Source: https://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/arizona/azdce/3:2012cv08251/745660/13
Timestamp: 2017-03-25 13:58:51
Document Index: 269078811

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 12', '§ 46', '§ 33', '§ 1601', '§ 1640', '§ 2601', '§ 2605', '§ 2607', '§ 2608']

ORDER, Defendants' motion to dismiss 8 is granted; Defendants' motion for summary disposition 9 is found to be moot; this case is dismissed with prejudice; the Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly for Cardin v. Wilmington Finance Incorporated et al :: Justia Dockets & Filings Log In
Cardin v. Wilmington Finance Incorporated et al
ORDER, Defendants' motion to dismiss 8 is granted; Defendants' motion for summary disposition 9 is found to be moot; this case is dismissed with prejudice; the Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly. Signed by Judge David G Campbell on 3/18/13.(REW)
No. CV-12-08251-PCT-DGC
Len Cardin,
Wilmington Finance, Inc., et al.,
Pro se Plaintiff Len Cardin filed a complaint alleging various causes of action
against Defendants relating to the alleged foreclosure and trustee sale of property located
at 2225 East Lockett Road, Flagstaff, Arizona 86004.
Wilmington Finance, Inc., Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., and Mortgage Electronic
Registration System (“MERS”) removed the action to federal court (Doc. 1) and have
filed a motion to dismiss (Doc. 8). In response, Plaintiff appears to have filed the report
of a forensic loan auditing firm. Doc. 10. Defendants filed a reply. Doc. 11. For the
reasons that follow, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
In the summer of 2007, Plaintiff Len Cardin borrowed $280,000 from Wilmington
secured by a Deed of Trust (“DOT”) that Plaintiff executed on property located at 2225
East Lockett Road, Flagstaff, Arizona 86004. Doc. 8 at 2. The DOT contained a
provision in which Plaintiff consented to a non-judicial foreclosure on the property if he
defaulted on the loan. Id. It also contained language anticipating that the loan could be
sold multiple times without notice to Plaintiff. Id.
On or about June 23, 2009, Ronald M. Horwitz, who had been appointed
successor trustee, executed a Notice of Trustee’s Sale (which was later cancelled).
Doc. 8 at 3.
current cause of action contesting various ways in which the DOT and Note were
transferred and assigned. Doc. 1-1 at 4-39.
Plaintiff does not appear to contest that he is in default, but he brought the
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The Court must construe the complaint liberally
since Plaintiff is proceeding pro se. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980).
In their motion, Defendants present several detailed arguments as to how they
believe each of Plaintiff’s claims fails to state a claim for relief. Doc. 8. Plaintiff’s
response is a photocopy of a forensic loan audit. Doc. 10. Local Rule of Civil Procedure
7.2(i) states that “if the unrepresented party or counsel does not serve and file the
required answering memoranda . . . such non-compliance may be deemed a consent to the
denial or granting of the motion and the Court may dispose of the motion summarily.”
Here, Plaintiff did nothing more than file an exhibit without comment. The exhibit does
not provide the Court with any additional legal arguments or reasons to deny the motion
to dismiss. When ruling on a motion to dismiss “the Court [is] not obligated to search for
legal theories not clearly laid on in Plaintiff’s response to the motion or his amended
complaint. Mansour v. Cal-Western Reconveyance Corp., No. CV-09-37-PHX-DGC,
2009 WL 2132695 at *3 (D. Ariz. Jul. 15, 2009). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s failure to
respond provides sufficient reason for the Court to grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
In light of Plaintiff’s status as a pro se litigant, however, the Court will consider the
merits of Defendants’ motion despite the fact that Plaintiff’s response has provided no
Merits of the Complaint.
Plaintiff’s first cause of action is for “lack of standing” to execute a trustee sale.
Doc. 1-1 at 17. He claims that Defendants cannot foreclose either because they do not
hold the note or because there were improprieties in the assignment of the note. Id.
Plaintiff’s arguments appear to be premised on the theory that in order to foreclose a
party must show possession of the original note and on the theory that Defendant MERS
does not have the authority to assign a deed of trust.
Defendants cite federal and Arizona case law rejecting the theory that custody of
the note is necessary for nonjudicial foreclosure. Hogan v. Wash. Mut. Bank, N.A., 277
P.3d 781, 783 (Ariz. 2012); Ruelas v. Sun Am. Mortg. Co., No. CV 12-01160-PHX-
NVW, 2012 WL 3277175 (D. Ariz. Aug. 9, 2012). Plaintiffs fail to show how their
claims regarding the inseparability of the note and DOT and MERS’s lack of capacity to
assign a note are distinct from cases that have rejected those theories. See Silving v.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 800 F. Supp. 2d 1055 (D. Ariz. Jul. 7, 2011); Blau v. Am.’s
Servicing Co., No. CV-08-773-PHX-MHM, 2009 WL 3174823 (D. Ariz. Sept. 29, 2009).
Accordingly, the Court finds that the first claim must be dismissed.
Plaintiff’s second claim alleges fraudulent concealment. Doc. 1-1 at 21-22. He
claims that Defendants concealed the fact that the note could be transferred into a pool
with other notes. In Arizona, fraudulent concealment claims are subject to a three-year
statute of limitations under A.R.S. § 12-543(3). The last date of any transfer of the note
was July 24, 2009, more than three years before this suit was filed. Doc. 8 at 7.
Accordingly, the claim is barred by the statute of limitations.
Plaintiff’s third claim alleges that Defendants misrepresented that they “were
entitled to exercise the power of sale provision contained in the Deed of Trust” and
“misrepresented that they are the ‘holder and owner’ of the note and the beneficiary of
the Deed of Trust.” Doc. 1-1 at 22-24. Plaintiff’s basis for asserting that Defendants do
not have power to do these things is another version of the show-me-the-note theory that
has been widely rejected. Additionally, a claim for fraud in the inducement must meet
the heightened pleading standards of Rule 9(b), and Plaintiff has not detailed the specific
statements upon which he relied. This claim must also be dismissed.
The fourth claim asserts intentional infliction of emotional distress. Doc. 1-1 at
Plaintiff claims that he was emotionally harmed by a wrongful attempt to
foreclose on the property. Id. In Arizona, intentional inflection of emotional distress
requires an allegation of “extreme and outrageous conduct,” Watts v. Golden Age Nursing
Home, 619 P.2d 1032. 1035 (1980), and “it is for the court to determine, in the first
instance, whether the defendant’s conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and
outrageous as to permit recovery, or whether it is necessarily so.” Lucchesi v. Frederic
N. Stimmell, M.D., Ltd., 716 P.2d 1013, 1016 (1986) (quoting Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 46 (1965)). The conduct alleged in this case does not satisfy this standard.
Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action asserts slander based on the publication of
documents like the notice of default and the notice of the trustee’s sale. Doc. 1-1 at 26-
28. Plaintiff cannot allege a statutory claim for slander under A.R.S. § 33-420 because a
Notice of Trustee’s sale is not covered by the statute. Nor can he state a claim for
common law slander because he has not adequately alleged that any of the information in
the postings was false.
The sixth cause of action is to quiet title. Doc. 1-1 at 27-28. It is well established
in Arizona that “a plaintiff cannot bring a quiet title action unless she has paid off her
mortgage in full.” Bergdale v. Countrywide Bank FSB, No. CV 12–8057, 2012 WL
4120482, at *6 (D. Ariz. Sept.18, 2012) (citing Farrell v. West, 57 Ariz. 490, 491, 114
P.2d 910, 911 (Ariz. 1941)) (“[I]f it appears there is an unsatisfied balance due a
defendant-mortgagee, or his assignee, the court will not quiet the title until and unless
[the plaintiff-mortgagor] pays off such mortgage lien.”); Eason v. Indymac Bank,
FSB, No. CV 09–1423, 2010 WL 1962309, at *2 (D. Ariz. May 14, 2010) (action to
“[q]uiet title is not a remedy available to the trustor until the debt is paid or
tendered.”); Frazer v. Millennium Bank, No. CV 10–01509, 2010 WL 4579799, at *4 (D.
Ariz. Oct.29, 2010) (same). Plaintiff has not alleged that he has paid the amounts due
under the loan; therefore, the Court will dismiss this claim.
Plaintiff’s seventh claim is for “declaratory relief” and appears to re-plead the
quiet title claim. Doc. 1-1 at 28-29. As there is no independent cause of action for
“declaratory relief,” and the Court has already ruled with regard to quiet title, this claim
must also be dismissed.
Plaintiff’s eighth claim alleges a violation of the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”),
15 U.S.C. § 1601, et. seq. Doc. 1-1 at 29-30. The one-year statute of limitations found at
15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) applies to violations of TILA. The limitations period begins at the
consummation of the transaction. King v. California, 784 F.2d 910, 915 (9th Cir. 1986).
Plaintiff’s loan closed in the summer of 2007, and this case is therefore time-barred.
Plaintiff claims that time limit should be tolled, but his argument is not supported by any
legal theory or case law.
violation of the terms of TILA.
Additionally, Plaintiff does not plead a specific or clear
Similarly, Plaintiff’s ninth cause of action, alleging violation of the Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”), 1 U.S.C. § 2601 et. seq., is barred by the relevant
statute of limitations. Doc. 1-1 at 30-31. RESPA violations under § 2605 are subject to a
three-year statute of limitations and violations under § 2607 or § 2608 are subject to a
one-year statute of limitations. Both statutes begin to run when the violation occurs,
which in this case was when the loan closed. Under either time period, the statute of
limitations had run before Plaintiff initiated the present suit.
Finally, Plaintiff alleges a tenth cause of action for rescission. Doc. 1-1 at 31-32.
This cause of action is predicated on the merits of several of the other claims that have
already been addressed. There is also an additional argument that the public interest
demands rescission. Plaintiff provides no support for this claim and the Court does not
agree with his bald assertion. The cause of action for rescission will be dismissed.
The Court has considered whether Plaintiff should be granted leave to amend, but
concludes that any amendment would be futile. Plaintiff’s claims fail because they are
contrary to well established law (rejecting the show-me-the-note theory), are barred by
the relevant statute of limitations (fraudulent concealment, TILA, RESPA), cannot satisfy
the high threshold under Arizona law (intentional infliction of emotional distress), or
cannot be asserted when Plaintiff is in fact in default on his loan (slander and quiet title).
Because these legal obstacles cannot be overcome through re-pleading, the Court will
dismiss Plaintiff’s claims without leave to amend.
Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 8) is granted.
Defendants’ motion for summary disposition (Doc. 9) is found to be moot.
This case is dismissed with prejudice. The Clerk is directed to enter