Source: http://openjurist.org/213/f2d/748/national-labor-relations-board-v-thayer-co
Timestamp: 2017-07-27 19:28:47
Document Index: 543033117

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 158', '§ 157', '§ 8', '§ 160', '§ 10', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 158', '§ 9', '§ 7']

213 F2d 748 National Labor Relations Board v. Thayer Co | OpenJurist
213 F. 2d 748 - National Labor Relations Board v. Thayer Co HomeFederal Reporter, Second Series 213 F.2d.
213 F2d 748 National Labor Relations Board v. Thayer Co 213 F.2d 748
THAYER CO. et al.
Norton J. Come, Atty., N. L. R. B., Washington, D. C. (George J. Bott, Gen. Counsel, David P. Findling, Associate Gen. Counsel, A. Norman Somers, Asst. Gen. Counsel, N. L. R. B., Washington, D. C., and Irving M. Herman, Atty., N. L. R. B., New York City, with him on the brief), for petitioner.
With this background we turn to the question of what effect the state court injunction had on the propriety of the Board's order reinstating the discharged pickets. It must be remembered that the employees were engaged in a strike provoked by unfair labor practices. This means, of course, that under ordinary circumstances if such strikers apply for their jobs at the termination of the strike, they must be returned to their old positions irrespective of the effect that such reinstatement may have upon the tenure of new employees hired as replacements. See, e.g., N. L. R. B. v. Remington Rand, Inc., 2 Cir., 1942, 130 F.2d 919, 927, 928. Where a strike is not caused by an unfair labor practice but is economic in nature, the employer need not discharge replacements in order to rehire strikers. N. L. R. B. v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 1938, 304 U.S. 333, 345, 58 S.Ct. 904, 82 L.Ed. 1381; N. L. R. B. v. Jackson Press, Inc., 7 Cir., 1953, 201 F.2d 541, 546. However, even in the situation of an economic strike, to avoid committing an 8(a) (1)2 unfair labor practice, the employer generally must rehire those strikers whose positions have not been filled and must refrain from disciplining them for the concerted activity. Home Beneficial Life Ins. Co., Inc. v. N. L. R. B., 4 Cir., 1947, 159 F.2d 280; General Electric Co., 80 N. L. R. B. 174 (1948).
Turning to point (1), perhaps we may infer from the Briggs-Stratton case10 that it would be violative of the supremacy clause of the Constitution for a state court to enjoin employee activity protected under § 7. If that inference is correct, there is some merit to this aspect of the respondents' argument, for the Supreme Court has held that the States are free, at least to some extent, to regulate the means or methods by which a strike is conducted. Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 1942, 315 U.S. 740, 62 S.Ct. 820, 86 L.Ed. 1154; see Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers Local Union No. 776, 1953, 346 U.S. 485, 488, 74 S.Ct. 161. Putting Allen-Bradley together with Briggs-Stratton, it would follow that when a state tribunal enjoins a strike because the strike as conducted constitutes an illegal breach of the peace, the state court's determination is tantamount to a finding that the employees by their conduct have lost the protection of § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act.
Be that as it may, if it were true that the Board has power to order reinstatement only after finding that the strike and the picketing are protected under § 7, a holding that the Board is bound by the findings in the state injunction proceeding might perhaps be justified (this we do not have to decide), for it might be suggested that the public interest would hardly be benefited by relitigating in the Board proceedings the precise question which was determined in the state tribunal, and which might have been brought before the Supreme Court of the United States for review on certiorari. Giving effect to the state determination, on the other hand, has the possible advantage of allowing the participants to act in reliance upon the earlier decision and might facilitate the re-establishment of labor stability in the disrupted plant. See Developments in the Law &#x2014; Res Judicata, 65 Harv.L.Rev. 818 at 871 (1952).
The Board came to the conclusion that the strike and picketing were protected under § 7, and thereupon ordered reinstatement. That holding with respect to § 7 constitutes a ruling of law based upon statutory construction which we are free to examine without deference to the Board's administrative expertness. Inherent in the Board's order, however, is the implied determination that, if the picketing employees were protected by § 7, their reinstatement would effectuate the policies of the statute;13 and in respect to such a determination, we would defer to the Board for two reasons: (1) This is a nice question of the appropriateness of the remedy confided primarily to Board determination. (2) It ordinarily may be assumed that the Board, as a part of the process of determining whether reinstatement would effectuate the policies of the Act, will balance the severity of the employer's unfair labor practice which provoked the industrial disturbance against whatever employee misconduct may have occurred in the course of the strike. Thus in reaching its decision the Board weighs two groups of facts. Such a decision has little value as a precedent in a subsequent Labor Board case because of the nuances of fact inevitable in the later situation. Therefore, if this court should conclude that the strike activity was not protected conduct under § 7, our disposition should be to remand the case to the Board in order to allow that body to make the primary administrative determination &#x2014; which it has not yet made &#x2014; whether under the circumstances the non-Section 7 activity was cause for discharge, and if not whether reinstatement is an appropriate remedy under the circumstances.14
Certain strikers, however, participated in activities which we find were coercive, and therefore not within the scope of § 7. The trial examiner, in recommending the reinstatement of such strikers, took into consideration the fact that "the strike resulted from the flagrant unfair labor practices of Respondent Companies". This seems perfectly proper &#x2014; not in justifying the employees' conduct or in concluding that their action was protected under § 7 &#x2014; but in deciding whether or not their discharge was "for cause" and whether their reinstatement would effectuate the policies of the Act.
When met with a refusal Salny stated: "I make demand for it on the ground that the statement which was given &#x2014; I want to cross-examine this witness to demonstrate that the statement he gave a year ago and his evidence that he gave to-day are not the same."
Furthermore, there is nothing in such cases as Gordon v. United States, 1953, 344 U.S. 414, 73 S.Ct. 369, 97 L.Ed. 447, or United States v. Krulewitch, 2 Cir., 1944, 145 F.2d 76, 156 A.L.R. 337, to support respondents' position, for counsel for respondents laid no foundation whatever before he demanded the pretrial statements given by witnesses to the general counsel's investigators. His simple assertion that the statements, which were not employed during the hearing by Mr. Ramsey, were to be used for the purpose of cross-examination, hardly suffices. Cf. Goldman v. United States, 1942, 316 U.S. 129, 62 S.Ct. 993, 86 L.Ed. 1322; Lennon v. United States, 8 Cir., 1927, 20 F.2d 490.
1. Thayer Co. v. Binnall, 1950, 326 Mass. 467, 95 N.E.2d 193.
2. 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(a) (1): "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer &#x2014; to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7".
3. 29 U.S.C.A. § 157: "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities * * *."
4. This is a paraphrase of the language of § 8(a) (1) of the Act. The employer could not be guilty of any of the other four employer unfair labor practices for refusing to reinstate employees because they engaged in a strike. Section 8(a) (2) makes it an unfair practice for an employer "to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization * * *." Section 8(a) (3) is applicable only where the discrimination is to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization. Section 8(a) (4) makes it illegal for an employer "to * * * discriminate against an employee because he has filed charges or given testimony under this Act". And Section 8(a) (5) imposes a duty on the employer to bargain collectively.
5. "* * * If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall be of the opinion that any person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any * * * unfair labor practice, then the Board shall * * * cause to be served on such person an order requiring such person to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this subchapter: * * * provided fur- ther * * * No order of the Board shall require the reinstatement of any individual as an employee who has been suspended or discharged, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such individual was suspended or discharged for cause. * * *" 29 U.S.C.A. § 160(c).
6. The "for cause" proviso added to § 10 (c) in 1947 is applicable where the employee is engaged in collective action as well as where he acts alone, H.R.Rep.No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 38-39; and it would seem that where an employee is discharged because he engaged in collective action and the discharge is found to be "for cause", the action is not the type protected under § 7. N. L. R. B. v. Local Union No. 1229, Int. Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 1953, 346 U.S. 464, 74 S.Ct. 172. However, a determination that an employee is not engaged in a § 7 activity does not necessarily mean that, if he is discharged for his participation in the unprotected action, the discharge is "for cause". That depends on the surrounding circumstances. What is cause in one situation may not be in another.
7. See N. L. R. B. v. Elkland Leather Co., Inc., 3 Cir., 1940, 114 F.2d 221, certiorari denied, 1940, 311 U.S. 705, 61 S.Ct. 170, 85 L.Ed. 457.
8. This analytical distinction has been overlooked on many occasions. Professor Cox states: "The distinction was overlooked by the House managers in reporting the conference agreement on the Labor Management Relations Act 1947, H. R.Rep.No.510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 38-39 (1947) and unfortunately it has not always been observed by the Board." Cox, The Right to Engage in Concerted Activities, 26 Ind.L.J. 319 at 324, note 24 (1951).
9. Thayer Co. v. Binnall, 1950, 326 Mass. 467, 95 N.E.2d 193.
10. International Union UAWA, AFL v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 1949, 336 U.S. 245, 69 S.Ct. 516, 522, 93 L.Ed. 651. The case held that a state had power to control "recurrent and unannounced stoppage of work." To reach this result the court found it necessary to decide that the collective action was not concerted activity within the meaning of § 7 of the NLRA. The tone, mood and language of the opinion strongly suggest that, if the work stoppages were protected under § 7, the state action would have been unconstitutional. Cf. Hill v. State of Florida, 1945, 325 U.S. 538, 65 S.Ct. 1373, 89 L.Ed. 1782.
11. But cf. New York State Labor Relations Board v. Holland Laundry, Inc., 1945, 294 N.Y. 480, 63 N.E.2d 68, 161 A.L.R. 802, criticized, perhaps too mildly, by Professor Jaffe in his article, The Public Right Dogma in Labor Board Cases, 59 Harv.L.Rev. 720, 743 (1946).
12. "Like the Trial Examiner, we find that the strike voted on January 25, and commenced on January 26 and 27, 1949, was an unfair labor practice strike to protest these discriminatory discharges of January 10-11. We further find that the strikers are entitled to reinstatement, unless there is merit to any of the Respondent Companies several contentions relating to the question of whether or not the strike and the strike conduct constituted protected concerted activity." H. N. Thayer Co., 99 N. L. R. B. 1122, 1128 (1952).
13. Of course if the pickets were engaged in § 7 activities, their discharge for such activities cannot be discharge for cause.
14. Such a determination could be reviewed subsequently in this court.
15. 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(b) (1) (A).
16. "Although section 8(b) regulates only the conduct of labor organizations and section 7 deals with the rights of employees, it seems plain that the group activities which section 8(b) forbids a labor organization to lead must fall outside the protection of section 7 when employees engage in them either with or without the direction of a union. To hold otherwise would disregard legislative history [H.R.Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 37-40 (1947)] and create an unwarranted anomaly." Cox, op. cit. supra at 325.
17. See Perry Norvell Co., 80 N. L. R. B. 225, 240 (1948).
18. See American News Co., Inc., 55 N. L. R. B. 1302 (1944); cf. Southern Steamship Co., v. N. L. R. B., 1942, 316 U.S. 31, 62 S.Ct. 886, 86 L.Ed. 1246.
19. Mass.Gen.Laws, C. 214, § 9A, as amended, provides that no state court may issue an injunction in a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute except after finding, among other things, "(e) That the public officers charged with the duty to protect the complainant's property are unable or unwilling to furnish adequate protection." It is clear on the Board's finding that such protection was afforded the respondents.
There are no other factors in the instant case which should take the strike or picketing outside the protection of § 7. Respondents have argued that the strike was in breach of a valid labor agreement. We agree with the Board that this is not so. Cf. National Licorice Co. v. N. L. R. B., 1940, 309 U.S. 350, 359-61, 60 S.Ct. 569, 84 L.Ed. 799; N. L. R. B. v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 1 Cir., 1941, 118 F.2d 874, 887, certiorari denied, 1941, 313 U.S. 595, 61 S.Ct. 1119, 85 L.Ed. 1549.
20. "In reaching the same conclusion as the Trial Examiner did, we have appraised each incident without regard to the length, nature, physical or psychological setting of the strike." H. N. Thayer Co., 99 N.L.R.B. 1122, 1133, note 37 (1952).
21. 29 C.F.R. 102.90, since renumbered 102.87 (17 F.R. 4983):
22. The letter indicated that Salny wished the statement for "the purpose of demonstrating to the Trial Examiner that the evidence which [Arsenault] had given was contradictory to and inconsistent with [his pre-trial statement]".
23. The letter went on to say that the rule is a "two-way street" so that the general counsel's attorney could not obtain statements given to Salny except on a prima facie showing that the testimony and the statement were contradictory.