Source: https://ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/_layouts/ntsb.recsearch/Recommendation.aspx?Rec=A-07-016
Timestamp: 2019-09-21 08:54:23
Document Index: 395650338

Matched Legal Cases: ['arts 23', 'arts 23', 'arts 23', 'art 121', 'art 135', 'arts 23', 'arts 23', 'arts 23', 'arts 121', 'art 121', 'art 121', 'art 121', 'art 121', 'art 121', 'art 121', 'art 121', 'art 121', 'art 121', 'art 121', 'art 121', 'art 121']

Safety Recommendation A-07-016
Recommendation: TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: When the revised icing certification standards (recommended in Safety Recommendations A-96-54 and A-98-92) and criteria are complete, review the icing certification of pneumatic deice boot-equipped airplanes that are currently certificated for operation in icing conditions and perform additional testing and take action as required to ensure that these airplanes fulfill the requirements of the revised icing certification standards. (A-07-16) (This safety recommendation supersedes Safety Recommendation A-98-100)
Response: On June 6, 2011, the FAA stated its position that “known safety concerns for in-service airplanes related to the Board’s safety recommendation A-07-16 have been addressed” by a series of actions described in its letter. As a result, the FAA believed that (1) there would be little benefit to retroactively applying new design regulations to existing airplane designs and (2) such a requirement would not be justified. The FAA therefore considered its actions in response to this recommendation to be complete. On September 12, 2011, we replied that we disagreed with the FAA and pointed out that this recommendation specifies that an evaluation of in-service airplanes should be conducted after the revised icing certification standards recommended in Safety Recommendations A-96-54 and A-98-92 are complete. On June 29, 2010, the FAA published its long-awaited notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), “Airplane and Engine Certification Requirements in Supercooled Large Drop [SLD], Mixed Phase, and Ice Crystal Icing Conditions,” which proposed the standards recommended in Safety Recommendations A-96-54 and A-98-92 and which will be applicable to new aircraft. We did not believe that the actions described in the FAA’s June 6, 2011, letter adequately addressed the ability of currently certificated aircraft to safely fly in SLD conditions. In our September 12, 2011, letter, we described our participation in an accident investigation then being conducted by the Junta de Investigaciones de Accidentes de Aviación Civil (JIAAC) of Argentina. On May 18, 2011, a Sol Lineas Aéreas Saab 340A was en route from Neuquén, Argentina, to Comodoro Rivadavia, Argentina, when the flight crew declared an emergency and the airplane subsequently disappeared from radar. The aircraft was later discovered, crashed, about 35 kilometers from Los Menucos, Argentina. It had been operating in icing conditions, and early investigative findings suggested that it might have encountered SLD conditions, possibly resulting in the loss of control and crash. We believed this was precisely the type of situation that Safety Recommendation A-07-16 is meant to address: an airplane currently certificated for flight in icing conditions (such as the Saab 340) that has not demonstrated the ability to safely operate in SLD conditions. Because this investigation was in progress when we wrote our letter, detailed information was not yet publicly available. Although the FAA stated that it regarded its action in response to Safety Recommendation A-07-16 to be complete and it planned no further action, we believed that, before we closed this recommendation, the FAA should review the results of the JIAAC investigation, once these results became available. This recommendation is now 6 1/2 years old, and it superseded Safety Recommendation A-98-100, issued 15 years ago. The NTSB believes that actions taken in response to safety recommendations should usually be completed within 5 years of the recommendation’s issuance. Although we believe the JIAAC investigation will provide information supporting this recommendation, the investigation has not yet been completed, nor does it appear that the report will be available soon. We continue to urge the FAA to examine this investigation closely when it is completed, but we also believe it unreasonable to further delay closing the recommendation. Accordingly, because the FAA plans no further action in response to Safety Recommendation A-07-16 and because we do not believe that the FAA has effectively corrected the unsafe conditions, the recommendation is classified CLOSED—UNACCEPTABLE ACTION.
Response: The NTSB disagrees with the FAA that “known safety concerns for in-service airplanes related to the Board’s safety recommendation A-07-16 have been addressed” by the series of actions described in the FAA’s letter. This recommendation specifies that an evaluation of in-service airplanes should be conducted after the revised icing certification standards recommended in Safety Recommendations A-96-54 and A-98-92 are complete. On June 29, 2010, the FAA published its long-awaited notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), “Airplane and Engine Certification Requirements in Supercooled Large Drop [SLD], Mixed Phase, and Ice Crystal Icing Conditions.” This NPRM proposed the standards recommended in Safety Recommendations A-96-54 and A-98-92. The actions described in the FAA’s June 6, 2011, letter do not adequately address the ability of an aircraft to safely fly in SLD conditions. The NTSB further disagrees with the FAA that there would be little benefit to retroactively applying the new design regulations to existing airplane designs, or that such a requirement would not be justified. The NTSB is currently participating in an investigation being conducted by the Junta de Investigaciones de Accidentes de Aviación Civil (JIAAC) of Argentina. On May 18, 2011, a Sol Lineas Aéreas Saab 340A was en route from Neuquén, Argentina, to Comodoro Rivadavia, Argentina, when the flight crew declared an emergency, followed by the airplane disappearing from radar. The aircraft was later discovered, crashed, about 35 kilometers from Los Menucos, Argentina. It had been operating in icing conditions, and early investigative findings suggest that it may have encountered SLD conditions it could not handle, and that this had resulted in the loss of control and crash. We believe this is precisely the type of situation that Safety Recommendation A-07-16 is meant to address: an airplane currently certificated for flight in icing conditions (such as the Saab 340) that is not able to safely handle SLD conditions. This investigation is currently ongoing, and detailed information is not yet publicly available. Although the FAA stated that it regards its action in response to Safety Recommendation A-07-16 to be complete and plans no further action, we believe that before we close this recommendation, the FAA should review the results of the JIAAC investigation, once these results become available. Because the NTSB disagrees that the FAA has effectively corrected the unsafe conditions as intended by Safety Recommendation A-07-16, pending completion of the recommended action, this recommendation remains classified OPEN—UNACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.
Response: CC# 201100234: - From J. Randolph Babbitt, Administrator: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has taken the following major actions related to icing to specifically address this safety recommendation in order to ensure safe operation of existing airplanes equipped with pneumatic deicing boots: •	Issued more than 25 airworthiness directives (AD) for Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) parts 23 and 25 airplanes equipped with de-icing boots requiring activation at the first sign of ice accretions anywhere on the aircraft. We also require cycling of the boots in the auton1atic mode, if available, or manually operating to minimize the ice accretions on the airframe. An example of an AD for activation of deicing boots at the first sign of icing is AD 99-19-10, which was applicable to Aerospatiale Model ATR-42 and ATR-72 series airplanes and became effective on December 27, 1999; •	Issued more than 40 severe icing ADs for 14 CFR parts 23 and 25 airplanes equipped with pneun1atic deicing boots and unpowered ailerons. The ADs provide the flight crew with visual cues to determine when the airplane has encountered severe icing conditions that exceed the capabilities of the airplane~ s ice protection equipment. The ADs also require specific procedures in the airplane flight manual for exiting the severe icing environment. An example of an AD for detecting and exiting severe icing conditions is AD 96-09-24, which was applicable to Embraer Model EMB-120 series airplanes and became effective on June 11, 1996; •	Conducted a roll control force evaluation that addressed 14 CFR parts 23 and 25 airplanes equipped with pneun1atic deicing boots and unpowered ailerons that are used in regularly scheduled revenue passenger service in the United States. The evaluation included a sin1ulated ice shape installed aft of the deicing boots and forward of the ailerons. The simulated ice shape represented possible ice formation in supercooled large drop icing conditions. We found all airplanes to have acceptable roll control forces should a ridge of ice form aft of deicing boots and forward of the ailerons; and •	Conducted an ice contaminated tailplane stall evaluation of existing airplanes with unpowered flight control systen1s (of which many are equipped with pneumatic deicing boots) operating under 14 CFR part 121 or part 135 operating rules. The FAA mandated changes to improve tailplane stall margins for airplanes found to be susceptible. We provided a list of ADs in the FAA response to this safety recommendation dated September 22, 2009. The actions discussed above apply to in-service airplanes. Proposed rulemaking activities will apply to future designs. In the interim, for airplane certification projects initiated after the ADs became effective, the FAA has imposed the intent of the ADs or required airplane evaluations to ensure safe operations through issue papers for each new certification project. The issue paper process provides a means to identify and resolve significant technical, regulatory, and administrative issues occurring during the certification process. The FAA considers whether or not a new regulation should apply to in-service airplanes. For activation of ice protection equipment, the FAA revised the design standards and has also proposed new operational regulations that would apply to airplanes most affected by flight in icing conditions regardless of when they were certified. Current status for that rulen1aking activity is provided in response to safety recommendations A-07-14 and A-07-15. The FAA maintains that known safety concerns for in-service airplanes related to the Board~ s safety re¢on1n1endation A-07-16 have been addressed as discussed above. As a result~ we believe there would be little benefit to retroactively applying the new design regulations to existing airplane designs, and such a requirement would not be justified. I believe that the FAA has effectively corrected the unsafe conditions as intended by this safety recommendation and consider our actions con1plete.
Response: The NTSB disagrees with the FAA’s conclusion that a formal evaluation of all airplanes equipped with pneumatic deicing boots to ensure that these aircraft comply with all icing certification criteria for new aircraft is not warranted. This recommendation specifically indicates that the evaluation of in-service airplanes should be conducted after the revised icing certification standards recommended in Safety Recommendations A-96-54 and A-98-92 are complete. The FAA has previously advised the NTSB that it believed the standards were sufficiently developed to make this determination, and the NTSB agreed with the FAA. However, it appears there has been a misunderstanding. The NTSB believed that the FAA would apply the standards recommended by the ARAC in December 2005 in response to Safety Recommendation A-96-54. Based on the FAA’s current letter, the FAA does not seem to believe that these standards must be used to meet the intent of Safety Recommendation A-07-16. Because the FAA has not yet issued the NPRM for these standards, let alone adopted a final rule mandating them, the FAA’s conclusion that a formal evaluation is not needed does not constitute an acceptable response to this recommendation. Accordingly, at its February 18, 2010, meeting, the Board voted to retain the classification OPEN -- UNACCEPTABLE RESPONSE for Safety Recommendation A-07-16.
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 10/5/2009 3:57:02 PM MC# 2090620: - From J. Randolph Babbitt, Administrator: The Board's letter dated September 10, 2008, reiterated their May 10, 2006, position, that to meet the intent of Safety Recommendation A-98-100 (now A-07-16), the FAA must formally evaluate all airplanes equipped with pneumatic deicing boots that are currently certificated for operation in icing conditions to ensure that these aircraft comply with all current icing certification criteria for new aircraft. We have taken the following major actions to ensure the safe operation of existing airplanes that are equipped with pneumatic deicing boots: Issued over 25 Airworthiness Directives (Ads for parts 23 and 25 airplanes requiring: Activation of the deicing boots at the first sign of ice accretions anywhere on the aircraft, and Cycling the boots in the automatic mode, if available, or manually operating to minimize the ice accretions on the airframe. Issued over 40 severe icing Ads for parts 23 and 25 airplanes equipped with pneumatic deicing boots and unpowered ailerons. The Ads provide the flight crew with visual cues to determine when the airplane has encountered severe icing conditions that exceed the capabilities of the airplane's ice protection equipment. The Ads also require the flight crew to exit the severe icing conditions; Conducted a roll control force evaluation that addressed parts 23 and 25 airplanes used in regularly scheduled revenue passenger service in the United States and equipped with pneumatic deicing boots and unpowered ailerons. All airplanes were found to have acceptable roll control forces should a ridge of ice form aft of deicing boots and forward of the ailerons; and Conducted an ice contaminated tailplane stall evaluation of existing airplanes with unpowered flight control systems (of which many are equipped with pneumatic deicing boots) operating under parts 121 or 135 operating rules. The FAA mandated changes to improve tailplane stall margins for airplanes found to be susceptible. These changes were mandated through the following Ads We believe the above actions adequately address the safe operation of existing aircraft equipped with pneumatic deicing boots. Therefore, a formal evaluation of all airplanes equipped with pneumatic deicing boots to ensure that these aircraft comply with all current icing certification criteria for new aircraft is not warranted, The remaining ongoing icing rulemaking projects for existing airplanes are provided here for information only as they address other safety recommendations but are not required for completion of A-07-16. These actions include the issuance of Part 121 Activation of Ice Protection System and Part 121 Exiting Icing rules. The Part 121 Activation of Ice Protection System rule will ensure timely activation of the ice protection system. The rule will apply to all airplanes operating under part 121, which have a maximum certificated takeoff weight less than 60,000 pounds. The FAA reports details of the Part 121 Activation of Ice Protection proposed rule to the Board through A-07-14. The Part 121 Exiting Icing rule will require flight crews of airplanes equipped with unpowered roll controls and that have a maximum certificated takeoff weight less than 60,000 pounds, to exit conditions that are conducive to the formation of ice accretion aft of the protected areas, unless the airplane is certificated for flight in SLD. We plan to initiate a Part 121 Exiting Icing proposed rule early in 2010. The FAA reports details of the Part 121 Exiting Icing proposed rule to the Board through A-96-56. I believe that the FAA has effectively addressed this safety recommendation, and I consider our actions complete.
Response: This safety recommendation supersedes Safety Recommendation A-98-100 by including all pneumatic deice boot equipped airplanes that are currently certificated for operation in icing conditions rather than only turbo-propeller aircraft equipped with pneumatic deice boots. The FAA stated that in response to Safety Recommendation A-98-100, it issued airworthiness directives (ADs) for existing aircraft similar in design to the ATR-72 airplane involved in the October 31, 1994, icing accident over Roselawn, Indiana, and an EMB-120 involved in the January 9, 1997, icing accident over Monroe, Michigan. In addition, the FAA is planning to revise the regulations in Part 121 (1) to address when the ice protection system should be activated and (2) to provide a less subjective means of determining when to exit icing conditions. The FAA believes that its actions are appropriate for both turbopropeller and turbojet airplanes. The FAA’s October 26, 2005, response to Safety Recommendation A-98-100 indicated that the FAA believed the icing certification regulations and advisory material were sufficient to determine whether additional actions were needed to correct unsafe conditions on airplanes certificated at that time. The FAA further stated that it had determined that no unsafe conditions existed that warranted actions beyond those that had already been completed or were in the process of being completed. On May 10, 2006, the Board responded to the FAA that it agreed that suitable information was available to determine whether additional action was required. However, the Board did not agree that the FAA had applied the new information to all appropriate airplanes in service. The FAA found that there were no airplanes for which an unsafe condition existed, and the Board was concerned that the FAA had based its conclusion primarily on the absence of accidents or serious incidents. To meet the intent of Safety Recommendation A-98-100 (and now A-07-16), the FAA will need to formally evaluate (perhaps by conducting flight tests on) all existing pneumatic deice boot-equipped airplanes that are currently certificated for operation in icing conditions to ensure that these aircraft comply with all current icing certification criteria for new aircraft. In the May 10, 2006, letter, the Board asked the FAA to supply a list of those aircraft that it had formally evaluated and a summary of the findings and resultant actions. Pending receipt of such a list, Safety Recommendation A-98-100 was classified Open Unacceptable Response. The FAA has not supplied such a list of aircraft evaluated and resultant actions. Pending our receipt and review of a list of those aircraft that the FAA has formally evaluated and a summary of the findings and resultant actions, Safety Recommendation A-07-16 remains classified OPEN -- UNACCEPTABLE RESPONSE.
Response: Letter Mail Controlled 5/31/2007 8:48:32 AM MC# 2070240: - From Marion C. Blakey, Administrator: 5/17/07 This safety recommendation supersedes A-98-100. In response to safety recommendation A-98-100, we have taken certain actions for the safe operation of turbopropeller-driven airplanes in icing conditions. We are aware of the lessons learned from two major accidents, the ATR-72 accident in Roselawn, Indiana and the EMB-120 accident in Monroe, Michigan, which occurred in 1994 and 1998, respectively. We issued airworthiness directives (AD) against existing aircraft of designs similar to the accident airplanes (see enclosure). In addition, after a general review of icing accidents and incidents the FAA began a rulemaking project to amend the 14 CFR part 121 operating rules to improve the safety of the fleet. The proposed part 121 rule, in addition to those described in our October 2005 response to the Board, improves ice protection activation means and requires less subjective means of determining when the flightcrew should exit icing conditions. This rule is applicable to all booted airplanes. We believe these Ads and the planned part 121 rule will incorporate the lessons learned from both the Roselawn and Monroe accidents for existing turbopropeller-driven airplanes in service. As a result of the issuance of A-07-16, we have reexamined our position and find that our actions are appropriate for both turbopropeller and turbojet-driven airplanes, because many of the FAA actions were applicable to both types of airplanes. The FAA will take additional action for specific airplane models if we find evidence that an unsafe condition exists or is likely to develop in any in-service airplane type.