Source: https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Costello_v._Immigration_and_Naturalization_Service/Dissent_White
Timestamp: 2018-06-22 00:23:12
Document Index: 366038189

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 241', '§ 241', '§ 241', '§ 241', '§ 241', '§ 241', '§ 340', '§ 241', '§ 340', '§ 241', '§ 340', '§ 241', '§ 241', '§ 241', '§ 241', '§ 241', '§ 241', '§ 241', '§ 241', '§ 241', '§ 241', '§ 241', '§ 241', '§ 241']

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Costello v. Immigration and Naturalization Service/Dissent White
< Costello v. Immigration and Naturalization Service
923904Costello v. Immigration and Naturalization Service — Dissent
Argued: Dec. 12, 1963. --- Decided: Feb 17, 1964
The qualification which the Court carves out of § 241(a)(4), requiring that the convictions occur at a time when an alien is not a citizen, is not found in the statute itself and can be achieved only at the expense of the purpose of the statute which is clearly evident from its terms and history and which should control its construction if the Court is not to stray from its judicial function. [1]
In certain respects § 241(a) redefined the criteria for deportability. Under subsection (d), § 241 was to be applied to an alien even though the conduct which placed him within a deportable class took place prior to the enactment of the section and even though that conduct would not have forfeited residential privileges under the previous law. This was the holding of the Court in United States ex rel. Lehmann v. Carson, 353 U.S. 685, 77 S.Ct. 1022, 1 L.Ed.2d 1122, where an alien was held deportable under the 1952 Act for the prior commission of two crimes although under the former law a conditional pardon given for one of them would have saved the alien from deportation. Given Lehmann v. Carson and like cases upholding the power of Congress to legislate in this manner, [2] the legislative intention to provide current standards for deportability is not to be frustrated by importing irrelevant considerations such as the previous state of the law or the fact of technical citizenship at the time the crimes were committed. Neither bears upon the question of whether the alien's past conduct brings him within the present definition of the deportable alien.
Today's holding has an anomalous result. The alien who has not become a citizen is deportable for the commission of two crimes. But not so the alien who has committed two crimes and has also been denaturalized for fraud practiced in procuring his citizenship. [3] His fraud becomes his ready and effective shield, a result which I cannot believe Congress intended to enact into law.
As in the instant case Eichenlaub and Willumeit argued that deportability is conditioned on alienage status at the time of conviction. [4] This Court's answer to that contention was:
'It is hardly conceivable that, under those circumstances, Congress, without expressly saying so, intended to prevent * * * (the deportation of) alien offenders merely because they had received their respective convictions at times when they held certificates of naturalization, later canceled for fraud. To do so would permit the denaturalized aliens to set up a canceled fraudulent status as a defense, and successfully to claim benefits and advantages under it. Congress, in 1920, evidently wanted to provide a means by which to free the United States of residents who (1) had been or thereafter were convicted of certain offenses against the security of the United States, (2) had been or thereafter were found, after hearing, to be undesirable residents of the United States, and (3) being aliens were subject to deportation. Congress said just that.' Id., 338 U.S., at 532 533, 70 S.Ct. at 334-335, 94 L.Ed. 307.
The Eichenlaub case, decided at the time the 1952 Act was under consideration, carried the clear message that the courts would not impute to the legislature an intent to favor twice-convicted aliens whose citizenship has been canceled for fraud over those who never held citizenship status and that Congress must say so if it intended to create a distinction based on citizenship status at the time of conviction for crimes on which deportation proceedings might be based. In the face of this message Congress proceeded to enact § 241(a)(4) declaring that 'Any alien * * * shall * * * be deported * * * who at any time after entry is convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude.' [5] Even if as a matter of abstract argument about the meaning of these words the majority's opinion is defensible, which I do not think it is, it fails completely as a matter of interpretation of this statute in the context of its enactment.
The petitioner contends that Eichenlaub is distinguishable on the ground that the statute in that case applied to aliens who 'have been or may hereafter be' convicted, whereas § 241(a)(4) refers to any alien who 'is' convicted. His argument is that by use of dual verbs the statute in Eichenlaub explicitly referred to two groups of aliens, those who were and those who were not citizens when convicted. In his view, therefore, the decision in Eichenlaub must have rested upon the 'have been' leg of the statute. But both the majority and the dissent in Eichenlaub recognized that the use of past and present verbs in the 1920 Act was necessary because that Act provided for two definite periods of time-between August 1, 1914, and May 10, 1920; and after 1920-in which the convictions might occur. [6] The coalescence of two verbs was thus unrelated to citizenship status at the time of conviction. [7]
Whatever doubt as to congressional intent the majority may have after examining § 241(a) standing alone should be dispelled by § 340(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which provides that revocation of a naturalization certificate relates back to, and is deemed 'effective as of the original date of the order and certificate.' [8] Under this section petitioner was not a citizen in 1954 because he did not become a citizen in 1924. It is therefore useless to talk about whether § 241(a)(4) makes an exception for aliens who were citizens when convicted because § 340 makes clear that in Congress' view they were always aliens. The distinction which the Court reads into § 241 is a distinction which § 340 declares nonexistent.
Prior to 1952 Rosenberg v. United States, 60 F.2d 475 (C.A.3d Cir. 1932), and Battaglino v. Marshall, 172 F.2d 979 (C.A.2d Cir. 1949), [9] held that members of a denaturalized alien's family derived through him no citizenship rights because 'the certificate of naturalization was simply a paper fraud and conferred at the time of its grant no rights whatever * * *.' Rosenberg v. United States, 3 Cir., 60 F.2d, at 476. But the principle stated in those cases was by no means limited to problems of derivative citizenship, as is shown by the Second Circuit's decisions in United States ex rel. Eichenlaub v. Watkins, 167 F.2d 659 (C.A.2d Cir. 1948), aff'd sub nom. United States ex rel. Eichenlaub v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 521, 70 S.Ct. 329, 94 L.Ed. 307; and United States ex rel. Willumeit v. Watkins, 171 F.2d 773 (C.A.2d Cir. 1949), aff'd sub nom. United States ex rel. Eichenlaub v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 521, 70 S.Ct. 329. These two cases, which, as shown earlier, involved the same issue as the instant case, were decided by the Court of Appeals on the theory that 'the decree of denaturalization relates back, at least for this purpose. Cf. Rosenberg v. United States, 3 Cir., 60 F.2d 475.' [10] On appeal the decisions were affirmed on other grounds, the Court finding it unnecessary to pass on the relation-back issue.
'The effect of a decree of denaturalization, as distinguished from expatriation or forfeiture of citizenship, is to declare that the 'naturalized' person never was in fact naturalized, because either by fraud or illegality the statutory prerequisites were not met. The naturalization laws make certain reservations, saving the naturalization of children who derive citizenship from a parent from the alienage which they would otherwise incur because of the fraudulent or illegal naturalization.' [11]
Section 241(a)(4) speaks in general terms and seems to apply to postentry convictions for any two crimes involving moral turpitude. But there are other paragraphs of § 241(a) which specify particular crimes in themselves justifying deportation. Some of these crimes may not involve moral turpitude; others may, and therefore fall within the literal language of § 241(a)(4). A recommendation against deportation of aliens convicted of these latter crimes is nonetheless ineffective, either because subsection (b) explicitly excludes the crime from its coverage, as in the case of narcotics offenses, [12] or because the offense is separately listed in a subsection other than § 241(a) (4). [13] Obviously, therefore, Congress did not intend judicial review of deportability in every case where the commission of crime, whether involving moral turpitude or not, is the basis of the action.
Moreover, there are other situations within § 241(a)(4) where § 241(b) procedures are unavailable and deportation nevertheless must follow. Under § 241(a)(4) deportation may be based upon postentry convictions whether occurring in this country or abroad. The requirement of the prior law that postentry crimes be committed in this country was eliminated in the 1952 Act. [14] It seems obvious that § 241(b) procedures would be unavailable in those cases where the crimes are committed abroad; yet it is difficult to believe that deportation is proscribed in those cases. This was the view of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit under the prior law where the provision for deportation for crimes committed abroad prior to entry [15] was ostensibly subject to the terms of § 241(b)'s predecessor providing the same broad judicial veto. [16]
I think Costello's is another case in which Congress could not have intended the unavailability of § 241(b) procedures to bar deportation. Under the Court's view no denaturalized alien can be deported for the commission of two or more crimes while a citizen. Congress intended no such result. It intended, as § 241(b) expressly says, to bar deportation only when there was a judicial determination of nondeportability. There is none here. In Costello's case, and those like it, the judge has no opportunity to exercise his power under § 241(b) because the convicted defendant, actually an alien under the law, appears before him with a certificate of citizenship, obtained by his own fraud, and prefers to continue the masquerade and to claim the protections of citizenship. In these circumstances, the lack of judicial consideration of Costello's deportability should not be equated to a judge's determination of nondeportability. This is especially true here since Costello knew of the denaturalization proceedings which had been instituted against him prior to his two convictions for tax fraud. [17]
^1 This Court has repeatedly stressed the principle that in construing statutes 'the general purpose is a more important aid to the meaning than any rule which grammar or formal logic may lay down.' United States v. Whitridge, 197 U.S. 135, 143, 25 S.Ct. 406, 408, 49 L.Ed. 696. See United States v. Shirey, 359 U.S. 255, 260-261, 79 S.Ct. 746, 749, 3 L.Ed.2d 789; United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 112, 68 S.Ct. 1349, 92 L.Ed. 1849; United States v. American Trucking Assns., 310 U.S. 534, 543, 60 S.Ct. 1059, 1063, 84 L.Ed. 1345; Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 194, 43 S.Ct. 65, 67, 67 L.Ed. 199.
^2 Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 75 S.Ct. 757, 99 L.Ed. 1107; Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 74 S.Ct. 737, 98 L.Ed. 911; Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 72 S.Ct. 512, 96 L.Ed. 586; Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 44 S.Ct. 283, 68 L.Ed. 549; Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 42 S.Ct. 92, 66 L.Ed. 938; Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 33 S.Ct. 607, 57 L.Ed. 978.
^3 The Court points out that there may be cases in which this anomaly will not result. This observation does not alter the fact that it does exist in this case, and will exist in all cases where the revocation of the naturalization certificate is for fraudulent conduct.
^4 Dr. Willumeit c ntended that: 'The language shows that the alien must be an 'alien' at the time that he 'may * * * be convicted.' The use of the words 'aliens who may be' convicted indicates that the alien must 'be' an alien at the time of conviction. There is no other grammatical possibility.' Brief for the Petitioner, United States ex rel. Willumeit v. Shaughnessy, No. 82, October Term, 1949, p. 7.
^5 The subcommittees of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees were aware of the Eichenlaub decision and of its bearing on § 241(a)(4) of the pending statute. In answer to the objection that certain provisions of the proposed statute were ex post facto and therefore unconstitutional, Mr. Richard Arens, Staff Director of the Senate Subcommittee on S. 716 stated:
^6 The opinion of the Court observed: 'The statutory language which says that 'aliens who since August 1, 1914, have been or may hereafter be convicted * * *' * * * refers to the requirement that the deportations be applicable to all persons who had been convicted of certain enumerated offenses since about the beginning of World War I (August 1, 1914), whether those convictions were had before or after May 10, 1920.' 338 U.S., at 530, 70 S.Ct., at 333, 94 L.Ed. 307.
^7 Petitioner also argues that the absence of a 'has been' provision in § 241(a)(4) is significant because of the fact that most of the other grounds for deportation based on past conduct are stated in the alternative perfect and indicative verb forms: 'is or has been,' or 'is or shall have been.' In petitioner's view the reason for this distinction is that under the 'is or has been' paragraphs, citizenship status at the time of the act or event is irrelevant, but the 'is' language of paragraph (4) authorizes deportation only if alienage status and the basis for deportability coincide in time. This dichotomy of deportability tests would mean that a denaturalized alien could be deported for being convicted of carrying a sawed-off shotgun, or being connected with the management of a house of prostitution during the time he was a citizen, but not for two convictions of crimes involving moral turpitude. The absurdity of imputing to Congress the intent to achieve such a result is too obvious to require more.
^8 'It shall be the duty of the United States district attorneys for the respective districts, upon affidavit showing good cause therefor, to institute proceedings * * * for the purpose of revoking and setting aside the order admitting such person to citizenship and canceling the certificate of naturalization on the ground that such order and certificate of naturalization were procured by concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation, and such revo ation and setting aside of the order admitting such person to citizenship and such canceling of certificate of naturalization shall be effective as of the original date of the order and certificate * * *.' (Emphasis added.)
^9 Revocation of fraudulently obtained naturalization certificates was authorized by statute in 1906; however, not until the 1952 Act was there an express statutory provision that revocations were to have retroactive effect. The judicial doctrine of relation-back developed in the interim. Although Rosenberg was the first case to apply the doctrine, dictum in this Court's decisions as early as 1912 implied its existence. In Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227, 240-241, 32 S.Ct. 613, 616, 56 L.Ed. 1066; this Court cited with approval the following language from a lower court opinion: 'It is (the applicant's) province, and he is bound, to see that the jurisdictional facts upon which the grant is predicated actually exist, and if they do not he takes nothing by his paper grant.' Cf. Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9, 24, 34 S.Ct. 10, 13, 58 L.Ed. 101.
^10 United States ex rel. Eichenlaub v. Watkins, 2 Cir., 167 F.2d 659, 660.
^11 S.Rep. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 755.
^12 Subsection (b) states:
^13 See Jew Ten v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 307 F.2d 832 (C.A.9th Cir.). Cf. United States ex rel. De Luca v. O'Rourke, 213 F.2d 759 (C.A.8th Cir.); Ex parte Robles-Rubio, 119 F.Supp. 610 (D.C.N.D.Cal.).
^14 Section 19 of the 1917 Act specified three categories of aliens deportable because of conviction for crimes involving moral turpitude. The classes of aliens involved were the following:
'Any alien in the United States * * * shall * * * be deported who-
^15 Rasmussen v. Robinson, 163 F.2d 732, 734 (C.A.3d Cir.), stated that:
^16 Section 19 of the 1917 Act provided:
^17 The petitioner and the majority suggest that if petitioner had been an alien at the time of his trial he could have offered to plead guilty to one count of income tax evasion in return for a nolle prosequi on the remaining counts, thereby avoiding the possibility of being convicted for two crimes. This is unrealistic for two reasons. At the time of the trial, denaturalization proceedings were pending against petitioner. United States v. Costello, D.C., 145 F.Supp. 892, reversed, 247 F.2d 384 (C.A.2d Cir.), reversed, 356 U.S. 256, 78 S.Ct. 714, 2 L.Ed.2d 741. He was therefore aware of the deportation implications flowing from conviction on dual counts, and was in a position to bargain as he felt most advantageous to himself. And even more speculative than the question of what the petitioner might have done had conditions been different is whether the Government, with denaturalization proceedings pending against Frank Costello, woul have agreed to a nolle prosequi which would foreclose the possibility of later deportation proceedings.
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This page was last edited on 21 December 2017, at 23:45.