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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 1973', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 1973', '§ 2', '§ 2']

JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III-A, III-B, IV-A, and V, concluding that: chanrobles.com-red
2. The language of § 2 and its legislative history plainly demonstrate that proof that some minority candidates have been elected does not foreclose a § 2 claim. Thus, the District Court did not err, as a matter of law, in refusing to treat the fact that some black candidates have chanrobles.com-red
1. Insofar as statistical evidence of divergent racial voting patterns is admitted solely to establish that the minority group is politically cohesive and to assess its prospects for electoral success, such a showing cannot be rebutted by evidence that the divergent voting patterns may chanrobles.com-red
BRENNAN, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III-A, III-B, IV-A, and V, in which WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ., joined, an opinion with respect to Part III-C, in which MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Part IV-B, in which WHITE, J., joined. WHITE, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 478 U. S. 82. O'CONNOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which BURGER, C.J.,and POWELL and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined, post, p. 478 U. S. 83. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which MARSHALL and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined, post, p. 478 U. S. 106. chanrobles.com-red
In April, 1982, the North Carolina General Assembly enacted a legislative redistricting plan for the State's Senate chanrobles.com-red
After appellees brought suit, but before trial, Congress amended § 2. The amendment was largely a response to this Court's plurality opinion in Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55 (1980), which had declared that, in order to establish a violation either of § 2 or of the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments, minority voters must prove that a contested electoral mechanism was intentionally adopted or maintained by state officials for a discriminatory purpose. Congress substantially revised § 2 to make clear that a violation could be proved by showing discriminatory effect alone, and to establish as the relevant legal standard the "results test," applied by this Court in White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755 (1973), and by other federal courts before Bolden, supra. S.Rep. No. 97-417, p. 28 (1982) (hereinafter S.Rep.). chanrobles.com-red
The District Court applied the "totality of the circumstances" test set forth in § 2(b) to appellees' statutory claim, and, relying principally on the factors outlined in the Senate chanrobles.com-red
First, the court found that North Carolina had officially discriminated against its black citizens with respect to their exercise of the voting franchise from approximately 1900 to 1970 by employing, at different times, a poll tax, a literacy test, a prohibition against bullet (single-shot) voting, [Footnote 5] chanrobles.com-red
Third, the court considered other voting procedures that may operate to lessen the opportunity of black voters to elect candidates of their choice. It noted that North Carolina has a majority vote requirement for primary elections, and, while acknowledging that no black candidate for election to the State General Assembly had failed to win solely because of this requirement, the court concluded that it nonetheless presents a continuing practical impediment to the opportunity of black voting minorities to elect candidates of their choice. The court also remarked on the fact that North Carolina does not have a subdistrict residency requirement for members of the General Assembly elected from multimember chanrobles.com-red
Fifth, the court examined the extent to which blacks have been elected to office in North Carolina, both statewide and in the challenged districts. It found, among other things, that, prior to World War II, only one black had been elected to public office in this century. While recognizing that "it has now become possible for black citizens to be elected to office at all levels of state government in North Carolina," 590 F.Supp. at 367, the court found that, in comparison to white candidates running for the same office, black candidates are at a disadvantage in terms of relative probability of success. It also found that the overall rate of black electoral success has been minimal in relation to the percentage of blacks in the total state population. For example, the court noted, from 1971 to 1982, there were, at any given time, only two-to-four blacks in the 120-member House of Representatives -- that is, only 1.6% to 3.3% of House members were black. From 1975 to 1983, there were, at any one time, only one or two blacks in the 50-member State Senate -- that is, only 2% to 4% of State Senators were black. By contrast, at the time of the District Court's opinion, blacks constituted about 22.4% of the total state population. chanrobles.com-red
With respect to the success in this century of black candidates in the contested districts, see also 478 U. S. post p. 82, the court found that only one black had been elected to House District 36 -- after this lawsuit began. Similarly, only one black had served in the Senate from District 22, from 1975-1980. Before the 1982 election, a black was elected only twice to the House from District 39 (part of Forsyth County); in the 1982 contest, two blacks were elected. Since 1973, a black citizen had been elected each 2-year term to the House from District 23 (Durham County), but no black had been elected to the Senate from Durham County. In House District 21 (Wake County), a black had been elected twice to the House, and another black served two terms in the State Senate. No black had ever been elected to the House or Senate from the area covered by House District No. 8, and no black person had ever been elected to the Senate from the area covered by Senate District No. 2.
Finally, the court considered the extent to which voting in the challenged districts was racially polarized. Based on statistical evidence presented by expert witnesses, supplemented to some degree by the testimony of lay witnesses, the court found that all of the challenged districts exhibit severe and persistent racially polarized voting. chanrobles.com-red
An understanding both of § 2 and of the way in which multimember districts can operate to impair blacks' ability to elect representatives of their choice is prerequisite to an evaluation of appellants' contentions. First, then, we review amended § 2 and its legislative history in some detail. Second, we explain the theoretical basis for appellees' claim of vote dilution. chanrobles.com-red
The Senate Report which accompanied the 1982 amendments elaborates on the nature of § 2 violations, and on the proof required to establish these violations. [Footnote 7] First and foremost, the Report dispositively rejects the position of the plurality in Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55 (1980), which chanrobles.com-red
In order to answer this question, a court must assess the impact of the contested structure or practice on minority electoral opportunities "on the basis of objective factors." Id. at 27. The Senate Report specifies factors which typically may be relevant to a § 2 claim: the history of voting-related discrimination in the State or political chanrobles.com-red
id. at 30 (footnote omitted), and on a "functional" view of the political process. Id. at 30, n. 120. chanrobles.com-red
Appellees contend that the legislative decision to employ multimember, rather than single-member, districts in the contested jurisdictions dilutes their votes by submerging them in a white majority, [Footnote 11] thus impairing their ability to elect representatives of their choice. [Footnote 12] chanrobles.com-red
The essence of a § 2 claim is that a certain electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to elect their preferred representatives. This Court has long recognized that multimember districts and at-large voting schemes may "operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial [minorities in] the voting population.'" [Footnote 13] 384 U. S. 88 (1966) (quoting Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433, 379 U. S. 439 (1965)). See also Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U. S. 613, 458 U. S. 617 (1982); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. at 412 U. S. 765; Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124, 403 U. S. 143 (1971). The theoretical basis for this type of impairment is that, where minority and majority voters consistently prefer different candidates, the majority, by virtue of its numerical superiority, will regularly defeat the choices of minority voters. [Footnote 14] See, e.g., Grofman, Alternatives, in Representation and Redistricting Issues 113-114. Multimember districts and at-large election schemes, however, are not per se violative of minority voters' rights. S.Rep. at 16. Cf. Rogers v. Lodge, supra, at 458 U. S. 617; Regester, supra, at 412 U. S. 765; Whitcomb, supra, at 403 U. S. 142. Minority voters who contend that the multimember form of districting violates § 2 must prove that the use of a multimember electoral structure operates to minimize or cancel out their ability to elect their preferred candidates. See, e.g.,@ S.Rep. at 16.
While many or all of the factors listed in the Senate Report may be relevant to a claim of vote dilution through submergence in multimember districts, unless there is a conjunction of the following circumstances, the use of multimember districts generally will not impede the ability of minority voters to elect representatives of their choice. [Footnote 15] Stated succinctly, chanrobles.com-red
a bloc voting majority must usually be able to defeat candidates supported by a politically cohesive, geographically insular minority group. Bonapfel 355; Blacksher & Menefee 34; Butler 903; Carpeneti 696-699; Davidson, Minority Vote Dilution: An Overview (hereinafter Davidson), in Minority Vote Dilution 4; Grofman, Alternatives 117. Cf. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 446 U. S. 105, n. 3 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting) ("It is obvious chanrobles.com-red
that the greater the degree to which the electoral minority is homogeneous and insular, and the greater the degree that bloc voting occurs along majority-minority lines, the greater will be the extent to which the minority's voting power is diluted by multimember districting"). These circumstances are necessary preconditions for multimember districts to operate to impair minority voters' ability to elect representatives of their choice for the following reasons. First, the minority group must be able to demonstrate that it is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district. [Footnote 16] If it is not, as would be the case in a substantially integrated district, the multimember form of the district cannot be responsible for minority voters' inability to elect its candidates. [Footnote 17] Cf. Rogers, chanrobles.com-red
Finally, we observe that the usual predictability of the majority's success distinguishes structural dilution from the mere loss of an occasional election. Cf. Davis v. Bandemer, post at 478 U. S. 131-133, 478 U. S. 139-140 (opinion of WHITE, J.); Bolden, supra, at 446 U. S. 111, n. 7 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting); Whitcomb, supra, at 403 U. S. 153. See also Blacksher & Menefee 57, n. 333; Note, Geometry and Geography: Racial Gerrymandering and the Voting Rights Act, 94 Yale L.J. 189, 200, n. 66 (1984) (hereinafter Note, Geometry and Geography). chanrobles.com-red
The investigation conducted by the District Court into the question of racial bloc voting credited some testimony of lay witnesses, but relied principally on statistical evidence presented by appellees' expert witnesses, in particular that offered by Dr. Bernard Grofman. Dr. Grofman collected and evaluated data from 53 General Assembly primary and general elections involving black candidacies. These elections were held over a period of three different election years in the six originally challenged multimember districts. [Footnote 19] Dr. Grofman subjected the data to two complementary methods of analysis -- extreme case analysis and bivariate ecological chanrobles.com-red
The court's initial consideration of these data took the form of a three-part inquiry: did the data reveal any correlation between the race of the voter and the selection of certain candidates; was the revealed correlation statistically significant; and was the difference in black and white voting patterns "substantively significant"? The District Court found that blacks and whites generally preferred different candidates and, on that basis, found voting in the districts to be racially correlated. [Footnote 21] The court accepted Dr. Grofman's expert opinion that the correlation between the race of the voter and the voter's choice of certain candidates was statistically significant. [Footnote 22] Finally, adopting Dr. Grofman's terminology, see chanrobles.com-red
North Carolina and the United States argue that the test used by the District Court to determine whether voting patterns in the disputed districts are racially polarized to an extent cognizable under § 2 will lead to results that are inconsistent with congressional intent. North Carolina maintains chanrobles.com-red
The Senate Report states that the "extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is racially polarized," S.Rep. at 29, is relevant to a vote dilution claim. Further, courts and commentators agree that racial bloc voting is a key element of a vote dilution claim. See, e.g., Escambia County, Fla., 748 F.2d 1043; United States v. Marengo County Comm'n, 731 F.2d 1546, 1566 (CA11), appeal dism'd and cert. denied, 469 U.S. 976 (1984); Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209, 223 (CA5 1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 951 (1980); Johnson v. Halifax County, 594 F.Supp. 161, 170 (EDNC 1984); Blacksher & Menefee; Engstrom & Wildgen, 465, 469; Parker 107; Note, Geometry and Geography 199. Because, as we explain below, the extent of bloc voting necessary to demonstrate that a minority's ability to elect its preferred representatives is impaired varies according to several factual circumstances, the degree of bloc voting which constitutes the threshold of legal significance will vary chanrobles.com-red
The purpose of inquiring into the existence of racially polarized voting is twofold: to ascertain whether minority group members constitute a politically cohesive unit and to determine whether whites vote sufficiently as a bloc usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidates. See supra, at 478 U. S. 48-51. Thus, the question whether a given district experiences legally significant racially polarized voting requires discrete inquiries into minority and white voting practices. A showing that a significant number of minority group members usually vote for the same candidates is one way of proving the political cohesiveness necessary to a vote dilution claim, Blacksher & Menefee 59-60, and n. 344, and, consequently, establishes minority bloc voting within the context of § 2. And, in general, a white bloc vote that normally will defeat the combined strength of minority support plus white "crossover" votes rises to the level of legally significant white bloc voting. Id. at 60. The amount of white bloc voting that can generally "minimize or cancel," S.Rep. at 28; Regester, 412 U.S. at 412 U. S. 765, black voters' ability to elect representatives of their choice, however, will vary from district to district according to a number of factors, including the nature of the allegedly dilutive electoral mechanism; the presence or absence of other potentially dilutive electoral devices, such as majority vote requirements, designated posts, and prohibitions against bullet voting; the percentage of registered voters in the district who are members of the minority group; the size of the district; and, in multimember districts, the number of seats open and the number of candidates in the field. [Footnote 24] See, e.g., Butler 874-876; Davidson 5; Jones, The Impact of Local Election Systems on Black Political Representation, 11 Urb.Aff.Q. 345 (1976); United States Commission chanrobles.com-red
As must be apparent, the degree of racial bloc voting that is cognizable as an element of a § 2 vote dilution claim will chanrobles.com-red
The District Court's findings concerning black support for black candidates in the five multimember districts at issue chanrobles.com-red
here clearly establish the political cohesiveness of black voters. As is apparent from the District Court's tabulated findings, reproduced in 478 U. S. 80, black voters' support for black candidates was overwhelming in almost every election. In all but 5 of 16 primary elections, black support for black candidates ranged between 71% and 92%; and in the general elections, black support for black Democratic candidates ranged between 87% and 96%.
In sharp contrast to its findings of strong black support for black candidates, the District Court found that a substantial majority of white voters would rarely, if ever, vote for a black candidate. In the primary elections, white support for black candidates ranged between 8% and 50%, and in the general elections it ranged between 28% and 49%. See ibid. The court also determined that, on average, 81.7% of white voters did not vote for any black candidate in the primary elections. In the general elections, white voters almost always ranked black candidates either last or next to last in the multicandidate field, except in heavily Democratic areas where white voters consistently ranked black candidates last among the Democrats, if not last or next to last among all candidates. The court further observed that approximately two-thirds of white voters did not vote for black candidates in general elections, even after the candidate had won the Democratic primary and the choice was to vote for a Republican or for no one. [Footnote 28] chanrobles.com-red
While the District Court did not state expressly that the percentage of whites who refused to vote for black candidates in the contested districts would, in the usual course of events, result in the defeat of the minority's candidates, that conclusion is apparent both from the court's factual findings and from the rest of its analysis. First, with the exception of House District 23, see infra at 478 U. S. 77, the trial court's findings clearly show that black voters have enjoyed only minimal and sporadic success in electing representatives of their choice. See 478 U. S. 82. Second, where black candidates won elections, the court closely examined the circumstances of those elections before concluding that the success of these blacks did not negate other evidence, derived from all of the elections studied in each district, that legally significant racially polarized voting exists in each district. For example, the court took account of the benefits incumbency and running essentially unopposed conferred on some of the successful black candidates, [Footnote 29] as well as of the chanrobles.com-red
North Carolina and the United States also contest the evidence upon which the District Court relied in finding that voting patterns in the challenged districts were racially polarized. They argue that the term "racially polarized voting" must, as a matter of law, refer to voting patterns for which the principal cause is race. They contend that the District Court utilized a legally incorrect definition of racially polarized voting by relying on bivariate statistical analyses which merely demonstrated a correlation between the race of the voter and the level of voter support for certain candidates, but which did not prove that race was the primary determinant of voters' choices. According to appellants and the United States, only multiple regression analysis, which can take account of other variables which might also explain voters' choices, such as "party affiliation, age, religion, income[,] incumbency, education, campaign expenditures," Brief for chanrobles.com-red
Whether appellants and the United States believe that it is the voter's race or the candidate's race that must be the primary determinant of the voter's choice is unclear; indeed, their catalogs of relevant variables suggest both. [Footnote 32] Age, religion, income, and education seem most relevant to the voter; incumbency, campaign expenditures, name identification, and media use are pertinent to the candidate; and party affiliation could refer both to the voter and the candidate. In either case, we disagree: for purposes of § 2, the legal concept of racially polarized voting incorporates neither causation nor intent. It means simply that the race of voters correlates with the selection of a certain candidate or candidates; that is, it refers to the situation where different races (or minority language groups) vote in blocs for different candidates. Grofman, Migalski, & Noviello 203. As we demonstrate infra, appellants' theory of racially polarized voting would thwart the goals Congress sought to achieve when it amended § 2, and would prevent courts from performing the "functional" analysis of the political process, S.Rep. at 30, n. 119, and the "searching practical evaluation of the past chanrobles.com-red
The irrelevance to a § 2 inquiry of the reasons why black and white voters vote differently supports, by itself, our rejection of appellants' theory of racially polarized voting. However, their theory contains other equally serious flaws chanrobles.com-red
The first problem with this argument is that it ignores the fact that members of geographically insular racial and ethnic groups frequently share socioeconomic characteristics, such as income level, employment status, amount of education, housing and other living conditions, religion, language, and so forth. See, e.g., Butler 902 (Minority group "members' shared concerns, including political ones, are . . . a function of group status, and as such are largely involuntary. . . . As a group blacks are concerned, for example, with police brutality, substandard housing, unemployment, etc., because these problems fall disproportionately upon the group"); S. Verba & N. Nie, Participation in America 151-152 (1972) ("Socioeconomic status . . . is closely related to race. Blacks in American society are likely to be in lower-status jobs than whites, to have less education, and to have lower incomes"). Where such characteristics are shared, race or ethnic group not only denotes color or place of origin, it also functions as a shorthand notation for common social and economic characteristics. Appellants' definition of racially polarized voting is even more pernicious where shared characteristics are causally related to race or ethnicity. The opportunity to achieve high employment status and income, for example, is often influenced by the presence or absence of racial or ethnic discrimination. A definition of racially polarized voting which chanrobles.com-red
To illustrate, assume a racially mixed, urban multimember district in which blacks and whites possess the same socioeconomic characteristics that the record in this case attributes to blacks and whites in Halifax County, a part of Senate District 2. The annual mean income for blacks in this district is $10,465, and 47.8% of the black community lives in poverty. More than half -- 51.5% -- of black adults over the age of 25 have only an eighth-grade education or less. Just over half of black citizens reside in their own homes; 48.9% live in rental units. And almost a third of all black households are without a car. In contrast, only 12.6% of the whites in the district live below the poverty line. Whites enjoy a mean income of $19,042. White residents are better educated than blacks -- only 25.6% of whites over the age of 25 have only an eighth-grade education or less. Furthermore, only 26.2% of whites live in rental units, and only 10.2% live in households with no vehicle available. 1 App. Ex-44. As is the case in Senate District 2, blacks in this chanrobles.com-red
Congress could not have intended that courts employ this definition of racial bloc voting. First, this definition leads to results that are inconsistent with the effects test adopted by Congress when it amended § 2 and with the Senate Report's admonition that courts take a "functional" view of the political process, S.Rep. 30, n. 119, and conduct a searching and practical evaluation of reality. Id. at 30. A test for racially polarized voting that denies the fact that race and socioeconomic characteristics are often closely correlated permits neither a practical evaluation of reality nor a functional analysis of vote dilution. And, contrary to Congress' intent in adopting the "results test," appellants' proposed definition could result in the inability of minority voters to establish a critical chanrobles.com-red
First, both the language of § 2 and a functional understanding of the phenomenon of vote dilution mandate the conclusion that the race of the candidate per se is irrelevant to racial bloc voting analysis. Section 2(b) states that a violation is established if it can be shown that members of a protected minority group "have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to . . . elect representatives of their choice." chanrobles.com-red
An understanding of how vote dilution through submergence in a white majority works leads to the same conclusion. The essence of a submergence claim is that minority group members prefer certain candidates whom they could elect were it not for the interaction of the challenged electoral law or structure with a white majority that votes as a significant bloc for different candidates. Thus, as we explained in Part III, supra, the existence of racial bloc voting is relevant to a vote dilution claim in two ways. Bloc voting by blacks tends to prove that the black community is politically cohesive, that is, it shows that blacks prefer certain candidates whom they could elect in a single-member, black majority district. Bloc voting by a white majority tends to prove that blacks will generally be unable to elect representatives of their choice. Clearly, only the race of the voter, not the race of the candidate, is relevant to vote dilution analysis. See, e.g., Blacksher & Menefee 59-60; Grofman, Should Representatives be Typical?, in Representation and Redistricting Issues 98; Note, Geometry and Geography 207. chanrobles.com-red
S.Rep. at 29 (footnote omitted), is a factor which may be probative of unequal opportunity to participate in the political process and to elect representatives. Courts and commentators have recognized further that candidates generally must spend more money in order to win chanrobles.com-red
election in a multimember district than in a single-member district. See, e.g., Graves v. Barnes, 343 F.Supp. 704, 720-721 (WD Tex.1972), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. White v. Regester, supra. Berry & Dye 88; Davidson & Fraga, Nonpartisan Slating Groups in an At-Large Setting, in Minority Vote Dilution 122-123; Derfner 554, n. 126; Jewell 131; Karnig, Black Representation on City Councils, 12 Urb.Aff.Q. 223, 230 (1976). If, because of inferior education and poor employment opportunities, blacks earn less than whites, they will not be able to provide the candidates of their choice with the same level of financial support that whites can provide theirs. Thus, electoral losses by candidates preferred by the black community may well be attributable in part to the fact that their white opponents outspent them. But the fact is that, in this instance, the economic effects of prior discrimination have combined with the multimember electoral structure to afford blacks less opportunity than whites to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. It would be both anomalous and inconsistent with congressional intent to hold that, on the one hand, the effects of past discrimination which hinder blacks' ability to participate in the political process tend to prove a § 2 violation, while holding on the other hand that, where these same effects of past discrimination deter whites from voting for blacks, blacks cannot make out a crucial element of a vote dilution claim. Accord, Escambia County, 748 F.2d 1043 ("[T]he failure of the blacks to solicit white votes may be caused by the effects of past discrimination'") (quoting United States v. Dallas County Comm'n, 739 F.2d 1529, 1536 (CA11 1984)); United States v. Marengo County Comm'n, 731 F.2d 1567.
Finally, we reject the suggestion that racially polarized voting refers only to white bloc voting which is caused by chanrobles.com-red
S.Rep. at 36. The Committee found the testimony of Dr. Arthur S. chanrobles.com-red
A second reason Congress rejected the old intent test was that, in most cases, it placed an "inordinately difficult burden" on § 2 plaintiffs. Ibid. The new intent test would be equally, if not more, burdensome. In order to prove that a specific factor -- racial hostility -- determined white voters' ballots, it would be necessary to demonstrate that other potentially relevant causal factors, such as socioeconomic characteristics and candidate expenditures, do not correlate better than racial animosity with white voting behavior. As one commentator has explained: chanrobles.com-red
Id. at 37. We therefore decline to adopt such a requirement. chanrobles.com-red
North Carolina and the United States maintain that the District Court failed to accord the proper weight to the success of some black candidates in the challenged districts. Black residents of these districts, they point out, achieved improved representation in the 1982 General Assembly election. [Footnote 35] They also note that blacks in House District 23 have enjoyed proportional representation consistently since 1973, and that blacks in the other districts have occasionally enjoyed nearly proportional representation. [Footnote 36] This electoral chanrobles.com-red
Section 2(b) provides that "[t]he extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office . . . is one circumstance which may be considered." 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b). The Senate Committee Report also identifies the extent to which minority candidates have succeeded as a pertinent factor. S.Rep. at 29. However, the Senate Report expressly states that "the election of a few minority candidates does not necessarily foreclose the possibility of dilution of the black vote,'" noting that, if it did, "the possibility exists that the majority citizens might evade [§ 2] by manipulating the election of a `safe' minority candidate." Id. at 29, n. 115, quoting Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1307 (CA5 1973) (en banc), aff'd sub nom. East Carroll Parish School Board v. Marshall, 424 U. S. 636 (1976) (per curiam). The Senate Committee decided, instead, to "require an independent consideration of the record." S.Rep. at 29, n. 115. The Senate Report also emphasizes that the question whether "the political processes are `equally open' depends upon a searching practical evaluation of the `past chanrobles.com-red
Nothing in the statute or its legislative history prohibited the court from viewing with some caution black candidates' success in the 1982 election, and from deciding on the basis of all the relevant circumstances to accord greater weight to blacks' relative lack of success over the course of several recent elections. Consequently, we hold that the District Court did not err, as a matter of law, in refusing to treat the fact that some black candidates have succeeded as dispositive of appellees' § 2 claim. Where multimember districting generally works to dilute the minority vote, it cannot be defended on the ground that it sporadically and serendipitously benefits minority voters. chanrobles.com-red
As an initial matter, both North Carolina and the United States contend that the District Court's ultimate conclusion that the challenged multimember districts operate to dilute chanrobles.com-red
black citizens' votes is a mixed question of law and fact subject to de novo review on appeal. In support of their proposed standard of review, they rely primarily on 466 U. S. 622-627; City of Rome v. United States, 446 U. S. 156, 446 U. S. 183 (1980); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. at 412 U. S. 765-770. Cf. Anderson v. Bessemer City,@ 470 U. S. 564, 470 U. S. 573 (1985).
Id. at 412 U. S. 769-770. Quoting this passage from Regester with approval, we expressly held in Rogers v. Lodge, supra, that the question whether an at-large election system was maintained for discriminatory purposes and subsidiary issues, which include whether that system had the effect of diluting the minority vote, were questions of fact, reviewable under Rule 52(a)'s chanrobles.com-red
See also Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1307 ("[W]e cannot endorse the view that the success of black candidates at the polls necessarily forecloses the possibility of dilution of the black vote. Such success might, on occasion, be attributable to the work of politicians, who, apprehending that the support of a black candidate would be politically expedient, campaign to insure his election. Or such success might be attributable to political support motivated by different considerations -- namely that election of a black candidate will thwart successful challenges to electoral schemes on dilution grounds. In either situation, a candidate could be elected despite the relative political backwardness of black residents in the electoral district").
590 F.Supp. at 369-371. chanrobles.com-red
I join Parts I, II, III-A, III-B, IV-A, and V of the Court's opinion, and agree with JUSTICE BRENNAN's opinion as to Part IV-B. I disagree with Part III-C of JUSTICE BRENNAN's opinion. chanrobles.com-red
In this case, we are called upon to construe § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended June 29, 1982. Amended § 2 is intended to codify the "results" test employed in Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124 (1971), and White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755 (1973), and to reject the "intent" test propounded in the plurality opinion in Mobile v. Bolden, 446 chanrobles.com-red
The Court attempts to resolve all these difficulties today. First, the Court supplies definitions of racial bloc voting and minority voting strength that will apparently be applicable in all cases, and that will dictate the structure of vote dilution litigation. Second, the Court adopts a test, based on the chanrobles.com-red
Alternatively, it would usually be possible to draw four single-member districts in two of which black voters constituted much narrower majorities of about 60%. The black chanrobles.com-red
Finally, it would be possible to elect all four representatives in a single at-large election in which each voter could vote for four candidates. Under this scheme, white voters could elect all the representatives even if black voters turned out in large numbers and voted for one and only one candidate. To illustrate, if only four white candidates ran, and each received approximately equal support from white voters, each would receive about 700 votes, whereas black voters could cast no more than 300 votes for any one candidate. If, on the other hand, eight white candidates ran, and white votes were distributed less evenly, so that the five least favored white candidates received fewer than 300 votes while three others received 400 or more, it would be feasible for blacks to elect one representative with 300 votes, even without substantial white support. If even 25% of the white voters chanrobles.com-red
Although § 2 does not speak in terms of "vote dilution," I agree with the Court that proof of vote dilution can establish a violation of § 2 as amended. The phrase "vote dilution," in the legal sense, simply refers to the impermissible discriminatory effect that a multimember or other districting plan has when it operates "to cancel out or minimize the voting strength of racial groups." White, 412 U.S. at 412 U. S. 765. See also Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433, 379 U. S. 439 (1965). This definition, however, conceals some very formidable difficulties. Is the "voting strength" of a racial group to be assessed solely chanrobles.com-red
Several possible measures of "undiluted" minority voting strength suggest themselves. First, a court could simply use proportionality as its guide: if the minority group constituted 30% of the voters in a given area, the court would regard the minority group as having the potential to elect 30% chanrobles.com-red
Ante at 478 U. S. 50. If not, apparently the minority group has no cognizable claim that its ability to elect the representatives of its choice has been impaired. [Footnote 2/1] Second, "the minority group must be able chanrobles.com-red
The Court's definition of the elements of a vote dilution claim is simple and invariable: a court should calculate minority voting strength by assuming that the minority group is concentrated in a single-member district in which it constitutes a voting majority. Where the minority group is not large enough, geographically concentrated enough, or politically cohesive enough for this to be possible, the minority group's claim fails. Where the minority group meets these requirements, the representatives that it could elect in the hypothetical district or districts in which it constitutes a chanrobles.com-red
To appreciate the implications of this approach, it is useful to return to the illustration of a town with four council representatives given above. Under the Court's approach, if the chanrobles.com-red
As shaped by the Court today, then, the basic contours of a vote dilution claim require no reference to most of the "Zimmer factors" that were developed by the Fifth Circuit to implement White's results test, and which were highlighted in the Senate Report. S.Rep. at 28-29; see Zimmer v. McKeithen, chanrobles.com-red
ibid., or "the use of overt or subtle racial appeals in political campaigns," ibid., or that "elected officials are unresponsive to the particularized needs of the members of the minority group." Ibid. Of course, these other factors may be supportive of such a claim, because they may strengthen a court's confidence that minority voters will be unable to overcome the relative disadvantage at which they are placed by a particular districting plan, or suggest a more general lack of opportunity to participate in the political process. But the fact remains that electoral success has now emerged, under the Court's standard, as the linchpin of vote dilution claims, and that the elements of a vote dilution claim create an entitlement to roughly proportional representation within the framework of single-member districts. chanrobles.com-red
Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F.Supp. 345, 358-359 (EDNC 1984). The Court goes well beyond simply sustaining the District Court's decision to employ this measure of undiluted minority voting strength as a reasonable one that is consistent with § 2. In my view, we should refrain from deciding in this case whether a court must invariably posit as its measure of "undiluted" minority voting strength single-member districts in which minority group members constitute a majority. There is substantial doubt that Congress intended "undiluted minority voting strength" to mean "maximum feasible minority voting strength." Even if that is the appropriate definition in some circumstances, there is no indication that Congress intended to mandate a single, universally applicable chanrobles.com-red
I believe appellants' characterization of the District Court's holding is incorrect. In my view, the District Court concluded that there was a severe diminution in the prospects for black electoral success in each of the challenged districts, as compared to single-member districts in which blacks could constitute a majority, and that this severe diminution was, in large part, attributable to the interaction of the multimember form of the district with persistent racial bloc voting on the part of the white majorities in those districts. See 590 F.Supp. at 372. [Footnote 2/2] The District Court attached great weight chanrobles.com-red
In enacting § 2, Congress codified the "results" test this Court had employed, as an interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, in White and Whitcomb. The factors developed by the Fifth Circuit and relied on by the Senate Report simply fill in the contours of the "results" test as described in those decisions, and do not purport to redefine or alter the ultimate showing of discriminatory effect required by Whitcomb and White. In my view, therefore, it is to Whitcomb and White that we should look in the first instance in determining how great an impairment of minority voting strength is required to establish vote dilution in violation of § 2. chanrobles.com-red
42 U.S.C. § 1973 (emphasis added). The court should not focus solely on the minority group's ability to elect representatives of its choice. Whatever measure of undiluted minority voting strength the court employs in connection with evaluating the presence or absence of minority electoral success, it should also bear in mind that "the power to influence the political process is not limited to winning elections." Davis v. Bandemer, post at 478 U. S. 132. Of course, the relative lack of minority electoral success under a challenged plan, when compared with the success that would be predicted under the measure of undiluted minority voting strength the court is employing, can constitute powerful evidence of vote dilution. Moreover, the minority group may, in fact, lack access to or influence upon representatives it did not support as candidates. Cf. Davis v. Bandemer, post at 478 U. S. 169-170 (POWELL, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Nonetheless, a reviewing court should be required to find more than simply that the minority group does not usually attain an undiluted measure of electoral success. The court must find that even substantial minority success will be highly infrequent chanrobles.com-red
I believe Congress also intended that explanations of the reasons why white voters rejected minority candidates would be probative of the likelihood that candidates elected without decisive minority support would be willing to take the minority's interests into account. In a community that is polarized along racial lines, racial hostility may bar these and other indirect avenues of political influence to a much greater extent than in a community where racial animosity is absent although the interests of racial groups diverge. Indeed, the chanrobles.com-red
In this case, as the Court grudgingly acknowledges, the District Court clearly erred in aggregating data from all of the challenged districts, and then relying on the fact that on average, 81.7% of white voters did not vote for any black candidate in the primary elections selected for study. Ante at 478 U. S. 59-60, n. 28. Although Senate District 22 encompasses House District 36, with that exception the districts at issue in this case are distributed throughout the State of North Carolina. White calls for "an intensely local appraisal of the design and impact of the . . . multimember district," 412 U.S. at 412 U. S. 769-770, and racial voting statistics from one district are ordinarily irrelevant in assessing the totality of the circumstances in another district. In view of the specific evidence from each district that the District Court also considered, however, I cannot say that its conclusion that there was severe racial bloc voting was clearly erroneous with regard to any of the challenged districts. Except in House District 23, where racial bloc voting did not prevent sustained and virtually chanrobles.com-red
In my view, the District Court erred in assessing the extent of black electoral success in House District 39 and Senate District 22, as well as in House District 23, where the Court acknowledges error. As the evidence summarized by the Court in table form shows, ante at 82, 478 U. S. the degree of black electoral success differed widely in the seven originally contested districts. In House District 8 and Senate District 2, neither of which is contested in this Court, no black candidate had ever been elected to the offices in question. In House District 21 and House District 36, the only instances of black electoral success came in the two most recent elections, one of which took place during the pendency of this litigation. By contrast, in House District 39 and Senate District 22, black successes, although intermittent, dated back to 1974, and a black candidate had been elected in each chanrobles.com-red
Zimmer's caveat against necessarily foreclosing a vote dilution claim on the basis of isolated black successes, 485 F.2d 1307; see S.Rep. at 29, n. 115, cannot be pressed this far. Indeed, the 23 Court of Appeals decisions on which the Senate Report relied, and which are the best evidence of the scope of this caveat, contain no example of minority electoral success that even remotely approximates the consistent, decade-long pattern in District 23. See, e.g., Turner v. McKeithen, 490 F.2d 191 (CA5 1973) (no black candidates elected); Wallace v. House, 515 F.2d 619 (CA5 1975) (one black candidate elected), vacated on other grounds, 425 U.S. 947 (1976).
I do not propose that consistent and virtually proportional minority electoral success should always, as a matter of law, bar finding a § 2 violation. But, as a general rule, such success is entitled to great weight in evaluating whether a challenged electoral mechanism has, on the totality of the circumstances, operated to deny black voters an equal opportunity to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. With respect to House District 23, the District Court's failure to accord black electoral success such chanrobles.com-red
Compromise is essential to much if not most major federal legislation, and confidence that the federal courts will enforce such compromises is indispensable to their creation. I believe that the Court today strikes a different balance than Congress intended to when it codified the results test and disclaimed any right to proportional representation under § 2. For that reason, I join the Court's judgment, but not its opinion. chanrobles.com-red
The Court identifies the reason why the success of one black candidate in the elections in 1978, 1980, and 1982 is not chanrobles.com-red
To paraphrase the Court's conclusion about the other districts, ibid., I cannot say that the District Court, composed of local judges who are well acquainted with the political realities of the State, clearly erred in concluding that use of a multimember electoral structure has caused black voters in House District 23 to have less opportunity than white voters to elect representatives of their choice. [Footnote 3/4] Accordingly, I concur chanrobles.com-red