Source: https://connecticut.lexroll.com/695-associates-v-stamford-no-cv00-0179475-s-jul-12-2002/
Timestamp: 2020-01-24 04:16:49
Document Index: 401843603

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 12', '§ 17', '§ 12', '§ 10', '§ 10', '§ 52', '§ 52', '§ 52']

695 ASSOCIATES v. STAMFORD, No. CV00 0179475 S (Jul. 12, 2002) | LexRoll (CT)
695 ASSOCIATES v. STAMFORD, No. CV00 0179475 S (Jul. 12, 2002)
LexRoll.com > LexRoll (CT) > Connecticut Superior Court Opinions > 695 ASSOCIATES v. STAMFORD, No. CV00 0179475 S (Jul. 12, 2002)
695 ASSOCIATES, LP v. CITY OF STAMFORD.
2002 Ct. Sup. 8700
No. CV00 0179475 S CT Page 8701Connecticut Superior Court, Judicial District of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE: MOTION TO STRIKE #112
This is a tax appeal case, wherein the plaintiff, 695 Associates, LP
appeals the property tax assessments made by the defendant, City of Stamford, in 1999 and 2000.
In count one of the complaint, the plaintiff alleges the following pertinent facts: that it owned certain real property located in the City of Stamford; that the defendant’s assessor determined that all property in the municipality should be liable for taxation at 70% of its true and actual valuation; that the defendant’s assessor estimated the value of the plaintiffs property on October 1, 1999; that the assessment was grossly excessive, disproportionate, unlawful and not in accordance with a uniform percentage of true and actual value that the disproportionate assessment was in violation of General Statutes § 12-64; that the plaintiff timely appealed to the Board of Assessment Appeals (board) claiming to be aggrieved by the assessment; that the board made no change to the assessment; and that the plaintiff is aggrieved by the assessor and board’s actions.
In count two, the plaintiff further alleges that on October 1, 2000, the defendant’s assessor estimated the value of the same property as discussed in count one and similarly disproportionately assessed the plaintiff’s property and that the plaintiff was also aggrieved by this action.
On January 31, 2002, the plaintiff filed an offer of judgment pursuant to Practice Book § 17-14[1] , expressing a willingness to stipulate to a judgment from the defendant in the specified amount. On February 14, 2002, the defendant filed a motion to strike the plaintiff’s offer of judgment on the grounds that offers of judgment, in the tax appeal context, are legally insufficient and because the application of General Statutes § 12-117a[2] would constitute a denial of the defendant’s equal protection and due process rights. In response, the plaintiff filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the motion to strike.
Preliminarily, the court notes that motions to strike are governed by Practice Book § 10-39 which states in pertinent part that: “Whenever any party wishes to contest (1) the legal sufficiency of the allegations CT Page 8702 of any complaint, counterclaim or cross claim, or any one or more counts thereof, to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or (2) the legal sufficiency of any prayer for relief . . . or (3) the legal sufficiency of any such complaint, counter claim or cross complaint, or any count thereof, because of the absence of any necessary party, or (4) the joining of two or more causes of action which cannot properly be united in one complaint . . . or (5) the legal sufficiency of any answer to any complaint, counterclaim or cross complaint, or any part of that answer including any special defense contained therein, that party may do so by filing a motion to strike the contested pleading or part thereof.” Thus, offers of judgment are not covered by § 10-39. However, this court will examine the propriety of the arguments raised in the defendant’s motion and will thus, view the motion to strike as an appropriately filed objection to the filing of the offer of judgment. SeeCocozza v. Wickes, Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury, Docket No. 334642 (June 14, 1999, Radcliffe, J.).
In order to place the analysis in context, the court notes that the underlying purpose of § 52-192a is judicial economy. The offer of judgment statute serves to “encourage pretrial settlements and, consequently, to conserve judicial resources.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Willow Springs Condominium Assn., Inc. v. Seventh BRT Development Corp., 245 Conn. 1, 55, 717 A.2d 77 (1998). “The strong public policy favoring the pretrial resolution of disputes . . . is substantially furthered by encouraging defendants to accept reasonable offers of judgment.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 55-56. CT Page 8703
In this case, the complaint is not solely equitable in nature. The plaintiff prays, among other things, for “reimbursement from the City of Stamford for the excess of the taxes paid by the plaintiff together with interest and costs. . . .” Furthermore, the offer of judgment statute itself, refers to “any civil action based upon contract or seeking therecovery of money damages. whether or not other relief is sought. . . .” (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 52-192a (a). Thus, the equitable nature of tax appeals plus the money damages sought place this case squarely within the type of case for which offer of judgments are utilized. In fact, as previously stated, the court can award such relief as justice and equity permit which may or may not include money damages. Thus, the court is not persuaded by the defendant’s argument that the equitable nature of tax appeals excludes them from offers of judgment. CT Page 8704
___________________ Mintz, J. CT Page 8705
[3] General Statutes § 52-192a states in pertinent part that: “(a) After commencement of any civil action based upon contract or seeking the recovery of money damages, whether or not other relief is sought, the plaintiff may before trial file with the clerk of the court a written “offer of judgment” signed by him or his attorney, directed to the defendant or his attorney, offering to settle the claim underlying the action and to stipulate to a judgment for a sum certain. The plaintiff shall give notice of the offer of settlement to the defendant’s attorney, or if the defendant is not represented by an attorney, to the defendant himself. Within thirty days after being notified of the filing of the “offer of judgment” and prior to the rendering of a verdict by the jury or an award by the court, the defendant or his attorney may file with the clerk of the court a written “acceptance of offer of judgment” agreeing to a stipulation for judgment as contained in plaintiffs “offer of judgment”. Upon such filing, the clerk shall enter judgment immediately on the stipulation. If the “offer of judgment” is not accepted within thirty days and prior to the rendering of a verdict by the jury or an award by the court, the “offer of judgment” shall be considered rejected and not subject to acceptance unless refiled. Any such “offer of judgment” and any “acceptance of offer of judgment” shall CT Page 8706 be included by the clerk in the record of the case.”