Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/739/541/454069/
Timestamp: 2019-10-22 21:55:59
Document Index: 368101949

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1962', '§ 1962', '§ 963', '§ 952', '§ 841', '§ 846', '§ 963', '§ 952', '§ 841', '§ 371', '§ 3731', '§ 3500', '§ 3500']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Robert S. Liuzzo, Louis J. Ragonese, Defendants-appellees, 739 F.2d 541 (11th Cir. 1984) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Eleventh Circuit › 1984 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Robert S. Liuzzo, Louis J. Ragonese, Defendants-ap...
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Robert S. Liuzzo, Louis J. Ragonese, Defendants-appellees, 739 F.2d 541 (11th Cir. 1984)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit - 739 F.2d 541 (11th Cir. 1984) Aug. 15, 1984
Robert S. Liuzzo and Louis J. Ragonese were indicted on October 8, 1982, by a federal grand jury in the Southern District of Florida. The indictment charged them with racketeering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1982), and conspiring to engage in racketeering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1982). In addition, Liuzzo was charged with conspiracy to import marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 963 (1982), two counts of importation of marijuana and quaaludes, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 952 (1982), and two counts of possession of marijuana and quaaludes with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1) (1982). Ragonese was charged with conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1982), three counts of conspiracy to import cocaine and marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 963 (1982), importation of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 952 (1982), six counts of possession of marijuana, quaaludes, and cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1) (1982), and conspiracy to obstruct justice, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1503 (1982).
The district court agreed to impose sanctions, as requested by the government. The court ordered that, if the government failed to turn over the grand jury materials in advance of trial, the court would exclude from evidence at trial the testimony of all government witnesses whose grand jury testimony was not produced. In addition, the court ordered that it would suppress from use for impeachment the grand jury testimony of all witnesses who might testify for the defense at trial. The government then took the present appeal under the Criminal Appeals Act. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1982).
In deciding this appeal we are faced with two questions. First, did the district court violate the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1982),1 in ordering the government to provide transcripts of the testimony of prospective government witnesses prior to trial? Second, did the district court abuse its discretion under Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in ordering the disclosure of all the grand jury materials? We will address each of these questions in turn.2
The Jencks Act embodies two separate themes. On the one hand, subsection (a), see supra note 1, states that "no statement " of a prospective government witness is subject to discovery or subpoena until that witness testifies at trial. On the other hand, subsections (b) and (c) of the Act delineate the circumstances under which portions of witness statements must be delivered by the government to the defendant. Subsection (d) provides the sanctions that the government will suffer if it fails to comply with court orders under subsections (b) and (c). Finally subsection (e) defines the term "statement" as it is used in subsections (b), (c), and (d). This definition of statement is somewhat restrictive. Nonetheless, it includes statements made to a grand jury. The definition of statement in subsection (e) does not apply to subsection (a). The statute provides no definition of or limitation on the word "statement" as used in subsection (a). In the absence of any limitation, logic alone would compel that the definition of statement in subsection (a) must be at least as broad and inclusive as the restrictive definition provided in subsection (e). Since subsection (e) (3) includes statements made to a grand jury, those statements must also be protected from subpoena, discovery, and inspection under subsection (a).
If logic were not persuasive enough to convince us that the grand jury testimony of prospective witnesses was not subject to pretrial discovery by the defense, precedent succeeds in precluding such discovery. In United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1979), the former Fifth Circuit held that pretrial disclosure of grand jury testimony of government witnesses was barred by the Jencks Act. Id. at 858. That court specifically held that the Jencks Act required the prosecutor to permit defense counsel to examine the witness' grand jury testimony "only after [the witness] had given his direct testimony at the trial." Id. Though we are bound by Campagnuolo,3 it is reassuring to note that with a single exception no other circuit has decided this issue differently. See, e.g., United States v. Callahan, 534 F.2d 763, 766 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830, 97 S. Ct. 91, 50 L. Ed. 2d 94 (1976); United States v. Tager, 481 F.2d 97, 100 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 914, 94 S. Ct. 1410, 39 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1974); United States v. Eisenberg, 469 F.2d 156, 160 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 992, 93 S. Ct. 1515, 36 L. Ed. 2d 190 (1973); see contra, United States v. Short, 671 F.2d 178 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1119, 102 S. Ct. 2932, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1332 (1982) (Jencks Act prohibition of the pretrial disclosure of witness statements does not apply to grand jury testimony).
Having disposed of the grand jury testimony of prospective government witnesses, we move on to the remainder of the grand jury materials not covered by the Jencks Act. The disclosure of those materials is controlled by Rule 6(e) (3) (C) (i) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.4 This rule permits the disclosure of grand jury materials "when so directed by a court preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding."
The Supreme Court has held that, in order to justify lifting the cloak of secrecy surrounding grand jury deliberations, a court must find a "particularized need" for the requested disclosure. See United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 683, 78 S. Ct. 983, 986-87, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1077 (1958); Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 221-222, 99 S. Ct. 1667, 60 L. Ed. 2d 156 (1979); United States v. Sells Engineering, Inc., --- U.S. ----, 103 S. Ct. 3133, 3148, 77 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1983). When such a particularized need is shown, the access to grand jury materials must still be "discrete [ ] and limited [ ]," Procter & Gamble, 356 U.S. at 683, 78 S. Ct. at 987, and must be "structured to cover only the material needed," Douglas Oil, 441 U.S. at 222, 99 S. Ct. at 1674.
The Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1982), provides in pertinent part:
We do not need to decide in this case whether Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963), would compel pretrial disclosure of any materials in question here for the following reasons. In Brady, the Supreme Court held that due process forbids a prosecutor to suppress "evidence favorable to an accused upon request ... where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S. Ct. at 1196-97. As we have stated supra text at ----, the government has agreed to furnish the defense with all favorable grand jury testimony, and does not challenge the portion of the district court's order that would require it to do so
Fed. R. Crim. P. 6 provides in pertinent part: