Source: http://www2.bloomberglaw.com/public/desktop/document/Monsanto_Co_v_Geertson_Seed_Farms_130_S_Ct_2743_177_L_Ed_2d_461_7
Timestamp: 2013-05-24 00:20:44
Document Index: 765841815

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 7711', '§ 4332', '§ 4321', '§ 7701', '§ 7711', '§ 2', '§ 340', '§ 340', '§ 7711', '§ 340', '§ 340', '§ 4332', '§ 1508', '§ 1506', '§ 1506', '§ 1531', '§ 702', '§ 702', '§ 1501', '§ 4332', '§ 1506', '§ 1506', '§ 4332', '§ 4332', '§ 8', '§ 4', '§ 1506', '§ 1502', '§ 1508', '§ 1937', '§ 523', '§ 924', '§ 340', '§ 1508', '§ 1508', '§ 1508']

Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 177 L. Ed. 2d 461, 70 ERC 1481 (2010), Court Opinion
Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 177 L. Ed. 2d 461, 70 ERC 1481 (2010) [2010 BL 138835]
Argued April 27, 2010.
Decided June 21, 2010.
[*2746] Hide Headnotes
[**465] The Plant Protection Act (PPA) provides that the Secretary of the
Department of Agriculture may issue regulations "to prevent the
introduction of plant pests into the United States or the
dissemination of plant pests within the United States."
7 U.S.C. § 7711(a). Pursuant to that grant of authority, the
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) promulgated
regulations that presume genetically engineered plants to be "plant
pests" — and thus "regulated articles" under the PPA — until APHIS
determines otherwise. However, any person may petition APHIS for a
determination that a regulated article does not present a plant pest
risk and therefore should not be subject to the applicable
regulations. APHIS may grant such a petition in whole or in part.
In determining whether to grant nonregulated status to a
genetically engineered plant variety, APHIS must comply with the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), which requires
federal agencies "to the fullest extent possible" to prepare a
detailed environmental impact statement (EIS) for "every . . . major
Federal actio[n] significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment." 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). The agency need not complete
an EIS if it finds, based on a shorter statement known as an
environmental assessment (EA), that the proposed action will not
have a significant environmental impact.
This case involves a challenge to APHIS's decision to approve the
deregulation of Roundup Ready Alfalfa (RRA), a variety of alfalfa
that has been genetically engineered to tolerate the herbicide
Roundup. Petitioners are the owner and the licensee of the
intellectual property rights to RRA. In response to petitioners'
deregulation request, APHIS prepared a draft EA and solicited
public comments on its proposed course of action. Based on its EA
and the comments submitted, the agency determined that the
introduction of RRA would not have any significant adverse impact on
the environment. Accordingly, APHIS decided to deregulate RRA
unconditionally and without preparing an EIS. Respondents,
conventional alfalfa growers and environmental groups, filed this
action challenging that decision on the ground that it violated NEPA
and other federal laws. The District Court held, inter alia,
that APHIS violated NEPA when it deregulated RRA without first
completing a detailed EIS. To remedy that violation, the court
vacated the agency's decision completely [**466] deregulating RRA; enjoined
APHIS from deregulating RRA, in whole or in part, pending completion
of the EIS; and entered a nationwide permanent injunction
prohibiting almost all future planting of RRA during the pendency of
the EIS process. Petitioners and the Government appealed,
challenging the scope of the relief granted but not disputing
that APHIS's deregulation decision violated NEPA. [***2] The Ninth Circuit
affirmed, concluding, among other things, that the District Court
had not abused its discretion in rejecting APHIS's proposed
mitigation measures in favor of a broader injunction.
1. Respondents have standing to seek injunctive relief, and
petitioners have standing to seek this Court's review of the Ninth
Circuit's judgment affirming the entry of such relief. Pp. 7-14.
([*2747] a) Petitioners have constitutional standing to seek review here.
Article III standing requires an injury that is (i) concrete,
particularized, and actual or imminent, (ii) fairly traceable to the
challenged action, and (iii) redressable by a favorable ruling. See
Horne v. Flo-res, 557 U. S. ___, ___. Petitioners satisfy
all three criteria. Petitioners are injured by their inability to
sell or license RRA to prospective customers until APHIS completes
the EIS. Because that injury is caused by the very remedial order
that petitioners challenge on appeal, it would be redressed by a
favorable ruling from this Court. Respondents nevertheless contend
that petitioners lack standing because their complained-of injury is
independently caused by a part of the District Court's order
that petitioners failed to challenge, the vacatur of APHIS's
deregulation decision. That argument fails for two independent
reasons. First, one of the main disputes between the parties
throughout this litigation has been whether the District Court
should have adopted APHIS's proposed judgment, which would have
replaced the vacated deregulation decision with an order
expressly authorizing the continued sale and planting of
RRA. Accordingly, if the District Court had adopted APHIS's proposed
judgment, there would still be authority for the continued sale of
RRA not with-standing
the District Court's vacatur, because there would, in effect, be a
new deregulation decision. Second, petitioners in any case have
standing to challenge the part of the District Court's order
enjoining a partial deregulation. Respondents focus their argument
on the part of the judgment that enjoins planting, but the judgment
also states that before granting the deregulation petition, even in
part, the agency must prepare an EIS. That part of the judgment
inflicts an injury not also caused by the vacatur. Pp. 7-11.
(b) Respondents have constitutional standing to seek injunctive
relief from the complete deregulation order at issue here. The Court
disagrees with petitioners' argument that respondents have failed to
show that any of them is likely to suffer a constitutionally
cognizable injury absent injunctive relief. The District Court found
that respondent farmers had established a reasonable probability
that their conventional alfalfa crops would be infected with the
engineered Roundup Ready gene if RRA were completely deregulated. A
substantial risk of such gene flow injures respondents in several
ways that are [**467] sufficiently concrete to satisfy the injury-in-fact
prong of the constitutional standing analysis. Moreover, those harms
are readily attributable to [***3] APHIS's deregulation decision, which
gives rise to a significant risk of gene flow to
non-genetically-engineered alfalfa varieties. Finally, a judicial
order prohibiting the planting or deregulation of all or some
genetically engineered alfalfa would redress respondents' injuries
by eliminating or minimizing the risk of gene flow to their
crops. Pp. 11-14.
2. The District Court abused its discretion in enjoining APHIS
from effecting a partial deregulation and in prohibiting the
planting of RRA pending the agency's completion of its detailed
environmental review. Pp. 14-22.
(a) Because petitioners and the Government do not argue otherwise,
the Court assumes without deciding that the District Court acted
lawfully in vacating the agency's decision to completely deregulate
RRA. The Court therefore addresses only the injunction prohibiting
APHIS from deregulating RRA pending completion of the EIS, and the
nationwide injunction prohibiting almost all RRA planting during the
pendency of the EIS process. P. 14.
(b) [1] Before a court may grant a permanent injunction, the plaintiff
must satisfy [*2748] a four-factor test, demonstrating: "(1) that it has
suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law,
such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for
that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between
the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted;
and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a
permanent injunction." eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L. L. C., 547 U. S. 388, 391. This test fully
in NEPA cases. See Winter v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 555 U. S. ___, ___. Thus, the existence of a NEPA
violation does not create a presumption that injunctive relief is
available and should be granted absent unusual
circumstances. Pp. 15-16.
(c) None of the four factors supports the District Court's order
enjoining APHIS from partially deregulating RRA during the pendency
of the EIS process. Most importantly, respondents cannot show
that they will suffer irreparable injury if APHIS is allowed to
proceed with any partial deregulation, for at least two
reasons. First, if and when APHIS pursues a partial deregulation
that arguably runs afoul of NEPA, respondents may file a new suit
challenging such action and seeking appropriate preliminary
relief. Accordingly, a permanent injunction is not now needed to
guard against any present or imminent risk of likely irreparable
harm. Second, a partial deregulation need not cause respondents any
injury at all; if its scope is sufficiently limited, the risk of
gene flow could be virtually nonexistent. Indeed, the broad
injunction entered below essentially pre-empts the very procedure by
which APHIS could determine, independently of the pending EIS
process for assessing the effects of a complete deregulation,
that a limited deregulation would not pose any appreciable risk
of environmental harm. Pp. 16-23.
(d) The District Court also erred in entering the nationwide
injunction [**468] against planting RRA, for two independent reasons. First,
because it was [***4] inappropriate for the District Court to foreclose
even the possibility of a partial and temporary deregulation, it
follows that it was inappropriate to enjoin planting in accordance
with such a deregulation decision. [2] Second, an injunction is a
drastic and extraordinary remedy, which should not be granted as a
matter of course. See, e.g., Weinberger v.
Romero-Barcelo, 456 U. S. 305, 312. If, as respondents now
concede, a less drastic remedy (such as partial or complete vacatur
of APHIS's deregulation decision) was sufficient to redress their
injury, no recourse to the additional and extraordinary relief of an
injunction was warranted. Pp. 23-24.
(e) Given the District Court's errors, this Court need not address
whether injunctive relief of some kind was available to respondents
on the record below. Pp. 24-25.
ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
ROBERTS, C. J., and SCALIA, KENNEDY, THOMAS, GINSBURG, and
SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting
opinion. BREYER, J., took no part in the consideration or decision
[*2749] JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case arises out of a decision by the Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service (APHIS) to deregulate a variety of genetically
engineered alfalfa. The District Court held that APHIS violated the
National Environ mental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA),
83 Stat. 852, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq., by issuing its
deregulation decision without first completing a detailed assessment
of the environmental consequences of its proposed course of action.
To remedy that violation, the District Court vacated the agency's
decision completely deregulating the alfalfa variety in question;
ordered APHIS not to act on the deregulation petition in whole or in
part until it had completed a detailed environmental review; and
enjoined almost all future planting of the genetically engineered
alfalfa pending the completion of that review. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the District Court's entry of permanent injunctive relief.
The main issue now in dispute concerns the breadth of that relief.
For the reasons set forth below, we reverse and remand for further
The Plant Protection Act (PPA),
114 Stat. 438, 7 U.S.C. § 7701 et seq., provides that the
Secretary of the Department of Agriculture (USDA) may issue
regulations "to prevent the introduction of plant pests into the
United States or the dissemination of plant pests within the
United States." § 7711(a). The Secretary has delegated that authority to
APHIS, a division of the
USDA. 7 CFR §§ 2.22(a), 2.80(a)(36) (2010). Acting pursuant to
that delegation, APHIS has promulgated regulations governing "the
introduction of organisms and products altered or produced through
genetic engineering that are plant pests or are believed to be plant
pests." See § 340.0(a)(2) and n. 1. Under [**469] those regulations, certain
genetically engineered plants are presumed to be "plant
pests" — and thus "regulated articles" under the PPA [*2750] — until APHIS
deter mines otherwise. See
ibid.; §§ 340.1, 340.2, 340.6; see also App. 183. However, any
person may petition APHIS for a determination that a regulated
article does not present a plant pest risk and therefore should [***5] not
regulations. 7 U.S.C. § 7711(c)(2); 7 CFR § 340.6. APHIS may grant
such a petition in whole or in part. § 340.6(d)(3).
In deciding whether to grant nonregulated status to a genetically
engineered plant variety, APHIS must comply with NEPA, which
requires federal agencies "to the fullest extent possible" to
prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) for "every
recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other
major Federal actio[n] significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment." 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). The statutory text
"speaks solely in terms of proposed actions; it does not
require an agency to consider the possible environmental impacts of
less imminent actions when preparing the impact statement on
proposed actions." Kleppe v. Sierra
Club, 427 U. S. 390, 410, n. 20 (1976).
An agency need not complete an EIS for a particular proposal if it
finds, on the basis of a shorter "environmental assessment" (EA),
that the proposed action will not have a significant impact on the
environment. 40 CFR §§ 1508.9(a), 1508.13 (2009). Even if a
particular agency proposal requires an EIS, applicable regulations
allow the agency to take at least some action in furtherance of
that proposal while the EIS is being prepared. See § 1506.1(a) ("no
action concerning the proposal shall be taken which would: (1) Have
an adverse environmental impact; or (2) Limit the choice of
reasonable alternatives"); § 1506.1(c) ("While work on a required
program environmental impact statement is in progress and the action
is not covered by an existing program statement, agencies shall not
undertake in the interim any major Federal action covered by the
program which may significantly affect the quality of the human
environment unless such action" satisfies certain requirements).
This case involves Roundup Ready Alfalfa (RRA), a kind of alfalfa
crop that has been genetically engineered to be tolerant of
glyphosate, the active ingredient of the herbicide Roundup.
Petitioner Monsanto Company (Monsanto) owns the intellectual
property rights to RRA. Monsanto licenses those rights to
co-petitioner Forage Genetics International (FGI), which is the
exclusive developer of RRA seed.
APHIS initially classified RRA as a regulated article, but in
2004 petitioners sought nonregulated status for two strains of RRA.
In response, APHIS prepared a draft EA assessing the likely
environmental impact of the requested deregulation. It then
published a notice in the Federal Register advising the public of
the deregulation petition and soliciting public comments on its
draft EA. After
considering the hundreds of public comments that it received, APHIS
issued a Finding of No Significant Impact and decided to deregulate
RRA unconditionally and without preparing an EIS. Prior to this
decision, APHIS had authorized almost 300 [**470] field trials of RRA
conducted over a period of eight years. App. 348.
Approximately eight months after APHIS granted RRA nonregulated
status, respondents (two conventional alfalfa seed farms and
environmental groups concerned with food safety) filed this action
against the Secretary of Agriculture and certain [***6] other officials in
Federal District Court, challenging APHIS's decision to [*2751] completely
deregulate RRA. Their complaint alleged violations of NEPA, the
Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA),
87 Stat. 884, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq., and the PPA.
Respondents did not seek preliminary injunctive relief pending
resolution of those claims. Hence, RRA enjoyed nonregulated status
for approximately two years. During that period, more
than 3,000 farmers in 48 States planted an estimated 220,000 acres
of RRA. App. 350.
In resolving respondents' NEPA claim, the District Court accepted
APHIS's determination that RRA does not have any harmful health
effects on humans or livestock. App. to Pet. for Cert. 43a; accord,
id., at 45a. Nevertheless, the District Court held that APHIS
violated NEPA by deregulating RRA without first preparing an EIS. In
particular, the court found that APHIS's EA failed to answer
substantial questions concerning two broad consequences of its
proposed action: first, the extent to which complete deregulation
would lead to the transmission of the gene conferring glyphosate
tolerance from RRA to organic and conventional alfalfa; and, second,
the extent to which the introduction of RRA would contribute to the
development of Roundup-resistant weeds. Id., at 52a. In light
of its determination that the deregulation decision ran afoul of
NEPA, the District Court dismissed without
prejudice respondents' claims under the ESA and PPA.
After these rulings, the District Court granted petitioners
permission to intervene in the remedial phase of the lawsuit. The
court then asked the parties to submit proposed judgments embodying
their preferred means of remedying the NEPA violation. APHIS's
proposed judgment would have ordered the agency to prepare an EIS,
vacated the agency's deregulation decision, and replaced
that decision with the terms of the judgment itself.
Id., at 184a (proposed judgment providing that "[the federal]
defendants' [June 14,] 2005 Determination of Nonregulated Status for
Alfalfa Genetically Engineered for Tolerance to the Herbicide
Glyphosate is hereby vacated and replaced by the terms of this
judgment" (emphasis added)). The terms of the proposed judgment,
in turn, would have permitted the continued planting of RRA pending
completion of the EIS, subject to six restrictions. Those
restrictions included, among other things, mandatory isolation
distances between RRA and non-genetically-engineered alfalfa fields
in order to mitigate the risk of gene flow; mandatory harvesting
conditions; a requirement that planting and harvesting equipment
that had been in contact with RRA be cleaned prior to any use with
conventional or organic alfalfa; identification and handling
requirements for RRA seed; and a requirement that all RRA seed
producers and hay growers be under contract with either Monsanto or
FGI and that their contracts require compliance with the other
limitations set out in the proposed judgment.
The District Court rejected APHIS's proposed judgment. In its
preliminary [**471] injunction, the District Court prohibited [***7] almost all
future planting of RRA pending APHIS's completion of the required
EIS. But in order to minimize the harm to farmers who had relied on
APHIS's deregulation decision, the court expressly allowed those who
had already purchased RRA to plant their seeds until March 30, 2007.
Id., at 58a.
In its subsequently entered permanent injunction and judgment, the
court (1) vacated APHIS's deregulation decision; (2) ordered APHIS
to prepare an EIS before it made any decision on Monsanto's
deregulation petition; (3) enjoined the planting of any RRA in the
United States after March 30, 2007, pending APHIS's completion of
the required EIS; and (4) imposed certain conditions
([*2752] suggested by APHIS) on the handling and identification of
already-planted RRA. Id., at 79a, 109a. The District Court
denied petitioners' request for an evidentiary hearing.
The Government, Monsanto, and FGI appealed, challenging the scope
of the relief granted but not disputing the existence of a NEPA
violation. See Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns,
570 F. 3d 1130, 1136 (2009). A divided panel of the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Based on its review of the record,
the panel first concluded that the District Court had "recognized
that an injunction does not `automatically issue' when a NEPA
violation is found" and had instead based its issuance of injunctive
relief on the four-factor test traditionally used for that purpose.
Id., at 1137. The panel held that the District Court had not
committed clear error in making any of the subsidiary factual
findings on which its assessment of the four relevant factors was
based. And the panel rejected the claim that the District Court had
not given sufficient deference to APHIS's expertise concerning the
likely effects of allowing continued planting of RRA on a limited
basis. In the panel's view, APHIS's proposed interim measures would
have perpetuated a system that had been found by the District Court
to have caused environmental harm in the past.
Id., at 1139. Hence, the panel concluded
that the District Court had not abused its discretion "in choosing
to reject APHIS's proposed mitigation measures in favor of a broader
injunction to prevent more irreparable harm from occurring."
The panel majority also rejected petitioners' alternative argument
that the District Court had erred in declining to hold an
evidentiary hearing before entering its permanent injunction.
Writing in dissent, Judge N. Randy Smith disagreed with
that conclusion. In his view, the District Court was required to
conduct an evidentiary hearing before issuing a permanent injunction
unless the facts were undisputed or the adverse party expressly
waived its right to such a hearing. Neither of those two exceptions,
he found, applied here.
[3] [1] At the threshold, respondents contend that petitioners lack
standing to seek our review of the lower court rulings at issue
here. We disagree.
[4] Standing under Article III of the Constitution requires that an
injury be concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly
traceable to [**472] the challenged action; [***8] and redressable by a favorable
ruling. Home v. Flores, 557 U. S., (2009) (slip
op., at 8). Petitioners here sat isfy all three criteria.
Petitioners are injured by their inability to sell or license RRA to
prospective customers until such time as APHIS completes the
required EIS. Because that injury is caused by the very remedial
order that petitioners challenge on appeal, it would be redressed by
a favorable ruling from this Court.
Respondents do not dispute that petitioners would have standing to
contest the District Court's permanent injunction order if they had
pursued a different litigation strategy. Instead, respondents argue
that the injury of which petitioners complain is independently
caused by a part of the District Court's order that petitioners
failed to challenge, namely, the vacatur of APHIS's deregulation
decision. The practical consequence of the vacatur, respon
dents contend, was to restore RRA to the status of a regulated
article; and, subject [*2753] to certain exceptions not applicable here,
federal regulations ban the growth and sale of regulated
articles. Because petitioners did not specifically challenge
the District Court's vacatur, respondents reason, they lack standing
to challenge a part of the District Court's order
(i.e., the injunction) that does not cause petitioners any
injury not also caused by the vacatur. See Brief for
Respondents 19-20.
Respondents' argument fails for two independent reasons. First,
although petitioners did not challenge the vacatur directly, they
adequately preserved their objection that the vacated deregulation
decision should have been replaced by APHIS's proposed injunction.
Throughout the remedial phase of this litigation, one of the main
disputes between the parties has been whether the District Court was
required to adopt APHIS's proposed judgment. See, e.g.,
Intervenor-Appellants' Opening Brief in No. 07-16458 etc.
(CA9), p. 59 (urging the Court of Appeals to "vacate
the district court's judgment and remand this case to
the district court with instructions to enter APHIS's proposed
relief"); Opening Brief of Federal Defendants-Appellants in
No. 16458 etc. (CA9), pp. 21, 46 ("The blanket injunction should be
narrowed in accordance with APHIS's proposal"); see also Tr. of Oral
Arg. 6, 25-27, 53-54. That judgment would have replaced the vacated
deregulation decision with an order expressly allowing continued
planting of RRA subject to certain limited conditions. App. to Pet.
for Cert. 184a (proposed judgment providing that "[the federal]
defendants' 14 June 2005 Determination of Nonregulated Status for
judgment" (emphasis added)). Accordingly, if the District Court
had adopted the agency's suggested remedy, there would still be
authority for the continued planting of RRA, because there
would, in effect, be a new deregulation decision.[fn1]
Second, petitioners in any case have standing to challenge the
part of the District Court's order enjoining partial deregulation.
[***9] Respondents focus their standing argument on the part of the
judgment enjoining the [**473] planting of RRA, but the judgment also states
that "[b]efore granting Monsanto's deregulation petition, even in
part, the federal defendants shall prepare an environmental
impact statement." Id., at 108a (emphasis added); see also
id., at 79a ("The Court will enter a final judgment . . .
ordering the government to prepare an EIS before it makes a decision
on Monsanto's deregulation petition"). As respondents concede,
that part of the judgment goes beyond the vacatur of APHIS's
deregulation decision. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 37, 46.
At oral argument, respondents contended that the re-triction on
APHIS's ability to effect a partial deregulation of RRA does not
cause petitioners "an actual or an imminent harm."
Id., at 39-40. In order for a partial deregulation to occur,
respondents argued, the case would have to be remanded to the
agency, and APHIS would have to prepare an EA "that may or may not
come out in favor of a partial deregulation." Id., at 39.
Because petitioners cannot prove that those two events would happen,
respondents contended, the asserted harm caused by
the District Court's partial deregulation ban is too speculative to
satisfy the actual or imminent injury requirement.
[*2754] We reject this argument. If the injunction were lifted, we do not
see why the District Court would have to remand the matter to the
agency in order for APHIS to effect a partial deregulation. And even
if a remand were
required, we perceive no basis on which the District Court could
decline to remand the matter to the agency so that it could
determine whether to pursue a partial deregulation during the
pendency of the EIS process.
Nor is any doubt as to whether APHIS would issue a new EA in favor
of a partial deregulation sufficient to defeat petitioners'
standing. It is undisputed that petitioners have submitted a
deregulation petition and that a partial deregulation of the kind
embodied in the agency's proposed judgment would afford petitioners
much of the relief that they seek; it is also undisputed that,
absent the District Court's order, APHIS could attempt to effect
such a partial deregulation pending its completion of the EIS. See
id., at 7-8, 25-27, 38. For purposes of resolving the
particular standing question before us, we need not decide whether
or to what extent a party challenging an injunction that bars an
agency from granting certain relief must show that the agency would
be likely to afford such relief if it were free to do so. In this
case, as is clear from APHIS's proposed judgment and from its
briefing throughout the remedial phase of this litigation, the
agency takes the view that a partial deregulation reflecting its
proposed limitations is in the public interest. Thus, there is more
than a strong likelihood that APHIS would partially deregulate RRA
were it not for the District Court's injunction.
The District Court's elimination of that likelihood is plainly
sufficient to establish a constitutionally cognizable
injury. Moreover, as respondents essentially conceded at oral
[***10] argument, that injury would be redressed by a favorable decision
here, since "vacating the current injunction . . . will allow
[petitioners] to go back to the agency, [to] seek a [**474] partial
deregulation," even if the District Court's vacatur of APHIS's
deregulation decision is left intact. Id., at 38. We therefore
petitioners have standing to seek this Court's review.[fn2]
[5] [2] We next consider petitioners' contention that respondents lack
standing to seek injunctive relief. See Daim-lerChrysler
Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U. S. 332, 352 (2006) ("[A] plaintiff
must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought"
(internal quotation marks omitted)). [6] Petitioners argue
that respondents have failed to show that any of the named
respondents is likely to suffer a constitutionally cognizable injury
absent injunctive relief. See Brief for Petitioners 40. We disagree.
Respondents include conventional alfalfa farmers. Emphasizing "the
undisputed concentration of alfalfa seed farms," the District Court
found that those farmers had "established a `reasonable probability'
that their organic and conventional alfalfa crops will be infected
with the engineered gene" if RRA is completely deregulated. App. to
Pet. for Cert. 50a.[fn3] A substantial [*2755] risk of gene flow
injures respondents in several ways. For example, respondents
represent that, in order to continue marketing their product to
consumers who wish to buy non-genetically-engineered alfalfa,
respondents would have to conduct testing to find out whether and to
what extent their crops have been contaminated. See, e.g.,
Record, Doc. 62, p. 5 (Declaration of Phillip Geertson in Support of
Plantiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment)
(hereinafter Geertson Declaration) ("Due to the high potential for
contamination, I will need to test my crops for the presence of
genetically engineered alfalfa seed. This testing will be a new cost
to my seed business and we will have to raise our seed prices to
cover these costs, making our prices less competitive");
id., Doc. 57, p. 4 (Declaration of Patrick Trask in Support of
Plantiff's Motion for Summary Judgment) ("To ensure that my seeds
are pure, I will need to test my crops and obtain certification
that my seeds are free of genetically engineered alfalfa"); see also
Record, Doc. 55, p. 2 ("[**475] There is zero tolerance for contaminated
seed in the organic market"). Respondents also allege that the risk
of gene flow will cause them to take certain measures to minimize
the likelihood of potential contamination and to ensure an adequate
supply of non-genetically-engineered alfalfa. See, e.g.,
Geertson Declaration 3 (noting the "increased cost of alfalfa
breeding due to potential for genetic contamination");
id., at 6 ("Due to the threat of contamination, I have begun
contracting with growers outside of the United States to ensure
that I can supply genetically pure, conventional alfalfa seed.
Finding new growers has already resulted in increased administrative
costs at my seed business").
Such harms, which respondents will suffer even if their crops are
not actually infected with the Roundup ready gene, are sufficiently
[***11] concrete to satisfy the injury-in-fact prong of the constitutional
standing analysis. Those harms are readily attributable to APHIS's
deregulation decision, which, as the District Court found, gives
rise to a significant risk of gene flow to
non-genetically-engineered varieties of alfalfa. Finally, a judicial
order prohibiting the growth and sale of all or some genetically
engineered alfalfa would remedy respondents' injuries by eliminating
or minimizing the risk of gene flow to conventional and organic
alfalfa crops. We therefore conclude that respondents have
constitutional standing to seek injunctive relief from the complete
deregulation order at issue here.
Petitioners appear to suggest that respondents fail to satisfy the
"zone of interests" test we have previously articulated as a
prudential standing requirement in cases challenging agency
compliance with particular statutes. See Reply Brief for Petitioners
12 (arguing that protection against [*2756] the risk of commercial harm "is
not an interest that NEPA was enacted to address"); Bennett v.
Spear, 520 U. S. 154, 162-163 (1997). That argument is
unpersua-sive because, as the District Court found, respondents'
injury has an environmental as well as an economic component. See
App. to Pet. for Cert. 49a. In its ruling on the merits of
respondents' NEPA claim, the District Court held that the risk
that the RRA gene conferring gly-phosate resistance will infect
conventional and organic alfalfa is a significant environmental
effect within the meaning of NEPA. Petitioners did not appeal
that part of the court's ruling, and we have no occasion to revisit
it here. Respondents now seek injunctive relief in order to avert
the risk of gene flow to their crops — the very same effect
that the District Court determined to be a significant environmental
concern for purposes of NEPA. The
mere fact that respondents also seek to avoid certain economic harms
that are tied to the risk of gene flow does not strip them of
In short, respondents have standing to seek injunctive relief, and
Circuit's judgment affirming the entry of such relief. We therefore
proceed to the merits of the case.
The District Court sought to remedy APHIS's NEPA violation in
three ways: First, it vacated the agency's decision completely
deregulating RRA; second, it enjoined APHIS from deregulating RRA,
in whole or in part, [**476] pending completion of the mandated EIS; and
third, it entered a nationwide injunction prohibiting almost all
future planting of RRA. Id., at 108a-110a. Because petitioners
and the Government do not argue otherwise, we assume without
deciding that the District Court acted lawfully in vacating the
deregulation decision. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 7 ("[T]he district court
could have vacated the order in its entirety and sent it back to the
agency"); accord, id., at 15-16. We therefore address only the
latter two aspects of the District Court's judgment. Before doing
so, however, we provide a brief overview of the standard governing
the [***12] entry of injunctive relief.
"[A] plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a
four-factor test before a court may grant such relief. A plaintiff
must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable
injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary
damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that,
considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and
defendant, a remedy
in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not
be disserved by a permanent injunction." eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L. L. C., 547 U. S. 388, 391 (2006). The
traditional four-factor test applies when a plaintiff seeks a
permanent injunction to remedy a NEPA violation. See Winter v.
555 U. S. ___, ___ (2008) (slip op., at 21-23).
Petitioners argue that the lower courts in this case proceeded on
the erroneous assumption that an injunction is generally the
appropriate remedy for a NEPA violation. In particular, petitioners
note that the District Court cited pre-Winter Ninth Circuit
precedent for the proposition that, in "`the run of the mill NEPA
case,'" an injunction delaying the contemplated government project
is proper "`until the NEPA violation is cured.'" App. to Pet. [*2757] for
Cert. 65a (quoting Idaho Watersheds Project v. Hahn,
307 F. 3d 815, 833 (CA9 2002)); see also App. to Pet. for Cert. 55a
(quoting same language in preliminary injunction order). In
addition, petitioners observe, the District Court and the Court of
Appeals in this case both stated that, "in unusual circumstances, an
injunction may be withheld, or, more likely, limited in scope" in
NEPA cases. Id., at 66a (quoting National
Parks & Conservation Assn. v. Babbitt,
241 F. 3d 722, 737, n. 18 (CA9 2001) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); 570 F. 3d, at 1137.
Insofar as the statements quoted above are intended to guide the
determination whether to grant injunctive relief, they invert the
proper mode of analysis. An injunction should issue only if the
traditional four-factor test is satisfied. See Winter,
supra, at ___ (slip op., at 21-24). [7] In contrast, the statements
quoted above appear to presume that an injunction is the proper
remedy for a NEPA violation except in unusual circumstances. No such
thumb on the scales is warranted. Nor, contrary to the reasoning of
the Court of Appeals, could any such error be cured by a court's
perfunctory recognition that "an injunction does
not automatically issue" in NEPA cases. See
570 F. 3d, at 1137 (internal quotation marks omitted). It is not
enough for a court considering a request for injunctive relief to
ask whether there is a good [**477] reason why an injunction should
not issue; rather, a court must determine that an injunction
should issue under the traditional four-factor test set out
Notwithstanding the lower courts' apparent reliance on the
incorrect standard set out in the pre-Winter Circuit precedents
quoted above, respondents argue that the lower courts in fact
applied the traditional four-factor test. In their view, the
statements that injunctive relief is proper in the "run-of-the-mill"
NEPA case, and that such injunctions are granted except in "unusual
circumstances," are descriptive rather than prescriptive. [***13] See Brief
for Respondents 28, n. 14. We need not decide whether respondents'
characterization of the lower court opinions in this case is sound.
Even if it is, the injunctive relief granted here cannot stand.
We first consider whether the District Court erred in enjoining
APHIS from partially deregulating RRA during the pendency of the EIS
process.[fn4]
The relevant part of the District Court's judgment states that,
"[b]efore granting Monsanto's deregulation petition,
even in part, the federal defendants shall prepare an
environmental impact statement." App. to Pet. for
Cert. 108a (emphasis added); see also id., at 79a ("The Court
will enter a final judgment . . . ordering the government to prepare
an EIS before it makes a decision on Monsanto's deregulation
petition"). The plain text of the order prohibits any partial
deregulation, not just the particular partial deregulation embodied
in APHIS's proposed judgment. We think it is quite clear
that the District [*2758] Court meant just what it said. The related
injunction against planting states that "no [RRA] . . . may be
planted" "[u]ntil the federal defendants prepare the EIS and decide
the deregulation petition." Id., at 108a (emphasis added).
That injunction, which appears in the very same judgment and
directly follows the injunction against granting Mon-santo's
petition "even in part," does not carve out an exception for
planting subsequently authorized by a valid partial deregulation
[3] In our view, none of the traditional four factors governing the
entry of permanent injunctive relief supports the District Court's
injunction prohibiting partial deregulation. To see why that is so,
it is helpful to understand how the injunction prohibiting a partial
deregulation fits into the broader dispute between the parties.
Respondents in this case brought suit under the APA to challenge a
particular agency order: APHIS's decision to completely
deregulate RRA. The District Court held that the order in question
was procedurally defective, and APHIS decided not to appeal
that determination. At that point, it was for the agency to decide
whether and to what extent it would pursue a [**478] partial
deregulation. If the agency found, on the basis of a new EA, that a
limited and temporary deregulation satisfied applicable statutory
and regulatory requirements, it could proceed with such a
deregulation even if it had not yet finished the onerous EIS
required for complete deregulation. If and when the
agency were to issue a partial deregulation order, any party
aggrieved by that order could bring a separate suit under
the Administrative Procedure Act to challenge the particular
deregulation attempted. See 5 U.S.C. § 702.
In this case, APHIS apparently sought to "streamline" the
proceedings by asking the District Court to craft a remedy that, in
effect, would have partially deregulated RRA until such time as the
agency had finalized the EIS needed for a complete deregulation. See
Tr. of Oral Arg. 16, 23-24; App. to Pet. for Cert. 69a. To justify
that disposition, APHIS and petitioners submitted voluminous
documentary submissions [***14] in which they purported to show that the
risk of gene flow would be insignificant if the District Court
allowed limited planting and harvesting subject to APHIS's proposed
conditions. Respondents, in turn, submitted considerable evidence of
their own that seemed to cut the other way. This put
the District Court in an unenviable position. "The parties' experts
disagreed over virtually every factual issue relating to possible
environmental harm, including the likelihood of genetic
contamination and why some contamination had already occurred."
570 F. 3d, at 1135.
The District Court may well have acted within its discretion in
refusing to craft a judicial remedy that would have
authorized the continued planting and harvesting of RRA while
the EIS is being prepared. It does not follow, however,
that the District Court was within its rights in enjoining
APHIS from allowing such planting and harvesting pursuant to the
authority vested in the agency by law. When the District Court
entered its permanent injunction, APHIS had not yet exercised its
authority to partially deregulate RRA. Until APHIS actually seeks to
effect a partial deregulation, any judicial review of such a
decision is premature.[*2759] [fn5]
Nor can the District Court's injunction be justified as a
prophylactic measure needed to guard against the possibility
that the agency would seek to effect on its own the particular
partial deregulation scheme embodied in the terms of APHIS's
proposed [**479] judgment. Even if the District Court was not required to
adopt that judgment, there was no need to stop the agency from
effecting a partial deregulation in accordance with the procedures
established by law. Moreover, the terms of the District Court's
injunction do not just enjoin the particular partial
deregulation embodied in APHIS's proposed judgment. Instead,
the District Court barred the agency from pursuing any
deregulation — no matter how limited the geographic area in which
planting of RRA would be allowed, how great the isolation distances
mandated between RRA fields and fields for growing
non-genetically-engineered alfalfa, how stringent the regulations
governing harvesting and distribution, how robust the enforcement
at the time of the decision, and — consequently — no matter
how small the risk that the planting authorized under such
conditions would adversely affect the environment in general and
respondents in particular.
The order enjoining any partial deregulation was also inconsistent
with other aspects of the very same judgment. In fashioning its
remedy for the NEPA violation, the District Court steered a "middle
course" between more extreme options on either end. See
id., at 1136. On the one hand, the District Court rejected
APHIS's proposal (supported by petitioners) to allow continued
planting and harvesting of RRA subject to the agency's proposed
limitations. On the other hand, the District Court did not bar
continued planting of RRA as a regulated article under permit from
APHIS, see App. to Pet. for Cert. 75a, and it expressly [***15] allowed
farmers to harvest and sell RRA planted
before March 30, 2007, id., at 76a-79a. If the District Court
was right to conclude that any partial deregulation, no matter how
limited, required the preparation of an EIS, it is hard to see why
the limited planting and harvesting that the District Court allowed
did not also require the preparation of an EIS. Conversely, if
the District Court was right to conclude that the limited planting
and harvesting it allowed did not require the preparation of an EIS,
then an appropriately limited partial deregulation should likewise
[8] Based on the analysis set forth above, it is clear that the order
enjoining any deregulation whatsoever does not satisfy the
traditional four-factor test for granting permanent injunctive
relief. Most importantly, respondents cannot show that they will
suffer irreparable injury if APHIS is allowed to proceed with any
partial deregulation, [*2760] for at least two independent reasons.
First, if and when APHIS pursues a partial deregulation
challenging such action and seeking appropriate
preliminary relief. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 705. Accordingly, a
permanent injunction is not now needed to guard against any present
or imminent risk of likely irreparable harm.
Second, a partial deregulation need not cause respondents any
injury at all, much less irreparable injury; if the scope of the
partial deregulation is sufficiently limited, the risk of gene flow
to their crops could be virtually nonexistent. For example, suppose
that APHIS deregulates RRA only in a remote part of the country in
which respondents neither grow nor intend to grow
non-genetically-engineered alfalfa, and in which no conventional
[**480] alfalfa farms are currently located. Suppose further that APHIS
issues an accompanying administrative order mandating isolation
distances so great as to eliminate any appreciable risk of gene flow
to the crops of conventional farmers who might someday choose to
plant in the surrounding area. See, e.g., Brief in
Opposition 9, n. 6 (quoting study concluding "`that in order for
there to be zero tolerance of any gene flow between a [RRA]
seed field and a conventional seed field, those fields would have to
have a five-mile isolation distance between them'"); see also Tr. of
Oral Arg. 15-16 (representation from the Solicitor General
that APHIS may impose conditions on the deregulation of RRA via
issuance of an administrative order). Finally, suppose that APHIS
concludes in a new EA that its limited deregulation would not pose a
significant risk of gene flow or harmful weed development, and
that the agency adopts a plan to police vigorously compliance with
its administrative order in the limited geographic area in question.
It is hard to see how respondents could show that such a limited
deregulation would cause them likely irreparable injury.
(Respondents in this case do not represent a class, so they could
not seek to enjoin such an order on the ground that it might cause
harm to other parties.) In [***16] any case, the District Court's order
prohibiting any
partial deregulation improperly relieves respondents of their burden
to make the requisite evidentiary showing.[fn6]
Of course, APHIS might ultimately choose not to partially
deregulate RRA during the pendency of the EIS, or else to pursue the
kind of partial deregulation embodied in its proposed judgment
rather than the very limited deregulation envisioned in the above
hypothetical. Until such time as the agency decides whether and how
to exercise its regulatory authority, however, the courts
have no cause to intervene. Indeed, the broad injunction entered
here essentially pre-empts the very procedure by which the agency
could determine, independently of the pending EIS process for
assessing the effects of a complete deregulation, that a
limited deregulation would not pose any appreciable [*2761] risk of
environmental harm. See 40 CFR §§ 1501.4, 1508.9(a) (2009).
In sum, we do not know whether and to what extent APHIS would seek
to effect a limited deregulation during the pendency of the EIS
process if it were free to do so; we do know that the vacatur of
APHIS's deregulation decision means that virtually no RRA can be
grown or sold until such time as a new deregulation decision is in
place, and we also know that any party aggrieved by a hypothetical
future deregulation decision will have ample opportunity
to challenge it, and to seek appropriate preliminary relief, if and
when such a decision is made. In light of these particular
circumstances, [**481] we hold that the District Court did not properly
exercise its discretion in enjoining a partial deregulation of any
kind pending APHIS's preparation of an EIS. It follows that the
Court of Appeals erred in affirming that aspect of
the District Court's judgment.
We now turn to petitioners' claim that the District Court erred in
entering a nationwide injunction against planting RRA. Petitioners
argue that the District Court did not apply the right test for
determining whether to enter permanent injunctive relief; that, even
if the District Court identified the operative legal standard, it
erred as a matter of law in applying that standard to the facts of
this case; and that the District Court was required
to grant petitioners an evidentiary hearing to resolve contested
issues of fact germane to the remedial dispute between the parties.
[9] We agree that the District Court's injunction against planting went
too far, but we come to that conclusion for two independent reasons.
First, the impropriety of the District Court's broad injunction
against planting flows from the impropriety of its injunction
against partial deregulation. If APHIS may partially deregulate RRA
before preparing a full-blown EIS — a question that we need not and
do not decide here — farmers should be able to grow and sell RRA in
accordance with that agency determination. Because it was
inappropriate for the District Court to foreclose even the
possibility of a partial and temporary deregulation, it necessarily
follows that it was likewise inappropriate to enjoin [***17] any and all
parties from acting in accordance with the terms of such a
deregulation decision.
[10] Second, respondents have represented to this Court that
the District Court's injunction against planting does not have any
meaningful practical effect independent of its vacatur. See Brief
for Respondents 24; see also Tr. of Oral Arg. 37 ("[T]he mistake
that was made [by the District Court] was in not appreciating . . .
that the vacatur did have [the] effect" of independently prohibiting
the growth and sale of almost all RRA). An injunction is a drastic
and extraordinary remedy, which should not be granted as a matter of
course. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo,
456 U. S. 305, 311-312 (1982). If a less drastic remedy (such as
partial or complete vacatur of APHIS's deregulation decision) was
sufficient to redress respondents' injury, no recourse to the
additional and extraordinary relief of an injunction was warranted.
See ibid.; see also Winter, 555 U. S., at ___ (slip
op., at 21-23).
In sum, the District Court abused its discretion in enjoining
APHIS from effecting a partial deregulation and in prohibiting the
possibility of planting in accordance with the terms of such a
deregulation. Given those errors, this Court need not express any
view on [*2762] whether injunctive relief of some kind was available to
respondents on the record before us. Nor does the Court address the
question whether the District Court was required to conduct an
evidentiary hearing before entering the relief at issue here. The
judgment of the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded
It is so ordered.[**482] JUSTICE BREYER took no part in the consideration or decision of
[fn1] We need not decide whether the District Court had the
authority to replace the vacated agency order with an injunction of
its own making. The question whether petitioners are entitled to the
relief that they seek goes to the merits, not to standing.
[fn2] We do not rest "the primary basis for our jurisdiction on the
premise that the District Court enjoined APHIS from partially
deregulating RRA in any sense." See
post, at 7 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). Even if
the District Court's order prohibiting a partial deregulation
applies only to "the particular partial deregulation order
proposed to the court by APHIS," see
post, at 8, petitioners would still have standing to challenge
that aspect of the order.
[fn3] At least one of the respondents in this case specifically
alleges that he owns an alfalfa farm in a prominent seed-growing
region and faces a significant risk of contamination from RRA. See
Record, Doc. 62, pp. 1-2;
id., ¶ 10, at 3-4 (Declaration of Phillip Geertson in Support
of Plan-tiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment) ("Since alfalfa is
pollinated by honey, bumble and leafcutter bees, the genetic
contamination of the Roundup Ready seed will rapidly spread through
the seed growing regions. Bees have a range of at least two to ten
miles, and the alfalfa seed farms are much more concentrated").
Other declarations in the record provide further support for
the District Court's conclusion that the deregulation of RRA poses a
significant risk of contamination to respondents' crops. See,
e.g., id., Doc. 53, ¶ 9, at 2 (Declaration of Jim Munsch)
(alleging risk of "significant contamination . . . due to the
compact geographic area of the prime alfalfa seed producing areas
and the fact that pollen is distributed by bees that have large
natural range of activity"); App. ¶ 8, p. 401 (Declaration of Marc
Asumendi) ("Roundup alfalfa seed fields are currently being planted
in all the major alfalfa seed production areas with little regard to
contamination to non-GMO seed production fields").
[fn4] Petitioners focus their challenge on the part of
the District Court's order prohibiting the planting of RRA. As we
explain below, however, the broad injunction against planting cannot
be valid if the injunction against partial deregulation is improper.
See infra, at 23; see also App. to Pet. for Cert. 64a
(District Court order recognizing that APHIS's proposed remedy "seek[s],
in effect, a partial deregulation that permits the continued
expansion of the Roundup Ready alfalfa market subject to certain
conditions" (emphasis added)). The validity of the injunction
prohibiting partial deregulation is therefore properly before us.
Like the District Court, we use the term "partial deregulation" to
refer to any limited or conditional deregulation. See
id., at 64a, 69a.
[fn5] NEPA provides that an EIS must be "include[d] in every
major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment." 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (emphasis added); see
also Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U. S. 390, 406 (1976) ("A
court has no authority to depart from the statutory language and
. . . determine a point during the germination process of a
potential proposal at which an impact statement should be
prepared" (first emphasis added)). When a particular agency
proposal exists and requires the preparation of an EIS, NEPA
regulations allow the agency to take at least some action pertaining
to that proposal during the pendency of the EIS process. See
40 CFR §§ 1506.1(a), (c) (2009). We do not express any view on the
Government's contention that a limited deregulation of the kind
embodied in its proposed judgment would not require the prior
preparation of an EIS. See Brief for Federal Respondents
21-22 (citing § 1506.1(a)); Tr. of Oral Arg. 20 ("what we were
proposing for the interim, that is allowing continued planting
subject to various protective measures, was fundamentally different
from the action on which the EIS was being prepared"). Because APHIS
has not yet invoked the procedures necessary to attempt a limited
deregulation, any judicial consideration of such issues is not
[fn6] The District Court itself appears to have recognized that its
broad injunction may not have been necessary to avert any injury to
respondents. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 191a ("It does complicate it
to try to fine-tune a particular remedy. So the simpler the remedy,
the more attractive it is from the Court's point of view, because it
appears to me enforcement is easier. Understanding it is easier, and
it may be, while a blunt instrument, it may actually, for the short
term, achieve its result, achieve its purpose, even maybe it
overachieves it. . . . Maybe a lot of it is not necessary. I
don't know" (emphasis added)); see also ibid. ("I don't say
you have to be greater than 1.6 miles, you have to be away from the
bees, you have be dah dah dah. That's the farm business. I'm not
even in it"); id., at 192a ("I am not going to get into the
isolation distances").
The Court does not dispute the District Court's critical findings
of fact: First, Roundup Ready Alfalfa (RRA) can contaminate other
plants. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 38a, 54a, 62a. Second, even
planting in a controlled setting had led to contamination in some
instances. See id., at 69a-70a. Third, the Animal and Plant
Health Inspection Service (APHIS) has limited ability to monitor or
enforce limitations on planting. See id., at 70a. And fourth,
genetic contamination from RRA could decimate farmers' livelihoods
and the American alfalfa market for years to come. See
id., at 71a; see also id., at 29a-30a. Instead, the
majority faults the District Court for "enjoining APHIS from
partially deregulating RRA." Ante, at 16.
In my view, the District Court may not have actually ordered such
relief, and we should not so readily assume that it did. Regardless,
the District Court did not abuse its discretion when, after
considering the voluminous record and making the aforementioned
findings, it issued the order now before us.
To understand the District Court's judgment, it is necessary to
understand the background of this litigation. Petitioner Monsanto
Company (Monsanto) is a large corporation
that has long produced a weed killer called Roundup. After years of
experimentation, Monsanto and co-petitioner Forage Genetics
International (FGI) genetically engineered a mutation in the alfalfa
genome that makes [***18] the plant immune to Roundup. Monsanto and FGI's
new product, RRA, is "the first crop that has been engineered to
resist a[n] herbicide" and that can transmit the genetically
engineered gene to other plants. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 45a.
In 2004, in the midst of a deregulatory trend in the agricultural
sector, petitioners asked APHIS to deregulate RRA, thereby allowing
it to be sold and planted nationwide. App. 101a. Rather than
conducting a detailed analysis and preparing an "environmental
impact statement" (EIS), as required by the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) for every "major Federal actio[n]
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment,"
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C), APHIS merely conducted an abbreviated
"environmental assessment" (EA). During the 6-month period in which
APHIS allowed public comment on its EA, the agency received
663 comments, 520 of which opposed deregulation. App. to Pet. for
Cert. 29a. Farmers and scientists opined that RRA could contaminate
alfalfa that has not been genetically modified, destroying the
American export market for alfalfa and, potentially, contaminating
other plants and breeding a new type of pesticide-resistant weed.
Id., at 29a-30a.
Despite substantial evidence that RRA genes could transfer to
other plants, APHIS issued a Finding of No Significant Impact and
agreed to deregulate RRA "unconditionally," ante, at 4.
With no EIS to wait for and no regulation [**483] blocking its path,
petitioners began selling RRA. Farmers and environmental groups
swiftly brought this lawsuit to challenge APHIS's [*2763] decision to
deregulate, raising claims under NEPA and other statutes.
The District Court carefully reviewed a long record and
found that "APHIS's reasons for concluding" that the risks of
genetic contamination are low were "not `convincing.'" App. to Pet.
for Cert. 38a. A review of APHIS's internal documents showed
that individuals within the agency warned that contamination might
occur. APHIS rested its decision to deregulate on its assertion
that contamination risk is "not significant because it is the
organic and conventional farmers' responsibility" to protect
themselves and the environment. Ibid. Yet the agency drew this
conclusion without having investigated whether such farmers "can, in
fact, protect their crops from contamination." Ibid.
The District Court likewise found that APHIS's reasons for
disregarding the risk of pesticide-resistant weeds were speculative
and "not convincing." Id., at 46a. The agency had merely
explained that if weeds acquire roundup resistance, farmers can use
"`[a]l-ternative herbicides.'" Ibid. In light of the
"acknowledged" risk of RRA gene transmission and the potential
"impact on the development of Roundup resistant weeds," the court
concluded that there was a significant possibility of serious
environmental harm, and granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs.
Id., at 54a; see also id., at 45a.
At this point, the question of remedy arose. The parties submitted
proposed final judgments, and several corporations with an interest
in RRA, including Monsanto, sought permission to intervene.
[***19] The District Court granted their motion and agreed "to give them the
opportunity to present evidence to assist the court in fashioning
the appropriate scope of whatever relief is granted."
Id., at 54a (internal quotation marks omitted).
While the District Court considered the proposed judgments, it
issued a preliminary injunction. Ordinarily, the court explained,
the remedy for failure to conduct an EIS is to vacate the permit
that was unlawfully given — the result of which, in this case, would
be to prohibit any use of RRA. See id., at 55a; see also
id., at 65a. But this case
presented a special difficulty: Following APHIS's unlawful
deregulation order, some farmers had begun planting genetically
modified RRA. Id., at 55a. In its preliminary injunction,
the District Court ordered that no new RRA could be planted until
APHIS completed the EIS or the court determined that some other
relief was appropriate. But, so as to protect these farmers, the
court declined to prohibit them from "harvesting, using, or selling"
any crops they had already planted. Id., at 56a. And "to
minimize the harm to those growers who intend to imminently plant
Roundup Ready alfalfa," the court permitted "[t]hose growers who
intend to plant [RRA] in the next three weeks and have already
purchased the seed" to go ahead and plant.
Id., at 58a (emphasis deleted). Essentially, the court
grandfathered in those farmers who had relied, in good faith, on
APHIS's actions.
Before determining the scope of its final judgment,
the District Court invited the parties and intervenors to submit
"whatever additional evidence" they "wish[ed] to provide," and it
scheduled additional oral argument. Id., at 58a-59a. The
parties submitted "competing proposals for [**484] permanent injunctive
relief." Id., at 60a. The plaintiffs requested that no
one — not even the grandfathered-in farmers — be allowed to plant,
grow, or harvest RRA until the full EIS had been prepared.
Id., at 64a. APHIS and the intervenors instead sought a remedy
that would "facilitat[e] the continued and dramatic growth" of RRA:
a "partial deregulation" order that would permit planting subject to
certain [*2764] conditions, such as specified minimum distances between RRA
and conventional alfalfa and special cleaning requirements for
equipment used on the genetically modified crop. See
id., at 60a-64a.
The court adopted a compromise. First, it declined to adopt the
APHIS-Monsanto proposal. APHIS itself had acknowledged that "gene
transmission could and had occurred," and that RRA "could result in
of Roundup-resistant weeds." Id., at 61a-62a. In light of the
substantial record evidence of these risks, the court would not
agree to a nationwide planting scheme "without the benefit of the
development of all the relevant data," as well as public comment
about whether contamination could be controlled.
Id., at 68a. The "partial deregulation" proposed by
petitioners, the court noted, was really "deregulation with certain
conditions," id., at 69a — which, for the same reasons given in
the court's earlier order, requires an EIS, ibid. The court
pointed out numerous problems with the APHIS-Monsanto proposal.
[***20] Neither APHIS nor Monsanto had provided "evidence that suggests
whether, and to what extent, the proposed interim conditions" would
actually "be followed," and comparable conditions had failed to
prevent contamination in certain limited settings.
Id., at 69a-70a. APHIS, moreover, conceded that "it does not
have the resources to inspect" the RRA that had already been
planted, and so could not possibly be expected "to adequately
monitor the more than one million acres of [RRA] intervenors
estimate [would] be planted" under their proposal. Ibid.
That was especially problematic because any plan to limit
contamination depended on rules about harvesting, and farmers were
unlikely to follow those rules. Id., at 71a. "APHIS ha[d] still
not made any inquiry" into numerous factual concerns raised by the
court in its summary judgment order issued several months earlier.
Id., at 70a.
Next, the court rejected the plaintiffs' proposed remedy of
"enjoin[ing] the harvesting and sale of already planted" RRA.
Id., at 76a. Although any planting or harvesting of RRA poses a
contamination risk, the court reasoned that the equities were
different for those farmers who had already invested time and money
planting RRA in good-faith reliance on APHIS's deregulation order.
And small amounts of harvesting could be more easily monitored.
Rather than force the farmers to tear up their crops, the
court imposed a variety of conditions on the crops' handling and
distribution. Id., at 77a.
As to all other RRA, however, the court sided with the plaintiffs
and enjoined planting during the pendency of the EIS. Balancing the
equities, the court explained that the risk of harm was great.
"[C]ontamination cannot be undone; it will destroy the crops of
those farmers who do not sell genetically modified alfalfa."
Id., at 71a. And because those crops "cannot be replanted for
two to four years," that loss will be even greater. Ibid. On
the other side of the balance, the court recognized that some
farmers may [**485] wish to switch to genetically modified alfalfa
immediately, and some companies like Monsanto want to start selling
it to them just as fast. But, the court noted, RRA is a small
percentage of those companies' overall business; unsold seed can be
stored; and the companies "`have [no] cause to claim surprise'" as
to any loss of anticipated revenue, as they "were aware of
plaintiffs' lawsuit" and "nonetheless chose to market" RRA.
Id., at 72a.
Thus, the District Court stated that it would "vacat[e] the
June 2005 deregulation decision"; "enjoi[n] the planting of [RRA] in
the United States after March 30, 2007," the date of the decision,
"pending the government's completion of the EIS and decision [*2765] on the
deregulation petition"; and impose "conditions on the handling and
identification of already-planted [RRA]." Id., at 79a. On the
same day, the court issued its judgment. In relevant part, the
judgment states:
defendants' June 14, 2005 Determination of
Nonregulated Status for [RRA] is VACATED. Before
granting Monsanto's deregulation petition, even
in part, the federal defendants shall prepare an
[EIS]. Until the federal defendants prepare [***21] the
EIS and decide the deregulation
petition, no [RRA] may be planted. . . . [RRA
already] planted before March 30,
2007 may be grown, harvested and sold subject to
the following conditions."
Id., at 108a-109a.
Before proceeding to address the Court's opinion on its own terms,
it is important to note that I have reservations about the validity
of those terms. The Court today rests not only the bulk of its
analysis but also the primary basis for our jurisdiction on the
deregulating RRA in any sense. See
ante, at 9-11, 16-23.[fn1] That is a permissible, but not
necessarily correct, reading of the District Court's judgment.
So far as I can tell, until petitioners' reply brief, neither
petitioners nor the Government submitted to us
that the District Court had exceeded its authority in this
manner. And, indeed, the Government had not raised this issue in any
court at all. Petitioners did not raise the issue in any of their
three questions presented or in the body of their petition for a
writ or certiorari. And they did not raise the issue in their
opening briefs to this Court. Only after respondents alleged
that Monsanto's injury would not be redressed by vacating the
injunction, insofar as RRA would still be a regulated article, did
petitioners bring the issue to the Court's attention. Explaining why
they have a redressable injury, petitioners alleged
that the District Court's order prevents APHIS from "implement[ing]
an[y]
interim [**486] solution allowing continued planting." Reply Brief for
Petitioners 5. APHIS, the party that the Court says was wrongly
"barred . . . from pursuing any deregulation," even "in
accordance with the procedures established by law,"
ante, at 19, did not complain about this aspect of
the District Court's order even in its reply brief.
Thus, notwithstanding that petitioners "adequately
preserved their objection that the vacated deregulation
decision should have been replaced by APHIS's proposed injunction,"
ante, at 8 (emphasis added), the key legal premise on which the
Court decides this case was never adequately presented. Of
course, this is not standard — or sound — judicial practice. See
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmi-chael,
526 U. S. 137, 159 (1999) (STEVENS, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Today's decision illustrates why, for it is
quite unclear whether the Court's premise is correct, and the Court
has put itself in the position of deciding legal issues without the
aid of briefing.
[*2766] In my view, the District Court's judgment can fairly be read to
address only (1) total deregulation orders of the kind that spawned
this lawsuit, and (2) the particular partial deregulation order
proposed to the court by APHIS. This interpretation of the judgment
is more consistent with the District Court's accompanying opinion,
which concluded by stating that the court "will enter a final
judgment" "ordering the government to prepare an EIS before [the
court] makes a decision on Monsanto's deregulation petition." App.
to Pet. for Cert. 79a. The language of that opinion does not appear
to "ba[r] the agency from pursuing any deregulation [***22] — no matter how
limited," ante, at 19 (emphasis deleted). This interpretation
is also more consistent with APHIS's own decision not to contest
what, according to the Court, was an unprecedented infringement on
the agency's statutory authority.
To be sure, the District Court's judgment is somewhat opaque. But
it is troubling that we may be asserting
jurisdiction and deciding a highly factbound case based on nothing
more than a misunderstanding. It is also troubling that we may be
making law without adequate briefing on the critical questions we
are passing upon. I would not be surprised if on remand
the District Court merely clarified its order.
Even assuming that the majority has correctly interpreted
the District Court's judgment, I do not agree that we should reverse
At the outset, it is important to observe that when
a district court is faced with an unlawful agency action, a set of
parties who have relied on that action, and a prayer for relief to
avoid irreparable harm, the court is operating under its powers of
equity. In such a case, a court's function is "to do equity and to
mould each decree to the necessities of the particular case."
Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 321, 329 (1944).
"Flexibility" and "practicality" are the touchtones of these
remedial determinations, as "the public interest," "private needs,"
and "competing private claims" must all be weighed and reconciled
against the background of the court's own limitations [**487] and its
particular familiarity with the case. Id., at 329-330.[fn2]
When a district court takes on the equitable role of adjusting
legal obligations, we review the remedy it crafts
for abuse of discretion. "[D]eference," we have explained, "is the
hallmark of abuse-of-discretion review." General Elec. Co. v.
Joiner, 522 U. S. 136, 143 (1997). Although equitable remedies
are "not left to a trial court's `inclination,'" they are left to
the court's "`judgment.'" Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 416 (1975) (quoting United States v.
Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 35 (No. 14,692d) (CC Va. 1807)
(Marshall, C. J.)). The principles set forth in applicable federal
statutes may inform that judgment. See [*2767] United States v.
Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative,
532 U. S. 483, 497 (2001) ("[A] court sitting in equity cannot
ignore the judgment of Congress, deliberately expressed in
legislation" (internal quotation marks omitted)). And historically,
courts have had particularly broad equitable power — and thus
particularly broad discretion — to remedy public nuisances and other
"`purprestures upon public rights and properties,'" Mugler v.
Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 672 (1887), [fn3] which include
environmental harms.[fn4]
In my view, the District Court did not "unreasonably exercis[e]"
its discretion, Bennett v. Bennett,
208 U. S. 505, 512 (1908), even if it did categorically prohibit
partial deregulation pending completion of the EIS. Rather,
the District Court's judgment can be understood as either of two
reasonable exercises of its equitable powers.
First, the District Court's decision can be understood as an
equitable application of administrative law. Faced with two
different deregulation proposals, the District Court appears to have
vacated the [***23] deregulation that had already occurred, made clear
that NEPA requires an EIS
for any future deregulation of RRA, and partially stayed the vacatur
to the extent it affects farmers who had already planted RRA.[fn5]
Under NEPA, an agency must prepare [**488] an EIS for "every . . . major
environment." 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). Recall
that the District Court had found, on the basis of substantial
evidence, that planting RRA can cause genetic contamination of other
crops, planting in controlled settings had led to contamination,
APHIS is unable to monitor or enforce limitations on planting, and
genetic contamination could decimate the American alfalfa market. In
light of that evidence, the court may well have concluded that any
deregulation of RRA, even in a "limited . . . geographic area" with
"stringent . . . regulations governing harvesting and
distribution,"[fn6] ante, at 19-20, requires
[*2768] an EIS under NEPA. See generally D. Mandelker, NEPA Law and
Litigation §§ 8:33-8:48 (2d ed. 2009) (describing when an EIS is
required); cf. Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources
Council, 490 U. S. 360, 371 (1989) (NEPA embodies "sweeping
commitment" to environmental safety and principle that "the agency
will not act on incomplete information, only to regret its decision
after it is too late to correct"). Indeed, it appears that any
deregulation of a genetically modified, herbicide-resistant crop
that can transfer its genes to other organisms and cannot
effectively be monitored easily fits the criteria for when an EIS is
required.[fn7] That is especially so when, as in this case, the
environmental threat is novel. See Winter v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U. S. ___, ___ (2008) (slip
op., at 13) (EIS is more important when party "is conducting a
new type of activity with completely unknown effects on the
environment").[fn8]
[**489] Moreover, given that APHIS had already been ordered to conduct an
EIS on deregulation of RRA, the court could have reasonably feared
that partial deregulation would undermine the agency's eventual
decision. Courts confronted with NEPA violations regularly adopt
interim measures to maintain the status quo, particularly if
allowing agency action to go forward risks foreclosing alternative
courses of action that the agency might have adopted following
completion of an EIS. See D. Mandelker, NEPA Law and
Litigation § 4:61. The applicable regulations, to which
the District Court owed deference, [fn9] provide that during the
preparation of an EIS, "no [*2769] action concerning the [agency's] proposal
shall be taken which would . . . [h]ave an adverse environmental
impact" or "[l]imit the choice of reasonable alternatives."
40 CFR § 1506.1(a) (2009). As exemplified by the problem of what to
do with farmers who had already purchased or planted RRA prior to
the District Court's judgment, even minimal deregulation can limit
future regulatory options. "Courts must remember that in many cases
allowing an agency to proceed makes a mockery of the EIS process,
from analysis to rationalization." Herrmann, Injunctions for NEPA
Violations: Balancing the Equities,
59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1263, 1289 (1992); see also see
40 CFR § 1502.5 (EIS should [***24] be implemented in manner assuring it
"will not be used to rationalize or justify decisions already
made").
Although the majority does not dispute that the District Court
could have reasonably concluded that NEPA requires an EIS for even
partial deregulation of RRA, it suggests that any such conclusion
would have been incompatible with the court's decision to permit
limited harvesting by farmers who had already planted RRA. See
ante, at 20.[fn10] I do not see the "inconsisten[cy]."
Ibid. NEPA does not apply to actions by federal courts. See
40 CFR § 1508.12. Exercising its equitable discretion to
balance the interests of the parties and the public,
the District Court would have been well within its rights to find
that NEPA requires an EIS before the agency grants "Monsanto's
deregulation petition, even in part," App. to Pet. for Cert. 108a,
yet also to find that a partial stay of the vacatur was appropriate
to protect the interests of those farmers who had already acted in
good-faith reliance on APHIS.
Similarly, I do not agree that the District Court's ruling was
"premature" because APHIS had not yet effected any partial
deregulations, ante[**490] , at 19. Although it is "for the agency to
decide whether and to what extent" it will pursue deregulation,
ante, at 17, the court's application of NEPA to APHIS's
regulation of RRA might have controlled any deregulation during the
pendency of the EIS. Petitioners and APHIS had already come back to
with a proposed partial deregulation order which, the court
explained, was incompatible with its determination that there is a
substantial risk of gene spreading and that APHIS lacks monitoring
capacity. That same concern would apply to any partial
deregulation order. The court therefore had good reason to make it
clear, upfront, that the parties should not continue to expend
resources proposing such orders, instead of just moving ahead with
an EIS. Cf. Railroad Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co.,
312 U. S. 496, 500 (1941) ("The resources of equity are equal to an
adjustment that will avoid the waste of a tentative decision").
Indeed, it was APHIS itself that "sought to `streamline'" the
process. Ante, at 18.
Second, the District Court's judgment can be understood as a
reasonable response to the nature of the risks posed by RRA.
Separate and apart from NEPA's requirement of an EIS, these risks
were sufficiently serious, in my view, that the court's injunction
was a permissible exercise of its equitable authority.
[*2770] The District Court found that gene transfer can and does occur,
and that if it were to spread through open land the environmental
and economic consequences would be devastating. Cf. Amoco
Production Co. v. Gambell,
480 U. S. 531, 545 (1987) ("Environmental injury, by its nature, can
seldom be adequately remedied by money damages and is often
permanent or at least of long duration, i.e., irreparable").
Although "a mere possibility of a future nuisance will not support
an injunction," courts have never required proof "that the nuisance
will occur"; rather, "it is sufficient . . . that the
risk of its happening is greater than a reasonable man would
incur." 5 J. Pomeroy, A Treatise [***25] on Equity Jurisprudence and
Equitable Remedies, § 1937 (§ 523), p. 4398 (2d ed. 1919). Once
gene transfer occurred in American fields, it "would be
difficult — if
not impossible — to reverse the harm." Hollingsworth v.
Perry, 558 U. S. ___, ___ (2010) (per curiam) (slip
op., at 12).
Additional considerations support the District Court's judgment.
It was clear to the court that APHIS had only limited capacity to
monitor planted RRA, and some RRA had already been planted. The
marginal threat posed by additional planting was therefore
significant. Injunctive remedies are meant to achieve a "nice
adjustment and reconciliation between the competing claims" of
injury by "mould[ing] each decree to the necessities of the case."
Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo,
456 U. S. 305, 312 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under
these circumstances, it was not unreasonable for the court to
conclude that the most equitable solution was to allocate the
limited amount of potentially [**491] safe RRA to the farmers who had
already planted that crop.[fn11]
The Court suggests that the injunction was nonetheless too
sweeping because "a partial deregulation need not cause respondents
any injury at all . . . if the scope of the partial deregulation is
sufficiently limited, the risk of gene flow to their crops could be
virtually nonexistent." Ante, at 21. The Court appears to reach
this conclusion by citing one particular study
(in a voluminous record), rather than any findings of fact.[fn12]
Even assuming that this study is
correct, the Court ignores the District Court's findings that gene
flow is likely and that APHIS has little ability to monitor any
conditions imposed on a partial [*2771] deregulation. Limits on planting or
harvesting may operate fine in a laboratory setting, but
the District Court concluded that many limits will not be followed
and cannot be enforced in the real world.[fn13]
Against that background, it was perfectly reasonable to wait for
an EIS. APHIS and petitioners argued to the District Court
that partial deregulation could be safely implemented, they
submitted evidence intended to show that planting restrictions would
prevent the spread of the newly engineered gene, and they contested
"virtually every factual issue relating to possible environmental
harm." Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns,
570 F. 3d 1130, 1135 (CA9 2009). But lacking "the benefit of the
development of all the relevant data," App. to Pet. for Cert. 68a,
the District Court did not find APHIS's and petitioners' assertions
to be convincing. I cannot say that I would have found otherwise. It
was reasonable for the court to conclude that planting could not go
forward until more
complete study, presented in an EIS, showed that the known problem
of gene flow could, in reality, be prevented.[fn14]
The District Court's decision that more study was needed to assess
whether limits on deregulation could prevent environmental damage is
further reinforced by the statutory context in which the issue
arose. A court's equitable discretion must be guided by "recognized,
defined public policy." Meredith v. Winter Haven,
320 U. S. 228, 235 (1943); see also Hecht Co. v.
Bowles, 321 U. S. 321, 331 (1944) (explaining that when a court
evaluates [***26] an agency's decision against the background of a federal
statute, the court's discretion "must be exercised in light of the
large objectives of the Act"). Congress recognized in NEPA
that complex environmental cases often require exceptionally
sophisticated scientific determinations, and that agency decisions
should not be made on the basis of "incomplete information."
Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council,
490 U. S. 360, 371 (1989). Congress also recognized that agencies
cannot fully weigh the consequences of these decisions without
obtaining [**492] public comments through an EIS. See Robertson v.
Methow Valley Citizens Council,
490 U. S. 332, 350 (1989).[fn15] While a court may not presume
that a NEPA violation requires an injunction, it may take into
account the principles embodied
in the statute in considering whether an injunction would be
appropriate. This District Court had before it strong evidence
that gene transmission was likely to occur and that limits on
growing could [*2772] not be enforced. It also had a large amount of highly
detailed evidence about whether growing restrictions, even if
enforced, can prevent transmission. That evidence called into
question the agency's own claims regarding the risks posed by
partial deregulation. In enjoining partial deregulation until it had
the benefit of an EIS to help parse the evidence, the court acted
with exactly the sort of caution that Congress endorsed in NEPA.
Finally, it bears mention that the District Court's experience
with the case may have given it grounds for skepticism about the
representations made by APHIS and petitioners. Sometimes "one
judicial actor is better positioned than another to decide the issue
in question." Miller v. Fenton, 474 U. S. 104, 114 (1985).
A "district court may have insights not conveyed by the record."
Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U. S. 552, 560 (1988). In this
case, the agency had attempted to deregulate RRA without an EIS in
spite of ample evidence of potential environmental harms. And when
the court made clear that the agency had violated NEPA, the agency
responded by seeking to "`streamline'" the process,
ante, at 18, submitting a deregulation proposal with Monsanto
that suffered from some of the same legal and empirical holes as its
initial plan to deregulate. Against that background, the court
may have felt it especially prudent to wait for an EIS before
concluding that APHIS could manage RRA's threat to the environment.
The District Court in this case was put in an "unenviable
position." Ibid. In front of it was strong evidence that RRA
poses a serious threat to the environment and to
American business, and that limits on RRA deregulation might not be
followed or enforced — and that even if they were, the newly
engineered gene might nevertheless spread to other crops. Confronted
with those disconcerting submissions, with APHIS's unlawful
deregulation decision, with a group of farmers who had staked their
livelihoods on APHIS's decision, and with a federal statute
that prizes informed decision making on matters that seriously
affect the environment, the court did the best it could. In my view,
the District Court [***27] was well within its discretion to order the
remedy that the Court now reverses. Accordingly, I respectfully
[fn1] See also ante, at 19-20 ("[T]he District Court barred the
agency from pursuing any deregulation — no matter how limited the
geographic area in which planting of RRA would be allowed, how
great the isolation distances mandated between RRA fields and fields
for growing non-genetically-engineered alfalfa, how stringent the
regulations governing harvesting and distribution, how robust the
enforcement mechanisms available at the time of the decision,
and — consequently — no matter how small the risk that the
planting authorized under such conditions would adversely affect the
environment in general and respondents in
particular" (emphasis deleted)).
[fn2] See also, e.g., Railroad Comm'n of Tex. v.
Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496, 500 (1941) ("The history of equity
jurisdiction is the history of regard for public consequences. . . .
There have been as many and as variegated applications of this
supple principle as the situations that have brought it into play");
Seymour v. Freer, 8 Wall. 202, 218 (1869) ("[A] court of
equity ha[s] unquestionable authority to apply its flexible and
comprehensive jurisdiction in such manner as might be necessary to
the right administration of justice between the parties"). Indeed,
the very "ground of this jurisdiction" is a court's "ability to give
a more complete and perfect remedy." 2 J. Story, Equity
Jurisprudence § 924, p. 225 (M. Bigelow ed. 13th ed. 1886).
[fn3] See Steelworkers v. United States,
361 U. S. 39, 60-61 (1959) (per curiam) (reviewing history of
injunctions to prevent public nuisances).
[fn4] See, e.g., Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.,
206 U. S. 230 (1907) (air pollution); Arizona Copper Co. v.
Gillespie, 230 U. S. 46, 56-57 (1913) (water pollution).
[fn5] See Reply Brief for Federal Respondents 3. There is an ongoing
debate about the role of equitable adjustments
in administrative law. See, e.g., Levin, Vacation at Sea:
Judicial Remedies and Equitable Discretion in Administrative Law,
53 Duke L. J. 291 (2003). The parties to this appeal and the
majority assume that the District Court's remedy was crafted under
its equity powers, and I will do the same.
[fn6] One of the many matters not briefed in this case is how
limited a partial deregulation can be. It is not clear whether the
sort of extremely limited "partial deregulations" envisioned by the
Court, see ante, at 19-23, in which RRA is "deregulated" in one
small geographic area pursuant to stringent restrictions, could be
achieved only through "partial deregulation" actions, or whether
they could also (or exclusively) be achieved through a more
case-specific permit process. Under the applicable regulations, a
regulated article may still be used subject to a permitting process.
See 7 CFR §§ 340.0, 340.4 (2010). These permits "prescribe
confinement conditions and standard operating procedures . . . to
maintain confinement of the genetically engineered organism."
72 Fed. Reg. 39021, 39022 (2007) (hereinafter Introduction).
Ordinarily, "[o]nce an article has been deregulated, APHIS does
not place any restrictions or requirements on its use."
Id., at 39023. As of 2007, APHIS had never — not
once — granted partial approval of a petition for nonregulated
status. USDA, Introduction of Genetically Engineered Organisms,
July 2007, p. 11, online at
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/brs/pdf/complete_eis.pdf
(as visited June 18, 2010, and available in Clerk of Court's
case file). In 2007, APHIS began contemplating a "new system"
to allow for the release and use of genetically modified organisms,
for "special cases" in which there are risks "that could be
mitigated with conditions to ensure safe commercial use."
Introduction 39024 (emphasis added).
[fn7] See, e.g., 40 CFR § 1508.8 (2009) (determination whether
an EIS is required turns on both "[d]irect effects" and "[i]ndirect
effects," and "include[s] those resulting from actions which
may have both beneficial and detrimental effects even if on balance
the agency believes that the effect will be
beneficial"); § 1508.27(b)(4) (determination whether an EIS is
required turns on "[t]he degree to which the effects on the quality
of the human environment are likely to be highly
controversial"); § 1508.27(b)(5) (determination whether an EIS is
required turns on "[t]he degree to which the possible effects on the
quality of the human environment are highly uncertain or involve
unique or unknown risks").
[fn8] The Court posits a hypothetical in which APHIS deregulates RRA
limited to a remote area in which alfalfa is not grown, and issues
an accompanying order "mandating isolation distances so great as to
eliminate any appreciable risk of gene flow to the crops of
conventional farmers who might someday choose to plant in the
surrounding area." Ante, at 21. At the outset, it is important
to note the difference between a plausible hypothetical and a piece
of fiction. At least as of 2007, APHIS had never granted partial
approval of a petition for nonregulated status.
See n. 6, supra. And I doubt that it would choose to deregulate
genetically modified alfalfa in a place where the growing conditions
and sales networks for the product are so poor that no farmer
already plants it. Moreover, the notion that this imagined
deregulation would pose virtually no environmental risk ignores one
of the District Court's critical findings of fact: APHIS has very
limited capacity to monitor its own restrictions. The agency could
place all manner of constraints on its deregulation orders; they
will have no effect unless they are enforced.
[fn9] See Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council,
490 U. S. 360, 372 (1989).
[fn10] The Court states that the order permitted both harvesting and
planting. But the court's final judgment permitted only sale and
harvesting of RRA planted before March 30, 2007, more than a
month before the judgment. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 109a; see also
id., at 79a.
[fn11] As explained previously, I do not see the court's broad
injunction as "inconsistent," ante, at 20, with its decision
that farmers who had already planted RRA could harvest their crop.
The equities are different for farmers who relied on the agency than
for companies like Monstanto that developed an organism knowing it
might be regulated; and APHIS could monitor only a limited amount of
[fn12] The Court also hypothesizes a set of growing conditions
that would isolate RRA from the plaintiffs in this case, even if not
from other farmers. See ante, at 21-22. As already explained,
these hypotheticals are rather unrealistic.
See n. 8, supra. And, given that the plaintiffs include
environmental organizations as well as farmer and consumer
associations, it is hard to see how APHIS could so carefully isolate
and protect their interests. In any event, because APHIS concedes
that it cannot monitor such limits, rules that protect these or any
other parties may be merely hortatory in practice. Moreover,
although we have not squarely addressed the issue, in my view
"[t]here is no general requirement that an injunction affect only
the parties in the suit." Bresgal v. Brock,
843 F. 2d 1163, 1169 (CA9 1987). To limit an injunction against a
federal agency to the named plaintiffs "would only encourage
numerous other" regulated entities "to file additional lawsuits in
this and other federal jurisdictions." Livestock Marketing
Assn. v. United States Dept. of Agriculture,
207 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1007 (SD 2002), aff'd,
335 F. 3d 711, 726 (CA8 2003).
[fn13] The majority notes that the District Court acknowledged, at a
hearing several months before it issued the judgment, that a simple
but slightly overinclusive remedy may be preferable to an elaborate
set of planting conditions. See ante, at 22, n. 6. Quite right.
As the District Court said to APHIS's lawyer at that hearing, if the
agency issues an elaborate set of precautions, "I don't know how you
even start to enforce it." App. to Pet. for Cert. 190a-191a.
[fn14] I suspect that if APHIS and petitioners had come back to the
court with more convincing evidence prior to completing an EIS, and
moved to modify the court's order, the court would have done so.
Indeed, the District Court showed a willingness to recalibrate its
order when it amended its judgment just a few months after the
judgment's issuance in light of APHIS's submission that certain
requirements were impractical. See App. to Pet. for
Cert. 111a-114a.
[fn15] Accordingly, while "NEPA itself does not mandate particular
results," it does mandate a particular process and embodies the
principle that federal agencies should "carefully conside[r]
detailed information" before incurring potential environmental harm.
Robertson, 490 U. S., at 350, 349.