Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/96313/morgan-vs-united-states
Timestamp: 2018-03-17 10:56:40
Document Index: 530375689

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 310', '§ 310', '§ 181', '§ 217', '§ 47', '§ 517']

Morgan Vs United States - Citation 96313 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Morgan Vs. United States - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/96313
Case Number 298 U.S. 468
Appellant Morgan
morgan v. united states - 298 u.s. 468 (1936) u.s. supreme court morgan v. united states, 298 u.s. 468 (1936) morgan v. united states no. 686 argued april 29, 30, 1936 decided may 25, 1936 298 u.s. 468 appeal from the district court of the united states for the western district of missouri syllabus 1. under § 310 of the packers & stockyards act, a hearing is prerequisite to a valid order of the secretary of agriculture fixing rates for market agencies. p. 298 u. s. 473 . 2. upon review under the packers & stockyards act of an order of the secretary of agriculture fixing rates of such agencies, all questions touching the regularity and validity of the proceedings before the secretary are open. p. 298.....
Morgan v. United States - 298 U.S. 468 (1936)
U.S. Supreme Court Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468 (1936)
1. Under § 310 of the Packers & Stockyards Act, a hearing is prerequisite to a valid order of the Secretary of Agriculture fixing rates for Market Agencies. P. 298 U. S. 473 .
2. Upon review under the Packers & Stockyards Act of an order of the Secretary of Agriculture fixing rates of such agencies, all questions touching the regularity and validity of the proceedings before the Secretary are open. P. 298 U. S. 477 .
5. It is not essential to the validity of a rate order made by the Secretary of Agriculture under the Packers & Stockyards Act that each of several respondents be given a separate hearing, or that a preliminary report be made by the examiner who took the testimony and be submitted to the parties in order that they may take their exceptions and address their arguments to the points thus raised. P. 298 U. S. 478 .
6. The function of the Secretary of Agriculture in fixing rates under the Packers & Stockyards Act is not that of ordinary executive action, but is both legislative and judicial in quality; fundamental procedural requirements must be obeyed; a full hearing of both evidence and argument must be given; nothing can be treated as evidence which is not introduced as such; facts and circumstances which ought to be considered must not be excluded, and those that should not legally influence the conclusion must not be considered; findings based on the evidence must embrace the basic facts needed to sustain the order. P. 298 U. S. 479 .
7. An order of the Secretary of Agriculture fixing rates for Market Agencies under the Packers & Stockyards Act is invalid if the evidence and arguments were heard and considered by an assistant to the Secretary, but not by the Secretary himself . P. 298 U. S. 481 .
8. If the duty of ascertaining and fixing just and reasonable rates for Market Agencies, imposed by the Packers & Stockyards Act on the Secretary of Agriculture, may lawfully be delegated by him in a particular case to an assistant -- a question not here presented or determined -- it would be for the assistant to make the order, as well as to conduct the hearing. Pp. 298 U. S. 478 , 298 U. S. 481 .
Appeals from decrees of the District Court of three judges dismissing fifty bills brought by Market Agencies, under the Packers & Stockyards Act, to enjoin the enforcement of an order of the Secretary of Agriculture fixing maximum rates to be charged by them for buying and selling livestock. The cases were consolidated in the court below for trial.
These are fifty suits, consolidated for the purpose of trial, to restrain the enforcement of an order of the Secretary of Agriculture fixing the maximum rates to be charged by market agencies for buying and selling livestock at the Kansas City Stock Yards. Packers and Stockyards Act 1921, 42 Stat. 159, 7 U.S.C. §§ 181-229.
On the merits, plaintiffs assert that the ultimate basis for the reduction in commission rates is the Secretary's opinion that there are too many market agencies, too many salesmen, and too much competition in the business; that the Secretary has departed entirely from the evidence as to the actual cost of employing salesmen in selling cattle at these yards, and has made an allowance for salaries which is based on pure speculation and is wholly inadequate to meet the cost of the service; that he has substituted in place of his accountants' figures as to actual expenditures, with respect to the item entitled "Business Getting and Maintaining Expense," a hypothetical allowance greatly less than actual cost, and that the Secretary has thus made findings without evidence, and an order, essentially arbitrary, which prescribes
The allegations as to the failure to give a proper hearing are set forth in paragraph IV of the bill of complaint, quoted in full in the margin. * The allegations in substance are: that separate hearings were not accorded to the respective respondents (plaintiffs here). That, at the
conclusion of the taking of the testimony before an examiner, a request was made that the examiner prepare a tentative report, which should be subject to oral argument and exceptions, so that a hearing might be had before the Secretary without undue inconvenience to him, but that the request was denied, and no tentative report was exhibited to plaintiffs and no oral argument upon the issues presented by the order of inquiry and the evidence was at any time had before the Secretary. That the Secretary, without warrant of law, delegated to Acting Secretaries the determination of issues
The government does not suggest that this request was granted, and plaintiffs say that it was denied. Oral argument upon the evidence was had before the Acting Secretary of Agriculture. Subsequently, brief was filed on plaintiffs' behalf.
First. The Packers and Stockyards Act makes the provisions of all laws relating to the "suspending or restraining the enforcement" or the "setting aside" of the orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission applicable to the "jurisdiction, powers, and duties of the Secretary" in enforcing the provisions of the act. Section 316; 7 U.S.C. § 217. These suits for the review of the administrative action were thus directly authorized, and appeal lies under the Urgent Deficiencies Act of October 22, 1913. 38 Stat. 219, 220; 28 U.S.C. § 47. Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U. S. 420 , 280 U. S. 443 ; Acker v. United States, ante, p. 298 U. S. 426 . All questions touching the regularity and validity of the proceeding before the Secretary are open to review. United States v. Abilene & Southern Ry. Co., 265 U. S. 274 , 265 U. S. 286 -290; Florida v. United States, 282 U. S. 194 , 282 U. S. 212 -215. When the Secretary acts within the authority conferred by the statute, his findings of fact are conclusive. Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, supra; St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, ante, p. 298 U. S. 38 ; Acker v. United States, supra. But, in determining whether, in conducting an administrative proceeding of this sort, the Secretary has complied with the statutory prerequisites, the recitals of his procedure cannot be regarded as conclusive. Otherwise, the statutory conditions could be set at naught by mere assertion. If, upon the facts alleged, the "full hearing" required by the statute was not given, plaintiffs were entitled to prove the facts and have the Secretary's order set aside. Nor is it necessary to go beyond the terms of the statute in order to consider the constitutional requirement of due process as to notice and hearing. For the statute itself demands a full hearing, and the order is void if such a hearing was
denied. Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 227 U. S. 88 , 227 U. S. 91 ; United States v. Abilene & Southern Ry. Co., supra; Florida v. United States, supra; United States v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 293 U. S. 454 , 293 U. S. 464 .
Nor should the fundamental question be confused with one of mere delegation of authority. The government urges that the Acting Secretary who heard the oral argument was in fact the Assistant Secretary of Agriculture, whose duties are prescribed by the Act of February 9, 1889 (5 U.S.C. § 517), providing for his appointment and authorizing him to perform such duties in the conduct of the business of the Department of Agriculture as may be assigned to him by the Secretary. If the Secretary had assigned to the Assistant Secretary the duty of holding the hearing, and the Assistant Secretary accordingly
The proceeding is not one of ordinary administration, conformable to the standards governing duties of a purely executive character. It is a proceeding looking to legislative action in the fixing of rates of market agencies. And, while the order is legislative and gives to the proceeding its distinctive character ( Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Garrett, 231 U. S. 298 , 231 U. S. 307 ), it is a proceeding which, by virtue of the authority conferred, has special attributes. The Secretary, as the agent of Congress in making the rates, must make them in accordance with the standards and under the limitations which Congress has prescribed. Congress has required the Secretary to determine, as a condition of his action, that the existing rates are or will be "unjust, unreasonable, or discriminatory."
If and when he so finds, he may "determine and prescribe" what shall be the just and reasonable rate, or the maximum or minimum rate, thereafter to be charged. That duty is widely different from ordinary executive action. It is a duty which carries with it fundamental procedural requirements. There must be a full hearing. There must be evidence adequate to support pertinent and necessary findings of fact. Nothing can be treated as evidence which is not introduced as such. United States v. Abilene & Southern Ry. Co., supra. Facts and circumstances which ought to be considered must not be excluded. Facts and circumstances must not be considered which should not legally influence the conclusion. Findings based on the evidence must embrace the basic facts which are needed to sustain the order. Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., supra; Chicago Junction Case, 264 U. S. 258 , 264 U. S. 263 ; United States v. Abilene & Southern Railway Co., supra; Florida v. United States, supra; United States v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., supra.
A proceeding of this sort requiring the taking and weighing of evidence, determinations of fact based upon the consideration of the evidence, and the making of an order supported by such findings, has a quality resembling that of a judicial proceeding. Hence, it is frequently described as a proceeding of a quasi -judicial character. The requirement of a "full hearing" has obvious reference to the tradition of judicial proceedings in which evidence is received and weighed by the trier of the facts. The "hearing" is designed to afford the safeguard that the one who decides shall be bound in good conscience to consider the evidence, to be guided by that alone, and to reach his conclusion uninfluenced by extraneous considerations which, in other fields, might have play in determining purely executive action. The "hearing" is the hearing of evidence and argument. If the one who determines
This necessary rule does not preclude practicable administrative procedure in obtaining the aid of assistants in the department. Assistants may prosecute inquiries. Evidence may be taken by an examiner. Evidence thus taken may be sifted and analyzed by competent subordinates. Argument may be oral or written. The requirements are not technical. But there must be a hearing in a substantial sense. And to give the substance of a hearing, which is for the purpose of making determinations
"(d) Petitioner states on information and belief, and therefore alleges the fact to be, that the Secretary, at the time said Order was signed by him, had not personally heard or read any of the evidence presented at any hearing in connection with this proceeding, and had not heard or considered oral arguments relating thereto submitted on behalf of this petitioner and had [ sic ] read or considered any briefs submitted by petitioner in this proceeding, but that the sole information of said Secretary with respect to said proceeding was derived from consultation with employees in the Department of Agriculture, out of the presence of this petitioner or any representative of this petitioner."