Source: http://www.ecases.us/case/ca9/c362941/in-the-matter-of-donald-eugene-albin-bankrupt-donald-eugene-albin-v
Timestamp: 2020-08-05 02:09:00
Document Index: 228737307

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 17', '§ 35', '§ 17', '§ 17', '§ 6592', '§ 17', '§ 17', '§ 17', '§ 17', '§ 17', '§ 17', '§ 659', '§ 101']

In the Matter of Donald Eugene Albin, Bankrupt. Donald Eugene Albin v. Wanda Louise Albin, Ninth Circuit, US Court of Appeals Cases, Federal Courts, COURT CASE
In the Matter of Donald Eugene Albin, Bankrupt. Donald Eugene Albin v. Wanda Louise Albin , 591 F.2d 94 ( 1979 )
591 F.2d 94
5 Bankr.Ct.Dec. 82
In the Matter of Donald Eugene ALBIN, Bankrupt.
Donald Eugene ALBIN, Plaintiff-Appellant,
Wanda Louise ALBIN, Defendant-Appellee.
This appeal is from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California reversing and remanding the judgment of a bankruptcy court. The district court held that appellant's debt to appellee was not dischargeable under § 17(a)(7) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 35(a) (7). Appellant asserts that his debt to appellee does not constitute alimony or payments for the support of wife or child, which § 17(a)(7) makes not dischargeable, but rather constitutes a property settlement which is dischargeable under § 17(a)(7). The bankruptcy court agreed with the appellant while the district court held for the appellee. We agree with the district court and, therefore, affirm.
Following the Maryland decision, appellant moved to California and again ceased making payments to appellee. Appellee took action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 6592 to levy execution against appellant's military pension in mid-1975. Appellant filed a petition in bankruptcy on October 9 of that year. The only creditor listed in his petition was appellee. The bankruptcy court, as already indicated, held that appellant's debt arose from a "property settlement" and was dischargeable. In reversing the bankruptcy court the district court held (1) that the Maryland court did not hold that appellant's obligation sprang from a "property settlement"; (2) that the substantive law of Virginia determines the rights and duties of the appellant and appellee under the final decree of divorce; (3) that the fact that these rights and duties were not subject to modification and arose from a contract did not compel their characterization as a "property settlement"; (4) that, measured by criteria of federal law appropriate in applying § 17(a)(7), the rights and duties imposed by Virginia law upon the appellee and appellant constitute alimony or payments for support of wife or child within the meaning of § 17(a)(7). Appellant's debt, therefore, was held not to be dischargeable.
Appellant attacks each of these positions in renewing before this court his effort to have his obligations characterized as arising from a property settlement. In addition, for the first time, appellant argues that § 17(a)(7) is unconstitutional because, in failing to make not dischargeable alimony payable to a husband, it creates a gender-based distinction violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. We shall deal briefly with both prongs of appellant's argument.
The district court is also on the mark in looking to the substantive law of Virginia to determine the legal relations between the appellant and appellee imposed by their contract incorporated into the Virginia final divorce decree. See, e. g., In re Alcorn, 162 F. Supp. 206, 208 (N.D.Cal.1958). Federal bankruptcy law is not the source of these obligations; it takes them as it finds them and, when necessary, characterizes the legal relations existing between the parties for its own purposes. See, e. g., In re Cox, 543 F.2d 1277, 1280 (10th Cir. 1976) (Doyle, J., concurring); In re Waller, 494 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1974); In re Avery, 114 F.2d 768 (6th Cir. 1940).
Record, at 240. See In re Smith, 436 F. Supp. 469, 475-76 (N.D.Ga.1977). See generally Annot., Obligation under property settlement agreement between spouses as dischargeable in bankruptcy, 74 A.L.R. 2d 758 (1960); Annot., Construction and application of provision of bankruptcy acts excepting debts for maintenance or support of wife or child from discharge, 103 A.L.R. 722 (1936); Annot., Bankruptcy as affecting alimony, 39 A.L.R. 1283 (1925).
After an extensive review of Virginia authorities it concluded that, notwithstanding the fact that appellant's obligations were not subject to modification and would not terminate on the remarriage of the appellee, the debt of the appellant was not dischargeable by reason of § 17(a)(7) of the Bankruptcy Act. In reaching this conclusion the district court determined that the appellant's obligations would terminate on his death or the death of his wife, whichever occurs first, were payable over a substantial period of time, were enforceable by contempt, and were intended for the economic safety of the wife. Our examination of Virginia law indicates to us that the district court did not err. See, e. g., Capell v. Capell, 164 Va. 45, 178 S.E.2d 894 (1935); Eaton v. Davis, 176 Va. 330, 10 S.E.2d 893 (1940); Durrett v. Durrett, 204 Va. 59, 129 S.E.2d 50 (1963); Martin v. Martin, 205 Va. 181, 135 S.E.2d 815 (1964); McLoughlin v. McLoughlin, 211 Va. 365, 177 S.E.2d 781 (1970); Shoosmith v. Scott, 217 Va. 290, 227 S.E.2d 729 (1976), Aff'd on rehearing, 217 Va. 789, 232 S.E.2d 787 (1977).
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF § 17(a)(7).
Inasmuch as appellant did not raise his constitutional issues in the proceedings below we are not obligated to consider them on appeal. See Singleton v. Wulff, 482 U.S. 106, 120, 96 S. Ct. 2868, 49 L. Ed. 2d 826 (1976); United States v. Patrin, 575 F.2d 708, 712 (9th Cir. 1978). Accord, Bustamante v. Cardwell, 497 F.2d 566, 558-59 (9th Cir. 1974). Moreover, because we incline toward an interpretation of § 17(a)(7) that would embrace alimony or maintenance or support payments to a husband, as well as such payments to a wife, we refuse to raise the matter Sua sponte. See Nuelsen v. Sorensen, 293 F.2d 454, 462 & n.7 (9th Cir. 1961); Werner v. United States, 233 F.2d 52, 56 (9th Cir. 1956). A controlling decision on this matter should await an occasion in which the issue is raised in a timely fashion.
42 U.S.C. § 659(a) (Pub.L. No. 93-647, § 101(a), 88 Stat. 2357 (1975)) (amended 1977) provides:
DocketNumber： 77-1882
Citation Numbers： 591 F.2d 94
Filed Date： 2/16/1979
Erwin P. Werner v. United States , 233 F.2d 52 ( 1956 )
In Re James Wilbur Cox, Sr., Bankrupt. Rhea Nita Cox, Now ... , 543 F.2d 1277 ( 1976 )
United States v. Floyd Julius Patrin, Sr., United States of ... , 575 F.2d 708 ( 1978 )
Durrett v. Durrett , 204 Va. 59 ( 1963 )
Shoosmith v. Scott , 217 Va. 789 ( 1977 )
Shoosmith v. Scott , 217 Va. 290 ( 1976 )
Martin v. Martin , 205 Va. 181 ( 1964 )
McLoughlin v. McLoughlin , 211 Va. 365 ( 1970 )
Capell v. Capell , 164 Va. 45 ( 1935 )
Remondino v. Remondino , 41 Cal. App. 2d 208 ( 1940 )
Abrams v. Burg , 367 Mass. 617 ( 1975 )
In Re Alcorn , 162 F. Supp. 206 ( 1958 )
Matter of Kakolewski , 32 B.R. 494 ( 1983 )
In Re Shaver , 27 B.R. 452 ( 1983 )
In Re Sampson , 142 B.R. 957 ( 1992 )
In Re Miley , 228 B.R. 651 ( 1998 )
Matter of MacKenzie , 57 B.R. 107 ( 1985 )
In Re Metropolitan Adjustment Bureau , 22 B.R. 67 ( 1982 )
Matter of Coverdale , 65 B.R. 126 ( 1986 )
In Re Stachowiak , 16 B.R. 392 ( 1982 )
In Re Zuccarell , 181 B.R. 42 ( 1995 )
Matter of Evans , 2 B.R. 85 ( 1979 )