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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1001', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 1001', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 1001', '§ 9', '§ 1001', '§ 9', '§ 1001', '§ 1001', '§ 9', '§ 1001', '§ 1001', '§ 1001', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 504', '§ 504']

US Supreme Court Decisions On-Line> Volume 396 > BRYSON V. UNITED STATES, 396 U. S. 64 (1969)
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(b) Petitioner's false statement was made in a "matter within the jurisdiction" of the NLRB, as the NLRB received the affidavit pursuant to explicit statutory authority, which, only a short time before, had been upheld as constitutional in Douds, supra. Pp. 396 U. S. 70-71. chanrobles.com-red
Petitioner asks this Court to set aside his 1955 jury conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 [Footnote 1] for having falsely and fraudulently denied affiliation with the Communist Party in an affidavit he had filed with the National Labor Relations Board pursuant to § 9(h) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act. [Footnote 2] This collateral proceeding was chanrobles.com-red
On the Government's appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed because it found "no significant differences" between this case and Dennis, and it therefore thought it unnecessary to consider the constitutionality of § 9(h). 403 F.2d 340 (1968). We granted certiorari, 393 U.S. 1079 (1969), and we now affirm. chanrobles.com-red
Petitioner bottoms his claim to relief on asserted constitutional deficiencies of § 9(h) of the National Labor Relations Act, enacted by Congress in 1947 out of concern that Communist Party influence on union officers created the risk of "political strikes," see American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U.S. at 339 U. S. 387-389. Under § 9(h), a union could participate in representation proceedings conducted by the NLRB or utilize the Board's machinery to protest employer unfair labor practices only if each of the union's officers had filed a "non-Communist" affidavit. See n 2, supra. Petitioner filed such an affidavit in 1951, and his subsequent conviction under § 1001 was based on a jury's determination that petitioner had knowingly and willfully lied in his affidavit by denying affiliation with the Communist Party. [Footnote 5] About one year before petitioner filed the false affidavit, this Court had upheld § 9(h) after considering a variety of asserted constitutional deficiencies, American Communications Assn. v. Douds, supra. However, in 1959, Congress replaced § 9(h) with a provision that simply made it a crime for one who was or had recently been a Communist Party member to be a union officer, [Footnote 6] and this successor statute was subsequently held unconstitutional as a bill of attainder, United States v. Brown, supra. Relying primarily on Brown, petitioner argues that § 9(h) was also a bill of attainder, prohibited by Art. I, § 9, cl. 3, of the Constitution. Petitioner also argues that the statute abridged First Amendment rights of speech, assembly, and association, and was so vague as chanrobles.com-red
We find the principle of Dennis no less applicable in the case before us. First, none of the elements of proof chanrobles.com-red
necessary for petitioner's conviction under § 1001 has been shown to depend on the validity of § 9(h). Petitioner suggests in this collateral proceeding that, when he filed his affidavit, he misunderstood the meaning of the statutory term "affiliated," a word which he claims is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. But the trial court narrowly defined the term in an instruction [Footnote 7] later explicitly approved by this Court in Killian v. United States, 368 U. S. 231, 368 U. S. 254-258 (1961). Moreover, the jury's verdict reflects a determination that petitioner's false statement was knowingly and willfully made. This negates any claim that petitioner did not know the falsity of his statement at the time it was made, or that it was the product of an accident, honest inadvertence, chanrobles.com-red
As another element of the offense, § 1001 requires that the false statement be made "in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States." Petitioner argues that, if § 9(h) was unconstitutional, then the affidavit requirement was not within the "jurisdiction" of the Board, and therefore the false statement was not punishable under § 1001. Because there is a valid legislative interest in protecting the integrity of official inquiries, see United States v. Bramblett, 348 U. S. 503 (1955); United States v. Gilliland, 312 U. S. 86, 312 U. S. 93 (1941), [Footnote 9] we think the term "jurisdiction" should not be given a narrow or technical meaning for purposes of § 1001, Ogden v. United States, 303 F.2d chanrobles.com-red
In this case, the Board received petitioner's affidavit pursuant to explicit statutory authority which, only a short time before, had been upheld as constitutional in Douds. Given that, under § 9(h), the Board's "power to act on union charges [was] conditioned on filing of the necessary affidavits," Leedom v. International Union of Mine Workers, 352 U. S. 145, 352 U. S. 148-149 (1956), the Board certainly had the apparent authority, granted by statute, necessary for purposes of § 1001. Thus, we hold that, irrespective of whether Douds would be reaffirmed today, petitioner made a false statement in a "matter within the jurisdiction" of the Board. [Footnote 11] chanrobles.com-red
Bryson v. United States, 238 F.2d 664 n. 8.
This conviction was founded on an indictment which in the words of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 makes it a crime to file "any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or chanrobles.com-red
Obviously the power of Congress to authorize prosecution for crimes of this character must rest on an interference with or obstruction of some "lawful" function of the agency in question. See United States v. Johnson, 383 U. S. 169, 383 U. S. 172. Apart from constitutional problems, the question of what is "within the jurisdiction" of an agency should be construed in a restrictive, not an expansive, way. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit so held in Friedman v. United States, 374 F.2d 363, when it ruled that telling a falsehood to the FBI in its role as "investigator" was not "within the jurisdiction" of that agency in the sense of § 1001. If it were, then telling lies to agencies would carry heavier penalties than committing perjury in court. 374 F.2d 367.
It was said in American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, that § 9(h) was not a bill of attainder. The opinion was by Mr. Chief Justice Vinson, and it was called an "opinion of the Court." It was, however, a six-man Court, and the ruling on the bill of chanrobles.com-red
So I conclude that no more than three members of the Court (Vinson, C.J.,and Reed and Burton, JJ.) ever held that § 9(h) was constitutional against the challenge that it was a bill of attainder.
In United States v. Brown, 381 U. S. 437, we held that the successor of § 9(h), § 504 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. § 504, was a bill of attainder. It made it a crime for a member of the Communist Party to serve as an officer or employee (except in clerical or custodial positions) chanrobles.com-red