Source: https://ipublica.wordpress.com/2015/05/22/the-law-of-evidence/
Timestamp: 2017-08-23 08:08:00
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Matched Legal Cases: ['§1', '§1', '§7', '§301', '§301', '§301', '§550', '§550', '§550', '§7', '§2', '§111', '§2485', '§13', '§301', '§13', '§14', '§301']

The Law of Evidence – Peter Fritz Walter
A Brief Introduction for Law Students
This article for law students provides an outline of the general principles of the law of evidence.
Here is a definition: ‘All legal means, exclusive of mere argument, which tend to prove or disprove any matter of fact, the truth of which is submitted to judicial investigation.’
— James Bradley Tayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence, 1898.
Only facts are subject to proof. Thus, the evidence procedure always relates to facts. Now, what is a fact? According to Wigmore, fact means ‘whatever is the subject of perception and consciousness.’
— John Henry Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law, 10 Volumes, Vol. 9 ‘Evidence in Trials at Common Law’, rev. by James H. Chadburn, Boston: Toronto: Little, Brown & Co., 1981, §§1, 2.
The main facts in issue are those that the plaintiff must prove in a civil action if he is to win, and those that the defendant must prove in order to establish a defense.
It is either substantive law or adjective law (procedural law) which determines those facts. In the words of Phipson and Elliott: ‘It is not the law of evidence’s business to say what those facts are in any particular case. They are determined by the substantive law or by the proceedings.’
— Phipson and Elliott, Manual of the Law of Evidence, 11th Edition, by D. W. Elliott, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1980, 15.
However, the objective burden of proof is not related to the production of evidence, but decides the litigation in case of a non liquet, that is, an irresolvable doubt regarding any fact in question: the party who carries the objective burden, then, loses the case.
This means, practically speaking, that the objective or legal burden enables the judge to render a verdict in a case where the truth cannot be found. It’s the applicable substantive law that attributes the objective burden. It’s also correct to denote this burden as the ultimate burden, as it does not shift.
— James, Fleming James & Geoffrey Hazard, Geoffrey, Civil Procedure, 2nd Edition, Toronto: Little, Brown & Company, 1977, §1.2, 4 [45]
In fact, because of the particular nature of the adversary litigation system and its bestowal of judicial cognition upon both judge and jury, evidence law in general, and the rules of the burden of proof, in particular, have a much higher importance under common law than under continental law.
There are however presumptions to be found in American civil procedure laws, in the rules No. 301 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (28 U.S.C.A.) and in the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 13 U.L.A. Civ. Proc. 227.
A detailed regulation of evidence rules was worked out by the American Law Institute and was inserted in the Model Code of Evidence (1942). Similar rules are to be found in the California Evidence Code. As to Canada, the Uniform Evidence Act contains very detailed provisions regarding the burden of proof.
The general rule is that the judge adjudicates about legal questions, while the jury decides about the facts, but there are several exceptions to this rule.
In addition, it has to be seen that more and more litigations are held without a jury; in such a case, the judge is said to take over the two functions in one person. However, in principle, the particularities and rules of the burden of proof have not changed for that reason. Phipson & Elliott write: ‘Now the trial is usually before the judge alone, but the two separate functions remain. The judge performs them both, but he must take care to keep them separate.’
— Phipson & Elliott, Manual of the Law of Evidence (1980), 37.
It is important to remember that evidence law has been marked by the particularity of the jury trial, and that is why the strict separation of the functions of judge and jury even applies when the judge decides alone.
— Sir Rupert Cross, Cross on Evidence, 5th edition., London: Butterworths, 1979, 92 and Graham C. Lilly, Introduction to the Law of Evidence, St. Paul (West), 1978, 47, note 13.
The main difficulty in understanding the concept of the burden of proof results from the fact that the term has more than one meaning. It was only at the end of the 19th century that, with the classical monograph of J. B. Tayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence (1898), the legal profession began to build awareness about the need to clarify the matter. James & Hazard note:
— James & Hazard, Civil Procedure (1977), §7.5, 240–241.
The two burdens have to be distinguished; they are called principle burdens.
So far there is unanimity in the literature; on the details, however, the literature greatly vacillates.
Cross distinguishes further between provisional and ultimate burden and between shifting burdens and rebuttable presumptions. Sometimes even a third burden is added, that is called the burden of pleadings, while in reality this burden is a consequence of the legal burden.
— Graham, Federal Rules of Evidence in a Nutshell, St. Paul (Minn.): American Textbook Series, 1981, §301.3, 42
— Phipson on Evidence, 13th ed., by John Huxley Buzzard, Richard May and M. N. Howard, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1982, 44, n. 4–03
— See, for example, Gerard, Nash, Civil Procedure, Cases and Text, Sydney: The Law Book Company Ltd., 1976, 32, Paul F. Rothstein, State and Federal Rules, 2nd edition, St. Paul (West), 1981, Ch. II, 99.
The presentation of evidence is a regulated and orderly ritual. It starts with the party who bears the evidential burden to address their proof to the judge. The judge decides if a prima facie case has been made, and then instructs the jury to pronounce the final decision regarding the evidence offered by both parties. This is often expressed in the terms that the parties have to ‘pass the judge and convince the jury.’
— See, for example, Phipson and Elliott (1980), 52.
— The formulation used in two U.S. district court decisions shows the nature of both burdens very well: ‘Burden of proof has two elements, the burden of producing evidence and the burden of persuading the fact finder,’ Abilene Sheet Metal Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 619 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1980) and Hochgurtel v. San Felippo, 253 N.W.2d 526, 78 Wis.2d 70 (Wis. 1977).
— See Cross on Evidence (1979), 29, Phipson & Elliott (1980), 63.
As in principle the legal burden is on the plaintiff, it’s the plaintiff who usually begins to produce evidence. For every single issue, evidence is thus produced.
This is not a particularity of civil procedure, but a general principle. We already learnt that every proof must relate to a specific fact in issue, otherwise it would be off-track and irrelevant.
As a result, a burden of proof ‘in general’ is inconceivable. For every fact in issue, there is a burden of proof that one of the parties is charged with.
Cross on Evidence expresses it this way: ‘In the context of the law of evidence, the expression ‘burden of proof’ is meaningless unless it is used with reference to a particular issue.’ (Id., 29).
Cross on Evidence writes that the concept of the evidential burden is the product of trial by jury and the possibility of withdrawing an issue from that body. (Id., 87, 91). See also the California Evidence Code (1965) which stipulates:
The Model Code on Evidence (1942) explains:
— American Law Institute, Model Code on Evidence, Chestnut, Philadelphia, 1942
— Sir Rupert Cross & Nancy Wilkins, An Outline of the Law of Evidence, 5th edition, London: Butterworths, 1980, 27. See also Model Code on Evidence (1942), p. 74: ‘Neither the rules nor the decisions require that the evidence discharging either burden shall have been introduced by the party having the burden.’
The standard of proof regarding the evidential burden is not a matter that the judge must instruct the jury about; only the persuasive burden is. This is so simply because the judge alone renders this decision.
Cross and Wilkins explain about the standard of proof for prima facie evidence that it necessitates a finding that the fact is proved if the evidence is uncontradicted.
— Cross & Wilkins, An Outline of the Law of Evidence (1980), 20. See also Graham, Federal Rules of Evidence in a Nutshell (1981), §301.4, 43, and Phipson and Elliott, Manual of the Law of Evidence (1980), 60: ‘… if the evidence is believed, any reasonable man could infer that the fact exists.’
This also has been called the shifting of the evidential burden, while it has to be seen that the persuasion burden never shifts. The ‘shifting’ is of course a juridical metaphor; the pretended ‘movement’ of the burden is in reality the idea of an equitable partition of the trial risk. Eggleston writes:
— Sir Richard Eggleston, Evidence, Proof and Probability, 2nd edition, London: Weidenfels & Nicholson, 1983, 27.
Another result that flows out from this system is that when a prima facie case was not refuted or ‘rebutted,’ the fact is considered to have been proven.
Similarly, when the prima facie evidence was not meeting the applicable standard of proof, the judge must render a decision adverse to the burdened party.
— Cross on Evidence (1979), 27, Graham, Federal Rules of Evidence in a Nutshell (1981), §301.4, 43.
— 550(b) of the California Evidence Code stipulates: ‘The burden of producing evidence as to a particular fact is initially on the party with the burden of proof as to this fact.’ (West’s Ann.Cal.Evid.Code §550, Vol. 29B, 508).
As Cross on Evidence puts it: ‘As a general rule, the burden of adducing evidence is borne by the party who bears the burden of proof.’
When the evidential burden is discharged, it is said to shift to the other party. Because of this assumed shifting of the evidential burden, and because it is temporarily with one and then the other party, it is also called provisional burden. Lord Denning explains in Brown v. Rolls Royce Ltd., [1960] 1 W.L.R. 210, 215 (H.L.):
My Lords, the difference between the judges of the Court of Session turned to the onus of proof. (…) The difference of opinion shows how important it is to distinguish between a ‘legal burden,’ properly so called, which is imposed by the law itself, and a ‘provisional’ burden which is raised by the state of the evidence.
As only at the onset of the trial the two burdens are united, at any other point in time during the trial a test has to be effected for the determination of who bears the evidential burden. This test has been inserted in various statutes; here is the one provided by the California Evidence Code:
§550 Party who has the burden of producing evidence (a) The burden of producing evidence as to a particular fact is on the party against whom a finding on that fact would be required in the absence of further evidence.
— West’s Ann.Cal.Evid.Code §550, Vol. 29B, p. 508
(1) In civil cases the burden of first proving the existence or nonexistence of a fact lies on the party against whom the judgment of the court would be given if no evidence were produced on either side, (…) (2) If such party adduces evidence which ought reasonably to satisfy a jury that the fact sought to be proved is established, the burden lies on the party against whom judgment would be given if no more evidence were adduced; and so on successively, until all the issues in the pleadings have been dealt with.
— Reproduced in Akinola Aguda, Law and Practice Relating to Evidence in Nigeria, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1980, n. 21–03.
— See in general Walker & Walker, The English Legal System, 6th edition, by R.J. Walker, London: Butterworths, 1985, 617, Curzon, Law of Evidence, Plymouth: McDonald & Evans Ltd., 1978, 60, Cross on Evidence (1979), 110, Cross & Wilkins, An Outline of the Law of Evidence (1980), 36, Phipson on Evidence (1982), n. 4–35, Eggleston, Evidence, Proof and Probability (1983), 129, Harry J. Glasbeek, Evidence Cases and Materials, Toronto: Butterworths, 1977, 594
The standard of proof, as we have already seen in our discussion of the evidential burden, is the measure for assessing a certain proof being adequate and sufficient for proving a certain fact. Generally put, standard of proof is thus a measure for the adequateness of the proof presented. All evidence must meet a certain standard to be adequate, to be sufficient; as a result, all evidence has to be evaluated by the judge for meeting the standard of proof applicable in the particular litigation.
This is a very important function of the judge and it’s because of this function that the saying is that for a litigation to win, you have to pass the judge; the next step, then, convincing the jury is the final or ultimate burden.
For example, if a good lawyer on the defendant’s side, who wants to avoid the unpredictable verdict of a jury, can convince the judge that the evidence presented by the plaintiff is insufficient for meeting the standard of proof, the trial will end here, and it will be ended not by the jury, but by the judge. The verdict will be that the plaintiff was not able to establish a prima face case for his allegations.
— James & Hazard, Civil Procedure (1977), §7.6, 243: ‘The usual formulation of the test in civil cases is that there must be a preponderance of evidence in favour of the party having the persuasion burden (the proponent) before he is entitled to a verdict’. See also Lilly, An Introduction to the Law of Evidence (1978), 41: ‘ … in a typical civil case, a party must prove the elements of his claim by a preponderance of the evidence (sometimes expressed by the phrases ‘greater weight of the evidence’ or ‘more probable than not.’) The same is stated for Canada in the U.L.C.C. Report 1982, §2.3(a), 23
Cross on Evidence speaks of three standards of proof in the American evidence law; if this standard differs from what is recognized as standard of proof in British law, is however not explicated by the author.
— Cross on Evidence (1979), pp. 111 ff., 118
A fact is proven when the proof submitted by one party has a surplus of probability over the proof submitted by the other party, or, in the words of Lord Denning ‘… if the evidence is such that the tribunal can say we think it more probable than not.’
— Miller v. Minister of Pensions, [1947] 2 All E R 372, 373–374
On the other hand, when the probabilities are equal, the fact is not proven.
However, this distinction is often simplified when its about the facts that are constituent for the action. For example, Lord Edmund Davis states in the case Chapman v. Oakleigh Animal Products, Ltd that ‘the golden rule is that the onus of proof is on the plaintiff.’
— [1970] 8 KIR 1063, 1072.
— Model Code on Evidence (1942), Rule 701, p. 312.
— Walker & Walker, The English Legal System (1985), pp. 606–610, Halsbury’s Laws of England, §§111 ff., Cross on Evidence (1979), pp. 121 ff., Phipson on Evidence (1982), n. 4–23 ff., Phipson & Elliott, Manual of the Law of Evidence (1980), p. 75, Lilly, An Introduction to the Law of Evidence (1978), p. 47, Model Code on Evidence (1942), pp. 306 ff.
Rule 301 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, applicable for proceedings in United States federal courts, stipulates this expressly:
— Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law (1981), Vol. 9, §2485, Cross & Wilkins, An Outline of the Law of Evidence (1980), 27, Lilly, An Introduction to the Law of Evidence (1978), 41. The term ‘trier of fact’ is defined in the Model Code on Evidence (1942), Rule 1(14), 72: ‘Trier of fact includes a jury, and a judge when is is trying an issue of fact other than one relating to the admissibility of evidence.’
This is why the persuasive burden is also called fixed burden of proof.
— See, for example, Glasbeek, Evidence Cases and Materials (1977), 634, Halsbury’s Laws of England, §13, Phipson on Evidence (1982), 47 n. 4–07, Lilly, An Introduction to the Law of Evidence (1978), 45, Graham, Federal Rules in a Nutshell (1981), §301.5, 45
— Cross on Evidence (1979), 87. Halsbury’s Laws of England, §13, Phipson on Evidence (1982), n. 4–06. Sometimes, in the literature there is question of a ‘burden of pleadings.’ The expression however is awkward as the burden of pleadings can’t be a valid guideline for finding out about the incidence of the persuasive burden.
For this reason, it also is called ultimate burden, while we have seen that the evidential burden is a provisional burden. The reason why this burden does not shift is its procedural function; it is not related to the production of evidence but enters the stage after all evidence has been produced: it then allows to render a verdict in favor of one party.
The general rule is ei qui affirmat non ei qui negat incumbit probatio.
That means the one who affirms a fact, be it positive or negative, must prove it, and not the one who contests the fact. In this simple rule, there are contained actually three different principles:
— Phipson on Evidence (1982), n. 4–02, Eggleston, Evidence, Proof and Probability (1983), 103. A synonymous expression is ‘ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat,’ see Cross on Evidence (1979).
— Glasbeek, Evidence Cases and Materials (1977), 634: ‘Each party will wish to have certain facts found so that the pertinent substantive law will be applied in his favour. Accordingly, it is logical to place the risk of non-persuasion, i.e. the legal burden, in respect of each fact-in-issue on the party who will fail in his claim if the fact-in-issue is not found to exist.’ See Cross & Wilkins, An Outline of the Law of Evidence (1980), 28: ‘The question is usually not a particularly difficult one, for a fundamental requirement of any judicial system is that the person who desires the court to take action must prove his case to its satisfaction. This means that, as a matter of common sense, the burden of proving of all facts to their claim normally rests upon the plaintiff.’ See also Cross on Evidence (1979), 96 and Halsbury’s Laws of England, §14: ‘The legal burden of proof normally rests upon the party desiring the court to take action; thus a claimant must satisfy the court or tribunal that the conditions which entitle him to an award have been satisfied,’ citing Dickinson v. Minister of Pensions, [1953] 1 Q.B. 228, 232, [1952] 2 All E R 1031, 1033.
— Graham, Federal Rules of Evidence in a Nutshell (1981), §301.2, 41 and Carlson v. Nelson, 285 N.W.2d 505, 204 Neb.765 (Neb.1979).
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