Source: http://supreme.nolo.com/us/312/426/case.html
Timestamp: 2019-05-19 16:32:34
Document Index: 224846514

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 8', '§ 7', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 7', '§ 8', '§ 7']

LABOR BOARD V. EXPRESS PUBLISHING CO., 312 U. S. 426 - Volume 312 - 1941 - Full Text - US Supreme Court Center - USSC Cases - Nolo
US Supreme Court Center > Volume 312 > LABOR BOARD V. EXPRESS PUBLISHING CO., 312 U. S. 426 (1941) > Full Text
2. Where an employer is found to have refused to bargain collectively in violation of § 8(5) of the National Labor Relations Act, the Board's order may properly require him to cease and desist from
Certiorari, 311 U.S. 638, to review a judgment enforcing an order of the National Labor Relations Board, but in part only, and with modification.
The Board issued its complaint charging respondent, a publisher of a newspaper, with refusal to bargain collectively with the Guild as the authorized representative of the employees in respondent's editorial department, and that, by such refusal and by statements made by respondent at a meeting of those employees, it "did interfere with, restrain and coerce" its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed by § 7 of the Act, * and did
Upon petition of the Board to enforce the order, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit struck from it all the provisions except that which directed respondent to bargain with the Guild on request, and to embody any understanding in a signed agreement. For so much of the order as directed the posting of notices, the court substituted a requirement that respondent notify the Guild of its willingness to comply with the order as modified and to notify a specified agent of the Board what steps respondent had taken to comply with the order. 111 F.2d 588. We granted certiorari, 311 U.S. 638, the questions
We conclude also that it is not open to respondent to challenge the judgment below, as it attempts to do, on the ground that the Board's complaint in charging a failure to bargain did not sufficiently inform respondent of the contention that it had failed to bargain in good faith. This is the case both because respondent has sought no review of the judgment below and because it sufficiently appears from the record that, in the
A question of a different nature is presented by Paragraph 1(b) of the order, by which the Board, on the basis of respondent's action in refusing to bargain and its statements interfering with the bargaining negotiations, has directed respondent not to violate "in any manner" the duties imposed on the employer by the statute. Petitioner argues that, since respondent's refusal to bargain, which is a violation of § 8(5), is also a violation of § 8(1), which in terms incorporates by reference all the rights enumerated in § 7, the Board is not only free to restrain violations like those which respondent has committed, but any other unfair labor
all of which are unfair labor practices as defined by § 8(3). Here, the Board made no finding, based either on the specific circumstances disclosed by the record or on its own expert judgment of their relation to the policy embodied in § 7, or as to any relationship or probable relationship of respondent's refusal to bargain and the other types of unfair practices some of which are enumerated
A federal court has broad power to restrain acts which are of the same type or class as unlawful acts which the court has found to have been committed or whose commission in the future unless enjoined, may fairly be anticipated from the defendant's conduct in the past. But the mere fact that a court has found that a defendant has committed an act in violation of a statute does not justify an injunction broadly to obey the statute, and thus subject the defendant to contempt proceedings if
Having found the acts which constitute the unfair labor practice, the Board is free to restrain the practice and other like or related unlawful acts. But, as the Court has held in the case of the Federal Trade Commission, see Federal Trade Commission v. Beech Nut Co., supra, 257 U. S. 455, an order not so related should be appropriately restricted on review. The breadth of the order, like the injunction of a court, must depend upon the circumstances of each case, the purpose being to prevent violations the threat of which in the future is indicated because of their similarity or relation to those unlawful acts which the Board has found to have been committed
The Board places strong reliance on Labor Board v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U. S. 240, and on Texas & New Orleans R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Railway Clerks, supra, 281 U. S. 555, 281 U. S. 567-571, and Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Federation No. 40, supra, 300 U. S. 543, 300 U. S. 544. In those cases, the cease and desist order and the injunctions were substantially like paragraph 1(b) of the Board's order in the present case. But, in them, the unfair labor practices did not appear to be isolated acts in violation of the right of self-organization, like the refusal
But respondent argues that the authority of the Board does not extend to the requirement, such as was made in this case, that the employer confess violation of the Act by a published announcement that he will "cease and desist" from violating it. See Labor Board v. Abell Co., 97 F.2d 951; Burlington Co. v. Labor Board, 104 F.2d 736; Swift & Co. v. Labor Board, 106 F.2d 87; Art Metals Construction Co. v. Labor Board, 110 F.2d 148, 151, 152; Hartsell Mills Co. v. National
Respondent did not object in its answer to the Board's petition before the Circuit Court of Appeals to that portion of the Board's order which the Court now modifies. So far as the briefs disclose, it did not make any such objection in the Circuit Court of Appeals. Nor did respondent question the propriety of that provision of the order, or challenge the power of the Board to make it either in its brief or in its oral argument here. Any controversy on that issue before this Court is therefore not attributable to respondent. For, on the record before us,
Take the case where an employer is playing ducks and drakes with the National Labor Relations Act. He pays mere lip service to the requirements of the Act, while intent on blocking in his plant any effective union action. If that is a faithful representation of his attitude, the mandate of the Act might be wholly frustrated, or its enforcement needlessly delayed were the Board merely to order him to cease and desist from interfering "with the efforts" of the union "to bargain collectively." That, without more, might well be wholly ineffective, or so the Board in its discretion might conclude. In fact, it might even be an open invitation to an employer intent on evasion of the spirit and letter of the Act to resort to devious routes to the same end. Employees are dropped -- perhaps
The Board concluded (so we must presume) that its order directing respondent to bargain collectively with the Guild need be buttressed by broad protective provisions good against any and all methods of evasion. Formal recitals could hardly make that plainer than it is. [Footnote 2] And clearly those provisions are no broader than
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