Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/alabama/court-of-appeals-criminal/1992/cr-89-1117-1.html
Timestamp: 2019-10-19 20:25:15
Document Index: 635361556

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', 'art, 456', '§ 13', '§ 13']

628 So. 2d 988 (1992)
*989 James H. Evans, Atty. Gen., and Beth Jackson Hughes and Sandra J. Stewart, Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellee.
*990 On Return to Remand
In Coral v. State, 628 So. 2d 954 (Ala.Cr. App.1992), we found it necessary to remand this cause to the trial court with the instruction that the trial court comply with the requirements of § 13A-5-47(d), Code of Alabama 1975, by entering specific written findings as to the existence or nonexistence of each aggravating circumstance enumerated in § 13A-5-49, of each mitigating circumstance enumerated in § 13A-5-51, and of any mitigating circumstance offered pursuant to § 13A-5-52, and summarizing the facts surrounding the crime and the appellant's participation in it.[1] We further instructed the trial court to vacate the appellant's conviction for murder under Count I of the indictment.
The appellant contends that the override provision of the Alabama death penalty statute, § 13A-5-47(e), is unconstitutional. He argues that the override provision, which he claims denied him the benefit of the jury's sentencing decision, violates his Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution. There is no merit to this contention. The United States Supreme Court, as well as the courts of this state, have consistently upheld the validity of advisory jury verdicts, which are subject to judicial override. Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 110 S. Ct. 1441, 108 L. Ed. 2d 725 (1990); Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638, 109 S. Ct. 2055, 104 L. Ed. 2d 728 (1989); Baldwin v. Alabama, 472 U.S. 372, 105 S. Ct. 2727, 86 L. Ed. 2d 300 (1985); See, e.g., Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 104 S. Ct. 3154, 82 L. Ed. 2d 340 (1986); Ex parte Jones, 456 So. 2d 380 (Ala.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1062, 105 S. Ct. 1779, 84 L. Ed. 2d 838 (1985); Freeman v. State, 555 So. 2d 196 (Ala.Cr.App. 1988), aff'd, 555 So. 2d 215 (Ala.1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 912, 110 S. Ct. 2604, 110 L. Ed. 2d 284 (1990); Tarver v. State, 500 So. 2d 1232 (Ala.Cr.App.), aff'd, 500 So. 2d 1256 (Ala.1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 920, 107 S. Ct. 3197, 96 L. Ed. 2d 685 (1987). In this state, the recommendation of the jury is advisory only and is not binding upon the *991 trial court. Ex parte Jones. Here, the trial court and not the jury is the sentencing authority. Freeman v. State.
Section 13A-5-47(e) prescribes a standard of review for jury override that meets constitutional requirements. Ex parte Jones. That standard, as stated in Ex parte Jones, 456 So. 2d at 382, is: "The whole catalog of aggravating circumstances must outweigh mitigating circumstances before a trial court may opt to impose the death penalty by overriding the jury's recommendation."
The appellant further contends that Alabama courts should adopt the Florida standard for jury override prescribed in Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908 (Fla.1975). Tedder provides that, in order for the trial court to reject the jury's recommendation of a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, "the facts suggesting a sentence of death [must be] so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ," id. at 910. The appellant relies on Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 97 S. Ct. 2290, 53 L. Ed. 2d 344 (1977), and Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 96 S. Ct. 2960, 49 L. Ed. 2d 913 (1976), to support his contention. He argues erroneously that the United States Supreme Court has adopted the Tedder standard and made it a constitutional requirement.
Justice Beatty, speaking for a majority of the Alabama Supreme Court, addressed this issue in Ex parte Jones, 456 So. 2d at 382-83, as follows:
"Petitioner argues that this language in Dobbert demonstrates that the United States Supreme Court found the Tedder rule to be a constitutional requirement when a trial court's override of a jury's advisory verdict of life imprisonment is reviewed. "It appears to this Court, however, that the United States Supreme Court, in Proffitt and Dobbert, did not find the Tedder rule to be a general constitutional requirement under a statutory scheme similar to that of Florida. Instead, the United States Supreme Court merely approved the standard which the Florida courts have adopted providing for additional protection to the defendant. Indeed, to hold otherwise would undermine the benefits of judicial sentencing praised by the United States Supreme Court in Proffitt, supra, and adopted therefrom by the Alabama legislature. Therefore, we are not required by the United States Constitution to adopt the Tedder rule. "Alabama's statute likewise affords more significant safeguards and more protection for the defendant than formerly. Death is no more automatic under Alabama's statute than under Florida's statute. The whole catalog of aggravating circumstances must outweigh mitigating circumstances before a trial court may opt to impose the death penalty by overriding the jury's recommendation. Because Alabama's statute is a clear expression of public policy as discerned by the legislature, and conforming to the statutory purpose of Florida's statute as approved by the United States Supreme Court, the petitioner's argument for the adoption of additional standards of review of a trial court's sentence was one properly addressed to the legislature."
*992 D.
"Courts are permitted to consider hearsay testimony at sentencing.... While hearsay evidence may be considered in sentencing, due process requires both that the defendant be given an opportunity to refute it and that it bear minimal indicia of reliability...." Kuenzel v. State, 577 So. 2d 474, 528 (Ala.Cr.App.1990), aff'd, 577 So. 2d 531 (Ala. 1991), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S. Ct. 242, 116 L. Ed. 2d 197 (1991) (quoting United States v. Giltner, 889 F.2d 1004, 1007 (11th Cir.1989)). See also Smiley v. State, 435 So. 2d 202 (Ala.Cr.App.1983).
"(c) At the sentence hearing evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant to sentence and shall include any matters relating to the aggravating and mitigating circumstances referred to in sections 13A-5-49, 13A-5-51 and 13A-5-52.... "(d) Any evidence which has probative value and is relevant to sentence shall be received at the sentence hearing regardless of its admissibility under the exclusionary rules of evidence, provided that the defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut any hearsay statements...."
We also find no merit in the contention that the trial court erred in considering victim impact information contained in the presentence report. The appellant relies on Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 107 S. Ct. 2529, 96 L. Ed. 2d 440 (1987), and South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 109 S. Ct. 2207, 104 L. Ed. 2d 876 (1989). The trial court specifically stated in its sentencing order that it did not consider the victim impact statement in imposing the appellant's sentence.
Furthermore, Booth and Gathers have been overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 115 L. Ed. 2d 720 (1991), where the Supreme Court recognized the relevance of evidence about the victim and about the impact of the murder on the victim's family to the question before the jury of whether the death penalty should be imposed. Although the Supreme Court held that, if a state chooses to permit the admission of victim impact evidence and prosecutorial argument on that subject, the Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar, it also ruled that, if victim impact evidence is "so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a mechanism for relief." Id. at ___, 111 S. Ct. at 2608 (citing Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 106 S. Ct. 2464, 91 L. Ed. 2d 144 (1986)). In the instant case, the victim impact statement was not presented to the jury, but only to the trial court, and, as noted, the court did not consider it in arriving at its sentence. We find no constitutional violation here.
The appellant further contends that the inclusion in the presentence report of criminal charges that had not resulted in convictions was reversible error. We find no merit to this contention. Thompson v. State, 503 So. 2d 871 (Ala.Cr.App.1986), aff'd, 503 So. 2d 887 (Ala.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 872, 108 S. Ct. 204, 98 L. Ed. 2d 155 (1987); Rule 3(b)(2), A.R.Crim.P.Temp. Likewise, the appellant's contention that the trial court erroneously considered convictions for offenses in the presentence report that did not involve violence is also without merit. Thompson v. State.
The appellant contends that the trial court erred in finding the existence of the *993 aggravating circumstance that the capital offense was committed while the appellant was engaged in the commission of a burglary, § 13A-5-49(4). We find no error here. Our capital murder statute contemplates that certain aggravating circumstances will be established by certain capital verdicts. See §§ 13A-5-45(e), 13A-5-50. This practice of permitting the use of an element of the underlying crime as an aggravating circumstance is referred to as "double counting" or "overlap," and has been upheld. See Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 108 S. Ct. 546, 98 L. Ed. 2d 568 (1988); Ritter v. Thigpen, 828 F.2d 662 (11th Cir.1987); Ex parte Ford, 515 So. 2d 48 (Ala.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1079, 108 S. Ct. 1061, 98 L. Ed. 2d 1023 (1988); Kuenzel v. State, 577 So. 2d 474 (Ala.Cr.App. 1990), aff'd, 577 So. 2d 531 (Ala.1991), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S. Ct. 242, 116 L. Ed. 2d 197 (1991). See also section III-C in our opinion of March 27, 1992.
In accordance with the above rule, we have examined the record in the case sub judice, including the resentencing proceedings referred to above, for any plain error, whether or not the error was brought to our attention by the parties or to the attention of the trial court. In considering what constitutes plain error in a capital case, we have adhered to the interpretation of the term "plain error," adopted by the Alabama Supreme Court, which follows the interpretation given that term by the federal courts. See Ex parte Harrell, 470 So. 2d 1309 (Ala.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 935, 106 S. Ct. 269, 88 L. Ed. 2d 276 (1985); Ex parte Womack, 435 So. 2d 766 (Ala.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 986, 104 S. Ct. 436, 78 L. Ed. 2d 367 (1983). See also Hooks v. State, 534 So. 2d 329 (Ala.Cr. App.1987), aff'd, 534 So. 2d 371 (Ala.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1050, 109 S. Ct. 883, 102 L. Ed. 2d 1005 (1989). Plain error arises only if the error is such that it has or probably has adversely affected a substantial right of the appellant, A.R.A.P. 45A, or is so obvious that the failure to notice it would seriously affect the fairness or integrity of the judicial proceedings. Ex parte Womack. After reviewing the record, we find no plain error or defect in the proceedings, either in the guilt phase or the sentence phase of the trial.
As we have previously stated in our opinions of May 31, 1991, and March 27, 1992, the appellant was indicted in a two-count indictment for the capital offenses of murder committed during a robbery in the first degree, in violation of § 13A-5-40(a)(2) (Count I), and of murder committed during a burglary in the first degree, in violation of § 13A-5-40(a)(4) (Count II). The jury found him guilty of the lesser included offense of murder (§ 13A-6-2(a)(1)) under Count I and *994 guilty of the capital offense of murder committed during a burglary in the first degree, as charged in Count II (§ 13A-5-40(a)(4)). A separate sentencing hearing was held before the jury in accordance with §§ 13A-5-45 and -46. After hearing the evidence pertaining to aggravating and mitigating circumstances and after being instructed by the trial court as to its responsibilities under the law, the jury, by a majority vote of eight to four,[2] returned an advisory verdict recommending a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the conviction of the capital offense charged in Count II (murder committed during a burglary in the first degree) of the indictment.
In accordance with §§ 13A-5-51 and -52, the trial court considered all evidence presented in all phases of the trial as well as information in the presentence investigation report favorable to the appellant in its efforts to determine if there was any aspect of the appellant's character or record or any circumstance of the crime for which he had been convicted that would constitute a mitigating circumstance. The trial court found that none of the enumerated mitigating circumstances listed in § 13A-5-51 was proven to exist. It found the existence of a number of other mitigating circumstances offered by the appellant, which are as follows: the state relied on the proof of only one aggravating circumstance; the appellant has no history of prior felonies involving the use of or threat of violence to a person; the length of time the jury deliberated indicates residual doubt; the appellant could adjust peacefully to penitentiary life; the appellant could make positive contributions to those with whom he comes in contact in the penitentiary; the appellant is an accomplished automobile mechanic and would be willing to teach other inmates that trade; the appellant is a thoughtful, caring person who often makes his own greeting cards, with poetry, to please others; the appellant is a pleasant person who enjoys singing and dancing and would be a positive influence on those with whom he would come into contact in the prison; the appellant is an accomplished handyman and carpenter and would be willing to teach that trade to other inmates; the appellant is well thought of by his family and friends; the appellant is the father of a four-year-old son, and the two care deeply for each other; the appellant is willing to do a favor for a friend without expecting a favor or compensation in return; the appellant has a history of performing work on the promise that he would be paid while knowing there was little likelihood that he would be paid; the appellant is a man of great patience; the appellant has already been a positive influence on fellow inmates, has taught them art, and has helped them with legal counsel; the appellant has adjusted to incarceration; the appellant has been a father figure to a friend, Gina Quello, and has urged her to excel in school and to make something of her life; the appellant's prior acts of kindness and good works toward others tend to indicate the possibility of redemption and rehabilitation in the penitentiary; the appellant shows love and concern for his family and friends and receives love and concern in return; the appellant can adjust to long-term prison life without significant difficulty; the jury recommended a sentence *995 of life imprisonment without parole; there was no "physical" evidence linking the appellant to the crime; the appellant was not a "problem" inmate during his incarceration; the appellant has sought to "do good" for other inmates; the appellant's childhood was unstable, with little input from his mother, father, and siblings; the appellant experienced limited interaction with members of his family during his youth; the appellant was deprived of family nurturing normally required during development; the appellant was cooperative with law enforcement officers in the instant case; the appellant willingly provided saliva and hair samples during the investigation of the case; the crime for which the appellant has been convicted is "out of character" for the appellant; the appellant spent much of his youth in foster homes and detention homes; the mother of the appellant's child has suffered multiple miscarriages and has had a stillborn child; the appellant waived extradition to Alabama after his arrest; and during plea bargaining, the state offered to reduce the charge to murder if the appellant would plead guilty and receive a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
"The process ... of weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances to determine the sentence shall not be defined to mean a mere tallying of aggravating and mitigating circumstances for the purpose of numerical comparison. Instead, it shall be defined to mean a process by which circumstances relevant to sentence are marshalled and considered in an organized fashion for the purpose of determining whether the proper sentence in view of all the relevant circumstances in an individual case is life imprisonment without parole or death."
"The Court gave great weight to the jury's recommendation in this case. However, upon an independent review of the circumstances of this case, the Court is of the opinion that the facts clearly indicate beyond any reasonable doubt that the defendant Robert Lance Coral, during a burglary, was discovered by the victim who knew the Defendant and could easily identify him. After severely beating the victim, the Defendant with the intent to avoid prosecution for burglary, murdered the victim who would have been a potential witness against him in a burglary trial." "The Court is of the opinion that in order to protect the general public and deter others from murdering witnesses to their crimes that the death penalty should be imposed and that the nature of this crime is sufficient to outweigh the opinion of the jury. The facts are clear that the Defendant severely beat the victim, attempted to strangle her and shot her in the head at close range. The facts indicate that the defendant took the time to use a pillow to muffle the deadly gunshot so that the deliberate murder would not be discovered before his flight."
*996 As required, we have searched the record of both the guilt and the sentence phases of the appellant's trial, and we have found no reversible error. We find no error adversely affecting the rights of the appellant in the sentencing proceedings. We find that the trial court's findings concerning the aggravating and mitigating circumstances are supported by the evidence. In reviewing the propriety of the sentence, we find no evidence that the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor. We concur in the trial court's reasons for overriding the jury's advisory verdict. Our independent weighing of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances convinces us that death is the appropriate sentence in this case.
The appellant was convicted of the offense of murder committed during a burglary in the first degree (§ 13A-5-40(a)(4)), a capital offense by statutory definition. We note that similar crimes are being punished capitally throughout this state. See, e.g., Thomas v. State, 539 So. 2d 375 (Ala.Cr.App.), aff'd, 539 So. 2d 399 (Ala.1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 910, 109 S. Ct. 3201, 105 L. Ed. 2d 709 (1989); Lynn v. State, 543 So. 2d 704 (Ala.Cr.App. 1987), aff'd, 543 So. 2d 709 (Ala.1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 945, 110 S. Ct. 351, 107 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1989); Ford v. State, 515 So. 2d 34 (Ala.Cr.App.1986), aff'd, 515 So. 2d 48 (Ala. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1079, 108 S. Ct. 1061, 98 L. Ed. 2d 1023 (1988); Clisby v. State, 456 So. 2d 86 (Ala.Cr.App.1982), aff'd in part and remanded in part, 456 So. 2d 95 (Ala.), remanded, 456 So. 2d 98 (Ala.Cr.App.), remanded again, 456 So. 2d 99 (Ala.Cr.App.), aff'd after remand, 456 So. 2d 102 (Ala.Cr. App.1983), aff'd, 456 So. 2d 105 (Ala.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1009, 105 S. Ct. 1372, 84 L. Ed. 2d 391 (1985). Considering the crime committed and the appellant, we find that the sentence of death is neither excessive nor disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases.
Commencing on September 18, 1989, the case was tried before a jury of Robert Lance Coral's peers. On September 23, 1989, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of the offense of Capital Murder as charged in Count II of the indictment and a verdict of guilty of the lesser included offense of Murder under Count I of the indictment. In a separate sentencing recommendation phase of the trial the jury returned a recommendation of life without the possibility of parole with a vote of eight jurors in favor of life without parole *997 and four jurors in favor of a punishment of death.
Blood was found in the victim's bedroom, around the dining table and in the hallway, where the body was found. There was evidence found which would indicate that a pillow had been placed over the victim's head to muffle the gunshot when it was fired. Further, evidence indicated that there had been a struggle which began in the bedroom and *998 continued until the victim was killed in the hallway.
The facts clearly point out that while the burglary was in process the Defendant was discovered by the victim. Coral beat the victim, attempted to strangle her and then at close range shot and killed her so that she would not be able to testify against him. The facts clearly indicate that the victim knew who the Defendant was and, but for her death, could have testified against him in any burglary trial which later followed. The Court finds that the Defendant with specific intent killed Nancy Burt while in the commission of a burglary in order to prevent her *999 testimony against him concerning the burglary.
1-9-66         Chicago, IL, PD TOP         1Y Prison, Suspended
3-13-70        Chicago, IL, PD TOP         1Y, 30D, Suspended
12-21-74       Chicago, IL, PD TOP         1 to 3Y on 4-9-75.
Paroled: 10-14-75
10-9-76        Chicago, IL, PD TOP         1 to 3Y in prison.
8-4-78         Chicago, IL, PD TOP         3Y in prison.
3-13-79        Chicago, IL, PD TOP; TO     3Y in prison.
*1000 (6) "The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired."
9. That Defendant is a pleasant individual who enjoys singing and dancing and would be a positive influence with those whom he *1001 would come in contact with in the penitentiary.
Discussion: The Court finds this to be a mitigating circumstance, but gives this little *1002 weight considering the violent nature of the capital crime and the significant criminal record of the Defendant.
Discussion: The Court did consider some evidence presented in this regard and finds *1003 this to be a mitigating circumstance. However, the Court feels this mitigating circumstance should not be given great weight as the listed attributes are inconsistent with the violent nature of this capital offense.
In weighing the aggravating circumstance and the mitigating circumstances it is apparent to this Court that the one aggravating circumstance outweighs the mitigating circumstances found. In the present case the Defendant was in the process of committing *1004 a burglary when he was confronted by the victim. The Defendant confessed to a friend that he committed the murder because the victim "had too much on him."
In weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the Court is aware of the nature of the process as defined in Section 13A-5-48 of the Alabama Code. It is not a matter the Court takes lightly. After carefully considering the matter, the Court is convinced that one statutory aggravating circumstance found far outweighs all of the mitigating circumstances and that the sentence out to be death.
[1] On original submission, we concluded that the trial court's sentencing order was deficient in that it did not comply with § 13A-5-47(d) and (e), Code of Alabama 1975. On May 31, 1991, we remanded the case with instructions for the trial court to enter a proper order. Coral v. State, 585 So. 2d 248 (Ala.Cr.App.1991). On August 12, 1991, the trial court filed a new sentencing order; however, we again remanded. Coral v. State, 628 So. 2d 954 (Ala.Cr.App.1992).
[2] The decision of the jury to return an advisory verdict in a capital case recommending a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole must be based on a vote of a majority of the jurors. Ala.Code § 13A-5-46(f) (1975).