Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/107998/miller-vs-french
Timestamp: 2019-09-24 09:33:54
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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3626', '§ 3626', '§ 3626', '§ 3626', '§ 3626', '§ 3626', '§ 3626', '§ 3626', '§ 3626', '§ 3626', '§ 3626', '§ 3626', '§ 3626', '§ 3626', '§ 2403', '§ 3626', '§ 3626', '§ 3626', '§ 3626', '§ 3626', '§ 3626', '§ 3626', '§ 3626', '§ 1', '§ 3626', '§ 3626', '§ 3626', '§ 3626', '§ 3626', '§ 3626', '§ 3626', '§ 3626', '§ 3626', '§ 3626', '§ 3626', '§ 3626', '§ 3626', '§ 3626', '§ 3626', '§ 3626']

Miller Vs French - Citation 107998 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Miller Vs. French - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/107998
Case Number 530 U.S. 327
miller v. french - 530 u.s. 327 (2000) october term, 1999 syllabus miller, superintendent, pendleton correctional facility, et al. v. french et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the seventh circuit no. 99-224. argued april 18, 2000-decided june 19,2000* in 1975, prison inmates at indiana's pendleton correctional facility brought a class action, and the district court issued an injunction, which remains in effect, to remedy violations of the eighth amendment regarding conditions of confinement. congress subsequently enacted the prison litigation reform act of 1995 (plra), which, as relevant here, sets a standard for the entry and termination of prospective relief in civil actions challenging prison conditions. specifically, 18 u......
Miller v. French - 530 U.S. 327 (2000)
raise serious separation of powers questions, and therefore should be avoided under the canon of constitutional doubt. But where, as here, Congress has made its intent clear, this Court must give effect to that intent. Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U. S. 195 , 215. Under § 3626(e)(2), a stay is automatic once a state defendant has filed a § 3626(b) motion, and the command that it "shall operate as a stay during" the specified time period indicates that it is mandatory throughout that period. The statute's plain meaning would be subverted were § 3626(e)(2) interpreted merely as a burden-shifting mechanism that does not prevent courts from suspending the stay. Viewing the automatic stay provision in the context of § 3626 as a whole confirms the Court's conclusion. Section 3626(e)(4) provides for an appeal from an order preventing the automatic stay's operation, not from the denial of a motion to enjoin a stay. This provision's one-way nature only makes sense if the stay is required to operate during a specific time period, such that any attempt by a district court to circumvent the mandatory stay is immediately reviewable. Mandamus is not a more appropriate remedy because it is granted only in the exercise of sound discretion. Given that curbing the courts' equitable discretion was a principal objective of the PLRA, it would have been odd for Congress to have left § 3626(e)(2)'s enforcement to that discretion. Section 3626(e)(3) also does not support the Government's view, for it only permits the stay's starting point to be delayed for up to 90 days; it does not affect the stay's operation once it begins. While construing § 3626(e)(2) to remove courts' equitable discretion raises constitutional questions, the canon of constitutional doubt permits the Court to avoid such questions only where the saving construction is not plainly contrary to Congress' intent. Pp. 336-341.
The Constitution prohibits one branch of the Government from encroaching on the central prerogatives of another. Article III gives the Federal Judiciary the power, not merely to rule on cases, but to decide them, subject to review only by superior Article III courts. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U. S. 211 , 218-219. Respondents contend that § 3626(e)(2) violates the separation of powers principle by legislatively suspending a final judgment of an Article III court in violation of Plaut and Hayburn's Case, 2 Dall. 409. Unlike the situation in Hayburn's Case, § 3626(e)(2) does not involve direct review of a judicial decision by the Legislative or Executive Branch. Nor does it involve the reopening of a final judgment, as was addressed in Plaut. Plaut was careful to distinguish legislation that attempted to reopen the dismissal of a money damages suit from that altering the prospective effect of injunctions entered by Article III courts. Prospective relief under
a continuing, executory decree remains subject to alteration due to changes in the underlying law. Cf. Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U. S. 244 , 273. This conclusion follows from the Court's decision in Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 18 How. 421, 432 (Wheeling Bridge II), that prospective relief it issued in Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 13 How. 518 (Wheeling Bridge I), became unenforceable after Congress altered the law underlying the ongoing relief. Applied here, the Wheeling Bridge II principles demonstrate that § 3626(e)(2)'s automatic stay does not unconstitutionally suspend or reopen an Article III court's judgment. It does not tell judges when, how, or what to do, but reflects the change implemented by § 3626(b), which establishes new standards for prospective relief. As Plaut and Wheeling Bridge II instruct, when Congress changes the law underlying the judgment awarding such relief, that relief is no longer enforceable to the extent it is inconsistent with the new law. Although the remedial injunction here is a final judgment for purposes of appeal, it is not the last word of the judicial department, for it is subject to the court's continuing supervisory jurisdiction, and therefore may be altered according to subsequent changes in the law. For the same reasons, § 3626(e)(2) does not violate the separation of powers principle articulated in United States v. Klein, 13 Wall. 128, where the Court found unconstitutional a statute purporting to prescribe rules of decision to the Federal Judiciary in cases pending before it. That § 3626(e)(2) does not itself amend the legal standard does not help respondents; when read in the context of § 3626 as a whole, the provision does not prescribe a rule of decision but imposes the consequences of the court's application of the new legal standard. Finally, Congress' imposition of the time limit in § 3626(e)(2) does not offend the structural concerns underlying the separation of powers. Whether that time is so short that it deprives litigants of an opportunity to be heard is a due process question not before this Court. Nor does the Court have occasion to decide here whether there could be a time constraint on judicial action that was so severe that it implicated structural separation of powers concerns. Pp.341-350.
178 F.3d 437 , reversed and remanded.
the prisoners' motion, enjoining the automatic stay. See id., Doc. No. 23; see also French v. Duckworth, 178 F.3d 437 , 440-441 (CA7 1999). The State appealed, and the United States intervened pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2403(a) to defend the constitutionality of § 3626(e)(2).
We address the statutory question first. Both the State and the prisoner class agree, as did the majority and dissenting judges below, that § 3626(e)(2) precludes a district court from exercising its equitable powers to enjoin the automatic stay. The Government argues, however, that § 3626(e)(2) should be construed to leave intact the federal courts' traditional equitable discretion to "stay the stay," invoking two canons of statutory construction. First, the Government contends that we should not interpret a statute as displacing courts' traditional equitable authority to preserve the status quo pending resolution on the merits "[a]bsent the clearest command to the contrary." Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U. S. 682 , 705 (1979). Second, the Government asserts that reading § 3626(e)(2) to remove that equitable power would raise serious separation of powers questions, and therefore should be avoided under the canon of constitutional doubt. Like the Court of Appeals, we do not lightly assume that Congress meant to restrict the equitable powers of the federal courts, and we agree that constitutionally doubtful constructions should be avoided where "fairly possible." Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U. S. 735 , 762 (1988). But where Congress has made its intent clear, "we must give effect to that intent." Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U. S. 195 , 215 (1962).
The Government contends that if Congress' goal were to prevent courts from circumventing the PLRA's plain commands, mandamus would have been a more appropriate remedy than appellate review. But that proposition is doubtful, as mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that is "granted only in the exercise of sound discretion." Whitehouse v. Illinois Central R. Co., 349 U. S. 366 , 373 (1955). Given that curbing the equitable discretion of district courts was one of the PLRA's principal objectives, it would have been odd for Congress to have left enforcement of § 3626(e)(2) to that very same discretion. Instead, Congress sensibly chose to make available an immediate appeal to resolve situations in which courts mistakenly believe-under the novel scheme created by the PLRA-that they have the authority to enjoin the automatic stay, rather than the extraordinary remedy of mandamus, which requires a showing of a "clear and indisputable" right to the issuance of the writ. See Mallard v. United States Dist. Court for Southern Dist. of Iowa, 490 U. S. 296, 309 (1989). In any event, § 3626(e) as originally enacted did not provide for interlocutory review. It was
Thus, although we should not construe a statute to displace courts' traditional equitable authority absent the "clearest command," Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U. S., at 705, or an "inescapable inference" to the contrary, Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U. S. 395 , 398 (1946), we are con-
vinced that Congress' intent to remove such discretion is unmistakable in § 3626(e)(2). And while this construction raises constitutional questions, the canon of constitutional doubt permits us to avoid such questions only where the saving construction is not "plainly contrary to the intent of Congress." Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U. S. 568 , 575 (1988). "We cannot press statutory construction 'to the point of disingenuous evasion' even to avoid a constitutional question." United States v. Locke, 471 U. S. 84 , 96 (1985) (quoting George Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U. S. 373 , 379 (1933)); see also Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U. S. 206 , 212 (1998) (constitutional doubt canon does not apply where the statute is unambiguous); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U. S. 833 , 841 (1986) (constitutional doubt canon "does not give a court the prerogative to ignore the legislative will"). Like the Court of Appeals, we find that § 3626(e)(2) is unambiguous, and accordingly, we cannot adopt JUSTICE BREYER'S "more flexible interpretation" of the statute. Post, at 355. Any construction that preserved courts' equitable discretion to enjoin the automatic stay would effectively convert the PLRA's mandatory stay into a discretionary one. Because this would be plainly contrary to Congress' intent in enacting the stay provision, we must confront the constitutional issue.
The Constitution enumerates and separates the powers of the three branches of Government in Articles I, II, and III, and it is this "very structure" of the Constitution that exemplifies the concept of separation of powers. INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919 , 946 (1983). While the boundaries between the three branches are not" 'hermetically' sealed," see id., at 951, the Constitution prohibits one branch from encroaching on the central prerogatives of another, see Loving v. United States, 517 U. S. 748 , 757 (1996); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 , 121-122 (1976) (per curiam). The powers of the Judicial Branch are set forth in Article III, § 1, which states that the "judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish," and provides that these federal courts shall be staffed by judges who hold office during good behavior, and whose compensation shall not be diminished during tenure in office. As we explained in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U. S., at 218-219, Article III "gives the Federal Judiciary the power, not merely to rule on cases, but to decide them, subject to review only by superior courts in the Article III hierarchy."
Although this Court did not reach the constitutional issue in Hayburn's Case, the statements of five Justices, acting as circuit judges, were reported, and we have since recognized that the case "stands for the principle that Congress cannot vest review of the decisions of Article III courts in officials of the Executive Branch." Plaut, supra, at 218; see also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U. S. 654 , 677, n. 15 (1988). As we recognized in Plaut, such an effort by a coequal branch to "annul a final judgment" is "'an assumption of Judicial power' and therefore forbidden." 514 U. S., at 224 (quoting Bates v. Kimball, 2 Chipman 77 (Vt. 1824)).
graf v. USI Film Products, 511 U. S. 244 , 273 (1994) ("When the intervening statute authorizes or affects the propriety of prospective relief, application of the new provision is not retroactive"). This conclusion follows from our decisions in Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 13 How. 518 (1852) (Wheeling Bridge 1), and Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 18 How. 421 (1856) (Wheeling Bridge II).
Applied here, the principles of Wheeling Bridge II demonstrate that the automatic stay of § 3626(e)(2) does not unconstitutionally "suspend" or reopen a judgment of an Article III court. Section 3626(e)(2) does not by itself "tell judges when, how, or what to do." 178 F. 3d, at 449 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). Instead, § 3626(e)(2) merely reflects the change implemented by § 3626(b), which does the "heavy lifting" in the statutory scheme by establishing new standards for prospective relief. See Berwanger v. Cottey, 178 F.3d 834 , 839 (CA7 1999). Section 3626 prohibits the continuation of prospective relief that was "approved or granted in the absence of a finding by the court that the relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means to correct the violation," § 3626(b)(2), or in the absence of "findings based on the record that prospective relief remains necessary to correct a current and ongoing violation of a Federal right, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and that the prospective relief is narrowly drawn and the least intrusive means to correct the violation," § 3626(b)(3). Accordingly, if prospective relief under an existing decree had been granted or approved absent such findings, then that prospective relief must cease, see § 3626(b)(2), unless and until the court makes findings on the record that such relief remains necessary to correct an ongoing violation and is narrowly tailored, see § 3626(b)(3). The PLRA's automatic stay provision assists in the enforce-
By establishing new standards for the enforcement of prospective relief in § 3626(b), Congress has altered the relevant underlying law. The PLRA has restricted courts' authority to issue and enforce prospective relief concerning prison conditions, requiring that such relief be supported by findings and precisely tailored to what is needed to remedy the violation of a federal right. See Benjamin v. Jacobson, 172 F.3d 144 , 163 (CA2 1999) (en bane); Imprisoned Citizens Union v. Ridge, 169 F.3d 178 , 184-185 (CA3 1999); Tyler v. Murphy, 135 F.3d 594 , 597 (CA8 1998); Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Rouse, 129 F.3d 649 , 657 (CA1 1997). We note that the constitutionality of § 3626(b) is not challenged here; we assume, without deciding, that the new standards it pronounces are effective. As Plaut and Wheeling Bridge II instruct, when Congress changes the law underlying a judgment awarding prospective relief, that relief is no longer enforceable to the extent it is inconsistent with the new law. Although the remedial injunction here is a "final judgment" for purposes of appeal, it is not the "last word of the judicial department." Plaut, 514 U. S., at 227. The provision of prospective relief is subject to the continuing supervisory jurisdiction of the court, and therefore may be altered according to subsequent changes in the law. See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U. S. 367 , 388 (1992). Prospective relief must be "modified if, as it later turns out, one or more of the obligations placed upon the parties has become impermissible under federal law." Ibid.; see also Railway Employees v. Wright, 364 U. S. 642 , 646-647 (1961) (a court has the authority to alter the prospective effect of an injunction to reflect a change in circumstances, whether of law or fact, that has occurred since the injunction was
entered); Lauf v. E. G. Skinner & Co., 303 U. S. 323 , 329 (1938) (applying the Norris-LaGuardia Act's prohibition on a district court's entry of injunctive relief in the absence of findings).
Here, the prisoners argue that Congress has similarly prescribed a rule of decision because, for the period of time until the district court makes a final decision on the merits of the motion to terminate prospective relief, § 3626(e)(2) mandates a particular outcome: the termination of prospective relief. As we noted in Plaut, however, "[w]hatever the precise scope of Klein, ... later decisions have made clear that its prohibition does not take hold when Congress 'amendes] applicable law.''' 514 U. S., at 218 (quoting Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc., 503 U. S. 429 , 441 (1992)). The prisoners concede this point but contend that, because § 3626(e)(2) does not itself amend the legal standard, Klein is still applicable. As we have explained, however, § 3626(e)(2) must be read not in isolation, but in the context of § 3626 as a whole. Section 3626(e)(2) operates in conjunction with the new standards for the continuation of prospective relief; if the new standards of § 3626(b)(2) are not met, then the stay "shall operate" unless and until the court makes the findings required by § 3626(b)(3). Rather than prescribing a rule of decision, § 3626(e)(2) simply imposes the consequences of the court's application of the new legal standard.
States v. Raines, 362 U. S. 17 , 20 (1960). Respondents' concern with the time limit, then, must be its relative brevity. But whether the time is so short that it deprives litigants of a meaningful opportunity to be heard is a due process question, an issue that is not before us. We leave open, therefore, the question whether this time limit, particularly in a complex case, may implicate due process concerns.
Congress has the authority to change rules of this sort by imposing new conditions precedent for the continuing enforcement of existing, prospective remedial orders and requiring courts to apply the new rules to those orders. Cf. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U. S. 211 , 232 (1995). If its legislation gives courts adequate time to determine the applicability of a new rule to an old order and to take the action necessary to apply it or to vacate the order, there seems little basis for claiming that Congress has crossed
3 The constitutional question inherent in these possible circumstances does not seem to be squarely addressed by any of our cases. Congress did not engage in discretionary review of a particular judicial judgment, cf. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U. S. 211 , 218, 226 (1995) (characterizing Hayburn's Case, 2 Dall. 409 (1792)), or try to modify a final, nonprospective judgment, cf. 514 U. S., at 218-219. Nor would a stay result from the judicial application of a change in the underlying law, cf. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 18 How. 421, 431 (1856); Plaut, supra, at 218 (characterizing United States v. Klein, 13 Wall. 128 (1872)). Instead, if the time is insufficient for a court to make a judicial determination about the applicability of the new rules, the stay would result from the inability of the Judicial Branch to exercise the judicial power of determining whether the new rules applied at all. Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is").
4 Neither did the Court of Appeals. It merely speculated that "[i]t may be ... that in some cases the courts will not be able to carry out their adjudicative function in a responsible way within the time limits imposed by (e)(2)," French v. Duckworth, 178 F.3d 437 , 447 (CA7 1999), without deciding whether this action presented such a situation. The court then concluded that "under Klein [the Congress] cannot take away the power of the court in a particular case to preserve the status quo while it ponders these weighty questions." Ibid.
The majority interprets the words "shall operate as a stay" to mean, in terms of my example, that the 1980 injunction must become ineffective after the 90th day, no matter what. The Solicitor General, however, believes that the view adopted by the majority interpretation is too rigid and calls into doubt the constitutionality of the provision. He argues that the statute is silent as to whether the district court can modify or suspend the operation of the automatic stay. He would find in that silence sufficient authority for the court to create an exception to the 90-day time limit where circumstances make it necessary to do so. As so read, the statute would neither displace the courts' traditional equitable authority nor raise significant constitutional difficulties. See Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U. S. 682 , 705 (1979) (only "clearest" congressional "command" displaces courts' traditional equity powers); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U. S. 568 , 575 (1988) (the Court will construe a statute to avoid constitutional problems "unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress").
I agree with the Solicitor General and believe we should adopt that" 'reasonable construction'" of the statute. Ibid. (quoting Hooper v. California, 155 U. S. 648 , 657 (1895), stating "'every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality' ").
Is this interpretation a "reasonable construction" of the statute? Edward J. DeBartolo Corp., 485 U. S., at 575. I note first that the statutory language is open to the Solicitor General's interpretation. A district court ordinarily can stay the operation of a judicial order (such as a stay or injunction), see Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U. S. 4, 9-10, and n. 4 (1942), when a party demonstrates the need to do so in accordance with traditional equitable criteria (irreparable injury, likelihood of success on the merits, and a balancing of possible harms to the parties and the public, see Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U. S. 922 , 931 (1975); Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414 , 440 (1944)). There is no logical inconsistency in saying both (1) a motion (to terminate) "shall operate as a stay," and (2) the court retains the power
Further, the legislative history is neutral, for it is silent on this issue. Yet there is relevant judicial precedent. That precedent does not read statutory silence as denying judges authority to exercise their traditional equitable powers. Rather, it reads statutory silence as authorizing the exercise of those powers. This Court has said, for example, that "[o]ne thing is clear. Where Congress wished to deprive the courts of this historic power, it knew how to use apt wordsonly once has it done so and in a statute born of the exigencies of war." Scripps-Howard, supra, at 17. Compare Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U. S. 182 , 186-187 (1943) (finding that courts were deprived of equity powers where the statute explicitly removed jurisdiction), with Scripps-Howard, supra, at 8-10 (refusing to read silence as depriving courts of their historic equity power), and Califano, 442 U. S., at 705-706 (same). These cases recognize the importance of permitting courts in equity cases to tailor relief, and related
relief procedure, to the exigencies of particular cases and individual circumstances. In doing so, they recognize the fact that in certain circumstances justice requires the flexibility necessary to treat different cases differently-the rationale that underlies equity itself. Cf. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 321 , 329 (1944) ("The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor to do equity and to mould each decree to the necessities of the particular case").