Source: https://advocatetanmoy.com/2017/10/20/imposition-of-pre-censorship-on-a-journal-is-a-restriction-on-the-liberty-of-the-press-which-is-an-essential-part-of-the-right-to-freedom-of-speech-and-expression-declared-by-art-19-1-a/
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Matched Legal Cases: ['Art.19', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 19', 'Art 12', 'Art.19', 'Art. 32', 'Art. 19', 'Art.19', 'Art. 19']

Brij Bhusan and another Versus The State of Delhi[SC 1950 May ] – Advocatetanmoy Law Library
October 20, 2017 November 16, 2017 Advocatetanmoy
KeyWorsd:-Pre-censorship-Public Order-Freedom of Press⇔
Imposition of pre-censorship on a journal is a restriction on the liberty of the press which is an essential part of the right to freedom of speech and expression declared by Art.19 (1) (a)
AIR 1950 SC 129 : (1950) SCR 605 : (1950) CriLJ SC 1525 : (1950) SCJ 425
Brij Bhusan and another Appellant
The State of Delhi Respondent
Petition No.29 of 1950, Decided on : 26-05-1950.
Shri N. C. Chatterjee, Senior Advocate, Supreme Court (Shri B. Banerji, Advocate, Supreme Court, with him) instructed by Shri Ganpat Rai, Agent – for Petitioners.
Shri M.C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India, (Shri S. M. Sikri, Advocate, Supreme Court, with him) instructed by Shri P. A. Mehta, Agent – for Opposite Party.
Fazl Ali, J—[Dissentry Judgment.] The question raised in this case relates to the validity of S.7 (i) (c). East Punjab Safety Act, 1949(as extended to the Province of India), which runs as follows:
“‘ The Provincial Government or any authority authorised by it in this behalf if satisfied that such nation is necessary for the purpose of preventing or combating any activity prejudicial to the public safety or the maintenance of public order may, by order in writing addressed to a printer, publisher or editor –
(c) require that any matter relating to a particular object for class of subjects shall before publication be submitted for scrutiny.”
2. It should be noted that the provision of sub-cl.(c) are not in general terms but are confined to a “particular subject or class of subjects”, and that having regard to the context in which there words are used, they must be connected with “public safety or the maintenance of public order’’
3. The petitioners on whose behalf this provision is assailed, are respectively the Printer (and Publisher) and Editor of an English weekly of Delhi called ‘ORGANIZER’, and they pray for the issue of writs of certiorari and prohibition to the Chief Commissioner. Delhi with a view “to examine and review the legality” of and “restrain the operation” of and “quash” the order made by him on 2nd March 1950, under the impugned section, directing them
“to submit for scrutiny, in duplicate, before publication, till further orders, all communal matter and news and views about Pakistan including photographs and cartoons other than those derived from official sources or supplied by the news agencies . . . . . . . “
The order in question recites among other things that the Chief Commissioner is satisfied that the “ORGANIZER” has been publishing highly objectionable matter constituting a threat to public law and order and that action to which reference has been made is necessary for the purpose of preventing or combating activities prejudicial to the public safety or the maintenance of public order. It is contended on behalf of the petitioners that notwithstanding these recitals the order complained against is liable to be quashed because it amounts to an infringement of the right of freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Art. 19(1) (a) of the Constitution. Article 19(1) (a) and (2), which are to be read together, run as follows:
“19. (1) All citizens shall have the right
(2) Nothing in sub-cl. (a) of cl. (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it relates to, or prevent the State from making any law relating to, libel, slander, defamation, contempt of Court or any matter which offends against decency or morality or which undermines the security of, or tends to overthrow, the State. “
4. It is contended that S. 7 (1) (c) of the Act, under which the impugned order has been made, cannot be saved by cl. (2) of Art. 19 of the Constitution, because it does not relate to any matter which undermines the security of, or tends to overthrow, the State. Thus the main ground of attack is that the impugned law is an infringement of fundamental right and is not saved by the so-called saving clause to which reference has been made.
5. There can be no doubt that to impose precensorship on a journal, such as has been ordered by the Chief Commissioner in this case, is a restriction on the liberty of the press which is included in the right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Art. 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution, and the only question which we have therefore to decide is whether cl. (2) of Art. 19 stands in the way of the petitioners.
6. The East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949, of which S. 7 is a part, was passed by the Provincial Legislature in exercise of the power conferred upon it by S. 100, Government of India Act, 1935, read with entry No. 1 of List II of Sch. 7 to that Act, which includes among other matters ‘public order’. This expression in the general sense may be construed to have reference to the maintenance of what is generally known as law and order in the Province, and this is confirmed by the words which follow it in entry No. 1 of List II and which have been put within bracets, viz , “but not including the use of naval, military or air forces or any other armed forces of the Union in aid of the civil power. “ It is clear that anything which affects public tranquillity within the State or the province will also affect public order and the State Legislature is therefore competent to frame laws on matters relating to public tranquillity and public order. It was not disputed that under the Government of India Act, 1935 (under which the impugned Act was passed) it was the responsibility of each Province to deal with all internal disorders whatever their magnitude may be, and to preserve public tranquillity and order within the Province.
7. At this stage, it will be convenient to consider the meaning of another expression “public safety” which is used throughout the impugned Act and which is also chosen by its framers for its title. This expression, though it has been variously used in different contexts (See Penal Code, chap XIV), has now acquired a well-recognized meaning in relation to an Act like the impugned Act, as a result of a long course of legislative practice, and may be taken to denote safety or security of the State. In this sense, it was used in the Defence of the Realm (Consolidation) Act, 1914, as well as the Defence of India Act, and this is how it was judicially interpreted in Rex vs. Governor of Wormwood Scrubbs Prison, (1920) 2 K. B 305. The headnote of this case runs as follows:
17. If the Act is to be viewed as I have suggested, it is difficult to hold that S. 7 (1) (c), falls outside the ambit of Art. 19 (2). That clause clearly states that nothing in cl. (1) (a) shall affect the operation at any existing law relating to any matter which undermines the security of, or tends to overthrow, the State. I have tried to show that public disorders and disturbance of public tranquillity do undermine the security of the State and if the Act is a law aimed at preventing such disorders, it fulfils the requirement of the Constitution. It is needless to add that the word ‘State’ has been defined in Art 12 of the Constitution to include “the Government and Parliament of India and the Government and Legislature of each of the State and all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India.”
18. I find that S. 20 of the impugned Act provides that the Provincial Government may by notification declare that the whole or any part of the province as may be specified in the notification is a dangerously disturbed area. This provision has some bearing on the aim and object of the Act, and we cannot overlook it when considering its scope. It may be incidentally mentioned that we have been informed that, under this section, Delhi Province has been notified to be a ‘‘dangerously disturbed area”
19. It must be recognised that freedom of speech and expression is one of the most valuable rights guaranteed to a citizen by the Constitution and should be jealously gua ded by the Courts. It must also be recognised that free political discussion is essential for the proper functioning of a democratic Government, and the tendency of modern jurists is to deprecate censorship though they all agree that “liberty of the press” is not to be confused with its “licentiousness “ But the Constitution itself has prescribed certain limits for the exercise of the freedom of speech and expression and this Court is only called upon to see whether a particular case comes within those limits. In my opinion, the law which is impugned is fully saved by Art.19 (2) and if it cannot be successfully assailed it is not possible to grant the remedy which the petitioners are seeking here.
20. As has been stated already, the order which is impugned in this case recites trial ‘‘the weekly ‘ORGANIZER’ has been publishing highly objectionable matter constituting a threat to public law and order” and that the action which it is proposed to take against the petitioners “is necessary for the purpose of preventing or combating activities prejudicial to public safety or the maintenance of public order.” These facts are supported by an affidavit sworn by the order in question was passed by the Chief Commissioner in Consultation with the Central Press Advisory Committee, which is an independent body elected by the All India Newspaper Editors’ Conference and is composed of representatives of some of lading papers such as “The Hindustan Times, “Statesman” etc. In my, opinion, there can be no doubt that the Chief Commissioner has purported to act in this case within the sphere within which he is permitted to act under the law, and it is beyond the power of this Court to grant the reliefs claimed by the petitioners.
21. In these circumstances, I would dismiss the petitioners’ application.
22. Patanjali Sastri J. [Majority Judgment.]—This is an application under Art. 32 of the Constitution praying for the issue of writs of certiorari and prohibition to the respondent, the Chief Commissioner of Delhi, with a view to examine the legality of and quash the order made by him in regard to an English weekly of Delhi called the ORGANIZER of which the first applicant is the printer and publisher and the second is the editor. On 2nd March 1950, the respondent, in exercise of powers conferred on him by. S. 7(1) (c), East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1919, which has been extended to the Delhi Province and is hereinafter referred to as the impugned Act, issued the following order:
“Whereas the Chief Commissioner, Delhi, is satisfied that ORGANIZER, an English weekly of Delhi, has been publishing highly objectionable matter constituting a threat to public law and order and that action as is hereinafter mentioned is necessary for the purpose of preventing or combating activities prejudicial to the public safety or the maintenance of public order,
Now therefore in exercise of the powers conferred by S. 7 (1) (c), East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949, as extended to the Delhi Province, I, Shankar Prasad, Chief Commissioner, Delhi, do by this order require you Shri Brij Bhushan, Printer and Publisher and Shri K.R. Halkani, Editor of the aforesaid paper to submit for security, in duplicate, before publication, till further orders, all communal matter and news and view about Pakistan including photographs and cartoons other than those derived from official sources or supplied by the new agencies, viz., Press Trust of India, United Press of India and United Press of America to the Provincial Press Officer, or in his absence, to Superintendent of Press Branch at his office at 5, Alipur Road, Civil Lines, Delhi, between the hours 10 a. m. and 5 p. m. on working days.”
23. The only point argued before us relates to the constitutional validity of S. 7 (1) (c) of the impugned Act which, as appears from its preamble, was passed “to provide special measures to ensure public safety and maintenance of public order.” Section 7 (1) (c) under which the aforesaid order purports to have been made reads (so far as material here) us follows:
“The Provincial Government or any authority authorised by it in his behalf if satisfied that such action is necessary for the purpose of preventing or combating any activity prejudicial to the public safety or the maintenance of public order may, by order in writing addressed to a printer, publisher or editor require that any matter relating to a particular subject or class of subjects shall before publication be submitted for scrutiny.”
24. The petitioners claim that this provision infringes the fundamental right to the freedom of speech and expression conferred upon them by Art. 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution inasmuch as it authorises the imposition of a restriction on the publication of the journal which is not justified under cl. (2) of that Article.
25. There can be little doubt that the imposition of pre-censorship on a journal is a restriction on the liberty of the press which is an essential part of the right to freedom of speech and expression declared by Art.19 (1) (a). As pointed out by Blackstone in his Commentaries,
“the liberty of the press consists in laying no previous restraint upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when published. Every freeman has all undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public; to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of the press.” Blackstone’s Commentaries, Vol. IV. pp. 151, 152.
The only question therefore is whether S. 7 (1) (c) which authorises the imposition of such a restriction falls within the reservation of cl. (2) of Art. 19
26. As this question turns on considerations which are essentially the same as those on which our decision in Petition No. XVI of 1950 Romesh vs. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124 was based, our judgment in that case concludes the present case also. Accordingly, for the reasons indicated in that judgment, we allow this petition and hereby quash the impugned order of the Chief Commissioner, Delhi, dated 2nd March 1950.
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