Source: http://www.717madisonplace.com/?p=10783
Timestamp: 2019-11-16 22:39:37
Document Index: 368081266

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 607', '§ 607', '§ 1552', '§ 7', '§ 7104', '§ 7104', '§ 7101', '§ 609']

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However, the Solicitor presents conflicting impressions of the board and its role. On one hand, he argues that the board is not an independent body, but is simply an extension of the former power of the Commissioner to 1572*1572 directly hear appeals from decisions of primary examiners.[1] The board is an alternative avenue through which the Commissioner may make “policy” decisions, of which as head of the Patent Office, he is the final arbiter. This being the case, the Commissioner has broad discretionary authority to designate, or redesignate, panels to keep the board from rendering decisions contrary to his policy. Therefore, the “Board” that either grants rehearings or rehears appeals is whatever collection of members the Commissioner chooses to designate at any stage of the proceeding before a final decision is entered.
The independent character of the board comports with the arrangement of other adjudicatory bodies in the executive branch. For example, Congress has created agency boards of contract appeals and given them the authority to rule on disputes arising out of contracts between the government and private parties. 41 U.S.C. § 607 (1988). These boards preside over cases in which contract rights of private individuals and entities are directly pitted against the interests of the government. Likewise the patent appeals board resolves conflicts between individuals seeking exclusive rights to inventions and the government’s interest in promoting free exchange of technology. Both the board of patent appeals[2] and the contract appeals boards[3] function under similar grants of authority that, at least facially, are not limited by the authority of the head of the agency. Both bodies are in some sense, “designated” by their agency head, but this does not mean their decisions may be limited or controlled by that official. Historical and statutory notes explaining the authority of the boards of contract appeals state that the boards act independently, “not as a representative of the agency, since the agency is contesting the contractor’s entitlement to relief.” 41 U.S.C.A. § 607 notes; see also United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 828 F.2d 1356, 1364 (9th Cir.1987) (the “ASBCA is intended to be independent of the Department of Defense,” and its function is “strictly quasi-judicial”). By virtue of its similar function and statutory authority, the patent appeals board cannot be viewed as a “representative of the agency” because the Patent Office, through the examiner, also contests the entitlement of the applicant by arguing for rejection of the patent application.
If Congress intended to create a board that is not independent, but subject to the policy-making authority of the agency head, it would have specifically done so as it has in other contexts. For example, it specified that the secretaries of the military departments may correct the military records of an individual by acting “through” a civilian board. See 10 U.S.C. § 1552 (1988 & Supp. IV 1993).[4] By the statute, the board acts as 1574*1574 the secretary would, it acts on his behalf. This contrasts sharply with the situation of the board of patent appeals on which the Commissioner acts simply as one member of the board. The Patent Act does give the Commissioner authority to designate the members who will sit on panels of the board, 35 U.S.C. § 7(b), but this is a far cry from a proviso that the board acts for the Commissioner, or the Commissioner acts “through” the board.
By way of another example, Congress specifically limited the independence of the Board of Veterans Appeals. See 38 U.S.C. § 7104 (1988). In addition to regulations of the department and precedent of the department’s chief legal officer, instructions of the secretary are specifically made binding upon the board in making its decisions. Id. § 7104(c).[5] The statute also gives the chairman, who is directly responsible to the secretary, the authority to order reconsideration of board appeals to be heard by an expanded section of the board. Id. §§ 7101(a), 7103(a) & (b).
The procedure to grant rehearing, although not the subject of formal rule,[6] must be consistent with the quasi-judicial character of the board itself, and must conform to the same standards as other judicial bodies. When a court grants a “rehearing,” it means one of two things: that the case is heard again by the original panel, or is heard by the entire court sitting en banc. See, e.g., Fed.R.App.P. 35, 28 U.S.C.App. (1988); Fed. Cir.R. 40 (1993) and Practice Note (petitions for rehearing); D.C.Cir. Rule 15, 28 U.S.C.A. (1993). In keeping with this practice, once a case is heard by a properly designated panel of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, and a decision rendered, rehearing may be granted and the case reheard only by the “Board,” i.e. the original panel or the board as a whole. There is no room for any intermediate procedure. Just as it would be impermissible for the chief judge of a court 1576*1576 to personally decide that a case should be reheard by an “expanded” panel and then pack the panel with judges known for conforming views, such action by the Commissioner is likewise unacceptable.
The Solicitor argues that the large size of the board, over forty members, would make it unwieldy to sit as a whole. According to the Solicitor, like the Ninth Circuit, the board has the power to sit in “limited en banc” panels, at the discretion of the Commissioner. The circuit courts, however, have express statutory authority to divide themselves into smaller “administrative units” to hear cases en banc if the circuit has more than fifteen active judges.[7] The board has no similar statutory authority and any attempt by the Commissioner to provide for limited en banc, by rule or otherwise, would be inconsistent with the exclusive authority of the board to grant rehearings. If the large size of the board impedes its operation by making it difficult to rehear cases en banc, congressional consent for an alternative procedure like the circuit courts’ should be sought. Because no such statutory authority now exists, however, the power of the board to grant rehearings is limited to the two choices available to other adjudicatory bodies, rehearing by the panel or by the entire board. The “rehearing” in this case was not accomplished by either of the two permissible options, so the decision of the expanded panel was not a decision of the “Board” within the meaning of the jurisdictional statute of this court and we have no authority to reach the merits, no matter how great their perceived importance.
The decision of the court to take jurisdiction nevertheless, raises another troubling issue. If the Commissioner is correct, as the court apparently thinks, the board must be seen as simply an extension of the Commissioner’s policy-making authority and thus not independent. If this is so, the standard by which this court reviews decisions of the board is questionable. It is now the practice, dubious from the start, to review the board under the same standard as we review a district court. In re King, 801 F.2d at 1326, 231 USPQ at 138. Questions of law are reviewed de novo, while findings of fact are examined to determine whether they are clearly erroneous. E.g., In re McCarthy, 763 F.2d at 412, 226 USPQ at 100(obviousness is reviewed for legal correctness without deference to the board’s determinations); In re Bond, 910 F.2d at 833, 15 USPQ2d at 1567 (anticipation is a question of fact for the board reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard). But if the board is simply implementing policy set out by the Commissioner, its decisions cannot be considered “legal” but must be subject to review as statements of agency policy. How such agency policy decisions 1577*1577 are to be reviewed is not uniformly agreed upon by the courts; some review them for abuse of discretion, some for whether they are arbitrary and capricious, and some virtually refuse to review them at all.[8] Regardless of which of these standards would be most appropriate, it at least may be said that the standard of review applied by this court to the board should include a good deal more deference than has been applied heretofore.[9] Our practice is inconsistent with our review of agency boards of contract appeals. Those boards are “independent” of their agencies, and yet the Contract Disputes Act directs that their fact finding be reviewed under the deferential “substantial evidence” standard. See 41 U.S.C. § 609(b) (1988); Triax-Pacific v. Stone, 958 F.2d 351, 353 (Fed.Cir.1992). If the court is correct that the patent appeals board is less “independent” and makes policy-based decisions, then arguably it should be reviewed more deferentially than contract appeals boards, not less so, as now.
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