Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/949/68/82564/
Timestamp: 2019-09-16 16:05:29
Document Index: 354783588

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3500', '§ 3500', '§ 3500', '§ 3500', '§ 3500', '§ 3500', '§ 3500', '§ 3500']

United States of America, Appellee, v. Goody Moore; Emmanuel Salami, Defendants,emmanuel Salami, Defendant-appellant, 949 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1991) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Second Circuit › 1991 › United States of America, Appellee, v. Goody Moore; Emmanuel Salami, Defendants,emmanuel Salami, Def...
United States of America, Appellee, v. Goody Moore; Emmanuel Salami, Defendants,emmanuel Salami, Defendant-appellant, 949 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1991)
US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit - 949 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1991)
Argued Nov. 1, 1991. Decided Nov. 15, 1991
On appeal, Salami renews his argument that the reports, or at least portions of them, should have been turned over to the defense. Salami again bases his claim on the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500, which is reproduced in the margin.1 Salami pointedly notes that he has not seen the reports, but argues that they undoubtedly contain statements "which relate [ ] to the subject matter as to which" Momodu and Moore testified, a logical supposition.
This court has ruled on the precise issue of whether the Jencks Act applies to disclosure of presentence reports. In United States v. Canniff, 521 F.2d 565 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1059, 96 S. Ct. 796, 46 L. Ed. 2d 650 (1976), we flatly held that a presentence report "did not constitute material required to be produced by the government" under 18 U.S.C. § 3500. Our reasoning was twofold: "The Probation Office is an arm of the United States Courts ... and is not subject to the control of the U.S. Attorney. Therefore, the prosecutor had no right to or control over copies of the report. Additionally, ... the prosecution never saw or possessed the pre-sentence report. Clearly, the government cannot be required to produce that which it does not control and never possessed or inspected." Id. at 573. Since prior opinions of a panel of this court are binding upon us in the absence of a change in the law by higher authority or our own in banc proceeding (or its equivalent),2 the broad statement in Canniff that 18 U.S.C. § 3500 does not apply to presentence reports would appear to dispose of Salami's claim here.
Although the United States Attorney's Office did not have access to the presentence reports in Canniff, in this case the United States Attorney's Office apparently did possess the presentence reports at issue; presumably, it acquired them when they were also turned over to Momodu and Moore for the purpose of sentencing. But even if Canniff were distinguishable, we would similarly reject Salami's claim to the reports under 18 U.S.C. § 3500. Presentence reports are prepared pursuant to the command of Rule 32(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the concern for confidentiality that permeates that Rule and its history is obvious. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3500, a defendant may obtain a statement of a witness with ease, and it cannot be that the concern for confidentiality so apparent in Rule 32(c) can be so easily overridden. The Jencks Act was enacted in 1957. At that time, disclosure of presentence reports was even more restricted than it is now. Indeed, it was not until 1975 that defendants were entitled to see their own presentence reports as a matter of right. See United States Dep't of Justice v. Julian, 486 U.S. 1, 9, 108 S. Ct. 1606, 1612, 100 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1988). It would be ironic to hold that Congress, almost two decades earlier, intended the Jencks Act to require the routine release of such reports to third parties.
Salami's inability to obtain the reports under 18 U.S.C. § 3500, however, does not end the matter. The government agrees that the district court was under an obligation to examine the presentence reports in camera--as it did--to determine whether any portions of them should be turned over to Salami. That position is undoubtedly based upon our later discussion of the subject in United States v. Charmer Industries, Inc., 711 F.2d 1164 (2d Cir. 1983). In that case, which did not involve 18 U.S.C. § 3500, a corporation had been indicted for violation of the Sherman Act, and had pled nolo contendere. A presentence report was thereafter prepared by the Probation Service to assist the district court in imposing sentence. Over a year later, a regulatory authority in another state sought a copy of the report in connection with civil proceedings against a related corporation. Charmer thus did not deal with turning over to a defendant in a criminal case a presentence report of an accomplice witness (although other courts have addressed that issue, as will be seen below). However, the court in Charmer thoroughly canvassed the cases dealing with release of such reports to a third person. The court held that
Id. at 1176. The Supreme Court has also noted that "the courts have typically required some showing of a special need before they will allow a third party to obtain a copy of a presentence report." Julian, 486 U.S. at 12, 108 S. Ct. at 1613 (citing Charmer) .
Other circuit courts have considered whether a presentence report of an accomplice witness or other government witnesses should be disclosed to a defendant. See United States v. DeVore, 839 F.2d 1330, 1332-33 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v. Anderson, 724 F.2d 596, 598-99 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v. Cyphers, 553 F.2d 1064, 1068-69 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 843, 98 S. Ct. 142, 54 L. Ed. 2d 107 (1977); United States v. Figurski, 545 F.2d 389, 391-92 (4th Cir. 1976). The opinions in these cases do not discuss 18 U.S.C. § 3500, but approve a procedure under which the trial court first examines the report in camera to determine whether it contains any exculpatory or impeachment material.
We address Salami's remaining contentions only briefly. Salami argues that the government failed to prove that he imported over one kilogram of heroin because the suitcase he transported contained only one-half kilogram of heroin. He maintains that his actions were wholly separate from and not part of the same conspiracy as those of Momodu, who transported one and one-half kilograms of heroin, and therefore there was insufficient evidence to support Salami's conspiracy conviction. In examining whether there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that Salami was part of a single conspiracy, we must determine "whether it could reasonably be inferred that [Salami] participated in the alleged enterprise with a consciousness of its general nature and intent." United States v. Alessi, 638 F.2d 466, 473 (2d Cir. 1980). In addition, " [t]here is no requirement that each member of a conspiracy conspire directly with every other member of it ... or be aware of all acts committed in furtherance of the conspiracy...." United States v. Rooney, 866 F.2d 28, 32 (2d Cir. 1989) (citations omitted). Here, the government presented evidence that: Salami and Momodu were both recruited by Rita and were both responsible to Okorie; on the flight to Nigeria, Salami and Momodu discussed their plans to transport heroin into the United States; Salami and Momodu went together to meet Okorie; and Salami went with Moore to meet Momodu at the airport. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding that Salami and Momodu were members of a single conspiracy.
Salami also claims that the trial court's numerous interruptions during defense counsel's examination of witnesses and the court's questions during the government's examination of witnesses deprived Salami of a fair trial. He argues that the court's questions and comments were so numerous as to effectively remove from the jury a major part of its role as a fact-finder and conveyed to the jury the court's low opinion of the defense. We must review a judge's comments upon an examination of the entire record in order to determine whether a defendant received a fair trial. See United States v. Bejasa, 904 F.2d 137, 141 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S. Ct. 299, 112 L. Ed. 2d 252 (1990). Although we recognize that there may be trials during which a court plays such an overly intrusive role that reversal is required, see, e.g., United States v. Mazzilli, 848 F.2d 384, 388 (2d Cir. 1988), we do not believe that the court's actions here rose to that level. While greater restraint in comments and questions on the part of the district judge would have been wiser, based upon an examination of the entire record we find that Salami was accorded a fair trial.
See, e.g., United States v. Pujana-Mena, 949 F.2d 24 at 31 n. 4 (2d Cir. 1991) (opinion circulated to active judges of the court before filing); United States v. Reed, 773 F.2d 477, 478 n. 1 (2d Cir. 1985) (same)