Source: http://www.dol.gov/brb/References/Reference_works/lhca/lsdesk/dbsec33.htm
Timestamp: 2014-10-01 16:26:52
Document Index: 582743740

Matched Legal Cases: ['§933', '§933', 'art 35', '§944', '§933', 'art, 505']

DBSEC33
Introduction; Section 33(a)
Section 33, 33 U.S.C. §933, addresses situations in which an employee is injured during the course of his employment and a third party may be liable for damages for his injury or death. In such situations, the employee need not elect between his compensation remedy and a third-party suit. Section 33(a) provides If on account of a disability or death for which compensation is payable under this Act the person entitled to such compensation determines that some person other than the employer or a person or persons in his employ is liable in damages, he need not elect whether to receive such compensation or to recover damages against such third person.
33 U.S.C. §933(a).
Section 33 is generally designed to foreclose injured employees from double recoveries where they receive both benefits under the Act and civil damages from a successful negligence action. The subsections define and delimit the rights of the employer and the employee to institute third-party actions and set up rules for allocating the proceeds of the third-party action between them. Subsections (b)-(d) address assignment of the right to file suit to employer under certain circumstances. Subsections (e) and (f) provide employer with offset or lien rights against the compensation due. Section 33(g) requires that the person entitled to compensation obtain employer�s approval of settlements with third parties for an amount less than the compensation due under the Act; failure to obtain approval where required is an absolute bar to the receipt of benefits. This section was amended by the 1984 Amendments, and these revisions were applicable to cases pending on appeal on September 28, 1984, the date of enactment. In general, the key issue in cases under Section 33(a) is whether a third-party suit is for the same disability for which compensation is payable under the Act. See United Brands Co. v. Melson, 594 F.2d 1068, 1074, 10 BRBS 494, 498�(5th Cir. 1979), aff'g�6 BRBS 503�(1977) (�the section is clearly limited to the situation in which the third party is potentially responsible to both the employee and the covered employer�). Thus, the requirements of Section 33 with regard to employer�s rights to offsets and to approve settlements do not apply where, for example, claimant settles a third-party suit based on asbestos exposure but is entitled to disability benefits for work-related hypertension or another condition. See Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Director, OWCP [Chavez], 139 F.3d 1309, 32 BRBS 67(CRT) (9th Cir. 1998); Richardson v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 39 BRBS 74 (2005), aff�d mem. sub nom. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Director, OWCP, 245 F. App�x 249 (4th Cir. 2007); Harms v. Stevedoring Services of America, 25 BRBS 375 (1992) (Smith, J., dissenting on other grounds), vacated on other grounds mem., 17 F.3d 396 (9th Cir. 1994).
The Board remanded for the administrative law judge to determine whether settlements received by claimant as a result of asbestos exposure in suits against various ship owners, stevedores and insurers as a result of loading activities on ships which were not owned by Lykes Brothers were the results of suits against "third parties" as provided in Section 33(a), for which employer would be entitled to an offset under Section 33(f). Castorina v. Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., 21 BRBS 136 (1988).
Following remand, the Board held that the third-party suits in this case fell within the definition of Section 33(a) because they and the claim under the Act against employer were undertaken as a result of the disability and impairment caused by claimant's work-related exposure to asbestos. Thus, the third-party suits were filed on account of the same disability for which compensation was payable under the Act. Castorina v. Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., 24 BRBS 193 (1991).
The Board held that the administrative law judge properly granted employer an offset under Section 33(f) for the entire net amount of third-party asbestosis settlements, even though only 50 percent of claimant�s disability was due to asbestosis. Under Section 33(a), the third-party suits were filed on account of the same disability being compensated under the Act, and employer was liable for the full extent of claimant's disability under the aggravation rule. Chavez v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 21 BRBS 272 (1988).
The Board rejected the Director's argument that Section 33(g) does not bar claimant's right to compensation owed for a siderosis claim because the settlements claimant entered into were for his alleged asbestosis, which is a different injury than his siderosis. Since Section 33(a) specifically refers not to "injury," but to suits resulting from "disability," the Board held that the two claims do relate to the same disability in that both involve occupational lung diseases resulting in respiratory impairment. Therefore, the Board held that Section 33(g) was at issue with regard to both claims because claimant settled third-party suits resulting from his respiratory disability. However, the Board found Section 33(g) did not bar the claim on other grounds. O'Berry v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 21 BRBS 355 (1988), modified on recon., 22 BRBS 430 (1989).
The Board modified this decision on reconsideration. The Board noted that its construction of Section 33(a) in the initial case did not affect the disposition on Section 33(g), so any error would be harmless. However, on reconsideration, the Director pointed out that if the settlements of the third-party asbestosis suits can invoke Section 33(a) with regard to the siderosis claim as being for the same disability, then employer would be entitled to offset the entire net recovery against its liability for the siderosis claim, and that this would be contrary to law. The Board held that this argument may have merit and thus modified its prior opinion to direct the administrative law judge to consider these arguments in determining what credit, if any, should be allowed for the asbestosis settlements in the event benefits are awarded for siderosis. �O'Berry v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 22 BRBS 430 (1989), aff'g and modifying on recon. 21 BRBS 355 (1988). Applying the 1972 Act, the administrative law judge awarded death benefits by finding that the employee was permanently totally disabled at the date of death. The administrative law judge held that the award was not barred by Section 33 due to claimant's abandonment of a malpractice suit for the employee's death, finding that this action was beyond the scope of employer's subrogation interest. The Board reversed, holding that the plain language of Section 33(a) states that it is applicable on account of death or disability for which compensation is payable under the Act. Since the malpractice suit and the claim under the Act were similarly instituted due to the employee's death, employer had a subrogation interest under Section 33. The Board held that claimant's failure to pursue a third-party malpractice action to final judgment cannot bar claimant's right to compensation under the Act unless employer establishes that claimant's failure prejudiced it or its carrier's right of subrogation. The case was therefore remanded for findings pertaining to the prejudice issue. Mills v. Marine Repair Serv., 21 BRBS 115 (1988), modified on recon., 22 BRBS 335 (1989).
On reconsideration, the Board affirmed the administrative law judge's finding that Section 33 does not bar the claim. The Board agreed with the Director that only failure to comply with Section 33(g) can result in the claim's being barred, and that the 1959 Amendment to Section 33(a) supersedes prior precedent that required that a third-party claim be prosecuted to avoid prejudice to employer. Mills v. Marine Repair Serv., 22 BRBS 335 (1989), modifying on recon. 21 BRBS 115 (1988).
The Board held that Section 33 did not apply in a case involving successive injuries covered under the Act where a settlement of a compensation claim for one injury was reached with another longshore employer. The Board found this result consistent with Melson, 594 F.2d 1068, 10 BRBS 494. Therefore, as Eagle Marine, with whom claimant settled his prior claim, did not cause injury to claimant during the course of his employment with employer and thus was not potentially liable to employer, it was not a "third party" under the Section 33(a) and employer was not entitled to a Section 33(f) credit for the prior settlement. Uglesich v. Stevedoring Services of America, 24 BRBS 180 (1991).
The Board affirmed the administrative law judge's finding that claimant's hearing loss claim was not barred by his prior third-party recovery for a crush injury. Section 33 was inapplicable since the hearing loss claim was not for the same disability as the prior third-party recovery. Harms v. Stevedoring Services of America, 25 BRBS 375 (1992) (Smith, J., dissenting on other grounds), vacated on other grounds mem., 17 F.3d 396 (9th Cir. 1994).
Following remand after the Ninth Circuit held that a determination regarding the proper Section 33(f) setoff against possible third-party settlements was ripe for decision, see Chavez v. Director, OWCP, 961 F.2d 1409, 25 BRBS 134(CRT) (9th Cir. 1992), vacating and remanding Chavez v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 24 BRBS 71 (1990), the Board held that in a case where claimant suffers two distinct disabilities, one of which is the basis for third-party litigation, the administrative law judge must determine whether each disability is work-related so as to ascertain which is being compensated, under the language of Section 33(a). If both are work-related, or if only the disability which was not the basis of the third-party suit is work-related, the Board held that employer is not entitled to an offset under Section 33(f). If the disability on which the third-party suit was based is the only work-related disability, then employer is entitled to offset its liability for the combined disability against the net proceeds of any third-party suit filed on account of that disability, consistent with Section 33(a). Chavez v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 27 BRBS 80 (1993) (McGranery, J., dissenting) (decision on remand), aff'd on recon. en banc, 28 BRBS 185 (1994) (Brown and McGranery, JJ., dissenting), aff�d sub nom. Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Director, OWCP [Chavez], 139 F.3d 1309, 32 BRBS 67(CRT) (9th Cir. 1998).
On reconsideration, the Board rejected the contention that employer's offset should be limited to that fraction of the whole disability caused by asbestosis. Two members reiterated the Board's holding that where claimant has two potentially work-related disabling conditions and files suit against a third party due to one of those conditions, employer's entitlement to a Section 33(f) offset depends on whether each condition is work-related. Two members dissented. Chavez v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 28 BRBS 185 (1994) (en banc) (Brown and McGranery, JJ., dissenting), aff'g on recon. 27 BRBS 80 (1993) (McGranery, J., dissenting) (decision on remand), aff�d sub nom. Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Director, OWCP [Chavez], 139 F.3d 1309, 32 BRBS 67(CRT) (9th Cir. 1998).
After the administrative law judge determined on remand that as claimant�s hypertension was a separately compensable disability and that employer was thus not entitled to a Section 33(f) offset against his asbestos recoveries, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Board�s holding. The court stated that where claimant suffers two work-related injuries, either of which could have resulted in his total disability, he could have filed a claim under the Act and obtained total disability benefits for either condition. The court set forth the Director�s interpretation which permits offset under Section 33(f) only if the third-party payments are due to the sole and same injury that gives rise to the claim under the Act; otherwise employer would experience a windfall as claimant could have sought a recovery for the injury for which no third-party proceeds were available. The court thus held that the administrative law judge properly denied employer either a full or an apportioned credit under Section 33(f). Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Director, OWCP [Chavez], 139 F.3d 1309, 32 BRBS 67(CRT) (9th Cir. 1998), aff�g Chavez v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 27 BRBS 80 (1993) (McGranery, J., dissenting), aff�d on recon. en banc, 28 BRBS 185 (1994) (McGranery & Brown, JJ., dissenting).
In a case in which claimant was exposed to asbestos only with General Dynamics and only to other pulmonary irritants with employer, and in which he settled third-party claims regarding the asbestos exposure with General Dynamics' approval, the Board remanded the case for the administrative law judge to consider whether claimant's failure to get employer's approval barred the claim under Section 33(g) since it was liable for claimant's entire disability under the aggravation and responsible employer rules. The administrative law judge was to consider the argument that the two claims involve separate and distinct injuries. Goody v. Thames Valley Steel Corp., 28 BRBS 167 (1994) (McGranery, J., dissenting).
Following remand, the Board held that claimant suffered two separate injuries as a result of distinct exposures with two employers, asbestosis while working at Electric Boat and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease while working for employer. Claimant properly obtained Electric Boat�s written approval of the third-party settlements concerning his asbestosis. The Board held that since claimant was not exposed to asbestos at employer�s facility, the Supreme Court�s holding in Cowart does not require that claimant must also obtain employer�s written consent. Employer did not purchase any asbestos products from the asbestos distributors and manufacturers against whom claimant filed his third-party suits, and it was undisputed that it did not expose claimant to asbestos during claimant�s employment with employer; thus, under Section 33(b) of the Act, it was not an employer to whom claimant�s right to file suit could be assigned. Accordingly, the Board affirmed the administrative law judge�s finding that claimant�s claim was not barred by Section 33(g). Goody v. Thames Valley Steel Corp., 31 BRBS 29 (1997), aff�d mem. sub nom. Thames Valley Steel Corp. v. Director, OWCP, 131 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1997).
The Board vacated the administrative law judge�s finding that Section 33(g) barred claimant�s asbestos-related claim for medical monitoring and his claim for disability benefits related to his COPD, and remanded for consideration of the entire record to discern the cause of claimant�s disability. The Board instructed the administrative law judge to make findings consistent with Chavez, 27 BRBS 80, and then to determine the applicability of Section 33(g) based on these findings. In this regard, only if asbestosis is claimant�s lone work-related disability can Section 33(g) be invoked to bar claimant�s claim. If, however, after reviewing the medical evidence in light of Chavez, the administrative law judge again found that claimant was disabled by both asbestosis and COPD, Section 33(g) cannot bar the disability claim because, under the aggravation rule, COPD is considered to be the disabling, compensable condition and therefore not the same disability for which claimant settled his third-party claims. Moreover, under the latter circumstance, claimant�s claim for medical monitoring for any asbestos-related condition likewise cannot be barred because, ultimately, claimant would not be entitled to disability compensation for asbestosis, and a person entitled only to medical benefits is not a �person entitled to compensation� for purposes of Section 33(g). Richardson v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 38 BRBS 6 (2004).
After remand, the Board affirmed the administrative law judge�s finding under Chavez, 27 BRBS 80 (1993), that claimant�s claim was not barred by Section 33(g), since he found that the third-party settlements were for asbestos-related conditions, and thus did not involve the same disability, i.e., COPD related to inhalation of substances other than asbestos, for which claimant obtained disability benefits under the Act. Richardson v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 39 BRBS 74 (2005), aff�d mem. sub nom. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Director, OWCP, 245 F. App�x 249 (4th Cir. 2007).
Where claimant settled the decedent�s pending third-party suit after his death, the Board held that Section 33(g) did not bar her death claim because her claim under the Act and decedent�s third-party suit were not for the same disability or death under Section 33(a). Claimant�s third-party claim was dismissed. Thus, if claimant did not have the right to seek damages from the third party for her own benefit, employer did not have the right to seek damages from the third party on her behalf under Section 33(b), and Section 33(g) was inapplicable. Mabile v. Swiftships, Inc., 38 BRBS 19 (2004).
If employer owns the vessel and is sued in its capacity as a vessel owner, it is a third party for purposes of Section 33. Employer is entitled to an offset under Section 33(f) for the amounts paid to claimant by the vessel in the third-party action. Bundens v. J.E. Brenneman Co., 46 F.3d 292, 29 BRBS 52(CRT) (3d Cir. 1995), aff'g and rev'g 28 BRBS 20 (1994); Taylor v. Bunge Corp., 845 F.2d 1323 (5th Cir. 1988).
The Board affirmed the administrative law judge�s finding that a third party, the vessel on which claimant was injured, was involved in the state court claim because claimant specifically released the barge from liability pursuant to Section 5(b) and a vessel, even if owned by claimant�s employer, is a third party under the plain language of Section 5(b) of the Act. Because a third party was involved, Section 33(g) applied to this case. As claimant failed to comply with the provisions of Section 33(g)(1), the Board affirmed the administrative law judge�s finding that claimant was not entitled to benefits under the Act. Bockman v. Patton-Tully Transp. Co., 41 BRBS 24 (2007).
Where claimant filed a state claim against his nominal employer, a temporary employment agency, and a claim under the Act against his borrowing longshore employer, and then settled his state claim without the prior approval of the borrowing employer, the Board held that the administrative law judge erred in considering the nominal employer to be a �third party� and in applying the Section 33(g) bar to deny longshore benefits. As there was neither a third party nor a suit for civil tort damages involved in this case, the Board held that Section 33 is not applicable. Rather, employer, as the parties agreed, was entitled to a Section 3(e) credit against the state settlement. Consequently, the Board held that the administrative law judge erred in applying Section 33(g) instead of Section 3(e), and it remanded the case for resolution of this and any remaining issues. Redmond v. Sea Ray Boats, 32 BRBS 1 (1998), vacated in part on other ground on recon., 32 BRBS 195 (1998).
The Ninth Circuit reversed the Board�s holding that the last responsible employer is entitled to a credit for Section 8(i) settlement payments made by other potentially liable longshore employers in claimant�s occupational disease claim. The court rejected employer�s contention that Section 33(f) provides for a credit under these circumstances, as there is no �third party� potentially liable to both claimant and employer. Alexander v. Director, OWCP, 897 F.3d 205, 36 BRBS 25(CRT) (9th Cir. 2002), rev�g in pert. part Alexander v. Triple A Machine Shop, 32 BRBS 40 (1999) and 34 BRBS 34 (2000); see also New Orleans Stevedores v. Ibos, 317 F.3d 480, 36 BRBS 93(CRT) (5th Cir. 2003), rev�g in pert. part 35 BRBS 50 (2001), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1141 (2004).
Claimant was injured and sought compensation under the Act as well as under the FTCA. The tort claim was dismissed as it was filed against the Navy Department, rather than the U.S., the only proper party defendant to a FTCA suit. Meanwhile, claimant settled his claim under the Act and did not seek to amend his FTCA claim to name the U.S. as a party defendant or to appeal the district court�s judgment. Employer sought subrogation rights pursuant to Section 33(b) against claimant�s potential recovery in any malpractice claim against his attorneys. The court held that Section 33 was not applicable, as such subrogation rights extend only to claims against third parties for which compensation is payable under the Act, and not to any harm allegedly caused by his attorneys� negligent representation. ITT Federal Services Corp. v. Monta�o, 474 F.3d 32 (1st Cir. 1997).
Because the definition of the term �person� in Section 2(1) of the Act does not include the United States government, claimant�s settlement with the U.S. government under the Federal Tort Claims Act for an amount less than he was entitled to receive under the Act did not invoke the Section 33(g) bar, as the United States is not considered a �third person� under Section 33. Milam v. Mason Technologies, 34 BRBS 168 (2000) (McGranery, J., dissenting).
Claimant settled his claims in a United Kingdom court with his employer, �AG Jersey,� and two related companies for an amount less than the amount he would be entitled to under the Act without obtaining prior written approval from the DBA carrier. The administrative law judge determined that one of the two related companies, �AG PLC,� was a third party to the settlement, thereby precluding claimant�s entitlement to further benefits under the Act pursuant to Section 33(g). The Board vacated the administrative law judge�s finding, as he failed to explain why AG PLC, the parent company of AG Jersey, is not also claimant�s employer � either under a borrowed employee test or by considering the companies as one entity. Further, the Board held it was error to apply res judicata or collateral estoppel to the UK court�s decision, as the issue of whether the company was an employer under the Act was not before the court, and the parties to the UK claims and the Act claims were not identical. The Board also vacated the administrative law judge�s finding that �AG UK,� which performed many of the functions of an employer, is a borrowing employer, because he did not fully explain how AG UK satisfies the elements of a borrowing employer test. Therefore, the Board vacated the finding that Section 33(g) precluded claimant�s recovery under the Act. The Board remanded the case for the administrative law judge to reconsider the employment relationships using the borrowed employee tests and/or to determine whether the entities should be considered as one by piercing the corporate veil. AG Jersey bears the burden of establishing that at least one of the employers is a third party. That there may be no offset for the recovery does not weigh in favor of the applicability of Section 33(g). Newton-Sealey v. ArmorGroup (Jersey) Services, Ltd., 47 BRBS 21 (2013).
Under Section 33(b), an employee must pursue his rights against a negligent third party within six months of accepting a compensation award under the Act or his rights against the third party are assigned to the employer. The 1984 Amendments make three changes to Section 33(b). First, the amendments explicitly state that the award of an administrative law judge may operate to trigger the six month limitation period. Second, the amended version expressly defines �award� to mean a formal order issued by the deputy commissioner, an administrative law judge or the Board. See Pallas Shipping Agency, Ltd. v. Duris, 461 U.S. 529, 15 BRBS 152(CRT) (1983) (pre-amendment case holding that a lapse of six months after acceptance of voluntary�compensation payments does not trigger assignment). Therefore, a memorandum of informal conference by a deputy commissioner memorializing employer's agreement to pay benefits would not satisfy the �award� requirement of this amended subsection. Costa v. Danais Shipping Co., 714 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1983). Finally, the amendment states that if an employer fails to commence an action against the third party within ninety days after assignment, the right to bring such action reverts to the claimant. This amendment overrules prior precedent.
In an early case, the Supreme Court stated that an employee did not automatically relinquish his right to proceed against a third party after the statutory six month period expired. Assignment to the employer was not recognized when it was demonstrated that the employer to whom the third party's rights were assigned would not pursue these rights because of a potential conflict of interest. Czaplicki v. The S.S. Hoegh Silvercloud, 351 U.S. 525�(1956); see also Caldwell v. Ogden Sea Transport, Inc., et al., 618 F.2d 1037�(4th Cir. 1980). However, Czaplicki�was decided prior to a 1959 amendment adding the words �unless such person shall commence an action against such third person within six months after such award.�
The Supreme Court held that failure to institute a third-party action within the statutory six month period is an absolute bar to a subsequent action by an employee. Rodriguez v. Compass Shipping Co., 451 U.S. 596 (1981). In a subsequent case, the D.C. Circuit held the Czaplicki�exception to the statutory period was no longer applicable and an employee is not permitted to institute a third-party action after expiration of the six month period. Johnson v. Bechtel Assoc. Professional Corp., 717 F.2d 574 (D.C. Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. Johnson et al., 467 U.S. 925�(1984). The Fourth Circuit also held that the claimant's failure to bring a third-party action within six months operates as an assignment of the claim to employer, and the six month period is triggered without regard to subsequent suspensions in payment of a formal award of benefits. Simmons v. Sea-Land Services, Inc., 676 F.2d 106 (4th Cir. 1982).
Since Section 33(b) sets forth an employer's rights regarding assignment under Section 33, that subsection does not affect employer's entitlement to an offset pursuant to Section 33(f). Castorina v. Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., 24 BRBS 193 (1991).
Claimant was injured and sought compensation under the Act as well as under the FTCA. The tort claim was dismissed as it was filed against the Navy Department, rather than the U.S., the only proper party defendant to a FTCA suit. Meanwhile, claimant settled his claim under the Act and did not seek to amend his FTCA claim to name the U.S. as a party defendant or to appeal the district court�s judgment. Employer sought subrogation rights pursuant to Section 33(b) against claimant�s potential recovery in any malpractice claim against his attorneys. The court held that Section 33 was not applicable, as such subrogation rights extend only to claims against third parties for which compensation was payable under the Act, and not to any harm allegedly caused by his attorneys� negligent representation. ITT Federal Services Corp. v. Monta�o, 474 F.3d 32 (1st Cir. 1997).
Section 33(c), (d)
Section 33(c) states that payment under Section 44, which provides for a $5,000 payment to the Special Fund where an employee dies without survivors, operates as an assignment to the employer of all rights of the legal representative of the decedent to recover damages against a third person. Section 33(d) provides that an employer to whom rights are assigned may either institute proceedings against a third party or enter into a compromise either with or without filing suit.
Inasmuch as decedent had no dependents entitled to receive death benefits under the Act, pursuant to Section 33(c) only decedent's employer had standing to pursue a negligence claim against the third party. Section 33(c) provides that employer's mandatory death benefits payment into the Special Fund, see 33 U.S.C. §944(c)(1), operates as an assignment to the employer of all rights of the legal representative of the deceased to recover damages against the third party. Johnson v. Continental Grain Co., 58 F.3d 1232 (8th Cir. 1995).
Section 33(e)
Section 33(e) provides for distribution of the proceeds where employer brings a successful third-party action. Under this section, when an employer is assigned a third-party claim and obtains a recovery, the recovery is first utilized to reimburse employer for litigation expenses, including any attorney�s fee awarded, benefits actually provided to the employee under Section 7, all amounts already paid as compensation, and the present value of compensation due in the future. 33 U.S.C. §933(e)(1).
Section 33(e)(2) then provides that any excess amount must be paid to the person entitled to compensation or the representative. This provision was amended to 1984 to repeal a 20 percent set-aside of the excess amount in favor of employer. Section 33(f)
If the employee initiates action against the third party within the time period allowed under Section 33(b) and recovers damages therefrom, the employer, pursuant to Section 33(f), is entitled to credit the employee's third-party recovery against its liability for compensation payments under the Act. Under the 1984 Amendments, the employer may only set off the "net" amount recovered less the expenses "reasonably incurred" by the claimant in the course of the proceedings against the third party, including "reasonable" attorneys' fees. This amendment codifies the Fifth Circuit�s holding in Ochoa v. Employers National Ins. Co., 724 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1984), reaff'd following remand, 754 F.2d 1196, 17 BRBS 49(CRT) (5th Cir. 1985), in which the court held that where an employee's third-party recovery was insufficient to cover both his attorney's fees and the compensation lien, the lien was payable out of the net recovery, after costs of litigation, including reasonable attorney's fees, were subtracted. The Board had reached a similar result, holding that an administrative law judge erred in computing the offset based on claimant's gross judgment rather than on his actual net recovery. Luke v. Petro-Weld, Inc., 14 BRBS 269 (1981), on remand from 619 F.2d 418, 12 BRBS 338 (5th Cir. 1980); see also Nacirema Operating Co. v. Oosting, 456 F.2d 956 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 980 (1972). The Act does not expressly provide for reimbursement from a judgment or settlement obtained by the worker from a third party of compensation benefits that an employer has already paid. Bloomer v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 445 U.S. 74 (1980). The courts have, however, held that employer has a subrogation right to be reimbursed from a worker's net recovery from a third party for the full amount of compensation already paid. See, e.g., Peters v. North River Ins. Co., 764 F.2d 306, 17 BRBS 114(CRT) (5th Cir. 1985). This is true even if the third-party award is reduced due to the employee's contributory negligence. Hayden v. Kerr-McGee, 787 F.2d 1000, reh'g denied, 790 F.2d 890 (5th Cir. 1986); Haynes v. Rederi A/S Aladdin, 362 F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1020 (1967).
The Supreme Court has held that the employer does not have to pay a share of the employee's legal expenses in securing the third-party recovery. Bloomer, 445 U.S. 74. The 1984 Amendments to Section 33(f) did not modify the Supreme Court's decision in Bloomer, but reinforced it. Thus, under Section 33(f) one first determines the net amount of the recovery, which is the total recovery minus legal expenses. If the net amount exceeds the compensation due claimant under the Act, employer is not required to pay further benefits. If little or nothing is left after the lien and attorney's fees have been deducted from the recovery, the court may adjust the attorney's fees in order to obtain a sufficient recovery for the injured worker. The lien, however, remains inviolate and carrier cannot be liable for any of the attorney's fees. This is consistent with the legislative history of the 1984 Amendment. Bartholomew v. CNG Producing Co., 862 F.2d 555, 22 BRBS 42(CRT) (5th Cir. 1989).
If the third-party award is less than the benefits due, the employee is entitled to be paid the difference by the employer. If the award against the third party is greater than the benefits owed or previously paid by the employer, the employer is entitled to credit the employee's third-party recovery against not only its past obligations under the Act, but also any future obligations for which it may be responsible. Webb v. Santa Fe Drilling Co., 2 BRBS 367 (1975). The employee is entitled to retain all proceeds of the third-party action remaining thereafter. The employer is not only entitled to credit the third-party recovery against its liability for compensation payments under the Act, but also for all past and future Section 7 medical benefits payable to the employee. Mobley v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 20 BRBS 239 (1988), aff'd, 920 F.2d 558, 24 BRBS 49(CRT) (9th Cir. 1990); Shoemaker v. Schiavone & Sons, Inc., 20 BRBS 214 (1988); Inscoe v. Acton Corp., 19 BRBS 97 (1986), aff'd mem., 830 F.2d 1188 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Ruby v. Dresser Offshore Services, Inc., 8 BRBS 432 (1978); Webb, 2 BRBS 367.
Employer is not permitted to include in its compensation lien on claimant's third-party recovery the sum paid by employer for a confirmation medical examination by its own physician. Employer also is not permitted to include in its lien the sum charged by the Department of Labor for an impartial examination of claimant. Castro v. Maher Terminals, Inc., 710 F. Supp. 573 (D.N.J. 1989).
Claimant is entitled to offset the medical expenses paid by his private group insurance carrier because employer would have been liable for these expenses but for the fact that the private carrier had already paid them. Claimant does not receive a double recovery because he does not receive any reimbursement for these previously paid benefits. Maples v. Texports Stevedores Co., 23 BRBS 302 (1990), aff'd sub nom. Texports Stevedores Co. v. Director, OWCP, 931 F.2d 331, 28 BRBS 1(CRT) (5th Cir. 1991). In affirming the Board's decision, the court stated that under Section 33(f) claimant's right to benefits resumes when the benefits "otherwise payable" under the Act equal the net amount of the third-party recovery. Texports Stevedores Co., 931 F.2d at 334, 28 BRBS at 4(CRT).
Section 33(f) provides that employer has the first lien against the net proceeds of a third-party settlement; secondary lien rights are provided to the Special Fund and the carrier under Section 33(g)(3) and (h). Because employer is primarily liable for the payment of compensation to claimant and because the third-party action arose from the same disability for which employer would be responsible if claimant was unable to obtain recovery from a third party, the Board held that employer was entitled to priority on the lien for the third-party recovery. Lindsay v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 22 BRBS 206 (1989). The Board held that under Section 33(g)(3), however, the Special Fund's lien rights in third-party settlement proceeds have priority over the employer's offset rights against future compensation under Section 33(f), as Lindsay is not determinative of this issue. To hold otherwise would render Section 33(g)(3) meaningless, as employer's continued liability for medical and funeral expenses in this case could create future obligations subject to offset at any time, and therefore postpone repayment to the Fund. Perry v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 29 BRBS 57 (1995).
An employer need not formally intervene in a claimant's third-party suit to recoup from the claimant's third-party recovery any Longshore benefits previously paid. Miller v. Rowan Companies, Inc., 815 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1987).
The Board has rejected an employer's attempt to compute its Section 33(f) offset on a present value basis for four reasons: (1) the plain language of the statute does not provide for it; (2) no case law provides for it and the consistent practice has been to compute deficiency compensation on a dollar-for-dollar basis; (3) the New York law on which Section 33 is based does not permit it; and (4) application of a present value would undercompensate claimants. Maples v. Texports Stevedores Co., 23 BRBS 302 (1990), aff'd sub nom. Texports Stevedores Co. v. Director, OWCP, 931 F.2d 331, 28 BRBS 1(CRT) (5th Cir. 1991). In affirming the Board, the Fifth Circuit stated that while Section 33(e) refers to "present value" of future benefits, Section 33(f) does not. Given the different purposes of the two sections, they are not to be read together to allow a present value reduction for Section 33(f) purposes. Texports Stevedores Co., 931 F.2d at 333, 28 BRBS at 2(CRT).
The Board has vacated an administrative law judge's conversion of a $500 per month annuity to its alleged $50,000 present value for purposes of calculating employer's net credit. Employer is entitled to a continuing credit of $500 per month as it is paid to claimant. Cretan v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 24 BRBS 35 (1990), rev'd on other grounds, 1 F.3d 843, 27 BRBS 93(CRT) (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1219 (1994). The Supreme Court, in Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 26 BRBS 49(CRT) (1992), stated that in the case where the claimant settles his third-party suit for greater than employer's liability under the Act, the employer's liability for compensation is "wiped out" by application of Section 33(f). See also Cretan v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 1 F.3d 843, 27 BRBS 93(CRT) (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1219 (1994). The Board has rejected the finding that Section 33(f) necessarily "wipes out" employer's total liability under the Act in all cases, although this may the practical effect in many cases. Harris v. Todd Pacific Shipyards Corp., 28 BRBS 254 (1994), aff'd and modified on recon. en banc, 30 BRBS 5 (1996) (Brown and McGranery, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In neither Cowart nor Cretan was the court required to consider the long-term effect of medical treatment or of a worsening disability in an occupational disease case. In Cowart, the claimant sustained scheduled injury, and was deceased by the time the Supreme Court decided the case. Similarly, in Cretan, the employee was deceased, and inherent in the court's decision is the fact that the net amount of the third-party recovery exceeded employer's liability for decedent's inter vivos claim for disability and medical benefits and for death benefits under Section 9. In Harris, the Board held that where the forfeiture provisions of Section 33(g) do not apply, the offset provision under Section 33(f) does not "extinguish" employer's total statutory liability, but provides employer a credit in the amount of the net third-party recovery against employer's liability for both compensation and medical benefits under the Act. 28 BRBS at 269. Similarly, the Board held in Gladney, et al. v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc., 30 BRBS 25 (1996) (McGranery, J., concurring), that the Fifth Circuit's decision in Villanueva v. CNA Ins. Companies, 868 F.2d 684 (5th Cir. 1989), does not stand for the proposition that Section 33(f) extinguishes an employer's liability for benefits in all situations. See, e.g., Bundens v. J.E. Brenneman Co., 46 F.3d 292, 29 BRBS 52(CRT) (3d Cir. 1995), aff'g and rev'g 28 BRBS 20 (1994) (providing for deficiency compensation to minor son).
The Board reiterated its holdings that an employer is entitled to a Section 33(f) credit in the amount of claimant�s net proceeds of a third-party settlement against its liability for all past and future Section 7 medical benefits because the Section 33(f) offset for the �amount� determined to be payable to claimant under the Act includes both medical benefits and disability compensation, rejecting the administrative law judge�s finding to the contrary. O�Brien v. Evans Financial Corp., 31 BRBS 54 (1997) (Brown, J., dissenting on other grounds), rev�d on other grounds sub nom. Evans Financial Corp. v. Director, OWCP, 161 F.3d 30, 32 BRBS 193(CRT) (D.C. Cir. 1998).
The Board vacated an administrative law judge�s holding that employer�s credit was limited to the net amount of claimant�s settlement in view of specific terms of the release executed by claimant which could provide a contractual basis for a credit in the gross amount of the settlement proceeds if the administrative law judge found that the release �clearly and unambiguously� demonstrated an intent to provide employer with such a credit. Gremillion v. Gulf Coast Catering Co., 31 BRBS 163 (1997) (Brown, J., concurring).
The Board held that the pertinent question in this case is whether INA has a lien right under Section 33(f) against claimant�s third-party recovery for benefits it voluntarily paid to claimant after his injury. Specifically, the Board determined that INA had a lien right absent a contractual waiver of this right. Further, since INA attempted to recoup its payments from Elf, the borrowing employer, instead of claimant or the third party, and the district court dismissed INA�s intervention in the third-party case, INA could not rely on its Section 33(f) lien rights in seeking reimbursement from Elf in this case. Schaubert v. Omega Services Industries, 32 BRBS 233 (1998).
In light of existing case precedent in Force, Cretan, and Maples, holding that credits under Section 33(f) must be made on a dollar-for-dollar basis without taking into account present value or interest, the Board held that the administrative law judge properly calculated employer�s offset of a third-party settlement by crediting it for the actual amount claimant received each month under an annuity rather than awarding employer a credit based on the purchase price of the annuity. A compelling reason for adhering to this precedent is that, if the credit is taken as the money is actually received, the risk of non-payment by the annuity company is on employer rather than on claimant, thus ensuring that employer does not get a credit for third-party payments claimant may never receive. Gilliland v. E. J. Bartells Co., Inc., 34 BRBS 21 (2000), aff�d, 270 F.3d 1259, 35 BRBS 103(CRT) (9th Cir. 2001).
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the Board�s holding that employer was entitled to a dollar-for-dollar credit for the monthly payments claimant was receiving from a third-party defendant against death benefits payable by employer, at the time of receipt of each payment, rather than to a one-time credit for the present value of the annuity purchased by the third-party defendant to fund its settlement obligation. Claimant�s interpretation is inconsistent with the Act�s plain language that employer�s offset is equal to the �actual amount recovered� by the claimant, nor is there any support for claimant�s contention that employer�s entire offset is to be taken at one time. Gilliland v. E.J. Bartells Co., Inc., 270 F.3d 1259, 35 BRBS 103(CRT) (9th Cir. 2001), aff�g 34 BRBS 21 (2000).
Where claimant, decedent�s widow, did not institute civil proceedings against a third party, as required by the plain language of Section 33(f), and was not a signatory to the pre-death third-party settlement, the Board held that the Section 33(f) offset provisions were inapplicable. While claimant received a portion of the settlement funds, her receipt of the proceeds was not the result of the surrender of any of her rights, nor was it the result of any proceeding which she initiated. Doucet v. Avondale Industries, Inc., 34 BRBS 62 (2000). The Ninth Circuit reversed the Board�s holding that the last responsible employer is entitled to a credit for Section 8(i) settlement payments made by other potentially liable longshore employers in claimant�s occupational disease claim. The court rejected employer�s contention that Section 33(f) provides for a credit under these circumstances, as there was no �third party� potentially liable to both claimant and employer. Alexander v. Director, OWCP, 897 F.3d 805, 36 BRBS 25(CRT) (9th Cir. 2002), rev�g in pert. part Alexander v. Triple A Machine Shop, 32 BRBS 40 (1999) and 34 BRBS 34 (2000). The Board affirmed the administrative law judge�s finding that employer is not entitled to a credit for the amount of medical benefits it would have had to pay decedent had he proceeded with his claim under the Act. As there is no liability under the Act to decedent, there is nothing against which the third-party proceeds can be credited. Maples, 931 F.2d 331, 28 BRBS 1(CRT), therefore, is distinguishable. Moreover, the proceeds of decedent�s third-party lawsuit cannot be credited against employer�s liability for death benefits. Mabile v. Swiftships, Inc., 38 BRBS 19 (2004).
�Person Entitled to Compensation"
The Board held in Castorina v. Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., 21 BRBS 136 (1988) that the phrase "person entitled to compensation" does not apply in the same manner to Sections 33(f) and (g). While the definition of "person entitled to compensation" was limited under Section 33(g) to a claimant receiving compensation at the time of the third-party settlement, see discussion in Section 33(g) of the desk book, concerns regarding claimant's entitlement at the time of settlement were held inapplicable under Section 33(f). For purposes of Section 33(f), the Board held that one is a "person entitled to compensation" regardless of his benefit status at the time of the settlement as long as he ultimately obtains benefits under the Act. See also Armand v. American Marine Corp., 21 BRBS 305 (1988). In Force v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 23 BRBS 1 (1989), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Force v. Director, OWCP, 938 F.2d 981, 25 BRBS 13(CRT) (9th Cir. 1991), the Board rejected a widow's contention that she was not a "person entitled to compensation" at the time she settled her potential wrongful death claims prior to the death of the employee, in view of the decision in Castorina. Cf. Jones v. St. John Stevedoring Co., 18 BRBS 68 (1986), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. St. John Stevedoring Co. v. Wilfred, 818 F.2d 397, reh'g denied, 823 F.2d 552 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 976 (1987) (a survivor is not a "person entitled to compensation" prior to the employee's death). In affirming the Board's decision, the Ninth Circuit deferred to the Director's view that Section 33(f) does not require that the claimant's status as a "person entitled to compensation" be determined at any particular time; the only relevant inquiry is whether the claimant is impermissibly recovering twice for the same injury regardless of when such payments occur. Force, 938 F.2d at 984, 25 BRBS at 18(CRT). The Board followed its decision in Force in Cretan v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 24 BRBS 35 (1990), rev'd, 1 F.3d 843, 27 BRBS 93(CRT) (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1219 (1994), and Ponder v. Peter Kiewit Sons' Co., 24 BRBS 46 (1990).
In view of the Supreme Court's decision in Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 26 BRBS 49(CRT) (1992), the Ninth Circuit again discussed the meaning of the phrase "person entitled to compensation" under Section 33(f). Cretan v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 1 F.3d 843, 27 BRBS 93(CRT) (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1219 (1994). In Cowart, the Supreme Court held that an employee becomes a "person entitled to compensation" under Section 33(g) at the moment his right to recovery vests and not when an employer admits liability. Cowart, 505 U.S. at 477, 26 BRBS at 52(CRT). The Court stated that the normal meaning of entitlement includes a right or benefit for which a person qualifies, and does not depend upon whether the rights have been acknowledged or adjudicated, but only upon the person's satisfying the prerequisites attached to the right. In Cretan, the Ninth Circuit held that the phrase "person entitled to compensation" must receive the same construction under Sections 33(f) and (g). In affirming the Board's holding that employer is entitled to an offset under Section 33(f), the court rejected the claimants' contention that they were not "persons entitled to compensation" inasmuch as they settled their third-party suits prior to the employee's death. The court held that, consistent with Force, the right to death benefits does not have to become vested at the time of the third-party settlement for purposes of employer's offset; the inquiry is whether claimant is recovering twice for the same injury regardless of when payments for the injury occur. Cretan, 1 F.3d at 847, 27 BRBS at 98(CRT). The court's analysis led it to conclude that claimants were also "persons entitled to compensation" under Section 33(g) and that their failure to obtain employer's consent to the settlements barred their receipt of benefits, reversing the Board's decision on this issue. See Force v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 30 BRBS 128, 131 (1996). The Fifth Circuit rejected the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of Cowart in Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. v. Director, OWCP, 65 F.3d 460, 29 BRBS 113 (CRT) (5th Cir. 1995), aff'g Yates v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc., 28 BRBS 137 (1994)(Brown, J., concurring) (Smith, J., dissenting). The Fifth Circuit affirmed the Board's holding that one is not a "person entitled to compensation" under Cowart in a death benefits claim until the death of the employee, specifically disagreeing with the Cretan court's interpretation of "person entitled to compensation" as contrary to the "vesting" discussion in Cowart. See Henderson v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc., 30 BRBS 150, 154 (1996). The Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit�s decision and held that before an injured worker�s death, the worker�s spouse is not a �person entitled to compensation� for death benefits within the meaning of Section 33(g)(1). Accordingly, the worker�s spouse does not forfeit the right t