Source: https://www.egad.org.uk/news/news-archive/
Timestamp: 2019-11-17 07:58:31
Document Index: 773069681

Matched Legal Cases: ['art 130', '§ 764', '§ 764', 'art 744', 'art 744', '§764', '§ 764', '§ 764', '§ 764', '§ 764', '§ 3553', '§764', '§764', '§764', 'art 744', '§ 764', '§ 764', '§ 764', '§ 764', '§ 2778', '§ 2778', '§ 2778']

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2018 News Articles >>
What happens if I violate export controls in the USA? (January – December 2018) >>
Former Florida CEO Pleads Guilty To Export Violations And Agrees To Pay Record $17 Million To Department Of Commerce(Source: Justice, 14 Dec 2018.) [Excerpts.]
Eric Baird, the former owner and Chief Executive Offer (CEO) of a Florida-based package consolidation and shipping service, has pleaded guilty to one count of felony smuggling and admitted to 166 administrative violations of U.S. export control laws as part of a global settlement with the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS).
On December 12, 2018, Baird’s criminal plea was accepted by a federal judge in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida, and BIS issued an Order outlining the administrative violations and imposing civil penalties of $17 million, with $7 million suspended, and a 5-year denial of export privileges, of which one year is suspended. The civil penalty is the largest to be paid by an individual in BIS history. In February 2017, Access USA settled with BIS and agreed to an administrative civil penalty of $27 million, with $17 million suspended.
As part of the administrative settlement, Baird admitted to violations of the Export Administration Regulations committed from August 1, 2011, through January 7, 2013, during his tenure as CEO of Access USA Shipping, LLC d/b/a MyUS.com (“Access USA”). Baird founded Access USA and developed its business model, which provided foreign customers with a U.S. address that they used to acquire U.S.-origin items for export without alerting U.S. merchants of the items’ intended destinations. Under Baird’s direction, Access USA developed practices and policies which facilitated concealment from U.S. merchants. Access USA would regularly change the values and descriptions of items on export documentation even where it knew the accurate value and nature of the items. Among the altered descriptions were some for controlled items listed on the Commerce Control List (CCL). For example, laser sights for firearms were described as “tools and hardware,” and rifle scopes were described as “sporting goods” or “tools, hand tools.”
Additionally, Baird established and/or authorized Access USA’s “personal shopper” program. As part of this program, Access USA employees purchased items for foreign customers from a shopping list while falsely presenting themselves to U.S. merchants as the domestic end-users of the items. In some cases, Baird directed or authorized Access USA employees to use his personal credit card information, and in others Baird personally asked Access USA employees to apply for and use personal credit cards of their own to make such purchases and have the items sent to their personal addresses. As a result, in addition to being misled to believe that a domestic customer and end-user was involved when the items were in fact intended for export, the U.S. merchant would be misled to believe that Access USA itself was not involved in the transaction.
The activities that Baird knowingly authorized and/or participated in resulted in unlicensed exports of controlled items to various countries, as well as repeated false statements on Automated Export System (AES) filings. As early as September 2011, Baird was made aware that undervaluing violated U.S. export laws, including the EAR. In fact, Baird received e-mails on this subject from his Chief Technology Officer, who stated, “I know we are WILLINGLY AND INTENTIONALLY breaking the law.” (Emphasis in original). In the same email chain, Baird suggested that Access USA could falsely reduce the value of items by 25% on export control documentation submitted to the U.S. government and if “warned by [the U.S.] government,” then the company “can stop ASAP.”
“It was through the outstanding investigative skills and dedication of the special agents of the Department of Commerce and the Department of Homeland Security, that enabled us to protect our country’s national security by detecting, disrupting and prosecuting a complex illegal export scheme led by Access USA’s former owner and CEO, Eric Baird. The message must be received that individuals, as well as companies, are equally liable for their illegal activities,” said BIS Special Agent-in-Charge Robert Luzzi. “BIS brought this action because of the serious potential harm to national security inherent in a business model where companies consolidating or forwarding packages abroad conceal from U.S. merchants the location of foreign customers and the fact that items are intended for export. As a result of these deceptive practices, U.S. merchants’ compliance programs may be unable to detect potential unlicensed exports and other violations.”
“We expect companies and individuals to adhere to our nation’s strict import and export laws,” said U.S. Attorney Chapa Lopez. “Shipping and freight forwarding companies must take sufficient steps to ensure that they are always in compliance with United States law, in order to protect our borders and prevent potentially dangerous items from reaching the hands of our adversaries.”
Commerce/BIS: Spider Camera of Lansing, NY, to Pay $8,500 to Settle Alleged Export Violations(Source: Commerce/BIS, 11 Dec 2018.)* Respondent: Shai Gear LLC, d/b/a Spider Camera Holster, d/b/a Spider Camera of Lansing, NY (“Spider Camera”)
Commerce/BIS: “Merit Aerospace and Yanghong Zhou of Pasadena, CA, Denied Export Privileges for 4 Years, to Pay Civil Penalty of $221,000” (Source: Commerce/BIS, 30 May 2018.) [Excerpts.]* Respondent: Merit Aerospace and Yanghong Zhou of Pasadena, CA.
FLIR Systems Inc is fined US$30m for ITAR ViolationsThe US Department of State’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) has entered into a Consent Agreement with FLIR Systems, Inc., to settle charges that it committed over 300 violations of the ITAR, including unauthorized export of defence articles, including: technical data; the unauthorized provision of defence services to various countries, including proscribed destinations; violation of the terms and conditions or other limitations of license authorizations; and failure to provide accurate and complete reporting pursuant to Part 130 of the ITAR involving sensitive thermal imaging systems. FLIR Systems agreed to pay a US$30m civil penalty (US$15m of which may be suspended if it implements the remedial compliance measures set forth in the Consent Agreement) and, among other measures, the appointment of a Special Compliance Official/Internal Special Compliance Official for four years.
Commerce/BIS: Trilogy International Associates, Inc., of Altaville, CA, and William Michael Johnson of Angels Camp, CA, to Pay Each $100,000 for Export Violations(Source: Commerce/BIS, 1 Mar 2018.)
Commerce/BIS: Pilot Air Freight LLC of Lima, PA, to Pay $175,000 to Settle Alleged Export Violations(Source: Commerce/BIS, 27 Nov 2017.) [Excerpts.]* Respondent: Pilot Air Freight LLC a/k/a Pilot Air Freight Corp. of Lima, PA.
Commerce/BIS: MHz Electronics, Inc. of Phoenix, AZ, to Pay $10,000 to Settle Alleged Export Violations(Source: Commerce/BIS, 16 Jan 2018.) [Excerpts.]
More Than a Trade War: What the Huawei Arrest and Investigation Means to Your Business >>
ONPOINT / A legal update from Dechert’s International Trade Group
On December 1, 2018, acting at the request of the United States, Canadian authorities arrested a senior officer of Huawei Technologies Co. (“Huawei”), the Chinese telecommunications equipment and consumer electronics device manufacturer. The arrest is the most recent escalation in the relationship between the United States and Huawei and in U.S.-Chinese relations. The new arrest goes beyond prior concerns that Huawei products may be used by the Chinese government to collect information on users. Now, the U.S. government is alleging fraud in the diversion of products to Iran, in violation of U.S. economic sanctions programs. According to public reporting, the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) commenced a criminal investigation into Huawei’s potential violation of U.S. sanctions in early 2017. This investigation impacts Huawei’s business partners, including U.S. and non-U.S. financial institutions as well as participants in Huawei’s supply chain.Beyond the impact of what could be a wide-reaching investigation, this recent development signals an escalation in the trade war between the U.S. and China, with particular focus on Huawei.
Huawei has struggled to access global markets, as the U.S., Australia, Japan and New Zealand have prohibited public procurement of the company’s products. While those governments have cited security concerns, the procurement bans arise against the backdrop of the economic struggle for dominance in the telecom market. With the emergence of super-fast fifth generation (“5G”) mobile phone networks, telecoms will have to make critical decisions about whose network infrastructure to buy, thus designing particular suppliers into their systems.
The U.S. and China also are engaged in a high-profile trade standoff, with both sides imposing escalating tariffs. The Trump Administration recently announced a 90-day tariff cease-fire (expiring March 1, 2019), during which a planned tariff increase has been suspended while the U.S. and China negotiate to end the tariffs. However, in light of the Huawei arrest, there is concern about whether the cease-fire can be sustained.
The U.S. government already exercises heightened scrutiny of Chinese investment into U.S. businesses through the CFIUS process, and with recent CFIUS reform giving the U.S. government broader discretion, investors that have any potential, even indirect, link to Huawei (or other Chinese telecom connections) will face even greater scrutiny now in the CFIUS review process.
Finally, given the precedent of mutual escalation in the trade war, U.S. companies should be prepared for retaliation by the Chinese government, including possible arrests of senior officers of U.S. companies travelling in China.
Ultimately, this latest development with Huawei plays into the broader political dispute for economic leadership in the world. How the Huawei investigation proceeds may be determined by how it fits into the resolution of larger economic disputes between the U.S. and China.
Latest Allegations against Huawei
Wanzhou Meng, Huawei’s Chief Financial Officer, and daughter of the company’s founder, was arrested in Canada and is facing extradition to the United States. U.S. authorities reportedly allege that between 2007 and 2014, Huawei operated Skycom Tech (“Skycom”), a Hong Kong company, as an unofficial subsidiary. During that time, Huawei is alleged to have used Skycom to provide U.S.-origin items to the Iranian market, in violation of U.S. economic sanctions and export controls.News of the Huawei-Skycom connection was reported in 2013.1 At that time, Skycom was alleged to have offered, on Huawei’s behalf, U.S.-origin IT equipment to telecommunications providers in Iran. Following news reports, certain of Huawei’s banking partners inquired about the potential connection between Huawei and Skycom. The U.S. alleges Ms. Meng made fraudulent statements to HSBC that there was no link between Huawei and Skycom, and that Huawei’s transactions processed through the bank were compliant with applicable sanctions law. HSBC reportedly relied on those statements to continue processing transactions. HSBC reportedly became aware thereafter of transactions that drew suspicion of diversion and shared information with U.S. prosecutors about the apparent connection between Huawei and Skycom.2 HSBC recently announced that it is not under investigation in connection with Huawei’s alleged violations.
With cooperation from HSBC (and perhaps other financial institutions), the U.S. government already has significant information about the parties involved in Huawei’s operations. Accordingly, companies that directly or indirectly supply products and technology to Huawei, and financial institutions that process financial transactions for Huawei, should assess their internal records to determine their potential legal and commercial exposure. As the U.S. demonstrated in its settlement agreement with PayPal arising out of sanctions violations, liability can arise when previously segregated information is aggregated, and the aggregated information gives rise to a claim that a company knew or had reason to know of a violation. And as the recent investigation of Huawei’s competitor, ZTE, demonstrated, major customers can disappear in a hurry.As the U.S. government moves to build its case against Huawei, and Ms. Meng individually, the recent investigation into ZTE may prove instructive. During the ZTE investigation, the U.S. government issued subpoenas to companies throughout the ZTE supply chain. Companies that sell to or partner with Huawei should take the opportunity now to assess their potential legal exposure. It should be noted in this regard that U.S. enforcement authorities welcome voluntary disclosures of violations of U.S. economic sanctions and export controls, offering significant mitigation of potential penalties as an incentive. At the same time, voluntary disclosure credit is not available if a potential violation is disclosed in response to a subpoena or other U.S. government investigation.In addition to legal liability, companies should evaluate how their commercial operations could be impacted if Huawei is made subject to export restrictions. When ZTE was placed on the Commerce Department’s Denied Party List, global companies were prohibited from providing ZTE with any U.S.-origin goods or technology. Before any equivalent action may be taken against Huawei, companies should assess if they are providing Huawei with any goods or technology subject to U.S. export controls and sanctions, bearing in mind the U.S. government’s de minimis rule. (Pursuant to this rule, the U.S. government asserts export control jurisdiction over certain foreign-made commodities and technology that include or incorporate a specified percentage of U.S.-origin items or technology.)Should the U.S. impose export restrictions on Huawei, specific areas that may be impacted include:
Supply of U.S.-origin parts and components, including foreign items that incorporate a specified percentage of U.S.-origin items or technology;
Return and repair agreements;
Continuation or renewal of IP licensing agreements; and
Provision of software updates or patches.
The U.S. government is investigating Huawei’s compliance with U.S. sanctions and export control regulations. The investigation likely will encompass Huawei’s supply chain and partner financial institutions. Impacted companies should consider conducting internal assessments now – before they are contacted by the U.S. government – to gauge their legal and commercial exposure. Identification of any violations and implementation of corrective actions before a government inquiry, with or without an accompanying disclosure, can help to mitigate potential government enforcement.
Dechert frequently assists clients in internal risk assessments, internal investigations and the defense of economic sanctions and export controls matters. When appropriate, Dechert assists with disclosures to enforcement authorities and settlements. For further information or assistance, please contact the authors.
1) Steve Stecklow, Reuters, Exclusive: Huawei CFO linked to firm that offered HP gear to Iran (Jan. 31, 2013), available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-huawei-skycom/exclusive-huawei-cfo-linked-to-firm-that-offered-hp-gear-to-iran-idUSBRE90U0CC20130131
2) Rachel Louise Ensign, The Wall Street Journal, HSBC Monitor Flagged Suspicious Huawei Transactions to Prosecutors (Dec. 6, 2018), available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/hsbc-monitor-flagged-suspicious-huawei-transactions-to-prosecutors-1544122717
The update was authored by:
T: +1 202 261 3452
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sean.kane@dechert.com
darshak.dholakia@dechert.com
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michael.grant@dechert.com
The CFIUS Reform Legislation—FIRRMA—Will Become Law on August 13, 2018 >>
BREXIT: Customs, Sanctions and Export Controls >>
BREXIT: Customs, Sanctions and Export Controls
Summary notes from the Joint Event by ADS / EGADD and techUK held on Tuesday 27th March 2018.
Brexit Customs Sanctions and Export Controls_ Summary Note
CISTEC Joint Comments on Draft China Export Control Law >>
CISTEC Joint Comments on Draft China Export Control Law
Towards the end of 2017 EGADD was approached by the Japanese Center for Information on Security Trade Controls or CISTEC (http://www.cistec.or.jp/english/index.html) – essentially the Japanese equivalent of EGADD relationship – which had been seeking to put together a multinational response to export control developments in the People’s Republic of China. The Ministry of Commerce of China (MOFCOM) published China’s New Export Control Law Draft on their website on 16th June 2016 to seek public comments. Attached is a copy of the resulting joint EGADD/CISTEC letter to MOFCOM on the proposed New Export Control Law Draft.
EGADD CISTEC Joint Comments on Draft China Export Control Law
China Releases Draft Export Control Law for Public Comment – Covington – July 21, 2017
Change is Coming: China Proposes New Export Control Law (IRB No. 563) – Lexology – July 24 2017
Change is Coming: China Proposes New Export Control Law – World Trade Controls – 8 September 2017
China Prepares New Export Control Law – World ECR – August 2017
China – What to Watch: Draft Export Control Law of China – Baker McKenzie – January 17, 2018
A guide to China’s new Export Control Law – MiC – 3 November 2017
Significant changes to export control laws proposed – Deloitte Tax@Hand – 07/19/2017
Draft Chinese Export Control Law Would Make Significant Changes – STR Trade – June 29, 2017
HMRC goes public on CDS go-live date & timetable to replace CHIEF >>
HMRC goes public on CDS go-live date & timetable to replace CHIEF
HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) will begin a phased launch of the Customs Declaration Service (CDS) in August 2018. CDS will replace the existing Customs Handling of Import and Export Freight (CHIEF) system, with all declarations taking place on CDS from early 2019. Read more …
2017 News Articles >>
What Happens if I Violate Export Controls in the USA? (Jan - Dec 2017) >>
Commerce/BIS: Ali Eslamian and Equipco (UK) Ltd of London, UK, Denied Export Privileges for 4 Years, Ordered to Pay $250,000 to Settle Alleged Violation of TDO
* Respondent: Ali Eslamian and Equipco (UK) Ltd. of London, UK.
* Charges: Between in or about October 2011, and in or about February 2012, Eslamian took actions prohibited by a BIS temporary denial order issued as to Eslamian on 24 August 2011 (“TDO” or “24 August 2011 TDO”). The TDO was issued pursuant to Section 766.24 of the Regulations, was effective upon issuance, and was published in the Federal Register on 31 August 2011… The TDO was a renewal of an existing BIS temporary denial order, the primary respondent was Mahan Airways, an Iranian airline…
Eslamian violated the TDO by participating in a transaction subject to the Regulations between in or about October 2011, and in or about February 2012, by carrying on negotiations concerning and ordering an aircraft engine subject to the Regulations during that time period… In doing so, Eslamian acted at least in part through Equipco (UK) Ltd. (“Equipco”), a company owned and directed by Eslamian.
The U.S. origin International Aero Engine (“IAE”) aircraft is an item subject to the Regulations, classified under Export Control Classification Number (“ECCN”) 9A991.d, and controlled for anti-terrorism reasons. …
– Civil penalty in the amount of $250,000
* Debarred: Four (4) years from the date of this Order, provided that Eslamian has made full and timely payment of the civil penalty.
* Date of Order: 28 September 2017.
Commerce/BIS: Miltech, Inc. of Northampton, MA, to Pay $230,000 to Settle Alleged Export Violations(Source: Commerce/BIS) [Excerpts.
* Respondent: Miltech, Inc., Northampton, MA
* Charges: 18 Charges of 15 C.F.R. § 764.2(a): Engaging in Prohibited Conduct
On eighteen occasions between on or about 14 October 2011 and or about 24 July 2014, Miltech engaged in conduct prohibited by the EAR when it exported items subject to the EAR from the United States to China and Russia without the required BIS licenses. Specifically, Miltech exported active multiplier chains, items classified under Export Control Classification Number (“ECCN”) 3A001.b.4, controlled on national security and anti-terrorism grounds, and valued in total at approximately $364,947, without seeking or obtaining the licenses required for these exports pursuant to section 742.4 of the EAR. …
* Penalty: Civil penalty of $230,000, of which $180,000 needs to be paid within 30 days, and the remaining $50,000 will be suspended and waived after two years if Miltech complies with the terms of its settlement agreement and this order.
* Debarred: Not if penalty is paid as agreed, and Miltech complies with the other terms of its settlement agreement and this order.
* Date of Order: 25 September 2017.
American Shipper: “New Jersey Firm Fined $400,000 for Export Violation”(Source: American Shipper, 15 Sep 2017) [Excerpts.]
State/DDTC: Bright Lights USA, Inc., Barrington, NJ to Pay $400,000 to Settle Alleged AECA and ITAR Violations(Source: State/DDTC)
* Respondent: Bright Lights USA, Inc., 145 Shreve Ave., Barrington, NJ
* Charges: Eleven charges of violations of the AECA and ITAR between 2010 and 2012, and 2014 and 2015
– Four Charges of Unauthorized Export of Defense Articles to a Proscribed Destination
– One Charge of Unauthorized Export of Defense Article (Technical Data)
– One Charge of Failure to Maintain and Provide Required Records
– Five Charges of Unauthorized Export of Defense Articles (Parts and Components)
* Civil Settlement: $400,000
* Debarred or Suspended from Export Transactions: Not if penalty is paid and corrective actions are completed as agreed.
* Result of Voluntary Self-Disclosure: Yes
* Date of Order: 11 September 2017
* Available documents:
– Proposed Charging Letter
– Consent Agreement
– Submitting two voluntary disclosures;
– Cooperating with the Department’s review of the disclosed events and signed multiple agreements tolling the statutory period;
– Provided information suggesting that the violations were not wilful in nature; and
– Significant improvements to its export compliance program that reduce the likelihood of future violations.
* Aggravating Factors:
– Central role of an individual with a prior AECA conviction;
– Significant ITAR training and compliance program deficiencies that directly contributed to the violations;
– Unauthorized export of technical data to a proscribed destination.
Justice: “CEO of International Metallurgical Company Sentenced to 57 Months in Prison for Conspiring to Export Specialty Metals to Iran”(Source: Justice) [Excerpts.]
Commerce/BIS: Narender Sharma and Hydel Engineering Products of Rampur Bushahr, India, to Pay $100,000 to Settle Alleged Export Violations(Source: Commerce/BIS) [Excerpts.]
Commerce/BIS: Cryofab, Inc. of Kenilworth, NJ, to Pay $35,000 to Settle Alleged Export Violations(Source: Commerce/BIS) [Excerpts.]
* Respondent: Cryofab, Inc., Kenilworth, NJ
* Charges: 2 Charges of 15 C.F.R. § 764.2(a) — Engaging in Conduct Prohibited by the Regulations:
On two occasions, on or about July 19, 2012 and December 4, 2012, respectively, Cryofab engaged in conducted prohibited by the Regulations by exporting gas storage containers and related tools and accessories, items subject to the Regulations, designated EAR99, and valued in total at $21,570, from the United States to the Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC), an Indian Department of Atomic Energy entity located in Mumbai, India, without the BIS licenses required by Section 744.11 and Supplement No. 4 to Part 744 of the Regulations. On the first occasion, Cryofab exported a liquid helium storage container and accessory (total value: $16,275), and on the second occasion, it exported a liquid nitrogen storage container and operating tool (total value: $5,295). BARC is and at all times pertinent hereto was an organization listed on the Entity List set forth at Supplement No. 4 to Part 744 of the Regulations. BARC was added to the Entity List on June 30, 1997.
Although an experienced exporter, Cryofab failed to screen the Entity List in connection with these two transactions and failed to seek or obtain the BIS licenses required pursuant to Section 744.11 and Supplement No. 4. It also erroneously listed the items as eligible for shipment without a license (“NLR,” or No License Required) on the Shipper’s Letter of Instructions for each shipment. …
– Civil penalty of $35,000;
– Cryofab shall complete an external audit of its export controls compliance program; and
– Cryofab shall hire an unaffiliated third-party consultant with expertise in U.S. export control laws to conduct the external audit of its compliance with U.S. export control laws (including recordkeeping requirements).
* Debarred: Not if penalty is paid, and the audit completed as agreed.
* Date of Order: 18 August 2017.
Commerce/BIS: Harold Rinko/Global Parts Supply of Hallstead, PA, to Pay $100,000 and Debarred for Ten Years to Settle Alleged Export Violations(Source: Commerce/BIS) [Excerpts.]
* Respondent: Harold Rinko/Global Parts Supply, Hallstead, PA
* Charges: One charge of 15 C.F.R. §764.2(d)- Conspiracy
Beginning in at least September 2007, and continuing through at least May 2011, Rinko/Global Parts Supply conspired and/or acted in concert with others, known and unknown, to bring about an act that constitutes a violation of the Export Administration Regulations (“EAR”). The purpose of the conspiracy was to procure U.S.-origin goods, items subject to the EAR, from suppliers in the United States for export from the United States to Syria without the required authorization from BIS.
Rinko/Global Parts Supply’s co- conspirators included Moawea Deri, a citizen and resident of Syria, and his brother, Ahmad Feras Diri, also known as Feras Diri, a citizen and resident of the United Kingdom (“U.K.”), who both operated d-Deri Contracting & Trading, a business located in Damascus, Syria that also transacted business in and through the U.K. In furtherance of the conspiracy, Rinko/Global Parts Supply procured items subject to the EAR from U.S. suppliers and exported or attempted to export them to Syria through a third country. These items were either specifically listed on the Commerce Control List or designated as EAR99. …
* Penalty: Civil penalty in the amount of $100,000. However, all of which shall be suspended for a period of five years from the date of this Order, and thereafter shall be waived, provided that during this five-year payment probationary period, Rinko has fully and timely complied with the quarterly reporting requirements described in the Order and has not committed a violation of the Act, or any regulation, order, license, or authorization issued thereunder.
* Debarred: For a period of ten years from the date of the Order. However, the ten-year denial period shall be suspended for a period of ten years from the date of the Order, and shall thereafter be waived, provided that during this ten-year probationary period Rinko has timely completed and submitted each of the quarterly reports as set forth above, and has not committed any violation of the Act or the Regulations or any order, license or authorization issued thereunder.
* Date of Order: 26 July 2017
DHS/ICE: “New Zealand Man Sentenced for Conspiring to Export Sensitive Parts to China”
(Source: DHS/ICE) [Excerpts.]
A New Zealand man who traveled to Seattle last year to take possession of export-restricted parts designed for missile and space applications was sentenced Thursday to two years in federal prison for conspiring to violate the Arms Export Control Act, following a probe by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) Homeland Security Investigations (HSI).
William Ali, 38, has been in federal custody since his arrest April 11, 2016, by HSI special agents. At Thursday’s sentencing, U.S. District Judge Thomas S. Zilly said, “You knew that if you did it you could go to jail and you proceeded to do it…you laughed and you were undeterred in your decision to come here.” …
According to records in the case and testimony presented at trial, Ali emailed several companies and distributors in April 2015 about purchasing certain accelerometers that are designed for use in spacecraft and missile navigation. These accelerometers cannot be exported from the United States without a license from the U.S. State Department, which Ali did not have. HSI learned of Ali’s inquiries and began an investigation. …
Commerce/BIS: Hassan Zafari of Brentwood, CA, to Pay $52,500 to Settle Alleged Export Violations(Source: Commerce/BIS) [Excerpts.]
* Respondent: Hassan Zafari, Brentwood, CA.
* Charges: One Charge of 15 C.F.R. § 764.2(b): Causing, Aiding, or Abetting an Unauthorized Export to Iran:
In or about September and October 2014, Hassan Zafari, a.k.a. Sam Zafari (“Zafari”), caused, aided, or abetted a violation ofthe Regulations. Specifically, Zafari caused, aided or abetted the export from the United States to Iran, via the United Arab Emirates (“UAE”), of a used industrial laser system subject to the Regulations and valued at approximately $12,000, without the required U.S. Government authorization.
* Penalty: Civil penalty of $52,500.
* Date of Order: 28 June 2017.
Commerce/BIS: Axis Communications, Inc. of Chelmsford, MA, to Pay $700,000 to Settle Alleged Export Violations(Source: Commerce/BIS) [Excerpts.]
* Respondent: Axis Communications, Inc., Chelmsford, MA
– Thirteen Charges of 15 C.F.R. § 764.2(a), Export of Thermal Imaging Cameras Without the Required Licenses:
On 13 occasions between on or about 16 March 2011, and on or about 15 July 2013, Axis engaged in conduct prohibited by the Regulations when it made unlicensed exports from the United States to Mexico of thermal imaging cameras, items subject to the Regulations, classified under Export Control Classification Number 6A003.b.4, controlled for national security and regional stability reasons, and valued in total at $391,819. These exports to Mexico required BIS licenses pursuant to Sections 742.4 and 742.6 of the Regulations.
– Two Charges of 15 C.F.R. § 764.2(i): Failure to Comply with Recordkeeping Requirements:
On two occasions, on or about 17 June 2013, and on or about 15 July 2013, respectively, Axis failed to comply with the recordkeeping requirements set forth in Section 762.2 of the Regulations in connection with exports from the United States to Mexico of thermal imaging cameras, items subject to the Regulations, classified under Export Control Classification Number 6A003.b.4, and controlled for national security and regional stability reasons. Axis failed to retain documents required to be retained under Section 762.2, including, but not limited to, invoices relating to these exports.
– Civil penalty of $700,000
– Complete an external audit of its export controls compliance program
– Hire an unaffiliated third-party consultant with expertise in U.S. export control laws to conduct the external audit of its compliance with U.S. export control laws
* Debarred: Not if penalty is paid as agreed, the audit is completed, and the audit results submitted.
* Date of Order: 9 June 2017.
Commerce/BIS: Cryomech, Inc. of Syracuse, NY, to Pay $28,000 to Settle Alleged Export Violations(Source: Commerce/BIS) [Excerpts.]
* Respondent: Cryomech, Inc., Syracuse, NY
* Charges: 1 Charge of 15 C.F.R. § 764.2(a): Engaging in Prohibited Conduct:
On one occasion, on or about August 16, 2012, Cryomech engaged in conduct prohibited by the Regulations when it exported an LNP-20 Liquid Nitrogen Plant, an item subject to
the Regulations, designated EAR99, and valued at $33,587, from the United States to the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Experimental Physics (VNIIEF) a.k.a Russian Federal Nuclear Center-VNIIEF (RFNC-VNIIEF) in Sarov, Russia, without the required BIS license. …
DHS/ICE: Four Arizona Residents Receive Lengthy Prison Terms for Exporting Firearms and Ammunition to Hong Kong(Source: DHS/ICE) [Excerpts.]
Four Arizona residents have been sentenced to lengthy prison terms for their role in a scheme to illegally export weapons and ammunition to Hong Kong, following a multiagency probe that included U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) Homeland Security Investigations (HSI).
In 2014, law enforcement authorities in Hong Kong intercepted a package containing 139 rounds of ammunition that had been shipped from Arizona by Plesinger. A search of the intended recipient’s Hong Kong residence resulted in the recovery of three rifles, two pistols, four rifle barrels, a silencer, and at least 9,000 rounds of ammunition. Further investigation revealed Plesinger had previously shipped those items to Hong Kong in packages with innocuous labels. Additionally, investigators determined Plesinger had been paid at least $64,500 to ship large quantities of firearms, ammunition, and silencers to Hong Kong, and that Smith had been paid at least $59,550 for making similar shipments.
“I wish to compliment the tenacity of the ATF agents and prosecuting attorneys who brought this case to a successful conclusion,” said ATF Assistant Special Agent in Charge Mark Murray. “Our agents left no stone unturned as they doggedly pursued these criminals and brought them to justice. ATF will continue our role in enforcing violations of the federal firearms and explosives laws both domestically and in this case internationally.”
“HSI, together with our domestic and international law enforcement partners, is dedicated to making communities safer by bringing criminals to justice,” said HSI Special Agent in Charge Scott Brown. “The successful outcome of this case is a direct result of the steadfast efforts of federal agents to prevent firearms from falling into the hands of transnational criminal organizations that pose a threat to public safety both here and abroad.” …
Justice: California Bay Area Residents Charged In Scheme To Export Components For Production Of Night Vision Rifle Scopes(Source: Justice) [Excerpts.]
New charges supplement bank fraud conspiracy charges filed against the defendants in September of last year
Naum Morgovsky and Irina Morgovsky were charged today for their respective roles in an alleged scheme to export components for the production of night vision rifle scopes in violation of the Arms Export Control Act, announced United States Attorney Brian J. Stretch and Federal Bureau of Investigation Special Agent in Charge John F. Bennett. The superseding indictment supplements bank fraud charges that were leveled in September of last year against Naum Morgovsky and Mark Migdal.
According to the superseding indictment, Naum and Irina Morgovsky owned night vision businesses in the United States and purchased numerous scope components including image intensifier tubes and lenses. The superseding indictment alleges the Morgovskys conspired to ship these items to a night vision manufacturing company in Moscow, Russia that was partly owned by Naum Morgovsky. The United States Munitions List prohibits export of the items unless the exporter obtains a license from the Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls. According to the superseding indictment, the Morgovskys did not have such a license.
In addition, the superseding indictment alleges the Morgovskys took steps to conceal their crimes so that they could continue to run their illegal export business undetected. According to the superseding indictment, Naum Morgovsky laundered the proceeds of the export conspiracy, used a bank account in the name of a deceased person to conceal the ownership and control of the scheme’s proceeds. The superseding indictment further alleges that Irina Morgovsky allegedly used a passport that she fraudulently obtained in the name of another individual to travel to Russia three times in 2007.
The superseding indictment includes the charges against Naum Morgovsky and Mark Migdal in the indictment filed in September of 2016. Specifically, the superseding indictment repeats that between June 2009 and April 2016, Morgovsky and Migdal conspired to defraud two federally-insured banks, now Bank of America and EverBank, by seeking those banks’ approval for a short sale of two condominiums owned by Migdal. The two condominium units were in the same building in Kihei, Maui. The superseding indictment alleges that Morgovsky and Midgal conspired to convince the banks to allow the properties to be sold in a short sale to an individual who was, in reality, deceased. A short sale is a sale in which a lender allows a property to be sold at a price that is less than the amount owed on the loan. According to the superseding indictment, the conspiracy also involved submission of false statements to the bank about Midgal’s employment status and income. After the banks approved the short sales in 2009 and 2010, Migdal continued to treat the property as his own, including collecting rent and paying taxes and homeowners’ association dues. The properties allegedly were transferred to Migdal’s wife in 2016.
In addition, the superseding indictment alleges that, during 2009 and 2010, Migdal submitted false statements to a federally insured bank. According to the superseding indictment, Migdal sought to obtain loan modifications for his residence in Portola Valley and his rental property in Mountain View by falsely stating he had rented part of his residence, by submitting a false employment offer letter, and by falsely stating his rental property in Mountain View was his principal residence. …
Any sentence following conviction would be imposed by the court after consideration of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and the federal statute governing the imposition of a sentence, 18 U.S.C. § 3553. The Superseding Indictment also seeks forfeiture of the false passport, a residence in Portola Valley, a condominium in Mountain View, and the two Hawaii condominiums.
An indictment merely alleges that crimes have been committed, and all defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. …
[Editor’s Note: an overview of the charges and maximum statutory sentences against Naum Morgovsky, Irina Morgovsky, and Mark Migdal is available here.]
Justice: Singapore Man Sentenced to 40 Months in Prison for Plot Involving Exports to Iran of U.S. Components(Source: Justice) [Excerpts.]
Lim Yong Nam, aka Steven Lim, 43, a citizen of Singapore, was sentenced today (Thursday) to 40 months in prison for his role in a conspiracy that caused thousands of radio frequency modules to be illegally exported from the U.S. to Iran, at least 14 of which were later found in unexploded improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Iraq. …
According to the statement of offense, 14 of the 6,000 modules the defendants routed from Minnesota to Iran were later recovered in Iraq, where the modules were being used as part of IED remote detonation systems. …
[Editor’s Note: this release was also published on the DHS/ICE Newsroom website.]
Commerce/BIS: Access USA Shipping, LLC of Sarasota, FL, to Pay $27,000,000 to Settle Alleged Export Violations(Source: Commerce/BIS) [Excerpts.]
* Respondent: Access USA Shipping, LLC, Sarasota, FL
– Charges 1-129: 15 C.F.R. §764.2(h) – Evasion:
On one hundred twenty-nine (129) occasions beginning on or about 21 April 2011, and continuing through on or about 7 January 2013, Access USA Shipping, LLC (“Access”) engaged in transactions or took other actions to evade the Export Administration Regulations (“EAR” or “Regulations”). Specifically, Access took actions that enabled foreign customers to purchase items subject to the EAR through Access without U.S. merchants knowing the items were intended for export and that were designed at least in part to avoid detection by the U.S. Government and law enforcement. These actions included mis-describing and undervaluing the items in false export control documents; undervaluing the items improperly to avoid the filing of the required export control documents; allowing foreign customers to place orders through Access employees to avoid export scrutiny; destroying or altering export control documents; and failing to maintain records related to export transactions. …
– Charges 130-146: 15 C.F.R. §764.2(a) – Engaging in Conduct Prohibited by the Regulations by Exporting or Attempting to Export Crime Control Items without the Required License:
On seventeen (17) occasions between on or about 23 August 2011, and or about 24 January 2013, Access engaged in conduct prohibited by the EAR when it exported or attempted to export items classified under Export Control Classification Number (“ECCN”) 0A987 and controlled for Crime Control reasons without the BIS export licenses required pursuant to Section 742.7 of the EAR. The destinations included Argentina, Austria, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Libya, South Africa, and Sweden. …
– Charges 147-150: 15 C.F.R. §764.2(a) – Engaging in Conduct Prohibited by the Regulations by Exporting or Attempting To Export Items Subject to the Regulations to a Listed Entity Without the Required License:
On four occasions between on or about 17 October 2012, and on or about 15 February 2013, Access engaged in conduct prohibited by the EAR when it exported or attempted to export items subject to the Regulations from the United States to Transsphere Oy in Finland without the BIS license required pursuant to Section 744.11 and Supplement No. 4 to Part 744 of the Regulations. The items were classified under ECCN 5A991 and controlled for anti-terrorism reasons, or were designated as EAR99. Transsphere Oy is a Finish entity listed on the Entity List …
* Penalty: Civil penalty of $27,000,000, of which $17,000,000 shall be suspended for two years from the date of this Order, and waived provided that during this two year payment probationary period, Access has committed no violations of the Export Administration Act, or any regulation, order, license or authorization issues thereunto, has made full and timely payment of the $10,000,000, and has complied with all the other terms of its Settlement Agreement, and has committed no violation of the Non-Prosecution Agreement that Access has entered with U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Middle District of Florida
* Debarred: Not if penalty is paid as agreed, Access has complied with all the other terms of its Settlement Agreement, and has not failed to comply with the terms of the Non-Prosecution Agreement.
* Date of Order: 9 February 2017
Commerce/BIS: ZTE of Shenzhen and Hi-New Shenzhen, China, to Pay $661,000,000 for Export Violations(Source: Commerce/BIS) [See related items #10, #13, and #16.]
* Respondents: Zhongxing Telecommunications Equipment Corporation, Shenzhen, China, and ZTE Kangxun Telecommunications Ltd., Hi-New Shenzhen, China, collectively known as ZTE
* Charges: 380 violations of the EAR:
– One Charge of 15 C.F.R. § 764.2(d) -Conspiracy
– 283 Charges of 15 C.F.R. § 764.2(e) – Acting with Knowledge of a Violation in Connection with Unlicensed Shipments of Telecommunications Items to North Korea via China
– 16 Charges 15 C.F.R. § 764.2(h) – Evasion
* Penalty: Civil penalty of $661,000,000. The payment of $361,000,000 shall be made to the U.S. Dept. of Commerce within 60 days of the date of this Order. Payment of the remaining $300,000,000 shall be suspended for a probationary period of seven years provided that all the requirements set out in the Order are met.
– ZTE shall complete and submit six audit reports of its compliance with U.S. export control laws, with respect to all exports, reexports, or transfers (in-country) that are subject to the EAR;
– ZTE shall hire an unaffiliated third party consultant with expertise in U.S. export control laws to conduct the external audits;
– The audits required shall be in substantial compliance with the Export Management Program sample audit module, available on the BIS website;
– ZTE will ensure that all records required to be kept or retained under the EAR are stored in or fully accessible from the United States;
– ZTE will allow the U.S. government to verify ZTE’s adherence to its export control compliance program and the EAR
– ZTE shall provide extensive training on applicable export control requirements to its leadership, management, and employees, including the leadership, management and employees of its affiliates, subsidiaries, and other entities worldwide over which it has ownership or control
* Debarred: Not if penalty is paid as agreed and all requirements set out in the Order are met.
* Date of Order: 7 March 2017
Commerce/BIS: Milwaukee Electric Tool Corp. of Brookfield, WI, to Pay $301,000 to Settle Alleged Export Violations(Source: Commerce/BIS)
* Respondent: Milwaukee Electric Tool Corporation, Brookfield, WI
* Charges: 25 Charges of 15 C.F.R. § 764.2(a) – Engaging in Prohibited Conduct:
On 25 occasions between April 2012 and May 2014, Milwaukee Electric Tool Corporation (“Milwaukee Electric”) engaged in conduct prohibited by the EAR by exporting thermal imaging cameras, items subject to the EAR, from the United States to various countries, including Hong Kong, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, and Mexico, without the required Department of Commerce export licenses. The items are classified under Export Control Classification Number (“ECCN”) 6A003.b.4, controlled for National Security and Regional Stability reasons, and valued in total at approximately $129,284. Pursuant to Sections 742.4 and 742.6 of the EAR, a BIS export license is required before the items can be exported to each of the destinations at issue. By exporting these items without the required export licenses, Milwaukee Electric committed 25 violations of Section 764.2(a) of the EAR.
* Penalty: Milwaukee Electric shall be assessed a civil penalty in the amount of $301,000.
* Date of Order: 19 January 2017.
Commerce/BIS: Dane Francisco Delgado of Eden, TX, Denied Export Privileges for 10 Years(Source: Commerce/BIS)
* Respondent: Dane Francisco Delgado, Eden, TX
* Charges: On 4 November 2014, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Dane Francisco Delgado (“Delgado”), was convicted of violating Section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. § 2778 (2012)) (“‘AECA”). Specifically, Delgado knowingly and willfully conspired with persons known and unknown to export, furnish, and cause to be exported from the United States to Mexico defense articles designated on the United States Munitions List without having first obtained from the Department of State a license or written authorization for such export. Delgado was sentenced to 60 months in prison, three years of supervised release, and a $100 assessment.
* Debarred: Delgado’s is denied export privileges under the Regulations for a period of 10 years from the date of Delgado’s conviction, until 4 November 2024.
* Date of Order: 29 December 2016.
Commerce/BIS: Robert Luba of Waymart, PA, Denied Export Privileges for 10 Years(Source: Commerce/BIS)
* Respondent: Robert Luba, Waymart, PA
* Charges: On 25 April 2016, in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, Robert Luba (“Luba”), was convicted of violating Section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. § 2778 (2012)) (“AECA”). Specifically, Luba knowingly and willfully exported and caused to be exported from the United States to India a defense article, that is, the technical drawing for the NSSN Class Submarine, Torpedo Tube, Open Breech Door, Gagging Collar A, Drawing Number 7072856, which was designated as a defense article on the United States Munitions List, without having first obtained from the Department of State a license for such export or written authorization for such export. Luba was sentenced six months in prison, three years of supervised release, $173,736.67 in restitution, and a $200 assessment.
* Debarred: Luba is denied export privileges under the Regulations for a period of 10 years from the date of Luba’s conviction 25 April 2026.
Commerce/BIS: Kamran Ashfaq Malik of Joint Base MDL, NJ, Denied Export Privileges for 5 Years(Source: Commerce/BIS)
* Respondent: Kamran Ashfaq Malik, Joint Base MDL, NJ
* Charges: On 29 June 2015, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, Kamran Ashfaq Malik (“Malik”), was convicted of violating Section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. § 2778 (2012)) (“AECA”). Specifically, Malik knowingly and willfully exported and caused the exportation of firearm parts and accessories designated as defense articles in Category I of the United States Munitions List, to wit: a .223 caliber rifle lower receiver, a .334 caliber rifle lower receiver, two .223 caliber rifle bolt carriers, and two .223 10 round magazines, from the United States and destined for Pakistan without having first obtained the required licenses or authorizations from the Department of State. Malik was sentenced to 24months in prison, three years o f supervised release, and a $100 assessment.
* Debarred: Malik is denied export privileges under the Regulations for a period of 5 years from the date of Malik’s conviction, until 29 June 2020
Reality Check: BREXIT - The Effect on Export Control - Aug 2017 >>
The following represent the considered views of the Export Group for Aerospace, Defence & Dual-Use, and, as such, is proprietary to EGADD and should not be copied or otherwise used without seeking prior permission.
There had been much debate since the Referendum decision to leave the EU. The EGADD Executive committee thought that it could be useful to produce a short paper on the risks and opportunities created by this decision, as far as reasonably possible, ahead of the invoking of Article 50 and the necessary diplomatic negotiations with our former partners in the EU to achieve our desired ends. Much of the legislation in place in relation to Export Controls and Sanctions will not be impacted; however, there will be need for negotiation in relation to EU legislation pertaining to Dual-Use goods and the Intra Community Transfers Directive for Military Goods.
The issues surrounding Authorised Economic Operator (AEO) and the Union Customs Code (UCC) will not be addressed here as there are other, more relevant committees focused on these issues….
Reality Check – BREXIT – The Effect on Export Controls
Announcing Global Trade Controls, The Leading International Venue for Discussing Export Controls, Sanctions and the Regulations for Trading Duel-use Goods - Aug 2017 >>
The challenges for exporters are multiplying. Economic protectionism in the USA, ever stricter sanctions on Russia, Iran and North Korea, and escalating cybercrime are all important considerations for the export market. In the UK however, Brexit is the looming question. Without knowing which form Britain’s separation from the European Union will take, it is difficult for exporters to anticipate what the effects will be on their business. And yet preparedness is essential if they intend to land on their feet.
Stephen Osborne, Research Associate at Project Alpha – King’s College London’s centre for developing countermeasures to illicit trade – outlines two possible versions of Brexit. In one scenario, he told Global Trade Controls’ correspondent, more permissive export controls in the UK could lead to a competitive advantage for UK exporters. The downside, however, is that the UK could “become a target for procurement networks looking to acquire goods for military or WMD programmes,” which would in turn lead to a “reluctance by EU member states and their respective licensing authorities to export dual-use goods to the UK.” What at first sight appears to be a benefit to UK exporters could therefore harm the economy as a whole. The alternative? A stricter UK export control regime which places British exporters at a disadvantage, but preserves the EU’s confidence in the UK as a responsible importer of dual-use goods.
Across the channel, European regulators are also facing tough choices. In their recent proposal for modernising export controls, the EU Commission acknowledged the risks posed to the privacy and security of EU citizens by the increasing proliferation of potentially invasive cyber surveillance technologies. Their response was to expand the definition of dual use items to include “software and technology… which can be used for the commission of serious violation of human rights or international humanitarian law”. By the time the proposals come into effect, most likely in the Spring of next year, exporters will need to familiarise themselves with the new guidelines to ensure that they remain compliant.
Taking place in London this November, the Global Trade Controls conference will convene to discuss these issues and many others. Join an international roster of export compliance professionals, as well as over forty expert speakers, to discuss the implications of Brexit, the modernisation of EU export policy, sanctions under the Trump administration, considerations for exporters in Asia, technology transfers in the cloud, and much more.
Exchange ideas with your peers in a range of interactive sessions including close knit roundtable discussions, networking lunches, and practical case studies on recent developments including ZTE and Epsilon Electronics. On the first day of the conference is the Export Licensing & Trade Controls Seminar, which will provide a comprehensive introduction to trade controls and the process of export licensing.
Speakers for Global Trade Controls 2017 include representatives from Google, IBM, Marshall Aerospace and Defence Group, Deloitte, Thomson Reuters, PricewaterhouseCoopers and many others. Among the confirmed speakers are:
Ian Stewart, Head of Project Alpha, King’s College London
Lillian Norwood, Manager of IBM Governmental Programs, Export Regulation Office, IBM Corporation
Brinley Salzman, Director of Overseas and Exports, ADS Group Ltd
Michael Lutz, Director of Global Trade Compliance, Google
Katja Stockburger, Legal Counsel for Foreign Trade Governance, ZF Friedrichschafen AG
Laurence Carey, Group Control Manager, Marshall Aerospace and Defence Group
Join us at Global Trade Controls this November to hear what they have to say. Find out more here: https://goo.gl/csdYvw
SIPRI Study Examines the Challenges Associated with Implementing Effective Internal Compliance Programmes - Aug 2017 >>
DOWNLOAD THE CONCEPT PAPER AND GOOD PRACTICE GUIDES:
SIPRI Good Practice Guide: Export Control ICP Guidance Material no. 4
SIPRI Good Practice Guide: Export Control ICP Guidance Material no. 5
Crown Exemption - July 2017 >>
Following a query, on behalf of a Member Company, it has been confirmed to EGADD by the UK Ministry of Defence that the ONLY people who are authorised to issue Crown Exemption/Immunity letters to companies to move items on the UK Government’s behalf, are the UK MoD staff who are embedded within the Export Control Joint Unit. No other letters, from any other sources, can or should be relied upon, as we are aware of a number of instances in which companies, who have done so, have been found to be in breach of the regulations. The current information (at the time of writing) on this on the GOV.UK website was not up-to-date, and its guidance was wrong, and should NOT be relied upon. It must also be noted that Crown Immunity does not cascade down through the supply chain, despite comments to the contrary.
If any companies need any further clarification on this issue, they should contact: Brinley.Salzmann@adsgroup.org.uk.
Project Alpha Newsletter - Mar 2017 >>
Some of the items covered in the March newsletter include:
Meet the Project Alpha Staff
Examining Intangible Technology Controls
DPRK Successful Missile Test
Project Alpha – March 2017 Newsletter
2016 News Articles >>
What happens if I violate export controls in the USA - January - December 2016 >>
What happens if I violate export controls in the USA – January – December 2016
BIS: Transparency in Export Licensing - Government Response - Jul 2012 >>
Transparency is a key theme of the Coalition Government and plays a vital role in enabling the public to hold the Government to account. It is particularly important in a high profile area such as export control – confidence in the workings of the export licensing system needs to be shared by Parliament and by the public.
> Transparency-in-Export-Licensing–Government-Response—BIS—July-2012
Import / Export Licensing Service - Mid-discovery Show & Tell - Jan 2016 >>
The Export Control Organisation has just commenced consultations with Industry aimed at the replacement, in 2017, of the current SPIRE electronic licensing system, to produce a new, improved and more user-friendly system for companies to use to apply electronically for import licences, export licences, exhibition clearances, security gradings, F680s, etc, etc. The first formal consultation meeting with Industry took place on 13th January, and a copy of the blog that has been created on this project is available at: www.egadd.org.uk/useful-guidance/. All Members are encouraged to get involved in this process and provide inputs to these consultations.
Blog: https://importexportlicensing.blog.gov.uk
Slides: Mid-discovery Show & Tell (Jan 16)
Please respond with feed back to:
James Curran | Delivery Manager | Digital | Department for Business, Innovation & Skills |1 Victoria St Level 6 Orchard 1 | Mobile 07584 618 200 |www.bis.gov.uk
2015 News Articles >>
SIPRI Work on Duel-use Export Controls and Cyber-surveillance Technologies - Dec 2015 >>
As part of the ongoing review of the EU dual-use export control system, the European Commission is conducting an impact assessment. This study supports the impact assessment through the collection and analysis of data and information. The April
2014 Communication ‘Ensuring security and competitiveness in a changing world’, which outlines the review options, issues and actions provides the overall rationale and framework for this study. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) implemented the project jointly with Ecorys during January to September 2015.
The project included three main Actions:
(1) development of the methodology for data collection;
(2) analysis of the baseline scenario through the collection of data and information, both on the structure and performance of directly affected sectors,and with regard to the impact of current controls and related problems; and
(3) the analysis of the review options and corresponding review actions.
The project combines EU- and sector-wide data with case studies on the machine tools, chemical and aerospace sectors. A strong focus of the study has been the implementation and future expansion of controls on exports of cyber-surveillance technologies and related review options.
FINAL REPORT ANNEXES FINAL REPORT – Data and information collection for EU dual-use export control policy review
Indian Arms Export to get a Boost as Ministry of Defence Okays 16 Broad Categories of Products - Oct 2015 >>
A formal list of defence items that can be exported has been endorsed by the ministry of defence, bringing India at par with international laws governing arms trade. The move – which identifies 16 broad categories of products that can be exported after clearance – is expected to boost military trade with experts saying that it brings clarity to private companies pursuing export orders.
BIS: Republishing of Consolidated UK Strategic Export Control - Aug 2015 >>
Notices to Exporters 2012/25 and 2012/26 – Republishing of consolidated UK Strategic Export Control List along with number of Open General Export Licences…
Notices-to-Exporters-2012-25-and-2012-26—Republishing-of-consolidated-UK-Strategic-Export-Control-
Alpha - Export Compliance - Jul 2015>>
Alpha’s new web platform to bring you the latest news on the implementation of trade controls to prevent proliferation. As you know, the Alpha team has been working hard for two years now to improve the implementation of trade controls both from the perspective of what governments are trying to achieve and from the business perspective of how to implement compliance requirements in practice.
The culmination of this research is the new alpha web platform. As Alpha is hosted at the Centre for Science and Security Studies of King’s College London, the site is called @csss, pronounced “access”. Through @csss Alpha has made available information, guidance, training and other resources intended to help implement trade controls. The Alpha team stand ready to discuss trade control implementation.
HMRC: Aircraft Infraction Update - Nov 2010 >>
We have agreed to circulate the draft pages of the HMRC Officers Guidance (VTRANS) for information- please see 3 attached documents. These pages will update the guidance currently published here: http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/vtransmanual/index.htm
Other pages (not included) will have consequential amendments to fit the numbering and cross referencing and other minor tweaks.
VTRANS110000PUBLICDRAFT4NOV2010
VTRANS110600PUBLICDRAFT4NOV2010
VTRANS120000PUBLICDRAFT4NOV2010