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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 504', '§ 504', '§ 1415', '§ 1412', '§ 1401', '§ 504', '§ 794', '§ 1401', '§ 300', '§ 300', '§ 300', '§ 300', '§ 504', '§ 504', '§ 505', '§ 794', '§ 504', '§ 504']

IRVING ISD V. TATRO, 468 U. S. 883 (1984) - US SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON-LINE
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IRVING ISD V. TATRO, 468 U. S. 883 (1984)
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Pursuant to the Act, petitioner developed an individualized education program for the child, but the program made no provision for school personnel to administer CIC. After unsuccessfully pursuing administrative remedies to secure CIC services for the child during school hours, respondents brought an action against petitioner and others in Federal District Court, seeking injunctive relief, damages, and attorney's fees. Respondents invoked the Education of the Handicapped Act, arguing that CIC is one of the included "related services" under the statutory definition, and also invoked § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which forbids a person, by reason of a handicap, to be "excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under" any program receiving federal aid. After its initial denial of relief was reversed by the Court of Appeals, the District Court, on remand, held that CIC was a "related service" under the Education of the Handicapped Act, ordered that the child's education program be modified to include provision of CIC during school hours, and awarded compensatory damages against petitioner. The court further held that respondents had proved a violation of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
BURGER, C.J.,delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE, BLACKMUN, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined, and in all but Part III of which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which MARSHALL, J., joined, post, p. 468 U. S. 896. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 468 U. S. 896. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In 1979, petitioner Irving Independent School District agreed to provide special education for Amber, who was then three and one-half years old. In consultation with her parents, who are respondents here, petitioner developed an individualized education program for Amber under the chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Respondents unsuccessfully pursued administrative remedies to secure CIC services for Amber during school hours. [Footnote 1] In October, 1979, respondents brought the present action in District Court against petitioner, the State Board of Education, and others. See § 1415(e)(2). They sought an injunction ordering petitioner to provide Amber with CIC, and sought damages and attorney's fees. First, respondents invoked the Education of the Handicapped Act. Because Texas received funding under that statute, petitioner was required to provide Amber with a "free appropriate public education," §§ 1412(1), 1414(a)(1)(C)(ii), which is defined to include "related services," § 1401(18). Respondents argued that CIC is one such "related service." [Footnote 2] Second, respondents invoked § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 394, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 794, which forbids an individual, by reason of a handicap, to be "excluded from the chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On remand, petitioner stressed the Education of the Handicapped Act's explicit provision that "medical services" could qualify as "related services" only when they served the purpose of diagnosis or evaluation. See n 2, supra. The District Court held that, under Texas law, a nurse or other qualified person may administer CIC without engaging in the unauthorized practice of medicine, provided that a doctor prescribes and supervises the procedure. The District Court then held that, because a doctor was not needed to administer CIC, provision of the procedure was not a "medical service" for purposes of the Education of the Handicapped Act. Finding CIC to be a "related service" under that Act, the District Court ordered petitioner and the State Board of Education to modify Amber's individualized education program chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
to include provision of CIC during school hours. It also awarded compensatory damages against petitioner. Tatro v. Texas, 516 F.Supp. 968 (ND Tex.1981). [Footnote 3]
This case poses two separate issues. The first is whether the Education of the Handicapped Act requires petitioner to chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
"transportation, and such developmental, corrective, and other supportive services (including speech pathology and audiology, psychological services, physical and occupational therapy, recreation, and medical and counseling services, except that such medical services shall be for diagnostic and evaluation purposes only) as may be required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from
special education, and includes the early identification and assessment of handicapping conditions in children."
The Court of Appeals was clearly correct in holding that CIC is a "supportive servic[e] . . . required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from special education." [Footnote 6] It is clear on this record that, without having CIC services available during the school day, Amber cannot attend school and thereby "benefit from special education." CIC services therefore fall squarely within the definition of a "supportive service." [Footnote 7] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
We also agree with the Court of Appeals that provision of CIC is not a "medical servic[e]," which a school is required to provide only for purposes of diagnosis or evaluation. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(17). We begin with the regulations of the chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Department of Education, which are entitled to deference. [Footnote 9] See, e.g., Blum v. Bacon, 457 U. S. 132, 457 U. S. 141 (1982). The regulations define "related services" for handicapped children to include "school health services," 34 CFR § 300.13(a) (1983), which are defined in turn as "services provided by a qualified school nurse or other qualified person," § 300.13(b)(10). "Medical services" are defined as "services provided by a licensed physician." § 300.13(b)(4). [Footnote 10] Thus, the Secretary has determined that the services of a school nurse otherwise qualifying as a "related service" are not subject to exclusion as a "medical service," but that the services of a physician are excludable as such.
This definition of "medical services" is a reasonable interpretation of congressional intent. Although Congress devoted little discussion to the "medical services" exclusion, the Secretary could reasonably have concluded that it was designed to spare schools from an obligation to provide a service that might well prove unduly expensive and beyond the range of their competence. [Footnote 11] From this understanding of chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Petitioner's contrary interpretation of the "medical services" exclusion is unconvincing. In petitioner's view, CIC is a "medical service," even though it may be provided by a nurse or trained layperson; that conclusion rests on its reading of Texas law that confines CIC to uses in accordance with a physician's prescription and under a physician's ultimate supervision. Aside from conflicting with the Secretary's reasonable interpretation of congressional intent, however, such a rule would be anomalous. Nurses in petitioner School District are authorized to dispense oral medications and administer emergency injections in accordance with a physician's prescription. This kind of service for nonhandicapped children is difficult to distinguish from the provision of CIC to the handicapped. [Footnote 12] It would be strange indeed if Congress, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Third, the regulations state that school nursing services must be provided only if they can be performed by a nurse or other qualified person, not if they must be performed by a physician. See 34 CFR §§ 300.13(a), (b)(4), (b)(10) (1983). It bears mentioning that here not even the services of a nurse are required; as is conceded, a layperson with minimal training is qualified to provide CIC. See also e.g., Department of Education of Hawaii v. Katherine D., 727 F.2d 809 (CA9 1983). chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Respondents sought relief not only under the Education of the Handicapped Act but under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act as well. After finding petitioner liable to provide CIC under the former, the District Court proceeded to hold that petitioner was similarly liable under § 504, and that respondents were therefore entitled to attorney's fees under § 505 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794a. We hold today, in Smith v. Robinson, post, p. 468 U. S. 992, that § 504 is inapplicable when relief is available under the Education of the Handicapped Act to remedy a denial of educational services. Respondents are therefore not entitled to relief under § 504, and we reverse the Court of Appeals' holding that respondents chanroblesvirtualawlibrary