Source: http://copyrightlitigation.blogspot.com/2011_03_01_archive.html
Timestamp: 2014-10-21 23:59:21
Document Index: 274443868

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1', '§ 13', '§ 5', '§ 3', '§ 302', '§ 302']

Copyright Litigation Blog: March 2011
Photobucket - 8 billion photos online﻿
In Wolk v. Kodak Imaging Network Inc., 10 Civ. 4135 (RWS) (SDNY March 17, 2011), ﻿Judge Robert Sweet found that Photobucket, an internet service provider, was protected by the "safe harbor" provisions of the Digital Millenium Copyright Act ("DMCA"). 17 USC 512(c).
Essentially, the DMCA requires an internet service provider ("ISP") to set up policies to respond to complaints from copyright owners when a third party stores infringing materials on their site. The complaints, or takedown notices, must specifically inform the ISP where the infringing material is.
Photographer Sheila Wolk sent numerous takedown notices to Photobucket. Her images, excerpted above from her website, are unusual and distinctive. All infringing materials that she specifically identified were removed. But the infringements kept popping up and Wolk got fed up and sought an injunction.
Judge Sweet's decision denied Wolk's application and her attempt to force Photobucket to install an electronic fingerprinting system to catch infringers.
Professor Eric Goldman warns copyright owners against being lazy in sending out takedown notices here, Marty Schwimmer's Trademark Blog is skeptical about Photobucket's alleged inability to screen its content here.
Wolk v Photobucket http://www.dunnington.com/rdowd_bio.html
From Boston College's website here
Common Examples of Copyright Infringement •Joining a file-sharing network and downloading unauthorized copies of copyrighted music for free. •Sharing unauthorized MP3 copies of a song on the Internet or through a file-sharing network. •Using a wireless router in your room; others may share illegal material through your router, giving the appearance that you are the guilty party. •Emailing copies of a copyrighted song to all of your friends. •Transferring copyrighted music using AIM or other instant messaging services. •Burning CD copies of music you have downloaded and then giving them to all your friends. This is the first time I have heard that colleges and universities are teaching America's youth that using a wireless router constituted copyright infringement, can anyone educate me as to where this came from?
I have excerpted below the three federal opinions mentioning wireless routers, in each, having a wireless router was a potential defense to copyright infringement.
From Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset 2009 WL 1664468, 7 (D.Minn. 2009)
Therefore, given the evidence that there is no wireless router involved in this case, the Court excludes Kim's opinion that it is possible that someone could have spoofed or hijacked Defendant's Internet account through an unprotected wireless access point. Similarly, because Kim explicitly testified that this case does not involve any “black IP space,” or any “temporarily unused” IP space (Kim Dep. 110-11), he is not permitted to opine at trial that hijacking of black IP space or temporary unused IP is a possible explanation in this case.
From Arista Records, Inc. v. Musemeci 2007 WL 3124545, 5 (E.D.N.Y. 2007)
In connection with a motion to vacate a default judgment, a defendant must present more than conclusory denials when attempting to show the existence of a meritorious defense. See Enron Oil Corp., 10 F.3d at 98. “The test of such a defense is measured not by whether there is a likelihood that it will carry the day, but whether the evidence submitted, if proven at trial, would constitute a complete defense.” Id (citations omitted) (emphasis added). To set aside a default, the movant must “support its general denials with some underlying facts.” Sony Corp., 800 F.2d at 320-21.
Here, defendant has failed to make an adequate showing of a meritorious defense. Despite this circuit's strong preference for resolving cases on the merits, see Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 94 (2d Cir.1983), I find that defendant has made no statement of facts which, if proven at trial, would constitute a complete defense to plaintiffs' claims. Defendant has offered little more than conclusory denials of the alleged infringement. While defendant claims that he uses an unsecured wireless router at his residence, which could have been used by an outside party to commit the alleged infringing activity,FN7 this does not constitute a complete defense. Furthermore, plaintiffs have identified the screen name that was used to commit the alleged infringing activity as “jAcKiEecUddlEsSs@KaZaA.” ( See Gutierrez Decl. ¶ 18.) Defendant admits that he has a daughter named Jacqueline. ( See Tr. at 16.) This is unlikely to be a coincidence. I therefore find that defendant has not established a complete defense to plaintiffs' allegations.
From Motown Record Co., LP v. DePietro 2007 WL 576284, 2 (E.D.Pa.,2007)
Defendant's refusal to cooperate with Plaintiffs has persisted throughout the discovery process. Defendant initially refused to provide any written discovery to Plaintiffs.FN14 On at least two different occasions, Defendant refused to answer questions related to the case by asserting her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, even though no criminal investigation or charges were pending against her.FN15 These refusals to cooperate forced Plaintiffs to seek Orders from this Court compelling Plaintiff to provide written discovery and to be deposed.FN16 Thereafter, Plaintiff was deposed a second time and submitted responses to previously issued interrogatories. During discovery, Defendant acknowledged that she was the only person who had access to her computer,FN17 that her live-in boyfriend was the only other person in her apartment for any extended period of time, FN18 and that she never used a wireless router or wireless service to connect to the Internet.FN19More on fair use guidelines here.
Techdirt attracts over 170 comments on the story here. Many commenters say that the BC policy is a poorly-worded security warning and that people should secure their routers to avoid unauthorized use.
Zeropaid comments here.
SDNY - Copyright Licensee Bears Burden of Proving Authorized Use of Copyrighted Works
In Elsevier N.V. v. United HealthGroup, Inc, 2011 WL 1002659 (SDNY March 7, 2011), Judge William Pauley denied Elsevier's motion for summary judgment. Elsevier licensed its database to defendant for the use of 50 employees. Elsevier's spreadsheets indicated that many unauthorized employees potentially accessed the articles. But who has the burden of proof? Here is the court's answer:
The central question in this litigation is whether the persons within the UHG organization who accessed ScienceDirect were Authorized Users. Elsevier contends those individuals were not authorized because all domestic employees of UHG were actually employed by UHCS, an entity not licensed to access ScienceDirect. (Pl.'s 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 7, 9; Dunnegan Decl. Ex. J: Klein Decl. ¶ 11.) From that contention, Elsevier asserts that since UHG's domestic employees outnumber its foreign employees, it is more likely than not that any access of ScienceDirect through the Ingenix IP Address, including the Articles at issue here, occurred as a result of activities by unauthorized, domestic UHCS employees. But that is not sufficient for summary judgment.
Elsevier has not met its burden of proving the specific acts of copyright infringement. Jorgensen, 351 F.3d at 51; see also Kelly v. L.L. Cool J., 145 F.R.D. 32, 36, n. 3 (S.D.N.Y.1992) (citing cases dismissing “[b]road, sweeping allegations of infringement” with no specific allegations). Elsevier asks the Court to look at the distribution of domestic and foreign subsidiaries in Defendants' entire enterprise and make a judgment about the probability that two individual acts of computer access took place in the United States. Even if true, as Elsevier asserts, that only 26 of UHG's 225 subsidiaries are based outside the United States, (Transcript of Oral Argument dated Oct. 8, 2010 at 11-12), Elsevier offers no evidence or reason to suggest that the blunt ratio of domestic to foreign subsidiaries in Defendants' enterprise should be applied to the specific downloads at issue on this motion. At best, the Master Spreadsheet entries show that each download was made from a different computer with a different “cookie.” (Lendi Reply Decl. ¶ 6.) But at this point in the case, Elsevier is unable to offer evidence of the identities or locations of the individuals who downloaded the Articles.
Further, Elsevier's theory on this motion is at odds with the terms of the Agreement, which specifically authorized Ingenix employees or independent contractors located in Basking Ridge, NJ to access the ScienceDirect database. (Agreement § 1.2, Schedule 2.) While domestic UHG “employees” may contract with UHCS, that does not foreclose the possibility they also work for Ingenix. This is buttressed by Klein's sworn statement that “employees in the enterprise are employed by [UHCS], and assigned to work for various companies in the enterprise.” (Dunnegan Decl. Ex. J: Klein Decl. ¶ 11.) Thus, a material issue of fact exists whether the individuals who downloaded the Articles were working for Ingenix and were one of the 50 Authorized Users at the time they accessed the Science Direct database.
On the other hand, Defendants contend they were authorized to access the ScienceDirect database under the Agreement and that Elsevier has the burden to prove that the individuals who downloaded the Articles were not authorized. While the copyright owner bears the burden of proving that a defendant's license does not apply in cases where “only the scope of the license is at issue,” Bourne v. Walt Disney Co., 68 F.3d 621, 631 (2d Cir.1995), the question here is whether the infringer had any license at all. Thus, the general rule-that defendant bears the burden of proving possession of a license-applies. See Bourne, 68 F.3d at 631 (citing Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 13.01.) A defendant may not “merely assert the existence of a license without evidence supporting defendant's position that the license covers the use in question; without such evidence, defendant cannot be said to have met its burden ...”. William F. Patry, Patry on Copyright ( “Patry” ) § 5:133. It is undisputed that the Agreement was in effect at the time the Articles were downloaded. But Defendants have not offered any evidence that the individuals who downloaded the Articles worked for Ingenix and were covered by its license or that the Articles were downloaded through any other authorized means.
Nor is it unfair in these circumstances to place the burden of discovering the identities of the individuals who downloaded the Articles on Defendants. Not only are Defendants in the best position to know such information, Ingenix was obligated to use “reasonable efforts” to prevent unauthorized use (Agreement § 3.2), which should include keeping track of the identities of those individuals who access ScienceDirect from the Ingenix IP Address.
Elsevier v United Health Group SDNY http://www.dunnington.com/rdowd_bio.html
breach of license agreement,
In Harris v. Winfrey, 2011 WL 1003807 (E.D.P.A. March 18, 2011), a federal district judge dismissed a claim against Oprah Winfrey but denied sanctions under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Copy of motion for sanctions here. The allegation was that Oprah took materials from a book "How America Elects Her Presidents" (I could not find this book on Amazon). Plaintiff mailed copies of his book to Oprah, trying to get on her show. A review of the transcript showed that the only question on Oprah's show that had any similarity to the book was a question of who was the heaviest president. Answer: William Howard Taft. From the decision:
Copyright law protects only an author's original expression; historical facts and information in the public domain are not copyrightable. Id. at 547-48 (“[N]o author may copyright facts or ideas.”); see also Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm't, Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 199 n. 5 (3d Cir.2003) ( “[C]opyright protection does not include facts and ideas, but only their expression.”). There is “thin” copyright protection for an author's choices as to the presentation of factual matter. Feist, 499 U.S. at 348. This protection, however, is limited to the author's original, creative contributions, since copyright “protects only the elements that owe their origin to the compiler-the selection, coordination, and arrangement of facts.” Id. at 359. In Feist, for example, the Supreme Court refused to extend copyright protection to a utility company's aggregation of telephone directory information, holding that neither the “raw data” nor the manner in which it was presented qualified as original. Id. at 361.
The material plaintiffs seek to protect here is not original. Plaintiffs argue that Winfrey infringed Harris's copyright in his booklet by referring to an historical fact, President Taft's weight. (Compl.¶ 21.) Winfrey's use of this fact, even if she learned it from Harris's booklet, does not infringe any copyright Harris may have held. This information is not original to Harris, but rather is a piece of “raw data” that preexisted Harris's booklet and is available from numerous external sources.
Plaintiffs also argue that Oprah infringed the manner in which the facts were presented by copying verbatim the way in which Harris “framed the questions.” (Pls.' Resp. to Defs.' to Mot. Dismiss 5.) While the two versions of Harris's booklet presented to the Court do have some hallmarks of originality, neither contains any material in question format. Thus, the framing to which plaintiffs refer, even if copyrightable, is not implicated in this case.
State law claims of unjust enrichment, conversion and tortious interference were dismissed as preempted. More on Rule 11 sanctions here. More on preemption here.
Chubbiest US President - William Howard Taft - Public domain image courtesy Wikimedia Commons
fed.r.civ.p. 11,
unprotectable facts,
Stein Pyritz - Swiss Government Report http://www.dunnington.com/rdowd_bio.html
auguste klipstein,
swiss art laundering,
Penguin Group (USA) Inc. v. American Buddha (N.Y. Ct. Appeals March 24, 2010), the New York State Court of Appeals decided an issue of extraordinary importance: whether someone offering copyrighted works in another state could be sued in New York if the copyright owner is located in New York, even if no sale took place in New York?
You can read my earlier post Copyright and the Story of the Long-Armed Buddhist Penguin here.
My post on the question being certified to the New York Court of Appeals: The Long Arm of New York Copyright Holders: Can New York Copyright Lawyers Sue America Without Leaving Manhattan? is here.
As readers of the Copyright Litigation Blog know, copyright cases overwhelmingly take place in federal court. That is because copyright law presents "federal questions" and the doctrine of complete preemption applies in copyright law. "Preemption" means that states cannot make laws inconsistent with copyright laws or that govern rights that are equivalent to copyright. It's not an easy test. More on preemption here.
So how did a copyright case get to the New York State Court of Appeals? Well, when legal questions at the appellate level arise that require a federal circuit court of appeals to determine an unsettled area of state law, the circuit court might "certify" or ask the state's highest appeals court to answer the question.
So the Second Circuit Court of Appeals heard an appeal from a district court ruling that denied "long arm jurisdiction" over American Buddha, a Washington State based online service that uploads Penguin books and claims that it is permitted by the fair use doctrine to give away free copies online to its members.
Instead of determining the question of whether New York's long-arm statute applied to American Buddha, the Second Circuit "certified" the question to the New York Court of Appeals. The question certified was:
In copyright infringement cases involving the uploading of a copyrighted printed literary work onto the Internet, is the situs of injury for purposes of determining long-arm jurisdiction under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302 (a) (3) (ii) the location of the infringing action or the residence or location of the principal place of the copyright holder?
To understand why this matters, we need to understand that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They can only exercise jurisdiction over matters when a statute says so. Usually over matters in their judicial district. For a court to answer a legal question, it must have 1. subject matter jurisdiction and 2. personal jurisdiction over the person whose rights are being decided.
In American Buddha, the "subject matter" is copyright, which is governed by the Copyright Act thus satisfying the test for subject matter jurisdiction (more on subject matter jurisdiction here).
But how can a federal court decide a matter outside the confines of its judicial district? When does a non-resident of New York acting outside New York state subject herself to jurisdiction in New York? The answer is that the federal court may exercise "long arm" jurisdiction to the extent that the state in which it sits permits.
CPLR 302 provides in part:
§ 302. Personal jurisdiction by acts of non-domiciliaries. (a) Acts which are the basis of jurisdiction. As to a cause of action arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary, or his executor or administrator, who in person or through an agent:
So the question answered by the New York Court of Appeals was whether copyright infringement by using the internet is an "act without the state causing injury to person or property within the state."
They said "yes". This case is of extraordinary importance to the New York copyright bar specifically and to intellectual property practitioners in general. But both the Second Circuit and the New York Court of Appeals specifically punted in a tantalizing footnote as follows:
The Second Circuit also stated that "[t]here is a possible question at the threshold that neither the district court nor the parties have addressed and which we do not here decide: whether a copyright -- in and of itself an intangible thing -- has a physical location for jurisdictional purposes and, if so, what that location is" (609 F3d at 36 n 4). The Second Circuit resolved to "accept for the purposes of this appeal the district court's implicit conclusion that copyrights have a location and that their location in this case is in New York State" (id.). We, too, accept this characterization in answering the certified question.
Now a New York lawyer can sue anyone in the world who infringes on the web by buying a subway token? Not so fast, says the NYS Court of Appeals:
Finally, contrary to American Buddha's assertion, our decision today does not open a Pandora's box allowing any nondomiciliary accused of digital copyright infringement to be haled into a New York court when the plaintiff is a New York copyright owner of a printed literary work. Rather, CPLR 302 (a)(3) (ii) incorporates built-in safeguards against such exposure by requiring a plaintiff to show that the nondomiciliary both "expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the state" and, importantly, "derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce." There must also be proof that the out-of-state defendant has the requisite "minimum contacts" with the forum state and that the prospect of defending a suit here comports with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice," as required by the Federal Due Process Clause (International Shoe Co. v Washington, 326 US 310, 316 [1945] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v Woodson, 444 US 286, 291-292 [1980]). These issues are beyond the scope of this certified question and their resolution awaits further briefing before the federal courts.
This case is an extraordinary victory for Penguin and Richard Dannay, who has a string of extraordinary victories behind him.
Penguin Group v American Buddha http://www.dunnington.com/rdowd_bio.html
certification to court of appeals,
cplr 302a,
Fair Use Fridays: You Are Listening To New York - Ambient Music and Live Police Radio Feed
Mixture of police radio and ambient music here, beautiful .... thanks to BoingBoing's post here.
Top copyright lawyers should join Copyright Twibes - another way to be social and see who is out there and active.
For the moment, Copyright Litigation Blog is at the top, but it won't be long until serious copyright tweeters join!
copyright law blogs,
copyright twibes,
SDNY Federal Bar Association CLE Program March 24: Due Process Limits to the Exercise of Personal Jurisdiction
The Federal Bar Association is sponsoring a CLE program on March 24 at the U.S. District Court - Southern District of New York - The Due Process Limits to the Exercise of Personal Jurisdiction. Click on flyer below.
My partner Luke McGrath and Professor Robert Pfeffer will present.
Supreme Court Round-Up_FLYER http://www.dunnington.com/rdowd_bio.html
robert pfeffer,
Soon we will see the Google lobbyists flock to Washington, DC. The blind should be leading. Chapter 11 of my Copyright Litigation Handbook (West 2010) covers class actions. Decision link below:
Authors Guild v Google 03 22 2011 http://www.dunnington.com/rdowd_bio.html
Work from Prince's infringing series incorporating Cariou's photographs﻿In Cariou v. Richard Prince, Gagosian Gallery, et al 08 CV 11327 (S.D.N.Y. March 18, 2011)(Batts, J.), the court issued a decision finding Richard Prince's artworks to be copyright infringements. Prince, known as an "appropriation artist" took Cariou's photographs from a book called Yes, Rasta.
The opinion is noteworthy and will basically EXPLODE the contemporary art world, which has invested heavily in Richard Prince and his appropriations. The opinion notes that Prince thinks his artworks are pretty meaningless, but the owners of his artworks will probably mobilize art and cultural critics to supply a deeper meaning pronto. Perhaps in future litigation Prince will become more articulate about the nature of his artistic vision, as did artist Jeff Koons whose early losses have now been turned into wins based in part by affidavits certifying that his art does indeed have a message more pleasing to judicial ears.
More on this case, including images here. More on appropriation art here. A Photo Editor opines here. Clancco is outraged delighted that the decision includes an order to impound and destroy Richard Prince's artworks, which Larry Gagosian made over $10 million dollars in selling, read Clancco here.
Does the price of a Prince work go up after this decision?
Cariou v Richard Prince March 22, 2011 update:
More commentary from Ruling Imagination here.