Source: http://nh.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20140602_0001992.SCT.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2020-05-26 00:45:36
Document Index: 732332910

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 229', '§ 229', '§ 229', '§ 229', '§ 229', '§ 1708', '§ 8', '§ 2']

(a) The parties debate whether section 229 is a necessary and proper means of executing the Federal Government's power to make treaties, but " normally [this] Court will not decide a constitutional question if there is some other ground upon which to dispose of the case." Escambia County v. McMillan, 466 U.S. 48, 51, 104 S.Ct. 1577, 80 L.Ed.2d 36 ( per curiam ). Thus, this Court starts with Bond's argument that section 229 does not cover her conduct. Pp. 8-9.
(1) A fair reading of section 229 must recognize the duty of " federal courts to be certain of Congress's intent before finding that federal law overrides" the " usual constitutional balance of federal and state powers," Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460, 111 S.Ct. 2395, 115 L.Ed.2d 410. This principle applies to federal laws that punish local criminal activity, which has traditionally been the responsibility of the States. This Court's precedents have referred to basic principles of federalism in the Constitution to resolve ambiguity in federal statutes. See, e.g., United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 92 S.Ct. 515, 30 L.Ed.2d 488; Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 120 S.Ct. 1904, 146 L.Ed.2d 902. Here, the ambiguity in the statute derives from the improbably broad reach of the key statutory definition, given the term -- " chemical weapon" -- that is being defined, the deeply serious consequences of adopting such a boundless reading, and the lack of any apparent need to do so in light of the context from which the statute arose -- a treaty about chemical warfare and terrorism, not about local assaults. Thus, the Court can reasonably insist on a clear indication that Congress intended to reach purely local crimes before interpreting section 229's expansive language in a way that intrudes on the States' police power. Pp. 10-14.
(2) No such clear indication is found in section 229. An ordinary speaker would not describe Bond's feud-driven act of spreading irritating chemicals as involving a " chemical weapon." And the chemicals at issue here bear little resemblance to those whose prohibition was the object of an international Convention. Where the breadth of a statutory definition creates ambiguity, it is appropriate to look to the ordinary meaning of the term being defined (here, " chemical weapon" ) in settling on a fair reading of the statute. See Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 130 S.Ct. 1265, 176 L.Ed.2d 1.
Pennsylvania's laws are sufficient to prosecute assaults like Bond's, and there is no indication in section 229 that Congress intended to abandon its traditional " reluctan[ce] to define as a federal crime conduct readily denounced as criminal by the States," Bass, supra, at 349, 92 S.Ct. 515, 30 L.Ed.2d 488. That principle goes to the very structure of the Constitution, and " protects the liberty of the individual from arbitrary power." Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. ___, ______, 131 S.Ct. 2355, 2364, 180 L.Ed.2d 269, 280. The global need to prevent chemical warfare does not require the Federal Government to reach into the kitchen cupboard. Pp. 15-21.
In 1997, the President of the United States, upon the advice and consent of the Senate, ratified the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-21, 1974 U. N. T. S. 317. The nations that ratified the Convention (State Parties) had bold aspirations for it: " general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, including the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction." Convention Preamble, ibid. This purpose traces its origin to World War I, when " [o]ver a million casualties, up to 100,000 of them fatal, are estimated to have been caused by chemicals . . ., a large part following the introduction of mustard gas in 1917." Kenyon, Why We Need a Chemical Weapons Convention and an OPCW, in The Creation of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 1, 4 (I. Kenyon & D. Feakes eds. 2007) (Kenyon & Feakes). The atrocities of that war led the community of nations to adopt the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which prohibited the use of chemicals as a method of warfare. Id., at 5.
Up to the 1990s, however, chemical weapons remained in use both in and out of wartime, with devastating consequences. [134 S.Ct. 2084] Iraq's use of nerve agents and mustard gas during its war with Iran in the 1980s contributed to international support for a renewed, more effective chemical weapons ban. Id., at 6, 10-11. In 1994 and 1995, long-held fears of the use of chemical weapons by terrorists were realized when Japanese extremists carried out two attacks using sarin gas. Id., at 6. The Convention was conceived as an effort to update the Geneva Protocol's protections and to expand the prohibition on chemical weapons beyond state actors in wartime. Convention Preamble, 1974 U. N. T. S. 318 (the State Parties are " [d]etermined for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of the use of chemical weapons, . . . thereby complementing the obligations assumed under the Geneva Protocol of 1925" ). The Convention aimed to achieve that objective by prohibiting the development, stockpiling, or use of chemical weapons by any State Party or person within a State Party's jurisdiction. Arts. I, II, VII. It also established an elaborate reporting process requiring State Parties to destroy chemical weapons under their control and submit to inspection and monitoring by an international organization based in The Hague, Netherlands. Arts. VIII, IX.
" (1) Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never under any circumstances:
" (a) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone;
" (b) To use chemical weapons;
" (c) To engage in any military preparations to use chemical weapons;
" (d) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention." Art. I, id., at 319.
" Chemical Weapons" are defined in relevant part as " [t]oxic chemicals and their precursors, except where intended for purposes not prohibited under this Convention, as long as the types and quantities are consistent with such purposes." Art. II(1)(a), ibid . " Toxic Chemical," in turn, is defined as " Any chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals. This includes all such chemicals, regardless of their origin or of their method of production, and regardless of whether they are produced in facilities, in munitions or elsewhere." Art. II(2), id., at 320. " Purposes Not Prohibited Under this Convention" means " [i]ndustrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical or other peaceful purposes," Art. II(9)(a), id., at 322, and other specific purposes not at issue here, Arts. II(9)(b)-(d).
Although the Convention is a binding international agreement, it is " not self-executing." W. Krutzsch & R. Trapp, A Commentary on the Chemical Weapons Convention 109 (1994). That is, the Convention creates obligations only for State Parties and " does not by itself give rise to domestically enforceable federal law" absent " implementing legislation passed by Congress." Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 505, n. 2, 128 S.Ct. 1346, 170 L.Ed.2d 190 (2008). It instead provides that " [e]ach State Party shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, adopt the necessary measures to implement its obligations under this Convention." Art. VII(1), 1974 U. N. T. S. 331. " In particular," each State Party shall " [p]rohibit natural and legal persons anywhere . . . under its jurisdiction . . . from undertaking any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention, including enacting penal legislation with respect to such activity." Art. VII (1)(a), id., at 331-332.
[134 S.Ct. 2085] Congress gave the Convention domestic effect in 1998 when it passed the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act. See 112 Stat. 2681-856. The Act closely tracks the text of the treaty: It forbids any person knowingly " to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, transfer directly or indirectly, receive, stockpile, retain, own, possess, or use, or threaten to use, any chemical weapon." 18 U.S.C. § 229(a)(1). It defines " chemical weapon" in relevant part as " [a] toxic chemical and its precursors, except where intended for a purpose not prohibited under this chapter as long as the type and quantity is consistent with such a purpose." § 229F(1)(A). " Toxic chemical," in turn, is defined in general as " any chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals. The term includes all such chemicals, regardless of their origin or of their method of production, and regardless of whether they are produced in facilities, in munitions or elsewhere." § 229F(8)(A). Finally, " purposes not prohibited by this chapter" is defined as " [a]ny peaceful purpose related to an industrial, agricultural, research, medical, or pharmaceutical activity or other activity," and other specific purposes. § 229F(7). A person who violates section 229 may be subject to severe punishment: imprisonment " for any term of years," or if a victim's death results, the death penalty or imprisonment " for life." § 229A(a).
Federal prosecutors naturally charged Bond with two counts of mail theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1708. More surprising, they also charged her with two counts of possessing and using a chemical weapon, in violation of section 229(a). Bond moved to dismiss the chemical weapon counts on the ground that section 229 exceeded Congress's enumerated powers and invaded powers reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment. The District Court denied Bond's motion. She then entered a conditional guilty plea that reserved [134 S.Ct. 2086] her right to appeal. The District Court sentenced Bond to six years in federal prison plus five years of supervised release, and ordered her to pay a $2,000 fine and $9,902.79 in restitution.
Bond appealed, raising a Tenth Amendment challenge to her conviction. The Government contended that Bond lacked standing to bring such a challenge. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit agreed. We granted certiorari, the Government confessed error, and we reversed. We held that, in a proper case, an individual may " assert injury from governmental action taken in excess of the authority that federalism defines." Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. __, __, 131 S.Ct. 2355, 2364, 180 L.Ed.2d 269, 279 (2011) ( Bond I ). We " expresse[d] no view on the merits" of Bond's constitutional challenge. Id., at __, 131 S.Ct. 2355, 2366, 180 L.Ed.2d 269, 283.
On remand, Bond renewed her constitutional argument. She also argued that section 229 does not reach her conduct because the statute's exception for the use of chemicals for " peaceful purposes" should be understood in contradistinction to the " warlike" activities that the Convention was primarily designed to prohibit. Bond argued that her conduct, though reprehensible, was not at all " warlike." The Court of Appeals rejected this argument. 681 F.3d 149 (CA3 2012). The court acknowledged that the Government's reading of section 229 would render the statute " striking" in its " breadth" and turn every " kitchen cupboard and cleaning cabinet in America into a potential chemical weapons cache." Id., at 154, n. 7. But the court nevertheless held that Bond's use of " 'highly toxic chemicals with the intent of harming Haynes' can hardly be characterized as 'peaceful' under that word's commonly understood meaning." Id., at 154 (citation omitted).
The Third Circuit also rejected Bond's constitutional challenge to her conviction, holding that section 229 was " necessary and proper to carry the Convention into effect." Id., at 162. The Court of Appeals relied on this Court's opinion in Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 40 S.Ct. 382, 64 L.Ed. 641, 18 Ohio L. Rep. 61 (1920), which stated that " [i]f the treaty is valid there can be no dispute about the validity of the statute" that implements it " as a necessary and proper means to execute the powers of the Government," id., at 432, 40 S.Ct. 382, 64 L.Ed. 641.
We again granted certiorari, 568 U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 455, 178 L.Ed.2d 285 (2013).
In our federal system, the National Government possesses only limited powers; the States and the people retain the remainder. The States have broad authority to enact legislation for the public good -- what we have often called a " police power." United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995). The Federal Government, by contrast, has no such authority and " can exercise only the powers granted to it," McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 4 Wheat. 316, 405, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819), including the power to make " all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution" the enumerated powers, U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 18. For nearly two centuries it has been " clear" that, lacking a police power, " Congress cannot punish felonies generally." Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 6 Wheat. 264, 428, 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821). A criminal act committed wholly within a State " cannot be made an offence against the United States, unless it have some relation to the execution of a power of Congress, or to some matter within the jurisdiction of the United States." United States v. Fox, 95 U.S. 670, 672, 24 L.Ed. 538 (1878).
[134 S.Ct. 2087] The Government frequently defends federal criminal legislation on the ground that the legislation is authorized pursuant to Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce. In this case, however, the Court of Appeals held that the Government had explicitly disavowed that argument before the District Court. 681 F.3d, at 151, n. 1. As a result, in this Court the parties have devoted significant effort to arguing whether section 229, as applied to Bond's offense, is a necessary and proper means of executing the National Government's power to make treaties. U.S. Const., Art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Bond argues that the lower court's reading of Missouri v. Holland would remove all limits on federal authority, so long as the Federal Government ratifies a treaty first. She insists that to effectively afford the Government a police power whenever it implements a treaty would be contrary to the Framers' careful decision to divide power between the States and the National Government as a means of preserving liberty. To the extent that Holland authorizes such usurpation of traditional state authority, Bond says, it must be either limited or overruled.
Notwithstanding this debate, it is " a well-established principle governing the prudent exercise of this Court's jurisdiction that normally the Court will not decide a constitutional question if there is some other ground upon which to dispose of the case." Escambia County v. McMillan, 466 U.S. 48, 51, 104 S.Ct. 1577, 80 L.Ed.2d 36 (1984) ( per curiam ); see also Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347, 56 S.Ct. 466, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). Bond argues that section 229 does not cover her conduct. So we consider that argument first.
Section 229 exists to implement the Convention, so we begin with that international agreement. As explained, the Convention's drafters intended for it to be a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. But even with its broadly worded definitions, we have doubts that a treaty about chemical weapons has anything to do with Bond's conduct. The Convention, a product of years of worldwide study, analysis, and multinational negotiation, arose in response to war crimes and acts of terrorism. See Kenyon & Feakes 6. There is ...