Source: http://law.justia.com/cases/minnesota/court-of-appeals/2005/opa041532-0524.html
Timestamp: 2014-11-24 05:07:47
Document Index: 581063481

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 480', '§ 609', '§ 609', '§ 609', '§ 609', '§ 609', '§ 609', '§ 609', '§ 609']

State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Marco Austin, Appellant. :: 2005 :: Minnesota Court of Appeals Decisions :: Minnesota Case Law :: Minnesota Law :: U.S. Law :: JustiaJustia.comFind a LawyerLegal AnswersLawMore ▾Justia BlogVerdictLaw Blog DirectoryLegal FormsU.S. Law U.S. Supreme Court Cases Federal Cases US Constitution US Code Federal RegulationsFederal DocketsState CasesState Codes & StatutesTrademarksPatentsCompany Legal ProfilesMarketing ServicesSign InSearchJustia › U.S. Law › Case Law › Minnesota Case Law › Minnesota Court of Appeals Decisions › 2005 › State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Marco Austin, Appellant.
State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Marco Austin, Appellant.Annotate this Case
State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Marco Austin, Appellant. A04-1532, Court of Appeals Unpublished, May 24, 2005.
This opinion will be unpublished andmay not be cited except as provided byMinn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2004). STATE OF MINNESOTAIN COURT OF APPEALSA04-1532 State of Minnesota,Respondent, vs. Marco Austin,Appellant. Filed May 24, 2005Reversed and remandedKalitowski, Judge Ramsey County
District CourtFile No. KX-02-3878 Mike Hatch, Attorney General, 1800 NCL Tower, 445 Minnesota
Street, St. Paul, MN 55101-2134; and Susan Gaertner, Ramsey County Attorney, Jeanne L. Schleh,
Assistant County Attorney, 50 West Kellogg Boulevard, Suite 315, St. Paul, MN
55102 (for respondent) John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, G. Tony Atwal,
Assistant Public Defender, 2221 University Avenue Southeast, Suite 425,
Minneapolis, MN 55414 (for appellant) Considered
and decided by Toussaint, Chief Judge; Kalitowski, Judge; and Klaphake, Judge.U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O NKALITOWSKI, Judge Appellant Marco DeAngelus Austin challenges his sentence as an
impermissible use of the Hernandez method of sentencing. Appellant argues that because he committed
several drug offenses to facilitate a racketeering offense, all offenses were
part of the same behavioral incident, and, therefore, the district court erred
by using the Hernandez method to increase his criminal history
score. We reverse and remand. D E C I S I O N The district
court's determination of a defendant's criminal history score will not be
reversed absent an abuse of discretion. State
v. Stillday, 646 N.W.2d 557, 561 (Minn.
App. 2002), review denied (Minn. Aug.
20, 2004). Under Hernandez, a
district court sentencing a convicted defendant on the same day for multiple
convictions based on multiple offenses that were not part of a single
behavioral incident or course of conduct, can increase the defendant's criminal
history score incrementally as each successive sentence is imposed. State v. Hernandez, 311 N.W.2d 478,
481 (Minn.
1981). Minnesota law prohibits the imposition of
multiple sentences, including concurrent sentences, for multiple offenses that
arise from a single behavioral incident. State v. Bookwalter, 541 N.W.2d 290, 294 (Minn. 1995); see also Minn.
Stat. § 609.035, subd. 1 (2002) (prohibiting the same). Whether multiple offenses arose out of a
single behavioral incident depends on the facts and circumstances of the
particular case. Bookwalter, 541
N.W.2d at 294. In making this
determination, courts "generally consider the factors of time and place and
whether a defendant is motivated by a single criminal objective in committing
[multiple] intentional crimes." Id. Between
July 29, 2002 and August 31, 2002, the St. Paul Police Department conducted a
videotaped surveillance operation of undercover controlled-substance
purchases. As a result of the operation,
eight individuals, including appellant, were alleged to be part of a criminal
enterprise that involved controlled-substance sales. Appellant was charged with (1) four counts of
second-degree controlled-substance crimes for selling cocaine in a school zone;
(2) one count of third-degree controlled-substance crime for selling cocaine;
(3) five counts of committing controlled-substance offenses for the benefit of
a gang; and (4) one count of racketeering. The
state dismissed the five counts of committing controlled-substance offenses for
the benefit of a gang and recommended a 120-month sentencing cap in exchange
for appellant's guilty plea to all remaining counts. The district court sentenced appellant
to concurrent terms of (1) 48 months for count 1, second-degree controlled-substance
crime occurring on August 1, 2002; (2) 68 months for count 3, second-degree
controlled-substance crime occurring on August 8, 2002; (3) 39 months for count
5, third-degree controlled-substance crime occurring on August 8, 2002; (4) 94
months for count 7, second-degree controlled-substance crime occurring on
August 18, 2002; (5) 94 months for count 9, second-degree controlled-substance
crime occurring on August 19, 2002; and (6) 36 months for count 11,
racketeering from July 29, 2002 to August 31, 2002. The district court sentenced the racketeering
as a severity level seven offense with a criminal history score of zero, but
added points to appellant's criminal history score for each of the
controlled-substance convictions. Appellant pleaded guilty to
racketeering under Minn. Stat. § 609.903, subd. 1 (2002), as a person
who is "employed by or associated with an enterprise and intentionally conducts
or participates in the affairs of the enterprise by participating in a pattern
of criminal activity." A "pattern of
criminal activity" is defined in relevant part as "conduct constituting three
or more criminal acts that . . . are neither isolated incidents, nor so closely
related and connected in point of time or circumstance of commission as to constitute
a single criminal offense." Minn.
Stat. § 609.902, subd. 6(2) (2002). The criminal acts must be "either: (i) related to one another through a common scheme or plan or a shared
criminal purpose or (ii) committed . . . by persons acting with the mental
culpability required for the commission of the criminal acts and associated
with or in an enterprise involved in those activities." Id.,
subd. 6(3) (2002). Appellant contends that his
controlled-substance offenses and his racketeering offense were part of a
single behavioral incident. "When one
crime is committed with the intent of facilitating another or is but a means
toward committing another, the offenses are part of a single behavioral
incident." State v. Huynh, 504 N.W.2d 477, 483 (Minn. App. 1993) (holding that
defendant's five coercion offenses were a means of sustaining a racketeering
enterprise and a means toward committing a racketeering offense), aff'd 519 N.W.2d 191 (Minn. 1994). Here, as in Huynh, appellant's controlled-substance offenses were a means of
sustaining the racketeering enterprise and a means toward committing the
racketeering offense, and therefore, part of a single behavioral incident. But racketeering is not one of the
listed exceptions in Minn. Stat. § 609.035 to the general prohibition against
multiple sentences for offenses committed as part of a single behavioral
incident. And appellant concedes that
the exception in Minn. Stat. § 609.910 (2002), permitted the district court to
sentence him for the controlled-substance offenses and the racketeering
offense. See Minn. Stat. § 609.910, subd. 1 (stating that a sentence imposed
for racketeering "does not preclude the application of any other criminal
penalty or civil remedy for the separate criminal acts"). But appellant argues that the district court
unfairly exaggerated his criminal conduct by sentencing him based on the Hernandez method. "[T]he Hernandez method cannot be used to increase a defendant's criminal
history score unless sentencing for more than one offense is permitted under
section 609.035. Unless section 609.035
authorizes multiple sentencing, use of the Hernandez
method unfairly exaggerates the criminality of a defendant's conduct." Huynh,
504 N.W.2d at 484 (citing State v.
Hartfield, 459 N.W.2d 668, 670 (Minn. 1990)).[1] Here, the district court was allowed to
sentence appellant for the controlled-substance offenses and the racketeering
offense under Minn. Stat. § 609.910, rather than under Minn. Stat.
§ 609.035. Therefore, the district
court should not have used the Hernandez
method when sentencing appellant. The state contends that the
criminality of appellant's conduct was not unfairly exaggerated in this case
because the racketeering conviction was not used to enhance sentences on the
predicate acts of the controlled-substance offenses. The state argues that Huynh is fact
specific and only applies where racketeering is the controlling or umbrella
offense and that since the racketeering count "was sentenced first and
appellant did not accrue a criminal history point for this offense, it
had no impact on his sentence for the last sale of cocaine." Finally, the state points out that
appellant's interpretation of Huynh
is not reasonable because, if followed, appellant would have been subject to a
greater sentence if he had not had the racketeering conviction. While the state's reasoning may have
merit, we note that this identical argument was recently rejected by this court
in an unpublished opinion involving a codefendant of appellant.[2] And in light of the cases interpreting Huynh, we do not find authority for limiting
the holding in Huynh. Following Tate,
we therefore reverse appellant's sentence and remand for resentencing. Reversed
and remanded.[1]
The supreme court acknowledged this ruling without discussion, noting that the
state did not appeal it. See Huynh, 519 N.W.2d 191.[2] See State v. Tate, No. A04-1563, 2005 WL
468865 (Minn. App. Mar. 1, 2005).