Source: https://jusmundi.com/en/document/decision/en-lagrand-germany-v-united-states-of-america-judgment-wednesday-27th-june-2001
Timestamp: 2019-12-09 02:44:30
Document Index: 153641149

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art. 36', 'Art. 36', 'Art. 5', 'Art. 36', 'Art. 36', 'Art. 94', 'Art. 41']

LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), Judgment, 27 June 2001
Vienna Convention on the...
Vienna Convention on Cons...
Optional Protocol to the... - Article I
Link2 (FR) Official source
Order - Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures - 3 Mar 1999
Separate Opinion of President Schwebel
Judgment - 27 June 2001
Declaration of President Guillaume (as appended immediately after the judgment)
Separate opinion of Vice-President Shi
Dissenting opinion of Judge Buergenthal
Separate opinion of Judge Parra-Aranguren
Application instituting proceedings - 2 Mar 1999
Request for the indication of Provisional Measures of Protection - 2 Mar 1999
Order - Fixing of time-limits: Memorial and Counter-Memorial - 5 Mar 1999
Memorial of the Federal Republic of Germany - 16 Sept 1999
Counter-Memorial of the United States of America - 27 Mar 2000
Documents submitted to the Court by the Federal Republic of Germany after the Closure of the Written Proceedings - 20 Oct 2000
Germany's answers to the questions asked by Judges Higgins and Koroma - 7 Dec 2000
Gilbert Guillaume President
Jiuyong Shi Vice-President
Shigeru Oda Judge
Mohammed Bedjaoui Judge
Raymond Ranjeva Judge
Géza Herczegh Judge
Carl-August Fleischhauer Judge
Abdul G. Koroma Judge
Vladlen Stepanovich Vereshchetin Judge
Rosalyn Higgins Judge
Gonzalo Parra-Aranguren Judge
Pieter H. Kooijmans Judge
Francisco Rezek Judge
Awn Shawkat Al-Khasawneh Judge
Thomas Buergenthal Judge
On 2 March 1999 the Federal Republic of Germany (hereinafter referred to as "Germany") filed in the Registry of the Court an Application instituting proceedings against the United States of America (hereinafter referred to as the "United States") for "violations of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations [of 24 April 1963]" (hereinafter referred to as the "Vienna Convention").
In its Application, Germany based the jurisdiction of the Court on Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Statute of the Court and on Article I of the Optional Protocol concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, which accompanies the Vienna Convention (hereinafter referred to as the "Optional Protocol").
Pursuant to Article 40, paragraph 2, of the Statute, the Application was forthwith communicated to the Government of the United States; and, in accordance with paragraph 3 of that Article, all States entitled to appear before the Court were notified of the Application.
On 2 March 1999, the day on which the Application was filed, the German Government also filed in the Registry of the Court a request for the indication of provisional measures based on Article 41 of the Statute and Articles 73, 74 and 75 of the Rules of Court.
By a letter dated 2 March 1999, the Vice-President of the Court, acting President in the case, addressed the Government of the United States in the following terms:
"Exercising the functions of the presidency in terms of Articles 13 and 32 of the Rules of Court, and acting in conformity with Article 74, paragraph 4, of the said Rules, I hereby draw the attention of [the] Government [of the United States] to the need to act in such a way as to enable any Order the Court will make on the request for provisional measures to have its appropriate effects."
By an Order of 3 March 1999. the Court indicated certain provisional measures (see paragraph 32 below).
In accordance with Article 43 of the Rules of Court, the Registrar sent the notification referred to in Article 63, paragraph 1, of the Statute to all States parties to the Vienna Convention or to that Convention and the Optional Protocol.
By an Order of 5 March 1999, the Court, taking account of the views of the Parties, fixed 16 September 1999 and 27 March 2000, respectively, as the time-limits for the filing of a Memorial by Germany and of a Counter-Memorial by the United States.
The Memorial and Counter-Memorial were duly filed within the time-limits so prescribed.
By letter of 26 October 2000, the Agent of Germany expressed his Government’s desire to produce five new documents in accordance with Article 56 of the Rules.
By letter of 6 November 2000, the Agent of the United States informed the Court that his Government consented to the production of the first and second documents, but not to that of the third, fourth and fifth documents.
The Court decided, pursuant to Article 56, paragraph 2, of the Rules, to authorize the production of the latter group of documents by Germany, it being understood that the United States would have the opportunity, in accordance with paragraph 3 of that Article, to comment subsequently thereon and to submit documents in support of those comments. That decision was duly communicated to the Parties by letters from the Registrar dated 9 November 2000.
Pursuant to Article 53, paragraph 2, of the Rules, the Court, after ascertaining the views of the Parties, decided that copies of the pleadings and documents annexed would be made available to the public at the opening of the oral proceedings.
Public hearings were held from 13 to 17 November 2000, at which the Court heard the oral arguments and replies of:
For Germany: Mr. Gerhard Westdickenberg,
Mr. Bruno Simma,
Mr. Daniel Khan,
Mr. Hans-Peter Kaul,
Mr. Andreas Paulus,
Mr. Donald Francis Donovan,
Mr. Pierre-Marie Dupuy.
For the United States: Mr. James H. Thessin,
The Honourable Janet Napolitano,
Ms Catherine W. Brown,
Mr. Theodor Meron,
Mr. D. Stephen Mathias,
Mr. Stefan Trechsel,
Mr. Michael J. Matheson.
At the hearings, Members of the Court put questions to Germany, to which replies were given in writing, in accordance with Article 61. paragraph 4, of the Rules of Court.
In addition, the United States, acting within the time-limit accorded it for this purpose, commented on the new documents filed by Germany on 26 October 2000 (see paragraph 6 above) and produced documents in support of those comments.
In its Application, Germany formulated the decision requested in the following terms:
‘'Accordingly the Federal Republic of Germany asks the Court to adjudge and declare
(1) that the United States, in arresting, detaining, trying, convicting and sentencing Karl and Walter LaGrand, as described in the preceding statement of facts, violated its international legal obligations to Germany, in its own right and in its right of diplomatic protection of its nationals, as provided by Articles 5 and 36 of the Vienna Convention,
(2) that Germany is therefore entitled to reparation,
(3) that the United States is under an international legal obligation not to apply the doctrine of ‘procedural default’ or any other doctrine of national law, so as to preclude the exercise of the rights accorded under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention; and
(4) that the United States is under an international obligation to carry out in conformity with the foregoing international legal obligations any future detention of or criminal proceedings against any other German national in its territory, whether by a constituent, legislative, executive, judicial or other power, whether that power holds a superior or subordinate position in the organization of the United States, and whether that power’s functions are of an international or internal character;
(1) the criminal liability imposed on Karl and Walter LaGrand in violation of international legal obligations is void, and should be recognized as void by the legal authorities of the United States;
(2) the United States should provide reparation, in the form of compensation and satisfaction, for the execution of Karl LaGrand on 24 February 1999;
(3) the United States should restore the status quo ante in the case of Walter LaGrand, that is re-establish the situation that existed before the detention of, proceedings against, and conviction and sentencing of that German national in violation of the United States' international legal obligation took place; and
(4) the United States should provide Germany a guarantee of the nonrepetition of the illegal acts."
In the course of the written proceedings, the following submissions were presented by the Parties:
On behalf of the Government of Germany,
in the Memorial:
"Having regard to the facts and points of law set forth in the present Memorial, and without prejudice to such elements of fact and law and to such evidence as may be submitted at a later time, and likewise without prejudice to the right to supplement and amend the present Submissions, the Federal Republic of Germany respectfully requests the Court to adjudge and declare
(1) that the United States, by not informing Karl and Walter LaGrand without delay following their arrest of their rights under Article 36 subparagraph 1 (b) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, and by depriving Germany of the possibility of rendering consular assistance, which ultimately resulted in the execution of Karl and Walter LaGrand, violated its international legal obligations to Germany, in its own right and in its right of diplomatic protection of its nationals, under Articles 5 and 36 paragraph 1 of the said Convention;
(2) that the United States, by applying rules of its domestic law, in particular the doctrine of procedural default, which barred Karl and Walter LaGrand from raising their claims under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, and by ultimately executing them, violated its international legal obligation to Germany under Article 36 paragraph 2 of the Vienna Convention to give full effect to the purposes for which the rights accorded under Article 36 of the said Convention are intended;
(3) that the United States, by failing to take all measures at its disposal to ensure that Walter LaGrand was not executed pending the final decision of the International Court of Justice on the matter, violated its international legal obligation to comply with the Order on provisional measures issued by the Court on 3 March 1999, and to refrain from any action which might interfere with the subject matter of a dispute while judicial proceedings are pending;
and, pursuant to the foregoing international legal obligations,
(4) that the United States shall provide Germany a guarantee that it will not repeat its illegal acts and ensure that, in any future cases of detention of or criminal proceedings against German nationals, United States domestic law and practice will not constitute a bar to the effective exercise of the rights under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations."
in the Counter-Memorial:
"Accordingly, on the basis of the facts and arguments set forth in this Counter-Memorial, and without prejudice to the right further to amend and supplement these submissions in the future, the United States asks the Court to adjudge and declare that:
(1) There was a breach of the United States obligation to Germany under Article 36 (1) (b) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, in that the competent authorities of the United States did not promptly give to Karl and Walter LaGrand the notification required by that Article, and that the United States has apologized to Germany for this breach, and is taking substantial measures aimed at preventing any recurrence; and
(2) That all other claims and submissions of the Federal Republic of Germany are dismissed."
At the oral proceedings, the following submissions were presented by the Parties:
"The Federal Republic of Germany respectfully requests the Court to adjudge and declare
(1) that the United States, by not informing Karl and Walter LaGrand without delay following their arrest of their rights under Article 36, subparagraph 1 (b), of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, and by depriving Germany of the possibility of rendering consular assistance, which ultimately resulted in the execution of Karl and Walter LaGrand, violated its international legal obligations to Germany, in its own right and in its right of diplomatic protection of its nationals, under Articles 5 and 36, paragraph 1, of the said Convention;
(2) that the United States, by applying rules of its domestic law, in particular the doctrine of procedural default, which barred Karl and Walter LaGrand from raising their claims under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, and by ultimately executing them, violated its international legal obligation to Germany under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Convention to give full effect to the purposes for which the rights accorded under Article 36 of the said Convention are intended;
(3) that the United States, by failing to take all measures at its disposal to ensure that Walter LaGrand was not executed pending the final decision of the International Court of Justice on the matter, violated its international legal obligation to comply with the Order on provisional measures issued by the Court on 3 March 1999, and to refrain from any action which might interfere with the subject-matter of a dispute while judicial proceedings are pending;
(4) that the United States shall provide Germany an assurance that it will not repeat its unlawful acts and that, in any future cases of detention of or criminal proceedings against German nationals, the United States will ensure in law and practice the effective exercise of the rights under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. In particular in cases involving the death penalty, this requires the United States to provide effective review of and remedies for criminal convictions impaired by a violation of the rights under Article 36."
"The United States of America respectfully requests the Court to adjudge and declare that:
(1) There was a breach of the United States obligation to Germany under Article 36. paragraph 1 (b), of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, in that the competent authorities of the United States did not promptly give to Karl and Walter LaGrand the notification required by that Article, and that the United States has apologized to Germany for this breach, and is taking substantial measures aimed at preventing any recurrence; and
(2) All other claims and submissions of the Federal Republic of Germany are dismissed."
Walter LaGrand and Karl LaGrand were born in Germany in 1962 and 1963 respectively, and were German nationals. In 1967, when they were still young children, they moved with their mother to take up permanent residence in the United States. They returned to Germany only once, for a period of about six months in 1974. Although they lived in the United States for most of their lives, and became the adoptive children of a United States national, they remained at all times German nationals, and never acquired the nationality of the United States. However, the United States has emphasized that both had the demeanour and speech of Americans rather than Germans, that neither was known to have spoken German, and that they appeared in all respects to be native citizens of the United States.
On 7 January 1982, Karl LaGrand and Walter LaGrand were arrested in the United States by law enforcement officers on suspicion of having been involved earlier the same day in an attempted armed bank robbery in Marana, Arizona, in the course of which the bank manager was murdered and another bank employee seriously injured. They were subsequently tried before the Superior Court of Pima County, Arizona, which, on 17 February 1984, convicted them both of murder in the first degree, attempted murder in the first degree, attempted armed robbery and two counts of kidnapping. On 14 December 1984, each was sentenced to death for first degree murder and to concurrent sentences of imprisonment for the other charges.
At all material times, Germany as well as the United States were parties to both the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and the Optional Protocol to that Convention. Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Vienna Convention provides that:
"if he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State if, within its consular district, a national of that State is arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in any other manner. Any communication addressed to the consular post by the person arrested, in prison, custody or detention shall be forwarded by the said authorities without delay. The said authorities shall inform the person concerned without delay of his rights under this subparagraph."
It is not disputed that at the time the LaGrands were convicted and sentenced, the competent United States authorities had failed to provide the LaGrands with the information required by this provision of the Vienna Convention, and had not informed the relevant German consular post of the LaGrands’ arrest. The United States concedes that the competent authorities failed to do so, even after becoming aware that the LaGrands were German nationals and not United States nationals, and admits that the United States has therefore violated its obligations under this provision of the Vienna Convention.
However, there is some dispute between the Parties as to the time at which the competent authorities in the United States became aware of the fact that the LaGrands were German nationals. Germany argues that the authorities of Arizona were aware of this from the very beginning, and in particular that probation officers knew by April 1982. The United States argues that at the time of their arrest, neither of the LaGrands identified himself to the arresting authorities as a German national, and that Walter LaGrand affirmatively stated that he was a United States citizen. The United States position is that its "competent authorities" for the purposes of Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Vienna Convention were the arresting and detaining authorities, and that these became aware of the German nationality of the LaGrands by late 1984, and possibly by mid-1983 or earlier, but in any event not at the time of their arrest in 1982. Although other authorities, such as immigration authorities or probation officers, may have known this even earlier, the United States argues that these were not "competent authorities" for the purposes of this provision of the Vienna Convention. The United States has also suggested that at the time of their arrest, the LaGrands may themselves have been unaware that they were not nationals of the United States.
At their trial, the LaGrands were represented by counsel assigned by the court, as they were unable to afford legal counsel of their own choice. Their counsel at trial did not raise the issue of non-compliance with the Vienna Convention, and did not themselves contact the German consular authorities.
The convictions and sentences pronounced by the Superior Court of Pima County, Arizona, were subsequently challenged by the LaGrands in three principal sets of legal proceedings.
The first set of proceedings consisted of appeals against the convictions and sentences to the Supreme Court of Arizona, which were rejected by that court on 30 January 1987. The United States Supreme Court, in the exercise of its discretion, denied applications by the LaGrands for further review of these judgments on 5 October 1987.
The second set of proceedings involved petitions by the LaGrands for post-conviction relief, which were denied by an Arizona state court in 1989. Review of this decision was denied by the Supreme Court of Arizona in 1990, and by the United States Supreme Court in 1991.
At the time of these two sets of proceedings, the LaGrands had still not been informed by the competent United States authorities of their rights under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Vienna Convention, and the German consular post had still not been informed of their arrest. The issue of the lack of consular notification, which had not been raised at trial, was also not raised in these two sets of proceedings.
The relevant German consular post was only made aware of the case in June 1992 by the LaGrands themselves, who had learnt of their rights from other sources, and not from the Arizona authorities. In December 1992, and on a number of subsequent occasions between then and February 1999, an official of the Consulate-General of Germany in Los Angeles visited the LaGrands in prison. Germany claims that it subsequently helped the LaGrands’ attorneys to investigate the LaGrands’ childhood in Germany, and to raise the issue of the omission of consular advice in further proceedings before the federal courts.
The LaGrands commenced a third set of legal proceedings by filing applications for writs of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, seeking to have their convictions — or at least their death sentences — set aside. In these proceedings they raised a number of different claims, which were rejected by that court in orders dated 24 January 1995 and 16 February 1995. One of these claims was that the United States authorities had failed to notify the German consulate of their arrest, as required by the Vienna Convention. This claim was rejected on the basis of the "procedural default" rule. According to the United States, this rule:
"is a federal rule that, before a state criminal defendant can obtain relief in federal court, the claim must be presented to a state court. If a state defendant attempts to raise a new issue in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, the defendant can only do so by showing cause and prejudice. Cause is an external impediment that prevents a defendant from raising a claim and prejudice must be obvious on its face. One important purpose of this rule is to ensure that the state courts have an opportunity to address issues going to the validity of state convictions before the federal courts intervene."
The United States District Court held that the LaGrands had not shown an objective external factor that prevented them from raising the issue of the lack of consular notification earlier. On 16 January 1998, this judgment was affirmed on appeal by the United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, which also held that the LaGrands’ claim relating to the Vienna Convention was "procedurally defaulted", as it had not been raised in any of the earlier proceedings in state courts. On 2 November 1998, the United States Supreme Court denied further review of this judgment.
On 21 December 1998, the LaGrands were formally notified by the United States authorities of their right to consular access.
On 15 January 1999, the Supreme Court of Arizona decided that Karl LaGrand was to be executed on 24 February 1999, and that Walter LaGrand was to be executed on 3 March 1999. Germany claims that the German Consulate learned of these dates on 19 January 1999.
In January and early February 1999, various interventions were made by Germany seeking to prevent the execution of the LaGrands. In particular, the German Foreign Minister and German Minister of Justice wrote to their respective United States counterparts on 27 January 1999; the German Foreign Minister wrote to the Governor of Arizona on the same day; the German Chancellor wrote to the President of the United States and to the Governor of Arizona on 2 February 1999; and the President of the Federal Republic of Germany wrote to the President of the United States on 5 February 1999. These letters referred to German opposition to capital punishment generally, but did not raise the issue of the absence of consular notification in the case of the LaGrands. The latter issue was, however, raised in a further letter, dated 22 February 1999, two days before the scheduled date of execution of Karl LaGrand, from the German Foreign Minister to the United States Secretary of State.
On 23 February 1999, the Arizona Board of Executive Clemency rejected an appeal for clemency by Karl LaGrand. Under the law of Arizona, this meant that the Governor of Arizona was prevented from granting clemency.
On the same day, the Arizona Superior Court in Pima County rejected a further petition by Walter LaGrand, based inter alia on the absence of consular notification, on the ground that these claims were "procedurally precluded".
On 24 February 1999, certain last-minute federal court proceedings brought by Karl LaGrand ultimately proved to be unsuccessful. In the course of these proceedings the United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, again held the issue of failure of consular notification to be procedurally defaulted. Karl LaGrand was executed later that same day.
On 2 March 1999, the day before the scheduled date of execution of Walter LaGrand, at 7.30 p.m. (The Hague time), Germany filed in the Registry of this Court the Application instituting the present proceedings against the United States (see paragraph 1 above), accompanied by a request for the following provisional measures;
"The United States should take all measures at its disposal to ensure that Walter LaGrand is not executed pending the final decision in these proceedings, and should inform the Court of all the measures which it has taken in implementation of that Order."
By a letter of the same date, the German Foreign Minister requested the Secretary of State of the United States "to urge [the] Governor [of Arizona] for a suspension of Walter LaGrand’s execution pending a ruling by the International Court of Justice".
On the same day, the Arizona Board of Executive Clemency met to consider the case of Walter LaGrand. It recommended against a commutation of his death sentence, but recommended that the Governor of Arizona grant a 60-day reprieve having regard to the Application filed by Germany in the International Court of Justice. Nevertheless, the Governor of Arizona decided, "in the interest of justice and with the victims in mind", to allow the execution of Walter LaGrand to go forward as scheduled.
In an Order of 3 March 1999, this Court found that the circumstances required it to indicate, as a matter of the greatest urgency and without any other proceedings, provisional measures in accordance with Article 41 of its Statute and with Article 75, paragraph 1, of its Rules (I.C.J. Reports 1999 (I), p. 15, para. 26); it indicated provisional measures in the following terms:
"(a) The United States of America should take all measures at its disposal to ensure that Walter LaGrand is not executed pending the final decision in these proceedings, and should inform the Court of all the measures which it has taken in implementation of this Order;
(b) The Government of the United States of America should transmit this Order to the Governor of the State of Arizona."
On the same day, proceedings were brought by Germany in the United States Supreme Court against the United States and the Governor of Arizona, seeking inter alia to enforce compliance with this Court’s Order indicating provisional measures. In the course of these proceedings, the United States Solicitor General as counsel of record took the position, inter alia, that "an order of the International Court of Justice indicating provisional measures is not binding and does not furnish a basis for judicial relief’. On the same date, the United States Supreme Court dismissed the motion by Germany, on the ground of the tardiness of Germany’s application and of jurisdictional barriers under United States domestic law.
On that same day, proceedings were also instituted in the United
States Supreme Court by Walter LaGrand. These proceedings were decided against him. Later that day, Walter LaGrand was executed.
The Court must as a preliminary matter deal with certain issues, which were raised by the Parties in these proceedings, concerning the jurisdiction of the Court in relation to Germany’s Application, and the admissibility of its submissions.
In relation to the jurisdiction of the Court, the United States, without having raised preliminary objections under Article 79 of the Rules of Court, nevertheless presented certain objections thereto.
Germany bases the jurisdiction of the Court on Article I of the Optional Protocol, which reads as follows:
"Disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the Convention shall lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and may accordingly be brought before the Court by an application made by any party to the dispute being a Party to the present Protocol."
Germany contends that the
"proceedings instituted by [it] in the present case raise questions of the interpretation and application of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and of the legal consequences arising from the non-observance on the part of the United States of certain of its provisions vis-a-vis Germany and two of its nationals".
Accordingly, Germany states that all four of its submissions
"are covered by one and the same jurisdictional basis, namely Art. I of the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes of 24 April 1963".
The Court will first examine the question of its jurisdiction with respect to the first submission of Germany. Germany relies on paragraph 1 of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention, which provides:
"With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions relating to nationals of the sending State:
(c) consular officers shall have the right to visit a national of the sending State who is in prison, custody or detention, to converse and correspond with him and to arrange for his legal representation. They shall also have the right to visit any national of the sending State who is in prison, custody or detention in their district in pursuance of a judgement. Nevertheless, consular officers shall refrain from taking action on behalf of a national who is in prison, custody or detention if he expressly opposes such action."
Germany alleges that the failure of the United States to inform the LaGrand brothers of their right to contact the German authorities "prevented Germany from exercising its rights under Art. 36 (1) (a) and (c) of the Convention" and violated "the various rights conferred upon the sending State vis-a-vis its nationals in prison, custody or detention as provided for in Art. 36 (1) (b) of the Convention". Germany further alleges that by breaching its obligations to inform, the United States also violated individual rights conferred on the detainees by Article 36, paragraph 1 (a), second sentence, and by Article 36, paragraph 1 (b). Germany accordingly claims that it "was injured in the person of its two nationals", a claim which Germany raises "as a matter of diplomatic protection on behalf of Walter and Karl LaGrand".
The United States acknowledges that "there was a breach of the U.S. obligation... to inform the LaGrand brothers that they could ask that a German consular post be notified of their arrest and detention". It does not deny that this violation of Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), has given rise to a dispute between the two States and recognizes that the Court has jurisdiction under the Optional Protocol to hear this dispute in so far as it concerns Germany’s own rights.
Concerning Germany’s claims of violation of Article 36, paragraph 1 (a) and (c), the United States however calls these claims "particularly misplaced" on the grounds that the "underlying conduct complained of is the same" as the claim of the violation of Article 36, paragraph 1 (b). It contends, moreover, that "to the extent that this claim by Germany is based on the general law of diplomatic protection, it is not within the Court’s jurisdiction" under the Optional Protocol because it "does not concern the interpretation or application of the Vienna Convention". The United States points to the distinction between jurisdiction over treaties and jurisdiction over customary law and observes that "[e]ven if a treaty norm and a customary norm were to have exactly the same content", each would have its "separate applicability". It contests the German assertion that diplomatic protection "enters through the intermediary of the Vienna Convention" and submits:
"the Vienna Convention deals with consular assistance... it does not deal with diplomatic protection. Legally, a world of difference exists between the right of the consul to assist an incarcerated national of his country, and the wholly different question whether the State can espouse the claims of its national through diplomatic protection. The former is within the jurisdiction of the Court under the Optional Protocol; the latter is not... Germany based its right of diplomatic protection on customary law... [T]his case comes before this Court not under Article 36, paragraph 2, of its Statute, but under Article 36, paragraph 1. Is it not obvious... that whatever rights Germany has under customary law, they do not fall within the jurisdiction of this Court under the Optional Protocol?"
Germany responds that the breach of paragraph I (a) and (c) of Article 36 must be distinguished from that of paragraph 1 (b), and that as a result, the Court should not only rule on the latter breach, but also on the violation of paragraph 1 (a) and (c). Germany further asserts "that ‘application of the Convention’ in the sense of the Optional Protocol very well encompasses the consequences of a violation of individual rights under the Convention, including the espousal of respective claims by the State of nationality".
The Court cannot accept the United States objections. The dispute between the Parties as to whether Article 36, paragraph 1 (a) and (c), of the Vienna Convention have been violated in this case in consequence of the breach of paragraph 1 (b) does relate to the interpretation and application of the Convention. This is also true of the dispute as to whether paragraph 1 (b) creates individual rights and whether Germany has standing to assert those rights on behalf of its nationals. These are consequently disputes within the meaning of Article I of the Optional Protocol. Moreover, the Court cannot accept the contention of the United States that Germany’s claim based on the individual rights of the LaGrand brothers is beyond the Court’s jurisdiction because diplomatic protection is a concept of customary international law. This fact does not prevent a State party to a treaty, which creates individual rights, from taking up the case of one of its nationals and instituting international judicial proceedings on behalf of that national, on the basis of a general jurisdictional clause in such a treaty. Therefore the Court concludes that it has jurisdiction with respect to the whole of Germany’s first submission.
The United States does not challenge the Court’s jurisdiction in regard to Germany’s second submission. Nor does it as such address the issue of the jurisdiction of the Court over the third submission concerning the binding nature of the Order of the Court of 3 March 1999 indicating provisional measures. It argues, however, that this submission is inadmissible (see paragraphs 50 and 53-55 below), and that the Court can fully and adequately dispose of the merits of this case without having to rule on the submission.
Germany asserts that the Court’s Order of 3 March 1999 was intended to "enforce" the rights enjoyed by Germany under the Vienna Convention and "preserve those rights pending its decision on the merits". Germany claims that a dispute as to "whether the United States were obliged to comply and did comply with the Order" necessarily arises out of the interpretation or application of the Convention and thus falls within the jurisdiction of the Court. Germany argues further that questions "relating to the non-compliance with a decision of the Court under Article 41, para. 1, of the Statute, e.g. Provisional Measures, are an integral component of the entire original dispute between the parties". Moreover, Germany contends that its third submission also implicates "in an auxiliary and subsidiary manner... the inherent jurisdiction of the Court for claims as closely interrelated with each other as the ones before the Court in the present case".
The third submission of Germany concerns issues that arise directly out of the dispute between the Parties before the Court over which the Court has already held that it has jurisdiction (see paragraph 42 above), and which are thus covered by Article I of the Optional Protocol. The Court reaffirms, in this connection, what it said in its Judgment in the Fisheries Jurisdiction case, where it declared that in order to consider the dispute in all its aspects it may also deal with a submission that "is one based on facts subsequent to the filing of the Application, but arising directly out of the question which is the subject-matter of that Application. As such it falls within the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction..." (Fisheries Jurisdiction (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 203, para. 72). Where the Court has jurisdiction to decide a case, it also has jurisdiction to deal with submissions requesting it to determine that an order indicating measures which seeks to preserve the rights of the Parties to this dispute has not been complied with.
The United States objects to the jurisdiction of the Court over the fourth submission in so far as it concerns a request for assurances and guarantees of non-repetition. The United States submits that its "jurisdictional argument [does] not apply to jurisdiction to order cessation of a breach or to order reparation, but is limited to the question of assurances and guarantees... [which] are conceptually distinct from reparation". It contends that Germany’s fourth submission "goes beyond any remedy that the Court can or should grant, and should be rejected. The Court’s power to decide cases... does not extend to the power to order a State to provide any ‘guarantee’ intended to confer additional legal rights on the Applicant State... The United States does not believe that it can be the role of the Court... to impose any obligations that are additional to or that differ in character from those to which the United States consented when it ratified the Vienna Convention."
Germany counters this argument by asserting that
"a dispute whether or not the violation of a provision of the Vienna Convention gives rise to a certain remedy is a dispute concerning ‘the application and interpretation’ of the aforesaid Convention, and thus falls within the scope of Art. I of the Optional Protocol".
Germany notes in this regard that the Court, in its Order of 9 April 1998 in the case concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Paraguay v. United States of America), held that
"there exists a dispute as to whether the relief sought by Paraguay is a remedy available under the Vienna Convention, in particular in relation to Articles 5 and 36 thereof; and... this is a dispute arising out of the application of the Convention within the meaning of Article I of the Optional Protocol concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes of 24 April 1963" (I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 256, para. 31).
Germany asserts also that its fourth submission arises under principles of State responsibility, according to which Germany is entitled to a "whole range of remedies" as a consequence of the particular violations alleged in this case and that these questions of State responsibility "are clearly within the ambit of the Optional Protocol".
The Court considers that a dispute regarding the appropriate remedies for the violation of the Convention alleged by Germany is a dispute that arises out of the interpretation or application of the Convention and thus is within the Court’s jurisdiction. Where jurisdiction exists over a dispute on a particular matter, no separate basis for jurisdiction is required by the Court to consider the remedies a party has requested for the breach of the obligation (Factory at Chorzów, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 9, p. 22). Consequently, the Court has jurisdiction in the present case with respect to the fourth submission of Germany.
The United States has argued that the submissions of Germany are inadmissible on various grounds. The Court will consider these objections in the order presented by the United States.
The United States objects first to Germany’s second, third and fourth submissions. According to the United States, these submissions are inadmissible because Germany seeks to have this Court "play the role of ultimate court of appeal in national criminal proceedings", a role which it is not empowered to perform. The United States maintains that many of Germany’s arguments, in particular those regarding the rule of "procedural default", ask the Court "to address and correct... asserted violations of US law and errors of judgment by US judges" in criminal proceedings in national courts.
Germany denies that it requests the Court to act as an appellate criminal court, or that Germany’s requests are in any way aimed at interfering with the administration of justice within the United States judicial system. It maintains that it is merely asking the Court to adjudge and declare that the conduct of the United States was inconsistent with its international legal obligations towards Germany under the Vienna Convention, and to draw from this failure certain legal consequences provided for in the international law of State responsibility.
The Court does not agree with these arguments of the United States concerning the admissibility of the second, third and fourth German submissions. In the second submission, Germany asks the Court to interpret the scope of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Convention; the third submission seeks a finding that the United States violated an Order issued by this Court pursuant to Article 41 of its Statute; and in Germany’s fourth submission, the Court is asked to determine the applicable remedies for the alleged violations of the Convention. Although Germany deals extensively with the practice of American courts as it bears on the application of the Convention, all three submissions seek to require the Court to do no more than apply the relevant rules of international law to the issues in dispute between the Parties to this case. The exercise of this function, expressly mandated by Article 38 of its Statute, does not convert this Court into a court of appeal of national criminal proceedings.
The United States also argues that Germany’s third submission is inadmissible because of the manner in which these proceedings were brought before the Court by Germany. It notes that German consular officials became aware of the LaGrands’ cases in 1992, but that the German Government did not express concern or protest to the United States authorities for some six and a half years. It maintains that the issue of the absence of consular notification was not raised by Germany until 22 February 1999, two days before the date scheduled for Karl LaGrand’s execution, in a letter from the German Foreign Minister to the Secretary of State of the United States (see paragraph 26 above). Germany then filed the Application instituting these proceedings, together with a request for provisional measures, after normal business hours in the Registry in the evening of 2 March 1999, some 27 hours before the execution of Walter LaGrand (see paragraph 30 above).
The United States rejects the contention that Germany found out only seven days before the filing of its Application that the authorities of Arizona knew as early as 1982 that the LaGrands were German nationals; according to the United States, their German nationality was referred to in pre-sentence reports prepared in 1984, which should have been familiar to German consular officers much earlier than 1999, given Germany’s claims regarding the vigour and effectiveness of its consular assistance.
According to the United States, Germany’s late filing compelled the Court to respond to its request for provisional measures by acting ex parte, without full information. The United States claims that the procedure followed was inconsistent with the principles of "equality of the Parties" and of giving each Party a sufficient opportunity to be heard, and that this would justify the Court in not addressing Germany’s third submission which is predicated wholly upon the Order of 3 March 1999.
Germany acknowledges that delay on the part of a claimant State may render an application inadmissible, but maintains that international law does not lay down any specific time-limit in that regard. It contends that it was only seven days before it filed its Application that it became aware of all the relevant facts underlying its claim, in particular, the fact that the authorities of Arizona knew of the German nationality of the LaGrands since 1982. According to Germany, it cannot be accused of negligence in failing to obtain the 1984 pre-sentence reports earlier. It also maintains that in the period between 1992, when it learned of the LaGrands’ cases, and the filing of its Application, it engaged in a variety of activities at the diplomatic and consular level. It adds that it had been confident for much of this period that the United States would ultimately rectify the violations of international law involved.
The Court recognizes that Germany may be criticized for the manner in which these proceedings were filed and for their timing. The Court recalls, however, that notwithstanding its awareness of the consequences of Germany’s filing at such a late date it nevertheless considered it appropriate to enter the Order of 3 March 1999, given that an irreparable prejudice appeared to be imminent. In view of these considerations, the Court considers that Germany is now entitled to challenge the alleged failure of the United States to comply with the Order. Accordingly, the Court finds that Germany’s third submission is admissible.
The United States argues further that Germany’s first submission, as far as it concerns its right to exercise diplomatic protection with respect to its nationals, is inadmissible on the ground that the LaGrands did not exhaust local remedies. The United States maintains that the alleged breach concerned the duty to inform the LaGrands of their right to consular access, and that such a breach could have been remedied at the trial stage, provided it was raised in a timely fashion. The United States contends that when a person fails, for example, to sue in a national court before a statute of limitations has expired, the claim is both procedurally barred in national courts and inadmissible in international tribunals for failure to exhaust local remedies. It adds that the failure of counsel for the LaGrands to raise the breach of the Vienna Convention at the appropriate stage and time of the proceedings does not excuse the non-exhaustion of local remedies. According to the United States, this failure of counsel is imputable to their clients because the law treats defendants and their lawyers as a single entity in terms of their legal positions. Moreover, the State is not accountable for the errors or mistaken strategy by lawyers.
Germany responds that international law requires the exhaustion of only those remedies which are legally and practically available. Germany claims that in this case there was no remedy which the LaGrands failed to invoke that would have been available in the specific context of their case. This is so because, prior to 1992, the LaGrands could not resort to the available remedies, since they were unaware of their rights due to failure of the United States authorities to comply with the requirements of the Vienna Convention; thereafter, the "procedural default" rule prevented them from seeking any remedy.
The Court notes that it is not disputed that the LaGrands sought to plead the Vienna Convention in United States courts after they learned in 1992 of their rights under the Convention; it is also not disputed that by that date the procedural default rule barred the LaGrands from obtaining any remedy in respect of the violation of those rights. Counsel assigned to the LaGrands failed to raise this point earlier in a timely fashion. However, the United States may not now rely before this Court on this fact in order to preclude the admissibility of Germany’s first submission, as it was the United States itself which had failed to carry our its obligation under the Convention to inform the LaGrand brothers.
The United States also contends that Germany’s submissions are inadmissible on the ground that Germany seeks to have a standard applied to the United States that is different from its own practice. According to the United States, Germany has not shown that its system of criminal justice requires the annulment of criminal convictions where there has been a breach of the duty of consular notification; and that the practice of Germany in similar cases has been to do no more than offer an apology. The United States maintains that it would be contrary to basic principles of administration of justice and equality of the Parties to apply against the United States alleged rules that Germany appears not to accept for itself.
Germany denies that it is asking the United States to adhere to standards which Germany itself does not abide by; it maintains that its law and practice is fully in compliance with the standards which it invokes. In this regard, it explains that the German Code of Criminal Procedure provides a ground of appeal where a legal norm, including a norm of international law, is not applied or incorrectly applied and where there is a possibility that the decision was impaired by this fact.
The Court need not decide whether this argument of the United States, if true, would result in the inadmissibility of Germany’s submissions. Here the evidence adduced by the United States does not justify the conclusion that Germany’s own practice fails to conform to the standards it demands from the United States in this litigation. The United States relies on certain German cases to demonstrate that Germany has itself proffered only an apology for violating Article 36 of the Vienna Convention, and that State practice shows that this is the appropriate remedy for such a violation. But the cases concerned entailed relatively light criminal penalties and are not evidence as to German practice where an arrested person, who has not been informed without delay of his or her rights, is facing a severe penalty as in the present case. It is no doubt the case, as the United States points out, that Article 36 of the Vienna Convention imposes identical obligations on States, irrespective of the gravity of the offence a person may be charged with and of the penalties that may be imposed. However, it does not follow therefrom that the remedies for a violation of this Article must be identical in all situations. While an apology may be an appropriate remedy in some cases, it may in others be insufficient. The Court accordingly finds that this claim of inadmissibility must be rejected.
Having determined that the Court has jurisdiction, and that the submissions of Germany are admissible, the Court now turns to the merits of each of these four submissions.
Germany’s first submission requests the Court to adjudge and declare:
Germany claims that the United States violated its obligation under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), to "inform a national of the sending State without delay of his or her right to inform the consular post of his home State of his arrest or detention". Specifically, Germany maintains that the United States violated its international legal obligation to Germany under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), by failing to inform the German nationals Karl and Walter LaGrand "without delay" of their rights under that subparagraph.
The United States acknowledges, and does not contest Germany’s basic claim, that there was a breach of its obligation under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Convention "promptly to inform the LaGrand brothers that they could ask that a German consular post be notified of their arrest and detention".
Germany also claims that the violation by the United States of Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), led to consequential violations of Article 36, paragraph 1 (a) and (c). It points out that, when the obligation to inform the arrested person without delay of his or her right to contact the consulate is disregarded, "the other rights contained in Article 36, paragraph 1, become in practice irrelevant, indeed meaningless". Germany maintains that, "[b]y informing the LaGrand brothers of their right to inform the consulate more than 16 years after their arrest, the United States... clearly failed to meet the standard of Article 36 [(1) (c)]". It concludes that, by not preventing the execution of Karl and Walter LaGrand, and by "making irreversible its earlier breaches of Art. 5 and 36 (1) and (2) and causing irreparable harm, the United States violated its obligations under international law".
The United States argues that the underlying conduct complained of by Germany is one and the same, namely, the failure to inform the LaGrand brothers as required by Article 36, paragraph 1 (b). Therefore, it disputes any other basis for Germany’s claims that other provisions, such as subparagraphs (a) and (c) of Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Convention, were also violated. The United States asserts that Germany’s claims regarding Article 36, paragraph 1 (a) and (c), are "particularly misplaced" in that the LaGrands were able to and did communicate freely with consular officials after 1992. There was, in the view of the United States, "no deprivation of Germany’s right to provide consular assistance, under Article 5 or Article 36, to Karl or Walter LaGrand" and "Germany’s attempt to transform a breach of one obligation into an additional breach of a wholly separate and distinct obligation should be rejected by the Court."
In response, Germany asserts that it is "commonplace that one and the same conduct may result in several violations of distinct obligations". Hence, when a detainee’s right to notification without delay is violated, he or she cannot establish contact with the consulate, receive visits from consular officers, nor be supported by adequate counsel. "Therefore, violation of this right is bound to imply violation of the other rights... [and] later observance of the rights of Article 36, paragraph I (a) and (c), could not remedy the previous violation of those provisions."
Germany further contends that there is a causal relationship between the breach of Article 36 and the ultimate execution of the LaGrand brothers. Germany’s inability to render prompt assistance was, in its view, a "direct result of the United States’ breach of its Vienna Convention obligations". It is claimed that, had Germany been properly afforded its rights under the Vienna Convention, it would have been able to intervene in time and present a "persuasive mitigation case" which "likely would have saved" the lives of the brothers. Germany believes that, "[h]ad proper notification been given under the Vienna Convention, competent trial counsel certainly would have looked to Germany for assistance in developing this line of mitigating evidence". Moreover, Germany argues that, due to the doctrine of procedural default and the high post-conviction threshold for proving ineffective counsel under United States law, Germany's intervention at a stage later than the trial phase could not "remedy the extreme prejudice created by the counsel appointed to represent the LaGrands".
The United States terms these arguments as "suppositions about what might have occurred had the LaGrand brothers been properly informed of the possibility of consular notification". It calls into question Germany’s assumption that German consular officials from Los Angeles would rapidly have given extensive assistance to the LaGrands’ defence counsel before the 1984 sentencing, and contests that such consular assistance would have affected the outcome of the sentencing proceedings. According to the United States, these arguments "rest on speculation" and do not withstand analysis. Finally, the United States finds it extremely doubtful that the early childhood "mitigating evidence" mentioned by Germany, if introduced at the trial, would have persuaded the sentencing judge to be lenient, as the brothers’ subsequent 17 years of experiences in the United States would have been given at least equal weight. The United States points out, moreover, that such evidence was in fact presented at trial.
The Court will first examine the submission Germany advances in its own right. The Court observes, in this connection, that the United States does not deny that it violated paragraph 1 (b) in relation to Germany. The Court also notes that as a result of this breach, Germany did not learn until 1992 of the detention, trial and sentencing of the LaGrand brothers. The Court concludes therefrom that on the facts of this case, the breach of the United States had the consequence of depriving Germany of the exercise of the rights accorded it under Article 36, paragraph 1 (a) and paragraph 1 (c), and thus violated these provisions of the Convention. Although the violation of paragraph 1 (b) of Article 36 will not necessarily always result in the breach of the other provisions of this Article, the Court finds that the circumstances of this case compel the opposite conclusion, for the reasons indicated below. In view of this finding, it is not necessary for the Court to deal with Germany’s further claim under Article 5 of the Convention.
Article 36, paragraph 1, establishes an interrelated regime designed to facilitate the implementation of the system of consular protection. It begins with the basic principle governing consular protection: the right of communication and access (Art. 36, para. 1 (a)). This clause is followed by the provision which spells out the modalities of consular notification (Art. 36, para. 1 (b)). Finally Article 36, paragraph 1 (c), sets out the measures consular officers may take in rendering consular assistance to their nationals in the custody of the receiving State. It follows that when the sending State is unaware of the detention of its nationals due to the failure of the receiving State to provide the requisite consular notification without delay, which was true in the present case during the period between 1982 and 1992, the sending State has been prevented for all practical purposes from exercising its rights under Article 36, paragraph 1. It is immaterial for the purposes of the present case whether the LaGrands would have sought consular assistance from Germany, whether Germany would have rendered such assistance, or whether a different verdict would have been rendered. It is sufficient that the Convention conferred these rights, and that Germany and the LaGrands were in effect prevented by the breach of the United States from exercising them, had they so chosen.
Germany further contends that "the breach of Article 36 by the United States did not only infringe upon the rights of Germany as a State party to the [Vienna] Convention but also entailed a violation of the individual rights of the LaGrand brothers". Invoking its right of diplomatic protection, Germany also seeks relief against the United States on this ground.
Germany maintains that the right to be informed of the rights under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Vienna Convention, is an individual right of every national of a State party to the Convention who enters the territory of another State party. It submits that this view is supported by the ordinary meaning of the terms of Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Vienna Convention, since the last sentence of that provision speaks of the "rights" under this subparagraph of "the person concerned", i.e., of the foreign national arrested or detained. Germany adds that the provision in Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), according to which it is for the arrested person to decide whether consular notification is to be provided, has the effect of conferring an individual right upon the foreign national concerned. In its view, the context of Article 36 supports this conclusion since it relates to both the concerns of the sending and receiving States and to those of individuals. According to Germany, the travaux preparatories of the Vienna Convention lend further support to this interpretation. In addition, Germany submits that the "United Nations Declaration on the human rights of individuals who are not nationals of the country in which they live", adopted by General Assembly resolution 40/144 on 13 December 1985, confirms the view that the right of access to the consulate of the home State, as well as the information on this right, constitute individual rights of foreign nationals and are to be regarded as human rights of aliens.
The United States questions what this additional claim of diplomatic protection contributes to the case and argues that there are no parallels between the present case and cases of diplomatic protection involving the espousal by a State of economic claims of its nationals. The United States maintains that the right of a State to provide consular assistance to nationals detained in another country, and the right of a State to espouse the claims of its nationals through diplomatic protection, are legally different concepts.
The United States contends, furthermore, that rights of consular notification and access under the Vienna Convention are rights of States, and not of individuals, even though these rights may benefit individuals by permitting States to offer them consular assistance. It maintains that the treatment due to individuals under the Convention is inextricably linked to and derived from the right of the State, acting through its consular officer, to communicate with its nationals, and does not constitute a fundamental right or a human right. The United States argues that the fact that Article 36 by its terms recognizes the rights of individuals does not determine the nature of those rights or the remedies required under the Vienna Convention for breaches of that Article. It points out that Article 36 begins with the words "[w]ith a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions relating to nationals of the sending State", and that this wording gives no support to the notion that the rights and obligations enumerated in paragraph 1 of that Article are intended to ensure that nationals of the sending State have any particular rights or treatment in the context of a criminal prosecution. The travaux préparatoires of the Vienna Convention according to the United States do not reflect a consensus that Article 36 was addressing immutable individual rights, as opposed to individual rights derivative of the rights of States.
The Court notes that Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), spells out the obligations the receiving State has towards the detained person and the sending State. It provides that, at the request of the detained person, the receiving State must inform the consular post of the sending State of the individual’s detention "without delay". It provides further that any communication by the detained person addressed to the consular post of the sending State must be forwarded to it by authorities of the receiving State "without delay". Significantly, this subparagraph ends with the following language: "The said authorities shall inform the person concerned without delay of his rights under this subparagraph" (emphasis added). Moreover, under Article 36, paragraph I (c), the sending State’s right to provide consular assistance to the detained person may not be exercised "if he expressly opposes such action". The clarity of these provisions, viewed in their context, admits of no doubt. It follows, as has been held on a number of occasions, that the Court must apply these as they stand (see Acquisition of Polish Nationality, Advisory Opinion, 1923, P.C.I.J., Series B, No. 7, p. 20; Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, I.CJ. Reports 1950, p. 8; Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1991, pp. 69-70, para. 48; Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1994, p. 25, para. 51). Based on the text of these provisions, the Court concludes that Article 36, paragraph 1, creates individual rights, which, by virtue of Article I of the Optional Protocol, may be invoked in this Court by the national State of the detained person. These rights were violated in the present case.
At the hearings, Germany further contended that the right of the individual to be informed without delay under Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention was not only an individual right but has today assumed the character of a human right. In consequence, Germany added, "the character of the right under Article 36 as a human right renders the effectiveness of this provision even more imperative". The Court having found that the United States violated the rights accorded by Article 36, paragraph 1, to the LaGrand brothers, it does not appear necessary to it to consider the additional argument developed by Germany in this regard.
The Court will now consider Germany’s second submission, in which it asks the Court to adjudge and declare:
"that the United States, by applying rules of its domestic law, in particular the doctrine of procedural default, which barred Karl and Walter LaGrand from raising their claims under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, and by ultimately executing them, violated its international legal obligation to Germany under Article 36 paragraph 2 of the Vienna Convention to give full effect to the purposes for which the rights accorded under Article 36 of the said Convention are intended".
Germany argues that, under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Convention
"the United States is under an obligation to ensure that its municipal ‘laws and regulations... enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under this article are intended’ [and that it] is in breach of this obligation by upholding rules of domestic law which make it impossible to successfully raise a violation of the right to consular notification in proceedings subsequent to a conviction of a defendant by a jury".
Germany points out that the "procedural default" rule is among the rules of United States domestic law whose application make it impossible to invoke a breach of the notification requirement. According to Germany, this rule "is closely connected with the division of labour between federal and state jurisdiction in the United States... [where] [c]riminal jurisdiction belongs to the states except in cases provided for in the Constitution". This rule, Germany explains, requires "exhaustion of remedies at the state level before a habeas corpus motion can be filed with federal Courts".
Germany emphasizes that it is not the "procedural default" rule as such that is at issue in the present proceedings, but the manner in which it was applied in that it "deprived the brothers of the possibility to raise the violations of their right to consular notification in US criminal proceedings".
Furthermore, having examined the relevant United States jurisprudence, Germany contends that the procedural default rule had "made it impossible for the LaGrand brothers to effectively raise the issue of the lack of consular notification after they had at last learned of their rights and established contact with the German consulate in Los Angeles in 1992".
Finally, Germany states that it seeks
"[n]othing... more than compliance, or, at least, a system in place which does not automatically reproduce violation after violation of the Vienna Convention, only interrupted by the apologies of the United States Government".
The United States objects to Germany’s second submission, since it considers that "Germany’s position goes far beyond the wording of the Convention, the intentions of the parties when it was negotiated, and the practice of States, including Germany’s practice".
In the view of the United States:
"[t]he Vienna Convention does not require States Party to create a national law remedy permitting individuals to assert claims involving the Convention in criminal proceedings. If there is no such requirement, it cannot violate the Convention to require that efforts to assert such claims be presented to the first court capable of adjudicating them".
According to the United States,
"[i]f there is no obligation under the Convention to create such individual remedies in criminal proceedings, the rule of procedural default — requiring that claims seeking such remedies be asserted at an appropriately early stage — cannot violate the Convention".
The United States believes that Article 36, paragraph 2, "has a very clear meaning" and
"means, as it says, that the rights referred to in paragraph 1 shall be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State, subject to the proviso that said laws and regulations must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under the Article are intended".
In the view of the United States,
"[i]n the context of a foreign national in detention, the relevant laws and regulations contemplated by Article 36 (2) are those that may affect the exercise of specific rights under Article 36 (1), such as those addressing the timing of communications, visiting hours, and security in a detention facility. There is no suggestion in the text of Article 36 (2) that the rules of criminal law and procedure under which a defendant would be tried or have his conviction and sentence reviewed by appellate courts are also within the scope of this provision."
The United States concludes that Germany’s second submission must be rejected "because it is premised on a misinterpretation of Article 36, paragraph 2, which reads the context of the provision — the exercise of a right under paragraph 1 — out of existence".
Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Convention reads as follows:
"The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State, subject to the proviso, however, that the said laws and regulations must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under this article are intended."
The Court cannot accept the argument of the United States which proceeds, in part, on the assumption that paragraph 2 of Article 36 applies only to the rights of the sending State and not also to those of the detained individual. The Court has already determined that Article 36, paragraph 1, creates individual rights for the detained person in addition to the rights accorded the sending State, and that consequently the reference to "rights" in paragraph 2 must be read as applying not only to the rights of the sending State, but also to the rights of the detained individual (see paragraph 77 above).
Turning now to the "procedural default" rule, the application of which in the present case Germany alleges violated Article 36, paragraph 2, the Court emphasizes that a distinction must be drawn between that rule as such and its specific application in the present case. In itself, the rule does not violate Article 36 of the Vienna Convention. The problem arises when the procedural default rule does not allow the detained individual to challenge a conviction and sentence by claiming, in reliance on Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Convention, that the competent national authorities failed to comply with their obligation to provide the requisite consular information "without delay", thus preventing the person from seeking and obtaining consular assistance from the sending State.
In this case, Germany had the right at the request of the LaGrands "to arrange for [their] legal representation" and was eventually able to provide some assistance to that effect. By that time, however, because of the failure of the American authorities to comply with their obligation under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), the procedural default rule prevented counsel for the LaGrands to effectively challenge their convictions and sentences other than on United States constitutional grounds. As a result, although United States courts could and did examine the professional competence of counsel assigned to the indigent LaGrands by reference to United States constitutional standards, the procedural default rule prevented them from attaching any legal significance to the fact, inter alia, that the violation of the rights set forth in Article 36, paragraph 1, prevented Germany, in a timely fashion, from retaining private counsel for them and otherwise assisting in their defence as provided for by the Convention. Under these circumstances, the procedural default rule had the effect of preventing "full effect [from being] given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under this article are intended", and thus violated paragraph 2 of Article 36.
The Court will now consider Germany’s third submission, in which it asks the Court to adjudge and declare:
"that the United States, by failing to take all measures at its disposal to ensure that Walter LaGrand was not executed pending the final decision of the International Court of Justice on the matter, violated its international legal obligation to comply with the Order on provisional measures issued by the Court on 3 March 1999, and to refrain from any action which might interfere with the subject matter of a dispute while judicial proceedings are pending".
In its Memorial, Germany contended that "[provisional [m]easures indicated by the International Court of Justice [were] binding by virtue of the law of the United Nations Charter and the Statute of the Court". In support of its position, Germany developed a number of arguments in which it referred to the "principle of effectiveness", to the "procedural prerequisites" for the adoption of provisional measures, to the binding nature of provisional measures as a "necessary consequence of the bindingness of the final decision", to "Article 94 (1), of the United Nations Charter", to "Article 41 (1), of the Statute of the Court" and to the "practice of the Court".
Referring to the duty of the "parties to a dispute before the Court... to preserve its subject-matter", Germany added that:
"[a]part from having violated its duties under Art. 94 (1) of the United Nations Charter and Art. 41 (1) of the Statute, the United States has also violated the obligation to refrain from any action which might interfere with the subject-matter of a dispute while judicial proceedings are pending".
At the hearings, Germany further stated the following:
"A judgment by the Court on jurisdiction or merits cannot be treated on exactly the same footing as a provisional measure... Article 59 and Article 60 [of the Statute] do not apply to provisional measures or, to be more exact, apply to them only by implication; that is to say, to the extent that such measures, being both incidental and provisional, contribute to the exercise of a judicial function whose end-result is, by definition, the delivery of a judicial decision. There is here an inherent logic in the judicial procedure, and to disregard it would be tantamount, as far as the Parties are concerned, to deviating from the principle of good faith and from what the German pleadings call ‘the principle of institutional effectiveness’... [P]rovisional measures... are indeed legal decisions, but they are decisions of procedure... Since their decisional nature is, however, implied by the logic of urgency and by the need to safeguard the effectiveness of the proceedings, they accordingly create genuine legal obligations on the part of those to whom they are addressed."
Germany claims that the United States committed a threefold violation of the Court’s Order of 3 March 1999:
"(1) Immediately after the International Court of Justice had rendered its Order on Provisional Measures, Germany appealed to the US Supreme Court in order to reach a stay of the execution of Walter LaGrand, in accordance with the International Court’s Order to the same effect. In the course of these proceedings — and in full knowledge of the Order of the International Court — the Office of the Solicitor General, a section of the US Department of Justice — in a letter to the Supreme Court argued once again that: ‘an order of the International Court of Justice indicating provisional measures is not binding and does not furnish a basis for judicial relief.
This statement of a high-ranking official of the Federal Government... had a direct influence on the decision of the Supreme Court.
(2) In the following, the US Supreme Court — an agency of the United States — refused by a majority vote to order that the execution be stayed. In doing so, it rejected the German arguments based essentially on the Order of the International Court of Justice on Provisional Measures...
(3) Finally, the Governor of Arizona did not order a stay of the execution of Walter LaGrand although she was vested with the right to do so by the laws of the State of Arizona. Moreover, in the present case, the Arizona Executive Board of Clemency — for the first time in the history of this institution — had issued a recommendation for a temporary stay, not least in light of the international legal issues involved in the case..."
The United States argues that it "did what was called for by the Court’s 3 March Order, given the extraordinary and unprecedented circumstances in which it was forced to act". It points out in this connection that the United States Government "immediately transmitt[ed] the Order to the Governor of Arizona", that "the United States placed the Order in the hands of the one official who, at that stage, might have had legal authority to stop the execution" and that by a letter from the Legal Counsellor of the United States Embassy in The Hague dated 8 March 1999, it informed the International Court of Justice of all the measures which had been taken in implementation of the Order.
The United States further states that:
"[t]wo central factors constrained the United States ability to act. The first was the extraordinarily short time between issuance of the Court’s Order and the time set for the execution of Walter LaGrand...
The second constraining factor was the character of the United States of America as a federal republic of divided powers."
The United States also alleges that the "terms of the Court’s 3 March Order did not create legal obligations binding on [it]". It argues in this respect that "[t]he language used by the Court in the key portions of its Order is not the language used to create binding legal obligations" and that
"the Court does not need here to decide the difficult and controversial legal question of whether its orders indicating provisional measures would be capable of creating international legal obligations if worded in mandatory... terms".
It nevertheless maintains that those orders cannot have such effects and, in support of that view, develops arguments concerning "the language and history of Article 41 (1) of the Court’s Statute and Article 94 of the Charter of the United Nations", the "Court’s and State practice under these provisions", and the "weight of publicists’ commentary".
Concerning Germany’s argument based on the "principle of effectiveness", the United States contends that
"[i]n an arena where the concerns and sensitivities of States, and not abstract logic, have informed the drafting of the Court’s constitutive documents, it is perfectly understandable that the Court might have the power to issue binding final judgments, but a more circumscribed authority with respect to provisional measures".
Referring to Germany’s argument that the United States "violated the obligation to refrain from any action which might interfere with the subject matter of a dispute while judicial proceedings are pending", the United States further asserts that:
"The implications of the rule as presented by Germany are potentially quite dramatic, however. Germany appears to contend that by merely filing a case with the Court, an Applicant can force a Respondent to refrain from continuing any action that the Applicant deems to affect the subject of the dispute. If the law were as Germany contends, the entirety of the Court’s rules and practices relating to provisional measures would be surplussage. This is not the law, and this is not how States or this Court have acted in practice."
Lastly, the United States states that in any case, "[b]ecause of the press of time stemming from Germany’s last-minute filing of the case, basic principles fundamental to the judicial process were not observed in connection with the Court’s 3 March Order" and that
"[t]hus, whatever one might conclude regarding a general rule for provisional measures, it would be anomalous — to say the least — for the Court to construe this Order as a source of binding legal obligations".
Neither the Permanent Court of International Justice, nor the present Court to date, has been called upon to determine the legal effects of orders made under Article 41 of the Statute. As Germany’s third submission refers expressly to an international legal obligation "to comply with the Order on Provisional Measures issued by the Court on 3 March 1999", and as the United States disputes the existence of such an obligation, the Court is now called upon to rule expressly on this question.
The dispute which exists between the Parties with regard to this point essentially concerns the interpretation of Article 41, which is worded in identical terms in the Statute of each Court (apart from the respective references to the Council of the League of Nations and the Security Council). This interpretation has been the subject of extensive controversy in the literature. The Court will therefore now proceed to the interpretation of Article 41 of the Statute. It will do so in accordance with customary international law, reflected in Article 31 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. According to paragraph 1 of Article 31, a treaty must be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in their context and in the light of the treaty’s object and purpose.
The French text of Article 41 reads as follows:
"1. La Cour a le pouvoir d’ indiquer, si elle estime que les circons-tances l’exigent, quelles mesures conservatoires du droit de chacun doivent etre prises a titre provisoire.
2. En attendant l’arret définitif, 1’ indication de ces mesures est immediatement notifiée aux parties et au Conseil de sécurité." (Emphasis added.)
In this text, the terms "indiquer" and "indication" may be deemed to be neutral as to the mandatory character of the measure concerned; by contrast the words "doivent être prises" have an imperative character.
For its part, the English version of Article 41 reads as follows:
"1. The Court shall have the power to indicate, if it considers that circumstances so require, any provisional measures which ought to be taken to preserve the respective rights of either party.
2. Pending the final decision, notice of the measures suggested shall forthwith be given to the parties and to the Security Council." (Emphasis added.)
According to the United States, the use in the English version of "indicate" instead of "order", of "ought" instead of "must" or "shall", and of "suggested" instead of "ordered", is to be understood as implying that decisions under Article 41 lack mandatory effect. It might however be argued, having regard to the fact that in 1920 the French text was the original version, that such terms as "indicate" and "ought" have a meaning equivalent to "order" and "must" or "shall".
Finding itself faced with two texts which are not in total harmony, the Court will first of all note that according to Article 92 of the Charter, the Statute "forms an integral part of the present Charter". Under Article 111 of the Charter, the French and English texts of the latter are "equally authentic". The same is equally true of the Statute.
In cases of divergence between the equally authentic versions of the Statute, neither it nor the Charter indicates how to proceed. In the absence of agreement between the parties in this respect, it is appropriate to refer to paragraph 4 of Article 33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which in the view of the Court again reflects customary international law. This provision reads "when a comparison of the authentic texts discloses a difference of meaning which the application of Articles 31 and 32 does not remove, the meaning which best reconciles the texts, having regard to the object and purpose of the treaty, shall be adopted".
The Court will therefore now consider the object and purpose of the Statute together with the context of Article 41.
The object and purpose of the Statute is to enable the Court to fulfil the functions provided for therein, and, in particular, the basic function of judicial settlement of international disputes by binding decisions in accordance with Article 59 of the Statute. The context in which Article 41 has to be seen within the Statute is to prevent the Court from being hampered in the exercise of its functions because the respective rights of the parties to a dispute before the Court are not preserved. It follows from the object and purpose of the Statute, as well as from the terms of Article 41 when read in their context, that the power to indicate provisional measures entails that such measures should be binding, inasmuch as the power in question is based on the necessity, when the circumstances call for it, to safeguard, and to avoid prejudice to, the rights of the parties as determined by the final judgment of the Court. The contention that provisional measures indicated under Article 41 might not be binding would be contrary to the object and purpose of that Article.
A related reason which points to the binding character of orders made under Article 41 and to which the Court attaches importance is the existence of a principle which has already been recognized by the Permanent Court of International Justice when it spoke of
"the principle universally accepted by international tribunals and likewise laid down in many conventions... to the effect that the parties to a case must abstain from any measure capable of exercising a prejudicial effect in regard to the execution of the decision to be given, and, in general, not allow any step of any kind to be taken which might aggravate or extend the dispute" (Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria, Order of 5 December 1939, P.C.I.J, Series A/B, No. 79, p. 199).
Furthermore measures designed to avoid aggravating or extending disputes have frequently been indicated by the Court. They were indicated with the purpose of being implemented (see Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Interim Protection, Order of 22 June 1973, I.C.J. Reports 1973, p. 106; Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France), Interim Protection, Order of 22 June 1973, I.C.J. Reports 1973, p. 142; Frontier Dispute, Provisional Measures, Order of 10 January 1986, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 9, para. 18, and p. 11, para. 32, point 1 A; Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Provisional Measures, Order of 8 April 1993, I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 23, para. 48, and p. 24, para. 52 B; Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Provisional Measures, Order of 13 September 1993, I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 349, para. 57, and p. 350, para. 61 (3); Land, and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, Provisional Measures, Order of 15 March 1996, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (1), pp. 22-23, para. 41, and p. 24, para. 49 (1)).
Given the conclusions reached by the Court above in interpreting the text of Article 41 of the Statute in the light of its object and purpose, it does not consider it necessary to resort to the preparatory work in order to determine the meaning of that Article. The Court would nevertheless point out that the preparatory work of the Statute does not preclude the conclusion that orders under Article 41 have binding force.
The initial preliminary draft of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, as prepared by the Committee of Jurists established by the Council of the League of Nations, made no mention of provisional measures. A provision to this effect was inserted only at a later stage in the draft prepared by the Committee, following a proposal from the Brazilian jurist Raul Fernandes.
Basing himself on the Bryan Treaty of 13 October 1914 between the United States and Sweden, Raul Fernandes had submitted the following text:
"Dans le cas où la cause du différend consiste en actes déterminés déjà effectués ou sur le point de l'être, la Cour pourra ordonner, dans le plus bref délai, à titre provisoire, des mesures conservatoires adéquates, en attendant le jugement définitif." (Comité consultatif de juristes, Procès-verbaux des seances du comité, 16 juin-24 juillet 1920 (avec annexes), La Haye, 1920, p. 609.)
In its English translation this text read as follows:
"In case the cause of the dispute should consist of certain acts already committed or about to be committed, the Court may, provisionally and with the least possible delay, order adequate protective measures to be taken, pending the final judgment of the Court." (Advisory Committee of Jurists, Procès-verbaux of the Proceedings of the Committee, 16 June-24 July 1920 (with Annexes), The Hague, 1920, p. 609.)
The Drafting Committee prepared a new version of this text, to which two main amendments were made: on the one hand, the words "la Cour pourra ordonner" ("the Court may... order") were replaced by "la Cour a le pouvoir d’indiquer" ("the Court shall have the power to suggest"), while, on the other, a second paragraph was added providing for notice to be given to the parties and to the Council of the "measures suggested" by the Court. The draft Article 2bis as submitted by the Drafting Committee thus read as follows:
"Dans le cas où la cause du différend consiste en un acte effectue ou sur le point de l'être, la Cour a le pouvoir d’indiquer, si elle estime que les circonstances l’exigent, quelles mesures conservatoires du droit de chacun doivent être prises à titre provisoire.
En attendant son arrêt, cette suggestion de la Cour est immediatement transmise aux parties et au Conseil." (Comité consultatif de juristes, Procès-verbaux des seances du comite, 16 juin-24 juillet 1920 (avec annexes), La Haye, 1920, p. 567-568.)
The English version read:
"If the dispute arises out of an act which has already taken place or which is imminent, the Court shall have the power to suggest, if it considers that circumstances so require, the provisional measures that should be taken to preserve the respective rights of either party.
Pending the final decision, notice of the measures suggested shall forthwith be given to the parties and the Council." (Advisory Committee of Jurists, Procès-verbaux of the Proceedings of the Committee, 16 June-24 July 1920 (with Annexes), The Hague, 1920, pp. 567568.)
The Committee of Jurists eventually adopted a draft Article 39, which amended the former Article 2bis only in its French version; in the second paragraph, the words "cette suggestion" were replaced in French by the words "l’indication".
When the draft Article 39 was examined by the Sub-Committee of the Third Committee of the first Assembly of the League of Nations, a number of amendments were considered. Raul Fernandes suggested again to use the word "ordonner" in the French version. The Sub-Committee decided to stay with the word "indiquer", the Chairman of the Sub-Committee observing that the Court lacked the means to execute its decisions. The language of the first paragraph of the English version was then made to conform to the French text: thus the word "suggest" was replaced by "indicate", and "should" by "ought to". However, in the second paragraph of the English version, the phrase "measures suggested" remained unchanged.
The provision thus amended in French and in English by the SubCommittee was adopted as Article 41 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice. It passed as such into the Statute of the present Court without any discussion in 1945.
The preparatory work of Article 41 shows that the preference given in the French text to "indiquer" over "ordonner" was motivated by the consideration that the Court did not have the means to assure the execution of its decisions. However, the lack of means of execution and the lack of binding force are two different matters. Hence, the fact that the Court does not itself have the means to ensure the execution of orders made pursuant to Article 41 is not an argument against the binding nature of such orders.
The Court finally needs to consider whether Article 94 of the United Nations Charter precludes attributing binding effect to orders indicating provisional measures. That Article reads as follows:
"1. Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party.
2. If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment."
The question arises as to the meaning to be attributed to the words "the decision of the International Court of Justice" in paragraph 1 of this Article. This wording could be understood as referring not merely to the Court’s judgments but to any decision rendered by it, thus including orders indicating provisional measures. It could also be interpreted to mean only judgments rendered by the Court as provided in paragraph 2 of Article 94. In this regard, the fact that in Articles 56 to 60 of the Court’s Statute both the word "decision" and the word "judgment" are used does little to clarify the matter.
Under the first interpretation of paragraph 1 of Article 94, the text of the paragraph would confirm the binding nature of provisional measures; whereas the second interpretation would in no way preclude their being accorded binding force under Article 41 of the Statute. The Court accordingly concludes that Article 94 of the Charter does not prevent orders made under Article 41 from having a binding character.
In short, it is clear that none of the sources of interpretation referred to in the relevant Articles of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, including the preparatory work, contradict the conclusions drawn from the terms of Article 41 read in their context and in the light of the object and purpose of the Statute. Thus, the Court has reached the conclusion that orders on provisional measures under Article 41 have binding effect.
The Court will now consider the Order of 3 March 1999. This Order was not a mere exhortation. It had been adopted pursuant to Article 41 of the Statute. This Order was consequently binding in character and created a legal obligation for the United States.
As regards the question whether the United States has complied with the obligation incumbent upon it as a result of the Order of 3 March 1999, the Court observes that the Order indicated two provisional measures, the first of which states that
"[t]he United States of America should take all measures at its disposal to ensure that Walter LaGrand is not executed pending the final decision in these proceedings, and should inform the Court of all the measures which it has taken in implementation of this Order".
The second measure required the Government of the United States to
"transmit this Order to the Governor of the State of Arizona". The information required on the measures taken in implementation of this Order was given to the Court by a letter of 8 March 1999 from the Legal Counsellor of the United States Embassy at The Hague. According to this letter, on 3 March 1999 the State Department had transmitted to the Governor of Arizona a copy of the Court’s Order. "In view of the extremely late hour of the receipt of the Court’s Order", the letter of 8 March went on to say, "no further steps were feasible".
The United States authorities have thus limited themselves to the mere transmission of the text of the Order to the Governor of Arizona. This certainly met the requirement of the second of the two measures indicated. As to the first measure, the Court notes that it did not create an obligation of result, but that the United States was asked to "take all measures at its disposal to ensure that Walter LaGrand is not executed pending the final decision in these proceedings". The Court agrees that due to the extremely late presentation of the request for provisional measures, there was certainly very little time for the United States authorities to act.
The Court observes, nevertheless, that the mere transmission of its Order to the Governor of Arizona without any comment, particularly without even so much as a plea for a temporary stay and an explanation that there is no general agreement on the position of the United States that orders of the International Court of Justice on provisional measures are non-binding, was certainly less than could have been done even in the short time available. The same is true of the United States Solicitor General’s categorical statement in his brief letter to the United States Supreme Court that "an order of the International Court of Justice indicating provisional measures is not binding and does not furnish a basis for judicial relief’ (see paragraph 33 above). This statement went substantially further than the amicus brief referred to in a mere footnote in his letter, which was filed on behalf of the United States in earlier proceedings before the United States Supreme Court in the case of Angel Francisco Breard (see Breard v. Greene, United States Supreme Court, 14 April 1998, International Legal Materials, Vol. 37 (1998), p. 824; Memorial of Germany, Ann. 34). In that amicus brief, the same Solicitor General had declared less than a year earlier that "there is substantial disagreement among jurists as to whether an ICJ order indicating provisional measures is binding... The better reasoned position is that such an order is not binding."
It is also noteworthy that the Governor of Arizona, to whom the Court’s Order had been transmitted, decided not to give effect to it, even though the Arizona Clemency Board had recommended a stay of execution for Walter LaGrand.
Finally, the United States Supreme Court rejected a separate application by Germany for a stay of execution, "[g]iven the tardiness of the pleas and the jurisdictional barriers they implicate". Yet it would have been open to the Supreme Court, as one of its members urged, to grant a preliminary stay, which would have given it "time to consider, after briefing from all interested parties, the jurisdictional and international legal issues involved..." (Federal Republic of Germany et al. v. United States et al., United States Supreme Court, 3 March 1999).
The review of the above steps taken by the authorities of the United States with regard to the Order of the International Court of Justice of 3 March 1999 indicates that the various competent United States authorities failed to take all the steps they could have taken to give effect to the Court’s Order. The Order did not require the United States to exercise powers it did not have; but it did impose the obligation to "take all measures at its disposal to ensure that Walter LaGrand is not executed pending the final decision in these proceedings...". The Court finds that the United States did not discharge this obligation.
Under these circumstances the Court concludes that the United States has not complied with the Order of 3 March 1999.
The Court observes finally that in the third submission Germany requests the Court to adjudge and declare only that the United States violated its international legal obligation to comply with the Order of 3 March 1999; it contains no other request regarding that violation. Moreover, the Court points out that the United States was under great time pressure in this case, due to the circumstances in which Germany had instituted the proceedings. The Court notes moreover that at the time when the United States authorities took their decision the question of the binding character of orders indicating provisional measures had been extensively discussed in the literature, but had not been settled by its jurisprudence. The Court would have taken these factors into consideration had Germany’s submission included a claim for indemnification.
Finally, the Court will consider Germany’s fourth submission, in which it asks the Court to adjudge and declare
Germany states that:
"[c]oncerning the requested assurances and guarantees of non-repetition of the United States, they are appropriate because of the existence of a real risk of repetition and the seriousness of the injury suffered by Germany. Further, the choice of means by which full conformity of the future conduct of the United States with Article 36 of the Vienna Convention is to be ensured may be left to the United States."
Germany explains that:
"the effective exercise of the right to consular notification embodied in [Article 36,] paragraph 2, requires that, where it cannot be excluded that the judgment was impaired by the violation of the right to consular notification, appellate proceedings allow for a reversal of the judgment and for either a retrial or a re-sentencing".
Finally, Germany points out that its fourth submission has been so worded "as to... leave the choice of means by which to implement the remedy [it seeks] to the United States".
In reply, the United States argues as follows:
"Germany’s fourth submission is clearly of a wholly different nature than its first three submissions. Each of the first three submissions seeks a judgment and declaration by the Court that a violation of a stated international legal obligation has occurred. Such judgments are at the core of the Court’s function, as an aspect of reparation.
In contrast, however, to the character of the relief sought in the first three submissions, the requirement of assurances of non-repetition sought in the fourth submission has no precedent in the jurisprudence of this Court and would exceed the Court’s jurisdiction and authority in this case. It is exceptional even as a non-legal undertaking in State practice, and it would be entirely inappropriate for the Court to require such assurances with respect to the duty to inform undertaken in the Consular Convention in the circumstances of this case."
It points out that "US authorities are working energetically to strengthen the regime of consular notification at the state and local level throughout the United States, in order to reduce the chances of cases such as this recurring" and adds that:
"the German request for an assurance as to the duty to inform foreign nationals without delay of their right to consular notification... seeks to have the Court require the United States to assure that it will never again fail to inform a German foreign national of his or her right to consular notification",
and that "the Court is aware that the United States is not in a position to provide such an assurance". The United States further contends that it "has already provided appropriate assurances to Germany on this point".
Finally, the United States recalls that:
"[w]ith respect to the alleged breach of Article 36, paragraph 2,... Germany seeks an assurance that, ‘in any future cases of detention of or criminal proceedings against German nationals, the United States will ensure in law and practice the effective exercise of the rights under Article 36’".
"[such an assurance] is again absolute in character... [and] seeks to create obligations on the United States that exceed those that are contained in the Vienna Convention. For example, the requirement of consular notification under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Convention applies when a foreign national is arrested, committed to prison or to custody pending trial or detained in any other manner. It does not apply, as the submission would have it, to any future criminal proceedings. That is a new obligation, and it does not arise out of the Vienna Convention."
The United States further observes that:
"[e]ven if this Court were to agree that, as a result of the application of procedural default with respect to the claims of the LaGrands, the United States committed a second internationally wrongful act, it should limit that judgment to the application of that law in the particular case of the LaGrands. It should resist the invitation to require an absolute assurance as to the application of US domestic law in all such future cases. The imposition of such an additional obligation on the United States would... be unprecedented in international jurisprudence and would exceed the Court’s authority and jurisdiction."
The Court observes that in its fourth submission Germany seeks several assurances. First it seeks a straightforward assurance that the United States will not repeat its unlawful acts. This request does not specify the means by which non-repetition is to be assured.
Turning first to the general demand for an assurance of nonrepetition, the Court observes that it has been informed by the United States of the "substantial measures [which it is taking] aimed at preventing any recurrence" of the breach of Article 36, paragraph 1 (b). Throughout these proceedings, oral as well as written, the United States has insisted that it "keenly appreciates the importance of the Vienna Convention’s consular notification obligation for foreign citizens in the United States as well as for United States citizens travelling and living abroad"; that "effective compliance with the consular notification requirements of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention requires constant effort and attention"; and that
"[t]his effort has included the January 1998 publication of a booklet entitled ‘Consular Notification and Access: Instructions for Federal, State and Local Law Enforcement and Other Officials Regarding Foreign Nationals in the United States and the Rights of Consular Officials to Assist Them’, and development of a small reference card designed to be carried by individual arresting officers".
Germany has stated that it "does not consider the so-called ‘assurances’ offered by the Respondent as adequate". It says
The Court notes that the United States has acknowledged that, in the case of the LaGrand brothers, it did not comply with its obligations to give consular notification. The United States has presented an apology to Germany for this breach. The Court considers however that an apology is not sufficient in this case, as it would not be in other cases where foreign nationals have not been advised without delay of their rights under Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention and have been subjected to prolonged detention or sentenced to severe penalties.
The United States has provided the Court with information, which it considers important, on its programme. If a State, in proceedings before this Court, repeatedly refers to substantial activities which it is carrying out in order to achieve compliance with certain obligations under a treaty, then this expresses a commitment to follow through with the efforts in this regard. The programme in question certainly cannot provide an assurance that there will never again be a failure by the United States to observe the obligation of notification under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention. But no State could give such a guarantee and Germany does not seek it. The Court considers that the commitment expressed by the United States to ensure implementation of the specific measures adopted in performance of its obligations under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), must be regarded as meeting Germany’s request for a general assurance of non-repetition.
The Court will now examine the other assurances sought by Germany in its fourth submission. The Court observes in this regard that it can determine the existence of a violation of an international obligation. If necessary, it can also hold that a domestic law has been the cause of this violation. In the present case the Court has made its findings of violations of the obligations under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention when it dealt with the first and the second submission of Germany. But it has not found that a United States law, whether substantive or procedural in character, is inherently inconsistent with the obligations undertaken by the United States in the Vienna Convention. In the present case the violation of Article 36, paragraph 2, was caused by the circumstances in which the procedural default rule was applied, and not by the rule as such.
Given the foregoing ruling by the Court regarding the obligation of the United States under certain circumstances to review and reconsider convictions and sentences, the Court need not examine Germany’s further argument which seeks to found a like obligation on the contention that the right of a detained person to be informed without delay pursuant to Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention is not only an individual right but has today assumed the character of a human right.
In reply to the fourth submission of Germany, the Court will therefore limit itself to taking note of the commitment undertaken by the United States to ensure implementation of the specific measures adopted in performance of its obligations under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Vienna Convention, as well as the aforementioned duty of the United States to address violations of that Convention should they still occur in spite of its efforts to achieve compliance.
(1) By fourteen votes to one,
Finds that it has jurisdiction, on the basis of Article I of the Optional Protocol concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 24 April 1963, to entertain the Application filed by the Federal Republic of Germany on 2 March 1999;
in favour: President Guillaume; Vice-President Shi; Judges Oda, Bedjaoui, Ranjeva, Herczegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal;
against: Judge Parra-Aranguren;
(2) (a) By thirteen votes to two,
Finds that the first submission of the Federal Republic of Germany is admissible;
in favour: President Guillaume; Vice-President Shi; Judges Bedjaoui, Ranjeva, Herczegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal;
against : Judges Oda, Parra-Aranguren;
(b) By fourteen votes to one,
Finds that the second submission of the Federal Republic of Germany is admissible;
in favour: President Guillaume; Vice-President Shi; Judges Bedjaoui, Ranjeva, Herczegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal;
against: Judge Oda;
(c) By twelve votes to three,
Finds that the third submission of the Federal Republic of Germany is admissible;
in favour: President Guillaume; Vice-President Shi; Judges Bedjaoui, Ranjeva, Herczegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh;
against: Judges Oda, Parra-Aranguren, Buergenthal;
(d) By fourteen votes to one,
Finds that the fourth submission of the Federal Republic of Germany is admissible;
Finds that, by not informing Karl and Walter LaGrand without delay following their arrest of their rights under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Convention, and by thereby depriving the Federal Republic of Germany of the possibility, in a timely fashion, to render the assistance provided for by the Convention to the individuals concerned, the United States of America breached its obligations to the Federal Republic of Germany and to the LaGrand brothers under Article 36, paragraph 1;
Finds that, by not permitting the review and reconsideration, in the light of the rights set forth in the Convention, of the convictions and sentences of the LaGrand brothers after the violations referred to in paragraph (3) above had been established, the United States of America breached its obligation to the Federal Republic of Germany and to the LaGrand brothers under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Convention;
against : Judge Oda;
(5) By thirteen votes to two,
Finds that, by failing to take all measures at its disposal to ensure that Walter LaGrand was not executed pending the final decision of the International Court of Justice in the case, the United States of America breached the obligation incumbent upon it under the Order indicating provisional measures issued by the Court on 3 March 1999;
against: Judges Oda, Parra-Aranguren;
Takes note of the commitment undertaken by the United States of America to ensure implementation of the specific measures adopted in performance of its obligations under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Convention; and finds that this commitment must be regarded as meeting the Federal Republic of Germany’s request for a general assurance of non-repetition;
(7) By fourteen votes to one,
Finds that should nationals of the Federal Republic of Germany nonetheless be sentenced to severe penalties, without their rights under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Convention having been respected, the United States of America, by means of its own choosing, shall allow the review and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence by taking account of the violation of the rights set forth in that Convention.
against: Judge Oda.
Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative, at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this twenty-seventh day of June, two thousand and one, in three copies, one of which will be placed in the archives of the Court and the others transmitted to the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Government of the United States of America, respectively.
This Wiki Note has not been contributed yet.
We continuously identify new themes to add to the existing Wiki Notes.
Become a Contributor, submit your candidacy to author this Wiki.
Become a Contributor, submit your candidacy to author other Wiki Notes.