Source: http://www.ecases.us/case/c291597/claudine-hall-v-sylvia-garson/
Timestamp: 2020-03-29 09:18:28
Document Index: 204655943

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 198310', '§ 1343', '§ 1343', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', 'Art. 5238', 'Art. 5238', '§ 1983', '§ 2284', 'Art. 5238', '§ 2281', '§ 50', 'Art. 5238', '§ 2281', '§ 52', '§ 1983', 'Art. 5238', '§ 1983', '§ 242', '§ 1983']

Claudine Hall v. Sylvia Garson, Fifth Circuit, US Court of Appeals Cases, Federal Courts, COURT CASE
Claudine Hall v. Sylvia Garson , 430 F.2d 430 ( 1970 )
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED Stuart M. Nelkin, Houston, Tex., for Claudine Hall, and another.
The cry was made by local government when local regulations of business were under constitutional attack. But the response to these cries was limited. In Bacon v. Rutland R. R. Co., 1914, 232 U.S. 134, 34 S. Ct. 283, 58 L. Ed. 538, an equity bill to restrain the state public service commission from requiring the railroad to locate a passenger station in a particular place, Mr. Justice Holmes said that the state remedy available to the railroad to make its challenge was judicial and "this being so * * * the railroad company was free to assert its rights in the district court of the United States." 232 U.S. at 138, 34 S. Ct. at 284, 58 L.Ed. at 539. Mr. Chief Justice Taft took the same position in Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Kuykendall, 1924, 265 U.S. 196, 44 S. Ct. 553, 68 L. Ed. 975. The only positive response came in the guise of the abstention doctrine (see IB, infra) where controlling questions of state law, which were unresolved by state courts, were presented. See e. g., Gilchrist v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 1924, 279 U.S. 159, 49 S. Ct. 282, 73 L. Ed. 652.
The same cry was also heard when the actions of local government were under attack because they allegedly deprived persons of personal civil rights. And it was again muffled. In Lane v. Wilson, 1939, 307 U.S. 268, 59 S. Ct. 872, 83 L. Ed. 1281, a suit challenging an Oklahoma restriction on voting, Mr. Justice Frankfurter said that to "vindicate his present grievance the plaintiff did not have to pursue whatever remedy may have been open to him in the state courts. * * * Barring only exceptional circumstances * * * or explicit statutory, requirements * * * resort to a federal court may be had without first exhausting the judicial remedies of the state." 307 U.S. at 274, 59 S.Ct. at 875, 83 L.Ed. at 1287 (Citations omitted).
The same cry was again heard after Mr. Justice Douglas set out the purposes8 of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 in Monroe v. Pape, 1961, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S. Ct. 473, 5 L. Ed. 2d 492. It was argued that Monroe held that the only purpose of § 1983 was to provide relief where state remedies were inadequate or only available in theory, not in practice. But the Supreme Court soon quieted this argument.
In McNeese v. Board of Ed., 1963, 373 U.S. 668, 671, 83 S. Ct. 1433, 1435, 10 L. Ed. 2d 622, 624-625 the Court pointed out that in Monroe, supra, 365 U.S. at 183, 81 S.Ct. at 482, 5 L.Ed.2d at 503 it had said that the "federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be sought and refused before the federal one is invoked." This has routinely been repeated by that Court, Damico v. California, 1967, 389 U.S. 416, 88 S. Ct. 526, 19 L. Ed. 2d 647; Houghton v. Shafer, 1968, 392 U.S. 639, 88 S. Ct. 2119, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1319; and we do not believe that the pronouncements9 made by the Court in those cases were meant to be limited to any particular type of § 198310 case. See Note, Exhaustion of State Remedies under the Civil Rights Act, 68 Colum. L.Rev. 1201 (1968). We believe they were to have general application.11 In a like manner, this Court routinely rejects the cry that it is necessary to exhaust state remedies. See Orr v. Thorpe, 5 Cir., 1970, 427 F.2d 1129. And we here again reject it.
But this mutation is inconsistent with the prior evolution of the law. It, like the exhaustion requirement, cannot survive. First, the abstention doctrine in federal constitutional claims is generally grounded on uncertainty12 created by the "strands of local law woven into the case" McNeese, supra, 373 U.S. at 673, 83 S.Ct. at 1436, 10 L.Ed.2d at 626. See Reetz v. Bozanich, 1970, 397 U.S. 82, 90 S. Ct. 788, 25 L. Ed. 2d 68. When, however, the cloth of state law is, as here,13 off the loom and there can be no doubt as to what the state law provides, there is no place for abstention.14 Moreover, this doctrine was not changed by Reetz v. Bozanich, 1970, 397 U.S. 82, 90 S. Ct. 788, 25 L. Ed. 2d 68. There the Court directed the District Court to abstain from passing on an Alaska fishing license statute. There was great uncertainty whether the statute violated the Alaska Constitution and because of this uncertainty the abstention doctrine was invoked.15 There was thus no departure from the traditional rule.16
Closely akin to defendants' assertion that the District Court lacks jurisdiction because a jurisdictional amount has not been stated is their claim that there is no jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1343 because only "property rights" are involved.18 The argument is based on statements in several cases that § 1343 does not protect property rights. See e. g. Hague v. C.I.O., 1939, 307 U.S. 496, 59 S. Ct. 954, 83 L. Ed. 1423; Holt v. Indiana Mfg. Co., 1899, 176 U.S. 68, 20 S. Ct. 272, 44 L. Ed. 374. We have expressed doubts, see e. g. Bussie v. Long, 5 Cir., 1967, 383 F.2d 766; Atlanta Bowling Center, Inc. v. Allen, 5 Cir., 1968, 389 F.2d 713.
There can be no doubt that the defendants are correct in their claim that "state action" is required for there to be a claim under § 1983. Moreover, there must be state action for there to be a deprivation of the rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment. See e. g. Pierson v. Ray, 1967, 386 U.S. 547, 87 S. Ct. 1213, 18 L. Ed. 2d 288, Shelley v. Kraemer, 1948, 334 U.S. 1, 68 S. Ct. 836, 92 L. Ed. 1161. See generally, Horan, Law and Social Change; The Dynamics of the `State Action' Doctrine, 17 J.Pub.L. 258 (1968). But it is equally without doubt that the actions of a private citizen can, and in some circumstances do, become the actions of the state both for purposes of § 1983 and for the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.21 Adickes v. S. H. Kress and Co., 1970, 398 U.S. 144, 162-173, 90 S. Ct. 1598, 1611-1616, 26 L. Ed. 2d 142, 157-162; Baldwin v. Morgan, 5 Cir. 1961, 287 F.2d 750, 756.
Since United States v. Classic, 1941, 313 U.S. 299, 61 S. Ct. 1031, 85 L. Ed. 1368, a case involving irregularities in the conduct of a state Democratic party primary,23 the question of state action has been whether the alleged wrongdoer was dressed with state authority. As Mr. Justice Stone said in Classic, the misuse of power "possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with authority of state law, is state action taken `under color of state law'." 313 U.S. at 326, 61 S.Ct. at 1043, 85 L.Ed. at 1383. And here Sylvia's action, which was traditionally a state function, was draped with such authority.
Moreover, although originally a state Court action and not a § 1983 case, Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 1969, 395 U.S. 337, 89 S. Ct. 1820, 23 L. Ed. 2d 349, the case upon which plaintiffs base their claim that they have been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution, necessarily involved a finding of state action for purposes of the 14th Amendment. See Adickes v. S. H. Kress and Co., supra. And in Sniadach the ministerial act of issuance of a writ of garnishment and the service of that writ by the creditor's attorney upon the garnishee, the debtor's employer, satisfied the state action requirement. The functional role of the creditor's attorney and debtor's employer in Sniadach, even when coupled with the formal role of the clerk who issued the writ, is not significantly different from the role of the landlady here. And here the state action requirement is also met.24
In addition to their challenge to the existence of the requisite state action, defendants argue that the other element of a cause of action under § 1983 — the deprivation of "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws" of the United States — was not alleged here. The plaintiff's claim is, however, that investing the landlord with power to take unilateral action Art. 5238a deprives her, and the class she represents, of the protection of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This claim springs from Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 1969, 395 U.S. 337, 89 S. Ct. 1820, 23 L. Ed. 2d 349 in which the Supreme Court held a Wisconsin garnishment statute unconstitutional. The defect in the statute was its failure to provide the debtor with any procedural protection against the loss of wages — "the interim freezing of wages without a chance to be heard violated procedural due process." 395 U.S. at 340, 89 S.Ct. at 1822, 23 L.Ed.2d at 353. See Note, Attachment and Garnishment — Constitutional Law-Due Process of Law — Garnishment of Wages Prior to Judgment is a Denial of Due Process: The Sniadach Case and Its Implications for Related Areas of the Law, 68 Mich. L.Rev. 986 (1970). See also Goldberg v. Kelly, 1970, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S. Ct. 1011, 25 L. Ed. 2d 287.
Before determining whether Sniadach requires a conclusion that plaintiffs have stated a claim, we must sound a caveat. In determining whether a claim for which relief can be granted has been stated we do not pass on the merits of that claim. That is for the trial Court to determine. See Public Affairs Associates, Inc. v. Rickover, 1962, 369 U.S. 111, 82 S. Ct. 580, 7 L. Ed. 2d 604. In making that determination we do, however, indicate some of the considerations and factors that may be important.
Among these is the fact that 5238a has the same characteristic that the Supreme Court found objectionable in the Wisconsin statute: Property may be seized by the landlord without "a chance to be heard." But Art. 5238a is not a garnishment statute and all prehearing summary procedures are clearly not unconstitutional. The requirements for due procedure must be balanced against the competing interest of society served by quick and decisive action.25 And in extra-ordinary situations the prehearing seizure of property is permissible, Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 1950, 339 U.S. 594, 598-600, 70 S. Ct. 870, 872-873, 94 L. Ed. 1088, 1092-1094; Fahey v. Mallonee, 1947, 332 U.S. 245, 253-254, 67 S. Ct. 1552, 1554-1556, 91 L. Ed. 2030, 2039.
In addition to the questions of the existence of the District Court's jurisdiction and the presence of a claim under § 1983 for which relief can be granted, we are also obligated to pass on the District Court's refusal to request a three-Judge Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 2284 (see note, 5 supra.) Schackman v. Arnebergh, 1967, 387 U.S. 427, 87 S.t. 1622, 18 L. Ed. 2d 865. See Mayhue's Super Liquor Store, Inc. v. Meiklejohn, 5 Cir., 1970, 426 F.2d 142; Currie, Appellate Review of the Decision Whether or Not to Empanel a Three-Judge Federal Court, 37 U.Chi.L.Rev. 159 (1969). The first question to answer in fulfilling that obligation is whether the two-pronged substantiality requirement of Ex Parte Poresky, 1933, 290 U.S. 30, 54 S. Ct. 3, 78 L. Ed. 152, has been met. See Local 300, Amalgamated Meat Cutters, supra; Hargrave v. McKinney, 5 Cir., 1969, 413 F.2d 320. Here, of course, there can be no question that the challenge to the constitutionality of Art. 5238a presents substantial federal questions. (See II B, supra.)
Here the injunction is sought against the landlord. And, although he may be performing state functions for purpose of any state action requirement, this does not mean that he becomes a state officer for purpose of § 2281 — "an enactment technical in the strict sense of the word and to be applied as such." Phillips v. United States, 1941, 312 U.S. 246, 251, 61 S. Ct. 480, 483, 85 L. Ed. 800 805; Mitchell v. Donovan, 1970, 398 U.S. 427, 90 S. Ct. 1763, 26 L. Ed. 2d 378. The three-Judge statutes were first enacted in reaction to Ex parte Young, 1908, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S. Ct. 441, 52 L. Ed. 714. Congress believed federal court interference with state policy and state officials would be better accepted if it was the action of a three-Judge rather than one-Judge Court. C. Wright, supra at § 50. The idea was to extend to the states as a matter of comity the protection of the considered judgment of three Federal Judges instead of just one.31 It has been held that the policy of the act does not extend to local officials unless they really are the means whereby the statewide policy is carried out. Rorick v. Board of Comm., 1939, 307 U.S. 208, 59 S. Ct. 808, 83 L. Ed. 1242. It seems apparent that the policy was also never intended to apply to situations, as here, where a private person, although performing a function traditionally performed by the state and "clothed with state authority", who is acting essentially for his own benefit is to be restrained. And the fact that the person may perform a role normally that of the state surely does not create a need for comity.
Another important pronouncement by the Supreme Court came in King v. Smith, 1968, 392 U.S. 309, 312, 88 S. Ct. 2128, 2131, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1118, 1123 n. 4 where the Court said:
We do not believe that this pronouncement constituted a limitation on the McNeese, Damico, and Houghton cases. The reference to a three-Judge Court in King, supra, goes to the substantiality of the constitutional attack not the nature of the Court to pass on it. Here, of course, the challenge to Tex.Civ.Stat.Ann. Art. 5238a is sufficiently substantial to meet the requirements of Ex Parte Poresky, 1933, 290 U.S. 30, 54 S. Ct. 3, 78 L. Ed. 152, see Mayhue's Super Liquor Store, Inc. v. Meiklejohn, 5 Cir., 1970, 426 F.2d 152; see Mayhue's Super Liquor Store, Court lacks jurisdiction because the requirements of 28 U.S.C.A. § 2281 are not met is not significant.
It has been asserted that there are four abstention doctrines. In addition to the (i) traditional doctrine classically articulated in Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 1941, 312 U.S. 496, 61 S. Ct. 643, 85 L. Ed. 971, (ii) it has been argued that federal Courts may avoid decision in order to prevent needless conflicts with state activity, (iii) to leave to the states the resolution of unsettled questions of state law, and (iv) to ease the congestion of federal court dockets. C. Wright, Federal Courts § 52 (2d ed. 1970). But the scope of these different doctrines, if indeed they are different, is illusive. See Zwickler v. Koota, 1967, 389 U.S. 241, 88 S. Ct. 391, 19 L. Ed. 2d 444. It is certain, however, that none authorizes abstention when state law is clear simply because the state has a general interest in the subject matter of the controversy, whether it is schools or debt collection. See McNeese,supra.
"The fact that a state remedy is available is not a valid basis for federal court abstention. Monroe v. Pape, 1961, 365 U.S. 167, 183, 81 S. Ct. 473, 5 L. Ed. 2d 492; McNeese v. Board of Education, 1963, 373 U.S. 668, 671, 83 S. Ct. 1433, 10 L. Ed. 2d 622; Zwickler v. Koota, 1967, 389 U.S. 241, 251, 88 S. Ct. 391, 19 L. Ed. 2d 444. There can be no doubt in this case about what the statute means. It defies any interpretation that would or could avoid or modify the constitutional question. In such a case it is the duty of a federal court to exercise its jurisdiction. Zwickler v. Koota, supra; Harman v. Forssenius, 1965, 380 U.S. 528, 534-535, 85 S. Ct. 1177, 14 L. Ed. 2d 50; cf. Reetz v. Bozanich, 1970, 397 U.S. 88, 91, 90 S. Ct. 788, 25 L. Ed. 2d 73, 76; Wright v. City of Montgomery, Alabama, 5 Cir., 1969, 406 F.2d 867, 871."
InReetz the Court quoted with approval from its opinion in City of Meridian v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 1959, 358 U.S. 639, 79 S. Ct. 455, 3 L. Ed. 2d 562:
Judge Murrah's statement in Stapleton v. Mitchell, D.Kan., 1945, 60 F. Supp. 51, 55, which Mr. Justice Douglas quotes inMcNeese, deserves repeating here:
Under a literal reading of § 1983, there would be little question that the first element had been met since the statute provides a cause of action against "every person who, under color of anystatute causes * * * any citizen of the United States * * *." to be deprived of rights, privileges, immunities secured by the constitution and laws of the United States. (emphasis added) And there can be no doubt that the seizure of Claudine Hall's General Electric television by Sylvia Garson was under the color of Art. 5238a. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 1967, 387 U.S. 369, 87 S. Ct. 1627, 18 L. Ed. 2d 830.
It is equally clear that private citizens who act in concert with state officials are clothed with state action for the purposes of both § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment. See e. g. United States v. Price, 1966, 383 U.S. 787, 86 S. Ct. 1152, 16 L. Ed. 2d 267; Gomez v. Florida State Employment Commission, 5 Cir., 1969, 417 F.2d 569, 578
Classic involved prosecution under what is now 18 U.S.C.A. § 242, which is the criminal counterpart to 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. It is clear that the scope of the two statutes is parallel. See U. S. v. Price, 1966, 383 U.S. 787, 794-795, 86 S. Ct. 1152, 1157, 16 L. Ed. 2d 267, 272 n. 7.
Other cases considering the applicability ofSniadach to different types of garnishment statutes and other prehearing summary seizure devices given to protect creditors' interest are Arnold v. Knettle, 1969, 10 Ariz.App. 509, 460 P.2d 45 and Larson v. Fetherston, 1969, 44 Wis. 2d 712, 172 N.W.2d 20. See also Sackin v. Kersting, 1969, 10 Ariz.App. 340, 458 P.2d 544.
Ex parte Collins, 1928, 277 U.S. 565, 48 S. Ct. 585, 72 L. Ed. 990; Moody v. Flowers, 1967, 387 U.S. 97, 87 S. Ct. 1544, 18 L. Ed. 2d 643
Ex parte Collins,supra; Wilentz v. Sovereign Camp, W.O.W., 1939, 306 U.S. 573, 59 S. Ct. 709, 83 L. Ed. 994.
DocketNumber： 29690_1
Citation Numbers： 430 F.2d 430
Filed Date： 7/22/1970
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