Source: https://casetext.com/case/people-v-sims-222
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People v. Sims, 192 Ill. 2d 592 | Casetext
192 Ill. 2d 592 (Ill. 2000)
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Peoplev.Sims
192 Ill. 2d 592•736 N.E.2d 1048•
People v. Edgar C. (In re Edgar C.)
…In the instant case, the arresting officer did not have a warrant, so the arrest is valid only if he had…
…Following Bull, this court again addressed a defendant&apos;s right to cross-examine a State expert witness with…
finding no error in the circuit court&apos;s granting of a motion in limine precluding the defense from cross-examining a DNA expert about the fact that he entered into a predisciplinary agreement with his employer regarding a theft where the evidence that the expert had a motive to fabricate DNA evidence was too remote and uncertain
Summary of this case from People v. Leak
reviewing trial judge&apos;s expression of sympathy to victim&apos;s grandmother
assuming error, court found it to be harmless, reasoning that absent reversible error, there could be no plain error
IL: Def arrested in bedroom w/o PC at 5:20 am should have all evidence from arrest suppressed
…192 Ill. 2d 592, 614 (2000). Plutz, Kivisto, and Siegel testified that they went to [**35] defendant’s…
…192 Ill. 2d 592, 637 (2000).B. "Five Free Murders"Defendant also asserts that he was deprived of a fair death…
No. 84686 — Agenda 8 — September 1999.
Opinion filed June 15, 2000. Rehearing Denied October 2, 2000.
Appeal from the Circuit court of Cook County, the Hon. Robert LeChien, Judge, presiding.
Charles M. Schiedel, Deputy Defender, and John J. Hanlon and John M. McCarthy, Assistant Defenders, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Springfield, for appellant.
James E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Joel D. Bertocchi, Solicitor General, and William L. Browers, Steven J. Zick and David H. Iskowich, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, for the People.
Following a jury trial in the circuit court of St. Clair County, the defendant, Paris D. Sims, was convicted of first degree murder, attempted first degree murder and armed robbery. At a separate sentencing hearing, the same jury found defendant eligible for the death penalty. The jury also found that there were no mitigating circumstances sufficient to preclude imposition of that sentence. Defendant was sentenced to death for the murder and to consecutive 30-year terms of imprisonment for the remaining offenses. Defendant's death sentence has been stayed pending direct review by this court. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 4(b); 134 Ill.2d Rs. 603, 609(a). For the reasons that follow, we affirm defendant's convictions and sentences.
Testimony at trial established the following facts. On the morning of October 24, 1994, at approximately 4 a.m., police officers in Belleville, Illinois, received a call stating that a man had been seen, covered in blood, running down the street in a Belleville trailer park. When the officers responding to the call reached the trailer park, they discovered this man, lying in a fetal position on the ground near the trailers. The man was bleeding from the head and face and was incoherent. Officers also discovered, in the bedroom of one of the trailers, the dead body of 17-year-old JoAna Bollinger. The man found injured on the ground, police later learned, was JoAna Bollinger's 17-year-old husband, Jacob Bollinger.
The record contains several different spellings of JoAna Bollinger's first name. We defer to the spelling which appears in the victim impact statement prepared by JoAna Bollinger's grandmother.
Jacob was also cross-examined regarding his identification of defendant as the assailant, in light of his initial belief that it was "Ice," known to Jacob at the time of trial as Willie Sims, who appeared at his door on the night of the attack. Jacob testified that, about six weeks before the attack, he gave a ride to a man he met on the street, in the trailer park. Jacob spent about an hour with the man, taking him to two stores. The man told Jacob that he was called "Ice." Jacob stated that he might have seen "Ice" previously at Rickey Harvey's trailer but that he was not certain that this was the person he had seen. Jacob also stated that he did not know if the person he took to the stores was "Ice," i.e., Willie Sims, or defendant.
ANALYSIS Motion to Suppress Statements
The special concurrence concludes that we need not address whether defendant was arrested without probable cause because defendant did not actually move to suppress his confession as the fruit of an unlawful arrest and, consequently, never met his initial burden of establishing a prima facie case that his arrest was unlawful under section 114-12(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure ( 725 ILCS 5/114-12(b) (West 1998)) (see, e.g., People v. Ertl, 292 Ill. App.3d 863, 868 (1997)). In addition, the special concurrence concludes that, even though the State introduced the testimony of Detectives Ellis and Jones concerning their investigation of the crimes and the events preceding defendant's arrest, probable cause was not litigated at the suppression hearing. We disagree. Defendant's motion to suppress plainly asserts that he was arrested without a warrant and without probable cause. The State, on appeal, expressly acknowledges that defendant was arrested without a warrant. Further, in its brief before this court, the State argues only that defendant was arrested with probable cause. The State does not contend, in any way, that defendant failed to establish a prima facie case that his arrest was unlawful, or that defendant otherwise forfeited his right to challenge the legality of his arrest before this court. Thus, the State has conceded that defendant met his prima facie burden and that probable cause was litigated at the suppression hearing. Indeed, the testimony of Ellis and Jones would have been unnecessary and irrelevant if the only contested issue was the voluntariness of defendant's statements given at the police station. We see no reason to disregard the State's concessions, particularly when those concessions coincide with defendant's characterization of the proceedings below. Accordingly, we address the issue of the legality of defendant's arrest as framed by the parties to this appeal, i.e., whether defendant's warrantless arrest was made with probable cause.
To effect a valid, warrantless arrest, a police officer must have probable cause to arrest. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 13 L.Ed.2d 142, 145, 85 S.Ct. 223, 225 (1964); People v. Kidd, 175 Ill.2d 1, 22 (1996). Probable cause to arrest exists where the facts and circumstances known to the police officer at the time of the arrest are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense had been committed and that the offense was committed by the person arrested. People v. Lippert, 89 Ill.2d 171, 178 (1982). Mere suspicion is inadequate to establish probable cause to arrest, but the evidence relied upon by the arresting officers does not have to be sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Kidd, 175 Ill. 2d at 22. Notably, because "an arrest not only serves the function of producing persons for prosecution but also serves an investigative function, courts have not ruled that an arrest can occur only when the known facts indicate that it is more probable than not that the suspected individual has committed the crime." Lippert, 89 Ill.2d at 179; see generally 2 W. LaFave, Search Seizure § 3.2(e), at 64-68 (3d ed. 1996).
The existence of probable cause is determined by the totality of the circumstances at the time of the arrest. People v. Tisler, 103 Ill.2d 226 (1984) (following the standard set forth in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 76 L.Ed.2d 527, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (1983)); People v. Williams, 147 Ill.2d 173, 210 (1991). Further, a determination of probable cause is governed by commonsense, practical considerations, and not by technical legal rules. People v. Buss, 187 Ill.2d 144, 204 (1999), quoting Kidd, 175 Ill.2d at 24. Because the present case involves the application of the law to undisputed facts, our standard of review is de novo. Buss, 187 Ill.2d at 205; People v. Krueger, 175 Ill.2d 60, 64 (1996).
After examining the totality of the circumstances known to detectives Ellis and Jones at the time defendant was apprehended, we conclude that the officers had probable cause to effectuate an arrest. The record in the case at bar shows that the detectives, while investigating a brutal murder and attempted murder, canvassed the Bollingers' trailer park in an attempt to gather information about the crimes. The only known witness to the murder, Jacob Bollinger, was hospitalized with head injuries and incoherent when Ellis and Jones began their interviews. The detectives were initially given a physical description of a suspect by a neighbor, Tony Graham, who reported seeing someone in the Bollingers' trailer. When the detectives gave this description to another neighbor, Kathy Kunkle, she provided them with defendant's name. Both Graham and Kunkle provided information in their capacity as ordinary citizens. Neither Graham nor Kunkle was an anonymous informant or a paid, criminal informant. See Kidd, 175 Ill.2d at 23 (fact that the defendant's name was given to police by someone other than a paid informer is a factor in the probable cause analysis). Moreover, there is no indication in the record that Graham and Kunkle were biased against defendant in any way.
At the time of defendant's arrest, Ellis and Jones also knew that defendant frequently visited the trailer park. They knew specifically that defendant had been across the street from the Bollingers' trailer hours before the murder occurred. The detectives located defendant, unexpectedly, four or five blocks from the murder scene hours after the murder had taken place. When the officers approached defendant on the street, he gave them a name which they knew to be false. See People v. Williams, 79 Ill. App.3d 817, 821 (1979) (suspect's giving of false name a factor in establishing probable cause); 2 W. LaFave, Search Seizure § 3.6(f), at 327 (3d ed. 1996) (responses by the suspect which the officer knows to be false may be a factor in constituting probable cause). Considering the totality of the circumstances set forth above, we believe that Ellis and Jones had probable cause to arrest defendant.
Defendant argues, however, that certain facts known to the detectives at the time of the arrest must be discounted from our probable cause analysis. Citing to case law which held that a suspect's presence near a crime scene, by itself, is insufficient to establish probable cause (see, e.g., People v. Carnivale, 61 Ill.2d 57, 58 (1975)), defendant contends that the fact that he was placed close to the Bollingers' trailer both before and after the murder is "virtually irrelevant" to whether the detectives had probable cause to effectuate an arrest. As the State points out, however, defendant was not arrested based solely on his presence near the crime scene. In addition, we know of no reported decision which holds that a suspect's proximity to a crime scene is irrelevant to establishing probable cause to arrest. Cf. Lippert, 89 Ill.2d at 181 (discussing fact that the defendant was found in an area near the crime scene and noting generally that the police are not required to assume that a suspect has put as much distance between himself and the crime scene as is possible). Accordingly, we determine that defendant's location both before and after the murder may properly be considered as factors in determining whether Ellis and Jones had probable cause to arrest defendant.
In probable cause jurisprudence, the term "basis of knowledge" refers to how a criminal or citizen informant has acquired information that has been given to police. Tisler, 103 Ill.2d at 239. An examination of an informant's basis of knowledge helps ensure that an arrest based upon information received from that informant is predicated upon something more substantial than conclusory allegations or "casual rumor." Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 416, 21 L.Ed.2d 637, 644, 89 S.Ct. 584, 589 (1969). The basis of knowledge inquiry is not a separate or independent test which must be satisfied in order to establish probable cause. Tisler, 103 Ill.2d at 237-40. Rather, an informant's basis of knowledge is simply a relevant factor to be considered as part of the totality of the circumstances known to police at the time of the arrest. Kidd, 175 Ill.2d at 23, quoting People v. Adams, 131 Ill.2d 387, 398 (1989).
In the case at bar, the evidence shows that Kunkle's identification of defendant was not based on casual rumor. To the contrary, the evidence of record shows that Kunkle had personal knowledge of defendant, and that she provided Ellis and Jones with defendant's name only after the officers had relayed Graham's description to her. The detectives, therefore, were well aware that Kunkle was not making a bald assertion that defendant had committed the murder, nor was she simply reporting "an offhand remark heard at a neighborhood bar." Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 417, 21 L.Ed.2d at 644, 89 S.Ct. at 589. Cf. People v. Wilson, 260 Ill. App.3d 364 (1994) (finding no probable cause to arrest where police had no indication whatsoever as to how a robbery victim's daughter was able to identify defendants as the assailants).
Moreover, under the totality of the circumstances approach to establishing probable cause, an imperfect expression of the basis of knowledge may nevertheless suffice to establish probable cause when considered together with the other relevant facts known to the police at the time of the arrest. Tisler, 103 Ill.2d at 240-41; 2 W. LaFave, Search Seizure § 3.3(d), at 145 (3d ed. 1996). As stated, Kunkle's identification of defendant was not the sole relevant factor under consideration by the police. The law requires us to consider Kunkle's identification of defendant as part of the totality of the circumstances known to the police at the time of the arrest, and to review all the known circumstances in a practical, nontechnical way. After carefully considering the evidence of record, we have determined that Detectives Ellis and Jones had probable cause to arrest defendant. Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress.
During the State's cross-examination of Gelbort, the State sought to have Gelbort read the charging indictment. The State's purpose in introducing the indictment was to rebut Gelbort's conclusion that, while defendant might have some rudimentary understanding of the crimes he was charged with, he was unable to "understand what the implication of those charges would be." The indictment stated, inter alia, that defendant was charged with committing "the offense of FIRST DEGREE MURDER * * * in that he, without lawful justification and with the intent to kill Joana Bollinger, strangled Joana Bollinger, thereby causing the death of Joana Bollinger." Defendant objected to this cross-examination, arguing that the indictment described the circumstances of the murder, and that these circumstances were irrelevant and would unduly inflame the jury. The objection was overruled. Gelbort read the indictment aloud and, after questioning, concluded that, "with some coaching," defendant could understand what the indictment meant. At the conclusion of the fitness hearing, the jury found defendant fit to stand trial.
Defendant now argues that the circuit court erred when it permitted Gelbort to read the indictment before the jury, and that as a result of this error, a new fitness hearing and a new trial are required. The State, in response, correctly observes that this argument is procedurally defaulted because defendant failed to include it in his post-trial motion. See People v. Enoch, 122 Ill.2d 176, 186 (1988). Nevertheless, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 615(a) (134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a)), this court may review an argument not properly preserved if we conclude that plain error affecting a substantial right has occurred. People v. Shaw, 186 Ill.2d 301, 326-27 (1998). Before invoking the plain error exception, however, "it is appropriate to determine whether error occurred at all." People v. Wade, 131 Ill.2d 370, 376 (1989).
"[Defense counsel]: I would suggest that just a very broad general question concerning the fact be just that this received some publicity, and if they have read any newspaper articles or seen any television or heard any radio concerning this case. And I believe we'd have to probably, in conjunction with that, probably mention that the-names of the alleged victims here.
THE COURT: Right. And it would seem to me a little follow up question for any juror who is considering the question of whether they heard anything as to what it is we are talking about. Does that mean that we need describe anything other than the First Degree Murder charge?
[Defense counsel]: I don't think we do."
Later, during opening arguments before the jury, defense counsel stated:
"Dr. Gelbort will testify *** that [defendant's] here but he doesn't understand that he's charged with murder; that he doesn't understand that he will be going for-before a jury at some future point where his guilt or innocence of that murder will be determined; that he doesn't understand either the proceedings or that he's in fact, charged with murder."
In light of the foregoing, defendant cannot now contend that, because the indictment stated that defendant was charged with murder, the trial court erred when it permitted the indictment to be read before the jury. See, e.g., People v. Abston, 263 Ill. App.3d 665, 671 (1994) (where the defendant acquiesces in the trial court's course of action, the defendant cannot raise that course of action as error on appeal).
Even if we assume that the circumstances of JoAna Bollinger's murder were irrelevant to determining the question of defendant's fitness, the admission of those circumstances was clearly harmless. Before Gelbort read the indictment, the jury knew that JoAna Bollinger had been murdered, and knew, obviously, that the murder had been committed in some manner. No graphic or inflammatory details of the murder were included in the indictment. Indeed, the only descriptive term in the indictment is the word "strangled." Furthermore, before beginning its deliberations, the jury was properly instructed that the only issue it was to decide was defendant's fitness to stand trial. Under the facts of this case, we find that no reversible error occurred when the indictment was read before the jury. Consequently, we also find no plain error. See People v. Keene, 169 Ill.2d 1, 17 (1995) (all plain errors are reversible errors).
Before this court, defendant contends that the circuit court erred when it barred the defense from impeaching Sallee with evidence of the predisciplinary agreement, and that this error requires reversal of his convictions and a new trial. The State initially maintains that this issue is procedurally defaulted because defendant failed to preserve the objection to the motion in limine in his post-trial motion. See Enoch, 122 Ill.2d at 186. Defendant, in turn, responds that the circuit court's denial of his right to cross-examine Sallee rendered his trial fundamentally unfair and that this court may review the issue as plain error. For the reasons set forth below, we find no error in the trial court's granting of the State's motion in limine. Accordingly, we also find no plain error and no basis to excuse defendant's procedural default.
In criminal proceedings, a defendant has the right to cross-examine a witness regarding the witness' biases, interests or motives to provide false testimony. People v. Triplett, 108 Ill.2d 463, 475 (1985). "With this method of impeachment, `the fact that a witness has been arrested or charged with a crime may be shown or inquired into where it would reasonably tend to show that his testimony might be influenced by interest, bias or a motive to testify falsely.'" Triplett, 108 Ill.2d at 475, citing People v. Mason, 28 Ill.2d 396, 401 (1963). "[C]ross-examination is proper whenever the prosecution has sufficient `leverage' over the witness justifying the defendant's claim that the witness has an interest or bias, or that there is corruption or coercion that would tend to make the witness testify falsely." M. Graham, Cleary Graham's Handbook of Illinois Evidence § 607.7, at 436-37 (7th ed. 1999). However, the evidence used to impeach a witness "`must give rise to the inference that the witness has something to gain or lose by his testimony.'" Triplett, 108 Ill.2d at 475-76, quoting People v. Phillips, 95 Ill. App.3d 1013, 1020 (1981). Therefore, the evidence used to establish bias, interest or motive should be timely, unequivocal and directly related. M. Graham, Cleary Graham's Handbook of Illinois Evidence § 607.7, at 440 (7th ed. 1999). The evidence used must not be "remote or uncertain." Triplett, 108 Ill.2d at 476.
In People v. Bull, 185 Ill.2d 179 (1998), this court addressed a claim similar to that presented by defendant in the case at bar. In Bull, the State filed a motion in limine to bar the defense from cross-examining David Metzger, an employee of the Illinois State Police crime laboratory, regarding his administrative disciplinary record. Like Sallee, Metzger had been caught stealing a microscope and had been subject to various disciplinary measures by his employer. The circuit court granted the State's motion. Bull, 185 Ill.2d at 205.
On appeal, the defendant in Bull argued that it was error to allow the motion in limine because cross-examination of Metzger regarding his disciplinary record with the State Police crime laboratory would show that Metzger had a "motive to testify falsely or to embellish his testimony to please his employers." Bull, 185 Ill.2d at 206. This court rejected that argument, stating:
"The record is too speculative and remote to infer that Metzger had something to gain or lose by his testimony. As the trial court noted, the administrative charges arose approximately two years after Metzger had completed and reported his DNA analysis in this case. Further, trial occurred approximately one year after Metzger was disciplined. At trial, Metzger's testimony regarding his DNA analysis of defendant was based on the three-year-old report." (Emphasis in original.) Bull, 185 Ill.2d at 207.
In the instant case, the State argues that Bull disposes of defendant's claim. The State maintains that the evidence which defendant wished to use to impeach Sallee in this case, like in Bull, was too speculative and remote to be admitted. Defendant, in response, attempts to distinguish Bull by focusing on the timing of the administrative action taken against Sallee. Defendant argues that, unlike Bull, in this case, Sallee "was the subject of disciplinary proceedings at the precise time he was conducting DNA testing on the evidence" in defendant's case. Thus, in defendant's view, at the time Sallee was conducting his DNA testing, he had a motive to curry favor with his employer by giving results favorable to the State's case. Accordingly, defendant asserts that the State's reliance on Bull is misplaced.
Assuming, without deciding, that Jamison's testimony was hearsay, its admission was clearly harmless. "The admission of hearsay evidence is harmless error where there is no reasonable probability that the jury would have acquitted the defendant absent the hearsay testimony." People v. Nevitt, 135 Ill.2d 423, 447 (1990). There is no such probability here. The two statements made by Jamison were isolated comments made in the context of extended narrative testimony. Both statements were made in response to general inquiries by the State, and neither remark was elaborated upon in any way. Moreover, aside from Jamison's testimony, the evidence of defendant's guilt was overwhelming. Jacob Bollinger testified unequivocally that defendant attacked him and murdered his wife, JoAna. In statements given to the police, defendant confessed to the murder. DNA evidence strongly implicated defendant, and defendant was arrested with the murder victim's rings on his person. Given this evidence, we do not believe that Jamison's two remarks were a significant basis for defendant's convictions. We hold, therefore, that even if Jamison's two statements were hearsay, their admission was harmless error. Because we find no reversible error regarding Jamison's testimony, we also find no plain error. See Keene, 169 Ill.2d at 17.
"[State's Attorney]: [Would you] be able to vote for the death penalty *** Mr. Cox?
JUROR [Cox]: I don't know if I could.
[State's Attorney]: Are you having some kinds of second thoughts here?
JUROR: Yeah, about the death penalty thing.
[State's Attorney]: You were persuaded by Mrs. Heap over here?
JUROR: Well, it's been on my mind since we —
[State's Attorney]: Well, just kind of found out about it, I suppose?
JUROR: You know, everybody talks about it until when it comes up to it. This is it. I mean —
[State's attorney]: Right. I guess I needed to ask you then, you think you probably could not impose the [d]eath [p]enalty?
[State's Attorney]: And I know that you know [defense counsel] from the school board?
JUROR: I only saw his name. I have never met him personally. I just saw his name on something.
[State's Attorney]: So that certainly doesn't have anything to do with it?
[State's Attorney]: You certainly think you may not be able to?
JUROR: It's kinds [ sic] of a religious thing.
[State's Attorney]: Okay. That's fine. You have some religious or moral beliefs against it?
JUROR: Yeah."
Cox was subsequently questioned by defense counsel. Counsel asked Cox if "you don't know whether you could sign that verdict or not?" Cox responded, "[m]ore or less, yeah, that would be about the same." Counsel then asked Cox if "there could be a circumstance where you could go through and deliberate on the case and you may find that you could sign a verdict of death?" Cox replied, "Yes." The State later moved to dismiss Cox for cause. Over the objection of defense counsel, the court allowed the challenge for cause.
A prospective juror in a capital case can be excused for cause when the juror's views on capital punishment would "`prevent or substantially impair the performance of duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.'" Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 83 L.Ed.2d 841, 851-52, 105 S.Ct. 844, 852 (1985), quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45, 65 L.Ed.2d 581, 589, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 2526 (1980). It is not necessary that a prospective juror express his views regarding the death penalty with "meticulous preciseness" before the trial court may rule on a motion to exclude for cause. People v. Tenner, 157 Ill.2d 341, 362 (1993). In addition, the remarks of a prospective juror during the voir dire examination must be considered "not in isolation but as a whole." Tenner, 157 Ill.2d at 363. Because of the unique nature of each voir dire, the standards for dismissing a juror for cause must be applied on a case-by-case basis. People v. Williams, 161 Ill.2d 1, 54 (1994).
We have frequently noted that the trial judge "is in a superior position to determine from a prospective juror's responses as a whole and the juror's demeanor whether that individual's views toward capital punishment would substantially prevent or impair the performance of his duties as a juror at the sentencing phase of the trial in accordance with the oath he is required to take." Williams, 161 Ill.2d at 54. Because the trial court is in a "`superior position to gauge the meaning of the prospective juror's responses,'" its determination of the propriety of removal for cause of a prospective juror is entitled to great deference on review. Tenner, 157 Ill.2d at 363, quoting People v. Emerson, 122 Ill.2d 411, 439 (1987).
In the instant case, at times, Cox indicated that he could follow the law and perform his duty as a juror. On other occasions, however, his responses indicated that he could not clearly "set aside his own beliefs in deference to the rule of law." Williams, 161 Ill.2d at 54, citing Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 176, 90 L.Ed.2d 137, 149-50, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 1766 (1986). "[I]t is precisely in situations such as this, where the cold record suggests an apparent contradiction, that we defer to the circuit court's discretion." People v. Shaw, 186 Ill.2d 301, 317 (1998), citing People v. Holman, 132 Ill.2d 128, 148-49 (1989). The trial judge in the case at bar clearly determined that Cox would have problems performing his duties as a juror. Based upon the record before us, we cannot substitute our "speculations about [Cox's] demeanor in place of the lower court's personal observations." Shaw, 186 Ill.2d at 318. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err when it dismissed venireperson Cox for cause. See, e.g., Tenner, 157 Ill.2d at 359-63 (upholding the dismissal for cause of a prospective juror who stated that she had "a problem with the death penalty").
In order to sustain a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show that trial counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 694, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693, 698, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 2068 (1984) (adopted by this court in People v. Albanese, 104 Ill.2d 504, 525-26 (1984)). Defendant acknowledges that "counsel's decision whether to present a particular witness is generally a strategic choice which cannot support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel." People v. Jones, 144 Ill.2d 242 (1991). Defendant maintains, however, that under the facts of this case, there can be no proper strategic justification for defense counsel's failure to call Gelbort as a witness at the mitigation hearing. We disagree.
A principal issue contested during the fitness hearing was whether defendant was faking his psychological symptoms. The State's expert witness, Dr. John Rabin, testified that malingering should be suspected when someone is charged with a crime or involved in litigation, and that it was possible that defendant was faking his symptoms. Delancy Moore's testimony that defendant appeared coherent during disciplinary proceedings which took place in the county jail less than a month before the fitness hearing implicitly supported the State's position that defendant was malingering. Gelbort was cross-examined at some length by the State regarding, inter alia, his conclusion that defendant was not "gilding the lily." In addition, during the State's closing argument, the State explicitly argued that defendant was faking his psychological symptoms, stating, "This defendant or any other defendant can stair [ sic] into space and start babbling words and start spouting psychobabble that anyone has seen on countless movies or countless talk shows where people have faked mental illness to avoid their day in court. And that is exactly what the defendant is doing."
JoAna Bollinger's grandmother, Mailyn Stofleth, read a victim impact statement to the jury during the aggravation-mitigation stage of sentencing hearing. As Stofleth was leaving the stand, the judge stated, "I am sorry about your loss, ma'am." Defendant contends that this comment denied him a fair sentencing hearing. The State initially maintains that this argument is procedurally defaulted because defendant failed to object to the judge's statement during trial. However, the procedural default, or waiver, rule is not rigidly applied where the basis for the objection is the conduct of the trial judge. People v. Nevitt, 135 Ill.2d 423, 455 (1990), citing People v. Sprinkle, 27 Ill.2d 398, 400-01 (1963); People v. Smith, 176 Ill.2d 217, 237 (1997).
A trial judge has a duty to see that all persons are provided a fair trial. People v. Burrows, 148 Ill.2d 196, 250 (1992). Accordingly, a trial judge must refrain from interjecting opinions, comments or insinuations reflecting bias toward or against any party. People v. Garrett, 276 Ill. App.3d 702, 712 (1995). "Judicial comments can amount to reversible error if the defendant can establish that such comments were `a material factor in the conviction or were such that an effect on the jury's verdict was the probable result.'" Burrows, 148 Ill.2d at 250, quoting People v. Harris, 123 Ill.2d 113, 137 (1988). We do not believe that the comment at issue here was a material factor in defendant's sentence of death. The judge's statement that he was "sorry about [Stofleth's] loss" was merely a polite expression of condolence, and it did not reflect a bias for or against any party. See People v. Holman, 132 Ill.2d 128, 150 (1989) (no error where the trial judge told the jury the "sad news that [the State's Attorney's] mother passed away"). Accordingly, we find no basis for disturbing defendant's sentence.
"`Any error related to *** comments to which no objections were made would normally be considered waived unless the comments were so inflammatory that defendant could not have received a fair trial or so flagrant as to threaten deterioration of the judicial process.'" People v. Kokoraleis, 132 Ill.2d 235, 283-84 (1989), citing People v. Albanese, 104 Ill.2d 504, 518 (1984). While we agree with defendant that the "whose life has more value" comment was improper, we cannot say that it was so improper as to warrant reversal of defendant's sentence. Considered in the entirety of the context of the State's closing argument, the comment did not deny defendant a fair sentencing hearing or threaten deterioration of the judicial process. Moreover, the jury was properly instructed that the evidence which it could consider consisted only of the testimony of the witnesses and the exhibits which the court had received. Consequently, we find no plain error.
Defendant argues that the Illinois death penalty statute is unconstitutional because it places a burden of proof upon defendants to show that mitigating evidence outweighs aggravating evidence, and because it permits the sentencer to consider a vague aggravating factor, namely, "any other reason" beyond the statutory factors why a defendant should be sentenced to death. See 720 ILCS 5/9-1(c), (e) (West 1994); Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 7C.06 (3d ed. 1992). This court has previously rejected both of these contentions. People v. Taylor, 166 Ill.2d 414, 439 (1995) (and cases cited therein). We decline to depart from our prior holdings on these issues.
Defendant also asserts that the death penalty is unconstitutional because it fails to sufficiently minimize the risks that death sentences will be arbitrarily and capriciously imposed. This contention has also been rejected by this court (see, e.g., Taylor, 166 Ill.2d at 440), and we decline to revisit our holdings on this issue.
In Illinois, a defendant who seeks to suppress evidence based upon an unlawful search or seizure bears the initial burden of proving that the arrest in fact was unlawful. 725 ILCS 5/114-12(b) (West 1998); People v. Buss, 187 Ill.2d 144, 204 (1999); People v. Kidd, 175 Ill.2d 1, 22 (1996). In other words, the defendant must make a prima facie showing both that the police acted without a warrant and that the police lacked probable cause, lacked reasonable grounds to arrest the defendant, or had no reasonable or articulable suspicion of criminal activity that would warrant an investigative stop. People v. Culbertson, 305 Ill. App.3d 1015, 1023 (1999); People v. Ertl, 292 Ill. App.3d 863, 868 (1997).
More importantly, the manner in which the parties proceeded at the motion hearing demonstrates that both defendant and the State were litigating a motion to suppress statements as involuntarily made, not a motion to suppress statements as the fruit of an unlawful arrest. Again, a defendant moving to suppress statements based upon an unlawful arrest clearly bears the initial burden of proving that the arrest was unlawful. 725 ILCS 5/114-12(b) (West 1998); Buss, 187 Ill.2d at 204. Despite bearing this burden, defendant presented no evidence whatsoever. However, when a defendant moves to suppress statements as involuntarily made, the State bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the confession was voluntary. 725 ILCS 5/114-11(d) (West 1998); People v. Woods, 184 Ill.2d 130, 146 (1998). In this case, the State alone presented evidence at the motion to suppress hearing, virtually all of which related to the voluntariness of defendant's confession. Moreover, defendant's cross-examination related solely to the voluntariness of his confession, and defendant rested without putting on a case. The only way this makes sense is if the parties were litigating a motion to suppress statements as involuntarily made, not a motion to suppress statements as the fruit of an involuntary search.
I agree that Sims' convictions should not be disturbed. In my view, however, his sentence of death cannot be allowed to stand. For the reasons set forth in my dissent in People v. Bull, 185 Ill.2d 179 (1998), the Illinois death penalty law violates the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amends. VIII, XIV) and article I, section 2, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2). Sims' sentence of death should therefore be vacated, and the cause should be remanded for imposition of a sentence of imprisonment. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(j) (West 1994).