Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/542/539/24927/
Timestamp: 2019-11-18 14:50:45
Document Index: 234784944

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1252', '§ 1252', '§ 1252', '§ 1252', '§ 1252', '§ 1252', '§ 1252', '§ 1252', '§ 1252', '§ 1252', '§ 1252', '§ 1252', '§ 1252', '§ 4332', '§ 4332', '§ 4332', '§ 661']

Save Our Invaluable Land (soil), Inc., et al., Appellants, v. Colonel William R. Needham et al., Appellees,andcity of Olathe, Kansas, et al., Intervenor-appellees, 542 F.2d 539 (10th Cir. 1976) :: Justia
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Save Our Invaluable Land (soil), Inc., et al., Appellants, v. Colonel William R. Needham et al., Appellees,andcity of Olathe, Kansas, et al., Intervenor-appellees, 542 F.2d 539 (10th Cir. 1976)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit - 542 F.2d 539 (10th Cir. 1976) Argued and Submitted May 21, 1976. Decided Sept. 29, 1976
On appeal SOIL raises essentially three points: (1) the trial court erred in finding that Section 102(b) (3) of the 1972 Amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act did not apply to the Hillsdale Dam; (2) the trial court erred in concluding that the Corps's EIS met the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, and that the Corps otherwise met the requirements of the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act of 1958; and (3) the trial court erred in concluding that the inclusion of storage for water supply as a project purpose met the requirements of the Water Supply Act of 1958, as amended. We shall discuss these several matters seriatim.
SOIL initially argues that the trial court erred in holding that Section 102(b) (3) of the 1972 Amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act did not apply to the Hillsdale Dam. That section, which appears as 33 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (3), reads as follows:
In 1972 Congress shifted the emphasis to an elimination of the so-called point sources of pollution. Illustrative of this changed approach to the water pollution problem is 33 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1), which reads as follows:
(b) (1) In the survey or planning of any reservoir by the Corps of Engineers, Bureau of Reclamation, or other Federal agency, consideration shall be given to inclusion of storage for regulation of streamflow, except that any such storage and water releases shall not be provided as a substitute for adequate treatment or other methods of controlling waste at the source.
The Hillsdale Dam was authorized by Congress in 1954 as one segment of a nine-part reservoir system in the Osage-Marias des Cygnes River Basin in Kansas. In 1961, and again in 1966, the project was deferred for further study. The restudy was finally completed and the project entered the advanced engineering and design phase with Congress appropriating funds for such planning for fiscal years 1968 through 1972. On August 25, 1972, Congress appropriated funds to initiate construction of the dam. The 1972 Amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act became law on October 18, 1972. It was in this setting that the trial court held that 33 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (3) did not apply to the Hillsdale Dam. Under the circumstances, we agree.
In the instant case one of the purposes of the Hillsdale Dam was admittedly water quality control. Other purposes were flood control, water supply, recreation, and fish and wildlife. And each of these purposes, as well as other matters, was taken into consideration in arriving at a final cost/ benefit ratio. It is SOIL's position that the Corps of Engineers failed to comply with 33 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (3) in that the EPA Administrator did not determine the need for, the value of, and the impact of storage for water control, nor were his views on these matters set forth in "any report or presentation to Congress proposing authorization or construction of any reservoir including such storage," as mentioned in the statute. As indicated, both the Corps, as well as the EPA, are of the view that § 1252(b) (3) does not apply to the Hillsdale Dam inasmuch as the authorization for the dam and its construction had cleared Congress before the enactment of § 1252(b) (3).
As above indicated, we are of the view that § 1252(b) (3) does not apply to the Hillsdale Dam. In support thereof, see, for example, Cape Henry Bird Club v. Laird, 359 F. Supp. 404 (W.D. Va. 1973), aff'd on appeal, 484 F.2d 453 (4th Cir. 1973). In its affirmance the Fourth Circuit held that neither § 1252(b) (1) nor (3) applied to the dam there under consideration, because "(t)he dam is neither in the survey or planning stage, nor is it before Congress for authorization or construction. Those stages have long passed." The foregoing applies to the instant case with equal vigor, even though actual construction of the Hillsdale Dam was delayed by temporary impoundment of budgeted funds. The issue is not whether the Corps because of such delay could have complied with § 1252(b) (3), if it chose to do so. Rather the issue is whether under the circumstances, the Corps, and the EPA, were required to comply with § 1252(b) (3). We think they were not.
In further support of our holding, see also Environmental Defense Fund v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 371 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Tenn. 1973), aff'd, 492 F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 1974). To the same effect, see Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 392 F. Supp. 130 (E.D. Mo. 1975), where that court flatly declared that "the plain language of the statute (33 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1) and (3)) indicates that it is applicable only to projects which are in the planning or preauthorization stages."
As indicated, the interpretation we have given § 1252(b) (3) concerning its applicability to Hillsdale Dam is the interpretation which has heretofore been adopted by both EPA and the Corps. The interpretation given a statute by the administrative agency charged with its administration is entitled to weight. Such fact fortifies us in our conclusion that the interpretation which we give § 1252(b) (3) is " 'correct,' to the extent that any particular interpretation of a complex statute such as this is the 'correct' one." Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60, 95 S. Ct. 1470, 43 L. Ed. 2d 731 (1975).
SOIL contends that the Corps has not complied with 42 U.S.C. § 4332(A) (B) and (C). Sections (A) and (B) are, in a sense, declarations of policy, and to effectuate such policies, Section (C) requires that an environmental impact statement be filed on all major federal actions, and lists five specific matters to be covered in such statement. Section (C) is apparently designed to make certain that there be compliance with the statement of policy announced in Sections (A) and (B). In the instant case the Corps filed a 57-page EIS, which included some 32 pages of comments by other governmental agencies, both state and federal, together with the Corps's response to each comment. Such was not enough, asserts SOIL. We disagree.
Judicial review of an EIS is limited to a consideration of the following: (1) does the EIS discuss all of the five procedural requirements listed in 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C); (2) does the EIS constitute a good faith compliance with the demands of NEPA; and (3) does the statement contain a reasonable discussion of the subject matter involved in the five respective areas? Sierra Club v. Stamm, 507 F.2d 788 (10th Cir. 1974) and National Helium Corporation v. Morton, 486 F.2d 995 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993, 94 S. Ct. 2405, 40 L. Ed. 2d 772 (1973). Thus, in a real sense, an EIS is to be tested by the concepts of "good faith" and a "reasonable" discussion of the five mandated areas of subject matter. Perfection is not the test. Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers of the United States Army, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,412 U.S. 931, 93 S. Ct. 2749, 37 L. Ed. 2d 160 (1972). Nor should the courts in evaluating an EIS engage in hindsight judgment by way of second guessing.
Judged by the foregoing standard, our study of the EIS filed by the Corps in the instant case convinces us, as it did the trial court, that there was compliance with 42 U.S.C. § 4332(A) (B) and (C). In sum, the Corps did consider the impact on the environment of the construction of the Hillsdale Dam, possible alternatives, and ways of easing the impact on the environment from the building of the dam. In preparing its EIS the Corps did not ignore the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act of 1958, 16 U.S.C. § 661, et seq. Also, the cost/benefit ratio was in our view adequately covered, when the EIS is considered in its entirety. Sierra Club v. Stamm, 507 F.2d 788 (10th Cir. 1974). We think the EIS was sufficient.