Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/102664/turner-vs-united-states
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Document Index: 124994534

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 174', '§ 174', '§ 174', '§ 4704', '§ 4704', '§ 4704', '§ 2', '§ 174', '§ 4704', '§ 174', '§ 4704', '§ 174', '§ 4704', '§ 176', '§ 174', '§ 174', '§ 174', '§ 174', '§ 174', '§ 174', '§ 174', '§ 174', '§ 4704', '§ 4704', '§ 4704', '§ 470', '§ 174', '§ 4704', '§ 4704', '§ 174', '§ 4704', '§ 174', '§ 4704', '§ 174', '§ 4704', '§ 174', '§ 174', '§ 4704', '§ 174', '§ 4704']

Turner Vs United States - Citation 102664 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/102664
Case Number 396 U.S. 398
turner v. united states - 396 u.s. 398 (1970) u.s. supreme court turner v. united states, 396 u.s. 398 (1970) turner v. united states no.190 argued october 15, 1969 decided january 20, 1970 396 u.s. 398 certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the third circuit syllabus narcotics agents stopped a car in which petitioner was riding and found a package, which petitioner had thrown away, containing about 15 grams of a cocaine and sugar mixture, 5% of which was cocaine, and a package in the car weighing about 48 grams consisting of a total of 275 glassine bags containing a heroin mixture, 15.2% of which was heroin. petitioner was indicted and convicted of four narcotics violations: (1) knowingly receiving,.....
Turner v. United States - 396 U.S. 398 (1970)
U.S. Supreme Court Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970)
1. The trial court's instructions on the inference that might be drawn under § 174 with respect to petitioner's possession of heroin did not violate his right to be convicted only on a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and did not place impermissible pressure on him to testify in his own defense. Pp. 396 U. S. 405 -418.
(a) Since it is abundantly clear that little, if any, heroin is made in this country, and that, therefore, virtually all heroin consumed in the United States is illegally imported, § 174 is valid insofar as it permits a jury to infer that heroin possessed here is a smuggled drug, whether judged by the "more likely than not" standard applied in Leary v. United States, 395 U. S. 6 , or by the more exacting reasonable doubt standard. Pp. 396 U. S. 408 -416.
(b) While there is no proof that petitioner knew who smuggled his heroin or how the smuggling was done, he, like others who sell or distribute the drug, was undoubtedly aware of the "high probability" that the heroin in his possession originated in a foreign country. Pp. 396 U. S. 416 -418.
2. The presumption under § 174 will not support petitioner's conviction with respect to the possession of cocaine, as the facts show that much more cocaine is lawfully produced in, than is smuggled into, this country, and that the amount of cocaine stolen from legal sources is sufficiently large to negate the inference that petitioner's cocaine came from abroad or that he must have known that it did. Pp. 396 U. S. 418 -419.
3. The conviction under § 4704(a) with respect to heroin is affirmed. Pp. 396 U. S. 419 -422.
(a) The evidence that petitioner possessed the heroin packaged in 275 glassine bags without revenue stamps attached established that the heroin was in the process of being distributed, an act proscribed by the statute. P. 396 U. S. 420 .
(b) When a jury returns a guilty verdict on a count charging several acts in the conjunctive, as here, the verdict normally stands if evidence is sufficient with respect to any one of the acts charged. P. 396 U. S. 420 .
it in or from an original stamped package in view of the fact that no lawfully manufactured or lawfully imported heroin is found in this country. Pp. 396 U. S. 421 -422.
4. Petitioner's conviction with respect to cocaine based on the § 4704(a) inference is not based upon sufficient evidence. Pp. 396 U. S. 422 -424.
(a) Petitioner's bare possession of a small quantity of a cocaine and sugar mixture does not establish that he was dispensing or distributing the drug. P. 396 U. S. 423 .
(b) The possibility that petitioner either stole the cocaine in or from a stamped package or obtained it from a stamped package in the possession of a thief is sufficiently real that a conviction cannot be rested solely upon the presumption. Pp. 396 U. S. 423 -424.
(c) To the extent that Casey v. United States, 276 U. S. 413 , gives general approval to the § 4704(a) presumption, it is limited by this decision. P. 396 U. S. 424 .
Petitioner was found guilty by a jury on four counts charging violations of the federal narcotics laws. The issue before us is the validity of the provisions of § 2 of the Act of February 9, 1909, 35 Stat. 614, as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 174, and 26 U.S.C. § 4704(a) which authorize an inference of guilt from the fact of possession of narcotic drugs, in this case heroin and cocaine.
Petitioner was indicted on two counts relating to the heroin and two counts relating to the cocaine. The first count charged that Turner violated 21 U.S.C. § 174 [ Footnote 1 ]
by receiving, concealing, and facilitating the transportation and concealment of heroin while knowing that the heroin had been unlawfully imported into the United States. The third count charged the same offense with regard to the cocaine seized. The second count charged that petitioner purchased, possessed, dispensed, and distributed heroin not in or from the original stamped package in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 4704(a). [ Footnote 2 ] The fourth count made the same charge with regard to the cocaine. At the trial, the Government presented the evidence of the seizure of the packages containing heroin and cocaine, but presented no evidence on the origin of the drugs possessed by petitioner. Petitioner did not testify. With regard to Counts 1 and 3, the trial judge charged the jury, in accord with the statute, that the jury could infer from petitioner's unexplained possession of the heroin and cocaine that petitioner knew that the drugs he possessed had been unlawfully imported. With regard to Counts 2 and 4, the trial judge read to the jury the statutory provision making possession of drugs not in a stamped package " prima facie evidence" that the defendant purchased, sold, dispensed, or distributed
The statutory inference created by § 174 has been upheld by this Court with respect to opium and heroin, Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U. S. 178 (1925); Roviaro v. United States, 353 U. S. 53 (1957), as well as by an
unbroken line of cases in the courts of appeals. [ Footnote 3 ] Similarly, in a case involving morphine, this Court has rejected a constitutional challenge to the inference authorized by § 4704(a). Casey v. United States, 276 U. S. 413 (1928).
Leary v. United States, supra, dealt with a statute, 21 U.S.C. § 176a, providing that possession of marihuana, unless explained to the jury's satisfaction, "shall be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction" for smuggling, receiving, concealing, buying, selling, or facilitating the transportation, concealment, or sale of the drug, knowing that it had bee illegally imported. Referring to prior cases [ Footnote 4 ] holding that a statue authorizing the inference of one fact from the proof of another in criminal cases must be subjected to scrutiny by the courts to prevent "conviction upon insufficient proof," 395 U.S. at 395 U. S. 37 , the Court read those cases as
395 U.S. at 395 U. S. 36 . Since, judged by this standard, the inference drawn from the possession of marihuana was invalid, it was unnecessary to
We turn first to the conviction for trafficking in heroin in violation of § 174. Count 1 charged Turner with (1) knowingly receiving, concealing, and transporting heroin which (2) was illegally imported and which (3) he knew was illegally imported. See Harris v. United States, 359 U. S. 19 , 359 U. S. 23 (1959). For conviction, it was necessary for the Government to prove each of these three elements of the crime to the satisfaction of the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury was so instructed, and Turner was found guilty.
The proof was that Turner had knowingly possessed heroin; since it is illegal to import heroin or to manufacture it here, [ Footnote 5 ] he was also chargeable with knowing that his heroin had an illegal source. For all practical purposes, this was the Government's case. The trial judge, noting that there was no other evidence of importation
or of Turner's knowledge that his heroin had come from abroad, followed the usual practice and instructed the jury -- as § 174 permits, but does not require, that possession of a narcotic drug is sufficient evidence to justify conviction of the crime defined in § 174. [ Footnote 6 ]
The jury, however, even if it believed Turner had possessed heroin, was not required by the instructions to find him guilty. The jury was instructed that it was the sole judge of the facts and the inferences to be drawn therefrom, that all elements of the crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the inference authorized by the statute did not require the defendant to present evidence. To convict, the jury was informed, it "must be satisfied by the totality of the evidence irrespective
of the source from which it comes of the guilt of the defendant. . . ." The jury was obligated by its instructions to assess for itself the probative force of possession and the weight, if any, to be accorded the statutory inference. If it is true, as the Government contends, that heroin is not produced in the United States and that any heroin possessed here must have originated abroad, the jury, based on its own store of knowledge, may well have shared this view and concluded that Turner was equally well informed. Alternatively, the jury may have been without its own information concerning the sources of heroin, and may have convicted Turner in reliance on the inference permitted by the statute, perhaps reasoning that the statute represented an official determination that heroin is not a domestic product. [ Footnote 7 ]
Whatever course the jury took, it found Turner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and the question on review is the sufficiency of the evidence, or, more precisely, the soundness of inferring guilt from proof of possession alone. Since the jury might have relied heavily on the inferences authorized by the statute and included in the court's instructions, our primary focus is on the validity of the evidentiary rule contained in § 174. [ Footnote 8 ]
Section 174 or a similar provision has been the law since 1909. [ Footnote 9 ] For 60 years, defendants charged under the
statute have known that the section authorizes an inference of guilt from possession alone, that the inference is rebuttable by evidence that their heroin originated here, and that the inference itself is subject to challenge for lack of sufficient connection between the proved fact of possession and the presumed fact that theirs was smuggled merchandise. Mobile, J. & K. C. R. Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U. S. 35 , 219 U. S. 43 (1910). Given the statutory inference and absent rebuttal evidence, as far as a defendant is concerned, the § 174 crime is the knowing possession of heroin. Hence, if he is to avoid conviction, he faces the urgent necessity either to rebut or to challenge successfully the possession inference by demonstrating the fact or the likelihood of a domestic source for heroin, not necessarily by his own testimony, but through the testimony of others who are familiar with the traffic in drugs, whether government agents or private experts. Over the years, thousands of defendants, most of them represented by retained or appointed counsel, have been convicted under 174. Although there was opportunity in every case to challenge or rebut the inference based on possession, we are cited to no case, and we know of none, where substantial evidence showing domestic production of heroin has come to light. Instead, the inference authorized by the section, although frequently challenged, has been upheld in this Court and in countless cases in the district courts and courts of appeals, these cases implicitly reflecting the prevailing judicial view that heroin is not made in this country, but rather is imported from abroad. If this view is erroneous and heroin is or has
This view is supported by other official sources. In 1956, after extensive hearings, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary found no evidence that heroin is produced commercially in this country. [ Footnote 10 ] The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice stated in 1967 that
abroad, the Middle East being the reputed primary point of origin. [ Footnote 11 ]"
The factors underlying these judgments may be summarized as follows: first, it is plain enough that it is illegal both to import heroin into this country [ Footnote 12 ] and to manufacture it here; [ Footnote 13 ] heroin is contraband, and is subject to seizure. [ Footnote 14 ]
Second, heroin is a derivative of opium and can be manufactured from opium or from morphine or codeine,
which are also derived from opium. [ Footnote 15 ] Whether heroin can be synthesized is disputed, but there is no evidence that it is being synthesized in this country. [ Footnote 16 ]
Third, opium is derived from the opium poppy, which cannot be grown in this country without a license. [ Footnote 17 ] No licenses are outstanding for commercial cultivation, [ Footnote 18 ] and
there is no evidence that the opium poppy is illegally grown in the United States. [ Footnote 19 ]
Fourth, the law forbids the importation of any opium product except crude opium required for medical and scientific purposes; [ Footnote 20 ] importation of crude opium for the purpose of making heroin is specifically forbidden. [ Footnote 21 ] Sizable amounts of crude opium are legally imported and used to make morphine and codeine. [ Footnote 22 ]
Fifth, the flow of legally imported opium and of legally manufactured morphine and codeine is controlled too tightly to permit any significant possibility that heroin is manufactured or distributed by those legally licensed to deal in opium, morphine, or codeine. [ Footnote 23 ]
Sixth, there are recurring thefts of opium, morphine, and codeine from legal channels which could be used for the domestic, clandestine production of heroin. [ Footnote 24 ] It is extremely unlikely that heroin would be made from codeine, since the process involved produces an unmanageable, penetrating stench which it would be very difficult to conceal. [ Footnote 25 ] Clandestine manufacture of heroin from opium and morphine would not be subject to this difficulty; but, even on the extremely unlikely assumption that all opium and morphine stolen each year is used to manufacture heroin, the heroin so produced would amount to only a tiny fraction (less than 1%) of the illicit heroin illegally imported and marketed here. [ Footnote 26 ] Moreover, a clandestine laboratory manufacturing
heroin has not been discovered in many years. [ Footnote 27 ]
Concededly, heroin could be made in this country, at least in tiny amounts. But the overwhelming evidence is that the heroin consumed in the United States
is illegally imported. To possess heroin is to possess imported heroin. Whether judged by the "more likely than not" standard applied in Leary v. United States, supra, or by the more exacting reasonable doubt standard normally applicable in criminal cases, § 174 is valid insofar as it permits a jury to infer that heroin possessed in this country is a smuggled drug. If the jury relied on the § 174 instruction, it was entitled to do so. [ Footnote 28 ]
Given the fact that little if any heroin is made in the United States, Turner doubtless knew that the heroin he had came from abroad. There is no proof that he had specific knowledge of who smuggled his heroin or when or how the smuggling was done, but we are confident that he was aware of the "high probability" that the heroin in his possession had originated in a foreign country. Cf. Leary v. United States, supra, at 395 U. S. 45 -53. [ Footnote 29 ]
It may be that the ordinary jury would not always know that heroin illegally circulating in this country is not manufactured here. But Turner and others who sell or distribute heroin are in a class apart. [ Footnote 30 ] Such
people have regular contact with a drug which they know cannot be legally bought or sold; their livelihood depends on its availability; some of them have actually engaged in the smuggling process. The price, supply, and quality vary widely; [ Footnote 31 ] the market fluctuates with the ability of smugglers to outwit customs and narcotics agents at home and abroad. [ Footnote 32 ] The facts concerning heroin are available from many sources, frequently in the popular media. "Common sense" ( Leary v. United States, supra, at 395 U. S. 46 ) tells us that those who traffic in heroin will inevitably become aware that the product they deal in is smuggled, [ Footnote 33 ] unless they practice a studied ignorance to which they are not entitled. [ Footnote 34 ] We therefore have little doubt that the inference of knowledge from the fact of possessing smuggled heroin is a sound one; hence, the court's instructions on the inference did not violate the right of Turner to be convicted only on a finding of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, and did not place impermissible pressure upon him to testify in his own defense. [ Footnote 35 ] His conviction on Count 1 must be affirmed.
Supplementing the facts presented in Erwing, supra, the United States now asserts that substantial amounts of cocaine are smuggled into the United States. However, much more cocaine is lawfully produced in this country than is smuggled into this country. [ Footnote 36 ] The United States
concedes that thefts from legal sources, though totaling considerably less than the total smuggled, [ Footnote 37 ] are still sufficiently large to make the § 174 presumption invalid as applied to Turner's possession of cocaine. [ Footnote 38 ] Based on our own examination of the facts now before us, we reach the same conclusion. Applying the "more likely than not" standard employed in Leary, supra, we cannot be sufficiently sure either that the cocaine that Turner possessed came from abroad or that Turner must have known that it did. The judgment on Count 3 must be reversed. [ Footnote 39 ]
26 U.S.C. § 4704(a) [ Footnote 40 ] makes it unlawful to purchase, sell, dispense, or distribute a narcotic drug not in or from the original package bearing tax stamps. In this case, Count 2 charged that Turner knowingly purchased, dispensed, and distributed heroin hydrochloride not in or
from the original stamped package. [ Footnote 41 ] Count 4 made the identical charge with respect to cocaine. Section 474(a) also provides that the absence of appropriate tax stamps shall be prima facie evidence of a violation by the person in whose possession the drugs are found. This provision was read by the trial judge to the jury. The conviction on Count 2 with respect to heroin must be affirmed. Since the only evidence of a violation involving heroin was Turner's possession of the drug, the jury, to convict, must have believed this evidence. But part and parcel of the possession evidence, and indivisibly linked with it, was the fact that Turner possessed some 275 glassine bags of heroin without revenue stamps attached. This evidence, without more, solidly established that Turner's heroin was packaged to supply individual demands, and was in the process of being distributed, an act barred by the statute. The general rule is that, when a jury returns a guilty verdict on an indictment charging several acts in the conjunctive, as Turner's indictment did, the verdict stands if the evidence is sufficient with respect to any one of the acts charged. [ Footnote 42 ] Here, the evidence proved Turner was distributing heroin. The status of the case with respect to the other allegations is irrelevant to the
Those possessing heroin have secured it from some source. The act of possessing is itself sufficient proof that the possessor has not received it in or from the original stamped package, since it is so extremely unlikely that a package containing heroin would ever be legally stamped. All heroin found in this country is illegally imported. Those handling narcotics must register; [ Footnote 43 ] registered persons do not deal in heroin, and only registered importers and manufacturers are permitted to purchase stamps. [ Footnote 44 ] For heroin to be found in a stamped package, stamps would have to be stolen and fixed to the heroin container, and even then the stamps would immunize the transactions in the drug only from prosecution under § 4704(a); all other laws against transactions in heroin would be unaffected by the presence of the stamps.
Even so, obtaining heroin other than in the original stamped package is not a crime under § 4704(a). Of the various ways of acquiring heroin, e.g., by gift, theft, bailment or purchase, only purchasing is proscribed by the section. Since heroin is a high-priced product, [ Footnote 45 ] it would be very unreasonable to assume that any sizable number of possessors have not paid for it, one way or another. Perhaps a few acquire it by gift, and some heroin undoubtedly is stolen, but most users may be presumed to purchase what they use. The same may be said for those who sell, dispense, or distribute the drug. There is no reasonable doubt that a possessor of heroin who has purchased it did not purchase the heroin in or from the original stamped package. We thus would sustain the conviction on Count 2 on the basis of a purchase not in or from a stamped package even if the evidence of packaging did not point unequivocally to the conclusion that Turner was distributing heroin not in a stamped package.
Finally, we consider the validity of the § 470(a) presumption with respect to cocaine. The evidence was that, while in the custody of the police, Turner threw away a tinfoil package containing a mixture of cocaine and sugar, which, according to the Government, is not the form in which cocaine is distributed for medicinal purposes. [ Footnote 46 ] Unquestionably, possession was amply proved by the evidence, which the jury must have believed, since it returned a verdict of guilty. But the
While one can be confident that cocaine illegally manufactured from smuggled coca leaves or illegally imported after manufacturing would not appear in a stamped package at any time, cocaine, unlike heroin, is legally manufactured in this country; [ Footnote 47 ] and we have held that sufficient amounts of cocaine are stolen from legal channels to render invalid the inference authorized in § 174 that any cocaine possessed in the United States is smuggled cocaine. Supra at 396 U. S. 418 -419. Similar reasoning undermines the § 4704(a) presumption that a defendant's possession of unstamped cocaine is prima facie evidence that the drug was purchased not in or from the original stamped container. The thief who steals cocaine very probably obtains it in or from a stamped package. There is a reasonable possibility that Turner
Decisions of the courts of appeals accepting application of the presumption to persons found in possession of opium, morphine, or heroin include Gee Woe v. United States, 250 F. 428 (C.A. 5th Cir.), cert. denied, 248 U.S. 562 (1918) (smoking opium); Charley Toy v. United States, 266 F. 326 (C.A.2d Cir.), cert. denied, 254 U.S. 639 (1920) (smoking opium); Copperthwaite v. United States, 37 F.2d 846 (C.A. 6th Cir.1930) (morphine); United States v. Liss, 105 F.2d 144 (C.A.2d Cir.1939) (morphine); Dear Check Quong v. United States, 82 U.S.App.D.C. 8, 160 F.2d 251 (1947) (unspecified narcotics); Cellino v. United States, 276 F.2d 941 (C.A. 9th Cir.1960) (heroin); Walker v. United States, 285 F.2d 52 (C.A. 5th Cir.1960) (heroin); United States v. Savage, 292 F.2d 264 (C.A.2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 880 (1961) (heroin); United States v. Gibson, 310 F.2d 79 (C.A.2d Cir.1962) (heroin); Lucero v. United States, 311 F.2d 457 (C.A. 10th Cir.1962), cert. denied sub nom. Maestas v. United States, 372 U.S. 936 (1963) (heroin); Garcia v. United States, 373 F.2d 806 (C.A. 10th Cir.1967) (heroin).
Under prior decisions, principally United States v. Gainey, 380 U. S. 63 (1965), such statutory provisions authorize, but do not require, the trial judge to submit the case to the jury when the Government relies on possession alone, authorize, but do not require, an instruction to the jury based on the statute, and authorize, but do not require, the jury to convict based on possession alone. The defendant is free to challenge either the inference of illegal importation or the inference of his knowledge of that fact, or both. Harris v. United States, 359 U. S. 19 , 359 U. S. 23 (1959); Roviaro v. United States, 353 U. 9. 53, 63 (1957); Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U. S. 178 , 268 U. S. 185 (1925); United States v. Peeples, 377 F.2d 205 (C.A.2d Cir.1967); Chavez v. United States, 343 F.2d 85 (C.A. 9th Cir.1965); Griego v. United States, 298 F.2d 845 (C.A. 10th Cir.1962). Even when the defendant challenges the validity of the inference as applied to his case, the instruction on the statutory inference is normally given. See, e.g., McIntyre v. United States, 380 F.2d 746 (C.A. 9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 952 (1967); United States v. Peeples, supra; Vick v. United States, 113 U.S.App.D.C. 12, 304 F.2d 379 (1962); Griego v. United States, supra; Walker v. United States, 285 F.2d 52 (C.A. 5th Cir.1960); United States v. Feinberg, 123 F.2d 425 (C.A. 7th Cir.1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 801 (1942). See also Erwin v. United States, 323 F.2d 674 (C.A. 9th Cir.193); Caudillo v. United States, 253 F.2d 513 (C.A. 9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Romero v. United States, 367 U.S. 931 (1958).
377 F.2d at 208. The defendant was found guilty by the jury; however, the Court of Appeals reversed for reasons not directly related to the trial judge's treatment of the question about the origins of heroin possessed in this country.
See Leary v. United States, 395 U. S. 6 , 395 U. S. 31 -32 (1969); United States v. Romano, supra, at 382 U. S. 138 -139 (1965); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U. S. 219 , 23235 (1911).
Arguably, in declaring possession to be ample evidence to convict for trafficking in illegally imported drugs, Congress in effect has made possession itself a crime as an incident to its power over foreign commerce. Cf. Ferry v. Ramsey, 277 U. S. 88 (1928). But the crime defined by the statute is not possession, and the Court has rejected this basis for sustaining this and similar statutory inferences. Leary v. United States, supra, at 395 U. S. 34 , 395 U. S. 37 ; United States v. Romano, supra, at 142-144; Harris v. United States, supra, at 359 U. S. 23 ; Roviaro v. United States, supra., at 353 U. S. 62 -63; Tot v. United States, supra, at 319 U. S. 472 .
The Court has also refused to accept the suggestion that, since the source of his drugs is perhaps more within the defendant's knowledge than the Government's, it violates no rights of the defendant to permit conviction based on possession alone when the defendant refuses to demonstrate a legal source for his drugs. Leary v. United States, supra, at 395 U. S. 32 -34. See also Tot v. United States, supra, at 319 U. S. 469 -470. The difficulties with the suggested approach are obvious: if the Government proves only possession, and if possession is itself insufficient evidence of either importation or knowledge, but the statute nevertheless permits conviction where the defendant chooses not to explain, the Government is clearly relieved of its obligation to prove its case unaided by the defendant, and the defendant is made to understand that, if he fails to explain, he can be convicted on less than sufficient evidence to constitute a prima facie case. See Tot v. United States, supra, at 319 U. S. 469 .
The most recent reported case involving a prosecution for unlawful production of opium poppies is Az Din v. United States, 232 F.2d 283 (C.A. 9th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 827 (1956). Unlike the case of marihuana, see Leary, supra, at 395 U. S. 42 -43, there are no reports of the discovery in this country of fields of opium poppies requiring destruction. This fact, together with the facts that opium poppies are hard to conceal because of their color and that the harvesting of opium is only economically feasible in countries with an abundant supply of cheap labor, justifies a conclusion that little if any opium poppy production is going on in this country. See Brief for the United States 21-23.
Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U. S. 178 , 268 U. S. 185 (1925).
Crain v. United States, 162 U. S. 625 , 162 U. S. 634 -636 (1896); Smith v. United States, 234 F.2d 385, 389-390 (C.A. 5th Cir.1956); Price v. United States, 150 F.2d 283 (C.A. 5th Cir.1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 789 (1946). See also Claassen v. United States, 142 U. S. 140 (1891); The Confiscation Cases, 20 Wall. 92, 87 U. S. 104 (1874).
The opinion of the Court establishes convincingly the virtual certainty that the heroin in Turner's possession had been illegally imported into the country. It was thus proper with regard to Count 1 for the trial judge to instruct the jurors, in effect, that, if they found that Turner did indeed possess the drug, they could infer that the heroin had been illegally imported, and impute knowledge of that fact to Turner. However, the instruction that possession is prima facie evidence of a violation of § 4704(a) is quite different. It may be true that most persons who possess heroin have purchased it not in or from a stamped package. However, Turner
The foregoing rights are among those that the Bill of Rights specifically spells out and that due process
Commercial traffic in deadly mind-, soul-, and body-destroying drugs is, beyond doubt, one of the greatest evils of our time. It cripples intellects, dwarfs bodies, paralyzes the progress of a substantial segment of
Ante at 396 U. S. 405 . The Court in the above statement is merely reaffirming the fundamental constitutional principle that the accused is presumed innocent until he is proved guilty, and that the Government, before it can secure a conviction, must demonstrate to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt each essential element of the alleged offense. This basic principle is clearly reflected in several provisions of the Bill of Rights. The Fifth and Sixth Amendments provide that, as a part of due process of law, a person held for criminal prosecution shall be charged on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, and that the defendant shall "be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation." The purpose of these requirements
Ante at 396 U. S. 405 .
"Whatever course the jury took, it found Turner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and the question on review is the sufficiency of the evidence, or, more precisely, the soundness of inferring guilt from proof of possession alone. "
Ante at 396 U. S. 407 . (Emphasis added.) These passages show that the Government wholly failed to meet its burden of proof at trial on two of the elements Congress deemed essential to the crime it defined. The prosecution introduced no evidence to prove either
United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U. S. 11 , 350 U. S. 19 (1955). I would therefore reverse Turner's conviction under Count 1 without further ado. Moreover, as the majority opinion and the record in this case indicate, petitioner's convictions under Counts 3 and 4 are also based upon totally insufficient evidence, for, as in Count 1, the prosecution failed to introduce any evidence to support certain essential elements of the crimes charged under these counts. They, too, should be reversed for lack of evidence.
The Court attempts to take the stark nakedness of the evidence against Turner on these counts and clothe it in "presumptions" or "inferences" authorized by 21 U.S.C. § 174 and 26 U.S.C. § 4704(a). Apparently the Court feels that the Government can be relieved of the constitutional burden of proving the essential elements of its case by a mere congressional declaration that certain evidence shall be deemed sufficient to convict. Such an idea seems to me to be totally at variance with what the Constitution requires. Congress can undoubtedly create crimes and define their elements, but it cannot, under our Constitution, even partially remove
from the prosecution the burden of proving at trial each of the elements it has defined. The fundamental right of the defendant to be presumed innocent is swept away to precisely the extent judges and juries rely upon the statutory presumptions of guilt found in 21 U.S.C. § 174 and 26 U.S.C. § 4704(a). And each of the weapons given by the Bill of Rights to the criminal accused to defend his innocence -- the right to counsel, the right to confront the witnesses against him and to subpoena witnesses in his favor, the privilege against self-incrimination -- is nullified to the extent that the Government, to secure a conviction, does not have to introduce any evidence to support essential allegations of the indictment it has brought. It would be a senseless and stupid thing for the Constitution to take all these precautions to protect the accused from governmental abuses if the Government could, by some sleight-of-hand trick with presumptions, make nullities of those precautions. Such a result would completely frustrate the purpose of the Founders to establish a system of criminal justice in which the accused -- even the poorest and most humble -- would be able to protect himself from wrongful charges by a big and powerful government. It is little less than fantastic even to imagine that those who wrote our Constitution and the Bill of Rights intended to have a government that could create crimes of several separate and independent parts and then relieve the government of proving a portion of them. Of course, within certain broad limits, it is not necessary for Congress to define a crime to include any particular set of elements. But if it does, constitutional due process requires the Government to prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt before it can convict the accused of the crime it deliberately and clearly defined. Turner's trial therefore reminds me more of Daniel being cast into the lion's den than it does of a constitutional proceeding. The Bible
I would have more hesitation in setting aside these jury verdicts for insufficiency of the evidence were I confident that the jury had been allowed to make a free and unhampered determination of guilt or innocence as the jury trial provisions of Article III of the Constitution and the Sixth Amendment require. The right to trial by jury includes the right to have the jury and the jury alone find the facts of the case, including the crucial fact of guilt or innocence. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U. S. 11 , 350 U. S. 15 -19 (1955). This right to have the jury determine guilt or innocence necessarily includes the right to have that body decide whether the evidence presented at trial is sufficient to convict. Turner's convictions on each count were secured only after the jury had been explicitly instructed by the trial judge that proof of Turner's mere possession of heroin and cocaine "shall be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction" under 21 U.S.C. § 174, and "shall be prima facie evidence of a violation" of 26 U.S.C. § 4704(a). App. 15-18. In my view, these instructions to the jury impermissibly interfered with the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to have the jury determine when evidence is sufficient to justify a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
The instructions directing the jury to presume guilt in this case were not, of course, the trial judge's own inspiration. Congress, in enacting the statutory presumptions purporting to define and limit the quantum of evidence necessary to convict, has injected its own views and controls into the guilt-determining, factfinding process vested by our Constitution exclusively in the Judicial Branch of our Government. The Fifth Amendment's command that cases be tried according to due
process of law includes the accused's right to have his case tried by a judge and a jury in a court of law without legislative constraint or interference. These statutory presumptions clearly violate the command of that Amendment. Congress can declare a crime, but it must leave the trial of that crime to the courts. See Leary v. United States, 395 U. S. 6 , 395 U. S. 55 (1969) (concurring in result), and United States v. Gainey, 380 U. S. 63 , 380 U. S. 84 -85 (1965) (dissenting opinion).
It is my belief that these statutory presumptions are totally unconstitutional for yet another reason, and it is a critically important one. As discussed earlier, the Constitution requires that the defendant in a criminal case be presumed innocent, and it places the burden of proving guilt squarely on the Government. Statutory presumptions such as those involved in this case rob the defendant of at least part of his presumed innocence and cast upon him the burden of proving that he is not guilty. The presumption in 21 U.S.C. § 174 makes this shift in the burden of proof explicit. It provides that possession of narcotic drugs shall be deemed sufficient evidence to justify a conviction "unless the defendant explains the possession to the satisfaction of the jury." However, so far as robbing the defendant of his presumption of innocence is concerned, it makes no difference whether the statute explicitly says the defendant can rebut the presumption of guilt (as does the provision of 21 U.S.C. § 174 just quoted), or whether the statute simply uses the language of " prima facie case" and leaves implicit the possibility of the defendant's rebutting the presumption (as does 26 U.S.C. § 4704(a)). Presumptions of both forms tend to coerce and compel the defendant into taking the witness stand in his own behalf, in clear violation of the accused's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. This privilege has been consistently interpreted to establish
the defendant's absolute right not to testify at his own trial unless he freely chooses to do so. As we observed in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1 , 378 U. S. 8 (1964), the privilege is fulfilled only when the person is guaranteed "the right . . . to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will. . . ." The defendant's right to a free and unfettered choice in whether or not to testify is effectively destroyed by the coercive effect of the statutory presumptions found in 21 U.S.C. § 174 and 26 U.S.C. § 4704(a). See United States v. Gainey, 380 U. S. 63 , 380 U. S. 71 -74, 380 U. S. 87 (1965) (dissenting opinions). Moreover, when the defendant declines to testify and the trial judge states to the jury, as he did in this case, that evidence of possession of narcotics shall be deemed sufficient to convict "unless the defendant explains the possession to the satisfaction of the jury," such an instruction is nothing less than judicial comment upon the defendant's failure to testify, a practice that we held violative of the Self-Incrimination Clause in Griffin v. California, 380 U. S. 609 (1965).
How does the Court respond to the grave constitutional problems raised by these presumptions of guilt? It says only that these presumptions are, in its view, "reasonable" or factually supportable "beyond a reasonable doubt." In other words, the Court has concluded that the presumptions are "fair," and apparently thinks that is a sufficient answer. It matters not to today's majority that the evidence that it cites to show the factual basis of the presumptions was never introduced at petitioner's trial, and that petitioner was never given an opportunity to confront before the jury the many expert witnesses now arrayed against him in the footnotes of the Court's opinion. Nor does it apparently matter to the Court that the factfinding role it undertakes today is constitutionally vested not in this Court, but in the jury. If Congress wants to make simple possession of