'property' for the purposes of the law of larceny). The law of breach of confidence, where it applies, is one of the few situations where (arguably) the common law recognises a propery right in informationl.
The main limitation on using the action for breach of confidence is that the relationship under which the information was obtained must also be recognised as one to which confidentiality attaches, and this is (surprisingly) still uncertain for most modern commercial and professional relationships beyond a few well known relationships such as banker/customer and doctor/patient.The limitations of the action of breach of confidence to protect privacy were shown in Fraser v Evans [1969] 1 QB 349, where it was held that the plaintiff in a breach of confidence action must be the discloser of the information. A duty of confidence is only owed to that person. This implies that it is insufficient to be the subject of the information . This is the same problem as in the negligent advice tort (prior to Spring) except that in negligence it is only the recipient who can sue, but in breach of confidence cases it is only the original discloser who can sue. Fraser v Evans is not quite as limiting as it might seem, because the subject of the information may have originally disclosed the information to A in confidence, who has then disclosed it to B. B will owe obligations to the subject of the information, as the original discloser.
One of the most controversial and important issues concerning breach of confidence as a privacy protection is the extent to which various types of 'improperly obtained information' are subject to obligations of confidence. Another way of putting this is whether 'non-consensual' disclosures (or moor e accurately 'obtaining of information') may attract obligations of confidence. Cases on this issue have been interpreted as suggesting 'that the action is not predicated upon a prior relationship between the parties but is based on the principle of unconscionability' (Berthold and Wacks (1977) p35).
Berthold and Wacks (1997) pgs 35-41
HKLRC 1999 Annex - Breach of confidence (a separate Discussion Paper has not been issued);
See the discussion in these sources of:
Franklin v Giddens [1978] 1 Qd R 72 - theft of budwood from orchard
Francome v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd [1984] 1 WLR 892 (contra Malone v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (No 2) [1979] 2 All ER 620)
Kaye v Robertson [1991] FSR 62 - Press took photographs in hospital room despite signs they were not to enter without permission. Breach of confidence not pleaded.
Koo and Chiu v Lam [1993] HKCA 209 (Hong Kong Court of Appeal) - Rival research team had copy of other team's questionnaire, but source of obtaining it was uncertain. Penlington JA said there was 'surreptitious' obtaining of the questionnaire but no theft. Held there was a duty of confidence here.
Recent cases take this issue further:
Hellewell v Chief Constable of Derbyshire [1995] 1 WLR 804: Laws J said "I entertain no doubt that disclosure of a photograph may, in some circumstances, be actionable as a breach of confidence... If someone with a telephoto lens were to take from a distance and with no authority a picture of another engaged in some private act, his subsequent disclosure of the photograph would, in my judgment, as surely amount to a breach of confidence as if he had found or stolen a letter or diary in which the act was recounted and proceeded to publish it. In such a case the law would protect what might reasonably be called a right of privacy, although the name accorded to the cause of action would be breach of confidence." (See Douglas v Hello at [117])
Les Editions Vice-Versa Inc v Aubry [1998] 1 SCR 591 ( Supreme Court of Canada ) Damages awarded for publication of photos of a person in a public place taken and published without their consent. (Quebec law may be very different, however, due to their Bill of Rights - see comments by Brooke LJ in Douglas v Hello!)
Douglas v Hello! [2000] EWCA Civ 353; [2001] 2 All ER 289; Wedding of actors filmed in secret by persons unknown despite clear notice to all attending wedding that filming was not allowed; An injunction against publication was refused on the balance of convenience, particularly as they had already surrendered most of their privacy for commercial gain..
Brooke LJ found a strongly arguable case on confidentiality grounds, but not (in the event of a photographer unaware of the warnings) on `breach of privacy' grounds (like Kaye v Robertson)
Sedley LJ said "126. What a concept of privacy does, however, is accord recognition to the fact that the law has to protect not only those people whose trust has been abused but those who simply find themselves subjected to an unwanted intrusion into their personal lives. The law no longer needs to construct an artificial relationship of confidentiality between intruder and victim: it can recognise privacy itself as a legal principle drawn from the fundamental value of personal autonomy. " Sedley LJ is therefore proposing to ground an extended law of breach of confidence in interests of privacy and autonomy.
Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers [2002] EWHC 499 (QB) (Morland J) The 'supermodel' Naomi Campbell won her privacy case against The Mirror newspaper but she was awarded only [sterling]3,500 in damages. In relation to the law of breach of confidence, the Court differentiates between the bare fact of whether she was a drug addict or not (which does not seem to have any confidentiality about it, given her earlier denials), and the fact that she was obtaining treatment through Narcotics Anonymous (which was held to have the necessary 'quality of confidence'). Morland J followed Gleeson CJ in Lenah v ABC in deciding this was 'easily idenfiable as private and disclosure of that information would be highly offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensitivities'. Also interesting from a breach of confidence perspective is that the Court was willing to conclude that the Mirror had obtained the information about Campbell's attendance at NA meetings as a result of a breach of confidence by a person unknown (either another NA attendee, or a member of Campbell's staff/entourage), with the result that the Mirror also held the information in confidence. Nothing surprising in the principle, but interesting in the Court's willingness to reach the right result without disclosure of journalistic sources. Nothing on a common law right of privacy irrespective of breach of confidence in this case. However, the influence of A 8 ECHR on interpretation of other aspects of UK law is discussed (this has some possible relevance in HK and Australia due to the ICCPR A 17). Campbell also succeed in a claim for compensation under the UK Data Protection Act 1988, the first judicial consideration of the new Act, on the question of whether the data was 'processed fairly and lawfully' under UK DPP 1 [to be considered later].
Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers [2002] EWHC Civ 1373 (on appeal from Morland J); The Court of Appeal (Phillips MR, Chadwick and Keane LJJ) allowed MGN's appeal against Morland J's judgment. Court of Appeal considered that the photographs here 'were of a street scene. They did not convey any information that was confidential. That information was conveyed by the captions.' [33]. They concluded that the taking of covert photos of her (even if it was offensive) was 'not relied upon as a ground for legal complaint' [54] [- therefore, this is not a case of improperly obtained info at all]. The Court concluded that the disclosure of the additional information about her attending Narcotics Anonymous was not sufficiently offensive [on Gleeson CJ's test] to justify intervention (no duty of confidence).
Campbell v Frisbee [2002] EWHC 328 (Ch) - see also Campbell's successful action against her employee who disclosed information to the media
A v B & C [2002] EWCA Civ 337 - CA attempts to limit consideration of a privacy tort: in most `if not all' situations where privacy protection is justified, it will be protected by breach of confidence (at least since the Human Rights Act 1998, which expands UK confidence law); The `vexed question' of a separate privacy tort may then be ignored
Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd [2001] HCA 63; Kirby J considered Courts had the power to restrain the use of information obtained by improper means (such as trespass here) where the use of the information would be unconscionable (which it was not here); Gleeson CJ held that the fact that the information was tortiously obtained is not sufficient to make it unconscionable for a third party to use it, but if the nature of the information was such as to make it 'private', the law of breach of confidence would provide a remedy.
Where information is disclosed by a person to a government, an obligation to hold the information in confidence may easily arise.
Johns v Australian Securities Commission (1993) 178 CLR 408, summarised by Greenleaf in Casenote: Johns v ASC (1994) 1 PLPR 10 and discussed in G Greenleaf High Court Confirms Privacy Right Against Governments (1994) 1 PLPR 1. The High Court in Johns held that a statute giving a power to obtain information (including personal information) defines the purpose for which it can be used, expressly or impliedly, so that any other use is a breach of a statutory duty of confidence. Even if there is authority to disclose, the rules of natural justice may require a hearing before the decision to disclose is made. It seems that the reasoning in Johns v ASC is applicable to information compulsorily collected by State governments as much as by the Commonwealth Government, so the decision is potentially very significant.
In the UK, similar conclusions have been reached in Marcel v Commissioner of Police [1992] Ch 225 and Morris v Director of the Serious Fraud Office [1993] 3 WLR 1 .
contra Hall v Commissioner of ICAC [1987] HKLR 210 (see Berthold & Wacks pg 46)
see Berthold & Wacks pgs 46-47 for further discussion
The implications of Johns for IPPs dealing with Use and Disclosure will be discussed later
The Privacy Act 1988 Part VIII, ss92-93, attempts to remedy these problems, but only in relation to personal information, and only in relation to obligations of confidence to which an agency or a Commonwealth (federal) officer is subject , and to those which arise under ACT law (irrespective of who is subject to them, such as a business in the ACT) (s89). Where such obligations of confidence do exist, s93(3) extends to the subject of the information disclosed on a confidential basis the same rights to sue for breach as the confider has.
These provisions may have added significance in the light of decisions such as Johns (discussed above). For example, if a Commonwealth agency compulsorily acquires information about a company's customers from the company, it will owe a duty of confidence to the company to only use the information for the purpose for which it acquired it (Johns). If it uses the information for some other purpose, the customers can sue for breach of the obligation of confidence (s93).As in Fraser v Evans, s92 clarifies that a third party recipient of information, who knew or ought to know that it was held in confidence by the person disclosing it, is also bound by that confidence.
s93(1) confirms that damages may be recovered for breaches of confidence concerning personal information.
There is no caselaw concerning Part VII - it does not seem to have ever been used.
A v B & C [2002] EWCA Civ 337 -
See Berthold & Wacks pgs 48-49 comparing breach of confidence with the HK Ordinance DPPs; B & W (2nd) p133
Will disclosure of personal information in breach of an IPP limiting disclosure constitute a breach of confidence by virtue of the statutory breach?
HKLRC 1999 Defamation
Berthold & Wacks pgs 57-62; note special 'innocence' defence in HK
Defamation has limitations as a form of privacy protection because:
It usually only gives protection against information. which is false (NSW law goes somewhat beyond this);
It has wide defences of qualified privilege , with no condition of fair practices (in the absence of malice) before the defence is available;
It gives no mechanism for people to find out that defamations have occurred - most bureaucratic defamations are in secret (eg government files, credit or insurance reports), only media defamations are usually known to the victim.
Is very expensive to pursue as a remedy, and is largely useless to most victims.
Defamation has some similarities to the US privacy tort of 'publicity which places the defendant in a false light in the public eye' (but see Berthold & Wacks p60).
A right of access may disclose defamatory material held in databases. However, the information must have been disclosed to some other person to be defamatory.
Berthold & Wacks pgs 62-66
The negligent advice cases following Hedley Byrne until recently have only give the recipient of negligent information a right to sue, not the subject of information; so a person who failed to obtain a job, credit etc because of a negligent reference or out-of-date information in a database had no remedy. Privacy protection by negligence actions is only likely to be significant if the subject of the information has an action.
However, the law could change to provide a remedy in this situation, if other Courts take the same approach as the House of Lords in Spring v Guardian Assurance PLC [1994] 3 WLR 354. More recent cases seem to make this unlikely, however.
Patrick Gunning Casenote - Spring v Guardian Assurance PLC (1994) House of Lords (1994) 1 PLPR 150. - An insurance company gave another insurance Company a bad references about Spring, a former employee. There was no malice, so a defamation action was defeated by the defence of qualified privilege, but the reference was given negligently. The House of Lords, by majority, held that the employer owed a duty of care to the subject of a reference (as opposed to the recipient), and that principles of negligence and defamation were different. The House of Lords decisions was in contrast with a number of New Zealand cases. Lord Keith, dissenting, thought the policy underlying qualified privilege was the same in relation to both negligence and defamation.
In Sattin v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (1996) 39 NSWLR 32 the plaintiff sued in negligence for damage to her reputation caused by a newspaper photo and caption, and then tried to amend her statement of claim to include a claim in negligence. Levine J refused the application, and in doing so declined to follow Spring v Guardian Assurance PLC . He said that the law of negligence `has a limited role to play in the matter of communications, it being fundamentally confined to the Hedley Byrne situation .... or perhaps others in which freedom of speech is not a legitimate consideration'. He implied that it had little role in `reference cases' (such as Spring) either. However, Sattin is only a decision of limited scope by a single judge, and the whole area awaits more authoritative consideration in Australia. ; the court in h Gould v TCN Channel 9 & Ors [2000] NSWSC 707 took a similar approach.
Sullivan v Moody; Thompson v Connon [2001] HCA 59 - The Australian High Court rejected a claim that investigators of an alleged sexual assault of a child owed a duty of care to one parent of the child when reporting details to the other parent, partly because of the effect this would have on the relationship between negligence and defamation law (see [54.]). The information communicated suggested the involvement of the first parent in the assault, and contributed to the breakdown of the marriage.
Lai Hing Tong v Attorney-General [1990] 1 HKLR 56 (see Berthold & Wacks p65) - A Hong Kong decision pre-dating Spring where the plaintiff recovered damages in negligence for the incorrect recording a communication of a criminal record, as a consequence of which he lost three positions. R Glofcheski in (1991) 20 HKLJ 393 argued he should have proceeded in defamation.
The tort of trespass can be used to protect the privacy of those who have a proprietary interest in land (only) against physical encroachment upon land or premises. Surveillance carried out from a distance will not constitute trespass.
However, as Lenah shows, the development of the law is uncertain in the extent to which Courts will restrain the use of information obtained as a result of a trespass or other tortious or unlawful act.
Berthold & Wacks p68
HKLRC 1999 Trespass to land
Lincoln Hunt Australia Pty Ltd v Willesee (1986) 4 NSWLR 457 -
Bernstein v Skyviews and General Ltd ([1978] QB 479
TCN Channel Nine Pty Limited v Henry Alfred Anning [2002] NSWCA 82 - Illustrates how significant trespass can be as a source of remedies for invasion of privacy. NSW Environmental Protection Agency invited 'A Current Affair' film crew to accompany it on a 'raid' of a rural propery where 70,000 tires were stored. CofA held that there was trespass, as there was no implied or express licence to the film crew to enter the property for the purpose of filming. Damages of A$50,000 ($25,000 general damages and $25,000 aggravated damages) awarded for trespass to land. Held that personal injury (mental trauma) was not recoverable as consequential damages as it was not the 'natural and probable consequences' of the trespass in the circumstances of this case.
Since the award of tortious damages in Wilkinson v Downton [1897] 2 QB 57 for the nervous shock suffered by a woman when told (falsely) that her husband's legs were broken, the exact scope of the tort of intentional infliction of (non-physical) harm has been uncertain, and there has been speculation it might offer scope for protection of privacy interests.
Berthold & Wacks pgs 50-57
HKLRC 1999 Intentional infliction of emotional distress
Bradley v Wingnut Films [1993] 1 NZLR 415; Gallen J refused injunction but considered plaintiff being 'shocked and upset' at film depiction of funeral plot was sufficient under Wilkinson v Downton.
Home Office v Mary Jane Wainwright & Anor [2001] EWCA Civ 2081 ; Wolff LCJ (at [23] - [33]) considered Wilkinson v Downton should be limited to 'actual recognised psychiatric illness or bodily injury', following Minna Wong v Parkside Health NHS Trust [2001] EWCA Civ 1721. Emotional distress falling short of psychiatric illness or other form of physical harm will not suffice. Here the prison officers were not intending to harm the plaintiffs, so the plaintiffs failed. (Nor would the emotional distress have been sufficient.) Buxton LJ took an equally restrictive approach. Mummery LJ agreed with both.
If Wainwright is followed in other jurisdictions, Wilkinson v Downton will become largely irrelevant to privacy protection.
The interferences with privacy caused by various types of intrusive activities, from strip searches to the taking of bodily samples, can potentially constitute battery (and threats to do so may constitute assault).
In Home Office v Mary Jane Wainwright & Anor [2001] EWCA Civ 2081 Buxton LJ (at [48]-[55]) stressed that battery is confined to direct physical contact with the plaintiff, and cannot be extended, as the plaintiffs argued, to situations of 'causing the claimants to do something to themselves that led to humiliation and illness'.
In Wainwright there does not seem to have been a threat by the prison officials to use force to search the plaintiffs - this could have constituted assault. The consequence of their failing to agree to do what the officers wanted was only refusal of entry to the prison.
Nuisance requires 'a condition or activity which unduly interferes with the use or enjoyment of land' (Clerk and Lindsell on Torts).
HKLRC 1999 Private nuisance
Khorasandjian v Bush [1993] QB 727 - extension of nuisance to harassment by telephone calls
Bernstein v Skyviews [1978] 1 QB 479 - no trespass to land to view from an aeroplane
If a person owns copyright in the form of expression of information about them (and, most likely, by them), then they can use copyright to prevent the reproduction etc of that expression of the information. However, copyright does not provide protection for the underlying information.
For example, copyright can be used by a person to prevent republication of letters or a diary written by them, but not a story based on the diary or letters which makes only insubstantial use of any particular expressions in the diary or letters, but merely uses facts obtained from them.
HKLRC 1999 Infringement of copyright
The malicious publication of falsehoods that produce damage, even if not defamatory, can result in an action for malicious falsehood. The importance of this is obviously very limited because of the requirement of malice, and because in most cases such falsehoods would be defamatory.
Perhaps an example might be a credit bureaux that maliciously deleted any information about a person's good credit record, thereby limiting the amount of credit available to the person.
HKLRC 1999 Malicious falsehood
Berthold and Wacks pgs 66-67
HKLRC 1999 Breach of contract
Berthold & Wacks pgs 67-8
Administrative law very rarely provides damages or other compensatory mechanisms (even in statutory forms such as ADJR or FOI), only reversal of incorrect decisions, or injunctions , so it is of limited use as privacy protection.
Many of the Information Privacy Principles (IPPs) have analogies in administrative law remedies (eg natural justice may require access to your own file; a decision may be ultra vires if it is based on irrelevant information). Natural justice may require a person be afforded a hearing before a decision is made to release information about him or her (Johns). But since no damages are usually available, the importance of the IPPs is that they may provide better remedies, particularly damages.
The significance of privacy Acts as a new aspect of administrative law has received little attention.
4.10.	The special position of the USA
Michael Froomkin's article below is essential reading in order to understand the constitutional limitations on the USA ever developing either (i) a comprehensive privacy tort or (ii) a data protection law on the European model.
<IMG ALIGN=MIDDLE SRC="http://www2.austlii.edu.au/itlaw/required.gif"> Michael Froomkin http://personal.law.miami.edu/~froomkin/articles/privacy-deathof.htm The Death of Privacy? [This HTML version is a draft which should not be cited, but there is a link to a more final PDF version.] - Part II. Responding to Privacy-Destroying Technologies - A. The Constraints
Froomkin summarises the limitations (footnotes omitted):
"Privacy-destroying technologies do not line up particularly well with the legal rules that govern them. This explains why the United States Constitution is unlikely to be the source of a great expansion in informational privacy rights. The Constitution does not speak of privacy, much less informational privacy. Even though the Supreme Court has acknowledged that "there is a zone of privacy surrounding every individual," the data contours of that "zone" are murky indeed. The Supreme Court's relatively few discussions of informational privacy tend to be either in dicta or in the context of finding other interests more important, (333) or both." "Whatever right to informational privacy may exist today, it is only a right against governmentally sponsored invasions of privacy only--it does not reach private conduct."
The common law protection of privacy in the USA has been mentioned earlier.
Froomkin summarises the effect of the First Amendment as follows (footnotes omitted):
"The First Amendment affects potential privacy-enhancing rules in at least three ways:
(1) most prohibitions on private data-gathering in public (i.e. surveillance) risk violating the First Amendment (conversely, most government surveillance in public appears to be unconstrained by the Fourth Amendment);
(2) the First Amendment may impose limits on the extent to which legislatures may restrict the collection and sale of personal data in connection with commercial transactions; and
(3) the First Amendment right to freedom of association imposes some limits on the extent to which the government may observe and profile citizens, if only by creating a right to anonymity in some cases. "
In a nutshell, he says that the First Amendment almost seems to support the adage that "information wants to be free," and in particular once it has been collected, data cannot in practice be controlled by law in the USA.
In more detail, some of Froomkin's main conclusions are set out below, with emphasis added. See Part IIA(2) of his article for supporting arguments and authorities.
In relation to public places and government-held information:
"In peacetime, the First Amendment allows only the lightest restrictions upon the ordinary gathering of information in public places (or upon repeating of such information). Other than cases protecting bodily integrity, the constitutional right to privacy is anaemic, especially when compared to the First Amendment's protection of the rights to gather and disseminate information." "However, both the Supreme Court and appellate courts have interpreted the First Amendment to encompass a right to gather information. The right is not unlimited. It does not, for example, create an affirmative duty on the government to make information available."
Again concerning data collection, "General regulation of new technologies such as thermal imaging or passive wave imaging seems unproblematic on First Amendment grounds so long as the regulation were to apply to all uses."
"...there are good reasons to believe that the First Amendment would forbid most legislation criminalizing the dissemination or use of accurate information. While good for free speech, it makes any ban on data collection much more difficult to enforce." "But, other than in cases involving intellectual property rights or persons with special duties of confidentiality, (201) the modern Court has struck down all peacetime restrictions on publishing true information that have come before it."
"The Supreme Court's decisions leave open the possibility that the First Amendment might apply more strongly when facts are legally acquired, as opposed to originating in the illegal actions of another. Legally acquired facts have the highest protection ... Thus, the Supreme Court's cases are unclear as to whether a ban on the publication of illegally acquired information could fall within the presumably small class of regulations of truthful speech that satisfy constitutional standards."
In relation to government-held information (public registers in particular), there is a question "whether sharing information is always speech protected by the First Amendment, or whether there are occasions in which information is just a regulated commodity". "If the Court adopts what amounts to a right/privilege distinction relating to government data, it is hard to see why the government's ability to impose conditions upon the use of its proprietary data should be any less than that of a private party, especially if those conditions arguably restrict speech."
In relation to transactional data:
" Transactional data--who bought what, when, where, and for how much--might be considered ordinary speech, commercial speech, or just an informational commodity. "
"If transactional data is commercial speech, its regulation would be reviewed under the test enunciated in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York: For commercial speech to come within [the First Amendment], it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest."
"The government's ability to regulate privately generated speech relating to commerce is surprisingly underlitigated. " ....."Current doctrine suggests that speech relating to commerce is ordinary speech,..." "On the other hand, the two most recent Supreme Court decisions relating to the regulation of personal data seem to imply that some transactional data is just a commodity, although the special circumstances of those decisions--the data was held by state or local governments--make generalization hazardous"
"A very small number of statutes impose limits upon the sharing of private transactional data collected by persons not classed as professionals." Only one has been challenged (a Maine law restricting who could obtain credit reports) and it was held unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds.
There are a number of implications of the US situation described by Froomkin for the protection of privacy in the rest of the world (ROW):
There is very little likelihood of the US providing comprehensive statutory protection for use and disclosure of personal information.
If the largest multi-national corporate collections and storage of personal information (particularly via the Internet) continue to be based in the USA, then this poses problems for citizens of many other countries, whose data may be misused by US firms.
US firms will have little statutory incentive to develop technologies and business practices that protect privacy,
The question of restrictions of data exports to countries with 'inadequate' laws is likely to remain very difficult in relation to the USA.
It may be that the USA continues to be a 'data haven' for companies with practices that abuse people's privacy.
Discussion Question: What practices of US firms (particularly in relation to the Internet) would breach data protection laws if they occurred in Australia, Hong Kong or Europe?