Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/739/236/454104/
Timestamp: 2019-08-20 14:18:33
Document Index: 780616883

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2', '§ 2312', '§ 2312', '§ 2', '§ 2312', '§ 2314', '§ 1952', '§ 2313', '§ 1001']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Clarence Hayes, Defendant-appellant, 739 F.2d 236 (6th Cir. 1984) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Sixth Circuit › 1984 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Clarence Hayes, Defendant-appellant
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Clarence Hayes, Defendant-appellant, 739 F.2d 236 (6th Cir. 1984)
US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit - 739 F.2d 236 (6th Cir. 1984)
Argued April 16, 1984. Decided July 20, 1984
Defendant-appellant Clarence Hayes (Hayes) appeals his conviction for aiding and abetting the transportation of a stolen motor vehicle in interstate commerce, knowing it to be stolen. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 2312. Hayes contends that the district court erred in ruling that the government was not required to establish, in order to obtain his conviction, that he knew that the stolen motor vehicle would be transported in interstate commerce. For the reasons set out below, we affirm the decision of the district court.
After purchasing the car, Garrett learned that it was stolen when a friend checked the records of the Michigan Secretary of State and discovered that the car was not on record there. Despite this knowledge, Garrett continued to drive the car in Michigan and across state lines. He was arrested in Detroit in October 1982 while in possession of the car. He pleaded guilty to a violation of the Dyer Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2312.
Hayes was charged with violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2312 and 18 U.S.C. § 2, aiding and abetting the transportation of a stolen motor vehicle in interstate commerce, knowing it to be a stolen vehicle. 18 U.S.C. § 2312 provides:
Hayes correctly concedes that it need not be shown that one charged as a principal under Sec. 2312 had knowledge that the vehicle was moving in interstate commerce (e.g. Bibbins v. United States, 400 F.2d 544, 545 (9th Cir. 1968)), but he contends here, again, that it is necessary to show that an aider and abettor had knowledge that it would be so transported.1 This is the narrow question presented, and we conclude that it is not necessary for a conviction to prove such knowledge on the part of an alleged aider and abettor.
In United States v. Kierschke, 315 F.2d 315 (6th Cir. 1963), the defendant was charged with aiding and abetting a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314, a provision very similar to section 2312, which makes criminal the interstate transportation of certain property, knowing it to be stolen. Section 2314 provides:
Id. at 317 (emphasis added). To the same effect in applying Sec. 2314, see United States v. Cowden, 545 F.2d 257 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. den., 430 U.S. 909, 97 S. Ct. 1181, 51 L. Ed. 2d 585 (1977).
In United States v. Beil, 577 F.2d 1313 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. den., 440 U.S. 946, 99 S. Ct. 1422, 59 L. Ed. 2d 634 (1979), the defendants were charged with conspiracy (Sec. 371) to violate Sec. 2312. They contended that it was necessary for a conviction that it be shown that they had knowledge that the automobiles that they had stolen would move in interstate commerce. The court determined that interstate movement was solely a jurisdictional fact and that, while it must be proved, it was not necessary to prove that the conspirators had knowledge that the cars they had stolen would move in interstate commerce.
Hayes relies on the holding of this court in United States v. Alsobrook, 620 F.2d 139 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 843, 101 S. Ct. 124, 66 L. Ed. 2d 51 (1980), to the effect that, to prove guilt as an aider and abettor of a violation of the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952, it is necessary that it be shown that the alleged aider and abettor had knowledge of the principal's interstate travel. As set out in Alsobrook, this is very much a minority view. In any event, unlike the Travel Act, the Dyer Act (Sec. 2312) by its very terms2 makes interstate transportation solely a jurisdictional fact, knowledge of which is not an ingredient of the crime.3
Bibbins cites Brubaker v. United States, 183 F.2d 894 (6th Cir. 1950) in which it was held that: "One violates the statute [18 U.S.C. § 2313 making it a crime to receive a stolen vehicle that has moved in interstate commerce, knowing it to be stolen] if he receives a stolen car with knowledge of its theft, even if unaware that it had been transported in interstate commerce." 183 F.2d at 898
See also, United States v. Yermian, --- U.S. ----, 104 S. Ct. 2936, 82 L. Ed. 2d 53 (1984), holding that in a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1001, which makes it a crime knowingly to make a false statement in any matter within the jurisdiction of an agency of the United States, it is not necessary for a conviction to prove that the defendant made the false statement with actual knowledge of federal agency jurisdiction