Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/371/718/642201/
Timestamp: 2020-08-14 09:32:34
Document Index: 756562142

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1252', '§ 1229', '§ 1229', '§ 1229', '§ 1229', '§ 1229', '§ 1229', '§ 1229', '§ 208', '§ 1252', '§ 1229']

Damar Bahadur Gurung, Petitioner, v. John Ashcroft, United States Attorney General, Respondent, 371 F.3d 718 (10th Cir. 2004) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Tenth Circuit › 2004 › Damar Bahadur Gurung, Petitioner, v. John Ashcroft, United States Attorney General, Respondent
Damar Bahadur Gurung, Petitioner, v. John Ashcroft, United States Attorney General, Respondent, 371 F.3d 718 (10th Cir. 2004)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit - 371 F.3d 718 (10th Cir. 2004) June 3, 2004
Mr. Gurung entered the United States in December 2000 with authorization to remain in this country until June 2001. He overstayed his authorization period, and in October 2002 filed an application for asylum, asserting that he had been subject to past persecution in Nepal by the Maoist Terrorist group and feared future persecution. The former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) issued a notice to appear at a hearing before an IJ in Denver, Colorado, at 9:30 a.m. on February 6, 2003, to show why he should not be removed from the United States. R., at 65-66.2 The notice specifically indicated that " [i]f you fail to attend the hearing at the time and place designated ... a removal order may be made by the immigration judge in your absence...." Id. at 66. According to a name-stamped certificate of service maintained at the INS, the notice to appear was sent to Mr. Gurung by regular mail at the Boulder, Colorado, address he provided to the INS. Id. at 65-66.
On appeal to the BIA, Mr. Gurung, represented by counsel, primarily argued that proof of mailing was insufficient because the certificate of service was name-stamped, not hand-signed. Id. at 4-6. The BIA affirmed the denial of the motion to reopen. It rejected the name-stamp argument, and " [i]n the absence of any rebuttal evidence, ... presume [d] that the serving official mailed notice of the hearing ..., and that Postal Service employees completed delivery to him at the same address at which he received notice of the Immigration Judge's in absentia decision." Id. at 3.
"We have jurisdiction to review the BIA's decision under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252 and 1229a(b) (5) (D)." Tang v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 1192, 1194 (10th Cir. 2003). "` [W]e review the BIA's decision on a motion to reopen [only] for an abuse of discretion. The BIA abuses its discretion when its decision provides no rational explanation, inexplicably departs from established policies, is devoid of any reasoning, or contains only summary or conclusory statements.'" Id. (quoting Mickeviciute v. INS, 327 F.3d 1159, 1162 (10th Cir. 2003)).
"It is well-settled that if `an alien is provided proper written notice of a removal hearing and fails to attend, the immigration judge is required to enter an in absentia order of removal.'" Valencia-Fragoso v. INS, 321 F.3d 1204, 1206 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Salta v. INS, 314 F.3d 1076, 1078 (9th Cir. 2002)); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b) (5) (A). For purposes of in absentia proceedings, notice is adequate if provided at the alien's contact address, with the requisite information about the nature of proceedings, the charges against the alien, the right to be represented by counsel, the time and place of the proceedings, and the consequences of a failure to appear. § 1229(a) (1), (2). No notice is necessary if the alien fails to provide an updated, written record of the address at which he may be contacted about removal proceedings. §§ 1229a(b) (5) (B), 1229(a) (1) (F). "Service by mail" is "sufficient if there is proof of attempted delivery to the last address provided by the alien." § 1229(c).3 In sum, the INS does not have to prove actual receipt of notice before holding an in absentia proceeding.
Further, notice that meets statutory requirements also fulfills the due-process protections accorded to aliens in exclusion proceedings. Notice of a proceeding satisfies due process if it is "reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S. Ct. 652, 94 L. Ed. 865 (1950).
In an immigration setting, due process requires only that service must be "conducted in a manner reasonably calculated to ensure that notice reaches the alien." Farhoud v. INS, 122 F.3d 794, 796 (9th Cir. 1997) (quotation omitted); see also Anin v. Reno, 188 F.3d 1273, 1277-78 (11th Cir. 1999). Notice of an exclusion hearing sent by regular mail to the last address provided by the alien satisfies the requirements of constitutional due process. See Dominguez v. United States Attorney Gen., 284 F.3d 1258, 1259-60 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that an alien's due process rights were not violated when the INS sent a notice of a removal hearing by regular mail to an address that the alien had provided several years earlier); Fuentes-Argueta v. INS, 101 F.3d 867, 872 (2d Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (finding no per se due process violation where notice of deportation proceedings was returned unclaimed); United States v. Estrada-Trochez, 66 F.3d 733, 735-36 & n. 1 (5th Cir. 1995) (due process satisfied where notice of deportation hearing, sent to alien by first-class mail, was returned because alien had moved without providing forwarding address).
Even if notice to the alien is constitutionally and statutorily sufficient, the statutory framework provides for rescission of an in absentia removal order "upon a motion to reopen filed at any time if the alien demonstrates that the alien did not receive notice." 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b) (5) (C) (ii). Considerations on a motion to reopen differ from those relevant to the holding of an in absentia hearing. A motion to reopen focuses on whether the alien actually received notice, rather than on whether the INS sent sufficient notice to the proper address. The Supreme Court has stated, however, that motions to reopen are particularly disfavored in immigration matters where, "as a general matter, every delay works to the advantage of the [removable] alien who wishes merely to remain in the United States." INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323, 112 S. Ct. 719, 116 L. Ed. 2d 823 (1992).
The burden of demonstrating the claimed lack of notice is on the alien. § 1229a(b) (5) (C) (ii). The burden is not a light one, because the alien must overcome the presumption of due receipt raised by the evidence of mailing presented at the in absentia hearing. See Moya v. United States, 35 F.3d 501, 504 (10th Cir. 1994) (stating that the "law presumes delivery of a properly addressed piece of mail"). To rebut the presumption, the alien must support a motion to reopen with affidavits or other evidentiary materials. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c) (6) (B); 8 C.F.R. § 208.2(c) (3) (ii) (A).
A petitioner who fails to submit documentary evidence in support of his motion to reopen, and instead merely alleges that he had not received proper notice, does not "demonstrate lack of notice, as the statute requires." Giday v. INS, 113 F.3d 230, 233 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quotation omitted). A petitioner must present "substantial and probative evidence ... demonstrating that there was improper delivery or that nondelivery was not due to the respondent's failure to provide an address where he could receive mail.'" Fuentes-Argueta, 101 F.3d at 871 (per curiam) (quoting In re Grijalva, 21 I. & N. Dec. 27, 37, 1995 WL 314388 (B.I.A.1995)). Although both Giday and Fuentes-Argueta involved certified mail, the principles they espouse regarding the alien's burden to refute the presumption of notice apply also to notice by regular mail, which similarly carries a presumption of receipt upon a showing that the notice was properly mailed to the authorized address.
On March 1, 2003, the INS ceased to exist as an independent agency within the Department of Justice, and its functions were transferred to the newly formed Department of Homeland Security (DHS)Yuk v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1222, 1224 n. 3 (10th Cir. 2004). Mr. Gurung's hearing took place before the transfer date, but the BIA's decision was issued after the date. For purposes of consistency, this opinion refers to the INS rather than the DHS.
Prior to the implementation of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), the notice of hearing had to be sent by certified, return receipt mail See 8 U.S.C. § 1252b(a) (2) (A) (1996). Under IIRIRA, notice may now be sent by regular mail. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) (1).