Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/370/238
Timestamp: 2016-02-10 15:27:04
Document Index: 748618516

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 301', '§ 185', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301']

Samuel M. ATKINSON et al., Petitioners, v. SINCLAIR REFINING COMPANY. | US Law | LII / Legal Information Institute
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370 U.S. 238 (82 S.Ct. 1318, 8 L.Ed.2d 462)
[HTML] Gilbert A. Cornfield, Chicago, Ill., for petitioners.
Court I of the complaint, which was in three counts, stated a cause of action under § 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act (
29 U.S.C. 185, 29 U.S.C.A. § 185) against the international and its local. It alleged an existing collective bargaining agreement between the international and the company containing, among other matters, a promise by the union not to strike over any cause which could be the subject of a grievance under other provisions of the contract. It was alleged that the international and the local caused the strike or work stoppage occurring on February 13 and 14 and that the strike was over the pay claims of three employees in the amount of $2.19, which claims were properly subject to the grievance procedure provided by the contract. The complaint asked for damages in the amount of $12,500 from the international and the local.
We have concluded that Count I should not be dismissed or stayed. Count I properly states a cause of action under § 301 and is to be governed by federal law. Local 174, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, and Helpers of America v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 102104, 82 S.Ct. 571, 576, 7 L.Ed.2d 593; Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 77 S.Ct. 912, 1 L.Ed.2d 972. Under our decisions, whether or not the company was bound to arbitrate, as well as what issues it must arbitrate, is a matter to be determined by the Court on the basis of the contract entered into by the parties. 'The Congress * * * has by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, assigned the courts the duty of determining whether the reluctant party has breached his promise to arbitrate. For arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.' United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 1353, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409. See also United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 570 571, 80 S.Ct. 1343, 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1403 (concurring opinion). We think it unquestionably clear that the contract here involved is not susceptible to a construction that the company was bound to arbitrate its claim for damages against the union for breach of the undertaking not to strike.
that the parties did not intend to commit all of their possible disputes and the whole scope of their relationship to the grievance and arbitration procedures established in Article XXVI,
that article itself is determinative of the issue in this case since it precludes arbitration boards from considering any matters other than employee grievances.
After defining a grievance as 'any difference regarding wages, hours or working conditions between the parties hereto or between the employer and an employee covered by the working agree-hereto or between the Employer and an employee covered by this working agreement,' Article XXVI provides that the parties desire to settle employee grievances fairly and quickly and that therefore a stated procedure 'must be followed.' The individual employee is required to present his grievance to his foreman, and if not satisfied there, he may take his grievance to the plant superintendent who is to render a written decision. There is also provision for so-called Workmen's Committees to present grievances to the local management. If the local superintendent's decision is not acceptable, the matter is to be referred for discussion between the President of the International and the Director of Industrial Relations for the company (or their representatives), and for decision by the Director alone. If the Director's decision is disputed, then 'upon request of the President or any District Director' of the international, a local arbitration board may be convened and the matter finally decided by this board.
The District Court must decide whether the company is entitled to damages from the union for breach of contract. The arbitrator, if arbitration occurs, must award or deny reimbursement in whole or in part to all or some of the 14 employees. His award, standing alone, obviously would determine no issue in the damage suit. If he awarded reimbursement to the employees and if it could be ascertained with any assurance
that one of his subsidiary findings was that the 14 men had not participated in a forbidden work stoppagethe critical issue according to the union's briefthe company would nevertheless not be foreclosed in court since, even if it were bound by such a subsidiary finding made by the arbitrator, it would be free to prove its case in court through the conduct of other agents of the union. In this state of the record, the union has not made out its case for a stay.
Under § 301 a suit for violation of the collective bargaining contract in either a federal or state court is governed by federal law (Local 174, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 102104, 82 S.Ct. 571, 576, 7 L.Ed.2d 593; Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 77 S.Ct. 912, 1 L.Ed.2d 972), and Count II on its face charges the individual defendants with a violation of the no-strike clause. After quoting verbatim the no-strike clause, Count II alleges that the 24 individual defendants 'contrary to their duty to plaintiff to abide by' the contract fomented and participated in a work stoppage in violation of the no-strike clause. The union itself does not quarrel with the proposition that the relationship of the members of the bargaining unit to the employer is 'governed by' the bargaining agreement entered into on their behalf by the union. It is universally accepted that the no-strike clause in a collective agreement at the very least establishes a rule of conduct or condition of employment the violation of which by employees justifies discipline or discharge (Mastro Plastics Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 350 U.S. 270, 280 & n. 10, 76 S.Ct. 349, 356, 100 L.Ed. 309; National Labor Relations Board v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71, 80, 73 S.Ct. 519, 524, 97 L.Ed. 832; National Labor Relations Board v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332, 59 S.Ct. 508, 83 L.Ed. 682; National Labor Relations Board v. Draper Corp., 145 F.2d 199 (C.A. 4th Cir.); United Biscuit Co. of America v. National Labor Relations Board, 128 F.2d 771 (C.A.7th Cir.); see R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 5 Lab.Arb. 16; Ford Motor Co., 1 Lab.Arb. 439). The conduct charged in Count II is therefore within the scope of a 'violation' of the collective agreement.
As well as charging a violation of the no-strike clause by the individual defendants, Count II necessarily charges a violation of the clause by the union itself. The work stoppage alleged is the identical work stoppage for which the union is sued under Count I and the same damage is alleged as is alleged in Count I. Count II states that the individual defendants acted 'as officers, committeemen and agents of the said labor organizations' in breaching and inducing others to breach the collective bargaining contract. Count I charges the principal, and Count II charges the agents for acting on behalf of the principal. Whatever individual liability Count II alleges for the 24 individual defendants, it necessarily restates the liability of the union which is charged under Count I, since under § 301(b) the union is liable for the acts of its agents, under familiar principles of the law of agency (see also § 301(e)). Proof of the allegations of Count II in its present form would inevitably prove a violation of the no-strike clause by the union itself. Count II, like Count I, is thus a suit based on the union's breach of its collective bargaining contract with the employer, and therefore comes within § 301(a). When a union breach of contract is alleged, that the plaintiff seeks to hold the agents liable instead of the principal does not bring the action outside the scope of § 301.
Under any theory, therefore, the company's action is governed by the national labor relations law which Congress commanded this Court to fashion under § 301(a). We hold that this law requires the dismissal of Count II for failure to state a claim for which relief can be grantedwhether the contract violation charged is that of the union or that of the union plus the union officers and agents.
Consequently, in discharging the duty Congress imposed on us to formulate the federal law to govern § 301(a) suits, we are strongly guided by and do not give a niggardly reading to § 301(b). 'We would undercut the Act and defeat its policy if we read § 301 narrowly' (Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S., at 456, 77 S.Ct., at 917, 918). We have already said in another context that § 301(b) at least evidences 'a congressional intention that the union as an entity, like a corporation, should in the absence of agreement be the sole source of recovery for injury inflicted by it' (Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U.S. 459, 470, 80 S.Ct. 489, 496, 4 L.Ed.2d 442). This policy cannot be evaded or truncated by the simple device of suing union agents or members, whether in contract or tort, or both, in a separate count or in a separate action for damages for violation of a collective bargaining contract for which damages the union itself is liable. The national labor policy requires and we hold that when a union is liable for damages for violation of the no-strike clause, its officers and members are not liable for these damages. Here, Count II, as we have said, necessarily alleges union liability but prays for damages from the union agents. Where the union has inflicted the injury it alone must pay. Count II must be dismissed.
We do not need to reach, therefore, the question of whether, under the contract involved here, breaches of the no-strike clause are 'grievances,' i.e., 'difference(s) regarding wages, hours or working conditions,' or are 'grievances' in the more general sense of the term. See Hoover Motor Express Co. v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Helpers and Taxicab Drivers Local, No. 327, 217 F.2d 49 (C.A.6th Cir.). The present decision does not approve or disapprove the doctrine of the Hoover case or the Sixth Circuit cases following it (e.g., Vulcan-Cincinnati, Inc. v. United Steelworkers, 289 F.2d 103; International Union, United Auto Aircraft v. Benton Harbor Malleable Indus., 242 F.2d 536). See also cases collected in Yale & Towne Mfg. Co. v. Local Lodge No. 1717, 299 F.2d 882, 883884 n. 5, 6 (C.A.3d Cir.). In Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, 370 U.S. 254, 82 S.Ct. 1346, the question of arbitrability of a damages claim for breach of a no-strike clause is considered and resolved in favor of arbitration in the presence of an argeement to arbitrate 'all complaints, disputes or grievances arising between them (i.e., the parties) involving * * * any act or conduct or relation between the parties.'
Swift & Co. v. United Packinghouse Workers, 177 F.Supp. 511 (D.Colo.). Contra, Square D Co. v. United Elec., Radio & Machine Wkrs., 123 F.Supp. 776, 779781 (E.D.Mich.). See also Morgan Drive Away, Inc. v. International Broth. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America Union, 166 F.Supp. 885 (S.D.Ind.), concluding, as we do, that the complaint should be dismissed because of §§ 301(b) and 301(e), but for want of jurisdiction rather than on the merits. Our holding, however, is that the suit is a § 301 suit; whether there is a claim upon which relief can be granted is a separate question. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 66 S.Ct. 773, 90 L.Ed. 939.