Source: https://www.opengovva.org/foi-advisory-council-opinion-ao-04-14
Timestamp: 2020-08-03 17:41:33
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FOI Advisory Council Opinion AO-04-14 | Virginia Coalition for Open Government
Home»FOI Advisory Council Opinion AO-04-14
The primary objective of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent. When a given controversy involves a number of related statutes, they should be read and construed together in order to give full meaning, force, and effect to each. Therefore we accord each statute, insofar as possible, a meaning that does not conflict with any other statute. When two statutes seemingly conflict, they should be harmonized, if at all possible, to give effect to both.[1]
The Court has also stated that in interpreting statutes, one is "bound by the plain meaning of that language and must give effect to the legislature's intention as expressed by the language used unless a literal interpretation of the language would result in a manifest absurdity."[2]
Although the General Assembly can abrogate the common law, its intent to do so must be plainly manifested. We are aware of only one legislative enactment that addresses suicide as a crime. Code 55-4 provides that "[n]o suicide . . . shall work a corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate." Thus, although the General Assembly has rescinded the punishment for suicide, it has not decriminalized the act. Suicide, therefore, remains a common law crime in Virginia as it does in a number of other common-law states.[3]
Note that there were three bills introduced to the 2014 Session of the General Assembly that would have decriminalized suicide, but none of those bills were enacted.[4] Without action by the General Assembly, suicide remains a crime at common law. Because suicide remains a crime, the records of a death investigation that concludes that suicide was the cause of death are criminal investigative files by statutory definition under subdivision A 2 a of § 2.2-3706, as quoted above. Therefore suicide reports and related records may be withheld from mandatory disclosure as criminal investigative files.
a suicide report would be subject to inspection and copying under FOIA as a noncriminal incident report required to be maintained pursuant to § 15.2-1722. Certain portions of that report, such as the name of the person who committed suicide, may be withheld pursuant to subdivision G 1 of § 2.2-3706.[5] However, the exemption only applies to those portions of the report of a personal, medical, or financial nature, and does not allow a law-enforcement agency to withhold the entire report just because it may contain some of this information. Subdivision B 3 of § 2.2-3704 states that a public body may delete or excise only that portion of the record to which an exemption applies and shall release the remainder of the record. Therefore, the appropriate response under FOIA would be to release the report, but redact any personal, medical, or financial information.[6]
Note that the response from the public body in this instance, in asserting the criminal investigative files exemption, also noted that the drafter of § 15.2-1722 may not have realized that suicide is a crime in Virginia. Turning to legislative history and intent, research revealed that the original version of what is now § 15.2-1722 was first enacted in 1975 and codified as § 15.1-135.1.[7] The available legislative history included only the bill itself; it does not appear that there were any other versions of or amendments to the bill before enactment, so it is unknown whether the fact that suicide is a common law crime was taken into consideration. While this provision has been amended several times, the original definition of "noncriminal incidents records" in § 15.1-135.1 stated that the term shall mean compilations of noncriminal occurrences of general interest to law-enforcement agencies, such as missing persons, lost and found property, suicides and accidental deaths. [Emphasis added.] While this definition is effectively identical to the current law, note that then § 15.1-135.1 also provided that the records required to be maintained by this section shall be exempt from the provisions of [FOIA]. Thus, as originally passed, all of the records described in what is now § 15.2-1722 were at that time exempted from mandatory disclosure under FOIA in their entirety. This FOIA exemption was subsequently removed from § 15.2-1722 in 1999 and a similar yet substantively different exemption was enacted instead in subdivision G 1 of § 2.2-3706, which provided in relevant part as follows:
Section 2.2-3706 was amended and recodified last year, and former subdivision G 1 of § 2.2-3706 became what is now current subsection B of § 2.2-3706.[8
We must also keep in mind that § 15.2-1722 is not an access statute, but instead addresses the requirement for local police chiefs and sheriffs to maintain records and pass them on to their successors in office.[9] Consider also the language of subsection B of § 15.2-1722 that precedes the definitions: For purposes of this section, the following definitions shall apply. [Emphasis added.] Reading this prefatory language together with the maintenance and succession provisions of § 15.2-1722, it is clear that the definitions therein are meant to apply only in regard to police chiefs' and sheriffs' duties to maintain and pass on the records described. The definitions in § 15.2-1722 were not written as words of limitation to constrain the application of FOIA exemptions. In the criminal context, this intent is borne out by legislative history in the form of the Report of the Joint Subcommittee Studying FOIA that recommended the changes to these provisions enacted by the General Assembly:
The final issue before the joint subcommittee concerned the clarification of the law relating to access to criminal incident logs, arrest information, and other routine law-enforcement matters. Specifically, § 15.2-1722 directs sheriffs and chiefs of police of every locality to ensure, in addition to other records required by law, the maintenance of adequate personnel, arrest, investigative, reportable incidents, and noncriminal incidents records necessary for the efficient operation of a law-enforcement agency. This section provided that, "Except for information in the custody of law-enforcement officials relative to the identity of any individual other than a juvenile who is arrested and charged, and the status of the charge of arrest, the records required to be maintained by this section shall be exempt from the provisions of Chapter 21 (§ 2.1-340 et seq.) of Title 2.1." This latter provision was in direct conflict with the criminal records portion of [FOIA]. It was agreed that the conflict would be resolved in favor of [FOIA] and that any criminal record exemption should be stated in [FOIA] itself. As a result, a single section in [FOIA] was dedicated to access to criminal records by consolidating all criminal records exemptions there.[10]
In the case of Tull v. Brown in 1998,[11] the Virginia Supreme Court had occasion to consider a request for an audio tape of a 911 call concerning the accidental death of a minor that was the subject of a FOIA request. The Court stated that the sheriff's office "treated the incident as a criminal investigation until an autopsy ruled out any criminal activity as the cause of death."[12] It was argued that the 911 tape was not a noncriminal incident record subject to the exemption. The Court rejected this argument, stating as follows:
911 calls frequently concern suicides or accidental deaths, which are two of the specific examples included in Code § 15.1-135.1(B)(5). Even the 911 call at issue here involved the initially unexplained death of a child. Thus, we conclude that the 911 Tape falls squarely within the exemption set forth in Code § 15.1-135.1(B)(5).[13]
To address the argument that § 15.2-1722 defines noncriminal incidents records as compilations rather than as individual records, note that there is no statutory definition of the term compilations. As stated by the Supreme Court of Virginia, an "undefined term must be given its ordinary meaning, given the context in which it is used. Furthermore, the plain, obvious, and rational meaning of a statute is to be preferred over any curious, narrow, or strained construction, and a statute should never be construed in a way that leads to absurd results."[14] The American Heritage Dictionary provides two definitions of the word compilation: "1. The act of compiling. 2. Something compiled, as a set of data, a report, or an anthology."[15] [Emphasis added.] Additionally, the Court in Tull addressed an argument that the 911 tape at issue in that case was "only raw data and not an orderly report or summary created by assembling raw data, i.e., a compilation."[16] The Court then held as follows: "Nonetheless, we conclude that the tape is a grouping of electronically gathered information and thus a 'compilation.'"[17] Therefore both the ordinary meaning of compilation and prior precedent lead to the conclusion that the suicide report and related records you requested are compilations as contemplated by § 15.2-1722.
Facing an argument that only the noncriminal records exemption would apply to law-enforcement personnel records because they are defined in § 15.2-1722, the Supreme Court of Virginia ruled to the contrary in the case of Harmon v. Ewing.[18] The Court found that the general personnel records exemption found at subdivision 1 of § 2.2-3705.1 also applies to law-enforcement personnel records.[19] It was argued before the Court that the general personnel exemption was in conflict with the more specific provision of former subsection G of § 2.2-3706 (now subsection B of the same section) referencing § 15.2-1722, and that the more specific exemption must control due to the conflict resolution provision of § 2.2-3706. The Court addressed that argument as follows:
No such conflict exists, however. [Former] Code 2.2-3706(G) requires that applicable records shall be subject "to the provisions of this chapter." (Emphasis added.) The provisions of "this chapter," that is, all of VFOIA, include not only the disclosure provisions of VFOIA but also the exclusion provisions of the chapter set forth in [former] Code 2.2-3705.1. In the absence of a conflict, there is no reason to involve [the conflict resolution rule of § 2.2-3706] in the analysis. Personnel records covered by [former] subsection (G) are, like all public personnel records, subject to the protections of Code 2.2-3705.1(1). The request for personnel records and for information found therein was thus appropriately refused by the Department, and this Court reverses that portion of the order requiring their disclosure.[20]
It would be an absurd result to state that arrest records and investigative records must be handled only under the noncriminal records exemption merely because that exemption references § 15.2-1722, when the definitions themselves refer to criminal activity and there are more specific provisions within FOIA itself that explicitly state how to handle arrest information[21] and criminal investigative files.[22] Applying Harmon and the rules of statutory construction quoted above, it is clear that the respective provisions of FOIA concerning arrests and criminal investigative files apply to these types of records even though these types of records also fall within definitions in § 15.2-1722.
[1] Lawlor v. Commonwealth, 285 Va. 187, 236-237, 738 S.E.2d 847, 875 (2013) (citations, internal quotation marks, and alterations omitted).
[2] Bates v. Commonwealth, 752 S.E.2d 746 (2014) (citations and alteration omitted).
[3] Wackwitz v. Roy, 244 Va. 60, 65, 418 S.E.2d 861, 864 (1992).
[4] House Bill 79 (2014), Senate Bill 22 (2014), and Senate Bill 521 (2014).
[5] Former subdivision G 1 of § 2.2-3706 was amended and recodified as current subsection B of § 2.2-3706. 2013 Acts of Assembly, c. 695.
[6] Freedom of Information Advisory Opinion 10 (2003). Please note that the issue of suicide as a crime and suicide reports as criminal investigative records was not raised for consideration in that opinion. That opinion only considered the noncriminal records exemption and the exemption protecting the identities of victims, witnesses, and undercover officers. Similarly, my research did not reveal any other precedents that addressed whether suicide reports and related records may be treated as criminal investigative files under FOIA.
[7] 1975 Acts of Assembly, c. 290.
[8] 2013 Acts of Assembly, c. 695.
[9] Subsection A of § 15.2-1722 reads as follows: It shall be the duty of the sheriff or chief of police of every locality to insure, in addition to other records required by law, the maintenance of adequate personnel, arrest, investigative, reportable incidents, and noncriminal incidents records necessary for the efficient operation of a law-enforcement agency. Failure of a sheriff or a chief of police to maintain such records or failure to relinquish such records to his successor in office shall constitute a misdemeanor. Former sheriffs or chiefs of police shall be allowed access to such files for preparation of a defense in any suit or action arising from the performance of their official duties as sheriff or chief of police. The enforcement of this section shall be the duty of the attorney for the Commonwealth of the county or city wherein the violation occurs.
[10] Report of the Joint Subcommittee Studying Virginia's Freedom of Information Act, House Document No. 106 (2000) at 25.
[11] Tull v. Brown, 255 Va. 177, 494 S.E.2d 855 (Va. 1998).
[12] Id., 255 Va. at 180, 494 S.E.2d at 856.
[13] Id., 255 Va. at 184, 494 S.E.2d at 859.
[14] Lawlor v. Commonwealth, 285 Va. at 237, 738 S.E.2d at 875 (2013) (citations, internal quotation marks, and alterations omitted).
[15] The American Heritage Dictionary 301 (2nd College ed. 1982).
[16] Tull, 255 Va. at 184, 494 S.E.2d at 858.
[18] 285 Va. 335, 745 S.E.2d 415 (2013).
[20] Id., 285 Va. at 337, 745 S.E.2d at 417.
[21] Subdivision A 1 c of § 2.2-3706 provides that information relative to the identity of any individual, other than a juvenile, who is arrested and charged, and the status of the charge or arrest shall be provided upon request.
[22] Subdivision A 2 a of § 2.2-3706 regarding criminal investigative files, quoted previously.
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