Source: https://www.flra.gov/decisions/v44/44-121.html
Timestamp: 2016-07-26 14:10:49
Document Index: 782966226

Matched Legal Cases: ['art 2425', '§ 511', '§ 5596', '§ 5596', '§ 5596', 'Art, 39', 'Art, 39', '§ 5596']

44:1548(121)AR - - Army, Fort Polk, LA and NAGE Local R5-168 - - 1992 FLRAdec AR - - v44 p1548 | FLRA
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The decision of the Authority follows: 44 FLRA No. 121 FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY WASHINGTON, D.C. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FORT POLK, LOUISIANA (Agency) and NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES LOCAL R5-168 (Union) 0-AR-2145 DECISION May 29, 1992 Before Chairman McKee and Members Talkin and
Arbitrator Harold R. Ainsworth filed by both the Union and the Agency under
Statute) and part 2425 of the Authority's Rules and Regulations. The Union
filed an opposition to the Agency's exceptions, and the Agency filed an
opposition to the Union's exception. The grievant filed a grievance claiming that under the parties'
collective bargaining agreement, she was entitled to have been temporarily
promoted for having performed the duties of a higher-graded position for an
extended period of time. The Arbitrator sustained the grievance and awarded the
grievant a retroactive temporary promotion with backpay. However, the
Arbitrator denied the Union's motion for an award of attorney fees. With respect to the Union's exception, we conclude that the
Arbitrator's denial of attorney fees is deficient, and we will strike that
portion of the award. With respect to the Agency's exceptions, we conclude that
the Agency provides no basis for finding the award deficient, and we will deny
the Agency's exceptions. However, we conclude that to the extent that the award
does not provide interest on the backpay, the award is deficient and we will
modify it accordingly. II. Background and Arbitrator's Award The grievant is employed by the Agency as a budget assistant, GS-7. She
filed a grievance, claiming that from October 11, 1988, through November 14,
1989, she performed the duties of the position of budget analyst, GS-9 and that
under the parties' collective bargaining agreement she was entitled to have
been temporarily promoted. The grievance was not resolved and was submitted to
arbitration. As a threshold matter, the Arbitrator rejected the Agency's argument
that the grievance was not arbitrable under the parties' agreement because it
concerned the classification of the grievant's position. He found that the
grievance did not concern classification, but rather concerned whether the
grievant performed the work of the GS-9 budget analyst position. Accordingly,
the Arbitrator ruled that the grievance was arbitrable. On the merits, the Arbitrator sustained the grievance. He noted that
under the parties' agreement, when all requirements for promotion are met and
an employee is assigned to a higher-graded position for more than 60
consecutive calendar days, the employee is entitled to be temporarily
promoted.(1) Based on the
evidence and testimony presented, the Arbitrator determined that the grievant
had performed the duties of the budget analyst position, as claimed. Specifically, the Arbitrator found that the grievant had documented the
work that she performed during this period and that the work was that of the
GS-9 budget analyst position. He explained that the work had consistently been
considered GS-9 budget analyst work and that such a determination could not be
changed in face of the grievance. The Arbitrator also noted that the grievant's
supervisor had certified during this period that the grievant was performing
the duties of the GS-9 budget analyst position. Although the grievant's
supervisor subsequently retracted that certification, the Arbitrator concluded
that the grievant's supervisor was "being candid" when she certified that the
grievant was performing higher-grade duties. Award at 5. In addition, the Arbitrator concluded that vacancies in the grievant's
office supported her claim. The Arbitrator noted that in October 1988, the
grievant's supervisor, at the time a GS-9 budget analyst in the office, was
promoted to supervisor and assumed those duties. The Arbitrator further noted
that with the supervisor assuming that position, the office had two vacant GS-9
budget analyst positions. In the Arbitrator's view, although the grievant's
supervisor probably continued to perform some of the work that she had
previously performed, the supervisor could not have performed the duties of two
GS-9 budget analysts; and that "[s]ome of these duties had to be assumed by
[the grievant]." Id. The Arbitrator was also convinced that the
grievant's large amount of overtime during the period supported her claim. In
the Arbitrator's view, the overtime demonstrated that the grievant was
performing the duties of the GS-9 budget analyst position because while
performing those duties, she still had to perform the work of her budget
assistant position, which required her to work overtime. Accordingly, the Arbitrator awarded the grievant a retroactive
temporary promotion to GS-9 for the period of October 11, 1988, through
November 14, 1989. However, the Arbitrator denied the Union's motion for
attorney fees, finding that an award of fees was not warranted in the interest
of justice because the Agency's position was "decided by litigating the
issue[]" and was not in "bad faith." Id. at 7. In the Arbitrator's view,
"[t]he fact that the Grievance was sustained does not justify in itself the
award of attorney's fees and costs." Id. III. Agency's First Exception A. Positions of the Parties 1. The Agency The Agency maintains that the grievance concerns the classification of
a position. Consequently, the Agency contends that the award is deficient
because it is contrary to section 7121(c)(5) of the Statute and fails to draw
its essence from the parties' collective bargaining agreement. The Agency asserts that the grievance and the Arbitrator's framing of
the issue clearly indicate that the essential nature of the grievance concerned
the duties assigned to and performed by the grievant and the grade level of
those duties. The Agency also argues that the grievant's requested relief went
beyond enforcement of the temporary promotion provision of the parties'
agreement and included reclassification of the grievant's position.
Accordingly, the Agency claims that the award is deficient because the
grievance was precluded by section 7121(c)(5) of the Statute. The Agency
further claims that the grievance concerns the classification of a position
within the meaning of Article XXXVI, Section 5g of the parties' agreement,
which excludes such matters from coverage by the parties' negotiated grievance
procedure. The Agency argues that by failing to find that the grievance was not
arbitrable, the award evidences a manifest disregard of the agreement. 2. The Union The Union disputes that the grievance concerned the classification of a
position. The Union contends that the grievant did not contest the
classification of any position. The Union maintains that the grievant was
claiming only that for a temporary period of time, she was performing the
duties of the higher-graded budget analyst position. B. Analysis and Conclusions We conclude that the Agency fails to establish that the award is
contrary to section 7121(c)(5) of the Statute or fails to draw its essence from
the collective bargaining agreement. Section 7121(c)(5) precludes any grievance concerning "the
or pay of an employee." The Authority has uniformly and repeatedly held that
grievances over whether a grievant was entitled under a collective bargaining
agreement to have been temporarily promoted by reason of having temporarily
performed the duties of a higher-graded position do not concern the
classification of any position within the meaning of section 7121(c)(5) of the
Statute. U.S. Department of the Navy, Naval Aviation Depot, Marine Corps Air
Station, Cherry Point, North Carolina and International Association of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers, Local 2297, 42 FLRA 795 (1991) (Marine
Corps Air Station); American Federation of Government Employees, Local
1923 and U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Social Security
Administration, Baltimore, Maryland, 38 FLRA 89 (1990) (and cases cited in
the decision) (SSA, Baltimore); American Federation of Government
Employees, Local 987 and U.S. Department of the Air Force, Warner Robins Air
Logistics Center, Robins Air Force Base, Georgia, 37 FLRA 386 (1990) (and
cases cited in the decision) (Robins AFB). The Authority has viewed the meaning of "classification" under section
7121(c)(5) in the context of 5 C.F.R. § 511.101(c), which defines the term
as "the analysis and identification of a position and placing it in a class
under the position-classification plan established by OPM [Office of Personnel
Management] under chapter 51 of title 5, United States Code." As emphasized by
the Union, the grievant did not claim before the Arbitrator that her position
should be reclassified because she had performed the duties of a higher-graded
position. Before the Arbitrator, the grievant merely claimed that she was
entitled to have been temporarily promoted for the time during which she
performed the duties of the higher-graded budget analyst position. The
Arbitrator did not reclassify the grievant's position at the higher grade.
Instead, in resolving the grievance the Arbitrator merely examined the duties
of the GS-7 budget assistant position and the GS-9 budget analyst position as
previously established and classified by management. The question resolved by
the Arbitrator was whether the grievant was entitled to a temporary promotion
for performing the duties of the GS-9 budget analyst position for an extended
period of time. We refuse to find that such a grievance concerns the classification of
any position within the meaning of section 7121(c)(5) of the Statute.
See Marine Corps Air Station; SSA, Baltimore (and cases
cited in the decision); Robins AFB (and cases cited in the decision).
Moreover, we are not persuaded otherwise by the grievant's request at the time
she filed her grievance to be "non-competitively promot[ed] to the GS-9 Budget
Analyst position." Employee Grievance Form, Agency's Exceptions, Enclosure 3.
Regardless of what the grievant may have intended by that request, the sole
issue submitted to and resolved by the Arbitrator was whether the grievant was
entitled to have been temporarily promoted. See SSA, Baltimore,
38 FLRA at 95 (grievants' request that their lower-graded positions be upgraded
did not bar under section 7121(c)(5) the grievances over the performance of
higher-graded duties because the request was not "urged by the Union" and was
not addressed by the arbitrator). Because we find that the grievance does not concern the classification
of a position within the meaning of section 7121(c)(5) of the Statute, we
likewise find that the Agency has not established that the award fails to draw
its essence from the collective bargaining agreement by manifestly disregarding
the exclusion from the negotiated grievance procedure for grievances concerning
the classification of any position. See U.S. Department of Labor and
Local 12, American Federation of Government Employees, 24 FLRA 435, 436-37
(1986) (Authority found that grievance did not concern the classification of
any position and denied the Agency's exception contending that the award was
contrary to section 7121(c)(5) and the corresponding exclusion in the parties'
collective bargaining agreement). Accordingly, we will deny the Agency's exception. IV. Agency's Second Exception A. Positions of the Parties The Agency contends that the award is contrary to the Back Pay Act. The
Agency notes that in order for a retroactive temporary promotion with backpay
to be authorized, the Arbitrator was required to find that: (1) an Agency
personnel action with respect to the grievant was unjustified or unwarranted;
(2) the action directly resulted in the reduction of the grievant's pay; and
(3) but for the action, the grievant otherwise would not have suffered the pay
reduction. The Agency asserts that the award is deficient because the
Arbitrator failed to find that but for the action, the grievant otherwise would
have been temporarily promoted. The Agency further asserts that the Arbitrator
could not have found that the grievant would have been temporarily promoted
because the Agency would have selected an employee other than the grievant for
a temporary promotion due to the grievant's performance deficiencies. The Union contends that no basis is provided for finding the award
contrary to the Back Pay Act. B. Analysis and Conclusions We conclude that the Agency fails to establish that by awarding
backpay, the award is contrary to the Back Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. § 5596.
However, we conclude that to the extent that the award does not provide
interest on the backpay, the award is deficient and must be modified. Under the Back Pay Act, an award of backpay is authorized only when the
grievant has been affected by an unjustified or unwarranted agency personnel
action that has resulted in the withdrawal or reduction of all or part of the
grievant's pay, allowances, or differentials. For example, U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development, Regional Office, Atlanta, Georgia
and American Federation of Government Employees, Local 1568, 41 FLRA 520,
524 (1991) (HUD). As recognized by the Agency, in order to award
backpay, an arbitrator must find that: (1) the aggrieved employee was affected
directly resulted in the withdrawal or reduction of the grievant's pay,
otherwise would not have suffered the withdrawal or reduction. Id. at
524-25. In our view, the Arbitrator's award satisfies these requirements of the
Back Pay Act. The Arbitrator's finding that the Agency failed to temporarily promote
the grievant as required by the parties' collective bargaining agreement
constitutes the required finding that the grievant had been affected by an
unjustified or unwarranted personnel action. See U.S. Department of
Veterans Affairs Medical Center, Allen Park, Michigan and American Federation
of Government Employees, Local 933, 38 FLRA 688, 697-98 (1990) (VA
Medical Center) (the agency's failure to temporarily promote and pay the
grievant for performing higher-graded duties as required by the collective
bargaining agreement constituted an unwarranted personnel action). In addition,
the Agency's failure to temporarily promote the grievant clearly resulted in a
loss of pay to the grievant. See HUD, 41 FLRA at 525; VA
Medical Center, 38 FLRA at 698. Therefore, we find that implicit in the
Arbitrator's findings and award is the necessary connection between the
Agency's failure to temporarily promote the grievant as required by the
parties' agreement and the grievant's loss of pay. See HUD, 41
FLRA at 525; VA Medical Center, 38 FLRA at 698. The Authority has uniformly found that an arbitrator has made a
properly supported award of backpay under the Back Pay Act whenever an
arbitrator has determined that an agency has denied an employee a temporary
promotion to which the employee was entitled for having performed the duties of
a higher-graded position for an extended period of time. For example,
American Federation of Government Employees, Local 1592 and U.S. Department
of the Air Force, Hill Air Force Base, Utah, 44 FLRA 147, 152 (1992) ("It
is well established that, if an agency's violation of a collective bargaining
agreement results in the denial of a temporary promotion to which the grievant
would otherwise be entitled under that agreement, an arbitrator may, consistent
with applicable law and regulations, award a noncompetitive temporary promotion
with backpay to that grievant for a period of up to 2 years."); VA Medical
Center, 38 FLRA at 697; Department of the Army, New Cumberland Army
Depot and American Federation of Government Employees, Local 2004, 21 FLRA
968, 971 (1986) (New Cumberland Army Depot). As the Authority ruled in
New Cumberland Army Depot, when an arbitrator finds that an employee
should have been temporarily promoted as the result of the performance of the
duties of a higher-graded position for an extended period of time, "the award
of backpay is clearly consistent with the grievant's statutory entitlement
under the Back Pay Act to receive the pay that he would have earned if the
unwarranted action had not occurred . . . ." 21 FLRA at 971 (citing 5
U.S.C.§ 5596(b)(1)(A)(i)). In finding the award properly supported, we reject the Agency's claim
that the Arbitrator could not have found that the grievant would have been
selected by the Agency for a temporary promotion to GS-9. In the circumstances
of this case, an employee becomes entitled to a temporary promotion by
performing the duties of a higher-graded position for 60 consecutive calendar
days, rather than by being selected for promotion by the Agency. Because the
grievant performed the duties of the GS-9 budget analyst position for more than
60 consecutive calendar days, the grievant was entitled to have been promoted,
and it is irrelevant whether she would have been selected by the Agency in a
selection action for a temporary promotion. Under 5 U.S.C. § 5596(b)(2)(A), as amended, an employee who is
found to have been subjected to an unjustified or unwarranted personnel action
that has resulted in a reduction in the employee's pay, allowances, or
differentials is entitled to interest on any backpay award. For example,
U.S. Department of the Army, New Cumberland Army Depot, New Cumberland,
40 FLRA 186, 193-94 (1991); U.S. Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant
Health Inspection Service, Plant Protection and Quarantine, Hyattsville,
Maryland and National Association of Agriculture Employees, 38 FLRA 1291,
1299 (1991); U.S. Department of Defense, Marine Corps Logistics Base,
Barstow, California and American Federation of Government Employees, Local
1492, 37 FLRA 796, 797 (1990) (Marine Corps Logistics Base). As we
held in Marine Corps Logistics Base, "interest must be paid" on backpay
awards such as the one in this case. 37 FLRA at 797. Accordingly, the
Arbitrator's failure to award interest on his award of backpay is inconsistent
with the Back Pay Act, and we will modify the award to include interest. V. Agency's Third Exception A. Positions of the Parties 1. The Agency The Agency contends that the award is deficient because it is based on
a nonfact. The Agency asserts that the basis for the award was the Arbitrator's
belief that in view of the vacancies for budget analysts in the grievant's
office, the grievant must have been performing the duties of the GS-9 budget
analyst position because the grievant's supervisor could not have been
performing the work of two budget analysts. In support of this contention, the
Agency cites to the Arbitrator's award and submits a memorandum from the
Agency's representative at the arbitration. The memorandum states that, after
receiving the award, the representative called the Arbitrator for a
clarification and that during the phone conversation, the Arbitrator stated
that the grievant must have been performing the duties of the GS-9 budget
analyst position because her supervisor could not have been doing the work of
the supervisory position and two budget analysts. The Agency maintains that, contrary to the belief of the Arbitrator,
there were not two GS-9 budget analyst vacancies. The Agency alleges that one
of the positions was filled on October 1, 1988, and that the grievant's
supervisor continued to perform her GS-9 budget analyst duties while performing
the duties of the supervisory budget analyst position. Therefore, the Agency
contends that no single person was performing the work of three positions and
that the Arbitrator's finding is clearly erroneous, but for which a different
result would have been reached. 2. The Union The Union contends that the Agency's exception simply disagrees with
the Arbitrator's findings of fact and provides no basis for finding that the
award is based on a nonfact. The Union also asserts that the memorandum of the
Agency's representative should be stricken from the record because the
representative's discussion with the Arbitrator constituted an impermissible
ex parte communication. B. Analysis and Conclusions We conclude that the Agency fails to establish that the award is
deficient because it is based on a nonfact. We will find an award deficient because it is based on a nonfact when
the appealing party establishes that the central fact underlying the award is
clearly erroneous and that but for the arbitrator's reliance on that fact, the
arbitrator would have reached a different result. For example,
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and National Treasury Employees
Union, 35 FLRA 241, 247 (1990) (FDIC). We find that the Agency fails
to establish that the central fact underlying the award was the Arbitrator's
finding that the grievant's supervisor was performing the duties of three
positions and that but for the Arbitrator's reliance on this finding, the
Arbitrator would have denied the grievance. In our view, the Arbitrator's conclusion that the grievant performed
the duties of the GS-9 budget analyst position was based on findings more
extensive than the Arbitrator's assumption that the supervisor could not have
been performing the duties of two budget analysts and that, therefore, some of
the duties had to have been assumed by the grievant. In addition, the
Arbitrator based his award on the grievant's documentation that she performed
the work of the GS-9 budget analyst position; the grievant's supervisor's
certification during the period in dispute that the grievant was performing the
duties of the GS-9 budget analyst position; and the grievant's large amount of
overtime during the period. Consequently, even if the Arbitrator's reliance on
the vacancies in the grievant's office was clearly erroneous, we are not
persuaded that this disputed finding was central to the award such that the
result would have been different, but for the Arbitrator's reliance on it. The
Agency is merely disagreeing with the Arbitrator's overall finding that the
grievant had performed the duties of the budget analyst position, and such
disagreement provides no basis for finding the award deficient. See
FDIC, 35 FLRA at 247-48. Accordingly, we will deny the Agency's exception.(2) VI. Agency's Fourth Exception A. Positions of the Parties The Agency contends that the award fails to draw its essence from the
parties' collective bargaining agreement. The Agency argues that the Arbitrator's award of a retroactive
temporary promotion has no rational basis in the agreement because Article
XLIV, Section 7 does not provide for a temporary promotion unless the employee
is assigned to a vacant position at the higher grade. The Agency asserts that
the Arbitrator found only that the grievant assumed the duties of the budget
analyst position and did not find that she was assigned to the position. The
Agency further asserts that at all relevant times, all budget analyst positions
in the office were encumbered and there was no vacant position to which the
grievant could have been assigned. The Agency also argues that the remedy is
deficient by commencing the promotion on the first day of the grievant's
assignment. The Agency maintains that under the terms of the agreement, the
promotion is to be effected when the employee is assigned for more than 60
consecutive calendar days. The Union contends that the award is consistent with the collective
bargaining agreement. B. Analysis and Conclusions We conclude that the Agency has not established that the award fails to
draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement. In order for the Authority to find that an award is deficient because
it fails to draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement, it must
be established that the award: (1) is so unfounded in reason and fact and so
agreement as to manifest an infidelity to the obligation of the arbitrator; (2)
does not represent a plausible interpretation of the agreement; (3) cannot in
any rational way be derived from the agreement; or (4) evidences a manifest
disregard of the agreement. For example, United States Department of
(1990) (OSHA). These tests and the private sector cases from which they
are derived make it clear that an arbitrator's award will not be found to fail
to draw its essence from the agreement merely because a party believes that the
arbitrator misinterpreted the agreement. OSHA, 34 FLRA at 573. The
question of the interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement is a
question solely for the arbitrator because it is the arbitrator's construction
of the agreement for which the parties have bargained. Id. at 576. In this case, the Arbitrator's conclusion that the grievant was
entitled to have been temporarily promoted beginning on October 11, 1988, under
the terms of Article XLIV, Section 7 constituted his interpretation and
application of the agreement. In our view, the Agency fails to establish that
the Arbitrator's interpretation and application disregards the agreement or is
unfounded, implausible, or irrational. Contrary to the Agency's contentions,
Article XLIV, Section 7 does not expressly require that an employee must be
assigned to a vacant position to receive a temporary promotion and does not
expressly provide that in all cases the temporary promotion is to begin on the
61st consecutive day of the assignment. It merely states that a temporary
promotion will be effected when an employee is assigned to a higher-graded
position for more than 60 consecutive calendar days and all requirements for
promotion have been met. Consequently, the Agency fails to establish that the Arbitrator's
interpretation and application of Article XLIV, Section 7 conflicts with
express provisions of the agreement. Compare American Federation of
Government Employees, Local 547 and Tampa Veterans Administration Hospital,
19 FLRA 725 (1985); Overseas Education Association and Office of Dependents
Schools, Department of Defense, 4 FLRA 98 (1980). Instead, the Agency's
contentions constitute nothing more than disagreement with the Arbitrator's
interpretation and application of the agreement and an attempt to have its
interpretation substituted for that of the Arbitrator. Disagreement with an
arbitrator's interpretation and application of a collective bargaining
agreement provides no basis for finding an award deficient under the Statute.
For example, OSHA, 34 FLRA at 576. Accordingly, we will deny the
Agency's exception. VII. Agency's Fifth Exception A. Positions of the Parties 1. The Agency The Agency contends that the Arbitrator was biased against the Agency
and that the award was tainted by improper contacts between the Union and the
Arbitrator. The Agency asserts that on August 28, 1990, the Arbitrator and the
Union engaged in an ex parte communication prohibited by the
collective bargaining agreement. The Agency further asserts that on May 22,
1991, an agent of the Union drove the Arbitrator to the arbitration hearing and
after the hearing drove the Arbitrator and the Union's attorney to the airport
approximately 70 miles away. The Agency maintains that these incidents are
inconsistent with the practice of the parties, which has been to require
arbitrators to provide their own transportation. The Agency claims that
previous arbitrators have never had contact of any consequence with
representatives of either party while handling a case without the other party's
presence or consent.(3) The Agency also asserts that the Arbitrator's bias was evident during
the hearing. The Agency notes that in response to testimony concerning the
reprimand of the grievant's supervisor for falsification of government records,
the Arbitrator commented as follows: In all due respect to the Army and the government of the United
States, people that falsify -- you call it falsify, I don't really call it
falsify. They say things on government pieces of paper that are not correct. .
. . People don't get reprimanded on account of that. . . . Exceptions at 7 (quoting the Arbitrator). The Agency claims that these
statements clearly indicate the bias and partiality of the Arbitrator because
they demonstrate his preconceived notion that falsification of government
documents is acceptable even if an employee's qualifications are illegally
enhanced. The Agency further claims that the timing of the Union's request for
attorney fees also evidences the Arbitrator's bias. The Agency notes that
rather than submitting a request for attorney fees after receipt of a favorable
award, the Union's attorney submitted the request before an award was
issued. 2. The Union The Union disputes that there were improper contacts between the Union
and the Arbitrator and that the Arbitrator was biased. The Union maintains that the August 28 telephone call concerned
scheduling and administrative matters as in every arbitration case. The Union
asserts that no substantive matters were discussed and notes that the
Arbitrator and Agency representatives must also have talked about scheduling
because Agency representatives showed up for the hearing. The Union also
maintains that at the time of the arbitration hearing, there had been flooding
in Louisiana and rental cars were virtually impossible to obtain. The Union
claims that as a result of these transportation problems, the Union provided
the Arbitrator with a ride to the hearing and provided the Arbitrator and the
Union's attorney with a ride to the airport after the hearing. The Union
asserts that the ride to the airport was offered only after the parties'
representatives had discussed the matter and management voiced no objection.
Finally, the Union maintains that the filing of a request for attorney fees
before issuance of the award is fully consistent with and advisable under
Authority practice. The Union claims that it is therefore "outrage[ous]" and
"ridiculous" for the Agency to insinuate bias from the timing of the request.
Opposition at 8. B. Analysis and Conclusions We conclude that the Agency fails to establish that the Arbitrator was
biased. The Authority will find an award deficient when the award was procured
by fraud, corruption, or undue means; when there was partiality or corruption
on the part of the Arbitrator; or when the arbitrator was guilty of misconduct
by which the rights of any party were prejudiced. For example,
Department of the Army, Headquarters, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)
and Fort Campbell, Fort Campbell, Kentucky and American Federation of
Government Employees, Local 2022, 7 FLRA 18, 19 (1981) (Ft.
Campbell). In National Gallery of Art and American Federation of
Government Employees, Local 1831, 39 FLRA 226, 233-34 (1991) (National
Gallery of Art), we reviewed the standards applied by the Federal courts
when a party seeks to have an arbitration award vacated on this ground. We
noted that the courts review the record to ascertain whether the arbitrator's
conduct destroyed the fundamental fairness of the process and that the courts
require the party challenging the award to prove specific facts indicating
impropriety. We further noted that the courts have found awards deficient on
this basis when: (1) a reasonable person would conclude that the arbitrator was
partial; (2) the circumstances are powerfully suggestive of bias; or (3) the
evidence of impropriety is direct, definite, and capable of demonstration.
National Gallery of Art, 39 FLRA at 234. We conclude that no basis is provided for finding the award deficient.
We have carefully reviewed the circumstances cited by the Agency and the
explanations provided by the Union. We are not persuaded that the Agency has
directly and definitely demonstrated that the award was procured by fraud,
corruption, or undue means; or that there was partiality or corruption on the
part of the Arbitrator; or that the Arbitrator was guilty of misconduct by
which the rights of any party were prejudiced under any of the tests commonly
applied by Federal courts in private sector labor relations cases. See
Ft. Campbell, 7 FLRA at 19 (exception totally devoid of any
substantiation that the award was deficient because of alleged improper
contacts between the agency and the arbitrator). In our view, the Agency has
failed to establish any impropriety that destroyed the fairness of the
arbitration proceedings. See National Gallery of Art, 39 FLRA at
234. Accordingly, we will deny the Agency's exception. VIII. Agency's Sixth Exception A. Positions of the Parties The Agency contends that the award conflicts with the decision of the
Comptroller General in Cassandra G. McPeak and Wayne E. Dabney, 69 Comp.
Gen. 93 (1989) (McPeak). The Agency argues that McPeak requires
that an employee be assigned to the higher-graded position in order to be
entitled to a temporary promotion and that, in this case, the grievant only
assumed the duties of the budget analyst position without ever being assigned
to it. The Union does not address this exception. B. Analysis and Conclusions We conclude that the Agency provides no basis for finding that the
award is contrary to the Comptroller General's decision in McPeak. In U.S. Department of the Navy, Long Beach Naval Shipyard, Long
Beach, California and International Federation of Professional and Technical
Engineers, Local 174, 37 FLRA 1111 (1990) (Long Beach Naval
Shipyard), we noted that, as confirmed in McPeak, an exception to
the general rule that an employee is entitled only to the salary of the
position to which the employee is actually appointed exists when "the parties
to a collective bargaining agreement agree to make temporary promotions
mandatory for details to higher grade positions, thereby establishing a
nondiscretionary agency policy which would provide a basis for backpay." 37
FLRA at 1119 (quoting McPeak, 69 Comp. Gen. at 94). In McPeak,
the Comptroller General concluded that the affected employees were not entitled
to retroactive temporary promotions because "there [was] no evidence of a
detail of the employees to the higher-graded position. Instead, it appear[ed]
that over a period of several years they either assumed or were assigned some
duties which were associated with the higher-graded position." 69 Comp. Gen. at
94. In this case, in contrast, the record reflects that beginning on
October 11, 1988, the grievant was assigned and directed to perform certain
additional duties. The primary issue submitted to arbitration concerned whether
those duties were the duties of a GS-7 budget assistant, as claimed by the
Agency, or a GS-9 budget analyst, as claimed by the grievant. The Arbitrator
sustained the grievance, concluding that the grievant had performed the work of
the GS-9 budget analyst position. Based on his interpretation and application
of Article XLIV, Section 7 of the parties' collective bargaining agreement, the
Arbitrator ruled that the grievant was entitled to have been temporarily
promoted. Consequently, unlike the situation in McPeak, it is clear in
this case that, as found by the Arbitrator, the grievant was assigned and
performed the duties of the GS-9 position and was entitled under the parties'
agreement to a temporary promotion. We find nothing in McPeak that
precluded the Arbitrator from ordering a temporary promotion with backpay in
these circumstances. See Long Beach Naval Shipyard, 37 FLRA at
1119. Unlike the Agency, we have not viewed McPeak as requiring a
formal detail or assignment. For example, in Marine Corps Air Station,
42 FLRA 795, the arbitrator rejected the agency's claim that compensation of
the higher-graded position was precluded by McPeak because the grievant
was never detailed to the higher-graded position. The arbitrator ruled that the
Federal Personnel Manual does not require any particular formality in the
assignment of a different set of job duties in order to constitute a detail.
Finding that the grievant was assigned the duties of a higher-graded position
for a legitimate management purpose, the arbitrator concluded that the grievant
had been detailed. Similarly, the arbitrator in Long Beach Naval
Shipyard found that the assignment of higher-graded duties to the grievant
by his supervisor for a legitimate management purpose constituted a detail. In
both cases, we found that awards of backpay by the arbitrators were consistent
with McPeak. Marine Corps Air Station, 42 FLRA at 802; Long
Beach Naval Shipyard, 37 FLRA at 1119; see also 57 Comp. Gen. 536,
545 (1978) ("where there is a mandatory provision requiring temporary promotion
for assignments to higher level positions and where the fact-finder has
determined that the assignment of higher level work is of such magnitude as to
be equivalent to a 'detail' to the established higher level position, an award
of a retroactive temporary promotion with backpay may be proper . . . ."). Consequently, we have consistently held that agreement provisions
entitling employees to temporary promotions are enforceable either when they
are detailed to the higher-graded position or when they are assigned or
directed to perform the duties of the higher-graded position. For
example, American Federation of Government Employees, Local 1592 and
U.S. Department of the Air Force, Hill Air Force Base, Utah, 44 FLRA 147,
152-53 (1992); U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Center, Allen
Park, Michigan and American Federation of Government Employees, Local 933,
38 FLRA 688, 697 (1990); U.S. Department of the Air Force, Warner Robins Air
Force Logistics Center, Robins Air Force Base, Georgia and American Federation
of Government Employees, Local 987, 37 FLRA 155, 158 (1990). Accordingly,
we will deny the Agency's exception. IX. Agency's Seventh Exception A. Positions of the Parties 1. The Agency The Agency maintains that on October 11, 1988, the grievant did not
meet the minimum qualification requirements set by the Office of Personnel
Management for promotion to the GS-9 budget analyst position. Thus, the Agency
contends that the award is contrary to civil service regulations. The Agency
likewise contends that the award fails to draw its essence from the collective
bargaining agreement because the award disregards the provision of Article
XLIV, Section 7 that all requirements for promotion must be met before an
employee can be temporarily promoted for having been assigned to a
higher-graded position. The Agency asserts that the grievant failed to meet the minimum
qualification requirements for promotion because she lacked the required
experience of 1 year as a GS-7 budget analyst. In support of this exception,
the Agency has submitted the statement of an Agency personnel staffing
specialist. The statement notes that on November 16, 1988, new qualification
standards were issued for the budget analyst position series and states that
under these standards the grievant was qualified for promotion to the GS-9
budget analyst position. However, the statement concludes that under the
standards applicable on October 11, 1988, the grievant was not minimally
qualified for promotion to the GS-9 budget analyst position because she had not
served at least 1 year as a budget analyst at the GS-7 level. 2. The Union The Union objects to the statement of the personnel staffing specialist
because it was never submitted to the Arbitrator. The Union also challenges the
specialist's "qualifications, background, and basis for his conclusion."
Opposition at 4. The Union further asserts that on May 4, 1989, the grievant
was rated qualified for promotion to a GS-9 budget analyst position and that,
therefore, the Agency is precluded from claiming that the grievant was not
qualified for promotion. B. Analysis and Conclusions 1. We will strike the Agency's Exhibit Section 2429.5 of our Rules provides as follows: The Authority will not consider evidence offered by a party, or any
proper. We reject the Agency's attempt to present evidence to the Authority that
was not presented to the Arbitrator concerning the qualifications of the
grievant for promotion. See U.S. Small Business Administration,
Washington, D.C. and American Federation of Government Employees, Council 228,
Local 2532, 38 FLRA 386, 405-06 (1990) (SBA); National Weather
Service Employees Organization and U.S. Department of Commerce, National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather Service, 38 FLRA
369, 383 (1990). Because the opinion of the personnel staffing specialist was
not presented to the Arbitrator, we view our consideration of this evidence to
be precluded by section 2429.5. See SBA, 38 FLRA at 405.
Furthermore, the qualifications of the grievant are not a proper matter for
official notice. Compare id. (official notice of decisions of the
Merit Systems Protection Board and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit). We, therefore, grant the Union's motion to strike, and we have not
considered the opinion of the Agency's personnel staffing specialist. However,
we will consider the Agency's arguments that the grievant was not qualified for
promotion under the applicable civil service qualification standards. In our
view, these arguments present the issue of whether the award is deficient on
any grounds set forth in section 7122(a) of the Statute. Such an issue is not
precluded under section 2429.5 because it is an issue that arose only after the
Arbitrator issued his award and could not have been presented to the
Arbitrator. See id. at 406. In resolving this issue, we will take
official notice that on November 16, 1988, new qualification standards were
issued by the Office of Personnel Management for the budget analyst position
series. See id. at 405. 2. The Award Is Not Deficient The Agency has argued that the grievant was not qualified under the
qualification standards applicable on October 11, 1988, because she had not
served for at least a year as a budget analyst at GS-7. However, clearly no
basis is provided for finding that the award is deficient to the extent that
the Arbitrator has awarded the grievant a retroactive temporary promotion from
November 16, 1988, through November 14, 1989. Independent of the statement of
the Agency's staffing specialist, the record reflects that the Agency had found
the grievant qualified for promotion to GS-9 budget analyst under the
qualification standards that applied after November 15, 1988. Therefore, in our
view, the only issue presented by the Agency's exception is the propriety of
the award of a retroactive temporary promotion from October 11, 1988, through
November 15, 1988. On this issue, we find that the Agency has failed to
establish that the grievant was not qualified for promotion. Although the Agency failed to provide a copy of the qualification
standards for the GS-9 budget analyst position applicable on October 11, 1988,
we have reviewed those standards, and we find no requirement that in order to
have been qualified for the GS-9 budget analyst position, an employee must have
served for at least a year as a GS-7 budget analyst. Contrary to the claim of
the Agency, the applicable standards permitted qualifying experience to be
gained in a wide range of positions. Although the standards provided that
qualifying experience "[t]ypically . . . is demonstrated by accomplishment of
assignments of the difficulty and responsibility described in the position
classification standard used to evaluate positions at the next lower grade
level in the normal line of promotion to the position being filled[,]" the
standards also provided that "[s]uch experience may have been gained as a
specialist in budget work, as an operating official, or as a staff specialist
in accounting, financial management, financial analysis, management analysis,
program analysis, or other responsible analytical administrative or
professional work that also provided a knowledge of the programs,
organizational structure, and work processes of the employing organization."
Handbook X-118, Budget Analyst Qualification Standards at 2, Transmittal Sheet
No. 189, June 1981. We are further persuaded that the Agency has failed to establish that
the grievant was not qualified when we compare the qualification standards
under which the grievant was found to be qualified. Under the qualification
standards applicable after November 15, 1988, qualifying experience must have
been at least equivalent to the next lower grade level in the normal line of
progression for the particular occupation. Handbook X-118, Minimum
Qualification Requirements for Two-Grade Interval Administrative, Management,
and Specialist Positions, Transmittal Sheet No. 227, December 1988. We fail to
perceive any differences in the two standards that would permit the grievant to
be found qualified under one, but not under the other. Because we conclude that no basis is provided for finding that the
grievant was not qualified for promotion, we likewise find that the Agency has
not established that the award fails to draw its essence from the collective
bargaining agreement by disregarding the requirement of Article XLIV, Section 7
that an employee must be qualified in order to be temporarily promoted.
Accordingly, we will deny the Agency's exception. X. Union's Exception A. Positions of the Parties 1. The Union The Union contends that the award is deficient because the Arbitrator
erred in denying the Union's motion for an award of attorney fees. The Union maintains that in its motion for an award of attorney fees,
it contended that an award of fees was warranted in the interest of justice
under the following criteria: (1) the Agency had engaged in a prohibited
personnel practice; (2) the Agency's action was clearly without merit and
wholly unfounded; (3) the Agency's action was in bad faith; and (4) the Agency
knew or should have known that it would not prevail on the merits. The Union
contends that the award is deficient because the Arbitrator failed to address
all the grounds on which the Union claimed that an award of fees would be
warranted in the interest of justice and because the Arbitrator erred in not
finding that the Agency's action was in bad faith. The Union asserts that it
established that an award of fees was warranted in the interest of justice on
all the asserted grounds and that, consequently, the Arbitrator's denial of its
motion for an award of fees is deficient. The Union, therefore, requests that
the Authority grant the Union's motion for an award of fees. 2. The Agency The Agency contends that the Union's exception provides no basis for
finding the award deficient. The Agency asserts that the Arbitrator
specifically noted that an award of attorney fees must be warranted in the
interest of justice. The Agency claims that although the award does not use the
specific words recognized by the courts and the Authority, the Arbitrator
provided a fully articulated decision in denying the Union's motion. The Agency
requests that the Authority honor the Arbitrator's findings and deny the
Union's exception. B. Analysis and Conclusions In American Federation of Government Employees, Local 1770 and U.S.
Department of the Army, Headquarters, XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, North
Carolina, 44 FLRA No. 108 (1992), we reexamined our approach to arbitration
awards denying requests for attorney fees without providing a fully
articulated, reasoned decision setting forth specific findings on each
pertinent statutory requirement. We held that as with awards granting attorney
fees without the proper support, we would find these awards deficient, and we
would strike the portion of the award denying the fees. We held that in such
cases we would no longer remand the issue of attorney fees to the parties for
further proceedings. In this case, the Arbitrator denied the motion for attorney fees
without the necessary support. The Arbitrator completely failed to address the
Union's assertions that an award of fees was warranted in the interest of
justice because: (1) the Agency had engaged in a prohibited personnel practice;
(2) the Agency's action was clearly without merit and wholly unfounded; and (3)
the Agency knew or should have known that it would not prevail on the merits.
In addition, in our view, the Arbitrator failed to provide a fully articulated,
reasoned decision setting forth specific findings supporting his determination
that the Agency's actions were not in bad faith. Accordingly, we find that the
Arbitrator's denial of attorney fees is unsupported by a fully articulated,
reasoned decision as required under the Back Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. § 5596, and
we will modify the award to strike the denial of fees. XI. Decision The Agency's exceptions are denied. The award is modified to include
the payment of interest on the award of backpay and to strike the denial of
attorney fees. FOOTNOTES: (If blank, the decision does not
have footnotes.) 1. Article XLIV, Section 7, entitled "Temporary
Promotions," provides: "When all requirements for promotion are met and an
employee is assigned to a higher graded position for more than 60 consecutive
calendar days, a temporary promotion will be effected."
2. In denying the exception, we have considered the
memorandum of the Agency's representative before the Arbitrator. We find that
the statements attributed to the Arbitrator merely reiterated the specific
findings set forth in his award, and we find no basis to exclude the memorandum
solely because the reiteration occurred in an ex parte discussion
between the Arbitrator and the Agency representative.
3. The Agency withdrew its allegation that the award is
deficient because the Union provided the Arbitrator transportation from the
airport to his hotel before the arbitration hearing. Federal Labor Relations Authority