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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1101', '§ 1101', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 286', '§ 4', '§ 893', '§ 893']

Toll v. Moreno - 458 U.S. 1 (1982) :: Justia US Supreme Court Center
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Case	U.S. Supreme CourtToll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1 (1982)Toll v. MorenoNo. 80-2178Argued March 2, 1982Decided June 28, 1982458 U.S. 1CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
(a) "[S]tate regulation not congressionally sanctioned that discriminates against aliens lawfully admitted to the country is impermissible if it imposes additional burdens not contemplated by Congress." De Canas v. Bica, 424 U. S. 351, 424 U. S. 358, n. 6. Here, in light of Congress' explicit decision in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 not to bar G-4 aliens from acquiring domicile in the United States, the State's decision to deny "in-state" status to G-4 aliens, solely on account of such aliens' immigration status, amounts to an ancillary "burden not contemplated by Congress" in admitting these aliens to the United States. Moreover, by imposing on domiciled G-4 aliens higher tuition and fees than are imposed on other domiciliaries of the State, the University's policy frustrates the federal policies embodied in the special tax exemptions afforded G-4 aliens by various treaties, international agreements, and federal statutes. Pp. 458 U. S. 10-17. Page 458 U. S. 2
BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, 458 U. S. 19. O'CONNOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, 458 U. S. 24. REHNQUIST, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C.J., joined, post, 458 U. S. 25. Page 458 U. S. 3
"1. It is the policy of the University of Maryland to grant in-state status for admission, tuition and charge-differential purposes to United States citizens, and to immigrant aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence in accordance with the laws of the United States, in the following cases: "Page 458 U. S. 4
In 1975, when this action was filed, respondents Juan Carlos Moreno, Juan Pablo Otero, and Clare B. Hogg were students at the University of Maryland. Each resided with, and was financially dependent on, a parent who was a nonimmigrant alien holding a "G-4" visa. Such visas are issued to nonimmigrant aliens who are officers or employees of certain international organizations, and to members of their immediate families. 66 Stat. 168, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(G)(iv). [Footnote 1] Despite respondents' residence in the State, the University denied them in-state status pursuant to its policy of excluding all nonimmigrant aliens. Seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, the three respondents filed a class action against the University of Maryland and its President. [Footnote 2] They contended that the University's policy violated various federal laws, the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Supremacy Clause. Page 458 U. S. 5
The District Court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the three named plaintiffs and the class of G-4 visaholders represented by them. [Footnote 3] In the view of the District Court, the University's denial of in-state status to these plaintiffs rested upon an irrebuttable presumption that a G-4 alien cannot establish Maryland domicile. Concluding that the presumption was "not universally true" as a matter of either federal or Maryland law, the District Court held that, under Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U. S. 441 (1973), the in-state policy violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreno v. University of Maryland, 420 F.Supp. 541, 559 (Md.1976). Accordingly, in an order dated July 13, 1976, the District Court enjoined the President of the University [Footnote 4] from denying respondents the opportunity to establish in-state status solely on the basis of an "irrebuttable presumption of non-domicile." Id. at 565. [Footnote 5] The court stayed its order pending appeal in reliance on the University's representation that it would make appropriate refunds "in the event the Court's Order of July 13, 1976, were finally affirmed on appeal." App. to Pet. for Cert. 100a. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, adopting Page 458 U. S. 6 the reasoning of the District Court. Id. at 102a. [Footnote 6] Affirmance order reported at 556 F.2d 573 (1977).
Id. at 660. [Footnote 7] It was therefore necessary to decide whether the presumption was universally true. With respect to federal law, we concluded that G-4 visaholders could "adopt the United States as their domicile." Id. at 666. [Footnote 8] We were thus left with the "potentially dispositive" question whether G-4 aliens are, as a matter of state law, incapable of becoming domiciliaries of Maryland. We certified this question to the Maryland Court of Appeals. [Footnote 9] The state court answered the Page 458 U. S. 7 certified question in the negative, advising us that "nothing in the general Maryland law of domicile renders G-4 visa holders, or their dependents, incapable of becoming domiciled in this State." Toll v. Moreno, 284 Md. 425, 444, 397 A.2d 1009, 1019 (1979).
"(c) efficiently administering the University's in-state determination and appeals process; and "Page 458 U. S. 8
On remand, the District Court determined that the clarifying resolution constituted a change in the University's position. Before that resolution, the University's primary concern had, in fact, been domicile; after the resolution, domicile was no longer "the paramount consideration in the University's policy." 480 F.Supp. 1116, 1124 (Md.1979). Thus, Page 458 U. S. 9 with respect to the period preceding the issuance of the resolution, the District Court reaffirmed its earlier determination that, insofar as the policy precluded G-4 aliens (or their dependents) from acquiring in-state status, it denied due process under Vlandis. 480 F.Supp. at 1122-1125. With respect to the period following the promulgation of the resolution, however, the court held that Vlandis did not control: the University had abandoned its position that G-4 aliens could not establish domicile in Maryland. 480 F.Supp. at 1125. Nevertheless, the District Court concluded that the revised in-state policy was constitutionally invalid, basing its conclusion on two alternative grounds. First, the court held that the policy ran afoul of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. According to the court, the challenged portion of the University's policy contained a classification based on alienage, requiring strict scrutiny, an analysis which the policy did not survive, since the policy did not further any compelling interest. 489 F.Supp. 658, 660-667 (Md.1980). Alternatively, the court held that the in-state policy violated the Supremacy Clause by encroaching upon Congress' prerogatives with respect to the regulation of immigration. Id. at 667-668. [Footnote 13]
The Court of Appeals affirmed for "reasons sufficiently stated" by the District Court. Moreno v. University of Maryland, 645 F.2d 217, 220 (1981) (per curiam). We granted certiorari. 454 U.S. 815 (1981). For the reasons that follow, we hold that the University of Maryland's in-state policy, as applied to G-4 aliens and their dependents, violates the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, [Footnote 14] and on Page 458 U. S. 10 that ground affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. We therefore have no occasion to consider whether the policy violates the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses.
Not surprisingly, therefore, our cases have also been at pains to note the substantial limitations upon the authority of the States in making classifications based upon alienage. In Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, supra, we considered a California statute that precluded aliens who were "ineligible for citizenship under federal law" from obtaining commercial fishing licenses, even though they "met all other state requirements" and were lawful inhabitants of the State. 334 U.S. at 334 U. S. 414. [Footnote 15] In seeking to defend the statute, the State Page 458 U. S. 11 argued that it had "simply followed the Federal Government's lead" in classifying certain persons as "ineligible for citizenship." Id. at 334 U. S. 418. We rejected the argument, stressing the delicate nature of the federal-state relationship in regulating aliens:
Id. at 334 U. S. 419 (emphasis added) (citation and footnote omitted). [Footnote 16] Page 458 U. S. 12
"state regulation not congressionally sanctioned Page 458 U. S. 13 that discriminates against aliens lawfully admitted to the country is impermissible if it imposes additional burdens not contemplated by Congress."
Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. at 435 U. S. 664. The Act recognizes two basic classes of aliens, immigrant and nonimmigrant. [Footnote 19] With respect to the nonimmigrant class, Page 458 U. S. 14 the Act establishes various categories, the G-4 category among them. For many of these nonimmigrant categories, Congress has precluded the covered alien from establishing domicile in the United States. Id. at 435 U. S. 665. [Footnote 20] But, significantly, Congress has allowed G-4 aliens -- employees of various international organizations and their immediate families -- to enter the country on terms permitting the establishment of domicile in the United States. Id. at 435 U. S. 666. In light of Congress' explicit decision not to bar G-4 aliens from acquiring domicile, the State's decision to deny "in-state" status to G-4 aliens solely on account of the G-4 alien's federal immigration status surely amounts to an ancillary "burden not contemplated by Congress" in admitting these aliens to the United States. We need not rely, however, simply on Congress' decision to permit the G-4 alien to establish domicile in this country; the Federal Government has also taken the additional affirmative step of conferring special tax privileges on G-4 aliens.
As a result of an array of treaties, international agreements, and federal statutes, G-4 visaholders employed by the international organizations described in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(G)(iv) are relieved of federal and, in many instances, state and local taxes on the salaries paid by the organizations. For example, the international agreements governing the international banks for which the parents of the named respondents are employed specifically exempt the parents from all taxes on their organizational salaries. See Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Art. VII, § 9(b), 60 Stat. 1458, T.I.A.S. No. 1502 (1945) ("No tax shall be levied on or in respect of salaries and emoluments paid by the Bank to executive Page 458 U. S. 15 directors, alternates, officials or employees of the Bank who are not local citizens, local subjects, or other local nationals"); Agreement Establishing the Inter-American Development Bank, Art. XI, § 9(b), [1969] 10 U.S.T. 3029, 3096, T.I.A.S. No. 4397 (1959) ("No tax shall be levied on or in respect of salaries and emoluments paid by the Bank to . . . employees of the Bank who are not local citizens or other local nationals"). [Footnote 21] Not only have some of the specific tax exemptions contained in international agreements been incorporated into a federal statute, see 22 U.S.C. § 286h, but also the International Organizations Immunities Act has explicitly afforded a federal tax exemption for those G-4 visaholders employed by international organizations for which no treaty or international agreement has provided a tax exemption for foreign employees. [Footnote 22] § 4(b), 59 Stat. 670, reenacted, 68A Stat. 284, as § 893 of the Internal Revenue Page 458 U. S. 16 Code of 1954, 26 U.S.C. § 893 ("Wages, fees, or salary of any employee [except citizens of the United States and of the Republic of the Philippines] of . . . an international organization . . . received as compensation for official services to such . . . international organization shall not be included in gross income and shall be exempt from [federal] taxation").
Brief for Petitioners 23 (footnote omitted). But to the extent this is indeed a justification for the University's policy with respect to the named respondents, it is an impermissible one: the State may not recoup indirectly from respondents' parents the taxes that the Federal Government has expressly barred the State from collecting. [Footnote 23] Page 458 U. S. 17
Finally, we must address petitioners' contention that the Eleventh Amendment precluded the District Court from ordering the University to pay refunds to various class members who would have obtained in-state status but for the stay of the District Court's original order of July 13, 1976. As petitioners concede, in seeking a stay of that order, the University Page 458 U. S. 18 made the representation to the District Court that, in the event the 1976 order was "finally affirmed on appeal," it would make appropriate refunds. This representation was incorporated in the stay orders of both the District Court and Court of Appeals. It is petitioners' contention, however, that the 1976 order was "effectively" vacated when this Court, in Toll v. Moreno, 441 U. S. 458 (1979), vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the District Court for reconsideration. Petitioners therefore conclude that the terms of the University's waiver of sovereign immunity can no longer be satisfied.
Petitioners' argument is not persuasive. We do not interpret Toll as having vacated the judgment of the District Court. In Toll, the Court recognized that the University had altered its position through the promulgation of the clarifying resolution, raising "new issues of constitutional law which should be addressed in the first instance by the District Court." Id. at 441 U. S. 462. The Court declined, however, to decide whether the District Court, in issuing its 1976 order, had improperly relied on due process grounds, and whether continuation of the order was justified on equal protection or preemption grounds. Thus, while we vacated "the judgment of the Court of Appeals," ibid., we left the judgment of the District Court undisturbed. [Footnote 26] And contrary to petitioners' suggestion, a vacatur of the Di